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Engraved by H. T. Hoall

ARTHUR WELLESLEY, DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

OB. 1852

FROM THE ORIGINAL BY

SIR THOMAS LAWRENCE, P.R.A.

IN THE POSSESSION OF REHARDING

THE PICTURE FROM A PICTURE BY W. IVANES ESQ.



THE LIFE AND TIMES OF  
*the late*  
DUKE OF WELLINGTON;

BY  
LIEUT COL<sup>L</sup> WILLIAMS,

COMPRISING THE CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLE-FIELDS  
OF WELLINGTON AND HIS COMRADES,

THE POLITICAL LIFE

OF  
*The Duke and his Contemporaries,*

AND A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF

ENGLAND'S BATTLES BY SEA AND LAND,

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE GREAT FRENCH REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT TIME

INTERSPERSED WITH

ANECDOTES, PERSONAL INCIDENTS AND ADVENTURES, &c.



*Dungan Castle,*

THE BIRTH PLACE OF THE LATE DUKE OF WELLINGTON

PUBLISHED BY JOHN TALLIS & COMPANY,

LONDON, EDINBURGH, DUBLIN AND NEW YORK



THE LIFE AND TIMES

OF THE LATE

DUKE OF WELLINGTON:

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL WILLIAMS.

Comprising the Campaigns and Battle-Fields

OF

WELLINGTON AND HIS COMRADES.

INTERSPERSED WITH

ANECDOTES, PERSONAL INCIDENTS, ADVENTURES, Etc., Etc.

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VOL. I.

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TO THE MEMORY

OF THE

Late Illustrious Duke of Wellington,

THE HERO OF WATERLOO,

THE PRIDE OF HIS COUNTRY,

AND

THE PRESERVER OF EUROPEAN FREEDOM;

AND TO THE

SURVIVING OFFICERS WHO WERE HIS COMPANIONS IN ARMS,

*This Work is Dedicated,*

WITH FEELINGS OF RESPECTFUL ADMIRATION,

BY A BROTHER OFFICER.

# INTRODUCTORY REFLECTIONS

ON THE

LIFE AND GENIUS OF THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS OF MODERN HEROES,

## Arthur, Duke of Wellington.

“ ———— Samson hath quit himself  
Like Samson, and heroically hath finished  
A life heroic.”

MILTON.

“ Not only that thy puissant arm could bind  
The tyrant of a world, and, conquering fate,  
Enfranchise Europe, do I deem thee great;  
But that in all thy actions I do find  
Exact propriety:—no gust of mind—  
Fitful and wild, but that continuous state  
Of ordered impulse mariners await  
In some benignant and enriching wind,—  
The breath ordained of nature. Thy calm mien  
Recals old Rome, as much as thy high deed;  
Duty thine only idol, and serene  
When all are troubled; in the utmost need  
Prescient; thy country’s servant ever seen,  
Yet sovereign of thyself whate’er may speed.

RT. HON. B. DISRAELI.

THE death of this illustrious warrior has arrested the attention and elicited the sympathy and regret of the whole of the British nation. England has lost its most distinguished son; the greatest general of the age, the patriarchal statesman, and the father of his country, is no more. The great Duke who has mingled in the struggles of three generations of heroes and politicians, expired at Walmer Castle, at a quarter past three in the afternoon of Tuesday the 14th of September. His death, though long expected, came suddenly at last, and has thrown a grateful and admiring nation into a state of painful excitement and universal mourning.

His career is now matter of history; the time has arrived when his life can be dispassionately and truthfully written; the biographer need no longer fear being accused of interested adulation; and the truth with respect to the achievements of this illustrious man, startling and romantic as it may often seem, may be told without disguise, or the fear of being charged with exaggeration and “hero-worship.” A full and minute biography is intended in this work; but we shall doubtless be pardoned for here indulging in a brief reflective glance at the great events of his varied and brilliant life; in giving



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such a hurried review as will satisfy the immediate curiosity of our readers, and permit us to express those feelings which rise warmly and vividly in every reflecting and patriotic mind. The character of a great man may be viewed from many points, and many deep and valuable lessons may be gained from it. Something there is in every life, which is not absolutely in the province of the mere biographer, and not unfrequently altogether escapes him: the soul and inner sense of it, its spiritual under current, its application to the affairs both trivial and exalted of readers of all ranks and positions, from the sovereign to the artizan, the peer to the peasant; and the lessons it teaches to the humblest as well as the most brilliant; for the least gifted man finds some expression of his own feelings in the record of the thoughts and acts of the greatest.

Let us then to our task, and endeavour to pluck from the grave of the mighty dead, lessons of wisdom which shall serve in some measure for our government in the future. Let us place a word-picture of the moral and mental aspect of the dazzling career of the great Duke before our readers, and dwell thoughtfully upon a life so distinguished, gleaning from it the precepts of truth and wisdom it shadows forth, which may serve as a beacon and life-guidance to the young, and a joy and intellectual refreshment to the old.

Arthur Wesley was born in the year 1769, which by a remarkable coincidence was the same in which his great rival Napoleon, whose star sunk into darkness beneath his overpowering influence, first drew breath. Born to no title, Wellington rose by his own genius to the enjoyment of the loftiest that could be bestowed upon a subject, a fact which the ambitious youth may remember while engaged in the studies which are to fit him for the battles of life, and which may help to sustain him during the storms of adversity, and the transient frowns of fate. As a boy the future hero displayed no remarkable precocity; he was an attentive student, but in other respects was considered rather slow and dull, and he was placed in the army because he evinced so little of that brilliancy of talent, and aptitude for literary studies, which distinguished most of the other members of his family. This fortunate accident led him to the field on which his natural genius was so perfectly and grandly developed, but a less happy choice might have deprived us of England's greatest military ornament. Parents should carefully study the minds and capabilities of their children, for the children of to-day are the men and women of to-morrow, and apparent dulness is sometimes real depth. Clever minds bud early, but greatness is a plant of slower growth.

It may be considered superstitious to say so, but there seems to have been something more than mere chance in this fortunate selection of a profession for the supposed dull boy; for upon that choice, unimportant as it then seemed, the future fate of empires and the liberty of Europe depended. If there is a special providence in the fall of a sparrow, doubtless the same benevolent and divine interference occurs in the salvation of a continent.

On the death of his father, Arthur Wesley was sent to Eton, and afterwards to the military school of Angers, in France, where he remained six years, and, in 1787, when he had reached his eighteenth year, received his first commission as an ensign in the 73<sup>d</sup> regiment of foot. Family connexion did something for him up to a certain point, and within a period of four years, he became first a lieutenant and then a captain. Beyond that he owed his distinction entirely to his own efforts and his own genius. Within a



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few years afterwards we find him distinguishing himself in India. Though very natural, it is still somewhat remarkable, that one of Captain Wellesley's (for in 1797 he altered his name of Wesley into that of Wellesley) earliest attempts in India was a failure, and the yet unrecognised hero was considerably agitated by it. The circumstance is worth remembering, because it shows that undisciplined genius is comparatively valueless; that the rarest genius, to become power, must be subjected to the rules of art and assisted by the resources of experience; that failure is the best of preceptors, and, if wisely considered, the true pathway to success. Scarcely more than two years after his landing at Calcutta, Colonel Wellesley was the conqueror of Seringapatam, and had risen to almost viceregal command. Failure had indeed taught him a lesson which he was quick to learn and speedy to apply.

The great, and indeed the most prominent truth, presented by the career of the illustrious Duke, is the triumph of integrity and patriotism over the probable suggestions of ambition; he had the seductive example of Napoleon before him, and he well knew that military genius could be turned to the promotion of personal renown at the expense of his country. Both ancient and modern history reveals such instances again and again; and the hero who has saved the liberties of his country, has too often lived to trample upon them. The steps that lead the conqueror to tyranny are too frequently but few and brief. In that direction our great English soldier never gazed—military glory and popular enthusiasm, the gaudy floating of victorious banners, the clang of trumpets, the welcoming roar of cannon, the peals of bells from hundreds of steeples, and the shouts of living masses of his fellow-creatures, never won him for one moment to a guilty ambition. His integrity was inflexible and adamant—even the daring sin of great and otherwise noble spirits had no temptations for him.

Men of all ranks may reflect profitably upon this interesting fact: the most prominent characteristic of the greatest Englishman of the nineteenth century was his integrity. Let us not be accused of vanity in saying that we trust and believe that it is peculiarly an English virtue; sure we are, that genius can never long be respected, or even successful, without it. Let the unacknowledged man of talent, struggling in want and almost in despair, remember this, and that it assisted to lead the Duke to the proud and noble position he held in the estimation of his countrymen; for, notwithstanding the great varieties of political opinion which prevail throughout the land, and the political bitterness once popularly entertained towards him, all parties have now joined in one sincere, deep, and solemn expression of sorrow at his death.

The following anecdote affords a small but yet valuable illustration of this pervading principle of his actions. In the early summer of life, he was not altogether insensible to the expensive amusements by which he was, of necessity, surrounded: expensive society leads to luxurious habits; and the young captain, when attached as aid-de-camp to the staff of the earl of Westmoreland, then lord-lieutenant of Ireland, became involved in extensive and very serious debts. Military society is notoriously gay; and it is almost equally notorious what is the fate of credulous tradesmen who are connected with it. The regiment is removed; the debts are too frequently evaded or forgotten; and bankruptcy or utter ruin stares the trusting traders in the face. So urgent were Captain Wellesley's wants, that he accepted an accommodating loan from his bootmaker;



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but when he left Dublin, he did not forget his debts, or apply to the whitewashing power of the law; but, straitened as he was in pecuniary matters, he yet confided a large portion of his income to another tradesman to settle his debts. There was something of heroism even in this small matter; for history reveals to us many distinguished soldiers who could conquer nations, but failed to subdue some personal appetite or caprice. True greatness unites integrity with self-denial. Such a mental conformation was, nearly two thousand years ago, observed in Caesar, and was, in our age, equally traceable in Wellington.

It is somewhat remarkable, that this extraordinary soldier, who bore so well the vicissitudes of various and trying climates, the roughest fatigues of rapid marches, and the sternest toils of war, and who, in advanced life, attained the surname of the "Iron Duke," as much from his hardy constitution as from his inflexible adherence to duty, possessed but feeble health in youth, and was liable to attacks of disease which subdued his body, but never conquered his mind. In these fits of illness, he was sustained by that wonderful sense of self-reliance which ever animated him, either in sickness, in battle, or at the council-board. It is recorded of him, that some allusion being one day made to an approaching Lord Mayor's dinner, he remarked, that the last public dinner attended by Mr. Pitt was on a similar occasion, and that he was much struck by a remark in the speech made by that eloquent man. A gentleman, in proposing Pitt's health, spoke of that statesman as "the saviour of his country;" and, in his reply, the orator denied that any such credit belonged to him, observing, "The country saved itself by its own exertions; and other countries would be equally fortunate, if they would follow its example." This remark the Duke much admired: he saw that Pitt, like himself, recognised the magic power of self-reliance and resolute industry.

Previously to the time of Wellington—even at the commencement of his active service—England had lost much of its military renown; and it began to be said, both at home and abroad, that the sea was our element, but that on land our good genius had left us. The art of war, it was supposed, we had in some respects lost, or that the strength and courage of our soldiers had degenerated. But when the hour came for great efforts, and the opportunity for brilliant successes, the man was found—that man was the subject of this article—the General whose military genius regenerated the fame of his nation, and inspired a new and unconquerable spirit into her soldiers.

After a brief service, in a subordinate position, on the plains of Belgium, where he had no opportunity of distinguishing himself, except by the business-like coolness and intrepidity he displayed in a disastrous and terrible retreat, he landed, in the February of 1797, at Calcutta, and then was to commence his career of glory. On the shores of India he first revealed his true worth: there he won a reputation which after times and events rendered still more glorious. In India occurred an instance of that generosity of nature which he ever exhibited when it did not interfere with his ideas of duty. However stern might be his duty, he would fulfil it: no sentimental weakness or ill-timed pity entered his bosom or withheld his arm; but while he made war dreadful by his firmness and decision, he redeemed some of its worst features by his mercy to the fallen. A powerful foe ever found in him a terrible adversary; but he did not war with the helpless. Few will forget his generous adoption of the infant son of the adventurer Dhoondiah, who fell



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in endeavouring to avenge the death of Tippoo Saib, and to wrest from Wellesley his newly-acquired territory.

In the September of 1805, after an absence in India of nine years, he again landed in England, with the title of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and a great military reputation derived from the establishment of British ascendancy in India, and in the course of the next three years he made his appearance in parliament; the soldier became a statesman. He was not destined in that respect, at least at that period, to engross any large amount of public admiration; strictly speaking, he never was an orator; he had a hesitating manner, and sometimes an indistinct utterance; but he possessed what a remarkable living writer called an "ineloquent eloquence." The following extract, descriptive of his oratorical talents, is from a highly popular and interesting work, *Francis's Orators of the Age*:—"The Duke of Wellington an orator! He who never uttered two consecutive sentences without hesitation; who exhibits a hardy contempt for all the graces of language and style; and in whom the faculty of imagination, if it ever existed in his mind, has been dormant for half a century! Do you mean seriously to class him as an orator? This would be a very natural question if it were admitted that oratory is a merely extrinsic and superficial art, aiming at skill in the choice of words and the shaping of sentences, and trusting for its hold on the human mind rather to the vehicle in which the thought is conveyed than to the truth or force of the thought itself. But there are degrees and classes of oratory as there are of poetry. The chief object of oratory is to persuade or convince, to bring the mind of the hearer into agreement and co-operation with that of the speaker; and this is often effected with success in proportion to the sincerity and straightforwardness brought to bear on the task. Some of the most effective and influential speakers have been men who never received any regular training to the art of elocution; and among these a place may be claimed for the Duke of Wellington. Although it is now fifty-six years since the Duke of Wellington was returned as a representative to the Irish parliament, and although, after the Union, he continued, with the exception of some intervals of time, to be a member of the united parliament as representative of an English borough in the House of Commons, until he was raised to the peerage; we should not forget that it is only within the last twenty or twenty-five years that he has taken so active a part in parliamentary life, or occupied so commanding a position as a politician in the state. In the earlier part of his career, he made no great figure as a speaker. When in the Irish parliament, he gave no promise of that intellectual distinction which he afterwards achieved, but some of the most obvious characteristics of his public speaking were as observable then as they are now. There was the same abruptness of delivery, the same plain, straightforward, but unassuming expression of his views, that has since been the distinguishing feature of his speaking in the House of Lords. A contemporary observer speaks of his address as being unpolished, and says, that he showed no promise of his subsequent unparalleled celebrity. During the years that intervened between this period and his second entrance into political life—years which witnessed his successes in India, his steady progress of triumph in Spain, and the final glories of Waterloo—his mind was occupied with thoughts and pursuits far different from those which qualify a man to become an influential public speaker. And when, at length, the course of events forced him into a position of responsibility which



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compelled him repeatedly to speak in parliament, he had nothing to rely on but the strong natural resources of his mind, the noble candour and sincerity of his disposition, and the consideration which he might hope would be extended to his deficiencies as a speaker, on account of his brilliant services as a soldier. As the character of his mind developed itself, it presented an aspect of strange originality to the civilians around him. They could not at first understand, though they soon learned to appreciate, that admirable organization of mind, matured, if not produced, by the habits of military life; an organization so perfect as to retain all subjects of discussion, all principles of political science, all the facts with which his mind was stored, in that exact subordination which was their relative due; and so well maintained as to enable him to call them up and use them for his purpose, with a readiness to which even the most practised minds around him were strangers, from their not having been subjected to the same discipline."

It was not long before he was again engaged on military service; after a fruitless expedition to Hanover, he proceeded to Denmark, and received the thanks of the House of Commons for his services. Spain was the next theatre on which this great actor was to appear. The Peninsular war would have undoubtedly terminated in the subjugation of Spain, and the humiliation of England, but for the extraordinary military genius, courage, and coolness of the supposed dull schoolboy,—the soldier whom Napoleon had at first pretended to despise, and contemptuously denominated "the Sepoy General;" but who defeated the Marshals of the great French chieftain with armies of fearful inferiority in point of numerical strength. Romantic as it may seem, resembling the extravagances of fiction rather than the sober revelations of fact, it is matter of unimpeachable history, that with a force seldom exceeding 50,000 troops, he maintained, first a defensive, and then an aggressive war, against an army of French veterans containing from 200,000 to 300,000 men, the flower of the military strength of France; and that he conducted this unequal war by a succession of brilliant victories to a glorious close. The reputation of the British arms was vindicated—no detractive spirit could any longer urge that the valour of English soldiers was exceeded by that of any other troops in the whole world.

In tracing this portion of the career of our illustrious warrior, we are astonished at his almost superhuman self-reliance, intrepidity, and iron determination. Temporary reverses seemed only to nerve him to increased efforts; that which discouraged other men added to his calm resolution, and his eagle glance was never to be diverted from the desired end. His conceptions were grand, and often apparently impossible; timid minds were startled, and shrunk from a contemplation of them; they could only act upon precedent; but genius requires no example, its convictions alone are its law, it does not understand timidity, but *acts* while others *deliberate*, and success usually crowns the result. We do not mean that Wellington was inspired by a reckless bravery: by no means; a lofty heroic courage certainly animated him, the courage of the heroes of a past world when Rome was in its glory; but no merchant at his books, no mathematician over a problem, no astronomer measuring the dimensions or tracking the progress of some newly discovered star, displayed a greater regard for the minute details of business or calculation; indeed he himself believed that his talent would have been greater as a financier than as a general. Mere courage alone, however distinguished, cannot make a successful warrior



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now; in this age of strategy and scientific warfare strength of muscle is as burnt flax to beaten iron, in comparison with strength of mind. The great soldier can spare the former, but must possess the latter; and to a manly courage that never valued his own life in preference to the glory or advantage of his country, did this modern hero unite a clearness of perception, and a gigantic grasp of mind which overlooked no difficulties, but with a steady gaze provided every available means of overcoming them; his eagle glance discerned every opportunity, and his iron hand seized it.

His successes in the Peninsula were rewarded by the loftiest title a grateful country had to bestow, and he at once took his station with the highest peers of the land. He was created Baron Douro of Wellesley, and Viscount Wellington of Talavera, afterwards Earl, and finally Duke of Wellington; to these rewards were added a pension, successive grants of money, honours, and a shower of crosses and other imperial and military distinctions. He left his country a Knight, he returned to it a Duke; his introduction to the House of Lords was a grand one, he must have felt a great man's pride upon that memorable occasion. The House was crowded, and its most distinguished and august members were present: upon his entrance all rose, and with uncovered heads greeted him with prolonged and repeated cheers; the aristocracy of birth bent its head with a generous and becoming recognition of the superiority of the aristocracy of genius.

It is a noble reflection that his conquests in the Peninsula, like most of his great engagements, were fought and won in the holy cause of freedom, and to prevent Europe from being laid prostrate at the feet of one man. The "English leopard," as the French styled him, did not fight for the love of carnage, or of glory, or shed blood to satisfy a restless ambition, and a love of conquest; but he fought for the maintenance of order, of justice, of liberty, and for the final enthronement of peace. If ever war was righteous, it was in such a cause as this; the sword that wins the freedom and protects the honour of nations, is more precious than the sickle that reaps their bread, for national distress is in the eyes of every noble spirit preferable to national dishonour. It was the language, not of vanity, but of the strictest and most literal truth, that the Poet employed when he thus addressed the deliverer of Spain and Portugal:

"Thine was the sword which justice draws,  
Thine was the pure and generous cause  
Of holy rights and human laws  
The impious thrall to burst;  
And thou wast destined for thy part,  
The noblest mind, the firmest heart,  
Artless, but in the warrior's art,  
And in that art the first."

The experience which he gained in his brilliant series of victories in the Peninsula, revealed to him all the weaknesses and inefficiencies of the British forces; he determined that his troops should not fight at a disadvantage; that their natural strength and valour should not be clogged by mistaken arrangements, or heavy and inefficient weapons. He saw much to be abolished, much to be improved; and he undertook the hazardous and responsible duties of a military reformer. In his later years certainly he was averse to changes in this respect, and satisfied with what he had done when practically engaged in warfare; but to his energy in this direction, during the maturity of his military career, many of his subsequent great triumphs are to be attributed.



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Wellington had not yet measured his strength against that of his great rival, Napoleon, but the hour was at hand when he was to be called upon to do so. The Emperor had escaped from Elba, and was again at the head of an enormous army; the great powers of Europe denounced him as a truce-breaker, and war was universally declared. Wellington was stationed at Brussels with an army of 78,500 men. The events of the next few days and nights were perfectly dramatic: on the evening of the 15th of June, 1815, Wellington was at the Duchess of Richmond's ball; on the 16th was the battle of Quatre Bras; and on the memorable 18th, the terrible Sunday desecrated by such a gigantic slaughter, occurred the great struggle of WATERLOO. Napoleon's army was computed at 154,370 men, and he felt confident of the victory. Terrible and protracted was the struggle; prodigies of valour were performed by the troops on both sides, and wonderful discernment and intrepidity exhibited by the two most remarkable commanders that perhaps ever contested together for victory. Such was the numerical superiority of the French army, that the issue might have been in their favour but for the arrival of the Prussians. Wellington, collected even at that awful moment, beheld their approach, and closing his telescope, with the exclamation, "The hour is come!" gave the order for a general charge. The result need not be detailed here; but when the sun set upon that bloody field, the glory of Napoleon was a thing of the past, and his star had set in darkness. The grim demons of discord and slaughter were sated, and Wellington's crowning victory at Waterloo, the last act of his military life, terminated war in Europe, and led to a peace as remarkable as the stormy struggle which preceded it. The olive and the vine flourished vigorously in the soil which had been ploughed with swords and bayonets, and commerce and reason tended and guarded the emblematic plants of peace. Wellington, warrior as he was, was also a man of enlarged views and sympathies, and thoroughly conscious of the immense value of the lasting peace this final conquest was to bestow. He himself said that the governments which had been engaged in the great and long-protracted struggle required such a peace as would give them "the power of reducing their overgrown military establishments, and the leisure to attend to the internal concerns of their nations, and to improve the situation of their people." Having conquered France, he did his best to restore that country to tranquillity; he was opposed to all confiscations and punishments, saying, that if the people were to be rendered tranquil, they must not be irritated. In the hour of victory he listened to the voice of generosity, and trusted for the restoration of order to the blandishments of peace rather than to the armed hand of power.

The meeting of the two greatest warriors of modern times in so grand a conflict as that of Waterloo, naturally suggests a comparison between the respective genius of these remarkable men. Stronger minds and more able pens than ours have been addressed to this subject; and perhaps few have accomplished it with more judgment, impartiality, and eloquence, than that distinguished writer and advocate, Sir Archibald Alison, in his *History of the French Revolution*. We subjoin the passage:—

"Napoleon and Wellington were not merely individual characters: they were the types of the powers which they respectively headed in the contest. Napoleon had more genius, Wellington more judgment: the former combated with greater energy, the latter with greater perseverance. Rapid in design, instant in execution, the strokes of the French hero fell like the burning thunderbolt: cautious in counsel, yet firm in action, the



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resources of the British champion multiplied, like the vigour of vegetation, after the withering stroke had fallen. No campaign of Wellington's equals in genius and activity those of Napoleon in Italy and in France; none of Napoleon's approaches in foresight and wisdom that of Wellington's at Torres Vedras. The vehemence of the French emperor would have exhausted, in a single campaign, the whole resources which during the war were at the disposal of the English general; the caution of Wellington would have alienated, in the very beginning, the troops which overflowed with the passions of the revolution. Ardour and onset were alike imposed on the former by his situation, and suggested by his disposition: foresight and perseverance were equally dictated to the latter by his necessities, and in unison with his character. The one wielded at pleasure the military resources of the half of Europe, and governed a nation heedless of consequences, covetous of glory, reckless of slaughter: the other led the forces of a people distrustful of its prowess, avaricious of its blood, but invincible in its determination. And the result, both in the general war and final struggle, was in entire conformity with this distinction: Wellington retired in the outset before the fierce assault of the French legions, but he saw them, for the first time since the revolution, recoil in defeat from the rocks of Torres Vedras: he was at first repeatedly expelled from Spain, but at last he drove the invaders, with disgrace, across the Pyrenees!

“The personal and moral character of the two chiefs was still more strikingly opposed, and characteristic of the sides they severally led. Both were distinguished by the unwearied perseverance, the steady purpose, the magnanimous soul, which are essential to glorious achievements: both were provident in council, and vigorous in execution: both possessed personal intrepidity in the highest degree: both were indefatigable in activity, and iron in constitution: both enjoyed the rarer qualities of moral courage and fearless determination. But, in other respects, their minds were as opposite as the poles are asunder. Napoleon was covetous of glory, Wellington was impressed with duty: Napoleon was reckless of slaughter, Wellington was sparing of blood: Napoleon was careless of his word, Wellington was inviolate in faith. Treaties were regarded by the former as binding only when expedient—alliances valid only when useful: obligations were regarded by the latter as obligatory, though ruinous; conventions sacred, even when open to objection. Napoleon's wasting warfare converted allies into enemies; Wellington's protecting discipline changed enemies into friends: the former fell, because all Europe rose up against his oppression; the latter triumphed, because all Europe joined to share in his protection. There is not a proclamation of Napoleon to his soldiers, in which glory is not mentioned and duty forgotten: there is not an order of Wellington to his troops, in which duty is not inculcated, nor one in which glory is alluded to. Singleness of heart was the great characteristic of the British hero, a sense of duty his ruling principle: falsehood pervaded the French conqueror, the thirst for glory was his invariable motive. The former proceeded on the belief, that the means, if justifiable, would finally work out the end: the latter, on the maxim that the end would in every case justify the means. Napoleon placed himself at the head of Europe, and desolated it for fifteen years with his warfare; Europe placed Wellington at the head of its armies, and he gave it thirty years of unbroken peace. The one exhibited the most shining example of splendid talents devoted to temporal ambition; the other,



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the noblest instance of moral influence directed to exalted purposes. The former was in the end led to ruin, while blindly following the phantom of worldly greatness the latter was unambitiously conducted to final greatness, while only following the star of public duty. The struggle between them was the same at bottom as that which, anterior to the creation of man, shook the powers of heaven: and never was such an example of moral government afforded as the final result of their immortal contest."

After the terrible conflict at Waterloo, which gave to Europe a peace as yet unbroken, we approach the second grand era of the life of Wellington, and consider him as a statesman. No man, whatever his gifts, can be equally brilliant and solid in every capacity; the field, and not the cabinet, was the peculiar province of the illustrious Duke. A severe disciplinarian, a lover of the sternest order, and habituated to the doctrines and practice of passive submission in the army, it was scarcely possible that he should have been, at least in the early possession of legislative power, what is now called a liberal politician. The wars in which he had been engaged, were in some measure attributable to the spread of democratic opinion; he believed them to be altogether so, and it was natural that he should regard such tendencies with suspicion and dislike, and even that he should suspect of democracy and revolution doctrines which had no connexion with them, but breathed only the purest constitutional freedom. But although not the friend of popular liberty, he was too wise, too generous and true-hearted, to be the apologist of wrong or tyranny. He was the stern advocate of duty, and demanded it peremptorily of every individual; he had a right to do so, for he had always been its slave, rigidly fulfilling its behests; and he regarded the discharge of duties as the only foundation of rights.

His early political conduct will not now meet with any very general approval; his doctrines were those of a school which is rapidly passing, if not altogether past. The Tory of the time of Lords Liverpool and Eldon would not now be understood or recognised among statesmen; and the last vestige of the doctrine of divine right has melted into nothingness; but those who would form an impartial judgment of the political progress of the great soldier, must recall the difference between the time of his political power and the present period. It was then necessary to educate the nation to the full enjoyment of freedom, and it was dangerous to trust an ignorant and bigotted populace with too free a use of a liberty for which they were not then fit, and which they were so likely to abuse.

Two great questions presented themselves to the Duke for solution in his capacity as statesman—questions of vital importance and gigantic aspect—questions which in those days could not be understood as they are now, because the present generation has seen them practically tried, and the difficulty of their expediency and applicability settled by actual experience. These subjects were, Catholic Emancipation and Parliamentary Reform. The great modern doctrine of Free Trade was not then prominently upon the scene of action, but flitted in the distance, a sort of political Will-o'-the-Wisp. Upon these topics he was called to legislate, for on the 15th of February, 1828, the exigencies of the country induced him to accept the position of Prime Minister of England. It is certain that he felt that this was not the place for which his genius and formation of mind fitted him. He had himself previously stated his conviction of



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his unfitness for such an office, and publicly declared that he "should have been mad to think of it," but the emergencies of the age called for his assistance, and he was ever ready to serve his country. In the field or in the council-chamber he would never recoil from difficulties; he had dedicated his life to the service of his nation, and he was ever ready to risk all in its defence. His opinions were those of the old Tory school of statesmen, but though firm he was not violent; he desired no change because he feared change, and dreaded the results of political experiments.

Not the smallest tincture of selfishness entered into the formation of his principles; that is evident, for he had nothing further to gain; a grateful nation had laid its riches and honours at his feet, and his adherence to his principles was dictated by a love of order, the security of property, and the safety of the throne.

But though the study of politics was not the natural bias of his mind, he reached a point of greatness and true nobility of soul in his capacity of Prime Minister; he contentedly and resolutely sacrificed his own convictions to the necessities of the times, and to preserve undisturbed the peace of the nation, and wrung from his colleagues in power an assent which to no man but him they would have yielded. To obtain popularity is an easy thing to a man who occupies a lofty position in the service of his country, but to perform unpopular justice requires a hero. The Duke's measure in favour of the Catholics, though called for by a large body of the people, yet rendered him exceedingly unpopular with another body, if not certainly as powerful, equally as large. His adherence to the Protestant cause was rigid enough, though his yielding up his own convictions to a sense of what was requisite, caused them to be suspected. In later years he made the following clear and solemn expression of opinion upon this subject: "It is our duty in every case to do all that we can to promote the Protestant religion. It is our duty to do so, not only on account of the political relations between the religion of the Church of England and the Government, but because we believe it to be the purest doctrine, and the best system of religion, that can be offered to a people." These had ever been his convictions, but he would not war with destiny; he yielded to the imperative demands of the age, and did not tacitly consent to, but vigorously carried the great measure of Catholic Emancipation.

His noble declaration in the House of Lords upon that occasion ought never to be forgotten:—"My lords, I am one of those who have probably passed more of my life in war than most men, and principally I may say in civil war too, and I must say this, that if I could avoid by any sacrifice whatever even one month of civil war in the country to which I am attached, *I would sacrifice my life in order to do it.*" In these noble words the soldier disappears in the statesman and the philanthropist; the glories of war could not blind him to its terrors, and those terrors he would never inflict upon his own country; he would make any sacrifice to avert that; personal prepossessions and political consistency were nothing in comparison with such an awful probability; in such a case he would scatter them to the winds. We firmly believe that he used no rhetorical ornament when he said that he would sacrifice his life sooner than inflict a month of civil war upon the country that he loved. He did for a time sacrifice his reputation, which, with such a man, is often dearer to him than his life, and may eternal honour wait upon his memory for that noble act.



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In 1830 came his second trial as a statesman; the question of Parliamentary Reform had seized upon the national mind, and political agitation rose to a universal storm. France had been convulsed by another revolution; the excitement resulting from it acted strongly in England; a cry for reform and new institutions went like an electric shock throughout the land. The Duke was astonished; he did not understand the political problem before him; in his ears it sounded like the muttered thunder which precedes the terrible storm of revolution. Visions of the destruction of order, the desecration of the church, the insecurity of property, and the shedding of blood in fearful conflicts between the military and the people, passed through his mind. With characteristic promptness, he decided on opposing the measure, opposing it vigorously, unflinchingly, and to the last.

The haughty, unbending tone, and resolute manner in which he refused to grant, or even to regard the loud clamours of the nation for reform, sealed the fate not only of the Duke's ministry, but also of that of his party. A feeling of mad resentment seized the people; they regarded him as the opponent of liberty, and the advocate of despotism, though, in reality, he was acting from a strict sense of what he regarded as his duty. His resolution upon this point threw him from office, and sunk the old Tory party to a depth of odium from which they never rose again. After a time, however, his opposition to the national will was lost sight of in his own inextinguishable military glory, and his universally recognised integrity.

As years rolled on, his opinions kept pace with the times, and his advice was sought by all parties upon all great occasions, until at length his advanced age and experience imparted something of an oracular character to his clear and strong perceptions. For a length of time he had altogether ceased to be a party man, but had been a sort of balance of opinion, or a connecting link between adverse factions; and his approval added a weight to any measure second only to that of the sanction of the Sovereign.

He had an uncompromising hatred of all idleness, quackery, and false pretensions; and his manners and mode of life were simplicity and plainness personified. He kept a French cook for the accommodation of his visitors, but he himself seemed indifferent to culinary luxuries. The poor cook was often extremely hurt at his master's want of appreciation of his services. "If," he would remark, "I cook a good dinner, the Duke observes 'it is well,' and if I cook a bad dinner he still says 'it is well.'"

The Duke was married in 1806, to the Honourable Catherine Packenham; he lost that lady in 1831, and died a widower in his eighty-fourth year, leaving two sons to inherit his name and honours, and mingle their tears and regrets with those of a nation. From such a life it might be anticipated that death would possess no terrors for him; he glided silently from existence, and even the exact moment of his demise could not be detected by his attendants. His life shed a lustre upon the English name, and his death produced a sensation over the whole civilized world. His character, morally and intellectually, is a legacy to his country, and a study and imitation of it will assist in forming the minds and elevating the views of future heroes.

We append a Chronological Index of the military and political events of his life, for which we are largely indebted to Colonel Gurwood's *Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington*.



COMMISSIONS, SERVICES, OFFICIAL COMMANDS, AND PUBLIC HONOURS

OF

Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Born . . . . .	1 May, 1769.	Colonel . . . . .	3 May, 1796.
Ensign . . . . .	7 Mar., 1787.	Major-General . . . . .	29 April, 1802.
Lieutenant . . . . .	25 Dec., 1787.	Lieutenant-General . . . . .	25 April, 1808.
Captain . . . . .	30 June, 1791.	General, in Spain and Portugal	31 July, 1811.
Major . . . . .	30 April, 1793.	Field Marshal . . . . .	21 June, 1813.
Lieutenant-Colonel . . . . .	30 Sept., 1793.	Died . . . . .	14 Sept., 1852.

1794.

Embarked at Cork in command of the 33rd regiment to join the Duke of York's army in the Netherlands, and arrived at Ostend . . . . .	June.
Re-embarked and proceeded by the Scheldt to Antwerp . . . . .	July.

1795.

As senior officer, commanded three battalions on the retreat of the army through Holland . . . . .	Jan.
Early in the spring, on the breaking up of the ice, the army, including the 33rd regiment, re-embarked at Bremen for England.	
On return to England, embarked in the command of the 33rd regiment for the West Indies, on board the fleet commanded by Admiral Christian . . . . .	Oct.

1796.

But owing to the heavy equinoctial gales, after being six weeks at sea, returned to port . . . . .	19 Jan.
Destination of the 33rd regiment changed for India . . . . .	12 April.
Joined the 33rd regiment at the Cape of Good Hope . . . . .	Sept.

1797.

Arrived in Bengal . . . . .	Feb.
Formed part of an expedition to Manilla, but recalled on arrival at Penang . . . . .	Aug.
Returned to Calcutta . . . . .	Nov.

1798.

Proceeded on a visit to Madras . . . . .	Jan.
Returned to Calcutta . . . . .	Mar.
The 33rd regiment placed on the Madras establishment . . . . .	Sept.

1799.

Appointed to command the subsidiary force of the Nizam, the 33rd regiment being attached to it . . . . .	Feb.
Advance of the army on Seringapatam; Colonel Wellesley moving on the right flank, attacked and harassed by the enemy . . . . .	10 Mar.
Tippoo Sultaun in position at Mallavelly; the attack and defeat of his right flank by the division under Colonel Wellesley and the cavalry under Major-General Floyd . . . . .	27 Mar.
Arrival of the British army before Seringapatam . . . . .	3 April.
The army take up their ground before the west face of that fortress: first attack on the Sultaun-pettah Tope, by the 33rd regiment and 2nd Bengal Native Regiment, under Colonel Wellesley . . . . .	5 April.
Second attack with an increased force, the Scotch Brigade (94th regiment), two battalions of Sepoys, and four guns . . . . .	6 April.
Siege of Seringapatam, until . . . . .	3 May.
Assault and capture: Colonel Wellesley commanding the reserve in the trenches . . . . .	4 May.
Colonel Wellesley appointed Governor of Seringapatam . . . . .	6 May.



SERVICES, OFFICIAL COMMANDS, AND PUBLIC HONOURS OF

A commission, consisting of Lieutenant-General Harris, Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, Colonel the Hon. A. Wellesley, the Hon. H. Wellesley, and Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick, appointed by the Governor-General for the settlement of the Mysore territories . . . . . 4 June.  
 Commission dissolved . . . . . 8 July.  
 Colonel Wellesley appointed to the command of Seringapatam and Mysore . . . . . 9 July.

1800.

Colonel Wellesley named to command an expedition against Batavia, in conjunction with Admiral Rainier, but declines the service, from the greater importance of his command in Mysore . . . . . May.  
 The tranquillity of Mysore troubled by Dhoondiah Waugh, a Mahratta freebooter. Colonel Wellesley takes the field against him . . . . . July.  
 Defeats him; death of Dhoondiah, and end of the warfare . . . . . 10 Sept.  
 Recalled from Mysore to command a force assembling at Trincomalee . . . . . Oct.  
 Appointed to command this force, to be employed at Mauritius, or in the Red Sea, in the event of orders from Europe to that effect; or to be ready to act against any hostile attempt upon India . . . . . 15 Nov.

1801.

A despatch, overland, received by the Governor-General, with orders, dated 6th October, 1800, to send 3,000 men to Egypt . . . . . 6 Feb.  
 The expedition being ready at Trincomalee, the Governor-general directed the whole force to proceed to the Red Sea; and appointed General Baird to command in chief, and Colonel Wellesley to be second in command . . . . . 11 Feb.  
 In the meantime Colonel Wellesley, having received from the Governors of Bombay and Madras copies of the overland despatch from Mr. Dundas, sailed from Trincomalee for Bombay in command of the troops . . . . . 15 Feb.  
 Colonel Wellesley, on his way to Bombay, informed of the appointment of Major-General Baird to the chief command . . . . . 21 Feb.  
 Prevented, by illness, from proceeding on the expedition to Egypt; Colonel Wellesley is ordered to resume his government of Mysore . . . . . 28 April.

1803.

Appointed to command a force assembled at Hurryhur to march into the Mahratta territory . . . . . 27 Feb.  
 Advance from Hurryhur . . . . . 9 Mar.  
 Arrival at Poonah . . . . . 20 April.  
 The Peishwah replaced on the musnud . . . . . 13 May.  
 Empowered to exercise the general direction and control of all the political and military affairs of the British Government in the territories of the Nizam, the Peishwah, and of the Mahratta States and Chiefs in the Deccan; similar authority being given to General Lake in Hindustan . . . . . 26 June.  
 The Mahratta war commenced . . . . . 6 Aug.  
 Siege and capture of Ahmednuggur . . . . . 11 Aug.  
 Siege and capture of Baroach . . . . . 29 Aug.  
 Battle of Assaye . . . . . 23 Sept.  
 Siege and capture of Asseerghur . . . . . 21 Oct.  
 Battle of Argaum . . . . . 29 Nov.  
 Siege and capture of Gawilghur . . . . . 15 Dec.  
 Treaty of Peace with the Rajah of Berar . . . . . 17 Dec.  
 ——— with Dowlut Rao Scindiah . . . . . 30 Dec.

1804.

Surprise of a body of predatory Mahrattas, who were routed and destroyed, after an extraordinary forced march, near Munkaiseer . . . . . 6 Feb



## FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

A sword of the value of £1,000 voted to Major-General Wellesley by the British inhabitants of Calcutta . . . . .	21 Feb.
A golden vase voted to Major-General Wellesley by the officers of his division, afterwards changed to a service of plate, embossed with "Assaye" . . . . .	26 Feb.
Visits Bombay . . . . .	4 Mar.
<i>Fêtes</i> and address by the garrison and inhabitants . . . . .	} to 16 May.
Returns to the army near Poonah . . . . .	17 May.
Resigns the military and political powers vested in him by the Governor-General . . . . .	24 June.
Left the army for Seringapatam . . . . .	28 June.
Address voted to Major-General Wellesley, on his return from the army, by the native inhabitants of Seringapatam . . . . .	6 July.
Called to Calcutta to assist in military deliberations . . . . .	July.
Appointed a Knight Companion of the Bath . . . . .	1 Sept.
The civil and military powers vested in him on the 26th of June, 1803, and resigned on the 24th of June, 1804, renewed by the Governor-General . . . . .	9 Nov.
Returns to Seringapatam by Madras . . . . .	30 Mar.

### 1805.

Resigns the political and military powers in the Deccan, and proposes to embark for Europe . . . . .	24 Feb.
Addresses on quitting India:—	
From the Officers of the division lately under his command . . . . .	27 Feb.
Answer . . . . .	8 Mar.
From the Officers of the 33rd regiment . . . . .	28 Feb.
Answer . . . . .	Mar.
From the native inhabitants of Seringapatam . . . . .	4 Mar.
Answer . . . . .	4 Mar.

Grand entertainment given to him at the Pantheon at Madras, by the civil and military Officers of the Presidency . . . . .	5 Mar.
Appoints Colonel Wallace, Major Barclay, and Captain Bellingham to superintend the prize affairs of the army of the Deccan . . . . .	6 Mar.
The thanks of the King and Parliament for his service in the command of the army of the Deccan, communicated in General Orders by the Governor-General . . . . .	8 Mar.
Embarks in his Majesty's ship <i>Trident</i> , for England . . . . .	Mar.
Arrival in England . . . . .	Sept.
Appointed to command a brigade in an expedition to Hanover, under Lord Cathcart . . . . .	Nov.

### 1806.

Appointed Colonel of the 33rd Regt., vice Marquis Cornwallis, deceased . . . . .	30 Jan.
On the return of the expedition from Hanover, appointed to command a brigade of infantry in the Sussex district . . . . .	Feb.
Returned to serve in Parliament . . . . .	

### 1807.

Appointed Secretary to Ireland (the Duke of Richmond being Lord-Lieutenant) . . . . .	3 April.
Sworn of his Majesty's Privy Council . . . . .	8 April.
Appointed to command in the army under Lord Cathcart, in the expedition against Copenhagen . . . . .	July.
Affair at Kiøge . . . . .	29 Aug.
Appointed to negotiate the capitulation of Copenhagen . . . . .	5 Sept.

### 1808.

Receives the thanks of Parliament for his conduct at Copenhagen, in his place in the House of Commons, and replies to the Speaker . . . . .	1 Feb.
Returns to Ireland . . . . .	



SERVICES, OFFICIAL COMMANDS, AND PUBLIC HONOURS OF

Appointed to command an expedition assembled at Cork . . . . .	July.
The expedition sails for Corunna and Oporto . . . . .	12 July.
Finally lands at the mouth of the river Mondego, in Portugal . . . . .	1 to 3 Aug.
Affair of Obidos . . . . .	15 Aug.
— Roliça . . . . .	17 Aug.
Battle of Vimiero . . . . .	21 Aug.
Superseded in the command of the army by Lieutenant-General Sir H. Burrard . . . . .	21 Aug.
By the desire of Lieutenant-General Sir H. Dalrymple, the Commander of the Forces, he signs the armistice with Lieutenant-General Kellermann, which led to the con- vention of Cintra . . . . .	22 Aug.
A piece of plate, commemorating the Battle of Vimiero, voted to Lieutenant-General Sir A. Wellesley, by the General and Field Officers who served at it . . . . .	22 Aug.
Commands a division of the army under Sir H. Dalrymple . . . . .	22 Aug.
Convention of Cintra . . . . .	30 Aug.
Returns to England . . . . .	4 Oct.
Court of Inquiry on the Convention of Cintra . . . . .	17 Nov.
His evidence before it . . . . .	22 Nov.
Returns to Ireland . . . . .	Dec.

1809.

Receives the thanks of Parliament for Vimiero, in his place in the House of Commons, and replies to the Speaker . . . . .	27 Jan.
Appointed to command the army in Portugal . . . . .	April.
Resigns the office of Chief Secretary in Ireland . . . . .	April.
Arrives at Lisbon, and assumes the command . . . . .	22 April.
The Passage of the Douro, and Battle of Oporto . . . . .	12 May.
By a decree of the Prince Regent of Portugal, appointed Marshal-General of the Portuguese army . . . . .	6 July.
Battle of Talavera de la Reyna. . . . .	27 and 28 July.
Created a Peer, by the titles of Baron Douro of Wellesley, and Viscount Wellington of Talavera . . . . .	26 Aug.
Meets Marquis Wellesley at Seville and Cadiz . . . . .	2 Nov.

1810.

Thanks of Parliament voted for Talavera . . . . .	1 Feb.
Pension of £2,000 per annum voted to Lord Wellington and his two succeeding heirs male . . . . .	16 Feb.
Appointed a member of the Regency in Portugal, in conjunction with Lord Stuart de Rothsay, then Mr. Stuart, his Majesty's Minister at Lisbon . . . . .	Aug.
Battle at Busaco . . . . .	27 Sept.
Takes up a position to cover Lisbon in the Lines, from Alhandra on the Tagus, to Torres Vedras and the Sea . . . . .	10 Oct.
Follows the retreat of the French army, under Marshal Massena, to Santarem . . . . .	16 Nov.

1811.

Again follows the retreat of the French army to Condeixa, and from thence along the line of the Mondego, to Celorico, Sabugal Almeida, and Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	5 Mar. to 10 April.
Affairs with the French army on its retreat:—	
At Pombal . . . . .	11 Mar.
At Redinha . . . . .	12 Mar.
At Casal Nova . . . . .	14 Mar.
At the Passage of the Ceira, at Foz d'Arouce . . . . .	15 Mar.
At Sabugal . . . . .	3 April.
Thanks of Parliament for the liberation of Portugal . . . . .	26 April.



FIELD-MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Battle of Fuentes d'Onoro . . . . .	3 and 5 May.
Fall of Almeida . . . . .	11 May.
Battle of Albuera . . . . .	16 May.
Siege of Badajoz raised . . . . .	10 June.
Concentration of the army on the Caya . . . . .	19 June.
Carries the army to the north . . . . .	1 Aug.
Affair at El Bodon . . . . .	25 Sept.
— at Aldea di Ponte . . . . .	27 Sept.
License granted in the name of the King, by the Prince Regent, to accept the title of Conde do Vimiero, and the insignia of Knight Grand Cross of the Tower and Sword, from the Prince Regent of Portugal . . . . .	26 Oct.
General Hill's surprise of General Girard, at Arroyo Molinos . . . . .	28 Oct.

1812.

Storm of Fort Renaud, near Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	8 Jan.
Siege and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	19 Jan.
Created by the Regency a Grandee of Spain, with the title of Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	Feb.
Thanks of Parliament for Ciudad Rodrigo . . . . .	10 Feb.
Advanced in the British Peerage by the title of Earl of Wellington . . . . .	18 Feb.
Vote of Parliament of £2,000 per annum, in addition to the title . . . . .	21 Feb.
Siege and capture of Badajoz . . . . .	6 April.
Thanks of Parliament for Badajoz . . . . .	27 April.
Forts at Almaraz taken by General Hill . . . . .	19 May.
Siege and capture of the fortified convents at Salamanca . . . . .	27 June.
Battle of Salamanca . . . . .	22 July.
Charge of Cavalry at La Serna . . . . .	23 July.
The Order of the Golden Fleece conferred by the Regency of Spain . . . . .	Aug.
Enters Madrid . . . . .	12 Aug.
Appointed Generalissimo of the Spanish armies . . . . .	Aug.
Advanced in the British Peerage by the title of Marquis of Wellington . . . . .	18 Aug.
Advanced by the Regent of Portugal to the title of Marquez de Torres Vedras . . . . .	Aug.
Marches towards Burgós . . . . .	4 Sept.
Siege and failure of Burgos . . . . .	22 Oct.
Retreat to the frontier of Portugal, to the . . . . .	19 Nov.
Thanks of Parliament voted for Salamanca . . . . .	3 Dec.
A grant of £100,000 from Parliament, to be laid out in the purchase of lands to that value, as a reward for his services, and to enable him to support the dignity of his peerage . . . . .	7 Dec.
Advanced by the Regent of Portugal to the title of Duque da Victoria . . . . .	18 Dec.
Visits Cadiz, where he is received by a deputation of the Cortes . . . . .	24 Dec.

1813.

Appointed Colonel of the Royal Regiment of Horse Guards . . . . .	1 Jan.
Returns to Portugal by Lisbon, where he is received by the whole population . . . . .	16 Jan.
<i>Fêtes</i> given by the Regency, and at San Carlos . . . . .	Jan.
Letter on quitting the 33rd Regiment as Colonel . . . . .	2 Feb.
Elected a Knight of the Garter . . . . .	4 Mar.
Advance into Spain in two columns; the left column, under Lieutenant-General Sir T. Graham, by the north bank of the Douro; the right column to Salamanca . . . . .	6 May.
Quits Freneda for Salamanca . . . . .	22 May.
Affair near Salamanca . . . . .	25 May.
The Commander of the Forces proceeds to the left column, at Miranda de Duero . . . . .	29 May.



SERVICES, OFFICIAL COMMANDS, AND PUBLIC HONOURS OF

Affair of the Hussar brigade at Morales de Toro . . . . .	2 June.
Junction of the two columns at Toro, and advance of the army on Valladolid and Burgos . . . . .	4 June.
The Castle of Burgos blown up . . . . .	12 June.
The Ebro turned at San Martin and Rocamundo . . . . .	14 June.
Affair at San Millan . . . . .	18 June.
Battle of Vittoria . . . . .	21 June.
Promoted to Field Marshal. ( <i>Gazette</i> , 3rd July) . . . . .	21 June.
Pursuit of the French army to France by Pamplona, and the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya in the Pyrenees; and by Tolosa, San Sebastian, and Irun . . . . .	June.
Thanks of Parliament for Vittoria . . . . .	8 July.
Siege of San Sebastian . . . . .	17 July.
The Regency of Spain, on the proposition of the Cortes, offer to bestow on the Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo the estate of the Soto de Roma in Granada, "in the name of the Spanish nation, in testimony of its sincere gratitude" . . . . .	22 July.
First assault and failure at San Sebastian . . . . .	25 July.
Advance of the French army under Marshal Soult, by Maya and Roncesvalles; the right and centre divisions of the army concentrating near Pamplona . . . . .	24 to 27 July.
Battle of Soracuren . . . . .	28 July.
Retreat of the French army into France . . . . .	30 July.
Affair at the Puerto de Echalar . . . . .	1 Aug.
Re-occupation of the positions on the Pyrenees by the Allied Armies . . . . .	2 Aug.
Second assault and fall of San Sebastian . . . . .	31 Aug.
Affairs on the Bidassoa and San Marcial . . . . .	31 Aug.
Castle of San Sebastian capitulated . . . . .	8 Sept.
Passage of the Bidassoa, and entrance into France . . . . .	7 Oct.
Thanks of Parliament for San Sebastian, and the operations subsequent to Vittoria . . . . .	8 Oct.
Surrender of Pamplona . . . . .	31 Oct.
The whole of the army descend into France; passage and battle of the Nivelle . . . . .	10 Nov.
Passage of the Nive . . . . .	9 Dec.
Marshal Soult attacks the left and right of the British army, and is successively defeated . . . . .	10 to 18 Dec.

1814.

Leaves two divisions to blockade Bayonne, and follows Marshal Soult with the remainder of the army . . . . .	Feb.
Affair at Hellette . . . . .	14 Feb.
Battle of Orthez . . . . .	27 Feb.
Passage of the Adour at St. Sever . . . . .	1 Mar.
Affair at Aire . . . . .	2 Mar.
The permission of the Prince Regent granted to the Marquis of Wellington to accept and wear the insignia of the following Orders:—	4 Mar.
Grand Cross of the Imperial Military Order of Maria Teresa.	
_____ the Imperial Russian Military Order of St. George.	
_____ the Royal Prussian Military Order of the Black Eagle.	
_____ the Royal Swedish Military Order of the Sword.	
Detaches two divisions to Bordeaux . . . . .	8 Mar.
Affair at Tarbes . . . . .	20 Mar.
Thanks of the Prince Regent and the Parliament for Orthez . . . . .	24 Mar.
Passage of the Garonne . . . . .	4 April.
Battle of Toulouse . . . . .	10 April.
Advanced in the British Peerage by the titles of Marquis of Douro and Duke of Wellington	3 May.
Visits Paris . . . . .	4 May.



## FIELD-MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Visits Madrid. King Ferdinand confirms all the honours and rewards conferred upon him in his Majesty's name by the Regency and the Cortes . . . . .	24 May.
A grant of £400,000 voted by Parliament, in addition to the former grants . . . . .	June.
Arrives in England . . . . .	23 June.
Proceeds to pay his respects to the Prince Regent, then at Portsmouth with the Allied Monarchs . . . . .	24 June.
His reception in the House of Peers on taking his seat as Baron, Viscount, Earl, Marquis, and Duke . . . . .	28 June.
Returns thanks at the bar of the House of Commons, and is addressed by the Speaker	30 June.
Appointed Ambassador to the Court of France . . . . .	5 July.
Banquet given by the Corporation of London . . . . .	9 July.
Heraldic honours bestowed . . . . .	25 Aug.
Assists at the Congress at Vienna . . . . .	1 Nov.

### 1815.

On the arrival of Bonaparte in France, appointed Commander of the British forces on the Continent of Europe, and from Vienna joins the Army at Bruxelles . . . . .	11 April.
Puts himself in communication with Prince Blücher, in command of the Prussian army on the Meuse . . . . .	2 May.
Moves the allied army towards Nivelles, on the French army, under Bonaparte, crossing the frontier at Charleroi . . . . .	15 June.
Battle of Quatre Bras . . . . .	16 June.
Retires to a position to cover Bruxelles, on the border of the Forest of Soignies . . . . .	17 June.
Battle of Waterloo . . . . .	18 June.
Created Prince of Waterloo by the King of the Netherlands . . . . .	June.
Thanks of the Prince Regent and Parliament for Waterloo . . . . .	22 June.
Pursuit of the fugitive remains of the French army to Paris . . . . .	June.
Surrender of Cambrai . . . . .	25 June.
——— of Peronne . . . . .	June.
Paris capitulated . . . . .	3 July.
By his interference, prevents the Column in the Place Vendôme and the Bridge of Jena being destroyed . . . . .	6 July.
A grant of £200,000 voted by Parliament, in addition to the former grants . . . . .	July.
Appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies of Occupation in France . . . . .	22 Oct.

### 1818.

Assists at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle . . . . .	Oct.
Appointed Field Marshal in the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian Armies . . . . .	Oct.
The evacuation of France by the Allied Armies . . . . .	1 Nov.
Appointed Master-General of the Ordnance . . . . .	26 Dec.

### 1819.

Appointed Governor of Plymouth . . . . .	9 Dec.
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### 1820.

Appointed Colonel-in-Chief of the Rifle Brigade . . . . .	19 Feb.
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### 1821.

Attends George IV., King of England, to the field of Waterloo . . . . .	1 Oct.
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### 1822.

Statue of Achilles inscribed to the Duke, in Hyde Park . . . . .	18 June.
Assists at the Congress of Verona . . . . .	22 Oct.

### 1826.

Proceeds on an especial embassy to St. Petersburg . . . . .	Feb.
Removes from the Government of Plymouth to be Constable of the Tower of London . . . . .	29 Dec.



SERVICES, OFFICIAL COMMANDS, AND PUBLIC HONOURS.

1827.

Appointed Colonel of the Grenadier Guards . . . . .	22 Jan.
Appointed Commander-in-Chief . . . . .	22 Jan.
Resigns . . . . .	30 April
Re-appointed . . . . .	27 Aug.

1828.

The King having called upon him to serve in the office of First Lord of the Treasury, he resigns the command of the army . . . . .	15 Feb.
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1829.

Appointed Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports . . . . .	20 Jan.
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1830.

Resigns the office of First Lord of the Treasury . . . . .	Oct.
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1834.

Elected Chancellor of the University of Oxford . . . . .	Jan.
Intrusted by the King with the whole charge of the Government and the Seals of the three Secretaries of State . . . . .	Nov.
Continues Secretary of Foreign Affairs . . . . .	Dec.

1835.

Resigns . . . . .	April
Receives Queen Adelaide, as Chancellor of the University of Oxford . . . . .	19 Oct.

1837.

Received with great cordiality by the people at the coronation of Queen Victoria . . . . .	28 June.
Presides at a meeting to erect a monument to Lord Nelson . . . . .	1 Aug.

1839.

Grand entertainment given to the Duke at Dover . . . . .	30 Aug.
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1841.

Peel Ministry: the Duke in the Cabinet, without office . . . . .	Sept.
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1842.

Her Majesty visits the Duke at Walmer Castle . . . . .	
The Duke appointed Commander of the Forces . . . . .	Dec.

1844.

Equestrian statue of the Duke inaugurated at Glasgow . . . . .	8 Oct.
Equestrian statue of the Duke, Royal Exchange, inaugurated . . . . .	18 June.

1845.

Her Majesty visits the Duke at Strathfieldsaye . . . . .	20 June.
First stone of the Waterloo barracks, in the Tower, laid by the Duke . . . . .	14 June.

1846.

Peel Ministry resigns: the Duke retires from the Cabinet . . . . .	6 July.
Colossal equestrian statue of the Duke erected upon the arch, Green Park . . . . .	30 Sept.

1848.

Publication of the Duke's letter to Sir John Burgoyne, on the national defences . . . . .	Jan.
The Duke directs great preparations to prevent a Chartist outbreak . . . . .	Mar.
Statue of the Duke erected in the Tower . . . . .	Oct.

1850.

The Duke sponsor at the baptism of the infant Prince Arthur . . . . .	22 June.
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1852.

Equestrian statue of the Duke at Edinburgh inaugurated . . . . .	18 June.
Death at Walmer Castle . . . . .	14 Sept.





THE MARQUIS OF WELLESLEY.

*Engraved by T. Hollis from a Daguerreotype of the Original Statue by H. Weekes,  
which was exhibited at the Great Exhibition of 1851.*





THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

*From the Colossal Statue in the Tower of London,  
a Model of which was exhibited in the Great Exhibition of 1851.*



# THE LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF WELLINGTON.

## BIRTH, PARENTAGE, AND EARLY HISTORY.

THOUGH Napoleon has been styled by the author of the *History of the War in the Peninsula*, "the greatest of captains," and "the first of all generals,"\* and by Berton, in his *Précis Historique des Batailles de Fleurus et de Waterloo*, "le génie de la guerre" (the genius of war), ARTHUR WELLESLEY, the late Duke of Wellington, may be said, without any hyperbolical exaggeration, to have been the greatest captain of modern times, and the most successful general that ever appeared on the theatre of warfare. He was born at Dangan Castle, on the 1st of May, 1769, and was the sixth child of a family nine in number. His ancestors, the Cowleys, Cooleys, or as the name is now written, Colleys, were originally of English extraction, being descended of an old Saxon family long settled in Rutlandshire, but migrated to Ireland in the reign of Henry the Eighth, who, for the purpose of promoting and strengthening the protestant religion in that country, offered grants of lands and high salaried offices to men of talent

\* Among the numerous overstrained laudations, and the misplaced idolatry of his hero, by the author of the *History of the Peninsular War*, some of those that occur in the sixth volume of his work are rather startling, if not outrageously extravagant. He there informs his readers, that his "greatest captain" and "first general," was "untainted by any private vice," and, lest the astounding piece of intelligence should be lost among the blaze of virtues with which he has endowed the god of his idolatry, he again propounds a no less extraordinary piece of intelligence, namely, that he was endowed with "freedom from all vices;" and, lastly, to give due effect to the hyperbolical fictions of his rapturous admiration of his idol's perfection and immaculateness, he gravely declares, that he was of "inflexible probity of character," and was "devoid of all selfish ambition." Never did the most rabidly idolatrous worshipper (even in the guise and semblance

and family. Robert and Walter Colley accepted the proffered reward, and settled in the counties of Meath and Kildare. They obtained the grant of the clerkship of the crown in chancery during their joint lives, with the benefit of survivorship; and, in 1537, Robert became master of the rolls, and Walter was appointed solicitor-general. A monument bearing date 1408, in the parish of Glaiston, in the hundred of Wrangdyke, Rutlandshire, and erected to the memory of Walter Colley and his wife Agnes, still remains a memorial of the English origin of the duke. The name of Wellesley, and the possession of Dangan castle, and its appurtenant estates, were obtained by intermarriage with the Wesley, Wellesley, or according to early orthography De Welesley family.

The family was raised to the peerage in 1746, by the title of baron Mornington, in Ireland. The second lord Mornington, the father of the duke, married the eldest daughter of the viscount Dungannon; and

of a Gaulish devotee) of Napoleonic virtues and perceptions—of Napoleonic probity and morality—draw more largely on his own imaginative powers, and require greater credulity on the part of his readers, than the otherwise judicious and instructive author of the *History of the Peninsular War* has done in favour of his "golden calf." It is to be regretted, that before he penned those misjudged and unfounded notions, and had suffered his judgment to be overlaid by his overweening admiration, he had not read and formed an accurate estimate of sir Walter Scott's more temperate and just estimate of Napoleonic probity and disinterestedness. "With a firm and unremitting attention to his own plans and *his own interest*," says that cautious and trustworthy authority, "Bonaparte proceeded from battle to plunder, less like a soldier than a brigand or common highwayman." Scores of other authorities of the highest credibility might be cited to the same effect.



was created viscount Wellesley and earl of Mornington in 1760. In his childhood he was distinguished by a great natural talent for music. His glees, songs, and some of his church compositions, obtained so much popularity, that the university of Dublin conferred on him, as a testimony of their respect for his skill and eminence in the science, the degree of doctor and professor of music. Among the most admired of his vocal productions are: "Come Forest Nymph," "Gently hear me, Charming Maid," and "By Greenwood Tree." One of his chants still continues to be performed in the churches of Dublin.

On the death of the earl in 1781, he was succeeded in his title and estates by his eldest son, Richard Colley Wellesley, who, in 1797, was raised to the British peerage, and in the same year was appointed governor-general of India. He was a man possessed of high classical attainments, and great oratorical powers. The other brothers, except the duke, were men ordinarily gifted in respect of mind, or were at farthest, but little above mediocrity in intellectual endowments.

Arthur Wellesley was sent with his eldest brother to Eton; but his mind, like that of

\* Such is the general and unvarying report of the duke's biographers; but to those who possess a knowledge of human nature, and who take a deeper insight into the character of man than superficial observers usually do, it is well known, that it is scarcely possible that a mind of the duke's structure and direction could pass through the routine of school-discipline without evincing some indications of ability—some promise of future superiority and mastery in the great game and business of life. Be it, however, as it may, as to the duke's evincing talent or not during his school noviciate, the absence of indication of precocious talent during the period of academical life, and of oratorical powers in the early stage of parliamentary career, has not occurred only in the person of Arthur Wellesley. Among scores of instances that might be readily cited, of unpromising students and orators, who afterwards rose to distinction in their respective vocations, the names of Goldsmith and Curran stand conspicuous; the first, while an undergraduate in Trinity College, was considered a dull, heavy scholar; the second, in his first essays in the debating societies of London, an ungainly and awkward speaker. The late Adam Clarke, the dissenting minister, was, during his school noviciate, deemed "a grievous dunce." Liebig, the celebrated German chemist, was distinguished at school as "a booby." Even sir Isaac Newton was considered, while at school, "a backward and unpromising scholar:" according to his own statement, he "ranked very low in the school until the age of twelve." The mother of Sheridan pronounced him "the dullest and the most hopeless of her sons:" and Isaac Barrow's father used to say,

Napoleon, being of a scientific structure, after a brief struggle with the heroes and poets of antiquity, he was sent by his mother (a woman of strong and cultivated intellect) to the military college of Angiers, in the department of Maine and Loire, in France, then under the superintendence of the celebrated Pignerol. There, as at Eton, it is said, that he exhibited no indication of superior and commanding talent:\* all he could pretend to was a fair and creditable proficiency. Neither did he in parliament, to which he was returned for the borough of Trim, in 1790, evince, as sir Jonah Barrington reports, "much promise of the unparalleled celebrity which he reached afterwards;" but as one (a member of the celebrated society of the "Monks of the Screw") of sir Jonah's friends said, "when he did speak, it was always to the purpose:" a remark which indicates, that sir Jonah's friend possessed more penetration than himself.

On leaving the college of Angiers, he was appointed, March 7th, 1787, to an ensigncy in the 73rd regiment of infantry; and on the 25th of December, in the same year, was promoted to a lieutenantcy in the 76th. After various purchases and exchanges,

"that if it pleased God to take from him any of his children, he hoped it might be Isaac, as the least promising." Neither did Shakspeare, Molière, Swift, Gibbon, Johnson, Niebuhr, Franklin, Davy, or Walter Scott, display any indications of precocious capacity; but rather the contrary. Gesner, the Swiss poet, at the age of ten years, was declared by his preceptors incapable of any attainment. Nor are these singular cases. Those who ultimately rise to great distinction, either in civil or military life, are seldom distinguished for early proficiency. Besides, generals are not, like poets, "heaven-born;" they do not come into the world intuitively gifted and inspired. They acquire that knowledge which they are to be called on to put into practice through the medium of instruction and experience; they derive nothing by intuition: all their knowledge is obtained through the medium of the other sciences; and for this obvious reason, great military commanders have rarely given indications of precocity of that talent by means of which they have become eminent when engaged on the theatre of warfare. Marlborough, Turenne, Frederick of Prussia, Sobieski, Charlemagne, and even Napoleon (though his biographers have been profuse in their declarations to the contrary) gave but little prognostication, when school-boys, of military genius; and had we the means and opportunity of knowing the whole details and circumstances of the lives of the great Grecian, Roman, Carthaginian, and Asiatic commanders—the Cesars, the Scipios, the Alexanders, the Hannibals, the Genghis Khans, &c.—there cannot be much doubt but that we should find the case to have been similar with them.



namely, into the 41st foot, the 12th light dragoons, the 58th foot, the 18th light dragoons, and the 33rd foot, his eldest brother purchased for him the lieutenant-colonelcy of the last-mentioned regiment, which was, at the time, stationed at the Cove of Cork.

From that port he embarked, May, 1794, with his regiment, for Ostend, where he remained in garrison, until the earl of Moira disembarked at that port the expedition which he commanded for the purpose of creating a diversion in Brittany in favour of the army under the command of the duke of York, then serving in Austrian Flanders. But the duke, in consequence of the defeat of the Austrians, under Clairfait, at Fleurus, being driven from his position at Tournay, and compelled to adopt a retrograde movement, for the purpose of falling back on Antwerp, and the republican forces at the same time advancing on Ostend, lord Moira evacuated Ostend, and marched by Bruges and Ghent, to the Scheldt, crossed that river at the Tête de Flanders, and effected a junction with the English army, which was then in front of Mechlin, or Malines. On its march, the force under the earl was attacked at Alost, July 6th, but repulsed the enemy. This was the first battle-field on which Wellington had been present, and on which he received his first practical lessons in the art of war.

The Republican forces were so vastly superior, both in numerical and physical strength, that the British army continued to retreat, first on Breda, and then on Bois-le-duc. On the 14th of September, the advanced posts were attacked at the village of Boxel, and though the enemy was repulsed in two successive assaults, the army was compelled to resume its retrograde movement. The duty of covering the operation was confided to colonel Wellesley. In that arduous and responsible task, the rear-guard, under their spirited and able commander, always presented so steady and determined an attitude, that the attack of the enemy was either averted, or the assailants were repulsed. At the posts of Meteren and Geldermansen, the enemy was not only repulsed, but repossession was obtained of the guns that had been taken. While the army was clearing the village of Schyndel, the cavalry covering the rear-guard being compelled, by a superior force, to fall back, colonel Wellesley, halting the 33rd, and deploying it into line, at the same

time opening his centre files, allowed the disordered cavalry to pass through, when, closing up his files, he resolutely charged the pursuing foe, and compelled him to fall back on his main body. Throughout the whole of the disastrous retreat from Holland to Bremen, he displayed the greatest judgment and skill, and the most conspicuous gallantry in the discharge of the important duty which had been confided to him.

The hardships and privations sustained by the troops during this retreat were excessive. The route from the frozen banks of the Lech to those of the Issel, lay through the flat and desert heaths of the dreary and inhospitable provinces of Guelderland and Over-Issel. On that dreary and barren waste, the unbroken covering of the snow was so deep, that the roads could not be traced, even by those who knew the nature of the country; and the snow continued to fall so thick and fast, that the track of the line of march was obliterated, so that hundreds of the stragglers lost their way and perished; a lot to which the sick and wounded were unavoidably exposed, as the waggons could not proceed on account of the deepness of the ruts in the roads. To add to the sufferings of the fugitive, but not dispirited troops, a piercing and biting wind drove a cutting sleet direct in their faces. The inclemency of the season—winter being at the time in its utmost rigour, and the thermometer being frequently down at 15° and 21° below zero of Fahrenheit, which Jomini, *Vie de Napoléon*, says was never so low in the disastrous retreat from Moscow, which, for its horrors, throws all other retreats, except that from Cabool, into the shade—the long and rapid marches, and the dark and tedious nights of ceaseless watching, without food, fuel, or proper clothing, broke down the spirits and hopes of the men, and increased the severity of their destitute and forlorn condition. If the exhausted soldier, overpowered with fatigue, sat down to rest, and allowed the influence of slumber to steal on his senses, unless his companions quickly aroused him, he slept the sleep of death. The tears that the cold caused to trickle from their eyes, congealed as they fell on their cheeks, and the breath that escaped from their mouth and nostrils, was converted into icicles on their beards. Their hardships were further increased by the almost absolute want of food, the only available means of supporting life being “a mere drink of water.”



And to add to the sum of their calamities, they were often assassinated by the Dutch peasantry. From this dismal scene of suffering and privation—of bad faith and hostility shown to them by those who had solicited their assistance and confederation, they were at length relieved by their reaching Bremen. In the spring of 1795, they embarked for England at Bremerleche on the Weser, and soon reached its shores, ready to prove to the world that they had not degenerated from their forefathers, the victors of Agincourt, Poitiers, and Crecy—of Blenheim, Ramilies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet, but that the bright examples of courage and patriotism there displayed, would be nobly and faithfully imitated by their descendants. That the inglorious and disastrous affair had not implicated the character and credit of the British soldier, we have the impartial testimony of general Jamini, who, in his *Histoire Critique et Militaire des Guerres de la Révolution*, has honourably acknowledged that the affairs were all between the bulk of the French army and merely the advanced posts of the British; and in another passage he adds, “L’armée Anglaise gémissait elle même sur rôle singulier qu’on lui faisait jouer;” by which expression he infers that the glory of the English arms had not been tarnished or diminished, but that the gallantry and efficiency of the British soldier had been foiled and frustrated by the ignorance and blunders of the allied commanders; and he closes his opinion of those leaders with this emphatic expression, “that the inefficiency and ignorance they exhibited are beneath all criticism, however severe.”

This inglorious campaign was a series of ill-advised and badly executed movements on the part of the allied generals; and the French leaders proved that they were equally incompetent, as they never availed themselves of the opportunity of taking advantage of those errors. The leaders of both sides were equally ignorant of the great principles of military science. When you design to assail your enemy, or are assailed by him, instead of occupying an extensive line of operations, and adopting the old and exploded cordon-system of posts and positions, you should group and concentrate your forces, ready to attack and overpower your foe where he presents his weakest points; or if you direct separate divisions of your forces against several distant points of an enemy's frontier, you should have

made provision for their rapid concentration when an entrance has been effected, and while the opposing forces are in a state of disunion, which was necessary to guard against simultaneous attacks from different quarters. These great and first principles of the science of war were violated by both parties—the assailant and the assailed. They were formalists and pedants in the science; men of mere routine, devoted exclusively to one-sided views of their art. The consequence was, the one was discomfited, and the other was unable to derive all the advantages which fortune presented him.

Thus ended Wellington's FIRST FLEMISH CAMPAIGN, or, in more subdued language, his first military services on “the great prize-fighting stage of Europe,” as Sterne, in his *Tristram Shandy*, makes his hero, “My Uncle Toby,” style Flanders. In it he gave the first dawn of that reputation which has filled the whole horizon of the civilized world with its splendour and effulgence; and in it, while he “heard those grand sounds with which he was to have so long and so glorious a familiarity in after life—the distant boom of the hostile gun, the rough thunder of batteries of cannon, the rolling of musketry, the tread of columns, the trampling of squadrons, and the dauntless cheers, the loud hurrah of those soldiers whom, under happier auspices, and on a more glorious theatre of action, he was so often to lead against the enemies of his country, and to guide to victory and glory”—he first learned and put into practice that “*patientia inedia, alboris, vigiliae, supra cuiquam credibilis,*” which laid the foundation of his “iron constitution,” and contributed, in conjunction with his extraordinary sagacity and well-poised mind, to save Europe from the most galling and tyrannous subjugation.

On the return of the British army to England, colonel Wellesley, as soon as the 33rd was reported fit for service, embarked (1795) with his regiment on an expedition fitted out against the French for the West Indies, but the fleet being repeatedly driven back by tempests, before it could proceed on its destination, the colonel and his regiment (1796) were ordered to India, which destination they reached in February, 1797. “Thus,” as a tasteful biographer of the duke has observed, “a star which might have set early in the west in obscurity—perhaps in death—arose in the east with life and brightness.”



# HOLLAND

SCALE.

0 10 20 30 40 Miles.



ROTTERDAM



DUTCH PEASANTS



ON THE DOCK

Longitude East from Greenwich.



## THE INDIAN CAMPAIGNS.

From the swamps and dykes of Holland, in which he had given an earnest of the future eminence he was destined to attain, we have now to accompany Wellington to the sultry and burning plains of Hindustan, on which he was to lay the foundation, and display that superiority of talent and genius which was to entitle him to rank among the most consummate masters of military science.

As it has been correctly said, much misconception has been entertained respecting Asiatic warfare and Asiatic soldiers. It is generally supposed that Asiatic armies are mere hordes of undisciplined barbarians—that the Asiatic soldier has but little bodily power and personal prowess—“is an effeminate, silken slave, whose nerves tremble at the report of a cannon;” but the bloody and severe combats which the armies of India have maintained with the hardy and veteran troops of Europe, the fierce impetuosity of their assaults and attacks, led and directed by French officers and British deserters, of whom more than three-fourths of the officers of Tippoo Saib and the Mahratta powers consisted, prove that this “fancy picture” is not true. Both in ancient and modern times, the Asiatic soldiers have shown that they are not deficient either in physical courage and energy, or in ability to support fatigue and privation. They resisted, in a succession of well-contested engagements, Alexander’s army, consisting of 120,000 men, whom he had collected as he traversed the various regions in his march to India. In the Mysore, Mahratta, Nepaulese, and Sikh wars, they have shown all the requisites of the soldier, either in the battle-field or in the breach of fortified places. And a very high military authority tells us, that “in the best requisites of a soldier, the Indian auxiliary might serve as a model to every service in Europe.” In the field, the sepoy soldier emulates his European comrades in gallantry and discipline; and in the camp he surpasses them in sobriety and good conduct. In danger the Hindu exhibits a calm resolution which no reverses can overturn; want and suffering never induce him to desert his officers; and death alone detaches him from his colours, which, whether in victory or defeat, he regards with

a devotion that borders on idolatry. The fidelity of the Hindu soldier is never to be shaken; the strongest human tie, even that of kindred or affinity, never induces him to swerve from his duty. When circumstances require the sacrifice, he seals his loyalty with his life, and abandons everything but his faith. Numerous are the instances in which the Hindu soldiers have shown the most devoted affection for their officers. During the march of Baillie’s army, in 1790, across the country, after their surrender to Tippoo Saib, the Hindu privates, who were kept separate from their officers, in hopes that they might be induced to accept service under the sultaun, often swam, during the night, tanks and rivers, by which they were separated from their officers, to carry them a part of their pittance of provisions. In Malcolm’s *Life of Lord Clive*, we are told that when provisions were becoming scarce in the fort of Arcot, when besieged by Morari Row, the sepoys proposed that Clive should limit them to canjee, the water in which the rice is boiled, and which resembled very thick gruel. “It is,” said they, “sufficient for our support; the Europeans require the grain.” But warm and devoted affection is not the only good feeling displayed by the Hindu soldier; his fidelity and attachment to the military point of honour is unalterable, and greater than he bears to his country or kindred, or even his religion. When Warren Hastings was engaged at Benares, in his dispute with Cheyte Sing, not a corps showed any reluctance to engage the rajah and the people of Benares; not a single case of desertion occurred, though the sepoys engaged in the suppression of the insurrection were, for the most part, men of the same tribe and country as those against whom they acted; many of them were natives of Benares and the surrounding districts, and, as such, had been accustomed to consider Cheyte Sing as their legitimate prince. In the mutiny also occasioned at Vellore by the injudicious order to reduce the beard and mustachios of the sepoys to a regular standard, the swords of the native Madras cavalry were as deeply stained as those of the 19th dragoons, in the blood of their mutinous countrymen. And in the insur-



rection at Cabool, and during the siege of Jellalabad, the fidelity of the native portion of the troops engaged in that ill-fated affair, remained unshaken amidst the severe privations and sufferings to which they were exposed, notwithstanding the most insidious endeavours were repeatedly made by the enemy to seduce them from their allegiance.


The capture of Indian fortresses and towering strongholds, also, is not that easy and harmless affair that many persons suppose it to be. Many of the fortresses in the Indian peninsula are very strong, and had they been properly defended, would have been difficult to capture, often absolutely impregnable. They are occasionally situated on rocks that present a perpendicular face varying in height from 80 to 100 feet, and sometimes the walls of those fortresses are 40 feet in height, without a rampart, and therefore afford no room to stand upon, or means for descent. "It is quite fearful," says the eloquent author of *Recollections in India*, "to stand upon the walls which our soldiers have mounted in hot blood and carried by escalade in our Indian wars." Another reason, also, of popular apathy and indifference on this subject is, that Indian warfare is not deemed so glorious as that which takes place on the theatre of Europe, and that Indian nomenclature is not so grateful and musical to the ear as that of the classical vocabularies of Europe. "Ahmed-nuggur and Gawilghur are not quite so euphonious as Fuentes d'Onore, Talavera de la Reyna," or those classical and historical associations, the sound and mention of which afford delight and satisfaction to the refined and cultivated mind. But to resume the narrative.

At the time of the arrival of colonel Wellesley in India, the British interests in that quarter of the globe were environed with perils and difficulties. The greater part of the native powers were either avowedly inimical, or secretly disposed to assume a hos-

\* Among the other displays of his hatred of the English, he caused the walls of the houses in the principal streets of Seringapatam, to be ornamented with rude paintings caricaturing the English. In one place there was a tiger seizing a trembling Englishman; in another, there was a Mysorean horseman rivalling the feats of Aitor, and cutting off two or three English heads at a stroke; and in other places, there were Englishmen placed in positions, and subjected to treatment too disgusting for description. But he took good care to have these exhibitions of his silly and impotent rage erased as much as possible when he found that his capital was to be invested

tile attitude, when a favourable opportunity offered; and in this disposition they were encouraged by the agency and intrigues of French emissaries. Tippoo Saib, the sultan of the Mysore, inheriting the deadly and immitigable hatred (a feeling that the loss of half his dominions, by virtue of the treaty of Seringapatam, in 1792, with Lord Cornwallis, had rendered more bitter and rancorous,) which his fierce and semi-barbarous father, Hyder Ali, had manifested in life, and recommended in death, carried his vindictive spirit to so great a degree of frenzy, that he was constantly indulging his fancy in schemes of vengeance, and devising plans for inflicting the most cruel torments on his foemen, the English, whom he contemptuously termed "Nazarenes." Some of his devices, to indicate this spirit, were as singular as they were childish. Among the curiosities found in the Jamdar Khana at the capture of Seringapatam, was a piece of mechanism, or big toy, for his amusement, representing a tiger in the act of tearing to pieces the body of a Nazarene; and when it was put into motion, a hideous noise issued from the mouth of the victim, and its arms were raised as if in supplication, intended to represent the growls of the tiger, and to express the agonies of the sufferings of its victim. This curiosity is now deposited in the Museum of the East India House, in Leadenhall-street; but it is greatly deranged by the frequent attempts of the visitants to put it into motion.\* A copy of one of his letters to the French Directory was also found in his bureau, in which he says that, "in a short time, not a Nazarene should be found in India," but that "all the accursed ones should be sent to hell." So bitter and implacable was his hatred of the British nation, that it was, as sir Hector Munro informs us, "death for any man to be known as one who could speak or read English." His hatred of that nation, and its expulsion from India, were the ruling passions of his heart, the mainspring of his policy, the fixed fund of the British army, by having the whole of the walls whitewashed. Those that remained on the walls of the tyrant's superb mausoleum, still appear unobliterated by time and weather, having been retouched by colonel Wellesley's orders, and those of successive governors of Seringapatam, as a memorial of Tippoo's cruel and vindictive disposition. Sir Arthur also caused the native representations of Baillie's defeat (which were highly exaggerated to the prejudice of the English), exhibited in one of the halls of the palace of Doolut Bang, in which he resided during his governorship of Seringapatam, to be renovated, and restored to their original condition.





Engraved by W. BULL

CHARLES, MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

OB. 1805.

FROM THE ORIGINAL OF "GIBNEY, JUN."

THE "GUTHRIE," LONDON.



damental principle of his councils and government. To indicate his tiger-like ferocity towards the English, and perpetuate the recollection of the hatred which actuated his heart from the cradle to the grave, he altered the imperial crest of the elephant, which his father, Hyder, had adopted on his usurpation of the Mysorean throne, to the emblem of the tiger; and caused the same emblematic representation to be emblazoned on everything about his palace, as an indicative testimony of his fierce and bitter intentions.\*

To put his designs into execution, he had recourse to the profoundest intrigue, practised the deepest duplicity and cunning, and spared no exertions and contrivances, to be in a condition to compete with his enemy. For this purpose, he secretly dispatched envoys to M. Malartie, the governor of the Mauritius, or Isle of France, soliciting the aid of men and arms; and was, at the same time, in correspondence with Buonaparte, then at Cairo with the army of Egypt. While practising these secret machinations, he professed to the British government in India, that "it was the desire of his heart to pay every regard to truth and equity, and to strengthen the foundations of harmony and justice between the two nations." At the same time, he put his army into an efficient state, by the introduction of the improved system of European tactics; and this he was enabled to accomplish by the great encouragement and reward of French officers. His infantry was tolerably disciplined and appointed, his artillery effective, his cavalry active and courageous; and though the last-mentioned force was unequal to repel the combined charge of European cavalry, they were, as irregulars, formidable from their rapid movements, sudden assault, and celerity of retreat. His European, or French force, sent by Malartie, consisted of ten officers, ninety privates, and four hundred and fifty half-castes and Caffres. Prior, however, to their arrival, he had a considerable body of Frenchmen, under M. Lally, in his service.

And the sultan of the Mysore was not the only enemy that the British had to contend with in that critical and ominous aspect of their Oriental affairs. Besides the alliance, offensive and defensive, which he had entered into with the French Directory, he had, by

his intrigue, stirred up enemies throughout the Indian peninsula against the British interests, and his emissaries were aided in their endeavours by the numerous French adventurers who were in the service of the different native powers. The Mahratta chiefs, Scindiah and Holkar, the rajah of Berar, and Zemaun Schah, prince of Candahar and Cabool, were either avowed or secret enemies.

To meet these difficulties, lord Mornington, the eldest brother of the duke, and afterwards marquis Wellesley, the new governor-general, on his arrival in India, May 22nd, 1798, directed all the energies of his mind. He had the sagacity not only to discover the secret machinations of the native powers, but he possessed the wisdom and decision requisite to concert measures to disconcert and counteract them.

Having failed in his endeavours to effectuate amicable relations with Tippoo, and convinced of his duplicity and dissimulation, he made vigorous preparations for war. He strengthened his alliances with the nizam (the soubahdar, or chief prince in the Deccan), and the peishwah, the head of the Mahratta states; obtained the surrender of the French subsidiary force in the service of the first mentioned prince, at Hyderabad; and to obviate the consequences which had compelled lord Cornwallis to break up the siege of Seringapatam, in 1791, on account of the sudden rising of the river Cauvery, he ordered all the disposable forces (about 19,000 infantry, and 2,700 cavalry, of which force 6,500 were Europeans,) that were encamped at Wallajahabad, under the temporary command of colonel Wellesley, until general Harris assumed the command, to hold themselves in readiness to advance, so as to be able to terminate the siege of the capital, before the monsoon, or rainy season should set in; as from the swelling of the rivers from the rain, it would be impossible for an army to approach that city, from the month of June to the month of December. A Bombay force, under lieutenant-general Stuart, amounting to 6,400 men, of whom 1,600 were Europeans, had been assembled at Cannamore, a town on the Malabar coast, about one hundred miles south-west

\* His name, in the native dialect, means tiger. He called his soldiers "tigers of war:" tigers were his pets, and often his executioners. The attendant that offended him, or the prisoner that was brought into his presence, was not unfrequently turned into a

barred room, or a large cage, and tigers were let loose upon him. Tigers were even his guardians and body-guards. On the capture of the fortress, a large tiger was found chained near the door of his treasury.



of Seringapatam, for the purpose of acting in combination with the Carnatic army. Two other divisions of 5,000 and 4,000 men, under lieutenant-colonels Reid and Brown, were also in motion, from the southern districts of the Carnatic, for the purpose of gathering in the fruits and resources of the productive country of Barrahmahal, in order to bring supplies to the grand army through the Caverypooram Pass. The preparations for the campaign being completed, war was declared, and the Carnatic and Bombay armies received orders to march upon Seringapatam.

The Carnatic army reached the frontier on the 4th of March, 1799, and, on the 5th, crossing the boundary line, invaded the Mysore territories. Colonel Wellesley commanded the Nizam contingent, together with the 11th, the 33rd, and part of the 2nd and 4th British regiments, two battalions of native infantry, and two brigades of artillery; amounting in all to eleven battalions.

Tippoo, determining to be the assailant, broke up his cantonments before Seringapatam, and marched with the *élite* of his army to attack the Bombay division of British troops, before it could effect a junction with the Carnatic force. Having crossed the boundary or frontier line of his own territories, he on the 5th of March encamped in an extensive plain north-east of Periapatam, and on the 6th, having stimulated his "tigers of war," (11,000 men of all arms), as he called them, with opium and bang, made furious and repeated attacks on the rear and in front of colonel Montessor's brigade, consisting of four native battalions, amounting to 2,000 men, posted near the village of Seedaseer, and which was about eight miles in advance of the main body, and the park and provisions encamped at Seedapoor, a post not above three or four marches from Seringapatam; but on the advance of general Stuart, with the 77th European regiment, and two flank companies of the 75th, to the assistance of Montessor and his gallant brigade of sepoys, who had sustained the unequal contest for near six hours, and whose ammunition was almost expended, he was compelled to retreat with precipitation through the jungles, and with the loss of 1,500 men, to his original encampment; from which he retired on the 11th to Seringapatam.

The Carnatic army, having reduced several hill-forts on its march, crossed, on the 28th,

the Cauvery, by the ford of Sosilay; while Tippoo, who on the 14th had broke up his cantonments at Seringapatam, and moved forwards to meet that army, was waiting with the main body of his forces at the ford of Arakery, thinking that the passage would be attempted there. On the advance of the Carnatic army to Mallavelly, (March 27th,) the army of the sultaun was observed drawn up in order of battle, on the high-road to the westward of that village, having bivouacked on the preceding night on the left bank of the Maddoor. Tippoo, opening a distant cannonade from the elevated position upon which the Mysorean army was posted, an engagement immediately ensued; in which the army of Tippoo was routed, with the loss of one thousand killed. In that engagement, colonel Wellesley, observing a favourable opportunity of turning the right flank of the enemy, formed his division into echéllon of battalions, and advanced to the attack. The 33rd regiment advanced against 2,000 of the best disciplined of the turbaned infantry—Tippoo's favourite "cushoon"—and when within fifty paces, having received the enemy's fire, delivered its own with the most decisive effect; and immediately charging with the bayonet, annihilated the whole of their enemies. At the same time, general Floyd seizing this critical moment, ordered a charge of cavalry, by which great numbers of the enemy were destroyed, six standards taken, and the retreat of the Mysorean army became general. The loss of the Anglo-Indian army was sixty-six in killed, wounded, and prisoners; that of Tippoo near 2,000.

On the 1st of April, the Anglo-Indian army was within twelve miles of Seringapatam; and on the 5th took up its ground in front of that city. The encampment was made at the distance of 3,500 yards or paces from the western face of the works, amidst the topes or groves (which were thickly planted with cocoa, areka, betel, and bamboo trees); and, because a bastion constructed at the north-west angle, which had been selected for lord Cornwallis's attack in 1791, furnished a fire which swept the whole extent of the two faces, the south-west front of the fortress was selected as the point of attack. Many improvements and additions had been made to the works since the English army lay last under them; an idea of the extent of which may be formed from the circum-



stance, that 6,000 men had been constantly at work on the fortifications during the last six years. Since the last siege, a new line of entrenchments had been constructed within 700 yards of the walls. Between these works and the river, Tippoo had encamped nearly the whole of his infantry.

The town of Seringapatam, in the native language called *Patana*, and in their maps *Sre Ranga Patana*, stands on an angle of an island formed by the junction of the rivers Cauvery and Coleroon, which breaking against the rocks, separates itself into two streams, one flowing on each side of the city walls. Two walls encircle the town. The population at that time exceeded 150,000 souls, and the garrison amounted to above 20,000 men.

As several ruined villages, and an aqueduct terminating in a tope or grove, called the Sultaan-pettah, in front of the British camp, presented the enemy the means of effecting advantageous lodgments, on the night of the encampment a body of troops under major-general Baird, was detached to scour it. This was effected without opposition, but that officer missing his way, found that he was marching into the enemy's lines, instead of returning to his cantonments. The serious mistake was first discovered by lieutenant Lambton, an officer on his staff, who, observing from the stars, that they were marching in a northerly direction instead of a southerly (a mistake which would have brought the party direct on the fort

\* The following note written to general Harris on receiving the order for the attack, is no indifferent prestige of the military genius which the duke subsequently so eminently displayed.

"MY DEAR SIR,—I do not know where you mean the post to be established, and shall therefore be obliged to you, if you will do me the favour to meet me this afternoon in front of the lines, and show it to me. In the mean time, I will order my battalions to be in readiness. Upon looking at the tope as I came in just now, it appeared to me that when you get possession of the bank of the nullah, you have the tope as a matter of course, as the latter is in the rear of the former. However, you are the best judge, and I shall be ready.—I am, my dear sir, your most faithful servant,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

† At the time, much ill-natured and misapplied criticism took place on colonel Wellesley's first attack on the Sultaan-pettah, and silly comparisons were made between his failure and Baird's scouring the post the preceding night, without any loss. The circumstance excited the sneers of the find-fault writers of the time, and is still alluded to by those liberalised patriots who love to depreciate their country's military renown. But without alluding to the hazardous nature of night-attacks, especially when the enemy is prepared and waiting for you,

of Seringapatam), Baird, who had a pocket compass with him, putting a fire-fly upon the glass, ascertained his mistake; when, halting his party, he faced about in order to regain the British camp, which he reached about four o'clock in the morning.

On the following day, a part of the position in front of the enemy's advanced posts, being assailed from the pettah and the adjoining ruined villages, with a hot fire of musketry and rockets, colonels Wellesley and Shaw were ordered to dislodge the assailants. The attack was made in the night, Shaw carried the village, and had established himself in the nullah or water-course; but the entire chain of posts, forming the tope, village, and enclosure, was so strongly fortified, and so resolutely defended, that Wellesley was repulsed.\* The attack, however, being renewed on the following morning, by the Scotch brigade and two battalions of sepoys under colonel Wellesley, for the purpose of supporting Shaw in the post which he had retained during the night, as also for the recovery of the tope, &c., the enemy abandoned his whole line of defences, or chain of posts, along the front of the besieging army, from the river on the left to the village of Sultaan-pettah on the right; and thus a ready-made first parallel was obtained to commence the approaches against the fortress, within 1,800 yards of the works, and extending two miles.† The business of the siege now went on vigorously.

the best answer is to be found in the following playful remark of one capable of explaining the cause of such failures:—"Men moving gently in the dark, may consult the stars, and read their high decrees; but nothing disturbs planetary observations more than a shower of musketry, accompanied with a flight of rockets." The fabulous circumstances alluded to by the late Mr. Theodore Hook, in his *Life of Baird*, and adopted by Mr. Alison in his *History of Europe*, and the startling scene which they credulously state to have taken place early in the morning of the 6th, partake, as a judicious writer has properly said, of the same character as those which are generally related of the early career of nearly every brilliantly successful general. "We have seen," adds the same writer, "in French books, and have heard from French lips, stories about young Buonaparte's skulking at the siege of Toulon, during which he first made his name known to the world." Mr. Hook's story of colonel Wellesley's being frightened, "spreading like wild-fire through the camp," and Mr. Alison's tale of his falling fast asleep upon a dining-table after his return from the night attack on the pettah, are as fabulous as "the solemn whispers" which Mr. Lushington, in his *Life of Lord Harris*, facetiously tells us he heard "in the Poligar counties, in 1800, to the same effect."



On the 9th, Tippoo being disappointed in his expectations of assistance on a large scale, from the governor of the Isle of France, addressed the following note to general Harris:—

“TIPPOO SULTAUN TO GENERAL HARRIS.

“The governor-general, lord Mornington, sent me a letter, the copy of which is inclosed. You will understand it. I have adhered firmly to treaties. What, then, is the meaning of the advance of the English armies, and the occurrence of hostilities? Inform me.”

To this laconic and peremptory communication, which, in style and spirit, bears a similitude to Napoleon's composition, though free from his inflation and magniloquence of language, general Harris referred the sultaun for an answer to the letters he had received from the governor-general. The British chief's reply was as brusque and as oriental in style as that of Tippoo:—

“Your letter, enclosing a copy of the governor-general's letter, has been received. For the advance of the English and allied armies, I refer you to the several letters of the governor-general, which are sufficiently explanatory on the subject. What need I say more?”

The Bombay army joined on the 14th, and took up its position on the north bank of the river. On the 20th a battery was opened to enfilade the front of the fortress against which the attack was directed; and on the evening of that day a parallel was opened within 780 paces of the works. The same day presented the contending chiefs with another opportunity of displaying the peculiar style of oriental diplomatic literature, in the communications which passed between them; Tippoo's note ending with the concluding sentence of his first communication—“What can I say more?” and general Harris's with that of his—“What need I say more?”

On the morning of the 22nd, the garrison made a furious sortie, with 6,000 infantry, and the French auxiliary corps, under Lally, but was repulsed with the loss of above 600 in killed and wounded. On the 26th, the working parties being much annoyed by the fire from a line of intrenchments in possession of the enemy, colonel Wellesley being ordered to dislodge them, advanced with two columns, under the cover of a cannonade, and effected the object. On the 30th, the first breaching battery was opened on the south-west bastion of the fortress; and on the 3rd of May, the breach in the *fausse-braie*, or outer work, for securing the covered way and the fosse,

being reported practicable, an immediate assault was determined on.

In the course of the night, the scaling-ladders, fascines, gabions, sand-bags, and other necessary *matériel* for the assault, were conveyed into the trenches; and before dawn of the following morning, the troops selected for the assault moved thither. The storming party consisted of about 4,400 men, of whom 2,500 were Europeans, and was distributed into two columns, the right commanded by lieutenant-colonel Sherbrooke, and the left by lieutenant-colonel Dunlop; major-general Baird having the chief command. The reserve corps, consisting of the foreign (Meuron's) regiment and four battalions of Sepoys, were posted in the advanced trenches, under the command of colonel Wellesley. The instructions for the assault were—that after the breach was carried, the storming party was to file off to the right and left along the ramparts, and sweeping them, to enter the body of the town. The time chosen for the assault was one o'clock (May 4th), an hour selected, because, to avoid the meridian influence of the sun, the native of the East then indulges in sleep and repose. But in that expectation the assailants were disappointed; for instead of finding the garrison buried in sleep, they found it ready to receive them.

At the hour appointed, the troops, “hot, panting, breathless for the signal,” moved from the trenches, crossed the rocky bed of the river under a very heavy fire, passed the glacis and ditch, and rushing up the ruins, crossed the breach, and, after a brief struggle with a few gallant Mysoreans on the slope, planted the British colours on its summit. The face of the wide breach was soon covered with assailants, who, on entering the rampart, filed off to the right and left, driving the enemy before them. The left division could not have passed the ditch, filled with water, between the inner and outer ramparts, had it not been for the scaffolding which had been raised for the use of the workmen who had been repairing the walls. On that side the assailants met with a vigorous opposition. The last resistance was in and round the principal mosque, where the carnage was very great, the resistance of the true Mussulmen, who would neither flee nor surrender, having been deadly and desperate. The sultaun, who is said to have been the last man to quit the traverses, as they were successively





Engraved by H. Singleton.



Engraved by J. Rogers.



THE LAST EFFORT AND FALL OF TIPOO SULTAN.



carried, was found dead, pierced with four wounds, three in his body and one in his head, among a heap of slain, under the sally-port or covered gateway that leads into the interior of the fort.\* Despite the wounds, the sultaun's countenance wore an expression of stern composure. This intrepid warrior, when news was brought him that the assault was made, hastily washing his hands,

\* Though Tippoo possessed great personal courage, and considerable energy of character, he proved in the siege of his capital his incapacity and unfitness as a leader. Instead of exerting himself, and animating his troops by his presence and example, he merged the character of the general in that of the sharpshooter, employing himself in discharging from behind a traverse carbines handed to him ready loaded by his servants. He was destitute of the military character and enterprising boldness of his father Hyder. Had he possessed either, instead of the formal attack on the Sedaseer post, he would suddenly and secretly have pushed forward under the cover of the jungle, and have taken Montessor's brigade by surprise. Instead, also, of becoming the assailant at Mallavelly, and attacking his opponent in the open field, he would have laid waste the country, harassed the outposts, intercepted the supplies, strengthened his hill-forts, and maintained a desultory warfare; with his description of troops, and the character of the enemy to whom he was opposed, no other mode promised a chance of success. In his misjudged plans, he forgot the mode of strategics which had been adopted by his father Hyder, and had been the means of promoting his success. When that chieftain was upbraided with cowardice by a British officer who pursued him, he coolly replied, "Give me the sort of troops you command, and your wish for battle shall soon be gratified. You will understand my mode of warfare in time. Shall I risk my cavalry, which cost me one thousand rupees each, against your cannon-balls which did not cost you two pice (a currency of almost only nominal value). No; I will march your troops till their legs shall become the size of their bodies. You shall not have a blade of grass, or a drop of water. I shall hear of you every time your drum beats, but you shall not know where I am once a month. I will give your army battle, but it shall be when I please, not when you desire it." Had Tippoo adopted his father's strategy, better success might have attended his measures. But he was wholly incompetent to the task; he possessed no military talent, nor any of the qualities that adorn the soldier. He was a ruthless and wayward barbarian; cruel, vindictive, and remorseless. The whole of the prisoners taken during the siege, were either hacked to pieces, or put to death by having nails driven into their skulls, or their necks twisted in a sudden and violent manner, so as to dislocate the vertebræ. Baird, who had been among those who surrendered under general Matthews, had been kept chained in a dungeon during three years. His only brother, Kerim Saheb, had sighed away, in a dungeon, the prime of life, beneath a weight of bolts and fetters rivetted on him by his brother's hand. The cruel punishments he inflicted, often on the most groundless suspicions, put an end to all private correspondence in his dominions; his nearest relations dared not venture

called for his arms, and while buckling on his sword, was told that Syed Goffer, his best officer, was killed. "Syed Goffer was never afraid of death!" was his exclamation; "let Mohammed Cassim take charge of his division." And with these words he went hastily forth to meet the assault. On the evening of the assault the body of the sultaun was conveyed, with military

to write to one another; their only communication was by verbal messages. On his succession to the throne, he compelled all the European soldiers in his dominions to submit to the Mahommedan rite of circumcision, and hanged those who refused to submit. Of those Hindu women who would not adopt the Mahommedan custom of covering the bosom, he cut off the breasts, and exposed them to the greatest indignities. He occasionally gratified his cruel and vindictive disposition on an extensive and systematic scale. When his prisoners, confined in the bungalow built on the summit of the Nundydroog rock, which was above 1,200 feet in perpendicular height above the level of the plain, became too numerous, they were thrown over the precipice, and left to be devoured by wild beasts. From the same rock he, on one occasion, cast several hundred sepoys, sewn up in sacks, who had been taken prisoners, because they refused to enter his service. And he was as capricious as he was cruel and vindictive. He indulged his whims of change and innovation to so great an excess, that he almost alienated even his Mahommedan subjects. He changed the dates of the ancient Mahommedan festivals, gave new names to the days and months—to weights, measures, coins, forts, towns, and offices, civil and military; in fact, he changed everything—government, law, religious institutions, and military tactics. His vanity was equal to his cruelty and capriciousness. Besides keeping in pay a corps of authors to record his exploits, he was an author himself; and never executed or meditated an evil deed, without writing himself, or causing to be written, some pedantic proclamation, treatise, or book, to extol his project. The book entitled *The King of Histories*, found in his palace at the storming of his capital, and which contains orientally exaggerated accounts of his bravery and exploits, and alludes to general Macleod's curious challenge to him, and of course gives a favourable version of the affair in behalf of himself, was written under his dictation. Yet this was the man whom Philip Francis and his coadjutors, in the unjust and vindictive prosecution of Warren Hastings, designated as "an inoffensive prince, sacrificed to English ambition and thirst of conquest." In person, Tippoo bore some resemblance to Buonaparte. Like him he was corpulent; and his hands and feet were remarkably small, and finely formed. Like him he was of temperate habits; fruits, milk, and jellies were his principal diet. Like him also he was licentious. At the time of the capture of his capital, 620 women were found immured within the walls of the zenana; and, like Buonaparte, he spent but little time among his female favourites. Like him, war and politics were his delight; but in military and diplomatic talent, and all the great qualities of the head and heart, there was an immeasurable disparity between them. In stature, Tippoo was about three inches shorter than the French emperor.



honours, to the mausoleum of Lang Bang, erected to his father, Hyder Ali. The loss of the garrison, in killed and wounded, exceeded 8,000 men; that of the Anglo-Indian army, 1,403. During the siege a spent ball struck colonel Wellesley's knee.\*

The booty that fell to the lot of the victors was immense. The succession of quadrangles filled with ranges of storehouses and magazines in the Jamdar Khana, were stored with jewels, gold and silver plate and ornaments, costly fire-arms and swords, china, looking-glasses, pictures, telescopes, &c. The shawls, muslins, silks, satins, velvets, and rich gold and silver cloths

\* The escapes from wounds are often owing to very trivial circumstances. A button, a piece of money in the pocket, the handle of a watch, and even the locket of hair or the image of "a beloved one" deposited in the bosom, have arrested the fatal ball in its errand. At the action of the Coa, under general Robert Crauford, an officer of the 95th rifles happened to be reading a pocket volume of *Gil Blas*, and while in the middle of one of his interesting tales, when the order was issued for the regiment to prepare for action, not liking to throw his book away, he thrust it into the breast of his jacket. In the course of the day the friendly burden received a musket-ball which fate had ordained the heart of the reader was to have stopped had not the volume interposed its kind offices. Miss Pardoe, in her account of the transactions of her father's life, entertains her readers with the following singular occurrence; which proves that "the saving of one's bacon is sometimes the salvation of one's self." While captain C—, of the —th regiment, in the Peninsular war, was taking "a hasty snack," the bugle sounded for all to "fall in." The captain having often before experienced the woes of being without prog on "glory's field," clapped the piece of bacon of which he was partaking with his brother officers, into his bosom. When "the noble fray" was over, and the captain took his "snack of bacon" out of his breast to regale his famished stomach, to his astonishment he observed a musket-ball snugly deposited in its contents. At the skirmish of Aire, a musket-ball struck one of the buttons of the regimental jacket of lieutenant-colonel Dodgin, and entered the groin above the right hip. When extracted it bore a correct impression of the two sixties, the number of his regiment. Kincaid, in his entertaining work, *Random Shots of a Rifleman*, says, that in the action of Sabugal, while he was addressing a passing remark to an officer near him, who, in turning round to answer, raised his right foot, "I observed a grape-shot tear up the earth in the print which the foot had but that instant left in the mud." Henry, in his *Events of a Military Life*, tells us of a grenadier of the 77th regiment having been wounded by a ricocheting cannon-ball that was nearly spent, and which striking the soldier's knapsack with the tin over it, was turned downwards, so that it ploughed its way through the soft parts, "carrying the lid of the tin before it, which cut every thing down to the bone sheer off." Castello, in his *Memoirs*, mentions an instance where a ball was arrested in its passage by the serpent or buckle of the leather band that

deposited there, were sufficient to burthen 500 camels. The value of the jewels of the zenana, or harem, alone, was estimated at a crore of rupees, equal to a million sterling. Gold and diamonds, to a very large amount, were carried off by the soldiers from the treasury and the zenana, and vast quantities were shared among the captors on the spot.† The military stores captured were, 520,000 lbs. of powder, 424,000 of round shot of different calibres, 99,000 firelocks and carbines, and 929 pieces of ordnance.

Colonel Wellesley having, on the night following the storming of the town, been

encircle the waist. But of all the hair-breadth escapes of "heads doomed to stop bullets in their way," perhaps none exceeds Captain Kincaid's account of the officer (lieutenant Worsley of the 95th rifles), who, at the storming of Badajos, received a musket-ball in the right ear, which came out at the back of the neck, and though, after a painful illness, he recovered, yet his head got a twist, and he was compelled to wear it looking over the right shoulder, until at the battle of Waterloo, receiving a shot in the left ear, which came out within half-an-inch of his former wound in the back of the neck, his head was set right again. War, however, amidst all its horrors, often presents very ludicrous incidents. Few of those who shared in the perils and honours—the incidents and marvels—of the Peninsular war, but are in possession of a store of them. Among those known to the writer of these notes, the following is not the least laughable. A captain of artillery was to be seen walking about the streets of Bayonne presenting the following ludicrous plight. A cannon-shot had shaved off the skirts of his coat close to his posteriors, and as he was rather Dutch built, or squatty set, he looked like a fat cock-pheasant whose tail had been shot away by a bungling sportsman.

† Some idea may be formed of the amount of property that disappeared in this manner from the following statement:—"Dr. Mein, of the medical department, purchased from a soldier of the 74th regiment, for a mere trifle, two pair of bracelets, set with diamonds, the least costly of which was valued by a Hyderabad jeweller at £30,000 sterling; the other pair was, he declared, of so superlative value, that he could not fix a price. Valuable pearls were frequently bought in the bazaars from the soldiery for a bottle of spirits."—*Major Price's Journal*. "The throne, which consisted of an armed chair, covered with a thick plate of gold, encircled with steps silver-gilt, and thickly set with jewels, was sold to general Gent, of the engineers, for £2,500; and he obtained for the gold and silver alone nearly £25,000."—*Ibid*. "The canopy was thickly set and decorated with jewels and fringes of costly pearls. A gold figure of a bird, covered over with the most precious stones, was fastened to the top of the canopy. Its beak was a large emerald, its eyes were carbuncles, the breast was covered with diamonds, many large jewels were fancifully arranged on its back, and its long tail so closely studded with diamonds, that the gold was scarcely visible.



appointed governor of the captured city, immediately proceeded to repress the excesses of the soldiery and protect the inhabitants. On the morning of the 5th he went in person to the houses of the chief inhabitants, placing guards for their protection. He removed the family of the late sultaun, and that of his father Hyder, together with their zenanas, to Vellore; and for their maintenance a sufficient income was allowed. He so restored the confidence of the inhabitants, and re-established order in the city, that in the space of three days the townspeople resumed their usual occupations, and the town assumed the appearance of an eastern fair. He conciliated the adherence of the late sultaun's chief officers and servants, either by granting them employment or by pensions. In a short time he restored the tranquillity of the whole kingdom (to the portion of which that had fallen, by virtue of the partition, to the lot of the East India Company, he had been appointed governor), and the population returned to their peaceful occupations, thankful for the happiness and security they enjoyed under the mild administration of the company.

The conquered dominions were partitioned among the East India Company, the nizam, and the lineal descendant of the rajah of the ancient Hindu dynasty of the Mysore, who had been conquered and deposed by Hyder Ali. The claimant of the vacant musnud or throne, was a grandson of the deposed monarch, and at the time of the partition was not above five years old, and passing his life in great indigence with the female branches of his family. To him was assigned about one-half of the conquered dominions, and the city of Mysore was appointed the seat of his government. The company received as their share the territory on each coast, below the Ghauts, the forts commanding these important passes into the highland of the Mysore, with the fortress and island of Seringapatam. The revenue arising to the company from their new acquisition, was about two-and-a-half millions sterling; and by a subsidiary treaty with the restored rajah, they obtained about the same amount.

But the tranquillity which the prudence and ability of colonel Wellesley had secured to the people of Mysore, was soon disturbed by the predatory incursions and cruelties of the reckless brigand, Dhoondiah Waugh, who had been liberated with the rest of

the prisoners immured in Tippoo's dungeons. That man, who was a native of the Mysore, but a Patan or Mahratta by descent, had been a trooper in Hyder's cavalry, and had obtained a petty command in the service of his son. Being of an ambitious and a restless disposition, he deserted during the siege of Seringapatam by lord Cornwallis, and collecting a band of desperate followers, acquired, by his depredations, great robber-reputation in the country near the Toombudra river. But Tippoo trepanning him to an interview, had seized, and having circumcised him, had thrown him into prison. On his liberation from prison, he resumed his old vocation of plunder and murder, and soon found himself at the head of a large predatory force, of which 5,000 were cavalry. Many of the disbanded troops of Tippoo flocked to his standard, and many of the killedars had betrayed their trusts, and surrendered many hill-forts and towns in Biddnore to him, before general Harris could send a sufficient force against him. He fancied himself so powerful, that he assumed the sounding and absurd title of "The King of the Two Worlds."

To suppress this brigand and his banditti, who had assumed a formidable aspect in respect of numbers and violence, and were committing the most inhuman atrocities, as also to suppress the hordes of other Pindarees, or robber bands, that had spread themselves over the Mysore, and to intimidate the Mahratta chiefs who were indicating their hostility to British interests, colonel Wellesley was, in September, 1799, appointed to the extensive command of the Ghauts, which are extensive ranges of mountains that divide the Deccan and Mysore from the low and flat country bordering on the sea. He immediately put himself in pursuit of the robber-duplicate monarch and his banditti band, and, after a long and harassing chase, with many doubles and crosses, he came up with one division encamped at Malowny, on the Malpoorba, and having sabred or driven into the river all the followers of his two-fold majesty, captured his baggage and guns, and soon after he attacked the brigand himself near the village of Conahgull. As his host of followers was strongly posted, having their rear and flank covered by the village and rock of Conahgull, the British commander, that he might not be outflanked by the superior extension of the enemy's line, formed four regiments of cavalry, the 19th and 22nd



dragoons, and two regiments of native horse, in all about 1,200 men, into single line, and, immediately charging, put the lawless host to rout, and slew his felon-majesty himself. Thus a desperate villain met with a soldier's death, instead of the ignominious fate of a malefactor; Colonel Wellesley having been instructed, when he captured his *Majesty of the Two Worlds*, to hang him on the first tree he came to. The dominion and career of "The King of the Two Worlds" having been thus brought to a close by Wellesley and his "regicide army," as sir Thomas Munro facetiously termed them in a letter to their gallant leader, tranquillity was restored to the Mysore and the whole of the Malabar country.

Shortly after this service, colonel Wellesley was appointed by lord Mornington to join an expedition, under general Baird, against Batavia, and to expel the French from the Indian seas, by the ultimate conquest of the isles of France and Bourbon; but the plan was frustrated on account of the demur to the governor-general's power, by admiral Rainier, who commanded in these seas. Thus the natural policy of freeing the trade of the East India Company from the losses occasioned by the enemy's cruisers was defeated by private pique.

The marquis was concentrating a large force at Trincomalee, in the island of Ceylon, to be employed as events should require, either against the enemy's eastern islands, or to proceed to any part of India which the French should menace, when, reports having reached the Indian government of the invasion of Egypt by Bonaparte, he appointed colonel Wellesley to its command. But before the colonel knew the governor-general's resolution as to the point of destination, the duplicate dispatch from London to the marquis Wellesley was transmitted to him from Madras, announcing the intention of the home government, that a diversion should be made from India by the Red Sea, in support of the expedition under general Abercrombie, against the French in Egypt. Colonel Wellesley, aware that the monsoon favourable for a voyage to the westward was near its termination, and that if the expeditionary force was not immediately put into motion, it must be retarded for some months, determined, on his own responsibility, to move

the fleet and army to Bombay, where it would be some thousand miles in point of space, and many months in point of time, advanced towards its Egyptian destination. This movement, which, for boldness, sagacity, and foresight, exceeds the same qualifications of Cæsar in his expedition to Pontus, receiving (by overland dispatch) the sanction of the home government, he advanced part of his expeditionary force to Mocha, on the Red Sea, before the arrival of general Baird to supersede him. Though deprived of the command to which he was originally destined, and in which he was confirmed by the home government, by whom he was appointed (1801) to the local rank of brigadier-general in Egypt—Baird claiming the appointment as senior officer, and alleging that Wellesley's appointment was an injustice, being a violation of the rules on which military command is based—he furnished that officer, for his assistance and direction, with memoranda on Egyptian affairs, and the operations to be assumed by the expedition, which he had drawn up for his own use; and as he was then labouring under a kind of jungle fever, exasperated by a cutaneous disorder, as soon as his health permitted, he returned to his government in the Mysore, and on the 11th of April, 1801, resumed his command as governor of Seringapatam, and chief of the army of the Mysore, and immediately devoted himself to the perfecting of the organization of the civil and military establishments of the country. By his mild conciliatory bearing, he no less gained the esteem of the people, than he commanded their respect and confidence by his moderation and justice.

In 1802 the political horizon began to darken through the whole of the extensive empire of the Mahrattas, particularly in the direction of Poonah. The Mahratta chieftains, though always ready to confederate for the overthrow of the British power, their mutual jealousies and suspicions of one another, and desire of securing only their own individual advantage, prevented him from adopting any enlarged political views for their general good. Though the five states into which the last empire was divided (namely, those of Scindiah, the Peishwah, Holkar, Guickwar, and the rajah of Berar),\*

\* All these men were usurpers, and were indebted for their elevation either to the unceasing contests for power and plunder in which the petty warrior-robbers, of whom that land of violence, of misrule,

and never-ceasing strife, India, has always been so prolific; or to the circumstance of the descendants of the ancient rulers having abandoned themselves, like the caliphs of Spain, or the Merovingian kings





BATTLE OF CONAGHULL.

Painted by J. Cooper, R.A.

Engraved by J. Rogers.

# DEFEAT AND DEATH OF DHOONDIAH AT CONAGHULL.



were all united in one confederacy, under the nominal control of the rajah of Sattarah, whose power Scindiah had usurped, they were always at variance, each having only his own interest in view. Holka, fearing the consequences of the interest of Scindiah\* at the court of Poonah, marched against the united army of the two rajahs, and defeating it, seized Poonah, dethroned the peishwah, and, setting another puppet on the throne, reigned there in his name. The peishwah fled to Bussein, in Guzerat, and there, to enable himself to recover his dominions, formed a defensive alliance with the company.

During this dispute between the Mahratta chieftains, the governor-general had received secret information that Scindiah, Holkar, and the rajah of Berar had entered into a confederacy against the British; and that their animosity was fomented by French emissaries and adventurers, located in large numbers among them. To anticipate the effects of that confederacy, and neutralize French influence and intrigue, he ordered a *corps d'armée* of 20,000 men to assemble at Hurrypoor, on the north-west frontier of

of France, to sloth and sensual gratification, and having resigned the reins of government into the hands of their favourite ministers, who soon became possessed of all power, and usurped their authority. Thus, the rajah of Sattarah, the descendant of Sevajee, the founder of the Mahratta empire, was displaced by his prime minister, the peishwah. Thus Scindiah, Holkar, Guickwar, and Bhoonslah, had obtained power, either directly or collaterally. Scindiah was the grandson of a husbandman, by name Ranajee, who, enlisting among the predatory troops of Bajee Rao the First, was of so great service to his employer, that, at the partition of the spoils of the Mogul empire, he was rewarded with extensive grants of land, and raised to high rank. Holkar was the great-grandson of an agricultural labourer, who also had been a follower of Bajee Rao. The origin of the other specimens of Indian majesty was equally low and obscure. Scindiah had dethroned the Mogul emperor, Shah Allum, and had installed a French adventurer, of the name of Perron, as his viceregent on the throne of Delhi; but general Lake, by his victory, unseated the Gallic viceroy, as also his successor, Bourguien, from their musnuds, and restored the displaced monarch. Besides the Mahomedan and Hindu natives, some European aspirants had the "Oriental twist in their imaginations" of becoming rajahs and nabobs, and playing the game of royalty. Thus, rajah George Thomas, originally a boatswain of an English man-of-war, finding himself supplanted in the good graces of the begum Somroo, or, according to her Gallic orthography, Sombéré (the old lady being tired of her *liaison* with the aforesaid George Thomas), by a Neapolitan rival, one signor Levasso, set up for himself as founder of an independent sovereignty in the county of Hurrianna, which is a vast tract of the Delhi province, and fixed

the Mysore, for the protection of the company's territories, as well as those of the nizam, the rajah of the Mysore, and the peishwah, in pursuance of the recent treaty entered into with these powers. The object was also to counteract the machinations of the French in the service of Scindiah, in the Deccan, who were watching for a favourable opportunity for prosecuting the views of the French government, to effectuate the establishment of a French empire in India; the invasion of Egypt by Buonaparte having been undertaken for the express purpose of making it an entrepôt between France and India. The French adventurer, Perron, was already, under Scindiah's protection, forming an independent state in Delhi and the surrounding territory, having under his command 16,000 or 17,000 regular and well-disciplined infantry, a well-appointed and numerous train of artillery, commanded by his own countrymen, a body of irregular troops, and from 15,000 to 20,000 horse ready, while he looked for reinforcements of cavalry from the petty chiefs who were his tributaries or allies. His head-quarters were established near Coel, on a command-

his royal residence at Hansi, about 90 miles north-west of Delhi. Like other rajahs, or anointed rulers, he coined his own money, had his zenana or harem, his court, and held his durbar in state. His views even extended to the conquest of the Punjab and all the country to the mouths of the Indus. But untoward incidents, and the treacherous combinations among his officers and subjects, compelled him to throw himself into the hands of the company, and the ex-rajah shortly afterwards died in India, when on the point of returning home to his native cot in Tipperary. Adventures of this kind have ever abounded in India, and the eastern Dugald Dalgetties have always found adherents ready to promote their aspirations for performing their part in the drama of royalty. The begum Somroo, *alias* Sombéré, was the widow of a Swiss or French adventurer, whose real name is lost in his Indian designation of Somroo, and who went to India as a serjeant in the French service. Deserting his country's standard, he enlisted under that of Meer Cosim, and was distinguished for his massacre of the English at Patna, while in that chief's service. In the course of time, having a *penchant* for royalty, he carved out for himself a rajahship, which he bequeathed in his royal will to his widow, "The little, queer, old-looking begum, with brilliant but wicked eyes," as major Thorn designates the old dame in his *Memoir of the War in India*. It was from this "queer-looking old begum" that Mr. Dyce Sombre, whose eccentricities have gained so much notoriety, derives his descent and parentage.

\* This chieftain was the most powerful of the Mahratta princes; he not only undid his own sovereign, but he was master also of the mogul's person; holding thus in actual subjection the descendants and representatives of Sevajee and Aurenzale.



ing position on the frontier of the British possessions, and on their most vulnerable part. To counteract these designs, a campaign was planned on a much more extensive scale than had ever been contemplated in India. It comprehended almost the whole of Hindustan, from Calcutta and Madras on the eastern, to Bombay on the western side, and from Delhi to Poonah and Orissa. In the Deccan, general Wellesley had to oppose the confederated force under Scindiah and the rajah of Berar, and to protect the nizam and the peishwah. On the Oude frontier, general Lake had to destroy the influence of the French, and rescue the blind emperor, Shah Autum, from these adventurers. Major-general Wellesley (who had been so gazetted on the 29th of April, 1802,) was ordered to put himself at the head of 9,700 men, including one European regiment of cavalry, and two of infantry, to which were added 2,500 Mysorean horse, the whole being part of the force assembled at Hurrypoor, on the north-west frontier of Mysore, with directions to march upon Poonah, and drive Holkar from that place. The subsidiary force furnished by the nizam, and under the command of colonel Stevenson, as also that from Bombay, were ordered to co-operate with him.

On the 9th of March, 1803, he crossed the Toombuddra, in basket-boats, covered with double leather-skins, and entering the Mahratta territory, began his advance on Poonah. He chose that season of the year to begin his operations, because the rivers being then high (the monsoon having set in,) would prevent, in a great measure, the movements of the Mahratta forces, which chiefly consisted of cavalry. On the 15th of April, he was joined by colonel Stevenson at Akloose, on the Neera, about seventy miles from Poonah; and on the 19th of May, the Bombay force effected a junction with him. Amreet Rao, the father of Holkar's puppet, having taken to flight, he, on the 20th, entered Poonah without

any opposition, after a forced march of sixty miles in thirty-two hours, the last forty miles during the night, and re-seated the peishwah on his throne.

As the governor-general had invested the major-general with the discretionary power of declaring war or making peace, he judged the alternative of conciliation preferable; but after above two months of procrastination, finding Scindiah availing himself of the usual duplicity and evasion of Oriental diplomacy, he, on the 4th of June, marched from Poonah, and moved on Ahmednuggur, one of the strongest fortresses in India, situated about eighty miles from Poonah; which, though defended by 3,000 Mahrattas, and 1,500 Arab mercenaries, he carried by assault, on the 12th of August, with the loss of 140 killed and wounded. The fort surrendered on the second day after the attack on the pettah or town, from which it was separated after the manner of European towns and fortresses. The gallantry exhibited by the British soldiers and officers on that occasion was so conspicuous, that Goklah, a Mahratta chief, who was present at the assault, makes, in a letter to a friend, the following observation:—"These English are a strange people, and their general a strange man; they came here in the morning, looked at the pettah-wall, walked over it, killed all the garrison, and returned to breakfast! What can withstand them?"\*

On the 21st of August, the Anglo-Indian army moved towards the Godavery, and crossing that river in wicker boats at Toka, reached Aurungabad on the 29th, once celebrated for its magnificence, and as the seat of the emperor Aunneggebe's government, but now, from the hand of time, the changes of fortune, and the revolutions of empires, a mere heap of splendid ruins—the mere shadow of its former self. Here, general Wellesley learning that Scindiah and the rajah of Berar had entered the nizam's territories, and were menacing Hyderabad, marched forwards to prevent their passage

\* There is a great coincidence in this opinion with that expressed by another Indian chieftain. Dhoondiah Khan having repulsed three successive assaults made on his fortress of Kamona, in the Doaab, the garrison descended into the ditch to bring away their wounded comrades lying among the dead and dying. Among the rest, they brought a wounded European soldier, in a state of insensibility, and laying him down in the presence of Dhoondiah and his sirdars, an effort was made to revive him. In a short time he opened his eyes, and, gazing on the martial throng around him, faintly exclaimed, "Killa lia?"

(Have we got the fort?) and almost instantly expired. "A wonderful people are these Feringhees," said Dhoondiah to his attendants, struck with this exhibition of "the ruling passion strong in death." "Here is one of them almost cut to pieces, and yet the moment he comes a little to himself, his thoughts run on victory, and his first and last question is, if his countrymen have gained the day! It is in vain to contend against such men. Beat them back a dozen times, and they will return again and succeed at last."



of the river; but, by subsequent information, understanding that they were encamped near Bokerdun, he, on the 20th of September, broke up his cantonments on the Godavery, and advanced to give them battle. To obviate the delay which would be occasioned by marching *en masse*, through a narrow and difficult defile, or tract of hilly country, between Budnapoor and Jaulna, as also to prevent the enemy escaping to the southward by one of the defiles, the united force of the Anglo-Indian army pursued different routes; general Wellesley taking an eastward direction, and colonel Stevenson's column a westward one, round the hills. On reaching Naulniah, general Wellesley, ascertaining that the armies of the confederated chieftains were encamped between the villages of Bokerdun and Assaye (or, as it is sometimes written Assye,) with that decision and promptitude that have ever distinguished his military exploits, determined to attack them without delay. Dispatching a messenger to colonel Stevenson, who was then advancing in a parallel line of march with his own, at a distance of eight miles to his left, with orders to effectuate a junction as quickly as possible; and leaving the rear-guard to protect the baggage and stores at Naulniah, he advanced to the Kaitna, with the 19th light dragoons and three regiments of native cavalry, under colonel Maxwell, to reconnoitre from an eminence on its banks, the enemy's position. From a hill in front of their right, he beheld it to be strong, extending from Bokerdun to the fortified village of Assaye; having the Kaitna in front, and its tributary the Juah, which united with it at an acute angle, about half-a-mile beyond the left of the position, in its rear. The right of the line, which consisted of cavalry, rested on Bokerdun; the left, of infantry, the best in the service of the allied native powers, on the fortified village of Assaye; while the artillery, which consisted of above 100 guns, many of large calibre, formed a grand battery in front of the left and centre. Among the spoils taken were a number of orderly books kept by Europeans, by which it appeared that the enemy's force consisted of 10,800 infantry, and 30,000 cavalry.

General Wellesley, perceiving that the enemy being penned up between the rivers, had confined himself within a space so narrow, that he could neither present a more extended front than he already presented,

nor be able to turn the flank of his assailant; and fearing, should Scindiah assume the initiative, that the Anglo-Indian army would be greatly harassed in its retreat by the vastly superior numerical force of the enemy's cavalry, determined on instant attack; trusting that courage and discipline would compensate for the appalling disparity of force. Desiring Maxwell to keep his present position, while he himself brought up the infantry, as soon as his whole force was united he issued orders for the army, which was but just off a march of fourteen miles under a vertical sun, to descend from the rocky heights of the river, and cross the ford of Peepuglaon, which was a little beyond the left of the hostile army, and which the English general judged to be a ford from a few houses being on the opposite banks. The passage was effected without loss, though the enemy directed a cannonade on the line of march.

As soon as the troops reached the opposite bank, the British chief effected his formation of battle, though a field battery had opened its fire on the troops, as soon as the head of the column began to ascend the banks of the river. The army advanced in two lines; the first, consisting of the 78th highlanders, two battalions of sepoys, and advanced pickets, to the right; the second, of the 74th regiment of the line, and two sepoy battalions. The 19th regiment of dragoons, under colonel Maxwell, and the 7th native cavalry, took their battle station, as the reserve, in the rear. The Mahratta and Mysorean horse, consisting of the troops of the peishwah and the rajah of Mysore, amounting to about 2,500, were stationed at the ford of Peepuglaon, to protect the baggage and stores, cover the advance of the army, and hold in check a large body of the enemy's cavalry, that had crossed the Kaitna, and followed the rear of the Anglo-Indian army in its march.

The disposition of battle adopted by the major-general best adapted to ensure victory, was:—As each of the flanks of the enemy rested on a river, he determined to reduce the field of battle to so confined a space, as to neutralize his numerous cavalry, or, at least, to subject its operations to very confusing disadvantages; while, at the same time, he prevented them from surrounding him by their superior numbers, by having both his flanks covered by the two rivers, which, from the scarped nature of the banks, could be crossed by cavalry only at a few



places. He also determined to make a flank attack on the infantry, in hopes, from the general inefficiency of the native troops in field movements, that they would not be able to effect the necessary evolution or change of position, in order and time, to meet his movement. By this brilliant conception and judicious reduction of the principles of mechanical science to the art of war, he displayed the talent of an accomplished general; and his success was commensurate. He had confined the enormous force of his adversary within so narrow bounds, that he could neither form a large front to oppose his handful, nor turn his flanks.

To meet the collateral attack of the British, the chiefs of the allied native army were obliged to make a correspondent movement of their formation of battle, and present a new front, by converting the left of their alignment into the right, and *vice versa*. This they effected in good order and with much greater ease than the English general had expected. Their front now presented one vast battery, so numerous and weighty were the guns.

The appointed order or disposition of battle made by the British chief was, that the attack should commence on the left flank of the enemy; but the officer commanding the pickets, or light infantry of the first line, either miscomprehending his orders, or urged on by a misjudged impetuosity, marched direct towards the village of Assaye, instead of making a detour to escape the raking fire of the artillery placed in that direction; his command and the 74th regiment which had been ordered to support the pickets, were overwhelmed by a murderous fusilade from the village, supported by continuous showers of grape; and at the same moment a large body of Mahratta cavalry, which had wheeled round the village unperceived, dashed through the broken ranks with fearful effect, and a forest of sabres appearing among the discomfited troops, a dreadful slaughter ensued. At the same time the whole of the Anglo-Indian line was assailed with so rapid, furious, and terrible a discharge from the enemy's numerous and heavy artillery, that its few light and feeble guns (only seventeen in number), were not only silenced and rendered unfit for use, the gunners dropping fast and the cattle lacerated beside them, but the Anglo-Indian ranks were falling before the withering and destructive

tempest of iron, as a field of standing corn before the hurricane—with so consummate skill and terrible effect was the enemy's artillery served.

To remedy the evil of the destruction of the unity of the line, which the loss occasioned in the pickets and the 74th, and their separation from the left wing had produced, a charge of the 19th dragoons was ordered. That regiment, by a rapid and brilliant movement, repulsed the enemy's cavalry attack; and, at the same moment, amid a shower of musketry and grape, it burst through the enemy's left wing; and the whole line of the Anglo-Indian right, hailing it with a shout of triumph, sprang forward, and driving the artillerymen from their guns at the point of the bayonet, broke their adversary's right wing. But the battle was not yet won. The enemy's centre remaining untouched, closed in upon the ground which had been occupied by the left wing, and uniting with the routed battalions, formed itself into a crescent, with its right resting on the river Juah, and its left on Assaye—a movement to which they were incited by the hopeful sound of discharges from the artillery on the rear of the victorious battalions that had overthrown the enemy's, and who, in their hot pursuit, had passed over the enemy's gunners, who had thrown themselves upon the ground—a practice common in the native armies of India—on the supposition that they were dead. To remedy this disastrous event, the British general, putting himself at the head of the 78th regiment, which had stood firm and compact, and as many of the 7th native cavalry as could be collected, rushed on the gunners and the enemy's new-formed line, and sabring them, carried Assaye at a rush, and obtained a complete victory. In this decisive charge, the 19th dragoons, which had re-formed on the left of their own infantry, materially contributed to the victory; but, in this good service, that regiment, making an oblique charge on the enemy's front, sustained considerable loss, among which was their gallant colonel. Thus ended the fiercest battle ever fought in India, and in which the most terrific fire on record in Indian annals had taken place. The Mahrattas had fought this battle with incredible stubbornness; and their French leaders showed consummate skill and readiness in taking up every available position.

With possession of the field of battle



(on which they remained during the night), the victors captured seventy-six brass guns and howitzers, and twenty-two cannon; seven stand of colours; the whole of the camp equipage; a great quantity of stores; and all the ammunition, except the powder, the tumbrils having been blown up either by accident or design. The number of the enemy slain was about 1,200, but that of the wounded could not be ascertained, as they were carried off the field by their comrades. Of the victors, whose little band of heroes consisted only of 4,500 men,\* of whom 1,700 were Europeans, 408 were slain, and 1,575 wounded. Thirty-six rank and file, and twenty-two officers were missing. So great had been the slaughter of the pickets and the 74th, that only four men survived of one company of the former, and scarcely more, in the whole, than the complement of one company of the latter. Two horses were killed under general Wellesley; one was piked, the other shot. Every officer of his staff had one or two horses killed; and his orderly's skull was torn off by a cannon-ball, as he rode close by his side, while he was effecting the formation of the troops as they ascended the bank of the river. Colonel Stevenson, whose march had been delayed by getting entangled in a nullah, or watercourse, reached the field of battle on the following morning.

On the 25th, the colonel was sent in pursuit of the enemy, who had halted for the night about twelve miles from the field of battle; but, on Stevenson's advance, he fled across the Ghauts, by the Adjuttee pass, losing, in the pursuit, many elephants, with the light or camel guns, and much of his baggage. The reason that an immediate pursuit was not ordered was, that the army was too much enfeebled, and the sun had gone down on the blood-stained field before the last struggle was over. The British cavalry, also, which in the original order of battle had been intended as a reserve to pursue and cut up the enemy when defeated and broken, having been greatly diminished in its brilliant charge to save the pickets and the 74th, as also on that of the hostile battalions, that had faced about on hearing their own artillery playing in the rear of the British army, was in too feeble a state

to undertake the task. In the course of a few hours after the battle, the adjutant, or Indian stork, though seldom met with but at Calcutta, and in the immediate vicinity of the Hooghly, had collected in vast numbers on the battle-field. This bird, like the grey vulture of the Pyrenees, has the instinctive faculty, or discriminating power—a sort of prescience of carnage and the devastations of death—of ascertaining the results of a well-foughten field, in an incredibly short time, and at a great distance from the occurrence. At Fuentes d'Onore, and the other battle-fields of Spain, the vulture was to be seen regaling on the bodies of the slain in the course of a few hours after the battle.

Such was the battle-field of Assaye. In every stage of the contest, the greatest talent and genius on the part of the general, and the most perfect valour and discipline on that of his troops, were manifested. If ever rapid and accurate conception, skilful and decisive manœuvres, prompt and vigorous action, were displayed in emergency and untoward crisis, they were eminently displayed at the battle of Assaye, and connected a prestige with the name of Wellesley which his future exploits eminently realized. "Never," says an eloquent critic, "was any victory gained against so many disadvantages. Superior arms and discipline have often prevailed against as great a numerical difference of force; but it would be the least part of this day's glory to say, that the number of the enemy was as ten to one: they had disciplined troops in the field, under European officers, who, themselves alone, nearly doubled the British force: they had 100 pieces of heavy artillery, and about 650 camel guns, which were served with perfect skill, the former of which the Anglo-Indian army, without the aid of artillery, twice won with the bayonet." Among the episodical occurrences of this battle were the following:—Captain A. B. Campbell, of the 74th, who had lost his arm in the combat in the Sherewele jungle, and who had, a short time previous to the battle of Assaye, broken his remaining arm at the wrist, was in the thickest of the fight, with his bridle in his teeth, and a sword in his mutilated hand, dealing destruction around him.

\* Namely, two European regiments, the 74th and 78th (900 men); four native battalions, viz., the first of the 4th regiment, the first of the 8th, the first of the 10th, and the second of the 12th, amount-

ing, in all, to 2,400 infantry; the 19th dragoons (300); and the 4th, 5th, and 7th native cavalry (300 each); making a total of 4,500 men, of which only 1,200 were Europeans.



The wisdom of the British general's hazarding a battle with a force so disproportionate to that of the enemy, has been the subject of considerable controversy, and has even been impugned by some writers. But the following facts justified his policy:—

1. The misapprehension occasioned by the name of the district being confounded with that of a village in it; and the consequent conclusion, that the enemy was posted in the district of Bokerdun, instead of at the village of Bokerdune; a mistake that induced the English general to suppose that he was six miles more distant from the enemy than was the case. He also learned from two horsemen taken during the march, that he was only five miles distant from the enemy, while from his previous information he supposed that he was twelve miles off.

2. From the intelligence he received from the two horsemen taken, that Scindiah and the rajah had put their cavalry in motion, he inferred that the intention of the enemy was either to escape, or to advance to attack him in the plain.

3. That on account of the numerous cavalry of the enemy, if he allowed his adversary to adopt the initiative, or had attempted to fall back to his camp at Naulniah, where he had left his baggage and stores under a slender guard, his retreat would have been difficult, if not impossible.

These considerations fully justified the English general's determination to deliver battle, and the event proved the soundness of his judgment, and the propriety of his

determination. The moral effect produced on the minds of the Indian population by a victory gained in so unequal a combat, stamped the dominion of Britain over prostrate India. Hindustan from that fatal day was viewed by its inhabitants as having passed into the hands of its invincible conquerors: they attached to it a mysterious agency, which partook deeply of the supernatural.\*

Frustrated in his measures, Scindiah had now recourse to his usual artifice and duplicity. He sent a vakeel (*i.e.* an ambassador or envoy) to general Wellesley, with proposals of peace; but finding that the British chief was not to be deceived by his specious professions, he and his confederate, the rajah of Berar, collected their shattered forces, and with these and their fresh reinforcements, amounting to 11,000 infantry and between 30,000 and 40,000 horse, and marching in a western direction along the banks of the Taptee, with the intention of advancing on Poonah, took post at Argaum.

On account of this apparent breach of the truce, the English general put the Anglo-Indian army in motion, and on November 28th reached that village; in front of which the army of Scindiah and the rajah of Berar was drawn up in order of battle, extending in line above five miles. In the centre were posted the rajah's infantry and artillery, commanded by Bhoonslay, the rajah's brother, flanked by his own cavalry. On the right was Scindiah's army, consisting of a heavy mass of horse, on whose right hovered a vast cloud of

\* Twenty-five years after the battle of Assaye had been fought, a military officer visited its site, which he thus describes:—"Around the once scene of carnage and havoc—of the roar of artillery, the peals of musketry, the clangor of swords, the groans of the dying, and the shrieks of the wounded, with which the battle-field of Assaye resounded, everything now was repose; the verdure rich, the fragrance of the wild flowers delightful, the foliage of the peepul trees glittering and luminous, and the short and occasional bellowings of the Indian cows, were the only sounds that broke the stillness of the scene. A top or grove of mangoes shaded a Moslem edgah, or house of prayer, outside the village. Round the small fane reposed many of the officers who had been slain in the action; and high over head, attached to a pole, on one of the umbrageous mangoes, fluttered the triangular white flag of a fakeer, or religious mendicant. Under a single banian tree was the grave of a staff-officer, upon which lay a heap of stones, with a small lamp at the head. The trunk of the banian was hollow, and in it had lived a fakeer, who had nightly lighted the lamp on the tomb. The tree near which general Wellesley had stood in the commencement of the action, had been so shattered with shot, that after struggling for life,

had been dead ten years before the writer had visited the spot." The veneration with which the natives regard the memories of those Europeans whose kindness had won their affection, is by no means rare. Their tombs are honoured as the tombs of saints—a lamp is kept constantly burning, and the ground around is constantly and carefully preserved from all impurity. The natives never pass the spot without saluting it; and those who may have served under the direction or orders of him whose resting-place it is, offer up prayers for his soul. Among other instances that may be mentioned, the tomb of general Wallace, at Seroor, a cantonment of Western India, is a place of peculiar veneration. The guard of the place, called "the Picket Hill," turns out at a stated hour of the night, and presents arms to the imaginary vision of the general seated on his favourite white charger. At the tomb, in the neighbourhood of Rajmhal, of Augustus Cleveland, an English resident who filled the office of judge at Boglipore, two fakeers are employed to keep a lamp continually burning, and once a year a festival is held at the spot to celebrate the apotheosis of that highly revered individual, whose memory is regarded with feelings approaching to idolatry, as a testimony of esteem for his impartial administration of justice.



Pindaries and light troops. General Wellesley, determining to give instant battle, formed his infantry into a single line, and stationing his cavalry as a reserve, in the second line, advanced to the attack. The enemy opening a brisk cannonade, and the Mahratta horse and Persian cavalry in the service of the rajah charging at the same moment, three battalions of the native troops being panic struck, took to flight; but the British general, rallying the fugitives, stationed them in prolongation of his line to the right; when the 78th regiment, the 29th native infantry, and the remaining fragment of the 74th regiment, advancing against the enemy's cavalry, the confederated army made a precipitate flight, leaving two thousand dead on the field; above twenty standards, thirty-eight guns, and all their stores and ammunition. In their flight they lost also their elephants and baggage. The loss on the part of the Anglo-Indian army, was forty-six killed and three hundred wounded. The two thousand Arabs, called the Pharsee Risaulah, or Persian battalion, who were posted on the left of the enemy's line, singling out the 74th and 78th European regiments, advanced with a tremendous shout, but they were instantly repulsed with the loss of six hundred in killed and wounded.

Fortress after fortress now fell into the hands of the victors. Gawilghur, situated in Berar, upon a rock in a range of mountains between the sources of the rivers Poorna and Taptee, and one of the strongest fortresses in India, was at length invested; and as colonel Stevenson, on account of ill health, was about to retire from the service, general Wellesley determined that he should have the opportunity of encircling his brows with the mural crown; he therefore waived the right of being the captor of that fortress in favour of the colonel, who stormed it on the 14th of December. On the acquisition of the fortress, a scene of horror challenged the attention of the victors, that made them shudder at their success. On entering the killadar's palace, they were startled at the sight of above a dozen young and beautiful women weltering in their blood and struggling in the last agonies of death. They had all fallen victims to the mistaken sense of the honour of their fathers and husbands, who, to save them from the expected licentiousness of the victors, had been guilty of the cruel act. Those men were rajpoots of distinguished caste and determined character,

and fell, together with the garrison of 5,000 men, disdaining or deeming it hopeless to ask for quarter.

The signal defeats of Assaye and Argaum, and the loss of that hitherto supposed impregnable fortress, left no other hope to the Mahratta chiefs than that they could obtain from pacification. They therefore sued for peace, and preliminaries were entered into with them in the month of November, and ratified with Bhoonslay on December 17th, 1803, and with Scindiah on February 15th, 1804, on condition that neither of them should employ any subject of any European or American power at war with Great Britain, and the cession of all the territory and numerous forts between the Jumna and the Ganges to the company. During this marvellous campaign, the services of general Lake and the army of Hindustan were signally eminent. Perron, on the advance of that army to Delhi, retiring before it, the victorious English entered that city, and delivered the blind emperor from his degradation and bondage. The fort of Ally Ghur, the usual residence and grand depôt of the French adventurer, was taken by storm, though deemed impregnable. The capture of Agra and the battle of Leswaree, completed the destruction of the French force, Perron and his officers throwing themselves on the protection of the British.

With the capture of Gawilghur, and the reduction of the formidable banditti termed Pindarees, with which the country was infested, general Wellesley's military services terminated in India; for though he was subsequently appointed to a command against Holkar, the reduction of that chieftain was effected by general Lake.

Having thus triumphed over every advantage arising to the enemy from local position, numerical strength, and well-served trains of artillery formed under French training and discipline, general Wellesley resumed his government of Seringapatam, and continued in the execution of its duties till the month of February, 1805, when he resigned all his political and military offices and appointments in India, together with his local rank of major-general in the army. On the 25th of February, notification had reached India that he had been invested with the Order of the Bath.

The reasons of his resignation and leaving India were, discontent at the treatment he had received from the directors of the East



India Company, and the neglect with which his services had been treated by the British government. In a letter to general Stuart, he says, "I think it desirable I should leave this country. The peishwah has manifested a most unaccountable jealousy of me personally, and has refused to adopt certain measures, evidently for his advantage, only because I recommended them. He has allowed their benefit, and has avowed this motive for refusing to adopt them. We have always found it very difficult to manage him; but it will be quite impossible to do so, if this principle is allowed to guide his conduct. I therefore think that it is best that I should go away as soon as possible; and I am certainly very desirous of getting some rest." He embarked from Fort St. George in March, 1805, and arrived in England in September of the same year.

On his leaving India the most lively demonstrations of respect and esteem were shown to him. The inhabitants of Calcutta presented him with a sword of the value of £1,000; and a gold vase (for which a service of plate was afterwards substituted),

of 2,000 guineas value, was voted to him by the officers of the division of the army of the Deccan that had served under his command, as "a testimony of their admiration of his exalted talents and splendid achievements; of his consideration and justice in command, which had made obedience a pleasure; and of that frank condescension in the private intercourse of life, which it was their pride individually to acknowledge." But the highest and most grateful tribute of homage paid him was that contained in the parting address of the inhabitants of Seringapatam, who implored "the God of all castes and of all nations, to hear their constant prayer, to bestow on him health, glory, and happiness."

Thus ended the Indian career of the military and political life of Arthur Wellesley, a career which had secured, not only the gratitude and affection of the people of Mysore, for the tranquillity and happiness they had enjoyed under his government; but had been marked by a succession of victories uninterrupted by a single disaster or defeat.

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#### HOME SERVICE, AND AT COPENHAGEN.

AFTER a voyage of five months, sir Arthur Wellesley reached England from India. In November of the same year he sailed for Hanover, in command of a brigade in the expedition under the earl of Cathcart, for the purpose of effecting a diversion in favour of the Austro-Russian army then on the banks of the Rhine; but in consequence of the disastrous battle of Austerlitz, and general Mack's inglorious surrender at Ulm, in the February following, the object of the expedition was frustrated.

On his return to England, he was appointed to the command of a brigade, in the Sussex district, and was returned to parliament as member for Newport, in the Isle of Wight. In the same year he married the honourable Catherine Pakenham, sister of the earl of Longford, and in 1807 he was appointed chief secretary in Ireland, and member of the privy council, during the vicereignty of the duke of Richmond. In

the summer of that year he sailed, as second in command of the army under lord Cathcart, to Copenhagen, for the purpose of taking possession of the Danish fleet. The military operations undertaken against the Danish troops were entirely under his direction. He drove the Danes from their positions of Frederickswerk, Kiøge, and Hersølse, into Copenhagen, with considerable loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. He negotiated the capitulation, and drew up its conditions. On his return to England, in 1808, he resumed his duties as secretary for Ireland and member of parliament. In the thanks voted by the house of commons to the generals and commanding officers of the army and navy, the speaker thus particularized the services of major-general Wellesley: "I should be wanting to the full expression of those sentiments which animate this house and the whole country, if I forebore to notice that we are this day crowning



with our thanks one gallant officer, long since known to the gratitude of this house, who has long trodden the paths of glory, whose genius and valour have already extended our fame and empire, whose sword has been the terror of our distant enemies,

and will not now be drawn in vain to defend the seat of empire itself, and the throne of his sovereign." In this just and eloquent eulogium, the future glorious career of Wellington was foreshadowed, and he nobly fulfilled the expectations of his country.

## THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGNS.

### PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

THE late Peninsular War, the greatest and the most vital that has been waged in modern times, will, as its tasteful historian, the late Mr. Southey, has observed, ever be memorable. It was no common war, of which a breach of treaty, an extension of frontier, a distant colony, or a disputed succession, a struggle for pre-eminence or political ascendancy between ambitious powers; such was not its cause and motive; but it was a struggle, a deadly conflict "for the life or death of national independence, national spirit, and those holy feelings, which are comprehended in the love of our native land." Had England been conquered, her existence as a free and an independent state would have been erased from the scroll of nations; she would have become the vassal and tributary of France, and besides being denationalized, would have been humbled to the dust, and compelled to submit to every insult and degradation that French vanity and vengeance could devise; massacre, rapine, and lust, would have stalked at large and unrestrained throughout the land: every holy tie and feeling would have been violated, and the most galling tyranny and bondage been inflicted. The leader of the French armies had unreservedly declared, that it was in his mission to triumph on British liberty; and his lieutenants Massena and Bessières gave expression to still more furious intentions. The former declared, that if he could land with an army in England, he would pledge himself, "not only to effect the conquest of the country, but to reduce it to a desert, not fit for the habitation of wild beasts." That England escaped that dire calamity, she should be eternally grateful to Wellington and his companions-

in-arms. Never were honour and gratitude more justly due to the defenders of their country. It is not the desolation of the land over which war passes—it is not the rivers of blood that flow in its prosecution—it is not the sufferings and horrors to which the inhabitants of the country in which it prevails are exposed, that makes warfare horrible; "it is the utter demoralization of the people with whom it comes in contact; it is the shock it gives to all those arts, and institutions, and influences, which ameliorate the condition and elevate the character of man; it is its burnings, its murders, its violations," that impart its dread and direful character to its visitations. Had the tide of battle during the contest with Bonaparte turned on the shores of England, as the duke of Wellington, with equal humanity and patriotism, observed in a letter to lord Liverpool, dissuading him from withdrawing the English army from the Peninsula, "then the English people would discover what are the miseries of war, of which, by the blessing of God, they have hitherto had no knowledge; then the cultivation, the beauty, and prosperity of the country, and the virtue and happiness of its inhabitants, would be destroyed, whatever might be the result of the military operations. God forbid that I should be a witness, much less an actor, in the scene."

At the commencement of this great and arduous struggle, Napoleon Bonaparte, "the scourge and wonder of the age" in which he lived, saw all the states of continental Europe prostrate at his feet; every banner of its various states had veiled its glories before his victorious eagles; France, Italy, Poland, Holland, the Austrian Netherlands



and all the German confederated states of the Rhine, were immediately subject to him; Switzerland was under his protection, and the Germanic empire under his uncontrolled authority: all covered before the magic of his name, all furnished contingents of men and arms for his projects and aggressions. From Spain, Portugal, and other countries, he drew large sums of money for his tacit allowance of their infringement of the continental system of non-intercourse with England; and he contrived to withdraw the flower of the armies of those degenerate nations, under the pretence of assisting him in enforcing the observance of the Berlin and Milan decrees in the north of Europe. Even Russia, duped by his insidious professions, and blindly subservient to his ambition, and seduced with the promise of being allowed to assume the empty title of "The Empire of the North," consented to his project of extinguishing the dynasties of Spain and Portugal, and seating his brother Joseph on the vacant throne, and Louis, Jerome, and his brother-in-law, Murat, on those of Holland, Westphalia, and Naples. In short, by the treaty of Tilsit, he had become omnipotent on the continent; all Europe tamely submitted to his will, and waited his bidding; throughout its whole extent there was only one solitary exception to his universal sway and dominion, and that exception was his hated rival—England.

The whole of continental Europe was fascinated with a craven-hearted dread of his supposed irresistible power; a silly wonder and admiration of his fancied stupendous, aye, even supernatural genius and ability. His name was "the nightmare" of all the continental nations, and his armies were regarded as invincible, and dignified with every moonshine appellation that folly, sycophancy, and stupidity could invent. "The terrible legions," "the invincible legions," "the famed and dreaded legions" of Napoleon, were the stupid and infatuated expressions from one end of Europe to the other. "They were," says general Foy, in his *History of the Peninsular War*, "considered as heroes of a superior species; as colossi, demigods, before whom Europe was dumb and prostrate." England alone, at least the sensible and true-hearted part of the nation, scorned to entertain so craven a spirit, so ridiculous a fantasy. To the honour of our country be it known, that no real and informed Englishman was ever subject to the stupid hallucination, the ab-

ject supposition of French invincibility and superiority; and I venture to predict that the same will be the case with every right-minded and brave-hearted man, when, as M. Michelet, in his bobadil and coxcombical style, vapours, "the day arrives in which the world conspires to take a clear view of France," although his "plebeian, weak people," the English (who "have no literature, no history or tradition, no hereditary glory," as he kindly condescends to inform us), shall have to contend against "thirty-four millions of nobles," armed with "the holy bayonets of France," and though the aforesaid M. Michelet pronounces that that "day will be hailed by the soldiers of France as the proudest in their lives."

Such were the power and resources of Napoleon Bonaparte, at the commencement of the Peninsular war, and though, "as the map of Europe lay spread before him, and the crossed swords of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, told silently of defeated armies, and subjugated kingdoms, of continental Europe prostrate at his feet, and ready to do his bidding, he turned dissatisfied and unsated away; there was 'a precious isle set in the silver sea,' which, in his eyes, disfigured that map, for it disputed his title and defied his power:" it remained, as one of his own satellites has truly and nobly said, "the bulwark of civilization, and the last refuge of liberty."—*Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule*, par Foy. The means to destroy that hated isle—that "nation of shopkeepers," and "heretical cotton-spinners," occupied all his thoughts; and his appetite for conquest was unsated while England remained free, and mocked and curbed his power. Degenerate Spain and Portugal presented him the likely means of putting his scheme into execution.

In furtherance of the tremendous system of "this enemy of liberty and the human race," for the desolation and subjection of the world, every country was compelled in succession, against which he turned his arms, to furnish men for the conquest of others. If any one of his vassal states presumed to be dissatisfied, the population of another was driven in arms to oppress it; and if any portion of his compulsory army exhibited signs of discontent, it was marched to some wasteful point of service, and it was thus destroyed before it had become dangerous; and yet not till it had performed a certain quantity of needful work for its fell destroyer. At the conference with the abbé



le Pradt, at Warsaw, when the abbé hinted the difficulty of finding men sufficient for the fearful expedition on which he was engaged, the heartless reply of the immolator of his fellow-men on the shrine of his criminal and insatiable ambition was, "Je ferais la guerre avec du sang Polonais."\* The best of his troops consisted of the natives of that nation and the German states, and by their aid he had enslaved nearly the whole of Europe. By the same means he contemplated the subjugation of England, when he had reduced the Peninsula under his power. To further this, the highest object of his ambition, he ordered the building of ships of war to proceed on a large scale throughout the ports of France, Spain, and Holland. He hoped, before the end of the year, to have above 130 vessels, in conjunction with the Russian fleet, ready for sea, and which were to receive the annual augmentation of about thirty more. Three hundred thousand men were to be stationed in the neighbourhood of the principal harbours, from Copenhagen to Venice, ready to embark at a moment's notice on board the various squadrons. This gigantic design of crushing hated England, and subjecting it, as Mr. Canning said in the debate for co-operation with the Spanish patriots (the 18th of June, 1808), to "the tyrant of the earth—the common enemy of all mankind;" and as Mr. Sheridan, on the same occasion, said, with equal truth, "to insults and injuries too enormous to be described by language,"—was frustrated and brought to nought by the energy and talent of the duke of Wellington, and the valour and patriotism of his companions-in-arms.

With the population of those countries in his armies, and the vast line of coast which they present for the training and supply of seamen, he thought that he saw England, like the rest of Europe, submissive at his chariot-wheels. A concurrence of circumstances at length presented him the opportunity for endeavouring to put his projects into execution. This was the corrupt and feeble state of Spain, labouring under the evils of an imbecile government, a profligate court, and a crafty and sanguinary priesthood. The mean submission of the meek and terrified prince of the Brazils, Dom Pedro, presented him the like facility of possessing Portugal, and declaring in his curt and imperious style, that "the house of Braganza had ceased to reign."

\* *Histoire de l'Ambassade de Varsovie.*

To present the reader with a connective view of Spanish affairs, it is necessary to take a retrospective glance of the current events for the last twelve or thirteen years preceding this period of Spanish history.

At the outbreak of the French revolution, Spain, fearful that "the divine rights of kings" were likely to be jeopardized by the diffusion of political knowledge, which was by that event shed over the understandings of men, and alarmed at Mirabeau's expression, that "the tricoloured cockade was about making the tour of Europe," entered into an armed coalition with the other monarchies of Europe, to resist the dissemination of democratic principles. In the prosecution of this regal crusade, the soil of republican France was trodden by Spanish armies, under Ricardo and Ventura; and even some fortresses, as Bellegarde, &c., in Roussillon, had been taken, and the battle of Cerite won. But the French republic reinforcing its armies on the frontier of Spain, the Spaniards were driven back, Figueras was taken, and the Basque provinces were overrun. The court of Madrid, apprehensive of the advance of the republicans on the capital, entered into the disgraceful treaty of Basle, on the 12th of July, 1795, by virtue of which, among other conditions, all in favour of her "faithful ally," the "great and indivisible republic of France," she was compelled to declare war against England, and receive a French fleet into the harbour of Cadiz.

When, by the battle of Jena, Prussia lay prostrate at the feet of the conqueror, the King, queen, and minister of Spain, were thrown into the greatest consternation; and from fear of the vengeance of the arbiter of the destinies of Europe, they professed that the proclamation, or as general Foy terms it, "the unseasonable rhodomontade," which had been issued on the eve of battle, and in which a mysterious allusion was made to some approaching crisis—"some terrible struggle at hand"—and calling on the Spanish people to arm—was apocryphal, and had been forged by the enemies of the government, and those who wished to produce a breach of amity between them and their "august ally." Gold and presents were also lavished, without stint, among the minions of Napoleon, in order to secure their good offices in propitiating his favour. As Napoleon had still to contend with the disjointed fragments of Prussia, and the unbroken strength of Russia, he deferred



his vengeance until it should harmonize with his policy. To lay the train for this fell purpose, he demanded a contingent of troops to aid him in enforcing his anti-commercial or non-international system against England. The Spanish minister, to conciliate his favour, and neutralize the effect of his foolish proclamation, sent him 16,000 of the best troops, under the command of the marquis Romana, and 6,000 under general O'Farril; who, by forced marches, were hurried to Holstein and Tuscany. He also extorted large contributions of specie, both from Spain and Portugal; from the former for the forgiveness of her perfidy, and from the latter for his permission of allowing her to become neutral in his contest with England, and for being the carrier of the Spanish dollars from the transatlantic dominions of Spain.

Affairs continued in this condition till Napoleon Buonaparte found matters ready to put his projects into execution. On the 29th of October, 1807, a secret treaty was entered into between the cabinets of Fontainebleau and Madrid, for the dismemberment of Portugal, and the military occupation of that country. By the terms of the convention, the country was to be divided into three portions; one, (namely, the province of Entre-Minho-e-Duero and Oporto, under the title of the kingdom of Lusitania,) was to be given to the queen of Etruria; the second, (the Alemtejo and Algarves,) to be erected into an independent principality for Godoy; and France was to hold the central provinces of Estremadura, Beira, and Tras-os-Montes, with Lisbon. The ultra-marine dominions were to be similarly divided; and "the royal wittol" of

\* For this effort of political wisdom, "the royal wittol" with "the foolscap crown on the fool's head," created his connubial helpmate—Manuel Godoy, "The prince of peace." That man (Godoy) was originally a subaltern in the Spanish body-guard; but possessing a pleasing exterior and being of large dimensions (a great subject of attraction with vicious women) he attracted the notice of the worthless and profligate wife of the aforesaid "royal wittol." His ignorance was so great, that he could scarcely read; but he possessed those qualifications which please frivolous and weak-minded women—he could sing, touch the lute, and possessed the faculty of chatting on light and trivial subjects. By the interest of the profligate and adulterous wife of the "royal wittol," he was created minister of the crown, in the place of the patriotic Florida Blanca, who was dismissed to make room for him; grand commander-in-chief of all the forces, naval and military, admiral of Spain and the Indies; and protector of commerce. Moreover, he had a body-guard assigned

Spain, Charles IV., was to assume in three years, the title of "protector of Lusitania and the principality of the Algarves," and that of "emperor of the two Americas."\* France was to take military possession of the country with 28,000 men, and Spain with 27,000. An army of observation, consisting of 40,000 men, was to be assembled at Bayonne, to advance in case of need.

To give some shadow of excuse for his violence and usurpation, the French emperor ordered the cabinet of Lisbon to close the Portuguese ports against the English; to arrest all the English residents in the country; to confiscate all British property which might be in that country; to contribute a contingent force† to enable him to carry out the continental system; and to furnish a war-contribution of one hundred million of francs, as "a ransom for the state," to enable him "to carry out his plan for the amelioration of Portugal, and save it from the tyrant of the seas." These conditions were pusillanimously conceded to by the prince of the Brazils, Dom Pedro; and he, moreover, agreed to declare war against England as soon as the transatlantic possessions of Portugal could be placed in a state of defence against English aggression.

To put this design into execution, the French contingent force, under the appellation of "the army of Gironde," under the command of Junôt, advanced from the frontiers of France, through Spain, on Portugal; and had nearly reached the capital, when Pedro observing in the *Moniteur* the announcement, that "the house of Braganza had ceased to reign," fled on the

him, and was dignified with the title of most "serene highness." He had espoused the niece of the king, and his daughter was destined in marriage to the heir apparent to the throne. He was a man of the most profligate and depraved morals. His vanity was equal to his ignorance: he wished to be thought of high and illustrious descent. To gratify his vanity in that respect, one of his minions undertook to prove that he was descended from Montezuma, the emperor of the Incas; and another maintained that he derived his origin from the kings of the Goths. Friend Munos, the "duke of Reazanares," Madame Christina's *cher ami*, is still of lower origin, and has even less pretensions to knowledge.

† This force consisted of between 8,000 and 9,000 men, under the command of the marquis d'Alorna; and the last miserable remnant of it perished in the calamitous retreat from Moscow, under the appellation of La Légion Portugaise. The Spanish contingent force under O'Farril had perished in Germany.



27th of November, on board of the English fleet in the Tagus, and had scarcely got without the range of the batteries when he beheld the ensign of France\* waving on the towers of Lisbon. On his entering the capital, Junôt immediately substituted the arms of the emperor for those of the house of Braganza, over the gates of the palace, and issued a proclamation, declaring that the emperor willed that Portugal should henceforth be governed in his imperial name. At the same time, the estates of the crown were confiscated, and heavy contributions levied on the inhabitants. All the fortresses throughout the country were taken possession of by the French troops and the Spanish contingent force. To the eternal disgrace of the Portuguese military reputation, Lisbon, which contained 300,000 inhabitants, and above 14,000 regular troops, abjectly submitted on the anniversary of the day on which Portugal had freed herself from the Spanish yoke, to a wretched force of 1,500 men, scarcely able to bear their muskets on their shoulders, the greater part of the invading army in their advance from the frontier having perished, whole companies and squadrons having been washed away in ravines by the swollen mountain torrents, or perished through the severe hardships sustained in their advance. On the arrival of the French troops under Junôt, "his eminence" cardinal Mendoça, the patriarch of Lisbon, commanded, in a proclamation, dated 8th December, 1808, "his dearly beloved sons in Jesus Christ" to obey "the man whom past ages could not have foreseen, the man of prodigies, the great emperor whom God had called to establish the happiness of nations." In the same memorable patriotic document, "all opposition to the divine mission of the magnanimous ally of Portugal" was denounced "a crime against God." Don José Maria de Mello, bishop of the Algarves, also issued a proclamation in the same spirit of patriotism, and of fidelity to his trust; and the other bishops, like veritable "fathers

in God," were responsive to the revered and sanctified voice of the holy and faithful patriarch, in their charges to their flocks and clergy. The magistracy in their edicts vied with one another in recommending, as a civil and religious duty, a kind reception of the French, and obedience to their magnanimous general.

As an excuse for co-operation in the fulfilment of the articles of the treaty of Fontainebleau, the army of observation on the frontiers of Spain was put into motion. Two formidable corps, amounting to 53,000 men, under Dupont and Moncey, advanced into the very heart of Spain, and 12,000, under Duhesme, penetrated through the Eastern Pyrenees, at La Jonquera, and established themselves at Barcelona. All the key fortresses of the frontiers, namely, St. Sebastian, Figueras, Pampeluna, Barcelona, and Mont Jouiç, were obtained possession of by cunning and artifice so mean and despicable, that war, in its dignity, disdains their practice; and all the principal passes across the Pyrenees being secured, the three main roads from France, by Perpignan, Navarre, and Biscay, to Madrid, were in possession of the French troops.

The devices by which the French obtained possession of those strong fortresses, and the stupidity of the Spaniards in acceding to those devices, are graphically described by general Foy, in his work entitled, *Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule*. His information is as follows:—Two battalions of the 2nd regiment of infantry, commanded by the general of brigade, Nicolas, halted at Figueras, under pretence of waiting there for a great personage, who, it was whispered, was the emperor himself. As there were no barracks in the town, the general demanded permission to quarter his troops in the strong citadel of San Fernando. The governor, who was a weak-minded man, acceded to the request, and the Spanish garrison, quitting that almost impregnable fortress, took up their quarters

\* When the standard bearing the arms of Portugal was surmounted by the foreign colours, the feelings of those Portuguese who felt as they ought to feel, are touchingly commiserated by general Foy. Veteran warriors, who, after their lives had been spared by war, have dragged out existence long enough to see the banner under which their blood had been shed, insulted by hostile bands, can imagine the anguish which was produced in the bosoms of the faithful sons of Lusitania. Their hearts were overwhelmed with the bitterest afflictions at the

humiliating sight. The fallen standard was consecrated by every remembrance of religion and glory. According to the legendary belief of every true and faithful Portuguese, Jesus Christ, in his invariable partiality for the Portuguese, had given it on the eve of the battle of Ourique, 1139, to Alphonso Henriquez, the first king of Portugal, and had impressed on it the marks of his passion; and while confiding that sacred labarum to such valuable keeping, had said to the favoured hero, "Behold the sign under which thou shalt conquer."



in the town. Thus Figueras fell into the possession of new masters.

In the intermediate time, the remainder of the army of the eastern Pyrenees, under Duhesme, had arrived at Barcelona, and bivouacked in the immediate neighbourhood of the town. On the following morning they were under arms, on pretence of being inspected before they commenced their march for another destination. Lecchi, the commander of the Italian division, ranged his troops in order of battle, with their backs to the fortifications. All the idlers of Barcelona, and even the Spanish soldiers of the guard, hastened to the review. While they were listening to the music, and their attention was fixed on the minute vigilance with which the officers and the general himself examined every part of the dress of the battalions, two companies of the right turned short before the citadel gate, and covered the drawbridge before it could be raised. At the same time, Lecchi, advancing at full gallop, called out to the Spanish soldiers, that intending to pay a visit of compliment to their commandant, he had sent the two companies to the drawbridge as his body-guard. During this parley, Barcelona was in the possession of the French, a fortification of such ponderous strength, that Napoleon, in his subsequent communication to Gouvion St. Cyr, impressing the necessity of its preservation, said, that it would cost 80,000 men for its recapture, should it be lost. "Thus," adds general Foy, "without striking a blow, the largest city (Barcelona) of the Spanish monarchy fell into the power of the French—that city which, a century before, when all the rest of Spain had been subjugated, had contended singly against the armies of Louis XIV. In the means which were employed to obtain possession of it," adds the general, with the noble scorn and indignation of the soldier at the practice of fraud and duplicity, "there was a mixture of the craft of weakness and the arrogance of strength."

The rock of Mont Jouic, on which was situated the fort, was too difficult of access to allow of the troops reaching it unperceived: Duhesme, therefore, went to count Ezpeleta de Veyre. "My troops occupy your citadel," said the Frenchman; "open instantly the gates of Mont Jouic; for the emperor Napoleon has ordered me to put garrisons into your fortresses." The stupid Spaniard obeyed the mandate, and gave up

the keys of Mont Jouic. Possession of Pampeluna, Figueras, and St. Sebastian, were obtained by the same kind of stratagem.

The plot was now ripe for development. The feuds and animosities that had been artfully fomented between the imbecile Charles and his worthless son Ferdinand, had now risen to the pitch that the crafty Frenchman had designed. Ferdinand had solicited aid against his father, and a matrimonial alliance with the Napoleonic dynasty. Charles, his vicious consort, and the expectant or reversionary prince of Portugal, her paramour Godoy, had invoked the assistance of their "august ally" against the alleged treason and contemplated matricide by Ferdinand, whom they denounced as a rebel and an usurper. To the recriminating solicitations of Charles and Ferdinand, Napoleon, for some time, paid no attention; but finding his schemes now fully ripe for development, and the country sufficiently occupied by his armies, which succeeded each other as the waves of the ocean, and had already inundated the northern and middle provinces of Spain, he commenced his professed mediatory measures.

Charles, in the mean time, had abdicated his crown, on condition that Ferdinand interposed his influence and authority with the people, who had seized Godoy as a traitor to his country, and were about to inflict the summary vengeance of death upon him, to release his wife's paramour. Ferdinand was accordingly proclaimed king; and the people hailed his elevation, while they welcomed the abdication of Charles.

In consequence of these events, Murat advanced from his cantonments at Aranda de Duero, and entered Madrid, March 23rd, with a strong corps of infantry and cavalry; and when Ferdinand made his appearance on the following day, with his father's crown tottering on his head, the lieutenant of the French emperor refused to acknowledge his title. A supreme junta was therefore appointed, of which Don Antonio, Ferdinand's uncle, was constituted president; and Murat was elected a member.

