

SWNCC 091 - IRAN

MISCELLANEOUS

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
 To **SECRET** Authority: Ltr of 5-19-61
 from James P. Burns State Dept. NNGA
 Name J. Dowling
 Date 3/9/63

DECLASSIFIED
 AUTHORITY: E.O. 11652, Sec. 1.4
 DATE: 11/19/01
 BY: [Signature]

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LIST OF PAPERS

DECIMAL FILE NO. 091 IRAN - MISCELLANEOUS ~~TOP~~ **SECRET**

SANACC _____ Series. Part _____ From SANACC _____ thru SANACC _____

(title)

| Serial No. | From | Date | To | SYNOPSIS |
|------------|--------------------|-----------|---------------|--|
| 12 | Gen. Wedemeyer P&O | 30 Apr 48 | | SUMMARY: United States Military Missions in Iran. |
| 13 | Sec. of the Army | 2 Jul 48 | Sec. of State | Ltr re: Bureau of the Budget suggests possible substitution of surplus stocks for non-surplus property currently earmarked for the Iranian Program. Encls. |

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
 To SECRET Authority: Ltr of 5-19-61
 from James P. Burke, State Dept.
 Name W.D. Quail NNGA
 Date 3/19/63

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
 To SECRET Authority: Ltr of 5-19-61
 from _____ Dept.
 Name _____ NNGA
 Date _____

Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 490)
Revised July 26, 1918**LIST OF PAPERS**File under No. SWNCC 091 - IRAN~~TOP~~ SECRET

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 3-6788

| SERIAL NUMBER | FROM- | DATE | TO- | SYNOPSIS |
|---------------|-----------------------------|--|---------------------------|--|
| 1 | Mr. Stimson | 2 2/15/45 | Mr. Stettinius | Letter re Iranian coded messages by Gen. Eisenhower's headquarters. |
| 2 | Sec of War | 6/1/45 | Sec of State | Letter re disposal of installation and equipment in Persian Gulf Command to Gov. of Iran. |
| 3 | Sec of War | 6/19/45 | Sec of State | Letter re withdrawal of American troops from Iran. |
| 4 | Col. McCarthy | 7/2/45 | Asst Ch. of Staff | Letter re: U.S.-British Responsibilities Concerning Operations in the Iranian Corridor. |
| 5 | Sec of War | 8/3/45 | Sec of State(Act) | Letter re: appreciation of Dept of State for Gen. Booth's Assistance to Ambassador to Iran. |
| 6 | Actg. Sec of War | 8/29/45 | Sec of State | Letter re Lend-Lease to Iranian Army |
| 7 | Maj. Ridley | 10/13/45 | Sec. of State | Letter re: Lend-lease on trucks sent to the Iranian Govt. during the vital period and price asked. |
| 8 | Mr. Hilldring Col. Reid | 9/26/46 9/27/46 | Sec. -SWNCC Sec. JCS | Re: Transmittal from State Dept. to JCS questions concerning U'S. Strategic Interests in Iran. |
| 9 | Col. McFarland Sec. Reid | 10/11/46 10/12/46 | SWNCC State Mbr. SWNCC | Re: United States Strategic Interest in Iran. |
| 10 | Sec. of War | 11/26/46 | Sec. of State | Re: List of Military equipment desired by the Govt. of Iran as presented to the War Dept. |
| | | <i>(Returned at request of the War Dept. 11/16/46)</i> | | |
| 10 | Sec. of War | 2 Jan 47 | Sec. of State | Re: Military assistance to the Govt. of Iran and list of equipment and supplies. |
| 11 | Sec. of War | 30 Jul 47 | Sec. of State | Re: Supply of Mil. equip. for Iran under existing legal and financial restrictions.○ |

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED

To SECRET Authority: Ltr of 5-19-61

from James P. Burks, State Dept.

Name Chapman WNGADate 3/19/63~~TOP~~ SECRET

Page - 1 -

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

SECRET

2 JUL 1948

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary:

091 Incls
cross

Reference is made to Bureau of the Budget letter attached as inclosure 1 hereto.

From referenced letter it will be noted that the Bureau of the Budget suggests the possible substitution of surplus stocks for non-surplus property currently earmarked for the Iranian Program. In reply (letter attached as inclosure 2 hereto) the Department of the Army has informed the Bureau of the Budget that there are no surplus stocks which can be used for such substitution.

It will be noted also from referenced letter that the Bureau of the Budget does not propose to recommend the allocation of any funds appropriated to the President for care and handling of surplus property, except with respect to actual surpluses.

In view of the foregoing, information is requested as to whether the original letter declaration of surplus made by the Department of the Army to the disposal agency covering the property no longer surplus may be withdrawn. Although the failure of Iran to provide the funds for repair, packing, crating and shipping relieves the United States of its obligation to sell this property under the original agreement, the Department of the Army does not know whether any new U. S. Government commitments have been made. It is the legal opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army that if Congress appropriated the money to pay for the repair, packing, crating and shipping of subject property with full knowledge of the fact that this property was not surplus-in-fact and may eventually require replacement, the original letter declaration of surplus may legally be allowed to stand.

Sincerely yours,

4102/HSA
74325/ORG
2881/EM
2461/GBH
2412/CID
74220/LFG
6010/RDO
6010/SJM
dw

SANACC SECRETARIAT

- 2 Incls.
- 1-Ltr fr State Member Bureau of the Budget Army Member
- 2-Ltr fr Navy Member to Bureau of the Army Air Force Budget
- Ass't State Member
- Ass't Army Member
- Ass't Navy Member
- Ass't Air Force Member

(Signed) KENNETH C. ROYALL
Kenneth C. Royall
Secretary of the Army

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4843



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106

encl # 1

SECRET

File

SECRET

2 JUL 1948

Honorable James E. Webb

Director, Bureau of the Budget

Dear Mr. Webb:

Reference is made to your letter, 10 June 1948 on the subject of the status of property earmarked for the Iranian Program and the allocation of funds for the repair, packing and shipping of this property.

This is to inform you that the Department of the Army does not have any surplus stocks which can be substituted for non-surplus property currently earmarked for sale to Iran.

A copy of Department of the Army letter to the Department of State as a result of referenced letter is attached as inclosure hereto for your information. It will be noted from this letter that the Department of the Army cannot withdraw the original letter declaration of surplus to the disposal agency covering the property no longer surplus until clearance is given by the Department of State, because of the U. S. Government commitments that may have been made involving this property. It is the legal opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army that if Congress appropriated the money to pay for the repair, packing and shipping of subject property with full knowledge of the fact that this property was not surplus-in-fact and may eventually require replacement, the original letter declaration of surplus may legally be allowed to stand.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) KENNETH C. ROYALL
Kenneth C. Royall
Secretary of the Army

Incl.
Ltr to Dept of State from
Dept of Army

4102/HSA _____
74325/CRG _____
2881/EM _____
2461/CBH _____
2412/CID _____
74220/LFG JS
6010/RDO RTV
6010/SJM _____
dw

SECRET

(13)

encl # 2

105

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CSOSP/D3 - 24782

Honorable James E. Webb
Director, Bureau of the Budget
ATTENTION: Mr. William F. Schaub

Dear Mr. Webb:

In a meeting held in your office on 18 May you were advised that the impact of the Iranian Air Program would have negligible effect on the U. S. Army Supply requirements.

