

affairs at any time since the Armistice had excited such deep and unanimous feeling as this among people in Great Britain of the most diverse parties, classes and temperaments; and it might be added that the British attitude towards a particular foreign country had never, within living memory, been so profoundly changed within so short a number of days—with the single ominous exception of the previous change of attitude towards Germany in 1914 in reaction to the German violation of the neutrality of Belgium. This British reaction in 1933 towards the German National-Socialist Revolution was psychologically as interesting as it was politically important.

The British disgust at Nazidom and most of its works was a compound feeling which can be analysed into a number of component emotions.

First and foremost, there was an indignation at the violence with which the Nazis pursued their aims and the brutality and callousness with which they persecuted their prostrate opponents. And a particularly bad impression was made by the persecution of the Jews; for while, no doubt, the Gentile attitude towards Jewry in Great Britain was in many ways not less wounding to Jewish sensibilities than it was elsewhere, still, British subjects of Jewish origin were at any rate not subject in the twentieth century to any tangible or automatic disabilities on account of their Jewish religion or descent; and the social and economic as well as political enfranchisement of the Jews in Great Britain was as deliberate a policy on the Gentile community's part, and as much a point of pride, as the persecution of the Jews in 'the Third Reich' was a deliberate implementation of a Nazi article of faith. In British, as in Dutch or French or American, eyes, the fashion in which any nation treated its Jews was regarded as a fair test of that nation's position in the scale of civilization; and a nation that maltreated its Jews was not only condemned by British opinion as barbarous but was also held in contempt for a self-confessed cowardliness and incompetence. British Gentiles had sufficient confidence in their own business ability to take it for granted that they could hold their own economically against British Jews in a fair field with no favour. And even if they had been forced by facts to admit their inability to compete with their Jewish fellow countrymen on equal terms, they would probably still have hesitated to protect their pockets at the price of their self-respect by resorting to physical force in order to 'get even with' a minority which had beaten them in a contest of wits. Conceivably there was a touch of Pharisaism in this British self-righteousness; but there is no doubt that the fate of the Jews in Germany in 1933 was one of the

genuine and important causes of the British aversion from the Nazi régime.

Another cause was an aesthetic distaste for the fanaticism and monomania which National Socialism induced in its German devotees (a distaste which was closely akin to the British antipathy towards the *éthos* of the Russian Communists). The British outlook on life at this time still reflected the old-fashioned eighteenth-century distrust of 'enthusiasm'; and the British people could not in any case be expected to welcome foreign outbursts of political 'enthusiasm'—Communist or Fascist—which were avowedly directed against 'Democracy' in the sense of the responsible parliamentary representative system of government which had been the historic British contribution to modern Western political development. Nor was this British disapproval of foreign anti-democratic movements merely a pardonable expression of national *amour propre*. It was also partly based on the more serious consideration that these 'enthusiastic' political movements—with their common claim to a transcendental inspiration which was to be imposed by a minority on a majority by force—were ethically retrograde and practically dangerous to the peace of the World. On this issue of peace, the British public watched with dismay the systematic and active propagation by the Nazis, among the rising generation in Germany, of that traditional Prussian cult of militarism which most English people had long since put out of their minds as something that had assuredly been buried in the same grave as the House of Hohenzollern. As British observers of the German National-Socialist Revolution saw this latterly discredited militarism being placed upon its pedestal again, there came back to their minds, with a rush, their dormant memories of all the misery that this evil spirit had brought upon Europe in the War, and upon Germany most of all; and they could not help asking themselves whether perhaps the French had been right, after all, in insisting, for the last fourteen years, that the Germans were incorrigible.

Indeed, the British outburst of feeling against Germany in 1933 could not be fully understood without being seen as an incident in an Anglo-French as well as in an Anglo-German controversy. This Anglo-French disputation had begun on the morrow of the Armistice of 1918;¹ and, by the date of Herr Hitler's taking office, the British had spent fourteen years in pressing upon the French a British thesis on policy towards Germany which may be summarized as follows: 'We agree with you that Germany had a greater share of

¹ See the *Survey for 1924*, Part I A, section (ii).

responsibility than any other country for the War, and that her special fault lay in giving a criminally uncritical allegiance to the barbarous doctrine and practice of Prussian militarism. The survival of this anachronistic Prussian régime in Germany, right into the twentieth century, brought a tremendous calamity upon the World—but that now belongs to the past. After all, the chief sufferer from this calamity in the end has been Germany herself. She has suffered an utter defeat, and the Prussianism which was her bane as well as ours had perished in the *débâcle*. Henceforth we have to deal no longer with the Prussian system and the Prussian governing class but with the German people, who have shown where they wish to stand by turning their Reich into a democratic republic. In spite of their unfortunate political past, the Germans—man, woman and child—are individually people of like passions with you and us. Treat them as you would treat any one else, and you will see that they will respond; but for goodness sake do not persist, *in saecula saeculorum*, in meting out to the new Germany of Weimar a measure meet for the old Germany of Potsdam. If anything could conjure the exorcized spirit of Prussianism back into the German body politic, the way to produce that disastrous miracle would be the way of Monsieur Poincaré!

A detached observer who came across this British thesis in 1933 might have endorsed it 'Too late!' After the passage of fourteen years during which the British had been making representations while the French had been taking action, Monsieur Poincaré's sowing of the storm had duly reaped a Hitlerian whirlwind; and, if the British had failed to prevent this, the British themselves were very largely to blame. They were to blame because their policy had been selfishly and short-sightedly half-hearted. With half their hearts and minds they had been trying to keep out of Continental European entanglements altogether, and so—for fear of being drawn into committing themselves—they had never given more than half their energies to their salvage-work of bringing the French to reason. In consequence, the *politique Poincaré* had prevailed, and Herr Hitler had triumphed on the strength of it. As Mr. Churchill put it—apostrophizing Ministers in a debate in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 7th November, 1933: 'You cannot be the saviours of Europe on a limited liability.'¹ This stricture was difficult, in 1933, for the British to parry; but in an undisguisable catastrophe Man's

¹ Mr. Churchill's own prescription, of course, was not to increase the liability but to diminish it to vanishing-point. For the policy advocated by him in 1933, see further p. 170 below.

instinctive impulse is to find a scape-goat; and accordingly the British reacted to the portent of the Nazi Revolution not by sitting down penitently in sackcloth and ashes but by drowning the voice of their own conscience in a furious denunciation of a more flagrantly guilty party.

If the British feeling towards Herr Hitler in 1933 were put into words, the invective would run approximately as follows: 'You Germans who have run amok again, have you paused to consider that we English have been fighting your battle with the French for years? For years we have been assuring them that you are really just reasonable and decent human beings, while they have been insisting that you are creatures of a different clay: ogres, Boches, Huns. And now, in this fifteenth year, when we have involved ourselves up to the neck against the French thesis in this exasperating controversy, you Germans suddenly raise up this Adolf Hitler to be your leader, and the first thing he does is to cry in a loud voice: "The French picture of us Germans is the true picture, and we glory in it!" What more can we English say when you Germans have condemned yourselves afresh by word and deed? You have made utter fools of us English in the eyes of the French. See how they are laughing at us. We will never forgive you for it!'

This British reaction to the German National-Socialist Movement found vent both in parliamentary language and in a popular demonstration. The object of the demonstration was Herr Alfred Rosenberg,¹ Herr Hitler's confidential adviser on foreign affairs, who would seem to have been either unaware of the new state of feeling in Great Britain, or else overconfident of his own ability to overcome it, since he insisted upon paying a visit to London in May 1933 in the apparent expectation of carrying all before him. Herr Rosenberg met with such a hostile reception from the British public that he broke his visit off and returned home to report. It was regrettable that an emissary from the Chancellor of the German Reich should have met with discourtesies that might put an additional strain upon Anglo-German relations; but it was also perhaps after all not inexpedient that the true state of British feeling should have been conveyed so promptly and plainly to the highest National-Socialist quarters.

The measured words that were spoken in the House of Commons at Westminster were even more significant than the demonstrations against Herr Rosenberg in the London streets.

¹ In spite of his name, Herr Rosenberg was not a Jew but a Gentile. He was a member of the German colonial diaspora in the Balticum, where a surname of this form was not a mark of Jewish origin.

The theme of German ingratitude for British good offices was expounded both by the Foreign Secretary of the day and by one of his predecessors in office who was entitled to speak with equal authority.

This country [said Sir John Simon in a debate on disarmament on the 7th November, 1933] has led the way in restoring Germany to her position as an equal partner, and in removing the discriminations which pressed upon her. Let the House remember that it was we, this country, which took the chief part in making Germany a member of the League of Nations and a permanent member of the Council—positions which she is now spurning. It was we who pressed for and secured the withdrawal of the army of occupation from the Rhineland. The history of Reparations, from the Dawes Plan to Lausanne, furnishes another illustration.

In an earlier debate, on the 5th July, the same point had been made, with a stronger touch of personal feeling, by Sir Austen Chamberlain.

For four or five very busy and responsible years, I worked my hardest, and, as I thought at the time, not without some measure of success, to bring Germany back as an equal into the comity of nations, to end the bickering and pin-pricking which she had no doubt suffered ever since the War, to put our relations on a friendly and even a confidential footing, and to go forward with old friends and new friends to build a better future for our country and the World. I see all those hopes, if not destroyed, adjourned, delayed, postponed, by this new spirit which is prevailing in Germany. It is not only the internal aspect, it is not only the internal events in which the new spirit finds expression. Locarno stood, for a time at any rate, as a symbol of peace and reconciliation, but in the new Germany the name of Stresemann has no respect, Locarno is a word of abuse.

No less strong was the language of a member of the Labour Party, Mr. Attlee, who opened for the Opposition a debate on foreign affairs on the 13th April.

I think this House and this country ought to say that we will not countenance for a moment the yielding to Hitler and force what was denied to Stresemann and reason.

And in the course of the same debate Sir Austen Chamberlain adopted the same position.

What is this new spirit of German Nationalism? The worst of the All-Prussian Imperialism, with an added savagery, a racial pride, an exclusiveness which cannot allow to any fellow-subject not of 'pure Nordic birth' equality of rights and citizenship within the nation to which he belongs. Are you going to discuss revision with a Government like that? Are you going to discuss with such a Government the Polish Corridor? The Polish Corridor is inhabited by Poles; do you dare to put another Pole under the heel of such a Government?

In this same debate, the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, raised the delicate but crucial question of whether the new régime in Germany could be trusted to carry out its undertakings.

The great difficulty is that, if no one believes it, we had better believe no one. I am bound to say that sometimes I am almost driven into that most uncomfortable position. It is no use talking about disarming by agreement, it is no use talking about pacts, it is no use talking about co-operation for peace unless you have had some experience which justifies you in accepting the word of those with whom you are to co-operate.

The striking thing about these pronouncements was that they were not mere expressions of individual feeling and opinion but were supported by a consensus of the whole House. This unanimity was emphasized by both Sir Austen Chamberlain and Miss Rathbone in the debate on the 13th April, and by Sir Austen Chamberlain again in the debate on the 5th July; and on both these occasions the point was driven home by the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, *à propos* of the Nazi persecution of the Jews.

This debate [Sir John Simon said on the 13th April] has been especially useful because it has expressed the deep, general and, I might say, universal feeling that is entertained in this country on the recent treatment of Jews and other minorities in Germany. I do not think it would be out of place if I say now, speaking as a Member of the Government, that it would be a profound mistake for any one in any country to imagine that this feeling is either limited to or instigated by members of the Jewish community. On the contrary, it is a spontaneous expression and it is an inevitable expression of the attachment which we all feel to the principle of racial toleration. . . . It is not a Jewish outlook and it is not merely the outlook of a section or of a party; it is what may truly be called the Anglo-Saxon outlook. It is the outlook of those who have inherited traditions which have been common to England and Germany alike. I make these observations knowing well the responsibility which rests upon the Government in such a matter, and I do not believe that we should be expressing the feelings of the country if I did not associate myself with what has been said on this subject to-day.

These words were explicitly recalled and deliberately re-affirmed by Sir John Simon on the 5th July.

There have been very general indications of a feeling of distress and concern about the situation in which certain minorities find themselves in Germany—and I by no means confine myself to the Jews. I will only say, as I said before, that I am perfectly convinced—and it is well that others in other countries should realize it—that what has been said to-day is not said in any spirit of narrow criticism or sectionalism. It is the real expression of the reaction of the British people as a whole. . . .

I will add this. There is in this country, and there has been for many years past, a great body of opinion that has been by no means blind to the claims of the great German people to sympathetic consideration in

view of their position after the War. The tragic thing is that events that are happening now, and that have recently happened, have done so much to forfeit, in the minds of those very people who are most sympathetic to the German people, some of the sympathy which, I presume to say, Germany needs.

Additional point was given to the repetition of Sir John Simon's declaration by the fact that the relevant passage in his speech of the 13th April had drawn an immediate official protest from the German Government.

Thus the moral opposition of the British Government and people to the German National-Socialist movement was unanimous and whole-hearted. But the strength of their feelings about this new portent on the Continent did not imply that they would be equally strong in act. So far from that, some of the most outspoken British critics of 'the Third Reich'—and this on the extreme Left as well as on the extreme Right of the British political gamut—drew the moral, not that Great Britain ought now to intervene whole-heartedly in Continental affairs in order to play her part in warding off a new danger to the Western Civilization, but rather that she ought at once to shake off from her feet the dust of a Continent which Herr Hitler's voice proclaimed to be a city of destruction. The most able exponent of this negative policy in the House of Commons was Mr. Winston Churchill, who argued consistently, in the debates of the 23rd March and the 13th April and the 7th November, that His Majesty's Government ought now forthwith to cease adjuring France to reduce her armaments, in order that the United Kingdom might be quit of any moral obligation to come to the assistance of France in another Franco-German War. In advocating this policy, Mr. Churchill did not carry with him a majority either in the House or in the country; and his policy was far from being adopted by the Government. 'We shall not get out of our difficulties', said Sir John Simon in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 7th November, 'by crying isolation when the conditions for isolation have disappeared and cannot exist.' The insular isolation to which Mr. Churchill harked back was indeed an academic dream in an age in which Great Britain had been welded on to the Continent by links of air; and it could not seriously be imagined that even those Frenchmen who had been most irritated by the British preaching of disarmament would desire to be relieved of this nuisance at the price of being left in the lurch. Thus Mr. Churchill's programme for the clarification of Anglo-French relations was hardly practical politics. Yet its exposition was not without political importance, as a hint that it would be unwise to infer the

probable action of the British Government and people from their manifest feelings.

The British attitude towards 'the Third Reich' was accentuated and almost caricatured in the United States, where the moral denunciation was equally vehement and still more plainly platonic. The same feelings were displayed in the Scandinavian countries; and this Scandinavian hostility touched the Nazis to the quick, since Scandinavia, the reputed cradle of 'Nordic Man', was the Holy Land of Herr Hitler's cult of Race, and, if there was anything in the racial creed, the pure-bred Scandinavians ought to have danced more enthusiastically to the Alpine *Führer's* pipings than either the Celtified Nordics of Britain or the Teutonized Alpines of Bavaria and Austria or the Slavified bleached-*proto-Negroids* of Prussia-beyond-the-Elbe.¹ Accordingly, the rebuffs received from Scandinavian quarters were felt by the Nazis to be a mortifying slap in the face; and they were particularly sensitive to the reaction in Sweden, which was not only the largest and strongest of the Scandinavian countries but had also been the most benevolent of them towards Germany in her neutrality during the War.

Scandinavian-German relations in 1933 ran the same course as British-German relations, and this almost point for point. Herr Rosenberg's 'goodwill tour' in England in May was not more efficacious, in producing the exact opposite of the intended result, than the simultaneous Scandinavian tour of Herr Rosenberg's colleague Herr Bogs. And the German Government's official protest of the 15th April against Sir John Simon's words on the 13th was matched by at least three German protests of the kind against similar pronouncements in Scandinavia. On the 9th February, for instance, Captain Göring protested telegraphically against a reference to Herr Hitler in the Swedish newspaper *Goteborgs Handels och Sjöfartstidning*. On the 7th March, the German *chargé d'affaires* at Stockholm protested verbally against a reference to Herr Hitler in a speech by the Swedish Prime Minister. And another German official protest was made in the same capital against a speech delivered by the Swedish Minister of Commerce on May Day.

A particularly bad impression was created in all the Scandinavian countries and throughout the World by the Nazi agitation in Northern Slesvik; a small fraction, recovered by Denmark in the Peace Settlement of 1919, of those large territories that had been conquered from

¹ For this interesting racial strain, which was one of the latest discoveries of scientific Ethnology, see R. B. Dixon: *The Racial History of Man* (New York, 1923, Scribner), pp. 74-5.

Denmark by Prussia and Austria in 1864. The Nazi offence here was flagrant because the conduct of the Danes had been a model of good behaviour. Between 1864 and 1918, the Danes had received extreme provocation; for Prussia, who had acquired the whole of the joint Austro-Prussian conquests at Denmark's expense through the subsequent Prussian victory over Austria in 1866, had never carried out the undertaking to hold a plebiscite in Northern Slesvik which the Austrians had chivalrously insisted upon inserting into the Austro-Prussian Peace Treaty of Prague; and for the next half-century the Prussian régime had done its utmost to germanize the Slesvik Danes by much the same methods as those which it employed against the Poles in the Ostmark. Nevertheless, in 1919-20, when Germany was prostrate, the Danes did not allow themselves to be influenced by feelings of revenge and were scrupulous in declining to take back more from Germany than was due to them in justice. Indeed, the Danish Government were more moderate in their presentation of the Danish case than the Commission of the Peace Conference of Paris to which the question was referred by the Allied and Associated Powers; and the boundaries of the two zones that were delimited for the purpose of the plebiscite were drawn in such a way that, when (according to expectations) the northern zone voted for Denmark and the southern for Germany, the German minority which was thereby brought under Danish rule was not greater in numbers than the Danish minority which was still left in Germany.¹ Thereafter, the Danish authorities were careful to give their handful of new German subjects the utmost freedom in the linguistic, educational and cultural spheres. In view of all this, the Danes had at least as good reason as the English to complain of German ingratitude in 1933.²

The ingratitude here took the extreme form of a threat which was first uttered in April by a certain Pastor Peperkorn, who was one of the North-Slesvik German Nazi leaders. The Nazis, he said, intended to reconquer Northern Slesvik for Germany 'in a lightning flash', and after this *fait accompli* a revision of the Danish-German frontier would follow through direct negotiations *à deux* without any foreign interference. In other words, the Nazis proposed to recompense Denmark for her moderation by dealing with her over Northern Slesvik as the Poles had dealt with Lithuania over Vilna³ and the Japanese with China over Manchuria.⁴ The Nazis might reply that

¹ See the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. ii, pp. 203-6.

² The point was not overlooked by Sir Austen Chamberlain in his speech in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 7th July, 1933.

³ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, Part III, section (ii) 2 (b).

⁴ See the *Survey for 1931*, Part IV, section (iii) (b) (2).

they had no special grievance against Denmark and had only singled her out because she was the weakest of the successor states and therefore the most promising target for a first attack with a view to setting the ball of territorial treaty-revision rolling. But this cold-blooded explanation of the rationality of the Nazi tactics was not calculated to make them any more popular either in Denmark itself or in the other countries with which the Nazis might plan to settle their accounts in similar fashion at later dates.

In view of the local Nazi agitation in Northern Slesvik, the Danish Rigsdag passed, on the 12th April, 1933, a bill prohibiting members of political organizations from wearing uniforms; but on the 28th April the Cabinet, with characteristic moderation, decided not to incur any special new expenditure for the defence of the threatened territory. This decision was the more remarkable in view of the lowness of the level to which the armed forces of Denmark had already been reduced.¹ At the same time the Danish Social-Democrats, to whom these reductions had been chiefly due, now began, under the influence of the Nazi menace, to display a less pacifist disposition. And in Sweden, where the virtually complete self-disarmament of Denmark had always been deprecated,² the Nazi agitation in Northern Slesvik was now taken seriously as a threat to the most dangerously exposed of the post-war frontiers of Scandinavia. In October 1933 the Social-Democratic Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Hansson, paid a visit to the Social-Democratic Prime Minister of Denmark, Mr. Stauning; and while the official purpose of the visit was to celebrate Mr. Stauning's sixtieth birthday, it was surmised that the two Governments were in fact more concerned to make a demonstration of Scandinavian solidarity.

Besides the Scandinavian countries, two other West-European neutrals who were Germany's immediate neighbours were disturbed in 1933 by the ground-swell of the Nazi wave. In Switzerland, in the autumn, there was a rumour of a projected Nazi *coup de main*—not, according to the story, for the purpose of seizing Swiss territory, like the threatened seizure of Danish territory in Northern Slesvik, but with an eye to making a surprise attack across Switzerland upon France, in the manner of the German invasion of Belgium in 1914. This rumour received a formal *démenti* from the German Government on the 29th September. Nevertheless, on the 22nd December, the Swiss Federal Council passed a supplementary vote of 82,000,000 Swiss francs for national defence. In Holland, the Nazi propaganda

¹ See the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 73-5, and the *Survey for 1929*, p. 32 n.

² See the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 75-6.

among the 25,000 German miners in the Dutch province of Limburg gave almost as much trouble as the Danish Government was being given by the similar agitation among the 27,000 German inhabitants of Northern Slesvik. The leader of the Nazi movement among the Germans in Holland had to be expelled from Dutch territory; and in July 1933 all German Nazi organizations in Holland were dissolved by order of the Dutch Minister of Justice.

5. *The Reactions in the Soviet Union and Poland*

If Western public opinion was incensed at seeing its best hopes of Germany shattered, Russian statesmanship was appalled at seeing its worst fears realized.

To begin with, the annihilation of the German Communist Party by the victorious Nazis was a painful blow to the Russian Communists, as the annihilation of the German Social-Democratic Party was a painful blow to the British Labour Movement. The Russian prophets of a world-wide Communist Revolution had seen, in the German Party, the destined instrument for the overthrow of the Capitalist régime throughout Europe; and, though this ambitious rôle had really ceased to be practical politics for the German Communists after the capitulation of the Weimar Republic to Monsieur Poincaré at the close of 1923¹ and the consequent alleviation of the pressure upon the German body social after the inauguration of Dr. Stresemann's policy of appeasement, still the German Communist Party had remained, till Captain Göring smote it in February 1933, the most powerful of any of the national Communist organizations in the World outside the frontiers of the Soviet Union. To see this sister-party destroyed in a trice must have given the Russian Communists a shock; and their displeasure must have been aggravated by the direct attacks which the Nazis also made upon Soviet citizens and institutions in Germany; for example, the restrictive measures against Soviet newspaper-correspondents which have been mentioned above,² and the police raids, on the 24th April, 1933, against the Berlin and provincial offices of 'Derop', the Soviet petrol-marketing organization in Germany.

The fate of the German Communists and the rough handling of Soviet interests in the Reich were not, however, the aspects of the National-Socialist Revolution that caused the Soviet Government the gravest concern. In the course of their chequered history, the Soviet rulers had more than once seen other Governments in other countries take action which had been almost equally drastic and

¹ See the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 212-17.

² See p. 155.

equally painful to Russian Communist feelings, without ceasing to cultivate relations with the countries in question. Indeed, Fascist Italy, within whose frontiers Communism was a *religio non licita*, had been the first of the post-war Great Powers to enter into normal diplomatic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union.¹ On this precedent, Russian Communist statesmanship might have looked forward to maintaining with 'the Third Reich' the mutually profitable good relations which it had established with the Weimar Republic in the Treaty of Rapallo, in spite of the suppression of Communism within the German frontiers under the new régime. What disturbed the Soviet Government most deeply was the possibility that the Nazis' anti-Communist 'drive' might not stop at the frontiers, but might one day sweep on past the post-war and the pre-war eastern limits of the Reich into the choicest part of the Soviet Government's own dominions.

This possibility was foreshadowed in the public pronouncements of leading members of the German National-Socialist Party, from the *Führer* himself downwards; the means for translating it into action had now been acquired by the Nazis through their mastery of the potential military resources of the Reich; and the opportunity might be created by concerted action between Germany and the Soviet Union's other militantly aggressive neighbour, Japan.

The essence of Herr Hitler's foreign policy, as expounded in his publications and utterances before coming into power, was contained in the proposition that the German nation was a *Volk ohne Raum* and in the doctrine that force was a legitimate and indispensable instrument for realizing national aims. According to Herr Hitler, the German people was entitled, in virtue of its high degree of culture, to as high a standard of living as any people in the World; and, for maintaining a people of these numbers (in which Herr Hitler included the Germans outside the post-war frontiers of the Reich) at the standard to which they claimed a right, the geographical area and natural resources of even the pre-war Reich—not to speak of the post-war Reich—were dismissed by Herr Hitler as being utterly inadequate. In his view, Germany must acquire territory on a vastly greater scale than that, and she must seek it in a quarter where the resistance of the present owners would be the most easily overcome and where the fruits of the conquest would be the most conveniently harvested. In the light of Germany's experience in the General War of 1914-18, Herr Hitler opined that Germany's future lay not 'on the water' (where the ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II had espied it in 1896),

¹ See the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 228-33.

but overland. In 1918, at the moment when Germany was brought to her knees by the combined effects of her military defeat on the Western front and her economic constriction through the naval blockade, her victorious armies in the east were overrunning the Ukraine and racing neck-and-neck with the Turks for the occupation of Transcaucasia. A great Eastern Empire—a Reich which would have given her all the *Raum* that she needed—had been actually within her grasp when the Western victors compelled her to relinquish the prize. If, in 1914, Germany had avoided involving herself in war with the Western Powers and had had only Russia for her antagonist, she could have conquered that Eastern Empire, not in a deadly four years' struggle, but 'before the leaves fell' in the self-same autumn, as easily and cheaply as Prussia had conquered the hegemony of Germany from Austria in 1866. The fatal error of challenging the whole World at once had involved Germany in a terrible defeat; but she was now recovering from her temporary prostration; the Nazi movement was reviving her military spirit; and she might still find an opportunity of trying her military fortunes in a fresh Eastern war of conquest without western complications. These Hitlerian ideas were shared and preached by Herr Hitler's adviser on foreign affairs, Herr Alfred Rosenberg,¹ who was a member of the German diaspora in the Balticum. As a descendant of the pioneers of medieval German eastward expansion, Herr Rosenberg aspired to lead a new Teutonic Crusade along an ancestral war-path.²

Herr Rosenberg was referred to by name, as the leading Nazi advocate of this policy, by Monsieur Molotov, the President of the Council of People's Kommissars, in a speech which he delivered at Moscow on the 28th December, 1933, at a session of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union; and the same Nazi policy was also commented upon, with equal emphasis, by Monsieur Litvinov, the Kommissar for Foreign Affairs, in a speech which he delivered before the same body on the 29th of the same month. It

¹ For Herr Rosenberg's unsuccessful 'goodwill tour' in England in May 1933, see p. 167 above.

² An exposition of Herr Rosenberg's programme will be found in his published works, e.g. *Der Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Aussenpolitik* (1923); *Die Entwicklung der deutschen Freiheitsbewegung* (1933); *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts: Eine Wertung der seelischen-geistigen Gestaltenkämpfe unserer Zeit* (1934). After the advent of the National-Socialist Party to power in Germany, Herr Rosenberg considerably modified his doctrine—explaining part of it away, and toning down the rest. We may conjecture that, in subjecting himself to this process of self-mortification, he was acting at the instance of colleagues who found that a propaganda which had been grist to their mill, so long as they were in the wilderness, was attracting an embarrassing attention abroad now that the Party was in power in the Reich.

was significant that both these authoritative Russian speakers spoke of the policy of 'the Third Reich' in close connexion with the policy of Japan.

In truth, the Soviet Union found itself caught between two fires now that the triumph of militarism in Japan, which had followed the Japanese *coup de main* in Manchuria on the 18th–19th September, 1931, was matched, on the Union's opposite flank, by the triumph of Nazidom in Germany that had followed Herr Hitler's advent to power in Berlin on the 30th January, 1933. And, from the Russian standpoint, it was hard to say which of the two menaces was the more formidable.

On the one hand, Japan, in 1933, was more *aktionsfähig* than Germany; for Japan had never been disarmed; the provisions of the Washington Treaties of 1921–2 had left her militarily and navally mistress of the situation in the Far East; and her dealings with the League of Nations and the United States during the past two years had seemed to prove that, within her Far Eastern radius, she could defy the World with impunity. Within that radius lay not only the Maritime Province of the Soviet Union, but also the main body of Eastern Siberia, at least as far west as Lake Baikal. Since 1932, when the Japanese Army had completed its occupation of Manchuria and bestridden the Chinese Eastern Railway, Japan, *vis-à-vis* Russia, was in possession of the interior lines, and the Japanese front in the Far East was much nearer than the Russian front to the national sources of supply. If it came to a war, the Russians would be handicapped by the distance of the field of operations, as well as by the disposition of the local *terrain*; and, even in the unlikely event of Russia finding an ally, Japan would almost certainly be in a position to prevent that ally from coming to Russia's assistance directly.

Compared with this immediate menace from Japan, the immediate menace to Russia from Germany in 1933 was not so alarming; for in 1933 Germany was still disarmed; she was geographically insulated from the territories of the Soviet Union by the broad belt of the post-war successor states, extending from Finland and Poland in the north to the Little Entente in the south; and if she did attempt to attack Russia overland, she would not merely have to reckon first with these East-European successor states across whose territories the German armies would have to make their passage; she would also have to reckon with France, who would not readily tolerate any vast change in the European balance of power to Germany's advantage. In contrast to the inability of the British and United States fleets to attack Japan in Far Eastern waters, the French Army in

but overland. In 1918, at the moment when Germany was brought to her knees by the combined effects of her military defeat on the Western front and her economic constriction through the naval blockade, her victorious armies in the east were overrunning the Ukraine and racing neck-and-neck with the Turks for the occupation of Transcaucasia. A great Eastern Empire—a Reich which would have given her all the *Raum* that she needed—had been actually within her grasp when the Western victors compelled her to relinquish the prize. If, in 1914, Germany had avoided involving herself in war with the Western Powers and had had only Russia for her antagonist, she could have conquered that Eastern Empire, not in a deadly four years' struggle, but 'before the leaves fell' in the self-same autumn, as easily and cheaply as Prussia had conquered the hegemony of Germany from Austria in 1866. The fatal error of challenging the whole World at once had involved Germany in a terrible defeat; but she was now recovering from her temporary prostration; the Nazi movement was reviving her military spirit; and she might still find an opportunity of trying her military fortunes in a fresh Eastern war of conquest without western complications. These Hitlerian ideas were shared and preached by Herr Hitler's adviser on foreign affairs, Herr Alfred Rosenberg,¹ who was a member of the German diaspora in the Balticum. As a descendant of the pioneers of medieval German eastward expansion, Herr Rosenberg aspired to lead a new Teutonic Crusade along an ancestral war-path.²

Herr Rosenberg was referred to by name, as the leading Nazi advocate of this policy, by Monsieur Molotov, the President of the Council of People's Kommissars, in a speech which he delivered at Moscow on the 28th December, 1933, at a session of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union; and the same Nazi policy was also commented upon, with equal emphasis, by Monsieur Litvinov, the Kommissar for Foreign Affairs, in a speech which he delivered before the same body on the 29th of the same month. It

¹ For Herr Rosenberg's unsuccessful 'goodwill tour' in England in May 1933, see p. 167 above.

² An exposition of Herr Rosenberg's programme will be found in his published works, e.g. *Der Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Aussenpolitik* (1923); *Die Entwicklung der deutschen Freiheitsbewegung* (1933); *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts: Eine Wertung der seelischen-geistigen Gestaltenkämpfe unserer Zeit* (1934). After the advent of the National-Socialist Party to power in Germany, Herr Rosenberg considerably modified his doctrine—explaining part of it away, and toning down the rest. We may conjecture that, in subjecting himself to this process of self-mortification, he was acting at the instance of colleagues who found that a propaganda which had been grist to their mill, so long as they were in the wilderness, was attracting an embarrassing attention abroad now that the Party was in power in the Reich.

was significant that both these authoritative Russian speakers spoke of the policy of 'the Third Reich' in close connexion with the policy of Japan.

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1933 was fully able to attack Germany in the Rhineland and the Ruhr; and unless and until Herren Rosenberg and Hitler could make certain of being immune from French attack on the west, they could not safely embark on an eastward adventure. To that extent, the Soviet Government could sleep easy in 1933, as far as the German threat to the Soviet Union was concerned. On the other hand, the internal political situation in the threatened territories was less favourable for the Soviet Government on the west than on the east. The Russian colonists in Siberia might be trusted to fight fiercely against a Japanese invader, whereas the Ukrainians and the Georgians nursed unsatisfied national aspirations which might incline them to look upon even the Nazi as a liberator. The most pertinent consideration of all, however, was the relative importance of the two threatened regions in the life of the Soviet body social; and from this point of view it was clear that, although the German threat might be considerably the less imminent, it was vastly the more serious of the two. If the worst came to the worst in the Far East and Japan conquered all the Soviet dominions east of Lake Baikal, the main body of the Soviet Union would scarcely feel the effects of the amputation. On the other hand, if the worst occurred on the west and Germany became mistress of the Ukraine, the Soviet Union would have been dealt a deadly, and possibly a mortal, blow; for the Ukraine was the Union's principal granary and workshop, and the loss could not be replaced for years, however rapidly the metallurgical industry of the Urals and the wheat production of Western Siberia might be developed by successive Five-Years' Plans.

Thus Herr Rosenberg's programme had to be taken very seriously by Soviet statesmanship if there was any visible prospect of its becoming practical politics. Was there any such prospect on the international horizon in 1933? Conceivably there was if the Germans and the Japanese were to put their heads together and to lay plans for concerted action; and in 1933 this combination must have occupied the attention of active minds in Berlin and Tokyo as well as in Moscow. The history of international relations showed that there was no cement of friendship so efficacious as a common object of hostility. The Soviet Union, after all, was the victim at whose expense both Germany and Japan could most readily satisfy the hunger for territorial expansion by which both these Powers were at this time tormented; and if it were true that the main obstacle which they would have to fear would be not the resistance of Russia herself but the intervention of third parties, then there was much to be said for acting in concert and for directing their action against

the one Power in the World that was still more unpopular than they were themselves. If, in 1933, Germany were to invade Danish Slesvik or Japan Netherlands India, they would each be running the risk of arousing the World's wrath as it had been aroused in 1914 by the German invasion of Belgium. But as for Communist Russia, who would feel a pang, or *a fortiori* lift a finger, on her behalf, were she the victim of attack, even if the attack were an act of naked aggression and Germany and Japan were the aggressors? In the Western countries which, in such a conflict, would theoretically hold the balance, would not the sympathies of different classes be so acutely divided between the belligerents that in practice the *Aktionsfähigkeit* of these Powers would be paralysed, so that they would be compelled to look on passively while the two black sheep in the international flock conducted their 'crusade' against the Soviet Union at their own will and for their own profit?

This was the nightmare by which the Communist rulers of Russia were haunted in 1933. The Soviet Union had never been so perilously exposed to the threat of foreign aggression at any time since the evacuation of the Crimea by General Wrangel in December 1921 and the evacuation of Vladivostok by the Japanese in October 1922. In this situation, the Soviet Government persistently declined to allow either Germany or Japan to pick a quarrel with them, and at the same time they bestirred themselves more actively, and also more successfully, than ever before to make friends with the Mammon of Capitalist unrighteousness wherever a common fear of German or Japanese intentions offered the Soviet diplomacy an opening. In order to remove any lingering suspicions from the minds of those nations with whom they now sought an understanding for the purpose of mutual defence against a common danger, the Soviet Government accompanied their overtures in 1933 by pointedly proclaiming their conversion, on territorial questions, to the anti-revisionist doctrine. This was an impressive demonstration of non-aggressive intentions on the part of the Power which had lost more heavily in territory than any other belligerent in the late War; and it also offered a remarkable contrast with the post-war policy of Italy—a belligerent whose territorial gains in the Peace Settlement of 1919–20 had not deterred her from crossing over thereafter to the revisionist camp.

In the Far Eastern quarter, Russia's anxiety in 1933 to avoid coming to blows with a bad neighbour was illustrated by her patient negotiations with the Japanese over the price at which she was to sell out her interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway, while her efforts to win friends in need were here richly rewarded by her success in

at last inducing the United States to renew diplomatic relations with her. These two transactions are dealt with in another part of the present volume.¹ In this place, we have to examine the first phase of the parallel and contemporary and equally successful activities of Russian statesmanship in Europe.

In the relations between Russia and Germany, the German police-raids of the 24th April, 1933, on the 'Derop' offices in the territory of the Reich were followed, no later than the 28th of the same month, by the first meeting, since Herr Hitler's accession to office, between the Chancellor and the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin. Possibly the political effect in Moscow of the 'Derop' raids may have suggested to Herr Hitler's mind that the Russo-German entente which he had inherited from his predecessors was too costly a treasure to be sacrificed recklessly on the altar of his anti-Marxian faith. On the other side, the Soviet Government by this time had travelled far, on their part, from their early counsel of perfection that Capitalist Powers, as such, were to be treated as 'untouchables'. This common will to peace took practical form, forthwith, in the exchange of ratifications at Moscow, on the 5th May, 1933, of two diplomatic instruments, implementing the original Rapallo Treaty of 1922, which had both been signed some time back but had remained thereafter in a state of suspension. One of the two was the German-Soviet Conciliation Agreement which had been signed on the 25th January, 1929;² the other was a protocol, signed in Moscow on the 24th June, 1931, for prolonging the German-Soviet Neutrality Treaty of the 24th April, 1926, which expired on the 29th June, 1931.³ This formal transaction in May 1933 was a certain offset to the moral alienation of the two parties from one another which had followed the inauguration of the new régime in Germany. Yet, even if this exchange of ratifications may have tempered the Soviet Government's misgivings towards 'the Third Reich', it was so far from allaying them that the Soviet Government continued to pursue, with all their might, their parallel European policy of making friends with as many as possible of Germany's other uneasy European neighbours.

The first step in this direction which was taken by Soviet diplomacy in 1933 was the submission by the Soviet delegation at the Disarmament Conference, during the discussion of the French plan in February, of a proposal for defining the aggressor which was so uncompromising and so comprehensive that the French themselves

¹ See Part IV, sections (v) and (vi), below.

² See the *Survey for 1930*, pp. 126-7; text in *Documents for 1929*, pp. 156-9.

³ *Survey for 1927*, pp. 301-10.

could not find fault with it. This Soviet proposal of the 6th February, and the later drafts which were drawn on the basis of it, are dealt with below in other chapters, in connexion with the rest of the Disarmament Conference's work.¹ In the meantime, the Soviet Government continued assiduously to nurse the seed which they had thus sown.

Their next step was a public declaration of conversion to the anti-revisionist standpoint in regard to the territorial terms of the Peace Treaties. The declaration took the form of a series of articles by Monsieur Radek which appeared in the Moscow *Izvestia* between the 12th May and the 24th and which were couched in the Communist equivalent of biblical language; but neither the tone nor the form of the declaration detracted from its political importance.² The gist of the declaration is contained in the following extract:

The way to revision of the predatory Versailles Peace leads through a new world-war. Discussion of revision is the smoke-screen behind which Imperialism prepares the most terrible and ruthless war that the human brain can conceive, a war by comparison with which all the horrors of the Imperialistic War of 1914-18 will pale. . . . The mere fact that revision of the Versailles Treaty is linked up with the victory of Fascism shows how much this revision could reckon with the interests of the masses of nations which are regarded by the *Fascisti* as 'lower'.³

In this declaration, the Soviet diplomacy effectively prepared its ground; and a few weeks later, after the adjournment of the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference on the 8th June, 1933, Monsieur Litvinov succeeded in extracting a political harvest from the unpromising soil of the World Economic Conference in London.

At this diplomatic gathering of delegations from no less than sixty-four countries, Monsieur Litvinov found representatives of all the states that had become parties to the Moscow Protocol of the 9th February, 1929, for the implementation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Monsieur Litvinov now proposed that the Soviet Union and the other parties to the Moscow Protocol should repeat their previous gesture of anticipating, as between themselves, the general carrying

¹ See pp. 234, 245-6, 278 *seqq.* below.

² It may be noted, for example, that the uncomplimentary reference to Fascism in the passage from one of Monsieur Radek's articles which is quoted below was written immediately after the ratification of the two Russo-German agreements on the 5th May, 1933, at Moscow (see p. 180 above); and that it was followed, before the end of the calendar year, by the signature, at Rome, on the 2nd September, 1933, of an Italo-Soviet Pact of Friendship, Non-Aggression, and Neutrality. In December 1933, Monsieur Litvinov paid a visit to Italy and had a cordial reception.

³ English translation in *The Bulletin of International News*, vol. x, No. 4, 17th August, 1933.

into force of the Kellogg-Briand Pact by now adopting—again, anticipatorily and as between themselves—the Geneva draft of the 24th May, 1933, defining aggression: in advance, this time, of the conclusion of a General Disarmament Convention. Monsieur Litvinov's proposal was accepted by all but two of the countries to which it was addressed, and it was significant that Rumania was not among the dissentients—as she might have been expected to be, considering the breakdown of the previous Soviet-Rumanian negotiations for a non-aggression pact in 1932, owing to the failure to find a mutually satisfactory diplomatic procedure for disposing of the awkward question of Bessarabia.¹ This time, the dissentients were Finland and Lithuania; and all the other countries in question—that is, Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Rumania, Turkey and the U.S.S.R.—duly signed, on the 3rd July, 1933, a convention accepting, as among themselves, the definition of aggression contained in the Geneva draft of the 24th May, 1933. The terms of this convention and its annex need not be analysed in this place, since the texts are printed in full in the accompanying volume of documents.² It is sufficient to mention here that the annex explicitly ruled out, as possible justifications of the aggression which was defined in the convention itself, certain circumstances in the international conduct of a state which had been put forward, at various times, as justifications for projects of aggression against the Soviet Union and which had also been cited by Japan, since the 18th-19th September, 1931, as justifications for her actual aggression against China.³

This achievement of Soviet diplomacy, which was sufficiently remarkable as it stood,⁴ was made the more impressive through being rounded off, before the end of the calendar month, by the accession of all, and more than all, the missing countries. On the 5th July, 1933, a separate bilateral convention, identical in terms with the multilateral convention of the 3rd July, was concluded between the Soviet Union and Lithuania (who thus reconciled a neighbourly co-operativeness with an indulgence of her own *amour propre* by avoiding a direct transaction with Poland). And on the

¹ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 273-8; the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 263-5; and the *Survey for 1927*, pp. 297-300.

² *Documents on International Affairs, 1933*.

³ It may be conjectured that this annex was also of interest to the Latin-American Republics in respect of their relations with the United States.

⁴ Monsieur Litvinov also found an opportunity, at the London Conference, for taking the first steps towards the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States (see Part IV, section (vi), pp. 530 *seqq.* below).

4th July the multilateral convention of the 3rd—to which one member of the Little Entente, namely Rumania, was a party—was brought into line with the new statute of the Little Entente¹ by the signature, at the Soviet Embassy in London, of yet another convention, conceived in the same terms as that of the 3rd, to which Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia were parties as well as Rumania, the Soviet Union and Turkey. This quinquartite convention of the 5th July contained an additional article conferring a right of adherence upon other countries, and Finland took the opening thus offered to her by duly adhering on the 23rd July—the last act required to make the new chain of agreements complete.

In this chain of agreements, the Russo-Polish link was no doubt the most important in Monsieur Litvinov's eyes; but his satisfaction at this fresh attestation of good-neighbourliness in the relations between the Soviet Union and Poland may have been tempered by his observation of a remarkable improvement which was now taking place in the relations between Poland and Germany.

The reappearance of a sovereign independent Polish state on the post-war political map of Europe had been made possible by the simultaneous downfall of the Hohenzollern and the Romanov Empires in the General War of 1914-18; and, on the morrow of the Peace Settlement, it had been an axiom of Polish statesmanship that the German and the Russian neighbours, at whose joint expense the Polish Republic had been resuscitated, were both still Poland's potential enemies. For a permanent Polish foreign policy, this was hardly a possible basis, since the state of prostration and humiliation, which was the condition of both Germany and Russia at the beginning of the post-war period, could not be expected to endure for ever, and Poland manifestly could not afford to be on bad terms with both of two neighbours who were each potentially so very much stronger than Poland herself, if and when their natural strength revived. For the moment, however, the problem of constructing a provisional Polish foreign policy on a simultaneous anti-Russian and anti-German basis had been made soluble by the temporary degradation of both Russia and Germany from the rank of Great Powers. Their abasement had been so extreme that it had not been retrieved by the *rapprochement* into which the two outcasts had been drawn by their companionship in adversity, and to which they had given diplomatic form in 1922 in the Treaty of Rapallo.² Indeed, this post-war Russo-German entente had not only involved no material threat to Poland, but had actually improved Poland's international

¹ See p. 204 below.

² See the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 30-1.

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status by emphasizing the fact that, in this quarter of post-war Europe, Poland was, for the time being, the only representative of respectable international society. Her respectability was certified by her possession of two assets—her membership in the League of Nations and her alliance with France—which were both lacking to her two ostracized neighbours. In this situation, Poland found herself not merely once more on the map but also in enjoyment of brevet rank as a Great Power; and, in this situation, any prospect of the recovery of either Germany or Russia tormented Poland with a twofold anxiety: a fear for her military security and a jealousy over her diplomatic status.

This jealousy had flared up on the occasion of Germany's admission to membership in the League, when Poland had rebelled against the prospect of seeing Germany acquire a status in the League superior to that of Poland herself, through being invested with a permanent seat on the Council; and this Polish revolt had only been appeased by the special creation of a new class of 'semi-permanent' seats to meet the case of countries which, like Poland, were of an intermediate calibre between Great Powers and small states.¹ During these middle post-war years, Poland found it more difficult to be on good terms with Germany, whom the Western Powers were inviting back into the comity of nations, than with Russia, who seemed little more eager to re-enter the society of 'capitalist states' than the latter were to re-admit her. Moreover, the Soviet Government, which was still mistress of more territory than it knew how to use, and which did not estimate political power in territorial terms, showed little interest in the large White Russian and Ukrainian territories which it had ceded to Poland in the Peace Treaty of the 18th March, 1921; whereas the German people and Government, under all post-war and pre-Nazi régimes, made a parade of a Magyar-like tenacity in maintaining their claim to the much smaller territories which Germany had been compelled to cede to Poland in the former Prussian Ostmark. In these circumstances it was not surprising that, from the signature of the Peace Treaty of Riga onwards, Polono-Russian relations should have gradually improved, while Polono-German relations seemed as unhappy, on the eve of Herr Hitler's advent to power in Berlin, as they had been at any time since the Peace Settlement of 1919. It was, however, surprising at first sight to see Poland, as well as Russia, apparently taking the Nazi Revolution in Germany as a signal for the reversal of her own post-war international rôle.

Whereas Russia, as we have seen, had parted company with

¹ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part I A, section (i).

Germany—openly declaring her adherence to the anti-revisionist doctrine, and seeking a *rapprochement* with France and her East-European satellites—Poland, who had been on worse terms with Germany than any other of Germany's neighbours, actually found it easier to live on good terms with 'the Third Reich' than with the Weimar Republic. Though Poland did not abandon her old alliance with France or her new understanding with Russia, she did now enter into more friendly relations with Germany; and, within twelve months of the inauguration of the Nazi régime, this German-Polish *rapprochement* culminated in the conclusion of the Pact of the 26th January, 1934.¹ In fact, Poland was the only one of Germany's neighbours with whom Germany's relations not only did not deteriorate but actually improved after the National-Socialist Revolution.

This was perhaps the last consequence of Herr Hitler's advent to power that any student of European politics would have thought of prophesying *a priori*! Yet the key to the puzzle may be found in the post-war position and attitude of Poland as these have been analysed above. The transposition of her respective relations to Germany and to Russia, which Poland made in the course of the year 1933, will no longer appear irrational when it is remembered that, within the same twelve months, Germany and Russia themselves made a virtual exchange of their respective international rôles. Germany now plunged herself into moral outlawry and political isolation—renouncing her membership in the League of Nations, and therewith her permanent seat on the Council; on the other hand, Russia now renounced her political isolation and sought remission of her moral outlawry—and this with such rapid success that, by the end of the calendar year, she was well on the way towards becoming a member of the League, stepping into the permanent seat on the Council which Germany had vacated, and being accepted as an ally by France into the bargain. It will be seen that, if Germany's re-entry into international society in 1925-6 had been unpalatable to Poland, the threatened re-entry of Russia in 1933 was still more disconcerting for her. The re-entry of Germany had increased, instead of diminishing, the value of Poland to France as an eastern ally, whereas the re-entry of Russia threatened to deprive Poland of this distinguished rôle by substituting a greater East-European Power in her stead. If Poland seemed inclined to draw away from Russia in 1933, this was because Monsieur Litvinov was now winning back for Russia her natural 'place in the sun' from which Monsieur Zinoviev had so wantonly kept her out; and if, at the same time,

¹ This transaction will be dealt with in a future volume.

Poland drew closer towards Germany, this was because Herr Hitler was now losing for Germany the position which Herr Stresemann had recovered for her. Poland could afford to be on good terms with either Germany or Russia in the measure in which either of these *ci-devant* Great Powers was remote from the possibility of recovering its historic birthright; and, on this showing, the marked improvement in Polono-German relations which followed the advent of Herr Hitler to power was a good augury for the peace of Europe but not for the elevation of 'the Third Reich' to that pitch of power which was the goal of Herr Hitler's ambitions in the international field.

