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THE FOURTH BOOK
OF THE
MEDITATIONS
OF
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS

ΜΑΡΚΟΥ ΑΝΤΩΝΙΝΟΥ

ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΟΡΟΣ

ΤΩΝ ΕΙΣ ΕΑΤΤΟΝ

ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ Δ.

THE FOURTH BOOK
OF THE
MEDITATIONS
OF
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS

A Revised Text

WITH TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY

AND AN

APPENDIX ON THE RELATIONS OF THE EMPEROR WITH
CORNELIUS FRONTO

BY

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Tous, tant que nous sommes, nous portons au cœur le deuil
de Marc-Aurèle, comme s'il était mort d'hier.

RENAN.

I MUST begin by craving the indulgence of the few readers who are likely to take up this little volume for its fragmentary character. Seven years ago I conceived the idea of producing such an edition of Marcus Aurelius as should tempt those who have not entirely forgotten the Greek of their youth, and who are yet interested in that most fascinating of all studies, the history of ethics, to read the Thoughts of the Emperor in their original form—a form often, indeed, rugged and technical in style, but not unfrequently felicitous and invariably direct and forcible. With this hope, I succeeded in producing a new translation of the entire book, with an English commentary on some part, when a change and increase of professional work diverted me from the project. Even a slight measure of success in such an undertaking demands the ample leisure sufficient to enable one to saturate one's mind with the literature and thought of the age. Still more is this true of a writer who in a certain sense presumes and sums up all preceding systems of philosophy. Finding, then, that for the present the probability of my being able to complete the commentary was rather receding, and being unwilling that the result of several years' labour should be entirely wasted, I venture to lay the portion I had completed before the public.

I have had before me the editions of Gataker (ed. altera, cura G. Stanhope, Lond., 1697); J. M. Schultz

(Sleswig, 1802, Leipzig, 1820, Paris, 1842, ed. Didot); Coraës (Paris, 1816); and 'R. I.'¹ Oxon., 1704: the translations of George Long (second ed., London, 1880); Alexis Pierron (Paris, 1878); and C. Cless (Stuttgart, 1866). The versions of Jeremy Collier, Meric Casaubon, Thomson, and Schneider have been also occasionally referred to. Besides the standard works on the history of the second century and the Stoic philosophy, I have derived help from Constant Martha's *Moralistes sous l'empire romain*; E. de Suckau's *Etude sur Marc-Aurèle*; Noël des Vergers' *Essai sur Marc-Aurèle d'après les monuments épigraphiques*; and the essay on 'St. Paul and Seneca' in Bishop Lightfoot's *Epistle of St. Paul to the Philippians*.²

The translation and commentary on the text were carefully revised by my dear friend and colleague, the late Professor W. Nesbitt, to whose sound judgment and ripe scholarship there is scarcely a page which is not indebted. For several suggestions and ready help I owe my best thanks to Mr. Samuel Alexander of Balliol College, Oxford; and Mr. W. M. Lindsay of Balliol College was good enough to assist me in the correction of the press.

¹ These initials, Mr. Bywater tells me, are those of R. Ives or Ivies.

² It is curious that while nothing has been done for M. Aurelius for so many years, two labourers should lately have been unconsciously working in the same field. I learn, at the moment of going to press, that Teubner will shortly publish an edition of the Emperor by Johann Stich, who has apparently been able to secure (what I could not) the inestimable advantage of a fresh collation of MSS. I cannot too greatly regret that I have been unable to profit by his work.

PREFACE.

THOUGH Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius have indeed never wanted readers, fit though few, it may seem strange from more than one point of view that Roman Stoicism has not attracted more attention in England—I mean attention of the practical sort as distinguished from that which springs from literary or historical curiosity. For it has undoubtedly an affinity with English character, such as is not possessed in a greater degree by any ethical teaching save that of the Gospel. If the Stoic view of life is before all things sober, serious, and practical, so also is the English. If Stoicism places duty in the forefront, declining altogether to recognise the claims of joy, and grudgingly making room, at any period of its history, for the emotions, our nation still takes its pleasure sadly, and loves to repress the evidences of feeling. The tendency of both is to *moralise* everything in human life. How does this bear upon conduct or upon the formation of character is the only question worth asking. Nothing, again, can be more grateful to an English ear than the unmistakable ring of directness and sincerity in these moralists. Their language is that of men who believed in what they taught, and acted upon it. Outspokenness indeed was cultivated to a fault: for the conventions regulating the *tacenda* of civilisation cannot be ignored with impunity. But the autocrat who ‘found nothing better in human life than justice, truth, temperance, and fortitude,’ who would ‘live as on a mountain,’ who ‘desired nothing needing walls and curtains,’ who, taking the constancy and purity of the

heavenly bodies for his daily example, reminded himself that 'there is no veil over a star,'¹ was one whom most men may imitate without danger.

But Stoicism has an interest deeper than this. If the pressing need of to-day is to find a place for higher beliefs beside practical interests and the obligation of accepting scientific truth, in Stoicism not only is an attempt made to satisfy like conditions, but in it a religious spirit which has many links of connection with ours is fused on the one hand with a practical spirit akin to ours, and on the other with a reasoned body of science. Each of these aspects of the system suggests some remarks.

In Roman Stoicism we have a remarkable union of several principles which the rival schools of philosophy cannot boast. The gifts of two, nay, of three distinct races are in it presented to us in organic unity. In the first place we have the Semitic 'genius for righteousness' wedded to the Hellenic genius for thought, an advantage possessed neither by the Academy, the Garden, nor the Lyceum. How great a debt Stoicism owes to the race among whom Christianity was born has been set forth lately with incomparable learning and force by Bishop Lightfoot in an essay to which, from one point of view, it would be difficult to add anything.² Not only was its origin in the East, but a roll-call of its most influential names, during the earlier period of its history, shows that in almost every case they were of Oriental, even of Semitic, blood. Its founder came from Cyprus, and was of Phœnician extraction; his immediate successor from Assos; the next from Cilicia. Not a single Stoic of any name was a native of Greece proper. Nor is the influence of the East, and the earnestness of the Semitic mind, less traceable in the spirit of the School. That Stoicism was in Greece an exotic importation might almost have been inferred without a knowledge of the original homes of its founders. Nothing could have been devised

¹ M. Anton. iii. 6; x. 15; iii. 7; xi. 27.

² Cp. also Sir Alex. Grant on 'the Ancient Stoics' in his 2d ed. of *Arist.*

Ethics, i. p. 243 sq.; and Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, Theil iii. Abth. i. (Eng. Transl., '*Stoics*,' p. 36 sqq.)

more antipodal to every instinct of the art-loving, pleasure-loving child of Hellas. These Puritans of antiquity poured contempt on everything which did not promise to lead to the cultivation of virtue, the improvement of life and character. That terrible weapon of Stoicism, its merciless analysis,³ would doubtless refuse to see anything in the Parthenon but blocks of stone—in the beauty of the fairest boy-Sophocles that ever graced a procession but flesh, bones, sinews, and arteries.⁴ In Stoicism, practically for the first time, the strange joy of self-repression, of self-abnegation, even to some extent of self-maceration,⁵ entered the western world; and the tendencies towards asceticism, which exist in different races in very different degrees, found a centre round which to rally, and a reasoned system of doctrine to support and develop them. But in Hellas itself—so alien was this side of Stoicism to the genius of the people—it gained few adherents. A farther step was necessary before the School attained the measure of success which was ultimately destined for it. Not until it entered the Roman world was its full strength put forth. In Rome, the true home of this philosophy had been long preparing for it. The view of life prevailing in the early Republic was more serious, less many-sided than in Greece; the very type of primitive Roman virtue seems an unconscious anticipation of the spirit of Stoicism. The very language of that stern generation was, in conciseness and gravity, naturally adapted to be the vehicle of Hebraic sentiments, on which the delicacy, copiousness, and versatility of Greek were as much thrown away as in translating the Pentateuch or the Minor

³ See note on the Analysis of Stoicism, p. 45 below.

⁴ Cp. M. Anton. ii. 2.

⁵ As far as this concerns Aurelius, cp. Capitolinus, *M. Ant. Philosophus*, § 2: 'Nam duodecimum annum ingressus habitum philosophi sumpsit, et deinceps tolerantiam, cum studeret in pallio et humi cubaret, vix autem matre agente instrato pellibus lectulo accubaret. . . . Tantumque operis et laboris studiis inpendit, ut corpus

adficeret, atque in hoc solo pueritia eius reprehenderetur.' For the meagre diet and ascetic mode of life recommended by Seneca to his disciples, see Ep. 18: 'Grabatus ille verus sit, et sagum, et panis durus ac sordidus. Hoc triduo et quadriduo fer, interdum pluribus diebus, ut non lusus sit sed experimentum.' 'Non iucunda res est aqua et polenta, aut frustum hordeacei panis: sed summa voluptas est, posse capere etiam ex his voluptatem.'

Prophets. In the Roman, Stoicism found a type of character curiously suited to assimilate and profit by its teaching. In Stoicism, the Roman found precisely the teaching needed to justify to himself many of the best (as well as perhaps some of the least praiseworthy) tendencies of his nature. So congenial does the system appear, that while the famous deeds of ancient Roman worthies cited so constantly by Seneca might be readily believed to have been performed in the very bosom of the Stoic school, its great Roman adherents, such as Cato, scarcely lose thereby a single trait of national character, but rather appear truer specimens of the type fostered by the Republic than their unphilosophical forefathers.

But Pagan Rome made other contributions to the system which stood to her more nearly than anything else in the place of a religion,⁶ than a list of illustrious men and women. In some respects the Stoic and the Roman were indeed ill adapted to correct each other's faults. Stoicism (to take one of its obvious defects) was deaf and blind upon the artistic side; accordingly it did nothing towards supplying the congenital deficiency of the Roman in this direction. Had Mummius been a disciple of Zeno, it may be doubted whether that circumstance would have modified in the least his famous order touching the Corinthian works of art. Again, the Roman suffered naturally (like the Bœotian) from *ἀναισθησία*. His moral sensibilities needed refinement as well as his artistic; nor was the new-found doctrine likely, in its original shape, to mend the fault. But the Roman, like the Englishman of a later day, with whom he has so many points of resemblance, possessed a store of practical good sense. This was now applied with excellent results to the curtailment or modification of Stoic extravagances. The word-splitting theory of formal logic was to a large extent quietly allowed to drop. The rigorous interdict laid upon the emotions was partially raised.⁷ Here

⁶ A delicately beautiful account of this aspect of Stoicism may be found in C. Martha's *Moralistes sous l'Empire Romain* ('La Morale pratique

dans les lettres de Sénèque.') See also Zeller, *Stoics*, p. 323.

⁷ In proof of this, as regards Aurelius, we may refer to the whole

and there the returning sense of beauty in natural objects was permitted to manifest itself.⁸ The haughty pretensions of the ideal sage were lowered. The doctrine of suicide was modified. A wise eclecticism supplemented defects, and softened asperities in practice. Finally, the Roman genius for organisation, through the far-reaching machinery of the Empire, and the stability of the imperial institutions, enabled this school of philosophy to extend its branches and deepen its roots in a manner which would hardly have been possible under other conditions, until it mounted the throne of the world in the person of Aurelius.

So that in the philosophy of the Emperor we have in reality the union of what was best and wisest in the unassisted search after truth of three distinct races; those races constituting the three most important nations of the ancient world. Among ancient schools of philosophy, this can be said of Stoicism, and of Roman Stoicism, only. This, I think, gives the writings of Aurelius and Epictetus a special claim to attention in the revival of interest in the books of devotion (if one may so call them) of the pre-Christian and extra-Christian world. While the Semitic fathers of the Porch brought to it the indispensable factor of their moral earnestness and genius for righteousness, the Romans contributed the advantages of their organisation, stability, and common sense. But it is the factor contributed by Hellas, or rather its fusion with the former into a living whole, of which the importance is apt to be overlooked.

For it should be remembered that in the later Roman Stoicism we have not only a pure and lofty ethical teaching, and that not unfrequently suffused with a genial warmth

tone of his correspondence with Fronto; and of such chapters of his Meditations as xi. 18 (ninth division), x. 36; vii. 22 and 31; vi. 48. But the singular affection with which he was regarded during life, and so long after his death, is a fact from which it is easy to draw the inference. For the Emperor's theory on this point

cf. vii. 69:—'The perfection of moral character consists in . . . being *neither violently excited nor torpid*, nor playing the hypocrite.' (*μητε σφόδρα μητε νερκῆρ.*) Only the excess and the defect are, it appears, to be avoided.

⁸ Cp. the remarkable (and, indeed, in the volume, unique) passage, M. Anton. iii. 2.

which recommends its precepts, but a *theory of the world which purports to be based on a survey of such scientific views as the age could boast*. Stoic doctrine is not unlike an embroidered texture of which the upper side should figure Virtue, the under, Knowledge. Nor does the interest and importance of this consideration depend so largely on the accuracy and positive value of such scientific views. What I mean is rather that this characteristic of Stoicism affects its attitude—the attitude of its moral teaching—towards the whole realm of physical science, whether actually attained or not. In other words, it knows no principle which would in self-defence attempt to arrest the advance of human knowledge at a particular point, lest some outwork of dogma should be overthrown or need reconstruction. Such speculations may seem useless; but there is no reason to suppose that, had the birth of modern exact methods of investigation taken place in the first century, this system would not have candidly examined and incorporated their results. Stoicism would, I believe, have welcomed Galileo.

At the same time we must not overrate the scientific spirit of the School. We do not find that its founders made any particular *addition* to the sum of the knowledge or of the theory of their time. Pure scientific curiosity was even incompatible with their first principles. But the importance of Natural Science was sufficiently secured by its being the indispensable basis of the ethical superstructure; and although among the three divisions of Philosophy made by the Stoics, *ἐπιστήμη* was never placed last (some assigning it even a higher rank than *ἀρετή*), their relative position really mattered to them but little.⁹ That the former was indispensable to the latter followed at once from the identification of virtue with knowledge, vice with ignorance—a doctrine which formed the very kernel of their whole system. The two elements, ethical and scientific, are, as it were, held in solution together. Neither can be grasped apart from the other; neither is, at the same time, wholly dependent on the other. To vary the metaphor once

⁹ Cp. Zeller, p. 66 *seq.*

more, we may say that in Stoicism the two fractions which compose the sum of knowledge are reduced to a common denominator. There is no antagonism between conflicting ideals. There is no chasm to be bridged between the intellect and the conscience. As far as it goes, Stoicism aims at satisfying the demands of both these sides of our nature.

Thus we find the sayings of Marcus Aurelius penetrated through and through with a scientific spirit. The fundamental doctrines of Physics are barely enounced till they change in his hands into ethical precepts.

Acquire the contemplative method of seeing how all things change into one another, and continually direct thy attention to it. . . . *For nothing is so sure to produce magnanimity.*

The nature of the All was impelled to the making of the world. But now everything which comes into being does so by way of consequence, or even the chief ends to which the ruling power of the world directs its special impulse are governed by no rational principle. *The remembrance of this will make thee more tranquil in many things.*

Look round at the courses of the stars, as if thou wert moving in a course like theirs : and constantly consider the changes of the elements into one another. *For such thoughts as these purge away the stains of earthly life.*¹⁰

Or they may be presented as it were in fusion :—

To Nature that giveth all and taketh all away, he that is instructed and modest says, Give what thou wilt, take what thou wilt away,—and this he says not in a spirit of arrogance, but of subordination and loyalty towards her.

What is thy art ? To be good. And how can this be properly attained except by principles, some concerning the nature of

¹⁰ M. Anton. x. 11 ; vii. 75 ; vii. 47. Cp. also iv. 27, and xi. 20—a curious instance : 'All the elements akin to air or fire which are commingled in thee, though they naturally mount upwards, yet in obedience to the disposition of the Universal, are imprisoned here in this compound frame. Again all the elements akin

to earth and water in thee, though tending downwards, are supported and maintained in a position not their natural one. Thus, then, even the elements obey the Universal. . . . *Is it not then strange that thy intellectual part alone should be disobedient and discontented with its own place!* . . . For the movement towards

the universe, some concerning the proper constitution of man ;¹¹

Not unfrequently the contemplation of the Order of Nature brings to his lips an almost lyrical cry, in which the separate tones either blend into a unison, as in the following :—

All that is in harmony with thee, O World, is in harmony with me. Nothing is early or late for me, which is in season for thee. All that thy seasons, O Nature, produce, is fruit for me. From thee, in thee, to thee, are all things.

or are contrasted in harmony, as thus, a passage which has something of the ring of Simonides about it :—

Above, below, around, are the movements of the elements. But the path of Virtue lies in none of these ; it is something more divine, and pursues its course unnoticed and undisturbed.¹²

It is no less interesting to observe how such principles as these affected the Emperor's mind with reference to the great question of the future life :—

How can it be that the Gods, who have ordered all things with such wisdom and love toward man, have overlooked this alone, that some amongst men,—and those very good men, who have had, as we may say, the most intercourse with the Divine, and who, through holy deeds and sacred offices, have become most familiar with the Divine,—should, when once they die, never exist at all again, but that their life should be completely quenched ?

If this be so, be sure, that if it ought to have been otherwise, they would have so ordered it. For had it been just, it would have been also possible ; had it been according to nature, nature would have brought it to pass. But because

injustice, intemperance, anger, grief, and fear, is nothing else than a desertion of Nature.'

¹¹ M. Anton. x. 14, and xi. 5, with which, remembering that Stoicism identifies God and the Universe, we may compare iii. 13.

¹² iv. 23, and vi. 17. The latter is worth quoting in the original: "Ανω, κάτω, κύκλω φοραὶ τῶν στοιχείων. Ἡ δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς κίνησις ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ

τούτων, ἀλλὰ θεϊτερόν τι, καὶ οὐδὲ δυσεπωσήτῳ προϊούσα εὐδοεῖ. Compare Simonides (58 Bergk) :—

"Ἔστι τις λόγος τὰν ἀρετῶν ναλεῶ δυσεμβάτοις ἐπὶ πέτραις, νῦν δὲ μιν θοῶν χώρων ἀγνὸν ἀμφέπειν. οὐδὲ πάντων βλεφάροις θνατῶν ἔσσωτος, ᾧ μὴ θακέθυμος ἰδρῶς ἐνδῶθεν μολῆ, ἰκηταὶ τ' ἐς ἄκρον ἀνδρείας.

it is not so, if in fact it is not so, be certainly assured that it ought not to have been so. Thou seest thyself that in pursuing this inquiry thou art disputing his justice with God: now we should not thus be disputing with the Gods at all, unless they were supreme in goodness and in justice. And if this be so, they would not have permitted anything in the ordering of the universe to be overlooked through neglect of justice and reason.¹³

Is any one inclined to exclaim, 'O lame and impotent conclusion'? The criticism would not be just. Here we have at least a logical sobriety of mind dealing with such data as were accessible to a Stoic. For a moment indeed the Emperor's creed may seem to contrast unfavourably with that of Seneca. Aurelius will not yield to the same temptation: he draws no bright but visionary pictures of the possible occupations of another life, like those which bring the *Consolatio ad Marciam* to its splendid conclusion. But we must remember that the speculations of Seneca are scarcely consistent with other parts of the system he professed. Aurelius (who knows at what cost) refuses to overstep the legitimate boundaries of Stoicism.

With reference, again, to a somewhat kindred topic, that of Prayer, these principles conduct the Emperor to a more hopeful and practical result. That prayer with him was no unfamiliar exercise appears from a few lines in the Sixth Book, which might easily escape the notice of a casual reader. They are introduced quite incidentally and without connection with what immediately precedes. St. Paul had written 'Pray without ceasing.' This persecutor of the churches he had founded writes:—

On all occasions call on the Gods: and do not perplex thyself about the length of time in which thou shalt do this: for even three hours so spent are enough.¹⁴

That such prayers were for his friends as well as himself appears elsewhere.¹⁵ But it is in the Ninth Book that

¹³ *Ib.* xii. 5. Cp. iii. 3; viii. 58; xii. 36. See the commentary on iv. 21 below.

¹⁴ M. Anton. vi. 23.

¹⁵ Cp. x. 36, quoted below, Appendix, p. 64. In v. 7 occurs a characteristic saying on this subject, which needs some explanation. It runs

his views on this subject are most fully and suggestively expressed: and here we see the influence of the scientific basis of his philosophy:—

... If the Gods can grant anything, why not pray them to grant that thou mayest not be afraid of anything, or lust after or repine at anything, rather than that anything may or may not come to pass? For if they can aid men for any purpose, they can surely aid them in this. . . . One man prays: Help me to gratify this carnal desire. Pray thou: Let me not have the desire at all. Another prays: Oh for release from this burden! Pray thou: Save me from the *wish* for release! A third: Let me not lose my child! Pray thou: Save me from the *fear* of losing him! Turn all thy prayers thus, and see what comes of it.¹⁶

Such, then, is the effect of the Hellenic genius upon this strange yet in certain aspects attractive philosophy. Candour, freedom of mind in attempting to look at things as they really are, intellectual courage in pursuing the investigation to the utmost attainable limits—may we add a certain receptivity for such fresh light on the facts of the natural world as might prove to be forthcoming—were in Stoicism grafted on the original stock of profound enthusiasm for virtue, to be afterwards modified in detail and restrained within bounds by the sobriety and sound practical judgment of Rome.

With a history like this, make what deduction we please on account of the crudities, inconsistencies, and omissions of the system, it can hardly be but that much will remain which any one who, like Socrates, *ἐπιμελείται τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται*, will, whatever be his belief, be able to turn to practical use. Stoicism was by no means so organically constituted that it must be accepted as a whole, or as a whole rejected. As of old the eclectic Seneca, though usually sojourning within its lines did not scruple

thus:—‘A prayer of the Athenians. “Rain, rain, kind Zeus, on the fields and plains of the Athenians.”’ It is not very intelligible why Aurelius should quote the petition, until he adds, ‘In truth we should either not pray at all, or pray in this simple

and noble fashion.’ His thoughts are so steeped in charity that he will not allow of any prayer in which supplication for oneself is not mingled with supplication for others also. Cp. C. Martha, p. 195.

¹⁶ M. Anton. ix. 40

to pass at will into the camp of other systems,¹⁷ so we of more recent times may find the many coincidences of its practical teaching with that of a higher faith derive, like brilliants, fresh lustre by the reflection of each other's rays.¹⁸ For minds of a different type, such manuals as those of Epictetus and Aurelius may conceivably prove of use in other ways. It has been said of Faraday, to account for his remaining faithful to the tiny sect of Sandemanians all his days, that 'when he entered his laboratory he shut the door of his oratory: when he entered his oratory he shut the door of his laboratory.' The man of science who enters the *lararium*¹⁹ of Aurelius will not need to leave his favourite pursuits behind him. The *continuity* of science and religion—nothing less than this is the problem which everyone desires to see solved. These Stoic manuals are the nearest approach made to the solution of this ageless problem by the ancient world; and few will be found to maintain that their interest is yet exhausted.

¹⁷ As he says himself: 'Transeo in aliena castra, non tanquam transfuga, sed tanquam explorator.' Cf. *De Otio Sap.* 29: 'Excusatissimus essem etiamsi non præcepta Stoicorum sequer sed exempla.'

¹⁸ The older editors had a gracious fashion of printing together all the 'testimonies and judgments,' the utterances of gratitude and admiration, of men in all centuries for him whom Aristides, one of the earliest, calls *ὁ θεῖος καὶ φιλόδηρος βασιλεύς*. A few may here be quoted. For Isaac Casaubon it is 'a golden volume;' his son Meric 'finds it easier to admire in silence than to praise;' Jean Paul Richter, in his peculiar style, tells us 'what swimming-belts and cork-waistcoats for the deepest floods he possessed in the Meditations of Antoninus.' To a German editor (Schultz) 'it has brought more consolation in personal sorrow than any

other:' to the French translator, Pierron, it has given 'quelque chose de cette force qui enlève notre âme dans une région sereine, au dessus des petites passions et des rivalités mesquines. Je m'y serai guéri, je l'espère, des blessures dont saigne trop souvent même la plus obscure et la plus inoffensive destinée.' The manual of Epictetus was recast with some alterations by Saint Nilus, and became a book of devotion for the monks of Mount Sinai. But a man illustrious in the Church, Cardinal Barberini, nephew of Urban VIII., translated this book of Stoic piety just as it stands, to spread among the faithful its fertilising and vivifying seeds; dedicating the translation to his soul, 'to make it redder than his own purple at the sight of this Gentile's virtues.'

¹⁹ Cp. below, Appendix, p. 59, note 43.

M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS.

B

ΜΑΡΚΟΥ ΑΝΤΩΝΙΝΟΥ

ΒΙΒΛΙΟΝ Δ.

1. Τὸ ἔνδον κυριεῖον ὅταν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχη οὕτως ἔστηκε πρὸς τὰ συμβαίνοντα, ὥστε αἰεὶ πρὸς τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ διδόμενον μετατίθεσθαι ῥαδίως. "Ἐλλην γὰρ ἀποτεταγμένην οὐδεμίαν φιλεῖ· ἀλλὰ ὀρμῆ μὲν πρὸς τὰ ἡγούμενα μεθ' ὧν ὑπεξαίρεσως· τὸ δὲ ἀντεισαγόμενον ἕλλην ἑαυτῷ ποιεῖ·

1. 4. 'ἡγούμενα corruptum videtur . . . aut cum Gatakero προηγούμενα aut προηγμένα aut ἀγόμενα rescribendum.'—Schultz. That the text is probably sound, however, is shown below.

1. 4. ὀρμῆ—πρὸς τὰ ἡγούμενα. No one has yet undertaken the defence of the text: even Coraëus would read προηγμένα, or προηγούμενα. Yet the clue, both to the right reading and interpretation of the passage, lies not far off. It is to be found, I think, in the explanation of the word προηγμένα, quoted by Cic. de Fin. iii. 16, from Stobaeus. The metaphor lying at the root of the latter throws light on ἡγούμενα. 'Non alienum est . . . rationem huius verbi faciendi Zenonis exponere.' Take the degrees of rank in a court as an illustration of the degrees of value in the objects of human pursuit. The king himself occupies a unique and absolute position: no one would describe him as 'promoted to honour'—*productus ad dignitatem* (προηγμένον). His nobles, however, enjoy different degrees of precedence, according to their several station. In this image the king

corresponds to the absolutely Good: the courtiers to things approximately good—*ἀδιάφορα*, which are yet προηγμένα. But what is Zeno's orig. expression for *productum*? Not προηγμένον, but προηγούμενον. The substance of his words is quoted by Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 156: Οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι (λέγουσι) προηγμένον, διὰ τὸ τὴν μεγίστην ἀξίαν αὐτὰ ἔχειν, τὸ δὲ προηγμένον, τὴν δευτέραν χώραν καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχον, συνεγλίξεν πως τῆ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν προηγουμένων εἶναι τὸν βασιλέα, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μετ' αὐτὸν τεταγμένους. We thus light here on the word used by Aurelius. The passage seems to show that προηγούμενος is merely another name for προηγμένος: 'the leading or principal courtiers' (Cicero's *praecipui*, which, by the way, seems intended for a translation of προηγούμενοι, as *praepositi* is of προηγμένοι) = those who are preferred, and the

M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS.

