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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Public Administration Division
Political Parties Branch

29 June 1946

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

(SHAKAITO)

SOURCES:

The following study of the origin, development, aims and personnel of the Social Democratic Party has been prepared on the basis of the published statements, platforms, and officially approved press releases issued by Tokyo party headquarters, checked by analyses of the speeches of accredited leaders and by interviews with the party's high officials.

PARTY STRENGTH:

In the Diet elections of April 1946, the Social Democratic Party polled 8,988,000 votes, electing 92 candidates out of a total of 332 seats contested by the party. This indicates that the party won a Diet seat for each 96,645 votes cast, a rate lower than the average of 113,100 votes per seat in all Japanese election districts.

NAME:

The Japanese name Shakai-to means Socialist, or Social Party, but the official translation preferred by party leaders is Social Democratic Party.

THEORY:

The Social Democratic Party has as its slogan "Democratic Politics and Socialist economy."

A loosely organized combination of politicians of divergent views, the party acts as a bridge between extremist Leftists and cautious conservatives.

More topflight leaders belong to the Social Democratic Party than to any other. Inside the party they sometimes quarrel so bitterly that observors constantly anticipate an outright break, but contrary to expectations, the rival leaders have held together firmly.

FORMATION:

Basically, the Social Democratic Party is a Socialist group made up of former members of the Social Mass Party (Shakai Taishuto), the Labor

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Party (Rodoto), and the Proletarian Party (Musanto), all of which were disbanded before the war through police opposition.

Roughly speaking, these three sources explain the origins of the Left Wing, the Center, and the Right Wing factions of the present Social Democratic Party. Labor Party men, together with former Communists (who may or may not be "Disguised Communists") constitute a Left Wing; former Social Mass members are on the right while a middle-of-the-road group is comprised of more conservative laborites and proletarians. The general statement must, however, not be taken as an absolute guide, since exceptions are plentiful on both the Leftist and the Rightist sections.

These terms, moreover, are misleading since the Leftists are not necessarily Communists and the Rightists have no reactionary tendencies.

Within a week after surrender, MIZUTANI Chosaburo, leftist opponent of Imperial rule, and HIRANO Rikizo, an Emperor supporter, both of the Social Mass Party, summoned proletarian leaders to a preliminary meeting at which merger plans were discussed.

Difficulties appeared at the start. The proposed party divided on three important issues:

1. Emperor: Several important Leftists desired to abolish the Emperor System, while the Right Wing group was generally committed to its preservation under conditions limiting the Imperial power.

2. Co-Operation: Generally speaking, the Left Wing asked for a more or less formal union of all democratic groups in a common struggle against what they termed Fascist tendencies; the Right Wing saw little danger of Fascism and preferred independent political action for the common goal of democracy.

3. Leadership: ABE Isoo, 83-year old Waseda University professor of economics and long-time head of politico-labor movements, was preferred but he excused himself on account of age. KAGAWA Toyohiko and TAKANO Iwasaburo were second choices but neither was willing to stand in the forefront. Certain former Labor Party members, notably KONO Mitsu, KAWAKAMI Jotaro, MIYAKE Masaichi and FUNADA Chu, Tokyo Chamber of Commerce chief and Prince KONOYE's president of the Legislative Bureau, 1937-1939, favored Count ARIMA Rainei, former head of the IRAA Co-Operative Division but this was bitterly opposed by KATO Kanju, SUZUKI Mosaburo and others who condemned ARIMA for his supposedly nationalistic views. When the party chiefs rejected ARIMA's candidacy, MIYAKE and FUNADA quit the Social Democrats and helped in the founding of the Co-Operative Party (Kyodoto).

KATO then proposed Marqiis TOKUGAWA Yoshichika, a step that caused KATO to be accused of lacking political principles, but TOKUGAWA also was rejected. Although the Marquis did not leave the Social Democratic Party he too threw his support to the Co-Operatives.

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Professor OYAMA Ikuo, former Waseda Professor, head of the Farmer-Labor Party (Ronoto) and currently attached to North-Western University, was also a presidential suggestion, as was KATAYAMA Tetsu, present chief secretary, MATSUOKA Komakichi, old-time labor leader, and NISHIO Suyehiro, ex-vice president of the Japan Trade Union Federation and of the Steel Workers Union.

The multiplicity of candidates was by-passed by the expedient of naming no one as president but, instead, appointing KATAYAMA as chief secretary and NISHIO as head of the Central Executive Committee. These were victories for the Right Wing faction which also controlled a two-thirds majority of the Executive Committee.

Under these agreements the party held an inaugural ceremony, 2 November 1945, under the slogan, "Capitalism or Socialism." The 150 proletarian and labor leaders who founded the party included 17 Diet members.

KATAYAMA TETSU:

The party is headed by KATAYAMA Tetsu, secretary-general, a lawyer with a long experience as political organizer of radical labor groups. KATAYAMA has held official posts, usually secretary-ships, in ABE Isoo's Proletarian Party (1925), the Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshuto-1926), the Farmers' Union (from which he resigned when there was danger of its becoming reactionary), and the Social Mass Party (Shakai Taishuto) which he represented in the Diet. The Social Mass Party, however, dropped him from its rolls when he voted to retain SAITO Takeo in the Diet. KATAYAMA headed the General Federation of Farmers' Unions from 1926 until its dissolution in 1940. He then attempted to form a National Labor Party (Kokumin Kinroto) but was prevented by the police from doing so.

KATAYAMA worked in co-operation with HOSHIJIMA Jiro (Liberal, and now Minister of Commerce and Industry) to establish the Central Legal Information Bureau and he has been legal advisor for several students accused of radicalism. He has served in the Diet since 1930, with the exception of the war period when he was defeated in the TOJO election of 1942.

A close advisor is MATSUMOTO Jichiro, treasurer of the party, who has been a contractor for buildings and public works and who is also a former Social Mass Party member. MATSUMOTO, however, is much better known as the Suiheisha leader. He, too, was a projector of the National Labor Party but later became an advisor to the IRAA and the IRAPS. MATSUMOTO was purged by the Japanese Government but was later reinstated.

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LEFT WING:

The Left Wing (Saiyoku) aims at transforming the Social Democratic Party from its present status of "a lower middle class conservative group", which ARAHATA Kanson, a Left Wing chief, calls "pinch-hitters for the imperialistic bourgeoisie", into a militant proletarian organization. It would purge the extreme Right Wing of KONO, KAWAKAMI, MATSUOKA and others and, while favoring the coalition of the Social Democrats with other anti-reactionary elements (by which they mean the Communists), oppose co-operation between their party and the Liberals and the Progressives.

The chief Left Wing leaders are:

KATO Kanju, long-time labor leader who led the Tokyo Transport Workers Union and the Japan Council of Trade Unions (created November 1934 and dissolved by the police in 1937). He helped form the Labor Party in 1936, and the Proletarian Party in 1937. A Diet member since 1932, he is married to the former Baroness ISHIMOTO.

ARAHATA Katsuzo (Kanson), a former Communist who prides himself on having been jailed seven times for anti-militarism, and one time member of OYAMA's Ronoto, was long an ardent supporter of the United Front and as such an uncompromising opponent of the Social Democratic Right Wing (he demanded the expulsion from the party of KONO Mitsu and KAWAKAMI Jotaro). As organizer of the Japan Labor Union Federation (Rodo Kumiai Sodomei) and of the Kanto Metal Workers' Union, which is said to include 5,000 members, he is credited with strong influence over at least 20,000 unionists. Within the party he founded the Doshi-sha, or Brotherhood Group, which sought a more aggressive Leftist policy, and he opposed vigorously all alliances with the "bourgeois Liberals." Nevertheless, after Communists led an anti-SHIDEHARA demonstration breaking a pledge previously made to the Social Democrats ARAHATA protested the action. For this he was severely criticised by the Communist newspaper Akahata.

YAMAKAWA Hitoshi, another former Communist, and editor of Minshu Shimbun, is the most vocal United Front advocate. On at least three occasions he issued a supposedly non-partisan call for an all-democratic union. He heads a committee of 19 Leftist publicists and educators, pledged to work for the establishment of such a Front.

ONO Shunichi, former Minshu Shimbun editor, who resigned that post 19 January, also advocates the Democratic Front. He has protested the party decision to support the Emperor System.

SUZUKI Mosaburo, active in the Tokyo Transport Workers Union and

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a former Proletarian Party secretary-general, is yet another Democratic Front pleader. He is in the curious position of being called both pro-Communist and pro-conservative. He is generally credited with being a KATO follower.

SHIMAGAMI Zengoro, labor organizer of the Tokyo Transport Workers Union and former Proletarian Party leader, who was jailed for anti-militaristic activity in 1928 and again, for a year, in 1937, favors democracy although, at the time the party was organized he confessed that he was not quite sure what democracy meant. He believes in the reduction of the Emperor to a position similar to that of the British king.

MIZUTANI Chosaburo, former Farmer-Labor and Social Mass member favors transfer of sovereignty from the Emperor to the people. An associate of OYAMA Ikuo, and a Democratic Front advocate he has been official party spokesman. He has been a Diet member five times.

RIGHT WING:

The conservative leaders of the Right Wing (Uyoku) are far more influential within the party than are the radicals. Some of them, perhaps, entered the party originally by arrangement with HATOYAMA Ichiro as his agents within the Social Democratic movement just as some of the Leftists were once described as "disguised Communists", but it is much more accurate to describe them now as old-line members of the former Social Mass Party (Shakai Taishuto). The three elder statesmen, ABE Isoo, KAGAWA Toyohiko and KATAYAMA Tetsu, secretary-general, belong to this faction.

In addition, the Right Wing includes:

NISHIO Suyehiro, an iron worker in his youth who became president of the Osaka branch of the Japan Federation of Labor (Nippon Rodo Sodomei) and of the Kansai Labor League. Twice delegate to the Geneva Trade Union Congress, 1923 and 1928, and former vice-president of the Tokyo Steel Workers Federation, he has been a member of parliament since 1930. Expelled from the Social Mass Party, 1938, for failure to follow its militarist leaders, he has been under constant attack because of alleged, but thus far unproven, charges of complicity in the activities of SASAKAWA Roichi, of the old Kokusai Taishuto, in favor of the 8th Day Society (Hachinichi-kai). He is also alleged to have been a member of the dissolved Zenkoku Kinroshi Domei. Said by the Communists to have been a friend of FUJI Yoshio, a supposed Fascist, it is also charged that he was sent by air to China during the war for the increase of morale among the troops.

HIRANO Rikizo, publisher and former chairman of Kyodo and Rengo News Agencies a Waseda graduate of 1922 and an agrarian leader since that year, has been member of the Diet from Yamanashi-ken

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since 1936. Former head of the Japan Farmers' Union and general secretary of the Japan Masses Party (Taishuto), as well as central executive committeeman of the Social Mass Party (Shakai Taishuto) he is said to have used his influence to promote the interests of the ultra-nationalistic Imperial Way Association (Kodo-kai) formed in 1933 to encourage militarism among veteran servicemen's associations. HIRANO explains, however, that two organizations of the same name were in existance and that his Kodo-kai was so anti-militaristic that it was dissolved by TOJO's government. HIRANO a close friend of MATSUOKA Komakichi, hoped for a Cabinet in which MATSUOKA would be premier and he would be Minister of Agriculture.

MATSUOKA Komakichi, labor leader since his factory working days, 1914, and former president of the General Union of Workers, has been a labor delegate to the International Labor Organization. Campaigning on a slogan "Free labor from the tyranny of capitalism", he was, nevertheless, appointed committeeman for the Ex-Servicemen's Protective Association and councillor for the National Spirit Mobilization Movement. MATSUOKA's campaign slogan in the 1942 election was "to further the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

HARA Hyonosuke, a lawyer, and active supporter of the National Industrial Service Movement, by which all labor unions were to be amalgamated into one governmentally-sponsored organization.

YONEKUBO Mitsutsuke, ex-branch chief of the IRAA and chief director of the Great Japan Ocean League (Dai Nippon Kaiyo Remmei), a former member of the Diet.

Mrs. YAMAZAKI Michiko, now known as FUJIWARA Michiko, who ran for the Diet in 1946 as a replacement for her husband, YAMAZAKI Kenji, war-time governor of Borneo. Mrs. YAMAZAKI instituted suit for divorce just prior to election when her husband returned with a Borneo wife and two illegitimate children.

CENTER GROUP:

Between the extreme wings is a third group, most of them former Ronoto members, who lean to the right but who prefer to be officially included with a centrist group. Some of them, as former IRAA officials were barred from office-holding by the 4 January 1946 directive; others are under constant criticism by leftist organs.

SUGIYAMA Motojiro, retired committeeman, who has been a Farmer-Labor, Mass Party, IRAA, IRAPS and headquarters member of the Seijikai. A co-operative leader and a dentist, he was also active in the Fatherland Defense Association.

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NOMIZO Katsu, also a former committeeman, and, like SUGIYAMA a former Diet member, who had been a Social Mass Party member and active in the Farmland Reform League (Nochi Seido Kaikaku Domei).

KONO Mitsu, a lawyer who had been an executive committeeman for the Farmer-Labor and Social Mass Parties, and a member of the Great Japan Industrial Patriotic Society (Dai Nippon Snagyo Hokokukai). In 1941 he published "The Politics of National Defence" in which he implied that totalitarian Shintoism was the basic principle of the Japanese state; he praised the exploits of sailors in small submarines who attacked Pearl Harbor. An ex-editor of Asahi, and Diet member since 1937, he was a member of the Diet Examination Committee of IRAA. He is also said to have carried out certain missions for the Navy.

TAHARA Haruji, graduate of Denver University and of the University of Missouri School of Journalism and former Asahi writer, now head of the Fishermen's Union, has represented Fukuoka since 1937. He has been a member of Asia Reconstruction Society (Koa Sohombu) and of the Greater Japan Asia Reconstruction League (Dai Nippon Koa Domei). As a Navy attache, "with the assimilated rank of admiral", he was sent to New Guinea on a special mission.

KAWAKAMI Jotaro, ex manager for IRAA, and former professor of St. Paul's University a former executive committeeman of the Social Mass Party, served three terms as a Hyogo Diet representative.

ASANUMA Inejiro, former committeeman for the Japan Mass and Farmer-Labor Parties, is a former vice chairman of the Tokyo Assembly and twice member of Parliament.

KURODA Hisao, one of the few centrists with Leftist leanings, has been active in the Proletarian, Social Mass and Farmer-Labor Parties, and twice a member of Parliament.

MIYAKE Shoichi, formerly of the IRAA and of the Patriotic society, Doshikai, is a member of the Society for the National Protection (Gokoku Boshikai).

SUNAGA Ko, a farmer and weaver, and former member of Parliament, has been active in the Farmer-Labor, Social Mass, Labor Mass and Japan Mass Parties, and has also served as an officer of the Japan Farmers' Association (Nomin Kai Kumiai Jimbi In).

DEMOCRATIC FRONT:

Much of the Party's internal difficulties arise from the troublesome question of how to co-operate with other parties. Left Wing strategy

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centered about the possibilities of an anti-reactionary alliance. As first projected, it was called a United Front, later modified into the Peoples' Front or Democratic Front, but, whatever the name, implying a common attitude to be taken against undemocratic (really anti-Communistic) or pro-capitalistic movements.

The Democratic Front idea was more tactical in nature than sincere in purpose but because it was put forward as a "liberal" and "democratic" movement for the prevention of reaction it gained much sympathy among progressive members of the community. The history of its development is, to a large degree, the story of Communist effort at infiltration into the Social Democratic Party.

As early as 19 October 1945, SHIGA Yoshio, Cummunist leader newly released from Fuchu Penitentiary, suggested to the organizers of the Social Democratic Party that they unite with the Communist Party for the promotion of democracy. The offer was promptly rejected as premature, by MIZUTANI Chuji, SUZUKI Mosaburo and HIRANO Rikizo because the Social Democrats, on the one hand, had not yet organized while the Communists had yet to announce a program.

The refusal was repeated by the Central Executive Committee, 4 December, on the ground that the Communists opposed the Emperor while the Social Democrats, as the committee said, believed "the power of the state to be vested in the sovereign."

The United Front invitation was declined, for a third time, 27 December, because the Central Executive Committee held that each party should produce its own program for the solution of the food problem.

Again, 15 January 1946, the Central Executive Committee refused a United Front because, except for generalities, "the Communists kept their principles secret." Moreover, according to MIZUTANI, when on a former occasion, about 1926, the Communists had proposed collaboration with the Farmer-Labor Party, they used unfair methods to gain exclusive control. In spite of the sincerity now professed by the Communists, MIZUTANI said, "The time is not ripe for blood brotherhood."

Privately the Right Wing leaders resented what they termed the effrontery of the Communists, a minor party in point of membership, in proposing amalgation on equal terms with a party several times larger than themselves. They considered the repeated invitations of the Communists as purely strategic efforts to attract attention and to brand the Social Democrats as "conservative" for not joining in a "common front against reaction."

Bitter intra-party battles marked each of the refusals. On each occasion, ARAHATA violently attacked the Central Executive Committee as "dominated by reaction". YAMAKAWA published, in Minshu, an appeal for unity, and when the appeal failed to attract favorable publicity he repeated it to a press interview. KITADA Ichiro and YAMAHAMA Hideo supported YAMAKAWA's plea.

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Indeed, at a rally honoring NOSAKA, KATAYAMA Tetsu, party secretary-general, went so far as to pledge the Social Democratic Party to a common front, but he added that since political matters were still in chaos it would be wiser to postpone decisions until after elections. This was the official party policy, intended to placate the Left while supporting the Right Wing's opposition to Communist alliances.

Generally speaking the collaborationist faction is composed of the Left Wing leaders plus MATSUOKA KURODA, YONEKUBO and MORITO Tatsuo, head of the Ohara Research Institute. The outstanding opponents are NISHIO, HIRANO KONO, ASANUMA, TAHARA and SUNAGA. Both groups claim to have the support of KATAYAMA.

Most of the local Branches support the Central Executive Committee's decisions but two of them, Aomori and Gifu, in each of which prefectures the Social Democratic Party is weak, raised objections. Both called for a United Front and each protested at the official party position concerning the Emperor. Aomori asked for a plebiscite on the Tenno System while Gifu called for outright abolition. The stand of these two Branches was particularly unusual in that both Gifu and Aomori are especially strong conservative constituencies.

Kyoto Leftists also proposed a coalition with the Communists but while this call drew extensive newspaper attention it appeared, upon close examination, to be a comparatively unimportant manoeuver "by disguised Communists" to swing the party into the radical orbit.

Probably Yamanashi, a strongly conservative area, more truly represented the general party attitude when the Branch announced that it would expel all members participating in a United Front. No such expulsions proved necessary.

KYUKOKU MINSHU REMMEI:

True to the Party's promise that after election day the creation of a common anti-reactionary "front" would be considered, the Standing Executive Committee set up, in mid-May, a special committee to study the situation. This group, headed by MORITO Tatsuo and including OSAWA Hisaaki, NAKAHARA Kenji and ITO Ushiro, proposed the creation of a Democratic League for National Salvation (Kyukoku Minshu Remmei) which had for its dual aim, (1) Solution of the food problem through socialistic policies and (2) "Establishment through a constructive bloodless revolution of a democratic government with a democratic structure."

Although no one objected to the dual overall program, there was a violent difference over methods to be employed for its realization.

The first problem concerned the admission of Communists. Since the original proposal for such a front had stemmed from Communist sources and since the greatest pressure for such a group had been Communist inspired, much of the League's expected value would have been sacrificed by Communist exclusion.

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Nevertheless, KATO Kanju, usually counted as a Leftist, astonished his colleagues by asserting that the Communists had been insincere in their advocacy of such a League--for this, he was blasted by Akahata, the Communist newspaper--while AKAMATSU Isamu (Aichi), a Right Winger, charged that the only reason the Communists made the proposal was to advertise Communism and to split the Social Democratic Party. Such representatives as KONO Mitsu, NIIZUMA Itoko (Hokkaido), ITO Ushiro (Fukuoka), MUTO Unijiro (Gumma), SAKAKIBARA Chiyo (Fukushima) and YAMAZAKI Tsunokichi (Aichi) agreed.

Others, such as MASAKI Kiyoshi (Hokkaido), TANAKA Shogetsu (Fukuoka) and OSAWA Kyumei (Aomori) insisted that the Communists be included. The Communists, incidentally, were dumb-founded to discover that one of their ardent supporters was TANAKA, a priest.

A second problem revolved about the question as to where and how the League should operate.

Right Wing spokesmen favored a working agreement among Diet members only, an arrangement which, by giving allies to the 95 Social Democratic representatives would greatly strengthen the minority position in the House. This would, in effect, submerge the 5 Communists into a democratic alliance and would rob them of much of their independence. Left Wingers, therefore, proposed the widening of the League into a broad agency including labor unions, farm organizations, cultural associations, discussion groups and other special councils.

A further complication appeared in the question as to how far such widened associations should operate. The conservatives disapproved the entire theory of expanded agencies and stood firm against them but they suggested that in the event they were over-ruled decisions should be made by majority vote of all member; the Leftists insisted on one vote for each group, regardless of its size. Since it was generally believed that Communists had set up a large number of tiny councils, each supposedly independent, such a program would afford the Communists a very effective voice.

The crux of the dispute was the question as to whether there should be extra-Diet supervision over legislation, especially one that would afford the Communists a greater control than their five Diet seats would justify.

Yet a third discussion centered about the League's programs. The narrow dual aim originally suggested seemed incomplete to Communists who desired to include the Emperor System, the replacement of the Diet by a Soviet system and other revolutionary ideas. The Social Democratic acceptance of the League had envisaged only the endorsement of a vague policy of democratization which would carry no idealogical significance.

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Long and heated discussion lasting more than a month threshed out these, and other problems, in great detail; it was not until mid-June that the Social Democratic Party eventually adopted the League program on a limited scale, with both a Diet group and an outside group--each to be governed by majority vote. The League idea, therefore, while highly acceptable to the conservative Right Wing faction repudiated the aims sought by its Communistic originators.