However that may be, the actual improvement in Polono-German relations was unmistakable and prompt. The change of régime in Germany found the two countries engaged in one of the bouts of their chronic dispute over the status and conditions of the German minority in Poland; and the ostentatious unveiling, on the 14th April, 1933, of a memorial, with a provocative inscription, at a spot on the Pomeranian frontier of post-war Germany, looking out over the Corridor, seemed to proclaim the spirit in which 'the Third Reich' intended to deal with its immediate neighbour on the east. Nevertheless, the advent to power, in Germany, of a Government committed to the Hitler-Rosenberg programme of a sweeping eastward expansion produced less of a flutter in Poland than in Russia (in spite of the fact that, if this German programme were put into action, Poland's turn would necessarily come first as the inescapable penalty of her proximity); and this Polish calmness was soon rewarded by a German diplomatic *démarche* of the 4th May. On that day, the Polish Minister in Berlin was received by Herr Hitler, and the German Minister in Warsaw simultaneously by the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs; and it was publicly announced that, at both these meetings, the representatives of the two countries had declared the intention of their respective Governments 'to keep their attitude and their actions strictly within the limits of existing treaties and dispassionately to examine their common interest'. On the 15th November there was an equally friendly conversation in Berlin between Herr Hitler and a newly accredited Polish Minister, Monsieur Lipski; and these deliberate mutual acts of goodwill in 1933 prepared the way for the conclusion of the German-Polish Pact of the 26th January, 1934.

The reality of this general improvement in German-Polish relations was attested in still more concrete and cogent terms by the local improvement in the relations between Warsaw and Danzig which likewise set in, immediately and unmistakably, after the Nazis had

followed up their capture of the Reich by establishing their supremacy in the Free City.

Here, again, the immediate sequel to the change of régime in the Reich, during the interval between the 30th January and the date on which the Free City followed suit, was an act of provocation—this time on the Polish side. At the beginning of March 1933 the Polish Government increased to 200 men the police-force of 88 men which they were entitled, under the Polish-Danzig Agreement of 1921, to keep at Westerplatte, in Danzig Harbour, for the protection of the Polish munition stores there.¹ The League of Nations High Commissioner at Danzig brought the matter to the attention of the Council; and at Geneva, on the 14th March, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Colonel Beck, agreed to withdraw the additional 112 men in consideration of an undertaking by the President of the Danzig Senate that adequate measures to safeguard the rights of Poland on the Westerplatte Peninsula would be taken by the Danzig authorities. At the same meeting of the Council, the two parties also agreed to accept the Council's proposals for clearing up questions which were in dispute in regard to the recruitment and control of the Danzig Harbour Police. And thus a certain *détente* in Polish-Danzig relations was already achieved before the Nazi capture of Danzig, which began with the seizure of the local trades-union headquarters by local S.A. detachments on the 12th May, 1933, and which was completed when the elections of the 28th May, for the local Volkstag, gave the Nazis 50.03 per cent. of the votes cast and 38 seats in the new Diet out of 72.

Thereafter, the new Nazi régime in Danzig displayed a goodwill towards Poland which marked a new departure in the Free City's policy. On the 3rd July, 1933, the first Nazi President and Vice-President of the Danzig Senate arrived in Warsaw, invested by the newly elected Danzig Volkstag with extraordinary powers, in order to seek a direct understanding with Poland on current matters of dispute; and the negotiations at Danzig, under the auspices of the League High Commissioner, by which this visit was followed, resulted, on the 5th August, in the initialing of an agreement which settled two of the more serious of the questions still outstanding, namely, the use by Poland of the Port of Danzig and the status, in the Free City, of Polish nationals and other persons of Polish origin or language. In the same month, a party of Hitler Youth visited a Polish youth camp in the Tatra; and further progress towards clearing up the still outstanding political questions was made during a second visit which

¹ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 242-3, and the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 375, 377.

the President of the Danzig Senate, Herr Rauschnig, paid to Warsaw in December.

This simultaneous improvement in the relations of a Nazi Reich and a Nazi Danzig with Poland in 1933 was one of the important international events of the year.

6. *The Reactions in Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia*

An Ost-Elbisch Prussian Junker who felt inclined to criticize Reichskanzler Hitler's policy of an appeasement with Poland might have remarked, with some bitterness, that, if the Austrian interloper was able to achieve a diplomatic success which had been beyond the reach of any of his predecessors in the government of post-war Germany, this was simply because he was willing to pay a price—in the renunciation of the old Prussian Ostmark—which no Reichsdeutsch Reichskanzler would have thought of paying, but which an Austrian, no doubt, could pay without a pang. Herr Hitler's Austrian origin may really have had something to do with the conspicuous improvement in German-Polish relations after his advent to power in Berlin; for the Austrians were the one German-speaking people that had learnt to appreciate the Poles and had come to be appreciated by them. It may even be true that Reichskanzler Hitler found it easier to come to an understanding with Poland because the Prussian Ostmark meant less to him than it meant to a Bismarck or a Hindenburg. In any case the converse is true, beyond doubt: that is to say, the *Anschluss* of Austria to 'the Third Reich' was nearer to Herr Hitler's Austrian heart than to the Prussian heart of an Ost-Elbisch Junker. This being the undoubted truth, it must be regarded as one of the major ironies of Herr Hitler's career that, as Reichskanzler in Berlin, he capped his *tour de force* of reconciling Poland with Germany by performing the greater *tour de force* of alienating Austria from her.

Down to the time of Herr Hitler's accession to office in Berlin on the 30th January, 1933, it was taken for granted, not only in Austria but also in Germany and almost everywhere else, that—notwithstanding the discomfiture of the German attempt to achieve a customs union between Austria and Germany in 1931¹—it was Austria's destiny to be absorbed into the Reich if and when the international situation in Europe changed so far as to remove or nullify the existing vetos. This was taken for granted because there was not any element or party in the population of Austria that would find itself positively penalized, or even intolerably uncomfortable,

¹ See the *Survey for 1931*, Part III A.

inside the German Reich of the Weimar régime. The great majority of the population was accounted for by the Catholics and the Social-Democrats between them; and in the Weimar Republic both these elements had their fair share, not only in the government of the Reich, but in the general control and management of affairs. For the Austrian Republic, to become a *Land* of the Reich under the Weimar régime might still have been painful, because it would have meant bidding a final farewell to the Imperial Austrian tradition, but an *Anschluss* under these conditions would not have had the full measure of the distastefulness which had deterred the Austrian Germans from throwing in their lot with the Reich under the pre-war Bismarckian régime, when the Reich was dominated by the Prussian Junkers, and when the Catholics, as well as the Social-Democrats, were looked at askance by the ruling element as being more or less alien from the spirit of the established political dispensation.

The situation changed very greatly when, in Germany, Herr Hitler and his followers pulled down 'the System of Weimar' and set up 'the Third Reich' in its stead. A detailed record of this change will be reserved for a later volume, since the forces now set in motion came to a head in a later year. In this place, the reactions of the Austrians need only be indicated in a general way as a necessary part of a survey of the effects of the Nazi Revolution in Germany outside the frontiers of the Reich. Some indication of this reaction in Austria is required, in particular, in order to explain the reaction in Italy.

In Austria, the Nazis followed the tactics of attempting to make themselves masters of the country *de facto* in anticipation, or perhaps even in lieu, of a *de jure* change in the state of affairs that had been established by the Peace Settlement; and, after an early promise of success, these tactics began to defeat themselves.

The Austrians were ripe for a militant propaganda in 1933; for although Austria had stood out, in the post-war years, as the most long-suffering, as well as the most sorely afflicted, of all the defeated countries, the temper of her people had been tried beyond endurance by the advent of the World Economic Depression—a fresh turn of the screw which in Austria's case found a plausible explanation, ready to hand, in the intolerable plight to which the Treaty of St. Germain had reduced her. This rising Austrian temper had been exasperated further, in 1931, by the renewal of the veto upon union with Germany, even in the studiously non-political form of the project for an Austro-German customs union. And when the Nazi movement swept over the Reich in 1933 it immediately captured, in

Austria, some part of the urban lower middle class which was the mainstay of the movement in its Reichsdeutsch homeland.

In Austria, however, a large fraction of this class was immune against National Socialism because it was wedded to the old-established indigenous Austrian Catholic movement of Christian Socialism; and even if the Austrian *petite bourgeoisie* had turned Nazi *en masse*, this would not have produced the portentous political effect which a corresponding mass-conversion did produce in the Reich, since in Austria this class was relatively less powerful. Vienna, the one great industrial city of post-war Austria, was at this time politically under the control of its own working class through the agency of the Social-Democratic Party, while in the other nine provinces of the Austrian federal state the towns were overshadowed by the countryside and the power was in the hands of the peasantry. The only province out of the nine in which the Nazis could make any show of being in a majority was Styria—a South-German Ostmark which had been mutilated, like the Prussian Ostmark, by the Peace Settlement. In Styria, the Slovene was at the gates while the Prussian aroused no antipathy because he was never here encountered in the flesh; and on this account Styria, in the pre-war age, had been the home of a local Pan-Germanism which preached *Los von Rom* and *Heil Hohenzollern* in substitution for *Heil Hapsburg*. It was thus in the Styrian tradition to turn Nazi.¹ But Styria had never been able to carry the rest of Austria with her in her provincial idiosyncrasies; and in 1933 the Reichsdeutsch National Socialism which partly captivated Styria left the rest of Austria almost entirely cold.

In the eyes of his Austrian fellow countrymen, Herr Hitler had not the glamour of a saviour, suddenly appearing from beyond the horizon, which was the aspect that he wore in the eyes of his Reichsdeutsch adherents. In Austrian eyes, there was nothing mysterious or poetic about this Austrian *petit bourgeois* who had made his political fortune across the frontier; and the mild amusement which the Austrians might have felt at seeing this child of their own lackadaisical fatherland avenging Sadowa for them by imposing his will so imperiously upon the stiff-necked Prussians was quashed by their annoyance at the message which the emigrant now evidently felt it his family duty to bring home to them; for, to most Austrian minds, Herr Hitler's message was no more new than Herr Hitler himself. If the prophet was, for them, just an Austrian *petit bourgeois* who had

¹ These Styrian Pan-Germans who were ripe for National Socialism in 1933 were the political heirs of early nineteenth-century Styrian Liberals who had turned Nationalist under the pressure of a Slovene *risorgimento*.

grown too big for his boots, they found nothing more in his gospel than the old spirit of Prussianism which he seemed to have naïvely taken for his own and furbished up in a form that was even more offensive to Austrian sensibilities than the rather less plebeian original. Accordingly, in most Austrian minds, the Nazi propaganda in Austria reawakened historic feelings which had been potent from the outbreak of the Austro-Prussian War of 1742-8 until after the close of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, but which had seemed gradually to be losing their force during the half century ending in 1914 and had taken on the aspect of a pathetic anachronism since the Peace Settlement of 1919-20. In the Nazi campaign for the *Gleichschaltung* of the Austrian Republic, Austrian honour was threatened with the one indignity which would be more painful than the post-war humiliations. In the Peace Settlement of 1919-20 Austria had been shorn of her ancient empire, but she had not been required to submit to a Prussian conquest; and it was this historic Austrian bugbear—so often threatened yet always held at bay—that was now being thrust upon the Austrians in a peculiarly distasteful form. In the school of adversity, they had latterly been learning to think of themselves as prospective citizens of a German democratic republic; but this prospect had now been wiped out through an Austrian dictator's conquest of the Reich; and to be *gleichgeschaltet*, like the Rhinelanders and the Bavarians in 1933, into the mould of Prussian subjects under an aggravated Prussian régime was a prospect which aroused strong aversion and antagonism in most Austrian breasts.

This vehement opposition to the Nazi programme of *Gleichschaltung* was the channel in which the temper of the Austrian people, already on the rise in 1932, found vent in 1933. And thus Herr Hitler duly performed the miracle of waking his Austrian fatherland from the dead, but this in a fashion which was directly counter to his own purpose. Under the impact of the Austrian *Führer's* Reichsdeutsch National Socialism, the artificial Austrian state, which had been deliberately left derelict, in the Peace Settlement, after the demolition of the Hapsburg Monarchy, became, for the first time, the object and the vehicle of a genuine and spontaneous Austrian national feeling; and it was as the champion of this new Austrian nationalism, on an anti-Nazi 'front', that Dr. Dollfuss now unexpectedly stood up to play David to Herr Hitler's Goliath.¹ At the time of writing, in the

¹ A Nazi spokesman would probably reply that this latter-day Austrian David was nothing better than a romantically camouflaged mercenary. In other words, he would enlarge upon the degree to which the Dollfuss Government was indebted to foreign support, both diplomatic and financial. It is a possible, though intrinsically undemonstrable, thesis that, without the foreign

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spring of 1934, this struggle was still in progress and its ultimate outcome could not yet be forecast. The most prominent, and ironical, feature in the situation was the fact that the Reichsdeutsch National Socialism, in inspiring an Austrian opposition with its own temper, conjured up an Austrian counter-organization in its own image. As the conflict between Austria and 'the Third Reich' lengthened out, the Austrian Heimwehr, which had been founded after the War as a pale imitation of the Italian Fasci di Combattimento, rapidly took on the tone and tactics of a kind of counter-Nazidom which was only distinguishable by the name of its leader and the cut and colour of its cloth from the Reichsdeutsch movement which was its detested ensample and unintentional trainer.

The history of the warfare which the Austrian Heimwehr now waged on two fronts—a defensive war against the National Socialism of 'the Third Reich' and an offensive war against the Social Democracy of Vienna—will be recorded in a later volume. At this stage, it was merely possible to discern that the new Austrian nation (if the child were destined to be born alive) was begotten of the Nazi conquest of Germany, as the old Austrian Empire had been begotten, four centuries back, of the Ottoman conquest of Orthodox Christendom. In this respect, the 'missions' of the old Austria and the new Austria were curiously similar. Both Austrias took shape in order to take their stand, against apparently hopeless odds, in the path of a formidable and hitherto victorious conqueror. But in another respect the postures of the two Austrias presented a contrast—in the geographical sense that their faces were set in opposite directions. The old Austria had always faced eastward; for she had been founded originally as a Bavarian march against the Avars and the Magyars, before she found her greater mission as the carapace of Western Christendom against the 'Osmanlis. In that phase of Austrian history, it was only the eastward-facing head of the double-headed eagle that was truly alive; and when that head was struck off in 1918

support, Dr. Dollfuss could not have held his own against the Nazi offensive. Yet political movements engineered by foreign Powers for foreign ends are notoriously apt to produce the opposite effects to those which they are designed to bring about; and if the foreign support which Dr. Dollfuss undoubtedly received were really the principal source of his success, then this success must be regarded as a strange and exceptional anomaly. It seems more reasonable to seek the main explanation of Dr. Dollfuss's success in a genuine Austrian national reaction against Hitlerism, while taking care to make full allowance for the foreign factor as a contributory cause. If the foreign factor is given the primacy, we have to ask why, in that case, French or Italian diplomacy chose to wait for the advent of Hitlerism before setting up a Dollfuss to make Austrian policy conform to foreign requirements.

it looked as though that must be the death of the fabulous creature. But now, in 1933, for the first time in Austrian history, the hitherto somnolent westward-facing head of the eagle woke to life with flashing eyes and combative beak. No doubt, compared with the Austria of 1914 (though, not perhaps, by comparison with the Austria of 1526), the Austria of 1933 was a weakling. Yet, in the new situation, there was one fundamental characteristic of Austria—her Catholicism—which was turned, by the new orientation, from a weakness into a strength. In the struggle against the 'Osmanlis, Austria's Catholicism had alienated from her her natural allies among the 'Osmanlis' subjects: Calvinist Magyars and Orthodox Serbs and Rumans. On the other hand, in the struggle against the Nazis, this selfsame Catholicism promised to win sympathy and support for Austria, in the new enemy's camp, among the 20,000,000 Catholic subjects of 'the Third Reich'.

The issue with which Austria was confronted by the establishment of 'the Third Reich' did not immediately confront Austria's neighbour and pre-war partner Hungary, so long as an independent Austrian Republic continued to insulate the post-war Kingdom of Hungary from the Germany of Herr Hitler. Yet Hungary—obsessed though she was with her ever-rankling grievances against the three states-members of the Little Entente, which had inherited between them the half of her pre-war kingdom—now found herself unable to watch the Austro-German struggle, beyond her fourth frontier, with entire detachment and indifference. The German National-Socialist movement had a number of implications for Hungary which were mutually contradictory and which therefore made it difficult for Hungarian statesmanship to define its own attitude towards the new dynamic force in Central Europe. On the one hand, the National-Socialist Revolution in Germany produced a certain excitement, if not elation, in Hungary because 'the Third Reich'—in representing itself as a revolt against 'Marxism' at home and against the Peace Treaties abroad—purported to embody two of the main planks in the post-war political platform of the Magyar governing class. At the same time, the Hungarian magnates doubtless reflected that the Nazi style of reactionariness was not aristocratic but *petite bourgeoisie*, and that the Nazis' interest in treaty-revision was as selfishly concentrated upon the Treaty of Versailles as the Awakening Magyars' interest was concentrated upon the Treaty of Trianon. Thus the advantages which Hungary might hope to gain for herself through Herr Hitler's triumph in Germany were only indirect, while the direct disadvantage which Hungary stood to suffer, if Herr Hitler were to

triumph in Austria as well, was too serious to be overlooked. In that event, Hungary would find herself the immediate neighbour of a Greater Germany whose dominions would extend from the Saar and East Prussia to the Burgenland inclusive. Therewith, a Hungary whose territory had been halved and whose population had been reduced from twenty million to seven million as a result of the Peace Settlement would have to live next door to a Germany with more than seventy million inhabitants and with a territory of approximately the same aggregate extent as her differently distributed pre-war area. Such a Greater Germany, under a militant Nazi régime, might well prove little less awkward for Hungary, as a friend and patron, than the Little Entente was awkward for her as an adversary.

Moreover, the hostility of the Magyars towards the Czechoslovaks and the Rumanians and the Jugoslavs was tempered by the contempt of a *ci-devant* ruling race for its *ci-devant* subjects, whereas the feelings of the Magyars towards the Germans, in the Magyars' heart of hearts, were those of ex-subjects towards their former masters. From the union of the rump of Hungary with Austria in 1526 down to the Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich* of 1867, the Austrian Germans, unaided, had proved themselves the Magyars' superiors. The Magyars had been forced to call in the Hapsburg sovereigns of Austria in order to save the remnant of Hungary from Ottoman conquest; and, even when Hungary had eventually been reunited under Hapsburg rule owing to the Austrians' subsequent military successes against the Turks, the Austrian Germans had long proved stronger than the united strength of the Magyar people. The *Ausgleich* itself—that master-stroke of Magyar statesmanship that had enabled Hungary to assume the airs of a Great Power during a brilliant half-century—was no more than a precarious advantage which the Magyars had snatched for themselves out of the Austrians' discomfiture in the nineteenth-century competition between Austria and Prussia for hegemony in Germany. By compelling an approximately equal number of Austrian Germans to go into political partnership with them in 1867, in order to rule jointly over an equal number of non-Magyars and non-Germans in the Dual Monarchy, the Magyar governing class had made themselves the ultimate arbiters of policy in a Hapsburg Empire of fifty millions which could treat with the Hohenzollern Empire of seventy millions on a footing of approximate equality. In this two-storied structure of a Magyar-German alliance, an Andrassy and a Tisza had known how to browbeat Vienna and refuse to be browbeaten by Berlin. But this Magyar construction of Mittel-Europa was a house of cards which collapsed in the general

débâcle of the Central Powers in 1918; and the Magyar statesmen, who knew all the time how uncertain their footing was upon the pinnacle on which they had stood since 1867, must have felt that the complete independence which Hungary obtained—for the first time since 1526—under the Treaty of Trianon was at least one substantial gain to set off against the immense territorial losses inflicted upon her in the dismemberment of the Hapsburg Empire.

Even this post-war extrication of Hungary from the perilous German connexion had to be bought at a price; for the plebiscite, which the Peace Treaties had provided for, in the strip of Hungarian territory along the Austrian frontier—the so-called Burgenland—had resulted in the transfer to Austria of the whole of this German-inhabited district except for the town of Sopron.¹ Thus, at the moment when the four-centuries-old political association of Hungary with Austria was being dissolved, Austria, in the very hour of her defeat and prostration, had succeeded in partially recouping herself for her losses elsewhere by joining with the successor states in the spoliation (as the Magyars regarded it) of the historic Crown of St. Stephen. The Magyars might reasonably feel some anxiety as to what their fate might be if this post-war Austria which had acquired the Burgenland were now to become the south-eastern advance-guard of a Greater Germany through being absorbed into a Hitlerian Reich.

In this situation the Magyars clung to their post-war entente with Fascist Italy,² who in every respect was a more convenient partner for post-war Hungary than a Greater Germany would be. Unlike Austria, or *a fortiori* Germany, Italy shared Hungary's hostility towards Jugoslavia; and through her acquisition of Fiume, which was Hungary's pre-war port, she had it in her power to re-open for Hungary her lost outlet on the Adriatic—if once the common enemy Jugoslavia were put out of the way. On the eve of Herr Hitler's advent to power in Germany, a fresh strain had been placed upon Italo-Jugoslav relations by a childish act of chauvinistic vandalism on the Jugoslav side—the mutilation of the Venetian lions at Trau in Dalmatia—and the worse Italy's relations were with Jugoslavia, the more surely Hungary could count upon Italian friendship. It was true that even this Italo-Hungarian entente was not on a footing of equality. Italy was the patron and Hungary the satellite. Yet Hungary was at least not so much at Signor Mussolini's beck and call, so long as Jugoslavia lay between them, as she would be at Herr

¹ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 304-7.

² See the *Survey for 1927*, pp. 155-61, 541.

Hitler's if once the Austrian barrier were to fall. Accordingly, Hungary's policy in 1933 was to cultivate her entente with Italy and to show reserve towards any overtures from Germany, as far as that could be done without giving positive offence. In response to an invitation from Herr Hitler, the Hungarian Prime Minister, General Gömbös, did pay a visit to Berlin on the 18th June; but, in an interview given on his return journey through Vienna, next day, to the Austrian press, the Magyar statesman was careful to declare that 'the purpose of' his 'trip to Berlin was chiefly economic. Harvest time' was 'near; and Hungary' required 'markets for her surplus agricultural products'. Thereafter, the Hungarian Government entered into those negotiations with the Italian and Austrian Governments, under Signor Mussolini's auspices, which resulted, on the 17th March, 1934, in the conclusion of a three-Power agreement. This agreement, which will be described in a later volume, was undisguisedly intended to erect a barrier in the way of a south-eastward expansion of 'the Third Reich' without giving Herr Hitler any excuse for officially taking offence.

For the states members of the Little Entente, individually and collectively, the situation created by the advent of Herr Hitler to power in Germany was perhaps less complicated, though certainly not less dangerous, than it was for Hungary.

Individually, Czechoslovakia was more gravely threatened than either of her allies; for while Rumania and Jugoslavia had no quarrel with either Austria or the Reich and little to fear directly for themselves if the two German states were to join forces, the *Anschluss* would at once place Czechoslovakia in an even more awkward predicament than it would create for Hungary. Czechoslovakia would not only, like Hungary, find herself an immediate neighbour of a Greater Germany, but she would be surrounded by this neighbour on three sides. The Austrian and the Silesian arm of the German colossus would grip between them, in a vice, the Bohemian heart of the Czechoslovak state, and would threaten to saw the hyphenated republic in sunder at its slender waist, in a zone where its new-found unity was weakened, in any case, by the physical barrier of the Carpathians and the political *mésintelligence* between Czechs and Slovaks. This Moravian corridor between Slovakia and Bohemia was thickly strewn with enclaves of German population—the largest of them at Brünn—which led like stepping-stones across the narrow Slavonic gulf between a German Lower Austria and a German Upper Silesia. And these were only a fraction of the German community within the Czechoslovak frontiers. All told, the German minority in

Czechoslovakia numbered 3,088,530—a figure which amounted to about 20 per cent. of the total population; and most of these Germans lived along the frontiers, in immediate contiguity to Silesia, Saxony and Bavaria. Before the War, these Deutschböhmern had been hammered, by their stubbornly fought and never ceasing defensive political battle against the aggressive nationalism of the more numerous Czechs, into the most militant Austrian-German nationalists in the Hapsburg dominions.

It will be seen that an *Anschluss* of post-war Austria to 'the Third Reich' would threaten to make life impossible for Czechoslovakia and might even jeopardize her very existence as an independent state. Even as it was, the victory of National Socialism in the Reich thrilled the Deutschböhmern, as it had thrilled the Styrians and the Saarlanders; and on the 4th October, 1933, the Czechoslovak Government decided to dissolve the German National-Socialist Party, and likewise the German Nationalist Party, in Czechoslovak territory, and to prohibit all their activities and all their subsidiary organizations. At the same time Czech statesmanship profited, at this critical juncture, by the wisdom and moderation which it had consistently shown during the post-war years. The Czechs who had wrestled with their German-Bohemian neighbours so relentlessly under the Hapsburg régime had reversed their policy the moment they themselves became the ruling element in the country; and the new relations which they had cultivated with the Deutschböhmern since the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic were almost up to the Swiss or Canadian standard of inter-communal fraternity: a light shining in the darkness of East-European national oppressions and vendettas. Moreover, the Deutschböhmern, unlike the Styrians, were pronouncedly Austrian in their German national sentiments. Their faces were turned towards Vienna, and not towards Munich or Dresden or Berlin. In spite of their geographical contiguity with the Reichsdeutsch they were sundered from them by historic differences of political allegiance and tradition, as well as by the physical barrier of high mountains. Finally, Czechoslovakia had contrived, since the Peace Settlement, to live on terms of good neighbourliness not only with Austria but also with the Reich. For example, the free navigation down the Elbe, and the free zone in the port of Hamburg, which had been secured to Czechoslovakia, at Germany's expense, in the Versailles Treaty,¹ had given rise to so little friction between the two parties that they were never in the public eye—in contrast to the

¹ See the Versailles Treaty, Part XII, especially Articles 331, 340 and 363-4.

notoriety of Danzig, which was unhappily so accurate a gauge of German-Polish animosities.

In these circumstances, Czechoslovakia's relative danger *vis-à-vis* Nazidom, as compared with the position of her two partners in the Little Entente, was not, after all, so inordinately great as might have been supposed. And if, even so, the Rumanians and Jugoslavs had hesitated to involve themselves in Czechoslovakia's special German complications, they would no doubt have been reminded courteously by Dr. Beneš that they too had each a special complication of their own with a formidable Power: Rumania with Russia over Bessarabia, and Jugoslavia with Italy over the Adriatic.¹ In any case, the actual effect of the Nazi Revolution in Germany upon the Little Entente was not to prise it asunder, by stampeding the two more distant members into leaving Czechoslovakia in the lurch, but on the contrary to clinch and confirm the alliance by convincing the statesmen of all the three countries concerned that, with this great new factor of uncertainty imported into the international politics of Europe, it would be more than ever unwise, on their part, to leave open any rift in their own solidarity.²

7. *The Reaction in Italy*

In Italian policy, the advent of Herr Hitler to power in 1933 produced a change of orientation which was comparable, *mutatis mutandis*, to the change that had followed the outbreak of the General War in 1914. Just as, in 1914-15, Italy withdrew from her existing alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary in order to intervene in the War on the opposite side to her own previous allies and on the same side as France, so, in 1933, Italy decidedly cooled off from the sympathy with post-war Germany which was the reverse side of her soreness against post-war France, and ranged herself with France against Germany on the issue of the Austrian *Anschluss*, which was a question of capital importance to all three countries.

The moment Herr Hitler established himself in the seat of power, it became clear that German National Socialism in the wilderness was more agreeable to Signor Mussolini than German National Socialism in the saddle. So long as the Nazis were battling their way in Germany

¹ See p. 195 above.

² At the moment when Herr Hitler came to power in Berlin, the statesmen of the Little Entente were already engaged in cementing that closer union between their three countries which was embodied in the 'pact of organization' of the 16th February, 1933. For this pact, and its relation to the Four-Power Pact which was initiated on the 7th June, 1933, see below, section (ii) of this part.

along the steep and toilsome road towards ultimate victory, the expressions of Italian Fascist sympathy with German Fascist comrades were frequent and cordial—partly because it warmed Signor Mussolini's heart to see his doctrine being propagated as a gospel of social salvation in another great European country besides his own, and still more, perhaps, because, in the threat of a National-Socialist Germany, Italian diplomacy found an effective stick for belabouring France. During the seven years that intervened between the first meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference on the 18th May, 1926, and the investiture of Herr Hitler with the Chancellorship of the Reich on the 30th January, 1933, Italian statesmanship seems to have played with the idea of countering, and eventually counteracting, the preponderance of France and her satellites in post-war Europe by the formation of an Italo-German *bloc*.¹ But in these Italian dreams we may conjecture that there was one unvarying feature which was *de rigueur*. In the future anti-French duet, as conceived in Italian imaginations, it was always Italy that was to play first fiddle. This, for Italian minds, was the axiomatic condition of the partnership, and this Italian presupposition would not conclusively convict Italian statesmanship of megalomania; for though it was true that, intrinsically and potentially, Germany outclassed Italy in calibre, nevertheless Italy might hope, not irrationally, to snatch a permanent advantage out of the passing situation of the post-war years. Owing to the outcome of the War, Germany—defeated, prostrated and outlawed—had temporarily lost caste, whereas Italy, though she might elect to range herself with the vanquished, was officially one of the victors. Was it too much to hope that Italy's reward for having condescended (in her own interest) to change sides once again might be the permanent leadership of the post-war opposition camp? True, she could never have dreamed of expecting pre-war Germany to follow her lead; and after the War she, too, had lost her *moral*—in spite of her official victoriousness—as signally as Germany had lost hers. But she had been the first of the prostrate Powers to recover herself; and from the end of 1922 to the beginning of 1933 Fascist Italy was manifestly more *aktionsfähig* (to borrow a Nazi term) than the Weimar Republic.

The Germany of Stresemann and Brüning seemed not unwilling to play second fiddle to the Italy of Mussolini; and, if so, then, *a fortiori*, could not Italy count upon a more actively zealous obsequiousness on the part of a successful Hitler? Down to January 1933, National Socialism might well appear, in Italian eyes, to be a slavish

¹ See the *Survey for 1930*, pp. 125-30.

though inferior imitation of Fascism; the Nazis were almost pathetically eager for Italian support; and they were almost indecently demonstrative in their renunciation of the South Tyrol. With Hitler in office, it no doubt seemed to Signor Mussolini that his long-cherished Italo-German combine under Italian leadership would come now at last within the range of practical politics. The supreme miscalculation in this Italian train of reasoning (if we have reconstructed it aright) was the tacit assumption that Hitler in the saddle would be the same man as Hitler in the wilderness. The moment Herr Hitler took office, this misconception was blown to the winds by the 'raging tearing' National-Socialist Revolution which transformed the Weimar Republic into a 'totalitarian' Third Reich with all, and more than all, the temper and pretensions of pre-war Germany. Signor Mussolini must have realized his mistake at once, but already it was too late.

In the course of the year 1933, as the Nazi Revolution in Germany ran its course, a number of unpalatable facts were borne in upon Italian minds successively. In the first place, it now became clear that, if Fascist Italy were to yoke herself to Nazi Germany *à deux*, it would not be Italy that would set the pace of the adventure or determine its direction. She would be swept off her feet by her turbulent yoke-fellow as helplessly as a strutting ram that had yoked itself to a charging bull; and Italy had no more desire to confer the hegemony of Europe upon Germany than she had to concede it to France, since the fundamental policy of Italy, like that of the United Kingdom, was to prevent any single Power from establishing a predominance on the Continent. In the second place it became clear that an Italo-German partnership would have to be *à deux* if it was to be entered into at all, since Germany, under the Nazi régime, was rapidly ridding herself of all her previous friends. Russia, above all, was sheering off from Germany as fast as she could, and even Italy's own satellite Hungary might hesitate to follow Italy in keeping such hazardous company as 'the Third Reich'. In the fourth place it became clear that, by casting in her lot with Nazi Germany, Italy would forfeit the goodwill of the English-speaking countries, to whom Nazi Germany was anathema; and it was one of the cardinal points of Italian policy to keep on good terms with the British Empire and the United States—two valuable friends with whom Italy had no cause to quarrel. In the fifth place, the Nazi persecution of the Jews aroused the same feelings of disapprobation in Italy as in the other Western countries. Finally it became clear that one of Herr Hitler's first objectives—an aspiration which was bound up with his own personal *amour propre*—was the incorporation of his Austrian home-

land into 'the Third Reich' which he had succeeded, by a *tour de force*, in setting up *in partibus Borussorum*. And this was a post-war German ambition which post-war Italy had always refused, and must always refuse, to countenance.

The *Anschluss* of Austria to Germany, under any German régime, would place Italy at Germany's mercy and threaten to deprive her of her principal gains in the War. For the *Anschluss*, once set in motion, would assuredly not come to a halt at the post-war frontier between Austria and Italy. Next door, just across the Brenner Pass, lay the South Tyrol with its quarter of a million Austrian German inhabitants whom the Peace Settlement had placed under Italian rule in defiance of the principles of nationality and self-determination. Under the territorial dispensation of the Peace Settlement of 1919-20, Italy's hold upon the South Tyrol was virtually secure—depending, though it did, upon naked force¹—since the quarter of a million Southern Tyrolese were powerless by themselves, while an independent Austrian Republic of six million inhabitants was equally powerless to help them and a German Reich of sixty-five million inhabitants could not take up the South-Tyrol question effectively so long as it was barred off, by a strip of Austrian territory, from direct contact with the Tyrolese field of action. On the other hand, an *Anschluss* of post-war Austria to post-war Germany would immediately confront Italy, at the Brenner, with a new neighbour—the *Siebzigmillionenstaat* that had been the dream of German patriots in 1848—and, for this colossus, the South Tyrol would be an immediate *terra irredenta*. However fervently the Nazis might have renounced the South Tyrol before, it was certain that they would claim it forthwith if once the North Tyrol were theirs; and, if Carinthia and Styria were theirs, might they not even extend their claim to Trieste into the bargain? The Nazi triumph in Germany made the question of the *Anschluss* almost a matter of life-and-death for Italy. Henceforward, it would be hardly possible for Italy to refuse to take any step which the paramount necessity of preventing the *Anschluss* might require of her. And—irony of ironies—the first step required was an Italian *rapprochement* towards France. In this situation, Italy might find it difficult to retain that profitable position of holding the balance on the Continent which had fallen to her in 1914 and then again after the inauguration of the Fascist régime. Signor Mussolini's anxiety to retain his initiative was doubtless one of his motives in advocating the conclusion of the Four-Power Pact.²

¹ For the Italian régime in the South Tyrol since the Armistice, see the *Survey for 1927*, Part II C, section (iii). ² This is dealt with below in section (ii).

Meanwhile, Italian diplomacy endeavoured to hold Germany in check so discreetly that it should not appear, in German eyes, that the special benevolence shown by Italy to the Weimar Republic was being meted out to 'the Third Reich' in any shorter measure. And the new rulers of Germany, on their side, affected not to see through this Italian manoeuvre, in their anxiety to convince the rest of the World that Fascist Italy was a warmer friend of Nazi Germany than it actually suited Italy to be. This Italo-German diplomatic competition in keeping up or creating appearances was conducted through an exchange of hollow official compliments and frigid official visits. In the course of the year 1933, Herr von Papen found his way to Rome once, Captain Göring three times, and Dr. Göbbels once;¹ and in July a touring party of Avanguardisti were entertained by the Hitler Youth at Munich. In September, two fraternal delegates from the Fascist Grand Council were present at the National-Socialist Congress and took part in the celebrations at Nuremberg. And Captain Göring, on his second visit to Rome in November, was the bearer of a personal letter from the *Führer* to the *Duce*. Yet, the more sedulously the two countries sought to advertise their friendship, the more evident it became to the rest of the World that, now that both of them had attained the 'totalitarian' state, their genuine cordiality had sensibly diminished.

8. Conclusion

The wide range of the reactions abroad to the National-Socialist Revolution of 1933 in Germany is witnessed by the length of the present chapter, in which some of these reactions have been very far from exhaustively surveyed; and after this long exposition of detail it may be well to conclude our survey by returning to the point from which we started out. The relation of the Nazi régime of 1933 in Germany to the rest of the World can be seen as a unity—and also, perhaps, seen in the clearest light—if it is regarded as one phase of the secular relation between the spirit of Western Christendom and the spirit of a European barbarism which Christianity had sometimes cowed and sometimes charmed, and had thereby partly tamed, but had never wholly exorcized. At the first critical encounter between this faith and these barbarians, the summons of the civilizing power had been 'Mitis demitte colla, Sigamber!' In 1933, the self-conscious epigoni of the blond beast who were seeking to express their neo-

¹ In these visits, of course, the German statesmen had business to transact at the Vatican City, as well as in the capital of the Regno.

barbarism through the instrument of 'the totalitarian state' were faced with this summons in their turn; and, sooner or later, they were bound to give an unambiguous answer.

(ii) The Little-Entente Pact and the Four-Power Pact

In a previous section,¹ some account has been given of the reactions which the National-Socialist Revolution of 1933 in Germany evoked abroad; and, in this connexion, we have touched upon the foreign policy which was pursued, in 1933, by a number of Germany's neighbours, including Italy, Poland and the three parties to the Little Entente. In the development of the policies of these and other European countries, in the course of this year, the reaction to the contemporary course of events in Germany was manifestly a factor of capital importance. At the same time, it was not the only important factor which was at work. The revolution in Germany made its impact upon an international field in which many other forces were already in action; and a large part of its international effect consisted in its interplay with these current forces, which it stimulated or toned down or deflected, as the case might be. Moreover, these other movements were already in full swing at the moment of Herr Hitler's advent to power at the end of January 1933; and since this internal change in Germany took a certain time to work itself out within the borders of the Reich, and *a fortiori* to exert its influence beyond them, it is not surprising to find that little direct relation can be traced between the revolution in Germany and some of the most important of the international transactions of Europe in 1933—including transactions between countries which, like the five countries above named, were bound to be affected by the German revolution profoundly in the long run. Two outstanding transactions which fall into this category are the three-power 'pact of organization' of the Little Entente which was signed at Geneva on the 16th February, 1933, by the Foreign Ministers of Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Rumania, and the Four-Power Pact which was initialed at Rome, on the 7th June, by the representatives of France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Since these two transactions have some bearing upon each other, it will be convenient to deal with them together in the present chapter.

The movement towards closer union in the Little Entente was a response to the ominous change for the worse, in the general complexion of international affairs, which had already declared itself,

¹ Section (i) of this part of the present volume.

before Herr Hitler's triumph in Germany, in the successful Japanese defiance of the League of Nations in the Far East and in the ill-success of the proceedings of the World Disarmament Conference at Geneva. In these circumstances, on the 16th February, 1933, a new 'pact of organization' for the Little Entente was signed by the three Foreign Ministers—Messieurs Beneš, Jevtić and Titulescu—in Geneva, where they were representing their respective countries at the Disarmament Conference. A comprehensive summary of this diplomatic instrument need not be given here, as the text has been published in full in the accompanying volume of documents.¹ It is sufficient to say that the aims of the contracting parties were described in the preamble as being 'the complete unification of their general policy' and 'the establishment of an organ by which this common policy should be directed'. The new organ took the shape of a Permanent Council of Foreign Ministers; and although this Council's decisions were still to be governed by the unanimity rule and were not to be taken by a majority vote, the contracting parties did, in certain other ways, make important renunciations of their individual sovereignty for the benefit of the triple common weal. They each bound themselves thenceforth to conclude no fresh treaties and take no fresh unilateral action of international import without the Permanent Council's unanimous approval; and they further bound themselves to co-ordinate and unify their existing treaties with third parties as far as possible. The three bilateral treaties of alliance which were the original foundation of the Little Entente, as well as the tripartite Treaty of Conciliation, Arbitration and Judicial Settlement which the members had signed on the 21st May, 1929, were now all renewed, and this time in perpetuity.

In the spirit of this agreement, both Rumania and Jugoslavia made efforts, in the course of the year, to do their part in diminishing the total liabilities of the Little Entente by seeking the appeasement of feuds in which they were protagonists. Monsieur Titulescu, for example, established contact with the Soviet Government in October on the neutral ground of Poland,² while in December the King and Queen of Jugoslavia entertained the King and Queen of Bulgaria at Belgrade on an official visit.

The Little-Entente Pact of the 16th February, 1933, was declared, by its own terms, to be open for the adhesion of other states—subject to conditions to be agreed upon *ad hoc* in each particular case—and

¹ *Documents on International Affairs, 1933.*

² For the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in 1933, see pp. 174-83 above, and Part IV, § v and vi below.

on the 1st March the Permanent Council handed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations a letter formally denying the allegation that the published document was supplemented by secret military appendices. Thereafter, in an interview given to one English newspaper on the 25th June, 1933,¹ and in an article published in another English newspaper on the 3rd September,² Dr. Beneš declared that an Austro-Hungarian reunion would be as undesirable as an *Anschluss* of Austria to Germany; reiterated (a point which he had often made before) that it was in the general interest that the small countries of Central and Eastern Europe should not become the pawns of rival Great Powers but should be as independent in their foreign relations as the West-European ex-neutrals; and threw out the suggestion that, on the economic side, the new Little-Entente Pact might profitably be extended in range in the near future by the inclusion of other Danubian countries—Hungary first and foremost. Since the morrow of the Peace Settlement, Dr. Beneš had consistently declared his view that his own work would not be complete until Hungary had been reconciled to the Little Entente. But in 1933 there was no more prospect than there had been at the moment of signature of the Treaty of Trianon that Hungary would consent to 'moral disarmament' without insisting upon a revision of the territorial peace-terms which would be as unacceptable to Dr. Beneš as to his Rumanian and Jugoslav colleagues. So long as the territorial terms of the Treaty stood unrevised, Hungary would assuredly prefer to be the satellite of Italy rather than join the Little Entente—even on an equal footing with the three original members.³

¹ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 26th June, 1933.

² *The Observer*, 3rd September, 1933.

³ Italy, on her part, had no desire to see her own influence in the Danube Basin diminished or eliminated by the establishment of an all-inclusive Danubian economic bloc; and France, though she favoured Dr. Beneš's idea in principle, was inclined to regard it as a counsel of perfection which was hardly practical politics. In the autumn, there was a Franco-Italian exchange of views in a French *aide mémoire* of the 12th September and an Italian memorandum of the 30th September on ways and means of implementing the recommendations of the Conference of Stresa (see the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 23-7 and 87-95); and though the proposal for an all-inclusive Danubian bloc was rejected, in the Italian document, in favour of a network of bilateral agreements, a Franco-Italian agreement on the subject was officially announced on the 8th October. This agreement seems to have been little more than a mutual gesture of courtesy between two Powers which, in their relations *inter se*, were being drawn closer together at the time by their respective concern over the course of the National-Socialist Revolution in Germany—especially in relation to Austria. It is possible, however, that the rather negative attitude of France at this stage facilitated the Italo-Austro-Hungarian negotiations that eventually resulted in the tripartite agreement of the 17th March, 1934. Without

The announcement of the new step towards closer union between the three original states members of the Little Entente was, in fact, as ill received in Italy as in Hungary, though this for a different reason. In Hungary, the Little-Entente Pact of the 16th February, 1933, was resented as a fresh obstacle deliberately placed in the path of Hungarian irredentism; in Italy, it was resented as an offensively ingenious attempt, on the part of three small countries, to present a united front to the World for the purpose of claiming, conjointly, the rank of a Great Power. While Hungarian statesmanship was thinking principally in terms of territory, Signor Mussolini was thinking principally in terms of status. In international affairs, however, *amour propre* is notoriously as potent a motive in determining policy as material interest; and, on the question of her international status, Italy was as sensitive as Poland.

In another part of this volume,¹ we have had occasion to notice that the foreign policy of Poland was partly governed by her anxiety to retain the brevet rank of Great Power which had been conferred upon her, after her political resurrection in the Peace Settlement, by a fortunate combination of passing circumstances; and in this connexion we have observed how Poland measured her own status by that of Germany and Russia, and how she postured and manoeuvred on the international stage with a view to keeping out of any tableau in which she would appear in a position of manifest inferiority to either of her traditionally and essentially grander, but temporarily and accidentally humbler, neighbours. A similar sensitiveness was one of the governing factors in the foreign policy of Italy, who likewise found herself uncomfortably near to the shadowy and shifting line which divided the Great Powers from the small fry in the international society of the day. If Poland was still just on the wrong side of this distressing mark, Italy was still only just on the right side of it; and the exertions of the 'near great' Power to struggle across the dividing line were matched by those of the 'just great' Power to save herself from slipping back again over it.

Since an early stage of the nineteenth-century Italian *Risorgimento*, one of the ulterior objects of the makers of a United Italy had been

anticipating the account of these negotiations which will be given in a later volume, it may be observed, at this point, that this Italo-Austro-Hungarian *rapprochement*, following upon the consolidation of the Little Entente, divided the Danubian countries into two sharply defined groups which were at cross-purposes on the issue of the territorial revision of the Peace Treaties, but were at the same time pursuing, separately, the identical aim of erecting a barrier against a south-eastward expansion of 'the Third Reich'.

¹ See pp. 184-6 above.

to raise the peninsula to the status of a Great Power through political union. This status, which was only won and only held at the cost of a heavy strain upon Italian national resources, had a proportionately high value in Italian estimation. And if the Italians prized their country's rank as a Great Power, then it was natural for them to magnify the breadth of the gulf fixed between Great Powers and states of lesser calibre. This sensitiveness about Italy's status as a Great Power, and about the status of the Great Powers as a class, was inherited, from his predecessors at the head of the Italian Government, by Signor Mussolini; and he was the more inclined to dwell upon the point because it was in accordance not only with Italian national tradition but also with Fascist social doctrine. Fascism stood for a social hierarchy which was frankly based in part upon force; and if the principle that 'might is right' was valid for individuals and for parties, it must also hold good for states. The seventeenth-century doctrine of the Equality of Sovereign States was as alien from the Fascist political philosophy as the eighteenth-century doctrine of the Rights of Man; and it was therefore natural that the *Duce* should deprecate, on principle, the position which—on the strength of a combination of these two doctrines—had been assigned, in the constitution of the League of Nations, to the fifty-four States Members which did not rank as Great Powers.

It was true that even the constitution of the League gave the Great Powers a special position by reserving to them the privilege of permanent representation on the Council.¹ Nevertheless, one of the important effects of the existence of the League, as originally constituted, was that it gave the lesser Powers a forum which they had not previously possessed for making their opinions and sentiments felt. This aspect of the League's activity was unwelcome to Signor Mussolini in the abstract and *a priori*; but his dislike of it was no doubt intensified by the practical fact that whenever the policy of any considerable group of smaller countries in the Assembly did happen to coincide with the policy of some particular Great Power, the beneficiary was France not infrequently but Italy seldom or never. Thus, if the machinery of the League could in some way be 'short-circuited' by placing an executive authority over international affairs in the hands of a Great-Power group, the probable effect would be not only to increase the relative authority of the Great Powers as a class but also, in the act, to increase the relative influence of Italy as against France in international counsels. On this showing, it may be conjectured that the concept of a European directory of

¹ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part I A, section (i).

the four European Great Powers had been taking shape in Signor Mussolini's mind for some time past; and he had ventilated the idea in a speech delivered in Turin on the 23rd October, 1932.

I think that if to-morrow, on the basis of Justice, of recognition of our sacrosanct rights . . . , it were possible to recognize the premises necessary and sufficient for the collaboration of the four great Western Powers, Europe would be tranquil from the political standpoint, and perhaps the end would be in sight of the economic crisis by which we are gripped. . . .

This suggestion was thrown out by Signor Mussolini nearly four months before the signature of the Little-Entente Pact of the 16th February, 1933; but this event, though it was perhaps not of capital importance or startling novelty in itself, may conceivably have moved Signor Mussolini to make a counterblast, and thereby have given him the final stimulus to develop a long-germinating idea into a definite project and to launch this project at the earliest possible date.

This seems the more likely when we consider that, apart from any question of *amour propre*, the disquieting features in the general international outlook, which had moved Dr. Beneš and his colleagues to strengthen the bonds between their respective countries, must have been equally evident to Signor Mussolini, and equally apt to move him to take action. The prospective recovery of Germany, for example, promised to upset the artificial and temporary balance of forces in Europe which the post-war prostration of Germany had alone rendered possible; and this threatened to deprive Italy of the exceptional influence and power which she had wielded in international affairs ever since the outbreak of war in 1914. If a fresh trial of strength were now to set in between Germany and France, Italy might sink once more to a position of secondary importance, in which she would have no choice except to join the camp of one or other of the two protagonists. On the narrower grounds of national self-interest, it must be one of the major aims of Italian policy to prevent this situation from recurring; and wider considerations of an Italian interest which was identical with the international common weal must have moved Signor Mussolini's mind in the same direction. By the beginning of the year 1933, no clear-sighted statesman could be blind to the possibility that, if the affairs of the World were allowed to drift on, unchecked, along their present unpropitious course, this might end in a breakdown of the Disarmament Conference and even in a breakup of the League; and, if either or both of these catastrophes occurred, the calamity of a new Franco-German trial of strength would then be imminent unless, in the meantime, at least

the foundations had been laid for some alternative system of international relations. If such an alternative was really to save Europe from a fresh schism into a French and a German camp, then it must be distinguished from the Geneva system by holding out to Germany the prospect of a more prompt and more substantial realization of her principal claims; and, if the new system was at the same time to serve the interests of Italy, it must provide the satisfaction for Germany in directions which Italy would not find dangerous or embarrassing.