BOOK IV.

1. When that which bears rule within is in its natural state, its attitude towards the event of life is such, that it always adapts itself easily to what is given and within its power. It has no predilection for any specified material, but moves towards things preferred, with a certain reservation. Obstacles that present themselves it converts into

metaphor is drawn from promotion in a court. It matters little, then, whether we retain *ἡγούμενα* or read *προηγούμενα*, as in the parallel passage, v. 20. In either case the meaning is the same as *προηγμένα*; for which, however, no scribe would have substituted the much less familiar *ἡγούμενα*.—Cf. Epict. Diss. i. 20, 1.

μὲθ' ὑπεξαίρεσως. Instead of saying absolutely, *I will do this or that*, the Stoic added, *if nothing happens to prevent me*. Sen. de Benef. iv. 34: 'Sapiens ad omnia cum exceptione veniet, si nihil incidit quod impediatur. . . Præsumit animo, posse aliquid intervenire, quod destinata prohibeat.' This is the reservation or exception meant. Like so many other doctrines of Stoicism, it has its reflection in the New Testament, St. James, iv. 13: *ἄγε νῦν οἱ λέγοντες, Σήμερον . . . πορευσώμεθα εἰς τήνδε τὴν πόλιν . . . ἀντὶ τοῦ λέγειν ὑμᾶς, Ἐὰν ὁ Κύριος θελήσῃ*.

5. τὸ δὲ ἀντεισαγόμενον. This should be read in connection with the closely parallel passages, v. 20 and vi.

50. All three may be explained here together. For meeting the events of life, the Stoic had two weapons in his armoury: *ὑπεξαίρεσις* and *περιτροπή*. The reservation saved him from aiming at impossibilities: the power of conversion enabled him to turn even failure or opposition into an opportunity for cultivating patience or some other virtue. 'For the mind (v. 20) converts every hindrance to its activity into an aid (*τὸ προηγούμενον*, which here means 'that which leads him farther on his way'), so that what was a hindrance becomes a furtherance, and the obstacle helps us farther on the road.' 'What might have extinguished the fire becomes fuel for the fire.'—Cf. the same train of thought in St. Paul, Phil. i. 12, 13: *τὰ κατ' ἐμὲ μάλλον εἰς προκοπὴν* (the technical term of Stoicism) *τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ἐλήλυθεν*. An admirable commentary is furnished by Epict. Diss. ii. 5. In the art of life, the materials used may be indifferent, but the use of them is not indifferent: it may be skilful or

ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ ὅταν ἐπικρατῆ τῶν ἐπεμπιπτόντων ὑφ' ὧν ἂν μικρὸς τις λύχνος ἐσβέσθῃ· τὸ δὲ λαμπρὸν πῦρ τάχιστα ἐξφκεύσεν ἑαυτῷ τὰ ἐπιφορούμενα καὶ κατηνάλωσεν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ἐπὶ μείζον ἤρθη.

2. Μηδὲν ἐνέργημα εἰκῆ, μηδὲ ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ θεώρημα συμπληρωτικὸν τῆς τέχνης ἐνεργείσθω.

3. Ἀναχωρήσεις αὐτοῖς ζητοῦσιν, ἀγροικίας καὶ αἰγιαλοὺς καὶ ὄρη· εἴωθας δὲ καὶ σὺ τὰ τοιαῦτα μάλιστα ποθεῖν. Ὀλον δὲ τοῦτο ἰδιωτικώτατόν ἐστιν, ἐξὸν ἧς ἂν ὥρας ἐθελήσῃς εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀναχωρεῖν. Οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ οὔτε ἡσυ-
 5 χιώτερον οὔτε ἀπραγμονέστερον ἄνθρωπος ἀναχωρεῖ, ἢ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν· μάλισθ' ὅστις ἔχει ἔνδον τοιαῦτα, εἰς ἃ ἐγκύψας ἐν πάσῃ εὐμαρείᾳ εὐθύς γίνεταί· τὴν δὲ εὐμάρειαν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγω, ἢ εὐκοσμίαν. Συνεχῶς οὖν δίδου σεαυτῷ ταύτην τὴν ἀναχώρησιν, καὶ ἀνανέου σεαυτόν· βραχέα δὲ
 10 ἔστω καὶ στοιχειώδη, ἃ εὐθύς ἀπαντήσαντα ἀρκέσει εἰς τὸ πᾶσαν αὐτὴν ἀποκλύσαι καὶ ἀποπέμψαι σε μὴ δυσχε-

6. Al. ἐμπιπτόντων. 3. 8. Al. λέγω οὐδὲν ἄλλο. 11. For αὐτὴν Reiske and Coraëns unnecessarily (see below) would substitute λύπη: Casaubon αὐτὴν.

the reverse. The weaver does not make his wool, but exercises his art on such as he gets. So do your best with your materials. If you come out of the trial safe, you will be congratulated by all.¹

2. 2. τέχνης. As it is probable that in writing c. 1, the Emperor may have had Epict. ii. 5 in his mind, so the allusion to τέχνη here seems to carry out the same train of thought: τῆς τέχνης meaning 'the art, occupation, or craft in question.' Long makes the gen. depend on θεώρημα. It evidently depends on συμπληρωτικόν.

3. 2. εἴωθας δὲ καὶ σὺ. This may be illustrated from the author's correspondence with Fronto, who, with

quaint jocularly, writes (Ed. Naber, p. 224): 'Quid? Ego ignoro ea te mente Alsium isse, ut animo morem gereres ibique ludo et ioco et otio libero per quattriduum universum operam dares? Nec dubito quin te ad ferias in secessu maritimo frundas ita compararis in sole meridiano ut somno oboedires cubans, deinde Nigrum vocares, libros intro ferre juberēs . . . in devium quantum poteras litus pergeres et raucas paludes ambires . . . ut bene haberes genio, utique verbo vetere faceres animo *volup*? Qua malum *volup*? Immo si dimidiatis verbis verum dicendum est, uti tu animo faceres *vigil* (*vigilias dico*) aut ut faceres *labo* aut ut faceres *mole* (*labores et molestias dico*). Tu unquam *volup*? *volpem* facilius quis tibi quam voluptatem conciliarit.'

¹ Cf. Sen. Prov. 4: Calamitas virtutis occasio est. Ib. 2: Marcet sine adversario virtus.

material for itself; thus resembling fire, at the stage when it conquers things falling upon it which would have extinguished a feeble light; whereas the bright fire at once appropriates and consumes what is thrown upon it, and by those very means increases in volume.

2. Let nothing be done without reflection, or otherwise than on a principle fully satisfying the requirements of the art.

3. Men seek retreats for themselves in the country, on the sea-shore, or the mountains. Even thou dost often earnestly wish for such things. All this betrays the extreme of vulgar ignorance; seeing that thou canst retreat into thyself at any hour thou pleasest. A man can find no retreat freer from noise and worry than his own soul, especially when he has such principles within him as will secure him immediate and complete ease of mind, if he will but contemplate them steadily; and the ease I mean is nothing else than the order of the soul. Avail thyself then continually of this retreat, and renew thyself; and let those principles be brief and axiomatic, such as will suffice, the moment they are applied, completely to cleanse the soul

That in this 'secessus maritimus' Marcus thought of anything rather than recreation, appears farther on more clearly still. 'Iam si bellum indixtei ludo, otio, satietati, voluptati, at tu dormi saltem quantum libero homini satis est.' See below, Appendix, p. 47.

Besides Alsium, there were two other favourite resorts. 'Galbam certe ad Centumcellas produces. An potes octavidis Lorii?' (p. 57). But the capital had a strong attraction for the emperor when young. In a letter to Fronto occurs this remarkable and indeed unique expression (p. 69): 'Valevis mihi, magister carissime et dulcissime, quem ego, ausim dicere magis quam ipsam Romam desidero.'

7. *ἐγκύβητας*. Cf. St. James, i. 25: ὁ παρακύβητας εἰς νόμον τέλειον τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας; and 1 Pet. i. 12. A similar maxim is strikingly illustrated at iii. 13.

10. *στοιχαιῶδη*. Such short sayings were called *κομματικοὶ λόγοι* (*κόμμα* = a short clause). Simplicius, Proem. 3.

11. *αὐτήν*. The pronoun is placed in opposition to τὰ ἔνδον; the soul itself to the principles within the soul. The connection is broken by the explanation of *εὐμάρεια*. *Αὐτός* denotes the person or thing itself as distinguished from its accessories.—Cf. Hom. i. 229: ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐ πιθόμην. . . ἔφρ' αὐτόν τε ἴδοιμι, i. e. *Κύκλωπα*, mentioned at 214. A parallel is furnished in Latin by 'ipse:' cf. Virg G. ii. 363—

'Et dum se laetus ad auras
Palmas agit laxis per purum immissus
habenis,
Ipsa acie nondum falcis temptanda'—

where *ipsa* = *vitis*, not mentioned in the context.—Cf. *ib.* 297. The proposed correction *λύπη* is therefore unnecessary.

ραίνοντα ἐκείνους ἐφ' ἃ ἐπανάρχη. Τίτι γὰρ δυσχεραίνεις ; τί τῶν ἀνθρώπων κακία ; ἀναλογισάμενος τὸ κρίμα ὅτι τὰ λογικὰ ζῆα ἀλλήλων ἔνεκεν γέγονε, καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι
 15 μέρος τῆς δικαιοσύνης, καὶ ὅτι ἄκοντες ἀμαρτάνουσι, καὶ πόσοι ἤδη διεχθρεύσαντες ὑποπτεύσαντες μισήσαντες διαδορατισθέντες ἐκτέτανται, τετέφρωνται, παύου ποτέ. Ἄλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν ὄλων ἀπονεμομένοις δυσχεραίνεις ; ἀνανεω-
 20 ὄσω ἀπεδείχθη ὅτι ὁ κόσμος ὤσανεὶ πόλις. Ἄλλὰ τὰ σωματικά σου ἄψεται ἔτι ; ἐννόησας, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμίγνυται λείως ἢ τραχέως κινουμένῳ πνεύματι ἢ διάνοια ἐπειδὴν ἄπαξ ἐαυτὴν ἀπολάβη καὶ γνωρίσῃ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐξουσίαν, καὶ

12. *Coraëis* δυσχερανεῖς, and so elsewhere. 18. *καὶ* is expunged by *Coraëis*, bracketed by Schultz, apparently without necessity.

13. *κρίμα* means the same thing as *δόγμα*. Gataker recalls the saying of Corellius Rufus (Plin. Ep. i. 12), who preferred a voluntary death to enduring an incurable disease, and who to the entreaties of his friends simply replied, *Κέκρικα* (*i. q. δέδοκται*).

14. *ἀλλήλων ἔνεκεν*. Thus Cato, in the noble words of Lucan: 'Nec sibi, sed toti genitum se credere mundo.' Cic. Fin. ii. 14: 'Eadem ratio fecit hominem hominum appetentem cumque iis natura et sermone et usu congruentem, ut profectus a caritate domesticorum . . . serpat longius et se implicet primum civium, deinde omnium mortalium societate, atque . . . non sibi se soli natum meminere, sed patriæ, sed suis.'

15. *ἄκοντες ἀμαρτάνουσι*. For an attempted reconciliation of the Socratic dogma that all sin is involuntary with the freedom of the will, see Zeller, 232. Where, as here, it is used as an excuse for human weakness, it seems better to render *ἄκοντες* 'without meaning it.'—Cf. vii. 22 and 63; xi. 18; viii. 14.

16. *διαδορατίζομαι* is used in its lit. sense by Polyb. to represent the Latin *velitari*.

17. *παύου ποτέ* Sc. *δυσχεραίνων*.

18. *ἀνανεωσάμενος*. Of course the constr. is *παύου δυσχεραίνων*, and so with *ἐνόησας* and *ἀπιδών* below.

19. *τὸ διεγυμένον*. A striking feature of all Stoic writings is the fondness displayed for resting in a logical dilemma, though it is rare to find it openly (as here) so characterised.—Cf. iv. 27; vi. 10; x. 3, *et passim*. Epict. Man. 25.—Sen. ad Marciam, xii. 1, asks, 'Dolor tuus . . . utrum sua spectat incommoda, an eius qui decessit? Utrumne amisso filio movet, quod nullas ex illo voluptates cepisti, an quod maiores, si diutius vixisset, percipere potuisti?' In either case a consolation is discovered. To Polyb., xxvii. 5, he repeats the old alternative, 'Quid eius desiderio maceror qui aut beatus aut nullus est? Beatum deflere, invidia est; nullum, dementia.'—Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. Such reasoning is peculiarly common in Epict. Few would now derive consolation from it.

πρόνοια. On the doctrine of Providence, see Zeller, 164, 599. Seneca's tract on the subject will amply repay perusal. Whether divine providence

that contains them, and send thee back no longer impatient with the world to which thou art returning. With what indeed art thou impatient? with human wickedness? Reflect on the conclusion that all rational beings are born for one another's sake; that tolerance is a part of justice; that men do wrong without meaning it; think too of the numbers in the past, who, after living in enmity, suspicion, hatred, and mutual strife, are stretched in death and turned to ashes; think of all this and be no more impatient!—But perhaps thou art impatient at the lot assigned thee in the order of the Universe.—Then recall to mind the alternative: Either Providence or Atoms: or all the proofs that the world resembles a City or State.—But the things of the body will still affect thee.—Reflect then that the intellect does not mingle with the air-currents, smooth or rough, when once

was confined to the universe as a whole, or equally extended to individuals also, was a moot point. Sen. Prov. iii. 1: 'Universorum maior diis cura est quam singulorum.' But Cic. N. D. ii. 65: 'Nec vero universo generi hominum solum, sed etiam singulis a Diis . . . consuli et provideri.'—Cf. ii. 3; vi. 44; x. 6; xii. 14.

20. **πόλις.** On the citizenship of the world, see Zeller, 308.—Cf. M. Ant. ii. 16; iii. 11; vi. 44; xii. 36. Epict. Diss. ii. 5: 'What is a man? A part of a State, of that first which consists of Gods and of men; then of that which is called next to it, a small image of the universal State.' Cic. Fin. iii. 19: 'Mundum esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum.' More grandly still, Sen. Marc. 18, addressing a soul about to be born: 'Intratura es urbem diis hominibusque communem, omnia complexam, certis legibus aeternisque complexam' . . . The conception of a world-wide State, perhaps first suggested by the conquests of Alexander, was represented to the mind positively by the Roman Empire. Enlarged to the notion of the universal πόλις, it was adopted and in a sense transfigured by Chris-

tian teachers in the vision of the 'city not made with hands, eternal in the heavens.'

22. **λεῖος ἢ τραχέως.** The phrase occurs again, v. 26, and x. 8. On a comparison with the former passage (*τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν . . . ἀτρεπτον ἔστω ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ λεῖας ἢ τραχέως κινήσεως*) it appears probable that not *respiration* alone is here meant, but the whole system of bodily *sensation*. If so, the ref. in *πνεῦμα* is to one of the strangest paradoxes of Stoicism. In connection with its thoroughgoing materialism, all emotions and sensations, even impulses and judgments, were regarded as due to certain *air-currents* (*πνεύματα*) pouring into the soul, some going so far as to speak of them as *animals*, and therefore of course as material.—Zeller, 122 *sqq.* The rest of the phrase is apparently not Stoic, but Cyrenaic. That school by *λεῖα κίνησις* meant *ἡδονή*; by *τραχεία κ., πόνος*.—Zeller, 448. In non-material language we may say, 'Emotions pleasurable or painful.'—Pierron: 'Les émotions douces ou rudes qui tourmentent nos esprits.'—Not so Long.

23. **ἔξουσιαν** the *αὐτάρκεια* of the Reason: *δύναμις ἐαυτῇ ἀρκουμένη*, v. 14.

λοιπόν ὅσα περὶ πόνου καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀκήκοας καὶ συγκατέθου.
 25 Ἄλλὰ τὸ δοξάριον σε περισπάσει; ἀπιδὼν εἰς τὸ τάχος
 τῆς πάντων λήθης, καὶ τὸ χάος τοῦ ἐφ' ἑκάτερα ἀπείρου
 αἰῶνος, καὶ τὸ κενὸν τῆς ἀπηχίσεως, καὶ τὸ εὐμετάβολου
 καὶ ἄκριτον τῶν εὐφημεῖν δοκούντων, καὶ τὸ στενὸν τοῦ
 30 τόπου ἐν ᾧ περιγράφεται. "Ὀλη τε γὰρ ἡ γῆ στιγμή, καὶ
 ταύτης πόντον γωνίδιον ἢ κατοικησις αὐτῆ; καὶ ἐνταῦθα
 πόσοι καὶ οἰοί τινες οἱ ἐπαινεσόμενοι; Λοιπὸν οὖν μέμνησο
 τῆς ὑποχωρήσεως τῆς εἰς τοῦτο τὸ ἀγρίδιον ἑαυτοῦ· καὶ
 πρὸ παντὸς μὴ σπῶ μηδὲ κατεντείνου, ἀλλὰ ἐλεύθερος ἔσο
 καὶ ὄρα τὰ πράγματα ὡς ἀνὴρ, ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ὡς πολίτης,
 35 ὡς θνητὸν ζῶον. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς προχειροτάτοις εἰς ἃ ἐγκύψεις
 ταῦτα ἔστω τὰ δύο. "Ἐν μὲν ὅτι τὰ πράγματα οὐχ ἄπτεται
 τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἔξω ἔστηκεν ἀτρεμουντα· αἱ δὲ ὀχλήσεις
 ἐκ μόνης τῆς ἔνδον ὑπολήψεως. "Ἐτερον δὲ ὅτι πάντα
 ταῦτα ὅσα ὀρᾷς ὅσον οὐδέπω μεταβάλλει καὶ οὐκ ἔτι
 40 ἔσται· καὶ ὅσων ἤδη μεταβολαῖς αὐτὸς παρατετύχκας
 συνεχῶς διανοοῦ. Ὁ κόσμος ἀλλοίωσις· ὁ βίος ὑπόληψις.

4. Εἰ τὸ νοερὸν ἡμῖν κοινὸν, καὶ ὁ λόγος καθ' ὃν λογικὸν
 ἐσμὲν κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ προστακτικὸς τῶν ποιητέων,
 ἢ μὴ, λόγος κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ νόμος κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο,
 πολίται ἐσμὲν· εἰ τοῦτο, πολιτεύματός τινος μετέχομεν· εἰ

24. Coraës, after Morus, *συγκατάθου*. But the constr. is carried on: *παύου ποτε δυσχεραίνων*. 28. MSS. *τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν δοκούντων*. Corr. Gataker. Cf. the var. readings, Epict. i. 16, 15. 32. *ἀγρίδιον*. Coraës, from Vat. A, for *ἀρθρίδιον*, which Xylander read. 40, 41. Reiske would punctuate . . . *παρατετύχκας*;—*Συνεχῶς διανοοῦ· ὁ κόσμος κ.τ.λ.*

25. *δοξάριον*. The depreciation and disparagement of all things except the highest Good by the Stoics finds a fitting expression in their constant use of diminutives *ad rem deprimendam*. They can, however, rarely be rendered in English, except by paraphrase. A few selected at random from Aurelius are—*σαρκίον, πνευμάτιον, δσάτριον, φλεβίον, γωνίδιον,*

ἀνθρωπάριον, ὑπομημάτιον, μαχαίριον, δεινδρύφιον, ἀνθόλλιον, βωλάριον, μυξάριον, σωματίον, φυτάριον, στρουθάριον, στρωμάτιον, σπερμάτιον, αἱμάτιον, γαλάκτιον, γυναικάριον, σπογγάριον, κυνίδιον, κρεάδιον, χυλάριον, σταφύλιον, τρῆχιον, προβάτιον, ἐντέριον, ἐπάριον κ.τ.λ. Of this custom perhaps Hadrian's *Ανιμίλια vagula διαπύλια* is an echo.—Cf. c. 20, *infra*, *εὐδ' ἴπ.*

it has withdrawn into itself and recognised its own power; and besides all that thou hast heard and assented to about pleasure and pain. But it may be that what men call glory distracts thee.—Consider how soon all things are forgotten; the void and formless eternities stretch before and behind us: how hollow is the echo of applause; how fickle and indiscriminating are the people who seem to applaud; how narrow the limits that circumscribe their praise. For the whole earth is but a point; and how small a corner of it this dwelling of thine, and in it how many are there, and of what stamp, that will praise thee!—For the rest then forget not this retreat into that little field—thyself; and above all, avoid distraction and overstraining: but be free, and view things as a man, as a citizen, and as a creature born to die. And among the truths most obvious to thy regard, have these two. One is that *things* do not affect the soul, but remain immovable without, while our perturbations proceed solely from the opinion formed within. The other is that everything thou seest is momentarily changing, and will cease to be: and in how many cases thou hast thyself witnessed the change, thou shouldst continually reflect. The world is transformation; life is opinion.

4. If the thinking faculty is common to us all, so also is that reason in virtue of which we are rational beings. If this is common, so also is that reason which prescribes what we should, and should not, do. Grant this, and it follows that law is common; if so, we are all fellow-citizens and

28. ἀκριτον. Of the many sayings current in antiquity in illustration of this, we may recall Antisthenes replying to πολλοὶ σὲ αἰνοῦσι with τί γὰρ κακὸν πεποίηκα; and Phocion to a burst of popular applause with οὐ δὴ που κακὸν τι λέγων ἐμαντὸν λέληθα;

30. πόστιον γωνιδιον. The extension of ἡ κατοίκησις αὐτῆ is determined by iii. 10: μικρὸν μὲν οὖν ὁ ζῆν ἕκαστος, μικρὸν δὲ τὸ τῆς γῆς γωνιδιον ὅπου ζῆν.

32. ἀγρῖδιον. ἐαυτοῦ appears to be a genitive of definition. So Pierron: 'Ce petit domaine qui est toi-même.' Not so, however, Cless and Long.

33. μηδὲ κατεντείνου will suggest the remarkable expression used in i. 16 of Antoninus Pius: 'There was nothing in him carried to the sweating-point;' ἕως ἰδρώτος.

37. ὀχλήσεαι. Cic. Acad. i. 10: 'Perturbationes autem nulla naturae vi commoventur; omniaque ea sunt opiniones ac judicia levitatis.' For the subject, cf. Zeller, 228, seq.

41. ὁ βίος ὑπόληψις. Hamlet, ii. 2: 'There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.'

4. 4. πολιτῆραι. The use of this word as a *relative* term is too common to need illustration. Cf. in Latin

5 τοῦτο, ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις ἐστὶ. Τίνος γὰρ ἄλλου
 φήσει τις τῶν ἀνθρώπων πᾶν γένος κοινοῦ πολιτεύματος
 μετέχειν; ἐκέϊθεν δὲ, ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς ταύτης πόλεως, καὶ
 αὐτὸ τὸ νοερὸν καὶ λογικὸν καὶ νομικὸν ἡμῶν· ἢ πόθεν;
 ὡσπερ γὰρ τὸ γεώδες μοι ἀπὸ τινος γῆς ἀπομεμέρισται καὶ
 10 τὸ ὑγρὸν ἀφ' ἑτέρου στοιχείου καὶ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ πυρῶδες
 ἐκ τινος ἰδίας πηγῆς (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μηδενός ἔρχεται,
 ὡσπερ μὴδ' εἰς τὸ οὐκ ὄν ἀπέρχεται), οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸ νοερὸν
 ἦκει ποθέν.

5. Ὁ θάνατος τοιοῦτος οἶον γένεσις, φύσεως μυστήριον·
 σύγκρισις ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων <καὶ διάκρισις> εἰς ταῦτά.
 Ὅλως δὲ οὐκ ἐφ' ᾧ ἂν τις αἰσχυρθεῖη· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸ
 ἐξῆς τῷ νοερῷ ζῳῆ, οὐδὲ παρὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς παρασκευῆς.

6. Ταῦτα οὕτως ὑπὸ τῶν τοιοῦτων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης· ὁ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ θέλων θέλει τὴν συκῆν ὅπῃ μὴ
 ἔχειν. Ὅλως δ' ἐκείνου μέμνησο ὅτι ἐντὸς ὀλιγίστου
 χρόνου καὶ σὺ καὶ οὗτος τεθνήξεσθε· μετὰ βραχὺ δὲ οὐδὲ
 5 ὄνομα ὑμῶν ὑπολειφθήσεται.

7. Ἄρον τὴν ὑπόληψιν, ἦρται τὸ Βέβλαμμα. Ἄρον
 τὸ Βέβλαμμα, ἦρται ἢ βλάβη.

8. Ὁ χεῖρω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐ ποιεῖ, τοῦτο

5. 2. <καὶ διάκρισις> or διάλυσις is obviously wanting to complete the sense. Cf. x. 7. 3. ἐφ' ᾧ MSS. Corr. Coraës. 6. 3. ἐκείνο MSS. Corr. Coraës., Vat. A, ἐκείνω.

'civis meus' and also 'municeps,' as in Juvenal, iv. 34. Even Pope's concealed use of a term properly absolute as relative ('My guide, philosopher, and friend') may be supported by the curiously coincident exp. of Seneca, Marc. 4: 'Se consolandam Areo, philosopho viri sui, præbuit' (Livia).

8. τὸ—νομικόν. That this means the 'force of law' rather than 'the legislative faculty' follows from the preceding demonstration.

11. (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μηδενός). Persius, iii. 84; Lucret. i. 150.

This first principle of Epicureanism was common to several schools. Joubert (*Pensées*, p. 13) comments on it thus: "Rien ne se fait de rien," disent-ils; mais la souveraine puissance de Dieu n'est pas rien: elle est la source de la matière aussi bien que celle de l'esprit."

5. 1. θάνατος—φύσεως μυστήριον. The remark of Anaxagoras on hearing of his son's death—ἦδειν ὅτι θνητὸν ἐγέννησα—is better known than its subsequent history. When the Emperor Valerian was taken captive,

share alike in a certain form of government. It follows that the World is as a State or City. For in what other City will it be said that the whole human race shares in common? Hence, therefore, from this common City comes the very thinking faculty, as well as the reasoning faculty and the force of law: else whence should they come? For just as what is earthy in me is imparted to me from a certain earth, what is moist from a different element, what is of the nature of breath, of warmth, or of fire, each from its peculiar source—for nothing comes from nothing, and nothing passes into non-existence—so the thinking faculty has *some* source.

5. Death is like birth—a mystery of Nature: the one a combination of certain elements; the other, dissolution into the same. In short it involves nothing of which a man need feel ashamed, nothing contrary to the law of a thinking being's nature or the design of its constitution.

6. That such men should act thus is a necessity of nature: to wish it otherwise is to wish that the fig tree had no juice. Meanwhile remember this: within a very short time both thou and he will be dead, and soon your very name will have ceased to survive.