This is to inform you that it has now been determined that due to increases in U. S. Army supply requirements under the proposed expansion program of the Army, approximately 60% (dollar value) of the property earmarked for the Iranian Program is not surplus-in-fact but may require replacement into Army stocks.

Sincerely yours,

/s/H.S. AURAND
Lieutenant General, GSC
Director of Logistics

COPIES FURNISHED:
TAG
Dept Chief/Staff
Army Comptroller
JAG

SECRET

(13)

File #3

C
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P
YEXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.**SECRET**

My dear Mr. Secretary:

We have received a letter dated June 3, 1948 from Lieutenant General H. S. Aurand indicating that on the basis of increased U. S. Army supply requirements, approximately 60 percent (dollar value) of the property previously earmarked for disposal to Iran as surplus military equipment is no longer surplus-in-fact.

In a previous conference, as General Aurand states, we were advised that the program, since it would utilize surplus stocks, would have a negligible effect on the U. S. Army supply requirements. On this basis, an appropriation estimate has been submitted to the Congress by the President for the necessary costs of care and handling of the surplus property.

I, therefore, suggest a further review at this time, by the Departments of State and the Army, of the availability of surpluses for the Iranian program, particularly with respect to the possible substitution of surplus stocks for items previously earmarked for Iran but no longer surplus-in-fact.

I do not propose, of course, to recommend the allocation of any funds to be appropriated to the President for care and handling of surplus property except insofar as it is demonstrated that actual surpluses are involved.

An identical letter is being sent to the Secretary of the Department of State.

Sincerely yours,

/s/Frank Pace, Jr.
Assistant Director

The Honorable

The Secretary of the Department of the Army

SECRET

Incl #4

(13)

TOP SECRET

1 APPROVAL

CSGPO

Lt Col Todd

091 Gro
msc
3343

1 CHIEF OF STAFF

WFO 091 Iran TB
(22 Apr 48)

United States Military Missions in Iran.

30 April 1948

SUMMARY

1. Major General Robert W. Crow, Chief, United States Military Mission with the Iranian Army, during a recent visit to Washington recommended that the two U. S. Missions in Iran be consolidated and that Brigadier General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Chief United States Military Mission with the Iranian Gendarmerie, be relieved. Army representatives met recently with the former Ambassador to Iran and now Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. George V. Allen, to obtain his views on General Crow's recommendations.

2. Mr. Allen stated that the merger of the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie was an explosive political issue in Iran. Consolidation of the Missions would appear as tacit U. S. approval of the merger and have unfortunate consequences. He also stated that there is considerable justification to the charge that Gen. Schwarzkopf has been in Iran "too long". His duties have necessarily resulted in becoming identified with certain elements, and many Iranians have expressed their belief that Gen. Schwarzkopf should leave. According to Mr. Allen, the health of both Gen. and Mrs. Schwarzkopf is not of the best, and for this reason alone, they should be returned.

3. Article 20 of the agreement between the U. S. and Iran regarding the Gendarmerie Mission provides that the Chief of the Mission will be the Commander of Gendarmerie. The Iranian Government has recently indicated a desire to revise the agreement and delete Article 20. Mr. Allen felt that Gen. Schwarzkopf should not be relieved while Article 20 was an issue as this would undermine American prestige.

4. On 12 April 1948 Gen. Schwarzkopf personally delivered to the Shah a re-organization plan for the Gendarmerie which, he reported, is the culmination of the Mission's efforts over the past five years. It is considered that this action is very timely and presents an opportunity to withdraw Gen. Schwarzkopf and refer to the reorganization plan as completing his work. Since the Iranians appear determined to delete Article 20 and reduce the Mission to an advisory role, Gen. Schwarzkopf should be replaced with a Colonel.

In view of the above, it is not considered advisable to consolidate the Missions.

OFFICE OF THE
CHIEF OF STAFF
RECOMMENDED

That the attached cable to General Schwarzkopf be approved and dispatched.

COORDINATION

Approved - MA - Lt. Col. Omar N. Bradley, 71525

OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army

J. W. Bowen
J. W. BOWEN, Lt Colonel, GSC
Secretary, General Staff

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED

To SECRET Authority: DTR of 5-19-61
from James F. Barks, State Dept.

Date *3/19/63* *J. D. Daulley* NNGA

A. C. WESSELYER
Lt. General, GSC
Director of Plans and Operations

Incl. Proposed cable to Gen. Schwarzkopf

EMH
4 - MAY 1948

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET

Copy for S. W. H. C. C.

(12)

TOP SECRET

TO: GENMISH Teheran Iran

From: CSGPO Personal for Schwarzkopf from Wedemeyer

Study of your records reveals that you have been assigned to duty in Iran continuously since 1942. During this arduous and historic period, your contributions to the services have been outstanding. The Departments of State and Army agree that the progress of American policy in Iran has been due in no small measure to your sound advice and to the high regard which officials of that Government have for you personally.

Recognizing that this exceptionally long tour has required many sacrifices on your part, the Department of Army has been considering for the past two months your transfer to a more desirable station. The decision in this matter has been delayed in hope that the rapidly changing political situation in Iran would become more stabilized; however, it now appears that no early developments in this regard can be expected, and it is therefore planned to transfer you from Iran in June.

The Department of Army desires to retain you on active duty if you so elect. Although everything possible will be done to reassign you in accordance with your desires, your new station will depend to a great extent on general officer positions available. An early expression of your preference as to duty station and assignment is requested.

Dist:

Gen Wedemeyer (State)
Gen Chamberlin
Gen Paul
CSA

H. G. SPARROW
Lt. Colonel, GSC
Executive, P&O

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To ~~SECRET~~ Authority: Ltr of 6-19-61
from James P. Banks, State Dept.
Name JH Dawley NNGA
Date 3/19/62

~~TOP SECRET~~

(12)

SECRET

*From
091 Misc.*

The Honorable

JUL 30 1947

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

With reference to your letter of 15 July 1947 pertaining to the supply of military equipment for Iran, the War Department will furnish, under existing legal and financial restrictions, to the maximum extent practicable, the equipment requested by the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie representatives.

In accordance with telephone conversation on 17 July, to Mr. Dunn (Near and Middle East Division) the War Department will furnish by separate communication a detailed report indicating the extent to which the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie requests can be met, to include by category the amounts of supplies and equipment which can be provided in serviceable condition, in unserviceable but repairable condition, and that which can not be provided.

In accordance with the terms of the agreement signed by General Connolly and Ambassador Ala, namely that the property would be purchased on a "where is, as is" basis and because of the legal and financial restrictions imposed on the War Department, which prohibit the repair or rehabilitation by the War Department of any of the unserviceable equipment, I consider it essential that these facts be clearly explained by the State Department to the Iranian representatives, both in the United States and Iran, in order that there will be no misunderstanding.

In the event the Iranian Government, with full knowledge of the unserviceable condition of that part of the equipment in this category, decides to accept this equipment and undertakes to have it reconditioned by commercial or other arrangements, the War Department will lend assistance in advising them on the ways and means of how such arrangements may be made.

