

KOPKOW, HORST

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

ACCESSION NO.

WELA90

DATE RECEIVED IN S. A.

SEP 26 1947

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. FBW	2258	SEP 29	SEP 30	EBE	<p style="text-align: center;">NOV 1947</p> <p style="text-align: center;">EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)</p> <p>(2)(A) Privacy <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2)(B) Methods/Sources <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2)(G) Foreign Relations <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>ed 21 oct 47 afw</p> <p>CIA SPECIAL COLLECTION RELEASE AS SANITIZED</p>
2. FBS	2137	OCT 1 1947	OCT 7	HLA	
3.				H [Signature]	
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6. W/D	2254	OCT 17 1947	OCT 16 1947	Amg/s	
7.	[]				
8. W/D		OCT 16	OCT 16	ED	
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10. P FBW	2237	OCT 17	OCT 21	HP/afw	
11. FBW	2254	OCT 23	OCT 23 1947	[Signature]	
12. W/D	2237				
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14. House	2254		OCT 28	JH	
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FORM NO. 51-10
SEP 1946 WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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CIA SPECIAL COLLECTION
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IR (030/8/64/2)

KOPKOW, HORST

Supplement to notes on the Espionage Organization "Rote Kapelle" activity in Belgium and France.

It only became possible to penetrate the SOVIET "Rote Kapelle" Organization in Germany by means of the Belgian sector of the Organization. The head of this section was a Russian Captain called Kent. This man had to go from Belgium to Berlin in order to exchange information on procedure (Wireless programme and code) with Luftwaffen-Offizier Schulze-Boysen whereby the latter was in a position to send coded messages from Berlin to Brussels from where they could be transmitted to Moscow. Kent conversed with a number of other persons among whom was a Finn in a commission business which had concluded trade contracts with the OT and the Wehrmacht. The "net proceeds" went straight to the Soviet Intelligence Service which was working in conjunction with a certain Gilbert in Paris. Whilst Kent was the so-called sub-leader of the organization Gilbert played the role of Leader for all West European territories. Gilbert was in direct W/T contact with Moscow just as Kent was. They were attached to the Soviet Military Intelligence and not the NKWD. In both instances, turned W/T agents, under the code names of "Mars" and "Marianne", were operated from Marseilles and Paris respectively by Stapo organization against Moscow. This was carried on for 1½ years, that is to say right up to the very last. These operations gave an interesting inside view into the Soviets aims, especially in France, particularly as they were not only of a military nature but also of a political one. If necessary I can give specified details about this. Kent himself was taken back to Germany and Gilbert escaped whilst walking with a Stapo Official in Paris and was caught again.

Further details about the Soviet Espionage Organization "Rote Kapelle" in France and Belgium.

The penetration into the "Rote Kapelle" movement in Belgium was only possible through the technical radio plotting by Orpo Supervision Forces, of a Soviet station in Brussels. On raiding the Station, Hermann Wenzel who had been known since 1933 as a very active Communist Official was arrested. He was a good wireless signaller and also member of a Soviet Intelligence Group in Belgium. After "turning" him the "game" with the NKWD Intelligence Service was continued. He was given more trust as the "game" went on so that finally he succeeded in escaping. His trace was later picked up again in Holland but he was not caught.

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Wenzel doubtlessly ran one of the main Soviet Intelligence Service transmitting stations in Holland, where he worked with a number of other persons, amongst which as far as I can remember, was a certain "Gouluce" (?) who likewise continually was able to avoid arrest.

On rounding up the Wenzel Group in Belgium in 1942 the Gestapo came across another Soviet Espionage movement which used Wenzel's station to transmit its information to the Soviet Union. Some Soviet Agents were arrested in the Belgian bathing resort Spa, as a result of which the "Petit-Chef" of the Belgian Organization was later arrested. "Kent" came from Leningrad and had been trained for the Soviet Intelligence Service since childhood, having visited several Leningrad Intelligence Schools. In contrast to Wenzel, "Kent" was active with Military Intelligence and for years he had been installed in a big Leningrad Hotel. He was a Lieutenant in the Soviet Military Intelligence Service but during the course of the "game" he was promoted Captain. His closest collaborator was the Soviet student Jeffrimow who was living in Brussels as a Finnish subject, possessing Finnish papers. "Kent" ran an import and export business in Brussels called "Simexco" which was entered in the Belgian Trade Register in the normal manner and which concluded commission business on a large scale with the Todt Organization and Wehrmacht establishments. Trade relations also reached mainly to France where "Kent's" "boss", the so-called "Grand-chef" of the whole Soviet Espionage Organization in the West, lived. The Belgian Group also came under his jurisdiction during his stay in Belgium. Kent possessed false papers in the name of Vincent Sierra which alleged him to be a Uruguayan subject. The firm "Simexco" was a pure "cover firm" of the Soviet Intelligence Service whose main aim was to avoid the difficult transfer of currency from Russia to Belgium, and to earn the money necessary to finance the Intelligence machine on the spot. In that way it was possible by means of the legal trading business to get permission without undue difficulties from the existing authorities, to travel backwards and forwards and moreover contact circles (OT and Wehrmacht) who were able to give in conversation the best information about their fields of activity. "Kent" was led to understand that he had to take part in a pleasure trip to the English Channel and bring back military information which the Soviet Intelligence Service thought to be extraordinarily important. It concerned the German Channel Coast defenses under construction at that time.

Through this firm Kent was able to go to Germany without difficulty. He had received the instruction from his "bosses" (Soviet Military Intelligence Service) to go to Germany by any means whatsoever, meet Lieutenant Schulze-Boysen in Berlin and hand over to him new Code and Cipher material as well as wireless communication detailed documents. Kent carried out this mission and actually met Schulze-Boysen in Berlin who personally gave him extensive "treason" material. Schulze-Boysen was head of a section in the Attache Group of the Luftwaffe HQ Staff which belonged to the Air Ministry. In his position and with his contacts, already described, he was able to give all the latest information. At their Berlin meeting Kent and Schulze-Boysen discussed the radio transmission of espionage material from the Berlin Group to Brussels from whence it could be sent on to Moscow.

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As far as I can remember three "Gegenspiele" were started by Germany after the rounding up of the Belgian-Russian Espionage System. These "games" did not meet with the required success; that is to say, they did not lead up to the discovery and penetration of further connections of the Espionage Organization in the West.

"Kent" was continually in contact with the "Grand-Chef" in Paris, who when later arrested, turned out to be the Soviet Russian Trepper alias Jean Gilbert. He was chief of the French Group but at the same time had the right of inspection over the Belgian Group. Trepper who came from Galacia, had come into contact with the Soviet Intelligence Service during early youth, visited several schools and held the rank of Captain in the Red Army. He was a personality in the truest sense of the word who understood how to contact numbers of people including wide intellectual circles in France of who he made use in his intelligence work. Gilbert was also "turned" by the Germans but he escaped in summer 1943 whilst taking a walk in Paris with an official of the Special Commission. From that moment onwards the Gestapo directed all its force on "Kent" in the "games" it was playing with Moscow. One day "Kent" received the order to go to Paris and at a later date the order to go to Marseilles where he had to fit up a Transmitting Station for the Soviet Intelligence Service with Moscow. The "Funkgegenspiel" from Marseilles under the cover name of "Mars" and the one from Paris under the cover name of "Marianne". One of the most important bits of information obtained from the Soviet Intelligence service resulting from the Paris Gegenspiel "Marianne" was the exposure of the name of "Solja" a Russian agent for many years who lived in Paris and with whom "Kent" had to cooperate from now on. "Solja" had to send his news communications in France to Moscow by a new transmitter which was to be erected. "Kent" received the order from the Sipo to maintain his communications with "Solja", from whom he derived important information for the Gestapo. I remember a French Captain who was in close connection with "Solja" and who was prepared to give information from French Military circles. This took place regularly, especially concerning French defense works. I recall among other things that the French Captain obtained the defense plan of Cherbourg Harbour which were passed on to "Solja" who then sent them on to "Kent" so that they finally reached the Sipo. Thus, valuable military information acquired from this communication was prevented from reaching Moscow. The demands of the Soviet Intelligence Service through these French "games" were principally of a military nature. I remember clearly that they wanted to know at any cost which new SS-Units were being formed in France as they were undoubtedly mainly interested in the presence of German armour in the West. These facts were really released by the German Military Authorities but numerous details about the German Atlantic Defenses were given on the other hand, about which the Russians were not especially interested. The Russian Intelligence Service not only showed great interest in military matters but also political groups of all kinds. The "Grand-chef" received extensive information and about these questions from a Professor Basil Maximowitsch and his sister. The former was at the time at the Sorbonne in Paris and the latter was a lady doctor also in

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Paris. This pair had not only relations with DeGaulist circles in France but also, which was of much more interest to the Soviet, relations with circles who were in close contact with Petain's Vichy Government.

A certain Henry Robinson (real name) was responsible for the "Grand-Chef's" communication from France to the Soviet Intelligence Service in Switzerland. He travelled continually from France to Switzerland direct or via Germany. Robinson was much more a kind of Organization Chief liaising the work of the French Group with Switzerland than a news messenger - that was much more dangerous to the Soviet Intelligence Service. Robinson was arrested.

After the interruption of this well organized connection of the Soviets their only remaining contact with their French experts was the "Funkgegenspiele" turned by the Stapo. One day the question of financing the Western Group arose, which in the course of the "game" had been pressed more and more. Finally the Moscow Military Intelligence Service who still had full confidence in the "Grand-Chief", was ready to put Swiss Funds at his disposal. By means of "Mars" or "Marianne" the necessary Swiss gold franc for the finance of the "Grand-Chief's" Group fell into German hands. I must also mention that the "Grand-Chief" in Paris in 1942 ran a commission business under the name of "Simex" which worked in the same way as "Kent's" organisation in Brussels "Simexco" which I have already described. The turnovers here were also considerable particularly as Gilbert had Wehrmacht contracts which ran into millions. I remember the following names from the entire organization in Belgium and France.

- 1) Jacques Blumsack
- 2) Cruet
- 3) Jenstream (alias) - JERNSTROEM *P. J. JERNSTROEM*
- 4) Margarete Baróza (friend of "Kent's")
- 5) Katz Bros. and others

I recall that Professor Maximowitsch succeeded in fulfilling the Moscow order to get in contact with the German Embassy in Paris. This came about through his affairs with Fraulein Margarete Hoffmann-Scholz, a German secretary at the Embassy, who he promised to marry later. This girl was completely under the influence of Maximowitsch and gave away the most secret information from the Embassy office. Hoffmann's cousin was the German Kriegsverwaltungschef General von Pfeffer (War Administration Chief) a brother of Osaf. Pfeffer (Oberster SA-Fuehrer before Roehm) and former Regierungspraesident of Wiesbaden (district or county governmental administrative chief). Maximowitsch was able to approach Pfeffer through Hoffman and used Pfeffer's simple-mindedness to obtain important information which he gladly gave.

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Moscow's wireless order, under no circumstances to contact the French Communist Party in any way for fear of discovery, ran like a red thread through the entire "Rote Kapelle" movement. The Russians finally agreed to it after the Germans had brought up this theme again and again. The Paris meetings arranged by radio had always a negative result.

The entire "Rote Kapelle" movement including the German sector was brought before a Luftwaffe Court Martial which was in session at the Reichskriegsgericht in Berlin. (Reich Supreme Military Tribunal.) At the end of 1943 two more Soviet transmitting organizations belonging to "Rote Kapelle" at Lyons and Lille were rounded up. The Soviet Military Intelligence Service had constructed two further paralled organizations in addition to the main one at Paris which however had been turned by the Germans. The wireless communication of these two organizations were mostly carried out by women. During these "round ups" the technical apparatus of the French Communists in Paris was broken into, whereby, about early 1944, a great quantity of homemade W/T sets, spare parts, valves, cables, quartz etc. were confiscated. The commission was led in Belgium and France on the German side firstly by Kriminalrat Karl Giering and later when he became ill by Kriminalkommissar Reiser. When the latter was recalled to Germany the job was taken over by Kriminalrat Heinz Pannwitz.

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for
KOPKOW, HORST

Further cases which were dealt with during the war by IV A 2 b

There was for instance the attempt by the Soviet Espionage Group "Rote Drei" by which the Soviet Intelligence Service obtained extensive information from leading circles of the German General Staff, which was relayed to Moscow by three Swiss transmitters in Lausanne, Verreux near Geneva and on the Monte Bree.

Almost all the Soviet Agents active in Switzerland were recognized. Amongst them was RADO the Hungarian leader, and other such as Punter, the Debendorfer couple, the Swiss Left wing Radical Politician Nicole and an Englishman called Foote about whom it was uncertain as to whether he was working for both sides or not. In Germany this was never decided although there were several factors which pointed in this direction. The traffic contained hundreds of W/T messages of a military nature mostly from the Eastern Theatre and the Balkans but also from Central Wehrmacht Establishments. A study of this deciphered W/T traffic by the Chief of Operations Dept. at OKH itself showed that 40 to 50% of the information was useful. I can give further information about this matter.

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[]

NEPKOW, Horst []
DOB: 29 Nov 1910 []
POB: Germany []
CIT: German (?) []

(in 17/3-53)

ENDJ, []

REMARKS: During WWII, was a member of the Abwehr who investigated activities of the RDS, particularly the "Rot-Kapelle" networks, against Germany.

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NWC - 001440

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No. WELA 99

MS

To: Chief, FBW

From: []

Subject: []

General: []

Specific: miscellaneous documents

Dobrik, Abraham + Joseph + Pedro

INTEL

1. We are attaching for your information twelve miscellaneous documents received from the [] through [] which deal with various personalities connected with []

2. Only one of these documents - that dealing with Joseph DOBRICK - is of any probable interest at this time. (See [] 4976).

- 4 SingeryM attachments - *BARCZA Suisse dossier*
- 2 Wachs " WACHS "
- 1 FORSTER " FORSTER
- 1 SOLOVIEEV, Kira " SOKOL dossier
- 1 HOORICKX " HOORICKX "
- 1 ATLAS " ATLAS
- 1 DOBRICK, Rachel " DOBRICK, R. dossier

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
2000

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2000

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RECORDED

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IP/CRU		INDEX
IP/CRU		PREPARE FOR INDEXING
IP/CRU		CODE NO. (1)
IP/CRU		EVENT INST. CODE
IP/CRU		CABLE IDEN (11)
IP/CRU		INFO (8)
IP/CRU		FOR INDEX

MS NR

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XX-12580

POUCH 923

XX 12580

4 October 1946

TO: CHIEF, FBK

FROM: SSU/London

SUBJECT: ^{has} Stubaf Horst ^{oo} KOPKOW

1. We are passing to you our only copy of
CSDIC (WEA) BAOR IR No. 70, the fourth interim report on
subject. This report contains much information of interest
in connection with your cable [] 2787, and we would appreciate
receiving a photostatic copy for our retention and local
processing.

Distribution: Washington
Files
Registry

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BY REQUEST OF _____
BY AUTHORITY OF SJC
ACCOMPLISHED BY TSC

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
2000

31 MAR 1952

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
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2000

XX-12580
4 Oct 46

CSDIC (WLA)
BLOR

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IR 70

FOURTH INTERIM REPORT

ON

Stubaf Horst KOPKOW

Ref: Brief CIB/B5/PF 253 dated 27 Nov 45.
Brief CIB/INT/B5/2428(253) dated 5 Nov 45.

ACTIVITIES AGAINST RUSSIAN IS

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- IV. VLASSOV AND THE RUSSIAN LIBERATION ARMY
- V. USE OF NKVD AGENTS
- VI. IV A 2 AND ORGANISATION OF NKVD AND NKGB
- VII. ACTIVITIES OF RUSSIAN CONSULATE IN KÖNIGSBERG
- VIII. GERMANS RETURNING FROM RUSSIA
- IX. ISH, ITF AND WOLLWEBER
- X. ROTE HILFE
- XI. BE-BE ACTIVITIES
- XII. AM ACTIVITIES
- XIII. METHODS OF EMPLOYMENT OF RUSSIAN AGENTS IN GERMANY
- XIV. NOTE ON COMMUNIST AGENT CAPTURED IN NORTH ITALY

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ACCOMPLISHED BY *ASD/C*

31 MAR 1953

I. RUSSIAN SCIENTIFIC ESPIONAGE IN GERMANY

1. Introduction

Prisoner states that the only forms of scientific espionage attempted by the Russians and known to him were in the realm of industry. This espionage was carried out by the following means:-

- a) by the interrogation of German engineers and technicians who emigrated to RUSSIA in 1933;
- b) by industrial espionage missions given to Germans returning from RUSSIA between the years 1935 and 38;
- ✓ c) by the "Be-be" work done in GERMANY;
- d) by the activities of visiting Soviet Commissions during the period of the Non-Aggression Pact 1939-41;

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- c) by specific missions given to agents during the war, many of which were disclosed to the Gestapo by means of WT "play-backs".

Prisoner's knowledge of this subject is limited, since this work of the Russian IS was dealt with in Amt IV by the Russian CI dept IV B 2 and the Communist CI dept IV A 1, and not by Prisoner's IV A 2.

2. Interrogation of German Engineers and Technicians

The Stapo ascertained from these persons, upon their return to GERMANY, that they had been questioned by the Russian IS when they emigrated in 1933. The following subjects had been of special interest to the Russians:-

- a) the light stool industry in SAXONY and THURINGIA;
- b) the optical glass industry;
- c) shipbuilding;
- d) short-wave-WT transmission.

Practically all tech trade secrets had been given away, without very much pressure being used on the Russian side; a refusal to divulge the info asked for would have meant either deportation for the German concerned, or that at least he would not have obtained a job commensurate with his skill.

3. Germans returning from RUSSIA

Germans wishing to return to GERMANY, from 1935 onwards, were asked if they would be willing to work for the Russian IS; if not, they were not allowed to leave the country. However, almost without exception, these men were not given any special individual missions. This was not practicable, as it was not known where in GERMANY the repatriates would obtain employment, and in any case the Russian IS reckoned only on a more or less temporary allegiance so far as these persons were concerned.

The instructions were to get in touch with a middleman in GERMANY itself, who would hand out specific tasks according to circumstances prevailing at the time and in the locality concerned. In the majority of cases, however, these meetings never actually took place.

4. "Be-be" Work

This is dealt with, in such detail as Prisoner can provide, in Section XI of the present report.

5. Activities of Russian Visiting Commissions

These commissions, which came into being as a result of the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, inspected a large number of German factories, in spite of the official objections to this procedure raised by many of the authorities concerned. In many places, however, these Russians were welcomed with open arms, and were accorded a totally unwarranted and often excessive measure of confidence, in spite of the astonishment caused when these Russian officials asked to inspect specialised secret productions. The Gestapo supervisory bodies set up to watch and control the movements of these commissions were actually only established months after the commissions had been touring GERMANY, and were, Prisoner believes, controlled by IV A 1 (formerly IV D 3).

Prisoner states that his only first-hand knowledge of Russian activities in this connection came to him much later when, during the war, an engineer who had obtained employment at the GAF research station at ADLERSHOF, near BERLIN, was arrested through a "play-back" with the Russian IS, and it was revealed that this engineer had long before been recruited as an agent by a visiting commission.

Another case of this kind was that of LORENZ, a German national, of whom it was discovered during a WT "play-back" that he had formerly had connections with the Russian Trade Commission in BERLIN, where his wife had been employed too. During the "play-back" it was revealed that LORENZ was to be approached and asked to supply infm relating to the firm of BORSING, BERLIN, where he had formerly been employed.

6. Missions given to Agents during the War

From infm obtained by WT "play-backs" it was soon apparent that the subject of most constant interest to the Russian IS was that of poison gas. This question was constantly cropping up and it was clear that the Russians always expected GERMANY to launch some form, possibly a new development, of gas attacks.

There came, too, a series of enquiries on the V-weapons programme; Russian interest in this was centred not so much on their production as on the location of the experimental firing bases near BROMBERG in POLAND.

The following industrial undertakings in GERMANY, AUSTRIA and the Protectorate were also subject to espionage activities by the Russian IS during the war:-

SCHICHAU Werft - ELBING
BRÜNNER Waffenwerk - BRÜNN (BRNO)
KOLBEN-DANNECK(?) Armaments factory - OLMÜTZ
SKODA - PILSEN
RHODE-SCHWARZ - MUNICH
Aircraft works - WIENER-NEUSTADT.

Prisoner gives the following personal estimate of the success achieved by the Russians through the afore-given activities:-

- a) Infm obtained from German technicians who had migrated to the Soviet was considerable. It dated, however, from before the time of the German armament drive.
- b) Extensive infm was obtained prior to 1933 through Communist Bo-be work; thereafter, owing to Stapo counter-measures, this was severely curtailed until, after the outbreak of war, owing to weakness in the channels of comm, it ceased entirely.
- c) The very numerous attempts to use WT agents in the Reich and German-occupied territories can be considered to have failed in the general sense, although such networks as the Rote Drei and the Rote Kapelle, until they were broken up, admittedly provided accurate and useful infm to the Russian IS.

Prisoner concludes by stating that a complete estimate can be obtained only by taking into consideration the views of the competent persons in Referat IV A 1 and IV B 2.

✓ II. COMMUNIST SABOTAGE ACTIVITY

14
✓
Introduction

Prisoner states that he can give only a brief report concerning the plans of and work done by Communist sabotage groups during the closing stages of the war, as this whole subject was dealt with mainly by Referat IV A 1a and not by his Referat IV A 2.

8. Organisation in GERMANY

In 1944 the illegal KPD endeavoured to enlist the help of Russian civilian workers and P. in GERMANY for the formation of sabotage groups. These preparations, which never got beyond the stage of initial planning, were completely frustrated by Stapo counter-action in BERLIN, Central GERMANY and LEIPZIG.