Napoleon now saw the moment had arrived for the *denouement* of his plot, and the extreme folly of the parties who were to be his dupes gave an apparent sanction to his acts. Both Charles and Ferdinand had, with the most extravagant flattery, solicited him to extend to them his protection. Both parties had been indirectly encouraged to believe, that he was disposed to favour them



respectively. They were both, by stratagem and artifice, induced to visit him at Bayonne, having been lured to the meeting by the artful Frenchman's hollow profession of "cementing their friendship," and "finding him their best and firmest friend." Napoleon having prepared them for the exhibition, confronted Ferdinand (who, notwithstanding that Napoleon had offered him one of his nieces in marriage, and had proposed to carve out a kingdom for him in some part of Europe, manifested a determined resistance to the resignation of the crown of Spain) with his father, his adulterous mother, and her paramour, Godoy; when an infamous recrimination took place between the royal brood, that would be scarcely credited, were it not confirmed by indisputable authority. The queen, with the rancorous hatred of an adulterous mother, thus broke forth to her son—"Traitor, you have for years meditated the death of the king, your father; but, thanks to the vigilance, the zeal, and the loyalty of the Prince of Peace, you have not been able to effect your purpose—neither you, nor any of the infamous traitors who have cooperated with you for the accomplishment of your designs. I tell you to your face, that you are my son, but not the son of the king! and yet, without having any other right to the crown than that of your mother, you have sought to tear it from us by force. But I agree and demand, that the emperor Napoleon shall be umpire between us;—Napoleon, to whom we cede and transfer our rights, to the exclusion of our family. I call on him to punish you and your associates as so many traitors, and abandon to him the whole Spanish nation." The parallel of this disgusting scene—this outrage on human nature—is not to be found in the pages of history: the case of Savage, the author of *The Bastard*, whose profligate mother, the countess of Macclesfield, who gloried in proclaiming her infamy, for the base purpose of disinheriting her talented but unfortunate son, bears but a faint approach to it.

After this memorable interview, the weak-minded and despicably-souled old king ceded all his rights to the crown of Spain "to the great man who has already shown himself my beloved friend;" and Ferdinand, who had no other alternative but to follow the same course, or to meet death (Napoleon having told him in express terms—"There is no alternative, prince, between submission

and death"), declared his renunciation of all right of succession in favour, as he phrases it in the form of his abdication, of "the hero who was destined by providence to save Europe and support thrones." As a recompense for their mean and dastardly conduct, the imbecile father was pensioned and placed with his adulterous wife and her paramour in the palace of Compeigne, and the son sent a prisoner to the castle of Valencay.

Ferdinand, to propitiate Murat's favour, had, previous to this drama, delivered to him the sword of the French king, Frances, which had been surrendered at the battle of Pavia, and which the Spaniards had preserved with the highest veneration, fondly regarding it as a proud trophy of their former greatness. To give effect to its transfer, its delivery was accompanied with great pomp and pageantry.

The artful and insidious Napoleon having thus extinguished the Bourbon dynasty of Spain, and laid his train of designs for the subjugation of the Peninsula, convened, June 13th, at Bayonne, an assembly of notables, which was composed of the grandes and chief ecclesiastics of the state, "to devise," as he alleged, "a plan under him as protector of Spain, for the security of the happiness, and the regeneration of the country, and to render the Spaniards a great, glorious, and happy nation." Of the one hundred and fifty members summoned, ninety-one obeyed the call, and when Napoleon proposed his brother Joseph as their king, they all, with the most servile acquiescence, swore fealty and homage to him, declaring with abject and fulsome adulation that they submitted "to branches of a family destined by an overruling providence to reign over mankind;" and some of them accepted places of trust and confidence about his court and person.

Neither was this the whole of Spanish perfidy to Spain; in the course of the Peninsular war, the peasantry which had been armed at the expense of England, were also found fighting in the ranks of the enemy; and the French convoys were often under the care and guidance of Spanish commissaries and conductors. Joseph Buonaparte's ministry consisted of Spaniards, and he had a large body of Spanish troops in his service.

The intrusive king set out on his journey, to take possession of the vacated throne of the Bourbon dynasty of Spain, accompanied



by 10,000 Italian mercenaries,\* and his faithful adherents, the members of "the assembly of notables." He entered the capital, May 20th, and was proclaimed "king of Spain and the Indies" on the 24th of the same month; the supreme junto, the council of Castile, the municipality of Madrid, and cardinal Bourbon, primate of Spain, and first cousin of Charles, having sent in their adhesions; the last-mentioned person having written a letter to Napoleon Buonaparte, congratulating him on the event.

While the farce of the digestment of the new constitution was enacting at Bayonne, which was "to secure the happiness of Spain, and make her a great and glorious nation," under "the protection of the magnanimous Napoleon," an event happened at Madrid which seemed likely to disconcert all the craft and duplicity of the French emperor.

Murat, in obedience to the commands of his master, to send him all the branches of the Bourbon family, sent off the various cargoes of the royal brood "duly packed and ticketed;" but in his attempt to transmit the queen of Etruria (the daughter of Charles,) and her son, the infante, the population of Madrid surrounding the carriage to prevent their departure, a riot ensued, May 2nd, and in the sanguinary conflict which took place, and which Murat continued while a pretext for resistance could be found, above 700 of the French, and nearly the same number of the Spanish population, were slain. Numbers of peasantry, who had flocked from the surrounding country to inquire about the fate of their friends in the city, were shot and sabred immediately that they approached the French position; and to deter the Spaniards from a repetition of resistance, the streets of Madrid were brilliantly illuminated throughout the night, to present to the inhabitants the ghastly exhibition of their dead and dying friends and relatives; nor were the bodies permitted to be removed till the evening of the second day from the occurrence of the bloody tragedy. A military commission was immediately appointed for the trial of the prisoners, and a number of them were shot, in batches of forty, tied two and two together, near the

\* Many of the officers of the Italian regiments, particularly the Neapolitans, who were now engaged in assisting in the subjugation of Spain, were descended from Spanish families, whose founders had served and found fortune in the Spanish armies that had subdued Italy, under Gonsalvo de Cordova and other

church of Señora de la Solidad, and the promenade of the Prado.

The following extract from the *Memoirs of a Voltigeur in the French Service*, furnishes some interesting information on this subject:—"It is with grief I speak it, but truth compels me to acknowledge, that every conceivable atrocity marked the conduct of the French soldiery on this dreadful occasion. The troops took deadly vengeance, sparing neither age nor sex; the child and the adult, the male and the female, were cut down and pierced alike by the edge of the sabre or the point of the bayonet. Even the penitent at the altar found no protection from the soldiers' mad vengeance; and the unhappy individuals confined by sickness to the wards of the hospitals, were torn from their beds and inhumanly lacerated. One of our grenadiers encountering a young woman holding an infant in one hand, and brandishing a poniard in the other, stunned the mother with a blow of the butt-end of his musket, and impaled the child on the bayonet. To consummate the horrors of the dreadful scene which took place on this occasion, as soon as the insurrection was quelled, the matron and the virgin were the victims of the most brutal and unbridled lust."

The example which had been set by the capital was electric. The exalted display of courage and self-sacrifice of the Madrilenos, "the first among the patriotic and martyred brave who set the stern example of defying the oppressor of their country," was too inciting, and carried too home an appeal to every man's heart and soul, not to awaken every feeling that animates the heart. The pride and patriotism of the Spanish nation had been outraged and insulted. From a sense of the humiliation of their nation, the thirst for vengeance burst at once on their imagination. One universal cry for arms was heard throughout the land, and at the same moment a general insurrection took place; the first outbreak was at Santander. In Valentia, Rodrigo, Cadiz, Seville, Carthagena, Valladolid, Granada, Badajos, and many other cities, the French, and all Spaniards, the supposed partisans of Godoy and Napoleon, were massacred. Provincial and local juntas were constituted captains, and had established the dominion of Spain in the Milanese and the kingdoms of the Two Sicilies. Thus, in the revolution of events, the shoots that Spain had thrown out in foreign conquests, were now returned to strike at her very root and existence as an independent state.



for the conduct of public affairs, and the levying of money and troops. Deputies were sent from the Asturias to the cabinet of London, to solicit arms, clothing, money, and the other *matériel* of warfare.

When the intelligence of the Spanish insurrection reached Portugal, insurrectionary movements immediately took place in that country, to resist French oppression, and to endeavour to liberate the country from their galling tyranny. Melgaço led the way; the city of Oporto followed; and the example was imitated by almost every town throughout the provinces of Duero-e-Minho and Tras-os-Montes. At Coimbra, a considerable city midway between Oporto and Lisbon, a junta was established; and, in imitation of the Spaniards, deputies were sent to England to solicit money, arms, ammunition, and the other warlike necessaries.

A treaty of alliance was concluded by the English government with both the Spanish and Portuguese deputies; and British agents were sent to both countries for the purpose of ascertaining their resources, and organizing their military levies. The Spanish prisoners were equipped with arms and clothes, and shipped for the purpose of being transported to their own country;\* as were also those in the service of Napoleon in Holstein,† under the command of the marquis of Romana. Specie, arms, money, and all the necessary *matériel* of

\* These men, forgetful of the obligations and gratitude due to the English nation for its bounty and generosity, mutinied on the passage, and seizing the transports, carried them into different ports of the Peninsula, and disembarking, proceeded to their homes. This was the first display of Spanish ingratitude for British generosity.

† The late poet-laureate, Southey, in his classically written, but not very scientific and trustworthy *History of the Peninsular War*, introduces to the notice of his readers the following singular and interesting anecdote:—"The author of *The Plain Englishman* (vol. i. p. 294), tells us on the authority of sir Richard Keats, admiral of the English fleet in the Baltic, that when the Spanish troops under the command of the marquis Romana, in the service of Napoleon in Holstein, were about being embarked on board of English vessels, for the purpose of being transported to Spain, in order to co-operate with the Spanish patriot armies, it not being possible to take the fine, black, long-tailed Andalusian horses of the two regiments of cavalry, and the marquis being fond of horses, and knowing that every man was (like the German dragoons, between whom and their horses, there subsists an attachment more like that which takes place between human kindred than between man and beast) attached to the beast that had carried him from his native land to the shores of the Baltic, was not able to order that they should, according to the usual practice of warfare,

were sent in profusion, almost without stint or limit, to Corunna, Santander, Cadiz, Gibraltar, Malaga, and other places. "They were all," says Napier, "incessantly demanded, and as profusely granted." Within twelve months from the commencement of the war, England had sent to the Spanish armies (besides £2,000,000 sterling, 150 pieces of field artillery, 420,000 rounds of ammunition, 200,000 muskets, 61,000 swords, 75,000 pikes, 23,000,000 ball cartridges, 6,000,000 leaden balls, 15,000 barrels of gunpowder, 92,000 suits of clothing, 356,000 sets of accoutrements and pouches, 310,000 pair of shoes, 37,000 pair of boots, 40,000 tents, 250,000 yards of cloth, 10,000 sets of camp-equipage, 118,000 yards of linen, 50,000 great coats, 50,000 canteens, 54,000 havresacks, with a variety of other stores, far too numerous to be recapitulated." And all this profusion was being made to the worthless government of Spain, while the British army was left neglected and without any funds. To men so imbecile was the government of England then entrusted.‡ The enormous demands of aid and supplies made by the Spanish juntas were scarcely credible. A rivalry often subsisted between the provincial juntas who should make the highest demand on the British government. And there was not much cause for surprise; Mr. Canning having instructed the accredited diplomatists, Stuart, Duff, and the

be shot, to prevent them falling into the hands of the French, ordered that they should be turned loose on the beach. As they moved off, they passed some of the country horses and mares which were feeding at a little distance; but turning back again they attacked the native horses. These resenting the aggression, a general conflict ensued, in which the Spanish horses, retaining their regimental discipline, charged in squadrons of ten or twenty together. The opposite combatants soon adopted the same tactics. Then both sides closely engaged, each party striking with their fore-feet, and biting and tearing one another with the most ferocious rage, trampled over those which were beaten down, till the shore, in the course of a quarter of an hour, was strewn with the dead and disabled. Part of them had been set free on a rising ground at some distance, but they no sooner heard the roar of the battle, than they came thundering down over the intermediate hedges, and catching the contagious madness, plunged into the fight with equal fury. 'Sublime as the scene was,' as Southey entitles it, it was too terrible to be long contemplated; and the marquis giving way to his merciful disposition, gave orders for shooting the surviving combatants; but it was found impossible to put the order into execution; and after the last boats had quitted the beach, the few horses that remained alive, were seen still engaged in the dreadful work of mutual destruction."

‡ Jones's *Account of the War in the Peninsula*.



other agents, to apprise the Spanish authorities, that no conditions were required as to the application of the pecuniary assistance afforded by the English government, and that the amount of money required to be granted was of no signification. In pursuance of these unlimited conditions, the central junta, in an application to Mr. Stuart, the plenipotentiary to the Spanish government, peremptorily demanded the following supplies to be furnished "without delay," namely: 10,000,000 of dollars, 500,000 yards of cloth, 4,000,000 yards of linen, 300,000 pair of shoes, 30,000 pair of boots, 12,000,000 of cartridges, 200,000 muskets, 12,000 pair of pistols, 50,000 swords, 100,000 arrobas of flour, besides a large quantity of salt meat and fish. The gratitude displayed in return for the profuse grants of the English government may be estimated from a postscript to one of the duke of Wellington's letters to his brother the marquis of Wellesley:—"Just to show you the kind of people the Spaniards are to deal with, I mention that I cannot station even a corporal's party, in the Sierra de Gata, or the Sierra de Francia, without giving the corporal money for rations for the horses and men of his party, while the French have everything in the same district for nothing."\* We shall also see in the course of the following pages their heartless and cruel conduct to the wounded at Talavera, as well as at other places in the course of the Peninsular war, and their treachery at the storming of Badajoz.

Of this improvidence on the part of the English government, Portugal took advantage, as well as the various juntas of Spain. Intending to convert the grants to their own private advantage, they demanded considerably more of every article than they had any occasion for, or could possibly find means of employing. The bishop of Oporto demanded accoutrements, arms, and ammunition for 40,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry, with an immense quantity of ammunition, clothing, &c., though he knew that not one-tenth of his demand could be made use of. "The arms were," says the author of the *History of the War in the Peninsula*, "generally left in their cases to rot, or to fall into the hands of the enemy; † the clothing seldom reached the soldier's back; and the

money, in all instances, misapplied, was in some embezzled by the authorities, into whose hands it fell, in others employed to create disunion, and to forward the private views of the juntas, at the expense of the public welfare. It is a curious fact, that from the beginning to the end of the war, an English musket was rarely to be seen in the hands of a Spanish soldier.

While these transactions were in progress of operation, hostilities broke out between the French forces in Spain and Portugal, and the natives of those countries. The Spaniards were defeated during the months of June, July, and August, 1808, at Logroño, Torquemada, Segovia, Cabezon, Soucillo, Huesca, Mallen, Kalou, Epila, Arbos, Moncada, St. Pol, Cabrillas, Melinos del Rey, Cuença, Quarte, St. Felipe, the passage of the Kucar, near Almanza, at Alcolea, and at Medina del Rio Seco, the loss of which last mentioned battle was the cause of Madrid opening its gates to the intruder. In the battles of Cabeçon, Torquemada, and Cuença, of Huesca and Epila, under Palafox, and that of Medina del Rio Seco, under Cuesta and Blake, they sustained great loss, both in men and artillery. Amidst the un pitying and unsparing severity with which the enemy used the sword upon the fleeing and defenceless Spaniards, the French cavalry shone in the rank of slaughter. After the battles of Logroño and Tudela, the French generals, Verdier and Lefebre Desnouettes, put all the leaders of the Spaniards to death. During the same period the patriots were successful at the pass of Bruch; repulsed the French twice from Geroux, and twice from Valencia and Saragossa, and obtained the ignominious surrender of Dupont's army at Baylen. The Portuguese, during the same period, were beaten at Castro d'Airo, Villa Viciosa, Beja, Leyria, Montemor, Alobaça, Evora, Guarda, and Attalaya; but obtained some partial success at Oporto, Coimbra, Faro, and Figueira da Foz.

The two sieges of Saragossa, or as it is sometimes written Zaragossa, have been embellished with many romantic and exaggerated legends of Spanish heroism, both male and female, by the late poet laureate Southey, and credulously adopted by those writers who are so carried away with the

ammunition, of clothing and provisions, all of which had been supplied by the English government, were captured at Benevente and Mayorja. The same loss happened on several other occasions.

\* *Wellington's Despatches.*

† After the defeat of the Spanish army at Rio Seco, under Cuesta and Blake, many thousand English muskets, and an immense quantity of stores and



love of the marvellous and impossible as to disqualify them for the examination of the truth. Neither the men nor the women did more than is generally done when brought to the push. Mr. Southey's extravagant laudation of Spanish gallantry and Spanish endurance were formed on the traditions of chivalry and romance with which the works of fiction of that nation abound, and in which he was very conversant. Had he had the opportunity of being personally acquainted with the defeats and disasters, the panics and flights, to which the rabble armies of the patriots, under their imbecile and arrogant leaders, were constantly subject, he would have been more circumspect and sparing in his eulogiums. The late Mr. Southey was not, however, singular in his exaggerations of Spanish heroism and other patriotic virtues; many other persons, among whom the political agents sent to that country, contributed to mislead the English public on the subject. Those gentlemen, in their reports, over-rated the power and capacity of the patriots, and mistook popular feeling for physical power and warlike capability.

On the termination of the first siege of Saragossa, notwithstanding the destitution to which the inhabitants were reduced, heavy contributions were levied on the woe-struck city. Junôt, among his other spoiliations, demanded for his own use a superb service of china, and fittings-up for a tennis-court. Lannes rifled the church of Our Lady of the Pillar, of jewels to the amount of nearly half a million of francs. Many of the monks were enclosed in sacks, and thrown into the Ebro. Palafox's chaplains, Gontiago Sao and Baulio Boggiero, met with the same fate, having been first bayoneted on the banks of that river.

Honourable as the sieges of Saragossa, as also that of Gerona, were to the Spaniards, the gallant defence of Mesolonghi, in the war of Greek independence, may vie with any similar event recorded in ancient or modern history, for the heroism displayed by all of every age and sex, from the opening of the siege to its dismal close.

The partial successes which the Spanish and Portuguese patriots had obtained, gave free scope for the display of the inordinate pride and arrogance, the absurd confidence and presumption of the first mentioned people, and for the vapouring and extravagant boastings of the second. By the surrender of the French army, under the timid and incompetent

Dupont, to Castanos and Reding, (the errors of the former of whom ought to have placed him and his army prisoners in the hands of the French, if their leader had possessed the ability of availing himself of them), all the innate pride and presumption of the nation burst forth, and was inflated to the highest degree; "the glory of past ages seemed to be renewed; every man conceived himself to be a second Cid, and perceived in the surrender of Dupont not only the deliverance of Spain, but the immediate conquest of France. 'We are obliged to our good friends the English,' was a common phrase among them when conversing with the officers of Sir John Moore's army; 'we thank them for their good will, and we shall escort them through France to Calais; the journey will be pleasanter than a long voyage; we shall not give them the trouble of fighting the French, but will be pleased at having them spectators of our victories.'"\*

The brains of their ignorant and arrogant leaders teemed with the most extravagant projects; instead of devising means to resist the enemy, they employed themselves in composing manifestoes and decrees in inflated and bombastic language, or in making lofty and empty boasts. They also invoked the aid of religion and superstition to give greater nerve and spirit to their hearts. According to their version of affairs, the deity had signified that the cause of the Spaniards was his own. The priests reported, that the church of Our Lady of Guadalupe was struck by lightning on the very day on which Ferdinand VII. entered Bayonne. The tapers which were burning round the sacred image were extinguished, but the mother of God remained untouched. In the cavern of Covadenga, in the Asturias, so famous for having been the asylum of Pelago and his brave followers, attentive and devout devotees saw large drops of sweat trickle down the face of Our Lady of Battles. At Compostella, a clinking of arms was heard during the night, on the tomb of St. James, announcing that the war was begun, and that the glorious nation of Spain would again lead her armies to victory.

This humility of opinion of themselves was not confined to the Spaniards; their peninsular neighbours, the Portuguese, had formed a like estimate of their valorous propensities. When the British army approached the lines of Torres Vedras, that intriguing member of the regency, Souza,

\* Napier's *History of the War in the Peninsula.*



proposed that the Portuguese troops should remain outside the lines, while the English took shelter within their protection. He was, no doubt, fearful that the French would escape the valorous clutches of his countrymen.

In Portugal, also, the junta, instead of teaching the people to practise the drill, to erect batteries, and to throw up trenches, employed them in puerile rejoicings, beating drums, ringing bells, and firing feu-de-joies. The Spaniards, in conformity with their accurate notions of military science, appointed their tutelar saint, Narcissus, generalissimo of all their forces; and the Portuguese, in the same spirit of wisdom and patriotism, conferred the like responsible and arduous employment on their unsubstantial friend, Don Antonio. Results proved how capable their saintships and their confiding votaries were to compete with their active and enterprising adversaries, who invoked no other assistance than common sense and common courage.

Such in the course of three short months had been the defeats and disasters, the panics and flights, to which the armies of the Spanish patriots were subject, in their unequal contests with the veteran and disciplined armies of France; and they experienced the same disasters and defeats, and were subject to the same panics and flights, during the whole six years of their contest for national independence. But it is impossible not to admire the untiring patriotism and unsubduable spirit of the people in their fearful struggle with the oppressors of their country. Though army after army had been routed and scattered as chaff before the wind, they returned again to the conflict with their

\* Historians have talked largely and loosely about the former military superiority of the Spaniards; but they have omitted to state, that the causes of that superiority were:—1st, That the Spaniards were the first nation who made use of artillery in the field of battle; and 2nd, That the introduction of that powerful and main arm of military superiority, infantry, owes its origin to them. Their success at Pavia, Rocroi, and in the Low Countries, was entirely attributable to these causes. Readers should be cautious in giving implicit credence to facts taken from Spanish and Portuguese writers, who often wrote under fear, and subject to inquisitorial authority.

† The loss of the Flemish, and also the Italian provinces, was a blessing to Spain, instead of an injury, as it is stated by some authors; it freed her from wars and much useless national expenditure. And their loss was not only beneficial to Spain but to the whole of Europe. For while Spain, and other countries, which had no local proximity with the Netherlands, had any portion of them as their tributary, that part of Europe was the battle-field of dis-

powerful foe, undismayed and undisheartened. They were the victims of the folly and imbecility (often the treachery) of their leaders; but they still made the most heroic exertions for their deliverance from their moral and political degradation. History told them, that the military feeling of their ancestors was once their pride and boast,—that “Spain,” according to their historical annals, “had been the most warlike nation in Europe\* till the battle of Rocroi, and the four-score years of warfare in the Netherlands,† when they unfortunately lost their provinces.” Though these glorious scenes had passed away, and might be considered the grave of Spanish military renown, pride, patriotism, and all those feelings that make life acceptable and dignify human nature, they still inclined them to hope that the national spirit might be resuscitated, and their country freed from the bondage of the foe, and restored to its former dignity and political importance. But the great and primary constituents of the military character‡ having been deteriorated and debased by the despotism and degradation, the benumbing and blighting influences of kingcraft and priestcraft, for a succession of ages; and the ignorant and arrogant leaders of the nation, both civil and military, not possessing sufficient talent, energy, and patriotism to awaken and elicit the requisite spirit, all the exertions and sacrifices of the patriots were fruitless and abortive.

During the contests above described, between the Spanish and Portuguese population and their fierce and haughty foes, all the terrors and dreadful visitations of war were practised by both sides, and on a putants, or as Sterne makes his hero term it, “the great prize-fighting stage of Europe,” for thirty centuries, and had occasioned many unnecessary and ravaging wars during that long succession of ages.

‡ The Spaniard naturally possesses all the qualifications necessary for the formation of the soldier: he is disposed to subordination, sober, patient, abstemious. General Foy, in his *History of the Peninsular War*, says that the Spanish soldier is capable of living on a pilchard and a bit of bread rubbed with garlic. If the readers of the general's work should be disposed to believe this statement in its literal sense, they will labour under a serious error. The duke of Wellington, with his usual discrimination, and strict regard for truth and fact, will be found a safer authority. “It is a mistaken popular notion,” says the British authority, “that the Spanish, or any other troops, can subsist on a smaller quantity, or a coarser kind of food, than the British. I have had the opportunity of knowing, that the Spanish are more clamorous for it, and are more exhausted, if they did not receive it regularly, than the English are.”



scale of frightful magnitude. The most horrible excesses were perpetrated, and the most rancorous spirit of hatred and revenge subsisted between both parties. On each side human nature was degraded by the commission of the most fiendish barbarities and torments that the ingenuity and malice of man could devise. By the French, conflagration, murder, rape, pillage, and even desecration of churches, and every kind of atrocity and wanton outrage which the most demoniac wickedness could conceive, were practised. As a lively writer, who was an eye-witness of what he relates, has well expressed himself: "the progress and retreats of the French armies in the Peninsula were marked by acts more suited to the ruthless and savage deeds of a horde of barbarians—to the followers of an Attila, a Timour Bec, or a Ghenghis Khan—than to those of a European military force; they left behind them scenes of horror unparalleled in the annals of war, but which are the inevitable results of the revengeful passions inspired in a licentious soldiery, who are the instruments of evil and insatiable ambition. Many of their deeds are too revolting to human nature, and too indecent, to relate."

The French often burnt the towns and villages through which they passed, plundered the inhabitants, and not unfrequently massacred them, or hung them on the trees by the road-side. Even the generals, except Dorsenne, Monçon, Macdonald, Marmont, Brune, Mortier, Travôt, Brennier, Charlôt, and a few others, were rapacious and cruel, and sanctioned the excesses of the troops. Besides their rapacity in their public capacity, they forced the chief people in the towns and cities to keep open table for them. Junôt, at Lisbon, obliged baron Quintilla to supply his table with forty covers daily; and Loisson visited signor Bandero in the same fearful manner. Many French generals (among whom Vandamme and Davoust shone conspicuous) acted even more extravagantly in Germany, and the other conquered countries. The lower and more abject the origin of the man had been, the more sumptuously and ostentatiously he required to be treated; and the more fearful and exorbitant were his exactions. What a beautiful contrast do the following proclamations of the duke of Wellington and the duke of York form to the cruelties and licentious proceedings of the French generals and their troops, among whom, not to mention

the atrocious massacres, violations, conflagrations, and devastations, "pillage and plunder were systematically pursued by all grades, from the commander-in-chief to the common soldier."

We subjoin a few extracts from the proclamation of the duke of Wellington to the French people, when the British army was in France, dated at his head-quarters, Vera, November 13th, 1813:—That he would "prevent the evils that usually attend the advance of a hostile army, and which your government allowed to be committed by its armies in Spain." At the same time, to protect the French population against the licentiousness of the Spanish troops, he issued another proclamation, authorizing the people of the districts which the British army had overrun, to arm themselves for the preservation of order, and the protection of their lives and property, under the direction of the mayors and civil authorities of the towns and villages; and he moreover invited them to arrest all plunderers and evil-doers, and to convey them to British head-quarters, with proof of the crimes committed, promising to punish the culprits, and pay for all loss and damage. The justice of his proceedings, and the good discipline he enforced, not only among the Spanish troops, but throughout the allied army, so won the esteem and confidence of the French population, that the peasantry, to save their property from the pillage of the French soldiery, and the exactions and forced contributions of the French generals, passed into the British lines, and put themselves, their carts, implements of husbandry, and other property, under the protection of the British general. Also by his rigid probity in paying for all the supplies furnished to the British army, a preference was given by the French dealers in the supply of the British troops to those of their own country; but the consequence was that the value of commodities was greatly enhanced, the daily cost of the rations of each man having been at one period above six shillings British specie.

The order of the duke of York issued to the army under his command, in reply to the decree of the National Convention of France, issued in April, 1794, directing that no quarter should be given to the British troops, was equally honourable to the British character:—"Remember, soldiers, that mercy to the vanquished is the brightest gem in the character of the soldier."

The following observation of general Foy,



when speaking of the mode in which England carries on war, is as highly complimentary to our country, as it is honourable to the candour of that high-minded man, and his regard for truth:—"Plunder and exaction in foreign countries are regarded with generous aversion by men, who, even in war, show every respect to institutions and private property." In pursuance of this principle, the general proceeds to remark, that "10,000 English, with money in their hands, would die of hunger where 20,000 French would live for nothing."

The *lex talionis*, or law of retaliation, was adopted by the Spanish and Portuguese patriots, in its most extensive and unrelenting manner; but it must be admitted, that it was not to be expected, that a wild peasantry, and an oppressed and insulted people, who beheld their dwellings burnt, their property plundered, their fields laid waste and devastated, and their wives and daughters violated, and often massacred, before their very eyes, could restrain their vengeance and moderate their violence; such an expectation is in opposition to nature, and in contradiction of those feelings that were given us for the wisest and most obvious purposes: the unbridled perpetrations of lust, rapine, and cruelty, by an insolent foe, invoke and put into operation all the energy of patriotic hatred, and all the vengeance of outraged morality. Assassinations and cruelties were, therefore, adopted in the spirit of the wildest and severest retaliation. The barbarities practised against the stragglers and sick of the French armies, were horrible; they were the victims of either shocking lingering deaths, or frightful mutilations. As the author of *The Recollections in the Peninsula*, says, in one of his works, *The Tales of the Wars of our Time* (and his narrative is not the suggestions of fancy, but a true and faithful portrait)—"Blows and exactions, pillage and rapine, insults and cruelties, filled the bosoms of the Spaniards with deadly and vindictive hatred, which found a thousand secret and silent modes of exhibiting its awful power. While the veteran conquerors of Italy, Egypt, and Germany, marched into the battle-fields of Spain with a laughing insolence, which their easy and cheap-bought victories and trifling losses, had made natural to them, their ranks were daily thinned and wasted by the stiletto or the dose of poison, by the massacre of the sick and stragglers, by the overpower-

ing of small detachments, by the waylaying of small convoys, by the poisoning of wells and food, and by all the other means that revenge and insulted national honour could devise." Of the sickening and abhorrent atrocities put into execution in furtherance of this purpose, the following transactions afford but a faint and an imperfect conception.

A party of French soldiers who had been captured in Navarre, were buried in the ground up to their chins, and the heads of the leaders having been struck off, were bowled by the guerillas against those of the living; and that monstrous diversion was persisted in for some time, and with the most fiend-like delight. The prisoners were sometimes literally hacked to pieces; many were roasted alive; and often the ligaments of their arms and legs were separated, the limbs being left pendant to the body, to increase the pain and torture of the sufferer. In short, all the innate cruelty of the Spanish character was called into action to devise new modes of torture and punishment. All the atrocity and cruelty practiced on the Peruvians and other offenceless tribes of the South Americans by Pizzaro and the other Spanish marauders, seemed to be revived, and to assume new vigour and activity in the hands of the descendants of the savage and remorseless conquerors of the New World.

Brigadier-general René, on his return from Portugal, to which country he had been on civil affairs, being taken prisoner, was plunged alive into a cauldron of burning oil. Many officers, among whom were captain Cagnier and commissary Vaugier, were put between planks, and sawn to pieces. Several of the followers of the Empecinado having been nailed to the trees in the passes of the Guadarama mountains, by the French, and left there to expire slowly by thirst and hunger; before a week elapsed from the display of that act of barbarous cruelty, a like number of French prisoners were affixed to the same trees by the guerillas. And in this spirit a war of extermination was carried on by both parties with the most relentless fury. The 14,000 prisoners who surrendered at Baylen, were either massacred or sent to the desert island of Cabrera, in the Mediterranean, where, from the severest privations and the most cruel treatment, but few of them were found alive at the termination of the war. The cruelty inherent in the Spanish character at last reached to so high a pitch,



that the slaughter of prisoners, and of the sick in the hospitals that happened by the fortune of war to fall into their hands, was lightly and unfeelingly termed *asegurar*, that is, *make sure of them*. Indeed, hatred and vengeance had become so inveterate and predominant against the French, that

they were blended, not only in all acts and ideas of the Spanish population, but were even introduced into their national songs and ballads. Neither were the Portuguese less revengeful than their neighbours. Both nations rivalled each other in the fierce and vengeful passions.

### THE FIRST PORTUGUESE\* CAMPAIGN.

A.D. 1808.

THE deputies from the Portuguese juntas having solicited the aid of a British force to enable them to expel "Gaul's locust host" that infested the Peninsula, 9,000 men, who had been assembled at Cork for the destination of South America, sailed the 12th of July, 1808, under the command of lieutenant-general sir Arthur Wellesley (who had been so gazetted on the 25th of April), for the coast of Portugal. The landing was appointed to take place at Figueras, a little fort near the mouth of the Mondego; but as the line of coast of that country is extremely rocky, and exposed to the full sweep of the Atlantic, the whole of the troops, artillery, stores, &c., was not landed till the 5th of August, the weather having not been propitious for the purpose, as the slightest breeze from the seaboard occasions a surf to break along the coast, which ren-

ders all approach to it dangerous at the time. On the evening of the disembarkation of the last of the forces, the expedition under major-general Spencer hove in sight, which had been dispatched to co-operate with the Spaniards in the south of Spain, and when at St. Mary's, near Cadiz, had been sent for by sir Arthur.

When the whole of the forces had effected a junction, the advanced guard moved from its ground on the Mondego, on the 9th, and was followed on the following day by the main body. The army advanced by the coast-road to Leyria, reached Alcobaca on the 14th, Caldos and Obidos on the 15th, at which last-mentioned place an affair of advanced posts took place between the hostile armies, in which, on account of the precipitancy of the pursuit of the French pickets, by the riflemen of the 95th, the

\* The configuration which Portugal presents in geographical maps, and as it is described in the various books on the science, give a very erroneous and imperfect idea of that country, as it has been formed by the hand of Nature. To one who casts his eye on the map of the Peninsula, it appears as if he had only to step over the boundary line, and he immediately transfers himself from one country to another. But a personal knowledge of that locality would soon convince him that he had formed a very erroneous conception of the geographical attributes which constitute the boundaries of Spain and Portugal. This may appear from the following sketch of its peculiarities:—The frontier of Portugal is very rugged; and this is occasioned by the country being intersected by several ridges of mountains, throwing off numerous offsets, which cover the face of a great part of the country. The parent-ridges are continuations of the chains which cross Spain from east to west, and which have a general inclination north-east to south-west. Another cause of the frontier ruggedness of Portugal is, that its physical geography varies from that which is peculiar to other maritime countries. In all other maritime positions, as rivers ap-

proach their mouths, the mountains dip and the valleys widen; but such is not the case in Portugal. There the mountains increase in height, and the valleys become narrower. The provinces of *Tras-os-Montes* and *Entre-Douro-e-Minho*, are more mountainous than the bordering provinces of Spanish Galicia and Leon. This peculiarity is occasioned by physical causes, dependent on the antagonist or counteractive powers of land and water; nature having, in her provident provision, formed the coast bold and rocky to resist the weight of the volume of the waters of the Atlantic, which is thrown upon them with great force and violence. The boundary line, besides ranges of mountains, consists of rivers. The Minho forms the boundary line from Melgaco to its mouth. The other river boundaries are formed by the Turones, the Erjas, the Lener, the Guadiana, and the Chanza; the banks of those rivers are very steep and rugged. All the great rivers of Portugal as the Minho, the Douro, the Tagus, and the Guadiana, have their rise in Spain, and belong to Portugal, only in their lower basins. The Mondego is the only river that has its source and whole course in Portugal.



latter lost some prisoners. At Leyria, the British army had been joined by 5,000 Portuguese, under Freire; but that general refused to advance, and appropriated to his own use the stores of provisions that had been collected in that city by the bishop of Oporto for the British. The only effect of sir Arthur's appeal to his honour and imputation against his patriotism and spirit, was the placing of 1,400 infantry and 250 cavalry under the orders of the British general. "It was now," to adopt the vivid and elegant language of the tasteful author of *The Military Memoirs of Wellington*, "on the wide theatre of fierce and sanguinary warfare that the careless whistle and the cheerful laughter of the English soldier was first heard. He, stranger alike to the violent and vindictive feelings which animated the invader and the inhabitant, marched gaily forward, looking for a combat as for some brave pastime; and panting to prove at home that the favoured jacket of blue covered not bolder hearts than those that beat proudly under his own crimson uniform;" and in the words of another eminent historian of English prowess, from this same source was to flow, "that mighty stream of battle, guided by the genius of Wellington, bearing the glory of England in its course, which burst the barriers of the Pyrenees, and, while it left deep traces of its fury on the soil of France, gave peace and happiness to Europe."

On information of the landing of the British army, the French commander-in-chief in Portugal, Junôt, had ordered Delaborde, Loisson, Thomières, Kellerman, Travôt, and Marganon, to advance towards Lisbon, leaving garrisons in the fortresses of Elvas, Almeida, and Peniche, and keeping advanced posts at Thomar, Santorem, Obidos, &c. He himself advanced with the

reserve from Lisbon. The design was for all the different corps to proceed in concentric lines to a given point (Leyria), at which it was arranged that the attack was to be made upon the British army.

To prevent the junction of Delaborde and Loisson, and thus force one of them to action, before the meditated junction could be effected, was the object of the commander-in-chief of the British army. This object he accomplished by severing the line of communication of the forces under those generals who were advancing from Abrantes and Lisbon, with the intention of forming their junction at Leyria. Thus Loisson was obliged to make a circuitous march, and compelled to fall back on Santarem; and Delaborde was placed in the predicament of retreat, and exposing the line of Torres Vedras and Mafra, or of accepting battle. The French general preferred the latter alternative, as he was in the neighbourhood of a strong natural position, and entertained sanguine hopes of being joined during the action by Loisson's force (from Rio Major), which amounted to between 7,000 and 8,000 men. He accordingly took up his position on an elevated plain in advance of Rolica,—or, as it is otherwise termed, according to the whim or carelessness of transcribers, Rorica, Roleia, Roliera, Rolissa—which is a pleasant and romantic village, situated at the intersection of the roads leading from Alcoentre, Torres Vedras, and Montecique, and at the southern extremity of a large oblong valley running north and south. Behind him, at the distance of one mile in his rear, a second position, parallel to his first, presented itself in the steep and difficult ridge of Zambugeira. This position, besides its great strength, enabled him to preserve a facility of communication with Loisson and Junôt.

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#### BATTLE OF ROLICA.

On the 17th of August, about seven o'clock in the morning, the British army broke up its temporary cantonments from Caldos and Obidos, and advanced in three columns towards the enemy. On the approach of the British to the French posi-

tion, Delaborde, perceiving from the skilful disposition of the English general, that both his flanks were threatened, fell back from his position on the plain in front of the village to the heights of Zambugeira (or as they are otherwise termed by some authors, Co-



lumbiera), and again he effected his formation of battle on the table-land of that ridge of rocks. As that precipitous and apparently inaccessible position was shut in by rocky thickets on both sides, covered with a close underwood of myrtles and gum cistus, it was to be approached only by a few difficult tracts, consisting of deep ravines, or water-courses, diverging from the foot of the heights to their crest, in the form of a fan; the original formation of the British army was altered to meet the correspondent changes of the French force and their altered position. General Ferguson's division and forces, consisting of 4,800 bayonets, 50 horsemen, and six guns, and a Portuguese force, consisting of 1,200 men, and 50 cavalry, under lieutenant-colonel Trant, were therefore ordered to skirt the base of the heights to the east and west, and turn the enemy's flanks. Another object of Ferguson's disposition was to intercept and retard Loisson's junction with Delaborde, which was hourly expected, as he had then reached Bombarel, which was only five miles distant from the field of battle. The centre of the English force, composed of Hill's, Nightingale's, Cotton's, Craufurd's, and Ford's brigades, and under the immediate command of sir Arthur Wellesley, being formed into five distinct columns of battalions, entered as many defiles or ravines in the front of the enemy, and after struggling with almost insurmountable difficulties (the ascent being so steep, that in many parts a slip of the foot would have been fatal; and in numerous places it was so overrun with briars, brushwood, and wild myrtlewoods, and in some places so impeded with rock, as greatly to interrupt the advance of the troops, and break their formation); and under a sultry sun, stormed all the passes, and reached the crest of the ridge; but the defile along which the 29th regiment advanced being so narrow as to admit of but three or four men abreast, when it reached the ground upon which it was to deploy, the men were so exposed to the fire of the French riflemen, who occupied the vineyards, that they were unable to form any front to return it, until the grenadier company charging that part of the enemy which was upon the open plain, gave time to the companies behind it to effectuate their formation, when, notwithstanding the murderous fire of grape and musketry, that had been poured into its dense columns, and that it had lost its gal-

lant colonel, Lake, it rallied, and being supported by the 9th regiment, they won back their dead and wounded, and were on the point of being led, under major-generals Hill and Nightingale, to a charge on the enemy's line, when Delaborde, perceiving that his right flank was about being turned by generals Ferguson and Fane,—whose advance had as hitherto been retarded by the nature of the ground over which they had to march, beyond the time which had been calculated necessary to enable them to reach their appointed destination, so as to have formed a simultaneous attack with the central portion of the English army,—retired his forces by alternate masses from the heights on which he was posted, to the village of Zambugeira; protecting his movements by vigorous charges of cavalry, and effecting his change of position in good order, on account of the deficiency of cavalry in the English army. There he rallied; but being dislodged by a spirited and vigorous charge, led by major-general Spencer, he retreated by the pass of Ruña in a long night march to Montechique, which was about nine leagues distant from the field of battle; leaving three guns in the possession of the victors, and the line of march to Torres Vedras uncovered. The loss of the English army was 78 killed, 325 wounded, and 74 missing. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded has been variously stated. Sir Arthur, in his despatch, said it exceeded 1,500. Thiebault (a dubious authority, as the French never acknowledge the truth on such occasions) says it was 600. A glaring violation of truth pervades all the French military works extant, as to the extent of their losses, and the effective force of the combatant French and English armies in all the battles that have taken place between those two nations, both in recent and former times. Even general Foy, one of the most liberal, enlightened, and most truth-speaking of French military authors, has sadly transgressed in this respect. He says, that the French army in Egypt was opposed to 14,000 British troops, and 60,000 Turks; and that the French army under Regnier was opposed at the battle of Maida by 10,000 English troops under sir John Stuart, as many Sicilians, and some Neapolitan refugees. The last mentioned battle he also denominates "a mere skirmish, unknown everywhere else but in England." He also gravely and logically attempts to prove, that Soult won



the battle of Toulouse (though he ran away) and asserts that the English army consisted of nearly twice the number of men than it actually did. Suchet, in his *Memoirs*, talks about "the reputation too easily acquired at Salamanca and Vittoria." Thiers, in his *History of the Consulate and Empire*, maintains that the English lost the battle of Alexandria; and that very conspicuous writer of military romance, kindly condescends in another part of his work, to inform us, that had Napoleon invaded England, he must have subjugated it, as his troops had been victors at Friedland, Jena, and Austerlitz. Some French writers have also undertaken to prove, in due logical form and figure, that the English lost the battle of Waterloo, but that they were so stupid as not to run away.

The amount of force under the British general at Rolica was 13,480 infantry, and 470 cavalry; but the troops actually engaged were only the 5th, 9th, 29th, some riflemen of the 95th and 60th, and the flank companies of major-general Hill's brigade, amounting in all to scarce 4,000 men; as it was not possible, from the nature of the ground, that a greater force could be brought into action. Fourteen hundred Portuguese infantry, and 250 cavalry, were with the army. This force general Wellesley had obtained from the Portuguese commander-in-chief Freire, for the sake of the moral and political effect which their presence and co-operation would have on the minds of the Portuguese nation. The amount of the French force, under Delaborde, has been variously stated. Thiebault, with the usual veracity of his countrymen on such occasions, says that it consisted of but 1,900 men. Sarrazin, Wellesley, and Napier (an authority by no means disposed to underrate French superiority and skill) all assert that it amounted to 5,000 men, of whom 560 were cavalry.

Such was the battle of Rolica, which lasted till four o'clock in the afternoon, and which dispelled the charm which had fascinated and overawed Europe, and had palsied the understanding of the weak and timid part of the English public and press, as to French invincibility and French superiority of military talent. Such was the issue of the first contest in which the "sepy gene-

ral" and the "shop-keeping and cotton-spinning army" of Buonaparte and his vapouring generals, Junôt, Soult, and Massena, with all the other opprobrious epithets which braggart and mortified and humbled French pride, has assailed the British army and its illustrious leader.\* Such was the prestige or earnest they had given of their ability for contending, in a series of successive combats and uninterrupted triumphs, from Rolica to Toulouse, from the heights of Lisbon to the walls of Paris, for the palm of victory, the glory of triumph, and the dispelling of the false halo of invincibility with which the brows of French warriors had been encircled by weak and misguided popular opinion, and ignorant and factious writers.

The British army pursued the foe to Villa Verde, on the road to Torres Vedras, where it bivouacked during the night. Next day, the commander-in-chief learning that major-generals Anstruther and Acland's divisions, amounting to between 4,000 and 5,000 men, and which had sailed from Harwich in July, had joined the fleet of victuallers off Peniche, orders were issued to discontinue the pursuit, and the line of march was directed on Lourinham, to cover the disembarkation, as a large hostile force of cavalry was in that neighbourhood. On the 20th sir Arthur took up a position at Vimiera, a village situated near the sea-coast, in the valley of Maceira, and about nine miles distant from Torres Vedras; and sent forward a detachment to cover the disembarkation of the troops in the bay of Maceira.

An officer who visited the battle-field of Rolica, thirty-six years after the bloody tragedy had been enacted on its theatre, says there was not a symptom or a fragment remaining to indicate the event, except the tombstone over the grave of colonel Lake, which the officers of his regiment had dedicated to his memory, as a tribute of their esteem and respect. He adds, "In the now peaceful and smiling valley of Rolica, which once resounded with the crash and clangor of arms, the deafening roar of cannon, and the peals of musketry, the exulting sound of victory, the shriek of agony, and the groans of despair, nature was then in her most lovely garb—green

\* The English have been sneered at, not only by Buonaparte and his colleagues and satellites, in respect of their character as soldiers; they received the same compliment from Louis and Villeroy a century

before. Ships, their Gallic friends were of opinion, they might manage; but as to land-fighting, they were ciphers—mere "sea wolves," awkward and inexpert—impossible to contend with "the great nation."



fields of wheat and barley gracefully undulating under the influence of the morning breeze, now redolent of the perfume of the peach, the almond, and the orange blossom." The same is nearly the case with all the battle-fields of the Peninsular war.

The writer of this work witnessed the following scene:—On the countermarch of that part of the British army under the command of general Hill, which had occupied Madrid in observation of Soult, to the confines of Portugal, the ruined forts of Fort Napoleon and Ragusa, which had been dismantled but a few short months before, were overhung with wild weeds and grass; and the wallflower, the honeysuckle, and ivy, clung to the embrasures of Fort Napoleon, and nodded on the summit of the tower of Ragusa. The *avant fosse*, in which above 1,000 men had been buried under the ramparts, that had been thrown over them, was covered with grass and weeds, and no other indication of the mortality that had been immured there appeared, but a fleshless bone and a broken musket projecting here and there from the sod.

It would be unjust to the memory of the heroic dead, to close this chapter without a tribute to the bravery of colonel Lake,\* who fell during the engagement; he was one whom "the officers adored, the soldiers revered, and there were few who would not have laid down their lives for." Mr. Guthrie has given the following graphic and touching description of his death:—"A narrow, steep ravine seemed the only accessible part, and up this, Lake, without further hesitation, led his grenadiers, on horseback. The whole regiment followed with unexampled devotion and heroism, and gained the summit; but not without the loss of three hundred men in the desperate conflict, which took place almost hand-to-hand in the olive-grove half-way up the hill. Broken and overpowered by numbers, Lake fell, and his soldiers would have been driven down, if the 9th regiment had not rushed up with equal ardour, led by a no less gallant soldier, colonel Stewart. The two regiments formed on the crown of the hill, supported on their right by the 5th,

\* Colonel Lake was the second son of general Lake. His father's horse having been killed under him at the battle of Laswarree, during the Mahratta

war, his son, who was his aide-de-camp, while dismounting from his horse, for the purpose of transferring it to his father, was wounded

which had been opposed, and the French retired, finding that their right was by this time turned. Colonel Lake, on horseback, on the top of the hill, seemed to have a charmed life. One French officer, of the name of Bellegarde, said afterwards, that he fired seven shots at him. Once he seemed to stagger as if he was hit; but it was only at the seventh shot he fell. It is probable he was right, for he was wounded in the back of the neck slightly; but the ball which killed him passed quite through from side to side, beneath the arms: I think he must have fallen dead. The serjeant-major, Richards, seeing his colonel fall, stood over him, like another Ajax, until he himself fell wounded in thirteen places by shot and bayonet. I gave him some water in his dying moments, and his last words were, 'I should have died happy if our gallant colonel had been spared;' words that were reiterated by almost every wounded man."

Sir Arthur Wellesley, who, fearless himself, was ever the first to recognise bravery and merit in others, for the truly heroic mind soonest perceives and most appreciates heroism, wrote thus to the brother-in-law of the deceased officer:—"It may, at the moment, increase the regret of those who lose a near and dear relation, to learn that he deserved and enjoyed the respect and affection of the world at large, and particularly of the profession to which he belonged; but I am convinced, that however acute may be the sensations which it may at first occasion, it must in the end be satisfactory to the family of such a man as colonel Lake, to know that he was respected and loved by the whole army; and that he fell, alas! with many others, in the achievement of one of the most heroic actions that have been performed by the British army." Much has been said, in later days, about the *iron* nature of the hero of the Peninsula; but when we find him, almost with a woman's gentleness, thus comforting the surviving friends of the fallen, we may be sure that no share of that iron entered into the composition of his heart.

war, his son, who was his aide-de-camp, while dismounting from his horse, for the purpose of transferring it to his father, was wounded.



## BATTLE OF VIMIERO.

As soon as Anstruther and Acland's brigades had joined the British army, the commander-in-chief issued orders for the march of the troops at day-break on the following day (August 20th), with the requisite supply of ammunition and provisions for nine days; but being informed that sir Harry Burrard had arrived in Maceira Bay, to supersede him, he went on board the vessel in which that general had embarked, to report to him the plan of his future operations, and to apprise him that he had issued orders for the advance of the army on the following morning. He represented to him the advantage of acting on the offensive, the probability of his gaining, by a forced march with his advanced guard, Mafra, in the enemy's rear, and thus turning Torres Vedras; the nature of the ground the army had to traverse, which was well adapted to the projected movement, as it presented several strong positions perpendicular to the line by which the French army must advance to resist his flank march; and which, if possessed, the French line of march to Montechique must be intercepted; that from the broken nature of the ground, it was unfavourable to the movements of the cavalry, in which arm the enemy was strong; and, lastly, that while the French were advancing to Vimiero by the long, narrow defile of Torres Vedras, the English army would have turned that town, and have arrived in the neighbourhood of Lisbon before the enemy would be able to occupy, with advantage, the ground which would defend it; or if the enemy preferred that neighbourhood for the scene of action, a victory vigorously followed up, would prevent him from crossing the Tagus into the Alemtejo, and probably force him to an unconditional surrender. Sir Arthur also recommended the division (10,000 men) of sir John Moore, which had arrived in the Mondego, to be disembarked and marched on Santarem. But the man of etiquette and routine, insensible to those arguments, directed his now subordinate officer to countermand his orders for the forward movement against the enemy. Fortune, however, determined that the gallant and talented Wellesley should not be deprived of the laurels to which his

genius and spirit were entitled, Junôt's critical situation compelling him to determine on immediate action.

The British army was posted about a mile in front of the village, on a range of hills about a mile-and-a-half in extent. The centre of the British line was posted on a rugged isolated height, which rose in front of the village; the right rested on a mountain that swept in a half-circle from the village to the sea-coast; and the left, which was composed merely of a few pickets, occupied another rising ground extending from the opposite side of the village. The cavalry and artillery were posted in the valley behind the village. This position had been taken up temporarily.

Having made these arrangements, Sir Arthur Wellesley was about to retire to rest near midnight, on the 20th of August, when he was disturbed by a German officer of dragoons, who came hurriedly into the camp, and informed him that Junôt was advancing at the head of 20,000 men, in the hope of taking the British by surprise, and was then distant only one hour's march. Sir Arthur listened to this startling intelligence without betraying any emotion; let the enemy come when they would they would not find him sleeping or unprepared. He sent out patrols to warn the pickets to be vigilant, lost no time in making preparations to receive the enemy, and when the sun rose on the valley in which the village of Vimiero stands, and gilded the little rivulet Maceira, which murmurs by it, all his troops were under arms. "It may be remarked in passing," observes captain M. Sherer, "that no general ever received reports with such calm caution as sir Arthur Wellesley. Suddenly awaked, he would hear an alarming account from the front with a quiet—and to many a bustling intelligent officer—a provoking coolness, and turn again to his sleep as before. Few, if any, are the instances, during the war, of his putting the troops under arms by night, or disappointing them unnecessarily of one hour of repose."

About eight o'clock in the morning of the 21st, a cloud of dust arising over the hills, indicated the approach of the enemy; whose columns, which were partially con-



cealed by dark pine woods, were advancing in three divisions, under Delaborde, Loisson, and Kellermann, and his cavalry, consisting of 1,600 men, under Margaron. It appearing to be his design to turn the left of the English army, and attack it in rear, the brigades of Ferguson, Nightingale, Acland, and Bowes, were moved across the valley from the hill on the eastward of Vimiero, to the hills on the westward, to strengthen that part of the position; and thus a change of front was effected in the British army. A little before ten o'clock, A.M., Delaborde and Loisson's divisions advanced simultaneously to the attack of the position in front of the village, saluting the English with jeering epithets as they approached. They rushed forward with the characteristic impetuosity of French troops, and in full confidence of that success which attends men whose battles had hitherto always terminated in victory. No doubt, the disgrace they had just met with at Roliça, further stimulated them.

Delaborde's division, covered by a host of tirailleurs, had crowned the hill on the south-east of the village, on which the 50th regiment and the light troops were posted. To resist the impetuous onset, colonel Walker ordered the left wing of his regiment to stand fast, and throwing his right into companies of echelon, intending to form it into line at a right or obtuse angle (according to circumstances) on the left wing; but there not being time to complete the formation, part of the echelon companies poured in, at the distance of twenty paces, a shattering fire on the angle of the hostile column, and immediately the whole regiment rushing forward with lowered bayonets, and charging the hostile column in front and flank, forced the angle on the centre; and the column being also at the same moment attacked by Acland's brigade, was thrown into irremediable confusion, and driven down the height with great slaughter. In their flight, the French left a thousand of their men dead upon the ground, besides three hundred and fifty prisoners, and seven pieces of artillery. The flying Frenchmen were pursued for nearly two miles, when they were succoured by a reserve of horse; and many of the pursuers, overpowered by a superior force, fell victims

to their enthusiastic gallantry. The secondary column, led by general Brennier, which was to have supported Delaborde, became separately engaged with general Anstruther's brigade, and was beaten back with considerable loss. Sir Arthur, seeing the general hotly engaged, sent an aide-de-camp to tell him that a corps should be sent to his assistance; but that brave man instantly replied, "Sir, I am not pressed, and I want no assistance; I am beating the French, and am able to beat them wherever I find them."

The division under Loisson attacked the left of the British position, where the 36th, 40th, and 71st, were posted. After the interchange of several withering volleys, the British line rushing forward with levelled bayonets, overthrew the whole of the French front line, and driving the survivors with the utmost confusion down the steep, captured six guns. On this body a detachment of the 20th dragoons made a charge, but being overpowered by the reserved cavalry of the enemy, were compelled to retreat with considerable loss, among which was their gallant leader, lieutenant-colonel Taylor.\* Kellermann, with the reserve of grenadiers and light infantry, consisting of four battalions, now made a desperate attempt to retrieve the fortune of the day, by a vigorous attack on the extreme left of the British centre, which was posted in the vineyards near the church; recaptured the six guns which Fane's brigade had won. These troops, exhausted with their extraordinary exertions, being at the moment lying down in loose array, but suddenly starting on their feet, and being supported by the 43rd regiment, they charged their opponents, and not only recaptured the artillery, but drove their assailants down the hill in so great confusion, that Solignac's and Brennier's brigades fled in opposite directions. At twelve o'clock the firing ceased, and the enemy retreated in great disorder, being driven back in a southeasterly direction, by which movement the British were masters of the great road by Torres Vedras to the capital. Thus the discomfiture of all the attacks of the enemy was complete; but no army can be destroyed, however beaten, that has protection for its fugitives in a superior cavalry. Had two of the regiments of dragoons, then kept

\* General Kellermann was close to colonel Taylor, of the 20th dragoons, when he was killed. He spoke of him in high terms, and said that none but a truly brave man would have advanced against the French

as he did, unsupported by infantry. Kellermann, in admiration of his conduct, gave up the colonel's horse to the 20th dragoons.



idle in the barracks at home, been present, the march to Torres Vedras would have been made, and Lisbon been our own.

At this moment sir Harry Burrard, who had reached the field of battle in an early period of the contest, assumed the command, and issued orders for the army "to halt and pile arms;"\* deeming it too hazardous to pursue the defeated and discomfited foe. At the moment that this fatal and unpropitious order reached major-general Ferguson, he was pressing the broken and fleeing columns of Solignac's Brigade. Indignant at the folly and timidity of the order, he dispatched his aid-de-camp to inform the commander-in-chief that he had cut off Solignac's brigade from the rest of the French army, and that the whole brigade would be obliged to lay down their arms, if he was allowed to continue his movement in advance. To strengthen the representation, sir Arthur Wellesley accompanied the aid-de-camp to sir Harry Burrard, and again earnestly pressed the advantage of a forward movement, by which the position that Junôt, who had been joined during the action by 1,200 fresh troops, had taken on the heights of Mafra, would be forced, the strong defiles of Torres Vedras turned, and the passage to Lisbon opened. But "the antiquated tactitioner" was deaf to all entreaty and remonstrance, and thus marred the brilliant victory which had been achieved by his now subordinate officer. An ingenious writer, in his comments on this battle, has well said, that Napier's "veteran" effected for the beaten enemy a miraculous deliverance from a condition which they themselves considered inevitable destruction. The author of *The Reminiscences of the Peninsula*, tells us, that when sir Arthur heard the decision of sir Harry Burrard, he turned his horse's head, and, with a cold and contemptuous bitterness, said aloud to his aid-de-camp, "You may think about dinner, for there is nothing more for soldiers to do this day."

\* In the inquiry which took place before the board of commissioners respecting the Cintra convention, it appeared that it had been the opinion of all the general officers (except sir Harry Burrard, who alleged "his weighty reasons" to the contrary), who were present at the battle, that had the enemy been vigorously pursued, the French army would not have been able to cross the Tagus, and must consequently have submitted to an unconditional surrender. Colonel Torrens, in his examination before the board, said, that immediately after the defeat of the French right column, and during its precipitate retreat, sir Arthur Wellesley

Another writer informs us, that to indicate his feeling of disappointment at being deprived of the glorious results of his victory, he, with affected gaiety, said to another officer, who was expressing his regret at the dishonourable condition imposed on the army by the commander-in-chief, "Well, we have nothing more to do but go and shoot red-legged partridges;" a species of game in which Portugal abounds. His opinion of the injury which the imbecility and timid caution of his superior in command (who, to adopt the indignant and well-merited castigation of a military critic, was one of those antiquated tacticians, bigoted in old-world notions, if he had to cross a bridge, would have spent half the day in reconnoitring), in preventing the interception of the retreat of the enemy on the capital, by turning Torres Vedras, is also emphatically expressed and demonstrated in his communication of the details of the battle to his royal highness the duke of York. "The enemy would have been cut off," says the indignant hero, "from Torres Vedras, and we should have been at Lisbon before him; if, indeed, any French army had remained in Portugal. But sir Harry Burrard, who was at this time upon the ground, still thought it advisable not to move from Vimiero." In the same despatch sir Arthur speaks thus warmly in praise of the conduct of the men and officers who fought under his command at Vimiero—"I cannot say too much in favour of the troops; their gallantry and their discipline were equally conspicuous; and, I must add, that this is the only action that I have ever been in, in which everything passed as it was directed, and no mistake was made by any of the officers charged with its conduct."†

Nor was sir Arthur Wellesley the only person who disapproved of the timidity and impolicy of his superior in command. The whole British army was disgusted with his conduct. "Murmurs," says the marquis

rode up to sir Harry Burrard, and said, "Now, sir Harry, is your time to advance on the enemy; they are completely broken, and we may be in Lisbon in three days; a large body of our troops has not been in action. Let us move them from the right on the road to Torres Vedras; and I will follow the enemy with the left." To this, sir Harry Burrard replied, that "he thought a great deal had been done, very much to the credit of the troops; and that he did not think it advisable to do more, or to quit the ground in pursuit."

† See the *Wellington Despatches*, August the 22nd, 1808.



of Londonderry, in his *Narrative*, "might here and there be heard; all of them condemnatory of that excess of caution which had checked a victorious army in the midst of its career; while a thousand wishes were expressed, that the new chief's arrival had been delayed till the campaign, so prosperously begun, had been brought to a conclusion." "What a different result would the Portuguese campaign have exhibited," says the author of *The Victories of the British Armies*, "had these two old gentlemen (namely, sir Harry Burrard and sir Hew Dalrymple,) been left in a district command, and not have been allowed to check the career of victory which opened so glorious a promise."

The loss of the French was about 3,000 in killed and wounded; that of the English, 175 killed, 584 wounded, and 51 missing. The enemy left 13 guns, several hundred prisoners, and a large quantity of ammunition in the hands of the victors. The amount of the French force in the action was 14,000 infantry, and 1,600 cavalry, with 23 guns; that of the English amounted to near 16,000 men, including 713 cavalry, of which last mentioned force only 180 were British, and 18 guns; but not more than one-half of the British force was engaged, the whole of the right of the army, consisting of the reserve of the 1st and 5th brigades, and the Portuguese, had not been brought into action, having been posted much nearer Torres Vedras than the left of the French was during the action. Thus a second time had the vainly deemed invincible legions of France, after efforts the most resolute and heroic, been fairly and signally beaten. The charm which had palsied the hearts and arms of all Europe had been now doubly broken by the gallant sons of hated England.

To the eternal disgrace of the French, be it said, that in their retreat over the field of battle, they stabbed and mutilated the wounded who lay in the course of their flight. This act of demoniac ferocity was more than once (particularly at the battle of Albuera) practised by them during the Peninsular war. At the battle of Waterloo, there is reason to suppose that they massacred the greater part of the prisoners who fell into their hands. Major Hodges, and the other captured officers of the 15th hussars, were seen alive in the possession of the French cuirassiers; but not one of those gentlemen was found alive at the close of

the battle. Sir Walter Scott has made the following admirable reflections on the conduct of the French:—"In the pursuit by the Prussians, after the battle of Waterloo, the fleeing French experienced little mercy; and, indeed, they had forfeited all claim to it; for their cruelty towards the Prussians taken on the 16th, and towards the British wounded and prisoners made during the battle of the 18th, was such as to exclude them from the benefit of the ordinary rules of war. Their lancers, in particular, rode over the field during the action, dispatching with their weapons the wounded English, with the most inveterate rancour; and many of the officers who have recovered from the wounds they received on that glorious day, sustained the greatest danger and most lasting inconvenience from such as were inflicted by those savages, when they were in no condition to offend others or defend themselves. The "Quoi! tu n'ès pas mort, Coquin?" of the spearman was usually accompanied with a thrust of the lance, dealt with an inveteracy which gives great countenance to the general opinion, that their orders were to give no quarter. Even the British officers who were carried before Buonaparte, although civilly treated while he spoke to them, and dismissed with assurances that they should have surgical and proper attendance, were no sooner out of his presence than they were stripped, beaten, and abused. Most of the prisoners that the French took from our light cavalry were put to death in cold blood, or owed their safety to concealment or a speedy escape. In short, it seemed as if the French army, when they commenced this desperate game, had, like buccaniers setting forth on a cruise, renounced the common rules of war, and bonds of social amity, and become ambitious of distinguishing themselves as enemies to the human species."

The late poet-laureate, Southey, relates the following interesting incidents, which may be not unjustly placed in contrast with the description just quoted of the barbarous conduct of the French troops, and which deserve to be recorded as striking episodes of this brilliant battle:—"General Solignac was severely wounded; general Brennier wounded and left on the field. He was in danger of being put to death by those into whose hands he had fallen, when a Highlander, by name Mackay, who was a corporal in the 71st, came up and rescued him. The French general, in gratitude for his



preservation, offered him his watch and purse; but Mackay refused to accept them. When he had delivered his prisoner in safety to colonel Pack, the French general could not help saying, 'What sort of man is this? He has done me the greatest service, and yet refuses to take the only reward which I can present offer him!' Brennier no doubt contrasted this with the conduct of his countrymen, in whose rapacity and cruelties it appears by the testimony of the Portuguese, that he had no share; when, therefore, colonel Pack replied, 'We are British soldiers, sir, and not plunderers,' he must have deeply felt the disgrace which had been brought upon the French character. Mackay was immediately made a sergeant by sir Arthur Wellesley's express desire; and the Highland Society, at their next meeting, voted him a gold medal, with a suitable device and inscription. The piper to the grenadier company of the same regiment, Stewart was his name, received, early in the action, a dangerous wound in the thigh; he would not, however, be carried off the field, but, sitting down where his comrades might hear him, he continued playing warlike airs till the end of the engagement.\* A handsome stand of Highland pipes, with an inscription commemorating the manner in which he had deserved the donation, was voted him by the Highland Society."

The author of the *History of the War in the Peninsula*, has found cause for much hypercritical, if not unfair and unsound remark, on sir Arthur Wellesley's brilliant victories of Roliça and Vimiero. The English general's position and disposition of the troops at Vimiero, were not those of choice but of necessity, for the purpose of covering the disembarkation of the reinforcements on the coast. Confiding in his own talent and the indomitable courage of his troops, he was confident of victory. The position he assumed between the horns of the Coa, when assailed by Marmont's formidable host, was of the same character as that of Vimiero, as was also that at the battle of Assaye; and in each case the British chief was eminently successful.

A distinguished French military writer, in the course of his unjust and inapplicable criticisms on the duke of Wellington's victories, and the absence of immediate and

vigorous pursuit which occasionally attended them (the non-execution of which was in all cases his deficiency of cavalry), has quoted the following satire on English generals, given in that very clever work, *Advice to the Officers of the British Army*. It must be acknowledged, that it has been sometimes not inapplicable in British military operations:—"Nothing is so commendable as generosity to an enemy. To pursue him vigorously after a victory, would be taking advantage of his distress. It is enough to show that you can beat him whenever you think proper. You should always act openly and candidly with both friends and enemies. You should be cautious, therefore, never to steal a march, or lay in ambush. You should never attack the enemy during the night. Recollect what Hector said when he went to fight with Ajax—'Heaven light us, and combat against us.' Should the enemy retreat, let him have the start of you several days, in order to show him that you can surprise him whenever you please. Who knows if so generous a proceeding will not induce him to halt? After he has succeeded in retreating to a place of safety, you may then go in pursuit of him with your whole army. Never promote an intelligent officer; a hearty boon companion is all that is necessary to execute your orders. Any officer who has a grain of knowledge beyond the common run, you should look on as your personal enemy, for you may depend on it, that he is laughing in his sleeve both at you and your manœuvres."

"The antiquated do-nothing tactitioner" was not doomed to enjoy his unenviable command, or to endure the odium and execration of every man of sense and spirit in the British army long. He was superseded by sir Hew Dalrymple, an officer of the same cautious school, though certainly not possessing the same amount of dulness and obstinacy. Sir Hew had been selected for the command on account of the activity and judgment he had exhibited in the south of Spain. Lord Castlereagh, then secretary for the war department, had addressed a private letter to him, strongly recommending sir Arthur Wellesley to his confidence, and trusting that sir Hew would select him for any service which required great prudence and temper, combined with much military experience. Sir Hew exhibited considerable delicacy of feeling, and left sir Arthur to carry out his own views;

\* "Weel, my braw lads, I can gang nae farther wi' ye a fighting; but Deil ha'e my soul if ye sal want music," were his words.



after receiving a vague account of the battle of Rolica, he sent to sir Arthur, that though he wished to be informed of his proceedings, he did not mean to interfere with his command. On the return of his messenger, sir Hew learned the result of the battle, and that sir Arthur Wellesley had been superseded in the command by sir Harry Burrard. No longer restrained by the feeling of delicacy that had hitherto withheld him, sir Hew landed on the morning of the 22nd of August, and immediately assumed the command. Thus the British army had the opportunity of witnessing the singular anomaly of having three commanders-in-chief in the short space of twenty-four hours.

Sir Arthur Wellesley again urged the

policy of an immediate pursuit of the enemy, but the new commander-in-chief was as much disinclined as his predecessor had been to a measure which he considered a hazardous operation. Like sir Harry Burrard, he thought that sir Arthur had been guilty of rashness, which, although it had led to success, would, if it had failed, have terminated in complete ruin. The old and the new schools of warfare were brought into collision, and time was soon to decide between them. While, in a too rigid adherence to the principles of prudence, the aged commanders thought sir Arthur rash, the voice of the whole English nation was soon raised to stigmatize them for the exercise of a caution which narrowly escaped being branded as dishonour.

#### THE CONVENTION OF CINTRA.

ON the afternoon of the 22nd, an alarm was given in the British camp; the tramp of horses was heard approaching, and it was supposed that the French were advancing to renew the conflict; orders were given to fall in, and the troops were speedily under arms. The alarm was, however, an unnecessary one; it was caused by a body of cavalry who approached under general Kellerman, bearing a flag of truce. Presenting himself at the outposts of the English army, he demanded an interview with the commander-in-chief. When admitted into the presence of sir Hew Dalrymple, he proposed a suspension of arms, and the entering into a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French. This arrangement was agreed to, and the British were now to lose by the pen, the glory which had been gained by the sword. Though defeated in arms, the French were successful in diplomacy, and succeeded in obtaining terms so favourable, that they excited the universal indignation and disgust of the English nation. In the course of the day the basis of a definitive agreement was arranged, the chief stipulations of which were as follows:—

I.—That a suspension should immediately take place, with a view to negotiate a con-

vention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army.

II.—That a day should be appointed by the generals-in-chief of the two armies, and the commander of the British fleet at the entrance of the Tagus, for the negotiation and conclusion of the proposed convention.

III.—That the river Sizandra should form the line of demarcation between the armies.

IV.—That the British commander-in-chief should undertake to include the Portuguese armies in this suspension; and that for them the line of demarcation should extend from Leiria to Thomar.

V.—That the French should not, in any case, be considered prisoners of war; and that all the individuals composing the army *should be transported to France, with their arms, baggage, and the whole of their private property, from which nothing should be excepted.*

VI.—That no individual should be called to account for his political conduct; that property should be respected; and that all who were desirous to quit the kingdom, should be suffered to do so unmolested.

VII.—That the port of Lisbon should be recognised as neutral for the Russian fleet; and that the principles of maritime law,



in respect to the privileges of neutral ports, should be strictly observed by the British squadron.

VIII.—That the horses of the cavalry, and the artillery of French calibre, should be transported to France with the army.

IX.—That the suspension of arms should not be broken, on either side, without forty-eight hours' previous notice.

An additional article stipulated that the French garrisons and fortresses should be included in the convention, in case they should not have capitulated before the 25th of August.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, as might be anticipated, disapproved of the terms of this convention, particularly of the fifth article, which secured to the French the plunder they had taken from the Portuguese. He termed it "an extraordinary paper," and, with a blunt but noble honesty, proposed that an article should be introduced for the purpose of "making the French generals disgorge the church plate they had stolen." General Kellermann, however, urged that the introduction of such a stipulation would be a reproach to the French armies, and exceedingly unpleasant to its commander, and the polite sir Hew Dalrymple, and his colleague, sir Harry Burrard, were pleased to respect this assumed delicacy.

As sir Arthur had foretold, sir Charles Cotton, the commander of the English fleet in the Tagus, refused to subscribe to the article stipulating for the neutrality of the port of Lisbon in behalf of the Russian fleet stationed there. This, and other circumstances, particularly the subtilty and evasion of the French, occasioned a new arrangement of the convention, which was confided to the management of colonel Murray, the quarter-master-general, who was invested with full powers to conclude a definitive treaty on a fresh basis. That treaty consisted of twenty articles, and stipulated, that the French army, with all the cavalry, artillery of French calibre, arms, baggage, and private property of every description, with sixty rounds of ammunition, should be conveyed in English ships to La Rochelle and the other ports between Rochefort and L'Orient, in France, at the expense of the English government. That treaty, which is termed "The Convention of Cintra," was concluded at Lisbon on the 30th of the month, and soon after ratified. It received the misnomer of *Cintra* from the circumstance of sir Hew Dalrymple forwarding the

document to the secretary of state from Cintra. Cintra, which stands as a green oasis in the midst of a barren wilderness, is a village situated about thirty miles from Lisbon, and, on account of the mildness of its climate, is the resort of the wealthy inhabitants of that city. This lovely spot presents a picture of the magnificence of nature unequalled on the face of the earth, and when lighted up by the heavenly sun of Portugal, which animates everything on which it shines, is ravishingly beautiful. The scenery, as you approach it, is exceedingly picturesque. Waving oak and cork-tree forests, clear gurgling brooks, gushing fountains, groves teeming with golden fruit, cool and fragrant retreats, with convents and churches that appear among the profuse foliage, render it one of the most captivating scenes that the eye can love to dwell upon. When approached by night, at the time the quintas or country houses are lighted up, it presents a truly fairy scene. It is moreover a region of contrasts and scenic paradoxes. The abrupt transitions of scenery, and the alternations of rich landscape with barrenness and desolation—the darkness of the deep and profound ravines, and the lovely sunny slopes—the vast conical splintered rocks and the romantic cascades—the immeasurable expanse of the Atlantic to be seen from the summit of the mountain rising above the village—and the lovely dales (among which the delightful valley of Collares, which opens to the sea, stands pre-eminent), and the dark-bosomed glens beneath, render it one of the most enchanting and extraordinary localities on the surface of the globe—one on which the mind loves to dwell, and recal to recollection at the most distant period of life.

On the 24th, the British army moved by its left on Ramalhal, where sir Hew Dalrymple established his head-quarters. Here he was visited by the temporising Dom Bernardin Freire, "who concluding that the fighting must be all over now, came boldly to the front," and complained that he had not been consulted in the concoction of the treaty. On the 25th, sir John Moore disembarked his force at Maceira Bay, and formed a junction with the army under sir Hew Dalrymple at Ramalhal.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, aware of French subtilty and finesse, and perceiving an inclination on the part of Junôt to evade the conditions of the treaty, strenuously urged, in a conference held with sir Hew Dalrym-



ple and sir John Moore, on the morning of the 27th, the necessity of breaking off the negotiation, and giving the prescribed notice of the cessation of the truce prior to the resumption of hostilities. But his suggestions were overruled.

The conditions of the treaty not being carried into execution on the expiration of the period fixed for the resumption of hostilities, the forces which had been disembarked under the command of sir John Moore, and two brigades of the army present at the battle of Vimiero being left at head-quarters at Ramalhal, the advanced guard of the British army pushed on the 29th beyond Torres Vedras; and sir Arthur Wellesley, early on the morning of the 31st, marched his corps by the left to Sobral, in front of the enemy's position of Cabeça de Montechique; where he received a message, that the treaty on its new basis had been acceded to by colonel Murray. The English army immediately advanced towards Lisbon, and reached Oyeras on the 2nd of September. On the 9th, sir John Hope took possession of the castle of Belem, and on the 11th of the citadel of Lisbon. During the progress of these transactions, the Portuguese, encouraged by the presence and success of the English army, indicated a strong insurrectionary spirit, and a determination to gratify their thirst for vengeance against their rapacious and cruel oppressors. They resorted to the most sanguinary retaliation against the stragglers of the French army. A band of peasantry, and other rabble of the population of the metropolis, headed by the juiz de foro, or magistrate, Monteiro Mor, attacked the French patrols occupying the south bank of the Tagus, but were prevented from putting their designs into execution, only by Junôt's threat of exemplary vengeance, and of setting fire to the city. Those misguided men had been incited to the commission of these excesses by the intrigues and the representation of the bishop of Oporto and Freire, that their country had been treated as a conquered province in the convention, the junta of Oporto and themselves not having been parties to it.

The time for the execution of the convention being now at hand, the first division of

the French forces, with Junôt, his staff, and immense pillage, embarked on board the transports on the 13th, under the protection of the second and third divisions. On the following day, sir John Hope assumed the government of the capital, and immediately adopted measures for enforcing subordination among the population. The last division of the French sailed on the 30th, amidst the execrations of all classes of the people. The French garrisons of Elvas and Almeida\* were not embarked until the 6th of October; and that of La Lippe till the 25th of the same month, on account of the Spanish general Guluzzo, who, like his prototype Freire, now that "the fighting was over," putting on a "swashing martial outside," refused to acknowledge the convention, and had invested La Lippe, but respectfully bombarded it at so great a distance, that all the damage his martial ire did, "was knocking away the cornices and chimneys of the governor's house." The French commandant, colonel Girval, despising the threats and deeds of the bobadil besieger, was about to inflict the merited vengeance on him, when, it being understood that sir John Hope had advanced as far as Estremos to remove the doughty Spaniard from before the fort, that specimen of Spanish heroism desisted from his fell purpose, and retired. This same Guluzzo shortly after undertook to defend the left bank of the Tagus with 5,000 men, and for that purpose occupied a line of forty miles; but on the appearance of a trifling French force, quickly took to his heels.

The pillage of the French, both officers and men, had during their domination in Portugal been enormous; no species of property had been exempt from their rapacity. They had robbed the national museum and library, the public treasury, the arsenal, the churches and convents, and even the tombs, of every thing that was valuable and portable. Junôt's aid-de-camp was detected in packing up even the duke of Sussex's carriage for his master. They had melted the church plate into bars to prevent its identification. Their military chest contained three months' pay; and one regiment alone boasted that it was in possession of one hundred thousand crowns; all obtained by the robbery of

\* Almeida lies between the rivers Coa and Turones, which are tributaries of the Douro, and partially form the boundary, in this part of the Peninsula, between Spain and Portugal. Elvas is a strongly fortified frontier town, about twelve miles west of

Badajos, and 125 east of Lisbon. It is situated between two forts, Santa Lucia and La Lippe, which stand on distinct summits, commanding the town: both the forts and the barracks in the town are bomb-proof.



the people of Portugal. Junôt, the *quondam* or *ci-devant* corn-chandler, now "his excellency the duke of Abrantes," modestly demanded five ships (the Danish then in the harbour) to carry off his *private property*; among which were found fifty-three boxes of indigo. Their robbery and rapacity had been enormous; and so tenacious were they in their endeavours to retain their plunder, that the English commissioners, major-general Beresford and lieutenant-colonel lord Proby, who had been appointed to carry the convention into effect, declared "that the ingenuity of man could not devise means to defeat the cavil and dexterity of the French in the evasion of the treaty," and that "their conduct throughout the whole affair was marked by the most shameful disregard of honour and probity."

Having entirely delivered Portugal from French dominion and usurpation, sir Arthur Wellesley, as he expresses himself in a letter to the secretary for foreign affairs, feeling himself dissatisfied with the military and public measures of the commander-in-chief (sir Hew Dalrymple), and with his treatment of himself, determining to return home, devoted his attention to the affairs of the army, so that he might deliver over his command to his successor in as efficient a manner as possible. In the interim, he drew up documents for the guidance and direction of sir John Moore; the suggestions in which, while they display his sound judgment and comprehensive mind, are a proof of his disinterested patriotism. Having accomplished these purposes, he applied to the commander-in-chief for permission to return to England, and resigning his command, repaired to Lisbon, from which port he sailed on the 20th of September.

\* The following letter expresses this testimonial of grateful admiration:—

"Camp at St. Antonio de Fayal,  
September, 6, 1808.

"SIR,—The commanding officers of corps and field-officers, who have had the honour of serving in the army under your command, anxiously desirous of expressing the high opinion they entertain of the order, activity, and judgment with which the whole of that force was so ably and successfully directed, from the time of the landing, to the termination of your command in the action of Vimiero, request you will accept from them a piece of plate, as a testimony of that sincere esteem and respect with which your talents and conduct have so justly inspired.

"To the Rt. Hon. Lieut. Gen.  
"Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., &c."

The above was signed by all the commanding

Sir Arthur had previously thus expressed his feelings in a letter to viscount Castlereagh, the secretary of the war department:—"It is quite impossible for me to continue any longer with this army; and I wish, therefore, that you would allow me to return home and resume the duties of my office, if I should still be in office, and it is convenient to the government that I should retain it; or if not, that I should remain upon the staff in England; or, if that should not be practicable, that I should remain without employment. You will hear from others of the various causes which I must have for being dissatisfied, not only with the military and other public measures of the commander-in-chief, but with his treatment of myself. I am convinced it is better for him, for the army, and for me, that I should go away; and the sooner I go the better." In another letter to the viscount, sir Arthur had thus decidedly expressed the pain he felt in consequence of the obstinacy or jealousy, or both, of his superior officers. "I assure you, my dear lord, matters are not prospering here; and I feel an earnest desire to quit the army. I have been too successful with this army, ever to serve with it in a subordinate position, and with satisfaction to the person who shall command it." Prior to his departure, the generals who had been under his late command in Portugal, apprised him, that "as a proof of their high esteem and respect for him, and their satisfaction of their good fortune to have served under his command," they had voted him a service of plate of £1,000 value; which vote the field-officers increased to £2,000.\*

When the news of the convention of Cintra reached England, "a nation to which military glory has ever been dear," officers of corps and field-officers who had served under the duke in this campaign, and was accompanied by the following:—

"Camp at St. Anna, near Lisbon.  
September 18th, 1801.

"SIR,—It has happily fallen to my lot, as the oldest field-officer in your army, to have the honour of presenting the enclosed address from the commanding officers of corps and field-officers serving in it: we have but one sentiment on the occasion—admiration of your talents, and confidence in your abilities.

"JAMES KEMMIS,  
Lieut.-Col. 40th, and Colonel.

"To the Rt. Hon.  
"Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., &c."

The subjoined is the characteristic reply:—

"SIR,—I have had the honour of receiving your letter of this day's date, in which you have transmitted



as the speaker of the house of commons observed in his communication of the vote of thanks of the house to sir Arthur, for his services in Portugal, a burst of national indignation broke forth. Petitions to the throne and both houses of parliament were presented from all parts of the kingdom, calling for inquiry into the reasons for entering into so disgraceful a convention, "after two signal victories." "The newspapers," says Southey, "joined in one cry of wonder and abhorrence. Some refused to disgrace their pages by inserting the treaty; others surrounded it with black broad lines, putting their journals in mourning for the dismal intelligence it contained; some headed the page with a representation of three gibbets, and a general suspended from each." It was even debated whether this disgraceful convention should not be broken by the English. The feeling of the country upon this point is thus clearly and powerfully expressed by the same writer:—"What could be done? There were not wanting writers who called upon government to annul the convention. The Romans, they said, would have done so, and have delivered up the generals who signed it, bound and haltered, to the enemies' discretion. Would it be argued, that to break the treaty would be to break our faith towards the enemy? Why, it was so framed, that it could not be fulfilled without breaking our faith towards each and all of our allies! We were the allies of Portugal; and it was a breach of faith towards Portugal, to transport this army of thieves, ravishers, and murderers, out of the country in which they had perpetrated their crimes, and from which they had no other possible means of escape. We were the allies of Spain; and it was a breach of faith towards Spain, if four-and-twenty thousand French troops, cut off from all succour and all retreat, should be conveyed, under the British flag, into their own country, with arms and baggage, that they might join the

an address from the officers commanding corps and the field-officers who served under my command in the late operations in Portugal.

"I have had more than one occasion of expressing the satisfaction I had derived, from the state of discipline and order in which the several corps were kept throughout the service in which we were employed, and my sense of the assistance I had derived from the officers belonging to the different parts of the army. These advantages rendered our operations easy and certain; and we were enabled

forces with which Buonaparte was preparing to march against the Spaniards. We were the allies of Sweden; and it was a breach of faith towards Sweden, to carry Russian sailors through the Swedish fleet, for the purpose of manning Russian ships against the Swedes. Were we then to annul this treaty with our enemies, or to betray our friends?—for to this alternative our triumvirate of generals had reduced us! No law of nations could justify them in making such stipulations; no law of nations, therefore, could justify us in performing them. But the French, it was urged, had already fulfilled their part of the convention; they had evacuated the fortified towns, and admitted us into Lisbon. Thus we had already reaped the advantages, and were, in honour, bound to carry into effect the remainder of the treaty, which was advantageous to them. In whatever way we acted, some loss of honour was inevitable; but it was less disgraceful to break the terms than to fulfil them; better that the French should reproach us, than that they should compliment us upon a fidelity which enabled them to injure our allies. The blow, it was affirmed, might have gone far towards deciding the fate of Europe. France had lost one army in Andalusia, and how deeply Buonaparte felt the loss, was shown by the anxiety with which he concealed it from the French people. What might not have been the effect of the destruction of a second and larger army, following so close upon that of the former! How would it have encouraged the Portuguese, given new animation to the Spaniards, and raised the hope and the courage of those various states who were suffering under the tyrant's yoke."\*

To appease the mind of the public, sir Hew Dalrymple and sir Harry Burrard were recalled home, and a board of inquiry, consisting of four generals and three lieutenant-generals, was commissioned to meet at the Royal College, Chelsea, to

meet the enemy on fair terms in the field of battle.

"I beg you to convey to the field-officers of the army, the assurance that I shall not lose the recollection of their services; that I am fully sensible of their kindness towards me; and that I value highly their good opinion.

"I have the honour to be, Sir,

"Your most obedient, humble servant,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

"Colonel Kemmis, 40th Regt."

\* *History of the Peninsular War.*



investigate the affair. Their sittings continued from November 14th, to December 27th, 1808. Four of the members approved of the convention, and three disapproved of it. The direct censure fell solely on sir Hew Dalrymple; sir Arthur Wellesley and sir Harry Burrard received an indirect reproof. But the conqueror of Roliça and Vimiero received his just and appropriate sentence in the vote of thanks of the house of commons, which he acknowledged in the following brief but manly speech:—"Mr. Speaker, I beg leave to express my acknowledgments to the house for the high honour which they have conferred upon me, by the notice which they have taken, and the approbation they have conveyed, of my conduct during the time I commanded his majesty's troops in Portugal. No man can value more highly than I do the honourable distinction which has been conferred upon me—a distinction which it is in the power of a free people alone to bestow, and which it is the peculiar advantage of the officers and soldiers in the service of his majesty to have held out to them as the object of their ambition, and to receive as the reward of their services. I beg leave to return to you,

sir, my thanks for the handsome terms in which your kindness—I ought to say your partiality—for me, has induced you to convey the approbation of the house."

When the thanks of the house of commons were awarded to sir Arthur Wellesley, it was universally felt by the king, court, parliament, and people, that he thoroughly deserved them, and that if his advice had been followed, the convention would never have taken place, and that the French must have surrendered unconditionally. The chief censure fell, for the time, upon sir Hew Dalrymple, but the nation saw that the greatest error had been committed by the government in England, in not permitting the general who had planned the campaign, and commenced it so successfully, to carry it to a brilliant close.\*

On the termination of the proceedings of the court of inquiry, sir Arthur Wellesley again assumed the execution of his duties as chief secretary for Ireland; but he shortly after returned to England, and resumed his seat in the house of commons; where he took an active part in the inquiry into the duke of York's transactions with Mrs. Clarke, relative to the affairs of the army.

#### SIR JOHN MOORE'S CAMPAIGN IN SPAIN, AND BATTLE OF CORUNNA.

FOR the purpose of preserving the concatenation of the events connected with THE PENINSULAR WAR, a brief sketch of the campaign in Spain of that much traduced and ill-requited officer, sir John Moore, is necessary.

On the evacuation of Portugal by the French, sir Hew Dalrymple had prepared to prosecute the war in Spain; and for this purpose the British army was cantoned in the Alemejo, along the road to Badajos, preparatory to its crossing the frontier, for

\* *Official Report of the English Force commanded by Sir Arthur Wellesley at the battle of Vimiero, and in Portugal.*—Under GENERAL SPENCER:—Artillery, 269; royal staff corps, 48; 6th regiment, 1st battalion, 1,020; 29th regiment, 863; 32nd regiment, 941; 50th regiment, 1,019; 82nd regiment, 991: total, 5,151. Under SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY:—5th regiment, 1st battalion, 990; 9th regiment, 833; 38th regiment, 957; 40th regiment, 843; 60th regiment, 936; 71st regiment, 903; 91st regiment, 917; 95th

the purpose of pressing on the flank and rear of the enemy's advance on Madrid, and turning his position on the Ebro; but sir Hew being recalled to appear before the Board of Inquiry in London, respecting the Cintra convention, the command of the forces fortunately devolved on sir John Moore.

The British ministry, influenced by the reports of their military agents, who, mistaking the vain boasts and arrogant pretensions of the Spaniards for energy and

regiment, four companies, 400; royal veteran battalion, 737; 36th regiment, 1st battalion, 647; 45th regiment, 599: total, 8,762. A detachment of 20th light dragoons, about 300. Under GENERAL ANSTRUTHER:—9th regiment, 2nd battalion, 675; 43rd regiment, 861; 52nd regiment, 858; 97th regiment, 769: total, 3,163. Under GENERAL ACLAND:—Queen's regiment, 913; 20th regiment, 689; 95th regiment, five companies, 180: total, 1,672.



courage—possibly the tremendous announcement they saw emblazoned on glaring ribbons, round the hats, of “Los valorosos Spagnuolos,” “vencir o morir por Fernando” (the valorous Spaniards—conquer or die for Ferdinand), might have influenced their judgments,—had represented the Spaniards as “a nation possessing unparalleled energy,” determined to foster and aid the national feeling. They accordingly dispatched a force of 10,000 men under general Baird, to Corunna, and instructed sir John Moore to assemble all the disposable British troops (which had been increased by fresh contingents under major-generals Sherbrooke and Hill) in Portugal, to the amount of 20,000 men, and to advance on Valladolid, where Baird was ordered to effect a junction with the main body of the army. Baird’s division reached Corunna on the 13th of October, 1808; but the main body of the army, on account of the defective state of the magazines, and the poverty of the military chest,\* was not put into motion from Lisbon† till the 18th of the month.

As the direct road on the line of route to Salamanca, was represented by the Spanish authorities to be impracticable for the passage of artillery, sir John Moore determined to adopt two distinct routes of march, a determination adopted also on account of the scantiness of subsistence to be found in that exhausted part of the country over which the line of march lay. Sir John Hope, with a protecting brigade of 3,000 infantry and hussars, marched with the artillery, by Elvas, Badajos, Truxillo, and Talavera, with orders to move by Talavera de la Reyna, and join the main body of

\* As only £25,000 were granted for this purpose, sir John Moore was compelled to borrow of Frere, the English plenipotentiary to the Spanish government, some of the two millions of dollars with which he had been entrusted for the use of the Spanish patriots; and also to send agents to Madrid, and other places for the same purpose. “Such was the policy,” exclaims the author of the *History of the Peninsular War*, “of the British ministry, that they supplied the Spaniards with gold, and left the English army to get it back in loans.”

† Lisbon is situated about nine miles above the bar or entrance of the river Tagus. It is built on three hills, and rises in the form of an amphitheatre from the bank of the river. That section of it which stands on the most westerly of the hills, has received the name of Buenos Ayres, from the comparative purity of its air. It is unfortified and open on all sides like London; the only military defence being a small castle in the midst of the city, and some batteries and strong forts on each of the banks of the river; as St. Julien, St. Antonio, Cascaes, and Belem, on the northern bank; and Bugio on the

the English army at Salamanca, by the royal road which traverses the pass of the Guadarama mountains. The main body, under the commander-in-chief, advanced in three columns on Ciudad Rodrigo, crossed the frontier of Spain on the 11th of November, and the head of the columns entered Salamanca on the 13th of the month. Before the troops began their march, the commander-in-chief, in his general orders, declared his determination to show no mercy to plunderers or marauders—“in other words, to thieves and villains;” and to show that he was in earnest in his intentions, he punished a marauder on the march with death, at Almeida.

As from deficiency of transport and supplies (no magazines having been formed on the line of march), the troops were obliged to march in small and successive divisions, the whole of the main body of the army was not concentrated in that city till the 23rd. On the 26th the head of Baird’s division was at Astorga, the rear beyond Lugo; while the head of Hope’s division, which for want of money to provide the means of transport, was obliged to move in six subdivisions, each being a day’s march behind the other, was at the Escorial, and the rear at Talavera. Hope, on the 4th of December, having reached Alba de Tormes, which is distant about twelve miles from Salamanca, sir John Moore dispatched a detachment to assist in covering his march into Salamanca.

On the 27th of November sir John Hope was at the southern entrance of the Guadarama pass of the Carpenteras; which marshal Lefebvre, with the fourth *corps d’armée*,

southern. The banks of the river present almost one continuous line of buildings, from fort St. Julien, which is near the bar, to the capital. The number of palaces, convents, and churches (all which are without domes or spires, except the Estrella convent),—the dazzling whiteness of the houses, the airy appearance of the windows and balconies, the tasteful arrangement of plants, flowers, and shrubs on the roofs and terraces, with the luxuriant appearance of the orange and lemon groves teeming with their golden fruit—the beautiful quintas and their gardens—and the olive, cypress, and judas trees in the surrounding country, present, when the sun shines on them, to the view of the observer, as he approaches the capital on his voyage up the Tagus, one of the most pleasing and delightful prospects that any city in the whole world affords. But though all is majestic and magnificent without, all is indescribable filth and stench within. The river in front of the city assumes a bay, or sea-like appearance, being five or six miles in breadth, and capable of containing all the fleets of Europe.



was in march to occupy, in order to intercept the retreat of the English army on Lisbon, a movement which Napoleon fancied sir John Moore was then executing. The circuitous and impolitic detour which had been imposed on Hope's division, in consequence of the false and insidious information of one Longa, a Spaniard, that the route by Rodrigo was impassable for artillery, occasioned the loss of more than one month in the operations of the English army, and imposed an additional march of above 150 miles on Hope's division, encumbered, too, as it was, with stores, artillery, &c. That that detour was unnecessary, is evident from the fact that Junôt, in a far more inclement season, when he invaded Portugal, had advanced, with his artillery, by the route of Alcantara, Castel Branco, and Abrantes; and that Loisson had frequently moved his artillery and cavalry between Lisbon and Almeida. And of the possibility of this passage, sir John Moore, in the course of his march, made the mortifying discovery, by personal observation, that his artillery could have accomplished the march by Almeida. "But," as the author of the *Military Memoirs of Wellington*, justly observes, "it is one of the trials of an English general, that a good military survey of the intended theatre of war is never to be found in or furnished from any public office at home. England has no department or bureau to help a general in these matters; he must know everything, and do everything, unassisted; even without money, he must provide food and contentment, and see both the troops and the followers of his army in long arrear." To these disadvantages, sir John Moore was, in an especial manner, exposed. He was thrown into the heart of Spain, with no armies to support him, no generals or government with whom to concert measures, no intelligence on which he could rely; without magazines, and without money in the military chest to form them.

Nor was the false and insidious information of Longa the only instance of Spanish treachery and deceit that occurred during sir John Moore's arduous campaign. Morla, the Spanish secretary of war, proposed to sir John Hope, that the division under his command should march in ten subdivisions through Madrid, in as many successive days; and to further his delusive projects, which he had concocted with Napoleon Buonaparte, for the purpose of deceiving

the division commanded by Hope by dribbles into the clutches of that intriguer, he concealed from Mr. Stuart, the English agent at Madrid, the calamitous condition of the Spanish armies, and asserted that there was no hostile force capable of preventing the junction of Hope's division with the main body of the English army under the command of sir John Moore. In this design he was aided, unwillingly, by Frere, the English plenipotentiary, "a person," to adopt Napier's phraseology, "of some scholastic attainments, but who was ill qualified for the duties" he had undertaken. That person, in his correspondence with sir John Moore, represented that the enthusiasm of the Spaniards was unbounded, and that the whole country, from the Pyrenees to the capital, was in arms. Morla, also, in his communications with the English commander-in-chief, asserted that 25,000 men under Castaños, and 10,000 from the Samosierra, were marching in all haste on Madrid, where there were already 40,000 men in arms; though the traitor was at the time in communication with Buonaparte for the surrender of the city; and no longer than two days after Frere's communication to the commander-in-chief, that gentleman, with the junta, was fleeing headlong towards the frontiers of Portugal. Nor was the treachery of the one party, and the hallucination of the other, the whole of the mischief designed for sir John Moore. A few days after Frere's letter had reached him, two Spanish officers, by name Don Ventura Enolenta and Don Augustin Bueno, arrived at his head-quarters, and presented a letter from Gareo, the minister of war, pressing him to advance on Madrid (already in possession of the enemy!) and to give full credence to Frere's information. At the same time, Frere sent to the English general one *colonel* Charmilly, a French emigrant, in the British service, and denized in England, but in the interest of Morla and Buonaparte, to persuade him to advance on Madrid, and if he declined to do so, to require him to submit its propriety to the consideration of a council of officers in the army. Moore, penetrating the insidious designs of the emissary, and confronting him with colonel Graham (the late lord Lynedock), who had just arrived at head-quarters with intelligence of the disasters of the Spanish armies, ordered him out of his presence. In the course of his narrative of this transaction, the author of the *History*



of the Consulate and the Empire of France has the candour to say that the letter of Morla "was written on the 2nd of December, and the men (namely, Castelfranco and Morla) had determined to betray their country, and lead on the British army to its destruction."

On the 11th of December, a forward movement was made by the British army from Salamanca (the reason that it had been delayed to that period was for the purpose of allowing the flank divisions of Hope and Baird to approximate, simultaneously, the main body of the army), with the intention of marching on Valladolid, and then advancing into the heart of Spain, in order to present the means for the wrecks of the armies of Castaños, Blake, and Belvedere, to rally on the English army. The object of this movement, namely, the attack of Soult's *corps d'armée*, which kept open the communication between France and Madrid, would also have forced Buonaparte to retrograde to oppose the British, and have thus constituted a powerful diversion in favour of Madrid, in case it was not in the enemy's possession, and of the southern provinces, to enable them to rise and organize their forces. On the evening of the following day occurred the first hostile *rencontre* between the English and French armies. While the army was moving from Arevalo, brigadier-general Stewart surprised, with a squadron of the 18th hussars, a French post, consisting of fifty infantry, and thirty cavalry, at Rueda, and slew or took prisoners almost the whole of the party.

During the progress of the operations of the English army the affairs of Spain were in a very critical position. As the intrusive king Joseph had, on the surrender of Dupont's army, fled from Madrid (taking good care, however, in imitation of his brother's example, to carry off with him all the valuable property of the palace, and the jewels of the crown) to Vittoria, Buonaparte determined to remedy the errors and incapacity of his lieutenants by his own presence. Accordingly, the veterans of Jena, Austerlitz, and Friedland—soldiers whose drums had beat to victory on the banks of the Adige, the Rhine, and the Nile—were collected from the central states

of Europe, into one body; and a host of cavalry, and a long train of infantry, in all amounting to 330,000 men, were marched into Spain. Buonaparte following them, reached Bayonne on the 3rd of November, and was at Vittoria on the 8th of the same month.

Immediately on his arrival in that city, he proceeded to arrange the plan of his campaign; which was completed in two hours. Soult was directed to proceed to Briviesca, and, with the second *corp d'armée*, to attack the Spaniards, posted at Gamonal, under the count de Belvedere. Buonaparte followed with the imperial guards and the reserve.

The right wing of the Spanish army fled as soon as it was attacked, and the left followed its example, although not assailed; but the volunteers from the universities of Salamanca displayed that courage, as a high-minded scholar has justly said, "which might be looked for from men of their condition." They twice repulsed the French infantry, and, when attacked in flank by the enemy's cavalry, the whole battalion fell almost to a man upon the ground on which they had been drawn up, exhibiting one of those bright examples which history furnishes of the noble devotion and self-sacrifice with which literature, when connected with honourable descent and exalted feeling, inspires its votaries, when their energies are invoked in the defence of their native soil. In the battle of Cabeçon, July 12th, and in the subsequent battle of Rio Seco, the students who had volunteered from the universities of Segovia and Leon, exhibited a like splendid valour and noble patriotism, proving that those whom the love of their country had brought to the field could not be frightened from it.\*

The French cavalry pursued the scared fugitives, sabring them, without remorse or intermission, as long as any of the defenceless and unresisting unfortunates could be overtaken. The next day, November 10th, Blake (who had already been routed at Zornosa, on October 31st, as he had also been, in conjunction with Cuesta, at Rio Seco, on July 10th), was defeated with great loss; as he was also at Reynosa, on the 13th. On the 22nd, Vives and Reding

\* The conduct of the 500 Greek students, who, stimulated with the love of country and the inspiration of freedom, left their universities in Italy, Russia, and Germany, to enrol themselves in the sacred band "*hieros logos*," in the army of Ypsilanti, was no

less memorable in the battle of June, 1821, fought on the plains of Dragesghan; who, though deserted by their countrymen, resisted the attacks of the Turkish cavalry, ten times their number, until the whole had fallen side by side.



were overthrown at Cardaden; on the same day, Castaños and Palafox were routed at Tudela; and, on the 30th, the almost impregnable pass of the Samosierra was forced by a few squadrons of Polish lancers, though defended by 12,000 men (among whom were men of the "heroic" regiments, that had captured Dupont's army at Baylen), and that sixteen pieces of artillery, which were planted in the gorge of the pass, commanded and swept the road that led to it. On the 21st of December, Reding was defeated at Molino del Rey; on the 4th of the same month, Madrid had capitulated after a few days' fruitless resistance; and in the course of a few hours afterwards, the nobles and clergy, the corporations and tribunals, and above 30,000 of the inhabitants of Madrid, presented an address of congratulation to Napoleon, soliciting his brother Joseph to resume the sovereign power; and they attested their sincerity by "declaring their allegiance on the holy evangelists." Thus, in the brief period of six weeks, all was submission from the Pyrenees to the capital; though many of the arrogant and presumptuous pretenders to patriotism (among whom the junta of Toledo stood pre-eminent), declared that they would bury themselves under the ruins of their towns, rather than submit to the oppressor of their country. Indeed, so arrogant and presumptuous were many of those vapouring patriots, that the supreme junta of Madrid projected a military board for the regulation of the operations of their armies, and appointed Castaños president, his seat to be taken "when the enemy was driven across the Pyrenees."

When the army had reached Alaejos, (December 14th), sir John Moore, ascertaining, from an intercepted despatch of Berthier to Soult, that Madrid was in the possession of the French, and that Buonaparte was advancing, by forced marches, to intercept his supposed retreat of the English army, sent orders to Baird to fall back on Corunna; and, at the same time, he with the main body fell back on Toro; and, continuing his route on Villapondó and Valderas, reached Mayorga on December 19th, where a junction was effected with Baird's division. At this time the British army amounted to 23,583 men, of whom 2,278 were cavalry. The winter had now set in. The whole face of the country was covered with snow, and the weather very severe.

While in this position, lieutenant-general

lord Paget, determining to surprise the enemy's cavalry, under general Debelle, and which was posted at Sahagun, marched early in the morning of the 20th from Melgar Abaxo, with the 10th and 15th hussars; and when his force had advanced two-thirds of the way, he directed general Slade to follow the course of the Coa with the 10th, and to enter the town by that side; while he with the 15th advanced by a more circuitous route. By the time the 15th had reached its destination, it was daylight, and they found the enemy, in consequence of the information of the advance having been communicated by a patrol of cavalry which had observed the 15th, formed in an open plain ready to receive them; but instead of rushing forward to the attack, they stood *pied-ferme*, the whole line keeping up a fire of carbines on their assailants. The 15th, without a moment's hesitation, came down full speed upon the enemy, and completely overthrowing them, took 13 officers, and 132 privates prisoner. The number of the enemy engaged was 700; that of the English, 400. In many other cavalry skirmishes that occurred at the outposts, the gallantry of the English was equally conspicuous. With perfect confidence, the smallest patrol would charge a body double its strength.

Sir John Moore, desirous of effecting a diversion in favour of the patriot cause, before he was in full retrograde motion, on the night of the 23rd, put his columns in motion from Sahagun towards the Carrion, for the purpose of attacking on the following morning Soult, whom he understood was at Saldanha, and who was not likely to be joined by any supporting force in time so as to render the attack hazardous. In the chill night the English columns were in motion, warmed and cheered by the promise of battle, when, intelligence being received from the marquis Romana, that Bonaparte was marching from Madrid with the 1st and 6th *corps d'armée*; that Soult, reinforced by Loisson and Hudelet's divisions, was advancing northwards to cut off the line of retreat; and that the other four *corps d'armée* were advancing in the radii of an irregular crescent, to a converging point on the rear and flanks of the English army; Sir John countermanded his order of advance, and on the 24th, commenced his retreat. Hope's division proceeded by the road of Mayorga, and Baird's by that of Valencia de San Juan. To conceal the retreat from the French marshal,



the reserve, the light brigade, and the cavalry, remained with sir John Moore at Sahagun; the latter pushing their patrols up to the enemy's lines to conceal the retrograde movement. On the 25th, the covering division followed the route of Hope's march; and it was not till the evening of that day, that the last of the cavalry pickets retired from the post of Sahagun.

While passing Mayorga, lord Paget's march being interrupted by a strong body of cavalry (1,500 in number), posted on a high ground that flanked the line of the English retreat, colonel Leigh being ordered to charge the enemy with two squadrons of the 10th hussars, they were put to flight, with the loss of 20 killed, and upwards of 100 taken prisoners. This decided superiority of the British cavalry was also evident in other rencontres. In all the cavalry affairs during the retreat, the hussar regi-

\* The instances of heroic courage and devoted sense of duty displayed both by privates and officers during the Peninsular war, were numerous. Napier, in his work, mentions the following transaction which took place at this bridge:—"John Walton and Richard Jackson, privates in the 43rd regiment, being posted beyond the bridge of Castro Gonzalo, were directed, on the approach of the enemy, the one to stand firm, and the other to fire and run back to the brow of the hill, to give notice whether there were many or few of the enemy. Jackson fired, and received twelve or fourteen sabre cuts in an instant; nevertheless he came staggering on, and gave the signal; while Walton, with equal resolution, stood his ground, and wounded several of the assailants, who then retired, leaving him unhurt; but his cap, knapsack, belt, and musket were cut in above twenty places, and his bayonet was bent double, and notched like a saw." The same author tells us, that the honourable captain Somers Cock, in his private journal of the transactions in the Peninsular war, records the following remarkable exploit, performed by a serjeant of the 16th dragoons, of the name of Baxter, during Mas-sena's retreat from the lines of Torres Vedras to Santarem:—"That brave soldier, having only five troopers with him, came suddenly on a picket of fifty men, who were cooking their messes, but instantly running to their arms, killed one of Baxter's men; but Baxter broke in so resolutely on them, that, with the assistance of some Spanish peasants, who were near at hand, he made forty-two of his enemies captives." The following anecdote, mentioned by the author of the *History of the War in the Peninsula*, in the third volume of his valuable work, and detailed more at length in Leith Hay's *Narrative of the Peninsular War*, partakes a little of the marvellous:—Colonel Waters (the officer who procured the boats at the "Passage of the Douro,") having been taken prisoner during Mas-sena's retreat from Portugal, and refusing his parole, was ordered to be sent to Salamanca under the escort of four gens-d'armes. During the journey, the chief of the party, who rode the only good horse, having occasion to dismount for a moment,

regardless of numbers, or the discouraging movements of a retreat, always sought a rencontre with the foe, and always came off victorious.

On the 26th Baird's division crossed the river Esla, by the ford or ferry of Valencia; and on the same morning, sir John Moore, with the reserve, passed that river, by the bridge of Castro Gonzalo.\* The whole of the army having effected the passage of the Esla, was concentrated on the 27th at Bene-vente,† where it was halted for two days, for the purpose of putting the stores and magazines in a condition for removal; but means of transport not being obtainable, the greater part was destroyed. At the moment of the evacuation of the town by the rear-guard, general Lefebvre Desnouettes, having crossed the Esla at a ford opposite Benaren, with the chasseurs à cheval of the imperial guard, was driven by the 10th

Waters clapped spurs to his mare, which was "a celebrated animal," and galloped off at full speed. His flight lay through the French army. While he hurried past the flanks of the columns of the enemy, some cheered him, others fired at him, and the gens-d'armes followed close at his heels. At last, he rushed full speed between two of the columns, and, on the third day of his flight, reached headquarters, where lord Wellington had caused his baggage to be brought, observing, that "he would not be long absent." Among the instances of heroic daring in the French army during the Peninsular war, the following exploit, which occurred during the retreat of the English army from Burgos to Ciudad Rodrigo, is not the least interesting:—"The bridge of Torderillas having been broken down, sixty officers and non-commissioned officers formed a raft to carry their clothes and arms, and then plunged into the water, holding their swords between their teeth, at the same time swimming and pushing the raft forwards. Having reached the opposite bank of the Douro, naked as they were, they successfully stormed a tower behind the ruins of the bridge, which was occupied by a detachment of the Brunswick Oels regiment." At the siege of Badajos, in relieving the pickets in the trenches, the men, instead of going through the trenches or parallels in front of the walls of the town, often used to show their contempt of danger by jumping out of them, and running across the next parallel or trench in the face of the enemy's fire. In executing this feat of daring, one day a cannon-shot from the ramparts, first striking the ground, hit one of the working party on the back, when he fell, as it was thought, dead on the spot; but, to the surprise of his comrades, in a moment he jumped up unhurt, the shot having glanced off his knapsack. In commemoration of the event, he was known afterwards by the appellation of "the bomb-proof man."

† The castle of Benevente, the property of the duke of Ossuna, and one of the finest monuments of the age of chivalry, and in which Gothic grandeur was united with the richness of Moorish decoration, was disgracefully dilapidated by the troops stationed there for the night.



hussars, under general Stewart, across the river, with many killed and wounded, and the loss of seventy prisoners, among whom was Lefebvre.\* From the termination of this affair, the French cavalry kept at a respectful distance as long as the English cavalry formed the rear-guard of the army.

Sir John Moore, with the rear-guard, reached Astorga on the 30th without any molestation; but that town being encumbered with the sick of Romana's army—which had the appearance of an ambulating hospital in need of an escort—and the ruins of his baggage, the retreat was resumed on the following morning; a large quantity of the remaining stores and ammunition having been first destroyed, and, for want of the necessary means of conveyance, the sick and wounded abandoned, the former of whom had been greatly increased by the contagious typhus fever, imparted to them by Romana's troops. On the 31st, the light division, under Craufurd, and the light German brigade, under Alten, were detached at Bonillos, to march by Orense on Vigo, for embarkation; which town they reached without having sustained any loss from the enemy. The reason for this separation of the light division from the main body of the army, was the inability to obtain a subsistence on one line of march, and to prevent the enemy from heading the British columns, and obstructing the retreat† by the lateral road to Orense and Vigo. The marquis of Romana took the same direction, his troops having

\* The following graphic account of this spirited affair appears in the narrative of sir John Moore's campaign, by his brother:—"While lord Paget was preparing to move with the cavalry, some of the enemy's cavalry were observed trying a ford near the bridge which had been blown up; and presently between five and six hundred of the imperial guards—'men,' as their captured leader, general Lefebvre, said to sir John Moore, 'who had put to flight thirty thousand Russians at Austerlitz'—plunged into the river, and crossed over. They were immediately opposed by the British pickets, who had been divided to watch the different fords, but who were quickly assembled by colonel Otway. When united they amounted only to two hundred and twenty men. They retired slowly before the superior numbers of the enemy. The front squadrons repeatedly charged each other; and on the pickets being re-inforced by a small party of the 3rd dragoons, they charged with so much fury, that the front squadron broke through the enemy, and was for a short time surrounded, by the enemy's rear squadron wheeling up. But they extricated themselves by charging back again through the enemy. They then quickly rallied, and formed with the rest of the pickets. When lord Paget reached the field, which he soon did, general Stewart, at the head of the pickets, was

been supplied with firelocks and ammunition from the British stores.

From the commencement of the retreat to the moment of reaching Astorga, the weather had been severe and inclement in the extreme; and the distress of the army was further increased by the absence of the necessary supplies. The consequence unavoidably was, that the continued line of march was a scene of the greatest suffering and insubordination. "The length of the marches, the severity of the weather, and the wretched state of the roads, which, in many places, were knee-deep in mud, joined to the want of supplies, the only food which the troops could obtain to appease their craving appetites being a little flour mixed with cold water, produced," says one who participated in the sufferings and privations of that disastrous retreat, "so complete a disorganization of the army—starvation, under any circumstances, compels the soldier to lose his discipline and spirit—that it presented the appearance of a tumultuary rabble, and, in the case of many regiments, not fifty men were with their colours." During the whole retreat the rain fell in torrents and without intermission, with a violent and impetuous wind beating, alternately, rain, snow, and sleet, direct in the faces of the troops; and to add to their misery, the cold was in a degree nearly equal to that of a polar winter; the oldest inhabitant of Spain had no recollection of its having ever been so severe in the Peninsula. No retreat on sharply engaged; the squadrons on both sides sometimes intermixing. His lordship was desirous of drawing on the enemy further from the ford, till the 10th hussars, who were forming at some distance, were ready. This regiment soon arriving, lord Paget wheeled it into line in the rear of the pickets; which then charged the enemy, supported by the 10th hussars. But before they could close, the French wheeled round, fled to the ford, and, plunging into the river, left their killed and wounded, and seventy prisoners, among whom was Lefebvre in the hands of the victors."

† Of the two reasons which have been assigned for that division of the army, namely—first, to lessen the difficulties of the commissariat, and secondly, to secure the left flank of the army,—the first may be defended; but there does not appear to have been any necessity for the second. If the left flank was insecure, it could become so only from lateral roads, by which the troops from Astorga might have turned the line of march of the retreating battalions; but to separate from them, and proceed direct for the valley of the Minto, through a distant country, where no enemy had existence, was an extraordinary mode of securing the uninterrupted march of the army.—Leith Hay's *Narrative of the Peninsular War*.



record was ever attended with so much misery, horror, and desolation, except the dismal and horrific one of Napoleon from Moscow, and that of the Anglo-Indian army from Cabul. At Bembibre and Villa Franca the stragglers broke into the large wine-stores, and hundreds of them, who were scattered, in a state of senseless intoxication, in the streets and on the roads at a distance from the vaults, were sabred by the French cavalry, who dealt death around unsparingly, and flushed with their inglorious triumph, pursued the drunken rabble that attempted to escape their vengeance, to Cacabelos, slaughtering and wounding men, women, and children, indiscriminately, and with the most inhuman ferocity. Some of the ill-fated fugitives found their way to the British rear, and, mangled as they were, were paraded through the ranks, as an intimidation to those who might feel inclined to follow their example, and disregard that first and greatest principle of military duty—obedience, which constitutes the soul and spirit of war.

As there may be some persons disposed to consider this a mere "fancy picture," without truth or reality, the testimony of a French writer may probably satisfy their scepticism. Speaking of the licentious conduct and desperate excesses of the stragglers of the English army, the author of the *History of the Consulate and the Empire of France under Napoleon*, says—"Many were often intoxicated and uncontrollable, and neither threats nor warnings could make them quit their boozing places, (namely, the wine-stores, cellars, &c.) There they remained till the French came up, or else, staggering sluggishly along the road, they were overtaken by the dragoons, who, as they rode along, brandishing their swords to the right and left, cut down the tardy drunkards, many of whom were so insensible from liquor, as neither to resist nor attempt to get out of the way."

During the course of these operations of the British army, the French were actively employed in scattering the armies of the patriots, and in preparations to overpower with numbers the English army, or to intercept its retreat on Portugal, and thus, as Thiers vauntingly expresses himself, "end the war in Spain with a crushing blow." The whole of the eight corps d'armée were, as has been already said, in motion, to accomplish this purpose against the English force. Napoleon Buonaparte, as soon

as he understood that sir John Moore was not retreating on Lisbon, but was at Salamanca, put himself at the head of the 1st and 6th corps d'armée, which amounted to above 50,000 men, and marched from Madrid on the 21st of December; was at Tordesillas on the 24th; and, after having passed the Guadarama pass of the Carpenteras—a ridge of mountains which separate the province of Madrid from that of Segovia—was at Valderas twelve hours after the English army had quitted that place. He reached the Esla, in front of Benevente, on the 28th, and had the mortification to witness the discomfiture of the cavalry of his guard, under Lefebvre, by the English hussars. Soult and he reached Astorga on January 1st, at the same time, with a force amounting to 80,000 cavalry and infantry, and 200 pieces of artillery, where, receiving intelligence of the hostile intentions of Austria, he delegated the task of pursuing the English, and, in the imperial bombastic phraseology, "of driving them into the sea," to Soult. Having placed under his command near 60,000 men and 91 guns, he prepared to return to France, taking with him the imperial guard, which amounted to 15,000 men. Having been frustrated by the prescience and vigilance of the English general, he disguised his miscarriage by one of those brilliantly inflated bulletins, so well calculated to dazzle the fervid imagination of warriors.

This march of Napoleon from Madrid to Astorga, has furnished his adulators and idolatrous admirers an abundant theme for their laudation of his "unsurpassable and unequalled military genius." One of them (and of course the rest have taken up the tune) breaks out into the following reverie:—He thus "traversed two hundred miles of country in ten days, [forgetting to state the truth, namely, *eleven*], regardless of the difficulties which the severity of the weather, the almost impassable state of the mountain routes, and long dark nights, produced."

Let us examine the miraculous feat and the propriety and application of its extraordinary laudation. First, then, with regard to "the severity of the weather and the long night marches." Had not the English army to contend with the same disadvantages, and that too under the discouraging and depressing circumstances of a retreat, and hotly pursued by a vindictive and a remorseless foe? "Aye," but reply the adulators, "look at the genius of the mag-



nanimous Napoleon's execution," with all the rest of the nonsense on which they are continually ringing changes. Secondly, "the almost impassable state of the mountain routes." Those mountain routes were the Guadarama pass of the Carpenteras, which, as has been before stated, forms part of the royal road from Madrid to Badajos. That we may not be accused of a partial description, we will adopt the description of the passage by the French—by one of those who love to assign marvels and prodigies to the object of their fanatical idolatry:—"Crossing the Carpenteras in a hurricane of sleet and snow, and the snow being deep, the French advanced guard was preparing to round the mountain, the emperor hurrying to the front formed the chasseurs à cheval of the guard into close column, occupying the entire width of the road, and causing the men to dismount, directed the leading half squadron, mingled with their horses, to advance; at the same time placing himself in its rear, the whole moved forwards, and treading down the snow in such a manner as to point out the way to the troops behind; and thus the whole army descended to Epinas."

Now, let us calmly examine the prodigiousness of this marvellous exploit, which has called forth the unbounded admiration of "the emperor's genius and spontaneous spirit or intuition." Did not sir John Hope, and that too with all the artillery and magazines of the British army, and, moreover, with the enemy's cavalry hovering about him, effect this passage of "mountain routes?" "Oh," reply the adulators, "that was nothing; he was only a divisional general, and an Englishman, one of our own countrymen; and then you know, it is liberal to undervalue our countrymen's talent and heroism, and overrate those of their enemies, particularly where they were led by "the great and matchless Napoleon." But not to waste time on such nonsense, let us resume the narrative.

While the main body of the English army moved towards Villa Franca, the reserve, to repress the vigour of the pursuit, took up at Calcabellos (January 3rd) a position on a lofty ridge, broken with vineyards and low stone walls, where they were attacked by eight squadrons of hussars under general Colbert, supported by a body of voltigeurs; which were repulsed and driven across the Guia river, with the loss of 200 men taken and slain; among the latter of whom was Colbert.

As the face of the country from Villa

Franca to Lugo is mountainous and rugged, and therefore the cavalry rendered useless, they preceded the infantry. On the army reaching Herrierias, the engineers presenting their reports of the harbours and positions of Ferrol and Corunna, the latter place was selected as the port for embarkation, as being the nearest by two marches. On reaching Nogales, the army met forty-two waggons, laden with arms, ammunition, shoes, and clothing, sent by England for the use of Romana's troops. When the necessary supplies had been served out to the almost naked troops, the remainder was destroyed; and, at the same time, the contents of the military chest (25,000 dollars) were thrown over a precipice into a ravine, several feet deep in snow. Many men who straggled from their ranks in hopes of possessing themselves of some of the money, met with death either from the severity of the weather or the sword of the enemy.

At this period of the retreat, the sufferings of the army had reached their climax. Horrible scenes of affliction were momentarily occurring among the fleeing and disorganized crowd. Jaded and half famished, barefoot and knee-deep in mud, their fatigue was so excessive, that they often fell by whole sections on the way-side and perished. Hunger, despair, and the inclemency of the weather, had done their worst. "It was melancholy," says an eye-witness, "to see brave soldiers, who feared no mortal foe, possessed of a spirit undaunted by no enemy, who had arrived on the soil of Spain, burning with a desire for battle, and in all the confidence of victory, thus beaten by want and the elements, and falling victims to their severity and fury!"

The same fate attended the women and children. Women were to be seen frozen to death, with infants lying on their breasts, and seeking sustenance from the lifeless bodies of their mothers: one woman was found by the way-side, with two babes lying beside her to whom she had given birth before her broken spirit had fled for ever. Children were frozen in their mothers' arms. The sick and the wounded, from the impossibility of passage for the waggons and cars that bore them, were abandoned to a lingering death, or the merciless sabres of the pursuers. "I looked around," says one who was present in the disastrous scene, "when we had gained the highest point of the slippery precipices over which we were hurrying, and saw the rear of the army winding



along the narrow road. I saw their way marked by the wretched people that lay on all sides, expiring from fatigue and cold; their bodies reddened, in spots, the white surface of the ground. The saddest indications of human misery and suffering presented themselves on the whole line of march."

Nor was this the condition of the main body alone. The retreat of the light division, under Craufurd, from Bonillos to Vigo, was equally calamitous. Their route lay through a wild and mountainous country, presenting the appearance of a wilderness of the most dreary and desolate nature. Long day and night marches, fatigue, want of food, and all the miseries and wretchedness attendant on a rapid retreat, had, with as unsparing a hand, done their work, as with the main body of the army. The snow that lay on the ground was dotted along the whole line of the retreat with the dead and dying bodies of men, women, and children, as also of mules and horses. Clusters of men and women were to be seen sitting huddled together in the road, their heads drooping forwards, and apparently waiting for death to put an end to their misery. Whenever any one sank down from fatigue or exhaustion, there he generally found his last resting-place. The whole division presented the appearance of the most abject wretchedness and misery. The wayworn and gaunt figures of the men—their ghastly features—their heads swathed in old rags, or tied up in fragments of handkerchiefs—their clothes and accoutrements hanging in tatters—gave them the appearance of moving corpses. The scenes among the women and children were infinitely more distressing. During the whole of the calamitous retreat, the condition of the women, both of the light division and the main body of the army, was distressing in the extreme. They were to be seen huddled together in the rear, with their ragged and scanty clothing displaying their bare limbs to the inclemency of the season, and with their husbands' tattered great coats buttoned over their heads, presenting the appearance of a tribe of migratory gipsies. But great and severe as their distress and sufferings were, their fortitude and resignation under them drew forth the admiration of the whole division. One instance deserves special remembrance. One of the men's wives being overtaken by labour-pains, laid herself down in the snow, a little out of the main road,

and was delivered of a male infant, her husband being her only attendant. In the course of a few hours after her delivery, she was seen among the ranks with her newborn babe in her arms. Cases of this nature occurred more than once during the Peninsular war.

On the approach of the army to the village of Constantine, the French, not aware that a bridge was constructed there, pressed the pursuit hotly, in order to harass the retreating army in effecting its passage of the river; but they were repulsed in their attack. To check the pursuit, the reserve under brigadier-general Paget was appointed to impede the passage of the river, while the main body continued its route to Lugo; which town it reached on the 5th of January. The reserve, though repeatedly assailed by the enemy, held its ground firmly till midnight, when it retired on the main body, and was bivouacked either in position or cantoned in and round the town. The French on the same day quickly appeared in front of Lugo, and took up a position on a mountainous ridge, opposite the rear guard of the British, only the width of a narrow valley intervening between the positions of the hostile armies.

On the 6th, preparations having been made for battle, the troops, as soon as they knew that their colours were planted in bivouac on a line of battle, hurried to their ranks; subordination and discipline immediately assumed their ascendancy, and the organization of the disorderly battalions became, as if by magic, complete; and as they examined their locks, fixed their flints, and loosened in the scabbards those bayonets which the pouring rain had rusted fast in the sheaths, they again looked to their officers with the regard of a ready obedience and a brave devotion—a fact, confirming the just estimate and appropriate metaphor of one who well understands the qualities of the British soldier:—"A British army may be gleaned in a retreat, but cannot be reaped. Whatever may be their misery, the soldiers are always to be found ready at the fight."

The position chosen for the field of battle was tolerably strong. The centre being formed among vineyards, separated from each other by low stone walls, was difficult to attack. The right being flanked by rocks and ravines, was not easily to be turned; but the left was vulnerable. With the first dawn of the following morning the guns of



the French opened, but were quickly silenced by the British artillery. Attacks were then made on the centres of the English line; a feint was made on the right wing; and a column of considerable magnitude, covered by a cloud of tirailleurs, ascended the hill on the left, and drove in the pickets and a wing of the 76th; but those troops falling back on the 51st, which was stationed in their rear, the enemy was driven down the hill with great slaughter, at the point of the bayonet; and having been repulsed at all points, retreated to his position, with the loss of 400 men. At the attack of the right wing, the 51st falling back behind the stone walls, sir John Moore, at the head of his staff, rushed forward, with his hat in his hand, exclaiming, "Recollect, men, I was your lieutenant-colonel—follow me;" and gallantly leading the regiment to the charge, they rapidly drove back their assailants.

Advantageous positions had presented themselves for offering battle before the army had reached Lugo. From Villa Franca to Lugo, the tract of country called the *Biergo*, lying between the two great ranges of mountains that trend north to south, is very rugged and much wooded, with numerous enclosures, consisting of low stone walls, built around vineyards and plantations of mulberry trees. Here could have been selected many desirable positions in which battle might have been offered to the enemy; and in the event of his declining to accept it, an action might have been brought on by the employment of those feints which a retreating army has it in its power to call into practice without implicating its safety or credit.

On the dawn of the 8th, the English army was again drawn up ready for the contest; and, though both armies stood embattled opposite to each other during the whole day, amidst storms of rain and snow, no hostile occurrence took place. In the words of a French historian, "The British stood to their arms, again offering battle, and giving defiance to the enemy. But the French were not equally eager for the fight; they looked back from the hills on which they were posted, but did not venture to descend. The trial which they had made of their enemies, on the two preceding days, was not such as to encourage them." Besides, as the same author has observed in another part of his work, "the French commander-in-chief well knew, that 'fatigue would do

his work more surely than the sword.'" As the enemy declined the offer of battle, the continuance of the retreat was again ordered to be resumed; and to deceive the enemy, the troops were directed to erect huts, and leave their bivouac fires burning. At ten o'clock at night, in silent order, the army filed off to the rear, by different routes, leading towards Betanzos; the position which had been chosen for the field of battle being about five miles distant from that town. The retreat commenced in a frightful storm of hail, rain, sleet, and wind. As the divisions advanced, the storm raged with increased violence; wind, hail, and sleet, swept so resistlessly across the plains, that it was with difficulty the lines could be induced to face the tempest; and to add to the misery of the troops, the bundles of straw that had been placed at certain distances to mark the tracks of march to be pursued in the night, had been swept away by the violence of the storm. The consequence was, only one division was enabled to gain the main road; the two others became bewildered, and after a night-march of five hours were still near Lugo. During the march of the following day, the troops temporarily bivouacked near the villages of Guilleriz and Valmeda, for a few hours, on ground streaming with water, and the rain and snow descending in torrents at the same time. In the second night's march, the whole army became disorganized, and the discipline and subordination which the stand at Lugo had tended to restore, was now no longer regarded or considered of any importance. The whole army became a continuous line of stragglers, and the repetition of the licentiousness and marauding that had disgraced the retreat to Lugo, again took place; the idea of fleeing from an enemy with whom they ardently longed to contend, had made so terrible havoc, both moral and physical, in their discipline and conduct, that they resembled more a tumultuous rabble than a gallant and an invincible army. At this time the Royals mustered with the colours only nine officers, three serjeants, and three privates; the rest had straggled on the march from Lugo. Most of the other regiments were equally disorganized. There was a memorable instance in this part of the retreat, of what might have been accomplished by presence of mind and by discipline among the stragglers. A party of invalids, between Lugo and Betanzos, were closely pressed by two



squadrons of the enemy's cavalry. Serjeant Newman, of the 2nd battalion, 43rd, was among them; not being able to pass those poor men, he rallied round him such as were capable of making any resistance, and directed the others to proceed as well as they could. He formed the party regularly into divisions, and commenced firing and retiring in an orderly manner, till he effectually covered the retreat of his disabled comrades, and made the cavalry give up the pursuit.

On the morning of the 10th, the columns reached Betanzos, where a halt was made to collect the stragglers, and re-organize the army. On that day the weather changed favourably, and the army again resumed its retreat on Corunna, in an orderly and compact body, amounting to 14,000 men. The loss from sickness, insubordination, and the casualties of the service, had amounted to nearly one-fourth of its original complement. The retreat between Sahagun and Lugo had occasioned the loss of 1,500 men; but more than twice that number perished between Lugo and Betanzos. But great as the loss had been, it was highly gratifying to reflect that it had not been inflicted by the enemy. Neither had any military trophy, gun or standard, fallen into his hands; and in the numerous affairs of posts that had taken place between the hostile armies, the French could not boast of one favourable issue, or even the most trifling advantage. Of the stragglers, near 1,000 found their way across the country to Portugal, after the battle of Corunna. "The good countenance that had been shown by the reserve, the partial actions at Lugo, and the risk to which they had been exposed of a general one" (to adopt the language of M. Thiers) "checked the French in their pursuit, and marshal Soult was too sensible of the danger he had escaped to trust himself again too near the British without a superior force." For these reasons the retreating army met with no interruption from the enemy, from the night of its reaching Valmuda to its arrival at Corunna, except on the evening of its reaching Betanzos, when the advanced guard of the French cavalry pressed on the British rear, but were quickly driven off by a volley from the English rear-guard.

\* Corunna, or according to Spanish orthography, La Coruna, stands on the neck of a peninsular promontory, which widely extends into the ocean at the entrance of the Bay of Betanzos, or as it is otherwise called the Groyne, and at the head of a spacious

The leading division reached Corunna\* in the course of the 11th of January. The three divisions took up their quarters in the town and suburbs, and the reserve was posted at the village of El Burgo. The defences by which the town could be approached were immediately put into a state of repair, and a position for a battle-field was selected. A rocky ridge, about three miles from the town, taking its rise on the river Mero, just behind the village of El Burgo, sweeping round to the north, and terminating on the ocean, presented a natural rampart. This would have been highly eligible for an army in sufficient force to defend it; but as that position was too extensive for the English army, an inferior ridge of heights, or rather swelling knolls, which form a sort of amphitheatre round the village of Elvina, and only two miles distant from Corunna, was chosen, though circumscribed, in a measure, by the large ridge before mentioned, and commanded by it within the range of cannon-shot.

The next object that claimed the attention of the commander-in-chief was the abundant magazines of stores, &c., which had been sent to Corunna by the English government for the use of the patriots. From those stores, fresh muskets, bayonets, flints, &c., were issued to the troops, for the battered and rusty arms they then had. The magazines containing the powder (between six and seven thousand barrels), and which were situated about three miles from the town, were blown up. The explosion was tremendous. "The earth trembled for miles; the rocks were torn from their bases; and the agitated waters rocked the vessels that were in the harbour as if they had been in a storm;" while a perpendicular column of flame and smoke rose to a considerable height, discharging a shower of stones and fragments, and bursting with a deafening roar, killed many persons within its reach, and destroyed a village.

The fleet of transports hove in sight on the evening of the 14th. On its coming to anchor, the women, children, sick, and wounded were immediately carried on board. A large portion of the artillery (fifty-two guns), the stores, and all the best horses,

harbour. It is defended by a chain of bastions, and a strong citadel which partly commands the road. At the time of the battle of Corunna, the fortifications were in a dilapidated state.



together with the dismounted men, followed. The foundered horses were shot, to put an end to their sufferings, as well as to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. During the transaction, many of the poor animals, anticipating their fate, broke loose and escaped. They eventually fell into the hands of the French.

On the 12th, the enemy had appeared in front of the town, and covered the heights on the opposite side of the Mero, extending from the village of El Burgo to the ocean. On the 13th, Baird's division marched into position, and the other brigades followed to their allotted posts. The position of the British army was,—General Hope occupied a hill to the left, with one division, with which he commanded the road to Betanzos, as the height sloped away gradually in a curve towards the village of Elvina, where Baird's division was posted. On Baird's right, the rifle brigade threw itself in extended order across the valley, and communicated with general Frazer's division, which was drawn up about a mile from Corunna, near the Vigo road. The reserve, under general Paget, occupied a village on the road to Betanzos, about half-a-mile in the rear of general Hope.

On the same day that the fleet of transports arrived, the French, having repaired the bridge of El Burgo, over the broad and swampy river that separated the two armies, pushed a considerable body of infantry and cavalry across the river; and on the 15th they constructed a battery, consisting of eleven guns of large calibre, in a commanding position along the range of the heights above the northern branch of the river, and, at the same time, the whole elevated outer ridge was covered with troops.

On the 16th, as no demonstration of a battle-movement had been made by the enemy, except a partial cannonade, orders were issued to prepare for embarkation in the course of the night; but, about two o'clock, the French were observed under arms, and an instant fusilade commenced between the enemy's tirailleurs and the English pickets and light troops. At the same moment four columns crossed the valley, two directing their march on the right of the English position, one moved on the centre, and the fourth threatened the left of the English line. Baird's right was turned, and the village of Elvina, which lay midway between the two positions, was carried by their impetuous onset in this

attack. General Baird's arm being shattered by a grape-shot, he was forced to quit the field. Sir John Moore directed the right wing of the 4th regiment, in order to counteract the effect of the enemy's outflanking movement, to form an acute angle on the rear of the left wing of the regiment, and to pour in a well-directed volley on the flank of the column. In this position they commenced a heavy raking fire, and the general watching the manœuvre, called out to them, "That is exactly what I wanted to be done." Sir John then rode up to the 50th regiment, commanded by majors Napier and Stanhope, who got over an enclosure in their front, and charged most gallantly. This drew from Moore the exclamation, "Well done, 50th! well done my majors." The enemy was driven from Elvina with great slaughter, by the 47th and 50th, but major Napier advancing too far, was wounded, and taken prisoner; and major Stanhope received a mortal wound. Approaching the 42nd regiment, which had formerly prevailed against Buonaparte's "Invincibles," Moore addressed them in these terms,—*"Highlanders! remember Egypt!"* They rushed on, driving the French before them, till they were stopped by a wall. Sir John accompanied them in their charge, and told them he was well pleased with their conduct. Captain Hardinge (now commander-in-chief) was sent to order up a battalion of guards to the left flank of the Highlanders. The officer commanding the light company conceived that as their ammunition was nearly expended, they were to be relieved by the guards, and began to fall back, but sir John discovering the mistake called to them, "My brave 42nd, join your comrades; ammunition is coming, and you have your bayonets." They instantly obeyed, and all moved forward. Captain Hardinge now returned to report that the guards were advancing. While he was speaking and pointing out the situation of the battalion, a hot fire was kept up, and the enemy's artillery played incessantly on the spot. Sir John Moore was too conspicuous. A cannon-ball struck his left shoulder and beat him to the ground. He raised himself, and sat up with unaltered features, looking intently at the Highlanders, who were warmly engaged. Captain Hardinge threw himself from his horse, and took the general by the hand; then marking his anxiety, he told him the 42nd were advancing; upon which his counte-



nance immediately brightened. His friend, colonel Graham, dismounted to assist him, and from the calmness of Moore's countenance entertained hopes that he was not even wounded; but observing the dreadful laceration of his person and the great effusion of blood, he rode off for surgeons. Sir John was carried from the field on a blanket by a serjeant of the 42nd and some soldiers. On the way he ordered captain Hardinge to report his wound to general Hope, who assumed the command of the army. Equally foiled in his attempt to pierce the centre, the French marshal endeavoured, with Delaborde's division, to overthrow the left of the British line. This attack was also rendered abortive by generals Hope and Paget's commands. Being thus unsuccessful on all points, his centre being defeated and broken, and his left turned, he fell back, as night came on, upon the high ridge of hills from which he had descended, darkness alone preventing his complete deroute; at the same time, the British line being considerably in advance on the ground it had occupied at the commencement of the action.

On the cessation of the battle, fires being kindled along the lines, and strong pickets (consisting of 2,000 men, under Beresford, in the lines and in the front of Corunna, and a reserve under Hill on a promontory behind the town), being left to guard the ground and watch the movements of the enemy; the victorious troops, at ten o'clock, filed down from the field of battle, and passed the night in embarking. At day-break, the enemy perceiving that the English had left their position (the pickets having been at that moment withdrawn), constructed a battery on the height of St. Lucia, so as to bear on the English shipping; but before the battery opened, the greater part of the troops had been embarked. Many of the masters of the transports, alarmed at the cannonade, having cut their cables, some of the vessels ran foul of each other. A few transports being wrecked, were burnt by the English navy. Hill and Beresford, with the rear-guard, embarked on the 17th; and in

\* Among the killed and wounded were the two majors of the 50th; Lincoln Stanhope, the third son of the earl of Harrington, and the present sir Charles Napier. While the body of major Stanhope was being committed to the grave, his brother, captain Fitzroy Stanhope, aid-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, stooping forward to take a last view of the remains of his gallant brother, nearly escaped sharing the same grave, a ball from the

the course of the afternoon of that day, the whole fleet was under weigh for England, with a fair wind. But, unfortunately, in the course of the voyage, it was scattered by a violent storm; and many transports were much damaged, and the Despatch transport lost, on board of which were 3 officers, 133 non-commissioned officers and privates, 4 women, and 68 horses of the 7th dragoons. The troops on their disembarkation presented a piteous appearance; haggard countenances, tattered garments, and damaged accoutrements; but their honour and courage untarnished, and their country's glory extended.

Thus ended the battle of Corunna, which, considering the numerical superiority of the French army, both in men and artillery, and the comparative moral and physical condition of the contending armies, a circumstance which, of course, rendered the disadvantage still greater on the part of the English in the contest, reflects no less credit on the talents and genius of the general, than it does on the courage and invincibility of his troops that won it, and "in that prodigious stand and noble feat of arms," as Thiers has had the candour and generosity to term it, immortalized their country's name.

The amount of the English army under arms was 14,500 men, but neither Hope's nor Frazer's divisions were engaged. Had they been engaged, and might not have intervened, the fate of the French army would have been inevitable, as its powder was nearly exhausted at the time of their falling back, and the Mero in its rear, the only passage over that river available for them, being the narrow bridge at El Burgo. The enemy's force exceeded 20,000 men. The British artillery consisted of twelve 6-pounders; but it was soon silenced by the number and superior weight of the enemy's guns. The loss of the English was 800 in killed\* and wounded. The French admitted theirs to be double that number; but the truth is that it thrice exceeded it. Sir John Moore, while applauding the repulse of the enemy from the village of Elvina, was

enemy passing through his cloak. Major Napier having been left for dead on the field of battle, where he received six wounds, a French soldier was about cutting off his head, when a French drummer interposed and saved him. The major was taken to Soult's quarters and kindly treated until exchanged. When Napoleon Buonaparte heard of the gallant generosity of the drummer, he presented him with the cross of the Legion of Honour.



wounded by a cannon ball, which carried away his left shoulder and part of the collar bone, leaving the arm hanging by the flesh. He died soon after he was carried out of the field. He was buried during the night of the embarkation in the rampart of the citadel. At midnight, he was borne to the grave (which had been prepared by a party of the 9th regiment), by colonel Graham, major Colborne, and his aides-de-camp, and, being laid in his bed of honour, wrapped in his camp-cloak, was "left alone in his glory."

The following inscription appears on a small column erected in the place where the battle had been fought, by the marquis Romana, to the memory of general Moore:

"A la Gloria  
del

Exmo. Sir D. JUAN MOORE, Gen. del Exto Inglesæ,  
Y a la de sus valientes compatriotas

e  
España agradecida."

And on the other side,

"Battalla de Coruna a 16 de Enero  
Ano 1809."

Marshal Soult directed the French consul, M. Foureroy, to cause the following inscription to be engraven on a rock near the spot where the English general was wounded:

"Hic cecitit JOHANNES MOORE, Dux Exercitûs  
Anglicani,

In Pugna, Januarii xvi., 1809,  
Contra Gallos, a duce Dalmatiæ ductos;"

but the order not having been carried into effect, marshal Ney caused a monument to be erected over the remains of sir John Moore; surmounted by a slab having on both its sides the sublimely simple inscription:

"JOHN MOORE,  
Leader of the British Armies,  
Slain in Battle, 1809."

The reputation of sir John Moore has been much assailed, and his judgment impugned, by those presumptuous and weak-minded men, who think that they have a prescriptive right "to find fault with unsuccessful measures." They condemn his halt at Salamanca; but in their condemnatory criticism they forget that had he advanced he must have left both his flank divisions unprotected; or that, if he had advanced to form a junction with one, he might have jeopardized the safety of the other. They find fault with his not advancing into the heart of Spain. Could there ever have been a more insane act? What! with eight corps d'armée, each ex-

ceeding his army, advancing on his flanks, and the rabble armies of the patriots routed and scattered, would it have been prudent to compromise the safety of his army, by submitting to the follies and caprices of infatuated and apathetic friends, and the delusions and designs of treacherous allies? The attempt might, possibly, have been attended with some partial and temporary success; but a conscientious self-denial made the British chief hesitate to risk the safety of his army on the desperate hazards of a chivalric effort; and for this preference he merits the gratitude of his country. Some of his critics have assigned the cause of his determination to retreat "to his melancholic and desponding temperament;" others assert, "that an excessive sensibility embarrassed his decisions;" and some, that he was "deficient" in that stern sufficiency of thought that marks the unhesitating character of the general.

Such are the objections of his critics. Had they condemned the subdivision which he made of his force, in the case of the light division, and the despatching that body by a different route to that pursued by the main body—had they reprehended his omission of taking advantage of the many defensible positions for offering battle which the Bierzo (a tract about twelve miles square, and enclosed by mountains, and one of the most defensible in Europe,) afforded—had they expressed their disapprobation of his declining to attack Soult at Lugo—had they reprehended his omission of having established a base or line of operations—or had they asserted, that if he had thrown himself behind the bridge of Almaraz, on the Tagus (an almost impregnable situation)—or had they said that by retiring on Lisbon instead of Corunna (which was the shorter road), he would have increased the difficulties of Soult and Lefebvre, by widening the communications they would have had to maintain, thus compelling them to weaken themselves, by leaving behind them a greater number of detachments, (an operation subsequently executed by sir Arthur Wellesley with decided success,) he would have given time for the reorganization of the Spanish armies, and have furnished the troops of Romana and the peasants of Galicia and Portugal with the opportunity of carrying on a harassing warfare against the French detachments—there would have been some appearance of reason in their reproof, and they would have indicated that they possessed some know-



ledge of military science and enterprise. Had sir John Moore, instead of exhausting the strength and spirit of his gallant army in a harassing and an inglorious movement, put forth that strength and spirit on the field of battle, there is but little doubt that he would have secured, by a gallant victory, a safe and an unmolested retreat; and that there would have been less loss of the lives of his comrades by that victory than occurred in the precipitate retreat. The insubordination and excesses which disgraced the arms of England in that affair would also have been obviated. Sir John Moore's great error was an hallucination of belief in the invincibility of the French and the superiority of their military genius, and too subdued an opinion of the indomitable courage and military qualifications of his own countrymen. In the words of a distinguished French historian, "it was his misfortune to have imbibed that exaggerated opinion of the French, as a military people, the ability of their generals, and the consummate wisdom of their emperor, which the enemies of government in England were always labouring to produce for humbling the spirit of their country."

The true, and no doubt a most potent and influencing cause, that determined sir John Moore to retire before the enemy, was the temporizing, perverse, and apathetic—often treacherous—conduct of the Spanish juntas and their imbecile and arrogant generals. Those incompetent and presumptuous men, instead of adopting measures for the promotion of the cause, were employed in cabals for furthering their own private interests. When they did devote their attention to the affairs of the public, they often carried their proceedings to the climax of absurdity; many of their arrangements having been made consequent on the expulsion of the French from Spain, and only to take effect when the last of the invaders should be driven across the Pyrenees by their invincible armies and their own sage counsels. Their cupidity also was insatiable; and their bad faith and treachery were no less conspicuous than their folly and arrogance. In some instances, they openly divided among themselves the treasure and stores furnished by England for the maintenance and use of the Spanish armies.

\* But fearful of meeting that "twenty thousand," or even not a sixth of it (which was the amount of Hope's division), "the magnanimous Napoleon"—"the greatest captain of the age"—"the genius of

Whether there is, or is not, much truth in the criticisms just stated, it is certain that he mainly contributed to the salvation of Spain, by withdrawing the attention of the French from their operations against the patriots, and thus affording them time and opportunity for retrieving their disasters. By his advance to Sahagun, he also arrested the march of the fourth corps d'armée on Lisbon; that force being obliged to cross the Tagus to aid the main body of the army.

But without taking into consideration whether the English general was right or wrong in his decision to retreat, the name of Moore ought, as sir John Hope observed in his despatch to the secretary of state, "ever to remain sacred to his country," and venerated by every real soldier and true-hearted Englishman. To his memory, the women of England, Ireland, and Scotland owe, in an emphatic manner, eternal and unbounded gratitude. By his firmness and foresight, the lives of near 20,000 of the sons of those brave nations were saved from the bitter and remorseless vengeance of the Corsican despot. In one of his inflated bulletins, issued during the presence of the British army in the Peninsula, "the great and magnanimous Napoleon," as his sycophantic adulators and infatuated admirers style him, and in which he states, "that all the evils, all the plagues which can afflict the human race come from London," he gives birth to the following monstrous and savage expression—an expression which would have disgraced the most ruthless barbarian that ever cursed the face of the earth:—"Oh!" exclaims, in an ecstasy of the most inhuman delight, "the magnanimous Napoleon!"—"oh, that they might be met with to the number of eighty or a hundred thousand men, instead of twenty thousand,\* that English mothers may feel the evils of war." In another part of the same disgusting production, he says, "Oh! that they may dye with their blood this continent. The day," he adds, "will be a day of jubilee for the French army." After perusing these declarations of rancorous hatred and implacable revenge—of demon spite and rancour, I appeal to the decision of every right-minded man, be his nature what it may, whether "the idol of mankind"—"the man of the people"—

war," could condescend to enter into a plot with the traitor Morla, to trepan, in dribblets, Hope's division, into his clutches: so just a dread had that meanest of heroes of British soldiers.



"the friend of humanity"—"the patron of liberty"—"the legislator for the millions"—"the regenerator of nations"—"the untainted, unambitious, immaculate, and magnanimous Napoleon"—with all the other nauseous, insane, and ridiculous epithets with which folly, ignorance, and superstition—which hate of the country of their birth, its honour, its happiness, and its integrity—have invested their idol, and imposed on the understanding of the weak-minded and the credulous, are not deserving of contempt and ridicule?

Sir John Moore's character may be summed up in few words. He was brave, moral, high-minded, and good, in the highest degree which our frail nature will admit. No man that ever adopted the glorious profession of arms afforded so positive a demonstration as he did, in the course of his spotless and honourable life, that "religion is a necessary ingredient in the perfect military character." His military talents were of the first order: his only defect, as has been just said, a mistaken notion of the superiority of French military talent and prowess.

As in the detail of the particulars of the fall and death of sir John Moore, a material variance prevails, the following letter describing that event by captain Hardinge, who was one of the general's aides-de-camp, as also lieutenant-colonel Anderson's communications on the same subject, appear appropriate appendages to the preceding account of that event. At the moment before sir John received his wound, captain Hardinge had just returned from ordering up the guards to the support of the 42nd, and was repeating to the general, that the guards were advancing, as he was struck by the cannon-ball.

"The circumstances which took place immediately after the fatal blow which deprived the army of its gallant commander, sir John Moore, are of too interesting a nature not to be made public, for the admiration of his countrymen. But I trust that the instances of fortitude and heroism of which I was witness, may also have another effect, that of affording some consolation to his relatives and friends. With this feeling I have great satisfaction in committing to paper, according to your desire, the following relation. I had been ordered by the commander-in-chief to desire a battalion of guards to advance; which battalion was at one time intended to have dislodged a corps of the enemy from a large house and garden

on the opposite side of the valley; and I was pointing out to the general the situation of the battalion, and our horses were touching each other, at the very moment when a cannon-shot from the enemy's battery carried away his left shoulder and part of the collar-bone, leaving the arm hanging by the flesh. The violence of the stroke threw him off his horse on his back. Not a muscle of his face altered, nor did a sigh betray the least emotion of pain. I dismounted, and taking his hand, he pressed mine forcibly, casting his eyes very anxiously towards the 42nd regiment, which was hotly engaged; and his countenance expressed satisfaction when I informed him that the regiment was advancing. Assisted by a soldier of the 42nd, he was removed a few yards behind the shelter of a wall. Colonel Graham Balgowan, and captain Woodford, about this time came up; and, perceiving the state of sir John's wound, instantly rode off for a surgeon; the blood flowed fast, but the attempt to stop it with my sash was fruitless from the size of the wound. Sir John assented to being removed in a blanket to the rear. In raising him for that purpose, his sword hanging on the wounded side, touched his arm, and became entangled between his legs. I perceived the inconvenience, and was in the act of unbuckling it from his waist, when he said, in his usual tone and manner, and in a very distinct voice, 'It is well as it is. I had rather it should go out of the field with me.' Here I feel that it would be improper for my pen to venture to express the admiration with which I am penetrated in thus faithfully recording this instance of invincible fortitude, and military delicacy of this great man. He was borne by six soldiers of the 42nd and guards, my sash supporting him in an easy posture. Observing the resolution and composure of his features, I caught at the hope, that the wound would not prove mortal; and remarked, that I trusted when the surgeons dressed the wound, that he would be spared to us, and recover. He then turned his head round, and looking steadfastly at the wound for a few seconds, said, 'No, Hardinge, I feel that to be impossible.' I wished to accompany him to the rear, when he said, 'you need not go with me. Report to general Hope that I am wounded, and carried to the rear.' A serjeant of the 42nd and two spare files, in case of accident, were ordered to conduct their brave general



to Corunna; and I hastened to report to general Hope.

"I have the honour to be, &c.,

"H. HARDINGE."

The following is the report of colonel Anderson:—

"The tidings of this disaster were brought to sir David Baird while the surgeons were dressing his arm. He desired them instantly to attend on sir John Moore. When they reached the general, and offered their assistance, he said to them, 'You can be of no service to me; go to the soldiers, to whom you may be useful.' As the soldiers were carrying him slowly along, he made them turn him round frequently to view the field of battle, and to listen to the firing, and appeared to be well pleased when the sound grew fainter. A spring waggon, bearing colonel Wynch, wounded from the battle, came up. The colonel asked—'Who was in the blanket?' and being told it was sir John Moore, he wished him to be placed in the waggon. The general asked one of the highlanders whether he thought the waggon or the blanket best? who answered, that the blanket would not shake him so much, as he and the other soldiers would keep their step, and carry him easy. Sir John Moore replied, 'I think so too;' so they proceeded with him to Corunna, the soldiers shedding tears as they went. In carrying him through the passage of the house where he was to take up his quarters, he saw his faithful servant François, who was stunned at the spectacle. Sir John said to him, smiling, 'My friend, this is nothing.'"

The colonel continues:—"I met the general, on the evening of the 16th, being brought in a blanket and sashes. He knew me immediately, though it was almost dark, squeezed my hand, and said, 'Anderson, don't leave me.' He spoke to the surgeons, on their examining his wound; but was in such pain, he could say little. After some time, he seemed very anxious to speak to me, and, at intervals, got out as follows:—"Anderson, you know that I have always wished to die this way.' He then asked, 'Are the French beaten?' which he repeated to every one he knew, as they came in. 'I hope the people of England will be satisfied! I hope my country will do me justice! Anderson, you will see my friends as soon as you can: tell them everything; say to my mother'—here his voice quite failed, and he was exceedingly agi-

tated—'Hope—Hope—I have much to say to him—but—cannot get it out. Are colonel Graham and all my aides-de-camp well?'—(A private sign was made by colonel Anderson not to inform him that captain —, one of his aides-de-camp, was wounded in the action.)—"I have made my will, and have remembered my servants: Colborne has my will, and all my papers.' Major Colborne then came into the room. He spoke most kindly to him; and then said to me, 'Anderson, remember you go to —, and tell him it is my request, and that I expect he will give major Colborne a lieutenant-colonelcy: he has been long with me, and I know him most worthy of it.' He then asked major Colborne 'if the French were beaten?' and on being told that they were on every point, he said, 'It is a great satisfaction to me to know we have beaten the French. Is Paget in the room?' On my telling him no, he said, 'Remember me to him—it's general Paget I mean—he is a fine fellow. I feel myself so strong. I fear I shall be long dying. It is great uneasiness—it is great pain. Everything François says is right: I have the greatest confidence in him.' He thanked the surgeons for their trouble. Captains Percy and Stanhope, two of his aides-de-camp, then came into the room. He spoke kindly to both, and asked Percy 'If all his aides-de-camp were well?' After some interval, he said, 'Stanhope, remember me to your sister.' He then pressed my hand close to his body, and, in a few moments, died without a struggle. This was every syllable he uttered, as far as I can recollect, except asking occasionally to be placed in an easier posture."

We here append sir John Moore's last despatch, a document of great value and interest, as it is explanatory of the motives and causes which induced that high-minded and accomplished soldier to adopt the measures he did while in command of the British army present in Spain during that part of the Peninsular war in which he held his command. In estimating the character and services of that "great and good man," the opinion of one fully competent to the task should be taken into consideration. "The only error," said the late duke of Wellington, "I can discern in sir John Moore's campaign is, that he ought to have looked on the advance to Sahagun as a movement in retreat, and have sent officers to the rear to mark and arrange



the halting-points of each brigade. But this is an opinion formed after a long experience of war, and especially of Spanish war, which must be seen to be understood. Finally, it is an opinion formed after the event."

On the 13th, sir John Moore, having been on horseback from daybreak, making every arrangement for battle, returned about eleven in the forenoon to his quarters, and being exhausted with fatigue, sent for brigadier-general Stewart, and telling him that he was incapable of writing, desired him to proceed to England, and as he was a competent judge, to explain to the ministers the situation of the army. But the vessel in which the general was to proceed not being quite ready, and sir John Moore recovering from his fatigue after taking some refreshment, he wrote off his last despatch to the British government:—

"Corunna, 13th June, 1809.

"MY LORD,—Situating as this army is at present, it is impossible for me to detail to your lordship the events which have taken place since I had the honour to address you from Astorga, on the 31st December. I have, therefore, determined to send to England brigadier-general Charles Stewart, as the officer best qualified to give you every information you can want, both with respect to our actual situation, and the events which have led to it. From his connexion with your lordship, and with his majesty's ministers, whatever he relates is most likely to be believed. He is a man in whose honour I have the most perfect reliance; he is incapable of stating anything but the truth; and it is the truth which, at all times, I wish to convey to your lordship and to the king's government.

"Your lordship knows that had I followed my own opinion as a military man, I should have retired with the army from Salamanca. The Spanish armies were then beaten; there was no Spanish force to which we could unite; and I was satisfied that no effort would be made to aid us, or favour the cause in which we were engaged. I was sensible, however, that the apathy and indifference of the Spaniards would never have been believed; that had the British been withdrawn, the loss of the cause would have been imputed to their retreat; and it was necessary to risk this army to convince the people of England, as well as the rest of Europe, that the Spaniards had neither the power nor the inclination to make any efforts for themselves. It was for this rea-

son that I marched to Sahagun. As a diversion, it succeeded. I brought the whole disposable force of the French against this army, and it has been allowed to follow it, without a single movement being made to favour its retreat. The people of the Gallicias, though armed, made no attempt to stop the passage of the French through their mountains. They abandoned their dwellings at our approach, drove away their carts, oxen, and every thing that could be of the smallest aid to the army. The consequence has been, that our sick have been left behind, and when our horses and mules failed, which, on such marches, and through such a country, was the case to a great extent, baggage, ammunition, stores, and even money, were necessarily destroyed, or abandoned.

"I am sorry to say, that the army, whose conduct I had so much reason to extol on its march through Portugal, and on its arrival in Spain, has totally changed its character since it began to retreat. I can say nothing in its favour, but that when there was a prospect of fighting the enemy, the men were then orderly, and seemed pleased, and determined to do their duty. In front of Villa Franca, the French came up with the reserve, with which I was covering the retreat of the army. They attacked it at Calcabalos. It retired, covered by the 95th regiment, and marched that night to Herrierias, and thence to Nogales and Lugo; where I had ordered the different divisions which preceded to halt and collect. At Lugo, the French again came up with me; they attacked our advanced posts on the 6th and 7th, and were repulsed in both attempts, with little loss on our side.

"I heard from the prisoners taken that three divisions of the French army, commanded by marshal Soult, were come up. I therefore expected to be attacked on the morning of the 8th. It was my wish to come to that issue; I had perfect confidence in the valour of the troops, and it was only by crippling the enemy that we could hope either to retreat or to embark unmolested. I made every preparation to receive the attack; and drew out the army in the morning to offer battle. This was not marshal Soult's object; he either did not think himself sufficiently strong, or he wished to play a surer game, by attacking us on our march, or during our embarkation. The country was intersected, and his position too strong for me to attack with an inferior force. The



want of provisions would not allow me to wait longer; I marched that night; and, in two forced marches, bivouacked for six or eight hours in the rain. I reached Betanzos on the 10th instant.

"At Lugo I was sensible of the improbability of reaching Vigo, which was at too great a distance, and offered no advantages to embark in the face of an enemy. My intention then was to have retreated to the peninsula of Betanzos, where I hoped to find a position to cover the embarkation of the army in Ares or Rodes Bays; but having sent an officer to reconnoitre it, by his report, I was determined to prefer this place. I gave notice to the admiral of my intention, and begged that the transports might be brought to Corunna. Had I found them here on my arrival on the 11th instant, the embarkation would have been easily effected; for I had gained several marches on the French. They have now come up with us; the transports are not arrived. My position in front of this place is a very bad one; and this place, if I am forced to retire into it, is commanded within musket-shot; and the harbour will be so commanded by cannon on the coast, that no ship will be able to lie in it. In short, my lord, general Stewart will inform you how critical our position is. It has been recommended to me, to make a proposal to the enemy to induce him to allow us to embark quietly; in which case, he gets us out of the country soon, and obtains this place with its stores, &c., complete; that otherwise, we have it in our power to make a long defence, which must ensure the destruction of the town. I am averse to make any such proposal; and am exceedingly doubtful if it would be attended with any good effect; but whatever I resolve on this head, I hope your lordship will rest assured, that I shall accept no terms that are in the least dishonourable to the army or to the country. I feel that I have been led into greater length and more detail than I thought I could have had time for. I have written under interruptions, and with my mind much occupied with other matter. My letter written so carelessly can only be considered as private; when I have more leisure, I shall write more correctly. In the meantime, I rely on general Stewart for giving your lordship the information and detail which I have omitted. I should regret his absence, for his services have been very distinguished; but the state of his eyes

makes it impossible for him to recover, and this country is not one in which cavalry can be of much use. If I succeed in embarking the army, I shall send it to England: it is quite unfit for further service until it has been refitted, which can best be done there.

"I have the honour to be, &c.,

"JOHN MOORE."

The despatch of general Hope, addressed to sir David Baird, and which for its eloquence and fidelity of narration is a model for such documents, states with so admirable precision the circumstances of the battle, that its introduction here seems indispensable. This admirable document was written as soon as general Hope had embarked.

"His Majesty's ship Audacious, off Corunna, June 18th, 1809.

"SIR,—In compliance with your desire, contained in your communication of yesterday, I avail myself of the first moment I have been able to command, to detail to you the occurrences which took place in front of Corunna on the 16th instant. It will be in your recollection, that about one in the afternoon of that day, the enemy, who had in the morning received reinforcements, and who had placed some guns in front of the right and left of his line, was observed to be moving troops towards his left flank, and forming various columns of attack at that extremity of the strong and commanding position which, on the morning of the 15th, he had taken more immediately in front. This indication of his intention was immediately succeeded by the rapid and determined attack which he made upon your division, which occupied the right of our position. The events which occurred during that period of the action you are fully acquainted with. The first effort of the enemy was met by the commander-in-chief of the forces, and by yourself at the head of the 42nd regiment, and the brigade under major-general lord William Bentinck. The village on your right became an object of obstinate contest. I lament to say that soon after the severe wound which deprived the army of your services, lieutenant-general sir John Moore, who had just directed the most able disposition, fell by a cannon-shot. The troops, though not unacquainted with the irreparable loss they had sustained, were not discouraged, but by the most determined bravery not only repelled every attempt of the enemy to gain ground, but actually forced him to retire, although he had brought up fresh



troops in support of those originally engaged. The enemy finding himself foiled in every attempt to force the right of the position, endeavoured by numbers to turn it. A judicious and well-timed movement was made by major-general Paget with the reserve (which corps had moved out of its cantonments to support the right of the army), by a vigorous attack, defeated this intention. The major-general having pushed forward the 95th (rifle corps), and first battalion 52nd regiment, drove the enemy before him, and, in his rapid and judicious advance, threatened the left of the enemy's position. This circumstance, with the position of lieutenant-general Frazer's division (calculated to give still further security to the right of the line), induced the enemy to relax his efforts in that quarter. They were, however, more forcibly directed towards the centre, where they were again successfully resisted by the brigade under major-general Manningham, forming the left of your division, and a part of that under major-general Leith, forming the right of the division under my orders. On the left, the enemy at first contented himself with an attack on our pickets, which, however, in general, maintained their ground. Finding, however, his efforts unavailing on the right and centre, he seemed determined to render the attack on the left more serious, and had succeeded in obtaining possession of the village through which the great road to Madrid passes, and which was situated in front of that part of the line. From this post, however, he was soon expelled, with considerable loss, by a gallant attack of some companies of the 2nd battalion 14th regiment, under lieutenant-colonel Nicholls. Before five in the evening we had not only successfully repelled every attack made on the position, but gained ground on almost all points, and occupied a more forward line than at the commencement of the action, whilst the enemy confined his operations to a cannonade, and the fire of his light troops, with a view to draw off his other corps. At six the firing ceased. The different brigades were assembled upon the ground they occupied in the morning, and the pickets and advanced posts resumed their original stations. Notwithstanding the decided and marked superiority which at this moment the gallantry of the troops had given them over an enemy who, from his numbers and the commanding advantages of his position, no doubt expected an easy victory, I did

not, on reviewing all circumstances, conceive that I should be warranted in departing from what I knew was the fixed and previous determination of the late commander of the forces, to withdraw the army on the evening of the 16th, for the purpose of embarkation, the previous arrangements for which had already been made by his order, and were, in fact, far advanced at the commencement of the action. The troops quitted their position about ten at night, with a degree of order that did them credit. The whole of the artillery that remained unembarked, having been withdrawn, the troops followed in the order prescribed, and marched to their respective points of embarkation in the town and neighbourhood of Corunna. The pickets remained at their posts until five in the morning of the 17th, when they were also withdrawn with similar orders, and without the enemy having discovered the movement. By the unremitting exertions of captains the honourable H. Curzon, Gosselin, Boys, Rainier, Serrett, Hawkins, Digby, Carden, and Mackenzie, of the royal navy, who, in pursuance of the orders of the rear-admiral De Courcy, were entrusted with the service of embarking the army; and in consequence of the arrangements made by commissioner Bowen, captains Bowen and Shepherd, and the other agents for transports, the whole of the army was embarked with an expedition which has seldom been equalled. With the exception of the brigades under major-generals Hill and Beresford, which were destined to remain on shore until the movements of the enemy should become manifest, the whole was afloat before daylight.

"The brigade of major-general Beresford, which was alternately to form a rear-guard, occupied the land-front of the town of Corunna; that under major-general Hill was stationed in reserve on the promontory, in rear of the town.

"The enemy pushed his light troops towards the town, soon after eight o'clock in the morning of the 17th, and shortly after occupied the heights of St. Lucia, which command the harbour. But, notwithstanding this circumstance, and the manifold defects of the place; there being no apprehension that the rear-guard could be forced, and the disposition of the Spaniards appearing to be good, the embarkation of major-general Hill's brigade was commenced and completed by three in the afternoon;



major-general Beresford, with that zeal and ability, which is so well known to yourself and the whole army, having fully explained, to the satisfaction of the Spanish governor, the nature of our movement, and having made every previous arrangement, withdrew his corps from the land-front of the town soon after dark, and was, with all the wounded that had not been previously moved, embarked before one this morning.

“Circumstances forbid us to indulge the hope, that the victory with which it has pleased Providence to crown the efforts of the army, can be attended with any very brilliant consequences to Great Britain. It is clouded with the loss of one of her best soldiers. It has been achieved at the termination of a long and harassing service. The superior numbers and advantageous position of the enemy, not less than the actual situation of this army, did not admit of any advantage being reaped from success. It must be, however, to you, to the army, and to our country, the sweetest reflection, that the lustre of the British arms has been maintained amidst many disadvantageous circumstances. The army, which had entered Spain amidst the fairest prospects, had no sooner completed its junction, than, owing to the multiplied disasters that dispersed the native armies around us, it was left to its own resources. The advance of the British corps from the Douro, afforded the best hope that the north of Spain might be relieved; but this generous effort to save the unfortunate people, also afforded the enemy the opportunity of directing every effort of his numerous troops, and concentrating all his powerful resources, for the destruction of the only regular force in the north of Spain. You are well aware with what diligence this system has been pursued.

“These circumstances produced the necessity of rapid and harassing marches, which had diminished the numbers, exhausted the strength, and impaired the equipment of the army. Notwithstanding all these disadvantages, and those more immediately attached to a defensive position, which the imperious necessity of covering the harbour of Corunna for a time had rendered indispensable to assume, the native and undaunted valour of British troops was never more conspicuous, and must have exceeded what even your own experience of that invaluable quality, so inherent in them, may have taught you to expect. When

every one who had an opportunity seemed to vie in improving it, it is difficult for me, in making this report, to select particular instances for your approbation. The corps chiefly engaged were the brigades under major-generals lord William Bentinck, and Manningham and Leith; and the brigade of guards under major-general Warde.

“To their officers and the troops under their immediate orders the greatest praise is due. Major-general Hill and colonel Catlin Craufurd, with their brigades on the left of the position, ably supported their advanced posts. The brunt of the action fell upon the 4th, 42nd, 50th, and 81st regiments, with parts of the brigade of guards, and the 26th regiment. From lieutenant-colonel Murray, quarter-master general, and the officers of the general staff, I received the most marked assistance. I had reason to regret that the illness of brigadier-general Clinton, adjutant-general, deprived me of his aid. I was indebted to brigadier-general Slade during the action for a zealous offer of his personal services, although the cavalry were embarked. The greater part of the fleet having gone to sea yesterday evening, the whole being under weigh, and the corps in the embarkation necessarily much mixed on board, it is impossible at present to lay before you a return of our casualties. I hope the loss in numbers is not so considerable as might have been expected. If I was obliged to form an estimate, I should say, that I believe it did not exceed, in killed and wounded, from seven to eight hundred; that of the enemy must remain unknown, but many circumstances induce me to rate it at nearly double that number. We have some prisoners, but I have not been able to obtain an account of the number; it is not, however, considerable. Several officers of rank have fallen or been wounded, among whom I am only at present enabled to state, lieutenant-colonel Napier, 92nd regiment, majors Napier and Stanhope, 50th regiment, killed;—lieutenant-colonel Wynch, 4th regiment; lieutenant-colonel Maxwell, 26th regiment; lieutenant-colonel Fane, 59th regiment; lieutenant-colonel Griffiths, guards, majors Miller and Williams, 81st regiment, wounded.

“To you, who are well acquainted with the excellent qualities of lieutenant-general sir John Moore, I need not expatiate on the loss the army and his country have sustained by his death. His fall has deprived



me of a valuable friend, to whom long experience of his worth had sincerely attached to me. But it is chiefly on public grounds that I must lament the blow. It will be the consolation of every one who loved or respected his manly character, that, after conducting through an arduous retreat with consummate firmness, he has terminated a career of distinguished honour by a death that has given the enemy additional reason to respect the name of a British soldier. Like the immortal Wolfe, he is snatched from his country at an early period of a life spent in her service! like Wolfe, his last moments were gilded by the prospect of

success, and cheered by the acclamation of victory! like Wolfe, also, his memory will for ever remain sacred in that country which he sincerely loved, and which he had so faithfully served! It remains for me only to express my hope, that you will speedily be restored to the service of your country, and to lament the unfortunate circumstance that removed you from your station on the field, and threw the momentary command in far less able hands.

