


- R E S T R I C T E D -

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
APO #234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO



INTERROGATION NO. 415

Place: Tokyo
Date: 14 Nov. 1945.

Division of Origin: Morale

SUBJECT : Changes in Attitude Toward ARP During the War.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Nishizawa, Nobusige, Police Affairs Section, Police
Affairs Bureau, Home Affairs Ministry.

Where interviewed: Heji Building.

Interrogator : Lt. Comdr. A.H. Leighton & Lt. Col. Shoemaker.

Interpreter : Mr. Bruce Rogers & Mr. Mitsunori.

Allied Officers Present: Mr. David Truran.

SUMMARY:-

This is a second interview with Mr. Nishizawa. (No. 1 was on 12 Nov.). More details were secured on reactions of the people to raids and to the changes of attitudes of people participating in ARP.

An outline of the structure of leadership in ARP and its relationship to local organizations is given. The most important unit seems to have been the Keibodan which was made up of Han and Bu leaders. These nominated the leader of their Keibodan and he was then recognized by the Government. The Keibodan was a civilian defense organization coordinated with the police and the regular fire fighters.

In the early days of the war, the people responded to ARP poorly because they did not think there would be any raids, or they thought the raids would be very light. Then in a short time, in late 1944 and early 1945, the raids became so heavy that people were overwhelmed and it did not seem worthwhile doing anything.

ARP was best in Nagoya and poorest in Tokyo and Osaka.

When the raids became bad, the people blamed the military for letting the American planes get through. Such was the talk among intimates and among Government workers who knew each other well, though there was no public talk of this character.

The police in charge of rumor control tended to just let things slip.

Although leaders and people in the Government thought for a long time that Japan might lose the war, most of the people did not realize it till August 1945.

- R E S T R I C T E D -

Interrogation of Nishizawa, Nobussige, Police Affairs Section.

Key to Interrogation:-

S - Lt. Col. Shoemaker
L - Lt. Condr. Leighton
R - Mr. Bruce Rogers
H - Mr. Mitsumori
N - Mr. Nishizawa

- S. There have been a number of reorganizations in Air Raid Defense. What were primary causes? Political? Air Raids? What was the cause?
- N. Mainly changes were due to air raids.
- S. Any important reorganizations before 1944?
- N. No. None.
- S. Were there many reorganizations in last 9 months of war?
- N. No changes in organization but there were changes in procedures.
- S. What sort of changes in procedures?
- N. No change in official policy, but on part of people. They changed their own methods. The signaling was changed, for example, when the air raid came, it was not necessary to blow siren for a large area. Instead, they plotted course of planes across a city and only alerted that portion of the city.
- S. What was official attitude toward the tendency of the people to run away from fires rather than to stay and fight them?
- N. As a general principle the Government has advocated dispersal for the last year, beginning with school children. This began before the raid, but after raids began, the Government put full force behind this. Evacuated children and aged.
- S. But in actual raid, if people ran away, did the Government object or approve?
- N. First, when there was an air raid, people stuck to their areas. The government helped as much as possible by providing food and transportation for bombed out people. After a raid, the people were encouraged by the government to go out into the country. There was a law that officials had to stay on the job. No holidays permitted. Regarding the people during the raid, there was no law that people had to stay and fight the fire. By radio and newspapers people were encouraged to stay, but not forced. However, local group opinion such as tonari guri tended to keep people there.
- S. Did government change policy of trying to have people stay and save the factories to one of letting certain factories go in order to save others?
- N. In case certain factories were lost, they would move machinery out and save this. Some building would be abandoned and fire fighters would try to save certain other buildings (Gov't offices, Police stations, Shrines) that were particularly important. Toward the last, due to inadequate equipment, they did abandon certain areas, but this was due to circumstances rather than policy.

Interrogation of Nishizawa, Nobussige, Police Affairs Section cont'd

- N. Toward the last, a certain section of city would burn and people would be asked to leave. But the regular fire fighters would try to save buildings that were of importance, such as temples or those that held records or schools.
- S. Was it necessary to force people away, or did they go without being forced?
- N. The evacuation policy dealt with moving aged and children. After town was burning the people ordered to stay, would tend to try and save their own places and own sections. Local leaders (tonari guri) would decide during fire whether local group would stay and fight or run away because police chief could not cover all areas.
- L. What leaders?
- N. Tonari guri leaders, Hancho leaders, Bucho leaders, Cho-Kaicho leaders.
(Hancho - created since war started)
(Bucho - made up of 5 tonari guri and 15 or 20 han make up one Bu)
(Chokai was made up of Bu - varying in size)
(Keibedan - government agents appointed from above, all other leaders noted above are elected by the local group. Every 4 or 5 chokai have a Keibedan)
- S. Those men who decided about whether a section would or would not be abandoned - how were they given that authority?
- N. No law governed this. Tonari Guri Cho would clear his area, a Hancho would clear his area, etc., on a common sense basis according to the fire.
- S. Were members of Keibedan in more authority than the cho (leaders)?
- N. The Keibedan had a board of governors for air defense made up of chokai cho and one of these would be the head of the Keibedan by election and then recognized by the government. Han and bu leaders (cho) would also be on this board of governors but not tonari guri leaders.
- This applies only to Tokyo & Osaka and other big cities.
- There was never any order for this kind of organization but it was encouraged.
- S. The Keidoban was a civilian defense organization coordinated with police and regular fire fighters.
- S. Who had greatest single authority to direct and make decisions, at time of an air raid -- What individual?
- N. The governor. He is head of air defense. (Boku)
- S. Did he actually go and observe the fires? I mean during an actual air raid?
- N. Yes, he is responsible - But there are many people in Hq. and maybe the governor went or he might send one of these others.
- S. Does the governor actually go there and say, "Send the Fire Department here or there"?
- N. I don't know, I was not there.