9. Organisation in AUSTRIA

In AUSTRIA the preparation for sabotage action by Communist groups was much further advanced and reached the stage of action; willing helpers had been found among Austrian railway workers. Altogether there was a series of attacks on railways, against which fairly large-scale Stapo counter-measures were initiated. However, from the Stapo point of view the danger was never disposed of, and the transfer of SS Stubaf STRAUB from BRUSSELS where he had been Leiter IV, to VIENNA, where he took up the post of KdS, in autumn 44, was an indication of the seriousness of the situation.

III. PENETRATION OF NAZI PARTY AND ORGANISATIONS
BY COMMUNISTS OR RUSSIAN-TRAINED AGENTS

10. Prisoner states that this question comes more properly within the scope of Dept IV A 1 of the Stapo than within that of IV A 2.

After the seizure of power by the NSDAP, the KPD made a series of attempts during the years 1933 to 1936/37, to penetrate the NSDAP with the object of disrupting the organisation; this work was directed from MOSCOW and was based on decisions reached at a Communist World Conference held there in 1933.

Prisoner adds that by the time he went to Stapo HQ in BERLIN in 1938, this action had been successfully dealt with by Depts IV A 1a and IV A 2a. Thereafter, almost the only attempts at penetration were those connected with persons returning from RUSSIA, among whom there were some who endeavoured to use allegiance to the NSDAP as a cloak to cover their real missions.

Prisoner asserts that the Comintern did not succeed at any time in achieving any systematic penetration of the NSDAP. Although, when Communists were arrested, it was found that they had in many cases become members of the NSDAP, it was clear that those persons had not become members with the purpose of undermining the Party, but had joined merely for the sake of appearances and to enjoy the advantages accruing from membership. They did not, however, constitute anything approaching a serious problem for the NSDAP.

Prisoner concludes by saying that none of the Russian-trained agents he had to deal with during the war ever appeared to have an assignment involving penetration of the NSDAP. When the NKVD used its agents in GERMANY for Party ends, their aim was not to split up the NSDAP, but to investigate the possibilities of placing Communist political work in GERMANY on some kind of organised footing.

IV. VASSOV AND THE RUSSIAN LIBERATION ARMY

11. Introduction

Prisoner states that he was not the Sachbearbeiter for VLASSOV and the questions relating to the Russian Liberation Army. These questions were dealt with by a special section of Referat IV B 2a. Prisoner did,

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however, come into contact with VLASSOV matters on three separate occasions.

12. First Contact with VLASSOV Matters

When the GAF Lt ~~AUGUSTIN~~ ^{AUGUSTIN}, who was arrested for his role in the von GOTTBERG case (see Field Interrogation Report ref O30/8/64/2 dated 7 Jun 45, Part 1, para 16) was interrogated, it was revealed that he had been interested in VLASSOV.

AUGUSTIN stated that he had been earmarked by the Russian IS to assassinate VLASSOV. For this purpose he had been to BERLIN to study how this could be carried out. He had then returned to MOSCOW and reported that he considered the task feasible, as VLASSOV had permanent headquarters in BERLIN which were not guarded in any special manner. However, his plans had not met with Russian approval and instead of being sent back to BERLIN to carry them out, he had been entrusted with the killing of von GOTTBERG in MINSK.

13. Second Contact with VLASSOV Matters

The second contact came a few months after the AUGUSTIN incident. A German patrol shot a Russian skier on the central sector of the Eastern front. On the dead man were found papers which showed that he intended making his way into the Reich, where he was to approach VLASSOV staff circles. Prisoner cannot recall whether he was to do this himself or whether the approach was to be made through intermediaries. In the papers a number of generals were named who belonged to VLASSOV's Russian Liberation Army, and who were to be contacted and made to realize the error of their ways. They were then to be persuaded to desert VLASSOV. It was made clear in the dead man's instructions that these measures were to be carried out very carefully and that he was not to fail in his mission through any too hasty approach or action.

14. Third Contact with VLASSOV Matters

In Feb or Mar 45 a Russian Maj landed in SILESIA behind the German lines in an old-fashioned aircraft. He was wounded on landing and arrested.

Under interrogation in BERLIN he stated that he was trying to reach VLASSOV's staff so as to join the fight against Bolshevism, but the circumstances were so peculiar and the Major contradicted himself so often that the German CI suspected any one of three possibilities:-

- a) That the Maj was a courier link between MOSCOW and VLASSOV;
- b) That the Maj had a mission to approach VLASSOV with a view to assassinating him, or arranging such action with the help of other persons;
- c) That the Maj was a courier bringing definite instructions to VLASSOV from MOSCOW to change sides at the last minute and take up arms against GERMANY.

It was pretended to the Maj that he would be given a post in one of the Liberation Army's Kdestollon; this, however, he refused to accept, insisting that in order to carry out his mission to free the Russian people, he must be allowed to contact VLASSOV's staff. When this was refused, he asked repeatedly to be sent to ENGLAND.

V. USE OF NKFD AGENTS

15. Introduction

The NKFD produced three types of agents:-

- a) Propaganda agents, recruited by the NKFD from German PW captured on the Eastern front;

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- b) NKFD agitators, similarly recruited, but who operated directly behind the German front line;
- c) NKFD agents who had been handed over to the Russian IS, with espionage assignments in GERMANY and German-occupied territories.

The NKFD was composed mainly of the German PW captured at STALINGRAD. Prisoner was told by a German immigrant who had held a leading position in the Communist Party in MOSCOW, that he and several other German Communists had travelled from MOSCOW to STALINGRAD in Jan/Feb 43 to recruit prisoners as members of the NKFD. These prisoners were at that stage so apathetic, having been decimated by disease, that the task was relatively easy and most of them clutched at the chance of co-operation as a way out of their difficulties.

Prisoner states that training was at first given by German Communist emigrants, who were, however, apparently quite incompetent. Later they were replaced by Russian college professors, among whom were many women instructors. The prisoners who had expressed their willingness to co-operate were sent to and trained in a special camp.

The first task received was usually the signing of drafts of leaflets which were to be dropped from aircraft and, in the case of officers, the making of gramophone records which were subsequently relayed over the front line by loudspeakers. Within the camp itself, there was the so-called "Innere Aktiv" which performed the real political work, ie drafted the leaflets, wall-newspapers, etc; at the same time this selected personnel of the "Innere Aktiv" was given training along with the remainder of the camp's inmates. This body, besides holding all the responsible positions in the camp, formed the nucleus of a widespread informer system among the PW.

16. Personalities in NKFD Organisations

Prisoner considers that the three most important personalities in connection with the organisation of the NKFD were:-

- a) GAF Lt Graf EINSIEDL

A nephew of HISMARCK and a strong advocate of his uncle's policy of Russo-German solidarity.

- b) Hptm VADERMANN

An Oberstudenrat from KASSEL.

- c) Fw or Lt RILES

Formerly deputy Gaupropagandaleiter of the NSDAP in STUTTGART; played a leading part in front-line propaganda and in the interrogation of German PW captured at the front.

17. Front-Line Propaganda

The principal medium for this was the loudspeaker in the front lines, by means of which German troops were given short talks on the political and military situation and were called upon to desert.

Another means to achieve this same end was the use of NKFD personnel as agitators behind the German lines; among these men there were also spies with minor espionage assignments in the fighting line proper. Prisoner states that he had no contact with persons in this category as such matters were dealt with by IV A 1a or IV B 2a.

18. Agents with Espionage Assignments in GERMANY and German-occupied Territories

Prisoner states that NKFD agents or groups of agents dropped by parachute were not employed until comparatively late in the war, i.e. after mid 44. Prisoner adds that he does not think that the org of the NKFD in RUSSIA was actually responsible for the briefing and dispatch of those agents. He believes that those Germans, having been fully trained politically by the NKFD, were handed over to the Russian IS, and that they thereafter came under the exclusive control of the latter service.

These agents formed part of the long-range rocco units which were dropped by parachute from Russian planes in the EAST of GERMANY. The personnel of these groups varied considerably; often they had a Russian officer in charge, several Red Army agents, a Russian female WT operator and a German NKFD PW as guide and interpreter. Some groups had more German PW and not all the German PW working in such groups were NKFD personnel.

Results obtained by these rocco units were very varied; in some cases the German members deserted at once and reported to the German police, giving info which led to the arrest of the group; in other cases, having become convinced Communists, they carried out their espionage duties loyally, and when caught, offered armed resistance.

VI. IV A 2 AND ORGANISATION OF NKVD AND NKGB

19. Prisoner states that he is unable to give any info regarding the org of the NKVD and the NKGB or on the use made by these bodies of Communist Party orgs. He claims that all matters relating to the NKVD and the NKGB were dealt with in the Stapo by Depts IV A 1 and IV B 2 and that his dept (IV A 2) only passed on to these depts any relevant info it might obtain without appraising this in any way. Prisoner is of the opinion that only the leading officials in the Depts concerned would be in a position to give the required info, which would not have been available to junior or even medium-grade officials.

VII. ACTIVITIES OF RUSSIAN CONSULATE IN KÖNIGSBERG

20. General

Prisoner states that, to the best of his knowledge, the Russian Consulate in KÖNIGSBERG had nothing to do with Communist Party work. There was no link between MOSCOW and the KPD running through that Consulate. The Consulate's interest was confined to a supervision of Russian IS work in EAST PRUSSIA proper. These activities were dealt with by the Stapo Regional station in KÖNIGSBERG.

Prisoner adds that, as he never served in KÖNIGSBERG, he cannot give info as to how this Consulate organized its espionage activities, who was in charge, the type of agents employed or their actual missions. Prisoner worked until 1937 at the Regional Stapo station in ALLENSTEIN and claims that while he was there, he was concerned mainly with CI activities directed against POLAND. Prisoner states that the amount of Soviet IS activity which came to the notice of the Stapo at ALLENSTEIN was certainly very small and was definitely not sufficient to give him any insight into the methods employed by the Russians at that time.

✓ 21. KPD Links with RUSSIA

Prisoner concludes by saying that, while the activities of the KPD in GERMANY and the links with RUSSIA have never been the subject of any study either on his part or on the part of his dept (they were dealt with by depts IV A 1 and IV B 2), he believes that the control was effected on the following lines:

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Controlled through STOCKHOLM

KPD in HOLSTEIN, MECKLENBURG, POMERANIA, HANOVER, BRANDENBURG and EAST PRUSSIA.

Controlled through PRAGUE

KPD in WÜRTTEMBERG, BADEN, BAVARIA, THURINGIA, SAXONY and SILESIA.

Controlled from a centre either in HOLLAND or BELGIUM

KPD in OLDENBURG, WESTPHALIA, RHINELAND and probably PFALZ, HESSEN, HESSEN-NASSAU.

VIII. GERMANS RETURNING FROM RUSSIA

22. Introduction

Prisoner states that about 40% of the Germans who returned from RUSSIA had been recruited for IS work by the NKVD. He reaffirms, however, that he knows of only two cases of returning German technicians who became active as agents and attempted to carry out their assignments.

The greater proportion of these returning Germans admitted freely to the German frontier control authorities that they had been recruited by the NKVD. A further section of these people would not make any such admission, even when prompted to do so, because they feared either punishment from the German side, or reprisals by the NKVD after they arrived home in GERMANY. They had, however, no intention of ever actually undertaking any IS work for the Soviet and were usually only given away by statements made by persons who arrived in later parties. They would then be cautioned by the Stapo, but legal proceedings would not normally be instituted against them.

23. Assignments given to Returning Germans

These persons were not given any specific assignments. They merely signed an agreement with the NKVD which bound them "to do everything to further the just cause of Socialism" on their return to GERMANY. This agreement usually contained a strict warning to these persons that the NKVD had means of calling them to account if they failed to fulfil this duty. Finally, they were told that when they reached their homes they would be contacted by some messenger, from whom they would receive specific instructions.

24. Methods of Sending Back Information

All arrangements for sending back information were to be made by the messenger who issued the instructions. The identities of a number of these messengers became known to the Stapo, who arranged that meetings between them and the returning Germans should be under their control. It was found that these messengers were either members of the staff of the Russian Embassy, or, more frequently, members of Russian Trade delegations in GERMANY. Prisoner cannot recall any special methods which may have been used for identification. Prisoner states that at the time the question was not viewed by the Stapo as being one of any exceptional importance; it was considered that the measures taken as regards the returning Germans were an adequate safeguard. In any case, in spite of the large number of persons who had signed the agreement with the NKVD, it was found that Russian activity in GERMANY itself through their messengers was extremely restricted, and very few returning German nationals were ever actually approached by a messenger at all. However, Prisoner admits that in later years, after the outbreak of the Russo-German war, it became evident that the Stapo had really failed initially to cope with the potential danger of these returning German nationals and much of the Russian

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espionage activity in GERMANY during the war did in effect receive noteworthy assistance from Germans who had returned to the Reich several years earlier. Prisoner states, however, that the persons who were eventually useful to RUSSIA came mostly from the ranks of the 100,000 odd who returned to the Reich after the signing of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 and not from the 6,000 technicians who started to return to GERMANY in 1936.

Prisoner admits that in the report he prepared at NEUMUNSTER (Ref O30/8/64/2 dated 7 Jun 45) he was mistaken when he wrote that these Germans who returned from RUSSIA were to be allowed to approach the Soviet Consulates direct. The most that such persons were to be allowed to do (having been initially contacted by the Russian IS messenger and received their assignment) was to place letters in the private letter-boxes of these messengers; on no account were they to send their letters through the post.

25. Training

Prisoner is certain that none of these Germans who returned to the Reich ever received any training prior to leaving RUSSIA; lack of time, and also the fact that many of these people would have been unsatisfactory in any case as agents, precluded any training being given. The Russian intention was, Prisoner maintains, merely to use the opportunity to send into GERMANY a large faction of people from which a network of agents might be selected as and when the need arose, and which in any case would be out of sympathy with the ideals of the Nazi State.

IX. ISH, ITF AND WOLLMEIER

✓26. Extent of Stapo Counter-Measures

Prisoner is not of the opinion that the ISH and ITF orgs were ever completely wiped out by the Stapo. From 1933 their activities in GERMANY were suppressed and their members could no longer be active in German ports, although most certainly not all of these were arrested. The large continental ports of ANтверп, ROTTERDAM, COPENHAGEN and OSLO remained important centres of activity. Finally, when, as a result of the war, these ports, too, were occupied by German troops, sabotage agents who were well known to the German Police were duly arrested. Nevertheless, in OSLO, for instance, it was only in 1943 that, after a big outbreak of sabotage, arrests were made among a group which had been in existence for many years.

✓27. Fate of Leading Personalities Known to Prisoner

over *over* ✓ WOLLMEIER, Prisoner believes, is probably in RUSSIA.

✓ The FICHELL brothers were tried, sentenced to death and executed.

✓ SCHAAP, Rimbertus, was also tried, sentenced and executed.

✓ KNUFFIGEN went to SWEDEN, where Prisoner knows he was arrested and interned by the Swedish Police at the request of the German Government; Prisoner has no knowledge of his subsequent fate.

✓28. Extent to which ISH and ITF orgs may have survived

Prisoner claims that he is unable to give anything more than a personal opinion on this point. He states that his knowledge of these orgs was confined to their sabotage activities in Western European ports (their activities in GERMANY had been completely liquidated by the Stapo long before Prisoner entered the Stapo Hauptamt). He adds that he is, of course, aware that the orgs also flourished in overseas ports and is of the opinion that they must therefore still be in existence and that whilst their activities may have ceased with the collapse of GERMANY, a reorganisation, especially of the ISH, on orders from MOSCOW, could easily be effected. /10

29. Discipline of the ISH

Prisoner believes that the ISH was disciplined on the lines of an international trade union of Communist seaman and dock-workers. The nature of the trade with which it was concerned made it easy, before the introduction of any restrictions on the movements of shipping, for its officials to travel or communicate with groups scattered throughout the world. The ISH possessed no anti-MOSCOW elements, but was, as Prisoner states, a completely Communist org which always looked to MOSCOW for inspiration, if not for actual guidance. The ITF was, however, originally a rival org under the aegis of the Second International. In the years immediately before the outbreak of war the ITF completely gave way to the ISH, which org had been undermining it for a long period, and the two orgs were amalgamated, with the ISH as a very dominant partner.

30. Edu FIMMEN

Prisoner states that he can give no important infm about this man. He only knows that he was a white-haired, serious, old gentleman with pleasant manners, who was President of the ITF and a long-standing Socialist. He lived in HOLLAND, but had many friends in foreign countries, where he was also highly esteemed. Prisoner does not believe that FIMMEN had anything to do with MOSCOW-inspired plans for the sabotage of Axis shipping. He was in charge of the MATTEOTTI fund for indigent Socialist trade union members. Prisoner states that he has no knowledge of the part played by FIMMEN and the ITF after the amalgamation with the ISH.

31. WOLLWEBER, his contacts and his connctions with ISH

The former German Communist official, WOLLWEBER, used individual members of the ISH to carry out the tasks of sabotage which he had been instructed to put into effect by the Russian General Staff. These persons were, of course, ideal for such tasks. Prisoner admits that he formerly knew most of WOLLWEBER's contacts were, but claims that he cannot now remember the names of all concerned. At that time, WOLLWEBER was living in SWEDEN, but used to make frequent trips to BELGIUM, HOLLAND, DENMARK and NORWAY. In BELGIUM his chief contacts were the FICHEL brothers, and in HOLLAND, Rimbortus SCHAAP; the latter, Prisoner believes, was probably WOLLWEBER's chief permanent deputy for Western European ports, as he nearly always accompanied him on lecture tours as far as BELGIUM and also made trips to DENMARK.

WOLLWEBER also spent considerable periods in COPENHAGEN, where the Danish Police were well informed regarding his movements. Prisoner suggests that the Danish Criminal Police must certainly have very complete files on WOLLWEBER from which much infm could be obtained. COPENHAGEN was a main transit centre for the explosives which WOLLWEBER smuggled out of SWEDEN.

WOLLWEBER made frequent trips to OSLO, where he had a mistress who acted as a letter-box for messages brought by courier for the OSLO sabotage group.

X. ROTE HILFE - note

32. Introduction

Prisoner states that the activities of this org were the concern of Stapo dept IV A 1 and in consequence he can only give general infm relating to its aims and activities, but can give no details regarding personalities or their rates.

33. Aims

The ROTE HILFE, an international org subsidiary to the COMINTERN,

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had two main aims:

- a) To provide assistance where necessary to the families of members of the COMINTERN who had been arrested or interned because of their political activities;
- b) to provide material assistance, coupled with political guidance, to oppressed sections of the population, with the object of securing their allegiance to the cause of Communism and thereby fostering a mass movement in its favour.

34. Activities

In GERMANY, before 1933, the ROTE HILFE was a legally established org linked with the KPD. After 1933, it went "underground" and became for many Communist groups virtually their only remaining means of Communist expression and initiative. Henceforth it took upon itself the provision of spiritual guidance and assistance, rather than of material aid, to the dependents of interned Communists. Prisoner adds that from the point of view of its Communist sponsors in MOSCOW, the propaganda value of its work in stimulating an atmosphere favourable to the introduction of Communism in the countries where it operated, was obviously the most important aspect of its activities. Prisoner believes that by 1933, in GERMANY, these activities had almost reached the stage of complete success and were only thwarted at the eleventh hour by the National Socialist assumption of power and the stringent anti-Communist measures which followed.

XI. BE-BE ACTIVITIES

35. Prisoner states that his knowledge of both the above and the AM activities (see Section XII of present report) is strictly limited by the fact that he did not work on these himself. All such activities had been almost completely disposed of by the time he joined the Stapo Hauptamt in 1938.

36. Firms which were penetrated by Be-Be Agents

Prisoner believes the following to have been the firms which were especially subjected to Be-Be espionage:

SIEMENS, BERLIN

TELEFUNKEN, BERLIN

A number of factories at SUHL and ZELLA-MEHLIS in THURINGIA

The AUER Gasglühlicht Gesellschaft

The SCHERING concern in the chemical industry.

37. Activities of a Be-Be Agent in a Factory

The Be-Be agent was called upon to provide regular reports on all that was happening in the works in which he was employed. Detailed infm had also to be provided from time to time on his particular tech branch of the work. Specific assignments were unusual. The Russians were really interested in all the infm that an agent could obtain, especially, in the tech field, as regards:

- a) Production
- b) Developments calculated to improve output
- c) Methods used in "finishing" manufactured articles;

and in the political field, infm on:

- a) Political attitude of workers

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- b) Relationship between workers and employers
- c) Willingness to agitate for increase in pay
- d) Willingness to strike.

38. Methods of Communication and Control of Bo-Bo Agents

Prisoner has no real knowledge regarding the points of control of these agents outside GERMANY. He is of the opinion that the info obtained went through PRAGUE to MOSCOW by courier. The Russian Trade Representatives were also certainly involved in this work. There was no link with the regional offices of the KPD, and, although the agents themselves were all Communists, they and the very highest executives of the KPD were the only persons who were aware of the existence of the Bo-Bo org. This was also the case as regards the AM apparatus.

39. Type of Agent employed on Bo-Bo activities

Prisoner states that tech employees and engineers were used for the most part as agents, and that ordinary workers, although they were sometimes used for other forms of political work, were rarely, if ever, used on specialised Bo-Bo work.

XIII. AM ACTIVITIES

40. Estimate of Success of Stapo Counter-Activities

Prisoner is of the opinion that the AM apparatus was completely uncovered by the Stapo by the end of 1934, even though the Ia Police who had had to deal with such matters up to 1933 had been completely ignorant regarding them. Krim Rat GIERING, who also dealt with the Bo-Bo activities, was the man responsible for these counter-measures, which were highly successful. In later years, efforts were made to resume activity, but these were completely fruitless. The org was broken by "turning" captured agents, granting them an indemnity and putting them to work for the Stapo.