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Howard C. ~~Rever~~

Acting Secretary of War

- State Member
- Army Member
- ~~Rever~~ Member
- Ass't State Member
- Ass't Army Member
- Ass't Navy Member
- Executive Secretary
- Ass't Exec. Secretary
- State Adm. Assistant
- Army Adm. Assistant
- Navy Adm. Assistant
- File

AUG - 1 1947



STATE WAR & NAVY COMPTROLLER GENERAL

SWNCC

SECRET

(11)

4070

TOP SECRET

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

091 Iran name

| | |
|-----------------------|-------|
| State Member | ----- |
| Army Member | ----- |
| Navy Member | ----- |
| Ass't State Member | ----- |
| Ass't Army Member | ----- |
| Ass't Navy Member | ----- |
| Executive Secretary | ----- |
| Ass't Exec. Secretary | ----- |
| State Adm. Assistant | ----- |
| Army Adm. Assistant | ----- |
| Navy Adm. Assistant | ----- |
| File | ----- |

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Reference is made to the recent decision to provide military assistance to the Government of Iran by making available noncombat materiel in reasonable quantities, and nonaggression combat materiel within the limits of a credit of ten million dollars allocated to Iran for this purpose.

Pursuant to the foregoing decision, General Mazhari of the Iranian Army has presented a list of equipment and supplies desired by the Iranian Government (Inclosure 1). The War Department has reviewed the Iranian request for nonaggression combat type items (this excludes such items as medium tanks and bombers) and has given General Mazhari a list of equipment (Inclosure 2) which, it is believed, may be made available substantially as shown therein. In addition, although not shown in Inclosure 2, the Iranian request for aircraft can also substantially be met.

Preliminary examinations indicate that except for such items as those currently under procurement, the War Department can make available a substantial portion of the items requested by the Iranians. Every attempt will be made to meet this program with surpluses overseas. It is hoped that most of these will be already in the hands of the disposal agency, Foreign Liquidation Commission. Items to be furnished from the Zone of the Interior will be processed through War Assets Administration. It is understood that, in accordance with existing procedure, the materiel will be turned over to the Iranians on site and that they are to be responsible for its transportation by commercial carrier or otherwise.

It is requested that the War Department be informed of your concurrence in the continuation of present arrangements whereby the disposal agency reimburses the War Department for the costs incident to care, handling, packaging, and preparation for shipment, in so far as the Foreign Liquidation Commission is concerned. A copy of a letter to War Assets Administration on this same subject is inclosed.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON
Secretary of War

- 3 Incls
- 1. Cy of list furn by Gen Mazhari
- 2. Cy of list furn to Gen Mazhari
- 3. Cy of ltr to WAA

SECRET

Copy for SWNCC

10

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
 To: SECRET Authority: Ltr of 5-19-61
 from: [Signature] State Dept.
 Name: [Signature] NNGA
 Date: 3/19/63

COPY

TOP SECRET

The following list of items have been requested by General Mashari of the Iranian Army for that army:

| No. | Item | COMBAT TYPE | 1st Priority | 2d Priority | Total |
|------------------------|--|---------------|---|-------------|-----------|
| 1. | Mortars -- 60 mm | | 150 | 298 | 448 |
| 2. | Mortars -- 81 mm | | 50 | 66 | 116 |
| 3. | Guns -- 57 mm | | 20 | 14 | 34 |
| 4. | Rockets | | 50 | 102 | 152 |
| 5. | Light tanks | | 80 | 163 | 243 |
| 6. | Medium tanks | | 20 | 34 | 54 |
| 7. | Tractors for carrying guns and ammunition | | 45 | 91 | 136 |
| 8. | Armored cars | | 20 | 34 | 54 |
| 9. | Hand Grenades | | 300,000 | 700,000 | 1,000,000 |
| 10. | Rifle Grenades | | 300,000 | 700,000 | 1,000,000 |
| 11. | Mines against infantry troops | | 30,000 | 70,000 | 100,000 |
| 12. | Anti-tank Mines | | 20,000 | 30,000 | 50,000 |
| 13. | Signal Pistolets | | 300 | -- | 300 |
| 14. | Cartridges for Signal Pistolets | | 60,000 | -- | 60,000 |
| 15. | Fighter and Bomber Planes | | 40 | 60 | 100 |
| 16. | Commanding Planes | | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| <u>NON-COMBAT TYPE</u> | | | | | |
| 1. | Trucks for carrying troops | | 600 | -- | 600 |
| 2. | Trucks for transport | | 500 | 1,000 | 1,500 |
| 3. | Motorcycles with sidecars | | 50 | 100 | 150 |
| 4. | Training Planes | | 30 | 70 | 100 |
| 5. | Motorcars | | 30 | 45 | 75 |
| 6. | Jeeps | | 50 | 50 | 100 |
| 7. | Tires and tubes for 3 years proportionate to each priority | | | | |
| 8. | Drugs and other medical supplies | \$100,000 |) The remainder depends on the amount of the credit | | |
| 9. | Engineer and Transmission supplies | \$100,000 | | | |
| 10. | Quartermaster supplies | \$500,000 | | | |
| 11. | Cloth for Officers Uniforms | 100,000 yards | 100,000 yds. | 200,000 yds | |
| 12. | Spare parts for different cars and trucks | | | | |

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
 To SECRET Authority: Ltr of 5-19-61
 from James P. Burke, State Dept.
 Name: Old Dowling NNGA
 Date: 3/19/63

TOP SECRET

COPY

Incl # 1

EQUIPMENT FOR IRANIAN ARMY

| <u>NOMENCLATURE</u> | <u>UNIT COST</u> \$ | <u>1ST PRIORITY REQ'T</u> | <u>AV'BLE FOR 1ST PRIORITY</u> | <u>2ND PRIORITY REQ'T</u> | <u>AV'BLE FOR 2D PRIORITY</u> |
|---|------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <u>Light Tanks:</u> | | | | | |
| | | 100 | 100 | 197 | 0 |
| Tank, light, M24 (w/75mm gun) | 39,653 | | | | |
| Tank, light, M5A1 (w/37mm gun) | 27,057 | | | | |
| Tank, light, M22 (w/37mm gun (obs) | 26,381 | | | | |
| Tank, light, M3 series (w/37mm gun) (obsolete) | 32,915 | | | | |
| <u>Tractors for carrying guns & Ammunition:</u> | | | | | |
| | | 45 | 45 | 91 | 91 |
| Tractor, cargo, M8 | 100,000 (Est) | | | | |
| Tractor, HS, 18 ton, M4 Series | 15,037 | | | | |
| Tractor, HS, 13 ton, M5 series | 11,925 | | | | |
| Tractor, HS, 38 ton, M6 | 35,879 | | | | |
| <u>Armored Cars:</u> | | | | | |
| | | 20 | 20 | 34 | 34 |
| Car, armored, M38 | 22,000 (Est) | | | | |
| Car, armored, light, M8 | 10,718 | | | | |
| Car, scout, M3A1 | 4,854 | | | | |
| Car, armored, T17 series (obs) | 32,790 | | | | |
| Car, half-track, M5 & M9 series (obs) | 8,217 | | | | |
| Carrier, universal, T16, T16E2 (obs) | 6,224 | | | | |
| <u>Mortar, 60mm:</u> | | | | | |
| | | 150 | 150 | 298 | 298 |
| Mortar, 60mm, M8, w/mount, mortar | | | | | |
| 60mm, M5 (M2) | 300 | | | | |
| Mortar, 60mm, M19 | 505 | | | | |

