HEADQUARTERS U.S. STRATEGIC ECMBING SURVEY (PACIFIC) C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NC. 70

PLACE: TOKYO

DATE: 15 Oct. 1945

Division of Origins:

Pasic Materials Division.

Subject:

Iron & Steel - Conference with Nippon Kokan Officials and Inspection of Kawasaki Works.

Personnel Interrogated and Background of Each:

KCMATSU, T. Managing Director, Nippon Kokan K.K.
TAKAMATSU, M. Managing Director, Kawasaki Works, N.K.K.K.
TANAKA, K. Managing Director, Tsurumi Works, N.K.K.K.

Other plant officials

Where Interviewed:

Kawasaki Works, N.K.K.K. Kawasaki.

Interrogator:

Lt. S.H. ROBOCK, USNR

Lt. (jg) R.I. GALLAND, USNR

Interpreter:

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Lt. (jg) E. LAFTIN

Allied Officers Present: Lt. (jg) CHAFFEE, USNR

SUMMARY:

Conference: Preliminary discussion of how company and plant records are kept and what data would be easily available on (a) production and production production production are due to air raids (b) raw material receipts and consumption (c) employment data.

General Subjects such as the corporation's expansion program, air raid precautions, purchase and sales transactions, price setting and government subsidies, outside inspectors and representatives were discussed.

Details on the Kawasaki Works were secured and a visit was made through the most damaged sections of the plant. Many ground photos were taken.

HEADQUARTERS U.S. STRATEGIC BCMBING SURVEY (PACIFIC) C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO INTER (GATION NO. PLACE: TCKYO 15 Oct. 1945 DATE: Subject: Iron & Steel - Conference with Nippon Kokan Officials and Inspection of Kawasaki Works. Conference with officials of Nippon Kokan K.K. and visit through Kawasaki Works 15 October 1945. Present at Conference: KOMATSU, T. Managing director, Nippon Kohan K.K. TAKAMATSU, M. Managing director, Kawasaki Works. MATSUSHITA, N. Technical director, Kawasaki Works. ISAMA, S. Chief engineer, Chemical Department, Kawasaki Works. ISAZAWA, Y. Chief engineer, Repair Department, Kawasaki Torks MINAMI, T. Sub-Chief, Sales Department, Kawasaki Works SASABE, M. Supervisor, Kawasaki Works TANAKA, K. Director, Tsurumi Works Allied Personnel: It. S.H. ROBCCK, USNR, USSBS Lt. R.I. GALLAND, USNR, USBS It. E. LAFFIN, USNR, USSES Lt. (jg) CHAFTEE, USNR, USSBS Reports previously submitted to U.S. authorities. Two reports were prepared for the Japanese Government to be submitted to G.H.Q. under directive No. 3. Copies of these reports are available in the Mirpon Kokan Tokyo main office. Iron and steel plants and mines owned and controlled by Nippon Kokan M.K.K. preliminary list. (a) Kawasaki Works, includes units at 10 Ogi-machi and 42 Ogi-machi (b) Tsurumi Works, Yokohama (Formerly Tsurumi Seitetsu Zosen) (c) Toyama Works, Toyama-ken (Former'y Denki Seitetsu) (d) Niight Works, Niigata-ken (Formerly Denki Seitetsu) Osaka Kokan, Osaka Genzan Seitetsu, Genzan, Vorea-small blast furnace plant. Manshu Nippon Kokan, Anshan, Manchuria (h) Nippon Kokan Kogyo-mining subsidiary-main office Tokyo, 1. Iron ore mine - Gumna-ken, Honshu. 2. Iron ore mine - Swa, near Chinno Station Nagano-Ken. 3. Iron ore mine - Malaya.

(i) Tsingtao Scitetsu, Tsingtao, China.

(j) Miscellaneous-chrome mine, small manganese mine, two ore mines in China.

In addition to the above mentioned installations the N.K.K. owns the Asano Shipbuilding Co. at Tsurumi.

3. Plant layout and departmentalization of Kawasaki Works.

A blueprint (2 copies) of the plant layout with bomb damage plotted by date of raid was requested and will be furnished by the company.

The departmentalization of the Kawasaki Works is:

General Affairs
Labor Department
Raw Materials Department
Pig Iron Department
Steel Department
Coke & by-product Department
Construction & Maintenance Department

4. Installations at Kawasaki Works: - Preliminary

(a) Coke ovens:

l battery Kuroda 75 coke ovens
l battery Kuroda 40 coke ovens
l battery Kuroda 40 coke ovens
l battery Kuroda 40 coke ovens
Total - 4 batteries Kuroda 230 coke ovens

(b) Blast furnaces:

No. 1. rated 350 tons completed 1936
No. 4. rated 350 tons completed 1937
No. 3. rated 600 tons completed 1938
No. 4. rated 600 tons completed 1943
No. 5. rated 600 tons completed 1944

(c) Steel:

8 -30 ton open hearth furnaces 4 -50 ton open hearth furnaces

5 -20 ton Thomas (Pessemer) furnaces

2 -20 ton electric furnaces

5. Expansion program of Nippon Kokan.

The company officials insisted that an overall pre-war expansion plan did not exist but that new construction was piece-meal. It was agreed that the officials would search their memories and files and attempt to reconstruct their expansion plans and reasons for major revision of plans. It was necessary to secure a government permit in recent years for new construction and a tabulation of these permits will be submitted. This will not show, however, the plans which never resulted in permits because of the futility of the situation.

