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III. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. General

a. The degree of cooperation and assistance given this observer by all individuals contacted, and the professional proficiency of all tactical units observed in Korea cannot be over-emphasized.

b. The comments and recommendations which are contained herein are relatively broad in scope and are restricted to those items which the observer believes to be of primary concern to the commandant, and the staff and faculty, of the Command and General Staff College.

2. Situation in Korea During Period of 20 Jun - 19 Jul 51.

a. Friendly situation:

For situation of UN forces see Observer Report on operations, Inclosure 7 Annex 3 to this report.

b. Enemy situation:

Throughout the period of 20 Jun through 19 July the enemy generally maintained a passive attitude. Periodic probing attacks by enemy forces of up to battalion size were conducted with the majority of these reported as directed against the ROK forces. Artillery and mortar fire by enemy forces was relatively light and spasmodic, however, the volume of fire appeared to be increasing somewhat toward the end of the period. The enemy was disposed in a defensive formation closely approximating a mobile defense on a broad front, with three North Korean corps (approx total strength - 62,000) and four CCF armies (approx total strength - 60,000) on the immediate front and confirmed reserve elements consisting of four North Korean corps (approx total strength - 127,000) and eight CCF armies (approx total strength - 154,000) in reserve. Seven additional CCF armies have been reported located in Korea but these reports are unconfirmed. In general, the forward elements of the enemy are located just beyond the range of friendly artillery. These forward positions consist of strong points of company to battalion size located on dominant terrain. Reserve elements are located well to the rear.

3. Recommendations:

The efficiency of operation of each intelligence section visited directly reflected the degree of understanding by the G2 of fundamental intelligence procedures, the functions of the various branches of the intelligence section, and the capabilities and limitations of the agencies available. As a result of my observations in this respect it is recommended that the Command and General Staff College place emphasis on instruction in:

a. The organization of the intelligence sections at division and corps, and a type organization for a field army intelligence section.

b. The functions of the various branches of the intelligence sections at division, corps and army and methods for collating their activities.

c. Realistic, careful and coordinated planning and direction of the collection effort.

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d. Utilization of a minimum number of EEI which state only the current high priority intelligence requirements of the commander.

e. A thorough understanding of visual and photo reconnaissance procedures, methods of requesting missions, utilization of the various types of intelligence cover, and prompt dissemination of information derived therefrom. Recommend front line cover on request only and not on a daily basis.

f. The necessity for maintaining and conforming to an SOP for operations at all levels. These SOP's should be furnished the next lower headquarters to insure uniformity and improve efficiency.

g. ^{the} The necessity for establishing close, personal coordination between the combat intelligence branch of the G2 section and the operations branch of the G3 section.

h. The reduction of the number and types of intelligence reports, maximum utilization of annexes to the PIR's, and reduction of unnecessary wordage and volume in intelligence reports.

i. The necessity for more adequate general staff supervision of the C/I section and coordination of security measures.

j. The necessity for tactical intercept facilities which are organized, trained and equipped specifically to furnish tactical communication intelligence direct to corps and division.

k. The preparation of strategic intelligence studies at army and higher levels, and the avoidance of duplication in the preparation of these studies.

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IV. Index to Intelligence Documents Furnished the C&GSC

1. Intelligence SOP's.
2. CCF and NK Tactics.
3. Intelligence Estimates.
4. Intelligence Annexes.
5. Periodic Intelligence Reports.
6. Sitreps.
7. I Sums
8. Special Studies.
9. Order of Battle.
10. Counter Intelligence.
11. Escape and Evasion.
12. Aerial Reconnaissance.
13. Miscellaneous.

Intelligence SOP's

<u>No.</u>	<u>Issuing Headquarters</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Contents</u>
SOP 1	3d Inf Div	Intelligence SOP	-
SOP 2	IX Corps	Intelligence SOP	-
SOP 3	I Corps	Intelligence SOP	-
SOP 4	X Corps	Intelligence SOP	-
SOP 5	EUSAK	Organization of Army G-2 Section	Chart Only

Enemy Tactics

<u>No.</u>	<u>Issuing Headquarters</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Contents</u>
T-1	ATIS	Chinese Intelligence Service	Translation of CCF intelligence manual includes employment of agents and sabotage methods.

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Enemy Tactics (cont'd)

<u>No.</u>	<u>Issuing Headquarters</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Contents</u>
T-2	FECOM	Army Group Tactics (Vol 1)	Translation of CCF Tactics manual
T-3	FECOM	Army Group Tactics (Vol 2)	Same
T-4	ATIS	Bulletin-Enemy Documents	CCF Combat Order CCF Recon Order CCF Recon Report CCF Recon Directive
T-5	ATIS	Interrogation Report	NK Defensive Tactics to include all types of defensive actions.
T-6	FECOM	Intelligence Digest	En Fifth Phase Offensive 16 May - 15 Jun 51
T-7	EUSAK	PIR 323 Inclosure 3	Army Group Study, Movement - Capabilities
T-8	EUSAK	PIR 288 Inclosure 3	Reinforcement capability of Mongolian Peoples Republic Forces.
T-9	EUSAK	PIR 294	CCF Replacement System
T-10	IX Corps	PIR 261 Annex 1	CCF Reconnaissance
T-11	IX Corps	PIR 228 Annex 1	CCF Attack Doctrines
T-12	IX Corps	PIR 244	CCF Withdrawal Tactics
T-13	EUSAK	PIR 306 Inclosure 6	CCF Tactics "flexible defense"
T-14	EUSAK	PIR 291 Inclosure 5	CCF Tactics Squad and Platoon
T-15	EUSAK	PIR 243 Inclosure 3	CCF Attack and Defense by Large Units
T-16	EUSAK	PIR 282	CCF Elastic Defense
T-17	EUSAK	PIR 284 Inclosure 3	CCF-A/T measures
T-18	X Corps	En Tactics Bulletin #4	CCF - Attack and Defense

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Enemy Tactics (cont'd)

<u>No.</u>	<u>Issuing Headquarters</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Contents</u>
T-19	X Corps	En Tactics Bulletin #8	Analysis of En Action in Battle of SOYANG River
T-20	X Corps	En Tactics Bulletin #7	CCF Assault Teams CCF Counterattacks
T-21	X Corps	En Tactics Bulletin #6	NK combat patrols CCF combat order CCF Flexible Defense
T-22	X Corps	En Tactics Bulletin No. 5	CCF Night Attacks
T-23	X Corps	En Tactics Bulletin No. 2	CCF Night Attacks CCF Reconnaissance
T-24	X Corps	En Tactics Bulletin No. 1	CCF offensive tactics - artillery road blocks

Intelligence Estimates

<u>No.</u>	<u>Issuing Headquarters</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Contents</u>
IE 1	EUSAK	G-2 Tactical Estimate, 24 May 1951	-
IE 2	EUSAK	Annex A to Operation RIPPER	Inclosure 1 is Intell Estimate. Inclosure 2 is reinforcement capabilities.
IE 3	X Corps	Opn Order 20	Annex B is Intelligence Annex - Appendix 1 is Intelligence estimate.
IE 4	IX Corps	Annex 1 (Intelligence Estimate) to Op Plan _____	
IE 5	2d Inf Div	Annex 1 (Intelligence) to Opns Order 26	
IE 6	3d Inf Div	Intelligence Estimate 311200 May 51	
IE 7	2d Inf Div	G-2 Estimate 29 Dec 50	
IE 8	2d Inf Div	G-2 Estimate 101800 Dec 50	

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Intelligence Estimates (cont'd)

<u>No.</u>	<u>Issuing Headquarters</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Contents</u>
IE 9	24th Inf Div	G-2 Estimate	
IE 10	3d Inf Div	Intelligence Estimate 191800 June 51	
IA 1	EUSAK	Annex A to Opn RIPPER	
IA 2	X Corps	Annex B to Opn Order 20	
IA 3	I Corps	Intelligence Annex to Opns Directive 53.	
IA 4	2d Inf Div	Annex 1 (Intelligence) to Opns Order 26	Appendix A is Intelligence Estimate
IA 5	24th Inf Div	Annex A to Opns 0-14	
IA 6	3d Inf Div	Annex 4 to OI 25-3	

Army PIR's

<u>No.</u>	<u>Issuing Headquarters</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Contents</u>
PI 16	EUSAK	PIR 346	O/B Annex
PI 17	"	PIR 368	Vehicle sighting Use of aerial photo by IPW Team. EM A/B capability
PI 18	"	PIR 323	Movement of CCF Army Groups
PI 19	"	PIR 335	

Corps PIR's

PI 20	X Corps	PIR 212	Terrain Study
PI 21	X Corps	PIR 88	
PI 22	X Corps	PIR 289	Characteristics of EM weapons
PI 23	I Corps	PIR 175	
PI 24	"	PIR 167	
PI 25	"	PIR 168	

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Corps PIR's (cont'd)

<u>No.</u>	<u>Issuing Headquarters</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Contents</u>
PI 26	I Corps	PIR 169	NK recruiting system
PI 27	"	PIR 156	Terrain Study
PI 28	"	PIR 172	
PI 29	"	PIR 175	
PI 30	IX Corps	PIR 261	CCF Recon Tactics
PI 31	IX Corps	PIR 284	Captured material - percent U.S., CCF and USSR
PI 32	IX Corps	PIR 228	CCF Attack Characteristics
PI 33	IX Corps	PIR 244	CCF Withdrawal Tactics
PI 34	IX Corps	PIR 250	

Division PIR's

PI 1	2d Inf Div	PIR 126	Psychological Warfare
PI 2	"	PIR 198	
PI 3	"	PIR 210	IPW interrogation
PI 4	"	PIR 200	Espionage activity
PI 5	"	PIR 203	TLO agent report
PI 6	"	PIR 201	CCF C/A Tactics
PI 7	24th Inf Div	PIR 352	
PI 8	24th Inf Div	PIR 362	
PI 9	3d Inf Div	PIR 160	Female agents
PI 10	"	PIR 167	CCF C/A Tactics
PI 10	"	PIR 168	Guerrilla Capabilities
PI 11	1st Cav Div	PIR 339	
PI 12	"	PIR 338	En O/B Weather Study EM Air Capability
PI 13	"	PIR 337	
PI 14	"	PIR 334	En CI measures Tactical Study of Terrain

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Army Sitreps

<u>No.</u>	<u>Issuing Headquarters</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Contents</u>
SR 1	USAK	Sitrep 920	
SR 2	"	" 921	
SR 3	"	" 875	
SR 4	"	" 874	

Intelligence Summaries

IS 1	X Corps	Form for I sums	
IS 2	X Corps	ISUM 571	
IS 3	24th Inf Div	Isum 091300 Jul 51	
IS 4	3d Inf Div	Isums	

Special Studies

SS 1	EUSAK	Vehicle Movement Sightings	Chart
SS 2	EUSAK	Enemy Armor Sightings	Chart
SS 3	EUSAK	Analysis of EM Vehicular Movement	Relates vehicular movement to moon phases, sorties flown, and weather
SS 4	IX Corps	Intelligence Bulletin No. 1	CCF Activities
SS 5	2d Div	Intelligence Bulletins 3 and 4	
SS 6	EUSAK	Terrain Analysis	Chart
SS 7	EUSAK	Weather Analysis	
SS 8	EUSAK	Vegetation Analysis	
SS 9	EUSAK	Crop Analysis	
SS 10	2d Inf Div	Operation GHOUL	

Order of Battle

OB 1	FECOM	North Korean Order of Battle
OB 2	FECOM	CCF Order of Battle

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Counter-Intelligence

<u>No.</u>	<u>Issuing Headquarters</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Contents</u>
CIC 1	I Corps	Apprehension of Enemy Agents	No. Enemy agents apprehended
CIC 2	EUSAK	Inclosure 3 to PIR 290	Espionage, sabotage, and subversion during Feb and March
CIC 3	EUSAK	Inclosure 4 to PIR 300	Enemy espionage and counter-measures
CIC 4	EUSAK	Charts on Guerrilla organization and strength trends	
CIC 5	EUSAK	Methods of identification of NK Agents	
CIC 6	210th CIC Det X Corps	Espionage in Korean War	Lecture presented to all units
CIC 7	IX Corps	Enemy Espionage Activities	
CIC 8	3d Inf Div	Mission of CIC in Combat Area	CIC-SOP
CIC 9	2d Inf Div	Appendix 1 (C/I Plan) to Annex 1 to Opn O #10 Special Opns Order #1	C/I Plan

Escape and Evasion

E and E	X Corps	Troop training in Escape and Evasion	
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Aerial Reconnaissance

A 1	EUSAK	Army Aviation	General data on utilization of army aviation
A 2	9th Inf Regt	Operations of 9th Inf Regt TACP	A study of TACP Operations
A 3	3d Inf Div		Illustrative K 20 photos.
A 4	Representative of tactical air support center	Personal letter	Deficiencies in aerial reconnaissance activities.

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Aerial Reconnaissance (cont'd)

<u>No.</u>	<u>Issuing Headquarters</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Contents</u>
A 5	APRC		Type photos received when requesting Intelligence Cover
A 6	IX Corps		Material prepared by Corps photo interpretation branch
<u>Miscellaneous</u>			
M 1	Korean National Police Force	Daily Operations Report	Anti-guerrilla activities
M 2	KAMAG	I SUM	
M 3	KAMAG	Advisors Handbook	All matters pertaining to ROK army and KMAG.
M 4			Organization for Army Map supply.
M 5	EUSAK	Minefield Doctrine	Violations in minefield doctrines by units of EUSAK
M 6	8th Engr C Bn	Minefield Bulk tins	Type reports on location of minefields.
M 7	EUSAK	Minefield Bulletins	Army report on minefield location
M 8	EUSAK	Technical Intelligence	Type Technical Intelligence Report (Engineer).
M 10	ATIS	Interrogators Guide	Strategic Interrogation.
M 11	1st Cav Div	Civil Assistance	Handling of Refugees
M 12	IX Corps	Civil Assistance Annex 1 to SOP	Handling of Refugees
M 13	7th Cav. 1. Regt	Opn O 28-51	RCT reconnaissance in force.
M 14	I Corps	Defense against air attack	

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ANNEX C TO INCLOSURE 7

OBSERVER REPORT

COVERING

G-3 ACTIVITIES WITHIN MISSION AND SCOPE OF
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

AS OBSERVED IN KOREA DURING PERIOD

20 JUNE TO 19 JULY 1951

BY

LT COL WARREN K. BENNETT, INFANTRY, O-35691
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE REPRESENTATIVE

ON

AFF OBSERVER TEAM NO 5

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INDEX TO OBSERVER REPORT

SECTION	CONTENTS
I	INTRODUCTION
II	ITINERARY
III	CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AND COMMENTS PERTAINING THERETO.
	1. Air Support
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	3. River Crossing Operations
	4. Cold Weather Operations
	5. Night Operations
	6. Mountain Operations
	7. General Offensive Operations
	8. Defensive Operations
	9. Delaying Action
	10. Fire Coordination
	11. The Assistant Division Commander
	12. Operation with Other UN Forces
	13. Organization of Army Units
	14. Psychological Warfare
	15. Partisan Operations
	16. General
IV	ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
V	INDEX TO REFERENCE MATERIAL
VI	REFERENCE MATERIAL (CGSC Library only)

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose - This report covers my observations as a member of AFF Observer Team No. 5 in Korea during the period 20 June to 19 July 1951, inclusive. Authority for the trip and instructions to observers are contained in the following:

a. Letter, OCAFF, 29 May 1951, Subject: "Army Field Forces Observer Team - June 1951."

b. Letter, D/A, AGPA-OS 200 4 (23 May 51), 28 May 1951, Subject: "Travel Orders."

c. Letter, Command and General Staff College, 6 June 1951, Subject: "Korean Trip."

Copies of above references are on file at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

2. Field of Activity - Based on a mutually agreed upon division of primary responsibility among the Command and General Staff College observers, I investigated those fields of activity within the mission and scope of the Command and General Staff College which are the primary responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. Observations were made at army, corps, division, and regimental levels, with maximum observation at the division level.

3. Itinerary - A detailed itinerary is shown in Section II of this report. Following is the general time breakdown:

<u>Period</u>	<u>Activity</u>
13-20 Jun 51	Travel from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas to Korea
20 Jun-19 Jul 51	Observations in Korea
19-28 Jul 51	Preparation of Report in Tokyo

During period in Korea, visits were made to Army Headquarters, each Corps Headquarters, each U.S. Army division, and several UN Forces. Within these units numerous subordinate units and staffs were visited and numerous activities observed. Within each unit, I conferred primarily with G-3 and all of his principal assistants, as well as conferring to some extent with the Commanding Generals, Chiefs of Staff, and other staff officers whose activities are related to the G-3 field. At least seven (7) regimental commanders and ten (10) battalion commanders were interviewed briefly.

4. Attitude of Eighth Army Units and Personnel - Without exception, all individuals and units contacted were extremely cooperative and helpful, and assisted in every possible manner.

Each unit appeared calm, confident of its ability to defeat the enemy in any encounter, and confident of its superiority over every other unit.

5. Variations in Operations - Each unit varied somewhat in its methods of operation and also in its opinions as to the proper conduct of tactical operations in Korea. However, two things were apparent:

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a. Those units which appeared to be operating most effectively were those which conformed most closely to doctrine now taught in our service schools.

b. The longer units operate in Korea, the more closely they conform to existing doctrine. This was confirmed by discussions with many commanders and staff officers.

6. Conditions Peculiar to Korea - Any evaluation of operations in Korea must take into consideration the following characteristics of the Korean war:

a. Enemy

- (1) Comparative lack of enemy air activity.
- (2) Small amount of enemy artillery and antiaircraft fire.
- (3) Nature of enemy mass attack techniques.

b. Terrain

- (1) The terrain in Korea is mountainous and the principles of mountain warfare apply.
- (2) Sectors and zones have habitually been extremely wide.

c. UN Forces

- (1) Operations of units of many nations with different physical, mental, and speech characteristics, must be integrated.
- (2) ROK units were committed to combat initially with as little as 10 days training; they still are not well trained; they particularly need trained leaders.

7. General Situation in Korea during Period of Observation - An inactive situation existed across the entire Eighth Army front during the period of observation with neither side executing major attacks. After the CCF May offensive was contained, Eighth Army initiated a rapid counter-offensive which returned our forces to a position generally a short distance north of the 38th parallel. Our forces now occupy positions along lines known as KANSAS and WYOMING. From a military standpoint, these positions offer a comparatively short line with strong terrain for defense.

