


A  
000216946  
4



UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY


hia

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA  
AT LOS ANGELES



THE GIFT OF  
MAY TREAT MORRISON  
IN MEMORY OF  
ALEXANDER F MORRISON







Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2007 with funding from  
Microsoft Corporation







UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

THE  
**HISTORY OF GREECE.**

BY WILLIAM MITFORD, ESQ.

WITH HIS FINAL ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,  
A BRIEF MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR,  
BY HIS BROTHER,  
THE LATE LORD REDESDALE.



---

CAREFULLY REVISED  
BY WILLIAM KING,  
EDITOR OF THE FIRST POSTHUMOUS EDITION

---

VOL. VII.

LONDON:  
PRINTED FOR T. CADELL, STRAND; AND  
W. BLACKWOOD AND SONS, EDINBURGH.

MDCCCXXXVIII.

UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA  
AT LOS ANGELES





DF  
214  
M69h  
1838  
v.7

## CONTENTS

### OF THE SEVENTH VOLUME.

---

#### CHAPTER XL.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE END OF THE SACRED WAR TO THE ACQUISITION OF THE LEAD OF THE WAR-PARTY OF ATHENS, AND THE AUTHORITY OF FIRST MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC, BY DEMOSTHENES.

SECT. I. Change in the political state of Greece produced by the Sacred war. Policy of the party of Chares at Athens: popular interest favouring the party: prosecution of hostile purposes against Macedonia: oration of Demosthenes on the peace . . . . . Page 1

SECT. II. Short cessation of arms throughout Greece. Contest of factions at Megara: animosities in Peloponnesus: inconvenience of the Lacedæmonian political system. Propensity to desire patronage of Macedonia. Invective at Athens against Macedonia: accusation of Philocrates: decree concerning Amphipolis. Accusation of Æschines by Timarchus. Second Philippic of Demosthenes. Accusation of Æschines by Demosthenes . . . . . 9

SECT. III. Peace of Macedonia: Illyrian war: troubles in Thessaly: confirmation of Macedonian interest in Thessaly: extension of Macedonian interest in Greece . . . . . 21

SECT. IV. War of Macedonia in Thrace and Scythia. Athenian interest declining in Greece. Exertions of the war-party: colony sent to the Thracian Chersonese: Diopithes Athenian commander in Thrace: hostile conduct against Macedonia 36

#### CHAPTER XLI.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE ACQUISITION OF THE SITUATION OF FIRST MINISTER OF ATHENS BY DEMOSTHENES TILL THE ELECTION OF THE KING OF MACEDONIA TO THE OFFICE OF GENERAL OF THE AMPHICTYONIC CONFEDERACY.

SECT. I: Character of the office of first minister of Athens. Ability and diligence of Demosthenes. Negotiation with Persia. New coalition with Phocion's party. Embassy of Demosthenes to the Hellespontine cities . . . . . 52

432697

SECT. II. War of Macedonia with the Hellespontine cities. Athenian decree: letter of Philip: fourth Philippic of Demosthenes . . . . .	Page 63
SECT. III. Philip's letter to the Athenian people: oration of Demosthenes on the letter . . . . .	66
SECT. IV. Defeat of Philip's measures against the Hellespontine cities. Difficulties remaining for Demosthenes. Measures of Demosthenes for an extensive confederacy against Macedonia. Reversion of superior influence to Phocion's party, and tranquillity ensuing . . . . .	86
SECT. V. New importance of the office of Amphictyon. Sacrilege of the Amphissians. Opposition of Æschines to the measures of Demosthenes. New Sacred war. Second epistle of Isocrates to Philip. Election of Philip to the office of general of the Amphictyons . . . . .	95

## CHAPTER XLII.

## AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE ELECTION OF PHILIP KING OF MACEDONIA TO BE GENERAL OF THE AMPHICTYONS TILL HIS DEATH.

SECT. I. Extraordinary policy of Demosthenes. Confederacy of Grecian states under the influence of the Athenian war-party. Hostilities against Macedonia, without declared war. Requisition of forces for the renewed Sacred or Amphissian war. Conclusion of the renewed Sacred war . . . . .	107
SECT. II. Critical situation of the Athenian war-party: political state of Thebes: exertions of Demosthenes to gain the alliance of Thebes: contest of parties at Athens: hostile decree against Macedonia: letters of Philip to the Athenians and Thebans: Elatea garrisoned by Philip . . . . .	117
SECT. III. Singular decree of the Athenian people: embassy to Thebes: alliance of Thebes with Athens. Power of Demosthenes: operations against the king of Macedonia and the Amphictyonic army . . . . .	126
SECT. IV. Repetition of proposal from the king of Macedonia for peace. Authority of Demosthenes at Athens and at Thebes: final determination for war: preparations during winter: battle of Chæronea . . . . .	137
SECT. V. Consternation at Athens: flight of Demosthenes: condemnation of Lysicles: generosity of Philip. Arrangement for Bœotia. Liberality to Athens . . . . .	147



- SECT. VI. Persevering scrupulousness of the party of Phocion. Return of Demosthenes. Funeral oration for the slain at Chæronea. Third letter of Isocrates to Philip . . . . . Page 155
- SECT. VII. Congress of Grecian states at Corinth. The king of Macedonia elected autocrator-general of Greece for war against Persia. Preparations for war against Persia: Assassination of the king of Macedonia . . . . . 170
- [Occupation of Elatea and battle of Chæronea. From Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici* . . . . . 177]
- SECT. VIII. Anecdotes illustrating the moral and political character of Philip king of Macedonia . . . . . 181

## CHAPTER XLIII.

STATE OF THE KNOWN WORLD, MORE ESPECIALLY OF MACEDONIA, WHEN ALEXANDER, SON OF PHILIP, SUCCEEDED TO THE MACEDONIAN THRONE.

- SECT. I. State of Macedonia when Alexander, son of Philip, succeeded to the throne: circumstances of surrounding countries: Aristotle's treatise on government: constitutions of various states: examples of limited monarchy in Greece 199
- SECT. II. History of Molossis . . . . . 216
- SECT. III. Constitution of the kingdom of Macedonia 227
- SECT. IV. Comparative view of the constitutions of Thessaly, Lacedæmon, and Rome. Indications of the Thracian constitution. Despotism unknown in Europe before the rise of republican government in Greece . . . . . 252
- SECT. V. Causes of deficiency of information concerning the politics and constitutions of Greece in Philip's age. Indications in letters of Isocrates; in a speech reported by Arrian: measures of Philip, for improving the constitution of Macedonia and of the Grecian confederacy . . . . . 263

## CHAPTER XLIV.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE ACCESSION OF ALEXANDER SON OF PHILIP TO THE MACEDONIAN THRONE TILL THE CONCLUSION OF THE WAR WITH THE NORTHERN NATIONS, AND THE RESTORATION OF DISTURBED UNION AMONG THE GRECIAN REPUBLICS.

- SECT. I. Authorities for the ensuing history. Alexander's boyhood: first measures after his accession to the Macedonian

- throne : election to the supreme dignity in Thessaly : admission to his seat in the council of Amphictyons : election to the office of stateholder and captain-general of the Grecian republics . . . . . Page 283
- SECT. II. Unquiet state of Greece : Macedonia threatened by the northern nations : measures of Demosthenes : war in Thrace ; on the Danube ; in Illyria . . . . . 300
- SECT. III. Combination among the Grecian republics under Demosthenes : revolution of Thebes : Greece again divided against itself : destruction of Thebes : composition with Athens, Elea, and Ætolia, and peace restored throughout Greece. Repetition of the Macedonian Olympic festival 317

## CHAPTER XLV.

SUMMARY VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF PERSIA FROM THE REIGN OF DARIUS NOTHUS TO THE ACCESSION OF DARIUS CODOMANNUS.

- SECT. I. Circumstances of Persia in the reigns of Darius Nothus and Artaxerxes Mnemon . . . . . 347
- SECT. II. Reign of Artaxerxes Ochus : fortune of a Grecian family : revolt of Phenicia and Cyprus suppressed : Egypt reconquered : administration of Bagóas in the east and of Mentor in the west of the Persian empire. Circumstances threatening to Macedonia and all Greece : death of Ochus, and troubles ensuing : accession of Darius Codomannus 356

## CHAPTER XLVI.

ALEXANDER'S EXPEDITION AGAINST PERSIA ; FIRST CAMPAIGN.

- SECT. I. Preparations of Greece and Persia for war ; transactions previous to the passage of the Grecian army into Asia 378
- SECT. II. Passage of the Grecian army into Asia : Alexander's visit to Troy : difficulties for the direction of the march : measures of the Persian generals : battle of the Granicus 390
- SECT. III. March into Lydia : surrender of Sardis : circumstances of Ephesus and other Grecian cities of Asia. Opposition of Miletus : late arrival of the Persian fleet : Miletus taken. Efficiency of the Persian fleet obviated by measures ashore. Pecuniary distress of Alexander . . . . . 412

SECT. IV. Constitutions of Asiatic states : circumstances of Caria : Ada queen of Caria : difficulties of Memnon : siege of Halicarnassus . . . . .	Page 428
---	----------

## CHAPTER XLVII.

## ALEXANDER'S WINTER CAMPAIGN IN ASIA, AND MEASURES OF THE PERSIAN ARMAMENT UNDER MEMNON AGAINST GREECE.

SECT. I. Financial difficulties of Alexander. Winter measures : Lycia subdued. A plot against Alexander . . . . .	438
SECT. II. Character of the country and people of the interior of Lesser Asia. Pamphylia subdued. Progress of Alexander in Phrygia. Circumstances threatening to Alexander. Pisidia subdued . . . . .	447
SECT. III. Measures of the Persian armament under Memnon : conquest of Chios : progress in Lesbos : death of Memnon : conquest of Lesbos completed by Memnon's successors. The Persian land force recalled from the Grecian seas : war prosecuted by the Persian fleet . . . . .	461
SECT. IV. Recruits from Europe : embassy from Athens : story of the Gordian knot : submission of Paphlagonia and Cappadocia : Plutarch's treatise on Alexander's fortune . . . . .	467

## CHAPTER XLVIII.

## ALEXANDER'S SECOND CAMPAIGN IN ASIA.

SECT. I. March over Taurus into Cilicia : Alexander's illness at Tarsus. Measures for completing the conquest and holding possession of Cilicia. Measures of Darius : composition of his army : alliance with Lacedæmon. Hazardous situation of Alexander. Simultaneous invasion of Syria by Alexander and of Cilicia by Darius : Alexander's hasty return into Cilicia . . . . .	477
SECT. II. Numbers of the contending armies in Cilicia : battle of Issus . . . . .	498
SECT. III. Consequences of the battle of Issus, in Greece and in Asia : submission of Syria : deputation from Darius to Alexander : ministers from the adverse party in Greece to the Persian court taken . . . . .	515



- SECT. IV. Parties in Phenicia : submission of Sidon to Alexander : deputation from Tyre : siege of Tyre : second deputation from Darius : Tyre taken : siege of Gaza Page 524
- SECT. V. Expedition to Egypt. Olympian festival at Memphis. Alexander's religion. Foundation of Alexandria. Journey to the temple of Jupiter Ammon. . . . . 536

---

The Vignette on the Title-page represents SILVER COINS OF CORINTH, copied from a Specimen in the British Museum.

---

Digitized by Google

THE  
HISTORY OF GREECE.

---

---

CHAPTER XL.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE END OF THE SACRED WAR TO THE ACQUISITION OF THE LEAD OF THE WAR-PARTY OF ATHENS, AND THE AUTHORITY OF FIRST MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC, BY DEMOSTHENES.

SECTION I.

*Change in the political state of Greece, produced by the sacred war. Policy of the party of Chares at Athens: popular interest favouring the party: prosecution of hostile purposes against Macedonia: cration of Demosthenes on the peace.*

THAT contest among the Grecian republics commonly entitled the Sacred War, though terminated with far less calamity, far less subversion of the former state of things than might have been apprehended, had either Thebes or Phocis commanded the use of victory, nevertheless produced a revolution in the political circumstances of Greece very important and wholly unforeseen. The empire, as it was called, of Thebes, which had shone like a meteor under Epaminondas, but from the moment of his death had held only a sickly existence, was annihilated; except as the Theban people were confirmed in their command, truly imperial, over the people of all the other towns

SECT.  
I.

---

12

within the narrow bounds of Bœotia. Lacedæmon, after many struggles, had risen little from the low state to which Epaminondas had reduced her. On the depression of Thebes and Lacedæmon, Athens had exulted in hope of command over her sister republics, more unrivalled than in her former greatest prosperity. But that hope was thwarted by the new power, and still more by the spreading popularity of the Macedonian government; forced, after much war with Athens alone, by the invasion of Thessaly, into contest and connexion among other states south of Thermopylæ. It was comparatively little that on the Thracian shore Amphipolis and Methone had been lost, and with Olynthus and its dependencies added to a rival dominion. Macedonia was now the power to which, far more than to Thebes, Lacedæmon, and Athens together, the Grecian people were become extensively disposed to commit that protecting and combining supremacy, which had so long been the object of ambition and contest for all.

A large party in Athens, as we have seen, was disposed to rest under these circumstances, considering them as altogether even desirable; affording the best prospect, for ages offered, of means for harmonizing the jarring interests of the several republics, and establishing for their people, upon the broad basis of a liberal community in rights, a quiet and security hitherto unknown, and now more than ever wanted. But the obstacles in the political state of the country remained many and great. Every republic having views, not simply to its own good, but, through habitual jealousy, adverse to its neighbours, and every republic being divided within itself, so that fellow-citizens were more jealous of each other than of any foreigners, thus, in the very advantages of the



Macedonian connexion, new sources of contention arose.

SECT.  
I.

---

In such a state of things, to set civil discord again extensively in flame, it would suffice that a rival patronizing power was ready. This the party of Chares saw, and on it rested the policy which, after so many failures, with unwearied diligence and unabated ardour they persevered in pursuing. On a union of the democratical interest throughout Greece under their patronage they hoped to found a power capable of balancing still, and even overwhelming, the Macedonian kingdom. That they had ever wholly abandoned this purpose, that they had ever intended to keep peace with Macedonia longer than the pressure of circumstances required, the whole tenor of the orations of Demosthenes shows highly doubtful, if indeed it does not rather absolutely disprove. But they had hoped that they might maintain their commanding influence in the sovereign assembly, even during peace, till their policy might bring them means for again resorting to war with advantage. Here however they had a new disappointment. All their flattery to the king of Macedonia, and all the ability with which, in the first negotiation for peace, they had outwitted their domestic opponents, could not induce him to give his confidence to them, or withdraw it from Phocion's party.

The form of the Athenian government afforded frequent opportunity for foreign powers to interfere in its concerns in a way highly dangerous. The jealousy of democracy would little allow a regular minister for foreign affairs with sufficient power; a jealousy perhaps not altogether unreasonable, because democracy, through the common mixture of impotence with tyranny, could hardly allow it with safety. The

CHAP.  
XL.

resource was to divide the authority among numbers : at Athens the council of Fivehundred was the regular board for communicating with foreign states. But that body was too unwieldy to be properly competent for the business. From one extreme then, as was not uncommon among the democracies, the transition was immediate to another. If matters pressed, and a decided favourite of the sovereign many was ready, all authority was committed to an autocrator-general. Thus a Pericles and a Cleon, an Alcibiades and a Chares, by turns, ruled with dictatorial powers. But, in the intervals of such decisive partiality for one man, any orator who could gain the popular ear might be the effectual agent of any foreign state ; as we have seen Demosthenes for Rhodes and for Megalopolis. Macedonia was now become the foreign power of most consideration, for Athens especially, but for every other Grecian republic also with which Athens had affairs to transact. If then one party in Athens could communicate with the Macedonian government readily and upon friendly terms, and the other not so, the former would have great advantage for holding the administration ; and the other, while peace with Macedonia lasted, could not hold it but under great disadvantages. Accordingly, after the conclusion of the peace, the party of Phocion, though much impeded, and sometimes interrupted, yet mostly directed the administration and disposed of the principal offices.<sup>1</sup> In these circumstances, for the party of Chares and Demosthenes to recover the lead, new troubles were necessary, and especially a breach with Macedonia.

Demosth.  
Phil. 2. &  
de Cherson.  
Æsch. de  
Legat. sub  
fin.

<sup>1</sup> This is shown by the complaints of Demosthenes in the second Philippic, and on the Chersonese, and more expressly by the oration of Æschines on the embassy, toward the conclusion.

The actual state of the Athenian republic then afforded them invitation and even incitement. Not Chares only and the leading men of his party, orators and principal officers, but all who had acted in any favour under him, to the lowest jurymen and the last rower of a trireme, together a large proportion of the Athenian citizens, were feeling, in peace, the loss of numerous advantages and larger hopes, to which in war they had been accustomed. In war every Athenian citizen on a foreign station was a great man. The consideration he held, the authority conceded to him, the profit ensuing, the prospect of adventure ever before him, with endless hope of new advantages, were through the peace ended, to the great regret of numbers. The orators also found their principal source of gain and of hope in war. No officer could long hold foreign command without an orator ready on all occasions to undertake the defence of his conduct. An orator, not yet eminent enough to be paid for defending a general, might hope to rise by attacking a general; and often he obtained pay for abstaining from attack, when for undertaking defence he could not get employment. To increase the foreign dependencies of Athens, to have disturbance arise in those dependencies, to have complaints come to the courts of Athens, whether from foreign republics against one another or against Athenian officers, all tended to the advantage of the orators. Nor did their cause, thus bad, stand unsupported: it rested on the broad basis of the interest of thousands of citizens, who lived by the pay for attending the assemblies and courts of justice, and the feasts or other bribes given to obtain their votes. The war party then, beginning with the endeavour to procure a breach of the peace and alliance just concluded with



CHAP.  
XL.

---

Macedonia, proceeded in their purpose of acquiring power equal to their ambition by patronizing throughout Greece the party opposite to that which, for the sake of peace external and internal, might form or desire connexion with Macedonia.

B. C. 346.  
Ol. 108. 3.

The hostile purpose, already on many occasions shown, became soon more directly avowed. The right of representation in the council of Amphictyons being given to the reigning family of Macedonia, Philip, with just deference to his co-estates, sent them severally notice of it. A Thessalian embassy accompanied Philip's ministers to announce it to the new ally of Thessaly, the Athenian people, and to desire the formal acknowledgment of him, as an Amphictyon, by a decree for the purpose. In the assembly held to give audience to those ministers, some violent speeches were made in opposition to the demand. Constitutional objection to it apparently was not to be found. The adverse orators therefore, passing over all consideration of the Amphictyonic decree, endeavoured to excite indignation among the proud and irritable multitude, by speaking of the king of Macedonia's message as a requisition, resting on his own authority. 'It was unfit,' they said, 'that the Athenian people should receive commands from any king;' and some went so far as to assert that they should prefer war to an acknowledgment of the king of Macedonia as an Amphictyon.

Demosth.  
de Legat.  
p. 374.  
& de Pac.  
vel Philip. 5.

The speech of Demosthenes on the occasion remaining to us abounds with art.<sup>2</sup> Pretending to

<sup>2</sup> The objections of Libanius and Photius to the authenticity of this oration, mischievous in the too common way of critics under the Roman empire, are yet almost too futile to deserve the formal refutation of the learned author of the note on the subject in the *Ancient Universal History*. For those curious

reprove the violence of others, he effectually stimulates it. ‘He never,’ he said, ‘believed Philip’s professions of friendship for the Athenian people.’ Calling his own party only, in the ordinary party-style, the Athenian people, he was perhaps right. ‘From that friendship,’ he proceeded, ‘he looked for none of the benefits which others so freely promised. He did not admire the treaty concluded: he did not think it such as the republic should have made. And yet he must caution the people against giving provocation for the states, now calling themselves Amphictyonic, to combine in war against the republic; of which there might be danger, if the Athenian people opposed what the Amphictyonic council had decreed. If indeed they would go to war again with Philip for Amphipolis, or whatever else, in which the Thessalians, Argives, and Thebans had no common interest, the objection would not hold; because he did not believe these would join Philip, and least of all the Thebans.’ Already, it may seem, the keen-sighted politician had discovered, in the popular passions and state of factions at Thebes, the rising opportunity for leading the republic, of all Greece actually the most hostilely disposed toward Athens, to co-operate in the purposes of his party. But some stir and murmuring among the people admonished him that he must yet be cautious in speaking of Thebes. Proceeding therefore he said:

SECT.  
I.

---

Demosth.  
de Pace, vel  
Philip. 5.

on the subject however that note may deserve attention. But I would invert the added argument, ascribing the oration to Demosthenes, ‘because he is worthy of it,’ and rather say, I ascribe it to Demosthenes, ‘because it is worthy of him;’ and to warrant this I would refer to the next following note in the same work.



CHAP.  
XL.