LIBERAL DEAL:

Post-election developments lent color to a prediction made in January by HATOYAMA Ichiro, Liberal leader, that a coalition agreement would be made between Liberals and Social Democrats. According to the HATOYAMA story, a secret agreement had been completed between himself and certain Social Democratic leaders, probably NISHIO and KONO, for an interparty alliance. Amplifications of the story, not made public by HATOYAMA, were that, in the event of electoral success, SUGIYAMA would be Agricultural Minister, and either NISHIO or MATSUOKA Welfare Minister.

The story was promptly denied by other Social Democratic leaders. KATAYAMA, in a formal statement endorsed by his party, declared that the Social Democrats has "never thought or hoped" for co-operation with the Liberals. NISHIO, denying a report that he, MIZUTANI and HIRANO had dined with HATOYAMA and had demanded "Cabinet positions relating to public welfare", said that the Social Democrats could not co-operate with HATOYAMA because the latter's "liberalism" was "contradictory to Socialism."

If, however, such a deal was ever made, the terms were purely an independent arrangement made by HATOYAMA personally since with the passage of HATOYAMA from the political scene, the close alliance between his branch of the Liberal Party and the Right Wing of the Social Democrats completely ended. Had HATOYAMA continued in public life the two parties would probably have drawn closer to each other, with perhaps a later merger of conservative elements into one party, but after his purging the Social Democrats became entirely an opposition party without agreements save on a common emergency food solution program.

CABINET CRISIS:

Immediately after election, when it was evident that no party commanded a clear majority, the Social Democrats seriously discussed the possibility of coalescence with the Liberals; but the Social Democratic Left Wing protested bitterly, alleging that the conservative Socialists were betraying the Party principles.

Simultaneously the Progressives invited coalition, offering, if the Social Democrats agreed to a coalition, to give the latter party the Commerce, Agriculture and Welfare Ministries. The offer was made by INUKAI Ken, chief political manipulator of the Progressive Party.

Had the Progressives been more generous, such a coalition might well have eventuated, but the Progressives, anxious perhaps to hold out other posts as bait for the Co-Operatives, declined to widen their offer. MIZUTANI therefore, unconditionally rejected the Progressive offer and announced that "Social Democrats will never co-operate with Progressives, nor with any other party that is not pledged to support our policies."

This attitude reflected the Social Democratic insistance upon principles, but it also had a more practical basis in that the leaders realized the tactical advantage of remaining in the opposition. At a time when imminent crises seemed impossible of quick solution, the party that headed the government must bear the blame if food supplies could not be increased and if reconstruction plans were difficult of fulfilment. An opposition party, on the other hand, might win support by voicing insistant demands for reforms for which it need not assume responsibility. The degree to which these two factors--principles and expediency--operated to color individual views varied according to the personality of executive committee members.

Nevertheless, at the same time that pride in Socialistic ideas contended with fear of failure, a certain degree of ambition also operated. Although well aware that immediate problems were incapable of solution, the lure of office appealed to certain politicians. NISHIO, HIRANO and TAHARA the more conservative leaders, conjured up, with the assistance of MIZUTANI, KATO, SUZUKI and NOMIZO, a plan whereby the Social Democrats would collaborate with the Liberals provided certain exorbitant terms were met. Those terms included the awarding to the Social Democrats of the Finance, Commerce, Agriculture, Welfare and Transport posts in addition to accepting KATAYAMA as prime minister.

Such a demand stunned the Liberals who, despite their 142 Diet seats, would thus have been reduced to the status of a minority party, but it is typical of the strange state of Japanese politics that the exorbitant demand was actually considered. But, as if this in itself was not enough, the Liberals went further by proposing that the arrangement be broadened into a four-party arrangement which would give recognition to the Co-Operatives and the Communists.

The suggestion collapsed. The Liberals, who needed only some 95 votes to form a majority, applied to the Progressives and made an alliance whereby Liberals and Progressives shared office on approximately equal terms. The Social Democrats, thus in the minority position where they had really always wished to be, did not regret the failure too much.

ORGANIZATION:

The party is undemocratically organized. Individual membership is decided upon a basis of applications submitted by those desiring to join on condition that they "adhere to party rules and pay the ¥4 annual party dues." They may not withdraw without submitting cause and must then surrender their membership cards. No provision exists for the expression of individual ideas, not even in the constitutional provisions concerning membership in branch organizations.

Party rules provide that a General Assembly shall be convoked yearly or by special call of one-third the Branches. This General Assembly, representing the Branches and chosen by them as they may desire, elects the secretary, treasurer and chairman of the Executive Committee, together with "several central committeemen."

Three committees are the actual party controllers. The Central Committee, described as the party's "deciding organ", is composed of headquarters officials and of an unspecified number of members elected by the General Assembly. An inner circle, the Central Executive Committee, is called the "executive organ", but a still smaller group, the Standing Central Executive Committee of the highest officials, "can over-ride the Central Executive Committee in cases where immediate action is necessary." Its head, the chairman of the Central Executive Committee, "shall control all party affairs."

The chairman of the Central Executive Committee is NISHIO Suyehiro, and the secretary-general KATAYAMA Tetsu. These men, therefore, are the controlling party officials.

BRANCHES:

Fifty party members or more residing in any town or prefecture may form a Branch, provided their application receives headquarters approval, but other Branches may be formed whenever the Central Executive Committee chairman thinks such an establishment desirable. All names and addresses of party members, together with all contracts and other important documents must be forwarded to Party Headquarters for approval.

The purpose of such Branches is "to resolve to materialize the party's general principles, policies and purposes." All discussions, as well as all decisions, made in Branches must be reported for approval to Headquarters.

In addition to officially recognized Branches, other groups, called Supporting Groups, "whose political contentions shall not be in discord with our party platform", may be affiliated. Neither Supporting Groups nor Branches have any authority except that the latter may send delegates to the General Assembly. There is no provision, whatever, regulating the manner in which delegates may be sent nor the basis upon which they are apportioned among the Branches.

PLATFORM:

The Social Democratic platform is noteworthy both for what it says and for what it omits to say. Drawn up by expert public opinion manipulators, it seeks to satisfy everyone without antagonizing either the Right or the Left Wing.

Thus, while the founders of the Party, in their organizational call, announced themselves as favoring "preservation of the Imperial lineage", neither the platform itself nor the official statement submitted to the Home Office mentions the Imperial System or the dynasty. While the organizers specifically favored legalization of "scientific birth control", the redistribution of population between town and country, the postponement of interest on and the redemption of principal of war loans, and the imposition of heavy progressive taxation to recover war profits, none of these are included in the official platform as reported to the police.

On the other hand, the party went beyond original intentions by stressing plans for autonomous producers', merchants' and consumers' cooperatives, the abolition of the Privy Council and the confiscation, for public uses, of idle lands, unused mansions and crown estates and military grounds.

The essential features of the Social Democratic Party as reflected both in its platform and in approved public statements include the following:

GOVERNMENT:

Democratization of the Constitution.
A two-House legislature, with the Upper House chosen by regional and occupational representation.
Votes for all citizens over 18 years of age, on the system of proportional representation.
Popular election of governors, mayors and town and village headmen.
Abolition of the nobility, the Elder Statesmen and the Privy Council.

LABOR:

Joint employer-workmen co-operation in management.
Minimum wage laws.
48 hour work week.
Establishment of a Labor Ministry.

AGRICULTURE:

Establishment of large-scale farming, with mechanization and wider use of draft animals.
Increase of ceiling price of rice to be paid to farmers.
National control over feeds, fertilizers and tools.

SOCIAL LEGISLATION:

Unemployment, health and old-age insurance.
Priority in employment for veterans.
Relief of unemployment through reconstruction, housing and reclamation projects.
Democratization of the radio system and wider distribution of radio sets.
Increase of grain ration to 3 go daily.

WOMEN:

Equality of men and women in customs, institutions and laws.
Prohibition of prostitution.

CULTURE:

Creation of a new Japanese civilization.
Free, universal education on all levels.
Adoption of the metric system.
Adoption of Esperanto as a universal language.

Following publication of the platform, authorized statements by responsible party leaders added other planks extending or clarifying the official statement of aims and purposes.

Thus, in late November, the party, through MIZUTANI, approved the public ownership of steel, coal and other essential industries such as electricity and fertilizer, together with the nationalization of banks, trust companies and insurance firms.

Later, MIZUTANI favored confiscation of all rice hoarded by farmers, and also suggested an increase in the property levy to 70 or 80 percent, together with a rise in the exemption level. MIZUTANI also advocated a reduction in the size of farms, cutting down the permitted holdings to three acres, even in the Hokkaido, with but one acre in Shikoku where it is possible to reap two crops per year.

Discussion of plans for a new Constitution afforded the Social Democrats an opportunity to revise and to extend their platform principles. The Party's Constitutional draft, as published on 23 February made the following suggestions:

EMPEROR:

The Emperor System should continue with the Throne enjoying reduced prerogatives. The Emperor, a politically irresponsible symbol, was to bestow honors and represent the state in foreign affairs. He was to have no other special powers and was expressly denied a veto.

Sovereignty was to rest in the state as a national cooperative body, and the Emperor was to be regarded as part of the state.

DIET:

Approves the succession and establishes regency.
Passes laws (a bill twice approved by Lower House (popularly elected by proportional representation) becomes a law without approval of Upper House (vocational representatives).
Approves all treaties and passes budget.
Exercises all supreme powers not held by Emperor.
Sits constantly but may be dissolved by popular referendum.

DIET PRESIDENTS:

Name prime minister for Imperial approval.

CABINET:

Suggests amnesties to the Emperor.
On advice of Presidents of both houses, names Supreme Court and Procurator General.
Appoints all other judges.
Administers laws.
Hires and discharges government officials.

PRIME MINISTER:

Appoints the Cabinet, which is then responsible to the Diet.

POPULAR RIGHTS:

In addition to the rights already demanded in the party platform etc., the Social Democrats asked that the Constitution include a clause limiting the rights of private ownership to purposes connected with public welfare, justice and fairness. Freedom of speech, press, publication, religion, communication, etc., was again stressed.

OTHER PROPOSALS:

Prior to the opening of the regular session of the Diet, in June 1946, the Standing Executive Committee presented to the YOSHIDA Cabinet a six-point Emergency Food Program for whose realization the Party pledged unwavering support. The plan comprised:

1. Government control over all farm lands, granting to farmers "the right to cultivate" and invalidating all land transactions since surrender which deprived farmers of their land.

2. Increased fertilizer production, with possible nationalization of the industry.

3. Revision of the food delivery system, developing a new price structure and exposing all hoarded food.

4. Reorganization and improvement of rationing.

5. Stabilization of the rice price at 500 yen per koku of five bushels.

6. Establishment of a government-operated salt works.

A supplementary recommendation, handed to the Agriculture, Finance, Transportation, Home and Education Ministries for transmission to the Cabinet, included government control of farm tools and farm necessities, (in addition to fertilizers), the suspension of luxury restaurants for a four months period, the prohibition of hoarding fishing tackle and the increase of school vacations in order to provide more farm labor.

This was the platform upon which the Social Democrats announced their willingness to co-operate with the Administration in the solution of the food crisis.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

Government Section

VOLUME I

JAPANESE POLITICAL PARTIES

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Political Affairs Division

23 August 1946

JAPAN'S WOMEN REPRESENTATIVES IN THE 90TH DIET

Party Affiliation of Women Representatives

Thirty-nine women succeeded in being elected to the House of Representatives in the 10 April 1946 elections. Six were from the Liberal Party, 6 from the Progressive Party, 8 from the Social Democratic Party, 1 from the Communist Party and 18 were either representatives of minor parties or independents. In the last four months, the latter 18 women representatives have joined either some major party or one of the two bargaining bodies in the Diet.

Of this group of minor party representatives and independents only 5 have become affiliated with a major party. An independent from Kyoto, KIMURA Chiyo joined the Liberal Party. NAKAYAMA Tama, an independent from Hyogo, and TAKEUCHI Utako of the New Japan Young Men's Party (Shin Nippon Seinen-to) joined the Progressive Party. The representative of the Newly-Born Citizens Party (Shinsei Komin-to) KOSHIHARA Haru, and the representative of the Hyuga Democratic Party (Hyuga Minshu-to) OHASHI Kimi, joined the Co-Operative Democratic Party)Nippon Kyodo-Minshu-to).

Of the remaining 13 women representatives, 6 are now in the Shinseikai * (New Political Association), 6 in the Independent Club and 1 is a completely independent member of the Diet.

On August 22, the breakdown by party of the Women Members of the House of Representatives was as follows:

Liberal Party	Progressive Party
HONDA Hanake	MOGAMI Hideko
IMAI Hatsu	MORIYAMA Yone
SUGITA Keike	MURASHIMA Kiyo
TAKEDA Kiyo	SAITO Tei
TAKEUCHI Shigeyo	SUGAWARA En
TOMITA Fusa	YAMASHITA Harue
KIMURA Chiyo	NAKAYAMA Tama
	TAKEUCHI Utako

*The Shinseikai is one of the bargaining groups in the Diet.

Social Democratic Party

KATO Shizue
MATSUO Toshiko
NIIZUMA Ito
SAKAKIBARA Chiyo
SAWADA Hisa
YAMAGUCHI Shizue
YAMAZAKI Michiko
YONEYAMA Hisako

Communist Party

KARASAWA Toshiko

Shinseikai

HATSU Ando
YONEYAMA Fumiko
YOSHIDA Sei
NOMURA Misu
TANAKA Tatsu
YAMASHITA Tsuno

Co-operative Democratic Party

KOSHIHARA Haru
OHASHI Kimi

Independent

MIKI Kiyoko

Independent Club

TOGANO Satoko
MATSUTANI Tenkoko
KONDO Tsuruyo
KORO Mitsu
WAZAKI Haru
OISHI Yoshie

Women Representatives' Debut in the Diet

On June 29, 1946, for the first time in the history of Japan, women mounted the speaker's rostrum in the House of Representatives. The first woman ever to speak in the Diet was 49 year-old YONEYAMA Hisako, a member of the Social Democratic Party, and an old-time suffragette. She and four other women made Japan's womanhood's debut in the Diet by speaking on a joint resolution of all parties urging acceleration of the repatriation and relief of demobilized servicemen and repatriates.

Mrs. YONEYAMA said she hoped that Japanese women would appeal to the women of the world to help accelerate the repatriation of Japanese overseas. She also thanked the Allied military authorities for extending assistance to the Japanese repatriates. Mrs. YONEYAMA urged the government to go on with its relief work as a national and public enterprise.

KONDO Tsuruyo of the Independent Club, a high school instructor, expressed her sympathy for demobilized men and pointed out that people in Japan are somewhat cold in receiving them. She said she would like to see the government guarantee the livelihood of all the demobilized men by providing jobs for them.

ANDO Hatsu, an ex-school teacher, who is the representative of the Japan Peace Party (Nippon Heiwa-to), said that unless and until repatriation and demobilization of Japanese soldiers and civilians from overseas are completed the war cannot be said to have ended nor peace really begun.

The two other women who spoke were TANAKA Tatsu of the Shinseikai and KARASAWA Toshiko of the Communist Party.

These maiden speeches of the women in the Diet were favorably received by the male representatives.

Women Representatives' Voice in the Diet

Since their debut, the women representatives have shown particular interest in problems peculiar to women.

Mrs. KATO Shizue, Social Democrat, interpellating in the Constitution Committee of the House of Representatives, complained that the existing Civil Code does not recognize the rights of wives. She proposed that the "feudalistic" provisions found in the Civil Code regarding the family system be revised. She also asked the government about provisions concerning the chastity of men in marriage and about the protection of motherhood and war widows, without which, she maintained equality between men and women cannot be realized.

Another woman concerned with the question of equality between men and women was Mrs. TAKEDA Kiyo, Liberal, who at a session of the House of Representatives Constitution Committee, took exception to Public Welfare Minister Kawai's casual reference at a previous committee meeting to the relationship between the cock and the hen as an illustration of equality between husband and wife. "The Public Welfare Minister has recently referred to the relationship between the cock and the hen in explaining the question of basic equality between man and woman, saying that it is something like the cock going out to pick up feed and the hen staying at home hatching eggs, "Representative TAKEDA pointed out. "I am bitterly dissatisfied with this statement....In terms of value of the cock and hen to the home, the hen is by far more useful than the cock. We may be content with only one cock but we always want as many hens as possible. It is imperative that the State have the fullest respect for the great power of the mother and see to it that this basic concept be fully incorporated in a Mother and Child Protection Law and other related laws," she added. Mrs. TAKEDA went on to ask the government about the custody of children in case of divorce, and the protection of women who "become physically weak in old age sooner than their husbands," and who often are subjected to maltreatment at such a time.

At a meeting of the House of Representatives Committee on the Livelihood Protection Bill, Mrs. TAKEUCHI Shigeyo, Liberal, and Mrs. MATSUO Toshiko, Social Democrat, interpellated on the steps the government was planning to take to prevent destitute women from leading shameful lives.

In this connection, a group of women Diet members have sent a

petition to the House Petitions Committee demanding the abolition of concubinage. One of the sponsors, Mrs. Tomita Fusa, Liberal, said, that "such a feudalistic system of women's slavery is a disgrace to Japan and must be eliminated."

Next to their preoccupation with women's problems, women representatives have been most interested in social relief proposals. When the Livelihood Protection Bill was introduced at a plenary session of the House of Representatives, Mrs. KORO Mitsu of the Indpendent Club presented a proposal to save the vast number of people destitute as a result of the war through a payment-in-kind system and a large-scale "welfare-enterprising corporation" which would serve the two-fold purpose of relief and full employment.

On that occasion another woman, Mrs. YAMAZAKI Michiko, Social Democrat also took the rostrum emphasizing that future social relief work should not be undertaken on a charity basis, but on the basis of the people's right to live.

A curb on labor activities was suggested by Mrs. SUGITA Keiko, Liberal Party Representative at a session of the Lower House Committee on the Labor Relations Adjustment Bill. She expressed the opinion that all labor disputes should be limited to achieving the workers' economic demands. She said that "all labor disputes designed to achieve political ends, including overthrow of a cabinet, should be denied." Mrs. SUGITA also said that no Communist should be appointed to the labor committees or made mediator in labor disputes.

An unusual step was taken by a woman representative, when a vote was taken for a Communist-sponsored motion to delay discussion of the Constitution in favor of the food problem. Miss MATSUTANI Tenkoko, representative of the Starvation Prevention League, was one of the handful of Diet representatives who supported this motion.

Women Representatives' Groups

Women representatives have formed several groups within the Diet. The largest of them, the Diet Women's Club (Fujin Giin Kurabu), organized on April 25, which had a very auspicious beginning, will soon be dissolved, according to Mrs. KATO Shizue, Social Democratic Party Representative. The Club was originally formed so that women Representatives could form a bloc in the Diet concerning women's problems, regardless of party affiliation. The women in the Diet are losing interest in the Club, particularly after General MacArthur's speech in which he said that it would not be wise to form a women's bloc in the Diet.

On July 17, Mrs. WAZAKI Haru, of the Independent Club, organized a committee of Diet Women to watch the Government's answers to interpellations and Government actions. They want to see laws safeguarding the people's livelihood not only enacted but put into effect.

A group of women members of the House of Representatives, on August 15, sponsored proposals to commemorate the occasion of Japan's unconditional surrender as the day for Japan's rebirth as a peace-loving nation. It was also proposed to establish a Peace Memorial Day and construct a Peace Memorial.

Women Representatives' Activity Outside the Diet

Outside the Diet, the women representatives have been active in their respective parties, making speeches to woman's organizations, to cultural groups and unions, taking part in woman's mass meetings, appearing on the radio, touring welfare organizations, and discussing vital problems with government officials.

Mrs. KATO Shizue of the Social Democratic Party asked for equal opportunity for women representatives at a meeting of the Social Democratic Party concerning a program to welcome a party of U. S. Congressmen scheduled to visit Tokyo. The party was to include Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce, but none of the Japanese political parties had appointed a woman representative to the welcoming committee. Mrs. KATO pointed out that the Social Democratic Party should set an example to other parties in demonstrating the democratic rule of the equality of the sexes. She said that despite the fact that liberation of women constitutes one of the essential aims of the Potsdam Declaration, the Diet remains prejudiced against women. She asserted that male members of the Diet seem to believe female members should limit their interests to problems concerning women and children alone. She requested that the way should be opened for women representatives to attend committee meetings to express their views on an equal basis with male Diet members.

Another Social Democratic Party Woman Representative pleaded eloquently for women's rights. When the Sub-Committee on the Revision of the Civil Code reported the result of its findings on the Family Law to the Legislative Reform Committee of the Ministry of Justice at a plenary session, Mrs. SAKAKIBARA Chiyo made an impressive speech urging the abolition of the old Family Law.

A group of Women Representatives met with government officials to discuss relief for soldiers' families and for hastening the repatriation of Japanese overseas. They also met with Public Welfare Minister Kawai to discuss social relief measures.

Furthermore, women Diet members are often invited to discuss vital problems by prefectural and municipal government units which seek their advice and suggestions.

Women Representatives as well as all the women's bureaus of the political parties are discussing the creation of a Women's Bureau in the

government. So far it has remained in the discussion stage, with the possibility that the Social Democratic Party may take up this problem as a project of its own.

After visiting Women's and Childrens' homes, war orphans' dormitories and veterans hospitals, several Women Diet members have decided to bring up the problem of bad conditions in such institutions for consideration to a special Diet committee.

At a women's mass rally in Hibiya Hall on July 7, Mrs. KATO Shizue, Miss KARASAWA Toshiko (Communist Diet representative), and other women politicians registered a protest against the suspended rationing of staple foods and the discharge of women workers because of men's prejudice against women.

Issues involving equal wages for equal work and other benefits for working women were also discussed. After the rally, the women marched to the Premier's official residence with placards saying "The government must take care of the street girls," and "Women must strive for their own improvement."