“I have the honor to be, &c.

“JOHN HOPE, Lieutenant-general.  
“To Lieut.-gen. SIR DAVID BAIRD,  
&c. &c. &c.”

## THE SPANISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE,

A. D. 1808.

For the purpose of not interrupting the narrative of sir Arthur Wellesley's campaign in Portugal, and that of sir John Moore in Spain, and rendering the details of their operations inconsecutive and illogical, but passing allusions have been made in these narratives to the struggles of the Portuguese and Spanish nations, with Napoleon and his invading army, in their endeavours to subjugate the Peninsula, and rob its inhabitants of their independence and nationality; a connected and consecutive narrative of those events will now be presented to the reader, to enable him to form a just and an accurate notion of those occurrences—the death-struggle of the patriots for their liberty and honour, and the gigantic and fiendish exertions of their op-

pressors to rob them of those highest of earthly blessings, for the purpose of satiating the reckless and unbounded ambition of a lawless adventurer, and enabling him to obtain, in violation of all the recognised principles of social and moral obligation, the means and resources of gratifying and rewarding the hosts of his desperate and ferocious followers,\* and of reconciling the passive and succumbing French nation to his remorseless sacrifice of her youth in the prosecution of his schemes, by exempting it from the necessity of providing the means for his unprincipled and devastating warfare, and compelling the nations on whom he was making his aggressions, to maintain his armies by the medium of requisition.† Another object of his unprincipled invasion of

\* M. Rocca, in his *Memoires de la Guerre Française en Péninsule*, enables his readers to form a correct opinion of the desperate and reckless character of the French soldiery. “Our soldiers never inquired to what country we were leading them; if there were provisions whither they were going, it was the only point of view in which they ever considered the geography of the earth.” In another part of his interesting volume he gives further elucidation of their extreme ignorance. “As they heard at the beginning of every campaign that they were called on to strike the last blow at the tottering power of England, they confounded that power, in all its forms, with England itself. They judged of the distance which separated them from it by the number of marches they had made for so many years from one end of the world to the other, without having yet reached that kind of

imaginary and distant country, which was constantly receding from them. At length, said they, if the desert separated us from it in Egypt, and the sea at Boulogne, we shall reach it by land after we have crossed Spain. That men so informed, and subject to Buonapartean despotism, should have committed the atrocities in Spain, Portugal, and the other conquered countries, there cannot be much cause of surprise.

† Having in the preceding note furnished the reader with a hint for estimating the character of the French soldiery, the agents in the unprincipled aggression and atrocities of “the imperial armies of France” on the countries they invaded and subdued,—to complete the picture, it is necessary to present him with the means of forming a correct opinion of the principal in that scene of violence and spoliation, of destruction and desolation. For



the Peninsula, was for the purpose of the enforcement of the Berlin decree for the exclusion of British commodities from Spain and Portugal, and thus, as he hoped, by crippling British commerce, eventually subject the hated isle to his despotism, having already reduced the whole of the continent to universal and slavish obedience.

The invasion of Portugal by the French army, under Junôt; the occupation of Oporto by General Carraffa with the Spanish troops, for the purpose of taking possession of that part of the Entre-Minho-e-Douro, which was to be erected into a kingdom, under the title of Northern Lusitania, to the

this purpose he is presented with the estimate of the man by the late poet-laureate, Southey, one of the fairest of critics and the soundest of judges, and as incapable of being the condemnatory partisan as the eulogistic admirer—of the perversion of truth and the distortion of facts—of deceiving his readers by exaggerated and idolatrous praise, or by indiscriminate and unjust condemnation. “Napoleon Buonaparte possessed all the qualities which are required to form a perfect tyrant. His military genius was of the highest order; his talents were of the most imposing kind; his ambition insatiable; his heart impenetrable: he was without honour, without veracity, without conscience; looking for no world beyond the present, and determined to make this world his own, at whatever cost. The military executions committed in Italy by his orders, had shown his contempt for the established usages of war, the law of nations, and the common feelings of humanity; the suppression of the Papal government, the usurpation of the Venetian states, and the seizure of Malta, had proved that neither submissiveness nor treaties afforded any protection against this fit agent of a rapacious and an unprincipled democracy. But it was during the Egyptian expedition that the whole atrocity of his character was displayed. He landed in Egypt, proclaiming that he was the friend of the grand seignor, and that the French were true Mussulmen, who honoured Mahomet and the Koran. His first act was to storm a city belonging to the grand seignor, which he now summoned to surrender, and which was incapable of defence. The butchery was continued some hours after the resistance had ceased. The very perpetrators of this carnage have related, that they put to death old and young, women and children, in the mosques, whither those unoffending and helpless wretches had fled to implore protection from God and from their prophet; and they have avowed that this was done deliberately, for the purpose of astonishing the people. Thus it was that Buonaparte commenced his career in Egypt. He left Alexandria, exclaiming, ‘The virtues are on our side! glory to Allah!’ He said, ‘There is no other God but God; Mahomet is his prophet, and I am his friend.’ He proclaimed to the Egyptians that destiny decreed all his operations, and had decreed from the beginning of the world, that after beating down the cross, he should come into that country to fulfil the task assigned him; and he called on them to enjoy the blessings of a system, in which the wisest and the most virtuous

king of Etruria, as an indemnity for his cession of the sovereignty of his Italian possessions in favour of Buonaparte, and the occupation by general Solano with the other contingent of the Spanish troops, of the Alemetjo and the Algarves, which were to form Godoy’s kingdom; the embarkation of the royal family of Portugal for the Brazils, and the appointment of a regency to govern the kingdom in the interim; the pillage and butcheries of the French generals on that occasion; the assembling of nearly 70,000 men, and above 100 pieces of artillery, at Bayonne, and their entrance into Spain at the eastern and western extremities of the

were to govern, and the people were to be happy. It is literally true, that the Egyptian mothers mutilated or killed their daughters, to save them from the brutality of his troops; and that wherever the French moved a flock of kites and vultures followed, sure of the repast which those purveyors every where provided for them. Their general entered Syria, took Jaffa by assault, and issued a proclamation on its capture, professing that he would be ‘clement and merciful, after the example of God.’ Four days after the capture, and after that profession of clemency had been made, he drew out his prisoners, some 3,000 in number, and had them deliberately slaughtered. A whole division of his army was employed in the massacre; and when their cartridges were exhausted, they finished the rest with the bayonet and the sword, dragging away those who had expired in order to get at the living, who, in the hope of escaping death, had endeavoured to hide themselves under the bodies of the dead. To complete this monster’s character it was only needful that he should show himself toward his own soldiers as to his prisoners. When sir Sydney Smith and captain Wright, then sir Sydney’s lieutenant, compelled him to raise the siege of Acre, the sick and wounded in his army were more than he had the means of removing: any other general would have recommended them to the humanity of an English enemy; but this would have been humiliating to Buonaparte, and therefore poison was administered to them by his orders.”

The above is a just estimate of Buonaparte’s character. Had other writers shaped their opinions by the same rule, instead of their hyperbolical and idolatrous laudation and panegyric, France and Europe would not have been subjected to those calamities which, for the last four years, have desolated the continent of Europe. Buonaparte was not so much indebted for his success and power to his talents, as to his guileful and extensive system of corruption, fraud, and intimidation. Deceit and misrepresentation were his organs of action and delusion. Labautner, in his *History of the Downfall of the Empire*, incontestably proves that the accounts of the victories, and the relations of the defeats, were garbled. And such were all the other actions of the man whom Napier and Alison, and the herd of French writers from whom they have borrowed their information, find it difficult to devise adequate terms to extol and be-praise, as the god of their culpable idolatry: whom fact and experience have proved was a braggart and a mountebank—the first criminal of Europe.



Pyrenees; the capture of the strong fortresses of Pamplona, Barcelona, Monjuic, Figueras, and St. Sebastian, by French artifice and duplicity; the fraudulent inveiglement by Buonaparte of the Spanish king Charles IV., and his son Ferdinand, to Bayonne; their abdication of the Spanish throne to the Frenchman in exchange for 30,000,000 of Spanish reals to the imbecile father, and 400,000 francs to his equally imbecile son, each pension to be annually paid out of the imperial treasury of France and the relegation of the drivellers, with that extraordinary specimen of virtue, Maria Luiza, and her *cher ami* Godoy, to Valençay, in the interior of France; the abject submission of the Spanish *nobles* and notables at Bayonne, who were "dazzled" as the sycophants and slaves expressed themselves, "by the glory of the invincible emperor; the entrance of the French, under Murat, into Madrid, the slaughter of the inhabitants of that capital by the French troops, and the abject adulation of the grandees, dignitaries, and authorities of the city of Madrid to Joseph Buonaparte, who, they said, "was employed by an over-ruling providence to make Spain happy:" were the subjects which have been stated in the preceding pages; the progress and particulars of the insurrection and the War of Independence are now to be described.

The seizure of the fortresses, and the advance of the French troops, had roused the spirit of the Spaniards; and in that state of public feeling, the slaughter of Madrid, and the transactions at Bayonne, were no sooner known, than the people, by an instantaneous impulse, manifested a determination to resist the insolent usurpation, and free their country from its oppressors. They rose in general and simultaneous insurrection; a spirit of patriotism burst forth which astonished Europe, and seemed to predict the prestige of their success.

The firing during the insurrection, and the massacre of the Madrileños on the 2d of May, being heard at Mostoles, a little town about ten miles north of Madrid, the alcalde dispatched a bulletin to the south, in these words: "The country is in danger; Madrid is perishing through the perfidy of the French; all Spaniards, come to deliver it!"

Asturias was the first province in which the insurrection assumed a settled form. A junta of representatives was elected, who declared that the entire sovereignty had devolved into their hands, and immediately despatched deputies to England to solicit suc-

cour; Corunna, Badajos, Seville, and Cadiz, followed. War was declared against France; troops and taxes were ordered to be levied, and voluntary subscriptions were entered into. The isle of Leon was put into a state of defence, and an attack being made, from the mortars and gun boats, on the French squadron in the harbour of Cadiz, it surrendered unconditionally. Early in the beginning of April, a communication had been opened between Sir Hew Dalrymple, the governor of Gibraltar, and general Castaños, at Algeziras. The popular ferment in Asturias, Galicia, and Andalusia, had quickly extended to Oviedo, Toledo, Valladolid, the city of Valencia, and other towns; and to raise and invigorate the national spirit to the highest degree, not only the patriotism of the nation, but also its popular faith, were appealed to. They were told to implore the aid of the immaculate conception; of Santiago, so often the patron and companion in victory of their ancestors; of our Lady of Battles, whose image is worshiped in the most ancient temple of Cavadonga, and who had there so signally assisted Pelayo in the first great overthrow of the Moorish invaders.

"No sooner was Napoleon aware of the formidable character of the insurrection, than he made preparations to meet the difficulty. Bessières received orders to put Burgos into a state of defence, to detach Lefebvre Desnouettes, with 5,000 foot and 800 horse, against Saragossa, and to reserve his main body so as to overawe the insurgents in Biscay, the Asturias, and Old Castile. A reinforcement of 9,000 men was prepared for Duhesme in Catalonia. A reserve was organized under Douet, on the Pyrenean frontier of Navarre; and another reserve was established in Perpignan. The communications and rear being thus adequately provided for, Marshal Moncey was directed, with part of his corps, to move upon Cuença, so as to prevent any communication between the patriots of Valencia and Saragossa; while Dupont, with two divisions of his corps, ten thousand strong, received orders to proceed across the Sierra Morena towards Cordova, Seville, and Cadiz. The remainder of his corps and that of Moncey were stationed in reserve at La Mancha, to keep up the communications of the divisions pushed forward, and be in readiness, if necessary, to support either which might require assistance."\* Having made their

\* Alison's *History of Europe*, vol. viii., p. 461.



arrangements, Napoleon Buonaparte returned to France, and the intrusive king Joseph proceeded on his journey to Madrid.

The French acted with their wonted celerity. Before Buonaparte had finished his arrangements at Bayonne, to preserve the communications of the French with the capital and the northern provinces, Freire, with a division of Dupont's army, advanced against Segovia, where a body of 5,000 men were posted and in possession of the dépôt of artillery; he defeated the insurgents and possessed himself of the town and artillery. The division under Verdier routed the armed force assembled at Logroño, and put their leaders to death. That under Lasalle, broke the armed peasantry, amounting to 6,000 men, at Torquemada, burnt the town, and pursued the fugitives with merciless severity. On the 12th of June, Cuesta, who had taken post with an undisciplined rabble at Cabeçon, a village situated about two leagues from Valladolid, was defeated by Merle and Lasalle, with the loss of between 5,000 and 6,000 wounded, 1,200 prisoners, all his artillery, and several thousand muskets, which his fugitive followers had thrown away in their flight. By these operations Bessières kept Navarre and the three Biscayan provinces in subjection, and opened a communication with Junôt in Portugal.

But these successes of the French in Leon and Castile, were in some degree counterbalanced by the checks they met with in Aragon. Schwartz, who had been detached by Duhesme, with 3,800 men, to Manresa, to raise in that city, three quarters of a million of francs, as a contribution for the service of the division, the Somatenes, or armed population, taking post in the strong pass or position of Bruch, repulsed him, June 7th, with the loss of 400 killed, and one piece of artillery; and on the following day Chabran, who had been also detached by Duhesme, with 4,200 men, to seize Tarrago, retreating in consequence of Schwartz's discomfiture, was defeated by the Somatenes in the same fatal pass, with the loss of 450 men and some of his artillery.

We have seen that Lefebvre Desnouettes had been detached with 5,000 infantry and 800 cavalry on Saragossa; which is an unfortified town, surrounded by a brick wall, from ten to twelve feet high, but in many of its parts houses and convents formed part of the line of inclosure; and commanded by some high ground called the *Torrero*,

about a mile to the south-west, upon which stood a convent and some smaller buildings: The Ebro bathes the walls of the city, and separates it from the suburbs. Its population, which at the period of the siege was between 40,000 and 50,000, have always been honourably distinguished in Spanish history for their love of liberty. "Within the Peninsula (and indeed throughout the whole of Catholic Europe)," says Mr. Southey, "Saragossa was famous as the city of our Lady of the Pillar, whose legend is so firmly believed by the people and most of the clergy in Spain, that it was frequently appealed to in the proclamations of the different generals and the juntas, as one of the most popular articles of the national faith. The legend is this: when the apostles, after the resurrection, separated and went to preach the gospel in different parts of the world, St James the elder (or Santiago, as he may more properly be called in his mythological history) departed for Spain, which province Christ himself had previously commended to his care. When he went to kiss the hand of the Virgin, and request her leave to set off, and her blessing, she commanded him, in the name of her Son, to build a church to her honour in that city of Spain, wherein he should make the greatest number of converts, adding, that she would give him further instructions concerning the edifice upon the spot. Santiago set sail, landed in Galicia, and having preached with little success through the northern provinces, reached Cæsarea Augusta, (the ancient name of the city upon whose site Saragossa is situated,) where he made eight disciples. One night, after he had been conversing and praying with them as usual on the banks of the river, they fell asleep, and just at midnight the apostle heard heavenly voices sing *Ave Maria gratia plena!* He then fell on his knees, and instantly beheld the Virgin upon a marble pillar in the midst of a choir of angels, who went through the whole of the matin service. When this was ended, she bade him build her church round that pillar, which his Lord, her blessed Son, had sent him by the hands of his angels; there, she told him, that pillar was to remain till the end of the world, and great mercies would be vouchsafed there to those who supplicated for them in her name. Having said this, the angels transported her back to her house in Jerusalem (for this was before the assumption), and Santiago in obedience, erected



upon that spot the first church which was ever dedicated to the Virgin."

At the time of the arrival of Lefebvre Desnouettes before Saragossa, the inhabitants of the city suspecting their governor, the captain-general of Aragon, of being devoted to the usurper's interest, deposed him, and elected Don José Palafox, the youngest of three brothers, of one of the most ancient families in the country, and who had escaped from Bayonne. By indefatigable exertions and the agency of the priests and friars, who spread themselves over the country to animate the peasantry, and induce them to enrol themselves for the defence of their country, Palafox and the junta raised and armed a force of about 10,000 infantry and 200 cavalry; and with this force, his brother, the marquis of Lazan took post without the city, in a favourable position behind Huecha. On June 12th Desnouettes attacked the marquis, and though the Spanish undisciplined levies gallantly repulsed several fierce attacks of the French, they were overthrown.

Undeterred, they rallied on the following day at Gallur, but were again overthrown. Immediately Palafox himself marched out of the city with 5,000 burghers and peasants, to reinforce his discomfited countrymen, and took post on the banks of the Xalon; but being attacked on the 14th, he was routed, the burghers taking to flight at the first sight of the enemy. The French immediately appeared before the city, and invested it.

Now is to be recorded the heroic defence of Saragossa, which, like Numantia and Saguntum of old, is "to become immortal in the annals of fame." The following narrative, however, will be divested of all the apochryphal embellishments with which the creative genius of the late Mr. Southey has invested that memorable event. That amiable and accomplished man's mind was highly tintured with the incidents of Spanish romance, and he interwove much of their high colouring of adventure and incident into his account of the siege and defence of Saragossa.

#### FIRST SIEGE OF SARAGOSSA.

As it has been properly said, though the whole of the population of Saragossa are entitled to the glory of the resolution of its defence, Palafox, Tio Martin, and Tio George—Tio, or uncle, or goodman, is the appellation by which men in the lower classes who have passed the middle age are familiarly addressed in that part of Spain—stood pre-eminently forward in the glorious task. The ensuing narrative will exhibit them in their full lustre and patriotism.

On the morning following (June 16th) the investment, the French attempted by a *coup-de-main*, to storm the city by the gate Portillo, and penetrated as far as the street Santa Engracia, but were driven back with great loss, as also that of part of their baggage and plunder. The loss of the patriots in the affair was about 4,000 in killed and wounded.

During the respite obtained by this repulse, the inhabitants, aided by the peasantry, who, to the number of 10,000, had thrown themselves into the town, worked so vigorously in throwing up defences, forming barricades,

loop-holing the walls of the houses, and raising ramparts with sacks and bags filled with sand, that in less than twenty-four hours, the city was in a condition to withstand an assault; and for the purpose of obtaining further aid, Palafox, uncle George, and four companions, in the mean time left the city by the suburbs, crossed the Ebro at Pina, and collecting on his march about 1,400 soldiers who had escaped from Madrid, formed a junction at Belchite with general Versage, who was in command of 4,000 men, levies from Calatayud. The united force collecting in their march the volunteers from the villages, took post at Epila on the river Xalon, in the rear of the besiegers. On the night of the 23rd, they were attacked by the French, and defeated with great loss. On the 27th, the French again attacked the city and the Torrero, but were repulsed with the loss of 800 men and six pieces of artillery; but the next morning, though repulsed from the city, they took the Torrero, in which 1,200 Spaniards were intrenched, by assault; and to add to the calamity of



the Saragossans, on the 28th, a powder magazine blew up in the very heart of the city, which occasioned great loss and consternation.

At the time of this success, Desnouettes having received reinforcements under Verdier, and a train of heavy artillery and stores from Bayonne and Pamplona, commenced a vigorous bombardment of Saragossa. At the same time repeated attacks were made to effect an entrance into the city; but the assailants, after several desperate struggles, were repulsed with severe loss. In this perilous work the women assisted; and, at the suggestion of the young, delicate, and beautiful countess Burita, formed themselves into companies, each headed and commanded by a lady of rank. The business of those companies was to carry meat and drink to the men who were fighting, to convey the severely wounded to the hospitals, and to bind up slight wounds upon the spot. In the midst of the most tremendous fire of shot and shells, the countess Burita attended coolly to these occupations, which were now become her duty; never, throughout the whole of a two months' siege, did the imminent danger to which she incessantly exposed herself, produce the slightest apparent effect on her, or in the least degree bend her from her heroic purpose. Some few females took a yet more active part, and fought side by side with their husbands, brothers, and fathers. The name of one of these heroines has acquired an enduring celebrity. Augustina Saragossa, a handsome young woman of humble birth, coming on the third day of the siege with provisions to the battery that suffered most from the enemy's fire, found every man belonging to it killed. For a moment every one hesitated to secure the guns. Augustina, undaunted, sprang over the dead and the dying, and snatching a match from the hand of a dead artilleryman, fired off a six-and-twenty pounder; and then, jumping upon the gun, made a solemn vow never to quit it alive during the siege. Her courage struck shame to the hearts of the men, who had shrunk from taking the places of the slain; her generous enthusiasm animated with fresh courage all who beheld it. The battery was instantly manned, and the fire being renewed with increased vigour, the French were repulsed at all points. Nor was this an isolated deed of heroism of that heroic girl, who is canonized in the annals of history by the

appellation of "The Maid of Saragossa." During the second siege, visiting a battery in which her husband held the command, and observing the artillerymen so discouraged by his fall, that the battery was on the point of falling into the hands of the enemy, she addressed the troops in an animated tone, and by her personal intrepidity and animated eloquence so rallied them, that they not only repulsed the enemy, but in a successful sortie beat them from the walls. In the course of the War of Independence, she was rewarded, as a testimony of her country's approbation of her patriotic heroism, with a field officer's commission.

Desnouettes now, (July 2nd), supposing that his destructive bombardment had so discouraged the Saragossans, that he could effect a lodgment easily within the gates, advanced with a column towards each of the gates Carmen and Portillo, but so heavy a fire of grape and musketry was opened upon the French, that they were dispersed with great loss.

On the same day, Palafox, with as many of his discomfited troops as he could collect after his defeat at Epila, having re-entered the city by the suburbs on the left bank of the river which had been left unguarded by the enemy—and on the 17th, a regiment of the line from Estremadura, 800 strong, with some artillerymen and artillery, and 300 militia of Logroño, having effected an entrance by the same road—the patriots determined with their new accession of strength to endeavour to retake the Torrero; but they were repulsed with great loss.

By the end of July all communication was cut off with the surrounding country, and, consequently, Saragossa could no longer receive supplies. By the 4th, the French having completed their approaches, so furious a bombardment took place, that the walls of the church and convent of St. Engracia were levelled at the first discharge, and the besiegers rushing through the opening, after a day of dreadful carnage, succeeded in establishing themselves in the convent and the adjacent street. The enemy following up his success, forced his way into the Cozo, in the very centre of the city, and before the day closed was in possession of one-half of Saragossa, as also of one side of the Cozo, while the inhabitants sternly occupied the other. Palafox, Tio George, Tio Martin, and the whole of the Saragossans, performed prodigies of valour on this disastrous day. Desnouettes now thought that



he had conquered, and required Palafox to surrender, in a note containing these words: "Quartel-general, Santa Engracia. La Capitulacion." (Head quarters, St. Engracia. Capitulation.) The heroic Spaniard immediately returned the reply "Quartel-general, Zaragoza. Guerra al Cuchillo." (War at the knife's point.)

"The contest which was now carried on is unexampled in history. One side of the Cozo, a street about as wide as Pall-mall, was possessed by the French; and, in the centre of it, their general, Verdier, gave his orders from the Franciscan convent. The opposite side was held by the Saragossans, who threw up batteries at the openings of the cross streets, within a few paces of those which the French had erected against them. The intervening space was presently heaped with dead, either slain upon the spot, or thrown out from the windows. A deadly contest now ensued, the strife was continued from street to street, from house to house, and from room to room, and was persevered in without intermission night and day. All classes of the citizens vied with each other in the dreadful struggle with the enemy.

In the midst of these difficulties, a reinforcement of 3,000 men, composed of Spanish guards, Swiss, and volunteers of Aragon, with a convoy of ammunition and provisions, having eluded the vigilance of the besiegers, entered the city under the command of Don Francisco Palafox, the general's brother. The murderous contest was now carried on with renewed vigour. In every conflict, the Saragossans now gained ground on the French, winning it inch by inch, till the space occupied by the enemy, which on the day of their entrance was nearly half the city, was gradually reduced to about an eighth part. But after eleven successive days and nights of obstinate and murderous contest, on the break of day of the morning of the 14th August, the enemy was observed in full retreat, over the plain by the road that leads to Pamplona, having abandoned or thrown into the canal, his heavy cannon and siege stores; a measure adopted in consequence of the defeat of Dupont at Baylen, and the failure of Moncey before Valencia. Such was the first siege of Saragossa, and slavish be the heart and base the tongue that attempts to obscure its glory. There is not, either in the annals of ancient or of modern times, an event more worthy to be held in admiration than the Siege of Saragossa.

On the 25th of August, solemn obsequies with military honours were performed in the church of Saragossa, for the heroic men who had fallen, and a funeral oration was pronounced in commemoration of their heroism from the pulpit, by the brave priest Santiago Sass, who had taken part in the perils of the siege. A pension was settled on the Saragossan maid Augustina, with the daily pay of an artilleryman; and she was authorised to wear a small shield of honour upon the sleeve of her gown, with "Saragossa" inscribed upon it. The priest Santiago was presented with a captain's commission; all other persons who had distinguished themselves were rewarded; and the perpetual and irrevocable privilege of never being adjudged to any disgraceful punishment by any tribunal for any offence, except for treason or blasphemy, was conferred on all the inhabitants of the city and its districts, of both sexes and all ranks.

The operations of the French were in several other quarters not more prosperous than they had been at Saragossa. While the sanguinary conflict was raging in that city, Duhesme and Moncey experienced reverses in the south and east of Spain.

About the time that Lefebvre Desnouettes advanced against Saragossa, Duhesme, who commanded the French army in Catalonia, was ordered by Murat to reduce Gerona, a city situated between Figueras and Barcelona, and strongly fortified both by nature and art, in order to open a communication with France for supplies and reinforcements for that garrison. In his march, the French general attacking the peasantry of Valles, who were posted on the heights which terminate at Mongat, to oppose his march, defeated them, and disgraced his victory by the cruelty which he exercised on his prisoners and the unarmed villagers who fell into his hands. Mataro, a rich and flourishing town, containing above 25,000 inhabitants, met with a like fate, because they had attempted to defend the entrance of the town against the French. The town was not only sacked, but the inhabitants were treated in the most merciless manner by the French troops, whom they had but two months before received as guests and friends while they were quartered on them.

Duhesme proceeded plundering, burning, and destroying everything in the whole progress of his march. On the 20th June, he appeared before Gerona, and attempted to take it by storm, but was repulsed by the



brave inhabitants, whose women rivalled the heroines of Saragossa in devotion and heroic conduct. The French general not being prepared to undertake a regular siege, and fearing that the Somatenes assembled without the town would harass him, having sacked the adjoining villages, Salt and St. Eugenia, he retreated by forced marches towards Barcelona, sacking and burning the towns and villages through which he passed, severely harassed by the Somatenes (the Catalonian militia), from their hill-sides in his march. About a week after his return to Barcelona, he again marched out of that city, and defeated a large body of peasantry assembled at Molinos del Rey, with the loss of all their artillery. He then, July 5th, detached general Reille to raise the blockade of Figueras, at that time besieged by the Somatenes, in which duty Reille succeeded; but attempting a *coup-de-main* against Rosas,

was repulsed (July 11th) with loss. On the 24th, Duhesme uniting his forces with those of Reille, advanced against Gerona and commenced operations against that fortress in form; and on the 15th of August, a breach being declared practicable, the assault was about to be commenced, when a general sally was made on the French lines, their cannon spiked, and works set on fire, while the besiegers were engaged in combat with 1,300 troops arrived from Majorca under count Caldague, the governor of the Balearic isles. In consequence of this event, Duhesme was obliged to break up the siege, having lost 2,000 men, and to abandon his baggage, stores, and ammunition; and being exposed to the raking fire of two English frigates as he retreated by the sea-coast, when he reached Catella he threw all his artillery down the precipices to expedite his flight.

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THE SIEGE OF VALENCIA; BATTLES OF BAYLEN, AND MEDINA DEL RIO SECO.

MONCEY, who had been ordered to reduce Valencia, was almost equally unsuccessful in his operations against that city. Advancing from Cuenca, with a force consisting of 12,000 men, besides cavalry, he encountered the new levies of armed peasantry, some Spanish regulars, and Swiss troops, amounting to 6,000 men, assembled in an intrenched camp, at the defile, near Contreras, as also at Las Cabrillas, with the loss of their artillery. At length, on the 27th of June, he appeared before the walls of Valencia, a city containing about 80,000 inhabitants, and situated on the Guadalaviar, in the vicinity of the sea. The Valencians being aware of his approach, laboured day and night on the fortifications; trenches were cut in the principal streets, barriers were constructed across them, chariots and carts were overturned in them, and stones and boiling oil collected on the tops of the houses, to throw upon the assailants.

Having summoned the town to surrender, and received in answer, that the Valencians preferred death to capitulation, the French general ordered (June 29th) an assault to be made, and the French approaching a battery which a Spanish smuggler had treacherously agreed to betray to

them, instead of finding it manned by traitors, were received with a brisk and well sustained fire. As the French advanced, the enthusiasm of the inhabitants increased. The Valencian women imitated the conduct of those of Saragossa and Gerona; they heroically threw themselves into the hottest of the fire, for the purpose of bringing up ammunition to the combatants; and when the grape-shot began to fail, they furnished a supply of missiles consisting of their trinkets and other valuables. After persevering in fruitless attempts from one P.M. to eight in the evening, perceiving that his force was not numerous enough for the civil war which it would have been compelled to wage from house to house, and from street to street, the French general relinquished the attack, and drew off to Cuarte, about a league from the city, having lost 2,000 men in his operations. From this position he quickly retreated, leaving part of his artillery. In his retreat, he attacked and overthrew a corps of 6,000 men, posted on the banks of the Xucar, under the Conde Cervellen; and two days after coming up with the fugitives at Almanza, he overthrew them, with the loss of



all their artillery. On reaching St. Clemente, he began to make preparations which would enable him to renew his attack on Valencia. In the meantime (July 3rd) the town of Cuenca had been delivered up by Caulincourt to pillage, and the inhabitants, men, women, and children, butchered by the ferocious French troops.

**THE BATTLE OF BAYLEN, AND ITS ANTECEDENTS.**—The fortune of Dupont was even more discouraging than that of his compatriots before Saragossa, Gerona, and Valencia.

One of the first acts of Murat, after he had reached Madrid, was to prepare for securing Cadiz, of which city Dupont had been appointed governor, soon after the abdication at Bayonne had been effected. As fears were now entertained for the French squadron at Cadiz, Dupont received orders to march and take possession of that city. At the time of the receipt of the order, he was at Toledo, repressing some tumults that had been manifested there. He began his march the end of May, and crossing the Sierra Morena mountains, and effecting the pass of Despeñas Perros, or Dog Rocks, without opposition, arrived on June 3rd at Andujar, where he had left his hospital of sick and wounded, in his march to Cordova, but who had been overpowered and massacred by a band of Spaniards from Jaen,\* in retaliation for the atrocities prac-

\* The atrocities and rapacity of the French at this time were excessive. The inhabitants, both armed and unarmed, were slaughtered; women violated; and the public buildings, houses, churches, and even the humblest dwellings of the poor, were sacked. Besides exacting from the depôts of the treasury and the consolidation, ten millions of reals for his own private benefit, Dupont compelled the city to raise an enormous contribution for the army.

† The conduct of the French army had become so atrocious, that the Central Junta, with the hope—vain hope! little did they understand the character of the chief of that army, whose standing order to his generals was, to inflict condign vengeance on those patriots who defended their country, and in whose opinion, no crime was so heinous as that of patriotism, none so fearful as that of resisting the oppressor of ones country and the despoiler of its nationality—of shaming them, published a remonstrance, addressed to the French generals, in which the following appeal was made to their humanity and sense of honour:—"In other times war was carried on between army and army, soldier and soldier; their fury spent itself upon the field of battle; and when courage, combined with fortune, had decided the victory, the conquerors behaved to the conquered like men of honour, and the defenceless people were respected. The progress of civilization had tempered the evils of hostility, till a nation that had so lately

tised by the French on the Cordovans. His enraged troops now cried for vengeance on the old Moorish town. Dupont dispatched a battalion of infantry and some cavalry, under one Baste, a sea captain, to put their sanguinary wish into execution. The ferocious seaman and his equally ferocious followers, having plundered and set fire to the town, committed every possible atrocity on the inhabitants, massacring old men and infants at the breast, and violating both women and children;‡ and to enhance this atrocity, Dupont's foraging and scouring parties being unsuccessful in their endeavours to obtain provisions and other supplies for the army, wounded and tortured all the country people whom they could seize for the purpose of compelling them to discover the places in which they had concealed their corn, money, and other property.‡ Proceeding now as in an enemy's country, he attacked the Spaniards posted at the black marble bridge of Alcolea, and defeating them after a brave resistance, carried both the bridge and the village.

Dupont now perceiving that his force was too weak to effectuate the conquest of Andalusia, applied to Joseph Buonaparte for succour. Two divisions were sent to him under generals Vedel and Gobert. Vedel, when he reached the Sierra Morena, found a considerable body of Spaniards intrenched in the tremendous defiles of that great chain

boasted that it was the most polished in the world, renewed, in the nineteenth century, the cruelty of the worst savages, and all the horrors that make us tremble in perusing the history of the irruptions of the barbarians of old. Like tigers, those enemies make no distinction in their carnage—the aged, the infants, the women—all are alike to them, wherever they can find blood to shed."

‡ The French soldiery and their officers were the most adroit marauders that ever marched under the banners of Mars. The first often carried a regular set of house-breaking tools in their knapsacks, and as soon as they entered a town, and were dismissed off parade, they immediately spread themselves over all its localities, like a ravenous brood of vultures, and broke open every house which they thought contained valuable property, or wine or spirits. If they thought the inhabitants had concealed their property by burying it, or by placing it between the walls of the house and a temporary wall they had erected, for the purpose of forming a vacuity in which to deposit the property; in the first case they threw water on the suspected spots, to ascertain whether it was quickly absorbed, as then it would be an indication of its having been recently dug; and in the second, they measured the inner and outer walls of houses and buildings, and according as they were disproportionate, they proceeded to dismantle the buildings.



of mountains. The first brigade and the cavalry of his army were allowed to pass the ambush, laid among the trees and rocks, in advance of the intrenchment, but on the second brigade a tremendous fire was opened; eventually the superior discipline of the enemy prevailed, and the patriots were dislodged with considerable loss. Vedel then passed the defiles, and advanced to Baylen, a village distant a short march from Andujar.

Dupont's situation was now becoming very insecure, his difficulties and distresses increasing daily. Twenty-five thousand peasants were gathering round his position, and Castaños was lining the opposite bank of the Guadalquivir with an equal number of infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and a heavy train of artillery; and these men, both of the regular and peasantry force, by the exertions of the Spanish general, had acquired habits of discipline, and obtained confidence in themselves and their officers. In effectuating that reform, he had endeavoured "to introduce among them that moral and religious discipline by which Cromwell, and the Swedish hero, Gustavus, before had made their soldiers invincible. He issued an order for banishing all strumpets from the camp, and sending them to a place of correction and penitence; he called on the officers to set their men an example, by putting away the plague from themselves, and dismissing all suspicious persons; he charged the chaplains to do their duty zealously, and threatened condign punishment to any person, of what rank soever, who should act in contempt of these orders. Such irregularities, he said, would draw down the divine anger, and make the soldiers resemble in licentiousness the French, who, for their foul abominations, were justly hated by God and man; and it would be in vain to gather armies, if at the same time they gathered together sins, and thereby averted from themselves the protection of the Almighty, which alone could ensure them the victory over their enemies."

The winding Guadalquivir flowed between the hostile armies. On the evening of the 16th of July, Castaños, with the main body of the Spanish army, crowned the Visos (heights) de Andujar, a strong and advantageous position directly in front of the town of Andujar, at the same time detaching Reding and Coupigny, with two divisions, to interpose between Dupont and Vedel.

In a desperate conflict at one of the fords of the river, the Swiss general, Reding, drove the enemy from their *tête-du-pont* at Menjibar, and the commanding officer, Gobert, fell mortally wounded. The patriots now took post in a strong position in front of Baylen.

Dupont now determined to march to the assistance of Vedel. On the night of the 18th, as soon as darkness had closed the day, the French, having first plundered the inhabitants of all that was portable, marched from Andujar, and advanced towards Baylen. At three o'clock in the morning of the 19th, he vigorously attacked Reding; but was repulsed. When day broke, the French re-formed their columns, and advanced to the attack. The greatest intrepidity was displayed by both armies. Several times the French broke the Spanish lines; but the Spaniards, knowing that reinforcements were at hand, resolutely recovered themselves. The battle had been long and bloody, when Dupont and his generals, putting themselves at the head of their men, made a last charge with the most determined bravery; but they were repulsed with equal determination. The arrival of the Spanish reserve under De la Peña (the future Bermeja hero), on the field of battle at the moment, and the desertion of some Swiss battalions, who went over to their countryman, Reding, during the battle, determined the French general to surrender; he therefore held up the white flag, and proposed an armistice. A capitulation was accordingly entered into on the morning of the 20th, by virtue of which Dupont and his army were to remain prisoners of war, as also Vedel and his division, who had surrounded and made prisoners a battalion of Reding's corps at Carolina, before he knew of Dupont's surrender, were, according to the first arrangement, after having laid down their arms, to have been allowed to quit Andalusia. Some of the prisoners were sent to serve in the hulks or prison-ships in the bay of Cadiz; others to the desolate island of Cabrera, lying about ten miles from the southernmost point of Majorca, in the Mediterranean. Dupont and the officers of his staff, as also all the generals, were exempted from the capitulation, and allowed to return to France. On their arrival there they were imprisoned, and having been tried, were condemned by a court-martial. As public opinion was loud in their favour, the sentence was not carried



into execution, but their imprisonment continued till the capture of Paris by the allies. The prisoners amounted to between 18,000 and 19,000, and the loss of the French in battle had been 4,000 in killed and wounded.

The loss of the battle by the French, was occasioned by Dupont's making independent attacks with separate brigades of his army, as they successively came into line, instead of a simultaneous charge with his whole force; and by his having kept the best of his troops in reserve, to guard his baggage and plunder, which was enormous, consisting of the pillage of the churches, convents, monasteries, and houses of all the towns he had entered. The approaching anniversary of the great victory of Las Navas de Toloso, so celebrated in Spanish annals, tended, from religious, national, and local feelings, greatly to animate Spanish bosoms on the day of the battle of Baylen.\*

The news of the battle of Baylen diffused a joy and triumph over Spain. The Spaniards now thought themselves invincible, and that the issue of that battle was a confirmation of the national hallucination, that Spaniards cannot be overcome only by Spanish soldiers. Views of the Pyrenees, and of their triumphant march to Paris, attended by "*nuestros amigos los Ingleses*" (our friends the English), as quiet and admiring spectators of their valorous doings, flitted over their imaginations, and inflated their constitutional overweening conceit and vanity. But the victory of Baylen had a better result than the indulgence of national superstitious belief; it occasioned the breaking up of the siege of Saragossa, and the flight of Joseph and his adherents from Madrid to Vittoria, the road to which had been opened to the intrusive king in consequence of the battle of Medina del Rio Seco, fought July 14th, 1808; after which he proceeded on his journey to Madrid, to take possession of his usurped throne, which he had scarcely occupied a fortnight before he was, in conse-

quence of the victory at Baylen, compelled to flee neck and heels from it.

**THE BATTLE OF MEDINA DEL RIO SECO.**—The first battle of any importance between the patriots and the French was fought near the town of Medina del Rio Seco, which is situated a few leagues from the city of Valladolid. There the Spanish general Cuesta had taken post with an army variously stated from 14,000 to 40,000 men, consisting of raw levies and a few Walloon regiments. Bessières, in expectation of a sure victory, marched against him with 15,000 men. Cuesta had drawn up his army in two lines, at the distance of a mile and-a-half from each other. Blake commanded the first line, Cuesta the second. Bessières observing the faulty disposition, immediately threw himself in the chasm between the two lines, and attacked Blake in rear and front, and in an instant overthrew him. Cuesta immediately moved his line forward to repair the disorder. The Spaniards attacked the enemy's infantry with so impetuous ardour, that they forced it to give way, when the troops set up a shout of victory; but too soon; for the French, charging the left wing, after a short and sanguinary struggle, broke it, and thus the fortune of the day was decided, the Spaniards taking to headlong flight. Few bloodier battles, or, in more appropriate language, savage massacres, have ever been fought in proportion to the numbers in the field, even if the force of the Spaniards be taken at the highest estimate. According to the Spanish and French accounts, the Spanish loss was stated to be between 5,000 and 6,000 killed and wounded, 2,000 prisoners, with eighteen guns, and all their ammunition; that of the French, 50 killed and 300 wounded; but according to better authority, that of the neighbouring priests, it is affirmed that 27,000 bodies were buried. And this is the more probable account, as the battle was savagely fought, and little mercy shown in the pursuit. The victors in the pursuit of the scared and fleeing fugitives, sacked the town of Rio Seco, and compelled all the nuns of its convents to submit to the brutal violence of the soldiery.

\* In that battle, fought July the 16th, 1212, at Baylen, Alphonso IX. gained the victory over a Mussulman host of two hundred thousand combatants.



## THE PORTUGUESE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

A.D. 1808.

WHILE the events just recited were passing in Spain, Portugal was in a state of political convulsion. No sooner had the news of the popular insurrection of Madrid become known at the Spanish frontier town of Badajos, than a lieutenant of the Walloon guards, was sent by Moretti to Lisbon to consult with Carraffa, commanding the contingent of Spanish troops which had marched on that kingdom with Junôt.

When Moretti's mission became known to Junôt, awakening from his dreams of royalty, to prevent its success he divided the Spanish contingent force into small detachments, stationing with each detachment a superior number of French. His plan however was not successful. Some deserted in small parties; others in larger; but the regiment of Murcia marched in a body. To intercept the Spanish regiment, Junôt sent a detachment of 600 French; the two parties met at Os Pegoens; the Spaniards being victorious, proceeded on their march. The Spanish troops who had taken possession of the Alemtejo and the south of Portugal, to keep Godoy's kingdom warm till he was ready to occupy it, escaped to Badajos, whence they were forwarded to Leon to share in the disasters of the battle of Medina del Rio Seco. The Spaniards at Oporto, who had occupied the north of Portugal, under Bellesta, marched for Corunna.

The students of Coimbra were the first to join the patriotic standard; the mountaineers of Tras-os-Montes, the provinces of the Algarves, the Alemtejo, Beira, and Entre-Douro-e-Minho, quickly followed their example. The people of Oporto rose to a man, and the Portuguese soldiery joined them; the prince regent was proclaimed at Braganza, the standard of the displaced dynasty displayed, and, in imitation of the Spanish patriots, a provisional junta of supreme government was appointed at Oporto, till the government instituted by the prince should be established; deputies or envoys despatched to England, to solicit protection and succour, and the council of

the regency established, of which the principal, Souza, and that intriguing priest, the bishop, now denominated the *patriarch*, were members.

To suppress the insurrection, Junôt applied himself with diligence. Having disarmed between 4,000 and 5,000 of the Spanish troops, and secured them in ships and hulks upon the Tagus, he directed Loisson to proceed with a division against the insurgents in the north; but the insurrection was so formidable, and the insurgent peasantry were so rapidly gathering around him, that he countermarched on Lisbon, routing the insurgents at Celerico and Guarda with great slaughter; and sacking the villages of Pezo, Regoa, and Nazareth, where neither age, nor infirmity, nor sex, nor childhood, was spared, for he was a man devoid of honour and humanity, notorious for rapacity in the most rapacious army that ever disgraced the profession of arms, and carried on war in the worst spirit of the worst ages, plundering and massacring without limit and without remorse. Margaron executed like vengeance at Leiria, where he butchered the old and the young, women and children, the babe suckling at the mother's breast, and the infirm and the sick lying on the bed of helplessness, without remorse or discrimination. When the streets and houses lacked furnishing his savage followers with means for their carnage, the miserable inhabitants, who had taken refuge in the churches, were dragged out and slaughtered in the open space in front of the chapel of St. Bartholomew.\* The town was then sacked, and partially set on fire. Equally atrocious practices took place at Guarda in the north, and at Evora, Beja, and Villa-vigosa in the south; those unhappy towns were given up to indiscriminate massacre, and the women, after having suffered violation, were slaughtered. "Beja," said the ruthless Kellerman, in his proclamation to the people of the Alemtejo, "is no more. Its guilty inhabitants have been put to the sword; its houses delivered work with the sword and bayonet, and the butt end of the musket, and finished it by firing upon their victims.—(*Historia Geral da Invasam dos Francezes em Portugal*, tom. iv., p. 42.)

\* The greater number of the unfortunate captives falling on their knees, in tones of agony implored the mercy of their executioners. The murderers, as if they delighted in the act of butchery, began their



up to pillage and the flames. Thus shall all those be treated who take up arms against us." At Villa-viçosa, insult had, in the wantonness of power and military licentiousness, been added to wrong. There was an image of *Nuestra Senhora dos Remedios*, (our Lady of Remedies,) which, after having, by a supernatural declaration of its own pleasure, changed its name, made sundry voyages to and from India, and travelled from one place to another during more than four-score years, had at length graciously condescended to take up its residence at Villa-viçosa, in a chapel of its own, where, being in high odour for its miraculous powers, it was visited with peculiar devotion on its own holiday, the 19th of June, by the people of that town, and the adjacent country. Some French soldiers, not disposed to reverence the systematic frauds to which the idol had contributed its influence to enable the priests to delude their Portuguese adherents, placing themselves in a gateway near the chapel, amused themselves with deriding the Portuguese, who, in the ignorant simplicity of their hearts, were going thither to worship. Some of the peasants resenting this insult, a scuffle ensued, and at length, amounting to a complete riot, an open insurrection broke out, in which a few Frenchmen being slain, Kellerman ordered general Aril to advance against the insurgents, of whom many hundreds were bayoneted, and the place given up to pillage. Setubal escaped a fate similar to that of the cities just specified. That

beautiful city had been devoted to pillage, but was saved by the interference of a Portuguese woman, who lived as his mistress, with general Graindorge, who then was in command in the Alemtejo, having succeeded the sanguinary and peculating Loisson. Before the ruthless French had been able to enter Evora, to perpetrate their atrocities, they had to contend with 10,000 Portuguese, and 4,000 Spanish troops, posted in front of the town, who had advanced from Badajos to their aid. But at the first shock of the enemy's attack, the undisciplined peasantry fled in confusion, and their Spanish auxiliaries soon followed their example. Of the insurgents, the French military historian, Thiébault, boasts that 8,000 were slain or wounded, while the loss of his own countrymen, who mercilessly slaughtered those defenceless men, was trifling. The affairs of Portugal now were to assume a more promising complexion. The intelligence that a British army had appeared off the coast of Portugal, arrested Loisson in his blood-stained progress towards Elvas, infused life and spirit into the bosoms of the Portuguese portraits, and its bugles announced, from the rock of Lisbon, the advent of the removal of the hallucination and mistaken notions of French invincibility, of the craven-hearted dread of the French legions and their leader, which had fascinated and enchained the people of continental Europe, and the overthrow of the most grinding despotism that had ever cursed the face of the earth.

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#### THE SPANISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, CONTINUED TO CLOSE OF 1808.

THE train that the emperor had laid for his scheme of universal aggression and spoliation being now ready for ignition, he prepared to proceed to the scene of action. In *The Preliminary Observations to the Peninsular Campaigns*, the reader has been informed of the principal events that conducted to the completion of that scheme. But as the preparatory feat of the "Erfurth Conference" has not been mentioned there, its introduction here will tend to throw addi-

tional light on the dark doings of the French despot.

He had long designed the subjugation of the Spanish and Portuguese Peninsula. To disguise the prosecution of his designs, he invited the Russian emperor Alexander to a conference at Erfurth, a town in the north of Germany, having previously communicated to that "imperial personage" the design of overthrowing the English power in India, and of dismembering the Turkish empire,



and partitioning the spoil between himself, Austria, and Russia; the Austrian cabinet no doubt, having previously lent a willing ear to the righteous purpose. Having appointed a day for the conference, he hied to its locality with a crowd of obsequious and fawning princes and potentates—messieurs the parasites of “The Confederation of the Rhine”—in his train; and on the arrival of Alexander, eternal friendship was pledged between the two plotters.\* To disguise their designs, they professed the object of their meeting was “influenced by the voice of humanity, to put an end to the bloody continental war that had so long been raging, and to seek, in a speedy pacification, the happiness and common interests of Europe.” The two emperors wrote a joint letter to the king of England, inviting him to co-operate with them in their humane design. A correspondence on the subject took place between the English government and the agents of the French government, but it was soon broken off, as the ruse of the joint imperial letter was too evident to be mistaken. Buonaparte having, as he thought, accomplished his long-cherished design of “driving the hideous leopard into the sea, and of planting his eagles on the ramparts of Lisbon,” issued the following braggart and bombastic proclamation to the French troops who were to be the agents to carry his design into execution:—“Soldiers, I have occasion for you! The hideous presence of the leopard contaminates the continent of Spain and Portugal. Let your aspect terrify and drive him hence.” When he issued this high-toned address to his soldiers, he hoped, no doubt, that his equally boasting threat of being in Lisbon in the course of three months was on the point of realization, when he was to “finish the war with a thunder-clap.”

The troops appointed for this Quixotic purpose were—first corps, Victor, 33,937; second corps, Bessières, 38,054; third corps, Moncey, 37,690; fourth corps, Lefebvre, 25,984; fifth corps, Mortier, 26,713; sixth corps, Ney, 38,033; seventh corps, St. Cyr, 42,107; eighth corps, Junôt, 25,730; re-

\* Amidst the festivities, the fêtes, and the frolics of his ballet girls and opera dancers, collected to entertain and solace his imperial and regal guests, he studiously took the opportunity of giving a momentous admonitory hint to his guest, the imperial autocrat of Russia. He took him to the battle-field of Jena, where a temple to Victory was erected, in which the French emperor had passed the night pre-

serve, Napoleon, 42,382; on march from France, 14,060. In all, 319,690. This vast host was composed of all nations; of French, Germans, Italians, Poles, Swiss, Dutch, Saxons, Bavarians, and even Irish, Scotch, and Mamelukes—for every nation contributed to supply “the insatiable tyrant’s demand for human life”—all dressed in their national uniforms, except the Irish and Scotch; but all wore the same cockade, and had the same shout of war, and the same cry to rally.

Napoleon Buonaparte having, by his arrangements at the Erfurth conference, secured himself from the probability of being attacked on his rear, while carrying his projects into execution, set out for the scene of action, and arrived at Vittoria, November the 8th. He immediately proceeded to put his plans into execution, and assigned to each of his agents in his wanton and unprincipled aggression on the nationality of Spain, his part and character in the drama of fraud and butchery. Soult, in obedience to the mandate of spoliation, proceeded to prosecute the destruction of the army of the Spanish centre.

THE BATTLE OF GAMONAL, which is sometimes termed the *Battle of Burgos*, was fought November the 10th. Gamonal is a village, situated in front of Burgos, and about one league distant from it.

The Spanish army consisted of about 19,000 men, of whom 12,000 were regulars, the Spanish Walloon guards and the royal carabineers being among them; the rest were new levies, without any organization; the whole equipped and clothed by the English government.

This force was no sooner attacked by the French infantry, than it broke and fled in utter confusion towards Burgos, and was pursued by Bessières’s cavalry, which having inflicted dreadful execution on the fugitives, entered Burgos pell-mell with them; the victorious cavalry passing through immense piles of wood placed on each side of the streets, and intended to have been carried for sale into France in their contemplated reveries of a triumphal advance into that country. The loss of the Spaniards was vious to the battle, and tents were pitched around it, for the purpose of entertaining his visitors to a sumptuous breakfast. The French entertainer paraded his Russian guest over every part of the ground which the contending armies had occupied, and left him to make his reflections upon the spot where Prussia had received the galling chains with which she was fettered, as a reward of her subserviency to France.



2,500 in slain, 900 prisoners, six stand of colours, and all their artillery. The battalion of students, volunteers from the universities of Leon and Salamanca, had displayed that courage which might be expected from men of their condition, whom patriotism had brought to the field; they all fell in the ranks in which they had stood. Burgos was given up by the French general to the plunder of his troops. Belvedere and the wreck of his army fled to Segovia.

On the second day after the battle of Gamonal, Burgos became the head quarters of Napoleon Buonaparte, and the centre of the operations of the French; 10,000 light troops were dispatched forward to scour the country, levy contributions, and diffuse a general terror of the French arms. They swept over the plains of Leon as far as Benevente, Toro, and Torderillas, spreading everywhere the boastful proclamations of Napoleon Buonaparte, and declaring, that notwithstanding their utmost efforts, the French cavalry were not able to overtake the English army, which was fearfully fleeing to its ships. The armies of the left and centre, having been annihilated, Lannes with 30,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, was ordered to advance against that of the right under Castaños, who, notwithstanding he was acquainted with the overthrow of the armies of Blake and Belvedere, had adopted the extravagant conceit, of marching to Burgos, and there annihilating the French reserves and rear-guard; but ascertaining that Ney was advancing against himself, and had entered Soria on the 19th of November, he retreated towards Tudela, which he reached on the evening of the 22nd, and was there joined by Palafox, and the army of Aragon: their united armies amounting to 40,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, with 40 guns.

THE BATTLE OF TUDELA was fought November 22nd, and by its issue the fate of the patriot Spanish armies was sealed.

It had been the intention of the French generals, who considered the defeat and destruction of the army of the left as certain as that of the right under Blake had been, to practise the same manœuvre against it as had been done against Blake's army, namely, routing it by a powerful attack in front, and then destroying the fugitives by intercepting them with a second force in their flight; but Lannes, when he observed its faulty position, being drawn up on a range of inconsiderable hills, nearly

six miles in length, stretching from Tudela to Taragona, ordered general Maurice Mathieu to pierce the centre with a division of infantry, when the cavalry under Lefebvre Desnouettes, rapidly passing through the broken line, wheeled to the left, and by the oblique movement surrounded the Spanish right wing, which the Aragonese held; and, at the same moment, general Morlet attacking them in flank, the fate of the battle in that wing was decided. The assailants immediately turning fiercely on the centre, speedily routed it. The fate of the left wing, in which "the conquerors of Baylen" were stationed, was decided at the same moment by Lagrange's division. The disheartened Spaniards fled in confusion, leaving 5,000 of their comrades on the field of battle, 3,000 prisoners, and all their ammunition and guns in the hands of the victors. Fifteen thousand Aragonese, Valencians, and Castilians, found refuge in Saragossa, and the wreck of Castaños' force fell back on Calatayud, a turn of fortune with which Ney's greediness favoured them, that marshal halting in his pursuit of the fugitives, three days at Soria, for the purpose of pillaging that town, and possessing himself of the large quantities of wool collected there.

The battles of Espinosa, Gamonal, or as it is sometimes styled, Burgos, and Tudela, having opened the passage to the capital, Napoleon Buonaparte, who was at the time at Vittoria, immediately advanced with the imperial guards, Victor's corps, and the reserve, amounting to 60,000 men, towards Madrid. At break of day of the 30th of November, reaching the Samosierra Pass, which was defended by 12,000 men, the wreck of Belvedere's army, and sixteen pieces of cannon, intrenched on the heights of Sepulveda, which overlooked the principal pass. The advanced guard of the French, consisting of three regiments of infantry, commenced the attack, and the Polish lancers and chasseurs of the guard charging along the causeway, the pass and its batteries were won by assault, and its defenders fled in disorder towards Segovia. The way to Madrid being now open, the central junta, which had been appointed on the 25th of September, fled in dismay from Madrid to Badajos.

Two days before the passage of the Samosierra, the people of Madrid began to make preparations to resist the enemy. Trenches were opened, batteries erected, the streets



barricaded, and the pavements torn up. Eight thousand muskets were distributed; but when the ammunition was served out, many of the cartridges were found to be filled with black sand, instead of gunpowder; and when the people clamoured for cartridges, Morla, to whom the defence of the city had been entrusted, said that there were none. "Happy would it have been for Morla, had he then perished under the hands of the indignant mob, as then the treachery to his country which he was preparing, would never have been known on earth, and he would have escaped perpetual infamy."

On the morning of December 2nd, only an hour or two after the flight of the central junta, the advanced guard of the French came within sight of Madrid, and immediately summoned it to surrender; and as an answer was not returned, the fortified palace of the Retiro was attacked and carried. From its heights, which completely command the city, a few shells were thrown, in the hope of intimidating the inhabitants, and in the forenoon of the following day, Berthier sent a flag of truce threatening the utmost severity of military execution, if the signal of surrender was not hoisted within two hours. At five in the afternoon Morla and Ivriarte arrived at the French head-quarters, to negotiate as deputies on behalf of the town, the terms of surrender. At daybreak, on the morning of the 5th, the capitulation was signed, and by ten o'clock the French general, Belliard, took the command of the city. Soon numerous deputations of the nobles, clergy, and public authorities, waited on Buonaparte at his head-quarters at Chamartin, to swear fealty to the pseudo king Joseph, who had entered Madrid "in the tail of the French army," and taken possession of the royal palace of the Prado. The French adventurer having thus far succeeded in his projects, gave "orders to compose songs descriptive of the glory the grand army had acquired, and would acquire"—no doubt designed as an allusion to his design of "driving the hideous leopard into the sea;" for "*God had given power and inclination,*" as he had told the Madrilleños in his proclamation, "*to surmount all difficulties!*"

At this conjuncture, the English army, under sir John Moore, was struggling in the heart of Spain with the difficulties in which the disasters of the Spanish armies, and the imbecility and perverseness of its

generals and provisional government, had involved it. Buonaparte, aware of those difficulties, and having found that its presence paralyzed the movements of the whole of the French armies in the south of Spain, determined to overwhelm and destroy it. Orders were immediately dispatched from Madrid to all the French generals to advance in concentric lines on the devoted English army; while he himself, with 50,000 men, hurried through the Guadarama pass, for the same purpose. But on reaching Astorga, receiving intelligence of the preparation of Austria for war, he deputed Soult and Ney to pursue the English, with 60,000 men, and he set out with the imperial guard, to return to Paris.

The disasters of the patriots still kept increasing. On the 11th of December, Victor being in possession of Toledo, Aranguez, and Ocaña, overran the open and defenceless plains of Lower La Mancha, foraging and plundering the towns and villages with impunity as far as Manzanares. The little hamlet of Vellacoñas, by its heroism, having resisted the assaults of the enemy for five successive days, remained safe and uninjured, while the whole country round had been plundered. About the same time, Vanegas—who had taken post with the rear guard, consisting of 5,000 men of Castaños' broken army, near the village of Buvierca, in the narrow gorge where the river Xalon has forced its way through the two great mountain ridges in that portion of the high road to Madrid, in order to cover the retreat of the disorganized patriots—was attacked by 8,000 French troops under general Mathieu, but after eight hours' contest compelled the French to withdraw, and thus secured the retreat of Castaños and his forces.

But these gleams of successful exertion were to be soon obscured by fresh disasters. The provincial government of the central junta, influenced by the reckless and unreasonable self-confidence of their countrymen, and relying on the saints and the virgin, determined to endeavour to recover Barcelona. For this purpose, general Vives was dispatched to take the command of an army of 30,000 men, which had been assembled by the marquis of Palacios. The French determined on its relief. Gouvion St. Cyr was ordered by Buonaparte to effectuate it: as a necessary preparatory measure, he besieged Rosas, a town situated four leagues east of Figueras. On November the 6th, he sat down before the place; and on the 16th,



attempted to carry Fort Trinidad, into which lord Cochrane, with eighty marines of the *Imperieuse*, had thrown himself, but was repulsed.\* After a month's siege the citadel having been battered in breach, till it was no longer tenable, capitulated Decem-

ber the 5th; and the garrison, marching out with the honours of war, were sent prisoners to France. As his post was no longer tenable, lord Cochrane then embarked his men, and blew up the magazine of the fort.

#### SIEGE (THE SECOND AND FINAL) OF SARAGOSSA.

AFTER the disastrous issue of the battle of Tudela, the Saragossans, aware that the first object of the French would be the attempt to reduce their city, exerted themselves with the greatest vigour in preparing for the assault. Every strong building was fortified; the convents and churches were converted into barracks; the streets were barricaded and retrenched; the doors and windows of the houses were walled up, their whole front pierced with loop-holes and communications opened within from house to house, and the suburbs were included in the new fortifications. That beyond the Ebro was defended by redoubts and fleches, with batteries and traverses at the entrance of the streets. The artillery amounted to 190 pieces, the greater part being four, eight, and twelve-pounders, the pieces of a larger calibre were mostly those that had been recovered from the canal into which the French had thrown them on their retreat after the first siege. Great part of the cannon balls also were what the French had fired or left behind them. To prevent all danger from the explosion of their magazines, it was determined to make the gunpowder as it was wanted, which could be easily done, as Saragossa was the place where all the saltpetre of Aragon was refined. The ammunition, stores, and provisions, were sufficient for six months.

The inhabitants, all combatants, were supported by 30,000 regular troops, and 15,000 armed peasants; and the excavators employed on the canal, were enrolled as sappers and miners. Even the women were enrolled

in companies to aid the combatants and attend to the sick. The countess Burita commanded those patriotically devoted females.

Three days had, by a general order, been allowed for all women, men above threescore years of age, and all boys under fourteen, to leave the town, and be provided for whithersoever they went. But the sentiment of patriotism was so ardent, that not one of the inhabitants left the place. In no place would they have imagined themselves so secure as in Saragossa, which had been so wonderfully defended and delivered, and which they believed to be invincible through the all-powerful protection of Our Lady of the Pillar, who had chosen it for the seat of her peculiar worship. During the former siege prints of that venerated idol had been distributed by women in the heat of action, and worn by men in their hats as a badge and an amulet; and the many remarkable escapes and deliverances that had occurred during that memorable event, were ascribed to the immediate interference of the Magna Mater of Saragossa. Thus the city was all fortress, the population one vast garrison.

The French, who had since the battle of Tudela, been sedulously making preparations for the reduction of Saragossa, advanced with an army consisting of nearly 30,000 men, under marshal Moncey, and on the 20th December invested the town. On the next morning, the fortified outpost of Monte Torrero was attacked and carried after a slight resistance, the garrison having retired into the town; but an attack on the suburb,

\* Lord Cochrane had prepared for the defence of the place with that sportiveness with which English sailors are as much characterized as schoolboys. He formed a rampart within the breach of palisades and barrels, ships' hammock-cloths, awning, &c., filled with sand and rubbish: these supplied the place of walls and ditches. When the assault was made upon

the breach of his little garrison, he not only stationed men with bayonets immediately within the breach, but he laid well-greased planks across the breach, upon which many of the French slipped and fell, in endeavouring to pass; and he hung ropes there with fish-hooks fastened to them, by which not a few were caught in their retreat.



two days after, was repelled with great slaughter of the enemy, according to the Spanish accounts 4,000, but according to the French, only the same number of hundreds.

On the 24th, the French marshal having completed the investment of the town on both sides of the river, the trenches were opened on the night of the 29th of December, and a powerful fire was directed against the walls. Meantime the besieged had raised a line of counter approaches, which compelled the enemy to prolong their works, lest they should be enfiladed; sallies were made from the town to interrupt the works, to cut down the olive trees, and destroy the buildings which afforded the enemy cover; and on the last day of the year, the besieged made a general attempt along the whole line to interrupt and impede the enemy's proceedings, but were repulsed in all quarters.

St. Cyr having obtained possession of Rosas, on December the 5th, advanced to the relief of Barcelona, an object of so great importance, that Buonaparte, in his instructions to him, said he would sooner lose 80,000 men than that fortress. Vives, on hearing of his approach, dispatched Reding, the *real* conqueror at Baylen, with 4,000 men to oppose him; and leaving a sufficient force to keep up the blockade, followed him with 5,000 men, with the intention of occupying an advantageous position between Vallaba and Llinas. A junction was formed by the two Spanish corps at Granillars, just as the French had passed through the defile of Treinta-pasos. On the following morning, he came in sight of the enemy ready drawn up for battle.

Souham's division was ordered to turn Reding's right; and two battalions were ordered to make a false attack on the left of the Spanish division. The left and centre were forced at the same moment; and though Reding had hitherto been successful, being now attacked by Souham's division, a total rout ensued. It was eight o'clock when the battle began, and before nine the Spaniards were in full flight, having lost 2,000 in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the opportunity of repeating at

the defile of Trienta-pasos, the occurrence at Baylen.

Reding having collected as many of the fugitives as he could, took post at Moliños del Rey. On December 21st, the French took up a position in his front, and on the 21st, attacking the Spanish army, a total rout ensued, every man fleeing his own way, and abandoning everything—fifty pieces of artillery, and large magazines, rewarding the victors. On the withdrawal of that part of the besieging force under Vives and Reding, Duhesme sallied out of Barcelona, and attacked the blockading besiegers under Caldagues, but was bravely met and repulsed. The defeat at Llinas however, induced him to break up the siege and return behind the Lobregat.

This disastrous campaign closed with the duke del Infantado's chivalrous self-delusion of the recovery of Madrid, the relief of Saragossa, as also of aiding the English army by pursuing the left wing of Soult's army then in operation against the English. In the prosecution of this quixotic design, he first attempted to surprise a body of 1,500 French cavalry who were scouring the country on both sides of the Tagus, and plundering a great part of the provinces of Cuença and La Mancha; but the infantry portion of his force, instead of surprising the enemy in Tarancon, were themselves surprised by them. The French, however, being inferior in number, after a stout resistance, retreated with some loss to Aranjuez.

Though England had not yet taken an active part in the contest between the patriots and their oppressors, it deeply sympathised in the cause of freedom and justice. From the beginning of the contest in June, 1808, to the commencement of 1809, subsidies in money amounting to £3,100,000, besides large voluntary contributions from the different towns throughout the country; and 200,177 muskets, 61,300 sabres, 79,000 pikes, 98 cannons, 38 mortars, 23,477,000 cartridges, 31,000 cannon balls, 6,000,000 of bullets, 150,000 barrels of powder, and an immense quantity of accoutrements, clothing, boots, shoes, and other necessaries, had been furnished to the patriots by the English government.



## WELLINGTON'S PORTUGUESE AND SPANISH CAMPAIGNS.

A.D. 1809.

WHEN sir Hew Dalrymple and sir Henry Burrard were recalled to attend the board of inquiry with sir Arthur Wellesley, relative to the Cintra Convention, sir John Craddock was appointed to the command of the British forces in Portugal; and as the Portuguese troops were in a very inefficient state of discipline, the Portuguese regency consented that Lisbon, and the frontier towns, should be garrisoned by the English.

To reorganize the Portuguese army, major-general Beresford (with the rank of field-marshal in the Portuguese service), and a number of English officers, were dispatched to Portugal. On his arrival (March, 1809) in that country, the marshal established his head quarters at Thomar; and collecting the Portuguese troops in masses, recast their military system on the model of the British army; but in the prosecution of his measures, he met with much opposition and perverseness from the regency.

To preserve a connected view of the affairs of the Peninsula from the period of its evacuation by the British army under sir John Moore, till the arrival of sir Arthur Wellesley in Portugal, April 22nd, 1809, it is necessary to present the reader with a recapitulated abstract of the operations of the French armies, and of the reverses of the

\* Ferrol is a seaport on the opposite side of the bay on which Corunna stands. It is almost impregnable, both by sea and land. To force the passage is impossible, ships having for the distance of a league to file one by one along a shore defended by forts.

† At Oporto, the conduct of the captors was cruel and outrageous in the extreme: neither age, sex, nor innocence, found favour at the hands of the infuriated foe. "Neither the shrieks of women and children, nor the prayers and entreaties of the feeble and helpless, arrested the sword of the merciless soldiery; ten thousand of the defenceless and unresisting inhabitants had been numbered among the slain of the defenders of the city, the cavalry charging through the streets, and slaughtering all whom they encountered." While that scene of horror was in operation, four thousand of both sexes were seen fleeing before their pursued countrymen, and reaching, in a frenzied tumult, the pontoon bridge, the foremost sunk into the stream, leaving a gulf in the agitated water, into which the dense mass was precipitated. To add to the dismal scene, the French artillery discharged incessant showers of grape on the mass in the stream, and the boats that attempted to approach the wretched throng. The plunder continued for several days, during which time it was accompanied with every

Spanish and Portuguese patriots during that period.

Immediately on the sailing of the British army from Corunna, Malgarejo, the governor, surrendered his trust to the French, though he, like many others of his countrymen, had sworn to bury himself under its ruins. Alcedo, governor of Ferrol,\* followed his example; and he of Vigo, not to be outdone in heroic patriotism by his neighbouring compatriots, surrendered his trust. In Corunna and Ferrol, Soult possessed himself of immense stores, which had been sent to those towns by the English government, for the use of the patriots.

The French general now directed his march on Portugal; and entering that country, captured Chaves and Braga. The city of Oporto,† after a resolute resistance by the Portuguese for three days, surrendered on the 28th. Delaborde and Franceschi had defeated the Portuguese under Baron Ebeu (a German attaché in the English service, who had succeeded to the command on the murder of Freire by his mutinous troops) at Carvalho d'Esté, or as some accounts designate the battle, Braga, with great slaughter; which was greatly increased by the merciless havoc made by the French in the pursuit; Franceschi species of violence and outrage. Oporto, which is the largest city in Portugal, except Lisbon, is a seaport, situated on the Douro, about three-quarters of a league from the mouth of that river. It is built on the declivity of a steep hill, so steep in some parts, namely the east side of the town, that the houses are only approached by steps cut out of the rock. It is an unfortified town, but partly surrounded by an old wall five or six feet high, flanked at intervals by strong towers. To the east lies Villa Nova do Porto; and between it and Gaya lie, on a small plain along the river, the immense vaults or lodges in which the wines manufactured in the provinces of Tras-os-Montes and Entre-Douro-e-Minho are kept till stored. The river during the heavy rains and the melting of the snow on the mountains, often rises to the height of twenty feet. The mouth of the river being obstructed by rocks and quicksands, renders the navigation of the passage of its bar difficult and hazardous. In the contest between the emperor Pedro and his brother Miguel, for the restoration of Dona Maria to the Portuguese throne, and while Oporto was occupied by the liberating army of Portugal, 3,000 pipes of wine were started into the Douro, to prevent their falling into the hands of Pedro, when the river ran blood red.



# SPAIN AND PORTUGAL



The Illustrations by N. Whinck & Engraved by J. Rogers.

The Map Drawn & Engraved by J. Rapkin.



getting in advance of the fugitives, and compelling them to halt, until the infantry came up to bayonet them.

The Spanish patriots had been equally unfortunate. The beginning of their calamities was at Torquemada, where the Spaniards first resisted the oppressors of their country; the consequence was, the slaughter of the inhabitants, and the delivery of the town to the flames. Their next discomfiture was at Cabeçon, where, under Cuesta, they experienced so complete a derout, that the enemy entered that town with the fleeing foe; and the calamity would have been still greater, had not the corps of students from Segovia retarded in some measure, the pursuit of the enemy, until they all fell upon the field of battle. In Aragon, all their efforts were fruitless. Palafox, in his endeavours to relieve Saragossa, was defeated at Huecha, June 12th; at Gullur, June 13th; at Alagon, on the Xalon, June 14th; and at Epila, June 23rd. In Catalonia they were defeated at Mongul; Cruz surrendered his army at Lena, October 26th; Vives was defeated at Llina, December 6th; and Reding, at Molinos del Rey, December 17th. On July 14th, the army under Cuesta and Blake had been routed with immense slaughter. On the 27th of the same month, Castaños attacking the French posts on the Ebro, was repulsed at Logroño with the loss of all his artillery. On October 31st, the army of Blake, which had been joined on the 9th of the same month by the Spanish troops from the Baltic, under the marquis of Romana, was defeated with great loss at Zornosa, and retiring to Espinosa de los Enteros, was attacked on the following day by Victor, but the contest was by the exertions of Romana's infantry prolonged till nightfall. Early next morning, the Spanish army was totally routed, and fled in the wildest disorder towards the river Truebas, in which a great number of the fugitives perished. With the remainder Blake fell back on Reynosa, where his reserve artillery was stationed; but being attacked there by Soult, was routed, with the loss of his whole artillery, and escaped with only a few thousand of his troops into the Asturian mountains. The consequence was, that Bilbao, Santander, and the whole line of the intervening coast, fell into the hands of the enemy. The army of the Spanish left being annihilated, that of the centre, stationed at Gamonal, under the Conde de Belvedere, was on November 10th over-

thrown, with the loss of 2,000 killed and wounded, 800 prisoners, and all its artillery. The battle of Tudela followed, and in it the Spanish army under Castaños and Palafox, consisting of 45,000 men, was completely routed and dispersed. In the battle of Espinosa, though the Spanish authorities, with their characteristic falsehood and boasting, asserted that Romana's troops had, Spartan-like, died to a man in their ranks; above 4,000 of them, who had been taken prisoners by the French, and had subsequently entered the French service, were, after four years of servitude under the banners of the oppressor of their country, delivered over by the Russian government to captain Hill, at Cronstadt, in the year 1812; having been taken prisoners in the retreat of the French from Moscow. To complete the sum of Spanish disasters, which had increased so rapidly in the short space of one year, the strong pass of Samosierra, which formed the boundary between the French armies and Madrid, though guarded by 10,000 men, was forced, and thus the passage to the capital opened to Buonaparte, who, on his entry, on December 4th, was waited on by a body of the nobility, clergy, and public authorities of the city, who tendered him their allegiance and fidelity; and the servile junta, who were soon convened, published a proclamation announcing that "the only object of their imperial ally was the prosperity and happiness of their beloved Spain." During the course of these events, the towns of Cordova, Toledo, Jaen, Bilbao, Burgos, Manresa, Rosas, both citadel and town, &c., had been sacked and delivered up to fire, sword, and the outrage of females even of the tenderest age. Venturada, Buitrago, El Milar, Iglenas, Benezuela, Gandullos, and Brojiz, experienced a like fate in Joseph Buonaparte's flight from Madrid behind the Ebro. To counterbalance this series of misfortunes, whose amount no nation ever experienced in the same space of time, the patriots could produce only the repulses of Schwartz and Chabran, at the passes of Bruch and Casa Masara, the battle of Baylen, and the repulses from Saragossa, Gerona, and Valencia. We shall now see that the year 1809 dawned equally unpropitious on Spanish efforts and Spanish patriotism.

The British ministry having determined to make another effort to liberate the Peninsula from the aggression of Buonaparte, adopted Sir Arthur Wellesley's recommendation of making Portugal, than which, in the



hands of a skilful and enterprising leader; no country affords a more defensible theatre of warfare, the basis of the operations for that purpose. The spirit of patriotism and resistance was alive all over the Peninsula; all it needed was the requisite genius to guide and direct it to the great end—the full and final deliverance. That genius the British ministry recognising in the person of Sir Arthur Wellesley, they appointed him to carry the great and glorious measure into execution. Sir Arthur having resigned his appointment as chief secretary of state for Ireland, and vacated his seat in parliament, left England on April 15th, 1809, and reached Lisbon on the 22nd of the same month. At that period, the second and fourth corps-d'armée of the enemy threatened Lisbon. Soult, with the second corps, amounting to 25,000 men, lay at Oporto with his advanced posts on the Vouga; and Victor, with the fourth corps, exceeding 20,000 men, was posted on the banks of the Tagus, with his head quarters at Merida.

In the course of Sir Arthur's passage to Lisbon, an event occurred which had nearly proved fatal to the future hero of the Peninsula and Waterloo.

In the course of the night, after the frigate had parted from Spithead, it was nearly wrecked at the back of the Isle of Wight. The circumstantial account given by the Marquis of Londonderry, in his *Narrative of the Peninsular War*, is highly interesting:—“We set sail with a stiff breeze blowing ahead. We had not proceeded beyond the Isle of Wight, when about midnight, or rather later, the captain of the *Surveillante* burst into the cabin, entreating us to use without delay precautions for our safety, for we were on the eve of shipwreck. As may be imagined, we lost no time in leaping from our cots, and mounting to the deck, when a very alarming spectacle presented itself. In attempting to clear a shoal which runs from St. Catherine's Point into the sea, the ship had missed stays; this occurred again and again, each failure bringing us nearer and nearer to danger; and now, when we looked abroad, the breakers were to be seen at a stone's throw from the bows. There was not an individual amongst us who anticipated any other result than that in a few minutes, at the farthest, the vessel would strike; but we were deceived. The wind, which had hitherto been blowing on shore, suddenly changed, and we were at once relieved from a situation, than which the whole progress of

our lives, had not before brought us into any one more uncomfortable.”

Sir Arthur, on his arrival at Lisbon, having had the command-in-chief ceded to him by Sir John Craddock, assumed the command of the British army, which had been augmented to 20,000 men by reinforcements under generals Sherbrooke, Mackenzie, Cameron, and Hill; and, May 2d, established his head-quarters at Coimbra. Having satisfied himself that no concert or communication between the armies of Soult and Victor could possibly be executed at that moment, he determined to drive Soult from Oporto, and clear the northern provinces of the enemy, and directed Mackenzie's brigade, and a body of 8,000 Portuguese, to take post at Santarem and Abrantes, for the purpose of defending the fords of the Tagus between those towns, and guarding the mountain passes into Portugal on the right side of the Tagus, as Victor and Lapisse were posted with strong corps on the eastern frontiers. While he advanced northwards to drive Soult from Oporto, Beresford, who was posted near Ciudad Rodrigo, was ordered to march with 6,000 Portuguese, a brigade of British infantry, and a squadron of cavalry, by Viseu, and crossing the Douro at Lamego, to turn Soult's left, and thus cut off his retreat into Galicia by Braga or through Tras-os-Montes, and compel him to proceed by Chaves, in order to prevent his junction with Victor.

On the 5th, the whole army, amounting to 14,500 infantry, and 1,500 cavalry, in which force four of the best Portuguese battalions were incorporated, was concentrated at Coimbra; and on the 7th the advanced guard was in motion on the Oporto road. At this moment intelligence was brought that the bridge of Amaranta, which afforded the most favourable road for the retreat of the French, had been crossed, and Silveira driven over the Douro.

The French having two positions at Albergoria Nova and Grijon, in advance of the main body at Oporto, sir Arthur, intending to surprise Franceschi, who was posted with two regiments of cavalry and one of infantry at the first-mentioned position, dispatched general Cotton, with the 14th dragoons, to accomplish the design; but Cotton, being misled by the guides, did not reach the French position till broad day-light, when he found the enemy ready drawn up to receive him, with a fine wood in their rear, and in too great force to hazard an



attack. But sir Arthur Wellesley coming up with Paget's division, Franceschi hastily retreated, and effected a junction with Mermet at Grijon; where, on the following day, the French forces being attacked by general Stewart, fled, with the loss of above one hundred prisoners, across the Douro. During these operations every means had been adopted by the French to render the passage of that river impracticable. The floating bridge at Oporto was destroyed, and the pontoons composing it burnt. All the boats on the Douro were also collected, and moored on the northern bank of the river.

At this period of the affairs of the Peninsula, an occurrence of a singular character took place. One John Viana, the son of a merchant at Oporto, had, at the instigation of the parties interested, communicated to marshal Beresford a design of a community of soldiers and officers in the French army, who were impatient of their subjugation, and disgusted with the tyranny of Buonaparte, to change the form of government; and as the conspirators were most numerous in the second corps-d'armée under Soult, they had come to the determination to seize him, and deliver him over to the British outposts. At the time of sir Arthur Wellesley's arrival in Lisbon, the chief of the conspiracy, D'Argenton, an adjutant-major, and who had been an officer on Soult's staff, being there, he had an interview with him, but, at the same time, refused all countenance of the projects of the malcontents. When at Coimbra, he also had an interview, between the English and French outposts, with a colonel Lafitte, who, as the conspiracy had been discovered (colonel Lefebvre, who had been taken prisoner in sir John Moore's retreat, and had broken his parole, having betrayed the conspirators), came at the instigation of Soult, to endeavour to penetrate sir Arthur's intended operations, and ascertain the strength and distribution of his army; but sir Arthur guessing his designs, had him conducted through by-paths to his presence, and again refused all countenance to the design. Sir Arthur, in his communication of

this transaction to the secretary of state, nobly observed, that it would be more honourable to the British arms to vanquish the enemy in the field, than to accomplish his overthrow by the countenance of any underhand project.

This conspiracy had been of considerable standing. The first knowledge of its existence, and which was obtained by the agency of the extensive system of espionage which Buonaparte had established not only throughout the dominions of France, but in all the states of Europe, and even in his palace, came under the notice of the French government about the time of the battle of Wagram. The conspirators had enrolled themselves under the title of Philadelphes or Brotherhood, and their object was the re-establishment of democracy. The founder was Joseph Oudet, an officer in the French service. The author of *Histoires des Sociétés Secrètes*, says that Oudet, and the officers who were known to be disaffected to the existing order of things, were recalled from their exile, for the purpose of furnishing the government an opportunity of getting rid of the malcontents, and gratifying the vengeance of the emperor. They were all appointed to the 9th of the line, and at the battle of Wagram were placed in such a condition with the enemy, that the whole of them were nearly destroyed. Colonel Oudet was severely wounded, and to complete the tragedy, was secretly assassinated in the course of the night following the battle. "It was part of the imperial policy, that if any part of the army exhibited signs of discontent, it was necessary to march it to the most wasteful point of service, and thus it would be destroyed before it could become dangerous, and yet not till it had performed a certain quantity of needful work for its fell employer." At this time a proclamation was found in which Soult announced himself as Nicholas I., king of Lusitania and Algarves. Joseph Buonaparte also accused him, in a letter to his brother Napoleon, of aspiring to the sceptre of Andalusia.

#### THE PASSAGE OF THE DOURO.

On the morning of the 12th May, the British army being concentrated at Villa Nova, a large village on the southern bank of the Douro, "the hero of Assaye," looking down from the convent of Serra upon the large

volume of waters which the Douro rolls swiftly into the sea, determined to effect the passage, though in the face of above twenty-five thousand opponents; an exploit unparalleled in the annals of warfare, and in the



glowing language of Napier, "so promptly, so daringly, so skillfully, so successfully executed, that it seemed rather the result of inspiration, than of natural judgment." For this purpose, viewing from the convent, which is situated on the elevated spot of the Serra, the opposite bank, he observed with an eagle's glance, a large unfinished building called "the Seminary," about half a mile from Oporto; and deeming it to present a defensible position, the area in which it stood being surrounded by a stone wall which came down to the water side, and enclosing space enough for at least two battalions to be drawn up in battle array; "with a marvellous hardihood," he determined to avail himself of it as a basis for his operations, and force the passage of the river. The army, in the mean time, "with hearts and hands all ready for the fray, joyous, careless, and full of hope," lay in the rear of the convent, concealed from the view of the enemy by the height on which it stood, and the bend which the river takes at that point. At this moment, the enemy's baggage and stores were seen moving in a long line on the Vallonga road.

Twenty guns were now placed in battery in the convent gardens. At the same time, major-general John Murray, with the German brigade, two squadrons of the 14th dragoons, and two guns, was directed to march to Barca de Avintas, about three miles down the river, and effect a passage there, for the purpose of intercepting the retreat of the enemy; and colonel Waters, of the Portuguese staff, was dispatched to endeavour to obtain some boats. About two miles from the convent the colonel had the good fortune to discover a boat concealed among some rushes, and in which a barber had, on the preceding evening, crossed the river from Oporto to Villa Nova for the purpose of seeing his sweetheart. Colonel Waters leaped into the boat, and with a priest and a few peasants, who happened to be standing by at the time, crossed to the opposite shore, where three large boats or barges lay in the mud. With these he hastened to the convent.

About 10 o'clock, a barge was reported ready to attempt the passage. "Let the men cross," was the decisive and confident order of the British chief; instantly an officer and twenty-five men of the buff's jumped on board, and, in the course of a few minutes, were in possession of the

Seminary. Two other barges, carrying three companies and general Paget, speedily followed.

Till this moment, all had been quiet in the city. Soult believed that the English army would, by means of the shipping, make its appearance at the debouchement or mouth of the river, and supposed that its passage otherwise, in presence of his force was impossible; especially as he had withdrawn all the boats to the southern side of the river, and had placed a strong guard over them. Nor were the operations of the passage observed; and for this reason, that the river in its course round the Serra rock, makes a sharp elbow or bending, shutting out the view of the upper river from the town. Just, however, as the third boat had reached the opposite bank, the enemy discovered the foe in the midst of their camp. Instantly all was hurry and noise in Oporto; drums beating, trumpets sounding, and troops—infantry, cavalry, and artillery—rushing in masses towards the Seminary, and assailing it with the utmost fury and desperation. The little party maintained itself, till the whole of the buff's, the 48th, 66th, and the 16th Portuguese battalion, had crossed under general Hill; the Serra battery, which swept both flanks of the Seminary garden, keeping up a well-directed fire, and thus confining the assault of the enemy, (whose fire both musketry and artillery, was sharp and voluble), to the iron gateway that opened on the Vallonga road. In the heat of the contest, Sherbrooke's brigade, consisting of the guards and 29th regiment, had crossed the river where the old boat bridge had been cut away, the citizens having brought boats across for the purpose. The appearance of Sherbrooke's brigade on the right of the enemy, and the head of Murray's column appearing at the same time, advancing down the bank of the river on his left, the enemy fled in confusion along the Vallonga road: Hill pouring in a destructive fire on his masses as they hurried past the Seminary gate. Murray, as the author of the *History of the Peninsular War* significantly observes, "seeming fearful lest they should turn and push him into the river;" allowed them to pass in their confusion and dismay, without firing a shot on their flank; but brigadier-general Charles Stewart and major Harvey, impatient of the unaccountable inactivity of their chief, charged with two squadrons of cavalry, the rear guard, and riding over the



disorderly battalions, cut their way back to their own division, bringing with them above one hundred prisoners. As Napier justly observes, "had Murray attacked vigorously, the ruin of the French army would have ensued. It was an opportunity that would have tempted a blind man to strike; the neglect of it argued want of military talent and military hardihood;" an opinion fully verified in the same man's conduct at Alicant, where he abandoned to the enemy "the time-honoured Badajos artillery."

The loss of the British army was 20 killed, 96 wounded, and 17 missing; that of the French, 500 killed and wounded, and many prisoners. Five guns were captured in the attempt to pass the Seminary, and a vast quantity of ammunition, and fifty guns, with the hospital containing 700 men, were found in the city. To the wine (amounting to 3,000 tuns, and in value above half a million sterling), on board English, Swedish, Danish, and French ships in the river, sir Arthur Wellsley renounced all claim on behalf of himself and the army, in favour of the owners and the Portuguese nation; in opposition to the demand of the English admiral on that station, that those goods should be considered as prizes or the droits of war. For this exalted display of disinterestedness, he received a sorry requital from the selfish and ungrateful wine-company, and the senate and citizens of Oporto, in their refusal to subscribe to a loan of £10,000, to enable the army to adopt ulterior operations in the defence of Portugal. At four o'clock of the day, of the passage of the Douro, sir Arthur Wellesley sat down to the dinner and table service, that had been prepared for his antagonist, marshal Soult, "one of those trifling circumstances in warfare," as the elegant narrator of the duke's memoirs observes, "which exhilarates not only the chance partakers of spoil so innocent, but which as an anecdote mirthful to the soldiery, spreads pleasure very widely through the lines."

The remainder of the 12th, and following day, were employed in transporting the rear-guard, baggage, stores, and artillery, from the left bank of the river; and on the morning of the 13th, Murray was detached

\* This place afforded a strong position, and had the enemy been inclined to display their usual propensity for battle, it, like many other localities which became invested with memorable recollections

with the Hanoverian cavalry in pursuit of the enemy; the whole army following on the same route on the 14th.

Soult had fled to Peñafiel, where, fearing that his retreat would be cut off, he destroyed his artillery and ammunition, and abandoned his baggage and military chest. Under the guidance of a Spanish pedlar, he escaped across the Santa Catharina mountains, by goat-herd paths, to Guimaraens, where he formed a junction with Loisson, (who had been driven by Beresford from Amarante); and in the course of the same night, he was joined by Lorge's cavalry, on the banks of the Sousa river. Again the artillery and ammunition of Loisson and Lorge's divisions were destroyed, and their baggage and military chests abandoned.

About four o'clock of the evening of the 16th the British army overtook the rear-guard of the French at Salamonde,\* which had been stationed there to cover the passage of the army over the bridges of the Ponte Nova and the Saltador, but after a single hurried volley it fled precipitately to Ponte Nova, where, their pursuers having outflanked them, inflicted a severe loss on the fugitives. The bridge was choked with lacerated bodies, and the bed of the mountain torrent Cavado was filled with dead. Again, at the passage of the Saltador (the leaper or flying-bridge), over the gulf produced by the Misarella, another repetition of havoc and destruction attended the remorseless slaughterers of the stragglers of sir John Moore's army. At length the harassed and exhausted fugitives reached, on the 17th, Montalegre in a complete state of deroute; on the 18th they crossed the Spanish frontier, on the 19th entered Orense, and on the 23rd reached Lugo, says Jomini, (*Vie de Napoleon*), "in a more distressed condition than that in which general Moore had, six months before, traversed the country to the same town, many of the troops being without even their accoutrements and their arms."

When the British chief was informed that the remnant of the French army had turned off from Montalegre towards Orense, he desisted from the pursuit, as it was impossible for an army encumbered with guns and baggage to continue the pursuit through the

in the Peninsular war, might have obtained a fatal celebrity; but dispirited by repeated defeat, they fled in confusion, after they had fired one single hurried volley.



rugged defiles by which the enemy had escaped; or, to adopt his own language: "When an army throws away all its cannon, equipments, baggage, and everything that can strengthen it, and can alone enable it to act together as a body, and at the same time abandons those who are entitled to its protection, but retard its progress, it must then be able to march by roads through which it cannot be followed with any prospect of being overtaken by an army which has not made the same sacrifices."

The sufferings and privations of the fleeing host had been so severe during its hurried and calamitous retreat, that, to adopt Napier's expression, "voices were calling for a capitulation, and the whole army was stricken with dismay." What a contrast to the heroic devotion of Moore's army! There the only voices heard (except those of a few craven-hearted general officers just preceding the battle of Corunna), were, "lead us to battle;" and the consequence of non-compliance with that heroic spirit was the insubordination and licentiousness which tarnished the British arms during that disastrous retreat. Soult's army had entered Portugal 25,000 strong; when it reached Orense it scarcely numbered 19,000, having, in the course of six days, sustained a much greater loss than Moore's army had in a period more than thrice as long; and that too in most inclement weather, and with the additional disadvantage, that the army was hampered with a large number of women and children. So complete had been the deroute, that the

whole line of march from Penafiel to Montalegre, besides being covered with the carcasses of horses, mules, and soldiers killed, wounded, and dying, was strewn with arms, accoutrements, and knapsacks filled with valuable stolen property. In the rocky bed of the Cavado, above 500 bodies of the fugitives, lying mingled with the carcasses of above 300 horses and mules, laden with the plunder of Oporto, and the other towns north of the Douro, were found by their pursuers; many of whom amused themselves by fishing in that stream for the French officers and privates, as about the bodies of the one they found rouleaux of gold, and in the knapsacks of the other gold and silver vases, watches, and other valuable property, all of which had been stolen from the natives.

The misery and cruelties which had been inflicted on the population of the country through which the French army had retreated were dreadful in the extreme. On the whole line of country over which its flight had extended, horror, desolation, and wretchedness, prevailed in their direst forms. The route of the retreat could be traced by the smoke and flames of the villages burning, or those already reduced to ashes. Pillage, massacre, conflagration, attended the whole course of the fleeing columns. Large numbers of the peasants were massacred, and in many places they were found hanging on trees by the road-side—a fate to which Franceschi had, with remorseless vengeance, subjected many of the ordenanzas in his flight from Albergaria Nova.

## THE FIRST SPANISH CAMPAIGN.

A. D. 1809.

A FEW remarks respecting Spain and the Spaniards may not be an uninteresting introduction to the memorable campaigns about to be narrated.

Spain, the land of romance and superstition, of love and chivalry, and whose towns were founded by the Greeks, the Carthaginians, the Romans, and the Arabians, is one of the most compact political divisions of the earth, and possesses natural advantages superior to any other politico-geographical

subdivision of the known world. In form, it is nearly quadrilateral, its length being, in proportion to its breadth, as one and three quarters are to one and-a-half. Its geographical situation is unequalled by that of any other country; for, while it enjoys the luxuriance of a tropical climate, it partakes of all the mildness and salubrity of the temperate zone. Its splendid river and mountain scenery, its fertile plains, and noble ports, constitute it one of the most gifted



regions of the globe; while the superstition, bigotry, and ignorance of its government and people have morally ruined, and politically disorganized, all the advantages conferred on it by nature.

The interior of Spain, which is scorched by the burning sun in summer, and swept by frozen blasts in winter, especially Léon and Castile, forms a table-land of greater elevation than that of any other country in Europe, being from 2,000 to 3,000 feet above the level of the sea, and is nearly surrounded by mountains, rocky and almost inaccessible, its principal and secondary ranges being all, more or less, connected with one another, and descending throughout the Peninsula in a serpentine direction, from its elevated table-land in the interior, to the fertile belt of land lying on the sea coasts. The north of Spain is the most mountainous land in Europe, Switzerland not excepted. The snow-clad peaks and ridges of Switzerland slope gradually down into fertile plains, and are intersected by numerous smiling valleys; but the lofty sierras, or mountains, of the north of Spain (particularly in the Basque provinces, Navarre, and the Ronda districts of the south, which consist almost of mountains, having very little level ground), are based on tablelands, whose lateral directions are sometimes almost a perpendicular, and their summits are covered with perpetual snow. These mountains are so arid that no trees grow upon them, and even brush-wood is by no means common. The mountains of Catalonia and Valencia are, however, an exception; there, the sides being cut into terraces, and nourished by artificial irrigation, are clothed with the most luxuriant vegetation. The streams that cut their way through them fret and roar along in deep gullies, and amidst overhanging rocks. Spain possesses only three great roads; that from Madrid to Bayonne, that to Valencia, and that to Barcelona; the others are little better than sheep-walks. The north of Spain, like Portugal, presents one of the most defensible positions in Europe. The Basque provinces, Navarre, and the Ronda districts in the south, enjoy independent privileges, and an almost democratic equality.

From Spain, the natural digression is to the Spaniards.

As my limits prohibit me from enlarging on the extravagancies and eccentricities, the foibles and the follies of "Spanuolissimo Spagnuolo," with all his sombre stateliness and indomitable pride—his habitual ex-

aggeration both in speaking and writing—his lofty promises and mean performance—his inflated and bombastic hyperboles—his exalted opinion of his importance and pre-eminent valour—his presumption and bigotry—his ignorant and superstitious reverence for antiquated customs and practices; in a word, his inveterate and unyielding "Spagnuolitas," which has rendered his nation the lowest and the weakest in the scale of European countries; I will waive the ungracious task of condemnation, and confine myself to a few brief remarks on the well-trained habits, the extreme temperance, the unostentatious endurance of poverty, the devoted attachment to their religion and country, which distinguish the Spanish peasantry over that of any region of the globe. They are, in general, well-ordered and sober, moral and religious. No labourer goes to his daily toil until he has supplicated the favour and protection of heaven; and, on the completion of his allotted duty, he returns into the bosom of his family, to enjoy its home-felt delights. His diet is frugal and sparing. A bit of dry bread and a few grapes, or a slice of a water-melon, supply his breakfast; a plain dish of vegetables, generally a sort of bean, boiled with the smallest morsel of bacon to flavour it, forms his dinner; and his drink is water, or the weak common wines of the country, and that in a very moderate quantity. The lives of this interesting people are perfectly patriarchal, and form a striking contrast to the debauchery and the ruthlessness of the higher classes. Of their devoted patriotism and attachment to the land of their birth, they gave the most splendid displays in their fruitless and disastrous struggles with the veteran armies of France during the Peninsular War.

Of the surpassing beauty of the Spanish women, language furnishes no adequate medium for its description. The lovely shape, the beautiful form, the large dark eye, and its expressive glance, heightened by the soft blood-tinged olive hue of the glowing complexion, give to the Spanish beauty all the might and majesty of loveliness, and invest her with a commanding influence over the heart and the affections. Their dress—we speak of the era of the Peninsular war, and that dress is the subject of the fond recollection of old "Peninsulars"—harmonizes with the beauty of their persons. The tastefully-worked and vandyked basquina, or black silk petticoat, assuming all the grace



of Ionian elegance in its foldings and form, by means of the small pieces of lead attached to its hem, and being bordered at the bottom with black beads disposed into an open net-work, affords the eye of the observer the casual felicity of admiring the most beautiful symmetrical ankle and instep in the world. The mantilla of black or white lace gracefully thrown over the head, and as gracefully confined at the waist by the arms of the wearer, imparts an interesting and imposing effect to their fine forms. In their toilet, those periodical moultings of dress which fashion elsewhere prescribes, is unknown. The Spanish ladies dress all alike, and in the same style at all seasons of the year; a practice which tends much to leave lasting and favourable impressions on the mind of the observer, of the form and fascination of the wearer. Those who have had the happiness of eliciting the bewitchingly-endearing tattle, the pretty lisp, the affectionate smile, the love-speaking look, can never disenchant their imagination of the recollection; it cannot but endure to the last moment of existence.

I have said that the complexion of the Spanish ladies is a blood-tinged olive, but this is not invariable in Spain. Though dark hair and eyes are the general attributes of Spanish women, I have seen in the south ladies of the fairest and most delicate complexion; and in the mountainous districts of northern Spain, particularly in the town of Vittoria and its neighbourhood, where the Viejos Christianos, the old Gothic race, took refuge when their country was overrun by the Moors, the females have generally blue eyes, fair tresses, and as soft and delicate a complexion as our own lovely countrywomen.

In all parts of Spain, the dress, even of the humble classes, is picturesque, and often becoming. In some parts it is singular. At Santander and its vicinity, the peasant women wear round their necks gold chains, from which are pendant crosses and other holy trinkets, such as the figures of the Virgin Mary and certain saints. These constitute the fair damsel's dowry, who is considered of greater or more moderate fortune according to the size and splendour of her neck gear or vestiture; so that a fortune-hunting swain (for that genus of lovers abounds in all parts of the known habitable world), has never any occasion, while he is making unbounded protestations of his disinterested motives, to set on foot a few little impertinent inquiries about the amount or

quantum of "the muck and dross" to which his "adored and adorable" may be entitled.

Sir Arthur Wellesley having, with consummate generalship, both in the conception and the execution, fulfilled his instructions "to rid Portugal of the French," directed his attention to those measures by which he should also rid the entire Peninsula of the same horde of ravagers and despoilers.

Receiving intelligence from major-general Mackenzie, that marshal Victor, after his overthrow of Cuesta, at Medellin, had crossed the Tagus, and had advanced to Castello Branco; sir Arthur, stationing Beresford with 15,000 Portuguese at Fuente Guinaldo, to protect the Portuguese frontier, and directing Silveira, with some regular troops and militia, to defend the northern provinces, in case Soult should make an irruption, put the British army in motion from Oporto, and established his headquarters, on the 7th of June, at Coimbra. Here he was joined by 5,000 fresh troops, who had been drafted from militia regiments in England. At this time, sir Robert Wilson was dispatched with the Lusitanian legion, 3,000 strong, one Portuguese caçadore battalion, and two Spanish battalions, in the direction of Madrid, to act on Victor's rear, when the allied British and Spanish army should have brought him to action.

The army was now encamped on the northern bank of the Douro, but was in a very sickly state, the men being young and unseasoned, and having suffered greatly from the hardships and privations to which they had been subject during the campaign, and which were increased by their pay being much in arrear. The consequence was insubordination and marauding; which were restrained only by sir Arthur threatening to send the offending regiments home, as a mark of disgrace, and ordering the regimental rolls to be called over every hour, from sunrise to eight o'clock in the evening. Severe as the privations and distress were to which the army was subject, these measures had the effect of introducing order and discipline; and so noble a spirit quickly pervaded the army, that the men were willing to endure any hardships, bear any privation, and face any danger, if they only saw their gallant and high-minded chief in the camp: their confidence in his tutelary genius was so unbounded. "When he appeared, or placed himself near their ranks," says one who had an opportunity throughout the war of observing the conduct of the



army, "the spirits of the men were raised to a frenzy of confidence. No matter how great the peril, the opposing force, or the difficulty of the ground—he being there, all was right, and though death stared the soldier in the face—open-jawed—almost certain to devour them—still he had faith and hope, and on he rushed. God only knows how he arrived at the point of his ambition; for in front, it was through a deluge of fire, and in the rear, through a river of blood; but, nevertheless, he did arrive there." The confidence the army had in his talents and fortunes, is also well described by another witness of his glorious exploits. Wherever he was, the soldiers used to say, "Aye! there he goes, boys: all's right." And forward they rushed, careless of dangers and numbers, driving the French out of the strongest and most impregnable positions. Such was their confidence in his talents and good fortune—such their determination to conquer or perish. They well knew that where he was, the day of battle would be the day of victory. He was the life and soul of the army: it was supposed impossible but success must attend him.

But to resume the narrative. As the exhausted state of Portugal would not allow the obtaining of the necessary magazines and means of transport for the advance of the army into Spain, arrangements were entered into with the central junta, and the alcaides of the villages of the fertile country in the Vera de Plasencia, for the supply of 20,000 rations of forage and provisions: and the superintendent-general, don Longano de Torres, was dispatched to sir Arthur to ratify the agreement. On the faith of that agreement, sir Arthur Wellesley, after having taken the precaution to secure his left flank from the advance of the three corps-d'armée, under Sault, Ney, and Mortier, which were on the other side of the Bejar mountains, by directing Beresford to defend the Puerto de Perales, and inducing Cuesta to order the marquis de la Reyna to adopt the same step at the Puerto

de Banos, those two passes being the only ones practicable for the passage of artillery; he, with the view of joining Cuesta on the Tietar, and combining with him an offensive movement on Madrid, on the 27th of June, marched from Abrantes, on both banks of the Tagus, towards the Spanish frontier; and on the 8th of July, established his head-quarters at Plasencia. But he had not proceeded more than seven marches from Castello Branco, before he found that no dependence was to be placed on the promises and engagements of the junta and the local authorities; who, with the characteristic faithlessness that had marked the whole of their proceedings with the British army throughout the Peninsular war, had not complied with any of the conditions of their contract for the supply of the army. He had not only to struggle with promises broken, and engagements violated by the temporizing and deceitful juntas—"his applications and remonstrances having been answered with false excuses and false statements by the government and local authorities,"—but he had also to contend with the perverseness and obstinacy of Cuesta. When he visited, July 10th, that headstrong and stolid old man,\* at his head-quarters, near the Col de Mirabete, before the junction of the two armies, and recommended to him to march and seize the bridge of Almaraz, and thus, by throwing himself between the French and Spanish armies, cut off the enemy's retreat on Madrid, the brilliant and masterly conception was marred and frustrated by "the bigoted and imbecile idiot whom he had for a colleague;" whose ignorance and perverseness he thus calmly and mildly reproved in one of his letters:—"The obstinacy of this old gentleman has thrown away the finest opportunity that any army ever had."

Failing of success in this recommendation, sir Arthur proceeded to arrange with "the old gentleman" the plan of the campaign; when it was agreed that a simultaneous advance of the two armies should be made on

\* The description given of this testy old Spaniard is really a caricature on the military character:—"When sir Arthur visited him at his head quarters at the Casa de Mirabete, he was lifted, for the purpose of accompanying the English general in the review of his army, on his horse by two grenadiers, while one of his aides-de-camp was ready on the other side to conduct his leg over the horse's croup, and place it in the stirrup."—*Campaign of 1809*, by the earl of Munster. Another intelligent writer

says, that his mental qualifications were on a par with his bodily weakness; and that his ignorance of military science was equalled only by his arrogance and presumption. He also informs us, that when sir Arthur visited him on the 23rd, at his bivouac on the Alberche, he presented a feature of mental and physical inability which strongly indicated his apathetic sluggishness and obstinacy. The rest of the Spanish generals, except those of Irish or Swiss descent, were equally incompetent.



the 18th, to dislodge Victor from his position at Talavera de la Reyna, to which place he had retreated, on hearing of Soult's expulsion from Oporto, and in furtherance of an arranged plan between him and Soult, that while he opposed the British army, and its feeble allies under Cuesta in front, Soult, with Ney's and Mortier's corps d'armée, should advance behind the Bejar mountains, and, at the same moment, "fall altogether," as Soult expressed himself, on the British army, and in Buonaparte's phrase, "crush it," or at least intercept its retreat into Portugal. Pending these operations, Blake had been defeated, on the 15th of July, at the village of Moria, on the Huerba, and on the 18th at Belchitte, with great loss; many of his regiments having fled without firing a shot.

It having been agreed on between the British and Spanish chiefs, that the British army, supported by that under Cuesta, should move against Victor's corps, and that Vanegas and sir Robert Wilson should threaten Madrid, in order, if possible, by this demonstration, to draw off the attention of the corps under Joseph Buonaparte and Sebastiani, and thus prevent it from making any movement in conjunction with Victor; the English army, on the 17th, broke up its cantonments from Plasencia; and, on the 20th, both armies marched in two columns on Talavera. In his march from Oropesa, Cuesta's progress was impeded by Victor's rear-guard, at the village of Gamonal. There, 2,000 cavalry, under Lautour Maubourg, brought to a halt Zayas, with 15,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, and treated them with so much contempt, that they never stirred from their position,\* until the head of the British columns appeared on their right. On reaching Talavera, the allied army found that Victor had taken a position behind the Alberche, where he remained, apparently regardless of the great force in his front.

The reason that the French general apparently disregarded the large force opposed to him, was, that the arrangement which had been made at the interview between sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta, that the attack should be delayed till the 23rd, had been betrayed to him by some

of Cuesta's staff. "There was something more than inertness," says Napier, "in Victor's halts." At the time, secret negotiations were carrying on between the agents of Joseph Buonaparte and several of the most influential men in the patriot government, for the betrayal of the English army, while they were even receiving money and supplies from England, and that the English army was shedding its blood in the defence of Spanish independence.

As it had been arranged that the enemy was to be attacked on the 23rd, the English army was under arms at three o'clock in the morning; but when sir Arthur Wellesley went to Cuesta's camp to make the final arrangements, he was told that the Spanish general was asleep, and had given orders not to be disturbed before seven o'clock; and when he did awake, he, with his usual perverseness and dogged disposition, refused to fight that day, because it was Sunday. Thus fettered and thwarted in all his operations, and despoiled of the opportunity of advantageously attacking the French army, which remained in its indefensible position, perfectly regardless of the presence of the hostile armies, the English general was obliged to sooth and humour the pride and arrogance of his intractable colleague. He invited him to accompany him in reconnoitring the enemy's position, and the selection of the battle-field. On the morning of the 24th, the old man came in a coach, drawn by six mules, and having felt some inconvenience from the jolting of the carriage, as soon as he was removed out of the vehicle, he threw himself on the ground, and immediately fell fast asleep.

Victor having now fallen back to Santa Olalla, and thence towards Torrijos, on the reinforcements under Sebastiani and Joseph Buonaparte advancing to his assistance; Cuesta, supposing that the French army was retreating before him, determined on an immediate pursuit, and communicated his intentions to that effect to the English general. "The towers of Madrid, nay, the Pyrenees themselves," instantly flitted before his vision; and probably the stolid old man formed in his imagination a fancy picture of the march of his supercilious countrymen to Paris, and that he should

\* The French had the most contemptible opinion of Spanish courage and discipline. "The whole of the Spanish forces," said Napoleon, in a communication to one of his generals, "are not capable of beating 25,000 French troops in a reasonable posi-

tion." Berthier, in a letter to Joseph Buonaparte, says "L'empereur considère qu'il n'y a de dangereux en Espagne, que les Anglais; que le rest n'est de canaille." (The emperor thinks the English alone are to be feared in Spain; the rest are mere rabble.)



have the British army the passive spectators of his victories in his French crusade, as his foolish compatriots had vauntingly boasted to sir John Moore's army. Sir Arthur warned him of the probable consequences of his quixotic expedition, and pointed out the danger of the separation of the armies; and as he could not divert the headstrong old Spaniard from his purpose, he determined to afford him an asylum or place of refuge, from his certain discomfiture. On the evening of the 23rd, he sent a letter, apprising him that, at four o'clock in the morning of the 24th, two divisions of infantry, and a brigade of cavalry, under major-general Sherbrooke, would cross the Alberche, and march to the attack of the right of the enemy's position, near the heights of Cazalegas. By this information, the self-sufficient Spaniard, finding himself under the protecting wing of the British, "in the fullness of his arrogant vanity and inflated pride," crossed the Alberche on the 24th, and established his outposts at Torrijos. Having, however, some perception, from Sherbrooke's movements, that he was likely to lose his protection, he, on the 26th, ordered a retreat, to avoid the inevitable consequences of his headlong march to ruin; but before he could withdraw his advanced guard, he was attacked, and the regiment of Villa Viciosa, which was drawn up in an enclosure, nearly surrounded by a ditch, was cut to pieces. The fugitive troops escaped to Alcabon, where, recovering from their panic, a portion of them, in number 4,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, made a stand under Zayas; but as soon as the head of the French column appeared, they again took to flight towards Santa Olalla. The whole Spanish army was saved from total destruction, by Albuquerque retarding the pursuit with 3,000 fresh cavalry, and the opportune intervention of Sherbrooke, who placed his corps between the scared fugitives and their pursuers. By this preposterous proceeding, the Spanish army lost 4,000 men, and reached the Alberche in the greatest disorder.

On the broken and bewildered columns coming to a halt, they were clustered, in the expression of their countryman, the duke of Albuquerque, "like a rabble on a pilgrimage," on a narrow slip of ground between the rivers Alberche and Tagus, and the heights of Salinas, a position so indefensible, that the first shot fired by the enemy would have been the signal of defeat. Sir

Arthur, foreseeing the consequence, had an interview, on the evening of the 26th, with his worthless and stupid ally, and earnestly conjured him, while Sherbrooke, was present to cover the movement, to withdraw across the Alberche, and take up his position at Talavera; and the headstrong old Spaniard being deaf to all entreaty, he again renewed his solicitations at daylight of the 27th, when Cuesta, having been previously informed that Sherbrooke was drawing off his corps for the purpose of recrossing the Alberche, sullenly consented; at the same time turning to his staff, and observing that sir Arthur's back was turned towards him, boasted that "he had made the Englishman go down on his knees before he had consented to change his position." As soon as the headstrong Spaniard had recrossed the Alberche, and taken up his position in the line of battle, Sherbrooke recrossed the river.

While the old Spaniard had been engaged in his quixotic expedition of pursuing the French, the British chief had been occupied in selecting his battle-ground. For this purpose he made choice of a range of steep hills, or high grounds, extending about two miles from the left of the Tagus, having the city of Talavera on the extreme right, and a commanding hill on the left; a valley of about six hundred yards across intervening, through which the Portina rivulet, a tributary of the Tagus, flowed, separating the range of hills from the opposite rocky ridge of the Sierra de Montalban. The right of the line was almost an unassailable position, its front being protected by ditches, embankments, mud walls, and other obstacles; while the rear and flank were secured by a thick wood, in which was a large mound on the left of the position, having a field-work thereon. In front of the city were many olive groves and enclosures, adapted to cover and conceal any force that might be stationed there. From the centre of the line to the hill on the extreme left, the country was naked and open. Having chosen his ground, sir Arthur assigned the securest place to the Spaniards, an almost unassailable position, and reserved the post of danger and honour for his countrymen, namely, the naked and open country to the hill on the extreme left. The approach to Talavera by the Toledo road, and all the avenues to the town, were defended by batteries. The right of the British army rested on the left of the Spanish, Campbell's division formed the right of the



British line, Sherbrooke's and the German legion the centre, Hill's division rested, *en echelon*, on the hill on the extreme left, and the cavalry in the rear, behind the mound which lay between the two divisions of the allied army; all drawn up in two lines, except Sherbrooke's division, which was in single line, it being intended that Macken-

zie's division, which was stationed in advance in the olive groves, near the Casa de Salinas, for the purpose of covering the troops while taking up their positions in the line of battle, should complete the formation. The divisions had scarcely taken up their battle-station, when the French columns were observed crowning the opposite heights.

#### THE BATTLE OF TALAVERA.

ABOUT two o'clock of the afternoon of the 27th, two columns of the enemy, headed by a cloud of voltigeurs, attacked one of the brigades of Mackenzie's division, which was posted, as before stated, in an advanced position in a wood on the right of the Alberche; and the attack was so sudden and unexpected that sir Arthur, who had ascended a tower at the Casa de Salinas, for the purpose of reconnoitring the enemy's position, was nearly captured.

As the advance of the enemy against Mackenzie's division, which consisted of young battalions that had never been under fire, was unperceived, one brigade was thrown into disorder, and driven from its ground; a misfortune which was further increased by some of the regiments, from their inexperience, actually firing on one another; but the second brigade, consisting of the 45th and the fifth battalion of the 60th, under colonel Donkin, advancing to their support, they recovered their order, and took up their ground in the main position, while Donkin's brigade took position on Hill's post; the enemy at the same time falling back, and taking up his original ground. A body of light cavalry, supported by a cloud of voltigeurs, following close on Mackenzie's rear-guard, now rode up to the Spanish line, to induce them to unmask their line of battle. Having discharged a few pistol-shots, and being answered by a discharge of the whole Spanish line, six thousand of the Spanish infantry, and the whole of the commissariat, being panic-struck with their own noise, threw away their arms, and took to flight; the adjutant-general, O'Donoghue, being amongst the foremost of the fugitives, and Cuesta in movement to follow the example. But sir Arthur, who was not above one hundred yards from the scene of confusion and flight, flanking the main road with a small detachment of Campbell's division, and addressing the fugitives in a soothing and encouraging

tone, rallied the greater part of the fugitives, and bringing them back to their position, removed the panic which was widely spreading through the Spanish ranks. The inefficiency, and often absolute cowardice, of the Spanish armies, are evident from the following expressions of sir Arthur Wellesley:—

"The misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy was constant and shameful." "Whole corps, officers and men, ran off on the first appearance of danger." "They have never, in a single instance, behaved as soldiers ought to do in the presence of an enemy. They made no scruple of running off in a body, and, after an action, were to be found in every village, and every shady bottom, within fifty miles of the field of battle." "We in England seldom hear of their defeats and flights; but I have heard Spanish officers talking of nineteen or twenty actions, all of the description of that of Arzobispo, an account of which has never been published." "In the battle of Talavera, in which the Spanish army, with very trifling exception, was not engaged, whole corps threw down their arms, and ran off in my presence, though they were neither attacked, nor threatened with an attack, but frightened with their own fire." "I cannot say that they do anything as it ought to be done, with the exception of running away, and assembling again in a state of nature." In another place he says, "the only safe places in which the Spaniards can be trusted are behind stone walls and strong entrenchments, and where they can neither betray nor escape." Again—"The Spaniards can do nothing but stand still; and we consider ourselves fortunate if they do not run away." In another place he ironically says, "The Spanish troops behaved *admirably*; they stood like stocks, quite immovable." In his remonstrance to the British ministry, respecting their projected design of withdrawing a portion of the veteran battalions serving in the south of France, for the purpose of





TALAVERA.

A. P. Fry



sending them on an expedition to Germany, and replacing them with drafts from the militia, the duke cautioned them on the consequences of leaving "a handful of brave men to the doubtful exertions and inefficient discipline of Spanish troops, long experience having taught me that if Spanish troops can be trusted anywhere, it is behind stone-walls and deep trenches, and remaining still there." But one of the most emphatic proofs of his opinion of the worthlessness of their military character is to be found in his sarcastic irony on their conduct at the battle of Toulouse, where, with their characteristic presumption, they requested to lead the battle; but they were no sooner in position to put into execution an honour to which they had not the slightest pretension, than they were driven by the French, panic-struck, in headlong flight, like a flock of sheep before the wolf,—a scene which drew the ironical reproof from the British chief, "that he had seen many curious sights, but never before saw ten thousand men running a race."

It may be said that the encomiums passed on the good-will and courage of the Spaniards in the official despatches published by the government are at variance with the above declarations in the English general's private correspondence; but then it should be recollected that it was wisdom to give to that "perverse people" credit for a virtue of which they were destitute, in the hope that they might thus be tempted to deserve for the future the praise gratuitously bestowed on them.

"Every action, every proceeding," says the author of *The History of the War in the Peninsula*, "during the six years that the war lasted, proved the truth that the Spanish troops were incapable of defending their country." In another part of his excellent work, the same author, speaking of their never-ending defeats, adds, "they were incapable of obtaining, and consequently incapable of losing military reputation."

When the Spanish leaders and officers gave expression to their insubordination, because the English commander-in-chief had ordered the Spanish troops to march to the Bastan, in the rear of the allied army, as a punishment for their misconduct in the forcing of the French intrenched camp in front of Bayonne, on the 9th of November, as also on account of their murder and pillage of the French peasantry on the borders of France, he told them, that he would withdraw the British

army from all union and communication with them, and that then they would not be able to remain in France a few days." Napier, when speaking of the licentiousness and outrages of the Spanish troops, under Murillo, Freire, and Mina, committed in the south of France, admits, that "they were more dangerous than useful" to the English army.

After the sorry affair of O'Donoghue and his fugitives, no movement was made by the enemy, until just as the shades of twilight began to make objects indistinct; when Victor, considering the heights on which Hill's division was posted the key of the position, and apprehending that if he could carry it the battle-ground of the English army would be untenable, ordered Lapisse to make a feint on the centre, to serve as a diversion in favour of the main object of attack; while Ruffin's and Villatte's divisions advanced under the protection of a heavy cannonade on the whole of the English line, against that part of Hill's position which was then occupied by the brigade of colonel Donkin.

These divisions, encouraged by the report of the Spanish panic, advanced to the attack with the confidence and impetuosity of men to whom war and victory had been familiar things; some of them, as they approached the English, calling out, that they were deserters from the German legion; others vociferating "Vivan los valorosos Ingleses!" and all desiring the British troops not to fire, as they were Spaniards. By this *ruse de guerre*, they turned the left of Donkin's brigade, and gained the hill in its rear; but the brigade discovering its error, and being supported by the 29th regiment, the first battalion of the 48th, and the first battalion of detachments under Hill, the whole force poured in a destructive fire, and immediately charging with the bayonet, drove their assailants down the hill with great slaughter. At midnight, the attack was renewed with increased fury, but was gallantly repulsed: the assault being made and met with the greatest spirit, the combatants were scarcely twenty yards, at any period of the fight, from each other; the hill the whole time sparkling with incessant flashes of musketry. While this attack was going forward, a false one was made as before stated, against the German legion.

Each army bivouacked for the night, which was one of watchfulness and alarm, on the ground which it had occupied during



the day; the English troops slept with their arms beside them, the cavalry with the bridles of their horses round their arms, anticipating "a fiercer and a bloodier day" on the morrow. The condition of the English army was very wretched. The men were suffering much from hunger; a few ounces of wheat in the grain forming the whole of their sustenance—and such had been their fare for some days—sir Arthur not having furnished himself with magazines, depending on the fulfilment of the contracts he had entered into with the Spanish government. "A morsel of bread, and some pure water," says one of the sufferers, "would have been considered luxurious fare on the battle-field of Talavera."

During the night, another unaccountable panic took hold of the Spanish army, which, probably alarmed by the movements of one of those animals Sancho Panza loved, while browsing among the olive trees, thinking that the French were in the midst of their unassailable trenches, poured forth a roll of musketry along the whole of their line, and immediately "three battalions, alarmed at their own noise, took to their heels." The idle "noise" was taken up by some of the inexperienced battalions, drafts from the militia, of the British army; and the consequence was, they shot several of their own officers and men who were at the outposts.

Soon after day-break, on the morning of the 28th, a cannon-shot from the centre of the enemy's line, was the signal for the advance of his columns, and the opening of all his guns. A shower of balls instantly fell in all parts of the English line; and under cover of the smoke, two strong columns of chosen troops ascended with the most resolute bearing, the hill on the extreme left. Again and again they pressed forward to within a few paces of the summit,

\* While the French were advancing, the following memorable circumstance occurred. Its detail in the identical words of the original narrator will, no doubt, be the most interesting to the reader. During the second day of the battle of Talavera, a Spanish officer rode up to me, and inquired, "If I was one of the English generals?" As I was only a colonel of the staff, I said, "No; but that I commanded the brigade then engaged in our immediate front." He answered—"I am sent by the duke of Albuquerque to desire that sir Arthur Wellesley may be informed that the Spanish general will afford him no assistance in this battle, and that he is in communication with the enemy." As the enemy was at the time making repeated and vigorous attacks on our left, in which my brigade was, I was not able to communicate the intelligence to the commander-in-chief until the lapse

and struggled hard for a footing, but they were repulsed and baffled in all their attempts, by the closely delivered volleys, and rapid charges of the English, leaving the ground covered with slain.

A pause in the work of death now took place, from nine o'clock till mid-day, on account of the extreme sultriness of the weather, and that Joseph Buonaparte was engaged in a council of war with Jourdan, Victor, and Sebastiani, as to the ulterior measures they should adopt. By virtue of a sort of tacit truce, a cessation of hostilities took place; and in the interim, the French army was engaged in cooking and eating their dinner; while the English army, having none to cook, ate their very scanty modicum of nature's unsophisticated gifts; namely, a few handfuls of wheat which they bruised between stones, handed from one man to the other. During the portentous calm which had suspended the work of death and destruction, many men of both armies straggled down to the Portina rivulet, which at that season of the year was only a muddy stream, and then ensanguined with the bodies of the slain, which were lying in it. There, and at the well at the foot of the Gata chain, which was also surrounded by the men of both nations,—imitating the gentle courtesy of the heroes of the Iliad, who shook hands and exchanged weapons in the hour of contest,—they passed the interval in social intercourse and mutual good wishes, exchanging the contents of their canteens and calabashes, as tokens of good fellowship and respect, which proofs of mutual courage had inspired, and which brave men know how to value in a brave enemy, till the rolling of the drums along the whole French line, and the roar of the signal-guns, recalled them to the posts of duty and allegiance.\* All were again engaged in the great and glorious game of war, and the

of half-an-hour; when I found him surrounded by his own staff and that of general Hill. Sir Arthur hearing that somebody was waiting to make a report, desired that I might go to him. I found him sitting on a low stone, his elbows resting on his knees, with his two hands flat on his face, each on one cheek, and his eyes looking out sharply beyond his two little fingers. I have seen the duke in this position at table more than once since. On my going up to him he turned his whole person as he sat towards me, and in the calmest manner, but with quickness, said—"Well, what have you to say?" I then repeated to him the message I had received. Sir Arthur, without removing his hands, or showing the least sign of surprise, answered—"Oh, very well; you may go back to your brigade." Not a motion indicated the slightest agitation; but calmly turning



goddess of arms held up the dazzling prize of victory to the view of the rival combatants, as the reward of superior prowess and skill.

During the suspension of hostilities, sir Arthur remedied his omission of not having occupied the hill of the Gata chain, which was further on his extreme left, and separated from it by a deep valley; but which at the time of his taking up his position, had been deemed too distant to have any influence on the position, by stationing a body of cavalry, and Bassecour's brigade, (which he had induced Cuesta to send him as a corps of observation), on the plain or valley between the two hills. He had scarcely effected this change, when, under the protection of a furious tempest of balls and bullets from 80 pieces of artillery, and of clouds of voltigeurs, four heavy columns were observed advancing, to make a simultaneous attack on the right and centre of the English line: the first against Campbell's division; the second against Sherbrooke's; the third against Mackenzie's and the German legion; and the fourth, accompanied by a mass of cavalry, against Hill's division on the hill; each column not deploying into line, till it had gained the summit of the ridge, except that against Sherbrooke, which advanced partly in line and partly in column.

When the first column under Sebastiani was within a few paces of Campbell's division, it was received with a shattering volley, and its flanks being at the same moment assailed with a lapping fire from the flanks of Campbell's line, it was, by a firm charge of the bayonet, driven back with great slaughter; and a battery of ten guns was taken. But Campbell prudently resolving not to break his line by a pursuit, the enemy rallied on their supports, but in the act of making head for another attack, were so

vehemently battered by the English artillery and musketry, that they fell back in disorder.

While the battle was thus won on the right, Vilatte's division, supported by Maubourg's cavalry and two batteries of eight guns each, was advancing against the left of the line, to turn Hill's division, which had been already so fiercely contested; when Anson's brigade, consisting of the 23rd regiment of light dragoons and 1st German hussars, which had been posted in the valley, being ordered to charge the head of those columns, the 23rd, under major Somerset, rushing forward impetuously, fell over the brink of a deep ravine or dry water-course, which the long waving state of the grass concealed from their view, and both men and horses were precipitated over one another in dreadful confusion. Nowise discouraged by this untoward accident and the destructive fire which the French, who had thrown their columns into solid squares (partly formed against the side of a house within gun shot of the British left, and protected by sixteen guns), poured in upon them, they mounted the opposite bank "in twos" and "threes," and being reformed by major Ponsonby, dashed through the intervals of the French squares, under a deadly blaze of fire—rushed on a brigade of chasseurs drawn up in the rear—and cutting the first line in two, attacked the second line. The French being assisted by the advance of some Polish lancers and Westphalian light horse, the gallant remains of the 23rd, after having lost above the half of its men and officers, repassing through the intervals of the French columns, again formed in the rear of Fane's brigade of heavy cavalry in the valley, whose advance had been countermanded on observing the discomfiture of the 23rd.\* The 1st German Hussars on seeing the calamitous condition of the

himself back, he again directed his view to the battle." (*Communication of general sir Rufane Donkin, to the United Service Journal, for 1830.*) The following anecdote, on the occasion of the battle of Waterloo, confirms this remark. At three o'clock in the morning of the 18th of June, while the troops were snatching a brief repose, the duke was employed in writing three letters (two of which were in French) to sir Charles Stewart, the duke of Berri, and the governor of Antwerp, calmly describing his situation, and expressing unshaken confidence in the result of the approaching battle. The author of *Twelve Years' Military Adventure*, says, that a cavalry officer told him that he had been sent express, one night, from a distant part of the army, with information of a sudden movement of the enemy, which was supposed

to be of great consequence. The duke received him while in bed, heard the communication, asked a few questions, and then saying "All's right," fell back on his pillow, and resumed his repose. As sir Rufane Donkin observes in his communication above stated, instances of the duke's cool and imperturbable self-possession were of daily occurrence during the Peninsular war; the feeling was habitual to him.

\* The daring and desperate charge of the 23rd dragoons, says a correspondent of the *United Service Journal*, was the subject of eulogy in the French army, "who are always more disposed to give the due measure of praise to the gallant bearing of the English, than their own countrymen are." In military circles, the following anecdote is current, as the cause of the escape of the remnant of the regiment



23rd dragoons, had reined up and retired. During this exploit, the attack on Hill's position was repulsed with the same success as had attended that on the right. Both sides displayed the same undaunted courage and resolution. The French columns advanced close up to the English line, but were so vigorously encountered, that they fell back in disorder, leaving the hill covered with their dead, dying, wounded, and exhausted comrades.

While these terrible conflicts were going on in the British wings, the battle raged in all its fury in the centre, being assailed by Lapisse's division, which advanced under the destructive fire of fifty pieces of heavy artillery. Though fearful chasms were made by the tempest of cannon balls in the British ranks, the enemy was received with close and well directed volleys, and being charged with the bayonet, their whole line broke, and they were hurled in confusion down the steep. In this struggle the brigade of guards quitting their lines, in the victorious excitement, and the headlong

passion of fight, hotly pursued the enemy into the plain, but being assailed in flank with a tempest of grape from the batteries, and at the same time attacked by the enemy, who had faced about, and their supporting columns and cavalry, they were thrown into great disorder, in which the German legion, who had followed their example, participated, so that all the mounted officers and about 500 privates were killed or wounded. Sir Arthur, to remedy the disaster, ordered the 48th regiment,\* which he had kept in hand, to advance to their support, and that gallant regiment wheeling back by companies, and allowing the guards and Germans to retire through the openings, immediately wheeled into line, and delivering a well directed and closely telling fire, arrested the advance of the enemy. In the interim, the guards and German legion having recovered their formation, the re-formed line rushed forward with a loud huzza—which was answered with a thrilling cheer, "the earthquake voice of victory," by the whole of the line of the

from the great force with which it was surrounded:—A German trumpeter, who had deserted from the enemy a few days before the battle, and had enrolled himself in the 23rd, seeing there was no possibility of escape, and aware of the punishment that awaited him if taken, rushed towards the trumpeter of the 23rd dragoons, exclaiming in the most agitated tones, "Gif me de trumpet, gif me de trumpet!" and at the same time snatching it as it hung loosely at the English trumpeter's side, blew with shrill and loud notes, "the French order to retreat." The enemy, on hearing it, supposing that some part of the army was in danger, retreated; and in the meantime the survivors of the 23rd rejoined their own army. Among the survivors was the late lord William Russell, who was murdered by his Swiss valet.

\* The commanding officer of this regiment was the gallant old colonel Donnell, who, having his knee dreadfully shattered by a ball, while leading his regiment at double-quick time, beckoned the next officer in command, major Middlemore, and, though suffering excruciating pain from the wound, taking off his hat, resigned the command, as formally as if he had been on the parade of a barrack-ground. Like the rest of the wounded, he was allowed by the ungrateful Talaverans to lie in the streets; but a mortification of the limb ensuing, he was released by death from his sufferings. When, on Cuesta's disgraceful and culpable abandonment of the British hospital, the French entered Talavera, some of the French officers who had witnessed the gallant bearing of the deceased during the action, as a testimonial of their admiration and esteem, conveyed him in a cloak to the spot of his gallant exploits, and buried him with all the honours of war. That gallant soldier was as distinguished for his eccentricity as for his officer-like and gentlemanly bearing. He was styled in the army "the last of the powderers," an appellation acquired from the circumstance of his persevering in his exhibition of the good old cauliflower head; which

he considered as essential a part of the soldier's costume as that of the sword and sash. Jack boots and white buckskin breeches were also the objects of his adoration; and when grey overalls and Wellingtons were ordered to be substituted, he pertinaciously adhered to his favourite costume. The eccentricities of that true son of Mars often occasioned many laughable circumstances. Among those fondly held in remembrance by the survivors of the regiment, the following is not the least interesting:—The battalion which he commanded first, and for the longest time, was the second, but he was promoted to the first on a vacancy occurring; an occurrence which occasioned him for some time to lose sight of his favourite portion of the regiment. Prior to the battle of Talavera, sir Arthur Wellesley reviewed the British army in the presence of Cuesta and his staff, in compliment to the exhibition of the Spanish army having been displayed to him on the junction of the allied forces. As the respective staffs rode down the line, every soldier stood perfectly motionless, not even a movement of a facial muscle being observable. All of a sudden, however, a bustle and a murmur were remarked in the second battalion of the 48th; its line had lost its usual statue-like appearance, and caps and heads, and tongues and hands, seemed to be undergoing an electric shock. This breach of discipline in that distinguished corps was caused by the sight of their old commander riding amongst the staff-officers, in his stiff white leathers, his cauliflower head, and square cocked hat. The men were those he had formerly commanded, and the sight of him had given rise to the murmurs of "There goes old Charley;" "God bless the old boy;" "long life to him;" and similar ebullitions of their esteem and affection. The explanation of the cause of these merited, but rather out-of-place expressions appeased sir Arthur's chagrin; and all were delighted as "Old Charley" waved his hat, in cordial salutation of his old friends, and in return for their compliment.



army—against the enemy, whose battalions in all parts of their line having been already shattered and disordered, and their slain strewed along the gallant front of the English in fearful numbers, retreated, under cover of the smoke of their artillery and numerous cavalry, to the rear of their original position; having been repulsed at all points, and leaving in the hands of the conquerors, seventeen guns, with two tumbrils and ammunition. Seventeen thousand stand of arms were found on the field of battle, and several silk standards, their eagles which had been made to unscrew, so that the standard-bearers, when hard pressed in the pursuit might pocket them, having been taken off. Near the termination of the battle, which closed about six in the evening, a melancholy scene occurred. The dry grass and leaves which lay upon the ground, becoming ignited from the cartridges and wadding that had fallen upon them, a volume of flame spread itself over hundreds of acres, involving in the conflagration many of the wounded of both armies.

The loss of the British was two generals, 31 officers, and 761 sergeants and privates killed; three generals, 193 officers, and 3,718 sergeants and privates wounded; nine officers, and 643 sergeants and privates missing. That of the French was, according to their own returns, 944 killed, 6,294 wounded, and 156 prisoners; but sir Arthur Wellesley's estimate, "about one quarter of their army," was nearer the truth, and this supposition is confirmed by the French war-office statement, of 8,794 men lost. The Spaniards returned their loss in the action as 1,200; but no credit was given to the account, as they had scarcely been engaged in the battle. The great loss which the

English army had suffered was chiefly occasioned by the murderous and overwhelming fire of the French artillery, several regiments which had been scarcely engaged having suffered nearly equal loss with those that bore the brunt of the battle. Two balls perforated sir Arthur Wellesley's coat, and a spent ball struck him on the shoulder. On the evening of the 27th a cannon-ball struck off the branch of a tree just above his head. The danger to which he had been exposed may be inferred from the following observation in a letter to the duke of Richmond:—"All my staff have either been hit, or have lost their horses."\*

The English army consisted of near 19,000 men, and the French army, according to the returns of the war-office at Paris, to 56,174 men. But only 38,000 of the French and 16,000 of the English were engaged in the battle; the reserves on both sides were not brought into action. Thus, to adopt the words of the author of *The History of the War in the Peninsula*, "16,000 English soldiers," the greater part raw and inexperienced, as the 87th, the 88th, &c., a large proportion of which had just been drafted from the militia, and of which they bore evident marks on their knapsacks and accoutrements, "worsted 38,000 French, who were all hardy veterans," and who, moreover, were troops who had no misgivings from having witnessed English courage and felt English bayonets at Roliça, Vimiera, Corunna, or Oporto. Thus had the battle of Talavera been "bravely fought and nobly won," and which, according to Sarrazin's acknowledgment, "avait repandu l'effroi dans l'armée Française."

The English army bivouacked on the same requital from the municipal body of Cadiz, for his gallant and patriotic services in saving that city from the grasp of the French. When that true patriot demanded clothing for his gallant corps, the municipality of that city (though the sordid and mercenary varlets had 700 pieces of cloth in their possession), refused to grant a single suit, until an order should emanate from the regency for the purpose, as they would then be entitled to a commission on the transaction. Albuquerque petitioned the regency for the purpose, and was directed by them to publish his memorial, which so exasperated the abject-souled municipal authorities, that they resorted to every species of calumny and virulence that malice and disappointed avarice could devise. Albuquerque, in the agony of his soul at the ingratitude and baseness of his contemptible countrymen, renounced his office of governor of Cadiz, and declined to continue in his military command. That illustrious patriot and real soldier died of a broken heart in England, while he was executing the office of ambassador from the Spanish government.

\* When the motion was made in both houses of parliament for a vote of thanks for the battle of Talavera, "so sternly fought, so hardly won," there were men to be found there who, to adopt Napier's indignant reproof, "considered the merits of him, who had delivered Portugal, cleared Galicia and Estremadura, and obliged a hundred thousand veterans to abandon the offensive, and concentrate about Madrid, nought; his actions silly, presumptuous, rash; his campaign one deserving not reward, but punishment." The same malignant and villifying spirit was indicated by a portion of the public press, and the cuckoo-note of ignorant and presumptuous reprehension of his military knowledge was taken up and re-echoed by the sages of the corporation of the city of London. The common council in their petition to parliament for inquiry (dated February 26th, 1810), presumptuously described his conduct as "exhibiting, with equal rashness and ostentation, nothing but useless valour." But presumption and ingratitude of the kind were not confined to English corporations. The duke of Albuquerque met with the



field of battle during the night, in a very cheerless state, being on the verge of absolute famine, and the night was very damp and chilly. In the course of the night the enemy passed the Alberche, leaving their watch-fires blazing along the whole front of their lines, and took up a defensive position on the heights of Salinas.\* On the following morning the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th rifles, under major-general Robert Craufurd, reached the field of battle. In their advance, having met 6,000 of the panic-struck Spaniards, who told them that the English had been defeated and Wellesley killed, and were fleeing before the French, the gallant band, desirous of sharing in the peril of their countrymen, made a forced march of sixty-two miles in the course of twenty-six hours, without a single halt—an effort of endurance unequalled in military annals. The 29th and 30th were employed in establishing the hospitals, and endeavouring to obtain food; for, as has been just observed, the army was on the verge of famine, though plenty abounded in Cuesta's camp, and that the cellars of Talavera contained a sufficiency of corn and provisions for a month's consumption. When the wounded were carried into the town, the inhabitants inhumanly refusing to receive them into their houses, and the civic authorities to grant any medical aid for the relief of their suffering protectors, they were obliged to rest on the pavement of the streets and squares, without aid or assistance. To sir Arthur Wellesley's application to Cuesta and the magistrates of the city, to furnish rations for the troops, a positive refusal was given, until the British chief threatened to retreat into Portugal. And the inhumanity and ingratitude of Cuesta and the people of Talavera were not confined to the refusal of food and medical aid to those who had shed their blood and sacrificed their limbs in their defence, but they refused to assist in burying the dead, and soon after the termination of the battle they were actively employed in stealing the arms, ammunition, clothing, and money of the sick and wounded, and in stripping the bodies of the dead on the field of battle. To prevent their knocking out the brains of the wounded French, (which they did wherever they could), sentries were

placed on the field, with orders to fire on the offenders. But cruelty was congenial to and inherent in the nature of that people. On the retreat of the French from before the Spanish intrenchments on the 27th, their dastardly enemies were observed to be busily employed in stabbing and maiming the wounded and dying, whom they had feared to close with when unmaimed and unhurt.

"In the battle of Talavera, the Spanish army, with very trifling exceptions, was not engaged. Bassecour's corps was stationed on our left, and was kept in check throughout the day by one French battalion."\* "It needed but a forward movement on the part of the Spaniards to render this hardly won, but singularly splendid victory, as decisive as any on record. Had it been possible to move them from the right of their line, so as to have gained the flanks of the French, one-half of the French army must have been sacrificed. But neither Cuesta nor his troops were capable of the change of a position in the face of an enemy; and therefore to attempt to manœuvre them, however simply, would have thrown them into confusion; and a second panic, such as that of the 27th, would have led to the most disastrous consequences." Again, while expressing his admiration of the English general's "moral courage in accepting battle with such a coadjutor as Cuesta," Thiers properly observes, that, had Jourdan's plan of carrying the key of the position (namely, the height occupied by Hill,) succeeded, the English general was prepared to neutralize the flank attack by a change in front, as by his left wing and cavalry he would have been enabled to keep the enemy in check, while his right, marching on the position abandoned by the French, would have cut the enemy off from the Alberche; and sir Arthur would have effected a junction with Vanegas and sir Robert Wilson's corps; and the results would have been, that Madrid and Toledo must have fallen into the possession of the allies; and before Soult could have united with Joseph, the allies would have obtained a new line of operations through the fertile country of La Mancha.

Cuesta now, that the fighting was over, "reared his abject head," and assuming of the toils they had been weaving for its destruction by its retrograde movement from Talavera, it was then Soult's design to intercept its retreat on Portugal by seizing the boat-bridge of Almaraz.

\* See sir Arthur Wellesley's letter to the duke of Richmond.—Gurwood's *Despatches*.

\* The reason that Victor, with the first corps d'armée, made his stand at Salinas was, for the purpose of falling on the rear of the English army when Soult had approached its position, after having passed the Puerto de Banos, and compelled it to retreat. When they found that it had escaped out



the part of the Roman general, began to decimate the runaways from his strong entrenchments. The victims to his unappeasable wrath were numerous; but on the intercession of sir Arthur Wellesley, he redecimated them, and limited his high and indignant sense of violated Spanish military renown to the immolation of five officers and thirty privates.

The kindly and generous feeling displayed at the rivulet Portina, and the well at the foot of the Gata Chain, by the hostile troops during the suspension of the battle of Talavera, was exhibited on several other occasions. On the morning after the battle of Busaco, the men of both armies were to be seen quenching their thirst in the same narrow stream, and even leaning over to shake hands. During the movements preceding the battle of Salamanca, while each army was on the opposite banks of the Douro, the soldiers of the hostile armies used to bathe together in the same stream, and to exchange their rations in token of amity and good fellowship. The men of both armies often passed the Douro, and held friendly intercourse in groups. During those conventional civilities, the arrangements were so perfectly amicable, that they not only made interchanges of presents, but the English took charge of the love letters of such of the French who had been prisoners of war in England, to be sent through the English army posts to their sweethearts there.\* Of the friendly intercourse and generous feeling generally subsisting between the outposts of the adverse armies during the Peninsular campaigns, the following incident is an illustration. Lord Wellington, desirous to ascend a hill in possession of the French near Bayonne, ordered the riflemen who composed his escort to drive the French away. Observing them to steal up the ascent more cautiously than he thought was necessary, he ordered them to fire. "No firing," cried one of the generous soldiers, at the same time holding up the butt of his rifle towards the enemy, and tapping it in a peculiar manner understood among the initiated in the proprieties of war. At the signal, which signified, "We must have the hill for a short time," the French retired. It must, however, be recollected that the point was not capable of an effective and permanent defence, or it would not have been relinquished without a contest. And this friendly understanding and observance

of the proprieties of war was so strictly maintained between the hostile armies, that not only the sentries, but also the piquets were safe from wanton surprisal; no attack on an outpost, being, under any circumstances, thought of, unless it was meant to be followed up by a general engagement. During the whole of the continuance of Massena before the lines of Torres Vedras, the sentinels, though within musket range of each other's post, never wantonly fired; and indeed, throughout the war, neither the sentries nor videttes of the contending armies ever fired on one another, or made any attempt at the outposts, to provoke or wrong each other by feigned attacks; for in regular armies it is rivalry, not hatred, that animates the troops even when engaged in battle; therefore all useless slaughter is abstained from by the sentries and outposts of each army.

But this courteous mode of carrying on hostilities may, as the author of *The Subaltern* observes, be pushed too far. This he proves by the following anecdote:—

"Towards the close of the war, so good an understanding prevailed between the outposts of the two armies, that lord Wellington found it necessary to forbid all communication whatever; nor will the reader wonder at this, when I state to him the reason. A field-officer (I shall not say in what part of the line,) in going his rounds one night, found that the whole of the serjeant's piquet-guard had disappeared. He was, of course, both alarmed and surprised at the occurrence; but his alarm gave place to absolute astonishment, when on stretching forward to observe whether there was any movement in the enemy's lines, he peeped into a cottage from which a noise of revelry was proceeding, and beheld the party sitting in the most sociable manner with a similar party of Frenchmen, and carousing jovially. As soon as he showed himself, his own men rose, and wishing their companions a good night, returned with the greatest *sang-froid* to their posts. [The officer unwilling that the sacred character which had by the practice of both armies been tacitly conferred on the piquets, should be violated, took no notice of the affair.] It is, however, but justice to add, that the sentinels on both sides faithfully kept their ground, and that no intention of deserting existed on either part. In fact, it was a sort of custom, the French and English [out-post] guards visiting each other by turns.

\* Suttree's *Twenty-five Years in the Rifle Brigade*.



“At the period of which I have spoken above, however, no such extraordinary intimacy had begun. And yet we were merely civil towards one another; and even that degree of civility was for awhile interrupted by the surprisal of a French post, by a detachment from general Beresford’s division, on the river Nive. Not that the piquet was wantonly cut off, or that any blame could possibly attach to the general who ordered its surprisal. The fact was, that the out-post in question occupied a hill upon the allied bank of the stream. It was completely insulated and detached from all other French posts, and appeared to be held as much out of perverseness, as because it commanded a view of the British lines to a great extent. Lord Bresford had repeatedly despatched flags of truce, to request that it might be withdrawn, expressing great unwillingness to violate the sacred character which had been tacitly conferred upon the piquets; but Soult was deaf to his entreaties, and replied to his threats, only by daring him to carry them into execution. A party was accordingly ordered out, one stormy night, to cut off the guard; and so successful was the attempt, that an officer and thirty soldiers, with a midshipman and a few seamen who had charge of the boat by which the reliefs were daily ferried over, were taken. Not a shot was fired. The French trusting to the storm for protection, had called in their videttes, leaving only one on duty at the door of the house, and he found his arms pinioned, and himself secured ere the roar of the tempest had permitted him to detect the sounds of approaching steps. The unfortunate officer who commanded, sent, in the course of a few days, to the French army for his baggage; but the reply was, that the general would forward to him a halter, as the only indulgence which he merited.”

The same feeling prevailed among the officers of each nation; besides observing all the courtesies of society and of kind and gentlemanly bearing towards one another in the friendly intercourse which took place, they often interchanged presents. During the marches and counter marches

that preceded the battle of Salamanca, while the armies were moving in parallel columns, the officers on each side made recognitions of courteous feeling towards each other, touching their shakos, and waving their hands in friendly salutation. Numerous instances of this honourable and humane mode of mitigating the austere discipline of warfare, in which civilities were exchanged, and often more substantial things, at the respective limits, are mentioned in *The Subaltern*, *Remiscences of a Subaltern*, *Recollections of a Subaltern*, *The Bivouac*, &c.; among them the following possess much interest.

While the light division was at Gallegos, some greyhounds belonging to an officer, strayed into the enemy’s lines, and an opportunity was found, by means of the first flag of truce, to request their being returned. The answer was favourable, stating, that they should be sent on the first opportunity. A day or two after the enemy made a reconnoissance, and when the skirmishers were thrown out, the greyhounds were seen in couples in the rear, and on the first carbine being fired, they were let slip, and came curveting through the whistling balls to their old masters.

“Many a time,” says the author of *The Subaltern*, “have I waded half across the Bidassoa in fishing for trout, and the enemy’s piquets posted on the opposite bank, have come down in crowds to watch my success; and have pointed out particular pools or eddies where the best sport was to be had.”

The courtesies and proprieties of war are not confined to the French and English services. During the seige of Tripolizza and Mesolonghi, in the Greek war of independence, the Greek and Turkish soldiers held communications and conference with each other, sitting down in two lines, smoking and conversing together for hours. Their conversations, however were not always so amicable as those of the English and French during the Peninsular war, but occasionally had a tragic conclusion, which generally terminated to the disadvantage of those who were the most distant from their friends.



## ULTERIOR OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST SPANISH CAMPAIGN, AND THE RETREAT ON THE FRONTIERS OF PORTUGAL.

WHILE sir Arthur Wellesley was contemplating a movement on Madrid, intelligence was brought on the 30th that Soult and Ney, with 54,000 men, were marching on his rear and flank, with the intention of cutting off his retreat into Portugal, the former having advanced through the Puerto de Baños (the marquis del Reyna having fled from that strong pass without firing a shot), and had entered Placentia. The English general, thinking that Soult's force did not exceed twenty thousand men, determined to march against him. Having obtained a promise from Cuesta, that he would remain at Talavera to secure his rear from Victor, and cover the removal of the wounded and stores to a place of safety, he broke up his cantonments from that city, on the 3rd of August, and began his march to Oropesa.

When Victor, supposing that the appearance of the Lusitanian legion under sir Robert Wilson, on his flank, was the advanced guard of sir Arthur Wellesley's army, had quitted the heights of Salinas, with the intention of retreating to Mostolles, heard that the British army had broke up from Talavera, he immediately retrograded on that town. As soon as Cuesta heard of his advance, forgetting his promise to cover the evacuation of the English hospital, and thinking his only safety was in his proximity to the British army, he took to his heels, and with his Spaniards, followed the English army in a rapid and hurried flight, like a flock of sheep, reaching Oropesa at day-light of the morning of the 4th. He not only left the sick and wounded\*—as the faithless old Spaniard expressed himself,—“to the Almighty helper of the friendless,” but

\* When colonel Mackinnon, who had been left in charge of the hospital, found that Cuesta was determined to abandon it to the enemy, he applied to him for cars for its removal; and though the selfish old man was encumbered with cars and waggons for which he had no lading, he gave only seven for the purpose. In the course of the battle he had displayed a like spirit. To sir Arthur Wellesley's application for the loan of some of his artillery, on account of the small calibre of the English guns, and their insufficiency to meet the weight of the enemy's artillery, he sent him only two out of the seventy which he had. Also, “on the very field of battle, and with the steam of English blood reeking in his nostrils,” he refused to lend his able and friendly coadjutor ninety mules,

exposed the English army to be attacked both in front and rear, by two superior armies, and also endangered the Portuguese corps under sir Robert Wilson, and the Spanish army under Vanegas. Fortunately, however, for the inmates of the hospital, they found a better friend and a more humane heart, in their adversary, Marshal Victor, than in the faithless and ungrateful Spaniards for whom they had shed their blood. That gallant officer as soon as he entered Talavera—no doubt influenced by the noble example of sir Arthur Wellesley, in his humane and generous treatment of the French prisoners that had fallen into his hands, as also in consequence of the letter he had received from the English chief, containing the noble expression, “as you found them brave, I trust you will treat them kindly,”—not only compelled the selfish and inhuman inhabitants to supply the sufferers with every requisite, but to receive into their homes the sick and wounded, who were lying on the bare stones, weltering in their blood, in the plaza, or square.

The ingratitude and inhumanity which the troops experienced at Talavera and other places in Spain, as well as the outrages frequently practised on small and isolated parties of officers and men on their way to join the army, created so much disgust and hatred in the breasts of the privates of the army, that to those causes may partly be ascribed the commission of the excesses that took place at the storming of Badajos and St. Sebastian. The men never forgot the cruel usage which the sick and wounded had received from the inhuman and ungrateful Talaverans.

As soon as Cuesta—whose fears had in the room of those that had been lost at the battle of Talavera, to draw the artillery in his advance to engage Soult, though he had hundreds in his army, employed in drawing only empty carts. Colonel Mackinnon succeeded in removing about two thousand of the wounded in forty cars, which, by sacrificing a great quantity of baggage, sir Arthur had forwarded to him; but still many hundreds were left behind. Many of the wounded, unwilling to fall into the hands of the enemy, crawled after the army, some still bleeding, many with their wounds open and undressed. Sir Arthur, when made acquainted with Cuesta's determination to abandon his wounded, remonstrated with him in strong terms against the impolicy and cruelty of the measure; but all in vain.



duced him to sacrifice the wounded at Talavera, and to leave an undisputed passage open to Victor—reached Oropesa, he assumed the same vapouring tone which he had displayed when sir Arthur Wellesley extricated him from the indefensible spot on which he had taken his position prior to the battle of Talavera; and in reply to the English general's proposal to take up a defensive position on the line of the Tagus, he talked loudly of standing his ground and fighting the French; but when he found that his skilful ally would not expose his army, which was exhausted from want of food, to the overwhelming force of the enemy (amounting to at least 70,000 men, concentrated in the valley of the Tagus, and which threatened the English army in front and rear at the same time), and had determined to secure a communication with Truxillo and Merida, before the enemy could seize the Col de Mirabete, and thus cut off his retreat on Portugal, the obstinate old Spaniard was glad to escape out of the toils the enemy had been laying for him, and to follow in the wake of the English.

In pursuance of sir Arthur's determination, the English army, by a forced march, passed the bridge of Arzobispo, and taking up a line of defence behind the Tagus, was, by two o'clock of the 4th in position; and thus the designs of the enemy were baffled, and the English army extricated from the critical position in which it had been placed in the valley of the Tagus. On the 7th the British head-quarters were at Deleytoza. On the 11th they were at Jaraicejo, and the main body of the army was cantoned in the villages, round the head-quarters. Two divisions occupied Almarez and the Puerto de Mirabete, and the cavalry the city of Truxillo, where sir Arthur halted the army in a position favourable for the defence of the passage of Almarez, and keeping open the defiles of Deleytoza and Jaraicejo, had thus a clear retreat to the frontier of Portugal. On the 8th the Spanish army crossed the bridge of Arzobispo; but the rear guard, consisting of two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, under Albuquerque, was surprised by Mortier, who took 400 prisoners, the survivors fleeing to the mountains in complete confusion, leaving their cannon behind them ready shotted. Another calamity similar to that which had occurred at Talavera, took place on this occasion. The herbage, stubble, and shrubs with which the ground was covered, took fire, from the ignited cartridges

and wadding which had fallen upon it, and communicating with the neighbouring groves of ilex and olive trees, all rendered dry and inflammable by the intense heat of the season, the blaze spread far and wide with frightful rapidity. The cries of the wounded at the same time mingling with the explosion of cartridges and cassoons, and the crackling of the flames, as the wind rolled the fiery flood from one part of the scene of conflagration to another, was heart-rending.

At this time the condition of the English army was very distressing: want and sickness assailed it in their direst forms. The soldiers were weakened for want of food, and the sick were dying for want of necessaries. "Starvation," said sir Arthur, in a letter to the duke of Richmond, dated August 8th, from Deleytoza, "has produced dire effects on the army." From July 20th to August 20th, Napier declares, that the army had not received ten days' rations. "A quarter of a pound of goat's flesh, half a pound of wheat in the grain, and a few ounces of flour twice a week, formed the sole subsistence of men and officers." During the same time, the cavalry and artillery horses had received only three deliveries of food; the consequence was, that 1000 horses had died, and 700 were on the sick list. In a letter addressed to Cuesta, dated Deleytoza, August 8th, sir Arthur Wellesley told the heartless old man, "I assure your excellency that since the 3rd the army has had no bread till yesterday, when about 4000lbs. of biscuit were divided among thirty thousand mouths. There is this day again no bread for the soldiers." In a letter dated August 11th, and addressed to Cuesta, sir Arthur tells the imbecile old Spaniard, that "while the British troops were starving on the hills, he met on the 7th of the month 350 mules laden with provisions for the Spanish army, and that General Sherbrooke, on the following day, gave a written order to another convoy, addressed to all British officers, to allow them to pass through the army unmolested. Yesterday I met on the road and passed not less than 500 mules laden with provisions for the Spanish army; and no later than yesterday, Major Campbell, my aid-de-camp, gave an order to another large convoy, addressed to all British officers and soldiers, not to impede its progress."\*

The consequence of these wants and sufferings was, sickness rapidly increased. In the cantonments the troops now occupied,

\* Gurwood's *Despatches*.



fever, ague, and dysentery stole upon them. In a few weeks many thousand men were in the hospital, and in a few more some thousands were in the grave; and to enhance the calamity, there was a great deficiency of the necessary medicaments. In the autumnal season the valley of the Guadarama is peculiarly insalubrious; for the river then ceasing to be a stream, noxious vapours arise from the detached pools of stagnant water that remain in the deepest hollows of the torrent bed.

And these were not the only grievances which the English army experienced from their ungrateful and faithless allies. The Spanish troops not only intercepted the provisions and forage destined for the English army, and which had been bought and paid for by the commissioners of that army, but had fired on the convoys and the foragers as if they had been enemies. Even the provisions that had been collected by the English, and put into the magazines at Ciudad Rodrigo, were seized by the *cabildo* of that town, under the feigned pretence of a debt due for the supply of Sir John Moore's army. When the English chief applied for a remount of six hundred mares for those lost by the British cavalry in the course of the campaign; when he demanded mules to draw his guns and ammunition, to supply the place of those which had been lost at Talavera by Cuesta's flight; when he requested the use of bullock cars to convey his sick and wounded, who had received their wounds and injuries in the defence of the Talaverans—he met with a refusal in each case, though the mares required could not be used by the Spanish troops, and the bullock cars asked for followed the Spanish army, without having any lading. The junta, also, threw every obstacle in the way of the exchange of the British prisoners (though those prisoners consisted chiefly of the sick and wounded who had been captured at Talavera in consequence of Cuesta's perfidy), and did all in their power to prevent any communication between the British chief and the enemy on that subject.

Neither did this spirit of hostility and ingratitude cease during the continuance of the British army in the Peninsula. During the whole six years it was lavishing its blood in the defence of the national independence of both countries, it experienced ingratitude, calumny, and the most heartless treatment from the governments and authorities of

both Spain and Portugal. Even at near the end of the contest, when it had driven the French from the soil that was drenched with its blood, the sordid and ungrateful cortes published a decree to prohibit the English from entering their fortresses, which had been lost by their own countrymen's cowardice and treachery, but recovered by English valour, though the blood of the gallant captors still smoked on the ramparts of those fortresses; and, in many instances, the magistrates ordered the inhabitants of the country not to furnish succour of any kind to their deliverers from thralldom and oppression, even for payment; though, at the same time, the French generals had merely to issue their orders for forced contributions, and other succours, even the muniments of war, and they were sure to be provided on the day, and ready at the place appointed. At Fuenterrabia, where a hospital had been established for the wounded of the allied army, the Spanish authorities endeavoured to burn the beds, that the English and Portuguese soldiers might not have the use of them. At Bilboa, the magistrates refused, even for payment, to allow any of the public buildings to be used as hospitals. The British hospitals at Santander, containing many thousand wounded men, with their attendants, were placed under quarantine, under the pretext of contagious fever; and consequently all vessels coming from them were prohibited from entering the waters of any other Spanish port. And to consummate the cruelty and ingratitude of their proceedings, they expressed a desire, that the English would not make use of that town and harbour as a depôt for their sick and wounded, though the English army was, at the time, in the midst of its arduous operations on the soil of France, forcing mountain fortifications, effecting the passage of various rapid rivers, storming five strongly intrenched camps, and fighting numerous battles—and all for the safety and independence of their ungrateful and heartless persecutors. Mercenary and empiric writers were also employed to excite the people to commence a warfare of assassination against the British soldiery. Officers and men were frequently murdered on the high roads; often severely ill-treated. Those enormities ran to so great a height, that while the British army was on the frontiers of France, its chief, in one of his communications to the earl of Bathurst, says, "that it was expedient to demand



security for the British troops against the criminal disposition of the Spanish government, and those in authority under them;" and at the same period of the operations in France, he adds, "that should it be expedient, in consequence of the machinations and treachery of the Spanish and Portuguese governments, to embark the British army at Passages, it would be necessary to adopt precautions for its safety, as the Spaniards would co-operate with the French army in molesting it." That this was not unfounded and vague surmise, is evident from the fact, that the regency and Spanish generals were in communication with the duke of San Carlos and Joseph Palafox, in pursuance of the treaty that had been entered into by Napoleon and Ferdinand at Valency, for the liberation of the latter, and his return to Spain under the protection of the French armies. Copons, the conde de Montijo, and the duke del Parque, also had secretly made proposals to pass over the forces under their command; and their example would, no doubt, have been followed by others, had they not been awed into obedience by the magical influence which the British chief exercised over them. Napoleon, in his "Memoirs," speaks of secret negotiations having been in agitation for this purpose. Indeed, so imminent was the crisis to the British army, that lord Wellington had more cause to dread his insidious Spanish friends in his rear than the whole of the French armies in his front. While in the south of France, he received many secret and earnest warnings from the well-disposed part of the French population, apprising him that a great act of treachery and delusion was in agitation between his Spanish allies and the French government and its generals.

The British commander-in-chief was also the object of their most rancorous hatred and calumny. "If he was active in the field, he was more intent on the subjugation of Spain than the defeat of the enemy; if he was cautious in preparation, his delay was to enable the French to conquer; if he was vigorous in urging the government to useful measures, his design was to impose his own laws; if he did not indicate a strong concern for the Spanish armies, he desired that they should be beaten; if he meddled with them usefully, it was to gain the soldiers, in order to turn the army against the country, and thus render Spain dependent

on England."\* Nor were their falsehood and malice confined to these base and unfounded insinuations; they spread reports that he had the ambition of aspiring to the crown of Spain. They hinted that he had correspondence with some of the Spanish nobility to make himself king of Spain; and that to render himself acceptable to the Spaniards for this object, he had changed his religion. The report was so accredited, that three Spanish grandees deemed it necessary to exculpate themselves, by publishing a refutation of the calumny.

Such was the conduct of the selfish and perfidious government of Spain—such that of the imbecile and presumptuous leaders of its armies; patriotism and honourable feeling were unknown to them; they were merely words in their mouths to delude their credulous and confiding countrymen. Far different, however, was the conduct of the lower classes of society; they, confiding in the deceitful professions of patriotism so loudly vaunted by their treacherous leaders, rushed in tens of thousands to the defence of their native soil, and its liberation from the thralldom of its oppressors; but they were uselessly sacrificed to the merciless and unmitigated fury of the foe, and the ignorance and treachery of their own countrymen.

Nor was the conduct of the Portuguese government (particularly that portion constituting the faction of which that odious priest the patriarch of Lisbon and the principal Souza, were the organs), and the hidalgos, or nobles, less inimical to the measures which the English general had devised for the salvation of their country. They strongly opposed all his plans for the defence of Portugal, and the protection of its inhabitants. They even refused him the permission to establish hospitals for his sick and wounded, in the rope-walk at Belem, or to make use of the hospitals in Lisbon, which had been formerly used by the British army for that purpose. Both the commander-in-chief and his troops were the constant subjects of their obloquy; and the contemptible faction carried their mischievous feeling to so high a pitch that they had concocted plans for libelling and caricaturing in England their saviours; in hopes that the factious and incendiary part of the press would excite the terror-stricken portion of the population to raise a clamour to have the army recalled. They laid a plot to raise the mob of Lisbon, seize the forts of Belem, St. Julien, and Bugio, and thus prevent, in case of retreat, the embarkation of

\* Napier's *History of the War in the Peninsula*, vol. vi., p. 311.



the English army on board of the transports. A traitorous correspondence was also carried on by them with Massena during his invasion of Portugal; and in his retreat they placed large supplies of provisions and cattle within reach of the French at most critical moments. As the historian of the Peninsular War has well said, "the Portuguese government was a more evil enemy to the British general, and occasioned more mischief, than all the skill and courage of the enemy."

All sir Arthur's complaints and remonstrances to Cuesta and the junta were met with falsehood, duplicity, and inhumanity. The junta told him, that "the British army was not only well but over-supplied." Their drivelling old general said, that "the British army robbed the peasantry, plundered the villages, intercepted the Spanish convoys, and openly sold the provisions thus shamefully acquired." Sir Arthur's reply to the faithless junta was, that he should withdraw his army into Portugal, where he could be provided with subsistence; and to their falsifying old general, that it was not only unbecoming the Spanish authorities to make accusations so unfounded, but that it was unworthy an English general to refute them. He moreover briefly and sternly declined any further correspondence with the last-mentioned official, till the insolent offence offered was acknowledged and atoned for by a fit apology.

Irritated at these unjust proceedings, and apprehensive of the safety of the army, sir Arthur determined to separate himself from his Spanish connexion, and, as has just been said, fell back on the frontiers of Portugal. The junta, fearful of the consequences of the separation, now endeavoured to conciliate him. With this intent, they appointed him captain-general of the Spanish armies, and offered him the command of a body of their forces. He accepted the military rank, but declined both the pay of the appointment and the separate command; as the latter would necessarily compel the renewal of the co-operation of the English army with the Spanish, and would entail upon it that defensive system which he knew would be utterly ineffective under the present circumstances. They also, at the suggestion of the marquis of Wellesley, who had succeeded Frere as plenipotentiary, displaced Cuesta, August 12th, and appointed general Eguia to his command. But that

officer differed from his predecessor, in his transactions with the British army, only in the plausibility of his conduct, and the profusion of his professions: "the evil of incompetency and faithlessness was," says a sagacious writer, "inherent in the character of the Spanish people." He not only connived at and sanctioned the false promises of the junta, to supply the British army, but he even permitted his troops to seize and appropriate to their own use the stores which were on their way to the British cantonments.

Having by his brilliant victory of Talavera saved the south of Spain from being overrun by the enemy, and also prevented him from making a fresh irruption into Portugal, the English chief, while stationed at Jaraceijo, was actively employed in devising measures to neutralize the overwhelming force which the enemy had concentrated in Estremadura; and, if possible, to infuse something like wisdom and vigour into the councils of the Spanish government, and discipline and science into its armies and generals. For this purpose he directed the duke del Parque and Vanegas to threaten Madrid, and the guerilla bands, which at this period of the war had become formidable, to hover round the capital; and thus, by intercepting convoys, and threatening the enemy's rear, to create a diversion, and compel him to divide his force. He instructed the junta to direct their generals to shun general actions, as their destruction, and to confine their operations to taking up strong defensive positions, and acting on his lines of communication. But that corrupt and perverse body deeming his opinions heretical, and jealous of his ability, determined to adopt their own plans. The result was commensurate with their inordinate folly and self-complacent ignorance. Their generals were as imbecile and self-willed as themselves: sir Arthur wished Eguia to take, in conjunction with the British army, a post behind the Guadiana, but the Spaniard refused to co-operate, and marched to form a junction with Areizaga, at Ocaña, near Aranjuez.

The British general finding his best plans, either for defence or aggression, not only opposed, but often thwarted—at the same time threatened on every side by an enemy possessing a numerical force four times exceeding his own,—his army more worn down, more diminished in numbers,\* and in con-

\* "The handful of troops which he now commanded were composed of second battalions of mere youths,

both officers and men. The guards, the buffs, the 48th, and the 61st, with the light division, could



sequence of hunger, long privation, sickness, and hardship, more disorganized than if it had fought an unsuccessful battle, instead of having been the victor in a contest in which it had borne the palm from the famed and dreaded legions of Buonaparte, as the crouching and awe-stricken nations of continental Europe deemed them—exposed to the most imminent hazard, and discovering that all the solemn promises of the junta to supply the army with food, were false and fallacious,—issued orders, August 20th, to break up the cantonments from Jaraceijo, and to retreat on Merida, with the intention of falling back on the frontiers of Portugal; at the same time desiring Eguia to occupy, in the course of the night, the posts in the neighbourhood of the bridge of Almarez, which the English army would evacuate. But the instant the junta and their general found that he had commenced his retreat, they assailed him with a storm of invectives and reproach, and calumniated him whom only ten days before, on his appointment as generalissimo of the Spanish armies, they had addressed with the most fulsome compliments. “The retreat,” they said, “across the Tagus, was unnecessary; Soult ought to have been destroyed; and the English general must have secret reasons for his conduct, which he dare not avouch.” Finding sir Arthur deaf to their idle clamour, and despising their ingratitude and calumnies, in the wildest terror and consternation they importuned him to desist from the retreat, and promised to reform their heartless system of duplicity and ingratitude; the junta promising “to apply to the nourishment of the army all the resources of the country,” and their equally faithless general declaring, “that the British army should have *all the provisions*, and the Spanish army *none*.” The English general, not to be deceived by the false professions and hollow promises of the junta and their general, replied in a cutting tone of rebuke to the preposterous offer of leaving the Spanish army provisionless. At the same time that that “miserable body made their ridiculous proposal, they earnestly conjured sir Arthur to adopt the offensive, and march upon Madrid, lest the enemy should escape their conquering and invincible clutches.

So sure did they expect to be in possession of it (could they have induced the English general to undertake the wild project), that they actually appointed civil officers for its government, and charged two of their body to frame regulations for its internal tranquillity: verifying in this instance, as in all their other acts, the truth of the remark, that in all their deeds, “at one moment they were shrinking with fear, and at the other bursting with folly.” In the beginning of October the English general established his head-quarters at Badajos, and cantoned his troops in the towns and villages of Estremadura, contiguous to the frontier of Portugal.

On the 12th of September, sir Arthur Wellesley received intimation that he had been created viscount Wellington, of Talavera, and baron Douro. In October, he went to Lisbon, to concert measures with the regency for the more complete organization of the regular army, and the militia of Portugal, and for putting the kingdom in a state of defence capable of resisting the threatened invasion of the enemy. As it was impossible to defend the extensive frontier of the country with the force at his disposal, he, at this time, selected a position, in the event of the British army retreating on that city, in which his flanks could not be turned, his front forced, or his army reduced by famine. The mountains traversing in two lofty ridges from the Tagus to the ocean, in the tongue of land in which Lisbon is situated, offered that position.\* Nature had drawn a rude outline of a strong defensive position; it remained for art to perfect it. This the British chief determined to effectuate, by the most gigantic application of the principles of field fortification to defensible positions that has ever been called into practice in warfare. Having, after a careful examination of the country in front of Lisbon, selected the line of defence, and fixed the principal points for forts, redoubts, the formation of intrenchments, &c., he left the detail and execution of the works to colonel Fletcher, according to the memorandum he had drawn up, dated October 20th, and returned to Badajos about the end of the month. In consequence of the signal defeats of the Spanish armies at

alone be regarded as fit for active service. One half of the army was fitter for the hospital than the field.”