Along Line KANSAS, fortifications have been constructed which were designed to be virtually impregnable to enemy penetration. Along Line WYOMING, which extends to an average depth of 10-15 miles beyond Line KANSAS in the central portion of the Army sector, hasty field fortifications were constructed initially. These have now been improved to the extent that they also constitute a formidable barrier. Directives under which Eighth Army now operates provide for holding Line WYOMING if possible and, in event of enemy mass attacks, executing phased withdrawal to line KANSAS if forced to do so by enemy pressure.

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Eighth Army consists of three US and one ROK Corps. As of 20 July 51 the major units were disposed from west to east as follows:

I US CORPS(left flank)

1st ROK Div
29th British Independent Bde
28th British Commonwealth Bde
25th Inf Div
3d Inf Div
9th ROK Div
1st Cav Div(Corps res)

IX US CORPS(left center)

2d ROK Div
24th Inf Div
6th ROK Div
7th Inf Div(Corps res)

X US CORPS(right center)

7th ROK Div
2d Inf Div
5th ROK Div
1st Mar Div (Corps res)
8th ROK Div

I ROK CORPS(right flank)

ROK Capital Div
11th ROK Div
3d ROK Div

For the first time in Korea, comparatively large reserves are retained. Each of the three U.S. corps has one U.S. division in reserve, although Eighth Army has placed certain limitations on their employment. Subordinate units have reserves of up to one-third of their strength. Theater has reserves of two divisions, plus one airborne RCT.

A buffer zone of varying depth exists between friendly and enemy forces. Daily patrolling activity plus occasional reconnaissance in forces is employed to maintain contact with the enemy and prevent his concentrating close to friendly lines. In order that friendly patrols can reach the enemy position in difficult terrain and still return before darkness, patrol bases, usually battalion size, are pushed forward of our MLR. These patrol bases are used often in Korea. They are a variation of the general outpost line, organized for perimeter defense and within supporting distance of artillery emplaced within the battle position. They perform the dual function of providing security, although they can easily be by-passed at night, and of providing bases closer to the enemy from which friendly patrols can operate. Patrols from the battle position operate daily between the battle position and the patrol bases. Patrol bases vary from one battalion in each regimental sector to one in each division sector. Occasionally, RCT size patrol bases are employed in each division sector.

At the time of departure from Korea the attention of all personnel was on the cease-fire negotiations in Kaesong. The enemy retained the capability of resuming large-scale offensive action at any time. However, Eighth Army was better prepared than at any other time to meet and repulse any enemy thrusts. In the opinion of this observer, the Eighth Army also has the capability of successfully initiating further offensive operations at any time such operations are ordered.

Data furnished to the Library, C&GSC, include copies of the directives under which Eighth Army was operating at the time of departure from Korea, plus a detailed situation overlay as of that date. For details of the current enemy situation, see the report of the intelligence observer, C&GSC.

II. ITINERARY

Unit and/or Location Visited	TIME		Method Of Travel (Departure)	REMARKS
	Arrived	Departed		
<u>EN ROUTE</u>				
	JUNE	JUNE		
Ft Leavenworth, Kans.		130830	Motor	
Kansas City, Mo.	130930	131045	Air	
San Francisco, Calif.	131835	141220	Motor	
Travis AFB, Calif.	141400	151600	Mil Air	Aerial Port
Tokyo, Japan	172215	200900	Mil Air	Briefings, equipment
<u>KOREA</u>				
EUSAK, Main, Taegu	201300	220700	Mil Air	
EUSAK, Fwd, Seoul	220830	251000	Lt Acft	
I Corps, Uijongbu	251030	260900	Jeep	Left Corps
1st ROK Div	261030	261200	Jeep	
29 & 28 British Bdes	261230	261630	Jeep	
I Corps, Uijongbu	261800	281300	Lt Acft	
1st Cav Div	281330	301000	Lt Acft	
JULY				
3d Inf Div	301015	021330	Lt Acft	
JULY				
25th Inf Div	021400	031215	Jeep	Corps Reserve
I Corps, Uijongbu	031230	031500	Lt Acft	
EUSAK, Fwd, Seoul	031530	060900	Jeep	
IX Corps, Chunchon	061200	081400	Lt Acft	Left Center Corps
24th Inf Div	081530	101500	Jeep	
7th Inf Div	101600	111730	Lt Acft	Corps Reserve; Bn in Defense Demon- stration
IX Corps, Chunchon	111800	120900	Lt Acft	
X Corps, Hongchon	120930	130900	Jeep	Right Center Corps
2d Inf Div	130915	131830	Jeep	Corps Reserve
X Corps, Hongchon	131845	141600	Air	
EUSAK, Fwd, Seoul	141800	161800	Air	
EUSAK, Main, Taegu	161900	171600	Air	
2d Log Comd, Pusan	171900	181330	Air	
EUSAK, Main, Taegu	181430	191430	Air	
<u>JAPAN</u>				
Tokyo	191850		Air	

Annex C to
Incl. 7

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III.
CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AND
COMMENTS PERTAINING THERETO.

I. AIR SUPPORT

CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.-

INVESTIGATE THE PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED IN
THE AIR SUPPORT OF GROUND UNITS TO INCLUDE:

a. Q: WHAT IS THE COMPOSITION AND EQUIPMENT OF TACPS?

A: (1) Composition:

One (1) Forward Air Controller (FAC).

One (1) Radio Mechanic (548) or (754).

One (1) Radio Operator (766) or (776).

(2) Equipment:

One (1) VRC-3 Radio Jeep (12 Volt) containing

One (1) Radio AN/ARC-3 (8 channel VHF).

One (1) Radio SCR-522 (4 channel VHF).

Two (2) Radios AN/TRC-7 (2 channel VHF,
portable).

One (1) AN/ART-13 (HF transmitter and re-
ceiver).

One (1) Personnel Jeep.

One (1) $\frac{1}{2}$ ton Trailer.

b. Q: DOES THE AIR FORCE FURNISH PERSONNEL AND EQUIP-
MENT?

A: Yes. Basis is four (4) TACPs per U.S. Division.
(one for division headquarters and one for each regiment),
plus one TACP for each ROK Division and each ROK Corps Head-
quarters. Additional TACPs are furnished to other UN forces
as required. Fifth Air Force has approximately 66 TACPs in
being in KOREA, and has established a requirement for 120.
No information was obtained as to the expected disposition
of the additional TACPs. The average attrition rate of TACPs
is five (5) per month.

c. Q: IF SO, IS THE FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER A RATED
PILOT?

A: Yes. Basic Fifth Air Force SOPs provide that
the FAC be a pilot who has had combat experience in close
support in this theater.

d. Q: HOW OFTEN ARE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO A TACP
ROTATED?

A: Every 60 days (occasionally every 30 days).
Division Air Liaison Officers (ALOs) are rotated approxi-
mately every six months.

Annex C to Inclosure 7 7-C-III-1

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e. Q: HAVE ANY TACPs BEEN ORGANIZED FROM ARMY PERSONNEL?

A: No. However, provisional units have been organized in some divisions to operate as Tactical Air Parties (TAPs) at battalion level. This has not been done in the majority of divisions. The organization of these battalion Tactical Air Parties (TAPs) was necessitated by the limited number of Air Force TACPs, which precluded the placement of Forward Air Controllers in positions to render adequate air support to infantry battalions operating in the extremely rough terrain of KOREA. They are not authorized to contact tactical aircraft direct, and do not have equipment to do so. Using an SCR-300 radio, the Bn TAP can contact Mosquito and liaison type aircraft. Using either this radio or other existent infantry communications, the bn TAP can contact the regimental TACP. Thus the bn TAP can assist regimental TACPs or Mosquito aircraft in locating and directing air strikes on targets in close support of ground units.

f. Q: IF SO, WHAT ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN REQUIRED?

A: Varied solutions to these provisional teams were observed. In general, the following are required:

(1) Personnel:

One (1) officer (usually is Bn S3 Air).
One (1) radio operator.
One (1) driver.

(2) Equipment:

One (1) $\frac{1}{2}$ ton Truck.
One (1) SCR-300 radio.

(3) Training:

Short training courses have been conducted at division level in air-ground radio procedure, use of identification panels, basic principles of air-ground operations, target identification and marking of targets for air strikes, division air request and control channels, second echelon maintenance and tuning of the SCR 300 radio.

g. Q: WHAT IS THEIR EFFICIENCY, COMPARED WITH AIR FORCE PERSONNEL?

A: All units contacted reported that the provisional teams are equally as efficient as Air Force TACPs, except for the limitations of their equipment, i.e., SCR 300 - short range, inability to contact fighter aircraft direct, and the fact that the Mosquito observer has many things to do in addition to operating the SCR 300 radio through which the bn TAP establishes its contacts. Fifth Air Force will not authorize other than trained pilots to actually direct air strikes.

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h. Q: HOW AND WHY ARE "MOSQUITO" AIRPLANES BEING USED?

A: (1) Mosquito airplanes (tactical air controllers) are used to direct close support strikes on to targets. Secondary functions include directed reconnaissance to locate targets and reconnaissance of known targets to select approaches and aiming points.

(2) The Mosquito aircraft now being used is the AT-6, an Air Force two-passenger trainer-type aircraft, in which are mounted an SCR 522 VHF and an SCR 300. This aircraft is flown by an Air Force pilot and is based at a centrally located field (all Mosquitos in KOREA are based at the same field). The observer in the rear cockpit is furnished by the Army.

(3) Normally one Mosquito supports each front line U.S. division and each ROK Corps, although the allocation of such support is made daily by JOC based on availability of aircraft, weather, and the requirements of the tactical situation. Within divisions or, if necessary, within corps, specific missions or areas are assigned by the G-3 Air based on the tactical situation, after consultation with the G-3.

(4) Mosquito aircraft theoretically operate from friendly front lines to the bomb line, although in practice their coverage sometimes extends beyond the bomb line to a depth of up to 15 miles from friendly front lines.

(5) Mosquito aircraft are used for the following reasons:

(a) Inability of one TACP per regiment to effectively control close air support.

(b) Better visibility and greater range of airborne controllers, compared with TACPs.

(c) Limited amount of enemy air activity and comparatively small amount of anti-aircraft fire by enemy, which permit Mosquitos to operate with relatively few losses.

(6) At present, Mosquito aircraft control approximately 85% of close support strikes, with the remaining 15% being controlled by the regimental TACPs, either directly or by relaying correction data provided by Bn TAP (Bn S3 Air) or company commanders.

(7) When an air strike is to be controlled by Mosquito aircraft, the incoming aircraft are turned over to the Mosquito either by the division TACP or the appropriate regimental TACP. The Mosquito, which has previously reconnoitered the target and determined direction of approach, etc., then leads the attacking aircraft to the target. The target may be marked by normal ground means or by the Mosquito using smoke rockets. Correction of strike data may be made either by the Mosquito directly, or by the Mosquito relaying correction data received from the Bn TAP using the SCR 300.

(8) Disadvantages of this use of Mosquito aircraft are:

(a) Dependence on friendly air superiority.

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(b) Recent increased enemy anti-aircraft fire and enemy use of area fire with small arms weapons have caused an increase in Mosquito losses and have caused Mosquitos to have to fly at higher altitudes, thus reducing their value.

(c) Mosquitos cannot operate if their central field is weathered in, although weather at fighter bases and in target areas may be operational.

(d) Inadequacy of SCR 300 as communication between ground units and Mosquitos, due to short range and the fact that the observer in the Mosquito has many other duties to perform in addition to maintaining radio contact with the supported ground unit. This is offset somewhat by the fact that the division or regimental TACP can direct the Mosquito to check in with a particular ground unit with the SCR 300. A VHF set is desired for this contact.

(9) A variation of the technique described above has been, and is being, tested, in which (3) L-19 aircraft, with Air Force pilots, based at a front-line division airstrip, replace the AT-6 aircraft. This enables the division to keep one controller airborne continually during operational weather, and avoids the disadvantage listed above pertaining to weather. In addition, the airborne controller is closer to the unit supported for briefings and debriefings, and, through working closely with the same unit over extended periods, becomes more familiar with the terrain and the tactical situation and can locate targets more quickly and accurately. Thus far, at least, Fifth Air Force has not agreed to the use of any aircraft with Army pilots as Mosquitos to control and direct tactical aircraft on to targets. This test is still being made and no firm conclusions are yet available. The division conducting the original test reported excellent results. A second division is now conducting a similar test.

1. Q: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS LACK OF TRAINING, PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT, ETC., INFLUENCED THE PRESENT AIR-GROUND ORGANIZATION:

A: (1) The consensus of opinion among Army commanders is that the requirement still exists for assignment of one TACP per battalion. Fifth Air Force has been unable to meet this requirement and has furnished only four (4) per division. To that extent, then the present organization for air-ground support has been limited by non-availability of Air Force personnel and, possibly, equipment. Consequently, ground units have had to improvise control expedients such as the battalion TAP.

(2) Air Force personnel presently assigned to TACPs appear to be uniformly well-trained and capable; their equipment is adequate; and sufficient personnel are available to meet their present commitment of 4 TACPs per division.

1. Q: WHAT WOULD BE THE PROPER SYSTEM ASSUMING ADEQUATE TRAINING, EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL?

A: (1) The system now being taught in service schools is adequate. TACPs must be provided on the basis of 13 per division. At least 4 FACs (1 at division head-

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and one at each regimental headquarters) quarters should be trained pilots who act as technical advisers to the appropriate commanders. Opinions differ as to whether the remaining 9 must be trained pilots. On the whole, ground commanders feel that artillery forward observers and/or infantry unit commanders should be trained and equipped with necessary communications to enable them to control air strikes.

(2) Airborne controllers (Mosquito type) should be used as supplemental means of controlling close support aircraft when enemy air and anti-aircraft activities will permit their effective employment.

k. Q: HOW ARE TARGETS MARKED FOR AIR ATTACK, NIGHT AS WELL AS DAY? WHAT PROCEDURES ARE REQUIRED WHEN DIRECT AIR SUPPORT IS GIVEN BY MEDIUM BOMBERS (B-29)? ARE GROUND TROOPS WITHDRAWN DURING AN ATTACK FOR SAFETY? IF SO, IS EQUIPMENT LEFT IN PLACE? WHAT ARE PROCEDURES FOLLOWED AFTER THE ATTACK?

A: (1) (a) During daylight attacks, targets are marked with all normal means, including WP, colored smoke, artillery, tank fire, or mortar fire, plus smoke rockets fired by the Mosquito planes. In addition, Mosquito planes make dry runs over the target to designate it to following fighter aircraft. Bulk of targets (90%) are marked by artillery firing WP; many others by smoke rockets fired by Mosquito planes. Units prefer colored smoke fired by artillery; however, this has not been available to any extent. Enemy have discovered that we use WP extensively and have often, during recent periods, fired WP into our own lines, thus making target identifications difficult and also presenting the possibility of the strike being directed against friendly positions.

(b) During night attacks, normal procedure is for aircraft to be radar controlled using IPQ-2 radar (TADP) (TADPOLE bombing). Flares, WP shells and visual bombing have also been used.

(2) Medium bombers have been used to a very limited extent for close support missions and never in mass. When used, targets have normally been far enough forward of front lines so that it has not been necessary to move troops from forward positions. Night radar-controlled bombing has been directed to within 500 yards of front lines with B-26 aircraft and 1000 yards with B-29 aircraft without the necessity of moving troops from forward positions.

l. Q: HOW HAS AIR SUPPORT AFFECTED THE USE OF VT FUZES?

A: (1) VT fire, as all artillery fire in the immediate target area, is stopped during the conduct of the close support strike. The flight patterns of all aircraft in the vicinity of the front lines, including tactical aircraft, Mosquitos, and Army aviation, must take into consideration the fire trajectories of all supporting weapons. The area in which artillery fires are stopped is much smaller now than early in the KOREAN War, due to experience gained and closer integration of fires. No specific figures can be given as to distances included, normally expressed by grid squares within which all fires will be stopped.

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(2) Coordination of artillery and other ground fires with air strikes is effected through fire support coordination channels.

(3) VT fuzes are also used in aerial bombs; approximately 80% of bombs dropped during night radar-controlled bombing runs are 500 lb bombs with VT fuzes, particularly against massed personnel targets.

m. Q: TO WHAT SIZE UNITS HAVE TACPS BEEN ALLOTTED DURING AN ATTACK? DURING THE DEFENSE?

A: (1) The regimental TACP normally operates at the regimental CP or OP due to the difficulty of moving rapidly in mountainous terrain. However, it occasionally operates with task forces or with battalion size units. The terrain, tactical plan, and availability of battalion TAPs determine location of the TACP. This is true in both attack and defense situations. In those units which have organized battalion TAPs from Army personnel, using SCR 300 for communication, the regimental TACP will usually remain with the regiment.

(2) Fifth Air Force SOP states that TACPs will not operate with units of battalion size without approval of the division ALO.

n. Q: HOW HAVE THE ACTIVITIES OF TACPs BEEN COORDINATED WITH OTHER FIRE CONTROL AGENCIES?

A: (1) At division level TACP activities are coordinated through the division FSCC. Both the ALO and the TACP are normally located in the FSCC. For discussion of organization of division FSCC, see Section 10, Fire Coordination.

(2) At regimental and, when appropriate, battalion levels, the coordination is less formal, being accomplished through personal contact, and radio and telephone communication between the regimental S3 (or S3 Air when assigned), the TACP, the artillery liaison officer, and other fire control agencies, including 4.2 heavy mortar company. For discussion of regimental and battalion FSCCs, see Section 10, Fire Coordination.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS REGARDING AIR SUPPORT.-

a. RADAR-CONTROLLED (MPQ-2) BOMBING-Considerable success has been achieved in KOREA through the use of medium and light bombers (B-29 and B-26) for radar-controlled bombing of tactical targets at night and during daylight periods of limited visibility. This method of support has been particularly effective during periods when the enemy has massed in front of friendly positions for initiation of his mass attacks. Normally, his concentration areas are beyond the range of our artillery. Consequently, precision bombing of known enemy troop and supply concentrations before and during enemy attacks has been extremely effective. Some details of this type of bombing are covered below:

(1) Aircraft:

(a) B-26 - Range of approximately 25 miles from controlling radar station; carries approximately 8 500-lb bombs or equivalent, averaging approximately 80% VT fuze and 20% instantaneous fuze.

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(b) B-29 - Range of approximately 35 miles from controlling radar station; carries approximately 26 500-lb bombs or equivalent in same ratio as B-26.

(2) Radar: IPQ-2 radar equipment is used to control bombers; hence, the name "IPQ-2 Bombing". This is also known as "Tadpole" bombing. One radar station is presently operating in each corps sector, giving complete coverage across the peninsula. Radar equipment and personnel belong to Fifth Air Force and operate under JOC, although they receive administrative support and protection from ground units in whose areas they are located.