Press and Public Opinion

Japanese Press Opinion during the 90th session of the Diet shows disappointment in the activities of the Women Representatives. The newspapers comment on the Diet women's incompetence and low intellectual level. They point out that the women are focussing their attention on matters of small scope such as the milk problem, and women's and children's problems, forgetting the nation as a whole. They would like to see the women take a broader point of view. They admit that three or four women Diet members are progressing satisfactorily and at times even praise them for their sincere efforts, but are contemptuous of the actions and statements of the remaining 35.

But at least one Japanese came out strongly in favor of Japanese political womanhood. At a session in the House of Peers, MIZUNO Jinjiro declared that all Japanese males should retire from politics and pass all political rights into the hands of women. Declaring that "woman is the goddess of peace," he pointed out that "Amaterasu Omikami was a sun goddess. We must now go back to the days when this land was ruled by the Sun Goddess. Men with their corrupt sense of morality could not possibly be expected to accomplish the task of reconstructing this country."

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Public Administration Division
Political Parties Branch

24 July 1946

DIET GROUPS AND INDEPENDENTS

The lack of well-established political parties possessing roots striking deep into Japan's history, and the consequent absence of strong political loyalties led in the 10 April 1946 election to the return to the Diet of an unprecedentedly large number of unattached candidates. When it was sought to appraise the political complexion of the new Diet the presence of 38 representatives of 26 minor parties, together with 78 Independents posed a problem of some magnitude.

Several of these small party and unattached members joined, however, with the Liberals, Progressives, Social Democrats or Co-operatives, thus reducing the number of men whose attitudes required separate study.

The presence of 116 Independent and minor party representatives inspired several politicians with the idea of either merging them with existing party organizations or of forming an entirely new group useful for bargaining purposes within the Diet.

Among those who sought one or the other of these ends were:

1. NARAHASHI Wateru (Fukuoka), SHIDEHARA's Minister Without Portfolio, who sought to absorb the Independents within the Progressive Party under SHIDEHARA's leadership in order to uphold the SHIDEHARA Cabinet. NARAHASHI worked toward this end with the silent approval of SHIMODA Toshio, former Speaker of the Diet, a Progressive Party founder, and of TANAKA Takeo, ex-Transportation Minister, also a Progressive Party founder. Both SHIMODA and TANAKA, as well as former Home Minister MITSUCHI Chuji, had been barred by purge directives from active political activity and hence did not dare appear openly in connection with NARAHASHI's activities.

Widespread press hostility and strong public opposition to what was construed as SHIDEHARA's bid to retain power in defiance to the results of the 10 April election grew so strong that NARAHASHI was obliged to withdraw from the political arena.

2. ISHIGURO Takeshige (Yamagata), SHIDEHARA's Legislative Bureau Director, took over the NARAHASHI program but sought to make it more palatable by stressing his desire to work through such younger Progressive leaders as NAGAI Gen and INUKAI Ken. With these and his Independents as a nucleus, ISHIGURO planned a party that would "link the Liberal left and the Social Democratic right."

3. WIKAWA Tadao, then chief of the Co-operative Party, invited into his organization all independents who subscribed to the co-operative principle. Many of the unattached representatives were expected to join but since a restriction imposed by the Co-operative Party limited accessions to agrarian members only ten or a dozen Diet members accepted. Among these were TANNO Monoru (Miyage), a former IRAA member and ex-Minseito leader, MIKI Takeo (Tokushima) a former Diet member, and KONO Kinshu (Aichi), former chief of the propaganda bureau of the East Asia Association (Tohokai). TANAKA Isaji (Kyoto), a well-known stormy petrel of Japanese politics, and a NARAHASHI adherent, also tried to join the Co-operatives but was not admitted.

4. TANAKA, a veteran Diet member, working in the NARAHASHI-ISHIGURO interest, next tried to organize the scattered Independents and minor party representatives. His goal was the creation of a new party of some 70 members which, by the aid of a "working agreement" with the Co-operatives (and, he hoped, with the right wing of the Social Democrats) would hold the balance of power in parliamentary politics. His promise of harmony to be achieved between capital and labor through the introduction of the co-operative guild principle into labor unions was calculated to attract both left wingers and Co-operative Party members. Nevertheless an apparantly widespread feeling that TANAKA was personally untrustworthy operated against the success of his plan.

5. Simultaneously with the TANAKA proposals, at the instigation of the Japan Educational Association, MATSUBARA Kazuhiko (Oita) and NAKADA Eitaro (Toyama) invited the new Diet's 37 teacher members to form an Educational Party to be called New Politics Friendly Association (Shinsei Doshikai). Opinions differ concerning the fundamental idea of this projected organization, some holding that the group was to operate as a bloc only in the event that educational matters came before the Diet, others believing that the Japan Educational Association intended to enter practical politics. The former idea is probably more nearly correct, since some attempt at least was made to enlist teacher members belonging to other established parties on the understanding that their regular party affiliations would not be affected on non-educational matters.

However, color is lent to the view that the Educational Association had wider designs by the accusation that in several prefectures the Association began a definite campaign to create a political machine operated by teachers, school officials and pupils. The success of 37 teachers in their election campaigns is cited as proof of the efficiency of this scheme.

This conflict over the underlying motives of the New Politics Friendly Association resulted in sharp cleavage among the teacher Diet members when the projected party held its first meeting. Dr. SASAMORI Junzo (Aomori), president of the Methodist missionary school AOYAMA GAKUIN, who had been slated for the presidency of the new organization, withdrew from all connection with the party when he suspected that its formation was a propaganda device; with him there also withdrew five other teachers. SASAMORI reports that a subsidiary reason for his action was his fear that the New Politics Friendly Association was, in reality, a means for promoting TANAKA's political ambitions.

The teachers remaining in the Association later became the nucleus for the Shinko Club.

6. At the same time that the teachers and the TANAKA clique attempted to capitalize on the NARAHASHI-ISHIGURO fiasco, KASAI Gyuji (Yamanashi), HAYASHI Heima (Fukushima), SASAMORI and eight others issued a call for a special group "to oppose all political manoeuvers that might betray the general wish of the public as manifested in the general election." This referred, of course, to the NARAHASHI-ISHIGURO manoeuvers, but SASAMORI, at least, also intended the manifesto to suggest that idealists and patriots should band together for the general welfare of Japan.

DAIDO CLUB:

Forty-seven unattached Diet members met on 21 April and agreed to unite into a so-called Daido Club. This group had, however, as its only criterion for membership the fact that the Diet member belonged to no major party. Thus it gained the adherence of such men as TANAKA, KASAI, MIKI, TANNO and KONO. ISHIGURO himself was invited to take part in the Daido Club "in his private capacity."

First-term Diet members whom SASAMORI describes as "Puritans" thereupon organized a purging process to rid themselves of old-line parliamentarians. As a first step, they transformed the Daido Club into the Japan Democratic Party Preparatory Committee, a group without a president or without officers which they intended to serve as a Diet bargaining agency. As a second step they announced that the organization should consist of "freshmen" (ichinin) only and that, therefore, MIKI, KASAI and TANAKA should withdraw. MIKI did so, joining the Co-operative Party; TANAKA also left but found difficulty in placing himself with any other group. KASAI, hoping, he said, for a relaxation of the rule in so far as he personally might be affected, lingered in the Democratic Club ranks although obviously unwelcome in that circle. The purge and other changes reduced the Democratic Club's strength.

7. Although obviously unwelcome in any of the minor parties, TANAKA Isaji continued his efforts to form a minor party. In this he represented, as he frankly admits, the secret purposes of the NARAHASHI-ISHIGURO alliance which, he says, has been unjustly judged by the general public. TANAKA, again echoing the NARAHASHI-ISHIGURO line, believes that SHIDEHARA continues to remain Japan's best hope and that the hue-and-cry raised against the continuance of SHIDEHARA in power was a false campaign caused by the lies and machinations of the Communist clique. TANAKA, while agreeing that free speech and free criticism is theoretically desirable, thinks that some form of censorship, perhaps of suppression, is required against newspapers and radio broadcasters who maliciously malign the characters and purposes of men in public life.

TANAKA's present plan is broader than a mere union of Independents; he thinks it possible to create an entirely new party from the older and better established organizations. Ten of the Democratic Club, he says, will follow his leadership (he mentions TAKEUCHI, TERASHIMA, NAKAYAMA, MASUI, TSUBOKAWA, KASAI, ZUSHI, NOMURA, YOSHIDA Sei and TANAKA Tatsuo in

this connection, together with KIMURA Chizo of the unattached group). With them he expects at least ten Liberals, headed by MIKI Bunichi, the ousted Speaker of the House, 5 Progressives (including SATSUMA, HORI, MATSUDA and NAGAOKA) and three Social Democrats (HIRANO NISHIO and KONO Mitsu).

Reminded that some of these, as for instance, MIKI, held high posts within their parties and that it would be difficult to understand why men in the majority coalition would secede to join an untried minority party, TANAKA retorted that the unity among Liberals, as well as within other parties had been much over-rated and that dissent was rampant against the current party leadership. He seems to have no real ground for such belief, inasmuch as he says the malcontent Liberals did not object to the leadership of KONO Ichiro nor are they angry at the appointment of WADA as Agricultural Minister; apparently he feels that more experienced members of Parliament will join together merely in opposition to the ambitions of the first-term members.

He is similarly vague with respect to the reasons why top-ranking Progressives closely allied with INUKAI should desert their party, but he says that the friendship with INUKAI is unreal and that, even when the men concerned and INUKAI himself profess such friendship, they are deliberately lying.

TANAKA's views concerning the Social Democratic Party are similarly unorthodox. The apparent Right Wing control, held by HIRANO, NISHIO and KONO Mitsu, he says, was unreal, and the Left Wing is really in the saddle. Any other explanation, he says, is entirely false; there is even, TANAKA declares, a secret agreement for a common front with the Communists.

Such "disclosures" perhaps explain the basis for the general reluctance of other parties to obtain the alliance of TANAKA Isaji. Few people put confidence in his judgment. NARAHASHI and ISHIGURO however, continue to hope that he may attract supporters, though their faith is apparently groundless.

Failing to perfect his inter-party alliance, TANAKA declared, he would ask admission into the Co-operative Party, where MIKI Takeo is at present located. The Co-operatives, however, declined to receive him, thus leaving TANAKA politically isolated.

When the Diet opened, the Democratic Club, the Shinko Club, and a band of assorted Diet members describing themselves as the Independent Club, together included nearly all members not affiliated with one of the major parties.

These three cliques existed only because of peculiar Diet rules of procedure. By Japanese custom, small minorities are stifled in their opportunity for expression; restrictions prevent the unsupported individual member from free activity on the floor or from committee membership, nor does the unattached member have the same privileges of steering legislative proposals as are possessed by those affiliated with larger blocs. To belong to a party, then, or a parliamentary club of at least 25 members confers

special opportunities upon the members. Each Diet member, irrespective of political belief, necessarily subscribes to such a bargaining body. Membership implies no political obligation but does confer such material advantage as office-space, and opportunity to gain the ear of the House.

DEMOCRATIC CLUB:

Within the three existing Diet clubs the same general situation was found. Without any overall platform and with no effective organization, the members, while, of course, united on the need for solving the food - inflation and reconstruction problems, differed widely on their proposed legislative program. Those elected on minor party tickets retained their membership in such parties and professed adherence to the platforms upon which they campaigned. Many of them were opportunists but all of them, including such experienced politicians as TANAKA, KASAI and MIKI, claimed to be idealists with no taste for practical political manoeuvering.

Nevertheless, some differences were discoverable. The Democratic Club, a freshman group, represented a conservative influence while the Shinko Club was more radical. The Democrats with five women members and five teachers (only one of whom is a class-room teacher) compared with the two women and the eighteen teachers (ten of whom have present-day classroom experience) of the Shinko Club. No exact geographical comparison was possible but it is evident that the Democratic Club was slightly stronger in the northern prefectures and that the Shinko Club was more powerful in the south; this, however, was probably accidental and devoid of ideological significance.

Within the clubs, no common attitude existed toward major problems. Many of the women, for instance, have no real programs but content themselves with vague aspirations concerned with "representing the women's point of view" which, as far as national problems are concerned they fail to distinguish from what they call the "masculine idea." Such women as TAKEUCHI Utako (Chiba) and ANDO Hatsu (Nagano) freely admit that they ran for office merely because some one else, in the former instance a friend and in the latter case a husband, recommended that they do so. Mrs. TAKEUCHI awaited advice on whether to remain within the Democratic Club or to transfer to some other group. On 12 July she formally entered the Progressive Party.

Many of the men independents are people of little higher calibre; many of them are political wanderers with no deep convictions. Others, such as the anti-Socialistic TSUBOKAWA Shinzo (Fuku), are private agents of chiefs of other parties; TSUBOKAWA admitted that he receives "confidential orders" from INUKAI Ken of the Progressives and that "INUKAI will take good care of me politically." He too joined the Progressives. Dr. SASAKAWA, who is no man's tool, also looks upon INUKAI as a sage advisor. YOSHIDA Sei, former champion lady shot-putter, and KASAI at first declined to classify themselves politically, the former confessedly for lack of information, the latter, because as a seasoned politician, he knew the danger of unnecessary advance commitments. After dickering with the Co-operatives KASAI eventually wished to be enrolled among the Liberals; he hoped, he said, to be appointed Foreign Minister.

All profess themselves as extremely anxious to follow SCAP leadership. TSUBOKAWA says that he may be counted upon to support all Administration

measures "since they will first have been passed upon and approved by SCAP."

TSUBOKAWA, while thoroughly sincere insofar as his co-operation with the Occupation is concerned, lined up with the Administration, however, chiefly because, as INUKAI's confidential agent he was obliged to follow the Government Party's leadership. His true convictions are that a conservative democratic party is essential; since the projected Democratic Party did not seem to him to fill that function he merged with the Progressives.

KOSHIHARA Haru (Aichi), a school principal, falls within the same category as TSUBOKAWA as a secret agent. Miss KOSHIHARA was elected on the New-Born-Citizens Party ticket, but immediately after election she switched her allegiance to the Co-operative Party and has been active in attempting to persuade independent and minor party women to join with her. Presumably the Co-operative Party applies strict membership tests prior to accepting candidates for entrance but Miss KOSHIHARA, perhaps in her zeal to win converts, appears to have waived the requirement. Thus far, however, her efforts have resulted only in the accession of YAMASHITA Tsune (Kumamoto), a fellow teacher and a veteran suffragist who in any case probably would have accompanied her male colleagues into the Co-operative ranks.

Dr. ARIMA Eiji, former professor at Hokkaido Imperial University, who headed the list of successful candidates in his Hokkaido prefecture, holds opinions parallel to those of his fellow-leader SASAMORI. ARIMA, however, who was elected through a "medical bloc", is more concerned than is his partner with the political manoeuverings of the educational leaders, who, he said, formed and who continued to dominate, the Shinko Club. He thinks that the Japan Educational Association, acting through the organized grade school teachers of the nation, are building a political machine and that the latent motive of this machine will be to echo the wishes of the purged HATOYAMA Ichiro. In fact, he saw the hidden hand of HATOYAMA not only in the Shinko Club but also as continuing to guide the present Liberal Party. This explains why he, as well as SASAMORI, prefers the leadership of INUKAI to that of any Liberal chief.

ARIMA, however, insisted that the Democratic Club, whether or not it formed a separate formal party, would uphold the Administration's food, inflation and rehabilitation programs, as well as the proposed draft Constitution. After these matters are settled, he says, the Democrats might declare war upon the Government coalition. This, of course, was prior to the Democratic Club's collapse.

AKAZAWA Masamichi (Tottori) a contractor specializing in public works construction, agrees with such a program and, like TANAKA, is fearful of a spread of Communist ideas. AKAZAWA distrusted the professions of KONO, since purged, and INUKAI and, while more friendly to the Liberals than to the Progressives, suspected that HATOYAMA continued to dominate the party. AKAZAWA favors any political alliance, however, that will limit Communistic influence. Together with AKITA Dansuke (Tokushima) he demands the introduction of scientific thinking into governmental matters. He was a first lieutenant during the war (not a career officer but one of those recruited during the war emergency for special engineering service) and it is evident that his views, as well as AKITA's, while sometimes couched in phrases that

are similar to the Fascist-Nazi pattern of scientific rationalization are really those of the businessman who has grown impatient with the wordiness and apparent lack of accuracy in political thinking. The established parties seem to him too addicted to fruitless debating but he would be inclined to enter the Co-operative Party were it not so obviously an agrarian movement.

Other Democratic Club members who may be counted upon to support the Liberal-Progressive coalition on most matters likely to crop up during the current Diet session are TERAJIMA Ryutaro (Chiba), OKADA Seichi (Tokushima) and ITSUBO Shigeo (Ishikawa). The latter is of s ecial importance as being one of the few schoolmen who did not desert to the Shinko Club ranks. This failure is explained by ARIMA as due to the fact that the teachers are themselves divided; the grade school Diet members swung to the comparatively Leftist Shinko Club, while the university professors and middle school teachers, like ARIMA SASAMORI TAKEUCHI and ITSUBO remained with the more conservative Democratic Club.

SHINKO CLUB:

The Shinko Club, sprung largely from the school-teachers operating under the leadership of the Japan Educational Association, contained those middle-of-the-roaders who tend toward a more leftist attitude. They are not Communists although they favor in principle the Democratic Front, nor are they adherents of the left wing of the Social Democrats. They support the Emperor System, although holding that the power of the Emperor should be reduced but when questioned concerning the detailed changes they would suggest in the sections of the proposed draft constitution dealing with the Emperor's reduced powers they point only to the Emperor's supposed right to make treaties and to dissolve the Diet.

The Shinko Club was itself internally divided. A Youth Group, the Seiso Club, led by HOSOSEKO Kanemitsu (Yamaguchi) comprises ISHIDA Ichimatsu, a Tokyo actor who calls himself a "happy-go-lucky fellow who must now calm down." From the time of his graduation from law-school, ISHIDA says, he has been anxious to participate in serious national affairs; now that he has been elected to the Diet he feels it not only a national duty but also a contribution to his profession to make himself a statesman worthy of his Diet seat. Other Seiso members were HIKITA Toshio (Yamaguchi), MATSUTANI Tenkoku (Tokyo), FUGITA Sakae (Chiba), HAYAKAWA Takeshi (Wakayama) and TANAKA Hisao (Mie) who is said to be OZAKI Yukio's secretary. HIKITA anticipated that after KASAI, MIKI and TANAKA have been removed from the Democratic Club the three minor groups might unite. His efforts toward that end resulted in July 1946 in the formation of a 45-member party, the Shinsei-kai.

A second group, the Non-Party Club (Mushozogu) included five members elected from Nagano (OGAWA Ippei, ANDO Hatsu, IKEGAMI Takasaka, IDE Ichitaro and KOSAKA Jentaro). This group, headed by OGAWA, had no peculiar ideas but is apparently a bargaining group within a bargaining group, and, as such, entered as a body into the Shinsei-Kai. Its membership was, however, interesting in that this tightly-integrated Nagano delegation reflected the situation that existed in other prefectures on election day.

None of the successful candidates (excepting MIYAZAWA Seikichi, who later joined the Progressives) accepted the aid of professional politicians. ANDO, as the only woman candidate, profited by the interest and curiosity expressed by women voters in one of their own sex who was sufficiently ambitious to stand for election; a quiet, completely conventional woman without force of intellectual strength, her election, as Peace Party candidate on a birth-control platform, is generally explained as a political accident. IDE, a brewer, consistently proclaimed that no political parties could be organized in advance of election but that parties could grow only after Diet members had been chosen. His effective personality, and his corps of highly competent canvassers, aided by his father, IDE Kesahei, head of the prefectural Wine Dealers' Association, won him success.

KOSAKA, a slightly leftist theoretician, and IKEGAMI also a progressive thinker, appealed to voters because of what were described as "refreshingly new" ideas. IKEGAMI however, had the additional advantage of an organized school-teacher machine which canvassed the community in his interest and, according to his opponents, required each school-child to deliver at least four votes. IKEGAMI also had organized farm support.

OGAWA's special interest in the repatriation problem, plus the fact that his father, the late OGAWA Heikichi (Oga-Hei), had been popular, gained him the election. OGAWA, a leader of considerable force, has neither the theoretical interests nor the attractiveness of IDE and KOSAKA but is likely to be a more effective organizer and a better bargainer. In so far as the Mushozogu exerted any influence within the Shinko Club it was due to OGAWA's wire-pulling ability.

The Education Group members, numbering approximately 18, comprised the remainder of the Shinko Club. Their associates and rivals assert that none of the Education Group members are strong men and women but that they are conservatives at heart who will act as they are directed by the Japan Educational Association. If it is true, as has been asserted from prefectures scattered over Japan, that politically-conscious school teachers hastily built a political machine that utilized their pupils as vote collectors, a tendency of potentially dangerous possibilities has thus been started. There seems no doubt but that in Miyazaki and Nagano prefectures, at least, such a machine was active during the campaign; the banding together of the teachers within the Shinko Club may well be a reflection of this political machine activity.

MATSUBARA Kazuhiko (Oita) and NAKADA Eitaro (Toyama) founders of the New Politics Friendly Association, deny that any sinister purpose lies latent in the teachers' political interest; they explain teacher activity as due solely to the interests of educators in good government; they also deny that undue pressure was exercised by the Educational Association. MATSUBARA, a former teacher and Tokyo school superintendent, is the driving force in teacher organization and the chief director of their political movement.

It is typical of the confusion currently rife in Japanese politics that while MATSUBARA and NAKADA say that the teachers represent a centrist influence, MIKI Takeo, a veteran politician, looked upon them as conservatives who might join the Co-operatives (a prediction also hopefully voiced by WIKAWA Tadao and YAMAMOTO Sanehiko of that party) while SASAMORI Junzo thinks they showed a leftist interest.