Incl # 2

| | UNIT COST \$ | 1ST PRIORITY REQ'D | AV'BLE FOR 1ST PRY | 2ND PRY REQ'T | AV'BLE FOR 2D PRIORITY |
|---|--------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|------------------|---------------------------|
| <u>Mortar, 81mm:</u> | | 50 | 32 | 66 | 0 |
| Mortar, 81mm, M1, w/mount, mortar 81mm, M4 (M1) (pk & gd) | 590.00 | | | | |
| Mortar, 81mm, M21 (T19E2) w/mount, mortar, 81mm, M15 (T21) | 1,738.00 | | | | |
| <u>Launcher, rocket:</u> | | 50 | 50 | 102 | 102 |
| Launcher, rocket, 2.36" M9A1 (M9) | 36.25 | | | | |
| Launcher, rocket, 2.36", M18 | 78.00 | | | | |
| Launcher, rocket, 3.5", M20 | 104.10 (Est) | | | | |
| Launcher, rocket, 3-tube, 4.5", A.C, M10 (M14, M15) | 150.00 | | | | |
| <u>Gun, 57mm:</u> | | 20 | 20 | 14 | 0 |
| Gun, 57mm M1A1 (M1) w/carriage, gun, 57mm, M2A1 (M2, M1A3) w/eds | 4,975.00 | | | | |
| <u>Signal Pistolets:</u> | | 300 | 300 | 0 | 0 |
| Projector, pyrotechnic, hand, M9 | 2.00 | | | | |
| <u>Hand Grenades:</u> | | 300,000 | 300,000 | 700,000 | 700,000 |
| Grenade, hand, fragmentation, MK2 | .79 | | | | |
| <u>Rifle, Grenades:</u> | | 300,000 | 300,000 | 700,000 | 700,000 |
| Grenade, rifle, HE, AT, M9A1 | 17.10 | | | | |
| Grenade, rifle, smoke, WP, M19A1 | 33.00 | | | | |
| Grenade, rifle, smoke, HC, M20 | 23.80 | | | | |

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NNDG# 740132

| | UNIT COST \$ | 1ST PRIORITY REQ'T | AV'BLE FOR 1ST PRIORITY | 2ND PRIORITY REQ'T | AV'BLE FOR 2D PRIORITY |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| <u>Mines, anti-personnel:</u> | | | | | |
| | | 30,000 | 30,000 | 70,000 | 70,000 |
| Mine, anti-personnel, M2A3 | 45.60 | | | | |
| Mine, anti-personnel, M3 | 36.90 | | | | |
| <u>Mines, anti-tank:</u> | | | | | |
| | | 20,000 | 20,000 | 30,000 | 30,000 |
| Mine, anti-tank, HE, Heavy, M6A1 | 83.30 | | | | |
| Mine, anti-tank, HE, light M7 | 27.30 | | | | |
| <u>Signal Ammunition:</u> | | | | | |
| | | 60,000 | 60,000 | 0 | - |
| Signal, Aircraft, Green, AN-M15A1 | .58 | | | | |
| Signal, Aircraft, Red, AN-M13A1 | .47 | | | | |
| Signal, Aircraft, Yellow, AN-M14A1 | .52 | | | | |

The above list of equipment includes only items which are physically located in the continental United States.

prices

The cost/listed above are the prices which the U.S. Government paid to secure the items concerned. The sale price will be determined by the WAA or FIC and may well be substantially less than the cost prices.

No estimates of packing and shipping charges are included above.

The availability of any item depends upon a series of complex factors. It must be borne clearly in mind that the availability listed above is merely a likely availability for each item to be used for planning purposes and must not be considered a firm statement of availability or a commitment by either the U.S. Government or the War Department.

TOP SECRET

8- JAN 1947

Mr. Robert Littlejohn
Administrator, War Assets Administration

Dear Mr. Littlejohn:

A recent government decision has been made to provide military assistance to the Government of Iran by making available serviceable noncombat materiel in reasonable quantities and serviceable non-aggression combat materiel within the limits of a credit of ten million dollars allocated to Iran for this purpose.

Pursuant to the foregoing decision General Mazhari of the Iranian Purchasing Commission has presented a list of equipment and supplies desired by the Iranian Government.

Preliminary examinations of existing stocks indicated that, except for such items as those currently under procurement, the War Department can make available a substantial portion of the items requested by the Iranians. These items will be declared surplus and will then be made available to the disposal agencies.

In this connection, your attention is invited to the inclosed copy of a letter to the Secretary of State. Your concurrence is requested in the principle of reimbursement to the War Department from funds to be provided by the War Assets Administration for care, handling, packaging, and preparation for shipment in accordance with existing arrangements.

It is requested that the War Assets Administration handle the transfer to Iran of such of this equipment as can be made available from the Zone of the Interior. It will be appreciated if you will indicate your views as to this procedure.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON

Secretary of War

1 Incl

Cy of ltr to Sec/State *not incl*

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
To SECRET Authority: ltr of 5-19-61
from James P. Burke, State Dept.
Name J. H. Dawley NNGA
Date 3/19/63

Incl #3

 SECRET

STAYBACK

TOP SECRET

*071 Iran
MDC*

SWN-4818
12 October 1946

HWK:do

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SWNCC

Subject: United States Strategic Interest in Iran

Reference is made to the State Department memorandum dated 26 September 1946 which transmitted a series of questions prepared by the Department of State concerning United States strategic interest in Iran.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered these questions and have advised the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as follows:

"It is apparent that the questions propounded by the Department of State are based on an assumption that a war with Soviet Russia is a possibility. On that assumption the following replies based on military considerations are an expression of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a consideration apart from such assumption, it must be realized that the interests of the United States and its military capabilities would be adversely affected by loss of Middle East oil occurring through possible Soviet domination of Iran by means other than war.

"1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that as a source of supply (oil) Iran is an area of major strategic interest to the United States. From the standpoint of defensive purposes the area offers opportunities to conduct delaying operations and/or operations to protect United States-controlled oil resources in Saudi Arabia. In order to continue any military capability for preventing a Soviet attack overrunning the whole Middle East including the Suez-Cairo Area, in the

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To SECRET Authority: Ltr of 5-19-61
From James P. Burns, State Dept.
Name *CK Dowling*
Date *3/19/63*
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first rush, it is essential that there be maintained the maximum cushion of distance and difficult terrain features in the path of possible Soviet advances launched from the Caucasus-Caspian area. Otherwise the entire Middle East might be overrun before sufficient defensive forces could be interposed. As to counteroffensive operations, the proximity of important Soviet industries, makes the importance of holding the Eastern Mediterranean-Middle Eastern area obvious. This is one of the few favorable areas for counteroffensive action. Quite aside from military counteroffensive action in the area, the oil resources of Iran and the Near and Middle East are very important and may be vital to decisive counter-offensive action from any area.

*2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that United States strategic interest in Iran is closely related to United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle East area as a whole as follows:

"Our best estimates indicate that the USSR does not now derive sufficient oil from sources within her borders to support a major war. The objective of the fourth Soviet five-year plan is 35,000,000 metric tons production annually. Again, our best estimates indicate this tonnage is only sufficient to meet the total Russian peacetime needs upon the expiration of this fourth five-year plan. The USSR and Iran have formed a joint Russian-Iranian oil company to develop oil resources in northern Iran, an area geologists consider an improbable source of large oil production, a fact which must be well known to the Russians. Hence, her motives in forming this Russian-Iranian oil company are subject to suspicion. Loss of the Iraq and Saudi Arabia sources to the United States and her allies would mean that in case of war they would fight an oil-starved war. Conversely, denial of these sources to the USSR would force her to fight an oil-starved war. However, due to Russia's geographic position, great land mass, and superior manpower potential, any lack of oil limiting air action by the United States and her allies or hampering their transportation ability or their war production would be of great advantage to the USSR.