---

‘ Let there not be tumult before I am heard : I repeat, ‘ least of all the Thebans. Not that they bear us any ‘ friendship ; not that they are not enough disposed ‘ to court Philip ; but because, however stupid any ‘ among you may suppose them, they know perfectly ‘ that their country lies between us and their allies ; ‘ whence, if they were to join with Macedonia in war ‘ against us, the pressure would fall upon them, while ‘ another, the principal director of measures, would ‘ profit most from any success.’ With consummate art then he directed the conclusion of his speech, through an argument professing the purpose of peace, to prepare among the people for ready use the fuel of war, ambition, cupidity, and resentment. ‘ We ‘ allow the Thebans,’ he said, ‘ to hold Oropus ; we ‘ have, by the late treaty, surrendered Amphipolis to ‘ Philip ; we have consented that Cardia shall be se- ‘ parated from our dominion of the Chersonese ; that ‘ the prince of Caria shall be the protecting power of ‘ Chios, Cos, and Rhodes ; and that the Byzantines ‘ may stop our ships.’ The Byzantines, independent since the Confederate war, and holding the command of the Bosphorus, took that toll from all ships passing to and from the Black Sea, which the Athenian government had exacted while Byzantium was under its dominion. ‘ Would it not then,’ he proceeded, ‘ be absurd, conceding thus to these powers important ‘ advantages properly our own,’ (as if the people of Cardia, Chios, Cos, Rhodes, and Byzantium were born to live under the dominion of the people of Athens,) ‘ to engage in war with all together for a ‘ shadow at Delphi ?’ The hostile mind is certainly enough exhibited in this speech for peace. What decision immediately followed we have no precise in-

formation; but, in the end, the advice of the more violent orators prevailed, and it was by a decree declared that the Athenian people did not admit the claim of the king of Macedonia to be an Amphictyon.

SECT.  
II.

Demosth.  
de Legat.  
p. 398.

## SECTION II.

*Short cessation of arms throughout Greece. Contest of factions at Megara: animosities in Peloponnesus: inconvenience of the Lacedæmonian political system. Propensity to desire patronage of Macedonia. Invective at Athens against Macedonia: accusation of Philocrates: decree concerning Amphipolis. Accusation of Æschines by Timarchus. Second Philippic of Demosthenes. Accusation of Æschines by Demosthenes.*

FULL of the spirit of discord as all Greece at this time remained, every republic hostile to many others, and each divided within itself, yet the conclusion of the Sacred war brought repose to the country so far that contest in arms seems everywhere to have ceased. According to the avowal of Demosthenes himself the Greeks very generally rejoiced in the peace, and were disposed to maintain it. Conformably to this testimony of the contemporary orator, the next year, the fourth of the hundred and eighth Olympiad, is remarkable in the narrative of the annalist for a void in Grecian affairs; with exception only for what little concerned Greece generally, the expedition, formerly related, of Timoleon from Corinth to Sicily: the very name of Macedonia is unmentioned.

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 240.

B. C. 345.  
Ol. 108. 4.

[B.C. 344.  
Cl.]

But the fire of faction did not long remain so smothered. In the little republic of Megara, formerly observed flourishing through industry in manufacture, the high democratical party, supported by the high democratical party in Athens, held the sway. As then that party in Athens was hostile to

Ch. 28.  
s. 9. of th<sup>e</sup>.  
Hist.

CHAP.  
XL.

---

Demosth.  
de Legat.  
p. 436.

Macedonia, the party dependent on it in Megara would also be hostile to Macedonia; and thence the views of the adverse party would be the more directed to Macedonian patronage, which was becoming so extensively an object of desire. Accordingly Ptæodorus, head of the noblest and wealthiest family of that little state, went to Pella. Of course he would be civilly received; but whether he obtained assistance, or reason to hope for assistance, appears uncertain. His principal encouragement seems rather to have been derived from the circumstances of Athens; the party of Chares, patrons of his opponents, no longer holding their former commanding influence there. The danger of their interference thus being, though not removed, yet rendered less imminent, he ventured upon what had enabled Hermocrates to return to Sicily, and Dion to acquire command in Syracuse, and so many other chiefs of parties to obtain a superiority in their republics: he introduced into Megara a body of mercenary troops. But, whether the more respectable of those within or without his own state, otherwise disposed to support him, disapproved this measure, or pecuniary means failed him, or for whatever other cause, the mercenaries were soon dismissed; civil contest was renewed, and the democratical party appears to have recovered the ascendancy.<sup>3</sup>

The troubles of Megara however seem little to

<sup>3</sup> Leland seems to have thought himself warranted, by loose expressions of Demosthenes, unless he was rather led by his French conductor, to assert (what Demosthenes would not venture to assert, though he might desire it should be believed) that the mercenaries under Ptæodorus were secretly paid by the king of Macedonia. It were endless to notice all instances of this kind among modern writers of Macedonian history. The translator Auger's introductions and notes abound with them.



have affected any state beyond the mountains which pressed upon its small territory on one side, and the sea on the other. But Peloponnesus meanwhile was disturbed with contention more extensively threatening. The Lacedæmonians persevered in their purpose of recovering the dominion of Messenia, while the Argives, a majority of the Arcadians, and a party among the Eleans were scarcely less zealous in opposition to it than the Messenians themselves. Unfortunately for Lacedæmon, its government, through extreme peculiarities, could associate intimately with none. The institutions of Lycurgus were scarcely less adverse to any close connexion with a king of Macedonia than with the democracies of Athens, Argos, or Megalopolis; nor were the deviations from his system, the pretensions of the ephors, the extravagant privileges of the Spartans, or any others of which we are informed, of a kind to render it more accommodating. Inflexibility remained the inconvenient virtue of the Lacedæmonian government, as extreme pliability was the commodious vice of the Athenian. The Athenian democracy seems to have formed alliance with tyrannies as readily and intimately as with any other government, and adopted kings, and satraps, and tyrants, in Cyprus, in Thessaly, in Eubœa, in Sicily, of good character or bad, with apparent indifference, as its citizens.

The inferior Peloponnesian states then, accustomed for ages to look to some one powerful government for patronage, would be little likely now, wretched as they were through their divisions, to revolt at the idea of the patronage of a prince of the advantageous character of Philip, the renowned and beloved sovereign of a free people. It is then remarkable that a zeal for Macedonian patronage, an earnestness for

NL

CHAP.  
XL.

---

Macedonian interference in the affairs of their peninsula, was particularly vehement among the people most vehemently democratical; and the testimony to this comes from no suspicious quarter, but from the great leader of the democratical cause in Greece, Demosthenes. The Argives and Megalopolitans, spurning at the obtruded patronage of Athens, but feeling keenly the want of a superintending power, though they had received no favour from Philip, scarcely had had any intercourse with him, yet for the mere popularity of his reputation sent him golden crowns, erected brazen statues of him in their cities, and passed decrees, providing that, should he come into Peloponnesus, hospitality should everywhere await him. In Elea, parties being more balanced, arms were taken, and much blood was shed; but the Macedonian party was finally victorious.

Demosth.  
de Legat.  
p. 424. 425.

Far beyond the power of the Macedonian arms, this spreading popularity of Philip's conduct and character was alarming and distressing to the war-party at Athens; the extravagance of it, in some places, indeed appearing to have been what might perhaps justly excite apprehension in men of better purposes. This therefore it was their first object to obviate and bear down; and the extravagance itself would assist to furnish them with ground for exciting jealousy of it. If they could raise suspicion and jealousy of Macedonia, the progress would be ready to suspicion and jealousy of their opponents of the party of Phocion. They did not spare the commonplace invective of the democratical orators, imputing, in the grossest terms, without care of proof, corruption against all their opponents. But Philip especially, and Philip's family, and all Macedonia to-



gether, they were sedulous to vilify. In a council of limited number, uncertainly composed even as that of the Fivehundred of Athens, more gravity and decency might be expected than in the assembly of the whole people. Nevertheless Demosthenes, not contented with gross invective against the king of Macedonia, indulged himself there in scandalous insinuations against the boy Alexander his son. Æschines, relating before the assembled people what he had witnessed in the council, of which he, as well as Demosthenes, was a member, justly admonished them that, if such injurious and base aspersion passed unreprieved, the Athenian character would be estimated among foreigners by that of their calumnious orator.

Æsch. in  
Timarch.

But, notwithstanding the success of the war-party in procuring refusal to acknowledge the king of Macedonia as an Amphictyon, they could not yet drive the party of Phocion from the administration. Their next resource therefore was impeachment. They threatened all who had been colleagues of Demosthenes in that embassy to Macedonia which became distinguished by the title of the embassy for the oaths. But while they held out the alarm of imputed guilt to all, they selected one for their first attack, and their choice was evidently judicious. Philocrates, who had moved the repeal of the decree forbidding intercourse of heralds with Macedonia, and afterward became one of the most zealous promoters of the peace and alliance, appears to have been of some eminence by birth and wealth, and sometimes useful to the party of Phocion by his zeal, activity, and fearlessness, though without great talents, or dignity of character. When it was the object of the party of Chares to reconcile and recommend itself to the

CHAP.  
XL.

Macedonian court, Demosthenes appears to have considered Philocrates as a man whose friendship might be gained and would be useful; and hence apparently he became his advocate when prosecuted for moving the repeal of the decree forbidding communication by heralds. When afterward, on the failure of the Phocian plot, the party became anxious to hasten a separate peace and alliance between Athens and Macedonia, the zeal of Philocrates was a ready instrument, which Demosthenes used with much dexterity. But when, shortly after, the purpose of the party with regard to Macedonia was wholly changed, and a breach with that power became again as a first principle of its policy, then the intimacy of Demosthenes with Philocrates of course would cease, and the change could hardly stop short of enmity. Not Demosthenes however, but Hyperides, an orator of considerable eminence, undertook the management of the prosecution. Whether Philocrates had implicated himself imprudently with Demosthenes, or for whatever other cause, there appears to have been no general disposition in the party of Phocion to give him effectual support. To avoid therefore the danger of a trial he withdrew from Attica; possibly, after the example of men of higher character, having provided a retreat, which might make banishment from the turbulence of Athens little a punishment. His flight being taken, after the manner of the Athenian courts, as a confession of guilt, sentence was pronounced against him.

Æsch. de  
Legat.

Ibid. p. 192.

This victory, through the ingenuity and diligence of the party in using it, was not a little important. Hegesippus, a coarse but popular orator, vehement in the cause of Chares and democracy, proposed a decree, declaring that the cession of the dominion of

Amphipolis, by the treaty of peace lately concluded with Macedonia, was injurious to the republic, and that the people in giving sentence against Philocrates who proposed it, had effectually decided so; wherefore the right to that dominion remained still entire in the Athenian people. This receiving the sanction of the popular vote, the orator proceeded to state that in the treaty was an article providing that, with the consent of both parties, any alterations might be made. It would therefore, he contended, be proper to announce to the Macedonian court the decree of the people, asserting their right to the dominion of Amphipolis, notwithstanding anything now in the treaty to the contrary, and to require that the treaty should be rectified accordingly. This also being approved by a majority of votes, Hegesippus himself was appointed ambassador from the republic for the occasion. Coming on so ungracious an errand, it appears indicated that, though received with Philip's usual civility, his conduct was offensive and even treacherous. Demosthenes, in a speech of two or three years after, mentions that Xenocides, a poet, who had been entertained at the Macedonian court, was ordered to leave the kingdom for his practices with the Athenian embassy. Demosthenes has enough shown that fearfulness and illiberality were no features in Philip's character; and desiring, on this occasion, to impress the people with an opinion that he had treated their ambassadors with incivility, he had nothing to impute but the dismissal of the poet Xenocides.<sup>4</sup>

Demosth.de  
Halon.p.82.

Demosth.de  
Legat.  
p. 447.

<sup>4</sup> The conduct of ministers under the late French democracy, and the following empire, will afford, for future commentators on the Greek orators, illustration which the learned of former times very much wanted.



B. C. 345.  
Ol. 108. 4.

Demosth.  
Philip. 2.\*  
p. 70.

About the time of the mission of Hegesippus to Macedonia, the convulsed state of Peloponnesus produced a congress of delegates from all or many of its governments. Demosthenes, in what character or on what pretence does not clearly appear, attended this congress, and spoke in it. His purpose was to obviate the growing propensity to the Macedonian alliance, and to persuade the Peloponnesians, especially the Messenians and Argives, to accept in preference the patronage of the Athenian democracy. His eloquence was applauded, but his arguments, in his own confession, produced in no degree the effect he desired.

Failing thus abroad, so the party nevertheless felt their strength at home that they resolved to proceed with impeachment, and to make *Æschines*, the most powerful speaker of the opposing party, their next object. But they were not judicious or not fortunate in committing the management to *Timarchus*, though an orator of considerable eminence; for his scandalous immorality afforded opportunity under the old law, after the manner of all the old Grecian constitutions regulating the morals, for accusation against himself. This *Æschines* used so ably that all the influence of the party and all the eloquence of *Demosthenes* were unable to save him; he was obliged to follow *Philocrates* in flight. Party interest, no doubt, operated powerfully to promote, as well as to oppose, this decision; for which nevertheless, in justice, some credit may be due to the Athenian character of this corrupt age; when the multitudinous tribunal so supported the principles and gave efficacy to the laws

[\* This Philippic is placed B. C. 344. by Mr. Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* p. 360.]

of elder times (for the law of the case was much and ably argued by the accuser) as to supply the place of the great censorial court of Areopagus, whose power Isocrates had been so anxious to restore.

The advantage gained by the war-party in the triumph over Philocrates was lost by this defeat. A sense of the failure of public favour, and a consequent uncertainty of preponderance in the general assembly, are strongly marked in that exquisite piece of oratory, soon after delivered by Demosthenes, commonly called the Second Philippic. The exordium, expressly complaining of that failure and that uncertainty, is singularly soothing and insinuating. With admirable art then, winding through a great variety of matter in short space, all proposed to conciliate the popular mind to himself and his friends, and to irritate it against the king of Macedonia and those who would maintain the treaty of peace with him, not till the conclusion at length the orator intimates the purpose of his party, for the disclosure of which all that had preceded was preparation, to institute a prosecution for high treason against Æschines, now to be conducted by himself.

To the war of oratory that followed between Æschines and Demosthenes we owe not only the orations the most admired that have been transmitted from antiquity, but also the most copious and most authentic information of the political circumstances and transactions of this interesting era, and the best insight especially into the civil circumstances of Athens, the constitution, the administration, and the party contests; with the advantage, uncommon for ancient history, of means often for verification by confronting the assertions of opposite interests. Demosthenes seems to have depended much upon the



CHAP.  
XL.

power of his party, and the influence of party interest in the multitudinous courts of Athens, for the success of his accusation ; which was such as otherwise there could hardly be a hope of supporting. It applied to the conduct of Æschines in the second embassy to Macedonia, called the embassy for the oaths ; stating ‘ that he made a false report of the ‘ transactions of the embassy, and of various matters ‘ deeply interesting the republic, and that he prevented the people from hearing the true representation, which Demosthenes would have given ; ‘ that he persuaded the people in assembly to measures adverse to their interest ; that he disobeyed ‘ his instructions ; that he occasioned a waste of time ‘ for the embassy, whence great opportunities were ‘ lost ; and that the whole of his conduct was influenced by bribes, which he, together with Philocrates, took from the king of Macedonia.’ The proof offered on all these heads was what, in an English court of justice, would excite indignation against the accuser rather than induce conviction of the accused. Nor will the political principles, occasionally declared, find general approbation, though they deserve notice. ‘ To make eternal peace,’ says Demosthenes, ‘ with a mortal man, whose utmost ‘ greatness must be transient ; to bind up all posterity ‘ from the right to use advantageous opportunities ‘ that Fortune might offer, is most heinous.’ In conformity to this principle he proceeds, ‘ the Phocian war was a great source of security for Athens, ‘ and the conclusion of such lasting hostilities was, ‘ among great advantages, lost to the republic, for ‘ which Æschines is accountable.’ And again, ‘ Had ‘ the war been successful, you would not have borne ‘ the name of peace.’ At the same time he acknow-

Demosth.  
Philip. 2.  
p. 358. [De  
Legat.]

p. 367.

p. 372.

p. 412.

ledges that Philip was always desirous of peace, which, he also intimates, was among reasons why peace should not have been made with him.

These principles Demosthenes seems never to have scrupled avowing. But in the accusation he appears to have felt that he had a bad cause to support. The disorder which critics have observed in his arrangement has been evidently the result, not of unskilfulness or negligence, but of design. It has been ingeniously imagined, to bewilder the judgment of his hearers, and draw away attention from the inconclusiveness of the arguments relating to the several points; while the object was to impress a general idea of disaffection to the popular cause, injury to the public interest, and corruption from the Macedonian court. But some of the arguments and some of the assertions of facts seem beneath a great orator and statesman, even in addressing a multitude, unless such as the Athenian, and putting forward a party cause.

In the reply of Æschines there is far more general dignity of manner, as well as more regularity of arrangement; mixed indeed with some very coarse personal abuse of the accuser, whose private life appears to have afforded opportunity, and the practice of republican courts furnished continual precedents. Every point of the accusation he seems to have so repelled that no conscientious jury could have given a verdict against him. Among the circumstances, not least remarkable, is the offer of his slaves to be examined under torture; and yet not less remarkable perhaps is the refusal of it by the accuser; with no motive of humanity alleged, but the consideration of his own dignity only, as unfit to be compromised

Æsch. de  
Legat.  
p. 295.

CHAP.  
XL.Demosth.  
de Legat.

by taking the evidence of slaves against his assertion; though he had himself brought forward a slave as a witness for the accusation. The confidence of the accused in the fidelity and fortitude of his slaves at the same time may excite our admiration; while the evident familiarity of the practice of putting them to torture will hardly excuse his proposal of it.<sup>5</sup> To weaken the purpose of justice through influence of popular respect and pity, the father, at the great age of ninety-four years, and the brothers and the children of the accused were, as usual in the Athenian courts, brought forward. For this measure however he has alleged a worthier object; to show the improbability that, bound to the commonwealth by such pledges, he could be false to its interest. Demosthenes, in his accusation, to excite indignation, at the same time against the accused and against the king of Macedonia, gave an affecting account of the miserable state of the Phocian people, and the desolation of their country, which, in traversing it lately, he had seen. To obviate the effect of this, some of the principal Phocian and Bœotian refugees, attending as witnesses, confirmed the account which remains in the speech of Æschines, of the exertions of the king of Macedonia, and of Æschines himself as a member of the Athenian embassy to the Amphictyons, in favour of both people. The speech of the accused being concluded, some of the most respectable men of the commonwealth, Eubulus, Nausicles, and, above all, Phocion, came forward and

<sup>5</sup> A similar offer and refusal of the evidence of slaves under torture has been noticed in the first section of the twenty-second chapter of this History.

spoke in favour of his cause. So supported, he was acquitted.<sup>6</sup>

## SECTION III.

*Peace of Macedonia: Illyrian war: troubles in Thessaly: confirmation of Macedonian interest in Thessaly: extension of Macedonian interest in Greece.*

By the peace with Athens, and the ensuing conclusion of the Sacred war, with the settlement of the affairs of Phocis and Delphi to the general satisfaction of the Greek nation, Philip acquired a leisure which seems to have been wanted for arranging the affairs of his increased dominions, and for directing the attention of the Macedonian government toward pre-

<sup>6</sup> From the licentiousness of the Greek historical writers of the later times of the republics in asserting without authority, whence Juvenal's 'Græcia mendax,' those under the Roman empire proceeded to licentiousness in denying, or in questioning, what had been largely authorized. An example from Juvenal himself has been formerly noticed. It may not be unnecessary here to remark an instance from Plutarch. Till his time it seems to have remained undoubted, through more than four enlightened centuries, that the prosecution of Æschines by Demosthenes was brought to issue, and that the celebrated speeches on the subject, by the two great orators, were actually spoken by them. Plutarch, admitting the authenticity of the orations, has asserted his doubt if they were really spoken, on the negative ground only, that no mention is found of them in two speeches of the same orators, delivered nearly twenty years after. The improbability that two such speeches would have been published, if the trial had not come to issue, might perhaps overbalance such an objection. But when the tradition and assent of more than four enlightened centuries had fixed the credit of their having been actually spoken, the question started by Plutarch seems as frivolous and presumptuous as the spirit of putting forward such questions, on ill-founded or weak surmise, is mischievous.



CHAP.  
XL.

B. C. 345.  
Ol. 108. 4.

B. C. 344.  
Ol. 109. 1.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 69.

servation of quiet on its extensive border against the numerous warlike predatory tribes of the northern continent. Judging from the total failure of notice of Macedonian affairs among ancient writers for the first year after the Sacred war, it seems probable that the Macedonian government, though not free from necessity for attending to the hostile disposition of all its northern neighbours, as well as to the avowed purposes of the war-party at Athens, was mostly intent upon its internal concerns. In the following year an army was marched into Illyria. Between the people of that country and Macedonia enmity, in the historian's words, was hereditary, and contest interminable.<sup>7</sup> What now particularly excited exertion we are not informed; nor is more said of the consequences than that the Macedonians prevailed so far that many small towns were taken, and much booty was carried off.