\* This position had been carefully surveyed by sir Charles Stuart, while he commanded the British

troops in Portugal, from the opinion that on this ground, in the event of a hostile invasion of the country, the kingdom must be won or lost. His maps and topographical accounts were in sir Arthur Wellesley's possession.



Ocaña and Alba de Tormes, under Areizaga and the duke del Parque, he, on December 15th, removed his head-quarters from that city, and fell back on the north-eastern frontiers of Portugal; satisfied, as he expressed himself, "that no British army could, with safety, operate with Spanish troops," on account of their national infirmity and military imbecility. The main body of the army, under his own command, observed all the country between the Douro and the Tagus. The cavalry, except the brigade furnishing reliefs for the outposts, were stationed in the rear. The light division was in front of Almeida, its patrols extending as far as Ciudad Rodrigo. General Hill was posted, with 14,000 men, in Alemtejo, his main body at Abrantes, and his advance at Portalegre, to watch Mortier and Regnier, who held the Upper or Spanish Estremadura; and Beresford, with the Portuguese, was stationed at Thomar, in case the enemy should threaten Lisbon through the Alemtejo. The line of defence taken up, formed the segment of a circle, of about forty miles in extent, along the frontier mountains of Beira, its convex part being opposed to the quarter from which the invasion was expected. By that arrangement more than thirty thousand men could be assembled in two marches, on any point menaced by the enemy. The different divisions were so posted as to hold the strong and rugged line of the Beira frontier, and command the two great roads which pierce on the north and south that mountainous region. Viseu, Guarda, Pinhel, and Celerico, were its main points; the Coa, with its tributary streams flowing in front of the line, along the greater part of its extent. The defence of the extremes of the line was entrusted to the militia and the ordenanzas; and to give confidence to the Portuguese recent levies, they were brigaded with the English troops, in the proportion of one battalion to two English battalions. During the remainder of the year the active and vigilant mind of the commander-in-chief was employed in tours of inspection; in examining the state of fortresses, securing the passes of the mountains between Spain and Portugal, and in selecting the positions to be taken up on the enemy's advance.

During the operations of the British army, the affairs of the patriots had been very disastrous: defeats succeeded each other in rapid succession. Blake had been overthrown at Maria and Belchitti, January 15th,

and 18th; Venegas at Almonacid, August 11th; Areizaga at Ocaña, November 19th; the duke del Parque (who, being joined by sir Robert Wilson, had repulsed Marchand at Tamames, October 18th) at Alba de Tormes, November 27th. In this last action the Spaniards fled without drawing a sword, and that too in the very sight of Tamames. So disastrous had been all their efforts, that as it has been said, without much hyperbolic exaggeration, "they were more familiar with defeat—formed only to be broken, fighting only to be slain." Town after town had been taken—fortress after fortress had been reduced—army after army had been dispersed—every battle a defeat—and three-fourths of the kingdom in possession of the enemy. Gerona had surrendered; but it fell after a desperate defence, for the third time; its heroic defenders resembling spectres haunting a city of the dead, having been reduced to the unparalleled extremity of feeding on their own hair. The brutal rigour and contumely with which the French marshal, Augereau, treated its gallant governor, Mariano Alvarez, whom he cast, though in the last stage of a malignant fever, into a dungeon at Figueras—"a name that will live till old Gerona be a heap of ruins, and Spain a solitude"—were equalled only by his cruelty to the Catalans, all of whom taken in arms he caused to be hung up on gibbets erected along the roads of Catalonia. The Catalans met with the same fate from Suchet, when he succeeded to the chief command in their province: besides giving up several of their towns and villages to pillage, he treated all Spaniards taken in arms against the French, as banditti. The severe and savage executions of the patriots—who were all declared assassins, beyond the pale of military law—taken in arms in Murcia, Granada, and Andalusia, by Soult; and by Massena in his invasion of Portugal, and his retreat from Torres Vedras, also forcibly proved how deplorably a military despotism debases the moral feelings and all the humane impulses of the heart; he ordered no quarter to be given to the ordenanzas, or militia; and those who had been already taken, he commanded to be shot. To repress his savage cruelty, the following remonstrance, dated "Gouvea, November 9th," was addressed by Lord Wellington to the French marshal: "You call these men peasants, without any uniform," said the British chief: "I have the honour to assure you, that they are the



ordenanzas of this kingdom, military corps, commanded by officers paid and appointed by military laws. You appear to insist, that they alone are entitled to the rights of war, who are clad in military costume, yet forget that you yourself have added to the lustre of the French army, at the head of soldiers who were not dressed in any uniform. Is not a country, invaded by a formidable foe, justified by defending itself by every possible means? If so, Portugal is entitled to put its ordenanza in requisition, a body

\* To Maréchal Massena, Prince d'Esseling.

"Au Quartier Général de l'Armée Anglaise,

"Ce 9 Sept., 1810.

"Monsieur le Maréchal,—Il m'a fait la plus grande peine d'apprendre que vous avez donné des ordres à l'armée Française, de ne pas faire de prisonniers parmi l'ordenanza Portugaise, et que les troupes Françaises obéissent à cet ordre, et fusillent tous ceux de ce corps que leur tombent dans les mains.

"Il faut que je vous fasse savoir que tous Portugais est obligé par les anciennes lois du pays de servir dans les troupes de ligne, ou dans la milice, ou dans l'ordenanza; et que les troupes des trois descriptions sont également soumises aux lois militaires, et sont sous les ordres des officiers généraux Portugais. La preuve en est, que malgré que l'ordenanza ait souffert et se plaint des ordres que vous avez donnés, et de la violation des usages de la guerre en leurs personnes, ils obéissent aux ordres qui leur ont été donnés; et ont préservé la vie, et ont bien traité tous les prisonniers qui sont tombés dans leurs mains. Monsieur le colonel Pavetti, au sort duquel vous êtes intéressé, a été fait prisonnier par cette même description de troupes, et il en a été bien traité, aussi bien que son escort.

"Comme l'ordenanza fait donc partie de l'armée Portugaise, comme elle est également sujette aux lois militaires, et comme elle agit d'une manière loyale envers les prisonniers de l'armée Française qui tombent dans ses mains, je vous prie de donner ordre que les officiers et soldats de l'ordenanza, fait prisonniers, jouissent également avec les autres soldats de l'armée Portugaise des droits et usages de la guerre.

"Depuis que j'ai commandé les troupes dans ce pays-ci, j'ai fait tout ce que a été en mon pouvoir, et j'ai réussi à faire la guerre d'une manière loyale; et j'ai fait respecter les usages de la guerre établis et reconnus parmi les nations civilisées, qui avoient été oubliés. Mais si l'armée Française continue à faire fusiller les prisonniers qu'on fera de l'ordenanza, on ne peut pas s'attendre que les soldats de ce corps, aussi bien que les autres soldats de l'armée Portugaise, ne retournent pas sur les prisonniers qu'ils feront de l'armée Française. Il ne sera en mon pouvoir de les protéger; et les ordres que vous avez donnés seront la causes des malheurs que souffriront les soldats de l'armée Française qui tombent dans les mains des troupes Portugaises.

"J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

"WELLINGTON."

"To Maréchal Massena, Prince d'Esseling.

"Au Quartier Général de l'Armée Anglaise,

"Ce 24 Sept., 1810.

"Monsieur le Maréchal,—J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que votre excellence m'a adressée

recognised and organized by the ancient laws of the country." As a compulsory measure to induce the Frenchman to desist from his fell and cruel purpose, he further informed him, that if the outrages and excesses of the French troops were not restrained, he could not be able to extend his protection to the French prisoners who might fall into the hands of the Portuguese.\*

On a review of the eventful campaign of 1809, and of the admirable plans and

le 14 de ce mois. Ce que vous appelez 'des paysans sans uniforme', 'des assassins et des voleurs de grand chemin,' sont l'ordenanza du pays que, comme j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous assurer, sont des corps militaires commandés par des officiers, payés et agissent sous les lois militaires. Il paraît que vous exigez que ceux qui jouiront des droits de la guerre soient revêtus d'un uniforme; mais vous devez vous souvenir que vous même avez augmenté la gloire de l'armée Française en commandant des soldats qui n'avaient pas d'uniforme.

"Vous vous plaignez de la conduite de l'ordenanza à Nave d'Aver envers M. le colonel Pavetti. La question est seulement si un pay qui est envahi par un ennemi formidable a le droit de se défendre par tous les moyens en son pouvoir. Si ce droit existe, le Portugal est justifié en mettant en activité l'ordenanza, un corps reconnu et organisé par les anciennes lois du pays. Je peux assurer votre excellence que l'ordenanza de Nave d'Aver à bien traité M. le colonel Pavetti, et il aurait été puni s'il l'avait maltraité. Je voudrais n'avoir pas entendu que malgré cet officier fût aussi bien traité et par le capitaine de l'ordenanza et par moi, la maison du capitaine de l'ordenanza à Nave d'Aver avait été brûlée et que quelques-uns de sa compagnie ont été pris et fusillés parcequ'ils avoient faire leur devoir envers leur pays.

"Je suis fâché que votre excellence sente quelques inconvéniens personnels de ce que les Portugais quittent leurs foyers à l'approche de l'armée Française. Il est de mon devoir de faire retirer ceux que je n'ai pas les moyens de défendre; et j'observe que les ordres que j'ai donnés là-dessus n'étaient presque pas nécessaires. Car ceux qui se ressouvenaient de l'invasion de leur pays en 1807, et de l'usurpation du gouvernement de leur prince en temps de paix, quand il n'y avait pas un seul Anglois dans le pays, pouvaient à peine croire aux déclarations que vous faites la guerre aux Anglois seuls; et ils pouvaient à peine trouver la conduite des soldats de l'armée Française, même sous vos ordres, envers leurs propriétés, leurs femmes, et eux-mêmes, conformes aux déclarations de votre excellence.

"Il n'est pas étonnant donc qu'ils quittent leurs foyers volontairement, brûlant et détruisant tout ce qu'ils ne peuvent pas emporter; et je n'ai nulle excuse à offrir pour l'encouragement que je leur en donne, excepté pour les inconvéniens personnels qu'ils peuvent causer à votre excellence.

"Votre excellence a été mal informée sur l'affaire de la milice ci-devant partie de la garrison d'Almeida. Avant de vous plaindre de l'infraction de la capitulation d'Almeida, votre excellence aurait dû se ressouvenir qu'elle a été violée aussitôt que signée. Votre excellence s'est engagée que les officiers et soldats de la milice retourneraient chez eux; et malgré cet en-



combinations, as detailed in the *Despatches*, it is clear, that if the British chief's designs had been seconded by good faith and exertion on the part of the Spaniards, and to adopt his own expression, "had the junta of Truxillo fulfilled their contract to furnish 240,000 rations, the English army would have slept in Madrid on the night of the battle of Talavera,"\* and the war would have been brought to an early conclusion; but all his measures were paralyzed by want of vigour and concert on the part of the Spanish government and its generals, or thwarted by the mean jealousies, and breach of right and honourable feeling on their part. Often, by their culpable conduct, his army was exposed to the hazard of total destruction, from which it had to be rescued by extraordinary efforts of skill on the part of its leader, and equally extraordinary efforts of courage on its own part; and generally at a vast expensiture of life. Thus (among numerous other similar affairs) the desertion by the Spaniards, of their post at the pass of Baños, and their conduct at the bridge of Arzobispo, exposed the British army to the most imminent danger. Indeed, the Spanish armies never behaved as soldiers ought to do in the presence of their enemies; they often took to their heels without waiting to receive their enemy's fire, or to deliver their own; their cavalry often fled before a sword was crossed; and they more than once ran away leaving their cannon ready shotted for the enemy. "The whole six years that the Peninsular War lasted taught them nothing more," as an intelligent writer observes, "than to run away, and assemble again in a state of nature." Nor were their officers "a whit braver or more skilful than their men. A few, like Albuquerque and Romana,† fought with some degree of valour, but with little skill or discipline. Many of them were traitors and poltroons. If any part of their forces behaved well they consisted of Swiss, the Irish brigades, and other foreigners; and the few of their officers who displayed any military skill were of Irish or other foreign extraction. On these accounts, the British general,

from this time, never made his movements dependent on the valour of Spanish troops, on the sagacity of Spanish generals, or on the policy of Spanish juntas; all that was to be done for working out the destinies of Europe, he determined should be done by English hearts and English hands. Nor were the imbecility and inefficiency of his allies the only difficulties with which the English general had to contend. By his own countrymen and government, discouragements were thrown in his way.

On the motion for a public acknowledgment of the services which had been rendered by sir Arthur Wellesley to his country, much rancorous feeling was displayed by some of the members of each house of Parliament. Earl Grey denied that the battle of Talavera was a victory, and declared that sir Arthur had betrayed want of capacity and skill in its direction. Lord Grenville talked of "gilded disasters," and denominated the blooming laurels that hung over the graves of its gallant victors, "cypresses indicating their country's sense of its grief for the dishonour sustained." In the lower House, Ponsonby called for impeachment, and Whitbread dissolved in tears for "the blood that had been sacrificed to folly and incapacity." Tarleton was profuse in his reproof and exposition of sir Arthur Wellesley's incapacity. Banks predicted, that "all fresh levies to the army would tend only to swell the triumphs of Napoleon's invincible legions; and that if we did win a battle, every defeat of the French was to be considered a snare to draw the English farther into Spain." Calcraft denounced the hero, and foretold "ruin and defeat would be the inevitable consequence before three months passed over the British chief's head; and for these reasons refused his assent to a pension for so grievous a blunder as the battle of Talavera."

The earl of Suffolk, in the abundance of his sapience, propounded this wonderful discovery, that the reason the French artillery fell into the possession of his countrymen was, "that it had not been convenient for the French to remove it;" and, therefore, they

\* *Despatches*, vol. v., p. 355.

† Perez de Hervasti, Mariano Alvarez, Julian de Estrada, and Santocildes, the governors of Ciudad Rodrigo, Gerona, Hostalrich, and Astorga, also deserve to be honourably mentioned. The memory of those brave men and true patriots will live in the recollection of the good and wise of every caste and country, when the fortresses they so nobly defended have become heaps of ruins, and Spain a solitude.

gagement, vous en avez détenu sept officiers et deux cents soldats de chaque régiment, pour en faire un corps de pionniers. La capitulation d'Almeida est donc nulle, et je suis en droit d'en faire ce que je voudrait. Mais je puis vous assurer qu'il n'y a pas un soldat de la milice que était a Almeida, au service.

"J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.,

"WELLINGTON."

"Le Maréchal Massena."



had left it as a waif of insignificant value, to be picked up by their enemies. The gloomy predictions of the factious and disaffected portion of "the fourth estate of the realm," especially during the early period of the peninsular war, and their libels against the British army and its illustrious chief were endless. They talked of "a shade having been thrown over the British arms"—ridiculed the idea of an English army being able to contend against the legions of France—laughed at our military knowledge, and prophesied disaster and disgrace.

But to all the calumny and ingratitude, the folly and presumption of the croaking and desponding tribe, the British hero's contemptuous reply was: "They may do what they please, and prate as much as they choose, I shall not give up the game here as long as it can be successfully played." . . . "I should forget my duty if I should permit public clamour or panic to induce me

to change, in the smallest degree, the system and plan of operations which I have adopted after mature consideration, and which daily experience shows to be the only one likely to produce a good end." He felt that the honour and interest, not only of England, but of the whole civilized world, required him,—notwithstanding, as he expressed himself, "the obloquy heaped upon him by the ignorant of his own country"—to maintain the struggle as long as there was a probability of a successful issue. The result produced a memorable and instructive contrast between his firmness, sagacity, and patriotism, and the craven-hearted fears and consternation, the abject pusillanimity and puny spirit of his calumniators, befooled and besotted with their stupid hallucination of French invincibility, and their fanatic wonder and idolatry of their "great and magnanimous Napoleon," and his "famed and dreaded—his terrible legions."

## THE SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

ANNO 1809.

### THE SPANISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE—SIEGE (THE SECOND) OF SARAGOSSA.

WE will now resume our history of the Spanish and Portuguese war of independence, which, for the sake of chronological arrangement, was broken off at the end of 1808. At the opening of the year 1809, the siege of Saragossa raged in all its horrors.

On the 2nd of January, Junôt took the command of the besieging force, and had immediate recourse to a heavy bombardment of the town. Every day and night was now signalized by bloody combats, but notwithstanding the heroic efforts of the besieged, almost all the fortified posts outside the town were in the possession of the enemy. A second parallel was then opened, and a tremendous bombardment kept up without intermission. The parapet of the feeble wall being now levelled by the enemy's batteries, its place was supplied with bags of earth, as fast as they were shattered by the enemy's balls. But a worse and more destructive enemy now assailed the city than the shot and shells of their implacable foe.

For security from the shells that were

thrown upon the devoted city in profusion, often many hundreds in the course of a few hours, a great number of the inhabitants, especially the women and children, took refuge in the cellars, where they were crowded together day and night, and the air entered their dismal abode but scantily. The places soon became hot-beds of infection. The impossibility of recruiting exhausted strength by needful sleep, on account of the incessant bombardment to which the enemy cruelly and inhumanly subjected the city, increased the calamity and aggravated the virulence of the disease. Thus, in this ill-fated city, the horrors of disease and contagion were added to war and slaughter.

In this state of the siege, marshal Lannes assumed the command of the besieging army. To intimidate the Saragossans, he wrote a letter to Palafox, stating that the force on which the city relied for relief had been destroyed; that the English army had fled to Corunna, leaving seven thousand in the hands of the French, and that Romana had



escaped with them, his army with its officers having submitted to Bonaparte; at the same time he demanded the surrender of the city. Palafox replied, that the Saragossans were too sensible of the duty they owed their country to submit to so ignominious a condition, and that it would more redound to the French general's honour to win the place by force of manly courage with the sword, than by bombarding it.

On the day following the summons, fifty guns opened their fire upon the wall, and on the morrow three practicable breaches were made. The enemy advanced to the assault, a dreadful struggle ensued, and the combat was prolonged during the whole of the night; but though the besieged maintained the conflict with the most desperate valour, the convents of Santa Engarcia and San Joseph were possessed by the besiegers.

The enemy's efforts were now directed against San Augustine and Santa Monacha; and having effected a breach in their walls, they carried them by assault. They forced their way into the church. Every column, every chapel, every altar became a point of defence, which was repeatedly attacked, taken, retaken, and attacked again; the pavement was covered with blood, and the aisles and nave of the church strewed with the dead. In the midst of the conflict, the roof, which had been shattered with bombs, fell in; the few who were not crushed, after a short pause, which this tremendous shock, and the sense of their escape occasioned, renewed the fight with increased desperation; fresh parties of the enemy poured in; monks, citizens, and soldiers came to the defence, and the contest was continued on the ruins of the bodies of the dying and the dead. Women mingled with the combatants, distributing cartridges to them; and sometimes, when their sons, husbands, and fathers fell, they rushed on the enemy, to avenge their deaths and to die with them. The contest, however, ended in favour of the besiegers, who succeeded in keeping the undisputed position. Taking advantage of the opportunity afforded while the attention of the besiegers was directed to this point, the French entered the Rua Quemada, and obtained one side of the street to the angle which it makes with the Corso; and at the same time, the Poles in the French service obtained possession of some houses on the side of San Engracia. But the enemy had sustained so great a loss in these affairs, that they de-

termined to make no more direct attacks, but to proceed as much as possible under cover, and by sap and mine.

The deadly warfare was now, as in the former siege, to be carried on from house to house; on balcony and in chamber; in vault and cellar.

The French having established themselves in the ruins of a house, which formed an angle of the Cozo and of the Rua del Media, endeavoured to penetrate into the principal street of the Cozo, but were repulsed with great slaughter. Every house, every room now became the scene of mortal combat; and the contest was continued until the dead and the dying lay heaped upon one another, to the height of several feet above the ground; but the undaunted foemen, in nowise discouraged, mounting the ghastly pile, maintained the contest so obstinately that no progress was made on either side; and not unfrequently, while still locked fast in the deadly struggle, the whole—dead, dying, and combatants—were together blown into the air by the explosion of the mines beneath.

On the same day of this event (7th of February), operations were renewed against the suburbs on the left bank of the Ebro, where the enemy, at the commencement of the siege, had already received two severe repulses. Gazan's division attacked it with vigour, at the same time opening a fire of fifty guns from their batteries on both sides of the convent of Jesus, effected a breach in San Lazar, and possessed themselves of the convent, which was the principal point of defence on that side, at the same moment the university was rendered a pile of ruins, from the explosion of a mine charged with 3,000 lbs. of powder. The suburb being no longer tenable, its brave defenders retired in two columns; the one crossing the bridge effected its retreat into the town, the other, consisting of 1,500 men, in endeavouring to escape into the country, along the bank of the Ebro, was after a desperate resistance captured, as its powder was exhausted. On the 19th, a furious assault being made on the suburbs on the right bank of the river, the monastery of the Trinity near the university and the traverses which the besieged had so gallantly defended, were carried. At the same moment, a mine charged with 1,600 lbs. of powder, exploded with a terrific shock, near the Comic theatre.

Meanwhile pestilence was consuming the Saragossans faster than fire and sword. The



infection occurred among that part of the inhabitants who had been compelled to seek safety in the noisome cellars of the town, in order to escape the enemy's bombardment, and which having now continued more than a month, made the city one vast charnel-house, hundreds dying every day of the infectious epidemic that was raging in every quarter of the town. In this dilemma Palafox, who was labouring under the prevailing epidemic, transferred, on the night of the 18th, all his authority, civil and military, to a junta, appointing as president Don Pedro Marc Ric, the regent of the Royal Audience of Aragon. The junta immediately summoned the chiefs of the various military departments to report their state. The general of cavalry represented that only sixty-two horses remained, and those weak and unserviceable, the rest having died of hunger. From a statement of the infantry department, it appeared that there were only 2,822 men fit for service. The ammunition was nearly exhausted; and the commandant of the engineers reported that the fortifications were demolished, and that there were neither men nor materials for repairing them, all the cloth which could serve for bags of earth having been consumed. General San Marc declared that it was not possible to maintain the contest longer than four days more. While the junta were deliberating, the bombardment was renewed with additional violence, no doubt intended by Lannes to induce them to a speedy determination. Two-thirds of the city had been now destroyed, thirty thousand of the inhabitants had perished, and from three to four hundred persons were dying daily of the pestilence.

Under these circumstances, the junta dispatched a flag of truce to the French general, requesting a suspension of hostilities for three days, that officers might in the mean time be sent to ascertain the situation of the Spanish armies, and according to the intelligence obtained they would treat for a surrender, a proposal Lannes himself had made when he had summoned the city. He now resented the proposal as an insult, and vented the most ferocious threats against the city unless it were immediately delivered up. The flag of truce was sent with a second letter, to which he returned no other answer than by a shower of bombs, and by ordering the attack to be renewed.

A flag of truce was again sent to the French head-quarters soliciting a suspension of hostilities for twenty-four hours, that a

treaty of capitulation might be adjusted in the mean time. The French general requiring the junta to repair to his head quarters, Ric and some of the junta went thither, when a capitulation was agreed to, by which it was stipulated that the garrison should on the following morning march out with the honours of war, and be conveyed as prisoners of war to France. While copies of the capitulation were being drawn up, Lannes produced a plan of the city, and laying his finger upon the part which was that night to have been blown up, told Ric that 44,000 pounds of powder were already lodged for the explosion, which would have been followed by a cannonade from seventy pieces of artillery, and a bombardment from thirty mortars, at that time being mounted in the suburbs.

On the evening of the capitulation, the French troops entered the city, when a sad spectacle presented itself to their vision, six thousand dead bodies lay in the streets, and the court-yards and chambers were filled with corpses: in some instances were seen infants endeavouring to draw nutriment from the breasts of their dying mothers.

The French being now masters of the place immediately began to pillage. From the woe-struck city, 50,000 pair of shoes, 8,000 pair of boots, and 1,200 shirts, with medicines and every requisite for an hospital were haughtily demanded. Several of the officers demanded for themselves double equipage and linen, and whatever they wanted, wishing that plenty of everything should be supplied them, and the best of its kind, at the expense of the city. A service of china was required for Junôt, and this merciless oppressor, who had escaped the proper punishment of his crimes in Portugal, wished that a tennis court should be fitted up for his amusement, in a city of which two-thirds were then lying in ruins, beneath which so large a proportion of the inhabitants lay buried. Lannes rifled the church of Our Lady of the Pillar, of jewels to the amount of 4,687,000 francs, and appropriated the whole to his own use.

Lannes made his entrance on Sunday the 5th of March, and proceeded in triumph to the Church of the Pillar, where a sermon, inculcating obedience to the oppressor, was preached by the despicable traitor to his country, the suffragan bishop of the diocese. A superb entertainment followed, at which Lannes and his chief officers sat down to a table of four hundred covers, furnished at



the expense of the wretched city of Saragossa.

And the foe, not content with his spoliation and robbery, sought also victims to satisfy his vengeance. Don Basilio Bagyiero and the patriotic priest, Santiago Sass, were, by the express commands of Lannes, bayoneted, on the banks of the Ebro, and many monks were tied up in sacks and thrown at night into that river.

In the course of this siege, fifty days of which were open trenches, above fifty thousand persons had perished, and now lay buried beneath the ruins. The troops that surrendered, 2,400—though the French bulletin affirmed that seventeen thousand men had laid down their arms,\*—and that number, with 2,500 taken in the suburbs and during the siege, were all that were marched off for France. Two hundred and seventy of these men, who from fatigue and weakness could not keep up the pace which their ferocious guard required, were butchered and left on the road, where their companions in the next march had to pass over their bodies. Augustina Saragossa was among the prisoners. She had distinguished herself as much in this siege as in the former. At the commencement she took her former station at the Portillo, by the same gun that she had served so well. "See, general," said she, with a cheerful countenance, pointing to the gun, when Palafox visited that quarter; "I am again with my old friend." Her husband was severely wounded, and she pointed the cannon at the enemy while he lay bleeding among his companions, by her side. Frequently she was at the head of an assaulting party, sword or knife in hand, with her cloak wrapped round her, cheering the soldiers, and encouraging them by her example; constantly exposed as she was, she escaped without a wound: yet even she was thrown into a ditch, and nearly suffocated by the dead and dying who covered her. At the close of the siege she was too well known by the French to escape notice, and they made her prisoner. Fortunately, as it proved, she had at that time taken the

contagion, and was removed to the hospital, where, as she was supposed to be dying, little care was taken to secure her. Feeling herself better she availed herself of this and effected her escape. The other Saragossan heroine, Donna Beneta, escaped the hourly dangers to which she was exposed, only to die of grief on hearing that her daughter had been killed while heroically engaged with the enemy in the streets.

The tragic story of the siege of Saragossa—a monument of heroic devotion, which will thrill the hearts of the brave and the generous to the end of time—having now reached its consummation, the junta pronounced the funeral oration of the heroic city. "Spaniards," said they, "the only boon which Saragossa begged of our unfortunate monarch at Vittoria, was, that she might be the first city to sacrifice herself in his defence. That sacrifice has been consummated. More than two months the murderous siege continued; almost all the houses were destroyed; those that were still standing had been undermined; provisions were nearly exhausted, ammunition all consumed; sixteen thousand sick were struggling with a mortal contagion which every day hurried hundreds to the grave; the garrison was reduced to less than a sixth part; the general dying of the pestilence, O'Neill, the second in command, dead; St. Marc, on whom the command then devolved, prostrated by the fever: so much was required, Spaniards, to make Saragossa yield to the rigour of fate, and suffer herself to be occupied by the enemy. The surrender was made on such terms as the French have granted to other towns: these terms have been observed as usual, by the perfidious enemy. Thus only were they able to take possession of those glorious precincts, filled only with the dead and the dying; where every street, every ruin, every wall, every stone, seemed mutely to say to the beholder, 'Go, tell my king that Saragossa, faithful to her word, hath joyfully sacrificed herself to maintain his truth.'

"A series of events, as mournful as they

\* To adopt a familiar phrase, this story is of "a piece" with that told the French people of the battle of Corunna. Three regiments, the French *Moniteur* said, the 42nd, 50th, and 52nd, had been entirely destroyed in the action. That the English had lost everything that constituted an army—artillery, horses, baggage, ammunition, magazines, and military chests. Of eighty pieces of cannon they had landed, they embarked no more than twelve. Two hundred thousand pounds weight of powder, sixteen thousand

muskets, two millions (francs) of treasure had fallen into the hands of the pursuers, and treasure yet more considerable had been thrown down the precipices along the road, between Astorga and Corunna. Five thousand horses had been counted, which they had slaughtered by the way; five hundred were taken at Corunna, and the carcasses of twelve hundred were infecting the streets, when the conquerors entered the town.



are notorious, frustrated all the efforts that were made to relieve the city; but the imaginations of all good men accompanied her defenders in their dangers, were agitated with them in their battles, sympathised in their privations and efforts, and followed them through all the dreadful vicissitudes of their fortunes; and when strength failed them at last, through a continued resistance, which they had prolonged almost beyond belief, in the first moment of grief it seemed as if the light of liberty had been at once extinguished, and the column of independence overthrown. But, Spaniards, Saragossa still survives for imitation and example! still survives in the public spirit which, from her heroic exertions, is for ever imbibing lessons of courage and constancy. For where is the Spaniard, priding himself on that name, who would be less than the Saragossans, and not seal the liberty of his country, which he has proclaimed; the faith of his king, which he has promised, at the cost of the same perils and the same labours? Let the base, the selfish, and the cowardly, be dismayed by them; not the other towns of Arragon, who are ready to imitate and to recover their capital; not the firm and faithful patriots who see in that illustrious city a model to imitate, vengeance to be executed, and the only path of conquest. Forty thousand Frenchmen, who have perished before the mud walls of Saragossa, cause France to mourn the barren ephemeral triumph which she has obtained, and evince to Spain, that three cities of equal resolution will save their country and baffle the tyrant! Valour springs from valour; and when the unhappy, who have suffered, and the victims who have died there, shall learn that their fellow-citizens, following them in the paths of glory, have surpassed them in fortune, they will bless their destiny, however rigorous it has been, and rejoice in the contemplation of our triumphs.

“Time passes away, and days will come when those dreadful convulsions, with which the genius of iniquity is now afflicting the earth, will have subsided. The friends of virtue and patriotism will come to the banks of the Ebro to visit these majestic ruins; and beholding them with admiration and with envy; here, they will say, stood that city which in modern ages realised, or more truly, surpassed, those ancient prodigies of devotement and constancy which are scarcely credited in history! Without a regiment, without other defence than a weak wall,

without other resources than its courage, it first dared to provoke the fury of the tyrant: twice it withstood the force of his victorious legions. The subjection of this open and defenceless town cost France more blood, more tears, more slaughter, than the conquest of whole kingdoms; nor was it French valour that subdued it, a deadly and general pestilence frustrated the strength of its defenders, and the enemy, when they entered, triumphed over a few sick and dying men, but they did not subdue citizens, nor conquer soldiers.”

This address was followed by a decree declaring that Saragossa, its inhabitants and garrison, had deserved well of their country in an eminent and an heroic degree: that whenever Palafox should be restored to liberty, to effect which no efforts on the part of the government should be wanting, the junta, in the name of the nation, would confer on him that reward which should seem most worthy of his unconquerable constancy and ardent patriotism. That every officer employed in the siege should be promoted one step, and every private soldier enjoy the rank and pay of sergeant. That all the defenders of Saragossa and its inhabitants, and their heirs, should enjoy personal nobility. That pensions, conformable to their rank and circumstances, should be granted to the widows and orphans of all who had perished there. That the having been within the walls during the siege, should be considered a claim in future pretensions. That Saragossa should be exempt from all contributions for ten years from the time when peace should be established; and that at that time the rebuilding of the public edifices, with all possible magnificence, should be begun at the expense of the state, and a monument erected in the great square of the city, in perpetual memory of the valour of the inhabitants, and their glorious defence. That in all the cities of the kingdom an inscription should be forthwith set up, relating the most heroic circumstances of the two sieges, and a medal be struck in its honour, as a testimony of national gratitude. Finally, the junta promised the same honours and privileges to every city which should resist a like siege with a like constancy, and proposed rewards for the best poem and the best discourse on this memorable event; the object being not only to uphold the Saragossans to the present generation and to posterity, but to inflame the hearts of the Spaniards with the same



ardent patriotism, the same love of freedom, and the same abhorrence of tyranny.

The consequence of the fall of Saragossa was, in a military point of view, the submission of the whole province of Aragon, commanding the principal pass through the Pyrenees from that province to France; Monzon, Benasque, and other places, immediately submitted to the invaders.

In the commencement of this year, a treaty of amity and alliance was concluded between Great Britain and the Spanish nation acting in the name of Ferdinand VII.; in which the contracting parties bound themselves to make common cause against France and its usurping government; and the British government engaged to assist the Spanish nation in its resistance against Buonaparte and his brother Joseph, the usurper, to the utmost of its power. This promise, it will be seen in the sequel, was fulfilled to its utmost possible limits. In the early part of the year, Soult, who was at St. Jago de Compostella, in Galicia, received orders from Buonaparte to leave Ney in charge of that province, and to march with 30,000 men on Oporto, while Lapisse and Victor were with their armies to menace Portugal on its eastern frontier, and thus a joint movement was to be formed on Lisbon, which Buonaparte calculated would be in their possession by the 16th of February; "so deeply was the future career of the English in the Peninsula shrouded from the Frenchman's view." On the 1st of February, Soult, in obedience to his orders, "to cut down the people with grape shot," began his march, and reached Tuy on the 10th, which he made a place of arms, leaving his artillery and all heavy incumbrances, with a garrison for its defence, and entered Orense on the 15th. On his road from this town he overtook the rear-guard (9,000 men) of Romana's army (March 6th) at Monterey, which, after a short skirmish, fled towards Puebla de Sanabria. The fleeing Spaniards were so closely pressed by Franceschi's cavalry, that a body of about 3,000 finding itself assailed in the rear by the French infantry, and headed by their cavalry, halted on some rough ground, and formed a large weak square. Against each face of this square, Franceschi directed a regiment of cavalry; the dismayed Spaniards, were broken, trampled down, and sabred without mercy, to the number of 1,200. Soult then resumed his march to the banks of the Minho. But scarcely had Soult quitted

Galicia, than the patriots blockaded Tuy and Vigo. Soult despatched a force to relieve Tuy; but Vigo, where his military chest was deposited, surrendered to the Galician peasants, though garrisoned by 1,300 men.

At Soult's departure for Portugal, Ney assumed the charge of Galicia. Hearing that Romano, after a seven days' siege, had compelled the garrison of Villa Franca, consisting of 800 men, to surrender, he marched from Corunna against him, but Romana evaded him by retreating to the valley of the Syl.

At the close of the year 1808, we have seen the unfortunate results that attended the exertions of the patriots in Catalonia—that Vives and Reding, who were posted in a strong position at Cardaden to impede the advance of St. Cyr, for the relief of Barcelona, were defeated (December 16th) by that general, with the loss of 2,000 men, and all their artillery and ammunition; and also on the 21st of the same month, Reding, who had collected the fugitives, and had increased his force to 20,000 men by the debris of the various routed and dispersed patriot armies. It was by this means, as also by the prisoners who escaped from the French escorts, and those who deserted after they had been armed and equipped for Joseph Buonaparte's service, that the Spanish armies were recruited after their disasters, with so surprising facility and despatch. When the army of Castanos arrived at Cuenca, after the battle of Tudela, it was reduced to 9,000 foot and 2,000 horse; a month after, at the battle of Ucles, it was more than 20,000 strong. After the defeat of Blake's army at Espinosa, the marquis de Romana had great difficulty in collecting 5,000 soldiers in Galicia; but as early as the beginning of December he had assembled 22,000 men in the neighbourhood of the city of Leon, was overthrown by the same general, and his army totally routed in the course of half-an-hour, when all his stores, ammunition, artillery (fifty pieces), and magazines (in which were 30,000 stand of English arms), fell into the hands of the enemy. Reding, however, in no wise discouraged by his disasters, immediately began to reorganise his fugitive troops that had fled to Tarragona, and the mountains in the interior of the province, with the intention of marching to the relief of Saragossa. In the mean time the duke del Infantado, in the indulgence of his delusive dream of relieving Saragossa, recovering Madrid, and making a diversion for the relief of sir John



Moore's army, ordered Vanegas to canton his troops at Ucles, to be ready to co-operate in the design. This ill-omened ground—for here the Spaniards had, under Alonzo VI., endured the most disastrous defeat that the Christians had ever suffered from the Moors since the declaration of the kingdom of the Goths—was to be the scene of an action as disgraceful to the Spaniards for the facility with which they were routed, as it was infamous to the French for the enormous wickedness with which they abused their victory. On the 13th of January, the French, under Victor, attacked this ill-fated army, and instantly put it to the rout; some laid down their arms, others fled wildly across the fields. The fugitives, in their panic, rushing on the enemy's artillery, were cut down with grape-shot. The victors immediately rushed into the town of Ucles, and, to compel the inhabitants to discover where their valuables were secreted, they put them to the torture. Having obtained the portable wealth of the place, they yoked the towns-people together, and loading them with their own furniture, and piling it in heaps on the castle-hill, set fire to it. They then dragged a considerable number of the inhabitants to the shambles, and there butchered them. These monsters, besides perpetrating atrocities that "cannot be hinted at without violating the decencies of language and the reverence which is due to humanity," tore the nun from the altar, the wife from her husband's corpse, and the virgin from her mother's arms, and treated them with such foul brutality, that many of their victims expired on the spot. The loss of the patriots was great in killed, wounded, and prisoners; of the latter of whom the French boasted that they had taken 300 officers and 12,000 men, though Vanegas' force did not exceed 8,000 foot, and 1,900 horse. A great number of the prisoners were massacred in cold

blood; the rest were marched to Madrid, and such as fell by the way from hunger and exhaustion were shot by their captors.

The affairs of the patriots in Catalonia were equally inauspicious. St. Cyr attacked (February 17) the Spanish troops assembled at Igualada, under Juan Baptista de Castro, as a nucleus for the formation of a *levy en masse*, which had, in obedience to the order of the central junta, been ordered to be raised for the relief of Saragossa, and quickly put them to the rout.

He immediately marched against Reding, sacking and burning, in his progress, Villarodoña and La Puebla; and for the purpose of cutting off Reding's retreat to Tarragona, and intercept his communications with that fortress, he took possession of Valls.

Reding was now on his march to Tarragona, with 12,000 troops, in a state of discipline superior to that of any body of troops which the patriots had yet been able to bring into the field in that quarter. The vanguard and the centre had in the course of its night march (February 24th) passed the town of Valls, when a volley of musketry being poured in, the Spaniards, both those that had passed the town and those who had not come up, took their battle station with alacrity and precision; the artillery on both sides began to play; and at the same moment the French, descending from the heights of Valls, were met by the Spaniards, and attacked so vigorously, that they were driven back to the heights. But reinforcements arriving to their aid, Reding, on account of the exhausted state of his army from its night march, determined to retreat towards Tarragona. But the following morning forced him to a re-engagement, when, after a short combat, with the loss of 2,000 men and all their artillery and baggage, Reding was severely wounded, having received five sabre wounds, from the effects of which he shortly after died.\*

\* The eulogy on this brave man—the real conqueror at Baylen, whatever Spaniards may say to the contrary—by Mr. Southey, is too touching and appropriate to need an apology for its introduction here:—

"The cause for which Theodore Reding fell, was the same for which his brother Aloys had fought amidst their native mountains; it was the cause of his own countrymen, as well as of the Spaniards; the cause of all good men everywhere. The motives for which ordinary wars have been undertaken are so mean and transitory, and come so little to the heart of man, that after a few years have elapsed all interest concerning them is exhausted; and even nationality does not prevent us from feeling that they whose

lives have been expended in such contests, have died rather in the exercise of their profession than of their duty. But the struggle of Spain against Buonaparte is of the same eternal and unfading interest as the wars of Greece against Xerxes: at whatever distance of time its records shall be perused, they will excite in every generous mind the same indignant and ennobling sympathy. Not, therefore, in an ungrateful service did Reding lay down his life, for with those records his name will be perpetuated: Switzerland will remember him with pride, as one of the most honourable, though not the most fortunate of her sons; and Spain with respectful gratitude, as a soldier not unworthy of her service in its best day, and true to it in its worst."



The discomfited patriots fled to the mountains, or to Tortosa, or Barcelona.

The result of this victory was, that the French, on the following day, entered Reuss, a rich commercial city, which saved itself from inevitable destruction by voluntarily raising a large contribution for the French army. The sick and wounded Spaniards in the hospitals were sent by St. Cyr to Tarragona, who, as they amounted to several thousands, occasioned an infectious disease to break out in that city.

St. Cyr had hoped by his victory at Valls, assisted by his ruse of sending the sick and wounded to Tarragona, that the Spaniards would be convinced of their usual inferiority to their conquerors, and their hopelessness of escaping the horrors of war. But he was mistaken, so far from having that effect the spirit of the Catalans was raised, and and the central junta spoke of his victory in their proclamations as one of those defeats in which ill-fortune brought with it no dishonour, but rather hope and confidence. They never believed themselves conquered, or doubted of their overcoming their enemies. Neither did they allow themselves to be depressed by reverses. Like the Roman senate, which after the defeat of Cannæ, thanked Varus that he had not despaired of the salvation of Rome; so the supreme junta of Seville declared, by a public ordonnance, after Cuesta's signal overthrow at Medellin, that he and his army had deserved well of their country, and awarded them the like recompense as if they had been victorious. Their patriotism was a religion, as it was with the ancient Romans, who never allowed themselves to despair, or believed that they had been conquered, even in the midst of disasters. As the sacred eagles of the god of the capitol, bore aloft in battle, led the Romans on to victory, the religious sentiment of dependence on their patron saint animated and cheered on the Spaniards in their aspirations for independent nationality. The vision of "driving the enemy across the frontier," constantly flitted before their eyes, and inspired them with renewed hope.

The enemy now occupied Villa Franca and the port of Salen, and thus cut off Tarragona from all communication by sea and land with the rest of Spain. Want of provisions, however, compelled them to retreat from that city; St. Cyr accordingly retrograded towards the Lobregat and the French frontier, and took post near Vich,

for the purpose of preparing for the siege of Gerona.

On his retreat, the Somatenes and Miguelites reissued from their mountains in renewed force and vigour. These irregular troops began to acquire that superiority which this species of warfare assured them; Chabron's division, harassed by repeated assaults, fell back from Igualada on Villa Franca, and the Spaniards, pushing parties up to the walls of Barcelona, cut off St. Cyr's communication with that city, and so excited Duhesme's apprehensions of the patriots within the city gaining possession of some of the gates, and delivering them up to their countrymen, that he determined to compel all the principal functionaries and the military to take the oath of allegiance to the intruders; and on their refusal to disgrace themselves and betray their country, both civilians and military were sent as prisoners of war into France.

To so high a pitch had the spirit of patriotism risen among the rural population of the mountainous districts, that the peasants of the Vallés displayed a memorable example of the sacrifices that love of country will excite the heart of man to make. Their country lies in the line between Vich and Barcelona; and the peasants taking arms to impede the communication, occupied the heights near the church of Canovellas, about a mile from Granollers, which is the capital of that district. The district is so strong, that the invaders were desirous of opening the communication by persuasion rather than by force, and therefore communicated to the insurgents, that the French commanders had ordered their troops to make war on soldiers only, not on peasants; that if they would lay down their arms, and retire every man to his house, no injury should be done them; but otherwise, there was a division in their front, and another was coming in their rear. A written answer was returned in the name of the peasants of the Vallés. "They held it a great honour," they said, "to form a part, but a small one, of the Spanish nation; and they had seen what their requital had been from receiving and entertaining the French troops, when their government had commanded them to do so; their peaceful habitations had been invaded, their property plundered, their houses burned, their women violated, their brethren murdered in cold blood; and, above all, the religion of their forefathers outraged and profaned. Nothing remained for them but



to repel force by force. General St. Cyr and his companions might have the poor glory of beholding that country one heap of ruins; they might pass in triumph over the bodies of those whom they had sacrificed; but neither they nor their master should ever say that the people of the Vallés had submitted their necks to a yoke which the whole nation had indignantly spurned." The success with which these peasants harassed the French, and cut off some of their artillery and baggage, raised the spirits of the Catalans more than the battle of Valls had depressed them. The devoted attachment of the Spanish peasantry to their country is admirably exhibited in the following incident mentioned by M. Rocca in his *Mémoires de la Guerre Française en Péninsule*.

"Among the insurgent peasants seized by our skirmishers, was one armed with a gun, who was driving before him an ass, laden with provisions for his family. The officer of the advanced guard took pity on him, and ordered him to be set at liberty, making signs to him to escape. The peasant availed himself of the boon granted, but quickly returned and fired at his deliverer; but the ball missed. The man had hoped to die a martyr, by killing one whom he supposed to be one of our chiefs. On being brought before the colonel of the regiment, our men told him that he would be shot; he immediately, and proudly, knelt down, prayed to the Virgin Mary and the saints, and then awaited his death. Had these men," says the narrator, "have known how to fight as well as they did to die, we should not so easily have passed the Pyrenees."

The next calamity that befel the patriot cause was the defeat of the Estramaduran army, under Cartajal, at La Carolina, or as it is sometimes termed, Ciudad Real. Here general Sebastiani attacked him (March

27th), and quickly putting his army to the rout, pursued it to the entrance of the Sierra Morena, capturing 4,000 prisoners, among whom were 200 officers, 18 pieces of cannon, and sabring 3,000 of the scared troops in their flight, though, according to his official report, they had fled on the first charge, without the least resistance.

A still greater disaster awaited Cuesta's army in Estremadura. The French having crossed the Tagus, by the Puerto del Arzobispo, and dislodged the Spaniards from their position at Mesa d'Ibor, advanced against Cuesta, but in their march the chasers of the advanced guard were surprised at the village of Mia Casas by some squadrons of the enemy's cavalry, and lost above 150 of their party. Cuesta now apprehending, from the circumstance of a heavy train of artillery having been sent from Madrid towards Estremadura, that the object of the enemy quitting his strong position at the bridge of Almaraz, was to lay siege to Badajos, posted his army, consisting of 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, at Medellin, for the purpose of annoying the besiegers in their operations against that city, and cutting off their communication with Madrid. At first the Spaniards occupied the heights and the town of Don Benito, but perhaps influenced by the recollection of the victory gained by their ancestors over the Moors on those plains, Cuesta drew up his army in a kind of crescent, in one line, of about a league in extent, without any reserve, or availing himself of any advantage of ground, on the wide and open plain in front of Medellin, so confident was he of the result of the contest. The French army, under Victor, amounted to 18,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry, and had been concentrated on the 21st of March, in Merida and its neighbourhood, crossing the Guadiana, advanced against the patriots on the 28th.

#### THE BATTLE OF MEDELLIN.

THE BATTLE of Medellin, or, as it is sometimes termed, Merida, began about eleven o'clock, on the 28th of March. The French batteries opened on the Spanish infantry, who had been ordered to charge with the bayonet, and take them; the order was bravely obeyed; two regiments of French dragoons charged the foot, but were repulsed with loss; the German division, which had been formed

in the centre of the enemy's line in close columns, being now resolutely attacked, formed itself into square, but resisted with so much difficulty, that Cuesta was in full hope of a complete victory, and Victor not without apprehensions of a defeat, till part of the French reserve succeeded in enabling their comrades to keep their ground. The Spaniards on the left had taken the first



battery, when a strong body of cavalry advancing to recover it, the whole of the Spanish cavalry on the left took panic, and, without facing the foe, or attempting to make the least stand, fled in the greatest disorder from the field, most of them to the distance of many leagues. The day being irrecoverably lost by the defeat of the left wing, the victors turned on the centre and the right, and directing the whole force of their artillery on those columns, a total dispersion of both took place, though the right wing had, while the discomfiture of the left wing was taking place, compelled the enemy to give ground, and was following up its success. A chain of cavalry now forming around the routed patriots, gave no quarter, in pursuance of the murderous system on which it had been instructed to act. The survivors threw down their arms, and took to headlong flight, pursued by the whole of the French cavalry. The infantry followed the cavalry, and despatched the wounded with their bayonets. Weariness, rather than compunction, put a stop to the carnage. The Spanish loss in killed is variously stated from 7,000 to 12,000 men. Two regiments of Swiss and Walloon guards were stretched on the field in the very line they had occupied in battle. The loss in prisoners was from 3,000 to 7,000; but of the latter not 2,000 ever reached Madrid. A wounded Spanish officer was brought into the room where Victor was at supper, when the French marshal said to him, "If my orders had been obeyed, sir, you would not have been here."\* Those orders had been too well obeyed. The French dragoons were a large part of the night of the battle employed in rubbing their sword-arms with soap and spirits, to recover the muscles, from that day's slaughter. And their cruelty was not yet satiated. A peasant in one of the neighbouring villages had a son in Cuesta's army; when the army drew near Medellin, Juan's conversation induced his two brothers to join the army as volunteers. Juan was never after seen; but the father, on searching the field of battle,

found Antonio's body, and his wounded brother Carlos weeping over it. He removed the dead son and the living one to his cottage. A party of the French, in their work of pillage, entering the house, deliberately shot the wounded son before the face of his father. When every thing had been lost by the ill-fated patriots, and that their last battalion had been broken and scattered, the duke of Albuquerque, and generals Alava and Eguia, with an English officer of the name of Whittingham, and a few orderlies, remained on the field, endeavouring to rally and form the scared and fleeing Spaniards. This little party, when they saw that all was lost, broke through the chain of cavalry by which they were surrounded, and in the course of their flight general Alava was addressed by name by a wounded Spanish soldier, who entreated him not to leave him to be butchered by the merciless French soldiery. The general, disregarding the imminent danger in which his own life would, by the delay, be placed, from the hot pursuit of the approaching French dragoons, pulled up, and desired the soldier to mount behind him, declaring that they would escape, or fall together. As soon as the wounded man was mounted, *en croup*, the horse was again urged forward, and fortunately both the wounded soldier and the noble-hearted general escaped their merciless pursuers.

When Cuesta had collected the remains of his fugitive troops at the rallying point Llerena, he thanked them, in his general orders, for their good conduct, excepting by name the horse regiments that had disgracefully fled. Three of the colonels he suspended from their rank, and he took from the privates one of their pistols, till by some good service they should regain the honour which they had lost. The conduct of the junta was equally magnanimous and politic. They decreed pensions to the widows and orphans of all who had fallen at Medellin, in proportion to their rank and circumstances, and a badge of distinction to those corps who had distinguished themselves.

\* In the pursuit from Medellin, and some other battle-fields of the feeble efforts of the patriots, the savage work of pursuing and slaughtering, for several miles, the supplicating and defenceless fugitives, is spoken of in the French accounts of those battles, as a severe labour that quite exhausted the victors; in the language of the narrator, "they were worn out in the savage and merciless work." In one battle nine thousand fugitive peasants were cut down; in another, three thousand of the fleeing host were slaugh-

tered; and in neither case, did the merciless have cease while a fugitive could be overtaken. At Ucles, a large number of the nine thousand prisoners taken, when they could march no farther through inanition and fatigue, were shot without mercy. Nor was this an isolated instance of French cruelty. At Ucles many of the principal inhabitants were bound in pairs and massacred in the slaughter-houses, and their wives and daughters delivered over to the passions and brutality of the soldiery.



They pronounced that the general and the body of the army had deserved well of their country. Knowing that Cuesta had been lamed, by the fall from his horse, they required him in all his despatches to report the state of his health. In the preamble to their decree they said that all the details of the battle tended to console them for its loss, and that the spirit of Herman Cortes might have beheld with joy the courage which his countrymen had manifested upon the scene of his childhood. The example of that day, they said, might make them hope that with perseverance they might form an infantry capable of defending the national independence; an infantry that should be the worthy rival and successor of those famous *Tercios*, which, under the best captains in the world, had supported the glory of Spain in Flanders and in Italy, and in Germany.

On the death of Reding, Blake having been appointed his successor in the command of the Catalonian patriot army, his appointment so raised the spirits of the soldiers and the people, that the inhabitants of Monzon, a fortification on the left bank of the Cinca, rose upon the French garrison, who were tyrannizing over the country, and levying contributions without mercy, and drove the invaders out. They had been enabled to effect this from the absence of the greater part of the garrison, being marched to the town of Albelda, which had refused to answer one of their oppressive demands, and was to be made, in French phraseology, an example of for its disobedience. In their attempt to retake the place, and punish the inhabitants, the French lost in prisoners eight companies, who were cut off in their attempt to recross the Cinca, after having being repulsed from Monzon.

To revenge the affront received on the Cinca, and repair the late reverses, Suchet, who had superseded Junôt in Arragon, advanced from Saragossa with 10,000 infantry and 800 cavalry against Blake, who was posted in the plain of Alcaniz, in front of that city. At six of the morning of May 26th, the hostile armies were in front of each other. The action began by an attack by the French on the centre of the Spanish line, which was with difficulty repulsed. Defeated in this attempt, Suchet withdrew to the heights, on which he originally took post; and after an action of seven hours, both armies stood looking at each other; but a false report being spread

by a drummer in the course of the night, the French army was so panic-struck, that it fled towards Saragossa in confusion, as if it had been utterly routed, leaving 500 dead on the field, and about as many wounded. The loss of the Spaniards was not 400.

Blake, inspired by his recent success, determined to recover Saragossa. On the 14th of June, he was in front of that city, with an army of 17,000 men. Early on the following morning, Suchet drew out his whole force from Saragossa, and the battle was fought under the walls of the town. The fire began at the advanced posts at five in the morning, and continued increasing till the same time in the afternoon, when a violent storm arising, which concealed the two from each other, the French general having during the obscurity prepared for the decisive movement of breaking the Spanish line,—no sooner had the weather cleared, than he made a rapid charge on the Spanish right, and having broken it, turned fiercely on the centre. To prevent a total rout, Blake withdrew his army, and retreated to Barrita, where he was joined by Areizaga, with 5,000 men. The loss of the Spaniards was 1,000 men and twenty guns; that of the French 800. This battle, in Spanish history, is termed *the Battle of Maria*.

On the following day he retreated to Belchite, where he was followed and attacked by Suchet. After four or five shots had been fired on both sides, and a few shells had been thrown by the French, which wounded four or five men, one of the shots falling into the middle of a regiment, the men were seized with a sudden panic, and fled; the panic instantantly spread; a second and a third regiment ran away without firing a gun, and in a few minutes the generals were left with none but a few officers in the midst of the position. With all their efforts, they could not rally more than 200 men, and no other remedy was left to them but flight, leaving artillery, baggage, ammunition, and all the materiel of the army in the possession of the enemy. The fall of the fortresses of Tortoso, Morella, and Monzon was the result of this defeat.

The defeat was, in all its circumstances, so disgraceful and disheartening, that Blake almost sank under it. He wrote to the government, that the calamity was so oppressive to his feelings, that he was not able to enter into its details, but considered it due to the nation that a judicial inquiry should be instituted into the conduct of a



general, under whose command an army of from 13,000 to 14,000 effective men had been utterly routed and dispersed. "He knew that he had not been culpable," he said, "but after so many proofs of his unhappy fortune, he wished not to be employed any longer in command. As a Spaniard and a soldier, he was still ready to serve his country in an inferior station, and he requested that only some portion of his present pay might be continued for the support of his family, or a part of the *encomienda* which had recently been conferred on him, but which it was not fitting that one so useless should retain." The

government neither accepted his offered resignation, nor instituted any inquiry,—for the Roman senate never demeaned itself more generously towards their unfortunate general, than did the central junta of Spain—it declared that the commander-in-chief and the generals had done their duty, and retained the confidence of the country. To brand the fugitives in a body would have been useless. A religion which is contented to accept the slightest degree of contrition, and keeps short reckoning with conscience, would soon teach them to be on easy terms with themselves.

#### SIEGE (THE THIRD AND LAST) OF GERONA.

THE town and fortress of Gerona stand upon the side and foot of a hill, where the little river, Onar, which divides the city from the suburbs, falls into the Ter. A wall fifteen feet high surrounds the upper town, but a rampart and wet ditch protect the lower. The citadel, Monjuic, and the forts termed the Capucins, which are situated on rocky eminences, constituted the principal defence. Monjuic was a square fort about 240 yards on each face, and was situate about sixty fathoms from the city.

The reduction of this place was an object of deep interest to the despoiler of Spanish freedom and nationality, and since the last attempt of his generals to obtain its possession, they had been busily preparing for their renewed assault. The brave Geronans and their gallant governor, Mariano Alvarez, were as actively employed in their efforts for defence, and exhibiting a sacrifice of heroic duty, no less memorable than that which Saragossa had displayed; to which they were encouraged by having twice driven the enemy from before their walls. The inhabitants of the place were about 14,000,

but they were overlaid by priests and religious, who formed more than a fourth of the number. The garrison consisted of 3,400 men. The French army numbered 30,000 men, under the command of St. Cyr, and Verdier.

Every military preparation that the circumstances permitted was taken to prepare for the contest; and as the surest reliance was to be placed on that moral resistance, of which the Saragossans had set them so glorious an example, the whole male population, without distinction of rank or age, formed itself into a corps, to support the efforts of the garrison. Women, too, even of the highest rank and station, formed themselves into an association which they called "The Company of St. Barbara," to bear away and attend to the wounded, and perform whatever duties lay in their power, as their countrywomen had done at Saragossa. The patron saint of the town, St. Narcissus,\* or as he was called in the clipt language of the province, St. Narcis, and who had obtained the credit of defeating Duhesme in his attempt on the city, was de-

\* The Spaniards are the most superstitious and credulous people on the face of the earth. Every town and even every village have their patrons, to whom they pray, and on whom they place their confidence. In all the towns and villages, and even on the high roads, saints and virgins are set up in niches, with the inscriptions underneath, "One thousand years"—"Two thousand years"—"Ten thousand years' indulgences for every one who will say five Paters, and five Aves before this holy image." Their lofty opinions of themselves and their nation are on a par with their superstitious notions. Such is their nature, that imagination cannot tax itself sufficiently to produce absurdities proportionately to their credulity. During the siege of Saragossa, the

extravagant report that the French were in headlong flight, and the marquis de Lazar was wasting France in his march to Paris, met with implicit credence. Several nuns, who believed themselves to be inspired prophetesses, were produced to the inhabitants of Seville, to assure them, that if ever the French should see the walls of that town, the fire of heaven would fall upon them, before they could reach the gates. In many other towns, the same prophetic inspiration descended on the nuns, who invariably predicted the destruction that awaited the invaders; and their extravagant predictions were religiously believed by the populace: so hoodwinked and stultified were that people by priestly craft and delusion.



clared generalissimo of the armies. To give effect to the appointment of his saintship, the aid of Romish superstition was invoked. A meeting was held for the purpose, of the municipality, the chapter, the heads of the religious houses, and all the chief persons of the city, Julien Bolivar presiding, as the king's lieutenant. Resolutions were passed, that seeing St. Narcissus had always vouchsafed his especial protection to the principality of Catalonia, as had been manifested during the former invasions of the French, and recently by the defeat of Duhesme, which was wholly owing to his favour; and seeing, moreover, that for the purpose of resisting the tyranny and oppression of Napoleon Buonaparte, it was necessary to appoint a commander, who should be capable of directing their operations and repulsing so inveterate and cruel an enemy, no one could so worthily fill that office as the invincible patron and martyr, St. Narcis; and therefore, in the name of Ferdinand the king, they nominated him generalissimo of all the Spanish forces, by land and sea, and confided to him the defence of Gerona, of its district, and of the whole principality. On the following Sunday, the junta, with all the clergy and persons of distinction, went in procession to notify this appointment to the saint, in his shrine in the church of St. Felix; the shrine was opened, and a general's staff, a sword, and a belt, all richly ornamented, were deposited beside the relics of the chosen commander; and the enthusiastic joy which the mummery excited was such, that the spectators said it seemed as if the glory of the Lord had descended and filled the church, manifesting that their devotion was approved and blessed by heaven. And further to animate his fellow-townsmen, and restrain by fear the few treacherous that might be waiting, when an opportunity offered, to side with the foe, and betray their country, Alvarez published an edict, forbidding all persons from speaking of capitulation, on pain of immediate death, without exception of rank, class, or condition: the noble order ran thus, and was dated May 5th:—"Whoever speaks of a capitulation or surrender, shall be instantly put to death;" and the order was received, both by the garrison and people, with acclamations.

On the 6th of May the besiegers first appeared on the heights of Casa Roca and Costaroga, on the opposite side of the Ter, and began to form their lines without op-

position. When the lines were completed, and everything ready to commence the bombardment, a flag of truce was sent (the 12th of June), requiring submission. Alvarez desired the officer who was the bearer of the summons, to tell his general to save himself the trouble of sending flags of truce in future, as no other communication would be held with him but at the mouth of the cannon. On the night of the day following the summons, about an hour after midnight, the bombardment began. Then, for the first time, the *generale*, or alarm, was beat; a sound that afterwards became so frequent in this devoted city. Roused from their sleep, the aged and the children repaired to cellars and other places of imagined security, which they who could had provided for this emergency; and the female company of St. Barbara hastened to their posts. The bombardment continued, and, among other buildings, the military hospital and those of St. Domingo and St. Martin were destroyed, so that, as the sick and wounded increased, the difficulty of providing for them was greatly augmented. About the end of the month an epidemic affection, in the shape of a bilious fever of the bowels, became prevalent, occasioned partly by the perpetual agitation of mind which the people endured, and partly by sleeping in damp subterranean places.

During these operations Palamos, a port by means of which Gerona communicated by sea with Tarragona, was carried by assault, by Italian troops under general Fontane, and the only persons found in it who were spared from slaughter, were the few who threw themselves into the sea, to escape the ferocity of the foe. This dreadful carnage was highly approved of by St. Cyr; it would prove, he said, useful as an example to other towns. The express words of the heartless soldier were: "La gloire de defendre ses foyers domestiques, menacés par l'étranger, est grande, la plus grande de toutes, peut-être; mais la vertu qui y fait prétendre, ne serait point la premières des vertus, si elle pouvait être pratiquée sans peril!"

Verdier, in the mean time, prosecuted the siege with vigour. The suburbs were soon rendered untenable, and by the beginning of June, their batteries keeping up an incessant fire upon three sides of the fortress of Monjuic, the angle upon which the flag was hoisted fell into the ditch; Mariano Montano, who commanded at this post, instantly descended amidst a shower of balls,



brought it up in safety, and replanted it on the walls. The breaching batteries having thundered incessantly on the walls for a fortnight, a breach having been effected wide enough for forty men abreast, about three o'clock of the morning of the 8th of July, an assault, under cover of a tremendous bombardment, was made by a close column of 6,000 of the enemy. Thrice the assailants renewed the assault, and thrice they were driven back. The summit of the breach was so formidably barricaded, that it was not possible to surmount the obstacles; and the flanking fire of the half-moon and ravelin did such fearful execution among them, that their loss in killed and wounded amounted to above one thousand men. A mortar which lay masked among the ruins of the ravelin, and which discharged five hundred musket-balls at every shot, was played full upon the foe, and the havoc which it made was immense. The company of St. Barbara distinguished themselves on this occasion; covered with dust and blood, under the burning heat of July, and through the incessant fire of the batteries and musketry, they carried water and wine to the soldiers, and bore back the wounded. Throughout the whole siege those heroic women shrunk from no duty, however laborious, however perilous, or however painful. In the frequent removal of the hospitals, which the bombardment occasioned, the exertions of the company of St. Barbara were attended with the severest toil, and the most imminent danger. Three of the leaders are especially mentioned—Dona Lucia Joana de Fitzgérald, Dona Mariangela Vivern, and Dona Maria Custi, commandants of the three divisions of St. Narcis, St. Dorothy, and St. Eulalia. An instance of extraordinary heroism was displayed one day by a youthful drummer of the name of Luciano Ancio. He was stationed to give the alarm whenever a shell was thrown; a ball struck off his leg at the knee, but when the women came to remove him, he begged of them to leave him where he was, saying, "As my arms are left, I can still beat the drum, to give my comrades warning in time to save themselves." Every day produced similar acts of heroism, both among the garrison and the townspeople.

The severe loss which the enemy had received in their late attack, convinced them that Monjuic was not to be taken by assault; they therefore resorted to the operation of the sap and mine. During the mining

operations, repeated attempts were made night after night to storm the ravelin, which was now the chief defence of Monjuic, but as it was a point of contention with the garrison who should be stationed there, the defenders were always ready, and always repulsed the enemy. To harass the garrison as much as possible, marksmen and sharpshooters were thickly stationed in the trenches, and so fatal was their aim, that for any of the garrison to be seen only for a moment was certain death; and this process of destruction was carried on so effectually, that it became only possible to observe what the enemy was about, by some one in the fosse lifting up his head and taking a momentary glance, for the besiegers had pushed their parallels to the very edge of the fosse.

Monjuic had now held out thirty-seven days since the practicable breach had been made. The defences being utterly ruined, and the fort no longer tenable, the governor deemed it his duty to preserve the men still left, that they might assist in the defence of the city. On the evening of the 11th of August he abandoned the ruins, and retired into Gerona. Five hundred of the intrepid garrison, which originally consisted of nine hundred men, had been killed and wounded, but the assailants had lost six times the number. Just after the fall of Monjuic, the garrison of Gerona was recruited by the arrival of seven hundred volunteers from the neighbouring towns and villages, who had passed unobserved through the enemy's lines.

About the end of August several breaches had been made in the walls of the lower town, from the batteries which the enemy had planted on Monjuic. Every hour an assault being expected, and as strong appeals had been made by many of the inhabitants to the governor to propose terms of capitulation, he published the following order to the troops occupying the first posts:—"The troops that occupy the second line have orders to fire on any Spaniards who retreat from the first line, as enemies to their country, who, by their example, do greater injury than the foreign enemy." But the garrison was now so greatly reduced by death and wounds, that the hospitals could no longer contain the numbers that required admission; the contagion increased, and became more virulent; the magazines were exhausted, and famine was beginning to be severely felt. Still not a word of capitulation was heard within the city.



In this critical moment Blake advanced with an army of 14,000 men, and a large convoy of supplies, to the relief of the place. Having made arrangements with Claros and Roviro, two Somatene chiefs, to threaten the besiegers' posts on the north, from the side of Figueras, he advanced from the side of Hostalrich. He accomplished his purpose by diverting their attention on various points of their extensive line, and inducing them to suppose that he intended to give battle in the quarter directly opposite to that by which the convoy was to proceed. This was accomplished with complete success by general Condé and colonel O'Donnell. Those officers, having left 3,000 men to reinforce the garrison, returned successfully with the rest of their force and the beasts of burden, to Hostalrich. As the stores introduced amounted only to a fifteen days' supply, Alvarez reduced the rations one-half, resolved to meet the extremity which he saw was now to be expected. At this time the convent of N. Señora de los Angeles, the chief outpost held by the besieged without the city, and which was an important point, as facilitating both ingress and egress for the besieged, was carried by the enemy, after a brave resistance by its garrison of 500 men, when every man was mercilessly put to the sword, except the governor and three other officers, who, leaping from the windows, escaped; in retaliation, as the captors said, for the massacre of some of their sick and wounded who had fallen into the hand of Roviro and other guerilla chiefs.

The fire of the breaching batteries was now recommenced with redoubled fury, on the three points of St. Lucia, St. Christobal, and the Quartel de Alemanes, or quarter of the Germans, that the French might enter over their ruins as by a bridge. The fire was well sustained by the besieged in return; but the French had so greatly the advantage, both in the size and number of their artillery, that Alvarez ordered a sortie, for the purpose of spiking the enemy's guns, and destroying his most advanced works; but though the assailants were partly successful, they were repulsed. By the 18th of September, the batteries had effected three enormous breaches, and the engineers declared that they were all practicable. But Monjuic having taught the enemy not to be confident of success, a white flag was sent to the town, and the French officers refusing to retire on Alvarez's verbal order to do so, they were fired on. As soon as the

officers reached their own lines, a furious bombardment began on the town, and all the batteries opened on the walls and breaches; and this continued without intermission, till day-break of the 19th. Between the hours of three and four of that day, the enemy was seen advancing in force towards the three breaches. Now was to commence a struggle of unparalleled resolution and heroism.

The tocsin was rung from the cathedral and beaten through the streets. The whole of the inhabitants hurried to the posts assigned them, and calmly and silently, amidst the fire of two hundred pieces of artillery, awaited death in the service of their country. There was scarcely an interval between the alarm and attack, so near to the walls were the points of which the enemy was in possession. Under a terrific fire of artillery that swept the ramparts by which they were flanked, three massive columns of 2,000 men each marched direct to the breaches. The Geronans were prepared to receive them at each point. The company of St. Barbara was distributed among the different posts, to perform their functions, and proclamations were issued inviting the other women of Gerona to assist them in the awful hour.

"Three times did the assailants, with the most heroic courage, mount to the summit of the breaches, and three times were they repulsed, by the equally heroic firmness of the besieged." At the Quartel de Alemanes, they succeeded in forcing their way into the first quadrangle of the building, their batteries in the meanwhile playing on the walls and buildings adjoining the breach; when the Geronans, rushing forward, drove them back to the breach, the contending parties fighting hand to hand all the way. Such was the press of the conflict, and such the enthusiasm that animated the defenders of the town, that impatient of the time required for re-loading their muskets, they caught up stones from the breach, and brained their enemies with those readier weapons. After a contest of two hours' duration, the enemy withdrew hastily and in disorder, leaving the breaches covered with his slain, and weakened by the loss of sixteen hundred men. Of the besieged forty-five fell on this glorious day, and 197 were wounded. Among the former were three gallant sons of England, by name Marshall, M'Carty, and O'Donnell. Alvarez, during the whole of the assault,



hastened from post to post, wherever there was most need of his presence, providing every thing, directing all, and encouraging all: he had prepared cressets to light up the walls and breaches in case the enemy should persist in his attempt after darkness had closed.

A glorious success had been gained, but it brought the conquerors no rest, no respite, scarcely even a prolongation of hope; and after all their exertions, the only refreshment they could obtain was a scanty mess of pulse or corn with a little oil, or a morsel of bacon in its stead. For want of other animal food, mules and horses were slaughtered for the hospital and in the shambles. Fuel was exceedingly scarce; yet the heaps which were placed at the corners of the streets, to illuminate them in case of danger, remained untouched, and not a billet was taken from them during the whole siege. At the same time the fever became more prevalent.

St. Cyr now despairing of obtaining possession of Gerona by the sacrifice of his soldiers, determined to convert the siege into a blockade, hoping, to use his own heartless phraseology, to accomplish that by "time, fever, and famine," which the fervid enthusiasm and desperate valour of the besieged proved to him he could not easily obtain by force of arms. Having thus extinguished in himself all sense of humanity, he prepared to accomplish the reduction of the heroic city by the medium of famine and disease, aided by the cruel process of bombardment and the ceaseless fire of artillery.

The besieged were now looking anxiously for Blake and his army, to make another effort for their relief. On the morning of the 26th he approached the town with a force consisting of ten thousand men and a convoy of two thousand laden beasts. But St. Cyr having drawn his lines round the town more closely than they were at the time of the entrance of the first convoy, only one thousand men under O'Donnell, with 170 laden beasts, could effect an entrance; the rest fell into the hands of the enemy; and Blake was defeated with the loss of 3,000 men.

St. Cyr now was superseded, October 13th, by Augereau; and not many hours after his taking the command of the besieging force, O'Donnell, with his brave band, accompanied by a few families of the town, broke through the besieging army in the course of

the night, and reached Blake at St. Colona, with scarcely any loss. They had passed through five-and-twenty posts of the enemy, through many of which they forced their way with sword and bayonet. Souhan was surprised in his quarters, and fled in his shirt, leaving behind him as much booty and plunder as the Spaniards had time to lay hands on.

The first act of Augereau was to possess himself of Hostalrich, where magazines were collected for the relief of Gerona. After a gallant resistance, the garrison, consisting of 2,000 men, retreated into the citadel, leaving the magazines in the possession of the enemy. The French now redoubled their vigilance; they drew their lines closer to the city; stretched cords with bells along the interspaces; and kept watch dogs at all the posts. The bombardment was continued with fresh fury, and always with greater violence during the night than during the day, in the hope of exhausting the Geronans by depriving them of sleep. Augereau sent letters into the city, threatening the utmost vengeance if the defence was prolonged, but at the same time offering an armistice for a month, and to send in provisions, if Alvarez would then capitulate if relief did not arrive; an act of humanity unequalled by any other French general during the Revolutionary War of France; but the terms were sternly rejected by Alvarez and the Geronans.

The siege being now converted into a blockade, and the arrival of large reinforcements from France enabling the beleaguering force to preserve it more strictly, famine began to do the fearful work of the enemy more effectually than his arms. Both the private stores and the public magazines were exhausted; the whole garrison and population were in a famishing state; and the few mules and horses which remained unslaughtered, were reduced to so severe a state of starvation, that they gnawed the hair from each other's manes and tails before they were led to the shambles. The enemy, aware of the dire privation that prevailed in the city, endeavoured to tempt the garrison to desert, by calling out to them to come and eat, and holding out provisions. A few were tempted; they were received with embraces, and fed in sight of the walls. But notwithstanding all their privations, all their sufferings, still the people of Gerona, as a body, opposed an heroic spirit of endurance to the enemy. The only circumstance that cast a shade of



dishonour on the heroic patriotism of the Geronans, either garrison or townsmen, during the whole of the siege, was the desertion of ten officers, two of whom were of noble birth, who, failing to persuade the governor to capitulate, took this disgraceful mode of revenge. Except in this instance, the number of deserters was very small. Towards the end of November, many of the inhabitants preferring their chance of death to the certainty of being made prisoners, ventured to pass the enemy's lines, some failing in the attempt, others being more fortunate.

The siege had endured nearly seven months; scarcely a woman had become pregnant during that time; the very dogs, before hunger had consumed them, had ceased to follow their kind; they did not even fawn on their masters; the almost incessant thunder of artillery seemed to make them sensible of the state of the city, and the unnatural atmosphere affected them\* as well as human kind. It even affected vegetation. In the gardens within the walls the fruits withered, and scarcely any vegetables could be raised. The pestilential vapours that arose from the stagnation of the rain-water in the streets and the sewers, was rendered more noxious by the dead bodies which lay rotting amidst the ruins. Within the last three weeks above 500 of the garrison had died in the hospitals; a dysentery was raging and spreading, the sick were lying upon the ground without food or medicine; and there was scarcely fuel to dress the little wheat and the few horses yet unconsumed. At length human nature was exhausted; but the flame of patriotism still survived: "if by these sacrifices," said the heroic Geronans, "the liberty of our country can be secured, happy shall we be in the bosom of eternity and in the memory of good men, and happy will our children be among their fallen countrymen." This melancholy picture of the sufferings of the Geronans is not in the least overcharged; it was strictly true; and the dismal wreck of destruction still continued.

The breaches which had been assaulted ten weeks before were still open, and another being now made, the enemy determined

\* All dumb animals have an instinctive aversion to the smell of putrefying animal flesh. Roeca (*Histoire de la Guerre Française en Péninsule*) says that the oxen of La Mesta, which had come as usual to pasture in the neighbourhood, fled with horror from the pasture grounds, at the sight of the dead bodies of Cuesta's

On bolder operations, having learned from the ten treacherous deserting officers that the ammunition and food were almost expended. They accordingly, having obtained possession of the Calle del Carmen, the forts Merced and Paula, with the city redoubts, were close to the walls, and thus cut off the forts of the Capucins and the Constable. As those forts were of the last importance, and their little garrisons, amounting to 160 men, were without food, and had scarcely any powder, and but little water, it was resolved to make a sortie for their relief, the garrison of the town giving up for this purpose their own scanty rations, contributed enough for the consumption of three days. The men who could be allotted for this service, or indeed who were equal to it, sallied in broad day through the Puerto del Socorro, within pistol-shot of the redoubts of the enemy. The sally was so sudden, so utterly unlooked for by the besiegers, and so resolutely executed, that its purpose was accomplished, but with the loss of a third of the party.

This was the last effort of the Geronans; their animal powers were prostrated. The deaths now increased in a dreadful and daily accelerating progression; and the difficulty of interring the dead was increased, by the French keeping up a fire on the cemetery, to prevent the interment of the corpses, in the hope the contagion would thereby be promoted. The way to the burial-place was never vacant. The deaths, from fever, flux, and want, averaged from thirty to forty daily; in some days they amounted to seventy. It was at this period, that Alvarez was seized with a dangerous fever, and that the command devolved on Don Julian de Bolivar, who, with a few of the brave survivors, felt that the time was come when to capitulate would not be attended with dishonour; and that it was perfectly useless to protract the siege a moment longer. D. Blas de Furnas, an officer who had greatly distinguished himself during the siege, was sent to the enemy's camp for the purpose. Augereau, glad to gain possession of the town, granted honourable terms. The whole of the 10th was employed in adjusting the terms of capitulation; which were, that the garrison (4,300 men) should march out with the honours of war, and army, that lay on the field of Medellín, and the smell of the pestilential vapours arising from the putrefying carcasses. "Their melancholy lowings, and the long howls of the dogs that kept and guarded them, indicated the vague instinct of terror which agitated them."



should be exchanged for an equal number of French prisoners; and that the inhabitants should be unmolested in their persons and property. On the 12th the French took possession of the city, which was little better than a heap of ruins, and sent Alvarez to Figueras, where he died. The first act of the French officer who was appointed governor, was to order all the inhabitants to deliver in their arms, on pain of death; and to establish a military commission. *Te Deum* was ordered in the cathedral; it was performed with the tears of the officiating priest, and a voice which could with difficulty command its utterance. Augereau would fain have had a sermon like that which had been preached before Lannes at Saragossa; but not a priest could be found who would sin against his soul, by following the infamous example. Nine thousand persons had perished in the defence of Gerona, of whom above 4,000 were the townsmen. The loss of the enemy, by the sword or disease, was 15,000. The central junta decreed the same honours to Gerona and its heroic defenders, as had been conferred in the case of Saragossa; besides awarding honours and titles to Alvarez.

The conduct of the French officers and soldiers was marked with so much atrocity and cruelty, during the wars of the French Revolution, especially during the Peninsular War, that it is gratifying to record an instance of their exhibiting those feelings and observances by which the evils of war are mitigated. This took place while the capitulation of Gerona was going on, when many of the enemy's soldiers ran eagerly to the walls with provisions and wine to be drawn up by their brave defenders. Also, during the siege, some of those humanities of warfare appeared, which were systematically outraged in Spain by the French soldiery, in consequence of the authorized example and enjoined orders of their generals. The out-sentries of the French and Spaniards frequently made a truce with each other, laid down their arms, and drew near enough to converse; the French soldier would then give his half-starved enemy a draught from his leathern bottle, or brandy-flask; and when they had drunk and talked together, they returned to their posts. Humanities like these redeem the character of the French army, and incline us to forget, for a season, that they were the instruments of the most insatiable and merciless ambition

that ever cursed the face of the earth. The same, as has already been said, was frequently the case, during the Peninsular War, with the English and French soldiers.

Thus unparalleled necessity compelled the submission of Gerona; but, to the eternal honour of its heroic defenders, be it known that the word *capitulation* never escaped their lips, or even entered their thoughts, until the last vestige of food had disappeared, and that they had been reduced to the necessity of feeding on the hair of their heads.

After the fall of Gerona, Augereau marched to the relief of the besiegers of Hostalrich, and the dispersion of the patriots who were assembled in its neighbourhood to impede the operations. Having put to the rout two bodies, of 6,000 and 5,000 each, on December 18th and 26th, he advanced against Blake, and defeating him on December 28th, at Coll-de-Sespena, drove him in confusion towards Tarragona. He then commenced the blockade of Hostalrich. From this time the only resistance the patriots could oppose to the progress of the enemy in Aragon and Catalonia was confined to a desultory guerilla warfare in the mountains. All the fortresses in the first mentioned province were in the possession of the enemy, and it was clear that Tarragona, Lerida, Tortosa, and the other fortified cities in Catalonia, still in the hands of the patriots, were about to change masters, as Suchet was making vigorous preparations for their reduction.

Calamitous as the cause of the patriots had been in the north-eastern part of Spain, their efforts were attended with more success in the north-western portion.

On re-entering Spain, Soult, in his flight from Oporto, finding that the pursuit by the English army was not continued, marched to the relief of his countrymen blockaded in Lugo by the Spanish general Mahi, with 10,000 men, having previously concerted with Ney a combined movement against Romana. Their plan of combined operations was that Ney should act against Carrera and Murillo, and having defeated them and retaken Vigo, to send a column on Orense; while Soult was to pursue Romana's army in the valley of the Sil, and disperse it, after which he was to march on the Puebla de Sanabria, and there observe the Portuguese frontier, threatening to re-enter it, and keeping up a communication with Ney by Orense, and with the corps



under Morlier by Zomora. In pursuance of this plan, Ney hastened to Corunna, and Soult having been supplied from that fortress with field-pieces and stores, marched for Lugo. As on his approach the patriot beleaguering force withdrew, he entered the town without difficulty to reorganize his troops, broken down by the hardships of their recent campaign. During the five days which they halted, wherever they bivouacked, the scene was such as might have been looked for in a camp of predatory Tartars, rather than in that of a civilised people. Food and forage, and skins of wine, and clothes and church vestments, books and guitars, and all the bulkier articles of wasteful spoil, were heaped together in their huts, with planks and doors of the habitations which they had demolished. Some of the men, retaining amidst this brutal service the characteristic activity and cleverness of their nation, fitted up their huts with hangings from their last scene of pillage, with a regard to comfort hardly to have been expected in their situation, and a love of gaiety only to be found in Frenchmen. The idlers were contented with a tub, and if the tub were large enough, three or four would stow themselves in it.

The spirit of resistance of the Galicians was now raised to the highest pitch, that the utmost efforts of the French to repress it were ineffectual. The task of burning villages, erecting gibbets, and executing, in the mockery of justice, such Spaniards as fell into his hands, was assigned to Loisson, who discharged it to the utmost of his power with characteristic remorselessness.

In the mean time, Ballasteros, who was on the eastern frontier of Asturias, attacked, May the 19th, the French garrison of Santander, or, as it is otherwise written, St. Andero, slew 800 of it, took 600 prisoners, and won the place; but that part of his army which he had stationed in the passes leading to the town, suffering itself to be surprised by the enemy, he was compelled to abandon his prize, and disperse his men to seek safety in flight. On the 23rd of the same month, Carrera, who had succeeded to the Galician army (8,000 men), under Barrios, at Vigo, marched against the garrison of Santiago, which consisted of only 2,100 men. The garrison, despising their opponents, came out of the town, and advanced to meet them at Campo de Estrella, or, as it is otherwise written, Campostello, but were now driven back into the city, and

through it, and pursued more than a league beyond it, till night came on. The conquerors did not fail to remark, that their success had been obtained on the day of Santiago's apparition, and on the field where his body had been discovered by the star that rested on his grave. These advantages were however counterbalanced by the following reverses. On the 22nd of May, Ballasteros, endeavouring to defend the passage of the river Deba, with 10,000 men, was defeated by Bonnet; and on the 11th of June he suffered a total defeat at St. Jago de Compostello.

While Soult was in his work of destruction, employed in the interior of the province, laying it waste with fire and sword, always in pursuit, but always baffled, as the patriots invariably dispersed before a superior force could reach them, and continually harassed by those whom his cruelty exasperated, Ney proceeded, with a force of 8,000 infantry, and 2,500 cavalry, to execute his part of the concocted plan of operations. On his approach to Pontevedra, the Conde de Novroño retreated to the bridge of San Payo, which had been fortified, resolving to make a stand there to cover Vigo, in which town the stores of the Galician army lay. Here Ney attacked him, but after several desperate attempts to dislodge him, retreated during the night, leaving his wounded, and 600 killed.

Ney, in his advance and retreat, put into operation the savage system of the French marshals—a system enforced by the French government, and faithfully adhered to by its generals. At Lourizon, thirty priests and forty-nine of the principal inhabitants had been hung by the French, who then set the place on fire; in retaliation for this barbarity, 130 of the prisoners taken at the bridge of San Payo were put to death. Barrios, while he commanded the Galician army, had repeatedly remonstrated with Ney on the atrocious system of warfare which he pursued; but his representations being treated with contempt by the French marshal, he executed the threats with which he had vainly endeavoured to enforce them, and threw 700 French prisoners into the Minho.

Discouraged by these reverses, and fearful of the vengeance of their outraged opponents, the French marshals determined to retreat from Galicia. Evacuating Orense, Soult retreated to Puebla de Sanabria; and Ney evacuating Corunna and Ferrol,



retreated (June 21st) through Lugo, Villafranca, and Astorga. The citadel of Ferrol, which was commanded by a treacherous Spaniard whom Ney had appointed, surrendered to captain Hothan, of the *Defiance*, on June 26th.

On the deliverance of Galicia, the Central Junta addressed one of their animated proclamations to the inhabitants of the province, which concluded, "People of Galicia, you are free! and your country, in proclaiming it, effaces with tears of admiration and tenderness the mournful words wherein, in other times, she complained of you."

After the separation of Soult and Ney, the former marched for Benavente and put his troops in cantonments on the Esla; the latter, after his repulse at the bridge of San Payo, in the valley of Soto-Mayor, set out for Asla; and Kellerman and Bonnet at the same time evacuated Asturia. The object of their concentration was to prepare for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; but in consequence of the pressing orders of Joseph, after the battle of Talavera, they united their forces near Salamanca, and by forced marches, were advancing on the rear of the British army, to intercept its line of communication with Lisbon. But the defensive policy adopted by the English general thwarted their intentions. Cuesta's Spaniards were however defeated by Mortier at the bridge of Arzobispo, with the loss of all their guns, which, in their panic, they left ready shotted. The object of delivering Madrid, which was at the same time threatened on one side by Vanegas, and on the other by sir Robert Wilson, being accomplished, the French generals separated. Soult and Mortier took post at Talavera, and Ney marched for Ciudad Rodrigo.

At this time Vanegas was at Aranjuez, and threatening Madrid. Joseph ordered Sebastiani to march against him. The French army consisted of 24,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. Vanegas had about an equal force. The attack was first made by the enemy on the Spaniards posted in the gardens of the royal palace of Aranjuez, but was repulsed with the loss of 300 men. Encouraged by his success, Vanegas assembled his whole army at Almonacid, where he was attacked by Sebastiani on the 18th of August, and, though the action was contested with great spirit by the Spaniards, his army was routed with the loss of the whole of his artillery and baggage and 6,000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The loss

of the French was 2,000. The routed army fled to the Sierra Morena, leaving the whole of the province of La Mancha in the hands of the victors.

About this time the Central Junta announced the assembly of the Cortes. At the same time the necessities of Joseph and his intrusive government were so urgent that their wits were put to work to glean whatever had been spared in the former pillage. They therefore abolished the monasteries and all the ecclesiastical orders of Spain, and confiscated the revenues and property of all Spaniards in foreign countries. Among many other decrees for seizing property of different descriptions, was one commanding persons possessing plate to the amount of more than ten dollars to give in an account thereof within three days; the mint was immediately to pay a tenth of its value; the remainder was *promised* within four months. All persons whose sons were serving in the insurgent armies were required to furnish a man for the intruders' service for every son, or a proportionate sum of money; and those who had no money for procuring the substitute, or paying the fine, were to be imprisoned or sent into France. Kellerman, in the extensive tract of country of which he was governor-general, ordered all the horses and mares above a certain height to be taken in requisition for the French armies; and every horse or mare below the size named, or under thirty months' old, with every mare that should be three months gone with foal, to have the left eye put out by the owner, and to be in other ways rendered unfit for military service. And to consummate the climax of atrocious aggression, Marchant, who had succeeded to the command of the south corps on the return of Ney to France, ordered that the principal sheep-owners in the plains of Castile, should be responsible in their persons and property for the guerillas who eluded his vengeance. He declared, also, that the priests, alcaides, lawyers, and surgeons of every village should be responsible for any disorders committed by the guerillas within their respective parishes, adding, that every village and every house which the inhabitants might abandon on the approach of the French, should be burned.

The French now began to prepare for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the third invasion of Portugal. As a preparative they attempted to carry Astorga by a sudden attack; but they were repulsed by Santo-



ciides, who commanded there, with the loss of 200 men.

A movement of more importance was soon undertaken against the duke del Parque, who, with the army formerly commanded by the marquis Romana, had taken a strong position on the heights of Tamames, in the mountains on the northern side of the Puerto de Banos. Marchant advanced, October 18th, against him, confident of success, and anticipating an easy victory. The French were at first successful on the left of the position, but the main body of the Spanish army falling back on their strong ground, showered down a murderous fire on the assailants, when Marchant drew off his men in disorder, having lost above 1500 men and one gun. On the third day after the battle the duke del Parque advanced towards Salamanca, hoping to surprise the French there, but on his entering that city (October 25th) he found it deserted, the French having retreated during the preceding night, carrying off the church plate and abundance of other pillage.

Elated with this transient gleam of success, the Central Junta entertained so sanguine hopes of recovering possession of Madrid, that they appointed a captain-general, a governor, and a corregidor, who were to enter on the functions as soon as it should be recovered, and directed Areizaga, who had been appointed to the command of the army of Vanegas, which had been raised to fifty thousand men, of whom seven thousand were cavalry, with sixty pieces of artillery, to advance and capture it. The new commander, partaking of the blind confidence of the Junta, on the 3rd of November moved forward from the foot of the Sierra, against Sebastiani, who, with the fourth corps, consisting of 30,000 men, of whom 5,000 were cavalry and lancers, was posted so as to defend the capital. His advanced guard lay in the plain of Ocaña.

Having reached the plain, Areizaga drew up his army, consisting of 43,000 infantry, 6,600 cavalry, and sixty guns, in order of battle. His left wing was placed behind a deep ravine, and his right in front of the same, the centre in advance of the town of Ocaña. He himself took post in the church tower of Ocaña. About seven in the morning Zayas attacked the French cavalry with the advanced guard, and drove them back. Laval's division now advanced against the

Spanish centre and right, which was received with so shattering a fire that its leading ranks fell back, but being speedily reinforced by Girard's division, the Spanish right wing was broken; a charge of cavalry completed the confusion in this side. The centre was driven through Ocaña by the French cavalry, Areizaga hurrying with them from his steeple. The Spanish right following the same example, a complete rout ensued, and the whole motley crowd fled in the wildest disorder, pursued and cut down on all sides over the wild and desolate plains which extend to the south, towards the Sierra Morena, by the savage French cavalry. In this calamitous affair the Spaniards lost 4,000 in killed, 26,000 prisoners, and all their ammunition and artillery. Of the Seville regiment, which entered the action with four hundred and fifty men, only eighty of them were accounted for when the battle was over. The loss of the French was 1,700. Though the pursuit of this battle was not disgraced by the butchery that attended that of Medellin, all those prisoners who were recognised to have been in Joseph's service, were shot, and by harsh usage and bad food, 8,000 of them were forced to join the intruders' banners.

This defeat was soon followed by that of the duke del Parque, who after his repulse of Marchant, advanced towards Medina del Rio Seco, in order to assist in the contemplated general movement on Madrid; but learning the issue of the battle of Ocaña, he began to retreat, pursued by Kellerman, who came up with him at Alba de Tormes (November 25th). The French were repulsed by the infantry and artillery, but the Spanish cavalry fled the moment they were attacked by the French horse, without firing a shot or drawing a sabre. The victorious cavalry then charged the whole of the Spanish line, but were thrice repulsed. On the approach of the darkness, the infantry, forming itself into an oblong square, fell back in the direction of Tamames, but when within sight of the spot of their recent victory, a French patrol appearing, they were so panic struck that, throwing away their firelocks and knapsacks, and whatever else encumbered them, they took to headlong flight, leaving their artillery, ammunition, and baggage, in the hands of the enemy. Thus ended the disastrous campaign (anno 1809) of the Spanish War of Independence.



## THE PORTUGUESE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

ANNO 1809.

At the time of the withdrawal of the British army from Corunna, sir John Cradock, the commander of the English forces in Portugal (about 8,000 men), desirous of being in a condition to embark them with safety, in case the enemy should invade the country, took post at Passa d'Arcos, close to the mouth of the Tagus; but being joined about the end of February by 6,000 men under generals Sherbrooke and Mackenzie, for the purpose of defending Lisbon as long as possible, he encamped at Sacavem, a position near that capital. Early in March, general Beresford, who had been appointed by the prince of Brazil commander-in-chief of the Portuguese army, with the rank of marshal, with the aid of a certain number of British officers, who volunteered into that service, retaining their rank in their own, proceeded to the reorganization of that army. At this time the Portuguese army was in an inefficient state; the military profession in that country, as well as in all others, had fallen to the lowest point of degradation: the government having weakened it for the miserable purpose of rendering a corrupt and a vile despotism secure.

In the beginning of February, Soult, in obedience to his orders to reduce Portugal, began to prepare for his march from Vigo,\* announcing in his bulletins, that he would cross the Minho from Tuy on the 11th of February, reach Oporto by the 20th, and be in Lisbon on the 28th.

The plan that was laid down for him was well concerted. Victor was to manœuvre on the side of Badajos, and send a column in the direction of Lisbon to facilitate the

operation against that city; Lapisse was to threaten the frontier between the Douro and Almeida, occupy Ciudad Rodrigo, march on Abrantes as soon as Soult should have reached Oporto, and when he was master of Lisbon, Lapisse was to join Victor, and invade Andalusia; the conquest of the south of Spain, as well as that of Portugal, being considered certain. Ney, in the meantime, was to occupy Galicia, and communicate with the army of Portugal.

Soult, in pursuance of this plan, removed his head-quarters, in the early part of February, to Santiago, and despatched Franceschi, with the light cavalry, to take possession of Tuy. Franceschi, in his march, dispersing a body of Spaniards, took advantage of the panic he had occasioned, and sent a detachment of cavalry to summon Vigo, the treacherous governor of which surrendered. He also entered Tuy without molestation. It having been determined to attempt the passage of the river Minho, below the city, the main body of the army was accordingly assembled there. To effectuate the passage of the river, a small flotilla ferried over 300 soldiers to the Portuguese shore, but these were captured by the armed bands assembled there; and a steady fire being kept up by two six-pounders which the Portuguese general Freire had sent to that point, the other boats of the flotilla were obliged to return. Soult having thus failed in his attempt, leaving his sick and his ordnance at Tuy, marched for Orense, in order to pass by the only remaining bridge at Amarante. Loisson's division, which formed the advanced guard, after a desperate re-

\* He, and his fellow marauding generals and officers, had previously caused all their pillage—plate, jewels, indigo, Peruvian bark, and whatever marketable plunder Galicia had afforded them—to be previously shipped at Corunna for France. The sequel of this narrative will show, that he was equally provident in respect of his pillage from the Portuguese, which he had taken care to despatch by carts, a day or two previous to his expected decampment from Oporto. The extent of the robberies of the French generals, their officers and troops, in Spain and Portugal is incredible. The author of this work saw in the palace of Belem, in Lisbon, a number of packages lying about on the floor of the hall, containing precious specimens of sculpture, which Junot, in his

Soult, to escape the vengeance of the populace of the city, had not been able to carry off. In some of the packages were the lapis lazuli and amethyst pillars, set in gold, of the inner chapel of Raques Church, together with the silver angels and candlesticks of the altar, valued at three millions of crusadoes. Napoleon Buonaparte, by his Egyptian expedition, had feathered his nest to the tune of above thirty million of francs. His associate generals had, no doubt, not been more abstemious. The system of peculation was so universal, and so recognised as just and laudable, that Serrurier, a general in the wars of Italy, was termed "*the virgin*," on account of his abstaining from robbing the inhabitants of the country where he commanded.



sistance on the part of the Portuguese under Silveira, and Lieutenant-colonel Patrick, an officer who had volunteered into the Portuguese service, carried the bridge, and set fire to the town. In this affair all classes took a part—even females were engaged; a beautiful woman, who had raised 700 followers in the neighbourhood of Penafiel, led them on sword in hand. Even nuns were seen among those who worked the battery which had defeated the French in their attempt at crossing the Minho.

Having halted more than a week at Orense, endeavouring by force to suppress the peasants, and by allurements to seduce the higher classes from their duty, Soult resumed his march by way of Monterey and Chaves, the frontier towns of Spain and Portugal; and encountering Romana at the first-mentioned place, dispersed his army, with the loss of above 1,000 men. Chaves was immediately invested, and capitulated on the 13th. In their march, the French committed unrestrained devastation, setting fire to the little towns of S. Miguel de Zequelenos and S. Christobal de Mourentan, with their adjacent hamlets. The French having now obtained a footing in Portugal, Soult announced his appointment as governor-general of the country; and as Chaves, which was evacuated by Silveira on the 10th of March, was a fortified town, he made it the depôt of the army, leaving 1,400 sick and wounded there.

The country through which the invaders had now to pass is one of the most defensible in Europe, the road lying through a series of defiles of great strength and intricacy; nor would it be possible to find a peasantry better disposed to defend their hearths and altars. At every step, the enemy met with incessant and harassing opposition. The villages were abandoned, stragglers were cut off; sometimes a handful of peasants stood their ground with a spirit like that of their ancestors, and sometimes an individual would rush upon certain death, so as he could be sure of one Frenchman. This harassing mode of warfare greatly impeded the march of the French army, that it did not come in sight of Braga till the 20th.

Braga was occupied by 20,000 ordenanzas, and 2,000 regulars, under general Freire. Ascertaining that the enemy had forced the pass of Ruivaens, and had won the defiles of Salamonde, having no confidence in his motley and undisciplined force, he determined to retire on Oporto; but the populace

and his tumultuous army were of a different opinion; they thought that the position at Carvalho d'Esté ought to be defended, and considered it an act of cowardice, or of treason, on the part of Freire to abandon Braga. They mutinied, and putting him to death, by acclamation elected in his stead baron d'Eben, a major in the British service, and equerry to the prince of Wales, and who at the time was in command of the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion. The bells of the churches being set ringing the alarm, the ordenanzas quickly obeyed the call, but on inspection, it was found that there were no cartridges to fit their pieces. A single mould was at length found of the just size, lead was taken from the churches, and bullets were made during the night as fast as this slow process would allow. In the meantime, the French vanguard arrived before the position of Carvalho, which a part of this tumultuary force had occupied, about five miles in front of Braga. During three days frequent attacks were made, and the Portuguese kept their ground. By this time (March 20th) the whole French force had come up, and Eben had collected about 23,000 men. The instant the French attacked, the tumultuary rabble was routed, and experienced but little mercy at the hands of their foes. The priests at Braga had embodied themselves as an ecclesiastical corps, to serve as a guard of honour for the primate, the principal part of whose military duties was to take off with one hand the hat at the Ave Maria bell, and to present arms with the other.

Soult now proceeded on his march to Oporto, and on the 28th appeared before that city, which was badly defended. Field works had been thrown up on the north side of the city, which were armed with 150 cannon. Soult sent a summons to the bishop, the magistrate, and the general, protesting, in the usual French style, that the French came not as enemies to the Portuguese, but only to liberate them from the tyranny of the English. Instantly the bells of all the churches were set ringing the alarm, and a storm of wind and rain and thunder breaking at midnight over the city, a discharge of cannon, and useless rolls of musketry, were kept up by the Portuguese along the whole line, at which the enemy gazed as at a spectacle, for not a shot could reach them. At daybreak of the 29th, a tumultuary body of 25,000 men hurried forth and occupied the redoubts.



That odious priest the bishop, whom we shall hear of in the course of this work, as the patriarch of Lisbon, and the intriguing opposer of the measures of the English commander-in-chief, having brought affairs to this awful crisis, quitted the city, and, priestlike, took his station in a convent beyond the Douro, where he could view in safety all the ensuing horrors.

At seven o'clock of the morning of the 27th, which was Good Friday, the attack commenced in three columns, which having quickly succeeded in taking all the outer defences, broke through the centre of the Portuguese. A general panic took place, and the whole force rushed in wild confusion into the town, while one portion of the fugitives fled up, and another down the Douro. In less than an hour from the commencement of the action, the French were in the town; more than 4,000 persons, of both sexes, young and old, were running in wild affright towards the bridge of the Douro, when a dastardly regiment of their own countrymen, fleeing before the enemy, rushed through the helpless crowd, at full gallop, trampling a bloody pathway to the river. At the same moment the French cavalry were charging the fleeing mass, slaughtering indiscriminately all whom they overtook, to the very edge of the river. So great was the multitude rushing on the bridge, that part of the pontons sunk under the weight, and huge piles of carcasses rose above the surface of the water. The crowd from behind still pressing on, to escape the ruthless horsemen, forced those in front headlong into the waves; the French all the while keeping up a fire of grape-shot on the affrighted and helpless fugitives. The surface of the river was covered with dead bodies of all ages and sexes. The scenes of rape, murder, and pillage that ensued were more odious and more opprobrious to humanity, than even the horrors of the carnage. On this unhappy day, above 10,000 Portuguese are said to have perished.

On the fall of Oporto, "the worthy representative of the great emperor," having entertained the design of adorning his head with a diadem, as "Nicholas I., king of Portugal and Algarves," proceeded as "his master had done in Egypt," to endeavour to conciliate the people whom he designed to enslave, by a show of his attachment to the religion of his intended subjects. "There is a famous crucifix, known by the name of *Nosso Senhor de Boucas*, in the

little town of *Matosenhos*, on the coast, about a league from Oporto. According to tradition, it is the oldest image in Portugal, being the work of *Nicodemus*; and *Our Lord of Boucas* is in so high estimation, that on the day of his festival 25,000 persons have sometimes been assembled at his shrine, coming thither on pilgrimage from all parts. Many miraculous stories are prevalent concerning this idol; among the rest, that when it was cast up by the sea, one of its arms was wanting; but one day a poor woman, while gathering shell-fish, and drift-wood for fuel, picking up upon the beach a wooden arm, and supposing it to have belonged to some ordinary and profane image, laid it on her fire to make the pot boil. But it sprang out of the flames; and the priests hearing of the miracle, carried it in procession to the church of *Nosso Senhor de Boucas*, and applying it to the stump of the armless idol, a miraculous junction was immediately effected, it being the identical arm the idol had lost. To this idol *Soult* determined to offer his devotions, in order to qualify himself for his regal aspirations. Accordingly he and his staff visited the church, and prostrating themselves before the altar, "paid," says his servile adulator, "that tribute of respect and reverence which religion requires from those who are animated with the true spirit of Christianity." The French marshal having gone through the mummery of preparatory qualification for royal assumption, directed his attention to the measures requisite for furthering his subjugation of Portugal; but the landing of the British army at Lisbon awoke him from his reverie of aggression and royalty. The surprise of *Chaves* (March 20th), with the capture of the magazines of the army, and 1,300 prisoners by *Silveira* and his Portuguese levies, and the occupation of *Coimbra* by *Trant*, also tended to occasion him embarrassment. In retaliation, he ordered such Portuguese as he suspected of communicating either with *Trant* or *Silveira*, to be hung from the trees along the road-side, and their bodies left to putrefy there, all persons being forbidden to bury them. He moreover ordered *Thomières*, who had been accustomed to such services, to tie—which the French called inflicting an exemplary and necessary chastisement—twenty-four of the inhabitants of the village of *Arifane* in couples, back to back, and shoot them, as a punishment, for a party of disbanded militia having killed a chef-d'escadron and his escort of three dragons



near that village. After the perpetration of this atrocity, the village was set on fire, the women and girls having been previously forced into an *ermida* or chapel, and there violated.

But "a spice" of French atrocities has been as yet presented to the reader; in its appropriate place in this work, they will be exhibited in all their horror and abomination.

### THE GUERRILLA OR PARTISAN WARFARE.

THE origin of the guerilla warfare was the excessive cruelty and extortion practised by the French on the inhabitants of Spain. If you inquired into the private history of the members of any of the guerilla bands, it uniformly recounted some tale of suffering. One had his father murdered by the French soldiers, at the threshold of his house; another had seen his wife violated and massacred, or his children butchered before his eyes; a third had lost both his sons in the war; a fourth, burnt out of house and home, had joined the bands in the mountains as the only means of gaining a livelihood, or of wreaking vengeance. All had in one way or other, been driven by suffering to forget every other feeling but the remembrance of their woes, and the determination to revenge them. "Navarre" said the elder Mina, in the preamble to his counter-proclamation of retaliation for the frightful and sanguinary denunciation of Bessièrè's proclamation, dated June 5th, 1811, "is covered with desolation; every where tears are shed for the loss of the dearest friends; the father sees the body of his son hanging for having had the heroism to defend his country: the son witnesses with despair his father sinking under the horrors of a prison, for no other reason than that he is the parent of a hero who has fought for his native land."—Proclamation by Espoz y Mina, December 14th, 1811. The immense extent of the contributions imposed, and the excessive rigour with which they were levied on all ranks and degrees of persons, were also highly instrumental in the formation of this species of warfare. Spain had now for the space of three years been devastated by all the horrors of war; had been suffering from a system of organised rapin and plunder, enforced by the most

remorseless severity and cruelty: the consequence was, that guerilla chiefs and bands sprang up in every quarter where the shelter of mountains rendered pursuit difficult.\* In Galicia, the Asturias, Biscay, Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, Leon, the two Castiles, indeed in the whole of the northern and midland provinces, those patriot bands were denominated guerillas: in the mountain districts included under the name of the Serra de Ronda, in Andalusia, the irregular bands were termed *serranos*. The distinction was, that the guerillas acted in concert, the serrano on his own responsibility. The dress of the guerilla was a short jacket of russet brown, and leather leggings of the same dark colour; that of the serrano was velveteen, of an olive green colour, profusely ornamented with silver buttons, and his legs were incased in leather *bottinos*. A belt of short leather surrounded the waist of each, stuck full of the weapons of the French officers whom they had slain. When in small parties those predatory bands were called *partidas*.

This species of force and mode of warfare are peculiar to the Peninsula. From the days of Pompey and Satorius, to the late contest between the aristocratic and democratic parties, it has been pursued without intermission through all the varieties of time, descent, and physical circumstances.

"To lead these guerilla and serrano bands, which were little more than semi-bandits, the priest girded up his black robe and stuck pistols in his belt; the student threw aside his books and grasped a sword; the shepherd forsook his flock, and the husbandman his home." Cooks, barbers, innkeepers, blacksmiths, and men of all callings and professions, enrolled themselves in their

\* No country in the world is more favourable to partisan warfare than Spain. It everywhere abounds in excellent positions, capable of a defence by few against many. The sphere of the exploits of the guerillas was therefore usually the mountain passes

fastnesses, &c., which abound in Spain, particularly in the range of the Pyrenees. The mountain of the Salinas was celebrated for the ambuscades which Mina, Louga, and El Pastor, were incessantly way-laying convoys.



ranks, in hopes of plunder and promotion. Many females wearing male attire (a custom not unfrequent among women who are the inmates of camps) were frequently in the ranks of the guerillas and the serranos, fighting among the foremost. The most ferocious of those female warriors was named Martina. Guerilla juntas were established by the regency in each province, to collect stores and provisions for the bands.

The most distinguished of the guerilla leaders were the two Minas, uncle and nephew, Espoz y Mina and Xavier Mina, and Renovales, in Navarre and Aragon; Porlier and Longa, in the Asturias: in Biscay, Juan Martin Diez (named El Empecinado), and Julian Sanchez, in the Castiles; Juan Paladea, in La Mancha; and Murillo Davila, in the mountainous districts included under the name of the Sierra de Ronda, in Andalusia. The curate Merino, friar Sapia, Jarregui, baron d'Erolles, Amor, Juan Abril, Sornil, Duran, Campillo, and others, acquired much notoriety in this species of warfare. Indeed each province and district had their predatory heroes, whose deeds, in the strain of Spanish bombast, were compared with those of the Cid. Their leaders were often designated from their former employments or professions, or were known by some other distinguishing appellation or kind of nick-name. Some were characterised on account of their peculiar deformity; others obtained epithets from their superior qualifications; many from their truculence, and dexterous modes of spoliation. Thus, Jarreguy was styled el Pastor (the shepherd); Paladea, el Medico (the doctor); Porlier, el Marquisito (the marquis). The other *soubriquets* were, el Principe (the prince); el Manco (the left-handed); el Francisco (the Franciscan); el Frayle (the monk); el Cura (the priest); el Cantarero (the potter); el Pescador (the fisherman), &c. &c.

The first adventurers who attracted notice as guerilla chiefs, by collecting stragglers from the Spanish patriot dispersed armies, deserters from the enemy, the English, and their own fugitive forces, and contrabandists or smugglers, and men fond of a life of wild adventure, or made desperate by the ruin of their private affairs, in the general wreck which the spoliation and cruelty of the French had occasioned, were Juan Diez Porlier, in Asturias, and Juan Martin Diez, better known by his appellation of El Empecinado, in Old Castile. A lawyer, by name Gil, commenced the same course in the

Pyrenean valleys of Navarre and Aragon; but after a short career of two months he disappeared; and Egoaguerra, who renewed the attempt in the same quarter, in a short time engaged in Doyle's battalion. The third guerilla chief who at this time raised the spirits of the Pyrenean provinces, and for a while gave employment to the French in Navarre, was D. Mariano de Renovales, by whom the convent of San Joseph had been so gallantly defended at the last siege of Saragossa. Having been made prisoner when the city surrendered, he had effected his escape on the way to France, and collected in the valleys of Roncal and Anso, a body of men and officers, who, like himself, believed that the scandalous manner in which the terms of the capitulation had been violated by the French, released them from all obligation of observing it. On March 1st, 1809, the French sending a force against him, then in the town of Anso, he defeated it and captured all the survivors; but in the following August, being attacked in the valley of Roncal, he was, after a gallant resistance, obliged to demand terms and capitulate for the valleys; himself and such of his followers as chose, being allowed to withdraw. The French, according to their own accounts, lost in this affair 500 killed and 800 wounded.

Xavier Mina, the son of a landholder who cultivated his own estate, and was deputy for one of the valleys of Navarre, was a student at Pamplona when the Spanish Patriot Insurrection began. He was then in the 18th year of his age, and during the earlier part of the war had been confined to his father's house by a severe illness, from which he recovered just after Renovales had been compelled to withdraw from Roncal. A French commander, whose corps was encamped in the neighbourhood, sent a serjeant, requiring the father, in his capacity as deputy, to provide rations for his men. The serjeant disappeared on the road, and, in consequence, the house was surrounded at midnight by a detachment of infantry, who had orders to arrest the elder Mina, and bring him to head-quarters. The son, however, had time enough to secure his father's escape, and then in his name presented himself to the officer. The French general before whom he was carried, threatened him with death unless the serjeant were produced; but as every thing in that quarter was to be arranged by means of money, Mina obtained his liberty after having



been detained three days. The party who arrested him had plundered his father's house. This usage, the danger he had escaped, and the injustice of the whole proceeding, roused into full action those feelings which had been suspended only by disease and languor. He provided himself with a musket and cartouche-box, and in that trim presented himself in his own village, and offered to take the command of as many Spaniards as would engage with him in the good work of avenging their country on its invaders. Twelve adventurers joined him; they took to the mountains, and there, while they waited an opportunity of action, maintained themselves on his father's sheep. His first adventure was to surprise a party of seven artillery-men, who were carrying two pieces of cannon and a quantity of ammunition from Saragossa to Pamplona. This success procured him twenty volunteers, and he retired again to the mountains after sending his prisoners to Lerida. Hearing that a general officer was on the road with an escort of thirty-four foot and twelve horsemen, he laid in ambush for them in so favourable a spot, that a volley was fired on the French with sure effect, before they had any apprehension of danger. The general was shot in his carriage, some of the escort were made prisoners, and some money fell into Mina's hands. This he immediately distributed among his men, recommending them to send part to their families, and to retain no more than would be necessary to defray the expenses of their own interment, exposed as they must now be continually to death. The men were thus raised in their own esteem and in that of their countrymen wherever this was told, and volunteers now presented themselves in abundance, attracted by a success which was reported everywhere with such exaggerations as tales like these usually gather in their way. He received, however, none but those who brought arms, or whom he could supply with the spoils taken from the enemy. His party at this time amounted to about three-score persons, distinguished by a red riband in their hats, and a red collar to their jackets. He proceeded now towards the frontiers of Aragon, where a band of fifty robbers were adding to the miseries of that afflicted country. These he succeeded in surprising; the greater number were killed on the spot; the rest were sent prisoners to Tarragona. Twelve horses were taken from the party, upon which he mounted some of

his men, and armed them with lances; and every day added to his numbers and his reputation. Rations were voluntarily provided for his people wherever they were expected, and given as freely at one time as they were paid for at another, from the spoils of the enemy. He levied a duty on the passes where a considerable trade in colonial produce was carried on, and with these resources he paid and equipped his men, and kept in pay a sufficient number of intelligencers. It was in vain that the French made repeated efforts to crush their enterprising enemy; if his troops dispersed on the appearance or attack of a formidable detachment, it was only to re-unite, and by striking a blow on some weak point or distant quarter, render themselves more formidable than before. In Navarre, Biscay, and on the road from Burgos to Bayonne, he made himself the terror of the French convoys. He nearly captured Massena, in his homeward journey through Spain; but though he missed that chance, he captured his baggage and the whole convoy at the Puerto d'Araban, near Vittoria, on which occasion he defeated a French force of 2,000 men, who were escorting the convoy of prisoners and plundered treasure to France. On this occasion he took 150 of the enemy, and slew 600. This active chieftain was always on the watch for the enemy; passing from one province to another, at one time concentrating his forces, at another dispersing them. At this time he had about 1,200 men under his command. His chivalrous spirit had made him so formidable to the enemy that, not being able to capture him, they offered in a proclamation six thousand duros for his head. This failing, they endeavoured to seduce him from his allegiance by tempting offers. Signal as his successes were, his career was as short as his escapes were hair-breadth. Chance, however, at last put him in their power. Expecting the arrival of a convoy, he went on horseback with only one companion, by moonlight, to reconnoitre the ground, when he was surprised and taken by some of the enemy's outposts.

To supply his place, his uncle, Espoz y Mina, was elected commander-in-chief of the guerillas in Navarre. His first act was to capture Echeverria, the leader of a marauding band of guerillas, consisting of about 800 German deserters from the French ranks. He shot Echeverria and three of his principal comrades, and incorporated the



men in his own band. A gang of forty ruffians, with a woman by name Martina for their leader, infested Biscay and Alava, and committed so many murders, that there was a general outcry for her suppression; surprising the leader and her party, he inflicted summary punishment on them. He kept no man in his troop who was known to be addicted to women, lest by their means he might be betrayed. No gaming was allowed among his men; nor were they permitted to plunder.

The only chiefs among the guerillas who had belonged to the genteel rank of society were Porlier, d'Erolles, and Duran, who had been officers in the regular Spanish service.

The daring guerilla chief, Juan Martin Diez, the Empecinado, had been a soldier for a short time previous to the War of Independence, but had returned to his peaceful occupation of an agricultural labourer. When the intelligence of the detention of Ferdinand at Bayonne reached Spain, the Empecinado was the first to make war against the French. Having persuaded two of his neighbours to take up arms, they took a position on the high road from France to Madrid, near Aranda de Duero, to intercept the French couriers. This he soon accomplished, and thus obtained his first horse and arms; and this course was continued till his band numbered fifteen warriors. With these he performed the most daring exploits, cutting off convoys, intercepting supplies, treasure, &c. In a few months he found himself at the head of 1,500 men, and was thus enabled to do the enemy incalculable mischief. In vain were armies sent to surround his band; he baffled them all; shut up garrisons, destroyed depôts, &c., until his name became a terror to the enemies of his country. His disinterestedness was equal to his valour, and for this reason he became the idol of his band, so that they were ready to undertake any exploit at his bidding. Among his daring operations the following is conspicuous. A convoy was conveying in a carriage a lady, the relation of marshal Moncey. The carriage was escorted by twelve soldiers, in the centre of two columns of 6,000 men each, about a mile asunder. The Empecinado, with only eight of his followers, was concealed close to the town of Carovras. He allowed the leading column to pass, then boldly rushed on the convoy, put to death the whole of the escort, seized and carried off the carriage, which contained a rich prize

of money, jewels, &c. This, with his characteristic generosity, he partly divided among his men, and sent the greater portion for the coffers of the state. He was constantly descending from the Guadalaxara mountains, and spreading terror and alarm among the French garrisons. In one of those irruptions, he surprised and captured three battalions at Calatayud. He ultimately became a brigadier-general in the Spanish service, and on the termination of the war, retired to his native village. When the French army, under the duke of d'Angouleme, crossed the Bidassoa, to put down the constitution of 1820, the Empecinado took the field on behalf of the constitutionalists, and though included in the capitulation made by general Placentia, was condemned, at the instigation of the heartless Ferdinand, to be taken on the back of an ass to the place of execution, and hung. The more ignominious part of this iniquitous sentence he refused to submit to, but walked with a firm step to his doom; here a sentence of his hard fate stimulated an attempt to escape; his great personal strength enabled him to burst the cords which bound him, but he was quickly overtaken, and literally dragged by the rope round his neck through the streets, and afterwards suspended on the gallows.

In the other provinces the daring of the bands of the guerillas, particularly that in the Asturias, under Porlier, called El Marquisito, greatly harassed the French. That chief surprised the garrison of Santander, and fought some well-contested battles with the enemy. Don Julian Sanchez gave the foe in Old Castile no repose; he was continually surprising detachments, and making prisoners. On one occasion he drove away the cattle from under the walls of Ciudad Rodrigo, and disposing an ambush captured the French governor, who had sallied out to chastise him for his presumption.

The example of these chiefs, and the rich booty which they obtained by the capture of the church plate and that of individuals, which the intrusive government were at that time enforcing by requisition, induced guerilla parties to be on the watch. One party surprised a convoy with eighty quintals of silver, near Segovia. The French, who found themselves annoyed by this species of warfare, endeavoured to raise a counter-force of the same kind in Navarre, styled Miguelés. But that appellation, which was so popular among the Spaniards, had



no attraction for them when it was pressed into the usurper's service.

These forces rapidly increased. By the autumn of 1811, there were not less than 10,000 guerillas south of the Ebro; while to the north of that river Mina and Longa headed corps of 5,000 or 6,000 men each. A few of the other chiefs mustered bodies of 400 or 500 men each, but the majority of them led small bands of forty or fifty.

By these bands great evils were inflicted on the enemy; they cut off communications, intercepted supplies, convoys, and couriers; and destroyed the little forts, block-houses, and redoubts, which were placed midway between the towns to preserve the communication. But the government interfering, and giving these chiefs military rank, rendered them tame and indolent regulars.

These predatory bands were often the scourge and terror of the provinces in which they acted, and their outrages were so great that counter-partidas in many places were raised, both by the regency and the French, to restrain their excesses. Their feelings of patriotism were deadened by the lawless nature of their avocation: the love of country, and all the generous and disinterested feelings which it engenders, had been absorbed in the views of individual interest and selfish enjoyment.

A celebrated chief of a band of marauding guerillas, after making war on the French, turned his arms against the Spaniards. He had struck so great terror into Castile, that the Spaniards joined the French to endeavour to take him. Betrayed by one of his men, he was seized in a venta. A few days after, he was quartered by four horses in Valladolid, and his disparted limbs

were placed on wheels at the four cardinal points of the city.

It has been stated that deserters from the French and English armies were among the guerillas. M. Blazé, in his interesting work, says, the advanced guard of the French army, in the pursuit of the English army to Corunna, arrived at a village surrounded by a palisade, where the tri-coloured flag waved on the steeple, and the sentinels wore the French uniform. Some officers going up to it were informed, that for three months past 200 marauders had occupied the place, their retreat having been cut off. Their commander-in-chief was a corporal, but his excellency was out shooting with his staff.

It may be proper to state that much erroneous misconception has been entertained by all writers on the subject as to the amount of injury which the French sustained from having their convoys and supplies intercepted by the guerilla bands; that misconception will appear from the following fact.

As the French system of warfare was entirely predatory, that is, the troops were maintained by the plunder and spoliation of the countries in which their wars were carried on, the French armies did not suffer from the loss of their supplies and magazines as armies do who carry on warfare according to the civilised usages of modern Europe; and, consequently, their operations were not in the same degree cramped and retarded as is the case with those armies that conform to the accredited usages of civilised nations. The guerilla bands of the Basque provinces, marshalled under Sartiarius, were much more formidable to the Romans than those of "the Peninsular War" were to the French.

### THE WALCHEREN AND SICILIAN EXPEDITIONS.

WHILE the English army was paralysed in the Peninsula for want of the sinews of war—men and money—by the incapacity of Castlereagh, and the intrigues of Canning, two expeditions, one to Walcheren, and the other to Sicily, were planned and undertaken by the imbecile cabinet of Great Britain. The object was to effect a diversion in favour of Austria, between which power and France war then subsisted. The Austrian government wished the attack to be made in the north of Germany; but the English cabinet, for "the capture or destruction of the enemy's ships, either build-

ing at Antwerp and Flushing, or afloat in the Scheldt; the destruction of the arsenals and dockyards of Antwerp, Terneuse, and Flushing; and the rendering, if possible! the Scheldt no longer navigable for ships of war," determined that the Scheldt should be the point of attack. In the selection of that point they were determined, because of Buonaparte's great maritime preparations there for the purpose of his contemplated descent on England. From the spring of 1807, formidable naval preparations had been carrying on by France in those waters. But both expeditions were rendered nugatory



by the procrastination of their preparations, the enemy having obtained a knowledge of their destination, and consequently took the necessary precautions to defeat them; and the first mentioned was further marred by the imbecility of the commander-in-chief, the earl of Chatham, whose name was proverbial for indolence and inactivity, and who, possessed of very slender abilities, but being a court favourite, and in embarrassed circumstances, the national interests were sacrificed to his private emolument, which would arise from the lucrative command to which he was appointed.

The armament destined for the Scheldt was the largest and the most complete that had ever left the British shores. Its preparation commenced from the beginning of the month of May. In July a fleet assembled in the Downs, consisting of thirty-nine sail of the line, thirty-six frigates, and a proportionate accompaniment of gun-boats, bomb-vessels, and smaller craft; in all, 245 vessels of war, accompanied by about 400 sail of transports, carrying nearly 40,000 troops; and on the 28th of the same month it set sail for its destination. The imposing magnificence of this mighty force, forming, together with seamen and marines, a sum-total of 100,000 men, drew thousands of spectators, among whom was its projector and his associate, Curtis the baker, biscuit baker and contractor, to witness the departure of the ill-fated multitude it contained, over whom the angel of death was hovering, who doomed them to perish, not on the glorious battle-field, but by the consuming breath of pestilence and disease. In the course of the following day, the fleet was off the Dutch coast; but it being not sufficiently provided with boats for landing the troops, ordnance, &c., Flushing was not invested till the 2nd of August; and the operations were then so slow, that the batteries were not ready for near a fortnight, so as to commence an effectual bombardment. The wind now permitted a naval blockade to be formed, when a hot bombardment began. On the 15th, the guns of the forts being silenced, and two churches, the stadthouse, and 250 houses having been destroyed, on the following morning, the governor, general Monnet, displayed the white flag, and demanded a suspension of hostilities for a few hours. On the following evening, the articles of capitulation being signed, he surrendered the place, with a garrison of about 6,000 men.

From the oversight by the incompetent military and naval commanders of the expedition, of not taking possession, or intercepting the communications, of the island of Cadsand, the only place from which the enemy could receive supplies and reinforcements, in the course of the siege 3,000 men had been transported from it to Walcheren. With the peaceable surrender of two small islands to the north of the Eastern Scheldt, the reduction of Flushing had been the virtual termination of the campaign.

Lord Chatham now talked loudly and solemnly of advancing on Antwerp and capturing that fortress, and the ships of war in its harbour; but while he was pausing and pondering for nearly another fortnight, a large force was collected there of regular troops and national guards of the Belgic provinces, and those nearest to them in France; and Bernadotte had arrived to take the command. Besides, the strong forts of Lillo, &c., on the Scheldt, were well manned, and all sorts of impediments, bars, boom chains, &c.,\* thrown across and into the Scheldt, to impede the advance of the British fleet. The consequence was, the English offensive operations were suspended, and the French commenced theirs. On the 30th of August, opening a fire from guns and mortars from both banks of the river, they forced the English fleet to retire from its advanced position. The consequence was, that Walcheren was the only post occupied by the English in the beginning of September. Nearly a fourth part of the army being now prostrated by the endemic fever of the country, the Earl of Chatham, on the 14th September, embarked with a portion of the army for England, leaving a feeble remnant of the magnificent army which had been entrusted to his command, under sir Eyre Coote, for the purpose of demolishing the defences and basin of Flushing. Sir Richard Strachan, the admiral of the fleet, wishing to continue his command, and enjoy the perquisites it afforded, transmitted a plan of defence of the island to the admiralty, so as to render it a permanent possession by England. The British ministry now ordered the fortifications to be improved, and sent out English bricklayers, bricks and mortar, for the purpose, as if those materials could not have been procured elsewhere. But the remainder of the troops left to garrison the town disappearing with alarming rapidity in the hospitals and the grave, orders were sent out to lieutenant-general



Don, who had succeeded sir Eyre Coote, to destroy the basin and the naval defences of the island, and withdraw the garrison. Thus ended the Walcheren Expedition, which cost the nation twenty millions of money, and 10,000 of her best troops. The only trophies of that memorable exploit were a frigate and the timbers of a seventy-four, which when put together was christened the Chatham, as a memorial of the vigorous and prompt measures — words, namely, “promptitude” and “vigour,” in the communication of the king’s approbation of his operations during the siege of Flushing — of the commander-in-chief of the expedition.

Incapacity, and, in some instances, the want of common honesty and humanity, marked the proceedings of all the prominent persons connected with this ill-fated expedition. The ministry, among their other exhibitions of ignorance, should have known that Walcheren had been maintained in the reign of William and Anne at a fearful expense of health and life. The conduct of the medical folk, or principal officers of the army medical department, was culpable and heartless. The subterfuges of the surgeon-general, the physician-general, and the inspector-general of the forces, of the time, in evading obedience to the command to repair to Walcheren to examine the causes of the malady, and report thereon, are an eternal stigma on them.

The expeditionary force intended to operate in favour of Austria in Italy, consisted of about 15,000 English, Sicilians, Calabrians, Corsican rangers, and other foreigners

in British pay, under the command of sir John Stuart, the hero of Maida, and who were then stationed in Sicily for the protection of Ferdinand IV. and his family, the ex-king of Naples. On the 11th of June, the expeditionary force set sail; and on its passage captured the islands of Ischia and Procida, together with 100 pieces of ordnance, and 1,500 troops. On the 24th, the advanced divisions anchored off Cape Miseno, between three and four leagues from Naples, but being detained there some time waiting the arrival of Don Leopold, whose presence it was supposed would have considerable influence on his father’s late subjects, the usurper of the throne of Naples, Joachim Murat, had put the city in so complete a state of preparation, that its reduction could not have been rapidly effected but by bombardment; and as the court of Palermo was unwilling to resort to that alternative, the expedition returned to Sicily, having previously dismantled the fortifications of Ischia and Procida. Having failed in his Neapolitan expedition, sir John Stuart dispatched general Oswald, with 1,600 men, against the islands of Zante, Corfu, and Cephalonia, which lie at the mouth of the Adriatic, the first and second of which surrendered, together with Ithaca and Cergo. Corfu was too strong to be reduced by so small a force, and remained in the possession of the French till the peace of Paris, 1814, when it was surrendered to the English. Maura, the remaining Ionian isle, was reduced in April, 1810.

## THE SECOND SPANISH CAMPAIGN, AND THE THIRD PORTUGUESE CAMPAIGN.

ANNIS 1810—1811.

UNDISMAYED by the series of disastrous events which closed the year 1809, and ushered in the opening of the following year, in the armies and affairs of Spain, the British chief did not relax in his exertions to prepare for the struggle in which he was engaged.

Having, as has been already stated, taken up a line of defence on the north-eastern frontier of Portugal, the divisions of the army being so disposed as to hold the strong and rugged line of the Beira frontier, on which a sufficient force could be rapidly

assembled at any point which the enemy might seriously menace, or which he himself might choose for a demonstration on the frontier, or for striking a blow should a favourable opportunity present itself; he proceeded to make his dispositions to oblige the French to move in masses, and to gain time himself; time to secure the harvests, complete his lines for retreat, and perfect the organization and discipline of the Portuguese troops.

In pursuance of his authority as Marshal-General of Portugal (so appointed 23rd



November, 1809) he caused the Portuguese regency to enforce the ancient military laws of the kingdom, by which all males of sufficient age were compelled to bear arms in its defence, under the denomination of the *ordenanzas*.

Having thus adopted every means in his power for the defence of the country, and for opposing the enemy when he could successfully resist his progress, he calmly waited the advance of the hostile force, which had three different routes of access open to it: the one on the eastern frontier, by the way of lower Beira; a second by the Alemtejo on the south; and the third on the north, through Galicia. As the first of these routes was the most practicable, the English general concluded that his adversary would select it, and consequently, that he must first effectuate the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, as places of arms on which to base his line of operations, before he could hazard an advance either on Lisbon or Oporto, along the descent of the Sierra de Estrella, a range of rugged mountains which extend from Coimbra to Guarda, and terminate in the extensive plains of Castile; being the best defensible line between the frontier and Lisbon, and at the same time cutting off the approach by the two great roads which run to the north and south of the Sierra, and which are the only ones passable by an army moving with its *matériel* of stores and guns. In February of this year he visited the lines of Torres Vedras, to ascertain their condition, in order, as he playfully observed, that should his companions-in-arms be eventually compelled to leave Portugal, "he felt a little anxiety that they should go like gentlemen, out of the hall-door, particularly after the preparations he had made to enable them to do so, and not out of the back door, or by the area." As has been happily observed by the author of *The Military Memoirs*, the Duke was always gay and good-humoured with those about him, inspiring others with the confidence he evidently felt himself, as about him was not the slightest ostentation; "no solemn mystery; no pomp of concealment; never one look of importance."

The power of Austria having been broken by the battles of Aspern and Wagram, Napoleon Buonaparte resumed his determination of reducing Spain to subjection. For this purpose, and with the view of bearing down on all points of opposition at once, and on each with an overwhelming supe-

riority, he lost no time in pouring into the Peninsula mass after mass of his veteran troops, accustomed to war and victory, and flushed with their recent German success. In the early months of the year, one hundred and twenty thousand men of the army of the Rhine had crossed the eastern Pyrenees; and thus the French force in the Peninsula was increased to the amount of 368,000 men. From this enormous force, two grand corps d'armée were formed; the first, consisting of 65,000 men, was assembled at the foot of the Sierra Morena, for the purpose of invading Andalusia; and the second, amounting to 80,000 men, was assembled under Ney, Junot, and Reynier in the valley of the Tagus, until Massena should assume the command in chief. At this period (March, 1810) the British army effective in the field did not amount to 22,000 combatants. The Portuguese troops consisted of twenty-four regiments of the line, six of light infantry, and ten of cavalry, with the due proportion of artillery: but the effective strength did not exceed 31,000 men; and of this number many regiments, not being sufficiently trained to act with British troops, remained in garrison.

Soult opened the campaign in the early part of January, by forcing the pass of Despeña-Perros, which forms the main road from Madrid to Cadiz, and though numerous field works and entrenchments had been added to its natural strength, its defenders, amounting to thirty thousand men, under Areizaga, fled before him, even over the field of Baylen, in the greatest confusion and consternation, without firing a shot in their defence. The other passable routes (Puerto del Rey, Venta Nueva, and Venta Quemada) of the mountain chain that embraces Andalusia, were as readily forced by his lieutenants, Dessolles and Sebastiani. Thus, in less than a fortnight, the French were masters of the whole of Andalusia, except the city of Cadiz and the Isle of Leon. Cordova, Grenada, Seville, Malaga, &c., fell without the least resistance; and Cadiz would have met with a like fate had it not been for the promptitude and spirit of the Duke of Albuquerque. That patriotic soldier, knowing that Soult was pushing on from Seville with the chief part of his force to seize that important place, by a rapid march of 260 miles, from Pedroso de la Sierra, entered the Isle of Leon on the 2nd of February, having gained a day's march on the enemy, thus not only outstripping



him in rapidity of movement, but also having outmanœuvred him.

In the north of Spain, the operations of the campaign, after the surrender of Astorga to Junô, commenced by the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo, on the 26th of April, but the siege was not prosecuted with vigour until Massena, whose advent had been vauntingly announced, arrived to take the command of the army destined for the invasion of Portugal. That officer, disapproving of Ney's operations (who, regardless of the reckless expenditure of human life, had begun his approaches where a general more sparing of his troops would have terminated them,) formally invested that city on the 4th of June. Napoleon had instructed him to proceed cautiously, and according to the rules and usages of military science. The fields of Roliça, Vimiera, Corunna, the Passage of the Douro, and the battle of Talavera, had taught the French emperor and his generals to respect the prowess of English troops, and the genius and skill of their leader. The delay that took place subsequent to the surrender of that city, before the French invaded Portugal; their feints and demonstrations, their marchings and countermarchings, prove that they had formed a just and an accurate estimate on the subject.

During the operations of the enemy preparatory to and pending the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, the duty was assigned to the light division of observing an advanced line of country extending from Escalon on the left to Nova Frias on the right, five-and-twenty miles between the Azava and the Coa. This arduous duty it performed for near three months, to the admiration of both armies, though the gallant band was distant but one hour's march from six thousand horsemen of the enemy, with fifty guns; and but two hours' march from their main army, amounting to seventy thousand men. The situation demanded and called forth a quickness and an intelligence in the troops, and a vigilance and skilful disposition in their leader, which have seldom been equalled. But the secret of this wonderful performance was the high state of discipline which they had attained. "Seven minutes," says one who shared in their perils and exploits, "sufficed for the division to get under arms in the middle of the night, and a quarter of an hour, night or day, to bring it in order of battle to the alarm-posts, with its baggage loaded and assembled at a convenient distance in the

rear. And this not on a concerted signal, or as a trial, but at all times and certain." The enterprising spirit and skilful manœuvres of their leader were equal to the bold countenance and perfect discipline of those "matchless soldiers." Where the river was full, Craufurd's infantry was disposed in small parties between Almeida and the Lower Agueda; and his artillery, consisting of six guns and a troop of horse artillery, was stationed at Fort Conception; but when it was fordable he concentrated his gallant band, to be ready for any night attack that the enemy might make; both men and officers slept accoutred, ready to get under arms in an instant.

The proximity of the enemy at length induced him to attempt the post at Barba del Puerco, which was occupied by four companies of the 95th Rifles, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Beckwith. On the night of the 19th of March, when the moon was just rising, the French general, Frey, with six hundred chosen grenadiers, issued from the village of San Felices, situated on the opposite side of the river, and imperceptibly crossing the bridge, drove the pickets into the village, but the rifles, rallying, quickly drove back their assailants.

Craufurd's chivalrous spirit, unable to brook these interruptions, and his temerity increasing by the impunity with which he had, in his advanced position, braved the entire army of the enemy with his handful of men (3,200 British, and, 1,100 Portuguese, eight squadrons of cavalry, consisting of the 14th and 16th light dragoons, and the 1st German hussars included) advanced on the 2nd July towards Ciudad Rodrigo, displaying his troops in single rank on a rising ground, and sending a party of cavalry to the rear to raise a dust, he marched his infantry at a slow pace, within view of the besiegers, to incline them to think that the whole of the English army was advancing to the relief of the town. What his motive was for this idle and ostentatious display, whether it was to annoy the enemy, or in expectation to decoy or cut off a portion of his troops, it is not possible to divine. It however produced a *reconnaissance*, and led to the skirmish at Alameda two days afterwards.

The French having assembled a strong body of troops at Mariaiva, crossed the Agueda, on the 4th of July, near that village, and compelled Craufurd's advance to fall back skirmishing on Alameda. The



movement was effected in good order, being covered by two troops of cavalry and two guns.

After this brilliant skirmish, which was conducted on both sides with a dashing and emulous spirit, no movement took place on either side during the following week. But the enemy's patrols being in the habit of plundering Villa de Puerco, Barquillo, and other villages in front of the British posts; Craufurd determining to cut off their next marauding parties, placed, on the night of the 10th, two ambuscades, consisting of nine squadrons of cavalry, five companies of riflemen, a Portuguese caçadore battalion, and some horse artillery, in a wood on the banks of the Duo Casas, and Barquillo, and Villa de Puerco, contiguous to the hamlets, in the hope that before day-break he should be able to get in the rear of the enemy, and capture the whole party. At day-break next morning, two parties of the enemy being discovered, measures were instantly taken to cut them off.

"The force of the enemy did not exceed thirty cavalry and two hundred infantry, but they were advantageously posted in an open space, just beyond a long defile; and to reach them it was necessary to thread that defile in a narrow line. The consequence was, that though the German hussars, who led, formed up in succession as they got through, and charged their opponents with great gallantry, they effected nothing more than the dispersion of the handful of horse; for the infantry had time to form a square, and not all the efforts of our people could succeed in breaking it. The hussars rode bravely up to the bayonets, but were repulsed by a volley closely thrown in, which killed or wounded upwards of a dozen men. The remainder wheeled off, and pursuing the French cavalry, made way for a squadron of the 16th. These galloped forward, but also took to the left, and, leaving the infantry uninjured joined in pursuit of the cavalry. They were induced to do so, from the belief that two squadrons of Craufurd's cavalry, which were about Barquillo, were belonging to the enemy. When the last charge was made the French square was without fire, every man having discharged his piece, and none having been able to load again; but when a third attempt was made, they were better prepared to receive it. It fell to the lot of colonel Talbot of the 14th to lead this attack. It was made with daring intrepidity; but the enemy remained perfectly steady, and re-

serving their fire till the bridles of the horses touched their bayonets, gave it with such effect, that Colonel Talbot, with several of his men, were killed on the spot. The rest drew off; when general Craufurd, despairing of success by the exertions of the cavalry alone, despatched an orderly to bring up a detachment of the 43rd, which chanced to be at no great distance."

"While this was doing," continues the marquis of Londonderry, in his narrative, "the enemy's little column began its retreat, which it conducted with singular steadiness and great order. The 16th dragoons, seeing this, prepared to launch another squadron against it; and was already in speed for the purpose, when colonel Arenschild of the hussars observing cavalry advancing both in front and flank, checked the movement. It was much to be regretted that he took that step, for the horse that alarmed him proved to be detachments from our own people, on their return from pursuing the enemy's dragoons, the whole of whom they had captured. The French infantry lost no time in availing themselves of the indecision of our cavalry. They marched on, and returned to their main body, without having lost a single prisoner, or suffered in killed or wounded."

The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was now drawing to a close. A practicable breach having been effected, and the enemy's columns ready for the assault, its brave governor, Hervasti, appeared on the ruins waving a handkerchief as a token of submission. Ney refused to accept the condition, on account of his offer, on the 28th of June, of an honourable capitulation having been refused; but Massena, with the feeling of a real soldier, granted the garrison and its brave governor honourable terms, and entered the city on the 10th of July. When all hope was over, that Rodrigo could be relieved, Julian Sanchez, in the night of the 22nd of June, with two hundred and forty of his partizans cut their way through the French posts, and joined the advanced division of the allied army.

It had been expected, and he was strongly urged to do so, that lord Wellington would have made an effort to relieve the garrison. Massena employed taunts and gasconade to induce him to it. In his proclamations he accused him of breach of honour and good faith in allowing his ally's fortresses to fall, without risking a shot to save them. Besides taunting him with cowardice, he told him that the sails were flapping, and his



ships waiting to carry him and his heartless countrymen to their island home. But the philosophic temperament of the English general was not to be diverted from his purpose by the ignorant and insulting gasconade of the vapouring Frenchman, nor the clamour and panic of his allies. "It was not a single campaign, but a terrible war;" a series of campaigns dependent on vast plans, and profound combinations, that "the cause of Spain could," as the Spanish historian Torreno justly observed, "be preserved from being struck down." Besides, his force was vastly inferior to that of his opponent, not only in point of numbers, but in discipline and experience. Even Thiers affirms, that Massena's army told 79,000 or 80,000 men; while the English general could oppose no more than 25,000 British and Portuguese.

Shortly after the ill-conducted affair of the 10th at Barquillo and Villa de Puerco, the enemy's cavalry advancing in force, Craufurd, having blown up fort Conception, fell back on Almeida, and took up a position on the Coa; his right covered by some broken ground, his left resting on Almeida, within medium range of the guns of that fortress; his force extending a mile and a

half obliquely towards the river; a position faulty and dangerous, not only as having the river in his rear, over which his only line of retreat was by a narrow bridge about one mile distant from his position; but his retreat might have been intercepted, and the whole of his gallant division compelled to lay down their arms, had the French known of the existence of the bridge of Castel Bom, about two miles distant from the right of his position. Neither was Picton, who was posted at Pinhel with the third division, and who was fully aware of the perilous predicament in which Craufurd was placed, without blame, in respect of this affair; Craufurd applied to him for his aid, but he, either from jealousy or pique, refused it. Craufurd, lest his ardent temperament might lead him to implicate his division into useless collision with the enemy, had been strictly enjoined by the commander-in-chief to withdraw behind the Coa; but suffering his judgment to be blinded by a love of distinction, and a craving for glory, he determined to encounter the enemy in the faulty and perilous position he had chosen; and this led to the useless but brilliant combat of the Passage of the Coa.

#### THE COMBAT OF THE PASSAGE OF THE COA.

BEFORE day-light, on the morning of the 24th, the troops, drenched with rain from the storm of the preceding night, were under arms, and as the mist cleared off, the French army, consisting of 24,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, with thirty guns, were seen in full march; while a host of horsemen and a powerful artillery swept the plain, driving the English pickets, cavalry, and horse artillery before them; Loisson's infantry, at a charging pace, advanced towards the centre.

The British line was immediately contracted, and as the plain from Villamula to the Coa being entangled with vineyards, intersected with deep branches, and surrounded with high walls and inclosures, afforded a good field for light infantry manœuvres, the ground was obstinately disputed, until oppressed by numbers, its defenders reluctantly retired before the enemy.

During those operations the cavalry and guns had crossed the bridge; and as it was necessary to hold the right to the last to

prevent the enemy from approaching the bridge, the infantry retired on the left in echelon; their passage over the bridge being protected by six companies of the 43rd, and some riflemen, who were posted on two hills, covering the line of passage. As the infantry passed the bridge, they placed themselves in loose order in the rear of the bridge behind rocks on the side of the mountain, on the summit of which the artillery was already planted; the cavalry watching the roads leading from the fords and the bridge of Castel Bom. The enemy gathered fast and thickly on the opposite banks. Soon the monotonous beat of the *pas de charge* rolled sullenly; a column appeared, and rushing suddenly on the bridge, had gained two-thirds of its length, before an English shot had brought down an enemy; the depth of the ravine having deceived the aim of the troops and the artillerymen; yet a few paces onwards the line of death was traced, and the whole of the leading section fell as one man. The gallant column still pressed



forward, but none could pass that terrible line; the heap of the dead and dying rose nearly even with the top of the parapet.

To adopt the vivid language of the historian of the War in the Peninsula, "The shouts of the British now rose loudly, but they were confidently answered by their opponents; and in half an hour, a second column, more numerous than the first, again crowded the bridge. This time, however, the range of fire was better judged, and ere half the distance was won, the multitude was again torn, shattered, dispersed, or slain; only ten or twelve men succeeded in crossing, and took shelter under the rocks at the brink of the river. The skirmishing was then renewed, and a French surgeon coming down to the foot of the bridge, and waving his handkerchief, commenced dressing the wounded under the hottest fire; nor was this brave and humane man's touching appeal unheeded; every musket turned from him, although his still undaunted countrymen were preparing for a third attempt."

The third attempt was made merely as a point of honour, to cover the escape of the few men who had passed the bridge, and

had concealed themselves among the rocks. When this chivalrous object had been obtained, a shower descending, the enemy ceased making any further attempt, and at nightfall the light division retired behind the Pinhel river, to a position about three leagues from Averca.

Never did a handful of men make a more heroic resistance against an overpowering multitude, but its loss had been considerable, thirty-six killed, one hundred and ninety-nine wounded, and eighty-three missing; among whom were twenty-eight officers. But the loss of the enemy was thrice as great, amounting to above one thousand in killed and wounded. The slaughter on the bridge had been dreadful, and the line of death was traceable for a considerable distance beyond it. The loss in prisoners sustained by the division was occasioned by Craufurd's stationing some companies of the 43rd in a vineyard enclosed by a high wall, where, though the greater part effected their retreat, most of the prisoners taken in the action had fallen into the hands of the enemy.

#### THE ADVANCE OF THE FRENCH ARMY INTO PORTUGAL, AND THE RETREAT OF THE BRITISH.

AFTER the reduction of Rodrigo, the English general, desirous of retaining his forward position as long as possible, made no movement until the 28th of July, when he moved up the Portuguese troops that were two or three marches in the rear, and withdrew behind the Mondego, leaving the fourth division at Guarda, to observe the enemy. There he waited the result of Massena's dispositions, whether he would invest Almeida, or only mask that fortress. As soon as the French marshal had commenced his operations for the siege, lord Wellington recrossed the Mondego, for the purpose of supporting the defence, and of compelling the French army to act in a collected state during the siege, and thus protract it. Every hour he could prolong the siege was of importance, inasmuch as the time of the autumnal rains approached, and the defences of the country would be considerably strengthened by the increased difficulties of the roads, and of procuring provisions for the invading armies.

A whole month had been spent before Almeida before that fortress was invested. The interval had been employed by the

French in the commission of every kind of plunder, violation, and cruelty, though Massena had issued the following proclamation, dated from Rodrigo, promising the inhabitants "the paternal protection of the emperor." That proclamation, which bears a great resemblance in style and matter to Napoleon's braggart and bombastic bulletins and addresses, and which the French armies, and those persons who are incapable of appreciating correct composition, but are dazzled with the glare and glitter of language, admire as master-pieces of eloquence, was as follows:—

"Inhabitants of Portugal, the emperor of the French has put under my orders an army of one hundred and ten thousand men, to take possession of this country, and to expel the English, your pretended friends. Against you he has no enmity; on the contrary, it is his highest wish to promote your happiness, and the first step towards securing it is to dismiss from the country those locusts, who consume your property, blight your harvests, and paralyze your efforts. In opposing your emperor, you oppose your true



friend; a friend who has it in his power to render you the happiest people in the world. Were it not for the insidious counsels of England, you might now have enjoyed peace, and tranquillity, and have been put in possession of that happiness. You have blindly rejected offers calculated only for the purpose of promoting your benefit, and have accepted proposals which will long be the curse of Portugal. His majesty the emperor has commissioned me to conjure you that you would awake to your true interests; that you would awake to those prospects, which, with your consent, may be quickly realized. Awake, then, so as to distinguish between friends and enemies. The king of England is actuated by selfish and narrow views; the emperor of the French is governed by universal philanthropy. The English have put arms into your hands, which you know not how to use: I will instruct you. They are to be the instruments of annihilation to your foes, and who those foes are I have already shown. Use them as you ought, and they will become your salvation! Use them as you ought not, and they will prove your destruction! Resistance is vain. Can the feeble army of the British general expect to oppose the victorious legions of the emperor? Already a force is collected sufficient to overwhelm your country. Snatch the moment that virtue and generosity offer! As friends you may respect us, and be respected in return; as foes you must dread us, and in the conflict be subdued. The choice is your own, either to meet the horrors of a sanguinary war, and see your country desolated, your villages in flames, your cities plundered; or to accept an honourable and a happy peace, which will obtain for you every blessing, which by resistance you would resign for ever.—The Marshal Prince d'Essling, commander-in-chief of the army of Portugal—MASSENA."

As many of the inhabitants on the frontier had relied on the faith of the promises and had severely atoned for their credulity, lord Wellington replied to the French marshal's deceptive manifesto by a counter-proclamation, dated August the 4th, which formed a fine contrast by its temperate and manly tone, and its calm and dignified style of composition, to the vapouring and hollow gasconade of the Frenchman. In that proclamation his lordship ordered the inhabitants of that line of country, which the enemy was likely to penetrate, and the military means at his disposal could not

protect, to remove their property and cattle, lay waste the fields, destroy the mills, and break down the bridges. The following is a copy of the English general's proclamation:—

"The time that has elapsed during which the enemy has remained on the frontiers of Portugal, has fortunately afforded to the Portuguese nation experience of what they are to expect from the French. The people had remained in nine villages, trusting to the enemy's promises, and vainly believing that by treating the enemies of their country in a friendly manner they should conciliate their forbearance, and that their properties would be respected, their women would be saved from violation, and that the lives of their wives, children, and themselves, would be spared. Vain hopes! The people of those devoted villages have suffered every evil which a cruel enemy could inflict. Their property has been plundered, their houses and furniture burnt, their women have been abused, and the unfortunate inhabitants, whose age or sex did not tempt the brutal violence of the soldiers, have fallen the victims of the imprudent confidence they reposed in promises which were made only to be violated. The Portuguese now see that they have no remedy for the evils with which they are threatened but determined resistance. Resistance, and the determination to render the enemy's advance into their country as difficult as possible, by removing out of his way everything that is valuable, or that can contribute towards his subsistence, or frustrate his progress, are the only and the certain remedies for the evils with which they are threatened. The army under my command will protect as large a portion of the country as will be in their power; but it is obvious that the people can save themselves only by resistance to the enemy, and their properties only by removing them. The duty, however, which I owe to his royal highness the prince regent, and to the Portuguese nation, will oblige me to use the power and authority in my hands to force the weak and the indolent to make an exertion to protect themselves from the danger which awaits them, and to save their country. And I hereby declare, that all magistrates, or persons in authority, who remain in the towns or villages, after receiving orders from any of the military officers to retire from them; and all persons of whatever description, who hold any communication with the enemy, and aid or assist them



in any manner, will be considered traitors to the state, and shall be tried and punished accordingly.—(Signed) Wellington.”

Early on the morning of the 26th of July, the enemy opened a tremendous fire on Almeida, and continuing the bombardment all day, the thunder of the artillery had scarcely died away, when soon after dark the ground upon which the city stood trembled as if an earthquake had occurred, and a vast column of smoke and fire rising into the air, the whole town sank into a shapeless ruin; only six houses being left standing, the rampart being breached, and the guns hurled into the ditch. The dreadful event had been occasioned by the explosion of the powder magazine in the castle, a shell having fallen on a tumbrel standing at the door of the magazine, and about to convey ammunition to the ramparts. Nearly the whole of the ammunition and the greater part of the artillerymen, and many hundreds of infantry soldiers, and of the inhabitants, were killed or wounded. The catastrophe was increased by a mutiny of the garrison, headed by the lieutenant-governor, Bernardo Costa, and José Bareiros, the commandant of the artillery, who for some time had carried on a secret correspondence with the enemy. The governor, colonel Cox, in vain endeavoured to defend the ruins; and being summoned next day by Massena to surrender, he, for the sake of gaining time, sent Bareiros with counter propositions to the French marshal, but his faithless deputy betraying his trust, by communicating the condition of the garrison, Almeida surrendered to the enemy on the day following the explosion. On the fall of the fortress, lord Wellington resumed his former position behind the Mondego, in the valley of the same name; stationing his cavalry in front of Celorico, and placing posts of observation at Guarda and Francoso, he established his head-quarters at Gouvea. In addition to the disappointment of the sudden and speedy fall of Almeida, the English commander-in-chief was now exposed to many other vexatious annoyances. Besides an active and enterprising enemy to contend with, he had the cabals and intrigues of false and perverse allies to counteract, desponding friends to inspire, and the folly and fears of a timid and vacillating cabinet at home to rectify and remove. The patriarch of Lisbon and the Souza faction in the regency attempted to interfere with and thwart his measures; they encouraged dis-

obedience to his orders for the destruction of the walls and the laying waste of the country; they promoted disaffection and riot in Lisbon; and had intrigued to have the duke of Brunswick placed at the head of the Portuguese army. At home, by their fears and forebodings, the cabinet seemed to partake of the same character of awe and wonder in which all Europe had been entranced in their blind admiration of Buonaparte's genius, and their stupid hallucination of belief in French invincibility. Defeat, discomfiture, flight to their ships, by Wellington and his gallant comrades, were the daily prophecies and the awful forebodings of the factious and disaffected part of the public press of England. The same croakings and prognostics of failure were reiterated by some of his own officers (some even generals, among whom were generals Spencer and Charles Stuart), and their correspondence with their friends assumed a dismal hue. To the factious and intriguing portion of his allies, after reproving them for their folly and deception, the English general replied by informing them that he alone was responsible for the operations which he directed, and that he would not change his plans until he saw good cause, and declared “that if the civil power was not sufficient to restrain the factious and disaffected from instigating the mob to the plunder and slaughter of the respectable and virtuous classes, martial law should be proclaimed;” and that “if their intrigues did not cease, he would advise his government to withdraw the British army.” To “the obloquy that had been heaped on him by the ignorant and flippant praters and factious alarmist demagogues of his own country, as well as those of his allies,” his reply was that “the magnitude of the undertaking was too great for their minds to comprehend, and their nerves to bear.” Those spirited and well-timed rebukes silenced the conspirators as well as “the ignorant praters.” The indiscreet and desponding letter-writers in his army were so effectually reprovved in a general order, which though it carried a keen sarcasm in its very title, was couched in terms so dignified and forbearing, that the tone of despondency and “the system of croaking” disappeared in the camp as if by magic.

Two months had now elapsed since the fall of Rodrigo, and yet the designs of the enemy remained undeveloped. Several feints and uncertain manœuvres had been made to mask his intentions, and deceive



the English general as to the line of march to be adopted. The enemy had his choice of three roads to Coimbra, either by Belmonte, Celorico, or Viseu. Having concentrated the three corps under Junôt, Ney, and Regnier, amounting to 85,000 veteran troops, supported by reserves and flanking forces, namely 22,000 under Drouet, at Valladolid; 15,000 under Serras, in the Gela, and 26,000 under Bessières, in the rear, he advanced in the middle of September on Viseu, hoping to reach Coimbra before Hill could effect a junction with the main body of the English army. It was the intention of Massena to throw his whole force on both flanks of the English army, to compel its general to accept battle on ground of his choosing.

As soon as lord Wellington ascertained that the troops at Guarda formed the advanced guard of Regnier, who had moved forward from Aleuda on the frontiers, simultaneously with Massena's force, he dispatched orders to generals Hill and Leith, who had been protecting the line of the Tagus and the Zezere, to concentrate their forces on the Alva, and advance to join the main army. Hill—who had been in observation of Regnier's motions in Spanish Estremadura, as soon as he discovered his movement towards the Tagus, anticipating the intention of the commander-in-chief, effected a junction with Leith, who had, with 2,000 British and 8,000 Portuguese, been laying at Thomar, ready to support Hill, or march northward, as circumstances might require—was already in motion.

As the enemy advanced, the allies fell back before them in excellent order, taking advantage of the ground, and never retaining any post so long as to be pressed into the necessity of accepting battle. While Massena was collecting his forces in front of the allied army, the English general withdrew his infantry one march into the valley of the Mondego, leaving his cavalry and outposts on their stations at Celorico and Guarda; when the enemy's forces were concentrated at Viseu, he retired by the left bank of the Mondego, leaving the light division and the cavalry in advance of Mortagoa on the Criz; and when the French marshal's passage of the Criz gave a determinate form and character to his movements, and plainly indicated his intention of marching on Coimbra, his active and skilful opponent crossed from the south to north of

the Mondego, and for the purpose of protecting that city, took up his position on the Serra de Busaco, which is in front of Coimbra, and distant from it about three leagues. During the advance of the enemy over the table-land from the Criz to the heights opposite Busaco, Craufurd obstinately maintaining possession of the position he had taken up on the morning of the 25th, after abandoning the strong ground he had held in the rear of Mortagoa, had nearly repeated his scene at the passage of the Coa, and had his division hemmed in, as it nearly had been in that affair. The French cavalry were swarming round him on every side, and the columns of infantry rapidly marching with the intent of cutting him off, when fortunately at the critical moment, lord Wellington arriving on the ground, took the command of the division, and ordering it to retire, by a succession of rapid and skilful manœuvres, effected the retreat without any important loss. On the 5th of September, colonel Trant had endeavoured to capture the enemy's military chest and reserve artillery, and though he failed in his daring exploit, he took above one hundred prisoners. On the 9th of the same month, the English commander-in-chief addressed his protest to Massena, on the subject of the French marshal's cruel treatment of the Portuguese ordenanza.

The Serra de Busaco, which presented an advantageous position for the resistance of the enemy, is a ridge or range of mountains trending from the north about eight miles to the Mondego, where it terminates abruptly with almost a perpendicular fall. Its ascent is steep and rugged; here and there covered with pine plantations, and in height about two hundred and fifty feet more elevated than the ground in its front. Its summit, to the east, is in many places pointed with sharp rocks. At the highest point of the ridge, about two miles from its northern extremity, is a table-land occupied by the Carmelite convent of La Trappe, situated in a large wooded garden, and on the left of that culminating point is the village St. Antonio de Cantara. It is intersected with a few gorges and defiles, and traversed by the three roads to Coimbra from the Beira frontier. In front of Busaco is a succession of heights, from the first of which it is separated by a wooded chasm of great depth, but so narrow that a twelve-pounder can range to the salient points over the opposite ridge.



## BATTLE OF BUSACO.

THE English general had now taken up his position on the heights of Busaco; but not more than half his force was in line. The fifth division had not yet joined; Hill was behind the Alva; and the light division, on account of the delay occasioned in manœuvring to escape the consequences of Craufurd's precipitancy, did not crown the ridge till the enemy's columns were on the opposite heights; when they immediately opened a cannonade. Some smart skirmishing occurred between the light troops of the hostile armies during the day (Sept. 25); and in the course of the night, some of the enemy's skirmishers stealing up the wooded dells, endeavoured to establish themselves close to the pickets of the light division; but they were quickly driven back.

On the evening of the 26th, the English line of battle was formed; 25,000 British soldiers, and a like number of Portuguese, lay on the backward slope of the mountain; the Portuguese troops having been brigaded in the proportion of one Portuguese battalion to two of English. The second division under Hill (who had effected a junction in the course of the morning, occupied the left of the order of battle; with the fifth division, under Leith on its left, and the Lusitanian legion in reserve. Then, at an interval of two miles, Picton's division (the third,) prolonged the line of the right of the position. About a mile from the left of the third division, the first division, under Spencer, formed the centre of the position, near the convent, with Pack's brigade posted in advance on the descent. The light division was formed on the left of Pack's brigade, nearly half-a-mile in front of the convent; while higher up, and nearly under the convent wall, a brigade of German infantry was posted. The fourth division, under Cole, held the extreme left of the position; a considerable space intervening between it and the second division. The cavalry under sir Stapleton Cotton was posted in the rear of

the left of the position, on the plains in the front of Mealhada, to watch the road leading from Mortagao to Oporto. A regiment of dragoons was in reserve on the summit of the ground on which the convent stood; and the commander-in-chief's headquarters were in the convent. Above fifty pieces of artillery were placed on the most salient points, and in the embrasures of the rocks, so as effectually to range along the front of the ridge. Colonel le Cor, with his brigade, was on the Serra de Murcella, to cover the right of the position; while Fane, with the 13th dragoons, and his division of Portuguese cavalry, was posted on the left bank of the Mondego, to repel any attempt the enemy's cavalry might make in that direction; and for the protection of the left (which was the weakest point of the position). Trant had been directed to march his division of militia to Sardao, to secure that pass.

When the night of the 27th had cast its mantle over the scene\* of warlike preparation and hostility, the fires of innumerable bivouacks shone on the rocky eminences of the ridges on both sides of the intervening chasm. In the English camp the veterans, accustomed to war and scenes of excitement, slept soundly on their stony beds, but the younger soldiers, who were now to witness a battle for the first time, were kept awake by the grandeur and solemnity of the scene.

As the first streaks of dawn (two o'clock) were beginning to appear over the eastern hills, a rustling noise was heard in the wooded chasm which ran up to the crest of the ridge. The allied army was instantly under arms. Presently the sharp crack of a musket, succeeded by the lengthened hiss of a spent bullet, was followed by another and another, until every bush and tuft on the face of the Serra seemed instinct with life and fire. As the light broke, and the grey mist in which the mountain was enveloped cleared off, five divisions of the enemy, covered by a mul-

\* The night preceding the battle of Busaco was of a different complexion to those which usually attended lord Wellington's victories. Storms, accompanied with intense thunder, lightning, and rain were the usual precursors that ushered in the night previous to almost all his great and glorious battles in the Peninsula; and the case was the same at the battle of Waterloo. His battles also were generally fought on a Sunday. Those occurrences at length gave birth to a species of proverbial phraseology in

his army. Unseasonable nights were termed "Wellington nights," and the plea for performing any worldly occupation on Sundays, was justified by the axiomatic expression, "The better the day the better the deed." But though the night preceding the battle of Busaco was not a "Wellington night," the air was very cold and piercing. Even the hardy veteran shrunk within his scanty covering. The young soldiers endured with less patience their bleak mountain couch.



titude of skirmishers, were seen to emerge from the ravine. Two divisions under Regnier appeared in front of Picton's division, prepared to advance by the road crossing the height of St. Antonio de Cantara, while three divisions, under Ney, stood in columns of masses in front of the road which leads to the convent. Junôt's corps was in the centre, and in reserve. The distance between the two points on which Regnier and Ney's corps were preparing to advance, was about three miles.

As the clump-trees and inequalities of the ground over which Regnier had to move contributed to cover his advance, and that the English regiments in that part of the line had not completed their formation, the leading battalions being in the act of deploying into line, his column reached the summit of the ridge, without any other opposition than the occasional fire of the artillery planted on the flanking points. Having gained that part of the crest of the ridge which formed the interval between Picton and Leith's divisions, and forcing back the right of Picton's division, they were preparing to wheel to the right, and sweep the battle-field, when they were furiously charged by the 88th and a wing of the 45th, supported by the 8th Portuguese regiment (which had suffered severely in the onset), and were driven down the declivity of the ridge in confused masses, with fearful slaughter; the whole line of their flight to the very bottom of the chasm being covered with the dead and wounded.

The battle in this quarter was, however, not yet ended. The columns of the enemy that had first gained the crest of the height, having been concealed from view by the haze that capped the mountain, had established themselves among the crowning rocks, but they were quickly driven headlong over the rocks into the valley, at the point of the bayonet, by the 9th regiment, under colonel Cameron. Thus Regnier's attempt to turn the left of the English position, and to possess himself of the road that traverses the Busaco chain from St. Antonio de Cantara, was completely frustrated. To be prepared to meet another attack, should the enemy feel inclined to try his fortune, Hill advanced his division and closed up the line between Leith's and Picton's left and right. At that moment, lord Wellington coming up, said, in a tone full of calmness, and confident assurance of success, "If they attempt this point again, Hill, you will give them a volley,

and charge bayonets; but don't let your people charge them down the hill."

Ney's attack was equally unsuccessful. The three corps commanded by him, formed in columns of mass, advanced to the attack at the same moment as Regnier's corps did. Loisson's corps rushed straight up the face of the mountain, and Marchant's inclined leftwards, as if intending to turn the right flank of the left of the allied position; while the third, under Junôt, remained as a reserve in the chasm.

Loisson's attack was led by the brigade of general Simon, who, thinking that Pack's brigade, supported by the German infantry posted on the elevated spot near the convent, was the only force to be opposed (the 43rd and 52nd, who were drawn up in line in a dip of the mountain, being concealed from view by the swell of the ground and rock in their front,) advanced up the steep with undaunted courage, never moving or flinching, or in the slightest degree slackening of pace, though a storm of bullets from the artillery swept through the column from the first to the last section. At the same moment Craufurd, who had been anxiously watching the movement, ordered the 43rd and 52nd, as soon as he observed that the enemy had crowned the heights, sending the air with the cry of "Vive l'empereur," to charge, and "the next moment a horrid shout startled the French column, and in another moment eighteen hundred bayonets, wielded 'by a fiery mass of living valour,' went, at the charge step, sparkling over the brow of the hill, and overthrew the hostile column." Instantly halting, three terrible volleys poured in at only a few yards' distance, drove the head of the hostile column on its rear, and its flanks being overlapped at the same moment, the shattered and wavering mass fled in confusion down the steep, pursued by a few of the light infantry companies, and were saved from total annihilation by Ney's moving forward his reserve to their support, and opening his guns from the opposite ridge. The expression of a French soldier who was engaged in this affair, and subsequently taken prisoner,— "Qu'il se laissa rouler de haut en bas de la montagne sans savoir, comment il echappa"—(That he found himself rolled from the top to the bottom of the mountain without knowing how he escaped), is a proof of the confusion of the derouted foe and the impetuous valour of their opponents. The hands of many of the victors were perfectly



ensanguined in the performance of this rather unwarlike mode of disposing of enemies.

At the very moment that Simon's brigade had been thus disposed of, Marchant's corps had obtained possession of a pine-wood, half up the mountain; where they were kept in check by Pack's brigade, and exposed to the destructive flanking fire from Craufurd's artillery, planted on the salient point of land occupied by the light division. Discouraged by the insurmountable opposition he met with, Ney at length sullenly withdrew from the contest, and by two o'clock, the battle-roar had ceased.

A tacit kind of temporary truce seemed now to have been agreed on between the combatants, and during its existence, the men of each army mixed together in amicable search for their wounded. But towards evening, this harmony was disturbed by a company of the enemy's infantry taking possession of a village, close under the brow of the Busaco ridge, and within range of half-musket shot from the light division. Craufurd sent an officer to the French commandant, requiring its evacuation, and at the same time reminded him, "that it should be his wish, as it was his duty, to follow his fleeing countrymen, while circumstances yet permitted, and that in giving him that advice, humanity alone was the source of his interference." To the irritated Frenchman's gasconade, that "he would die in defence of his post," Craufurd replied by a storm of bullets from twelve pieces of artillery, and when the place was reduced to ruins, and half of its contumacious defenders slain, he sent down a party of the 43rd, and rifles, to drive the survivors from their post of fancied honour.\*

Now that the battle's roar had ceased, the horrible traces of the fight were visible along the whole face of the ridge. Long

trails of the dying and the dead—of wounded men, broken arms, and bleeding carcasses marked the lines of flight of each division. The clusters of rocks presented often a curious, as well as a melancholy sight. In many of the niches were to be seen dead Frenchmen, in the posture in which they had fought, some sitting upright, others with their heads resting on the points of the rocks, apparently in the act of taking a deliberate aim; while on the other side of the bases of the rocks, and on the projecting crags, were strewed the bodies of their gallant defenders. Of the allies, 197 were killed, 1,014 wounded, and 68 missing; among whom were 74 officers. Of the enemy 2,000 were slain, about 3,000 wounded, and near 300 were taken prisoners; among whom was one general slain, three wounded, and one taken prisoner. Massena had asked permission to bury his dead, but compliance with his request was refused.

When Massena made his reconnoissance of the position of the allied army, observing that the ridge was too extensive to be effectually defended by the forces under the command of lord Wellington, he exclaimed, with anticipated triumph, to the marquis d'Alorna, general Pamplona, and the other renegade Portuguese hidalgos in his camp,—“I cannot persuade myself that lord Wellington will risk the loss of his reputation; but if he does—I have him; to-morrow we shall complete the conquest of Portugal, and in a few days more I shall drown the leopard.” On his part, the English general was equally confident. When some of his officers expressed their disappointment if Massena should not attack him, his reply was, “If he do I shall beat him.” The result proved who was the boaster, or to make use of a homely phrase, “who calculated without his host.”

is not, to adopt an artistical metaphor, a mere glimmering of the outline, but the filling up of the picture that constitutes its perfection, and imparts to it real interest and usefulness. As a general picture must be compounded of detached sketches, so must the description of a battle be composed of the observations of individuals, taken at different points. The proper compounding of the particular views into an harmonious whole constitutes the character of the battle historian.

\* All the accounts extant in print, even those entitled to credit, of the battle of Busaco, are very meagre in description and barren of facts. The above detail of that glorious event has been drawn up from the oral description of officers who were in different parts of the field of battle; and it is hoped, that it is not only more circumstantial, but also more interesting and exact than those already before the public. To present a correct description of a battle-field is no easy part of descriptive composition. It



## THE RETREAT TO THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS.

MASSENA had felt the effects of "the fiery mass of living valour," posted on the ridges of Busaco, too sensibly and severely to incline him to repeat his empty vaunt of "driving the leopard into the sea:" he therefore prepared, by a flank movement, to avoid his adversary, and reach Coimbra; and as it would be more difficult to turn the position of the allied army by the Mondego, as his opponent could pass the river quicker than he could, he determined to turn the left of the allied position; and this he was enabled to accomplish, by the information extorted from two peasants, under the fear of death and torture, of the pass through the Serra de Caramula, a ridge running at an obtuse angle with that of Busaco, and communicating with the great road between Oporto and Coimbra, and debouching into it near Sardo; and which unfortunately was undefended. Bacellar, who commanded in the north, having sent Trant round by Oporto to occupy it, in consequence of the direct route by San Pedro de Sul being in the possession of a detachment of the enemy.