INDEPENDENT CLUB:

The Independent Club represented a number of unclassified interests. The presence of 7 women, 3 teachers, 3 priests, and 4 former local politicians suggest something of the flavor of the group.

KORO Mitsu (Tokushima) wife of a purged Diet member, MIKI Kiyoko (Osaka), colorful woman member whose court struggle to explain her misrepresented questionnaire attracted the attention of all Japan, INOUYE Tokiro (Miyage), an old-time Minseito leader and IRAPS member, and KONISHI Torematsu (Osaka), a contractor and labor boss, were other outstanding members. So was NAKANO Shiro (Aichi) who advocates prefectural self-government as well as an Imperial veto power. INOUYE, the practical politician, led most of these into the Shinsei Kai.

ABE Shunzo (Miyage), lawyer, Sendai city official and community authority on Americanism, placed himself first among the Independents, and later among the Liberals, because he wishes to work for "free civil liberties, progressive taxation and Jeffersonian democracy." As an anti-Socialist, he preferred the Liberal Party program but he did not join it at first because he could not tolerate the HATOYAMA influences still dominating the Liberals. After HATOYAMA and KONO were purged this objection was removed.

Virtually all Independents were elected as supporters of the Emperor System; hence neither Communists nor left-wing Social Democrats will benefit by their votes.

Most Independents, also, are strongly pro-American; several of them, indeed, may be described as "professional Americaphiles." ABE makes a living by lecturing on American national characteristics; his ordinary conversation is studded with Lincoln quotations. While he takes pains to stress what he calls his "Forty Years in the United States" it appears that what he actually means is that he studied forty years ago in a small college near Chicago.

ABE, like SASAMORI, TSUBOKAWA and KASAI, announces his willingness to support any measure that the Occupation may suggest. Apparently he has no favorite doctrines of his own, other than opposition to TANAKA Isaji and to the Communists but he is anxious to cultivate friendships with American officials.

SHINSEI KAI:

Such uncertainties as those which made the Shinko Club, the Democratic Club and the Independents an unpredictable group of adventurers, exhibitionists, political accidents and high-minded theorists eventually threatened the collapse of all three bargaining groups. Desertions to the major parties cut memberships to dangerously low levels, the Democratic Club's membership, for instance, being reduced to 17, while both the Shinko Club and Independent Club fell close to the 25 member limit.

Although under the circumstances, the majority parties showed surprising tolerance of the splinter groups, tacitly ignoring the Diet regulations by continuing to allow such factions headquarters space and speaking facilities--the six Communist members, for instance, received far more than their proportionate amount of interpellation time--party realignments were essential.

On 9 July, therefore, 31 members of the Lower House representing the Shinko Club, the Democratic Club and the Independent Club met under the chairmanship of HIKIDA Toshio and organized the New Party, Shinsei Kai, a conglomerate body whose chief purpose was the mustering of more than 25 Diet members. Among the chief leaders of this movement were OGAWA, Mrs. ANDO, IKEMURA Heitaro and KUBO Takeo of the Shinko Club, OKADA, AKITA Daisuke, ISHISAKI Senmatsu, AKASAWA Masamichi and TANAKA Tatsu of the Democrats, and Hozumi Hichiro, KITA Narajiro, OTANI Keijun, YAMASHITA Tsuneko, KIMURA Chiyo and INOUYE Takeshi of the Independents. The Shinsei Kai was expected to enrol 45 members; it is significant that TANAKA Isaji and KASI Jiuji, like NARAHASHI and ISHIGURO, were not invited to take part in the negotiations.

In the formation of this new party, certain phenomenon are outstandingly important. One is that the Shinko Club went over almost en masse, the only exceptions being three individuals who preferred to remain within independent ranks. Since one of these was HOSOSAKO, the Yamaguchi lawyer who had ambitions to weld together a new party of his own it is evident that the unifying forces came from a more adroit source.

Second, the school teacher clique, both within the Shinko Club and those scattered within the Independent Club and the Democrats, have clustered into the Shinsei Kai. Only ARIMA Hideji, now a Progressive stalwart, remains outside the solid teacher grouping of the Shinsei Kai.

Third, the Democratic Club, through desertion to the Shinsei Kai and to older parties, has been wholly shattered. In this movement, it is noteworthy, the so-called Old Boys, those whom the New Faces distrusted, have been eliminated, so that the Shinsei Kai becomes largely a group of amateurs under the leadership of SASAMORI, HIKITA and OGAWA.

Little, however, happened to disturb the more elastic group of Independents; instead of losing, they gained, in addition to HOSOZAKO such converts as ISHIDA, MUTO and FUJITA Sakae. Rumors that the colorful MIKI Kyoko would apply for Communist affiliation appeared to be without foundation.

Thus, the Shinsei Kai, newest of the Diet groups became the fifth largest party, with a membership of more than 40 delegates. How long it would continue, however, was still at the close of July 1946, a matter for heated political debate.

A SURVEY OF THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY

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By

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A SURVEY OF THE JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY

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A SURVEY OF THE JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY

I. INTRODUCTION

In pre-war years the Communist Party, banned by the Peace Preservation Laws and Imperial Ordinances, existed only as an underground association working principally among the intelligentsia. Whenever by overt activity it attracted the attention of the authorities it was promptly suppressed and driven back underground. Throughout the Pacific War the party lay dormant, its leaders in jail or scattered in exile. When freedom of political organization and activity was bestowed upon the Japanese by the Allied Occupation, communism achieved legal status on a basis of equality with other political ideologies.

In the immediate postwar period the communist movement experienced a surge of power fostered by effective party organization and militant leadership and aided by the political vacuum then existing. For a brief time it appeared that the Communist Party might rise to power in Japan through legal political means. This potentiality failed of realization, however, due to a combination of factors, chiefly the inherent nature of the movement and the revulsion of the Japanese people against its tactic of violent action under foreign direction.

The present norm of direct popular support of communist candidates is but 5% of the electorate. Communist front organizations are losing their influence as they are identified by the people. Labor, important segments of which at first came under communist control, has ejected communist leaders from all key positions. Japanese courts, reflecting public opinion, have sanctioned the discharge of communist agitators from sensitive positions. Even the prisoners of war formerly held in communist-dominated areas for thorough party indoctrination have on repatriation broken away from the movement. Party finances are at a low ebb.

By order of the Occupation, communist publications guilty of repeated violations of the Press Code have been suspended. The party itself is so discredited in the eyes of the public and so weakened by internal schism that it is unlikely to show any material increase in strength in the foreseeable future. How this situation came about is the subject of the present report.

II. BACKGROUND AND FORMATION

Beginnings

There was no organized peoples' movement in Japan from the Meiji Restoration in 1868 until the termination of the Sino-Japanese War. Feudalistic concepts prevailed. There was no labor movement. Japan's first strike occured in 1896, and then only as a relatively minor railroad stoppage north of Tokyo. However, the government was pushing an accelerated industrial revolution and accordingly, as industrial laborers increased in number, labor organizers began to work among them. Among those first to advocate peoples' action comparable to that contemplated by communism were KOTOKU Shusui, later executed together with his wife for plotting against the life of the emperor, and SAKAI Toshihiko. Also active were OSUGI Sakae and KONDO Eizo, responsible in November of 1904 for the translation of the Marx-Engel's Communist Manifesto and for its publication in the Heimin Shimbun.

This publication marked the beginning of communism in Japan--but the end of the Heimin Shimbun, which was immediately closed for having published the Proclamation in violation of the police regulations for public peace.

KONDO's group, too, fomented opposition to the Russo-Japanese War and in support of the position of the burgeoning Russian Communist Party. They were ineffectual, however, and succeeded only in arousing a certain amount of intellectual interest.

Industrialization proceeded, Japan profited from World War I, and the plight of the tenant farmer and the industrial laborer became more difficult. A rice riot in August 1918, which required the calling of Army units for its suppression, though in itself spontaneous, prepared many intellectuals mentally to accept any political dogma which would correct the evil conditions affecting these classes. Social Research institutes were formed in the universities and among scholars, of which the New Men's Society of Tokyo University and the Civilian Peoples' Society of Waseda University were the principal ones. Students began to study and discuss a subject new in Japan: the rights of man.

Additionally, the recession which took place in 1920 and 1921 put many laborers on the street, depressed prices, and further unsettled Japanese society.

The catalyst did not exist, however, until the formation of the Comintern in March 1919, and it was August 1921 before the first Japan Communist Party, the Gyomin-Kai or Gyomin Kyosanto, was formed; then it appeared as a secret society. Later, after the Comintern Branch in Shanghai had organized and instructed them, SAKAE Toshihiko, YAMAKAWA Kin, OSUGI Sakae, TAKATSU Seido and KONDO Eizo, as a preparatory committee, formed the Japan Branch of the Comintern.

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This group contrived various supporting societies, prospered, sent TOKUDA Kyuichi and TAKASE Kiyoshi to Moscow in December 1921 to receive instructions, and began to plan the spread of communist propaganda throughout Japan. KONDO Eizo, however, became over bold, and together with seven of his fellows, was imprisoned for violation of the public peace regulations by criticism of the Imperial Government. Other members of the committee continued their work, and on 15 July 1922 the first general assembly of the Communist Party met. SAKAI Toshihiko, YAMAKAWA Kin, ARAHATA Kanson and TOKUDA Kyuichi formed the Central Committee of the party.

The Japanese Communist Organization swore adherence to the Comintern and obedience to its instructions to include submission to Comintern authority even though by this foreign agency Japanese party members should be called upon to break Japanese law. Thus--they bound themselves in the slave pattern of International Communism.

First Japan Communist Party

The first Japan Communist Party accepted YAMAKAWA Kin as its leader and teacher of theory. Since it existed only as a secret organization it could not conduct open political activity, but it began publication of AKAHATA to spread its ideology, and established a Labor Union Department to infiltrate and influence the labor unions. Also, it dispatched YAMAMOTO Kenzo to Moscow to receive further instructions of the Comintern.

During this period, SANO Gaku propagandized the Society of Declassed People, calling for a Common Front and SUZUKI Mosaburo formed the Protection and Relief Society, which strove to promote class struggle among various depressed groups.

Sectarianism sprang up, however, among party leaders who could not reconcile their views on the Emperor System and the revolutionary propriety of parliamentary action. Party influence began to decline going into practical extinction after the great Kanto Earthquake of September 1923.

Second Japan Communist Party

All important party leaders except ARAHATA agreed early in 1924 that Japan was not sufficiently developed to support a communist movement. "Since the class consciousness of the proletariat is undeveloped," YAMAKAWA Kin said, "it is best to strengthen personal enlightenment for the present, in order to pave the way for attainment of the party later."

A Liquidation Bureau was set up to give aid to social movements and the party retreated to the purely theoretical sphere. A reconstruction faction, however, soon grew up under the prodding of SANO Gaku and YAMAMOTO Kenzo, who received instructions from the Comintern. They sent

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ARAHATA to Shanghai for advice in January 1925, followed later by SANO, who came back in mid-1925 with reconstruction plans and adequate funds.

By December 1925, reconstruction had proceeded to the extent of these instructions, and TOKUDA was called to Moscow to meet the Comintern Executive Committee. There he was provided with additional funds and instructions and dispatched back to Japan to reorganize the party in December of 1926 as follows:

Chairman of Central Committee	SANO Fumio, Chief of Farmers' Union Section
Central Committee Member	FUKUMOTO Kazuo, Chief of Political and Intelligentsia Section
Central Committee Member	WATANABE Masanosuke, Chief of Labor Union Section
Central Committee Member	SANO Gaku, Chief of the Proletarian Newspaper Section
Central Committee Member	ICHIKAWA Shoichi
Central Committee Member	TOKUDA Kyuichi, Japanese Representative of the Comintern
Central Committee Member	NABEYAMA Sadachika (Teishin)
Central Committee Member	NAKAO Katsuo
Chairman of Control Committee	YAMAKAWA Kin

Serious factionalism sprang up again. YAMAKAWA Kin found his parliamentary modification of the Comintern-dictated policies of defense of the Soviet Union, abolition of the Emperor System, land reform, and support of labor principles not acceptable to a more radical clique led by FUKUMOTO. He argued that the party should organize for violent revolution and swerve away from "making too much of the Intelligentsia". The Comintern settled the dispute by rejecting YAMAKAWA's theories as opportunistic and FUKUMOTO's as disrupting and ordered that a new thesis be adopted. Under this decision, the fundamentals of cellular structure were first soundly introduced to Japan, the general principles of YAMAKAWA's platform re-adopted, and the doctrine of the democratic front approved.

For a short time the party prospered, but lost caution in support of Labor-Farmer Party political activities. In the February 1928 elections (during which "manhood sufferage" was first put into practice) leaders collaborated so openly with OYAMA Ikuo, Labor-Farmer Chief, that the Japanese Government took drastic suppressive action. During what is called the "March 15th", 1928 Incident, 500 communists were arrested. Their leaders fled to Moscow and called for violent resistance on the part of followers still in Japan. Some responded by arming themselves and combating law enforcement agents until concerted action by police brought arrest of more than 600 party members in the "April 16th" 1929 Incident.

Attempts to Renew the Party

In June of 1929, TANAKA Seigen received instructions from the Comintern

to attempt party reorganizations. He bungled and the police intervened in February 1930. Nonetheless, the precept which he brought from the Comintern --that terrorism and violence should continue, and that the Japanese communists therefore must organize in armed corps--was adopted by the remaining comrades. Consequently, there were several instances of pistol fights with the police and a major riot at Kawasaki on 30 April 1930 where the communists were successful in agitating delegates at the General Council of Labor Union Delegates to a clash with the police.

The Comintern was not satisfied with progress, however, and dispatched KAZAMA Jokichi, who had been studying party tactics in Moscow, to set up an Emergency Communist Party. He received organization funds and was able to make some progress in the propagation of the Comintern's repeated dictate: that the proletarian revolution should be accelerated by terroristic acts. KAZAMA erred in trying to expand party membership too rapidly and in quite openly negotiating to secure arms and ammunition illegally. Though he attracted adherents from among those hurt by depression, their qualifications were not carefully examined and the party had no secrets from the police who planted many spies in its ranks.

Funds continued to come from the Comintern, until the Manchurian Incident, when the party received a revised propaganda line but no adequate support. This revised line stressed support of the Soviet Union and liberation of Japanese Colonies, as well as domestic strife and sabotage. The only success was within farmer, labor and student front organizations where such men as KAWAKAMI Hajime, one time Kyoto University professor and leader of the Farm Labor Party, taught Marx-Lenin doctrine.

Under adversity, factionalism flared up and the fight between KAZAMA and KONNO Yojiro, the Comintern's new favorites, and SANO and NABEYAMA, imprisoned but still anxious to retain leadership, burned hot. Lack of funds drove party members to bank robbery, forgery and blackmail. The party fragmented and no group had the confidence of any other group since betrayals to the police were common. SANO and NABEYAMA dealt the final blow by publicly recanting their communistic faith.

Leaderless Period

From 1934 until October of 1945, the Japan Communist Party had no coordinated leadership, and neither was International Communism's direction so constant and certain as at other times, since the Comintern could find no suitable political organ in Japan. This was in large part due to the completely discredited leadership of the group which formerly had supported Comintern policy. There appeared a Laborers' Sect, and Intelligentsia Sect, a Majority Sect, a Minority Sect and a Dissolution Sect, all trying to gain control of the remnants of the party and each most interested in discrediting all the others. Although the Comintern intervened and appointed leaders, none was successful in more than a very limited sphere.

Additionally, militaristic ideas were becoming more and more prevelant;

ultranationalism had been nurtured by the Military to the status of a religion, and the lot of the communist--natural target of the patriot--was a dangerous one.

The Comintern continued to exert influence until its dissolution in 1943 through the Labor Magazine and its guiding genius, UCHINO Soji; through the Japan Politics and Economy Research Institute, managed by KOIWAI Kyoshi; through the Maritime Communist groups who maintained cells in Kobe, Yokohama, Hiroshima, Nagoya and Kure and received propaganda materials from Hawaii and the United States; and through cultural groups. The most significant of these groups was headed by KASUGA Shoichi and his associates, several of whom here listed became significant party leaders during the Occupation:

YAMASHIRO Yoshimune
KATO Shikai
HASEGAWA Hiroshi
ITO Ritsu
OKABE Takashi
KAMIYAMA Shigeo
SATO Hideichi

Espionage Activity

Additionally, during this period, International Communism was in contact with Japan through the Japan Cell of the Red Army's International Spy Agency. This cell, which funnelled Japan's secrets to the Kremlin from 1933 until 1941, was headed by Richard Sorge, a German and long-time Communist Party member, assigned from the Russian Communist Party. He came to Japan ostensibly as a special correspondent of Die Frankfurter Zeitung and together with Max Klausen of the German Embassy, De Vokelitch, a French Communist, MIYAGI Yotoku, member of the American Communist Party, OZAKI Hidemi, Japanese pressman, and other associates found access to many important Japanese politicos, even including Prince KONOYE. The group, numbering technicians adept in many fields and brilliant personalities able to ingratiate themselves in any society, was notably successful in its espionage mission. There existed, too another spy organ, the responsibility of the Chinese Communist Party, which worked in Japan with the cooperation of communist NAKANISHI Ko and dispatched information to Moscow through Yenan.

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III. POSTWAR RESURGENCE

Potsdam Requirements for Democracy

With the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration by Japan and the end of the Pacific War came the era of opportunity and resurgence for the Japan Communist Party. The Potsdam Declaraction provided:

> "The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established."

This demanded that the recision of oppressive laws designed to prevent normal democratic development and the abolition of certain police agencies which enforced these laws and made it impossible for the Japanese people to enjoy freedom of thought. Additionally, it required that peoples' movements, never strong in Japan, be fostered and permitted to develop in a normal fashion and that the democratic freedoms of thought, assembly, speech and unrestricted discussion be taught. As corollary, it was required that all political prisoners be released.

Removal of Restrictions

To accomplish these democratic objectives, General MacArthur, on 4 October 1945, issued to the Japanese Government SCAPIN No. 93, Subject: Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious Liberties. This SCAPIN responded to the policy for Japan prepared jointly by the State, War, and Navy Departments (SWNCC) which pointed among other objectives of the Occupation of Japan, the precepts that:

(1) Democratic political parties with rights of assembly and public discussion shall be encouraged.

(2) Certain laws and ordinances discriminating on the ground of nationality, race, or any other prejudices shall be repealed.

(3) Persons unjustly confined by Japanese authorities on political grounds shall be released.

Specifically, SCAPIN No. 93 contained these instructions:

> "Release immediately all persons now detained, imprioned, under 'protection or surveillance', or whose freedom is restricted in any other manner who have been placed in that state of detention, imprisonment, 'protection and surveillance', or restriction of freedom;

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(1) Under the enactments referred to in paragraph 1 a and b above.
(2) Without charge.
(3) By charging them technically with a minor offense, when, in reality, the reason for detention, imprisonment, 'protection and surveillance', or restriction of freedom, was because of their thought, speech, religion, political beliefs, or assembly.

"The release of all such persons will be accomplished by 10 Oct. 1945.

"Abolish all organizations or agencies created to carry out the provisions of the enactments referred to in paragraph 1 a and b above and that part of, or functions of, other offices or subdivisions of other civil departments and organs which supplement or assist them in the execution of such provisions. These include, but are not limited to;

(1) All secret police organs.
(2) Those departments in the Ministry of Home Affairs, such as the Bureau of Police, charged with supervision of publications, supervision of public meetings and organizations, censorship of motion pictures, and such other departments concerned with the control of thought, speech, religion or assembly.
(3) Those departments, such as the Special Higher Police (Tokubetsu Koto Keisatsu Bu), in the Tokyo Metropolitan Police, the Osaka Metropolitan Police, any other Metropolitan Police, the police of the territorial administration of Hokkaido and the various Prefectural Police charged with supervision of publications, supervision of public meetings and organizations, censorship of motion pictures, and such other departments concerned with the control of thought, speech, religion or assembly."

To assure that reactionary Japanese governmental authorities then still in office did not move through normal police agencies to throttle the newly given liberties, General MacArthur on 10 October 1945 issued SCAPIN 115 which prohibited further employment in police or related public service of persons who had been charged with the suppression of civil liberties as follows:

"The entire personnel of the Special Higher Police will be dismissed and in no case be re-employed in any position of power or responsibility over the people.

"All personnel connected with 'Protection and Surveillance' will be dismissed."

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Release of Political Prisoners

As a result of these directives, 276 members of the former Japan Communist Party were simultaneously released from Japanese jails and police surveillance. Of these, many had recanted; some honestly, as in the cases of YAMAKAWA Kin and ARAHATA Kanson, who moved immediately to the formation of the Social Democrat Party; some in expediency. Others, including TOKUDA Kyuichi, SHIGA Yoshio, MIYAMOTO Kenji, KUROKI Shigenori, ITO Ritsu, and NISHIZAWA Ryuji had no cause to make explanation; they had clung to Marxism through the years of imprisonment.

Reconstruction of Communist Party

The freed communists set about the reconstruction of the Communist Party in Japan and on the day of their release organized a Mass Rally at Hibiya Park where TOKUDA, HAKAMADA, SHIGA and MIYAMOTO formed the Japan Communist Party Reconstruction Committee and urged comrades throughout the country to rejoin them in their struggle for revolution.

Publication of the party organ AKAHATA was resumed and by 8 November 1945 the Japan Communist Party was flourishing as never before. It boasted more than 1,000 members and was strong enough to call a "First National Council" at which leaders drafted the platform for a "people's struggle". TOKUDA, HAKAMADA, KIN, MIYAMOTO, KUROKI and KAMIYAMA here perpetuated themselves as the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Mass Rally to be held at Yoyogi, Tokyo on 1 December 1945. Also were adopted "Regulations for the Guidance of the Party" which made plain that the Japan Communist Party intended through advocacy of a popular socialistic program to effect a communist state in Japan. The preamble contains the following covenant continued unchanged to this date.