These were perhaps some of the considerations in Signor Mussolini's mind when, in March 1933, he actually put forward his proposal for a European Four-Power Pact.

The essence of the plan, as the head of the Italian Government originally conceived it, seems to have been that the four Powers, acting *à quatre*, could and should do certain things—agreeable to Germany and not disagreeable to Italy—which France, at any rate, could not be expected to do gladly, and which she probably never would do, or allow to be done, at all, if, instead of being placed in a minority of one on an executive committee of four, she continued to play her previous rôle under the existing international régime, in which French policy could count upon holding its own on the Council and Assembly of the League by enlisting the support of a phalanx of smaller Powers. Two specific points on his own agenda which Signor Mussolini probably hoped to be able to carry—if once he were to secure the transference of the business from the League to a four-Power group—were the revision of the territorial chapters of the four European Peace Treaties in favour of the ex-vanquished countries (with whom Italy had ranged herself),¹ and the re-armament of Germany up to the post-war level of the ex-victors, by a four-Power agreement, in the event of a breakdown of the World Disarmament Conference. These two objectives were respectively set forth in the second and the third articles of Signor Mussolini's original draft for a Four-Power Pact.² And while he was careful to declare, in his draft of Article 2, that 'the principle of revision' could not 'be applied except within the framework of the League and in a spirit of mutual understanding and solidarity of reciprocal interests', this caveat was perhaps to be interpreted by the declaration, in the Mussolinian Article 1, that the

¹ See the *Survey for 1930*, pp. 125-30.

² See the synoptic presentation of the four successive draft texts of the Four-Power Pact—the Mussolini draft of March 1933, the British draft of the 1st April, the Daladier draft of May, and the final text of June—as printed in *The Bulletin of International News*, 22nd June, 1933, pp. 7-9 [802-3], and in *Documents on International Affairs, 1933*, pp. 240-9.

four Powers 'undertake to act in the sphere of European relations in such a manner that' their 'peace policy' would 'be adopted in case of necessity by other Powers as well'. It may be conjectured that, in Signor Mussolini's intention, the four Powers were to act in the same cogent manner when they were advocating treaty revision and German re-armament as when they were championing 'the Kellogg and anti-war pacts'.

It was evident that a re-armament of Germany would be much less awkward for Italy—and, indeed, for the World at large—if it were carried out by agreement, in a four-Power conclave, through Italy's good offices, than if it came to pass in a sheer unregulated competition between Germany and France. It was also possible that a four-Power conclave would prove to be a more favourable forum than the Assembly or even the Council of the League for setting a territorial revision of the Peace Treaties in motion in the direction which the Italian Government would like to see it take.

It remains to describe the course of the negotiations and their effects. In regard to their opening, the most authoritative testimony will be found in the statements made in the House of Commons at Westminster by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald on the 23rd March, 1933, and by Sir John Simon on the 13th April. For Signor Mussolini's first move was to bid for the sympathy and goodwill of the British Government on behalf of his project. The occasion presented itself during the two British Ministers' visit to Geneva in March,¹ when Mr. MacDonald seems to have let it be known that he would welcome an invitation from Signor Mussolini to travel on to Rome before returning to London. In making this overture, Mr. MacDonald may have looked forward to expediting a solution of the disarmament problem by discussing it *à deux* with the *Duce*. If this idea were in the British Prime Minister's mind, it did not come to fruition; and we may conjecture that it was not agreeable to the *Duce*—concerned though he was over the disarmament problem—to deal with it in exactly this way. On the other hand, he evidently appreciated the friendliness of Mr. MacDonald's gesture, and he promptly took the opportunity of broaching his own project.

Several considerations indicated the United Kingdom as the Power which it would be wise for Signor Mussolini to approach first. Like Italy, the United Kingdom was trying to play a mediatory part between Germany and France; like Italy, she looked forward with misgiving to a breakdown of the Disarmament Conference; and, indeed, the business that had brought the British Prime Minister and

¹ See section (iii) (b) and (c) of this part of the present volume.

Foreign Secretary to Geneva on this occasion was a rescue expedition with the object of saving the Conference *in extremis*.¹ Thus, in their general policy, Italy and the United Kingdom had much in common; and, on the particular issue which Signor Mussolini intended to raise, the British had shown signs of sharing to some extent the Italian impatience with the international franchise which the constitution of the League of Nations had conferred upon the smaller states.² These points were all favourable to Signor Mussolini's project. At the same time, there were other points in the foreign policy of the United Kingdom which were of at least an equal importance in the British statesmen's estimation, but which were not so auspicious from the Italian point of view. British co-operation with Italy must not take any form detrimental to British co-operation with France;³ and the smaller states—however unwarrantable it might be for them to take a strong line on international matters of general concern—had 'a right to be consulted wherever their special interests' were 'concerned'.⁴ Both these points of British policy were raised by the Italian approach to Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon in March 1933; and the British Ministers did not allow their adherence to them to be weakened by their eagerness to support an Italian move for finding a way out of the threatened European deadlock. Hence, the broaching of the Italian project to Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon at once evoked suggestions from them for modifications of the original Italian idea; and when the revision, thus started, had been carried further by the several contributions of Messieurs Herriot and Daladier and Beneš and Titulescu, the Four-Power Pact came to assume a shape in which it was acceptable to everybody because it had been purged of just those elements that had been the essence of it in the original Italian conception. Since these eliminated elements were precisely the features of the project that might have

¹ See pp. 248 *seqq.* below.

² This had become apparent on more than one occasion during the years 1932-3 in the discussions in the League Assembly, and in its Watching Committee, over the Sino-Japanese conflict (see the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 570 *seqq.* and the present volume, Part IV, section (iv)). The annoyance then manifested by British statesmen at the stand which the representatives of the smaller countries were taking was possibly noticed by Italian observers. It was the more noticeable because it was in pointed contrast to the considerateness which the same British statesmen almost invariably displayed, in intra-Commonwealth relations, towards those small States Members of the League which were at the same time self-governing Dominions of the British Crown.

³ See Sir John Simon's observations on this point in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 13th April, 1933.

⁴ Mr. MacDonald in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 23rd March, 1933.

made the pact an effective instrument of action, its possible importance, for good or evil, was considerably diminished between the moment of Signor Mussolini's first overture on the 18th March and the eventual initialing of an agreed text on the 7th June.

The first step taken by Sir John Simon, when the Italian invitation to the two British Ministers was delivered on the 15th March, was to discuss it with the French Foreign Minister, Monsieur Paul-Boncour, in Geneva and to communicate on the subject with the French Prime Minister, Monsieur Daladier, in Paris. Thereupon Monsieur Daladier paid a special visit to Geneva to see the British Ministers before they left for Rome, gave his blessing to their acceptance of the invitation, and publicly expressed his good wishes in a speech delivered at Geneva on the 16th March, the day before his British colleagues set out on their journey. On the 18th March, in the motor-car in which the two Ministers travelled the last stage of their way to Rome from the air-port of Ostia, they were shown 'what was described as a very rough draft which Signor Mussolini had prepared of some ideas which he entertained. He had at the same time given a copy of the draft to the French Ambassador in Rome, Monsieur de Jouvenel, and to the Italian Ambassador from Berlin.'¹ The first impression made by the Italian plan upon these British eyes was that it 'merely' had, 'as its general purpose, peace, and, as its big, and almost only, detail, revision of treaties'.² And the first comment of the British statesmen to their Italian colleagues was 'that there' were 'certain difficulties . . . in the form of the draft . . . which' they were 'quite confident' that the Italian statesmen would 'have to consider'.³

In particular [Sir John Simon afterwards reported to the House of Commons at Westminster] we mentioned two. In the first place, it was clear to us that, if it were expected that our friends in France were going to agree, the document must be in a form which might reasonably secure their concurrence, and, at any rate, not rouse their suspicion. As one article of this document was originally drawn, though it referred to the possibility of a revision of treaties, it made no reference whatever to the corresponding obligations of the Covenant, namely, recognition of the sanctity of treaties. In the course of the afternoon I drafted—very roughly, no doubt—a new form of article, embodying what appeared to us to be a very necessary form of change, in the course of which we put in the proposition, which is in the preamble of the Covenant, namely, that there must be a scrupulous respect for treaties, side by side with the other proposition, which is equally in the Covenant, that the Covenant envisages the possibility, under certain conditions, of treaty revision.⁴

¹ Sir John Simon, *loc. cit.*

² Sir John Simon, *loc. cit.*

³ Mr. MacDonald, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Sir John Simon, *loc. cit.*

This counter-draft of Sir John Simon's foreshadowed the lines along which all the subsequent negotiations were to run; so that in a general way the destiny of the Italian project was determined by the time when, on the 20th March, the two British Ministers left Rome again to visit their French colleagues in Paris on their way to London. After this Anglo-French meeting in Paris, a French official *communiqué* was issued there on the 21st, 'stating that the French Ministers had thanked their colleagues for the information they had furnished and had affirmed their desire to see established in the interest of peace, within the framework and in the spirit of the League of Nations, a loyal co-operation between the four European Powers who are permanent members of the Council of the League'. Thereafter the French Government occupied themselves still more actively than the British Government in pressing for a modification of the Italian draft in this sense.

Meanwhile, rumours had become rife, and hopes or fears had been aroused, in almost every part of Europe.

In Great Britain, for instance, it was asked whether some part of Italy's and Germany's share of the feast was to be the acquisition of colonies or mandates at the British Empire's expense. It was true that an overseas application, in Italy's or Germany's favour, of the principle of territorial revision was faintly hinted at in Article 4 of the Italian draft, which provided that

In all political and non-political European and extra-European questions, as well as in the colonial sphere, the four Powers undertake to adopt as far as possible a common line of action.

In the House of Commons at Westminster on the 23rd March, 1933, the Secretary of State for the Colonies denied, in answer to a parliamentary question, that His Majesty's Government had ever contemplated any surrender of the mandate for Tanganyika; and, in the same place on the same day, Mr. MacDonald added that Tanganyika had never been mentioned in the conversations at Rome.

While Mr. MacDonald was rendering his account in London, Messieurs Daladier and Paul-Boncour were being interrogated in Paris on the same subject on the same day, the 23rd March, by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber. In a newspaper article¹ published in France on the 1st April, the Italian project was stigmatized by Monsieur Herriot as a scheme for a four-Power directory which was to attempt to re-draw the political map of Europe with the inevitable result of precipitating a war. On the other hand, the project found an authoritative and influential sponsor in France in the person of

¹ In *Le Démocrate* of Lyons.

the French Ambassador in Rome, Monsieur de Jouvenel. And on the 3rd April the French press published a statement, given by him in Rome to the *Agence Havas*, in which he deprecated the sinister interpretations which had been made of Signor Mussolini's intentions in non-Italian quarters. In the meantime, the French Government were engaged in drafting a memorandum on the project, and on the 6th April some indication of the trend of French policy was given by Monsieur Daladier in a speech in the Chamber of Deputies.

There is no question [he said on this occasion] of giving our adherence to a sort of directory of the Great Powers which would impose their wills upon the rest of Europe—a Holy Alliance which would decide upon territorial revisions and more or less extensive changes of frontiers and would thereby show itself even more ambitious than the original Holy Alliance, which was really a conservative institution. This enterprise would come into collision with the French—or, rather, Franco-Italian—idea of the equality of nations. . . . If the new pact is to be useful it must constitute a genuine sequel to those great constructive contributions to the edifice of peace to which its own text refers: the Covenant of the League . . . , the Briand-Kellogg agreement, the agreements of Locarno.

In the course of the same speech, Monsieur Daladier referred to Article 19 of the Covenant and suggested that, while it might be important to implement this article, it was no less important to implement Articles 11, 12, 15 and 16.

The points made in Parliament by the French Prime Minister on this occasion seem to have represented the gist of the French Government's memorandum, which, after long delay and much revision, was finally communicated to Rome and London on the 12th April.

French policy was no doubt influenced in large measure by the strong reactions to the Italian project in those East-European countries that were the French Republic's allies.

At Geneva, on the 25th March, the Permanent Council of the Little Entente discussed the situation and issued a statement in which they adroitly applied to the Great Powers the British formula in regard to the states of lesser calibre. The British formula, as has been noticed above, was that the smaller states were taking too much upon themselves in calling the tune for dances in which the Great Powers had to pay the piper, but that on the other hand they had a fair 'right to be consulted whenever their special interests' were 'concerned'. The Little Entente Council now declared on its part its opinion that

any collaboration between states with a view to establishing friendly relations between them, and regulating those questions that concern them exclusively, is desirable and wholesome. All the same, the states

of the Little Entente would find it difficult to agree that the cause of good relations between countries was being served by agreements having it as their object to dispose of the rights of third parties—and this equally whether these agreements bind the signatories to take concrete decisions, or whether the object is simply to exert pressure upon countries other than the contracting parties. Since nobody can dispose of anybody else's property either directly or indirectly, the states of the Little Entente formulate, from now onwards, the most explicit reserves with regard to the eventual conclusion of any agreements of the kind, in respect of anything that touches their own rights and policy. Agreements of this nature belong to the past, and certainly to times anterior to the foundation of the League of Nations. The states of the Little Entente also regret that, in the negotiations of the last few days, the idea of a revisionist policy should have been emphasized. . . .

This statement was communicated, on the day of issue, to Sir John Simon at Geneva, and Dr. Beneš called upon him there on the same day. On the 26th March, in the same place, Sir John Simon received visits from Monsieur Titulescu, from Monsieur Fotić the representative of the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, from Monsieur Massigli the French representative at the Disarmament Conference, and from Count Raczynski representing Poland. At the end of March, Monsieur Titulescu set out on a visit to Paris and London on behalf of the Little Entente as a whole. On the 30th March, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Monsieur Jevtić, speaking in Parliament at Belgrade, said that the Little Entente Council's statement of the 25th March precisely reflected the Yugoslav point of view. At the beginning of April, the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, started on a round of visits to Prague, Bucarest and Belgrade.

On the 25th April, the most telling attack, up to date, upon Signor Mussolini's policy was delivered by Dr. Beneš in a speech addressed to the two houses of the Czechoslovak Parliament.

Dr. Beneš declared that the Italian draft embodied the essentials of Italian foreign policy during the previous ten years, which he summed up as follows:

1. Italy and Germany are to have equality of status within the concert of the four Great Powers; the exceptional position of the Great Powers is emphasized as against the remaining states, especially in Central and South-Eastern Europe.
2. A new European balance of power is to be created, which will involve the military weakening of France and her friends and the military strengthening of the defeated states.
3. The revision of the Peace Treaties will create a new balance of power in Central Europe as against the Little Entente and Poland, whose position will be weakened.
4. Italy will receive satisfaction in the colonial question.

On the question of treaty revision he defined the attitude of the Little Entente in terms that were precise and uncompromising.

While discussing this question at Geneva with Sir John Simon I was compelled to remind him that frontier adjustments cannot be imposed upon any state and that any one attempting anything of the sort with Czechoslovakia would have to march an army into her territory. We should know how to defend ourselves. It was possible to dispose of territory at the Peace Conference. Since the moment when ownership was confirmed in law to this or that state it is perfectly absurd to claim any right of disposition. That is our position in principle, and we will not depart from it for any one. We cannot understand how a combination of states can be formed to divide the territory of other states when—if I am rightly informed—all questions as to their own territory are to be excluded on the ground that no agreement could be reached about them. . . .

Frontier alterations are only possible by direct agreement between the states concerned within the framework of Article 19 of the League Covenant.

This vehement negative declaration was followed, however, by a positive statement of three conditions on which a 'minor alteration or adjustment of the treaty frontiers' might possibly be brought about.

(a) There must be no external pressure, which would only call forth counter-pressure and would lead to nothing. Agreement can only be reached by direct negotiation between the peoples interested and with their free consent, given in accordance with their constitutional laws. This is true of any application of article 19 of the Covenant, since that article assumes the agreement of the interested states.

(b) Such an agreement is only possible in an atmosphere of calm after some years of peaceful co-operation between the peoples concerned. It cannot follow from any sort of terror, pressure, or blackmail exercised by one Power against another.

(c) Such an agreement is only possible if equivalent compensation is given, so that the interests of both parties are fully respected and their Parliaments and public opinion can give their free consent.

This limited and guarded indication of a possibility that the Little Entente might not always remain completely intransigent in regard to Hungary's and Bulgaria's territorial claims was a corollary to the second of two points in which Dr. Beneš summed up the Little Entente's ideals and aims. The first of these points was that Central and Eastern Europe must not be allowed again to become an arena for the Great Powers' conflicts, nor the Central and East-European successor states to become the Great Powers' pawns. The second point was that, if the Great Powers were to be precluded from fishing in troubled waters, the ex-victors among the Central and East-

European successor states must contrive to effect a reconciliation with their ex-vanquished neighbours and peers.

At the moment, Dr. Beneš's speech of the 25th April seemed to have given the *coup de grâce* to an Italian project that was already apparently moribund; for the damping effect that had been produced by the guarded attitude of the British and the French towards Signor Mussolini's draft, and by the hostile attitude of the Poles and the peoples of the Little Entente, had been accentuated by a general turn for the worse in the proceedings of the Disarmament Conference at Geneva and in the relations between Germany and the rest of the World. Logically, this unfavourable trend of international affairs was a justification of Signor Mussolini's thesis that some energetic move—of the kind represented by the proposed Four-Power Pact—was needed precisely at this moment in order to ensure in advance against the risk of a breakdown at Geneva. In practice, the onset of the malady increased the difficulty of applying the Mussolinian remedy for it. This turn for the worse continued during the first half of May, when the British attempt at Geneva to make headway with the British draft disarmament convention was being obstinately obstructed by the German representative at the Disarmament Conference.¹ But the air was cleared by Herr Hitler's speech of the 17th May, in which he committed himself with impressive publicity and solemnity to a policy of peace, in response to President Roosevelt's peremptory challenge.² When Herr Hitler's words in Berlin were promptly translated into action at Geneva through the withdrawal of the German delegate's obstructive amendments to the British draft convention, the international tension relaxed sufficiently to make it possible for the text of a Four-Power Pact to be initialled by all the four Powers in question. At the same time, the document that was initialled at Rome on the 7th June, 1933, showed more traces of Monsieur Daladier's hand than of Signor Mussolini's.

The final text of the Four-Power Pact, as initialled on the 7th June, 1933, was a compromise between the original Italian draft and a French counter-draft³ embodying the points laid down in the French Government's April memorandum, as well as the points on which the Little Entente Council had insisted. (The views of the Little Entente had differed from the views of the French themselves in emphasis rather than in substance.) At Prague, on the 30th May, the French counter-draft was formally accepted by the Little Entente

¹ See section (iii) (c) of this part of the present volume.

² See p. 125 above and pp. 266-71 below.

³ For a synoptic view of the three texts, see *loc. cit.* on p. 209 above.

Council in a statement in which, after reciting the text of their previous statement of the 25th April, they declared that the objections to the Italian project, there set forth, were met by the new French text. To make assurance doubly sure, they proceeded to point out the differences between the two drafts, put on record the assurances which they had received from all the four Great Powers that there was no question of impairing the authority of the League of Nations, and let it be known that formal guarantees against any attempt at treaty-revision had been given to them by the French Government in accordance with the pre-existing reciprocal undertakings that bound France and the Little Entente countries to one another.

The differences between the French counter-draft and the original Italian draft, which were hereby underlined, and accepted as satisfactory, by the Little Entente Council, were substantially maintained in the final draft which was initialled on the 7th June; and accordingly the news of the transaction at Rome on that date was received calmly in Prague, Bucarest and Belgrade. On the other hand, it raised a storm in Warsaw, where the question of substance, on which the statesmen of the Little Entente had sought, and obtained, satisfaction, was overshadowed by a question of status which did not trouble Dr. Beneš and his Yugoslav and Rumanian colleagues. In their view, the contretemps was over and done with as soon as their own diplomatic efforts had been duly successful in emasculating the original draft of the Four-Power Pact and so condemning the final instrument to sterility. In the Polish view, on the other hand, the damage which was the most grievous in Polish eyes had been done, and done irretrievably, in the mere fact that a diplomatic instrument, however innocuous, which purported to be the act of the Great Powers of Europe, had been negotiated and initialled without Polish participation. In Polish minds, this was an offensive advertisement of the fact that Poland did not, after all, rank as a Great Power in Italian, German, British or French eyes; and the Polish resentment at this supposed slight was concentrated upon France. The Poles felt that France, as Poland's ally, was in honour bound to consider Polish feelings and stand up for Polish interests, and that if France were unwilling to vindicate Poland's cherished status as a Great Power, then France had morally forfeited her claim to count upon Poland as her principal ally in the event of a future settlement of accounts with Germany. Indeed, this Polish resentment against France for having accepted the Four-Power Pact at all, even in so greatly diluted a form, may have had some effect in promoting the

Polish-German *détente* of 1933,¹ which culminated in the Polish-German non-aggression pact of the 26th January, 1934. If so, this was perhaps the principal positive result which the Four-Power Pact produced; for its eventual acceptance by all the four signatories, and by all the other countries, except Poland, whose interests were affected, had been purchased at the price of emptying the text of almost any meaning that was not already expressed in other diplomatic instruments that were already in force.

The new features, embodied in the original Italian draft, had been, first, the suggestion (contained in the Italian Article 1) that the four Powers should impose their joint policy upon other countries; second, the declaration that one point in this policy should be a territorial revision of the Peace Treaties (Italian Article 2); third, the undertaking that in the event of a breakdown of the Disarmament Conference, Germany should be permitted by the other three Powers to attain, in practice, that equality of rights which had been assured to her in the matter of armaments, on condition that she consented to attain it by stages (Italian Article 3); fourth, the hint that, in the colonial sphere, Italy and Germany should receive some satisfaction of their claims at the hands of the United Kingdom and France (Italian Article 4). In the final text, as initialled on the 7th June, 1933, the first and fourth of these original distinctive features of the project were not to be found at all, while the second and the third were retained in so shadowy a form that their survival could barely be detected. The reaffirmation of the principle of the revision of treaties was reduced to a formal tribute of equal respect for Articles 10, 16 and 19 of the Covenant of the League. The permission for Germany to rearm by stages, if the Disarmament Conference were to break down, was replaced by a statement (which might assuredly have been supposed to go without saying) that, in the event of a breakdown, the four contracting parties reserved 'the right to re-examine these questions between themselves under the present agreement with a view to ensuring their solution through the appropriate channels'.²

The negativeness of the result actually achieved was indicated indirectly in the German Government's hesitation, at the last moment, over initialling the final text, and explicitly in the terms of the covering despatch with which the text to be initialled was communicated by Sir John Simon to the British Ambassador in Rome.

¹ See pp. 185-8 above.

² For these crucial differences between the first draft of the Pact and the final version, see the synoptic presentation of the texts in *loc. cit.* on p. 209 above.

The German doubts were overcome—as a result, it was said, of a personal telephone-call from Signor Mussolini to Herr Hitler a few hours before the due accomplishment of the act of initialling at 7.30 p.m. on the 7th June, 1933. In Sir John Simon's despatch, two negative points were put on record on the British Government's behalf. In the first place, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs recalled that

throughout the negotiations we have made it clear that the proposed agreement should in no sense be regarded as a substitute for, or as set in opposition to, the Covenant of the League of Nations. . . . The proposed agreement was never intended to involve any attempt on the part of the four Powers, if not to impose their will on other states, at least to establish themselves as a kind of directory in Europe.

But, having thus laid it down that the new Pact was 'not a piece of rival or competing machinery, but' was 'framed for the purpose of operating within the ambit of the Covenant and in fulfilment of its object', Sir John Simon took care to explain that, in paying the formal tribute of Article 2 of the Pact to Articles 10, 16 and 19 of the Covenant, the British Government no more intended to raise their own standard of implementing Articles 10 and 16 than the French Government intended, on their part, to give any greater practical effect than before to Article 19. In this matter, Sir John Simon made it clear

that His Majesty's Government's adherence to the new Agreement does not imply any extension of the obligations of the United Kingdom in European affairs. I took occasion, in my speech in the House of Commons on the 26th May, to explain once more the attitude of His Majesty's Government in this respect. In the course of summarising certain heads of British foreign policy, I spoke as follows: 'We have already assumed the obligations of the Covenant, and we have assumed the obligations of the Pact of Locarno. The obligations which Britain has entered into we shall strive to perform, but our friends on the Continent well understand—and it cannot be too clearly understood—that it is no part of the policy of Great Britain to assume further and additional obligations of this character. We take our existing responsibilities too seriously to be willing in a light-hearted and speculative fashion to enlarge them.'

It will be seen that, in effect, the vindication of the integrity of the Covenant against the trespass of the Four-Power Pact was little more than a barren form, and that, in substance, the negotiations ending in the act of the 7th June, 1933, had had the ironical and preposterous result of weakening, *de facto*, all those three articles of the Covenant which the final text of the Pact reaffirmed. While Signor Mussolini's attempt to give reality to Article 19 of the Covenant had been stigmatized as an attack on the Covenant by the

Italian statesman's critics and opponents, the formal defence of the Covenant against this alleged Italian attack had given an opportunity for France to reinforce her virtual reservations against Article 19 and the United Kingdom hers against Articles 10 and 16.

For this untoward outcome of his original initiative, Signor Mussolini was doubtless himself partly to blame, in so far as certain specific and controversial Italian national aims were bound up, in his original scheme (as his critics promptly pointed out), with a public-spirited attempt to salve the wounds inflicted by the territorial terms of the Peace Treaties and to prevent a fresh outbreak of unregulated competition in armaments. But if Signor Mussolini's opponents had triumphantly exposed and frustrated the self-regarding part of his policy, they had done nothing whatever, on their side, to solve the two grave and urgent problems of common interest which Signor Mussolini had in part been attempting to grapple with. And before the close of the calendar year these faults of European statesmanship—calculated self-seeking on one side and blind unconstructiveness on the other—inexorably produced their bitter fruits.

The *détente* at Geneva which had followed Herr Hitler's pacific speech of the 17th May, and which had rendered possible the initialling of the Four-Power Pact on the 7th June, was unhappily not of long duration. The resumption of the work of the Conference, after the summer vacation, on the 9th October, was quickly followed by a fresh deadlock,¹ and the German Government reacted to this deadlock by taking two drastic steps: an immediate withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference, and a serving of notice of an intention to secede, after the lapse of the statutory two years, from the League of Nations. The withdrawal of Germany from the Disarmament Conference was notified to the President of the Conference, Mr. Henderson, by the Foreign Minister of the Reich, Freiherr von Neurath, on the 14th October; the intention to secede from the League was notified to the Secretary-General on the 21st.² And both acts were posthumously confirmed by an overwhelming majority of votes, in the plebiscite on the Government's foreign policy which was held on the 12th November, 1933, simultaneously with a general election

¹ The circumstances, which had their origins a considerable way back in the history of the Disarmament Conference, are dealt with in section (iii) below, and need not be recapitulated here.

² Already, in June 1933, the German delegation to the International Labour Conference had withdrawn from the Conference as the result of a difference of opinion between them and the other delegations; but Germany had not on that occasion declared her intention to secede from the International Labour Organization, and *a fortiori* not from the League as a whole.

for the Reichstag. The significance of this plebiscite in the history of the National-Socialist Revolution in Germany has been touched upon in a previous chapter.¹ In the field of international affairs, the event fulfilled those fears which had partly actuated Signor Mussolini when he made his diplomatic overtures to the British Ministers in the previous March.

This German sequel to the emasculation of the original Italian project for a Four-Power Pact had effects upon both Italian and British foreign policy which were alike unfortunate for the post-war structure of international society.

In the debate in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 7th November, 1933, in which the history of Germany's withdrawal was reviewed by Sir John Simon, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs did not cease to pay lip-service to the principle of international solidarity.

We shall not get out of our difficulties [he said] by crying isolation when the conditions for isolation have disappeared and cannot exist. We shall not increase our influence for peace by declaring that it does not matter to us what our neighbours in Europe do or do not do.

But Sir John Simon immediately followed up this declaration by a further examination of British obligations under the Pact of Locarno; and this time he went beyond what he had said in his speech of the 26th May and had repeated in his despatch of the 7th June.² On those occasions, he had deprecated the undertaking of additional commitments on the ground that His Majesty's Government took their existing commitments so seriously. On the 7th November, he laid stress upon the freedom of action which the Locarno commitments still left at the British Government's discretion. His conclusion was that

no British Government is blindly fettered by the Treaty of Locarno. We have by that Treaty assumed certain important obligations—I do not minimize them—along with Italy and the other Powers, in the interpretation of which we have a decisive voice.

He went on to raise the question whether the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Locarno Pact would be ended if Germany, two years later, were to carry out the intention to leave the League of Nations of which she had given notice; and he gave his own answer in the following terms:

The view of the Government, after consulting the Law Officers of the Crown, is that the withdrawal of any party to the Treaty of Locarno from the League does not of itself and by itself involve the release of all

¹ See pp. 148-9 above.

² See pp. 219-20 above.

parties from their obligations under the Treaty. But the withdrawal of Germany, if indeed it ever were to become effective, would raise issues of so far-reaching a character that it would be impossible to make any public statement upon them without careful consideration in consultation with the other parties to the Treaty.

He qualified this answer by 'earnestly' deprecating 'the discussion of these hypotheses, which' could 'only serve to create apprehension and, it' might 'be, to cause misapprehension'. But, in spite of this caveat, the effect on the Continent of the British Secretary of State's analysis of the legal situation was to strengthen a prevalent belief that in future the United Kingdom would exert itself to the utmost in order to evade Continental entanglements.

In Italy, the German notice of secession from the League was taken as a natural consequence of the frustration of the Italian scheme for modifying the structure of the League by means of the Four-Power Pact; and Italian dissatisfaction at this chain of events was expressed in a decision that was taken by the Fascist Grand Council, on the 6th December, 1933, to the following effect:

The continued collaboration of Italy with the League of Nations shall be conditional upon the radical reform of the League in its constitution, organization, and objectives within the shortest possible time.

This fresh assault upon the principle of 'the Equality of States' met with the same opposition, from the same quarters, as the Italian project of March. At Bratislava, on the 6th December, Dr. Beneš once more spoke against any enlargement of the influence of the Great Powers. At Paris, on the 8th, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Paul-Boncour, expressed the opinion, in a public statement, that the League, as then constituted, combined 'happily the principle of equality for all nations with the fact that the Great Powers, as permanent members of the Council', were 'able to play a predominant part in directing the work of the League without at the same time exercising a decisive hegemony'. On the 14th December, Dr. Beneš arrived in Paris; and on the 17th Monsieur Paul-Boncour made a joint statement in Dr. Beneš's name and his own. In reporting the upshot of their conversations the French Foreign Minister said that both statesmen had reaffirmed their faith in the League, and were agreed that, if it were to be abandoned to its fate, the whole fragile structure of the peace of Europe would crumble. 'They would stand by it,' said Monsieur Paul-Boncour, 'even if they were the last of the faithful.' They had been of the same mind that reforms to the League were only possible within the fundamental principles of its present constitution. There was, in fact, no need

to reform the Covenant, but it might be possible to improve the machinery with which the League did its work.

Thus, in December as in March 1933, the League of Nations was honoured by the lips of statesmen whose hearts were very far from being moved to serve the League in deed and in truth by modifying any of their national policies or renouncing any of their national assets. If the institution at Geneva—the repository of the political hopes of Mankind—had been a creature born to live on air, it would have found itself richly nourished by the generous verbal tributes of its self-designated champions; but some diet of a more substantial kind than the legendary food of chamaeleons was needed to restore the vitality of a political organism which was now being cold-shouldered by the Italians after having been so roughly handled by the Germans and the Japanese. It remained to be seen whether the League would be allowed to die of inanition through the indifference and neglect of an international society which could hardly suffer the League to perish without itself committing suicide.

(iii) The Disarmament Conference, 1933

(a) INTRODUCTORY

In the preceding volume of this series,¹ the proceedings of the World Disarmament Conference were recorded from its opening on the 2nd February, 1932, down to the adjournment of the General Commission of the Conference on the 14th December, 1932. On that date the General Commission had taken note of the five-Power declaration regarding Germany's equality of rights in matters relating to armaments which had been signed on the 11th December² and which had put an end to a period of stalemate that had begun five months earlier with the refusal of Germany to continue her participation in the work of the Conference unless her claim to equality was accepted by the other Powers.³ The recognition of this claim in principle in the declaration of the 11th December made it possible for the German delegation to return to the Disarmament Conference; but, though the formula adopted served temporarily to bridge the gulf between France and Germany, the negotiators failed to lay the foundations for a permanent solution of the principal political problem which had hampered the work of the Conference during the preceding eleven months—the problem of reconciling the German demand for equality with the French insistence on 'security first'.

¹ The *Survey for 1932*, Part III, section (ii).

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 288-9.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 255-6.

The declaration of the 11th December was accepted by France because the principle of Germany's equality of rights was conceded as part of 'a system which would provide security for all nations', and the French Government were able to interpret this phrase to mean that the establishment of a satisfactory system of security would precede any steps in the direction of equalizing the armed forces of France and Germany. The German Government, on the other hand, made no secret of their determination to direct all their efforts towards the attainment of practical equality in armaments at the earliest possible moment. Their attitude was clearly defined in an article by General von Schleicher which was issued to the Press on the 26th January, 1933. In this article the Chancellor of the Reich announced that Germany was returning to the Disarmament Conference with the object of achieving, 'in the shortest time', the conclusion of a convention which would satisfy Germany's fundamental demands by creating equal security for all through the disarmament of the highly armed states. The practical realization of German equality of status would depend upon the way in which the Conference carried out general disarmament, but there must be no question of distinguishing between the rights of those who had lost and those who had won the War. This declaration lost none of its force when its author resigned the Chancellorship of the Reich two days later; for Herr Hitler's advent to power on the 30th January was certainly not likely to portend any weakening of Germany's claims in the matter of armaments. Nor did the simultaneous change of Government in France—where Monsieur Daladier took office as President of the Council, in succession to Monsieur Paul-Boncour,¹ on the 31st January—mean that the policy which had been pursued by the French delegation at the previous session of the Disarmament Conference was likely to be modified in substance during the new phase of the activities of the Conference.² Thus when the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference reassembled at Geneva in the last week of January 1933 the delegates were brought once more face to face with the problem of finding a common measure between the demand

¹ The Government of Monsieur Herriot, which had been in power at the time of the signature of the five-Power declaration of the 11th December, had fallen on the 14th December (the day on which the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference had adjourned) on the question of the payment of the December instalment of the French debt to the United States (see the *Survey for 1932*, p. 127); Monsieur Paul-Boncour's Cabinet, which took office on the 18th December, was defeated on the 28th January, 1933, on the question of a proposed increase in direct taxation.

² On the continuity of French policy in regard to security and disarmament, see the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 196-7 and 268-70.

of Germany for practical equality in armaments with France at the earliest possible moment and the refusal of France to consider the possibility of reducing her own armaments—and *a fortiori* the possibility of allowing an increase in German armaments—unless the security of France was guaranteed by means other than a superiority of French armed force.

The record of the negotiations on disarmament and security which took place at Geneva and elsewhere during the year 1933 is inevitably somewhat complicated, and it may therefore be convenient if the detailed narrative is preceded by a brief review of the main stages through which the discussions passed during this eventful year.

The plan which had been submitted to the Conference in November 1932 by the French delegation,¹ and which was designed to meet the French need for security by organizing the states of the World in three concentric circles, was the first item on the agenda of the General Commission of the Conference when it met at the beginning of February 1933; but the debate on the plan soon showed that it had no chance of general acceptance, and, although it was not actually withdrawn, it was tacitly shelved. Thereafter the French Government and the French delegates at Geneva turned their attention to the possibility of guaranteeing security by means of the supervision of armaments.

By the middle of February the various committees of the Conference were at work on a programme which had been put forward by the British delegation, but they were able to make little progress, and by the end of the month it was generally recognized that, in view of the political situation in Europe and of the growing mistrust of Germany under the Hitler régime which was manifested by other states, there was no prospect that agreement would be reached along the lines which had been followed hitherto. Early in March the British Prime Minister, accompanied by the Foreign Minister, paid a visit to Geneva in the hope of finding a way out of the deadlock, and on the 16th March the 'MacDonald Plan', in the form of a draft convention, was laid before the Conference. This British draft convention—in which, for the first time, definite figures were introduced into proposals for the limitation of effectives and of material—was well received, and when the Conference went into recess at the end of March on the completion of a general discussion on the new proposals, there seemed to be reason to hope that the British initiative might prove to have given the Conference the fresh impetus which it had needed.

¹ See the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 273 *seqq.*

By the time, however, when the General Commission met again, on the 25th April, the political situation had become even more unfavourable; for the resentment of the smaller European Powers against Signor Mussolini's proposals for a Four-Power Pact, which had been discussed with Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon when they went on to Rome after their visit to Geneva in the middle of March,¹ was now added to the hostility towards Germany which had been the principal disturbing factor in March, and which had been increasing during April as a result of the Nazis' anti-Jewish measures. The general uneasiness was reflected in the discussions on the details of the British draft convention, and the unwillingness of the majority of the European states to make concessions which might reduce their effective strength was naturally augmented by the intransigence which was displayed by the German delegation. The principal difficulty arose over a proposal for the standardization of Continental armies, which had figured alike in the French plan and in the British draft convention. This proposal implied that the Reichswehr should be transformed into a short-service army, and to this transformation Germany refused to agree. The threatened breakdown of the Conference on this issue was averted when the German Chancellor made a conciliatory speech on the 17th May (following an appeal addressed on the preceding day by President Roosevelt to all the Governments represented at the Conference), and the German delegates at Geneva were instructed to withdraw their objections to the standardization of Continental armies. The General Commission of the Conference was thus able to go on with the first reading of the draft convention, and by the end of May a good deal of progress had been made, particularly in connexion with air armaments. An outstanding feature of this period was the speech made by Mr. Norman Davis, the leader of the American delegation, on the 22nd May, in which the readiness of the potentially strongest Power in the World to reduce its armaments to the level established by the Peace Treaties was proclaimed, and the contribution that the Roosevelt Administration was prepared to make towards European security was clearly defined. As the discussions continued, however, it became clear that there were still a number of important points on which divergent views were strongly held and that many delegations were still reluctant to take binding decisions. In these circumstances, and in view of the approach of the date (the 12th June) which had been fixed for the opening of the World Economic Conference, the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference decided at the end of May to

¹ See section (ii) of this part of the present volume.

postpone the second reading of the draft convention until the autumn, in order that attempts might be made to reconcile opposing views by means of informal negotiations. The President of the Conference, Mr. Arthur Henderson, was charged with the conduct of these negotiations, and on the 8th June the General Commission adjourned, after it had adopted a resolution formally accepting the British draft convention as the basis of the future Disarmament Convention.

The attempts to solve outstanding difficulties by negotiation met at first with little success, and the results of an Anglo-Franco-American meeting in Paris on the 8th June and of the 'disarmament pilgrimage' which Mr. Henderson undertook in July were alike disappointing. In September the negotiations were reopened by further Anglo-French conversations, which were subsequently extended to include Italy and the United States. The German Government were not consulted until a considerable measure of agreement had been achieved between the four Powers, along lines which involved a marked departure from the British draft convention. The British Government were now prepared to support the idea—to which the French Government had come to attach the utmost importance—that there should be no reduction of non-German armaments and no increase in German armaments until the efficacy of a system of supervision had been tested. The adherence of Italy and of the United States to this principle was secured, and the four Powers agreed provisionally on a proposal that the duration of the Disarmament Convention should be divided into two periods—say, of four years each. During the first period a system of supervision would be put into operation, a beginning would be made with the standardization of Continental armies, and the manufacture of 'aggressive' armaments would be suspended. During this period there would be no substantial 'levelling-up' or 'levelling-down' of armaments, but if the system of supervision proved satisfactory the reduction of armaments—on a scale to be laid down in precise terms in the convention—would take effect during the second period.

Towards the end of September, the negotiations were transferred to Geneva, where the new proposals were discussed with the German delegates. The chief difficulties encountered in these conversations appeared to arise in connexion with the German demand for 'samples' or 'prototypes' of armaments which they had been forbidden hitherto to possess, and not directly in connexion with the 'période d'épreuve'. The German Government put forward unacceptable counter-proposals to Great Britain on the 6th October, but, in spite of the numerous

indications which had been given¹ that Germany would not continue indefinitely to take part in the Disarmament Conference unless her demands were satisfied, an abrupt termination of these particular negotiations was not anticipated, at any rate by the general public in the various countries concerned. On the 14th October, however, after an outline of the new 'two-period' plan had been given to the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference by Sir John Simon, the German Government announced their decision to withdraw from the Disarmament Conference and to give notice of resignation of their membership of the League of Nations.

The departure of Germany did not formally break up the Disarmament Conference. Indeed, there was a section of opinion, led by France, in favour of continuing the work as though Germany's absence made no difference. This course was, however, far from meeting with general approval, and the French delegation finally bowed to the inevitable. On the 22nd November the Bureau of the Conference decided that there should be no further meeting of the General Commission until January 1934 and that, while the committees and rapporteurs of the Conference should go on with their technical work as far as possible, questions with a political bearing—above all, the crucial problem of how to bring Germany once more within the scope of discussions on disarmament—should be dealt with by 'parallel and supplementary' diplomatic negotiations. The new phase of the problem of disarmament and security which opened in December 1933 with the initiation of these negotiations must be reserved for a later volume.

(b) THE DISCUSSION OF THE FRENCH PLAN AND THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEES OF THE CONFERENCE (23RD JANUARY TO 16TH MARCH, 1933)

Before the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference had adjourned on the 14th December, 1932, it had fixed the date of

¹ For example, the warning given by Herr Nadolny on the 2nd February in the General Commission (see p. 232 below); his statement a week later that any departure from the provisions of the declaration of the 11th December, 1932, would involve a second departure of the German delegation (see footnote on p. 237 below); and the articles published from time to time in *Völkerbund* by Herr Nadolny and Freiherr von Neurath on the theme that Germany's patience was not inexhaustible (see p. 250, footnote 5, below). Similar indications were given in Herr Hitler's speech of the 23rd March, 1933, in which he maintained Germany's claim to equality (see *Documents on International Affairs*, 1933, pp. 404-5); in Herr Nadolny's warning on the 29th June that the adjournment of the General Commission would have very serious consequences (see pp. 292-3 below); in Herr Hitler's refusal to consider the proposal for a trial period during his conversation with Mr. Henderson in July (see p. 294 below); and in Freiherr von Neurath's speech in Berlin on the 15th September (see p. 297 below).

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its next meeting as the 31st January, 1933, and had decided that the Bureau, or Steering Committee, of the Conference should meet a week earlier in order to prepare the agenda for the General Commission. The meeting of the General Commission was postponed until the 2nd February, but the Bureau met on the 23rd January and remained in session until the 31st. It decided that the first subject of consideration by the General Commission should be the revised French proposals which had been submitted to the Bureau in November 1932¹ but which had not been discussed by the General Commission before the adjournment.

The Bureau spent some time in an examination of two reports which had been completed since the middle of December: the report of a special drafting committee which had been instructed on the 15th November to prepare texts dealing with the question of supervision and the functions of the Permanent Disarmament Commission,² and the replies to a questionnaire which had been submitted to the Special Committee on Chemical, Incendiary, and Bacteriological Weapons.³

In connexion with the draft texts on supervision, an interesting debate took place in the Bureau on the question of granting legal immunity to persons who gave information as to alleged breaches of the provisions of the proposed Disarmament Convention. Under the existing laws of many countries, such persons would lay themselves open to a charge of treason, and the French and other delegates, who attached special importance to the establishment of an efficient system for supervising the application of the convention, were strongly of opinion that persons who gave information in good faith ought to be protected against punitive proceedings. The special case which these delegates had in mind, of course, was that of Germany, and it was significant that Herr Nadolny, the German representative, should have been among the speakers who advocated the abandonment of the attempt to agree upon provisions for legal immunity. The Bureau finally referred the question for further study to a drafting committee. Herr Nadolny was also in the minority⁴ which opposed the adoption of clauses providing that any state might demand an investigation into the armaments of a particular country and that the decision to conduct such an investigation should be

¹ See the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 273 *seqq.*

² *Op. cit.*, p. 294. The setting-up of a Permanent Disarmament Commission was provided for in the British draft convention. Its duty would be 'to watch the execution of the present Convention'.

³ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ The minority also included Italy. The British delegate also opposed the proposal for a two-thirds majority.

taken by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Permanent Disarmament Commission and not by a unanimous vote. These clauses were supported by Monsieur Massigli, the French delegate, on the ground that it ought to be made as easy as possible for the Permanent Disarmament Commission to conduct investigations. Thus an opposition between the French and German points of view on the fundamental question of supervision made itself apparent at an early stage of the resumed proceedings of the Conference.

The discussion of the report on the supervision and prohibition of chemical, incendiary, and bacteriological weapons showed that there was still a marked difference of opinion in regard to the measures which should be taken in the event of an infraction of the provisions relating to those weapons. It was generally agreed that it was impracticable to control the preparation of chemical substances which could be used by an aggressor,¹ and the question of penalties for the use of chemical, incendiary, or bacteriological weapons therefore became of special importance. The majority of the members of the Bureau were in favour of prohibiting individual reprisals by a state which might be attacked with such weapons and relying upon collective measures, but the British and Italian delegates took the view that no Government could be expected to give an undertaking not to reply by immediate reprisals to such an attack. It was finally agreed that the question of penalties should be left open until the Conference had reached a decision on the general problem of the measures which would be taken in the event of a breach of any of the provisions of the Disarmament Convention. Certain portions of the reports on supervision and on chemical, incendiary, and bacteriological warfare were adopted provisionally by the Bureau, but the results of the debate were necessarily inconclusive, since any question raised in connexion with the reports was liable to be reopened when they came before the General Commission at a later stage.

On the 2nd February—the anniversary of the opening of the Conference—the General Commission began a discussion of the French proposals which lasted until the 8th February. The proposals² were explained to the Commission by Monsieur Massigli on the 2nd February, and the debate was wound up by Monsieur Paul-Boncour, the French Foreign Minister, on the 8th, with a restatement of the motives of the French Government which laid significant emphasis upon the necessity for making disarmament dependent upon security. Support

¹ This conclusion had already been reached by the Bureau in the previous November (see the *Survey for 1932*, p. 294).

² For an outline of the French proposals, see the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 275-9.

for the French plan was forthcoming from Belgium, Greece, and the Little-Entente states, but most of the speakers raised objections to some at least of its provisions. The representatives of Germany and of Italy, who took part in the debate on the first day, both criticized the plan on the ground that it did not make adequate provision for immediate and effective reduction of armaments. Herr Nadolny suggested that the proposed retention of 'aggressive' armaments for the use of the League of Nations would nullify any provisions for qualitative disarmament, and he expressed the opinion that existing guarantees of security were sufficient to allow of an immediate and far-reaching reduction of armaments. He did not oppose, in principle, the suggestions for a European pact of mutual assistance and for the establishment of an international force, but he indicated that the German delegation was only prepared to discuss these and other questions relating to security on the understanding that agreement on them was not a prior condition of the attainment of German equality.

It will be remembered that the chapter of the French plan which dealt with the organization of security divided the states of the World into three concentric circles: an outer circle consisting of all the Powers represented at the Disarmament Conference, who would be required to undertake certain obligations in regard to a breach or a threat of breach of the Paris Pact for the Renunciation of War; an intermediate circle, consisting of the members of the League of Nations, who would be required 'to give full effect' to the obligations arising out of the Covenant of the League and out of any treaties concluded in conformity with the Covenant; and an inner circle consisting of states on the Continent of Europe, for whom a special organization for mutual assistance, involving political and military arrangements, was suggested. This proposed system of security represented perhaps the most notable contribution made by the French delegation to the common stock of ideas for consideration by the Disarmament Conference, and it was on the security chapter that the debate mainly turned during the first week of February.¹ Baron Aloisi, who followed Monsieur Massigli on the 2nd February, criticized the provisions relating to the innermost circle of states—the basis upon which the whole structure rested—on the ground that they did not apply to Great Britain, and that any system of European mutual assistance from which Great Britain was excluded would be worthless in Italian eyes. Mr. Eden, who spoke on the following day on behalf

¹ The other important innovation in the French plan of November 1932—the proposal for the standardization of Continental military forces on a short-term basis—was not discussed in detail at this stage.

of the British delegation, disposed of any hope that Great Britain might be drawn into the European system by declaring emphatically that the British Government, while fully recognizing their obligations under the Covenant and the Locarno Pact,¹ could not undertake any fresh commitments in Europe. Mr. Eden acknowledged with gratitude the fact that the French Government had taken account of the British standpoint in drawing up their plan, but he agreed with Herr Nadolny in thinking that existing guarantees of security were sufficient to justify a real and immediate reduction in armaments.

The British delegate did not indicate his Government's views upon the portion of the security proposals which was applicable only to signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, but it was evident that the attitude of the United States on this question would be the determining factor. In view of the impending change of Administration at Washington, however, it was not likely that the American representative would be able to make a definite statement at this stage. The French plan had indeed been drafted in the light of a pronouncement by Mr. Stimson, the American Secretary of State, on the subject of the obsolescence of neutrality and the obligation upon signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact to consult with one another in times of emergency, which appeared to show that an important change had taken place in American opinion on the European security problem;² but at the beginning of February 1933 Mr. Stimson was due to go out of office in a month's time, and an authoritative statement of the new Administration's policy in regard to these and other questions could not be expected until President Roosevelt had actually succeeded President Hoover at the White House. Accordingly Mr. Gibson, who was representing the United States on the General Commission, contented himself with pointing out that it would be desirable for the Conference to reach agreement first upon

¹ It was noticeable that neither on this occasion nor in subsequent statements by British Ministers on the subject of the Locarno Pact (see pp. 220 and 222-3 above and pp. 300 and 313 below) was any reference made to the general obligation in regard to the maintenance of the collective system which had been accepted at Locarno by the signatories of the collective note to Germany regarding Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In that note, which formed Annex F to the Final Protocol of the Locarno Conference, the representatives of the Locarno Powers (other than Germany) placed it on record that, according to their interpretation, Article 16 of the Covenant 'must be understood to mean that each state member of the League is bound to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant and in resistance to any act of aggression to an extent which is compatible with its military situation and takes its geographical position into account'.