(3) Distances: Radar-controlled bombing has been successfully employed within 500 yards of friendly front lines.

(4) Procedures: Division staffs submit requests for targets through FSCC channels to corps. Corps G-2 Air and G-3 Air coordinate requests of divisions and submit corps requests, with priorities, through G-2 Air channels to JOC. Army G-2 Air coordinates with G-3 air, then submits consolidated army priorities to A-2, who integrates them with Air Force targets and announces targets to be engaged, with priorities. The number of aircraft participating in this type mission on army targets has averaged 20 B-26s and 2 B-29s daily, with much greater numbers during critical periods.

(5) Type of Targets - Known enemy troop concentrations have been most often engaged, followed by supply installations, then by other suitable targets.

(6) Evaluation of Results - Detailed evaluation of results is usually impossible due to distance of targets from friendly positions. However, reports indicate that night radar bombing greatly aided in the defeat of the enemy during mass attacks in May 1951. Aerial OPs normally study target areas for strike evaluation each morning at first light. Radar bombing has been proved to be accurate enough to be used within 500 yards of front lines.

(7) Conclusion - Radar-controlled bombardment aviation is effective for close support at night and should be employed when suitable targets exist.

b. TIME REQUIRED TO RECEIVE ON-CALL AIR STRIKES.-

(1) JOC studies indicate that the average time required to furnish an on-call strike in KOREA from the time the request is initiated at the infantry battalion level until fighter aircraft are over the target is approximately 49 minutes, assuming there are no airborne aircraft either on armed reconnaissance or on air alert which can be diverted to perform the strike. The period of 49 minutes is broken down generally as follows:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Time Required</u>
Transmission of request to div FSCC	5 min
Transmission of request to JOC	3
Processing request at JOC	3

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Transmitting request to airfield	3
Scrambling aircraft	15
Average flight time to target area	<u>20</u>
Total	49

(2) The desirability of reducing this time is apparent. Studies to reduce this time are being made in JOC, and every unit contacted was aware of the necessity for action in this respect. Two ways, among others, in which this elapsed time can be materially reduced are:

(a) Eliminate scrambling time by providing aircraft on air alert during all active periods, or at least during critical periods. This has not always been possible in KOREA, due to limited availability of aircraft.

(b) Reduce flying time to target area by establishing airfields much farther forward. Due to the nature of the terrain in KOREA, the engineer effort required, and, extremely important, the fluidity of the situation during the massed attacks of the enemy, it has not been feasible to have airfields as far forward as desired.

(3) Ground commanders feel they should receive air strikes within 30 minutes after request is initiated; more quickly during critical periods.

(4) Conclusion - Present average time required to receive an air strike is excessive. Service school instruction in this subject should point out the necessity of reducing this time interval to the absolute minimum.

c. PRESENT ALLOCATION OF FIGHTER EFFORT. - In general terms, the following allocation of fighter effort is being made in KOREA:

(1) One-third to anti-air activities, including attacks on enemy airfields.

(2) One-third to isolation missions; i.e., interdiction and specific targets such as roads, bridges, rail lines, etc.

(3) One-third to close support missions. During recent weeks this portion of the effort has averaged approximately 100 sorties daily over the entire EUSAK front.

d. CONTROL OF TACTICAL AIR. - At least one corps (X Corps) has recommended that field army or separate corps commanders should have operational control over supporting tactical air units and that tactical air units should be organized and employed on the basis of one group per infantry division, giving one wing per corps of three divisions. Detailed discussion of this recommendation is contained in Staff Study, Hq X Corps, 25 December 1950, subject: "Army Tactical Air Support Requirements."

e. SUBSTITUTE TRANSPORTATION FOR TACP - Some U.S. divisions have authorized the use of one M39 vehicle per regiment, in lieu of $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck, to transport the regimental TACP equipment and personnel. The radio equipment has been damaged in some instances when operating over rough roads in jeeps. In addition, the M39 is more

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suitable for use when TACPs are operating with task forces. H39s so used are equipped with the following communication equipment:

- (1) AN/ARC-3 - to contact aircraft.
- (2) SCR 628 - regimental net.
- (3) SCR 300 - to contact Mosquito or infantry battalion.
- (4) SCR 522 - alternate air contact.

f. EUSAK STUDIES ON AIR SUPPORT.-

(1) Due to problems of issue, maintenance, and replacement of complicated communication equipment, the possibility is being considered of recommending that equipment for TACPs be furnished by army agencies. Studies in this field are now being made by EUSAK.

(2) Eighth Army has recently requested that Fifth Air Force provide a total of ten (10) TACPs per division. This will provide one (1) for division headquarters and three (3) for each regiment. No information was obtained as to why ten (10) per division were requested rather than 13. However, it is estimated that Eighth Army felt that ten (10) per division could do the job successfully in KOREA and that Fifth Air Force would be unable to provide 13 per division, even if the request were made. This was not stated as a recommendation on the part of Eighth Army that the figure of ten (10) per division should be the accepted standard. Eighth Army also indicated in their request for ten TACPs per division that the Forward Air Controllers need not necessarily be experienced fighter pilots.

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2. SWEEPING OPERATIONS

CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

INVESTIGATE THE TECHNIQUES USED IN "SWEEPING" AN AREA DURING AN ADVANCE TO INCLUDE:

a. Q: HOW DOES THE DIVISION ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITY FOR SWEEPING? ARE ZONES OF RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGNED?

A: Division assigns responsibility by designating regimental zones, by prescribing phase lines by objectives, and by closely regulating rates of advance.

b. Q: HOW MUCH DOES SWEEPING DELAY AN ADVANCE?

A: Appreciably. Depending on the terrain and roadnet, sweeping may cause rate of advance to be as much as 2 or 3 times as slow. Advantage is not taken of breaches of enemy main position. Success is not exploited to the maximum. Opportunity is afforded for the enemy to offer more stubborn defense and improve additional positions farther to the rear. However, offset against these disadvantages of sweeping is the important fact that virtually no enemy guerrilla activity has occurred in division and other rear areas since sweeping attacks were initiated. As a result, it has not been necessary to divert major tactical units for anti-guerrilla operations in rear areas, and no delays have been necessary so that rear areas could be cleared. Personnel and materiel losses to by-passed enemy have become negligible. In the situation which existed in Korea, with no tangible physical objective for our forces so that success could be exploited and operations terminated, these attacks were of very great value.

c. Q: DO CERTAIN UNITS ADVANCE WITHOUT COMPLETELY SWEEPING? DO UNITS ADVANCE TO A PRESCRIBED LIMIT OF ADVANCE AND THEN ACCOMPLISH SWEEPING BEFORE CONTINUING THE ATTACK?

A: (1) The basic directives under which all elements of EUSAK operate during sweeping attacks are:

(a) "Inflict maximum losses on the enemy consistent with maintenance intact of all major units and with all necessary lateral coordination within and between units."

(b) "No enemy forces of sufficient strength to jeopardize the safety of any column will be by-passed."

(2) (a) Methods of executing sweeping attacks vary between and within units, depending on commanders and terrain.

(b) Certain units do frequently advance without complete sweeping, particularly where terrain is most difficult. In those cases, attacks are normally made with narrow columns operating along adjacent ridge lines.

(c) Attacks are controlled by successive phase lines. In some cases, units advance abreast with infantry on ridges and other elements in valleys. In other instances, strong combat patrols or infantry-tank task forces (reconnaissances in force) are sent out to phase lines or objectives. If their orders require them

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to remain on their objectives, sweeping is done by the main body as it follows through to join them. If the patrol or task force is sent out merely to obtain information of the terrain and enemy and returns to friendly front lines before darkness, then sweeping is conducted generally as described above during subsequent advances with infantry along ridges and other elements in the valleys.

(d) There have been instances where complete regiments have been ordered to by-pass certain rough, "slow-going" terrain features which were later swept by reserve regiments or other forces.

(e) In summary, the basic army directives quoted above control sweeping operations. The second directive quoted is particularly important in influencing the methods of conducting sweeping operations. Usually, zones of responsibility are completely swept by front-line regiments, either by sweeping as they advance, or by advancing to prescribed phase lines with strong combat patrols or task forces and then clearing areas in rear thereof before continuing the attack on division order. The use of reserve regiments or reserve divisions to conduct sweeping operations in rear areas has been exceptional during recent months. Units habitually "button-up" before darkness, prepare for all-around defense, and physically tie-in, if possible, with adjacent units.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS - Documents furnished to the Library, CGSC, contain numerous examples of plans and orders which show varied methods of conducting sweeping attacks.

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3. RIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS

CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

INVESTIGATE TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES USED IN RIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE:

a. Q: FRONTAGES ASSIGNED DIVISIONS, REGIMENTS AND BATTALIONS?

A: These vary between extremely wide limits. Extremely wide frontages were assigned during the breakout from the Naktong River perimeter. Average frontages of one division which has participated in several crossings, including one extremely successful crossing of the HAN River, are:

- (1) Division - 8000 to 12000 yards.
- (2) Regiments - 4000 to 6000 yards.
- (3) Battalions - 2000 to 3000 yards.

b. Q: ARE ENGINEERS OPERATING ASSAULT BOATS AND BUILDING BRIDGES ATTACHED TO ASSAULT INFANTRY UNITS OR PLACED IN SUPPORT?

A: Placed in direct support. See Engineer Lessons Learned in Korea Report Number 2, Hq EUSAK, June 1951.

c. Q: ARE SUCCESSIVE OBJECTIVES (O-1, O-2, O-3 LINES) NORMALLY USED IN PLANNING AND TO CONTROL THE ATTACK?

A: Yes, Although these phase lines are not called O-1, O-2 and O-3 lines as such, they achieve generally the same result. For an example, see Opn Order 5, Hq I Corps, 2 Mar 51.

d. Q: WHAT ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURES ARE REQUIRED IN PREPARATION FOR A RIVER CROSSING?

A: None, other than those now taught in service schools. These include: Use of agents to obtain data on enemy strength, location, weapons, and dispositions in vicinity of crossing sites; OB Teams must determine ability of enemy to move reinforcements into crossing area in time to interfere with crossing; engineer and reconnaissance personnel must determine depth of water, speed of current, type bottom, type and slope of banks, existing and/or required routes into and out of crossing sites; reconnaissance elements must reconnoiter enemy side of river to determine detailed nature of expected resistance and defenses; aerial reconnaissance must keep abreast of movements into and out of area; aerial photo coverage must be kept current; all dams and reservoirs that may be blown by the enemy must receive study and plans must be made to destroy them prior to the crossing or seize them with other elements prior to the crossing; counterintelligence measures must be complete and continuous.

e. Q: WHAT SPECIAL SUPPLY PROBLEMS ARE ENCOUNTERED IN A RIVER CROSSING?

A: None peculiar to KOREA. The usual river crossing supply problems include: availability of bridging and assault crossing equipment and means to transport it; buildup of supplies adequate to support troops once across; traffic control on both sides of river.

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f. Q: WHAT SPECIFIC MEASURES ARE USED TO PREVENT CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE WITH RIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS? ARE CIVILIANS FROZEN IN PLACE OR ARE THEY EVACUATED TO THE REAR?

- A: (1) Civilians in friendly areas are evacuated to rear areas.
- (2) Civilians in enemy held territory are prevented from crossing the river and passing through friendly lines.
- (3) During and after crossing, civilians coming within friendly lines are evacuated out of the battle area to the rear.

g. Q: DOES DIVISION OR CORPS MAKE THE DECISION AS TO THE EXACT TIME TO CONSTRUCT INITIAL BRIDGES?

A: Division. It is felt that division must make this decision due to the fact that the time of starting bridging operations is dependent on the tactical situation, even though corps or army engineers supporting the division will construct the bridges. Corps prescribes the location and type of bridges to be constructed and the priorities for construction. For one method of handling, see Annex 2 (Engr) to Opn O 5, I Corps, 2 Mar 51.

h. Q: HAS THE QUESTION OF CONTROL WHEN AIRBORNE FORCES SEIZE THE FAR BANK BEEN INVESTIGATED?

A: No. Normal procedure within the theater during past early linkup airborne operations has been for the airborne force to come under the control of the appropriate ground element upon linkup.

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4. COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS

CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

INVESTIGATE THE EFFECT OF COLD WEATHER ON OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE:

a. Q: SPECIAL MEASURES REQUIRED, AS WARMING TENTS, ETC, TO MAINTAIN INDIVIDUAL COMBAT EFFICIENCY?

A: (1) All units use some method of providing warming shelters, usually tents with heat, to provide periodic warming and drying of personnel and equipment. Details vary with units. Shelters are usually squad shelters. Native huts and dugouts, as well as tents, have been used. Personnel are rotated at least every two hours (much more often during periods of extreme cold). During daylight hours in periods of comparative inactivity, as few as two men per squad are maintained in forward positions, with the remainder in sheltered areas. At night, one man per two-man foxhole is alert, with the other either in squad shelter or improvised individual shelter providing some degree of warmth.

(2) In addition to the above, special cold weather clothing must be provided; warm meals (or at least hot drink) must be provided; and water for cooking must be prevented from freezing.

b. Q: INFLUENCE OF REQUIREMENT OF THE SPECIAL MEASURES ON TACTICAL PLANS?

A: Tactical plans are affected to a great extent. New time and space factors must be computed, both for personnel moving on foot and for vehicles of all types. Usually not more than 2/3 of the unit can be considered effective at one time. Units can maintain reasonable combat efficiency for short periods, but can not be expected to operate for long periods without opportunity for rotation, warming, hot meals, etc. Commanders report that some troops exposed to extremely low temperatures for extended periods are in a condition of shock.

c. Q: ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS IN COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS (FOR EXAMPLE ADDITIONAL SUPPLY AND EVACUATION REQUIREMENTS)?

A: Special attention must be given to batteries, lubricants, winterization kits, special clothing, fuel, and ration allowances. Traffic control becomes increasingly important; many instances were reported of vehicles being lost over mountainous, icy roads. This is particularly true of such tracked vehicles as the prime mover for the 155-mm howitzers. Helicopters for evacuation of casualties become increasingly important; divisions feel they need a minimum of four (4) per division for such use. Periodic warming of weapons and motors is essential. Additional blankets are required for casualties. Additional tentage is required for warming tents. Additional transportation is required to transport the additional equipment required. The burden on indigenous labor, or animal transport if used, becomes greater.

d. Q: TO WHAT EXTENT DOES COLD WEATHER DELAY OPERATIONS?

A: No definite answer can be given. Operations are delayed appreciably, however, in that units move much more slowly, personnel and equipment react more sluggishly, and time must be allowed for the employment of the special measures to cope with the cold weather. One corps submitted the approximation of 75% to 80% as the extent to which operations are delayed by cold weather.

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5. NIGHT OPERATIONS

CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.

INVESTIGATE TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES USED IN NIGHT OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE:

a. Q: HAVE US UNITS MADE NIGHT ATTACKS? AT WHAT ECHELON WERE SUCH ATTACKS CONDUCTED?

A: Very few night attacks have been made. When employed, they have been conducted by company, and occasionally battalion, size units. Ranger companies have been employed in these attacks to some extent.

b. Q: IF LARGE SCALE (DIVISION OR LARGER) NIGHT ATTACKS HAVE NOT BEEN MADE, IS THE REASON LACK OF TRAINING? TERRAIN? ENEMY?

A: Reasons for failure to employ night attacks to any degree are:

(1) Lack of training within units in planning and conduct of night operations.

(2) As late as March 1951, a EUSAK directive decreed that movements be confined to daylight hours.

(3) Practically all units still habitually "button-up" before darkness as a means of minimizing the effect of enemy night action.

(4) Lack of support by some commanders. Some commanders feel that night attacks fail to fully utilize the fire power available to US units; they prefer to lose surprise and take full advantage of the massed artillery and air support which they can receive during daylight attacks. They, then assault the objective using marching fire under the cover of their supporting fires. Some commanders also feel that it is too difficult to negotiate the mountainous terrain at night. Also, that the mass of manpower which the enemy has enables him to cover all possible routes to the objective, thus reducing the probabilities of success of night attacks.

Some of the above reasons have not been borne out by recent activities in this regard. The following progress has been made:

(1) EUSAK has recently directed increased training in, and conduct of, night operations.

(2) Majority of units are conducting increased night patrolling.

(3) Units which have conducted night attacks in company and battalion size have, almost without exception, reported excellent results. The exceptions were apparently largely a result of lack of training. One instance was reported in which an objective was captured without a single casualty being suffered by the US unit involved.

c. Q: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS BATTLEFIELD ILLUMINATION BEEN USED?

A: Battlefield illumination has been very widely used in all of its forms. Forward units have successfully used trip flares and

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mortar illuminating shells. In addition, they have received artillery illumination (limited supply available), and illumination by aircraft. Many field expedients have been employed to provide additional illumination. However, one of the most important, and most successful, methods of illumination has been employment of engineer searchlight companies. These are now provided on the basis of one company per US corps. Employed across the corps front, usually on the basis of one platoon per infantry division, they provide some degree of illumination across the entire corps front. In two US corps, searchlight units are attached to division artillery, primarily to take advantage of existing communications. In the other corps, they remain under engineer control, working directly with the infantry units which they support. EUSAK has recommended their attachment to artillery. Detailed studies concerning battlefield illumination have been furnished to the CGSC library, paragraph 5 below. All forms of illumination have, at various times, disclosed enemy attack formations in sufficient time to disperse them with artillery fire. All units depend to a considerable extent on night illumination.

d. Q: WHAT HAS BEEN THE NATURE AND DEPTH OF OBJECTIVES FOR NIGHT ATTACKS? (ENEMY PROCEDURES AS WELL AS US).

A: (1) US night attack objectives are usually limited objective attacks, such as an attack from one ridge to the next, or a railway tunnel occupied by enemy. They have normally been objectives on which it is difficult to concentrate the massed fire power of the supporting arms, or which can be so successfully defended by the enemy that daylight assault would be extremely costly. Night patrolling is being conducted to a greater extent during recent periods to harass the enemy and prevent his building up troop concentrations close in to friendly positions. This is still not being done to a great extent, however. Due to lack of training, it has been necessary to accomplish night attacks which are limited in nature and which can be planned in great detail. Other type objectives for night movements include movement to gain attack positions on the enemy flanks and establishment of blocking positions in his rear.

(2) Enemy night attacks vary from probing patrols all along the front, or at isolated points, to major all-out night attacks involving one or more enemy armies on a wide front or at two or more widely separated areas. For details of these attacks, see the report of the intelligence observer, CGSC.

e. Q: WHAT HAS BEEN THE NORMAL TIME OF ATTACK FOR NIGHT OPERATIONS? (ENEMY PROCEDURES AS WELL AS US).