To cover his design, the French marshal renewed the skirmishing on the morning of the 28th, and drove Craufurd from the village, of which he had dispossessed the gasconading French captain on the preceding evening. In the course of the night, the French army quitted its position, and on the following day the enemy's columns were seen filing off over the Caramula mountains, along the Mortagoa road. Though the enemy's flank-march presented the English general the opportunity of assailing him, as he was distant but four hours' march from either end of the defile, which runs from Mortagoa to Sardas, through which the French army

\* Coimbra is celebrated in the love legends of Portugal, for the sites of the Quinta das Lagrimas, or Garden of Tears, and the Fonte dos Amores, or Fountain of Loves—romantic sequestered spots, not far from the convent of St. Clara, and immortalised by the muse of Camoens as the residence and death scene of Inez de Castro, and the triumphs of love stronger than death.

† The stores of the principal houses and all the convents were full of corn, wine, oil, fruits, and preserved meats; and the crops of grain, pulse, and grapes on the ground were fit for gathering. And these would have been sufficient for two months' consumption of the French army, had they been collected and secured by the commissariat in magazine.

was passing, he resisted the temptation, lest any of the chances of war should mar or interrupt the plan and combinations of the grand defensive campaign he had conceived for the protection of Portugal. On the abandonment, therefore, by the enemy of his position, Hill immediately recrossed the Mondego, and marched by Espinal on Thomar; while the main body, consisting of the centre and left of the army, under lord Wellington, defiled upon Milheada, the light division covering the movement until the army reached the open country beyond Fornos, when that duty was assumed by the cavalry.

The allied army having the shorter road to advance to Coimbra, reached Mondego on the 1st of October, and crossing the fords near Martinho de Bispo, entered that city in perfect order; but the enemy pressing rapidly upon them, an instant retreat became necessary, and now a fearful scene of confusion ensued, in consequence of a large portion of the inhabitants having delayed to remove themselves and their property "till the vicinity of the foe alarmed them into flight that looks not behind." The fleeing inhabitants crowding the bridge, and the narrow road leading from it between high rocks, with all they could carry off; in a few minutes the defiles of Condeixa were so choked up by the throng of fugitives, that the light division was obliged to clear a road for itself, and the passage of the artillery. The emergency of the occasion allowed but little to be done to alleviate the sufferings, or to assist the flight of those whose folly had induced them to neglect the opportunity of complying with the wise and provident injunctions of the English commander-in-chief.

Massena, on his entrance into Coimbra,\* found large resources† for his troops, who The wine stores that lay in the line of retreat were destroyed as far as possible by the allied army. In the districts of Villa Franca, Azambuja and Cartaxo, upwards of 40,000 almudes were destroyed. The fatigue parties in some instances waded breast high in the sunken adegas (wine stores) in destroying the wine, either drawing out the taps or beating in the heads of the tuns for the purpose. By frequent immersion in the crust of the red wine their bodies and limbs had assumed a fine rich mahogany tint. In some places the wine was allowed to flow in torrents down the streets; and the same was the case with the English rum at Condeixa, to prevent it falling into the hands of the enemy.





TORRES VEDRAS

THIS  
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just at that critical moment had exhausted the fourteen days' provisions they had carried with them from Busaco. These resources, from the information of traitorous Portuguese, he expected, and really found. This fortunate occurrence for the enemy was occasioned partly by the faction of the Patriarch and Souza having prohibited the inhabitants of the country behind the Mondego from abandoning their dwellings and removing their property, and partly from the feeling inherent in human nature, which induces men to cling to their homes, and not to destroy the work of their own hands. Having established his hospital at Santa Clara, and leaving behind him five thousand sick and wounded of his army, on the fourth day after his entrance into that city, the French marshal resumed his march through the defiles leading into Condeixa and Pombal.

Scarcely had Massena left Coimbra, when his neglect of having omitted to form a base of operations in his rear, presented colonel Trant the opportunity of performing one of the most brilliant partisan exploits that occurred during the Peninsular war. That active and enterprising officer determined to capture the French hospital and stores at Coimbra by surprise. To accomplish this purpose, he suddenly galloped his cavalry into the town, and, the infantry rapidly following, captured the whole of the hospitals and a company of the marines of the imperial guard, and immediately marched them off for Oporto, under a strong escort, to protect them from the Portuguese peasantry, whose rancorous hatred of the enemy was now excited to the highest pitch by his recent atrocities and licentiousness.

While the allied army was advancing on Leiria, the French army appeared in sight. Massena immediately formed his force into three columns, and endeavoured to overwhelm the British with his centre, while he

turned their flanks with the others, but he was quickly repulsed by a portion of the artillery and cavalry of the allies, though the enemy engaged was nearly four times as many as that of their adversary.

From Leiria the allied army retreated in three columns. Hill's division, forming the right, marched by Thomar and Santarem, the left by Alcobaca and Obidos, and the centre took its route by Batalla and Rio Mayor. The enemy followed in a single column by the last-mentioned town.

The allies were now—after having performed a retreat of above two hundred miles, during which no alarm, no confusion, no precipitance, had occurred on the march, and without the loss of a single gun,\* ammunition waggon, or baggage animal, and a greater number of prisoners having been taken in the skirmishing affairs at Coimbra, Pombal, Alcoentre, and Quinta los Torres, from the pursuers, than had been lost by the pursued, "an occurrence in the history of retreats without a parallel"—preparing to enter the LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS† a formidable barrier, consisting of a line of field fortification extending over a mountain-chain for above fifty miles, and which, as has already been said, exhibited the gigantic application of the principles of field fortification to a defensive position presented by nature, that no age of the world has as yet witnessed. They were constructed by lieutenant-colonel Fletcher and captains Jones and Chapman, under the direction of lord Wellington, and above 7,000 Portuguese labourers, besides English engineers, were daily employed in their construction. Neither the English army nor ministry was aware of their existence until they were ready for occupation, and Massena was in equal ignorance until he was distant not five marches from their site. Lord Wellington had determined to undertake their construction

\* The six guns taken at Alcoentre had been recovered. The circumstances attending that affair were:—Just as the cavalry, under sir Stapleton Cotton, had reached Alcoentre, and were bivouacked on the plain during a tremendous thunder-storm, the third regiment of the enemy's hussars driving the English pickets into the town, obtained possession of six guns; but their triumph was but short-lived; for being charged by the 10th English hussars, the guns were recaptured, and the enemy put to flight.

† The lines of Torres Vedras derive their name from the little town of Torres Vedras (the Torres Veteres, or the Old Towers of the Romans), are situated on the Oporto road from Lisbon, about twenty-five miles N.N.W., distant from the capital, and

eight from the sea coast. They form the gorge or neck of the peninsula at the extremity of which the city of Lisbon stands. The importance of this position having been observed by sir Charles Stuart in an early period of the French revolutionary war, he caused plans to be drawn of the ground. The duke of Wellington, in his campaign against Junót, had observed them, and was convinced that they presented the vantage ground for the defence of Portugal, should the French attempt its reconquest. "Portugal," he said in the house of commons, "could be defended, but not on the frontier; the defence must be on the strong ground about Lisbon." And that consideration, he added, was in his mind at the time that the convention of Cintra was signed.



from the time of the battle of Talavera. The value of Spanish co-operation having then been fully demonstrated by the utter inefficiency of their armies, from want of organization and discipline, and the unskilfulness and imbecility of their officers. The

discontented and "the croakers" in the English army had now an opportunity of witnessing the sagacity and foresight of their chief, and the possibility, if not moral certainty, of his being able to reduce his wise and comprehensive plans to a successful issue.

#### THE OCCUPATION OF THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS.

ON the 8th of October, the allied army entered "the lines" by divisions, conducted to the positions they were intended to occupy by officers appointed for the purpose. But the light division had not yet arrived. Craufurd having delayed his march from Alemquer till the middle of the day of the 10th, and being nearly surprised by the enemy, injudiciously ordered the division to break, and re-form on the other side of the archway of the town-gate, out of gun range, — a movement which occasioned so much disorder, that in the dark, the division mistook its route, and was obliged to make a flank march of several miles along the foot of "the lines," to gain their position of Aruda, an occurrence which occasioned the weakest part of the lines to be left open for several miles to the enemy's irruption in the meantime.

The formidable position in which the allied army was now stationed to resist the power of the enemy, was a peninsula, an area containing about twelve hundred square miles, traversed by two lofty mountainous chains, stretching from the Tagus, in a semi-circular direction to the ocean, varying in altitude and abruptness, and running in a parallel direction, at a distance from six to nine miles, and from Lisbon at the respective distances of twenty and thirty miles from the nearest points of their respective arches. Through the passes in these mountains, the five great roads (namely, two at Torres Vedras, two at Sobral, and one at Alhandra; but two of these roads uniting at Cubeça, the number that pierced the second line was but four, and these passed Quintilla, Bucellas, Montechique, and Mafra, that communicate between Lisbon and the interior of the country. The mountainous nature of the country renders lateral communication between these roads extremely difficult.

Upon these heights were "the lines" constructed, which consisted of three ranges of defence, one within the other, for the

purpose of cutting off the advance of a hostile force on the capital. All the advantages of site, rock, water, rugged steep, and precipice, which the position presented, were increased by art and science, so as to render them unassailable. Triple chains of redoubts and field-works were constructed, to block up or cover every road or pass leading to Lisbon; rivers were obstructed in their course, so as to flood the valleys, and render the country swampy and impassable; mountains were scooped perpendicularly, to the height of fifteen or twenty feet; abattis of the most formidable description, either closing the entrance to ravines, impeding the approach to the works, or blocking up roads, conduced to increase the natural difficulties of the position, and render it unassailable. Across the great valley of Aruda, the weakest point of the position, a double line of abattis was drawn, composed of full-grown oaks and chesnut trees, which had been dug up with all their roots and branches on them, and reset in a cross position; and across the ravine on the left of Aruda, a loose stone wall, six feet thick, and sixteen high, was erected. From the chains of redoubts and other batteries (in number 150,) 600 pieces of artillery swept all approaches, and with a concentric fire, commanded or enfiladed every practicable point. The right of the lines was flanked by the Tagus and a division of gun boats stationed on its waters, at Villa Vella; its left by the Atlantic. The bridges were mined and prepared for explosion; and telegraphs were erected on the Socorro rock, and at Alhandra, Monte Agraça, Torres Vedras, &c., so as to preserve an instant communication between the centre of the position and every part of the lines. A paved road was parallel to the foot of the hills through Torres Vedras, Runa, Sobral, and Aruda, to Alhandra, for the purpose of expediting the necessary movements of the troops.

The first line of defence, or advanced



position, which consisted of thirty redoubts placed on a ridge of heights, on which were mounted 140 guns, following the inflection of the hills, extended twenty-nine miles; and its right rested on Alhandra, on the Tagus, and its left on the mouth of the Zizandre, on the sea-coast. When first constructed, this line was not intended for permanent occupation, but merely as an advanced post to protect the army, while taking up its position in the second line. But Massena's inactivity on the frontier had afforded so much opportunity of increasing its strength, that it afforded time for converting it into a sufficient outwork, upon which the first fury of the enemy might burst and expend itself. The right of the second line, which was twenty-four miles in length, and about eight miles in rear of the front line, rested on Quintilla, on the Tagus, and its left on Ericeira, at the mouth of San Lorenzo. It was in this position that the grand stand was to be made. The third line extended from Passo D'Arcos on the Tagus, to the tower of Junquera on the coast. An intrenched camp was also formed near Fort St. Julien, and occupied by a corps of English marines, so as to cover the movements of an embarkation, should such an operation be necessary, and be delayed by bad weather; and that fort was so armed and strengthened, as to enable a rear-guard to resist an army. Such was the position which British genius had devised, and on which British valour and patriotism were to foil and render nugatory all the devices and power of "the common enemy of mankind," to subjugate the whole of the human race, and make them the sport and gratification of his restless and insatiable ambition: here were to be stationed those slandered, but really dreaded soldiers, who, in the foolish, insolent, and vapouring language of his minion, Lacépède, the president of his obsequious senate, "were to furnish feeble glories to our (i.e., the French) arms, and disgrace to themselves." The sequel proved the prophetic spirit of the inflated and vapouring Frenchman.

In the occupation and defence of this vast fortress and spacious camp (for to both purposes it was converted,) nearly 100,000 men, 55,000 of whom were regular troops, about half being Portuguese,\* and 5,000

Spaniards, under the marquis Romana, were concentrated. The irregular troops consisted of the militia, the ordenanzas, and the civic guard. The last mentioned species of force, with the native artillery, and the least disciplined of the native regular troops, garrisoned the forts and redoubts, and occupied the intrenchments on the second line. The British troops, with the *elite* of the Portuguese regular force, were held ready to meet the attack, or assail the enemy, should a favourable opportunity present itself; and they were so judiciously posted, and the communications so ready of access between the respective positions, that the enemy could not assemble a force sufficient to bear on one part of "the lines," with any probability of success, before the English chief could make a correspondent movement of concentration to meet the attack.

The British force was posted where the peculiar talent of the leaders would be most likely to correspond with the peculiarity of the respective positions.

Hill, on whose calm courage the firmest reliance might be placed, was posted, with the second division, on the extreme right of the advanced line, which was the most remote from head-quarters, and the most exposed to the enemy; the ground entrusted to his defence extending from Alhandra to the head of the valley of Calandria. Craufurd, with the light division, continued the line on Hill's left, and, on account of the fiery courage of the leader, and the ardent spirit of his troops, the weakest part of the line, namely, from the head of the vale of Calandria to the Pé de Monte, was entrusted to their defence. Spencer, with the first division, garrisoned the heights over Zebreira. Picton, with the third division, occupied Torres Vedras, and watched the line of the Zizandre. Cole's division (the fourth), continued the line along the mountain's brow; and Campbell formed the extreme left. Pack's Portuguese brigade was posted on Monte Agraça, above Sobral; and the fifth division, under Leith, was posted in reserve on the reverse slope; Romana's force took post at Enaxara dos Cavalleros. The cavalry were cantoned along the second line, and among the villages to the left. The English marines occupied the third line. The head-quarters of

\* On account of the neglect of the Regency to provision and pay their countrymen, above 10,000 of the Portuguese regular troops had deserted within

the last nine months; two-thirds of the militia had abandoned their colours; and the ordenanza disbanded themselves by whole companies.



lord Wellington were at Pero Negro, under the Socorro Rock.

The cavalry and advanced-guard of the French army came in sight of "the lines" on the afternoon of the 10th, and dislodged general Spencer from Sobral, who fell back on the great redoubt of the same name, about a mile in the rear. Massena, who had no knowledge of the existence of so formidable a defence until within four or five marches of its site, occupied several days in examining the nature of the position. The valleys of Callandria and Aruda at first seemed to him to offer an assailable point, and he made several attempts, by throwing out his skirmishers, to discover their mode of defence, and the number of the defenders. On the 14th, while engaged in the reconnoissance, a strong detachment of infantry, supported by artillery, attacked a party of the 71st in a breast-work thrown up near Sobral, but they were quickly driven back at the point of the bayonet, on a field-work of their own. The loss of the English, who at sunset took a more retired line of works, was about 150 men; that of the enemy nearly double that number.

The French general, after a careful reconnoissance, being convinced that the position was unassailable, that it could neither be turned nor carried,\* determined to blockade the allied army in their stronghold, hoping that the many thousands of inhabitants of the neighbouring country for miles around, that had poured into the capital, would occasion embarrassment to the English commander-in-chief. He therefore disposed his troops between Villa Franca and Sobral, so as to menace all the weak points in his front, the second corps holding the heights opposite Alhandra, and its right extending to Aruda. The peculiarity of the position (namely, the pass of Runa, being commanded by the heavy redoubts on Monte Agraça), compelled him to dispose his forces on one side or other of the Baraqueda—the spur of the Monte Junta which was nearly opposite the centre of the first line, and which divided the country between the Tagus and the sea into nearly two equal parts—and which, therefore, afforded the facility to the besieged to fall on the front and rear of

any force the enemy might detach to the other side.

Massena's situation was very critical. The country had to a considerable extent been laid waste and devastated on his line of march, and the militia of the north, the ordenanzas, and the partisan corps under Trant, Fenwick, Wilson, Carlos d'España, &c., were hanging on his rear from Abrantes to Peniche. He was not, however, to be scared or discouraged by difficulties. He therefore caused a wide extent of country to be ravaged by his foragers. From this source, and the culpable negligence of the regency in enforcing the orders for the devastating of the country, he found abundance of stores and provisions in the country lying between the Mondego, the Tagus, and the lines. Corn and cattle abounded on both banks of the Tagus, and on the numerous islands and alluvial lands in that river in the neighbourhood of Santarem. With these resources he formed depôts and magazines at Santarem, Barquina, and other places. And, for the purpose of cutting off all communication between Lisbon and the neighbouring districts, and operating on the flank of the lines, he seized forty boats which had been collected near Santarem, and left to his mercy by the criminal supineness of the government and the local authorities.

Nor were these untoward circumstances, and the criminal negligence of the regency, the whole of the difficulties with which the English general had to contend. So inveterate and systematic were the intrigues and machinations of the faction of the Patriarch and Souza, that besides taking every opportunity to endeavour to thwart and mar the plans of their able and magnanimous ally for the salvation of their country, they exerted all the influence they possessed over an ignorant and bigoted community, to bring him and his measures into disrepute. In the bitterness of his resentment for their perverse and culpable conduct, he exclaimed, "It is heartbreaking to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly." Even in his defensive attitude, "the follies and intrigues of the Portuguese government," says the author of the War in the Peninsula, "were a more dire enemy to

\* No one who was acquainted with the nature of "the lines" can agree with the marquis of Londonderry, that had the French general assailed them before the English generals of division "had learned their grammars of defence," he would have forced them, and been enabled to march to Lisbon. The

marquis's precise words are, "That he shall ever be of opinion, that by a well-constructed assault, Massena might have effected his purpose of penetrating the lines and marching on Lisbon." The marquis seems not to have had his grammar by heart.



the English general than the whole French army was."

And he was not only annoyed and harassed by the perverse and vexatious proceedings of his allies, but the ignorant and disaffected part of the London press exerted all its influence to render him unpopular in England. They daily predicted that, "with famine in its rear, and an overwhelming enemy in its front, the army must take to its shipping"—"that it was Wellington, and not Massena, who was in danger of famine"—"that the French general could remain in his position as long as he pleased, and would drive into the lines the population of the surrounding country, and thus compel the English general to take to his shipping, or surrender." The scribe of the *Morning Chronicle*, in the superabundance of his military knowledge, and the excess of his genuine patriotism, in his critical strictures on lord Wellington's selection of his position, condemned "his erroneous judgment" in its selection; which the aforesaid critical and patriotic worthy pronounced to be "a violation of the most essential principles of military positions!" The ministry even participated in the alarm, and intimated a wish that the army should return.

Beset on every side with difficulties, thwarted by perverse allies, and discouraged by lukewarm friends, the English general "rose as a giant," and, disregarding the follies of the one, and the fears of the other, adopted the heroic resolution of persevering in those measures which had hitherto baffled the designs of the enemy. In reply to the English minister's expression of his fears as to the result of "the fearful struggle" in which the British army was engaged, he addressed the celebrated dispatch, dated the 3rd of November, from Pero Negro, in which he took an historical review of the circumstances, military and political, which had induced him to undertake the defence of Portugal, and which, for its spirit of sagacity, and the subsequent extraordinary fulfilment of all his predictions respecting the result of the campaign, would, "were all other records of his genius lost, alone suffice to vindicate his great reputation, [his foresight and sagacity] to posterity." This dispatch was as follows:—

"TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL.

"Pero Negro, 3rd Nov. 1810.

"My lord,—I wish it was in my power to give your lordship an opinion of the pro-

bable course of the enemy's operations, founded on the existing state of affairs here, considered in a military point of view; but from what I am about to state to your lordship, you will observe it is impossible to form such an opinion.

"The expedition into Portugal was, in my opinion, founded originally on political and financial, rather than military considerations. It is true, that with a view to the conquest of Spain, there were advantages purely military to be derived from the removal of the British army from Portugal; but I think I could show that it was not essentially necessary to effect that object, particularly after the door into Castile had been closed on us, by the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.

"The political object, therefore, in removing us from Portugal, which was the effect that our evacuation of the Peninsula would have had on the inhabitants of Spain in general, and on those of Cadiz in particular, and the financial object, which was the possession and plunder of Lisbon and Oporto, were the principal motives for the perseverance of the expedition into Portugal. I believe the latter to have been more pressing even than the former.

"It is impossible to describe to your lordship the pecuniary and other distresses of the French armies in the Peninsula. All the troops are months in arrears of pay; they are in general very badly clothed, their armies want horses, carriages, and equipments of every description; their troops subsist wholly on plunder, whether acquired individually or more regularly by the way of requisition and contribution; they receive no money, or scarcely any from France; and they realize but little from their pecuniary contributions in Spain. Indeed, I have lately discovered that the expense of the pay and the hospitals alone of the French army in the Peninsula, amounts to more than the sum stated in the financial *exposé* as the whole expense of the entire French army.

"This state of things has very much weakened, and in some instances destroyed, the discipline of the army; and all the intercepted letters advert to acts of malversation and corruption, and misapplication of stores, &c., by all the persons attached to the army.

"I have no doubt, therefore, that the desire to relieve this state of distress, and to remove the consequent evils occasioned by



it, by the plunder of Lisbon and Oporto, was the first motive for the expedition into Portugal.

"The expedition not having been founded on any military necessity, has been carried on and persevered in against every military principle. We know that Massena could expect no immediate reinforcements; and without adverting to the various errors, which I believe he would acknowledge he had committed in the course of this service, he has persevered in it, after he found that he was unable to face the troops opposed to him, when posted in a strong position, and when he knew that they had one still stronger in their rear, to which they were about to retire; and that they were likely to be reinforced, while his army would be still further weakened by sickness, and by the privations to which he knew they must be liable on their march. He knew that the whole country was against him; that a considerable corps was formed upon the Douro, which would immediately operate in his rear; that at the time of the battle of Busaco he had no longer any communication with Spain; and that every step he took further in advance, was a step towards additional difficulty and inconvenience, from which the retreat would be almost impossible.

"If the expedition into Portugal had been founded on military principle only, it would have ended at Busaco; and I do not hesitate to acknowledge, that I expected that Massena would retire from it, or at all events would not advance beyond the Mondego. But he has continued to advance, contrary to every military principle, and I therefore conclude that the pressure of financial distresses, which was the original motive for the expedition, was that for persevering in it, and may operate on the measures of the present moment.

"In this view of the case, it is probable that Massena may endeavour to maintain his position, as long as he can keep alive any sufficient proportion of his troops, being certain that the same difficulties that induced the emperor to undertake the expedition without any military necessity, would induce him to make every effort to reinforce him at the earliest possible period of time, and therefore that he will remain some time longer where he is.

"Your lordship is already acquainted with the means of reinforcing him. There is no doubt, by raising the siege of Cadiz, and abandoning other attainable objects,

Massena may be reinforced to a very considerable extent.

"Under these circumstances, I have frequently turned over in my mind the expediency of attacking the French army now in my front, before it should be joined by its reinforcements; and, on the whole, I am inclined to be of opinion that I ought not to do so.

"I inclose your lordship an account of the number of battalions, squadrons, &c., which entered Portugal with Massena, and I cannot believe that they composed an army of less than 70,000 men at the battle of Busaco. I calculate their loss, including sick, since that time, at 15,000 men, which would leave them with 55,000 men, of which 6,000 or 7,000 are cavalry, at the present moment.

"The effective strength of the British army, according to the last returns, was 29,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and one regiment at Lisbon, and one at Torres Vedras, which, in the view of the contest, ought not to be taken into the account; and I inclose a statement of the Portuguese force, according to the last returns.

"Besides this force, the marquis de la Romana's corps consists of about 5,000 men, making a total of 58,615, of which I could command the services, in case I should act offensively against the enemy, of which about ——\* would be cavalry.

"Besides these troops, there are different bodies of militia, infantry, and artillery, in our positions; but I should deceive myself if I could expect, and your lordship, if I should state, that any advantage would be derived from their assistance in offensive operations against the enemy.

"Although the enemy's position is not so strong as that we occupy, there is no doubt but that it has its advantages; one of which is, that in attacking it, we could hardly use our artillery. I would also observe, that in every operation of this description, by the British army in Portugal, no attempt can be made to manœuvre on the enemy's flank or rear; first, because the enemy show, that they are indifferent about their flanks, or their rear, or their communications; and secondly, because the inevitable consequence of attempting such a manœuvre, would be to open some one or other road to Lisbon, and to our shipping, of which the enemy would take immediate advantage to attain his object.

\* Blank in the original.



"We must carry their positions, therefore, by mere force, and consequently, with loss; and, in the course of the operations, I must draw the army out of their cantonments. I must expose the troops and horses to the inclemencies of the weather at this season of the year, and must look to all the consequences of that measure, in increased sickness of the men, and in loss of efficiency and condition of the horses.

"I observe that, notwithstanding the length of time that has elapsed since the greatest and most efficient part of the French army has been employed against us; there is as yet no other military body in the Peninsula, which is capable of taking, much less of keeping, the field; and the relief of Cadiz, which appears to me to be the probable consequence of the state of affairs here, would not give us the assistance of an army from that quarter, either in the way of co-operation or diversion; nor would the removal of Sebastiani from Granada, which would be the consequence of the relief of Cadiz, enable Blake to make any progress beyond the Sierra Morena towards Madrid. We should still stand alone in the Peninsula as an army; and if I should succeed in forcing Massena's positions, it would become a question whether I should be able to maintain my own, in case the enemy should march another army into this country. But when I observe how small the superiority of numbers is in my favour, and know that the position will be in favour of the enemy, I cannot but be of opinion, that I act in conformity with the instructions and intentions of his majesty's government, in waiting for the result of what is going on, and in incurring no extraordinary risk.

"Every day's delay, at this season of the year, narrows our line of defence, and consequently strengthens it; and when the winter shall have set in, no number, however formidable, can venture to attack it; and the increase of the enemy's numbers at that period will only add to their distress,

\* The English general had drawn his information of the condition of the enemy from the French private and official letters, and the Parisian journals which had been intercepted.

† This was not the only instance in the course of the war, in which the English army contributed a portion of its pittance of pay, and even a share of its rations to alleviate the distress which the people of Spain and Portugal suffered from the rapine and violence of the French soldiery. At Fuentes d'Onor, the English army raised £8,000 to relieve the inhabitants from the miseries they were suffering in

and increase the difficulties of their retreat.\*

"I have thought it proper to make your lordship acquainted with the cause of my reflections on this subject, and my present determination, which I hope will be consistent with the wishes of his majesty's government. Circumstances may change: the enemy's distresses for provisions, and the operations of our detachments in his rear, may induce him to detach to such a degree, as to render a general attack on him a measure of positive advantage, in which case I shall alter my determination. But adverting to the necessity of placing the troops in the field in this season if I should make any attack, the advantage must be very obvious before I adopt a measure which must be attended by the consequences of losing the services of my men by sickness.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"WELLINGTON."

Nor was he indifferent to the sufferings of that portion of the Portuguese population which, to escape the deadly visitations of the enemy, had taken refuge within the lines. As far as circumstances would possibly permit to mitigate the evils of war, he availed himself of all feasible measures. He caused Peniche, Setuval, and Palmela, to be fortified as places of refuge for those who wished to emigrate, should the enemy's invasion be successful. To support the starving population of Lisbon, he collected corn and other provisions from Spain and the coast of Barbary; and, in a letter addressed to the earl of Liverpool, he recommended the unfortunate portion of the Portuguese population to the consideration of the benevolent disposition of the British public. "I propose," said he, "to have a subscription for the purpose in the British army, and I have no doubt but that every soldier in the army will contribute."†

While the French, notwithstanding all their rapine, and ingenious devices to obtain subsistence, were suffering from want and privation, consequence of the injuries sustained during the contest between the French and English armies when in occupation of that place. The like humanity had been exhibited by the British soldiery in sir John Moore's retreat. The instances in that retreat were not unfrequent in which the famished soldiers shared with the wretched inhabitants their own scanty pittances doled out to them on the march; proving that liberal and generous feelings are as much the characteristics of the British soldier as indomitable courage and unshakable spirit.—*Vide* Lord Wellington's letter, at page 176—*post*.



vation, all was comfort and even gaiety within "the lines." Provisions of every kind were abundant. Field sports and amusements went on among the officers of every rank in the intervals of relaxation from military duties. The men, too, had their pastimes and recreations. Never were the toils of war more harmoniously blended with the pleasures and amusements of peaceable life. Little fêtes and galas occurred from time to time. At Mafra, on the 7th of September, the commander-in-chief gave a grand dinner and ball for the purpose of formally investing Marshal Beresford with the order of the Bath. On the same occasion were distributed medals to those who had distinguished themselves at the battle of Bussaco; as also the ten ensign-commissions which the government had sent out for deserving non-commissioned officers, in consequence of lord Wellington's letter of remonstrance on the subject. In his instructions for the preparation of the festivities on that occasion, and providing fit accommodation for his female guests, lady Emily Berkeley and her daughters, the commander-in-chief gave expression to his usual good-natured tone of humour. Sliding in a half apology for the indifferent appearance which the wear and tear of warfare had occasioned in the wardrobes of his officers, he observed, "we shall all appear in our best attire, but I fear that with many of us bad will be the best." Seldom has an army occupying ground in the face of its enemy, enjoyed so many hours of relaxation, or continued to unite so completely the pleasures of country life, with the serious business of war. And this feeling of security not only prevailed in "the lines," but also in the city of Lisbon. The public theatres were never more crowded, or the assemblies more gay and brilliant. This fearless and inconsistent gaiety among a people, under whose walls a licentious army of above seventy thousand men lay burning with revenge and panting for plunder, can only be accounted for by the fact, that custom and necessity reconcile to the prospect of the most dreadful visitations. Hence it is that the inhabitants of Portici sleep tranquilly under the burning Vesuvius, and that mariners sing jovially while rocked upon the restless waves, in which the starting of a single plank might engulf them for ever.

The crisis was now approaching in which the English general was to reap the reward of his skill and perseverance; and it is

worthy of recollection, that in the whole of his correspondence and intercourse while in this trying situation, as also on all occasions throughout the Peninsular War, he never, in a single instance, gave expression to a distrust of success or a possibility of failure. As he made all the provisions that human wisdom and foresight could devise, from the spirit of sagacity in which his plans were conceived, he felt confident of success. Convinced of the fallacy and futility of the doctrine of chances or destiny in guiding and influencing human affairs, he relied little on the mere accidents of fortune for his results: he more wisely trusted to his own exertions and prudence.

For some time the movements of the enemy indicated they were on the eve of change of their position. Towards the end of October, the hospitals, stores, and other incumbrances of the army had been removed to Santarem, and a number of boats, in addition to those that had fallen into their hands by the wilful negligence of the regency, were in process of construction. Ney, with his corps, and Montbrun, with the cavalry, had fallen back on Thomar and Leyria, and had put their troops into cantonments in the neighbourhood of those towns.

At length, though the twilight showed the French sentries as usual in front at Aruda, daylight proved that the slopes of Monte Jura, Torres Vedras, and Alhandra were evacuated, and that the sentries were motionless men of straw, each in full military costume, with a pole by his side as the representative of a musket. Under cover of the darkness of the night of the 14th, and during a thick mist that enveloped the slopes of the mountains, the French army had broke up their position from Sobral, and commenced their retreat from the right of the line, and were now seen retiring through the defiles of Alemquer, by the great road on the Tagus, and marching under cover of a strong rear-guard on Torres Novas, a strong detachment only having been left to protect the road which leads to Santarem by Rio Mayor and Alcantara, for which town the second corps had made a simultaneous retrogressive movement, as the main body of the army had done for Torres Novas.

Immediately that lord Wellington ascertained that the enemy had retreated, he issued orders to the respective generals of division for counteracting the movements of



the enemy. Hill, with the second division, was directed to pursue by the road of Villa Franca; Craufurd was instructed to feel his way with the light division, to Santarem; and sir Brent Spencer, with the first division, advanced towards Alemquer. The boats of the fleet, under admiral sir Thomas Williams, were sent up the Tagus as far as Alhandra, to wait orders to transport the troops across the river, to oppose the enemy should he threaten an irruption into the Alemtejo. General Fane,—who, in the beginning of November, had been detached with a brigade of Portuguese cavalry and several guns, to the left bank of the Tagus, to endeavour to destroy the incipient flotilla of the enemy, and, if possible, to prevent his crossing the river should he make the attempt—deceived by the false movements to which Massena had erroneously subjected the second and eighth corps d'armée,—having reported that the main body of the French army was in full retreat, and that Santarem was occupied only by a strong rear guard, the troops were already formed and in motion, when the military eye of Wellington discovered the fallacy of the report, and the powerful means of resistance the enemy had prepared.

As it was not possible to divine whether the retreat of the enemy was not a ruse or feint to draw the English from their intrenched position, and by a forced and rapid march on the right of the lines turn the Monte Junta, and push the head of his columns on Torres Vedras, the utmost caution was necessary on the part of the English general that he did not afford the enemy an opening to his position. The principal part of the army was therefore kept stationary until the design of the enemy—whether a feint or a retreat—was developed. This was fully indicated on his reaching Alcoentre, by the division of his force into two columns, one taking the line of Rio Mayor, and the other Santarem. The cavalry and the light division now formed the advanced guard of the pursuit; and in its execution took four hundred prisoners. At the village of El Vallé, Craufurd's impetuosity of character and love of battle would, on the 16th, have provoked an unequal engagement, similar to that of the Coa, had it not been for the opportune arrival of lord Wellington.

When a sufficient body of troops to support the advanced guard had arrived, a

demonstration was made on the 19th, on Santarem, the head of the enemy's position, to endeavour to make him disclose his strength, and discover how far the post itself was assailable—a measure lord Wellington was desirous of putting into immediate execution; but the columns of attack were recalled, and the troops were placed in cantonments at Cartaxo, Alcoentre, Azambuja, Alemquer, and the surrounding villages. Hill, with the second division, was stationed on the left bank of the Tagus, at Barcos and Chamusca, to defend the passage of the river and prevent the enemy from making an irruption into the Alemtejo, keeping up his communications with the ferry opposite Alhandra by means of floating bridges, that he might be enabled speedily to re-enter the lines should occasion require the movement. To prevent communication between Soult and Massena, Beresford, with two brigades of cavalry and two divisions of infantry, was stationed along the left bank of the Tagus, from Almeirim to the mouth of the Zezere, to defend the passage of that river, and in the event of Massena's retreat to be in early motion on the line of pursuit. All the routes leading to the lines between the Tagus and the Monte Junta were secured by the heads of cantonments, and the works additionally strengthened and garrisoned by two divisions; an amount of force necessary, as the French at Alcanhete were nearer to Torres Vedras than the English were at Cartaxo. As the heights of Almada commanded the anchorage and the city of Lisbon, they were strongly retrenched, and a chain of fortifications was constructed parallel to the Tagus, from Aldea Gallega to Traffaria, in case the enemy should transfer his operations to the south bank of the Tagus. And to prevent any sudden irruption from Santarem, a battery was erected on a hill which looked down the causeway; the bridge at its extremity was mined; and the light division, supported by a cavalry brigade, was posted on the heights that overlooked the marshes which surrounded Santarem. Thus, every precaution that human foresight could devise, was taken to prevent the enemy's finding an opening to the lines, and enable the English general to avail himself of every favourable opportunity that might present itself to operate on the enemy.

The ground which Massena had taken up presented a defensive position of great strength at any season of the year, but



it was now rendered extremely difficult of access, from the long-continued rains and the overflowing of the river.

The town of Santarem, which formed the head of his position, affords, by its natural peculiarities, one of the strongest defensive positions in Portugal. It stands on a mountain of considerable elevation, rising almost precipitously from the banks of the Tagus, and trending northwards about a league. In front of this height, stretches a lower range of acclivities, covered by the waters of the Rio Mayor, and furnishing the facility of excellent outposts. The ground in front, on the Lisbon road, is an open flat, inclosed by the two streams of the Rio Mayor, and traversed for the last half mile by a raised causeway, called the Ponte Seca, by which alone the town can be approached; for, on one side of the Ponte Seca, a flat, sedgy marsh, which, though not impassable, was, from several deep water-cuts, extremely difficult of access, especially for artillery and cavalry, and thus secured the left of the French position; while, on the other side, the overflow of the river occasioning a deep pond or lake, their right was protected. And in addition to its natural difficulties, the position was strengthened by an abattis, and a battery placed on a gentle eminence beyond it, swept the whole extent of the causeway. Thus, before Santarem could be gained, three formidable barriers of defence were to be carried.

By his judicious choice of position, the French marshal had secured to himself great military and political advantages. He was enabled to remain in the heart of Portugal, and while he preserved his passage open to the Spanish frontier by means of his bridges over the Zezere, he retained the power of offensive operations by crossing the Tagus on his left, or by turning the Monte Junta on his right. His cavalry and foragers ranged over an immense tract of fertile and abundant country, from Santarem to the Zezere, and to the eastward of that town. To second the operations of the army of Portugal, general Foy brought orders from Paris for all the disposable forces in the south of Spain to march for the Alemtejo frontier. In the north, Bessieres was preparing to co-operate with Massena; and Drouet, leaving Claparède with eight thousand men at Guarda, to keep Silveira and the ordenanza in check, reached Leyria with the ninth corps on the 24th of December; and taking post on the right flank of

the French army, by the extension of forces seawards, cut off the communication of the English army with the northern provinces, Silveira, flushed with a trifling success he had obtained over Claparède at Ponte d'Abade, presumptuously venturing to attack him at Trancosa, was repulsed and driven across the Douro with great slaughter.

Towards the end of November, Gardanne, in his advance from Ciudad Rodrigo, with a convoy of stores and ammunition, escorted by five thousand men, was attacked by the ordenanza of Upper Beira, under the command of colonel Grant, at Cardijos, in the Sierra de Citrella, when the French, falling into disorder from the suddenness of the attack, abandoned their convoy, and lost all their baggage, with several hundred men. Grant also subsequently executed a very dashing exploit against a portion of Claparède's force detained at Belmonte.

Ascertaining that it was their intention to sack and destroy Covilhaens, a considerable village and a post of some importance, as they had treated all the villages around Belmonte, he secretly marched with 400 ordenanza from Sardao to Covilhaens, and there concealing his force, on the arrival of two columns of the enemy, consisting of 1,500 men, as soon as they came within range of grape-shot, he opened so biting a fire on them from his single six-pounder, that they quickly took to their heels in the utmost confusion.

"While," to adopt the graphic language of an eloquent historian, "the two great leaders stood thus opposed to each other, like the contending spirits of light and darkness, the one earnest to save, the other no less eager to destroy," but neither venturing to strike till a favourable opportunity, or some oversight of his adversary, should give him the chance of preponderance, the hostile armies continued inactive, in observation of each other, as all the country between Alcanhete and Ponte Seca was impracticable for military operations, from the heavy rains and the broken state of the roads.

But while the English general and his army were straining every nerve to rid the Portuguese of the yoke of their tyrant, and save their lives and property, the Patriarch and the Souza faction at Lisbon continued to exert all their influence to thwart the measures of their ally, and render him and his army odious to the unthinking and uninformed part of the Portuguese population.



In order to put an end to the "miserable intrigues," as the English general emphatically termed them, of this faction, and the meddling insolent spirit of that odious priest, the patriarch, Lord Wellington denounced their insidious practices and interference in the following letter to sir Charles Stuart, the English ambassador at Lisbon:—"You will do me the favour to inform the regency, and above all the principal Souza, that his majesty and the prince regent having entrusted me with the command of their armies, and likewise with the conduct of the military operations, I will not suffer them, or anybody else, to interfere with them; that I know best where to station my troops, and when to make a stand against the enemy; and I shall not alter a system formed on mature consideration, on any suggestion of theirs. I am responsible for what I do, and they are not; and I recommend them to look to the measures for which they are responsible, and which I long ago recommended to them, namely, to provide for the tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the food of their own army and of the people, while the troops will be engaged with the enemy. As for principal Souza, I beg you to tell him from me, that I have had no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country, since he has been a member of the government; that being embarked in a course of military operations, of which I hope to see the successful termination, I shall continue to carry them on to the end, but that no person on earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula one moment after I shall have obtained his majesty's leave to resign my charge, if principal Souza is to remain a member of the government, or to continue at Lisbon; either he must quit the country, or I will; and if I should be obliged to go, I will take care that the world, or Portugal at least, and the prince regent, shall be made acquainted with my reasons. From the letter of the 3rd, which I have received from don Miguel Forjaz, I had hoped that the government was satisfied with what I had done and intended to do; and that, instead of endeavouring to render all further defence fruitless, by disturbing the minds of the populace of Lisbon, they would have done their duty by adopting measures to secure the tranquillity of the town; but, I suppose that, like other weak individuals, they add duplicity to their weakness, and that their expressions of approba-

tion, and even gratitude, were intended to convey censure."

"P. S.—I have but little doubt of success; but as I have fought a sufficient number of battles to know that the result of any one of them is not certain, even with the best arrangements, I am anxious that the government should adopt preparatory arrangements, and take out of the enemy's way those persons and their families, who would suffer if they were to fall into their hands."

In relation to the interference of the same faction with marshal Beresford's management of the Portuguese troops, the English chief thus expressed his opinion in another letter addressed to Mr. Stuart:—"In order to put an end at once to these miserable intrigues, I beg that you will inform the Portuguese government, that I will not stay in the country, and that I will advise the king's government to withdraw the assistance which his majesty affords them, if they interfere in any manner with the appointments of marshal Beresford's staff, for which he is responsible; or with the operations of the army; or with any of the points which, under the original arrangement with marshal Beresford, were referred exclusively to his management. I purpose, also, to report to his majesty's government, and refer to their consideration, what steps ought to be taken if the Portuguese government refuse or delay to adopt the civil and political arrangements recommended by me, and corresponding with the military operations which I am carrying on."

And in reference to the vexatious misrepresentations and unfounded complaints made by the Portuguese government concerning the British troops, who were the constant subjects of the obloquy of the faction, his remonstrance to the English ambassador was—

"Louzao, 16th March, 1811.

"SIR,—I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 9th instant, on a complaint said by don Miguel Forjaz to be made of the conduct of the British troops at Salvaterra, which complaint you will observe refers not to the conduct of the British troops, but to that of the Portuguese regiments, Nos. 4 and 10.

"In respect to the charge of cutting barren firewood in the royal parks for firewood, I have to reply, that I suppose his royal highness does not propose that his majesty's troops shall want firewood in Por-



tugal. It is reasonable that his royal highness, as well as other proprietors, should be paid for the wood cut upon his demesnes; but either the troops must be allowed to cut firewood, paying for the same, wherever the defence of his royal highness' dominions renders it necessary that they should be stationed, or they must be removed to the places where they can cut firewood, by which his royal highness' interests must suffer.

"I cannot avoid adverting to the disposition recently manifested by the government to complain of the conduct of the British troops, certainly, in this instance, without foundation.

"Acts of misconduct, and even outrage, I admit, have been committed, but never with impunity in any instance in which the complaint could be substantiated; and I have not yet been able to obtain the punishment of any individual in this country, be his crimes what they may.

"If the British soldiers have committed, as all soldiers do commit, acts of misconduct, they have at least fought bravely for the country. They have, besides, recently shown that commiseration for the misfortunes of the people of this country—which I am convinced will be equally felt by their countrymen at home—and actually fed the poor inhabitants of all the towns in which they were cantoned on the Rio Mayor river. Yet I have not heard that the Portuguese government have expressed their approbation of this conduct, very unusual in people of this class and description; nor do I find that either their bearing in the field, or their humanity, or their generosity, can induce those whom they are serving to look with indulgence at their failings, or to draw a veil over the faults of the few, in consideration of the military and other virtues of the many.\*

"I have the honour to be, &c.,

"WELLINGTON."

\* This was a poor requital to the English army for the humanity it had displayed towards the Portuguese population. The British soldiery had shown their commiseration for the misfortunes of the people of Portugal, not only by a liberal subscription of their pay, but had actually fed with their own rations the poor inhabitants of all the towns in which they were cantoned on the Rio Mayor river. In a letter addressed to Mr. Perceval, thanking him for attending to his recommendation of the people of Portugal to the humane consideration of the British public, in consequence of which, money, stores of every kind, seed, cows, oxen, and agricultural implements, were abundantly supplied to relieve the misery and desti-

The factious and disaffected part of the periodical press of his own country also again raised its "inauspicious and incendiary voice," and "in its exultation of its supposed disastrous aspect of affairs in the Peninsula," and "the predicament into which Wellington had brought himself and his army by the unwise prosecution of his scheme for the deliverance of Portugal," and "his folly in presuming to oppose himself to 'the redoubted Massena,'" prophesied that "the protection even of Lisbon was hopeless, much less the deliverance of the Peninsula;" and in the supposed verification of its silly and presumptuous prophecies "of his erroneous judgment, and the utter impracticability of his plans," the unnatural and craven-hearted scribes called on the government to recall the English army, and save it from absolute destruction, by "the invincible legions of France, and the superior genius of the redoubted Massena." Their unnatural and unpatriotic attempts to break and humiliate the spirit and bearing of the soldiery, and depreciate the military character of the country, were deemed by Buona-parto so admirably adapted to reconcile the French nation to the unpopularity of his Spanish war, and to prove the incapability of England contending with him, that he caused the various papers containing the heartless and disgraceful calumnies to be reprinted at the "imperial" press, and circulated throughout France, and the states subject to his control and influence. From the same sources also of disaffection and treachery, the French generals derived better information of the position and resources of the English army, and the intended operations of the English general, than they were able to obtain by the agency of their spies and the traitorous hidalgos, or nobles who conspired with them for the enslavement of their country. "I enclose," says the English general, in a letter addressed to the earl of Liverpool, dated Cartaxo, January the

tution of the Portuguese population, which had been occasioned by the French invasion—the words of the British chief are, "My soldiers have continued to show every kindness in their power, as well to the Spaniards as the Portuguese. The village of Fuentes d'Onor having been the field of battle the other day, and not being much improved by this circumstance, they immediately and voluntarily subscribed to raise a sum of money, to be given to the poor inhabitants as a compensation for the damage which their properties had sustained in the contest." Lord Wellington frequently had occasion to report the efforts of his troops to mitigate the sufferings of the Portuguese population.



19th, 1811, "a newspaper giving an account of our works; the number of guns and men in each, and for what purpose constructed. Surely it must be admitted, that those who carry on operations against an enemy possessed of all the information which our newspapers give to the French, do so under singular disadvantages."\*

And at this critical moment, with a powerful enemy in his front, the intrigues and faithlessness of his allies, and the calumny of the ignorant and disaffected part of his own countrymen, conjoined with the timidity and lukewarmness of the English cabinet, were not the only evils with which the English general was beset. These vexatious annoyances drew from the English general, in a letter addressed to marshal Beresford, and dated 24th of January, 1811, this indignant reprehension:—"The obstinacy and perverseness with which the Portuguese and Spanish governments persevere in opposing and rendering fruitless all measures to set them right, and save them, and the difficulties thrown in our way by our own government and its officials, cross and thwart our operations, and create great difficulties in carrying on the service."† Even his own officers occasioned him disquietude and annoyance. His generals of division had either gone or were preparing to go home. As Hill and Fane were compelled by sickness to retire, the commander-in-chief acceded to their request in the most ready and affectionate manner. To those who had not so strong a plea for absence, while consenting to their requests, he replied in terms that conveyed any other meaning than his approbation. To general Leith's request, he says, "I sincerely wish that the war was over, that I might take leave myself, and give leave to all those who are desirous of taking it. But as that is not the case, I have been obliged to regulate my own discretion, and to make rules by which I am guided in the grant of leaves of absence. Those who are obliged to go for the recovery of their health, are compelled to appear before a medical board, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will go through that ceremony, and I shall be happy to comply with your wishes."

In the same tone, though the edge of the rebuke was more fine and delicate, is the reply to sir Stapleton Cotton's application: "It is certain that the enemy will take a decided line of action one way or the other, as soon as his reinforcements join, which

will be in a day or two. Under these circumstances you will judge for yourself whether to go or stay, without further reference to me, and will act accordingly." The quiet manner of allusion to the probability of the eve of an action, could not be mistaken by sir Stapleton Cotton more than it could in the commander-in-chief's reply to General Craufurd. To the application of that gallant soldier, who, like the war-horse of Scripture, loved the scent of battle, the reply was: "I cannot believe that having twenty thousand men on the Guadiana, and from seven to ten thousand men upon the Coa and the sources of the Mondego, which the French can draw in, they mean to leave Massena where he is till death shall have swept away his army; and therefore my opinion is, that they will attack us. However, you are as capable of forming an opinion on this subject as I am; and, as I have often told you, when an officer in your situation tells me that he has business to settle in England of paramount importance to him, I cannot object to his going there if he thinks proper; and you will therefore go if you wish so, by the packet, and take captain Cotton with you."

Craufurd's answer to this gentle but significant remonstrance, produced the following reply: "I have received your letter of the 27th, and I see no reason why I should depart from the rule which I have laid down for myself in these cases. Officers (general officers in particular) are the best judges of their private concerns; and although my opinion is that there is no private concern that cannot be settled by instruction and power of attorney, and that after all is not settled in this manner, I cannot refuse leave of absence to those who come to say that their business is of a nature that requires their personal superintendence. But, entertaining these opinions, it is rather too much that I should not only give leave of absence, but approve of the absence of any, particularly a general officer, from the army. It is certainly the greatest inconvenience to the service that officers should absent themselves as they do, each of them requiring at the same time, that when it shall be convenient to return he shall find himself in the same situation as when he left the army. In the meantime, who is to do the duty? How am I to be responsible for the army? Is colonel ——— a proper substitute for general Craufurd in the command of our advanced posts? or general ——— for sir

\* *Wellington Despatches.*† *Ibid.*



Stapleton Cotton, in command of the cavalry? I may be obliged to consent to the absence of an officer, while I cannot approve of it. I repeat, that you know the situation of affairs as well as I do; and you have my leave to go to England if you think proper."

The absence of the duke's home-sick generals gave to the factious part of the public press an opportunity to exercise their spirit of virulence, and to create in the public mind a discontent of that absence. The secretary of war communicated to lord Wellington the public opinion on the subject; to which communication the following answer was returned to Lord Liverpool:—

"Santa Marinha, 23rd March, 1811.

"MY DEAR LORD,—I assure you that the departure of the general officers of the army was as much against my inclination, as their arrival in England was injurious to the public interests. I did every thing in my power to prevail on them not to go, but in vain; and I acknowledge that it has given me satisfaction to find that they have been roughly handled in the newspapers. The consequence of the absence of some of them has been, that in the late operations I have been obliged to be general of cavalry, and of the advanced guard, and the leader of two or three columns, sometimes on the same day.

"I have requested colonel Torrens not to allow any general officer to come in future who is not willing to declare that he has no private business to recall him to England, and that he will remain with the army as long as it shall stay in the Peninsula.

"Believe me, &c.

"WELLINGTON."

"The Earl of Liverpool."

This letter and "the handling of the newspapers," occasioned several of the home-sick truant officers to return to the army before their leave of absence had expired.

During the period of inaction, while the hostile armies were in front of each other, many points of the highest importance,

\* The humanity of his suggestions for economical reform in the government departments is no less worthy of admiration than the wisdom with which the idea was conceived:—"Adverting to the discontent which always follows reform of expenditure, I recommend to you to proceed with caution in the reform of the different juntas and boards. Let no man, or, at all events, a number of men, be discharged from the service without having some visible means of livelihood left. There are, I believe, some members of those juntas and boards, who have fortunes besides their salaries, of which last they may be de-

besides his military duties, occupied the attention of the English commander-in-chief, and elicited the powers of his vigorous and capacious mind. To enable the Portuguese government to meet the exigencies of the war, he suggested the necessity of new modelling and improving the revenue, and the introduction of reform into the various departments of the government,\* for the purpose of diminishing the expense in that branch of the government. The increasing inefficiency of the Portuguese army, on account of the neglect and ill-treatment of it by the regency, required his utmost care and attention. During the last nine months above ten thousand regular forces, and near two-thirds of the militia, had been driven by want to desert their standards and return home. The ordenanza disbanded themselves by whole companies at a time. Two regiments of the line, the 9th and the 21st, had dwindled down from more than 2,400 men, to less than 1,300, and the Lusitanian legion, which had numbered upwards of 1,700, scarcely exceeded 1,000 men. "At this moment," (January 18th, 1811) says lord Wellington, in his celebrated letter addressed from Cartaxo to the English envoy at the court of Lisbon, and which contained truths so condemnatory of the intrigues and machinations of the patriarch and the Souza faction in the regency, that, in the expressive language of the writer, it placed "the patriarch's conduct in such a light that he would tremble at the sight of a lamp-post,"—"the Portuguese troops are frequently in want of provisions; and all the departments of the Portuguese army, including the hospitals, are equally destitute of funds to enable them to defray the necessary expenditure, and to perform their duty. These deficiencies and difficulties have existed ever since I have known the Portuguese army; and it is well known that it must have been disbanded more than once if it had not been assisted with the provisions, stores, and funds, destined for the maintenance of the British army." To remedy this grievance, and prevented, and still continue members of the junta. In the inferior departments of the customs, also, from which it may be necessary to discharge many officers, either a half or a third of their salary should be continued to those not otherwise provided for. If these measures are not adopted, there will be serious discontent in Lisbon, which will be encouraged by these people [namely the intriguing priest, the patriarch, and the Souza faction], and will be worse than an additional twenty thousand men to the enemy."—Letter to the British envoy, Mr. Stuart Wellington

*Despatches.*



vent the total abandonment of their colours by the Portuguese army, the English general was obliged to take active and efficient measures to feed the Portuguese troops from the stores of the British commissariat. But while devising means of saving the Portuguese army from starvation, and enforcing its efficiency, the factious and intriguing Souza and the patriarch were vilifying his character, and undermining his influence in the regency. In a private communication to marshal Beresford on the subject, the words of the English general are:—"Baron Eben has made some curious discoveries at Lisbon, and has given Mr. Stuart some papers written by these personages, which tend to show their folly equally with their mischievous dispositions. Among other plans they have one for libelling and caricaturing me in England! I have this day discovered that some of the anonymous letters to me are written by the principal Souza; and others by the bishop. These are men to govern a nation in difficult circumstances!"

Notwithstanding this ingratitude and enmity of the regency, the destitute state of the Portuguese troops and the inhumanity of the regency in disregarding their destitution and sufferings, were the subject of the English general's earnest solicitude. In a remonstrance to the British envoy, Mr. Stuart, after severely censuring the inhumanity of the Portuguese regency towards their countrymen, he adds, the Portuguese troops "are patient under privations to an extraordinary degree. But men cannot perform the labour of soldiers without food. Those of general Pack's brigade died of famine on their march, and above 100 men have fallen from inanition, many of whom must have died from the same cause. The government neglected both establishments and troops when they were on the Rio Mayor river, and neither are in a state in which they ought to be at the commencement of a campaign." Again, July 15th, 1812, in reply to a dispatch from marshal Beresford, while describing "the wants and serious distress" in which the British army was, on account of the defalcation of its pay, and the deficiency of the military chest, he says, "the arrears and distresses of the Portuguese troops are a joke to ours."

As among large bodies of men assembled together, a state of inaction and the absence of sufficient excitement, are often introductive of irregularity, and subversive of subordination; so it occurred with the

British army in their cantonments. A sectarian spirit began at this time to be prevalent among the troops. Two Methodist meetings, of which one belonged to the Guards, were held in the town of Cartaxo. The men met in the evening, and sang psalms; a serjeant, of the name of Stephens, occasionally preaching to them after the fashion of the military saints in the time of Cromwell. Meetings of the kind were also held in other cantonments. In the 9th regiment there was one, at which two officers attended. To suppress these irregularities, which were occasioned by the insufficiency of the military chaplains, application was made to the commander-in-chief, who declined any forced interference with the religious sentiments of the army, as the act would be a violation of the principles and policy of religious toleration. "The meeting of soldiers in their cantonments, to sing psalms, or to hear a sermon read by one of their comrades," said the enlightened and liberal-minded Wellington, "is in the abstract, perfectly innocent, and is a better way of spending their time than many others to which they are addicted; but it may become otherwise." "Religious instruction," adds the high-minded and sagacious soldier, "is the greatest support and aid to military discipline and order." "We want the assistance of a respectable clergyman," he continues. "By his personal influence and advice, and by that of true religion, he would moderate the zeal and enthusiasm of these gentlemen, and would prevent their meetings from being mischievous, if he did not prevail on them to discontinue them entirely." By the diffusion of this wise and temperate counsel throughout the army, and the noble sentiments it contains, the sectarian spirit which had obtained favour among the troops during the period of inactivity, became extinct on the resumption of active service.

But among all the various difficulties and discouraging circumstances with which the English general was beset, none gave him more uneasiness than the folly and perverseness of the Spanish government, and the inefficiency and uselessness of its generals and armies. "I am afraid," says he in a letter, dated Cartaxo, December 2nd, 1810, "the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. The Cortes appear to suffer under the national infirmity in as great a degree as the other



authorities; that is, boasting of the strength and power of the Spanish nation; till till they are seriously convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down quietly, and indulging their natural indolence.\* That the English chief had not formed an inaccurate estimate of his allies appears from this circumstance. When that body was assembled in September, 1810, instead of addressing itself to the measures best adapted for carrying on "a war of deeds," and the improvement of the Spanish armies, and the direction of the energies of the people, it employed its time in the "war of words," and idle boasting;† in declaring in inflated speeches all that Spaniards would endure and effect; and, in the ridiculous badinage of one of its members, "prove to the world that Spain was about to tread upon Greek and Roman name." To endeavour to provide a remedy for these grievances, the general addressed the following letter, which, for profound exposition of the subject, will remain a memorial of his extraordinary sagacity and penetration, to his brother the marquis Wellesley, who was then a member of the ministry. In that invaluable document, which is extant in the *Despatches*, he says: "Another object to which I wish to draw your attention, is the state of the Spanish government and army. I do not know what the agents of government, in different parts of Spain, may represent to them; but I assure you the cortes have got nothing, either to raise, discipline, pay, or support an army. The distresses of the Spaniards are worse even than those of the Portuguese. The army of the poor marques de la Romana has not a shilling, except what I gave them; nor a magazine, nor an article of any description, that is to keep them together, or to enable them to act as a military body. The operations of these troops are approaching to the Portuguese frontier; and I foresee what is going to happen, viz., a war between them and the inhabitants of Portugal, for the provisions, clothes, doors, windows, and beams of the houses of the latter. This will be a new era in this extraordinary war. Then the corps of Mahy, in Galicia, either from similar deficiencies, or disinclination on the part of Mahy, does nothing.

\* *Wellington Despatches.*

† Its injustice and insolence, at this time, to the South American colonies, caused those states to declare themselves independent of Spanish rule; and

"All this forms a subject for serious consideration. Either Great Britain is interested in maintaining the war in the Peninsula, or is not. If she is, there can be no doubt of the expediency of making an effort to put in motion, against the enemy, the largest force which the Peninsula can produce. The Spaniards would not, I believe, allow of that active interference by us in their affairs, which might effect an amelioration of their circumstances; but that cannot be a reason for doing nothing. Subsidy given, without stipulation for the performance of specific services, would, in my opinion, answer no purpose; but I am convinced that in the next campaign I may derive great assistance from general Mahy, as I should in this, if I could have put his troops in movement; and I am also convinced that I may derive great assistance from the corps of the marquis de la Romana, and shall prevent its being mischievous in the way in which I have above pointed out, if I am allowed to assist with provisions and money occasionally. But then I must have the power to tell the Spanish government, that unless these troops co-operate strictly with me, the assistance shall be withdrawn from them.

"The amount of the expense of this assistance may be settled monthly, and may be in the form of a loan, to be paid by drafts on the government of Mexico, or in any other manner that government may think proper. Upon this a question may be asked, viz., what good it will produce? I shall answer, for nothing but to maintain the war in the Peninsula.

"I have seen too much of the troops of the Peninsula, even the Portuguese, when not united with our own, to form any calculation of the effect of any operation of theirs. Even when the troops are encouraged, and incline to behave well, the impatience, inexperience, and unconquerable vanity of the officers, lead them into error, as appears strongly in ——'s recent operations, who, if he had obeyed his instructions, and have remained quiet, would have kept Claparède in check; but he chose to attack him, even with an inferior force, and was defeated; and Claparède was enabled to overrun Upper Beira, even to Lamego.

"It may also be asked why we should

the injustice of the act was aggravated by its ingratitude, the colonies having contributed ninety millions of dollars to enable the mother country to maintain the war against French oppression.



spend our money, and why these troops should not go on as the French troops do, without pay, provisions, magazines, or any thing? The answer to this question is as long as what I have already written. The French army is certainly a wonderful machine; but if we are to form such a one, we must form such a government as exists in France, which can with impunity lose one half of the troops employed in the field every year, only by the privations and hardships imposed upon them. Next we must compose our army of soldiers drawn from all classes of the population of the country; from the good and middling, as well in rank and in education, as from the bad, and not as other nations, and we, in particular do, from the bad only.

"Thirdly, we must establish such a system of discipline as the French have; a system founded upon the strength of the tyranny of the government, which operates upon an army composed of soldiers, the majority of whom are sober, well-disposed, amenable to order, and in some degree educated.

"When we shall have done all this, and shall have made these armies of the strength of those employed by the French, we may require them to live as the French do, viz., by authorized and regulated plunder of the country and its inhabitants, if any should remain; and we may expose them to the labour, hardships, and privations which the French soldier suffers every day; and we must expect the same proportion of loss every campaign, viz., one-half of those that take the field.

"This plan is not proposed for the British army, nor has it yet been practised in any great degree by the Portuguese; but I shall state the effect, which, in my opinion, the attempt has had upon the Spaniards.

"There is neither subordination nor discipline in the army, among either officers or soldiers; and it is not even attempted (as, indeed, it would be in vain to attempt) to establish either. It has, in my opinion, been the cause of the dastardly conduct which we have so frequently witnessed in the Spanish troops; and they have become

odious to their country; and the peaceable inhabitants, much as they detest and suffer from the French, almost wish for the establishment of Joseph's government, to be protected from the outrages of their own troops. These armies, therefore, must be paid and supported, if any service is expected from them; and at present, at least, I see no chance of their being paid, except by British assistance."

The hostile armies had now been in presence of each other for the space of near four months, and the only movement that had been made on either side was that of a strong reconnoissance under the command of Junôt, January 19th, on Rio Mayor, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the allied forces were being concentrated at Alcoentre. But Massena receiving information, by the medium of the renegade hidalgos, or Portuguese nobles, that the English general was meditating an attack and the relief of Badajos, apprehensive that he would not be able to maintain his intended positions against that attack, determined to retreat. Disease, famine, and desertion,\* from the combined effects of which his army was gradually mouldering away, also forced him to that determination. Another cause that inclined him to retreat was the arrival in the Tagus of a fleet of transports, having the long-expected reinforcement of 7,000 men on board, on whose junction he well knew that lord Wellington would commence offensive operations. For these reasons the greater part of his general officers were urgent for a retreat. He accordingly commenced his arrangements for retreat in the end of February. Having gradually passed his sick and baggage upon Thomar, and destroyed all his ammunition and guns that could not be horsed, he maintained a bold front, and made a show of intending to pass the Zezere. When the impediments of the army had gained two marches, so that the progress of the troops might not be impeded, they made a bold movement with the sixth corps on the Lys, near Leyria, as if with the intention of advancing on Torres Vedras, but for the real purpose of com-

Alcobaga in full sovereignty, as an established army of avowed professional robbers. Their influence and power at length became so predominant, that Massena sent two detachments against them; they fought desperately, but at length being surrounded and overpowered, they laid down their arms. Their leaders being shot, the men were again incorporated in their regiments, not being deemed the less eligible for the service in which the French army was engaged.

\* The number of the deserters was so great, that they formed themselves into a little army, which they organized into regular companies, and, in conformity to the characteristic deeds of the French army, denominated themselves "the eleventh corps;" electing general officers and subalterns. It consisted of more than 1,600 men, who frequently attacked the foraging parties of the French, and made the prisoners join them. They occupied the country about Caldas and



pling the English general to abstain from any active operation lest he should lay open his lines to his adversary.

Matters having thus been prepared, the French army retired, on the night of the 5th of March, from Santarem and its neighbourhood. On the following morning the appearance of motionless sentinels foretold the usual French ruse, and that the position had been abandoned.\* The English army was in instant pursuit. Hill's division was sent across the Tagus for the purpose of protecting Abrantes, and embarrassing Massena's movements, should he attempt to retire by the Alemtejo, or take the route by Punhete. Beresford was ordered to advance to the relief of Badajos with the Portuguese and the fourth division, and a body of cavalry; and the third and fifth divisions directed to join from the Lines.

Massena's first movements indicated an intention of concentrating a force at Abrantes, and of attempting the passage of the Zezere. On the 8th his intention was more evidently developed; his line of retreat being directed through the valley of the Mondego, with the design of crossing the river of that name for the occupation of Coimbra. Leaving the second corps on the route to Espinal, and Loisson's division taking the road to Angiaio, the main body of the hostile army retreated in concentric lines on Pombal. That portion of the army was followed, and never lost sight of by the light division, the royal dragoons, and the first German hussars, who took above 200 prisoners.

On the 9th, the third and eighth corps-d'armée, and Montbrun's division of cavalry, were found posted on a table-land in front of Pombal. Some smart skirmishing took place between the cavalry of the hostile armies; but as the English general had not a sufficient body of troops in hand to commence a serious attack, and as he was informed by letter that Badajos was in a

state to hold out for a month, he recalled the fourth division and heavy cavalry already on its march to the Alemtejo. Before their arrival Massena had made, on the night of the 11th, a hasty retreat through the town of Pombal, leaving a body of troops in the castle; but on the following morning the 95th rifles and the 3rd caçadores drove the enemy out of the castle with so much spirit and impetuosity, that they had not time to destroy the bridge, though it was ready mined.

On the 12th, Ney, with the rear-guard, took up a strong position on a ridge of heights at the extremity of a defile between Pombal and Redinha, and he made so skilful a disposition of that force as to give it the appearance of a powerful force. Immediate orders were given for the attack of the enemy, and in less than an hour his right, which was covered by a wooded slope, was carried by the 52nd, the 95th rifles, the 3rd caçadores, and a company of the 43rd. In the mean time, Picton, with the third division, had seized the wooded heights that protected his left. But though his position was thus laid open, he maintained his ground, from a conviction that the English general was deceived as to his real strength; and such was really the case, so skilfully had he masked his force.

A lull therefore took place for about an hour, until a sufficient force could be concentrated to ensure success. Then, to adopt the vivid language of the author of *The War in the Peninsula*, "three shots from the British centre gave the signal for advance, when, in an instant, the green woods sparkled with bayonets, and the whole army was in full march across the plain; while horsemen and guns, starting simultaneously from the left wing and the centre, charged under a general volley from the French battalions. A dense cloud of smoke enveloped the enemy for a few moments, and when it rose upon the wind, and

\* The French marshal has been reprehended by some writers, and accused of having committed a serious error in wasting the campaign in inactivity, in his cantonments at Santarem. But the following, among other causes, encouraged him to that measure:—1. The destitute state of the Portuguese army, numbers of whom had died of inanition, and a large portion had abandoned their colours, or deserted. 2. The distressed condition of that part of the population that had taken shelter within the lines of Torres Vedras. 3. The machination of the renegade hidalgos in the French party at Torres Novas, and their correspondence with the disaffected part of the Lisbon population. 4. The general disinclination of

the people of England to the continuance of the English army in Portugal—this information he obtained from the factious English newspapers. These causes he hoped would break up the alliance between England and Portugal. He also calculated, that the whigs, on their accession to office on the appointment of the regency, would recal Lord Wellington, and substitute in his place some "antiquated tactitioner;" and this opinion he caused to be disseminated among his troops, as an encouragement to bear up against their difficulties. In this respect he displayed that greatest of military qualifications—calculation of moral causes; and he who is not capable of the act, is "but half a general."



was scattered, no enemy was longer visible." The French had rapidly and skilfully withdrawn, and gained the village of Redinha before the English cavalry could reach them, and neither the utmost efforts of Picton's skirmishers, nor of the horse-artillery, could enable the pursuers to do more than slightly gall the rearmost of the fugitives with their fire. At length they were compelled to fall back upon the main body at Condeixa; but by this daring halt, a start had been gained of many hours, for the sick and wounded who were moving on Condeixa, with the baggage and field-equipment of the army, to cross the river with the main body of the army.

On the following day the pursuit was resumed, and the English advanced guard reached Condeixa\* about ten o'clock in the morning of that day; but as the position the enemy had taken up was impassable in front, being covered by a marsh, and that the right of the heights on which he was posted was protected by a palisade, and breast-works thrown up on either side of the hollow, by which it could be approached, Picton was detached with the third division, by a circuitous path through the mountains of the Sierra de Anciao, for the purpose of turning the left flank of the enemy. As soon as Massena observed Picton winding round the bluff end of a mountain about eight miles distant from this position, the whole camp was thrown into confusion. A thick cloud of smoke was soon seen to rise from Condeixa, and their columns were at the same time observed hurrying towards Casal Nova, a village about three miles distant from Condeixa. The English advanced guard pursued with eagerness, but their advance was greatly impeded by the conflagration of the town, as also by the trees that had been felled and thrown across the road, and the block of rock that had been rolled down from the heights into the line of march. A multitude of fires were also simultaneously kindled to cover and conceal the flight of the fugitives with volumes of smoke. Yet the desire of the pursuers was so eager to close with their adversaries, that the few skirmishers and cavalry who had surmounted the obstacles, closed with the rear of the French, penetrated between the corps at Fonte Coberta (Massena's

head-quarters), and the rest of the retreating army, and nearly captured the French marshal, who escaped by disguising himself, and scrambling over the mountains by night to regain the army.

In the night the French divisions at Fonte Coberta "stole away" (as they had done in all the positions they had successively taken up), and favoured by the extreme darkness of the night, made for Miranda de Corvo. Sir William Erskine (who had been appointed to general Craufurd's command during the absence of that officer in England), put the light division in pursuit, at day-break of the 14th, without a vanguard or calling in his outposts. The ground was covered with so dense a fog that it was not possible to discern objects at many paces distance; but from the hills in front came the dull buzz of a great multitude. Uninfluenced by that ominous sound, Erskine sent forward the 52nd, without adopting any of the necessary and customary precautions. The road taking a sudden dip into the valley, that gallant regiment ("soldiers that had never met their match") was soon lost to sight in the mist, and passed the enemy's outposts without being observed, on account of the dense haze; but the fog clearing up, it was seen fiercely engaged in the midst of the hostile rear-guard.

At this critical juncture, lord Wellington came up. The whole of the light division was immediately pushed forward to succour the 52nd. Gradually, Picton and Cole, with the third and fourth divisions, were turning the enemy's left flank; and the first, fifth, and sixth divisions, with the heavy cavalry, and Ross and Bull's horse artillery advancing against his centre, he was driven from ridge to ridge, and at length flung back in great disorder on the main body at Miranda de Corvo, with the loss of one hundred prisoners. The casualties of the allies, in killed and wounded, were eleven officers, and one hundred and fifty privates; that of the enemy much greater. The "astounding indifference" to the safety of the troops and the violation of the rules of his art, by Erskine, having disconcerted the design of the commander-in-chief to turn the enemy's left flank, and for which object the third and fourth divisions were in march at of the 13th, in consequence of the information he received that Badajos had not surrendered, the fourth division marched for the same destination, in order to enable Beresford to relieve that fortress, and compel the enemy to break up the siege.

\* Soon after the evacuation of Pombal, the English general being convinced that Massena would not deliver a general battle, detached from Condeixa a brigade of cavalry, and a division of Portuguese infantry, for the Alemtejo; and again, on the night



the moment, it was necessary to adopt the disadvantageous measures to extricate the 52nd from the perilous condition into which Erskine's culpable negligence had thrown them at Casal Nova.

The result of these operations was, that the rich districts of Upper Beira were saved from the invader's ravages, the English general having, by his skilful movements, compelled the enemy to the line of retreat between the Mondego and the mountain range of Anciao. The communication with the north provinces was also again opened. In the furtherance of these objects, colonel Trant had materially contributed.

That enterprising and indefatigable officer, ascertaining from the intercepted dispatches, that Montbrun was advancing with the cavalry to siege Coimbra, evacuating the suburb of Santa Clara, which is on the left bank of the river, and destroying an arch of the Coimbra bridge, on the city side, so actively saluted the French, on their approach, with a discharge from six pieces of artillery, that the French leader, supposing the city to be strongly garrisoned with the reinforcement that had long been expected from England, abandoned the attempt, and rejoined Massena at Miranda de Corvo.

Lord Wellington, now desirous to prevent the enemy's passage of the Mondego, as that line of march would present him with a country whose supplies were inexhaustible, he was again in active pursuit of the foe; and as, by the junction of Cole's division with Nightingale's at Espinhal, he had the power of turning the strong position of Miranda de Corvo, the enemy abandoned it, rapidly retreating to the bold and formidable line of mountains behind the Ceira, leaving Ney's corps on the left bank of the river, in a rugged and defensible position in front of the village of Fons d'Arence, to cover the retreat.

Again his pursuers were up with the foe. Late in the afternoon of the 16th, arrangements were made for driving in his rear-guard, preparatory to the movements for crossing the Ceira on the following morning. The light division and Pack's brigade were ordered to hold his right in play, and the third division to make a vigorous charge on his left, while a battery of horse artillery opened from an eminence a destructive fire. At the first charge, the left wing of the enemy was overthrown; and the panic-stricken troops, fleeing in confusion to the river, many were drowned by missing the

ford, or were crushed to death in a disorderly attempt to pass the bridge. The action on the right, on account of the ruggedness of the ground, had resolved itself into a number of desultory skirmishes, which enabled Ney in some measure to check the pursuit of his routed wing. Night, too, coming on, favoured his escape, and afforded him the opportunity of blowing up the bridge. His loss in killed and wounded exceeded five hundred men; that of the English, four officers and sixty privates. Ney, in consequence of the reproaches of Massena as to the slow march of the rear-guard, indignantly ordered the whole of the plunder which had been collected by the French army in its retreat to be burned, and the execution was begun on Massena's own share. Here, as at Condeixa, Redinha, and Casal Nova, having driven in the rear-guard, a direct attack on the main body would have been fatal to the army of the enemy, and would have compelled him to abandon his artillery and baggage; but as the attack in each case might have been attended with material loss, the English general preferred acting on the flanks, in order to reserve his men, to meet the additional force they would have to encounter on the frontiers. This was the reason that, in each case, as also in those in which opportunities presented themselves, that lord Wellington did not avail himself of those opportunities. He was not like Buonaparte, a general, as Kleber said, who "used up ten thousand men a-week." Besides, his force was, during the whole retreat, much inferior to that of his adversary, and he had not the means of replacing the casualties as his adversary had.

The allied army was constrained to halt for a day, partly on account of the destruction of the bridge, and partly from want of the necessary supplies of provisions, and the destitute state of the Portuguese troops, many of whom had perished from inanition, and a large portion of whom were unable to follow the army after passing Pombal. "I had," says the English commander-in-chief, in his statement to the British minister, "repeatedly urged the governors of the kingdom to adopt measures to supply the [native] troops with regularity, and to keep up the establishments while the army was in cantonments on the Rio Mayor river; which representations were not attended to: and when the army was to move forward, the Portuguese troops had no provisions,



nor any means of conveying any to them. They were to move through a country ravaged and exhausted by the enemy; and, it is literally true, that general Pack's brigade and colonel Ashworth's had nothing to eat for four days, although constantly marching or engaged with the enemy.

"I was obliged either to direct the British commissary-general to supply the Portuguese troops, or to see them starve for want; and the consequence is, that the supplies intended for the British troops are exhausted, and we must halt till more come up, which I hope will be this day."\*

In the night of the 16th, a bridge of tressels was constructed, and on the following morning the army passed the river in pursuit. Again the enemy was, on the 19th, driven from the strong position he had taken behind the Alva, on the Serra de Moita; his antagonist having, with consummate skill, turned the French left by the Serra de Santa Quiteira, with the first, third, and fifth divisions, while the light and sixth divisions manœuvred in front from the Serra de Murcella. These movements compelled the enemy to concentrate his forces on the Moita, and being thus out-manœuvred, to push forward for Celerico and Guarda. As the utmost speed was necessary with such a pursuer, he was compelled again to destroy more baggage, ammunition, and stores, as also all his guns that could not be well horsed; and to abandon his foraging parties that had been sent towards the Mondego, of whom above eight hundred were intercepted and taken prisoners on their return to the Alva.

As the allied army had again outmarched its supplies, it was compelled to halt till those that had been sent round from Lisbon to Coimbra should arrive. This halt was absolutely unavoidable; food of no kind was to be found in the country, the enemy having devastated it on both flanks of his march, and every day's march increased the distance from the magazines on the Tagus and those which had been conveyed to Coimbra, thereby rendering the supply of the troops more difficult and precarious. But the case was not so with the French. When they left Santarem each man was provided with bread for fifteen days' march. They also collected large supplies by pillage, in the course of their march, and were aided more by the treachery of the renegade hidalgos, and the faction of the patriarch and

Souza; for that faction not only neglected to supply their own countrymen with food, but their agents were discovered to have placed large supplies at Coimbra and on the Alva, within reach of the enemy at most critical moments.

The pursuit of the enemy towards Celerico was, however, prosecuted by the commander-in-chief at the head of the cavalry and the light troops, supported by the sixth and third divisions, and the militia, under Trant and Wilson, on the right of the Mondego. Here above one hundred prisoners were taken, and about the same number of the fugitives slain.

Massena had now taken post at Guarda, a town situated on the summit of a steep hill, forming part of the Estrella range. In this strong position he hoped to be able to maintain himself until he could by a countermarch to the Elga, through Subugal and Peña Maçor, establish his communications with Soult across the Tagus, and with the intrusive king, Joseph Buonaparte, by the valley of that river. But on the morning of the 29th he found his dream of security dispelled. Five columns of attack, consisting of three divisions of infantry and two regiments of cavalry, supported on the wings by the fifth division and the Portuguese militia under Trant and Wilson, and in the centre by the fifth and seventh divisions, were seen simultaneously ascending by as many routes, the Guarda mountain, in the form of a semicircle, and all converging to one given point on the citadel, and at the same time overlapping both of the enemy's flanks. At the apparition of the attacking columns, the enemy, in the greatest hurry and confusion, abandoned this almost impregnable position, and fleeing with the utmost precipitation, he did not halt until he had placed the Coa between himself and his pursuers. Several brigades were nearly cut off, and baggage, ammunition and stores, as well as a portion of the property of which the Portuguese had been robbed, fell into the hands of the pursuers. The light division regaled themselves with the provisions, which were in a state of preparation on the fires of the enemy's bivouac.

Still followed and harassed by his unweariedly active pursuer, whose vigilance and activity allowed him no rest, and whose sagacity seemed to divine his plans at the very first movement he made to put them into execution, he was obliged to seek safety in constant flight. In his retreat to Subugal, his pursuer was quickly upon his track; and,

\* *Wellington Despatches.*



—although Massena had taken up a strong position, the ground being admirably calculated for defence, and approachable only by its left, the river Coa, which makes a considerable elbow near Subugal, covering two sides of the triangular position, and its banks being very steep and rugged throughout its course—Wellington quickly dislodged him from his stronghold.

Here the French marshal determined to make a last effort to maintain his hold of Portugal, and avoid the disgrace of being foiled by his adversary, whom, in his boastful and bombastic proclamation, he had threatened to drive into the sea in less than three months from the time of his invasion of Portugal. His head-quarters were at Alfayates; his left, consisting of the second corps, had one flank upon a height immediately above the bridge and town of Subugal, and the other extended along the road to Alfayates as far as a lofty ridge, which commanded all the approaches to Subugal from the fords of the Coa above the town. The sixth corps was at Roveria, and communicated with the second by Rendo. The right wing was at Ponte Sequeiras. The eighth corps was under the immediate command of Massena at Alfayates.

On the 1st of April, the English army was concentrated on the right bank of the Coa; and at break of day of the 3rd was in motion to drive the enemy from his position. It was the object of the English commander-in-chief to cut off the sixth corps at Roveria before it could be succoured. For this purpose his dispositions of attack were that different divisions should simultaneously pass the Coa at three several fords, and by the bridge at Subugal, and attack the enemy in front, flank, and rear, at the same moment. The cavalry, which formed the extreme right of the British position, was directed to ford the Upper Coa; the light division a little lower down above Subugal; the third still lower; and the fifth with the artillery, by the bridge at Subugal, all to converge on the position of the sixth corps. The first and the seventh were kept as a reserve, and the sixth to observe the corps at Roveria. But this well-concerted plan was marred in its execution by the untowardness of the weather and the unskillfulness of the commander (Erskine) of the light division, who, the author of *The War in the Peninsula* says, “did not put the columns in a right direction; nor were the brigades held together; and

he carried off the cavalry.” The untowardness of the weather consisted in the morning breaking in a mist and fog, which soon turned to a dark heavy rain, making it impossible for the troops to gain their respective posts of attack with that simultaneous regularity which is essential to decisive success.

Beckwith's brigade, consisting of the 43rd, four companies of the 95th, and three companies of the 3rd caçadores, first forded the river, and, by some unaccountable miscalculation of Erskine, was ordered to attack before the other columns had advanced far enough to their respective battle stations to support him. By that injudicious order the little band was unconsciously advancing against more than 12,000 infantry, supported by cavalry and artillery.

No sooner had the rifles driven in the enemy's pickets, and reached the top of the hill, than they were forced back upon the 43rd by overwhelming numbers; and at the same moment, the fog clearing off, exhibited to Beckwith the magnitude of his peril. But he resolved to meet it. Heading a fierce charge, he beat back the enemy, and gained the summit of the hill, when he was attacked in front and flank by fresh troops, supported by cavalry, while the fire of two guns at musket range poured in a deadly discharge of grape-shot on his little band; and at the same time the fire of the French musketry was increasing to a perfect storm of bullets. To protect himself he posted his men in a small stone enclosure, which was fortunately at hand, where he maintained the unequal combat, and repelled all the assaults of the enemy till the 52nd advanced to his aid. The French now began to fall fast. A howitzer was taken from them, and the English skirmishers of the 52nd falling back on the main body of the regiment, the whole of the men instantly forming line behind a stone wall, overthrew with their rolling fire everything that ventured to attack them.

Regnier at length, perceiving the insufficiency of his partial attacks, advanced a column of 6,000 men, supported by cavalry and artillery; but captain Hopkins, with a company of the 52nd, seizing a small eminence, commanding the ascent by which the enemy was advancing, with two volleys throwing them into confusion, immediately charged them with the bayonet. At the same crisis, the leading brigade, under general Colville, of the third division, issuing out of the woods on the enemy's right, opened a



destructive fire on that flank; while the 5th, having carried the bridge, was ascending the heights on the same flank; and at the same moment the cavalry was advancing on the high ground on the left of the enemy. Regnier, finding himself nearly surrounded, availing himself of a violent storm of hail, which prevented the armies from seeing each other for a time, retreated rapidly on Rendo; where, being joined by the sixth corps, he fell back upon Alfayates. Besides leaving the field of battle in possession of the victors, he lost about 1,500 men, of whom above 300 were taken prisoners. The loss of the allied army scarcely amounted to 200 men. The great loss of the French in killed and wounded, was occasioned in their endeavours to recapture the howitzer, which, on the termination of the battle, stood on the brow of the hill, guarded by Death itself, every brave soldier who had attempted its rescue having fallen a victim to the unerring fire of his opponents. Had Slade pursued vigorously with the cavalry, the retreat of the enemy would have been disastrous. To remedy his insufficiency, the light division was detached in the route of Valdespina, to feel for the enemy on the side of the passes leading on Coria. On this eventful day, individual courage had served to equalize the fearful disparity of numbers, and the result was proportionate. Though the whole affair had not occupied an hour, the loss of the enemy exceeded 1,000 men, while that of the allies amounted scarcely to 200. Its approbation by the English general was commensurate. In his despatch he says, "although the operations of this day were, by unavoidable accidents, not performed in the manner I intended they should be, I consider the action that was fought by the light division, by colonel Beckwith's brigade chiefly, with the whole of the second corps, to be one of the most glorious that British troops were ever engaged in." Or, as he afterwards observed in a lighter vein, in a private letter, "we have given the French a handsome dressing, and I think they will not again say that we are not a manœuvring army. We may not manœuvre so beautifully as they do, but I do not desire better sport than to meet one of their columns *en masse* with our lines. The poor second corps received a terrible threshing from the 43rd and the 52nd on the 3rd."

During the night that followed the combat of Subugal, Massena continued his retreat, and on the 5th of April crossed the

frontier of Spain, having in the various combats sustained a severe loss in killed and wounded, and near 3,000 prisoners. Wellington now stood victorious on the confines of Portugal, having achieved that which to some seemed "incredibly rash and vain even to attempt," and proved that there was one "whose consummate genius and comprehensive plans could overwhelm Napoleon and his generals;" and that though a "*homme borne*," "a man of confined ideas and the plodding pupil of the old system," as Napoleon and his fellow-scribes of the imperial press denominated him, that "his happy blunders and hair-breadth escapes," as they termed them, could foil and frustrate "the mighty projects of the master-mind of Napoleon, at the touch of whose hand the military power of England, and the reputation of her generals," was "to be dissipated and vanish as a mist before the sun."

But sneers and taunts, defamation and calumny, respecting the military character of England, and the skill of her generals, were not confined to the French press; the factious (or, in more correct terms, the *un-English* and unnatural) journalists of England were busy in lauding the French general's military talents. To disparage the exploits of their glorious countryman, and exalt the generalship of his antagonist, they said that "Massena had the credit of paralyzing the *superior* forces of lord Wellington until he could bid defiance to their utmost efforts;" and, adopting the Frenchman's subterfuge to give a false colouring to his flight, they described the retreat from the Zezere to the Agueda as "a manœuvre of Massena to lead the English from their resources, and to approach his own supplies."

All Wellington's masterly plans and combinations, by which, with an inferior force, he had manœuvred his adversary out of every position he had attempted to defend, all of which were with difficulty assailable by any superiority of numbers (for the country afforded many advantageous positions to a retreating army), were said by the chief organ of the party, who, from interested and corrupt motives, felt disposed to calumniate the reputation of the English general, and depreciate the military character of their country, to be "the movements of an idle game, which would be disconcerted at the touch of the master hand who ruled the destinies of Europe; that it was insanity itself, and deceiving the



nation, to assert that any British army could ultimately succeed in arresting the progress of Napoleon's arms, and preventing the accomplishment of his gigantic views." In another of the calumniating publications they accused him of having, in the noble prosecution of his measures, "lapsed into unjustifiable want of intelligence and erroneous judgment." Among the alarmists and despondents of the times, lord Holland was eminently conspicuous for his prophetic spirit respecting the result of his illustrious fellow-countryman's exertions for the salvation of the freedom of Europe. His precise words were—"That he believed the peninsula might be rescued, if some great master spirit in the art of war should arise, whose mighty genius and comprehensive plans would overwhelm Napoleon and his generals; but he regretted, that at the commencement of the year 1811, he saw no prospect of any genius of that sort arising amongst his countrymen." Unfortunately for the credit of the sagacious seer, the refutation of his calumny was on its passage to England while he was giving birth to his twaddle. The just and generous rebuke which M. Thiers, in his *History of the Consulate and the Empire*, gives those prophetic worthies, the scribes of the press, and the members of the senate, for their unworthy and unnatural slander of the military character of their country, reflects equal honour on his candour as a man and his credit as an historian.

The only French force that now remained in Portugal was the garrison of Almeida, and a brigade of the ninth corps, which was employed in covering the march of the battering train from Almeida to Ciudad Rodrigo. To intercept this last-mentioned force, ten squadrons of cavalry, and a troop of horse-artillery were despatched under the command of sir William Erskine, whom we have already seen not competent to the trust confided to him; and on their attacking the enemy near Fort Conception, he rapidly formed his force into squares, and bravely retreated over the plain, without sustaining any loss from his incompetent opponent.

Massena had invaded Portugal with one of the finest armies that ever had been marshalled under the standard of France, and was supplied with every description of warlike muniment necessary for the undertaking. He had been re-enforced while at Santarem with 10,000 men under Drouet,

and with 9,000 convalescents, &c., during his retreat. Belmas says, that when he recrossed the frontiers, he "could hardly number 35,000 broken and dispirited troops."\* And all this waste of human life had served no other end, than to fix an eternal blot of dishonour on the escutcheon of France—an imperishable disgrace to the French people, both as men and soldiers. The name of the French chief was not only infamous for his ruthless cruelties and wanton barbarity, but was equally conspicuous for the want of good faith. So absolutely incapable was he of honourable and soldierly feeling, that the English commander-in-chief declared, that he could not even treat with him for an exchange of prisoners; and when earnestly entreated to do so by his friends, his reply was—"He (Massena) executed with so little good faith the only agreement for an exchange that I ever made with him, that it is impossible to propose another to get out of his hands the few prisoners he may have." How deeply he felt and resented the dishonourable conduct of the French marshal appears also from the following reply to Marmont when he succeeded Massena in the command of the French army:—

"Au Quartier Général de l'Armée, Anglaise,  
" Ce 25 Mai, 1811.

"MONSIEUR LE MARECHAL,—Je n'ai reçu que le 22me la lettre que votre excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 16me de ce mois; et j'ai tarde d'y envoyer une réponse jusqu'à ce que j'aie pu savoir si le colonel La Motte était toujours à Celerico, où on l'avait envoyé. Je suis fâché de vous faire savoir qu'il était déjà parti pour Lisbonne, mais si vous voulez avoir la bonté d'envoyer Monsieur le lieutenant-colonel Hill aux avant-postes de l'armée, j'aurai soin que Monsieur le colonel Motte soit tout de suite renvoyé à l'armée Française.

Peu de jours après que M. le Prince d'Essling eut pris le commandement de l'armée qui est à present sous les ordres de votre excellence, je lui avais proposé que les chirurgiens et les officiers des autres départemens civils des armées fussent considérés comme non-combattans, et que s'ils étaient pris, ils seraient rendus des deux côtés. Mais son excellence ne m'a donné aucune réponse sur cette proposition, malgré quelle fait accompagnée par l'offre de rendre quelques officiers de santé de l'armée Française qui avaient été pris. Après, quand

\* *Journal des Sieges.*



tout l'ambulance de l'armée Française fait prise à Coimbra, son excellence m'a proposé que les officiers de santé seraient censés non-combatants, et que les non-combatants seraient rendus de part et d'autre. Mais c'était alors trop tard; cars dans le temps qui était passé, depuis que je lui fis la même proposition, j'avais reçu la copie des pièces d'une négociation entre les gouvernemens Anglais et Française pour l'échange des prisonniers de guerre, par lesquelles j'ai vu que les non-combatants de toute espèce, des voyageurs, des marchands qui suivaient leurs affaires, des personnes qui n'avaient rien à faire avec la guerre, détenus en France quand elle a malheureusement commencée, étaient censés prisonniers de guerre, et devaient être changés comme tels en cartel, pour des officiers et des soldats de l'armée Française.

"Il n'est plus donc dans mon pouvoir de mettre en liberté quelque prisonnier que ce soit, comme non-combatants; et je le regrette d'autant plus, que j'aurais eu le plus grand plaisir à me rendre au désir de votre excellence en faveur de Monsieur le sous-inspecteur ville sur Ance.

"Je l'honneur d'être, &c.,

"WELLINGTON."

"Le Maréchal Marmont, duc de Raguse."

And the liberation of Portugal was not the only good accomplished by the expulsion of Massena and his horde of marauders. From it originated that point of reaction in the career of French conquests from which all the subsequent reverses of "the common enemy of the human race" may be dated, and the emancipation of Europe from his galling and ignominious yoke effected. It shook the belief and stupid hallucination of the continental nations of Europe, and the alarmists and factious of our own country in the invincibility of French arms, and "the mighty and overpowering genius of Napoleon;" taught Russia in what spirit of constancy his lawless and gigantic power might be resisted; and awakened the subjugated nations of Europe to the hope of deliverance from their thralldom and oppression.

At this period of the war, the marauding spirit of the enemy was in its full vigour and activity. The conduct of the enemy during their continuance in Portugal, and throughout the retreat, was one universal scene of outrage and violence. "Their conduct," says the English commander-in-chief, "throughout the retreat was marked

by a barbarity seldom equalled, and never surpassed."\* Nor was the English commander-in-chief singular in this opinion. Numerous other authorities might be readily cited. "Having paid the tribute of praise which is due to marshal Massena," says colonel Jones, "as a general, it is but proper to notice his conduct as a man, and to endeavour to hold him up to the execration of his fellow-men, by stating, as an eye-witness, that the inhuman cruelties which marked every step of his retreat, rank him as one of the greatest monsters that ever disgraced the human form." "The deplorable scenes of havoc and devastation—the terrible spectacles of bloodshed and cruelty continually before our eyes," says one of the pursuers, "are such, that to see the country is to weep for the horrors of war, and enough to make one's blood curdle in one's veins to think that man can inflict so demoniac deeds on his fellow-men." "Nothing," says General Picton, in a letter addressed to colonel Pleydel, dated the 24th of March, 1811, and published in his Life by the late Theodore Hook, "can exceed the devastation and cruelties committed by the enemy during the whole course of the retreat; setting fire to all the villages, and murdering all the peasantry for leagues on each flank of his columns. Their atrocities have been such and so numerous, that the name of Frenchman must be execrated here for ages." Even the author of *The History of the War in the Peninsula* says—"Every horror that could make war hideous attended that dreadful march. Distress, conflagration, death in all modes. On every side unlimited violence, unlimited vengeance." In a word, the whole line of retreat was marked by fire, desolation, and blood; and the most ruthless and vindictive spirit of revenge by the humbled and baffled foe. In many extensive districts neither a living animal nor an article of subsistence was to be found; and to adopt the mock philanthropic lament of the foe when he beheld the wise precaution of his opponent on his invasion of the country, "near 2,000 square miles of country were reduced to the state of a desert." Not only towns and villages had been pillaged and set on fire, and even churches and hospitals destroyed, but the inhabitants wantonly massacred. In the district of Coimbra alone, above 8,000 of its inhabitants were massa-

\* *Wellington Despatches.*



cred by the cruel and ruthless foe as they passed in their retreat. And so bitter and unappeasable was his vindictive spirit of revenge, that he shot by the wayside the inhabitants of Miranda de Corvo whom he had compelled to accompany him as guides, when their services were no longer required. Along the whole line of their retreat, the peasants were to be seen hanging on the trees by the roadside, blackened in the sun. The priests were impaled by the throat on the sharpened branches of the trees, as an indication of the rancour and revenge of the baffled foe for their exhorting their countrymen to resistance. Even in the towns which had been the head-quarters of some of the corps for four months, namely, Torres Nova, Thomar, Leyria, &c., and in which the inhabitants had been induced by promises of good treatment, and the proclamation of Massena, to remain, had to lament their credulity amidst scenes of plunder, violation, blood, and conflagration, and that too even on the very night of the enemy's flight. His vengeance and cruelty extended even to the brute creation. The horses, mules, asses, and oxen employed in the conveyance of his artillery, ammunition, and stores, as they became exhausted, were hamstrung, and left to perish from famine. To those who wish to know the full measure of French atrocity and French outrages in the conquered countries, we recommend the perusal of a work entitled *Galli in Hispania; seu Napoleonis Rapacitatis Descriptio, Duo Partes, Romae Persepoli, 1814*. Among many other trustworthy publications, general Foy's *History of the Peninsular War*, and M. Thiers' *History of the Consulate and Empire of France*, contain some just and true acknowledgments on the same subject; and form a striking contrast to some works published by our own countrymen, which are either studiously silent on the subject, or attempt to cast a veil over those hideously criminal acts.

As a relief from the above disgusting detail of French ferocious atrocities, it is but right to say, that no doubt a large and gallant proportion of the French army, both officers and privates, viewed with abhorrence and contempt the acts of ruffians who disgraced the name of soldier, though those acts were approved and sanctioned, and even commanded by orders from head-quarters.

On the riddance of the soil of Portugal from Massena and his Gallic horde, the

English general caused the following proclamation to be published:—

“PROCLAMATION.

“10th April, 1811.

“The Portuguese nation are informed that the cruel enemy who had invaded Portugal, and had devastated their country, have been obliged to evacuate it, after suffering great losses, and have retired across the Agueda. The inhabitants of the country are therefore at liberty to return to their occupations.

“The marshal-general refers them to the proclamation which he addressed to them in August last, a copy of which will accompany this proclamation.

“The Portuguese nation now know by experience that the marshal-general was not mistaken either in the nature or the amount of the evil with which they were threatened, or respecting the only remedies to avoid it, viz., decided and determined resistance, or removal and the concealment of all property, and everything which could lead to the subsistence of the enemy, or to facilitate his progress.

“Nearly four years have now elapsed since the tyrant of Europe invaded Portugal with a powerful army. The cause of this invasion was not self-defence; it was not to seek revenge for insults offered, or injuries done by the benevolent sovereign of this kingdom; it was not even the ambitious desire of augmenting his own political power; as the Portuguese government had, without resistance, yielded to all the demands of the tyrant; but the object was the insatiable desire of plunder, the wish to disturb the tranquillity, and to enjoy the riches of a people who had passed nearly half a century in peace.

“The same desire occasioned the invasion of the northern provinces of Portugal in 1809, and the same wish for plunder the invasion of 1810, now happily defeated; and the marshal-general appeals to the experience of those who have been witnesses of the conduct of the French army during these three invasions, whether confiscation, plunder, and outrage, are not the sole objects of their attention, from the general down to the soldier.

“Those countries which have submitted to the tyranny have not been better treated than those which have resisted. The inhabitants have lost all their possessions, their families have been dishonoured, their religion destroyed; and, above all, they



have deprived themselves of the honour of that manly resistance to the oppressor of which the people of Portugal have given so signal and so successful an example.

“The marshal-general, however, considers it his duty, in announcing the intelligence of the result of the last invasion, to warn the people of Portugal, that although the danger is removed, it is not entirely gone by. They have something to lose, and the tyrant will endeavour to plunder them: they are happy under the mild government of a beneficent sovereign; and he will endeavour to destroy their happiness: they have successfully resisted him, and he will endeavour to force them to submit to his iron yoke. They should be unremitting in their preparations for decided and steady resistance; those capable of bearing arms should learn the use of them; or those whose age or sex renders them unfit to bear arms, should fix upon places of security and concealment, and should make all the arrangements for their easy removal to them when the moment of danger shall approach. Valuable property, which tempts the avarice of the tyrant and his followers, should be carefully buried beforehand, each individual concealing his own, and thus not trusting to the weakness of others to keep a secret in which they may not be interested.

“Measures should be taken to conceal or destroy provisions which cannot be removed, and everything that can tend to facilitate the enemy’s progress; for this may be depended on, that the enemy’s troops seize on everything, and leave nothing for the owner.

“By these measures, whatever may be the superiority of numbers with which the desire of plunder and of revenge may induce, and his power may enable, the tyrant again to invade this country, the result will be certain; and the independence of Portugal, and the happiness of its inhabitants, will be finally established to their eternal honour.

“WELLINGTON.”

The English general having, by his consummate stratagetic plans and combinations, baffled his opponent, and proved to him that he was too powerful for resistance, disposed his army in cantonments between the Coa and the Agueda, and established his headquarters at Villa Formosa. Two causes prevented him from continuing the pursuit of his baffled and humbled foe, and taking a position beyond the Agueda. First, the

deplorable condition of the Portuguese forces, their destitution being so great that daily desertion took place from their ranks; and, secondly, to restore the equipments and reorganization of the troops, which the rapidity of the pursuit had greatly disarranged. Almeida was blockaded, it not being possible to undertake its siege for want of battering artillery, and the requisite siege stores; so apathetically indifferent were the authorities at home, and the Portuguese government, to the interests of the army, and the successful issue of the war. Lord Liverpool, quailing under the heartless and insidious clamour of the Whig faction in parliament for economy, even required the return of many battalions to England, to join the misjudged and calamitous expedition to Walcheren. So limited and short-sighted were the views of the timid and inefficient cabinet of the day!

The English general being relieved from an immediate surprise on the frontier of Beira, surrendered the command of the army to sir Brent Spencer, and proceeded to the Alemtejo to arrange measures with Beresford for the recovery of Badajos, the disgraceful surrender of which fortress had occasioned him much disappointment.

The episodal military operations of this campaign were the expedition, under general lord Blaney, to the southern coast of Spain, and the battle of Barossa.

The object of the expedition under Blaney was to make a feint attack on a depôt of artillery and stores collected in the castle of Fuengirola, distant about twenty miles west of Malaga, in the hope that Sebastiani would hasten from that city to the relief of the castle; and, in the event of his doing so, Blaney’s instructions were to re-embark his force, and attempt the surprise of Malaga. The expedition sailed early in October, 1810, for the purpose; and consisted of a battalion of the 89th, a corps of Italian and German deserters from the French army, and the Spanish regiment of Toledo, drawn from the garrison of Ceuta; in all about fifteen hundred men. Sebastiani gaining intelligence of the design, advanced to the relief of the place. Blaney, strangely mistaking his advanced guard for Spanish troops coming to his assistance, was captured, with two hundred of his men; and the whole detachment would have been taken prisoners had not the Rodney, with the 82nd regiment on board, hove in sight



at the critical moment; when the flank companies of that regiment being disembarked, checked the enemy, and enabled the remainder of Blaney's force to regain their shipping. The ultimate of this untoward affair was, that Blaney acted with but little skill and prudence through the affair. He fruitlessly occupied himself for two days in attempting to batter the place with a few twelve-pounders; instead of which foolish act, he should have re-embarked his force, as it was morally certain that the enemy would, in the course of that time, obtain intelligence of his presence; and therefore the attempt at surprise would be rendered nugatory. But Blaney's tarriance until his adversary was prepared for him, formed a contrast to sir John Murray's rapidity of movement on the north coast of Spain some time afterwards, who was in so great a hurry to get out of Suchet's way, that he left all his baggage behind him. Or the funny freak of the same gentleman—he "who was afraid of being pushed into the Douro," at the passage of that river—when he abandoned "the time-honoured battering train of Badajos" to the same "fearful Frenchman," from a supposition that "*it was not worth carrying away, as other cannon could be manufactured.*"

The battle of Barossa originated out of the following transaction:—The French having forced the extraordinarily strong pass of the Sierra Morena, and overrun Andalusia, quickly advanced from Seville on Cadiz.\* Early in February, 1811, Victor reached that city just in time to see the troops of Albuquerque (who had, by forced marches, traversed the distance of 260 miles in nine days, and thus opportunely saved that city from the grasp of the enemy) on the walls, and manning the works of the Isle of Leon. Soult soon arrived to direct, in person, the operations of the siege. For that purpose, a line of contravallation was formed around the bay, from San Lucar to Chiclana; to the extent of twenty-five miles. The line was composed of three grand positions at Chiclana, Puerto Real, and Santa Maria, strongly fortified and connected by intrenched camps, which cut off all commu-

nication with the country. His conduct here even surpassed his savage cruelties in Portugal. There, besides the most unbounded plunder and rapacity, he caused all persons suspected of holding communication with the English colonel, Trant, or the Portuguese general, Silveira, to be hung from the trees along the road-side; and not only left them hanging there, but forbade them to be buried. A party of militia, under the command of a lieutenant-colonel, having surprised a chef d'escadron near the village of Arrifana, and slain him and three of his escort, Soult ordered general Thomières to seize twenty of the inhabitants, and having tied them back to back, to shoot them in the presence of the whole village, and then to set fire to it.

For the defence of the place, lord Wellington detached general sir William Stewart, with 2,000 men from Lisbon; and the governor of Gibraltar sent one thousand more for the same purpose. The English general, immediately on his arrival, prepared to restore and reoccupy the insulated outwork of Fort Matagorda, which, with the Trocadero, though both important posts, had been abandoned and dismantled by their timid and ignorant defenders. The former is an insulated outwork, situated on a rocky islet, a short distance from the Trocadero, and about 4,000 yards distant from Cadiz.

For the re-possession of that post, 150 men, consisting partly of soldiers and sailors, pushed, under the command of captain Mac Lean, of the 94th, on the night of the 22nd of February, across the channel, during a storm, and, taking possession of it, made a lodgment. As the operations of the little garrison, with their seven guns, interrupted the progress of the enemy's works for near two months, the fire of fifty pieces of heavy ordnance was now concentrated on it. After the iron tempest had raged thirty hours, the fort being reduced to a mere pile of ruins, and above half of its gallant garrison down; the survivors were, on the night of the 22nd of April, withdrawn, bearing with them the colours, which had been six times shot away and as often re-hoisted, amidst the cheers of the brave

\* Cadiz, which is the great arsenal of Spain, and the principal rendezvous of the Spanish navy, and, until the defection of the South American colonies, was the great emporium of the commerce of that region of the earth, is situated on a ledge of rocks placed at the extremity of a narrow tongue of land, projecting five miles north-north-west from the Isle of Leon,—which island is separated from the main-

land by the river Sante Petri,—and has two of its sides washed by the sea, the right one looking on the harbour. The isle covers the fortress and the harbour, which is a vast bason of from ten to twelve leagues in circumference. The strongholds of the Trocadero and Matagorda, and the three other forts of St. Sebastian, St. Catherine, and Louis, defend the bay.



band that had so gloriously defended them. At the same time the works of the fort were blown up. By their heroic defence of this little post, this little band of heroes had not only prevented, by their persevering gallantry, any attack being made on other quarters of the panic-stricken city, but eventually proved its salvation.

While the crashing flight of metal was playing on the devoted garrison from the guns and mortars, the following display of female heroism took place. A serjeant's wife observing a drummer-boy hesitating, in consequence of the terrible shower of shot and shell which was falling, to fetch water from the well of the fort, took the bucket from him; and though a shot cut the cord of the bucket short from her hand, she recovered the vessel, and returned to her quarters with the water. Another memorable occurrence took place at the siege of this fort. When the retention of the place was no longer possible, major Lefevre, of the engineers, carried the order to the governor to withdraw the garrison. When the whole garrison had descended the ladder, a point of etiquette arose between the major and captain Maclean, who should quit the

scene of danger last. Captain Maclean politely offered the precedence to the major, who, while as politely conceding it to the commandant, had his head struck off by a 32-pounder, discharged from the enemy's batteries.

The siege of Cadiz still continued. But Soult having received directions from Paris to take a strong draught of the army, and having laid siege to and captured Olivenza and Badajos, to advance to the relief of Massena at Santarem, the prosecution of the siege was committed to Victor. As soon as general Graham arrived at Cadiz, which was in the early part of February, to take the command of the English forces then co-operating in the defence of that city, he concerted a plan with the Spanish general, Lapeña, then governor of Cadiz, to surprise the French besieging army under marshal Victor; and, by driving the French general out of his lines, to raise the siege of Cadiz. That noble and spirited conception he proposed to put into execution by an expedition sailing from Cadiz to Tariffa, where it was to be joined by a Spanish force from St. Roque, the 28th\* English regiment, and the flank companies of the 9th and 82nd regiments,

\* The presence of the gallant 28th, in the memorable battle of Barossa, presents a favourable opportunity of introducing to the reader's notice the soubriquets, or nick-names, of certain distinguished regiments, &c.; of which distinctions those regiments are proud and tenacious. The 28th of the line enjoys a distinction which no other regiment in the service, perhaps in any service in the world, possesses:—viz., the privilege of wearing a badge on the *back* as well as on the front of their shakos; being thus doubly decorated, both prospectively and retrospectively, or as their mates and brothers-in-arms of the *aquatic* profession would phrase it, "fore and aft." This distinction that gallant corps obtained for their conduct in the battle under the walls of Alexandria, Egypt, where, under the command of sir Edward Paget, they performed the prompt and decisive manœuvre of facing the rear-rank to the right about; thus repulsing, when attacked in front by a formidable force of infantry, and assailed at the same moment by a body of cavalry in the rear, while posted in a ruined and open intrenchment. For this exploit, "the slashers," as the regiment was afterwards familiarly termed in military parlance, acquired the emblem of the double decoration. Other regiments, as well as the 28th, have their cognomens, and have similar or equal distinction, obtained for some particular conduct displayed in a course of honourable service. But as qualifications of the kind are too numerous in the British army, when properly officered and properly led, to allow enumeration, and too well known to require repetition, we shall confine our statement to the matter of cognomens, or, as our friends, and when unfortunately we are at loggerheads together, truly-gallant enemies, on the other side of the water, express themselves,

*soubriquet*, but which downright, plain-speaking Mr. Bull would, in his lingo, term *nicknames*, *crack galaver*, &c. Thus the 57th regiment, for their gallant and enduring spirit at the battle of Albuera (where only one officer was left standing out of twenty-four, and 168 privates out of 584), bear the significant and honourable distinction of *The Die-hards*, a title the 27th are as justly entitled to for their conduct at Waterloo, where the principal part of them covered with their lifeless bodies the ground upon which they had maintained the honour and glory of their country. The 87th, for their capture of the French eagle at Barossa (a task of no easy performance, as the French, whenever they were hard pressed, or took to their heels, unscrewed their eagles, and pocketed them, throwing away the banner staff and bit of tawdry silk, as a waif to their pursuers, and even as a *ruse de guerre* for the retardment of the Johnny Raws in the English service,) are termed, in the true and native phraseology of the Emerald Islanders, "Sure arn't they the aigle-ketchers." The Royals, from their boasted antiquity (their enrolment dating from the year 1633; being the oldest regiment in any European service, except the Austrian regiments, the 24th and the 36th of the line, which had been raised the preceding year; and the Spanish regiment, *Inmemorial del Rey*, the date of whose establishment is beyond memory,) are styled *Pontius Pilate's Guards*. The Queen's, from the effigies of the Agnus Dei appearing on their appointments, and, satirically, in allusion to their accompanying, under the infamous colonel Kerke, and the no less infamous and savage judge Jeffreys, during "the bloody assizes," *Kerke's Lambs*. The 89th are christened, *The Yorickers*. The 50th, from their black facings and numerical standing in the regiments of the line, were termed *The Dirty Half*



already there, in order that a combined attack might be made on the rear of the enemy's lines; while, at the same time, the Spanish divisional general, Zayas, with 6,000 Spanish troops from the Isle of Leon, (which is a narrow tongue of land, of about five miles in length, and at the extremity of which stands Cadiz,) should, by means of a pontoon bridge thrown across the San Petri canal, at its sea-mouth, open a communication with the assailants. Thus, by taking the enemy by surprise, it was hoped the siege would be raised; but events proved how little the sluggish and arrogant Spaniard, Lapeña, understood of the meaning of the word.

On the 21st of February, 1811, the weather being favourable, the British contingent part of the expedition (consisting of 3,000 men, including 180 German hussars,) sailed from Cadiz; but being driven by a gale past its port of destination, it landed at Algeiras on the 23rd, and on the following day marched across the mountains to Tariffa. On the 27th, Lapeña arrived with 7,000 men. For the sake of conciliating the vain and arrogant Spaniard, the brave old English general, and really accomplished scholar, ceded the command-in-chief to his Spanish coadjutor, though he had been counselled by that perfect master of the science of war, and most successful, aye, and immaculate of generals, either ancient or modern, lord Wellington, to retain the chief command: but real talent is ever unassuming; and of

*Hundred*, a soubriquet which their gallant bearing in the Peninsula ought to have transformed into one of the most honourable that any regiment in any service has ever acquired. Some regiments have their cognomens from the places where they have been originally raised; as the 88th, having been raised in Connaught, and the 27th in Enniskillen, are termed *Connaught Rangers*, and *The Enniskilliners*. Again, regiments are distinguished by the colour of their facings, that of their uniform, or that of their horses; as—the *Pompadours*, the *Bufs*, the *Oxford Blues*, the *Scotch Greys*, &c. Even divisions of armies have, according to peculiar circumstances, been distinguished by soubriquets or cognomens. During the Peninsular war, the 3rd division, having had a large share of the hard knocks and other pleasantries of warfare, was emphatically entitled, *The Fighting Division*; the 4th, from lord Wellington's mode of expressing himself, in his despatch respecting their conduct at the battle of Pamplona, *The Enthusiasts*; the light division, consisting of "the matchless soldiers" of the 43rd, the 52nd, and the 95th rifles, were, on account of their constant employment, and forming the advance and rear guards of the army; or being, as the motto of the artillery expresses the services of that distinguished corps—"ubique"—(everywhere), *The War Brigade*; and another division (we shall avail ourselves, for the sake of courtesy

this indubitable axiom of moral philosophy, and almost sure criterion for ascertaining a true and correct judgment of the capacity and power of the human mind, Graham gave a splendid and an instructive example.

The next day, the allied army passed the mountain-ridges that separate the plains of St. Roque from those of Medina and Chiclana, at which time they were within four leagues of the enemy's posts of Vejer and Casa Vieja. There the army was distributed into three divisions; the vanguard under Lardizabel; the centre was led by the prince of Anglona; and Graham commanded the reserve, consisting of the British contingent, the 20th Portuguese çaçadores, the two Spanish regiments of the Walloon guards, and Ciudad Real. The united cavalry of both nations was under the command of Whittingham, who was then in the Spanish service.

From the first movements of Lapeña, Medina Sidonia seemed to be his object; but hearing that it was fortified, after many circuitous and eccentric movements over mountains, and through lagunes and by-roads, he reached, at noon of the 5th of March, the Cabeza de Puerco, more familiarly known to the English, in the events of the Peninsular War, under the memorable name of *The Heights of Barossa*, which is a mountain-ridge, about four miles distant from the Isle of Leon, rising gradually from the coast on one side, and on the other overlooking a high and broken plain of con-

and respect for that gallant corps, of a rhetorical figure, leaving the reader the labour of tasking his ingenuity to supply the vacuum), having from accidental circumstances been prevented from being so much engaged in the perilous business of warfare as the other corps, *The Immortals*. Regiments and divisions in the French army have also their soubriquets, and with as just a title to them as any of the English regiments, for that nation is truly a nation of warriors: they are born for soldiers, and would be invincible did they possess the enduring spirit and calm and temperate courage of the English. Thus the 4th demi-brigade, and the 57th demi-brigade of the line of the army of Italy, were styled, *The Impetuous*; and, *The Terrible*. The column of grenadiers that formed the advanced guard of the army of the western Pyrenees, was surnamed, *The Infernal*. The chasseurs of the imperial guard were styled, *The Invincibles*; and the 45th of the line, *The Immortals*. The same practice prevails in most of the services of Europe. The entire service of nations have received soubriquets. Thus the English soldiers term those of France, *Johnny Crapauds*, while the French designate the fellows in red jackets, who were so stupid as never to know that they were beaten—*les Godams*. Our troops in the Peninsular war termed the Spaniards, *los Carajos*, from their terrible swearing, and no less terrible runnings away.



siderable extent, bounded on the left by the coast cliffs, and on the right and the front by the pine forest of Chiclana, which skirts the plain, and circles round the height at some distance, terminating down towards San Petri. Beyond this locality, the space between the sea and the Almanza creek is filled by the narrow ridge of the Burmeja, which is accessible by the sea-shore under the cliff, or by the forest of Chiclana. Prior to reaching this position, the vain-glorious Spaniard, like the heroes of old, as they are pourtrayed in the immortal verse of Homer, harangued his soldiers with divers specimens of Spanish military eloquence, to keep "their courage cheery" and up to the mark.\*

While the combined army was leisurely

advancing in its rambling round-about pilgrimage to take the enemy by *surprise*,† and its leader "spouting" to "keep its courage cheery," Victor and Zayas were actively employed. The French general leaving his works garrisoned with 10,000 chosen troops, took up a position between Chiclana and Medina Sidonia, till the movements of the allies should disclose the object of their operations. Zayas, in pursuance of his orders, had thrown the bridge across the San Petri, and had established there a *tête du pont*. But as this was a post of too much consequence to leave unmolested, it was attacked in the nights of the 3rd and 4th, and Zayas driven back into the Isle.

#### BATTLE OF BAROSSA.

LAPENA, on taking up his position on the heights of Barossa, detached his vanguard under Lardizabel to open the communication with Zayas; but in effecting the junction Lardizabel suffered great loss, and was exposed to imminent danger. At the same time he directed Graham to march through the pine wood, and take possession of the Burmeja ridge, for the purpose of securing the communication of the San Petri; and from which it is distant about two miles.

\* Among "the vain-glorious" Lapena's bombastic orations, the reader may probably feel entertained with the following specimen of Spanish military rhetoric:—"Soldiers of the Fourth! The moment for which you have a whole year been longing, has at length arrived; a second time Andalusia is to owe to you her liberty, and the laurels of Mengibar and Baylen will revive upon your brows. You have to combat in the sight of the whole nation, assembled in its Cortes; the government will see your deeds; the inhabitants of Cadiz, who have made so many sacrifices for you, will be eye-witnesses of your heroism; they will lift up their voices in blessings, and in acclamations of praise, which you will hear amidst the roar of musketry and cannon. Let us go, then, to conquest! My cares are directed to that end." This precious bit of braggadocioism, the reader will perceive, is a sorry as well as a mawkish travesty of Napoleon's spirit-stirring, soul-entrancing, though inflated and bombastic, addresses and proclamations to his armies, which were so calculated to dazzle the fervid imaginations of warriors—that they "shot like fire to the heart of the real soldier,"—and to a nation like the French, thirsting for military glory, and insatiable in its acquisition, produced that frenzied enthusiasm, that intoxication of pleasure and delight in warfare which enabled them to overcome all difficulties, and reduce all the states of Europe to the subjection and dominion of their worshipped leader. That extraordinarily talented but mischievous man, was endowed with all the elements and characteris-

Graham obeyed the mandate, though at the same time he pointed out the impolicy of the measure, observing, that no general acquainted with the science of war, would expose his flank by attacking the Burmeja, while the heights of Barossa were held in force. But as the headstrong Spaniard was not to be diverted from his purpose, Graham began his march, in full persuasion, that Lapena would retain the preservation of the heights with Anglona's division and ties of the orator, and had he followed literature as a profession, would, no doubt, have obtained a distinguished station in her ranks; but his restless temperament and insatiable ambition, rendered all the gifts of intellect that nature had so profusely bestowed on him, vain and valueless.

† Lapena, and his concoctors of the notable scheme of "*taking the enemy by surprise*," certainly adopted an odd way of *surprising* their adversary, by beating up his outposts, and thus *apprising* him of their approach. Their rambling movements, or exploratory pilgrimage, over mountains, through lagunes and by-roads, for the distance of above ninety miles, also afforded the enemy no trifling opportunity of getting ready for their reception. Even the distance of sixty miles, which the direct march from Tarifa to Barossa required, might have been avoided by the very means that Zayas adopted of throwing the pontoon bridge over the San Petri; and thus the troops would have been saved the harassment to which they were subjected; and the chance would have been greater of surprising the enemy, as he would have had less opportunity and time of becoming cognizant of their designs, and it was by no means improbable that the battle of Barossa would have not then been unproductive in its results, as the British contingent force would not have been disabled from pursuing the fleeing enemy, from the exhausted state they were in after that battle; having not only been worn out with the length and tedium of the march, but having also suffered much from want of provisions.



the united cavalry. No sooner had the English entered the pine wood, than the imbecile Spaniard began his march, by the sea-road for San Petri, leaving five battalions to protect his baggage on the heights.

The French general having been informed by the fugitives who had escaped from his outposts of Vejer and Casa Vieja, that the allied army was advancing, and that Lapeña was the commander-in-chief, was anxiously on the watch to avail himself of Spanish error and inefficiency; therefore, as soon as he observed Lapeña's false movements, and that the English were fully involved in the wood, he rushed forward to seize the heights which his opponent had so unwisely abandoned. Lieutenant-colonel Brown, who had been left with a battalion of the light companies of the several regiments, to guard the English baggage, unable to stem the torrent, sent to Graham for orders. The English general's situation was now truly desperate. Laval's division was advancing along the edge of the forest, within cannon-shot of his left flank; Ruffin's was rapidly ascending the left side of the Barossa hill, from which the Spanish rear-guard was fleeing on the opposite side towards the sea, in the most indescribable confusion; the English battalion, under colonel Brown, alone remained on the heights, and having been formed into square, was making a gallant resistance; but Lapeña and his force had vanished. To have retreated on the Burmeja would have brought the enemy pell-mell with the allies upon that narrow ridge, where defeat must inevitably have been the consequence, as the whole army would "have been driven like sheep into an inclosure; the Almanza creek being on one side, the sea on the other, the San Petri to bar their flight, and the enemy hanging on their rear in all the fierceness of victory." With decision, therefore, as heroic as it was sudden, and which partook more of the nature of an inspiration than a resolve, the English general determined to encounter with his little band the host of the enemy, and recover the key of the field of battle.

As it was not possible, in the thick forest and the difficult and intricate ground on which he was, to countermarch his columns, he simply faced it to the right-about, by which evolution the rear-rank men of the respective companies occupied the place of front-rank men; and in this state being formed into line, as they issued from the wood, they were immediately pushed for-

ward to the attack; the right wing (consisting of a battalion of the guards, lieutenant-colonel Brown's flank battalion of the 28th, lieutenant-colonel Norcott's two companies of caçadore-rifles, the 28th and part of the 67th, led by lieutenant-colonels Betson and Prevost) bearing away, under the command of brigadier-general Dilkes, to assail Ruffin's corps on the heights; and the left wing (consisting of three companies of the Coldstream guards, under lieutenant-colonel Jackson, the 87th regiment, and lieutenant-colonel Barnard's flank battalion, consisting of two companies of the 47th, two of the 20th Portuguese, and four companies of the 3rd battalion English rifles), under the command of lieutenant-colonel Wheatley, to make head against Laval's division. In the opening, major Duncan drew up his artillery, consisting of ten guns, and opened a furious cannonade on Laval's column. The enemy's guns, in reply, threw a tempest of grape and canister over the field.

The English little band was received with a courage and determination scarcely inferior to their own undaunted bearing. The artillery on each side did fearful execution, while the musketry kept up a withering and an exterminating fire. The British left wing now advanced, firing, when the three companies of guards, and the 87th, fixing their bayonets as they advanced, made a fierce charge on the first line of Laval's division, and forcing it back on the second, both were broken by the shock. Nor was the right wing less successful. On that side, the enemy, confident of victory, descended the hill half-way to meet Dilkes's division. With loud shouts the combatants engaged in desperate conflict; but the struggle was not of long duration. The vigour of the attack was irresistible, and Ruffin's division was forced back, and driven down the other side of the heights in confusion, leaving two pieces of cannon in possession of the victors.

The discomfited divisions retreating concentrically, attempted to rally at the point where their disordered masses united, and renew the action; but the English artillery rendering all exertion to regain their formation unavailing, they fled precipitately to their lines. The British troops, who had been twenty-four hours (the greater part of which occupied in a night march) under arms without food of any kind (an occurrence which frequently happened during



the glorious struggles in the Peninsula, through the culpable conduct of the Spanish juntas, and the ingratitude and inhumanity of the Spanish people, and which often tended materially to deteriorate the effects of the victories of the British army), and weary with the rambling and harassing march to which the Spanish general had subjected them, were incapable of an effectual pursuit; they, however, followed the foe "as far as their exhausted limbs would carry their gallant hearts."

\* After the battle the wounded of both armies were, from want of means of transport, necessarily left upon the field of battle during the whole night, and part of the following day. Rousseau was of the number. His dog, a white one of the poodle kind, which had been left in quarters on the advance of the French force, finding that the general did not return with those that escaped, set out in search of his master, and finding him in his dreary resting-place of death, expressed his affliction by moans and affectionately licking the hands and feet of the dying general. When the fatal crisis took place, he attached himself closely to the body, and for three days refused the sustenance offered him. Arrangements having been made for the interment of the dead, and the body of the general having been committed to its honourable grave, the dog laid himself down upon the sod that covered the beloved remains of his master, and evinced by silence and dejection his sorrow for the loss he had sustained. General Graham observed the friendless mourner, drew him from the spot of his affliction, and gave him his protection, which he continued to him till his death, which happened many years afterwards at the general's residence in Perthshire. Other instances of canine attachment, that occurred in the French armies (for it is no unusual thing for the French soldier to be accompanied by his dog, and almost every regiment in the service has its staff dog, which is the favourite of the whole regiment, and considered its common property), are no less memorable and interesting. On the night following the battle of Bassano, Napoleon, accompanied by some officers, took a survey of the field of battle—a practice he adopted for the purpose of ascertaining the nature of the contests, and the points on which success had depended. The moon shed her light upon the scene, and the profound silence of the night was disturbed only by the cries of the wounded and the groans of the dying. Suddenly a dog which had been lying upon a dead body, came forward moaning, alternately advancing and receding, as if hesitating between the desire of avenging the death of his master, and the apprehension of allowing the body to become cold, which he was desirous of preserving. Napoleon checked his horse, and after remaining for some minutes absorbed in profound meditation, exclaimed, "What a lesson for man!" The occurrence made so strong an impression on his feelings, that he reverted to it during his abode in St. Helena. The author of *The Subaltern* tells us, that when the British army was in the south of France, he observed a dog close by the side of the dead body of a French soldier, lying in a garden on the banks of the Nive, howling in a very piteous manner, and that he could not induce him, either by force or kindness, to desert the post he had taken,

The English general having remained several hours on the field, withdrew to the Isle of Leon, with his wounded prisoners, six guns, and one eagle, leaving a detachment of the 95th, under major Ross, in possession of the field of battle; thus removing all possible surmise that the retrograde movement was a retreat. The loss of the enemy, in killed and wounded, was about 2,000. The generals of division and brigade, Ruffin and Rousseau\*, were mortally wounded. The loss of the English, in

for the purpose of defending his dead master from the wolves and vultures which were hovering round the body. Henneskin, in his *Seven Years' Campaigning*, relates an equally interesting anecdote of canine attachment. He says, that while pacing the battlefield of the Nivelles, he saw a black poodle dog lying by the side of a wounded officer of chasseurs (an Irishman who had entered the French service) for the purpose of watching his master. A soldier in the Italian regiment of the Veliti, of the guards, had, when at Milan, a dog that was much attached to him, following him to all his various military duties, and invariably mounting guard with him, and sharing his sentry-box whenever he stood sentry at the gate of the vice-regal palace. In 1812, at the time of the disastrous Russian campaign, among the numerous regiments composing the fine Italian army that marched with the viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, went the Veliti, and with them the master of the dog. Tofino, who was already well known to the soldiers, marched after his master, and having crossed the Alps, and traversed a great portion of the European continent, finally arrived at Moscow, where he closed his career by dying upon the body of his slain master. But among all the instances of canine attachment, whether in military or civil life, the following is the most remarkable:—A few days before the overthrow of Robespierre, the revolutionary tribunal had condemned M. Roulet, who, participating in that holy enthusiasm that gave birth to the immortal prodigies of military valour and devotion in the early periods of the French republic, had served with distinguished reputation in the army commanded by Jourdan, but had unhappily incurred the vengeance of the French dictator, as having been guilty of a conspiracy. His faithful dog, a water-spaniel, was with him when he was seized, but not being suffered to enter his prison, he took refuge with an old comrade of his master, and every day, at the same time, returned to the prison door, and passed some time there, but was always refused admittance. His unremitting fidelity at last won on the keeper, who daily admitted him to his master's presence. When the day of trial arrived, the dog, notwithstanding the endeavours of the officers of justice to prevent him, penetrated the hall, and lay crouched beneath the legs of his master. Again, at the hour of execution, he was there; nor could he be separated from the lifeless body of his master; and after the body was committed to the grave, he lay stretched upon it. Being found there by his master's friend, he was taken home by force, but he returned again to the grave, and this he continued to do for three months. At length he refused food altogether, and commenced tearing up the earth which covered the remains of his much loved master



killed and wounded, exceeded one-fourth of the army; 61 officers, and 1,180 rank and file being killed or wounded. An eagle, six pieces of cannon, and 440 prisoners remained in the hands of the victors, who did not lose a single prisoner. The eagle belonged to the 8th regiment of the line, which, for its conduct at the battle of Talavera, was honoured by Napoleon placing, with his own hand, a golden wreath of laurel round the neck of the eagle. The first attempt made to seize the eagle was by ensign Keogh, of the 89th; but that officer being run through the body by several men who surrounded the standard, serjeant Masterman, of the same regiment, made a dash at the prize, and secured it.

While these prodigies of valour were performing, Lapeña, who had taken post on his favourite Bermeja, though at the head of 12,000 infantry, and 800 cavalry, remained a quiet and cold-blooded spectator of deeds, the bare recital of which should have been enough to warm him into a hero, without lending the least assistance to his gallant ally, whom his own commands had involved in this terrible conflict; not even menacing the right of the enemy, which was close to him, and too weak in numbers to have resisted his attack; nor did he attempt to pursue the wreck of the beaten brigades as they were hurrying in disorder from the heights of Chiclana. Had he detached his cavalry and horse-artillery, who, by sweeping round the left of Ruffin's division, would have rendered the defeat ruinous, the siege would have consequently been raised. The three troops of German hussars, under colonel Ponsonby, however, impatient of the shameful inactivity, burst away from the useless mass, and reaching the field just as the defeated divisions were attempting to unite, rapidly rode in upon them, and threw them into still greater confusion.

Victor, astonished at his escape from a fate that seemed inevitable, had the imbecile Lapeña done his duty, resuming his offensive attitude, reoccupied his posts round the bay of Cadiz; and prepared to prosecute the siege. The reason that he halted so near the field of battle as he did, was merely to afford Latour Marbourg (who had been

detached with 2,000 cavalry to Vejer, for the purpose of cutting off the retreat of the English army on Gibraltar, had the fortune of the day turned in favour of the French) a chance of escape from the perilous enterprise on which he had been sent. Thus ended the battle of Barossa, which though unproductive of any beneficial result, from the shameful conduct of the Spanish general, will ever remain on record as one in which English valour was pre-eminently successful. Had Graham possessed "a worthy colleague instead of the dastard Lapeña," it would have been as beneficial in its results as it was glorious in its issue.

The doughty Spaniard, now that the fighting was over, raised his recreant head, and sent an address to the cortes, arrogating to himself the victory. The English general, justly exasperated, exposed this delusion in a public letter to the British envoy. The cortes, to appease the indignation of the English army and its general, brought Lapeña to trial; but his judges exculpating him, he published his "Justification," as he called his falsifying defence, in which he insinuated that the victory of Barossa was the result of his plans, and that the failure of breaking up the siege was owing to Graham's retreat. His subordinates, Lacy and Cruz Murgeon, united in the accusation, publishing false accounts and plans of the battle. Graham, incensed at their duplicity, and the apparent sanction it had received by the exculpation of the Spanish court-martial, refused, with disdain, the title of grandee of the first class, that had been voted to him by the cortes; and, besides re-exposing the duplicity and falsehood of his Spanish calumniators in a second letter to the British envoy, enforced an apology from Lacy with his sword. Eventually dissatisfied with the disingenuous treatment he had received, having previously caused a military survey to be made of the Isle of Leon, and materially strengthened the works from the sea on the right to the Caraccas on the left (the batteries having been ill-placed, the intrenchments contemptible, and the interior defences neglected by the Spanish authorities), he relinquished his command to general Cooke, and proceeded to join the army under lord Wellington, where, on account of the absence of many of the generals of division, who had gone home on leave, his services were much required.

The strength of the mourner not being equal to the display of his long-tryed and unexhausted affection, he shrieked in his struggles to accomplish his purpose, and with his last look fixed on the grave, ceased to breathe.



## THE SPANISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

ANNIS 1810—1812.

THE experience of 1809, "the never-ending defeats," the panics and flights of the scared troops of Spain, had not taught either its perverse and foolish government, or its imbecile generals, wisdom, moderated their rashness and presumption, or improved their military skill and discipline. Their armies still continued to be overthrown and scattered as the timid and unresisting flock before the fierce and raging tiger. Town after town still continued to fall into the hands of the enemy, and army after army to be scared and scattered. In the early part of 1810, Olivença, Cordova, Granada, and Malaga, fell without a struggle; Lerida, Mequinza, Hostalrich, and Astorga, after a gallant defence. O'Donnell was defeated at Vich in February, and at Mugalet in April. The strong passes of the Sierra Morena were forced, and the 25,000 men, under Areizaga, stationed there to defend them, utterly routed. The remnants of the scared patriot armies were, to adopt a significantly expressive term, employed by one who was well acquainted with their merits and demerits, "discussed by the French generals at their leisure." The brave and zealous Romana was defeated at Bevenida in August, and at Fuentes de Caubos in September; as was also Cupons at Tinto on the same day, and at Castillejos in October. On the 4th of November Blake's army was routed at Velez Malaga, on the Almanzor River; and on the same day Bassacour was overthrown at Undecono, and on the 27th of the same month at Benicarlo. These untoward events forcibly demonstrated the policy of lord Wellington's "divorcing" his operations from the folly and feebleness of Spain; from the intrigues and bad faith of the junta, and the imbecility of its generals. To counterbalance those great and signal disasters,

the only advantage the Spaniards had gained, was the capture, by O'Donnell, of two battalions of the enemy's infantry, and five squadrons of cuirassiers, by surprise, at Santa Perpetua and Mollet, in February; and of 1,500 men under Schwartz, in September, at La Bispal. The full detail of these operations is as follows.

As soon as Buonaparte had concluded his Austrian alliance, he ordered 120,000 of his troops, who had been engaged in the campaign at Wagram, to cross the Pyrenees; and on the 3rd of December he announced to his obsequious senate his intention of following them: "When I shall show myself," said the braggart, "beyond the Pyrenees, the leopard in terror will plunge into the ocean to avoid shame, defeat, and death."\* The French force in the Peninsula was thus increased to 366,000 men. Out of this force two armies were formed, each composed of three corps. The first, destined for the conquest of Andalusia, consisted 65,000 men, under the command of Soult; who, towards the close of the year 1809, had been appointed the chief of Joseph's staff, and his principal military adviser, and comprised the corps of Victor, Sebastiani, and Mortier; the second, charged with the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo, and ultimately with the conquest of Portugal, consisted of 80,000 men, under the command of Massena, and comprised the corps of Regnier, Ney, and Junot. For the sustentation of the immense French force in the Peninsula, distinct military governments were constituted to collect the resources of the country, for its clothing, food, pay, and equipments, except to the extent of two millions of francs drawn monthly from the exchequer of Paris.

To compete with this formidable force, the Central Junta were wholly unequal.

\* Allusion has been already made to the empirical manœuvres by which Buonaparte contrived to delude the understanding of his idolatrous adherents and worshippers. M. Blazé, in his interesting work, confirms the truth of these statements. "In the proclamations and orders of the day," says that gentleman, "he (namely Buonaparte) detailed his exploits, the number of soldiers, cannon, and carriages that he had taken; it was exaggerated, but it was high-sounding, and had an excellent effect." It is, as the

author of *Imaginary Conversations* has observed, astonishing that so much power with so small an exertion of genius, and so little of anything that captivates the affections, should have been maintained so long unbroken in a succession of enormous faults, so scandalous disgraces, and so disastrous fortunes; and that too "after the loss of seven armies, and which, in every instance, he abandoned to destruction." This truthful and sensible observation is deserving the reflection of all Buonapartean idolaters.



After the fatal battle of Ocaña they had neither troops nor resources. To provide the last mentioned, they called for half the plate and jewels of every family and individual in the nation. This measure, in conjunction with their incapacity, excited the people of Seville to rise in insurrection and depose them. The displaced members fled to Cadiz; but the inhabitants of that city disclaiming their authority, they transferred it to a temporary regency until the cortes, or representatives of the whole nation could be assembled. Previous to their flight, the junta had ordered Areizaga, who had collected 35,000 of his fugitive troops, to take post in the strong defiles or passes of the Sierra Morena.

The French now advanced to take possession of the kingdom of Andalusia; and for the purpose of breaking the spirit of its population, and intimidating them, Soult issued a proclamation—which he mercilessly carried into execution—declaring, that all persons found in arms, “whatever might be their number, and whoever might be their commander, should be treated as banditti, who had no other object than robbery and murder; and that all the individuals of such parties who might be taken in arms should be immediately condemned and shot, and their bodies exposed along the highways.” When the regency found that this decree was actually carried into effect, they reprinted it, with a counter decree by its side, in French and Spanish, declaring, in imitation of their former decree, “that every Spaniard capable of bearing arms was in these times a soldier, and that for one who should be murdered by the French in consequence of the edict of the ferocious Soult, who called himself the duke of Dalmatia, the first three Frenchmen taken in arms should be infallibly hanged; three for every house which the enemy burned in their devastating system, and three for every person who should perish in the fire.” Soult, himself, they declared unworthy of the protection of the law of nations, while his decree remained unrepealed. They gave orders, that if he were taken he should be punished as a robber; and they took measures for circulating both decrees throughout Europe, to the end that all persons might be informed of the atrocious conduct of those enemies of the human race, and that those inhabitants of the countries which were in alliance with France, or more truly, which were enslaved by her, who were unhappy

enough to have children, or kinsmen, or friends, serving in the French armies in Spain, might see the fate prepared for them by the barbarity of a monster who thought by such means to subdue a free and noble nation. The decree made on the occasion was founded on the decree made at the time of the surrender at Saragossa, and was dated February, 1809. In that decree the supreme junta addressed an order to their generals, requiring them to apprise the French commanders, to whom they might be opposed, that every Spaniard who was capable of carrying arms was a soldier, and that so their duty to their country required them to be, and such the supreme junta declared them. “This,” they said, “was not a war of armies against armies, as in other cases, but of an army against a whole nation, resisting the yoke which a tyrant and an usurper sought to force upon them; every individual, therefore, of that nation, was under the protection of the laws of war; and the general who should violate those laws was not a soldier, but a ruffian, who would provoke the indignation of heaven, and the vengeance of man. The junta well knew,” they said, “that the French, when victorious, ridiculed principles which the observance and respect of all nations had consecrated; and that they did this with an effrontery and an insolence equal to the affectation with which they appealed to them when they were vanquished.” They added, that “the Spanish nation was, however, in a condition to enforce that justice which it demanded; that three Frenchmen should suffer for every Spaniard, be he peasant or soldier, who might be put to death. Europe would hear, with admiration, as well as horror, that a magnanimous nation, which had begun its struggle by making 3,000 French prisoners, was forced, in opposition to its natural character, to decimate those prisoners without distinction, from the first general to the lowest in the ranks.” That it would be the chiefs of their own nation who condemned the unfortunate persons on whom this vengeance might be inflicted; who, by imposing on Spain the dreadful necessity of retaliation, signed the death-warrant of their own countrymen when they murdered a Spaniard.

On the 20th of January, 1811, the French drove the Spanish troops from Despeños Peras, and Puerto del Rey, with scarcely a show of resistance, and on the next day the victors passed over the field of Baylen, in pursuit of the fleeing foe. Jaen, Granada, and



Cordova, were then taken without resistance, Areizaga's army, which was posted in the neighbourhood of the first-mentioned town, taking to flight on the first appearance of the enemy. On the 31st the enemy entered Seville, and took possession of its foundry of cannon and immense arsenals, which had been abandoned by the junta.\* The people of Alhama were the first who opposed the enemy; but their town, which had only the ruins of Moorish works to protect it, was carried by storm. Sebastiani then fought his way from Anquera to Malaga, through armed citizens and peasantry. The inhabitants of this last-mentioned city bravely formed an exception to the ignoble manner in which the Andalusian cities had submitted to the invader; they resisted the enemy until 500 of their fellow-townsmen were slain. While Sebastiani thus overran Granada, Mortier was detached to occupy Estremadura; but Albuquerque—disobeying the express commands of the government to move to Alamada, and support the Spanish left in the mountains there—had garrisoned Badajoz, and Romana was present, so that the designs of the enemy were, in that quarter, for a season baffled.

Victor now hurried on to seize Cadiz; but that important prize was saved from his grasp by the duke of Albuquerque. That true patriot having garrisoned Badajoz, proceeded with the remainder of his army from Utrera, consisting of 8,000 infantry and 600 cavalry, by forced marches, by Llerena, Labreja, and Guadacanal, to Cadiz, where he arrived late in the evening of the third of February, having performed a march of 65 leagues, or 260 English miles, in nine days. Having saved this all-important place by his presence, he made the greatest exertions to put it in a state of defence. Next morning the French appeared in great force on the opposite shores of the straits. The junta, though they had rejected the offer of lord Wellington the preceding autumn to strengthen the garrison with an English force, now implored aid to be sent with all speed. Three British regiments, the 79th, the 94th, and the second battalion of the

87th, with the 20th Portuguese regiment, amounting in all to 5,000 men, under major-general W. Stewart, were dispatched thither from Lisbon. Other British forces were sent from Gibraltar, so that the British and Portuguese contingent soon amounted to 8,000 men; and lieutenant-general Graham arrived to assume the command. Victor now sent a summons to the junta, telling them that he was ready to receive their submission to king Joseph. They returned an answer that they acknowledged no king but Ferdinand VII. Soult, who arrived in the French camp on the 15th of February, sent another summons to Albuquerque, insinuating that the English intended to seize Cadiz for themselves. Albuquerque's answer was that that great and brave nation was too generous for the design. The French army consisted of about 25,000 men, and occupied the neighbouring ground from the village of Rota on the coast, on the north of the bay of Cadiz, to Chiclana, which is three leagues to the south of Cadiz, thus forming a chain of forts within a circle of ten leagues, and resting at each extremity on the sea. On these works 300 pieces of artillery, and cannon-mortars (or villantrops, so named after the inventor) of a prodigious size, were planted before the end of the year 1810. These huge pieces of ordnance being placed in slings, threw shells with a force so prodigious as to range over Cadiz, a distance of more than 5,000 yards; but as they were partly loaded with lead, and their charge of powder was too small for an effective explosion, they produced more alarm than mischief in the city. In March of this year a violent storm arising in the bay of Cadiz, three line of battle ships, one frigate, and about forty merchantmen, were driven to the side of the bay which was in the occupation of the French. The men were taken out in British boats, and the ships were set on fire by the enemy's red-hot shot; but no small part of the lading fell into their hands. Soon after this storm 1,500 French, on board of two of the hulks,† who had been detained there since the battle of Baylen, cut their

prisoners was the island of Cabrera, a desert rock in the Mediterranean, in the neighbourhood of Majorca and Minorca. The island was about 15 miles in circumference, and with no other inhabitants than a handful of soldiers, who were stationed there to prevent the Barbary cruisers from making it a place of rendezvous. Here about 10,000 French prisoners were detained, but their treatment was so severe, and their supplies from Palma so irregularly

\* This ignoble conquest was obtained without the least resistance, though it contained a garrison of above 7,000 men; and that the people, especially the working classes, with "that ardent patriotism which in a great crisis distinguishes the humbler ranks in society, and forms a striking contrast to the selfish timidity of their superiors," indicated a desire to resist the enemies of their country.

† The usual place for the detention of the French



cables, and being drifted to the French side of the bay, rejoined their countrymen. About the same time the peasants of the Sierra de Ronda offering a determined resistance to the spoliating columns of the enemy, Soult ordered several of the villages of that district to be burned, and their inhabitants executed; and though general Lacy advanced to their assistance with 3,000 men, he sustained so severe a loss in his conflicts with the foe, that he was compelled to re-embark for Cadiz.

After the French had overrun Andalusia, having falsely proclaimed in their Spanish gazettes, that "the Napoleonic throne" was established in Cadiz, they prepared for the invasion of Portugal by the northern line. To ensure success, it was necessary to reduce Ciudad Rodrigo; but before they entered on their operations in that quarter, they deemed the complete possession of Leon necessary, that their communications might be open with Valladolid; for this purpose, Junôt, on the 22nd of March, invested Astorga with 12,000 men. The vigorous operations of Santocildes obstructed his proceedings so much, that a month elapsed before he opened his batteries. On the 20th of April, a breach being effected, the garrison was so distressed for ammunition, that Santocildes offered to capitulate, but Junôt refused the terms demanded. On the evening of the 21st, the bombardment was recommenced, and an assault made by 2,000 men; but after a desperate struggle, they were repulsed with the loss of three-fourths of their number; but as only thirty rounds of cartridges remained for the troops, and eight for the artillery, and that the enemy's working parties had cut through the stockade into the town, the governor surrendered on condition that the garrison should be entitled to the honours of war, and the inhabitants be secure both in person and property.

From the 25th of April, the French had been assembling troops before Ciudad Rodrigo; by the 4th of June, a sufficient number having been collected, the city was

sent, that scores and hundreds of them died of hunger and thirst, and many of them were in a complete state of nakedness. Such was their destitution that with no other tools than a single knife they obtained their water by breaking the surface of the ground to the depth of six feet; and some of them used the skulls of their own dead for want of other vessels.

\* This guerilla chief was the son of a farmer, near

invested. In the intervening time, repeated skirmishes had taken place between the garrison and the enemy; and in these Julian Sanchez\* was particularly conspicuous. That enterprising leader made repeated assaults on the enemy, not hesitating, at the head of sixty, eighty, or a hundred of his lancers, to attack three or four times his own number; and the French suffered daily losses from his indefatigable activity, as well as that of Antonio Carnargo, the commandant of the volunteers of Avila, and of Jose Puente, the commandant of the cavalry regiment of Ciudad Rodrigo. The circle of the enemy's investment being now contracted, Sanchez, on the night of the 22nd, pierced, with 200 of his horsemen, through the enemy's line, and reached the English light division, then six miles from Ciudad Rodrigo. On the 24th, Massena arrived and took the command, and again summoned the governor to surrender. Hervasti replied with the dignity and spirit becoming a soldier and a patriot. The fire on the town now continued with increased violence; and the convent of Santa Cruz was carried after a fierce resistance, and with great loss on the part of the enemy. At this time an exploit of singular intrepidity was performed. The governor expressing a wish to drive the enemy from the convent of St. Domingo, a serjeant, by name Manuel Martin, with twenty-five of his comrades, offered to undertake the hazardous enterprise. This he accomplished, though the enemy's troops in the convent were of greatly superior numbers; and they were so terrified at his daring exploit, that they took to flight, leaving their knapsacks and muskets behind them. By the 9th of July, the guns of the garrison were nearly silenced, part of the town was in flames, and the ditch was so filled with the ruins of the counterscarp, that a broad way lay open to the breach. The columns of assault were immediately assembled, and 30,000 men were ready to perpetrate all the unrestrained vengeance and brutality of French soldiers. To preserve the helpless inhabitants, 5,000 in number, from the hor-

the banks of the Guebra. Till the invasion of his country, he had cultivated his father's lands; but when his father, mother, and sister, had been murdered by the French, he made a vow of vengeance. On one occasion, he surprised in his father's house a French colonel, infamous for his atrocities, and put him to death, first telling him who it was that inflicted his merited punishment in this world, and sent him to render account of his crimes in the next.



rors of an assault, the brave Hervasti appeared on the rampart waving the white flag. Massena promised that the garrison should march out with the honours of war, and agreed to all the other conditions which are usual in the like circumstances. Loisson immediately marched through the breach, and took possession of the town, and, in violation of Massena's promise, made the garrison deposit their arms in the arsenal. To Hervasti's request, on the following day, that the articles of capitulation should be observed, Massena's reply was, that he ought not require more than had already been complied with. The civil officers, whose liberty had been stipulated for, were declared prisoners of war; the members of the junta were thrown into a dungeon; a contribution of near two millions was imposed on the inhabitants, and they were compelled to labour in the reparation of works, the destruction of the batteries, and the filling up of the trenches, without provisions, and but little rest.

While Soult was preparing to fix his army between the Isle of Leon and Cadiz, he received orders to leave Victor to blockade Cadiz, and to prepare for the siege of Olivenza and Badajos. Collecting all his disposable forces, to the amount of 20,000 men, he proceeded from Seville to Estremadura. Olivenza, garrisoned by 4,100 men, was invested 11th of February, 1811, and on the 20th the breaching-batteries opened their fire. On the 21st the governor, Manuel Herk, received advice that Romana had despatched a large force to his relief, and though he had in reply said that he would maintain the place to the last moment, capitulated, though the fortress was unimpaired. On the 26th Soult marched against Badajos. On the 28th Badajos was invested. In consequence of a plan concocted with lord Wellington, the marquis Romana was, for the protection of that fortress, to occupy the strong position on the heights of San Christoval, between Gebora, the Caya, and the Guadiana; but that true patriot dying, the command devolved on Mendizabel. A few shells thrown from the mortar batteries on his position so discomposed the Spanish general, that with astonishing fatuity, he withdrew his army, consisting of 10,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, from his impregnable post, when, being attacked by Mortier, he was overthrown (February the 19th), with the loss of 850 killed, and 5,000 prisoners. The next day the

siege was carried on with renewed vigour. The sallies of the garrison were frequent and vigorous. In that made on the 2nd of March, Don Rafael Menacho, the governor, being killed, the command devolved on one Imaz, the lieutenant-governor, and who had served with the Spanish troops which had escaped from Denmark. On the 10th he was summoned to surrender, and on the 11th the garrison laid down their arms, and were made prisoners of war, though it consisted of 7,500 effective men, and the town was well stored with provisions and ammunition, and that on the 9th intelligence had been conveyed to him that Massena was in full retreat from Portugal, and the British army was on its march for his relief. The empty stipulation of the treacherous dastard, that his garrison should march out by the breach, which was so insignificant in width that he was obliged to enlarge it himself, he supposed redeemed his honour. The surrender of Campo Mayor, Albuquerque, and Valencia d'Alcantara, immediately followed the fall of Badajos, when Soult, in consequence of the battle of Barossa, returned with the greatest speed to Andalusia. While Soult was occupied in his operations in Estremadura, the junta assembled in Cadiz, and assuming the title of majesty, proceeded to form a constitution worded in the spirit of republican freedom, and to the abolition of the inquisition. These innovating projects not being acceptable to the nobles, the ministers, and the regency, who were displeased with the inferior title of highness accorded them, the old system of intrigue, folly, and procrastination, became predominant. In one point, however, all parties agreed—the determination to suppress the rising spirit of liberty manifested by the transatlantic provinces. As soon as the colonial rights were agitated in the cortes, eternal slavery was declared to be the only lot of the colonists. Having been declared traitors, their ports were blockaded. Two parties now arose in Spanish America: the loyalists, who submitted to the regency, and the independents, who insisted on governing themselves.

While these events were occurring at Cadiz, important transactions were taking place in Aragon and Catalonia. The fall of Gerona had enabled the besieging army to undertake farther operations; but the Catalans, as well as the French, had changed their commander. O'Donnell superseded Blake, but in the middle of February he was de-



feated in the neighbourhood of Vich, with the loss of 3,000 men.

Suchet having received considerable reinforcements from France, and having concerted a plot with several influential persons in Valencia for its surrender, reappeared, March the 3rd, before that city; but the plot having been discovered, after remaining five days before the place, he retraced his steps to Saragossa, severely harassed by the guerillas. This success of the patriots was enhanced by the destruction of a detachment of 600 men, who were posted at Santa Perpetua, to keep up the communication between Barcelona and Hostalrich. The Valencians imputed their deliverance to their patroness and generalissimo, the Virgin, and to the saints who were natives of Valencia.

The enemy now prepared to reduce the fortress of Hostalrich, which is situated seven leagues from Gerona. The castle still remained in the possession of the Spaniards, but a division of the enemy, under Mazzuchelli, occupied the town. The garrison of the castle were prepared for a Spanish defence—for though, according to the old saying, the Spaniards are women in the field, they are lions behind their walls. "This fortress," said the governor, Julian de Estrada, "is the daughter of Gerona, and ought to imitate the example of its mother."

The siege began on the 13th of January, but it was carried on with little vigour till the 20th of February, when the French began to bombard the town. The men who defended it showed themselves worthy the cause in which they were engaged; and here, as at Gerona, the enemy found that the strength of a fortress depends less on its walls and bulwarks, than on the virtue and valour of those who defend it. The blockade having now lasted two months, and the garrison being reduced to the last extremity from want of provisions, its brave governor sallied forth, at midnight on May 12th, at their head, and cut his way through the blockading forces; and though he, with 300 of his brave men, fell into the hands of the enemy, above 800 of the garrison escaped to Tarragona. The French, on their entrance, stripped the clothes and blankets from the beds of the wounded, who would, no doubt, have been all massacred, had not the comptroller of the hospital previously made terms for their safety with the French commandant of the town.

About this time large desertions took

place from the French armies. Eight hundred Austrians, who had been taken prisoners in the late war, had been forced by Buonaparte into the French service. These men went over to the Spaniards in a body, stipulating only that they might keep their arms, and remain together, till they should be distributed among the regiments of the line. General Doyle had addressed proclamations to the soldiers in the French service, not only in the French and Spanish languages, but in the Italian, Dutch, German, and Polish also, setting before them the real cause of the war, the nature of which they saw and felt. The Catalans, too, had learned the good policy of distinguishing between the French and the foreigners in the French army, treating the latter, when they were taken, with kindness, as men who had been brought against them by compulsion. The effect of this system and of the proclamations was such, that in a short space of time the enemy lost more than 6,000 men.

Lerida, a fortress situated among the mountains of Catalonia, had been invested in the beginning of April during the siege of Hostalrich. Its garrison consisted of 9,000 men, and the governor, Garcia Conde, when summoned to surrender, replied in the usual lofty style of the Spaniards. O'Donnell, who commanded the Spanish troops in the province, advanced (April 23rd) to its relief, with 8,000 infantry and 600 horse, but was repulsed with the loss of 1,000 killed, and 5,000 prisoners. Three practicable breaches having been at length effected, a general assault was made on the 13th of May, and the city was soon in the hands of the assailants. A scene of horror now ensued. Suchet ordered his troops by a concentric movement to drive at the point of the bayonet the citizens of every age and sex toward the citadel. The shrieking and terrified multitude rushed into the fortress with the retiring garrison. As soon as the helpless crowd were shut in, a powerful fire of howitzers and bombs, and other destructive projectiles, was kept up the whole of the night on the crowded place. The governor, overpowered by the cries and sufferings of the helpless multitude, surrendered the fortress on the following morning,—on the same day Hostalrich having fallen—with the garrison, amounting to above 8,000 men and 130 pieces of artillery, and an immense quantity of stores. Suchet deeming the frightful vengeance he had inflicted on the Leridans likely to favour the prosecu-



tion of his projects, invested (May 19th) Mequinenza, a fortress situated on a steep rock, at the confluence of the Cinca and the Ebro. On the night of June 4th, the town was carried by escalade, and on the 8th the garrison of the castle, consisting of 2,000 men, surrendered, at the very moment general Doyle was within sight of the town with succour for its relief. The day after the fall of Lerida, Villa Campa attacked 400 men conducting a convoy of prisoners from Calatayud to Saragossa, captured the convoy and slew its guard. About this time Augereau was superseded by marshal Macdonald. The cause of Augereau's supersession was, that, though at the head of 20,000 men, he had been obliged by O'Donnell's successes at Villa Franca and Manresa, to take refuge in Gerona, with the loss of 3,000 men. Great as the success of the enemy had been, Cordova, Urgel, San Felipe, Balaguer, Tortosa, and Tarragona, which formed the link of connection between Valencia and Catalonia, were still to be reduced to establish the invader's power in the east of Spain; and as the French could not in Catalonia, as they had done in other parts of Spain, press forward, and leave defensible towns behind them, it was necessary to reduce those places.

Macdonald, to revive the lost lustre of the French arms in Catalonia, now advanced to the relief of Barcelona; and in his march thither he attacked Cordova, which stands at the foot of a rugged hill, on which frowns a strong castle on a mountain above. Here the Spanish army under Campoverde, was drawn up, and when attacked by Macdonald, drove his forces down the hill with the loss of several hundred men. The French general being thus foiled, proceeded to the relief of Barcelona, which was then closely pressed by the patriot forces.

Suchet now began to execute his orders to besiege Tortosa, which is situated on the left bank of the Ebro, and about five leagues from the sea. The city though a place of great strength, and considered the principal bulwark of Catalonia and Valencia, was in a very inefficient state of defence, until strengthened and stored by the English general Doyle, who had generously surrendered up his pay for the use of the place. To aid Suchet in his operations, Macdonald, having revictualled Barcelona, approached from the north. During these operations the Spanish general Bassecour, attacking the covering force at Uldecana, was defeated

with the loss of 3,000 men. A sort of nominal blockade of the city had been kept up since the middle of August. On the 4th of July the enemy had appeared on the right bank of the river, and had occupied the suburbs of Jesus, and Las Roquetas. On the 8th they attacked the tête-du-pont, expecting to carry it by a sudden and vigorous attempt; they were repulsed, renewed the attempt at midnight, were again repulsed, and a few hours afterwards failed in a third attack. They were now satisfied that Tortosa was not to be won without the time and labour of a regular siege. They had seen also a manifestation of that same spirit which had been so eminently displayed at Saragossa and Gerona: for the Tortosan women had passed and repassed the bridge during the heat of action, regardless of danger, bearing refreshments and stores to the soldiers; two who were wounded in this service were rewarded with medals and a pension. In imitation of the Saragossan and Geronan women, they enrolled themselves in companies to attend on the wounded. There was one woman who during the whole siege carried water and cordials to the troops at the points of attack, and frequently went out with them in their sallies; the people called her La Titaya. In the course of the siege she was made a serjeant for her services. During these operations Doyle's address to the foreigners in the French service, in their respective languages, and which were fired from the town in shells, and by that means scattered among the besiegers, had produced no inconsiderable effect. At the same time the bodies of some peasants were taken out of the river with many bayonet wounds and their hands tied together, who had been massacred in pursuance of the savage system in which the intrusive government required its generals to act: they were interred by their countrymen with much solemnity, and the circumstance made a strong impression on the Tortosans.

The investment being completed, and all the posts of the besieged driven in, the trenches were opened on the 19th, and the operations were carried on with so great vigour, that by the night of the 31st, the besiegers' guns were on the edge of the counterscarp. In a state of alarm, the governor, Lili, "an imbecile man," displayed three white flags from different parts of the fortress. The conduct of the governor, however, in consequence of the desire



of the officers to renew the defence, appearing indecisive, Suchet, riding up to the gates with a considerable staff, and escorted by a company of grenadiers, informed the Spanish officer on guard that hostilities had ceased, desired to be conducted to the governor, and on his admission, assuming an imperious tone, and menacing the garrison with military execution if any further delay occurred, the garrison, consisting of nearly 8,000 men, laid down their arms, and surrendered at discretion, to 10,000 French. The strong fortress of Col de Belaguer, which commands the pass over the mountains of the same name, between Tortosa and Tarragona, was escalated a few days after Lili's surrender of Tortosa; which had excited so great indignation at Tarragona, that the inhabitants of that city beheaded his effigy in the market-place. After the fall of Tortosa, Suchet was engaged for several months in preparations for the siege of Tarragona.

After lord Blaney's unsuccessful attempt at the castle of Frangerola, general Rey attacked, November 2nd, the central\* army under Blake, at Velez el Rubio, with one regiment of dragoons, a regiment of Polish lancers, and a detachment of infantry, and broke it at the first charge, the men throwing down their arms, and crying for quarter. About 1,500 of the Spaniards were slain, and about the same number taken. On June 30th he was repulsed from Niebla, which he attempted to take by escalade, with considerable loss. On the 19th of March, Campoverde having assembled 1,500 men at Moliños del Rey, with the intention of surprising the city and forts of Barcelona, detached in the night a chosen body of 800 grenadiers, to possess themselves of Monjuic, whose town major he had corrupted. While the detachment was waiting in the ditch, in expectation of having the gate opened, the greater part of the column was in an instant overwhelmed with fire. This failure, however, was shortly after compensated by the surprise and capture of Figueras, a little town situated in the midst of the fertile plains of Ampurdan, and about eighteen miles distant from the French frontier. Martinez, a leader of the Mique-

lets, formed, with the aid of some citizens in the town, the design of surprising the gates. He entrusted the execution of the design to Rovira, who had been a doctor in theology, now a colonel in the Spanish army. In the night of the 9th of April, Rovira, with 1,054 chosen volunteers, approached the ditch; when three Spaniards in the French service opened the gate which leads into the ditch to receive them. Rovira and his companions rushed in, and Figueras and its garrison, amounting to about 1,000 men, were in their hands before the astonished Italians could make any preparation for their defence. This event so elated the Spaniards, that *Te Deum* was sung in all the churches of the Peninsula not under the control of the enemy. As an appropriate testimony of national gratitude for this exploit, the regency conferred the dignity of *maestre-escuela* in the cathedral of Vich, a dignity equivalent to that of prebend in the English church, on the brigadier doctor Renovales—for to that rank he was presented—for his recovery of Figueras.

As the French generals were making active preparations for the recovery of Figueras, Eroles, with that promptitude and vigour for which he was distinguished, hastened with all the force he could collect, from Martorell, to reinforce the garrison, and on his march took the forts which the French had erected in Castelfellit and Olot, and made above 500 prisoners there. Though 8,000 troops, under Baraguay d'Hilliers, had been collected before the place, he entered it on the sixth day after its capture, with 1,500 infantry, 150 horse, and about 50 artillerymen. About the same time a convoy of stores arrived in a frigate from Tarragona. On the 30th of March, Manresa, which had been marked for vengeance, because it had been the first place in Catalonia which had declared against the French, and that one of those journals was printed there which had contributed to keep up the national spirit, was burned by Macdonald's order, and the inmates of its hospitals driven from their beds and plundered. To restrain the like excesses, Campoverde issued orders to his troops to give no quarter to any Frenchmen who might be taken in the vicinity of any place which had

*army*; the Mercian force, *the third*; the troops at Cadiz and Algeiras, *the fourth*; the remnants of Romana's Galician division, *the fifth*; the new raised troops of Galicia and those of the Asturias, *the sixth*; and the partidas of the north, namely, those of Mina, Longa, Campillo, Porlier, and other smaller bands, formed *the seventh army*.

\* In December of this year, the regency had re-organized the Spanish military force, distinguishing the armies by numbers, instead of that of *the centre*, *the left*, and *the right*. Thus the Catalonian forces, previously called *the army of the right*, was now called *the first army*. The Valencians, with the partidas of the Empecinado and Duran, *the second*



been burned and sacked, or in which the inhabitants had been murdered. During these operations, Espoz y Mina was so actively engaged in Navarre against the enemies of his country, that, to adopt his own hyperbolic expression, "reams of paper would not suffice for the details of all the skirmishes in which he and his party were engaged; for every day, and sometimes twice and thrice in the day, they were occurring."

Suchet, having completed his formidable preparations for the siege of Tarragona, on the 4th of May invested that city with an army of 20,000 men, and 100 pieces of artillery, and on the 28th the fire from the French batteries was opened. During the operations several sallies had been made by the besieged. On the night of the 29th, the garrison of Fort Olivio, one of the outworks, was to be charged; but "a wretch, who was wicked enough to sell the blood of his comrades and the interests of his country," betraying the circumstance to the enemy, the French presenting themselves at the same time with the new garrison possessed themselves of the fort. Meanwhile, the siege being pressed with the utmost skill and exertion, and three practicable breaches being declared in the rampart of the lower town, the enemy prepared to make the assault. At seven o'clock at night of the 27th of June, 1,500 chosen men marched in three columns on the breaches, and after a desperate resistance the ramparts were won, and the fleeing Spaniards were pursued and massacred. When the morning dawned, amidst a terrific carnage of soldiers and citizens, the French remained masters of the harbour and the lower town.

The upper town, still, with wonderful resolution, maintained the contest. A flag of truce sent by Suchet, on the day following the capture of the lower town, was sternly rejected. Undismayed, the besieged still held out, in hopes that Campoverde would advance for the relief of the place. These hopes were increased by the arrival in the harbour of 2,000 English from Gibraltar, under colonel Skerret, but which were not landed, the English engineers reporting that the wall of the town was shaking under the French fire. At this time nearly half the town was in possession of the enemy, and on the breach being reported practicable, on the evening of the 28th 1,500 men, rushing forward towards the rampart, supported by 8,000 in reserve, the whole body speedily "streamed over the breach, and spread like

a torrent along the ramparts on either side," and in a moment the place was in their possession. The heroic governor, Contreras, who had received a bayonet wound in the breast at the siege, was, while the carnage was reeking in every quarter, carried into the presence of the French general. When told that he deserved instant death for continuing resistance after the breach was practicable, he replied, "I know of no law which compelled me to capitulate before the assault was made." Gosales, the second in command, had fallen, pierced by more than twenty wounds. The savage cruelty displayed by "the invincible conquerors" towards the inhabitants was unequalled among even French atrocities. To use Suchet's own words, "a horrible massacre had been made," and in the expression of the journalist (Belmas) of the siege, "the blood of the Spaniards inundated the streets and the houses." The French field-pieces kept up an unceasing fire on the thousands of the fleeing multitude on the one part; and on the other, the cavalry charged among them, sabring women and children, and trampling them down. A heavy fire was kept up on the group of women and children who were crowding into the English boats at the landing place, and every endeavour was made to sink the boats employed in this service of humanity. More than six thousand unresisting persons were butchered on that dreadful night, old and young, men and women, mother and babe; and when "the execrable conquerors" had satiated their thirst for blood, they even indulged in the perpetration of the most revolting crimes. In the streets and in the churches, they violated women, who had escaped their first fury only to suffer more horrors before they died. Nuns and wives, and widows, in the hour when they were widowed, girls and children, were seized on by these monsters; and retaining their cruelty, when their rage and lust were palled, they threw those of their victims, and of the wounded Spaniards, into the burning houses. In the course of this siege above 20,000 Spaniards had perished; the loss of the enemy had been 5,000 in killed and wounded; 9,000 prisoners, 320 cannon, and an immense quantity of stores, fell into the hands of the victors. On the morning following this dismal tragedy, the French general ordered the alcaides and corregidores of the surrounding country to be brought into the town and led through its streets, that they might see the slaughtered



bodies which were lying there, and report to their countrymen what they might expect if they dared attempt resistance to the French.

Suchet having made himself master of Tarragona, marched against Campoverde's army, the only remaining force of any consequence in the province of Catalonia. That general, unwilling to meet him, proposed to captain Codrington to embark his forces from Arens de Fuer, leaving their horses on the beach; but Codrington, refusing to receive any forces on board, except the 2,400 Valencians whom he had conveyed to Catalonia, Campoverde retired to the mountain ridges on the frontier of Aragon, where he was superseded by general Lacy, who assumed the command of an army which he said was non-existent: "Bad as I expected to find things," said he, "they are infinitely worse; and my only consolation must be, that there is absolutely nothing left for me to lose." But, undismayed, he gave a new organization to the army, re-forming it into guerilla bands, with permission to select their chiefs. At the same time he issued a proclamation in which he called on his countrymen to join the patriotic standard: "Every father of a family has wrongs to avenge," said the gallant chief; "war and vengeance must now be our only business; and those who have not spirit to follow this resolution, let them abandon us and join the enemy, that we may know whom to treat as enemies and whom as friends. By a subsequent decree of the cortes, the guerilla parties were attached to the armies of their respective districts, and military rank was given to their leaders, leaving them to pursue their own system of warfare at their own discretion, but subjecting them to a military superior when they should be called on for the purpose.

The fortified points which the Catalans still retained were, Berga, Monserrat, Figueras, Cordova, and the Seu d'Urgel. Berga was dismantled by Lacy because he was unable to defend it, and orders having been received from Paris to dismantle Tarragona, forming only a redoubt there, and to reduce Montserrat, Suchet proceeded to the execution of his orders.