² See the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 270 *seqq.*

the European aspect of the security proposals, and he reserved the opinion of the United States Government on the portion of the French plan which directly concerned them. Monsieur Litvinov, on behalf of another state which was included only in the outermost circle, was able to make a more constructive contribution to the discussion. He said that the Soviet Government would be prepared to sign an agreement embodying the proposals contained in the French plan for interpreting and extending the obligations undertaken by signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and he also submitted to the Conference—as a 'logical expansion' of the French plan—a detailed definition of an aggressor¹ which, at a somewhat later stage of the proceedings, provided a basis for relatively fruitful discussion.²

The outcome of the debate on the French plan was sufficiently indicated by the speech of the Polish representative on the 6th February. The Polish Government could generally be counted upon to support any suggestions put forward by France, but the section of the French proposals which related to the standardization of Continental forces was not regarded with favour in Warsaw, where the reintroduction of conscription in Germany was considered a highly dangerous measure. Count Raczkinski did not give direct expression to Polish apprehensions on this point, but he deduced from the speeches which had already been made that there was little hope of 'realizing the generous ideas that inspired the authors of the French plan', and he suggested that it would be well for the Conference to aim at producing concrete results, in the shortest possible time, by concentrating upon questions on which agreement seemed to be within reach. A proposal, emanating from the Great Powers, for declaring an 'interim dividend' of this kind had been canvassed in the previous autumn but had been dropped owing to the opposition of the smaller states,³ but there was general agreement on the desirability of co-ordinating the work of the Conference and avoiding inconclusive discussions as far as possible. With this object in mind the British Government had drafted a programme of work which had been circulated to other delegations and submitted to the Bureau of the Conference before the General Commission assembled.

In their 'draft proposals'⁴ the British Government suggested 'that it would be advisable, as soon as the general discussion of the French plan' had 'been completed in the General Commission, to agree on

¹ The text is given in League of Nations Document *Conf. D./C.G./38*.

² See pp. 278-9 and 281-2 below. ³ See the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 287-8.

⁴ League of Nations Document *IX. Disarmament. 1933. IX. I. (Conf. D. 154)*.

a programme of work which would enable the Conference to embody in a convention the proposals made by various delegations since the opening of the Conference'. Accordingly, they offered for consideration a draft resolution, 'containing directions for the ordering of the work', which might be submitted by the Bureau to the General Commission.

The Bureau, in whose hands the direction of the work would be placed, would 'organize without delay practical discussion' of certain topics of a general nature. These topics included 'a solemn affirmation, to be made by all European states, that they will not in any circumstances attempt to resolve any present or future differences between them by resort to force';¹ 'the immediate study by the Continental European States... of the possibility of reaching political arrangements' for mutual assistance; the application of the principles that the new disarmament convention would replace the disarmament chapters of the Peace Treaties and that 'the newly expressed limitations in the case of Germany and the other disarmed states' would 'last for the same period and be subject to the same methods of revision as those of all other countries'; the embodiment in the disarmament convention of an undertaking to enter upon negotiations, before its expiry, for a new convention providing for a further adjustment of armaments; the embodiment in the convention of provisions for the realization of qualitative equality in regard to war material, if not immediately after the entry into force of the convention, then by specified stages, and the consideration, in this connexion, of 'the reduction of the armies of the Continental European States to a uniform general type of organization'.

It was suggested that the Political Commission² should begin at once to study the question of a 'solemn affirmation' against resort to force, and that a committee of the Continental European States should be constituted to examine the possibility of arrangements for mutual assistance. Questions more directly concerned with disarmament would be dealt with by the Bureau with the assistance, where necessary, of technical committees. Thus, while the Bureau would be responsible for computing the total land forces to be permitted to each state, the Effectives Committee might be required to submit recommendations concerning the ratios to be employed

¹ The Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy had already, in the declaration of the 11th December, 1932, announced their readiness to join in a solemn affirmation of this kind. (See the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 288-9.)

² For the appointment of the Political Commission, see the *Survey for 1932*, p. 214.

in the calculation of the 'police component (the irreducible component) of the existing land forces of each country, both metropolitan and overseas',¹ and concerning the 'stages and methods by which Continental European armies' might 'be brought into harmony with the general type of organization adopted'. It was also proposed that a special committee consisting of representatives of the principal air Powers should be set up 'to examine the possibility of an entire abolition of military and naval machines and of bombing from the air, combined with an effective international control of civil aviation'. The Bureau itself would be required to take decisions regarding the maximum unladen weight of military aircraft, the maximum unit tonnage of various classes of ships and of tanks and the maximum calibre of naval and mobile land guns, and also regarding the limitation of numbers of aircraft, tanks and land guns, and the disposal of material in excess of the limits agreed upon.

This suggested programme of work was discussed by the Bureau on the 9th and 10th February. In recommending its adoption, Mr. Eden pointed out that the time for making decisions had come. Nearly all the proposals that were before the Conference had been fully examined from the technical point of view, and it now remained for the Governments to shoulder their responsibilities. He appealed to his fellow delegates to weigh the risks of making concessions in order to promote agreement against the infinitely greater danger of a breakdown of the Conference. The thesis that the Conference had entered upon the stage of definite decisions was not contested by subsequent speakers, but there was a division of opinion in regard to the procedure which should be followed. There was general agreement that the habit of referring points from one committee to another, into which the Conference had fallen in its previous sessions, must be avoided if progress was to be made, but the British proposal that the Bureau should be the body to take decisions did not meet with general acceptance. The smaller states, many of whom were not represented on the Bureau, had shown themselves particularly sensitive in the past on the question of the transfer of responsibility from the Disarmament Conference as a whole to any smaller body,² and the French Foreign Minister now associated himself with this point of view. Monsieur Paul-Boncour suggested that the points in the British programme relating to security should be discussed by the Political Commission and those relating to disarmament by the

¹ For the suggested division of effectives into a 'police component' and a 'defence component', see *op. cit.*, pp. 203 and 240-1.

² See the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 235, 248, 255, 300.

General Commission.¹ This proposal was adopted, but considerable difficulty was encountered in deciding on the order in which the various items of work should be taken up. Herr Nadolny wished to reserve for later consideration the questions which were raised by the sections of the British proposals relating to the replacement of the disarmament chapters of the Peace Treaties and to the 'realization of qualitative equality', and he suggested that attention should be concentrated on concrete questions of reduction of armaments and in the first place on the problems of land war material. The Italian delegate also thought that questions relating to material should be given precedence, whereas Monsieur Paul-Boncour was in favour of taking effectives first. The Bureau finally decided to refer to the Political Commission the questions of an affirmation against resort to force and of European mutual assistance, together with other security questions arising out of the French plan and the discussion on that plan; to postpone consideration of the remainder of the general questions mentioned in the British programme; and to leave it to the General Commission to decide in what order it should deal with the various problems submitted for its consideration.

This debate on procedure was interesting because it showed France and Germany manoeuvring for position on a matter which was to prove a serious obstacle to progress during the next few weeks. The proposal for the standardization of the military forces of the Continental European states on the basis of universal short-term service formed an integral part of the French plan, and the French delegation held that it would be useless to discuss questions relating to the armaments of the military forces of France and other countries until the nature and size of those forces had been determined. The French Government had hoped that this part of their proposals would prove acceptable to Germany, whose representatives had included a reduction in the period of military service stipulated in the Peace Treaty among the desiderata which they had put forward for consideration by the other Powers in the spring and summer

¹ During the discussion, Monsieur Paul-Boncour made a statement on the declaration of the 11th December, 1932, which aroused much resentment in Germany. He said that that declaration could not take the place of a decision of the Disarmament Conference, and that France could only conceive of equality of rights within an organization ensuring security. Herr Nadolny replied to this by pointing out that the declaration of the 11th December formed the basis on which Germany had returned to the Conference, and he hinted that any departure from its provisions would involve a second withdrawal of the German delegation. It was subsequently denied in French official quarters that Monsieur Paul-Boncour had intended in any way to repudiate the declaration of the 11th December.

of 1932.¹ The German Government, however, had contemplated the retention of the Reichswehr in a modified form, and they had proposed in addition to supplement their regular forces by some kind of militia. Since the publication of the French plan in November 1932, there had been many indications that the Germany military authorities had become convinced of the value of the long-service army which had been forced upon Germany by the Peace Treaty, and were by no means inclined to relinquish it now at the bidding of France. Time was to prove that French opinion was correct in thinking that the desire of the German delegation to postpone the question of effectives portended an intention to make a stand against the proposal to abolish the Reichswehr in favour of a short-term force.

The discussions in the Bureau and in the General Commission had served to show that there was still a wide gulf between the French and the German points of view, and Mr. Henderson, the President of the Conference, was reported to have made the suggestion that it might facilitate the task of the General Commission if the European Great Powers were to attempt to clear the ground in private conversations. Monsieur Paul-Boncour, however, was not in favour of informal negotiations of this kind, and when the meetings of the General Commission were resumed on the 13th February even the preliminary question of the order of its agenda still remained to be settled.

Herr Nadolny urged once more that the Commission should proceed immediately to discuss the reduction of material, and he suggested that questions relating to effectives should be referred to the Effectives Committee. Monsieur Paul-Boncour took the view—with which there was general agreement—that the committee could not be expected to do useful work unless questions of principle had first been settled by the General Commission. It was finally agreed that a drafting committee should determine the points in connexion with effectives on which decisions in principle were necessary and that the General Commission should then discuss these points and should postpone the question of war material until it had disposed of effectives. Thus the first round in the contest was won by France, and the German delegation was obliged to show its hand on the matter of effectives at an earlier stage than it had desired.

The first of the series of questions drawn up by the drafting committee for the General Commission ran as follows: 'Is the General Commission of opinion that the European Continental armies should be standardized by being converted into armies with short-term service and limited effectives?' When the Commission began its

¹ See the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 225, 261, 280.

attempt to answer this question on the 16th February, Herr Nadolny reserved his Government's attitude until details were known of the organization which it was proposed to substitute for the Reichswehr. On the following day Monsieur Pierre Cot, who was at this time Air Minister in the French Government, presented on behalf of the French delegation a resolution by which the General Commission would adopt the principle 'that in Continental Europe an army with a short-term service and limited effectives is the type of military organization that represents the most defensive character and with which mobilization is slowest'; would recommend the 'general adoption of this type of army'; and would decide 'to pass on to the study of the conditions in which this general adoption might be brought about'. Monsieur Cot explained that in the system contemplated by the French Government the period of service would be eight or nine months, and he added that France would agree that the necessary adaptation of existing systems should take place in two stages of three or four years each. His speech was conciliatory in tone, but he emphasized the point that the worst possible system would be one in which standing armies and militias could exist side by side, and a reference which he made to 'para-military' associations in certain countries that had developed a militarist spirit was taken up by Herr Nadolny with some heat. The German delegate, while still refusing to make a definite pronouncement for or against the standardization of armies, declared that he could not accept the principle that such standardization should be an indispensable condition of a reduction of armaments. On the 18th February Herr Nadolny went to Berlin to consult his Government, but the new instructions which he received did not enable him to make any concessions to the French point of view. The case which he outlined to the General Commission on the 22nd February was that the defensive or aggressive character of an army depended not so much upon its organization and the term of service of its effectives as upon the defensive or aggressive nature of its armaments.¹ Herr Nadolny submitted a resolution asking the Commission, before pronouncing on the principle of standardization of armies, to take a decision on the abolition of 'offensive' armaments and the limitation of permitted war material.² On the following day a vote was taken on the French

¹ This was the exact opposite of the French thesis that the nature of the army must be decided before the nature of the armaments (see p. 237 above).

² Herr Nadolny took exception to a ruling by Mr. Henderson that this resolution was in complete contradiction with the Commission's decision of the 13th February to take effectives first, and when Mr. Henderson declared the meeting closed the German delegation was manifestly aggrieved. The difficulty

and the German resolutions and also on an Italian resolution which approved the principle of the standardization of armies but laid stress on the importance of limiting material. The French resolution was carried by twenty-one votes (including those of the British and American delegates), with a large number of abstentions. The Italian resolution received five votes, but the German delegation was alone in supporting its own resolution—a position of isolation the significance of which was not missed by Herr Nadolny and his colleagues.

Having thus decided in principle in favour of the standardization of Continental armies, the General Commission went on to discuss the proposed new system in greater detail. Between the 27th February and the 6th March a number of questions concerning effectives were disposed of provisionally by majority votes. Thus it was decided that standardization should not apply to forces stationed overseas;¹ that in calculating the period of service account must be taken of pre-military training and of instruction given outside the army (that is, in 'para-military' associations); that police of a military character must be included in computing effectives; that the coexistence of a professional army and a short-service force must be avoided; and that effectives stationed at home should be divided into reducible and irreducible components intended respectively for purposes of defence and of police. The appearance that the Conference was making headway on the question of effectives was illusory, however, for the large number of abstentions on votes of any importance, combined with the consistent opposition of the German delegation, which received some support from the representatives of Italy, the U.S.S.R., Austria, and Hungary, made it clear that agreement on terms which could be embodied in a disarmament convention was still far to seek. Herr Nadolny had strongly opposed the decision to exclude colonial and overseas forces from the standardized system and had suggested that forces stationed near the mother country ought to be subject to the same rules as the home forces. He was supported in this by the Italian delegate, whose Government shared the apprehensions

was smoothed out, however, by a conversation between Mr. Henderson and Herr Nadolny.

¹ A sub-committee was appointed, however, to consider whether effectives stationed overseas should be divided into reducible and irreducible components. Most of the members of this sub-committee were representatives of Powers which possessed colonies, but it also included a German representative. A reference which was made by Monsieur Sarraut, the French Minister for the Colonies, during the discussion, to the possible collaboration of non-colonial Powers in the development of overseas territories was received with pleasure in Germany, though it was the subject of some criticism in France.

that were felt in Germany in regard to the possible use in Europe of the French forces stationed in North Africa. Herr Nadolny had wished to refer to the Effectives Committee the question of pre-military training, and after this proposal had been rejected by seventeen votes to ten he abstained from taking part in subsequent votes. On the 3rd March, however, he expressed keen disappointment because the General Commission had failed to take the opportunity to decide on a real measure of disarmament, and declared that after a year's work the Conference had made no progress. This pronouncement was made after the Commission had accepted, by twenty votes to three, a proposal from Monsieur Paul-Boncour to postpone the question of the proportion in which it would be possible for the reducible component of effectives to be reduced. Monsieur Paul-Boncour explained that his Government could not declare their views on this matter until they knew the degree of security which would be provided by the Disarmament Convention.

After the General Commission had concluded on the 6th March its discussion of questions of principle relating to effectives, the special Effectives Committee began its consideration of points of detail, but here also the attitude of Germany proved an obstacle to progress. The committee was asked by the General Commission to provide a table showing the effectives of each country as determined by application of the principles approved by the General Commission. The first item on the committee's programme was the question of the inclusion in effectives of members of national police forces which conformed to certain criteria. The German delegate presented a proposal which was designed to exclude the German Schutzpolizei altogether, and after some discussion a sub-committee was appointed to go into the question of the status of the German police, on the basis of the criteria which had already been established. The problem of the criteria which should be used in determining what constituted pre-military instruction was also referred to a sub-committee, and on the 11th March the Effectives Committee adopted a formula proposed by the sub-committee. On the 14th March the Effectives Committee decided to recommend to the General Commission that in countries where pre-military or 'para-military' instruction existed it should be regulated and supervised in such a way that account could be taken of it in computing effectives, and that Governments which did not feel able to take the necessary measures to that end should be required to prohibit pre-military and para-military instruction altogether.

The other principal committees of the Conference which were

at work between the middle of February and the middle of March were the Air Commission and the Political Commission.¹

The Air Commission, which consisted of the representatives of eighteen Powers with Señor de Madariaga (Spain) as chairman, had been appointed by the General Commission on the 16th February with instructions to examine the possibility of the abolition of military and naval aircraft and of bombing from the air, combined with an effective international control of civil aviation. At the first meeting of the Commission, on the 20th February, the discussion was opened by the British Air Minister, Lord Londonderry, who pointed out that the essence of the problem was to devise some system of controlling civil aviation, since it would be useless to consider the abolition of military and naval air forces so long as civil aircraft could be adapted at any moment to purposes of aggression. In the British Government's view the scheme for regulating civil aircraft must effectively prevent any possibility of the use of such aircraft for military purposes, but must not hamper the development of civil aviation nor impose any restrictions on freedom of experiment and research.² Lord Londonderry refrained from making any constructive proposal in regard to the way in which the ends that he indicated might be attained, and his insistence upon the reservation (which had been made already in the British proposals of November 1932)³ that air bombing should be retained for police purposes in certain outlying regions was generally felt to constitute a serious obstacle to progress.

The Air Commission had before it a French proposal for the internationalization of civil aviation by means of the establishment of an international company, under the auspices of the League of Nations, to manage the great transport lines, with subsidiary companies managing lines of secondary importance.⁴ The scheme would be completed by the creation of an international air police. This proposal was especially remarkable because it represented an attempt by the strongest existing air Power to clear the way for the abolition of

¹ The Technical Committee of the Commission on National Defence Expenditure was also going on steadily with the preparation of a report based on the information regarding national defence budgets supplied by the Governments represented at the Conference (see the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 232, 209).

² This statement of policy was slightly modified at a later meeting of the Commission by Mr. Eden, who declared that it was more important to secure immunity from air attack than it was to ensure the full development of commercial aviation.

³ See the *Survey for 1932*, p. 285.

⁴ The minutes of the Air Commission were published as League of Nations Documents *Conf. D./C.G./C.A./P.V. 1 to 10*. For Monsieur Cot's plan see Document *Conf. D./C.G./C.A./5*, and for the proposal regarding an international air police see Documents *Conf. D./C.G./C.A./P.V. 7 and 8*.

military aircraft. It was recommended for acceptance in a vigorous speech by Monsieur Pierre Cot, the French Air Minister, and it received support from the representatives of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. The minority which considered internationalization of civil aviation impracticable included the German, Italian and Russian delegations, and the British representative also saw difficulties in the way of carrying out the French proposals. Germany was in favour of the abolition of military and naval aircraft and the prohibition of air bombardment, but considered that regulation and control of civil aviation would be sufficient. Italy was not prepared to accept the total abolition of military aircraft, though she was in favour of strict limitation, and she was opposed even to supervision of civil aviation on the ground that it would infringe national sovereignty. On the 27th February, after an inconclusive debate, Herr Brandenburg, the German delegate, declared that he could not continue to take part in discussions on the internationalization of civil aviation until he knew the intentions of other delegations in regard to the abolition of military aircraft. This difficulty was disposed of by conversations between Herr Brandenburg and Señor de Madariaga, and the Commission adopted a resolution on the 28th February declaring that its work was based on the hypothesis of the total abolition of military and naval aircraft, but that no decision could be reached on such abolition until the preliminary questions of the internationalization of air transport and the creation of an air police force had been settled. On the 2nd March, Herr Brandenburg declared that if military aviation were abolished Germany would be ready to accept any really decisive measure to prevent the use of civil aviation for military purposes, but he inquired whether, if a scheme of internationalization were adopted for Europe, non-European countries would take similar measures. Mr. Gibson, for the United States, returned a non-committal answer to this inquiry, but the representatives of Japan, India and Siam expressed the opinion that internationalization of civil aviation was a purely European problem. Finally, a sub-committee was appointed to draw up a report on internationalization, and the question of air police was also referred to another sub-committee, after a general discussion in which Herr Brandenburg was again the leading critic of the French proposals.¹

The Political Commission, which consisted of one member of every

¹ Mr. Eden, for Great Britain, adopted a cautious attitude in regard to the proposed constitution of an international air force and suggested that it might be found possible to use national forces instead of creating a new force.

delegation taking part in the Conference and which was therefore distinguishable from the General Commission only in name, began work on the 14th February. It decided to discuss first the British proposal that the European states should make a solemn affirmation against resort to force. The debate on this question, which lasted until the 2nd March, turned mainly on two points:¹ whether the declaration should be confined to Europe or should be extended to include all countries, and whether or not reservations should be included permitting the application of force in execution of previous obligations such as the Covenant of the League and the Locarno Treaties. The principal advocate of an extension of the scope of the declaration to cover the whole World was Monsieur Litvinov, who pointed out that if the declaration were confined to Europe the signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact would fall into two categories—the European states who had renounced the use of force as well as the use of war, and the non-European states who would still be free to resort to force. Monsieur Litvinov was supported by the representatives of Persia, Turkey, China, and Afghanistan, but considerable weight was felt to attach to the argument, which was put forward by Monsieur Paul-Boncour, that the United States, through the mouth of Mr. Gibson,² had recommended the European states to come to a preliminary understanding among themselves on matters affecting their security. The representative of the United States did not join in the discussion, but Sir Philip Sassoon, for Great Britain, indicated that his Government had proposed, and were ready to accept, a declaration applying only to Europe.³ It was finally agreed

¹ There was also some discussion in regard to the use of the word 'force'. Mr. Eden explained that the word had been used deliberately in the British draft in order to avoid controversy, in any case that might arise, as to whether the action taken amounted to war or not. The Italian delegate expressed a preference for the use of the word 'war', but he did not receive any support, though the German delegate provoked criticism by remarking that the assembly of German troops in the demilitarized zone could not be considered a resort to force. It was obvious, indeed, that it was only the expression 'resort to force' which differentiated the proposed affirmation from the undertaking which was already binding upon signatories of the Kellogg Pact. The point of view that the multiplication of international pacts only served to throw doubt on their efficacy was put with some emphasis by Señor de Madariaga.

² See pp. 233-4 above.

³ Presumably the intention of the British Government was to retain their freedom of action 'in certain regions of the World', in accordance with the 'British Monroe Doctrine' which had been formulated at the time of the negotiation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact (see the *Survey for 1928*, pp. 20-1). Possibly, also, the attitude of the British delegate was coloured by knowledge of the fact that a declaration of world-wide scope would not be accepted by Japan.

that the question of giving universal effect to the proposed obligation should be left open for the present.

On the question of reservations covering previous obligations a more serious difference of opinion arose. The French delegation was anxious that the terms agreed on should not make it more difficult to apply the provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant or of the Locarno Pact, and Monsieur Massigli was therefore in favour of a reservation covering previous obligations. The German delegate, however, refused to agree to the inclusion in the declaration of any reference to the Locarno Pact or other previous agreements. A deadlock appeared to have been reached, but after a series of meetings between the Locarno Powers a formula was devised which satisfied both France and Germany. It was agreed that resort to force should be prohibited on the same terms as resort to war was prohibited in the Kellogg Pact—that is, the signatory states would 'solemnly affirm that they will not in any event resort, as between themselves, to force as an instrument of national policy'. In this form, the declaration was accepted by the Political Commission on the 2nd March. There were twenty-six affirmative votes, and no opposition, but the number of abstentions was again very large.

On the 4th March the Political Commission began to discuss the French proposal for a European pact of mutual assistance. Monsieur Paul-Boncour, who said that his Government attached special importance to the conclusion of a pact of this kind, was supported by the representatives of the Little Entente states, Greece, and Finland. Herr Nadolny was again critical, and although the Italian representative did not take part in the debate he joined Herr Nadolny in voting against a resolution accepting the principle of a pact of mutual assistance between Continental European states which was adopted by fourteen votes to five on the 7th March. The other states which opposed the resolution were Austria, Hungary, and the Netherlands—the last because the provisions of the pact were not to apply to Great Britain.¹ Mr. Eden voted with the majority, after he had secured the insertion of the word 'Continental' in order to leave no doubt that Great Britain was excluded. It was proposed that a small committee should be appointed to draw up the text of a pact, but when the representatives of Germany, Italy, and Hungary refused an invitation to take part in this task it was decided that the preparation of a text should be postponed until a decision had been reached in regard to the definition of the aggressor, whose action would put the machinery of mutual assistance into operation. According

¹ Belgium abstained from voting for the same reason.

to the French plan, the right to assistance would be established 'when a territory under the authority of one of the signatory Powers' was 'attacked or invaded by foreign forces', but the Commission also had before it the more detailed Russian proposal for defining an aggressor which had been submitted to the General Commission during the discussion of the French plan.¹ The French delegation was willing to take this Russian proposal as a basis for discussion, and many of the small Powers were in favour of it, but the methods suggested were criticized as too rigid and automatic by Mr. Eden and also by Mr. Gibson, the American representative. After a general discussion, the Political Commission decided on the 10th March to set up a sub-committee which would examine first the question of defining the aggressor, second a Belgian proposal relating to the establishment of the facts of an aggression,² and third the proposed pact of mutual assistance. On these terms the German, Italian, and Hungarian delegations were ready to join the sub-committee.

By this time, however, it had become only too clear that the Conference was not proceeding on lines which were likely to lead to the conclusion of a Disarmament Convention within a reasonable period of time. The high proportion of abstentions on votes of any importance in the Commissions and Committees gave an appearance of unreality to the proceedings, and it was evident that many of the delegations were not ready to commit themselves, in the present state of international politics, to measures involving a reduction of their countries' armed forces. The situation in the Far East,³ which had cast its shadow over the Disarmament Conference from the outset, was certainly not conducive to a belief in the efficacy of the collective system of security, and in South America, also, more than one State Member of the League of Nations and signatory of the Kellogg Pact had disregarded its treaty obligations and was engaged

¹ See p. 234 above.

² For the Belgian proposal, see *Conf. D./C.P./12*.

³ See the *Survey for 1932*, Part V, and the present volume, Part IV. On the 24th February, 1933, the Japanese delegation withdrew from the special session of the Assembly which was considering the Sino-Japanese dispute, and the notice of Japan's resignation of her membership of the League was expected to follow in due course. On the 1st March, however, the Japanese delegation to the Disarmament Conference notified Mr. Henderson that it would continue its participation in the work of the Conference, but it was announced at the same time that the Japanese Government considered it necessary, in view of the situation in the Far East, to make various modifications in national defence. This indication that the level of Japanese armaments was likely to be raised rather than lowered did not seriously affect the discussions in the Disarmament Conference until naval armaments came up for consideration (see p. 285 below).

in an attempt to assert its rights by armed force.¹ Thus the atmosphere would not have been propitious for the Disarmament Conference to take the definite decisions which were expected of it in its new phase even if there had been no disturbing changes in Europe. By the end of February, however, there could be no doubt that the principal factor in determining the state of mind of delegates from European countries was the development of the situation in Germany.² Whatever the ultimate intentions of Herr Hitler's Government in regard to the conduct of German foreign policy might prove to be, the assumption of power by a party which had always made the revision of the Peace Treaty one of the cardinal points of its programme was bound to cause uneasiness in neighbouring states, and the utterances of leading members of the new administration had done nothing so far to calm these apprehensions. Moreover, so far as the Disarmament Conference was concerned, it could not be denied that the change of régime in Germany had been reflected in the behaviour of the German delegates. Their attitude appeared to the majority of their colleagues to be deliberately obstructive, and the manner in which they put forward their demands was certainly far less conciliatory than that which Herr Nadolny had adopted in the early days of the Conference, when he had represented the Government of which Dr. Brüning was the head.

The tactics of the German delegates were due in part, no doubt, to the exigencies of home politics (a Nazi Government would obviously consider it due to its own prestige to 'make itself felt' at Geneva); but, not unnaturally, they confirmed the fear of France and her allies that Germany under Herr Hitler was moving, more or less openly, in the direction of rearmament and treaty violation.

In this situation, it was more improbable than ever that the French Government would modify their traditional policy of 'security first', but by the beginning of March Monsieur Daladier's Cabinet had committed itself at least to a change in the direction in which the

¹ See the present volume, Part III, sections (iv) and (v).

² The Little Entente countries in particular were also perturbed over an alleged arms smuggling incident—known as the Hirtenberg affair—which had taken place in December 1932, when a large consignment of machine-guns and rifles, which had been sent from Italy to Austria—with Hungary, it was believed, as its ultimate destination—had arrived at the arms factory at Hirtenberg in Austria for repair. It was significant that the Foreign Ministers of the Little Entente states, who held a meeting at Geneva in the middle of February, should have decided that the time had come for a closer and more formal bond between them. On the 16th February, 1933, a statute of the Little Entente was signed, providing for the transformation of the Entente into a unified international organization. (See pp. 203-4 above.)

desired security was to be sought. The discussion of the French plan by the General Commission at the beginning of February had convinced the Government that there was little or no hope that the plan would be adopted as a whole. On the conclusion of the debate, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber appointed a sub-committee to examine the position, and this sub-committee, which reported in the middle of February, was believed to have taken the view that France would do well, for the time being, not to insist too rigidly upon improvements in the system of collective security, but to concentrate instead on an effort to secure really effective arrangements for the control of armaments and supervision of the execution of a Disarmament Convention. On the 1st March Monsieur Daladier, in an address delivered to the American Press Association in Paris, declared that his Government looked forward to a simultaneous reduction of all armed forces, and that he himself regarded effective supervision of armaments as the most essential step towards a general reduction. The prospects of agreement at Geneva would obviously be improved if the French Government no longer intended to insist upon additional contributions to security from the United States and from Great Britain and upon the establishment of an international force; but, while the emphasis was thus shifting to the question of control, it still remained open to doubt whether any system of control which would satisfy France would be accepted by Germany.

By the beginning of March many observers had come to the conclusion that the Disarmament Conference was merely wasting time and that the discussions were bound to be fruitless until the new German Government had declared their policy in unmistakable terms.

On the 1st March, Mr. Eden, the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who was acting as the Government's principal representative at the Conference,¹ had left Geneva for London in order to report to the Cabinet on the position, and on the 3rd March it had been officially announced that the British Prime Minister and Foreign Minister intended to go to Geneva in the near future in order to assist the Conference to reach early decisions. During the next few days there was some discussion regarding the possibility of a meeting at Geneva between the heads of Governments, or other responsible Ministers, of the Great Powers, at which the differences

¹ The only senior British Minister who had attended the Disarmament Conference since it reopened was Lord Londonderry, who took a not very helpful part in the discussions of the Air Commission on the 20th February (see p. 242 above).

between France and Germany might be frankly discussed, with Great Britain and Italy, and perhaps the U.S.A.,¹ acting as 'honest brokers'. The French Government, however, were still opposed to any idea of a four-Power or five-Power Conference, and it soon became apparent that Signor Mussolini did not intend either to break his rule of staying away from Geneva himself or to send a special representative to meet the representatives of other Powers. On the 8th March it was announced that neither Herr Hitler nor Freiherr von Neurath, his Foreign Minister, could leave Berlin at that moment.² In the meantime it had been arranged that the British Ministers should leave London on the 9th March and should discuss the situation with members of the French Government in Paris on their way to Geneva. Monsieur Paul-Boncour had returned to Paris on the 5th March, and he was among the Ministers who accompanied Monsieur Daladier at an interview with Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon on the 10th March. The *communiqué* issued at the close of the conversations stated that the exchange of views had covered 'the main economic and political questions now calling for attention. The urgency of the Geneva problem, especially in relation to the actual European situation, was fully recognized by the Ministers, who declared themselves determined to seek, in agreement with the representatives of the other states, all means of safeguarding the peace of the World.'

The European situation had, in fact, been growing more tense since the British Prime Minister had taken his decision to go to Geneva. French opinion was much disturbed at the German Government's decree of the 24th February authorizing the enrolment as auxiliary police of members of the Nazi Sturm Abteilungen ('S.A.') and of the Stahlhelm.³ By the 3rd March the enrolment of auxiliary police was in full swing, and a few days later the worst fears of Germany's neighbours appeared to be on the way to realization, for on the 9th March a detachment of Nazis occupied the disused barracks at Kehl, in the demilitarized zone on the right bank of the Rhine. Both these developments were considered in France as

¹ Towards the end of February, President-elect Roosevelt had asked Mr. Norman Davis to continue to act as the leader of the American delegation and to carry on the policy which had been pursued at the earlier session of the Conference. In the first week of March, however, Mr. Davis was still in the United States and had not yet received his final instructions from the new President, and Mr. Gibson, who was leading the American delegation in Mr. Davis's absence, had not taken a prominent part in the discussions.

² This decision could be justified on internal grounds, since the new Government was busily engaged in the task of consolidation (see pp. 143 *seqq.* above).

³ See p. 145 above.

breaches of treaty obligations—the enrolment of auxiliary police as an infringement of an agreement, laying down the size and character of the German police force, which had been reached between the Allied Powers at the Boulogne Conference in June 1920 and accepted by Germany at the Spa Conference in the following month,¹ and the incident at Kehl as an infringement of Article 43 of the Peace Treaty (which prohibited 'the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manœuvres of any kind,' in the demilitarized zone).² The uneasiness of Germany's eastern neighbours was illustrated at the same time by the action of the Polish Government in notifying the League's High Commissioner at Danzig on the 6th March that they had decided to reinforce the Polish guard stationed at the munitions depot on the Westerplatte,³ in view of the danger of an attack on the depot.

This increase in the tension in Europe was reflected in the atmosphere at Geneva when Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon arrived there on the 11th March. Two days earlier the General Commission, having completed its discussion of effectives,⁴ had begun to examine the question of land material, and the debate had at once brought the German and the French delegates into direct opposition. Herr Nadolny expressed the opinion that the problem of qualitative disarmament was ripe for decision, and must no longer be postponed pending the attainment of a greater degree of security. The time had come when the heavily armed states must reduce their armaments.⁵ Monsieur Massigli was equally uncompromising. He declared that France could not agree to any reduction of her armaments unless the

¹ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 108-9.

² The Nazis were withdrawn from Kehl within thirty-six hours, and in reply to representations from the French Ambassador on the 14th March Freiherr von Neurath explained that the Government did not consider either the Kehl incident or the enrolment of auxiliary police as a breach of treaty obligations because neither the S.A. nor the police could be regarded as an armed force. The French Ambassador had already, some three weeks earlier, drawn the attention of the German Government to the bad effect on French opinion of Nazi demonstrations on the bridges at Kehl and Hüningen.

³ For the question of the Westerplatte munitions depot, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 242-3, and the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 375 and 377. See also the present volume, p. 187 above.

⁴ This thesis was elaborated in greater detail by Herr Nadolny in an article which was published on the 11th March in *Völkerbund*, the organ of the German League of Nations Society. A week earlier the same journal had contained an article by Freiherr von Neurath which also laid stress on the fact that Germany's patience was exhausted. The German Foreign Minister complained that the General Commission had devoted too much time to discussing the French plan—which was a plan for security rather than disarmament—and declared that it was the security of Germany, not that of France, which was threatened by the existing situation.

Conference accepted the French proposals for a Continental pact of mutual assistance and for the standardization of Continental land forces. Since the German delegation had already refused to accept the principle of standardizing armies,¹ an impasse appeared to have been reached, and although the General Commission adopted its usual method of evading an immediate decision by appointing a sub-committee to go into the question of the abolition and limitation of material, it was difficult to see how a solution could be found so long as both France and Germany stood their ground. In any case, the political problem of the widening gulf between France and Germany, which was raising again, in an acute form, the danger of the division of Europe into two armed camps, could clearly not be disposed of by the method of discussion in a committee or sub-committee of the Disarmament Conference; yet in default of some prospect of a better understanding between France and Germany the Conference seemed doomed to an early death.

While Herr Nadolny continued to act as the principal representative of the German Government, the French delegation was again strengthened by the presence of the Foreign Minister. Monsieur Paul-Boncour returned to Geneva with the British Ministers on the 11th March, and during the next few days a series of interviews was arranged in which the whole position was thoroughly explored. The upshot of these conversations was the decision that Mr. MacDonald should make an attempt to revive the Conference by presenting a new and comprehensive plan to the General Commission on the 16th March. On the 15th March it was announced that Monsieur Daladier was leaving for Geneva in order that he might continue his conversations with the British Ministers, and might also attend the meeting of the General Commission at which Mr. MacDonald would explain his proposals. It was announced at the same time that Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon had received an invitation from Signor Mussolini to visit him in Rome, and that they would leave Geneva for Italy on the 17th March.²

(c) THE BRITISH DRAFT CONVENTION (MARCH TO JUNE, 1933)

On the 16th March Mr. MacDonald made his attempt to give the Disarmament Conference a new lease of life by submitting to the General Commission a new and complete scheme for the reduction and limitation of armaments. In his speech Mr. MacDonald explained

¹ See p. 239 above.

² This visit of the British Ministers to Rome and its outcome (the Four-Power Pact) are dealt with in section (ii) of this part of the present volume.

that the British Government had decided to produce a comprehensive scheme because they were convinced that the 'departmental or compartmental' method of dealing with the problems of disarmament had 'yielded its maximum usefulness', and that the time had come 'to face the facts'. He made it clear that he did not underestimate the seriousness of the existing situation in Europe, and while he quoted a remark recently made by Freiherr von Neurath: 'either Germany is given justice and freedom or Europe will risk destruction,' he also took the opportunity to point out that the disarmed as well as the armed nations had a contribution to make if the difficulties confronting the Conference were to be solved. 'The armed nations must be prepared to make their contribution in disarmament. The disarmed nations must be prepared to make their contribution in helping to establish confidence, goodwill, security, mutual understanding and international belief in each other.' Mr. MacDonald said that when he arrived at Geneva he was 'met with the proposal' that, in view of the changes which had taken place in the international situation, 'the only thing that this Conference could do was to adjourn for a period. The idea was that the sky is too cloudy for anything to be done: wait until the clouds have passed away. . . . The clouds will not pass away unless you and I create the atmosphere in which they cannot exist. . . . Therefore, an adjournment pure and simple would be the most heartbreaking confession of failure that this Conference could indulge in.' Mr. MacDonald gave only a broad outline of the British Government's proposals, but he warned his hearers frankly that the plan would not satisfy any of them. The British delegation expected criticism, but they asked their colleagues to 'try and work' the plan, or at least to 'consider how it can be worked, in the spirit in which it was drafted'. Mr. MacDonald ended his long speech on the note which had already been struck by Mr. Eden at a meeting of the bureau in February¹—the note of alternative risks. If the delegations to the Disarmament Conference were to return to their respective countries without having signed a Disarmament Convention, they would 'not be facing a risk', they would 'be facing a certainty. Risk is the alternative to certainty. If there is a failure, the stream of events will drive with increasing swiftness to catastrophe. . . . Failure—that means no signature, no agreement. Failure means the choice of a certainty, unexpressed and hidden, in place of the risk expressed in documents. Failure would let loose the passion that makes for war.'

The draft convention submitted by the British delegation consisted

¹ See p. 236 above.

of five parts.¹ Part I, relating to security, was based on the existence of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. It provided that in the event of any breach, or threatened breach, of that pact, a conference should be held between the parties to the convention, at the request of any five of them (including one of the Great Powers). The conference might be summoned through the machinery of the League of Nations. If a breach of the pact was threatened, it would be the object of the conference to agree upon the steps which could be taken, and if a breach was found to have occurred the conference would determine which party to the dispute was to be held responsible. Any conclusions reached by the conference must be concurred in by the representatives of all the Great Powers and by a majority of the other participating Governments.

Part II dealt with effectives and with land, naval, and air material. In regard to effectives, the result of the proposals would be to reduce the whole of the land forces of Continental Europe, excluding forces stationed overseas, to a militia basis by fixing eight months as the maximum period of service. (Provision was made, however, for an extension of the period to twelve months in certain cases to be decided by the Conference.) In calculating effectives, account would be taken of police forces or other formations possessing certain specific characteristics, doubtful cases being referred to the Permanent Disarmament Commission for decision. The table on the next page shows the suggested figures of average daily effectives which were not to be exceeded in the land armed forces² of Continental European countries.

In regard to land material, a maximum calibre of 105 mm. (4.5 inch) was proposed for mobile land guns in future, though those states which already possessed them would be allowed to retain existing guns up to 155 mm. (6.1 inch) in calibre without limits of time or of numbers. The maximum calibre of coast-defence guns would be 406 mm. (16 inch)—the size of the largest naval gun. The maximum limit for the weight of tanks would be 16 tons.³ All prohibited

¹ The text of the convention was published as Document *Conf. D. 157*.

² Similar tables for effectives in naval and air forces were not included in the draft, and it was pointed out in notes that the figures for these forces would have to be related to the naval and air material allowed to each contracting party. The table for land forces would also, of course, need to be completed by the addition of figures in respect of non-European countries.

³ It was subsequently explained that an unladen weight of 16 tons was meant. This was equivalent to a laden weight of about 20 tons—the figure which had been put forward in the British proposals of July 1932 (see the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 244–5). The question of limiting numbers of tanks was not dealt with in the MacDonald plan, but the British Government, which had opposed limitation hitherto, let it be known at a later stage that they were now prepared to waive their objections.

Party.	Land Armed Forces	
	Stationed in Home Country.	Total including Overseas.
Germany	200,000	200,000
Belgium	60,000	75,000
Bulgaria	60,000	60,000
Spain	120,000	170,000
France	200,000	400,000
Greece	60,000	60,000
Hungary	60,000	60,000
Italy	200,000	250,000
Netherlands	25,000	75,000
Poland	200,000	200,000
Portugal	50,000	60,000
Rumania	150,000	150,000
Czechoslovakia	100,000	100,000
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	500,000	500,000
Jugoslavia	100,000	100,000
Each other Continental European state	no separate figure	50,000

material would be destroyed within three years of the coming into force of the convention. The object of the chapter relating to naval material was to extend the provisions of the Treaty of London to France and Italy and to stabilize the situation, on the basis of the Washington and London Treaties, until 1935, when a conference of all contracting parties possessing naval armaments would meet concurrently with the conference of the principal Naval Powers for which provision had been made in the London Treaty.¹ The truce in the building of capital ships which was binding on the signatories of the London Treaty until the 31st December, 1936,² was to be extended to all states, with the reservation that Italy might lay down one ship not exceeding 26,500 tons. There would be no construction of cruisers carrying 8-inch guns, except as provided for in the London Treaty,³ and all other construction would be purely for replacement and would conform to the limitations already in force. Any proposals for further naval limitations which had already been placed before the Conference would be examined by the Permanent Disarmament Commission with a view to their consideration by the Naval Conference which was to meet in 1935.

The chapter on air armaments prohibited bombing from the air ('except for police purposes in certain outlying regions'), and pro-

¹ See the *Survey for 1930*, p. 69.

² See the *Survey for 1930*, p. 69.

³ See *op. cit.*, pp. 65 and 68.

vided that the Permanent Disarmament Commission should 'immediately devote itself to working out the best possible schemes' either for the 'complete abolition of military and naval aircraft, which must be dependent on the effective supervision of civil aviation to prevent its misuse for military purposes'; or, failing agreement on a method of effective supervision, for the 'determination of the minimum number of machines required by each High Contracting Party consistent with his national safety and obligations, and having regard to the particular circumstances of each country'. In order to facilitate the attainment by the Permanent Disarmament Commission of the above-mentioned objects, it was provided that the numbers of aeroplanes capable of use in war possessed by signatory states should be reduced within the period of the convention in accordance with the following table:¹

Belgium	150	Norway	75
United Kingdom	500	Poland	200
China	100	Portugal	25
Czechoslovakia	200	Rumania	150
Denmark	50	Siam	75
Estonia	50	Spain	200
Finland	25	Sweden	75
France	500	Switzerland	75
Greece	75	Turkey	100
Italy	500	Union of Soviet Socialist Re-	
Japan	500	publics	500
Latvia	50	United States	500
Lithuania	50	Jugoslavia	200
Netherlands	150		

Each state mentioned in the table might, however, keep in reserve a number of aeroplanes not exceeding 25 per cent. of the number in commission. For states which did not possess aeroplanes capable of use in war, the *status quo* existing on the 1st January, 1933, was to be maintained during the period of the convention. No naval or military aircraft, excluding troop carriers and flying boats, was to exceed three tons in unladen weight. No dirigibles were to be built or acquired during the period of the convention, though countries already possessing dirigibles might retain them. Aeroplanes exceeding the quantitative and qualitative limitations imposed were to be disposed of, one-half by the 30th June, 1936, and the other half before the expiry of the convention. Proposals for regulating civil aviation, which were to apply during the period of the convention, were set out in an annex.²

¹ It was pointed out that figures would have to be inserted subsequently for other signatory states possessing military or naval aeroplanes.

² The annex provided that signatory states should not permit the con-

Part IV¹ dealt with chemical, incendiary, and bacteriological warfare, which was prohibited in accordance with the proposals that had already been accepted by the Conference. Preparation for such warfare in time of peace was also prohibited, and regulations were proposed which were designed to prevent the manufacture, import or export of substances suited to chemical warfare except under Government authorization and in quantities 'necessary for protective experiments, therapeutic research and laboratory work'. The instruction of armed forces in the use of chemical weapons was also to be prohibited, but the signatories were to retain their freedom to take measures, with regard to material and installations and with regard to training, which were 'intended exclusively to ensure individual or collective protection against the effects' of chemical weapons. Provision was also made for the examination by the Permanent Disarmament Commission of complaints regarding preparation for chemical warfare, and for the steps to be taken by the Commission to establish the fact of the use of such weapons, but the nature of the action to be taken in cases where a breach of the provisions was proved was not specified.

Part V of the convention contained clauses relating to the composition, functions and operations of the Permanent Disarmament Commission and miscellaneous provisions. The Permanent Disarmament Commission was to be empowered to conduct investigations in the territory of any contracting party which was suspected of any infractions of the convention, either at the request of the Government of the suspected state, or at the request of one or more of the other contracting parties. In the latter case the scope of the investigation would be determined by a two-thirds majority of all

struction or use of civil aeroplanes which might be used for war purposes or which were designed to facilitate the installation of military fittings; that they should furnish the League of Nations with regular information concerning civil aircraft and should permit inspection of such aircraft at all reasonable times by qualified representatives of the League—the object being to establish, under the direction of the League, a complete international register of civil aircraft; that they should not require civil aviation enterprises to employ personnel specially trained for military purposes, nor prescribe the training of civil aviation personnel in military duties; that they should not establish civil air lines intended for use for military purposes; that they should not subsidize, either directly or indirectly, air lines other than those intended for economic, administrative and social purposes, and that they should communicate the amount and conditions of all subsidies to the League of Nations, which would publish the information supplied.

¹ Part III, which was headed 'Exchange of Information', consisted of a note to the effect that the provisions would 'depend in the main on the limitation and restrictions imposed by the other parts of the convention', so that it seemed unnecessary to draft them until a later stage.

the members of the Commission, whether present at the meeting or not. (In general, the Commission's decisions would be taken by a majority of the members present.) The Commission would also be entitled to conduct periodic investigations in regard to states which had made a special agreement to that effect. The convention was to remain in force for five years (except for the naval provisions, which would remain in force until the 31st December, 1936, and the rules forbidding the use of chemical methods of warfare, which were to remain in force indefinitely). Before the expiry of the convention, a second Disarmament Conference would be held to conclude a new convention, and it would be one of the duties of the Permanent Disarmament Commission to prepare for this conference. The convention, together with the conventions to be concluded subsequently, would replace the disarmament chapters of the Peace Treaties.

The outstanding features of the British draft convention were the proposals, in Part I, for consultation in the event of a breach or threatened breach of the Kellogg Pact, and the inclusion, in Part II, of definite figures relating to the effectives and the aeroplanes of European states. It was the first time since the discussion of disarmament had begun under the auspices of the League of Nations that proposals had been submitted in this concrete form, and although it was improbable, as Mr. MacDonald himself pointed out, that any state would be prepared to accept the limitations proposed without further bargaining, the suggested figures did provide the Conference with a firmer basis for discussion than it had possessed hitherto. In other respects, the plan contained little that was new, and indeed its purpose was to incorporate as many as possible of the proposals which had already won more or less general acceptance. It was noteworthy that the plan was not intended to be anything but transitional; it was based on the idea that the reduction of armaments must be carried out by stages, and its provisions were applicable only to the first stage, which would not in any case last for more than five years.

On the conclusion of Mr. MacDonald's speech, appreciation of the British Government's initiative was expressed by Monsieur Daladier, Herr Nadolny, Mr. Gibson, and General Cavallero, the Italian representative, but the general discussion of the plan was postponed for a few days, since the proposals had not been circulated beforehand, and the various delegations needed leisure to study them before they could make their views known. In the interval which elapsed between the presentation of the plan and its discussion by the General Commission, the attitude of the principal European countries

towards the proposals became fairly clear. French opinion was pleased at the incorporation in the plan of the suggestion for the standardization of European military forces on a militia basis and of other points taken from the French proposals; but the provisions for the exercise of control by the Permanent Disarmament Commission were criticized as inadequate, and uneasiness was also felt in regard to the position in which Germany would be placed if the convention were adopted. The proposals would double the size of the German army at one stroke; and, since the convention was to supersede the disarmament provisions of the Peace Treaties, it was feared that Germany might be free to acquire unlimited quantities of the armaments—such as land guns up to 105 mm.—for which no quantitative limitation was mentioned. The proposed cancellation of the Disarmament Chapter of the Versailles Treaty was naturally welcomed in Germany, and although certain portions of the draft convention—especially that relating to air armaments¹—were criticized, German comment was not unfavourable on the whole. In Italy, attention was mainly concentrated during the third week of March on the visit of Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon and on the outcome of their discussions with Signor Mussolini,² but the Government were understood to be favourably disposed towards the British plan. In the Little Entente states, the provisions of Part I of the draft convention were resented on the ground that they gave undue preponderance to the Great Powers—a point on which the smaller European states were particularly sensitive at the moment as a result of the reports that were in circulation regarding the nature of the conversations in Rome.