A: (1) US night attacks have normally been conducted starting at from 2400 to 0200 hours on first and last moon quarters. Attacking in full darkness has, in some cases, caused failure of the mission due to separation and confusion on the part of the comparatively untrained units involved. Most of the successful attacks have been conducted so that the attacking force is on the objective at first light, in the center of the enemy position, and is then able to take full advantage of surprise to clear the opposition. Due to absence of night activity on the part of US units during past periods, the enemy normally provides extremely light security forces.

(2) Enemy night attacks have occurred reasonably early at night, as a rule, particularly during mass attacks. Attacks have started as early as 2200. For details of these enemy attacks, see the report of the intelligence observer, CGSC.

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ADDITIONAL COMMENTS.

a. The necessity of "buttoning-up" at night during enemy mass attacks is clearly seen. Also, it is apparent that untrained troops cannot successfully conduct large scale night attacks. However, the success of some units in small scale, limited objective attacks has demonstrated the value of such operations and the necessity for adequate training of all US units in their conduct in all types of terrain and against all types of enemy.

b. References furnished to the Library, CGSC, contain numerous directives pertaining to night operations and detailed studies and recommendations concerning battlefield illumination.

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6. MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS

CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.- INVESTIGATE OPERATIONS IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN TO INCLUDE:

a. Q: TO WHAT EXTENT ARE OPERATIONS IN MOUNTAINS DECENTRALIZED? INCLUDE USE OF ARTILLERY, ARMOR AND TYPE OF INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS.

A: (1) Decentralization of operations is, on the whole, extremely limited. Although some instances were noted in which decentralization was employed, the overall tendency appears to be to retain centralized control except when subordinate elements are operating independently, or at such distances that centralized control is impractical. Artillery is habitually retained under centralized control, except when RCT organization is necessary, even though the width of zones and sectors and the nature of the terrain may make centralized control extremely difficult. Employment of the tank battalion varies. See discussions of tank employment in Sections 8, 9, 10 and 13.

(2) Instructions to subordinate units are issued, as a rule, in considerable detail and extremely close control is retained by the higher echelons, though some instances were found of mission type orders being issued.

(3) The above condition exists at division and higher echelons. At subordinate levels, decentralization is necessary to a greater extent, due to the distances and time and space factors involved. For example, one tank platoon and one heavy mortar platoon are normally attached to each infantry battalion.

(4) The reasons for the centralized control at higher echelons appear to be -

(a) Desire of commanders to closely control subordinate echelons in view of enemy mass tactics.

(b) Ability to exercise close control due to modern communications, helicopters, etc.

(c) Belief that centralized control gives greater flexibility in meeting enemy mass tactics.

b. Q: PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT OF UNITS OPERATING IN THE MOUNTAINS?

A: No problems peculiar to Korea. The primary problem is that of moving required supplies over difficult terrain. This is usually accomplished by native bearers. In some instances, air drop is used. Use of wheeled vehicles is often impossible; this necessitates the use of human or animal transport. Fortunately, KOREAN labor is available in the required amounts. This makes continuous operations in mountains feasible. If this were not true, it would be necessary either to provide a large quantity of animal transport or to restrict the scale of operations. Ammunition supply is the greatest single problem.

c. Q: WHAT PROBLEMS IN TIMING EXIST IN MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS?

A: Time and space factors must be recomputed. Additional time must be allotted for all phases of mountain operations. Reserves cannot be moved rapidly to influence the situation. Coordination after the operation has begun is very difficult. Therefore, detailed prior planning and coordination are required. No workable formula for computing time and space factors has been developed.

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d. Q: WHAT PROCEDURES ARE USED TO SECURE AN ADVANCE THROUGH A DEFILE?

A: Infantry and supporting weapons must be employed to clear the commanding ground which dominates the defile before any vehicular column is committed to the defile. Tank elements are sometimes employed to neutralize the area beyond the defile, although this presents the possibility of having the defile blocked by one disabled vehicle. The dominating ground must be retained until the last using elements have cleared the defile.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS.- a. All units have learned that infantry must move along the ridges during advances. This, of course, is normal in mountain operations, but many commanders did not recognize this early in the KOREAN war. Units following cannot use the valley until the ridges are cleared, although tank elements may operate ahead of, parallel with, or in rear of infantry on the ridges. Tank elements thus employed support the infantry advance with appropriate direct fires on located targets on forward, side, and reverse slopes of ridges.

b. In mountainous terrain during offensive operations, units habitually cease operations sufficiently early to permit resupply and evacuation of casualties and to permit organization of perimeter defense and physical contact with adjacent units, when possible, before darkness. It is felt by most commanders that a minimum of 2 hours is required for this process, with this time increasing with the difficulty of the terrain.

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7. GENERAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.- INVESTIGATE THE TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES USED IN GENERAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT OF ENEMY AND TERRAIN ON CURRENT DOCTRINE AND TACTICS. INCLUDE:

a. Q: WHAT IS THE USUAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE TANK COMPANY WITH THE INFANTRY REGIMENT?

A. (1) Usual employment is to attach one platoon to each infantry battalion. Infrequently, the entire company may be retained under regimental control for varied reasons. Many regiments in KOREA do not have organic tank companies. For these units, it is normal for one company of the tank battalion organic or attached to the division to be attached to each infantry regiment.

(2) During offensive operations, tanks operate with infantry, normally employing direct fire. In difficult terrain, tanks may provide overhead direct fire, or may move abreast of infantry along valleys, while infantry move along ridges. Tank-infantry patrols or small task forces are also employed during daylight hours. At night, tanks are normally employed in a portion of the line.

b. Q: WHAT IS THE USUAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE TANK BATTALION WITH THE INFANTRY DIVISION?

A: (1) There is no usual employment, due to the differences in organization within units and the differences in terrain. Some divisions have no regimental tank companies. Some division tank battalions have 3 companies; others have 4.

(2) In those divisions in which there are no regimental tank companies, the tank battalion most often is broken down to provide one company for attachment to each regiment (2 or 3). The remaining company(ies) are employed under division control. During offensive operations any portion or all of the battalion may be used to form the nucleus for a task force or to support regimental tank companies. Other uses during offensive operations are somewhat dictated by the trafficability in the area and the suitability of the area for employment of tanks in mass. There have been comparatively few instances in which battalion size tank units have been employed. In most of those cases, they have been employed in column.

(3) The tank battalions of divisions having regimental tank companies are employed in much the same way, except that there is a greater potential for use in task forces (or for counterattacks in defensive operations).

c. Q: WHAT UNITS COMPRISE THE "TANK-INFANTRY TASK FORCES" THAT HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN USED FOR COMPARATIVELY DEEP THRUSTS?

A: (1) Composition of these task forces varies greatly; however, they will normally include infantry, tanks and artillery, plus provision for engineer and medical support. A typical task force may include:-

- One tank battalion (less any of its elements on other missions)
- One infantry battalion (or required portion thereof)
- One 105-mm arty battalion (sometimes a battery)
- One platoon of engineers (including a mine detector squad)
- Essential medical personnel.
- FO party from the division 155-mm arty battalion
- TACP
- Tank battalion commanders spotter aircraft
- Btry of 155-mm how bn when operating beyond range of such support

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(2) Other elements sometimes included are: Signal detachment, Naval Gunfire Liaison Team (when suitable), platoon of the regimental 4.2 mortar company, POW Interrogation Team and PSYWAR Team.

(3) These task forces have been used in deep thrusts both to take and hold ground until follow-up forces arrive and also to operate in an area for a limited period and then return to friendly lines. In the former situation, when it is not planned that the task force will return immediately to friendly territory, the organization of the task force must be such that it can defend itself for extended periods against persistent enemy attacks. One of the major difficulties in operations of this nature has been the lack of armored infantry vehicles to transport infantry to remain with tanks on the objective. Normally, the only infantry are those who ride the tanks.

(4) Many excellent examples of the use of tank-infantry task forces may be found in the documents furnished to the Library, CGSC. See section V of this report, Index to Reference Material.

d. Q: COULD EACH DIVISION EFFECTIVELY USE A NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS OR ASSAULT AIRCRAFT FOR LIMITED OBJECTIVE ATTACKS?

A: (1) Units contacted did not see any particular use for helicopters for limited objective attacks in the terrain in KOREA, although the lack of enemy air and the limited amount of antiaircraft fire makes their use possible from the standpoint of enemy reaction. All units, however, desire helicopters for use in evacuation of casualties, command and staff aerial reconnaissance of the battle area down to battalion level, ferrying supplies to task forces, communications, and similar tasks. In most of the mountainous area, landing areas for large numbers of helicopters cannot often be found.

(2) Assault aircraft were not considered to be of any great value to divisions in view of the nature of the terrain in KOREA.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS.-

a. All units stress that infantry must sweep ridges and other elements follow in valleys, except when tank-infantry teams are making thrusts into enemy territory.

b. Units feel that we should stress to a greater extent in our service schools the actual conduct (execution) of the attack, without reducing the emphasis on planning.

c. Due to nature of terrain, consequent time and space factors, and width of zones, reserves are more often split than not, both in attack and defense.

d. In mountainous terrain, with enemy using well-positioned bunkers with overhead cover, our units should be masters of the techniques of assaulting fortified positions.

e. Based on enemy defense tactics of covering forward slopes with automatic weapons and having bulk of force on reverse slopes, the following is a typical series of counter-measures employed in the attack in KOREA:

(1) Maximum use of air, artillery and mortars to destroy camouflage, uncover position, and destroy emplacements.

(2) Recoilless rifles well forward for use against point targets.

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(3) Saturate enemy defense positions with direct tank fire while infantry advances to assault position; tanks join infantry in assault if terrain permits (exceptional).

(4) Use high angle fires to cover rear slopes and flanks and prevent enemy from reinforcing his main position.

(5) Upon seizure of objective, reorganize rapidly, covered by artillery and mortar fires, moving machine guns rapidly forward, and taking maximum measures to defend against enemy mortar barrages and rapid counterattack. Prearrange fires for this period before attack is launched.

f. Reference material furnished to the Library, CGSC, includes many examples of plans and orders at army, corps, and division levels for all types of offensive operations which have been conducted in KOREA. See Section V of this report, Index to Reference Material.

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8. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.-INVESTIGATE THE PROCEDURES USED IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO INCLUDE:

- a. Q: (1) WHAT FRONTAGES ARE ASSIGNED DIVISIONS ON DEFENSE?
 (2) IS THE AVERAGE DISPOSITION A POSITION OR A MOBILE TYPE DEFENSE?

A: (1) Division frontages have varied from 8,000 yards to 43 miles in KOREA. Average division frontage is approximately 25,000 yards. This figure is not too indicative, however, as understrength divisions have defended extremely wide frontages and other full strength divisions, reinforced by attachment of UN forces, have defended narrow sectors. The present average is probably a 25,000 yards sector defended by a division which has 9 organic battalions and from 1 to 3 attached (UN) battalions.

(2) The average disposition during recent months has contained some characteristics of both position and mobile type defense, but probably has been more in the nature of a mobile type defense. The majority of units prefer a linear defense in which close physical contact is maintained with adjacent units, regardless of width of sector, to prevent large-scale infiltration through front lines by the enemy at night. Thus, a solid line without much depth is employed so that infiltrating enemy can be discovered. Both high and low ground are occupied. Small local reserves of platoon and company size are maintained on critical terrain. If the enemy is successful in penetrating the thin linear defense line at night, the should-ers are held, all units remain in position, and local reserves are employed in counterattacks at first light to restore the position if possible or, if not, to contain it until general reserves can reach the area or, if the situation necessitates, retrograde movements can be initiated. When units are extended in such manner over wide fronts, it is obviously impossible to provide much depth within front line battalions. Often the nature of the terrain is such that it is difficult to provide all-around defense. For example, a unit may be defending a knife-like ridge, with the next easily defensible terrain being a parallel ridge several thousand yards to the rear. In this situation, the bulk of the unit occupies the main linear defense position and there is no depth to the position within the unit. However, general reserves are maintained by all appropriate size units, although they may not be of the size considered desirable for mobile type defense. Some other units, including some UN forces, prefer to organize tight perimeters on dominant terrain and depend on warning devices and supporting fires to limit enemy penetrations and on reserves to destroy the attacking enemy through counter-attack. The greatest difficulty in this latter method is that distances and time and space factors in mountainous terrain, plus the night mass attacks of the enemy, make it difficult, if not impossible, for general reserves to reach critical areas for employment in a counterattack role at the required time, and local reserves may not be strong enough to restore the position, or even contain the penetration.

b. Q: (1) WHAT SIZE UNITS FORM SEPARATE DEFENSE AREAS (PERIMETERS); WHEN THE DIVISION DEFENDS ON A WIDE FRONT?

(2) HOW ARE THE PERIMETERS ORGANIZED?

A: (1) First, it should be emphasized that the use of perimeters by units in KOREA is not now normal during defensive

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situations, for the reasons discussed above. The perimeter is used when units are isolated, such as an outpost or a patrol base or when units are cut off from their parent units, or during those times in wide front defense when they are physically separated from adjacent units to the extent that enemy penetrations in the gaps are likely or possible. Perimeters are habitually used, of course, by units in rear of front lines. This does not however, prevent front line units from organizing so they can fight in any direction. The perimeter is also used extensively during offensive operations when units "button-up" for the night. With these considerations in mind, this question can be answered in the following manner:

Battalion size perimeters are the most common. However, regimental and company size, and even platoon size, perimeters have been employed successfully many times. It is generally considered by commanders that the battalion perimeter is the smallest that can be expected to hold out for extended periods against persistent enemy attacks.

(2) The perimeter is organized to provide all-around defense on terrain which affords the greatest advantage to the defender. Sometimes it is necessary to defend less desirable terrain in a portion of the perimeter in order to eliminate gaps between adjacent units. All elements of the unit are within the perimeter. Normally, local reserves of platoon size for each company are positioned where they can quickly reach any threatened portion of the perimeter and execute counterattacks to restore the original position. All appropriate defensive measures are taken, including use of wire, mines, trip flares, alarms, noise devices, listening posts, illumination, and similar devices, subject to the time available.

A description of the organization and conduct of an RCT perimeter is contained in Combat Notes No 11, Hq X Corps, Defense of CHIPYONG-NI. This is considered a classic example of perimeter defense in the KOREAN war.

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4. c. Q: HOW IS THE TANK BATTALION USED IN DEFENSE?

A: Basically as an assembled division counterattack force, or as companies occupying defensive positions in depth. These positions usually control defiles, passes, roads, or valleys. Regimental tank companies are normally employed in a direct fire role on the MLR. They are dug-in and nearby infantry provide close-in protection. In this situation, plans may be made for all or part of the division tank battalion to be employed in counterattack roles within the regimental sectors, either in conjunction with the division reserve, or, more normally, with the regimental, or even battalion, reserve. There has been little requirement for its use in an antitank role, due to absence of enemy armor.

d. Q: HOW DOES CORPS COORDINATE AND CONTROL DIVISIONS WHEN DEFENDING ON A WIDE FRONT?

A: Normal means, including all or part of the following: sectors; boundaries; limiting points; prescribing security measures; prescribing, when necessary, location of positions in depth to be organized; directing patrolling and contact measures to be effected; directing retention of adequate reserves by subordinates, including placing limitations on their employment, when necessary; prescribing extent of, and priorities for, the defense organization; authorizing and directing mutual agreement between adjacent commanders on matters requiring coordination; requiring subordinate units to withdraw only on corps order. Necessary directives, reports, and staff visits are made to ensure compliance.

e. Q: WHAT SPECIFIC MEASURES ARE TAKEN IN DIVISION AND CORPS REAR AREAS AGAINST INFILTRATION, GUERRILLAS AND AIRBORNE ATTACKS? IS ONE INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY AT SUCH AN AREA?

A: (1) Majority of units set up a Rear Area Defense Command (RADC) under control of one designated individual as protection against infiltration, guerrillas, and airborne attacks. The organization and procedures vary with each unit. Some of the variations are listed below:

(a) Army.--Chief of Staff, ROK Army, is responsible for security of area in rear of corps rear boundaries, except for areas specifically exempted, such as 2d Log Comd area of territorial responsibility. Each US service unit is responsible for its own security. No US combat units are now employed in rear of corps rear boundaries. Chief of Staff, ROKA, uses ROK Security Bns and Civil Police and, normally, one ROK division, plus such other troops as may be made available by EUSAK when needed. The Security Branch, Operations Division, G3 Section, EUSAK, coordinates these activities through KMAG (Korean Military Advisory Group).

(b) Corps.--(i) I Corps.--A separate staff section (RADC) has been established, headed by a Lt Col, responsible directly to the Chief of Staff (CG). No combat troops specifically provided. Responsible for area in rear of division rear boundaries. Establishes local rear area defense commanders who report to him at corps headquarters. For details, see SOP for Defense of Corps and Division Rear Areas, I Corps, 1 May 1951.

(ii) IX Corps.--Similar to I Corps, except that Deputy Corps Commander has been designated as Rear Area Defense Commander. See SOP for Defense of Corps and Division

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Rear Areas, IX Corps, 16 April 1951. In this area, as in all others, the RADC is responsible for coordinating security measures of all units and agencies within the designated area, whether assigned or not.

(iii) X Corps.-This varies from the other two corps in that the entire corps rear areas is assigned to particular units for coordination of defense measures. These units include any or all of the following: corps reserve division, attached ROK division, and the 12th Security Bn (ROK) which is now attached to X Corps. Other units such as Engr Gp may also be assigned area responsibility. These units all report to the corps G3. See X Corps SOP, 1 July 1951.

(c) Divisions.-Each of the six US Army divisions contacted has an SOP for defense of rear areas. The individuals responsible vary as follows: 1st Cav Div - Deputy Assistant Division Commander; 2d Inf Div - each unit is responsible to the division G3; 3d Inf Div - Division Chemical Officer; 7th Inf Div - Deputy Assistant Division Commander; 24th Inf Div - CO, AAA AW Bn; 25th Inf Div - CO, AAA AW Bn. For examples of division SOPs covering this subject, see -

(i) SOP for the Defense of Division Rear Area, Hq 1st Cav Div, 12 May 1951.

(ii) SOP for Protection of Rear Area Installations Against Ground Airborne, and Air Attack, Hq 24th Inf Div, undated.

(2) Specific measures include: each unit responsible for own security, daily patrolling, use of ROK police, SOP for defense and alerts, road blocks, use of reconnaissance company, etc. Sub-area commanders are also designated.

(3) For specific measures used in dealing with agents and saboteurs, see report of G2 observer, CGSC.

f. Q: WHAT SIZE DIVISION RESERVE IS HELD OUT UNDER VARIOUS DEFENSE CONDITIONS?