41. Links with the KPD and Methods of Communication

There was no link with the KPD and only the highest executives in the latter know of the existence of the AM apparatus. The AM personnel were, however, all Communists. Most of the work was done in the BERLIN area and the line of comm for couriers ran to PRAGUE, crossing the frontier in the mountains (ERZ- and RIESENBERG). At that time there was no question of any WT links.

42. "Deutsche Sabotage und Terror Organisation"

Prisoner states that this org was completely uncovered by the Stapo. The org had prepared for action, but nothing at all had been accomplished. As in all AM activities, comm was by courier through PRAGUE. There were no links with the KPD and here again only the very highest executives of the KPD knew of the existence of the org.

The leader of this org, PIETZUCH, was successful in avoiding arrest and fled abroad. KOSTKA was captured, "turned" and used as a V-man; Prisoner presumes that he is still free today in BERLIN or in the Russian Zone; he was a very ardent Communist and although "turned", never produced any work which was really satisfactory to the Stapo. GÜTSCHKE fled after the detection of the theft of a large quantity of explosives from Army dumps in EAST GERMANY; he was next heard of in MOSCOW.

43. "Danziger Sabotage und Terror Organisation"

When this org was "broken" by the Stapo and most of its members on German soil were arrested, those who were in DANZIG or in the Polish corridor were able to escape by ship to the Soviet Union from DANZIG, / 13

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GDYNIA etc, before German representations to the govts of the Free City of DANZIG and POLAND could effectively produce any arrests. Prisoner is not able to give any infm relating to the org of these escapes and does not know how far they were in fact organised, or improvised.

Prisoner states that there was no traceable link between the organisers of sabotage and the illegal KPD. The KPD as a whole, whether it was the legal party up to 1933 or the illegal org thereafter, had no knowledge of any Be-Be or AM activities. Only the officials in the very highest circle of the party knew of these activities and knew that they were in fact being carried out by Communists under the direction of MOSCOW.

Agents to be employed in these activities, if they had been previously active in KPD work, ceased doing all such work immediately. Many of them were sent to MOSCOW, where they were given detailed training before commencing their new activities. Prisoner states that he has no knowledge of this training.

XIII. METHODS OF EMPLOYMENT OF RUSSIAN AGENTS IN GERMANY

44. Preamble

This subject has been largely covered in the answers given by Prisoner to other questions and embodied in earlier reports, see especially CSDIC (WEA) IR 63 of 9 May 46 (Seventh Combined Interim Report on KOPEKOW/THOMSEN/NOSSKE). The infm given below is supplementary to that already given.

45. Mass Employment of Agents

Prisoner considers that one of the most outstanding features of the Russian IS was the mass employment of agents (this was intensified after the outbreak of war). The Russians intended to achieve their ends through the large number of int missions they initiated, and whilst they must obviously have taken into their calculations that this mass employment must result in heavy losses, they failed to realise that such methods could only result in their whole org becoming known to the enemy and being effectively countered.

Thus, although the Russian IS endeavoured to build up a large WT network throughout the Reich, some of their agents were captured by the Stapo and by skilful use made of "play-backs", and the whole network was eventually brought to light. This was achieved in the great majority of cases without arousing the suspicions of the Russians that they were in fact being swindled and were only receiving deception material.

Prisoner states that it is hard to understand why the Russians never considered checking the genuineness of the keying of the WT operator. With present-day tech knowledge, this would not have been difficult, and it would certainly have defeated a major part of the "turning" that was done by the Germans, for in the majority of cases of "turned" agents, a German operator had to be put to work the WT and imitate the keying as best he could. The danger of allowing the agent himself to pass the traffic was too great, and even keeping a close watch on him while he was operating provided only a very limited safeguard.

46. Dropping of Agents

The Russian IS was consistent in its policy of dropping its agents in places far distant from where they were to operate; thus, agents for Western GERMANY were dropped by Russian aircraft in EAST PRUSSIA, agents for the BERLIN area in the territory of the General Gouvernement. Captured Russian agents repeatedly confirmed that they had not reckoned with such strict travel control within the Reich.

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47. Co-operation of Agents

It was often ascertained that agents of different tech branches worked together; thus, a parachute agent might receive assistance from a seaman working for the Russian IS in a German harbour town.

There was also co-operation among parachute agents themselves.

48. Recalling of Agents to RUSSIA

The methods of the Russian IS also included the recalling of agents to RUSSIA to report. This, of course, was the most thorough means of checking an agent's activities, but was necessarily a slow process. It did, however, cause some awkward situations for the Stapo in "play-backs", considerable ingenuity being necessary to explain the reasons for the delay in the agent's return.

49. Provision of Addresses and Messages to Agents

Agents were provided with lists of addresses of contacts that might be useful to them in GERMANY; also they bought messages or handwritten letters from German PW in Russian captivity. The idea was that the relatives in GERMANY would be so relieved at receiving news from son, brother or husband that they would easily be induced to help the agent, at least in obtaining identity papers and accommodation.

Prisoner states that in his opinion the giving of any such written evidence of his calling to an agent was a mistake and all particulars might have been provided with greater safety by WT after the agent's reliability had been tested.

50. Provision of Documents and Money

The Russian agents were on the whole well equipped with forged documents; these were printed by the State Printing Works in MOSCOW. Food ration cards, however, were a great difficulty to the Russians after the Stapo had ordered that these be changed frequently. German 'Travel Ration Cards' were watermarked, and the Russians never succeeded in copying these.

Agents were supplied with considerable amounts in USA dollars; this idea proved a failure, for, unless the agents had connections in the Black Market, which only a very small number of them ever had, this money was useless in the open market. Strict currency regulations provided for such harsh penalties for persons found to be in possession of foreign currency that no one was willing to take any chances in this respect.

XIV. NOTE ON COMMUNIST AGENT CAPTURED IN NORTH ITALY

51. Identity

This man, referred to by Prisoner in "M" Weekly Summary No 6, para 4, dated 17 Oct 45, was the Italian Communist "MARIO", who was a General in the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War.

52. Activities 1942-44

"MARIO", whose real name is not known to Prisoner, was well-known to the Stapo as a prominent Italian anti-Fascist when he was arrested in PARIS in 1942. He was eventually handed over to the Italian Police at the BRENNER PASS and by them was banished to an island in the MEDITERRANEAN (ELBA?). He was released by the turn of events in 1944 and contacted the Italian Communist leader TOGLIATTI, who endeavoured to obtain for him an adm post in the then Allied-occupied zone of ITALY. These attempts were unsuccessful, Prisoner believes, because MARIO's political record was not entirely acceptable to the British or American Police. However, MARIO was accepted by the British IS as a potential agent for NORTH ITALY. /15


Prisoner believes that it was owing to the difficulty of infiltrating agents through the German lines in ITALY at that time that it was decided to land him as a parachute agent, and for this purpose he was sent to a British paratroop trg school in SOUTH ITALY and also to an establishment in BARI where he received a certain amount of int trg. It is NOT correct that he was trained in ENGLAND, but he did receive trg from the British in ITALY.

He was then dropped from an aircraft in NORTH ITALY, whence he transmitted military infm to a British WT control station near NAPLES. His chief activity, however, was the building up of a Communist org in VERONA, BOLZANO, MERANO etc.

He was arrested in Dec 44 by the Stapo and was "turned". Prisoner does not believe that the play-back with the British WT control station in NAPLES produced any useful results, as the British were constantly asking for military infm which could not be given. A Communist network in NORTH ITALY was, however, completely broken up and many arrests were made.

"MARIO" was not brought to BERLIN by the Stapo and he was at liberty in NORTH ITALY at the time of the surrender, as he had agreed to being "turned".

CSDIC(WEA)
10 Jul 46


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for Colonel GS
Commandant CSDIC(WEA)

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KOPKOW, HORST

REF. 64.

SPECIAL POINTS.

- 1) KOPKOW realises fully his situation, and knows it is hardly possible for him to hide much or cover up his activities. As a number of his office staff were captured together with him, he is aware that he can easily be crossed-checked and he repeatedly said "If you don't believe me there are plenty of people here you can ask". His attitude is that his only chance for a milder judgement is to tell as much as possible. He also declared he is fully prepared to make any declaration of loyalty required.
- 2) Interrogator made use of this frame of mind. Further it was also realized that it would be hardly possible to catch K. out on contradictions etc. through cross-questioning as he is not only too intelligent for that, but has had a very thorough criminalistic training, and knows all the tricks of the trade.
- 3) Therefore K. was warned from the start, that he would not be treated as any small agent, but if one wanted to know something from him he would be asked point blank. That had the advantage for him that he always knew, where he stood, but on the other hand if he slipped up and tried to conceal something important and he was bound to be found out sooner or later, then he had damaged his prospects for good and all.

Attitude towards USSR.

- 4) One thing is very obvious, and runs like a red thread through the whole statement that is K's antipathy towards the U.S.S.R. He is not only through his East Prussian upbringing biased against them, but also through his whole career he was to 90% engaged on work against Communism. His knowledge of the West is far inferior often second hand with few exceptions, like the "Punkspiele" as France, Belgium, Holland in respect to sabotage were dealt directly by the Asts Paris, Brussels, The Hague etc.
- 5) Many of K's stories must be considered in connection with above-mentioned attitude towards the USSR, for instance the instructions given to the Russian agents to continue their work even after the liberation of the territory they were working in by British Forces (See statements Page 26 c) and the remarks of Gen. Iwanoff (loc cit & Notes 6) They have a very distinct tendency.
- 6) Is KOPKOW deliberately trying to throw suspicion between the English and Russians or is he genuinely telling matter of facts? (For a similar sample see STEINERT report Appendix No 2 para 15) The most probable answer to this question seems, that a conflict between the USSR would suit him down to the ground. All the same it is probable that the stories he is telling are true, only they have a normal explanation and nothing hostile towards England; but this would not enter the anti-Russian biased brain of K.

CONFLICT GESTAPO-ABWEHR.

- 7) Another fact worth mentioning is the bad co-operation between Abwehr and Gestapo, which now can be taken as an established fact. Although it doesn't appear very often in his statements K. commented upon this fact in connection with the happenings of 20th July 44. He declared that although the hostile attitude of the Abwehr towards the regime was known, the Gestapo was taken by surprise when suddenly faced with the deadly hostility of the Abwehr and parts of the higher Officer Corps towards Hitler and the Nazi Party.
- 8) It seems that in this case even the Gestapo was partly blinded through GOEDELIS propaganda that the whole nation was behind it's beloved Fuehrer, although just they ought to have known better.

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- 9) One point which was raised with K. was about active sabotage. As his Dept. had perhaps the most thorough knowledge of it and its technique, one would naturally think that Mat. IV A 2 would have been extensively used for giving advice, especially later when the whole Abwehr was swallowed by the RSHA.
- 10) K. denies this, and admits, it sounds unbelievable that all the experience collected by his Dienststelle wasn't made use of. This he ascribes to bureaucratic and departmental jealousies, and rivalries, for instance, with his whole outfit of Jagdverbaende was going his own ways, and not bothering about the rest of the RSHA. Considering the ways of officialdom this is a probable explanation.

PLANS FOR AFTER THE WAR?

- 11) Before closing these comments one more point must be touched. What was K's attitude after the dissolution of the RSHA, did he have any Werewolf ideas et. or was he thinking of continuing Gestapo activities? This ought to have been dealt with in K's personal report (Ref. 64) but only after cross-checking with other internees and with his statements could one form an opinion.
- 12) KOPKOW firmly denies that his Dept. had anything to do with "Duntschuh" (See K's statements Page 31) and no clue could be found in other interrogations.
- 13) Quite some importance was attached to his attitude during the days at Dahme, when the whole group was trying to hide. It is certain that K. was not welcome in their midst. FUHRMANN, DOCK & SCHEFFKA had arrived previously, and they naturally feared one would be more on the look-out for someone of K's standing than of small fry like themselves. Further they still had the uncomfortable feeling of being in the presence of their boss.
- 14) The conversation naturally always reverted to the future. All claim that the prevailing opinion was that resistance was futile and their greatest problem was to get back to their proper names and to legality.
- 15) Only one man stated K had "ideas" for the future. This was STEINERT (See Appendix No) Again everyone concerned and present during these talks was cross-checked (They were all in separate cells, and had no means of communication) but all denied, and stuck to their original statements that no conspiracy for the future had been mentioned or discussed.
- 16) STEINERT reinterrogated amplified his tale insofar as that K. had still tried to lay down the law with his opinions, so that they could-shouldered him for a few days. K. then behaved himself, and everything was alright, but STEINERT could not substantiate his original assertion that K. had talked of future subversive activities.

INTRODUCTIONS.

- 17) There is no doubt that KOPKOW was a convinced National-Socialist, and quite in agreement with its principles, but he owed his career hardly to his party activities except the start; that means his entry into the Stapo. His quick promotion is certainly due to his capabilities and intelligence. He has an extremely matter of fact and methodical brain, very suitable for police work. His is also a very typical German mind, which classifies immediately each case, and must have it in the proper box, where it belongs.
- 18) Although some of his subordinates rather disliked him, and were obviously jealous of his quick promotion, they all considered him a good and efficient superior. On the whole he seems to have bothered more about his staff in the end, than other members of the "Fuehrungsstabe" who only thought of themselves.

19) Naturally the crucial point in these statements is, if K. has told all the truth and is reliable. This was considered from following point of view. It cannot be expected that a man of his position can put down or remember to the very last detail every incident of his professional career. But does his statement give a sufficient clear picture of

- a) his and his Dept's activities.
- b) the methods used.
- c) organization of RSHA IV A 2.

20) Ad a) Here the statement speaks for itself. K. sometimes goes into details, which have hardly any O.I. interest, but have been left to illustrate the far reaching activity of the Gestapo. One must note here, as has already been mentioned in the preamble, that he was prepared to give further material, but sometimes had to be out short as the statement was getting too lengthy. Interrogator is of the opinion that in this respect nothing of importance has been left out. His subordinates were interrogated, but disclosed no new side of K's activities which he hadn't touched.

21) Ad b) Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this case is to look into the methods used by this Dept. of the Gestapo. Now KOPKOW considers himself as purely a criminalist, and most of his staff was recruited from police officials. This was inherent in the type of work IV A 2 was doing, which called for policemen and not for politicians. (Therefore it was possible that some of the people employed were not even party members e.g. STEINERT) Amt IV A 2 was purely a matter of fact specialist department and the Nazis took good care that its efficiency wasn't impaired through fanatical political amateurs. All the same its fundamental tendency dating from its origin was a political one - guarding of the existing regime - only through the necessity of the war, was it forced to turn into a "Fachreferat", using police methods.

22) Ad c) Great importance was attached to this, and here KOPKOW required to give latest and exactest information not only of his Dept. but of the whole Amt IV. Personalities he had given were carefully revised and amplified by the other detained persons of his Dienststelle.

In all 3 important points no concealment of vital information could be proved against K.

CONCLUSION.

25) It is believed KOPKOW has given all vital information, and his statements seem reliable.

RECOMMENDATION.

INTERMENT.

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31. European Union

About the turn of the year 1943/4 my Berlin office, mainly sub-department IV A 2b, succeeded in penetrating an enemy organisation whose leading members were strongly bolshevized and consequently ready to collaborate. On arresting a soviet parachute agent in Germany a card was found on him with the name of Dr. Hatschek who was employed at the Tobis-Film A.G. On questioning, the agent said that he would be able to get connections in other prominent circles. Dr. H was absolutely trustworthy and had worked for the Soviet Intelligence Service for years.

Dr. Hatschek was visited by an official of my office disguised as the presumed parachute agent who was able to get information from him regarding espionage matters. Later on he gave the Stapo official not only political directives but also those from the Armament Industry especially the one dealing with precision-mechanics and high frequency, under the impression that they were destined for Moscow. By and by Dr. Hatschek's circle of friends came to light of which the following are still in my memory :-

A head physician of the Surgical Dept. of the Robert Koch Hospital in Berlin - Dr. Grosscourt

An assistant at the Technical High School in Berlin, Charlottenburg - Dr. Havemann, who was a friend of Dr. Grosscourt and who made several recognised inventions during the war.

Richter - An engineer belonging to the Staff Dept. of Reichsmarschall Goering who before the war had arranged the Hunting Exhibition and later other festivities for Goering.

The whole circuit consisted of about 40-50 people who were mostly from the better classes of society. Besides their treacherous activity they intended to form a left radical party under the title of "Europäische Union". The population of Berlin were to be shown by means of instructive leaflets and explanative booklets that Germany's only way out of the confused situation and which would still offer a possibility of meriting its existence, was to come to an understanding with Russia.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
2000

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

NWC-001452

Appendix

(I) The change of location of the Gestapo from BERLIN and its eventual dissolution.

(1) The temporary Gestapo H.Q. "Daoha I" and "Daoha II" in TREBNITZ near MUENCHENBERG/DRANDENBURG.

It became clear in the Spring of 1944 that the Gestapo (RSHA IV) could not continue its work in BERLIN as the various offices which were already spread out were threatened more and more by the ever increasing air raids and tele-communications to and from BERLIN were continually interrupted.

A wood was chosen near WULKOW (approximately 15 km west of the ODER) and two camps were erected about 4 to 5 km apart as a precaution against air raids. In these wooden huts all the Gestapo offices were installed. Only small detachments of the various sub-departments remained in BERLIN, especially the Chief of Amt IV who spent almost two thirds of the week there.

In WULKOW was a Telephone exchange of the German Reichpost which RSHA IV could best use for its tele-communications. That was another reason for the move to WULKOW.

(2) Formation of a working staff in HOF.

The move took place in July 1944 in various stages. The evacuation was kept secret from the outside world. The camps had to be closed after the Red Army breakthrough across the ODER in Jan/Feb and the whole area became a battle zone.

The climax of the English air raids on BERLIN came on 3rd Feb. 1945 at the same time that the Gestapo had intended to return there. In these circumstances it was impossible to bring the offices back to BERLIN and the Chief of Amt IV decided to evacuate the majority of the Gestapo personnel to HOF in Bavaria. Most of the officials received the immediate order to proceed to HOF via BERLIN where they were to report at the Censorship Office which was to be found in a camp in Wilhelm Gustloff Strass in HOF. The greater part of the Stapo documents and current files were sent to HOF as well.

The billeting of the staff in HOF was totally insufficient. Every day an air raid on HOF was expected, therefore after about 14 days the various sub-sections of the Dept. were spread out in the neighbourhood and, as far as I remember, amongst the villages, farms and castles, such as BERG, BRUCK near HOF, and a few other small villages. Working possibilities in these billets were very restricted. Communications were the biggest difficulties as for instance a courier system had often to be used between BERLIN and HOF.

The Allied advance in the west forced the staff to evacuate southwards. The plan was to go to the neighbourhood of REICHENHALL. As far as I know the first stop was to be LANDSHUT. I cannot say whether it was moved from there to the REICHENALL district as the normal communications were out after leaving HOF and only occasionally were they restored by wireless.

The staff, in the last stage of its existence, was transferred into the Southern Group of RSHA IV and was to work independantly in the area of Southern Germany not yet occupied.

Appendix 2.

(3) Formation of an H.Q. Staff.

As it became more and more obvious that the Government intended to remain in BERLIN with the Fuehrer, the Chief of the Sipo, and the Chief of the Gestapo, Gruppenfuhrer MUELLER had also to stay. MUELLER named a number of leading officials of the Gestapo who had to remain there with him and form the so-called H.Q. Staff. These were in most cases the departmental chiefs as they were in a position to give the best information regarding their respective departments. The entire H.Q. Staff consisted therefore of not more than about 30 people including auxiliary and office employees.

This H.Q. Staff also was unable to find accommodation in which to work owing to day and night air raids on BERLIN. They were finally billeted in the barracks of the Luftlotte "Das Reich" on the Grossen Wannsee near BERLIN, where they were given a large room for office and living accommodation. According to several statements by the Chief of Amt IV it was quite clear that the entire H.Q. Staff would remain in BERLIN even in case it became a battle zone, and in case of emergency it would withdraw to the inner BERLIN defence ring. Finally it would be attached as a fighting unit to the Wehrmacht and sent into action. This plan fell through following an order by the Chief of Amt IV on the afternoon of 21 April 1945 which said that the complete H.Q. Staff should proceed to SCHWERIN Stapo Station by car. From there they were to find a place in Northern Germany, where they could continue their Stapo work. I should like to emphasise that the various Office chiefs had no files with them and that the remainder had already been burnt at the Wannsee H.Q. Only a few technical documents in connection with the "Nibelungen" scheme were in my possession, about which I will give more details later.

The H.Q. Staff convoy started off in the evening of 21 April 1945, sometimes keeping close together and at other times well separated on account of low flying aircraft. The vehicles arrived at the Gestapo Station in SCHWERIN at 5 a.m. on 22 April and remained until 26th/27th during which time some officials were sent to SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN to find suitable quarters. In SCHWERIN the nominal transformation of the H.Q. Staff into the Northern Group of the RSHA took place. This group included members of all departments arriving in SCHWERIN as time went on and was therefore analogous the Southern Group. SS-Gruppenfuhrer, Generalleutnant der Polizei OHLENDORFF became leader of this Northern Group, and he at that time lived in SCHWERIN. Later he moved to MALENT near EUTIN, and as far as I am aware finally took residence in FLENSBURG. The Stapo sector of this Northern Group was given the following title:- Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und SD Nordgruppe -IV-

On 26/27th the Northern Group removed to BREIHOLZ, a place north of the KIEL Canal and south of the EIDER. I have no idea whatsoever where the other departments went to. Accommodation was found in BREIHOLZ School where it stayed from 28th April to 3rd May incl. (SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Ober-Regierungsrat) Lischke was the chief of Northern Group IV at this time. The majority of the members of the Group at that time wanted a dissolution, as according to rumours, the English Army was pushing further north in the neighbourhood of the town of Husum. During the move, which was done in stages owing to the danger of low flying air attack, two cars were shot up and had to be towed.