Montserrat, which is a mountain fastness, about seven leagues from Barcelona, and celebrated for its convent of the Lady of Montserrat, was now attacked. Its peaceful inhabitants, the monks, dreading French spoliation, had removed all the treasures of

their sanctuary to Majorca. Its garrison, confiding too much in the natural strength of the mountain, suffered themselves to be surprised from its heights. D'Erolles, with the greater part of the garrison, however, throwing themselves down the ravines, escaped to the Lobregat. The last calamity in this series of misfortunes was the fall of Figueras. When it had been blockaded by a force occupying a circuit of lines eight miles in length round the town, between four and five months, and all the horses had been eaten, the garrison sallied, and attempted to force their way through the besiegers. An aid-de-camp of the governor had deserted, and given information of their purpose; the enemy, therefore, were prepared to receive them; nevertheless they made their way to the abattis, formed of trunks of trees, which they found impenetrable, and after three attempts in the course of one day (August 19th), they were compelled to capitulate. Honourable terms were obtained. It had been stipulated that the garrison should march out with their baggage, and deliver their arms on the glacis. But no sooner had they given up their arms than they were marched into France in a state of so great destitution that they were indebted for needful covering to the humanity of the towns through which they passed. The garrison, which originally consisted of 4,000 men, had lost 1,500 in their ineffectual sorties. On October 7th, D'Erolles captured Cervera, with its garrison, amounting to 630 men; and in his pursuit of the enemy captured the corregidor of Cervera, who had joined the French, and with the malevolence of a traitor, persecuted his own countrymen. He had invented a cage in which to imprison those who did not pay their contributions for the support of the French army, or were in any way obnoxious to him; it was so constructed as to confine the whole body, leaving the head exposed to be buffeted and spat upon, and sometimes "the devilish villain" anointed the face of his victim with honey to attract the flies and wasps. "To-morrow," said D'Erolles, in his despatches, "the señor corregidor will go out to parade the streets in this same cage, where the persons who have suffered this grievous torment may behold him. Discite justitiam meritè, et non temnere Divos." In the course of the same month, D'Erolles entered France by the pass of the Valle de Luerol, and levied, in Languedoc contributions of some thousand



sheep, a large quantity of corn, and specie to the amount of 50,000 dollars. On the 8th of August Soult had defeated the patriots under general Quadra, at Baza, in Murcia, with great loss.

Suchet having completed his preparations, in the beginning of September marched against Valencia. In his line of march lay the fortifications of Peniscola, Oropesa, and Murviedro, which last mentioned fortress stood on the site of the ancient Saguntum, famed for its resistance against Hannibal.

Murviedro, is an open town, twelve miles east of Valencia, and its fortress, called the castle of San Fernando de Sagunto, and which stands on the summit of a steep and rocky hill, was, for its natural strength and artificial defences, a formidable post. Luis Maria Andriani commanded its garrison of 3,500 men. On the 21st the French arrived before the place, and on the following day assaulted the fort at old breaches discovered in the walls, but were repulsed with the loss of above 400 in killed and wounded. As the French artillery had not yet arrived, and that the little fort of Oropesa commanded, in a narrow defile, the road by which it was to be brought from Tortosa, that fort was attacked and carried. On the arrival of the artillery, the approaches were carried on with vigour; and on the 18th of October a practicable breach having been made, twice in the course of that day, and the following night, the enemy attempted to storm it, but were repulsed with great slaughter. During these operations, Blake was advancing from Valencia, to the relief of the place, with an army consisting of 22,000 infantry and 2,500 horse. Suchet, with the intention of preventing his enemy arriving on the ground where he designed to give battle, leaving six battalions to continue the siege, marched against him with 17,000 men, and took post in a pass, about three miles broad, through which the Spanish army must pass to reach Murviedro. On the morning of the 25th, Blake approached the French position, and immediately began the attack, but was, after a desperate contest, compelled to retreat, with the loss of 1,000 in killed and wounded, 2,500 prisoners, and sixteen guns. On the same night the garrison of Murviedro, consisting of 2,500 men, capitulated. During this siege the Empecinado and Duran, uniting their guerilla forces, amounting to 4,000 men, had laid siege to Calatayud,

which, on the sixth day (October 3) of the siege, capitulated, an event which caused great joy to the patriots.

About six weeks after the fall of Murviedro, Suchet having been reinforced by the divisions of Sevole and Reille, advanced to complete the conquest of Valencia by the siege of its capital, which stands in an open plain, upon the right bank of the Guadalaviar, about two miles from the sea. "In no part of Spain," says the historian of the Peninsular War, "nor perhaps of Christendom, were there so many religious puppet-shows exhibited; nowhere were the people more sunk in all the superstitions of Romish idolatry, and, if the reproaches of even the Spaniards themselves may be credited, there was as little purity of morals as of faith." But if the Valencians were, as a censorer has said of them, light equally in mind and body, the cause has been wrongly imputed to their genial and delicious climate; the state of ignorance to which a double despotism had reduced the nation, and the demoralizing practices of the Romish church, sufficiently account for their degradation. On the day subsequent to his victory over Blake's army at Murviedro, Suchet summoned Valencia, offering the people his especial protection, and assuring them the French would make them happy, and relieve them from the evils with which they were oppressed. The Valencians relying on their intrenched camp, occupied by Blake's army exceeding 20,000 men, and which contained, within its extensive line, the city and the suburbs on the right bank of the river, did not deign to reply to the gasconade.

On the 25th of December, the enemy appeared before Valencia. They soon closed upon the city, and established themselves in the suburb called Serrano, on the left bank of the river, not, however, without considerable opposition. Having gained the suburb, they formed a contravallation of three strong redoubts. Next they occupied the Grayo, which is the port of Valencia. The French general had now, by a semicircular march of above fifteen miles round the southern side of the city, interposed the main body of his army between it and the Spanish intrenched camp, so as to cut off its retreat towards Alicante and Murcia, the Spaniards abandoning their intrenchments and artillery almost on the first fire. Blake now, at the head of 15,000 men, endeavoured to force his way out of the town by the left bank of the Guadalaviar, but was forced to



fall back on Valencia,—about 4,000 men, under Mahi, to whom the order to return could not be communicated, escaping, reached Alicante.

The investment of Valencia, and the intrenched camp, was completed before the close of the day. On the 28th, Blake, at the head of 15,000 men, attempted to force his way out of the town by the left bank of the Guadalaviar, but was driven back with the loss of above 600 men. A few days afterwards a similar attempt was fruitlessly made, when, taking with him his field artillery, and leaving in the deserted lines about eighty pieces of heavy ordnance, he retired into the city. The next morning the French general resummoned the city, but his terms being rejected, he proceeded to bombard it. The bombardment having been continued some days, Blake proposed to capitulate, and thus about 16,000 troops, and nearly 400 pieces of cannon, and an immense quantity of military stores, fell into the hands of the enemy, January 12th, 1812. Suchet, on his obtaining possession of the place, executed, in the public square, some of those persons who had been most distinguished for their zeal in the national cause, though he had promised that no man should be molested, and the inhabitants should be protected both in person and property. During the siege, St. Philippe, a town situated midway between Valencia and Alicante, surrendered, by which the enemy obtained a vast quantity of provisions, and more than a million of cartridges. At the close of the campaign, a contribution of fifty millions of francs was imposed on the city and province of Valencia for the benefit of the French exchequer.

A few days after the fall of Valencia, the little town and port of Denia surrendered without resistance; and on February 5th, Peniscola, a fort so strong by nature, and so well secured by art, that it had obtained the name of Little Gibraltar, was betrayed by its treacherous governor, Navarro. An attempt was made on Alicante, but was repulsed by the gallantry of the garrison and the inhabitants; and thus it had the honour of sharing with Cadiz and Carthage the glory of being the only Spanish cities which were never sullied by the presence of the enemy. On March 18th, Duran scaled the walls of Soria, which stands on the Douro, near the supposed site of Numantia, and obtained possession of the city. Levying a contribution, and seizing a large quantity of

grain and biscuit, he retreated without loss. In retaliation the French seized the junta of Burgos, and putting them to death, suspended their bodies from the gallows. The bodies being removed and buried, the French compelled the attendants to carry back the bodies to the gallows, and hang them there again in their shrouds. The guerilla chiefs resorted to retaliatory measures, and so furious was the enmity on both sides, that since the religious wars in France, no contest had been carried on with so ferocious a spirit on both sides. By the French heads were exposed on poles, bodies left hanging on the gallows, or the trees, and in the market-places of large towns, the walls, against which the victims were shot, were pierced with bullets, and the ground blackened with blood. The reprisals of the Spaniards were characteristic of a vindictive people, capable of inflicting as well as enduring anything; but they were evidences also of that high-mindedness which they retained in their lowest fortune, never abasing themselves, never submitting to the insolent assumption of authority, nor for a moment consenting that might should be allowed to sanction injustice.

From this period the hostile collisions between the patriots and the invaders may be considered to have mainly ceased. The results which the act of aggression on the mother country produced in the colonies may now be appropriately mentioned.

Buonaparte having succeeded in his hypocritical designs at Bayonne, immediately despatched messengers with secret instructions to the captain-general of the Caraccas, and the governor of Mexico, to induce those officers to yield obedience to the intruder Joseph, who had modestly proclaimed himself Joseph I., king of Spain and the Indies, (*Jaó Primero*, &c.); but the Spanish colonists, who were already inclined to proclaim their independence, as they considered their connexion with the mother country virtually dissolved, by the dissolution of its legitimate authority, spurned the proposal of submission to the usurper. To meet the emergency, juntas, formed in imitation of those of the mother country, assumed the direction of affairs; and on the 19th of April, 1810, the Caraccas, with six other provinces, declared themselves united as a federal government, by the name of the American Confederation of Venezuela. The regency of Cadiz, and the merchants of that city, indignant at the proceedings of



the colonists, and unwilling to relieve them from the monopoly of the whole of their commerce being confined to Cadiz, fitted out an expedition against the insurgent colonies. Hostilities now commenced on the 5th of July 1811, Venezuela proclaimed its independence, and Mexico, Carthagena, Buenos Ayres, Potosi, Paraguay, Chili, Peru, and other provinces soon followed the example. The war between the contending parties was carried on with various success, and in its prosecution unparalleled atrocities

were practised by both sides. The independence of the whole of the insurgent colonies was ultimately acknowledged in consequence of the decisive battle of Ayacucho, fought December 9th, 1824, and obtained by the valour of the British auxiliary force in Bolivar's army, and which had been insidiously enlisted on behalf of the south American colonists, by the English capitalists, who had advanced loans to a considerable extent to the insurgent authorities.

### THE THIRD SPANISH CAMPAIGN.

ANNIS 1811—1812.

THE third Spanish campaign,—the most glorious and memorable in the annals of warfare, both for its great results on the contemporary and the future destinies of Europe, as well as for the consummate talent and judgment displayed by its principal actor, and the indomitable courage, and unequalled discipline of his companions-in-arms, in which sieges and battles had ever been carried on and fought, or which had ever been fancied, or even dreamt of, by Vauban and Folard, by Marlborough or Turenne,—began with the usual inauspicious aspects attending on, and inseparable from, Spanish and Portuguese affairs during the whole of that great and arduous struggle, THE PENINSULAR WAR. But time, the great improver of all things, the radical regenerator of ignorance, superstition, and bigotry, and all the errors and phantasies that man falls into by his disobedience to the dictates of reason, the monitions of conscience, and the laws of nature, had made no improvement, no amendment, in the policy, administration, and warlike character of that strange and wayward people, the Spaniards. The opening of "the third Spanish campaign" was attended with the same disasters, the same discomfiture and loss, as had invariably attended the preceding campaigns. Tortosa surrendered on the 2nd of January, 1811. The army under Mendizabel had been routed and dispersed on the Gebora on the 18th of February; Badajos had surrendered on the 9th of March; Oli-

venza, Valencia, d'Alcantara, and Albuquerque, made a show of resistance; but, on the first discharge of the enemy's artillery, the courage of their garrisons being completely paralyzed, they submitted. Campo Mayor acquired a nobler name by its brave resistance; but its garrison would have imitated the craven conduct of its Castilian neighbours, had it not been for the noble spirit of major Tallala, a Portuguese engineer. That brave man heroically defended his trust as long as there was a possibility of resistance; and his heroism met with a proportionately honourable treatment from the enemy. Tarragona, with a garrison of 10,000 men, surrendered on the 28th of June; and though but a very feeble resistance had been made, the excesses of the French troops were terrific. *Long after resistance had ceased*, the batteries were discharged on the fleeing and affrightened inhabitants, and the French cavalry rode among the fugitives, sabring with ruthless ferocity, and savage exultation, those who had outstripped the infantry. The British seamen gallantly rescued many within reach of the very sabres of the dragoons. The frightful massacre was continued for many hours; and "a licentiousness of the most brutal nature, was acted with all its most wanton and heartless atrocities amid flaming edifices, and bleeding victims." "At the storming of Tarragona," says an eye-witness of the dismal scene, and one, too, who is disposed to speak leniently of French outrage, and



to find plausible palliations for the excesses of war, "above 6,000 human beings, all defenceless and unarmed, men and women, gray hairs and infant innocence, attractive youth and wrinkled age, were, with the most infernal spirit of implacable vengeance, butchered by the infuriated troops in one night, and the morning sun rose upon a city whose streets and houses were inundated with blood. Beauty and innocence, after satiating the passions of a licentious soldiery, were mercilessly sacrificed," and yet for these terrific transactions, as well as for the cruel and contumelious usage of its governor, the brave Contrera, Suchet, "the servant of a warlike tyrant," was not only elevated by his heartless master (for the gratification of whose insatiable ambition, and ruthless violation of the rights and well-being of mankind, all this slaughter had been occasioned) to the rank of marshal of France, created duke of Valencia, and endowed with rich possessions in that ill-fated and desolated province; but the character of the butcher of his species rose in the estimation of his countrymen. The strong and almost impregnable fortresses of Murviedro, Montserrat, Mesquinenza, and Figueras, had all fallen into the enemy's hands, after very feeble resistance; and the Spanish armies, under Campoverde, D'Erolles, Quadra, Freire, Balasteros, and Blake, had been routed at Figueras, 29th of April, and scattered at Villa Nueva (June 29th), at Buza, and Lorca, in August; at Puzol, Tache, and Santa Maria, near Valencia, on the 25th of October; at Casteblejos in the mountains of Santander, and on Guadalaviar in December. The only advantages gained over the enemy, that could be produced as a set-off for these tremendous losses and discomfitures, were the surprise of Figueras by Martinez, and Rovira, with the capture of 1,000 prisoners; that of Igualada by Lacy; that of Calatayud by Duran and the empecinado; that of Ayerba by Mina; the combats of Vals under Sarsfield, and of Godinot under Ballasteros. Some idea and estimate of the immense loss of men, artillery, and the munitions of war, sustained by the Spaniards in their disastrous discomfitures just stated, may be formed from the facts, that by the surrender of Tortosa and Tarragona, above 18,000 prisoners were taken, and in the defeat of Mendizabel, on the Gebora, above 7,000 men, all the artillery and munitions of war, fell into the hands of the enemy.

To meet the mighty contest, the British commander-in-chief, invoking all the energies and resources of his vigorous and comprehensive mind, adopted the following plan of operations:—

To provide for all contingences, he determined to act on two lines of operations, that according as circumstances might render it expedient, he might adopt that which was likely to be productive of the best results. For these purposes he directed the mass of his forces to the south for the relief of Cadiz, and the protection of Portugal on the south-eastern frontier, while he remained in Beira on the defensive, and was prepared to undertake the reduction of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; and on the fall of those fortresses, to push his operations into the heart of Spain, and open a communication with the Anglo-Sicilian army, then present in Valencia, under the incompetent command of sir John Murray. This brilliant and masterly conception, by concentrating the British and Spanish forces, and cutting asunder the northern and southern armies of the enemy, would have relieved Cadiz and the south of Spain, as effectually as any direct operation; and, besides opening the communication between the Spanish government in that city, would have delivered Portugal from the possibility of invasion on that side; and, at the same time, the British army would have obtained a new base of operations on the shores of the Mediterranean. Never did a brighter and a more profound conception enter the mind of a military genius. Let the minions and worshippers of Buonaparte's "superlative genius" adduce a similar example.

To carry that part of his project for the relief of Cadiz, and the freedom of the south of Spain, into execution, immediately after the successful termination of the combat of Fons d'Oronce, he had despatched Beresford into Estremadura, with 14,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and eighteen guns, with directions to relieve Campo Mayor, and besiege Olivenza and Badajos.

The English commander-in-chief, sensible of the great importance of the possession of the fortress of Badajos to his future operations, had arranged with the marquis Romana, that the Spanish army should take up a strong position behind the Gebora for its defence, in the event of its being assailed by the enemy. For this purpose he amply detailed the measures by which he was of opinion that



the attempt might be frustrated, until he was in a condition to act on the offensive by the junction of the reinforcement of the 5,000 troops who were daily expected to arrive at Lisbon. He directed Mendizabel to secure the passage of the Guadiana by the mining of the bridges of Medellin and Merida, ready for explosion should the enemy attempt the passage of that river. To increase the great natural strength of the position, he was directed to fortify it with intrenchments, the duke being convinced that if the Spaniards were to be trusted anywhere, it was behind stone walls and deep trenches, and that at best it could only be expected of them that they should stand still. Instead of adopting this salutary counsel, Mendizabel, a man utterly incapable of originating any plan for himself, and, like his countrymen, possessed of too much pride and self-conceit, to adopt the counsel of those who were competent to advise him, lingered on the heights of San Christoval, till, alarmed at the fall of a few shells, thrown by the French from the opposite bank of the river, into his encampment, he hastily deserted his post, and being suddenly and furiously attacked by the enemy, his huge mass of fugitives was divided and slaughtered, and leaving in the hands of the victors 8,000 prisoners, with all his artillery and ammunition, he abandoned Badajos to its fate. On the evening of their easy conquest, the French broke ground before Badajos.

The fort was nobly and gallantly defended by Rafael Menacho, until that brave and honourable man was slain in an unsuccessful sortie on the French batteries; when the command devolved on "one Imaz, who, like a poltroon and a traitor," determined to surrender the fortress to the enemy. At the very crisis of putting his treachery into execution, he was informed by three different channels (namely, by letter, a messenger, and a telegraphic communication from Elvas), that Massena was in full retreat, and that the British army, under Beresford, was in actual march to raise the siege; yet he did not hesitate to surrender, though his garrison consisted of 8,000 men, his stores of every kind abundant, the breach still impracticable, the streets were retrenched, and the besiegers greatly reduced by sickness and fatigue. To the honour of his lieutenants, Garcia and Juan Mancio, be it said, that they scornfully opposed the dishonourable measure.

To serve as a cover to his treachery and cowardice, the dastard had made a condition with Soult, that the garrison should march through the breach for the purpose of laying down their arms; but before that display of mock heroism could be executed, he was obliged to enlarge the breach himself. The bridges of Medellin and Merida had been neglected to be mined by the ignorant Spanish engineers to whom the task had been intrusted.

By those acts of treachery and ignorance the plans of the English commander-in-chief were greatly frustrated. The communication between Andalusia and Castile was thrown open to the enemy; the Alemtejo made easy of entrance, facilities of aiding Massena created, and the fate of the Peninsula again endangered. Had Mendizabel occupied the almost impregnable position pointed out for him, he would have possessed a decided advantage in harassing the enemy, and impeding the progress of the siege. The consequences involved in the fall of Badajos, are most appropriately described in the following expression of lord Wellington: "If it had not been for the treachery of Imaz, Spain would have been out of the fire, notwithstanding former treachery, blunders, and cowardice."\*

Beresford, putting his troops in motion on the morning of the 23rd of March, his advanced guard, consisting of 2,000 cavalry and a brigade of infantry, under colonel Colborne, came up with the enemy, who, having heard of the advance of the British, were in the act of evacuating Campo Mayor. The French retreat was covered by a strong detachment of hussars, but these not being sufficient to beat off their pursuers, four regiments of dragoons advanced to their support. The 13th light dragoons and the French cavalry, then charging with loose reins, rode so fiercely up against each other, that numbers on both sides were dismounted by the shock. The combatants pierced through on both sides, then re-formed and charged again, when the 13th, galloping forwards, cut down the gunners who were conducting the battering train, continued their course till they headed the French column of march, and made themselves masters of a convoy of goods, stores, and ammunition. But the gallant captors were not able to retain possession of their booty, from the unaccountable want of support from the brigades of heavy cavalry in reserve.

\* *Wellington Despatches.*



Some of these formed in front of the French column, and returned by cutting their way through it; while others, hurried on by extreme ardour and impetuosity, kept up a running and an irregular combat with the horsemen of the enemy, to the very mouths of the guns on the ramparts of Badajos, and even made some prisoners at the bridge of that town.\* But the consequence of that hot and uncontrollable conduct was that about seventy of those heroic horsemen were captured close to the gates of Badajos. The enemy lost three hundred men in killed and wounded, one hundred prisoners, and one howitzer. The loss sustained by the 13th in their gallant and chivalrous exploit, was occasioned by marshal Beresford ordering the heavy cavalry brigade, consisting of the 3rd dragoon guards, and the 4th dragoons, who were advancing to their aid, to halt, in consequence of the hasty and erroneous report of one baron Trip, a Hanoverian belonging to his staff, who, seeing the 13th gallop through the French cavalry, and the enemy's columns close up, concluded that the 13th was cut off. While this chivalrous exploit of the 13th excited the unbounded admiration of the army, it met with the following severe reprimand from the commander-in-chief:—"I wish you would call together the officers of the dragoons, and point out to them the mischiefs that must result from the disorder of the troops in action. This undisciplined ardour of the 13th dragoons, and 1st regiment of Portuguese cavalry, is not of the description of the determined bravery and steadiness of soldiers confident in their discipline and in their officers. Their conduct was that of a rabble galloping as fast as their horses would carry them over a plain, after an enemy to whom they could do no mischief when they were broken, and the pursuit had continued a limited distance; and sacrificing substantial advantages, and all the objects of your operation, by their want of discipline. To this description of their conduct I add my entire conviction, that if the enemy could have thrown out of Badajos only 100 men, regularly formed, they would have driven back these two regiments in equal haste and disorder, and would pro-

\* At Fuentes d'Onor a similar exploit was performed by the 1st regiment of heavy dragoons. They charged a French regiment of cavalry, and the shock was so tremendous, that many men and horses were overthrown on each side. They rode through and passed each other, and then wheeling round, reformed and came again to a second charge.

bably have taken many whose horses had been knocked up. If the 13th dragoons are again guilty of this conduct, I shall take their horses from them, and send the officers and men to do duty at Lisbon." Notwithstanding this judicious reprimand, the chivalric exploit of the 13th excited the boundless admiration of the whole army.

To restrain all undue impetuosity on the part of officers and men, which might endanger the safety of the troops and derange the plan of operations presented for their guidance, the English general, after the untoward affair of the escape of the garrison of Almeida, caused copies of the following admonition to be distributed among the officers of the army:—

"The frequent instances which have occurred lately of severe loss, and, in some instances, of important failure, by officers leading the troops beyond the point to which they were ordered, and beyond all bounds, such as the loss of the prisoners taken in front of the village of Fuentes; the loss incurred by the 13th light dragoons, here and at Badajos; the severe loss incurred by the troops in the siege of Badajos, on the right of the Guadiana; and the still more recent loss at Almeida, have induced me to determine to bring before a general court-martial, for disobedience of orders, any officer who shall in future be guilty of this conduct. I entertain no doubt of the readiness of the officers and soldiers of the army to advance upon the enemy; but it is my duty, and that of every officer in command, to regulate this spirit, and not to expose the soldiers to contend with unequal numbers in situations that are disadvantageous to them; and above all, not to allow them to follow up trifling advantages to situations where they cannot be supported, from which their retreat is not secure, and in which they incur the risk of being prisoners to the enemy they had before beaten. The desire to be forward in engaging the enemy is not uncommon in the British army; but that quality which I wish to see the officers possess, who are at the head of the troops, is a cool discriminating judgment in action, which will enable them to decide with promptitude, how far they can and ought to go with propriety; and to convey their orders, and act with such vigour and decision, that the soldiers will look up to them with confidence in the moment of action, and obey them with alacrity."



On obtaining possession of Campo Mayor, Beresford cantoned his troops at Elvas and the adjoining villages, while the means of bridging the Guadiana at Jurumenhu were obtained, the requisite materials having, as usual, been promised by the Portuguese government, but not supplied. On the 3rd of April a bridge was constructed, consisting of trestle piers in the fordable places, and in the deep parts, of the five Spanish boats that had been saved from the stores at the capture of Badajos by the French; but in the course of the night it was carried away by a sudden rising of the river. No materials being at hand, a narrow viaduct, consisting of pontoons and casks, collected from the neighbouring villages, being speedily formed for the infantry, and the five Spanish boats being converted into flying bridges for the cavalry and artillery, on the evening of the 6th the whole army effected the passage of the river, and took up its position on the left bank. In the course of the night, Latour Maubourg, who had succeeded Mortier in the command of the French troops in Estremadura, passing, with 3,500 infantry and 500 cavalry, unobserved through some Portuguese videttes, surprised and captured a squadron of the 13th light dragoons, and penetrating the village in which Beresford's head-quarters were established, was allowed to escape without a shot or a sabre being employed against him.

On the morning of the 9th, Beresford advanced on Olivenza, and after a halt of two days, left Cole, with the fourth division and Madden's Portuguese cavalry to reduce the place. A sufficient battering train being collected from Elvas, the town was invested on the 12th, and the wall being breached on the 14th, the governor surrendered the place on the following morning. On the 16th, Cole joined Beresford at Zafra; and on the same day, the 10th light dragoons intercepting, between Los Santos de Maquira and Usagre, two regiments of French cavalry (the 4th and 16th hussars), who had been raising contributions in the neighbourhood, and had succeeded in collecting considerable stores, attacked them, and pursuing them for the distance of six miles, slew above 300, took many prisoners, and recaptured part of the plunder. Had Beresford, according to his instructions, been enabled to invest Olivenza and Badajos, instead of cantoning his troops at Elvas and its neighbourhood, the war would have soon been transferred from the frontiers of Portugal into

the heart of Spain, and "the History of the Peninsular War" might have been shortened by several years. The secrecy and promptitude with which Wellington marched his army on Estremadura, and the moral effect of the late chivalrous daring of the 13th light dragoons, would have tended materially to the reduction of Badajos. But the failure in the attempt delayed the English chief for one year on the frontiers of Portugal, and enabled the enemy to prepare his plans. And it may be confidently said, that had the British government thrown at once on a proper part of the European continent, a force deserving the name of an army, instead of the pitiful dribbles they had ever done, and the temporary measures they had adopted, until they had determined on the descent on the Peninsula, the career of Buonaparte might have been checked, and his fate determined many years earlier.

The English commander-in-chief having given instructions for the blockade of Almeida, delivered the command of the allied army in Beira to sir Brent Spencer, *ad interim*, while he proceeded to Estremadura to inspect personally the condition of the army under sir William Beresford, and to decide on the means of carrying on effectually the siege of Badajos, which had been surrendered on the 11th of the preceding month to the enemy. He reached the camp on the 21st, and on the following day, with a strong escort of German light troops which had recently joined the army, and two squadrons of Madden's Portuguese cavalry, he reconnoitred Badajos for the purpose of making the enemy indicate his force. At that moment, a convoy, under escort, was coming in from the country, and an effort being made to cut it off, the assailants were beaten off, with the loss of 100 men, by a sally of the garrison, under the command of the governor.

Orders were now issued for active operations against Badajos; but when the preparations for the siege were nearly completed, the floods again carried away the bridge which had been thrown across the Guadiana at Jurumenhu, the water rising nearly nine feet in the course of twelve hours. That untoward accident put a stop to all offensive operations for the present; as the army could not be subsisted without having a constant communication with Elvas, and in the event of Soult's advance to relieve the fortress, a battle would be very hazardous with such a river



in the rear, without a facility of transit for a retreating army. Beresford was therefore directed merely to blockade Badajos as closely as possible, till the bridge was re-established, and to post his army so as to command the communication with the right of the river by the Merida bridge. To insure a successful issue to the siege, the English commander-in-chief determined to require the assent of the Spanish generals (Blake, Castanos, and Ballasteros), to a combined plan of operations, which he detailed in the following "Memorandum:"—

"To the officers in command of corps in Estremadura.

"Elvas, 23rd April, 1811.

"The corps of allied British and Portuguese troops, under marshal sir William Beresford, being about to be employed in the siege of Badajos, it is desirable that the troops in Estremadura, the Cenclado de Niebla, and Andalusia, should co-operate in and protect that operation.

"It has been reported, and there is reason to believe that it is true, that the enemy have fortified their magazines and establishments at Seville, and therefore no diversion that might be threatened, or even attempted on that city, will have the effect of drawing off the enemy's attention from the measures he must adopt to relieve Badajos. If that relief should be attempted, therefore, it will be by the whole force which the enemy can bring from the blockade of Cadiz, and from his several corps in Andalusia, Granada, &c., and it must be resisted by the whole force of the allies *en masse*; and the following plan is proposed for the consideration of the Spanish general officers.

"Sir William Beresford's corps will carry on the operations of the siege; and it is requested that general Castaños will aid him with three battalions to work in the trenches.

"In case the enemy should endeavour to interrupt the siege, and sir William Beresford should think proper to fight a battle to save it, he will probably collect his troops in the neighbourhood of Albuera. It is proposed, that the troops under the Conde de Penre Villemeur should observe the enemy towards Guadalcanal, reporting all that passes daily to marshal sir William Beresford. In case the enemy should advance in force, the Conde de Penre Villemeur should retire by the road of Usagre, Villa Franca, Almendralejo, and to the left of the position of the allied British and Portuguese

army, ascertaining, and sending daily, intelligence of the enemy's force and movements.

"It is proposed that the troops under general Morillo shall continue to occupy Merida, and observe all that passes towards Almarez and the passages of the Tagus. In case of the advance of the enemy, general Morillo should break up, and march by Lebon, and be prepared to join the allied British and Portuguese army, either by Talaveruela, or by a more direct route.

"It is proposed that, during the siege of Badajos, general Ballasteros shall have his quarters at Burguillos, and communicate by his left, with the Conde de Penre Villemeur, and observe the roads through the Sierra by Fregenal and Monasterio, taking care to involve himself in no serious affair, and sending daily information to sir William Beresford of all that passes.

"In case the enemy should advance, general Ballasteros should retire by the road of Barcarrota upon Valverde, in order to join on the right of the army.

"When general Blake's corps shall land, it is proposed that it should take its station at Xeres de los Caballeros; and, if the enemy should advance, it should fall back by the same road as that pointed out for general Ballasteros.

"It is proposed, that the troops of the several nations shall carry on these operations under the command of their several chiefs, of course communicating with each other constantly, as above proposed; but, in case of joining for the purpose of giving battle to the enemy, it will be necessary that the whole should be under the orders of the officer of the highest military rank.

"The Spanish general officers are requested to state to sir William Beresford whether they will or not co-operate with him in the manner above proposed, in carrying on the siege of Badajos; and what the number is of the effective men of the cavalry, infantry, and artillery, under their several commands.

"WELLINGTON."

Before the pride and the perverseness of the Spanish generals conceded to these wholesome and judicious suggestions, intelligence being received from sir Brent Spencer, that Massena was again in force on the Agueda, having established his head-quarters at Ciudad Rodrigo, the English commander-in-chief instantly repaired to Beira, and arrived at Villa Formosa on the 28th of the month. Previous



to his departure, foreseeing the probability of Soult's advance to raise the siege of Badajos, he instructed Beresford that Albuera was the best battle-field that could be selected in the neighbourhood of that fortress.

With the broken and dispirited band with which Massena had re-crossed the frontier of Portugal, he had fallen back to Salamanca, where he made the most strenuous exertions to refit and reorganize his shattered forces. Being reinforced by two divisions of the 9th corps, which on account of Joseph Buonaparte's flight from Madrid was no longer necessary in that locality, as also by the cavalry and artillery of the imperial guard under Bessières, from the army of the north, he advanced to the frontiers of Portugal; and on the eve of the invasion he addressed a proclamation to the French army, couched in the usual inflated and bombastic Napoleonic phraseology; in which, among much braggadocioism and

exaggeration, the following startling declaration appeared: "Soldiers of the army of Portugal! After six months of *glorious* and *tranquil* operations you have returned to the first scene of your *triumphs*." As the river Agueda was not as yet fordable for infantry, no movement was made, except two of reconnoissance towards the bridge of the Azava, near Marialva, in both of which the French sustained considerable loss. On the 2nd of May, however, the whole of the army, consisting of the 2nd, 6th, and 8th corps, amounting to 41,000 infantry, and 5,000 cavalry, crossed the Agueda at Ciudad Rodrigo, escorting a convoy of stores and provisions for the relief of Almeida. The English commander-in-chief immediately concentrated his force, amounting to 32,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, to deliver battle, though both the ground and the circumstances were unfavourable, and opposed the entry of the supplies.

#### THE BATTLE OF FUENTES D'ONOR.

As the great object of the English general was to keep up the blockade of Almeida, and prevent the enemy from having any communication with the garrison, he was compelled to take up a position with the river Coa in his rear. To make provision for this disadvantage, it was necessary to keep open the communication with the bridge of Sabugal; and thus was imposed on him the necessity of occupying a position of not less than six miles from flank to flank, the ruins of Fort Conception being on the extreme left, Fuentes d'Onor (a "fair" and beautiful village situated on an eminence on the left bank of the Duas Casas, near its source, the river dividing Portugal from Spain at an equal distance from the two frontier lines,) towards the centre, and Nave d'Aver on the extreme right. The position included the tableland between the Turones and the Duas Casas. This was the position selected by the English general for the battle, and though somewhat similar to those of Assaye and Vimiero, he had confidence in the resources of his genius and the spirit of his troops. The event proved that his estimate was correct.

To anticipate the enemy at whatever point he might direct his attack, the 6th

division, under general Campbell, observed the bridge opposite Alameda; sir William Erskine, with the 5th, covered the passage of the Duas Casas at Fort Conception and Aldea del Obispo; while the principal part of the army, consisting of the 1st, 3rd, and 7th divisions, was massed on Fuentes d'Onor, within cannon-shot, behind the village, ready to meet the enemy's attack on whatever point it might be directed; the village itself being occupied by a battalion of chosen detachments of light infantry, taken from the 1st and 3rd divisions, and placed under the command of lieutenant-colonel Williams. Park's brigade, with the queen's regiment from the 6th division, kept up the blockade of Almeida. The partisan Julian Sanchez had been prevailed on to occupy Nave d'Aver with his guerilla horse and infantry. The light division was in observation on the banks of the Duas Casas.

On the evening of the 2nd, the enemy passed the Azava, and on the next morning, continuing their march towards the Duas Casas, the light division, with its cavalry, fell back on Fuentes d'Onor. Towards the evening of the 3rd, Loisson having formed the 6th corps on the right bank of the river, with the intent of forcing the centre of the



British position, under the cover of a hot cannonade, made a fierce attack on the village, but the assault was successfully resisted by colonel Williams, who was reinforced in succession by the 71st, 79th, and a battalion of the 24th; when a vigorous charge being made on the enemy, he was driven from the lower part of the village of which he had obtained a momentary possession; and night closing the scene of the angry and deadly strife, he withdrew across the Duas Casas. Colonel Williams was severely wounded in this honourable and well-contested conflict.

Massena having failed in his attempt to pierce the British centre, determined to make a simultaneous attack on any other part of the line which should appear to present a weak point. For this purpose, he occupied the whole of the 4th in carefully reconnoitring the British position. From the course of the reconnoissance, lord Wellington being of opinion that he would endeavour to turn his right by crossing the river at Poço Velho, which stands midway between Fort Conception and Fuentes d'Onor, for the purpose of counteracting his attempt, moved the 7th division, under major-general Houston, to that point, with orders to defend to the utmost the passage of the river.

The anticipations of the English general were realized. At daylight of the 5th (Sunday), the 8th corps, under Junôt, appeared in two columns, with all the cavalry, on the opposite side of the valley of the Duas Casas, and advancing against the village of Poço Velho. Houston's advanced guard was driven back, and the right of his division being turned in consequence of Julian Sanchez—who had imprudently taken alarm—abandonment of Nave d'Aver, the right of Houston's division being uncovered, the village was carried by the enemy, Houston's advanced brigade retiring in good order.

The light division, the cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery, were sent to Houston's assistance; but whilst the British cavalry were moving up to his support, they were furiously charged by the whole of the French horse, supported by the infantry; and though the weak squadrons unflinchingly maintained the shock of the overpowering numbers of the enemy, they were compelled to retire behind the light division, which, forming itself into squares, and at the same time the 7th division taking ad-

vantage of the ground, which was in some parts intersected by stone walls, while in other parts the rocks stood several feet above the surface, the united force poured in so destructive a fire, that the whole force of the enemy at once recoiled, and fell back in disorder.

In the mean time, the enemy was gaining ground in the wood of Poço Velho, and his numerous cavalry was observed to be collecting on the right flank, while large masses of infantry were forming on the front. This movement determined the English general to take up a more concentrated position towards his left, by forming a new alignment at right angles with his former position, from the Duas Casas to the Turones, and relinquishing his communication with Sabugal.

To accomplish his purpose, the 7th and light divisions were ordered to a commanding ground beyond the Turones, which protected the right flank and the rear of the 1st division, and covered the communication with the Coa, while it prevented that of the enemy with Almeida by the road between the rivers. The 7th division was directed to take post on the height beyond the Turones, which commanded the whole plain of Frenada, and the cavalry and the light division were ordered to form in reserve, in rear of the left of the 1st division. The enemy viewing this movement as a general retreat, pressed on with the confidence of victory. They had at one period cut off and surrounded, with their cavalry, captain Ramsay's battery of horse-artillery. "In a moment," to adopt the vivid language of the historian of *The War in the Peninsula*, "great confusion and tumult, with sparkling of blades, and flashing of pistols, in the locality where the gallant band stood, was observed, when an English shout peeled high and clear; the mass was rent asunder, and Ramsay burst forth, sword in hand, at the head of his battery, his horses breathing fire stretched across the plain, the guns bounded behind them like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners followed close, with heads bent low, and pointed weapons, in desperate career." The gallant band had broke its way through the astonished squadrons of the enemy, and brought off the battery. At the same moment, captain Brotherton advanced to their relief with a squadron of the 14th dragoons, and checked the head of the pursuing troops.



The retrogressive movement of the 7th and light divisions was executed for near two miles with great regularity and firmness, in the face of the enemy's numerous cavalry, which, strongly supported by artillery, made repeated charges on the retiring divisions. The light division, having covered the passage of the 7th division across the Turones, commenced its own retreat over the plain in squares, slowly and in good order, followed and continually outflanked by the French cavalry, one moment lost to sight, and the next emerging from the confused crowd, till they at length reached the ground appointed them, having been protected by the occasional charges of a few squadrons of their own cavalry, through the intervals of the squares. On the divisions taking up their battle-stations, the cavalry, in passing through the intervals of the new alignment, having occasioned some confusion, Montbrun ordered a charge of the whole French cavalry; but his force was received with so destructive a fire, that it retreated in confusion; from which time, the efforts of the enemy on the right were confined to a cannonade, and some charges of horse on the advanced posts.

But the storm of battle throughout the whole day was at Fuentes d'Onor. There the principal effort of the enemy was directed. Drouet made a desperate attack on the village, which was as desperately defended by the three British regiments, the 71st, 79th, and 34th infantry. Infantry, cavalry, and artillery, were all brought to bear, and at nine o'clock in the morning, on a given signal, a tremendous cannonade opened on the devoted village, and the assault was made in front and flanks at the same time. The struggle was at one time on the banks of the stream, and amongst the houses in the lower town, and at another among the rugged heights, and about the chapel. Every house in the lower town was taken and retaken in the course of the day, and one by one abandoned as the entrances were choked up with the dead. So hotly and stiffly was the contest maintained by the gallant defenders of the village, that the numbers of the enemy brought in to reinforce Drouet produced but little effect. But the French guns played with so much fury, and the assailing columns became so powerful and impetuous, that the defenders were compelled to withdraw to the upper part of the village, when one tremendous inundation of Frenchmen pouring into the chapel,

passed out on the opposite side, and they were about attempting a formation to assail the plateau, or table-land, between the Turones and the Duas Casas, when the 74th, 83rd, and 88th, under general Mackinnon, advanced to the charge, and drove them back into the village at the point of the bayonet, where the contest recommenced, and was kept up with great vigour and obstinacy till nightfall, when the enemy retired about a cannon-shot from the stream, leaving the English in possession of the upper part of the village, and the lower part in the "silent occupation of the dead." In this desperate affair, bayonets were repeatedly crossed.

Never was national rivalry and heroism more conspicuously shown than in the battle of Fuentes d'Onor. Each army performed prodigies of valour. Never were the gallantry and devotion of every regiment engaged, in that part of the contest which was about the village, exceeded. But the conduct of the French 45th of the line was eminently conspicuous. It came on to the sound of music, in all the regularity of a field day, and planting its eagle on the wall of the village nearest to the British position, maintained it floating there, till forced to retire, when near 100 dead were found piled on one another, near the pole of their favourite banner, all slain in their heroic attempts to rescue it from the foe. The loss of the British was 1,776 in killed, wounded, and missing—that of the French is said to have exceeded 5,000. Intercepted letters stated, that between 3,000 and 4,000 had been wounded.

At daylight of the 6th the whole French army was in motion, and on the 10th retired across the Azava, in full retreat for Ciudad Rodrigo, Massena having previously transmitted orders to the governor of Almeida to blow up the fortifications and withdraw the garrison to Barba del Puerco, whence he was to march to San Felices, where a strong force would be ready to cover his retreat. "He had recourse to this artifice," says general Sarrazin, "to repair as much as possible the reverses he had experienced, and to cover or gloze over his disgrace," after all his vaunting and boasts. He carried his boastful spirit and disposition for misrepresentation so far as even to arrogate to himself the victory just obtained at Fuentes d'Onor, representing that the evacuation and not the relief of Almeida, was the object for which the battle of Fuentes d'Onor had



been fought; adopting the usual Napoleonic jesuitical phraseology:—"The operation," said he, "which had put the army in motion, was thus terminated." In conformity with his orders, general Brennier, the governor of Almeida, mined the principal fortifications in the course of the day of the 11th, and at 11 o'clock of the night of that day, having given the watchword, "Buonaparte and Bayard," to his brave and intrepid followers, and marshalling the garrison into two columns, placing the baggage in the rear of each to allure and detain his pursuers, evacuated the place. His advanced guard came up with the English posts at the moment the mines exploded and blew up the ramparts. The spirit of the attack, and the superiority of numbers, easily opened a passage for the head of the column, through the pickets, who were all bayoneted. The queen's regiment, and the other troops employed in the blockade, believing the explosions were of the same kind as those they had heard on the preceding nights (the gar-

rison, while Massena was between the Duas Casas and the Azava, having been in the habit of firing cannon during the night, and of making constant attacks on the pickets; measures no doubt preparatory to the intended evacuation, and designed to beguile the attention of the besiegers,) remained at their posts and cantonments till the cause had been actually ascertained. The negligence, too, of some of the British officers, particularly Erskine and Campbell, not a little aided Brennier in his bold and daring attempt. But though the garrison escaped, and formed a junction with Regnier, who was waiting for them at the bridge of San Felices, it was much harassed on its flanks, and lost all its baggage and 300 prisoners, and the whole of its rear-guard was cut to pieces. Great, however, was the mortification of the English commander-in-chief, that a single Frenchman escaped, and he angrily declared, that he looked on it as "the most disgraceful event that had occurred during the war."\* Had the mere precaution of

\* In his official letter to Lord Liverpool, he expressed the same sentiments, and with scarcely less acerbity; and candour must allow that the honour of the service, and the interests of his country, demanded the severity of his just and judicious rebuke:—

"To the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State.

"Villa Formosa, 15th May, 1811.

"MY DEAR LORD,—You will receive by this post the account of the blowing up of Almeida; and although I believe that we have taken or destroyed the greater part of the garrison, I have never been so much distressed by any military event as by the escape of even a man of them.

"The enemy having retired across the Azava, during the night of the 9th, I went forward in the morning to observe their subsequent movements. About one o'clock of the day of the 10th, having seen their whole army across the Agueda, I sent orders for the right of the army to remove their cantonments on the Duas Casas; the advanced guard and cavalry upon the Azava and the Upper Agueda; the 5th division (Sir W. Erskine) to send a regiment to Barba de Puerco; and the 6th division (major-general Campbell) to resume the blockade of Almeida.

"Sir W. Erskine was dining with sir Brent Spencer at head-quarters, and received his orders about four o'clock; and he says he sent them off forthwith to the 4th regiment, which was stationed, under former orders, on the Duas Casas, half-way between Aldea de Obispo and Barba de Puerco. General Campbell called on me about half-past five or six o'clock, and told me that before dark his division would have resumed their positions for the blockade.

"At about half-past twelve the place was blown up; and the garrison had about fourteen miles to march to Barba de Puerco, and nearly the same distance to the only fords on the Agueda, the whole of which were occupied by our dragoons.

"General Pack and general Campbell both expected that the garrison would attempt to escape,

and were both at Malpartida, about four miles from Almeida, on the road towards the Agueda and Barba de Puerco. General Pack joined the pickets, and followed the enemy with ten men, and kept a fire upon them, as a guide to the other troops, which he supposed were following. General Campbell did follow, with eight companies of the 36th regiment. The 8th Portuguese regiment, under lieutenant-colonel Douglas, which was at Junga, on the southwest side of Almeida, marched when the explosion was heard, and arrived at Barba de Puerco before the French; but finding nobody there excepting a picket of cavalry, they passed the Duas Casas again, and thus misled them.

"The Queen's regiment, which was within a mile of Almeida on the road to Malpartida, were not aware that the place was blown up, and did not march at all; and the 4th regiment, which it was said did not receive their orders before midnight, and had only two and-a-half miles to march, missed their road, and did not arrive at Barba de Puerco till after the French, and with general Campbell and general Pack; and the flank battalions of the 5th division, which sir W. Erskine had detached from Aldea del Obispo (so long after he had heard the explosion, that he sent an officer to Almeida, between five and six miles, to ascertain what it was, and this officer had returned), arrived nearly at the same time.

"The other corps of the 6th division had marched different distances in pursuit of the enemy; but, excepting the 39th and the 8th Portuguese, none had crossed the Turones.

"Thus your lordship will see that, if the 4th regiment had received the orders issued at one, before it was dark, at eight o'clock at night; or if they had not missed their road, the garrison must have laid down their arms; and the same would have occurred if lieutenant-colonel Douglas had remained at Barba de Puerco; and possibly the same would have occurred, had the pursuit been judiciously managed.

"Possibly I have to reproach myself for not hav-



drawing lines of circumvallation round the fortress, been adopted, the misfortune might have been obviated, as the delay which the attack upon such lines would have occasioned, would have given time to collect the blockading troops, and of giving Brennier that chastisement for having put himself without the pale of the accustomed laws of war, by the wanton and unwarrantable destruction of the fortifications and warlike stores of the fortress.

One of the early consequences of the victory at Fuentes d'Onor was the advance of the British rear on the Azava and the lower Agueda, while the main body occupied cantonments on the Duas Casas. Having been thus far successful in the north, the British chief was preparing to proceed to the south to direct and prosecute the siege of Badajos, when, on the 15th, he received advice from marshal Beresford, that Soult had broken up from Seville, and was advancing for the relief of Badajos. Transferring the command of the army to general Spencer, he immediately set off for Elvas, and there on the 19th ascertained at the same time that Beresford had been obliged to raise the siege of Badajos, and the issue of the battle of Albuera.

Beresford had been directed to endeavour to retake Badajos before the French had had time to repair the breaches and fill up the trenches. The causes that prevented him from putting his orders into immediate execution have already been stated. Much valuable time was also lost before the Spanish generals acceded to the plans which lord Wellington had enjoined on Beresford as the indispensable condition of laying siege to that fortress.\* At length operations were commenced against the fortress. On the 8th of May the investment commenced on the left bank of the Guadiana; and on the 11th a breaching battery was constructed against ing been on the spot; but really, when the enemy's whole army had crossed the Agueda, with the exception of one brigade of cavalry, in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, I did not think it probable that the attempt to escape would be made; and having employed two divisions and a brigade, to prevent the escape of 1,400 men, who I did not think it likely would attempt to escape; the necessity of my attendance personally to this operation, after I had been the whole day on the Azava, did not occur to me. However, it is that alone, in the whole operation, in which I have to reproach myself, as everything was done that could be done, in the way of order and instruction.

"I certainly feel, every day, more and more the difficulty of the situation in which I am placed. I am obliged to be everywhere and if absent from any

Fort St. Christoval; but the siege *matériel* was perfectly inadequate to the undertaking. The guns being small, and brass, were ineffective, and soon silenced by the superior fire of the enemy. On the 12th, intelligence being received that Soult was in full march from Seville to relieve the place, the progress of the works was arrested, the gabions and fascines burned, the siege *matériel* conveyed across the river; and the flying bridge drawn ashore, seven hundred men having perished in the fruitless undertaking. On the breaking up of the siege, the whole of the allied army, except the fourth division, which remained to maintain the blockade of the place, marched for Albuera, to give the enemy battle. At a conference held at Valverde on the 13th, with the Spanish commanders, Blake, Castanos, and Ballasteros, the command in chief was ceded to Beresford, and Blake engaged to bring up the Spanish army into line by 12 o'clock on noon of the 15th. The Anglo-Portuguese reached the field of Albuera on the 15th, where they found their cavalry had already taken post. At this time Massena was superseded by Marmont in the command of the army of Portugal, as that division of the French force in the Peninsula was, in Napoleonic phraseology, pompously termed. "L'Enfant gâté de la victoire," "*the favourite child of victory*," or as some versions have it—*the spoiled child of fortune*—having been foiled by the superior strategics of his opponent; and seeing his reversionary hopes of having the crown of Portugal perched upon his pate dissipated—pleaded ill health and returned to Paris, having narrowly escaped capture by Mina at the Puerto de Arlaban, near Vittoria, who took the whole of his baggage and plunder. He was not the only Frenchman baffled by Wellington, who in his aspirations had been alike frustrated and disappointed of their "high degree."

operation, something goes wrong. It is to be hoped, that the general and other officers of the army will at last acquire that experience which will teach them that success can be attained only by attention to the most minute details; and by tracing every part of every operation, from its origin to its conclusion, point by point, and by ascertaining that the whole is understood by those who are to execute it.

"Believe me, &c.,

"WELLINGTON."

\* Some writers have accused Beresford of unnecessary delay. The following observation, which occurs in a letter dated "Elvas, April 21st," seems to justify the accusation:—"I am afraid," says the English commander-in-chief, "that we have lost much valuable time here; and I have come here principally to put matters in the right road."



## THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

THE battle of Albuera, one of the fiercest on human record, derives its name from the village of Albuera, or as it is otherwise written, Albuhera; which is about five Spanish leagues distant from Badajos, and situated on the river Albuera. At the time of the battle it contained a church and about one hundred houses, which had been deserted by the inhabitants; the only living animals in it were an old man and his dog. On the right and left of the village were two bridges. Over that, to the left, the great road from Seville runs, and then diyaricates to Badajos. It was for this reason that lord Wellington had selected Albuera as a battle-field, should an action be necessary, in preference to receiving the enemy at Valverde, which, though it presented a stronger position, Badajos would have been left open to the enemy's advance.

The position was an undulating ridge about four miles in extent, having the Albuera in front and the Arroya in its rear, both running nearly parallel. The right of the position had no *point d'appui*, the range of heights being prolonged in that direction to an extent it was impossible to occupy. A little above the bridge, a rivulet called the Ferdia joins the Albuera, and the banks of these streams and the ground between them were thickly covered with ilex trees, a species of wood which, though calculated to conceal the formation of bodies of men, did not impede the movements of an army.

On the morning of the 15th the Anglo-Portuguese army occupied the left of the position; the right, which was elevated, and consequently less assailable, was left open for Blake's army; but as Blake had failed to bring up his corps, the English marshal formed a temporary right wing with his cavalry and artillery, and dispatched officers to hasten Blake's movements, who, though he had but a few miles to march, and that the roads were good, the head of his columns did not reach the ground till midnight, and the rear at 3 o'clock of the day of battle. The army was then marshalled in two lines, the Spanish on the right, on the heights, the British in the centre, and the Portuguese on the left. The two battalions of German riflemen occupied the village of Albuera; and a strong artillery battery protected the bridge. The cavalry, under Lumley, was

posted in the rear of the Spanish line. The fourth division, under general Cole (which had come up from Badajos after the action had commenced,) and one brigade of the Portuguese division, formed a second line in rear of the centre. The amount of the Spanish force was 16,000 men; that of the Portuguese 8,000; and that of the English between 6,000 and 7,000. Lumley's command consisted of 17 squadrons of cavalry, amounting to near 2,000 men, Portuguese and English inclusive. Thirty-two guns constituted the whole of the artillery.

About three o'clock on the evening of the 15th the whole of the French army, consisting of above 19,000 chosen infantry and 4,000 veteran cavalry, with fifty guns, took their station in the wooded ground on the opposite side of the Albuera. The French general, Soult, in reconnoitring the position of the allied army, and observing its weak points, made his disposition of attack accordingly.

As on the right of the allies there was a kind of table-land trending backwards towards the Valverde road, and looking into their rear of the line of battle; and that their right wing was composed wholly of Spanish troops, whom the troops he commanded had repeatedly and recently put to the most fearful rout and flight, the French marshal expected, by dispersing its disheartened and dispirited occupants, he would roll up the right wing of the allies upon their centre, and drive them into the narrow ravine of the Arroya. Success in that quarter would give him possession of the Valverde road, and thus the retreat of his adversary would either be cut off, or it would be disastrous in the face of his numerous cavalry. If he failed in this point, an attack on the bridge and village of Albuera would sever the wings of the allies, and enable the attacking force to compete with them separately; as also to serve as a feint to prevent the enemy from divining the principal part of the attack, and making the necessary disposition to meet it.

For each of these movements great facilities were afforded the French marshal for the formation of his columns to remain unseen by the enemy until the moment of their debouchment, and for concealing their strength and direction until the moment



they were in action. For the attack on the bridge and the village, which were in advance of the centre of the British line, the wooded nature of the right banks of the Albuera effectually concealed the force and its disposition for that service. Beresford having neglected to occupy the wooded hill between the two positions, and about a cannon-shot distant from either, but separated from the right of the allies by the Albuera, and from the left of the French by the Ferdia, favoured his attack on the right flank. For his grand and principal attack, Soult, in the course of the night of the 15th, concentrated, behind the wooded hill, the 5th corps, under Girard, Lautour Maubourg's heavy cavalry, and the greater part of the artillery under Ruty. Thus, unseen and unsuspected, were 15,000 veteran troops, with forty pieces of artillery, within ten minutes' march of the right wing of the allies; while the remainder of his force, consisting of Godinot's brigade, the division of the 1st corps under Werle, the light cavalry, and the ten remaining pieces of artillery, were formed in the woods that extended along the banks of the Ferdia, towards its confluence with the Albuera.

A little before 8 o'clock in the morning of the 16th of May, the ever-memorable battle of Albuera began, by a heavy column, consisting of Werle's division and Godinot's brigade, preceded by a battery of ten guns, and flanked by light cavalry, debouching from the wooded ground between the Ferdia and the Albuera, and making for the bridge; while the 5th corps, with Maubourg's cavalry and Ruty's artillery, rushing from behind the wooded hill, were preparing to ascend the heights on the right. Beresford, observing that Werle's division, and the light cavalry, did not follow closely on Godinot's brigade, but countermarched, and soon gained the rear of the main body advancing to the attack on the right, concluded that the village was not the real point of the attack, but the heights on the allied line; he therefore ordered Cole's division, which had just taken up its battle-station, to form obliquely to the rear of the right; and at the same time he dispatched major Hardinge to Blake to request him to form part of his first line, and all his second at right angles, or in a perpendicular direction to his original position, that the right wing might correspond to the new front assumed by the centre, in order to enable it to meet the flank movement of the enemy's principal

attack, which was now completely developed.

Blake doggedly refusing to comply with the commander-in-chief's orders, on the ground that the principal attack was on the village, Beresford was obliged personally to obtain his compliance; but the surly and dogmatic Spaniard setting about the movement with the pomposity and pedantic slowness characteristic of his countrymen, the British general assumed the command, and attempted to wheel the sluggish force into the new front; but he was not able to push forward the first line sufficiently to allow room for the second to support it, before the French artillery began to play among them; while the fifth corps and Werle's division, advancing close to their position, poured in volleys of musketry, and the cavalry outflanking them in front, sabred them as they gave way under the rolling fire of grape and musketry. Beresford, placing himself in the very front of danger, used every mode of authority and persuasion, to induce the disheartened Spaniards to advance to meet the enemy's attack. Seizing a colonel in one hand, and an ensign with the colours in the other, he thrust them forwards, in hopes that the line would follow—but all in vain; the dastard officers slunk back to the ranks, and the panic-struck troops rushed, in wild and tumultuous confusion, towards the centre, breaking through, and, in their terror, firing upon the very troops that were advancing to their assistance.

The French now establishing themselves upon the ground abandoned by the Spaniards, Soult formed his force in line, extending to the Valverde road, and as the ground of which he had possessed himself rather commanded the rest of the position of the allied army, he would have been able to sweep with his artillery the whole of the allied line. So sure did he now calculate on victory, that he detached his heavy cavalry, under Maubourg, beyond the right of the allies, to take advantage of the first signal of retreat, and intercept or harass the allies in their retrograde movement.

To dislodge the enemy from the commanding position, and make an effort to retrieve the fortune of the day, major-general William Stewart was ordered to bring up from the centre, colonel Colburn's brigade, consisting of the buffs, the 66th, the 2nd battalion of the 48th, and the 31st; but that officer leading his command up the lost position by columns of com-



panies, while they were in the act of deploying into line, as they crowned the height (the two leading battalions having completed the manœuvre, and the 31st remaining in column), they were assailed by a large body of Polish lancers, and some squadrons of French hussars, who had galloped round on their rear, and whose approach had been concealed by a mist and heavy fall of rain, that had obscured the whole horizon. Even when seen, being mistaken for Spanish cavalry, a mistake occasioned by the dishonourable ruse of the enemy calling out as they advanced, "Vivan los Ingleses," "Vivan los amigos de España,"—a dastardly subterfuge often adopted by the enemy in the course of the Peninsular War—they were allowed, without a shot being fired, to approach the ranks, and the next moment they were within them. The result was, the whole brigade, except the 31st, was either slain or driven forward into the enemy's lines, and made prisoners, whole companies being cut down without having fired a single shot, or made the smallest resistance. At this moment, a gust of wind succeeding the rain, and clearing off the mist, general Lumley detached some squadrons of the heavy brigade against the merciless lancers and hussars, who did considerable execution among them, while they were riding over the field, spearing the wounded as they lay upon the ground.

The 31st having been on the left of the ill-fated brigade, and having remained in column, was the only regiment that had escaped the destructive charge of the enemy's cavalry. That gallant regiment having managed to maintain its ground, general Stewart, who had escaped the carnage, advanced with the same impetuosity, but in a more judicious order of battle, with the third brigade of his division, consisting of the 29th, the 57th, and the 1st battalion of the 48th, under major-general Houghton, for the purpose of restoring the

\* Much erroneous misapprehension exists on this subject. Not only the public, but *all* the books that treat of the battle of Albuera, attribute the merit of ordering the 4th division to restore the battle to major Hardinge. Never was there a greater error, and a greater act of injustice to the man who had the sole merit of gaining the battle. But both the error and the injustice are mainly attributable to the author of *The History of the War in the Peninsula*. "While the commander-in-chief was thus preparing to resign the contest," says he, "colonel Hardinge, using his name, ordered general Cole to advance with the 4th division, and then riding to the 3rd brigade of the

battle. A contest of the most bloody and pertinacious character now ensued.

The leading regiment, the 29th, no sooner reached the summit of the disputed heights, than it was exposed to a murderous fire of musketry and artillery, which spread havoc and destruction through its ranks. But undaunted, it persevered in its course, till, being prevented by a steep gully from reaching the enemy with the bayonet, it halted, and opened fire. The 48th and 57th rapidly taking their position in the line, the struggle was maintained on both sides with the most desperate courage. It was an incessant fire, or rather a perfect hurricane of grape and canister, very often at the distance of but twenty paces, only interrupted by partial charges of the bayonet by the British. Of the 57th, which amounted to 570 privates, and twenty-four officers, only one officer remained standing, and above 400 of the privates had fallen. The 29th and the 48th were in a more calamitous condition.

Still the enemy maintained the struggle; and with so great effect, that "the inauspicious thought of retreat," arising in the agitated mind of the commander-in-chief, he sent orders to Alten to abandon the bridge and the village of Albuera, and to general Hamilton to assemble the Portuguese and the artillery in a position to cover a retrograde movement by the Valverde road. Having also ordered part of the Portuguese brigades, under Hamilton, to advance to restore the fight, as he could not prevail on the Spanish troops to move up to the right of Houghton's brigade, he galloped to the left to hasten their advance. In the interim, the battle-field having assumed its worst aspect of havoc and destruction, major Hardinge, not being able to find marshal Beresford to receive his orders for the advance of sir Lowry Cole's division, which constituted the reserve, rode to that distinguished officer, represented to him the state of affairs, and strongly urged\* him to reinforce the battle.

2nd division, under colonel Abercrombie, directed it to push forward into the fight." Of course the misrepresentation has been religiously adopted by all the copyists of the eloquent historian of the Peninsular War; and the necessary changes rung of "happy assumption of command," "well-timed piece of boldness," and the rest of the twaddle, that those who never exercise their understanding, but take everything on faith, without inquiring into its truth or falsity, adopt. But how unjust has this conduct been to the man to whom is attributable all the merit of the act—sir Lowry Cole. From his letters in the *United Service Journal* the truth is best seen.



General Cole immediately advanced with his division, the fusilier brigade, consisting of the 7th royal fusiliers and the 23rd Welch fusiliers in the van, under the command of sir William Myers, on the right of the 31st and Houghton's brigade, which had already lost two-thirds of their number. At the same moment, the reserve brigade of the 2nd division, under Abercrombie, pressed forward on the left, under cover of Dickson's guns. The British reliefs, on crowning the heights, were received with a fire so terrific, that at first the fusilier brigade recoiled; but instantly recovering its ground, it advanced, together with Abercrombie's reserve, to the aid of Houghton's brigade, which, in its shattered state, with the standards of the respective battalions all flying near to each other in the centre of the weakened line, still remained unbroken, defending with desperate valour every inch of ground, and baffling every attempt of their powerful opponents to dislodge it. Withering volleys were instantly exchanged between the contending hosts; but the front, as well as the flanks and rear, of the deep columns of the enemy being exposed to the rapid fire of the English infantry, the discomfited and shattered battalions of the foe were driven down the hill in so utter confusion, that Girard's corps threw away their arms to expedite their flight, and the reserve, under Werle, was overwhelmed in the confusion. Had not Rutly, emerging through the throng of the fugitives, arrested, with his artillery, the advance of the victors, the whole French army would have been annihilated. Thus Cole, converting a defensive battle into an offensive one, at a critical moment obtained a decisive victory.

During the struggle of the fusiliers on the right for victory, Beresford, perceiving that Cole's division had brought on the crisis of the battle, ordered Alten's brigade to retake the village, and Blake's first line to move on the same point, to enable the Portuguese under Hamilton to move up to the aid of the fusiliers; but before either movement had been executed, the fusiliers were victorious.

While the deadly struggle had been enduring on the right, the contest was maintained with spirit and vigour on the key of the position. Many attempts had been made by Godinot to obtain possession of the bridge and village; but they were all gallantly repulsed. At length the enemy retreated under cover of Rutly's guns,

and the battle ceased a little before three o'clock.

The stage at which the fusilier brigade came into action is described by the historian of *The War in the Peninsula* with so much force and fervid eloquence, that the passage containing it should be known to every Englishman proud of his language and country—should be engraven on his mind as one of his fondest and proudest recollections, and be the constant theme of recital and admiration to his children and acquaintance; it is one of the most vivid and glowing passages to be found either in ancient or modern composition:—

“Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of the smoke, and rapidly separating itself from the confused multitude, startled the enemy's heavy masses, which were increasing and pressing onward as to an assured victory; they wavered, hesitated, and then, vomiting forth a storm of fire, hastily endeavoured to enlarge their front, while a fearful discharge of grape from all their artillery whistled through the British ranks. Myers was killed; Cole (with almost all his staff), and three colonels, Ellis, Blake, and Hanshawe, fell wounded; and the fusilier battalions, struck by the iron tempest, reeled and staggered like sinking ships. Suddenly and sternly recovering, they closed on their terrible enemies, and then was seen with what a strength and majesty the British soldiers fight. In vain did Soult, by voice and gesture, animate his Frenchmen; in vain did the hardiest veterans, extricating themselves from the crowded columns, sacrifice their lives to gain time for the mass to open out on so fair a field; in vain did the mass itself bear up, and fiercely striving, fire indiscriminately on friends and foes; while the horsemen, hovering on the flank, threatened to charge the advancing line. Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined valour; no nervous enthusiasm weakened the stability of order; their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in their front; their measured tread shook the ground; their dreadful volleys swept away the head of every formation; their deafening shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous crowd, as foot by foot, and with a horrid carnage, it was driven by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest edge of the hill. In vain did the French reserves, joining with the struggling multitude, en-



deavour to sustain the fight; their efforts only increased the irremediable confusion, and the mighty mass giving way like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the ascent. The rain flowed after in streams, discoloured with blood, and 1,500 unwounded men, the remnant of 6,000 unconquerable soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill."

The loss on each side in this fierce and bloody battle was great. On the side of the allies the killed, wounded, and missing, amounted to 7,000: of whom all were English, except 2,500 Spaniards, Germans, and Portuguese. The precise loss on the part of the English, was 984 killed, 2,993 wounded, and 570 missing; but of the prisoners, near 300 joined their columns, having in the course of the night escaped from the French bivouac, on account of the great disorder which prevailed in their camp, owing to the disorganized state of the brigades and regiments that had fled from the field. The first and second brigades of the second division had consisted of 1,400 hundred men each, and had each sustained a loss of above 1,000 men. Fifteen hundred rank and file were the complement of the fusilier brigade; at the termination of the action its loss was 953 rank and file, 47 serjeants, and 45 officers. The casualties in Houghton's brigade were appalling. Of the 29th, only 96 privates, two captains, and a few subalterns, remained standing. The 57th lost above 400 men, and 23 out of 24 officers. Both the battalions of the 48th were not much more fortunate. Every field officer of the brigade was either killed or wounded, so that at the close of the action the brigade remained in the command of a captain of the 48th; and what rendered the circumstance more singular was, that that officer was a French refugee—captain Cemetière. The contingencies in Colburne's brigade had been equally great. A few days after the battle, the five regiments that had suffered most (namely, the Buffs, one company; 66th, one company; 29th, two companies; 57th, three companies, and 31st, three companies) were embodied into one, forming a provisional battalion, under the command of colonel L'Estrange. Soult stated that his loss in killed and wounded was 2,800; but this estimate was untrue, for he left 800 wounded when he retreated, as they were not able to be removed; and by intercepted letters it was ascertained that he had 4,000 wounded under medical treatment, and

subject to the command of general Gazan. Marshal Beresford also, in his pursuit, captured a large number of wounded at Al-mendralegos. From these facts the enemy's loss could not have been less than between 8,000 and 9,000.

Both sides claimed the victory. Soult's pretensions were, that 500 prisoners, a howitzer, and six stand of colours, remained in his hands. Beresford preferred the more substantial claim. He maintained his ground, and "the horrid piles of carcases within his lines told, with dreadful eloquence, who was the conqueror." He had also frustrated Soult's attempt to communicate with the garrison of Badajos.

A tempestuous night closed the fatal day. The rain, which during the day had fallen at intervals, became, in the course of the night, so heavy, that the streams that rolled down the heights occasioned the rivulets literally to run red with blood. All night long the hills and the woods on both sides of the river resounded with the groans and dismal cries of the wounded. Beresford had applied to Blake for assistance to remove the wounded, which the shattered and exhausted condition of the surviving remnant of the British army disabled them from performing; but the heartless and ungrateful Spaniard, notwithstanding the thousands of English lives that had been sacrificed on the battle-field of Albuera, in the defence of his country, to which the "hero of a hundred defeats and his scared runaways," his sluggish and awe-spell bound countrymen were unequal, refused; morosely replying that it was usual in allied armies for each nation to attend to its wounded and bury its dead.

The instances of heroic courage in this battle were countless; every man, whether friend or foe, performed prodigies of valour, except the sluggish and terror-stricken Spaniards, and they were dastards. Among the numerous instances of noble devotion and patriotism of which the battle-field of Albuera was so prolific, the following claim particular mention:—

In the *mêlée* between the Polish lancers and the Buffs, ensign Thomas was ordered to surrender the colours he carried, and refusing to comply, he fell a victim to the infuriated foe. The colour-staff having been broken in the hand of ensign Welch, and he falling wounded on the field, in the agonies of death, the gallant youth, mindful of his country's honour, tore the colours from the



broken staff and thrust them into his bosom ; in which hallowed depository they were found dyed with his blood after his death. Lieutenant Latham, who carried the colours of the Buffs, being attacked by several French hussars, one of them seized hold of the staff, and at the same time rising in his stirrups, aimed a stroke at the lieutenant's head which severed one side of the face and nose. Still continuing struggling with his adversary for the sacred deposit confided to his trust, the high-spirited youth exclaimed, "I will surrender it only with my life." A second stroke severed his left arm and hand, when, throwing away his sword, he seized the colours with his right hand, and continuing to struggle with his remorseless foe, he was thrown down and pierced by the spears of some lancers who had joined in the fray. The enemy being driven off by the advance of Houghton's brigade, Latham's last effort was to tear the flag from the staff and thrust it partly into the breast of his jacket. After the battle, the colours being found where he had placed them, they were sent to the head-quarters of the Buffs ; but life being supposed to be extinct in the body of their gallant defender, he was left on the field. Shortly recovering his senses he crawled on his knees and his right hand, to the Albuera, to slake his fevered and parched throat ; where, being found by one of the orderlies of the regiment, he was removed to the convent, and the stump of the shattered arm being amputated, in the course of a short time he was restored to health. For his noble devotion he was promoted to a company in the Canadian fencible infantry ; but a vacancy soon occurring in his own beloved regiment, he rejoined that distinguished corps. As a testimony of their esteem and admiration of their comrade, the officers of the regiment presented him with a gold medallion, on which his gallant action was represented in high relief. The battle also presented sir William Beresford an opportunity for the display of the most exalted forbearance and humanity. Being attacked by a Polish lancer, and thrusting aside the weapon of his adversary, he seized hold of him and threw him upon the ground. Sir William offered his antagonist quarter, but the Pole, refusing to yield, was dispatched by an English orderly.

Such was the battle of Albuera, one of the fiercest on record, and one of the most destructive ever fought, considering the comparative amount of force engaged.

Both generals have been severely censured for engaging in it ; but truth and candour must allow, that Beresford has been stigmatized with much unnecessary acrimony, and no small degree of injustice. Let his faults have been what they may, "his fame will go down to posterity, associated for ever with that of those invincible soldiers who upheld the fame of England upon the bloody field of Albuera." He has been blamed, among many other idle imputations, for not drawing lines of contravallation and circumvallation around Badajos, and there waiting to deliver battle to the enemy. The allegation, also, that he should have pursued the enemy into the wood on the opposite side of the Albuera, into which they had retreated in confusion and disorganization, as "then the whole French army might have been destroyed, and its entire *matériel* captured," is as ridiculous as the execution of the quixotic project would have been calamitous to its equally quixotic undertaker. What ! with a few hundred exhausted men, attack as many thousand veteran troops, with a strong and overpowering force of cavalry, in a position favourable for defence, and calculated for the action of cavalry ! No, Beresford was no such Quixote. His errors and oversights were (and even those should be spoken of leniently and respectfully)—1st, that he omitted to occupy the wooded hill in front of his right flank, and to intrench it ; 2ndly, his right flank should have been strengthened by field-works ; and, 3dly, instead of displaying his whole line to the view of the enemy, he should have adopted the plan of that master-spirit in the art of war (Wellington), and have kept his line concealed a few yards behind the crest of the heights, which would have disabled Soult from choosing his point of attack, and ascertaining the vulnerable part of the position ; a knowledge which the colour of the Spanish uniform readily furnished him.

On the 17th Soult reorganised his shattered forces, who had fled from the battlefield in so great confusion, that the brigades and regiments were intermixed. He retained his position, well-knowing that the remnant of the British force was too crippled to attempt any operation against him ; but ascertaining that the 3rd brigade of the 4th division, which had been employed on the right bank of the Guadiana, had, on the 17th, come up by a forced march



from Jerumenhu to the aid of their countrymen, and having wofully known the efficiency of an English brigade, animated by English hearts,—on the following day, destroying the contents of his tumbrils and baggage-waggons, to furnish conveyance for his wounded, he began his retreat on Seville. Other reasons were, the extreme despondency and discontent of his troops, and the information that lord Wellington was expected at Albuera. It was in a full comprehension of the value of that name, that he had resolved on attacking “the legion while it lacked the charm of Cæsar’s presence.”

On the day following the retreat of the French, Beresford ordered general Hamilton to reinvest Badajos with the three brigades of Portuguese which he commanded; and on the same day lord Wellington reached the field of battle. So great was his desire to be present at the approaching action, that he rode sixty miles daily, and the bridge which he had desired to be constructed not being ready, in the attempt

to pass the river both the orderlies and horses were drowned, the commander-in-chief being saved merely by the superior strength of his horse. Inspecting the field of battle, and approving of Beresford’s conduct, he observed, that the battle would have been more easily won, and the loss would, by no means, have been so great, had the Spaniards done their duty. Ordering Beresford to pursue the enemy cautiously, he directed the 3rd and 7th divisions to come up from Elvas, to complete the reinvestment of Badajos. In the prosecution of Beresford’s commission, who advanced by the Solano road to Almendralejos, General Lumley, with the 3rd and 4th dragoons, charged a brigade of heavy cavalry under general Bron, at Usagre, on the 25th, and occasioned a loss to the enemy of 200 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. General Hill having now returned to the Peninsula, to the great joy and contentment of the troops, was reinstated in the command of the 2nd division, and sir William Beresford resumed his Portuguese command.

#### SECOND ENGLISH INVESTMENT OF BADAJOS.

LORD WELLINGTON having ordered the 3rd and 7th divisions to move up from Elvas, and directed Spencer, who had been left in command of the 1st, 5th, 6th, and light divisions, with a brigade of cavalry behind the Agueda, to move his divisions towards Villa Vella as soon as he should ascertain that Marmont’s army was in motion towards Almaraz, vigorously prepared for the second siege of Badajos, as that town and Ciudad Rodrigo were the keys of Portugal, closing the doors of Beira and the Alemtejo on the enemy, as also affording time for laying a secure basis for his projected operations in Spain. At the same time, he instructed general Hill to take post at Almendralejos for the purpose of holding in check Soult, who occupied Llerena, and for covering the operations at Badajos. In the meantime Philippon availing himself of the absence of the besiegers, had not only levelled the trenches, and destroyed the approaches of the besiegers, but had repaired his own works, and had constructed strong interior intrenchments.

The partial reinvestment began by Hamilton with the Portuguese on the 19th of May, was completed on the 25th, by the

3rd and 7th divisions under Picton and Houston; and the investment was made on the right as well as the north bank of the river, siege being thus laid to the town and the fort of San Christoval simultaneously, instead of confining the incipient operations to the fort, as had been the case in Beresford’s investment.

As the siege would require longer time and better means than the English general possessed, and lest his operations should be disturbed by the sudden appearance of the enemy for the relief of the place, he determined to adopt a more compendious mode than the usual and prescribed rules of regular and sure approaches. He had received information that about twenty battalions, and a body of cavalry, of the 9th corps, were on their march to join Soult; and, by an intercepted despatch of Soult to Marmont, he learned that that marshal and Marmont had arranged the junction of their armies, preparatory to their contemplated movement for the raising of the siege. He was also aware, that in every requisite *matériel* for the undertaking, he was sadly deficient. No army was ever worse provided for so arduous an enterprise in the engineer



and artillery departments; it was in utter destitution of everything that was requisite for the service. It had no corps of sappers and miners, and without a single private who knew how to carry on an approach under fire. It had no guns fit for the service; those it did possess were Portuguese ones, consisting of soft brass or bronze, false in bore, worn out by previous service, and the shot of all shapes and sizes; the howitzers taken from the Portuguese arsenals were of larger calibre than any shot that could be obtained; and the shells did not fit the bore of the mortars, both giving a windage that rendered the fire vague and uncertain, and often nullified its effect; whereas the enemy's mortars threw his shells with a precision that threatened to ruin everything within their range. The siege tools were also so worthless, that the engineers seized with avidity the French tools wherever they could lay hands on them. Thus crippled in every requisite, no other resource was left the commander-in-chief than to overcome the difficulties he had to contend with by energy and daring; and the consequence was, that a great sacrifice of life was necessary to be made to compensate for the negligence of the government, and the incapacity of its home officials.

At length operations commenced on the night of the 29th, by breaking the ground for a false attack on the Pardaleras; and on the following night, the first parallel, extending 1,000 yards in front of the town, was completed by 1,600 workmen; while 1,200 workmen commenced a parallel before the fort of San Christoval, each working party being covered by three-fourths of its amount of men under arms. The batteries opened both on the town and the fort on the morning of the 3rd of June; but several of the guns were soon rendered unserviceable by a few discharges, and the windage was so great in the others, that their service was very indifferent; in fact, so defective was the ordnance, that though the batteries had played for three days, and at the distance of only 500 yards, the breaches were scarcely practicable. However, on the 6th, though the breaches were reported practicable, both in the town and the fort, yet, as the artillery from the fort San Christoval swept along the foot of the castle wall, and over the ground in its front, the capture of the fort was a necessary precedent condition to the attempt to storm the castle. Major Mackintosh was therefore ordered, with 180

of the 85th, to storm the San Christoval breach; ensign Dias, of the 51st, volunteering to lead the forlorn hope. At midnight the storming party advanced to the attack, but finding that the enemy had cleared the rubbish from the bottom of the escarpe, after above an hour's unavailing effort to ascend the breach, they were obliged to retire with the loss of near three-fourths of their party; a loss occasioned by the numerous shells, hand-grenades, stones, bags, barrels of powder, and other combustibles, hurled down upon them by the besieged, and by their repeated explosions destroying all within their reach. The loss was also aggravated by the enemy being enabled to mount on the top of the parapet, and take a deadly aim at their assailants, there being no fire from the trenches to prevent them, on account of the unserviceable nature of the guns. Notwithstanding all this carnage and discouragement, and that seven feet of the wall of the breach stood clear before the gallant assailants, they applied their ladders to every face and flank of the work, but all their heroic efforts were fruitless, and the fragment of the storming-party was obliged reluctantly to retire.

After a continual cannonade from a few iron ship-guns, which had been expedited to the army, the breach having been much widened, and reduced in height, being again deemed practicable, at nine o'clock of the night of the 9th, the storming party, under major M'Greachy, of the 17th Portuguese regiment, Dias again leading the forlorn hope, advanced to the breach, and were again repulsed with a severe loss, from the same causes as those of the night of the 6th. The enemy had again cleared away the rubbish from the foot of the breach; the ladders were again too short; and the enemy assailed the storming party from the top of the ramparts, with every form of missile and combustible as they had on the first assault. The intrepid stormers made every effort to mount the breach; and could only be induced to give up the contest by the peremptory command of general Houston. The total loss that had been sustained during the siege was, 118 killed, and 367 wounded.

The commander-in-chief having now ascertained that Soult, who had been reinforced by Drouet's corps, on the 14th, was in communication with Marmont at Merida, and that they were simultaneously advancing, by rapid marches, towards Badajos; on the



night of the 10th ordered the guns and stores to be removed from before the town, and took a position in front of Albuera, in the hope of bringing Soult to action before he could effect a junction with Marmont. There he concentrated his forces, and caused the position to be intrenched, not forgetting to occupy the wooded hill on the right of the Albuera. Here Hill joined him with the covering force. But the prestige of the battle of the 16th of the last month disinclined the French general to accept the challenge.

The approach of the French marshal rendering it prudent to give up the blockade of Badajos, the English commander-in-chief retired across the Guadiana; the British troops passing by the pontoon bridge near Badajos; and the Spaniards, under Blake, withdrew to Jerumenhu. On the 19th, the British army encamped in the woods, and among the gardens, on the banks of the Caya, about Torre del Mero, its right and left flanks extending from the Ponte de Caya to Campo Mayor. Here, Spencer,

who had been left in command of the divisions on the frontiers of Castile, joined the main army; and here Wellington was determined to give the enemy battle, should he attempt to penetrate into Portugal. In expectation of raising the siege of Cadiz by the diversion, Blake had been ordered to march rapidly down the right bank of the Guadiana, recross that river at Mertola, and surprising Seville, destroy the arsenal, foundry, and magazines collected there for the siege of Cadiz; but the self-sufficient Spaniard, instead of obeying his instructions, wasted three days in an abortive assault on the old castle of Niebla, garrisoned by 300 Swiss, who were in the service of the usurper; and thus lost the opportunity of surprising Seville, which was but slightly guarded by a mixture of French and Spaniards in the service of Joseph. Hearing of a detachment, under general Coureux, having been sent against him, he precipitately fled into the island of Canelas, whence he and his fugitives were conveyed in boats to Cadiz.

#### OPERATIONS FROM THE TERMINATION OF THE SECOND SIEGE OF BADAJOS TO THE SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

WHILE Spencer was posted behind the Agueda, in observation of Marmont, he had been directed to move towards the Tagus by parallel movements, should the French marshal make that river the object of his march, or to take up the line of the Coa, if assailed. Marmont, by an able flank movement, deceived him as to his intentions. Dispatching Regnier, with two divisions, through the pass of Baños, while he advanced, protecting an immense convoy destined for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, he pushed forward the greater part of his force on Truxillo, and on the 18th effected a junction with Soult at Merida; their united forces amounting to 70,000 veterans, 8,000 of whom were cavalry, familiar with war. The French marshals having re-victualled the two fortresses of Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo on the 22nd, reconnoitred on the side of Campo Mayor, the position of the British army; but not being able to discover its dispositions on account of the nature of the ground, which masked the allied brigades from observation, after continuing a month in front of the allies, they made a retrograde movement to their original posi-

tions; the former returning to Seville, and the latter taking up a position in front of Salamanca.

As the possession of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos afforded the French great facilities in their operations against Portugal and the south of Spain, and at the same time presented a base for those of the English general, in the execution of his plan for the liberation of the Peninsula; as soon as the French marshals had retreated, Wellington advanced to the vicinity of the Coa, August the 10th, preparatory to his attack on Ciudad Rodrigo. For this purpose the advanced corps of the allied army was so distributed as closely to observe the enemy, and at the same time a defensive position was prepared at Fuente Guinaldo for its retreat, if closely pressed by the enemy. The right of the army was encamped in the woods about Torre del Moro, having its flank on the mountains that divide Castile and Estremadura; its left was on the lower Azava, and the cavalry was upon the upper Azava. The 3rd division was posted on the heights of El Bodon, supported by the 11th dragoons and a few troops of



German hussars. The 4th, at Guinaldo, and the 1st in rear of the right, observed the road leading from Perales, from which point it could intercept Marmont at Morvao, or Castello de Vide, if he should attempt to turn the allies at Albuquerque, and was equally ready to oppose Soult if he should move between Elvas and Estremos. The Spaniards of Julian Sanchez and Carlos d'España watched the lower Agueda.

At this period of the war, the situation of the English commander-in-chief was highly critical; not only half his army being in hospital, and impediments thrown in the way of his operations by the regency of Portugal, but he was left to his own resources for the feeding and paying of his troops, lord Liverpool having hinted that neither corn nor specie could be had from England. To remedy this last-mentioned grievance, the English general purchased corn in Africa with commissariat bills, and selling it at an advanced price at Lisbon, not only replenished his military chest, but furnished a supply of food for the Portuguese population. At this period of the campaign, the troops were often for three days consecutively without bread; half and quarter rations were often served; and their clothing was so patched, that scarcely a regiment could be known by its uniform.

The garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo being again straitened for provisions, Marmont advanced to its relief. Having thrown his convoy into the place, he advanced against the British position, capturing in his march a picket of sixty men of the 11th light dragoons, its commander having mistaken the enemy for Portuguese, from the similarity of uniform. On the morning of the 25th of September, Marmont directed Montbrun, with fourteen battalions of infantry, between thirty and forty squadrons of cavalry, and

\* "At the charge made by the whole of the French cavalry at El Bodon, a French officer had his horse shot under him, and both fell together. The officer, though not much hurt, lay upon the ground as if dead, and in this situation would, in all probability, have escaped, as the French infantry were fast advancing to the relief of their cavalry, had it not been for a Hanoverian hussar, one squadron of which nation was engaged in the conflict, who rode up to the spot, and made a cut at the prostrate officer; on which he immediately sprung up, and with his sword at the guard, set the German at defiance. Another of the Hanoverian hussars then galloped up, and desired the French officer to surrender, which he refused to do. The appearance of the officer in this position was truly heroic; he stood without his cap; his head was bare, and some marks of blood were on his face. From the fine attitude he presented, and being a tall

twelve guns, to cross the Agueda, and turn the left of Picton's division, which was posted in advance, on the heights of El Bodon and Pastores. The French cavalry, confident in their numbers, ascended with intrepidity the heights on the left, where the 5th and 77th, numbering about 700 bayonets, were posted, and gaining the battery, cut down the Portuguese gunners; but their victorious squadrons were now to witness a new manœuvre. The 5th infantry and 2nd battalion, under major Ridge, rapidly advancing in line, and delivering a shattering fire upon the French horsemen, drove them down the heights, and, at the point of the bayonet, recaptured the guns, pursuing the fugitives with a volley in their flight.\* In the same moment, a column of great strength having advanced unnoticed round the rear of the right of Colville's brigade, in consequence of which its communication with Picton's right brigade was cut off; and as the position was no longer tenable, Colville's brigade, consisting of the 77th, the second battalion of the 5th, the 21st Portuguese, and about 300 cavalry, descended the heights in retreat, rapidly pursued by the French cavalry. To resist the attack in their retreat over the plain, the three regiments formed two solid squares. The Portuguese and the cavalry were the foremost. Repeatedly was the British square furiously charged on three of its faces at the same moment by the French cavalry and horse artillery, but the gallant band halting and delivering a shattering fire, which intimidated its foes, as each repulse was given, resumed its retreat with perfect regularity, and being joined by the right brigade, which had extricated itself from the rugged grounds and vineyards in the rear of El Bodon, the united force, under general Picton, presented so bold an athletic man, he strongly impressed the beholders with the belief that he would defend himself against both the hussars. At this time, ensign Canch, of the 5th, ran out of the square, in the hope inducing the officer to surrender himself a prisoner; but the hussars, finding they were baffled, and could not subdue this brave man with the sword, had recourse to the pistol, with which they killed him, to the great regret of the British regiments that were looking on. This affair took place about half way between the square already mentioned and the French cavalry, who were hovering about after having been repulsed by the 5th and 77th regiments." The author of *The Reminiscences of a Subaltern*, from which work this extract is made, says that a prisoner, who had been captured in the affair, gave information that the officer was an Irishman, and the major of his regiment.



tude in its retreat across a plain of six miles, as to meet with but little interruption and loss from the enemy's cavalry and artillery, until it met a support of infantry and cavalry detached from the 4th division at Guinaldo. Thus the little band reached the position of the main army in safety, though its total annihilation at one moment seemed inevitable. The 60th and 74th, commanded by colonels Williams and French, having been cut off in their position at Pastores, forded the Agueda in the night, and marching along its right bank, joined the army by a circuitous route; and the light division, posted for the purpose of watching the passes over the Sierra de Gata, on the enemy's side of the Agueda, reached the camp on the following day; a delay occasioned by not having received its orders in time to fall back on Fuente Guinaldo; and Craufurd having adopted a circuitous march, fearful of being intercepted in his passage of the river.

While these operations were in execution, Marmont had, on the morning of the 26th, assembled 35,000 infantry, including twenty-two battalions of the imperial guard, with his numerous cavalry, in front of Guinaldo, and for several hours occupied his troops in the performance of evolutions within little more than cannon-range of the British position, until his whole force, consisting of 60,000 men, was collected, thinking that the wide disposition of the allied force presented him with a favourable opportunity of attacking them. In the meantime, lord Wellington formed his two weak divisions, consisting of 15,000 men, ready for battle, in front of the enemy's post, waiting the arrival of his right and left wings.\* Before sunset, the infantry of Marmont was augmented to 60,000 men; and he had 120 guns on the field. But, in the mean time, the light divisions had effected a junction with the main body of the British army.

The army being now concentrated, Wellington retreated, in the course of the night of the 26th, on Alfayates. Two columns of the enemy on the following morning at-

tacked the rear guard at Aldea da Ponte. Twice the village was carried; but both times the enemy was driven out by Cole's division. On the same evening, the British army was concentrated on the heights, behind Soito, a strong position, about twelve miles in the rear of Guinaldo, being the chord of an arc formed by the Coa; thus both flanks were protected; but not a single line of retreat presented itself, as the river was in the rear. Here Wellington, confident in his own provident genius, and the indomitable valour of his troops, determined to receive battle; but Marmont declined the challenge, and withdrew to Ciudad Rodrigo. The allied army was now cantoned on both banks of the Coa; and headquarters were established at Frenada. During these operations, which closed the third Spanish campaign, two episodic events occurred of great moment and brilliance.

When Soult and Marmont separated their forces, Girard had been detached, with a flying column of a division of infantry and a numerous detachment of cavalry, into Spanish Estremadura, to narrow the English general's line of action, and cripple the Spanish supplies and the new levies, with which Castaños, who had established himself at Cáceres, was endeavouring to recruit his battalions. Hill, who had resumed his cantonments at Portalegre, was ordered to drive Girard from the northern district of the province. For this purpose he marched, with 6,000 men, on October 22nd, and on the night of the 27th reached the neighbourhood of Arroyo de Molinos, whither Girard had retreated. At two o'clock on the morning of the 28th, drenched with rain, and amidst darkness and wind, the English battalions moved simultaneously from Alcuésca, where they had bivouacked during the night, and rushing from behind a low cover, about half a mile distant, entered the town in three columns, to the point of attack. At the moment the French were filing in retreat through the streets, a terrible shout came mingling with the blasts of a boisterous wind, and the British columns were in the

\* "It was at this moment, a Spanish general (general Alava), remarkable for his zeal and gallantry, and a great favourite of Wellington's, observed to him as he sat cool and quiet upon the grass, 'Why, here you are, with a couple of weak divisions, in front of the whole French army, and you seem quite at your ease;—why it is enough to put any man in a fever.' 'I have done according to the best of my judgment, all that can be done,' said Wellington, 'therefore I care not for the enemy in

front, or for anything they may say at home.' There was the golden secret of his calm unalterable demeanour. Duties were his—and he did them. Events were not his—and to the Great Disposer of all he left them. It was no fault of his that he was thus dangerously exposed. He could not, and he would not, abandon his light division, without such a struggle as might and must have ensued had the French attacked."—*Sherer's Military Memoirs of Wellington.*



town. The enemy's infantry formed in two squares, supported by their cavalry outside the town; but being quickly thrown into disorder, they threw down their arms, and rushing towards the Sierra de Montanches, sought, in confused crowds, to scramble up its steep acclivity. Fourteen hundred prisoners, among whom were 35 officers, and all their artillery, ammunition and commissariat stores, together with the magazines of corn and the contributions which had been just levied, fell into the hands of the captors, and several hundreds were slain in and near the town, and on the mountains, while the loss of the victors did not amount to 70. The brass drums and drum-major's baton of the French 34th of the line, fell into the hands of the English 34th, by whom they are still preserved as trophies of their prowess. An anecdote is current, that when Girard was told that his assailants were the English, he observed that it could be a party only of Spaniards, as the English were too fond of their beds to be out on so bad a morning; but at the very moment of expressing his doubt, his ears were saluted from the Highland bagpipes with the tune of "Hey, Johnny Cope, are you wauking yet," and at the same moment, the 71st and 92nd Highlanders charged into the town with three cheers. Having achieved this brilliant exploit, Hill returned to his cantonments in the vicinity of Portalegre.

This brilliant affair, so creditable to all concerned in it, was so much approved by the duke as to cause him to write the following note to the earl of Liverpool:—

"Freneda, 6th Nov., 1811.

"It would be particularly agreeable to me, if some mark of the favour of H. R. H. the prince regent were conferred upon general Hill; his services have been always meritorious, and very distinguished in this country, and he is beloved by the whole army. In recommending him, as I do most anxiously, I really feel that there is no officer to whom an act of grace and favour would be received by the army with more satisfaction than on general Hill."

Lord Hill's despatch, descriptive of this attack, is so characteristic of that able general of division, that at the risk of repeating what has already been stated, but in more abstract expression, we lay it before our readers.

"To General Viscount Wellington, K.B.

"Merida, 30th Oct., 1811.

"MY LORD,—In pursuance of the in-

structions which I received from your excellency to drive the enemy out of that part of Estremadura which lies between the Tagus and the Guadiana, and to replace the corps under the command of brigadier-general the Conde de Penne Villemur, in Caçeres (from which town it had been obliged to retire by the superior force of the enemy), I put a portion of the troops under my orders in motion on the 22nd instant, from their cantonments in the neighbourhood of Portalegre, and advanced with them towards the Spanish frontier. On the 23rd the head of the column reached Albuquerque, where I learned that the enemy, who had advanced to Aliseda, had fallen back to Arroyo del Puerco, and Caçeres, and that the Spaniards were again in possession of Aliseda. On the 24th I had a brigade of British infantry, half a brigade of Portuguese artillery (6-pounders), and some of my cavalry at Aliseda, and the remainder of my cavalry, another brigade of British infantry, and half a brigade of Portuguese 6-pounders at Casa de Castellana, about a league distant. On the 25th the Conde de Penne de Villemur made a reconnoissance with his cavalry, and drove the enemy from Arroyo del Puerco; the enemy retired to Malpartida, which place he occupied as an advanced post with about 300 cavalry and some infantry, his main body being still at Caçeres. On the 26th, at daybreak, the troops arrived at Malpartida, and found that the enemy had left that place, retiring towards Caçeres, followed by a small party of the 2nd hussars, who skirmished with his rear-guard. I was shortly afterwards informed that the whole of the enemy's force had left Caçeres, but the want of certainty as to the direction he had taken, and the extreme badness of the weather, induced me to halt the Portuguese and British troops at Malpartida for that night. The Spaniards moved on to Caçeres.

"Having received certain information that the enemy had marched on Torremocha, I put the troops at Malpartida in motion on the morning of the 27th, and advanced by the road leading to Merida, through Aldea del Cano and Casas de Don Antonio, being a shorter route than that followed by the enemy, and which afforded a hope of being able to intercept and bring him to action, and I was here joined by the Spaniards from Caçeres. On the march I received information that the enemy had only left Torremocha that morning, and that he had



again halted his main body at Arroyo Molinos, leaving a rear-guard at Albala, which was a satisfactory proof that he was ignorant of the movements of the troops under my command. I therefore made a forced march to Alcuéscar that evening, where the troops were so placed as to be out of sight of the enemy, and no fires were allowed to be made. On my arrival at Alcuéscar, which is within a league of Arroyo Molinos, every thing tended to confirm me in the opinion that the enemy was not only in total ignorance of my near approach, but extremely off his guard; and I determined upon attempting to surprise, or at least to bring him to action, before he should march in the morning, and the necessary dispositions were made for that purpose.

"The town of Arroyo Molinos is situated at the foot of one extremity of the Sierra de Montanches, the mountain running from it to the rear in the form of a crescent, almost everywhere inaccessible, the two points being about two miles asunder. The Truxillo road runs round that to the eastward. The road leading from the town to Merida runs at right angles with that from Alcuéscar, and the road to Medellín passes between those to Truxillo and Merida, the grounds over which the troops had to manœuvre being a plain thinly scattered with oak and cork trees. My object, of course, was to place a body of troops so as to cut off the retreat of the enemy by these roads.

"The troops moved from their bivouac near Alcuéscar about two o'clock in the morning of the 28th, in one column, right in front, direct on Arroyo Molinos, and in the following order: major-general the Hon. K. Howard's brigade of infantry (1st battalion 50th, 71st, and 92nd regiments, and one company of the 60th); colonel Wilson's brigade (1st battalion 28th, 2nd battalion 34th and 39th regiments, and one company of the 60th); 6th Portuguese regiment of the line, and 6th caçadores, under colonel Ashworth; the Spanish infantry under brigadier-general Morillo; major-general Long's brigade of cavalry (2nd hussars, 9th and 13th light dragoons); and the Spanish cavalry, under the conde de Penne Villemur. They moved in this order until within half a mile of the town of Arroyo Molinos, where under cover of a low ridge the column closed, and divided into three columns. Major-general Howard's brigade and three 6-pounders under lieutenant-colonel Stewart, supported by brigadier-general Morillo's infantry, the

left; colonel Wilson's brigade, the Portuguese infantry under colonel Ashworth, two 6-pounders and a howitzer, the right, under major-general Howard; and the cavalry the centre. As the day dawned, a violent storm of rain and thick mist came on, under cover of which the columns advanced in the direction and in the order which had been pointed out to them. The left column, under lieutenant-colonel Stewart, marched direct upon the town. The 71st, one company of the 60th and 92nd regiments, at quarter distance, and the 50th in close column, somewhat in the rear, with the guns as a reserve. The right column, under major-general Howard, having the 39th regiment as a reserve, broke off to the right so as to turn the enemy's left; and having gained about the distance of a cannon-shot to that flank, it marched in a circular direction upon the further point of the crescent, on the mountain above mentioned. The cavalry, under lieutenant-general sir W. Erskine, moved between the two columns of infantry, ready to act in front, or move round either of them, as occasion might require. The advance of our column was unperceived by the enemy until they approached very near, at which moment he was filing out of the town upon the Merida road; the rear of his column, some of his cavalry, and part of his baggage being still in it. One brigade of his infantry had marched for Medellín an hour before daylight. The 71st and 92nd regiments charged into the town with cheers, and drove the enemy everywhere at the point of the bayonet, having a few men cut down by the enemy's cavalry. The enemy's infantry, which had got out of the town, had, by the time these regiments arrived at the extremity of it, formed into two squares, with the cavalry on their left; the whole were posted between the Merida and Medellín roads, fronting Alcuéscar; the right square being formed within half-musket-shot of the town, the garden walls of which were promptly lined by the 71st light infantry, while the 92d regiment filed out and formed line on their right, perpendicular to the enemy's right flank, which was much annoyed by the well-directed fire of the 71st. In the meantime one wing of the 50th regiment occupied the town, and secured the prisoners, and the other wing, along with the three 6-pounders, skirted the outside of it; the artillery, as soon as within range, firing with great effect upon the squares.



“Whilst the enemy was thus occupied on his right, major-general Howard's column continued moving round his left, and our cavalry advancing and crossing the head of the column, cut off the enemy's cavalry from his infantry, charging it repeatedly, and putting it to the rout. The 13th light dragoons, at the same time, took possession of the enemy's artillery: one of the charges made by two squadrons of the 2nd hussars and one of the 9th light dragoons was particularly gallant; the latter commanded by captain Gore, and the whole under major Busche, of the hussars. I ought previously to have mentioned, that the British cavalry having, through the darkness of the night and the badness of the road, been somewhat delayed, the Spanish cavalry, under the conde de Penne Villemur, was on this occasion the first to form upon the plain and engage the enemy, until the British were enabled to come up. The enemy was now in full retreat; but major-general Howard's column having gained the point to which it was directed, and the left column gaining fast upon him, he had no resource but to surrender, or to disperse and ascend the mountain. He preferred the latter; and ascending near the eastern extremity of the crescent, and which might have been deemed inaccessible, was followed closely by the 28th and 34th regiments, whilst the 39th regiment, and colonel Ashworth's brigade of Portuguese infantry, followed round the foot of the mountain by the Truxillo road, to take him again in flank. At the same time, brigadier-general Morillo's infantry ascended at some distance to the left with the same view.

“As may be imagined, the enemy's troops were by this time in the utmost panic; his cavalry was fleeing in every direction; the infantry threw away their arms; and the only effort of either was to escape. The troops under major-general Howard's immediate command, as well as those he had sent round the point of the mountain, pursued them over the rocks, making prisoners at every step, until his own men became so exhausted and few in number, that it was necessary for him to halt and secure the prisoners, and leave the further pursuit to the Spanish infantry, under brigadier-general Morillo, who, from the direction in which they had ascended, had now become the most advanced; the force general Girard had with him at the commencement, which consisted of 2,500 infantry and 600 cavalry, being at this time

totally dispersed. In the course of these operations, brigadier-general Campbell's brigade of Portuguese infantry (the 4th and 10th regiments), and the 18th Portuguese infantry, joined from Casas de Don Antonio, where they had halted for the preceding night; and as soon as I judged they could no longer be required at the scene of action, I detached them with the brigade, consisting of the 50th, 71st, and 92nd regiments, and major-general Long's brigade of cavalry, towards Merida; they reached San Pedro that night, and entered Merida this morning; the enemy having in the course of the night retreated from hence in great alarm to Almendralejo. The conde de Peñe Villemur formed the advanced guard with his cavalry, and had entered the town previous to the arrival of the British. The ultimate consequences of these operations I need not point out to your lordship; their immediate result is the capture of one general of cavalry (Brun), one colonel of cavalry (the prince d'Aremberg), one lieutenant-colonel (*chef d'Etat Major*), one aid-de-camp of general Girard, two lieutenant-colonels, one *commissaire des guerres*, 30 captains and inferior officers, and upwards of 1,000 men, already sent off under an escort to Portalegre; the whole of the enemy's artillery, baggage, and commissariat, some magazines of corn, which he had collected at Caçeres and Merida, and the contribution of money which he had collected on the former town, besides the total dispersion of general Girard's corps. The loss of the enemy in killed must also have been severe, while that on our side was comparatively trifling, as appears by the accompanying return, in which your lordship will lament to see the name of lieutenant Strenuwitz, aid-de-camp to lieutenant-general sir W. Erskine, whose extreme gallantry led him into the midst of the enemy's cavalry, and occasioned his being taken prisoner. Thus has ended an expedition which, although not bringing into play to the full extent the gallantry and spirit of those engaged, will, I trust, give them a claim to your lordship's approbation. No praise of mine can do justice to their admirable conduct, the patience and goodwill shown by all ranks during forced marches in the worst weather, their strict attention to the orders they received, the precision with which they moved to the attack, and their obedience to command during the action. In short, the manner in which every one has performed his duty,



from the first commencement of the operations, merits my warmest thanks, and will not, I am sure, pass unobserved by your lordship.

“To lieutenant-general sir W. Erskine I must express my obligations for his assistance and advice upon all occasions. To major-general the hon. K. Howard, who dismounted and headed his troops up the difficult ascent of the Sierra, and throughout most ably conducted his column; and to major-general Long, for his exertions at the head of his brigade, I feel myself particularly indebted. I must also express my obligations to colonel Wilson, colonel Ashworth, and lieutenant-colonel Stewart, commanding brigades, for the able manner in which they led them. Lieutenant-colonel Cameron, lieutenant-colonel the hon. H. Cadogan, lieutenant-colonel the hon. A. Abercromby, and lieutenant-colonels Fenwick, Muter, and Lindsay, majors Harrison and Busche, major Park (commanding the light companies), and captain Gore, commanding the 9th light dragoons, major Hartman, commanding the artillery, lieutenant-colonel Grant and major Birmingham, of the Portuguese service, captain Arriaga of the Portuguese artillery (whose guns did so much execution), severally merit my warmest approbation by their conduct; and I must not omit to mention the exertions made by brigadier-general Campbell and his troops to arrive in time to give their assistance.”

The second episodic event which occurred at this period of the war, was the siege of Tarifa, and the repulse of the French in their endeavour to storm that fortress.

With the view of supporting Ballasteros, who had assembled a force of 8,000 men in the mountain district of the Ronda, strong detachments of English and Spaniards had been sent from Gibraltar and Cadiz to occupy that fortress. Soult, fearful lest his operations against Cadiz should be impeded by that force, dispatched 10,000 men, under general Laval, to reduce the place. Laval invested the fortress on the 20th of December, and on the 31st of the same month, a practicable breach of 60 feet having been effected, the French advanced to the assault; but being repulsed by the 87th and 47th regiments, Laval, having destroyed part of his artillery, and buried the remainder in the sands, hastily retreated towards Seville.

Thus ended *The Third Spanish Campaign*. As an eloquent biographer of the Duke has

said, “when it is considered that the effective strength of the British army did, at no period of 1810, exceed 26,000 men, did never in 1811 amount to 34,000 men, and fell below that state considerably after the battles of Fuentes d’Oñor and Albuera, and that during that time the French had employed in their efforts to establish and maintain themselves in Portugal, at the lowest calculation, 100,000 of their choicest troops, the reader will be assisted in forming a right estimate of the genius, the judgment, and the efficiency with which that army was commanded. The result was proportionate. At the invocation of the hero of Assaye, the military spirit of England had been awakened under his guiding genius, the martial qualities of the British soldier had been shown upon the open field, and the charm of French invincibility was gone.”

It may not be misplaced to enumerate the difficulties the English commander-in-chief had to contend with in the performance of his arduous duties in the Peninsular war, and incidentally to allude to the inapplicability of comparative parallels between him and Napoleon Buonaparte, than whom no two persons were ever more dissimilar in all the characteristics of head, heart, and temperament.

It has been customary with interested partisans and those who wish to place the duke’s character in an unamiable light, to compare him with Napoleon Buonaparte, in representing both as stern and unpitiful soldiers, working their purposes out, reckless of the sufferings they occasioned, and dead to the kindlier feelings of humanity. But in the rare exhibition of the softer feelings, no men differed more. Napoleon’s was a public display, and strongly partook of an empirical character. The duke’s was a secret offering, and resembled the equal justice of paternal affection. An ostentatious visit to his hospitals, a consolatory address to a passing ambulance, bearing the wounded from the field, the parade of sorrow beside a dying friend,—all with Buonaparte assumed the semblance of acting, and seemed intended rather to elicit applause from the lookers-on, than to give expression to heartfelt sympathy. Wellington made no *open show* of sorrow. He saw old friends fall, he rode past the dying and the dead, the same stern calmness in his look, the same firm and unalterable determination in his bearing. For the sufferers he had no empty words, but



when others slept he was toiling in his bureau to obtain means for their relief; and when none expected him he visited his hospitals in private, and from personal inspection assured himself that those to whom the sick and wounded were committed, had not neglected their trust.\* It is not possible to believe that it was in his nature to put into practice the chicanery and charlatanism of Napoleon Buonaparte, who, when intending to inspect the troops, despatched his aides-de-camp to the respective commanders of regiments, to desire information whether any of the men to be inspected had served with him in Italy, Egypt, or Germany; and in what victories they were, as also their numbers. Furnished with this information on bits of card put into his hand as he passed through the ranks, he would suddenly stop opposite the designated man, as if some recollection occurred to his mind, and looking earnestly at the party, ask him whether he had not served with him in Italy, Egypt, or Germany, (as the case might be,) and being informed that he had, the charlatan "emperor" would exclaim, "And not the cross!"—i.e. the Legion of Honour—at the same moment presenting the party with the decoration; and if his card told him that the man had a father—saying, "How is your father—is the old man alive?" Even in civil affairs he practised the same empiricism. He was, by his minions, much extolled for his supposed knowledge of the liberal arts, manufactures, &c. He obtained that reputation by the following means. Whenever he visited exhibitions of

\* While the duke's head-quarters were at Fuente Guinaldo, sir Arthur Wellesley, according to his custom, visited the sick and wounded. He spoke with his usual laconism to some of the sufferers: "Wounded?" "Yes, my lord." "Badly?" "Smartish." "Been attended to?" "No, my lord." "How long have you been here?" "A day or two." "How is this?" "Don't know, but there are more worse wounded than I am; but now that you have come it will be all right." The commander-in-chief's eye sparkled, his lip contracted, and the sharp expression "Ah!" was uttered. Then turning round, he said, "Let these poor fellows be put under cover [they were then lying in the streets, on or under bullock-cars], in the houses of the Juiz de Fora, or of the magistrates. I will see whether they will leave my men to rot in the streets." Then sending for the principal functionary, he rated him in such terms as made the man wish the earth would open to hide him; and turning on his heel, walked towards the hospital. At this juncture, came up the medical superintendent, a smart tall Irishman, with well-polished boots, snow-white linen, and an umbrella sheltering his best coat from the showers. The contrast between the drenched and mud-splashed chief

the kind, he was attended by confidential prompters, while all other persons were kept at a distance. The exhibitors were taught beforehand what objects to produce, what observations to make, what questions to propose; when the mountebank visitor delivered by rote his opinions, which he previously conned over from his prepared papers. It was by manœuvres and charlatany of this kind that Buonaparte obtained the idolatry of the French army. The inquiry after the "old man" implied that he was acquainted with the circumstances of every soldier who fought under his banners, and felt an interest in his welfare and that of his family. But "the duke" scorned so paltry artifices, so studied in trickery and charlatanism; he trusted to his merits alone to acquire the good will of his army, and secure their confidence. The duke never cared for the comfort and welfare of his army! Never was there a falsèr assertion, a more unfounded calumny. Look at the "Dispatches," and read there his numerous remonstrances, not only with his own government, but also with the faithless and ungrateful juntas of Spain, and their imbecile and ignorant generals. The complaint also, that the duke was not able to excite in his troops that enthusiastic and idolatrous devotion which the French soldiery evinced for Napoleon Buonaparte, is equally unreasonable. What was the cause that produced that diversity of devotion of the two armies to their respective leaders? Was it not the difference of position in which their leaders were placed? Buonaparte had not only the

and the spruce man of physic was striking. The duke eyed the son of Esculapius, and said nothing—he had not made up his mind how to deal with him. As the party advanced, a bullock-car obstructed the narrow street. The son of the Emerald Isle raised his umbrella, put his hand on the crupper of one of the oxen, vaulted over with great agility, seized their heads, and turned them so as to obtain a passage. This feat was not lost upon the duke, who, having finished his inspection, and finding everything rather in a state to augment than to allay his anger, administered no very honied admonition to the medical superior attendant, mounted his horse, and returned to head-quarters. On his arrival there, the inspector-general of hospitals was sent for, to whom he expressed his displeasure at the condition he found his men in, and ordered the unfortunate superintendent to be sent in disgrace to England. The inspector-general ventured to deprecate the duke's wrath, and added, "I regret most sincerely your lordship's displeasure, as I always considered M— to be one of the most active men in the department." "Active enough by G—," retorted the duke, "for he jumped over a car and pair of bullocks with an umbrella in his hand. But he is not active enough in the discharge of his duty."



wealth and honours, military and civil, of France, but also of the conquered countries, at his disposal and control. He could reward with rank, honour, and riches, his followers of every caste and grade, from the marshal's baton to the drum-major's stick; from the possessor of the highest and most cultivated mind to the boorish and insensate peasant; whereas the duke's power in that respect was a perfect nullity. As he indignantly remarks, in his letter of remonstrance to the military secretary at the Horse Guards, after prefacing, that feeling ashamed of letting it be known to the army how little were his means of rewarding their devotion and gallantry, he adds, "Though I command one of the largest armies that ever left England, I have not the power of making a corporal. I am almost ashamed of acknowledging the small degree (I ought to say nullity) of power of rewarding merit."

The comparisons drawn between the duke and his opponent, by interested partisans, and adopted by party and partial writers, and those who form opinions at second hand, in respect of the genius, the sagacity, the mental resources, and the military talents of the two chiefs, are equally idle and unfounded. The following observations will prove this assertion.

The duke was only a subordinate in the great game that was played on the theatre of Spain; but Buonaparte was a principal in it. The duke's calculations of his resources, and his employment of them in his operations, were dependent on the ill-judged measures of men over whom he had but little influence, and no control; in abstract terms, he, was subject to the control of others. First, he was subject to the shallow and short-sighted policy of the ministry at home; secondly, he was dependent on the caprice and obstinacy of the Spanish and Portuguese governments. His patience and temper were often put to severe trials, and his measures frustrated by the factious disposition of the Portuguese, by the intractable pride and perverseness of the Spaniards, and the negligence and lukewarmness of his own government. How often were his admirable projects thwarted by the intrigue and incapacity (often the faithlessness and treachery) of the Spanish rulers and military chiefs; and thus the fruits which would have been produced by his genius and talents were often blighted in the bud, or not allowed to reach maturity; and even when his allies did co-operate

with him, how often did he find his measures fettered and hampered by the imperfect and apathetic compliance with them? Nor did he meet with less difficulties and impediments from the timid and imbecile counsels and instructions of the Canning and Perceval administrations. The consequence was, as has been happily and forcibly observed, "his successes were often snatched from the midst of conflicting political circumstances; they were as gems brought up from the turbulence of the whirlpool." How different was the case with Napoleon Buonaparte! He was dependent on no one, subject to no control—knew no other law in the choice and furtherance of his designs than—*sic volo, sic jubeo, stet pro ratione voluntas*: he willed his measures at his pleasure, and compelled his crouching subordinates to carry his mandates into execution, in the most literal and unscrupulous manner, under fear of incurring his uncontrollable displeasure, or of losing their heads for their miscarriage.

Secondly, Wellington was limited in his means, not only in the amount of his forces, but also in the extreme deficiency of his magazines, and the poverty, nay absolute bankruptcy of his military chest. His army never exceeded in English and German soldiers, one-third (and sometimes was much less) of the numerous corps d'armée of the French, which were in immediate co-operation on his front and flanks in the Peninsula; and had he, in any bold and adventurous exploit, lost a single division of his army, he was aware that the feeble and vacillating policy of the Canning and Perceval cabinets would be so influenced by the brawlings and croakings of the factious part of the public press, and the anti-English members of both houses of parliament, that they would be inclined to withdraw the English army from the Peninsula, and leave it to the ravages and oppression of the French. Napoleon was subject to no such restraints, to no such motives, to influence his conduct. He had the lives of the whole of the male population of France, as also of almost all the states of central Europe (which were under his direct dominion, either by conquest or by the influence which he exercised over their cabinets) at his beck and command. It was his boast that he could bring a million of infantry and one hundred thousand cavalry, into the field at his pleasure; and he proved that this was not assertion, for he led half a million of men to slaughter and destruction



in his Russian campaign, and in less than two months of the Leipsic campaign, 600,000 men were demanded and granted by his obsequious satellites. Both Buonaparte and his generals were indebted more for their success to the ready and abundant means they possessed of supplying the losses occasioned by the profuse, profligate, and unprincipled sacrifice of the lives of their troops, than to any other cause, which, as the duke of Wellington correctly said, "was in every campaign one-half of those who took the field;" and his assertion is confirmed by even French writers. M. Rocca, in his *Mémoire de la Guerre Française en Péninsule*, says, that during that war of destruction, "battalions, and even whole regiments, reduced to skeletons, that is, to two or three men only, were constantly carrying back their eagles and banners to recruit in France, or Italy, or Switzerland, or Holland, or Germany, or Poland." With what a contrast does the same gentleman present us in a subsequent part of his work, when, speaking of the duke's position on the lines of Torres Vedras, he says, "Wisely economical of the blood of his soldiers, he refused to shed it for his personal glory, or to risk the fate of his country, which he had undertaken to defend, in a single battle." This is the highest eulogium that can be passed on the late duke, and cannot be surpassed in truth and beauty. Wellington's escutcheon is unstained by any wickedness, or injustice; any reckless slaughter of his fellow-creatures, or wanton sacrifice of human life; his blaze of victories is undimmed by cruelty or crime: as has been beautifully said, "No tears of desolated provinces dim the lustre of his laurels." When in India, after the storming of Seringapatam, he went, individually, among the inhabitants of that city, to calm their fears and sooth their sorrows, and protect them from the violence and licentiousness of the soldiery. When, after the retreat of Soult from Oporto, the enraged inhabitants were about to massacre his sick and wounded he had deserted, his noble-hearted conqueror issued the following humane proclamation: "I call on the inhabitants of Oporto to be merciful to the wounded and prisoners. By the laws of war they are entitled to my protection, which I am determined to afford them." When the ruthless Massena, in his irruption into Portugal, was massacring the peasants and the ordenanzas (militia) with the most savage barbarity, his illustrious opponent told him that if he per-

severed in his cruelty he could not save the French prisoners from the just vengeance of the Portuguese. When he entered the territory of France he prohibited the Spaniards from retaliating the atrocities to which their countrymen had been subjected by the French armies; and his treatment and protection of the French population were such that the peasantry brought their property within the British lines, in preference to those of their own countrymen. When the marquis of Londonderry required him, during the occupation of France by the British army, to maintain that army by requisition, he remonstrated on the injustice and impolicy of the act, and saved that country from the penalty of confiscation. His celebrated declaration on the debate respecting the removal of the Roman catholic disabilities, would be a sufficient proof of his humanity, were all other instances wanting. And to his eternal honour be it mentioned, he never bombarded a town in any of his sieges, that is, threw bombs, red hot shell, &c., from mortars and howitzers, as by that mode of procedure in sieges the inhabitants are the sufferers, not the garrisons. The truth is, his earnest and unceasing endeavour was to mitigate and alleviate the evils and asperities of warfare, no less by setting an example of justice and clemency, than by recommending and enforcing, whenever he could, moderate and humane measures among his allies. His despatches, both Indian and European, furnish numerous proofs of his humane and merciful disposition. When the Peishwa, whom he had contributed to restore to his throne, indicated a wish to execute his vengeance on some of the Mahratta chiefs who had opposed him, the duke interposed to save them. "The war," said he, "will be eternal if nobody is forgiven; and I certainly think that the British government cannot intend to make the British troops the instruments of the Peishwa's revenge." This measure saved the devoted chiefs.

Thirdly, Nor was the state of destitution of his army in respect of food and the necessaries of life, the only untoward circumstance the English chief had to contend with during the Peninsular War: the military chest was frequently in as destitute a condition. Napier tells us (and he tells only the bare truth) that it "sometimes did not contain a halfpenny;" at other times "it was quite bankrupt." Such was not the case with Buonaparte and his generals. They ex-



acted, at their will and pleasure, all the necessary succours for furthering their operations, from the inhabitants of the countries in which they were carrying on their schemes of violence and aggression, and that too under the terror and pains of military execution. This practice was enjoined on all his subordinates by the express command of Buonaparte. Among Joseph Buonaparte's papers captured at Vittoria, a letter was found addressed to him by his brother Napoleon, in which he tells him that "he had always supported his wars by the resources of the territory in which they were carried on." In his first Italian campaign, besides maintaining the army, he remitted fifty millions of francs to the French exchequer. The French armies were supported by authorized and regulated plunder of the countries and their inhabitants which were for the time the scenes of their operations. Every article, whether of food or raiment, every animal, and every vehicle, were considered to belong of right to the soldier, and without payment. But it was very different with the English army. In all its dealings and intercourse with the natives of the Peninsula, the national character for good faith and disinterested honour, was maintained pure and sacred. And yet, as the duke said, in a letter dated December 21st, 1810, addressed to the earl of Liverpool:—"With all our money I could not maintain one division in the district in which the French have maintained not less than 60,000 men and 20,000 animals, for more than two months. This time last year I was obliged to move the British cavalry from the district which the French now occupy with their whole army, because it could not be subsisted. But [*the secret was*] they take every thing, and leave the unfortunate inhabitants to starve:" thus confirming General Foy's pointed contrast, of "10,000 English with money in their hands," with an army of 20,000 French, though moneyless.

Fourthly, Even in the power of provisioning his army, Wellington was shackled and hampered—often reduced to the greatest straits and difficulties. His commissariat was vicious and defective; not unfrequently selfish and peculating: faults arising from the pernicious influence exerted by the

\* *Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule sous Napoléon.*

† The Duke of Wellington, in the course of the Peninsular War, compelled the French to have recourse to a new system of subsisting and paying their armies. Instead of requisitions and exactions on the

government in the selection of persons for that employment. The opinion of general Foy on that subject furnishes a sufficient explanation of the difficulties and disappointments to which the duke was subject in that respect: "The British commissariat," says the French general, "was composed of the class of petty tradesmen and greedy speculators who contrived to get rich by irregular means."\* To those acquainted with the influences which abject birth and low occupation have on the conduct and motives of men, the declaration of the French general affords a solution of the difference resulting to the French and English armies from their respective commissariats, and the impediments consequently resulting to the plans and operations of the duke of Wellington, as he was under the unavoidable necessity of being dependent for his supplies on his commissariat. But Buonaparte's power in that respect was lawless. He maintained his armies by forced contributions and unrestrained pillage in the invaded countries; and moreover compelled his commissariat to execute their duties faithfully and zealously, from the fear of the certainty of punishment which would attend their fraud or malversation. In Italy, Egypt, Germany, Russia, Spain and Portugal, he and his generals put that system into full and effective operation, and they made the clergy and magistrates responsible for the fulfilment of the requisitions, or forced contributions, and the supply of the requisite succours and means of transport for the French armies.† It was one of the maxims of the French chief's military economy, "that a general at the head of 20,000 men, who could not, in a civilised country, procure subsistence for his troops, was ignorant of his trade." His generals proved themselves no dull scholars. Foy, in his *History of the Peninsular War*, says, "that a French army consisting of 20,000 men, without a military chest, would find abundant subsistence in a country in which an army of 10,000 English, with money in their hands, would die of famine." In another part of his interesting work, when speaking of the great change that Buonaparte introduced into the French armies in their conduct and treatment of the conquered countries, he obliged them to have, in a great measure, recourse to the resources of France, or, as he emphatically expressed himself, "of maintaining themselves," by carrying on a war of magazines. As he, with his usual foresight, said, "this soon made the French people discontented with warfare."



quered or invaded countries, to what it had been in the pure times of the republic, he exclaims: "Woe, then, three-fold woe to the soil traversed by the car of victory. From the period of Napoleon's ascendancy, no more magazines on unforeseen lines of operation, no more convoys of provisions organized in continually variable directions, were ever thought of. Like the avalanche rushing from the summit of the Alps into the valleys, our innumerable armies, by mere passage, destroyed in a few hours the resources of a whole country. Wherever they halted they demolished houses that had stood for half a century." Even one who is no cold and apathetic eulogist of the French and their leaders, admits that the French generals enforced their exactions on Spain, "by executions and burnings." "How different was the conduct of the republican armies of France, in the pure times of their revolutionary austerity and sublime devotedness to patriotism, when masculine virtue and the fiery independence of a truly republican soul actuated our soldiers," exclaims the high-minded Foy: "During the first years of the republic the conquered nations were protected from the licentiousness of arms. The old soldiers long remembered St. Just and Lebas, representatives of the people, who, during the campaign of 1794 caused some volunteers to be shot for having stolen a few eggs from the poultry yard of a peasant of Brabant. Again, later, the brigade of Lautour D'Auvergne was encamped in cherry orchards in Biscay, and the grenadiers durst not pick the cherries from the boughs which hung over their heads. But then," the general emphatically observes, "the French generals made war with an austerity and a moderation befitting the noble cause for which they had taken up arms. The pay was then eight francs per month for the higher ranks. At head-quarters the generals ate at table no other bread than the soldier, and no other meat than the kind which he received." What a contrast to the Napoleonic system! According to that system of regulated and systematic robbery, Buonaparte and his generals became possessed of a great part of the riches of the plundered countries. "How many saints of gold and silver," says M. Blazé, "how many pyxes and cups, were transformed into ingots, to be afterwards exchanged for hotels in Paris! How many diamonds and rubies, after adorning for ages the pompous ceremonies of the

Roman catholic church, were utterly astonished to find themselves on the bare bosom of an opera dancer! The magnificent pictures which decorated the churches of Spain, now adorn the galleries of their generals, and their vacant places are covered with a piece of black cloth." Well may the duke of Wellington have declared at the wholesale removal of the robberies of the Portuguese by Junot and his associate thieves, that it was to be regretted that no means could be devised "to make the French generals restore the property they had *stolen*."

Fifthly,—The medical department of the British army was equally as vicious and defective as that of the commissariat. When the British chief demanded a reform, the medical board in London disregarded his complaints, and even thwarted the arrangements he had made for improving the disgraceful condition of the hospitals, and rendering their officers more efficient. The French hospitals were well regulated and furnished with all things necessary, even with luxuries and superfluities, while the British were even destitute of the commonest necessaries. The French medical staff was skilful and efficient; the English, inefficient and without capacity. Even in the removal of the wounded off the field of battle, the facilities of the French plan were admirably contrasted with the clumsy and bungling contrivances of the English. The French wounded were removed with rapidity off the field, and by the medium of the hospital ambulances, without the infliction of unnecessary pain on the sufferers; but the fallen English soldiers were often left for many hours, and when removed were transported in clumsy bullock-carts, which often occasioned the most excruciating pain and agony to the sufferers. These defects frequently produced in the English army the most doleful scenes after a battle, or when an hospital was to be removed. They also tended greatly to impede the plans and operations of the English chief, on account of the length of time the sick and wounded were prevented from joining the ranks. On the other hand, the French sick and wounded, from the superiority and efficiency of the French medical staff, and the full and constant supply of the necessaries requisite for the restoration of the patients to health and activity, quickly rejoined their regiments. For this reason the operations of the French armies were not impeded or retarded by the obstructions which the presence of large



hospitals occasion to military movements. The case was the same on account of the exoneration from which the French generals were relieved, from the necessity of having commissariat stores conveyed with the armies, and from which the system of forced contributions in the invaded countries, relieved them.

Sixthly,—The Duke's operations in the field were retarded and enfeebled—nay, often endangered, by the remissness and culpability of the government officials, in respect of the deficiencies and imperfections of the engineer and artillery departments of his army. His sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and St. Sebastian, were retarded and greatly impeded, not only from the want of the requisite battering trains and siege *matériel*, but even of a body of men trained to siege duty; and his earnest and frequent representations and remonstrances to the Board of Ordnance on that subject, were not only disregarded, but even treated with slight and indifference. Even when the requisite battering train and siege *matériel* were sent to St. Sebastian, ammunition only for one day's consumption accompanied the train. The cause of the protraction of the siege of the last-mentioned fortress, and the failures of the assaults in the two gallant attempts to storm the breaches, were further occasioned by the absence of cruisers on the coast, to prevent the enemy entering the port with stores and ammunition, and removing the wounded men of the garrison to places of safety. As it has been well remarked, in consequence of the culpable conduct on the part of the government officials, the history of our sieges in the Peninsular war, forms a sad and humiliating chapter in our military annals; they were, as Napier has said with truth, "a succession of butcheries, because the commonest materials (namely, stores, implements, &c.) and the means necessary for their use, were denied to the engineers." As the same author justly observes in another part of his voluminous work, it was from the incredible carelessness of preparation, and the habitual negligence of the different cabinets and government officials, "that the laurels of the British army had for many years been blighted." Another admirable historian of the Peninsular war,\* while speaking of the destitute state of the British army prior to its advance into Spain, when "the men were without shoes; the officers and men

without pay and common necessaries; the hospitals full, and the military chest empty," adds: "this great and shameful irregularity of providing for the army, was not an isolated occurrence, but obtained frequently throughout the war, and consequently fettered and hampered the illustrious subject of our memoir in the execution of his measures."

"It will scarcely be credited," says the author of *The Defenceless State of Great Britain*, "that the trenches, saps, mines, batteries, and other important works necessary for the capture of Olivença in April, 1811; the attack of Fort Christoval, in May, 1811; the second siege of Badajos, in 1812; the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, in 1812; the third and last siege of Badajos, in March and April, 1812; the escalade and capture of the French works at Almaraz, in May, 1812; the reduction of the French posts at Salamanca, in June, 1812; the capture of the Retero, at Madrid, in August, and the siege of Burgos, in September and October of the same year, were undertaken and conducted by a British army, *unattended by a single sapper or miner.*"

Nor were these the only mischievous results arising from the negligence and culpable conduct of the ordnance and admiralty departments in the course of the operations of the British army during the Peninsular war. Among other obstructions to its effective operations during that desperate and eventful struggle, the following may be particularized:—At the battle of Fuentes d'Oñor, the troops were obliged to pick up the enemy's shot fired into the camp, to supply the guns; and after the battle of Vittoria, the only ammunition available was that captured from the French; but as the shot were not of sufficient size for the calibre of the muskets and cannon, the consequence was their comparative inefficiency. Similar cases had occurred at the siege of Badajos, and in some of the battles previous to that memorable event. "The guns at the siege of Badajos," says Napier, "were false in the bore, and the shot of different sizes, the largest being too small," and consequently they were in a great measure ineffectual, from the windage thereby caused. In these respects the case was very different with Buonaparte and his generals. They experienced no difficulties and obstructions of the kind. His crouching dependents amply supplied him and his generals with all the necessary succour and

\* *Military Memoirs of Wellington.*



aid they wanted; and even his timid and fawning allies contributed their quotas in the furtherance of his ambitious projects of violence and aggression. The inhabitants of the countries in which the war was carried on at the time were, as has been already stated, compelled, under pain and terror of military execution, to furnish ample supplies, which relieved the French generals from being encumbered with magazines and stores.

Seventhly,—The duke's measures and operations were frequently impeded, sometimes foiled, by the short-sighted and narrow-policied views of the imbecile cabinets of his own country, and the perverse, and often perfidious measures of his allies. His admirable plans, when lord Liverpool declared the inability of the government to supply the army with corn and specie, for provisioning the British army, and after replenishing his military chest with the produce of the surplus, supplying the Portuguese population, by the importation of corn, &c., from North and South America, Egypt, and the northern coast of Africa, were, in a great measure, thwarted by the culpable negligence, nay, even the absolute refusal of the admiralty, to establish cruisers for the protection of the coasts of Portugal and Spain from the presence of the French and American privateers, and other vessels of war belonging to the enemy; and his financial contrivances to replenish the bankrupt state of the military chest, were rendered nugatory by the mischievous consequences of lord William Bentinck's enhancement of the value of Spanish dollars, in the idle and visionary Sicilian scheme projected by him and the English ministry. The consequence of the Sicilian competition was, an absolute dearth of specie in Spain; and that of the neglect of the English admiralty to station cruisers on the coasts, the loss of store-ships and merchantmen conveying money, clothing, and the munitions of war for the use of the British army, which were captured by privateers issuing from Santona, Bayonne, and Bordeaux. Even the store-ships from Santander could not sail with the necessaries for the British army during its operations on the Nive and the Nivelles, and in front of Bayonne, for want of convoy. The conse-

quence was, that its operations were checked. And to add to the list of grievances, the commissariat availed itself of every opportunity of turning the culpable negligence and dereliction of duty of the government and its officials, to its own selfish advantage. Among numerous other instances of its transgression, may be mentioned, its employment of the provision mules from the port of St. Jean de Luz, in the conveyance of luxuries, in order to sell them at an exorbitant profit to the army. The evils rose to so great a height, that the daily expense of each man's rations exceeded six shillings, British specie. And to fill up the measure of destitution which the army was suffering from the abject and heartless faction under which the English nation was groaning, while its heroic sons were vindicating the rights and independence of civilized men, on the snows of the Pyrenees, and in the swamps of the plains of France, during the winter of 1812 and 1813, their great coats were not furnished by the greedy contractors until the month of April of the last-mentioned year: a neglect probably occasioned for the purpose of verifying the heartless and ignorant declaration of that wisest of sages and purest of patriots, Lord Melville, "*that the army was the last thing that ought to be attended to.*"\* And to crown the folly and iniquity of that timid and incapable faction, colonel Bunbury, the under-secretary of state, was sent to the duke's head-quarters, "at the time millions were being poured by the British ministry into the continent; when every petty German sovereign, partisan, or robber, who raised a hand, or a story, against Napoleon, was supplied to satiety,"—to protest against the maximum expenditure of £100,000 monthly, (and even that sum was not paid regularly) for the maintenance of the British army and its allied battalions; and that, too, at the very crisis of the tremendous struggle, and when the duke was overwhelmed with debt contracted in consequence of the ignorant and crooked policy of the government he was serving. When a review is taken of the tissue of contemptible and culpable conduct by which the government harassed the duke, the only excuse for the strange hallucination under which the ministry laboured,

\* It was probably, to adopt a vicious parliamentary phrase, "in the carrying out" the same notion of the army being the last thing that ought to be attended to, that the imbecile Perceval cabinet, in its dread of the newspaper cry for economy, forgot the safety of the

army in the lines of Torres Vedras, in their keen love of place, and actually issued orders to discharge all the transport ships lying in the Tagus, to save expense, or, more correctly speaking, keep them in their places.



is the laughable declaration of one of their body, that "the views of the duke were wild and visionary, and required the sanction of older and wiser heads before they were assented to." In contending with these untoward circumstances, the duke's attention was not only engaged in directing the movements and fighting the battles of the Peninsular war, but also in the provisioning, the equipment, the supply of the stores, and superintending the health of his army: in a word, he was, besides executing the duty of commander-in-chief, obliged to be his own engineer, artilleryman, commissary, medical adviser, and financier. How he discharged those duties, the event proved: "By a succession of victories, he taught his countrymen to know their own military capacities, and to believe in the fortune of their arms." It has been truly and emphatically said, "the true mark of a great man is, that he accomplished great achievements with small means." To this high and distinguishing claim no man in any age has proved a better title than the late duke of Wellington. His means were cramped and limited, and yet he "accomplished great achievements," and overcame all difficulties. Buonaparte overwhelmed all obstacles by enormous masses of soldiery, and the unlimited command of all the sinews of war—money, munition, and every warlike *matériel*, besides the homage and co-operation of all the subjugated states of Europe.

To meet these difficulties, and provide for those defects, which were occasioned by the English ministry and his allies, the Spanish and Portuguese, the duke was left to his own resources, and compelled to call into practice all the energy, sagacity, and foresight, of his sound, and well-regulated and well-poised mind. By his deep designs and vast combinations, his soundness of judgment and clearness of perception, his intuitive sagacity and inflexibility of purpose, his indefatigable activity, and prompt and decided

execution, he, notwithstanding the follies and the fears of weak and timid, and selfish cabinets, both foreign and domestic, with which he had to contend, not only overcame all those difficulties, and provided for all those defects, but he subdued and reduced to subjection the colossal power and overweening arrogance of one of the most inveterate foes and aggressors of national honour and independence, that had ever appeared on the face of the earth; and eventually restored peace and happiness to Europe, and collaterally to the whole civilized world.

Such are the comparisons, truth and justice tell us, that ought to be drawn between Wellington and Napoleon Buonaparte; they are well summed up in the following brief and emphatic remark of an able periodical writer:—"Instead of the enormous sacrifices of human freedom, human life, and human comfort, which Napoleon Buonaparte demanded, the duke achieved an immortality for himself and his country without leaving half the youth of each generation on the field of battle—without taking any part in the suppression of national freedom or national intellect—without giving the least help towards reducing his country to a herd of slaves, packed up and driven by legions of policemen and spies." To this high and just praise may be appropriately appended that of the most eloquent and judicious of his biographers:—"Though his commands were many and considerable, and the theatre of his services often varied, he was never charged with one act of rapacity or of cruelty; we find no stain of severity upon his hands, no dirt of plunder adhering to his honourable sword, no tears of desolated provinces to dim the lustre of his laurels." His campaigns were sanctified by the cause: they were sullied by no cruelties, no crime. As a conqueror, he has left a blaze of victory behind him, resplendent with honour, patriotism, and justice.

#### MEMORANDUM OF OPERATIONS IN 1811.

BY GENERAL VISCOUNT WELLINGTON, K.B.

DURING the period that Lord Wellington was in the Peninsula, he had been in the practice, from time to time, of drawing up memoranda of the operations of the army under his command, and forwarding them to the minister. These documents are all

eminently characteristic of the man, and exhibit in a clear and striking manner his power of conducting the greatest affairs, while he never neglected the most minute and apparently trifling circumstances which might tend towards the great result. The



important memorandum which we here introduce is that of the operations of the Peninsular army in 1811, as giving a concise and accurate epitome of the occurrences of that year, and thus preparing the reader for a clear understanding of the great events of 1812 :—

Freneda, 28th Dec. 1811.

The last memorandum on the operations in the Peninsula, brought them down to the end of the year 1810, when a division of the 9th corps, with other troops, which had before endeavoured to join Massena from the frontiers of Castile, through Lower Beira, arrived, and took their station on the right of the enemy's army at Leyria. These troops, supposed to be from 8,000 to 10,000 men, had been annoyed on their march by colonel Wilson's detachment on the Alva.

The other division of the 9th corps under Claparède, amounting also to about 10,000 men, remained on the frontier, and by their manœuvres kept general Silveira in check during the march of the division under Drouet, by the valley of the Mondego. Silveira attacked their advanced guard at Ponte do Abade, on the 30th December, 1810, and was defeated; and he was himself attacked and defeated at Villa da Ponte on the 11th January; and he retired, first to Lamego, and thence across the Douro. Claparède advanced upon Lamego, but general Bacellar having placed the divisions of militia, under the command of general Miller and of colonel Wilson, on his flanks and his communications, he was obliged to retire, and went to Guarda, to which place he had been ordered by Massena.

But the principal occurrence in the commencement of this year was the movement, from Andalusia, of a large force into Estremadura, in order to create a diversion in favour of Massena.

The army of the south, under the command of Soult, consisted of the 1st corps, which was engaged in the operations of the siege of Cadiz; of the 4th corps, which was at Granada; and of the 5th corps, one division of which, under Gazan, could with difficulty maintain its ground in Estremadura against the Spanish division of Mendizabel and Ballasteros, whilst the other division, under Girard, was employed in the Condado

de Niebla, and in keeping open the communication between Seville and the besieging army of Cadiz. The whole amount of the army of the south could not be less in the beginning of the year than 50,000 men.\*

Soult broke up from Cadiz with about 5,000 men on the 21st December, and collected at Seville the troops destined for the invasion of Estremadura. He had with him about 20,000 men,† including a very large body of cavalry; to oppose which there were the Spanish divisions of Mendizabel and Ballasteros, which amounted to about 10,000 men, a brigade of Portuguese cavalry, and about 1,500 Spanish cavalry, making altogether about 2,300 cavalry. There were, besides, Spanish garrisons in Badajos and Campo Mayor, Albuquerque, and Valencia de Alcantara; and Don Carlos de España's brigade, about 2,000 men, which was on the right of the British army near Abrantes, was considered disposable for service in Estremadura.

If this corps had been left entire, and had been prudently managed, it would have been fully sufficient, even though not joined by the other troops belonging to the army of the marquis de la Romana, incorporated with the British army, to prevent the enemy from passing the Guadiana, which was full at that season of the year.

But the first measure adopted by the Spanish government, on the same day, the 21st December, that Soult broke up from Cadiz, was to order Ballasteros, with a part of his division, into the Condado de Niebla. Notwithstanding that we received at Cartaxo, on the 29th December, the accounts of Soult having broken up from before Cadiz, the Spanish general Mendizabel did not hear of this circumstance for some days afterwards; and the first he heard of it was from us. He was quite unprepared for his retreat, which was hurried; and he retired in a manner different, and making a different disposition from that which was recommended and ordered.

He had been ordered to break the bridges of Merida and Medellin, and to defend the passages of the Guadiana. He retired upon Badajos and Olivença; and the engineer officer who was sent to destroy the bridge of Merida, instead of obeying the

summed that it was more than 50,000 men in the beginning of the year.

† The 5th corps alone had about 12,000 infantry; and 5,000 brought from the siege of Cadiz and the cavalry, would make his army 20,000 men.

\* By a return of the 25th March, it appears that this army then consisted of 48,619 men; of which number 7,744 were cavalry. This was after the battle of Barossa, and after the siege of Badajos, the battle of the 19th February, &c. It may be pre-



orders he received, made a report which was sent to Cartaxo to the marques de la Romana, and asked for orders. The town of Merida itself was not defended; and the consequence was, that an advanced guard of French cavalry took Merida, which post 400 French troops had held in June in the year 1809, against the whole Spanish army, with this additional disadvantage, that the river Guadiana was then fordable, and that the Spanish troops were in possession of all the avenues to the town.

General Mendizabel, in making his retreat upon Badajos and Olivença, threw 3,000 men of general Ballasteros' division into the latter, the others having marched under general Ballasteros, by order of the government, into the Condado de Niebla. The division of general Mendizabel retired upon Badajos, with all the cavalry, excepting a small body which marched upon Merida.

There were various reports of the movements of the French; and in fact it was but little known in what direction, and with what object, they were moving. It was at one time positively stated, that they had passed the bridge of Merida on the 15th of January, and that they were moving towards the bridge of Almaraz on the Tagus; at another time it was reported that they were encamped at Caceres; but at last it was found that they did not cross the Guadiana in any force, but blockaded the troops of general Ballasteros' division in Olivença.

This blockade was made on the 15th, and continued until the 23rd of January, when the garrison surrendered. Two or three attempts were made by general Mendizabel to raise the blockade, but without success; and as the garrison at last surrendered, before the enemy had attacked the place, and without being distressed for provisions, it is believed that the place was sold.

During the month of January, the marques de la Romana was taken very ill at Cartaxo, of which illness he died on the 23rd of that month. He had ordered don Carlos de España's brigade to march as soon as he heard of the danger of Ballasteros' detachment from the advance of the French troops, and he afterwards ordered that the remainder of the troops which had been incorporated with the British army should move from Villa Franca, where they had been cantoned. They moved on the 20th of January.

From the period at which we had heard of the movement of the French from Cadiz

and particularly, latterly, I had frequent conversation with him regarding the situation of affairs in Estremadura; and as he was unwell, I wrote, in the shape of a memorandum, my opinions on the plan of operations to be pursued, as well for the objects of the war in general, as for the particular purpose of saving Olivença, or rather for relieving the troops in that place, respecting whom the marques was particularly anxious.

The marques died three days after he had received this memorandum; but not till after he had circulated it among the officers under his command, and had desired them to attend to it. A reference to the memorandum, and to the letters and dispatches of that day, will show how far they attended either to the first or to the last.

After two attempts were made to raise the blockade of Olivença, the place surrendered on the 23rd of January; and the enemy invested Badajos, on both sides of the Guadiana, on the 27th of January, and broke ground on the left of the river on the 29th. The Spanish generals were not decided respecting the measures which they should adopt in the circumstances in which they stood. But at length the troops, which had quitted the allied army on the 20th of January, were ordered to advance to Badajos. They immediately re-established the communication between Elvas and Badajos, obliging the French cavalry to retire beyond the Gevora; and then having entered the town, they attempted to raise the siege by making a sortie upon the enemy's works. They were driven back with loss; and having remained in the town, the communication between Elvas and Badajos was again cut off by the enemy's cavalry.\*

The Spanish troops, however, came out of the town again on the 9th of February, and at last took the position on the heights of San Christoval, which was recommended to them. They did not, however, adopt any measure to fortify this position, nor did they adopt any of the other measures recommended to them, particularly that of sending away from Badajos the bridge of boats, the want of which was afterwards found to be so fatal to the cause.

The Spanish army, about 10,000 strong, and having besides about 2,000 cavalry, including general Madden's Portuguese bri-

\* If the French had sent a sufficient body of cavalry to the right of the Guadiana, they would have taken the whole army without firing a shot.



gade, remained in the position at San Christoval, till the 19th of February, having the Gevora in their front, and that river and the Guadiana between them and the enemy, on which day they were surprised by between 5,000 and 6,000 French troops, and totally destroyed as a military body; their camp and artillery being taken, and the whole body, not killed or taken, dispersed, except the Portuguese brigade of cavalry, and a few hundred Spaniards. About 2,000 of the troops escaped into Badajos.

An examination of the letters written at this period to Mr. Wellesley and the secretary of state, will show my anxiety for the relief of Badajos, and the measures which I recommended for that object. The most effectual measure of any would, undoubtedly, have been to detach a body of British troops to that part of the country; but a moment's reflection on the relative numbers of the two armies at that time on the Tagus, and on the extent and nature of the positions which we had to occupy, will show that it was impossible to venture to detach, from our army at least, till the reinforcements then expected should have arrived in the Tagus.

Massena had come into Portugal with 72,000 men, of which he had lost 10,000 at the battle of Busaco, and its consequences; and it is a large allowance to suppose that he had in January lost 10,000 more by deaths, prisoners, deserters, and killed, in various little affairs which had occurred. This would reduce his original number to 52,000 men; and an aid-de-camp of his who was taken in December, reported that the army had that number before Drouet joined.

To this number Drouet, in December, and Foy, in January, added about 12,000 men, making 64,000; and Claparède was at Guarda with between 8,000 and 10,000 men; of the 64,000, about 14,000 may have been sick, as the army were very sickly; and there would have remained on the Tagus, fit for service, about 50,000 men.

The British army, on the 20th January, consisted of 41,040 men; of which number there were sick, 6,715; on command, 1,974; prisoners of war, 1,586; and there remained present, fit for duty, 30,765. Of this number, the 2nd battalion, 88th (485) were at Lisbon, and the 2nd battalion, 58th, at Torres Vedras; leaving about 30,000 for service; of which number 2,655 were cavalry.

The Portuguese army, joined with the

British for service in the field, at the same time amounted to about 32,000 effective men, exclusive of the garrisons of Abrantes and Elvas, in each of which there were two regiments of infantry, one regiment of infantry at Cadiz, and one regiment of infantry (24th) with general Silveira. The object of the French general at this time was undoubtedly to pass the Tagus; and he had his choice of making the attempt in a course of about thirty miles from Santarem to the Zezere, and even higher than the junction of that river. It was necessary to guard the whole course of the river; for which it is conceived that 14,000 men could not be deemed more than sufficient.

The remainder of the army, about 40,000 men, was on the right of the Tagus, opposed to the whole French army; and it must be observed, that if the enemy had been able to advance, either with their 50,000 men, or after being joined by Claparède, they would have been opposed by very unequal numbers, as some days must have elapsed before the troops on the left of the Tagus could have been brought across the river.

The detachment which it would have been necessary to make, in order to effect any good at Badajos, or even to have been in safety, adverting to the mode in which the Spanish troops have usually conducted themselves, ought to have been about 13,000 men; which numbers, it is obvious, could not be spared from the army from the end of January to the 19th February.

Reinforcements to the amount of 6,000 or 7,000 men were daily expected, which afterwards arrived in the beginning of March. It was hoped that the Spaniards would risk nothing, and would be able to hold out till these reinforcements should arrive, when it was intended to detach a sufficient force to effect the object at Badajos, before any thing else should be attempted against Massena.

The delay of all measures against Massena's position continued to be absolutely necessary on account of the state of the roads and rivers in the country; even if our force had been deemed sufficient to attack him.

The result of the battle of the 19th February, however, destroyed all hopes of being able, even when the reinforcement should arrive, to make such a detachment from the army as should be able to relieve Badajos; more particularly as the Spaniards, having neglected to remove the bridge from Badajos to Elvas, the troops which should attempt



to relieve Badajos had no choice left, in respect to the mode of crossing the Guadiana. They must have passed by the bridge of Badajos.

It was then determined to attack Massena as soon as the reinforcements should arrive, by which time it was hoped that the roads and rivulets would become practicable. In the mean time the governor of Badajos was requested to hold out to the last moment. Massena, however, retired from his position on the night of the 5th March, before our troops, which had arrived at Lisbon on the 1st March, could join the army. The British troops were immediately put in motion in pursuit of the French army; those on the left of the Tagus, by Abrantes and the Zezere; and those on the Rio Mayor river, by the different routes leading in the direction which the enemy had taken.

A letter was written to general Leite, the governor of Elvas, from Santarem, on the 6th, to request him to apprise the governor of Badajos of Massena's retreat, and to assure him that support and relief would be sent to him without loss of time. This support was accordingly ordered to march on the 8th, as soon as the enemy's retreat was found to be decided.

When the enemy retired, it appeared at first that their intention was to go by the road of Thomar and Espinhal, leaving Coimbra on their left; and it was not certain that they had taken the high road by Pombal, till the 9th. On that morning a most favourable report was received of the state of affairs at Badajos. It appeared that the garrison had not suffered; that the fire of the place was superior to that of the enemy; and that one of the enemy's six battering guns had been dismantled by the fire of the place. Under these circumstances, when it was found on the afternoon of the 9th, that the enemy had collected their army in a strong position at Pombal, it was deemed expedient to order the 4th division, and general de Grey's brigade of cavalry (which had been ordered to march on the 10th to join the 2nd and general Hamilton's division on the left of the Tagus, as soon as the bridge should be laid for them), to march upon Pombal, to co-operate in the attack which it was intended to make upon the enemy on the 11th. These troops accordingly joined, and the enemy retired; but the garrison of Badajos surrendered on the 10th of March.

The mode of the enemy's retreat on the

11th, and the fact that they were still stronger than we were, and might have taken up the position of Coimbra and the Mondego, unless hurried beyond that town, caused the continued detention of the 4th division, and general de Grey's brigade of cavalry, till the operations of the 13th forced the enemy past Coimbra, and enabled us to communicate with that town.

The troops for Badajos were immediately put in motion to return to the south, but unfortunately we that night heard of the fall of that fortress on the 10th. These accounts were accompanied by reports of the enemy immediately threatening Campo Mayor; and even if it had not been desirable to prevent them from extending their conquests on that side, the fall of Badajos facilitated to such a degree their entry into Portugal, and Badajos was so much nearer to Lisbon than the point at which we then found ourselves, that it would have been impossible to continue the pursuit of Massena even for one march, without providing for the security of our right flank, by placing a large corps on the Tagus. Thus, then, it was still necessary to make this detachment, notwithstanding that the original object for which it was destined was lost.

The pursuit of Massena was continued with uniform success from that period till he had finally crossed the Agueda on the 9th April. Our reinforcements, however, were not all arrived in Portugal, and those which had arrived did not join the army till the end of March. Even then we were infinitely inferior to the enemy in numbers, particularly when he approached the frontier, and was joined by Claparède's division of the 9th corps from Guarda. Our movements were, therefore, necessarily cramped, and we were obliged to proceed with caution, when the utmost activity would have been desirable.

Let any body now advert to the difference of the result of Massena's invasion of Portugal, if the operations on the Guadiana in the month of January had been carried on as they ought; if the Spanish Regency had not drawn Ballasteros from Estremadura at the moment that province was attacked; if his troops had not been shamefully sold in Olivença; if the battle of the 19th February had not been lost, and the Spanish army annihilated; and, finally, if Badajos itself had not been shamefully sold to the enemy on the day after the governor was informed that relief would be sent to him.



As soon as the French were driven across the Agueda, Almeida was invested; and it will be seen in a subsequent part of this memorandum that the enemy made an attempt in May to relieve the place. What would have been the result of that attempt, nay more, would it ever have been made, if we had had 22,000 men in the ranks, which were at that time in Estremadura.

If our attention had not been preferably, and with part of our army necessarily, carried into Estremadura, in consequence of the events in that province, in the months of January, February, and March, what would have been the result of an attempt to obtain possession of Ciudad Rodrigo in May, after the fall of Almeida, by the concentrated force and resources of the allied army?

But other circumstances occurred, not yet adverted to in this memorandum, which show still more clearly the fatal effects of the Spanish system of military operations. Notwithstanding that general Ballasteros was weak, and that he ought never to have been removed from Estremadura, he held his ground against a French corps which attacked him on the 25th of January. A part of the French force in Estremadura was consequently withdrawn from that province, and the force engaged in the siege of Badajos was reduced.\*

Another event occurred highly advantageous in all its circumstances to the state of affairs in Estremadura. In consequence of the diminution of the force before Cadiz in December, 1810, the British and Spanish authorities conceived that a fair opportunity offered of making an attack upon the blockading army by the besieged. This attack was fixed for the 28th of February, but owing to contrary winds, and a variety of circumstances, could not take place till the 6th of March. On that day the battle of Barossa was fought, four days before the surrender of Badajos; and in all probability, if Badajos had held out one day longer, the enemy would not have remained to take possession of the place.

The troops which were detached from the army at Condeixa on the 14th of March, did not arrive at Portalegre till the 22nd of that month. Campo Mayor, which had been regularly attacked by the enemy on the 14th, surrendered on the 22nd. Marshal sir W. Beresford, having collected his corps, ad-

\* He had further successes in an action fought in the end of February.

vanced against the enemy, surprised them at Campo Mayor on the 25th, which place they abandoned. Their cavalry fled into Badajos, leaving behind them a regiment of infantry, and all their cannon. Unfortunately the excessive impetuosity of the troops (the 13th light dragoons in particular) prevented sir W. Beresford from taking the advantage which he intended to take of these events. Some of the 13th dragoons were taken on the bridge, between the *tête du pont* and the gate of Badajos.

The instructions to sir W. Beresford were to pass the Guadiana, as soon as he should have possession of Campo Mayor, and to blockade Badajos, till the means for attacking the place regularly could arrive. Unfortunately, here again our operations were frustrated by the conduct of the Spaniards. One of the objects particularly recommended to their attention was to send to Elvas the bridge of boats that was in Badajos. This had been repeatedly desired before, and the reasons for urging the measure again were particularly stated in that memorandum. This was the only bridge in the possession of the allies; and if it had been at Elvas, marshal Beresford could have passed the Guadiana, and have blockaded Badajos on the 26th of March, and in all probability the place would have fallen into our hands as Campo Mayor had, or as Almeida subsequently did, as it was at that time unprovided with stores or with provisions. As it was, he could not pass the Guadiana till the 4th of April, and could not advance till the 6th or 7th; and in the intermediate time the enemy threw into the place all the provisions and stores which it required to last till the enemy were enabled finally to relieve it in the middle of June.

When the French crossed the Agueda on the 9th of April, they left Almeida to its fate, and it was immediately invested and blockaded by our troops. The enemy retired beyond the Tormes, some of them even beyond the Douro, and abandoned Ciudad Rodrigo as well as Almeida. Our army, however, was scarcely strong enough to maintain the blockade of Almeida, and certainly could not have maintained that of Ciudad Rodrigo. Indeed the state of the Agueda rendered it impossible for us to draw supplies across that river.

The enemy having passed the Douro, Almeida being invested, and matters appearing tolerably quiet on the frontiers of Castile, the head-quarters were moved on the 15th



of April into Alentejo, and arrived at Elvas on the 20th. Sir W. Beresford had crossed the Guadiana on the 4th of April, and had blockaded both Badajos and Olivença. The garrison of the latter place having refused to surrender, guns were brought from Elvas, and lieutenant-general Cole forced the place to surrender on the 15th of April.

In the mean time, sir W. Beresford advanced with the second division of infantry, and general Hamilton's division, and the cavalry, as well to force the enemy to retire from Estremadura entirely, as to give support to general Ballasteros, who had been obliged to retire into that province from the Condado de Niebla. Marshal Beresford surprised the enemy's cavalry on the 16th of April, at Los Santos, and defeated them with considerable loss. Badajos was reconnoitred on the 22nd, and the general plan for the attack was fixed. But unfortunately the rain which had fallen in the third week in April swelled the Guadiana considerably; and the bridge which marshal sir W. Beresford had constructed under Jurumenha, with great trouble and difficulty, and after much delay, was swept away in the night of the 23rd of April. Marshal sir W. Beresford was consequently instructed to delay the operations of the siege till he should have re-established the bridge, or till the river should become fordable. The marshal was likewise instructed and authorised to fight a battle, in case he should think it expedient, in order to save the siege of Badajos; and these instructions applied as well to the corps under general Blake, which landed about this time at Ayamonte.

All these arrangements being made, the head-quarters were again transferred to the frontiers of Castile. They quitted Elvas on the 25th April, and arrived at Alameda on the 28th. Intelligence had been received that orders had arrived from Paris, for Massena to make an attempt to raise the blockade of Almeida; in which attempt marshal Bessières was to co-operate with part of the army of the north.\*

The enemy's army was collected at

\* It is a curious circumstance, and shows what good intelligence we had, that these accounts were received at Elvas, together with accounts of the day Massena was to set out from Salamanca, and our head-quarters arrived at Alameda in Castile on the day before Massena arrived at Ciudad Rodrigo.

† The enemy never had such a superiority of numbers opposed to the British troops as in this action. They had all the infantry of the four corps which had been in Portugal, and all the cavalry. In addition

Ciudad Rodrigo in the end of April, but the same fall of rain which had swelled the rivers in Estremadura, likewise swelled those in Castile, and they did not advance till the 2nd May. They attacked us at Fuentes d'Oñor on the 3rd and 5th, but could make no impression upon us, and at length retired on the 10th, and the whole were across the Agueda on that night.†

In the middle of the night of the 10th, after the blockade was completely resumed in force, general Brennier, the governor of Almeida, blew up the place, and made his escape with his garrison across the bridge of Barba de Puerco. This event was to be attributed to a variety of unfortunate circumstances.

First, the officer commanding the queen's regiment, who was close to the place, was not aware of the nature of the explosion which he heard, or that the garrison escaped, and made no movement.

Secondly, the officer commanding the 4th regiment, who had been ordered to Barba de Puerco, at one o'clock on the 10th, when the French retired, missed his road; and although the distance he had to march was only three miles, he did not reach Barba de Puerco till the morning of the 11th, after the French had arrived there.

Thirdly, the 8th Portuguese regiment had been ordered to march from its cantonments at Junça to Barba de Puerco, in case an explosion should be heard. These orders were obeyed; the regiment marched to Barba de Puerco, and arrived before the French, and before major-general Campbell, with the 4th and 36th regiments; but finding nothing there but a picket of cavalry, and the commanding officer believing that he had mistaken the nature of the explosion, returned again to his cantonments.

The 3rd and 7th divisions were ordered off to Estremadura on the 13th and 14th; and accounts having been received on the 15th that Soult was about to advance from Seville, the head-quarters were again removed on the following day to Elvas, where they arrived on the 19th. Sir W. Beresford

to which they had three fresh regiments of cavalry, which could not have less than 1,200 men, and 900 cavalry of the guard. We had—British cavalry, 1,331; ditto infantry, 18,000; Portuguese cavalry, 300; ditto infantry, 10,142. But we had two divisions, the 5th and 6th, and general Pack's brigade, and the Portuguese cavalry on the left, either forming or protecting the blockade, and these troops were not engaged. The enemy had about five to one of cavalry, and more than two to one of infantry engaged.



had invested Badajos on both sides of the Guadiana on the 4th, and he broke ground on the 8th. He lost some men on the right of the river, in front of the *tête du pont*, on the first day, and a considerable number in a sortie made by the enemy on the 10th. On the 12th, the marshal heard of the collection of a large body of troops by marshal Soult, in the neighbourhood of Seville, and of their march towards Estremadura, and he immediately raised the siege; and, according to the instructions and recommendation left with them, he and the Spanish generals collected their troops on the Albuera rivulet.

The battle of Albuera was fought on the 16th of May, on the ground pointed out in those instructions. That which was most conspicuous in the battle of Albuera was the want of discipline of the Spaniards. These troops behaved with the utmost gallantry, but it was hopeless to think of moving them. In the morning the enemy gained an eminence which commanded the whole extent of the line of the allies, which either was occupied, or was intended to be occupied, by the Spanish troops. The natural operation would have been to re-occupy this ground by means of the Spanish troops; but that was impossible. The British troops were consequently moved there; and all the loss sustained by those troops was incurred in regaining a height which ought never for a moment to have been in possession of the enemy.\* After the battle of Albuera, the enemy retired leisurely to Llerena and Guadalcanal.

It was obvious, from the immense superiority of cavalry which they showed in that battle, and that, as the allies were but little superior in total strength, and had beaten them with difficulty, and could derive no great advantage from their success, it was hopeless to attack Soult in the position which he had taken at Llerena. There was nothing to prevent him from retiring upon Seville, or even upon the troops engaged in the blockade of Cadiz, if he should have found himself so pressed as to render that measure necessary; and the arrival of reinforcements, which it will appear he had reason to expect, would have placed in a

\* This is stated, because it has been matter of dispute whether the Spaniards had or had not occupied the height before the French were on it. They were certainly ordered to occupy the ground, and their pickets were on it; but it is not clear that they had occupied it in sufficient strength before the French troops were on it.

state of risk the troops which would have obliged him to take this step. But this reasoning supposes that Soult would have considered himself under the necessity of retiring from the strong position of Llerena and Guadalcanal, in consequence of the measures which we might have adopted in Estremadura in the end of May. I believe there is no foundation for this hypothesis.

The allied troops, which were sent from the frontiers of Castile, and arrived at Campo Mayor on the 23rd and 24th May, were rather more than equal to the loss sustained in the battle of Albuera, and in the first siege of Badajos. It had been obvious in the battle of Albuera, that we could not reckon upon the Spaniards in any affair of manœuvre, and therefore that we could not rely upon them in such an operation as the attack of Soult's army in the positions of Guadalcanal and Llerena.

But the effect of these operations, even if well executed, could only be to force Soult to fall back for a time; and here the question arose whether it was worth while to attempt it. It was known that Drouet had marched with 17 or 19 battalions of the 9th corps, belonging to the army of Portugal, from Salamanca, on the 16th or 17th May, destined for a reinforcement to Soult; and it was calculated that these battalions would join Soult on or about the 8th June.

Under these circumstances, it was deemed better not to lose the time between the 25th May and the 8th June, by an attempt to attack Soult, which appeared hopeless; and to take advantage of our superiority in the battle of Albuera, and in the early arrival of our reinforcements, to make a vigorous attack upon Badajos. Accordingly, the place was reinvested on the 25th May, and the fire was opened on the 2nd June.

There appeared every ground for belief that we should have been able to obtain possession of the place before the day on which it was possible that Soult could advance for its relief. It is certain that its possession depended upon the possession of the outwork of San Christoval, which commanded the point of attack in the castle. This outwork was deemed to be in a state to be taken by storm on the 6th, and again on the 9th. Both attempts failed; and the question whether Badajos could be taken or not in the time which remained, during which the allied army could be applied to that operation, came to be one of means, upon which we were decidedly of opinion



that we had it not in our power to take the place; and therefore we raised the siege on the 10th, although we continued the blockade till the 17th.\*

While the operations of the second siege of Badajos were going on, accounts were received that marshal Marmont was about to move from Salamanca into Estremadura, in order to aid Soult in his operations for the relief of Badajos. The first movements of the army were upon Ciudad Rodrigo, into which place Marmont introduced a convoy on the 6th June. Lieut.-general sir B. Spencer retired across the Coa; and Marmont then turned about, and marched through the Puerto de Baños to Plasencia. Lieut.-general sir B. Spencer made a corresponding movement on Castello Branco, at which place he received intelligence of the enemy having had posts on the Alagon, and the cavalry in Coria, and some doubts were entertained of their intention to cross the Tagus. The head of their army, however, crossed that river on the 12th, and arrived at Truxillo on the 13th; and the advanced guard was at Merida, and in communication with Soult, on the 15th.

Soult had broken up from Llerena and Guadalcanal on the 12th, as soon as he was joined by Drouet; and he moved upon Zafra, and his advanced guard to Los Santos, on the 13th. The allied army were immediately concentrated upon Albuera, with the exception of the 3rd and 7th divisions, which kept the blockade of Badajos. But the accounts of the arrival at Truxillo of the advanced guard of the army of Portugal having arrived at Albuera, and Soult† having made a movement from Zafra on Almendralejo, having thus shewn that he knew of the arrival of that army, it was deemed expedient to retire across the Guadiana.

As far as we could form a judgment, the French had at that time assembled in Estremadura 60,000 men, of which 7,000 were cavalry. The British army consisted of:—cavalry, 1,671; infantry, 11,812. The Portuguese—cavalry, 900; infantry, 12,885, and general Blake had about 8,000 men.

\* I believe the failure in the attack upon San Christoval is, like many other events, to be attributed to the want of experience in the British army. First, the battery to breach the wall ought to have been placed on the crest of the glacis. Secondly, if it was not, care ought to have been taken from the commencement to prevent the enemy from clearing the rubbish while the fire was continued upon the wall.

The head of sir B. Spencer's column did not join till the 20th, the 5th division not till the 24th. The strength of the whole army,‡ when collected together, was, British infantry, 25,123; Portuguese infantry, 18,926; British cavalry, 3,197; Portuguese cavalry, 1,200.

It would have been impossible for the allies to maintain the blockade of Badajos with the strength which they could produce against that of the enemy, in the days which intervened between the 17th and 24th of June; nor could the allies pretend to attack the enemy in Estremadura, composed as they were, being, after all, even including the Spaniards and sir B. Spencer, inferior in numbers, particularly of cavalry, and very inferior in composition.

These circumstances were stated in a conference with general Blake on the 14th June, at Albuera, and in a previous letter to him; and he was urged either to co-operate with the allied British and Portuguese army; or, having crossed the Guadiana at Jurumenha, to move down the right bank, and to cross that river at Mertola, and to endeavour to obtain possession of Seville, while the enemy's attention should be drawn to us on the frontier of Alemtejo. General Blake preferred the last operation, and he recrossed the Guadiana on the 22nd June.

But, instead of moving at once upon Seville, he attempted to obtain possession of Niebla on the 30th June, where the enemy had only 300 men, in which attempt he failed; and Soult having, towards the end of the month of June, discovered general Blake's movement, and detached a body of troops into Andalusia, general Blake embarked at Ayamonte on the 6th July. While this was going on, the allied British and Portuguese army took a position on the 19th June between Elvas and Campo Mayor. The particular object in taking this position was to protect those places, and to insure the arrival into them of the convoys of provisions and stores destined for their supply. The enemy reconnoitred the position of the army on the 22nd June, but they never showed any inclination to attack it.

† Soult brought to Zafra little more than his advanced guard and cavalry. The main body of the army marched direct from Llerena upon Almendralejo and Merida.

‡ This account includes the 5th division, and Barbacena's brigade of Portuguese cavalry, which did not arrive at Portalegre till the 24th of June. The 5th division consisted of about 5,000 men. In this account the artillery is not included.



The armies remained opposite to each other till the 14th July, when Marmont retired across the Tagus, and cantoned his army about Plasencia, &c., and along the Tagus to Talavera; and Drouot removed the 5th corps to Zafra. Before these troops separated, the allies were certainly stronger than the enemy, in infantry; the enemy were strongest in cavalry; but the attack of the enemy would have answered no purpose, excepting to oblige them to retire from Estremadura. That object was likely to be accomplished without incurring the risk of an attack with inferior numbers of cavalry, and without exposing the troops to the inconvenience of making long marches in Estremadura in that season.

The enemy having retired from Estremadura, the question regarding the future operations of the army was maturely considered, and it was determined to remove the seat of the war to the frontiers of Castile. The grounds of that decision were,—

First, that in that season we could not venture to undertake any thing against Badajos.

Secondly, that we were not strong enough to venture into Andalusia.

Thirdly, that from all the information I had received, the strength of the northern army was less than that of the south; and that the army of Portugal, which was destined to oppose us in whatever point we should direct our operations, was not likely to be so strongly supported in the north as in the south.

In this supposition I was mistaken. The army of the north, even before the reinforcements arrived, was stronger than that in the south; but it must be observed that there is nothing so difficult as to obtain information of the enemy's numbers in Spain. There is but little communication between one town and another; and although the most minute account of numbers which have passed through one town can always be obtained, no information can be obtained of what is passing in the next. To this add, that the disposition of the Spaniards naturally leads them to exaggerate the strength and success of themselves and their friends, and to despise that of the enemy, and it will not be matter of surprise that we should so often have been misinformed regarding the enemy's numbers.

The first intention was to remain in the cantonments of the Alemtejo, which had been taken up as soon as Marmont had

retired, till the train and stores should have been brought up from Oporto, to make the attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo. The march of the troops would consequently not have taken place till the beginning of September. The movement was made in the end of July and beginning of August, for the following reasons.

In the end of July it was discovered, that notwithstanding marshal Bessières had evacuated the Asturias and Astorga when Marmont moved into Estremadura in the beginning of July, and thereby increased the disposable force under his command, Don Julian had been so successful in the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, that up to that moment the enemy had not been able to keep open any communication with the place, or to supply it at all with provisions.

A return of the supplies in the place, when it was left by Marmont in the beginning of June, had likewise been intercepted, from which it appeared that the provisions would be exhausted by the 20th August. It was therefore determined to send the army across the Tagus immediately, and to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo, if it should not have been supplied; and if it should, to canton the army in Lower Beira, till the train and stores should have arrived. We did not receive intelligence that the place had been supplied till we went so forward as to disclose our design against the place. But there were two other reasons for taking up cantonments for the summer in Castile rather than in Lower Beira; one was, that in Castile we could procure supplies of provisions, which we much wanted, and we could procure none in Beira; the other was, that by threatening Ciudad Rodrigo, we were likely to relieve Galicia, and General Abadia's army, from the attack with which both were threatened by the army of the north.

We accordingly made the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo in the first week in August, and continued it from that time forward. The train for the siege would have arrived at Almeida in the first week of September. But before that period, accounts were received of the arrival in Spain of the enemy's reinforcements. It was also discovered, by an intercepted return of the army of the north, that they were much stronger than they had been supposed in July, when the plan was determined upon to make the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Under these circumstances, and as Almeida was not in a state



to give security to the heavy train and its stores, it was determined not to bring the equipment forward, and to confine our efforts to the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo.