A: (1) Division reserve during recent periods has normally been one infantry regiment (sometimes less one battalion) plus all or part of the division tank battalion. The reserve will vary, however, from one battalion to a reinforced regiment, plus tanks, depending on the width of sector, nature of terrain, and the ability of the reserve to influence the action. The last item is closely related to mobility and nature of terrain.

(2) It is now normal for orders to subordinate units to direct that such units retain approximately one-third of the unit in suitable reserve positions. This is true for both division and regimental reserves.

g. Q: AT WHAT ECHELON ARE COUNTER-ATTACKS LAUNCHED? TO WHAT EXTENT DOES EACH ECHELON (CORPS, DIVISION, REGIMENT, BATTALION) RESTRICT THE CATK OF SUBORDINATE UNITS?

A: (1) Counterattacks are launched at all levels from company to army. The most common counterattacks are those at company and battalion levels. Small units can counterattack with local reserves and restore the position while the enemy is still disorganized. This is possible due to the placing of local reserves well forward where they can reach counterattack positions reasonably quickly, even in difficult terrain. These counterattacks are usually executed at first light. Units re-

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main in position at night, even if penetrations are made by the enemy; then they counterattack at first light with local reserves.

(2) Use of division or larger reserves to counterattack is difficult and time consuming due to the distances involved and the slow movement in mountainous terrain. The division commander normally cannot wait until the effect of the division counterattack can be felt, but must rely on subordinate unit counterattacks, at least during early periods of enemy attacks. Division reserves are normally split, but still cannot reach critical areas early enough.

(3) Counterattacks of subordinate units are normally not restricted, except to the extent that it becomes necessary to place a limitation on the employment of the reserve due to the overall situation. This is done frequently to provide the higher headquarters with a source for a reserve, and was most common during the early part of the KOREAN war due to shortages of units. Usually, however, when this occurs, the reserve is released to the subordinate commander as soon as he requests it, provided the situation is not more critical elsewhere and provided the higher headquarters can obtain another reserve from another portion of the sector.

(4) The above counterattack pattern relates to both position and wide front defense in Korea.

h. Q: HOW EFFECTIVE ARE FIRE, OBSTACLES, MINES, PATROLS, ETC., IN KEEPING SMALL GROUPS FROM INFILTRATING BETWEEN ORGANIZED POSITIONS?

A: These measures serve primarily as warning devices, and are not particularly successful in preventing small group infiltration. For this reason among others, many units prefer a linear defense.

i. Q: AFTER A COUNTERATTACK HAS SUCCEEDED, DOES THE COUNTERATTACKING FORCE ASSUME THE DEFENSE OF THE PENETRATED SECTOR?

A: Normally yes, This is often not possible in local counterattacks, however, in which the reserve must restore one position, return the area to control of the original defending unit, and then be employed in other counterattacks in other portions of the sector.

j. Q: (1) DO DIVISIONS PREPARE "BLOCKING POSITIONS" IN THE REAR OF REGIMENTAL POSITIONS?

(2) ARE THESE POSITIONS NORMALLY OCCUPIED PRIOR TO ATTACK?

(3) WOULD MOVEMENT TO THESE POSITIONS AFTER THE ENEMY'S ATTACK IS LAUNCHED BE PRACTICABLE IF THE ENEMY HAD AIR AND ARTILLERY SUPERIORITY?

A: (1) Yes. These positions are usually on commanding terrain in rear of forward regiments and/or astride important roads or defiles. Other positions are prepared on the flanks to limit penetrations from adjacent sectors. These are used both to limit penetrations and as delaying positions or covering force positions during retrograde movements.

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(2) Occupation of these positions prior to the enemy attack is not normal, although it is often done. For the most part, reserves are kept mobile, to be moved where needed. In extremely rough terrain in which movement is greatly slowed, important positions covering critical routes of approach and withdrawal are often occupied. It is normal for reserves of divisions and larger units to be split between two or more locations, due to the width of sectors and difficulty of movement. In this manner, the element of the reserve nearest the critical sector can be committed either in a blocking or a counterattack role, while remaining elements are moved as rapidly as possible to assist. Each situation is considered separately in determining whether to initially occupy blocking positions.

(3) In mountainous terrain such as that of KOREA, with limited routes for movement and many defiles, if the enemy were attacking with artillery and air superiority, movement of reserves to blocking positions after the enemy attack was launched would not be practicable unless the commander concerned was prepared to accept extremely heavy casualties plus some delay in movement.

k. Q: (1) WERE ARTILLERY UNITS INCORPORATED IN INFANTRY DEFENSE AREAS?

(2) IF SO, IN THE AREA OF WHAT SIZE UNIT?

(3) DOES THE ARTILLERY SUPPORT ONLY THIS PERIMETER OR DOES IT HAVE OTHER MISSIONS?

A: (1) Normally not. This is normally not feasible due to location. Front line battalions are too far forward for artillery. Reserve battalions and regiments are often located in areas inaccessible for artillery.

(2) When infantry reserves (regiment or battalion size) are located in areas adjacent to or accessible to artillery, the artillery may be located within the perimeter of that reserve unit, or be tied in with it. Also, when a regiment occupies a perimeter separated from the remainder of the division, the direct support artillery battalion will usually be within the regimental perimeter.

(3) Artillery normally has additional missions besides support of the perimeter in which it is located.

(4) Protection for artillery is provided by organizing defense platoons within battalions, by tying in with adjacent units and by using attached ROKs, as well as by being incorporated occasionally within infantry perimeters.

1. Q: (1) ARE WE USING MINES EFFECTIVELY?

(2) IS THERE NEED FOR A NEW TYPE?

A: (1) The American minefield doctrine has proven sound in every respect; however, it is apparent that training in minefield techniques and mine discipline has been unsatisfactory. This is true of units of all arms and services. The most common fault is failure to report minefields properly. Other failures include: improper recording of fields, failure to report local security or unit minefields when overrun or abandoned to the enemy, failure of units to properly orient relieving units of minefields within their areas, fields not covered by fire, and failure to remove minefields when the situation requires an area in friendly possession to be vacated without occupation by another force. Training in this subject

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should be intensified in service schools and in units, to include not only using combat troops, but also commanders of all echelons who may be in position to authorize their use.

(2) No need for a new type mine has been reported.

Q: TO WHAT EXTENT ARE POSITIONS PREPARED? I.E. AMOUNT OF WIRE, MINES, WARNING DEVICES USED? EXTENT OF DIGGING, FOX-HOLES, TRENCHES, DUGOUTS, ETC.?

A: (1) The extent of preparation depends on the time available. Positions are continually improved. They vary from individual foxholes in a hastily organized position to completely prepared deliberate defensive positions. Large numbers of native laborers are available to units to carry fortification material and to prepare, or assist in preparing, the positions.

(2) Positions normally include two-man foxholes, plus weapons positions with overhead cover and, as time permits, connecting fire and communication trenches. Dugouts are also prepared. Recently emphasis has been placed on bunker type emplacements with overhead cover.

(3) Due to the fact that the present area of operations has been occupied several times by both our own and enemy forces, the entire area is organized to a certain extent. In addition, using native labor, additional positions are continually prepared and improved in rear of our own lines, so that prepared positions, complete with wire and mines, can be occupied if we are forced to withdraw.

(4) The most deliberately organized positions thus far in KOREA are the "KANSAS" and "WYOMING" lines now held by our forces. Following are the approximate figures on the fortification materials employed in this position, plus priorities for construction of the position:

Kansas and Wyoming Lines

(a) FORTIFICATION MATERIALS

Unit	Barbed Wire (reels)	Concertina Rolls	Long Pickets	Short Pickets	Sandbags
I US Corps	40,000	10,000	270,000	600,000	5,000,000
IX US Corps	32,960	3,941	165,584	273,625	1,420,670
X US Corps	17,410	1,000	100,326	166,554	1,911,000
I ROK Corps	13,271	-	104,675	185,055	320,000
Totals	103,641	14,941	640,585	1,225,234	6,651,670

(b) NOTES:

- (i) Kansas Line - Approximately 200,000 yds. frontage.
- (ii) Mines - AF - 1 per yd.
AT - 1 per 2½ yds.
- (iii) Trip Flares - Used to maximum extent; exact figures not known.
- (iv) Tonnages - Approximately 15,000 S/T.
- (v) Double-apron fences used for the most part - from one to six or more bands.
- (vi) Other items such as Napalm for illumination (Fougasse) are not included above.

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Secret(c) PHASES OF CONSTRUCTIONPHASE I:

Construct emplacements for crew served weapons (i.e., MG's, mortars, BAR's, rocket launchers, 57 & 75 mm recoilless rifles) of units occupying main battle position (MLR to regimental reserve line); tactical wire for same; clear field of fire of natural obstacles; all other work requiring blasting.

PHASE II:

Complete work scheduled in phase one; construct alternate crew served weapons emplacements; install supplemental tactical wire; complete artillery surveys and fire plans and construct artillery emplacements; complete plans for mines, flares, fougasses, demolitions and communications; improve access roads.

PHASE III:

Construct individual emplacements, communication trenches, OP's and CP's; install protective and supplemental tactical wire; improve access roads; install fougasses; work on division reserve blocking positions.

PHASE IV: (Upon occupancy)

Execute demolitions; lay minefields and flares; clear fields of fire of houses, walls and other artificial obstacles; construct road blocks; reinforce tactical and protective wire; continue improving roads; install communications.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS.-a. Division reserves in KOREA in defensive situations are used primarily in blocking or delaying roles, rather than in counterattack roles, for the reasons discussed above. The difficulty of employing them in a counterattack due to the terrain, the time required for such commitment, and the nature of the enemy mass tactics all contribute to this fact. For these reasons, primarily, the overall plan has been to execute retrograde movements, rather than risk loss of major units, trading space for time until the enemy is overextended and has expended his momentum. In this type of situation, the division reserve most often covers the withdrawal of front line elements by occupation of blocking or delaying positions, often opposite the nose of the enemy penetration, until such time as other elements of the division can be extricated and moved to additional positions further to the rear. When the division reserve is used to counterattack, it is often committed against the nose of the penetration to stop the momentum so that other units can withdraw.

b. The above discussion of division reserves also pertains, for the most part, to corps and army reserves, although there have been notable exceptions to this practice. During the May enemy offensive, it was necessary to commit the army reserve, with the exception of one RCT, to stop the enemy momentum. However, with that accomplished, it was possible to rapidly initiate a counteroffensive employing all available forces, including the reserve RCT.

c. Detailed data concerning organization of the KANSAS-WYOMING lines, including the complete defensive organization within one corps sector, have been furnished to the Library, CGSC.

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d. Recent observations of the army commander on conduct of the defense are contained in Memorandum for Corps Commanders, Hq EUSAK, File AG 350.06 KGO, 31 May 1951, Subject: "Tactical Observations". A copy of this reference has been furnished to the Library, CGSC.

e. Reference material furnished to the Library, CGSC, includes many examples of plans and orders at army, corps, and division levels for all types of defensive operations which have been conducted in KOREA. See Section V of this report, Index to Reference Material.

f. A detailed, excellent discussion by a veteran regimental commander of many of the problems involved in organizing a defensive position in KOREA is contained in letter, Hq 21st Inf, 23 Jun 51, a copy of which has been furnished to the Library, CGSC. Subjects discussed include perimeter versus linear defense; defense of topographical crests versus forward slope defense.

g. Reserve units in KOREA habitually prepare counterattack plans based on orders from the larger unit which contain basic data required for planning, such as assumed penetrations, axes of attack, priorities of employment, etc.

m. Q: ARE ADDITIONAL DAYS OF SUPPLY NORMALLY STACKED WITHIN UNIT PERIMETERS?

A: Yes. Usually one additional day of supply; more depending on accessibility of area for resupply, suitability of area for air resupply, and mission of unit in the perimeter. At the same time, units avoid overstocking on positions, to prevent unnecessary losses through capture or destruction if position is overrun. Certain items such as hand grenades, mortar ammunition, and machine gun ammunition are stocked in greatest quantities.

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9. DELAYING ACTION

CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.-INVESTIGATE TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES USED IN DELAYING ACTION TO INCLUDE:

a. Q: ARE TANKS USED AS A MOBILE RESERVE OR ARE THEY ATTACHED TO UNITS FOR DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS?

A: Both. Often retained as mobile division reserve due to terrain limitations. However, when terrain permits, elements usually work with infantry as delaying and rear guard forces. Tank elements may be attached to infantry or infantry attached to tanks, depending on the force and type action involved.

b. Q: WHAT CONTROL MEASURES ARE USED? PHASE LINES? TIME SCHEDULES? ZONES OF ACTION? ETC?

A: All control measures are used to some extent. Zones of action are prescribed. Phase lines and/or specific delaying positions to be occupied are prescribed. Time schedules are not often used due to the fact that the higher headquarters prefers to retain freedom of action to order withdrawal or delay based on enemy pressure. Specific delaying positions are often prescribed due to the type of terrain and the fact that there are usually a few specific positions which must be strongly held (defiles, passes, positions on flanks) if the entire force is to be extricated.

c. Q: HOW DO TECHNIQUES OF WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION AND DELAYING ACTION COMPARE WITH TEACHINGS AT CGSC? SPECIFICALLY, IN NIGHT WITHDRAWALS, IS A COVERING FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 1/3 STRENGTH LEFT IN CONTACT WHILE THE REST OF THE FORCE WITHDRAWS?

A: (1) Techniques are generally the same. Ordinarily, a covering force of approximately 1/3 of the major unit is left in contact. However, it is normal for the covering force to be a complete unit (reinforced battalion for regimental sector for example), rather than a portion of each unit. This has been found better from the standpoint of control and coordination, as well as from the standpoint of an integrated fighting force.

(2) As indicated above, corps and division exercise extremely close control through designation of specific positions to be occupied, and often the minimum strength to be employed on each such position. These positions are comparatively close together on terrain which dominates withdrawal routes and enemy avenues of approach. In mountainous terrain with few roads (these roads along the valley floors), withdrawing units converge on the valleys, rather than withdrawing to the rear in zones. This creates a threat from fast-moving enemy along adjacent ridges, and requires that all defiles and dominating ridges be held by covering forces until withdrawing elements have cleared.

(3) For the most part, in Korea, retrograde movements consist of movements of battalion size forces, reinforced with tanks when terrain permits, to occupy critical positions which delay the enemy and keep withdrawal routes open long enough to permit extrication of the remainder of the command.

d. Q: WHAT PERCENTAGE OF WITHDRAWALS HAVE BEEN MADE AT NIGHT?

A: (1) During recent months, virtually no night withdrawals have been made. EUSAK has directed that a night withdrawal should be the exception. This is due to the fact that the enemy move largely at night and have, in the past, often bypassed and attacked withdrawing elements from the flanks - withdrawing elements moving by vehicle along roads in valleys. During daylight withdrawals, our forces have greater mobility, have air and artillery support, and can break contact and withdraw to the

rear with little difficulty.

(2) It should be emphasized that our use of daylight withdrawals in KOREA is based on our air and artillery supremacy, our greater daylight mobility, and the enemy's present advantage in night movements and other night operations.

e. Q: WHAT IS THE COMPOSITION OF THE COVERING FORCE IN WITHDRAWALS?

A: Normally approximately 1/3 of the command. For a division, usually the equivalent of one regiment, or the major portion thereof, all or part of the division tank battalion when terrain permits, a light artillery battalion (displacing by bounds or leapfrogging by battery), and necessary engineer personnel for demolitions and construction of obstacles. One TACP is normally provided. Reasons for employing complete units, rather than portions of several units, were discussed above. In other situations, battalions from two or more regiments have been used.

f. Q: HOW IS CONTACT MAINTAINED DURING DELAYING ACTION?

A: By occupation of successive delaying positions which dominate enemy avenues of approach into the friendly position. These enable our forces to direct air, artillery, and other long-range ground fires on the enemy as he approaches. Continuous aerial observation is maintained over the enemy. Patrolling is used to regain lost contact. However, occasionally, ground contact is intentionally broken to enable our forces to reach and occupy positions further to the rear. Enemy mass tactics are such that no difficulty is normally found in maintaining contact.

g. Q: HOW ARE THE FLANKS PROTECTED DURING THE WITHDRAWAL?

A: All or part of the following measures are used: screening by reconnaissance units, reserve units occupy positions on shoulders, covering forces displace elements to protect exposed flanks, aerial surveillance by liaison type aircraft or by Mosquito aircraft. In some cases, limited objective counterattacks have been employed on flanks for the purpose of gaining sufficient time to extricate friendly forces. Physical tie-in is made, when possible, between adjacent units at successive delaying positions. If not possible, then patrols are used, plus aerial observation.

h. Q: HOW ARE SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT EVACUATED? IS DESTRUCTION MORE NORMAL WHEN THE WITHDRAWAL HAS NOT BEEN FORESEEN?

A: (1) When the possibility of withdrawal is foreseen, planned evacuation of unneeded items is carried out as early as necessary. All available means of evacuation are used, including native bearers.

(2) Destruction is more often required when the withdrawal has not been foreseen. However, the extent of destruction has been greatly decreased during recent months. All units have SOPs for destruction of equipment. All units must be able to initiate evacuation of equipment on short notice, in event of unexpected enemy mass attack.

(3) It does not often become necessary to destroy ammunition; normally, it is expended prior to the withdrawal. Weapons can be carried out by hand, or on vehicles. Heavy equipment not needed during final stages can be evacuated early. Finally, withdrawal routes must be kept open so that covering forces and their equipment can be evacuated. Recent losses of equipment have been primarily due to failure or inability to keep routes open for movement of covering force equipment to the rear.

ADDITIONAL COMMENT.-Numerous examples of plans and orders for retrograde movements have been furnished to the library, CGSC.

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10. FIRE COORDINATION

CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. INVESTIGATE PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES USED IN PLANNING AND COORDINATING FIRES TO INCLUDE:

a. Q: HAVE ANGLICO UNITS BEEN AVAILABLE FOR UNITS NOT MAKING AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS, BUT RECEIVING SUPPORT FROM NAVAL GUNFIRE?

A: No. The 1st Mar Div ANGLICO is the only one in KOREA. It was split up and attached to army and NOK divisions for the HUNGNAM-WONSAN operation. Since then the company (less naval gunfire component) has operated as a part of the 1st Mar Div.

b. Q: WHEN NO ANGLICO UNITS ARE AVAILABLE, DOES THE ARMY OR NAVY FURNISH SHIP-TO-SHORE COMMUNICATIONS?

A: Army divisions have seldom been located where they can receive naval gunfire support, except during amphibious operations. The answer to this question was not determined.

c. Q: AT WHAT ECHELON HAVE NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON OFFICERS BEEN FURNISHED? (BATTALIONS, REGIMENT, DIVISION).