> "The Japan Communist Party is the vanguard of the Labor classes in Japan and is the only political party which protects the working people.
>
> "The Party is motivated by the ideology of Marx-Leninism, which is scientific socialism.
>
> "The Party is established to campaign for the realization of principles with firm intention intensely unified and consolidated in obedience to the rules and regulations of the Party to which all the Party members must give allegiance in the same degree.
>
> "The Party will make every effort to assure the independence of the Japanese race and world peace.
>
> "The Party will struggle for the democratization of Japan and to expel all the reactionary influence, release laborers, farmers and all workers from exploitation and

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oppression by capitalists and landlords, establish the socialistic state in the most typical pattern of democracy and make possible development of the communistic community as its final aim.

"In this socialistic state, caste will be abolished, unemployment and poverty will disappear, the rights of the working people seeking freedom and happiness will be guaranteed for the first time and people will work in correspondence to their ability and will be rewarded in accordance with the quantity and quality of their labor so that the production of all society will be splendidly advanced. Under these circumstances, remainders of the privileged regime will perish and all the abundant fruits of labor, science and culture will be possessed by the people.

"Thus, an enlightened Communistic society in which people will work in response to their ability and consume in accordance with their necessity, will be realized. The Japan Communist Party is a glorious party campaigning for establishment of this new society for the Japanese race."

Having publicly proclaimed its intention, the party, at its Fourth Convention, 1 - 3 December 1945, adopted the following slogans in support of the "Two Stage Revolution":

1. Democratic revolution by peaceful and democratic means.
2. Expulsion of war criminals and oppressors of human rights.
3. Abolition of the Tenno system.
4. Reformation of the system of land ownership.
5. Destruction of monopolistic capital.
6. Stabilization and elevation of the people's livelihood.

Further, this mass rally, presumably uniting Japan's most independent minds in free discussion for the first time in more than ten years, adopted the following principles of organization:

1. The Japan Communist Party, as a party of the masses, will appeal to laborers and farmers.
2. The Party will strive for organization of labor unions in each industry.
3. Farmer unions will be organized by the Party to include all farmers who themselves till the soil.
4. Urban people will be organized in Citizens' Food Control Committees.
5. Laborers, farmers, and citizens alike will be formed into a common front to fight for human rights under the guidance of the Communist Party.

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Opportunity for National Party

Here was the greatest opportunity ever to be afforded the Japan Communist Party for advancement of its popularity with the people and achievement of leadership over them. The police organs through which the militarists had suppressed democratic organization were gone and with them all police restraints on communism. The police regulations which had prohibited communism's more overt activities were abolished. The Peace Maintenance Law, principal punitive instrument of their control, (Article 1 is included herewith as typifying its intent) could no longer be applied.

> "Article 1. A person who has organized an association for the purpose of revolutionizing this country or who has engaged in tasks as an officer or other leader of such association will be sentenced to death, life imprisonment or 7 years or more in prison; a person who knowingly has joined such association or who has acted for the achievement of its objectives will be sentenced to penal servitude for 3 years or more."

A new constitution guaranteeing civil liberties was certain to be promulgated. The sixteen principles for the organization of trade unions were well understood. The Japanese people were suffering from shock. Their invincible empire had proved poor and weak. Their illusions were shattered. They were ready to accept any teaching voiced in the phrases of democracy. They were desperate for a new faith and, for a short space, the communist leaders appeared to grasp their opportunity. They acted energetically and seemingly with freedom from external control. Their actions were generally intelligent, well considered and concentrated on problems dealing with the livelihood of the citizen. They appeared headed for leadership of a national Labor Farmer Party in socialistic pattern.

But only briefly did this situation exist. Soon appeared the familiar communist propaganda designed to create disorder among the illiterate and unthinking. The Communist Party leaders began to display disregard of truth and reality and conspicuous inability properly to evaluate the power of the people to think and analyze. The same party leader would one day exhort the farmer to resist the collection of rice and the next day incite the urban laborer to demonstrate for increase of the controlled rice ration. Other excesses appeared: There was disorder and riot; demonstrations were called for no purpose except disturbance of the peace. The party had proved incapable of self motivation and here first began to alienate and offend the literate liberal elements in whom it could have found strength.

NOZAKA's Thesis

Leaders concentrated on organization and with the assistance of NOZAKA Sanzo, who had fled Japan in 1930 to return in mid-January of

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1946, a solid core of experienced and hardened workers was welded into a machine destined to rule the party for the next four and one-half years.

NOZAKA's reputation was tremendous. He had served as a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in Moscow and thereafter, as advisor to the Chinese Communist Party at Yenan. With his assistance, TOKUDA and SHIGA Yoshio, editor of the AKAHATA planned the Fifth Party Mass Rally held 7 April 1946 when party membership exceeding 7,500 was announced and the following control body established:

Secretary-General	TOKUDA Kyuichi		
Political Bureau	TOKUDA Kyuichi	Secretariat	TOKUDA Kyuichi
	NOZAKA Sanzo		NOZAKA Sanzo
	SHIDA Shigeo		ITO Ritsu
	SHIGA Yoshio		HASEGAWA Hiroshi
	MIYAMOTO Kenji		KAMEYAMA Kozo
	ITO Ritsu		
	HASEGAWA Hiroshi		
	KONNO Yojiro		
	KIN Tenkai		

Chief, Organization Department	TOKUDA Kyuichi
Chief, Struggle Organization Department	TOKUDA Kyuichi
Chief, Propaganda Department	NOZAKA Sanzo
Chief, Political Affairs Research Department	NOZAKA Sanzo
Chief, Finance Department	KAMEYAMA Kozo
Chief, Disciplinary Department	MIYAMOTO Kenji
Editor, Party Organ, AKAHATA	SHIGA Yoshio

Preparatory thereto, a party convention met 24 February 1946 to elaborate party policy. NOZAKA's thesis, "Under the Occupation, a peaceful and democratic formula of revolution through parliamentary action is possible", found acceptance. It was around this decision that the control organ grasped hands. The party, still seeking policy, had no real agreement among the leaders except that NOZAKA's thinking and TOKUDA's strength were respected by all. These leaders attempted to bring order out of the hazy concepts of party declarations and lay a foundation for direct action.

NOZAKA's pronouncements which the party honored in greater or lesser degree until he was criticized by the Cominform in 1950 were:

"(1) The Communist Party should become a "likeable' party.

"(2) The question of abolishing the Emperor system should be decided by the people at large when democracy in Japan has matured.

"(3) Efforts should be made to remove the general impression among the people that the communists are plotting an early revolution by force; and the people should be made to believe that the communists are sincerely working to improve the people's living conditions and that they are like others, patriotic.

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"(4) All democratically-minded persons should be invited to join hands with the communists in a 'united democratic front', embracing the masses, the small and medium industrialists and the petit bourgeoisie for 'solution of the national economic crisis.'"

By this apparent shift to nationally rationalized activity the Japan Communist Party prospered. Despite its excesses and the unpopularity of some of its "struggles", it brought into its sphere for a time many of the dissident elements of Japan's postwar society.

NOZAKA believed that the Occupation would fall into policy difficulties and that International Communism would have a voice in Occupation policy through the Allied Council. But the Allied Council proved a disappointment to the Communist Party Leader. General MacArthur intelligently and effectively opposed its interference with the accomplishment of basic occupation objectives. Its Russian member continued to voice communistic sentiments at Council meetings but there was no compromise with principle and he became valueless to the International Communism, excepting that his presence in Japan made it possible to station here under the guise of staff members, Russian agents who could guide, teach and, above all else, control the local Communist Party. Had these agents not been working openly with the Japan Communist Party it is possible that in this time of unsettled course, party leaders, more Japanese than communist in inclination, could have brought about a common front with Labor-Farmer and Socialist elements on a basis of continuing cooperation and eventual communistic control through the ballot.

Warning against Excesses

In the first months of 1946, Russia and the Japan Communist Party tried General MacArthur's strength. It was their hope that he would weakly permit the Communist Party to seize power through manipulation of the Japanese masses unprepared to exercise political freedom. The Russian and the local party leaders claimed alike that the Communist Party was a democratic party loved by the people everywhere and that it would come soon to power in all the countries of the world. When these claims became too extravagant, SCAP instructed his deputy in the Allied Council, Mr. George Atcheson, Jr., to clarify the American position on the Communist Party, and he did so in a speech at the Fourth Meeting of the Allied Council, 15 May 1946, of which the pertinent excerpt follows:

"I do not need to tell you that the United States does not favor Communism either in the United States or in Japan but it has been our firm belief that in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration the Japanese people should be as free as possible to develop their political activities. The Communist Party has not been suppressed in the United States. It has not been suppressed in Japan.

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It has been allowed in Japan the same rights as other political parties, and members of the Communist Party have been elected to the Diet in Japan."

Communist leaders continued to call mass demonstrations and incite aggressive physical solution of political problems. General MacArthur, therefore, on 20 May 1946 issued the following statement warning the Japanese people against unruly demonstration and mass disorder:

> "I find it necessary to caution the Japanese people that the growing tendency towards mass violence and physical processes of intimidation, under organized leadership, present a grave menace to the future development of Japan. While every possible rational freedom of democratic method has been permitted and will be permitted in the evolution now proceeding in the transformation from a feudalistic and military state to one of democratic process, the physical violence which undisciplined elements are now beginning to practice will not be permitted to continue. They constitute a menace not only to orderly government but to the basic purposes and security of the occupation itself. If minor elements of Japanese society are unable to exercise such self-restraint and self-respect as the situation and conditions require, I shall be forced to take the necessary steps to control and remedy such a deplorable situation. I am sure the great mass of the people condemn such excesses by disorderly minorities, but it is my sincere hope that the sane views of this predominant public opinion will exert sufficient influence to make it unnecessary to intervene."

The Communist Party leaders appeared to heed the warning; certainly the people of Japan heard and took heed. Since that date no great mass demonstrations have been incited to violence and only in isolated instances have small groups been induced by communists to take violent actions. By General MacArthur's action, the Communist Party was blocked in this avenue to revolution and forced to more subtle manipulation of the masses through labor struggles, propaganda, and front organizations.

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IV. MAJOR EXTERNAL FORCES SHAPING JAPANESE COMMUNISM

International Communism

Obedience to its dictates are the terms of acceptance by International Communism. Some leaders of the party have shown a tendency to rebellion, but as was proved when the NOZAKA line party policy was criticized by the Cominform on 6 January 1950, a local party can have no self-determination.

Criticism of NOZAKA

The Cominform said in effect that the NOZAKA thesis of "revolution through parliamentary procedure" is a doctrine in advocacy of imperialism; that Japan is completely under the control of the Occupation Forces of the United States of America; and that aggressive revolutionary action must be taken in the Marx-Lenin pattern.

Party response is best indicated by the statements of its leaders. SHIGA said, "The previous principles of the party have been false as the Cominform's criticism indicates. The party should sincerely bow to superior wisdom and fight imperialism with all its might." TOKUDA, who had some pretension to stature as an independent said, "The party itself has been partially false; consequently the party has not reached the necessary development to stage a resolute struggle against imperialism."

NOZAKA decided by 6 February 1950 to bow to the Cominform and issued a statement of self-criticism in the following words: "Revolution is the problem of class struggle, which must be conducted with power. To perform this serious task, we must accept that the Japanese Communist Party has its proper part to play in the international revolutionary campaign."

Russian Influence

Within Japan the Russian Government maintains a Liaison Mission of full diplomatic status staffed by several hundred technicians, including military officers. This Mission undoubtedly serves as a major link between the Japan Communist Party and Moscow. Communist leaders, including TOKUDA, NOZAKA, ITO Ritsu and MIYAMOTO Kenji, frequented the Mission.

There is a strong suspicion that the Russian Mission has within its organization a secret body, sometimes referred to as the "G Organ", whose purpose is control of the Japan Communist Party. This, like transmission of Russian funds to the Japan Communist Party, cannot be confirmed but logic points to its probability.

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The Russian Mission has further and openly influenced the Communist Party by sponsorship of the Soviet-Japanese Friendship Society, an organization numbering possibly five thousand members, whose honorary president is the Soviet Chief of Mission, and which pays allegiance to the Soviet Union as the "spiritual fatherland". Through this society the Russian Mission gives support to the Soviet Research Institute, the Russian Language School and to various cultural and study groups. Additionally, through the North Star Commercial Company, excellent Soviet propaganda films, such as "Bride of Caucasus", "Humpback Pony", and "Tales of Siberia" are distributed throughout Japan.

Other important outside influences in the consideration of Japanese communism are the Chinese and the Korean.

Chinese Influence

Chinese influence has increased with the military successes of the Chinese Communists. Japan needs Chinese markets for survival in trade. Chinese Communist elements have collaborated with the Japanese Communist Party in threatening that Japan will be barred from Chinese markets unless she favors the Chinese Communist cause. In late 1948, NOZAKA said:

> "What will then be the relation between Japan and this new China? China will require machines, industrial products and techniques from Japan, while the latter will import necessary raw materials from China. When I was in Yenan, Mao Tse-tung told me of this plan. This, I believe, is the most important thing for Japan's rehabilitation. It is impossible to speak of Japan's rehabilitation without reference to China. How then shall we be able to enter into close contact with this new China? Are the Chinese willing to shake hands with such a reactionary and corrupt government as the Yoshida Cabinet? In regard to this, Mao Tse-tung said: 'We cannot cooperate with a Militaristic reactionary Japan. We want the Japanese to become a peace-loving, democratic nation.'"

The Japanese answer to NOZAKA was expressed by Prime Minister Yoshida, who in his statement of February 1949, pointed out that China needs machinery and manufactured goods which cannot be secured with advantage anywhere other than in Japan. Mr. YOSHIDA said:

> "The Chinese are very realistic. They will trade with the Japanese if it is profitable to them. Likewise, the Japanese will be willing to trade with a Red China. Japan is not in a position to neglect any market. Before the war, Japan did not have to worry about markets

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because there was a free flow of goods and a demand for Japanese goods. Now, however, the situation is changed, and it has become necessary for Japanese to think about markets. China is a natural market whether it is Communist or not."

Chinese Communist elements residing in Japan have coordinated their local activities in the Overseas Chinese Democratization Society and the Chinese-Japanese Collaboration Society through which they give some financial support to the common cause.

Korean Influence

Korean Communists have been the tool but not the partner of the Japan Communist Party. The Occupation found an oppressed and dissident Korean element in Japan. Repatriation was offered but those disinclined to follow the Rhee Government remained in Japan. Within this community, extremists organized the League of Koreans Residing in Japan whose members were controlled by determined and lawless elements demanding special privilege for all Koreans. Domination of the organization was seized with the aid of Communist Party scheming by KIN Tenkai, Chief of the handful of Koreans admitted by party leaders to their highest councils.

Though the founding purpose of the League of Koreans was to "realize the unity of Korean people, promote the welfare and culture of Korea, and set up a democratic Korean government", it soon became apparent that the organization was completely responsive to communist dictate. To carry out the will of the party, it furnished action corps of young men with whose violence the Communist Party threatened the Japanese community; and through whom wealthy Koreans were requested to make "voluntary" contributions to the party. The League became so irresponsible that it constituted a danger to the growth of democracy in Japan and on 8 September 1949, after consultation with SCAP, the Japanese Government applied the provisions of legislations implementing SCAPIN 548 to dissolve it as a terroristic organization.

Korean League leaders expected the Communist Party to protect them from such action and were disillusioned to find that the party, having used the League to its own purpose for four years, now deemed it expedient to disclaim responsibility for their actions.

Korean influence, and indeed all external communist influence, have suffered through the abortive attack upon the Korean Republic of the North Korean puppet. Prompt [and successful] United Nations action there has proved to the Japanese that the democracies will not desert free countries in their times of need and has thereby strengthened the native Japanese resistance to the rash promises and ruthless actions of World Communism.

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V. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Organization is the Communist Party's greatest strength. It is rigid and uncompromising organization prescribed by party regulations exactly defining structure and pattern of executive control. And it is dictatorial organization calling for absolute obedience—prepared to punish dissidents.

Party Regulations

The Communist Party Regulations state in preamble that the objective of the party is the establishment of a socialistic state in order to accomplish an enlightened communistic Japan.

The regulations are in ten chapters containing sixty-two articles. There is one paragraph of supplementary provisions dealing with the use of place names to designate cells or district committees.

Chapter I defines the rights and duties of party members. Membership is open to all who are of service to the party, who promise to pay dues, and who are properly proposed and accepted by cell vote. Members must be politically active, class conscious, earnest students of Marx-Leninism. Members are promised freedom to discuss party matters and to criticize party actions within party conferences. They may vote in the election of party officers and question and criticize these officers.

Chapter II states succinctly that the party is governed under "democratic centralization of power." Committee members are elected by methods determined in conference. Absolute obedience to higher authority is demanded and when decisions are made all party members must comply. Party executive organization is: Central Committee, Regional Committee, Prefectural Committee, District Committee, and Cell. Lower echelons are required to report all actions to next superior echelons.

Chapter III states that the General Party Conference is the supreme organ of party power and that the Central Committee controls the calling of the General Conference and is its agent when it is not in session. The Chief Secretary and Politburo Secretary must be selected from the Central Committee. The Central Committee is elected by the General Party Conference but the Central Committee determines who is eligible to be a candidate for the Central Committee. The Central Committee calls conferences of regional party chiefs and these conferences make party policy subject to final review by the Central Committee.

Chapter IV sets up a pattern for regional organization paralleling that of the central headquarters.

Chapter V similarly details the prefectural organization.

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Chapter VI lays down the like procedures guiding district organization.

Chapter VII specifies that the basic organization of the Japan Communist Party is the cell. A cell may be formed by three or more party members upon district approval. The cell collects dues from its members and carries out instructions.

Chapter VIII states that communist members of unions, farm labor fronts, cooperatives and other mass organizations must organize mutual assistance "groups" to carry out the instructions of the party.

Chapter IX restates that obedience to the party is the highest duty of the communist and adds that members will be expelled and cells dissolved for disobedience. The next higher echelon determines guilt.

Chapter X deals with the party fund. Normal party dues are 1% of definite income—the Prefectural Committee determines the proper dues of members without definite income.

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Organization Chart

Party organization is pictured in the charts below:

As of 30 Oct 51



* These organs though appearing separately on diagram are same bodies with two functions. Bodies designated under "Deliberative" act as "Committees in conference"; whereas, bodies indicated under "Executive" act in normal guidance capacity.

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TYPICAL COMMUNIST CELL ORGANIZATIONS



* Internal Cell control is managed through group leaders who instruct "groups" of cell members. The groups are set up for convenience of instruction, and usually all residents of one district or all workers in one place of employment are included in one group.

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Change of Legal Leadership

From early 1946, the organization of the Japan Communist Party had been unchanged and control had remained in the hands of the same Central Committeemen. During the first six months of 1950, this group stung by Comintern criticism and goaded by adversity so abused democratic freedom in propagation of untruth and incitement to violent action that General MacArthur found it necessary to direct their removal from public office. He therefore ordered on 6 June 1950 in the following letter to Prime Minister YOSHIDA that action be taken to purge and consequently bar from all political and public service activity the whole membership of the existing Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party whom he designated by name.

> "It has been a fundamental purpose of the Occupation to assist the Japanese people to meet their commitments under the Potsdam Declaration, foremost of which requires the establishment in Japan of a new order of peace, security and justice upon which may firmly stand a peacefully inclined and responsible government. To such end the Japanese Government is specifically enjoined in the Potsdam Declaration to 'remove all obstacles to the strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.'
>
> "In the implementation of this requirement, carried forward as one of the basic objectives of Allied policy as determined and prescribed by the Far Eastern Commission, the structure of the Japanese Government has been redesigned, its laws and institutions where undemocratic have been revised, and those persons whose public record gives warning that their continued influence would be inimical to democratic growth have been removed and excluded from Japan's public affairs.
>
> "The guiding philosophy of this phase of the Occupation has been protective, not punitive. Its purpose and effect has been to provide assurance that the aims of Allied policy in the democratization of Japan would not be thwarted by the influence and pressure of anti-democratic elements. The area of its application for the most part has embraced those persons who because of position and influence bear responsibility for Japan's totalitarian policies which led to adventure in conquest and exploitation. Recently, however, a new and no less sinister groupment has injected itself into the Japanese political scene which has sought through perversion of truth and incitation to mass violence to transform this peaceful and tranquil land into an arena of disorder and strife as the means of stemming Japan's notable progress along the road of representative democracy and to subvert the rapidly growing democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.

Authority NND 963012

"Acting in common accord, they have hurled defiance at constituted authority, shown contempt for the processes of law and order, and contrived by false and inflammatory statements and other subversive means to arouse through resulting public confusion that degree of social unrest which would set the stage for the eventual overthrow of constitutional government in Japan by force. Their coercive methods bear striking parallel to those by which the militaristic leaders of the past deceived and misled the Japanese people, and their aims, if achieved, would surely lead Japan to an even worse disaster. To permit this incitation to lawlessness to continue unchecked, however embryonic it may at present appear, would be to risk ultimate suppression of Japan's democratic institutions in direct negation of the purpose and intent of Allied policy pronouncements, forfeiture of her chance for political independence, and destruction of the Japanese race.

"Accordingly, I direct that your government take the necessary administrative measures to remove and exclude the following named persons, constituting the full membership of the Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party, from public service, and render them subject to the prohibitions, restrictions and liabilities of my directives of January 4, 1946, (SCAPINS 548 and 550) and their implementing ordinances:

HAKAMADA Santomi
ITO Kenichi
KAMEYAMA Kozo
KASUGA Shoichi
KONO Yojiro
KURAHARA Koreto
MATSUMOTO Saneki
NOSAKA Ryu
SATO Satoji
SHIGA Yoshio
TAKAKURA Teru
TOKUDA Kyuichi
HASEGAWA Hiroshi
ITO Ritsu
KAMIYAMA Shigeo
KASUGA Shojiro
KISHIMOTO Shigeo
MATSUMOTO Kazumi
MIYAMOTO Kenji
NOSAKA Sanzo
SHIDA Shigeo
SHIRAKAWA Seiichi
TAKENAKA Tsunesaburo
TOSAKA Hiroshi

Sincerely yours,

(sgd.) Douglas MacArthur"

The Central Committee was thus removed at a stroke; the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee lost all principal members; and the Control Committee was deprived of the services of MIYAMOTO Kenji.