In the third week of September, the enemy collected the whole army of the north, (with the exception of Bonet's division, which observed Abadia's movements on the side of Galicia,) and two divisions from Navarre, which had recently come from Calabria, and five divisions, and all the cavalry of the army of Portugal, to escort a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo. They had not less than 60,000 men,\* of which more than 6,000 were cavalry, to which we could oppose about 40,000. If we had fought a battle to maintain a blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, we must have had the river Agueda, and the place in our rear; and if defeated, a retreat was impossible.

Although we did not fight a battle to protect the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, the army was assembled on the left of the Agueda, and a partial engagement, highly honourable to the troops, was fought at El Bodon on 25th September. The object of taking a position so near to the enemy was to force them to show their army. This was an object, because the people of the country, as usual, believed and reported that the enemy were not so strong as we knew them to be; and if they had not seen the enemy's strength, they would have entertained a very unfavourable opinion of the British army, which it was desirable to avoid. This object was accomplished by the operations at the close of September.

Although the removal of the army from the Alemejejo did not accomplish all the objects which were in view when the movement was made, it had the effect of obliging the enemy to collect their whole force for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, and to abandon all their other operations and objects.† The army of the north were obliged to dis-

continue their operations against Abadia, and still further, to call to their assistance two divisions which had recently arrived from Calabria, and were employed in Navarre against the guerilla Mina. Mina's success in Navarre has consequently been extraordinary, and his numbers have rapidly increased.

After the operations for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo, it was determined to persevere in the same system till the enemy should make some alteration in the disposition of their force, and to continue to threaten Ciudad Rodrigo with an attack, in order to keep a large force of the enemy employed to observe our operations, and to prevent them from undertaking any operation elsewhere.

To this system we were forced, not less by the relative force of the two armies, than by the extraordinary sickness of our own troops. All the soldiers who had recently arrived from England, and all those who had been in Walcheren, and vast numbers of officers, were attacked by fever, not of a very violent description, but they were rendered unable to perform any duty, and those who recovered relapsed upon making any exertions. Even if an opportunity had offered, therefore, for undertaking any thing on this side, the unfortunate state of the army would have prevented it.

It would not have answered to remove the army to the frontiers of Estremadura, where a chance of effecting some important object might have offered; as in that case general Abadia would have been left to himself, and would have fallen an easy sacrifice to the army of the north. We availed ourselves of the opportunity which offered of striking a blow against Girard in Estremadura, by which the country between the Tagus and the Guadiana was relieved from the enemy.

But little notice has been taken in this memorandum of the operations of the Span-

\* Besides these 60,000 men, general Foy was at Plasencia with one division of the army of Portugal, and some troops of the army of the centre, with which he co-operated with Marmont, and actually ascended the mountains by the Pass of Perales and Poyo on our right. The 2nd and general Hamilton's divisions of infantry, and the 2nd division of cavalry, have always been in the Alemejejo, with the exception of general De Grey's brigade of the latter, while it continued on the strength of that division of cavalry.

† There is nothing more comical than the lies published in the *Moniteur* about the expedition to relieve Ciudad Rodrigo, excepting that our newspapers do not notice them. It is not possible that either Marmont or Dorsenne could have written such

nonsense as has appeared with their names affixed to it. They say that they heard of our approach to the Coa in the beginning of September; we approached the Coa on the 6th of August, and they knew it at Salamanca on the 14th. They then say, that in consequence of this knowledge, acquired in the beginning of September, Dorsenne attacked Galicia; he attacked Abadia in Galicia on the 25th of August. Marmont then took four guns on the 25th of September; but he forgets to say that we retook the only two which he had taken for a moment. The comical part of that story is, that major Gordon, who was in the French head-quarters on the 26th, offered to lay a wager that the *Moniteur* would mention that the guns had been taken, but would omit the sequel of the story.



iards, which, having been confined principally to the eastern coast of the Peninsula, have been but little influenced by those on the western side. Tortosa was surrendered by treachery on the 2nd January, as Lerida had been but a short time before. The troops under Suchet then prepared to attack Tarragona, which place was taken by storm on the 28th June.

In the course of the winter it had appeared, by an intercepted letter, to be Soult's intention to attack Carthagena, in order to be prepared to attack Valencia on both sides in concert with Suchet. He attempted to carry this intention into execution in the month of July, after he had obliged general Blake to embark at Ayamonte. General Blake, however, went with his army by sea to the coast of Murcia, and landed it there in August, while Soult moved in that direction by Granada. It appears that general Blake quitted the army as soon as it had formed a junction with the army of Murcia, called the third army, and he proceeded to Valencia, leaving general Freire in the command of the troops in Murcia. The French advanced from Granada, but the Spaniards did not retreat in time, and their loss was very great. They had time, however, to re-assemble their dispersed divisions, and the people in Murcia took arms; and partly on this account, partly on account of the prevalence of the yellow fever at Carthagena, and throughout Murcia, and partly because the movement of the allied British and Portuguese army upon Ciudad Rodrigo rendered necessary a concentration of the French forces in the Peninsula, Soult returned to the westward, and arrived at Seville on the 17th September.

In the mean time, Suchet, having been joined by reinforcements from France, and having dispersed the troops which general Lacy had attempted to collect in Catalonia, penetrated into the kingdom of Valencia. General Blake had been since August preparing for the defence of that city, and he collected there the army of Valencia, and others from Aragon and Catalonia; and latterly, general Mahy marched from Murcia to join him with the troops which general Blake had brought from Cadiz, and a part of the 3rd army, i.e. that of Murcia. Suchet having gained possession of Orapesa, commenced an attack on the castle of Saguntum on the 29th of September. He made several attempts to obtain possession of the castle by storm, in all of which he

failed; and at last, having brought up a few heavy guns, he broke ground regularly before the place, and made a breach in its wall. He made several attempts to carry the breach by storm, in all of which he failed.

As soon as general Blake was joined at Valencia by the troops from Murcia, under general Mahy, he moved out from Valencia on the 24th of October, and on the 25th attacked Suchet, and was defeated, with the loss of some prisoners and eight pieces of cannon. The French immediately summoned the garrison of Saguntum to surrender, which they did, upon capitulation. Suchet advanced upon Valencia, and it is understood that he opened his fire upon a part of the intrenched position occupied by Blake in front of the town, on the 25th of November. It is likewise stated, that on the 2nd of December, there was a severe action at Valencia, in which the French suffered considerably.

These circumstances, and the movement of Marmont's army towards Toledo, as is supposed, to aid Suchet, have induced us to make preparations for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. By these measures we shall bring Marmont back, and probably oblige the army of the north to re-assemble.

Since Suchet has been in Valencia, the guerillas have been very active and enterprising in Aragon and Navarre. Mina defeated a detachment of 1,100 men, sent against him, only three of whom escaped; and besides other advantages of small amount, he and the Empecinado, and Duran, having joined, it is reported that they had taken the garrison of Daroca, consisting of 2,400 men.

When general Blake embarked on the 6th July from the mouth of the Guadiana, he left there general Ballasteros with a division of troops, which likewise embarked, and went to the Sierra de Ronda on the 24th August. He has been very successful against the French by his light operations in rear of the army, blockading Cadiz; and he has always a secure retreat open upon Gibraltar. In order to aid general Ballasteros, and to give additional security to Tarifa, Colonel Skerrett, with about 1,200 men, was detached thither from Cadiz on the 10th October. By this measure the French were obliged to retire from San Roque on the night of the 21st October, in which position they had kept Ballasteros blockaded under the guns of Gibraltar; and



Ballasteros did them much mischief in their retreat, and in a subsequent attack which he made upon one of their detachments at Bornos. He was afterwards again obliged to retire in the end of November, under protection of the guns of Gibraltar; and colonel Skerret, and the Spanish general Copons, to Tarifa. The object of the French on this occasion was to attack Tarifa, while they should keep Ballasteros blockaded. But they had commenced to retire on the 12th December.

From this memorandum it will be seen, that if the Spaniards had behaved with common prudence, or if their conduct had been even tolerably good, the result of Massena's campaign in Portugal must have been the relief of the south of the Peninsula.

We had to contend with the consequences of the faults of some, the treachery of others, and the folly and vanity of all. But although our success has not been what it might and ought, we have at least lost no ground, and with a handful of British troops fit for service, we have kept the enemy in check in all quarters since the month of March. Till now they have gained nothing, and have made no progress on any side. It is to be apprehended that they will succeed in Valencia; but I believe there is no man who knows the state of affairs in that province, and has read Suchet's account of his action with Blake on the 25th October, who does not believe that, if Blake had not fought that action, Valencia would have been safe. Are the English ministers and generals responsible for the blunders of Blake?

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## THE FOURTH SPANISH CAMPAIGN.

A.D. 1812.

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### THE SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

THE English general having collected his battering train and siege stores at Almeida, and the gabions and fascines necessary for the siege having been prepared by the troops while in their cantonments, the 6th of January, 1812, was fixed for the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo; and the trestle bridge prepared by major Sturgeon, at Almeida, for crossing the Aguada, was laid down at the ford of Salicis; but the weather continuing very inclement, the intrenchment did not take place till the 8th.

As the weather was excessively cold, snow and sleet having fallen during several days preceding; and as no camp equipage was with the army, or cover of any kind to be found in the vicinity of the town (which stands on a height, overhanging the northern banks of the Aguada) or its immediate neighbourhood, the duties of the siege were undertaken by the light, third, and fourth divisions alternately, each remaining twenty-four hours in the trenches, and furnishing the guards and working parties for that period.

At nine o'clock of the evening of the 8th, colonel Colbourne, with three companies of

the 52nd, stormed the redoubt on the upper Teson, a hill overlooking the town, and distant about 600 yards from the ramparts. On the night of the following day, the first parallel was established, and the batteries traced out; and on the 13th, the convent of Santa Cruz having been carried by escalade, a lodgment was made in the suburbs, and a communication established by the flying sap. At noon of the 14th, during the interchange of the tour of duty by the divisions, as the workmen of the third division to be relieved, withdrew from the trenches, to meet the advance of the relieving division, a sortie was made from the garrison, for the purpose of destroying the parallels, and spiking the guns in battery; but the officer of engineers on duty collecting a few of the workmen, and the relieving division approaching at the same moment, the enemy retreated into the town.

On the night of the 14th, the fortified convent of San Francisco was escaladed by the 14th regiment. On the 19th, two breaches being established—the width of the one being 100 feet, and that of the





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other 30 feet—and lord Wellington receiving intelligence that Marmont was advancing to the relief of the place, reconnoitred the breaches, and deeming them practicable, ordered an assault to be made at 7 o'clock of the evening of that day. Seated on the reverse of one of the advanced approaches, he wrote the orders for the assault. To the light and third divisions, whose tour of duty in the trenches had now come round, that duty was assigned. To carry the main, or great breach, was the duty of the third, under Picton; that of the lesser breach, was assigned to the light division, under Crau-

\* The precise order of the assault was:—"The attack on Ciudad Rodrigo must be made this evening at seven o'clock. The light infantry company of the 83rd regiment will join lieutenant-colonel O'Toole at sunset. Lieutenant-colonel O'Toole, with the 2nd caçadores and the light company of the 83rd regiment, will, ten minutes before seven, cross the Agueda by the bridge, and make an attack upon the outwork in front of the castle. The object of this attack is to drive the artillery-men from two guns in that outwork, which bear upon the entrance into the ditch, at the junction of the counterscarp with the main wall of the place: if lieutenant-colonel O'Toole can get into the outwork, it would be desirable to destroy these guns. Major Sturgeon will show lieutenant-colonel O'Toole his point of attack. Six ladders, twelve feet long each, will be sent from the engineer park to the old French guard-room, at the mill on the Agueda, for the use of this detachment. The 5th regiment will attack the entrance of the ditch, at the point above referred to; major Sturgeon will likewise show them the point of attack; they must issue from the right of the convent of Santa Cruz; they must have twelve axes to cut down the gate by which the ditch is entered, at the junction of the counterscarp with the body of the place. The 5th regiment are also to have twelve scaling ladders, twenty-five feet long, and immediately on entering the ditch, are to scale the fausse-braie, in order to clear it of the enemy's posts on their left, towards the principal breach. The 77th regiment are to be in reserve, on the right of the convent of Santa Cruz, to support the first party, which will have entered the ditch. The ditch must besides be entered on the right of the breach by two columns, to be formed on the left of the convent of Santa Cruz, each to consist of five companies of the 94th regiment. Each column must have three ladders twelve feet long, by which they are to descend into the ditch, and they are to have ten axes to cut down any palisades which may be placed in the ditch to impede the communication along it. The detachment of the 94th regiment, when descended into the ditch, is to turn to its left to the main breach. The 5th regiment will issue from the convent of Santa Cruz ten minutes before seven. At the same time a party consisting of 180 sappers, carrying bags containing hay, will move out of the second parallel, covered by the fire of the 83rd regiment, formed in the second parallel, upon the works of the place, which bags are to be thrown into the ditch, so as to enable the troops to descend the counterscarp to the attack of the breach: they are to be followed immediately by the storming party of the great breach, which is to consist of the troops of

furd. To the Portuguese brigade, under general Pack, was assigned the duty of making a diversion, or false attack, on the outwork of San Jago, and the convent of Caridade, on the northern face of the works.\*

As the cathedral bell tolled seven o'clock, the moon at the same moment rising, both divisions moved simultaneously to the points of attack, each preceded by its respective forlorn hope and stormers, and the sappers carrying the ladders and bags filled with hay. The forlorn hope of the third division was led by lieutenant Mackie, of the 88th; and its storming party, consisting of the major-general M'Kinnon's brigade. Major-general M'Kinnon's brigade is to be formed in the first parallel, ready to move up to the breach immediately in rear of the sappers with bags. The storming-party of the great breach must be provided with six scaling ladders twelve feet each long, and with ten axes. The ditch must likewise be entered by a column on the left of the great breach, consisting of three companies of the 95th regiment, which are to issue from the right of the convent of St. Francisco. This column will be provided with three ladders, twelve feet long, with which they are to descend into the ditch, at a point which will be pointed out to them by lieutenant Wright: on descending into the ditch, they are to turn to their right, and to proceed towards the main breach. Another column, consisting of major-general Vandeleur's brigade, will issue out from the left of the convent of St. Francisco, and are to attack the breach to the left of the main breach; this column must have twelve ladders, each twelve feet long, with which they are to descend into the ditch, at a point which will be shown them by captain Ellicombe. On arriving in the ditch, they are to turn to the left, to storm the breach in the fausse-braie on the left of the small ravelin, and thence to the breach in the tower of the body of the place; as soon as this body will have reached the top of the breach in the fausse-braie wall, a detachment of five companies are to be sent to the right, to cover the attack of major-general M'Kinnon's brigade by the principal breach; and as soon as they have reached the top of the tower, they are to turn to their right, and communicate with the rampart of the main breach; as soon as this communication can be established, endeavour should be made to open the gate of Salamanca. The Portuguese brigade in the 3rd division, will be formed in the communication to the first parallel, and behind the hill of St. Francisco (Upper Teson), and will move up to the entrance of the second parallel, ready to support major-general M'Kinnon's brigade. Colonel Barnard's brigade will be formed behind the convent of St. Francisco, ready to support major-general Vandeleur's brigade: all these columns will have detached parties especially appointed to keep up a fire on the defences during these operations. The men ladders, and axes, and bags, must not have their arms; those who are to storm must not fire. Brigadier-general Pack, with his brigade, will make a false attack upon the outwork of the gate of St. Jago, and upon the works towards La Caridade. The different regiments and brigades to receive ladders, are to send parties to the engineers' depot to receive them, three men for each ladder. "WELLINGTON."



light companies of the division, by major Manners, of the 74th. Lieutenant Gurwood led the forlorn hope of the light division, and major Napier the 300 volunteers, constituting the stormers of that division. The supporting columns of each division followed close.\*

As soon as the sappers had thrown the bags into the ditch, so as to reduce its depth from fourteen feet to eight feet, the forlorn hope and stormers of the third division jumped down amidst a crash of shells and combustibles which garnished, or had been spread over the base and the summit of the breach. Undismayed by the terrific sight and sound, the assailants rushed forward to the breach; and at the same moment every gun upon the ramparts that could bear upon the spot, opened a concentric fire with one tremendous roar.

A battalion of the 5th, under major Ridge, and a wing of the 94th, under colonel Campbell, which had been directed to move forward for the purpose of clearing away any obstacle that might interrupt the advance of the main storming party, descending the counterscarp by ropes, and gaining the breach unobserved, rushed up, and cutting down the artillery-men, impetuously carried everything before them, notwithstanding the difficulties sustained by the explosion of bombs and grenades rolled down upon them from the summit of the breach, and of the bags of powder deposited among the slopes of its ruins, and the destructive force of the grape from the two guns planted on the summit. So rapid had been their movements, that when they appeared on the top of the breach, they were fired at by their countrymen outside the walls, from the supposition that they were the enemy defending the breach. At this moment, Mackinnon's brigade, consisting of the 45th, 74th, and 88th, appeared. The enemy now being driven from

the opening, retired behind the retrenchment, which isolated the breach, and cut it off from the rampart by a perpendicular descent of sixteen feet, and defended by traverses thrown up on each side of the retrenchment. Here, and from the neighbouring houses, the foe plied the assailants with an enfilade musketry fire of terrible rapidity and destruction. But the third division maintained the terrible struggle with desperate resolution. At the moment that both sides of the retrenchment were turned, the stormers of the light division having carried the lesser breach, which was not intrenched, at the point of the bayonet, and Pack's brigade having converted its false attack into a real one, a shout of victory was raised by the 43rd and 95th regiments, who, rushing along the ramparts to the right and left, appeared in sight. The garrison thus threatened in its rear, and the flanks of the retrenchment of the great breach being at the same moment carried by the third division, fled in confusion; concealing themselves in the houses, and supplicating that mercy to which, by the laws of war, they had forfeited all title, but which was nobly granted them by their generous conquerors. The fortress was now won; and the garrison, consisting of 80 officers and 1,700 men, was surrendered by the governor. A scene of wild disorder ensued. The victors, preceded by Spaniards as guides to conduct them to the species of plunder they most coveted, committed much excess during the night. Next morning, a part of the covering force being marched into the town, the victors were marched out; and never could masquerade, in point of costume and grotesque figures, rival the marauding characters. Hams, loaves, and joints of meat garnished the bayonets of some regiments; cinctures of eighteen or twenty pairs of shoes encircled the waists of some

make assurance doubly sure; and more taking leave of their wives and children. This last was an affecting sight, but not so much so as might be expected, because the women, from long habit, were accustomed to scenes of danger, and the order for their husbands to march against the enemy was in their eyes tantamount to a victory; and as the soldier seldom returned without plunder of some sort, the painful suspense which his absence caused was made up by the gaiety which his return was certain to be productive of; or, if unfortunately he happened to fall, his place was sure to be supplied by some one of the company to which he belonged, so that the women of our army had little cause of alarm on that head. The worst that could happen to them was the chance of being in a state of widowhood for a week!"

\* The following extract from the *Reminiscences of a Subaltern*, shows the cool bravery with which the soldiers prepared for the attack:—"Our commanding officer announcing to us that our division was directed to carry the grand breach, the soldiers listened to the communication with silent earnestness, and immediately began to disencumber themselves of their knapsacks, which were placed in order by companies, and a guard set over them; each man then began to arrange himself for the combat, in such manner as his fancy or the moment would admit of; some by lowering their cartridge boxes, others by turning theirs to the front, in order that they might the more conveniently make use of them; others unclasping their stocks, or opening their shirt collars, and others oiling their bayonets; then again, others screwing in flints, to



soldiers; half-a-dozen silk or satin gowns often surmounted the tattered uniform of others. "While marching out to our cantonments," says the lively author of the *Adventures in the Rifle Brigade*, "lord Wellington entering the city gate as we passed through it, inquired of the officer of the leading company what regiment it was; for there was scarcely a vestige of uniform among the men; some of them being dressed in Frenchmen's coats; some in white breeches and huge jack boots; some with cocked hats and queues; most of their swords were fixed in their rifles, and stuck full of hams, tongues, and loaves of bread; and not a few carrying bird-cages. There never was a better masked corps."

Thus was Ciudad Rodrigo, which had baffled, for twenty-five days, all the efforts of Massena in the summer season, and occupied by but a weak garrison, reduced by lord Wellington, in the depth of winter, in eleven days; but the prize, as time did not allow the observance of the regular siege process of the reduction of the counterscarp, being pressed by the advance of the enemy in strength for the relief of the place, had been won at the cost of near 1,100 men; three officers and seventy-seven privates having been killed, and twenty-four officers and 500 men wounded during the siege; and six officers and 140 privates killed, and sixty officers and 500 men wounded in the assault. Among the slain were generals Craufurd\* and Mackinnon; the former received his death in the advance to the lesser breach, the latter was blown up by the explosion of an expense magazine in the ditch of the retrenchment. They were both buried in the respective breaches they attacked. The loss of the garrison did not amount to 300 men and officers during the siege and the assault. One hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, forty-four of which constituted Marmont's battering train, and an immense quantity of arms and ammunition, fell into the hands of the captors. In the words of the author of *Military Memoirs*, "The capture of Ciudad

Rodrigo was, indeed, a very proud achievement—most honourable to all the officers and troops employed; and an enterprise so secretly prepared for, so suddenly commenced, and so brilliantly concluded, that it not only astonished the French marshals, —Marmont, who was advancing to its relief with 60,000 men, being so confident in his strength, that in his letter to Berthier, dated January 16th, he bade him 'expect events, as fortunate as they would be glorious for France, in Spain,'—but all those Frenchified politicians at home, to whom it was a constant and a mean delight to disparage the fame of Wellington, and the glory of the British arms."

During the assault, an event occurred deserving commemoration. The men who had been left in guard over the baggage of the 3rd division, not being able to withstand the temptation, as soon as they heard the first shot fired, joined their companions; when the marauders who infested the camp, attempting to plunder, the women of the division defended their charge with so much spirit, that the varlets were glad to sheer off, and leave the heroines in possession of the field.

Among the many incidents and hair-breadth escapes that occurred during the storm, was that which occurred to lieutenant Faris of the 88th, or Connaught rangers. Being separated from his regiment, he found himself opposed to a French soldier. The Frenchman fired at, and wounding Faris in the thigh, made a desperate push with the bayonet at his body, but Faris parrying the blow, the bayonet lodged only in his leg. He immediately sprang forward, and seizing the Frenchman by the collar, a struggle of the most nervous kind took place. In the contest, they both lost their caps, and were so entangled with each other, that their weapons were of no avail. At last Faris disengaging himself from the Frenchman, pushed him back, and before he could recover himself, laid his head open nearly to the chin. With the force of the blow, his

\* General Craufurd entered the army at an early age, and had seen much and varied service. In the short interval of peace, he visited the Continent to improve himself in the scientific branches of his profession, and afterwards served in two Indian campaigns under lord Cornwallis. After some unimportant employments on the Continent, he joined the disgraceful expedition against Buenos Ayres, and subsequently served with the army of sir John Moore, in command of the light brigade. After the retreat, he joined sir Arthur Wellesley the morning after Talavera, and

became most deservedly a favourite of that commander. Craufurd's military talents are admitted to have been of the first order. An enthusiast regarding martial glory, he sought every opportunity to distinguish himself. In the affair of the Coa—at Busaco and Fuentes d'Onor, he established an undying reputation. Wellington's despatch contained his well-earned eulogy—and the breach before which he fell was fitly chosen as a last resting-place for the fearless leader of the gallant light brigade.—Maxwell's *Victories of Wellington*.



sword-blade, a heavy soft ill-made one, was completely doubled up, and crimsoned to the hilt.

When the news of the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo reached England, a universal joy was diffused throughout all ranks. As a tribute of his country's gratitude, the English general was created earl of Wellington, and a pension of £2,000 a-year was settled on him. By the Spanish cortes he was

created duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, with a pension of £5,000 a-year; and by the Portuguese government marques of Torres Vedras, with a like pension; but with that magnanimous disinterestedness that distinguished his career throughout the arduous struggle, he declined to accept the foreign pecuniary rewards, desiring them to be applied to the respective emergencies of each state.

### THE THIRD SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF BADAJOS.

RODRIGO having been rendered thoroughly defensible, and, on March 5th, delivered over to the Spaniards under the command of Castaños, the captain-general of the province, the allied army commenced its march for the Alemtejo. On the 11th the troops were disposed in convenient cantonments on the frontier of Spanish Estremadura. Great exertions had been making for some time, and with the greatest privacy, for undertaking the third siege of Badajos.\*

The necessary matériel having been collected, and all preparations completed by the 15th of March, on the following day a pontoon and two flying-bridges were thrown across the Guadiana, and the 3rd, 4th, and light divisions, under generals Picton, Colville, and lieutenant-colonel Barnard, crossed and invested Badajos. The covering army, under Hill and Graham, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, 6th, and 7th divisions, and the cavalry, with the Portuguese, under general Hamilton, occupied positions at Llerena, Merida, and Almendralejos; the one to observe Soult's movements, and the other to prevent a junction between that marshal and Marmont.

On the night of the 17th, in the midst of rain and storm, 1,800 men broke ground 160 yards distant from the Picurina fort. The tempest stifled the sound of their axes, but as soon as the morning dawned, and rendered them visible to the garrison, the

\* "The town of Badajos contains a population of about 16,000, and, within the space of thirteen months, experienced the miseries attendant upon a state of siege three several times. The first was undertaken by lord Beresford, towards the end of April, 1811, who was obliged to abandon operations by Soult advancing to its relief, and which led to the battle of Albuera on the 16th of May. The second siege was by lord Wellington in person, who, after the battle of Fuentes d'Onor, directed his steps towards the south with a portion of the allied army. Operations commenced on the 30th of May, and con-

stillness of the scene was broken by conflicting peals of artillery and musketry.

On the 19th, while the working parties were busily engaged, a joint sortie from the town and fort, consisting of 1,500 infantry and cavalry, entered the trenches; but the men rallying, and being assisted by the covering-party, the enemy was vigorously charged and repulsed, being able to do no other damage than fill up a small portion of the parallel, and carry off 200 trenching-tools. The loss of the assailants in this affair amounted to 300 men, that of the English to 150. This casualty had been occasioned by the following circumstance. The French cavalry forming two parties, had a sham-fight, and the smaller party pretending to flee, and answering in Portuguese to the challenges of the English sentries, were allowed to gallop to the engineers' park of artillery.

From the commencement of the siege the weather had been very unfavourable, the rain falling in incessant torrents, not only occasioning difficulty and delay in the formation of the trenches and the erection of the batteries, but exposing the troops to great hardships. The trenches were knee-deep in mud and rain, the pontoon-bridge was swept away, and the flying-bridges were worked with so great difficulty, that at one time fear was entertained that the siege must be raised, from the inability of the army being

finued till the 10th of June, when the siege was again abandoned; Soult having a second time advanced in combined operation with the army of Marmont from the north. The allies continued the blockade of the town till the 17th, when they recrossed the Guadiana, and took up a position on the Caya. The third siege, again undertaken by lord Wellington in person, was begun on the 17th of March, 1812, and continued without interruption till the 6th of April, when it fell by assault, after a most determined and gallant resistance on the part of the French."—Mackie.





R. W. Terry.



J. J. Powell.

STORMING OF BADAJOZ.



supplied with provisions and military stores. But the weather clearing up, the batteries were completed during the night of the 24th, and on the forenoon of the following day they began to play on the works. At ten o'clock of that night, an assault being made on the Picurina fort by 500 men of the 3rd division, under major-general Kempt, the fort was boldly escaladed and captured, and its garrison either slain or taken, but with the loss of 4 officers and 50 men killed, and 15 officers and 250 men wounded, among the resolute assailants.

By the capture of Picurina the besiegers were enabled to push on the second parallel, and complete the breaching-batteries. After five days' firing, two breaches were reported practicable; one in the bastion of La Trinidad, and the other in that of Santa Maria. But lord Wellington observing, on a close reconnaissance, that they were defended by formidable interior retrenchments, directed a third breach to be effected, so that the retrenchments might be turned; which breach, by being exposed to the guns of all the batteries, was effected in twenty-four hours. In the mean time formidable preparations had been made by the garrison to repel the assault. Every means that ingenuity could devise to baffle the assailants were employed in accumulated profusion. The breaches had been retrenched, and secured by interior defences, and deep intrenchments covered by loopholed walls. A chevaux-de-frize, consisting of a massive beam, stuck full of double-edged pointed sword blades, stretched across the ramparts, and its extremities were mortised into the stonework of the parapet. Loose planks, studded with spikes harrow-wise, covered the slopes of the breaches, and lighted shells were ready to be thrown down from the crests. At the foot of the breach sixty fourteen-inch shells, communicating with hoses, and embedded in the earth, were placed ready for explosion; and round the breach a deep trench was cut in the ramparts, which was planted full of muskets with fixed bayonets, fixed perpendicularly and firmly in the earth up to the locks. The

summits of the walls were garnished with huge masses of stones, ponderous logs of wood, cart-wheels, barrels with tarred straw, bags of powder, live shells, grenades, and every species of burning composition and destructive missiles were ready to be hurled down on the assailants. On the flanks of each curtain batteries were charged to the muzzle with grape and case-shot, and mortars doubly loaded with grenades. The trenches were defended by a multitude of men ranged in an amphitheatrical manner, tier above tier, and by the side of each man lay three loaded firelocks, with supernumerary men ready to reload them as they were discharged on the assailants. Thus was Badajos fortified and defended, so as to be without parallel in the history of sieges and military defences. To overcome these terrible defences, and, as an eye-witness terms them, "hellish engines" of destruction, the most heroic courage and the most persevering fortitude were requisite. These truly great military qualifications were eminently displayed by the captors of Badajos, and they were proportionately successful.

As at this period of the siege, information was brought that Soult was rapidly advancing to the relief of the place, and that Marmont was making menacing demonstrations on the frontier of Beira, lord Wellington determined to march and deliver battle to the first-mentioned marshal, leaving 10,000 men to blockade the place; but reconnoitring the breaches on the 6th of April, and finding that in the curtain there was a practicable breach, he ordered the preparations for the assault on that night. The stern orders issued, directed, with awful distinctness,— "The fort of Badajos is to be attacked at ten o'clock this night. The attack must be made at three points; the castle, the face of the bastion of La Trinidad and the flank of the bastion of Santa Maria, and on the Paredelas and the bastion of San Vicente, on the southern side of the town. The attack of the castle is to be made by escalade, that of the two bastions by the storm of the breaches."\* The attacks on the castle and

the breaching batteries ceasing to batter, and the commencement of the assault, to cover the front of the breaches with harrows and crow's-feet, and to fix a chevaux-de-frize of sword blades on their summits.] 2. The attack must be made on three points; the castle, the face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the flank of the bastion of Santa Maria. 3. The attack of the castle to be by escalade; that of the two bastions by the storm of the breaches. 4. The troops for the storm of the castle, consisting of the 3rd divi-

\* The memorandum for the attack<sup>1</sup> was as follows:— 1. The fort of Badajos is to be attacked at 10 o'clock this night. [The time originally named was half-past seven, being immediately after dusk, but it was subsequently changed to ten, in consequence of the arrangements being found to require that delay. The garrison took advantage of the interval between

<sup>1</sup> The parts in the smaller print are alterations and explanations made subsequent to the original order for the attack



San Vicente were intended as feints to divert the attention of the garrison from the breaches.

The following was the order of attack:— Third division, lieutenant-general Picton, to escalate the castle. Fourth division, major-general the honourable C. Colville; light division, lieutenant-colonel Barnard, 95th regiment, to storm the breaches in the bastions of La Trinidad and Santa Maria, and sion of infantry, should come out from the right of the first parallel at a little before ten o'clock. 5. They should cross the river Rivillas below the broken bridge over that river, and attack that part of the castle which is on the right, looking from the trenches and the rear of the great battery constructed by the enemy to fire on the bastion of La Trinidad. 6. Having arrived within the castle, and having secured the possession of it, parties must be sent to the left along the rampart, to fall on the rear of those defending the great breach, in the bastion of La Trinidad, and to communicate with the right of the attack on that bastion.

It is recommended that the attack of the 3rd division should be kept clear of the bastion of San Antonio, at least till the castle which is above and commands the bastion, shall be carried.

7. The troops for this attack must have all the long ladders in the engineers' park, and six of the lengths of the engineers' ladders. They must be attended by twelve carpenters with axes, and six miners with crowbars, &c. 8. The 4th division, with the exception of the covering party in the trenches, must make the attack on the face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the light division on the flank of the bastion of Santa Maria. 9. These two divisions must parade in close columns at nine o'clock. The light division, with the left in front, the 4th division with its advanced guard, with the left in front; the remainder with the right in front. The 4th division must be on the right of the little stream, near the picket of the 4th division, and the light division must have the river on their right.

This arrangement of the columns is made in order that the light division may extend along the ramparts to the left; and that the 4th division, with the exception of the advanced guard, which is to communicate by its left with the light division, might extend along the ramparts to the right. It may be necessary, however, for these two divisions mutually to support each other, and attention must in this case be paid to the formations.

10. The light division must throw 100 men forward into the quarries, close to the covered way of the bastion of Santa Maria, who, as soon as the garrison are distributed, must keep down by their fire the fire from the face of the bastion of Santa Maria, and that from the covered way. 11. The advance of both divisions must consist of 500 men from each, attended by twelve ladders; and the men of the storming party should carry sacks filled with light materials, to be thrown into the ditch, to enable the troops to descend into it. Care must be taken that these bags are not thrown into the covered way. 12. The advance of the light division must precede that of the 4th division; and both must keep as near the inundation as they possibly can. 13. The advance of both divisions must be formed into firing parties and storming parties. The firing parties must be spread along the crest of the glacis, to keep down the fire of

in the curtain connected therewith between fort Pardeleras and the castle. Fifth division, lieutenant-general Leith, to attack fort Pardeleras, and to escalate the walls of Badajos near the western gate. Portuguese division, brigadier-general Power, to storm the bridge over the Guadiana, and attack the works on the right bank of the river. Of these splendid troops, now all life and daring, and desperately resolute to force their way on the enemy; while the men of the storming party, who carry bags, will enter the covered way, at the *place d'armes*, under the breached face of the bastion of La Trinidad; those attached to the 4th division on its right, those to the light division on its left, looking from the trenches or the camp.

No. 13 will run thus:—After the words, "while the men of the storming party, who carry bags, will enter the covered way," insert, "thereof the light division, at the *place d'armes* on the left, looking from camp, of the unfinished ravelin; those of the 4th division, on the right of that ravelin, at the *place d'armes*, under the breached face of the bastion of La Trinidad."

14. The storming party of the advance of the light division will then descend into the ditch, and turning to the left, storm the breach on the flank of the bastion of Santa Maria, while the storming party of the 4th division will likewise descend into the ditch, and storm the breach in the face of the bastion of La Trinidad. The firing parties are to follow immediately in the rear of their respective storming parties.

Major-general Colville will observe that a part of the advance of the 4th division must be allotted to storm the new breach in the curtain.

15. The heads of the two divisions will follow their advanced guards, keeping nearly together, but they will not advance beyond the shelter afforded by the quarries on the left of the road, till they shall have seen the heads of the advanced guards ascending the breaches: they will then move forward to the storm in double-quick time.

The place here pointed out may be too distant. The heads of the columns should be brought as near as they can without being exposed to fire.

16. If the light division should find the bastion of Santa Maria intrenched, they will turn the right of the intrenchment, by moving along the parapet of the bastion. The 4th division will do the same by an intrenchment which appears on the left face, looking from the trenches of the bastion of La Trinidad. 17. The light division, as soon as they are in possession of the rampart of Santa Maria, are to turn to their left, and to proceed along the rampart to their left, keeping always a reserve at the breach. 18. The advanced guard of the 4th division are to turn to their left, and to keep up the communication with the light division. The 4th division are to turn to their right, and to communicate with the 3rd division, by the bastion of San Pedro, and the dense bastion of San Antonio, taking care to keep a reserve at the bastion of La Trinidad. 19. Each (the 4th and light) division must leave 1,000 men in reserve in the quarries.

It will be necessary for the commanding officer of the light division to attend to the ditch on his left, as he makes his attack. He should post a detachment in the ditch, towards the salient angle of the bastion of Santa Maria, so as to be covered by the angle from the fire of the next bastion on its left, looking from the trenches.



this fearful night, through the terrible defences, and the appalling obstacles that opposed their progress, how few were living in a few hours!

As the deep bell of the cathedral of St. John's struck ten, the night being dark and gloomy, and not a sound audible but the chirping of the field-cricket, the croaking of the frogs, and the softened footfall of the assailants the forlorn hopes and storming parties of the light and fourth divisions stepped out of the trenches, closely followed by their supporting columns. On reaching the brink of the ditch, countless fire-balls thrown from the town betrayed the position of the assailants, and rendered their movements distinctly visible by the vivid light they cast around. Immediately a line of levelled muskets, and every gun that could be brought to bear upon the spot, vomited forth a rapid and murderous fire. Amid the pale and leaden hue that rose thickly into the air, the assailants cheered, and, bags filled with hay being thrown into the ditch, the ladders were lowered, and the forlorn hopes and storming parties had scarcely descended into the ditch, when suddenly a broad bright flame flashed upwards, a crash like thunder ensued, and in

20. The 4th division must endeavour to get open the gate of La Trinidad; the light division must do the same by the gate called Puerto del Pila. 21. The soldiers must leave their knapsacks in camp. 22. In order to aid these operations, the howitzers in No. 4 are to open a fire upon the batteries constructed by the enemy to fire upon the breach, as soon as the officers shall observe that the enemy are aware of the attack, which they must continue till they see that the 3rd division are in possession of the castle.

Some signal must be arranged between the commanding officer of the artillery and the officer who shall command the attack on the castle, for ceasing the fire in No. 4.

23. The commanding officer in the trenches is to attack the ravelin of San Roque with 200 of the covering party, moving from the right of the second parallel and round the right of the ravelin, looking from the trenches, and attacking the barriers and gates of communication between the ravelin and the bridge; while 200 men, likewise of the covering party, will rush from the right of the sap into the salient angle of the covered way of the ravelin, and keep up a fire on its faces. These should not advance from the sap till the party to attack the gorge of the ravelin shall have turned it. That which will move into the covered way on the right of the ravelin looking from the trenches, ought not to proceed further down than the angle formed by the face and flank.

It would be better that this attack should move from the right of the sap. The commanding officer in the trenches must begin it as soon as he shall observe that the attack of the 3rd division on the castle is perceived by the enemy.

24. The remainder of the covering party to be a

an instant 400 of the foremost of the assailants were blown to atoms, by the explosion of hundreds of shells, grenades, fougasses, powder-bags, and barrels, which had been laid in the ditch, throwing out a blaze that imparted to its surface the appearance of vomiting fire. Though the destruction was terrific and the confusion great, undismayed the supporting columns rushed down into the fiery gulf, reckless of the danger and the depth of the ditch; the leading platoons of the fusileer brigade unhappily leaping into a part of the ditch deep in mud, and overflowed with water, sunk in the mire, and disappeared in an instant. A murderous scene now ensued. Incessant explosions of shells, grenades, fougasses, and other combustibles of every kind of burning composition, accompanied with a withering fire of musketry and artillery, from the whole front of the parapet and defences, plied with terrible rapidity and effect, produced a scene of the most frightful carnage and confusion. Yet no pause occurred in the attack. The fourth division pressed boldly up a ruinous and unfinished ravelin, mistaking it for the breach, and were here joined by the head of the light division. These corps, finding that a difficult descent separated them from the reserve in the trenches. The working parties in the trenches are to join their regiments at half-past seven o'clock. Twelve carpenters with axes, and ten miners with crowbars, must be sent with each (the 4th and light) division. A party of one officer and twenty artillerymen must be with each division. 25. The 5th division must be formed, one brigade on the ground occupied by the 48th regiment, one brigade on the Sierra del Viento, and one brigade in the low grounds extending to the Guadiana, now occupied by pickets of the light division. 26. The pickets of the brigades on the Sierra del Viento, and that on the low grounds towards the Guadiana, should endeavour to alarm the enemy during the attack by firing at the Pardelera, and at the river in the covered way of the works towards the Guadiana.

A plan has been settled with lieutenant-general Leith for an attempt to be made to escalate the bastion of San Vicente, or the curtain between that bastion and the bridge, if circumstances should permit. The commanding officer of the light division will attend to this. General Power will likewise make a false attack on the tête-de-pont.

27. The commander of the forces particularly requests the general officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the commanding officers of regiments, and the officers commanding companies, to impress upon their men the necessity of keeping together, and forming as a military body after the storm, and during the night. Not only the success of the operation, and the honour of the army, but their own individual safety, depend upon their being in a situation to repel any attack by the enemy, and to overcome all resistance which they may be inclined to make, till the garrison are completely subdued.

WELLINGTON.



breach, after having sustained a hot fire, were led by their officers, with the most heroic devotion, to the true point of attack. But on gaining the summit of the main breach, an impassable barrier, the formidable and immovable chevaux-de-frize, presented itself. Nowise daunted, officers and men in fast succession rushed up the ruins into the breach, but "the boldest hearts, the strongest arms" were all unavailable; the gallant groups all fell slain or disabled upon the ruins.

"The tumult was now as if the very earth had been rent asunder, and its central fires were burning upwards uncontrolled." Amidst the roar and red flashes of artillery, the rattle and crash of musketry, the explosion of shells and grenades, rockets bursting on all sides, the blazing of cressets and fire-balls, and the comet-like fuses of the bombs, which spread around a dazzling light, a terrible illumination, intermingled every now and then with lurid or utter darkness; the groans and shrieks of the dying and wounded added to the horror of the scene. To aggravate the effect of the horrific spectacle, the taunting Frenchmen, secure and unharmed behind impenetrable defences, while hurling the engines of death and destruction on their opponents, invited them, in derision, to enter Badajos. After two hours' unavailing efforts, during which the heroic officers, sometimes followed by a few soldiers, sometimes by many, repeatedly rushed up the breach, or clustered near the unfinished ravelin and the traverses in the ditch, in hopes to force an entrance, disdaining to retreat, though unable to advance, and consequently "met confused and bloody deaths." A staff-officer was dispatched to lord Wellington, who was posted in front of the tête-de-pont that defends the great stone bridge across the Guadiana, to apprise him that 2,000 men had fallen in the breaches, and that the troops were without leaders. At the same moment that this communication was brought from the breaches, another staff-officer rode up with tidings that the third division was in possession of the castle. Orders were sent to Picton to retain his position at all hazards until assistance was sent, and to the officers in command at the breaches to withdraw the remnants of the divisions, to be reorganized for a fresh assault as soon as day should dawn.

While the uproar and carnage had been raging in the breaches, the third and fifth divisions met with nearly equal difficulty and

danger at the castle and the San Vicente bastion. The third division having been obliged, from the circumstance of a lighted carcass having fallen close to it, and discovering its array, to begin the attack half-an-hour before the appointed time; rushing up the rugged steep to the foot of the castle-walls, raised, under a destructive fire, their ladders against the wall; but they were no sooner planted, than they were grappled by the garrison with hooked pikes of enormous length, and thrown down with the men who had mounted on them; at the same moment stones, crushing logs of wood, bars of iron, loaded shells, and other destructive missiles, with which the tops of the walls were garnished, were hurled down on the heads of the assailants. Some of the ladders also broke with the weight of the troops that, in their eager haste to meet the foe, swarmed upon them, and precipitated the men who had mounted them upon the bayonets of their comrades below. The heroic troops however persevered, but all who first ascended fell by musketry or the bayonet. But, undaunted by the terrific reception they met, fresh assailants swarmed round the feet of the ladders, eager to ascend, but all in vain; the assault seemed hopeless. Many men of the 45th and Pakenham's brigade, though they reached the top of the rampart, were thrown down wounded. Receding a few paces, the assailants reformed, and Picton, who had been wounded in the early part of the assault, directing ladders to be placed in an embrasure where the wall was lower, lieutenant-colonel Ridge, of the 5th fusiliers, and a German officer, of the name of Girsewald, caught up the ladders, and planting them against the walls, mounted, followed by their men. Having gained a footing, a fierce contest ensued between the combatants, and the ground was, foot by foot, won and lost, until, after a fierce contest of an hour, the intrepidity of the assailants surmounted every obstacle, and drove the enemy from his post, when in a moment the castle was won, its garrison escaping through the sally-port. Had not the castle-gate been bricked up, the victors would have marched down on the rear of the defenders of the breaches.

The fifth division was no less successful; but the party carrying the scaling-ladders having missed its way, the attack on that side of the town was not begun until eleven o'clock. Having effected an escalade, they were sweeping round the rampart, when a vague alarm seized the leading files, from a



port-fire that had been thrown away by a retreating gunner; on the cry of "a mine," the men who had so bravely won the bastion, rushed tumultuously back on a detachment of the 38th, which had been formed on the rampart as a reserve. With that reserve general Walker advanced against the pursuers, and putting them to flight, proceeded with the re-formed battalions through the town towards the breaches; but in his progress through the streets, which were brilliantly illuminated, was fired on by the Spaniards from under the doors and through the wickets of the houses. The governor, now finding the town in the possession of the assailants, retired with the garrison into fort San Christoval, which communicates with the town by a bridge of twenty-eight arches, and since the last siege had been strongly fortified, but at daylight of the following morning surrendered to the victors. Thus "Badajos, so fiercely fought, so terribly won, so dreadful in all its circumstances, that posterity can scarcely be expected to credit the tale," fell into the power of the British general, after nineteen days' siege, of which only eleven were with open trenches. Never, since the invention of gunpowder, had its blasting terrors been so awfully displayed. Never, in the annals of war, had more heroic courage been displayed in assault, or more skill been exhibited in defence. It is worthy of observation, that this formidable place was not carried by the assault at the breaches, but by escalade at two distant points, where the defences were entire. The walls of the castle rose from 18 to 24 feet, and it was deemed secure from attack. The bastion of San Vicente had an escarpe wall 20 feet perpendicular, and the troops having ascended this, had yet 12 feet, which inclined at an angle to an old parapet, to surmount by scrambling. The breach in the curtain was never attempted; the guides having been probably killed, or the way missed, as those to the trenches of La Trinidad and Santa Maria were at first. But the conquest had been purchased at a great price, the captors having sustained a loss of 5,000 men and officers during the siege and in the assault; in the latter, 59 officers and 744 men being killed, and 258 officers and 2,600 men wounded. About 600 men and officers fell in the escalade of San Vicente, as many at the castle, and more than 2,000 at the breaches. The 43rd regiment left 22 officers and 300 men in the breach and ditch, and every other regiment

suffered in the like proportion. How deadly the strife had been at the breaches appears from the fact, that the 43rd and 52nd regiments of the light division alone lost more men than the seven regiments of the 3rd division engaged at the castle. Let the reader picture to himself this frightful carnage, taking place in the space of less than 100 square yards; let him consider that for hours the destruction was endured without shrinking, and that the town was won at last,—he must admit that a British army bears with it an awful power. "When the extent of the night's havoc was made known to the English general, the firmness of his nature gave way for a moment, and the pride of conquest yielded to a passionate burst for the loss of his gallant soldiers." But let it be recollected that that havoc was occasioned by his having had neither the means nor the time to reduce the fortress by a regular system of attack, and therefore he was obliged by a bold effort to make himself master of it, before the French generals could advance to its relief. In the dreadful assault of Badajos, as the author of *The War in the Peninsula* has emphatically said, "the crimes of politicians were atoned for by the blood of the troops." A rebuke covertly uttered by the victorious general himself, in a letter to general Murray: "I trust," says he, "that future armies will be properly equipped for sieges."

The town being won, the soldiers' herosim was tarnished with wild and desperate licentiousness, rapine, and confusion. Hosts of drunken soldiers and women, followers of the camp, the lower classes of the inhabitants of the town and the surrounding neighbourhood, together with some of the vanquished garrison, who had concealed themselves, made one common cause in the commission of violence, plunder, and destruction, in the wildest orgies, and the most frantic excess. "Groans and piteous lamentations resounded for two nights and days in the streets of Badajos: youth and age, the noblesse and the beggar, were involved in one common ruin; and more than one officer perished by the bullets and bayonets of the very men whom they had but a few hours before led to the assault, in the endeavours to restrain them from the commission of the enormities, to which their maddened state of intoxication excited them.\*

\* The horrid custom of giving up a city taken by assault to the licentiousness and violence of the captors, though regarded from time immemorial as



"Before six o'clock on the morning of the assault, all organization among the assaulting columns had ceased, and a scene of plunder and cruelty, that it would be difficult to parallel, took place. The army, so fine and effective, of the preceding day, was now transformed into a vast band of brigands. The horde of Spaniards, as well as of Portuguese women and men, that now eagerly sought for admission to plunder, nearly augmented the number of brigands to what the assailing army had been before the assault; and it may with truth be said, that nearly 20,000 armed ruffians were let loose upon the ill-fated inhabitants of this devoted city. These people were under no restraint, and soon became so intoxicated, that they lost all control of their actions. In the first burst of violence, all the wine and spirit stores were burst open by those infuriated and licentious marauders. Casks of the choicest wines and brandy were dragged into the streets, and their heads stove in, or the casks otherwise broken, so that the liquor flowed down the gutters in streams. The inhabitants were compelled, at the point of the bayonet, to bear bales of plunder, taken from their own houses, and deposit them in the camp, under a guard of soldiers' wives. The stately gravity with which the Spaniards went through their

a privilege, is, as the author of *The Military Memoirs of the Duke*, says, "deeply dishonourable to the profession of arms, and as deeply injurious to good discipline." "There is nothing," as the same admirable writer observes, "more deeply humiliating to man, or more mortifying to military pride, than to find noble qualities and base passions in close alliance." To put an end to the horrid custom, "the moral power of a nation's voice," is, as the same humane authority adds, "necessary; no other influence will be effective."

\* The fearful scenes of rapine and riot, and the dreadful outrages which ensued the storm, and continued for one day and two nights, may be imagined from the following dismal portrait of the evening of the day after the place had been carried:—"The streets," says an eye-witness, "were heaped with the drunken and the dead. The soldiery were in a state of furious intoxication, and the town in terrible confusion; on every side frightful tokens of military licence met the eye. One street, as I approached the castle, was almost choked up with broken furniture, for the houses had been gutted from the cellar to the garret, the partitions torn down, and even the beds ripped and scattered to the winds, in the hope that gold might be found concealed. A convent at the end of the strada of St. John was in flames; and I saw more than one wretched nun in the arms of a drunken soldier. Further on the confusion seemed greater. Brandy and wine casks were rolled out before the stores; some were full, some half drunk, but were staved in mere wantonness, and the liquors

work, often dressed in hat and plumes, followed by our raggamuffin soldiers, was at times laughable. The following day (April 8th), was a fearful one; the men had been drunk and reckless to so dreadful an extent, that no person's life was safe; they even fired on their own comrades.\* To put a stop to so frightful a scene, in the course of that day, parties from those regiments that had least participated in the assault, were ordered into the town, to collect the hordes of stragglers that filled the streets, but they becoming infected by the contagion, increased the disorder. At length, a brigade of troops was marched into the city, and were directed to stand by their arms while any of the marauders remained; the provost-marshal attached to each division were directed to use their authority. Gibbets and triangles were in consequence erected, and many men were flogged before submission was obtained. Towards evening tranquillity was restored. Early on the morning of the 9th, the auction for the sale of the plunder began; and to it a vast concourse of Spaniards from the neighbouring valleys thronged. Of the produce of the spoil, some men realised upwards of 1,000 dollars."

When the fury of the sack had abated, and the fearful scene of rapine and riot had

running through the kennel. Many a harrowing scream saluted the ear of the passer-by; many a female supplication was heard asking in vain for mercy. How could it be otherwise, when it is remembered, that twenty thousand furious and licentious madmen were loosed upon an immense population, among which many of the loveliest women upon earth might be found? All within that devoted city was at the disposal of an infuriated army, over whom, for the time, control was lost, aided by an infamous collection of camp followers, who were, if possible, more sanguinary and pitiless even than those who had survived the storm. It is useless to dwell upon a scene from which the heart revolts. Few females in this beautiful town were saved that night from insult; the noblest and the beggar—the nun, and the wife and daughter of the artisan—youth and age, all were involved in general ruin. None were respected, and few consequently escaped. The madness of these desperate brigands was variously exhibited; some fired through doors and windows: others at the church bells; many at the wretched inhabitants as they fled into the streets to escape the bayonets of the savages who were demolishing their property within doors; while some wretches, as if the blood had not flowed in sufficient torrents already, shot from the windows their own companions as they staggered on below. What chances had the miserable inhabitants of escaping death, when more than one officer perished by the bullets and bayonets of the very men whom a few hours before they had led to the assault."



been suspended by the mere inaction of the vast band of brigands to continue their work of mischief and violence, a Portuguese brigade, accompanied by the provost-marshal and the gallows, was marched into the town. No sooner was the brigade drawn up, and the gallows planted, than the demon of mischief and misrule disappeared, and order and military subordination were restored; the rope carrying terror to those whom the bayonets of a brigade could not appal. As soon as the wonted empire of discipline was restored, the ludicrous succeeded to the terrible. Men were to be seen marching out of Badajos, some decked in the uniform of the slain French officers; others begirt in all the ample foldings of Spanish toggery, and in the various costumes of priests, monks, nuns, grandees, and ladies of quality; and bearing everything away that was portable or drivable. Others were preceded by Spaniards, dressed in slashed doublets and hat and plumes, laden with bales, often their own property, before their hard task-masters.

Such were the horrors of the siege of Badajos. On the morning succeeding the capture, a beautiful sun displayed a fearful scene of death and destruction. Silence had succeeded to the dreadful din and crash of arms. Hosts of gallant hearts that had the night before beat high with devoted bravery, lay in the cold grasp of death. The breaches and the ditch presented an awful charnel-pit of wretchedness, slaughter, and destruction. In the main breach lay a frightful heap of 2,000 gallant soldiers; many dead, but still warm, mixed with the desperately wounded, to whom no assistance could yet be given. In the ditch, lay the burned and blackened corpses of those who had perished by the explosions of the combustible materials with which it had been profusely garnished, mixed with those who had been torn to pieces by round shot or grape, or had been killed by musketry; stiffening in their gore, body piled upon body, involved and intertwined in one hideous and enormous mass of carnage. Among the heaps of dead and mangled corpses, some still holding their firelocks in their grasps, lay broken piles of arms, shattered ladders, and the remnants and mangled remains of those who had been blown up by the explosions of magazines and mines; many with their heads swollen to an enormous size, and their limbs of a gigantic and terrific appearance. The

stench arising from the still burning blood-cemented pile of slain, wounded, and dying, was as noisome and sickening, as that of a vast charnel-house, and was perceptible some miles distant from the horrid scene. In the main breach stood the still terrific beam, armed with its sharp and bristly sword-blades, which no human dexterity or strength could pass without impalement; and on which some of the bodies of its assailants were still affixed, in all the horror and agony of dying attitudes: the men, in their ardour and impetuosity of attack, having pushed on their comrades in front, in the desperate hope of effecting a passage over their writhing and wriggling bodies. While viewing this appalling scene of horror and havoc, of desolation and destruction, the only redeeming reflection that could occur to the mind of the spectator was, that the fallen filled a glorious grave on the spot on which they had displayed their indomitable valour.

The most appropriate and interesting appendage that can be made to this brilliant exhibition of siege process—a siege such as Cohorn and Vauban never dreamt of, and which is unparalleled in military annals—is its unassuming detail by the great actor in its operations, to the secretary of state, in his despatch dated—

“Camp before Badajos, 7th April, 1812.

“My despatch of the 3rd instant will have apprised your lordship of the state of the operations against Badajos to that date; which were brought to a close on the night of the 6th, by the capture of the place by storm. The fire continued during the 4th and 5th against the face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the flank of the bastion of Santa Maria; and on the 4th, in the morning, we opened another battery of six guns in the second parallel against the shoulder of the ravelin of San Roque, and the wall in its gorge.

“Practicable breaches were effected in the bastions above-mentioned on the evening of the 5th; but as I had observed that the enemy had intrenched the bastion of La Trinidad, and the most formidable preparations were making for the defence, as well of the breach in that bastion, as of that in the bastion of Santa Maria, I determined to delay the attack for another day, and to turn all the guns in the batteries in the second parallel on the curtain of La Trinidad; in hopes that by effecting a third breach, the troops would be enabled to turn the



enemy's works for the defence of the other two; the attack of which would besides be connected by the troops destined to attack the breach in the curtain. This breach was effected in the evening of the 6th, and the fire of the face of the bastion of Santa Maria, and of the flank of the bastion of La Trinidad being overcome, I determined to attack the place that night.

"I had kept in reserve in the neighbourhood of this camp, the 5th division under lieutenant-general Leith, which had left Castile only in the middle of March, and had but lately arrived in this part of the country, and I brought them up on that evening. The plan for the attack was, that lieutenant-general Picton should attack the castle of Badajos by escalade with the 3rd division; and that a detachment from the guard in the trenches furnished that evening by the 4th division, under major Wilson of the 48th regiment, should attack the ravelin of San Roque upon his left, while the 4th division, under major-general the honourable C. Colville, and the light division under lieutenant-colonel Barnard, should attack the breaches in the bastions of La Trinidad and Santa Maria, and in the curtain by which they are connected. The 5th division were to occupy the ground which the 4th and light divisions had occupied during the siege; and lieutenant-general Leith was to make a false attack upon the outwork called the Pardaleras, and another on the works of the fort towards the Guadiana, with the left brigade of the division under major-general Walker, which he was to turn into a real attack, if circumstances should prove favourable; and brigadier-general Power, who invested the place with his Portuguese brigade on the right of the Guadiana, was directed to make false attacks on the tête-du-pont, the fort San Christoval, and the new redoubt called Mon Cœur.

"The attack was accordingly made at ten at night; lieutenant-general Picton preceding by a few minutes the attacks by the remainder of the troops. Major-general Kempt led this attack, which went out from the right of the first parallel. He was unfortunately wounded in crossing the river Rivillas below the inundation; but notwithstanding this circumstance, and the obstinate resistance of the enemy, the castle was carried by escalade, and the 3rd division established in it at about half past eleven. While this was going on, major Wilson, of the 48th, carried the ravelin of San Roque by the

gorge, with a detachment of 200 men of the guard in the trenches; and with the assistance of major Squire, of the engineers, established himself within that work. The 4th and light divisions moved to the attack from the camp along the left of the river Rivillas, and of the inundation. They were not perceived by the enemy till they reached the covered way, and the advanced guards of the two divisions descended without difficulty into the ditch, protected by the fire of the parties stationed on the glacis for that purpose, and they advanced to the assault of the breaches, led by their gallant officers, with the utmost intrepidity. But such was the nature of the obstacles prepared by the enemy at the top and behind the breaches, and so determined their resistance, that our troops could not establish themselves within the place. Many brave officers and soldiers were killed or wounded by explosions at the top of the breaches; others who succeeded to them were obliged to give way, having found it impossible to penetrate the obstacles which the enemy had prepared to impede their progress. These attempts were repeated till after twelve at night, when, finding that success was not to be attained, and that lieutenant-general Picton was established in the castle, I ordered that the 4th and light divisions might retire to the ground on which they had been first assembled for the attack.

"In the mean time, lieutenant-general Leith had pushed forward major-general Walker's brigade on the left, supported by the 38th regiment, under lieutenant-colonel Nugent, and the 15th Portuguese regiment, under colonel Do Rego, and he had made a false attack upon the Pardaleras with the 8th caçadores, under major Hill. Major-general Walker forced the barrier on the road of Olivença, and entered the covered way on the left of the bastion of San Vicente, close to the Guadiana. He there descended into the ditch, and escaladed the face of the bastion of San Vicente. Lieutenant-general Leith supported this attack by the 38th regiment and 15th Portuguese regiment, and our troops being thus established in the castle, which commands all the works of the town, and in the town; and the 4th and light divisions being formed again for the attack of the breaches, all resistance ceased, and at daylight in the morning the governor, general Philippon, who had retired to fort San Christoval, surrendered, together



with general Vieland, and all the staff, and the whole garrison. I have not got accurate returns of the strength of the garrison, or of the number of prisoners; but general Philippon has informed me that it consisted of 5,000 men at the commencement of the siege, of which 1,200 were killed or wounded during the operations, besides those lost in the assault of the place. There were five French battalions, besides two of the regiment of Hesse Darmstadt, and the artillery, engineers, &c.; and I understand there are 4,000 prisoners.

“It is impossible that any expressions of mine can convey to your lordship the sense which I entertain of the gallantry of the officers and troops upon this occasion. The list of killed and wounded will show that the general officers, the staff attached to them, the commanding and other officers of the regiments, put themselves at the heads of the attacks which they severally directed, and set the example of gallantry which was so well followed by their men.

“Marshal sir W. Beresford assisted me in conducting the details of this siege; and I am much indebted to him for the cordial assistance which I received from him, as well during its progress, as in the last operation which brought it to a termination. The duties in the trenches were conducted successively by major-general the hon. C. Colville, major-general Bowes, and major-general Kempt, under the superintendence of lieutenant-general Picton. I have had occasion to mention all these officers during the course of the operations; and they all distinguished themselves, and were all wounded in the assault.

\* \* \* \* \*

“Marshal Soult left Seville on the 1st instant, with all troops which he could collect in Andalusia; and he was in communication with the troops which had retired from Estremadura, under general Drouet, on the 3rd, and he arrived at Llerena on the 4th. I had intended to collect the army on the Albuera rivulet, in proportion as marshal Soult should advance; and I had requested lieutenant-general sir T. Graham to retire gradually upon Albuera, while lieutenant-general sir R. Hill should do the same on Talavera, from Don Benito and the upper parts of the Guadiana. I do not think it certain that marshal Soult has made any decided movement from Llerena since the 4th, although he has patrolled forward with small detachments of cavalry, and the ad-

vanced guard of his infantry have been at Usagre. None of the army of Portugal have moved to join him.

“According to the last reports which I have received of the 4th instant, from the frontier of Castile, it appears that marshal Marmont had established a body of troops between the Agueda and the Coa, and he had reconnoitred Almeida on the 3rd. Brigadier-general Trant’s division of militia had arrived upon the Coa, and brigadier-general Wilson’s division was following with the cavalry, and lieutenant-general the conde de Amarante was on his march, with a part of the corps under his command, towards the Douro.

“It would be very desirable that I should have it in my power to strike a blow against marshal Soult before he could be reinforced: but the Spanish authorities having omitted to take the necessary steps to provision Ciudad Rodrigo, it is absolutely necessary that I should return to the frontiers of Castile within a short period of time. It is not very probable that marshal Soult will risk an action in the province of Estremadura, which it would not be difficult for him to avoid, and it is very necessary that he should return to Andalusia, as general Balasteros was in movement upon Seville on the 29th of last month, and the conde de Penne Villemur moving on the same place from the Lower Guadiana.

“It will be quite impossible for me to go into Andalusia till I shall have secured Ciudad Rodrigo. I therefore propose to remain in the positions now occupied by the troops for some days; indeed, a little time is required to take care of our wounded; and if marshal Soult should remain in Estremadura, I shall attack him; if he should retire into Andalusia, I must return to Castile.

“I have the honour to enclose returns of the killed and wounded from the 31st of March, and in the assault of Badajos, and a return of the ordnance, small arms, and ammunition found in the place. I shall send the returns of provisions in the place by the next despatch. This despatch will be delivered to your lordship by my aid-de-camp, captain Canning, whom I beg leave to recommend to your protection. He has likewise the colours of the garrison, and the colours of the Hesse Darmstadt’s regiment, to be laid at the feet of H.R.H. the prince regent. The French battalions in the garrison had no eagles.”



## OPERATIONS FROM THE CAPTURE OF BADAJOS TO THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

HAVING snatched the two frontier fortresses out of the hands of the enemy, "in the presence," as Lery, the chief engineer of Soult's staff, said, in his letter to Kellerman, "of two armies amounting to 80,000 men," the English general would have advanced into Andalusia, for the purpose of raising the siege of Cadiz; and with this intent he ordered sir Stapleton Cotton to pursue Soult's army, which had approached Llerena, (only two marches distant from Badajos), when that marshal, apprised by a body of cavalry, which had escaped from Fort San Christoval, that Badajos had fallen, immediately retreated. By a rapid night march, the British cavalry overtook his rear-guard at Usagre, and having slain a considerable number, took captive 150 men and horses.

But the advantages which the capture of these fortresses presented, were neutralized for a time by the advance of Marmont into Portugal; the apathy and indolence of the Spaniards in neglecting to put Ciudad Rodrigo into a defensive state; and the English general's financial difficulties, his military chest being almost empty, the English merchants having, by artifices, depreciated the commissariat bills twenty-five per cent., for the purpose of buying them up at a ruinous discount. This disgraceful spirit of cupidity displayed by his countrymen, occasioned the English general great embarrassment.

During the siege of Badajos, Marmont, relying on the advance of Soult to the relief of that fortress, had marched from Salamanca, and leaving a division to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo, invested, in the beginning of April, Almeida with the remainder of his force; his marauding parties laying waste and devastating Lower Beira. The English general having foreseen that this was likely to take place, had directed Silveira to protect the Tras-os Montes, Alten to take post in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, and Trant and Wilson to cover that part of Beira, extending from the Douro along the Coa to Subugal, with especial orders to attend to the safety of a considerable magazine of

ammunition collected at Celerico. The French general was diverted from his assault of Almeida, by Trant's kindling fires to the right and left of his position on the left bank of the Coa, from the apprehension of the presence of a large British force. But Alten's and Silveira's measures frustrated in a great degree the British general's plans. The former, instead of falling gradually back, according to his instructions, on Castello Branco, disputing the rivers and defiles with the enemy's advanced parties, crossed the Tagus at Villa Velha, leaving the country open to the enemy's marauding parties; and the latter was so slow in his advance in joining Trant at Guarda, that it was necessary to destroy a considerable part of the magazines of ammunition at Celerico, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. To meet this emergency, lord Wellington, leaving Hill, to whom the task of restoring Badajos to a defensible state was entrusted, two divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry, marched the remainder of the army into Beira; and on Marmont's retreat towards Salamanca, he re-established his head-quarters at Fuente Guinaldo, and cantoned his troops between the Agueda and the Coa. Here he was engaged in devising his plans for the ensuing campaign.

Having received information that sir Home Popham's expedition had sailed for the coast of Biscay, and that the Sicilian expedition was on its passage, the object of the former being to divert Caffarelli's reserves from joining Marmont, and that of the latter to effect the same purpose in respect of the armies of Suchet and the intrusive king, by threatening Catalonia and Valencia, he directed the middle arch of the Roman bridge of Alcantara to be repaired,\* and sir Rowland Hill to destroy the pontoon bridge of Almarez. Thus, by the first operation, a short and easy communication was secured with Hill; and by the second, the communication between Marmont and Soult, whose commands amounted to 108,000 men, was interrupted. Graham was posted at Portalegre, with 20,000 men as a corps

some ruined buildings near the spot supplied, and by means of cables and a net-work of strong ropes, secured by straining beams, fixed in the masonry on each side of the broken arch.

\* The chasm occasioned in the Alcantara bridge, by the destruction of the middle arch by the French, which was 100 feet in extent, was restored under the direction of colonel Sturgeon, with such materials as



of observation, to protect Hill in his expedition from any movement of Soult or Marmont.

On the 12th of May Hill moved from Almendralejos on his expedition, with 6,000 men, six twenty-four pounder howitzers, and the necessary equipment of stores. On reaching (May 16th) the pass of Miravete, finding it strongly fortified, and protected by the neighbouring castle, which was situated in the highest part of the gorge of the mountains, and the pass being the only route practicable for the passage of artillery, dividing his force into two columns, he instructed general Chowne to make a false attack with one on the castle, while he advanced with the other down the steep and rugged mountain tract leading through the village of Romangorda. In a night march he advanced towards the pontoon-bridge, and soon after daybreak, halting in a concealed position, about eight o'clock the 50th and a wing of the 71st rushed forward from the cover of a hill with the bayonet, and, with a loud shout, planted their ladders. Though assailed with a heavy discharge of small arms and artillery by the garrison, supported by a flank fire from fort Ragusa on the opposite bank of the river, they escalated fort Napoleon, and, driving their opponents before them at the point of the bayonet, entered the tête-du-pont or bridge-head with the fugitives. The guns of fort Napoleon being turned on fort Ragusa, the governor and garrison, after firing a few rounds, took to flight. Besides a considerable number of killed and wounded, the enemy lost 250 prisoners. On the part of the English only 32 were killed and 144 wounded. Had it not been for the false report of Erskine—who, somehow or other, was a strange marplot in all transactions in

which he was concerned—that Soult was in Estremadura, Hill would have assaulted the castle. Having destroyed the bridge and forts, with all the stores and magazines, the English general retired to Merida, and thus frustrated Soult's and Marmont's intention to intercept him. On the 11th of July, the garrison of Miravete being relieved by Marmont, on the retreat of that marshal the castle was blown up, and thus the pass was left open, and lord Wellington's wishes fully realized.

Wellington having now completed his field magazines, secured his right flank by Hill's destruction of the pontoon-bridge at Almarez, and obtained the means of a short and easy communication with that general, on the 13th of June, determined to reap those fruits for the enjoyment of which his reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos opened a fair and promising prospect, crossed the Agueda with an army of 35,000 infantry, and 2,500 cavalry, plunged into the heart of Spain, and commenced that campaign which has immortalized his name. The first collision with the enemy took place on the 16th, near the Valmusa rivulet, distant about six miles from Salamanca. On the occurrence of this cavalry skirmish, the French evacuated Salamanca, leaving a garrison of 800 men in the three forts of San Vicente, Cayetano, and La Merced, which had been constructed and fortified for the defence of Salamanca, now converted into a depôt for the army of Portugal.\* On the 17th the English army crossed the Tormes by the fords of El Campo and San Martha, above and below the bridge which was in occupation of the enemy, and entered Salamanca, being greeted by the inhabitants with universal acclamations, and all that vehemence of enthusiasm which is

\* The duke has been subjected to much censure and animadversion for not having attacked Marmont at this time; his letter to the earl of Bathurst, dated near Salamanca, July 21st, is a sufficient answer to his impugnors:—"I have invariably been of opinion, unless forced to fight a battle, it is better that one should not be fought by the allied army, unless under such favourable circumstances as that there would be room to hope that the allied army should be able to maintain the field, while that of the enemy should not. Your lordship will have seen by the return of the two armies, that we have no superiority of numbers even over that single army immediately opposed to us; indeed, I believe that the French army is of the two the strongest, and it is certainly equipped with a profusion of artillery double ours in number, and of larger calibres. It, therefore, cannot be attacked in a chosen position

without considerable loss on our side. To this circumstance add, that I am quite certain that Marmont's army is to be joined by the king's army, which will be 10,000 or 12,000 men, with a large proportion of cavalry, and that troops are still expected from the army of the north, and some are ordered from that of the south; and it will be seen, that I ought to consider it almost impossible to remain in Castile after an action, the circumstances of which should not have been so advantageous as to have left the allied army in a situation of comparative strength, while that of the enemy should have been much weakened. I have therefore determined to cross the Tormes if the enemy should; to cover Salamanca as long as I can, and above all, not to give up communication with Ciudad Rodrigo, and not to fight an action unless under very advantageous circumstances, or that it shall become absolutely necessary."



peculiar to a southern temperament. Immediately the sixth division, under Clinton, invested the forts, and the main body took up a position on the heights of San Christoval, which extend about four miles in front of Salamanca, and about three miles distant from that city, the Tormes sweeping round its reverse and touching both its flanks. An advanced guard followed Marmont, who had withdrawn to the heights of Aldea Rubia, about six miles in the rear of his original position.

The siege of the forts now proceeded with vigour. On the night of the second day after the investment, San Cayetano was attempted to be escaladed, but the storming party was repulsed with the loss of 120 killed and wounded, among the latter of which was general Bowes. On the 20th, Marmont advancing for the purpose of drawing off the garrisons of the forts, the British army formed in order of battle on the summit of San Christoval. After a heavy discharge of shells, and a brisk cannonade, the French marshal having, by an impetuous assault, possessed himself of the village of Morisco, which lay at the foot of San Christoval, took up a position on the plain, in front of the English army, and just out of gun-shot. During the following day, though both armies were in presence of each other, no other movement took place than the recapture of Morisco; but Marmont having, in the course of the night, occupied an eminence which overlooked the right flank of the allies, on the following morning he was dislodged by the 58th and 61st with considerable loss. Early in the morning of the 24th, in the midst of a heavy fog, 12,000 infantry and 14 squadrons of cavalry crossed the Tormes, at the ford of Huerta, and attacked Bock, who had been posted on the other side of that river, to watch that ford, for the purpose of covering Salamanca. As the fog cleared off, Bock being observed to be retreating in excellent order, Graham was detached to his assistance, with two divisions and Le Marchant's brigade of cavalry, while Wellington concentrated the

main body of the army between Morisco and Cabrerijos, in readiness to avail himself of any false movement of his rival. "The apparition of Wellington's skilful disposition"—Graham ranged in order of battle, Wellington's columns clustering on the heights above the fords of Santa Martha, and the light division at Aldea Lengua—caused the French marshal hastily to face about, and repossess the Tormes.

On the 26th, ammunition being brought up from Almeida, the batteries commenced firing with red hot shot, and on the following day, San Vicente being in flames, and a breach effected in Cayetano, a white flag was hoisted on the first-mentioned redoubt, but as it was evident that the commandant wished to gain time, on his non-compliance with the English general's proffer, of five minutes for consideration, San Cayetano was ordered to be stormed, and La Merced escaladed, and both attacks being successful, the commandant of San Vicente surrendered: 700 prisoners, and a vast quantity of stores fell into the hands of the captors, who immediately destroyed the forts. The loss of the English since the passage of the Tormes, had been 36 officers and 450 men.

On the night of the surrender of the forts, Marmont, who had continued manœuvring in front of Salamanca, in hopes of drawing off the garrisons of the forts, set fire to Morisco and the neighbouring villages, burning all the corn, both standing and housed, in the neighbourhood, and plundering the inhabitants, retreated by Toro and Tordesillas, on the Douro. He was closely followed by Wellington, who, on the 2nd of July, came up with his rear-guard, and drove it across the river with loss. On the 3rd of July the hostile armies were in presence of each other. Marmont concentrated his forces on the opposite bank to dispute the passage; and Wellington occupied Rueda,\* in force, on the other bank of the river. The intervening period, from the 3rd to the 15th, was marked by few changes of position. On the 16th the French general concentrated his forces be-

position, the soldiers of both sides passing the Douro in groups, held amicable intercourse. In the retreat from Burgos, a repetition of the scene which took place at Rueda, occurred at Torquemada. The immense well-stored wine vaults there were plundered; twelve thousand men of the allied army were lying at one time in the streets and houses, in a state of helpless drunkenness; and on Souham's occupation of that town, the drunkards of the French army more than numbered that of the English.

\* Here wine was so plentiful, that it was difficult to keep the soldiers sober. The wine-caves, natural, and cut in the rock below Rueda, were so immense, and so well stocked, that the drunkards of the two armies failed to make any sensible diminution in the quantity. Many men on both sides perished in a state of drunkenness in that labyrinth. Here also recurred one of those recognitions of military propriety that tend to mitigate the severity of war. During the continuance of the hostile armies in this



tween Toro and San Roman, and having repaired the bridge of Toro, passed over Bonet's division, in the hopes of occasioning an alteration in Wellington's movements, by forcing him back from the line of the Douro, and thus intercepting his communication with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo; but the English general replied to the ruse by making a feigned advance on Toro, while he prepared to take up a position on the Guarena, a tributary stream of the Douro. With this view, sir Stapleton Cotton was posted, with the fourth and light divisions, and a brigade of cavalry, at Castrejon, on the Trebancos, to favour the concentration of the British forces. At the dawn of the morning of the 18th, those troops were vigorously attacked by the whole French army; Marmont having, by a forced march of 40 miles, reached Tordesillas on the 17th. Cotton maintained his position from daylight till seven o'clock, when lord Wellington arriving on the ground, the troops were withdrawn, and retired in perfect order to the main body on the Guarena. While observing the enemy's movements in this affair, the English commander-in-chief was surrounded by the French cavalry, who had been allowed to approach, from the supposition that they were deserters. The whole mass, friends and foes, were mixed in the *melee*, and went like a whirlwind to the foot of the height, bearing among them the English general and his staff, who, with drawn swords, extricated themselves with difficulty. In this affair the loss of the French was 240 prisoners, and 400 killed; that of the allies amounted to 550.

The French army now crossed the Guarena a little below the junction of the four streams which form that river, and advanced to Castillos, with the intent to turn the left of the allies in the command of the Salamanca road; but Cole, at the head of the 27th and 40th regiments, supported by a brigade of Portuguese, advanced against them with the bayonet, and took 300 prisoners, including a general, and a piece of artillery. The loss on the side of the allies was 100 killed, 400 wounded, and 50 prisoners.

The 19th and 20th were passed in countermarches and manœuvres in parallel or corresponding ridges of country, each chief endeavouring to outflank the other, and each watching a favourable moment to attack. To reach a point was Marmont's object; to intercept him was that of Wel-

lington. During these manœuvres, each hour wore away in the belief that the succeeding one would usher in a conflict. A battle in the plain of Valesa was considered inevitable. As the dread note of artillery resounded among the hills, as circumstances were favourable for its play, each host prepared to form into line. But though the line of march of both armies was within half-cannon-shot range, often half-musket-shot, of each other, and was at times on an open plain, the discharge of a few cannon-shots alone interrupted the stillness of the scene, according as the diversities of ground or other accident afforded either party an advantage, or an occasional fusilade brought the light troops, or the stragglers of both armies into collision, in their contests for the plunder of the villages that lay in the intermediate space between the parallel lines of march of the hostile hosts. As the valley began to widen, on the 21st the enemy took the route to the left, while the allies marched direct to San Christoval. During the last day of the hostile exhibition of one of the finest displays of military tactics ever exhibited—two hostile hosts, consisting of near 100,000 men, in the immediate presence of each other, so skilfully manœuvred by their respective leaders, as to afford no opportunity to each other of a favourable result from a collision, neither general furnishing an opportunity for a partial attack—the officers of both armies exchanged courtesies and recognitions with hand and hat, pointing onwards with their swords, as if to urge each other to the common goal, for the exhibition of their courage and military skill and rivalry. In the course of the operations of these manœuvres, the loss of each side by the sword and casualties was about 1,000 men.

The preceding sketch of the series of masterly manœuvres exhibited by the contending generals of the hostile armies is admirably detailed in the despatch of the English general, officially addressed to earl Bathurst, foreign secretary of state; it is as remarkable for its candour and truthfulness of narration as it is perspicuous, precise, and exact.

“Cabrerizos, near Salamanca,

“21st July, 1812.

“MY LORD,—In the course of the 16th the enemy moved all their troops to the right of their position on the Douro, and their army was concentrated between Toro and San Roman. A considerable party



passed the Douro at Toro, on the evening of the 16th; and I moved the allied army to their left on that night, with an intention to concentrate on the Guareña.

"It was totally out of my power to prevent the enemy from passing the Douro at any point at which he might think it expedient, as he had in his possession all the bridges over that river, and many of the fords; but he recrossed that river at Toro on the night of the 16th, moved his whole army to Tordesillas, where he again crossed the Douro on the morning of the 17th, and assembled his army on that day at La Nava del Rey; having marched not less than ten leagues in the course of the 17th.

"The 4th and light divisions of infantry, and major-general Anson's brigade of cavalry, had marched to Castrejon on the night of the 16th, with a view to the assembly of the army on the Guareña, and were at Castrejon under the orders of lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton on the 17th, not having been ordered to proceed further, in consequence of my knowledge that the enemy had not passed the Douro at Toro, and there was not time to call them in between the hour at which I received the intelligence of the whole of the enemy's army being at La Nava, and daylight of the morning of the 18th. I therefore took measures to provide for their retreat and junction, by moving the 5th division to Torrecilla de la Orden; and major-general Le Marchant's, major-general Alton's, and major-general Bock's, brigades of cavalry, to Alaejos.

"The enemy attacked the troops at Castrejon at the dawn of the day of the 18th, and sir Stapleton Cotton maintained the post, without suffering any loss, till the cavalry had joined him. Nearly about the same time the enemy turned, by Alaejos, the left flank of our position at Castrejon.

"The troops retired in admirable order to Torrecilla de la Orden, having the enemy's whole army on their flank, or in their rear, and thence to the Guareña, which river they passed under the same circumstances, and effected their junction with the army.

"The Guareña, which runs into the Douro, is formed by four streams, which unite about a league below Cañizal, and the enemy took a strong position on the heights on the right of that river; and I placed the 5th, 4th, and light divisions on the opposite heights, and had directed the remainder of the army to cross the upper Guareña at Val-

lesa, in consequence of the appearance of the enemy's intention to turn our right.

"Shortly after his arrival, however, the enemy crossed the Guareña at Castrello, below the junction of the streams; and manifested an intention to press upon our left, and to enter the valley of Cañizal. Major-general Alton's brigade of cavalry, supported by the 3rd dragoons, were already engaged with the enemy's cavalry, and had taken, among other prisoners, the French general Carrié; and I desired lieutenant-general the hon. L. Cole to attack, with major-general William Anson's, and brigadier-general Harvey's brigades of infantry (the latter under the command of colonel Stubbs) the enemy's infantry, which were supporting their cavalry. He immediately attacked and defeated them with the 27th and 40th regiments, which advanced to the charge with bayonets, colonel Stubbs's Portuguese brigade supporting, and the enemy gave way; many were killed and wounded; and major-general Alton's brigade of cavalry having pursued the fugitives, 240 prisoners were taken.

"In these affairs, lieutenant-general the honourable L. Cole, major-general V. Alten, major-general W. Anson, lieutenant-colonels Arentchildt of the 1st hussars, and Hervey of the 14th light dragoons; lieutenant-colonel Maclean of the 27th, and major Archdall of the 40th; colonel Stubbs, lieutenant-colonel Anderson, commanding the 11th, and major de Azeredo, commanding the 23rd Portuguese regiments, distinguished themselves.

"The enemy did not make any further attempt on our left, but having reinforced their troops on that side, and withdrawn those which had moved to their left, I brought back ours from Vallesa.

"On the 19th, in the afternoon, the enemy withdrew all their troops from their right, and marched to their left by Tarazona, apparently with an intention of turning our right. I crossed the Upper Guareña at Vallesa and El Olmo, with the whole of the allied army, in the course of that evening and night; and every preparation was made for the action which was expected on the plain of Vallesa on the morning of the 20th. But shortly after daylight the enemy made another movement, in several columns, to his left along the heights of the Guareña, which river he crossed below Cantalapedra, and encamped last night at Babila-fuente and Villoruella; and the allied army made a





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corresponding movement to its right to Cantalpino, and encamped last night at Cabeza Vellosa, the 6th division and major-general Alten's brigade of cavalry being upon the Tormes at Aldea Lengua. During these movements, there have been occasional cannonades, but without loss on our side.

"I have this morning moved the left of the army to the Tormes, where the whole are now concentrated; and I observe that the enemy have also moved towards the same river near Huerta. The enemy's object hitherto has been to cut off my communication with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, the want of which, he knows well, would distress us very materially. The wheat harvest has not yet been reaped in Castile, and even if we had money, we could not now procure anything from the country, unless we should follow the example of the enemy, and lay waste whole districts, in order to procure a scanty subsistence of unripe wheat for the troops.

"It would answer no purpose to attempt to retaliate upon the enemy, even if it were practicable. The French armies in Spain have never had any secure communication beyond the ground which they occupy; and provided the enemy opposed to them is not

too strong for them, they are indifferent in respect to the quarter from which their operations are directed, or on which side they carry them on.

"The army of Portugal has been surrounded for the last six weeks, and scarcely even a letter reaches its commander; but the system of organised rapine and plunder, and the extraordinary discipline so long established in the French armies, enable it to subsist at the expense of the total ruin of the country in which it has been placed; and I am not certain that marshal Marmont has not now at his command a greater quantity of provisions and supplies of every description than we have. Any movement upon his flank, therefore, would only tend to augment the embarrassments of our own situation, while it would have no effect whatever upon that of the enemy; even if such a movement could have been made with advantage as an operation purely military: this, however, was not the case, and when the French attempted to turn our right, I had the choice only of marching towards Salamanca, or of attacking the enemy in a position highly advantageous to him, which, for several reasons, I did not think expedient." \* \* \* \*

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THE two hostile generals having exhausted all their skill in the series of manœuvres during the past week; the one to maintain himself till he had been joined by his expected reinforcements; and the other to cover Salamanca, at length came to a standstill, neither having been able to obtain "the vantage ground" favourable for battle, to the prejudice of his opponent.

On the morning of the 21st July, the English army was concentrated in its old position of San Christoval; Marmont on the evening of the same day, having garrisoned the castle of Alba, which had in a panic been abandoned by the Spaniards, crossed the Tormes between the fords of Alba and Huerta, and occupied the hamlets of Calvarassa de Ariba, and the adjoining heights of Lapeña, for the purpose of gaining the road to Ciudad Rodrigo. To counteract his intention, lord Wellington, leaving the third division, and D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry, intrenched at Cabrerizos, on the right bank of the Tormes, to watch the corps of the

enemy posted on the heights of Babilafuente, as also to retard the progress of Marmont should he cross the river in the course of the night, made a correspondent flank movement, and crossing the river late in the evening of the same day, by the bridge of Salamanca and the Santa Martha and Aldea Lengua fords, placed his army on the chain of hills near the Arapiles. Before the last of the columns had passed the fords, night came on with unusual darkness; for a tempest, that common herald and usual precursor of the Peninsular battles, was gathering. A dreadful storm of thunder and lightning, with heavy rain, ensued; crash succeeded crash, the lightning glared in sheets of vivid flashes, and the rain poured down in torrents. One flash killed several men and horses of Marchant's brigade, near Santa Martha; and hundreds of the horses, terrified by the storm, broke away from their picketings; above thirty escaped into the enemy's lines. The dispersion of the troopers in their endeavour to retake their horses,



and the scared cattle, galloping about in a state of wildness and confusion, increased the awful effect of the elemental strife.

Before daylight of the 22nd, the hostile armies moved into position; the allied army appuying its right on the larger and nearer Arapile, its left extending to the Tormes, below Santa Martha, and having its cavalry posted in front of Cavariza de Abaxo. The enemy was in position in front, on the heights of Lapeña, covered by the thick wood of Calvarassa de Ariba. In taking up their positions, both generals had overlooked the advantage the two steep and rugged hills—which on account of their perfect symmetrical resemblance, were called Dos Arapiles, (the two Arapiles)—presented, and which lay about half cannon shot from each army. But lord Wellington being informed that a column of the enemy was rapidly advancing towards them, despatched the 7th caçadores to seize the more distant and stronger of them, which the French perceiving, the column rapidly broke, and with a rush seized the hill. In their attempts on the larger Arapile, they were less fortunate. This, in spite of all their efforts, was seized and retained by the English. Soon afterwards, the 7th division and the 4th caçadores, attacked the heights of Lapeña, and succeeded in obtaining possession of one half of them. At the same time, lord Wellington, judging from Marmont's movements that his intentions were on the left of the Tormes, ordered the 3rd division and the Portuguese cavalry from the right bank of the river, to take post behind Aldea Tejada, which gave the allies the command of the Ciudad Rodrigo road.

About noon Marmont made a demonstration, by marching a force to the right, and forming columns of attack opposite the 5th division, as if his design was to attack the allied left; but lord Wellington, on re-

\* "An error of one of their generals gave him the opportunity he desired, availing himself of which, he fell upon them like a thunderbolt; and the issue of the attack was as decided a rout upon the part of the French, as was, perhaps, ever experienced by any army. Their broken and discomfited masses, swept away before our victorious troops, were precipitated upon the Tormes, in crossing which many were drowned. Had it not been for the protection afforded them by the night immediately coming on—for it was four in the evening before the action commenced—few of them could have escaped. As it was, although prevented following up the victory to the full extent, the trophies of the day were two eagles, twelve pieces of cannon, and 10,000 prisoners. It has been said, how far with truth the editor is not aware, that the duke of Wellington has

connoitring the manœuvre, being satisfied that no real attack was designed in that quarter, galloped back to the right. In the interval, a sharp cannonade was exchanged from the Arapile hills, on which the two hostile generals had taken their positions, each eagerly looking out for the moment when a false step of his opponent should invite him to pounce upon his quarry. Both Wellington and Marmont were at this moment masters of their respective lines of communication, free to accept or decline battle as they chose.

The third division, and D'Urban's cavalry, being concealed by the nature of the ground, occasioned an apparent interval of near two miles between the actual and apparent right of the allied position. Marmont, deceived by this illusion, as also by the movement of the baggage of the allied army towards the Rodrigo road, ordered about three o'clock Thomière's division, with his light cavalry and fifty guns, to outflank the allied right and cut off its retreat, by interposing his force between the allies and the Rodrigo road. Under cover of a heavy cannonade, Thomière advanced, and at the same time Marmont hastened the march of his other divisions, intending to fall on his adversary the moment he should move against Thomière, for he was in total ignorance of the English position at Aldea Tejada.

The extension of the French left being observed by a staff officer, was reported about three o'clock to lord Wellington, who, satisfying himself of the error, made immediate dispositions for the attack.\* Suddenly the mass which covered the greater Arapile rushed down the interior slope of the hill, and entered the hollow beneath, amidst a storm of grape and bullets, which seemed to tear away the whole surface of the earth over which they moved. Instantly their formation was effected. Pakenham's division been heard to express himself to this effect,—'that if required to particularize any of the battles in which he commanded for the purpose, that Salamanca is the one on which he would be best contented to rest his reputation as a general.' When we consider the infinite skill with which, during the previous operations, he outmanœuvred his opponents, rendering their superiority of numbers of no avail, the eagle-eyed sagacity that saw the error of the French commander, and the promptness and decision with which he turned it to his purpose, ending, as it did, in the total discomfiture and rout of the enemy, it is by no means improbable that such is his opinion, although it may never have been so openly expressed. On comparing it even with the most brilliant of his other victories, such, no doubt, will be the opinion of most military men."—*Mackie.*



sion (the third), and D'Urban's cavalry, formed the right of the line; Cole and Leith's divisions (4th and 5th), and Bradford's Portuguese brigade, the centre; supported by Clinton and Hope's divisions (6th and 7th), in the second line. The 1st and light divisions, under Campbell and Alten, with Pack's Portuguese brigade, were in reserve on the higher ground, behind the greater Arapile hill. The heavy cavalry brigade, under Cotton, was posted chiefly on the right of the first line, and the light cavalry in the second. The guards occupied the village of Arapiles. By this change of position the allied army was placed nearly perpendicular to its original position, its left occupying the near peak of the greater Arapile, and its right extending to Aldea Tejada, and thus that which was the rear became the front.

This formation having been effected, Packenham, supported by D'Urban's cavalry, two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, with two brigades of artillery, moved on the enemy's left at a rapid pace; while the 4th and 5th divisions, supported by the 6th and 7th, and the heavy and light cavalry, proceeded to the attack of the hostile force in the centre and front; at the same time Pack's Portuguese brigade advanced against the lesser Arapile, with orders to assail it at the moment the British centre line should pass it.

About five o'clock, Packenham, rapidly ascending the ridge on which the French left was posted, his division deploying from column into line as they advanced, fell upon Thomière's flank, and though a furious cannonade threw showers of grape and bullets on them, the half-formed lines of the enemy were soon broke into fragments and driven in confusion on the advancing supports. On cresting the wooded heights, the main body of the enemy was seen drawn up in continuous supporting squares, with the front ranks kneeling. Nearly at the same moment the French squares and the British line delivered their volleys, when the latter rushing forward with levelled bayonets, broke the squares, drove the discomfited Frenchmen headlong down the opposite slope, and pursued them from one height to another, until they had made 3,000 prisoners, and captured two eagles. On a sudden an impenetrable cloud of dust arose, when Marchant's heavy brigade, consisting of the 3rd and 4th dragoons, and the 5th dragoon guards, flanked by Anson's light cavalry, burst from it. These gallant horsemen,

sabring all that opposed them, rushed against three battalions of the French 66th, formed in six supporting lines to check their progress, and afford time for the broken divisions to reorganize, scattered them as chaff before the wind. Le Marchant fell, but still his gallant horsemen, galloping forward, charged a brigade under a forest of ilex trees, and captured five guns. But their formation having been much disordered by the nature of the ground over which they charged, their loss in this daring exploit was so severe, that of the three regiments, consisting of 1,000 men, that had entered the field, only three squadrons could be formed of the survivors on the evening of this glorious day. Thus, in less than half an hour, the French left was broken and routed, and no longer existed as a constituent part of the hostile army. Thomière was slain; and Marmont, in the act of hurrying forward to his ill-fated left, had his arm broken, and two deep wounds inflicted in his side, by the explosion of a shell. On the occurrence of this accident, Bonet assumed the command in chief.

While the ruin of the French left was being consummated, the battle was raging in the centre. The divisions of Cole and Leith had advanced to the attack of the enemy's centre and front, at the same moment as Packenham marched against his left, while Pack led his Portuguese brigade against the lesser Arapile. Cole and Leith attacked the enemy's front with no less ardour than his left had been by Packenham, and driving their opponents from one height to another, broke and dispersed his centre. Thus, on this part of the line, the fortune of the day was adverse to the enemy. During these successful operations, Bonet had been repulsed in his attack on the village of Arapiles.

All, hitherto, had been propitious to the allied arms; but as the fourth division was necessarily obliged to lend its flank to the enemy posted on the lesser Arapile, and as Pack's Portuguese brigade had been repulsed from that position, while that division was in the act of passing the hill, Bonet, encouraged by Pack's failure, and having been reinforced by the fugitives from the left and the centre, re-formed his divisions and advanced against Cole, while a withering fire of grape and musketry was poured in on the flank and rear of the 4th division from the crest of the lesser Arapile. Cole lay wounded, and his division, overpowered by overwhelming masses, was forced to give way; but being



reinforced by a brigade, withdrawn by Beresford from the second line, which, by a skilful change of front, took the enemy in flank with a heavy fire, they drove him backward. A brigade of the 6th division at the same time carried the lesser Arapile. The left and the centre of the enemy were now *hors de combat*, but the French right was yet unbroken.

Clausel, who had now succeeded to the command in consequence of Bonet's having been wounded, rallying the fleeing troops, re-formed them in a new position, at right angles to their original one. The battle was now restored, and its crisis had arrived; and victory hung in the balance. To meet the emergency, Wellington ordered the 6th division to attack the enemy's re-formed front, while the 1st and the light divisions, with two brigades of the 4th, were directed to turn his right. The 6th rapidly advanced under a tempest of grape and bullets. It was half-past eight o'clock at night, and nearly dark. The glare of light produced from the thunder of the artillery, the continued blaze of musketry, and the lurid glare of the burning dried grass, which had caught fire from the ignited cartridges, to the extent of a mile, gave to the face of the hill a terrific appearance; it was one vast sheet of flame; and it appeared as if Clinton's men were attacking a burning mountain, the crater of which was defended by a barrier of glittering steel. But nothing could retard the dauntless 6th division, as they advanced with desperate resolution to carry the hill. Onward they rushed against the enemy with the bayonet, and supported by the brigades of the 4th on the flank, they ascended the crest of the hill, and drove the French down the opposite slope from their last hold, as a shattered wreck borne away by the force of some mighty current; and now the hill, which but a moment before was glowing like a furnace, suddenly sank into utter darkness.

The battle being irretrievably lost, Clausel rallied the divisions of Foy and Macune on a rising ground, the first being so placed as to command the roads leading to the fords of Huerta and Encina, while the latter covered the road to Alba de Tormes, whither the broken fragments of the army retired behind them in confusion; but under cover of the woods and the night, a host of the fugitives, who would otherwise have swelled the triumph of the victors as prisoners, effected their escape. It was now ten o'clock

at night; the battle, which had lasted seven hours, was ended. At its closing scene, it had been confined to a small space, which, trampled and blood-stained, gave ample evidence of the havoc that had taken place in its confined limits. The loss had been great on both sides. Above 7,000 of the enemy had been killed and wounded, among whom were six generals; that of the allies about 5,600. Of the British, 500 had been killed, 3,100 wounded, and 101 missing; of the Portuguese, 338 killed, 1,648 wounded, and 207 missing; of the Spaniards, *two killed and four wounded*. General Marchant was killed; and Beresford, Cotton, Leith, Cole, and Spry wounded: 7,000 prisoners, two eagles, eleven cannon, and a field covered with the slain and wounded left in possession of the victors, attested at once the severity of the contest and the splendour of the victory. These were its immediate results; its consequential ones were the abandonment of Andalusia and the Asturias; the raising the siege of Cadiz; the paralyzing of the operations of the enemy; and the shaking the basis of his dominion and influence to its very centre throughout the Peninsula.

Exhausted with fatigue from their mighty efforts, those portions of the allied force that had been actively and unremittingly engaged in this magnificent battle, rested on the scene of their heroic exploits.

Among the instances of gallantry exhibited at Salamanca, the two following were conspicuous. Captain Brotherton, of the 14th light dragoons, having received a severe sword wound in his side in a recent skirmish, not being permitted to serve with his regiment, in an undress, he joined a Portuguese corps, and was a second time wounded in assaulting the Arapiles. Captain Mackie, of the 88th, after heading his regiment throughout their advance against the foe, joined the heavy cavalry as they charged the enemy, and rode through every charge. And heroism on that brilliant day, to adopt the words of the historian of the war in the Peninsula, was not confined to a particular service, or even to the sex to which gallantry inherently belongs. A man of the 43rd, though shot through the middle, and having lost his shoes in passing the marshy streams, refused to quit the fight, limping under fire in rear of his regiment with blood streaming from his wound. The wife of colonel Dalbiac, an English lady of gentle disposition, and possessing a very delicate frame, had braved the dangers



and endured the privations of two campaigns, with the patient fortitude that belongs only to her sex; and in this battle, forgetful of everything but that strong affection which had so long supported her, she rode deep amidst the enemy's fire, trembling, yet irresistibly impelled forward by feelings more imperious than horror, more piercing than the fear of death."

Wellington, though much fatigued, placing himself at the head of the 1st and light divisions, and a brigade of cavalry, proceeded in pursuit of the fleeing foe, and in the belief that the castle of Alba de Tormes was in possession of the Spaniards, and that the French must necessarily retreat by Huerta, for España suppressed the knowledge of the fact of its having been abandoned by his countrymen, directed his pur-

\* Though the duke never experienced the perils and hair-breadth escapes of "the deadly imminent breach," his experience of the dangers and hazards of war were not "few and far between." At the battle of Assaye, while crossing the river Juah, the head of his orderly, who was close by his side, was struck off by a cannon-ball; he had two horses killed under him, one piked, the other shot; and the tree under which he stood during the battle, was pierced with balls. It is said, on the authority of the *Standard* newspaper, that in some one of the Indian battles, he received an injury near the knee-joint. At the battle of Talavera, two balls perforated his coat; a spent ball struck him on the shoulder; a branch of the tree near which he stood, was struck off just above his head by a cannon-ball; and while reconnoitring the position of the enemy at the Casa de Salinas, he was nearly captured. During the movements of the English and French armies, preceding the battle of Salamanca, the duke, while observing the enemy's movements, was surrounded by the French cavalry, who had been allowed to approach from the supposition that they were deserters. The whole mass, friends and foes, were mixed together in the *melee*, and went like a whirlwind to the foot of the height, carrying away the English general and his staff, who with drawn swords extricated themselves with difficulty. At the battle of Vittoria, he passed, unharmed, through the fire of the French centre, bristling with eighty pieces of artillery. In the battle of Sorauren, July 28th, 1813, while he sat in observation on the heights, within close musket-range, a ball, which struck the hilt of the breast-plate of the marquis of Worcester's sword, and threw him from his horse, glancing off grazed lord Wellington. In the course of the evening of the same battle, while examining his maps in the neighbourhood of Echellar, he was so nearly captured by a detachment of the enemy, that it was almost a miracle that he escaped the volley of shot they poured on him while he galloped away. At the battle of Orthes he was struck by a spent ball. At the battle of Waterloo the elm tree, which was in the centre of the British line, and under which he took post during part of the battle, was pierced with balls. In the advance on Paris, after the battle of Waterloo, the commandant of the citadel of Cambray having consented to the proffered conditions for the surrender of that important for-

suit towards the fords of Huerta and Encina. A squadron of French dragoons bursting hastily from the forest, and after a hurried discharge of their arms, fled at full gallop towards Huerta, thus confirming lord Wellington's opinion that the retreat was in that direction. While urging on the pursuit in the rear of the 43rd regiment, a spent bullet perforated the holster of the English commander-in-chief, and slightly contused his thigh.\* By España's culpable suppression of the fact of the abandonment of the castle, the enemy gained Alba, and passed the river unmolested: had he given timely notice, the English general would at once have directed the pursuit upon the right track, and no doubt the enemy would have sustained the loss of many more thousands in prisoners, or possibly the greater part of the tress, the duke being anxious to obtain its immediate possession, proceeded in person to one of its gates to wait until it should be opened. Directing his staff to get under shelter in the ditch of an unoccupied outwork, he posted himself in a sally-port of the glacis. A staff officer, having an important communication to make, and thinking the duke had entered the place, rode towards the gate, and suddenly approaching the duke, while posted as above described, drew the attention of the enemy, who treacherously discharged a howitzer, loaded with grape, at that point, by which the wall where the duke was standing was shattered to pieces, and his clothes covered with its fragments. In his passage to Lisbon in the year 1809, the vessel in which the future hero of the Peninsula and Waterloo sailed from Spithead, was nearly wrecked on the shoal which runs from St. Catherine's Point, and extends to the back of the Isle of Wight into the sea. While inspecting the troops stationed on the Bois de Boulogne, he was several times fired at by assassins. On the occasion of a fête to take place in his honour in Paris, it was intended to set fire to a quantity of powder concealed in the cellar; and, on another occasion, while his carriage entered the gates of his hotel, a pistol was fired at him by an assassin of the name of Cantillon, to whom Buonaparte bequeathed a legacy of 10,000 francs, in recognition of the deed, and, in his own words, the "right to assassinate that oligarchist." What a contrast to this despicable act of the "great and magnanimous Napoleon," does the duke's conduct form, who, to the offer of the conspirators to seize Soult and deliver him over to the British, as a part of their plan to free themselves from the tyranny of Buonaparte, and change the form of government, declined all sanction of the act, adding that "it would be more honourable to the British arms to vanquish the enemy in the field, than to accomplish his overthrow by the countenance of any such project." His conduct and sentiments on the occasion of general Muffling's communicating to him Blucher's proposal, should they capture Buonaparte, to shoot him on the spot where the duc d'Enghien was put to death, were equally magnanimous—"Such an act," said the hero, "would hand our names down in history stained by a crime, and posterity would say of us that we were not worthy to have been his conquerors"—this was true heroism—true magnanimity.



fleeing host would have been crushed. This circumstance, in conjunction with the setting in of the night, was the salvation of the remnant of the French army. "They all agree," wrote lord Wellington, "that if we had had another hour's daylight at Salamanca, the whole army would have been in our hands." Another awkward accident happened just at the moment that the night pickets were set at Huerta. Sir Stapleton Cotton, who was returning from the ford, was shot through the arm by a Portuguese sentinel whose challenge he had disregarded.

What the victor himself felt when the night closed on his splendid triumph, may be estimated from the graphic words of the historian of the War in the Peninsula: "I saw him late in the evening, when the advancing flashes of the cannon and musketry, stretching as far as the eye could command, showed him the field was won. He was alone; the flush of victory was on his brow, and his eyes were eager and watchful; but his voice was calm, and even gentle. More than the rival of Marlborough, since he had defeated greater warriors than Marlborough ever encountered; with a prescient pride he seemed only to accept this glory as an earnest of greater things."

On the eve of this battle, the following affecting scene is detailed, in a communication, entitled, "Recollections in Quarters," to the *United Service Journal*, as having taken place:—

"On the eve of the memorable battle of Salamanca, as the camp-fires were slowly dying out, or flickering, while stirred by some sleepless watcher, feeling no inclination for repose, on account of the sharp, chilly, and moist night-air, I wandered for a short distance from the camp. The larger stars only were visible. The scene was as tranquil as that of a church-yard. The piles of arms, the groups of men, and the scattered tents were dimly blended to my gaze. At this moment a murmur fell upon my ear. I approached the spot whence the sound proceeded; it was of two voices, that of a youth, and that of a full grown man. A few steps farther brought me in sight of them. I looked on them attentively. Two figures were on the ground kneeling; an elderly man and a youth of sixteen. Their faces were close together, their hands elevated in the attitude of prayer, and their heads directed upwards. Their words now dropped distinctly on

my ear. I recognised the elderly one, a most meritorious soldier, who had risen from the ranks to a lieutenancy. Two days before, his only son had arrived from England, as an ensign in the same corps as his father, who was justly proud of his son, a fine promising lad, just from school, and from the quiet home of his boyhood, now all at once cast into the arena of death. Could it be wondered at, that his young spirit quailed at the prospect before him, when he compared it with all he had left behind him in his native land. That night he had withdrawn with his parent into the solitude of the encampment, where I beheld that father and that son, unseen by them, invoking the Father of all at that midnight hour. The prayer of the son was interrupted by many a sob; his father's low but earnest voice in vain whispered consolation; the youth felt awfully oppressed by the sense of his new and startling position in commencing his career. Distinctly I heard his young heart unfold all its latent apprehensions, and utter all its doubts and dismays; and then he sobbed bitterly, casting himself in the arms of his kneeling father, whose voice rose louder as he appealed to heaven to strengthen and shield his boy in the hour of combat. Down he turned his face on his son's, and kissed him, with a low whisper. To that son the glory of a soldier's fame and a soldier's death appeared vain and unenviable; he wished to forsake his dismal trade, to pursue a humble and an unambitious course in the midst of civil life, and in the absence of pride; but the old soldier would not listen to those requests; he did not chide or upbraid his son; he knew that nature was strong, and must hold her course, unconstrained. A long silence ensued, the sobs of the youth became less frequent, and at length both rose, the one with a lighter and a bolder heart, fortified by the spirit which had regained the mastery, and by the prayers which had not been unheard or unheeded. The father placed his arm round the neck of the youth, and both walked leisurely away.

"The son did his duty at Salamanca; his conduct was especially noticed and applauded; he behaved like a young lion, and was in the thickest of the death-storm till the close of the day. The struggle did not end till night came over the field; but then the young hero's hour was come; it came as he was congratulated by a brother officer



on the almost achieved success of the day, when he fell dead by a musket shot. His grieved father sought him among the slain, and buried him in a lonely grave near the spot on which they had prayed the previous night. From that hour that father pined away; he still did his duties well; death he vainly sought in every succeeding action; at last the spirit was vanquished, and he passed away from among us, unscathed by mortal weapon; but his heart pierced by that wound which baffles mortal skill."

The clear and unassuming official detail of the incidents of this memorable battle, by its great actor, is admirably elucidative of the preceding narrative:—

"To earl Bathurst.

"Flores de Avila, 24th July, 1812.

"In my letter of the 21st, I informed your lordship, that both armies were near the Tormes; and the enemy crossed that river with the greatest part of his troops, in the afternoon, by the fords between Alba de Tormes and Huerta, and moved by their left towards the roads leading to Ciudad Rodrigo.

"The allied army, with the exception of the 3rd division and general D'Urban's cavalry, likewise crossed by the bridge of Salamanca, and the fords in the neighbourhood; and I placed the troops in a position, of which the right was upon one of the two heights, called Dos Arapiles, and the left on the Tormes, below the ford of Santa Martha.

"The 3rd division, and brigadier-general D'Urban's cavalry, were left at Cabrerizos, on the right of the Tormes, as the enemy had still a large corps at Babilafuente, on the same side of the river; and I considered it not improbable that, finding our army prepared for them in the morning, on the left of the Tormes, they would alter their plan, and manœuvre by the other bank.

"In the course of the night of the 21st, I received intelligence, of the truth of which I could not doubt, that general Chauvel had arrived at Pollos on the 20th, with the cavalry and horse artillery of the army of the north, to join marshal Marmont; and I was quite certain that these troops would join him on the 22nd or 23rd at latest.

"There was no time to be lost therefore; and I determined that, if circumstances should not permit me to attack him on the 22nd, I would move towards Ciudad Rodrigo without further loss of time, as the difference of the numbers of cavalry might have made a march of manœuvre, such as

we have had for the last four or five days, very difficult, and its result doubtful.

"During the night of the 21st, the enemy had taken possession of the village of Calvarassa de Arriba, and of the heights near it, called Nuestra Señora de la Peña, our cavalry being in possession of Calvarassa de Abaxo; and shortly after daylight, detachments from both armies attempted to obtain possession of the more distant from our right of the two hills called Dos Arapiles.

"The enemy, however, succeeded; their detachments being the strongest, and having been concealed in the woods nearer the hill than we were; by which success they strengthened materially their own position, and had in their power increased means of annoying ours.

"In the morning the light troops of the 7th division, and the 4th caçadores belonging to general Pack's brigade, were engaged with the enemy on the height called Nuestra Señora de la Peña, on which height they maintained themselves with the enemy throughout the day. The possession by the enemy, however, of the more distant of the Arapiles rendered it necessary for me to extend the right of the army *en potence* to the height behind the village of Arapiles, and to occupy that village with light infantry; and here I placed the 4th division under the command of lieutenant-general the hon. L. Cole; and, although from the variety of the enemy's movements, it was difficult to form a satisfactory judgment of his intentions, I considered that, upon the whole, his objects were upon the left of the Tormes. I therefore ordered major-general the Hon. E. Packenham, who commanded the 3rd division, in the absence of lieutenant-general Picton, on account of ill-health, to move across the Tormes with the troops under his command, including brigadier-general D'Urban's cavalry, and place himself behind Aldea Tejada; brigadier-general Bradford's brigade of Portuguese infantry, and Don Carlos de España's infantry having been moved up likewise to the neighbourhood of Los Torres, between the 3rd and 4th divisions.

"After a variety of evolutions and movements, the enemy appeared to have determined upon his plan about two in the afternoon; and, under cover of a very heavy cannonade, which, however, did us but very little damage, he extended his left, and moved forward his troops, apparently with an intention to embrace, by the position of his troops, and by his fire, our post on that



of the two Arapiles which we possessed; and from thence to attack and break our line, or, at all events, to render difficult any movement of ours to our right.

“The extension of his line to his left, however, and its advance upon our right, notwithstanding that its troops still occupied very strong ground, and his position was well defended by cannon, gave me an opportunity of attacking him, for which I had long been anxious. I reinforced our right with the 5th division, under lieutenant-general Leith, which I placed behind the village of Arapiles, on the right of the 4th division, and with the 6th and 7th divisions in reserve; and as soon as these troops had taken their station, I ordered major-general the Hon. E. Packenham to move forward with the 3rd division, and general D'Urban's cavalry, and two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, under lieutenant-colonel Harvey, in four columns, to turn the enemy's left on the heights; while brigadier-general Bradford's brigade, the 5th division, under lieutenant-general Leith, the 4th division, under lieutenant-general the Hon. L. Cole, and the cavalry, under lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton, should attack them in front, supported in reserve by the 6th division, under major-general Clinton, the 7th under major-general Hope, and don Carlos de España's Spanish division; and brigadier-general Pack should support the left of the 4th division, by attacking that of the Dos Arapiles, which the enemy held. The 1st and light divisions occupied the ground on the left, and were in reserve.

“The attack upon the enemy's left was made in the manner above described, and completely succeeded. Major-general the hon. E. Packenham formed the 3rd division across the enemy's flank, and overthrew every thing opposed to him. These troops were supported, in the most gallant style, by the Portuguese cavalry, under brigadier-general D'Urban, and lieutenant-colonel Harvey's squadrons of the 14th, who successfully defeated every attempt made by the enemy on the flank of the 3rd division.

“Brigadier-general Bradford's brigade, the 5th and 4th divisions, and the cavalry, under lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton, attacked the enemy in front, and drove his troops before them from one height to another, bringing forward their right, so as to acquire strength upon the enemy's flank, in proportion to the advance. Brigadier-

general Pack made a very gallant attack upon the Arapiles, in which, however, he did not succeed, excepting in dividing the attention of the enemy's corps, placed upon it, from the troops under the command of lieutenant-general Cole, in his advance.

“The cavalry, under lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton, made a most gallant and successful charge against a body of the enemy's infantry, which they overthrew and cut to pieces. In this charge major-general Le Marchant was killed at the head of his brigade; and I have to regret the loss of a most able officer.

“After the crest of the height was carried, one division of the enemy's infantry made a stand against the 4th division, which, after a severe contest, was obliged to give way, in consequence of the enemy having thrown some troops on the left of the 4th division, after the failure of brigadier-general Pack's attack upon the Arapiles, and lieutenant-general the honourable L. Cole having been wounded. Marshal sir W. Beresford, who happened to be upon the spot, directed brigadier-general Spry's brigade of the 5th division, which was in the second line, to change its front, and to bring its fire on the flank of the enemy's division; and, I am sorry to add that, while engaged in this service, he received a wound which I am apprehensive will deprive me of the benefit of his counsel and assistance for some time. Nearly about the same time lieutenant-general Leith received a wound which unfortunately obliged him to quit the field. I ordered up the 6th division, under major-general Clinton, to relieve the 4th, and the battle was soon restored to its former success.

“The enemy's right, however, reinforced by the troops which had fled from his left, and by those which had now retired from the Arapiles, still continued to resist; and I ordered the first and light divisions, and colonel Stubbs' Portuguese brigade of the 4th division, which was reformed, and major-general W. Anson's brigade, likewise of the 4th division, to turn the right, while the 6th division, supported by the 3rd and 5th, attacked the front. It was dark before this point was carried by the 6th division; and the enemy fled through the woods towards the Tormes. I pursued them with the 1st and light division, and major-general W. Anson's brigade of the 4th division, and some squadrons of cavalry under lieutenant-general sir S. Cotton, as long as we could



find any of them together, directing our march upon Huerta and the fords of the Tormes, by which the enemy had passed in their advance; but the darkness of the night was highly advantageous to the enemy, many of whom escaped under its cover who must otherwise have been in our hands. I am sorry to report that, owing to the same cause, lieutenant-general sir S. Cotton was unfortunately wounded by one of our own sentries after we had halted.

"We renewed the pursuit at break of day in the morning with the same troops, and major-general Bock's and major-general Anson's brigades of cavalry, which joined during the night; and, having crossed the Tormes, we came up with the enemy's rear of cavalry and infantry near La Serna. They were immediately attacked by the two brigades of dragoons, and the cavalry fled, leaving the infantry to their fate. I have never witnessed a more gallant charge than was made on the enemy's infantry by the heavy brigade of the King's German Legion, under major-general Bock, which was completely successful; and the whole body of infantry, consisting of three battalions of the enemy's 1st division, were made prisoners. The pursuit was afterwards continued as far as Peñaranda last night, and our troops are still following the flying enemy. Their head-quarters were in this town, not less than ten leagues from the field of battle, for a few hours last night; and they are now considerably advanced on the road towards Valladolid, by Arevalo. They were joined yesterday on their retreat by the cavalry and artillery of the army of the North, which have arrived at too late a period, it is to be hoped, to be of much use to them.

"It is impossible to form a conjecture of the amount of the enemy's loss in this action; but, from all reports, it is very considerable. We have taken from them eleven pieces of cannon,\* several ammunition wagons, two eagles, and six colours; and one general, three colonels, three lieutenant-colonels, 130 officers of inferior rank, and between 6,000 and 7,000 soldiers are prisoners;† and our detachments are sending in

more at every moment. The number of dead on the field is very large.

"I am informed that marshal Marmont is badly wounded, and has lost one of his arms; and that four general officers have been killed, and several wounded.

"Such an advantage could not have been acquired without material loss on our side; but it certainly has not been of a magnitude to distress the army, or to cripple its operations.

"I have great pleasure in reporting to your lordship that, throughout this trying day, of which I have related the events, I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the general officers and troops. The relation which I have written of its events will give a general idea of the share which each individual had in them; and I cannot say too much in praise of the conduct of every individual in his station.

"I am much indebted to marshal sir W. Beresford for his friendly counsel and assistance, both previous to, and during the action; to lieutenant-generals sir S. Cotton, Leith, and Cole, and major-generals Clinton, and the honourable E. Packenham, for the manner in which they led the divisions of cavalry and infantry under their command respectively; to major-general Hulse, commanding a brigade in the 6th division; major-general G. Anson, commanding a brigade of cavalry; colonel Hinde; colonel the honourable W. Ponsonby, commanding major-general Le Marchant's brigade after the fall of that officer; to major-general W. Anson, commanding a brigade in the 4th division; major-general Pringle, commanding a brigade in the 5th division, and the division after lieutenant-general Leith was wounded; brigadier-general Bradford; brigadier-general Spry; colonel Stubbs; and brigadier-general Power, of the Portuguese service: likewise to lieutenant-colonel Campbell of the 94th, commanding a brigade in the 3rd division; lieutenant-colonel Williams of the 6th foot; lieutenant-colonel Wallace of the 88th, commanding a brigade in the 3rd division; lieutenant-colonel Ellis of the 52nd, commanding major-general the honourable E. Packenham's brigade in the 4th division, during his absence in the command of the 3rd division; lieutenant-colonel the honourable C. Greville of the 38th regiment, commanding major-general Hay's brigade in the 5th division, during his absence on leave; brigadier-general Pack; brigadier-general the Conde de Re-

\* The official returns only account for eleven pieces of cannon, but it is believed that twenty have fallen into our hands.

† The prisoners are supposed to amount to 7,000; but it has not been possible to ascertain their number exactly, from the advance of the army immediately after the action was over.



zende of the Portuguese service; colonel Douglas of the 8th Portuguese regiment; lieutenant-colonel the conde de Ficalho of the same regiment; and lieutenant-colonel Bingham of the 53rd regiment; likewise to brigadier-general D'Urban and lieutenant-colonel Hervey of the 14th light dragoons; colonel lord E. Somerset, commanding the 4th dragoons; and lieutenant-colonel the honourable F. Ponsonby, commanding the 12th light dragoons.

"I must also mention lieutenant-colonel Woodford, commanding the light battalion of the brigade of guards, who, supported by two companies of the fusiliers, under the command of captain Crowder, maintained the village of Arapiles against all the efforts of the enemy, previous to the attack upon their position by our troops.

"In a case in which the conduct of all has been conspicuously good, I regret that the necessary limits of a despatch prevent me from drawing your lordship's notice to the conduct of a larger number of individuals; but I can assure your lordship that there was no officer or corps engaged in this action who did not perform his duty by his sovereign and his country.

"The royal and German artillery, under lieutenant-colonel Framingham, distinguished themselves by the accuracy of their fire wherever it was possible to use them; and they advanced to the attack of the enemy's position with the same gallantry as the other troops.

"I am particularly indebted to lieutenant-colonel De Lancy, the deputy quarter-master-general, the head of the department present, in the absence of the quarter-master-general, and to the officers of that department and of the staff corps, for the assistance I received from them, particularly lieutenant-colonel the honourable L. Dundas and lieutenant-colonel Sturgeon of the latter, and major Scovell of the former; and to lieutenant-colonel Waters, at present at the head of the adjutant-general's department at head-quarters; and to the officers of that department, as well at head-quarters as with the several divisions of the army; and lieutenant-colonel lord Fitzroy Somerset, and the officers of my personal staff. Among the latter I particularly request your lordship to draw the attention of his royal highness the prince regent to his serene highness the hereditary prince of Orange, whose conduct in the field, as well upon every other occasion, entitles him to

my highest commendation, and has acquired for him the respect and regard of the whole army.

"I have had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Mariscal de Campo Don Carlos de España, and of brigadier Don Julian Sanchez, and with that of the troops under their command respectively, and with that of the Mariscal de Campo Don Miguel de Alava, and of brigadier Don José O'Lawlor, employed with this army by the Spanish government, from whom, and from the Spanish authorities and people in general, I received every assistance I could expect.

"It is but justice likewise to draw your lordship's attention upon this occasion to the merits of the officers of the civil departments of the army. Notwithstanding the increased distance of our operations from our magazines, and that the country is completely exhausted, we have hitherto wanted nothing, owing to the diligence and attention of the commissary-general, Mr. Bissett, and the officers of the department under his direction. I have likewise to mention that, by the attention and ability of Dr. M'Grigor, and of the officers of the department under his charge, our wounded, as well as those of the enemy, left in our hands, have been well taken care of; and I hope that many of these valuable men will be saved to the service.

"Captain lord Clinton will have the honour of laying at the feet of his royal highness the prince regent the eagles and colours taken from the enemy in this action."

"WELLINGTON."

The annexed was addressed by lord Wellington to earl Bathurst, and in a light and playful manner alludes to the great victory he had just achieved:—

"Flores de Avila, 24th July, 1812.

"I hope that you will be pleased with our battle, of which the despatch contains as accurate an account as I can give you. There was no mistake; everything went on as it ought; and there never was an army so beaten in so short a time. If we had had another hour or two of daylight, not a man would have passed the Tormes; and as it was, they would all have been taken if ——— had left the garrison in Alba de Tormes as I wished and desired; or, having taken it away, as I believe before he was aware of my wishes, he had informed me that it was not there. If he had, I should have marched in the night upon Alba, where I should have caught them all, instead of



upon the fords of the Tormes. But this is a little misfortune, which does not diminish the honour acquired by the troops in the action; nor, I hope, the advantage to be derived from it by the country; as I do not believe there are many soldiers who were in that action, who are likely to face us again till they shall be very largely reinforced indeed.

"I am very anxious that a mark of his royal highness' favour should be conferred upon sir S. Cotton. I believe he would be much gratified at receiving the red riband. No cavalry could act better than ours did in the action; and I must say for sir Stapleton, that I do not know where we should find an officer that would command our cavalry in this country half so well as he does."

The following is the duke's letter to sir Thomas Graham, in which he describes this important battle:—

"Flores de Avila,

"25th July, 1812.

"I took up the ground which you were to have taken during the siege of Salamanca, only the left was thrown back on the heights, it being unnecessary, under the circumstances, to cover the ford of Santa Martha. We had a race for the large Arapiles, which is the more distant of the two detached heights which you will recollect on the right of your position; this race the

French won, and they were too strong to be dislodged without a general action.

"I knew that the French were to be joined by the cavalry of the army of the north on the 22nd or 23rd, and that the army of the centre was likely to be in motion. Marmont ought to have given me a *pont d'or*, and he would have made a handsome operation of it. But instead of that, after manœuvring all the morning in the usual French style, nobody knew with what object, he at last pressed upon my right in such a manner, at the same time without engaging, that he would have either carried our Arapiles, or he would have confined us entirely to our position. This was not to be endured, and we fell upon him, turning his left flank; and I never saw an army receive such a beating.

"I had desired the Spaniards to continue to occupy the castle of Alba de Tormes. — had evacuated it, I believe, before he knew my wishes; and he was afraid to let me know that he had done so; and I did not know it till I found no enemy at the fords of the Tormes. When I lost sight of them in the dark, I marched upon Huerta and Encinas, and they went by Alba. If I had known there had been no garrison at Alba, I should have marched there, and should probably have had the whole.

"Believe me to be, &c.,

"WELLINGTON."

#### EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

SUCH was the great and important battle of Salamanca—a battle which, from the peculiarities attending it, stands foremost of all the contests in the Peninsular war. It effaced the last traces of the spell of French invincibility, and showed that however highly skilled in military manœuvres their generals might be, that they had now to oppose them an enemy who was equally their match, both in skill and bravery. Well might a contemporary writer, when speaking of this battle, say, that "whether we consider it in reference to the uncommon sagacity displayed by lord Wellington in taking advantage of the injudicious movement of his adversary, the promptitude and skill with which the plans and arrangements were formed in this critical moment, the intrepidity and success with which all these arrangements were executed, or the final issue

of the whole, must be deemed the most decisive proof of the superiority of British military talent and bravery; and a battle to which the sons of Britain may always appeal with the proudest feeling, as challenging a comparison with any that history records."

The great achievements of the British arms in the course of this war, which we have still to narrate, may perhaps cause the battle of Salamanca, in the view of the cursory reader, to lose comparatively some of its importance; but those who with intelligence study the links of cause and effect, will find that it marks a brilliant and important era in British history. Wellington's previous successes, though far from unimportant, did not appear to make that lasting impression on the enemy which might justify the hope that the day of his expulsion from the Peninsula was at hand. Though frequently baffled,



the French force had heretofore remained unbroken. The victory of Salamanca created a feeling with regard to British interference in Spain which had been till then unknown. "Marmont," says the writer already quoted, "seems to have thought that he could, by the variety and rapid change of his movements, so utterly and deeply fill the thoughts of lord Wellington, for the protection and safety of his own army, that he would not be able to direct any active thought against the French army. In this, Marmont underrated the powers of lord Wellington's mind, and it is from a reference to this circumstance, that we are best able to estimate the great merit of lord Wellington, in the victory which he gained at Salamanca. This circumstance distinguished it far above his former victories, not less than its consequences did, and this circumstance rendered it particularly interesting and instructive to military men. In his former victories lord Wellington had not room for the full display of his military genius: they had been won as much by the discipline and valour of his troops, as by his own talents, since those talents, from the circumstances in which the battles were fought, could only exert themselves in the evolutions necessary during the battles, whereas at Salamanca there was ample room for the display and exercise of military genius of the highest order, and rarest kind."

The French ascribed their disastrous overthrow at Salamanca to the error of a subordinate commander, but it was impossible to deny the fact that the English general was one who, if a military error was committed in his presence, could instantly turn it to account.

The effects of this great event were most important—the confidence of wavering allies was confirmed—the evacuation of Madrid was rendered necessary—the siege of Cadiz was raised—Andalusia and Castile were delivered from military occupation—while Napoleon was prevented from reinforcing his army of the north from the troops in the Peninsula, as he had notice of Marmont's defeat as early as the 2nd of September, a week before the great battle of Borodino.

The inhabitants of Salamanca had watched from all the high grounds about the city, the various changes of the battle, with painful anxiety, and when, after the total discomfiture of the French, the allied troops entered the town, they were received with the most rapturous demonstrations of joy.

Mules and cars laden with refreshments were despatched from Salamanca to the field of battle; every care was taken of the wounded, and every exertion made to alleviate their sufferings; here might be seen the interesting spectacle of Spanish girls supporting from the field such of the wounded as were able to walk, and carrying for them their knapsacks and muskets. High mass was said in the cathedral, which the duke attended, and the new Spanish constitution was proclaimed with great ceremony.

Favoured by the night, and aided by the untoward circumstance of d'España's not having communicated his abandonment of the castle of Alba, the enemy continued their retreat, Clausel employing the time with great skill and energy in carrying off his broken army. But he was allowed no respite; the pursuit was renewed at the break of the following day, and Bock and Anson's brigades of cavalry having joined during the night, the pursuers came up in the course of the morning of the 23rd, with the rear-guard of the enemy, both cavalry and infantry, near La Serna. They immediately attacked the cavalry, which taking to flight, and leaving the infantry, drawn up in three squares, to its fate, with unhesitating spirit, they charged the squares, broke them, and captured 900 prisoners. Such as were not cut up or taken, threw away their arms, and scrambling over the fields, joined the main body of the retiring army. But as the French were still strong in cavalry and horse artillery, having been joined at Naval de Sotroval, two days after the battle, by Chauvel's long expected reinforcement in those arms, and by making forced marches, they reached Valladolid without further loss. So headlong had been their flight, that Clausel's head-quarters were on the night of the 23rd, at Flores de Avila, which is ten leagues from the field of battle. To that city Wellington pursued them, and they retired to Burgos as he approached. In Valladolid, which he entered on the 30th, and was greeted with as enthusiastic a reception as he had received at Salamanca, he captured 800 sick and wounded, seventeen pieces of artillery, and considerable stores. On the next day the allies recrossed the Douro, and head-quarters being fixed at Cuellar, preparations were made for a move against the army of the centre, under Joseph and Jourdan, which had, since the battle of the 22nd, been manœuvring at no great distance from the allies, to favour the escape of the



defeated force, and allow time for Clausel to rally it. At this time the movements of the English chief were so impeded for want of supplies and money, that in a letter to the secretary-of-war he said—"we are absolutely bankrupts. The troops are now five months in arrears, instead of being one in advance. The staff has not been paid since February, the muleteers not since June, 1811." By great exertions, however, supplies were brought up, and on the 6th of August, the English general, leaving the 6th division, Anson's brigade of cavalry, and some of the regiments which had suffered most in the late battle, to observe the line of the Douro, and prevent the junction between the armies of Portugal and the centre, marched on the capital by the route of Segovia and St. Ildefonso.\* On the 9th he reached St. Ildefonso, and on the two following days, the troops defiling by the passes of Guadarama and Naval Serrada, crossed the mountains, and descended into the plains of new Castile.† Though Joseph Buonaparte made a show of resistance by placing his army across the roads leading from the passes of the Guadarama, he fled hurriedly to Madrid, from which he retreated with all his court and followers, to the number of above 2,000 persons, and crossing the Tagus, anxious to leave it as a barrier between him and the English, retreated on Valencia. On the evening of

the 11th the advanced guard, composed of D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry, supported by captain Macdonald's troop of horse artillery, and of the German legion, came up with the cavalry and outposts of Joseph's army, and driving them in, made themselves masters of Majalahonda. The enemy's cavalry, who had been compelled to retire in the morning, returned in greater numbers in the latter part of the day, when D'Urban forming his men, ordered them to charge the enemy's leading squadrons; but when they came within a few paces of the enemy, they disgracefully fled through the village upon the German dragoons, who were posted at Las Rosas, about a mile in the rear, leaving the guns of Macdonald's troop of horse artillery totally unprotected, and dashed through the village upon the German dragoons. Macdonald made a vigorous effort to save his guns, but three of them being overturned, fell into the hands of the enemy. Though surprised, the Germans charged as they best could; and, in small bodies, sword in hand, many of them being undressed, resisted the enemy, until Ponsonby's cavalry and the 7th division appearing in the distance, the enemy suddenly fell back on Madrid, having set fire to the three gun-carriages. The enemy slew 200 of the brave German horsemen, and carried off 140 of their horses.

Maxwell gives the following account of

\* Segovia, a celebrated town of Old Castile, where are many remains of Moorish and Roman antiquity. Among the former is the Alcazar, once the palace of the Moorish kings, and afterwards of Ferdinand and Isabella, but which since their days has been used as a state prison. This building stands on a rock, rising some hundred feet above the river, which winds round nearly three-fourths of its base, and is cut off from the town on the remaining portion by a deep ditch and defences. The aqueduct, said to have been built by Trajan, is to be seen at different points between the town and Ildefonso, where the water is obtained; but the most remarkable feature of this structure is the portion in the suburb of the town, consisting of two rows of arches one above the other, nearly two hundred in number, the whole being formed of large blocks of stone, fitted into and supporting each other without cement, having thus withstood the ravages of time for eighteen centuries. San Ildefonso is a village fifty miles north of Madrid. Here is situated the palace of La Granja, a favourite summer residence of the royal family. The building and gardens, with the numerous *jets d'eau*, were formed after the model of the palace and gardens of Versailles, by the Bourbon dynasty on their accession to the throne of Spain. The palace is situate at the bottom of the Sierra Nevada, an attached ridge of the Guadarama, in a recess on the north side of the mountain, which rises to a considerable height, covered with trees to its summit, and to the east and

west; thus sheltering it at all times from the scorching heats of summer. The front of the building looks to the gardens, which rise before it, till they terminate in the craggy, pine-covered summit, adding much to the picturesque beauty of this delightful residence. The whole presents a scene, certainly, much more calculated to remind the beholder of the verdure and freshness of a more northern clime than of the burning fields and sultry sun of Spain.—*Maxwell*.

† From our bivouac in the woods of Ildefonso, at daybreak on the 10th of August, we began to ascend the mountain; the road winding among stately pines and rugged precipices, at every point presenting behind us a prospect in every way worthy to arrest the attention. From the summit we commanded a boundless view of the country we had lately traversed, interesting from being the scene of our past toils and victories; while in our front lay one not less so from its novelty, from the many striking objects that presented themselves to the eye; but, above all, awaking feelings the most intensely interesting, from our near approach upon the capital of Spain, a flying and dispirited enemy in our front. With exhilarated spirits we descended the wooded skirts of the mountain, the palace of the Escorial to our right, while more distant lay Madrid, with its hundred globe-topped spires, the indications of former Moorish sway. Encamping in the neighbourhood upon the 12th, we moved into the city the following day.—*Mackie*.



this untoward affair :—" On the evening of the 11th, the army of Lord Wellington was comfortably bivouacked three miles in the rear of Majalahonda. The Portuguese cavalry, under D'Urban, forming the advanced guard, were pushed forward a mile beyond the village, in which two regiments of German dragoons, and Macdonald's brigade of horse artillery, were posted to support them. Some trifling skirmishing had taken place during the day, between the Portuguese cavalry and the French lancers, who formed part of Joseph Buonaparte's escort, but it led to no serious result. No hostile movement was apprehended—all foretold a quiet night—when suddenly the horse-artillery opened in front of the village, and announced that the outposts were attacked. In a few minutes it was ascertained that the Portuguese dragoons had given way—and indeed, their flight was most disgraceful; they rode off at speed, without crossing a sabre, leaving their brave supporters, the horse-artillery, surrounded by the enemy. Nor was theirs a momentary panic—the fugitives dashed through the village of Majalahonda, without an attempt to rally—while many of the startled horsemen there were cut down before they could reach their saddles, and their colonel was killed in the act of dressing. But still, though surprised, the Germans maintained their well-won reputation; these gallant troopers charged as they best could; and in small bodies, sword in hand, met, checked, and at last fairly drove back the lancers. The cowardice of the Portu-

guese on this occasion was indefensible—they had scarcely a casualty to show—while, of the brave men who fought so gallantly, half-armed and surprised, 200 were put *hors de combat*, 120 horses carried off, and three guns taken. The cannon were recovered—but, to use the words of an amusing writer, whose military descriptions are lively and characteristic—"it was one of the most disgraceful and unlooked-for events that had taken place during the campaign. To be beaten at any time was bad enough; but to be beaten by a handful of lancers on the eve of our entering Madrid, almost in view of the city, was worse than all."

The duke thus refers to the same event in one of his despatches :—" We had a devil of an affair on the evening of the 11th. The French, 2,000 cavalry, moved upon the Portuguese cavalry; D'Urban ordered them to charge the advanced squadrons, which charge they did not execute as they ought, and they ran off, leaving our guns (captain M'Donald's troop). They ran in upon the German cavalry, half a mile or more in their rear, where they were brought up; but they would not charge upon the left of the Germans. These charged and stopped the enemy; but colonel de Jonquiers was taken, and we have lost a good many of these fine fellows. There are twenty killed, and about as many wounded and prisoners. We likewise lost three guns of M'Donald's troops in the Portuguese flight, but the French left them behind."

#### LORD WELLINGTON'S ENTRY INTO MADRID.

On the 12th of August, a memorable epoch, the allied army and its illustrious chief entered Madrid, amidst the most enthusiastic acclamations, and every demonstration of joy and exultation by all ranks throughout the capital. It was a day of public jubilee. All business was suspended; the inhabitants sallied forth in throngs, bearing laurel branches, welcomed their liberators at the gates with tears of joy, and waving handkerchiefs, and showering flowers upon them to evince their gratitude. "Every individual, from the first to the last," says a participator in the scene, "embraced either the officer or a soldier whom they could first lay hold of while we were marching. They invited us to their

homes, and insisted on our drinking wine with them almost at every corner of the streets. With tears, and every other sign of deep emotion, the inhabitants crowded around the horse of the illustrious conqueror, hung on his stirrups, touched his clothes, or throwing themselves upon the earth, blessed him aloud as the friend of Spain." "The entrance into the capital," said the editor of the *Madrid Gazette*, in the first number of that journal, published after the occupation of that city by the allied army, "was equal to the triumphal entries of the heroes of antiquity." Instantly Wellington proceeded to reconnoitre the Retiro palace, which the French had strongly fortified, and was garrisoned by 2,500 men. The place stands



on a rising ground at the eastern extremity of Madrid. Having been converted into a depôt of the enemy, it then contained 23,000 stand of arms, upwards of 180 pieces of brass ordnance, eight field guns, and an immense quantity of trenching tools and stores, among which were the cables and hawsers with which the centre arch of the Almansor bridge was repaired, to enable sir Rowland Hill to march to Madrid. The eagles of the 13th and 57th regiments were also deposited there. By the evening of the 13th, the place was completely invested; and on the morning of the 14th, while arrangements were making for the attack of the place, the commandant surrendered.

In the evening of the 13th, don Carlos de España was appointed governor of Madrid, and the ancient government of the cortes and Ferdinand VII. was anew proclaimed. The new constitution was proclaimed amid the vivas of exulting crowds. All was joy and exultation. The entire population poured into the streets and squares; every tongue was loosened; on all sides were heard the accents of joy. "The scene was truly grand," says the paper already mentioned. "His lordship was attended by the flower of the British nobility, and by all the generals of the allied armies—whilst the Spanish nobility and the dignitaries of the church came out to meet him, accompanied by almost the whole population of the city, to witness the presentation of the keys. The air was rent with cries of long live the great duke of Rodrigo; but the elegant females, and those of the first rank, threw under his horse's feet, not only laurels and flowers, but even shawls and veils of the finest texture. When he attempted to alight at the palace assigned for his residence, women of the first quality embraced and kissed him, and even every person whom they took for him, so that it was a long time before he and his generals could get housed. There was, indeed, but little trouble in getting billets, for the inhabitants took hold of the British officers where they could find them, and insisted on making them inmates of their homes. The doors of all the houses were seen instantly adorned as if by enchantment, and every thing contributed to prove that the inhabitants considered the day as the aurora of liberty. The council of Madrid also entertained the marquis with a magnificent bull-fight. When he appeared in the royal box, twelve thousand spectators made the air ring with their repeated cheers."

On August the 22nd, the newly-appointed municipal council of Madrid, with the governor at their head, waited on the English general, with all the ceremonies of state, to offer him the following congratulatory address as duke of Ciudad Rodrigo:—"The inhabitants of Madrid manifest to your excellency, by the voice of their magistrates, the satisfaction they feel at seeing in the palace of their kings the illustrious conqueror of Vimiera and Talavera—the deliverer of Portugal—the conqueror of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos—the hero who, on the plains of Salamanca, humbled the pride of our perfidious and cruel enemies, frustrated their designs, and broke the chains which disgraced the capital of the Spanish empire, by a memorable victory, which history shall transmit to the latest posterity." To this proud and swelling enumeration of his great exploits, Wellington replied with simple dignity and unaffected modesty. After stating that he was sensible of the honour the council had conferred on him by the visit—"The events of war," said he, "are in the hands of Providence;" adding, "that he should continue to make every effort ultimately to establish the independence, prosperity, and happiness of Spain." Feelings such as these, so free from the elation and intoxication of triumph were the sure prelude of future and still more glorious exploits.

But, amidst these festivities and rejoicings, the poor Medrileños were suffering famine—of which 20,000 persons had died between September, 1811, and July, 1812—produced by the oppression and pillage of their cruel enemy. This was remedied in a small degree by the subscriptions raised among the English officers for the establishment of soup kitchens, &c. "At night," says one who witnessed the sad spectacle, "the groans, and stifled cries of famishing people were heard, and every morning emaciated dead bodies cast into the streets, showed why their cries had ceased. Even noble families secretly sought charity that they might live."

Honours and titles now thickly accumulated on lord Wellington. When the news of the victory at Salamanca reached England, it was hailed with great joy, and celebrated by a general illumination. Wellington was created a marquis of the United Kingdom, and allowed to add to his armorial bearings, in the dexter quarter, an escutcheon, charged with the crosses of St. George, St.



Andrew, and St. Patrick; being the union badge of the United Kingdom, as a lasting memorial of his glorious achievements; and subsequently, £100,000 was granted by parliament to purchase lands, and enable him to support the dignity of the peerage. In addition to the title of duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, the knighthood of the golden fleece was subsequently conferred on him, and he was made generalissimo of the Spanish armies. The prince regent of Portugal created him, in addition to the title of conde de Vimiero, marquis of Torres Vedras, a title subsequently augmented to that of duque da Vittoria. But in the midst of the enjoyment of these honours and titles, the private finances of their possessor were suffering

\* The instances of the duke's disinterestedness and charitable disposition are numerous. In 1810, during the French invasion of Portugal he contributed liberally from his private resources to the relief of the distress and misery of the Portuguese population. His refusal of the pay attached to his high commands in the Portuguese and Spanish armies, as also of the rental of the Spanish estate given by the central junta, and the appropriation of the same to the use of each country during the war, is an instance of disinterestedness of which it would be difficult to find its parallel. When the Portuguese regency appointed the duke field-marshal-general of the Portuguese armies, he declined accepting the pay and emoluments attached to the rank, which were about £12,000 sterling a-year; and he again refused to accept the annual accumulations which the Portuguese government had reserved, with the hope that they would eventually meet with his acceptance, and his request was that the accumulated sums should be distributed among the officers of the Portuguese army, who had faithfully served their country. His conduct was equally disinterested and magnanimous in regard to the appointments of the Spanish central junta. He declined the acceptance of the pay and emoluments attached to his appointment of captain-general, or generalissimo of the Spanish armies, which amounted to about the same sum annually as his Portuguese appointments, and requested that the proceeds might be transferred to the Spanish treasury during the war, to be appropriated to the use of the state. He even transferred to the same use during the struggle for Spanish independence, the revenue (17,000\$) arising from the estate, which the junta had conferred on him during the time the war might last; and even in the selection of the estate, he manifested the same disinterestedness; of the three estates the junta submitted to his selection, he chose the least valuable one, namely, the Soto de Romana, situated on the river Xenil, about two leagues from Grenada, merely on account of its picturesqueness. Much misapprehension prevails on this subject, and has been occasioned by the duke's invariable practice when applied to for contributions towards public charities, to request the applicants not to make public his donation. The instances of his private charity were not few. The frauds practised on him by the begging-letter impostor (Stone), and the woman (Stanley), with whom he cohabited, under the pretences that she was the daughter of officers who had

great derangement; in explicit language, the income allowed him was insufficient to meet his necessary and unavoidable expenses. In a letter written to lord Bathurst, a few days after his triumphant entry into Madrid, he says, "I have been going on for more than three years upon the usual allowance of a commander-in-chief, that is, ten pounds per diem, liable to various deductions; among others, of income-tax, reducing it to about eight guineas; but it will be necessary that government should now either give me an additional pay, under the head of 'table money,' or any other they please, or that they should allow me to charge some of the expenses, such as charities,\* &c., which I am obliged to incur, in the existing

been slain under the duke's command, are fresh in the recollection of the public. His conduct towards the son of Dhoondiah Waugh, his extra duplicate majesty of Indian notoriety, who was slain, after a long and arduous "royal chase," is a convincing proof of the generosity of his disposition. He took him under his protection, and when he left India, settled a pension on him for the purpose of defraying the expenses of his education. As one of his biographers has justly said, the assertion by misinformed and factious writers, that the duke's nature was "cold and unfeeling,"—is false. If other proofs were wanting, his extensive correspondence published in the *Despatches* proves that misfortune obtained his sympathy and the widow and orphan met frequently in him a warm and an eloquent friend. Lord Ellesmere, in his recent lecture in the Worsley Library and Reading-rooms, introduced the following anecdote of the duke's sensibility to distress. He told his auditors, that a lady present in the lecture-room had once directed the duke's attention to the case of a distressed needle-woman at Nottingham, whose privations had been recorded in the *Morning Chronicle*. The lecturer said, that the duke made some remark at the time, but on the following morning informed the lecturer that he had written to the editor of that journal, stating that the poor woman should have her wishes, namely, a passage to the colonies, complied with at his expense. And the instances of the like benevolent and beneficent feeling are not rare. A lady wrote to the duke requesting his autograph, to dispose of among a collection of the kind, at a charitable sale. The duke's reply was—"London, May 17, 1847.—F.M. the duke of Wellington presents his compliments to Mrs. N—. To aid in promoting the object of a charity is one thing—to send a signature for sale at a bazaar is another. To comply with the latter may prove very injurious to those with whom the sender of the signature might have pecuniary relations. F.M. the duke of Wellington therefore declines to do the latter; but he incloses a pecuniary contribution (£5) to the charity which Mrs. N— desires to promote." And even no later than within five days of his death, he gave evidence of his charitable disposition. Mr. John Hughes, of Downsend, near Bristol, having addressed a letter to the duke, requesting his interference to procure a pension for a man, named Joseph Flock, who had served in the 15th hussars, and had been in



SOUTHERN ITALY.



The Illustrations by A.E. Ward & Engraved by J. Rogers.

The Map Drawn & Engraved by J. Rogers.



state of this country, or I shall be ruined. It is not proper, probably, to advert to other services; but I believe there is no service in which a commander-in-chief, with such a charge as I have, is so badly paid as in the British service. Indeed, as far as I can learn, there is no instance of an officer holding a permanent command in the British service whose receipts have been confined to ten pounds per diem, with deductions. They all receive either the allowance of a government, with that of a commander-in-chief, or

an allowance of some other description; but I doubt that the trouble or responsibility, or the expenses of any at all equal mine. However, I should not have mentioned the subject, knowing that the public expect in these days to be well served at the lowest possible rate of expense, if I did not find that I was in a situation in which I must incur expenses which I cannot defray without doing myself an injury." This letter produced the parliamentary grant of £100,000 already mentioned.

### THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION.

DURING the occurrence of these transactions, the Sicilian expedition to the eastern coast of Spain, and that of sir Home Popham to the north-western coast, took place, and were intended as diversions to prevent the enemy from concentrating his armies upon the allied force under lord Wellington. To enable the reader properly to understand these operations, it will be necessary to take a rapid glance at the affairs of Sicily at this period. In the year 1806, English troops had been landed in that island, and from that time up to the period of which we are now treating, they had been maintained there at a great expense. A luxurious prince and a thoughtless court, had, however, rendered their efforts almost unavailing for any of the purposes for which they were intended. English generals had successively remonstrated, but to little purpose, though a subsidy was annually paid to the Sicilian government by England, amounting to from three to four hundred thousand pounds. The object of this advance was to insure the Sicilian army being placed on a proper footing, but it still remained badly paid, and deficient in discipline. The king is spoken of as not being wanting in understanding, but like his namesake of Spain, so his personal enjoyments were secured, all else seemed beneath his care. To Caroline of Austria, the sister of Marie Antoinette, the combat of Sahagun, and the battles of Vittoria, Orthes, Thoulouse, and Waterloo; the duke replied, that he had no power to procure a pension or reward for any soldier, adding—"all the duke can do is to give the man charity," which he accordingly did. In a word, his purse was ever open to the wants and distresses of the soldier's orphan and widow; it was that feeling which rendered him the

he was content to leave all affairs of state. Queen Caroline had been one of the most fervent admirers of Nelson. She was considered amiable, generous, and though addicted to pleasure, capable of acting a noble part on great occasions. The miserable fate of her sister had, in the course of years, produced in her, so it was thought, a mournful change; and from being gay and gentle, she became angry and vindictive. She prompted that severity towards the Neapolitan admiral, Caraccioli, which threw dishonour on the name of the hero of the Nile. Great misfortunes had since overtaken her, and soured by these, she was disposed to regard all who avowed themselves favourable to reform, as no better than traitors. Hence the prisons and fortresses of Sicily became the recipients of numerous state prisoners. The humane interference of English commanders, in favour of some of the sufferers, gave her serious offence, and she reproachfully complained, that king Ferdinand was no longer master in his own island, and that the English encouraged refractory subjects, whose only aim was to bring about a revolution. These complaints became louder, after the marriage of Napoleon with her niece Maria Louisa. Some emissaries of Buonaparte were at this time in Sicily, and through them, queen Caroline corresponded with the French emperor. victim of the audacious impostor Stone. There are few public characters of whom the million have a more false idea. The far-seeing kindness, the anxious consideration for others, and the extensive and never-talked of charities, prove that the soubriquet of "the Iron Duke," however applicable to his unflinching sense of duty, is a complete misnomer as far as relates to his other characteristics.



The abhorrence she had formerly felt for the French nation, while it was proclaimed to be a republic, had been greatly softened down by its taking the shape of an empire, under Buonaparte, who had been the fierce enemy of the Jacobins and the republicans. Let it be added, he was commended to her better feelings by the severity he used towards those who had sent the unfortunate Marie Antoinette to the scaffold. Napoleon had promised to restore her husband's dominions, or to give him a kingdom elsewhere, making it, however, a condition, that he should by some means or other expel the English from Sicily. Such a delusive scheme is said to have been submitted to Caroline, and to have been approved by her. She, in consequence, was favourable to a plot, having for its object the utter extinction of the British army, which had been sent to Sicily for her defence.

Affairs were in this situation when lord William Bentinck was sent to Palermo, as envoy-extraordinary and commander-in-chief. The information which he possessed, rendered it necessary for him to state some painful truths to her majesty. His interference in behalf of parties who had been imprisoned on suspicion, she fiercely resented, and contemptuously described the English commander-in-chief to be a "hard-hearted German corporal," who would not listen to reason. Had not, she indignantly demanded, "the king, her husband, and herself, a right to govern in Sicily as they thought proper, and to imprison without trial as many Sicilians as they pleased?" She pointed to her Sicilian troops and Calabrians, and vowed if the English attempted to control the movements of the king or her own, she would resist force by force. Thus treated, it appeared to Bentinck necessary to return forthwith to England, to ask for new instructions and additional powers. General Maitland, who commanded the forces, announced to the English army in general orders, that urgent political considerations, intimately connected with the future prosperity of Sicily, had called his lordship away. He stated at the same time, that four persons, who had been imprisoned for corresponding with the enemy in Calabria, were then liberated, because, though sufficient proofs were obtained against them, he would not on first assuming the command, put offenders to death. It was added, like clemency would not be shewn in any other case, as the general was determined to put

an end to the system of espionage and treachery, which had long been acted upon by those who were equally enemies to the Sicilian people, and their British allies. The general declared, from that time forward parties guilty of like practices, should be brought before a council of war, and if convicted, the sentence of the council should be at once executed. It had by this time become known that general Manhes, who commanded the French army in Calabria, was in communication with Neapolitan traitors. Facts transpired, which made their doings known, and scheme was employed against scheme.

By means of bribery those who brought the letters of Manhes were induced to give them up to the English, who allowed them to be forwarded to their destination, but not till an exact copy had been made. General Manhes had no suspicion of being thus overreached, and having in one of his communications stated that he had matters to impart, which could not be trusted to a letter, he added, an aid-de-camp would shortly wait upon his correspondent, a colonel De Philippis, with whom all that was necessary could be arranged. To guard effectually against De Philippis being imposed upon, Manhes supplied a minute description of the person of the young French officer with whom he was to confer. What immediately followed, we give in the words of Mr. M'Farlane, who states many of the particulars to have been obtained from private information in Sicily, at Naples, and at home:—"It became necessary for the English general to find some one who should personate this French aid-de-camp. This was not very easy: it was in vain to look among the British and Sicilian officers, for a man that could speak French so as to pass for a Frenchman; it was moreover indispensable that this spy or counter-plotter should be a person of address, ability, courage, and confidence, and also a stranger in Messina, and that he should bear some resemblance to the French aid-de-camp whom Manhes had described. At length such a man was found in one of the foreign regiments in our service, Monsieur A—— De ——, a subaltern in a regiment doing duty at Malta, who, though educated from his childhood in England, was a Frenchman by birth, the son of a French emigrant. Having undertaken to personate the aid-de-camp, now anxiously expected by the conspirators, he was brought to Messina in



disguise, kept concealed till his moustachios had grown to the pattern, and till he received the instruction necessary to enable him to go through the difficult part he had to act. He was then secretly carried out to sea, and was landed by night from a small boat on an open part of the shore, as if from the Calabrian coast, wearing the disguise of a sailor's dress, which Manhes had said his aid-de-camp would wear. He was furnished with such credentials as the intercepted materials in general Maitland's hands enabled him to provide, and he had the watchwords which had been agreed upon between Manhes and De Philippis. M. A—— De —— was led, blindfolded, into the conspirator's den, in the very heart of Messina. This den was the lodging of colonel De Philippis, and here the adroit and strong-nerved Frenchman, gained the complete knowledge of everything, with a list of all the persons in Sicily upon whom Manhes might count. There was matter to try his nerves and his wit. He was in imminent danger of being discovered by a Sicilian who had been his brother officer, but who had been turned out of the regiment for misconduct, and some of the Neapolitan conspirators were personally acquainted with Manhe's real aid-de-camp. But with great art and firmness, and an unchanging countenance, he refused to see the Sicilian and the others who were clamorous for admission, alleging the positive order of his general, to be introduced only to a small and select number, to men whose courage and honour could be depended upon.

This clever impostor succeeded in gaining all the information he sought, and withdrew in an open boat as if to return to Reggio, but speedily finding his way to the Sicilian coast, before daylight next morning, the 2nd of December, 1811, those he had rejoiced by promising them such assistance as should enable them to dispose of the English army as they pleased, found themselves arrested and lodged in the citadel. Lord William Bentinck soon after this reappeared in Sicily, having obtained those powers from his government which he thought it necessary to demand. The town-major of Messina was one of the conspirators who had been apprehended. They were all brought to trial before a court-martial formed of British and Sicilian officers. All were found guilty and received sentence of death, but of fifteen thus doomed, only one suffered capital pun-

ishment. After their trial had been completed, the president of the court committed to the flames a list of conspirators with which he had been furnished, in the hope that this act of mercy, in abating fear, would check disaffection. Facts were stated in the course of the proceedings which deeply implicated queen Caroline. The mind of this lady had been so operated upon by various circumstances, that some of her proceedings really wore the aspect of insanity. Lord William Bentinck judged it expedient to restrain the queen, and it was very distinctly intimated that an important change must take place by suspending for a time the expected subsidy. The duke of Orleans, afterwards king Louis Philippe, who had become the husband of Maria Amelia, a Neapolitan princess, and queen Caroline's second daughter, acquainted with the intrigues which had been in progress, approved of the course pursued by lord William Bentinck, and urged Don Francisco, the hereditary prince, to come forward at this juncture, and take the reins of government out of the hands of his incapable father. Don Francisco was indolent and infirm, and but indifferently qualified for the high station to which he aspired, but to invest him with kingly authority offered the best means of opposing the mad plottings of his mother, and Ferdinand himself thought this was necessary to save him from the ruinous consequences of his consort's folly. He accordingly resigned the kingly authority into the hands of Don Francisco with the title of *Alter Ego*. The arrangement was formally completed on the 16th of January, 1812.

Early in the year 1812, an expedition was to have left Sicily, to clear the eastern coast of Spain of the enemy, and if possible, expel him from Catalonia, Valencia, and Murcia. The expediency of this course was called in question, and lord William Bentinck, the English commander-in-chief in Sicily, recommended that instead, the Anglo-Sicilian armament should be directed to operate on the coast of Italy, which was then left almost defenceless. Murat, and a Neapolitan force, having been called off by Buonaparte, to aid him in the war then breaking out between France and Russia, lord Bentinck was of opinion that no very beneficial result could reasonably be anticipated, from employing the troops under him, on the eastern coast of Spain. Wellington felt much disappointed at learning this, after the measure



had been proposed to government, and he failed not to make his view of it known to his lordship.

In a communication to lord W. Bentinck, dated Boecillo, near Valladolid, 30th July, he says, "I am happy to find that, although it appears that you do not expect any successful result from the operations of the Sicilian army on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, to which point I shall advert presently, you had resumed the intention of sending them there. I acknowledge that I thought that, upon consideration, you would find the grounds for your intended expedition to the coast of Italy so little satisfactory, that you would resume the plan for the eastern coast which had been concerted and arranged; and every thing remains in exactly the state in which it was in the beginning of June, excepting that the first division of the Sicilian army has gone, according to your former directions, to Sardinia. I should hope, however, that there will be no inconvenience in bringing it back from thence. In regard to the aid to Spain to be derived from this expedition, I am concerned to find that you have altered your opinion upon it since you first proposed the measure to government; and if I did not hope that general Maitland and the staff and other officers of the Sicilian army would alter their opinion upon a nearer view of what they have to accomplish, and its effect upon the contest, I should despair of any success from persons coming on a service holding such opinions. I am quite certain that they can succeed in taking Tarragona, and in opening a communication between the fleet and the Spanish army by Tarragona—which is in itself a service of the greatest importance. I am likewise quite certain that they can take the city of Valencia; that they will thereby give to the Spaniards, and deprive the French of, an important resource; that the war will revive again in Valencia; and that, if matters are well arranged in that quarter, the enemy will never again gain possession of that city. But if I should be mistaken in my expectations of their success in these operations, I cannot be mistaken in their effect upon my own. I have lately, on the 22nd, beaten marshal Marmont in a general action, fought near Salamanca, and I have pursued him beyond the Douro; and our troops have this day entered Valladolid. \*

\* \* \* Then, if Suchet's attention should not be diverted from me, and, not-

withstanding Marmont's defeat, the French should become too strong for me in Old Castile, I shall at least have the satisfaction of reflecting, while I am retiring, that general Maitland's progress will be unopposed, and that we shall take Tarragona and Valencia. But it is not impossible, that neither my success in Castile, nor general Maitland's on the eastern coast, will eventually give any aid to Spain; upon which point I have nothing to say. That is a subject for the consideration of politicians; and, as a military officer, I can advert to any plan only as being likely to be attended with military success, or otherwise; but I beg to remark, that the same observation is applicable by politicians, not only to every military plan, but to the general operations of every war, and even to the objects of the war itself. I have taken up so much of your attention upon this subject, because, in my opinion, without intending it, you have, by a few words, thrown upon the king's ministers a larger share of the responsibility for the success of general Maitland's expedition than belongs to them. I am certain he will succeed; and, at all events, he will do good to my operations. But much as I wish for their success, I assure you that I should not give my advice that general Maitland's credit, or the safety of the troops, should be risked for that object only."

A few days later he wrote to lord Bathurst, impressing upon him the importance of the aid which he expected to derive from the operations of the Sicilian expedition. His letter was dated from Cuellar, the 3rd August, and in it he says:—

"It is perfectly true that his Majesty's government had at first in contemplation only a short service on the east coast; and that I reckoned upon the co-operation of the troops from Sicily, only till the period of the equinoctial gales. Circumstances, however, have now materially altered; and either my position in Castile must be supported by the continuation of the appearance of the troops on the eastern as well as on the northern coast of the Peninsula, or it must be expected that I shall be obliged to withdraw into Portugal at an early period after those troops shall have withdrawn.

"If lieutenant-general Maitland should succeed in taking Valencia, there appears no reason for which he should quit the coast, unless, indeed, the enemy's army in the kingdom of Naples should be so reinforced, as that the island of Sicily shall be in



danger. If he should not succeed in taking Valencia, as long as the allies shall remain in possession of Minorca, Alicante, and Carthagena, there appears no reason why the fleet of transports and troops under the command of lieutenant-general Maitland should quit the coast, or should discontinue their efforts to alarm the enemy for the safety of their possession of Valencia. The expedition to the northern coast might likewise remain on the coast to keep up the alarm which has already been so useful to this army. This is my view of these operations at the present moment; and I hope that, if your lordship should concur in it, you will send orders accordingly to lieutenant-general Maitland, and to sir H. Popham.

"Circumstances may put it in my power to acquire fresh successes, particularly against the army of the centre; and this army may, by its own efforts, secure its position in Castile, at least till the French shall evacuate Andalusia. It will then remain to be considered what ought to be done with the Sicilian troops; but in the mean time, I trust that your lordship will not allow them to withdraw from the Peninsula, as ordered, in the second week in September."

When Wellington thus wrote, an expedition was almost within sight of the eastern coast of Spain; but the force sent was wholly inadequate to the object in view. It consisted of but 6,000 men, under the command of lieutenant-general Maitland, one-half British and Germans, the other were

Calabrians and Sicilians. In its passage to the coast of Catalonia, it was joined by the Spanish Majorcan force, a large portion of whom were such runaways from the routs in Valencia and Murcia, as could be collected and caught, consisting of about 4,000 men, and transports having "the honoured battering train which had shattered the gory walls of Badajos" on board. Maitland reached Palamos on the 31st of July, but ascertaining that Alicante was in danger on account of Joseph O'Donnel's defeat at Castalla on the 21st of July, in which the Spanish general lost 4,000 men, though Harispe's attacking force did not exceed that number, he, on August the 10th, landed at that fort. On the 14th he took the field, but on the 18th, receiving intelligence that the army of the intruder and that of Suchet were about to form a junction, he fell back to his position in front of Alicante. Maitland's health giving way under the anxieties of his situation, the command devolved upon major-general John Murray, until major-general W. Clinton arrived from Sicily. Thus the Anglo-Sicilian expedition was rendered useless, and disappointed the hopes of Wellington. The results, however, of sir Home Popham's expedition had been more encouraging: Guetaria, Santander, and Bilbao had been recovered by the patriots. In the mean time, Hill, being pressed by Soult, advanced to Albuera, but the French general was unwilling to risk a second battle on that field.

#### LORD WELLINGTON EVACUATES MADRID.

BESIDES the failure of the support which the English general hopefully expected from the Sicilian expedition, he was embarrassed by other disappointments. The cortes, instead of directing their attention to reorganizing their armies and rendering them efficient, were engaged in inventing new constitutions and determining the precedence of saints. Such was their apathy, that the English chief, in a letter dated Madrid, 23rd of August, 1812, and addressed to the right honourable Henry Wellesley, says, "As for raising men and supplies, or taking any one measure to enable them to carry on the war, that is out of the question. They are in general

the most incapable of useful exertion of all the nations that I have known." But his own exertions began now to display themselves in all their lustre and effect. The moral consequences, military and political, of the great victory of Salamanca, appeared in every direction throughout the Peninsula. Andalusia, indeed almost the whole of the south and centre of Spain, was liberated from the thralldom of the oppressor, and the fabric of his power and domination was shaken to its very centre. The same event also materially contributed to uphold the insurrectionary spirit of the guerillas and Somatenes. Astorga, Guadalaxara, and Tordesillas, containing garrisons, amounting to 2,450 men,



surrendered to the patriots. The siege of Cadiz was raised on August the 24th, the French having previously destroyed a large number of their guns and stores on the works of Chiclana, Santa Maria, and the Trocadero, but the garrison advancing to the lines, they retreated in so great haste, that about one-half of the artillery, with a large portion of their stores, and thirty gun-boats, fell into the hands of the allies. Soult then leaving eight battalions in Seville, on the night of the 26th, quitted the city, and advanced on Granada, with the intention of concentrating his army in that province. To recover Seville, a detachment of Spaniards, consisting of 600 men, under general Cruz-Moragon, the 1st regiment of guards, the 87th, and a Portuguese regiment, under colonel Skerrett, were deputed from Cadiz. This small force, landing at Huelva, in the Guadalquivir, made a rapid march by San Lucar; on the 24th, drove the enemy thence, and on the morning of the 27th suddenly seized the suburb of Triana, and advanced to the bridge as rapidly as possible. The French immediately attempted to destroy the bridge between the suburb and the city; but the guards, and Downie's legion soon carried it. Downie,\* who was second in command, during the assault, leaping his horse over the chasm the enemy had made, and falling wounded into the hands of the enemy, threw his sword (which had been Pizarro's) among his own people. The bridge being carried, the enemy retired to the Triunfo, and there again made a stand, but soon retreated through the city, taking the direction of Alcala. Scarcely had the allies taken Seville, when 7,000 French infantry from the blockade of Cadiz approached with the intention of taking up their quarters there; but supposing that it was occupied by sir Rowland Hill's force, they hastily moved towards Soult, Ballasteros hanging upon their flank, and continuing to harass them till they reached Granada.

Clausel having re-organized his army, and received some reinforcements, by a bold advance carried off the garrisons from Toro and Zamora, and drove back the Gallician army under Santocildes, which, after

\* Downie, who had commenced his military career by accompanying Miranda in his first expedition to Venezuela, served as assistant commissary-general in sir John Moore's army, and was in the same capacity with sir Arthur, in 1809. But seized with a military mania, he entered the Spanish service, and raised the loyal legion of Estremadura, which he caused to be clothed according to the old Spanish

its capture of Astorga, had advanced towards Zamora for the purpose of effecting a junction with Paget's force posted at Cuellar; and having made demonstrations against that force so as to induce the English general to retire on Arevalo, Wellington, to prevent the interruption of his communication with Portugal, determined to besiege Burgos, for the purpose of putting the Gallicians in possession of it, as then the French would be deprived of any strong post or depôt on the great line of communication between France and the interior of Spain, and the Gallician army would be enabled to hold the army of Portugal in check while he was proceeding against Soult, the intruder, and Suchet. He therefore directed Hill to advance from the Guadiana to the Tagus, and take post in the Jarama, for the purpose of covering Madrid on that side; and leaving under his command the 3rd, 4th, and light divisions, Alten's brigade of cavalry, D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry, and de España's Spanish corps in the capital and its neighbourhood, he despatched the 1st, 5th, and 7th divisions, Bradford and Pack's Portuguese divisions, with the German heavy cavalry, and Anson's light brigade to advance and form a junction with Paget at Arevalo. He himself quitted Madrid on the 1st of September, having previously addressed the following proclamation to the Spanish nation:—

“Madrid, 29th August, 1812.

“Spaniards—It is unnecessary to take up your time by recalling to your recollection the events of the last two months, or by drawing your attention to the situation in which your enemies now find themselves.

“Listen to the accounts of the numerous prisoners brought in, and deserters from their army; hear the details of the miseries endured by those who, trusting to the promises of the French, have followed the vagabond fortunes of the usurper, driven from the capital of your monarchy; hear these details from their servants and followers who have had the sense to quit this scene of desolation, and if the sufferings of your oppressors can soften the feeling of those inflicted upon yourselves, you will find ample cause for consolation.

costume. By this, and by his character, which in some respects resembled their own, he made himself popular among the Spaniards; insomuch, that the marquesa de Conquista, the representative of the Pizarros, presented him with the sword of her ancestor, “the famous or infamous conqueror of Peru,” as a testimony of her appreciation of his efforts in behalf of Spanish liberty.



"But much remains still to be done to consolidate and secure the advantages required. It should be clearly understood that the pretended king is an usurper, whose authority it is the duty of every Spaniard to resist; that every Frenchman is an enemy, against whom it is the duty of every Spaniard to raise his arm.

"Spaniards! you are reminded that your enemies cannot much longer resist; that they must quit your country if you will only omit to supply their demands for provisions and money, when those demands are not enforced by superior force. Let every individual consider it his duty to do every thing in his power to give no assistance to the enemy of his country, and that perfidious enemy must soon entirely abandon, in disgrace, a country which he entered only for the sake of plunder, and in which he has been enabled to remain only because the inhabitants have submitted to his mandates, and have supplied his wants.

"Spaniards! resist this odious tyrant, and be independent and happy.

"WELLINGTON."

While quitting Madrid, he took every precaution that might be requisite in case of a reverse, pointing out the different measures to be adopted according to the movements of the enemy, and ordering that if they advanced, the sick and the stores should be removed, and every thing destroyed that could not be carried off. Hill, by his occupation of Toledo, Yopez, and Aranjuez, guarded all the roads which led from the south of Spain to Madrid, and thus not only covered Madrid but the right of the main army.

On the 4th of September, the allied force moved from Arevalo, on the 6th forded the Douro, and on the 7th entered Valladolid; Clausel having, on the preceding night, quitted it, retreating through the fruitful and picturesque valleys of Arlanzan and Pisuerga, and destroying the bridge on the Pisuerga; his "long line of baggage being larger and closer than any man who had served in

India had ever seen with an Indian army, for he had pressed all the cattle in the country, and left nothing transportable for any marauder who might follow him." Now began a trial of consummate military skill between the French general and his great adversary. The valleys through which the enemy was retreating, abounding with numerous enclosures and ridges, whose flanks appearing on the lofty hills which rose on each side, afforded at every mile a position capable of vigorous defence. Of these local advantages the French general skilfully availed himself. "Each day he offered battle, but on ground which Wellington was unwilling to assail in front, partly because he momentarily expected the Gallicians up, but chiefly because of the declining state of his own army from sickness, which, combined with the hope of ulterior operations in the south, made him unwilling to lose men. By flank movements he dislodged the enemy, yet each day's darkness fell ere they were completed, and the morning's sun always saw Clausel again in position [as little assailable as that of the preceding day]. At Cigales and Dueñas, in the Pisuerga valley; at Magoz, Torquemada, Cordobilla, Revilla, Vallejera, and Pampliega, in the valley of the Arlanzan, the French general thus offered battle, and finally covered Burgos on the 16th by taking the strong position of Cellada del Camino."\*

The pursuit continued beyond Valencia, where the English general forming a junction with the Gallician army, consisting of about 12,000 men, Clausel made a hasty retreat to a strong position near Burgos, where he was next day joined by Souham with 9,000 infantry; Souham assuming the supreme command, retired to a position near Briviesca. On the 18th, the allies crossed the Arlanzan, and taking possession of the heights on the north-west of the castle, entered the city of Burgos, which the French abandoned, and retired into the castle. The garrison consisted of 2,500 men, commanded by general Dubreton.