In view of the negotiations which were initiated as a sequel to the visit of the British Ministers to Rome, it was thought desirable in some quarters to postpone the discussion of the British draft convention by the General Commission until after the Easter vacation, but a suggestion to this effect met with strong opposition from the delegations of some of the smaller Powers, who saw in it yet another move in the direction of the establishment of a dictatorship by the Great Powers. Mr. Henderson consulted the General Commission on the 23rd March regarding the desirability of an immediate adjournment, and, since the views of the majority were clearly against adjournment, it was decided to adhere to the original programme and begin the examination of the British plan without further delay.

¹ During the period of the convention Germany would still be in a position of inferiority in the air, since she had no military or naval air force and the acquisition of aeroplanes capable of use in war by states which did not possess them was expressly forbidden.

² See section (ii) of this part of the present volume.

The debate on the draft convention lasted from the 24th to the 27th March, and its result was to show a general readiness on the part of the delegates to accept the draft as a suitable basis of work for the decisive stage of the Conference. The plan did not escape criticism, however, on account of its omissions as well as of its contents. Several speakers commented with disapproval on the proposed retention of bombing from the air in outlying regions, and the naval provisions were also felt to be open to objection, while the proposals for implementing the Kellogg Pact were criticized on the ground that they ignored the machinery of the League of Nations. A number of delegates indicated that they would propose amendments of certain details of the plan at a later stage, and it was clear that suggestions for modifications were to be expected especially in regard to the allocations of effectives¹ and of aeroplanes. As for omissions from the draft, several speakers regretted the absence of provisions for budgetary limitation and for control of the manufacture of, and trade in, arms; but Sir John Simon explained, in the speech in which he wound up the debate on the 27th March, that these omissions were to be accounted for by the fact that the committees of the Conference which were dealing with the problems in question had not yet completed their work.

Almost the only delegate who gave unqualified adherence to the British plan was Signor di Soragna (Italy), who expressed the opinion that it simplified and co-ordinated the various proposals which had been laid before the Conference and gave them a reality which had never before been achieved. The future attitude of the Italian Government towards the plan, he said, would be determined by the nature of the amendments which were submitted by other delegations. The American delegate did not join in the discussion, while the Japanese representative merely stated that the plan was receiving careful consideration.² Monsieur Dovgalevsky, for the U.S.S.R., was among the critics of the air and naval proposals, and he regretted that the figures which had been inserted into the draft applied only to European states, but he did not oppose the convention as a whole. As for

¹ The Turkish delegate expressed surprise that Turkey was not included in the list of European states the numbers of whose effectives were provisionally fixed in the draft. This omission caused some resentment in Turkey, where it was considered as an indication that the British Government regarded Turkey as an Asiatic state not primarily concerned in European problems. The misunderstanding was cleared up by the British representative in Turkey.

² Immediately after the British proposals had been presented to the General Commission, the Japanese military authorities had made it plain that, in their view, the plan was certain to founder in Europe, so that the question of its applicability to Japan need not be considered.

France and Germany, neither of them rejected the draft outright, but the speeches of their respective representatives illustrated once again the fundamental difference between their points of view. Monsieur Massigli emphasized the relation between security and disarmament, declared that the reduction and abolition of armaments must be governed by the situation which was likely to arise after the expiry of the first convention, and insisted that there must be no German re-armament. Herr Nadolny accepted the provisions in the draft convention for the implementation of the Kellogg Pact, but only on the understanding that they would make it possible for other states to disarm. He pointed out that the draft appeared to recognize the justice of Germany's claim to equality of rights, and he said that the German Government would accept the principle of a transitional period, but he indicated that they considered that certain modifications in the draft would be necessary in order to satisfy Germany's dignity and her need for security. In concluding the debate, Sir John Simon remarked that not one of the thirty-four speakers who had preceded him had signified disapproval of the new procedure which Mr. MacDonald had advocated—that of abandoning 'compartmental' methods and looking at the problem steadily and as a whole. He pointed out that the principal object of the draft was to find a middle course between conflicting extremes, and he emphasized once more the point which had been made by Mr. MacDonald: that Germany was being asked to make a contribution towards the re-establishment of confidence. In regard to the security proposals, he explained that the British delegation could not put forward any proposal which they themselves would be unable to sign, but they would be happy if other delegations could reach agreement among themselves, independently of Great Britain. At the end of the debate, the General Commission decided that the British draft should form the basis of its future discussions—various delegations reserving the right to propose modifications and additions—and that when the Commission reassembled after Easter it should proceed to examine the draft article by article. The Commission then adjourned for the Easter holiday, which was to last until the 25th April.¹

¹ The Effectives Committee, which had been considering the question of pre-military instruction in the middle of March (see p. 241 above), also decided on the 29th March to adjourn until after Easter. The majority of the members of the committee were in favour of continuing their work and proceeding at once to examine the next item on their programme (the problem of armed police); but Germany and Italy refused to take any part in the proceedings while the General Commission was in recess, and the committee found itself obliged to agree to adjournment, on the pretext that its discussions ought to

The period of four weeks during which the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference was in recess was occupied by negotiations regarding the Four-Power Pact¹—negotiations which gave rise to considerable uneasiness on the part of the smaller European states which had profited from the Peace Treaties and which feared that questions implying a revision of those Treaties were going to be settled over their heads. It was also marked by an increase in the hostility felt by other countries towards the new régime in Germany as a result of the Nazis' anti-Jewish measures. A change of attitude towards Germany on this account was particularly noticeable in Great Britain, where it was reflected both in the columns of the press and in questions and debates in the House of Commons.² As a result of these developments, the atmosphere at Geneva when the General Commission reassembled on the 25th April was again decidedly unfavourable to progress.

A number of amendments to Part I of the British draft convention had been submitted since the adjournment of the General Commission, but the discussion of the security proposals in the new session had hardly begun when the proceedings met with an unexpected check. The American delegation was now headed by Mr. Norman Davis, who had left the United States in the third week of March with a commission to act as Mr. Roosevelt's Ambassador-at-large in Europe, and who had since visited London, Paris, and Berlin and had conversations with leading members of the Government in all three capitals. It had been hoped that Mr. Davis would be able to take an early opportunity at Geneva of outlining the policy of the new Administration at Washington, especially in regard to the question of American contributions towards security. On the 26th April, however, Mr. Davis told the General Commission that the United States Government were still studying the question of consultation for the preservation of peace, and that he could not at present commit himself to a decision on Part I of the British draft convention, though he hoped at a later stage to be able to indicate the manner in which the United States could associate itself with the efforts to organize machinery for preserving peace. In view of this statement, other

be based in future on the new British proposals. A similar line was taken by the German and Italian representatives on the Committee for the Regulation of the Trade in, and the Private and State Manufacture of, Arms and Implements of War, which was also in session during March and which decided on the 29th to adjourn until the General Commission resumed work. (For the work of this committee in the previous year, see the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 251, 295, 297-8 n.)

¹ See the present volume, section (ii) of this part. ² See pp. 163 *seqq.* above.

delegates were naturally reluctant to express a final opinion on the security provisions, and the Bureau of the Conference decided that the General Commission should postpone its consideration of Part I of the draft convention and pass on to Part II (effectives and material). This programme brought the Commission at once face to face with the same difficulties that it had encountered in February and March.

On the 28th April the German delegation submitted amendments to Part II of the draft convention, the result of which would be to include trained reserves among effectives, and to limit the numbers of overseas forces stationed near the home country.¹ In addition, the German delegation proposed that the whole question of the standardization of Continental military forces should be referred to the Permanent Disarmament Commission. This would mean that provisions for standardization could not be incorporated in this first convention and no final decision on the question could be taken until the second Disarmament Conference was held in four or five years' time. In supporting the German amendments Herr Nadolny said that the question of German equality of rights in armaments must be settled in such a way as to guarantee the security of the Reich, and that Germany must therefore be authorized to possess any classes of armaments which other states considered necessary for their own defence. Provision must also be made for placing Germany in the same legal position as other states after the expiry of the first Disarmament Convention. This statement was interpreted as a claim to the immediate acquisition by Germany of types or samples of all the weapons retained by other states—a measure which would obviously make it much easier for Germany to rearm rapidly up to the strength of France at some future date. In reply to Herr Nadolny, Monsieur Massigli pointed out that the German amendments destroyed the basis of the British plan, and he could only hope that they did not represent the last word of the German delegation. He insisted that there must be progressive reduction of armaments without any rearmament, and he expounded once more the French point of view regarding the declaration of the 11th December, 1932—namely that the grant of equality of rights to Germany depended upon the establishment of a system of security. Mr. Eden also thought that the German proposals would render it very difficult to continue the discussions if they were maintained in their present

¹ Since Germany had neither trained reserves nor overseas forces this proposal would have left the total of her effectives untouched, whereas it would have greatly reduced the number of effectives allowed to France.

form. It was significant that no other delegate supported Herr Nadolny's amendments.

Private conversations during the next few days revealed no inclination on Herr Nadolny's part to withdraw or modify his proposals, and when the General Commission met again on the 1st May it was decided, after a desultory discussion, that all amendments to the chapter dealing with effectives should be postponed until the second reading of the convention. Certain non-controversial articles of the effectives chapter were adopted, but when the table of average daily effectives came up for consideration it was agreed, on Monsieur Massigli's suggestion, that that also should be postponed until the questions raised by the German amendments had been settled.

In the meantime the Effectives Committee, which had also re-assembled on the 25th April and which had been invited by the General Commission to continue its work as rapidly as possible, had been discussing the question of German police. The German delegate still took the line that the Schutzpolizei ought not to be counted as effectives, but a member of the French delegation produced detailed evidence in support of the view that the German police possessed military characteristics, and his statements were corroborated by the Belgian and Polish representatives. On the 1st May the committee took a series of decisions, by majority votes, which would result in the inclusion among German effectives of about 38,000 members of the Schutzpolizei. On the other hand, the committee decided by seven votes to six not to classify the new German auxiliary police¹ as effectives. The British and American delegates voted in the majority on this occasion, but it was subsequently explained that the British attitude on this point was determined by the fact that no decision had yet been taken as to the military character of the Nazi storm-troops, from whom the auxiliary police were drawn. The question of police was also discussed by the General Commission on the 3rd May, and a compromise proposal was provisionally adopted which would allow each country to retain a certain quota of militarized police (the quota was to be fixed in proportion to the strength of the country's effectives) in addition to its regular armed force; but any militarized police in excess of the quota would count as effectives. This proposal was accepted by Monsieur Massigli on the understanding that it would be open to reconsideration during the second reading of the draft convention.

During the first week of May there was much discussion regarding the next step which was to be taken at Geneva. The German

¹ See p. 249 above.

delegation showed no sign of yielding on the question of standardization of Continental forces, and Herr Nadolny also refused to withdraw his amendments regarding reservists and overseas forces. The Germans wished to continue the first reading examination of the draft convention and to pass on to the question of material, but a number of other delegations, including the French, held that the second reading of the effectives chapter should be taken without delay and decisions reached on the controversial points. If this procedure were to be adopted, however, and the German amendments were to be rejected, it was to be feared that the German delegation would withdraw from the Conference, and there was therefore some support for the idea that it would be better for the Conference to adjourn for some months without risking a breach with Germany. On the 8th May the question of procedure was discussed by the Bureau of the Conference, but no agreement was reached. Mr. Eden (who had returned to London on the 4th May in order to give the British Government first-hand information regarding the critical situation of the Conference) was in favour of coming to immediate decisions on the effectives chapter, and he was strongly supported by Monsieur Massigli. Mr. Wilson (a member of the United States delegation who had been taking an active part in the informal conversations that had been going on) suggested that Herr Nadolny might withdraw his amendments and make a general reservation on the effectives chapter, but Herr Nadolny refused to consider this possibility. The Bureau finally decided, as the only course open to it, to recommend further private conversations (in spite of the dislike of such conversations which was consistently manifested by the smaller Powers), in the hope that the German delegation might at least be persuaded by this means to abandon their purely negative standpoint and produce counter-proposals.

The prospects of a satisfactory outcome of these informal negotiations seemed slightly more hopeful as a result of a statement issued by the German Defence Minister, General von Blomberg, on the 8th May. While General von Blomberg declared that Germany could not accept any ultimatum from other Powers on such an important question as her system of defence, he implied that her refusal to consider the French proposal for standardization was not her last word on the subject. He pointed out that it was not possible to alter the defence system rapidly, and that a gradual shortening of the period of service was essential. The hope of a compromise which this statement appeared to offer was disappointed, however; and on the 11th May Mr. Eden, who had been conducting negotiations with

Herr Nadolny, informed the leaders of the French, Italian and United States delegations that the conversations had broken down and no solution had been found. The situation was further complicated, on the same day, by the wide publicity given to an article in the German press by Freiherr von Neurath, which was interpreted as a definite announcement of Germany's intention to re-arm. The German Foreign Minister referred to the German Government's preference for securing equality by means of a reduction of the armaments of other countries, but he declared that the realization of Germany's equality of rights through disarmament had broken down owing to the attitude of the highly armed states. There was no hope that military aircraft or big guns would be forbidden or abolished, and, that being so, Germany would have to provide herself with those weapons. The position in regard to effectives was similar. The impression which was produced by the publication of this article at this moment was illustrated by the comment of *Le Temps*, which declared that Freiherr von Neurath had sounded the death-knell of the Disarmament Conference.

Thereafter, events moved rapidly. On the 11th May Lord Hailsham, the British Minister for War, remarked in the course of a debate in the House of Lords that a refusal by Germany to take any further part in the Disarmament Conference would be tantamount to the rejection of the offers made to her, and the situation would demand the gravest consideration. In such circumstances he thought that Germany would remain bound by the Treaty of Versailles, and that any attempt to re-arm would be a breach of the Treaty and would bring into operation the sanctions for which it provided. Lord Hailsham made it clear that he was expressing his own personal opinion and not that of the Cabinet as a whole; but the fact that a British Cabinet Minister could refer openly to the possibility of applying sanctions to Germany was in itself a sufficient indication of the strength of the suspicion and hostility which the proceedings of Herr Hitler's Government were arousing.¹ On the 12th May, Monsieur Paul-Boncour issued a statement to the Press to the effect that if, owing to German intransigence, the Disarmament Conference did not produce a convention, the terms of the Treaty of Versailles would continue to be applied. In a speech in the Senate on the same day

¹ If the German Government were in any doubt as to the change of feeling towards Germany in Great Britain they must have been enlightened by the experiences of Herr Hitler's special emissary, Dr. Rosenberg, the head of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Nazi Party, who arrived in London in the second week of May and whose reception was anything but cordial (see p. 167 above).

Monsieur Paul-Boncour pointed out that the decision of the Effectives Committee regarding the inclusion among Germany's effectives of a considerable number of police and of members of semi-military formations¹ was equivalent to the recognition of a breach of the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty. On the same day, at Geneva, the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference decided that, since the method of private conversations had produced no result, the problem must be handed back to the General Commission, and it was agreed that the Commission should resume its general discussion of the British draft convention on the 16th May, and that it should deal with both effectives and material.

The meeting of the General Commission was, however, postponed for a few days in consequence of the decision of the German Government to call a meeting of the Reichstag on the 17th May at which a statement of policy would be made by the Chancellor. This decision was taken on the 12th May, after the Cabinet had heard a report from Herr Nadolny, who had been summoned to Berlin for that purpose. Further discussion of general questions at Geneva would obviously be mere waste of time until Herr Hitler had made his declaration, and the interval was filled mainly by speculation as to what the nature of that declaration was likely to be. The prevailing gloom was heightened by a speech which was delivered by the Vice-Chancellor of the Reich, Herr von Papen, at Münster on the 13th May, for Herr von Papen chose this moment to deliver a panegyric on war, in which he referred to the traditional German aversion from dying in one's bed and appealed to German mothers to bear sons in order that they might die fighting for the Fatherland. It was hardly surprising that utterances such as this on the German side should have given rise to discussion of the desirability of a preventive war in certain organs of the French Press, though Monsieur Daladier and the members of his Government were careful to refrain from any public statement which might still further increase the tension. The only important move during this period in which the World was waiting for Herr Hitler to speak came from the United States.

Towards the end of April President Roosevelt had received visits from Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and from Monsieur Edouard Herriot. The principal subjects of discussion between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr.

¹ The Effectives Committee had discussed the question of pre-military training on the 10th and 11th May, and had decided by nine votes to two (Germany and Hungary) that the Nazi S.A. and the Stahlhelm were organizations of a military character. The question of Italian semi-military organizations was provisionally settled on the basis that the Fascist militia should be counted as equivalent to 30,000 effectives.

MacDonald were the forthcoming World Economic Conference and the problem of War Debts, and the primary object of Monsieur Herriot's mission was also to discuss the debt question;¹ but the situation in relation to disarmament and security naturally came up for consideration in both series of conversations. Mr. MacDonald, on his return, said that he had come to an understanding with President Roosevelt for co-operation in trying to bring the Disarmament Conference to a successful issue, while Monsieur Herriot's account of his conversations in Washington appeared to show that President Roosevelt shared French views in regard to the importance of international supervision and the necessity of avoiding any German re-armament, and that his attitude on the question of American neutrality in cases of aggression was also likely to be helpful. During the first fortnight of May also, Mr. Norman Davis was following the development of the situation in Europe at first hand, and was keeping in close touch with the Governments in London and in Paris as well as with the delegates at Geneva. The reports which Mr. Davis transmitted to Washington determined President Roosevelt to intervene² before Herr Hitler made his statement of policy on the 17th May.

On the 16th May, President Roosevelt addressed an appeal to the Sovereigns or Presidents of the other fifty-four nations which were represented at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. In an explanatory message to the Congress of the United States, the President said that he was 'impelled to this action because it' had 'become increasingly evident that the assurance of world political and economic peace and stability' was 'threatened by selfish and short-sighted policies, actions and threats of actions'. Mr. Roosevelt referred to the 'two great world conferences' which had been called in the hope that peace might 'be assured through practical measures of disarmament' and that the 'common struggle against economic chaos' might be carried to victory. The World Economic Conference 'must establish order in place of the present chaos by the stabilization of currencies, the freeing of the flow of world trade and international action to raise price levels. It must supplement individual domestic programmes for economic recovery by wise, considered international action.' As for the Disarmament Conference, it had 'laboured for

¹ See the present volume, Part I, section (ii) (b), for an account of the Washington conversations from the economic aspect.

² It was stated in Washington that the President's message had been under consideration since January and that it was not in any sense an improvisation designed to meet a special emergency, but the moment of its despatch seems to have been decided on Mr. Davis's advice.

more than a year, and as yet' it had been 'unable to reach satisfactory conclusions'.

If we ask what are the reasons for armaments [the President's message continued] it becomes clear that they are two-fold—first a desire, disclosed or hidden, on the part of Governments to enlarge their territories at the expense of sister nations. I believe that only a small minority of Governments and peoples harbour such a purpose. Second—the fear of the nations that they will be invaded. I believe the overwhelming majority of the peoples feel obliged to retain excessive armaments because they fear some act of aggression against them, not because they themselves seek to be the aggressors. There is justification for this fear. Modern weapons of offence are vastly stronger than modern weapons of defence. Frontier forts, trenches, wire entanglements, coast defences—in a word, fixed fortifications—are no longer impregnable to the attack of war planes,¹ heavy mobile artillery, land battleships called tanks, and poison gas. If all nations agree wholly to eliminate from their possession and use weapons which make possible successful attack, defences automatically will become impregnable and the frontiers and independence of every nation will be secure. The ultimate object of the Disarmament Conference must be the complete elimination of all offensive weapons. The immediate objective is a substantial reduction of some of these weapons and the elimination of many others.

This Government believes that the programme for immediate reduction of aggressive weapons now under discussion at Geneva is but the first step towards the ultimate goal. We do not believe that the proposed immediate steps go far enough. Nevertheless, this Government welcomes the measures now proposed and will exert its influence towards the attainment of further successive steps of disarmament.

Stated in the clearest way, there are three steps to be agreed upon at the present discussions:

- (1) To take at once the first definite step towards this objective as broadly outlined in the MacDonal Plan.
- (2) To agree upon the time and procedure for taking the following steps.
- (3) To agree while the first and following steps are being taken that no nation shall increase its existing armaments over and above the limitations of the treaty obligations.

But the peace of the World must be assured during the whole period of disarmament, and I therefore propose a fourth step, concurrent with and wholly dependent on the faithful fulfilment of these three proposals and subject to existing treaty rights:

That all nations of the World should enter into a solemn and definite pact of non-aggression, that they should solemnly reaffirm the obligations they have assumed to limit and reduce their armaments, and, provided that these obligations are faithfully executed by all the signatory

¹ The use of the term 'war planes' presumably indicated that the Roosevelt Administration was prepared at this time to agree to the total abolition of all naval and military aircraft and not only of bombing aircraft.

Powers, individually agree that they will send no armed force of whatsoever nature across their frontiers.

Common sense points out that if any strong nation refuses to join with genuine sincerity in these concerted efforts for political and economic peace, one in Geneva and the other in London, progress can be obstructed and ultimately blocked.

In such an event the Civilized World, seeking both forms of peace, will know where the responsibility for failure lies.

President Roosevelt's message reached Berlin in time for perusal while the final draft of Herr Hitler's declaration of policy was in preparation. Whether or not the draft was modified in the light of President Roosevelt's clear warning that Germany would be held responsible for a breakdown of the Disarmament Conference, the tone of the speech which Herr Hitler delivered before the Reichstag on the 17th May was reassuringly statesmanlike and even conciliatory.¹

Herr Hitler claimed that Germany had disarmed in accordance with the terms of the Versailles Treaty. He denied that the Nazi S.A. and the Stahlhelm were military organizations, and declared that their purpose was to protect Germany against Communism. 'If attempts are now made at Geneva', he said, 'to include these organizations, which serve exclusively internal purposes, in military effectives, there would be an equally good reason for including the fire brigade, the athletic associations, the watch and ward companies, rowing clubs and sports associations and others in the military forces.' As for the auxiliary police, which had 'an exclusively political character', they were already being demobilized and would be completely dissolved before the end of the year.

Germany had no intention of using force in support of her claims and she did not 'wish to take any other path than that recognized as justified by the treaties themselves'. 'No new European war could improve the unsatisfactory conditions of the present day. On the contrary, the application of violence of any kind in Europe would have no favourable effect upon the political or economic position which exists to-day.'

On the question of guarantees of security, Herr Hitler asked what concrete safeguards France could desire in addition to those which she already possessed; and he suggested that Germany, which lacked aeroplanes and heavy guns, had, 'in her state of defencelessness and disarmament, greater justification in demanding security than the over-armed states bound together in military alliances'.

¹ The text of the speech will be found in *Documents on International Affairs, 1933*.

'Nevertheless,' he continued, 'Germany is at any time willing to undertake further obligations of international security if all the other nations are ready on their side to do the same and if this security is also to benefit Germany. Germany would also be ready to disband her entire military establishment and destroy the small amount of arms remaining to her if the neighbouring countries will do the same thing with equal thoroughness. But if these countries are not willing to carry out the disarmament measures to which they are also bound by the Treaty of Versailles, Germany must at least maintain her demand for equality.'

Herr Hitler declared that the German Government looked upon the British draft convention which was before the Disarmament Conference 'as a possible basis for the solution' of the disarmament question. But they 'must demand that the defence force existing in Germany shall not be abolished unless at least qualitative equality be conceded to Germany'. They must also 'demand that any change in Germany's present defence organization, which was not chosen by her but imposed on her from abroad' should 'follow step by step in the same degree as the actual disarmament of the other states'. Germany was ready to accept a five-year transitional period provided that at the end of that time she would really be on an equal footing with other states. She was also ready to renounce 'aggressive' weapons if other nations destroyed such weapons during the five-year period, and, on the same condition of equality, she would accept a general international control of armaments, and would agree to include in the scope of the control 'organizations which merely serve educational and sporting purposes . . . in order to prove beyond doubt to the whole World that they are of an entirely unmilitary character'. On the question of the French Colonial troops, however, Herr Hitler maintained the standpoint which had been taken by the German delegation at Geneva: that is, he insisted that they ought to be reckoned as a part of the French Army.

Herr Hitler referred to President Roosevelt's proposals, which were, he said, warmly welcomed by the German Government—particularly 'the possibility suggested . . . of bringing the United States into European relations as a guarantor of peace'. Towards the end of his speech the Chancellor struck a warning note.

The German Government and the German people will under no circumstances allow themselves to be forced to sign what would mean a perpetuation of the degradation of Germany. . . . The attempt has been made in newspaper articles and regrettable speeches to threaten Germany with sanctions, but such a monstrous step would only be our

punishment for having pressed for the carrying out of the Treaties by our demand for disarmament. Such a measure could only lead to the definite moral and effective invalidation of the Treaties. Germany, however, even in this case would never abandon her peaceful claims. The political and economic consequences, the chaos which such an attempt would bring upon Europe, would be the responsibility of those who used such means against a people which is doing the World no harm. Any such attempt, or any attempt to do violence to Germany by means of a simple majority vote contrary to the clear meaning of the Treaties, could only be dictated by the intention of excluding us from the conferences. The German people, however, to-day possesses sufficient character in such a case not to impose its co-operation on other nations, but, though with a heavy heart, to draw the only possible consequence. It would be difficult for us as a constantly defamed nation to continue to belong to the League of Nations.

Herr Hitler's statement, following upon President Roosevelt's message, did produce a certain relaxation of the tension in Europe, and the atmosphere was lighter than it had been for many weeks when the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference met again at Geneva on the 19th May. The German Chancellor's declaration was generally considered to be satisfactory so far as it went—all the more because it was recognized that, if Herr Hitler's protestations of peaceful intentions were sincere, he was in a far better position than any of his predecessors in office to carry out a policy of international co-operation, because he could count on the support of the extreme nationalist elements whose opposition had hampered the efforts of Dr. Stresemann and Dr. Brüning. At the same time, the terms of Herr Hitler's declaration were not felt to be sufficiently precise to make it certain that the obstacles to progress in the Disarmament Conference which had been presented by the German attitude would now be removed, and a further statement from Herr Nadolny was therefore awaited with anxiety. French opinion, in particular, was inclined to be sceptical as to the value and sincerity of Herr Hitler's conciliatory phrases. As for President Roosevelt's message, it was well received in most European countries,¹ and

¹ Formal replies to the message, accepting President Roosevelt's four points, were despatched on behalf of the heads of most of the fifty-four nations to which it was addressed during the week following the 17th May. In Italy, the message was favourably received, but it was thought to be addressed primarily to France and the Little Entente states, and the proposal that all the nations of the World should agree to 'send no armed force of whatsoever nature across their frontiers' was regarded as a warning that the United States would not countenance the application of sanctions to Germany. The U.S.S.R. had been included among the fifty-four states addressed by President Roosevelt (a step which gave rise to undisguised satisfaction in Moscow and which also provoked considerable comment in the United States, where it was considered in some quarters to foreshadow the formal recognition of the Soviet Government which

Monsieur Daladier announced on the 17th May that he gladly associated himself with 'the generous effort undertaken' by Mr. Roosevelt. Nevertheless, a certain amount of disappointment with the message was observable in France, and the absence of any promise of definite action by the United States against an aggressor was noticed with regret by other European countries as well as by France. As in the case of Germany, it was felt that judgement must be suspended until the declaration by the head of the American Government had been supplemented by a more detailed exposition of policy at Geneva.

The meeting of the General Commission on the 19th May began with the reading of President Roosevelt's message by Mr. Henderson, who said that he considered the message a contribution of the utmost importance to the work of the Conference. There followed the expected statement by Herr Nadolny, which was still somewhat lacking in precision, but was of a nature to allay apprehension. Herr Nadolny announced that the German Government now accepted the British draft convention 'not only, as hitherto, as a basis of discussion, but as a basis for the future convention itself'. So far as they had any modifications to propose, they would be 'in conformity with this new idea'. The German delegation subsequently made it known that this statement implied the modification or withdrawal of the German amendments which had already been presented, and the amendment which had proved the principal obstacle (that proposing to refer the question of standardization of Continental European forces to the Permanent Disarmament Commission) was in fact withdrawn almost immediately.¹ Herr Nadolny's declaration elicited cordial replies from both Mr. Eden and Monsieur Massigli—the latter interpreting the German delegate's statement to mean that the path was now free and that the Conference could proceed with its work.²

did in fact follow some six months later), and Monsieur Kalinin's reply was cordial in tone. In Japan the receipt of the message caused some embarrassment. It was formally acknowledged by the Emperor, but the reply of the Government was not sent for nearly three weeks. It merely stated that Japanese views on the different steps detailed in the President's message would, if necessary, be presented as occasion offered.

¹ Mr. Henderson announced its withdrawal at the meeting of the General Commission on the 22nd May.

² On the same day, a debate took place in the French Senate on an amendment to the Budget providing that the proposed cut of 5 per cent. in all administrative expenditure should not apply to the war budget. The amendment was carried by 272 votes to 70, after Monsieur Daladier had declared that it would be impossible to reduce the expenditure on military material until the nations of the World had discovered an effective system of simultaneous disarmament.

On the following day (the 20th May), the General Commission had a short preliminary discussion on the question of material, but no important developments took place until the 22nd May, when Mr. Norman Davis made his long awaited pronouncement. Mr. Davis was now in a position to explain the attitude of the new Administration at Washington on the principal problems which called for settlement at Geneva. On the question of the German claim to equality, Mr. Davis said:

It would neither have been just nor wise, nor was it intended, that the Central Powers should be subject for all time to a special treatment in armaments. There is and has been a corresponding duty on the part of the other Powers, parties to the Peace Treaties, that by successive stages they too would bring their armaments down to a level strictly determined by the needs of self-defence. While the United States is not bound by the provisions or the implications of those treaties,¹ I have no hesitancy in saying that it is the will of our people, interpreted by President Roosevelt, to join with the other Powers in disarming down to that level, and we are prepared to exert our influence to bring this about, not by theoretical statements of good intentions, but by decisive and progressive reduction of armaments through international agreement.

The contribution which the United States was prepared to make was described by Mr. Davis as follows:

As regards the level of armaments, we are prepared to go as far as the other states in the way of reduction. We feel that the ultimate objective should be to reduce armaments approximately to the level established by the Peace Treaties: that is, to bring armaments as soon as possible through successive stages down to the basis of a domestic police force.

In particular, as emphasized by President Roosevelt, we are prepared

¹ This phrase in Mr. Davis's speech was prompted, no doubt, by a desire to conciliate 'isolationist' opinion in the United States, but the statement was not in strict accordance with the facts. The United States was not, of course, bound by the Treaty of Versailles as such, but in the separate German-American Peace Treaty of the 25th August, 1921—ratifications of which were exchanged on the 11th November, 1921—it was expressly stated that the United States should 'have and enjoy . . . the rights and advantages stipulated' in certain provisions of the Versailles Treaty, and the provisions specified included the whole of Part V (the disarmament chapter). Moreover, President Wilson was among the signatories of the note of the 16th June, 1919, from the Allied and Associated Powers to Germany in which the disarmament of Germany was declared to be the first step towards the general reduction and limitation of armaments. It may be noted that when Mr. Stimson, on the 6th January, 1932, addressed the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Senate on the subject of an appropriation to send delegates to the Disarmament Conference, he laid stress on the moral obligation which the United States had incurred by participating in the demand made to Germany that she should accept 'the drastic terms of disarmament that were imposed upon her by the Treaty'.

to join other nations in abolishing weapons of an aggressive character, which not only are the more costly to construct and maintain, but at present are those most likely to lead to a sudden breach of the peace. To cut the power of offence and remove the threat of surprise attack would do more than anything else to lessen the danger of a war. Almost a year ago the American Government submitted a proposal along these lines. This proposal, which received the approval of a large number of states, was not acceptable to certain states, and was therefore not adopted. A few weeks ago the British Prime Minister submitted a detailed proposal, which embodies many of the features of the American plan of last year. As the British proposal represents a real measure of disarmament, we accept it wholeheartedly as a definite and excellent step toward the ultimate objective. We, therefore, are prepared to give our full support to the adoption of this plan.

In addition I wish to make it clear that we are ready not only to do our part toward the substantive reduction of armaments, but, if this is effected by general international agreement, we are also prepared to contribute in other ways to the organization of peace. In particular we are willing to consult with other states in case of a threat to peace, with a view to averting conflict. Further than that, in the event that the states, in conference, determine that a state has been guilty of a breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations and take measures against the violator, then, if we concur in the judgment rendered as to the responsible and guilty party, we will refrain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort which these states may thus make to restore peace.

Finally, we believe that a system of adequate supervision should be formulated to ensure the effective and faithful carrying out of any measure of disarmament. We are prepared to assist in this formulation and to participate in this supervision. We are heartily in sympathy with the idea that means of effective, automatic and continuous supervision should be found, whereby nations will be able to rest assured that, as long as they respect their obligations with regard to armaments, the corresponding obligations of their neighbours will be carried out in the same scrupulous manner.

Mr. Davis referred to President Roosevelt's proposal that, 'subject to existing treaty rights, armed forces should not be sent across national frontiers', and he suggested that 'in the long run we may come to the conclusion that the simplest and most accurate definition of an aggressor is one whose armed forces are found on alien soil in violation of treaties'.

He thought that there had been

two main obstacles to disarmament. One was the apprehension that Germany proposed to rearm; the other the reluctance of the armed Powers of Europe, in the present state of the world, to take a real step in disarmament.

If at this decisive point any nation should fail to give conclusive evidence of its pacific intention and insist upon the right to rearm, even

though the other Powers take effective and substantial steps towards disarmament, then the burden of responsibility for the failure of the Disarmament Conference, with the incalculable consequences of such a failure, would rest on the shoulders of that nation. The problem with which we are faced cannot be solved if one nation insists on rearming while the others disarm. The result inevitably would be another race in armaments.

As regards the action of the other Powers, we are not unaware in the United States of the political difficulties which still lie in the way of the reduction of European armaments. We recognize the legitimate claim which any state has to safeguard its security. But we are firmly convinced that, in the long run, this security can best be achieved through a controlled disarmament, by which the military strength of the most heavily armed nations is progressively reduced to a level such as that provided for in the Peace Treaties. To the extent that armaments create political tension, they in themselves constitute a menace to peace, and may jeopardize the security of the very nations which maintain them.

If we take a long step in the direction of disarmament to-day, and agree by stages to achieve our ultimate objective, we can meet any legitimate claim of the Powers bound by the Peace Treaties, and at the same time effectively help to ensure peace.

This statement, in which Mr. Roosevelt's Ambassador-at-large defined and amplified the President's own declaration of policy, was a highly important landmark from the point of view of disarmament as well as of security. In regard to disarmament, the United States Government now showed themselves ready to take the German Government at their word and accept the solution of the problem of equality in armaments which Berlin was declared to prefer—to agree, that is, to the reduction of all armaments, within a limited period, approximately¹ to the level imposed on Germany by the Peace Treaty. In regard to security, Mr. Davis's statement finally removed the uncertainty which had still existed, even after the receipt of the message of the 16th May, in regard to the exact nature of the part which the American Government expected to play in strengthening European security. Mr. Davis was able not merely to proclaim the readiness of the United States to consult with other states in case of a threat to peace; he was also able to announce what amounted to a

¹ Mr. Davis's use of the word 'approximately' was apparently intended to cover the contingency that the German pocket-battleships might remain in commission (the German delegation had made a conditional offer to abandon them in 1932 [see the *Survey for 1932*, p. 227 n.]), in which case it was considered necessary that allowance should be made for battleships exceeding 10,000 tons (the limit imposed by the Treaty) in order to meet the special qualities of the pocket-battleship. With this reservation the American proposal could be interpreted as a definite offer to accept the Versailles Treaty limitations on armaments.

radical change in the traditional attitude of the United States towards the whole question of neutrality and the freedom of the seas. Mr. Roosevelt had definitely accepted the thesis, which his predecessor's Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, had propounded nine months earlier,¹ that the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the Renunciation of War had made the conception of neutrality obsolete, and he proposed to implement Mr. Stimson's doctrine by giving an undertaking that the American Government would 'refrain from any action tending to defeat' any collective measures against an aggressor which might be decided on by the states in conference. It was true that this abandonment of neutral rights was to be conditional on the concurrence of the United States in the judgement rendered by the *ad hoc* conference, and it was also true that the last word on this question rested not with the President but with the Congress of the United States; but even with these reservations it was clear that this was the most definite step that had yet been taken in the direction of abandoning the policy of isolation which had been inaugurated when the Senate of the United States rejected the Versailles Treaty in 1920. If this American contribution did not quite fulfil all the hopes that had been raised in France by Monsieur Herriot's account of his conversations with Mr. Roosevelt, at least the French Government now knew what they could expect. The satisfaction which was naturally felt in France at the American Government's definite rejection of any idea of German rearmament and at their endorsement of French views in regard to the importance of control of armaments was somewhat tempered by the effect of other passages of Mr. Davis's speech. Mr. Davis indicated clearly that France was now expected to disarm and that if she displayed any further reluctance she would run the risk of incurring the blame for obstructiveness which had attached to Germany before Herr Hitler made his declaration. French apprehension on this score was not diminished by a belief that opinion in the United States—and perhaps also in Great Britain—was inclined to accept Herr Hitler's declaration at its face value and to overlook the obvious fact (as it seemed to France) that a single speech by the head of the German Government could not wipe out the impression which had been created by the whole trend of events in Germany since the end of January. As for Herr Nadolny's statement of the 19th May, it was welcomed in France as a sign that the German Government intended to abandon their obstructive tactics, but at the same time there was a suspicion that this change of tactics was only part of a deliberate move on Germany's part to put France

¹ See the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 272-3.

in the wrong. The French delegation therefore felt that it was more than ever necessary for them to exercise caution at Geneva.

The meeting of the General Commission on the 22nd May at which Mr. Davis made his speech was attended by the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and of France. Sir John Simon expressed warm appreciation of Mr. Davis's statement, but it was noticeable that he made no direct response to the lead given by the United States in the direction of 'levelling down' armaments; nor did he allude specifically to the abandonment of the traditional American attitude regarding neutrality—one of the effects of which, of course, would be to make it impossible for the British Government to plead in future that American views regarding the freedom of the seas might make it difficult for them to carry out their obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant and other commitments designed to strengthen security. Sir John Simon's principal suggestion was that, now that the British plan had been accepted by the German delegation as the basis of the future convention, the General Commission ought to take definite decisions on the draft, article by article. Appreciation of Mr. Davis's statement was also expressed by Baron Aloisi (Italy)¹ and by Monsieur Paul-Boncour. The French Foreign Minister also supported Sir John Simon's suggestion that the time had come to take decisions on the draft convention, and he pointed out that, since the United States had now indicated what it could do in the matter of security, there was nothing to prevent the Commission from going back to Part I of the draft convention, consideration of which had previously been postponed.² In view of the political atmosphere in which these questions were being examined, he thought that it would be easier to discuss the reduction of armaments in detail after a decision had been reached on the security proposals. Mr. Norman Davis, however, opposed the suggestion that the Commission should return to Part I of the British draft. In view of his statement, he thought that it would be waste of time for the Commission to discuss security until the Powers of Continental Europe had come to an understanding among themselves on the regional arrangements for security in which non-European Powers would not be concerned. He would prefer to proceed at once to a detailed discussion of the chapter of the draft which dealt with material. The

¹ The Italian Government appear, however, to have felt some doubt regarding the nature of the system of control of armaments envisaged by the United States. This doubt was shared by the German Government, and the Italian and German Ambassadors in Washington called at the White House on the 22nd May to ask for further light on this point.

² See p. 262 above.

question of the procedure to be adopted was discussed privately, and on the 23rd May the Bureau decided, as a compromise, that the questions of security and of material¹ should be dealt with at alternate meetings of the General Commission.

In the meantime, questions relating to security had been under consideration by the committee which had been appointed by the Political Commission of the Conference on the 10th March.² By the third week of May this committee had adopted a definition of the aggressor and it had also agreed on measures which should be taken to ascertain the facts in a case of aggression. The proposal for defining an aggressor, which had been submitted by the Soviet delegation during the discussion of the French plan in February,³ had undergone certain modifications in detail, but in substance it was unchanged. The aggressor in an international conflict was defined as

that state which is the first to commit any of the following actions: (1) declaration of war upon another state; (2) invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another state; (3) attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another state; (4) naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state; (5) provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another state, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded state, to take in its own territory all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.

¹ It was not considered necessary for the General Commission to revert to the question of effectives at this stage, as the relevant portion of the draft convention had already been given a first reading and the Effectives Committee was still at work. During the first half of June, this committee completed its examination of the question of pre-military training and drew up a report. Having decided on the 11th May that the Nazi S.A. and the Stahlhelm ought to be classified as effectives, the committee decided on the 22nd May that the German auxiliary police, who were drawn from the Nazis and the Stahlhelm, need not be included in the category of militarized police, since their numbers would already have been taken into account in computing effectives. As there appeared to be no possibility of agreement regarding the control of pre-military instruction, the British delegate suggested that it should be left uncontrolled, and the committee decided in principle, by eight votes to six, that if this suggestion was adopted there ought to be some arrangement for compensating states in which pre-military instruction did not exist. The British delegate, however, was not prepared to accept this principle. On the question of the account which should be taken of compulsory labour corps in computing effectives, the committee decided, by twelve votes to four, that the only satisfactory solution would be to prohibit such corps (the minority in this vote consisted of Italy, Germany, Austria, and Hungary). On the 13th June the committee adopted a report which was of an inconclusive nature. There were numerous reservations, and on the question of pre-military instruction opinions were expressed which were in complete opposition with one another.

² See p. 246 above.

³ See p. 234 above.

In addition it was stipulated that 'no political, military, economic or other considerations' might 'serve as an excuse or justification' for aggression, and a special protocol, to be annexed to the act defining the aggressor, enumerated 'the principal cases in which states might have thought themselves authorized to resort to measures of force against another state under international law as it existed previously to the Pact of Paris and to the Covenant of the League of Nations'.¹

The proposal relating to the establishment of the facts of aggression had been put forward in the first place by the Belgian delegation. It provided for the setting up of a 'Commission for establishing the Facts' in the territory of any High Contracting Party which might so request. The Commission was to consist of five members, and rules were laid down for its constitution. Any High Contracting Party which believed itself 'to be the victim of, or threatened with, any aggression or violation of its territory' would 'have the option of calling upon the Commission to establish all the facts likely to throw light on the situation'.

The Security Committee also gave some consideration to the proposal for a European pact of mutual assistance,² but the representatives of Germany, Hungary, and Italy confined themselves to following this part of the committee's work as observers, and, although the committee prepared a draft of a pact, this was submitted to the General Commission only as a basis of discussion. The draft reiterated the obligation not to resort to force and provided that states which had not already done so should accede to the General Convention to improve the Means of preventing War.³ The draft took account of existing obligations with regard to assistance, and strengthened them in two ways: first, by providing for an exact definition of the aggressor and, second, by making any recommendation of the League Council in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant binding upon the signatories. The participating states would be free to limit the application of their commitments either by declaring at the time of accession that they accepted the obligations in a given region but not throughout the whole of Europe, or by specifying the forces or the material with which they would be prepared to render assistance. Finally, a distinction was drawn between the

¹ Report, dated the 24th May, 1933, of the Committee on Security Questions (Document *Conf. D./C.G./108*). In the original Soviet proposal the list of considerations which might not be adduced as justification for aggression had formed an integral part of the act defining the aggressor.

² See Documents *Conf. D./C.G./108(a)* and *Conf. D./C.G./C.R.S./9(a)*.

³ See the *Survey for 1931*, Part II, section (iii).

idea of assistance and the idea of belligerency, and it was laid down that a country which fulfilled its obligations to give assistance in the event of a dispute would not be considered as in a state of war with the opponent of the country to which the assistance had been rendered.

The report of the Security Committee was available when the General Commission began its discussion of the first chapter of the British draft convention on the afternoon of the 24th May. The British delegation had redrafted this part of their proposals in the light of Mr. Davis's statement of the 22nd May. Articles 1 to 5 of the original draft¹ were now replaced by three new articles:

Art. 1. In the event of a breach or threat of breach of the Pact of Paris, either the Council or Assembly of the League of Nations or one of the parties to the present Convention who are not members of the League of Nations may propose immediate consultation between the Council or Assembly and any of the said parties to the present Convention.

Art. 2. It shall be the object of such consultation (a) in the event of a threat of a breach of the Pact to exchange views for the purpose of preserving the peace and averting a conflict; (b) in the event of a breach of the Pact to use good offices for the restoration of peace; and (c) in the event that it proves impossible thus to restore the peace, then to determine which party or parties to the dispute are to be held responsible.

Art. 3. The provisions of the above article do not in any way prejudice the rights and obligations of the Members of the League, nor conflict with nor limit the powers and duties of the Assembly and Council under the Covenant.

The amended draft was submitted to the General Commission by Sir John Simon, who explained that it was an attempt 'to devise . . . what has been called the outermost circle of security'. The British delegation hoped that Article 1 would provide 'for that method of consultation to which Mr. Norman Davis referred'. Sir John Simon also made special mention of the passage in Mr. Davis's speech promising that the United States would 'refrain from any action tending to defeat' collective measures to restore peace, which he described as 'an effort to modify the strict regard for the law of neutrality, the importance of which we all recognize and in respect of which we tender to the United States our best thanks'. He also pointed out that the amended draft which he presented met the criticism directed against the earlier proposals on the ground that they failed to take account of the machinery of the League of Nations.² Mr. Norman Davis commented favourably on the new draft, which appeared to him to be in harmony with his declaration

¹ Article 6, which dealt with special regional agreements, remained unchanged.

² See p. 259 above.

of the 22nd May, and he explained that, in the event of the British draft being accepted by the Conference, the United States Government intended to make a unilateral declaration on the following lines:

Recognizing that any breach or threat of breach of the Pact of Paris (the Briand-Kellogg Pact) is a matter of concern to all the signatories thereto, the Government of the United States of America declares that, in the event of a breach or threat of breach of this Pact, it will be prepared to confer with a view to the maintenance of peace in the event that consultation for such purpose is arranged pursuant to Articles and of Part I of the Disarmament Convention. In the event that a decision is taken by a conference of the Powers in consultation, in determining the aggressor, with which, on the basis of its independent judgment, the Government of the United States agrees, the Government of the United States will undertake to refrain from any action and to withhold protection from its citizens if engaged in activities which would tend to defeat the collective effort which the states in consultation might have decided upon against the aggressor.

After a number of the speakers, who included Monsieur Paul-Boncour and Herr Nadolny, had expressed general approval of the amended draft, it was adopted on a first reading, on the understanding that any delegation which wished to do so could submit amendments before the second reading was taken.

The first-reading discussion of the definition of an aggressor, which was taken by the General Commission on the 25th and 29th May, showed that opinion was divided as to the merits of the proposal. When this question was considered by the Security Committee, 'certain members of the Committee (Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom) showed a preference for an elastic definition of aggression which would permit the international authorities to take all the circumstances into account, thus obviating the drawbacks of the application of rigid definitions which in certain cases might not be adaptable to the actual facts'.¹ This minority view was maintained by the delegations concerned during the discussion in the General Commission, where the strongest opposition came from the representatives of Great Britain and of Italy. The British Government had always held that too rigid a definition of aggression would defeat its own ends, and Mr. Eden put this view once more before the Commission. The Italian delegate, Signor di Soragna, took a still stronger line, for he declared that the proposed definition substantially modified the British draft convention, and that if it was adopted the Italian Government might have to reconsider their

¹ Report of the Security Committee (Document Conf. D./C.G./108).

views on the convention as a whole. The attitude of the German delegation was less decided, and, while Herr Nadolny expressed a preference for greater elasticity in the definition, he did not reject it outright. The proposal was warmly supported by Monsieur Paul-Boncour and by the representatives of the Little Entente and of Greece.¹ It was finally decided that before the second reading of the convention an attempt should be made to produce an amended definition, on the same lines as that submitted by the Security Committee but less rigid in its wording; and Mr. Eden, Monsieur Dovgalevsky (who had been responsible for the original proposal to define the aggressor), Señor de Madariaga (who had taken up an intermediate position during the discussion), and Monsieur Politis, the *rappporteur* of the Security Committee, were asked to consult together with this object in view.² The General Commission then went on to deal with the proposal for the establishment of the facts of aggression, which passed its first reading without discussion, and to the question of a European Security Pact.

The Pact was recommended to the Commission by Monsieur Politis as a 'modest piece of work' which was, he thought, sufficiently elastic to be acceptable to all states 'except those who were resolved at all costs to prevent the organization of peace in Europe'. The representatives of France and of the Little Entente were in favour of the adoption of the pact, but the delegate of the Netherlands formulated certain reservations. The question of making the obligation not to resort to force of universal application was also raised once more by Persia, Turkey, and Afghanistan, and Mr. Norman Davis made the important statement that the draft article dealing with this point, 'if expanded so as to have universal application, would not be incompatible with the intention of the President's proposal for a pact of non-aggression'. Monsieur Paul-Boncour welcomed the idea that the obligation not to resort to force should be made universal, but he urged the importance of not allowing the desire for universality to prevent neighbouring states from entering into contracts of mutual assistance. Mr. Eden suggested that, in view of Mr. Davis's statement, the question of including a prohibition of resort to force in the European pact should be reconsidered, and, since the pact was also dependent to some extent upon the definition of an aggressor, in regard to which agreement had not yet been

¹ Monsieur Politis, the Greek representative, had acted as *rappporteur* of the Security Committee.