While the Macedonian arms were thus engaged, the old party of the tyrants in Thessaly, allies of Athens, connected especially with the war-party, were encouraged to stir again. Philip hastened to the support of his friends there. The disturbances were soon suppressed: but, the former lenient conduct having been found ineffectual for the peace of the country, severer measures were taken. Still however they were far milder than those ordinary with the republican governments, whether against strangers

<sup>7</sup> ... Φίλιππος, πατρικὴν ἔχθραν διαδεδεγμένος πρὸς Ἰλλυριοὺς, καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἀμετάθετον ἔχων, κ. τ. λ. Diod. l. 16. c. 69. Rhodoman and Wesseling's translation of this passage exhibits remarkably the malice, already noticed as common among modern translators, commentators, and authors, on Macedonian history: *Philippus odii Illyriorum, quod quasi hereditarium a patre acceperat, et controversiæ, quam pertinaciter fovebat, stimulis incitatus, &c.*



or adverse fellow-citizens. The strength of the insurgent party lay in Pheræ, the seat of government of the late tyrants. To prevent future insurrection, without resorting to capital punishment, or even expulsion from the country, a part, and probably a large part, of the Pheræan citizens was removed only to other towns; and, to obviate necessity for carrying the severity to a greater number, less able to bear the expense of removal, a garrison was put in the citadel. The Athenian orators, who could approve, not only the assassination of a king of Thrace, their adopted fellow-citizen, but the massacre of the Sestian people, were not ashamed to exclaim against these measures, however requisite for the quiet of the established free government of Thessaly, and of a large majority of the people. Yet we find Demosthenes, on one occasion, led by his argument to acknowledge Philip's popularity among the Thessalians, and to admit that it was the result of beneficial conduct towards them, especially in ejecting their tyrants; a title which, remarkably enough, he gives the Pheræan chiefs, patronized by the Athenian people. Diodorus, it may deserve to be observed, in his own words, has described the measures thus briefly: 'Philip ejected the tyrants, and gained completely the good will of the Thessalians.' Nor was the advantage resulting limited to Thessaly; for, the fame of his popular conduct spreading, 'the neighbouring Grecian states,' proceeds the historian, 'concurring in the opinion of the Thessalians, became eager to be associated with them in the advantages of the Macedonian alliance.'<sup>8</sup>

SECT.  
III.

Demosth.  
de Halon.  
p. 84.

De Halon.  
p. 84. &  
Philip. 3.  
p. 117. 119.

Demosth.  
de Cherson.  
p. 105.

<sup>8</sup> ... τοὺς τυράννους ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἐκβαλὼν, ἰδίους ταῖς εὐνοίαις ἐποίησατο τοὺς Θετταλοὺς ἠλπιζε γὰρ, τούτους ἔχων συμμαχοῦς, καὶ τοὺς Ἑλληνας φραδίᾳ εἰς εὐνοίαν προτρέψασθαι ὅπερ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι· εὐθὺς γὰρ οἱ πλησιόχωροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, συνεχνεχθέντες τῇ

CHAP.  
XL.Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 245.

On the other hand this disposition, so extensive in Greece, adverse to the ambition of Athens, is thus remarkably described by Demosthenes: ‘ Philip had a great advantage ; for there was, among the Greeks, not some but all alike, a flood of traitors, bribe-takers, men odious to the gods, such as none ever before knew, whom Philip took for his partizans and assistants. Civil discord and mutual malevolence prevailed enough before in Greece ; but he inflamed them ; cajoling some, making presents to others, corrupting in all ways.’ A kind of magic in the arrangement of words, peculiar, even in the Greek language, to the powers of Demosthenes, and not to be transfused into a translation, has fixed the attention of ancients and moderns upon this passage. Diodorus more candid than judicious or careful of consistency, taking it for historical matter, has copied it in his own work ; unheeding that portrait, which should be the historian’s object, is foreign to the orator’s business ; who, like the painter of the higher classes, takes his subject indeed from nature, but arranges, compounds, diversifies, places in light or in shadow, on foreground or in distance, adds or omits, as may suit the effect desired for the design in his mind. Philip’s real bribery was the security which his patronage afforded against faction within every republic, and war from close neighbours without. How he received the various applications made to him, or what connexion he really formed with any of the states, we have no trustworthy and scarcely any intelligible information. We may however believe Demosthenes that, in a dispute between the Ætoliens and Achæans, about

Demosth.  
Phil. 3.  
p. 120.

τῶν Θετταλῶν κρίσει, συμμαχίαν προθύμως πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐποίησαντο.  
Diod. l. 16. c. 69.

the town of Naupactus, once the refuge of the unfortunate Messenians, which seems to have been referred to his arbitration, he decided in favour of Ætolia; and that he favoured the claim of his kinsman, Alexander, king of Epirus, to a territory on the border of Acarnania, against the Acarnanian people. The Acarnanians, or a strong party of them, through some tissue of interests unexplained to us, were among the people of Greece most disposed to the Athenian cause. Demosthenes thought their alliance important enough to induce him to undertake himself embassy to them, and it seems to have been the mission in which he was most successful. A decision of Philip therefore, with whatever justice, adverse to their interest, would earn his unfavourable animadversion.

Phil. 4.  
p. 134.  
de Halon.  
p. 84.  
de Cherson.  
p. 119.

Meanwhile in Athens the failure in the prosecution of Æschines, disappointing to the immediate hopes of the party, and visibly, even in extant orations, checking to the great orator who conducted it, nevertheless little damped the ardour or abated the industry of those who acted with him: on the contrary, his ensuing reserve, leaving an opener career for the minor speakers, perhaps rather excited their zeal and industry. The little island of Halonnesus, near the Thessalian coast, formerly subject to Athens, whether through negligence or connivance of the Athenian naval commanders, had been occupied by Sostratus, a chief of pirates who acknowledged, or at least formally acknowledged, no sovereign. A Macedonian force expelled Sostratus, and reduced the island under the Macedonian dominion. The orators of the party of Chares, passive under the occupancy of the island by a pirate, urged the people to claim it from the king of Macedonia. The principle asserted by the

B. C. 343.  
Ol. 109. 2.

Demosth.  
de Halon.  
Epist.  
Phil. ap.  
Demosth.  
or. in Epist.



CHAP.  
XL.

party, that whatever, by right or wrong, the Athenian people had once possessed must ever thereafter of right be theirs, that a surrender by a formal decree of the sovereign assembly did not bind the people, if in another assembly they voted that they had been ill-advised by the orator who moved it, had so been sanctioned in the recent decree about Amphipolis that either to controvert the doctrine, or oppose the measure proposed as founded on it, might be hazardous. The party however so prevailed that an embassy was sent to Macedonia, specially to assert the claim.

Demosth.  
de Halon.  
p. 77.

B. C. 342.  
Ol. 109. 3.  
[Cf. p. 29.]

Philip answered the mission in the way esteemed most friendly and respectful on such occasions, sending an embassy to Athens, with a representation in writing from himself, in the form, then usual, of a letter to the Athenian people. The letter unfortunately remains known only by such extracts as an orator, of the fiercest and coarsest of the high democratical party, selected for the purpose of a speech in the general assembly; and yet, even in these, the liberality and moderation of the prince who wrote it are conspicuous. He has evidently proposed to use the opportunity of the question, so offensively made about the little island of Halonnesus, for endeavouring to settle upon equitable and liberal terms some far more important affairs, which required arrangement between the two governments, to prevent the threatened disturbance of the peace so lately concluded between them. ‘About Halonnesus,’ he said, ‘there should be no difficulty; he would give it to the Athenian people. Two other matters more pressed upon his consideration; to deliver the Grecian seas from the common pest of piracy, and to provide for the just settlement of disputes frequently occurring



‘ in commercial intercourse between Macedonian and Athenian subjects.’ For the former purpose he proposed the united exertion of the Athenian and Macedonian naval forces, and, for the latter, to enter upon a treaty of commerce. He complained then, in gentle terms, of the decree relating to Amphipolis; referring to the treaty of peace to evince its injustice, or, as, apparently to avoid irritation, he rather termed it, mistake. The Athenian government, in sending its notices about Amphipolis and Halonnesus, had added remonstrances on some other matters. Promises of measures for the benefit of the republic, perhaps relating to affairs in Eubœa, they said, had not been performed: some small towns on the Thracian coast, usually acknowledging the sovereignty of the Athenian people, they asserted, had been taken by the Macedonian arms after the conclusion of the peace; and, in some measures injurious to the ancient right of the Athenian people to the dominion of the Chersonese, the Cardians had been encouraged and supported by Macedonian officers. To these complaints Philip replied, ‘ that he never made any such promises as those claimed of him for benefits to the Athenian people. With regard to the towns in Thrace, he did not desire to be judge in his own cause; he would refer the matter (a mode usual among the Grecian states) to the arbitration of neutral powers; and he would engage that the Cardians, who reckoned that, instead of injuring the Athenians, they had been injured by them, should also refer to similar arbitration the question of right to the lands claimed by Athenian settlers.’<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> This explanation of the dispute with the Cardians is found in Philip’s letter to the Athenians, preserved with the oration of Demosthenes on the letter.

CHAP.  
XL.

The king's letter having been read to the assembled Athenian people, his ambassadors were allowed to address them in speech. Of these Python of Byzantium was of celebrated eloquence. He seems however to have added little to the written matter, except to remonstrate on the illiberal invective and scandalous calumny against the sovereign whom he represented, in which the Athenian orators were accustomed to find indulgence from their sovereign.

Demosthenes, after his recent failure against Æschines, would not be likely to remit that caution which has been noticed in his oration commonly called the Second Philippic. Though he spoke on the occasion, yet the more violent declamation, which the purposes of the party required, seems to have been committed to a secondary orator; and the speech, transmitted among the works of Demosthenes, entitled 'The Oration on Halonnesus,' has, by ancient and modern critics, on probable ground, been attributed to Hegesippus, already mentioned as mover of the decree about Amphipolis, and afterward ambassador to Macedonia. That oration differs widely in character, not only from the Second Philippic, but from everything remaining from Demosthenes. Not only it is inferior, as the critics have observed, in style, but wholly wants the neatness of delusive reasoning, the subtilty of insinuation, avoiding assertion, the wonderfully ingenious texture of phrase, calculated to infuse falsehood into the hearer's belief without pledging the speaker, the whole art, in which Demosthenes has so singularly excelled, of making the worse appear the better cause, disguising with fair colours the foulest forms, and recommending monsters by the grace and splendour of the robes with which he could veil their hideousness.<sup>10</sup> The oration

Liban. arg.  
or. de  
Halon.

<sup>10</sup> 'Ο Ἰσαῖος. Ἦν δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ δόξα, παρὰ τοῖς τότε, γοητείας

on Halonnesus marks no purpose of even imitating Demosthenes. It carries every appearance of originality; plain and coarse in its violence, and careless of all decencies.

‘ I will answer the letter,’ said the orator, ‘ article by article. Philip will give you Halonnesus, he says, as if it was of any right his to give, being taken from pirates who had a right to nothing. Why did not he say he would restore it? And he has proposed reference to the arbitration of neutral powers. This is ridiculous, but it is insulting too. Truly it becomes the Athenian people, deliverers of Greece, to contend juridically about islands with a man of Pella! Is not your own navy able to do you justice? If you commit decision about islands to the arbitration of neutral powers, will it be less than declaring that you abandon your right to re-assert your dominion over so many continental territories, of which you have been deprived?’

Having boldly thus warned the Grecian states of Asia and the islands what they must expect from the policy of his party, should they acquire power to follow up their policy, the orator proceeds to the consideration of the proposal for a treaty of commerce; a subject interesting enough to excite regret that the

SECT.  
III.

Or. de  
Halon. p.77.  
[B. C. 343.  
Cl.]  
p. 78.

καὶ ἀπάτης, ὡς δεινὸς ἀνὴρ τεχνιτεῦσαι λόγους ἐπὶ τὰ πονηρότερα, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο διεβάλλετο. Δηλοῖ δὲ τοῦτο τῶν ἀρχαίων τις ῥητόρων, ἐν τῇ Δημοσθένους κατηγορίᾳ, Πυθίας, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ πονηρίαν γὰρ τῷ Δημοσθένει καὶ κακίαν τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πᾶσαν ἐνοικεῖν φῆσαι. Καὶ τότε τὸ μέρος ὅλον εἰς διαβολὴν ἐπιτίθησιν, ὅτι τὸν Ἰσαῖον ὅλον καὶ τὰς τῶν λόγων ἐκείνου τέχνας σεσίτισται. Καὶ μὰ Δία οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ τὴν διαβολὴν ταύτην εἶχεν ἑκάτερος. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν οἱ μὲν Ἰσαῖοι τε καὶ Δημοσθένους λόγοι καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀληθείας καὶ δικαίας συντάξεως αἱ ὑποθέσεις ὑποπτοὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, τῆς πολλῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως ἕνεκα· οἱ δὲ Ἰσοκράτους καὶ Λυσίου παντὸς μάλιστα δίκαιοί τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς. Dion. Hal. in Isæo, pp. 104. 105. ed. Sylburg.



CHAP.  
XL.

---

passage relating to it is not throughout clearly intelligible.<sup>11</sup> One part however, perfectly plain, will deserve notice : ‘ Experience,’ says the orator, ‘ shows ‘ that the proposed new jurisdiction for commercial ‘ matters is needless. Under Amyntas, father of ‘ Philip, and former Macedonian kings, none such ‘ existed, when there was more communication than ‘ now between the Macedonian and Athenian people ; ‘ for Macedonia was then subject to us, and paid us ‘ tribute.’ It is not improbable that ground for this strong assertion may have existed, so far that Amyntas found it convenient, like so many other powers around the Ægean, to compound for free navigation for his subjects.

Philip’s proposal for combined energy of the Macedonian and Athenian navies to abolish piracy in the Grecian seas appears to have put the orator to most difficulty. It was very much against the interest of the Athenian naval commanders that piracy should be abolished ; and it was also against the interest of the orators ; not only as they were connected with the

<sup>11</sup> Leland has given up the passage as inexplicable ; and Auger, after an attempt, far from satisfactory, to explain in translation what relates expressly to commerce, confesses himself unable to discover what the matter of Potidæa, brought in by the orator, has to do with the general question. Thus much however seems altogether clear, that Philip’s proposition was founded on his persuasion that commercial disputes, arising in the Macedonian territory, and so carried before Macedonian courts, were generally decided with liberal justice, but that, in Athenian courts, Macedonian subjects could obtain no better justice than Xenophon and Isocrates inform us was usually obtained by the subjects of other states in alliance with Athens. One object also in the introduction of the matter of Potidæa appears obvious ; to excite among the people regret for the loss of former conquests, and appetite for the dangerous struggle to recover them which the orator was anxious to recommend.



naval commanders, but as piracy contributed to bring applications to the Athenian people for protection, and litigation to the Athenian tribunals, sources both of profit for the orators. Piracy was perhaps advantageous even to the Athenian merchants, to whom trade accrued through the superior security of the Athenian flag. But these grounds of objection could not prudently be stated. The orator therefore confined his reply to the vague assertion, that ‘the king of Macedonia’s proposal was made only to obtain permission of the Athenian people for his ships to visit every island, and in short to have their assistance for making himself master of the sea.’

This however was but the refusal of a matter open for choice, no claim of right being in question. To another orator, before a different assembly, the difficulty might have appeared greater to maintain the right of the Athenian people to the dominion of Amphipolis, after they had formally ceded it by the late treaty of peace; but of that difficulty Hegesippus made light, meeting it with arguments of a very remarkable character: ‘Philip,’ he said, ‘pretends that his right to Amphipolis is acknowledged by the late treaty. True it is that the Athenian people did, by that treaty, consent that each party should keep what at the time it held; but they did not so at all consent that Amphipolis should belong to Philip. He held it indeed, at the time, unquestionably: but a person may hold what belongs to another; and many do hold what belongs to others, so that this wise argument of his is mere folly.<sup>12</sup> Do you think then he has kept his word

Or. de  
Halon.  
p. 81. 83.

<sup>12</sup> Ὅστε τοῦτό γε τὸ σοφὸν αὐτοῦ ἡλίθιον ἐστὶ.—p. 83. The description of the *status quo*, in the phrase of our diplomatists,

CHAP.  
XL.

---

‘ with you, professing strict attention in all he says  
 ‘ and does to whatever is esteemed just among men?  
 ‘ or does he not rather show that he utterly despises  
 ‘ it? he who asserts that the country belongs to him  
 ‘ which both the Greeks and the king of Persia have  
 ‘ declared to belong to the Athenian people!’ The  
 reader will recollect that the country, if the meaning  
 be confined to the territory of Amphipolis, first be-  
 came Athenian property by forcible intrusion upon  
 the Thracians; was lost again soon after by fair  
 chance of war with the Lacedæmonians; was made  
 free by the peace of Antalcidas through decrees of  
 the Greeks and the king of Persia together; was  
 associated afterward, apparently by the choice of its  
 people, with the Olynthian confederacy; was reduced  
 again under the power of Athens, not, seemingly,  
 without treachery; shortly after was taken in open  
 war by the united arms of Olynthus and Macedonia;  
 and finally was ceded to Macedonia by that clause in  
 the treaty of peace, recently concluded with Athens,

is given with material difference in different parts of the orator’s  
 argument, as if with the purpose of puzzling and misleading  
 the mob-sovereign he was addressing. In one place it is, *ἐκατέ-  
 ρους τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔχειν*, (p. 81. l. 4.) ‘for each party to have its  
 ‘ own.’ This would rather imply restitution of all that had  
 been taken, which most certainly was never meant on the part  
 of Macedonia. Afterward he gives it, *ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἃ εἶχεν*, p. 83.  
 l. 12. ‘for him to have what he actually held,’ and this, no doubt  
 the meaning of the treaty, he marks for nearly its expression too,  
*ἐψηφίζεσθε ἔχειν αὐτὸν*, κ. τ. λ. The whole is worth the curious  
 reader’s attention, as a specimen of the kind of argument that  
 might be ventured before the sovereign people of Athens, by an  
 eminent orator, a leading man in the assembly, and who had  
 been employed on the most important embassies; for so much  
 is fully indicated, whether the oration be of Hegesippus, or De-  
 mosthenes, or any other.

which declared that both parties should hold what they at the time possessed.

SECT.  
III.

A clause, according to the orator, had been added to the original treaty, declaring all Greeks, not partaking in its benefits as allies of either party, free and independent, and binding the parties to protect them against all aggression. This clause is of a spirit very wide of what we find prevailing in the avowed politics of Demosthenes, but perfectly conformable to that which connected Phocion's party with the king of Macedonia. To appreciate the reproach of breach of this article by Philip, in measures against three towns of Ambracia, we want what was said by the Macedonian government on the other side; unless the light and little explicit mention of that matter by Demosthenes, and the obvious futility of the charge which the orator on Halonnesus has added of violence against the Pheræans, may be taken as sufficiently indicating that reproach to have been little founded. In the usual party style of the Greeks, the party of the tyrants of Pheræ are called exclusively the Pheræans; and the body of the Thessalian people enemies of Athens, and their satisfaction with the king of Macedonia's conduct, and the sanction which they appear in a constitutional way to have given it, are carefully kept out of sight.

Or. de  
Halon.  
p. 84.

Philip, in the confession of the orator on Halonnesus confirming all other accounts, had restored all his Athenian prisoners without ransom. This, as it did him great and extensive credit, was far from gratifying to the orator and his party; and their ingenuity found means to make a large proportion of the Athenian many unsatisfied with it. There remained yet in a Macedonian prison a man, not an Athenian, for he was of Carystus in Eubœa, but a

p. 85.



CHAP.  
XL.

public guest of the Athenian people.<sup>13</sup> What crime made him obnoxious in Macedonia, and what merit procured him the zealous favour of the party of Chares, the orator has equally avoided to say; but the Athenian people were persuaded to urge the Macedonian court, by three successive embassies, for his liberation. It was thus evidently not a hasty measure to send him to the executioner. Whether just or necessary, may best be estimated from what we learn, on best authority, of the common conduct of the Macedonian and Athenian governments; adding the consideration that it was clearly Philip's desire to maintain peace and alliance with Athens, and the earnest purpose of the party of Chares to lead the Athenian people to break them.<sup>14</sup>

Or. de  
Halon.  
p. 86.

On the border of the Cardian territory, against the Athenian dominion of the Thracian Chersonese, was some land, unoccupied by the Cardians, on which some Athenians, or persons under Athenian protection, had settled. The Cardians appear not absolutely to have objected to this use of land, to themselves useless, provided it were not turned to their political disadvantage: they desired only that their right to the sovereignty of the territory should be acknowledged. The question had been brought before the Athenian people in a favourable season, and, on the motion of Callippus, a decree passed acknowledging the right of the Cardians to the territory. This was evidently carried against the high democratical party; for the orator who led their

p. 87.

<sup>13</sup> Πρόξενον τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως.

<sup>14</sup> The translator Auger has been candid enough to remark, in a note, that 'Ce Carystien étoit probablement quelque criminel, pour qui les Athéniens s'étoient intéressés.'



business in the question concerning Halonnesus, probably Hegesippus, afterward led a prosecution against Callippus for moving the decree, as against the interest of the commonwealth ; but the people a second time gave their voices in favour of the Cardian claim by acquitting him. If the Cardian people were not thus secured against any future claim of Athenian sovereignty over the land in question, apparently such security could not be. The orator on Halonnesus nevertheless, in a season more favourable to his purpose, did not scruple to tell the people that he had done right in accusing Callippus, and they had done wrong in acquitting him, and that their claim to the land in question, notwithstanding their formal renunciation of it, remained perfect, and ought still to be asserted. Among the extant works of the orators instances abound of a very humble tone in addressing the sovereign people : some such remain, as we have observed, even from Demosthenes. Such a tone was used when the orator doubted the strength of his party, or the favour of the people toward himself. The oration on Halonnesus is not least remarkable among instances of an opposite kind. The speaker, evidently feeling himself strong, did not fear to be arrogant. In the conclusion of his speech he assumed something nearly approaching command of the assembly. ‘ There are some,’ he said, ‘ who contend that this letter of the king of Macedonia is reasonable and proper. They deserve your hatred much more than Philip himself. He acquires glory and great advantages by his measures against you. But those Athenians who show more goodwill toward Philip than toward their country ought to be sent by you to the worst perdition, if you carry your brains within your temples, and not trodden

CHAP.  
XL.