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Name W. Dowling NNGA
Date 3/19/63

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It is therefore to the strategic interest of the United States to keep Soviet influence and Soviet armed forces removed as far as possible from oil resources in Iran, Iraq, and the Near and Middle East.

"3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

"g. A division of Iran into a Soviet sphere of influence in the north and a British sphere of influence in the south would enhance the ability of the Soviets to achieve their 'security' ends in this area by political means while having the effect of serving notice to other countries that the western democracies admit their inability to protect their strategic interests in this area. Further, it would give the Soviets opportunity to perfect transportation facilities in northern Iran, to organize northern Iran for defense, and to prepare northern Iran as a possible base for operations against British and/or American oil resources in southern Iran and Saudi Arabia. It would allow the Soviets to move their forces half way to these sources of oil without serious opposition. It would, for all practicable purposes, nullify any ability the British may have at present to protect the oil fields in Iraq and, finally, it would be another step in the encirclement of Turkey.

"h. Permanent Soviet control of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan would, from the strategic point of view, be the least objectionable of the four situations propounded in question three. It nevertheless would be a permanent penetration into Iran and thus permit movement of Soviet forces close to the oil fields of Iraq.

"g. The creation of a Soviet-dominated autonomous Kurdish state which might include contiguous portions of northwestern Iran and northern Iraq would adversely affect United States strategic interests by introducing into the area a state owing its existence to the USSR, and therefore strongly influenced by the Soviets and hence

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To **SECRET** Authority: Ltr of 5-19-61
from **TOP SECRET** P. Burke, State Dept.
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Date 3/19/63 NNGA

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probably a willing instrument of the USSR for the creation of discord, dissent, and revolt in the Near and Middle East. Such a state would very probably include the sources of British oil in the Kirkuk area. In this case the revenue now derived by Iraq from Britain for the use of these oil resources would revert to the newly created Kurdish state. Such a situation would probably cause the dissolution of the present government of Iraq and a subsequent chaotic condition from which might arise a new government oriented toward the USSR instead of toward the western democracies. Since Iraq stretches to the head of the Persian Gulf and the Abadan oil refineries are practically on the border of Iraq, our strategic resources in the area would be endangered.

"d. Soviet domination of the whole of Iran would entail all of the objections raised in a, b and c above but with the possible adverse effects on United States strategic interests in the Near and Middle East greatly intensified.

"4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that token assistance by the United States to the Iranian military establishment would probably contribute to the defense of United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle East by creating a feeling of good will toward the United States in the central government of Iran and would tend to stabilize and strengthen that government. They are informed that the immediate security objective of United States policy toward Iran is to prevent civil disturbances which might invite intervention by powerful neighbors and which might endanger United States economic interests in the Persian Gulf area. They feel that, in support of this objective, the United States should accede to Iranian requests for non-aggression items of military material, in reasonable amounts, to enable the Iranian Government to maintain internal security, in view of the fact that Iran cannot supply its own military needs as they have no established sources for security supplies. They consider such non-aggression items of military material as small arms and light artillery, ammunition, small tanks, transportation and communication equipment, quartermaster supplies, and perhaps short range aircraft and naval patrol craft, to be appropriate for release to Iran in reasonable quantities upon the request of Iran, so long as the United States is satisfied that Iran demonstrates a desire to maintain its

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To SECRET Authority: Ltr of 5-19-61
from James P. Burke, State Dept.

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Name B. Dowling NNGA
Date 3/19/63

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independence in the community of nations. Technical advice given unostentatiously and on request would also be appropriate and contributory to the defense of United States strategic interests in Iran and the Near and Middle East area. United States military missions now in Iran should remain there, but any additional military mission to Iran would be inadvisable at this time.

"The military implications in the existing international situation concerning Iran are closely related to the military implications of the current Turkish situation, on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnished their views to the Secretaries of War and the Navy on 24 August 1946."

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. D. REID,
Secretary

*Note: Copy forwarded to State Department in letter to Acting Secretary of State from Secretaries of War and the Navy dated 31 August 1946.

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from James P. Burke, State Dept.
Name PH Dowling NNGA
Date 3/19/63

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NOV 19 1946



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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SM-6874
11 October 1946

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: United States Strategic Interest
in Iran.

Reference is made to the request of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in SWN-4776 that they be furnished, as a matter of high priority, with answers to certain questions raised by the Department of State.

It is apparent that the questions propounded in SWN-4776 are based on an assumption that a war with Soviet Russia is a possibility. On that assumption the following replies based on military considerations are an expression of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a consideration apart from such assumption, it must be realized that the interests of the United States and its military capabilities would be adversely affected by loss of Middle East oil occurring through possible Soviet domination of Iran by means other than war.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that as a source of supply (oil) Iran is an area of major strategic interest to the United States. From the standpoint of defensive purposes the area offers opportunities to conduct delaying operations and/or operations to protect United States-controlled oil resources in Saudi Arabia. In order to continue any military capability for preventing a Soviet attack overrunning the whole Middle East including the Suez-Cairo area, in the first rush, it is essential that there be maintained the maximum cushion of distance and difficult terrain features in the path of possible Soviet advances launched from the Caucasus-Caspian area. Otherwise the entire Middle East might be overrun before sufficient defensive forces could be interposed. As to counteroffensive operations, the proximity of important Soviet industries makes the importance of holding the Eastern Mediterranean-Middle Eastern area obvious. This is

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- State Adm. Assistant -----
- Army Adm. Assistant -----
- Navy Adm. Assistant -----
- File -----

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To ~~SECRET~~ Authority: Ltr of 5-19-61
from James P. Burke, State Dept.
Name *PL Dowling* NNGA
Date *3/19/63*

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one of the few favorable areas for counteroffensive action. Quite aside from military counteroffensive action in the area, the oil resources of Iran and the Near and Middle East are very important and may be vital to decisive counteroffensive action from any area.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that United States strategic interest in Iran is closely related to United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle East area as a whole as follows:

Our best estimates indicate that the USSR does not now derive sufficient oil from sources within her borders to support a major war. The objective of the fourth Soviet five-year plan is 35,000,000 metric tons production annually. Again, our best estimates indicate this tonnage is only sufficient to meet the total Russian peacetime needs upon the expiration of this fourth five-year plan. The USSR and Iran have formed a joint Russian-Iranian oil company to develop oil resources in northern Iran, an area geologists consider an improbable source of large oil production, a fact which must be well known to the Russians. Hence, her motives in forming this Russian-Iranian oil company are subject to suspicion. Loss of the Iraq and Saudi Arabia sources to the United States and her allies would mean that in case of war they would fight an oil-starved war. Conversely, denial of these sources to the USSR would force her to fight an oil-starved war. However, due to Russia's geographic position, great land mass, and superior manpower potential, any lack of oil limiting air action by the United States and her allies or hampering their transportation ability or their war production would be of great advantage to the USSR. It is therefore, to the strategic interest of the United States to keep Soviet influence and Soviet armed forces removed as far as possible from oil resources in Iran, Iraq, and the Near and Middle East.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that:

a. A division of Iran into a Soviet sphere of influence in the north and a British sphere

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To SECRET Authority: Ltr of 5-19-61

from P. Burke, State Dept.