7. Remove the opinion, and you remove the sense, of injury. Remove the sense of injury, and the injury itself vanishes.

8. What makes the man himself no worse than he was

and presumably slain by the Persians, his dissolute son, Gallienus, with mock Stoicism, exclaimed, 'Sciebam patrem meum esse mortalem!' to the admiration of a courtier who discerned the *constantia sapientis* in the words.—Trebellius Pollio, *Gallieni duo*, 17.

6. and 7. The same feeling has been recently thus expressed: 'The ordinary misfortunes of the world would lose much of their pain if they were distinctly recognised. And although it is true that we do not *remove* misunderstanding in accounting for it, yet the difference between a pain which we trace to unkindness

or selfishness and that which we trace to inevitable mistake is great. *The mind loses the bitterness of its sufferings in discerning their necessity*; and is sometimes surprised in this acquiescence to find them almost disappear.'

ὄρν. The juice of the fig tree was used as rennet. 'Coaguli modo lac contrahit.'—Plin. xxiii. 7.

8. 1. ὄν—χέλων ποικ. More fully ii. 11, cf. ix. 1. Sen. Ep. 85, 30: 'Quod malum est nocet: quod nocet, deteriolem facit. Dolor et paupertas deteriolem non faciunt: ergo mala non sunt.' Expanded by Zeller, 219, sqq.

οὐδὲ τὸν βίον αὐτοῦ χεῖρω ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ βλάπτει οὔτε ἐξωθεν οὔτε ἔνδοθεν.

9. Ἡνάγκασται ἡ τοῦ συμφέροντος φύσις τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

10. "Οτι πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον δικαίως συμβαίνει· ὃ, ἐὰν ἀκριβῶς παραφυλάσσης, εὐρήσεις· οὐ λέγω μόνον κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς, ἀλλ' ὅτι κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ὡς ἂν ὑπὸ τινος ἀπονέμοντος τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. Παραφύλασσε οὖν ὡς ἤρξω:
5 καὶ ὃ τι ἂν ποιῆς, σὺν τούτῳ ποιεῖ, σὺν τῷ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, καθ' ὃ νενόηται ἰδίως ὁ ἀγαθός. Τοῦτο ἐπὶ πάσης ἐνεργείας σῶζε.

11. Μὴ τοιαῦτα ὑπολάμβανε οἷα ὁ ὑβρίζων κρίνει, ἡ οἷά σε κρίνειν βούλεται· ἀλλ' ἴδε αὐτὰ ὅποια κατ' ἀλήθειάν ἐστι.

12. Δύο ταύτας ἐτοιμότητας ἔχειν αἰεὶ δεῖ· τὴν μὲν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶξαι μόνον ὅπερ ἂν ὁ τῆς βασιλικῆς καὶ νομοθετικῆς λόγος ὑποβάλλῃ, ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ἀνθρώπων· τὴν δὲ πρὸς τὸ μεταθέσθαι, ἐὰν ἄρα τις παρῆ διορθῶν καὶ
5 μεταγῶν ἀπὸ τινος οἰήσεως. Τὴν μέντοι μεταγωγὴν αἰεὶ ἀπὸ τινος πιθανότητος, ὡς δικαίου ἢ κοινωφελοῦς γίνεσθαι, καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τοιαῦτα μόνον εἶναι δεῖ, οὐχ ὅτι ἡδὺ ἡ ἔνδοξον ἐφάνη.

13. Λόγον ἔχεις;—Ἐχω.—Τί οὖν οὐ χρᾶ; τοῦτου γὰρ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ποιούντος, τί ἄλλο θέλεις;

8. 2. οὐδὲ βλάπτει is added on the authority of a MS. collated by Creuzer, q. v. ad Plotin. de Puler., p. 313. 9. Schultz proposes to print c. 9 continuously with c. 8. Gat. suggests ἐνεκα τοῦ σ. ἡ φύσις. 10. 3. ὅτι should perhaps follow μόνον. Coraës, after Reiske, ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ κατὰ κ. τ. λ. 12. 6. Coraës approves of the emendation of Morus: ὡς δίκαιον καὶ κοινωφελές καὶ τὰ π. τοιαῦτα, γίνεσθαι δεῖ, οὐχ ὅτι κ. τ. ε.

9. ἡ τοῦ συμφέροντος φύσις seems a *recherché* way of saying, 'Nature has been constrained to this for the general good.'

11. 2. οἷά σε κρίνειν βούλεται. Sen. Const. Sap. 17: 'Genus ultionis est, eripere ei qui fecit, contumelie voluptatem. Solent dicere, Miserum me, puto non intellexit! adeo fructus contumelie in sensu et indignatione patientis est.'

12. 1. ἐτοιμότητας. See iii. 13, which is the best comment on this phrase, and determines it to mean δόγματα ἔτοιμα, a word convertible with πρόχειρα. The precept is then to the same purport as in c. 3: ἐν τοῖς προχειροτάτοις, κ. τ. λ. The use of ἐτοιμότητες derives light from, and throws light upon, the difficult exp. of St. Paul, Eph. vi. 15: ἐν ἐτοιμασίᾳ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τῆς εἰρήνης,

before does not make his life worse either or do him harm either outwardly or inwardly.

9. The nature of the general good has been constrained to this.

10. That everything that happens, happens justly:—as thou wilt discover by watching narrowly. I do not merely mean according to a certain order, but according to a principle of justice, and as if determined by one who dispenses to each what he deserves. Watch therefore as thou hast begun; and whatever thou doest, cleave to goodness in doing it—goodness in the proper sense of the word. Keep this in mind on the occasion of every action.

11. Do not conceive of things as he who commits the outrage regards them, or as he would have thee regard them; but view them as they really are.

12. Have these two principles always at hand: firstly, only to do what the royal and legislative reason suggests, for the good of men: secondly, to change thy mind, if so be thou hast by thee any one endeavouring to set thee right, and lead thee to change any particular opinion. Such change however should always be due to some probability that the thing is just or of public utility; and such as these should be the only motives; not that it seemed likely to bring pleasure or reputation.

13. Art thou endowed with Reason?—I am.—Then why not use it? If thy reason performs its part, what wouldst thou more?

'doctrina salutaris, quæ vobis semper in promptu sit.'

2. τῆς βασιλικῆς καὶ νομοθετικῆς. Sc. τέχνης. Not the 'λόγος of thy legislative faculty,' but 'of thy legislation' = 'legislative Reason.' This is the noblest of the many Stoic expressions for τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, and finds a parallel in St. James's *ei νόμον τελεῖτε βασιλικόν* (ii. 8).

6. πιθανότητος. A term of the Sceptics. For them no idea reached certainty, but only probability, ἔμφρασις, πιθανότης.

ὡς δικαίου ἢ κοινωφελούς. The constr. is unusual. The ellipse of

the participle (*ὄντος*) occurs chiefly after verbs of perceiving, showing, finding, and the like; and no close parallel to the constr. of the text seems to present itself. Krüger, *Sprachlehre*, i. 56, 7, 4. Perhaps *πιθανότητος* is virtually *concrete*, and *δικαίου ἢ κοινωφελούς* are to be regarded as nouns in apposition. The most satisfactory explanation, however, is that *ὡς* is not uncommonly used in Hellenistic Greek to indicate *definition* (*διὰ βεβαίωσιν καὶ ὀρισμῶν*, as it was said), cf. *Evang. Joan. i. 14: δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρὸς*. 7. οὐχ ἔρι ἡδύ. *Gat.* quotes the

14. Ἐνυπέστης ὡς μέρος. Ἐναφανισθήσῃ τῷ γεννήσαντι· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναληφθήσῃ εἰς τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ τὸν σπερματικὸν κατὰ μεταβολήν.

15. Πολλὰ λιβανωτοῦ βωλάρια ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ βωμοῦ· τὸ μὲν προκατέπεσεν, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον· διαφέρει δ' οὐδέν.

16. Ἐντὸς δέκα ἡμερῶν θεὸς αὐτοῖς δόξεις οἷς νῦν θηρίων καὶ πίθηκος, ἐὰν ἀνακάμψῃς ἐπὶ τὰ δόγματα καὶ τὸν σεβασμὸν τοῦ λόγου.

17. Μὴ ὡς μύρια μέλλων ἔτη ζῆν. Τὸ χρεῶν ἐπήρηται· ἕως ζῆς, ἕως ἕξεστιν, ἀγαθὸς γένου.

18. Ὅσῃν ἀσχολίαν κερδαίνει, ὁ μὴ βλέπων τί ὁ πλῆσιον εἶπεν ἢ ἐπραξεν ἢ διανοήθη· ἀλλὰ μόνον τί αὐτὸς ποιεῖ, ἵνα αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον ᾖ καὶ ὄσιον, ἢ κατὰ τὸν

16. 2. ἀνακάμψῃς restored by Schultz, following Xylander. Gat. ἀποκάμψῃς.
18. 1. Coraēs εὐσχολίαν or ἀχολίαν, misapprehending the meaning of κερδαίνει.

teaching of Antisthenes, μηδὲ δάκτυλον ἐκτεῖναι ποτε εἴνεκα ἡδονῆς, and his celebrated utterance, Μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖην.

14. 2. ἀναληφθήσῃ. The word is constantly used in N. T. to denote the 'taking up,' or (as the Vulgate has it), the 'assumption' into heaven.—Mark xvi. 19; Acts i. 2, 22; 1 Tim. iii. 16; so in lxx. of Elias, 2 Kings ii. 11; Sirach xlvi. 9. The difference in the conceptions is that between 'taking up' and 'taking back'; but the coincidence is curious.

τὸν λόγον—τὸν σπερματικόν. As the creative force in nature, God, or the Universal Reason, bears the name of σπερματικὸς λόγος, the seminal principle, generative Reason, or fertilising power (as it is variously rendered), out of which all form and shape, all life and reason, in the present arrangement of the world, has grown, and by which all things were produced out of primary Fire as their seed. This primary fire then or Reason is conceived as containing in itself the germ of all things; and into

it at the end of every period all derivative things return (ἀναλαμβάνονται).

The description of a future life and its occupations given by Seneca, Marc. 26, ends with a similar anticipation: 'Quum tempus advenerit, quo se mundus renovaturus extinguat . . . nos felices animae et aeterna sortitae, quum visum erit Deo iterum ista moliri . . . in anti-qua elementa vertemur.' This absorption or resumption of derivative beings into God or the Universe (for they are identified by Stoicism) is thus but a prelude to the formation of a new world corresponding to the former in every particular; and 'aeterna' in this passage appears to be the strict correlative of 'aevum.'

αἰτοῦ. Sc. τοῦ γεννήσαντος.

16. 1. θεός—οἷς νῦν θηρίων καὶ πίθηκος. This antithesis occurs in more than one connection. Some see here an allusion to the moral miracle of the Stoic conversion, which transformed in a moment one stained with every vice into a hero, a king, a god.

14. Thou hast existed as part of a whole ; thou wilt be absorbed into that which gave thee birth ; or rather, in virtue of a change of state, thou wilt be taken back into its Generative Principle.

15. Many grains of frankincense are thrown on the same altar : one falls upon it sooner, another later, but it makes no difference.

16. In ten days thou wilt seem a God to those who now think thee a wild beast or an ape, if thou wilt only return to thy principles and reverent worship of Reason.

17. Act not as though thou hadst thousands of years to live. Fate hangs over thy head : while thou livest, while thou mayest, be good.

18. How much trouble he spares himself who does not look to see what his neighbour may have said or done or thought, but only what he is doing himself, that that may be

Plut. Stoic. Paradox. : *ἐξαίφνης ἦρως τις . . . ἡ θεὸς ἐκ θηρίου τοῦ κακίστου γενόμενος*. Pierron suggests 'une simple allusion au mot d'Aristote sur la multitude, *ἡ θεὸς ἢ θηρίον*, une protestation contre les murmures populaires.' Strange to say, no commentator on Antoninus has perceived that his phrase is due to Heraclitus (Bywater, Frag. xcix.), as cited by Plato, Hipp. Maj. 289 B—*ἡ οὐ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ταῦτόν τοῦτο λέγει, ὅν σὺ ἐπάγει, ὅτι ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πύθης φανέται καὶ σοφία καὶ κάλλει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν*; this being one of several allusions in Anton. to the few extant sayings of the Ephesian philosopher : cf. iv. 27, 46 ; vi. 17, 42 ; vii. 9 ; ix. 3. For the sentiment, cf. Epict. Man. *ἐὰν ἐκμεινῆς τοῖς αὐτοῖς* (thy principles) *οἱ καταγελωπῆσάν σου τὸ πρότερον ὄντο σε ἴσπερον θαυμάζονται* . . . Meric Casaubon turns the sentence quite otherwise by attempting to make *ἐὰν ἀνακ.* depend on the pres. understood with *νῦν*. 'Within ten dayes thou shalt be esteemed a god of them who now, if thou shalt returne to . . . the honoring of reason, will esteeme of thee no better then of a meere brute and of

an ape :—a view which (were it grammatically tenable) might derive support from such expressions as those of Avidius Cassius (Hist. August., § 14) : 'M. Antoninus philosophatur et quaerit de elementis et de animis et de honesto et iusto, *nec sentit pro republica*.' But we have no reason to think that Aurelius ever connected his principles with unpopularity. His biographer says (Capitol., § 8), 'Dabat se totum philosophiae, *amorem civium adfectans*;' and (§ 27), 'Sententia Platonis semper in ore illius fuit, florere civitates, si aut philosophi imperarent, aut imperantes philosopharent.'

18. 3. *κατὰ τὸν ἀγαθόν*. As the text is not actually indefensible, I have altered nothing. But the conj. of Xyl., *κατὰ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα*, is at once ingenious and probable. Agathon would thus be the author of the iambic fragment loosely and unmetrically cited from memory (as in Hesiod by Plat., Prot. 341 D), which may have run—*ἦθος μέλαν Μῆ περιβλέπεσθαι σ', ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς γραμμῆς τρέχειν Ὀρθόν*, the last two words being the emperor's. For *μέλαν ἦθος*, cf. c. 28.

ἀγαθὸν † μὴ μέλαν ἦθος περιβλέπεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς
5 γραμμῆς τρέχειν ὀρθὸν, μὴ διερριμμένον.

19. Ὁ περὶ τὴν ὑστεροφημίαν ἐπτοημένος οὐ φαντά-
ζεται ὅτι ἕκαστος τῶν μεμνημένων αὐτοῦ τάχιστα καὶ αὐτὸς
ἀποθανεῖται· εἶτα πάλιν καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἐκείνον διαδεξάμενος,
μέχρι καὶ πᾶσα ἡ μνήμη ἀποσβῆ διὰ ἐπτοημένων καὶ
5 σβεννυμένων προιοῦσα. Ἐπόθου δ' ὅτι καὶ ἀθάνατοι μὲν
οἱ μεμνησόμενοι, ἀθάνατος δ' ἡ μνήμη· τί οὖν τούτο πρὸς
σέ; καὶ οὐδὲν λέγω ὅτι πρὸς τὸν τεθηκότα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς
τὸν ζῶντα· τί ὁ ἔπαινος πλὴν ἄρα δι' οἰκονομίαν τινά;
παρίης γὰρ νῦν ἀκαίρως τὴν φυσικὴν δόσιν, ἄλλου τινὸς
10 ἐχόμενος λόγου λοιπόν.†

20. Πᾶν τὸ καὶ ὄψωσούν καλὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καλὸν ἐστί

4. ἀγαθὸν can hardly be right. Xyland. Ἀγάθωνα: see Comm. Others re-constitute the passage variously: e.g. *Morus ὄσιον· δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἀγαθὸν μὴ κ.τ.λ.* 19. 4. For ἐπτοημ. Schultz and Pierron, ἀπτομένον ἐξαπτομένον would be nearer the MSS., the conj. supported by Seneca's expression, Ep. 54, 'Nos quoque et accendimur et exstinguimur;' and one might add, Heraclitus, lxxvii., "Ἀνθρώπος, ὅσως ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φάος, ἀπτεται ἀποσβέννυται. (The word, however, has a very different reference in c. 21, χέονται καὶ ἐξάπτονται.) 7. Coraës, οὐ λέγω, suggesting also τί πρὸς τὸν τεθν. 9. This difficult and corrupt passage can hardly be now restored with certainty. MSS. πάρες γὰρ νῦν ἀκαίρως τὴν φ. δ., ἄλλου τινος ἐχόμενον (Vat. A ἐχομένην) λόγου λοιπόν. As this is untranslatable (for γὰρ νῦν cannot naturally be joined with the imperative), I adopt Gataker's emend., παρίης . . . ἐχόμενος, as the easiest. Coraës suggests *parapsis ἢ παρέντες . . . ἐχη ἢ ἐχόμεθα*. Schultz's former conj., *φυσικὴν* for *φυσικὴν* (Cless, 'jenes aufblähende Geschenk'), deserves recording. *Λοιπόν* is barely defensible: it should probably commence the next chapter, as Boot supposed.

4. ἐπὶ τῆς γραμμῆς. 'Quasi ad lineam ductam'—'lineae insistere,' Gat. 'Along the line,' Long; and so Cless and Pierron. This is certainly wrong. *Γραμμὴ* means *βαλβίς*. Ἐπὶ with gen. has its familiar sense of motion *towards* a goal: it would perhaps be hard to produce an instance of its signifying movement *along* a line. Lastly, the metaphor becomes more intelligible, being thus drawn from the actual conditions of the racecourse.

19. 4. ἐπτοημένων καὶ σβεννυμένων Schultz considers corrupt. I think, however, if the sentence be read

carefully, ὁ περὶ τὴν ὑστ. ἐπτοημένος οὐ φαντ. ὅτι ἕκαστος . . . ἀποθανεῖται, εἶτα . . . μέχρι καὶ πᾶσα ἡ μνήμη ἀποσβῆ διὰ ἐπτοημένων καὶ σβεννυμένων, it will be seen at once that the two pairs of words in spaced type balance and correspond to each other accurately. The difficulty of ἐπτοημένων used *absolutely* then disappears: we must complete *περὶ τὴν ὑστεροφημίαν τὴν ἐαυτῶν*. For the word, cf. Heraclitus, cxvii.—*Βλάξ* *ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ παντὶ λόγῳ ἐπτοῆσθαι φιλέει*.

8. πλὴν ἄρα δι' οἰκονομίαν τινά. *οἰκονομία* in this sense answers to *utilitas*, and the whole phrase is ex-

just and holy; or, as beseems the good,† look not around on malign purpose, but run right for the goal, without distraction.

19. He who is excited and anxious about posthumous fame considers not that every individual who remembers him will speedily himself die too. So again the next in succession also, until every spark of that remembrance be quenched, handed on as it is by persons as anxious and excited as he, whose lives are being quenched in their turn. Even suppose thy memory and those that will cherish it alike immortal, what after all can it be to thee? I say not, when thou art dead, but in thy life: what is the good of praise, except indeed for some object of practical utility?—For now thou art unseasonably foregoing the gift of nature, depending henceforth upon another's speech.†

20. Everything which is beautiful in any way is beauti-

actly rendered by Cicero's 'utilitate detracta' (Fin. iii. 57). This again answers to our 'expediency,' in its ordinary sense. This use of *olk.* falls under the extended meaning it had acquired of 'modus et ratio aliquid agendi,' of which a good example occurs, Cic., Att. vi. 1, 'nec *olkovouμlav* meam instituum, sed ordinem conservabo tuum.' This seems what Gat. means by 'dispensatio,' i.e. management. (The French 'ménagement' represents another shade of meaning, as c. 46, *inf. sub fin.*) *δὲ olkovouμlav* would be fully represented by 'on the score of expediency': *δὲ olk. τινα* means 'for some practical end.' *Τὰ κατ' olkovouμlav*, then, are things preferred as *means* of advancing moral or natural life, in contradistinction from *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν*, things which have an intrinsic value, as being in harmony with human nature. The Stoics were not agreed to which of the three classes of 'things preferred' (Zeller, 216, 264) Fame or good name should be referred. Yet it was admitted to be necessary, if not for a man himself, at least for the good of his neighbours: else social credit would be destroyed. Cic. says: 'Negligere quid de se quisque sentiat,

non solum arrogantis, sed omnino dissoluti est.' On the other hand (Fin. 3, 57), '*Utilitate detracta*, ne digitum quidem ejus caussa porrigendum,' is the opinion of Chrysippus. That the remark here is based rather upon the emperor's philosophic creed than his real nature is implied by Capitolinus, who records of him, 'Erat famae suae curiosissimus, et male loquentium dictis vel literis vel sermone respondebat.'

9. *παρίης γὰρ νῦν.* 'C'est donc à tort que tu négliges le don que t'a fait la nature' (so far Pierron is right), 'en t'attachant à toute autre chose qu'à la raison:' this is clearly wrong. *ἄλλου τινος λόγον* for *ἡ λόγου* would be scarcely tolerable, although Xen., Mem. iv. 4. 25, has *ἄλλα τῶν δικαίων*. A stronger obj. is that the train of thought is thus broken. 'Another's speech' is equivalent to *ἑταυρος* or *ψόγος*.

10. *λοιπόν.* This, both from its position and sense, would naturally commence c. 20.—'Everything, besides, which is beautiful' . . . In fact, the two chapters should be read, if not actually printed, continuously. There is no break in the train of reflection.

καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτὸ καταλήγει, οὐκ ἔχον μέρος ἑαυτοῦ τὸν ἐπαινον. Οὕτε γοῦν χεῖρον ἢ κρεῖττον γίνεται τὸ ἐπαινούμενον. Τοῦτό φημι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κοινότερον καλῶν λεγομένων·
 5 οἶον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑλικῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνικῶν κατασκευασμάτων, τὸ γε δὴ ὄντως καλὸν τινὸς χρεῖαν ἔχει; οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ νόμος, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλήθεια, οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ εὐνοια ἢ αἰδώς. Τί τούτων διὰ τὸ ἐπαινέσθαι καλὸν ἐστὶν ἢ ψευδόμενον φθείρεται; σμαράγδιον γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ
 10 χεῖρον γίνεται ἂν μὴ ἐπαινῆται; τί δὲ χρυσὸς, ἐλέφας, πορφύρα, λύρα, μαχαίριον, ἀνθύλλιον, δειδρύφιον;

21. Εἰ διαμένουσιν αἱ ψυχαί, πῶς αὐτὰς ἐξ αἰδίου χωρεῖ ὁ ἀήρ;—πῶς δὲ ἡ γῆ χωρεῖ τὰ τῶν ἐκ τοσοῦτου αἰῶνος θαπτομένων σώματα; ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐνθάδε ἡ τούτων μετὰ ποσὴν τινα διαμονὴν μεταβολὴ καὶ διάλυσις χώραν
 5 ἄλλοις νεκροῖς ποιεῖ· οὕτως αἱ εἰς τὸν ἀέρα μεθιστάμεναι ψυχαί ἐπὶ ποσὸν συμμείνασαι μεταβάλλουσι καὶ χέονται καὶ ἐξάπτονται, εἰς τὸν τῶν ὄλων σπερματικὸν λόγον ἀναλαμβάνόμεναι, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον χώραν ταῖς

20. 2. ἐφ' ἑαυτὸ. Coraë's for MSS. ἐαντῶ. 6. καλὸν οὐ τινος χρεῖαν ἔχει, οὐ μᾶλλον Coraë's, after Gat. A simpler corr. would be τίνος χρεῖαν ἔχει. 21. 4. μετὰ ποσὴν τινα διαμονὴν is the corr. of Coraë's. MSS. πρὸς ἡντινα ἐπιδιαμονήν.

21. 2. πῶς δὲ ἡ γῆ. This is the answer to the preceding question.

4. μετὰ ποσὴν τινα. The correction of Coraë's is strongly recommended by the symmetry thus restored to the argument. μετὰ ποσὴν τινα διαμονὴν answers, in the case of the body, to ἐπὶ ποσὸν συμμείνασαι of the soul. However, the vulgate is not absolutely untenable. ἡ πρὸς ἡντινα ἐπιδιαμονὴν μεταβολὴ will be then 'the change of these (bodies) to some after (ἐπὶ) state:' the continuance would be implied, and the analogue in the case of the soul would be the condition supervening upon the change—χέονται καὶ ἐξάπτονται. In Gataker's note there is an oversight. The words 'animis' and 'corporibus' should change places with each other.

6. συμμείνασαι. In this compound the prep. expresses the *reten-*

tion by the soul of *its distinct form*, in contrad. to its resolution or absorption into the universal soul. The contrast is clearly brought out by Cic. Tusc. i. 42—'Ita sive dissipantur (χέονται) animi, sive permanent et conservant habitum suum' (συνμμενονσι).

7. ἐξάπτονται. Sen. *pariter*, Ep. 54: 'Nos quoque et accendimur et exstinguimur'—Gat. The quotation is here misleading. ἐξάπτονται does not mean 'kindled into life,' i.e. according to the view of certain Stoics, who held that souls after death passed into new bodies;—which would be inconsistent with εἰς τὸν σπερμ. λόγον ἀναλαμβάνόμεναι below. In the words χέονται καὶ ἐξάπτ. Marcus is speaking of the *resolution* of the soul into its elements of air and fire (as Cic. Tusc. i. 24: 'Si anima est, fortasse dissipabitur; si ignis, exstinguetur');

ful of itself, and with itself its beauty ends. Praise forms no part of it. Nothing therefore is either the better or the worse for being praised. This applies also to things called beautiful in common life; for instance, to material objects and works of art; and indeed what is intrinsically beautiful needs no addition, any more than Law, any more than Truth, any more than Benevolence or Reverence. Which of these owes its beauty to men's praise, or is the worse for their censure? Does an emerald suffer if men do not praise it? or gold, or ivory, or purple? a lyre, a dagger, a floweret, or a shrub?

21. If souls continue to exist, how does the air contain them from eternity? But how does the earth contain the bodies of those continually interred in it from so distant an age? Just as here the change and dissolution of these after a certain duration makes room for other dead bodies: thus souls when translated into the air, after holding out for a certain time, change, are diffused, kindle into flame, while in process of resumption into the Generative Principle of the universe; and in this way they make room for the

but for the latter resolution he uses *ἐξάπτεσθαι*, 'are kindled,' because he contemplates, not the extinction of the soul, but its absorption into the 'Fiery Reason of the Universe' (Zeller, 144), in which connection the soul is itself called *πῦρ ποσειδόν*.

Zeller, 206 n., is in error in saying that 'it is clear from M. Aurel. iv. 14, 21, that the soul lives some time after death, and is not resolved into the world-soul till the general conflagration.' 'Non ergo usque ad *ἐκπύρωσιν* permanere vult Marcus'—Gat., who rightly rejects a view inconsistent with the scope of a passage intended to make it conceivable that, not at the consummation, but *through all the ages*, the air is being continually cleared for the reception of new souls by the resolution and absorption of its existing tenants. It is interesting to contrast this dry, quasi-scientific theory with the beautiful imaginings of Seneca (Marc. 25): 'Integer ille nihilque in terris relinquens, fugit et totus excessit: pau-

lumque supra nos commoratus, dum expurgatur, et inhaerentia vitia situmque omnis mortalis aevi excutit, deinde ad excelsa sufflatus, inter felices currit animas; excipitque illum coetus sacer, Scipiones, Catoesque, utique contemptores vitæ, et mortis beneficio liberi.' To much the same effect, Cic. Tusc. i. 40, 27, and De Rep. vi. 26, who, however, at Tusc. i. 39, expressly repudiates the Stoic teaching of the ultimate dissolution even of the souls of the good.