A: None furnished except during amphibious operations. Number furnished during amphibious operations not determined.

d. Q: WHAT PERSONNEL, ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES ARE USED TO COORDINATE ALL SUPPORTING FIRES, INCLUDING TACTICAL AIR, AT BATTALION, REGIMENT, AND DIVISION ECHELON?

A: Methods employed vary with each division. Following comments indicate general practices:

(1) Division.-- All divisions employ some form of FSCC. These vary in many respects. Normal personnel included are Div Arty Commander with his staff (FDC), the G3 Air, the division ALO, the division TACP and, when appropriate, the division naval gunfire liaison officer. Div Arty commander normally acts as fire support coordinator; sometimes the Div Arty S3 is designated by him to act. Physical organization varies with each unit. Procedures employed approximate those in present doctrine, although in some units the organization and procedures have not been formalized to a great extent. In general as to location, the FSCC is normally located in the FDC, which is, when possible, adjacent to the division command post. In a fluid situation, this may not be possible. Then, the decision must be made as to whether it is better to separate the FSCC from the command post or to separate the division artillery commander and at least a portion of his staff from the artillery for a considerable distance, so the FSCC can remain at the command post. There is no unanimity of opinion on this question in KOREA.

(2) Regiment.--FSCC organization varies from an informal relationship among the personnel concerned at the regimental command post or observation post to a more formal FSCC at the direct support artillery battalion FDC (when possible, adjacent to the regimental command post). Personnel involved are the regimental S3 (some units have designated S3 Air officers who perform this function), the TACP, and the artillery liaison officer. This group may also include a representative of the 4.2 Heavy Mortar Company. One of the most important coordination functions is that of coordinating artillery and other ground fires with planned air strikes.

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(3) Battalion.—This is for the most part an informal relationship between the battalion S3 and the artillery liaison officer. Some units have designated battalion S3 Air officers who, in some cases, also function with an SCR 300 as a battalion tactical air party (TAP). In those units, these officers also operate informally as a part of the FSCC. Organic and attached mortars are also integrated into the coordinated fire plan.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS.—Methods employed by two divisions in fire coordination are discussed in the following references,

a. Letter, Hq 1st Cav Div, 1 Apr 51, subject: "Fire Support Coordination Center".

b. Letter, Hq 2d Inf Div, 16 Jan 51, subject; "Letter of Instructions Regarding Supporting Arms Fire Coordination."

c. Letter of Instructions No 17, Hq 2d Inf Div, 16 Mar 51, subject: "2d Division Combat Doctrine; Coordination of Supporting Arms."

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11. THE ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER

CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.-INVESTIGATE THE DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER TO INCLUDE:

a. Q: TYPE OF TASKS ASSIGNED IN TRAINING? PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS? CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS?

A: (1) Tasks assigned to assistant division commanders vary with the personalities of the division commanders, and with the background and capabilities of the assistant division commanders. Type duties include -

(a) Liaison and staff visits to subordinate units to advise them and report their progress to the division commander - both tactical and administrative.

(b) Tactical adviser to the division commander. In one division, all plans and orders must be approved by the assistant division commander before they are published.

(c) Command of task force of comparatively large size.

(d) Miscellaneous administrative duties, such as awards and decorations boards, battlefield commissions, etc.

(2) In most divisions contacted the assistant division commander was used tactically, as the eyes and ears of the commander, to be at critical spots at critical times and act as a senior adviser to the subordinate units and as an adviser to the division commander.

b. Q: ARE ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDERS GIVEN COMMAND OF TASK FORCES OR OTHER SUBORDINATE COMMANDS? IF SO, HOW IS THE STAFF AND COMMUNICATION FACILITIES FURNISHED?

A: (1) Occasionally. Very seldom are task forces formed which can not be suitably commanded by regimental or battalion commanders or by the tank battalion commander. If they are of sufficient size to warrant higher command, normally they can best be commanded by the division commander. However, there are occasionally situations in which large forces are separated from the parent division, and in which these forces can suitably be commanded by the assistant division commander.

(2) Staff and communication facilities are most often provided by forming provisional means from within the division headquarters. This causes an increased burden on the division staff. An alternate means is to use an augmented staff from the major element of the task force.

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12. OPERATION WITH OTHER UN FORCES

CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.-INVESTIGATE PROCEDURES USED IN OPERATING WITH FORCES OF OTHER NATIONS TO INCLUDE:

a. Q: WHAT TYPES OF COMPOSITE ORGANIZATIONS ARE FORMED?

A: All combat units of UN forces are under EUSAK. Major subordinate elements are three US corps, one ROK corps, 2d Log Comd, and ROK Army. All divisions of the ROK Army are attached to the four corps, with each US corps having at least two ROK divisions attached. The ROK corps reports direct to EUSAK for operational matters. Within subordinate commands, the following takes place:

(1) Battalion size UN units are attached to US regiments; they remain with the same regiments and wear the division patches.

(2) Brigade (regimental) size units are attached to US divisions and wear US division patches, except that two British brigades operate directly under I US Corps. These attachments also remain constant, so that UN units will become familiar with the operations of the units to which they are attached, and vice versa.

(3) ROK soldiers were integrated into US units early in the war to the extent of 40-50%. They are not being relieved except through attrition; divisions now have from 5 to 10% remaining. They are fully integrated into units down to include squads.

(4) With the exception of those ROK soldiers mentioned above, all UN units operate as complete tactical units, attached as indicated.

b. Q: HOW ARE ORDERS TRANSLATED? BY THE ISSUING OR THE RECEIVING HEADQUARTERS? HOW ARE LANGUAGE DIFFICULTIES OVERCOME IN LIAISON ACTIVITIES?

A: (1) Orders are translated by the receiving headquarters.

(2) Liaison difficulties are overcome through the use of English speaking interpreters on duty at both headquarters.

c. Q: HOW DOES THE USE OF SUCH UNITS AFFECT OPERATIONS? DO THEY DELAY OPERATIONS?

A: The language barrier and differences in customs and procedures delayed operations initially. However, time and understanding, plus adequate liaison, have practically eliminated this difficulty. US commanders must exercise extreme care in assigning missions to and dealing with UN units, so they will not feel discriminated against and so their capabilities will be properly utilized. Commanders must also realize that these units are organized, trained, and equipped differently from US units, and their combat effectiveness will vary with these and other factors.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS.-

a. Many UN units have arrived in KOREA untrained and unequipped. A UN training center has been established near PUSAN where these units receive equipment and training under US supervision. Liaison officers must be provided. Interpreters can usually be found within the UN unit. Commanders in the field feel that UN units should be trained and equipped before arriving in the combat zone.

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b. The organization and functions of the Korean Military Advisory Group are covered in detail in the Advisor's Handbook, K.M.A.G., 1 March 1951, a copy of which has been furnished to the Library, CGSC.

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13. ORGANIZATION OF ARMY UNITS

CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.-

a. Q: FOR A GENERALLY DEFENSIVE WAR AS BEING FOUGHT IN KOREA SHOULD AN INFANTRY DIVISION HAVE FOUR REGIMENTS UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF THE DIVISION COMMANDER RATHER THAN THE THREE AS AT PRESENT?

A: Opinions vary on this subject. Due to attachment of UN units, many divisions have ^{had} the rough equivalent of four regiments (and many regiments the rough equivalent of four battalions) during recent months. Commanders recognize the additional flexibility which this allows, particularly on wide front defense where they can place three regiments on the MLR and still retain a sizeable division reserve. Without exception, as division commanders, they would like to have four regiments. However, some feel that the answer is to have more divisions of three regiments each.

b. Q: (1) WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF HAVING A TANK COMPANY ORGANIC TO THE INFANTRY REGIMENT? (2) SHOULD THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION BE RETAINED?

A: (1) Advantages are closer control and integrated teamwork, both in training and in combat. Disadvantages are minor one of the regiment being responsible for supply, maintenance and administration, plus a lack of teamwork when the company is employed with other tank units.

(2) Consensus of opinion is that the present organization should be retained. However, some commanders feel that better overall armored support can be obtained by having two tank battalions organic to the infantry division, normally splitting one to attach one tank company to each infantry regiment.

c. Q: (1) WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF HAVING THE TANK BATTALION ORGANIC TO THE INFANTRY DIVISION? (2) SHOULD THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION BE RETAINED?

(1) Advantages are closer control and integrated teamwork, in both training and combat, plus the ability of the division to reinforce regimental tank companies or form task forces with organic means. No disadvantages are seen, except the minor ones of slightly less flexibility from the corps standpoint and the fact that it has not always been possible to employ the division tank battalion in KOREA because of the mountainous terrain.

(2) All commanders contacted feel that the present organic tank battalion should be retained within the division. (Note: Only one US army division in KOREA has an organic tank battalion at this time. However, efforts are being made to obtain authority to publish the necessary orders to make the present attached tank battalions organic.)

d. Q: (1) WHAT MISSIONS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED THE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY OF THE INFANTRY DIVISION? (2) SHOULD IT BE RETAINED? (3) SHOULD IT BE AUGMENTED?

A: (1) During recent months reconnaissance companies have been employed in their normal roles. Prior to that time they had been employed primarily in administrative roles, or secondary tactical roles such as rear area defense, patrolling MSR's, and defense of division command post. Present missions include screening, patrolling, contact missions, establishment of road blocks, operation with covering forces and delaying forces, and similar tasks.

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- (2) The reconnaissance company should be retained.
- (3) No particular need is seen for augmentation.

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14. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

a. Q: WHO IS CHARGED WITH PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES AT DIVISION, REGIMENT, AND BATTALION ECHELONS?

A: G3 and S3. Officers within the G3/S3 sections plan, recommend and conduct PSYWAR operations in consonance with the tactical plan and with policies prescribed by higher echelons.

b. Q: WHAT PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASURES HAVE BEEN USED?

A: (1) Leaflets.—These are prepared and dropped by both GHQ and EUSAK. Approximately 50,000,000 per month are dropped. EUSAK uses 2 C47 aircraft for PSYWAR purposes. Some leaflets are dropped by organic army aircraft of divisions. Artillery shells have not been used to any extent for leaflets, although this is recognized as a desirable method of delivery, particularly in conjunction with artillery concentrations. 52 sample leaflets have been furnished to the library, CGSC.

(2) Loudspeaker operations.—Both aircraft loudspeakers and vehicular loudspeakers have been employed to a considerable extent. Attempts are made to integrate them with tactical operations. Both C47 speakers and light aircraft speakers are used, principally the former. One loudspeaker team is attached to each division, including one team chief, one radio repairman, one $\frac{1}{4}$ ton truck with trailer, and one PA set, complete. Both standard, recorded broadcasts and special broadcasts based on the current situation are employed.

(3) Other.—Other special PSYWAR operations have not been employed to any extent; such measures must be coordinated through the EUSAK PSYWAR officer.

c. Q: HOW EFFECTIVE WERE THESE MEASURES?

A: (1) Apparently these measures are very effective, although it is impossible to determine exact effect. Majority of prisoners carry leaflets. Several specific instances have been reported in which groups of enemy have surrendered to loudspeaker teams. Excellent results have been reported through coordinating loudspeaker operations with artillery fire and air strikes.

(2) Unit commanders appear to be increasingly aware of the value of psychological warfare operations.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS.— a. Units report needing lighter, hand-carried loudspeaker equipment. Also, some units report that the $\frac{1}{4}$ ton truck is unsatisfactory and that a light armored (tracked) vehicle should be provided. This has been done in some units by mounting the loudspeaker on a tank and employing it well forward where jeeps could not go; also the loudspeaker mounted on a tank has been used successfully with task forces operating well forward of friendly lines.

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b. Six B26 mounted loudspeakers are to be made available to the EUSAK PSYWAR officer sometime this late summer or fall. C47 aircraft fly above 6000 feet and not more than two miles beyond front lines; formerly they flew at 1500-2000 feet, but received such heavy ground fire that they were forced to fly at the higher altitude. Some units state that speaker broadcasts cannot be heard at the new altitudes.

c. SOPS for PSYWAR operations at corps and division levels have been furnished to the library CGSC.

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15. PARTISAN OPERATIONS

CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:-

a. Q: HAVE PARTISANS BEEN EMPLOYED BY OUR FORCES? IF SO, AT WHAT LEVEL ARE THEY CONTROLLED?

A: Yes. Bulk are controlled by army; some recently have started to operate under corps.

b. Q: AGAINST WHAT TYPE TARGETS HAVE THEY BEEN EMPLOYED?

A: Personnel, supply installations, convoys, bridges, defiles, tunnels. They have used ambushes, raids, mines, booby traps, etc.

c. Q: WHAT HAS BEEN THEIR EFFECTIVENESS?

A: The degree of success has varied. Greatest success has been with personnel operating in or near their homes (North Koreans). The following direct results have been reported as of 16 Jul 51:

<u>Direct Action</u>		<u>Material Destroyed</u>		<u>Material Captured</u>	
KIA	2291	Supply Trucks	48	Small Arms	567
MIA	225	Supply Carts	51	LMGs	54
POW	369	Boats	21	MMGs	37
		MG's	9	Ammo (rds)	13700
		Arty	1	Grenades	148
<u>Instls Destroyed</u>				Carts	3
Bridges	33			Arty Pieces	6
RR Bridges	5			Boats	27
Tunnels	5			Oxen	11
Comm Lines	46			Documents	1
RR Sections	19			Misc Food	5376 bags
OPs	16	Friendly PWs			
Ammo Dumps	5	Liberated (10K)	122		
Supply Dumps	4	Friendly Civilians			
Bn Hq	1	Liberated	1060	Pilots Rescued	2 US
Other Instls	12				4 British

d. Q: INTO WHAT SIZE UNITS ARE THEY ORGANIZED? ARE THEY UNDER OUR CENTRALIZED CONTROL OR IS CONTROL DECENTRALIZED TO CORPS AND DIVISIONS?

A: (1) The bulk of partisans (10,000 approximately) are controlled directly by EUSAK through a separate staff section under the operational control of the G3. These operate in groups ranging from 15-25 to 400-500 depending on mission and area of operations. The basic partisan unit is the company. The greatest success has been obtained by groups of 50 or less. They are based on islands off the coast of KOREA. American advisers are with them at these bases. From the bases, they move to the mainland, where they operate for indefinite periods (up to 3 or 4 weeks), living primarily off the land. In the beginning they were assigned specific missions. Now that they are better trained, they are usually given areas of responsibility in which to conduct operations of their own selection, unless specific important missions are indicated. They normally operate near their own homes.

(2) EUSAK has recently authorized each corps to organize, train, equip, and employ three companies in each ROK division for guerrilla operations against enemy supply installations and communications. These will be employed in platoon and company size raids of 3 to 7 days duration in enemy rear areas, raids to be under control of corps.

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e. Q: DO WE SUPPLY THEM? IF SO, WITH WHAT? AND HOW?

A: We supply them only with minimum food (rice), weapons and ammunition, and necessary communication equipment (radios). Of the approximately 10,000 partisans operating under army control, only about 3500 have been provided weapons. Many of the remainder obtain arms from the enemy during raids. Supply is made primarily by water to island bases. Air supply is not often used, nor is air drop of partisans employed to any extent, due to difficulties of maintaining secrecy. Partisans live off of the land for the most part, returning to the island bases when necessary to replenish supplies of any kind.

f. Q: WHAT METHODS ARE USED IN COUNTERING ENEMY GUERRILLA OPERATIONS?

A: (1) Enemy guerrilla activities have been extremely limited during recent months. During this period, the following measures have been sufficient: daily patrols, use of reconnaissance company, each unit provide its own local security. Each division and larger size unit has an SOP for defense of rear areas. For details of this organization, see the answer to question e, Section 8, Defensive Operations, above, and the references contained therein.

(2) During the periods when enemy guerrilla operations were being encountered on a large scale, it was necessary to divert large tactical units, division or larger, to the problem of security of rear areas. At that time, the greatest success in combating large guerrilla forces was obtained by studying enemy routes of movement and other activities, blocking enemy escape routes by battalion size units (reinforced) organized for perimeter defense, and then by employing the remainder of the force to enclose the area in which the enemy was known to be located and attack to destroy the guerrilla force. Even so, large numbers escaped. Patrols during that period were initially too small (I&R Platoon size) and were often ambushed with heavy losses. Later, patrols of company size, or larger, were employed with greater success.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS.-a. A minimum of two weeks training is given partisans in KOREA. Subjects include guerrilla warfare subjects, weapons, raiding, use of mass, demolitions, mines, booby traps, plus some intelligence training and map reading.

b. The staff section which controls operations of the bulk of the partisans consists of approximately 29 officers and 53 enlisted men, broken down into a headquarters section located at army headquarters (includes section headquarters and intelligence, operations, supply and communications divisions); an Island Base Unit of 7 officers and 14 enlisted men, which controls partisans consisting of 8 guerrilla regiments, 1 OK Raider Co, 1 Base Security Co, and 14 small operating units; Mobile Unit of 4 officers and 8 enlisted men, which controls 3 guerrilla companies; and an Air Unit of 6 officers and enlisted men, which handles aerial supply and guerrilla task forces organized for parachute missions.

c. An attempt was made to obtain more detailed information of operations, but there has been little documentation of operations. It would be desirable for such units to document everything possible, so that service schools and personnel engaged in operations of this nature in the future could have a broader base of information and experience from which to draw.

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16. GENERAL

CGSC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.-

- a. Q: (1) ARE INFANTRY DIVISION T/O&ES ADEQUATE?
(2) SPECIFICALLY, IS THERE TOO MUCH OR TOO LITTLE TRANSPORTATION ASSIGNED?

A: (1) Present tables are adequate. An ad hoc committee organized by EUSAK to study this subject some months ago made no recommendations for changes. Many subordinate units recommended changes of some nature, but there was no particular pattern to the recommendations.

(2) Although opinions as to adequacy of transportation vary, the consensus of opinion is that present allowances are entirely adequate. The road net in KOREA is barely adequate to support available transportation, even though the engineer effort expended has been the maximum available.

- b. Q: HOW EFFECTIVE ARE THE 57-MM AND 75-MM RECOILLESS RIFLES?

A: (1) Both are excellent weapons. Both are well liked by most units. 57-mm is particularly well-liked. Existing doctrine for employment is sound. Some retaliatory fires are received. Weapons must be kept well forward to influence the action. Alternate positions must be prepared and occupied after a few rounds are fired due to disclosure of position. 75-mm is used at ranges above listed maximum; sight scale should be increased.

(2) Principal disadvantages are weight of weapons, particularly the 75-mm, and the ammunition therefor, and the consequent difficulty in moving them cross-country by hand. Some units leave them behind with vehicles; however, most carry them.