Name W.D. Dowling MNGADate 3/19/63TOP SECRET
- 2 -

of influence in the south would enhance the ability of the Soviets to achieve their "security" ends in this area by political means while having the effect of serving notice to other countries that the western democracies admit their inability to protect their strategic interests in this area. Further, it would give the Soviets opportunity to perfect transportation facilities in northern Iran, to organize northern Iran for defense, and to prepare northern Iran as a possible base for operations against British and/or American oil resources in southern Iran and Saudi Arabia. It would allow the Soviets to move their forces half way to these sources of oil without serious opposition. It would, for all practicable purposes, nullify any ability the British may have at present to protect the oil fields in Iraq and, finally, it would be another step in the encirclement of Turkey.

b. Permanent Soviet control of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan would, from the strategic point of view, be the least objectionable of the four situations propounded in question three. It nevertheless would be a permanent penetration into Iran and thus permit movement of Soviet forces close to the oil fields of Iraq.

c. The creation of a Soviet-dominated autonomous Kurdish state which might include contiguous portions of northwestern Iran and northern Iraq would adversely affect United States strategic interests by introducing into the area a state owing its existence to the USSR, and therefore strongly influenced by the Soviets and hence probably a willing instrument of the USSR for the creation of discord, dissent, and revolt in the Near and Middle East. Such a state would very probably include the sources of British oil in the Kurkuk area. In this case the revenue now derived by Iraq from Britain for the use of these oil resources would revert to the newly created Kurdish state. Such a situation would probably cause the dissolution of the present government of Iraq and a subsequent chaotic condition from which might arise a new government oriented toward the USSR instead of toward the western democracies.

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Since Iraq stretches to the head of the Persian Gulf and the Abadan oil refineries are practically on the border of Iraq, our strategic resources in the area would be endangered.

d. Soviet domination of the whole of Iran would entail all of the objections raised in a, b and c above but with the possible adverse effects on United States strategic interests in the Near and Middle East greatly intensified.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that token assistance by the United States to the Iranian military establishment would probably contribute to the defense of United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle East by creating a feeling of good will toward the United States in the central government of Iran and would tend to stabilize and strengthen that government. They are informed that the immediate security objective of United States policy toward Iran is to prevent civil disturbances which might invite intervention by powerful neighbors and which might endanger United States economic interests in the Persian Gulf area. They feel that, in support of this objective, the United States should accede to Iranian requests for non-aggression items of military material, in reasonable amounts, to enable the Iranian Government to maintain internal security, in view of the fact that Iran cannot supply its own military needs as they have no established sources for security supplies. They consider such non-aggression items of military material as small arms and light artillery, ammunition, small tanks, transportation and communication equipment, quartermaster supplies, and perhaps short range aircraft and naval patrol craft, to be appropriate for release to Iran in reasonable quantities upon the request of Iran, so long as the United States is satisfied that Iran demonstrates a desire to maintain its independence in the community of nations. Technical advice given unostentatiously and on request would also be appropriate and contributory to the defense of United States strategic interests in Iran and the Near and Middle East area. United States military missions now in Iran should remain there, but any additional military mission to Iran would be inadvisable at this time.

The military implications in the existing international situation concerning Iran are closely

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
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
related to the military implications of the current Turkish situation, on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnished their views to the Secretaries of War and the Navy on 24 August 1946.*

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:


A. J. McFARLAND,
Colonel, U.S. Army,
Secretary.

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To SECRET Authority: Ltr of 5-19-61
from James P. Burke, State Dept.
Name A. Dowling NNGA
Date 3/19/63

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SAS-4776
27 September 1946

VFF:aj

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: United States Strategic Interest in
Iran.

Enclosed is a series of questions prepared by the Department of State concerning United States strategic interest in Iran.

It is requested that this list be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a view to obtaining answers to the questions raised by the Department of State.

In view of the strong political interest of the Department of State in Iran, particularly in the present serious situation of internal strife, it is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider this as a matter of high priority.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

A. B. REID,
Secretary

Enclosure

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To SECRET Authority: Ltr of 5-19-61
from James P. Burke, State Dept.
Name B. Dowling NNGA
Date 3/19/63

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PROPOSED QUESTIONS TO JCS

1. To what extent does the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider Iran to be an area of vital strategic interest to the United States for defensive or counter-offensive purposes, or as a source of supply?
2. In what way does the JCS consider the United States strategic interest in Iran to be related to United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle Eastern area as a whole?
3. In what manner does the JCS consider that United States strategic interest would be affected by:
 - (a) A division of Iran into a Soviet sphere of influence in the north and a British sphere of influence in the south?
 - (b) Permanent Soviet control of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan?
 - (c) The creation of a Soviet-dominated autonomous Kurdish state which might include contiguous portions of northwestern Iran and northern Iraq?
 - (d) Soviet domination of the whole of Iran?
4. Given the existing inadequacy of Iranian security forces and the political desirability of strengthening the authority of the central government, does the JCS consider that a program of assistance by the U.S. to the Iranian military establishment would contribute to the defense of United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle Eastern areas?

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To SECRET Authority: Ltr of 5-19-61
from James P. Burke, State Dept.
Name: AK Dowling NNGA
Date: 3/19/63

Enclosure

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : The Secretary - SWNCC

DATE: September 26, 1946

FROM : Assistant Secretary of State Hilldring

SUBJECT: Transmittal from State Department to Joint Chiefs of Staff of Questions Concerning U. S. Strategic Interests in Iran.

There is attached a series of questions concerning United States strategic interests in Iran which the Department of State requests you to transmit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.

3. In view of the strong political interest of the Department ^{of State} in Iran, particularly in the present serious situation of internal strife, it is requested that ~~these questions be treated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as~~ ^{consider this matter of} high priority.

J. H. Hilldring, for
J. H. Hilldring
 John H. Hilldring
 Assistant Secretary of State

Enclosure:
 As stated.

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To ~~SECRET~~ Authority: Ltr of 8-19-61
 from James P. Burke, State Dept.
 Name *AD Dowling* NNGA
 Date *3/19/63*

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TOP SECRET~~TOP SECRET~~PROPOSED QUESTIONS TO JCS.

1. To what extent does the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider Iran to be an area of vital strategic interest to the United States for defensive or counter-offensive purposes, or as a source of supply?

2. In what way does the JCS consider the United States strategic interest in Iran to be related to United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle Eastern area as a whole?

3. In what manner does the JCS consider that United States strategic interest would be affected by:

(a) A division of Iran into a Soviet sphere of influence in the north and a British sphere of influence in the south?

(b) Permanent Soviet control of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan?

(c) The creation of a Soviet-dominated autonomous Kurdish state which might include contiguous portions of northwestern Iran and northern Iraq?

(d) Soviet domination of the whole of Iran?

4. Given the existing inadequacy of Iranian security forces and the political desirability of strengthening the authority of the central government, does the JCS consider that a program of assistance by the U.S. to the Iranian military establishment would contribute to the defense of United States strategic interest in the Near and Middle Eastern area?