The doctrine of a temporary after-life followed from that of the conflagration and recreation of the world at the close of each cycle; and its usual type is that recorded by Cic. Tusc. i. 77: 'Stoici vitæ usuram nobis largiuntur, tanquam cornicibus: diu mansuros (aiunt) animos: semper negant.' Even this Chrysippus confined to the souls of the just. On the question of a future life Aurelius pronounces hesitatingly: iii. 3; vi. 24; vii. 32, 50; viii. 25, 58; above all, xii. 5.

προσσυνοικιζομέναις παρέχουσι. Τοῦτο δ' ἄν τις ἀποκρι-
 10 ναιτο ἐφ' ὑποθέσει τοῦ τὰς ψυχὰς διαμένειν. Χρῆ δὲ μὴ
 μόνον ἐνθυμῆσθαι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν θαπτομένων οὕτωςι
 σωμάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐκάστης ἡμέρας ἐσθιομένων
 ζώων ὑφ' ἡμῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων. Ὅσος γὰρ
 15 τῶν τρεφομένων σώμασι, καὶ ὅμως δέχεται ἡ χώρα αὐτὰ,
 διὰ τὰς ἐξαιματώσεις, διὰ τὰς εἰς τὸ ἀερῶδες ἢ πυρῶδες
 ἀλλοιώσεις. Τίς ἐπὶ τούτου ἡ ἱστορία τῆς ἀληθείας ;
 διαίρεσις εἰς τὸ ὑλικὸν καὶ εἰς τὸ αἰτιῶδες.

22. Μὴ ἀπορρέμβεσθαι· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πάσης ὀρμῆς τὸ
 δίκαιον ἀποδιδόναι, καὶ ἐπὶ πάσης φαντασίας σφίξειν τὸ
 καταληπτικόν.

23. Πᾶν μοι συναρμόζει ὃ σοι εὐάρμοστόν ἐστιν, ὦ

9. MSS. προσσυνοικιζομέναις. Corr. Gat. and Ménage. 15. MSS. αὐτή. Corr. Gat. αὐτὰ Cor. after Gat. for αὐτη. Schultz proposes ἡ αὐτή. 16. For διὰ τὰς Coraë's suggests καὶ τὰς.

9. προσσυνοικιζομέναις. Of the successive additions to the commu-

18. τὸ ὑλικὸν καὶ τὸ αἰτιῶδες. 'What is material,' *i.e.* acted upon ; and 'what is causal or formal,' *i.e.* that which acts upon ; in other words Matter and Force, or Cause. The two ultimate grounds of things are the Highest Cause (God) and Formless Matter.—Diog. Laert. vii. 134 : δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὄλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. The former is *ἄποιος οὐσία* or *ὄλη* : the other *ὁ θεός*.—Zeller, 134 *sqq.* To the *σπερματικὸς λόγος* (see c. 14, *supra*, note), viewed as the creative force in the universe, is due all form and shape, life and reason, in the *κοσμός*. By its *particular* exercise, this *λόγος* produces individual things out of their seed (which is primary fire), thus constituting their *αἰτία*, or form : the law, in fact, which determines their shape and qualities. In unphilosophical language, *αἰτιῶδες* might therefore be better represented by 'formative' or 'forming,' than by 'formal.' To these two categories Marcus adds

a third (*ἀναφόρα*, or purpose), xii. 10 : and a fourth (*χρόνος*), xii. 18. (For the usual Stoic doctrine of categories, see Zeller, 97.)

22. 1. ἀπορρέμβεσθαι. The radical notion is that of *turning*, cf. *τροπή*ς ἀποσκίασμα—St. James, i. 17 : cf. vv. 5-8. For ἀποδιδόναι, cf. St. Paul, Rom. xiii. 7 : ἀπόδοτε ὄντων ἡμῶν τὰς δόξαις. ὀρμή and φαντασία must not be pressed : for their exact technical meaning, see Zeller, 227 and 76 : but Marcus is here using the language of his school in admonition.

3. καταληπτικόν. Cicero's 'comprehensibile' (Acad. i. 11, 41) : 'that which may be firmly grasped.' *Sensation* Zeno compared to the extended fingers, *assent* to the closed hand, *conception* to the fist, and *knowledge* to one fist firmly grasped by the other. Thus, between sensation and knowledge the difference is merely of *degree*. The standard of truth is a relative one only. Some of our perceptions (*φαντασίαι*) force us to bestow our assent upon them, and regard them as corresponding to the real nature of things. These, then, may be roughly

reception of others in succession. This would be an obvious answer under the hypothesis of the continued existence of souls. But the host of bodies so buried is not the only thing to be considered. There is also the host of animals, which constitute the daily food both of ourselves and the rest of the animal world. What a vast number of these are consumed, and thus in a manner buried, in the bodies of those that live on them. Yet space contains them all;—from their passing into blood, or being transformed into the elements of fire or air. What means have we of investigating the truth in this case? The distinction into Matter and Form.

22. Waver not: but in all action, render what is just; in all perception, hold fast that which carries conviction with it.

23. All that is in harmony with thee, O World, is in

called *irresistible* perceptions (*φαντασται καταληπτικαί*), and this power of carrying conviction (*τὸ καταληπτικόν*), inherent in certain perceptions, is the Stoic test of truth.—(Zeller, 86 *sqq.*) A still higher degree of certainty is afforded by the logical proof of general conceptions; and, in fact, in the view of later Stoicism, every *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία* must pass through the fire of sceptical criticism before it can be believed. The objects of *φαντασται* being not merely outward things, but individual states and activities of mind, *κατάληψις* may be strictly predicated of them. In modern language the text would run: 'In thought, hold to your convictions.'

23. 1. *ὁ κόσμος*. To the Stoic, God, Nature, and the World were one.—Sen. Q. N. ii. 45: 'Vis Deum Mundum vocare? non falleris. Ipse enim est totum quod vides, totus operibus suis inditus.' The author of the quotation *πόλι φιλη Κέρκωρος* has not yet been discovered. The chapter offers a good example of that *intensity*, which, when combined with their prevailing simplicity and earnestness, raises Stoic utterances occasionally to the level of poetry.—Cf. vi. 47; vii. 17, *fn.* In fact, one of

Milton's sonnets might be regarded as an expansion of the thought, *mutatis mutandis*, from the standpoint of Christian philosophy:—

'How soon hath Time, the subtle thief of youth,
Stolen on his wing my three and twentieth year!
My hasting days fly on with full career,
But my late spring no bud or blossom sheweth.
Perhaps my semblance might deceive the truth,
That I to manhood am arrived so near,
And inward ripeness doth much less appear,
That some more timely happy spirit endueth.
Yet be it less or more, or soon or slow,
It shall be still in strictest measure even
To that same lot, however mean or high,
Toward which Time leads me and the will of Heaven.
All is, if I have grace to use it so,
As ever in my great Taskmaster's eye.'

One would willingly believe the coincidence other than accidental; were it only for the value it would add to the thought of Marcus to have been the *στέμμα* of such fruit. And as a matter of fact, Gataker's curate was Milton's master.

From a purely philosophical point of view, one may observe that this mood of unconditional submission to the will (so to speak) of Nature answers more nearly than anything

κόσμε. Οὐδέν μοι πρόωρον οὐδὲ ὄψιμον τὸ σοὶ εὐκαιρον.
 Πᾶν μοι καρπὸς ὃ φέρουσιν αἱ σαὶ ὥραι, ὧ φύσις· ἐκ σοῦ
 πάντα, ἐν σοὶ πάντα, εἰς σὲ πάντα. Ἐκείνος μὲν φησι·
 5 Πόλι φίλη Κέκροπος· σὺ δὲ οὐκ ἔρείς· ὦ πόλι φίλη Διός ;
 24. Ὀλίγα πρήσσε, φησὶν, εἰ μέλλεις εὐθυμήσειν· μή-
 ποτε ἄμεινον <τὸ> τἀναγκαῖα πράσσειν καὶ ὅσα ὁ τοῦ φύσει
 πολιτικοῦ ζώου λόγος αἰρεῖ καὶ ὡς αἰρεῖ. Τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ
 μόνον τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ καλῶς πράσσειν εὐθυμίαν φέρει, ἀλλὰ
 5 καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀλίγα πράσσειν. Τὰ πλείστα γὰρ ὧν
 λέγομεν καὶ πράσσομεν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ὄντα ἕαν τις περιέλη,
 εὐσυχλωτέρος καὶ ἀταρακτότερος ἔσται. Ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ
 παρ' ἕκαστα ἑαυτὸν ὑπομνησκειν, μή τι τοῦτο οὐ τῶν
 ἀναγκαίων ; Δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον πράξεις τὰς μὴ ἀναγκαίας
 10 περιαιρεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ φαντασίας· οὕτως γὰρ οὐδὲ πράξεις
 παρέλκουσαι ἐπακολουθήσουσι.

25. Πείρασον πῶς σοι χωρεῖ καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀν-
 θρώπου βίος, τοῦ ἀρεσκομένου μὲν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν ὄλων
 ἀπονεμομένοις, ἀρκουμένου δὲ τῇ ἰδίᾳ πράξει δικαία καὶ
 διαθέσει εὐμενεῖ.

26. Ἐώρακας ἐκεῖνα ; ἴδε καὶ ταῦτα. Σᾶυτὸν μὴ

24. 2. The article before *τἀναγκαῖα* is added, but still bracketed, by Schultz and Coraëss.

else in the Stoic system to the Christian virtue of Humility. See Appendix, p. 60, note 47.

24. 1. Ὀλίγα πρήσσε. We learn who the author of this dictum was from Sen. de Ira, iii. 6: 'Proderit nobis illud Democriti salutare præceptum, quo monstratur tranquillitas, si neque privatim neque publice multa, aut maiora viribus nostris egerimus.' Also De Tranq. Animi, xii. 4, where Sen. is speaking of *πολυπραγμοσύνη* and its attendant evils: 'Ex hoc malo dependet illud teterrimum vitium, auscultatio . . . et multarum rerum scientia, quae nec tuto narrantur nec tuto audiuntur. Hoc secutum puto Democritum ita coepisse: "Qui tranquille volet vi-

vere, nec privatim agat multa, nec publice," ad *συρενωσια*' (τὰ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα) 'scilicet referentem. Nam si necessaria sunt, et privatim et publice non tantum multa, sed innumerabilia agenda sunt: ubi vero nullum officium solenne nos citat, inhibendae' (*περαιαιρεῖν*) 'actiones sunt.' The exact words of Democritus are given by Stob. i. 100: τὸν εὐθυμείσθαι μέλλοντα χρὴ μὴ πολλὰ πρήσσειν μητὲ ἰδίᾳ μήτε ξυνη, μηδ' ὄσ' ἂν προσῆ, ὑπὲρ τε δύναμιν αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ φύσιν. Cf. M. Anton. iii. 5; Cic. Tusc. i. 31, 75. Plutarch de Tranq. rejects this precept: ἀπραξία is too high a price to pay for εὐθυμία: nor do we find that the ἀπρακτοὶ are really more contented. In general

harmony with me. Nothing is early or late for me, which is in season for thee. All that thy seasons, O Nature, produce, is fruit for me. From thee, in thee, to thee, are all things. There is one who cries, 'Dear City of Cecrops!' and wilt thou not cry, 'Dear City of Zeus!'

24. 'If thou wouldst have contentment,' it has been said, 'do but few things.' Perhaps a better rule is to confine one's self to doing what is necessary, and to what the reason of a being born for a life in common dictates, and as it dictates. One thus attains not only the contentment which springs from doing well, but also that which springs from doing few things. In fact the greater part of our words and acts are unnecessary. Put away these, and thou wilt have more leisure and be less disquieted. Hence thou shouldst on each occasion put it to thyself, may not this be unnecessary?—Not only unnecessary actions but also unnecessary thoughts should be put away; for in this way a man will escape the superfluous actions that follow in their train.

25. Try how the life of the good man also prospers with thee, who welcomes the lot assigned him in the order of the universe, and is contented with his own just action and kind disposition.

26. Hast thou considered that? consider this also.

the Stoics held, with Chrysippus (herein not unlike certain modern religionists), that a wise man avoids business and lives in retirement; and though he may consider it his duty not to withdraw altogether from public life, still he can only actively take a part in it in States which present an appreciable progress towards perfection.—(Zeller, 304 *sqq.*) That Antoninus would naturally have preferred the life of retirement seems plain. He heard the news of his adoption to the empire with no joy (Capit. 5). When asked 'cur tristis in adoptionem regiam transiret, disputavit quae mala in se contineret imperium.'—Cf. *infra*, x. 15, and v. 16 (the text of a sonnet by Mr. M. Arnold) "Even in a palace life may be lived well." Probably he found the best solution of the difficulty in the

saying of Plato: 'si imperatores philosopharentur,' etc. (*vid. sup.* 13, note).—Cf. xi. 7.

25. 1. *χωρεῖ*. 'Quomodo procedat, quos progressus tecum faciat,' Gat. Perhaps 'thrives with thee.'

26. 1. *Ἐσπασας ἐκεῖνα*. This may possibly be intended for a separate aphorism: 'Thou hast seen that side of the question: look at this also.' But, considering the opening words of iii. 11, *τοῖς δὲ εὐρημέτοις ἐν ἑρι προσέτω, τὸ δρον κτέ.*, which refer to c. 10, it seems better to take the sentence as expressing the antithesis between the motives urged in this c. and in the last. There the *experience* of a virtuous life (*μελεσασον, πῶς σοι χωρεῖ* . . .); here the *theoretic* ground of the constitution of the universe, and man's place in it: the 'awe-inspiring view of the human lot.'

τάρασσε· ἄπλωσον σεαυτὸν. Ἀμαρτάνει τις ; ἑαυτῷ ἀμαρτάνει. Συμβέβηκέ σοί τι ; καλῶς· ἐκ τῶν ὄλων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς σοι συγκαθείμαρτο, καὶ συνεκλώθητο πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον.
 5 Τὸ δ' ὄλον, βραχὺς ὁ βίος· κερδαντέον τὸ παρὸν σὺν εὐλογιστίᾳ καὶ δίκῃ. Νῆφε ἀνειμένος.

27. Ἦτοι κόσμος διατεταγμένος ἢ κυκεῶν, συμπεφυρμένος μὲν ἀλλὰ κόσμος. Ἡ ἐν σοὶ μὲν τις κόσμος ὑφίστασθαι δύναται, ἐν δὲ τῷ παντὶ ἀκοσμία ; καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως πάντων διακεκριμένων καὶ διακεχυμένων καὶ συμπαθῶν ;

28. Μέλαν ἦθος, θῆλυ ἦθος, περισκελὲς ἦθος, θηριῶδες,

26. 3. Others, including Coraës, punctuate *συμβέβηκέ σοί τι καλῶς ; ἐκ κτέ.* The emendation is as old as Casaubon. De Joly professes to have found the punct. of the text in 'le MS. du Roi ;' which cannot now be identified. 6. Coraës reads *ἀνειμένος*, based probably on the corrupt *ἀνειμέως* of Vat. A. 27. 1. Coraës suggests *συμπεφυρμένος*.

2. *ἄπλωσον σεαυτὸν.* The *ἄπλους* is the opp. of the *διψυχος* of St. James: the 'man of divided will' (mistransl. 'double-minded,' i. 8), who will receive nothing from God, who giveth *ἄπλως*, 'with single purpose of his well-being' (mistransl. 'abundantly').

3. *καλῶς.* For constr. cf. Romans xii. 20 : for that of *ἑαυτῷ*, Rom. xiv. 7 : the precept is enforced by a different motive, *Ib.* xiv. 4.

4. *συγκαθείμαρτο.* Chrysippus distinguished between two degrees of pre-ordination: in one, the will co-operated with external causes; in the other, things were determined by Destiny alone (*συγκαθειμαρμένα* ('confatalia') and *ειμαρμένα*).

5. *σὺν* = 'in accordance with :' cf. Xen. An. ii. 6, 18 : *σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ καλῷ.* Cf. Ephes. v. 15 : *ἀκριβῶς (i.e. σὺν εὐλογιστίᾳ) περιπατεῖτε, ἐξαγοραζόμενοι τὸν καιρὸν.*

6. *ἀνειμένος.* Of the recreations of the Emperor's youth, several interesting and natural descriptions may be found in his Letters to Fronto. (Ed. Naber, *e.g.* pp. 35, 66). Capitolinus, § 4, says of him, 'Amavit

puigillatum, luctamina, et cursum, et aucupatus, et pila lusit adprime, et venatus est. Sed ab omnibus his intentionibus studium eum philosophiae abduxit seriumque et gravem reddidit, non tamen abolita in eo comitate quam . . amicis . . exhibebat.'

27. 1. Ἦτοι κόσμος. In reading this passage, stress must be laid on *διατεταγμένος*, and *κυκεῶν* somewhat toned down. On either supposition, that there is an intelligent Author of the Universe, and that its formation is fortuitous, we must regard it as a *κόσμος*. Any other view is inconsistent with the *fact* of the microcosm. (Macrob. in Som. Scip. i. 12 : 'Ideo physici mundum magnum hominem, et hominem brevem mundum esse dixerunt.') The argument would be strengthened if we could regard it as a disjunctive, with the affirmation of a *κόσμος* as the minor. It would thus also be more in keeping with the parallel passages, vi. 10, and ix. 39.—*κυκεῶν*, 'the wild unfathered mass' of Mr. M. Arnold's fine poem, *In utrumque Paratus*, which is thoroughly Stoic in tone.

Avoid distraction; aim at simplicity. Does any man sin? he sins to himself. Has aught befallen thee? It is well: every event that happens was portioned out to thee in the order of the universe, and woven into thy destiny from the beginning. In a word, life is short: turn the present to account, with circumspection and justice as thy guides. In relaxation, be sober.

27. Either there is an appointed order of the world, or a medley—casually brought together, it may be, yet still an order of the world. Else how can a certain order possibly subsist within thee, and disorder in the universe? and this when all things are divided and dispersed, and withal in mutual accord?

28. A black character, an effeminate character, a stub-

3. **ἀκοσμία.** Plat. *Gorgias*, 507 ε: *φασί δ' οἱ σόφροι* (sc. the Pythagoreans) *καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τῆν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φίλλαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδ' ἀκολασίαν.* The first use of the word *κόσμος* in this sense is attributed to the Pythagoreans.

4. **διακεκρυμένον καὶ διακεχυμένον** are all but synonymous, as appears from Plat. Phil. 46, *sub fin.* Cf. Cic. de Or. 42, 187: 'dispersa et dissipata' immediately after expressed by 'diffusa.'—'Things the most perfectly distinct and widely distant are yet in accord.'

συμπάθων. In Stoic language, *συμπάθεια* does not mean the instinctive community of feeling which is now conveyed by the term 'sympathy,' but the *natural connection and coincidence* prevailing between phenomena in all parts of the *κόσμος*: particularly between the phenomena of earth and of heaven. Epict. D. i. 14, 2: *οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἠρώσθαι τὰ πάντα*;—*Δοκεῖ, ἔφη.—τί δέ; συμπάθειν τὰ ἐπίγεια τοῖς οὐρανοῖς*;—Cf. M. Anton. ix. 9; iv. 40; vi. 1. From the connection of the heavenly bodies amongst themselves, and with the earth, it appears that the *κόσμος* is an organic whole, a *ζῶον*.—Cf. c. 40, *infra*.

28. **Μέλαν ἦθος κτέ.** The chapter is somewhat in the style of Heraclitus. Cf. the Lucianic parody (Vit. 14), and the fragm. *νυκτιπόλοιο, μάγοι, βόκχοι, λῆναι, μύσται* (Heracl. cxvii.) Gataker at one time thought that it formed part of c. 18, *συγγρα*, and that the writer intended to expand what he meant by the *μέλαν ἦθος* there spoken of. Horace indeed uses 'niger' generically (S. i. 14), but even the form of the chapter is against making *μέλαν ἦθος* the subject. On the whole, see v. 11.

περισκελῆς, κτέ. Soph. Ajax, 648: *ἀλίσκεται χῶ δεινὸς ἔρκος καὶ περισκελῆς φρένες* ('stubborn will'). For *βοσκηματώδες*, cf. Longfellow's 'dumb driven cattle.' We have not the exact word: 'bestial' is too wide, 'bovine' too narrow.—For *βλακικός*, cf. Thompson's *Gorgias*, 488 A, n. Of this type the frag. of Heraclitus (already cited) furnishes a characteristic (cxvii.). *Βλάξ ἀνθρώπος ἐπὶ παντὶ λόγῳ ἐπτοῖσθαι φιλέει.—κίβδηλος*; the opp., *ἀκίβδηλος*, is one of the traits of the *σόφος*.—Diog. vii. 117; Zeller, 286, n.—*Καπηλικόν*, 'the trickster.' In illustration of the unworthy contempt for industry prevalent in Rome, cf. Cic. Off. i. 42: 'Sordidi etiam putandi qui mercantur a mercatoribus quod statim vendant. Opificesque omnes sordida arte versantur.'

παιδαριώδες, βοσκηματώδες, βλακικόν, κίβδηλον, βωμολόχον, καπηλικόν, τυραννικόν.

29. Εἰ ξένος κόσμος ὁ μὴ γνωρίζων τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ὄντα, οὐχ ἦττον ξενος καὶ ὁ μὴ γνωρίζων τὰ γιγνώμενα. Φυγὰς ὁ φεύγων τὸν πολιτικὸν λόγον· τυφλὸς ὁ καταμύων τῷ νοερῷ ὀφθαλμῷ· πτωχὸς ὁ ἐνδέης ἐτέρου καὶ μὴ πάντα ἔχων
5 παρ' ἑαυτοῦ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον χρήσιμα. Ἀπόστημα κόσμος ὁ ἀφιστάμενος καὶ χωρίζων ἑαυτὸν τοῦ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως λόγου, διὰ τοῦ δυσαρεστεῖν τοῖς συμβαίνουσιν· ἐκείνη γὰρ φέρει τοῦτο ἢ καὶ σὲ ἤνεγκεν· ἀπόσχιμα πόλεως ὁ τὴν ἰδίαν ψυχὴν τῆς τῶν λογικῶν ἀποσχίζων, μᾶς οὔσης.

30. Ὁ μὲν χωρὶς χιτῶνος φιλοσοφεῖ, ὁ δὲ χωρὶς βιβλίου· ἄλλος οὗτος ἡμίγυμνος. Ἄρτους οὐκ ἔχω, φησὶ, καὶ ἐμμένω τῷ λόγῳ.—Ἐγὼ δὲ τροφὰς τὰς ἐκ μαθημάτων οὐκ ἔχω, καὶ ἐμμένω.

31. Τὸ τεχνίον ὃ ἔμαθες φῖλει, τούτῳ προσαναπαύου· τὸ δὲ ὑπόλοιπον τοῦ βίου διέξελεθε, ὡς θεοὶ μὲν ἐπιτετροφῶς

30. 2. οστος, conjectured by Gat., was restored from Vat. A by Coraës. Al. οστωσ.

29. 1. ξένος κόσμος. Cf. iv. 46, viii. 15, xii. 1 and 13. For ξένος, cf. the μὴ ξειζήσθε of 1 Pet. iv. 12.

3. τυφλός. Matt. xiii. 15: τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτῶν ἐκάμυσαν.—καταμύω here intrans.; elsewhere trans.

4. πτωχός. Prop. 'one who cringes' (πτώσσω) a beggar, as distinct from the πένης who 'works' for his living (πένομαι) 'poor.' Vid. Schmidt, *Synonymik*, I. 620.—ὁ ἐνδέης ἐτέρου· cf. Epict. D. iv. 8: 'If I am waiting for another to help me, I am nothing.' The αὐτάρκεια of Stoicism was borrowed and adapted by one who shows many traces of familiarity with the system.—St. Paul, Philipp. iv. 11: ἔμαθον ἐν οἷς εἰμι αὐτάρκης εἶναι. Cf. 2 Cor. ix. 8: πᾶσαν αὐτάρκειαν ἔχοντες. Bp. Lightfoot's *Philippians*, pp. 302

sqq. M. Anton. i. 16: τὸ ἀτταρες ἐν παντί. Sen. Ep. Mor. 9.

5. Ἀπόστημα κόσμος. Had it been possible to say 'he who absceides,' the solemn play upon words (ἀπόστημα—ἀφιστάμενος) might have been fully represented.—Cf. ii. 16. Plutarch applies the word, not in a moral but political sense, to such persons as Nabis and Catiline.

8. ἀπόσχιμα πόλεως. Of this thought viii. 34 and x. 18 furnish beautiful expansions. In the former the dissident from the universal Reason is compared to a hand severed from the body; in the latter to a branch from the tree; in each to something severed from a *living organism*. The conception and its illustrations are familiar to Christian writers.—Rom. xii. 5; John xvi. 6.

born character, a brutal, a childish, a bovine, an imbecile, a counterfeit, a scurrilous, a knavish, a despotic character.

29. If he is a stranger in the world who knows not what exists in it, no less a stranger is he who knows not what goes on in it. He is a renegade who flies from the law of civic life; he is blind who closes the eyes of his understanding; he is a beggar who stands in need of others, and has not from himself all that life requires. He is an *abscess* on the frame of the world who *secedes* and severs himself from the law of universal Nature, through discontent at what is happening; for it is borne by the same Nature that bare thee. He is a thing cut off from the commonwealth, who cuts off his own soul from the soul of all reasonable beings, which is one.

30. One pursues philosophy without a tunic: another without a book: a third here, half naked. 'Bread I have none,' says he, 'yet I abide by reason.'—'Livelihood from my learning I derive none,' says another, 'yet I too abide by it!'

31. Love the art thou hast learned, humble though it be, and in this find repose. Pass the rest of thy life as one who has committed all that concerns him with his

9. *μῆς οὐσης*. The soul of the World, of which each particular soul was an emanation.

30. 1. *χωρὶς χιτῶνος*. The Cynics alone among philosophers wore no tunic under the *pallium*, and hence doubled the latter. Antisthenes, in search of a *χιτῶν*, was told by Diogenes, *πτόξαι θολμάτιον*. *Εἰ τις ἀχαλκῆ*, says an epigram, *μηκέτι πεινάτω θεῖς τὸ χιτωνάριον*, *i.e.* becoming a Cynic. Hence Juvenal's saying that the Stoics differed from the Cynics in nothing but a tunic. For *χωρὶς βιβλίου*, see ii. 2: *ἀφ᾽ ἑ τὰ βιβλία μηκέτι σπῶ*.