6. Production data.

The only planned production figures available will be the quarterly quotas set by the Control Association (Tekko Tosei Kai) after joint cenferences.

7. Raw Material Data.

Information on the source of raw materials will be available from the company even though all raw material purchases were through the Tosci Kai's raw materials Sales Control Company. The Tosei Kai normally did not receive and tranship materials but performed its duties by paper transactions.

Electric power generated within the plant had to be supplemented by purchased power.

8. Loss of Production.

Data is available on absenteeism as a result of the air raids.

9. Air Raid Precautions.


The government issued decrees specifying type of equipment and plans for work parties and rescue work. The company then purchased the equipment itself and organized its personnel under the direction of the head of the plant. Fire parties were formed from personnel of plant and headed by section chief. About 20% of each shift was assigned these extra rescue and fire duties. Company fire trucks were used for small fires. Outside trucks were called in for large fires. In emergencies police and medical aid were called in from outside.

The alerts were transmitted by radio, siren and runners. On alert all ordinary workers were either to go to posts or into shelters. At first 5% of personnel remained on duty to keet most important machinery running. As the raids increased in frequency all the workers made for the shelters and left the machinery unattended.

The power plant was considered the most important place and a cement wall about 7-8 feet high and 8 inches thick was built around this building. Walls of bamboo about 18 inches thick were scattered throughout the plant as further protection against fragments. The company anticipated fire-bomb raids mainly rather than precision H-E attacks aimed at particular parts of the plant.

Smoke pots had been supplied by Ordnance Department but were never used. Using the stacks of the plant to put up a smoke screen had been centemplated but never actually carried through. Corrugated sheet roofs and walls were used to blackout the coke side of the coke ovens and other sections of the plant where flames might be visible from the air.

10. <u>Purchase Transaction</u>. Hypothetical purchase transaction: NKK buys new blower for blast furnace.



N.K.K. makes an application for the machine to the Iron & Steel Tosei Kai 8 months in advance of the desired delivery date. Such applications collected from all Iron & Steel Companies are evaluated by the Iron & Steel Tosei Kai and are passed to the Bureau of Iron & Steel in the Munitions Ministry. At the ministerial level the allocations of raw materials and production facilities within the Japanese economy are made. The Machinery Eureau with the advice of the machinery Tosei Kai makes specific production instructions and raw material assignments for that segment of industry. The machinery Bureau with the Iron & Steel Bureau decides what part of the applications presented by the latter can be produced. These allocations are made quarterly. The Iron & Steel Tosei Kai is told which applications are to be filled.

The Iron & Steel Tosei Kai makes out the ticket allowing the machine to be produced and delivers it to N.K.K. A copy of this ticket goes to the machinery Tosei Kai. NKK then sends the ticket with an order for the machine to the Machinery Tosei Kai where a maker is assigned the job and given tickets for the necessary raw materials. But in the case of "special machinery" NKK takes the ticket and order directly to the maker.

11. Sales Transaction.

Sales of iron and steel by N.K.K. are in all cases made to the Iron & Steel Sales Centrol Company unless special permission for a direct sale is cleared by the president of the Iron & Steel Tosei Kai. The ticket system applies to sales of steel products except those to the Iron & Steel Sales Centrol Co. Deliveries are made by NKK to big consumers directly. The Iron & Steel Sales Sales Centrol Company actually takes delivery of some steel at storage warehouses of authorized dealers.

12. Price & Government Subsidy.

Sales by N.K.K. to the Iron & Steel Sales Control Company are at the fixed prices, - 142 to 170 yen per ten depending on the category of product. NKK's costs for exceed these prices. The difference and enough profit to pay a 7% dividend to sharchelders is paid by the government by check on the Bank of Japan. The amount of subsidy is determined semiannually by inspectors from the Tekke Tosei Kai.

13. Inspectors and Rolling Committee.

The Army, the Navy and the Munitions Ministry, each had inspectors in the plant watching out for the quality of the product and urging production. To settle rival claims to finished shapes etc, there were set up at NKK and at other plants in the industry Rolling Committees. This committee at NKK included the Army Navy and Munitions Ministry inspectors and representatives of the plant and Tekko Tosci Kai. It decided in detail the shapes, and sizes of the relled products and the priority of relling each. These plant Rolling Committees were coordinated by a Central Rolling Committee in the Munitions Ministry made up of representatives of the same organizations.