‘ upon at your heels.<sup>15</sup> It remains for me to write  
‘ the answer which I think just and advantageous  
‘ for you to return to this reasonable and proper  
‘ letter, and to the speeches of the ambassadors.’  
It appears only probable that an answer of the same  
temper with the speech was approved by a majority  
of the assembly, and sent to the king of Macedonia.

#### SECTION IV.

*War of Macedonia in Thrace and Scythia. Athenian interest declining in Greece. Exertions of the war-party: colony sent to the Thracian Chersonese: Diopithes Athenian commander in Thrace: hostile conduct against Macedonia.*

B. C. 343.  
O<sup>l</sup>. 109. 2.  
[B. C. 342.  
Cl.]

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 71.

IN this year, the third after the conclusion of the Phocian war, Philip carried his arms to the country which, if disturbance from Greece had not interfered, should have most invited the ambition of a king of Macedonia, and still, according to the historian, his measures were required by the ambition and injustice of others. The king of Thrace, Kersobleptes, having been compelled to surrender the Chersonese to the Athenians, and to divide the rest of his dominions with the princes of his family who had rebelled against him, his means, either to give protection to the Grecian towns on his shores, or to exact tribute from them, were greatly reduced. Whether their refusal provoked his arms, or he was unable to re-

<sup>15</sup> Εἴπερ ἡμεῖς τὸν ἰγκέφαλον ἐν τοῖς κροτάφοις, καὶ μὴ ἐν ταῖς πτέρλαις καταπεπατημένον φορεῖτε. This phrase the French translator, it seems, could not venture to give in his own language. He has certainly not done justice to the character of the oration in his refinement of the expression, ‘ s’il vous reste ‘ encore quelqu’ étincelle de raison.’

strain the licentiousness of his Thracian subjects, or instigation from Athens was the principal moving spring, (for an Athenian fleet was at hand, and there was an Athenian party more or less powerful in every Grecian town of his coast,) the lands of some of those Grecian towns were plundered by Thracian freebooters. The Athenian commander, warm in the war-party interest, was ready to assume the patronage of any party anywhere; and, confident of support at home, ready also to take any measures adverse to Macedonia, for which convenient opportunity might offer. The people of the Hellespontine towns however, like those of so many republics of Proper Greece, shunning the Athenian connexion, sought Macedonian patronage.

With solicitation then from those towns, many circumstances concurred at this time to induce Philip to put himself at the head of a powerful army and cross the lofty mountains between his dominion and Eastern Thrace. If the desire of conquest instigated, no extension of his border could be so advantageous, whether for the opportunities of commerce which would increase his revenue, or of a frontier to give security to his kingdom, or of a point whence to extend conquest into the country, always the foremost object of Grecian appetency, the rich provinces of Lesser Asia. For so advantageous an acquisition the way had been largely prepared by the division of the Thracian monarchy, the work of the war-party of Athens, pursuing their own purposes of ambition. While then the unfortunate and weak Kersobleptes, consenting to hold his diminished kingdom in a kind of vassalage under the Athenian people, looked to them with ill-judging confidence for protection, Teres, another of the Thracian princes, joined Philip, and

SECT.  
IV.

Epist. Philip. ap. Demosth.

Ibid.

Dec. 1. 16. fought under his orders. The forces of Kersobleptes were overcome, and the Grecian townships of his shores, no longer subject to Thrace, acknowledged Macedonia as their protecting power.

Whether this adverse event excited the activity of Athenian policy to penetrate into the wild country toward the Danube, and stir against Macedonia the warlike hordes that for ages had denied any certain quiet to its northern border, we are not informed, but Athens had opportunity for communication with those powers, through its commercial establishments on the Euxine shores formerly noticed. They were however apparently serious menaces that induced Philip to lead his army next into that inhospitable and uninviting country; no purpose being obvious but to prevent a destructive invasion of his kingdom. Little distant from Greece in latitude, but widely differing in seasons, winter overtook him there unexpectedly, coming perhaps with severity uncommonly early. His way back into Macedonia was so barred by snows that not even a messenger could pass. Much interest was excited in Greece by the various rumours circulated. Among the first authentic accounts was information of a severe illness that confined him; and report for some time prevailed that he was dead. On the other hand, if ever the extravagant fable of the conquest of Cappadocia, which no extant author earlier than Justin has noticed, was at all heard of in Philip's age, probably it was a rumour arising in this time of uncertainty. An authentic history of this war could not fail to be highly interesting. That great difficulties, hardships, and dangers were encountered, ably, firmly, and successfully, is nearly all to which we have any trustworthy testimony; though, with such defective information

Demosth. de  
Cherson.  
p. 98. &  
Philip. 4.  
p. 34.



of most important public transactions, some ancient writers have not scrupled to give conversations, and witty sayings, and various matters the least likely to have been correctly reported. What remains therefore from the adverse orator, who would sometimes endeavour by flashes of eulogy amid his invective to excite among his fellow-countrymen emulation of the great character he slandered, is highly valuable. ‘In quest of glory,’ says Demosthenes, ‘Philip freely met all kinds of hardship, and danger in every shape: undismayed by wounds, unappalled by sickness, patient in confinement by snow, he was contented to pass the winter, living upon millet and rye, in a Thracian cellar.’ Apparently, the Thracian cellar, here spoken of, was the common winter dwelling of the country, sunk in the ground, for shelter against the extreme severity of the season, such as we have seen described by Xenophon among the Armenian islands, in a latitude where such severity would still less be expected.<sup>16</sup>

Ch. 23. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

It is clearly indicated by Demosthenes that his party reckoned much upon the difficulties in which Philip was involved in this rough and hazardous enterprise, and were busy to profit from the opportunity. But, beside opposition, still strong, from the party of Phocion, circumstances among the surrounding republics assisted to disappoint them. As

<sup>16</sup> The reader desirous of information about the countries which were the seat of this winter campaign, may find them interestingly described in a small volume printed at Naples. Mr. Raicewick, the author, by birth a Transylvanian, was, in 1788., counsellor of legation from the emperor of Germany at Naples. He had before been secretary to the imperial embassy at the Ottoman court, and for some time resided in Walachia, as secretary to the prince of Walachia Ypselanti.

CHAP.  
XL.

Æsch. de  
Legat.  
p. 290.

Demosth.  
de Cherson.  
p. 94. & 98.

Ibid.  
p. 97. 100.

their influence had risen in Athens, the credit of Athens, it appears, had declined in Greece. In Eubœa their conduct had excited universal jealousy. Those most disposed to the Athenian connexion, hitherto confident of Athenian support against Thebes, were alarmed at the new connexion of Athens with Macedonia, the ally of Thebes; and especially at the zeal which the war-party of Athens had so publicly demonstrated for that new connexion. On the other hand their opponents, the Theban party, on the same view of things, participated in the same alarm, though with opposite apprehensions. The general turn however was in favour of the Theban interest, now gaining the new and more favourite denomination of the Macedonian interest, and the Athenian became the waning cause. In Oreus it was completely overborne. In Chalcis with difficulty it maintained a balance. Meanwhile the little island of Sciathus, one of the nearest to the Attic shore, dared to defy the Athenian navy; and the strife of faction again shook the small neighbouring republic of Megara, where the party patronized by the high democratical party in Athens had hitherto prevailed.

Opportunity was thus offered for the opponents of Chares and Demosthenes at home, which was not wholly neglected. It was urged that the spreading disaffection of allies, and the ill state altogether of the republic's affairs, too glaring for denial, for it appears Demosthenes himself could not wholly deny it, arose from misconduct of the same leading men of whose mismanagement the effects were still so severely felt in the result of the Confederate war.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> That the party of Chares and Demosthenes had latterly

The party replied by imputing all adversity abroad to the hostile conduct of the restored ally of the republic, the king of Macedonia, secluded as he was among the snows of the country toward the Danube ; and all disorder at home to the corruption of traitors who promoted his purposes, meaning all who opposed their own. So far their imputations appear to have been well founded, that a preference of the king of Macedonia's patronage to theirs did prevail extensively over Greece ; and a desire to meet the king of Macedonia's peaceful professions prevailed also among the best men of Athens.

But the ingenuity of the party found means to overbear or elude the influence of the better men. To relieve the idle, petulant, and craving multitude by sending out a colony, was a resource of former times ; good or bad, according as it was carried into execution. Opportunity occurred now in the circumstances of the Thracian Chersonese, a country among the most inviting. The party of Chares, putting forward the measure, obtained the direction of it for one zealous in their interest, as formed for their purposes, Diopithes ; and to the same person was committed the Thracian command by land and sea. A fleet then, to transport settlers, awe opponents, and maintain respect for the Athenian dominion of the sea, was readily granted by the sovereign people, under lure of the advantages proposed. But, for the purposes of the party, a land force also was wanted, which was a matter of more difficulty to obtain ; for the people would neither serve nor pay. Diopithes

directed measures is fully implied in the charge of the adverse party against them and their reply to it, stated by Demosthenes in the Oration on the Chersonese, p. 97., where also the ill state of the republic's affairs is explicitly acknowledged.



CHAP.  
XL.

however, to have the command in chief by sea and land, did not scruple undertaking, at his own risk, to raise a sufficient body of mercenaries, and find pay for them. Such an offer, gratifying to the shortsighted many, was accepted. To raise the men was not difficult. To provide pay then, as soon as he arrived at his station he sent them to collect plunder from the lands, or contributions from the towns, of the Greeks; and the allies, not of Macedonia only, but even of Athens, suffered. His fleet at the same time was active in rapine against all Grecian ships within the range of his cruises.

Demosth.  
de Cherson.

In pursuing these violent measures evidently he confided in support from his party; whose disposition seems to have been as sincere as their promises could be warm for the purpose. But complaints, pouring into Athens, produced alarm among the people such as the party saw with much uneasiness; and public indignation was particularly pointed at Chares, the person acting in the situation of what we should call war-minister. The people were summoned to assemble. The party of Phocion came forward; and, with their usual moderation, moved only to send out another general who might compose the affairs which Diopithes had embroiled, and to dismiss the mercenaries, to whose licentiousness they were willing to attribute the disorders which had given cause for complaint.

Ibid. p. 97.

But the views of the war-party were not limited to the establishment of a colony, or the defence of the actual possessions of the republic. The peace, which ended the Confederate war, having as little restored the friendship and confidence as the subjection of the revolted allies, Byzantium had engaged in the Macedonian alliance, and that alliance had been acknowledged by Athens, in the recent treaty of

Demosth.de  
Cor. p. 254.



peace. Between Byzantium and the strait of the Hellespont the two principal towns on the European shore were Selymbria and Perinthus; whose people claimed a common Dorian origin with the Byzantines, and held intimate connexion with them. By the loss of Byzantium the commerce of Athens with the Euxine, important especially for the essential articles of corn and slaves, was made difficult and hazardous. This difficulty would of course excite the ingenuity and diligence of the merchants, which seem to have been in a great degree successful. Friendly communication was restored with Perinthus and Selymbria; and, Perinthus becoming the principal key of communication for Athens with the Euxine, the interposit of the Athenian trade, its advances in wealth and population were rapid. The busy temper of Athenian democratical policy thus getting an advantageous establishment, quickly found means to work its way into Byzantium itself. No longer ago than when Demosthenes delivered his Oration on the peace, Byzantium was on no friendly terms with Athens, or however with the war-party there. Grievance from Macedonia meanwhile none is reported; and yet already now an Athenian party had so grown that Athenian support might produce a revolution in the government, whence would follow renewed alliance with Athens, and breach with Macedonia. This advantage it was evidently among the purposes of the mission of Diopithes to promote. But, were Diopithes superseded by a commander of Phocion's party, it would be lost. On the contrary, could he be supported in what he had already done, the progress would be great; and the proof of the strength of the party would encourage their foreign friends, and make their interest at home secure.

---

 SECT.  
IV.

 Demosth.  
de Pace.

 Epist.  
Philip.

CHAP.  
XL.

---

These appear to have been the circumstances which gave occasion for one of the most studied orations remaining from Demosthenes, one in which evidently he felt his task most difficult. He was to persuade his audience that the conduct of Diopithes, violating treaties, committing extensive rapine, against friends as well as foes, by sea and land, were what the Athenian people ought to approve; and that the king of Macedonia, notwithstanding the numerous instances of his generous and forbearing conduct, not only was actually at war with them, but was the most injurious of possible enemies. Widely different from the tone of the orator on Halonnesus, as if feeling still his recent defeat in his accusation of Æschines, as well as the weakness of his cause now to be supported, he begins, and mostly proceeds, in the same complaining and insinuating strain as in the second Philippic; and yet, with wonderful ingenuity, in pressing the interests of his party and inveighing against their opponents, among the general gloom he throws in occasional flashes of a vehemence like lightning. He did not venture to deny the facts alleged against Diopithes; that he plundered the lands of Greeks at peace with the republic, and even allies of the republic, and that his ships were the pirates of the Grecian seas; nor did he deny that it was, in a general view, wrong to plunder Grecian lands and Grecian ships. But he undertook to justify all by the urgency of circumstances: Philip, he said, had broken the peace. It was evidently Philip's object (Philip being still engaged in the northern wilds) to destroy Athens, and especially to destroy the democracy. War against him was therefore necessary for the republic's welfare. To make war against him the mercenary force must be maintained, and it was highly expedient that Diopithes

should remain to command it: for he had deserved well of the republic by what he had done, however objectionable in itself; since in no other way could he have held together his army.—After some complaint then that the Athenian people would neither undertake military service themselves, nor allow taxes for paying mercenaries, there follows perhaps the most valuable passage remaining in any author for elucidating the Athenian history of the time, so defectively delivered by professed historians. ‘In this dilemma ‘of the republic,’ says the orator, ‘I must speak ‘openly; and, at all risk for the consequences, I ‘will assure you that no naval commander ever sails ‘from your harbours but he receives presents. They ‘come from the Chians, the Erythræans, all the commercial states likely to be within reach of your ‘fleets; I mean however the Asiatic only. If he ‘has but one or two ships under his orders, he has ‘something: if his force is greater, he has more in ‘proportion. The pretence of these presents is ‘goodwill to the commander: under that title they ‘are offered. But those states, you may be sure, ‘none of them give this money for nothing: they pay ‘for the safety of their commerce; that their ships ‘may be, not plundered, but protected.’

SECT.  
IV.

---

Demosth.  
de Cherson.  
p. 96.

In these few sentences is discovered why so many leading men at Athens desired always war rather than peace for the republic, and how they found means to induce so many of the lower orders to concur with them. The remarkable fact, mentioned both by Xenophon and Isocrates, that the lowest of the Athenian people would often be ready for the service of the trireme when they refused themselves for that, in former estimation more honourable, of the phalanx, will no longer appear strange; and the reason why



CHAP.  
XL.

---

the king of Macedonia's proposal for the suppression of piracy was so thwarted by the war-party becomes evident. Were the piracy of petty freebooters suppressed, presents from the pirate, on one side, for permission of it, from the mercantile towns, on the other, for protection against it, would have ceased together; and the greater piracy of the Athenian commanders themselves would have been too invidious, giving a clear and certain point for clamour and opposition.

In making this avowal, confirming only what we have formerly observed his rival orator Æschines, though less explicitly, asserting, Demosthenes seems to have depended upon two separate grounds for obviating danger to those numerous of his party who must have been implicated in the charge. Perhaps he possessed proof against some of the opposite party, such as might deter prosecution from them against his friends. But he was apparently aware that there was no extensive disposition among the people to favour prosecution for a public crime whence so many of them had been accustomed to profit. On the contrary, it seems evident that he touched a chord in harmony with the feelings of a large proportion of his audience; and he therefore proceeded to propose, instead of punishment for such peculation, to extend the system of plunder under public authority, so that the public might share in its advantages: 'The same states,' he said, 'which thus paid tribute to the individual commanders of the republic, were the proposal properly made to them, would, no doubt, readily pay contributions to the republic itself, such as might well maintain the force now under Diopithes.'

The turn of the speech, in its progress, appears to



indicate that this proposal was received with marks of favour ; for what the orator had just before stated as matter of complaint against the people, that they would neither undertake military service themselves, nor pay others for it, he directly proceeded to treat as a needless burthen, which his adversaries, desirous of superseding Diopithes, would impose upon the people. Thus apparently encouraged, in conclusion he inveighed violently against the king of Macedonia ; urging war against him as the necessary enemy of Athens, and especially of democratical government ; and not scrupling to tell the people, to whom he had been justifying past and recommending future plunder of other people, that they were the natural friends and protectors of the freedom of all.

His speech seems to have been altogether too flattering to the passions of the Athenian many to be resisted. Diopithes retained his command ; and neither the unfortunate Greeks who had been robbed appear to have received any redress, nor was any apology made to the king of Macedonia, who, by the very treaty of peace lately concluded with Athens, had bound himself to protect them.

Successful so far, the war-party yet could not obtain a decisive lead in the administration. What had passed however was encouragement for Diopithes to proceed in his course, and it became the business of orators at home to prepare the popular mind for reports of farther violences. With this view Demosthenes spoke the oration called the third Philippic ; by some the most admired of the masterpieces of eloquence known by that title. The complaint of the ill state of the republic's affairs, with which it begins, indicates fully the inability of the party yet to

Ol. 109. 3.  
B. C. 342.  
[B. C. 341.  
Cl.]

CHAP.  
XL.

---

Demosth.  
Philip. 3.  
p. 112.

p. 114.

hold a decisive lead. They were evidently distressed by the king of Macedonia's forbearance; who, notwithstanding the insulting injuries he had received, avoided to return them, and professed himself still desirous of that accommodation in which the party of Phocion and Isocrates were ready to meet him. Against this conduct they could hardly carry their purpose, unless they could persuade the people that his professions were insincere, and intended only to lull them in a fatal security. To this point therefore Demosthenes directed all his art, combined with all his boldness in assertion. He went so far as to tell the people they were deceived if they supposed Philip was not even now at war with them; and he proceeded to proof, such as might be offered to such a sovereign as the Athenian many. To show the actual existence of war he was not ashamed to point five years back to that capture of some little piratical towns on the Thracian coast, the question concerning which Philip had repeatedly offered for the arbitration of neutral powers, and the party of Demosthenes had met by persuading the people to treat such a proposal with scorn, and take justice into their own hands. Of a later date the orator's ingenuity could find nothing specific but the support given to the brave Cardians; who had so hardly earned and creditably supported their emancipation from the dominion of the Athenian people, and whose cause also had met only insult in being offered for the decision of impartial arbitrators. The remainder of the argument is vague assertion; calculated however to impress the Athenian many, accustomed to hear from their orators that they had a right to interfere in all governments, and that it was grossly offensive for any power to

interfere, not only in theirs, but in any other in competition with them.<sup>18</sup> ‘ I maintain,’ says the orator, ‘ Philip is now making war with you, by interposing in the affairs of Megara, by supporting a tyranny in Eubœa, by his speculations among the states of Peloponnesus.’ That in every republic of Greece, a party was courting Macedonian patronage is, from Demosthenes himself, abundantly evident ; but what were the measures of Macedonia to profit from this disposition remains in every instance utterly problematical. Had they been of a kind to be in any way either disgraceful to Philip, or fairly to be stated as hostile to Athens, farther account of them would doubtless have been afforded. In conclusion the orator recommended embassies to negotiate a confederacy against Macedonia, not only wherever there might be any favouring prospect among Grecian states, but even with the court of Persia.

The third Philippic appears to have had success more proportioned to its rhetorical excellence than to the merit of the cause it recommended. As the party then advanced toward a more certain influence over a majority in the sovereign assembly, they sent positive and authoritative orders for their commander on the Thracian station to act against Macedonia, whenever convenient opportunity might be found. Accordingly Diopithes, zealous in the cause, marched from the Chersonese, took by storm two Grecian towns of the Macedonian alliance, Crobyle and Tirstasis, and sent those of the inhabitants who escaped the sword, prisoners into the Athenian colony. A

SECT.  
IV.

Demosth.  
Philip. 3.  
p. 115.

Ibid.  
p. 129.

Epist.  
Philip. &  
Demosth.  
in Epist.  
Philip.

<sup>18</sup> For this the third Philippic, p. 121. of Reiske's edition, may be seen.



CHAP.  
XL.

Macedonian of rank, Amphilochus, commissioned to him to remonstrate on these hostile measures, with instruction to negotiate at least the ransom of the prisoners, was refused audience by the democratical general, thrown into prison, and released only on paying nine talents, near two thousand pounds sterling, for his ransom.<sup>19</sup>

The superior talents and indefatigable activity of Demosthenes had now raised him to a decisive lead in his party. Even Chares found it convenient to yield. Demosthenes was effective first minister of Athens; and under his superintending guidance an improved steadiness, as well as evident ability, infused confidence among dependents everywhere. The party had been able to name the commanders for a fleet on the Thessalian station, Aristodemus and Callias; whose conduct perfectly harmonized with that of Diopithes. They carried direct hostilities against the towns of the Pagasæan bay, allies of Macedonia, entitled by treaty to peace and friendship with Athens; and finding them, through confidence in that treaty, unprepared for resistance, they took them all. They stopped all ships bound to Macedonia, and condemning all aboard as enemies to Athens, they sold all for slaves. And so the interest of the party now prevailed that, when complaint was made of these infractions of the treaty by ministers from the king of Macedonia, and the matter was brought before the assembled people, decrees were obtained approving

Epist.  
Philip. ut  
ant.