2. *ἡμίγυμνος*. So the Cynics are often described, from their keeping the right arm and shoulder uncovered, while their single garment (*ἔξωμυς*) was thrown back on the left.

3. *τροφῆς*. Sen. Ep. 17: 'Licet ad philosophiam etiam sine viatico pervenire.' Poverty is no hindrance

to a philosophic life.—Epict. Man. xii. The contrary view is embodied in the German expression 'Brotstudium.' The thought recalls Schiller's couplet (Xenien: *Wissenschaft*)—

'Einem ist sie die hohe, die himmlische
Göttin: dem andern
Eine tüchtige Kuh, die ihn mit Butte
versorgt.'

31. 1. *προσαναπαύου*. See Schmidt, *Synonymik*, i. 463, who points out that the word peculiarly applies to the *soldier's* rest. It is the same as *ἐπαναπαύη ἐν τῷ νόμῳ* ('find delight in'), Rom. ii. 17. Cf. 'acquiescere,' as in Cic. Att. iv. 16: 'quae delectat, in qua acquiescam.' For the sentiment, 1 Cor. vii. 20, *ἕκαστος ἐν τῇ κλήσει κτέ*, and the proverb in Aristoph. Vesp. 1431, *ἔρδοι τις ἦν ἕκαστος εἰδὲν τέχνην*, so familiar to Cic., who frequently cites it by the first two words only, and renders 'quam quisque norit artem, in ea se exercent.

τὰ σεαυτοῦ πάντα ἐξ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ μηδεὸς μῆτε τύραννον μῆτε δούλον ἑαυτὸν καθιστάς.

32. Ἐπιπόησον, λόγου χάριν, τοὺς ἐπὶ Οὐεσπασιανοῦ καιροὺς, ὄψει ταῦτα πάντα· γαμοῦντας, παιδοτροφοῦντας, νοσοῦντας, ἀποθνήσκοντας, πολεμοῦντας, ἐορτάζοντας, ἐμπορευομένους, γέωργοῦντας, κολακεύοντας, αὐθαδιζομένους, 5 ὑποπτεύοντας, ἐπιβουλεύοντας, ἀποθανεῖν τινὰς εὐχομένους, γογγύζοντας ἐπὶ τοῖς παρούσιν, ἐρώντας, θησαυρίζοντας, ὑπατείας, βασιλείας ἐπιθυμοῦντας. Οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ τούτων βίος οὐκ ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ. Πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς καιροὺς τοὺς Τραϊανοῦ μετάβηθι· πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ πάντα. Τέθηκε 10 κἀκεῖνος ὁ βίος. Ὅμοίως καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιγραφὰς χρόνων καὶ ὄλων ἐθνῶν ἐπιθεώρει, καὶ βλέπε πόσοι κατενταθέντες μετὰ μικρὸν ἔπεσον καὶ ἀνελύθησαν εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα. Μάλιστα δὲ ἀναπολητέον ἐκεῖνους οὓς αὐτὸς ἔγνωσ κενὰ σπωμένους, ἀφέντας ποιεῖν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν 15 κατασκευῆν, καὶ τούτου ἀπρίξ ἔχσθαι, καὶ τούτῳ ἀρκεῖσθαι. Ἐναγκαῖον δὲ ὧδε τὸ μεμνήσθαι ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἐπιστροφή καθ' ἐκάστην πρᾶξιν ἰδίαν ἀξίαν ἔχει καὶ συμμετρίαν. Οὕτως γὰρ οὐκ ἀποδυσπετήσεις, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπὶ πλέον ἢ προσῆκε περὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω καταγίνῃ.

33. Αἱ πάλαι συνήθεις λέξεις γλωσσήματα νῦν· οὕτως

32. 8. τοὺς—Τραϊανοῦ. Gat. and others wrongly τοῦ. 10. ἐπιγραφὰς. Casaubon read περιγραφὰς; but no change is needed. 12. καὶ . . . Μάλιστα δὲ. Gat. and others. In both cases the reading of Xylander has been restored by Coraës and Schultz.

32. 5. ἀποθανεῖν τινὰς εὐχομένους. Cless follows Casaubon in understanding *mori optantes*. But Gat. is clearly right in taking *tinás* as the subject of *ἀποθανεῖν*. Otherwise the word *tinás* would be superfluous, and the sentiment not in keeping with the context.

10. ἐπιγραφὰς χρόνων καὶ ὄλων ἐθνῶν. ἐπιγραφὰς must be interpreted by the aid of context. 'Look at Vespasian's times. . . Pass to the times of Trajan . . .' These are periods designated by the name of the prince. 'So too the other ἐπιγραφὰς of periods and of whole nations.' We naturally expect a general term covering the instances given: and

this we have in ἐπιγραφὰς ('signationes'), properly the titles or inscriptions affixed, as it were, to the records of each reign; and by an easy transition, the 'designations' of particular periods in the history of the Roman people, and of the historical epochs of whole nations, by some such distinctive 'titulus' as the name of a particular sovereign. Gat. well compares Tac. Dial. xvi.: 'Interrogato quos vocetis antiquos, quam oratorum aetatem significatione ista determinetis' for the gen. sense; but it would be hard to produce an exact parallel for this use of ἐπιγραφὰς. Two other possible meanings need

whole soul to the Gods: not making himself either the tyrant or the slave of any man.

32. Look for instance at Vespasian's times, and thou wilt see all these things: people marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying, fighting, feasting, trading, tilling the soil, playing the flatterer, arrogant, suspicious, hatching plots, longing for the death of others, murmuring at their lot, yielding to love, amassing wealth, aiming at the fasces or the throne. Well, that life they lived is now nowhere to be found.—Again, pass to Trajan's times: again, the spectacle is exactly the same. That life of theirs also has passed away. So too pass in review the other designations of periods and of whole nations, and see how many, after utmost striving, sank in a little while and were resolved into the elements. Especially recall such persons as thou thyself hast known, in their idle distractions, neglecting to do that which conformed to their constitution—to cling tenaciously to this: with this to rest content. And here we should remember this also, that attention has a distinct value and proportion for each action on which it is bestowed. In this way thou wilt escape disgust, if thou dost not occupy thyself unduly with comparative trifles.

33. Expressions once current are now obsolete. And

only be mentioned to be rejected:

(1) *ἐπιγράφω* being the techn. term for 'entering in a list or roll,' the word might be rendered 'the registers of periods of time and whole nations.'

(2) In viii. 31 the coincidence *κάκεινο δὲ τὸ ἐπιγραφόμενον τοῖς μνήμασι, ἔσχατος τοῦ γένους* might tempt us to interpret here 'sepulchral inscriptions.'

16. *ἡ ἐπιστροφή*. For an expansion of this maxim see iii. 11. Its object is to inculcate *proportion* in our actions. Our aim should be to ascertain the relative worth of things, and bestow on them a *proportionate* amount of attention. And this appreciation should be universal. Marcus says that he aims at proportion 'even in intermediate duties,' *ἀμα μέντοι τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐν τοῖς μέσους συστοχάζομαι* (iii. 11). Seneca, Ep.

89, assigns it the first place: 'Quid est tam necessarium, quam *pretia rebus imponere!* . . . primum est ut quanti quidque sit iudices.' And a modern verse writer:—

'Mankind, though satirists with jobations
weary us,
Have but two faults, if rightly reckoned:
The first consists in trifling with things
serious,
And seriousness in trifles is the second.'

The scope of the passage on Attention (*προσοχή*), cited by Gat. from Epict. (iv. 12), is altogether different, consisting of variations on the text, 'Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might.' For the order of the thoughts, cf. viii. 21 (*fin.*) and 22, with the two parts of the chapter before us; also iii. 10.

33. I. *γλώσσημα* does not appear to occur in any other Greek writer.

οὖν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν πάλαι πολυμνήτων, νῦν τρόπον
 τινα γλωσσήματά ἐστι, Κάμιλλος, Καίσιων, Οὐόλεσος,
 Λεοννάτος, μετ' ὀλίγον δὲ καὶ Σκιπίων καὶ Κάτων, εἶτα
 5 καὶ Αὔγουστος, εἶτα καὶ Ἀδριανὸς καὶ Ἀντωνίνος. Ἐξίτηλα
 γὰρ πάντα καὶ μυθώδη ταχὺ γίνεται· ταχὺ δὲ καὶ παν-
 τελῆς λήθη κατέχουσεν. Καὶ ταῦτα λέγω ἐπὶ τῶν θαυ-
 μαστῶς πως λαμψάντων. Οἱ γὰρ λοιποὶ ἅμα τῷ ἐκπνεῦσαι
 αἴστοι, ἄπυστοι. Τί δὲ καὶ ἔστιν ὅλως τὸ ἀείμηστον ;
 10 ὅλον κενόν. Τί οὖν ἐστι περὶ ὃ δεῖ σπουδῆν εἰσφέρεισθαι ;
 ἔν τοῦτο, διάνοια δικαία καὶ πράξεις κοινωνικαὶ καὶ λόγος
 οἶος μήποτε διαψεύσασθαι, καὶ διάθεσις ἀσπαζομένη πᾶν
 τὸ συμβαῖνον ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς γνώριμον, ὡς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς
 τοιαύτης καὶ πηγῆς ῥέον.

34. Ἐκὼν σεαυτὸν τῇ Κλωθοῖ συνεπιδίδου, παρέχων
 συννήσαι οἷς τισὶ ποτε πράγμασι βούλεται.

35. Πᾶν ἐφήμερον, καὶ τὸ μνημονεῦον καὶ τὸ μνημο-
 νεύόμενον.

33. 4. μετ' ὀλίγον, Coraës : MSS. κατ' ὀλίγον. καὶ Σκιπίων—Gat. and others omit the copula, as well as the article, before ἀείμηστον (l. 9), though the earlier edd. exhibit both.

The corr. adj. evidently means unusual, obsolete, 'dictionary' words ; and this falls in with the classical meaning of γλώσσα, which may be gathered from Arist. Poet. : λέγω δὲ κύριον μὲν, ᾧ χρῶνται ἕκαστοι, γλωτταν δὲ, ᾧ ἕτεροι. Cf. Rhet. iii. 10 *inil.* : αἱ μὲν οὖν γλώτται, ἀγνώτες· τὰ δὲ κύρια ἴσμεν. In Rhet. iii. 3 he gives specimens of the γλώτται as an element of the *poetic* or *frigid* style. Hence we conclude that γλώτται, as a gram. term, was 'a foreign word,' the word of a γλώτται (ἑτέρα), whence it came to mean a word belonging to another dialect of the same language, and ultimately any unusual or obsolete word which, from its unintelligibility, had the air of a foreign word (*vid.* Twining's *Poetics*, ii. 315). In the N. T. the use of γλώσσαί fairly coincides with this. Whatever they may have been (*vid.* Stanley's *Ec-*

cursus, 'Paul's Epp. to the Corinthians,' p. 258 *sqq.*), they were at least ἀγνώτες, 'unintelligible' without an interpreter—1 Cor. xiv. 4 and 28. Hor. A. P. : 'Multa renascentur quae nunc cecidere, cadentque quae nunc sunt in honore vocabula.'

3. Καίσιων. Which of several men of note who bore this name is meant cannot now be determined.

Οὐόλεσος. The Volesus Messala, whose cruelty Sen. de Ira ii. 5 records, was proconsul of Asia under Augustus. Evidently this is not he, and the person alluded to seems unknown to history.

4. Λεοννάτος. The relative and friend of Alexander the Great.

5. Ἀντωνίνος. Aurelius could not have suspected how tenacious of life his adopted name was destined to prove : in this respect perhaps second only to those of Cæsar and Augustus.

so the names of persons once widely renowned have now in a manner become obsolete, such as Camillus, Caeso, Volesus, Leonnatus; and soon it will be the same with Scipio and Cato; then even with Augustus, then even with Hadrian and Antoninus. For all things vanish away and quickly become a mere tale that is told; ay, they are soon buried in utter oblivion. And this I say of those who have attained extraordinary distinction: as for the rest of mankind, when they draw their last breath they are lost alike to name and fame. At best, what is it to live in perpetual remembrance? mere vanity. About what then ought a man to be in earnest? this, and this only—just thought, unselfish actions, speech that knows not deceit, and a disposition that welcomes whatever befalls, as being inevitable, as being familiar, and as flowing from a like origin and source.

34. Commit thyself cheerfully to Destiny, letting her work thy thread into what tissue she will.

35. That which remembers and that which is remembered are alike creatures of a day.

Regularly borne by eight princes—Pius, Marcus, Verus, Commodus, Caracalla, Geta, Diadumenus, Helio-gabalus—it is also ascribed by some to the Gordians, Severus, Pertinax, Didius Julianus, and Macrinus. Dishonoured by Commodus and Helio-gabalus, it yet retained so unchangeably the love of the army and the people, that, as Capitol. says (*Macr.* 4): 'Nisi Antonini nomen audirent, imperatorium non putarent.' 'Pendant que les noms d'Auguste et de César continuent de se transmettre comme titres de la dignité impériale, le nom d'Antonin demeure comme la marque de l'héritage de vertus transmis par Antonin et Marc-Aurèle à leurs successeurs, et de l'obligation de ne pas faillir à cette succession glorieuse' (Suckau, *Etude sur Marc-Aurèle*, p. 238). This is proved by the scene in the senate on the accession of the virtuous Alexander. The name Antoninus was the greatest honour they could offer their prince. 'Antonini nomen suscipe . . . nomen

Antoninorum tu purifica . . . Antonini nomen ornabis . . . Antonine Auguste, di te servent' (Lamprid. *Alex.* 7 sq.)¹

9. αἰστοί, ἀπυστοί. Homer, *Od.* i. 242: 'Lost to sight and hearing.' *Vid.* Schmidt, *Synonymik*, 149.

13. ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τοιαύτης. Sc. φύσεως. Cf. c. 29, *sup.*: ἐκείνη γὰρ φέρεται τοῦτο ἢ καὶ σὲ ἤρηνκεν.

34. 1. Κλωδοί. God or Zeus may be equally well spoken of as Destiny, Providence, Nature, or the World, 'Hunc (Deum) Fatum si dixeris, non mentieris.'—Sen. *Benef.* iv. 7; For the Stoic teaching on the Freedom of the Will, cf. Zeller, 205, and M. Anton. viii. 56.

35. 1. τὸ μνημονεῖον. Perhaps, in the late meaning of the word, 'The recorder and the record': cf. vii. 16; Schmidt, *Synonymik*, i. 314. The transl., however, is supported by c. 19, and so Pierron.

¹ The passage, taken verbatim from the Journals of the Senate, is apparently the most extensive fragment of the *Acta* now extant (Leclerc, *Journaux*, 407).

36. Θεώρει διηλεκῶς πάντα κατὰ μεταβολὴν γινόμενα καὶ ἐθίζου ἐννοεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν οὕτως φιλεῖ ἢ τῶν ὄλων φύσις, ὡς τὸ τὰ ὄντα μεταβάλλειν καὶ ποιεῖν νέα ὁμοία. Σπέρμα γὰρ τρόπον τινα πᾶν τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐσομένου. Σὺ δὲ
5 μόνᾳ σπέρματα φαντάξῃ τὰ εἰς γῆν ἢ μήτραν καταβαλλόμενα· τοῦτο δὲ λίαν ἰδιωτικόν.

37. Ἦδη τευνήξῃ, καὶ οὐπω οὔτε ἀπλοῦς οὔτε ἀτάραχος οὔτε ἀνύποπτος τοῦ βλαβῆναι ἄν ἐξωθεν, οὔτε ἴλεως πρὸς πάντας οὔτε τὸ φρονεῖν ἐν μόνῳ τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν τιθέμενος.

38. Τὰ ἡγεμονικὰ αὐτῶν διάβλεπε, καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους οἷα μὲν φεύγουσιν οἷα δὲ διώκουσιν.

39. Ἐν ἀλλοτριῷ ἡγεμονικῷ κακὸν σὸν οὐχ ὑφίσταται· οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τινι τροπῇ καὶ ἑτεροιώσει τοῦ περιέχοντος. Πού οὖν; ὅπου τὸ περὶ κακῶν ὑπολαμβάνον σοί ἐστι. Τοῦτο οὖν μὴ ὑπολαμβάνετω, καὶ πάντα εὖ ἔχει. Κἂν τὸ
5 ἐγγυτάτω αὐτοῦ τὸ σωματίον τέμνηται, καίηται, διαπυύσκηται, σήπηται, ὅμως τὸ ὑπολαμβάνον περὶ τούτων μόριον ἡσυχάζετω· τούτέστι, κρινέτω μήτε κακὸν τι εἶναι μήτε ἀγαθόν, ὃ ἐπίσης δύναται κακῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ ἀγαθῷ συμβαίνειν.

36. 1. διηλεκῶς πάντα κατὰ μ. γινόμενα is the reading of Vat. A adopted by Schultz. The early editions exhibited γινόμενα γίνεταί· καὶ κτέ. Coraës' text has ὡς πάντα κ. μ. τὰ γινόμενα γίνεταί. 38. 1. τοὺς φρονίμους offends all—unnecessarily, I think. Gat. proposes τὰς φροντίδας, followed by Coraës and Cless. Long prefers Schultz's τῶν φρονίμων. But the construction, which no one seems to have understood, is the familiar *prolepsis* of the subj. of the dependent clause: διάβλεπε τοὺς φρονίμους, οἷα διώκουσι = οἷα οἱ φρόνιμοι δ.

37. 1. οὐπω—ἀπλοῦς. Not unlike the tone of a letter to Fronto, written by the Emperor at twenty-five (Naber, p. 75): 'Erubescit discipulus tuus, sibi que suscenset, quod viginti quinque natus annos nihil dum bonarum opinionum et puriorum rationum animo hauserim. Itaque poenas do, irascor, tristis sum, ζηλοτυπῶ, cibo careo.' Cf. x. 1; ii. 6; below, Appendix, p. 61.

4. τιθέμενος. The ellipse of the second person of the copula is very rare,

especially in prose. Krüger i. 62, 1, 5, cites Aesch. Prom. 320: σὺ οὐδέπω ταπεινὸς οὐδ' εἰκεῖς κακοῖς. *Ib.* 474: σεαυτὸν οὐκ ἔχεις εὐρεῖν ὅποιοις φαρμάκοις ἰάσιμος. Add Eur. I. T. 95: σὺ γὰρ μοι τοῦδε συλλήπτωρ πόνου.

38. 1. Τὰ ἡγεμονικὰ αὐτῶν διάβλεπε. At first sight we might take the sentence to mean 'Examine the minds (reason) of the wise,—what they avoid and what they pursue,' and assume that αὐτῶν is put for τῶν φρονίμων by the carelessness of a

36. Continually reflect that everything owes its origin to change. Accustom thyself to the thought that the Nature of the Universe delights in nothing so much as in changing the things that are, and making new things like them. Everything that is may be said to be the seed of that which will spring from it. Whereas thou thinkest nothing to be seed but what is deposited in the earth or in the womb; but that is a very gross conception.

37. Presently thou wilt be dead, and thou art not yet simple, nor unruffled, nor without suspicion of harm from outward things, nor gentle to all; neither dost thou place wisdom in righteous dealing only.

38. Look at their minds, and what even wise men shun and pursue.

39. What hurts thee has no foundation in another's mind; nor yet in any modification or change of that which surrounds thee.—Where then can it be?—In that part of thee where that which forms the opinion about evils has its seat. Let that then not form the opinion, and all is well. Even supposing that which is nearest it, the poor body, be wounded or burnt, suppurate or mortify; yet let the part which forms opinions about such matters be silent—that is, let it consider as neither good nor bad anything to which good and bad men are equally liable. For a thing

private jotting. And Gat., whose note is not altogether to the point, seems partly to support this view, by defending Marcus from the charge of inconsistency; seeing that (vii. 55) he has forbidden *περιβλέπειν ἀλλότρια ἡγεμονικά* absolutely, but (iii. 4) saves himself by specially excepting cases *μεγάλῃς καὶ κοινωφελούς ἀνάγκῃς*. But on comparing such passages as ii. 8 and 13; iii. 4; vii. 55; ix. 22, 34, and 37, it will be seen that this is probably not the right interpretation. Nor would *αὐτῶν*, thus unprepared, be intelligibly used except in the sense of men in general.

39. 1. οὐχ ὑφίσταται. 'Is not grounded' in another's thoughts.

2. τοῦ περιέχοντος. The word is often used to designate the *air* as

surrounding the earth: thus Polyb. opposes τὸ περιέχον τὸ ἡ θάλαττα. And so Marcus himself, viii. 54: Μήκει μόνον συμπνεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι ἀέρι, ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ συμφρονεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι πάντα νοεῶ. In this sense it is here taken by Xylander. Gat., followed by Long and Cless, understands the narrower envelope of the *body* itself, which would certainly be right, were the choice between these two interpp. only. But it may possibly bear the more general meaning of *everything external to the mind*, including the bodily affections as well as outward circumstances. For the purposes of translation, it is best to leave the point undecided.

4. μὴ ὑπολαμβάνετω. Cf. c. 7, *supra*.

“Ο γὰρ <τῷ παρὰ φύσιν> καὶ τῷ κατὰ φύσιν βιοῦντι ἐπίσης
10 συμβαίνει, τοῦτο οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν, οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν.

40. Ὡς ἔν ζῶον τὸν κόσμον, μίαν οὐσίαν καὶ ψυχὴν
μίαν ἐπέχον, συνεχῶς ἐπινοεῖν· καὶ πῶς εἰς αἰσθησιν μίαν
τὴν τούτου πάντα ἀναδίδονται· καὶ πῶς ὀρμῇ μὴ πάντα
πράσσει· καὶ πῶς πάντα πάντων τῶν γινομένων συναίτια·

5 καὶ οἷά τις ἡ σύννησις καὶ συμμήρησις.

41. Ψυχάριον εἰ βαστάζον νεκρὸν, ὡς Ἐπίκτητος ἔλεγε.

42. Οὐδέν ἐστι κακὸν τοῖς ἐν μεταβολῇ γινομένοις· ὡς
οὐδὲ ἀγαθὸν <τοῖς> ἐκ μεταβολῆς ὑφισταμένοις.

43. Ποταμός τις ἐκ τῶν γινομένων καὶ ρεῦμα βίαιον ὁ
αἰὼν· ἅμα τε γὰρ ὤφθη ἕκαστον, καὶ παρενήνεκται, καὶ
ἄλλο παραφέρεται, τὸ δὲ ἐνεχθήσεται.

44. Πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον οὕτως σύνηθες καὶ γνώριμον ὡς
τὸ ῥόδον ἐν τῷ ἔαρι καὶ ὀπώρα ἐν τῷ θέρει· τοιοῦτον γὰρ

39. 9. The words in brackets are restored with much probability by Coraë. 10. τοῦτο οὔτε. Cor. for οὔτε τοῦτο. 42. 1. τοῖς. Restored by Coraë.

40. 1. ἐν ζῶον. Boëthus was the only Stoic who combated this Pantheistic view, asserting a real distinction between God and the World: Βοήθης δὲ φησιν οὐκ εἶναι ζῶον τὸν κόσμον.—Diog. Laert. vii. 143.

2. αἰσθησιν μίαν, i.e. mens mundi = πρόνοια. For ὀρμῇ μὴ, cf. Cic. N. D. ii. 22, 58: ‘Natura mundi omnes motus habet voluntarios conatusque et appetitiones quas ὀρμὰς Graeci vocant, et his consentaneas actiones sic adhibet ut nosmet ipsi.’

4. συναίτια. This is explained by the doctrine of *συμπάθεια*, or universal connection (c. 27), or ‘consensus,’ ‘concentus,’ cognatio, ‘conjunctio, continuatio naturae,’ etc., prevailing among all parts of the world. But in *συναίτια* or ‘joint causes,’ there is a further allusion no doubt to the distinction of ‘causæ principales,’ and ‘causæ adjuvantes’ by which the Stoics sought to save the freedom

of the will.—Zeller, 170 and 173-4. Points of contact with Christian ideas appear in the phrases πάντα συνεργεῖ—Rom. viii. 28, and ἡμεῖς συνεργοῦντες, sc. τῷ θεῷ—2 Cor. vi. 1. Of the two meanings of *μηρεύσθαι*, ‘to weave’ and to ‘wind off thread,’ the former is more in keeping with the cognate expressions.

41. Ψυχάριον. The only part of the quotation which can now be identified is the word νεκρὸν, which Epict. several times applies to the body:—i. 19: τοῦ νεκροῦ δὲ μου κύριος εἶ· λάβε αὐτόν. iii. 10: τὸ οὐκ ἐμὸν, τὸ φύσει νεκρὸν. iii. 22: πῶς δὲ μέγα ἢ ἀξίολογον, τὸ φύσει νεκρὸν, ἢ γῆ, ἢ πηλός. But it is quite possible that the sentiment may be traditional—quoted loosely from memory. At all events it is here given as such. A nearer parallel is Arnob. 2: ‘Quid sunt homines nisi animae corporibus illigatae . . . corporibus clausae?’ Adapted by modern verse—

to which he who lives contrary to nature and he who lives according to nature are equally liable, is itself neither according to nature nor contrary to nature.

40. Continually regard the World as one living thing, composed of one substance and one soul. And reflect how all things have relation to its one perception; how it does all things by one impulse; how all things are the joint causes of all that come into being; and how closely they are interwoven and knit together.

41. Thou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, as Epictetus used to say.

42. There is no evil in undergoing change, any more than there is good in existing as the result of change.

43. Time is a river and a rushing torrent, consisting of all that comes to pass. No sooner has anything appeared than it is past, and now another thing is passing, and that yonder will presently be here.

44. Everything that happens is as familiar and well known as roses in spring or fruit in autumn. Such, for

For the glass of the years is brittle wherein we gaze for a span :
A little soul for a little bears up this corpse which is man.

Conceived in the same spirit is *τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου*;—Rom. i. 24. And the expr. of Epict. may perhaps have suggested the *language* of 2 Cor. xiv. 10.

42. 1. Οὐδὲν ἔστι κακόν. This should be read in connection with vii. 23 and viii. 50, as well as iv. 5. The meaning is that both extinction and generation are neither good nor evil, being things which fall equally to the lot of the good and the bad. Sen. Ep. 87: Quod contemptissimo cuique . . . contingere potest, bonum non est, and of this life itself is an instance. Zeller, 220, 219, note 1. For the same maxim another reason is assigned, ii. 5: that we cannot call that an evil which comes in the course of nature. Cf. ii. 11, *ἴν*.