According to party regulation, a new Central Committee can be selected only by a General Party Conference. To this date no such conference has met, and the party has been under the direction of a Provisional

Central Guidance Bureau established by the Control Committee. Membership of the Provisional Central Guidance Bureau is indicated below:

Chairman: SHIINO Etsuro
Members : WADA Ichizo
SUGIMOTO Fumio
SUZUKI Ichizo
KAWADA Kenji
TADA Tomeji *
KIKUNAMI Katsumi **
TANIGUCHI Zentaro ***

* Expelled from JCP, 16 Aug 50
** Purged, AKAHATA Staff, 7 Jun 50
*** Purged, 28 Jun 50

The Central Guidance Bureau has probably received assistance from certain Central Committee members purged by General MacArthur's order; however, such fact though generally accepted, cannot be proved. It is known, however, that no new Central Committee, Central Committee Candidates' Pool, Political Bureau, Secretariat, or Control Committee members have been designated. New chiefs have been designated for the various departments. The following are the best available listings of important Communist Party officers and heads of principal departments:

Members of Principal Party Organs

Central Committee Candidate Pool (Chuo Iinkai Koho)

** HARADA Choji
HOSAKA Hiroaki (Komei)
IWATA Eiichi
KONISHI Masao
NISHIDATE Hitoshi
SUNAMA Kazuyoshi
** TADA Tomeji
** TOSAKA Ryoichi
YAMAMOTO Hitoshi

Political Bureau (Seiji Kyoku)

* HASEGAWA Hiroshi
* ITO Ritsu
* KONNO Yojiro
* MIYAMOTO Kenji
* NOSAKA Sanzo
* SHIDA Shigeo
* SHIGA Yoshio
* SHIRAKAWA Seiichi
* TOKUDA Kyuichi

* Purged Central Committee
** Expelled from JCP for schismatic activity

Secretariat (Shoki Kyoku)

Secretary General: * TOKUDA Kyuichi
Members : * HAKAMADA Satomi
* ITO Ritsu
* KAMEYAMA Kozo
* KASUGA Shojiro
* KONNO Yojiro
* MATSUMOTO Mimasu
* NOSAKA Sanzo
* SHIDA Shigeo
* SHIRAKAWA Seiichi
* TAKENAKA Tsunesaburo
Cooperators : SHIINO Etsuro
NISHIZAWA Ryuji

Control Committee (Tosei Iinkai)

Chief: SHIINO Etsuro
WADA Ichiro
* MIYAMOTO Kenji
OKADA Bunkichi
YAMABE Kentaro
IWAMOTO Iwao
NISHIZAWA Ryuji
** MATSUMOTO Soichiro
** MASUDA Kakunosuke

* Purged Central Committee
** Expelled from JCP for schismatic activity

Heads of Principal Departments

Japan Communist Party

	Before Purge of 6 June 1950	Present (30 Oct 50)
Financial Affairs:	INOUE Morio	KAWADA Kenji
Business Affairs:	** KAWAMURA Tatsuo	OKADA Bunkichi
Personnel Affairs:	* TAKENAKA Tsunesaburo	UCHINO Takechiyo
Labor Union Department:	* KASUGA Shojiro ***	YAMABE Kentaro
		SUZUKI Ichizo
		KIMURA Saburo
Agrarian Affairs:	* MATSUMOTO Saneki (Mimasu)	TERADA Mitsugu
		KOHARA Yoshi
Cultural Affairs:	OHURA Einosuke	FUKAYA Susumu
		NISHIKAWA Ryuji
Propaganda and Education:	KOMATSU Yuichiro	MURAYAMA Tomoyoshi
		KOMATSU Yuichiro
Research (Investigation):	SHIINO Etsuro	YAMAMOTO Aki (Shu)
		HORIE Yuichi (Muroichi)
Scientific and Technique:	IJIRI Masaji	IZUMI Toshio
		ISHII Kinosuke
Publication:	AKIYAMA Yoshiaki	AKAIWA Katsumi
	UGAI Nagatoshi	SUZUKI Tomino
		MATSUMOTO Masaji

* Purged Central Committee
** Purged AKAHATA Staff
*** Internationalist Faction

Heads of Principal Departments (continued)

	Before Purge of 6 June 1950	Present (30 Oct 50)
AKAHATA Department:	* SHIGA Yoshio ***	WADA Ichizo
	* ITO Ritsu	YANO Osamu
ZENEI Magazine:	** ANEBA Saburo ***	
New World Magazine:	KATAYAMA Satoshi	
Women's Affairs:	SHIINO Etsuro	SHIOYA Ai (Shiotani)
		KARITA Asano
Youth Affairs:	ONDA (Mita) Hideichi (Shuichi)	FUJIO Mamoru
		KOIDE Takashi
		KOBAYASHI Shin (Nobu)
People's Affairs:	* KAMIYAMA Shigeo	IWATA Eiichi
	IWATA Eiichi	MATSUSHIMA Matsutaro
Local Affairs Department:	* NOZAKA Sanzo	KAWAKAMI Kanichi
		KITAZOE Tadao
Urban Peoples:	* KAMIYAMA Shigeo	
Party Historical:	* SHIGA Yoshio ***	
Party Clinic:	SATO Takeo	
Central Publishing Company:	IIDA Isaburo	
Marx-Lenin:	HORIE Muraichi	IZU Kimio
		KAWASAKI Misaburo
		MATSUMURA Kazuto
Soviet Culture Propaganda:	* NOZAKA Sanzo	
Legal Affairs:	KAZAHAYA Yasoji	
General Affairs:	SUGIMOTO Hamako	
Maritime & Fishermen's:	* HAKAMADA Satomi ***	
Repatriates Affairs:	* TSUMURA Kenji	
Juvenile Affairs:	FUSE Misao	
Political Affairs:	IWATA Eiichi	
Election Policy:	* KONNO Yojiro	
Organization Guidance: (Dantai . Shido Bu)		SUGIMOTO Funio
		DOKI Tsuyoshi
Enterprise:		KAMIMURA Susumu
		TATSUTA Seiun
Pioneer Affairs:		HIJIKATA Yoshi
		KAWAJIRI Yasuji
Party School:		SHIINO Etsuro
		ONO Yoshihiko

* Purged Central Committee
** Purged AKAHATA Staff
*** Internationalist Faction

There is some indication that a Central Reconstruction Guidance Committee exists consisting of the principal party organizers of the national, regional, prefectural and district levels. The structure of this group presumed to be charged with "second party activity" is reported to be as follows:

Chairman:	IWATA Eiichi
Responsible Official:	IWAMOTO Iwao
Members:	MATSUMOTO Yoshiji - Shin-etsu Region
(Known as national organizers' group)	KAJITA Shigeho - Kanto Region
	ONDA (Mita) Shuichi - Tohoku Region
	TANAKA Gyohei - Kansai & Shikoku Regions
	KITAZOYE Tadao - Kyushu Region
	* KANEKO Kenta - Tokai Region
	KARITA Asano - Hokkaido Region

* Purged for connection with Zenroren, 30 August 1950

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VI. ELECTIONS

Election Aims

Beginning on 10 October 1945 with their release by SCAP order from imprisonment for illegal political activity, the Communist Party leaders prepared for occupied Japan's first election. Their ruling political philosophy, though sometimes criticized within the party and finally blasted by the Cominform in 1950, was that of NOZAKA, who believed "Legal revolution through parliamentary procedures possible under the Occupation". Internally he explained his theory as "application of strategy whereby the people can be won over to communist principles through socialism from within the Diet". He argued that the party should lay a legal foundation for taking over the reins of government and that other and less acceptable party methods leading to social unrest and confusion should be subordinated to the creation of a "lovable party".

Secretary-General TOKUDA supported NOZAKA's political thesis and at the Fourteenth General Assembly of the Central Committee in March of 1948, he said, "Since Japan's political independence is guaranteed by the words of the Potsdam Declaration, the Communist Party can certainly come to power if it enjoys the confidence of the people, and without their confidence, it will not be able to administer the affairs of State. The more seats the Communist Party can obtain in the Diet, the more easily we can seize the reins of government. If the Communist Party can legally obtain thirty or more seats in the Diet, it will become so influential over the government that the government will not be able to take unfavorable action against us."

In the application of this theory, the Communist Party concentrated on making the best possible showing in every election. Any issue which had public appeal was seized upon. More important, the party organized cells and conducted coordinated political activity in every area from the center of the largest city to the corner of the smallest farming village. Mass political rallies were held to whip up the enthusiasm of party workers and party line political issues were widely propagandized.

Poor Showing at Polls

Despite these efforts and relatively well-advised legal political maneuvering, Japanese antipathy to what many consider an alien-controlled group blocks the turn of any considerable support to the party's candidates. By continuous effort, the party has achieved a vote norm of about five and one-half percent. Only occasionally is this exceeded. In the House of Representatives' election, January 1949, it was almost doubled by a temporary shift of Socialist votes.

Factors resonsible for this temporary shift were: The disillusionment of the Japanese labor voter by reason of governmental scandals recently disclosed; pay readjustments and increased working hours forced

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upon salaried employees by the financial stringency; and the recently attained communist control in China which had been given constant headline attention in the Japanese press and had arousedapprehension among some Japanese that support should be given to the Communist Partyin order to avoid its future displeasure.

NABEYAMA Sadachika, left-wing political leader and commentator, in propounding the theory that the Communist Party's 1949 increased vote resulted from losses of the socialist parties, compiled the following table from official election statistics:

Party	1947	1949
Social Democrats	7,170,484	4,129,724
Social Reformists	- - -	387,214
Labor-Farmers	- - -	606,744
Communists	996,507	2,984,583
Total	8,166,991	8,108,265

Results of Successive Elections

National Elections

In the general election of April 1946 the Communist Party entered 143 candidates for the House of Representatives and elected 5. The vote received was 2,135,757, or 3.8 per cent of the total (plural voting).

In the general election for members of the House of Representatives in April 1947, the Communist Party entered 120 candidates and elected 4. The vote received was 996,507, or 3.7 per cent of the total (single ballot system). In the election for members of the House of Councillors during the same month, 40 candidates were entered by the communists -- 12 in the national constituency and 28 in prefectural constituencies. Of those candidates 4 were elected, 3 from the national constituency and 1 at the prefectural level. The total number of votes accorded the communist candidates was 825,304 (3.7 per cent of the total) on the local level and 610,948 (2.9 per cent of the total) in the national constituency.

In the general election of January 1949 for members of the House of Representatives, the Communist Party entered 115 candidates and elected 35. The total vote received was 2,984,583 or 9.6 per cent of the total. The communist gain was the result of the near-disintegration of the Social Democratic Party which lost 62 seats.

In the June 1950 general election for members of the House of Councillors, 50 candidates entered by the Communist party -- 28 in prefectural constituencies, and 12 in the national constituency -- received 1,637,451

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(5,7 per cent) of the total vote in the national constituency, and 1,333,872 (4.8 per cent) of the total cast at the prefectural level. Two of the party's candidates, both in the national constituency, were elected.

Local Elections

In April 1947, when the Japanese for the first time elected prefectural, city, town and village executives and assembly members by universal adult suffrage, the Communist Party score in terms of the number of candidates elected was as follows:

Prefectural governors	0
Prefectural assemblymen	4
Mayors	0
City assemblymen	36
Town and village headmen	11
Town and village assemblymen	380
TOTAL	431

In 2,011 local elections held during 1949, Communist Party candidates were elected to 100 of the 7,364 posted vacancies -- 1.3 per cent of the total. Of the 100 successful candidates, 31 were seated in uncontested elections. One was elected to membership in a prefectural assembly, 7 to city assemblies and the remaining 92 at the town and village level. During the latter part of this period the communist candidates' vote-getting ability showed a steady decline.

In the election held 18 August 1949 when farmers throughout Japan selected 110,723 Land Commissioners, Communist Party candidates were elected to 953 seats -- 0.9 per cent of the total.

In local elections held 1 January - 1 October 1950, 3.8 per cent of the total vote cast in 1,133 elections went to communist candidates. The 57 seats secured by communist candidates representing 1.3 per cent of 4,328 contested were:

Governors	0
Prefectural assemblymen	0
Mayors	0
City assemblymen	9
Town and village headmen	1
Town and village assemblymen	47
TOTAL	57

Communist failure at the polls is graphically assessed by the comparisons below of the relative voter support of the party in elections of 1949, 1950, and 1951 in Hiroshima and Fukushima.

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Hiroshima

Type of Election	Date	Total Vote Cast	Communist Vote	Percent of Total
House of Representatives	23 Jan 49	832,159	87,178	10.4
House of Councillors	4 Jun 50	776,209	36,830	4.9
Governors Election	22 Jan 51	919,791	16,739	1.8

Fukushima

House of Representatives	23 Jan 49	724,572	60,483	8.34
By-election For Governor	23 Jan 50	711,535	37,327	5.24
House of Councillors	4 Jun 50	711,326	37,143	5.21
House of Councillors By-election	12 Feb 51	781,182	8,645	1.12

Party leaders many times have appealed to Socialists and Labor-Farmers for a common front. These overtures, except in some purely local campaigns, invariably have been rejected, despite claims to the contrary. Periodically since May 1947, the Socialists have publicly disavowed any common front inclinations. "Racial Democracy" and "Racial Independence", slogans adopted by the Communist Party in December 1947 have not deceived the electorate.

Elective Post Held

Following is a tabulation of elective posts held by communists on 1 January 1951:

Elective Office	Seats	Communists Elected('47)	Communists Elected('49)	Communists Elected('50)	Seats Now Held	% of Total
House of Representatives	466	4	35		27	5.8
House of Councillors	250	4	0	2	4	1.6
			31			

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Elective Office	Seats	Communists Elected('47)	Communists Elected('49)	Communists Elected('50)	Seats Now Held	% of Total
Prefectural Governors	46	0	0	0	0	0.0
Prefectural Assemblymen	2,494	4	1	0	6	0.2
Mayors	257	0	0	0	0	0.0
City Assemblymen	8,969	51	5	11	87	0.9
Town and Village Headmen	10,160	11	3	1	16	0.1
Town and Village Assemblymen	181,900	365	75	50	694	0.3
Total	203,695	439	119	64	834	0.40

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VII. FACTIONS AND SCHISMS

International dissensions have troubled the Japan Communist Party from its inception in the early 1920's. Though party members unanimously acknowledge Marx-Leninism as their ideological standard and international Communism as their master, they cannot for long agree in the interpretation of either the philosophy of the first or the orders of the latter. Factional disputes between leaders prominent im regional organizations, personality clashes always present when strong minds meet, and personal jealousies perpetuate disunity. Disintegration has not resulted because the dictates of Marx-Leninism will not permit open conflict in the party. Party regulations are inflexible and attacks against the leadership, no matter how fundamental they may appear, must be settled in unanimity so that all the members can move as one. This iron control restricts and welds the party even though its elements feel dissatisfaction. Submission to the dictates of the leaders or expulsion from the party are the only alternatives.

First Postwar Factions

First factions to spring up in the postwar Japan Communist Party were the Fuchu and the Kuramae Factions. The Fuchu Faction headed by TOKUDA Kyuichi and SHIGA Yoshio was so-called because its principal members were jailed in Fuchu Penitentiary. In addition to TOKUDA and SHIGA it included "martyred leaders" MIYAMOTO Kenji, HASEGAWA Hiroshi, ITO Ritsu, MATSUMOTO Ichizo and HAKAMADA Satomi.

The Kuramae Faction boasted no long imprisoned martyrs. Its significant leaders, KAMIYAMA Shigeo, HOSOKAWA Karoku and NAKANISHI Ko, had valued personal freedom above profession of principle. Now they say they voiced abandonment of communism in order to gain freedom the better to carry on the struggle. This group met in the Kuramae Industrial Hall in Shimbashi where gathered intellectuals and those interested principally in theoretical communism.

These factions disintegrated with the return of NOZAKA Sanzo who assumed leadership of the intellectuals and with the reinstitution of normal party organization. Members of the Fuchu Faction seized most of the important posts in the permanent organization. NOZAKA despite his great prestige was more the collaborator than rival of TOKUDA.

TOKUDA, SHIGA and NAKANISHI Factions

The Party Control Organs responsive to the strong hand of TOKUDA Kyuichi brooked no argument or opposition. Some resentment began to grow up among the leaders of powerful regional committees. However, resistance to the central faction of Secretary General TOKUDA, NOZAKA, HOSAKA Komei, ITO Ritsu and SHIDA Shigeo was ineffective except in the Kansai where SHIGA Yoshio, KASUGA Shojiro and MIYAMOTO Kenji were strong. So long as SHIGA

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held position with NOZAKA and TOKUDA as one of the Japan Communism's Big Three, his group had no dynamic leadership, but when he lost his Diet seat in April 1947, he blamed lack of support from the central headquarters and in pique withdrew from headquarters work to strengthen his local position in the Kansai District. By late 1948, his Kansai position was so secure that he felt able to challenge TOKUDA, and he began a series of intra-party attacks against what he termed "bureaucratic control". Except when they clashed over revenues of AKAHATA of which SHIGA was editor, MIYAMOTO Kenji, financial director of the party, supported SHIGA. Other principal headquarters officials oppose him at present but his Kansai position is so strong that he will not be expelled from the party except as a final resort.

NAKANISHI Ko, too, has independent ideas. He advocates social revolution as the first step to the Communist State and refuses to be silenced by defeat in the party councils. He does not draw support from the major factions and both have denounced him as a left-wing opportunist. When he publicly criticized party leadership in late 1949, he was expelled from membership.

Centralist-Internationalist Schism

The lack of unity of thought among Communist Party leaders was spotlighted by the Cominform criticism in early 1950 of NOZAKA's thesis of a "lovable party" and revolution by "parliamentary procedures". Rank and file confidence in the infallibility of party leadership was shaken and, though the centralist faction continued overwhelmingly predominant, definite schisms sprang up sharply dividing party leaders in the following pattern:

Factions within Japan Communist Party

CENTRALIST

*TOKUDA Kyuichi	SHIINO Etsuro	HOSOKAWA Karoku
*NOZAKA Sanzo	WADA Ichizo	KAZAHAYA Yasoji
*ITO Ritsu	SUZUKI Ichizo	KARITA Asano
*HASEGAWA Hiroshi	KAWADA Kenji	UEMURA Susumu
*KONNO Yojiro	SUGIMOTO Fumio	INOGUCHI Masao
*MATSUMOTO Saneki	YAMABE Kentaro	KAWAKAMI Kanichi
*SHIDA Shigeo	IWAMOTO Iwao	WATANABE Yoshimichi
*KASUGA Shoichi	NISHIZAWA Ryuji	NASHIKI Sukejiro
*SATO Satoji	OKADA Bunkichi	TAJIRO Fumihisa
*TAKENAKA Shosaburo	IWATA Eiichi	FUKAZAWA Yoshinori
KIN Ten Kai	HOSAKA Komei	

*Purged, Central Committee - 6 June 1950

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Factions within Japan Communist Party

INTERNATIONALIST

*MIYAMOTO Kenji	MASUDA Kakunosuke	TADA Tomeji
*SHIGA Yoshio	TACHIBANA Toshio	MASUDA Haruo
*KASUGA Shojiro	YAMANA Masani	HONJO Isshin
*KAMEYAMA Kozo	NAITO Tomomichi	INOUE Masata
*KURAHARA Koreto	TAKAHASHI Eisuke	MIYAJIMA Yutaka
*TAKAKURA Toru	*HAKAMADA Satomi	NODA Yasaburo
TOSAKA Ryoichi	HARADA Choji	UTAGAWA Koizo

NAKANISHI FACTION

NAKANISHI Ko	NAKANISHI Atsuchi	NAKANISHI Sanyo
MATSUMOTO Soichiro	SATO Noboru	KUBO Shigetoshi
FUKUMOTO Kunio	MIYAHARA Toshio	

NEUTRAL

*KAMIYAMA Shigeo	***DOBASHI Kazuyoshi	KIMURA Sakae
*ITO Kenichi	**KIKUNAMI Katsumi	FUKUMOTO Kazuo
*SHIRAKAWA Seiichi	SUNAMA Ichiryo	

* Purged, Central Committee - 6 June 1950
** Purged, Akahata Staff - 7 June 1950
*** Purged, Zenroren - 30 August 1950

The Centralists retain control of the formal party organization. They believe that the Japan Communist Party should, in expediency, advocate Japanese neutrality in the international struggle of capitalism versus communism; and that Japanese capitalists and property holders represented by the Yoshida Government rather than America are their most vulnerable enemies. Further, they believe that the present party leadership exercised by them is competent, ~~efficient~~ DEMOCRACY and in accordance with Marx-Lenin doctrine.

The Internationalists advocate closer adherence to the Cominform line of all-out attack upon "American imperialism". They maintain that no expediency justifies a pretense that Japan can be neutral in the struggle between capitalism and communism; and they believe present leadership is incompetent, dictatorial and out of accord with doctrine.

Reconciliation Certain

Irreconcilables have appeared in the rank and file of both factions and each group spies upon the other. Minorities which ordinarily submit to party guidance are confused. The rift appears serious; however, there is strong pressure from International Communism for reconciliation. Leaders of both groups know the fatal consequences of fragmentation. They will accede to mediation and the breach will mend for no leader of Japan Communism believes the party strong enough to survive in Titoism.