<sup>19</sup> This, with the preceding circumstances, stated by Philip in his letter to the Athenian people, and transmitted with the speech of Demosthenes upon it, being not in any degree denied in that speech, must be considered as among the most authenticated facts reported from antiquity.



and even applauding the conduct of the commanders who directed them.<sup>20</sup>

SECT.  
IV.

---

While Philip still avoided all reprisals, the people of the little island of Peparethus, calling themselves free, but looking to the Athenian people for protection, and effectually their subjects, surprised the neighbouring little island of Halonnesus, and carried off the small Macedonian garrison. Even then redress was first sought by negotiation. This proving utterly ineffectual a Macedonian force, sent to Peparethus, quickly compelled its people both to restore their prisoners and to surrender Halonnesus. It is not even pretended that any severity was used, beyond what was found necessary to accomplish those just purposes; and yet the Athenian many were taught by their orators to commiserate and bewail the sufferings of the unfortunate and innocent Peparethians.

Epist.  
Philip.  
p. 162.

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 248.

<sup>20</sup> ... πόλεις ... ὑμῶν μὲν ἐνόρκους, ἐμοὶ δὲ συμμαχίδας οὔσας. Epist. Philip. p. 159. In Philip's epistle Callias is named as the commander. Æschines, in his Oration on the Crown (p. 478.), mentions Aristodemus as the commander principally engaged in unwarrantable hostilities on the Thessalian coast. Possibly Aristodemus was commander in chief, and as such obtained from the party the reward stated by Æschines; while Callias, acting under him, was the officer principally offering himself to Philip's notice.

## CHAPTER XLI.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE ACQUISITION OF THE SITUATION OF FIRST MINISTER OF ATHENS BY DEMOSTHENES TILL THE ELECTION OF THE KING OF MACEDONIA TO THE OFFICE OF GENERAL OF THE AMPHICTYONIC CONFEDERACY.

## SECTION I.

*Character of the office of first minister of Athens. Ability and diligence of Demosthenes. Negotiation with Persia. New coalition with Phocion's party. Embassy of Demosthenes to the Hellespontine cities.*

CHAP.  
XLI.

---

THE situation of first minister, or vicegerent of the sovereign assembly, for the direction of the executive government, was less connected with a particular office in Athens than in any other Grecian commonwealth whose constitution has been unfolded to us. In Lacedæmon the ephor of the year was the principal minister; at Thebes the polemarch or the Bœotarch. Under Solon's constitution the archon of the year seems to have been the proper first minister of Athens. But when the commonwealth became much implicated in wars, it was found convenient that the strategus, the first general, should have a discretionary power to call extraordinary assemblies of the people, which was analogous to demanding an audience of the sovereign. The general commonly acquired his situation by his abilities; the archon, at least in the constitution of Clisthenes, if the business was legally conducted, acquired it always by lot; the communications of the general to the sovereign assembly were often most highly interesting; those of the archon seldom. Men of the extraordinary characters then of Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, and

Pericles, holding successively the office of general through most critical periods of many years, gave it an importance far above that of any other. But still no political power was constitutionally attached to it, except that of convening the people; and to avail himself of this the general must be an able speaker. The real character of first minister of Athens then seems best marked by Thucydides, in his account of the disgrace and restoration of Pericles, in the early part of the Peloponnesian war: ‘none of the orators,’ says the historian, ‘could satisfy the people. After ‘a short interval therefore they called for Pericles ‘again, to mount the bema, and tell them his opinion ‘of their affairs, and advise them what measures they ‘should sanction with their decrees.’\* But when afterward the military and civil characters became more separated than they were in the times of Themistocles and Pericles, if the general was not himself an able orator, it was indispensable for him to seek the assistance of an able orator. Hence Iphicrates, though himself a speaker of not the lowest rank, chose an orator, not a military man, for his associate in military command; and hence what Demosthenes in his political noviciate described, an orator commander in chief with the ‘general under him;’ that is, an orator doing that part of the general’s business which he was unable to do for himself, speaking to the sovereign people for him, and so appearing the principal person. But Demosthenes himself seems to have been the

[\* These words seem rather to be an adumbration of Plutarch than Thucydides. The former says: τῆς δὲ πόλεως πειρωμένης τῶν ἄλλων στρατηγῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ῥητόρων, ὡς οὐδεὶς βάρως ἔχων ἰσόρροπον, οὐδ’ ἀξίωμα πρὸς τοσαύτην ἐχέγγυον ἡγεμονίαν ἐφαίνετο, ποθοῦσης δ’ ἐκείνων καὶ καλοῦσης ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα καὶ τὸ στρατήγιον, κ. τ. λ. Vit. Pericl. p. 313. ed. H. Steph. The historian states more briefly: ὕστερον δ’ αὖθις οὐ πολλῶ, ὅπερ φιλεῖ ἄμιλος ποιεῖν, στρατηγὸν εἶλοντο καὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν. ii. 65. Previously he had said: πανταχόθεν τε τῇ γνώμῃ ἄποροι καθεστῶτες ἐνέκειντο τῷ Περικλεῖ. ii. 59.]

first who ever acquired that leading situation which he held, of effective first minister of the commonwealth, wholly without military reputation, and without any military office. He became an eminent example of what he had formerly represented as a new portent, an absurd anomaly in government, an orator commander in chief, with a general under him.

The Greeks, amid their deficiencies in the science of politics, held very generally, as well as justly, that the military should be subordinate to the civil power; that is, the military, as a branch of the executive, should be subordinate to the legislative. But it farther deserves remark that, in every Grecian republic where we find any steady constitution, the executive was modelled upon the plan of regal authority. The same person (at least in times of war, which were almost continual) the chief military man held the chief civil command. Hence *Æschines*, on an occasion when it was of the utmost importance for him to avoid whatever might offend popular jealousy, did not scruple to arraign *Demosthenes* of unconstitutional conduct, as well as gross arrogance, in threatening that he would make the generals of the commonwealth feel the superior importance of an orator. But, throughout the Grecian republics, the civil and military character were, in theory, never separated: both equally pervaded the whole people: every man was to be a soldier, and every man a member of the sovereign assembly. Citizens however more and more avoiding military service, it became necessary for the commonwealth to entertain an overbearing body of mercenaries, while nowhere, in the constitution, existed any proper provision for such a state of things. Hence the conduct of *Demosthenes*, in fact irregular, was in principle perhaps good; and the reproof of



Æschines, justly founded, as the constitution had been, yet, in the altered state of things, was of pernicious tendency. But again still it deserves observation that, as far as the Grecian governments are laid open to us, nowhere was the civil power of the military chief magistrate more narrowly limited, nowhere so regularly, as in the Lacedæmonian constitution; where alone hereditary succession and the title of king were preserved, and where the sacredness of the royal person, as of the essence of the constitution, was most strictly sanctioned.

The situation in which Demosthenes now stood, was arduous, yet offered, to a soaring ambition, great and inviting views. As first minister of Athens he was the leading man of the interest, throughout Greece, hardly to be properly distinguished as the Democratical, though some of the principal republics, warmest in the Macedonian alliance, were highly democratical, but of that which was opposed to the Macedonian; an interest existing, in greater or less amount, in every republic of the nation, and maintained by a disposition, not so much adverse to Macedonian patronage, as ready to oppose, in all circumstances, fellow-citizens of that party which enjoyed Macedonian patronage. This party, in every republic, wanted a patronizing power; and of the Grecian states Athens alone was in a situation to afford encouragement. If then Athens could give a general prevalence to the anti-Macedonian party, Athens would be, what we find Demosthenes continually inciting her people to covet, the imperial republic, mistress of Greece, and himself at the head of the empire.

The numerous and great failures already and recently experienced, in the pursuit of this object,

CHAP.  
XLI.

---

Lord Bo-  
lingbroke  
on the  
Spirit of  
Patriotism.

might have disconcerted the most ambitious politician, unless he possessed the penetration and power of combination of Demosthenes to find and form new ground of hope. Speculation on opportunities, some of them perhaps hardly then discernible to any other eye, is shown, by following events, to have engaged his attention; and the use he made of them marks him for one of the acutest statesmen that ever was at the head of a government. It has been well observed by a modern politician, of great acuteness and extensive experience, speculating on this part of history, that ‘haranguing was, at this time, the least part of the business of Demosthenes; and eloquence neither the sole, nor the principal talent, as the style of writers would induce us to believe, on which his success depended. He must have been master of other arts, subservient to which his eloquence was employed; and must have had a thorough knowledge of his own state, and of the other states of Greece; of their dispositions, and of their interests, relatively to one another and relatively to their neighbours; to the Persians particularly, with whom he had correspondence, not much to his honour. I say he must have been master of many other arts, and have possessed an immense fund of knowledge to make his eloquence in every case successful, and even pertinent and seasonable in some, as well as to direct it and furnish it with matter, whenever he thought fit to employ that weapon.’ And we find Demosthenes speaking not very differently of himself. He has boasted that he was the only one who had ever undertaken singly to carry political business through all its stages: for instance, to show the people the public interest requiring that an embassy should be sent to such a state; to draw

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 306. &  
308.

the decree, containing the instructions for the ministers to be employed; to defend it against the objections of opposing orators; and then himself to take the office, and execute all the functions of the embassy: 'I applied myself,' he says, 'to every kind of public business.'<sup>1</sup>

From before the first Persian invasion, when the Athenians, pressed by the Lacedæmonians, solicited assistance from the satrap of Sardis, there had never been perhaps a time when some of the republics were not looking for advantage from connexion with the Persian court or its officers. On the other hand, since the victories of Xanthippus and Cimon, but much more since the expedition of the younger Cyrus and the following successes of Agesilaus, even that distant court, but much more the western satraps, had been accustomed to watch Grecian politics with a jealous eye; to fear any political union of the numerous states of that little country, to interpose in its divisions, and assist the weaker against the stronger. The prospect therefore now appearing of union under such a prince as Philip, whose conquests already approached the Persian provinces, would be more than commonly alarming. It seems reasonable to suppose that a politician generally so cautious as Isocrates had knowledge of circumstances not reported by extant writers, which led him to that provocation to Persia, contained in his Oration on Peace, and repeated in the orations to Archidamus and to Philip. Demosthenes himself formerly, opposing, with apparent propriety, needless or interested provocation to Persia, had however declared that he considered the king of Persia as the common enemy of all the Greeks. With whatever good or ill

Demosth.  
pro Rhod.

<sup>1</sup> Ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμαντὸν ἔταττον. Demosth. de Cor. p. 302.



CHAP.  
XLI.

Demosth.  
Philip. 4.  
& or. in Ep.  
Philip.

Æsch. de  
Cor.  
Ol. 109. 3.  
B. C. 342.  
19 of Philip.  
17 Blair,  
13 Diod.  
of Ochus.  
[B. C. 340.  
Cl.]

judgment then Isocrates persevered in urging as the interest of Greece to carry war against Persia, Demosthenes did not scruple now to pursue the interest of his party in forming or improving connexion with Persia. In the general assembly he contended that alliance with Persia should be cultivated, and pecuniary assistance, for war against Macedonia, solicited. An embassy to the Persian court on his motion was decreed, and, under his able direction was successful. A considerable subsidy was obtained, and he became himself the agent of the Persian court for the disposal of the money.

The situation of the important island of Eubœa, distracted still violently by faction, but almost lost to Athens, then engaged his attention. Large experience had now taught him that the haughtiness of democratical empire had been carried by the Athenian government to a pernicious extreme; not only in the violences of the former leaders of his party, which had produced the misfortunes of the Confederate war, but perhaps even in his own speeches and measures, which might have contributed to the loss of Amphipolis and Olynthus. If, in the present situation of Greece, the republic would hold subjects, or support its ambitious purposes by alliances, the tone must be altered. Yet the change could not be easy; for so were the Athenian people accustomed to be flattered with the idea of their absolute sovereignty that to profess an adverse principle, to imitate the king of Macedonia's arts of equity, liberality, and scrupulous regard for the constitution of every little patronized republic, would require great circumspection, and able as well as careful management. To obviate this difficulty Demosthenes seems, a second time, to have used and abused the liberality of the party of Phocion. They had always recom-



mended a liberal policy, both toward allies and toward enemies; and there were many among the Eubœans disposed to trust them, who would not trust the party of Chares. How any accommodation was brought about does not appear, but some degree of coalition was again formed.

During the late war between Athens and Macedonia, Callias, founder of the Eubœan general assembly, instituted to support the independency of the island, had passed to the Macedonian court. The distinction with which he was treated there is marked in the observation of the contemporary orator, that he was favoured with the title of ‘the king’s companion;’<sup>2</sup> a principal honour of that court, revived under the Roman empire with the Latin appellation ‘comes;’ whence the modern title ‘count,’ so familiar now throughout Europe. Apparently the term ‘companions’ of the orders of knighthood has been of the same origin. The peace quickly following between Macedonia and Athens could hardly fail to produce some disappointment to his hopes. What the circumstances were we are not informed; nor should we perhaps trust Æschines, any more than Demosthenes, for all that his words appear to imply, which he would not venture directly to assert. Callias however engaged in measures offensive to Philip, whence he was obliged to quit Macedonia. If then there remained a state of any considerable power, whence he could hope for support in his political purposes, it was Thebes, and he went thither.

Æsch. de  
Cor. p. 482.

Before this time, evidently, Demosthenes had opened that communication with a party in Thebes with which we find Æschines reproaching him, and

<sup>2</sup> τῶν ἐταίρων εἰς ἀνομάζετο. Æsch. de Cor. p. 482.

CHAP.  
XLI.

which he afterward turned to great account. It was a bold idea to bring the people of all Greece the most inveterately hostile, equally hating the Athenians and hated by them, to close political union with Athens. But, as the party in Thebes which desired to maintain the connexion with Macedonia would be indisposed to favour Callias, or to receive overtures from Demosthenes, the opposite party would, on that very account, be in some degree prepared for both. Callias however soon quitted Thebes without having carried any public purpose that has been made known to us; and returning to his own city, Chalcis, where his influence seems to have remained entire, he procured a deputation to be sent by the Chalcidian government to Athens to treat of a new alliance. Demosthenes not only gave his support to the liberal system, which Phocion and Isocrates had been continually recommending, but, as in making the peace with Macedonia, so now again in treating with Eubœa, he surprised them with going much farther than they would have ventured. Under his management a treaty was concluded, by which all claim of dominion of the Athenian people over, not Chalcis only, but Eretria, Oreus, in effect all Eubœa, was surrendered: those cities were no longer to send deputies to the synedrium at Athens, and no more to pay tribute: they were made as completely independent, by this treaty, as Byzantium and the allied islands by the peace concluding the Confederate war.

Æsch. ut  
ant.

B. C. 341.  
Ol. 109. 4.  
[Cf. p. 58.]  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 74.  
Æsch. de  
Cor.

This negotiation, managed by Demosthenes, Phocion so far approved that he took the military command requisite for carrying it into effect. Under his orders a body of Athenian troops passed into Eubœa. Theban and Macedonian troops are spoken of, as in considerable force in the island. But among

the contemporary orators, and not less among the later historical writers, such terms are found very loosely applied. It seems very unlikely that any Macedonian or even Theban men were among those troops; they seem rather to have been only Eubœans, who desired support from Macedonia and Thebes which they did not obtain; for Philip, hindered by his war with Thrace and Scythia, had besides no disposition to oppose Phocion; and Thebes was distracted by faction, heightened by the intrigue of Demosthenes. Philistides of Oreus, and Clitarchus of Eretria, principal men, called by their opponents tyrants of those cities, withdrew, and the whole island was brought under subjection (not nominally to Athens, but to the party of Callias, the friend of Demosthenes) with so little effort that no account of any contest remains.<sup>3</sup>

For surrendering that sovereignty of Eubœa, with the revenue attached to it, which the Athenian people had, now for ages, claimed and generally held, it might be expected that one day some opposing orator would propose to acquire profit, or credit and power, by calling the authors of the measure to a severe account. It was however most advantageous for Demosthenes that those generally his political opponents were, in this business, his colleagues. But, while he treated them yet as political friends, he used the opportunity to provide still farther. One of his own party, Aristonicus, moved in the general as-

SECT.  
1.

---

Æsch. de  
Cor.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, as it has been well observed by Wesseling, has omitted all notice of this expedition under Phocion; an expedition producing no brilliancy of military achievement, yet of great political importance. For a good account of it we might well have spared some of his strange tales of Phocion's deeds afterward in Thrace.



CHAP.  
XLI.

---

sembly, that the thanks of the people be given him for his various services to the republic, and especially for restoring the liberty of the Eubœan cities; and that, as an acknowledgment of them, a crown of gold be presented to him in the theatre, at the festival of Bacchus. No opposition seems to have been made; the decree passed, and he received the honour.

Speculations in Thrace next engaged him. The great object was to gain the important town of Byzantium, commanding the commerce of the Euxine sea. Nor would the advantage be single; for thus Athens, already mistress of the Chersonese, would command the two readiest passes between Europe and Asia; and so the importance of her alliance to the Persian court, and especially to the satraps of Lesser Asia, would be greatly increased. Four or five years before, when he delivered the oration on the peace with Macedonia, the party then ruling in Byzantium being adverse to Athens, and especially to the war-party, he spoke of the Byzantine people generally in surly and threatening terms, adverting to the claim of the Athenian people to dominion over them, and tribute from them. He now used the opportunity, afforded by the implication of the king of Macedonia in war with Scythia, to correct the evil of this imprudence. The new connexion with Persia could not but give increased importance to Athens in the eyes of the Byzantines. Demosthenes knew the general indisposition of commercial communities to any implication of policy with a government in which the landed was the prevailing interest. An opening for political communication was ready, through the commercial communication already established; principally with Perinthus, but through that town with Byzantium, and all connected



with Byzantium. The objects altogether appeared important enough to induce Demosthenes to leave the Athenian people, for a time, to the impression of the eloquence of others, while he undertook himself an embassy to Thrace. He visited Byzantium, Selymbria, Perinthus, and went on to the courts of the Thracian princes. In proposing his new system of liberal alliance he seems to have had the concurrence of the party of Phocion. His success evidently was great. In Perinthus, Selymbria, and Byzantium a preponderance was given to the Athenian party; who quickly carried things far beyond what Phocion is likely to have approved. With those towns, as with Olynthus formerly, the term was short between alliance with Athens and war with Macedonia.

SECT.  
II.

---

Demosth.  
de Cor.

## SECTION II.

*War of Macedonia with the Hellespontine cities. Athenian decree: letter of Philip: fourth Philippic of Demosthenes.*

WE are without information of the specific provocation which induced Philip, soon after his return from the Scythian war, to lay siege to Perinthus. The historian's expression is general, that Perinthus was hostile to Macedonia.<sup>4</sup> But to Philip's common practice, of employing sedulously and most patiently, against all Grecian towns, peaceful means before he would resort to arms, we have large testimony; and for encouragement to the Athenian party in Perinthus to give provocation to Macedonia information is ample that it was invitation from Athens, and

<sup>4</sup> . . . Πέρινθον, . . . ἐναντιουμένην μὲν αὐτῷ. Diod. l. 16. c. 74.

CHAP.  
XLI.

---

assurance of the powerful and profitable support of Persia. The force which Philip led against a little Grecian colony indicates that he was aware the contention would be with force beyond its own. The besieging army is said to have been of thirty thousand men. But the town, singularly strong by situation, covering a hill of conic form, nearly surrounded by the sea, was also well fortified. The art of the besiegers soon made a breach in the wall. But no sooner was a point threatened by their machines than the besieged raised a new defence within, connected, at its extremities, with the uninjured part of the old fortification. This new defence then, though inferior in strength to the old wall, yet being on higher ground, and flanking the ground without it, possessed great advantage against assault. Meanwhile, the port being opened, supplies of every kind were largely furnished to the besieged, and the satraps of all the maritime provinces of the Persian empire had received orders to support them; so that not only provisions and ammunition were abundantly supplied, but a large body of those Grecian troops, always ready for hire in any service, was prepared to re-enforce the garrison.

Ol. 110. 1.  
B. C. 340.  
Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 75.  
Pausan. 1. 1.  
c. 29.  
Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 52.

Philip now perceived that a fleet, powerful enough to command the sea, was absolutely necessary to the success of his enterprise. Such a fleet accordingly, he assembled. Meanwhile observing that supplies reached Perinthus principally through the Selymbrians, whom he had not before treated as enemies, he sent a body of troops to blockade their town. These measures were efficacious and threatening enough to excite new and extraordinary exertion from Demosthenes. The war-party had long been imputing to Macedonia hostile conduct against Athens:

they had incited and committed hostile acts against Macedonia: yet war was not avowed between the two governments; and in the connexion, which seems to have been yet maintained in some degree with the party of Phocion, it could not conveniently be proposed. But the naval commander on the Hellespontine station Leodamas, being a man for their purpose, they sent him instructions, at their own risk, without authority from the sovereign assembly, to carry troops and provisions into Selymbria, conveying them in merchant-ships, under pretence of supplying the island of Lemnos. The commander of the Macedonian fleet however, Amyntas, took all the ships, and sent them, with their commander Leodamas, into a port of Macedonia.