43. 1. Ποταμός. 'Le temps est un fleuve et un torrent impétueux, entraînant tout ce qui naît.'—Pierron. This is elegant, but is not the con-

ception of the author. The *ποταμός* in question does not 'sweep away' *τα γινόμενα*, but is *made up* of them. More freely: 'Time is a stream whose waters are all things that come into being. Each wave (*i.e.* event or *γεγονός*) has no sooner appeared than it is already past.' . . . The simile occurs ii. 17, vi. 15, vii. 19, suggested perhaps by the saying of Heraclitus, which has been the theme of so many variations (Bywater, xli.): *ποταμοῖσι δις τοῖσι ἀνθρώποι οὐκ ἄν ἔμβαιης· ἕτερα γὰρ ἐπιρρέει ὕδατα (= τὸ δὲ ἐνεχθήσεται of the text)*. Cf. *ib.* lxxxii.: *Ποταμοῖσι τοῖσι ἀνθρώποι ἐμβαινομέν τε καὶ οὐκ ἔμβαινομεν, εἰμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἰμεν*. Sen. Ep. 58: 'Hoc est quod ait Heraclitus: In idem flumen bis descendimus et non descendimus: manet enim idem fluminis nomen, aqua transmissa est. Hoc in amne manifestus est quam in homine, sed nos quoque non minus velox cursus prætervehit.' That Heracl. alluded to the stream of life we are distinctly told by Plato, *Crat.* 402 A: *ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα*.

καὶ νόσος καὶ θάνατος καὶ βλασφημία καὶ ἐπιβουλή καὶ ὅσα τοὺς μωροὺς εὐφραίνει ἢ λυπεῖ.

45. Τὰ ἐξῆς αἰεὶ τοῖς προσηγησαμένοις οικειῶς ἐπιγίνε-
ται· οὐ γὰρ οἶον καταρίθμησις τίς ἐστὶν ἀπηρητημένων καὶ
μόνον τὸ κατηναγκασμένον ἔχουσα, ἀλλὰ συνάφεια εὐλογος·
καὶ ὥσπερ συντέτακται συνηρμοσμένως τὰ ὄντα, οὕτως τὰ
5 γινόμενα οὐ διαδοχὴν ψιλὴν ἀλλὰ θαυμαστὴν τινα οικειό-
τητα ἐμφαίνει.

46. Ἄει τοῦ Ἡρακλειτείου μεμνήσθαι· ὅτι γῆς θάνατος
ὔδωρ γενέσθαι, καὶ ὕδατος θάνατος ἀέρα γενέσθαι, καὶ
ἀέρος πῦρ, καὶ ἔμπαλιν. Μεμνήσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἐπιλαν-
θανομένου ἢ ἢ ὁδὸς ἄγει· καὶ ὅτι, ᾧ μάλιστα διηνεκῶς
5 ὀμιλοῦσι, λόγῳ τῷ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι, τούτῳ διαφέρονται·
καὶ οἷς καθ' ἡμέραν ἐγκυροῦσι, ταῦτα αὐτοῖς ξένα φαίνεται·
καὶ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ὥσπερ καθεύδοντας ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν· καὶ

45. 2. I have received into the text the corr. of Cor., ἀπηρητημένων for ἀπηρητη-
μένων. Otherwise the *zeugma* of ἔχουσα is intolerably harsh. ἐχόντων is also a
plausible correction, but not absolutely necessary.

45. 2. καταρίθμησις . . ἀπηρη-
μένων. The relation of the consequent
to the antecedent is not that of mere
arithmetical succession of units arbi-
trarily placed in juxtaposition, but
otherwise isolated and independent;
but that of 'causality'—in Stoic
phrase, of *rational connection*, of
intimate kinship. If ἔχουσα be right,
τὸ κατηναγκασμένον, which appears to
mean 'a necessary or arbitrary con-
junction' [we might say, 'possessing
merely (the bond of) necessity'], is
predicated of the καταρίθμησις, in-
stead of being predicated, as we might
expect, of the units themselves. The
corr. ἐχόντων would remove the diffi-
culty. But we should not look for
absolute accuracy of expression in
private jottings. Or might the whole
phrase mean 'a computation of inde-
pendent units, giving merely a *neces-
sary result*'? In any case stress
should be laid on κατην., so as to bring
out the antithesis of εὐλογος in the
contrasted clause. Pierron, reading

ἐχόντων, renders 'qui (sc. les nombres)
ne contiennent que la quantité qui les
constitue;' referring κατην. to the
fixity and definiteness of abstract
numbers, 'containing nothing but
their constituent quantity,' as the
best symbol of perfect isolation. For
which we may compare Locke, ii. 16:
'The simple modes of numbers are
of all others the most *distinct*, every
the least variation, which is an unit,
making each combination as clearly
different from that which approacheth
nearest unto it, as the most remote.'

46. 1. τοῦ Ἡρακλειτείου. This
chapter is entirely composed of re-
miniscences of Heraclitus. The first
is variously cited: Plut. de EI Delph.
18, p. 392, οὐ γὰρ μόνον, ὡς Ἡρά-
κλειτος ἔλεγε, πῦρὸς θάνατος ἀέρι γένε-
σις καὶ ἀέρος θάνατος ὕδατι γένεσις·
ἀλλ' ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐπ' αὐτῶν (ἡμῶν)
ἴδοις ἄν.—(Bywater xxv.) Cf. Max.
Tyrius, 41, 4, p. 489, and Diog.
Laert. ix. Clem. Alex. Strom. 6, will
have it that Heracl. derived this

example, are sickness, death, calumny, treachery, and everything that gives pain and pleasure to fools.

45. Things that follow are always connected with those that go before by a kind of relationship. It is not like the enumeration of a series of independent units, arbitrarily forced together; but there is a rational connection. And just as there is a harmonious co-ordination of things that exist, so things entering upon existence exhibit no barren succession, but a marvellous relationship, each to each.

46. Always remember the saying of Heraclitus, that it is the death of earth to become water, the death of water to become air, that of air to become fire, and conversely. Remember too the man who forgets where the road leads; and that men quarrel with that Reason, the sovereign disposer of all things, with which they live in the most constant communion; while even everyday occurrences seem strange to them. We are not to speak and act as if we were asleep—for even then we think we do speak and act—nor,

doctrine from an Orphic hymn to the same effect: "Ἔστιν ὕδωρ ψυχῆ (sc. ἀέρι), θάνατος δ' ὑδάτεσσιν ἀμοιβή. Ἐκ δ' ὕδατος γαίη¹ τὸ δ' (fort. legend. τὸ δ' ἀρ) ἐκ γαίης πάλιν ὕδωρ κτέ. Their similarity of mental attitude caused Zeno to borrow considerably from Heracl.; yet the Stoic view of Nature, as Intelligence working with a purpose, is notably fuller and more developed than the Ephesian's, whose highest conception was the blind power of Destiny. This change Zeller ascribes to the influence of Aristotle (p. 371 sqq.) Something also may be due to the Semitic influences which helped to shape the Stoic system.

4. ἢ ἡ ὁδὸς ἀγία. 'Suboritur suspicio . . . Heracliteum dictum aliquod quasi δακτυλοδεικτεῖσθαι,' Gataker. If Mr. Bywater is right (lxxiii.) the dictum is, 'Ἀνὴρ ὁκός¹ ἂν μεθυσθῆ, ἀγεται ὑπὸ παιδὸς ἀνήβου σφαλόμενος, οὐκ ἐπαίων δκη βαίνει, ὑγρὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχω. [For the explan. of the last clause see Zeller, 186 sqq. To Heracl. the Stoics referred their doctrine of

the Four Elements, among which Fire and Air are light, Water and Earth heavy. Cf. *Fragm.* lxxiv.: *Ἀῦη ψυχῆ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη.*]

ᾧ μάλιστα διηκεῖς. Gat. (but not Mr. Bywater) sees a possible allusion to the cit. from Heracl. given by Sext. Empiricus, *adv. Math.* vii. 133: *Δεῖ ἐπεσθαι τῷ κοινῷ (ξυνὸς γὰρ ὁ κοινός) τοῦ λόγου δ' ἔοντος ἔννου, ζῶουσι οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίην ἔχοντες φρόνησιν.* (*Fragm.* xcii.) For the ὁμίλια in question, cf. viii. 54. The punctuation is in accordance with a suggestion of Mr. Bywater's, who takes *λόγῳ τῷ τ. ὁ. δ.* as an explanation of the Heraclitean *ᾧ μάλιστα διηκεῖς ὁμιλοῦσι.*

6. οἷς καθ' ἡμέραν. Heracl. v. (ap. Clem. Strom. ii. 2, p. 432)—*Ὁὐ φρονέουσι τοιαῦτα πολλοὶ ὀκσοῦσι ἐγκυρέουσι οὐδὲ μαθόντες γινώσκουσι, ἐωντοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι.*

7. ὥσπερ καθέδοντας. There seems to be no other authority for this saying of Heracl. (xciv.) The closest parallel from other sources (Sext. *Emp. adv. Math.* vii. 132) is, *τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἀσθρόπου λαμβάνει ὀκῶσα ἐγεγθέντες ποτέουσι, δικωσπερ ὀκῶσα*

¹ Mr. Bywater, p. 23, reads: *ἐκ δ' ὕδατος μὲν γαῖα, τὸ δ' ἐκ κτέ.*

γὰρ τότε δοκοῦμεν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν· καὶ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ 'παῖδας τοκέων,' τοῦτ' ἔστι, κατὰ ψιλὸν, καθότι παρελήφαμεν.

47. "Ὡσπερ εἴ τις σοι θεῶν εἶπεν ὅτι αὔριον τεθνήξῃ ἢ πάντως γε εἰς τρίτην, οὐκ ἔτ' ἂν παρὰ μέγα ἐπιού τὸ εἰς τρίτην μᾶλλον ἢ αὔριον εἴ γε μὴ ἐσχάτως ἀγεννῆς εἶ· πόσον γὰρ ἔστι τὸ μεταξύ; οὕτως καὶ τὸ εἰς πολλοστὸν
5 ἔτος μᾶλλον ἢ αὔριον, μηδὲν μέγα εἶναι νόμιζε.

48. Ἐννοεῖν συνεχῶς πόσοι μὲν ἱατροὶ ἀποτεθνήκασιν, πολλάκις τὰς ὀφρῦς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀρρώστων συσπᾶσαντες· πόσοι δὲ μαθηματικοὶ, ἄλλων θανάτους, ὡς τι μέγα, προειπόντες· πόσοι δὲ φιλόσοφοι, περὶ θανάτου ἢ ἀθανασίας
5 μύρια διατεινόμενοι· πόσοι δὲ ἀριστεῖς, πύλλοος ἀποκτείναντες· πόσοι δὲ τύραννοι, ἐξουσία ψυχῶν μετὰ δεινοῦ φρουράγματος ὡς ἀθάνατοι κεχρημένοι· πόσοι δὲ πόλεις ὄλαι, ἔν' οὕτως εἶπω, τεθνήκασιν, Ἑλίκη καὶ Πομπηῖοι καὶ

46. 8. The text, though probably sound, has as yet found no defender. Salmassius suggested to Gat. ὅτι δεῖ παῖδας τοκέων μεμνησθαι, οὐ κατὰ ψιλὸν, τοῦτεστι, κ. π., inverting the sense. With humble apology for attempting a different cure, 'post Machaona quoque,' Gat. himself proposes ὅτι οὐ δεῖ <ὥσπερ> παῖδας, τοῦτεστι, κ. ψ., καθότι τῶν τοκέων παρ. His text presents οὐ δεῖ παῖδας τ., ὧν τοῦτ' ἔστι, κατὰ ψιλὸν κ.τ.λ., meaning apparently, 'neque oportet agere sicut pueros, quorum est (dicere "Agamus) simpliciter, sicut accepimus."' Coraës, οὐ δεῖ ὡς παῖδας τοκέων . . . <καὶ> καθότι παρελήφαμεν. Others alter the text still more violently.

εὐδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται (Frag. ii.) Cf. Lucretius, iii. 1060:—

'Qui somno partem maiorem conteris aevi,
Et vigilans stertis, nec somnia cernere cessas,
Atque animi incerto fluitans errore vagaris.'

8. παῖδας τοκέων. It is quite possible that the text is sound. The much-disputed words π. τ. are above printed so as to indicate a quotation; as indeed appears to be the case with every clause of the present chapter. They may stand as one of those mutilated proverbs in which all literature and conversation abound, and which might not unnaturally be looked for as akin to the Emperor's brachylogical style. It is easy to

complete οὐ δεῖ 'παῖδας τοκέων' ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, τοῦτεστι κτέ. The orig. constr. of the entire proverb it is only possible to conjecture. It may have been based upon the saying of Heraclitus, preserved by Origen, Cels. vi. 12, p. 291, cited by Mr. Bywater (xcvi.): Ἄνῆρ νήπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος ὁκωσπερ παῖς πρὸς ἀνδρὸς or upon some utterance to a similar purport now lost; although there is the obj. that the sense in which Origen understands the words (of the childlike dependence of man upon God) is opposed to the spirit of the text of Marcus; while if we suppose a foolish dependence on supernatural aid to be here deprecated, we are met with the twofold difficulty that

as the child obeys his parents, that is, simply, just as we have been taught.

47. If one of the Gods had told thee that thou shouldst be dead to-morrow, or at furthest by the day after, surely thou wouldst not greatly care whether it were by the day after or to-morrow, the difference being so slight—unless indeed thou art to the last degree ignoble. In the same way, think it no great matter whether thou diest a thousand years hence, or to-morrow.

48. Continually reflect how many physicians are dead after knitting their brows so often over their patients; how many astrologers who had plumed themselves on predicting the death of others; how many philosophers, after endless dissertations on death and immortality; how many mighty warriors, after slaying their thousands; how many tyrants, after lording it so insolently over men's lives as if they were immortal themselves; how many cities are, so to speak, utterly dead—Helice, Pompeii, Herculaneum, and numberless others. Go through the list of thy own acquaintances,

Origen is then citing wrongly, and that such a sentiment would be inconsistent with other parts of Heraclitean doctrine. For instances of such truncated popular sayings, cf. Cicero's Letters, *passim*, e.g. τὰς τῶν κρατούντων—ὀρθὰν τὰν ναῦν—ἄπαξ θανεῖν—τίς πατέρ' ἀνήσει;—παῖδες παιδῶν—ἄλις θρύβος—ὡς ἀεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον—and one actually a part of a Heraclitean dictum (c. xiii.), εἰς ἔμοι μύριοι. If this hypothesis be right, the phrase παῖδας τοκέων had come to be the shorthand expression for *implicit unquestioning obedience*.

47. 3. εἴ γε μὴ ἐσχάτως ἀγενῆς εἰ. Sen. Q. N. ii. 59: 'Nonne contemneres eum, qui inter perituros constitutus, beneficii loco peteret, ut ultimum cervicem præberet' (the precise *ξενήϊον* offered by Polyphemus to Odysseus) 'idem facimus.'—Cf. *infra*, x. 8, for the def. of Magnanimity.—Cf. Lucret. iii. *fn.* Dryden's version is:—

'The man as much to all intent is dead
Who dies to-day, and will as long be so
As he who died a thousand years ago.

And Pope, ἀντιστρόφως—

'The blest to-day is as completely so
As who began a thousand years ago.'

The thesis that time is no element in happiness is as old as Chrysippus—παρὰ τὸν πλεῖον χρόνον οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εὐδαιμονοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπίσης τοῖς τὸν ἀμερῆ χρόνον εὐδαιμονίας μετασχούσιν.

48. 6. ἔξουσία ψυχῶν. Compare the words of Socrates (Diog. Laert. ii. 35), who, to the remark, Θάνατόν σου κατέγνωσαν, answered, Κάκελων ἢ φύσις.

8. ἔν' οὕτως εἶπω seems an obvious Latinism (*ut ita dicam*). Lucian, *Charon*, 23: ἀποθνήσκουσι γὰρ καὶ πόλεις . . . ὡς ἄνθρωποι.

'Ἐλίκη καὶ Πομπήϊοι. Ovid, M. xv. 293:—

'Si quaeras Helicem et Burin, Achaidas urbes,
Invenies sub aquis.'

Strabo informs us that Bura was swallowed up by an earthquake, and Helice by a huge wave two years before the battle of Leuctra. The

Ἡρακλάνον καὶ ἄλλαι ἀναρίθμητοι. Ἐπιθὶ δὲ καὶ ὄσους
 10 οἶδας, ἄλλον ἐπ' ἄλλω· ὁ μὲν τοῦτον κηδεύσας, εἶτα ἐξετάθη,
 ὁ δὲ ἐκείνον· πάντα δὲ ἐν βραχεῖ. Τὸ γὰρ ὄλον, κατιδεῖν
 αἰεὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ὡς ἐφήμερα καὶ εὐτελῆ· καὶ ἐχθὲς μὲν
 μυχάριον, αὐριον δὲ τάριχος ἢ τέφρα. Τὸ ἀκαριαῖον οὖν
 15 ὡς ἂν εἰ ἐλαία πέπειρος γενομένη ἐπιπτεν, εὐφημοῦσα τὴν
 ἐνεγκοῦσαν καὶ χάριν εἰδυῖα τῷ φύσαντι δένδρῳ.

49. Ὅμοιον εἶναι τῇ ἄκρα ἢ διηλεκῶς τὰ κύματα
 προσρήσεται· ἢ δὲ ἔστηκε καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν κοιμίζεται τὰ
 φλεγμήναντα τοῦ ὕδατος.—Ἀτυχῆς ἐγὼ, ὅτι τοῦτό μοι
 συνέβη.—Οὐμενοῦν· ἀλλ' Εὐτυχῆς ἐγὼ, ὅτι τοῦτό μοι
 5 συμβεβηκότος ἄλυπος διατελῶ, οὔτε ὑπὸ τοῦ παρόντος
 θρανόμενος οὔτε τὸ ἐπίον φοβούμενος. Συμβῆναι μὲν γὰρ
 τὸ τοιοῦτο παντὶ ἐδύνατο· ἄλυπος δὲ οὐ πᾶς ἐπὶ τρύτῳ
 ἂν διετέλεσε. Διὰ τί οὖν ἐκείνο μᾶλλον ἀτύχημα ἢ τοῦτο
 εὐτύχημα; λέγεις δὲ ὅλως ἀτύχημα ἀνθρώπου, ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν

48. 9. Ἡρακλάνον. Coraës from Vat. A for vulg. Ἡρακλάνον. Such con-
 tractions were usual in Greek transcriptions of Roman names. Cor. compares in
 Latin the voc. 'Hercle.' 11. ἐν βραχεῖ. Coraës conjectures ἐμβραχυν.—ὄλον is
 M. Casaubon's emendation of ὄλα, received by Cor. For αἰεὶ he proposes δεῖ,
 which, owing to the constant use of the infin. for imperat. by Antoninus, would
 be unnecessary, were it not for the preceding γὰρ. 49. 6. τὸ ἐπίον: the article
 restored by De Joly. For θρανόμενος Cor. would prefer θραττόμενος.

event is also mentioned by Sen. Q. N. vi. 26, and many others: *vid.* Gatak. Whereas the slight impression made by the ruin of Pompeii and Hercul. on contemporaries excites astonishment. Tac. dismisses the event in a couple of short phrases (Ann. xv. 22; Hist. i. 22). Sen. Q. N. vi. 1, remarks coldly, 'desedissee audivimus.' 'Staius speaks more feelingly of the calamity than any of the few other writers who allude to it; but even he is ready within ten or twelve years to consign it to oblivion:—

'Mira fides! credetne virum ventura propago,
 'Cum segetes iterum, cum jam haec deserta
 virebunt,
 Infra urbes populosque premi, proavitaque
 toto
 Rura abiisse mari.'

Cf. Merivale, *History of the Romans*, vii. 314, n.

10. κηδεύσας. For this sense of κηδεύω cf. the Sophoclean line (El. 1141), 'Ἐν ξενάσι χειρὶ κηδευθεὶς τάλας—

'By foreign hands thy dying eyes were closed.'

14. καταλύσαι. On Philipp. i. 23, Bp. Lightfoot takes the metaphor in τὸ ἀναλύσαι to be 'from breaking up an encampment,' comparing 2 Tim. iv. 6, ἀνάλυσις, and 2 Cor. v. 1, ἐὰν ἢ ἐπίγειος ἡμῶν οἰκία τοῦ σκηνῶς καταλυθῆ. . . This seems more than doubtful. The primitive meaning of ἀναλύω is probably 'to weigh anchor,' = solvere; of καταλύω (as appears from Hom. δ. 28) is to 'unyoke

one after another; one, having closed his friend's eyes, was next laid out himself, to be buried in turn by another—and all in a brief time. In short, always keep before thee how worthless and ephemeral human life and its interests are. What was *mucus* yesterday will to-morrow be a mummy or a heap of ashes. Pass, therefore, this moment of time as Nature would have thee, and end thy journey cheerfully, as an olive falls when it is ripe, blessing the mother that bare it, and grateful to the tree which put it forth.

49. Be like the promontory whereon the waves break unceasingly, while it stands unmoved, and lulls the boiling surge to rest around it.—How unfortunate I am, in having met with this accident.—Say rather, How fortunate I am, in that, although having met with this accident, yet I continue without repining, neither crushed beneath the present, nor dreading the future. For such an accident might have happened to any man, but it is not every one who would have continued without repining under it. So why dost thou call the one a misfortune, and not rather the other a gain? And dost thou in general call that a man's misfor-

horses.' At 2 Cor. v. 1, it is wholly different, being the familiar term for to 'destroy' (cf. Matt. xxvi. 61, where it is opposed to *οικοδομεῖν*). 'Αναλύω and καταλύω, so far from being convertible terms, are to some extent even opposed; the latter meaning the 'end of the earthly pilgrimage,' the former the 'departure on the celestial voyage.' As these moments of human life are coincident in time, the words may be often used indifferently, but need not therefore be confounded.

15. τὴν ἐνεγκοῦσαν—τῷ φύσαντι. The words are used in their proper sense: *φέρειν*, 'to bear by its own strength, or inherent force' (Schmidt, *Synonymik*, iii. 170 sqq.): *φύειν* is *distinctively* applied to secondary production. For the former cf. Hom. *θ.* 357; for the latter, s. 148. Cf. the use of *φύειν* in reference to the excrescences of the body, *δδοντας, πώγωνα κ.τ.λ.* τὴν ἐνεγκοῦσαν is wrongly understood therefore of the branch of the tree: sc. γῆν.

49. 1. Ὅμοιον εἶναι τῇ ἄκρῃ. Of this fine image the earliest use is Hom. O. 618:—

Ἄρηρδρες ἦντε πέτρα
Ἡλιβατος μεγάλη πολιῆς ἀλδς ἐγγυδς
εἰούσα,
Ἦ τε μένει λιγέων ἀνέμων λαιψηρὰ κέ-
λευθα,
Κύματὰ τε τροφόμεντα, τὰ τε προτερεῖγε-
ται αὐτῇ.

To the many parallels cited by Gataker may be added, perhaps, the most recent, from Tennyson's *Will*:—

'O well for him whose will is strong:
He suffers, but he shall not suffer long;
Who seems a *promontory of rock*.'

In Horace's 'Justum ac tenacem' the same image may be glanced at: 'Mente quatit *solida*,' i.e. rock-like; cf. Sen. de Const. Sap. iii.: Quemadmodum projecti in altum scopuli mare frangunt . . . ita sapientis animus *solidus* est.'

- 10 ἀπότευγμα τῆς φύσεως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ; ἀπότευγμα δὲ τῆς φύσεως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ, ὃ μὴ παρὰ τὸ βούλημα τῆς φύσεως αὐτοῦ ἐστι ; Τί οὖν ; τὸ βούλημα μεμάθηκας· μὴ τι οὖν τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο κωλύσει σε δίκαιον εἶναι, μεγαλόψυχον, σώφρονα, ἔμφρονα, ἀπρόπτωτον,
- 15 ἀδιάψευστον, αἰδήμονα, ἐλεύθερον, τᾶλλα, ὧν παρόντων ἢ φύσις ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀπέχει τὰ ἴδια ; Μέμνησο λοιπὸν ἐπὶ παντὸς τοῦ εἰς λύπην σε προαγομένου, τούτῳ χρῆσθαι τῷ δόγματι· οὐχ ὅτι τοῦτο ἀτύχημα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φέρειν αὐτὸ γενναίως εὐτύχημα.

50. Ἰδιωτικὸν μὲν ὅμως δὲ ἀνυστικὸν βοήθημα πρὸς θανάτου καταφρόνησιν ἢ ἀναπόλησιν τῶν γλίσχρως ἐνδιατριψάντων τῷ ζῆν. Τί οὖν αὐτοῖς πλέον ἢ τοῖς ἀώροις ; πάντως πού ποτε κείνται, Καδικιανὸς, Φάβιος, Ιουλιανὸς,

5 Λέπιδος, ἢ εἴ τις τοιοῦτος, οἱ πολλοὺς ἐξήνεγκαν, εἴτα ἐξηρέθησαν. "Ολον μικρὸν ἐστὶ τὸ διάστημα, καὶ ἐν οἴῳ σωματίῳ ; μὴ οὖν ὡς πρᾶγμα . . . βλέπε γὰρ ὀπίσω τὸ ἀχανὲς τοῦ αἰῶνος, καὶ τὸ πρόσω ἄλλο ἄπειρον. Ἐν δὴ τούτῳ, τί διαφέρει ὁ τριήμερος τοῦ τριημερίου ;

51. Ἐπὶ τὴν σύντομον αἰὲν τρέχε· σύντομος δὲ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν· ὥστε κατὰ τὸ ὑγιέστατον πᾶν λέγειν καὶ πράσσειν. Ἀπαλλάσσει γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη πρόθεσις κόπων καὶ τερατείαις καὶ πάσης οἰκονομίας καὶ κομφείας.

13. κωλύσει Vat. A. Early editions, κωλύει, as also some MSS. Gat. κωλύσειε.
 14. ἀπρόπτωτον is wanting in some MSS. : for ἀδιάψευστον some present ἀψευδῆ.
 15. For ὧν παρόντων some MSS. ὧν συμπαρόντων or συνόντων, with παρόντων in the margin. 18. Some would correct ὅτι οὐχὶ τοῦτο κτέ. 50. 1. ἀνυστικὸν is Schultz's corr. for ἀνυτικὸν, based on Vat. A, ἀνυστικόν. It is adopted by Coraës. 7. ὡς πρᾶγμα . . . 'Oratio elliptica : forsan mutilata.'—Gat. The latter seems to be the case. 51. 3. τερατείας, Reiske and Coraës, for στρατείας.

10. ἀπότευγμα. A 'miscarriage : ' then 'that which makes a man miss the end of his being,' or frustrates the purpose of his life.

14. ἀπρόπτωτον. Acc. to Zeno ap. Diog. Laert. vii. 46, ἀπροπτωσία is ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πότε δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ, an absence of precipitancy in forming our judgments. The primary

meaning is, perhaps, 'without proclivities or bias.'

15. ἀδιάψευστος. As the Stoics claimed for the wise man immunity from error as well as from deceit, we may perhaps leave it undecided whether the word is here used actively or passively.