After a halt of several hours at the Arbeitsdienstlager in Winnert near Ostenfeld we were directed by the camp staff to proceed to the Arbeitsdienstlager Ostenfeld near Ostenfeld where the Northern Group remained until 6th May 1945. On this date SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Lischka gave the order which broke up the Group and all members were free to go wherever they wanted.

During the stay of the Northern Group IV in Dreiholz and Ostenfeld Lischka went several times to see Gruppenfuhrer Ohlendorff by car to get information regarding the situation and directives as to the dissolution. As far as I can remember he returned with completely insatisfactory results because at Northern Group H.Q. also there was complete helplessness and nobody could make any plans or have enough courage to order the dissolution. At this moment a certain change took place.

On the orders of Lischka SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Quetting went to Flensburg on the 4th May approx. to receive final instruction, particularly as it had become known that the Reichsfuhrer-SS with his staff were there.

4) Meeting in Flensburg.

In the early hours of the next morning Quetting went to Ostenfeld from Flensburg and gave the following information at a staff meeting; He had succeeded in getting through to the office of the A.D.C. of the RF-SS where he had been informed that a meeting would take place that same night under the chairmanship of the RF-SS in the Police H.Q. in Flensburg, in which he was to take part. According to Quetting there were 15-18 Hoehere and Hohe SS-Fuhrer at the meeting, where Himmler spoke for an hour and a half to two hours. I believe that Quetting mentioned the following names of the people present at the meeting;

- a) Himmler himself
- b) SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Pruetzmann
- c) SS-Gruppenfuhrer Ohlendorff
- d) SS-Oberfuhrer Ehrlinger (?) Chief of Amt 1 RSHA
- e) SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Wuennenberg
- f) SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Quetting

Further names were mentioned which I knew at the time but have since forgotten

Himmlers speech itself.

Himmler gave those present to understand that total military defeat was a fact. Nothing could be done about the collapse and one should trust Doenitz, if he could succeed in alleviating the situation of the German nation. He himself had voluntarily resigned his post as Home Minister so that he would not be in the way of any new Government which might be formed. Himmler presumed that according to the situation the possibility might exist that the Allies would leave a small preserve, which was believed to be the area north of the Kiel Canal, to a still existing German Government and that this zone might be regarded as a breeding ground for a possible new and modest reconstruction. The hammer must replace the sword in this area and everyone must be called up and start immediately with the rebuilding of Railways and Industries. I also remember that Quetting repeated Himmlers references to the Police itself, whereby the Gestapo in its present structure was to go into the background or even disappear completely. The officials still in the North were to be disturbed in towns in the area where they were to take over executive work of a purely criminal investigation nature.

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Appendix 4.

The existing ORPO forces were naturally too large for this remaining area. Roughly these words were said by Himmler; An office which may have been administered by a Captain must now be taken over by a Colonel whose position would naturally be less in all respects. Himmler then spoke about the economical side and exclaimed that the question of food was very urgent and it could only be solved by the reappearance of the deep sea fishing trade and the transport system being put into working order as soon as possible.

Quetting then arrived at Northern Group IV in Ostenfeld with this news. As some SS members had already taken off their uniforms in order to part from each other as civilians at the future disbandment of the Group, it was ordered by Obersturmbannfuhrer Lischka as a result of this "encouraging news" that uniforms were to be worn again immediately and that at the moment there was to be no thought of separation.

This state of affairs lasted only until 6th May when Lischka went again by night in an armoured car to Flensburg or its vicinity to obtain more information, particularly as in the last hours it became more apparent that occupation of Northern Schleswig Holstein by English troops was absolute inevitable, as the first Allied spearhead were in Nusim and had been seen in Flensburg. I know for certain that Lischka did not speak that night (5th/6th May) with the RF-SS. As far as I remember he spoke only with the Chief of Amtl of RSHA- SS-Oberfuhrer Ehrlinger, who gave the order to disband the Northern Group IV, which was passed on by Lischka to the SS Leaders stationed in Ostenfeld.

11) The employment of English Agents in Germany as far as I know it from the Counter Intelligence standpoint (Turning)

Cases of espionage in Germany by England and America were dealt with on principle by the departments concerned. Here mainly by the IV B 1 b (England) and IV B 2 b (Poland) which were recognised as being a great source of information to the English Intelligence Service. The main point of my work was only in those cases where the possibility existed of using them to start a counter "game" with the enemy Intelligence Service. These were mainly cases where W/T was concerned as wireless "turning" required much technical knowledge which IV A 2 b had obtained through long experience.

I recall the following cases in Germany: ~~ex: Germany~~
1) ~~Frank Chamier, an Englishman, and Resohke, a German, who was formerly in the Foreign Legion were parachuted into Southern Germany, possibly in Wuerttberg, in summer 1944. Chamier was given extensive espionage orders by the English Intelligence Service, which as far as I can remember concerned SS Units. To this end Chamier carried detailed tables with him which were similar to Cipher Codes lists which replaced military information by letter to be transmitted by radio.~~ *ww II*

Shortly after the parachute jump the two separated after having decided to meet again in a South German town which, if I am not mistaken, was Heilbronn. Soon after their parting Resohke went to the Station Master of a small South German Railway Station and reported Chamier giving the details of his mission and route. As a result of this betrayal he was arrested. In Chamier's luggage was found all the documents and he made a full confession. As part of his mission covered the Berlin area he was taken to Berlin.

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Appendix 5.

*Commander to send
by English during WWII
for capture*

A military counter "Game" was started from there by radio which only lasted a few weeks as apparently the English Intelligence Service became very suspicious through some mistake or other on our part. Chamier, who had offered to co-operate, was given a cover name and put in a Berlin prison where he was killed together with a number of other prisoners during a day raid.

2) In a hotel in Hannover objects were found belonging to a Luftwaffe H.C.O. who had been there several days. (about Autumn 1943 Amongst these objects Wehrmacht Pay Books soldered in a Corned Beef tin were found. *Woods Street, London* It was *believed* that it was *belonging* to an agent. After examination the conclusion was reached that his *airman* was the German (Obergefreiter) Kurt Koenig, *alias Broecker* who had long been a deserter and whose uniform had been found in a wood on the Spanish-French Border. At that time there was the suspicion that Koenig had gone to England via Spain. It was impossible to arrest him at that time in spite of the extensive search measures that were taken.

Not till many months later was it reported that a German soldier had been arrested after having been dropped from an English long distance bomber in Southern Germany (South Baden). The identification of this soldier who possessed false papers proved him to be the wanted Obergefreiter Kurt Koenig who had been sent repeatedly on Sabotage and as far as I can remember Espionage missions. The most important thing in this case was the fact that this was Koenig's third mission into Germany and on the two previous occasions he had returned to England via France and Spain. As Koenig was in possession of a transmitter it was hoped that he could be "turned" but this never succeeded. He was sent before a court martial but as yet no judgement had been passed on him.

3) Two English parachute agents were reported by the Stuttgart Stapo Station, one possessing papers which could not be distinguished from genuine ones. Great excitement was caused in Berlin as a result of this excellent complete forgery. As far as I can remember one of these agents was called Doemmelburg. A counter "game" on a military basis was played with London from Southern Germany with these agents about which I cannot give any positive details as it was impossible to direct the proceedings from Berlin owing to the continual breakdown of communications. The name Doemmelburg was only an alias. I remember that in connection with Doemmelburg's arrest he gave the information that a German Kriminalrat (Councillor of Kripo) of the Geheime Feld Polizei (Security Police force) was working for the British Intelligence Service stationed somewhere in Scotland. This man was in a position to give extensive information about the structure of the Sipo and SD.

4) At the end of 1944 or beginning of 1945, a German Kriminalrat crossed the frontier illegally from Switzerland into Germany and report to the Stapo station. This man had been a Kriminalrat working with the Kommandeur of the Sipo and SD in Strasbourg where he was captured by the Allies during the occupation. As far as I know he was "turned" by the Americans Intelligence Service who sent him on a mission to Southern Germany via Switzerland, particularly as he had assured the Americans that he knew a French Engineer in Southern Germany who could transmit the news by radio for him. As he reported voluntarily he was made Chief of the Kripo Regional Control Branch in a town on the Swiss-German Frontier (this may have been Constance). However this appointment was later cancelled. A radio counter "game" was started with him by the Appropriate Leitstelle (Regional Control Executive Command H.Q.) which as far as I can remember had quite good results but which had to be discontinued owing to the Allied advance into Southern Germany.

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5) In a small place near Munich was the (Dr.) Rhode-Schwarz W/T apparatus factory. Dr. Rhode, one of the most skilled specialists in W/T apparatus and radio, had made contact by plain language wireless communication with an English radio transmitter. This illegal communication was picked up by the technical supervision stations and its location plotted. The interesting part of this case was the fact that Rhode had succeeded by radio in formulating a cipher code with the English Intelligence Service which could not be understood by the German Cipher Stations. Dr. Rhode was arrested but his first Engineer was able to escape. The wireless communication was continued with London as regards military information and the English Intelligence Service were deceived into believing that an opposition group of Bavarians were ready to help in a forthcoming overthrow of the regime and also to send information. A meeting was arranged by wireless to take place in Switzerland between Rhode's liaison man and English Intelligence Experts. The German "confidence man" sent was Schmidt, a representative of Caritas (Catholic Charity Organisation) who had legal authority to travel to Switzerland in order to see a High Caritas official of the Catholic Church and at the same time met the English Intelligence Representative. On his return Schmidt reported that he had not only seen this representative but also an expert who was sent specially by air from London. The conditions demanded by the English Intelligence Service of the imaginary Opposition Group in South Germany were almost exclusively of an intelligence nature which could scarcely be fulfilled by Stapo Counter moves especially as the catastrophic military situation in the West scarcely permitted a large scale deception (January 1944 approx). The most interesting request by the English Intelligence Service, as reported by Schmidt, was their need of finding a high ranking SS-Fuehrer who possibly could take part at meetings in the presence of the Reich-Fuehrer-SS and who would work for England. As far as I can remember, the Chief of Stapo H.Q. in Munich who was in charge of the "game" chose Freiherr von Eberstein for this task. The latter agreed to this. The matter was later dropped as the Reich-Fuehrer-SS would not give his permission.

6) I remember another case whereby the American Intelligence Service sent to Germany via Switzerland a German Lieutenant (Wehrmacht Reserve Panzer Unit) who owned breweries in Southern Germany. This officer had fled to Switzerland after the 20 July incident although he had no connection with it whatsoever. His orders were to contact a Captain working at Stapo H.Q. Munich in order to recruit him for the American Intelligence Service. The Captain reported the matter immediately and the Lieutenant was arrested (Jan/Feb 1945). He was then sent back by the Stapo H.Q. Munich to the American Intelligence Unit via Switzerland (I believe it was the 7th American Army Intelligence H.Q. with the message that the Captain at Stapo H.Q. Munich was more or less ready to co-operate in intelligence matters of a political nature but not of a military one. The Lieutenant never returned as the turn of Military events changed the whole situation.

III) Penetration into the Radio Code used by Draha-Mihailowitsch and Tito by German Cipher-Examination Offices.

I know from my own experience with the Military radio examination offices that especially in the Balkans great success was obtained in penetrating the radio cipher system of Draha-Mihailowitsch, so that nearly all instructions and orders given, could be read and then passed on to the operational Command of the German-Balkan Army. Thereby information was received regarding the help given by British Staff Officers to Mihailowitsch and their activities. This cipher penetration gave also a clear picture as to the relationship between the Draha-Mihailowitsch movement to the Tito movement and the Cetniks to the legal Yugoslav Government in London and later in Cairo. As far as I remember a penetration was made into Tito radio service but by no means to the same extent as the one made into the Cipher Code of Draha-Mihailowitsch.

IV) The Air Crash of Dr. Todt.

As chief of a special commission I had to investigate the air crash of Reichsminister and OT Chief Todt. The plane carrying Dr. Todt crashed shortly after taking off from the aerodrome in East Prussia where he had visited the Fuehrer's H.Q. The facts obtained were as follows:- The aeroplane was a JU 52 in which Dr. Todt left Rastenburg Aerodrome for Berlin. There was a Military guard on the aircraft all night. The crew were extremely reliable and all were killed in the crash. Shortly after the take-off the machine (about 1 to 2 km. from the aerodrome) curved back towards the aerodrome and already showed signs of dropping. No smoke or fire was noticed by eye-witnesses. Roughly 200 meters before touching down on the run-way a vertical sheet of flame appeared from above the pilot's cockpit which pointed to an explosion inside the cockpit or the cabin. This fact led to the presumption that some foreign body exploded in the aircraft and it was not due to any defect of the engines nor the result of a flame from the exhaust causing the fire in question. Certainly not the latter because flames from the exhaust would always be thrown back by the slipstream and seen from the rear of plane. The vertical sheet of flame seen by a number of witnesses was not to be explained even after a thorough reconstruction of the wrecked plane as no foreign bodies could be found. The case remained unsolved. There was however still the possibility from the criminologists point of view that the crash was not the result of technical defects.

2) The Spanish Communist General "Mario".

"Mario" (alias) was known to the Gestapo since 1936/37 (Spanish Civil War). He was an outspoken Italian Anti-Fascist who joined the ranks of the communist fighters for freedom via Paris and who after a certain time, through his own intelligence and initiative became General of an International Brigade.

M- "Mario" was arrested in France about 1942 and sent to the Gestapo because his prominent position was of interest to the Central Court. The Italian Police at that time were asked to confirm his identity and statements. They immediately asked for him to be handed over and sent to Italy. After interrogation by the Gestapo "Mario" was handed over to the Italians at Brenner Pass and was sent to a Detention Camp which as far as I can remember was in Elba until he was freed by the Badoglio Revolt.

"Mario" was a "red-hot" member of the III Internationale before leaving Fascist Italy. After his liberation from prison he went to the Italian Communist Minister Togliatti who tried to get him a post in the area occupied by the Allies. This failed every time because "Mario" was known to the English and American Police and had been detained several times by them on account of attempted political activity. At a further meeting with Togliatti they both agreed that "Mario" should place himself at the disposal of the English Training School which at that time was recruiting agents for service in the northern part of Italy still occupied by the Germans. "Mario" visited several schools including the one at Bari. I think, and from his statements, caused the English instructor some difficulties through his continual hostility. Finally he took a paratroop course and was then sent to Northern Italy (Bozen Area), with a transmitter. From here he was in communication with an H.Q. in Italy and transmitted military information, rail transport being the main item. He had also discussed with Togliatti the task of communist organisation in this area which he himself would undertake, so that it would not have to be started after the Allied Occupation, as was the case in Southern and Central Italy "Mario" was arrested by the German Sipo in Bozen after being given away by another communist.

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The "Gegenspieler" (Counter Radio "Game") was continued with the English Intelligence Service by using "Mario" from Dozon, but I was never informed as to its extent or result. "Mario" was arrested about December 1944 and the "Gegenspieler" commenced at about the same time. As "Mario" was voluntarily "turned" he was given his freedom.

3) The Use of Russian Agents via Archangel/White Sea, Glasgow/London to Western Germany.

Referat IV A 2b dealt with the use of parachute agents in Germany. Nearly all Russian agents were dropped by Russian aircraft in the Eastern Provinces and also repeatedly in Central Germany. It was therefore something new to find a group of Russian agents in Western Germany and explanation as to why they had not been caught by the well organized Observer Corps could be given at first. On arrest or after giving themselves up - I think there were three groups - it was learned that they had not been dropped by Russian planes but by English long-distance bombers coming from England. They had left the Soviet Union via Archangel in ships to Glasgow and were then sent on to London. They never came in contact with the English Intelligence Service at all but were received and looked after by representatives of the Soviet Embassy in London. They were taken to their respective destinations by English Bombers, going to Germany. I recall a case in which two agents were torpedoed on the way from Archangel to England. The ship was lost, together with their equipment, and what was of most importance, their radio equipment. This was replaced in England but their mission in Germany was consequently delayed. A "Gegenspieler" was started by the Stapo-Regional Control Bureau (Ausendienststelle) in Trier by using one of these groups against the Soviet Intelligence Service. This did not last long, as the demands for military material from the Rhine-Ruhr district were so high that they could not be satisfied against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Intelligence Service categorically demanded that this Group in all circumstances should make use of people in the Ruhr District who had communist leanings. The Russian view was that there should be a considerable number of such people amongst the masses of German workers in that area. Actually the communist movement during the war in the mining areas of the Ruhr was extremely small (as seen from the Stapo point of view). Moscow always argued against this. I believe that I can say with certainty that the above mentioned parachute landings were the only ones in Western Germany carried out by the Russians as otherwise the buried parachutes and other objects at least would have been found by the Gendarmerie, Landwacht and other organisations used in this work.

4) Further details about the Soviet Espionage Organisation "Rote Kapelle" in France and Belgium.

See also pages 37, 38, 39 and 57.

The penetration into the "Rote Kapelle" movement in Belgium was only possible through the technical radio plotting by Orpo Supervision Process of a Soviet station in Brussels. On raiding the Station, Hermann Wenzel who had been known since 1933 as a very active Communist Official was arrested. He was a good wireless signaller and also member of a Soviet Intelligence Group in Belgium. After "turning" him the "game" with the NKWD Intelligence Service was continued. He was given more trust as the "game" went on so that finally he succeeded in escaping. His trace was later picked up again in Holland but he was not caught.

Wenzel in Rote Kapelle network

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Appendix 9

Wenzel doubtlessly ran one of the main Soviet Intelligence Service transmitting stations in Holland, where he worked with a number of other persons, amongst which as far as I can remember, was a certain "Gouloue" (?) who likewise continually was able to avoid arrest.

On rounding up the Wenzel Group ^{agent} in Belgium in 1942 the Gestapo came across another Soviet Espionage Movement which used Wenzel's station to transmit its information to the Soviet Union. Some Soviet Agents were arrested in the Belgian bathing resort Spa, as a result of which the "Petit-Chef" of the Belgian Organisation was later arrested. ^{code name} "Kent" came from Leningrad and had been trained for the Soviet Intelligence Service since childhood, having visited several Leningrad Intelligence Schools. In contrast to Wenzel, "Kent" was active with Military Intelligence and for years he had been installed in a big Leningrad Hotel. He was a Lieutenant in the Soviet Military Intelligence Service but during the course of the "game" he was promoted Captain. His closest ~~collaborator~~ ^{collaborator} was the Soviet student Jeffrey who was living in Brussels as a Finnish subject, possessing Finnish papers. "Kent" ran an import and export business in Brussels called "Simexco" which was entered in the Belgian Trade Register in the normal manner and which concluded commission business on a large scale with the Todt Organisation and Wehrmacht establishments. Trade relations also reached mainly to France where "Kent's" "boss", the so-called "Grand-cher" of the whole Soviet Espionage Organisation in the West, lived. The Belgian Group also came under his jurisdiction during his stay in Belgium. Kent possessed false papers in the name of Vincent Sierra which alleged him to be a Uruguayan subject. The firm "Simexco" was a pure "cover firm" of the Soviet Intelligence Service whose main aim was to avoid the difficult transfer of currency from Russia to Belgium, and to earn the money necessary to finance the Intelligence machine on the spot. In that way it was possible by means of the legal trading business to get permission without undue difficulties from the existing authorities, to travel backwards and forwards and moreover contact circles (OT and Wehrmacht) who were able to give in conversation the best information about their fields of activity. "Kent" was led to understand that he had to take part in a pleasure trip to the English Channel and bring back military information which the Soviet Intelligence Service thought to be extraordinarily important. It concerned the German Channel Coast defences under construction at that time. Through this firm Kent was able to go to Germany without difficulty. He had received the instruction from his "bosses" (Soviet Military Intelligence Service) to go to Germany by any means whatsoever, meet Lieutenant Schulze-Boysen in Berlin and hand over to him new Code and Cipher material as well as wireless communication detailed documents. Kent carried out this mission and actually met Schulze-Boysen in Berlin who personally gave him extensive "treason" material. Schulze-Boysen was head of a section in the Attache Group of the Luftwaffe H.Q. Staff which belonged to the Air Ministry. In his position and with his contacts, already described, he was able to give all the latest information. At their Berlin meeting Kent and Schulze-Boysen discussed the radio transmission of espionage material from the Berlin Group to Brussels from whence it could be sent on to Moscow. As far as I can remember three "Gegenspiele" were started by Germany after the rounding up of the Belgian-Russian Espionage System. These "games" did not meet with the required success; that is to say, they did not lead up to the discovery and penetration of further connections of the Espionage Organisation in the West.

collaborated with Soviet Espionage Agent Wenzel
USSR
Konstantin

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Appendix 10

of the Kitzkopelle network
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G E T
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"Kent" was continually in contact with the "Grand-Chef" in Paris, who when later arrested, turned out to be the Soviet Russian Trepper alias Jean Gilbert. He was chief of the French Group but at the same time had the right of inspection over the Belgian Group. Trepper who came from Galacia, had come into contact with the Soviet Intelligence Service during early youth, visited several schools and held the rank of Captain in the Red Army. He was a personality in the truest sense of the word who understood how to contact numbers of people including wide intellectual circles in France of who he made use in his intelligence work. Gilbert was also "turned" by the Germans but he escaped in summer 1943 whilst taking a walk in Paris with an official of the Special Commission. From that moment onwards the Gestapo directed all its force on "Kent" in the "games" it was playing with Moscow. One day "Kent" received the order to go to Paris and at a later date the order to go to Marseilles where he had to fit up a Transmitting Station for the Soviet Intelligence Service with Moscow. The "Funkgegenspiel" from Marseilles under the cover name of "Mars" and the one from Paris under the cover name of "Marianne". One of the most important bits of information obtained from the Soviet Intelligence service resulting from the Paris Gogenspiel "Marianne" was the exposure of the name of "Solja" a Russian agent for many years who lived in Paris and with whom "Kent" had to co-operate from now on. Solja was the cover name of a Latvian Colonel who had played a leading part in an International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War. "Solja" had to send his news communications in France to Moscow by a new transmitter which was to be erected. "Kent" received the order from the Sipo to maintain his communications with "Solja", from whom he derived important information from the Gestapo. I remember a French Captain who was in close connection with "Solja" and who was prepared to give information from French Military circles. This took place regularly, especially concerning French defence works. I recall among other things that the French Captain obtained the defence plan of Cherbourg Harbour which were passed on to "Solja" who then sent them on to "Kent" so that they finally reached the Sipo. Thus, valuable military information acquired from this communication was prevented from reaching Moscow. The demands of the Soviet Intelligence Service through these French "games" were principally of a military nature. I remember clearly that they wanted to know at any cost which new SS-Units were being formed in France as they were undoubtedly mainly interested in the presence of German armour in the West. These facts were really released by the German Military Authorities but numerous details about the German Atlantic Defences were given on the other hand, about which the Russians were not especially interested. The Russian Intelligence Service not only showed great interest in military matters but also political groups of all kinds. The "Grand-chef" received extensive information and about these questions from a (Professor) Dasil Maximowitsch and his sister. The former was at the time at the Sorbonne in Paris and the latter was a lady doctor also in Paris. This pair had not only relations with DeGaulist circles in France but also, which was of much more interest to the Soviet, relations with circles who were in close contact with Petain's Vichy Government.