(3) Observer comment: Original question referred to the 105-mm recoilless rifle. This weapon has not yet been received in KOREA.

- c. Q: DO FORMS FOR OPN ORDERS, PERIODIC REPORTS, ETC, DIFFER FROM FM 101-5?

A: (1) Periodic Reports.- G3 periodic report form varies based on directive from EUSAK early in KOREAN war. No particular reason was given for variation. Paragraphs used are (a) Composition and disposition of friendly forces, (b) operations planned, (c) operations ordered, and (d) results of operations. Personnel contacted felt either this form or form in FM 101-5 is satisfactory. For copies of these and other periodic report forms, see reference data furnished to the Library, CGSC.

(2) Combat Orders.-Forms for combat orders generally conform to FA 101-5, except that letters of instruction do not normally follow five-paragraph form, and except for the addition of a new variation of fragmentary order discussed below.

(a) Army.-Opn plans, operation orders, letters of instruction, and fragmentary orders disseminated by electrical means are used by EUSAK. The present army commander prefers general directives. As a result, a plan or order is usually

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written in five paragraph form, then converted to general terms for electrical transmission as a fragmentary order. Due to distances and communication nets in KOREA, it has been found preferable to use electrical dissemination, rather than to depend on formal orders with overlays being delivered by liaison officers or other means. Too, overlays on a map of 1:250,000 scale mean very little when subordinate units attempt to interpret boundaries and objectives in terms of terrain. As a result, common practice is to designate such locations by six-digit coordinates taken from a 1:50,000 map. The basic G3 situation map at army level is a 1:50,000 map, as there are no intermediate scales between that and 1:250,000. The overwhelming majority of army directives are fragmentary orders issued electrically.

(b) Corps and Division.-

(i) The above procedure varies somewhat at corps and division levels due to their closer physical relationships. All three US corps and all six US army divisions use operation plans, operation orders, occasional letters of instruction, and some form of fragmentary orders. Virtually all of these are mimeographed with appropriate annexes, including operation overlays. A variation from current doctrine arises here, as all units at these levels employ a form of fragmentary order, mimeographed for dissemination by normal means, which most of them call an "Operation Instruction". Others call it an "Operation Directive". Whereas an operation order covers a major operation over a period of days or weeks, an operation instruction is normally issued daily (less often if possible) to cover activities for the following day, to conform verbal orders, or to cover minor instructions to one or more units - while the entire unit still operates under the basic operation order which is still in effect. These orders do not follow the usual five-paragraph form. Most units number these orders consecutively beginning with number one, without reference to the basic operation order which may be in effect. One division, however, uses a numbering system which relates to the operation order in effect. For example, if operation order 25 is in effect, then operation instructions will be numbered 25-1, 25-2, etc., until such time as operation order 25 is superseded; then, when operation order 26 goes into effect, then operation instructions will be numbered to conform to the new order. Most of these units also use fragmentary orders disseminated electrically, when time requires rapid transmission.

(ii) The reasons advanced by units for using this variation instead of the usual fragmentary order dispatched electrically are that the number of copies required is usually such that the fragmentary order must be reproduced, in any event, and they desire to document everything in comparatively formal manner for historical purposes.

(iii) This observer sees no particular harm in this form of an order. It is, in effect, a fragmentary order. The formality being employed in issuing and recording it appears unnecessary; however, units contacted do not agree. EUSAK G3 section has gotten away from using this designation, and prefers the normal fragmentary order disseminated electrically. It is considered desirable by this observer that if this form of order is used its numbering system be designed to refer to the basic operation order then in effect, as indicated in the example above. Its use should be restricted to the minimum, rather than its being issued daily.

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(iv) There will undoubtedly be a number of officers in the regular class at the Command and General Staff College this year who will have used this form extensively in KOREA. The college should decide whether to accept it as a form of combat order.

(v) Recommendation.-That no new terms be added to current instruction in combat orders. That the "operation instruction" be accepted as a variation of a fragmentary order which varies from the normal in that it (a) is called a different name, (b) is normally issued formally, and (c) may have a different numbering system. That instruction stress the desirability of (a) keeping to a minimum the number of types or orders issued, (b) simplifying their content, and (c) facilitating their rapid dissemination.

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IV. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Patrolling.--All patrols are organized as combat patrols, although they may have primarily an intelligence mission. G3 (S3) normally controls patrol plan. G2 (S2) tells him what missions or information desired. Due to type enemy activity, SOP is that each echelon must be prepared to support the next lower echelon at all times; i.e., if company is on patrol, battalion must be within supporting distance and prepared to go to assistance of the company if necessary. A typical patrol pattern within one corps sector for one day is shown in POR No 288, Hq X Corps, copy furnished Library, CGSC.

2. Ranger Company.--Ranger company has not been used to a great extent in primary role due to small size, enemy mass tactics, and difference in physical characteristics and speech. Some suitable missions have included scouting, screening, operation with task forces, ambushes. Some successful small-scale night attacks have been conducted. Attachment to regiments has often been made. Due to above factors, ranger companies in this theater are being inactivated. Letter, Hq Ranger Training Command, 30 Jun 51, Subject: "Interim Ranger Report" (copy furnished Library, CGSC), contains detailed study of reasons for inactivation, uses in Korea, and some recommendations by the reporting officer as to how this problem should be handled in the future.

3. Patrol Bases.--These were discussed in Section I of this report. In addition, corps (sometimes army) normally designates the general line of patrol bases and the minimum size to be employed. This is usually a reinforced battalion as a minimum. Artillery support must be provided, either by locating the base where it can be supported by artillery within the battle position, or by making the patrol base unit sufficiently large (usually RCT) so that supporting artillery can be positioned within its perimeter. Patrol bases are usually furnished from reserve regiments.

Decision as to time to withdraw patrol bases during enemy attacks is difficult for, with large gaps between patrol bases, they can easily be surrounded and cut off from friendly positions. Therefore, they must be sufficient size to withstand heavy enemy attacks. Normally, if the enemy's intentions can be determined, they should be withdrawn early during enemy attacks; otherwise, either they will be cut off, or will return too late, and not in proper condition, to be of great assistance during subsequent phases of the defense, or possibly the larger unit may be forced to send a strong force to rescue them.

4. Logistical Feasibility.--Commanders in Korea are continually reminded of the necessity of determining their ability to logistically support operations before such operations are ordered. This is particularly true due to the mountainous terrain and limited road net. Fortunately, the availability of indigenous labor is such that most operations proposed are logistically feasible. If this were not so, then either animal transport would have to be provided, troops diverted from other tasks, or the scope and tempo of operations curtailed. Emphasis should be placed in our service schools on the use of indigenous labor and/or animal transport, particularly the former.

5. Snooperscopes and Sniperscopes.--These are not liked and are not used. They are too heavy, bulky, and complicated, and their maintenance is too difficult. Also, ranges are too short.

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Commanders like the idea; desire less complicated equipment with greater range and durability.

6. Troop Movements.-G3s in Korea get less involved with details of tactical troop movements than we teach at CGSC. Normally, in Korea, G3 states who will move, destination, and either the time the move will be initiated or the time by which the move will be completed or both. G4 Transportation does all of the rest. G3 is kept informed of progress of moves and often makes staff visits to keep informed of such progress. G3 also establishes priorities when necessary.

7. 2d Log Comd.-a. All major subordinate units are under operational control of appropriate technical service staff officers.

b. It is presently planned to eliminate the G2 section as such and include his functions within the G3 section.

c. The present commander favors getting G3 into the operational field. Nothing has been done as yet in this respect; however, he is contemplating this step, starting with transportation and movement control-moving them from G4 to G3.

d. For details of organization and operation of 2d Log Comd, see report of the logistics observer, CGSC.

8. Reconnaissance in Force and Task Forces.-These are normally closely controlled by corps, both as to location and objectives and exact, or at least minimum, size. Execution is, of course, decentralized.

9. Lack of Camouflage and Dispersion.-Due to lack of enemy air activity, units have virtually no regard for camouflage and dispersion. Light discipline is somewhat better.

10. Coordination Along Boundaries.-More attention must be given this matter in service schools and in planning. Close physical coordination is essential. Commanders and staffs must plan in detail and personally check coordination. This has been particularly true in Korea where the enemy seeks out boundaries for his attacks. Closely allied with this is the proper selection of boundaries, particularly in the defense.

11. Counteroffensives.-A rapidly initiated counteroffensive was used for the first time in Korea at the end of the May CCF offensive. Excellent results were obtained. The potentialities of this form of maneuver, which exploits enemy disorganization, are very great. Emphasis should be placed on this in our service schools. Two items emphasized by the action in Korea are -

a. Timing of the operation must be such that full advantage is taken of enemy disorganization, and the enemy is not allowed time to reorganize or withdraw.

b. Rapid exploitation to block escape routes and destroy encircled enemy. This involves a complete change of attitude on the part of units concerned (retrograde to exploitation) and requires aggressive leadership. Further complicating this point in Korea was the fact that for several months our offensive actions had been of the sweeping nature, which involved methodical, closely controlled advances. As a result, some units apparently did not exploit to the maximum and the full effect was not realized.

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12. Blocking Positions.-The term "blocking position" as used in Korea refers to any position which is organized or occupied to deny the enemy immediate access to an area or route, including delaying positions, whether intended for use in conjunction with counterattacks or not. It is recommended that service schools study this term, agree on definitions, and insure that instruction is uniform in this matter.

13. FSCC Organization.-As discussed elsewhere in this report, there is no uniformity in the organization within divisions. All appropriate service schools should insure that adequate coverage is given to this subject, so that uniform methods and organization will be employed by all units at division, regimental, and battalion levels. Procedures now taught should be retained.

14. Wide Front Defense.-Opinions vary as to how wide front defense should be conducted in Korea, as discussed elsewhere in this report. Primarily, the variations are due to the peculiarities of the Korean war. It is felt that our doctrine is basically sound and that no particular changes are necessary. Those important points on which opinions vary in Korea to a great extent should be discussed in our instruction, together with the reasons for variations.

15. Degree of Control Exercised.-Generally speaking, closer control is exercised in Korea by commanders at all levels than is taught in our service schools. Reasons advanced by commanders are (a) nature of the terrain with its bottlenecks, defiles, and limited road net, (b) mass attacks used by the enemy, (c) extra precautions required due to the presence of ROK forces on the flanks, and (d) the fact that modern communications means, plus light aircraft and helicopters, enable the commander to keep more closely in touch with the situation than in the past. With these points in mind, many commanders feel that it is desirable to exercise closer control, and that such close control will be common in the future. In effect, some corps operate much as divisions, and some divisions much as regiments, from the standpoint of control.

It is believed that the conditions discussed above are somewhat peculiar to Korea. It is, therefore, recommended that no change be made in our instruction, insofar as degree of control is concerned. When possible, subordinate commanders should be given more latitude in execution of assigned missions. The present Eighth Army commander has indicated a preference for this additional latitude by requiring his staff to prepare directives which are recently more general in nature than those previously used.

16. G3 Organization.-Organization of G3 sections and methods of operation vary widely. Without exception, G3 sections have had to be augmented beyond T/O&E figures at all levels, to permit 24-hour operation, and to provide personnel to handle the many functions included within the jurisdiction of the G3. These include PSYWAR, G3(S3) Air, Historical, Troop I&E, and, in some cases Army Avn and Rear Area Defense, in addition to Plans, Operations, Administration, and Training.

Some of the variations in organization of G3 sections at various levels will be noted in the reference material furnished to the Library, CGSC. See Section V, Index to Reference Material.

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Due to the many variations which exist, it is recommended that greater emphasis be placed at the Command and General Staff College on the organization and functioning of the G3 sections at army, corps, and division levels. It is also recommended that tables of organization be reviewed to determine what changes are necessary in organization to permit G3 sections to function efficiently during wartime. The reference material referred to above may be of value in this study.

17. Troop Basis.-A copy of the present Eighth Army troop list has been furnished Library, CGSC, as have various studies concerned with the augmentation considered necessary by Eighth Army to conduct sustained operations in Korea. In addition, for purposes of comparison and study, figures have been obtained which show details of the size of the division slice in Korea, with breakdown of non-divisional troops by number and percentages. These data are considered desirable for study by appropriate staff and instructional sections at the Command and General Staff College.

18. Use of Means Available.-Many commanders stated that greater stress must be placed on making commanders at all levels more aware of the capabilities and limitations of the means available to them. Service schools can assist in this by covering in more detail the employment of the major combat elements of the division, i.e., infantry, artillery, tanks, by stressing the details of the division fire plan, and by stressing rapid shifting of means during the execution phase of the operation.

19. Additional Recommendations.-a. That the comments and recommendations contained in this report be approved and referred to appropriate agencies of the Command and General Staff College for consideration for inclusion in the program of instruction.

b. That action be taken to obtain copies of all ORO studies made pertaining to the Korean situation, if this has not already been done.

c. That action be taken to obtain copies of all documents pertaining to combat lessons published by divisions and larger units in Korea.

d. That the following subjects related to the field of operations, all of which have been discussed to some extent elsewhere in this report, be stressed in instruction at the Command and General Staff College:

- (1) Wide front defense.
- (2) Night operations of all types.
- (3) Fire support coordination.
- (4) Operation with UN forces.
- (5) Organization and functioning of G3 sections at appropriate levels.
- (6) Retrograde movements of all types.
- (7) Execution phase of all types of operations.

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V INDEX TO REFERENCE MATERIAL

- I COMBAT LESSONS
- II G3 ORGANIZATION
- III PLANS AND ORDERS
- IV REPORTS
- V SPECIAL ITEMS:
 - 1. Army Aviation
 - 2. Fire Support Coordination
 - 3. Guerrilla Operations
- VI STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES
- VII TRAINING
- VIII TROOP BASIS

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I COMBAT LESSONS

1. EUSAK Combat Lessons

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TITLE AND CONTENTS</u>
1	Combat Information Bulletin No 1, NK Army Tactics and Techniques.
2	Combat Information Bulletin No 2, 3.5 Inch Rocket Material.
3	Combat Information Bulletin No 3, M-46 Medium Tank
4	Combat Information Bulletin No 4, Characteristics of CCF.
5	Combat Information Bulletin No 5, CCF Combat Doctrine.
6	Combat Information Bulletin No 6, Notes on Chinese Company Tactics.
7	Combat Information Bulletin No 7, River Crossing Information (Tactics and Techniques).
8	Combat Information Bulletin No 8, Employment of Searchlight For Battlefield Illumination.
9	Combat Information Bulletin No 9, Operations in Cold Weather.
10	Combat Information Bulletin No 10, How The Chinese Communists Wage War.
11	Combat Information Bulletin No 11, CCF Combat Doctrine, Part II.
12	Combat Information Bulletin No 12, Characteristics Of The Fragmentation Bomb M83 (Butterfly Bomb).
13	Combat Information Bulletin No 13, CCF Experiences Gained In 3 Battles Since Entering Korea.
14	Combat Information Bulletin No 14, Combat Principles (Action Of One Recon Co).
15	Combat Information Bulletin No 15, Platoon In The Assault.
16	Combat Information Bulletin No 16, Identification of Aircraft.
17	Combat Information Bulletin No 17, Mines, Fuzes, Booby Traps, Camouflage (NK and CCF).
18	Combat Information Bulletin No 18, Field Expedient Sound Detector.
19	Combat Information Bulletin No 19, Enemy Field Fortifications, Camouflage, And Deceptive Tactics.
20	EUSAK Signals, April 1951.
21	EUSAK Signals, May 1951.

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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TITLE AND CONTENTS</u>
22	EUSAK Signals, June 1951.
23	EUSAK Signals, July 1951.
24	Engr Lessons Learned In Korea, Number I.
25	Engr. Lessons Learned In Korea, Number II.
26	Memo For Corps Commanders On "Tactical Principles" 3 Mar 51.
27	Memo For Corps Commanders On "Tactical Observations", 31 May 51.
28	Letter, EUSAK, 15 Jul 51, Subject: Defense Against Napalm Attack.
29	Letter, EUSAK, 9 Mar 51, Subject: Command Post Security.
30	Study By 92 Engr Slt Co re: Searchlights For Illumination.
31	Feature Article From Newspaper "Stars and Stripes" Regard- ing Searchlights.
32	Draft Combat Information Bulletin Regarding Tank Employment in Korea.
33	Report (Interim) On Ranger Companies.
2.	<u>I Corps Combat Lessons</u>
1.	Combat Bulletin No 1, Enemy Use Of Booby Traps.
2	Combat Bulletin No 4, Expedient Anti-Personnel Devices (2).
3	Combat Bulletin No 8, Unusual Type Field Fortifications.
4	Combat Bulletin No 9, Enemy Camouflage And Deceptive Tac- tics.
5	Combat Lesson No 2, Selection Of Attack Routes.
6	Armor Combat Lesson Bulletin No 4, Obsns Made With Task Force Dolvin, 8 Feb 51.
7	Letter, I Corps, 21 Dec 50, Subject: "Measures To Combat Chinese Tactics".
8	Letter, I Corps, 14 Jan 51, Subject: "Guerrilla Activi- ties".
9	Letter, I Corps, 20 Feb 51, Regarding: Security And Use Of Indigenous Labor.
3.	<u>IX Corps Combat Lessons</u>
1	Combat Notes No 1, Miscellaneous.
2	Combat Notes No 2, Armored Combat Notes (Offensive Action).

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ITEM	TITLE AND CONTENT
3	Combat Notes No 3, Fire Power.
4	Armored Combat Notes, Miscellaneous.
4.	<u>X Corps Combat Lessons</u>
1	Combat Notes No 1, Small Unit Tactics Of The CCF.
2	Combat Notes No 2, Small Unit Action (US).
3	Combat Notes No 3, 2 Patrol Actions.
4	Combat Notes No 4, CCF In The Attack.
5	Combat Notes 5, Battle Of The Tunnels (Regimental Action).
6	Combat Notes No 6, Ambushed Patrol.
7	Combat Notes No 7, Infantry battalion Tactical Air Parties.
8	Combat Notes No 8, Study Regarding Time Intervals For Air Strikes.
9	Combat Notes No 9, Battle of Hoengsong.
10	Combat Notes No 10, Battlefield Illumination By Searchlights.
11	Combat Notes No 11, Defense Of Chipyeong-ni (Perimeter Defense By RCT).
12	Combat Notes No 12, Reinforced Regiment As A Task Force (Exploitation).
13	Battle of Soyang River (Division And Its 3 RCTs).
5.	<u>2nd Infantry Division Combat Lessons</u>
1	Letter Of Instructions, 26 Jun 51, Subject: "Combat Lessons".
2	Memorandum, 7 Jul 51, regarding average width of sectors.
6.	<u>3rd Infantry Division Combat Lessons</u>
1	Combat Bulletin No 1, Battlefield Illumination Expedients.
2	Combat Bulletin No 2, Miscellaneous Combat Lessons.
3	Combat Bulletin No 3, Chinese Mountain Defense Plan.
4	Combat Bulletin No 4, Tank-Infantry Teamwork.
5	Combat Bulletin No 5, Use of Bangalore Torpedoes By CCF.
6	Combat Bulletin No 6, Report Of Death Of A UN Commander.
7	Combat Bulletin No 7, Enemy Booby Traps.
8	Combat Bulletin No 8, Miscellaneous Combat Comments.