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To SECRET Authority: Ltr of 5-19-61
from James P. Burke, State Dept.
Name OK Dowling NNGA
Date 3/19/63

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091- Iran

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| COL. MCCARTHY | |
| COMDR. RICHARDSON | |
| MR. R. E. COX | |
| LT. COL. PENNOYER | |
| LT. NEMEN, WEILFUBB | |
| MR. H. W. MOSELEY | |
| MR. J. R. GARDINER | |
| LT. COL. V. F. FIELD | |
| MAJOR W. E. GUNTHER | |
| 1ST LT. E. SPITTALL | |
| ENSL. F. WHITESIDE | |
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Wm [unclear]

18 OCT 1945

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In 1942 the United States Government had just initiated a project of supplying vital war materials to Russia by way of the Persian Gulf and Iran, and under the tripartite treaty covering the occupation of Iran by the British and the Russians, the Iranian Government had assumed the responsibility of maintaining internal order. In order to support this vital effort on the part of the Iranian Army, the War Department on 4 December 1942 directed the Commanding General, Persian Gulf Service Command, to transfer to the Iranian Army through the Commanding General, United States Military Mission with the Iranian Army, two hundred 3 1/2 ton Studebaker trucks with one year's repair parts, as a loan to the Iranian Government for use until worn out.

As you know, the two hundred trucks thus loaned were subsequently Lend-Leased to the Iranian Government, and it is understood that the Foreign Economic Administration is endeavoring to collect at 100% of the face value for these trucks. In view of the special conditions attending the loan of these trucks to the Iranian Government, the War Department is anxious to relinquish title to them in favor of the Iranian Government, and to waive all United States interest in these trucks, such as recapture right, in consideration of a very nominal sum, in view of the facts that their residual value at this time is small, and that the use made of them by the Iranian Government in the last two and a half years has contributed materially to the war efforts of our forces in the Persian Gulf area.

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I am inclosing a letter from Major General C. S. Ridley, commanding the United States Military Mission with the Iranian Army, which recommends that the ownership of the trucks and spare parts be offered to the Iranian Government at \$50 per truck, or a total of \$10,000.

It is recommended that the United States Government waive all United States rights in this property in consideration of a price of \$50 per truck, or a total of \$10,000.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON

Secretary of War

1 Incl
Cy Gen Ridley's ltr
dtd 19 Sept 45

OCT 17 1945

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Headquarters
United States Military Mission
With the Iranian Army
Teheran, Iran
September 19, 1945

SECRET
Auth _____
Date _____
Initials _____

Subject: 200 Trucks Loaned to Iranian Army

To : The Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, War Department, General Staff,
Pentagon Building, Washington, 25, D. C.

1. With further reference to my letter of May 20, 1945, (copy enclosed) regarding property accountability for 200 trucks with spare parts loaned to the Iranian Army, it is now recommended that authority be given by the War Department to settle this matter under the plan described below.
2. In deciding the course now to be followed, the situation existing here, at the time loan was made, which justified making the loan must be kept in mind. The United States Government had just initiated a project of supplying vital war materials to Russia by way of the Persian Gulf and Iran. The German Armies were apparently approaching Iran through the Caucasus. It was known that there were German agents operating in Iran and elements of the population were affected. The native tribes living athwart the line of supply to Russia were giving trouble and were armed. The Iranian Government had not declared war.
3. Under the tripartite treaty covering the occupation of Iran by the British and Russians, the Iranian Government had assumed the responsibility of maintaining internal order. The Iranian Army was basically the only instrument which the Iranian Government could use to maintain this internal order and quiet which was so essential to the operation of our supply line to Russia. But, the Iranian Army was practically immobile due to lack of trucks.
4. My predecessor, Major General Greely, had made a personal survey of the situation and he had strongly recommended that 200 trucks be released to the Iranian Army at once. This, I understand, was backed by our State Department and by the British Military Attache in Teheran who was very familiar with the situation. About one month after my arrival in Iran, the Secretary of War ordered the loan of the trucks.
5. Apparently under the circumstances existing at the time, the loan of the trucks was clearly an emergency war measure in support of our project to get war materials to Russia. Although doubtless I am not in possession of all the facts leading to the decision to make the loan, since it was done in Washington without my knowledge, still under the conditions as I know them, I cannot question the wisdom of the decision.
6. The situation at the present time is this:
 - a. The Iranian War Ministry has been informed in writing that the trucks are on loan until worn out.

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b. Signed receipts for all 200 trucks, dated from May 31, 1943, through September 14, 1943, are in my possession.

c. The trucks have been in severe service with indifferent maintenance from two to 2½ years and the time when they will be "worn out" is problematical.

d. The Iranian War Ministry clearly understands that the trucks are the property of the United States and cannot be sold even when worn out, and the Chief of Transport Department has acknowledged this status to me in writing.

7. Bearing on the matter are the following considerations:

a. It is unthinkable that the United States will not carry out its agreement with respect to these trucks. Consequently no charge can be made for their use. This is also the view of the American Embassy here.

b. The remaining equity of the United States in the trucks is their scrap value. The difference between this and the original cost has been expended in the war effort.

c. Under all the circumstances, it is now desirable to dispose of the remaining equity and close the matter.

8. In view of all of the above, authority is requested to offer the ownership of the trucks and spare parts to the Iranian War Ministry at \$50.00 per truck or a total of \$10,000.00.

9. I expect to ask for orders to visit the United States about October 15. It is suggested, if unfavorable decision on the above recommendation is contemplated, that it be suspended pending my arrival. On the other hand, if favorable action can be taken prior to October 10, I may be able to present the matter to the Minister of War prior to my departure.

C. S. RIDLEY
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

1 Incl.

Incl. #1 - 1 cy Ltr. AG 457.2 (29 May 45) dated 30 May 45
Hq U. S. Mil. Mission W/Iranian Army

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CONFIDENTIAL

COL. MCCARTHY
 COMDR. RICHARDSON
 MR. R. E. COX
 LT. COL. PENNOYER
 LT. COMDR. NEILFUSS
 MR. H. W. MOSELEY
 MR. J. P. BARDINER
 LT. COMDR. ROCKEFELLER
 LT. COL. V. F. FIELD
 MAJOR W. E. GUNTHER
 1ST LT. E. SPITTALL
 ENS. F. WHITESIDE
 FILE

SWNCC

29 AUG 1945

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Chief of the ~~United States Military Mission to the~~ Iranian Army (Major General Ridley) has advised that the suspension of Lend-Lease supply to the Iranian Army by the Presidential directive will seriously detract from the work of his Mission unless an alternative solution can be found. The unfilled balance of the approved Iranian Army requirement falls into two categories:

"Maintenance" items such as spare parts for equipment of United States origin, that the War Department is still authorized to supply the Iranian Army under the directives of the President to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 5 July and 29 July 1945.

"Non-maintenance" items, such as office supplies, uniform cloth, and medical supplies, that the War Department is no longer authorized to supply under these directives.

If you deem it advisable to complete the shipment of the balance of this requirement, the War Department is prepared to assist. The great bulk of both the "maintenance" items and "non-maintenance" items are available from United States Army excess stocks. The War Department will supply the Foreign Economic Administration against reimbursement to War Department appropriations those "non-maintenance" items which are so available. For simplicity it is believed desirable that in addition the War Department also release to the Foreign Economic Administration, on the same basis, the "maintenance" items which it is still authorized to supply the Iranian Army.

The War Department considers it desirable that any further supply of the Iranian Army should be arranged by the State Department. The War Department would be willing to study any further requirements, and comment as to their military appropriateness; however, without any supply responsibility therefor.