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VIII. FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

In the pattern of International Communism, the Japan Communist Party, unable to draw wide popular support to its own banner, employs the tactic of promoting popular fronts and infiltrating communists among the leadership of organizations concerned with the welfare of particular groups. The Communist Party endeavors by this means to dominate labor movements in Japan and it has made similar attempts at domination of student movements, women's movements, movements in support of third nationals, and peace and cultural movements. More disturbing, it has attempted to create and unite under its guidance elements dissident to the Occupation by appealing to racial pride and decrying the irritations inevitable to an occupation situation. Fortunately the camouflage has worn thin, the people are increasingly aware, and front organizations generally have become ineffective in the development of widespread support for communist causes.

Common Political Front

As early as 19 October 1945, communist leaders approached the Socialist Party and proposed a common front or, as it was referred to by the party in a statement of 8 November 1945, "A people's front to form a people's republic". The communists have been carrying on similar efforts since that time.

On 21 December 1947, the party publicly called for a "Democratic Racial Front" and in February 1948, concrete proposals along this line were made to leaders of the Social Democrats, Labor-Farmers and other organizations numbering left-wing sympathizers among their members. The Communist Party's thesis is that the Japanese Government, with the support of the Occupation, has violated the Potsdam Declaration; that only Russia defends the Potsdam Declaration; and that Japan is being enslaved and colonized by international monopolistic capital under the protection of the "American imperialists".

This thesis found acceptance among some of the more radical elements of the labor unions and student organizations, and with their support the communist-dominated Democratization Protection League was established on 27 August 1948. The Democratization Protection League has not prospered, being torn by dissension among its communist and non-communist components and has proved an ineffective poltical weapon.

Farmers' Union

The Communist Party endeavored similarly to control the Japan Farmers' Union but lost this organization to anti-communist leadership despite the excellent preparatory work of the Farm Village Operations Corps which sent agents to every hamlet to advise farmers on problems concerning their livelihood. The party's activities among the farmers failed principally because SCAP directed Farm Land Reform programs were put into effect early in the Occupation, settling the problem of tenant farm dissension.

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Women's Organizations

In order to control for party ends the women of Japan now given political voice by the new Constitution, the Communist Party was active in the organization of such groups as the Democratic Women's Conference, The Democratic Women's Group and the Working Women's Society. However despite party claims that its efforts on the behalf of the women of Japan have contributed materially to their present status of political equality, women's groups continue basically moderate if not actually conservative in direction.

Student Self-Government Association

In the colleges and universities of Japan, party organizers found a group ready to hear extremist propaganda. The youth of Japan does not have the feeling of war guilt held by the older generation or the background to realize the tremendous and unusual problems facing the Japanese in the rehabilitation of their country. They know only that they are subjecting themselves to an austere daily routine. They are discouraged by the diverse difficulties of their daily lives, slow to appreciate the gradual economic recovery of their country, and prone to blame the government and the Occupation for their discomforts.

It is into such mental gaps that the party's propaganda has best infiltrated. Party dominated groups began to assume the leadership of students' self-government associations and were able to foment additional dissension among the students. The National Autonomous Students' Self-Government Association which was formed under Communist Party auspices in 1948 became dominent among student organizations. It had chapters in 60 per cent of Japan's institutions of higher education. For a time it was controlled by members of the Communist Young Men's Counter-Measures Section of the Japan Communist Party.

Communist influence exercised over students through this organization was strengthened by ill-advised persons in authority who criticized certain liberal professors and threatened action depriving them of academic positions. Considerable adverse publicity resulted and the Self-Government Association was handed -- ready made -- a popular cause.

Had the Communist Party retained its solidarity, it could have used the Students' Self-Government Association to excellent advantage in the Democratic Racial Front. As Communist Party central leadership disintegrated, however, so did communist control of the Association, and in mid-1949 the party had so thoroughly lost touch with influential Student Association leaders that in punishment of their dissidence, cells in Waseda and Tokyo Universities were dissolved. At present, less than 10 per cent of students are subject to communist-dominated leadership and the vast number have rejected communism as a political ideology. They realize that their

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primary interest is the rapid attainment of the education for which they and their parents are making considerable sacrifice, and that student strikes, examination boycotts and like communist student struggle tactics militate against their interests.

Cultural Groups

Practicing intellectuals and liberal scholars, scientists, artists and entertainment world personalities pride themselves upon openness of mind and willingness to hear any prophet. To appeal to this group, the Communist Party organized the Japan Democratic Cultural League. The League has 23 carefully nurtured affiliates including poets, actors, lawyers, doctors and the advocates of Esperanto. Its principal value to the party is that it has attracted to membership some well-known names which are exploited in recruitment drives. This group also assists propaganda efforts by supplying entertainers and attraction personalities to perform at gatherings where those attracted by personality or performance are subject to communist indoctrination.

Peace Movements

Among other front organizations dominated by the communists are faction actively advocating Russian and Sino-Japanese cooperation, the Stockholm Peace Movement, and other causes now so well identified with International Communism that some who might otherwise be attracted are kept away through distrust of the communist motive.

Business and Trade Appeals

Societies to promote trade with China aroused considerable interest among businessmen of Osaka, Tokyo and Nagoya in 1949 but faded as they proved of little commercial influence. As in earlier attempts to attract small and medium entrepreneurs by offers of tax benefits, the party found that promise of advantage to this shrewd element was answered by promise of support when advantage materialized and that any support granted was calculated on sound business principles.

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IX. INFLUENCE AMONG REPATRIATES

Of six million Japanese outside the main islands upon the termination of war, some 1,400,000 came to be controlled by Russia. Russia's handling of these Japanese citizens has greatly embarrassed the Japan Communist Party and contributed more than any other single factor to early recognition by the Japanese people of Russian insincerity. The Japanese in the hands of Russia died of hardship, cold and deprivation in tens of thousands during the first winters of their captivity. They were forced by their captors to work as slave laborers in lumber and construction camps in the most desolate areas of Siberia. They were transported wherever Russia needed more hands for harsh work. The Japanese believe that some were herded across Asia into the Ukraine to work on rehabilitation projects there. Now Russia has announced the completion of the repatriation program and the families of more than 375,000 do not know whether their dear ones are alive or dead.

Embarrassment of Local Party

The Japan Communist Party struggled to explain failure to return these Russian captives as the fault of the Japanese Government or of the Occupation authorities, stating that ships were not furnished or that negotiations were conducted in bad faith and broken off before they could be finalized. SCAP has many times refuted these statements and 13 June 1949 he said on the subject:

"This failure to meet international commitments and maintain normal standards of human decency in the disposition of captives finds little parallel in the history of modern civilization, and is calculated so to outrage moral sensibilities that even the Japanese Communists have been moved to register a bitter and indignant protest. The burdened effort at this late date to challenge the number long publicly recorded as held in Soviet hands by charging mathematical error is small solace indeed to the hundreds of thousands of Japanese homes from whom no sophistry can conceal the fact that a family member in Soviet custody has failed to return; and as to whom, contrary to all international covenants respecting prisoners of war, no word whatsoever has been received during the long period of captivity."

In November of 1948, TOKUDA Kyuichi publicly requested that the Soviet member of the Allied Council use his influence on the Kremlin to speed repatriation, and propagandized that the Japan Communist Party would solve the repatriation problem. Russia soon thereafter agreed to resume repatriation. When the first contingent of repatriates reached Maizuru on 27 June 1949, her purpose became apparent.

Indoctrination before Repatriation

These repatriates had been subject to strenuous indoctrination while under Russian control. They had been told that living conditions in Japan under the Occupation were so miserable that no worker or farmer could be sure of daily rice and that a reign of terror was being perpetrated by the Occupation Forces and their collaborators of the Japanese Government.

Having no other channels of information and being daily subject to this propaganda and to praise of the communist line — and in order to alleviate their own circumstances and secure release from imprisonment — these repatriates agreed to accept communism, pledging themselves to work for the communist cause. Upon their return, they ignored their friends, refused to see members of their families who had come to meet them, marched in groups to demonstrations arranged by the communists, and conducted themselves in such unseemly fashion that the whole Japanese people were disgusted with them and their communist mentors.

Many of them were expected to join the Communist Party, and it was International Communism's hope to use them as shock troops in terrorism and violence when the time was ripe for revolution. The program, however, failed when the repatriates by their own observation learned how they had been deceived.

Counter Measures

The question of counter-propaganda indoctrination of these repatriates was often raised in the period immediately after their return. Such action was deliberately avoided. Its value in counter-indoctrination would have been doubtful, and it would have required segregation of these men in schools or camps, contrary to the Potsdam provision that the Japanese military force after being completely disarmed be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

The course selected by the Japanese Government under guidance of SCAP was to return the repatriates as quickly as possible to their homes where, under the healing influence of normal community life, they could discover the hollowness of their previous indoctrination and settle into normal, useful lives. As time has proved, this course was the practical as well as the honest one, and the Communist Party plan for the absorption of the repatriates and their conversion into active party members has completely failed.

Indication that the party recognizes this is found in a directive issued by the Central Committee to Prefectural Committees at the time the repatriates were being returned to Japan, which contains the following:

> "As the families of the repatriates are nearly all anti-Soviet and anti-communist, and as it will be difficult to absorb them into our organization after they settle down, because of the strained condition of their livelihood, efforts must be made this year to absorb them into the party before they return to their homes."

Repatriates' Accusations

Many of the repatriates who appeared to have been thoroughly indoctrinated have turned upon the party with the accusation that the party leaders requested Russia hold Japanese prisoners in Siberia until they were converted to communism.

On the basis of these accusations, the Repatriation Committee of the Diet requested the testimony of TOKUDA on 16 March 1950. His embarrassment was apparent from the fact that he appeared at the inquiry only once despite repeated demands for his attendance. During this appearance he was forced into practical admission that the Communist Party has been guilty of self-contradiction by calling for strict adherence to the Potsdam Declaration on the one hand while defending Russia's violation of specific Potsdam repatriation promises on the other.

Repatriate Organizations

There still exists an organization of repatriates paying lip service to the Communist Party. The Japan Repatriates Union has pledged itself to "fight for the protection of Russia and Communist China and for world peace." Its slogan is, "Every returnee from the Soviet area should work to accelerate friendly relations between Japan and Russia." The party has tried to assist the member of this organization in livelihood problems and since membership is small, for a time was able to support them; but party financial difficulties have thwarted any impressive development of such program with resultant bad feeling in the Repatriates' organization whose officers now criticize the Guidance Section and threaten disobedience.

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X. PUBLIC INFORMATION MEDIA ACTIVITY

General Propaganda Activity

The Japan Communist Party does not neglect propaganda. Every available medium is used to put the party's views before the people. Numbers of Japan's wandering story tellers, the "papershow men", are subsidized to relate party merits and berate capitalism. Posters, wall newspapers, and leaflets are distributed and displayed in public places. Russian produced notion pictures, some of excellent audience appeal, are promoted. Entertainers, actors and well-known persons in the world of culture attracted to the party or its fringes are exploited to the utmost. Fullest advantage is taken of political campaign opportunities and the speech immunity of members of the Diet in Chamber.

Akahata and the Public Press

Most important channel of propaganda available to the communists in Japan was the public press. Newspapers of general and of specialized circulation appeared in numbers. Magazines were published to appeal to various segments of society including youth and intelligentsia.

The communist press here as elsewhere must serve a two-fold party purpose, disseminate instructions to the faithful, and propagandize those sympathetic to the party in particular and all dissident members of the social community in general. Despite those restrictions on the journalist, the Japan Communist Party succeeded remarkably in its newspaper projects until the Cominform criticism of NOZAKA's "parliamentary revolution" policy.

From October 1945 when AKAHATA reappeared until June 1950 communist newspapers grew in number, strength, and reader coverage. AKAHATA, the party organ, first appeared as a pamphlet of 15 pages printed weekly and distributed in 3,000 copies. By January 1946, it was printed at five-day intervals as a tabloid and distributed in 50,000 copies. In August 1946, publication was made each third day; however distribution briefly dipped to 30,000 copies. On 1 August 1947, AKAHATA became a daily newspaper whose circulation reached 150,000. By January 1949, it was printed in local and metropolitan editions, and distributed to 200,000 subscribers. By May 1950, three editions (evening, local and metropolitan) were published and 280,000 copies distributed daily.

AKAHATA was printed by the AKATSUKI Printing Company in Yoyogi, Tokyo, adjacent to the party headquarters. The AKATSUKI Printing Company was the only major printing company controlled by the Japan Communist Party and of the many local communist publications, generally only those which could avail themselves of the AKATSUKI plant were printed; others were mimeographed. About 100 regions and districts published mimeographed organs distributed at varying intervals. All major cells produced and distributed mimeographed cell newspapers.

AKAHATA's editor, SHIGA Yoshio, able party leader and faithful worker, gathered around him a staff which ran AKAHATA as nearly as possible according to good newspaper methods. Their efforts were productive both of propaganda result and monetary profit; AKAHATA in 1949 was the most influential political party newspaper in Japan and could turn several million yen into the party treasury. At that time Central Headquarters' publications were:

	Size	Circulation	Publication
AKAHATA Daily	2 pgs	230,000	Daily
AKAHATA Weekly	4 pgs	100,000	Weekly
VANGUARD Magazine	40-50 pgs	25,000	Monthly
NEW WORLD Magazine	40-50 pgs	6,000	"
TAISHU Club Magazine	20-30 pgs	12,000	"
SCIENCE and TECHNIQUE Magazine	30-40 pgs	9,000	"
RESEARCH REPORT	30 pgs	11,000	"
FRIENDS Newspaper	4 pgs	10,000	Weekly

Propaganda Slants

In keeping with NOZAKA's thesis of "two-stage revolution", AKAHATA continuously criticized existing Japanese Governments. On 25 August 1948, NOZAKA in an article entitled, Characteristic of a New Fascism, said, "The Fascism of today is serving not only the capital of its own country but the interests of its new master. In short, it is a traitorous fascism. The new fascism leaves the democratic principles as they are, but as a matter of fact it is bent on destroying them."

Columns were daily crammed with incitement to class warfare, shaped facts and misrepresentations of the most dishonest character. When SCAP in July 1948 addressed the Prime Minister in a letter relating to legislation governing the conduct of government employees, AKAHATA twisted the context of the letter to the advantage of the communist propaganda line but did so in a manner that plausibly could be explained away as editorial carelessness. Whenever opportunity presented, AKAHATA warped the news to suit the party's propaganda interests.

AKAHATA yet had not directly criticized the Occupation. The Attorney General's Office made the following report August 1949, "The Organs of the party headquarters are cautious and to this date no anti-occupation articles have appeared on the surface."

By the Cominform criticism of January 1950 however, the party was placed in an impossible position: Failure to attack the Occupation in available organs would further offend the Cominform -- attack on the Occupation would certainly bring drastic action under the Press Code. SHIGA who had never been a staunch believer in the NOZAKA thesis and who was fanatic enough to sacrifice the AKAHATA at the bidding of International Communism, saw but one course. He began publication of dishonest and vicious attacks upon America and the Occupation.

SCAP Warnings

At the same time. communist Diet members attacked the Occupation from the floor of the Diet. General Whitney, SCAP's Chief of Government Section, moved at once to warn the communists that such tactics would not be permitted. On 24 February 1950, he summoned communist Diet member SUNAMA Ichiro, who was guilty of a particularly vicious attack and through him warned the Communist Party in the following words:

> "I have summoned you to give you warning, and through you to warn your associates in the Communist Party that lying statements concerning the Occupation will not be tolerated. Your statement was in direct violation of a long standing Occupation directive with which you and your fellow party members are fully familiar. Its obvious purpose is to use the legislative forum as an instrument of propaganda directed aginst the Occupation. The AKAHATA, newspaper of the Communist Party, likewise is moving steadily toward that line beyond which it cannot go without similarly violating the Occupation directive.
>
> "You, your leaders, and hundreds of your fellows were released from prison where you had long been incarcerated by the Civil Liberties Directive issued by the Supreme Commander immediately following the surrender. Since then, the Supreme Commander has fed you, clothed you and your families and protected your right to organize as a lawful political party in Japan. He has literally saved Japan from the brink of impending disaster. Have you no intelligence or gratitude? How do you justify that recently a tendency has been noted on the part of you and some of your associates to avail yourselves of your liberty in licentious disregard of the very purposes for which protection in the exercise of liberty is extended by the Supreme Commander?
>
> "My purpose is to warn you and through you the members of your party that any further statements of this kind, either on the floor of the Diet, in your newspapers, or any place in Japan, defaming and criticizing the Occupation will be cause for your immediate arrest. If your newspapers transgress the bounds of free expression which have been established by the Occupation, they will be closed, and if misconduct by its members or party policy dictated by its leaders is such that the Communist Party under reasonable interpretation becomes a threat to the legitimate political purposes of free society, the protection of the Supreme Commander will be withdrawn.
>
> "Inform your fellows that by their conduct, or their misconduct, they themselves will prescribe the duration of their party as a political influence in Japan.

"There exists today peace and tranquility in Japan. This responds to the fact that the great majority of the Japanese people are peacefully inclined, law-abiding citizens. The Supreme Commander will not permit any group in Japan, whatever its name or political affiliation, to incite violence and disrespect for Occupation directives or Japanese law. As long as the Occupation lasts, he will exact obedience to his orders and respect for the processes of representative government in all political activity. Be yourself warned and caution your follows."

This warning for a time was heeded but party fanatics were under pressure from International Communism and could not be quieted. On 7 June 1950, General MacArthur found it necessary to direct the Japanese Government in the following letter to purge the responsible editorial staff of the AKAHATA:

"To the end that representative democracy in Japan might have the opportunity to thrive in the free atmosphere of full knowledge and public discussion, it has been one of the most fundamental of Allied policies governing the Occupation to encourage and assist the development of a truly free and responsible press. In the furtherance of this purpose, censorship was progressively lifted until finally terminated two years ago and the press left free to publish on its own responsibility, subject only to a code embodying a statement of principles and ethics patterned after the Canons of Journalism of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, supplemented by minimum restrictions essential to the safeguard of military security.

"The Japanese press has in general responded admirably to this challenge and developed a degree of responsibility which has evoked most favorable comment from many visiting journalists from abroad. The glaring exception is the Communist organ AKAHATA. This journal has for some time assumed the role of mouthpiece for the most violent of lawless elements within the Communist Party and as such has defiled its news columns and editorial page with licentious, false, inflammatory and seditious appeal to irresponsible sentiment in the effort to provoke defiance of constituted authority, disrupt the progress of economic revival and create social unrest and mass violence. All this calls for prompt corrective action to safeguard the public peace.

"One course such corrective action might take would be to close the journal and destroy for all time its propaganda making power and constant incitation to violence and revolution; another the re-institution of pre-censorship over all material it proposes to print. Both courses, however, are repugnant to me as violative of the briad philosophy which has guided the development of press freedom in Japan and should be imposed only if other measures prove ineffective.

"As an alternative method of correction, I therefore direct that your government take the necessary administrative measures to incorporate within my letter to you of 6 June 1950 the following named additional persons, sharing responsibility for the policies governing the content of this journal:

"AIKAWA Haruki	MORIYA Tenro	SUGAMA Shosaku
ANEBA Saburo	NISHIZAWA Tomio	TAKAHASHI Katsuyuki
AOYAMA Toshio	OKAMOTO Tadashi	TAKEI Takeo
KAWAMURA Tatsuo	SAKANO Yoshiro	TAKEMOTO Kenzo
KIKUNAMI Katsumi	SHIMADA Koichi	UCHINO Soji
MIYAMOTO Taro	SUITA Hidezo	

SHIGA Yoshio, dominant influence of AKAHATA, was named in SCAP's letter of 6 June 1950 to be designated purgee as a member of the Central Committee.

Suspension of Communist Publications

This warning was not sufficient; scurrilous material continued to be published and on 26 June 1950, SCAP gave final warning by directing suspension of the publication of AKAHATA for a period of 30 days. He said:

"In my letter to you of June 7th, I directed that certain persons therein listed as sharing responsibility for the editorial policies of the communist organ AKAHATA be, for the reasons stated, rendered subject to the prohibitions, restrictions and liabilities of my directives of January 4, 1946, and their implementing ordinances. I took this action in the hope that through the new leadership thereby induced the paper might be reoriented toward a course of relative moderation, with due regard for the truth and avoidance of inflammatory appeals to lawlessness and violence. Examination of the paper during the period intervening discloses, however, that such hope has not materialized.

"In its latest issues, moreover, by its perversion of the truth in discussing the Korean situation, the paper gives evidence of the fact that it is not the legitimate organ of a Japanese political party but rather an instrument of foreign subversion used to disseminate among the people of Japan, and in this case particularly its large Korean minority, malicious, false and inflammatory propaganda aimed at subverting the public mind to the prejudice of the public peace and welfare. Seditious acts of this nature may not be tolerated in a peaceful and democratic society.

"Accordingly, I direct that your government take the necessary measures to cause publication of AKAHATA to be suspended for a period of thirty days, after which its right to continued existence will depend upon its ability to attain a position of

responsibility within the ranks of Japan's free and responsible press."

The Communist Party was in a vise and ideological pressure from the Cominform was great; attempts were made to thwart SCAP's purpose by setting up successors to AKAHATA. Therefore, SCAP directed the Japanese Government to suppress all communist newspapers and all offending communist publications of whatsoever nature. Schedule of suspension of the communist organs was as follows:

Publications	Beginning Date	Affected Number
AKAHATA	27 June 50	1
Regional, Prefectural and Certain Ward Committee Organs (Tokyo)	28 June 50	110
District Committees and Large Cell Organs	11 July 50	655
Cell Organs	30 July 50	706
Total as of 1 March 51		1,472

Normal public information media channels have thus been denied the Communist Party. Though sporadic propaganda activity is continued through variously circulated organs, the party is now unable adequately either to instruct its members or propagandize sympathizers -- and has lost a considerable source of income.

Party workers have frantically endeavored to continue some sort of nationally circulated organ whatever the cost. Papers of front controlled groups have served for this purpose as have clandestinely published smear sheets. The Japanese Government has however vigorously traced each successive publication to its source and there arrested the editorial staff and blocked and seized presses and other equipment to the considerable distress of the party. Until 23 January 1951 when a list of responsible distributors was discovered, government authority could not break up the distribution net. Acting on this list officers properly equipped with search warrants descended upon 378 distribution points throughout all Japan in the early morning of 4 February 1951 and arrested 568 communists for this illegal activity.

