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The following is the gist of the conversation with Secretary Hull on the 20th.

Accompanied by Ambassador Kurusu, I called on Hull, he having given ready consent to our meeting although it was Thanksgiving Day, one of the most important holidays in the United States. I explained the items in accordance with the instructions of your telegram No. 798. Hull showed complete disapproval of the item "The Government of the United States undertakes not to indulge in measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China", though, as regards the rest of the items, he expressed no special opinion, merely putting one or two questions. He dilated upon the assertions of the American Government in connection with the Tripartite Pact, and declared that, so long as there dwelt in the minds of the American people a persistent doubt which was rooted in Japan's relations to the Pact, it would be extremely difficult to stop aid to Chiang Kai-shek. He again pointed out that the present policy of the United States is to assist Britain on the one hand and to aid Chungking on the other, against the German policy of limitless armed expansion, and stated that it is just as difficult to change the policy of aiding Chiang Kai-shek as to stop assistance to Britain, so long as it remains unclear whether Japan's attitude toward peace is unwavering. In the meantime, American interests in China (and Manchuria) have suffered heavy damage, bringing about the present situation.

Kurusu reminded Hull of the President's statement at our previous interview that he would be the introducer in connection with the question of peace between Japan and China, and said that since the President has expressed his intention to be the introducer, it is only natural that Japan should request the stopping of aid to the Chiang Kai-shek régime, as it is self-contradictory for him on the one hand to continue to aid Chungking, which is destructive to the realization of peace, and on the other to use his influence to restore peace between Japan and China. Hull stated in reply that the President had so spoken on the assumption that the fundamental policy of the Japanese Government would be peaceful, and that it is difficult for Americans to believe in Japan's return to its former policy of peace, in view of the fact that up to now certain influential statesmen of Japan have often been advocating the Hitlerian armed expansion policy.

I explained to Hull that the new proposal of today was presented in the circumstances that Proposal "A" has made no progress, stumbling on two or three points, while the situation has been getting extremely tense, and that its aim lies in first relaxing the strained relations between Japan and the United States, especially in the Southwestern Pacific, thereby contributing to the restoration of amicable feelings between the two nations, and in promoting the negotiations thereafter. Hull said in reply that, though he fully appreciates the intention of the Japanese Government, there are such difficulties as those mentioned above, and he added with a grave face that he and I bear a weighty responsibility for the Japanese and American nations as well as for the whole of mankind. He said that with respect to the proposed points, he hoped to talk them over further after studying them with full sympathy.