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with I.S. documents

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currier for Kitzkopelle Network

A certain Henry Robinson (real name) was responsible for the "Grand-Chef's" communication from France to the Soviet Intelligence Service in Switzerland. He travelled continually from France to Switzerland direct or via Germany. Robinson was much more a kind of Organisation Chief liaising the work of the French Group with Switzerland than a news messenger that was much more dangerous to the Soviet Intelligence Service. Robinson was arrested.

G E T

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Appendix 11

After the interruption of this well organized connection of the Soviets their only remaining contact with their French experts was the "Funkgegenseispiele" turned by the Stapo. One day the question of financing the Western Group arose, which in the course of the "game" had been pressed more and more. Finally the Moscow Military Intelligence Service who still had full confidence in the "Grand-Chef", was ready to put Swiss funds at his disposal. By means of "Mars" or "Marianne" the necessary Swiss arrangements were agreed add thus shortly afterwards 33,000 Swiss gold franc for the finance of the "Grand-Chef's" Group fell into German hands. I must also mention that the "Grand-Chef" in Paris in 1942 ran a commission business under the name of "Simex" which worked in the same way as "Kent's" organisation in Brussels "Simexoc" which I have already described. The turnovers here were also considerable particularly as Gilbert had Wehrmacht contracts which ran into millions. I remember the following names from the entire organisation in Belgium and France.

- ed 12
- 1) Jacques Blumsack,
 - 2) Gruet
 - 3) Jenstream (alias)
 - 4) Margarete Baroza (friend of "Kent's")
 - 5) Katz Bros. and others.

I recall that Professor Maximowitsch succeeded in fulfilling the Moscow order to get in contact with the German Embassy in Paris. This came about through his affairs with Fraulein Margarete Hoffmann-Scholz, a German secretary at the Embassy, who he promised to marry later. This girl was completely under the influence of Maximowitsch and gave away the most secret information from the Embassy office. Hoffmann's cousin was the German Kriegsverwaltungschef General von Pfeffer (War Administration Chief) a brother of Osa Pfeffer (Oberster SA-Fuehrer before Roehm) and former Regierungspraesident of Wiesbaden (district or county governmental administrative chief). Maximowitsch was able to approach Pfeffer through Hoffmann and used Pfeffer's simple-mindedness to obtain important information which he gladly gave.

Moscow's wireless order, under no circumstances to contact the French Communist Party in any way for fear of discovery, ran like a red thread through the entire "Rote Kapelle" movement. The Russians finally agreed to it after the Germans had brought up this theme again and again. The Paris meetings arranged by radio had always a negative result.

The entire "Rote Kapelle" movement including the German sector was brought before a Luftwaffe Court Martial which was in session at the Reichskriegsgericht in Berlin. (Reich Supreme Military Tribunal. At the end of 1943 two more Soviet transmitting organisations belonging to "Rote-Kapelle" at Lyons and Lille were rounded up. The Soviet Military Intelligence Service had constructed two further parallel organisations in addition to the main one at Paris which however had been turned by the Germans. The wireless communication of these two organisations were mostly carried out by women. During these "round ups" the technical apparatus of the French Communists in Paris was broken into, whereby, about early 1944, a great quantity of home-made W/T sets, spare parts, valves, cables, quartz etc. were confiscated. The commission was led in Belgium and France on the German side firstly by Kriminalrat Karl Giering and later when he became ill by Kriminalkommissar Reiser. When the latter was recalled to Germany the job was taken over by Kriminalrat Heinz Panwitz.

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**NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
2000**

**CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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A m t IV

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MULLER
schung u. -bekaempfung

IV G
Mueller
Gen.Grenzinspekteur

isstelle
per

Gruppe IV B
Lischka

ausl. Arbeiter
Haessler

L a e n d e r g e b i e t s - A r b e i t (in Verbindung
mit dem III-F-Dienst)

Abteilungen

<u>IV B 1</u> Westen Norden Hoehner	<u>IV B 2</u> Osten i. V. Thomsen	<u>IV D 3</u> Sueden Isselhorst	<u>IV B 4</u> Pass Krause
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Referate

<u>IV B 1 a</u> Frankreich Belgien Spanien (?) Hoehner	<u>IV B 2 a</u> UdSSR i. V. Thomsen	<u>IV B 3 a</u> Protektorat Balkan Tuerkei, fer- ner Osten(?)	<u>IV B 4 a</u> Passwsen Kroening
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<u>IV B 1 b</u> Holland England Amerika Clemens	<u>IV B 2 b</u> Polen Thomsen	<u>IV B 3 b</u> Schweiz Italien Hilliges	<u>IV B 4 b</u> Ausweis- wesen Wilke
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<u>IV B 1 c</u> Daenemark Norwegen Schweden Finnland Rauch			<u>IV B 4 c</u> Zentrale Sichtver- merkstelle Jarosch
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IV-Nachrichten
Halmannsegger

Amts
Gen Lt
Gegnerfor
IV Gescha
Pie

Gruppe IV A

Huppenkothen

F a c h g e b i e t s - A r b e i t

<u>IV A 1</u> Opposition <u>Litzenberg</u>	<u>IV A 2</u> Sabotage u. Gegenabwehr <u>Kopkow</u>	<u>IV A 3</u> Spionage- Abwehr <u>Quetting</u>	<u>IV A 4</u> Juden <u>Eichmann</u>	<u>IV A 5</u> Sonder- faelle --	<u>IV A 6</u> Schutzhaft <u>Berndorff</u>
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<u>IV A 1 a</u> Linksopposit Kommunismus Marxismus <u>Puetz</u>	<u>IV A 2 a</u> Komm.Spezial apparate. At- tentate. Pass faolschung. Sa- botage. <u>Buechert</u>	<u>IV A 3 a</u> Spionage Abwehr generell <u>Dr.Schaefer</u>	<u>IV A 4 a</u> Juden <u>Guenther</u>	<u>IV A 5 a</u> Schutz- dienst Sonder- faelle <u>Schultz</u>	<u>IV A 6 a</u> Schutz- haft <u>Berndorff</u>
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<u>IV A 1 b</u> Rechttopposit- tion Reaktion <u>Sader</u>	<u>IV A 2 b</u> Gegenabwehr <u>Ampletzer</u>	<u>IV A 3 b</u> Wirtschaft- Wirtschafts spionage <u>Keller</u>	<u>IV A 4 b</u> Religion Sekten, Freimaurer <u>Dr. Fahr.</u>	<u>IV A 5 b</u> Partei (NSDAP) Presse <u>Snaders</u>	<u>IV A 6 b</u> Aktenhal- tung, Kartoi <u>Witzel</u>
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Abwehrbeauf-
tragte,
Werkschutz
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APPENDICES 2 - 6

To cross-check as far as possible on KOPKOV's statements the following personalities were interviewed. They were also briefly questioned in respect to their background etc. It was found that K. had given most of the required information, and all had hardly anything to add. It won't therefore be necessary to give them a further detailed interrogation.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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REF: 64

APPENDIX No 2.

PERSONAL PARTICULARS

NAME: ~~STEINERT~~ CHRISTIAN NAMES: HELMUT

ALIAS: SCHWEIGER, HELMUT.

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 24.8.12, CRIMMITSCHAU, SAXONY.

NATIONALITY GERMAN.

OCCUPATION. KRIM. ASST. former MASTER WEAVER.

RANK -

PHOTO NIL

HEIGHT 1.70m.

BUILD SQUARE SHOULDERED, SLIM.

H.AIR THIN, BLACK

FACE OVAL

LAST PERMANENT ADDRESS ALT-TESSCHAU WITH FAMILY PROPP.

LANGUAGES FRENCH FLUENT, WORKING KNOWLEDGE OF ENGLISH.

FATHER PAUL STEINERT former S.P.D. official } Reichstr. 5 } Not Party

MOTHER HEDWIG born SCHWEIGER } Crimmitschau, } Members

SISTERS HELENE SCHNEIDER, widow 47 not party member

MELNIE KAPPEL, HOUSEWIFE not party member

WIFE ILSE born ROESSLER, Frankenhausen by Crimmitschau, Adolf Hitlerstr. 67/II. not party member.

~~STEINERT~~

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APPENDIX No 2

REF 64

1. STEINERT visited school till 1929. Then he went out to West Africa to work on the farm of an uncle, but didn't get along with him, so returned home, and was unemployed. Later for a time he worked for the Reichsbanner selling newspapers for it. He became member of the SPD. 1st. Feb 33, his father, who was an official of that part, was arrested, STEINERT one day later. He was released after 24 hrs. as otherwise there was no one to look after his mother. March of the same year he was again arrested, but released the same day after being beaten up. Jan 34 he started employment in the textile industry, and keeps to that work till he is called up Feb 1940.
2. After a very short period in the Wehrmacht, St. is first transferred to the Schutzpolizei in Vienna, from there to the Grenzpolizeischule (Frontier Police School) Pretz a/d Elbe. Aug. 40 he finished his course, and is posted as Krim. Assst. Anwaerter to the Grenzpolizei Kommissariat Danzig-Gdynia.
3. First he does the checking of the in and outgoing ships in the harbour. 1941 he is transferred to Abt. III F (counter-espionage) at the same Dienststelle.
4. May 1942 he is suddenly called to the RSHA, Berlin, and there drafted into the "Einsatzkommando Afrika". After Rommel's victory this unit was to operate in Cairo, Alexandria and Baghdad. But it only got as far as Athens, and from there, after having waited in vain for the victories, returned Sept. 42 to Berlin.
5. Nov 42 the same outfit was sent to Tunis to do counter-espionage. For the first time they started "Funkspiele" (wireless games with the enemy). Beginning May 43 the unit had to escape from Tunis, and returned to Germany, where it was made into "Einsatzkommando A.S. (Armee secrete)". It was supposed to take up the fight with the resistance in France. From the outset this was a hopeless undertaking, as it was much too small a unit to cope with the huge problem. It was only used to make the "Funkspiele" in the South of France. Sept. 44 the unit escaped to Konstanz.
6. Oct. 44 St. was back at his old Dienststelle Danzig-Gdynia, and is put into the dept. IV 3a (Spionage Abwehr) and IV 2b (Parachute.) The work was again "Funkspiele" with the Russians. This lasted till end of March 45, when the Germans had to retire before the advancing Sowjets.
7. Easter Sunday St. arrived in Berlin and reported to KOPKOW. There he did nothing at all. He then accompanied Krim. Kom. WERTH, his former boss in France, to Schleswig Holstein to recon the position for possible billets for member of IV A 2 of the RSHA who were being evacuated from Berlin.
8. April 20th. St. and WERTH left for Luebeck via Schwerin and arrived there the 21st. The next day they found billets for 6 in Tiepensee by Heide. On the 23rd. WERTH had a conference with the Reg. Prass. in Kiel. April 25th. WERTH met KOPKOW, and told him about the billets etc.
9. St. himself found a billet in Sierksdorf at a fisher called STURM and stayed there till the arrival of Brit. troops. Then he went for a few days together with WERTH to Dahme, where they met KOPKOW, KULLA, FUHRMANN, SCHEFFKA and DOCK.
10. Together with WERTH he left Dahme on 20th May and went to Alt-Teschau. Subject claims he had here a final row with WERTH, with whom he had not been getting along well all the time. This man had considerable sums of money including foreign currencies on him and refused to give St. anything at all. Now they parted ways. (For WERTH see personalities No. 26).

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APPENDIX 2 (CONTINUED)

11. On May 29th, St. reported to the FSP Luebeck, and there informed the names and whereabouts of the other members of Int IV, who have been arrested in the meantime (except WERTH).

POLITICAL CAREER

12. Subject belonged before 1935 to the social-democratic party, he states that from then on he had no political activities at all, except 1938 he was forced to join the NSV or he would have lost his job.

13. St. claims that although he was occupied by the Gestapo, and was issued with SS uniform, he never belonged to the NSDAP. He further says he asked a few times to be transferred to another job, but his applications were all turned down.

SPECIAL POINTS.

14. As he was a rather unimportant official of the RSHA he hasn't much news to tell concerning his work. Everything is covered by KOPKOW's statements. Most of the specific cases he mentioned are too unimportant or too far back to be mentioned.

15. Only one item is of some interest as fairly recent. In his last "Funkspiel" with the Russians before leaving Danzig, he got the order from them to go to the Saargebiet, and report from there on the movements of Brit. troops. This was the "Funkspiel" Kiebitz mentioned in K's statements page 30.

16. On a second interrogation subject stated, when he was on the 27th or 28th April 1945 with WERTH in Kiel and latter had a conversation with Reg. Praes. VOEGE. St. overheard VOEGE say that explosives are distributed over the whole of Schleswig Holstein and in this connection "Duntschuh" was mentioned. Unfortunately he heard no more.
(For conversations re subversive activities see KOPKOW report, special points paragraph 12 ff.)

DEDUCTIONS.

17. Subject is the typical informer type. He did us a good turn tipping of the whereabouts of KOPKOW and Co. He has hinted a few times during his interrogation that he is prepared to continue to work for us, as he has old scores to settle with the Nazis. (Not as stool pigeon).

18. His statements didn't always prove quite accurate, sometimes they were slightly exaggerated, but there was a grain of truth in them. Interrogator is not completely satisfied that STEINERT never belonged to the NSDAP or SS, but this point is not important enough to vouchsafe much further bother.

RECOMMENDATION.

INTERMENT.

~~SECRET~~

REF 64

APPENDIX No 3

PERSONAL PARTICULARS.

NAME: ~~X~~ SCHEFFKA CHRISTIAN NAMES DRUNO

ALIAS DRUNO KOERNER

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 27.9.14 DANZIG.

NATIONALITY GERMAN

OCCUPATION KRIM. ASSISTANT

RANK STAFFELEDERSCHLEFUEHRER

PHOTO NIL

HEIGHT ca 1.68m.

BUILD normal

HAIR dark

FACE oval, pale complexion

LAST PERMANENT ADDRESS Ostseebad Dahme, c/o Lehrer Jensen

LANGUAGES GERMAN

FATHER FELIX SCHEFFKA + 1938

MOTHER EMM. born LEMRITH + 1943

BROTHER ~~X~~ ARTHUR ~~X~~ SCHEFFKA secretary of municipal water works, party member since 1933

~~X~~ KURT ~~X~~ SCHNEFFKA railway employee, not party member

~~X~~ HANS ~~X~~ SCHEFFKA soldier missing, not party member.

SISTERS ~~X~~ GERTRUDE ~~X~~ SCHEFFKA 36 working for NSV party member

~~X~~ CHARLOTTE ~~X~~ SCHEFFKA married SCHLIDT housewife, not party member.

~~X~~ ELSE ~~X~~ DLOCK ~~X~~ SCHEFFKA 32 housewife, not party member.

WIFE ~~X~~ ELSE ~~X~~ SCHEFFKA born DRUEBERT housewife, Lankestr. 4 Oldenburg, Holstein.

CHILDREN two aged 4 and 3.

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REF 64

APPENDIX No 3

1. Bruno SCHEFFKA was born in Danzig and went to school there until 1934, then was called up to the Arbeitsdienst. He originally wanted to study theology, but as he liked it at the Arbeitsdienst he stayed there as paid official. In 1937 he became a party member, and advanced to Arbeitsfuehrer.
2. Later (1939) Sch. went to Danzig to be with his mother, who was now quite alone. He found a job with the political police, and with outbreak of the war, he was taken over by the Gestapo.
3. For the rest of the time subject worked in Danzig till 15.3.45. First he was Abwehr III, at the end IV 3a and IV 2b. At the beginning his work of supervision of former Foreign Legionnaires and general counter-espionage. When he worked in IV 2b he was engaged in "Funkspiele". (See Steinert, Appendix No.2 para. 6).
4. 15.3.45. together with other officials of his Dienststelle (Schulz, Weihrach and Steinert) he was ordered to leave Danzig. After a long trip this group arrived in Berlin on the 1st. April, and reported to KOPKOW (see Steinert, Appendix No.2 para 7). SCHULZ is sent to Magdeburg, WEIHRACH to Potsdam, he and STEINERT are detached to KRIM. KOM. WERTH. (See personalities No. 26 and Appendix No. 2 para. 7.)
5. Subject leaves Berlin on 20th. April 45 and four days later he meets WERTH and STEINERT in Luebeck. Together with a Krim.Sekr. TIPPE of the Stapo Luebeck he is instructed to look around for billets for the staff of Amt IV RSh. He passes on these addresses to WERTH, and then goes together with TIPPE and also his own wife, who had joined him in the meantime, to Oldenburg, and stays at the former's house there.
6. Subject claims that first TIPPE and he had decided to give themselves up to the Brit. authorities, but one Sunday DOCK (see Appendix No.4) appeared, to enquire about the quarters, which had been found for them. Subject then changed his mind, and decided not to give himself up, but joined the others in Dahme. He visited his wife at Witsuntide, and she told him the Brit. had been looking for him. He returned to Dahme with the idea to vanish for about two years and then take back his proper name. On the 29th. May. KOPKOW and KULLA were arrested, subject on the 30th.

SPECIAL POINTS

7. Re his work the same applies as with the others (STEINERT, SCHEFFKA, etc). as it is covered with KOPKOW's statements, and he has nothing new of interest to tell.
8. Questioned about the conversations during the stay in Dahme, he claims they were all against the idea of further resistance or continuation of the Gestapo.

DEDUCTIONS.

9. SCHEFFKA makes an honest but not a brilliant (mentally) impression. He is hardly of any more C.I. interest.

RECOMMENDATION

INTERMENT

~~SECRET~~

REF 64

APPENDIX No 4

1. Erich DOCK was born 1907 in Berlin, and went to school there till 1923, after finishing his studies he worked in a bank, and at different other office jobs till 1930. From then till 1933 he was without work.
2. June 1933 D. became a member of the NSDAP, and a month later he got a job with the Gestapo. 1939 he is made Krim. Assistent, and comes into the RSHA IV a 4. His work is letter-censoring, wireless control and general researches.
3. Subject claims that he was now pressed to join the S.S. But as he had married in the meantime into a catholic family, he resisted for a time. At the end, as usual, he had to give in or there would have been no promotion for him.
4. 1944 he is transferred to IV A 2A (Krim.Kom. HAUPT). His work was to exploit statistically reports coming from the East. He remained in the Berlin office till April 22nd., and then left with others together on a bicycle. In Luebeck he joined up with FUHRMANN (see Appendix No. 5 para 3), and with him together eventually landed in Dahme, where they were both arrested.

SPECIAL POINTS.

5. There is nothing extraordinary in this case to comment upon. Also his movements and whereabouts before his arrest check with other reports.

CONCLUSION.

6. DOCK was no man of importance in the dept. of the RSHA, where he was working. He has given quite some personalities, which were included in the general list. He doesn't seem to be holding back with anything. He is of no more C.I. interest.

RECOMMENDATION.

INTERMENT.

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APPENDIX No 5

REF 64

PERSONAL PARTICULARS.

NAME ~~FUHRMANN~~ CHRISTIAN NAMES ERICH
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH *Del.* 24.3.09. LUBLINITZ, UPPER SILESIA

ALIAS KARL KRAUSE

NATIONALITY GERMAN

OCCUPATION KRIM. SEKR.

RANK. SS. UNTERSTURMFUEHRER

PHOTO NIL HEIGHT ca 1.75m.

BUILD tall, slim

HAIR dark

FACE oval

LAST ADDRESS STRANDHOTEL, OSTERAD DAHME.

LANGUAGES GERMAN

FATHER ~~FUHRMANN~~ *Del. circa. 1880.* FRIEDRICH pole nurse, 65 since 38/39 party member

MOTHER ~~FUHRMANN~~ *Del. circa. 1882.* AUGUSTE born MAUDISS 63 not party member

WIFE ~~FUHRMANN~~ *Del.* ELLI born SACHER last address Liebstadt by Dresden, but had the intention of going to Hof, Bavaria.

CHILDREN One boy of 1 year

~~SECRET~~

REF 64

APPENDIX No 5

1. FUHRMANN went to Lublinitz to school till 1922, then to Plackwitz a/d Oder, where the family had moved to 1924/27 he was an engineering apprentice. 1927 he volunteered for the police, and came to the police school in Meissen. Then till 1936 he was with the Shupo in Chemnitz. In the meantime he had joined the NSDAP.

2. July 1936 he was first detached to the Gestapo Saaher, 1937 transferred to the Stapoestelle Dresden. On 1.1.40. he was posted to RSHA Amt IV A 2 and stayed there till the end.