Major AHAHATA Successors	Date Suspended
SHIN BUNKA (New Culture)	24 Jul 1950
RODO SHIMBUN (Labor Newspaper)	24 Jul 1950
KAIHO SHIMBUN (Liberation Newspaper)	2 Aug 1950
KAKYO MIMPO (Huachiao Daily)	28 Sep 1950
JIYU SHIMBUN (Liberty Newspaper)	10 Nov 1950
HEIWA NO TOMO (Friends of Peace)	21 Dec 1950
HEIWA NO KOE (Voice of Peace)	23 Jan 1951

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XI. LABOR ACTIVITIES

During World War II and ten years before, Japan's militarists and ultranationalists had exterminated all semblance of healthy labor leadership in Japan by harsh legislation and police state methods. Labor freed to organize under Allied policy (summarized in the Sixteen Point Declaration of Principles for Japanese Trade Unions) had no experienced leadership, no organization technicians and no tradition for legal, orderly struggle in the pattern developed by trial and error in the labor unions of the western democracies. Here the communists saw an opportunity and seized it. For a time, they made progress in securing control of newly formed, rapidly growing but immature workers' organizations by infiltrating experienced party workers into key positions. But here again, the communists had no real understanding of the opportunity. Though they could, by orderly, sincere leadership have forged sound and lasting support in the unions -- which they once controlled -- they chose to use their power to further political ends, and thus lost their influence to more moderate, less self-interested elements.

Seizure of Leadership

Communist minorities dominated all government workers' unions, railroad unions, most heavy industry unions, the maritime unions, the communications unions, the teachers' unions, and the unions in the electrical industry. They were in absolute control of labor forces with tremendous support in the occupation, the Japanese public, and in organized labor throughout the world. They were able to guide the course of Japanese labor until their mistakes brought labor movements into disrepute and lost that store of good will.

As early as 7 April 1946, the Communist Party openly indicated that it would use the strength of labor for political purpose. Party spokesman NOZAKA said, "To overthrow the reactionary anti-peoples' Cabinet of Shidehara, more demonstrations and meetings will not avail. We should prepare a general strike of all laborers and other workers throughout the country."

The Communist Party's fumbling of the control of labor can be devided roughly into four phases: Production control; the general strike effort; the public servants' struggle; and the localized struggle.

Production Control

The production control strike, a device conceived in Italy, is very effective when government mechanisms are uncertain in action. Immediate postwar Japan was an ideal field for such techniques, which were first used in the Yomiuri Press Strike, 24 October 1945, and the Keisei Dentetsu Strike of 1 December 1945. It appeared that the communist leaders of Japan labor could gain control over any industry by this method.

To perfect the application of the production strike technique, the Communist Party decided to concentrate on single industry organization. Recognizing that control of public information media meant virtual control of public thinking under the existing chaotic conditions, the party concentrated first on organization of newspaper and communications workers' unions. Their gains were impressive here and in other industry-wide unions. On 10 March 1946 they set up a National Labor Unions' Liaison Council. May Day 1946, the Council directed a demonstration in which more than two million workers throughout Japan participated.

Political party purpose rather than the welfare of the worker was apparent. Demonstrations were directed at national and local government offices in show of force to intimidate officials and soften their resistance to the demands of the Communist Party. SCAP pointed out the dangers of the situation. Thereafter the Japanese Government, on 13 June 1946, prohibited the Production Control Strike. The Japanese worker, glad of sane guidance, responded admirably and the first crisis was past.

General Strike Efforts

Perhaps it was in anticipation of the prohibition of "Production control" that NOZAKA in April called for a general strike. Organization to this end had proceeded with the tentative target date for a "fall offensive" publicly announced. In the meantime, the party tested its strength by calling strikes in various key industries and public service organs, including the Yomiuri Press, 12 July 1946, the maritime unions, 10 September 1946, and the railroad unions early in September. Public support, essential to a general strike, did not appear and many laborers resisted. The target date was therefore retarded and the railroad strike suspended. Further organizational propaganda, and infiltration activities were planned, and an attempt was made to effect awareness of the laborer's needs by an electrical union strike technique of shutting off the power supply to certain users in accordance with preannounced schedules.

Living conditions continued difficult for the average Japanese. That apathy which had accompanied the shock of the surrender was wearing off, and there was dissatisfaction with the measures taken by the existing government to alleviate hardship. On 6 January 1947, the communist leaders felt time was ripe to announce they would call out the workers on a general strike in February. In final preparation, a communist-dominated Joint Struggle Committee boasting the control of four million organized workers was set up. The Japanese public and the Japanese worker did not give all-out support to the general strike plans, but neither did they know how to oppose them. Their dissatisfaction with uncertain internal guidance was such that they looked to General MacArthur for a decision, which he gave them firmly and without compromise.

On 31 January 1947, General MacArthur issued the following public statement, which took the form of an instruction from the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers to the General Strike Organizers:

"....I have informed the labor leaders whose unions have federated for the purpose of conducting a general strike that I will not permit the use of so deadly a social weapon in the present impoverished and emaciated condition of Japan, and have accordingly directed them to desist from the furtherance of such action.

. . . . . .

"A general strike crippling transportation and communication would prevent the movement of food to feed the people and of coal to sustain essential utilities, and would stop such industry as is still functioning. The paralysis which inevitably would result might reduce large masses of the Japanese people to the point of actual starvation and would produce dreadful consequences upon every Japanese home regardless of social strata or direct interest in the basic issue....

. . . . . .

"While I have taken this measure as one of dire emergency, I do not intend otherwise to restrict the freedom of action heretofore given to labor in the achievement of legitimate objectives. Nor do I intend in any way to compromise or influence the basic social issues involved. These are matters of evolution which time and circumstances may well orient without disaster as Japan gradually emerges from its present distress."

By this action the situation was composed. Press and public opinion unanimously supported the Supreme Commander's intervention and condemned the instigators of the averted general strike as enemies of the public welfare.

Public Servants' Struggle

Control of Japanese labor unions by communist elements continued to present a serious problem. The unions they dominated included employees of the Japanese Government engaged in the operation of government-owned railway and communication systems and in governmental administrative activities. Virtual control of internal transportation and communications gave these groups influence over the Japanese Government and pressure on the public out of all proportion to real strength, and the communists prepared to exert this power, not to the advancement of the economic and social betterment of the workers, but to the political ends of the subversive elements in control.

The problem was attacked along a broad front. Research was instituted to determine and prepare legislation providing adequate guarantees to the worker, and at the same time, prohibiting strikes against the people -- in accordance with the well recognized democratic principle that the public servant cannot be permitted to force his minority demands upon the majority, whose will is spoken through elected representatives.

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The communist leaders of the unions which included public servants were aware that unless they acted soon the chance to disrupt governmental process by strike of the government workers would be gone.

On 1 March 1948, they called a series of rallies calculated to unite all workers in a common front opposing regulation of the public servant. At the same time, they called for a communication workers' strike. Had GHQ not intervened forbidding "coordinated work stoppages", the country's mail, telegraph and telephone communications would have been hopelessly disrupted in early April with inevitable unfavorable impact upon economic recovery and the welfare of all Japanese. On 17 May 1948, they endeavored to incite government railway employees to strike by calling out 30,000 private railway workers, but control of the government railway workers' unions was shifting away from them and they were unsuccessful.

These tactics aroused such apprehension among political leaders and appeared to have such strong support from other labor organizations, including electrical workers, metal workers and mine workers, that the Japanese Government considered it impossible without SCAP support to secure legislation necessary to the control of the peoples' servants. SCAP therefore, on 22 July, directed the Japanese Government that legislation be enacted prohibiting strikes or similar labor tactics by government employees. He further directed that (pending passage by the Diet of adequate legislation) measures immediately be taken under Potsdam authority to effect this order.

The Japanese Government responded on 31 July 1948 by issuing Cabinet Order No. 201 embodying temporary rules for the control of governmental workers. This Cabinet Order remained controlling over national government employees' activities until the National Public Service Law was promulgated on 3 December 1948 and will continue controlling on local government servants until the promulgation of a local government service law.

Despite desperate tactics of the communists (including incitement of an illegal railway strike in Hokkaido in August, outcries that any restriction of labor's right to strike was contrary to the Potsdam Declaration, and a September request to the Russian Mission for intercession) SCAP's action staving off anarchy at once received general support from the Japanese public at large. Later it was approved by responsible world labor organizations if not by the affected workers themselves.

Thereafter, though various unions including government workers among membership threatened strikes, none seriously challenged SCAP's order. Disorderly elements of the Government Railway Workers' Union made the most determined effort. In June of 1949 an unruly minority, since punished by court action, stopped a number of local trains, and in one instance, known as the "People's Electric Car Case" ran an unauthorized train.

Feeling was high among the railway workers; a number of them were soon to be discharged in an effort to bring operation of the railroads out

of the red and they were gaining the support of the Communication Workers' Union, whose members faced similar personnel reductions. On 5 July, however, there was immediate public revulsion to union extremists who were blamed for the murder of SHIMOYAMA, National Railroad Corporation Resident, whose mutilated body was found on the railroad track north of Tokyo. Even the most militant union leaders realized further disruptive action would be dealt with by an aroused citizenry.

Localized Struggles

The Communist Party therefore retreated from support of the public servant and in accordance with its policy of "two steps forward and one back" began to create local labor trouble wherever possible, adopting the so-called "one man, one demand" tactic. Efforts concentrated principally among electric workers, heavy industry employees, maritime workers, and miners impeded economic recovery. But not again was the Communist Party able to threaten domination of Japan through control of the labor movement. When on 26 September 1949 at the Seventeenth Emergency Central Committee, the party analyzed the labor front for the benefit of organizers, advising on probabilities and principles, practical admission was made that control of organized labor in Japan was in the hands of non-communist labor leaders.

Loss of Labor Control

Last of the great unions controlled by the communists, the Electrical Workers, was lost to them when its convention in July 1950 expelled the communist faction. Neither has the once powerful union control organ, the World Federation of Trade Unions dominated National Congress of Industrial Workers maintained its usefulness. Lately it is being considered for voluntary dissolution which is graphic testimony of the bankruptcy of the communist labor program, typified by this paragraph of the agenda for the next party convention:

> "The party is considering to put into force the dissolution of the National Congress of Industrial Organizations at the National Convention of the party [to be held in November 1950] in order to infiltrate the party influence into labor unions by setting up another organization."

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XII. LABOR RATIONALIZATION AFFECTING THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Necessity for Rationalization

Communist minorities early infiltrated unions including public servants among their membership, organizations of public information media employees, and the important industrial and utility unions. So firmly entrenched were they in union policy-making that they could turn the power of labor to communist ends. Labor as organized in Japan included supervisory employees in the same unions with thier subordinates. Neither did Japanese labor leadership possess the protective inhibitions developed over the years in the western democracies. Authoritative intervention, therefore, was essential to rationalize the influence of the communist minority.

Tax Collectors' Union Incident

In late 1947 and the first months of 1948, the Communist Party organized an intensive tax struggle to appeal to small and medium enterprisers. Communist committees were organized in various neighborhoods to coordinate tax protests. Cases mediated in the tax collectors' offices by these committees were usually productive of tax adjustments.

Communist propaganda advertised this preferential service. Investigations disclosed the explanation that control of the All-Japan Tax Collectors' Union was in the hands of the Communist Party and tax officials were favoring communist sponsored tax protests.

Finance Vice Minister, IKEDA Hayato, broke the back of this conspiracy by moving with decision to discharge tax officials misusing public position in the interest of the Communist Party. These discharges which took place in the spring of 1948 were for legally justifiable disciplinary reasons. They were significant as the first moves of any Japanese agency to combat illegal communist manipulation of unionized workers by release of communist agitators from the employment which made them eligible for official participation in local union affairs.

Government Personnel Adjustments

Job holders are protected in Japan by rights of tenure, labor standard laws, and other progressive labor legislation. The communists could not be separated from employment, including governmental employment, without cause. Therefore, despite the evident benefits to Japanese political and economic stability of the action taken by the Finance Minister regarding communist-motivated tax officials, it was not until July 1949 that other government agencies were enabled to relieve employee unions of irresponsible leadership.

When the Nine-Point Economic Stabilization Program made government retrenchment necessary, personnel appropriations were decreased to the extent that thousands of non-essential governmental employees had to be discharged. The Prime Minister decided that such discharges should be on the basis of ridding the government of its least efficient workers. Communists in the government offices and enterprises had almost invariably devoted their principal attention to labor agitation to the neglect of thier assigned duties. It was, therefore, legally possible under the Administrative Agency Fixed Personnel Law and the National Public Service Law to separate these employees. When Cabinet Conference determined that such action was politically feasible as well, it was carried out routinely with the results indicated in the following table.

COMMUNISTS DISCHARGED FROM GOVERNMENT OFFICES

Government Office	Employees	Dismissed	Percent	Dates of Action
Attorney General's Office	30,856	73	0.23	Jul 49-Feb 50
Board of Audit	1,247	8	0.63	Aug 49
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry	30,986	237	0.76	Aug 49-Oct 50
Ministry of Construction	10,866	71	0.65	Aug 49
Ministry of Education	1,764	20	1.12	Sep 49
Schools (under Ministry of Education)	61,847	167	0.27	
Ministry of Finance	13,373	380	2.84	Jul 49-Aug 50
MITI	13,533	101	0.74	Aug -Oct 49
Ministry of Labor	20,705	76	0.36	End of Sep 49
Ministry of Postal Admin.	260,640	1,664	0.63	End of Sep 49
Ministry of Telecommunication	144,642	1,077	0.74	End of Sep 49
Ministry of Transportation	16,068	612	3.81	End of Sep 49
Ministry of Welfare	44,073	183	0.41	Aug -Nov 49
Prime Minister's Office	2,269	8	0.35	Aug 49
Autonomous Police	95,000	170		Aug 49-Oct 50
Courts	19,536	16	0.01	Jul -Sep 49
Local Public Entities	248,320	1,650	0.66	Oct 49-Feb 50
NPA	1,262	6	0.47	Sep 49
National Railroads	482,837	2,591	0.53	Jul -Aug 49
NRP	46,036	96	0.20	Aug -Sep 49
Price Control	330	3	0.90	Sep 49
Public Schools	572,864	1,583	0.30	Dec 49-Oct 50
Special Procurement Board	6,825	1	0.01	Sep 49
Totals	2,125,879	10,793		

As a result of this action, communist control of the public servants was lost and that basic domestic tranquility upon which the new democracy of Japan strengthens was enhanced. Gradually, however, additional communists infiltrated the ranks of the public servants and to interfere with the administration of public business; therefore, the Government in connection with further personnel adjustment scheduled the discharge during the latter part of 1950 of about 1,100 known troublemakers. These communists were given the opportunity to correct their errors. None was listed for release who had not committed overt illegal act.

The Ministry of Education is discussing the rescreening of school teachers in order to discover and reserve communists and their follows from the field of education. The Ministry, as yet, has found no effectual plan by which such action can be accomplished. Until the administration of the various schools is strengthened and taught to take a properly responsible attitude it must be presumed that there will be no positive solution to illegal teacher activity.

Information Media Personnel Adjustments

Communists in public information organs slanted the news through control of various sensitive positions. Recognizing this evil, the heads of the great information media companies of Japan met in Tokyo to determine proper response to SCAP's letter of 18 July 1950 in which he said:

> "... In the great struggle which is now engaging the forces of the free world all segments must accept and faithfully fulfill their share of the attendant responsibility. That share as to none is greater than such as falls upon the

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media of public information. For there rests the full responsibility of insuring dissemination of the truth, and based upon the truth the development of an informed and enlightened public opinion. History records no instance where a free press failed in the discharge of this responsibility without inviting its own doom...."

At this meeting, information media organ executives decided to act independently and on their own responsibility to sever from employment all communists and their fellow travelers who worked to thwart accurate presentation of the news. Following is a list of subsequent action:

Public Information Media	Number Dismissed As of 24 October 1950	Date (1950)
Broadcasting Facilities	121	Jul - Aug
News Agencies (2)	50	Jul - Aug
Newspaper Companies (46)	519	Jul - Aug
Total	690	

Decision of Fukuoka District Court

Those discharged moved immediately to protest in court actions. The courts received the cases and heard them. The first decision announced (a pattern for subsequent decisions) was that of the Fukuoka District Court in the case of certain dismissed persons vs the Western Office of the ASAHI SHIMBUN, handed down 9 September 1950. The appellants protested that the action of the ASAHI in dismissing communists was unconstitutional and in violation of the Labor Standards Law. The judgment of the court was:

"The people in general have already deemed that there is a danger that the Communist Party may proceed in organized activity with the objective of violent revolution. This fact is also known from General MacArthur's letters and messages. If these activities are unchecked a state of disturbance and anarchy and rule by force will be brought about; fundamental human rights will be trampled, and the Constitution become as a sheet of waste paper. The aim of democracy under the new Constitution is emancipation of the individual from feudal and totalitarian oppressions and his utmost protection to enjoy fundamental rights and liberties. The objective of the Japan Communist Party is the bondage of class dictatorial power. The party's method of realization of this objective is disturbance of order and domination by violence. The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, speech and association but it does not guarantee against frustration of these freedoms by subversive activity. Further, the guarantee of fundamental rights by the Constitution does not give the right

-- even in order to realize a certain ideal -- to ignore the basic human rights of others. *** Rights and liberties which our Constitution intends to guarantee have their own limits in the public welfare. *** Each individual is a unit in social life of the community and it cannot be considered proper exercise of right and freedom to abuse the exercise of guaranteed liberties beyond the limits which are inherent in these liberties.

"To be a member of the Japan Communist Party or a fellow sympathizer thereof is not only to be true to the creed of communism but to take action at any time, in obedience to the party's directives, as a member of a defiant organization which with destructive motive attacks the Constitution and all other laws and ordinances. Therefore, it is not contrary to the Constitution that a private organization producing an important publication eliminated members of the Japan Communist Party or its sympathizers in order to protect the press from the danger as mentioned above; such action was a necessary measure of protection against the threat of disturbance and destruction of the strong organization of the Japan Communist Party -- not a discrimination against the profession of creed."

Rationalization in Industries and Utilities

Industry and utilities also felt the need to free their employee organizations of communist influence. Encouraged by the action of the public information media companies as upheld by the decision of the Fukuoka District Court, and by the statement of the Japanese Government that it intended further action to sever governmental employees active in support of communism, companies in these fields began a program of release of communists in sensitive positions in the autumn of 1950.

A tabulation of those discharged and scheduled to be discharged follows:

Industries	No. Employed	No. Dismissed	Percentage
Banking Firms	111,700	27	.02
Chemical Industry	170,000	1,432	.84
Coal Mining	395,000	1,924	.48
Electrical Industry	204,000	2,137	1.04
Express Companies	110,000	516	.46
Heavy Industry (iron & steel)*	190,000	2,164	1.13
Life Insurance Industry	12,300	10	.08
Mining (other than coal)	70,000	219	.31
Motion Picture Companies	8,000	122	1.52
Oil Industry	105,000	91	.08
Printing Industry	12,000	160	1.33
Private Railway	134,000	519	.38
Pulp Industry	30,000	110	.36
Spinning & Textile Industry	200,000	83	.04

* Includes automobile manufacturing & Shipbuilding Companies.

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The program of labor rationalization undertaken independently by Japanese agencies concerned has undoubtedly drawn moral support from SCAP and encouragement from the warm response of Japanese public opinion. It has turned the practical control of Japanese unions to labor leaders whose primary interest is betterment of the laborer's lot. Though it has militated against the livelihood of 22,000 people, it has enabled millions more to maintain their employment under steadily bettering conditions. The dismissals have not been predicated solely on ideological belief or party affiliation, but have been made after analysis of misconduct and on the job risk: neglect of duty, obstruction of business, betrayal of official information, tendency to sabotage, and acts prejudicial to the integrity of government and public welfare. Those affected are protected by sound labor procedures including appeal to the courts. Unless ill-advised management abuses the rationalization program to offend honest labor leadership, Japan's labor management relationships will continue vastly improved.

XIII. PARTY FINANCES

The Japan Communist Party is not financially self-sustaining. In the past it has depended upon grants of funds from more prosperous organs of the Comintern, donations variously secured, and activities not quite within the law.

Dues of loyal members constitute the greatest source of income to the present Japan Communist Party. Members are expected to give within their means, and in any event, to pay into the party treasury at least one per cent of earnings, however small. The heaviest expense is for personnel since the Communist Party, depending upon the all-out efforts of its leaders and organizers, must maintain them and their families.

Even when most prosperous the Japan Communist Party never has quite enough money and, generally, it has far from enough.

Pre-war Financing

In the period from organization of the first Communist Party in Japan until 1943, the party is believed to have been financed largely by donations from the Russian, Chinese and American communist parties. Police records indicate that when KONDO Eizo returned from Shanghai in May 1921, he brought 6,500 yen with him for the party funds. There are other such instances. WATANABE Masanosuke was bringing funds from China for the party when fearing capture by the police, he committed suicide. Some additional funds came from the party's publication enterprises, such as the Hope Pavilion, the Marx Bookstore, and the White Willow House, and from contributions made by culture groups. No great sums were needed since the party was small and its program not ambitious.

Party revenue for 1933 was recorded by police investigators as approximately the following:

Estimated Revenue for 1933

Party fees (500 CP members)	¥ 12,000
All Japan Workers' Union	30,000
Japan Proletariat Cultural League	30,000
College Students and Teachers	36,000
Individuals	30,000
Illegally acquired (DAIHYAKU Bank Robbery)	31,800
Total	¥169,800

Postwar Financial Difficulties

When the Japan Communist Party became active in 1945, first expenses were met by contributions from unidentified agencies of International Communism.

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