50. 1. Ἰδιωτικόν. 'Argumentum vulgare, non Stoicorum peculiare,

tune which is not a frustration of the man's nature? And dost thou hold that a frustration of the man's nature which is yet not contrary to that nature's Will? Well, what that Will is, thou hast learned: will this accident, then, in any way prevent thy being just, magnanimous, self-restrained, prudent, deliberate, a stranger to deception, modest, free, and everything else that a man need be if he would have all that is proper to his nature? But remember, when anything happens that would cause thee to repine, to fall back upon this maxim: The thing itself is not a misfortune, whereas bearing it bravely is a gain.

50. A simple, but effectual, aid towards the contempt of death is to recall those who have tenaciously clung to life. What advantage have they over them that have died before their time? Full surely all of them are lying somewhere at last: Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus, and their like, who followed so many to the grave and then were borne thither themselves. In a word, the difference is but small—and that, too, dragged out amid what cares, what company, what bodily infirmity! Think it, therefore, nothing Look at the void of duration behind thee, and the other infinity before. In that immensity, what difference between a three days' life and a life of three ages?

51. Ever run the shortest way: the shortest way is the natural way: and thus be thoroughly sound in every word and deed. A purpose like this saves trouble and imposture, and all dissembling and affectation.

qui altiora spirant.'—Gat. 'Simple' or 'commonplace.'

4. **Καδικιανός.** Gat. and others would read *Καικιλιανός* or *Καττιδιανός*: a useless alteration, since no one of either name can be identified as the person meant. Coraëus, *Καιδικιανός*.

Φάβιος. Q. Fabius Maximus is mentioned by Plin. N. H. vii. 48, as long lived. Livy tells us he enjoyed an augurate of 62 years. The other persons are unknown.

6. **μικρόν ἐστι τὸ διάστημα.** 'The interval is small [between birth and death];' Long. Not so: the *διάστημα* in question is the *excess* of life of the *μακροβίολοι*.

9. **τριγέρηνος** occurs only here: *τριγέρων* is applied to Nestor in the *Anthology* and by Athenæus: in the former Long sees a possible allusion to the Homeric *Γεργήνιος Ἰππάρχα Νέστωρ*.

51. 1. 'Ἐπὶ τὴν σύντομον. Strictly 'over the short way,' like *πλεῖν ἐπὶ ὄνοπα πόντον*. The Cynics boasted that they had discovered *συντομοσάτην πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ὁδὸν*, meaning *τὴν κατὰ φύσιν*.

4. **οικονομίας.** See above, c. 19. 'Reserve' or 'reservation' in the technical sense comes near the meaning; cf. the history of the word 'ménagement.'

NOTE ON THE FUNCTION OF ANALYSIS IN STOICISM.

THE function of Analysis occupies an important position in the practical philosophy of Aurelius. A few instances will show its ordinary use. Since with the Stoics action is made to depend ultimately not on the Will, but on Intelligence (wickedness being synonymous with ignorance), evidently the first step is to obtain true opinions. On *opinion* everything depends. If you do not think yourself wronged, you are not wronged (iv. 7). The mind makes itself what it is, and what it wills to be, and also makes everything that happens appear to itself what it wills (vi. 8). 'Reflect that everything is opinion, and opinion is in our power. Take away the opinion, then, when you please, and, as if you had suddenly doubled a promontory, you will find yourself in calm water, perfect serenity, a waveless bay' (xii. 22). The power of ideas is absolute, but this power is virtually ours. To obtain true ideas is the problem. For this purpose *analysis* is necessary. Things must be contemplated in themselves—stripped, as Aurelius expresses it, of their bark (xii. 8). Material forms and relations of each thing must be examined separately. Mistakes in this department are fatal to Virtue, fatal to Happiness. But what is there to prevent our succeeding? That enemy of Truth, that mother of delusion, Imagination. With Imagination Analysis wages an unceasing war. Under whatever mask she presents herself, the disguise must be torn off: the object looked at as it really is, and it will no longer be able to tempt us to our ruin. Again and again Aurelius renews the struggle. He bursts forth into a sort of cry of anguish: 'What art thou doing here, Imagination? I adjure thee to depart' (vii. 17). Elsewhere we see the method in operation: 'When we sit down to rich fare and delicate viands, we receive the impression that this is merely the dead body of a fish, or of a bird. . . . The wine I drink is only a little grape juice; the purple I wear simply wool dyed with the blood of a shellfish. Such, then, are these impressions, and they reach the things themselves and penetrate them, and so we see what kind of things they are. In the same way a man should act all through life; and whenever anything strikes him as being especially plausible, he should lay the deception bare, look at its worthlessness, and strip it of all the verbiage

which makes it so imposing. For outward show is a dangerous perverter of the judgment, and, when you are surest of being occupied with things worth serious attention, then it cheats you most' (vi. 13).

This glorification of Analysis is closely connected with the cardinal weakness of Stoicism, and, if logically carried out, it would break in upon the completeness of the system. The same analysis which would make vain depression impossible makes righteous enthusiasm equally so. For one who believes in the doctrine of Association¹ it is the solvent of all the great emotional facts of life. But Aurelius had no such theory. With a happy inconsistency, he stops short precisely at the point when analysis would prove fatal. He excludes from its operation the department of the primitive moral perceptions: 'In all things, *except virtue and the acts of virtue*, remember to apply thyself to their several parts.'²

Perhaps we may go further, and say that not only in these cases, but in many others, Analysis is insufficient and even delusive. It regards only the elements of things, without attending to the *nexus* which gives them a living reality, forgetting that combinations are facts quite as real as the factors which go to make them up. It severs the imagination from science, without reflecting that imagination is often the high road to truth; it overlooks the fact that Reason is not only the servant of Nature, but its interpreter. That any of the Stoics observed this further objection to their theory there is no reason to suppose.

¹ Cf. J. S. Mill's *Autobiography*: 'The habit of Analysis has a tendency to wear away the feelings. It may help one to face trouble, but it is a terrible solvent to all desires and pleasures which are the effects of Association.'

For this and many other interesting illustrations of passages throughout the whole work of Aurelius, I am indebted to my cousin, Mr. H. C. Irwin, of the Oudh Civil Service.

² xi. 2: "Ὅλως οὖν, χωρὶς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς μέμνησο ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ μέρος τρέχειν, καὶ τῇ διαίρεσει αὐτῶν εἰς καταφρόνησιν ἴεναι· τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν βίον ὅλον μετέφερε.

APPENDIX.

THE CORRESPONDENCE OF FRONTO AND

M. AURELIUS.¹

THE year 1815, amidst the absorbing excitement of its political and military events, witnessed a singular instance of a literary resurrection. A rumour had become rife that Cardinal Angelo Mai, then an official of the Ambrosian Library at Milan, had made what was expected to prove a most important discovery, and was about to issue from the press, in two volumes, the literary remains of Fronto, including correspondence between that rhetorician and no fewer than three of the Cæsars who wore the purple during his long lifetime. Among the scholars of Germany immense interest was excited by this intelligence. It was remembered what light the letters of Pliny had thrown on a preceding age; and a wealth of illustration of the same sort was expected in the African master of the second century. Little enough had hitherto been known of Fronto: but complimentary allusions to his writings existed in the Latin grammarians: Minucius Felix had preserved a highly appreciated fragment of an unsparing onslaught on the Christian Church; another had praised his style for its *siccitas*, a third for its *pompa*: Eumenius had epigrammatically hailed in him *Romance eloquentiæ non secundum sed alterum decus*: and (weightiest testimony of all) the noble Aurelius had assigned him a niche in the gallery of worthies immortalised in the first book of his *Meditations*.

But this highly-wrought expectation was doomed to disappointment. Two causes may be assigned. The garb in which Fronto was first presented to modern readers was disorderly to the last degree. So careless had been the editorial supervision of Mai, that his edition was hailed by the savants of Germany with a perfect chorus of disapprobation. We hear indeed an occasional sentence urging the excuse of extenuating circumstances, and not without reason. The Palimpsest which had

¹ Reprinted from *Hermathena*, No. V., 1877.

originally contained the remains of Fronto along with parts of Symmachus, Pliny's *Panegyric*, and certain scholia on Cicero, was covered with an account of the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon. The pages were fragmentary and disarranged. Even after the application of strong chemical agents, the writing was barely legible. But Mai, growing tired of telling—to use a phrase of Conington's—both the 'dream and its interpretation,' presently committed the task of consulting the MS. to a subordinate; and shortly afterwards, being appointed Librarian of the Vatican, betook himself to Rome. Germany, however, was on the watch. Even before Mai's volumes had appeared, three notable men—Niebuhr, Buttmann, and Heindorf—formed the design of re-editing the work, should it prove of any value. In this respect indeed their hopes were extravagantly high; and it is almost amusing to read the tale of their disappointment in Niebuhr's preface. Fronto was so far from being a second Cicero! Even scraps of fresh information could be gleaned from him in such small quantities! Presently, however, the clouded brows of the three collaborateurs relaxed into a smile,—*querela in risum soluta est*, says their chief,—and they resolved, though Fronto might not prove all that they had fondly dreamed, at least to present him to the public in as intelligible a form as might be. But haste was necessary, that the book might be ready for the great annual fair at Leipsic in 1816. Not long afterwards Mai discovered in the Vatican Library another piece of the same palimpsest, making in all 286 pages. Incorporating many of the results to which Niebuhr had been led by the insight of genius, he brought out all in a new edition at Rome in 1823. At this the wrath of Germany again exploded. Not only had the Cardinal printed Niebuhr's conjectures as actual readings authorised by the MS., without any notification to the reader, but even adopted visionary corrections of theirs which had no other foundation than his own original mistakes: thus producing a confusion twice confounded. Though individual passages in large numbers were emended by various critics, no fresh collation of the Palimpsest was attempted till 1867. A Dutch scholar named Du Rieu investigated even the pages where the writing, owing to the effect of the Cardinal's chemical agents, seems to have vanished for ever. On his return, he communicated the results to S. A. Naber, whose edition is a vast improvement on its predecessors. The emendations of many earlier critics are incorporated, notably those of Eckstein and Haupt: while selections from the first of three pamphlets published at Dublin (1841, 1863, 1867) by Henricus Alanus are given in the

Addenda. Since then Professor Robinson Ellis has thrown light on several dark places in the *Journal of Philology*, Vol. I., No. 1. But a more substantial contribution is the joint work of two Germans. Of the *Emendationes Frontonianæ* of Klussmann and Studemund (Berlin, 1874) it is not too much to say that they are a perfectly indispensable supplement to Naber's edition. The fresh collation of parts of the palimpsest by the latter, together with the insight of the former, have cleared up difficulties which in Naber remain absolutely inexplicable, and many of Klussmann's corrections commend themselves at once and finally to the judgment of the reader.¹

Such is a sketch of the recent history of these Letters, which I for one, notwithstanding the grave indictments of their foreign expositors, have found extremely interesting. Let us hear the worst that can be said of Fronto at once. 'Novi,' says the Dutch editor in his Prolegomena, 'quid de eius admirabili eloquentia æquales iudicarint et posteri nimis facile crediderint; sed, fateor, Frontonis flosculos et imagines et inanes tinnitus non amo, et, si verum dicendum est, contemno. Profuisset hominis existimationi, si operum reliquiæ e codicibus palimpsestis nunquam erutæ fuissent.' 'Præter Italum, qui inventum suum exosculabatur, nemo fuit quin agnosceret in Frontone corruptam eloquentiam et in æqualibus corruptum iudicium.' Not even Mai has a word to reply to Niebuhr when he complains: 'Ita sententiis et rebus nondum notis vacuum, ita levem et indisertum quin sæpenumero putide delirantem in his quidem scriptis Frontonem invenimus ut . . . cum Silio Italico numerari debeat.' These are severe judgments, yet not without grounds. Of affectation, of false taste, of evidence of what M. Suckau calls *la chasse aux syllabes*, there is unfortunately too much. A fixed idea with Fronto is the all-importance of the *form* of the expression. An orator (he is never tired of telling Marcus) ought not to content himself with a *good* word; he must not be satisfied until the one *best* word presents itself. Everyday forms of

¹ The all but exhaustive bibliography of Frontonian criticism in Klussmann's opening pages omits two items contributed by France; the first of which is also unknown to Teuffel (§ 351, 9 *sqq.*) It is a reprint of Mai's Roman edition, with original notes and a French translation opposite the text, by Armand Cassan, Paris, 1830. The translation is, I fear, quite worthless. Wherever any real difficulty occurs, M. Cassan either goes wrong or has recourse to asterisks.

Yet this is the shape in which such careful writers as Suckau (*Étude sur Marc-Aurèle*) and Noël des Vergers (*Essai sur Marc-Aurèle*), as well as Pierron, are content to make Fronto's acquaintance. Klussmann's second omission is that of a singularly charming study of the relations between Aurelius and his tutor, which appeared in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for April, 1868, by M. Gaston Boissier, and of which I have made some use in the following pages.

speech are set aside in favour of *recherché* and archaic expressions. An excellent passage of Cicero is condemned for furnishing so few choice phrases.² Poverty of vocabulary, as he understands it, is in Fronto's eyes the unpardonable sin; and the word *Tullianus*, which he occasionally deigns to use, has always in his pages a slightly contemptuous sense attached to it. This is quite the taste of the clever schoolboy, whose powers of thought lag behind his powers of expression; and which, when found in later years, is justly termed pedantry. How this style of oratory proved so successful at the Roman Bar is surprising, until we reflect that Fronto is herein but an advanced exponent of the degraded taste of his age—an age which could see no beauty in Virgil or Livy, but dwelt with morbid admiration on the obsolete diction of Varro and Cato.³ One may go farther, and even confess that there is hardly a single strikingly original idea nobly expressed in the compass of the whole volume. At p. 144, ed. Naber, we seem at first sight to have discovered the proper ownership of a thought since polished and set by the perfect art of Milton:—'Novissimum homini sapientiam colenti amiculum est gloriæ cupido.'

'Fame . . .

That last infirmity of noble mind . . .

Tacitus is an author to whom Fronto never once alludes. But that he had read the *Histories* to some purpose is evident from the coincidence of language:—'Etiam sapientibus gloriæ cupido novissime exiit.'⁴

The main interest of these letters lies in another direction. It is in the light which they throw on the early years of M. Aurelius, and the illustration of some few points in the *Meditations*, which may be thence incidentally derived. Since the discovery of Fronto's remains, no annotated edition of the text of the Emperor has anywhere appeared. Gataker's monumental work—one of the chief triumphs of English scholarship—came out in 1652. Though there is reason to suppose that Schultz prepared a commentary, it has never been given to the world. His editions of the text are dated 1802, 1820, and 1849—the last being, as is not generally known, in Didot's collection. Nor

² Fronto's estimate of Cicero may be found in Naber's ed., p. 63. He complains that 'in omnibus eius orationibus paucissima admodum reperias insperata atque inopinata verba, quæ nonnisi cum studio . . . atque multa veterum carminum memoria indagantur.'

³ Cf. Friedländer, *Mœurs romaines*, iv. 14, 15.

⁴ iv. 6. Naber cft. Plut. *An seni resp. ger.*, p. 783 D.—The coincidence of Tac. and Milton had been noticed by Lecky, *Hist. Eur. Morals*, i. 184, note.

does the work of Adamantinos Coræes, dedicated, in 1816, with a modern Greek preface,⁵ to the young men of the isle of Chios, contain any notes whatever. On the other hand, both Long and Pierron occasionally comment on the text they translate so well. There is little reference to Fronto in either.

In the *Meditations* themselves we become acquainted only with the last phase of the development of the Emperor's inner life. We see it in its fulness and strength—we see it, if I may borrow the expression of M. Suckau, '*toute entière recueillie en face de la mort, dans l'achèvement d'une vie noble et bien remplie.*' They are purest expression of a great man's character; but of his external circumstances they tell us little. Now it is just here that his correspondence with Fronto proves so interesting. It furnishes us with a charming picture of a naturally serious, yet cheerful and sunny boyhood: and again, after an interval of many years, the letters interchanged during which have disappeared, with pleasant glimpses of family life in villa and palace, both before and after Marcus became actually Emperor. The young man who was about to become Fronto's pupil in Latin eloquence had the good fortune not to be born in the purple. As no one could have suspected his future eminence, it was not the interest of any to flatter him in early years. In youth the truth was spoken to him, and the love of truth became a marked feature in his character. 'Am I to be congratulated,' he writes to Fronto, 'because I have some one to teach me how to dress out an idea, to make the most of a metaphor? non hoc est quod me felicem nuncupo. Quid est igitur? quod verum dicere ex te disco.'⁶ Elsewhere he exclaims: 'Quid ego de tuis litteris dicam benignissimis, *verissimis.*'⁷ In one of his Greek letters—in using which language the aged African claims indulgence, as being (like Juvenal's mice) a member of the ubiquitous tribe of the *Opici*⁸—Fronto declares that were he a doorkeeper at some great festival, and entrusted with the power of refusing admission to the unworthy, the first to be excluded should be

⁵ As the book is both in itself interesting and extremely rare (I could not find a copy in the British Museum), a specimen of the dedication may be quoted. ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΧΙΑ ΜΕΙΡΑΚΙΑ.—Εἰς ἐξᾶς, εὐτυχῆ τῆς Χίου μεράκια, προσφωνῶ τοῦ μεγάλου ἀνδρός καὶ αὐτοκράτορος τὸ πολῦτιμον τοῦτο σύγγραμμα. Σᾶς ἐπροτίμησα παρὰ τοὺς συνηλικιώτας ἄλλους Ἕλληνας, ὅχι ὡς ἀξιοτέρους ἐκεῖνων, ἀλλ' ὡς τρέχοντας μεγαλύτερον κίνδυνον νὰ φανῆτε καταφρονηταὶ τῆς

προνομίας τοῦ θεοῦ· ὅστις, ἐπέλθῃ σᾶς ἐχάρισεν ἀρετῆς μέσα πλειότερα, καὶ κάρπου αὐτῆς δικαίως πλειοτέρους ζητεῖ καὶ προσμένει ἀπὸ σᾶς.

⁶ Naber, p. 49.

⁷ Naber, p. 55.

⁸ 'Epistolam matri tuæ scripsi, quæ mea impudentia est, græce . . . Tu prior lege, et si quis inerit barbarismus, tu qui a grecis litteris recentior es, corripge, atque ita matri redde; nolo enim me mater tua ut *opicum* contemnat.'

whosoever loveth and maketh a lie ; in the Homeric phrase of the original, ἔτερον μὲν τι κευθούσας ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ λεγούσας.⁹ In the most pathetic of his writings, the tract on the loss of his grandson, Fronto says with manly brevity, 'I have done my best to speak the truth, and never shirked hearing it. Verum dixi sedulo : verum audiui libenter.'¹⁰ We see what atmosphere was breathed by the prince in the society of at least one friend whom he afterwards credited with showing him 'what . . . duplicity and hypocrisy are in a tyrant'¹¹—a prince whom Hadrian, in allusion to his original name, loved to call by the gracious superlative Verissimus.

If sincerity was one prominent feature in the character of Fronto, warmheartedness was another. His correspondent is never weary of reminding him of and glorying in their mutual attachment. In speaking to Marcus of Hadrian, whose reserve was due to pride or age, Fronto confessed that he was not at ease in his presence ; but 'regarded him rather as a deity to be propitiated than as a man to be loved.'¹² With the younger Cæsar no such barrier existed. No official etiquette prevented a full and unreserved expression of feeling on either side. Sometimes it reaches a height which (like the unexpected revelations of love-letters in an English law-court) is more calculated to raise a smile than excite admiration. Hardly a letter of the shortest dimensions passes without ending in a series of the strongest superlatives. Open the volume anywhere, and you will find appellatives like *magister dulcissime, mellitissime, iucundissime, mea lux, meus spiritus, mea voluptas, meum desiderium*. For a moment Marcus yielded to the morbid taste of the age for exaggeration. A French critic has grounds for saying that he finds occasionally in these letters an indefinable *couleur grecque qui ressemble à du fard*.¹³ But after every deduction is made, a solid basis of indestructible sincerity remains : and Marcus had no truer friend than the old Numidian. In commending to Marcus's colleague a valued acquaintance named Clarus, Fronto uses the following remarkable expression to sum up his character : 'Simplicitas, castitas, veritas ; fides Romana plane, φιλοστοργία vero nescio an Romana ; quippe qui nihil minus in tota mea viti Romæ repereri quam

—Naber, p. 24. But Marcus is equally humble about his Greek, and says (p. 31), 'Me *opicum* animantem ad græcam scripturam perpulerunt homines, ut Cæcilius sit, *incolumi inscientia*.'—*Cf.* p. 44.

⁹ Naber, p. 243. Fronto goes on to observe, with a veracity which verges

on impoliteness, *γυναικεία δὴ τις αὐτῆ θεὸς παρὰ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν γυναικῶν θρησκευέται ἢ Ἀπάτη*. The letter is addressed *Μητρὶ Κλαύραος*.

¹⁰ *Id.* p. 235.

¹¹ *M. Ant.* i. 11.

¹² Naber, p. 25.

¹³ Suckau, p. 10.

hominem sincere φιλόστοργον: ut putem, quia reapse nemo est Romæ φιλόστοργος, ne nomen quidem huic virtuti esse Romanum.¹⁴ What is to be observed in this passage is that, though unique as far as the sentiment is concerned, it exactly coincides with the brief notice of Fronto in the Emperor's *Meditations*. 'He showed me that generally those among us who are called Patricians are rather deficient in warmheartedness: ὅτι ὡς ἐπίπαν οἱ καλούμενοι οὗτοι παρ' ἡμῖν εὐπατρίδαι ἀστοργότεροί πως εἰσίν.'¹⁵ It was the quality which Aurelius valued most in Fronto. The word occurs again, p. 231, 'Vale, φιλόστοργε ἄνθρωπε.'

The strength of this prince's attachment to his master of Latin eloquence may be measured by the genuine efforts, contrary to the bent of his nature, which he made to give the Frontonian scheme of education a fair trial: to hold the power of verbal expression above all others. For philosophy was his real vocation. Already, at the age of twelve, he had begun to practise the austerities of Stoicism, and live the life of an ascetic. It is Diogenes whom he thanks for inspiring him when a boy with the 'love of the σκίμπος and δορά, with the other accessories of Grecian discipline.'¹⁶ 'Tantum operis et laboris studiis impendit,' says Capitolinus, 'ut corpus adficeret; atque in hoc solo pueritia eius reprehenditur.'¹⁷ But Fronto was a rhetorician—and a rhetorician firmly convinced that nothing in the world was more important to a prince than rhetoric. At the time when the correspondence opens, if Naber¹⁸ be right, Marcus had just been associated in the Empire, and was already distracted by the grave cares of office. Nevertheless Fronto could not refrain from sending his ex-pupil from time to time a little theme or thesis to develop, just to keep his hand in. 'C'était le travers,' says Boissier, 'de cette education oratoire des Romains d'être éternelle. On exigeait de l'orateur tant de

¹⁴ Naber, p. 135. Even from the worthless voluptuary to whom the letter is addressed Fronto's warmheartedness and sincerity (if we may take Lucius Verus's word for it) had called forth a response. 'Simulare Lucium quicumque adversus Frontonem, a quo ego prius multo simplicitatem verumque amorem quam loquendi polite disciplinam didicisse me praedico!'—Naber, p. 130. But the whole passage rings false, and it is to be feared that *verus amor* is scarcely yet διδακτός.

¹⁵ In translating 'those who are called patricians are deficient in paternal

affection,' Long seems to indicate a play upon words of which there is no trace in the original. Schultz does the same, in rendering 'Patricios . . . a genuino paterni amoris affectu . . . alienissimos.' This is one of Schultz's 'improvements' on the version of Gataker.

¹⁶ M. Ant. i. 6.

¹⁷ M. Ant. *Phil.* 3.

¹⁸ At p. xx. he assigns what he supposes to be the earliest letters of the series (*ad M. Caes.* iii. 1) to the year 139, when Fronto was fifty years of age.

qualités différentes et une telle diversité de perfections qu'il n'était jamais tout à fait formé et qu'il lui fallait étudier toujours.' Probably no one was at that time astonished at seeing a prince of twenty-two still doing exercises, but it makes one smile to read the record now. 'I sent you a subject,' says Fronto: 'it is a serious occurrence. A consul of the Roman People lays aside his robes, puts on a gauntlet, and slays a lion in sight of the whole assembly at the Quinquatria: Διασκεύασον, αἰξήσον.'¹⁹ Aurelius replies: 'When did the event occur? Was it at Rome? Do you say it happened under Domitian at Alba? Besides, with a subject like this, it would take more time to make the fact credible than to develop it. It seems to me an ἀπίθανος ὑπόθεσις. Though I preferred a subject such as I had requested, write to me at once about the date.'²⁰ Fronto's *naïf* delight at his august pupil's success comes out occasionally. 'My daughter Gratia came last night,' he writes. 'But it almost did me as much good that you should have turned the γνώμαι so capitably—that indeed which reached me to-day so nearly to perfection that it might be introduced into a chapter of Sallust's, and no difference or inferiority be detected. Ego beatus, hilaris, sanus, iuvenis denique fio, quum tu ita proficis. . . . Please God, when you get back all right to Rome, you shall do verses for me again every day.'²¹ What is meant by a γνώμη may be gathered from other parts of the correspondence. Equally important was the εἰκόν, ever on the lips of Fronto. Marcus begs for advice on the best use to be made of a happy thought. 'This afternoon I accomplished something as I lay down since one o'clock: I worked up about ten εἰκόνας. At three o'clock I find myself forced to call you in as adjutant'²²—

¹⁹ Naber, p. 82.

²⁰ Id. p. 82. The end of this letter contains in the palimpsest a riddle which no one has yet solved. Let me add one to the many attempts already made. Naber prints: 'Ἀπίθανος ὑπόθεσις videtur mihi, quod plane BALUCIS, qualem petieram. Rescribe statim de tempore.' He supposes that under the *monstrum* in capitals lurks some Greek word; acting upon which suggestion Klussmann, with moderate probability, proposes ἀλύσκεσις. But the hypothesis of the true reading being a Greek word at all is unnecessary. In these Letters B is constantly written by the scribe for V. We find *benia, vibo, virtus, voluntas*, etc., at every page. *Quod* and *Quom*, moreover, are often

confused: v. pp. 80, n. 1, 67, n. 7, 127, n. 8. Under these circumstances, we may, perhaps, changing the punctuation, restore 'Quom plane VOLUERIM, qualem petieram, rescribe statim de tempore,' in the sense of the translation given above. But if any one should prefer MALUERIM, I shall not object. For the three words *quod plane baluceis* Schopen courageously proposes *non ubi clamare liceat*.

²¹ Naber, p. 48.