SECT. II.

Epist. Phil.  
lip. 1 p.  
Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 251.

This event produced, as was likely, much agitation in Athens. The war-party were sedulous to excite indignation among the many against Philip. Demosthenes, as we learn from himself, took a leading part.<sup>5</sup> A moderate decree however, moved by Eubulus, one of the most eminent of Phocion's party, was adopted, which may deserve to be seen complete in a literal translation. It ran thus: 'In the archonship of Neocles, in the month Boedromion, the generals having called an extraordinary assembly, Eubulus, son of Mnesitheus, of the Cyprian ward, moved—Whereas the generals have reported to the assembly, that the naval commander Leodamas with twenty ships of burthen, passing under his

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 249.

<sup>5</sup> Ταῦτα τοίνυν ἐπολιτευόμενῃ τὸτ' ἰγώ. Ἠναντιούμενῃ, καὶ πρᾶξι λέγων καὶ διδάσκων μὴ προέσθαι ταῦτα Φιλίππῳ διετέλουν. Demosth. de Cor. p. 249. The first phrase seems to contain an acknowledgment that the irregular orders to Leodamas were from himself.

CHAP.  
XLI.

‘ orders to the Hellespont<sup>6</sup> for corn, have been taken  
 ‘ by Amyntas, commanding in the service of Philip,  
 ‘ and carried into the ports of Macedonia and there  
 ‘ detained under guard : therefore the prytanes and  
 ‘ the generals shall provide that the council be as-  
 ‘ sembled, and proceed to the appointment of am-  
 ‘ bassadors to Philip, who shall confer with him for  
 ‘ the release of the admiral, the ships, and the sol-  
 ‘ diers ; and if it shall appear that the proceedings  
 ‘ of Amyntas have been the result of ignorance or  
 ‘ mistake, the people will impute no blame to him :  
 ‘ if Philip detected their officer exceeding his in-  
 ‘ structions, the Athenians will take cognizance of  
 ‘ the matter, and reprove or punish, as the fault or  
 ‘ inadvertency may deserve : if it be neither of these,  
 ‘ but either he who gave or he who executed the  
 ‘ commission has committed wilful outrage, be it re-  
 ‘ ported, that the people, on just information, may  
 ‘ consider what ought to be done.’<sup>7</sup>

An embassy was accordingly sent to the king of Macedonia, who returned by it a written answer, preserved also by the orator, apparently at length, thus : ‘ The king of the Macedonians, Philip, to

<sup>6</sup> Here and elsewhere the Hellespont includes evidently the Propontis. See also Philip’s letter, *inf.* p. 339.

<sup>7</sup> Demosthenes, in reporting this decree and that which followed it, appointing ambassadors has shown his dissatisfaction with them in the language of ill temper. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν τὸ ψήφισμα, he says, Εὐβουλος ἔγραψεν, οὐκ ἐγώ. Τὸ δ’ ἐφεξῆς Ἀριστοφῶν, εἶθ’ Ἠγήσιππος, εἶτ’ Ἀριστοφῶν πάλιν, εἶτα Φιλοκράτης, εἶτα Κηρισοφῶν, εἶτα πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι ἐγὼ δ’ οὐδὲν περὶ τούτων. Λέγε τὸ ψήφισμα. The repetition of the name Aristophon, and the introduction of that of Philocrates, who was an exile, are rather curious characteristics of temper or artifice.



‘ the Athenian council and people greeting : Your  
 ‘ ambassadors have communicated with me concern-  
 ‘ ing the capture of the ships commanded by Leo-  
 ‘ damas.<sup>8</sup> Altogether you seem very easy to be  
 ‘ imposed upon, if you think I can be ignorant that  
 ‘ those ships, under pretence of carrying corn from  
 ‘ the Hellespont to Lemnos, were sent to succour  
 ‘ the Selymbrians, besieged by me, and not entitled,  
 ‘ under the provisions of the existing treaty, to be  
 ‘ considered as your allies. The instructions more-  
 ‘ over to the commander I know were not authorized  
 ‘ by the Athenian people : they were but hazarded  
 ‘ by some men in office, and some now in private  
 ‘ station, who desire by any means to urge the people  
 ‘ to prefer war with me to the friendship actually ex-  
 ‘ isting ; men who have their private advantages much  
 ‘ more in view than any benefit to the Selymbrians.  
 ‘ I am however of opinion that this would be bene-  
 ‘ ficial neither to you nor to me. I will therefore  
 ‘ release the ships ; and, for the future, if you will  
 ‘ not allow those at the head of your affairs to manage  
 ‘ them dishonestly and injuriously, but will duly re-  
 ‘ prove and restrain them, I also will endeavour to  
 ‘ preserve the peace.’

This letter, like all those preserved from Philip to the Athenians, bearing nothing of that character of cunning which has, more indeed by modern than ancient writers, been imputed to him, but on the contrary dignified rather than conciliatory, yet indicates moderation in purpose as well as openness in conduct. The ships’ crews were released : complaint of the indefensible measure of the commander was

<sup>8</sup> It seems not easy to account for the variation of names, in the copies extant of Demosthenes, between the *de ree* and the letter.

CHAP.  
XLI.

dropped : but the return was not of corresponding character. Wherever an opening could be found for negotiation, Demosthenes and the war-party were indefatigable in exciting hostility against Macedonia. Encouraged by them the Byzantines were sedulous in furnishing support to the Perinthians : the best part of their military force was actually serving in Perinthus. When therefore the siege had already been continued through the autumn and winter, and no prospect of speedy success appeared, Philip, leaving a force sufficient only to blockade the place, marched suddenly with the greater part of his army against Byzantium itself. The Byzantines, unable to defend their lands, were distressed ; but their town was too strong to be suddenly taken.

In these circumstances Demosthenes pronounced that called the fourth of his celebrated Philippic Orations.<sup>9</sup> It has been observed by the literary critics that this oration is principally a repetition of former topics, but for the political observer it has important characteristics of its own. Throughout the orator shows an increased confidence in the power of his party, and in the revival of his own favour with a majority of the people ; he resumes the discussion of the question of the theoretic revenue, with again a change of sentiments professed on that subject ; apparently the price of his revived favour with the many, for whose gratification he now again vindicates the accustomed application of that revenue, which he had before demanded for public service. The purpose of alliance with Persia is openly avowed ; and in proof of a disposition in the Persian government favourable to Athens, it is mentioned that a Macedonian

Phil. 4.  
p. 139.

<sup>9</sup> Φιλίππου . . . νῦν ἐπὶ Βυζάντιον παριόντος. Phil. 4. p. 149.

minister, apparently commissioned to the court, had been arrested on his way by one of the satraps. Among those great officers however we have already had occasion to observe conduct sometimes very adverse to the purposes of the court, and, while in some of them rays of the liberality of the great Cyrus and the first Darius, in others all the barbarism of the modern east. But, what will be not least important to remark, the orator, in consequence apparently of the improved prospect of the affairs of the war-party altogether, again holds out the claim of the empire of Greece for the Athenian people, and indicates the probability of attaining it. Lacedæmon, he observes, was unable to raise her head; and Argos, Thebes, Corinth, and Arcadia, formerly accustomed to arrange themselves under the lead of either Lacedæmon or Athens, now concurred only in a general competition with them and with one another. This miserably divided and consequently weak state of the nation he then asserts to be the fortunate crisis whence the Athenian people should profit to establish their authority over the whole.

Phil. 4.  
p. 143.

p. 145.

## SECTION III.

*Philip's letter to the Athenian people: oration of Demosthenes on the letter.*

THE threats in this celebrated oration, baffled as the Macedonian arms had been in Thrace, were alarming to Macedonia; but still more perhaps to every republic of Greece which desired to avoid subjection to the war-party of Athens. Toward Macedonia however the tenor was so hostile that, coming from one who possessed a commanding influence in

CHAP.  
XLI.

---

the sovereign assembly to which it was addressed, and who was effectually first minister of the commonwealth, it might be considered as hardly short of a declaration of war. Nevertheless Philip, knowing that a party still of great weight, whose leaders he highly esteemed and respected, was very differently disposed, resolved once more to address remonstrance to the good sense and justice of the Athenian people. He sent it in the form, then usual, of a letter ; which, though of considerable length, has been fortunately preserved with the works of Demosthenes. Apparently with reason it has been generally supposed Philip's own composition. Demosthenes informs us that, on important occasions, he was his own secretary, and Æschines that he was as capable of the business as Python of Byzantium, or any other of the ablest Greeks in his service ; and the supposition receives confirmation from the striking conformity, in style and character, between this and two shorter letters from Philip to the Athenian people, preserved in the Oration of Demosthenes on the Crown, which have already occurred for notice. In the original it has been universally admired as one of the most perfect models of a state paper ever published ; singularly combining dignity with simplicity, perspicuity with conciseness, civility of expression with force of representation, moderation of phrase with triumph of argument. As a historical document it is perhaps the most curious, and certainly among the most valuable, remaining from antiquity ; its value in that view being greatly increased by the preservation of the oration of Demosthenes in reply to it. That oration, avoiding to contest, most effectually confirms the exactness of its statements ; insomuch that there is hardly such another series of important facts, through-

Demosth.  
de Cor.



out ancient history, established by evidence so unquestionable.<sup>10</sup> In any translation it must suffer much; yet in justice to this part of the subject the reader should see it entire, in words the nearest to the original that may be, which I venture to offer thus:

‘ Philip to the Athenian council and people greeting. Having endeavoured repeatedly, by my ambassadors, to induce you to adhere to your engagements solemnly sworn to, and those endeavours having proved fruitless, I have thought it best now myself to lay before you the matters in which I reckon I am aggrieved. Be not surprised at the length of my letter: my complaints are numerous, and it appears necessary to explain all distinctly.

‘ I will begin with mentioning that, when Nicias my herald was carried off by violence from my territory, you did not call the perpetrators of that outrage to account, but you imprisoned the injured

<sup>10</sup> Some modern writers, in vehemence of attachment to the politics of Demosthenes, have not scrupled, what Demosthenes dared not venture, to impute falsehood to Philip's statements in this letter. Thus the translator Auger, in what he calls his ‘ Summary ’ of the letter: ‘ Dans cette lettre, mélangant adroitement le vrai avec le faux, il tire de l'un tout le parti possible, donne à l'autre l'air de la vérité, présente avec art des faits ou constants ou douteux, dont il déduit à son avantage les conséquences les plus justes et les plus précises, &c. He has done himself and the writer credit then in noticing ‘ le style simple, noble, et précis de cette lettre, la marche facile et l'enchaînement naturel des idées qui la composent. ’ In his ‘ Summary ’ afterward of the oration of Demosthenes in reply, he says, ‘ Sans s'amuser à répondre à tous les articles de la lettre, il (Démosthène) prend le ton affirmatif. ’—So equally Auger himself, and all other writers, admirers of the politics of Demosthenes, as far as my reading among them has gone, have avoided to ‘ s'amuser ’ with answering any one of the articles of the letter; and all, after the great orator's example, have taken ‘ le ton affirmatif. ’

‘ person ten months; and my letters, of which he  
‘ was the bearer, you caused to be read in your general  
‘ assembly.<sup>11</sup>

‘ That when the Thasians, your subjects, admitted  
‘ into their port the ships of war of the Byzantines,  
‘ my enemies, and all privateers and pirates, cruising  
‘ against my subjects coming there, though the treaty  
‘ between us declares such conduct an act of hostility,  
‘ you would take no measures to prevent it.

‘ It was about the same time that Diopithes in-  
‘ vaded the country under my protection, carried off  
‘ the free inhabitants of Crobyle and Tiristasis, and  
‘ sold them to slavery, plundered and wasted the  
‘ bordering lands of Thrace, and at length proceeded  
‘ to that excess of lawless violence as to arrest my  
‘ minister, Amphilochnus, sent to negotiate the release  
‘ of the prisoners, and, by treating him with extreme  
‘ severity, forced him to pay nine talents’ (near  
eighteen hundred pounds) ‘ for his ransom. And this  
‘ conduct received absolutely the approbation of the  
‘ people in assembly, though among all nations to  
‘ violate heralds and ambassadors is held nefarious,  
‘ and most among you. When your herald, Anthe-  
‘ mocritus, was put to death by the Megareans, you  
‘ marked your sense of the crime by excluding the  
‘ Megarean people from participation in the mysteries,  
‘ and by erecting a monumental statue before your  
‘ city-gate. What then is to be said of a crime com-

<sup>11</sup> Later writers have eulogized the politeness of the Athenians on this occasion, in returning the letters of the queen Olympias unopened. They have however avoided notice of the violation of the law of nations in stopping the herald; and their eulogy is a little farther weakened by the failure of the authority of Demosthenes for the matter of politeness. It is indeed observable that Philip himself seems to have known nothing of the letters for the queen.

‘mitted by yourselves, which you, when committed  
‘against you, have so resented?

‘To proceed then: your general, Callias, took  
‘possession of all the towns on the Pagasæan bay,  
‘connected by close alliance with me, and entitled  
‘by treaty to peace from you: he seized all ships  
‘bound to Macedonia, and, condemning all found  
‘aboard as enemies, sold them to slavery. And for  
‘these violences your decrees rewarded him with ap-  
‘plause. I am really not aware what you could do  
‘more contrary to habits of peace, if you were at  
‘declared war with me. When there was open  
‘war between us, you did so and no otherwise; you  
‘sent out your ships, you sold those whom you took  
‘sailing to my kingdom, you assisted my enemies,  
‘you did all the ill you could to my people. But  
‘now you have proceeded to such an extreme of un-  
‘justifiable malevolence as to send an embassy to the  
‘Persian king to persuade him to make war against  
‘me. Surely this is conduct most extraordinary.  
‘Before that monarch had recovered Egypt and  
‘Phenicia, in apprehension of attack from him, you  
‘passed decrees proposing a confederacy against him,  
‘and inviting me, with all other Greeks, to accede  
‘to it. Now, on the contrary, such is the extrava-  
‘gance of your rancour toward me, you are treating  
‘with him for an alliance against me. Your fore-  
‘fathers, as I am informed, held it a foul reproach  
‘to the family of Pisistratus that they led the Persians  
‘against the Greeks; yet you are not ashamed to do  
‘those very things which, in those you call tyrants,  
‘you condemn.

‘Among other extraordinary matters then in your  
‘decrees you require that I should allow Teres and  
‘Kersobleptes to command undisturbed in Thrace



CHAP.  
XLI.

---

‘ because they are Athenian citizens. But I know  
 ‘ they were not comprised in the treaty of peace made  
 ‘ by me with you ; their names are not to be found  
 ‘ in the engraved copies of the treaty, and they have  
 ‘ been disowned by you as Athenian citizens : farther  
 ‘ I know that Teres has borne arms with me against  
 ‘ you, and that Kersobleptes, desiring to take the  
 ‘ oaths to the treaty before my ambassadors, was  
 ‘ prevented by your generals, representing him as an  
 ‘ enemy to the Athenian people. How then is this  
 ‘ fair or just ; to declare him an enemy to your state,  
 ‘ if so your interest in the moment requires ; yet to  
 ‘ claim him as your citizen, if you want to institute  
 ‘ a calumnious charge against me ? Sitalces,’ (the  
 prince already so often occurring for mention by the  
 name of Cotys,) ‘ it is known, was admitted to the  
 ‘ rights of your city : yet when he was assassinated,  
 ‘ his murderer immediately found favour with you ;  
 ‘ and nevertheless you would go to war with me in  
 ‘ the cause of Kersobleptes ; knowing perfectly that  
 ‘ none of those foreigners, on whom you have be-  
 ‘ stowed the present of citizenship, care in the least  
 ‘ for either your laws or your decrees. But, omitting  
 ‘ much that might be said on this subject, to come  
 ‘ to a point, you gave the rights of your city to Eva-  
 ‘ goras the Cyprian, and Dionysius the Syracusan,  
 ‘ and their posterity. If you will persuade those who  
 ‘ expelled these to restore them to the authority they  
 ‘ held when you made them Athenian citizens, you  
 ‘ shall command from me that part of Thrace over  
 ‘ which Teres and Kersobleptes reigned. But if you  
 ‘ take no measure of any kind in favour of those your  
 ‘ fellow-citizens, and yet would give me trouble on a si-  
 ‘ milar account, how am I not justified in resisting you ?  
 ‘ Much more which might be reasonably insisted



' upon occurs on these matters, but I will omit it and  
 ' proceed to speak of the Cardians. I must maintain  
 ' then that I am bound to support them; having  
 ' formed alliance with them before the peace made  
 ' with you, while you have constantly refused the  
 ' arbitration to which I over and over, and they not  
 ' seldom, have earnestly urged a desire to have it re-  
 ' ferred. Should I not deserve to be esteemed even  
 ' profligate, if I deserted my allies, and showed more  
 ' regard for you, who have been, with unremitted  
 ' assiduity, exciting trouble for me, than for those  
 ' who have been my good and steady friends?

' With regard to the Thracian princes and the  
 ' Cardians however, you have confined yourselves to  
 ' remonstrances; but in a recent affair you have begun  
 ' with serious violence; for, upon simple complaint of  
 ' the Peparethians that they had been injuriously  
 ' treated, you immediately commanded your general  
 ' to make reprisals against me. Now the truth was  
 ' that my measures against that people were less severe  
 ' than they deserved. In full peace they seized Halon-  
 ' nesus; and, on repeated application from me, re-  
 ' fused to restore either the island or my troops whom  
 ' they had made prisoners. Of the injury done me  
 ' by the Peparethians you would take no account;  
 ' you would look only to the measures I took, in jus-  
 ' tice to myself, against them. But you well know  
 ' that I acquired the island by taking it, not from  
 ' them, not from you, but from the pirate Sostratus.  
 ' If then you say you gave it to Sostratus, you ac-  
 ' knowledge yourselves patrons of pirates. If he esta-  
 ' blished himself there by violence, against your con-  
 ' sent, what injury have you suffered from my taking  
 ' it, and making the navigation of that sea safe? Ne-  
 ' vertheless having taken it, I showed so much regard

CHAP.  
XLI.

‘ for your state as to offer to give it you. But your  
 ‘ orators would not allow you to accept it as a gift ;  
 ‘ they insisted upon your reclaiming it as your right ;  
 ‘ that so, if I obeyed their requisition, I might incur  
 ‘ the disgrace of acknowledging that I had taken what  
 ‘ I had no right to take, or, by refusing to surrender  
 ‘ the place, I might become obnoxious to the Athe-  
 ‘ nian many. Aware of their purpose, I proposed  
 ‘ to refer the matter to arbitration, upon the condition  
 ‘ that, should the island be decided to be mine, it  
 ‘ should pass to you as a gift from me ; should it be  
 ‘ decided to be yours, then it should pass as a resti-  
 ‘ tution. Frequently as I urged this, you would not  
 ‘ consent ; and meanwhile the Peparethians took the  
 ‘ island. What became me then to do ? Not to re-  
 ‘ quire justice of those who, in violation of their oaths,  
 ‘ did me that wrong ? Not to make reprisals against  
 ‘ those who were so insultingly injurious ? If the island  
 ‘ belonged to the Peparethians, how can the Athe-  
 ‘ nians reclaim it ? If it belonged to you, how was  
 ‘ it that you did not demand it of the Peparethians ?

‘ But so far has the hostile temper now carried  
 ‘ you that, by your decree, passed on the motion of  
 ‘ Polycrates, you have warranted your colonists in  
 ‘ the Chersonese to consider themselves as in a state  
 ‘ of war with me ; and your general on that station  
 ‘ has sent formal notice to the Byzantines, and others  
 ‘ in those parts, that you have authorized him to com-  
 ‘ mence hostilities against me whenever fair oppor-  
 ‘ tunity may offer, and that you require their co-  
 ‘ operation. Hence, wanting to send a fleet into  
 ‘ the Hellespont<sup>12</sup>, I was obliged to order an army

<sup>12</sup> Εἰς Ἑλλάσποντον, p. 163., evidently meaning that afterward distinguished as the Propontis.

‘ for its escort through the strait by the Cherso-  
‘ nese.<sup>13</sup>

‘ Nevertheless I have abstained from reprisals  
‘ against your towns, your ships, and your territories,  
‘ though it has been enough in my power to make  
‘ myself master of all or most of them ; and I have  
‘ not ceased to solicit you to come to an amicable  
‘ arbitration about all matters in question between  
‘ us. And I still desire you to consider whether the  
‘ trial of arms is preferable to the trial of reason, and  
‘ whether it is really fittest that you should assume  
‘ judgment in your own cause, or commit it to others :  
‘ I desire you to reflect how utterly unreasonable it  
‘ must appear to all the world that the Athenians,  
‘ who compelled the Thasians and Maronites to ab-  
‘ stain from arms in their dispute for the possession  
‘ of Smyrna, and commit the matter to arbitration,  
‘ should themselves refuse a similar equitable dis-  
‘ cussion of their claims against me ; with this ad-  
‘ dition to the inconsistency that, if judgment goes  
‘ against you, no loss of what you now possess will  
‘ ensue, and if in your favour, you will gain what I  
‘ now possess.