LAST DAYS OF THE WAR

3. F. left Berlin on April 21st., and had more or less the same itinerary as the rest of the personell of IV A 2. Only after Luebeck he teamed up with DOCK and eventually landed in Dahme, where he stayed till arrested with DOCK 30 May 45.

SPECIAL POINTS.

4. About his work there is nothing of special interest to report, Most of it is covered in KOPKOW's statements, and he gave no new aspects. Like the other cross-examinations this was used to check the reliability of KOPKOW.

5. Subject does not like KOPKOW as he thinks his promotion was not quick enough due to latter's influence, but he also denies any "Werewolf" conversations in Dahme.

CONCLUSION

6. FUHRMANN seems a steady, reliable type not over intelligent policeman. No reason to doubt his story and information.

RECOMMENDATION

INTERMENT

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APPENDIX No 6

PERSONAL PARTICULARS

NAME FRAU MASS ^(w) born PETERSEN CHRISTIAN NAME CHRISTINE

ALIAS NONE

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH ^{clal} 29.12.1910. Dorkholz, Dittmarschen Ger.

NATIONALITY GERMAN

OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE former OFFICE EMPLOYEE

RANK NIL

PHOTO NIL

HEIGHT 1.68 m

BUILD slim

HAIR blond

FACE longish

LAST PERMANENT ADDRESS DUMSTEDTFELD (SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN)

LANGUAGES GERMAN

FATHER CHRISTIAN PETERSEN businessman, since 1930 party member

MOTHER ~~ELSE~~ ^{PETERSEN} born JENSEN housewife, since 1931 party member

HUSBAND ALFRED MASS, GRENPOLIZEI, since 1932 party member

CHILDREN one BOY aged 7

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APPENDIX No 6

-
1. Frau HASS went to school in Kiel till 1926, then 1 year domestic science school and till 1935 she worked in a children's home. In 1931 she had already become a member of the NSDAP.
 2. As she had married in 1937 and had had a baby, she was exempt from war work till 1944 as her child was under 6. Then she had to go to work. She found a job at the RSHA IV A1, where she was put into the card index dept, as she couldn't type.
 3. 1.2.45. she was dismissed as all work was stopping in Berlin, and she was evacuated with her mother and child to Schleswig Holstein, where she was arrested on the 28.5.45.

SPECIAL POINTS

4. Frau HASS was employed for a short time in a very subordinate capacity at the Gestapo - 5½ months - and her knowledge of affairs and org. of the RSHA is very meagre. She did not work in KOPKOW's dept. but in IV A 1. She is the source for all the names of that office. As she was already dismissed 1st March 45, she knows nothing of the last moves or plans of the RSHA.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5. Frau HASS seemed quite truthful, as she was only employed as a kind of manual worker, and in respect of her mother and child it is recommended to

RELEASE HER IMMEDIATELY.

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-2-

6) Name: *HABECKER* Walter *dob. circa 1891*
 Rank: Kriminalkommissar.
 Address: Berlin-Weissensee.
 Description: About 54 years old, Height 1.75, thick-set figure, bald, blue eyes, fresh complexion, oval shaped head, wears plain clothes.
 General Remarks: —
 Last seen: See STEMPER.

Source: K. & R.

7) Name: *SCHULZ* Hermann. *dob. circa 1888*
 Rank: Kriminalinspektor.
 Address: Berlin-Osten.
 Description: About 55 to 57 years old, Height 1.72 to 1.75, slim figure, white hair parted right side, fresh complexion, oval shaped head, wears civilian clothes, dark horn-rimmed spectacles for reading.
 Last seen: Berlin.

Source: K. & R.

8) Name: *RIMLOW* Karl. *dob. circa 1895*
 Rank: Kriminalsekretaer, SS-Untersturmfuehrer.
 Address: Berlin-Osten.
 Description: 46 to 48 years old, Height 1.72, slim, completely bald, dark type, fresh complexion, long narrow face, uniform and civilian clothes.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSH, IV.

Source: K. & R.

9) Name: *HEISE* Ernst. *dob. circa 1897*
 Rank: Kriminalsekretaer, SS-Untersturmfuehrer.
 Address: Berlin-Osten.
 Description: About 47 to 48 years old, Height 1.70, slim, medium blond, blue eyes, fresh complexion, longish oval shaped head, uniform and civil clothes, wears spectacles for reading.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSH, IV.

Source: K. & R.

10) Name: *RUESTER* *dob. circa 1900*
 Rank: Kriminalsekretaer.
 Address: Eastern suburb of Berlin.
 Description: 44 to 45 years old, Height 1.70/75, robust build, thick-set, blond hair combed back, fresh red complexion, round shaped head, civilian clothes.
 Last Seen: Berlin.

Source: K. & R.

11) Name: *SCHLOMM* Hermann. *dob. circa 1909*
 Rank: Kriminalsekretaer, SS-Sturmscharfuehrer.
 Address: Berlin-Osten (bombed out).
 Description: About 36 years old, Height 1.70, ovalshaped face, thick-set, receding hair, fresh brown complexion, wears spectacles for reading, uniform and civilian clothes.
 Last seen, Southern Group.

Source: K. & R.

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-3-

- Bellevue*
- 12) Name: *W. W. W.* **WILHELM** Fritz. *dat. circa 1897*
 Rank: Kriminalobersekretaer
 Address: Berlin-Nordosten, Naeh Frankfurt Allee.
 Description: 47 to 48 years old, Height 1.75, strong thick-set figure, dark brown parted hair going grey, fresh comple-
 xion, long shaped head, at times wore a greyish beard, wears spectacles for reading, civilian clothes, Schwerin/Mecklbg. at the end of April 1945.
 Last Seen:
 Source: K. & R.
 - 13) Name: *W. W. W.* **MEYER** Hermann. *dat. circa 1923*
 Rank: Regierungsekretaer (Admin. Official)
 Address: Trebnitz near Berlin.
 Description: About 40 to 42 years old, Height 1.75, massive build, dark brown parted hair, pale full face, wears spec-
 taacles, civilian clothes and sometimes uniform.
 Last Seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: K. & R.
 - 14) Name: *W. W. W.* **RIEDEL** Erich. *dat. circa 1910*
 Rank: Kriminaloberassistent, SS-Hauptscharfuehrer.
 Address: Berlin Stuedosten (furnished flat).
 Description: 34 to 35 years old, Height 1.68, slim, slight forward stoop, dark blond hair, exceptional pale complexion, long shaped head, civilian clothes and uniform.
 Last Seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: K. & R.
 - 15) Name: *W. W. W.* **NORDMANN** Hans - alias Heinz NIEMANN. *dat. circa 1913*
 Rank: Kriminalassistent, SS-Oberscharfuehrer.
 Address: Berlin-Charlottenburg.
 Description: 32 years old, Height 1.83, slim build, light blond slightly wavy parted hair, blue eyes, fresh comple-
 xion, exceptionally good teeth, longish shaped head, wears horn-rimmed spectacles.
 Last seen: Last seen when leaving Berlin.
 Source: K. & R.
 - 16) Name: *W. W. W.* **KRUMELCH**. *dat. circa 1915*
 Rank: Kriminalkommissar, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer.
 Address: Many years in East Prussia.
 Description: 30 years old; 1.70 tall, thick set figure, dark hair, broad face, light complexion, uniform.
 He was only with RSHA IV. L. 2 for a few days in April 1945.
 Source: K. & R.
 - 17) Name: *W. W. W.* **LANGE** Hermann. *dat. circa 1900*
 Rank: Kriminalobersekretaer, SS-Unterscharfuehrer.
 Address: Berlin-Westen, (bombed out)
 Description: about 45 years old, Height 1.75, thinning hair, blue eyes, pale complexion, round shaped head, thick-set build, uniform and civilian clothes.
 Last seen: Berlin.
 Source: Erich Book.

17a) Name: *KALESKE Willy* *dob circa 1910*
 Rank: Kriminalsekretaer, SS-Hauptscharfuhrer.
 Address: Berlin-Westen,
 Description: 35 years old, Height 1.70, slim build, thick dark brown wavy hair, dark eyes, oval shaped full face, usually wears civilian clothes,
 Last seen: With the Army on the Eastern Front; presumably killed,
 Source: Eva Grimm.

II.) IVA 2 b.

18) Name: *AMPLETZER Thomas* *dob circa 1913*
 Rank: Kriminalrat, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer.
 Address: Berlin-Charlottenburg, Schlueterstrasse.
 Description: 32 years old, Height 1.65, slim weak build, dark brown hair combed back, pale complexion, high cheek bones, oval shaped head, uniform and civilian clothes,
 Last seen: Berlin.
 Source: K. & R.

19) Name: *STRUEBING Johannes* *dob circa 1903*
 Rank: Kriminalkommissar, SS-Obersturmfuehrer.
 Address: Berlin Weissensee.
 Description: 40 - 42 years old, Height 1.70, corpulent build, fair hair, fresh complexion, full face, oval shaped head, wears spectacles, uniform and civilian clothes,
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: K. & R.

20) Name: *MUELLER Hans* *dob circa 1913*
 Rank: Kriminalkommissar, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer.
 Address: Was living temporarily with Kriminalrat Ampletzer,
 Description: 32 years old, Height 1.80, very slim, fair parted hair, exceptionally pale complexion, longish shaped head, brown eyes, uniform and civilian clothes.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: K. & R.

21) Name: *MIKI Johannes* *dob circa 1908*
 Rank: Kriminalkommissar, SS-Untersturmfuehrer.
 Address: Berlin (furnished rooms) Wife in Olmuetz/OSR.
 Description: about 37 years old, Height 1.75, thick-set broad shouldered build, dark brown hair, pale complexion, full face, uniform and civil clothes.
 General Remarks: Speaks Viennese dialect.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: K. & R.

22) Name: *BIELEMEYER Wilhelm* *dob circa 1893*
 Rank: Kriminalobersekretaer.
 Address: Berlin-Neukoelln.
 Description: more than 50 years of age, Height 1.80, slim well built figure, fair thin hair, pale shrunken features, civilian clothes.
 General Remarks: Spoke Westphalian dialect.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: K. & R.

Order and names

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- 23) Name: ~~RICHTER~~ Waldemar, *dat. circa 1907*
Rank: Kriminalsekretär SS-Sturmscharführer.
Address: Eberswalde near Berlin, later Potsdam.
Description: 38 years old, Height 1.75, thick-set athletic build, fair hair, fresh complexion, gruff voice owing to throat trouble, uniform and civilian clothes.
Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
Source: K. & R.
- 24) Name: ~~KROGGSE~~ Erwin (called Muck), *dat. circa 1911*
Rank: Kriminalsekretär SS-Hauptsturmführer.
Address: Berlin-Nordosten (?)
Description: About 34 years old, Height 1.80, slim well developed athletic figure, light blond hair, almost bald in front, fresh full face, blue eyes, usually in uniform.
Last seen: Waffen-SS in Konitz. Later severely wounded in Lazarett Stolp.
Source: K. & R.
- 25) Name: ~~MUTWIG~~ Roland, *dat. circa 1914*
Rank: Kriminalassistent, SS-Oberscharführer,
Address: Berlin. Lived formerly in a flat with family in Laaehon.
Description: 34 years old, Height 1.95, broad shoulders, massive build, fair parted hair, blue eyes, fresh thin face, usually in uniform.
Last seen: Waffen-SS.
Source: K. & R.
- 26) Name: ~~WERTE~~ Herberth, (*dat. circa 1910* alias Jochen F.H.L., born Breslau 1907.
Rank: Kriminalkommissar, SS-Hauptsturmf. Buerovorsteher.
Address: Berlin. (Chief Clerk)
Description: Frau Sierkadorf, evacuated to Alt-Teichau, Kreis Radekau, 35 years old, Height 1.80, corpulent figure, fair parted hair, fresh complexion, brown eyes, oval shaped head, scarred face, uniform and civilian clothes.
General remarks: Speaks perfect French.
Last seen: Alt-Teichau. Intended to go to Bremen. Possibly staying with the director of "Bremer Baumwollboerse".
Pragerstr. 12. In possession of foreign currency.
Source: K. & R.
- 27) Name: ~~KLINGER~~ Fredy, *dat. circa 1910*
Rank: Kriminaloberassistent, SS-Hauptscharführer.
Address: Berlin-Westen. Wife bombed out in Hamburg.
Description: About 35 years old, Height 1.90, well built figure, fair parted hair, very pale complexion, long shaped head, light eyes, uniform and civilian clothes.
General Remarks: Spoke several Western European languages.
Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
Source: K. & R.
- 28) Name: ~~Voss~~ Richard, *dat. circa 1905*
Rank: Kriminalsekretär SS-Sturmscharführer.
Address: Berlin-Friedenau.
Description: 38/40 years old, Height 1.72, corpulent figure, getting fat, bald, reddish-blond hair at the sides, healthy full face, light eyes, oval shaped head, uniform and civilian clothes.
Last seen: Flensburg/Schleswig. Intended to go to Westphalia.
Source: K. & R.

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- Handwritten:* Please include and make
- 29) Name: HUEBNER Heinrich. *dob. 1898*
 Rank: Kriminalobersekretaer.
 Address: Berlin, Prenzlauer-Allee,
 Description: About 47 years old, Height 1.60, slim, greying parted hair, pale rather shrunken face, light eyes, comparatively big head, civilian clothes, occasionally uniform.
 Last Seen: Flensburg/Schleswig. Wanted to go to relations in
 Source: K. & R. Central Germany.
 - 30) Name: PICH Johannes. *dob. circa 1903*
 Rank: Kriminalsekretaer, SS-Sturmscharfuehrer.
 Address: Berlin-Neu Koelln.
 Description: 40/42 years old, Height 1.65, thick-set stocky build, fair hair, face noticeably lined, dark eyes, round shaped head, uniform and civilian clothes.
 General Remarks: Speaks distinct Austrian dialect.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: K. & R.
 - 31) Name: LORENZ Friedrich. *dob. circa 1897*
 Rank: Kriminalsekretaer,
 Address: Berlin-Pankow,
 Description: About 48 years old, Height 1.65, very slim build, light brown hair, lined face, light eyes, round shaped head, wears spectacles to read, civilian clothes, occasionally uniform.
 Last seen: With Mayerhof in Schwerin/Meckl.
 Source: K. & R.
 - 32) Name: GOGOLLA Gustav. *dob. circa 1903*
 Rank: Kriminalobersekretaer, SS-Untersturmfuehrer.
 Address: Berlin-Tempelhof (?)
 Description: About 40/42 years old; Height 1.80, very strong corpulent figure, grey wavy hair combed back, full fresh complexion, light eyes, round shaped head, civilian clothes and uniform.
 Last seen: Berlin. (ill in bed)
 Source: Eva Grimm.
 - 33) Name: FRANK. *dob. 1910*
 Rank: Kriminalsekretaer, SS-Untersturmfuehrer.
 Address: Berlin-Neu Koelln
 Description: 35 years old, Height 1.70, slim build, dark brown strong hair, strong beard growth, dark eyes, Longish oval shaped face, pale complexion, usually civilian clothes.
 General Remarks: Speaks Austrian dialect.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: E. Fuhrmann.
 - 34) Name: KERSCH Heinrich. *dob. circa 1913*
 Rank: Kriminalkommissar, SS-Untersturmfuehrer.
 Address: Temporarily in Berlin.
 Description: About 32 years old, Height 1.80, slim well built athletic pale complexion, uniform and civilian clothes,
 Last seen: Military Service. Presumably killed.
 Source: K. & R.

- Index with name*
- 35) Name: Mang Emil, *dob. circa. 1895*
 Rank: Kriminalobersekretär.
 Address: Berlin.
 Description: About 50 years old, Height 1,72, thick-set massive build, greying hair, dark eyes, oval shaped full face, pale complexion, Civilian clothes and uniform, wore spectacles when reading.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: E. Fuhrmann.
- 36) Name: *SOBEK* Gerhard, *dob. circa. 1908*
 Rank: Kriminalkommissar, SS-Obersturmführer,
 Address: Berlin-Westen.
 Description: 36/37 years old, Height 1,75, slim figure, bald in front, light eyes, longish oval shaped face, fresh complexion, uniform and civilian clothes, one eye noticeably small.
 Last seen: Berlin.
 Source: E. Book.
- 37) Name: *GOEFERT* Karl, *dob. circa 1900*
 Rank: Kriminalkommissar, SS-Untersturmführer.
 Address: BERLIN-Stralau-Rummelsburg.
 Description: About 45 years old, Height 1,68/70, thick-set figure, dark hair combed back, brown eyes, full face, pale, usually civilian clothes.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: E. Book.
- 38) Name: *BOEHME* Karl, *dob. circa 1905*
 Rank: Kriminalsekretär.
 Address: Berlin-Neu Koelln.
 Description: 38/40 years old, Height 1,70, slim figure, fair parted hair, light eyes, tough oval shaped face, civilian clothes and uniform.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: E. Book.

Other persons temporarily with IV A 2.

- 40) Name: *SAUERBIER* Kurt, *dob. circa 1900*
 Rank: SS-Untersturmführer der Allgemeinen SS.
 Address: Employee of Forschungsamt. (Research Dept.)
 Address: Berlin-Westen.
 Description: About 45 years old, Height: 1,62, very slim figure, dark type, dark brown hair combed back, light eyes, very narrow face, healthy complexion, usually civilian clothes, wears spectacles.
 Last seen: Flensburg. Wanted to go to Central Germany.
 Source: K. & R.

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41) Name: *Wohlfahrt Hans* WOHLFAHRT Hans *det. inc. 1915*
 Rank: SS-Scharfuehrer der Waffen-SS
 Notdienstverpflichteter (Emergency conscript)
 Civil Occupation: - Journalist.
 Address: Guestarow/Mecklbg.
 Description: About 30 years old, Height 1,75, slim, strong black hair, light eyes, healthy oval shaped face, wore civilian clothes and uniform.
 Last seen: Flensburg. Wanted to go to his wife at Schwerin/Mecklbg.
 Source: Eva Grim.

Supplement

IV 2 a.

- 42) Kriminalsekretær BOCK
 - 43) Kriminalsekretær E. FUHRMANN
 - 44) Kriminalsekretær U. KULLA
- } Now in Neumuenster Prison.
 } committed suicide.

IV 2 b.

- 45) Kriminalassistent H. STEINERT
 - 46) Kriminalassistent B. SCHEFFKE
- } Now in Neumuenster Prison.

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-9-

Heads of the Groups, Departments and Sub-Departments of RSHA IV.

- 1) Name: *D* MUELLER, Heinrich. *dat. circa. 1900*
Rank: Generalleutnant der Polizei, SS-Gruppenfuehrer.
Address: Berlin-Lankwitz, Corneliusstrasse.
Description: 45 years old, Height 1,58/59, slim, well built athletic figure, dark type, dark brown hair, greying at the temples, full face, fresh brown complexion, oval shaped head, uniform and civilian clothes.
Last seen: Berlin (last news about him 24.4.45)
Source: K.
- 2) Name: *D* Huppenkothen, Walter. *dat. circa. 1907*
Rank: Regierungsdirektor, Gruppenleiter - RSHA IV A
SS-Standartenfuehrer.
Address: Berlin-Grunowald.
Description: 37/38 years old, Height 1,78/80, strong well built body, fair parted hair, full rather soft face, round shaped head, light eyes, Civilian clothes and uniform,
Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV since middle of April 1945.
Source: K.
- 3) Name: *D* LITZENBERG. *dat. circa. 1895*
Rank: Oberregierungsrat, SS-Sturmabfuhrer.
Address: Had permanent flat in Berlin.
Description: About 50 years old, Height 1,80, strong slim build, blond thin hair going bald, pale lined face, oval shaped face, believed to have scars on face, uniform and civilian clothes,
Last seen: Presumably in Berlin.
Source: K.
- 4) Name: *D* FUETZ, Guenther. *dat. 1913*
Rank: Kriminalrat, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer.
Head of RSHA IV A 1 a.
Address: Berlin-Westen, near U-Bahnhof Onkel-Toms-Huette.
Description: 32 years old, Height 1,72/75, strong thick-set build, very blond hair, blue eyes, longish full face, healthy complexion, Uniform and Civilian clothes.
Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
Source: K.
- 5) Name: *D* SADER. *dat. circa. 1907*
Rank: Kriminalrat, SS-Sturmabfuhrer.
Head of RSHA IV A 1 b.
Address: Berlin-Tempelhof (?).
Description: About 36 years old, Height 1,75, slim figure, blond parted hair, light eyes, pale complexion, several scars on face, usually civilian clothes, but also uniform.
Last seen: Northern Group at Osterfeld/Holstein 6.5.45.
Source: K.

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Index last name

del. circa 1898

- 6) Name: *Index last name* QUETTING Wilhelm (?)
 Rank: Regierungsrat SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer
 Head of RSHA IV A 3.
 Address: Had a permanent flat in Berlin.
 Description: 48/50 years old; Height 1,78, well built slim figure, greying dark hair, strong beard growth, narrow full face, wore spectacles for reading, usually civilian clothes sometimes uniform.
 Last seen: Northern Group of RSHA IV at Flensburg 6.5.45.
 Had the intention to go to the Zollgrenzschutz (Customs) at Husum or Niebuell.
 Source: K. & R.

- 7) Name: *Index last name* (Dr.) SCHAEFER *del. circa 1897*
 Kriminaldirektor, SS-Sturmbannfuhrer. Head of Dept. IVa 3 a of RSHA.
 Address: Furnished room in Berlin.
 Description: About 48 years old, Height 1,75/78, strong corpulent figure, fair hair; full roundish face, fresh complexion, wears spectacles, usually civilian clothes but also uniform.
 Last seen: Berlin, until the end of April 1945 ill in bed.
 Source: K.