²² 'Nona te socium et optionem mihi sumo.'—H. Alanus has anticipated me in comparing Plaut., *Asin.* i. 1, 88, 'tibi optionem sumito Leonidam.' Marcus owed his Plautine acquirements to Fronto, with whom the comic poet was in high favour, on the ground

the inspiration had deserted me. The point is this. In the island of Aenaria there is a lake, and in this lake another inhabited island: 'Ἐνθ' ἐμὴν δ' εἰκόνα ποιῶμεν. Vale, dulcissima anima.'²³ Fronto promptly rejoins: 'Suppose you apply your metaphor to your own position in the empire with reference to your father Antoninus? On the outer island (wherever it is) beat waves and storms, while it keeps the inner islet in its lake in perfect peace and security—item pater tuus imperii romani molestias atque difficultates perpetitur, te tutum intus in tranquillo sinu suo . . . honorum omnium participem tutatur. You might make something of this in a speech of acknowledgment to your father—a subject on which you ought to be always ready to enlarge.' And Marcus is treated to a lengthy list of all possible genera and species of εἰκόνας, by way of conclusion. The disinterested faith of Fronto in his art is indeed touching. Day and night his soul is in travail for his pupil's deliverance. 'You think I have been asleep,' he writes elsewhere; 'no: I have scarcely been able to close my eyes all night. I kept wondering whether indulgence had not blinded me to your want of progress and your faults: whether your not being farther on and better built up in Eloquence is not due to natural idleness or negligence on your own part.' This self-examination ends in a melancholy discovery, and he bethinks himself of an important omission in his teaching—he takes himself bitterly to task for not having induced Marcus to lay the foundations of his study of the *genus demonstrativum*²⁴ deeper. 'Sed, quod mihi tum demum venit nocte media in mentem, qualem ἰπόθεσιν scribis! nimirum ἐπιδεικτικήν, qua nihil est difficilium. Cur? quia cum sint tria ferme genera ἰποθέσεων (ἐπιδεικτικῶν, συμβουλευτικῶν,²⁵ δικανικῶν), cetera illa multo sunt proniora, multifariam procliva, vel campestria; τὸ ἐπιδεικτικὸν in arduo situm. Denique cum æque tres quasi formulæ sint orationis, ἰσχνόν, μέσον, ἀδρόν, prope nullus in epidicticis τῷ ἰσχνῷ locus, qui est in *dicis* multum necessarius.'²⁶ Happily, however, all may yet be well.

of his antiquity and extensive vocabulary. *Vide* Naber, p. 62. We even find the word *Plautinotato* (p. 56), which Studemund (ap. Klussmann, xxxii.) has admirably restored for *plautinotato*, the source of numberless conjectures.

²³ Naber, p. 45.

²⁴ So Quintilian (iii. 4) translates ἐπιδεικτικόν.

²⁵ Supplied by Haupt.

²⁶ Naber, p. 54. The word *DICIS* I

have myself substituted for the MS. reading *DICIA*, which Naber still prints. Any one who opens these Letters will be struck by two features of the Frontonian style: the habit of mixing Greek and Latin together, the former being frequently written in Roman characters:—prothymia, pannychio, meto-
ria, pseudomenus, in hac εἰκόνε, for instance; and the special love of Plautinisms, of which Studemund has collected two pages (xxx. sq.) Of Greek

Only let Marcus's daily regimen of reading be changed—changed, for instance, from old comedy, which tends to foster a simple style, to *pompaticæ orationes*. 'Let us do our very best,' urges the master: 'I engage, I take it upon myself, I will be answerable, that we shall have you at the top of the tree of Eloquence directly. Heaven is on our side: the Gods will help us.' Do what we will, it is impossible not to be amused at this misplaced zeal. Such, however, was Fronto's own strength of conviction that he ended by convincing. Marcus threw himself into this path of study again with so much ardour as to alarm his family. The works of Cato the Elder aroused his special admiration, and it is to be hoped that he carried away from the sound and manly freshness of that early literature something better than obsolete and archaic expressions to restore to fashion. Nothing pleased him more than to find something in Fronto's speeches which reminded him of Cato, or one of Cato's contemporaries. Then he bursts forth into strange transports. 'O te hominem beatum hac eloquentia præditum! . . . ο ἐπιχειρήματα! ο τάξις! ο elegantia! ο lepos! ο venustas! ο verba! ο nitor! ο argutiæ! ο kharites! ο ἀσκησις!' ending with a truly Whitmanic touch, 'ο omnia!' And nothing will satisfy him but crowning Fronto, with sceptre and diadem, king of the republic of letters.²⁷

Plautinisms *dica* is a well-known specimen. 'There are three kinds of *προθέσεις*' (Fronto is saying) 'and three kinds of style: the *λαχρόν*, the *μέσον* (Quintilian's *ἀσθηρόν*, xii. 10), and the *ἀδρόν*. Now for the *λαχρόν*, your previous reading has mainly fitted you. For this style, however, there is no room in *epidicticis*, which yet is so necessary in forensic practice, in *DICIS*' (i. q. *δικαίς*, like *epidicticis* in the preceding line). This is a smaller change than any yet proposed. 'Omne oratoris officium,' says Quintilian (iii. 4), 'aut in *iudiciis* est aut extra *iudicium*.' He then goes on to distinguish the genera and *species orationis*, some of which are enumerated above. Fronto prefers expressing his meaning in Greek. In *dicis* will then mean the same thing as in *dicanicis*, which Haupt would restore, but from which it is not so easy to see how *dica* could have arisen.

²⁷ Naber, p. 28. Cf. Boissier, p. 682. The fullest expression of Fronto's doctrine of words may be found in his letter *ad M. Caes.* iv. 3; Naber, p. 61. It contains an estimate of the various

Roman writers in respect of 'style,' that is (being interpreted) of richness in archaic and rare phraseology. Cicero we have seen condemned for not employing 'unexpected' words. 'Insuperatum atque inopinatum vero appello, quod præter spem atque opinionem audientium aut legentium promittitur: ita ut si subtrahas, atque eum qui legat quærere ipsum iubeas, aut nullum aut non ita ad significandum adcommodatam verbum aliud reperiat. *Quamobrem te magno opere conlaudo*, quod ei rei curam industriamque adhibes, *ut verbum ex alto eruas et ad significandum adcommodes*' (p. 63). And elsewhere Fronto acknowledges still more directly that his teaching had taken effect. 'Scis verba quærere, scis reperta recte collocare, scis colorem *sincerum vetustatis appingere*, sententiis autem gravissimis . . . abundare' (*De Eloquentia*, p. 152). It would be interesting to inquire how far the subsequent style of Aurelius was really modified by Fronto. Curiously enough, the very same remark as that last quoted is made by Herodian, *Hist.* i. 1, 'Ο βασιλεύων Μάρκος . . .

But the reaction was not far off. During this hothouse period of tropes and rhetoric, Aurelius had cherished philosophy deep in his heart, and Fronto had been instinctively aware of the danger. It needed but a spark to kindle it again. This was applied by a personage whose acquaintance he seems to have now made. Rusticus the Stoic was in every particular the reverse of Fronto. A man of outspoken candour and difficult temper, Rusticus pointed out shortcomings where Fronto applauded. He did not care to disguise his opinion of the prince's literary pursuits. Marcus had written various copies of verses under the direction of Fronto, who thought they tended to improve style.²⁸ 'It is very kind of you to ask for my hexameters; I should have sent them at once had I had them by me. My librarian Anicetus, however, sent none of my own productions with me when I left: knowing my weakness for putting them into the fire. But *those* hexameters were in no danger: to tell you the truth, I like them.'²⁹ 'I now feel the advantage of polishing four or five lines a day.'³⁰ He was the last of that remarkable and all but continuous series of poet princes³¹ which had begun with Augustus, the author of the *Ajax*, who 'fell upon his sponge.' But Stoicism was as intolerant of the Muses as it ever had been. Rusticus mocked at the imperial verses and the rhetoric which it was expected they would facilitate. So much care spent on chiselling expressions seemed to his stern philosophy entirely worthy of contempt. 'Rusticus saved me,' the Emperor acknowledges, 'from being led astray into the rivalry of sophistic disputation . . . from delivering short hortatory speeches; from keeping up my study of rhetoric and poetry, and aiming at clever talking.'³² It seems that this was done with a rough candour which showed small consideration. Even the sweet nature of Aurelius sometimes resented it. Elsewhere, he admits that he was 'often out of humour with Rusticus,' at the same time adding that 'he never did anything to repent of.'³³ Beside the well-meaning affectation of Fronto's

λόγων ἀρχαιότητος ἦν ἐράσσης, ὡς μηδενὸς μήτε Ρωμαίων μήτε Ἑλλήνων ἀπολείπεσθαι. The large and rare vocabulary used in the *Meditations* was noticed also by the Lyons editor. 'Utitur vocibus plane suis, quas raro apud alios auctores invenias.' Of such ἀπαξ λεγόμενα, without aiming in the least at exhaustiveness, I have had no trouble in making a list half a page long. But, in all other respects, the philosophic style of Aurelius dif-

fers toto caelo from the Frontonian ideal.

²⁸ Cf. Naber, p. 54.

²⁹ Page 34.

³⁰ Page 253.

³¹ Cf. Friedländer, *Mœurs romaines*, iv. 63.

³² M. Aurelius, i. 7—Παρά 'Ρουστίκου τὸ μὴ ἐκτραπήναι εἰς ζῆλον σοφιστικὸν . . . μὴδὲ προτρεπτικὰ λογάρια διαλέγεσθαι . . . καὶ τὸ ἀποστήναι ῥητορικῆς, καὶ ποιητικῆς, καὶ ἀστείου λόγιαι. ³³ i. 17.

style, Marcus's letters had been in comparatively pure taste. Yet his regard for the orator led him unconsciously to imitate his literary faults, and a metaphor now and then appears which savours of the sophist.³⁴ One day he came across a letter of Rusticus to his mother, the natural simplicity of which was a sort of revelation.³⁵ Was it about this time that he wrote, 'Cum aliquid pulcrius elocutus sum, placeo mihi, ideoque eloquentiam fugio ;'³⁶ words which have something of that exquisite moral refinement already about them which he was afterwards to show here and there in the *Meditations*? But Fronto would not loosen his hold so easily. Again and again he expostulates with the prince ; he dedicates a whole treatise to the subject,³⁷ in which he goes as near as he possibly can to losing his temper, and resorts to every argument and the strangest metaphors. The Rostra no longer echo to the voice of Cato and Gracchus. The eloquence of the whole empire has but a single mouthpiece—its prince. 'Orbem terræ, quem vocalem acceperis, mutum a te fieri'—can he endure such a result? 'Si linguam quis uni homini exsecet, immanis habeatur ; eloquentiam humano generi exsecari mediocre facinus putas?' It is the sin of Tereus, of Lycurgus.³⁸ But even these classical allusions fail to shake Aurelius. He thanks the Gods 'that he did not make more proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and the other studies in which he would, perhaps, have become completely entangled had he seen himself progressing in them,'³⁹ coupling the remark shortly afterwards again with the name of Rusticus.⁴⁰ The deathblow to Fronto's influence over his mental development remained to be given. In the *Discourses* of Epictetus, of which Rusticus presented him with a copy out of his own collection,⁴¹ the whole splendour of morality burst upon his view. The veil which had partially obscured his sight fell ; and from that period his full Stoic *Aufklärung* is to be dated. Beside the strong meat of this teaching, all other pursuits seemed insipid. Henceforward he loved Fronto for himself alone ; it is noticeable that the obligation to him, acknowledged in after years, is exclusively a *moral* one. Not a word is said of the care so abundantly lavished on

³⁴ An instance of concession to Frontonian taste may be found in Naber's Ed., p. 67 : 'Quum videbis in dolio mustum fervere, in mentem tibi veniat, mihi sic in pectore tuum desiderium scatere et abundare et spumas facere.'

³⁵ M. Ant. i. 7—τὸ τὰ ἐπιστόλια ἀφελῶς γράφειν, ὅσον τὸ ἰπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦτου ἀπὸ Σινώεσης τῇ μητρὶ μου γραφέν.

³⁶ Naber, p. 143.

³⁷ *De Eloquentia*.

³⁸ Naber, p. 145.

³⁹ M. Ant. i. 17.

⁴⁰ The return to the same person, in what is ostensibly a regularly arranged list of acknowledgments, shows that the book consists of jottings written at different times, and never revised.

⁴¹ M. Ant. i. 7.

his style. Sincerity, truth, warmheartedness—these are the qualities which make up the image he retained of the old master,⁴² whose bust doubtless had its place in the *lararium* of the Emperor.⁴³

Perhaps the very praises which Fronto showered on Aurelius tended to undermine his influence. To the last he believed that if his pupil did not become an irreproachable orator, it was the fault of his will, not of his genius. On his accession to empire, Fronto writes: 'Video te, Antonine, Principem tam egregium, quam speravi; tam iustum . . . quam spondi; . . . tam mei amantem, quam ego volui; *tam disertum, quam ipse voluisti*. Crede hoc mihi, omnium hominum, quos ego cognoverim, uberiore quam tu sis ingenio adfectum comperisse me neminem.'⁴⁴ But the candour of Rusticus admitted the shortcomings even of him whom Mr. Matthew Arnold calls 'the unique, the incomparable Marcus Aurelius.' From *him* Aurelius recorded that 'he received the impression that his character needed moral improvement and discipline.'⁴⁵ Notwithstanding his unsurpassed regard for the Emperor, Rusticus never took the same view of his abilities as Fronto. 'Ille meus Rusticus Romanus,' writes the latter, 'qui vitam suam pro unguiculo tuo libenter dederit atque devoverit, de ingenio tamen invidus et tristis ægre concedebat.'⁴⁶ And this, one gathers from the tone of all he has written, as well as from isolated expressions, had always been the view taken by Aurelius himself. There is a virtue on which Christianity lays great stress, which Greek philosophy is often charged with having overlooked. In all the breadth and scope of Aristotle, Humility finds no place. And of all schools, Stoicism, with its defiant *αὐτάρκεια*, its glorification of absolute human independence, seems at first sight to offer the least favourable soil for its cultivation. But a change was coming over the character of the system. Time was when the haughty attitude of philosophers had led them to confront armies on the brink of revolution, and brave the utmost wrath of a victorious emperor. The spirit of Cato had lived again in Thræsea and Musonius; Persius, the boy-soldier of Stoicism, had hurled at Nero the proud prayer, 'Great Father of the Gods, inflict on tyrants no punishment save one: let them gaze on the face of Virtue, and pine that they have lost her for ever!' Since that time the caricature had appeared beside the reality; the Tartufe

⁴² M. Ant. i. 11.

⁴³ 'Tantum honoris magistris suis detulit ut imagines eorum aureas in larario haberet, ac sepulcra eorum

aditu hostiis floribus semper honoraret.' Capitol. M. Ant., *Phil.* 3.

⁴⁴ Naber, pp. 95, 96.

⁴⁵ M. Ant. i. 7. ⁴⁶ Naber, p. 96.

of philosophy had stolen the cloak of the genuine sage. Partly owing to the absurd pretensions of the sophists of the second century, culminating in the grotesque self-immolation of Peregrinus before the assembled Greeks at Olympia; partly perhaps to some *souffle errant du christianisme* which had begun to exercise an indirect influence upon it, even Stoicism shared in the general softening movement of civilisation. Many of its most rigid paradoxes gradually cease to be put forward; and it is one of the excellences of Aurelius that he developed the scattered seeds of the virtue of *ταπεινότης* in the best of his predecessors, till the result appears in the character of his work throughout.⁴⁷ The extreme form that virtue assumes in some phases of Christianity is certainly not to be found in any philosophic system. The form it assumed in such men as St. Simeon Stylites, who refuse to see any germ of good in the 'noblest work of God,' and regard themselves as

'From scalp to sole one slough and crust of sin,'

does not belong to Stoicism, and perhaps we need not greatly regret its absence. But its healthier form, which begins to appear in Seneca and Epictetus, modifies with its subtle influence the whole tone of Aurelius's work. It is shown in his absolute submission to the will of God, as manifested in the events of life, the course and constitution of Nature. He 'gives himself up to Destiny, to make what she will of the texture of his life.'⁴⁸ It is shown in the deep sense of the littleness and frailty of human existence: *ψυχάριον εἶ, βαστάζον νεκρόν.*⁴⁹ 'To Nature that giveth all and taketh all away, he that is instructed and modest says, Give what thou wilt—take what thou wilt away. And this he says not in a spirit of pride, but of subordination and loyalty towards her.'⁵⁰ It is shown above all in the humble estimate the writer forms of his own powers, as well as of his own position. And here the views of his manhood are illustrated by an interesting glimpse of his earlier mental history, which we get in a letter to Fronto. His feelings of habitual dissatisfaction with his own achievements had been brought into painful prominence by the works of Aristo. 'Aristonis libri

⁴⁷ The subject of Humility in Stoicism has been briefly touched upon (I know not whether for the first time) in that exquisite book, Martha's *Moralistes*, p. 64: 'Toutefois on trouve chez les stoïciens une sorte d'humilité. Se soumettre sans murmurer aux lois éternelles, céder à la volonté de la nature

de Dieu, reconnaître sa faiblesse et son peu d'importance dans ce monde, voilà une espèce d'humilité qui souvent inspire Sénèque et qui remplit le livre de Marc-Aurèle.'

⁴⁸ M. Ant. iv. 34.

⁴⁹ M. Ant. iv. 41.

⁵⁰ Id. x. 14.

. . . cum ostendunt quantum ab his melioribus ingenium meum relictum sit, nimis quam sæpe erubescit discipulus tuus sibi que suscenset, quod viginti quinque natus annos nihildum bonarum opinionum et puriorum rationum animo hauserim. Itaque poenas do, irascor, tristis sum, ζηλοτυπῶ, cibo careo.⁵¹ 'Thou wilt soon be dead,' he wrote afterwards in his note-book, 'and thou art not yet simple, nor tranquil of mind, . . . nor gentle to all men.'⁵² And connected with it is one of those traits of unassuming frankness and simplicity which make the character of Aurelius so lovable.—'Let those who can feel the beauty of spiritual refinement (says an admirable judge of the quality) read this, the reflection of an emperor who prized mental superiority highly.' 'Thou canst claim no admiration for keenness of intellect: admitted; yet there are surely other things the want of which thou canst not charge upon Nature. See how many virtues thou mightest display at this moment, in the case of which thou canst urge no plea of natural unfitness; . . . and yet thou consciously satisfiest thyself with the lower standard! Grumbling, stinginess, . . . complaisance, vaunting, restlessness of mind—are these forced upon thee by any natural incapacity? I trow not. From all of them thou mightest have been delivered long ago. Only, if thou art *noticeably* below the average of intelligence, it is a matter requiring exertion; and thou shouldst by no means neglect it, or take pleasure in being dull.'⁵³ One more passage—which has to me a perfect music in the words—and the illustration of this subject is complete. 'Through all changes of Nature I press forward, till the time come when I shall fall and rest—breathing my last breath into that air whence I daily draw it in, while my body shall fall upon that earth whence my father drew the germ of life, my mother the blood, my nurse the milk, that brought me forth and nourished me; that earth to which all these years I owe my daily food and drink; which bears me as I walk upon its surface, and abuse it for so many purposes.'⁵⁴ From the whole tone of his correspondence and *Meditations*, we may conclude that, notwithstanding his adherence to a system once proverbial for arrogance, the writer thinks of himself as Paul of Tarsus would have every man think of himself—soberly, in an impartial and natural way.

Merivale thinks the burden of Empire more than the sensitive student could bear.⁵⁵ No such suspicion, as far as I can discern, seems to have crossed his own mind, but that life weighed heavily

⁵¹ Naber, p. 75. ⁵² M. Ant. iv. 37. Another remark of Merivale's with which
⁵³ M. Ant. v. 5. ⁵⁴ M. Ant. v. 4. I do not quite agree occurs at p. 367:
⁵⁵ *History*, viii. pp. 337 and 349. 'Even his *Meditations*, with their

upon him there is abundant evidence. Two means of escape were open to him. Of abdication there is no hint. He had been called to the office and work of a monarch by lawful authority: he was no self-constituted *τύραννος*: his throne had not been secured by a *coup d'état*. He looked, we may suppose, on his life-task as divinely imposed: he would serve his fellow-men with all his might, yet as one of themselves, *civiliter*, not from the platform of royalty. To use his own language, he took care 'not to be *Cæsarised*, not to be dyed with that dye;' ⁵⁶ he had 'received' the purple 'without arrogance,' and was 'ready to let it go.' ⁵⁷ Court life was eminently distasteful to him. Capitolinus tells us of the sadness which clouded his spirit at the first news of his adoption to the empire. ⁵⁸ It was a lasting sadness. When Fronto wrote 'Fac te, Cæsar, ad sapientiam Cleanthis aut Zenonis posse pertingere, *ingratius tamen tibi purpureum pallium erit sumendum, non pallium philosophorum soloci lana,*' ⁵⁹ he alluded to the same feeling on the part of Aurelius, which afterwards dictated 'Even in a palace life may be lived well,' and, in one whose soul loathed the corruption amidst which he was forced to live, inspired the pathetic cry, 'Come quick, O Death, lest perchance I too should forget myself!' ⁶⁰

Another method of escape was common on the lips and not uncommon even in the practice of the men of his sect. But this is another of the modifications which Stoicism has undergone in the hands of the humane and gentle Aurelius. Suicide, which the older masters had glorified, and looked upon as the coping-

anxious and important scruples, seem to betray some want of decision, some littleness of view and purpose. We must smile at the fervour with which the wisest of princes exhorts himself to rise betimes in the morning.' He alludes to *M. Ant. vi.*—*δρθρου δταν δυσόκνωσ ἐξεγερῃ, πρόχειρον ἔστω, ὅτι ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου ἔργον ἐγείρομαι.* This is precisely a subject on which the correspondence throws quite an accession of light. It seems that Aurelius was naturally a heavy sleeper ('sum multi somni,' he says of himself, *Naber, p. 93*). But in combating this weakness he ran into the opposite extreme so as to alarm his friends for his health, which was generally feeble. Fronto is never tired of exhorting him to spare himself in this respect. 'At tu *dormi* saltem quantum libero homini satis est' (*p. 227*). 'Si quicumque nos amas, *dormi* per istas noctes ut forti colore in sena-

tum venias et vehementi latere legas.' To which Marcus briefly replies—is the brevity due to exhaustion?—'Ego te nunquam satis amabo: dormiam' (*pp. 77, 78*). And that these exhortations were not fruitless, appears at *p. 230*: 'Dictatis his, legi litteras Alsieneses meo tempore, mi magister, cum alii cenarent, ego cubarem tenui cibo contentus hora noctis secunda. Multum, inquis, exhortatione mea: multum, mi magister; nam verbis tuis adquevi, sæpiusque legum ut sæpius adqueiscam.' The effects of this rigour in early years may have been lasting, and produced the difficulties with which the Emperor had to struggle in manhood. Cf. *Naber, pp. 9, 10, 11, 12.*

⁵⁶ *M. Ant. vi. 30.* ⁵⁷ *Id. viii. 33.*

⁵⁸ *M. Ant. Phil. 5.*

⁵⁹ *Naber, p. 144.*

⁶⁰ *M. Ant. v. 16; ix. 3: cf. vi. 12, and v. 10.*

stone of the system, is spoken of by the Emperor with doubtful utterance. It may not be pure fancy to suppose that this want of perfect adhesion to his philosophical guides may be partly due to his long familiarity with Fronto. To the African orator's unquestioning serenity and clear confidence in the ends of human life, the thought of self-destruction would have been absolutely alien. But Aurelius had not always succeeded in concealing his profound distaste for the society among which his lot was cast. His biographer tells us how his 'venerabilis morum et imitanda sanctitudo'⁶¹ contrasted with the dissolute pleasures of Verus, when the latter sought his company. Philosophy had made him serious and grave, 'non tamen prorsus abolita in eo comitate, quam præcipue amicis . . . exhibebat, cum esset . . . sine tristitia gravis.'⁶² Yet he takes himself to task for an excessive *gravitas* which may have grown upon him with years. 'A lowering look is altogether unnatural: when it often appears, the usual expression of the face perishes under its influence, so that it can never be lighted up again.'⁶³ While he was probably as yet only on the steps of the throne, Fronto had warned him of the danger. 'Nonnunquam ego te coram paucissimis ac familiarissimis meis gravioribus verbis absentem insectatus sum: olim hoc, cum *tristior quam par erat in coetu hominum progredere*, vel cum in theatro tu libros vel in convivio lectitabas. . . . Tum igitur te durum et intempestivum hominem, odiosum etiam nonnunquam ira percitus appellabam. Quod si quis alius eodem te convicio audiente me detrectaret, æquo animo audire non poteram.'⁶⁴ When his best friend can write thus, what must the indifferent, the hostile, have occasionally felt? No care, no love for others could prevent *some* from wearying of his very goodness. To some that was a standing reproach, a living sermon to which they could not close their ears. Aurelius knew the danger well; and, before he breathed his last, put these pathetic words on record: 'There is no man so fortunate as not to have some standing by his deathbed who are glad at what is going to happen. Suppose he was a good and wise man: will there not be some one to say to himself, At last I shall breathe freely now that this schoolmaster is no more! Harsh, indeed, he was to none of us; but I felt that he condemned us silently. So much for a good man. But, in our own case, how many other reasons many a man has for wishing to be rid of us! Think of these things in thy last hours, and thou wilt be more content to go, saying to thyself, I am leaving a life in which

⁶¹ Capit., *Verus*, 8.

⁶² Id., *M. Ant. Phil.* 4.

⁶³ *M. Ant.* vii. 24.

⁶⁴ Naber, p. 74.

my own familiar friends for whom I toiled, and prayed, and thought so much, even they wish me to depart.' It is, indeed, a 'bitter seed' to 'fling among mankind:' a view which most of us (it is to be hoped) can falsify each from his own experience. Aurelius lived in a different age—his family life, to say the least of it, was not all that he might have wished. But his sweetness of disposition is unconquerable. He immediately goes on to add: 'Yet do not leave them with less kindly feelings on that account; but continue as usual, well-pleased, contented and resigned.'⁶⁵ Well might his prosaic biographer kindle a little in describing the last moments of such a man as this, and speak of him as *diis vita ac morte coniunctus*.⁶⁶

Other interesting points remain. I should like to have quoted at length, in illustration of the tact of Aurelius in uniting his friends among themselves, his admirable letter to Fronto,⁶⁷ entreating him to spare the orator Herodes Atticus, against whom he had been engaged to plead. It is a model of grace and good feeling. Scarcely inferior is the tract of Fronto, *de Nepote Amisso*.⁶⁸ Towards the end of his life he was smitten with a heavy loss. Bowed down by a real grief, all his wonted affectation vanished, and nature re-asserted her sway. His letter to the Emperor on this occasion is the worthiest product of his pen. But considerations of space forbid me to do more than call attention to both. The whole correspondence deserves to be more widely read.

Only two autograph records of the noble Emperor remain to us. In his Meditations he is all the Philosopher: there the precepts of Stoicism—greatly as his native gentleness has modified them—still seem to stifle his free utterance. He will not allow his feelings and aspirations vent in other than the conventional channels that Epictetus traced before him. But in the letters of his youth and early manhood we see the reverse of the medal. The other half of his nature is revealed; the character is all but complete.

⁶⁵ M. Ant. x. 36.

⁶⁶ Capit., M. Ant. *Phil.* 18.

⁶⁷ Naber, p. 40.

⁶⁸ Id., pp. 231 *sqq.*

THE END.

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