² For the non-aggression pacts, based on the definition incorporated in the report of the Security Committee, which were concluded in July 1933 between the U.S.S.R. and a number of other European states, see pp. 181-3 above.

reached, it was decided that the whole question should be left open until the second reading of the draft convention.

The discussion of the security provisions of the convention was therefore somewhat inconclusive, and unsatisfactory to France and the other European states which held strong views regarding the precedence of security over disarmament. French opinion was specially disappointed at the attitude of the British delegation in regard to the definition of an aggressor, since it was felt that the application of Article 16 of the Covenant, and of other measures, such as the proposed European pact, designed to strengthen security, would be greatly facilitated if the League Council and other international bodies concerned had definite rules laid down for their guidance in determining which party to a dispute was guilty of a breach of its obligations. Disappointment was also felt in France because Mr. Norman Davis's declaration of the 22nd May had not been followed by any indication on the part of the British Government that their policy of refraining from entering into fresh security commitments was likely to be modified as a result of the attitude of the Administration at Washington. On the 26th May Sir John Simon gave the House of Commons at Westminster an account of the developments which had taken place during his recent visit to Geneva, and, while he underlined the importance of Mr. Davis's announcement, he did not explain what conclusions the British Government drew from that announcement in regard to their own future attitude. He made it clear that the British Government did not contemplate entering the innermost, or European, of the three concentric circles into which the French plan had divided the World for purposes of security, but he did not define the exact position which the Government intended to take up, and he did not give France the assurance which she desired that the new American attitude in regard to neutrality would remove, or at least reduce, British unwillingness to take part in economic sanctions. The French reception of Mr. Davis's declaration had been coloured by a suspicion that President Roosevelt might not be able to count on the support of Congress for the policy which Mr. Davis had outlined, and the value of the declaration was still further diminished in French eyes by the omissions in Sir John Simon's speech.

French uneasiness at the trend of affairs at Geneva had been reflected in a statement made by Monsieur Paul-Boncour before the General Commission on the 23rd May, when the Commission began its discussion of the chapter of the draft convention dealing with war material. Monsieur Paul-Boncour took the opportunity to

restate the French conditions for a reduction of French armaments. These conditions were the organization of peace in Europe 'on a solid basis', the establishment of a strict permanent control over armaments, with provision for sanctions in case of a breach of obligations; and supervision of the manufacture, especially the private manufacture, of arms. On this last point the French delegation intended to submit detailed proposals in due course. Monsieur Paul-Boncour also caused something like consternation by reverting to the idea that 'aggressive' armaments should not be abolished but should be retained for the use of the League of Nations.¹ The resubmission of this proposal at this stage no doubt reflected the conviction, which was held by many Frenchmen, that Germany, having already begun to rearm, would not accept any system of control on the terms contemplated by France—a conviction which led naturally to the conclusion that 'aggressive' weapons (the possession of which put France in a position of superiority over Germany for the time being) must on no account be destroyed until an adequate system of control had been accepted and put into effective operation. Monsieur Paul-Boncour was perhaps thinking less of the effect of his words upon his immediate hearers than of their effect in France, and his speech created an unfortunate impression of intransigence. The appearance of an exchange of rôles between Germany and France was strengthened by the conciliatory attitude of Herr Nadolny, who said that, while Germany would like the Disarmament Conference to go further in regard to the reduction of material than was contemplated in the British plan, he would accept any proposal relating to land armaments that was likely to meet with general approval, and would not insist upon his own amendments. The withdrawal of the German amendments enabled the General Commission to proceed rapidly with the first-reading discussion of the articles on land armaments. An interesting point was raised by a Turkish amendment providing for the abolition of the special régime of the Straits which had been established by the Lausanne Treaty. In a conversation with Tevfik Rüstü Bey, the leader of the Turkish delegation, Sir John Simon had undertaken to give careful consideration to this proposal, and the Turkish delegate suggested the appointment of a special committee to examine the matter. Monsieur Paul-Boncour pointed out, however, that the Turkish amendment raised an important question of principle, since its adoption would involve revision of one of the Treaties of Peace, and he felt that it would be undesirable to intro-

¹ For the earlier history of this proposal, see the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 108, 217-18, 220, 277, 278-9.

duce the problem of treaty revision into the discussions of the Disarmament Conference. A number of other amendments had also been submitted, including five which provided for the abolition of tanks, and it was agreed that all the amendments should stand over until the second reading.

The General Commission then went on to discuss the articles of the draft convention which dealt with naval armaments. The most important amendments on this subject were submitted by Japan and Germany. The Japanese delegation proposed the deletion of an article which provided that the naval armaments of states which were parties to the Treaties of Washington and of London should remain subject to the limitations imposed by those treaties. This proposal was apparently a move in preparation for a Japanese demand for parity, and it was strongly opposed by Mr. Eden and Mr. Norman Davis. At one stage of the discussion it looked as though the Japanese delegation intended to reject the convention outright unless their amendments were adopted immediately, but they finally agreed to confer privately on the question before the second reading. The German amendment was designed to give Germany the right to build one more ship before 1936, and it was interpreted in France as an indication that the German Government intended to lay down a large battleship in reply to the French *Dunkerque* (which was itself a reply to the German 'pocket-battleships').¹ Some of the smaller naval Powers put forward suggestions for altering the draft convention in order to provide for their special needs, and the British proposals were also criticized by the representatives of the U.S.S.R. and of France—Monsieur Massigli regretting in particular the absence of any provision for qualitative limitation.

The first reading of the chapter on air armaments, which was taken on the 27th May, gave rise to one of the most interesting and important discussions that had taken place at the Disarmament Conference. The debate showed that there was widespread and emphatic support for the total abolition of military aircraft, while opinion was almost unanimously in favour of the abolition of air-bombing, as a first step. A serious obstacle to progress in this direction was presented, however, by the reservation in the British draft convention allowing the use of bombing in outlying regions for police purposes. Strong opposition to this proposal had already manifested itself,² but

¹ See the *Survey for 1929*, pp. 60-3; the *Survey for 1930*, pp. 48 and 65 n.; the *Survey for 1931*, pp. 32, 80, 276-7 and 288 n. For the German offer to abandon the pocket-battleship see the *Survey for 1932*, p. 227 n.

² See p. 259 above.

Mr. Eden now explained that the British Government felt obliged to maintain the reservation, although they regretted the necessity, and he added that the 'Irāqī Government held strong views on the impossibility of relinquishing the right of bombing. The only support for Mr. Eden came from the representatives of 'Irāq, Persia, and Siam, and it was clear that the British reservation was greatly disliked by the majority of delegates, including the American. It was also opposed by the French delegate.¹ There was some discussion on the possibility of internationalizing civil aviation, in regard to which the division of opinion followed the same lines as in the Air Commission earlier in the year.² The opposition of the German delegation to this proposal was, however, somewhat modified, and Herr Nadolny declared that 'if the Conference were really disposed to decide upon the complete abolition of military aviation . . . Germany, for her part, was prepared to go as far as possible to prevent the use of civil aircraft for military purposes'. The discussion on the air chapter was again inconclusive and the contentious points were left undecided until the second reading.

While this method gave opportunity for private negotiations in which different points of view might be reconciled, it was obvious

¹ The policy of His Majesty's Government on this matter was also the subject of much criticism at home. While the critics did not deny that the use of air-bombing for police purposes might possess outstanding advantages, they felt that those advantages were completely outweighed by the danger that British intransigence on this point would seriously prejudice the efforts which were being made to promote agreement on disarmament. It was pointed out that Great Britain could not claim a monopoly of the right to use air-bombs for police purposes; that the right must also be conceded to other states with colonial possessions; and that so long as the existence of bombing aeroplanes was tolerated, for instance, in the French and Italian possessions in North Africa, it would be useless to attempt to devise measures for protecting the population of Europe from the air menace. These considerations were brought to the notice of the Government in representations from many quarters, and the question was discussed on more than one occasion in the House of Commons at Westminster, where opinion on the merits of the Government's case was divided on non-party lines. On the 30th May, Mr. Baldwin answered a parliamentary question by declaring that the Government saw no reason to change the policy which had been deliberately arrived at because objection had been taken to it. The great majority of the members of the Cabinet were believed to be in favour of maintaining the reservation, though Sir John Simon was understood to have advocated its withdrawal. Protests against the Government's decision and appeals to them to modify their attitude continued to pour into Whitehall during June, and the advocates of the retention of air-bombing also did not fail to make their views known. The first sign of yielding on the part of the Government was given early in July, when Mr. Eden remarked at Geneva that if the question of air-bombing threatened to wreck the attainment of a disarmament convention 'a very different situation would have arisen'.
² See pp. 242-3 above.

that the Conference would not be able to record any real progress so long as it postponed the stage of taking final decisions. After Herr Hitler's speech of the 17th May and the change of attitude on the part of the German delegation, a few of the more optimistic spirits at Geneva had hoped that it might be possible for an agreement on the lines of the British draft convention to be concluded before the 12th June, the date which had been fixed for the opening of the World Monetary and Economic Conference. By the end of May, however, there could be no doubt that the conclusion of a convention was not yet in sight. The first-reading discussion of the first two chapters of the draft convention in the General Commission had shown how fundamental were the differences of opinion that still existed, and it had also shown that the uncertainty of the political situation was still making many European delegations extremely reluctant to commit themselves to definite measures for the reduction of armaments. On the 31st May the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference decided that the General Commission should adjourn as soon as the non-committal first reading of the draft convention was finished, and that an attempt should be made to solve the worst of the difficulties in private before the decisive second reading was taken. In order to meet the objections of the smaller Powers to this method of conducting the business of the Conference, it was agreed that the Bureau should be responsible for preparing the draft convention for its second reading (states not represented on the Bureau being entitled to send a delegate to meetings at which amendments submitted by them were discussed), and that Mr. Henderson, as President of the Conference, should be charged with the conduct of negotiations to facilitate the preparation of the second draft.

After this decision had been taken, the first reading of the remainder of the draft convention¹ proceeded rapidly. The French delegation submitted amendments to the chapter dealing with supervision in order to make the system more rigid and automatic. The French proposal provided for regular and automatic control of armaments, including investigation in each country at least once a year by small bodies appointed by the Permanent Disarmament Commission. It also provided for complete immunity for persons giving information in good faith and for sanctions in case of non-observance of the terms of the convention. This amendment was supported by a number of

¹ The chapter on chemical warfare had been dealt with on the 30th May. No amendments had been submitted and the discussion did not raise any new points. The question of reprisals was brought up once more, and a number of delegates, including the representatives of France and the United States, spoke in favour of collective measures and against individual reprisals.

delegations, including those of the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Finland, Holland, and Switzerland. Mr. Norman Davis was in favour of permanent and automatic supervision, subject to the reservation that the United States would not be required to take part in any sanctions for non-observance. The representatives of Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Hungary reserved their opinion on the French amendment. On the other hand, the French and certain other delegations reserved their opinion on the final article of the draft convention which provided for the suppression of the disarmament clauses of the Peace Treaties.

The General Commission completed its preliminary examination of the draft convention and approved the recommendations of the Bureau on the 1st June, and it did not meet again until the 6th June. On that day¹ it had a general discussion on a report² from the Committee for the Regulation of the Trade in, and Private and State Manufacture of, Arms and Implements of War. This report showed that there was a fundamental divergence of views on all the more important issues which had come under examination by the committee. Four delegations—those of France, Spain, Denmark, and Poland—had submitted proposals for the abolition of the private manufacture of arms. The Turkish delegation had suggested the internationalization of all arms manufacture and the Persian delegation had declared itself ready to agree to the abolition of private manufacture if state manufacture was internationalized. On the other hand, five delegations (Great Britain, the United States, Japan, Italy, and Germany) were of opinion that the dangers likely to arise from the abolition of private manufacture would be greater than those inherent in its existence. In these circumstances, the committee decided to refer the two questions of the internationalization of all arms manufacture and the abolition of private manufacture to the General Commission for decision, and its report merely summarized the arguments for and against the abolition of private manufacture.³

¹ The Commission also took note on the 6th June of a communication from the President of the Committee for Moral Disarmament forwarding a resolution, which had been adopted by the committee on the 2nd June, which expressed the opinion that 'provisions should forthwith be drawn up concerning moral disarmament, these provisions to stand on the same footing as the provisions regarding material disarmament in the final texts to be adopted by the Conference'.

² Document *Conf. D. 160*.

³ The report also contained the replies which had been received to the questionnaire on arms manufacture that had been circulated on the 28th October, 1932 (see the *Survey for 1932*, p. 298), together with preliminary and inconclusive reports from sub-committees on the manufacture of arms and the trade in arms and from a technical committee on categories of arms.

In the light of the discussions in this committee the French delegation had drafted a new proposal,¹ in the form of an additional chapter to the British draft convention, and this draft was also considered by the General Commission on the 6th June. According to this French proposal, the manufacture of arms would be prohibited except in establishments belonging to the State or directly supervised by it, and restrictions would be imposed on the quantities of arms that might be manufactured or imported or supplied to other countries. The French representative explained that his Government had not abandoned the opinion that the private manufacture of armaments ought to be entirely suppressed, but in the meantime they would accept international control of manufacture. Unless the convention contained some provision for such control, they would not be able to give it their approval. The discussion which followed showed that the majority of the delegates were in favour of the insertion in the convention of detailed provisions for the regulation of the manufacture of, and trade in, arms, but that there was not yet general agreement regarding the nature of the control. The French proposals were opposed by the representatives of Italy and of Japan. Herr Nadolny was prepared to agree to some measure of control if state and private manufacture received equal treatment, but he rejected the idea of prohibiting private manufacture. Mr. Eden expressed the British Government's preference for the system of control of exports by licence and publicity for manufacture. Finally, it was left to the *rapporteur* (Monsieur Komarnicki of Poland) to prepare texts for the second reading of the convention in consultation with delegations which were specially interested in the matter.

On the 7th June the General Commission discussed a report² which it had received from the National Defence Expenditure Commission. This report was based on the conclusions reached by the Technical Committee on National Defence Expenditure, whose report³ had been completed on the 8th April after thirteen months of practically continuous labour. The Technical Committee, which had dealt with every technical aspect of the problem of the limitation and publicity of expenditure, based its conclusions on a complete examination of documentary information supplied by nineteen states (including all the great military Powers), and a partial examination of the material supplied by ten other states. The expenditure of these twenty-nine states represented ninety per cent. of the total military expenditure of the World. The members of the committee formed the opinion,

¹ Document *Conf. D./G.G./122*.

² Document *Conf. D. 161*.

³ Document *Conf. D. 158*.

which was endorsed by the National Defence Expenditure Commission, that the states whose documentation they had examined would be able to draw up for practical purposes complete returns of their total expenditure on national defence, but that it would not be possible, for purposes of limitation, to separate expenditure on each of the three forces. Any system of limitation would therefore have to be 'global'. The report of the Technical Committee contained detailed proposals for putting such a system of limitation into force. National defence expenditure was defined as 'all expenditure necessitated or entailed by the creation, maintenance and training, in time of peace, of land, sea and air armed forces and formations organized on a military basis, and by measures immediately connected with preparations for national mobilization'. In addition, 'in order to define more strictly the contractual obligations of the signatory states', the committee drew up a 'conventional list' of expenditure to be considered as national defence expenditure for the purposes of the future Convention. They recommended the adoption of a model statement of expenditure which they had prepared in order to ensure a uniform presentation, and they suggested that the juridical basis for the limitation and publicity of expenditure must be the payments made in published accounts within periods and in forms suitable for the requirements of the Convention. They also suggested the adoption of special procedures designed to take into account fluctuations in the purchasing power of the currencies of different countries and unforeseeable and exceptional expenditure.

The National Defence Expenditure Commission agreed that 'any system of global limitation of expenditure on national defence which would offer the greatest possibilities of realization' would have to be based on the proposals put forward by the Technical Committee, but, while the members of the Commission were unanimous in believing that a system of national publicity for defence expenditure could be put into force immediately, they were divided on the question whether it was possible to include in the first Disarmament Convention provisions for the immediate application of the principle of global limitation. While eighteen delegations, including those of France, Spain, the Little Entente, and the Scandinavian states, were in favour of the inclusion of such provisions, six others, including Japan, Germany, and Italy, held that it was not possible to apply a system of limitation immediately, and that a system of publicity should first be put into effect for a trial period. The United States delegates associated themselves with the view that the application of a system of publicity would afford the most practical means of

determining the technical possibilities of a system of limitation. The British delegation was amongst the four or five delegations which reserved their opinion on the practicability of limitation until their Governments had been able to give the question fuller consideration. This division of opinion was reflected in the General Commission's debate on the report of the National Defence Expenditure Commission, and the conclusion was finally reached that the question of limitation was not yet ripe for decision. The Commission resolved 'that the first general convention for the reduction and limitation of armaments' should contain 'provisions as to the application of the principle of publicity of national defence expenditure subject to international supervision in the conditions indicated in the report of the Technical Committee of the National Defence Expenditure Commission'. The Technical Committee was asked to prepare 'the necessary draft articles with annexes to give effect to the above decision', while the question of imposing limitations on national defence expenditure was to be the subject of further negotiations to be conducted by Mr. Henderson with the delegations which were specially interested in the subject.

On the 7th June, also, the General Commission adopted a recommendation from the Bureau to the effect that 'the draft convention submitted by the United Kingdom delegation and accepted as a basis of discussion by a formal decision of the General Commission should be accepted as the basis of the future convention. This acceptance would be without prejudice to amendments or proposals submitted before or during the second reading, particularly as regarded additional chapters concerning the manufacture of, and trade in, arms and budgetary limitation.' On the following day, the 8th June, the Commission adjourned, after it had heard a statement from the Japanese delegate, Mr. Sato, on the subject of air bombardment. Mr. Sato said that the Japanese Government could not accept the abolition of air bombardment unless aircraft carriers were also abolished, and he seized the opportunity to launch another attack on the Naval Treaties of Washington and London.

(d) DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF GERMANY FROM THE CONFERENCE (JUNE TO NOVEMBER, 1933)

Many of the principal delegates had already left Geneva before the final meeting of the General Commission on the 8th June, and on that day conversations took place in Paris between the French Prime Minister, Lord Londonderry and Mr. Eden on behalf of the British Government, and Mr. Norman Davis. The principal subject of

discussion was believed to be the possibility of a reduction of French armaments—in particular of the destruction of 'offensive' weapons—but Monsieur Daladier was reported to have made it clear that his Government could not contemplate any reduction of their armed strength unless they were assured of a satisfactory system of control of armaments and of arms manufacture and were provided with some guarantee against German rearmament. Since Monsieur Daladier's counter-inquiries regarding British and American views on guarantees met with little response, these diplomatic conversations left the position unaltered.

In the meantime, the Bureau of the Conference had decided on the 7th June to adjourn until the 27th June, when it would meet again in order to hear how far Mr. Henderson had been able to carry out the task which had been entrusted to him of preparing the way for the second reading of the draft convention by means of informal conversations with representatives of the principal Powers concerned. Mr. Henderson hoped that he would be able to arrange the necessary interviews with the statesmen who would be assembled in London for the World Economic Conference, the opening session of which took place on the 12th June; but, owing to the pressure of work on delegates to that Conference, he found that it was impossible to carry out this programme, and when he returned to Geneva at the end of the month he could not report that any progress had been made in smoothing out the remaining difficulties.¹ In these circumstances the Bureau came to the conclusion that it was necessary to adjourn the Conference until the autumn in order to give time for the private negotiations on questions of special difficulty to bear fruit. On the 29th June the General Commission accepted the recommendation of the Bureau that it should adjourn until the 16th October, and asked Mr. Henderson to continue his efforts to reconcile divergent points of view.² The only opposition to this proposal came from Herr Nadolny,³

¹ The outlook was not improved by the intensive campaign for 'air equality' which was launched in Germany after the publication in the press of the 24th June of a report that foreign aeroplanes had flown over Berlin on the previous evening and dropped leaflets.

² Mr. Henderson gave the Commission the following list of the principal questions on which divergences of opinion existed: 'non-recourse to force; European or universal pact; definition of aggression; supervision and control; sanctions to be used against any state violating the Disarmament Treaty; air bombardment; military and naval aviation; abolition of aggressive land material (suggested by President Roosevelt); size of tanks and artillery; trained reserves; period of training for short-term effectives; colonial forces; period of destruction of aggressive weapons; budgetary limitation; manufacture of and trade in arms'.

³ The Hungarian delegate abstained from voting on the proposal.

who declared that the consequences of adjourning the Conference would be very serious and that the delegations which approved of the Bureau's recommendation would be accepting a very grave responsibility.

In pursuance of his mission, Mr. Henderson left London on the 10th July on a 'disarmament pilgrimage' which took him to the principal European capitals. Between the 10th and the 23rd July he visited Paris, Rome, Berlin, Prague, and Paris again, and he had conversations in those cities with leading members of the French, Italian, and German Governments and with Dr. Beneš, the Czecho-slovak Foreign Minister, who was also the *rappporteur* of the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference. During his visit to Berlin he missed Herr Hitler, who was in Bavaria, but a meeting was arranged in Munich when Mr. Henderson was on his way back from Prague. A suggestion which Mr. Henderson made to the effect that a meeting between Monsieur Daladier and Herr Hitler might promote a Franco-German understanding, and thus remove the principal obstacle to progress at Geneva, was not well received either in Berlin or in Paris; and at the end of his tour Mr. Henderson was obliged to admit that, while he had discovered a good deal of common ground on certain questions (such as that of the definition of the aggressor), on other matters agreement was still far to seek.

One of the most difficult and controversial questions which came under consideration during these conversations was that of supervising the execution of the terms of any convention which might be concluded. It has been seen¹ that the French Government had come to attach special importance to this question of supervision as the most practicable form of guarantee of security; and the amendments to the British draft convention which had been submitted by the French delegation at Geneva before the General Commission adjourned on the 8th June included one which provided that the control over armaments for which the convention would stipulate should be permanent and automatic: that is, that permanent commissions should be established which would conduct investigations in every country at least once a year.² As French suspicions of German intentions deepened during the summer of 1933, the idea gained ground that it would be dangerous for France to give her approval to any increase in German armaments, or to take any steps in the direction of reducing her own armaments, until the efficacy of any

¹ See p. 248 above.

² See p. 287 above. Since June the suggestion had been canvassed in France that investigations should take place every six months.

system of supervision on which agreement might be reached had been proved by experience. The proposal that there should be a probationary period of some years' duration, which would allow the system of supervision to be tested before the other provisions of the disarmament convention came into effect, had taken shape in French minds by the time when Mr. Henderson visited Paris at the beginning of his pilgrimage, and he was thus in a position to explain the French views on this subject in his subsequent interviews in other countries. According to Press reports, the idea of a trial period was flatly rejected by Herr Hitler when he and Mr. Henderson had their conversation in Munich.

After Mr. Henderson had completed his tour in the last week of July, the efforts to dispose of difficulties by negotiation were suspended until September, when the approach of the date which had been fixed for the next meeting of the General Commission necessitated a fresh attempt to find a solution. The only important development during August was the announcement from Washington on the 23rd that Mr. Norman Davis, who had had an interview with President Roosevelt to receive instructions before he returned to Europe to resume the disarmament discussions, had been authorized to support the French plan for permanent and automatic supervision.¹ It was announced a few days later that the programme for the modernization of the land and air equipment of the United States Army had been suspended until the result of the forthcoming meeting of the Disarmament Conference was seen.

When Mr. Davis arrived in England on the 5th September, an exchange of views between the British and French Governments had begun, and arrangements had been made for conversations in Paris on the 18th September between Mr. Eden and the French Prime Minister. Mr. Davis, having discussed the situation with members of the British Government in London, decided to follow Mr. Eden to Paris in the third week of September. Mr. Henderson was also in Paris at the same time and was thus able to keep in touch with the negotiations, though he was not invited to be present during the Franco-British and Franco-American conversations.²

Developments in Europe during the last two or three months—particularly the Nazi pressure upon Austria—had increased the ten-

¹ Mr. Davis had already given his general support to the French proposals when the French amendment to the British draft was discussed by the General Commission on the 1st June.

² The negotiations were not tripartite as they had been in June, and the principal object of Mr. Davis's interview with members of the French Government, which followed those of Mr. Eden, was apparently to hear the results of the Franco-British conversations.

sion which had been making itself felt when the Disarmament Conference adjourned at the end of June, and the French Government were becoming seriously concerned over reports which were reaching them to the effect that Germany had not waited for permission or for the breakdown of the Disarmament Conference, but was already rearming on a substantial scale. In these circumstances, it was not likely that Monsieur Daladier would yield on the point that there could be no reduction of French armaments until certain prior conditions had been fulfilled, and in fact the considerable measure of agreement which resulted from the Franco-British conversations was achieved because Mr. Eden was able to indicate that some at least of the conditions which the French Government deemed necessary¹ would now be given more favourable consideration by the British Government. This readiness to meet French views applied not only to the nature of the system of supervision which was to be established but also to the proposal that the system should be tested during a preliminary period before the provisions of the Disarmament Convention came into full effect. Having made these concessions, Mr. Eden found that Monsieur Daladier was ready in his turn to concede a point to which the British Government attached special importance—that is, that there should be a substantial reduction of armaments at the end of the probationary period if the system of supervision proved satisfactory, and that the extent of the reduction should be laid down in precise terms in the convention by which the Permanent Disarmament Commission would be established. Monsieur Daladier expressed himself satisfied with the result of the conversations, and declared that, as a result of British efforts to understand the French point of view, the situation was decidedly better than it had been in June. In one important respect the situation had certainly improved. For some months Monsieur Daladier's Government had been making a determined and successful attempt to establish better relations between France and Italy; and during the early part of September an exchange of views on disarmament had been going on between Rome and Paris through diplomatic channels. As a result, the French Government felt justified in the belief that they could count on the support of Italy as well as on that of the United States and Great Britain for their plan of putting a system of automatic supervision into force for a test period.

¹ Other questions which were said to have been raised and not to have met with British and American approval were those of a possible preliminary examination into the state of German armaments before the convention was signed, and of the application of sanctions in case a flagrant breach of the convention was proved.

Thus, before the disarmament negotiations were transferred in the last week of September to Geneva, where the fourteenth session of the Assembly of the League of Nations opened on the 25th September, there appeared to be general agreement between France, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States on the principle that the period of validity of the Disarmament Convention should be divided into two parts: during the first period, which might last for three or four years, the prohibition on any increase in German armaments would remain in force, and its observance would be guaranteed by a system of supervision, while the reduction of the armaments of other Powers would not begin until the second period. This proposal involved a marked departure from the British draft convention, which had been accepted by the General Commission in June (when Herr Hitler had already been in power in Germany for over four months) as the basis of the future Disarmament Convention.¹ In the British draft, the period of validity suggested was five years, and while it was contemplated that the reduction of armaments should proceed by stages, there had been no suggestion that the process would not begin as soon as the convention had been ratified. It remained to be seen whether the German Government could be induced to accept a plan which would, at the best, postpone for some years the attainment of the equality of status in armaments which had been granted to Germany in principle by the other Great Powers in December 1932.²

The exchange of views between Governments during the first three weeks of September had not been extended to include Germany, and the last occasion on which Herr Hitler had been invited to express his opinion on disarmament questions had been during his interview

² See p. 291 above.

¹ See the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 288-90. It was perhaps natural that the Germans should have suspected that the postponement of equality for three or four years was not the only result which the French expected from the two-period plan. In German eyes, it appeared probable that the French intended in effect to make the attainment of equality dependent on the fulfilment of certain conditions during the probationary period in order that they might have the opportunity of refusing at a later stage to grant equality on the ground that the stipulated conditions had not been carried out. This point of view was forcibly expressed by the German Foreign Minister in a statement to foreign press representatives on the 16th October, after Germany had withdrawn from the Conference. Under the two-period plan, said Freiherr von Neurath, 'Germany alone would be subject to decisive armament limitations in the next few years. The other Powers would therefore always have the possibility of pleading the non-functioning of the supervision, or alleged German violation of the Treaty, in order to evade their material obligations in respect of disarmament. . . . The standpoint of the Powers therefore amounts to postponing their disarmament *ad calendas graecas*, while at the same time prohibiting any levelling of armaments on the part of Germany.'

with Mr. Henderson at Munich in the middle of July. Since then, the indications pointed to an intention on the part of the German Government to stand their ground when the discussions were resumed at Geneva, and to insist that a failure of the armed Powers to reduce their armaments would leave Germany free to rearm herself. On the 15th September, for instance, Freiherr von Neurath made a statement to foreign press representatives in Berlin in which he took the line that there could be no more giving way by Germany. If the highly armed countries continued to evade their obligations to disarm, the German Government would 'have the right and the duty to provide for the equality and security of its own people according to its own judgement and without any hesitation or false scruple'. Nevertheless, when informal discussions on disarmament began again on the fringe of the League Assembly towards the end of September, competent observers found grounds for optimism in the apparently sincere desire to come to an agreement which was manifested by members of the German delegation. After a few days, however, during which Monsieur Paul-Boncour, Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden, Signor Suvich (the Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs), Mr. Norman Davis, Freiherr von Neurath and Dr. Göbbels all took part in intensive negotiations, the feeling of optimism gave place to the realization that there was no real advance to record. A certain progress was made in determining the steps which could be taken in such matters as the reorganization of effectives before the reduction of material began, but there appeared to be little prospect that the German demand for equality of rights would ultimately prove compatible with the latest form of the French demand for security. The German representatives did not reject outright the idea of dividing the duration of the Disarmament Convention into two periods, but they insisted that the supervision which was to come into effect during the first period must be generally applied, and that specific undertakings on the part of the heavily armed Powers to reduce their armaments must be included in the convention. They also claimed the right to possess samples or prototypes of any weapons which were retained by other Powers during the first period. It was now proposed that the transformation of the German Reichswehr into a short-service army, in accordance with the proposals in the British draft convention, should take place during the probationary period, and since the new force was to number 200,000 instead of the 100,000 long-service men permitted to Germany by the Peace Treaty, it was recognized that the change implied a certain increase in the armaments which Germany was allowed to possess. In the French view, however, there could

be no question of arming the new force with any but the weapons which the Peace Treaty had allowed Germany to retain, and the proposal that Germany should be permitted to provide herself with samples or 'prototypes' of heavier weapons—which could then be multiplied without difficulty—was rejected by French opinion as highly dangerous.¹ British and American opinion also hardened against this degree of German rearmament, but the Italians, who were attempting to act as mediators, took the view that Germany had an undeniable moral right to possess any armaments which the other Powers decided to keep for themselves. There was some difficulty in regard to the exact interpretation which was to be put upon the German demand for 'samples', and the German Foreign Minister was asked to define what was meant by that term. On the 29th September the negotiations at Geneva were suspended and Freiherr von Neurath and Dr. Göbbels left for Berlin to report to the Government. Sir John Simon, Mr. Eden, and Signor Suvich all left Geneva on the following day. The next important development was the reply of the German Government to the request for a definition of 'samples', which, in effect, took the form of counter-proposals. On the 6th October the German Ambassadors in London and in Rome presented *notes verbales*, the contents of which were also communicated to Mr. Davis at Geneva on the following day. No communication was made by the German Government to the French Government.

According to the unofficial version of the German proposals which was subsequently published in the Press, the German Government reiterated their willingness to accept the British draft convention as a basis, and their opinion that the period of five years laid down in the draft was reasonable; but it was declared to be 'impossible for the German Government to accept the proposal relative to a trial period. The German Government' had 'no objection to the proposed disarmament being effected by stages, for practical reasons relative to the disposal of material. It would be possible to fix the period of the first stage for two years after signature, and that of the second stage for three years after the expiry of the first. The German Government' would 'be forced to claim that the principle of equality of rights be applied as soon as the first stage shall be put into force'.² The German Government were prepared, as a proof of their desire for conciliation, 'to undertake to change the Reichswehr into an

¹ The German demand for prototypes was said to have been definitely rejected by Monsieur Paul-Boncour, who had an interview with Freiherr von Neurath on the 28th September.

² The version here quoted is that which was read by Viscount Cecil of Chelwood in the House of Lords at Westminster on the 8th November, 1933.

army made up of short-term recruits'; but they were 'unable to give precise indication with regard to the quality and quantity of material required by this new army until the actual conditions laid down in the convention regarding material' were 'known'. The British plan, it was pointed out, dealt with 'three distinct categories of land weapons: (1) arms to be absolutely prohibited in the future; (2) arms to be limited quantitatively; (3) arms to be authorized to the Powers without any limitation whatsoever'.

With regard to the first category, Germany was 'prepared to accept any prohibition of any weapon whatever, provided that this prohibition be applied generally. Further, Germany' was 'prepared to give up all kinds of weapons owned at the present time by the armed nations on condition (1) that these nations undertake to destroy these weapons in a given period, which should not exceed the period of the convention; (2) that the use of these weapons be prohibited in the future'.

With regard to the second category, the British plan provided that certain kinds of weapons would 'be limited qualitatively and quantitatively. The Government of the Reich' were 'anxious to know as soon as possible how these weapons' would 'be defined, and what' would 'be the quantitative limits imposed. By the application of the principle of equality of rights, Germany should be authorized from the beginning of the application of the convention to possess certain kinds of weapons which the other Powers' would 'be authorized to keep in specified numbers. The only point remaining for discussion' was 'the exact number of weapons in this category to be allowed to Germany'.

'With regard to the third category (weapons to be limited neither quantitatively nor qualitatively) the Government of the Reich' estimated that there would be 'no question of any limitation for Germany so long as no limitation' was 'laid down for the other Powers'.

It will be seen that the German Government categorically rejected the idea of a 'trial period' on the lines discussed in Paris and at Geneva. In regard to the demand for 'prototypes', they refrained from asking for samples of any armaments the ultimate destruction of which might be agreed upon, but their reference to the defensive category of weapons, limited numbers of which were to be retained permanently, could be interpreted in the sense that they were demanding, not 'samples' of such weapons, but immediate quantitative equality.

It has been mentioned that these German proposals had not been communicated direct to the French Government and there was no reference to them in a speech which Monsieur Daladier delivered at

the Radical Party Congress at Vichy on the 8th October. France, he said, did not wish to threaten or to humiliate any other country, and for that reason she would accept no reduction of forces without an international agreement which would be effectively guaranteed and which would provide for the establishment of permanent and automatic supervision and for progressive disarmament. He declared that Great Britain, Italy, the U.S.A. and many other countries had agreed with France on the principle that there should be a period of four years during which the system of supervision would be put into operation, armies would be reorganized on a short-term basis (excluding semi-military formations), and no more heavy war material would be constructed. At the end of that period, if supervision had proved effective, 'prohibited' material would be destroyed.¹ Monsieur Daladier asked what it was that Germany wanted. The Government publicly proclaimed their desire for peace and had expressed through diplomatic channels the hope of a *rapprochement* with France. But why was German youth trained for fighting? Why did the Government refuse to take the first step towards disarmament? And why did it demand the right to construct material which would have to be destroyed soon afterwards if a convention was signed?² Monsieur Daladier referred with satisfaction to a speech which had been made by Mr. Baldwin at Birmingham on the 6th October at the annual conference of the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations. Mr. Baldwin had remarked on that occasion that if a Disarmament Convention was signed, a nation that infringed its provisions would have no friend in the Civilized World, and the same was true of any nation which deliberately prevented the conclusion of an agreement by putting forward demands which it knew would not be acceptable to the other signatories. Mr. Baldwin had also referred to the fear that Great Britain had less regard than of old for the sanctity of agreements into which she had entered and which were designed to contribute towards the peace of Europe, and he had mentioned in particular the Locarno Treaty (which was at the time the subject of violent attack in certain organs of the British Press). 'What Great Britain has signed', he declared, 'she will adhere to.'

¹ It will be remembered that at Geneva, in May, Monsieur Paul-Boncour had again suggested that 'offensive' armaments should not be destroyed but should be retained for use by the League of Nations. In this respect, therefore, the policy of the French Government had been modified in accordance with the views of the other Powers.

² It would appear from this reference to the German demands that the French Government were not yet aware of the tenor of the German proposals of the 6th October.

On the 9th October, the day following Monsieur Daladier's speech, a meeting of the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference took place at Geneva. The meeting, which was attended by Monsieur Paul-Boncour but not by Sir John Simon or by Freiherr von Neurath, was the first to be held since June, and it was thus the earliest opportunity which Mr. Henderson had had of reporting officially upon the outcome of the negotiations with the conduct of which he had been entrusted. Mr. Henderson enumerated certain questions on which agreement could, in his belief, be reached without much difficulty, but there were still a number of problems which could not easily be settled.¹ The two most delicate questions appeared to be those of the duration of the Convention and of sanctions in case of its violation. In regard to the duration of any convention that might be signed, Mr. Henderson mentioned that while certain countries showed a marked preference for a period of validity of five years, as contemplated in the British draft, others considered that the duration of the convention should be eight years and that the first four years should be a probationary period. In order to promote a feeling of greater security, Mr. Henderson himself put forward the suggestion that the establishment of the Permanent Disarmament Commission need not wait for the ratification of the convention, but that the Commission might be constituted as soon as a certain number of states had signed the convention. After hearing the President's report, the Bureau decided that conversations between the principal delegations should continue, in the hope that further progress might be made before the meeting of the General Commission on the 16th October.

On the same day (the 9th October) the British Cabinet considered the situation and were understood to have decided that the British delegation at Geneva should support the proposal for a preliminary period during which the Permanent Disarmament Commission would be at work and a beginning would be made with the transformation of Continental armies to a militia basis. On the 10th October Sir John Simon left London for Geneva—having first had an interview with the German Ambassador in London. In Geneva, conversations were again in full swing, and Herr Nadolny, who was representing

¹ The questions on which Mr. Henderson believed that agreement was within reach were non-resort to force; definition of the aggressor; supervision; standardization of Continental European armies; budgetary publicity; bombardment from the air; establishment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission; and naval questions. The more difficult problems which he mentioned were the duration of the first convention; the tonnage of tanks and calibre of artillery; the reduction of land war material either by destruction or in any other way; the manufacture of, and trade in, armaments; naval and military aviation; and sanctions in the event of a violation of the convention.

the German Government, had interviews with Monsieur Paul-Boncour, Mr. Norman Davis, and Mr. Eden. On Sir John Simon's arrival on the 11th further discussions took place, from which it appeared that the French, British, and American representatives were in general agreement as to their line of action.¹ It also appeared that the French Government—who were being subjected to bitter criticism from the Nationalists²—felt strongly that they could not make any further concessions. On the 12th October a meeting took place between Sir John Simon and Herr Nadolny, and after this interview Herr Nadolny returned to Berlin to report to the Government. A Cabinet meeting was held on the 13th at which President Hindenburg, who had returned unexpectedly to Berlin from East Prussia, was present; and, although it was denied in Germany that any decision regarding withdrawal from the Conference had been reached at this meeting, the rapidity with which one event followed another on the 14th October led outside observers to conclude that the steps which the German Government took on that day had been fully planned in advance, even if the final decision was not taken until the last moment.

On the morning of the 14th October the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference met and heard a statement from Sir John Simon. It had been arranged that the British Foreign Secretary, on behalf of the representatives of the Great Powers who had been in consultation together, should explain the position and give an outline of the proposals which had taken shape during the negotiations that had begun in September. Sir John Simon's account of the conversations was sufficiently short to be quoted in full:

So far as the United Kingdom representatives are concerned, we have taken part in meetings at different times with the French, German, Italian and American representatives, as well as in a number of talks with the representatives of some other Powers. These conversations have led me to take the view that the draft convention which the United Kingdom Government put before the General Commission over six months ago, and which has been unanimously adopted as the general framework for the proposed agreement, will require to be in some respects recast.

¹ The Italian representative at Geneva does not seem to have taken an active part in the conversations at this stage, but in Rome Signor Mussolini was in close touch with the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, and Germany and was said to be trying to find a conciliatory formula.

² The main Nationalist attack was directed against the proposal that the standardization of Continental armies should begin during the first period, since this would involve some reduction in French strength before the efficacy of the system of supervision had been proved.

The draft convention is at present drafted to cover a period of five years, but the discussions which I am summarizing indicate on the part of some Powers a wish that the period should be extended to perhaps eight years, and, so far as I recall, no serious objection to this extension has been [raised]. It was further proposed that this period of eight years should be occupied by the fulfilment of a continuous programme designed to secure at the end of the period two essential conditions:

(a) A substantial measure of disarmament actually realized and completed on the part of heavily armed Powers, and

(b) The achievement of the principle of equality in a régime of security which, ever since December of last year, has been the declared objective, not only of the Powers who signed the declaration of the 11th December, but of the Disarmament Conference itself.

But in order to attain this it is necessary to proceed by steps. Indeed, the method of stages has from a very early date been adopted as the necessary method by the general vote of the Conference. And when I speak of a programme which would gradually unfold in action so as to secure at the end of the period these two essential conditions, I recall the language of Mr. Henderson in his report to the Bureau on the 9th October last, when he declared: 'On some of the more important questions the approach is manifestly influenced by the present unsettled state of Europe and the ensuing distrust, fears and alarms.' The present unsettled state of Europe is a fact, and statesmen in drawing up their plans have to face facts. The need, therefore, for modifying the draft convention so as to accomplish this purpose by a process of evolution is clearly established.

The scheme, therefore, which emerged for consideration as the result of a number of these interviews was one in which the proposed period of eight years would begin with the transformation of Continental armies on the lines set out in the British draft, together with the setting up, through the medium of the Permanent Disarmament Commission, of an adequate system of supervision, so that the sense of security which the due observance of the convention will afford should provide the groundwork for the practical attainment of the two ideas of disarmament and equality.

Mr. Henderson has suggested that the Permanent Disarmament Commission might be set up as soon as the convention is signed, without waiting for ratification. If this suggestion is found feasible it ought to be welcomed, for it aims at shortening the period when actual disarmament and attained equality would be effectively reached.

It is understood on all hands that the supervision contemplated would be of general application. Its purpose would be to ensure that the undertakings contained in the convention were being loyally observed. It is a matter for close consideration to determine how much of the eight years would be needed for the initial steps to which I have referred. Transformation of armies involves technical questions which will govern the time-limit, and in the meantime a real feeling of confidence should develop, when it is seen that the whole plan is agreed to and is in due process of execution. Without binding myself finally to the length of this first stage, I report that the period of four years was mentioned

by several Governments, though others have raised the question whether it could not be somewhat shortened.

Whatever the length of this first stage may be, it is essential to make clear that the convention itself would have to contain at the time of its signature the detailed scheme of disarmament provided for as the final result to be attained by the time its full period of, say, eight years comes to an end. I have described that disarmament as 'substantial', and the extent of it has been the subject of detailed discussion. Since general phrases will not advance matters, I add that by 'substantial' disarmament is meant either the disarmament provided for in this draft convention or some comparable variation of it. I say quite definitely that the whole scheme would not be satisfactory to my Government, and we could not lend our own support to it, unless the degree of disarmament by the heavily armed Powers is both fully defined in the convention and really adequate. But there is another feature in the second stage of the plan which is equally definite—it is this: the results of the abolition of various kinds of armaments and of prohibition against their further use will be to constitute a common list of permitted arms which would become the same for all countries, and thus the differential position of the Powers whose armaments were limited by the Peace Treaties would finally cease. Quantities and other detailed regulation would, of course, be in each case the subject of negotiation and agreement.

The Bureau will, therefore, see that the plan I have outlined is one which, if it were adopted and loyally observed, would bring into practical operation the principle of equality of status by the method of substantial disarmament on the one hand and the application to all countries of a common list of prohibited arms on the other.

But this programme involves a feature which appears to me to be essential. I must state it with complete frankness to the Bureau—the scheme involves the principle that the Powers now under restriction of the Peace Treaties should not begin to increase their armaments forthwith but should express their willingness to conform to a timetable such as I have indicated. The Government of the United Kingdom takes the view that agreement could not be reached on the basis of a convention which would provide for any immediate rearmament. In speaking of 'no rearmament' I do not mean to dispute the reasonableness, as the Reichswehr is transformed into a more numerous short-service army, of a proportional numerical increase in its armament. And there should be from the beginning of the convention an agreement that [no Government] will manufacture or acquire any further weapons of any of the types to be eventually abolished.

In our view, therefore, for the reasons indicated by Mr. Henderson in the passage I have quoted, the attainment of the object which we all have in view at the Disarmament Conference must be in accordance with a regular programme. We earnestly desire to establish by international agreement the attainment of equality of status, and we point out that it is attained in a most complete and effective way by providing for disarmament through the adoption and loyal fulfilment of such a programme as I have indicated. By accepting the principle of no immediate rearmament, and co-operating with the rest of us in framing

a convention which is best calculated to restore the sense of confidence which has recently been so rudely shaken, the necessary conditions of success can be established.

After Sir John Simon had spoken, the representatives of the United States, Italy, and France associated themselves with his statement, approval of which was also expressed by Dr. Beneš, Monsieur Politis, and other speakers. Mr. Norman Davis declared that the statement was in harmony with the proposals which had been put forward by President Roosevelt in May 1933, and he laid stress on the importance of not transforming the Disarmament Convention into an occasion for rearmament. Signor di Soragna, the Italian delegate, said that he would be happy to associate himself with efforts to bring about an agreement along the lines laid down by Sir John Simon. Monsieur Paul-Boncour was rather more guarded in his approval; but he declared that he accepted some of the principles mentioned by Sir John Simon. He emphasized the necessity of taking account of the political situation existing in Europe, and from this point of view he believed that the division of the period of application of the convention into two stages was essential. It was important that there should be no re-armament, and it was desirable that there should be definite undertakings regarding a substantial reduction of armaments during the period of validity of the convention. In regard to the suggestion that the first of the two stages should be of four years' duration, Monsieur Paul-Boncour pointed out that that period had not been chosen arbitrarily but as a result of a series of considerations to which the French Government attached great importance.

In the absence of both Freiherr von Neurath and Herr Nadolny the German Government were represented by Freiherr von Rheinbaben, whose statement contained no hint of what was to come. The German representative contented himself with reminding the Bureau that the German Government's attitude was determined by two considerations: that there must be real and substantial disarmament on the part of the heavily armed Powers; and that there must be a practical and immediate application of the principle of equality of status, with questions of quantities left open for further negotiation.

The meeting of the Bureau ended at about 12.30 and unofficial reports that Germany had decided to withdraw from the Conference were in circulation within an hour or two.¹ By 3 o'clock

¹ The news that the Government had decided to withdraw from the Disarmament Conference and from the League was announced in the midday papers in Berlin.

Mr. Henderson had received the following telegram from Freiherr von Neurath:

On behalf of the German Government I have the honour to make to you the following communication. In the light of the course which recent discussions of the Powers concerned have taken in the matter of disarmament, it is now clear that the Disarmament Conference will not fulfil what is its sole object, namely, general disarmament. It is also clear that this failure of the Conference is due solely to unwillingness on the part of the highly armed states to carry out their contractual obligation to disarm. This renders impossible the satisfaction of Germany's recognized claim to equality of rights, and the condition on which the German Government agreed at the beginning of this year again to take part in the work of the Conference thus no longer exists. The German Government is accordingly compelled to leave the Disarmament Conference.

During the afternoon and evening of the 14th October the reasons which had led the German Government to decide that Germany must withdraw from the League of Nations as well as from the Disarmament Conference were explained to the German people and to the World at large in two manifestoes—one issued by Herr Hitler and the other by the German Government—and in a broadcast speech by Herr Hitler. In the Chancellor's manifesto, 'the German nation and its Government' were declared to have been profoundly humiliated 'by the deliberate refusal of real moral and material equality of rights to Germany. After the German Government had declared as a result of the equality of rights expressly laid down on the 11th December, 1932, that it was again prepared to take part in the Disarmament Conference, the German Foreign Minister and our delegates were informed by the official representatives of other states in public speeches and direct statements that this equality of rights could no longer be granted to present-day Germany.' The German Government again announced 'its unshaken desire for peace', but it declared 'to its great regret that in view of these imputations it must leave the Disarmament Conference'. It would also 'announce its departure from the League of Nations'. The Chancellor went on to explain that he had 'proposed to the President of the Reich, as a visible expression of the united will of Government and people, to submit this policy of the Government to the nation in a referendum, and to dissolve the German Reichstag in order to give the German people an opportunity of electing those deputies who, as sworn representatives of this policy and of peace and honour, can give the nation the guarantee of an unswerving representation of its interests in this respect'.¹

¹ A decree dissolving the Reichstag and ordering fresh elections, together with a referendum, on the 12th November, was signed by President Hindenburg on the 14th October.

The German Government's manifesto also laid stress on Germany's desire for peace. 'The German Government and the German nation reject force as an unsuitable means of removing existing differences within the European community of states. . . . [They] renew . . . the assurance of their readiness to destroy even the last German machine-gun and to discharge the last man from the army if other nations decide to do the same. . . . [They] declare their readiness at any time, by the conclusion of Continental pacts of non-aggression, to guarantee the peace of Europe for the longest period, to serve its economic progress and to take part in the general cultural reconstruction. . . . [They] have no desire to take part in any competition in armaments with other nations; they demand only that measure of security which guarantees to the nation tranquillity and liberty to carry on peaceful work. The German Government and the German nation are prepared to secure these justified demands of the German people by means of negotiations and treaties.'¹ In conclusion, the German Government asked the German people the following question: 'Does the German nation approve the policy which its Government here submits to it, and is it prepared to declare and solemnly to acknowledge this policy as the expression of its own view and its own desire?'