#### SIEGE OF BURGOS.

BURGOS, which is the capital of old Castile, and the original seat of the Spanish monarchy, is situated in the beautiful and fertile valley of the Arlanzan, and stands on that river, over which it has three bridges. Many

historical recollections are connected with it. It was the birth-place of Gonzales and the Cid Campeador, and the last mentioned hero and his wife Xemina lie buried there

\* *History of the War in the Peninsula.*



Our Edward I. was knighted there by his brother-in-law, Alphonso the Wise. It abounds with objects of antiquity and veneration. Among the relics shown in its magnificent cathedral were the handkerchief of the prophet Elijah, and a lock of Abraham's hair. But those extraordinary relics were eclipsed by the miraculous crucifix in the convent of St. Augustine, which is supposed to have been the image carved by Nicodemus, and carried from Jerusalem to Berytus, or to have descended from heaven, in order that there should be on earth one perfect resemblance of the crucified Saviour, and which a merchant, on his homeward voyage from Flanders, is said to have found at sea in a chest shaped like a coffin. Volumes, filled with *authentic* accounts of the miracles which this extraordinary crucifix has performed, have been published, and are highly esteemed by pious Spanish catholics.

On its north stand the castle and the rocky hill San Miguel. The castle of Burgos stands on an oblong conical hill, towering above all the houses of the town; and the acclivity on which it is situated was encircled at the time of the siege by successive lines of field works, from the base to the summit. The two inner lines bristled at all points with cannon. The third line consisted of an uncovered scarp wall of difficult access at the base of the hill. At the distance of 300 yards from the castle hill, and separated from it by a deep ravine, stands the Cerro de San Miguel, which was surmounted by a horn-work, and is about an equal elevation.

On the 19th of September, the allied army invested the castle. The operations of the siege were entrusted to the 1st and 6th divisions, under Campbell and Clinton, and the Portuguese brigades of Pack and Bradford. The covering army, under the immediate command of Wellington, was advanced on the high road in front of Monasterio, to hold Souham in check. Headquarters were established at Villa Toro.

The enemy's outposts being driven in, as a preliminary measure to any attack, it was necessary to win the horn-work for the purpose of erecting a battery to weaken the defences on the castle-hill preparatory to their being attacked. This plan, from the very small artillery means, namely, three 18 long pounders, and five 24-pound iron howitzers, at the disposal of the English general, gave the best promise of success. Accordingly, on the evening of the 19th, two parties were directed to attack it in

front, while major the honourable W. Cocks forced it in the rear. The attack in front could not be carried into effect, on account of the ladders not being long enough for the face of the work, and the injudicious act of the parties opening fire before they had reached the ditch. But major Cocks, though he lost in advancing nearly half his party by the fire of the castle, found an entrance over the palisades at the gorge, which the garrison had neglected, being fully occupied with the attack in front. He therefore, with little opposition, got over the palisades, and entered the body of the work, with about 140 men; these he divided, putting one-half on the ramparts to ensure the entry of the co-operating force in front, and the other he formed opposite the gateway in the hope of making the garrison prisoners; but the French running from their works, in number about 500, literally ran over this little party, and escaped into the castle; leaving eight guns, one officer, and sixty-two men in the hands of the captors. The assailants sustained a loss of about 400 killed and wounded. That of the enemy was about 100. Batteries were now erected on the horn-work, and trenches were opened to secure the communication with that work. Encouraged by the success of the attack of the 19th, on the night of the 22nd an attempt was made to carry the exterior line or outer escarp wall of the works by escalade. The attack was made by detachments of Portuguese troops on the French left, while a part of the 1st division under major Laurie, of the 79th, attempted to scale the walls. The ladders were reared, and the storming party forced up the wall most gallantly; but as soon as the leading men gained a momentary footing, they were bayoneted down, and those on the ladders either shot or knocked down by heavy cannon balls and combustibles, which caused the men's pouches to explode. After repeated attempts, the storming columns were obliged to retire with the loss of half their number in killed and wounded; among the latter of whom was Laurie.

It was now determined to mine the outer or escarp wall. The execution of this process was retarded by the heavy falls of rain, and the exposure of the workmen to the murderous fire of the garrison from the lofty site of the enemy's defences. In carrying the approaches down the hill, the workmen were exposed to the whole artillery of the place, and the enemy's marksmen,



showers of grape and tempests of bullets falling without intermission around the spot were they were working. A gallery was however at last carried under the outer wall, and a mine being charged with 1,100 lbs. of powder, at midnight of the 29th the hose was fired, and a breach being effected by the explosion, a serjeant and three privates, who formed the forlorn hope, rushed through the smoke, and mounting the ruins, bravely gained the breach; but the storming party missing its way in the dark, the French, who had been at first surprised, seeing the four men in the breach without support, charged and drove them down. These brave men, three of whom had been wounded, regained their division. Before daylight the enemy had made the breach impracticable.

Another mine having been placed under another part of the wall, a fire was opened on October 4th from San Miguel, against the old breach, and at five o'clock, p.m., the mine was sprung, when 100 feet of the wall giving way, the 24th regiment rushed forward through the smoke and ruins, and carrying both breaches, a lodgment was made within the outer wall, and the first line of the defences. In this gallant affair about 200 men were killed and wounded. At this time a supply of ammunition arrived from Santander.

On the afternoon of the 5th, the enemy made a furious sally on this post, destroying the lodgment, carrying off the intrenching tools, and causing a loss of 150 men in killed and wounded to the besiegers. As soon as it was dark this damage was repaired, and a parallel pushed within ten yards of the enemy's second line; but many of the labourers were slain by the enemy's marksmen, and the large shells which they rolled down the glacis. Only one piece of siege artillery now remained serviceable.

About three o'clock of the morning of the 8th they made another fierce sortie, when the guard in the trenches being overpowered, they levelled the works and carried off the tools. In this sortie 200 of the besiegers were killed and wounded, among the former of whom was colonel Cocks, who lost his life in rallying the guard and workmen, and repelling the assailants.

The troops being now established within about 100 yards of the interior line, another gallery was run under the second or interior lines, and a mine laid beneath the church of San Roman. As soon as the hose was fired,

a counter-mine was immediately sprung by the enemy, when colonel Brown, with a detachment of Portuguese and Spaniards, rushing on, seized on the ruined building; at the same time a practicable breach being effected in the line, on the afternoon of the 18th, preparations were now made for the assault. A detachment of the guards rushed through the old breach, escalated the second line of defence, and in front of the third line encountered the French in overpowering numbers; at the same time 200 of the German legion carried the new breach, and some of them escalated the third line. The defence of the enemy was not less vigorous than the attack; they poured so destructive a fire from the third line and the castle on both the detachments, and attacked them with so overpowering numbers before they could be supported, that the assailants were driven back with the loss of more than 200 in killed and wounded.

At this period of the siege, namely, the day of the failure of the last assault, Souham, who had succeeded Massena in the command of the army of Portugal, being joined by the army of observation from Alava, and the remainder of the army of the north, moved a strong body against the outpost of Monasterio, and capturing the picket of Germans, obtained possession of the heights covering that place. In consequence of this menacing movement, the covering army moved near Quintanapalla, and all the besieging troops, except a force sufficient to maintain the siege, were ordered to join it.

Wellington immediately arranged his army. The French moved 10,000 men forward on the evening of the next day, for the purpose of driving the allied outposts from Quintapanalla and Olmas; when the English general, seeing there was a fair opportunity to strike a blow, directed Paget, who had recently joined, to move with two divisions on their right flank. The enemy was quickly driven back, and Monasterio recovered. During the whole of the siege, the vigilance and active superintendance of the commander-in-chief had been unremitting; the arrangements for each attack had been written out by himself as he sat on the ground watching the movements. Considering how often he was within fire, his escape from injury was surprising. As he closely observed the assault on San Miguel, 29th September, he was in imminent danger; a field which he crossed being literally ploughed up by grape and bullets.



The siege had now lasted thirty days, five intrepid assaults had been made on the successive strong lines of defence, and above 2,000 men had been killed and wounded in their gallant efforts, but still the fortress remained in the hands of the enemy. No blame was attributable either to the general or his army. The discomfiture was occasioned by the insufficient means with which the siege had been undertaken. The artillery was defective both in numbers and force, the entire siege park being only, as before stated, three 18-long-pounders, and five 24-pound iron howitzers, and being the same as had been in battery against the forts of Salamanca, where they were found to be of not sufficient weight and calibre. The ammunition was so scanty and deficient, that the 16-pound shot fired by the enemy, were collected, and made to serve for the English artillery. The siege establishments of the army had been deficient in the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, and therefore success had been purchased by a profuse expenditure of human life; but at Burgos there was not even the skeleton of an establishment. The weather had also been very unfavourable; rain, accompanied by violent winds, having impeded the progress of the operations during a great part of the siege. Preparations therefore were made to raise the siege; a measure which the combined movement of the armies of the south and centre, under Soult and the Intruder, and the effective and powerful army of Souham in his front, determined the English chief to adopt. Soult had been enabled to effect his junction with the intruder, in consequence of Ballasteros, who, on the 1st of June, had been defeated at Bornos by Coureux, with great loss, refusing to take a position at Alcaraz, in La Mancha, for the purpose of preventing the juncture of Soult and the intruder, according to the plan prescribed by the commander-in-chief, and enjoined by the cortes; an act of dereliction of duty, proceeding from jealousy that the English general had been appointed generalissimo of the Spanish armies. Soult accordingly moved, on the 15th of September, from Grenada, having in his march reduced, October 3rd, the castle of Chinchilla, a fortress peculiarly strong by site and construction, which stands on an isolated rugged hill, at the confines of Murcia and La Mancha, and on the point where the roads from Alicante and Valencia run to Madrid; thus forming the knot of all the great lines of communication.

During this siege, the English general had been subject to sore annoyance by his Portuguese and Spanish allies. To the neglect of the regency at Lisbon to the payment of the Portuguese troops serving in Spain, with any part of the British subsidy which they received in money, he indignantly observed, "Something or other has made a terrible alteration in the troops for the worse. They have lately, in several instances, behaved very ill; and whether it be owing to the nature of the service, or their want of pay, I cannot tell; but they are not at all in the style they were. I am rather inclined to attribute their misbehaviour to the misery and consequent indifference of both officers and soldiers, on account of their want of pay. If it be true, as I declare it is, that the subsidy is not in arrears, ought the pay of the Portuguese army to be in arrears at all? ought it to be in arrears for a longer period than the pay of the British army? That it is so, there is no doubt; and yet Dom Miguel, &c., will produce hundreds of documents to prove this assertion to be false, and contrary to the evidence of all the officers of the army, that the men have the money in their pockets." To the regency's pretence that frauds were practised on the Portuguese revenue by the British commissariat, under cover of importing stores for the army, the British chief indignantly replied—"I have no knowledge of 'frauds or extortions' on the country; or 'violence on the magistrates,' committed by the officers of the commissariat of the British army; and if the Conde de Funchal has any knowledge of such acts, I hope he will make them known to me in detail. If he has not, I hope that he will have no objection to make known the authority he had for making so serious a charge in a public document.

"It is perfectly true, that owing to the poverty of the government, 'exactions and violence' (but not 'frauds,' as far as I have any knowledge) have been practised by the officers of the Portuguese commissariat; but to remedy these evils is one of the objects of my repeated remonstrances to the Portuguese government, in regard to their finances, and other measures."

His Spanish allies occasioned him no less anxiety. Among other causes of vexation, the conduct of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and their treatment of the French prisoners, particularly those who surrendered at Madrid on capitulation, excited his



anger: he declared it was atrocious, and threatened—a threat of all others most likely to be felt by offenders of the kind—to withhold their pay.” “You know,” said the humane and highminded chief to the governor, “under what conditions I promised to pay the troops under your command, and you know whether I have acted according to my promise. The fact is that you have received more than my own soldiers, since this arrangement. But I will give no more money to officers and troops that have not discipline, and dare to pillage and murder prisoners of war with whom I have made a capitulation. The officers of the garrison have not done their duty, or this misfortune would not have happened; and I will not pay officers who slight their duty. Having been guilty of this neglect, they ought to be punished; and neither will I give anything to the chiefs who do not punish such neglect.”

Wellington now commenced preparations for withdrawing his army across the Arlanzan, and moving back to the Douro, so as to secure his junction with Hill, whom he ordered to withdraw from Aranjuez to Arevalo on the Adaja. Two routes were open for the retreat, one by the bridge of Villaton, the other by the bridge of Burgos. The latter, being the shorter, was preferred.

All being in readiness, the siege was raised, and the whole army defiled on midnight of the 21st, within musket-range, under the walls of the castle, and over the bridge, with their entire baggage and field-equipage, the wheels of the gun-carriages being muffled with straw. The allies moved in silence and good order; but a party of guerilla horsemen “failing in nerve,” putting their horses to their speed, the garrison was alarmed by the clatter. A fire was immediately opened from the castle, the guns having been trained upon the bridge in anticipation of the attempt, and the first discharge was destructive; but the range and direction being lost, after a discharge or two, the retreating army reached the other side of the Arlanzan, with but a trifling loss. By the exertions of the artillery and engineer officers, everything was carried off, except the three eighteen-pounders destroyed by the enemy’s fire, and the eight pieces of cannon taken from them in the storm of the hornwork. These were buried and their carriages destroyed; such stores and ordnance as could not be removed having also been wasted and disabled.

The allies, by this skilful arrangement and bold manœuvre, were now in the direct line of their retreat, and on the morning of the 22nd, reached Celada del Camino. The troops left in blockade of the castle, which had begun their retrograde movement early on the morning of the 22nd, joined the army on its march from Celada to Aldea. The rear-guard consisted of two light battalions of the German legion under colonel Halkett, and Anson’s and Bock’s brigades of cavalry; the whole under the command of sir Stapleton Cotton. So complete was the success of this bold manœuvre, that a march was gained on the enemy, the retreat of the allies not being discovered till the afternoon of the 22nd, when he rapidly proceeded in pursuit. On the 23rd the army continued its retreat to Torquemada. On noon of that day the French cavalry pressing closely on the rear-guard, just at the time that the main body had crossed the Pisuerga, at Cordovillas and Torquemada, the British cavalry twice charged and checked them for nearly three hours before they could effect a passage. The rear-guard then retired slowly, when a considerable interval occurring between the hostile squadrons, the guerilla horsemen of Marquez and Julian Sanchez, who had been hovering in a kind of scattered swarm on the flank, taking courage, entered the interval, and made an irregular charge on the enemy; but being rapidly driven back towards the flank of Anson’s brigade, mingled with four or five squadrons of the enemy. The hostile squadrons being mistaken for Spaniards, were allowed to approach without opposition, and fell on the rear of the British, and as they brought up fresh squadrons every moment, the allied cavalry were so hard pressed that they were obliged to give way and fall back on the two German battalions of infantry of the rear-guard under colonel Halkett. That officer formed his brigade into squares, in echelon, and gallantly repulsed the attack of the enemy. The next day the army crossed the Pisuerga; and on the 24th was in position on a lofty range of hills with the garrison in front, while their right wing rested at Dueñas, covered by the Pisuerga, and their left at Villa Muriel. The 1st battalion 1st guards, with detachments of other regiments, under lord Dalhousie, here joined the army from Corunna.

Wellington, now determined to make a stand, and check his pursuer, sent out de-



tachments to destroy the bridges over the Carrion at Palencia, Villa Muriel, and Dueñas, and that on the Pisuerga at Tariejo. Those at Villa Muriel and Dueñas were successfully destroyed; but those at Palencia and Tariejo remained passable; and even at Villa Muriel, the enemy was able to effectuate a passage from the following untoward circumstance. A horseman suddenly started from the French column, and galloped up under a storm of bullets, to the chasm of the bridge made by the explosion; when, suddenly reining up his horse and exclaiming, he was a deserter, begged the English soldiers on guard of the bridge to point out some ford by which he could pass. On one being pointed out close by, the horseman kissing his hand in derision, wheeled his horse round, and bending over his saddle-bow, dashed back to his comrades, while the shots whistled about his ears, and shouts of laughter burst from the lookers-on of both armies. The consequence of this discovery was that the French crossed the river with a strong body of infantry and guns, under a concentrated fire of artillery, and immediately lined the bed of the canal at Muriel; general Oswald, who had succeeded to the command of the 5th division in consequence of Leith's indisposition, having neglected to occupy Muriel in strength, and having overlooked the advantages presented by the bed of the canal. Wellington coming up to the position at the moment of its occupation by the enemy, instantly despatched a column of Spanish troops to dislodge them; but the Spaniards being quickly thrown into confusion and repulsed, the Brunswick Oels corps advanced, and drove the French across the Carrion. Thus the left of the allies was secured. But the enemy having in the mean time crossed the river at the bridge of Tariejo, and the allied position having thus become sapped, Wellington before daybreak of the 26th crossed the Pisuerga at Cabezon, and ordering a detachment to hold the bridge of Tudela on the Douro behind him, he directed the 7th division to secure the bridges of Valladolid, Simancas, and Tordesillas. Having thus assured his retreat behind the Douro, the waters of which were now full, he again halted, his object being still to gain time and detain the enemy as long as possible, in order to effectuate his junction with Hill.

On the morning of the 27th, the whole French army was in front of Cabezon, and made an attempt to gain possession of the

bridge, but were defeated in their intention. At this period of the retreat, the English general having had an opportunity of ascertaining the overwhelming superiority of the enemy's force, fearing, should he be obliged to retreat behind the Tormes, that Hill would be exposed to the enemy both in front and rear, ordered him to abandon the defence of the Tagus, and to advance through the Guadarama pass, to effectuate a junction with him on the Adaja.

On the morning of the 28th, Souham attempted to turn the left of the allied army, still halted in its position at Cabezon, by extending his own right, and endeavouring to force the bridge of Simancas on the Pisuerga, and that of Tordesillas on the Douro. In both attempts he was foiled, the bridges being destroyed. But the French perceiving that only a weak guard of the Brunswick Oels corps was left in the castle to observe the broken bridge at Tordesillas, the enemy caused a chosen party of volunteers, consisting of sixty officers and non-commissioned officers, to secure the river in the night. These gallant men crossing the river on horseback, or, in the chivalrous expression of the author of the *War in the Peninsula*, "placing their clothes and arms upon a raft, having effected their passage, naked as they were," boldly attacked and stormed the castle behind the ruins of the bridge held by the Brunswick Oels guard, and thus opened a passage over the river to the French army.

Wellington, now, to prevent the enemy intercepting his line of communication with Hill, put the army in motion, and on the 30th crossed the Douro by the bridges Tudela and Ponte de Douro, and then marching by his left, and gaining the heights between Rueda and Tordesillas, placed his army in battle position immediately opposite Tordesillas, thus confronting the enemy now posted at this town, on the northern bank of the river. In this position he remained to the 6th of November, employing the interval in refreshing and reposing his army, as well as for affording time for effecting his junction with Hill. But the enemy having repaired the bridge at Toro, as well as that at Tordesillas, on the 7th of that month, the allied army fell back to Torrecilla de la Orden. Having now ascertained that Hill was sufficiently forward, he broke up from his position, and marched towards the heights of San Christoval, in front of Salamanca, and then posted the army in the course of



the day of the 8th. In the prosecution of the retreat to this point, the ground over which the retreating army passed presented a considerable advantage, the road from Burgos to Valladolid being intersected every ten or twelve miles by a river, over which the road passes by a ford or bridge. Of this advantage the English general availed himself, by taking up his several positions on the further side of the intersecting rivers, and destroying the bridges; thus interposing the stream as a barrier between himself and the enemy. He was thus secured in his bivouacs, and had time to retreat before his rear was forced, or his flank turned.

During these operations of the allied army under Wellington, Hill, in obedience to his orders to abandon the line of the Tagus, and fall back by the Guadarama pass on Salamanca, concentrated the forces under his command. Having destroyed the stores and works on the Retiro, he retreated (Oct. 30) by the Guadarama valley, cautiously followed by the united armies of the centre and south, under Joseph and Soult. While moving on Arevalo, for the purpose of effecting his junction with Wellington on the Adaja, he received orders to direct his march by Fontiveros, on Alba de Tormes. On the 7th the advanced posts of the two armies entered into communication; and on the 8th, Hill, crossing the Tormes, and leaving in the town of Alba a corps of British and a division of Portuguese, a junction was effected. The ground on which the late battle had been fought, was still blanched with the bones of the combatants, and strewn with fragments of casques and cuirasses, and broken arms. The position of the allies on the right bank of the river, extended from the heights of San Christoval to Aldea Lengua; and the castle of Alba, lower down on the same side, was occupied by Howard's brigade of the 2nd division. On the left bank, the position terminated at the bridge of Alba, behind which Hamilton's Portuguese were posted as a support to the garrison in the castle; the other brigades of the 2nd division watched the fords of Huerta and Encina, while the 3rd and 4th divisions were stationed at Calvarassa de Ariba, in reserve. The British cavalry covered the whole front of the position on the other side of the Tormes, and the Spanish infantry were posted in Salamanca.

The French armies of the north, south, and centre, were united upon the right bank of the Tormes, on the 9th. Their combined

forces amounted to 75,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, with 200 pieces of artillery. The allied army amounted to 48,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. On the 10th Soult attacked the town and castle of Alba, with twenty pieces of cannon and a considerable body of infantry, but he met with so vigorous a resistance that he drew off his forces in the course of the night. On the 14th, the united armies of the south and centre crossed the river at the fords of Encinas, and took post on the wooded heights of Mozarbes. Wellington, when apprised of this movement, posting Hill in front of Alba to protect his movements, and securing the Arapiles, by leaving the 3rd division there in reserve, marched with the 2nd division, and a large body of cavalry, to drive the enemy across the Tormes; but finding the enemy too numerous and too strongly posted to be attacked with the prospect of success, he, in the course of the evening, withdrew the troops from the neighbourhood of Alba to the Arapiles, and having destroyed the bridge, left a garrison of 300 Spaniards in the castle. The enemy now threatening the line of communication with Ciudad Rodrigo, the English general determined to retreat. The allied army was immediately put into motion, and marching to its right, passed round the enemy's left flank at little more than cannon-shot distance, a thick fog and heavy rain favouring the movement. Having now gained the direct road to Portugal, the army was encamped for the night on the Valmusa river. The retreat continued towards the Huebra during the two next days; the French following the line of march with a strong advanced guard. On the 17th sir Edward Paget, who commanded the first column, consisting of three divisions, observing an interval of about half a mile between the 5th and 7th divisions, which had been occasioned by the badness of the roads and the swelling of the rivulets, riding to the rear to ascertain the cause of the separation, was, together with his aid-de-camp and orderly, captured and carried off by a few Italian cavalry who had pushed forward through the wood on the scout. The allied army on the same day approached the Huebra, which in this part flows between two steep and wooded hills. The main body quickly passed the river, and took post behind it; but the light division, instead of following immediately, was formed by its commander into squares, to resist the enemy, who were pressing forward with vigour.



Wellington, perceiving its dangerous position, ordered four companies of the 43rd, and one of the 95th rifles, to cover the passage, while he pushed the remainder of the division across the river. The covering parties spreading themselves out as skirmishers, though assailed in flank and rear, maintained their ground at the edge of the wood, till the division was safe on the other side of the Huebra; then, dashing down the hill, they crossed the ford with but little loss. The allied army was now in a position that covered the roads to Ciudad Rodrigo, and were only one day's march distant from it.

Between three and four on the following morning the army resumed its march. The retreat at this point was a matter of peculiar delicacy; for though the Huebra presented a strong position for defence, it was not unattended with difficulty to remove from, in the presence of an enemy; and that difficulty was increased by the principal road, which was about a mile in the rear of the position, being rendered impassable by the overflowing of a rivulet. Of this the commander-in-chief being aware, he ordered that the army should march by a longer and seemingly more difficult road. But his general officers adopted the line of march for themselves. Wellington posted himself before daybreak in his line of route; but finding the troops did not make their appearance, he galloped off for the other road, where he found his self-sufficient generals brought to a stand by the flood. Contenting himself with one sarcastic remark, more expressive of contempt than anger, he proceeded to draw off the troops and lead them into the road selected. On the following day (18th November) the army reached Ciudad Rodrigo; on the 20th, crossed the frontier of Portugal, or halted in the villages on the Agueda; and as soon as it was known that the enemy had re-crossed the Tormes, they were distributed in their winter quarters, the left resting at Lamego, on the Douro; and the right advanced to Baños and Bejar, to hold the passes. As soon as the army had reached Ciudad Rodrigo, the light cavalry and the guerilla horse were despatched to search for the stragglers, the wounded, and disabled, in the woods; of whom they found above 1,500.

"During the retreat from the Tormes to the Agueda, the weather was very inclement, storms of wind and rain succeeded each other with little intermission, and the march

was either over stony and ploughed grounds, or marshy and swampy lands scored with gullies, so that the troops were often ankle-deep in clay and mud, and water, and the horses sank up to the fetlocks. In the march from the Arlanzan to the Douro, some of the rivers crossed were breast-high at the fords. Sometimes divisions were moved too soon, more frequently too late, and kept standing upon wet ground, in rain, for hours, perishing with cold, waiting the order to move. Their clothes were seldom dry for six hours together, and during the latter part of the retreat continually wet; sometimes they were bivouacked in a swamp when better ground was near; they lay down upon the wet ground, fell asleep from mere exhaustion, were roused to receive their meat, and had then no means of dressing it—the camp-kettles had been sent on, or by some error were some miles in the rear, or the mules which carried them had famished on the way; and no fire could be kindled on wet ground, with wet materials and under a heavy rain. The subalterns threw the blame upon their superiors, and these again upon theirs, all complaining of incompetence in some of the general officers, and carelessness or supercilious neglect in some of the staff. The consequence was, the bivouacks were on ground perfectly saturated with water. The privations were equally great.\* From the negligence of the commissariat, only two rations had been served to the troops during the five days of the retreat from the Tormes to the Agueda. Insubordination and marauding were the result. In the retreat from Burgos to the Douro, 12,000 men were lying at the same moment about the streets, and in wine caves of Torquemada, in a helpless state of intoxication; and the excesses were equalled to a proportionate extent by Hill's rear-guard at Valdemoro: hundreds were picked up in a senseless state in the cellars which they had plundered. The retreat during the 16th was through the extensive woods on the Huebra, and as those localities abounded with droves of swine, both officers and men straggled during the night from the lines of march, and shot them. At one time so regular a fire of musketry rolled through the forest that it was apprehended the enemy were making a night attack. Though two of the offenders were hung, it had little effect in restraining the starving soldiers.

Thus ended this masterly retreat, in which

\* Southey.



no capture or destruction of stores, treasure, ordnance or provisions—no abandonment of the sick and wounded—had taken place; and though a considerable loss of prisoners had been sustained, that loss did not happen in combat, but from the straggling of the men from the line of march, or in the course of the night, for the purpose of marauding; or when in a state of intoxication. The loss has been variously stated—the French represented it to exceed 12,000; the English scarcely as many hundreds. The truth is, the loss by casualties and prisoners, was about 1,500; while more than twice that number of stragglers fell into the hands of the enemy.

In speaking of the retreat from Burgos, an infantry officer says,—“The privations which the army suffered were unusually severe: I saw many a brave fellow lying on the road, dying from fatigue, famine, and the inclemency of the weather. On one spot, about 100 English and Portuguese soldiers lay extended after the retreat. One miserable instance was a soldier of the 95th; having marched as far as he was able, at last he sunk from exhaustion, and crawled upon his hands and knees, until he expired.” Another thus describes his misadventure. “We travelled the whole of the night, our army in full retreat, and the French in close pursuit; the weather wet and miserably cold, and the roads so drenched, it was up to the middle in mud; the animals were knocked up, and I unfortunately fell into the hands of the enemy, a French hussar regiment, who treated me vilely. They knocked the cart from under me, sabred the men and dragged me into the middle of the road; stripped me, tearing my clothes into shreds, and turning me over with their sabres, plundered me of what little I had remaining; tore a gold ring from my finger, and then left me naked, to perish with cold and hunger. I lay in this miserable state two days and nights, with no mortal near me, except dead ones; one of which lay with his head upon my legs, having died in that position during the night preceding, and I was too weak to remove his body; I could not raise myself, I was so reduced. In this suffering state I continued to exist, which I attributed to some rum, of which I drank a considerable quantity from a Frenchman’s canteen, who was humane enough to let me do so, when I explained to him that I was a British officer:

\* Maxwell.

the rum soon laid me to sleep. The Frenchman was a hussar, and appeared to belong to the regiment who had treated me so inhumanly in the morning (it was now past dusk). I begged him to take me up behind him. He shook his head; but kindly took an old blanket from under his saddle, covered me with it, and then rode off. In this wretched state I was discovered by an Irish soldier, who turned out a true Samaritan. The poor fellow found me literally in a state of starvation, and took me upon his back (for I was quite helpless) to the village; begged food for me from door to door; but the inhuman Spaniards shut them in our faces, refusing me both shelter and food, at the same time they were actually baking bread for the French. However, my fellow-sufferer, by good chance, found a dead horse, and he supplied me with raw flesh and acorns; which, at the time, I thought a luxury, believe me, and devoured, when first given me, in such quantities, as nearly put an end to my sufferings.”

“A very creditable exception must be made in favour of the Spanish women, who during the Peninsular campaign, exhibited the greatest kindness towards the British, and afforded to the sick or wounded soldiery the most disinterested and devoted attention. In the higher classes this feeling was frequently indulged, even at the risk of family or personal proscription; and it would appear that among the humbler grade a warm sympathy existed towards their deliverers.”\* “Two girls, daughters of the baker of the village, notwithstanding the threat of punishment to those who should relieve me,” says a sufferer, “absolutely did, two or three times, bring me a little food saved from their own meals.”†

Another writer, referring to this retreat, says, “It is scarcely possible to imagine what powerful effect the excitement consequent on active warfare produces upon those who under different circumstances would evince apathy or irritability. Men nursed in the lap of luxury, and accustomed from childhood to all the elegancies of upper life, submitted to every privation without a murmur; while others, whose constitutional indolence was proverbial, seemed actuated by some secret impulse that spurred them to exertion, and roused a latent energy that was surprising even to themselves. Persons who at home would have dreaded injurious cir-

† *Military Recollections of Four Brothers.*



cumstances from a damp shoe, were too happy, on service in the Peninsula, to find the shelter of a roof and luxury of wet litter after a ten hour's march over muddy roads, in rain, and storm, and darkness; and those whose Apician tastes were not unfrequently outraged by the culinary offendings of the most gifted mess-cook, cheerfully discussed the ration cut from the reeking carcase of an over-driven ox, and exchanged claret and champagne for *aqua ardentia* and *vin du pays*, flavouring more strongly of the goat-skin than the grape.

"It is true, that when cantoned the army were spared from these annoyances. The strict eye kept by lord Wellington over the commissariat at these times, secured a plentiful supply of necessaries for the troops, and under huts or canvass they were tolerably protected from the weather; but at the sieges, the retreats, and the rapid advances in bad weather, nothing could surpass the misery endured through cold and heat, hunger and thirst, continued fatigue, and all the ills the soldier's life is heir to. Bright as the hour of triumph appears to the conqueror—brilliant as the foughten field that ends in victory—'the tale of war still bears a painful sound,' and many a heart-rending story of distress might be narrated attendant on the storms of Badajos and Rodrigo, and the retreats to Corunna, the Lines, and from Burgos. The state of the sick, the worn-out, and the wounded, was pitiable. Unable to extricate themselves, numbers, 'with vulnerable wounds,' perished of cold and hunger in the ditches of the captured fortresses—or, after struggling to the last, died on the line of march, abandoned of necessity by their comrades, and ridden over or cut down by merciless pursuers, who had neither leisure nor inclination to extend succour to those deserted sufferers."

The following extracts from the "Despatches," dated Cabezon, October 26th; and Ciudad Rodrigo, November 19th, exhibit an admirable summary of the operations which occurred:—

"Cabezon, 26th October, 1812.

"The enemy followed our movement with their whole army. Our rear-guard consisted of two light battalions of the king's German legion, under colonel Halkett; and of major-general Anson's brigade of cavalry; and major-general Bock's brigade was halted at the Venta del Poso, to give them support; the whole under the command of lieutenant-

general sir Stapleton Cotton. Don Julian Sanchez marched on the left of the Arlanzan; and the party of guerillas hitherto commanded by Marquinez, on the hills on the left of our rear-guard.

"Major-general Anson's brigade charged twice, with great success, in front of Celada del Camino, and the enemy were detained above three hours by the troops under lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton, in the passage of the Hormaza, in front of that village. The rear-guard continued to fall back in the best order, till the guerillas, on the left, having been driven in, they rode towards the flank of the rear of major-general Anson's brigade, and four or five squadrons of the enemy mixed with them. These were mistaken for Spaniards, and they fell upon the flank and rear of our troops. We sustained some loss; and lieutenant-colonel Pelly, of the 16th dragoons, having had his horse shot, was taken prisoner.

"The delay occasioned by this misfortune enabled the enemy to bring up a very superior body of cavalry, which was charged by major-general Bock's and major-general Anson's brigades, near the Venta del Poso, but unsuccessfully, and our rear-guard was hard pressed. The enemy made three charges on the two light battalions of the king's German legion, formed in squares, but were always repulsed with considerable loss by the steadiness of these two battalions. They suffered no loss, and I cannot sufficiently applaud their conduct, and that of colonel Halkett, who commanded them."

The despatch then expressing the commander-in-chief's approbation of the exertions and conduct of lieutenant-general sir Stapleton Cotton, and Major Bull's troop of horse artillery, under major Downman and captain Ramsay, proceeds to state that—

"The army continued its march on the 24th, and took up its ground on the Carrion, with its right at Dueñas, and left at Villa-Muriel; and the 1st battalion 1st guards joined us from Coruña. I halted there on the 25th, and the enemy attacked our left at Villa-Muriel. They were repulsed, however, by the 5th division of infantry, under the command of major-general Oswald, in the absence of lieutenant-general Leith, on account of indisposition.

"I had directed the 3rd battalion of the Royals to march to Palencia, to protect the destruction of the bridges over the Carrion at that place; but it appears that the enemy assembled in such force at that point that



lieutenant-colonel Campbell thought it necessary to retire upon Villa-Muriel, and the enemy passed the Carrion at Palencia. This rendered it necessary to change our front, and I directed major-general Oswald to throw back our left, and the Spanish troops upon the heights, and to maintain the Carrion with the right of the 5th division. The bridge of Villa-Muriel was destroyed, but the enemy discovered a ford, and passed over a considerable body of cavalry and infantry. I made major-general Pringle and brigadier-general Barnes, attack these troops, under the orders of major-general Oswald; in which attack the Spanish troops co-operated, and they were driven across the river with considerable loss. The fire upon the left had been very severe throughout the day, from which we suffered a good deal, and major-general Don Miguel Alava was unfortunately wounded while carrying on the Spanish infantry in pursuit of the enemy. I broke up this morning from the Carrion, and marched upon Cabezon del Campo, where I have crossed the Pisuerga."

"Ciudad Rodrigo, 19th Nov. 1812.

"The troops under the command of lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill, crossed the Tormes at Alba on the 8th instant, and those under my command took the position on the heights of San Christoval de la Cuesta on the same day; brigadier-general Pack's brigade occupying Aldea Lengua, and brigadier-general Bradford's Cabrerizos, on our right, and the British cavalry covering our front. I had desired lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill to occupy the town and castle of Alba with major-general Howard's brigade of the 2nd division, leaving lieutenant-general Hamilton's Portuguese division on the left of the Tormes to support those troops, while the 2nd division was posted in the neighbourhood of the fords of Encinas and Huerta, and the 3rd and 4th divisions remained at Calvarrassa de Arriba in reserve.

"On the 9th, the enemy drove in the pickets of major-general Long's brigade of cavalry in front of Alba; and major-general Long was obliged to withdraw his troops through Alba on the morning of the 10th. In the course of the day, the enemy's whole army approached our positions on the Tormes; and they attacked the troops in Alba with twenty pieces of cannon and a considerable body of infantry. They made no impression on them, however, and withdrew the cannon and the greatest part of the

troops in the night, and this attack was never renewed.

"I enclose lieutenant-general Hamilton's report to sir Rowland Hill, of the transactions at Alba, which were highly creditable to the troops employed. From the 10th to the 14th the time was passed in various reconnaissances, as well of the fords of the Tormes, as of the position which the troops under my command occupied, on the right of that river, in front of Salamanca, and on the 14th the enemy crossed that river in force at the fords near Encinas, about two leagues above Alba.

"I immediately broke up from San Christoval, and ordered the troops towards the Arapiles; and as soon as I ascertained the direction of the enemy's march from the fords, I moved with the 2nd division of infantry and all the cavalry I could collect, to attack them, leaving lieutenant-general sir Rowland Hill with the 4th; and lieutenant-general Hamilton's divisions in front of Alba to protect the movement, and the 3rd division in reserve on the Arapiles, to secure the possession of that position.

"The enemy, however, was already too strong, and too strongly posted at Mozarbes to be attacked; and I confined myself to a cannonade of their cavalry, under cover of which I reconnoitred their position.

"In the evening I withdrew all the troops from the neighbourhood of Alba to the Arapiles, leaving a small Spanish garrison in the castle, with directions to evacuate it, if they should find that the enemy retired, and having destroyed the bridge. In the course of the night and following morning I moved the greatest part of the troops through Salamanca, and placed lieutenant-general sir E. Paget with the 1st division of infantry on the right at Aldea Tejada, in order to secure that passage for the troops over the Zurguen, in case the movements of the enemy on our right flank should render it necessary for me to make choice either of giving up my communication with Ciudad Rodrigo or Salamanca.

"On the morning of the 15th, I found the enemy fortifying their position at Mozarbes, which they had taken up the night before, at the same time that they were moving bodies of cavalry and infantry towards their own left, and to our communications with Ciudad Rodrigo. It was obvious that it was the enemy's intention to act upon our communications; and as they were too strong, and too strongly posted for me to think of



attacking them, I determined to move upon Ciudad Rodrigo. I therefore put the army in march in three columns, and crossed the Zurguen, and then passed the enemy's left flank, and encamped that night on the Valmuza. We continued our march successively on the 16th, 17th, 18th, and this day, when part of the army crossed the Agueda, and the whole will cross that river to-morrow, and canton between the Agueda and Coa.

"The enemy followed our movement on the 16th with a large body, probably the whole of the cavalry, and a considerable body of infantry; but they did not attempt to press upon our rear. They took advantage of the ground to cannonade our rear-guard, consisting of the light division, under major-general Alten, on the 17th, on its passage of the Huebra at San Muñoz, and occasioned some loss.

"The troops have suffered considerably from the severity of the weather: which, since the 13th, has been worse than I have ever known at this season of the year. The soldiers, as usual, straggled from their regiments in search of plunder, and I am apprehensive that some may have fallen into the enemy's hands.

"I am sorry to add, that we have had the misfortune to lose lieutenant-general sir E. Paget, who was taken prisoner on

\* In the course of the same day, general sir Edward Paget, who had ridden to the rear to discover the cause of some delay in the march of the 7th division of infantry, was surprised, when on the top of a hill, with a spy-glass in his hand, and was taken prisoner by some Italian cavalry which issued from a wood. "I was well acquainted with the officer who had the principal share in this capture. It was Don Marc Antonio Colonna, son of the prince of Stigliano, a branch of the most ancient and noble family of the Colonna, long settled in the kingdom of Naples. He discovered, with his glass, an English general officer on the top of a hill, and galloping to the spot, surrounded the base of the hill. I have often heard him give a graphic and touching account of the behaviour of the stately and gallant veteran, who had already lost an arm, and was very short-sighted. Sir Edward, upon first seeing the dragoons, put spurs to his horse, and would have galloped down the hill, but Colonna cried out that it was surrounded, that escape was impossible, that the attempt might lead to destruction; and as he closed upon him with several troopers, sir Edward presented his sword, and surrendered." Upon learning the capture, lord Wellington wrote the following characteristic letter.

Head-quarters, 19th November, 1812.

MY DEAR PAGET,—I did not hear of your misfortune till more than hour after it had occurred, nor was I certain of it till the enemy attacked our rear-guard, and the firing had continued for some time,

the 17th.\* He commanded the centre column; and the fall of rain having greatly injured the roads, and swelled the rivulets, there was an interval between the 5th and 7th divisions of infantry. Sir Edward rode alone to the rear to discover the cause of this interval; and as the road passed through a wood, either a detachment of the enemy's cavalry had got upon the road, or he missed the road, and fell into their hands in the wood. I understand that sir Edward was not wounded, but I cannot sufficiently regret the loss of his assistance at this moment.

"In my despatch of the 7th instant, I communicated to your lordship my opinion of the strength of the enemy, as far as I could judge of it from the reports I had received, and from what I had seen. I have since learned that general Caffarelli, with the army of the north, certainly remained joined with the army of Portugal. King Joseph left Madrid on the 4th instant, and arrived at Peñaranda on the 8th, leaving at Madrid the civil authorities of his government, and a small garrison. These authorities and troops evacuated Madrid on the 7th, and marched for Castile; and colonel Don J. Palecca took possession of that city.

"Your lordship will have seen general Ballasteros' letter of the 24th of October to the regency, from which you will observe that he disobeyed the orders of the govern-

and I found you were not on the field; and you will judge of my concern by the sense which I hope you feel I entertain of the cordial assistance which I received from you during the short time that you have been with us. I cannot account for your misfortune, excepting that you were alone, and could not see the approach of the enemy's cavalry. That which must now be done, is to endeavour to obtain your exchange. I have no French general officer in the Peninsula; but I beg you to make it known to the king and to the duke of Dalmatia, that I will engage that any general officer they will name shall be sent from England to France in exchange for you. If you should find that there is any prospect of your being exchanged, I recommend to you to endeavour to prevail upon the king not to send you to France. It is not necessary to enter into the reason for giving you this advice. If the king or the duke of Dalmatia will not name an officer to be exchanged for you, the sooner you are sent to France the better, I send you some money—£200. I will take care of your friend Morley. You cannot conceive how much I regret your loss. This is the second time I have been deprived of your assistance, at an early period after you had joined us, and I am almost afraid to wish to have you again; but God knows with what pleasure I shall hear of your being liberated, and shall see you with us.—Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

P. S.—Let me know your wishes on any subject, and they shall be carried into execution.—*Macfarlane.*



ment given to him at my suggestion, to march his troops into La Mancha, and hang upon the enemy's left flank, because the regency and cortes had offered me the chief command of the Spanish armies. General Virues, who succeeded to the command upon general Ballasteros being removed, had not advanced farther than Jaen, when I last heard from that quarter on the 8th instant. The whole of the enemy's disposable force in Spain was therefore upon the Tormes in the middle of this month, and they were certainly not less than 80,000 men, but more probably 90,000. Of these, 10,000 were cavalry; and as the army of Portugal alone had 100 pieces of cannon, it is probable that they had not less in all than 200 pieces. I had 52,000 British and Portuguese troops, of which 4,000 were British cavalry, on the Tormes, and from 12,000 to 16,000 Spaniards; and, although I should have felt no hesitation in trying the issue of a general action on ground which I should have selected, I did not deem it expedient to risk the cause on the result of an attack of the enemy in a position which they had selected and strengthened.

"I entertained hopes that I should have been able to prevent the enemy from crossing the Tormes, in which case they must have attacked me in the position of San Christoval, or must have retired, leaving us in possession of the line of the Tormes. I considered either to be likely to be attended by so many advantages to the cause, that I deemed it expedient to delay my march from the Tormes till the enemy should be actually established on the left of that river; and if the weather had been more favourable, we should have made the movement without inconvenience or loss.

"It is difficult to form a judgment of the enemy's intentions at present. They have not pushed any troops beyond the Yeltes, and very few beyond the Huebra. But it is obvious, and a general sense is said to prevail among the French officers, that until they can get the better of the allied army, it is useless to attempt the conquest and settlement of Spain; and as far as I can form a judgment from one of marshal Soult's letters to the king in cipher, which was intercepted, and fell into my hands some time ago, it was his opinion, and he urged that Portugal should be made the seat of the war.

"The result of the campaign, however,

though not so favourable as I at one moment expected, or as it would have been, if I could have succeeded in the attack of the castle of Burgos, or if general Ballasteros had made the movement into La Mancha, which was suggested, is still so favourable, that this operation appears out of the question. The strong places of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos being in our possession, and Almeida being re-established, it is not easy for the enemy to penetrate by either of the great entrances into Portugal; and although the two former of these places (particularly the first-mentioned) are neither in the state of defence nor garrisoned as I should wish to see them, having deprived the enemy of their ordnance, arsenals, and magazines in Andalusia, at Madrid, at Salamanca, and Valladolid, it does not appear possible that these places should be attacked. I conclude, therefore, that for the present they will canton their army in Old Castile, and in the valley of the Tagus, and will wait for the arrival of fresh reinforcements and means from France."

The army being now disposed in its winter cantonments, the commander-in-chief devoted his attention to the reform of its moral inefficiency and physical deterioration. In pursuance of this purpose, he addressed the following circular to the commanding officers of divisions and brigades:—

"Freneda, 28th November, 1812.

"Gentlemen,—I have ordered the army into cantonments, in which I hope that circumstances will enable me to keep them for some time, during which the troops will receive their clothing, necessaries, &c., which are already in progress by different lines of communication to the several divisions of brigades.

"But, besides these objects, I must draw your attention in a very particular manner to the state of discipline of the troops. The discipline of every army, after a long and active campaign, becomes in some degree relaxed, and requires the utmost attention on the part of the general and other officers to bring it back to the state in which it ought to be for service; but I am concerned to have to observe, that the army under my command has fallen off in this respect in the late campaign to a greater degree than any army with which I have ever served, or of which I have ever read. Yet this army has met with no disaster; it has suffered no privations, which but trifling attention on the part of the officers



could have prevented, and for which there existed no reason whatever in the nature of the service; nor has it suffered any hardships excepting those resulting from the necessity of being exposed to the inclemencies of the weather at a moment when they were most severe.

"It must be obvious, however, to every officer, that from the moment the troops commenced the retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred. Yet the necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made on which the troops had such short marches; none on which they made such long and repeated halts; and none on which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy.

"We must look, therefore, for the existing evils, and for the situation in which we now find the army, to some causes besides those resulting from the operations in which we have been engaged.

"I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual inattention of the officers of the regiments to their duty, as prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, and by the orders of this army.

"I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and spirit of the officers of the army; and I am quite certain, if their minds can be convinced of the necessity of minute and constant attention to understand, recollect, and carry into execution the orders that have been issued for the performance of their duty, and that the strict performance of this duty is necessary to enable the army to serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future give their attention to these points.

"Unfortunately the inexperience of the officers of the army has induced many to consider that the period during which an army is on service is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period during which, of all others, every rule for the regulation and control of the conduct of the soldier, for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries, and field equipments, and his horse and horse appointments; for the receipt and issue and care of his provisions, and the regulation of all that belongs to his

food and the forage for his horse, must be most strictly attended to by the officers of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army, a British army in particular, shall be brought into the field of battle, in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial.

"These are the points, then, to which I most earnestly entreat you to turn your attention, and the attention of the officers of the regiments under your command, Portuguese as well as English, during the period in which it may be in my power to leave the troops in their cantonments. The commanding officers of regiments must enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant inspection and superintendence of the officers over the conduct of the men of their companies in their cantonments; and they must endeavour to inspire the non-commissioned officers with a sense of their situation and authority; and the non-commissioned officers must be forced to do their duty by being constantly under the view and superintendence of the officers. By these means the frequent and discreditable recourse to the authority of the provost, and to punishments by the sentence of courts-martial, will be prevented, and the soldiers will not dare to commit the offences and outrages of which there are too many complaints, when they know that their officers and non-commissioned officers have their eyes and attention turned towards them.

"The commanding officers of regiments must likewise enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant real inspection of the soldiers' arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and necessaries, in order to prevent at all times the shameful waste of ammunition, and the sale of that article and of the soldiers' necessaries. With this view both should be inspected daily.

"In regard to the food of the soldier, I have frequently observed and lamented in the late campaign, the facility and celerity with which the French soldiers cooked in comparison with those of our army.

"The cause of this disadvantage is the same as that of every other description, the want of attention of the officers to the orders of the army, and the conduct of their men, and the consequent want of authority over their conduct. Certain men of each company should be appointed to cut and bring in the wood, others to fetch water, and others to get the meat, &c. to be cooked; and it would soon be found that if this



practice were daily enforced, and a particular hour for seeing the dinners, and for the men dining, named, as it ought to be, equally as for parade, that cooking would no longer require the inconvenient length of time which it has lately been found to take, and that the soldiers would not be exposed to the privation of their food at the moment at which the army may be engaged in operations with the enemy.

"You will, of course, give your attention to the field exercise and discipline of the troops. It is very desirable that the soldiers should not lose the habits of marching; and the divisions should march ten or twelve miles twice in each week, if the weather should permit, and the roads in the neighbourhood of the cantonments of the divisions should be dry.

"But I repeat, that the great object of the attention of the general and field officers must be to get the captains and subalterns of the regiments to understand and perform the duties required from them, as the only mode by which the discipline and efficiency of the army can be restored and maintained during the next campaign.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"WELLINGTON."

This letter was received by the army in general with vexation; and by some of the oldest and best regiments, who had maintained their discipline, and whose losses had been trifling, with a momentary feeling of resentment. But it must be admitted that the circumstances of the retreat justified the severity of the remarks. Of those who had been the most culpable, some were tried, others dismissed, and many allowed to return home to avoid more painful consequences.

In the annexed despatch, addressed to the earl of Liverpool, lord Wellington takes a rapid glance at the state of affairs in the Peninsula, and alludes to his prospects in the beginning of the next year.

"Ciudad Rodrigo, 23rd Nov. 1812.

"I received by the last post your letter of the 27th October. When one army is so inferior in numbers to another as ours is to the French army, now assembled in Castile, its operations must depend in a great degree upon those of its opponent. It is impossible therefore for me at this period to point out what line I shall follow. The enemy have abandoned Madrid, and having given up all their communications with the north, solely with a view to collect a still larger force against us, there is no diversion which

would answer at present to effect an alteration in our relative numbers, even if I could depend upon the Spaniards to do any thing. But I am quite in despair about them. The only man among them who ever did any thing (Ballasteros) is gone; and I am apprehensive that it will be quite impossible to employ him again. But even he never did more than give employment for a short period to one or at most two divisions of the enemy's army. Then there is another circumstance which must be attended to, and that is the situation of our own army. It has been actively employed since the beginning of last January, and requires rest. The horses of the cavalry, and artillery in particular, require both that and good food and care during the winter; and the discipline of the infantry requires to be attended to as is usual in all armies after so long a campaign, and one of so much activity.

"I believe that the enemy require repose as much, if not more than we do; and that their immense numbers are rather embarrassing to them in a country already exhausted. But I am not quite certain that they do not propose to penetrate into Portugal this winter. I hope the enterprise will end fatally to them; but our troops will suffer a good deal if they are to have a winter campaign, and if the weather should continue as severe as it has been since the 15th of this month. I believe that I have under-rated rather than over-rated, the enemy's force. They say themselves at Salamanca that they have 90,000 infantry and 14,000 cavalry; and their demand for provisions from the country is 140,000 rations daily. I think they have 90,000 men altogether, including from 10,000 to 12,000 cavalry. The morning state will show what we have.

"It is not easy to form a judgment in Spain of the strength of the enemy's armies. The disposition of the Spaniards to exaggerate their own advantages induces the best intentioned among them to deceive; and no individual will ever allow that the French have more men than he has seen himself. The numbers of the army now in Castile have been stated to me at 15,000, and at almost every number from 15,000 to 90,000. I have never found myself mistaken in my estimate of the numbers of the enemy, when I relied upon the returns, making a reasonable abatement for losses during the period elapsed since their date. The only occasion



on which I have been seriously mistaken was at Burgos, when I relied upon the reports of the country; and was induced to believe that sir H. Popham's operations would continue to give employment to Caffarelli. But I afterwards found that the army of Portugal had been very largely reinforced in cavalry as well as in infantry, to a larger amount even than I stated in my despatch to Lord Bathurst, as it was thirty-one battalions instead of twenty-three, as I stated, and the 130th regiment. There were besides two divisions of infantry, and from 1,000 to 1,400 cavalry of the army of the North; and most certainly when I saw the whole drawn out near Cigales, they were not less than 46,000, of which 5,000 are cavalry. Soult has six divisions of infantry, and sixteen regiments of cavalry. The gross numbers of his army last April were 65,000. He has since sustained no great loss excepting the garrison of Badajos, 5,000 men. But I strike off from his gross strength, for losses, sickness, and men on his strength who were employed principally in the siege of Cadiz, 25,000 or 30,000, including the garrison of Badajos; and I believe his army consists of 35,000 men, of which from 4,000 to 5,000 are cavalry. The army of the king, when it quitted Madrid in August, was from 20,000 to 22,000 men, including *juramentados*, and an Italian division belonging to Suchet's army, under general Palmobini, and the 16th regiment, likewise belonging to Suchet. Supposing the king to have lost by desertion, or to have sent away all the *juramentados*, and that the troops belonging to Suchet's army were left in Valencia, there will still remain the French troops of the king's guard, 5,000 men, about 3,500 more French and German infantry (I know the numbers of the regiments), which belong to the army of the centre, and from 2,000 to 3,000 good French cavalry. I believe all this put together will amount to 90,000 men.

"What are our prospects against this army? At present none certainly. In the spring, as soon as the green forage shall appear, I shall be able to take the field with a very large British and Portuguese force, probably larger than we have yet produced, and more efficient I hope in cavalry and artillery. I have sent the army of Galicia home; and I hope advantage will be taken of the winter to do something with them; but unless some changes are effected I shall certainly be disappointed. There are be-

sides, applicable to the *guerra* in Castile, the Spanish army lately under the command of Ballasteros, and the troops under the command of Elio.

"If I should find that the French remain quiet during the winter, I propose to go to Cadiz for a short time, to endeavour to put matters upon a better footing, at least as far as regards the armies of Galicia, and that lately under the command of Ballasteros, which must be brought forward in co-operation with us. It will likewise be necessary to apprise the government of the inconvenience and danger of the system on which they have been acting in the provinces which have been freed from the enemy; and of the inefficiency of all the persons selected for public trusts; and of the inconvenience of loading the resources of the provinces with the maintenance of such people. It is useless to trouble your lordship with a detail of these facts; but I can only say that, if I cannot by the exercise of fair influence in concert with my brother, produce some alteration, it is quite hopeless to continue the contest in the Peninsula with the view of obliging the French to evacuate it by force of arms. After this detail of facts, your lordship will see that it is very useless to trouble you with my opinion of what ought to be done after the French shall leave the Peninsula, more particularly as I have already communicated that opinion to Lord Bathurst.

"From what I see in the newspapers I am much afraid that the public will be disappointed at the result of the last campaign, notwithstanding that it is in fact the most successful campaign in all its circumstances, and has produced for the cause more important results than any campaign in which a British army has been engaged for the last century. We have taken by siege Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and Salamanca; and the Retiro surrendered. In the mean time the allies have taken Astorga, Guadalaxara, and Consuegra, besides other places taken by Duran and sir H. Popham. In the months elapsed since January, this army has sent to England little short of 20,000 prisoners; and they have taken and destroyed, or have themselves the use of, the enemy's arsenals in Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, Salamanca, Valladolid, Madrid, Astorga, Seville, the lines before Cadiz, &c.; and upon the whole we have taken and destroyed, or we now possess, little short of 3,000 pieces of cannon. The siege of Cadiz



has been raised, and all the countries south of the Tagus have been cleared of the enemy.

"We should have retained still greater advantages, I think, and should have remained in possession of Castile and Madrid during the winter, if I could have taken Burgos, as I ought early in October; or if Ballasteros had moved upon Alcazar as he was ordered, instead of intriguing for his own aggrandizement. The fault of which I was guilty in the expedition to Burgos was, not that I undertook the operation with inadequate means, but that I took there the most inexperienced instead of the best troops. I left at Madrid the 3rd, 4th, and light divisions, who had been with myself always before; and I brought with me that were good the 1st division, and they were inexperienced. In fact the troops ought to have carried the exterior line by escalade on the first trial on the 22nd September, and if they had we had means sufficient to take the place. They did not take the line because — —, the field officer, who commanded, did that which is too common in our army. He paid no attention to his orders, notwithstanding the pains I took in writing them, and in reading and explaining them to him twice over. He made none of the dispositions ordered; and instead of regulating the attack as he ought, he rushed on as if he had been the leader of a forlorn hope, and fell, together with many of those who went with him. He had my instructions in his pocket; and as the French got possession of his body, and were made acquainted with the plan, the attack could never be repeated. When he fell, nobody having received orders what to do, nobody could give any to the troops. I was in the trenches, however, and ordered them to withdraw. Our time and ammunition were then expended, and our guns destroyed in taking this line; than which at former sieges we had taken many stronger by assault.

"I see that a disposition already exists to blame the government for the failure of the siege of Burgos. The government had nothing to say to the siege. It was entirely my own act. In regard to means, there were ample means both at Madrid and Santander for the siege of the strongest fortress. That which was wanting at both places was means of transporting ordnance and military stores to the place where it was desirable to use them.

"The people of England, so happy as they are in every respect, so rich in resources of every description, having the use of such roads, &c., will not readily believe that important results here frequently depend upon fifty or sixty mules more or less, or a few bundles of straw to feed them; but the fact is so, notwithstanding their incredulity. I could not find means of moving even one gun from Madrid. ——— is a gentleman who piques himself upon his overcoming all difficulties. He knows the length of time it took to find transport even for about 100 barrels of powder and a few hundred thousand rounds of musket ammunition which he sent us. As for the two guns which he endeavoured to send, I was obliged to send our own cattle to draw them; and we felt great inconvenience from the want of those cattle in the subsequent movements of the army."

While exerting himself to restore the army to its moral and military efficiency, its re-equipment was no less a subject of his care. He directed, instead of the ponderous large iron camp-kettles in use for the preparation of the food, that small tin kettles should be substituted, one for every six men, to be carried in turn on the top of a knapsack. The mules hitherto employed in the carriage of the large lumbering iron kettles were appointed to the conveyance of three tents for a company. Thus, besides expedition being obtained in the preparation of the food, the men off duty would always be provided with some cover in the field, which would obviate many casualties from sickness. Having thus put matters in a train for the re-equipment and reorganization of the army, and transferred the command of the army to Hill, he proceeded, December 12th, accompanied by lord Fitzroy Somerset, and one orderly dragoon, to Cadiz, to communicate, in person, with the Spanish government, to endeavour to effectuate the reform or more efficient organization of the Spanish army; intending, as he expressed himself, "to throw himself in fortune's way at the commencement of the next campaign, if he could collect a sufficient army." He reached Cadiz on the 24th of the month, and was received with enthusiasm and the highest respect by the cortes and the population of the town. His visit promoted the good understanding between him and the Spanish executive. They conferred on him the rank and authority of generalissimo of the Spanish forces; and



arranged that he should have the active co-operation of 50,000 Spanish troops in the next campaign. Having accepted the command, he issued the following address to the Spanish army.

“Cadiz, 1st January, 1813.

“The army have been already informed that the command-in-chief of the armies in Spain has been conferred on the captain-general, lord Wellington, duque de Ciudad Rodrigo. Although this is the first time his excellency has the honour of addressing the army as its commander, he has long been acquainted with its merits, its sufferings, and its state; and in taking upon himself the exercise of a command so highly honourable to him, he wishes to assure the general officers, officers, and troops, of his earnest desire that his arrangements may tend to enable them to serve their country with advantage, and that while under his command the honour of their profession may be advanced.

“It is necessary, however, that, at the same time, the utmost attention will be paid by the government to what will tend to the comfort of the soldiers, and the convenience of the officers of the army, the discipline established by the royal ordenanzas should be maintained; as without discipline and order not only is an army unfit to be opposed to an enemy in the field, but it becomes a positive injury to the country by which it is maintained. The commander-in-chief trusts, therefore, that every effort will be made by the general and other officers, to enforce and maintain, in every particular, the discipline ordered by the royal ordenanzas; and he assures them that, at the same time that he will be happy to draw the notice of the government, and to extol their good conduct, he will not be backward in noticing any inattention on the part of the officers of the army to the duties required from them by the royal ordenanzas, or any breach of discipline and order by the soldiers.

“WELLINGTON.”

For the purpose of investing sir Charles Stuart with the order of the Bath, Wellington made a brief visit to Lisbon, where he was received with the most enthusiastic gratitude and rapturous acclamations. The city was illuminated three nights. It was about this period that he was created, by the prince regent of Portugal, duke of Vittoria; and about the same time he was made knight of the Garter, and appointed

colonel of the Blues, or Royal Horse Guards. He left Lisbon January 20th, and reached head-quarters, at Frenada, on the 25th of the same month.

He was now busily engaged in adjusting the arrangements for the prosecution of the ensuing campaign. Every military department underwent a searching reform. The attention of regimental officers was directed to the revision and inspection of the conduct and discipline of their men. The malingers and idlers were forced back to their colours. The 2nd division had recovered no less than 600 bayonets in one month. The Douro was rendered navigable above its confluence with the Agueda; a pontoon-train was prepared to accompany the army on its line of march in the following campaign; and as the season for taking the field approached, the different divisions and brigades were practised in manœuvres on an extensive scale, thereby training both officers and men for the rapid movements and long marches which the “short and brilliant campaign” their leader intended to make would require. And amidst all these exertions, the commander-in-chief and his officers found leisure for their pleasures. During this interval, races were established, hunting parties formed, and the Spanish gentry entertained with balls. At the head-quarters of sir Rowland Hill, a theatre was fitted up, at which *The School for Scandal*, *The Rivals*, and *The Poor Gentleman*, were acted by the officers.

During the continuance of the army in winter cantonments, the only military affair that had taken place, was the attempt, in February, of general Foy to capture the town of Bejar, one of Hill’s outposts; but he was resolutely repulsed by the 50th regiment, and the 6th caçadores.

At this period of the Peninsular struggle, the war was almost at a stand for want of specie; there not being 20,000 dollars in the military chest, and “each regiment not possessed of three.” To provide for the deficiency, Wellington, in conjunction with sir Charles Stuart, the British minister at Lisbon, made purchases of corn in the Brazils, America, and Egypt, by which they not only fed the army, and saved the people of Portugal from starvation, during a year of invasion and another of famine, but replenished the military chest with large sums of money. To the dissatisfaction expressed by the English ministry, who, listening to the interested complaints of a few sordid



merchants, his reply was: "Sir Charles Stuart can show that we have not only saved the people of Portugal during the scarcity of 1810-11, by this system, but that we have actually brought into the military chest considerable sums of money which would otherwise not have found their way there; that we have gained money for the public by each of these transactions; and that we paid more than two-thirds of the Portuguese subsidy in kind in the last year, principally in corn thus imported. In a letter on this subject to Sir Charles Stuart, he observes: "I admit that your time and mine would be much better employed than in speculating on corn, &c., but when it is necessary to carry on an extensive system of war with one-sixth of the money in specie which would be necessary to carry it on, we must consider questions, and adopt measures of this description, and we ought to have the confidence and support of the government in adopting them." Nor was this the only

difficulty thrown in the way of the English general by the British ministry. When the war broke out between England and the United States, he earnestly pointed out to them the necessity of stationing ships to protect the vessels bringing flour and stores to Portugal. So far from attending to this advice, they so reduced the naval force at Lisbon, that American privateers so infested the Portuguese shores, as almost to put an end to the provision trade with the Brazils, from which country the army drew its principal supplies.

Thus ended the campaign of 1812, which gave so much disappointment to the expectations of England, that when a motion for thanks to Wellington and the British army was proposed in parliament, it met with strenuous opposition. In its vindication and results, the best exposition is to be found in the words of its chief actor, which will be found in one of his despatches in a previous page.



## THE FRENCH INVASION OF RUSSIA.

It will now be necessary to take a glance at the state of Europe, at the close of the year 1812, in order that the reader may the more clearly comprehend the events of the ensuing years 1813 and 1814—events which brought the operations of war from other countries to be enacted on the soil of France itself, and compelled the haughty French invaders to submit to the drinking of the bitter cup themselves which they had so often held to the lips of other nations. In those years the star of their great military demigod paled before the might of outraged Europe; and he, who in the early part of the year 1812, addressed such language as the following to the ambassador of the emperor of Russia—"I would have your master to know that I propose and I dispose," found in the reverses of that and the following years how signally his boastful impiety was avenged. In the history of these years the reader will perceive the vindication of the ways of God to man, and the retributive justice which sooner or later inevitably overtakes long triumphant wickedness. In 1813 the soil of France was invaded on all sides. Wellington on the south, with hostile banners displayed, came down from the Pyrenées upon the fertile plains of the Garonne, while the united armies of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Sweden, extended their mighty masses towards the north and the east, enclosing by the progressive development of their resources, their formidable antagonist in a "circle of fire."

The great proximate cause of the downfall of Napoleon was doubtless the steady opposition given to all his schemes of plunder and aggrandizement by the British nation, and especially to the assistance which they had rendered to Spain, and the able manner in which the arms of Britain, under the command of lord Wellington, had been opposed to the French generals; next to this may be placed the invasion of Russia by the French in this year, some account of which we shall now proceed to give.

The aim of Napoleon Buonaparte, when he became emperor of France, was to make all Europe one nation, or, at least, a confederacy of nations, of which he was to be the acknowledged head. His own words were, "There must be one universal Euro-

pean code—one court of appeal. The same money, the same weights and measures, the same laws, must have currency throughout Europe. I must make one nation out of all the European states, and Paris must be the capital of the world." In the accomplishment of this purpose he had been so far successful, as one European nation after another bowed in the dust before his iron rule. His principal obstacle was the power and independence of Britain. Napoleon was aware that the main strength of Britain was in her trade and commerce; that from these sources she derived the great revenues and profits by which she was able, almost single-handed, to maintain her opposition to his plans. To ruin these resources became therefore his avowed and settled purpose. In 1806, by his famous Berlin decrees, he declared the British islands in a state of blockade, and all commerce or intercourse with them was forbidden to France and her allies. By subsequent decrees he insisted on the exclusion of British goods and British colonial produce from all the continental ports. These exclusive decrees were generally complied with by almost every nation except Russia. The Russians carried on an extensive and lucrative trade with this country in the exchange of their articles of raw produce, such as hemp, tallow, timber, potash, pitch, and other commodities, for our manufactured goods, comprising cotton and woollen cloths, cutlery, &c. The emperor Alexander was disposed to make any arrangements which he could, short of the destruction of the trade and commerce of his subjects, for the purpose of maintaining peace with France; but nothing less than the entire exclusion of British goods would satisfy the haughty tyrant of the Tuilleries.

In 1807, however, when Russia as the ally of Prussia, had suffered a severe defeat at Friedland, Napoleon forcibly procured the consent of the emperor Alexander to his exclusive decrees with reference to trading with Great Britain; notwithstanding the forced consent of the emperor, Russia never entered cordially into Napoleon's continental system. In the year 1810 the landholders of Russia, from the stoppage of their trade with Britain, suffered great distress. This induced the emperor to issue a ukase dated



# RUSSIA IN EUROPE

SHOWING  
THE TERRITORIAL ACQUISITIONS SINCE THE TIME OF  
PETER THE GREAT.





the 31st of December in that year, permitting all colonial and other goods to enter the ports of Russia, unless they were clearly proved to be British property. It is obvious a prohibition so indifferently provided for, might easily be evaded. This occurred, and it may fairly be concluded the Russian government had no wish to prevent it, and the trade with England soon revived. On this subject remonstrances were made by the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, which were followed by a series of attacks on the personal character of the emperor Alexander, in the Paris journals. The pens which had been employed to eulogise, now laboured to traduce him, and a history of the Russian empire appeared, in which every vice said to have disgraced the Roman emperors, was represented to have belonged to the czars of Russia; and the reigning emperor, it was broadly hinted, might be numbered among the assassins of his father. For the same reasons which caused the English government to complain of the articles that appeared in the *Moniteur* a short time before the rupture of the peace of Amiens, the Russian emperor could only regard these outrageous attacks as originating in the malevolence of Buonaparte.

There were also other circumstances besides the Berlin and Milan decrees, which were tending to produce a rupture between France and Russia. The territory of the czars is exposed to aggression on that important western frontier which connects Russia with Europe. The partition of Poland was to her a greater benefit than to the other powers associated with her in that act of spoliation, and consequently any new change which would restore Polish independence, would, in a great measure destroy Russian influence in Europe. Buonaparte had encouraged the Poles to expect at his hands the boon of national independence, and this had brought them in great numbers to his standard after the battle of Jena. Forming the Polish provinces into what was called the Independent Grand Duchy of Warsaw, placed under the sovereignty of the king of Saxony, who was descended from the ancient kings of Poland, was viewed by Russia, in connection with other circumstances, as indicating a design at some future period to unite the provinces held by Russia and Austria to that duchy. The Grand Duchy of Warsaw was regarded as but a vast garrison established there, for the furtherance of Napoleon's ultimate views in

days to come. Alexander thought it right to claim from him an explicit engagement that the kingdom of Poland should not be re-established. Refusing to comply with this requisition, Napoleon offered to pledge himself not to favour any enterprise having that object in view. Such a concession was by no means satisfactory. Greater changes in the policy of Buonaparte were called for, but without effect, other than that of waking feelings of jealousy and animosity; and the movements of the French armies in the direction of Pomerania, soon brought full conviction to the mind of Alexander, that war could not be avoided. Things were at this crisis in the early part of the year 1812. About the same time causes of difference had arisen between Napoleon and Bernadotte, king of Sweden, and in consequence of his failing to enforce in a manner satisfactory to Buonaparte, his exclusive decrees, he seized and confiscated fifty Swedish merchant vessels. Resenting this and various affronts not less galling, Bernadotte signed a treaty of alliance with the Russian emperor, in March 1812, and formed in concert with him a plan to resist the tyranny of Buonaparte.

Infatuated with success, and urged on by his boundless ambition, Napoleon decided on a military attack on Russia, to bring her to terms. Against the advice of his friends and counsellors, he determined that nothing should prevent what he termed his "accomplishing the destiny of Russia." He felt that Spain had cost him dear, and hoped to console himself with the subjugation of the great northern potentate. By crushing Russia he assured himself that Spain must ultimately yield. Fouché, in an able and eloquent address, endeavoured to advise him against this reckless attempt, reminding him that he was already master of the finest empire the world had ever seen, and that all history demonstrated that universal monarchy was an impossibility—and suggested that he should rather apply himself to consolidate and secure his present acquisitions, than endeavour to achieve further conquests—as whatever he might acquire in extent he must lose in solidity. Fouché also drew his attention to the extent of the country which he was about to invade, and the distance which each fresh victory must remove him from his resources, annoyed as his communications were sure to be, by hordes of Tartars and Cossacks. Napoleon listened to this advice with but ill-disguised impatience and contempt—and in the charlatan lan-



guage which had now become habitual to him, he replied—"Don't disquiet yourself; but consider the Russian war as a wise measure, demanded by the true interests of France, and the general security. Am I to blame because the great degree of power I have already attained forces me to assume the dictatorship of the world? My destiny is not yet accomplished—my present situation is but a sketch of a picture which I must finish." Advices from other counselors had no better effect. His uncle, Cardinal Fesch, alarmed for the consequences of engaging in such a distant war, used every argument he could to dissuade him from this insane expedition. He conjured him to abstain from tempting providence—and entreated him not to defy heaven and earth—the wrath of men and the fury of the elements at the same time. Napoleon met the arguments of the ecclesiastic in the same spirit as he had those of his minister of police—and both were equally in keeping with his character. Leading the cardinal to a window, opening the casement and pointing upwards, he asked him if he saw yonder star?" "No, sire," answered the astonished cardinal. "*But I see it,*" rejoined Buonaparte, and turned from his relative as if he had fully confuted his arguments.\*

Thus refusing all counsel, Napoleon hurried on his preparations for the war with Russia. Notwithstanding the enormous number of troops he required for the occupation of Spain, he found no difficulty in raising new armies; and just before the opening of the Russian campaign, he is understood to have had in France, Spain, Italy, and elsewhere, upwards of 800,000 men in arms, independently of allies. To raise so many soldiers the cruel conscript system was put into full operation, draughts were made on the whole male inhabitants of France between eighteen and sixty years of age; and the population was so decimated, that a large portion of the business of the country was necessitated to be carried on by women. At this time, also, the continent of Europe was afflicted with a famine, which caused a great degree of privation. Although everything tended to show the madness of the Russian invasion, yet nothing was allowed to stop the preparations for it. The French people, blinded by what they insensately denominated "military glory," entered into this new war with

\* Sir Walter Scott.

the highest hopes, whilst the soldiery looked upon it as opening up new fields for pillage. As to the morality of the question, it was an element not to be considered. Napoleon was, however, by no means blind to the difficulties of the great project which he had determined to carry out. Before it was possible for him to gain the interior of Russia, where a most determined opposition was likely to be made to him, he would have to march his troops 1800 miles, through different states, possessing little or no food for men or horses. He had thus a powerful obstacle to contend with in the procuring of supplies for his army. His next great difficulty was the transporting the *materiel* of such a monster army across the large rivers which it was necessary to pass before he could gain the centre of Russia. In his line of march there were several extensive rivers emptying themselves into the Baltic, or Mediterranean seas, and therefore flowing at right angles with his proposed route. A number of them could be crossed by bridges; but the Niemen, the Berezina, the Dnieper, and some others, would require to be forded, and that, probably, under the fire of a vigilant and watchful foe. To meet these formidable difficulties every provision was made that was possible in the circumstances.

As a preliminary to the new war, a sham overture of peace was made to England, in which he proposed as a basis, that "*la dynastie actuelle sera déclaré independante et l'Espagne regie par un constitution nationale des cortes.*" To this lord Castlereagh replied, in the name of the prince regent, in reference to the passage just quoted, stating that if, as his royal highness apprehended, its meaning was, that the royal authority of Spain, and the government thereof by cortes, should be recognised as residing in the brother of the ruler of France, and cortes formed under his authority, not under that of the legitimate sovereign, Ferdinand VII., and the extraordinary cortes then exercising the powers of government, he must frankly declare that obligations of good faith precluded the prince regent from entertaining a proposition for peace, founded upon such a basis. This matter disposed of, and the Russian minister having first been insulted, and then presented with his passports; on the 9th of May Buonaparte, with his empress, left Paris for Dresden, where his vassal kings of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Saxony, and West-



phalia, and other princes of less importance, assembled to meet him, as did the emperor of Austria and the king of Prussia. The former was accompanied by the mother of Maria Lousia; the queen of the latter was no more. She had passed to the grave, deeply wounded, it was believed, by the unmanly calumnies which had been circulated against her, with the sanction of Napoleon.

In the capital of Saxony, fêtes and festivals surprised all beholders by their magnificence, and still more by their extraordinary attendance. Dramatic performances were among the entertainments provided, and the powers of Talma were there displayed before a pit peopled with emperors, empresses, kings, and princes.

Taking leave of his empress, Buonaparte hastened to Thorn, which he reached on the 2nd of June; from this period he became the presiding genius of the enterprise. The tactics of Napoleon, as a general, had always been to bring an enormous force to bear on a centre of operations; on these tactics he now acted. That part of the army which was furnished by France passed in an easterly direction into Germany, where it united with the levies drawn from Saxony, Italy, Austria, Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Poland, and the other countries over which he exerted a control. From different directions this immense force drew towards a central point on the Oder, whence they were all to combine in a united attack on the Russian frontier

#### HOSTILITIES ARE COMMENCED.

NAPOLEON commenced this war in his usual way, by robbery. The districts between the Oder and the Vistula were laid under contribution; and the subsistence of his forces was made to depend upon plunder. The hero-worshippers of Buonaparte have said that he did not sanction robbery as a principle; but this it is impossible for them to deny, that he winked at it as a practice. Segur, not a bad authority, says—"Ever since 1805, there was a sort of mutual understanding—on his part, to wink at the plundering practices of his soldiers—on theirs, to suffer his ambition." In other words—"if you allow us to be thieves, we have no objection to your being our chief." So that, stripped of the tawdry appellation of emperor—in all his pomp and pride—Buonaparte was but the head of a band of robbers. Like all aberrations, however, from the moral code, this toleration of rapine recoiled on its author. The unprincipled conduct of the French soldiery had become so well known, that the inhabitants of the countries through which they passed, fled at their approach, carrying everything with them that was possible, and frequently destroying what they could not take away; so that it was only by sudden onslaughts that his ruthless followers could insure any booty.

The mighty host arrayed against Russia comprehended, on the extreme right, 34,000 Austrians, led by prince Schwartzburg;

on the left Jerome Buonaparte appeared with 79,200 Westphalians, Saxons, and Poles. The viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnois, commanded 79,000 Bavarians, Italians, and French. Buonaparte himself appeared, assisted by Murat, Davoust, Oudinot, and Ney, with 220,000 men, and general Macdonald brought up a force of 32,500 Prussians, Bavarians, and Poles. Other corps might be enumerated, making a total of 480,000 men, and besides large armies of reserve had been assembled. Of the force present, 80,000 were cavalry. The army was attended by thousands of waggons, carrying provisions, gunpowder, shot, and shells, with medicines, and other accommodations for the sick and wounded. His attendant artillery comprehended 1,372 pieces of cannon, for drawing which, and the various vehicles now to be put in motion, 100,000 horses were required; and to supply food for these animals a most extensive system of forage was required.

Here, then, was an army of about half a million of men invading a country with whom they had no just cause of quarrel, carrying misery and ruin in their track, in order to pander to the insatiate and heartless ambition of one man, that he might be styled "emperor of Europe." Out of the 500,000 who followed him, perhaps not five knew what was the real cause of the war. Sufficient for them it was that the emperor *willed* it, and that plunder and "glory"



were to be acquired. Satisfied with his arrangements, and feeling, doubtless, that his prey was within his grasp, on the 22nd of June he deigned to declare himself to his army in one of his bombastic proclamations:

"Soldiers! the second Polish war has begun. The first terminated at Friedland and at Tilsit. At Tilsit, Russia vowed an eternal alliance with France, and war with England. She now breaks her vows, and refuses to give any explanation of her strange conduct, until the French eagles have repossessed the Rhine, and left our allies at her mercy.

"Russia is hurried away by a fatality! Her destinies will be fulfilled. Does she think us degenerated? Are we no more the soldiers who fought at Austerlitz? She places us between dishonour and war. Our choice cannot be difficult. Let us, then, march forward. Let us cross the Niemen, and carry the war into her country. The second Polish war will be as glorious to the French arms as the first has been; but the peace we shall conclude will carry its own guarantee, and will terminate the fatal influence which Russia has for fifty years past exercised in Europe."

By the soldiers and supporters of Buonaparte this proclamation was looked upon as a miracle of eloquence, and to men who wanted no substantial reason for fighting, it was pronounced quite satisfactory, and they proudly contemplated the "glory" they were to achieve.

By means of pontoons the Niemen was passed, and when the emperor Alexander was made aware that this act of aggression had been committed, he issued the following proclamation, the spirit of which may be well contrasted with that of his boastful antagonist:—

"Wilna, June 25th, 1812.

"We had long observed, on the part of the emperor of the French, the most hostile proceedings towards Russia, but we had always hoped to avert them by conciliatory and pacific measures. At length, experiencing a continued renewal of direct and evident aggression, notwithstanding our earnest desire to maintain tranquillity, we were compelled to complete and assemble our armies. But even then we flattered ourselves that a reconciliation might be produced while we remained on the frontiers of our empire; and without violating our principle of peace we prepared to act only in our own defence. All these con-

ciliatory and pacific measures could not preserve the tranquillity which we desired. The emperor of the French, by suddenly attacking our army at Kowno, has been the first to declare war. As nothing, therefore, could inspire him with those friendly sentiments which possessed our bosom, we have no choice but to oppose our force to those of the enemy, invoking the aid of the Almighty, the witness and defender of the truth. It is unnecessary for me to recal to the minds of the generals, the officers, or the soldiers, their duty and their bravery. The blood of the valiant Selavonians flows in their veins. Warriors! you defend your religion, your country, and your liberty! I am with you, God is against the aggressor.

"ALEXANDER."

Much to the surprise of the French, their aggressive progress was but little interfered with; and, except in the affair at Kowno, there was no enemy to dispute their advance into the interior of Russia. As division after division of the French army advanced in almost the same line of march, the Russians fell back, giving no decided interruption. The invaders were astonished at the rapidity with which they were allowed to proceed. It was midsummer, and they experienced little inconvenience but from the heat of the weather, and the immense clouds of dust which were raised by the marching of their troops.

It was not from a lack of courage nor from a want of determination on the part of the Russians to resist the invading foe to the utmost, that the passive resistance system was adopted by the emperor Alexander. He was strenuously advised by those who were well acquainted with Napoleon's inordinate ambition, that it would lead him, if unopposed, to push forward his army into countries where the snows of winter would more surely do the work of destruction and death than could the cannon or the musket. Acting on this prudential advice the Russians risked no encounter of great moment, but kept retreating so as to leave the French in entire possession of the country through which they passed. The army which the emperor had raised to oppose the invaders amounted to 300,000 men, divided into two corps, respectively commanded by Barclay de Tolly, a Scotchman by extraction, and the prince Bagration.

To explain the system of passive resistance adopted by the Russian Emperor, he



issued a second proclamation, addressed to the French soldiers, to apprise them of the true nature of the successes in which they had begun to exult; for in the several conflicts which had already taken place, the Russians had given way; they had shown their valour, but they had uniformly retreated. "Do not," said this proclamation, "be deceived by our first movements. You ought to know the Russians too well to suppose that they will fly before you. As soon as we begin the combat, you will find it difficult to retreat. We advise you, as fellow-warriors, to return *en masse* to your own country." Happy would it have been for the brave men then advancing with "the Man of Destiny," had this prophetic language been duly respected; happy would it have been for their chief himself, had the sudden desertion of his soldiers spared him those scenes of misery and humiliation through which it was eventually his fate to pass.

Acting upon the principle of opposing the enemy by retiring before him, and destroying everything in his way before he could seize it—houses, villages, and towns likely to afford him shelter, were razed to the ground, so as to render it difficult to say where they had stood. The crops of grain and hay were cut and carried away, or effectually destroyed. Here, as in Spain, Buonaparte found, to his sorrow, that he had not merely to encounter armies, but to subdue a whole people. The Russians, nobles, priests, and serfs, for the time united in a warm attachment to their emperor, and in a determination to withstand the domination of the invaders of their country; so much so that they voluntarily ruined themselves to bring about the desired object. By Napoleon, as well as by many others, it was believed that the Russian serfs would have hailed and succoured the French, under their much-belied declaration of being heralds of liberty; but that spirit, so universal and so justly entitled to reverence, which leads men to proclaim, "whatever our condition, whatever the defects of our political system, we will accept of no redress from a foreign invader; we claim to settle our differences for ourselves;"—that feeling was manifested by all classes in Russia. Startling superstition united with glorious patriotism, to repel the hostile intruder, and vindicate the cause of despotism. The lowly peasant marched to battle with the gallant devotion of a hero, while the arch-

bishop of Moscow forwarded to his imperial majesty the precious image of St. Serge, described as "the ancient defender of the country's happiness," for the acceptance of Alexander. It is impossible to enumerate all the indications manifested of a fixed determination, never to yield to the domination of France. Besides setting fire to their hamlets, the peasants, says Scott, "proclaimed the punishment of death to all of their own order who, from avarice or fear, should be tempted to supply the enemy with provisions; and they inflicted it without mercy on those who incurred the penalty. It is an admitted fact, that when the French, in order to induce their refractory prisoners to labour in their service, branded some of them on the hand with the letter N, as a sign that they were the serfs of Napoleon, one peasant laid his hand on a log of wood, and struck it off with an axe which he held in the other, in order to free himself from the supposed thralldom." The devotion of the peasantry was equalled by the patriotism of the nobles, who everywhere deserted their mansions, and left them a prey to the invaders. Many of these chateaux were splendid buildings, yet their proprietors did not hesitate upon their destruction. Labaume, a French officer, states, that in one day he saw two of these palaces completely ravaged. "Halting at the second, he passed through a delightful garden, with beautiful walks, tastefully arranged. The pavilions, which had been newly decorated, now presented a picture of the most frightful desolation. The valuable furniture was broken in pieces, fragments of the most beautiful china were scattered about the garden, and many fine paintings had been torn from their frames, and were dispersed by the winds." At a village, which a band of the French one day reached, they found the seigneur, or feudal proprietor, surrounded by a number of men armed with scythes, poles, and other rude weapons, resolved to make a stand. A few shots from the invading force speedily dispersed this miserable group; the chief alone evincing firmness on this trying occasion. Awaiting the approach of the French soldiers, armed with a poniard, he menaced all who approached him. "How can I survive the dishonour of my country!" exclaimed he, when summoned to surrender—"our altars are no more! our empire is disgraced! Take my life, it is odious to me!" His last frantic request was soon complied with by the brutal French soldiery, and the unfortu-



nate nobleman was killed by repeated stabs of the bayonet.

The van of the army, with Napoleon at its head, reached Witepsk on the 28th of July, and found the place nearly deserted. As they moved forward, though the Russians still gave way, the ranks of the invaders were considerably thinned by famine, desertion, and other casualties. Buonaparte was advised not to continue his advance; but to pause or retreat would be to confess failure, and that was a thought which he could not brook. He flattered himself that marching to Moscow, he should bring the emperor Alexander on his knees, happy to accept of any peace which it might be his good pleasure to grant.

After a brief engagement, the Russians still retiring before them, the French entered and took possession of Witepsk on the Dwina, on the 28th of July. This town, like all the others which they had reached, they found deserted, the inhabitants having carried with them every article of value which they possibly could. Already Napoleon began to experience the difficulty of supporting so large an army in an enemy's country, without any supplies but those which could be forcibly taken from the inhabitants. Every day now added to the difficulties of his position. Confident, when he entered the Russian territory, that he had only to march steadily on the capital, in order to compel the emperor to sue for peace, he felt surprised that no such communication had been received, while desertion, fatigue, famine, and wounds, were daily diminishing the numbers of his soldiers; and when he entered Witepsk, little more than a month after the commencement of the campaign, his muster-roll was less by one-third than when he left France. The soldiers had already been obliged to submit at first to the stoppage of their allowance of wine, then beer, and latterly even water and bread fell short. For several days at a time the soldiers were reduced to feed on roots; and by the end of the month of July, the only provisions which could be obtained for whole divisions of the army was a nauseous kind of broth made from rye. This unwholesome food soon produced its natural consequences, and the men were attacked with dysentery and typhus fever; and as shelter or comforts of any kind could not be obtained for the sick, thousands of them died. For hundreds of miles the track of the "grand army" was marked by devas-

tation on every side, and by the dead bodies of men and horses. The severities and hardships which the troops had to undergo began to produce dissatisfaction, and to undermine discipline. The aimless object of the enterprise began to be discussed among the soldiers, and they deserted in considerable bodies. The inhabitants, however, profited but little from these defections, as the deserters never thought of returning to France, but joined themselves into predatory bands, murdering and robbing all who came in their way, and living a life of dissipation, as long as the means of their indulgence could be obtained by force or rapine. Ultimately all these marauders were cut down by the Cossacks, or by armed bands of the peasantry, who combined for mutual protection.

The difficulty of procuring supplies produced sometimes the most heartrending scenes. Everything which constituted the wealth or fortune of families was taken from them in the most ruthless manner, and the slightest opposition to the parties who scoured the country to procure provisions, resulted in the murder of those who opposed their proceedings. Labaume, a French authority, whom we have already quoted, says, in describing the entrance of a division into one of the Russian towns—"As we advanced towards the centre of the town, we observed, in every street, crowds of soldiers robbing the houses, altogether regardless of the cries of the wretched inhabitants, or the tears of the mothers who, on bended knees, begged for their own lives and those of their children. This insatiable rage for plunder was justified by some who, famishing, only sought for provisions; but others, under this pretence, rifled the dwellings of their contents, and even robbed the women and children of the clothes with which they were covered."

The more prudent counsellors of Napoleon now advised him either to fortify and remain in Witepsk till the succeeding spring, or to return to Wilna or Warsaw. He, however, had willed otherwise, and hurried on by his blind ambition, he determined not to stop short of Moscow, the capture of which he considered would enable him to put his troops into comfortable winter-quarters. He was compelled at once to advance, as there could not, at Witepsk, on any occasion, be gathered together more than twenty-four hours' provisions at any one time. To have returned to Poland



would have destroyed the prestige of success which he affected to believe was attached to his name; therefore forming a junction of his army (August 10th) he marched on Smolensk.

After the occupation of Witepsk by the French, the Russians partially changed their tactics. Their object now became to keep the invaders in check until the winter should overtake them; so that the retreat, which they foresaw must ultimately take place, might be aggravated by all the horrors of a northern winter. Smolensk, the next place of importance which the French approached, is a large fortified city, situated on the Dnieper. Here Barclay de Tolly, with his division of the Russian army, made a resolute stand, in order to cover the removal of the inhabitants, with all the transportable stores. Napoleon observing this, was delighted at the prospect that a general engagement was about to take place; for, having gained most of his successes by generalship in great battles, he concluded that similar results would follow in this instance. "Now I have them!" he exclaimed, when he came in sight of the Russian forces. The Russians were attacked with all the energy and skill of the French commanders, and a bombardment of the city ensued; after a severe struggle Smolensk was taken on August the 18th, the Russians retiring according to their ordinary practice. The French, however, found, to their astonishment, that their victory was of but little value to them. On the evening of the day of battle thick columns of smoke were seen ascending from the city; shortly after the bright red flames burst forth, spreading with fearful rapidity in every direction, and before the morning sun had dawned Smolensk was a smoking ruin.

Next day the French army entered the town; but so completely had the fire done its work, that there was not even shelter to be obtained in the half-burnt houses. Palaces yet burning showed walls half destroyed by the flames, and strewed among the charred and smoking ruins were to be seen the dead bodies of the unfortunate inhabitants who had been overtaken by the destructive element, or who had been slain in the bombardment of the previous day. Some few of the houses and the churches which had been spared, were filled by miserable wretches, who presented a woeful spectacle. In the great cathedral, venerated by the Russians, might be seen whole families, aged men and children, prostrated on the

steps of the altar, imploring that aid from heaven which had been denied them by man. The clang of military music, and the shouts of the French soldiery, however, soon drowned the wail of misery which had been uttered by the wretched sufferers. The Russians, in this affair, lost 12,000, and the French 4,000 men.

Calculating on this fine city as a place where he could have quartered and provisioned his troops, and, if required, that he could have fallen back upon from Moscow, the burning of Smolensk dismayed and perplexed Napoleon. He now appeared to comprehend the true nature of the contest in which he had engaged; and as he began to form a just estimate of the character of the people whose country he had invaded, his mind was filled with the most anxious forebodings. He found that this was not a mere war with the emperor of Russia, but a war with the entire people; that he had not only to contend with soldiers in pitched battles, but he had to encounter the determinate resistance of the whole population; and, what was worse, he was becoming hemmed in a wilderness infinite in extent, barren in condition, and remote from succour. His ablest generals also at this time murmured against the undertaking, and Murat, Ney, and others, loudly exclaimed against the foolhardiness of the spoiled child of fortune. Their objections were overruled, and Moscow was pointed to as the goal of all their endeavours, which was to crown their exertions with peace and security, and the troops were ordered to march onwards.

Having halted four days at Smolensk, the march from that city to Moscow, a distance of 280 miles, was commenced. The way lay through marshes and forests, and as the invaders moved, fatigue and intoxication, joined with the irregular assaults made on them by the enemy, reduced their numbers. The Russian army still retired, and the French advanced, occasionally exposed to the fierce charges of the Cossacks, a description of cavalry pictured as contemptible in the bulletins of Buonaparte, but one that through the campaign was often found to be terrible by his followers. The plan of Barclay de Tolly was to avoid a general engagement, but to weaken the enemy in partial actions, and draw him on from swamp to swamp, from desert to desert, and from conflagration to conflagration. At Gjat, a place which the French reached after leaving Smolensk, a Russian



officer appeared with a flag of truce. He was asked by a French general what place of consequence would be found between Wiazma and Moscow. "Pultawa, the place where Charles XII. saw his proud hopes annihilated by Russia," was the brief but significant reply.

Their onward course the French still pursued. On the 7th of September, having reached a place called Borodino, it was obvious that prince Kutusoff, who had now superseded Barclay de Tolly, proposed to give battle. Buonaparte, in a brief address to his troops, announced to them that a victory there achieved would secure them abundance, good winter-quarters, and a prompt return to their own countries, while late posterity would exalt the fame of each who was at "the great battle under the walls of Moscow." The hostile armies engaged, and awful was the attendant carnage. The French lost more than 50,000 men, with 43 generals; the Russian loss was said to reach 32,000 men, and 50 generals. Ninety thousand cannon were fired by the French, and each soldier used 100 cartridges. Sixty thousand men and 25,000 horses were burnt or buried on the fatal field, while the neighbouring ravines were crowded with wounded sufferers, who filled the air with passionate appeals to their comrades to give them death, that their present anguish might terminate.

Labauve, speaking of the destruction attendant on this battle, says—"As we passed over the ground which the Russians had occupied, we were able to judge of the immense loss that they had sustained. On many places the bursting of the shells had promiscuously heaped together men and horses. The fire of our howitzers had been so destructive, that mountains of dead bodies were scattered over the plain; and the few places that were not encumbered with the slain, were covered with broken lances, muskets, helmets, and cuirasses, or with grape-shot and bullets, as numerous as hail-stones after a violent storm. The most horrid spectacle, however, was the interior of the ravines: almost all the wounded who were able to drag themselves along, had taken refuge in these hollows, to avoid the shot. These miserable wretches—heaped one upon another, and almost suffocated with blood, uttering the most dreadful groans, and invoking death with piercing cries—eagerly besought us to put an end to their torments. We had no means of re-

lieving them, and could only deplore the calamities inseparable from a war so atrocious." Segur also thus refers to the sufferings of the Russians at this time—"One of these poor fellows lived for several days in the carcase of a horse, which had been gutted by a shell, and the inside of which he gnawed. Some were seen straightening their broken leg by tying a branch of a tree tightly against it, then supporting themselves with another branch, and walking in this manner to the next village."

The town of Mojaisk was captured, but neither inhabitants nor provisions were found, and Napoleon began to contemplate the awful consequences of being opposed by means like those on which the Russians relied. He laboured to conceal the dreary forebodings which came over him, and to affect an air of triumph. On the 14th of September, his army reached the crest of the last eminence interposed between them and Moscow, and they gazed on its numerous gilded domes and steeples with as much eagerness, if not with as much pious joy, as the pilgrims of other days felt when they first caught a glimpse of Jerusalem.

As the French approached the ancient capital of the Russian empire, they found that the population, as elsewhere, fled before them, leaving to the invaders nothing but scorched fields and smoking ruins. The determination with which the work of devastation was carried on by the Russians, appalled Buonaparte. Other circumstances at this time tended to depress his mind, and almost drove him to desperation. News of the disasters which had overtaken his armies in Spain reached him at this period. About a week before the battle of Borodino, Marmont's defeat at Salamanca was made known to him by colonel Fabvier, who made the journey from Valladolid in one course, and having fought at the Arapiles in Spain, on the 22nd of July, he was wounded on the heights of Moskowa on the 7th of September. Intelligence from France told him of plots against his power, and he was earnestly pressed by Fouché and his other ministers to return to Paris as soon as he possibly could.

The possession of Moscow, however, he still flattered himself would make amends for all he had undergone; the Russian citizens he fondly imagined, when they saw their capital fairly in his possession, would submit themselves to his rule. He would dictate to them his laws, and afford them



his protection. Subsidies would be raised, his army would be comfortably fed and lodged, and its efficiency restored. Trade and commerce being protected, would assume their accustomed course; and here, from the palace of the Kremlin, with the emperor at his feet suing for peace, he could dictate to him whatever terms he chose. Alas! how miserably were these high hopes fulfilled!

The city of Moscow is the capital of the Russian government of that name, and formerly the capital of all Russia. It is situated in a fertile and richly cultivated country on the banks of the river Moskwa, and of the rivulets Yausa and Neglina, 482 miles south-east of St. Petersburg. The form of the city is a sort of irregular rhomboid, and its circuit, within the ramparts that enclose the suburbs, is said to exceed twenty-six English miles; the population, however, does not correspond with its extent, as in this space are contained upwards of 1,000 gardens, besides about 240 kitchen-gardens, some of great extent, and a number of unenclosed fields, called *Poles*, which are used for exercising troops, holding festivals, and for promenades; and there are also upwards of 250 small lakes, the banks of some of which are laid out with much taste as public walks and gardens. Moscow was still the most populous city of the Russian empire, and had the largest and most splendid establishments of the nobility, notwithstanding the residence of the court at St. Petersburg. The city is distributed into five divisions, each of which has its respective circumvallation, and forms, as it were, a separate town; viz., the Kremlin, or central part; the Kitai-Gorod, or Chinese Town; the Beloi-Gorod, or White Town; the Zemlianoi-Gorod, or Earthen Town; and the Slobodi, or suburbs. The Kremlin, the central and highest part of the city, occupies a commanding situation on the banks of the Moskwa, and is surrounded by high walls of stone and brick, nearly two miles in circuit, furnished with battlements, embrasures, numerous towers, and five gates. This division was built of stone in 1367, and has no wooden houses; it includes the ancient palace of the czars, in which Peter the Great was born, the cathedral of the Assumption, the cathedral of the Annunciation, the cathedral of St. Michael, and the cathedral of the Transfiguration; several other churches with beautiful spires, two convents, the patriarchal palace, and the

arsenal. The Kitai-Gorod is much larger than the Kremlin; it is the centre of the trade of Moscow, and contains the bazaars, the magazines, and the best and greatest number of shops; and it has the only streets in Moscow in which the houses stand close to each other. Here also are the Pokrovskoi cathedral, which is so constructed as to contain twenty different chapels or places in which divine service may be performed at the same time; the town-hall; the printing-office of the holy synod; and various other public buildings. The Beloi-Gorod, or White Town, runs round the last-named division; it takes its name from a white wall, by which it was formerly surrounded. Besides many fine palaces of the nobility, it contained several remarkable edifices, such as the university, the medico-chirurgical academy, the foundling-hospital, the post-office, the college of foreign affairs, the residence of the governor-general, the excise-house, the assembly-room of the nobility, three monasteries, three nunneries, and several churches. The Zemlianoi-Gorod environs all the other three divisions, and is so denominated from a circular rampart of earth by which it is encompassed. It contained the depôt of the commissariat, the government depôt for spirits, the Imperial Philanthropic Society and the Moscow commercial school. In this division also are several promenades, planted with trees. The two last-named divisions exhibit a grotesque group of churches, convents, palaces, brick and wooden houses, and mean hovels. The slobodi, or suburbs, thirty-five in number, form a vast exterior circle round all the parts already described, and are invested by a low rampart and ditch; among these suburbs are to be found Catharine's Barracks, the military hospital, the hospital of Sheremetof, many monasteries, &c.; besides which, there are numerous orchards, gardens, corn-fields, much open pasture, and some small lakes, which give rise to the Neglina. The Moskwa, from which the city takes its name, flows through it in a winding channel; but, excepting in spring, is only navigable for rafts. Moscow exhibits an astonishing degree of extent and variety, irregularity, and contrast; some parts have the appearance of a sequestered desert, others of a populous town; some of a contemptible village, others of a great capital: the streets in general are very long and broad; some of them are paved; others, particularly in the suburbs, are formed with trunks of trees, or boarded with planks, like



the floor of a room. The churches are richly ornamented within, and the pictures of the saints are decorated with gold, silver, and precious stones; some of their bells are of a stupendous size; they hang in belfries detached from the church, are fixed immovably to the beams, and rung by means of a rope tied to the clapper. In the cathedral of St. Michael the sovereigns of Russia were formerly interred; their bodies are deposited in raised sepulchres, mostly of brick, in the shape of a coffin, above the pavement, each having, at the lower extremity, a silver plate, containing the name of the prince and the time of his death: on great festivals they are all covered with palls of gold or silver brocade, studded with pearls and jewels. The cathedral of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary is the most magnificent in the city, and has long been appropriated to the coronation of the Russian sovereigns. Between these two cathedrals, and nearly in the centre of the Kremlin, is the church of Ivan Veliki: it has a circular tower, terminated by a conical-shaped cupola richly gilt, about 300 feet high, and is the loftiest building in Moscow. In 1737, a bell, weighing more than 400,000 lbs., was cast for this church, but was materially injured by fire the same year; its height is 19 feet, the circumference at the bottom 64 feet, the greatest thickness 23 inches, and a triangular piece is broken off from its periphery: on festival days this bell is visited by the natives, who regard it with superstitious veneration. The Foundling Hospital, founded by Catharine II., is an immense pile of building, of a quadrangular shape, and will contain 8,000 foundlings. Two miles north of the city is the palace of Petrovsky, the usual residence of the Russian sovereigns during their visits to Moscow: it is a large edifice of brick-work, and has an appearance of great magnificence, but the style of architecture is cumbrous and heavy.

Napoleon, when he first beheld "Moscow with the golden cupolas," partook of the general enthusiasm of his soldiers. About two o'clock on the 14th of September, while the rear-guard of the Russians were in the act of evacuating Moscow, he reached the hill called the Mount of Salvation, because it is there where the natives kneel and cross themselves at first sight of the Holy City. Moscow seemed lordly and striking as ever, with the steeples of its thirty churches, and its copper domes glit-

tering in the sun; its palaces of eastern architecture mingled with trees, and surrounded by gardens, while the Kremlin rose like a citadel out of the general mass of groves and buildings. But not a chimney sent up smoke, not a man appeared on the battlements, or at the gates. Napoleon gazed, every moment expecting to see a train of bearded Boyards arriving to fling themselves at his feet, and place their wealth at his disposal. His first exclamation was—"Behold at last that celebrated city!" His next—"It was full time." His army, less regardful of the past or the future, fixed their eyes on the goal of their wishes—and a shout of Moscow! Moscow! passed from rank to rank.\*

Napoleon halted till the evening, the whole of his forces in the mean time coming up, his scouts advancing to the city, and even mingling with the retreating Russians. He remained in the anxious expectation that a deputation of the inhabitants would wait upon him formally to surrender to him their ancient capital. Time came on, but no deputation appeared. Was it possible that the Russians were ignorant of the usual formalities of surrendering a town? The scouts of Murat had returned—they had penetrated into the streets, and found Moscow deserted—the population had either left, or was asleep. Several Frenchmen who had been resident in Moscow came out of their hiding-places, and made the same report—the city had been deserted. Napoleon at first refused to give credit to what he was told, so contrary was it to his experience of war or of human nature, that the entire population of a large city should abandon it, because it was about to fall into the hands of an enemy. Disagreeable and unprecedented as the fact was, however, it was impossible to disbelieve it, and when the city was entered, no one was found in its deserted houses and streets but a few thousand vagabonds, who had remained in the hope of plunder; and a few French and other foreign residents, whom the retreating Russians had not been able to induce to leave.

When the emperor Alexander was forced to retire before the French, he committed the command of his army to his two generals, as we have before stated. He then proceeded into the interior of his country, in order to superintend the preparations which were being made for the defeat of the

\* Sir Walter Scott.



enemy. He visited Moscow, a city which from the wealth of its inhabitants, and the number of nobles who resided in it, was considered one of the most important in his empire. The excess of the danger which threatened the empire, begot the most intense spirit of loyalty in the inhabitants; and when Alexander reached the ancient city, he was received with every demonstration of enthusiasm, and offers of money and other supplies were made, which could never have been expected. One merchant subscribed 50,000 rubles, two-thirds of his fortune, and paid the sum the ensuing day. The strong feeling of patriotism which thus exhibited itself, convinced Alexander that Moscow would do its duty.

The emperor having left the city to proceed to other parts of his dominions, the inhabitants of Moscow watched the gradual approach of the French with the greatest anxiety. Rostopchin, the governor, upheld the spirits of the citizens by proclamations, in which he assured them that the French would be defeated long before they could reach Moscow, and forced to retreat. Notwithstanding these assurances, many of the inhabitants left the city. Rostopchin, while he appeared to have great confidence in his own proclamations, did not fail to make provision for the reception of the enemy should his hopes be frustrated. Large quantities of fireworks and combustibles were accumulated in the houses, which were to be fired at the proper time, and thus destroy the invader and his followers in a

general explosion. Such was the determined spirit with which the invading army of France was to be met.

About a fortnight before the arrival of the French, the general emigration of the inhabitants had commenced. The governor had the archives of the city and the public treasure removed, the merchants next began to shift their property, and the whole country for miles round was covered with fugitives from the devoted city. The news of the battle of the Moskwa completed the desertion of the city. It was at first supposed by Rostopchin that Kutusoff would risk another battle in the vicinity of Moscow; but when he learned that it was the intention of that general to retreat still further, he determined to lose no time in carrying his desperate design of burning the city into execution. On the night of the 13th, while the French were hurrying forward to take possession of their much coveted prize, Rostopchin sent emissaries round to warn the few remaining inhabitants to lose no time in leaving the city. Fusees and other combustible materials, it is said, were introduced into the deserted houses and shops, and places where they would be the most likely to lead to a general conflagration. A stream of fugitives now poured out of the gates of the city, urged alike by their fear of the French, and the stern measures of Rostopchin. Men might be seen harnessed to carts, dragging their wives, children, their aged parents, and the slight remains of their property.

#### BURNING OF MOSCOW.

SUCH was the condition of Moscow when the invading army approached the city. Napoleon experienced severe disappointment, when made acquainted with the above facts, but still indulged a hope that the fall of Moscow would produce an impression on the Russians favourable to his views. He entered it on the evening of the 14th of September, but passed that night in a house in the suburbs. While here, a report reached him that it was intended to fire the city. He was vigilant in observing all that passed, and was continually sending messengers to ascertain that all was quiet in Moscow, when at two o'clock in the morning he learned that a fire had actually broken out. A fire balloon was sent up, which fell in the

palace of Trubetskoi, and this seems to have been the signal for a general conflagration. It was seen that the exchange was on fire, and the pillaging of that building immediately commenced. "Under the piazzas," says Labaume, "numerous warehouses were found, in which the soldiers broke the chests, and divided the spoil, which exceeded all their expectations. No cry, no tumult, was heard in this scene of horror; every one found wherewithal to satisfy his thirst for plunder. Nothing was heard but the crackling of the flames, and the noise of the doors that were broken open; till all at once, a dreadful crash was occasioned by the falling in of a wall. Cottons, muslins, in short the most costly pro-



ductions of Europe and of Asia were seen in a blaze. In the cellars were accumulated sugars, oils, vitrol,—all these objects consumed at once, in subterraneous warehouses, sent forth torrents of flames, through thick iron grates." The fire soon reached the finest parts of the town; the palaces which adorned Moscow were destroyed; the steeples of the churches lately resplendent, like gold and silver, were laid low; and more dreadful still, the hospitals were soon involved in the conflagration. These had contained 20,000 wounded sufferers, many of whom, previously mutilated, were seen vainly struggling to escape the devouring element. Napoleon affected an air of calmness, and directed his soldiers to enter the Kremlin, the ancient palace of the czars, which is in the central part of Moscow. Thence he wrote with his own hand proposals of peace, which he forwarded by a Russian officer of rank, who had lately been captured. The flames abated the next day, and the French officers occupied the deserted palaces, but at night the fire burst out again. Many persons were discovered with torches in their hands, who had concealed themselves till darkness arrived. Whether these persons were animated by patriotism, or by a hope of plunder, admits of some doubt; but the latter, it is probable, more generally prevailed among them. Some of them were cut down by the exasperated French. It was impossible to check the conflagration; the fire engines had previously been sent away, and it was soon apparent that the Kremlin was in danger. There, anxiously pacing his apartment, Bonaparte sorrowfully contemplated the magnificently frightful spectacle which was presented to him, while such exclamations as, "What desperate resolution!—it's all their own doings!—these are Scythians indeed!"—were heard to fall from his feverish lips. Soon a cry was raised that the Kremlin was on fire. He found it no easy task to withdraw. He wished to seek Petrovsky, a residence of the Russian emperor, three miles distant on the Petersburg road; but attempting to leave the Kremlin by a postern gate, found himself surrounded by the fire. A single narrow winding street presented the only outlet; through this he rushed, and with great difficulty made his way to Petrovsky.

Segur gives the following graphic account of the escape of Napoleon:—"We were encircled by a sea of fire, which blocked up all the gates of the citadel, and frustrated the first attempts that were made to depart.

After some search, we discovered a postern gate, leading between the rocks to the Moskwa. It was by this narrow passage that Napoleon, his officers, and guards, escaped from the Kremlin. But what had they gained by this movement?—they had approached nearer to the fire, and could neither retreat nor remain where they were. And how were they to advance? how force a passage through the waves of this ocean of flame? There was no time to be lost; the roaring of the flames around us became every moment more violent. A single narrow winding street appeared to be the only outlet. The emperor rushed on foot, and without hesitation, into this narrow passage. He advanced amid the crackling of the flames, the crash of floors, and the fall of burning timbers, and of the red-hot iron roofs which tumbled around him. The flames, which, with impetuous roar, consumed the edifices between which we were proceeding, spreading beyond the walls, were blown about by the wind, and formed an arch over our heads. We walked on a ground of fire, beneath a fiery sky, and between two walls of fire. The intense heat burned our eyes, which we were, nevertheless, obliged to keep open and fixed on the danger. A consuming atmosphere, glowing ashes, detached flames, parched our throats, and rendered our respiration short and dry; and we were already almost suffocated with the smoke."

This occurred on the evening of the 16th. The conflagration, however, raged till the 20th, when it ended, having lasted in all six days. During that period, Dr. Lyall states in his *History of Moscow*, "innumerable palaces, crowds of noble mansions, and thousands of houses, bazaars, shops, and warehouses, containing the wealth and luxuries of the world—the depositories of science, and literature, and taste, the cabinets and galleries—were destroyed." Karamzin, a Russian historian, says:—"Palaces and temples, monuments of art and miracles of luxury, the remains of ages which had passed away, and those which had been the creation of yesterday—the tombs of ancestors and the nursery cradles of the present generation—were indiscriminately destroyed. Nothing was left of Moscow save the remembrance of the city, and the deep resolution to avenge its fall."—The total loss by fire and the war in the government of Moscow was estimated at 321,000,000 of rubles, about £50,000,000 sterling.



On the 20th, Napoleon returned to Moscow, and again took up his lodging at the Kremlin, which, owing to the exertions of the soldiers to save it from destruction, had escaped with but little damage. At this extremely perilous period of their affairs, the appearance of the French invaders was anything but what might have been expected. Their camp or quarters presented a resemblance to a fair. It was, in reality, what has been laughed at as one of the most facetious efforts of Mr. Canning's imagination, "An army in disguise." While Moscow was burning, the staff-officers stationed round the chateaux, where their generals resided, were established in the gardens and quartered under grottos, Chinese pavilions, or green-houses. The horses tied under acacias or linden-trees, were separated from each other by hedges or beds of flowers. "This camp, truly picturesque, was rendered still more so, by the new costume adopted by the soldiers. Thus we saw walking in our camp, soldiers who were dressed *à la Tartare, à la Cosaque, à la Chinois*; one wore the Polish cap, another wore the high bonnet of the Persians, the Basques, or the Calmucks. In short, our army presented the image of a carnival." Labaume, the writer thus quoted, goes on to state that the army forgot their fatigues, rejoicing in the good cheer they found, and the profits which they made by articles stolen at Moscow; the army having by this time withdrawn from that city and assembled at Petrovsky. The soldiers continued to return to the Kremlin, where they found many valuable articles, of which they made sale. They were, notwithstanding their wealth, so indifferently lodged as to be constantly exposed to all the inclemency of the weather; while they ate off China plates, drank out of silver vases, and had at their command the most elegant appliances of luxury. But distress was fast approaching. The cattle died for want of forage. Their tables were laden with syrups and dainties, but bread and meat were wanting. All foretold, as might easily be perceived, through the rent veil of splendour, that dire want must soon overtake the grand army.

The description given by eye-witnesses of the appearance of the city and its suburbs, now that the fire was over, is horrible in the extreme. "Strict orders had at first been issued to refrain from pillage, but these had been at last withdrawn, and thousands of persons of all descriptions, French and Rus-

sians, officers and privates, men of respectable character and the lowest dregs of the population, the refuse of the Russian gaols, had for several days been going about through the streets, breaking open shops, and ransacking houses, in quest of such goods or movables as had escaped the fire. There had been no order or regularity; all had been excess and brutal indulgence. On the road from Petrovsky to Moscow, the most strange and disgusting scenes met the eyes of the emperor: large blazing bonfires, in which the fuel consisted of mahogany furniture and gilded doors; around these, officers and soldiers, splashed and bedaubed with mud and dirt, lying on silken couches, or sitting in fine arm-chairs, their feet resting on Siberian furs, Cashmere shawls, or Persian gold-cloth; gold and silver plates in their hands, from which they were ravenously eating huge pieces of half-broiled horseflesh. Round every one of these little groups were gathered crowds of Russian citizens trying in some cases to recover part of their own property, in others to pillage their neighbours, but many of them tempted merely by the fires which the French had kindled, and the horseflesh which they were eating. Entering the suburbs of the city, the scenes which offended the eye and the other senses were more disgusting. Everywhere heaps of ashes, and fragments of stone and iron, blocked up the path; and the air was filled with an indescribable stench, rising from such a smouldering chaos of lime, bricks, wood, dead bodies, and all the heterogeneous mass of materials which the imagination can conceive to be lodged in a great city. In the gardens, wretched and gaunt-looking Russians of both sexes, some with scarcely a rag to cover them, others clad in furs and rich pelisses, were seen scraping the soil with their nails in search of roots or herbs; or fighting with each other for the thigh-bone of a horse which had been left behind them by the French. On the banks of the river, crowds were devouring handfuls of raw and sour corn, which they had fished up from the water, out of a large quantity which had been sunk by the orders of Rostopchin."

The return of Napoleon put a stop to many of these scenes of disorder. Indiscriminate pillage was ordered to cease; the churches were evacuated by the soldiery; the principal streets were cleared; and means were taken to restore order and regularity into the sacked and ruined city.



But nothing could repair the losses sustained by the indiscriminate pillage of the last six days. Quantities of provisions which, if prudently taken care of, would have been a welcome addition to the army stores, had been irretrievably squandered by a wasteful and licentious soldiery.

Thus have we endeavoured to convey to our readers a faint idea of that great event in history, the "Burning of Moscow;" and though we have, in accordance with the generally-received account of this event, attributed the act to the Russians, yet we cannot refrain from giving colonel Mitchell's view of the question, although he differs from all other writers on the subject. Colonel Mitchell denies that the Russians did burn Moscow. Alison, in his *History of Europe*, states that Rostopchin, in Paris, with his own lips, told him that he had applied the incendiary torch with his own hands; but to what? *to a bed in his own country palace.* The French evidence of course is worth nothing, as they had no means of knowing who set fire to the town, whether their own soldiers or the Russians. They had strong motives, however, for saying the latter, and therefore they said it. We will, however, let colonel Mitchell state his own case.

"But," he says, "it will be asked, how then was Moscow burnt? for if the Russians did not burn it, the French certainly would not. The answer is very easy. The first thing famishing troops are likely to do on entering a town, is to demand food; but when there are no inhabitants to supply them, as was the case in the deserted city of Moscow, the soldiers naturally look for it themselves; and as they are not generally provided with lanterns and wax tapers for the purpose of searching cellars, cupboards, and dark corners, their usual substitutes are wisps of lighted straw, or burning sticks: and thousands of starving wretches so employed—to say nothing of intemperance, and the proverbial carelessness of soldiers—would soon set fire to a deserted city, mostly built of wood. We have seen what the conduct of the troops was on entering the capital, and may safely ask, how could any city escape being burnt under such circumstances! The Russians, seeing that great honour attached to this presumed sacrifice, very quietly took the credit of it to themselves, though they had in the first instance accused the French of the deed. Count Rostopchin, in a pamphlet written on the

subject, frankly owns that it was not the act of the Russian government: but so proud have the nation become of this pretended deed of heroism, 'this sublimest of volcanoes,' that colonel Bouturlin, in his half-official account of the campaign of 1812, avowing that no direct orders were given for the destruction of the city, insinuates, nevertheless, that intelligible hints to the same effect emanated from the highest quarter, and were received as absolute commands in consequence. We doubt the assertion altogether, and believe the fire to have been the very natural result of the circumstances under which the deserted city was taken possession of by the famishing French. Nor can the Russians claim any credit for this pretended national sacrifice, unless at the expense of the very moderate degree of sagacity which must have rendered the needless severity of such a measure plain and apparent."

We add the observations of Sir Walter Scott on this important point in history:—"The conflagration of Moscow was so complete in its devastation, so important in its consequences, so critical in the moment of its commencement, that almost all the eye-witnesses have imputed it to a sublime, yet almost horrible exertion of patriotic decision on the part of the Russians, their government, and, in particular, of the governor, Rostopchin. Nor has the positive denial of count Rostopchin himself diminished the general conviction that the fire was directed by him. All the French officers continue to this day to ascribe the conflagration to persons whom he had employed. On the other hand, there are many, and those good judges of the probabilities in such an event, who have shown strong reasons for believing that Moscow shared but the fate of a deserted city, which is almost always burnt as well as pillaged. In the meantime, we shall only observe, that should the scale of evidence incline to the side of accident, history will lose one of the grandest as well as most terrible incidents which she has on record. Considered as a voluntary Russian act, the burning of their capital is an incident of gigantic character, which we consider with awe and terror—our faculties so confused by the immensity of the object, considered in its different bearings, that we hardly know whether to term it vice or virtue, patriotism or vengeance. Whether the conflagration of Moscow was or was not the work of Russian will and Russian hands, the effects



which it was to produce on the campaign were likely to be of the most important character. Bonaparte's object in pressing on to the capital at every risk was to grasp a pledge, for the redemption of which he had no doubt Alexander would be glad to make peace on his own terms. But the prize of his victory, however fair to the sight, had, like that fabled fruit, said to grow on the banks of the Dead Sea, proved in the end but soot and ashes. Moscow, indeed, he had seized, but it had perished in his grasp; and, far from being able to work upon Alexander's fears for its safety, it was reasonable to think that its total destruction had produced the most vehement resentment on the part of the Russian monarch, since Napoleon received not even the civility of an answer to his conciliatory letter. And thus the acquisition so much desired, as the means of procuring peace, had become, by this catastrophe, the cause of the most irreconcilable enmity. Neither was it a trifling consideration, that Napoleon had lost by this dreadful fire a great part of the supplies which he expected the capture of the metropolis would have contributed for the support of his famished army. Had there existed in Moscow the usual population of a capital, he would have found the usual modes of furnishing its markets in full activity. These, doubtless, are not of the common kind, for provisions are sent to this capital, not, as is usual, from fertile districts around the city, but from distant regions, whence they are brought by water carriage in the summer, and by sledges, which travel on the ice and frozen snow, in the winter time. To Moscow, with its usual inhabitants, these supplies must have been remitted as usual, lest the numerous population of 250,000 and upwards should be famished, as well as the enemy's army. But, Moscow deserted—Moscow burnt and reduced to mountains of cinders and ashes—had no occasion for such supplies; nor was it to be supposed that the provinces from which they were usually remitted would send them to a heap of ruins, where there remained none to be fed save the soldiers of the invading army. This conviction came with heavy anticipation on the emperor of France and his principal officers."

Accustomed to domineer over the sovereigns of Europe, Buonaparte had confidently expected that the emperor Alexander, his ancient capital lost, would be content to take his place among the vanquished. He

had the grief to learn, after sending Lauriston to Kutusoff to propose an accommodation or an armistice, that he, while receiving the communication with all courtesy, had made known that he had no authority to receive any proposals for peace or for an armistice. With respect to an armistice, the Russians had no occasion for it, and they were in possession of too many advantages to think of granting a cessation of arms to an invading enemy. When Lauriston complained of the barbarous manner in which the war was conducted on the part of the Russians, he was answered that the barbarities complained of originated with the French, who had, without provocation, invaded their country. He added, that now, when vengeance and retaliation were at hand, they sought for peace; but peace could not be granted till the French were beyond the Vistula. They had come to Moscow uninvited, and must get back how they could. The Russian army, he might be assured, would do its duty, and this was but the commencement of the campaign. In the same spirit, when Murat having concluded a short armistice, with Miloradovitch, complained of the excesses committed by the Cossacks, the latter at once declared that they had acted only according to orders. Murat remonstrated against their firing on flags of truce, but received for an answer—"We want not to negotiate, but to fight. Take your measures accordingly." These brave commanders only communicated the sentiments and the fixed resolve of their sovereign. When he learnt the fall of Moscow, this was the language of Alexander—"No pusillanimous dejection! Let us vow redoubled courage and perseverance. The enemy is in deserted Moscow, as in a tomb. He entered Russia with 300,000 men of all countries, without union, or any national or religious bond: he has lost half of them by the sword of famine and desertion. He is in the heart of Russia, and not a single Russian at his feet. To escape famine he will soon be obliged to direct his flight through the close flanks of our brave soldiers. Shall we then falter when our efforts against the common enemy are beheld and approved by all Europe?"

While Napoleon remained in deserted Moscow, Murat, with part of the army, was in pursuit of Kutusoff and his Russians. Several engagements took place between the Russian general and the chivalrous king of Naples, which, however, were decisive of nothing, save the stubborn bravery of



the Russians. Tired of this protracted and undecisive warfare, and becoming every day more sensible of the danger of his position, Napoleon still hoped that he might be able to bring the czar to sue for terms of peace. His plans at this time were undecided. At one time it seemed to be his intention to remain at Moscow through the winter; and in conformity with this design, or probably with the intention of deceiving the Russians, an intendant and municipal magistracy were established for the city; a theatre was erected amid the ruins; first-rate actors were sent for from Paris; and an Italian singer commenced giving entertainments in the Kremlin. At another he would propose to his assembled officers, that the army should at once march on St. Petersburg; this idea, however, was soon laid aside. A third proposed measure was to move southward on the fertile province of Kalouga, and thence to proceed westward to Smolensk, which was their first depôt. This, however, would involve a general action with Kutusoff, who occupied a favourable position to the south of Moscow. The sample which Napoleon had received of this general's bravery at the battle of Borodino, indisposed him to risk another encounter with him, as, should it be as obstinately contested, and as doubtful in its termination, it would be but a bad commencement for a retreat, the flanks of which would certainly be annoyed, even if the Moldavian army did not intercept him in the front. There was but one other course open to the invaders, and that was to retreat. This, as yet, none of his generals had the courage to propose to their great leader. Besides, the line of retreat must lie through the countries which had been totally wasted and destroyed by the advance of the army, and where all the villages had been burned and abandoned, either by the French or the Russians themselves.

Buonaparte's difficulties still continued to increase; and it became necessary at once to decide on what course was to be pursued. Provisions were becoming so scarce that the soldiers had to depend for their rations on the supplies which were brought in by parties of cavalry who scoured the country round, and seized on everything eatable they could find. The stock in the neighbourhood was in a short time all consumed, and it became necessary for these foraging parties to extend their circle of robbery and pillage wider and wider, where they had to contend with the enraged peasantry, and bands of

Cossacks fell upon them whenever an opportunity presented itself. In addition to their present sufferings, the French were haunted with the dread of a Russian winter, of whose horrors they had heard, but of the true nature of which they could as yet form but a faint idea. In the conversations they had had with the inhabitants and the prisoners they had taken, the French soldiers were told that the winter was at hand; that when it did come, within a fortnight their nails would drop off from the effects of the cold, and their muskets would fall from their half-dead and frozen fingers; that in fact, their graves would be the snows of Russia.

Still Napoleon would not decide on a retreat; still he clung to the hope that the fall of Moscow would dispose the Russians and their emperor to sue for peace; he calculated that the occupation of Moscow, even in its deserted state, was a blow which the nation could not survive. "Millions of money," he said, "have no doubt slipped through our hands in consequence of the burning of Moscow; but how many millions is Russia losing? Her commerce is ruined for a century to come. The nation is thrown back fifty years; this, of itself, is an important result. When the first moment of enthusiasm is past, this reflection will fill them with consternation."

Napoleon still determined to await an answer to a communication despatched by Lauriston to Kutusoff, which was to be forwarded to the emperor. Lauriston, after much difficulty, obtained an interview with Kutusoff on the 6th of October. He opened his business with a proposal for an exchange of prisoners; this Kutusoff declined; the shrewd old Russian easily perceived that a lack of soldiers was not likely to occur in his army, while the ranks of the French must every day become thinner. General Lauriston then entering on the real business of his mission, asked "if this war, which had assumed such an unheard-of character, was to last for ever?" declaring at the same time that the sincere desire of his master, the emperor of France, was to terminate hostilities between two great and generous nations. The Russian general easily perceived that the desire of Napoleon to make peace arose from the difficulties of his position, and he immediately adopted the course which he thought most likely to gain time, which must at once increase the difficulties of the French, and his own power of availing



himself of them. He affected a sincere desire to promote a pacification, but declared that the emperor had given him no power to receive any proposal of that kind himself, or to transmit it to him. He therefore declined to grant to general Lauriston a passport to the presence of Alexander, but professed himself willing to send general Wolkonsky, an aid-de-camp of the czar, to learn his imperial pleasure. Lauriston did not object to this arrangement. Occupying still his apartments in the Kremlin, Napoleon persisted in awaiting the answer to his letter to the czar despatched by Lauriston; this answer could not be expected till the 26th.

If Buonaparte had any real expectation of the Russian emperor's agreeing to terms of peace, he had indulged in a groundless hope. Alexander refused to hear of any negotiation, and severely reprimanded his general for holding any communication with the invaders. The Russian soldiers were at the same time made acquainted with the news of the success of the British arms in Spain; Frenchmen, like others, it was shown, were liable to defeat; and the soldiers were called on to emulate the courage of the British and patriotism of the Spaniards. While the minds of the soldiery were thus excited and encouraged, Kutusoff put an end to the armistice, and took up an offensive position.

At this time, a scheme is said to have been suggested by Daru, one of Napoleon's generals, to turn Moscow into an entrenched

camp, and occupy it as winter quarters. Let them, he said, make themselves as comfortable as possible in the city; let every effort be made to procure food by sweeping the neighbouring country; and to lessen the amount of forage required, kill all the spare horses, and let them be salted down and barrelled. With these preparations they would be able to defy the rigours of a Russian winter, and be able to take the field again in spring! Napoleon approved of what he termed a lion's counsel; but finally this plan was abandoned. The fear of what might happen in France, from which this plan would have excluded them for six months, weighed heavily with him. "Besides, if Napoleon fixed himself at Moscow for the winter, not only his line of communication, but Lithuania and the Grand Duchy, which formed the base of his operations, ran every risk of being invaded. On the south-west the dubious faith of Austria was all he had to trust to, for the purpose of resisting the united armies of Tchitchagoff and Tormasoff, which might be augmented to 100,000 men, and make themselves masters of Warsaw and Wilna. On the northern extremity of his general line of operations, Macdonald and St. Cyr might prove unable to resist Wittgenstein and Steingel; and he had in his rear Prussia, the population of which Napoleon justly considered as ready to take arms against him at the first favourable opportunity. The scheme, therefore, for occupying winter quarters at Moscow was rejected as fraught with danger."

#### THE FRENCH RETREAT FROM MOSCOW.

WE now come to the saddest chapter which is perhaps to be found in the bloody annals of war,—the retreat from Moscow. Not until a heavy fall of snow had unmistakeably reminded the French emperor of the climate he was braving, did he decide on leaving Moscow; but he dared not longer remain there; and at length, with feelings of the deepest humiliation, but maintaining his ordinary bravado and pretension, the order to retreat was given. It was issued on the 18th of October, thirty-four days after they had entered Moscow in triumph, and never was a richer burlesque on calamity exhibited to the world, than was displayed on this occasion. Far distant from their home, having before them a two month's journey

through rugged roads, and pathless snows, and exposed to all the horrors of a northern winter, though scantily supplied with provisions and necessaries for such a dismal pilgrimage, long files of carriages in three or four ranks moved in the sad procession, laden with booty; valuables that might be desirable in a milder climate and in the security of peace, but worse than valueless to the traveller in a desert, surrounded by enemies to whom these treasures belonged. Yet these, and the trophies of war, among which must be mentioned the Cross of St. Ivan, were proudly paraded. The resolution of Napoleon was taken to march by the Kalouga road, and in his wonted bombastic style he thought it fitting to exclaim: "Wo



be to those I meet by the way." The army left Moscow on the 19th, then consisting of 100,000 fighting men, while a vast number of helpless women and children were among the followers of the army.

On the 22nd, the emperor had reached Borowsk, ten leagues from Moscow, and had fixed his quarters there. Here was distinctly heard the dreadful explosion of the blowing up of the Kremlin, which Napoleon had left his rear-guard to execute. The mode of carrying out this mandate was a piece of additional barbarity. Aware that some of the Russians who were left behind, the offscourings of society, would crowd in to plunder the palace when the French retreated, the soldiers attached long slow matches to the barrels of gunpowder which were stored in the vaults of the palace, and lighted them when the rear of the French column marched out. The French were but at a short distance when the explosion took place, which laid a considerable part of the Kremlin in ruins, and destroyed at the same time, in mere wantonness, a large number of unfortunate beings whom curiosity or love of plunder had induced to enter the palace.

On the 23rd, a battle was fought at Maro-Jaroslavitz, between the advanced portion of the army, under prince Eugene Beauharnois, and the whole Russian army, under Kutusoff. The French were victorious; but victory in their then situation brought them little cause for rejoicing. The town of Maro-Jaroslavitz presented scenes too mournful to be described. Napoleon is said to have heard, without emotion, the doleful cries of the wounded, who demanded assistance, while he ascribed to Eugene all the honour of that glorious day. Buonaparte could no longer disguise to himself the appalling fact, that the situation of his army, though triumphant in this battle, was becoming desperate; and anxious to reach Smolensk without loss of time, he made choice of one of the three roads leading to that city, which passed by Mojaisk.

On the day succeeding this engagement an incident occurred, as he was proceeding to reconnoitre, in which Napoleon incurred a great risk of his life or freedom. It was about daybreak when, as attended by his staff and orderly soldiers, he crossed the little plain on the northern side of the Louja in order to gain the bridge; the level ground was suddenly filled with fugitives, in the rear of whom appeared some black

masses. At first, the cries they made seemed to be those of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" but the wild hurrah of the Cossacks, and the swiftness of their advance, soon announced the children of the desert. "It is the Cossacks," said Rapp, seizing the reins of the emperor's bridle, "you must turn back." Napoleon refused to retreat, drew his sword, as did his attendants, and placed themselves on the side of the highway. Rapp's horse was wounded, and borne down by one of the lancers; but the emperor and suite preserved their liberty by standing their ground, while the cloud of Cossacks, more intent on plunder than prisoners, passed them within arm's length, without observing the inestimable prey which was within their grasp, and threw themselves upon some carriages which were more attractive. The arrival of the cavalry of the guard cleared the plain of this desultory but pertinacious enemy; and Napoleon proceeded to cross the river, and ascend the further bank, for the purpose of reconnoitring.

On the 28th of October, the army reached Mojaisk, leaving a track of ruin and devastation behind them, and fronting a desert equally horrible. "The fields," says Labaume, "trampled down by thousands of horses, seemed as though they had never been cultivated. The forests, cleared by the long continuance of the troops, partook likewise of the general desolation; but most horrible were the multitudes of dead bodies which, deprived of burial for fifty-two days, scarcely retained the human form. As we traversed the field of Borodino, my consternation was inexpressible when I found the 40,000 men who had perished there yet lying exposed. The whole plain was entirely covered with them. None of the bodies were more than half buried. In one place were to be seen garments yet red with blood, and bones gnawed by dogs and birds of prey; in another were broken arms, drums, trumpets, and helmets. Continuing our march through the plain, we heard at a distance a feeble voice appealing to us for succour. Touched by his plaintive cries, some soldiers approached the spot, and, to their astonishment, saw a French soldier stretched on the ground, with both his legs broken. 'I was wounded,' said he, 'on the day of the great battle. I fainted from the agony I endured, and, on recovering my senses, I found myself in a desolate place, where none could hear my cries or afford me relief. For two months I daily dragged myself to the brink



of a rivulet, where I fed on the grass and roots, and some morsels of bread which I found among the dead bodies. At night I laid myself down under the shelter of some dead horses. To-day, seeing you at a distance, I summoned all my strength, and happily crawled sufficiently near your route to make my voice heard." The poor wretch was placed in a carriage, and carried along with the army.

The weather became piercingly cold, the "hurrah" of the Cossacks who pursued the retreating host was more formidable than ever, and on the 6th of November, while yet they had some days' march to perform to reach Smolensk, the winter set in. Withering blasts swept the surface of the earth, and masses of snow descended to furnish a shroud for the soldiers of the grand army. Their freezing garments stiffened on their bodies, their benumbed limbs became powerless, they staggered rather than walked, and the thick snow which covered the soil soon presented a multitude of tumuli, which served but to indicate so many graves. The Cossacks hung on their rear with unflinching courage, the peasants joined them to exterminate the hated intruders, and the very dogs of the neighbourhood joined in the pursuit, to feast on the carcases of the victims to mad ambition. Then the useless artillery they had brought with them, the trophies which they had won, and the treasures which they had stolen, were rapidly abandoned. Men and horses expired from fatigue. The flesh of the horses was all the soldiers had to feed on for many days. The animals were torn to pieces as soon as they were dead, and portions of the meat broiled on coals, or on the wood fires which were kindled. Warming themselves by these, if for a moment they forgot their woe, when they rose to move forward, their frost-bitten limbs were powerless, and they preferred falling into the hands of the enemy to a further effort at continuing their painful journey. Hundreds, seated by the fires kindled on their march, fell fast asleep to wake no more. They had left Moscow from 100,000 to 120,000 strong; when they had reached Viazma on the Wop, not more than 60,000 capable of standing before an enemy remained. One anecdote of their march will show the terrible condition to which the unfortunate fugitives were reduced. "At the gates of Smolensk," says Segur, "a mother had abandoned her little son, only five years

old. In spite of his cries and tears, she had driven him away from her sledge, which was too heavily laden. She herself cried out, with a distracted air, that *he* had never seen France; that *he* would not regret it: as for *her*, *she* knew France, and was resolved to see France once more. Twice did Ney himself replace the unfortunate child in the arms of his mother: twice did she cast him off into the frozen snow. This solitary crime, amid the many instances of the most devoted tenderness, they did not leave unpunished. The unnatural mother was abandoned to the same snow from which her infant was snatched, and entrusted to another mother. This little orphan was exhibited in their ranks, and he survived all the horrors of the retreat."

Napoleon reached Smolensk on the 9th of November, but instead of gaining there, as he expected, a fortnight's provision for all his army, he found the activity of the Russians had left within his reach a very inadequate supply. Scenes of great disorder and fierce contention, attended with bloodshed, ensued. Those who soonest reached the city, were not disposed to spare anything for comrades that might follow. They feasted with reckless greediness, and many died from repletion, from wastefully consuming that which would have saved their friends from starving. At Smolensk the emperor proceeded to reorganize his army. It was now reduced to 40,000 men; and 350 cannon had already been left behind; this force he divided into four corps, which were to leave Smolensk, placing a day's interval between each. He himself led the van, with 6,000 of his guard, and about as many soldiers, the relics of different corps, amalgamated into battalions as well as circumstances would permit. It was not till the 14th of November, that all the army had reached Smolensk, and on that day Napoleon left for Orcha. The rear of the army was brought up by Ney, who had to sustain a series of desperate conflicts on the road. When the rest of the army had reached Orcha he was given up as lost. On the 17th of November, Ney, last of the invading army, left Smolensk at the head of 7,000 or 8,000 fighting men, leaving behind 5,000 sick and wounded to the tender mercies of the Russians. They advanced without much interruption, until they reached the field of battle of Krasnoi, where they saw all the relics of a bloody action, and heaps of dead, from whose dress and appear-



ance they could tell that they had belonged to the French army; but there was no one to tell the fate of the survivors. They soon arrived at the banks of the Losmina, where they had to encounter the Russian general Miloradovitch, at the head of a great force. A thick mist concealed the Russians from view, and Ney's columns were under their batteries before they were aware of their danger. A single Russian officer appeared, and invited Ney to capitulate. "A marshal of France never capitulates," answered the heroic general. The officer retired, and the Russian batteries opened at the distance of only 250 yards, while at the concussion the mist arose, and showed the devoted column of French, subjected on every side to a fire of artillery, while the hills were black with the Russian soldiers, placed to support their guns. Far from losing heart in their perilous situation, the guards forced their way through the ravine of the Losmina, and rushed with the utmost fury on the Russian batteries. They were, however, charged in their turn by the bayonet, and those who had forced their way across the ravine suffered dreadfully, and were obliged to retrace their steps. Ney, however, made another attempt to cut his passage through the opposing Russians. Again the French advanced upon the cannon, losing whole ranks, which were supplied by their comrades as fast as they fell. The assault was again unsuccessful; and Ney, seeing that the total destruction of his column must ensue if he further persevered in this attempt, selected about 4,000 of the best men, and separating himself from the rest, he set forth, under the shelter of the night, moving to the rear, as if about to fall back on Smolensk. This, indeed, was the only road open to him, but he did not pursue it long; for as soon as he reached a rivulet, which had the appearance of being one of the feeders of the Dnieper, he adopted it for his guide to the banks of that river, which he reached in safety. Here he found a place where the ice was sufficiently strong for his soldiers to pass over, one at a time; but when the waggons, some of which were loaded with sick and wounded, attempted to pass, the ice gave way beneath them, and they were precipitated into the river. The heavy plunge and the stifled moaning told their fate. The Cossacks, as usual, speedily appeared in the rear, captured some hundreds of prisoners, and took possession of the baggage and artillery.

On Ney's arrival on the 20th, Napoleon testified great joy at his safety. By the 25th of November, the march being continued under increasing difficulties, the numbers of the grand army were shrunk to about 28,000 fighting-men, and 40,000 stragglers. Buonaparte was reflecting what step it might be necessary to take after crossing the Berezyna, when he learnt that the Borizoff bridge, 300 fathoms in length, and to which he was directing his anxious steps, with the town from which it takes its name, was lost to him; the town having been captured, and Dumbrowski defeated under its walls. "The Man of Destiny" could not dissemble the concern which this intelligence gave him; disconsolately looking upwards, while he smote the earth with his cane, he was heard to exclaim, "Is it then written in the book of fate, that we shall commit nothing but errors?"

Mindful of the admonitory hint he had formerly received from Fouché, it had been the policy of Napoleon to furnish bulletins couched in terms calculated to keep up the spirits of the people of Paris, by sending flattering accounts of the successes achieved by his troops. This task had often been somewhat difficult to perform; now there was great danger indeed of taking that "step" of which he often spoke, "from the sublime to the ridiculous." When a drawn battle was to be described, it was easy to claim a victory, but when the grand army was no more, still to have chronicled new triumphs, would have been, not to wake admiration or sustain hope, but to provoke laughter. When the twenty-ninth bulletin was to appear, he found it necessary to make some important admissions, and here we accordingly read, "the cold which began on the 7th suddenly increased, and on the 14th, 15th, and 16th, the thermometer was sixteen and eighteen degrees below the freezing point. The roads were covered with ice, the cavalry, artillery, and baggage horses perished every night, not only by hundreds but by thousands, particularly the German and French horses. In a few days more than 30,000 horses perished; our cavalry were on foot, our artillery and our baggage were without conveyance. It was necessary to abandon and destroy a good part of our cannon, ammunition, and provisions." It was now admitted that a pursuing enemy inflicted on them great loss. Of the Cossacks it was said, "This contemptible cavalry, which only makes a noise,



rendered themselves formidable by favour of circumstances." More need not have been told. If a force which could "only make a noise" had become "formidable," what must have been the state of that well-disciplined army to which a noise only was formidable! The unwilling admissions which were thus drawn from Napoleon, told to all Europe very distinctly the dreadful state of his soldiers. It was not unaptly called "the last dying speech and confession of the grand army."

PASSAGE OF THE BEREZYNA, AND TOTAL RUIN OF THE GRAND ARMY.

NAPOLEON'S situation at this moment was little to be envied. Attachment melts rapidly before misfortune, and those who had idolized him in the moment of victory, pointed to him with contempt when they saw him retreating with shame and disorder before a vindictive enemy. In this miserable progress, for some time he rode in his carriage. The soldiers, who had been devoted to him, insisted that he should leave it, and share their fatigue. He was wrapped up in a cloak. They demanded that it should be thrown aside, and the mandate was from necessity obeyed. Trifles could now agitate him. Stretched on a couch, while he seemed to sleep, Duroc and Darou sitting near him, conversed on the difficulties which surrounded them, when the expression, "state prisoner," having fallen from one of them, Napoleon instantly started up,—“How,” said he, “can you for a moment suppose they would dare?” The reply of Darou was not very consoling: it told the emperor that “state policy might induce the Russians, should he fall into their hands, to immure him as their captive. For his own part, he was anxious that Napoleon should reach France through the air, if the earth offered him no passage thither.” Buonaparte seemed sadly to ruminate on the condition in which he was likely to be placed, and ordered the reports of his ministers to be burnt. He admitted their condition was most lamentable, and tracing the course of the Berezyna on a map, was repeatedly heard to murmur, “Charles XII.—Pultawa!” He saw his own fate shadowed in the melancholy termination of the Swedish conqueror's career. The grand army, says Labaume, had, in fact, now reached the very spot where Charles XII. crossed the Berezyna, June 25th, 1708, on his way to Moscow, and the French writer proceeds, “What a frightful picture did this multitude of men present, overwhelmed by misfortunes of every kind, and hemmed in by a morass;

that very multitude which, two months before, had exultingly spread itself over the surface of a vast empire! Our soldiers pale, emaciated, dying with hunger and cold, having nothing to defend them from the inclemency of the season, but tattered pelisses, sheep skins half-burnt, and uttering the most mournful lamentation, crowded the whole length of this unfortunate bank. Germans, Polanders, Italians, Spaniards, Croats, Portuguese, and French, were all mingled, quarrelling with each other, in their different languages, while the officers, even the generals, wrapped in pelisses covered with dirt and filth, were confounded with the soldiers, abusing those who insulted them, or braved their authority.” Two wooden bridges having been hastily constructed, the troops began to pass over on the 27th, and among them was Buonaparte himself, with a division of 6,000 strong. No language can adequately describe the horrors now accumulated. The two bridges were intended, one for the carriages, and the other for the foot soldiers; but the crowd was so great, that the approaches to them became choked up; and about eight o'clock in the morning of the 28th, the bridge appropriated to the cavalry, baggage, and artillery, gave way. A frightful struggle ensued among the desperate unfortunates who strove to reach the only remaining bridge. The cavalry became at last so exasperated by the resistance opposed to them, that they adopted the murderous resolution of cutting their way through the crowd. The Russian armies had come up before daylight. Their fire was incessant, the slaughter enormous, and one whole division was forced to surrender. The multitude was still urged forward, amidst a shower of cannon-balls. Many perished by the hands of their comrades, and the passage to the bridge was so obstructed by the remains of men and horses, that it was necessary to climb over mountains of dead bodies, to get to the



river side. "Some buried in these horrible heaps still breathed, and struggling with the agonies of death, caught hold of those who mounted over them, but the latter kicked them with violence to disengage themselves." The scene became every moment more horrible. Many hundreds were seen striving in the water against masses of ice, while the snow descended in immense flakes. Screams, groans, and curses filled the air, the roar of the enemy's artillery continued through the whole night to add to the fearful tumult. Another morning dawned, yet thousands were still waiting to cross the bridge, but the Russians were now so close that it was thought necessary to burn the bridge, for the security of those who had already passed the river. Crossing the Berezyna, it is said, inflicted on the invaders a loss of upwards of 30,000 men.

Pursued by the exulting Russians, the disorganized fugitives continued their flight, suffering every imaginable privation, and encountering every variety of misery. At Smorgoni, Bonaparte determined to quit the army and proceed to Paris. Three sledges were provided; one was to carry him and Caulincourt (duke of Vicenza), who, on their journey, was to assume the title of emperor. Calling his officers together, he announced to them that Murat, in his absence, was to command the army as generalissimo. He tried to encourage those about him by confidently announcing that he had ordered Ney to Wilna, who would reorganize the army, and strike such a blow as would effectually check the Russians. He then departed, endeavouring to dissemble the dire apprehension that came over him, but which showed itself in peevish answers and impatient gestures. He narrowly escaped being captured at Youpranoui, but reached Warsaw on the 10th of December.

After his departure, the sufferings of the army, which was now reduced to a very select body, continued to be dreadful in the extreme. The weather was intensely cold, and, says Segur, "the dull and monotonous sound of our steps, the cracking of snow, and the feeble groans of the dying, were the only interruption to the vast and doleful silence. Such of our soldiers as had hitherto been the most persevering here lost heart entirely. Whenever they stopped for a moment, from exhaustion, the winter laying

his heavy and icy hand upon them, was ready to seize upon his prey. In vain did these poor unfortunates, feeling themselves benumbed, and already deprived of speech and plunged into a stupor, proceed a few steps, like automatons; their blood freezing in their veins, like water in the currents of rivulets, congealed their hearts, and then flew back to their heads: these dying men staggered as if they had been intoxicated. From their eyes, which were reddened and inflamed by the continual aspect of snow, by the want of sleep and the smoke of the bivouac, there flowed real tears of blood. They were not long before they fell upon their knees, and then upon their hands; their heads still wavered for a few minutes, to the right and left; from their open mouths some agonizing sounds escaped; at last they fell upon the snow, which they reddened with livid blood, and their sufferings were at an end. Their comrades passed on without moving a step out of their way, for fear of prolonging their journey." The remnant of the grand army reached Wilna on the 9th of December. Though joined by 25,000 recruits, after the passage of the Berezyna, no more than 40,000 could be numbered at Wilna. Their distress did not terminate even there. No preparation had been made for their reception, and no regular rations being supplied, a new scene of contention and plunder was witnessed, and many perished in the streets before food could be obtained. From Wilna the French marched to Kowno, the last town on the Russian frontier; and on the 13th of December they re-crossed the Niemen. Of 400,000 men that were computed to have entered Russia on this memorable expedition, not more than 25,000 returned; and these were debilitated by their sufferings, and, in every respect, in a most deplorable plight.\* They plunged into the forests of Russian-Poland, and sought their several homes, still chased by the untiring Cossacks, and few indeed were they who reached France in safety and in health. It has been calculated that during the invasion and the defence of Russia six hundred and fifty thousand lives were sacrificed! Many thousands of Russians perished obscurely, attempting to repel the enemy from their habitations; and multitudes were lost from fatigue, hunger, and the destruction of their towns and cities. In this sketch

\* Sir Walter Scott gives the numbers, on the authority of Boutourlin, as follows:—Slain in battle, 125,000; died from fatigue, hunger, and the severity

of the climate, 132,000; prisoners, comprehending 48 generals, 3,000 officers, and 190,000 men, — 193,000.—Total 450,000.



the reader has been spared many scenes of appalling horror. Some apocryphal narratives preserved by Labaume, though very interesting, have been purposely omitted. Enough has been retained to indicate the devastation and ruin Napoleon spread around him as he advanced, the terrifying slaughter and desolation which marked his triumph, and the awful retaliation which signalized his retreat. France long continued to idolize him as a conqueror; but what chief could be named from her annals who ever brought upon her such fearful humiliation, such complete prostration, such miserable defeat!

Thus ended the celebrated French invasion of Russia, which was undertaken for no wise or intelligible purpose, and with no prudent foresight or sagacious calculation, but merely from the morbid restlessness, unbounded ambition, and overweening self-confidence of a military adventurer, who aspired to the acquisition of universal monarchy. The hero-worshippers of Buonaparte ascribe the entire of the failure of this campaign to the frost, the snow, and the fire: but surely frost and snow in such a high northern latitude were not to be unlooked for in the months of November and December. Nor was it an unlikely thing to occur that the Russian people, against whom a most unjustifiable war of aggression was being carried on, should resort to every means they could to oppose the invaders of their country. But from the Egyptian expedition downwards, blind rashness and inconsiderate daring had been a principal feature in Napoleon's character; and though he escaped punishment nineteen times; still, upon his own theory of the doctrine of chances, it was only the more natural to look for it the twentieth time. He himself has left on record a graphic picture of the capability of Russia to repel foreign aggression, which goes far to prove the foolhardiness of the project.

"Backed," said he, "by the eternal ices of the pole, which must for ever render it unassailable in rear or flank, it can only be attacked even on its vulnerable front during three or four months in the year, while it has the whole twelve to render available against us. It offers to an invader nothing but the rigours, sufferings, and privations of a desert soil, of a nature half dead and frozen, while its inhabitants will ever precipitate themselves with transport towards the delicious climates of the south. To these physical advantages, we must join an immense

population, brave, hardy, devoted, passive; and vast nomad tribes, to whom destitution is habitual, and wandering is nature. One cannot avoid shuddering at the thought of such a mass, unassailable alike on the flanks and rear, which can at any time with impunity inundate you; while, if defeated, it has only to retire into the midst of its snows and ices, where pursuit is impossible, and reparation of loss easy. It is the Antæus of the fable, which cannot be overcome but by seizing it by the middle, and stifling it in the arms; but where is the Hercules to be found who will attempt such an enterprise? We could alone attempt it, and the world knows what success we have had. Show me an emperor of Russia, brave, able, and impetuous: in a word, a czar who is worthy of his situation, and Europe is at his feet. He may begin his operations at the distance only of 100 leagues from the two capitals of Vienna and Berlin, the sovereigns of which are the only obstacles he has to apprehend. He gains the one by seduction, subdues the other by force, and he is soon in the midst of the lesser princes of Germany, most of whom are his relations or dependents. A few words on liberation and independence will set Italy on fire. Assuredly, in such a situation, I should arrive at Calais by fixed stages, and be the arbiter of Europe."\*

It is astonishing, that after the committal of such a grievous error as the Russian campaign, that Napoleon should, for so long a period, have retained the reputation of a great military genius. Genius he certainly possessed; and great genius of a certain volcanic and purely physical kind; but more extraordinary than his genius unquestionably was his good fortune, in that his early adversaries were feeble and divided; and that the popular enthusiasm, whatever there was worthy of the name at that time, was all on the side of a despot. We cannot close this chapter more appropriately than by giving colonel Maxwell's summary of the military character of Napoleon.

"The world at large are easily dazzled by military success; and the splendid triumphs of Napoleon's early campaigns, his long, unbroken career of victory, seemed almost to justify the multitude, who judge only from results, in ascribing to him the highest order of military talents. When reverses came in their turn, opinion was already formed in his favour; and the world are

\* Napoleon, in *Las Cases*.



slow to change an opinion, however extravagant, when once established: men do not like to avow that they have been mistaken; and though ready to judge by results when these tell in favour of their views, are not easily made to strike an impartial balance when results tell both ways. Had it been otherwise, Moscow and Leipzig must have been weighed against Lodi and Marengo; Laon and Waterloo against Austerlitz and Jena; a process which would 'leave the grand result in yon lone isle,' to show the just finale of the inquiry. The historian is not, however, allowed to judge by results alone, for in all ages very ordinary commanders have gained battles; and though it would be idle to estimate the skill of commanders by any pedantic rules of martinet tacticians, or line and compass strategists, there are plain and intelligible principles, according to which all who are acquainted with history can form a fair estimate of the talents displayed by those who have been long at the head of armies. A great commander will effect great things with comparatively small means, and will conduct operations, and achieve victory, with the least possible loss and suffering to the troops under his orders. Such a commander will know, like Hannibal, how to strike after enticing his adversaries into the fatal defiles of Thrasymene; but like the great Carthaginian, will also know how to extricate an army from peril, and foil an enemy anticipating certain triumph on the Casilian hills. And, from an absolute sovereign, possessing great military genius, some improvement in the science of tactics, the very foundation of the whole science of war, will surely be expected. But in the history of Napoleon we find none of these proofs of military skill, and only find victories gained and conquests achieved by fully adequate means. The revolution had unshackled all the energies of the country, already the most powerful on the continent, and placed the lives and properties of the people completely at the disposal of government. The conscription sent the best men of France by myriads into the ranks of the army; rapid promotion, and the enthusiasm of fancied freedom, animated the first republican soldiers; and at a later period, crowns, wealth, domains, principalities, the spoils of conquered provinces, rewarded the victors, and

became incitements to daring deeds by the aid of revolutionary power. Robespierre and his Committee of Public Safety sent, according to Capefigue, fourteen armies into the field; and from 1811 to 1813, Napoleon levied more than 1,100,000 conscripts in France alone, independently of those raised for his service in Italy and in the states of the Rhenish confederation! and all this at a period when civilization had long acted the pioneer in Europe, made roads, and extended cultivation, and thus facilitated the movements of large armies to an extent never known in earlier times. And what could the old established continental governments, fettered as the most despotic were by the laws which protected persons and property, oppose to this tremendous force? Inferior armies of well-powdered and well-buttoned soldiers, taken mostly from the refuse of the German population, ruled by a cruel and degrading system of discipline; three-halfpence a day, without the slightest prospect of ever improving their condition, being their brightest incentive to meet wounds, death, and mutilation. That these men fought so bravely, as they certainly did on many occasions, could result solely from the natural bravery of the people; but such exertions required to be encouraged, and they were not. In Austria, the mass of the subaltern officers were not even eligible to the command of companies; and the higher ranks of the army were filled exclusively by members of the higher orders of the aristocracy. When, however, the necessity of self-defence obliged the other states of Europe to introduce the French conscription, and make Europe one vast drill-ground, though without the power of plundering provinces, and giving French reward, there was a speedy termination to the brilliant lustre of French victories. The advantages gained by Napoleon at Wagram, Smolensk, and Borodino, were in no proportion to the superiority of his forces; and of Lutzen and Bautzen, Clausewitz tells us that there was not a man present who did not feel confident that with equal numbers the allies would have been victorious. Of the disasters which followed in rapid succession, it is needless to speak; for military annals furnish no parallel to the retreat from Moscow, the rout of the bridge of Leipzig, and the flight from Waterloo."



## BUONAPARTE RETURNS TO PARIS—CONFEDERATION OF RUSSIA AND PRUSSIA.

AFTER Buonaparte had left the poor remains of the grand army, he lost no time in making his way to Paris. He ran some risk of being arrested in Silesia, but, as he afterwards said, the Prussians lost the opportunity of securing him, by debating whether he ought to be arrested or not. It is, however, by no means certain, that the Prussian monarch ever thought of thus dealing with his former conqueror, and present ally. Buonaparte found himself at Dresden on the 14th of December, where he had a long conference with the king of Saxony, who still adhered to him, being indeed too deeply committed with the allies, to have anything to hope for from them, if they should ultimately triumph. Their interview took place at the hotel where Buonaparte alighted, and the royal Saxon visited him *incognito*. Napoleon reached Paris on the evening of the 18th, two days after that city had been thrown into a state of despondency, by the publication of the twenty-ninth bulletin. It was late when he approached the Tuilleries, and his appearance was so altered, or he was still so well disguised, that he found some difficulty in gaining an entrance. The empress had retired to her private apartment, when "two figures, muffled in furs, entered the ante-room, and one of them directed his course to the door of the empress' sleeping-chamber. The lady-in-waiting hastened to throw herself betwixt the intruder and the entrance, but recognising the emperor, she shrieked aloud, and alarmed Maria Louisa, who entered the ante-room. Their meeting was extremely affectionate."\* On the following morning, all Paris resounded with the news of his sudden appearance, and whatever the feeling, the general appearance of Paris was greatly improved. If the French people were still disconsolate, they assumed an air of gladness, as if the escape of the emperor consoled them for the loss of their army. He immediately convoked the council of state. He spoke of the misfortunes which had befallen the army, but accounted for all the disasters which had occurred, by the severity of the winter. He spoke of that, as an evil which wisdom could not foresee, or prudence guard against, and this view of the subject was adopted, and promulgated

\* Sir Walter Scott.

by many politicians, who were supposed to have been well informed, though the truth is, the winter had set in later than usual; and certainly during his advance, when his bulletins compared his march on Moscow, to a holiday excursion to Fontainebleau, he was warned in some of the English journals that before the close of the year, he would be likely to find it the most disagreeable excursion that ever thoughtless Frenchman had ventured to undertake. The senate and the legislative body appeared as loyal, as obsequious as ever, but he learnt with some vexation, that during his absence, an insurrectionary attempt had been made, in which a general Malet was the chief instigator, which had caused some confusion.

Intelligence of this had reached Buonaparte on the 6th of November, and had hastened his return to the French capital. That so many should have been executed, startled him, and he declared it to be a massacre, and was afraid it would make a bad impression on the people of Paris. He ascertained that the Parisians had taken little interest in the business, and he therefore hesitated not to sound the praises of the judges, who had acted in defence of the throne and the laws.

He lost no time in calling for new levies, remarking, that if he were not enabled to meet the Russians on German ground, the sacred frontier of France would be passed by the armies of all Europe. Properly supported, he doubted not it would be his, to give a good account of his enemies, while yet their armies were at a distance, and to make known his perfect disinterestedness, he told them, he could do better without the French, than the French could do without him. The appeal seemed to be answered with eagerness and loyal alacrity. The new conscriptions were enforced with the utmost rigour. The 100,000 youths of the first band of national guards, who had been placed in frontier garrisons under the declaration that they were never, on any occasion, to march out of France, were converted into soldiers of the line. Troops were recalled from Spain, sailors were taken from the fleets, and formed into regiments; and every possible exertion was made to raise a mighty host, that would enable him, in a new campaign, to accomplish all that



he had failed to realize in the last. Early in the year 1813, such stupendous exertions had been witnessed, that an army comprehending between 700,000 and 800,000 men, was prepared to march at Napoleon's command. The remounting of the cavalry was a matter of great difficulty, but horses were purchased or procured in every direction; and Napoleon promised the legislative representatives that he would retrieve all, provided the sum of 300,000,000 of francs were forthcoming, which were wanted to repair the losses occasioned by the Russian campaign. He contemplated levying 10,000 youths of the higher ranks, who had formerly been exempted from the levies, or had found substitutes. They were to be formed into four regiments of guards of honour, who were to be treated like the troops of the royal household under the old régime. This scheme was opposed by the jealousy of the imperial guard, who conceived the privileges of such a corps might interfere with theirs. Without this aid, however, he found himself at the head of an army, numerous enough to render his will law, wherever it moved; but still it was not equal to that which he led forth in the preceding year, to perish in Russia, and in Poland. The cavalry was far from being like what he once possessed; and Murat, the most distinguished cavalry general, refused to quit his kingdom to place himself at its head. Murat, however, was a weak, vain, wavering man, and very much under the influence of his wife, who now united with Ney and Fouché to bring him back to his old comrades, and eventually prevailed upon him to repair to Germany. He went with reluctance, and such is believed to have been the case with many of the generals who followed Napoleon in this campaign. It is in some degree thus accounted for: they had gained wealth and honours in former days. The contest, in which Buonaparte was at present engaged, seemed to them unnecessary, its result very doubtful, and as they were now approaching "the sere and yellow leaf," they repined at being called from those enjoyments, which they had thought reserved for their declining years, again to endure the privations, and brave the dangers of war. Not only was there a spirit of discontent thus kindled, but there was positive disaffection to his cause, and to his person, and when Bernadotte became a member of the coalition, he was enabled to place in the hands of the emperor of Russia

a comprehensive list of officers who were disposed to betray their trust. Generals Massena and Augereau, and other greatly distinguished captains, were of the number.

The commanders who were now disposed to forsake Napoleon, were but the representatives of his allies, former supporters, and flatterers. The successful stand made against him in Spain, and the terrible Russian catastrophe, gave evidence to all the world that his fortunes were on the decline, and prudence whispered that the time had arrived when those who had marched with him, might safely declare against him. The Russians did not think it necessary to wait till the French emperor might prepare for a second invasion, but advanced into Prussia. Though the monarch of that nation had appeared with an army in support of Buonaparte's views, Alexander was well assured that he was never sincerely well-disposed towards the conqueror who had been such a scourge to him and his people.

It was not to be expected that having seen his dominions overrun by the French as enemies, that Frederick William would now, if it could be avoided, submit to their being ravaged anew by the Russians, because he was the ally of France. General D'Yorck, a Prussian general, on the 30th of December concluded an armistice with the Russian general Diebitsch, under which the Prussian troops were to be cantoned in their own country, and to be considered neutral for two months. D'Yorck then wrote to Macdonald to announce his secession from the French army, at the same time declaring that whatever opinion the world might form of his conduct, it was dictated by a sense of duty to his troops and to his country. The conduct of the general was at first denounced by the king, but eventually approved. It is due to general D'Yorck to say that he acted honourably towards his late comrades. Had he been disposed to do otherwise, he might have turned his arms against them, at a moment when, in their confusion and distress, they could have offered no effectual resistance. Many of his officers wished him to take this course, but he resisted all their representations, and did not withdraw from Macdonald till he was comparatively in safety.

To the king of Prussia it was apparent that at this moment he might regain much, or all the territory of which he had been despoiled, and this chance neglected, it was hardly within the range of things possible



that so favourable an opportunity could ever again occur. With that impression, on the 22nd of January, 1813, he suddenly quitted Berlin, and proceeded to Breslau, where, no longer encompassed by the French military, he could more freely correspond with the Russians and their emperor. He then published an address to his people, and called his armies together. The outrages committed by the French in the hour of victory had united all classes of the Prussian community in hostility to Buonaparte. All panted with eagerness to avenge the wrongs they had suffered. What followed may be easily anticipated. A treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was concluded with Russia early in March; and on the 15th of that month the emperor Alexander arrived at Breslau. The two sovereigns conferred personally, and renewed their former friendship. The king of Prussia is described to have been so affected at their meeting that he could not refrain from tears. Alexander soothed him by encouraging hope for the future. "Courage, my brother!" said he, "these are the last tears Napoleon shall cause you to shed." On the 16th of March, the king of Prussia declared war against France, and a statement was laid before the world of the many injuries, of the countless indignities, which Prussia had borne. It set forth, that while professing to recognise her independence, France had made Prussia her subject and her slave. Hence it became necessary for Prussia to shake off the fetters which violence had imposed, and take counsel of herself in order to raise anew and support her existence as a nation. In the love and courage of his people the king sought for means to extricate himself, and to restore to his monarchy the independence which was essential to the future prosperity of his kingdom.

A noble proclamation was put forth by the Russian general Wittgenstein, calling on Saxony to take part in the struggle against the common oppressor. It declared that the emperor Alexander came not as an enemy, but as a friend, to liberate Germany from a foreign and degrading yoke. It described the Saxon people to be forsaken by their king, who still adhered to the French, and who might, in fact, be considered their prisoner. It demanded, could Saxony ever be prosperous or independent while her soil was polluted by the presence of a single Frenchman? Did they recollect what was the condition of their country before the French entered it? How peaceful it was!—

how flourishing, how happy? Did they witness the state to which it had been reduced, and not wish to restore it to what it was formerly seen? Was every spark of liberty and patriotism extinguished in their bosoms? He trusted not; but if they remained inactive, or the partisans of France, they were no longer Germans, nor would he treat them as such. The proclamation proceeded:—"Whoever is not for liberty is against her. Therefore, choose: accept my fraternal offer of aid, or meet my sword. Join me to restore your king, and you shall have a free king, and be free Saxons. Up! up! and arm yourselves! were it even only with sickles, scythes, and cudgels: drive the strangers from your soil. You shall always find me and my Russians, with the valiant Prussians, wherever danger is most prominent. Already has the vengeance of God been manifested against the insolent. Believe me we shall conquer. The long forbearance of God is exhausted. We shall conquer! I speak not this in the spirit of idle boasting, but in reliance on God and on you, and in the just and sacred cause which is ours."

The consequences of the ill-judged and rash campaign in Russia were now beginning to develop themselves. The German PEOPLE in their might were aroused, and determined to resist the grinding exactions of the tyrant of Europe; it was "written in heaven" that pride should have a fall.

At this period, however, gloomy as his prospects were, Napoleon appeared full of hope and confidence. The declaration of Prussia (March the 16th,) could not but give him serious concern, but he received it with an air of calmness, merely remarking, that it was better to have an open enemy than a doubtful ally. The legislative body continued to flatter him, and even thanked him for the sacrifices he called upon them to make for his dynasty, while they promised him every aid that he might require. He replied in a complimentary strain, and told them that Providence and the will of the nation had called upon him to constitute the great French empire, and in a few years more the mighty task would be complete. The prosperity of France was the sole object he had in view; he aimed at snatching her for ever from English dictation. The world would behold with admiration and wonder the tranquillity with which late reverses had been sustained, and the speed with which they had been repaired.



Thence they would be taught the important lesson, how capable the French were of defending their own territory; and the independence of his crown. He was about to place himself at the head of his armies, to meet and confound his enemies. In no case would he suffer the integrity of the French empire to be called in question, or abandon any of his conquests. Finally, he promised those he addressed, when the cares of war would allow it, to recall them to Paris, with the notables of the empire, to assist at the coronation of Maria Louisa, and that of the king of Rome.

Prussia was now committed to a new struggle, and soon made efforts to which Buonaparte flattered himself his policy had rendered her unequal. He had bound her down not to maintain a militia of more than 25,000 men on foot; but this number had, in effect, been doubled by the Prussian government, as, though only that number were exercised in the course of a year, two calls were made, and the individuals forming that force were changed in the course of twelve months. By this expedient, discipline was largely diffused, and the youth of Prussia, exasperated by the wrongs their connexions and their country had sustained from the French while victorious, were impatient to seek glory and vengeance on the field of battle. All classes came forward to swell the ranks of Frederick William's army. The Prussian nobles and burghesses largely taxed themselves to sustain the cause, while the ladies resigned their diamonds and gold ornaments, substituting for those they had been accustomed to wear, chains and bracelets beautifully wrought out of iron, proud of introducing such a fashion as a measure of hostility against France. The students formed themselves into battalions and squadrons; some took arms as *black-bands*, while others assumed the weapons and dress of the Cossacks. They were admirably disciplined on a new system, devised by the celebrated Scharnhorst; and in a few weeks vast armies were on foot, and a leader worthy to lead the patriots who thus rose to vindicate their country's fame was found in the veteran Blucher. This distinguished commander was not eminently scientific. Scharnhorst and Gneisau attended to such

matters in connection with the present movement, but in courage and determination he was second to no general of his age. Superior to misfortune, if vanquished one day he was ready to take the field on the next; and when, after the disaster at Jena, he saw his country prostrate at the feet of Buonaparte, in the spirit of prophetic hope, he still disdained to abandon her cause in despair.

The Russian emperor had been active to recruit his armies, and to follow up the successes of the last campaign. In the dead of winter he passed from St. Petersburg to Wilna. There his victorious army and his "clouds of Cossacks," as Buonaparte called them, received him with shouts of congratulation. Not long did he allow his troops to repose. His army advanced in two divisions, one taking the direction of Warsaw, the other of Königsburg. On reaching Poland, the excesses which the French had committed caused Alexander to be welcomed as a deliverer. Continuing his advance, he conferred with the king of Prussia, and this, as has been seen, ended in a treaty of alliance, the basis of a sixth coalition against France. Dantzic, Glogau, Stettin, and other Prussian fortresses were in the hands of the French. Dantzic was soon blockaded by the Russians. They advanced from the Vistula to the Oder, strengthened on their march by the Prussian general Bulow. Prussia was at this time in a flame. The poet Körner's "Song of the Sword" waked a degree of loyal enthusiasm in the bosoms of the youth of Prussia, not less ardent than the Jacobinical frenzy which had been kindled by the "Marseillaise Hymn" in France. While these clouds, big with impending ruin, were gathering over the fortunes of Buonaparte, he affected to remain undismayed, and spoke of leading to victory an army double the number of that which had met its fate in Russia, and, at the same time, of maintaining 300,000 men in Spain; while it was proudly intimated, that if any one desired the price at which he would grant peace, it might be found in the duke of Bassano's letter to lord Castlereagh, before 1812.

With this rapid glance at the state of Europe at the end of the year 1812 and the beginning of 1813, we shall close this volume.