‘ But there remains yet to mention what appears  
‘ to me more extraordinary than all the rest. When  
‘ I proposed last to treat with you of the common  
‘ interests of Greece, with a view to an accommo-  
‘ dation upon equitable terms, to obviate jealousy I  
‘ procured embassies from all the Grecian states of  
‘ my alliance to attend, as witnesses to all trans-

<sup>13</sup> Ἠναγκάσθην αὐτάς καταπέμψαι διὰ Χερρόνησου τῆ στρατιᾶς. Epist. Philip. p. 163. I am not wholly without doubt about the sense of this passage, which I submit to those who have given their attention to the naval and military affairs of the ancients. [The right reading seems to be παραπέμψαι. Auger translates : ‘ je fus obligé, pour la garantir d’insultes, de faire marcher les troupes le long des côtes de la Chersonèse.’]

CHAP.  
XLI.

---

‘ actions ; interested to oppose whatever might involve  
 ‘ common danger, and able to convict me of being  
 ‘ the unworthiest of mankind, if I proposed any de-  
 ‘ ception. You refused my ministers audience. Nor  
 ‘ is the ground of this conduct difficult to discover ;  
 ‘ for, whatever benefit might have resulted to the  
 ‘ people, the proposed accommodation would not have  
 ‘ suited the purposes of some of your orators ; those  
 ‘ traders in politics among you<sup>14</sup>, who hold that war  
 ‘ is for them peace, and peace war. If generals are  
 ‘ employed, employment for the orators also is cer-  
 ‘ tain ; for either promoting measures or opposing  
 ‘ them, defending and applauding conduct or arraign-  
 ‘ ing it, their profits are sure. At the same time ca-  
 ‘ lumniating from the bema, the most respectable of  
 ‘ your citizens, those most known in other states and  
 ‘ most esteemed, they acquire, among the many, the  
 ‘ credit of being friends of the people.

‘ It would be easy for me, at small expense, to  
 ‘ stop their invective, and set them upon panegyric  
 ‘ of us. But I should be ashamed of appearing to  
 ‘ purchase from such men your good-will ; men who  
 ‘ have had the assurance to bring into question even  
 ‘ my right to Amphipolis. I trust I can maintain  
 ‘ that right on much juster grounds than any can  
 ‘ dispute it with me. If first possession is to esta-  
 ‘ blish the claim, the evidence of the golden statue at  
 ‘ Delphi, dedicated by my ancestor Alexander from  
 ‘ the spoils, when he conquered the country from the  
 ‘ Persians, what Grecian state can contest? Should  
 ‘ the right thus acquired be considered as invalidated  
 ‘ by later possession, the latest claim that can be as-  
 ‘ serted also is mine ; for I took the place by siege  
 ‘ in open war, against the colonists established there

<sup>14</sup> Οἱ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς παρ' ὑμῶν ἔμποροι.



‘ by the Lacedæmonians, who had taken it, in fair  
 ‘ and open war from you. We all hold our respective  
 ‘ countries either by inheritance from our ancestors, or  
 ‘ by conquest. Of Amphipolis then you neither were  
 ‘ the first Grecian possessors, nor are the present pos-  
 ‘ sessors ; but, having held it for a very short time only,  
 ‘ claim it from me against your own most solemn  
 ‘ pledge of faith in treaty made with me. Frequently  
 ‘ I have mentioned it to you ; and, on the other  
 ‘ hand, your acknowledgment of my right has been  
 ‘ fully confirmed by the treaty of peace between us,  
 ‘ leaving me in possession, and it has been farther  
 ‘ corroborated by the treaty of alliance which fol-  
 ‘ lowed. How then can any right be more strongly  
 ‘ established ? It was originally conquered by my an-  
 ‘ cestors ; it became again mine by the acknowledged  
 ‘ laws of war ; and finally my right has been solemnly  
 ‘ admitted by you, who are so much accustomed to  
 ‘ claim what you have no pretension to.

‘ These are the matters of which I complain ; and  
 ‘ my past forbearance, it is evident, has produced  
 ‘ only encouragement for you to be more forward in  
 ‘ such injurious conduct, and to pursue it unceas-  
 ‘ ingly to the utmost of your power. You then  
 ‘ being the aggressors, with justice on my side, and  
 ‘ calling the gods to witness it, I will resist your  
 ‘ aggression, and put to the trial of arms the right  
 ‘ you deny me.’

This letter having been read in accustomed form  
 to the Athenian people, Demosthenes ascended the  
 bema. His speech on the occasion, fortunately  
 preserved, is, even among his speeches, of singular  
 boldness and extraordinary ingenuity. Evidently  
 he felt the letter a refutation of all his Philippics,  
 not to be answered by reason and argument. He

came therefore prepared with another kind of artillery. Beginning with a bold assertion, adapted to excite attention, he proceeded directly to the mention of transactions foreign to the purpose of the latter, but adapted to introduce the invective and instigation composing the rest of the speech, in which not the least notice is taken of any one of the king's complaints, or of any one of the facts stated by him as the ground of them. But the speech, though, like the letter, it must suffer in any change of language, will deserve to be seen entire, and in words following the original the nearest that may be.

‘ Athenians,’ said Demosthenes, ‘ that Philip made  
 ‘ no peace with you, but only postponed the war, is  
 ‘ evident to you all. For after he had given Halus  
 ‘ to the Pharsalians, and disposed of the Phocians,  
 ‘ and subdued all Thrace, feigning grounds which  
 ‘ had no existence, and finding pretences founded on  
 ‘ no justice, he immediately, in fact, made war against  
 ‘ the republic, and now, in the letter which you have  
 ‘ just heard, acknowledges it. That we ought not  
 ‘ then either to fear his power, or set ourselves with  
 ‘ any ordinary exertion to oppose it, but that with our  
 ‘ bodies and our fortunes, with our ships, and in short  
 ‘ with all we have, we should proceed unsparingly to  
 ‘ vigorous war, I will endeavour to show.

‘ In the first place then, Athenians, it may be  
 ‘ trusted that the greatest of the gods will be our  
 ‘ allies and assistants, whom he has dishonoured, un-  
 ‘ justly violating the peace sworn to in their names.  
 ‘ Next it is to be observed, that the arts by which  
 ‘ he has hitherto prospered, continually deceiving  
 ‘ some people or other with promises of great benefits  
 ‘ from his friendship, have now lost all their effect.

‘ The Perinthians, the Byzantines, and all connected  
 ‘ with them, are aware that his purpose is to treat  
 ‘ them as he has treated the Olynthians. Even the  
 ‘ Thessalians now see that he means to hold authority  
 ‘ among his allies, not at their choice, but by his own  
 ‘ power. The Thebans are already highly jealous of  
 ‘ him : his garrison in Nicæa, and his surreptitiously  
 ‘ acquired seat among the Amphictyons are enough  
 ‘ to hold them in alarm. The Peloponnesians he  
 ‘ requires to attend him by their embassies, and to  
 ‘ make their alliance with him exclusive. Thus, of  
 ‘ those formerly his confederates, some are now at  
 ‘ open war with him, and others are lukewarm in  
 ‘ alliance ; all suspect and complain. But there is  
 ‘ another thing, of great importance : the satraps of  
 ‘ Asia have compelled him, by the force of merce-  
 ‘ naries thrown into Perinthus, to raise the siege of  
 ‘ that town. Hostility being thus actually begun,  
 ‘ the consideration of the danger threatening the  
 ‘ Persian provinces, should he possess himself of  
 ‘ Byzantium, not only will make the satraps our  
 ‘ ready allies, but will induce the king of Persia him-  
 ‘ self to supply us with money. His power so to  
 ‘ supply us, it is well known, exceeds that of all  
 ‘ others ; and such altogether are his means to inter-  
 ‘ fere in all the affairs of Greece that, formerly, in  
 ‘ the wars between us and the Lacedæmonians, his  
 ‘ alliance gave the superiority to either side at his  
 ‘ pleasure. Becoming then now our ally, he will  
 ‘ easily overbear Philip’s power.

‘ Nevertheless I will not say that Philip has not,  
 ‘ during peace, possessed himself of many towns and  
 ‘ harbours, and various advantages of no small im-  
 ‘ portance for war. But I observe that when power  
 ‘ is founded on good will, and all the states combined

CHAP.  
XLI.

---

‘ for war have one interest, such power is lasting.  
‘ On the contrary, when it is held by intrigue, and  
‘ ambition, and deceit, and violence, as now by him,  
‘ a little appearance of a turn of fortune, the smallest  
‘ failure of success, will suffice to shake and over-  
‘ throw it. And, considering often these matters,  
‘ Athenians, I am persuaded that, not only among  
‘ Philip’s allies there is much mistrust and ill will  
‘ toward him, but that, even within his own king-  
‘ dom, there is not quite that harmony and that  
‘ attachment to him which some suppose. The  
‘ Macedonian power is become considerable by accre-  
‘ tion. Of itself small, it is yet utterly unpropor-  
‘ tioned to support the authority which must ulti-  
‘ mately rest on it. Philip, by his wars and his expe-  
‘ ditions, and everything by which any might suppose  
‘ he is become great, has made it only more pre-  
‘ carious. For you must not imagine, Athenians,  
‘ that the same things delight Philip and his subjects.  
‘ You must recollect that he is ardent for glory ;  
‘ their wish is for safety : he cannot acquire glory  
‘ without danger ; and they do not desire, while they  
‘ have children and parents and wives at home, to  
‘ perish or meet daily dangers for him. From these  
‘ considerations any one may gather how the greater  
‘ part of the Macedonians are disposed toward him.  
‘ Those then called his companions, and the principal  
‘ officers of his mercenaries, enjoy indeed distinction  
‘ in some proportion to their merit ; but they live in  
‘ more apprehension than those less distinguished.  
‘ For those of lower degree fear only the enemy ; but  
‘ the man holding high rank has more to apprehend  
‘ from flatterers and calumniators than from battles.  
‘ In the perils of war high and low partake ; but the  
‘ dread of the king’s temper is peculiar to the great.



‘ Moreover, those of the lower ranks are punished  
 ‘ only if they deserve punishment ; but those of the  
 ‘ higher often incur mortification and humiliation by  
 ‘ merit too conspicuous. Nor is this to be doubted  
 ‘ by any man of sense and information ; for Philip is  
 ‘ so greedy of glory, as those who have lived with  
 ‘ him affirm, that he shows more dissatisfaction with  
 ‘ his generals when they do anything highly praise-  
 ‘ worthy than when they wholly fail in a business  
 ‘ committed to them. How then is it, if things are  
 ‘ so, that he has been so well served so long ? Be-  
 ‘ cause, Athenians, prosperity throws a veil over such  
 ‘ things. Success is powerful to overshadow and hide  
 ‘ the faults of men. Should he once fail, then all will  
 ‘ be brought into clear day-light. For, as in our  
 ‘ bodies, while general health prevails, ailments in  
 ‘ particular parts are little regarded, but in sickness  
 ‘ every sore is disturbed, old fractures, old strains,  
 ‘ and whatever is not perfectly sound ; so in king-  
 ‘ doms and all governments, while they are successful  
 ‘ in war defects are little observed ; but when failure  
 ‘ begins, such as may be expected for him in pro-  
 ‘ jects beyond his strength, everything that has gone  
 ‘ wrong will become evident to everybody.

‘ Nevertheless, Athenians, if any of you, seeing  
 ‘ Philip successful, reckon him therefore formidable,  
 ‘ I think he judges well ; for in all the affairs of men  
 ‘ fortune is much, or rather everything. And yet,  
 ‘ in a comparison of his fortune with ours, the ad-  
 ‘ vantage will be found, in many ways, with us.  
 ‘ For we have inherited from our ancestors our supe-  
 ‘ riority and command, transmitted from times, not  
 ‘ only before this man, but before any reigned in  
 ‘ Macedonia. They formerly paid tribute to the  
 ‘ Athenians, but our commonwealth never to any.

CHAP.  
XLI.

---

‘ We have many reasons then to expect superior  
 ‘ favour from the gods, inasmuch as our conduct  
 ‘ has been more consonant to piety and justice. But  
 ‘ why then was he so successful against us in the  
 ‘ former war? Because, Athenians, for I must be  
 ‘ open with you, he is always present with his army,  
 ‘ bears all fatigue and every privation, faces every  
 ‘ danger, and, regardless of seasons throughout the  
 ‘ year, never misses an opportunity. On the con-  
 ‘ trary we, for the truth must be spoken, sit here  
 ‘ idling, procrastinating, decreeing, and inquiring  
 ‘ for news. For news! what can be stranger news  
 ‘ than that a Macedonian man, holding the Athe-  
 ‘ nians in contempt, should dare to send them such  
 ‘ a letter as you have just heard? But he has an  
 ‘ army of mercenaries in his pay,—and, the gods  
 ‘ know, some of our orators besides; who are not  
 ‘ ashamed to live for Philip, and seem hardly aware  
 ‘ that they are selling the commonwealth, and them-  
 ‘ selves with it, for a little pelf. But we neither stir  
 ‘ to excite elsewhere opposition to his designs, nor  
 ‘ will furnish the expense of a mercenary army, nor  
 ‘ have courage to serve ourselves. It is not therefore  
 ‘ wonderful that he obtained successes against us in  
 ‘ the late war; but rather that we, doing nothing  
 ‘ that in war ought to be done, expect to prevail  
 ‘ against him who does everything that can promote  
 ‘ his superiority.

– ‘ These, Athenians, are the matters you have to  
 ‘ consider; and so to consider as becomes those who  
 ‘ cannot say they are enjoying peace; for now, after  
 ‘ open acts of hostility, he has declared war. It  
 ‘ becomes you therefore to spare neither public nor  
 ‘ private wealth; it becomes all to dedicate their  
 ‘ persons zealously to the service when occasion may

‘ be. Better generals than formerly should be ap-  
 ‘ pointed. For let it not be imagined that those,  
 ‘ through whom the affairs of the commonwealth  
 ‘ from better have become worse, are those who  
 ‘ from worse will make them better again. Nor  
 ‘ have the weakness to suppose that, if you are your-  
 ‘ selves inactive as formerly, others will be zealous  
 ‘ to fight your battles for you. But, on the con-  
 ‘ trary, consider how disgraceful it is for you, whose  
 ‘ fathers bore so many labours and such extraordinary  
 ‘ dangers in war with Lacedæmon, to refuse the  
 ‘ exertion necessary for maintaining what they,  
 ‘ honourably and justly acquiring, have transmitted  
 ‘ to you ; that a man of Macedonia should be so  
 ‘ ready for danger in his ambitious pursuits as to  
 ‘ have been wounded in battle in every part of his  
 ‘ body, and Athenians, whose inheritance is inde-  
 ‘ pendency and victory, should, through softness and  
 ‘ idleness, surrender the acquisitions of their fore-  
 ‘ fathers and the interests of their country.

‘ Not however to make many words, I insist that  
 ‘ we should all prepare for war ; that we should ani-  
 ‘ mate the other Greeks to join in alliance with us,  
 ‘ not with words but with deeds : for all argument,  
 ‘ unsupported by actions, is vain, and so much the  
 ‘ more from our government, as we are known to  
 ‘ have readier means for acting against him than any  
 ‘ other Greeks.’

## SECTION IV.

*Defeat of Philip's measures against the Hellespontine cities. Difficulties remaining for Demosthenes. Measures of Demosthenes for an extensive confederacy against Macedonia. Reversion of superior influence to Phocion's party, and tranquillity ensuing.*

CHAP.  
XLI.  
B. C. 340.\*  
Ol. 110. 1.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 77.

Plut. v.  
Phoc.

As it must have been assurance of a strong party among the many of Athens that encouraged Demosthenes to answer such a letter with such a speech, so it appears to have been good assurance of a strong combination against Macedonia, which was gathering on the eastern side of the Ægean, that encouraged him and his party in the line of politics which they followed. The Chians, and Rhodians, and Coans, whose political connexion with Byzantium had not ceased with the Confederate war, took a warm interest in the danger of their ally, and they were strong in marine. But, what was still more important, orders were sent from the Persian court for all the maritime satraps to use their utmost exertions for preventing the progress of the Macedonian arms, and the injury that might ensue to the Persian interest. Under direction then of the Athenian government, a powerful combined fleet was assembled in the Hellespont, and Chares took the command. Whether Demosthenes really considered him as the fittest instrument still of the purposes of the party, or, taking himself the lead in political business, he was unable to deny the first military situation to Chares, neither his own speeches nor any other memorials

\* [Mr. Clinton places the speech of Demosthenes on the Letter B. C. 339. *Fasti Hellen.* p. 360.]



furnish satisfactory information. Chares, with the combined fleet under his orders, meeting the Macedonian fleet, under the orders of Amyntas, was defeated. While his insufficiency thus against the enemies of his country made him contemptible, his rapacity against its friends, of which experience was old, made him odious. It became necessary to recal him, and Phocion was sent to supersede him in the command.

Plut. v.  
Phoc.

It were highly desirable to elicit all possible light from the narrative of Plutarch, far more copious than any other extant of the transactions of this time, which were among the most critical of the age; but he has so painted his hero Phocion in glaring colours, without comprehensible form, and so thrown Philip into smoke and darkness, also without distinguishable lines, and altogether so wants support from the historian, the orators, the Roman biographer, and probability, that, amid much obvious romance, it is hardly to be discovered to what, among all his tales, reason should allow belief. The issue however was that Philip, abandoning the hope of reducing any of the adverse towns of the Thracian shore, came to a composition with his enemies. The historian, writing near three hundred years after, and willing that Greeks only should be believed the defenders of Grecian cities, imputes the principal effect to the interference of the Chians and Lesbians; but what Demosthenes indicates, in his speech at the time on the king of Macedonia's letter, was then probably too notorious to be concealed, and in his opinion perhaps matter rather for boast, as the advantageous result of his negotiation, namely, that the wealth of Persia, paying and plentifully supplying Grecian troops, principally gave the strength from which Philip

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 77.

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 257.

CHAP.  
XLI.

---

thought it prudent to withdraw. It is possible also, and not wholly improbable, that somewhat of that credit may have been due to Phocion which Plutarch gives, but of which Demosthenes would avoid an account. Phocion having the command of the Athenian armament on the Hellespontine station, Philip would respect him, and be ready for accommodation with him. But, in an oration of many years after, Demosthenes assumed the merit for the Athenian people; yet more particularly for himself, as the director of their measures. Thus flattering the Athenian people, he may have omitted what was owing to Phocion and others, and yet perhaps may have arrogated little more to himself than he might justly claim: the combination and direction of force, and the success ensuing, may have been principally owing to his able management.

The triumph thus might appear great for Demosthenes, as the disappointment certainly must have been great for Philip; who, since his defeat by Onomarchus, and ensuing distress and danger in Thessaly soon repaired by a splendid victory, had been accustomed to see all the measures of his enemies turn to their own confusion and his advantage; and, having earned the estimation of being the most fortunate, formidable, and glorious potentate of the age<sup>15</sup>, was now completely foiled in enterprise, successively against three little commercial states which had before solicited his protection. But the success of Demosthenes, though much had been done, was yet so far from complete that he and his whole party

<sup>15</sup> Εὐδαίμων καὶ μέγας καὶ πολλῶν κύριος γέγονεν. Demosth. Philip. 4. p. 143. And again, p. 149. Εὐδαίμων καὶ μέγας καὶ φοβερὸς ἔστι πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ Βαρβάροις.

remained as on the verge of a precipice. He had been, in his public speeches, continually and vehemently urging the republic to war against Macedonia, procuring measures of positive hostility to be taken, and, after great forbearance and repeated remonstrances from Philip, contemptuously asserting the falsehood of that prince's pretence to desire peace, and the actual existence of war. In these circumstances he and his party could not undertake conciliation with Macedonia. If conciliation were proper or necessary, they must yield the lead to their opponents of the party of Phocion, who had always desired peace, and with whom, it was well known, Philip was disposed to friendship. Nothing therefore remained for them, if they would even hold the lead in Athens, and more especially, if they would prosecute still those ambitious purposes of extensive empire which we have seen Demosthenes so frequently avowing, but to persevere in urging war against Macedonia, and in effort to form a confederacy able to support it. Of the terms of the treaty concluded when the Macedonian arms were withdrawn from Byzantium we have no information; but it is evident that the pressure upon Macedonia was relieved; the hope of farther co-operation from the Chians and Rhodians in the views of the war-party was ended; and active hostility, even from the Persian satraps, apparently in necessary consequence ceased.

Such appear to have been the disadvantageous and discouraging circumstances remaining for Demosthenes after his success in procuring so important a check to the Macedonian arms, the first given since his acquisition of any share in the administration. He had however yet before him advantages which talents like his might use, and ambition like his would

CHAP.  
XLI.

not abandon. He retained still the agency for the Persian court, the means afforded by which are not to be calculated. In Eubœa his new system of liberality had been highly successful. The able conduct of the brothers, Callias and Taurosthenes, his agents, had made their party preponderant in all the towns of the island. In western Greece the Acarnanians were much disposed to connexion with the war-party of Athens, through enmity to the Epirots on their northern, and the Ætolians on their southern border, favoured against them by Macedonia. In Peloponnesus the Achæans, instigated like the Acarnanians by enmity to the Ætolians, desired Athenian patronage for their support against those who enjoyed Macedonian patronage. Corinth also remained under the lead of those who held friendly connexion with the war-party in Athens. But the important speculation was in Thebes; and the interest there, adverse to Macedonia, not only maintained itself, but was advancing in weight.