The question of the continued need for the services of the Ridley Mission under present circumstances has also been raised. An expression of your views on the matters of completing the present outstanding Iranian requirement, as set forth above, of future supply, and of the continued need for the Ridley Mission is requested.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON

Copy for SWNCC

ACTING Secretary of War

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AUG 3 - 1945

The Honorable Joseph C. Grew
Acting Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have your letter of 25 July 1945 expressing the appreciation of the Department of State for General Booth's assistance to the Ambassador to Iran. It has been made a matter of official record.

In accordance with your request, it has given me great pleasure to have a copy of your letter forwarded to General Booth.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK L. STEINSON

Secretary of War

| SWNCC | |
|------------------------|--------------------|
| COL. MCCARTHY | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| COMDR. RICHARDSON | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| MR. R. E. COX | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| LT. COL. PENNOYER | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| LT. COMDR. SEILFUSS | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| MR. H. W. MOSELEY | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| MR. J. P. GARDINER | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| LT. COMDR. ROCKEFELLER | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| LT. COL. V. F. FIELD | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| MAJOR W. E. GUNTHER | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| 1ST LT. E. SPITTALL | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| ENS. F. WHITESIDE | <i>[Signature]</i> |
| FILE | <i>[Signature]</i> |

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SECRET

2 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4:
Attn: Lt. Col. R. R. Stout

Subject: U.S.-British Responsibilities Concerning Operations in the Iranian Corridor.

1. Reference conversation with Colonel Stout of your office and Major Macomber of Operations Division. It does not appear advisable to bring before the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee the question of U.S. responsibility for operations looking to the lend-lease supply of Russia through the Iranian Corridor.

2. Representatives of the Department of State advise, informally, that they are in sympathy with the recommendations contained in the attached paper and that action contemplated will not affect our relation with the British in the Middle East nor will it serve to weaken our position in regard to that area. This problem is viewed more as a British-U.S. problem than a U.S.-Middle East problem.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
Secretary

Encl.

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JUN 19 1945

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have your letter of 13 June 1945 (ME) with reference to the Iranian Government's request for the withdrawal of American forces from Iran, and note that you will welcome the views of the War Department on this subject.

The supply and transport operations of the Persian Gulf Command have been successively reduced until the primary mission of the command was declared completed as of 1 June 1945. The withdrawal of troops not needed in the operations of the command has been under way continually since January as each successive cut in the scale of operations was made. The withdrawal of the remainder of the operating service troops will continue as rapidly as the exigencies of the military situation permit. The bulk of the troops still in Iran at present will fall in this category.

It will, however, be necessary for certain United States troops to remain in Iran for an indefinite period, probably not less than the duration of the Japanese War plus six months. These troops fall into two categories. The first category includes the caretaking troops at United States installations throughout Iran, and troops necessary for their maintenance, totaling about 3000, which will be withdrawn as soon as satisfactory arrangements for the liquidation of United States assets are made. The War Department has no desire to keep these troops in Iran any longer than is necessary for the protection of United States interests. The second category is composed of the service troops, numbering about 1500 for the support of the Air Transport Command air base at Abadan. These troops are required for staging combat aircraft to China, and for Air Transport Command traffic in support of United States Forces in the India-Burma and China theaters. They are directly contributing in the war against Japan and will be required until that war is successfully completed.

In any reply to the Iranian Government it should be pointed out that there are no United States combat troops in Iran, and that it is essential that the two categories of troops referred to in the foregoing paragraph remain until their missions are completed.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMPSON

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Secretary of War

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|-----------------------------|-------|
| COL. MCCARTHY | |
| COMDR. WOOD/CROBY | |
| MR. R. E. MAJ. Macomber/hbl | |
| LT. COL. PENNOYER | |
| LT. COMDR. BEILFUSS | |
| MR. H. W. MOSELEY | |
| MR. P. J. JAMES | |
| LT. COMDR. ROCKEFELLER | |
| LT. COL. V. F. FIELD | |
| MAJOR W. E. GUNTHER | |
| 1ST LT. E. SPITTALL | |
| ENS. F. WHITESIDE | |
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The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Attention is invited to the series of letters between the War Department and the Department of State relative to the policy concerning the disposal of the installations and equipment within the Persian Gulf Command to the Government of Iran, and in which agreement was reached that such matters would be referred to the Department of State.

The Commanding General of the Persian Gulf Command has informed the War Department that as result of the Allied occupation of Iran, the essential civil lift requirements of the Iranian State Railway are now higher than the requirements previous to that occupation, and that the British have fixed the minimum essential civil lift at 50,000 long tons per month.

Additional locomotives and freight cars will be required to supplement the present Iranian State rolling stock if this 50,000-ton target is met. This additional equipment may be supplied either from United States rolling stock or from combined United States-British rolling stock, all of which is presently in the Persian Gulf Command. For your information, a paper is presently under consideration within the War Department, the intent of which is to advise the British Government that the United States deems it a British responsibility to make financial settlements with Iran or its agencies for all costs arising from the operation by the United States of ports and supply routes within the Iranian Corridor; and further that the United States expects reimbursement for maintenance stores of United States origin turned over to the Iranian State Railway by the Persian Gulf Command Military Railway Service, as well as for rental charges on American owned equipment used in railway operations.

The War Department would appreciate a statement from the Department of State relative to the desirability of augmenting the Iranian State Railway's existing equipment to the point where it may maintain 50,000 tons per month for Iranian civil use, and whether the additional equipment should be supplied from United States or combined United States-British equipment. The War Department is of the opinion that

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The Honorable The Secretary of State

the British rolling stock should be used to the limit of its availability provided the 50,000-ton target is maintained; and if the Department of State concurs, request that conversations toward that end be initiated with the British Foreign Office by the Department of State.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

Secretary of War

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STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

STATE ✓

 Mr. Cox
 Mr. Moseley
 Mr. Gardiner

WAR ✓

 Col. Whitson
 Col. McCarthy
 Major Field
 Lt. Massa

NAVY ✓

 Comdr. Nutting
 Comdr. Richardson
 Lt. Comdr. Rockefeller
 Lt. Geilfuss
 Ens. _____

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REMARKS:

FEB 15 1945

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

My dear Mr. Secretary:

In reply to your letter of 8 February 1945 concerning the delay in handling of official Iranian coded messages by General Eisenhower's Headquarters, General Eisenhower has replied to our message on this subject stating that information available to him indicates messages of this nature are processed over commercial facilities and that there are no records of such messages passing through his headquarters.

If you desire that further investigation of this matter be made, may I suggest that the War Department be furnished the details of several specific instances in which delay occurred.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War

CHIEF OF STAFF
OFFICE OF THE
DISPATCHED



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STATE WAR & NAVY COORDINATING
63 COMMITTEE

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SECRETOPD/2818
Lt Col Yost/kma

OPD 336 Denmark (25 Jan 45)

FEB 15 1945

Honorable James C. Dunn
Assistant Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I refer again to your letter of 25 January 1945 concerning the informal inquiry of the Danish Legation as to whether this Government has any objection to Mr. Carl Frederik Bistrup Simony of Sweden proceeding from Stockholm to Greenland via the United States in order to assist the Governor of Greenland.

The War Department interposes no objection from a military point of view to the proposal made by the Danish Legation that Mr. Simony travel to Greenland to hold office in that country.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War

FEB 17 1945

STATE WAR & NAVY COORDINATING
64 COMMITTEE

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