Interrogation of Nishizawa, Nobusige, Police Affairs Section cont'd.

- S. What about in Tokyo?
- N. In Tokyo, it was the chief of the Tokyo Metropolitan area.
- A. Is it normal for the Governor to go and accompany the Chief of Police and direct the operations?
- N. The Police chief takes orders from the Governor and he gives orders to the Fire Chief.
- S. In 1934 I saw 3 things in Kobe. Gas defense drill, black out drill and an exhibition on the 6th floor of the Dai Nippon Dept. store showing miniature airplane and bombs. Were people then alive to and interested in air raid defense?
- N. I don't remember.
- S. When did you first become aware of air raid propaganda in Japan?
- N. About the summer of 1937. They built up the Keibedan in 1937 - at time of China war. The first air raid drill was in 1934 - about once a year. I remember it now. Once a year till 1937 and after that twice a year.
- S. Up to 1938 did they have any equipment for air defense in homes or factories?
- N. Not in households. They had only black cloth for blackout drill. They did not have blackout cloth in the factories. Even at the end of the war country people did not have blackout or fire fighting equipment.
- S. When did people actually begin to obtain water buckets, fire beaters, etc., for their homes?
- N. A year after war started with the U.S.
- R. This not so - they had it before.
- S. How did people take it after the gov't began to encourage these steps in earnest - Did they obtain the equipment or did they think it was foolish?
- N. People did not take it in earnest, they thought there would be no such thing as an air raid.
- S. Did Government ever threaten prosecution?
- N. No there was no punishment.
- S. How did they explain to the people it was necessary?
- N. They instructed district directors to call meetings and give talks, and they circulated the notice boards.
- S. Did the police inspect homes?
- N. Yes, in 1942 and 1943, they began doing it.
- L. Did the Doclittle raid have anything to do with this tightening up?

Interrogation of Nishizawa, Nobussige, Police Affairs Section cont'd

- N. They took this as a big joke. They locked out windows and thought it was very funny. Since, then, however, the Gov't. and the people put forth more effort. Up to that time the people had paid little attention to Air Raid precautions. After that, the gov't. pushed it and real defense work started from that time on.
- S. What of the period after that until the raids started? Did people stay alert all through this time from 1942 to 1944?
- N. Since that time, people little by little were more and more enthusiastic about Air Raid Precautions. The Gov't. intensified its efforts. This was as the war went on.
- S. Did it vary from one area to another? Were some more enthusiastic than others where little was done unless police came around and urged them?
- N. It differed, naturally. The orders from Gov't. to different Kens were all the same, but response varied. At lower echelons, enthusiasm was proportional to leaders enthusiasm.
- L. Where was it outstandingly good or bad from 1942 up to the time heavy raids started?
- N. Before the raids we didn't bother to investigate. After the raids Aichi Ken, the Nagoya area was most alert, but as other areas suffered they became alert too. The worst were Tokyo and Osaka.
- S. Can you describe what you saw and how in general people behaved during actual raids here in Tokyo?
- N. The condition was so terrible I could not well describe it. After a raid I was supposed to investigate but I didn't go because I did not like to see the terrible sights.
- S. Were there any panics?
- N. My home was raided 13 April 1945. When it started, people left, not disorderly at first, but as the fire grew in intensity they began to flee. I stayed until the very last and the area was burned. I and the Keibodan chief, the fire chief, and the Police chief rode on last car out of area.
- S. Were streets clogged with people carrying out their household goods?
- N. Before the raid, the government had warned people to send out most of their things into country. This they did, but also they put their things into dug-outs and wet the earth. To carry their things out during a raid they found hindered their movement too much and goods burned as they carried them.
- S. Were there any criticisms of the conduct of the people, police, or fire fighters?
- N. There didn't seem to be anything in the papers.
- S. Among the people?


- R E S T R I C T E D -

Interrogation of Nishizawa, Nobusige, Police Affairs Section cont'd

- N. They blamed the army. The people blamed the military as separate from government. They blamed them for letting the planes come. The government also blamed the army for not telling them that the raids would be great.
- S. What form did this criticism take?
- N. Nothing in the newspapers or radio. The criticsers did not talk in a "big voice" - but in public batsh or over a cup of tea. However up to August even so the people were talking always of victor, victory, victory.
- L. What else?
- N. I am a civil servant, and I could not hear it officially, but my own thoughts and those of others in government were that this criticism was about right.
- S. Did peace provocation measures increase?
- N. No.
- R. What about rumor control?
- N. Police decided that there was not much we could do and let it slip.
- S. The Kenpei might have taken some measures. When did you and the people you knew begin to think the war might be lost?
- N. From beginning I thought there was not much chance, but I became sure about the time of Leyte.
- S. Was this general?
- N. The leaders, people in government, thought it about the time I did, but the common people, no.
- S. When did the common people realize it?
- N. About August this year.

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Chart of Civilian Defense and
Tonari Gumi Organization
14 Nov 1945



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