- 8) Name: *Index last name* SCHILLER. *del. circa 1895*
 Rank: Oberstleutnant der Wehrmacht Head of RSHA IV A 3 b
 Address: ???
 Description: 50 years old, Height 1,78/80, slim well built figure, thick blond hair, blue eyes, strongly marked face, Officer type, narrow shaped head, wore uniform.
 Last seen: Central Germany.
 Source: K.

- 9) Name: *Index last name* TISCHER. *del. circa 1900*
 Rank: Kriminalrat, SS-Sturmbannfuhrer.
 Head of RSHA IV A 3 c.
 Address: Berlin.
 Description: About 45 years old, Height 1,72, thick-set figure, fast greying hair combed back, oldish appearance, oval shaped face, healthy complexion, uniform and civilian clothes,
 Last seen: Northern Group of RSHA IV at Flensburg 6.5.45.
 Had the intention to go to the Zollgrenzschutz (Customs) in Husum or Niebuell.
 Source: K.

- 10) Name: *Index last name* Eichmann. *del. circa 1907*
 Rank: SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer in the SD.
 Head of RSHA IV A 4 and IV A 4 a.
 Address: Berlin.
 Description: About 38/40 years old, about 1,68, tall, thick-set build, light blond hair, full oval shaped face, mostly wore uniform.
 Last seen: In Berlin until about the 15.4.45.
 Source: K.

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- 11) Name: *GUENTHER* *dob. circa. 1907*
 Rank: SS-Sturmbannfuhrer in the SD.
 Address: Head of RSHA IV A 4 a. until March 1945.
 Berlin.
 Description: 36/38 years old, Height 1,80, well built slim figure, blond parted hair, blue eyes, narrow shaped head, fresh full face, usually in uniform.
 Last seen: Kommandeur der Sipo and SD Linz, since March 1945.
 Source: K.
- 12) Name: *Dr. JAHR* *dob. circa 1907*
 Rank: Regierungsrat, SS-Sturmbannfuhrer. Head of RSHA IV A 4 b
 Address: ???
 Description: 38 years old Height approx. 1.80, very slim, fair parted thick hair, oval fresh face, dark eyes, wears spectacles, uniform and civilian clothes.
 Last seen: Northern Group of RSHA IV. at Ostenfeld/Schleswig 6.5.45.
 Source: K.
- 14) Name: *SANDERS* (former name *SAMERSKY*) *dob. circa 1909*
 Rank: Kriminaldirektor, SS-Sturmbannfuhrer,
 Address: Head of RSHA IV A 5 b.
 Berlin-Charlottenburg.
 Description: 36 years old, Height 1.72, thick-set slightly fat figure, thick fair parted hair, dark eyes, full fresh complexion, oval shaped face, uniform and civilian clothes.
 Last seen: Ostenfeld/Schleswig 6.5.45.
 Source: Wanted to go to Central Germany.
 K.
- 15) Name: *Dr. BERNDORFF* *dob. circa 1895*
 Rank: Oberregierungs- und Kriminalrat, SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer,
 Address: Head of Department RSHA IV A 6 and Sub-Dept IV A 6 a.
 Berlin.
 Description: About 50 years old, Height 1,60, very slim build, bald, (completely), oval shaped head, small strongly lined face, uniform and civilian clothes, wears spectacles for reading.
 Last seen: Northern Group of RSHA IV, at Ostenfeld/Schleswig 6.5.45.
 Source: Wanted to go to Breiholz/Schleswig to his family.
 K.
- *(13 omitted from above)
- 13) Name: *SCHULZ* *dob. circa 1890*
 Rank: Regierungs- und Kriminalrat, SS-Sturmbannfuhrer.
 Address: Head of RSHA IV A 5 a.
 Berlin-Pankow.
 Description: About 54/55 years old, Height 1,68/70, corpulent, bald, oval shaped full face, light eyes, scars on face, uniform and civilian clothes, wears spectacles for reading.
 Last seen: Northern Group of RSHA IV, Ostenfeld/Schleswig 6.5.45.
 Source: K.

- 16) Name: *WITZEL. Johannes. dob. circa 1895*
 Rank: Polizeirat, SS-Sturmabfuhrer. Head of RSHA IV A 6 b
 Address: Berlin-Nordosten.
 Description: About 50 years old, Height 1.75, strong thick-set body, bald, pale full round face, round shaped head, hook nose, wears spectacles for reading, usually civilian clothes. ill.
 Last seen: Presumably Theresienstadt/CSR. April 1945.
- 17) Name: *Dr. HOEHNER Heinz. dob. circa 1907*
 Rank: Oberregierungsrat, SS-Sturmabfuhrer.
 Address: Head of Dept. IV B 4 and SUB-Dept. IV B 4 a. Berlin.
 Description: About 36/38 years old, Height 1.75, very slim, fair parted hair, thin narrow face, very distinct hook nose, oval shaped head, uniform and civilian clothes,
 Last seen: Presumably Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: K.
- 18) Name: *CLEMENS. dob. circa 1910*
 Rank: Kriminalrat SS-Sturmabfuhrer.
 Address: Head of RSHA IV B 4 b. Berlin.
 Description: About 35 years old, Height 1.78, slim athletic figure, very blond hair, receding on forehead, oval shaped full face, fresh complexion, Blue eyes, Uniform and civilian clothes.
 Last seen: Northern Group of RSHA until it dissolved at Osterfeld
 Source: K. 6.5.45.
- 19) Name: *RAUCH dob. circa 1905*
 Rank: Kriminalrat, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer,
 Address: Head of RSHA IV B 1 c. ???
 Description: About 40 years old, Height 1.65, thick set figure, dark type, dark brown almost black hair, pale full face, crooked big nose, wears spectacles for reading, uniform and civilian clothes.
 General Remarks: Speaks Bavarian Dialect.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV
 Source: K.
- 20) Name: *THOMSEN. Harro. dob. circa 1911*
 Rank: Regierungsrat, SS-Sturmabfuhrer.
 Address: Head of RSHA IV B 2 b and Deputy of IV B 2. Berlin.
 Description: 33/34 years old, Height 1.78, very slim, blond straight hair, blue eyes, long shaped head, full healthy face, uniform and civilian clothes.
 Last seen: Northern Group of RSHA. at Osterfeld/Schleswig Holstein 6.5.45.
 Source: K.

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-13-

- Just each name*
- 21) Name: (Dr) ISSELHORST. *dat. circa 1905*
Rank: Regierungsdirektor, SS-Standartenfuhrer.
Head of RSHA IV 3.3.
Address: ???
Description: 40 years old, Height 1.78, slim figure, fair parted hair, blue eyes, uniform.
Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
Source: K
- 22) Name: HILLIGES. *dat. circa 1910*
Rank: Kriminalrat, SS-Sturmabfuhrer.
Head of RSHA IV D 3 b.
Address: Presumably Innsbruck.
Description: 45 years old, Height 1.83, well built figure, fair parted hair, oval thin lined face, uniform and civilian clothes, wears spectacles to read.
Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA.
Source: K
- 23) Name: KRUSE. *dat. circa 1885*
Rank: Ministerialrat,
Head of RSHA IV D 4.
Address: Berlin-Norden.
Description: 58/60 years old, Height 1.72, slim build with forward stoop, bald, long narrow face, noticeable pale complexion, strong nose, only civilian clothes, wears spectacles for reading.
Last seen: Berlin.
Source: K
- 24) Name: KROENING. *dat. circa 1897*
Rank: Ober-Regierungsrat, SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer.
Head of RSHA IV D 4 a.
Address: ???
Description: About 45/48 years old, (?), Height 1.80, fair hair, small head, full healthy face, wears spectacles, uniform and civilian clothes.
Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
Source: K
- 25) Name: WILKE. *dat. circa 1890*
Rank: Regierungsrat, SS-Sturmabfuhrer.
Head of RSHA IV D 4 b.
Address: Presumably Berlin.
Description: 50/55 years old, Height 1.65, slim well built figure, dark brown parted hair, brown complexion, small head, crooked nose, uniform and civilian clothes, spectacles when reading.
Last seen: Northern Group of RSHA IV at Ostenfeld/Schleswig 6.5.45.
Source: K
- 26) Name: JAROSCH Erwin. *dat. circa 1910*
Rank: Polizeirat, SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer.
Head of RSHA IV D 4 o.
Address: Berlin-Potsdam.
Description: About 35 years old, Height 1.70, slim, fair parted hair, oval shaped head, blue eyes, fresh healthy complexion, uniform and civilian clothes, wears horn rimmed spectacles,
Last seen: Northern Group of RSHA IV at Ostenfel/Schleswig 6.5.45.
Source: K

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- Index card name*
- 27) Name: LISCHKA *dob. circa. 1907*
Rank: Ober-Regierungsrat, SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer.
Deputy Gruppenleiter of RSHA IV B.
Address: Berlin.
Description: 38 years old, Height 1.85, strong well built figure, receding hair, oval shaped face, light eyes, big pale face, uniform and civilian clothes, spectacles.
Last seen: Northern Group of RSHA IV at Osterfeld/Schleswig 6.5.45.
Source: K.
- 28) Name: NAESSLER *dob. circa. 1913*
Rank: Kriminalkommissar, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer.
Head of Section RSHA IV B "Auslaendische Arbeiter" (Foreign workers)
Address: ???
Description: 32 years old, Height 1.70, thick-set figure, strong fair parted hair, dark eyes, round face, pale complexion, uniform and civilian clothes.
Last seen: Northern Group of RSHA IV at Osterfeld/Schleswig 6.5.45.
Source: K.
- 29) Name: ~~Halmannseger~~ LNU *dob. circa. 1895*
Rank: Kriminalkommissar, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer.
Head of a Section RSHA IV N.
Address: Berlin-Westen.
Description: About 50 years old, Height 1.78, thick-set strong body, fair greying hair, long shaped head, full pale lined face, uniform and civilian clothes, spectacles for reading,
General Remarks: Speaks Bavarian Dialect.
Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
Source: K.
- 30) Name: PIEPER Hans. *dob. circa 1903*
Rank: Regierungsrat, SS-Sturmbannfuehrer.
Head of Geschaeftsstelle IV - RSHA.
Address: Berlin-Zehlendorf-West.
Description: About 40/42 years old, Height 1.70, thick-set figure, longish oval shaped face, strong beard growth, full pale face, dark brown parted hair, beginning to go bald, protruding lips, uniform and civilian clothes, spectacles,
Last seen: Northern Group of RSHA IV at Osterfeld/Schleswig 6.5.45.
Source: K.
- 31) Name: SCHLANN *dob. circa. 1903*
Rank: Oberst der Polizei, SS-Oberfuehrer.
Deputy Generalgrenzinspekteur RSHA IV
Address: Ludwigslust/Mecklbg. probably at Wyk auf Foehr, later.
Description: 45 years old, Height 1.80, massive build, fair straight hair, longish shaped head, full fresh face, uniform and civilian clothes, wears spectacles for reading.
Last seen: Flessburg. Most likely with his family at Wyk auf Foehr.
Source: K. & R.

Sub-Department IV A 1 a RSHA.

Head of this Department: Kriminalrat PUETZ - See 3 Number 4)

- 32) Name: *RIKOWSKI* *dob. circa. 1895*
 Rank: Kriminalkommissar,
 Deputy of Sub-Dept. RSHA IV A 1 a.
 Address: Berlin.
 Description: About 50 years old, Height 1.78, broad shoulders, dark greying hair, long shaped head, full fresh face, always civilian clothes,
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: Frau Hass.
- 33) Name: *"Eckerle" LNU* *dob. circa. 1895*
 Rank: Regierungs-Oberinspektor, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer,
 Expert in IV A 1 a.
 Address: Berlin.
 Description: About late forties, Height 1.65, slim figure, dark type, dark brown smooth parted hair, wears spectacles, pale lined longish face, uniform and civilian clothes.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: Frau Hass.
- 34) Name: *BRANDT.* *dob. circa 1897*
 Rank: Kriminalrat, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer,
 attached to Sub-Department IV A 1 a
 Address: ???
 Description: 46/48 years old, Height 1.68, slim figure, fair straight hair, blue eyes?, lined oldish looking face, wears spectacles when reading, uniform and civilian clothes,
 Last seen: Northern Group of RSHA IV at Ostenfeld/Schleswig 6.5.45.
 Source: Frau Hass.
- 35) Name: *HUSE* *dob. circa 1919*
 Rank: Kriminalsekretaer, SS-Sturmscharfuehrer.
 Address: ???
 Description: Early thirties, very tall, fair hair, wide lips, round pale face, wearing uniform.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: Frau Hass.
- 36) Name: *BORDASCH.* *dob. circa. 1913*
 Rank: Kriminalsekretaer, SS-Sturmscharfuehrer.
 Address: ???
 Description: 30/32 years old, small, very slim, fair hair, pale face, uniform.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: Frau Hass.
- 37) Name: *PROTZNER.* *dob. circa 1910*
 Rank: Kriminalsekretaer, SS-Sturmscharfuehrer.
 Address: ???
 Description: Between 30 and 40 years old, Height 1.65, thick black hair, noticeable gold teeth, pale round face, uniform.
 General Remarks: Believed to have been a baker.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: Frau Hass.

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Index each name

- 38) Name: ~~SEMPKE.~~ *del. circa. 1943*
 Rank: Kriminalsekretar:
 Address: Berlin.
 Description: About 42 years old, Height 1.70, very fat swollen figure, very blond hair, beginning to go bald, round pale face, always wore civilian clothes.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: Frau Hass.
- 39) Name: ~~SCHULZ.~~ *del. circa. 1945*
 Rank: -
 Address: ?
 Description: About, 40 years old, Height 1.78, very thin, fair hair, noticeably bad teeth, pale long lined face, limped on one foot, always wore civilian clothes.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: Frau Hass.
- 40) Name: ~~NEUMANN.~~ *del. circa 1910*
 Rank: Kriminalsekretar, SS-Sturmscharfuehrer.
 Address: Berlin.
 Description: 34/35 years old, Height 1.65, corpulent figure, fair parted hair, full pale longish face, spectacles, uniform and civilian clothes,
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: Frau Hass.
- 41) Name: ~~VETZ.~~ Herbert. *del. circa. 1907*
 Rank: Kriminalassistent, - Ober- oder SS-Hauptsoharsfuehrer.
 Address: ?
 Description: About 36 years old, small thin build, dark hair, pale long face, uniform and civilian clothes.
 General Remarks: Speaks Rhineland Dialect.
 Last seen: Souther Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: Frau Hass.
- 42) Name: ~~RASCH.~~ *del. circa. 1907*
 Rank: Kriminalsekretar, SS-Sturmscharfuehrer
 Address: ?
 Description: Late thirties, tall, slim, very dark hair, spectacles, small moustache, fresh complexion, oval face, usually uniform.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: Frau Hass.
- 43) Name: ~~WESTERMANN~~ Wilhelm *del. circa. 1910*
 Rank: Kriminalkommissar, SS-Untersturmfuehrer
 Address: ?
 Description: About 35 years old, Height 1.75, very strong build, broad shoulders, fair wavy hair, blue eyes, chubby fresh round face, uniform.
 Last seen: Southern Group of RSHA IV.
 Source: Frau Hass.
- 44) Name: ~~HEROLD.~~ *del. circa 1890*
 Rank: Polizeioberinspektor, SS-Hauptsturnfuehrer.
 Address: Berlin-Charlottenburg.
 Description: About 55 years old, Height 1.70, thin build, bald (completely) sharp featured, pale yellow complexion, uniform, spectacles when reading.
 Last seen: Berlin (?)
 Source: K. & R.

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(When Issued)

NOTE: Consult the 201 Control System Reference Manual before completing this form. Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

TO: RID []	DATE 27 OCT 59	ACTION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPEN <input type="checkbox"/> AMEND <input type="checkbox"/> CLOSE
FROM: SR/3-CE []	ROOM NO. 1509 J	TELEPHONE 3839

SECTION I

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SENSITIVE <input type="checkbox"/> NON-SENSITIVE	SOURCE DOCUMENT XX-9639, 29 Oct 1945	
NAME (Last) KOPKOW,	(First) Horst	(Middle) (Title)
		3. SEX <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> M <input type="checkbox"/> F

NAME VARIANT

2. TYPE NAME	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)

4. PHOTO <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	5. BIRTH DATE D 29 M 11 Y 10	6. COUNTRY OF BIRTH GERM	7. CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP GERMANY?
OTHER IDENTIFICATION				8. OTHER IDEN CODE 1. 2. 3.
OCCUPATION/POSITION				9. OCC/POS CODE

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

10. COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE	11. PRIMARY DESK INTEREST SR, []	12. 2ND COUNTRY INTEREST	12A. 3RD COUNTRY INTEREST
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COMMENTS
During WWII, was a member of the Abwehr who investigated activities of the SIS against Germany.

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
2000

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

PERMANENT CHARGE	RESTRICTED FILE	SIGNATURE []
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NWC-001A56

FIELD INTERROGATION REPORTONHORST KOPKOW

(2 PARTS)

PART II

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Organisation of RSHA Amt IV, its Field of Activity and Personnel known.1) Chief of Amt IV.

Gruppenfuhrer Generalleutnant der Polizei Mueller whose home was at Munich was a member of the Bavarian Police before 1933 and finally held the rank of Kriminalinspektor. The RF-SS (Himmler) took him to Berlin at the time that he (RF-SS) took over from Goering the leadership of the Gestapo in Prussia, where he became the successor to Flesch, the former Chief of the Political Dept, about 1934. - in contrast to the Counter Espionage Dept., Departments II and III were unified at the time when the Gestapo was absorbed into the Reichsicherheitshauptamt to form RSHA IV where Mueller remained Chief until the end of the war. Mueller was on very close terms with Heydrich but his relationship with Obergruppenfuhrer Kaltenbrunner was of a milder nature. Mueller remained in Berlin, so I was told by other departmental chiefs, and also by one of my colleagues called Ampletzer, who also stayed in Berlin, although he had been ordered to leave.

Mueller was responsible for all groups, departments, and sub-departments of Amt IV. He directed all Stapo Stations through Amt IV, and was the representative of the Chief of Sipo in Stapo matters. Furthermore he was generalgrenzinspekteur (Inspector General) of Frontiers that is to say he was responsible for Dienststelle IV G (Office) as regards frontier questions concerning persons but not customs matters. IV G will be described separately. One of his main interests was shown to IV N Stelle (Office) which was the Amt IV information collating office in charge of which was SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer Halmannseger, with whom Mueller was a very close friend, as a result of their both coming from the same locality.

His A.D.C. was SS-Obersturmfuhrer Albert Duhstein and Kriminalsekretaer Schulmacher worked in his office.

IV Geschaeftsstelle was responsible to the Chief of Amt IV personally.

This department was in the charge of Regierungsrat, SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Hans Pieper, an administrative official. Through his hands came matters of promotion, accomodation and feeding. He was also responsible for pay, sick and health reports and the granting of leave. SS-Obersturmfuhrer Otzel and a number of smaller administrative officials as well as office clerks worked under him (Pieper). Furthermore IV Geschaeftsstelle was responsible for the prison at Prinz-Albrechtstrasse 8 and the Gestapo Identity Office. The last time Pieper and I were together was at Arbeitsdienstlager Qstenfeld.

2) Group IV A.

The post of Groupleader was filled by SS-Standartenfuhrer und Regierungsdirektor Walter Huppenkothen who held the appointment of Deputy Groupleader. He was Groupleader of IV E (Counter Intelligence) for about a year before the last reorganisation of Amt IV. In his capacity as Groupleader of IVA he was responsible for all departments and sub-departments from IV A 1 to IV A 6. A week before 21st April, that is to say the day of our departure, Huppenkothen went south and was to have joined the Southern Group but I have no idea of where he went. The office was purely an H.Q. A Kriminalobersekretaer, who was getting on in years and a shorthand-typist, were the only ones who worked with him.

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations
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Department IV A 1.

Ober-Regierungsrat SS-Sturmabfuhrer Litzenberg was the Head of the Department. For many years he was in charge of IV A 1 b, combatting Right Wing Opposition. He did not come with the Northern Group and I do not know if he went to the Southern Group.

IV A 1 a.

Although not confirmed, Kriminalrat SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Guenther Puetz was Head of this sub-department. He can be regarded as the best theoretical Gestapo expert on the subject of Communism in general. The entire Left Wing Opposition, that is to say the combatting of Communism, Marxism and their affiliations, came under his jurisdiction. During the war IV A 1 a dealt with German Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union, the German Legion in the SU, the formation of the "Free German National Committee (Seydlitz-Group), Anti-fascist schools in the SU, the League of German Officers and the return of German Prisoners of War to Germany. IV A 2 had the closest contact with this sub-department because of its close co-operation with IV A 2 a and IV A 2 b, I am therefore able to give extensive details about the facts concerning the SU. At the beginning of March 1945 Puetz was posted to the Staff of Amt IV in Hof, Bavaria, and should have finally been with the Southern Group.

Members of the Sub-Department:- Kriminalkommissar Sinner,
Kriminalkommissar Rikowski, Kriminalkommissar Westermann and Oberinspektor
Eckerle,

IV A 1 b.

Ober-Regierungsrat Litzenberg who has already been mentioned was for many years Head of this Department. In the last months, Kriminalrat SS-Sturmabfuhrer Sader took his place. Sader came with the Northern Group as far as Otenfeld but I do not know where he went to from there. The Sub-Department dealt with the combatting of Right Wing Opposition, that is to say especially with reactionary and opposition circles and with the Austrian Monarchists. This department carried the main burden of the events on 20th July. It is the office which most of all dealt with matters in connection with the Officer class, aristocracy and Monarchists, etc.

IV A 2. See Special Report.

Dept. IV A 3.