Herr Hitler in his broadcast speech reiterated once more Germany's readiness to disarm completely on the sole condition of reciprocity. 'If the World decides that all weapons are to be abolished down to the last machine-gun, we are ready to join at once in such a convention. If the World decides that certain weapons are to be destroyed, we are ready to dispense with them immediately. But if the World grants to each nation certain weapons, we are not prepared to let ourselves be excluded from this concession as a nation with inferior rights.' The most significant passage in the speech, however, was that in which the Chancellor made overtures to France. He said that he took it as a 'sign of a noble sense of justice' that Monsieur Daladier had shown a 'spirit of conciliation and understanding' in his latest speech and had denied that France desired to humiliate Germany.

I speak [he said] in the name of the whole German people when I affirm that we sincerely desire to end a feud which has resulted in the

¹ On the 16th October, the German Foreign Minister gave additional explanations of the Government's reasons for leaving the Conference in an interview with foreign Press representatives. He declared that the departure of Germany need be no obstacle to the work of the Conference, since she was already disarmed, and he added that the Government would at any time examine serious proposals for disarmament and remained ready to come to an agreement based on equality of rights. Extracts from Freiherr von Neurath's statement will be found in *Documents on International Affairs, 1933*.

loss of so many lives, a loss so disproportionate to anything that has been gained by it. The German people is convinced that the honour of its arms had remained unsullied and unsmirched, just as we see in the French soldier only our ancient but glorious opponent. We and the whole German nation would rejoice at the thought that we might spare our children and children's children what we as honourable men had to watch and suffer in the long years of bitterness. The history of the last one hundred and fifty years should in its changing course have taught the two nations that essential and enduring changes are no more to be gained by the sacrifice of blood. As a National-Socialist I, with all my followers, refuse by reason of our national principles to acquire by conquest the members of other nations, who will never love us, at the cost of the blood and lives of those who are dear to us.

It would be a great day for all humanity if these two nations of Europe would banish, once and for all, force from their common life. The German people is ready to do so. While claiming boldly those rights which the Treaties themselves have given us, I will say as boldly that there are otherwise for Germany no grounds for territorial conflict. When the Saar territory has been restored to Germany only a madman would consider the possibility of war between the two states, for which, from our point of view, there is no rational or moral ground. For no one could demand that millions of men in the flower of youth should be annihilated for the sake of a readjustment, indefinite in scope, of our present frontier.

While the full seriousness of the step which Germany was taking in thus abruptly withdrawing from the Disarmament Conference was nowhere underestimated, the situation was accepted with comparative calm, and the other European Great Powers lost no time in making it clear that they did not consider that the departure of Germany from Geneva meant that their efforts to secure the limitation of armaments by agreement had definitely broken down. On the 17th October, Monsieur Daladier made a statement on Germany's withdrawal from the Conference, the effects of which, he said, the French Government were examining. In reply to Herr Hitler's broadcast speech, he declared that France was 'deaf to no appeal, but blind to no act. If one sincerely wishes for understanding, why begin with rupture? If one wishes to respect obligations, why oppose the verification of undertakings? We intend . . . to continue the examination of a state of affairs which concerns not only France and Germany, but all the community of peoples who were associated in a great and noble enterprise.'

On the same day, Sir John Simon, in the course of a broadcast address,¹ remarked that the British Government's future course of

¹ The greater part of Sir John Simon's speech consisted of a refutation of statements which had been made by the German Foreign Minister in his interview with foreign Press correspondents on the previous day. Freiherr von Neurath had described as 'not correct' the assertion which Sir John Simon

action, in the face of Germany's withdrawal, would 'involve communications with other Powers, including, I should hope, the Government of Germany herself'. He added that 'the object of British policy' was 'not to rouse resentful feelings'. The Government had tried, and would continue to try, 'to promote and invite co-operation between all nations of good will'. He spoke 'the thought of the British Government as a whole' when he said that nothing should 'be left undone in the future . . . to seek an honest and honourable compact in a great cause upon which the hopes of Mankind for the future peace of the World are so largely founded'.

In Italy, an official *communiqué* issued on the 15th October expressed surprise at Germany's decision¹ and indicated that in the Government's view it would be impossible for the Disarmament Conference to go on with its work in Germany's absence. There

had made (apparently on the occasion of the presentation of the *note verbale* of the 6th October) that in their communication of that date the German Government had gone far beyond their earlier demands. Freiherr von Neurath had declared that he must 'energetically reject any attempt to shift on to us a responsibility which rests on others', and he had implied that it was Sir John Simon's speech of the 14th October, in which a new plan had been put forward in place of the MacDonald plan, that had made a rupture inevitable.

Sir John Simon, in his reply, maintained that he had been fully justified in his statement and was ready to publish documents and records in support of it. He gave a brief account of the progress of the conversations in which the attempt had been made to work out the modifications that were required in the British plan in consequence of the new situation in Europe. 'I certainly thought', he said, 'that we were finding in our discussions a much closer approach to a possible basis of agreement than ever before. . . . I do not for a moment suggest that agreement had been reached, but I do most emphatically say that the question which seemed likely to give most trouble was not the proposal of successive periods, but the question whether Germany should have from the very beginning what were called "samples". . . . I had asked to be informed by the German Government exactly what they meant by "samples". . . . When at length the German claim was formally restated, there cannot be the least doubt that, instead of defining what was meant by "samples", the claim was for substantial rearmament from the very beginning. Now, a disarmament convention cannot begin with rearmament. . . . There is not the slightest doubt in the mind of any of us who have been as closely in touch with these discussions as I have, that the attitude taken up by the German Government at the last moment represented a further widening of the breach, and that all the hard work which has been put into recent conversations by all of us . . . was jeopardized, if not wrecked, by this new attitude. We are now asked to believe that the German Government only made up its mind to withdraw from the Disarmament Conference because of, and at the time of, my statement to the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference. . . . The suggestion that Germany withdrew from the Conference on this account is a very absurd suggestion.'

¹ It was subsequently reported that Signor Mussolini had in fact been informed of the decision before it was communicated to Geneva, but too late to bring any influence to bear on the German Government.

were rumours to the effect that Signor Mussolini intended to summon a meeting of the signatories of the Four-Power Pact to discuss the situation, and continue the negotiations which had been suspended at Geneva, but if he did in fact contemplate this step he soon became convinced that it would be useless.

In the United States the news was received with astonishment and indignation, and it confirmed the tendency, which had become noticeable since the resumption of discussions on disarmament in September, for the United States delegate to remain in the background and leave the initiative to other Powers. On the 15th October, the United States Secretary of State announced to the Press at Washington that the Government firmly maintained their opposition to German rearmament and ascribed to Germany the blame for a step which gravely imperilled the movement for the organization of peace. Two days later, at Geneva, Mr. Norman Davis issued a statement outlining his Government's future policy in regard to the Disarmament Conference. The United States would participate in disarmament discussions as long as there was any prospect of their being continued with success, but the Government were not interested in the political elements of the purely European aspect of disarmament. Europe and not the United States must decide whether conditions were favourable for continuing the attempt to reach an agreement on armaments, and the American delegation did not wish to take an active part in any consultation on political questions which might take place between European capitals.

Meanwhile, on the 16th October, the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference had met to consider the situation. The principal business which it transacted was to approve the terms of the communication which Mr. Henderson was to despatch to Berlin in reply to Freiherr von Neurath's telegram of the 14th. The text of the document which was approved (with abstention from voting on the part of Hungary, the U.S.S.R., Poland, and Turkey)¹ was as follows:

I have now communicated to the General Commission Your Excellency's telegram of the 14th October, announcing the decision of the German Government to discontinue participation in the work of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments and

¹ The Hungarian delegate abstained because 'Hungary found herself in a special situation as regards disarmament'. The other three abstentions were intended as a protest against the secrecy with which recent negotiations had been carried on, and thus indicated, not approval of Germany's action, but the habitual disapproval of states which were excluded from conversations between three or four Powers.

indicating the reasons for the decision. The German Government took this step at a moment when the Bureau had just decided to submit to the General Commission a definite programme. This programme, to be completed within a limited period, provided for the realization progressively, in accordance with resolutions of the Conference in which Germany herself concurred, of reductions of armaments comparable to those contemplated in the Draft Convention submitted to the General Commission. This programme provided also, with corresponding measures of security, for the realization of equality of rights, which the German Government have always placed in the forefront of their demands. I regret therefore that this grave decision should have been taken by your Government for reasons which I am unable to accept as valid.

Certain delegates expressed a desire to consult their Governments as to the policy which they were to follow in the new circumstances, and the General Commission adjourned until the 26th October. It was arranged that the Bureau should hold its next meeting on the 25th October.

The interval of ten days was occupied by consultation between the principal Powers on the course of action which should be pursued. The Italian Government were strongly in favour of the abandonment of any attempt to continue the discussions at Geneva, and the British Government also came to the conclusion that it would be better to adjourn the Conference in order to give Germany time to re-consider her position. This opinion was also apparently shared by Mr. Norman Davis, though he was not in favour of any long delay before the work was resumed. The French Government, on the other hand, took the view that Germany's withdrawal from the Conference was to be interpreted as a refusal to submit to the investigation which would have revealed the extent to which she had already rearmed; and they held that the Disarmament Conference ought to continue its work and endeavour to complete a convention, which could then be presented to Germany for signature.¹ The situation was complicated by the budgetary difficulties of Monsieur Daladier's Government, which led to their resignation after a defeat in the Chamber on the 24th October.² In Germany, during these ten days, attention was concentrated on the election campaign which opened on the 20th October.³ On the following day, the formal notification of Germany's

¹ Dr. Beneš, the *rapporteur* of the General Commission, was also strongly opposed to any suggestion for adjournment.

² On the 27th October Monsieur Sarraut formed a Government, with Monsieur Daladier as Minister for War and Monsieur Paul-Boncour as Foreign Minister. This Government fell on the 23rd November, and the Chautemps Government which succeeded it held office only until the 27th January, 1934.

³ The possibility of an understanding with France formed an important

withdrawal from the League of Nations was handed to the Secretary-General by the German Consul at Geneva. Herr Trendelenburg, the German Under-Secretary of the League, presented his resignation at the same time.

On the 25th October the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference agreed to recommend to the General Commission that it should adjourn, but should decide provisionally to meet again not later than the 4th December. In the meantime, exchanges of views would continue, and the Secretariat would be responsible for preparing a revised text of the British draft convention, in which account would be taken of the various amendments that had been proposed since the draft had been put forward in March 1933. The Bureau would meet again on the 9th November to examine the situation in the light of any further developments, and it would hold a further meeting before the 4th December to decide whether or not it would be useful for the General Commission to reassemble. The General Commission, meeting on the 26th October, approved the recommendations of the Bureau, though not without some expressions of concern on the part of the smaller Powers lest their interests should be overlooked. At the meetings of both the Bureau and the General Commission, practically all the speakers announced their determination that the work of the Disarmament Conference must be carried to a successful conclusion.

On the 6th November the revised text of the draft convention was circulated to the states represented at the Conference. On the same day, the German attitude was defined once more in an election speech which Freiherr von Neurath made in Berlin. The Foreign Minister attacked the whole policy of the League of Nations, the principal aim of which, he declared, had been to consolidate the powerful position which the victorious nations had won at Versailles and to keep the vanquished in permanent subjection. In deciding to leave the League, Germany's object was not to turn her back on the policy of peace, but to give a fresh impulse to a genuine and fruitful policy of peace. The Government hoped to render a service, if not to the Geneva League of Nations, at least to the true League of Nations spirit. They appealed from the existing to a better League. Freiherr von Neurath again repudiated the idea that Germany merely wished to be free to rearm, and he concluded his speech by declaring that the topic of the speech with which Dr. Göbbels opened the campaign at the Sportpalast in Berlin on the 20th. Like Herr Hitler on the 14th October, Dr. Göbbels referred to the Saar question as the only outstanding difficulty between Germany and France and declared that when the Saar had been returned Germany would have no more material claims to make.

Government were making 'an honest and trustful offer' to the other Powers. If their offer was accepted, and if other Governments would 'take the hand which Germany stretched out to them', the settlement of individual questions would present no serious difficulty.

Attention was drawn to this passage of the German Foreign Minister's speech by Sir John Simon during a debate on disarmament in the House of Commons at Westminster on the following day. Sir John Simon reviewed the course of the Disarmament Conference from its beginning in February 1932 and explained the circumstances in which he had made his statement to the Bureau on the 14th October, 1933. He also dealt at some length with the question of British obligations under the Locarno Treaty and the situation which would arise in that connexion if Germany carried out her announced intention of leaving the League of Nations.¹ On the subject of Freiherr von Neurath's 'honest and trustful offer', Sir John Simon reminded the House of the wish which Herr Hitler had expressed for a *rapprochement* with France, and he declared that the British Government most earnestly trusted that these statements might 'lead, in some form or other, to the renewal of contact, and that this object' would 'be pursued by whatever method' was 'found most useful and appropriate'. He added that the British Government had 'never been sticklers for method' if they could 'help the result'; and they intended to continue their efforts 'and invite other Governments to continue theirs'. At a later stage of the debate, a question from Mr. Lloyd George (who had strongly criticized the Government's action in supporting the proposal for a period of probation)² elicited from Mr. Eden an assurance that the Government were not committed to that proposal, which was merely 'in the process of negotiation'. They 'were prepared to support it if it found support in the Conference'. Mr. Eden added that, since the negotiations on the two-period plan had failed, 'of course the draft convention still stands'.

These hints that the British Government would be prepared to abandon the plan which had been given shape in Sir John Simon's statement of the 14th October, and to continue negotiations, if

¹ Certain passages from Sir John Simon's speech are quoted in other sections of this part of the present volume on pp. 168 and 222-3 above.

² Sir John Simon deprecated the use of this term, which he described as 'not quite accurate'. 'The period of probation', he said, 'is a phrase and not only a phrase but a conception, which we of the British delegation had rejected publicly and privately throughout'. Nevertheless there can be little doubt that Sir John Simon's statement to the Bureau on the 14th October was generally taken to mean that the British Government were committing themselves to the acceptance of a 'période d'épreuve'.

necessary outside Geneva, on the basis of the draft convention, were not followed up immediately. There had been a suggestion that either Sir John Simon or Mr. Eden, or both, should resume conversations with the French Government in Paris on their way to Geneva for the meeting of the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference on the 9th November; but when the time came the French Government were still in the throes of their financial difficulties, and since it would be impossible, for this reason, for Monsieur Paul-Boncour to go to Geneva, it was decided that it was unnecessary for Sir John Simon or Mr. Eden to make the journey. Mr. Norman Davis had left Geneva for the United States at the beginning of November,¹ so that none of the delegates who had taken the leading part in the conversations immediately preceding the withdrawal of Germany were present at the meeting of the Bureau. The result of the Bureau's deliberations was the appointment of a small committee to make recommendations regarding the best method of carrying forward the work of the Conference. This committee recommended that *rapporteurs* should be appointed to deal with the majority of the outstanding questions on which agreement had not been reached, and that the two questions of effectives and of supervision, which appeared likely, at the moment, to give rise to most difficulty, should be referred to committees. These recommendations were accepted by the Bureau on the 11th November.

This decision was not reached without trouble, for there was a sharp divergence of views on the desirability of continuing the attempt to arrive at an agreement in the absence of Germany. While the French delegation maintained that the best course was for the Conference to go on as though nothing had happened, the Italian delegation considered that this would be merely waste of time. During the past four weeks Signor Mussolini had become confirmed in the belief, which he had held from the first, that to continue the discussions at Geneva while Germany remained aloof would serve no useful purpose and might do harm by hindering the attainment of agreement with Germany through other channels. Although the intention was that the *rapporteurs* and the committees whose appoint-

¹ An announcement was made by Mr. Cordell Hull in Washington at the same time to the effect that Mr. Davis's return did not mean that the United States Government were abandoning their attempt to help Europe. Mr. Davis would go back to Geneva whenever his presence there seemed necessary. Mr. Davis had an interview with Monsieur Paul-Boncour in Paris before he left Europe. He was reported to have said that he was as anxious as ever to promote the conclusion of a disarmament convention, but that he did not feel that the United States was called upon to take the initiative in attempts to bring Germany back to the Conference.

ment was now decided upon should confine themselves as far as possible to the technical aspect of the questions which they would have to consider, leaving the political aspect for informal negotiations, the Italian delegate, Signor di Soragna, considered it necessary to make a reservation at the first meetings of the Committees on Supervision and Effectives on the 12th November, leaving himself and his colleagues free to act as observers if the discussions should take a political turn and to refrain from voting on delicate questions. Italy's 'semi-exit' from the Conference was greatly regretted in France, not least because it appeared to mark a definite breach in the good understanding which had been established between France and Italy a few months earlier.

The Italian representative's gesture, combined with the poor attendance of Ministers at the meeting of the Bureau, threatened to wear out the apparently inexhaustible patience which had been displayed hitherto by the President of the Conference. Mr. Henderson indicated that unless he received a greater measure of support he would feel obliged to resign his office, and he also addressed a communication to the Governments represented at the Conference pointing out that it was difficult for the *rapporteurs* on various questions who had just been appointed to make progress in the absence of heads of delegations. These *démarches* had the desired effect, and by the 19th November Sir John Simon and Monsieur Paul-Boncour had again arrived at Geneva and had resumed consultations with Mr. Henderson and with the representatives of Italy and the United States.

The discussions showed that the French Government not only still desired to carry on the work of the Conference at Geneva but were also as insistent as ever upon the importance of testing the efficacy of supervision during a trial period.¹ In view of the precarious position of Monsieur Sarraut's Cabinet, it was difficult for Monsieur Paul-Boncour to make concessions, but the strong opposition of Italy to the continuance of the Conference received a good deal of support from the British and American representatives, who were more concerned to find some means of reopening negotiations with

¹ Their views had been explained in a note of the 15th November to the British Government, in reply to certain questions which had been raised by the British Ambassador in Paris. In this note the French Government expressed their preference for proceeding with the drafting of a convention, and made it clear that they were not ready to abandon the principle of a 'période d'épreuve', though they had no objection to a revision of the formula which had been discussed at Geneva in September and October, provided that the same results would be achieved by any new formula that might be adopted.

Germany than to keep up the appearance of activity at Geneva. Monsieur Paul-Boncour finally agreed that it would be best to postpone the meeting of the General Commission for a time,¹ but in deference to French views the representatives of the other Great Powers agreed that the two committees which had been appointed by the Bureau on the 11th November, together with the *rapporteurs*, should make an attempt to continue their work, in order to keep the framework of the Disarmament Conference in existence.

After a long meeting between the representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States on the 21st November, it was announced that the four Powers were in agreement as to the immediate course of action to be pursued. On the following day the result of their deliberations was communicated to the Bureau by Mr. Hen-

¹ An additional motive for postponing the public discussions on disarmament was provided by the attitude of Japan in regard to supervision. At a meeting of the Supervision Committee, when the Russian representative had urged that supervision must be universally applied, the Japanese delegate had declared that Japan's special circumstances made it impossible for her to accept any supervision of her armaments. (Japan had made a similar reservation when the question of supervision had been discussed at an earlier stage of the Conference's proceedings.) In the existing state of Japanese-Russian relations it was to be expected that Japan's refusal to accept supervision would imply a similar refusal on the part of the U.S.S.R.; and a system of supervision which was not to be effective in the U.S.S.R. was obviously not likely to be acceptable to the majority of European states. The Disarmament Conference, unfortunately, had never evolved any method of dealing with difficulties of this kind except that of postponing consideration of the question at issue in the hope that it might be solved by means of informal negotiations.

In spite of the obstacle presented by the Japanese attitude the Supervision Committee was able, during the first week of December, to make some progress in its examination of the question of supervision. A basis for the discussion was provided by a French memorandum in which revised proposals were put forward for the periodical inspection of armaments. On the 6th December the chairman of the committee, Monsieur Bourquin of Belgium, presented a series of texts, which he had drafted in the light of the previous discussions. The texts, which followed the French proposals very closely, dealt with the use by the Permanent Disarmament Commission of information from unofficial sources; the question of the majority which would be required for decisions of the Permanent Disarmament Commission or its committees, particularly in connexion with investigations on the spot in the event of a complaint; the question of periodical investigations; and the constitution and duties of control committees working on the spot. These texts were not adopted by the delegates, who merely noted them and referred them to their Governments; but there appeared to be strong support for the French scheme as a whole. The French proposals included a recommendation that the private manufacture of armaments should be controlled by a system of licensing, and, while many delegates considered that a system of this kind was indispensable, the suggestion did not meet with the approval of Great Britain (whose opposition had been largely responsible for the withdrawal of the earlier proposal—which the French continued to prefer—that the private manufacture of arms should be abolished).

derson, who proposed that the General Commission should adjourn until the meeting of the Council of the League in January 1934, and that in the meantime 'parallel and supplementary' efforts to reach agreement should be made through diplomatic channels. The chairmen of the various committees of the Conference would decide, in consultation with the President and the other officers of the Conference,¹ how far it was possible for them to carry on their work.² In view of the powers which the General Commission had conferred upon the Bureau it was not thought necessary for the former body to meet merely in order to approve the recommendation for its own adjournment. No objection was raised to this proposal, which was therefore adopted, and the Bureau and the General Commission stood adjourned until January 1934.

The course and outcome of the 'parallel and supplementary' negotiations between the European Great Powers which were opened in December 1933 must be reserved for treatment in the next volume of this series.

¹ That is, with Monsieur Politis (Vice-President of the General Commission), Dr. Beneš (*rapporteur* of the General Commission), and Monsieur Avenol (Secretary-General of the Conference and of the League of Nations).

² The committees had already found that it was very difficult to make progress on questions which affected Germany and Italy when the former was not represented at all and the latter's representative refrained from expressing an opinion.

PART III

THE AMERICAN CONTINENT

(i) The Seventh Pan-American Conference (December 1933)

THE Seventh International Conference of American States which was held at Montevideo from the 3rd to the 26th December, 1933, was generally acclaimed by the participants as the most successful in the series of Pan-American Conferences which had begun in 1889.¹ The justification for the spirit of mutual congratulation in which the delegates took leave of one another was to be found not so much in the concrete results achieved by the Conference as in the evidence which it afforded that the relations between the United States of America and the other twenty states members of the Pan-American Union had entered upon a new and happier phase, and that the countries of Central and South America need no longer find cause for alarm in the political and economic predominance of the 'Colossus of the North'. One of the most striking features of the Montevideo Conference was the absence of the concerted South American opposition to the United States which had manifested itself at earlier Conferences and which had been specially marked at the sixth Conference at Havana in 1928.² It was particularly noticeable that the representatives of the Argentine Republic, who had led the opposition to the United States in 1928, worked in close and friendly co-operation with the United States delegation in 1933.

The change in the Latin-American attitude towards the United States which was revealed at Montevideo was the outcome of a change of policy on the part of the Government of the United States which had been initiated towards the end of President Coolidge's

¹ The Seventh Conference probably owed some of its success to a fortunate meeting-place. At Havana in 1928, the problems raised by the relations between the United States and the Caribbean countries naturally assumed formidable proportions, whereas at Montevideo the atmosphere was far more propitious for a discussion of the burning question of intervention. Montevideo had been chosen as the site of many important Latin-American conferences, and it was, indeed, developing into a kind of American Geneva. Its suitability as a meeting-place was due in large part to the fact that Uruguay had none of the pretensions to Latin-American leadership which made the capital of Argentina or of Brazil unacceptable to other states, while at the same time it was within easy reach of both Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro. It was also a special advantage in 1933 that the site of the Pan-American Conference should have been relatively close to the Chaco.

² See the *Survey for 1927*, Part IV A, section (ii).

Administration. It has been indicated in a previous volume¹ that this change of policy made itself felt principally in four ways: in the display of less vigour in championing the cause of citizens of the United States who had grievances against the citizens or the Governments of other American republics; in the relaxation of the political control which the United States had established over certain republics in the Caribbean area; in the return to the policy, which had been followed down to 1913, of recognizing *de facto* Governments in South America whether they had been established by constitutional means or as the result of revolution; and in attempts to allay the uneasiness of the Latin-American states in regard to the use of the Monroe Doctrine as a weapon of economic imperialism. The Government of the United States continued to act upon these principles throughout President Hoover's term of office and also after the change of administration in March 1933.

The unwillingness of the United States Government to champion the cause of American citizens who were at issue with the citizens or Governments of the countries of Central and South America was specially noticeable in connexion with defaults on loans floated in the United States. Defaults by South American Governments, states, or municipalities on bonds held in the United States assumed increasingly serious proportions as the World Economic Crisis developed, and by the end of the year 1931 they amounted to more than \$815,000,000.² There was a widespread feeling in the United States that the State Department at Washington had a certain moral responsibility towards the bondholders who suffered from these defaults, because of the indirect control which the Department had exercised over the issue of foreign loans from the year 1922 onwards. In that year an arrangement had come into force whereby bankers who were contemplating the issue of a loan informed the State Department in order that the proposal might be examined from the political aspect. If the State Department approved of the proposal, the bankers concerned were informed that there was 'no objection' to the issue of the loan, and they were reminded at the same time that the Department could not undertake to give advice in regard to the financial risk involved, which must be examined by the issuing house in the normal way. This warning, however, was conveyed to the bankers and not to the investing public, and there was no doubt that many investors looked upon the State Department's approval

¹ The *Survey for 1930*, Part V, section (i).

² Evidence given before the Finance Committee of the United States Senate on the 1st January, 1932.

as a guarantee that a proposed loan was commercially sound. Moreover, the ordinary citizen did not realize the implications of the Government's change of policy in regard to the protection of his interests, and he was inclined to interpret the State Department's notification that it had 'no objection' to his purchase of certain securities as an undertaking that the Government would take steps to safeguard his interests if the need should arise.

Thus the system under which issuing houses consulted the State Department had undeniably helped to promote the sale of many of the bonds which were in default by the end of the year 1931, and it was natural that the system should have become the subject of considerable criticism. The critics did not fail to point out that in some cases¹ the State Department had given its approval to a loan against the advice of the Department of Commerce, on the ground that the political consequences might be serious if objections were raised to the proposed issue. In June 1930 the Senate passed a resolution asking the Secretary of State on what authorization, constitutional or statutory, the Department based its right to approve or withhold approval from foreign loans. Mr. Stimson, in his reply, expressed the opinion that the Department's action was in accordance with the Constitution and the revised Statutes of the United States, and denied that there was any interference with the powers of the Federal Reserve Board. On the 26th February, 1931, the Senate passed another resolution declaring it to be 'the sense of the Senate' that the Department of State should 'desist from the dangerous practice of involving the United States Government in any responsibility for foreign investment loans'. On the 9th December, 1931, a resolution was introduced into the Senate by Senator Johnson of California calling for an investigation of the sale of foreign bonds or securities in the United States. The hearings on this resolution, which occupied many weeks of the Senate Finance Committee's time during 1932, gave an opportunity for the ventilation of the whole question. Both the State Department and the bankers were strongly criticized by many witnesses, and the means by which some of the Latin-American loans had been obtained were described by Senator Johnson in March 1932 as 'little short of nefarious'. These attacks upon the policy of the State Department did not cause President Hoover's Administration to modify their view that they were not called upon to take action to redress the grievances of American citizens who had purchased South American securities. Early in February 1931,

¹ e.g. in the case of a Bolivian loan which was issued in 1928 (see p. 397 below).

Mr. Stimson issued a statement to the effect that the Federal Government had no means of affording relief to private investors in foreign securities on which defaults had occurred, and that the investors could only have recourse to the banking houses which had acted as agents for the issue of the loans. Three months later, Mr. Stimson made a broadcast speech in defence of the Government's Latin-American policy, in the course of which he pointed out that the policy was in accordance with the principle which had been laid down by Mr. Elihu Root when he was Secretary of State at the beginning of the twentieth century: 'It is the established policy of the United States not to use its army and navy for the collection of debts.' The announcement on the 20th June, 1931, of Mr. Hoover's proposal for a moratorium on inter-governmental debts¹ gave rise to rumours that a moratorium for South American debts was under consideration, and a statement contradicting these reports which was issued from the White House on the 27th June laid stress on the fact that the debts in question were private debts, which remained 'solely a relationship between the debtors and creditors'.²

The State Department could not maintain the same official lack of interest in defaults on loans to countries in Central America and the Caribbean, since such loans were usually made subject to an agreement between the Government of the country concerned and the Government of the United States. These agreements stipulated as a rule that the customs receipts or other internal revenues should be pledged to the service of the loan and should be collected under American supervision as long as the loan remained unamortized. In some cases, also, definite provision was made for the tightening up of American financial control if default should occur. Defaults on loans had, of course, provided numerous occasions in the past for active intervention by the United States in the affairs of Caribbean countries, but in the years 1931 and 1932 the State Department, in accordance with its new policy, refused to make default the excuse for further intervention.

Thus, in November 1931 the State Department acquiesced in a default by the Dominican Republic on a loan issued in 1924, in

¹ See the *Survey for 1931*, pp. 72-3.

² At the same time, President Hoover interested himself in projects for the rehabilitation of South American currencies which were under discussion in the summer of 1931, and the *démenti* issued from the White House on the 27th June was simultaneous with the announcement that New York banking interests would have the co-operation of the Federal Reserve system in making an investigation into the possibility of granting further loans to certain South American countries.

connexion with which customs duties were paid to an American receiver. The effects of the economic crisis had been accentuated in the Dominican Republic by a disastrous hurricane from which it had suffered in 1930, and in the autumn of 1931 the Government informed the State Department at Washington that, while they proposed to continue the payment of interest on foreign loans, they found themselves obliged temporarily to divert certain customs revenues from the payment of amortization, although they recognized that this step violated their obligations to bondholders and was not in accordance with the terms of the convention between the United States and the Republic. The State Department, having made an independent investigation which confirmed the seriousness of the Dominican Government's financial situation, merely informed the Government that the steps which they 'felt required to take and the reasons therefor' had been noted—pointing out at the same time 'that the measure proposed would necessarily extend the life of the receivership of customs for so long a period as the amortization payments' were 'held in abeyance'. A statement on the subject which was issued by the State Department on the 10th November, 1931, declared that the Government of the United States were 'not disposed at this time to take any action other than to continue to follow with attention and care the developments in the Dominican Republic'. A similar policy of restraint was followed when the Government of Salvador defaulted in February 1932 on an American loan which dated from 1922. This loan was not the subject of a special agreement between the Governments of Salvador and of the United States, but the terms of the contract gave the American bankers who issued the loan the right to appoint a fiscal representative to whom customs duties would be paid and the additional right to establish a customs receivership in the event of a default. The Government of the United States were, however, concerned indirectly in the loan, for the contract also provided that disagreements between the Republic and the bankers should be referred for decision to the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, through the Secretary of State, and that, in the event of default, the bankers' agent should 'select, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State of the United States of America, two individuals competent in their opinion to discharge the duties of Collector General' of customs. Nevertheless, when the Salvadorean Government issued a decree ordering that the customs duties which were pledged to the service of the loan should be paid into the Salvadorean Treasury, the State Department at Washington declined to assist the American bankers in establishing a receiver-

ship, on the pretext that the United States had not recognized the Government which then held office in Salvador.¹ At the same time the reluctance of the State Department to undertake fresh financial responsibilities in Central America or the Caribbean did not mean that the Government were ready to divest themselves prematurely of the responsibilities which already rested upon them. Thus, while it was the considered policy of the Government at Washington to put an end to the political domination exercised by the United States over Nicaragua and Haiti and to withdraw the marines who were stationed in those countries, they felt constrained in both cases to keep a certain measure of financial control after the termination of the occupation, on the ground that they were under an obligation to bondholders who had advanced money in the belief that the collection of the revenue pledged to the service of the loans would be supervised by United States officials.²

The first stages in the relaxation of political control over Nicaragua and Haiti have been recorded elsewhere.³ Before the end of the year 1933, the process had been carried to its conclusion in the case of Nicaragua, while in the case of Haiti a definite date had been fixed for the final withdrawal of the American marines. The settlement which had been negotiated by Mr. Stimson in Nicaragua in May 1927⁴ provided that American marines should remain in the country temporarily in order to supervise elections and to assist in pacification and in the organization of the National Guard as a non-partisan force which would combine the functions of army and police. Presidential elections were duly held under American supervision in 1928 and 1932 and Congressional elections in 1930. In the 1932 Presidential election the Conservative candidate was Señor Adolfo Díaz, who had been President at the time of the signature of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in 1914, and who had been elected a second time, with the support of the United States, in November 1926.⁵ Señor

¹ See pp. 326-7 below. In May 1933 the Salvadorean Congress approved an agreement which had been negotiated with representatives of the bondholders and which provided for the suspension of amortization payments and the resumption of interest payments.

² See section (ii) of this part of the present volume for the negotiations on this question between Haiti and the United States. In Nicaragua, customs receipts were pledged to the service of a loan dating from 1909, and they continued to be collected by an American official after the marines had left the country. This official also acted as one of two members nominated by the State Department on a High Commission which was responsible for the payments on bonds issued in 1918.

³ See the *Survey for 1927*, Part IV B, section (iv), and the *Survey for 1930*, Part V, sections (iv) and (vi).

⁴ The *Survey for 1927*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

Diaz's defeat in 1932 by the Liberal candidate, Dr. Sacasa, was a sufficient proof that American supervision had not influenced the result of the poll. Meanwhile, the training of the National Guard had been making good progress, and from April 1929 onwards they gradually took over from the American marines the duties of policing the country and conducting operations against the insurgents who remained at large under General Sandino's leadership. In spite of the continued activities of the Sandinistas, which made it impossible for the Government to claim that the pacification of the country was complete, Mr. Stimson (who, since his visit to Nicaragua, had become Secretary of State in Mr. Hoover's Administration) announced in February 1931 that the American marines would be withdrawn after the Presidential election of November 1932. This promise was carried out, and on the 2nd January, 1933, the last detachment of marines left Nicaragua. The withdrawal of the marines was justified by the event, for, on the 2nd February, 1933, General Sandino signed an agreement with President Sacasa whereby the insurgents undertook to lay down their arms in return for an amnesty and the grant of public lands for settlement.¹ The withdrawal of the marines marked the end of the special relations which had existed between Nicaragua and the United States, and the responsibilities of the United States were limited thereafter to the exercise of supervision over Nicaraguan finances.² The United States also retained the rights which they had acquired under the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in connexion with an inter-oceanic canal across Nicaraguan territory. In 1929 an Inter-Oceanic Canal Board had been appointed to investigate and survey the proposed route,³ but this Board, which reported in December 1931, did not recommend any action in connexion with the Nicaraguan canal. Although they recognized that the existence of an alternative route to the Panamá Canal would be advantageous in some ways, they felt that the expense of constructing the canal could not be justified from an economic point of view, since it was estimated that the Panamá Canal, at its existing capacity, would be

¹ A little over a year later, on the 21st February, 1934, General Sandino and two or three companions were killed by National Guards in the outskirts of Managua, whither they had gone to negotiate with Government officials regarding the surrender of arms, which had not yet been completed. The assassination of General Sandino was declared in an official *communiqué* to have been contrary to the wishes and orders of President Sacasa, who had guaranteed the safety of the General and his followers during their visit to Managua, but the National Guards responsible do not appear to have been punished.

² See footnote on p. 323 above.

³ See the *Survey for 1930*, Part V, section (iv).

adequate for all traffic until the year 1970, and that its capacity could be considerably increased at relatively low cost.

The negotiations between the United States and Haiti, which resulted in an agreement for the withdrawal of the American marines by the end of November 1934, are described elsewhere in the present volume,¹ and the situation in Cuba is also dealt with in a separate section.² It will be sufficient here to note that the attitude of the Administration at Washington towards the Cuban troubles afforded a striking proof of the sincerity of the United States Government's intention to place their relations with Latin-American countries upon a new footing. When the discontent with President Machado's régime in Cuba came to a head in the summer of 1933, President Roosevelt's Government consulted the Governments of certain South American countries as to the course which it would be desirable to pursue, and, while they took the precaution of despatching warships to the spot, they refrained, in spite of considerable provocation, from landing marines or otherwise intervening actively for the protection of American interests. Moreover, in November 1933 President Roosevelt announced that he was ready to enter into negotiations with Cuba regarding the 'Platt Amendment' of 1901, which was the basis of the relations between Cuba and the United States, and these negotiations terminated in May 1934 in the signature of an agreement whereby the 'Platt Amendment' was abrogated.

The three years preceding the Montevideo Conference did not provide many opportunities³ for carrying into effect the third of the four principles which governed the new Latin-American policy of the United States—the recognition of *de facto* Governments in South America; for, although political unrest and military revolts continued to play a large part in South American life during the years 1931 to 1933, it generally happened either that the Government in office was able to ride the storm, or that a change of Government was effected by constitutional means, so that the question of recognizing a régime which had established itself by force did not arise. Chile provided an exception, for a revolution overthrew the Government at Santiago at the beginning of June 1932, and this *coup d'état* was followed by a series of counter-revolutions and revolts, with the result that political stability was not restored for some months. On the 6th June the State Department at Washington announced that

¹ Section (ii) of this part of the present volume.

² Section (iii) of this part.

³ The recognition by the United States of the Panaman Government which came into power as the result of a revolution in January 1931 was recorded in the *Survey for 1930* (pp. 366-7).

it would be guided on the question of granting recognition to the new Chilean Government by the principles which had been applied in the case of other revolutionary Governments in South America; that is, recognition would be accorded as soon as the United States Government were satisfied that the Chilean Government were in *de facto* control of the country. The State Department was not able to satisfy itself on this point until October 1932, when arrangements had been made by a provisional Government for the holding of Presidential elections. The American Ambassador at Santiago notified the Chilean Government of the official recognition of the United States on the 21st October, nine days before the election of a President in the manner provided by the Constitution took place.

In regard to the recognition of Central American Governments, however, the policy of the State Department during the years 1931 to 1933 continued to be that so long as the Central American Treaty of 1923 remained in force, its terms precluded the possibility of granting recognition to Governments which had come into power as the result of a revolution.¹ The issue was raised by a revolution which took place in Salvador in December 1931. As a result of a *coup d'état* carried out by a group of young army officers, Señor Martínez, who had been Vice-President and Minister for War in the Government which was overthrown, became President of the Republic. The Governments of the United States and of the other Central American Republics refused to recognize the new régime, although its *de facto* control over the country was not in doubt and although recognition was granted by Mexico and by several South American states, as well as by a number of European Governments. This application of the treaty of 1923 aroused much resentment in Salvador, and the Salvadorean Congress, in its decree appointing Señor Martínez to the Presidency, declared that the right to revolt was recognized in the Constitution of Salvador and that the terms of the 1923 treaty could not 'affect the legitimacy' of the

¹ See the *Survey for 1930*, Part V, section (i). For the General Treaty of Peace and Amity signed by representatives of the five Central American Republics on the 7th February, 1923, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 414-15. The treaty bound each of the signatory Powers 'not to recognize any other Government which might come into power in any of the five Republics through a *coup d'état* or a revolution against a recognized Government as long as the freely elected representatives of the people thereof had not constitutionally reorganized the country'. The Government of the United States had not signed the treaty; but, since the Conference at which it was signed had been held at Washington on the initiative of the State Department, the Government felt themselves under a moral obligation to abide by the provisions which the Central American Republics had accepted for themselves.

Martínez Government. It was also pointed out that Salvador had ratified the 1923 treaty subject to a reservation regarding the provisions for non-recognition of revolutionary Governments.

The situation in Salvador raised the question whether the 1923 treaty did not infringe the sovereignty of the Central American Republics. The Costa Rican Government took the view that certain articles of the treaty established 'obligations affecting the sovereignty and independence of the signatory republics', and on the 23rd December, 1932, they denounced the treaty as from January 1934.¹ On the 28th December the Salvadorean Government followed suit, though the validity of this action by a Government which had not been recognized by the other signatories was questioned by Guatemala. In August 1933 the Salvadorean Congress took the further step of declaring the treaty null and void, on the ground that the provisions which had been made in the treaty for its registration with the Secretariat of the League of Nations had not been carried into effect. A few weeks later the Costa Rican Government decided that it would be possible for them to recognize the Martínez Government in January 1934, when a year would have elapsed since they had given notice of denunciation of the 1923 treaty. The Costa Rican Government carried out their intention on the 2nd January, 1934, and during January recognition was also accorded by the other Central American Republics—their change of front being explained apparently on the ground that Salvador had denounced the treaty and could therefore be treated as outside its scope. The recognition of President Martínez by the four neighbouring countries removed the obstacle to recognition by the United States, and before the end of January diplomatic relations had been resumed between San Salvador and Washington. In the meantime Guatemala had taken the initiative in summoning a Central American Conference which was to meet in March 1934 and was to consider the revision of the 1923 treaty.² Thus it appeared

¹ By the terms of the treaty, it was to remain in force until the 1st January, 1934. Thereafter one or two of the parties might cease to be bound by the treaty, without affecting its validity for the rest, by giving one year's notice of denunciation, but denunciation by more than two signatories would finally terminate the treaty.

² The Conference was duly opened in Guatemala City on the 15th March, and on the 12th April, 1934, a Treaty of Central American Fraternity was signed to replace the treaty of 1923. In the new treaty, the question which had led to the denunciation of the earlier treaty was dealt with by the omission of any provision regarding the recognition or non-recognition of new Governments. The signatories undertook never to 'make use of force to settle their differences'; war was declared to be 'impossible among them'; and they agreed that any future conflicts should be settled by arbitration or other peaceful means. They recognized that 'the political union of Central America is the supreme

probable that the recognition of the Salvadorean Government by the Government of the United States in January 1934 marked the end of the phase during which the State Department had continued to apply to the Central American Republics a policy which they had abandoned in the case of South American countries.¹

In regard to the Monroe Doctrine, the Government of the United States did not take any further direct steps during the years 1931 to 1933 to interpret the doctrine in a manner likely to allay the uneasiness of Latin-American countries regarding its implications. It was significant, however, that Mr. J. Reuben Clark, the author of the interpretative memorandum which was prepared at the request of the Secretary of State (Mr. Kellogg) at the end of 1928,² should have been appointed a member of the United States delegation to the Montevideo Conference in December 1933. This was one of several indications that the Administration at Washington, under both President Hoover and President Roosevelt, were anxious to prove that they had sincerely renounced any intention of using the Monroe Doctrine as a weapon of imperialism. The Government's attitude came out clearly in connexion with the attempts which were made by the League of Nations, as well as by countries in the American hemisphere, to promote a peaceful settlement of the two serious conflicts which were disturbing the peace of South America during the period under review: the conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay in the Chaco³ and that between Peru and Colombia over Leticia.⁴ It was true that the Neutral Commission at Washington, which was the first agency to attempt mediation between Bolivia and Paraguay, while it made several attempts to enlist the co-operation of the states which were neighbours of the disputants, showed little inclination for some months to welcome the assistance of the League of Nations; but the aspiration of its peoples; and the Governments of the five republics promised 'to lend their effective co-operation to unify those interests which they have in common, without diminution of or detriment to their sovereignty'. The principle of non-intervention by one state in the internal affairs of another was expressly recognized, and each signatory Government agreed to take measures to prevent the promotion or development within its territory of revolutionary movements directed against the Government of another Central American Republic. Other provisions dealt with the status of nationals of one state resident in another and with co-operation in matters of trade, law, education, communications, &c. A Central American Extradition Convention was signed at the same time.

¹ The question of United States recognition of the Governments which succeeded one another in Cuba in the year 1933-4 is dealt with in section (iii) below.

² See the *Survey for 1930*, pp. 370-1.

³ See section (iv) of this part of the present volume.

⁴ See section (v) of this part of the present volume.

United States was only one of the five members of the Neutral Commission,¹ and it was hardly fair to assume that the preference which that Commission displayed at first for keeping the settlement of the dispute in American hands was due to any reluctance on the part of President Hoover's Government to see active intervention by the League of Nations in the region covered by the Monroe Doctrine. Indeed, when the Leticia dispute assumed serious proportions early in 1933, Mr. Stimson at once established close co-operation with the League of Nations, and this policy was carried on after the change of Administration at Washington in March 1933. In May, the Neutral Commission which had been dealing with the Chaco dispute deliberately stood back in order to leave the field clear for the League, and the proposals to despatch League Commissions to the Chaco and to Leticia were carried into effect before the end of the year without any trace of opposition from Washington.

On the other hand, Latin-American countries continued to take such opportunities as presented themselves of attacking the Monroe Doctrine. Thus when the Government of the Argentine Republic, in November 1932, addressed a note to the Neutral Commission which was acting in the Chaco dispute, pointing out the desirability of entrusting the settlement of the dispute to the League Council, they took occasion to affirm that the 'regional or continental doctrines' which might present an obstacle to League action had 'neither the adherence of Argentina nor a sanction created by the unanimous will of the countries of the Continent'.² In the same way, when the Argentinian Congress, in September 1933, passed the legislation necessary to enable Argentina to resume full activity as a Member of the League of Nations,³ it instructed the Executive, in communicating

¹ The United States representative acted as chairman of the Commission, so that his influence on the Commission's policy was perhaps greater than that of his colleagues.

² See section (iv) of this part of the present volume, p. 411 below.

³ Argentina had acceded to the Covenant of the League of Nations by an act of the Executive Power, but it was not until 1933 that the accession was formally approved by Congress. An Argentinian delegation attended the first session of the Assembly of the League in 1920, but it withdrew on the rejection of certain proposals which it had sponsored, and Argentina was not represented at subsequent sessions of the Assembly, though she took part in the work of the League of Nations in connexion with disarmament and other matters, and until 1928 she made periodical contributions towards the cost of the League. An Argentinian delegation attended the fourteenth session of the Assembly in 1933, and on the 3rd October Argentina was elected to a seat on the Council for the year 1933-4. The attitude of Argentina towards the League from the year 1920 onwards and her ultimate return to Geneva in 1933 were probably influenced to some extent by the position of Brazil. Argentinian public opinion had resented the election of Brazil as a member of the Council in 1920, and her

its decision to the Secretariat of the League of Nations, to 'state that the Argentine Republic regards the Monroe Doctrine mentioned as an example in Article 21 of the Covenant as a unilateral political declaration which in its time rendered signal service to the cause of American emancipation, and not as constituting a regional understanding as stated in the Article in question'. A similar gesture was made by Mexico on her admission to membership of the League in September 1931.¹ The Mexican Government's note of the 10th September, accepting the invitation to accede to the Covenant which the Assembly of the League had tendered to Mexico on the 8th, contained the following passage: 'Mexico thinks it necessary to state when accepting that she has never recognized the regional understanding mentioned in Article 21 of the Covenant.'

From the above brief review of certain aspects of the relations between the United States and the countries of South and Central America and the Caribbean during the three years preceding the Montevideo Conference, it is clear that the victory of the Democratic candidate in the United States Presidential election in 1932 did not result in any marked change in the Latin-American policy which had been followed for the last five years under a Republican Administration. Indeed, it may be said that so far as there was any change it was in the direction of speeding up the programme; for the arrival of re-election every year until 1926 did not tend to make the League more popular in Argentina. In 1926, however, Brazil gave notice of resignation from the League on the rejection of her claim to a permanent seat on the Council, and her resignation duly took effect two years later. The movement in Argentina for the resumption of full membership gathered strength from that time until it culminated in the action taken by Congress in September 1933.

¹ At the time of the drafting of the League Covenant, Mexico was in bad odour with the Government of the United States, and her name was not included in the list of states mentioned in the annex to the Covenant which were invited to become members of the League by acceding to the Covenant. Mexico was too proud to apply for admission on her own account, and by the year 1931, when she had attained a measure of political stability which might well be envied by many Latin-American members of the League, the desirability of putting an end to the situation created in 1920 was generally recognized. Accordingly the five permanent members of the League Council, together with Spain, took the initiative by introducing a resolution at the twelfth session of the League Assembly calling upon the Assembly 'in all justice' to repair the omission of the name of Mexico from the annex to the Covenant by inviting her to accede—an invitation which was promptly accepted. Little more than twelve months had elapsed before Mexico gave notice of resignation from the League, but the reason for this step was said to be the economic crisis, which made it impossible for Mexico to pay her contribution towards the League's expenses, and in notifying the League Secretariat in December 1932 of their intention to withdraw the Mexican Government held out the hope that it might be possible for them to reconsider their decision before the resignation took effect. They did in fact withdraw their resignation in May 1934.

President Roosevelt at the White House appeared to be the signal for an intensification of the efforts which the State Department had been making to place the relations between the United States and Latin America on a more satisfactory footing. President Roosevelt took immediate steps to remove any apprehension as to the attitude which his Government were likely to take on Latin-American questions. In his inaugural speech of the 4th March, 1933, the question of foreign relations was naturally subordinated to the urgent domestic issues which confronted the new Administration, but the speech contained one pregnant phrase which struck the keynote of the President's Latin-American policy. 'I would dedicate this nation', said Mr. Roosevelt, 'to the policy of the good neighbour. We now realize, as we have never realized before, our interdependence on each other; that we cannot merely take, but we must give as well.' President Roosevelt elaborated his conception of the 'good neighbour' in a speech which he delivered during the celebration of 'Pan-America Day' on the 14th April, 1933.¹ 'The essential qualities of a true Pan-Americanism', he said, 'must be the same as those which constitute a good neighbour, namely, mutual understanding, and, through such understanding, a sympathetic appreciation of the other's point of view. It is only in this manner that we can hope to build up a system of which confidence, friendship and good-will are the corner-stones.'