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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TITLE AND CONTENT</u>
9	Combat Bulletin No 9, Use Of Bayonet.
10	Combat Bulletin No 10, Snipers.
11	Combat Bulletin No 11, Mines and Booby Traps.
12	Combat Bulletin No 12, Patrols.
13	Memorandum No 73, Combat Notes.
14	Combat Information Bulletin Number 3, NK Booby Trap Tactics.
15	Letter, 15 Jun 51, "Comments On Technical Manual ORO-T-7 (EUSAK).
16	Letter, 20 Jun 51, "Field Evaluation Of 10th PEFTOK" (UN Forces).
7.	<u>24th Infantry Division Combat Lesson</u>
1	Letter 21st Infantry, 23 Jun 51, Regarding Defense.
8.	<u>29 British Brigade - Lessons Learned</u>
1	Review of The Battle of The Injin.
9.	<u>ORO (FEC)</u>
1	List of ORO, FEC Projects, 15 May 51.
2	Index to ORO, FEC Publications, 25 May 51.
3	Staff Memo ORO-S-25 (CCF Tactics in The Envelopment of A Column), 29 Dec 50.
4	Staff Memo ORO-S-34 (EUSAK) (CCF in The Attack (Part II)), 27 Jan 51.
10.	<u>Artillery Lessons Learned</u>
1	Artillery Information Bulletin Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, Hq EUSAK.

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
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II G3 ORGANIZATION

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1	EUSAK - Organization Chart (Staff Directory).
2	I Corps - G3 Organization Chart.
3	I Corps - Letter Regarding Overstrength Augmentation, 14 Mar 51.
4	I Corps - Letter Regarding Overstrength Augmentation, 6 Jun 51.
5	IX Corps - G3 Organization.
6	2nd Infantry Division - G3 Organization and Physical Ar- rangement.
7	3rd Infantry Division - G3 Organization Chart.
8	24th Infantry Division - G3 Organization Chart.

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III PLANS AND ORDERS

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1.	<u>EUSAK Plans and Orders</u>
1	Opn Plan No 10, Breakout From Naktong Perimeter.
2	TWX GX1-207 KG00, Basic Directive Changing Attitude of Army.
3	Opn Plan No 21, Coordinated Withdrawal.
4	TWX GX1-1645 KG00, Initiation of Armored Infantry Counterattacks
5	Opn Plan Ripper, Phased Attack (Sweeping Action).
6	Letter of Instructions, 1 Jun 51, Deliberate Defense (Kansas-Wyoming).

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>CONTENT</u>
2.	<u>I Corps Plans and Orders</u>	
	<u>Plans</u>	
1	Opn Plan "Exploitation"	Attack Followed By Defense of Han (Jan).
2	Opn Plan A	Defense (Feb).
3	Opn Plan "Bullhead"	Coordinated Withdrawal (May).
4	Opn Plan "Sticky"	Coordinated Withdrawal (June).
	<u>Orders</u>	
5	Opn Order 5 (Ripper)	Phased Attack (March 51).
6	Frag Overlay Type Order	Counterattack Plans (Jan 51).
7	Frag Order CIACT 5-204	Est of Patrol Bases.
	<u>Operation Directives</u>	
8	OD #36	Withdrawal (Jan).
9	OD #37	Phased Withdrawal (Jan).
10	OD #38	Armored Thrust, Followed by Withdrawal.
11	OD #39	Recon in Force .
12	OD #40	Recon in Force (Phase Lines).
13	OD #41	Continuation of OD 40.
14	OD #43	Task Force for Exploitation.
15	OD #44 (Pacemaker)	Exploitation with Task Force.
16	OD #45	Atk, Def, Prep for River Crossing.

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*Restricted*CONTENTOpn Directives (Cont'd)

17	OD #46	Continuation of OD 45.
18	OD #48	River Crossing, Continuation of.
19	OD #49	Continuation of OD 48.
20	OD #50	Attack, Phased, Incl Armored Thrusts.
21	OD #58	Atk, Prep For Defense, Organization of Kansas Line.
22	OD #59	Defense, Patrolling and Kansas Line.
23	Frag O, 20 Jun 51	Mission For Corps Reserve (25 Division).

3. IX Corps Plans and Orders

1	Opn Plan 5	Withdrawal.
2	Opn Plan 12	Attack, Linkup w/ 187 RCT (Envelopment).
3	Opn Plan 13	Phased Attack.
4	Opn Plan 14	Phased, Coordinated Withdrawal.
5	Opn Plan 17	Coordinated Withdrawal.
6	Opn Plan 18	Phased Attack.
7	Opn Plan 21	Coordinated Withdrawal.
8	Opn Order 9	Withdrawal.
9	Opn Order 11	Recon in Force Using Phase Lines.
10	Opn Order 14	Attack by Phases.
11	Opn Order 17	Coordinated Phased Withdrawal, Incl Delay.
12	Opn Order 19	Attack by Phase Lines.

4. X Corps Plans and Orders

1	Opn Plan Roundup	Attack Using Phase Lines.
2	Opn Plan Gopher	Defense.
3	Opn O 16 - Ripper	Phased Attack.
4	Opn O 17 -	Defense, Plus Deep Recon (Patrol Base).
5	Opn O 18 - Rugged	Phased Attack.

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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>CONTENT</u>
6	Opn O 20 -	Defense, Plus Patrol Bases.
7	Opn O 21 -	Attack.
8	Opn O 22 -	Attack.
9	Opn O 23 -	Attack to Cutoff and Destroy En Force.
10	Opn O 24	Defense of Kansas Line; Plus Patrol Bases.
11	Letter of Instruction 5 June 51	Preparation of Defensive Positions..
5. <u>1st Cavalry Division Plans and Orders</u>		
1	Opn Plan 14-51 (Piledriver)	Attack in "Iron Triangle" Area.
2	Opn Plan 15-51	Withdrawal and Delay.
3	Opn Order 18-51	Defense of Wyoming and Kansas.
4	Opn Order 19-51	Continuation of 18-51.
5	Opn Order 20-51	Patrol Bases.
6	Opn Order 21-51	Continuation of Mission in 19-51.
6. <u>2nd Infantry Division Plans and Orders</u>		
1	Operation Instructions 67	Patrol Base.
2	Operation Instructions 70	Defense Plus Patrol Bases.
3	Operation Instructions 85	Relief in Place Plus Defense.
7. <u>3rd Infantry Division Plans and Orders</u>		
1	Opn Plan Golden A	Retrograde Movement - Phased.
2	Opn Plan Bullhead	Coordinated Withdrawal.
3	Opn Plan Poke	Counterattack as Corps Reserve.
4	Opn Plan Extract	Employment as Corps Reserve.
5	Opn Plan Headstrong	Withdrawal.
6	Opn Plan 26 (Sticky)	Withdrawal involving Delay From Wyoming to Kansas.
7	Opn O 16	Phased Withdrawal.

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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>CONTENT</u>
8	Opn O 18	Miscellaneous Activities.
9	Opn O 19	Employment as Army Reserve.
10	Opn O 20	Blocking Role in X Corps Sector.
11	Opn O 21	Attack.
12	Opn O 24	Attack Followed by Defense.
13	OI 25-3 (Doughnut)	Recon in Force, Incl Subordinate Unit Orders.
14	Opn Plan Sticky Killer	Regimental Plan For Withdrawal Through Successive Prepared Positions to Line Kansas.
8.	<u>24th Infantry Division Plans and Orders</u>	
1	Opn Plan, 4 May	Defense in Depth and Attack.
2	Opn Order No 1	Attack by Phase Lines.
3	Opn Instr No 115	Retrograde Movements.
4	Opn Instr No 119	Limited Attack to Seize Line For Covering Force (Patrol Bases).
5	Withdrawal Plan No 1	Withdrawal.
6	Counterattack Plan 1	Attack.
7	Counterattack Plan 2	Attack.
8	Counterattack Plan 3	Attack.
9	Counterattack Plan 4	Attack.
9.	<u>2nd Logistical Command Plans</u>	
1	Opn Plan No 11	Defense of Port of Pusan.
2	Opn Plan No 12	Screening Pusan Port w/ Smoke.
3	Alert Plan XRay	Security Measures.

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IV REPORTS

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TITLE AND CONTENT</u>
1.	<u>Command Reports</u>
1	EUSAK G3 Section Command Reports for May and June 51.
2	3rd Infantry Division, Guide for Preparation and Submission of Command Reports.
3	3rd Infantry Division, Command Report for Feb 51.
2.	<u>Periodic Operation Reports</u>
1	EUSAK POR #944.
2	EUSAK POR #945.
3	EUSAK POR #946.
4	EUSAK G3 Opns Report, 22 Jun 51.
5	EUSAK G3 Opns Report, 23 Jun 51.
6	EUSAK G3 POR, 24 Jun 51.
7	EUSAK Situation Overlay as of 18 July 51.
8	EUSAK Enemy Situation Overlay as of 17 July 51.
9	I Corps POR #781.
10	I Corps POR #782.
11	IX Corps POR #752 and Daily Briefing Notes.
12	X Corps POR #288.
13	1st Cavalry Division POR #530.
14	1st Cavalry Division POR #533.
15	2nd Infantry Division POR #618.
3.	<u>Miscellaneous Reports</u>
1	Patrol Analysis Chart, IX Corps.
2	Acetate Overlay Showing Detailed Organization of Line Kansas.

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V SPECIAL ITEMS

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TITLE AND CONTENT</u>
1.	<u>Army Aviation</u>
1	Org and Functional Chart, Aviation Section, EUSAK.
2	D/A Questionnaire Regarding Army Aviation.
3	Summary of Aviation Officers Conference at Taegu in April 51.
4	Aircraft Accident Prevention Letter No 2.
2.	<u>Fire Support Coordination</u>
1	Letter, 1st Cav Division Fire Support Coordination Center.
2	Letter, 2nd Inf Division Instructions Regarding Supporting Arms Fire Coordination.
3	Letter Instruction #2, 2nd Infantry Division Fire Support.
4	Letter Instruction #17, 2nd Infantry Division. Coordination of Supporting Arms.
5	3rd Infantry Division Study (Memo) Forward Observer Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.
3.	<u>Guerrilla Operations</u>
1	Organization of 8086 Army Unit.
2	Letter, Results of Operations Through 16 Jul 51.
3	Letter, Report of Operations, 17 Jul 51.
4	TWX, EUSAK, GX-271-TAC-KGOP- Instructions to Corps regarding Guerrillas.
4.	<u>Psychological Warfare</u>
1	Letter, EUSAK, 11 Feb 51, Psychological Warfare at Corps and Division Level.
2	Letter, EUSAK, 6 Apr 51, Psychological Warfare at Corps and Division Level.
3	EUSAK Psychological Warfare Bulletin 28, Jun 51, - 4 Jul 51.
4	Psychological Warfare Report No 14, Hq I Corps.
5	Psychological Warfare Report No 20, Hq I Corps.

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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TITLE AND CONTENT</u>	
6	Memo No 2, Hq IX Corps, SOP for Psychological Warfare Operations.	
7	Psychological Warfare Opns Report No 19, Hq IX Corps.	
8	52 Assorted Leaflets.	
5.	<u>Tactical Air Support</u>	
1	5 AF SOP No 55-9	SOP for ALO and TACP.
2	5 AF SOP No 55-12	Voice Control and Reporting Procedures.
3	I Corps Memo, Undated	A Suggested Fighter/Bomber Control System (Using Arty FOs to Control Strikes).
4	IX Corps Memo, 26 Mar 51.	Battalion Air Control Parties.
5	X Corps Staff Study, 25 Dec 50	Army Tactical Air Support Requirements.
6	X Corps Staff Study, Jun 51	Tactical Air Support by Radar Controlled Bombers (MPQ2).
7	X Corps Staff Study, 21 Feb 51	Tactical Air Request Net for ROK Divisions.
8	Letter Instructions #1, 2nd Inf Div, 24 Feb 51.	Bombardment Support for Infantry.
9	Letter Instructions #11, 2nd Inf Div, 11 Mar 51.	SOP for Tactical Air Support.
10	Letter Instructions #12, 2nd Inf Div, 12 Mar 51	Air Support Requests.
11	Letter, 3rd Inf Div, 12 Mar 51.	Recommendations for Improving Air-Ground Support.
12	Letter, 3rd Inf Div, 14 Apr 51	Letter on Recommendations for Improving Air-Ground Support.
13	Memo, 3rd Inf Div	How to Make Requests For Tactical Air Support.
14	JOC Mission Request Form	

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VI STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TITLE AND CONTENT</u>
1.	<u>Tactical SOPs</u>
1	I Corps Tactical SOP, 10 Sep 50.
2	X Corps SOP, 1 Jul 51.
2.	<u>SOPs For Defense of Rear Areas</u>
1	I Corps SOP for Defense of Corps and Division Rear Areas.
2	I Corps Area Defense Orders No 11.
3	I Corps Defense Against Air Attack.
4	IX Corps SOP for Defense of Corps and Division Rear Areas.
5	1st Cav Div SOP for Defense of Division Rear Area.
6	24th Infantry Div SOP for Defense of Division Rear Areas.

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VII TRAINING

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TITLE AND CONTENT</u>	
1	Training Dir #1, EUSAK,	Basic Directive.
2	Training Dir #2, EUSAK,	Cold Weather.
3	Training Dir #3, EUSAK,	Specialist School Quotas.
4	Training Dir #4, EUSAK,	Information regarding Specialist School.
5	Training Dir #5, EUSAK,	Abn Training.
6	Opn Bunker Hill - Demonstration of Inf Bn in Defense on Kansas Line - 7th Inf Division.	
7	Letter Instructions, EUSAK, 19 Jun 51, Regarding Items to be Emphasized.	
8	Letter, 1st Cav Division, 28 Jun 51, Night Operations.	

7-C-V-15


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VIII TROOP BASIS

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TITLE AND CONTENT</u>
1	Status of Units Report (Troop List) As of 20 July 51.
2	Recapitulation of Troop List by Arm and Service.
3	Additional Units Required by EUSAK w/ Justification.
4	List of Units Required Over Ceiling w/ Priorities.
5	Additional Units Required by EUSAK Within Space Allocation of 8700.
6	Division Slice (EUSAK); Percent by Arm and Service.

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AGPA-OS 200 4 (23 May 51)

28 May 1951

In all reports made as a result of this temporary duty a positive statement that the foregoing instructions have been carried out will be included.

4. Upon completion of temporary duty outside continental United States Col Bodner and Col Beaver and Lt Col Welles will proceed to Ft Monroe, Va reporting to Chief, Army Field Forces on temporary duty of approximately two (2) days in connection with Army Field Forces activities, thence return to proper station. Other officers named will return direct to proper station, upon completion of temporary duty outside continental United States.

5. TDM. Allotment authority as indicated. Within continental United States travel by railroad, bus, ship and air is authorized. Outside continental United States travel by rail, bus and military surface transportation authorized. Travel by military aircraft outside continental United States is directed when available. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (65) pounds, personal effects, is authorized while traveling by aircraft.

6. CIPAP.

7. Each officer has been cleared for access to classified information and material up to and including TOP SECRET.

8. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Chapter 2, WD Pamphlet No. 29-11, May 1947, as amended, will be complied with in regard to personal baggage, immunizations, clothing and equipment. Mail will be addressed to show grade, name, SN, Casual Personnel Section, APO 613, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

S/R. Q. EASTERLING
Adjutant General

COPY

Incl 8

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COPY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of The Adjutant General
Washington 25, D CRQE/laf/gcd/LE625
Br 54335

AGPA-OS 200 4 (23 May 51)

28 May 1951

SUBJECT: Travel Orders

AIR MAIL - SPECIAL DELIVERY

To : Officers Involved

1. Each of the following named officers will proceed from station indicated to Tokyo, Japan, thence to Korea on temporary duty of approximately thirty (30) days for the purpose of carrying out the instructions of the Chief of Army Field Forces. He will proceed to Travis Port of Aerial Embarkation, Travis Air Force Base, Fairfield, California and report not later than 14 June 1951 to the Embarkation Officer for air transportation to destination under APR NW USA 2D 7237 RA 6. Upon completion of this temporary duty, he will return proper station.

2110425 55 1028 P 432-02 S14-021	
Colonel William S. Bodner, 051393, Inf	Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, Kan
Lt Col William H. Hale, 022184, Armor	do
Major Warren K. Bennett, 035691, Inf	do
55-6029 P 432-02 S14-040 2110425 FSA	
Lt Col Dayton E. Bennett, 040212, Inf	Army General School, Ft Riley, Kansas
1-1455 P 432-02 A 2110425 S31-001	
Lt Col Edward W. Wellens, 024484, Inf	Army Airborne Center, 8575 AAU, Ft Bragg, N C
2110425 52-1131 P 432-02 S15-014	
Lt Col Howard P. Schaudt, 031673, Armor	Armored School, Ft Knox, Ky
FSA 2110425 54-1551 P 432-02 S41-014	
Colonel Francis L. Beaver, 042057, Arty	AAA & GM Center, Fort Bliss, Tex.
2110425 54-1554 P 432-02 S34-031	
Lt Col Harmon P. Rimmer, 023204, Armor	Artillery School, Ft Still, Okla.
2110425 53-4000 P 432-02 S00-196	
Lt Col Donald A. McPheron, 019555, Inf	The Infantry School, Ft Benning Georgia

2. Colonel Bodner and Colonel Beaver will proceed from present station to Fort Monroe, Virginia reporting upon arrival to the Chief, Army Field Forces for temporary duty of approximately two (2) days for the purpose of orientation and instruction, thence proceed to Travis Air Force Base, Fairfield, California for transportation to destination.

3. Colonel Beaver will immediately on arrival, as his first official act, report to the theater commander (or his designated representative in the area to be visited) informing the latter of the purpose of his visit. As practicable during his visit and in all cases on completion thereof, Col Beaver will report to the theater commander (or his designated representative) the nature and findings resulting from his visit and the substance of any report he intends to make to the Department of the Army or to the office from which he is sent.

Incl 8