After the former Abwehrgruppe IV E was dissolved Standartenfuhrer Huppenkothen temporarily took charge of this department. His successor was Regierungsrat SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Quetting who at the same time was also in charge of the sub-department for Economics, before joining the Gestapo, Quetting was a Customs Official dealing with currency regulations. From this activity he obtained a fairly extensive knowledge of German economy, the internal structure and factors connected with it. In his Sub-Department IV A 3D all cases concerning German economy, the Armament Industry, and Economic Espionage were dealt with.

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Sub-Dept. IV A 3 a.

This department was in the charge of a long experienced Intelligence expert Kriminaldirektor SS-Sturmabfuhrer Dr Schaefer. This man came from the Rhine and was active for many years with the Stapo in Frankfurt/M. The department dealt with Counter Espionage in general, that is to say with those cases which did not come under any specified country and in addition it observed Espionage in general.

IV A 3 a issued C.I. News sheets to all Stapo Stations and further dealt with deserters, passive resisters, the use of carrier pigeons, etc. His Deputy was Kriminaldirektor SS-Sturmabfuhrer Haussler who as far as I know also went to the Southern Group. Schaefer did not join the Northern Group and as far as I know he must have stayed in Berlin as he was confined to bed.

IV A 3 b

See details of Quetting under Department IV A 3. His permanent Deputy was Oberstleutnant Keller who joined Amt IV from the Wehrmacht. In conversation once with Quetting I learnt that this man had gone to Central Germany (destination unknown).

IVA 3 c.

The department dealt with questions regarding the safeguarding of Industry in general and posted all political police Intelligence Commissioners to branches of Armament and important war industries in Germany. It was responsible that with these Intelligence Commissioners courses at the various Stapo Stations were held where lectures about Counter Espionage and Counter Sabotage in Industry were given. At these meetings the alien problem played an important part. The office further concerned itself with all questions regarding the Work Protection Force in the Armament Industry as for instance with legal matters, Work Protection Force subordination matters, its clothing and weapons.

Kriminalrat, SS-Sturmabfuhrer Tischer was the Head of the department. He went with the Northern Group as far as Ostenfeld but his present whereabouts are unknown.

Department IV A 4

SS-Obersturmabfuhrer Eichmann was the Head of the Department after being transferred to the Gestapo from the SD. He did not have any official rank. His office was separate from the other Amt IV offices and was situated in a former Masonic Lodge in Kurfurstenstrasse near the Zoo. His Deputy was SS-Sturmabfuhrer Guenther who had also been transferred from the SD and who in the last months before the end of the war was made Commander of a Sipo H.Q. in Austria.

I can not say much about Sub-Dept. IVA 4 a as I never had any working contact with it. I only knew it dealt generally with all questions regarding Jews and anyone with Jewish blood and with the issue of Jewish Stars. The Altersghetto in Theresienstadt, Czechoslovakia, was directly controlled by this department.

I have no idea of Eichmann's whereabouts. He was last in Berlin where he belonged to the H.Q. Staff Warnsee. The Department IV A 4 a dealt with property confiscated by the Stapo.

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IV A 4 b

Regierungsrat SS-Sturmbannführer Dr Jahr was the head of the department. He came with me to the Northern Group in Ostenfeld where I saw him at the beginning of May. This department dealt with Political Protestantism and Catholicism, with sects such as Bible Students and if I am not mistaken with Freemasonry. Information about the activity of the Catholic Bishops and Clergy in Germany reached this Dept. and furthermore the endeavours of the Evangelical Confessionalists. I know from conversations that the work of this department was extremely difficult as owing to the continual countermands, especially during the war, scarcely any executive interventions could be made. The avowed antagonism towards the church before the outbreak of war had to be avoided under all circumstances in times of stress.

Department IV A 5

The position of Head of this department was vacant. The fields of activity are described under IV A 5 a and IV A 5 b.

IV A 5 a

Regierungsrat SS-Sturmbannführer Schulz was in charge of the "Schutzdienst" (Protection Service). He worked in close co-operation with the "Reichssicherheitsdienst des RF-SS" (Hitler's State Security Service, abbreviated RSD), which was in the charge of SS-Brigadeführer Rattenhuber. Whilst the "Reichssicherheitsdienst" was always responsible for providing bodyguards for Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, Ribbentrop and other prominent persons, Sturmbannführer Schulz for example had to take the necessary measures to prevent any kind of disturbance whatsoever occurring at big public meetings.

I cannot give exact details about the dealings of special cases by IV A 5 a but I know that internal events in the Amt from time to time, for instance the committing of an offence by an official, were dealt with by this department.

IV A 5 a had to keep contact with the Research Dept. of the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (Air Ministry).

Schulz belonged to the Northern Group and left Berlin on 21st April going to Ostenfeld via Schwerin. His present whereabouts are unknown.

A Kriminalkommissar who worked in Sturmbannführer Schulze's office, and who as far as I know remained in Berlin, was called Mathieu.

IVA 5 b

This Sub-Department was in the charge of Kriminaldirektor SS-Sturmbannführer Sanders. Sanders had changed his name a few years ago at the Registry Office, his former name being Samerski.

All cases concerning the NSDAP and its Affiliations were dealt with by this department. The Party had its own Law Courts and judged non-disciplinary matters. But this had nothing to do with IV A 5 b. It was the duty of this department to deal with all those cases in which leading

Party Members were implicated and which must be legally tried. I emphasise once again that this did not concern ordinary Party Members without rank ie. up to and including Ortsgruppenleiter, but was mainly concerned with the supervision and accusation of Party Members from Kreisleiter upwards and high SA, SS, NSKK leaders etc. I know that this department collected important and extensive information about a large number of leading Party Members which would have justified their arrest at any time.

As the "Partelleitung" (Executive Council) had to be consulted before arrests were made a number of cases were hushed up. The work of this department was extremely difficult because Sanders was constantly exposed to attack in consequence of his activity against leading personalities of the Party.

Sanders was finally with the Northern Group in Ostenfeld at the beginning of May. As he wanted to go to Central Germany I took him in my car across the Kiel Canal as far as Bad Bramstadt. He went in a Southern direction (Elbe) and I continued towards Bad Segeberg together with Kriminalsekretar Kulla.

As the Government remained in Berlin, Gruppenfuhrer Muller ordered that this sub-department should also stay there until the end. As Sanders was the only one of the department present in Ostenfeld the majority must have stayed in Berlin.

Department IV A 6

SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr. Berndorff was the Head of this Department. He belonged to the oldest leading executive officials of the Amt and was at the same time in charge of Sub-Department IVA 6a.

Sub-Dept. IVA 6 a.

This office had a fairly big scope and dealt with the technical developments of all matters concerning detention. It had direct contact with SS-Gruppenfuhrer Glucks, the Inspector of Concentration Camps, who resided in Oranienburg near Berlin. As far as I am able to say, this office kept the detention proceedings of every single person as well as the usual Stapo Personal Dossiers. The Stapo Stations that is to say Commanders had to propose arrests through this Department. The office had nothing to do with the internal organisation and disciplinary action taken against Concentration Camp prisoners. This was done by the SS Economic and Administration Main Office (Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt SS) Amtsgruppe D, which also was in charge of the Guard Personnel.

Kriminalrat Forster was Dr. Berndorff's Deputy. Whereabouts unknown. I last saw Berndorff at the Northern Group in Ostenfeld on 6th May.

IV A 6 b

This Sub-Department kept the Personal Dossiers of all persons connected with politics and the Stapo Card Index. It was a purely administrative machine employing 200 persons whose job was to keep the card index and dossiers up to date. This administrative staff and documents were moved from Berlin to Theresienstadt, CSR, in 1944 on account of air raids. From conversation with other members of the department I learnt that everything had been destroyed a few weeks before finished. SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Polizeirat Johannes Witzel was the Head of the Department. SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer Regierungsamtman ~~Karl Mauch~~ was his Deputy. ~~Polizeileber-Inspektor Kurt Spiecker~~ was in charge of the supervision of foreigners and their card index. SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer ~~Karl Spaeth~~ was in charge of the "Reputation" Dept. and ~~Polizeiinspektor SS-Obersturmfuhrer Erich Richter~~ was his Deputy. The Card Index itself was in the charge of ~~Polizeiobersekretar Erich Parant~~. ~~Polizeiobersekretar Zager~~ was in charge of the filing administration.

Before describing the fields of activity of Group IV B it must be pointed out that they were substantially different from those of Group IV A with the exception of Dept. IV A 4 and IV A 6. The work in the Depts IVA 1, IV A 2, IVA 3, and IV A 5 was of strong criminalistic nature and questions of a political nature were only slightly dealt with. In contrast, Group IV B was responsible for all general political questions, for instance foreign labour and the resistance movement in the Occupied Territories. Dept. IV B 4 must be excluded as it represented purely a section of the Home Office and was exclusively staffed by Civil Servants dealing with general passport and permit questions in Germany and the Occupied Territories.

3) Group IV B.

Ober-Regierungsrat SS-Obersturmbannführer Lischka was the Head of the Group and in that capacity represented the Group's affairs. Before he came to the Amt Lischka was temporary Commander of the Sipö and SD in Paris until about the end of 1943. He was ordered by the Chief of Amt IV to take charge of the Northern Group and was present in Ostenfeld until 6th May. As Deputy Group Leader he was actually in charge. The only people in his office were a shorthand-typist and an i.D.C. SS-Obersturmführer Fritz Jahn. Section IV "Foreign Workers" (Sachgebiet IV ausländische Arbeiter came directly under Lischka's control. This section dealt with all general questions regarding foreigners in Germany and was in close contact with the Ministry of Labour (Office of Gauleiter Sauckel) and the German Labour Front. It also dealt with all questions of accommodation of foreigners in camps, curfews etc.

Kriminalkommissar SS-Hauptsturmführer Hassler was the head of this section and was finally with the Northern Group in Ostenfeld.

Dept. IV B 1.

The Head of the Dept. IV B 1 and also Sub-Dept. IV B 1 a was Ober-regierungsrat SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Heinz Hoehner who was previously Chief of the Stapo Station at Wilhelmshaven. Hoehner was posted to the South and may have last been found with the Southern Group. The Department dealt entirely with the occupied territories to the west and North of Germany. For details see the following description.

Sub-Dept. IV B 1 a.

Head of this Dept., as already mentioned, was Ober-Regierungsrat Dr. Hoehner. His Deputy (?) was SS-Hauptsturmführer Kriminalrat Seibold whose present whereabouts are unknown; presumably in Southern Germany.

The department dealt with all incidents in Occupied France and Belgium; chiefly centred on the national Resistance Movements. It issued general instructions on how to treat Resistance Members and also dealt to the same extent with pro-German Groups in these countries. Frenchmen and Belgians in Germany, mostly used for labour, were also dealt with by this department. Similarly this department dealt with counter espionage activities of the Belgian and French Intelligence Services. It was urgently important to amalgamate the work dealing with counter espionage matters and that dealing with Resistance because it became more and more apparent that the Resistance Movements of the countries were the main sources of Allied espionage. What has been said about the France-Belgium Sub-Department applies equally to the other sub-departments of Dept. IV B 2 and IV B 3.

Sub-Department IV B 1 a furthermore dealt with the accommodation and looking after of all the Belgian and French prominent people who were arrested and interned by Germany. For example I would like to mention the furnishing of a castle in the Tyrol under the cover-name of "Wälzertraumen" (I think it was "Schloss Itter" which was used to accommodate a great number of French political personalities with their families. As far as I know a similar castle for Belgian personalities was in the neighbourhood of Karlsbad. IV B 1 a also dealt with the accommodation and welfare of the Petain Government. in Signaringen and the Belgian King who was kept in a castle near Salzburg.

Sub-Dept. IV B 1 b.

The Head of this Sub-Dept. was Kriminalrat SS-Sturmbannführer Clemens, who was with the Northern Group of the RSHA until 6th May. Present whereabouts unknown. I do not know any other members of this department.

IV B 1 b was responsible for all matters in Occupied Holland. It dealt with the Dutch Resistance Movement and at the same time with espionage matters which previously were dealt with by Group IV E. The department was able to look into all matters taking place in Holland including sabotage even when the Military Abwehrstelle in Holland was dealing with this by means of Gegenpiel. I scarcely had any knowledge as regards to the counter espionage work against England and America, but I know that this department dealt with a number of cases. Cases whereby English or American agents, dropped by parachute into Germany, were tried to be "turned" for counter intelligence purposes were dealt with by IV A 2 b. I can give information about these cases of course. It concerned about 2 to 10 cases. The knowledge of this department about methods used by the American Intelligence was small in my opinion.

Sub-Dept. IV B 1 c.

Head of this Dept. was Kriminalrat SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Rauch who according to my knowledge went to Bavaria, where he was born. Rauch was in charge of Stapo work in Denmark and Norway. In Sweden and Finland his activity was only of a counter intelligence nature having nothing whatsoever to do with the employment of agents. The department's working in Norway had great difficulties caused by the rigid and almost incomprehensible attitude of Reichskommissar Terboven who always succeeded in having his own way even with the Heads of State. I am thinking here especially about the question of the taking of hostages, which was strongly disapproved of by IV B 1 c as such methods only encouraged national resistance, with which it was finally impossible to deal by Stapo methods. This department was also responsible for the internment of the Danish Police Officials.

Dept. IV B 2.

Regierungsrat SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Harro Thomsen, although Deputy, was in charge of this department and at the same time as Head of sub-dept. IV B 2 b. He was last seen with the Northern Group. Whereabouts unknown. The department dealt with all questions concerning the East, while the ideological combatting of Communism was centred on departments IV A 1 a and IV A 2 a.

IV B.2. a

Ober-Regierungsrat SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Wolff was Head of this Department until about February 1945 when he took over the command of Dresden Stapo Station as Deputy. IV B 2 a dealt with all Russian matters, incidents in the Baltic States, Partisan activities in the rear of the German front in Russia, Groups promoted by Germany. IV A 2 b greatly assisted the III F-Dienst of this sub-department by passing on military information obtained by the "Funkgegenspiele" with the Soviet Union.

Sub-Dept. IV B 2 b.

Head of this department, as already mentioned, was Regierungsrat SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Thomsen. SS-Obersturmfuehrer Kriminalkommissar Meller worked with him and was considered to be one of the best and most successful experts in Polish Intelligence Service matters.

IV B 2 b was responsible for all matters concerning Poles in the General Government and in Germany. Some of the subjects dealt with by the department were the entire Polish Resistance Movement, the question of Polish labour for Germany, dealt with in conjunction with Dept. IV - foreign workers (auslaendische Arbeiter), and the case of Poles who had sexual intercourse with Germans. As Polish espionage in Germany and the Occupied Territories played a big part for the Intelligence Service of the Western Allies, the department gave special attention to cases of Polish espionage in the German Armament Industry. I know from conversations that the department dealt with two big cases, one being espionage activity in the aircraft industry in Miener Weustadt and the other, espionage intentions in the German Baltic Ports and also the entire coast.

Dept. IV B 3.

The Head of the Dept. for the last few days was SS-Standartenfuhrer Dr. Isselhorst who at that time was a Colonel of the Police (z.b.V. gestellt) on special duties. Isselhorst was posted to South Germany where he may have finally remained with the Southern Group. His predecessor, as far as I can remember, was SS-Standartenfuhrer Dr. Rang whose whereabouts and the reason for his replacement are unknown to me. I was informed by others that he was with the Southern Group.

The Department dealt with all countries South of Germany; the Balkans, Italy, Switzerland and presumably Spain. I am not quite sure about the latter as it is possible that this country was dealt with by Dept. IV B 1.

IV B 3 a and IV B 3 b. (There is also the possibility that a third sub-department IV B 3 c existed)

A Sub-Department of IV B 3 dealt with the "Protektorat" that is to say the countries Bohemia and Moravia (Formerly CSR), with Slovakia and the whole Balkan area. In the "Protektorat" the national Resistance Movement, and also the communistic problems were, the Tito Partisan Movement, the Anglo-American Military Missions, questions in connection with the Roumanian "Iron Guard" (protection of Horia-Sima) etc.

Another sub-department of IV B 3 dealt with all Stapp matters in Switzerland and Italy. Before and after the Badoglio incident the Department was in contact with the Italian Police. I have not much knowledge about this department but I vaguely know that its main work was Counter Espionage against Switzerland, which was clearly recognised by the Gestapo as having been a "jumping off place" for the American, English, Russian and Polish Intelligence Services even in the last war.

I also believe that matters concerning the Far East were also dealt with by this Dept. (IV B 3). Before the reorganisation of the RSHA this work was done by the sub-department (Russia - Counter Espionage of Group IV B 3. I know from conversations with the experts in question that the Japanese carried out espionage against Germany, mostly through the Manchurian Embassy in Berlin and also by the use of Polish Subjects.

The Head of the Department dealing with the "Protektorat", Slovakia and the Balkans was finally an Ober-Regierungsrat SS, Obersturmbannfuhrer, whose name I have forgotten, but who came from the Stapo Station in Vienna.

The Head of the Sub-Department dealing with Italy and Switzerland was Kriminalrat SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Hilliges who was temporarily at the Stapo Station in Innsbruck. In January 1945 Hilliges was still with the Staff, which later became the Southern Group, in Hof. I last saw him myself in Berlin about a week before I left there.

Dept. IV B 4.

This Department belonged for a long time to the Ministry of the Interior and later became a part of the Head Office of the Stapo. When the RSHA was reorganised at the end of 1943 this department was incorporated into Amt IV, but existed separately owing to its special work. The officials of this department were almost exclusively administrative officials and only the heads were in the SS, IV A 2 a and its "Political Passport Forgery" Section was actually the only executive office which had the closest contact and collaboration with this department. IV B 4 obtained information from this department resulting from executive work and they were asked to issue Counter Measures such as, New Publication of German Identity Cards, New form of German Passports, and alterations to a Forgery-proof Frontier Pass, etc.

Sub-Departments IV B 4 a and IV B 4 b issued general instructions in close co-operation with the Ministry of the Interior itself, mostly on its behalf addressed mainly to German Regierungspraesidenten and Landraete of the Kreise giving them direcives as to the future method of issuing Passports and Identity Cards.

Head of the Department was Ministerialrat Kraus (No SS Rank), an official of about 60 years of age who had spent his whole life dealing with this kind of work and as such can be considered as a specialist. Krause stayed in Berlin. Under him in Sub-Dept. IV D 4 a was Ober-Regierungsrat, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Kroening who was responsible for all questions dealing with general laws concerning passports, and in Sub-Dept. IV B 4 b Regierungsrat, SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Wilke who was an expert in all questions dealing with all internal Police Identity matters.

As far as I know Kroening was finally on a duty trip through Southern Germany and Austria. Wilke however belonged to the Northern Group and I last saw him in Osterfeld when I left on the 6th May.

Sub-Dept. IV B 4 c did not actually belong to Dept. IV B 4. The Head of the department was Polizeirat SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Erwin Jarosch. The department was the central office for all matters regarding the issue of Visas. During the war it became apparent that various local and District Police (Freispolizei) Authorities were not in a position to judge which Germans and foreigners should receive permits to travel abroad. The District Police had to turn therefore to the District Stapo Station to submit requests for permits to travel abroad. The Stapo Station then turned to IV B 4 c as Central Visa Office, who after investigating the persons in question by means of the Gestapa Central Card Index, gave the final decision. This ruling, which applied to the whole country, was broken by the Foreign Office and the OKW who granted special permits to members of the Wehrmacht and Armament Industry.

Polizeioberinspektor SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Samuel was for a long time Deputy to Jarosch. Jarosch belonged to the Northern Group and was finally in Osterfeld. Whereabouts unknown.

In the last months IV B 4 c also dealt with the "Sippenhaftung" that is to say the arrest of the relatives of prominent persons working abroad against Germany who could therefore not be arrested themselves.

4) Office IV G had a special position
Generalgrenzinspekteur RSH. IV G.

which looks after the entire German Frontier Police Force. In contrast to the Customs, the Frontier Police had to deal with people travelling to and from Germany whether German or Alien. They were not only on the land and sea frontiers but also on civil aerodromes. As an example I mention Luebeck Grenzkommissariat (Frontier Post) which besides its Stapo activity in Luebeck and district had also officials who performed frontier police duties, that is to say the control of people on incoming and outgoing ships. The Frontier Police closely co-operated with the Customs. It was not an efficient organisation and possessed all the weaknesses of a newly formed authority, and could in no way be compared with the Customs. After the events on 20th July, in which the Chief of Customs (Zollgrenzschutz) Colonel Hossfeld was to a large extent involved, the Customs were incorporated into the Sipo and approximately half the Staff were called up into the Wehrmacht. A part of the other half were put into the Frontier Police.

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Inspector General of Frontiers was Generalleutnant der Polizei, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Mueller who was also Chief of Amt IV of the RSHA. His Deputy was Colonel of Police, SS-Oberfuehrer Schmann who was previously Inspector of the Sipo and SD in Wiesbaden. Schmann was temporarily with the Northern Group I heard but left it at Schwerin and later went direct to Flensburg. I have no ide of his whereabouts.

5) Supplement to III-F Dienst in Group IV B of RSHA.

The III-F Dienst under Colonel Rohleder joined the RSHA IV when the OKW -Amt Ausland - Abwehr - III - was dissolved. It was attached to Group IV B and the various officers attached to the Spionage-Abwehr-Sektor of sub-department IV B 1 a including IV B 3 b. Rohleder himself was given an exceptional position and was directly under the Group Leader of IV B. The III-F Dienst, just like Amt Ausland-Abwehr, collected information about the enemy's Intelligence Service, its organisation and its intention and passed this on to the Wehrmacht H.Q. Staff. In the execution of its work it communicated as before, with the A.O.'s. (Abwehr Offizier) in neutral countries. The A.O.'s came under the Amt, Mil. of Amt IV from a purely organisational point of view, so that here too a certain amount of redundancy arose. IV A 2 b passed on, especially the Soviet results which arose from Counter Intelligence, to the III-F Dienst of Group IV B.

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