These general declarations were supplemented by more concrete proofs of the good intentions of the Government of the United States. On the 16th May, 1933, for instance, President Roosevelt issued an appeal to the Sovereigns or Presidents of the fifty-four nations which were represented at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva,² and amongst the measures which he recommended was the inclusion in an international agreement of an undertaking that the signatory Powers would 'send no armed force of whatsoever nature across their frontiers'. The announcement of this proposal at Washington made it clear that the President intended the undertaking to apply to relations between the United States and the countries of Central America and the Caribbean. His sincerity on this point was borne out by his attitude in regard to the Cuban disturbances, to which reference has already been made. The non-intervention of the United States in Cuba in the summer of 1933 made a profound

¹ The Governing Board of the Pan-American Union had recommended in 1931 that the 14th April should be kept as 'Pan-America Day' in all the countries which were members of the Union.

² See the present volume, Part II, section (iii), pp. 267-9.

impression upon Latin-American opinion and helped more than any other political factor to prepare the way for fruitful co-operation between the United States and the Latin-American delegations at the Montevideo Conference.

It was, however, in the economic field that the change from a Republican to a Democratic régime at Washington was likely to have its most profound effects upon the relations between the United States and Latin America. Under President Hoover's Administration these relations had been gradually changing for the better as the State Department developed its new policy; but the improvement had been less marked than might have been anticipated, and this disappointing result was largely due to the fact that political concessions on the part of the United States had not been accompanied by any lowering of tariff walls. The United States tariff was one of the principal causes of Latin-American discontent, and so long as this grievance remained unredressed there was little prospect of a genuine and lasting *détente*. Before the onset of the World Economic Crisis in 1929, the tariff policy of the United States had borne most hardly upon agricultural countries such as Argentina, whose staple products were in direct competition with the products of the American farmer; but as the crisis grew in intensity and new duties were imposed at Washington, Latin-American countries whose trade with the United States was mainly non-competitive also suffered severely from the limitations imposed on their markets. Early in 1932, for instance, Chile and Peru became seriously concerned at proposals for a new American duty on copper, and they consulted together as to the possibilities of forming a Latin-American customs union to take defensive action against the United States. Mexico also took part in the negotiations, and Argentina was reported in May 1932 to be favourably disposed towards the project.¹ At the same time, a bill was introduced into the Peruvian Congress empowering the Government to impose a prohibitive duty on all imports from the United States.

Meanwhile, even without the adoption of special measures of retaliation, the export trade from the United States to Latin America had been declining rapidly, although the fall was not quite so serious as in the case of the export trade from Latin America to the United States.² When Mr. Roosevelt opened his presidential campaign in

¹ Some years earlier, Argentina had herself suggested a South American customs union, but at that time the United States tariff was directed mainly against agricultural produce, and Peru and Chile were therefore not interested in the suggestion.

² In 1929, the value of the United States import trade from Latin America was rather more than \$1,000,000,000 and the value of the export trade a little

August 1932 by denouncing the Republican Administration's tariff policy, Latin-American observers felt that they might see better days if Mr. Roosevelt were to succeed Mr. Hoover at the White House, and their hopes were strengthened when Mr. Roosevelt, having been duly elected President, appointed as his Secretary of State a leading exponent of a low-tariff policy in the person of Mr. Cordell Hull. The prospect was clouded again by the developments which took place in London during the World Economic Conference in June and July 1933;¹ but early in July, while the Conference was still in session, President Roosevelt indicated that there was still a possibility of relatively liberal treatment of Latin-American countries in matters of trade, by making it known that the Government at Washington were ready to enter into negotiations with several other American Governments for the conclusion of bilateral trade agreements on a basis of reciprocal tariff concessions. Conversations were initiated without delay with Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia,² and during the next few months good progress was made,³ but the negotiations had not reached a conclusion by the second week of November 1933, when the American delegation to the seventh Pan-American Conference was on the point of leaving Washington *en route* for Montevideo. President Roosevelt's readiness to enter into trade negotiations had once more raised expectations regarding the benefits which might accrue to Latin America from the 'New Deal', and there seemed to be grounds for hope that the forthcoming Conference at Montevideo, which would afford the opportunity for a frank interchange of views on economic questions, would mark the beginning of a new era. On the 9th November, however, President Roosevelt issued a statement declaring that 'unsettled conditions, such as European quota restrictions', had 'made it seem desirable for the United States to forego immediate discussions of such matters as currency stabilization, uniform import prohibitions, permanent customs duties and the like'. He suggested that the Pan-American Conference would do well to turn its attention to less controversial matters, and he indicated in particular the question of communications, especially the proposed Pan-American highway.⁴

less. In 1930 both fell by about 30 per cent., and in the year ending the 30th June, 1933, the value of United States imports from Latin America fell to \$212,000,000 and the value of exports to \$291,000,000.

¹ See the present volume, Part I, section (ii) (d).

² Commercial negotiations were also opened with two European countries, Portugal and Sweden.

³ The progress was most rapid in the case of the negotiations with Colombia, and an agreement was signed on the 15th December, 1933.

⁴ The project of a highway which would link the capitals of all the American

The President's statement, taken at its face value, appeared to mean that the United States delegation at Montevideo would be debarred from taking part in discussions on some of the most important problems which would come before the Conference. Economic questions naturally figured largely in the agenda for the Conference, which had been adopted by the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union on the 31st May, 1933.¹ The Conference would have to consider recommendations relating to customs duties, currency stabilization, commercial arbitration, and the promotion of tourist travel, which had been made by the Fourth Pan-American Commercial Conference,² and the questions of import quotas and import prohibitions would also come before it. Reports would be submitted on the resolutions of the Inter-American Conference of Agriculture³ and on a proposal for the establishment of an Inter-American economic and financial organization under the auspices of the Pan-American Union, and a number of projects for uniform legislation on commercial matters would come up for examination. The value of the discussions on this part of the programme would obviously be greatly diminished if the United States delegation was unable to express any views on some of the most important aspects of inter-American economic relations; and unfortunately there were obstacles of another kind which were likely to hamper the Conference in its deliberations on another highly important chapter of the agenda—that relating to the organization of peace.⁴

The states of the American hemisphere were accustomed to con- countries had been discussed at the Sixth Pan-American Conference in 1928, and a resolution in favour of it had been adopted. In July 1932 the Chilean section of the highway, which covered 1,577 miles, was completed, and considerable progress was reported to have been made in Central America. It was estimated that the completion of the whole project would take another fifteen years.

¹ In accordance with the recommendations of the Sixth Pan-American Conference, the date of the seventh Conference was originally fixed for December 1932, but in May 1932 the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union decided, in view of the economic depression, to postpone the Conference for a year. There were suggestions during the summer of 1933 that a further postponement would be desirable; but this course did not commend itself to the Government of the United States, and in the absence of encouragement from Washington proposals for putting off the Conference once more had little chance of success.

² This Conference had been held from the 5th to the 12th October, 1931.

³ This Conference had taken place from the 8th to the 20th September, 1930.

⁴ Questions relating to the organization of peace constituted Chapter I of the Agenda, and economic and financial problems Chapter IV. The other chapters dealt respectively with problems of international law, the political and civil rights of women, social problems, intellectual co-operation, transportation, and international conferences of American states.

gratulate themselves on the fact that the majority of the disputes and differences which had arisen between them since their establishment as independent nations had been settled without recourse to arms, and they took pride in the good example which they had set to the Old World by preferring arbitration to the use of force and by elaborating machinery for the pacific settlement of disputes. 'The American republics to-day', said President Hoover on Pan-America Day (the 14th April), 1931, 'are rapidly approaching the time when every major difference existing between them will be settled by the orderly processes of conciliation and arbitration.' 'We are rapidly approaching', said Vice-President Curtis on the corresponding occasion in 1932, 'a situation unique in the history of the World: namely, an entire continent which has finally settled its outstanding international problems without recourse to force and in which the reign of law has become dominant.' This complacent conception of the American nations as the pioneers of peace was rudely shattered during the course of the next twelve months, and Mr. Curtis's phrases were not echoed in their turn by the speakers who took part in the celebration of Pan-America Day in 1933. For in April 1933 two American nations—Bolivia and Paraguay¹—had been engaged for some ten months in active warfare, and the danger of serious hostilities between two more—Colombia and Peru²—had not yet been eliminated. During the summer of 1933 the first steps towards a peaceful settlement of the Colombian-Peruvian dispute over Leticia were taken, but Bolivia and Paraguay continued to reject proposals for mediation, and fighting was still in progress in the Chaco when the delegates assembled at Montevideo for the Seventh Pan-American Conference. In this situation, it was evident that the Conference would be faced with a difficult problem. A meeting at which practically all the American nations (including Bolivia and Paraguay) were represented certainly appeared to offer a unique opportunity for bringing pressure to bear upon those two countries; but the experiences of the various international organizations and groups of states which had offered their good offices for the settlement of the dispute since June 1932 proved that neither Bolivia nor Paraguay was at all amenable to methods of persuasion, and at the same time there seemed little likelihood that the other members of the Pan-American Union would agree among themselves on the application of measures of compulsion. If it was difficult, for these reasons, to see what action the Conference could usefully take in the matter of the Chaco dispute,

¹ See section (iv) of this part of the present volume.

² See section (v) of this part of the present volume.

it would be equally difficult for it to take no action at all; for it would clearly be a somewhat futile proceeding if the delegates were to discuss the questions relating to the organization of peace which were on their agenda without reference to a state of affairs which afforded a striking illustration of the inadequacy of existing machinery.

In point of fact, the question of the Chaco dispute was raised indirectly not only by the first item on the agenda for the Conference ('methods for the prevention and pacific settlement of inter-American conflicts'), but also by the third item ('declaration of the 3rd August, 1932'); for the declaration in question had been made by all the states members of the Pan-American Union except Bolivia and Paraguay, and in it those nineteen states had appealed to Bolivia and Paraguay to submit their dispute to arbitration, and had warned them that any territorial arrangement brought about by force would not be recognized.¹ This principle of the non-recognition of territorial changes effected by other than peaceful means, which had been first enunciated by Mr. Stimson in connexion with the Sino-Japanese dispute in Manchuria,² was also incorporated in an 'anti-war treaty' which figured likewise in the agenda for the Pan-American Conference.

This treaty, which had been signed on the 10th October, 1933, in Rio de Janeiro, on behalf of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay, was the result of an Argentinian initiative. In November 1932 the Argentinian Government had suggested the conclusion of a South American non-aggression pact which would supplement the provisions for the outlawry of war contained in the 'Kellogg-Briand Pact'. The suggestion seems to have been made in the first place to the Brazilian Government, which welcomed the proposal, but thought that the pact should be open to signature by the whole World. The project was discussed further at a conference between the Foreign Ministers of Argentina and Chile which was held at Mendoza in February 1933,³ and during the following months it was elaborated in consultation with other Latin-American countries, until it was ready for signature in October by those states which had declared their willingness to adhere to it. After signature, the text was communicated to the League Secretariat, and four countries—the United States, Spain, Portugal, and Italy—were specially invited to accede.⁴

¹ See pp. 407-8 below.

² See the *Survey for 1932*, pp. 540 *seqq.*

³ See pp. 415-6 below.

⁴ The invitation was accepted by Italy in principle in December, and the Italian Press took occasion to refer to the pact as an example of the possi-

The treaty,¹ which comprised seventeen articles, condemned acts of aggression and the settlement of territorial questions by violent means, declared that any differences arising between the signatories would be submitted to peaceful settlement, and made provision for the establishment of conciliation commissions to deal with disputes. The parties bound themselves not to recognize territorial arrangements unless they had been effected peacefully, and they undertook to exercise against any states which had recourse to force all the political, juridical, and economic measures authorized by international law—subject to the proviso that diplomatic or armed intervention would only take place in accordance with the terms of collective treaties of which the belligerents were signatories.

This proviso indicated that Latin-American fears of intervention by the United States had not yet been exorcised by the proofs which Washington had given of a change of heart.² The question of intervention was due to come up for discussion at Montevideo, for the consideration of two projects by which it was raised had been postponed from the sixth Conference at Havana;³ but, in view of the record of the United States in the matter during the interval, the American delegation might perhaps expect to find the discussion less embarrassing in 1933 than it had been in 1928.

The United States delegation to the Montevideo Conference was headed by the Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull.⁴ As the Conference was attended by the Foreign Ministers of nine other American states, it afforded an excellent opportunity for informal diplomatic negotiations of the kind which had become familiar at Geneva, and in fact the most delicate question with which the Conference was concerned—that of the Chaco dispute—was dealt with to a large extent by means of informal conversations. A considerable measure

bilities of international co-operation outside the framework of the League of Nations. (For the Italian attitude towards the League at this time, see Part I, section (iii).) Italy's formal adherence to the pact took place on the 14th March, 1934.

¹ For the text, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1933*.

² It may be noted that the Argentinian Government, who were the originators of the 'anti-war treaty', had strongly opposed a suggestion made by the Neutral Commission in Washington for applying coercion to Bolivia or Paraguay by breaking off diplomatic relations (see section (iv), p. 410 below), and they were also specially emphatic in advising the United States against any form of intervention in Cuba in 1933 (see section (iii), p. 383 below).

³ See the *Survey for 1927*, pp. 437-8.

⁴ At the sixth Conference in 1928, the leader of the American delegation was a former Secretary of State, Mr. C. E. Hughes, but the then holder of the office accompanied the President on a flying visit to Havana on the first day of the Conference, when Mr. Coolidge delivered an inaugural address.

of the success which the United States delegation scored at Montevideo was generally attributed to the personality of Mr. Hull, whose friendly and unassuming manner of getting into touch with his fellow delegates prepossessed them in his favour before the Conference was formally opened. Mr. Hull's most significant achievement in this respect was the establishment of friendly personal relations with Dr. Saavedra Lamas, the Argentinian Foreign Minister. Dr. Saavedra Lamas, who had profited by the experiences of Dr. Pueyrredón at Havana in 1928,¹ and was determined not to repeat the mistake of coming out in open opposition to the United States, responded to the American overtures, with the result that the appearance of rivalry between Argentina and the United States at the Conference was avoided, and the two delegations even found themselves able to agree on many of the most important matters which came up for examination.

The Conference, which was attended by delegations from twenty nations,² was opened on the 3rd December by Dr. Terra, the President of Uruguay. President Terra, in his speech, did not hesitate to refer to controversial questions; for he declared that the American ideal of peace 'must not be buried in the swamps of the Chaco', and he protested against the tariff policy of the United States in energetic terms. He expressed the opinion that it was the policy of isolation by means of tariff barriers which had brought disaster upon the economic system of the World, and he declared that the United States tariff, which had almost completely closed the markets for the industrial and agricultural products of South America, was responsible for the failure of South American states during the past three years to pay their public and private debts.

Among the general questions which came up for consideration before the Conference settled down to discuss the questions on its agenda was that of the desirability of admitting representatives of non-American states or organizations. A proposal to invite Spain and Portugal to nominate observers to attend the Conference met with a good deal of support, and the Steering Committee of the Conference decided provisionally in favour of despatching invitations, but there was more hesitation over the suggestion that the League of Nations should also be represented. The post of Secretary-General of the Conference was filled by Señor Enrique Buero, who had represented Uruguay in various European capitals and had been in close

¹ See the *Survey for 1927*, Part IV A, section (ii).

² Costa Rica was the only member of the Pan-American Union which was not represented.

touch with the work of the League of Nations. At Señor Buero's request the Secretariat of the League of Nations had prepared a memorandum on the activities of the League in connexion with questions which were on the agenda for the Pan-American Conference. This memorandum, which was presented to the Montevideo Conference by a Uruguayan member of the League Secretariat, laid special stress on the League's work for the preservation of peace, and the efforts which had been made to promote a settlement of the disputes between Bolivia and Paraguay and between Colombia and Peru were described at some length—the delay which had occurred in the Chaco case owing to the activities of other agencies being pointed out. The memorandum was therefore interpreted—and resented—in some quarters as an attempt to induce the American nations to resign to the League of Nations the leadership in the organization of peace in the New World as well as in the Old World. In these circumstances, the suggestion that the League, as well as Spain and Portugal, should be represented at the Conference by an observer, met with considerable opposition. Mr. Cordell Hull criticized the proposal for admitting non-American representatives, on the ground that the value of the Pan-American Union as a regional organization might be diminished if it entered prematurely into relations with European and world organizations,¹ and on his initiative the whole question was deferred until the next session of the Conference. On the 16th December the seventh Conference resolved to entrust to the eighth Conference 'the determination of the principles that must guide the admission of observers of organizations of non-American states to the International Conferences of American States, as well as of their character and prerogatives'. The eighth Conference was also to be invited to study 'methods of co-operation with other parts of the World by the Pan-American Organization'.

After the opening meeting the work of the Conference was allocated among ten committees, and these committees in turn appointed nearly thirty sub-committees to deal with specific questions.² The most important committees were those which dealt with the organization of peace; with questions of international law;³ and with economic

¹ Mr. Hull also pointed out that if Spain and Portugal were admitted as the mother-countries of the Latin-American states, France might claim the right to admission as the mother-country of Haiti and Great Britain as the mother-country of the United States.

² The meetings of the committees were open to the public, but the sub-committees met in private.

³ It was this committee, and its sub-committee on the rights and duties of states, which dealt with the question of intervention.

questions;¹ but a good deal of useful work was also done by the committees and sub-committees on the less controversial questions of transportation, intellectual co-operation, and social problems.²

The efforts which were made 'on the fringe' of the Conference to settle the Chaco dispute are described elsewhere.³ For some ten days the Committee on the Organization of Peace and a sub-committee which it appointed on the Chaco question stood back and left the initiative to President Terra, who was endeavouring to persuade Bolivia and Paraguay to lay down their arms; but these negotiations had apparently produced no result by the middle of December, and on the 15th the committee itself intervened by adopting the following declaration:

The Seventh International Conference of American States declares: First, that it reaffirms its faith in peaceful means for the solution of international conflicts, by virtue of which it has made and will continue to make every effort to re-establish peace as soon as possible between Bolivia and Paraguay. Second, that it is ready to co-operate with the League of Nations in the application of the Covenant. Third, the Seventh Conference expresses to the Governments of Bolivia and

¹ Economic questions were examined by two committees, which dealt respectively with questions on the agenda for the Conference and with new proposals submitted to the Conference. These committees appointed several sub-committees.

² The instruments which were signed at the conclusion of the Conference included a treaty standardizing extradition procedure and a convention on political asylum; a convention relating to the revision of history text-books; and a treaty guaranteeing that women should enjoy the same rights as men in matters of nationality. An attempt was made to secure approval for a more comprehensive convention relating to the civil and political rights of women, but there was a good deal of opposition to this proposal, and the Conference merely adopted a resolution recommending to Governments that they should endeavour, so far as the peculiar circumstances of each country would conveniently permit, to establish the maximum of equality between men and women in all matters pertaining to the possession, enjoyment, and exercise of civil and political rights.

Of the other resolutions and recommendations of the Conference perhaps the most interesting was the recommendation for the establishment of an Inter-American Labour Institute with its headquarters at Buenos Aires. It was intended that this Institute should co-operate with the International Labour Organization at Geneva in the 'study and solution of American social problems which have features distinctive from, if not in conflict with, European problems'. By another resolution, the Conference recommended that 'a thorough investigation be made of the social and economic conditions of the intellectual workers of the various scientific, artistic, and literary professions'. The Conference also decided that additional expert commissions should be appointed to assist in the work of codifying international law which had been entrusted to an International Commission of Jurists by the third Conference in 1906. The project for a Pan-American Highway, which had been indicated by President Roosevelt as specially suitable for discussion, received the blessing of the Conference. ³ In section (iv) of this part of the present volume.

Paraguay its fervent desire that the conflict in which the two sister nations are compromising their future and wasting their energies may end, and we offer them the services of all Governments represented at this Conference.

Representatives of Bolivia and Paraguay were present at the session of the committee which adopted this declaration, and both in turn thanked the Conference for its efforts to bring about peace.

Before the committee of the Conference adopted this declaration, the Paraguayans had won an important victory in the Chaco;¹ and the acceptance of a truce a few days later was probably due rather to the change in the military situation than to the action of the Pan-American Conference. Even if the Peace Committee's declaration, with its veiled threat that the other American nations might apply economic sanctions to Bolivia and Paraguay if they continued to prove contumacious, could have been supposed to exercise a decisive influence on the minds of the belligerents, subsequent developments were to deprive the Conference of the credit which it might otherwise have claimed for putting an end to the Chaco war. The announcement of the truce, however, was received by the Conference with great rejoicing, and since the negotiations for its renewal had not yet broken down when the Conference came to an end, the delegates left Montevideo with the comfortable hope that the Chaco dispute was on the way to settlement. Among the last acts of the Conference at its closing session on the 26th December was the adoption of a motion put forward by Mr. Hull which urged Bolivia and Paraguay to accept the terms of peace proposed by the League Commission,² and of a recommendation that a conference should be convened at an early date to consider the geographical and economic aspects of the dispute over the Chaco.³

On the 15th December, the day on which the Committee on the Organization of Peace adopted its declaration on the Chaco dispute, the committee also passed a resolution calling upon all the American nations to adhere, if they had not already done so, to the five existing general treaties by which the states of the American hemisphere undertook to settle their disputes by peaceful means—that is, the 'Gondra Pact' of 1923;⁴ the arbitration and conciliation conventions signed in January 1929 at the Conference on Arbitration and Conciliation in Washington,⁵ and the Argentinian 'Anti-War Pact'

¹ See p. 402 below.

² See p. 426 below.

³ See pp. 416 and 426 below.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 414-15.

⁵ See the *Survey for 1930*, Part V, section (ii). The Seventh Pan-American Conference also adopted an additional protocol to the Conciliation Convention

which had been signed by six American states on the 10th October, 1933. This last treaty had appeared on the agenda for the Pan-American Conference, but the Committee on the Organization of Peace had decided that, since it was already a *fait accompli*, it was not necessary for its provisions to be discussed. Accordingly, the text of the treaty was read into the records of the Conference without discussion, and it was then declared open for signature by all participating states. There were no further signatures during the session of the Conference, but Mr. Hull was reported to have promised Dr. Saavedra Lamas that the United States Government would give the question of adhering to the pact their favourable consideration.¹

The Committee on the Organization of Peace also had before it a comprehensive proposal for the establishment of permanent machinery for arbitration and conciliation, including an inter-American Court of Justice, which was submitted by the Mexican delegation. This 'peace code', however, was not laid before the Conference until it had been in session for over a week, and the Peace Committee felt that it would be unable, in the time at its disposal, to study the elaborate provisions of the code with due care. On the 23rd December the Conference adopted a resolution submitting the Mexican proposal, through the channel of the Pan-American Union, for the consideration of the Governments of the states members of the Union.

On the same day (the 23rd December) the Conference also adopted a resolution which was designed to provide 'a method for the peaceful adjustment of disputes between states where other methods are not for any reason in effective operation'. By this resolution, the subscribing Governments declared that 'it shall never be deemed an unfriendly act for any state or states to offer good offices or mediation to other states engaged in a controversy threatening or rupturing their peaceful relations, to the end that such differences may be so

by which the Commissions of Investigation and Conciliation for which the convention provided would become permanent instead of not being appointed until after a controversy had arisen. The text of this additional protocol and of the resolution on adherence to peace instruments will be found in *Documents on International Affairs, 1933*.

¹ There was a rumour to the effect that the United States Secretary of State and the Argentinian Foreign Minister had struck a bargain by which the latter undertook to support the American economic proposals in return for the promise that the United States would sign the anti-war pact. Whether or not there was a bargain of this kind, the United States Government did give the anti-war pact favourable consideration, and on the 27th April, 1934, they formally notified the Argentinian Government of their adherence to the pact. Eleven Latin-American states (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panamá, Salvador, and Venezuela) adhered on the same day.

composed as to avoid recourse to or to end measures of force between the differing states. The aforementioned good offices or mediation' were not to be 'applicable when other methods of peaceful solution emanating from treaties or agreements between the parties for the peaceful settlement of international disputes' had 'begun to function'.

The other important political question which came up for consideration at Montevideo, that of intervention, was raised, as has been mentioned,¹ by certain proposals which had been submitted to the sixth Conference at Havana in 1928 and had been postponed till the seventh Conference. The Montevideo Conference therefore had before it a draft convention on the rights and duties of states in which it was laid down as a principle of international law that no state had the right to intervene in the affairs of another. The states which were most interested in the adoption of this resolution were, of course, the small countries in Central America and the Caribbean in which intervention by American troops, on the occasion of some disturbance of the peace or of some failure to meet treaty obligations, had been the prelude to the establishment of political and economic dominance by the United States. In spite of the change of policy at Washington on this matter, the development of which has been outlined above, on the eve of the Montevideo Conference the indications were that two at least of the states concerned—Cuba and Haiti—intended to take full advantage of the opportunity to air their grievances which the discussion on the rights and duties of states would afford.

It fell to the leader of the Cuban delegation, Dr. Giraudy, as the representative of the country in which the last Pan-American Conference had been held, to reply to the speech of the Uruguayan President at the opening meeting of the Conference, and some apprehension was felt lest he should seize the occasion to launch a direct attack on the United States. Dr. Giraudy's speech did contain an appeal for the recognition of the Grau San Martin Government (of which he was a member), and it was full of implied criticism of the policy of the United States, but on the whole its terms were less provocative than had been expected. On the proposal of Nicaragua, a Cuban representative was appointed to serve on the sub-committee of the International Law Committee which dealt with the rights and duties of states, but the Cuban delegation did not restrict its campaign to that sub-committee. Thus, during a discussion in the Committee on New Economic Proposals on the 13th December, when the Colombian delegate referred to the United States Government's

¹ See p. 337 above.

non-intervention in Cuba as a proof that that Government's views on political and economic questions were coming into line with those of other American nations, Señor Giraudy indignantly declared that the United States Government were in fact intervening in Cuba by surrounding the island with warships and refusing to recognize the Government which the Cuban people wanted. It was significant that it was Dr. Saavedra Lamas of Argentina who used his authority as chairman of the committee to check the flow of Dr. Giraudy's eloquence. A day or two later, the same committee was the scene of a similar, though less violent, outburst on the part of the Haitian representative, who took occasion to explain that he would like to accept the declaration on tariff policy which was under discussion,¹ but that he must first obtain permission from the American Financial Controller in Haiti.

In the meantime the sub-committee on the rights and duties of states had been making good progress, and by the middle of December it had submitted a draft convention to the International Law Committee. Article 8 of this convention laid it down that 'no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another'. Article 9 provided that foreigners should be 'under the same protection of the law' as the nationals of a state and might not 'claim rights other or more extensive than those of the nationals'. The convention also incorporated, in Article 10, the principle that 'differences of any claims' which might arise between states 'should be settled by recognized pacific methods'; and in Article 11 the contracting states definitely established 'as the rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by force, whether this consist in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure'. The territory of a state was declared to be 'inviolable', and it might not be 'the object of military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever, even temporarily'.²

When this convention was discussed by the International Law Committee on the 19th December, the Cuban and Haitian representatives renewed their accusations of American interference in their internal affairs,³ and they were joined on this occasion by the repre-

¹ See p. 349 below.

² For the full text of the convention, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1933*.

³ On the 17th December, at a meeting of the Committee on the Organization

sentative of Venezuela. Mr. Hull, however, took the wind out of the critics' sails by refraining from offering any objection to the adoption of the convention.¹ He contented himself with making the following statement:

The policy and attitude of the United States Government toward every important phase of international relationships in this hemisphere could scarcely be made more clear and definite than they have been made by both word and action especially since the 4th March. I have no disposition therefore to indulge in any repetition or rehearsal of these acts and utterances and shall not do so. Every observing person must by this time thoroughly understand that under the Roosevelt Administration the United States Government is as much opposed as any other to interference with the freedom, the sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes of the Governments of other nations.

In addition to numerous acts and utterances in connexion with the carrying out of these doctrines and policies, President Roosevelt, during recent weeks, gave out a public statement expressing his disposition to open negotiations with the Cuban Government for the purpose of dealing with the treaty which has existed since 1903. I feel safe in undertaking to say that under our support of the general principle of non-intervention, as has been suggested, no Government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt Administration. I think it unfortunate that during the brief period of this Conference there is apparently not time within which to prepare interpretations and definitions of these fundamental terms that are embraced in the report. Such definitions and interpretations would enable every Government to proceed in a uniform way without any difference of opinion or of interpretations. I hope that at the earliest possible date such very important work will be done. In the meantime in case of differences of interpretations and also until they (the proposed doctrines and principles) can be worked out and codified for the common use of every Government, I desire to say that the United States Government in all of its international associations and relationships and conduct will follow scrupulously the doctrines and policies which it has pursued since the 4th March which are embodied in the different addresses of President Roosevelt since that time and in the recent peace address of myself on the 15th day of December before this Conference² and in the law of nations as generally recognized and accepted.

of Peace, Mr. Hull had declared that 'the people of the United States strongly feel that this so-called right of conquest must for ever be banished from this hemisphere, and they shun and reject the so-called right for themselves'. Dr. Giraudy had then expressed satisfaction that the American policy of interference had come to an end.

¹ Mr. Hull would apparently have preferred to postpone action on the question of intervention once more by referring the draft convention to a juridical committee, but since the general opinion was against this course he did not press for its adoption.

² This was a speech which Mr. Hull made at the meeting of the Committee on the Organization of Peace at which the resolution urging all American states to adhere to the Five Peace Pacts was adopted.

This statement was placed on record as a reservation when Mr. Hull, together with the leaders of all the other delegations, gave a final vote in favour of the convention at a plenary session of the Conference on the 22nd December, and it was subject to this reservation that Mr. Hull affixed his signature to the convention on the 26th December.

In abjuring the right of intervention Mr. Hull was pursuing to its logical conclusion a principle which had guided his predecessor in the office of Secretary of State of the United States; but in the attitude which he adopted at Montevideo towards economic questions Mr. Hull struck out a line of his own, and his initiative was the more remarkable in the light of his experiences at the World Economic Conference,¹ and of the warning which had been uttered by President Roosevelt on the eve of the departure of the American delegation for Montevideo.² Mr. Roosevelt's statement that the time was not considered opportune for participation by the United States delegates in discussions on currency stabilization and other important questions which were likely to come up at the Pan-American Conference did not deter the delegates of other countries from proceeding with their preparations to discuss such questions at Montevideo, with or without the co-operation of representatives of the United States; and, indeed, the number of economic and financial projects, supplementary to the agenda, which were submitted to the Conference after it had assembled, was sufficiently large to make it necessary for a special committee to be set up to deal with them. It was in this Committee on New Economic Matters, which was presided over by Dr. Saavedra Lamas of Argentina, that many of the most interesting discussions of the seventh Pan-American Conference took place.

Perhaps the most controversial of the new proposals on economic and financial questions³ was that put forward by Mexico for the establishment of an inter-American system of money and banking, for the Mexican project included a suggestion for a long-term moratorium on public and private debts. Dr. Puig Casauranc's request that these questions should be discussed by the Conference gave rise to a lively debate in the Steering Committee (a two-thirds vote of which was necessary before new items could be included among the agenda).

¹ See the present volume, Part I, section (ii) (d).

² See p. 333 above.

³ Other interesting proposals were those put forward by Peru and Uruguay. Peru submitted a plan for economic recovery based on the idea that credit must be strictly regulated by an inter-American Central Bank; while Uruguay suggested a tariff truce, on the basis of the tariff level ruling in January 1928, the abolition of sanitary regulations having the effect of trade barriers, and a declaration against import and export quotas.

The proposal for a moratorium was opposed by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile and by other countries which had made sacrifices in order to maintain their foreign debt services. Mr. Hull took a conciliatory line on the matter—partly, perhaps, because he realized that the Mexican delegation were unlikely to receive the necessary amount of support, partly because the official attitude of the Administration at Washington was that it was not interested in the question of a moratorium, since it was private investors in the United States and not the Government who were the creditors of Latin-American countries. In the end it was decided that the Mexican plan should not be examined by the Conference but should be referred to the third Pan-American Financial Conference which was to be convoked at Santiago as soon as possible. The proposal that a Financial Conference should be held at an early date came from the United States delegation, while the Argentinian delegation suggested that, in view of the urgent importance of economic questions and of the limited amount of time which the Seventh Pan-American Conference would be able to devote to them, a special inter-American Commercial Conference should also be convened. The natural result of the adoption of these two proposals by the Conference was that most of the economic and financial projects submitted to it were referred either to the Third Pan-American Financial Conference or to the Commercial Conference which, it was agreed, was to be convened at Buenos Aires immediately after the close of the Financial Conference.¹ Thus the Financial Conference was asked to give further consideration to proposals which were made at Montevideo for the creation of an inter-American organization for economic and financial co-operation,² and it was also invited to discuss provisional recommendations which were made by the Economic Committees of the Pan-American Conference on such matters as the stabilization of currencies, commercial arbitration, the promotion of tourist traffic, the protection of patents and the preparation of projects relating to the unification of customs procedure and port formalities and to laws of exchange. The questions which were referred to the Commercial Conference at Buenos Aires

¹ The intention was that the Financial Conference should be held in April or May 1934, but in the early spring of 1934 the Chilean Government, which was to be responsible for convening the Conference, suggested that it would be better to postpone the meeting until October in the hope that by that time currencies would be more stable. In April, the Argentinian Government were said to be considering the desirability of summoning the Commercial Conference at an early date, without waiting for the Financial Conference.

² It was suggested that this organization should be composed of a Board of Directors, a consulting Economic Commission, and an inter-American Bank which would exercise the functions of a Central Bank.

included the improvement of communications and the regulation of sanitary restrictions.

The principal achievement of the Seventh Pan-American Conference on the economic plane was the adoption of a declaration on tariff policy which was based on proposals made by Mr. Cordell Hull. The delegates to the Pan-American Conference from countries other than the United States had been pleasantly surprised to find, on their arrival at Montevideo, that Mr. Hull did not appear to consider that he was prohibited in any way by President Roosevelt's statement of the 9th November from entering into discussions on economic questions. He let it be known at once that he was ready to join in the examination of any question which any of his colleagues wished to raise, and he was reported to have told Dr. Saavedra Lamas that he was specially interested in facilitating the economic work of the Conference. His popularity with his fellow delegates was considerably increased when it became known that at a meeting of the Steering Committee on the 5th December he had declared that he had no interest in preventing a discussion of debts, and had strongly criticized the policy of international bankers—who, he pointed out, were not among the supporters of the Roosevelt Administration. Nevertheless, delegates from countries other than the United States hardly expected that Mr. Hull would be able to make any very constructive contribution on his own account to the economic discussions, and their satisfaction was all the greater when they listened to the speech which he made at a meeting of the Economic Committee on the 12th December. On this occasion, Mr. Hull made a strong declaration in favour of the reduction of tariff and trade barriers to a reasonable level, either by means of a system of bilateral commercial treaties on a reciprocal basis, or by means of a general undertaking for a simultaneous lowering of barriers. He suggested that a convention should be drawn up providing for the abolition of import and export prohibitions and making obligatory the principle of unconditional most-favoured-nation treatment. This part of his proposals met with some criticism, but on the whole his declaration was very well received, and among the delegates who strongly supported it was Dr. Saavedra Lamas, the Argentinian Foreign Minister.

There was naturally a certain feeling of perplexity at Montevideo when Mr. Hull enunciated this policy of low tariffs, since his initiative appeared to run counter to the policy which the American delegation had been instructed to follow at the World Economic Conference in London as well as to President Roosevelt's statement of the 9th

November, and an expression of opinion at Washington was therefore awaited with considerable anxiety. The statement which was issued from the White House on the subject was not particularly encouraging, for, although the general tenor of Mr. Hull's speech was approved, it was suggested that no very important result could be expected immediately if the policy which he had outlined were adopted. Nevertheless, the fact that Mr. Hull's proposals were not disavowed was enough to inspire the majority of the delegates at Montevideo with the hope that the Roosevelt Administration would ask Congressional approval for what amounted to a revolutionary change in the commercial policy of the United States. On the 15th December, the Economic Committee of the Pan-American Conference voted unanimously¹ in favour of the adoption of a tariff declaration on the lines suggested by Mr. Hull, and on the following day the declaration was formally adopted by the Conference in plenary session.

In signing this declaration,² the delegates bound their respective Governments to subscribe 'to the policy and undertaking, through simultaneous action of the principal nations, of gradually reducing tariffs and other barriers to mutually profitable movements of goods, services, and capital between nations'. In particular, the subscribing Governments, 'while not neglecting unilateral action,' would 'simultaneously initiate between and among themselves negotiations for the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements for the removal of prohibitions and restrictions and for the reduction of tariff rates to a moderate level'. The aim of these negotiations would be to secure 'substantial reductions of basic trade barriers and liberalization of commercial policy . . . and not merely the removal of temporary and abnormal restrictions and increments imposed for bargaining purposes'. Among the duties or restrictions the removal of which was held to be specially desirable were those restricting 'the importation of particular commodities to less than three to five per centum of domestic consumption' and those which had been 'in effect for a considerable period of time without having brought about domestic production equal to fifteen per centum of the total consumption thereof'.

The Governments of the American republics undertook to revive the convention of 1927 for the abolition of import and export prohibitions³ or to negotiate a new convention for the same purpose.

¹ Some countries made reservations in regard to the proposal that all commercial agreements should include an unconditional most-favoured-nation clause.

² For the full text, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1933*.

³ See the *Survey for 1929*, Part I B, section (i) (b).

The 'principle of equality of treatment' was declared to be 'the basis of all acceptable commercial policy', and accordingly the subscribing Governments undertook to include in their agreements 'the most-favoured-nation clause in its unconditional and unrestricted form, to be applied to all types of control of international trade, limited only by such exceptions as may be commonly recognized as legitimate'.¹

In order that the policy outlined in the declaration might be carried into effect, the subscribing Governments declared themselves in favour of the establishment of a permanent international agency which would 'closely observe the steps taken . . . in effecting reduction of trade barriers' and furnish information upon request regarding the progress made.

In the last paragraph of the declaration, the Governments of the American republics earnestly called upon 'the appropriate agencies of the World Monetary and Economic Conference at London, now in recess, promptly to co-operate in bringing this proposal to a favourable conclusion'.

The Conference also took the first steps in the direction of giving concrete effect to the principles enunciated in this declaration by adopting on the 24th December a declaration condemning 'the system of quotas of exportation and importation under permits or licences' and appealing to Governments to abolish the system as soon as possible, together with a recommendation that sanitary measures which restricted international commerce in animal or vegetable products should only be applied in consultation with the countries affected.²

That Mr. Hull's economic policy, taken in conjunction with his attitude on the question of intervention, made an extremely favour-

¹ The United States delegation had put forward a supplementary proposal in connexion with 'the development of economic relations among the peoples of the World by means of multilateral conventions, the benefits of which ought not to inure to countries which refuse to assume their obligations'. The suggestion was that the Governments of the American republics should bind themselves by a general convention not to 'invoke the obligations of the most-favoured-nation clause for the purpose of obtaining advantages enjoyed by the parties to multilateral economic conventions of general applicability, which include a trade area of substantial size, have as their objective the liberalization and promotion of international trade or other international economic intercourse, and are open to adoption by all countries'. This proposal was discussed, but it did not meet with general acceptance, and the Conference decided that the American draft convention should be deposited at the office of the Pan-American Union and declared open to adherence by all countries.

² For the text of these resolutions, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1933*.

able impression on his colleagues at Montevideo was proved by the tone of the speeches which were made at the final session on the 26th December. Dr. Saavedra Lamas, for instance, made a point of congratulating the United States on the welcome new policy towards Latin America which had been revealed in the action and attitude of the United States delegates. Equally significant was the change which took place during the course of the Conference in the attitude of Dr. Puig Casauranc, the Mexican Foreign Minister and leader of the Mexican delegation. Not only did Dr. Puig Casauranc fail to meet with the opposition which he had expected from the United States on his moratorium proposal;¹ he was also induced to modify his views in regard to the danger of United States Imperialism. It has been mentioned² that Mexico had registered a protest against the Monroe Doctrine on becoming a member of the League of Nations, and at a meeting of the International Law Committee of the Pan-American Conference on the 19th December Dr. Puig Casauranc launched another attack against the doctrine, which he described as a humiliation for Latin America. Nevertheless, before the Montevideo Conference came to an end the Mexican Foreign Minister had become one of the leading exponents of the view that the Latin-American states could safely believe in the sincerity of President Roosevelt's 'good neighbour' declarations.

The good impression which Mr. Hull created by his acceptance at Montevideo of the convention on the rights and duties of states was confirmed and strengthened when President Roosevelt himself, in a speech delivered before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation in Washington on the 28th December, 1933, two days after the Seventh Pan-American Conference had come to an end, declared explicitly that 'the definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention'.

The maintenance of constitutional Government in other nations [said Mr. Roosevelt] is not a sacred obligation devolving upon the United States alone. The maintenance of law and orderly processes of government in this hemisphere is the concern of each individual nation within its own borders first of all. It is only if and when the failure of orderly processes affects the other nations of the continent that it becomes their concern; and the point to stress is that in such event it becomes the joint concern of a whole continent in which we are all neighbours.

President Roosevelt believed that it was the general comprehension of this doctrine which had made the Conference at Montevideo a success; and in these circumstances he felt justified in claiming that

¹ See pp. 346-7 above.

² See p. 330 above.

'a better state of feeling among the neighbour nations of North and Central and South America' existed at the end of the year 1933 'than at any time within a generation'.¹

(ii) Relations between Haiti and the United States (1931-3)

In a previous volume of this series,² an account was given of the situation in Haiti which led to the appointment by President Hoover in February 1930 of a Commission under the chairmanship of Mr. W. Cameron Forbes 'for the study and review of conditions in the Republic of Haiti'. The Forbes Commission had reported in March 1930, and by the end of the year the position in Haiti and the relations between the republic and the United States had undergone a marked change for the better as a result of the action which had been taken in accordance with the Commission's recommendations.³ Elections for Congress had been held in October, without any intervention or supervision by the American authorities, and in the following month the Congress had elected Monsieur Sténio Vincent as President for a term of six years. Before these elections took place, the change in the relations between Haiti and the United States had been symbolized by the recall of the American High Commissioner (a military officer), and his replacement by a civilian Minister, Dr. Dana G. Munro.⁴

The scheme proposed by the Forbes Commission called for the 'increasingly rapid Haitianization of the services' administered by Americans, 'with the object of having Haitians experienced in every department of the Government ready to take over full responsibility at the expiration of the existing treaty',⁵ and the new Minister was

¹ A similar claim had been made by Mr. Hull in his final speech at Montevideo two days earlier. 'This Conference', he said, 'has been of the highest importance in international relations. . . . I truly believe it has marked a new epoch in the dealings between the United States and the twenty other peoples of South and Central America, and among all these nations I am not alone in saying that a more thorough understanding has been brought about at Montevideo than at any time in two generations.'

² See the *Survey for 1930*, Part V, section (vi).

³ President Hoover had appointed a second Commission consisting of negro educationalists, headed by Dr. R. E. Moton, who were asked to undertake an exhaustive investigation into the educational system of Haiti. This Commission reported in November 1930, but no immediate steps were taken to carry out the programme which it suggested. Indeed, in June 1933, three years after the Commission had visited Haiti, none of its principal recommendations had yet been put into operation (see *Foreign Policy Association of New York: Foreign Policy Reports*, vol. ix, No. 8, 21st June, 1933).

⁴ Dr. Munro resigned in the summer of 1932 and was succeeded by Mr. Norman Armour.

⁵ The period of validity of the agreement of the 16th September, 1915, which had transformed Haiti into a virtual protectorate of the United States,

'charged with the duty of carrying out the early Haitianization of the services . . . whether or not a certain loss of efficiency' was entailed. As for the American marines who were stationed in Haiti, the Forbes Commission had considered that their immediate withdrawal would be inadvisable, but they recommended 'their gradual withdrawal in accordance with arrangements to be made in future agreement between the two Governments'. The Commission had also proposed that 'the United States limit its intervention in Haitian affairs definitely to those activities for which provision is made for American assistance by treaty or by specific agreement between the two Governments'; and that 'the new Minister be charged with the duty of negotiating with the Haitian Government further modifications of the existing treaty and agreements providing for less intervention in Haitian domestic affairs and defining the conditions under which the United States would lend its assistance in the restoration of order or maintenance of credit'.

Negotiations between the American Minister and the Haitian Government were opened in November 1930, but they did not proceed altogether smoothly, owing to a difference of opinion as to the rate at which it was practicable and desirable for the 'Haitianization' of the services to be carried out. The Haitian view was that Haitians who had been trained under American officials and who were capable of running the services efficiently were already available in sufficient numbers to justify an immediate transfer of responsibility; but the American officials held that the transfer must be gradual, since they feared that their abrupt withdrawal would result in the breakdown of the organization which they had built up. They also considered it important that the rights conferred on American officials by the treaty should be respected so long as the services remained under American control, and there was a considerable amount of friction in the early months of 1931 over alleged Haitian attempts to interfere unduly with the work and responsibility of the 'treaty officials'. Before the appointment of the Forbes Commission, Haitian discontent had manifested itself principally in connexion with the system of vocational and agricultural education which was known as the 'Service Technique'. In 1930, after the Forbes Commission had reported, difficulties had arisen over the appointment of a new chief of the Technical Bureau of the Department of Agriculture, and the Haitian Government refused to confirm the

had been extended from ten to twenty years by a protocol signed on the 28th March, 1918. The original agreement came into force on the 3rd May, 1916, and it was thus due to expire in May 1936.

appointment of President Hoover's nominee, Dr. Colvin.¹ These difficulties remained unsolved, and the Technical Bureau was still nominally without a head in the middle of 1931. Trouble also arose in the Public Works Department, which was in the charge of an American naval officer, because of attempts by the Haitian Minister of Finance and Public Works, Monsieur Thoby, to appoint subordinate officials and exercise jurisdiction over projects which had been put in hand by the department. A dispute over these questions was settled by the intervention of the American Minister in January 1930, but the Haitian Press continued to attack the administration of the Public Works Department with special vehemence.

It was a proof of the sincerity of the American Government's desire to withdraw from Haiti that this atmosphere of recrimination was not permitted seriously to interfere with the progress of the negotiations for Haitianization of the services under American control. On the 5th August, 1931, an agreement was signed providing for the transfer to Haitian control, as from the 1st October, 1931, of the Department of Public Works, the Service Technique, and the Public Health Service,² and for the abrogation of rights possessed by the American authorities in connexion with proposed Haitian legislation and payments by the Haitian Secretary of Finance. At the same time, the American military authorities withdrew the proclamation of martial law, under which they had been able to override any opposition from Haitian officials, and thus technically put an end to the American 'occupation' of Haiti.

After the 1st October, 1931, however, the American authorities in Haiti still continued to be responsible for the Garde—the Haitian military and police organization—and about 750 American marines remained in the territory of the republic, though the Department of State at Washington expressed the hope that sufficient progress might be made with the task of training the Garde to enable the marines to be withdrawn before the expiration of the treaty in 1936. The office of Financial Adviser-Receiver General was also not abolished, since American control of Haitian finances was exercised not only in virtue of the treaty of 1915 but was also bound up with the existence of a loan which had been issued in 1922.

¹ See the *Survey for 1930*, pp. 416-17. Under an agreement signed in April 1923, the Haitian Government had undertaken to appoint to this post the person nominated by the President of the United States.

² For the protection of the health of the American troops and officials still stationed in Haiti it was arranged that an American scientific mission should continue to be responsible for the control of sanitation at Port au Prince and Cap-Haitien.

Under the treaty of 1915, an American official had become responsible for the collection of the Haitian customs, but this function would have terminated with the expiration of the treaty if it had not been for the terms of a protocol signed in 1919. By this protocol Haiti agreed to the flotation of a loan in the American market¹ and authorized the Government of the United States to nominate an official to control the collection of the revenues (including certain internal revenues as well as the customs) which were pledged as security for the loan. Bonds to a total of \$23,660,000 were issued in 1922² for a term of thirty years, and the United States Government were thus entitled to retain a considerable measure of control over Haiti's finances until 1952 unless the loan were liquidated at an earlier date.

This prospect became increasingly unwelcome to the Haitian public as American control over other departments of the administration was relaxed.³ The Administration at Washington, however, held that the responsibility towards the bondholders which the Government of the United States had accepted in signing the protocol of 1919 made it impossible for control of the pledged securities to be abandoned so long as any portion of the loan remained unamortized.⁴ In his message to Congress on the 10th December, 1931, President Hoover referred to this question in the following terms: 'It must be borne in mind that investors have supplied capital desired by Haiti and that securities have been issued to them on the faith and credit of the provisions of that treaty and the American financial control which it provided during the life of the bonds.' This declaration aroused considerable resentment in Haiti, and on the 22nd December, 1931, President Vincent addressed a note to the Government of the United

¹ The purpose of the loan was to liquidate Haiti's outstanding foreign and internal debts, to provide for the payment of awards made by a Commission set up to adjudicate claims against the Haitian Government, and to finance certain public works.

² The greater part of the issue was bought by the National City Company of New York.

³ According to the evidence given by a Haitian representative before the Senate of the United States in February 1932 (in connexion with the hearings on a resolution providing for an investigation of foreign securities offered in the United States since the General War of 1914-18), the Haitian public believed that the loan had been contracted only as the result of pressure from the United States, and that it had resulted in immense profits to American banks. In 1931 the Haitian Congress passed resolutions declaring that the loan protocol of 1919 was invalid, since it had not been approved by the Haitian legislative authority. It was pointed out by the State Department at Washington, however, that under the Constitution of 1918 the acts of the executive power in Haiti did not require ratification.

⁴ The debt had been reduced to about \$15,000,000 by the end of 1931.