Beyond Greece the Chersonese alone was now under the dominion of Athens; but the neighbouring cities of Byzantium, Selymbria, and Perinthus, commanding the coast nearly from the Chersonese to the Euxine, were restored to her alliance. Among arrangements made there by Phocion would be a restoration of some liberal participation in civil power to the party adverse to war with Macedonia. For Demosthenes then it would be an object, on the first opportunity, to reverse this, and restore complete preponderance to the other party; whose leaders, formerly connected with him, would not fail in zealous concurrence. How successful he was in this pursuit, following circumstances show.

In Byzantium, as in Athens, political measures



were, in regular course, proposed in a select council, and, after discussion there, brought before the assembled people. A bill, regularly carried through the council, was transmitted to the general assembly, and there passed into a law, declaring the gratitude of the Byzantine to the Athenian people for their support in the recent war with Macedonia. It moreover directed that, in perpetual memory of the benefit, three statues, each sixteen cubits high, representing the Byzantine people and the Perinthian crowning the Athenian, should be placed in a public part of Byzantium. The decree for this purpose has been preserved as given by Demosthenes in its original Doric dialect. The temper and the policy of those who led in the business are clearly marked by the preamble, which contains a direct libel upon those Byzantine patriots who, through opportunity afforded by the Confederate war, had emancipated their commonwealth from its former oppressive and degrading subjection under the sovereignty of the Athenian people. It states, as the ground of the decree, that ‘the Athenian people, in former times, had been always friendly to the Byzantines, and to their allies and kinsmen the Perinthians; and that recently, when Philip the Macedonian made war with the purpose of exterminating them, they had done many and great services, assisting them with a hundred and twenty vessels, bringing corn and arms and heavy-armed troops, and thus delivered them from great dangers, and restored their ancient form of government, their laws, and the tombs of their forefathers.’ An extensive purpose is indicated in what follows: to the whole Athenian people are given freedom of both cities, right of marriage with citizens; right of holding lands and houses in the Byzantine

SECT.  
IV.

---

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 255.

Demosth.  
ut sup.

CHAP.  
XLI.

and Perinthian territories, and with these common rights of citizens, the extraordinary privileges of precedence at religious ceremonies and public spectacles, and immunity from those burdensome offices which, in all the republics, were connected with the rights of citizens. After this the statutes are directed, and then follows the concluding clause, not the least remarkable, enacting that embassies shall be sent to all the great national meetings, the Isthmian, Nemean, Olympic, and Pythian, to make there solemn proclamation of the crowns, 'with which,' says the decree 'the Athenian people are crowned by us; that all the Greeks may be informed of the merit of the Athenians, and of the gratitude of the Byzantines and Perinthians.'

The tenor of this decree fully shows that the high-spirited and successful assertors of independency, who had directed the measures of Byzantium and Perinthus in the Confederate war, no longer held the lead, and that the connexion of those who had superseded them in power was not with the party of Phocion, to whom their cities owed recent relief from a ruinous war, but with the Athenian war-party, whose instruments they submitted to be, in offering such servile flattery to the Athenian people, and in promoting a new breach with Macedonia. The influence then of that party thus prevailing there, their authority would not be likely to fail among the subjects of Athens in the neighbouring territory of the Chersonese. Accordingly, from that country a decree was procured in these remarkable terms: 'The Chersonesites inhabiting Sestus, Eleus, Madytus, and Alopeconesus crown the council and people of Athens with a golden crown of sixty talents; and they erect an altar to gratitude, and to the Athenian people, who

‘ have done the greatest of all benefits to the Chersonesites, rescuing them from Philip, and restoring their country, their laws, their freedom, and their religious rites : wherefore they will not cease henceforth for ever to be grateful, and to return the greatest good in their power. So it is in common council decreed.’ This extortion of sixty talents from the Chersonesites, gratifying to the Athenian many, and therefore what Demosthenes would boast of before them, was not what would gain favour to the war-party cause among the other Greeks, and so was not proclaimed at the national meetings like the decree of the Byzantines.<sup>16</sup>

The restoration of the war-party interest in Byzantium was an important step toward the completion of the political system of Demosthenes, which had two great points, to surround Attica with allies, and Macedonia with enemies. To prosecute this he devoted himself, according to his own boast, to every kind of business. He was elected an Amphietyon, or representative of Athens in the office of pylagore in the Amphietyonic assembly, and he went to Delphi. It seems to have been a principal advantage of that situation and office that together they gave great opportunity for communication with Thebes. He used moreover the opportunity of residence in Phocis for taking the duty of ambassador to the neighbouring people of Acarnania, and he went in the same capacity into Peloponnesus. But he would not allow himself long absence from the debates and intrigues of Athens. The prosecution therefore of negotiation, begun in

Demosth.  
de Cor.Æsch. de  
Cor.

<sup>16</sup> Sixty talents, if talent was taken in its ordinary sense, denoting a sum of money, would be between eleven and twelve thousand pounds sterling; if meaning weight of gold, it would be many times more.

CHAP.  
XLI.

Peloponnesus and Acarnania, he committed to Callias of Chalcis, whose abilities had been so advantageously proved in Eubœa.

Æsch. de  
Cor. p. 486.

Callias, returning to Athens, was introduced by Demosthenes to the assembled people, to report matters of important public concern. He had succeeded, he said, in negotiating a confederacy for war against Macedonia : the Achæans and Megareans had engaged to supply sixty talents annually ; the Eubœans would furnish forty, and many other Grecian republics would concur. He must however desire to be excused for withholding report of some very advantageous circumstances procured by his mission, as they required secrecy ; but they were known to some Athenians who would vouch for them, and he named Demosthenes. To this Demosthenes assented, adding that, of his own knowledge, the force engaged for by the Peloponnesians and Acarnanians together was a hundred ships of war and ten thousand mercenary troops, besides native forces, two thousand from each country ; that the command in chief, it was agreed, should be conceded to the Athenians, and that a congress of deputies from all the confederacy should meet at Athens, on a day not distant, which he named.<sup>17</sup>

p. 488.

Possibly Callias was deceived by those he trusted as leading men of the democratical party in the governments with which he communicated ; or possibly, deceiving themselves, they undertook for what they were unable to accomplish. There was however a general failure of the promises : neither fleet nor army was assembled, no congress met, and, whatever may

<sup>17</sup> For all these particulars Æschines refers to a decree of the Athenian people, passed on the occasion, which on his motion was read before the assembly.



have been agreed in secret, no confederacy for war with Macedonia was acknowledged. To prosecute war then, as Demosthenes had proposed, was impossible, and to maintain peace was what he least of anybody could undertake. Thence evidently arose the necessity for what, it appears, followed: he conceded the lead in public business to those who could consistently propose to maintain friendly connexion with Macedonia, and with whom the Macedonian government might be not indisposed to friendly communication. Under such circumstances, that he could quietly withdraw himself from the leading situation, and still hold the weight that enabled him to interfere as a speaker in the general assembly, marks either very extraordinary influence which he possessed among the many, or very extraordinary moderation in the opposite party, or rather both. The tranquillity ensuing from his retirement, during the year following that of the Hellespontine war, is marked by a complete omission of notice from the annalist historian of both Grecian affairs and Macedonian.

SECT.  
V.

---

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 275.  
Æsch. de  
Cor.

B.C. 339.  
Ol. 110. 2.  
Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 82, 83.

#### SECTION V.

*New importance of the office of Amphictyon. Sacrilege of the Amphissians. Opposition of Æschines to the measures of Demosthenes. New Sacred war. Second epistle of Isocrates to Philip. Election of Philip to the office of general of the Amphictyons.*

IN this season of comparative tranquillity, when nothing occurred strikingly affecting the principal republics, a political leaven was working in a corner of the country, which quickly produced a fermentation deeply interesting the whole. Formerly the office of

CHAP.  
XLI.

---

Amphictyon was of so little importance that hardly, among all extant memorials, is to be found the name of any who held it as representative of any Amphictyonic state before Demosthenes. But the acceptance of it by one of his eminence, his character, and actually holding the power of first minister of the Athenian republic, not lightly indicates that it was become an office affording, in then existing circumstances, great opportunities. Accordingly, when his opponents acquired the administration, Æschines was elected to the office. Athens, it appears, now sent four representatives to the Amphictyonic council; three pylagores, among whom was Æschines, but still only one hieromnemon. What had been foreseen of importance enough to detach a man of the powers of Æschines from the controversies of oratory at Athens does not appear, but matter requiring his talents and experience in business soon showed itself.

In the Sacred war, recently concluded, the Ozolian Locrians, the most zealous and active allies of Thebes, had been the greatest sufferers; and the final success of their friends had merely relieved them from injury and danger, without bringing any compensation. Their principal town, Amphissa, hardly seven miles from Delphi, overlooked, nearly as Delphi, the rich Cirrhæan plain; and its territory bordered on the devoted land, forbidden to the use of man. The Thebans, powerful among the Amphictyons, would be likely to desire gratification for the Locrians, if it might be had without expense to themselves; but allowance for what was coveted could be only by connivance. The Amphissians however not only used the devoted land, both for pasture and tillage, but ventured to occupy and even fortify the accursed port; and, encouraged by permission for so much,

they advanced in assurance so far as to exact duties for goods and persons passing to and from Delphi.

Æschines, in a speech of many years after, before the Athenian people, asserted that the AmphiSSIANS tampered with the Amphictyons, and especially with Demosthenes; who took from them a present of between sixty and seventy pounds sterling as a fee for his interest immediately in the Amphictyonic council, with a promise of a yearly sum nearly equal for his regular support to their cause at Athens: and this is not contradicted in the reply of Demosthenes. Indeed it appears unquestionable that the Athenian orators generally, not less than the naval commanders, to whom we have seen Demosthenes himself imputing it, were in the habit of taking such fees or benevolences. It was so they made their fortunes; as afterward the orators in the Roman republic: so the great Cicero acquired his immense fortune. But the purpose of Æschines, in that speech, was not to explain freely and fully the politics of the times, but merely to inculcate Demosthenes. What he said of his rival might be true; but the purpose of that extraordinary statesman certainly went far beyond a little private lucre. Nor will it appear wonderful, all the little that is laid open considered, that from Demosthenes in his reply scarcely any facts can be gathered: the splendid colouring, which he could give to anything, he has given with almost only vapour: the tangible matter that has reached us comes mostly from Æschines.

---

Æsch. de  
Cor.

Soon after Æschines had taken his seat in the Amphictyonic council (for so Demosthenes has shown) he noticed the profanation of the AmphiSSIANS. Why this was not immediately followed by proceedings against them does not appear. The crisis at

CHAP.  
XLI.

---

length arose thus. There was a temple newly built, probably to supply one destroyed in the late troubles; and, before it was regularly consecrated, some golden shields, which had been dedicated by the Athenian people after the battle of Plataea, were placed in it, as if duly prepared to receive such oblations. The shields bore an inscription reproachful to Thebes, in these words: ‘The Athenians, from the Medes and Thebans, when they fought against the Greeks.’ This seems to have been done imprudently rather than with any purpose of offence; for had there been any view to disturb by it the intrigue of Demosthenes for a connexion between the Athenian and Theban governments, which following circumstances show to have been at this time prosecuting at Thebes, more care would probably have been taken to avoid objectionable irregularity.<sup>18</sup> Not the Thebans then, but the Amphissan members of the council came forward to notice the irregularity. They said it was impious; and they claimed damages against the Athenian people for the fault of their representatives, to the amount of fifty talents, near ten thousand pounds sterling. Æschines rose to speak in defence of himself and his colleagues and his constituents. An Amphissan member interrupted him, and went to the length of insisting that the Athenian people, as implicated in all the guilt of the Phocians by alliance with them in the Sacred war, ought to be excluded from the temple, and deprived of Amphictyonic

<sup>18</sup> Æschines has avoided to say whether the Athenian accusation against the Amphissians, or the Amphissan accusation against the Athenians, was first instituted, and of course credit will be due to the assertion of Demosthenes, in his reply, that no accusation had been brought against Athens by the Locrians when Æschines first brought their profanation into question.



rights. Æschines however, obtaining a hearing, defended the suspension of the shields, and then proceeded to urge against the Amphiſſians their sacrilegious profanation in using the devoted land and the accursed port.

Probably enough the Amphiſſian member, as Æschines says of him, and perhaps others of the Amphiſtyons, representatives of the smaller states, were men of no advantageous education. It is indeed evident that, for the new or revived importance to which the council was raised, there was a great deficiency of established and suitable forms of proceeding; necessary, in every assembly, for ensuring just deliberation and dignified conduct. The arguments of Æschines or the weight of the Athenian interest prevailing, the council came so rapidly to a decisive decree on so difficult and delicate a subject that, on the same evening, proclamation was made by the herald, for ‘all Delphians, of two years and upward above boyhood, free and slaves, to meet on the morrow at day-break, at a place named, with hooks and spades; the hieromnemons and pylagores to attend; every state, whose representatives failed, to be excluded from the temple as implicated in the profanation.’

Æsch. de  
Cor. p. 514.

This hasty communication produced its effect, so far that all met as the decree required. Under command of the Amphiſtyons the crowd descended into the plain, destroyed the port, burned the houses, and returned. But the Amphiſſians, admonished of course by their members in the council, had assembled in arms; and, whether urged more by inconsiderate passion, or encouraged by promise of powerful support, though too late to prevent, would revenge the injury to their possessions. The unarmed Delphians p. 515.

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 277. &  
279.

fled from their menacing approach, but many were wounded, and some, even of the hieromnemons, were seized and stripped.

Such disgraceful irregularities abundantly mark the deficiency and weakness of this national assembly. Nor were the following measures at all becoming the dignity which it ought to have maintained. Next day the president, Cottyphus<sup>19</sup>, summoned what was called a general assembly of the Amphictyons. In such a general assembly custom had established that all Greeks, at the time at Delphi, entitled to admission to the common sacrifices and to consultation of the god, should have votes with the hieromnemons and pylagores. The very resource of summoning such an assembly seems to mark deficiency in the Amphictyons; and the result of its deliberations enough indicates that they felt their dignity committed by their former hasty measures. The necessary forms of justice, apparently not less than a just consideration of their own means, would have required notice to the Amphissians, with a formal requisition to quit the lands they had improperly occupied, before violence for ejection. Measures were now taken which should rather have preceded those through which their dignity and authority had been subjected to insult. It was decreed that the hieromnemons should meet on a day named, before the regular time for the next session of the Amphictyons, (which in course was to be held not at Delphi, but at Thermopylæ,) prepared with a bill for bringing the Amphissians to justice for their offences against the god, the consecrated land, and the Amphictyons.

<sup>19</sup> Κόττυφος, ' τὰς γνώμας ἐπιψηφίζων. Æsch. de Cor.

With this decree the Amphictyons concluded their session. The Athenian members, returning home, prepared a bill, as the decree required; which, whether as a matter of duty or only of supposed prudence and expediency, they offered for the approbation of their own government; presenting it first to the council of Fivehundred, and then, warranted by their sanction, to the assembled people. Demosthenes opposed in vain, and the decree of the people gave it the force of law.

But Demosthenes, superior to his opponents in diligence hardly less than in acuteness, talking over the members of the council of Fivehundred, procured a decree there, commanding that the hieromnemon and pylagores of Athens should go to Thermopylæ and to Delphi at the times appointed by their forefathers; thus virtually forbidding their going at the previous time appointed by the Amphictyons. Choosing then dexterously his moment in an assembly of the people, when the business appointed for the day was over, and Æschines with the other principal men of his party were gone, he brought this decree forward there; and, uncontrolled by the salutary forms which check insidious party-measures in the British parliament, he procured at once the complete ratification of it. Nor did he stop thus. Finding the sovereign assembly at his devotion, he added a clause, commanding ‘that the hieromnemon and pylagores of Athens should not communicate with those of the other Grecian states, in words, or deeds, or votes, or act of any kind.’<sup>20</sup> The

<sup>20</sup> Τὸν ἱερομνήμονα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τοὺς πυλαγόρας τοὺς αἰὶ πύλαγοροῦντας, μὴ μετέχειν τοῖς ἐκεῖ συλληγομένοις, μήτε λόγων, μήτ' ἔργων, μήτε δογμαμάτων, μήτε πράξεως μηδεμιᾶς. Æsch. de

CHAP.  
XLI.

account of Æschines, imputing sinister management to Demosthenes in this business, does no credit to himself or his party for diligence or vigilance.

The decree, thus carried, seems to have been effectual for its purpose; which evidently was to render any attendance of the Athenian members of the council either nugatory or embarrassing. Had the Athenian Amphictyons been of the war-party, they would probably have attended purposely to embarrass. But they avoided to go. The Theban members also staid away. All the others however were present when the council resolved, that war be made against the Amphissians, and the command committed to Cottyphus. An army accordingly was collected; the Amphissians were brought to submission; and, as Æschines seems truly to say, all things considered, they were not severely treated. A fine was imposed on the Amphissian state, to be paid in a limited time to the god. Some of those who had taken a leading part in the late violence

Æsch. de  
Cor. p. 518.

p. 519.

Cor. p. 518. ‘Sycophantice prætermittit quarum rerum non debeant esse participes, belli Phocensis scilicet.’ [Wolf.] There is something extremely curious in the disposition to democratical barking, so extensively shown among the critics of the continent, from the revival of letters onward to the French revolution; and more especially when compared with the greater moderation of those of our own country, where real freedom, and the constitution that should ensure it, was so much better understood. Taylor accordingly has said indignantly to this: ‘Nihil prætermittitur.’ In what he adds I cannot equally agree with him: ‘Decrevit Demosthenes eos non participare cum consiliis vel actis senatus Amphictyonici, qui *extra ordinem cogebatur.*’ The additional clause of Demosthenes had surely a farther purview; for the use of an enactment forbidding the Athenian members to concur in counsels and deeds with the previous meeting which, by the former part of the decree, they were forbidden to attend, is not obvious.



against the Amphictyons were banished, and some Amphissian citizens, who had been condemned to exile for opposition to the little politics of their state, were restored. Thus what had been very irregular and highly disgraceful was put into as regular course as, according to all appearance, could be, and in a manner as little objectionable.

But no sooner was the force which had compelled submission withdrawn than the Amphissians returned to their former temper, and proceeded to corresponding measures. They refused payment of the fine, they recalled those whom the Amphictyons had banished, and drove into banishment again those whom they had recalled. War then again was decreed against them. But troops were not duly furnished by the states called upon, and the measures taken were of little effect.

Æsch. de  
Cor. p. 519.  
Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 277.

Such successful resistance of the people of the little town of Amphissa to the Amphictyons, the general council of the Greek nation, would appear strange indeed, were it not fully indicated in remaining accounts that their resistance was encouraged and supported by the party of Demosthenes and Chares at Athens, in concert with a powerful party in Thebes. Nor was the matter of light moment. It involved the question whether the party of Demosthenes and Chares at Athens should command the Greek nation. In the fourth Philippic oration of Demosthenes, Corinth, Arcadia, Argos, Thebes, and even Lacedæmon, are found threatened to be reduced under Athenian empire. Perhaps this boldness, otherwise apparently improvident, may have been necessary for instigation to the Athenian people. Could Demosthenes have carried his purposes more secretly, he might have succeeded in them.

CHAP.  
XLI.

At the next meeting of the Amphictyons, held at Thermopylæ, and thence called the Pylæan meeting, the circumstances of Greece were taken into serious consideration. How the people of the little town of Amphissa should be reduced to order would have been even a ridiculous question for such a body, had not the Amphissians been already notoriously secure of that support which soon after was openly given them. It was evidently the notoriety of the divided state of Greece, which Demosthenes himself has described as so inviting for Athens, and the apprehension of being brought under the rule of the conqueror of Sestus and his party, that induced a majority of the members to turn their view to the king of Macedonia.

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 279.

p. 276.

Demosthenes, in a speech many years after, told the Athenian people that the whole business of this little Amphissian war arose from the intrigue of Æschines; the ultimate object having been to procure the election of Philip to the command. Philip was then making war against that powerful Scythian horde, occupying the coast of the Euxine sea from the Borysthenes to the Danube or beyond it, and he was actually in their country. Agents indeed might nevertheless be busy for him in Greece. But, on the contrary, if Isocrates should be credited, Philip was as backward to interfere among the republics, even on their invitation, as Demosthenes desired to have him believed eager, indefatigable, and profuse. That however the little people of Amphissa would venture first to attack the Amphictyons, and afterward to resume and persevere in war against them, without assurance of support from some more powerful state, is evidently improbable; and the disposition of a powerful party in Thebes, and of the war-party.

Æsch. de  
Cor. p. 519.

in Athens, to favour them, is abundantly testified by Demosthenes himself. Toward an estimate of Philip's politics then, this may deserve consideration. At the conclusion of the Sacred war, a partnership in the presidency of the Pythian festival had been committed to him and his successors for ever. When that great politician, Jason of Thessaly, had in view to make himself sovereign of Greece, it was with him a great point to preside in person at the Pythian festival; insomuch that he proposed to assume the situation by force, should it not quietly be conceded to him. But Philip, avoiding use of the invidious honour, already his own, sent his deputy. The ingenuity of Demosthenes converted this into matter of reproach for him. Philip would not condescend, the orator told the many of Athens, to attend himself, but sent his servant. Had Philip, on the contrary, used the opportunity open to him, as he was well capable of using it; had he displayed at Delphi the elegant magnificence which had been so admired at his Olympic festival in Macedonia; had he there, with advantageous opportunity for communicating personally with principal men, especially young men, from every city of Greece, exerted his singular talent for conviviality and pleasant conversation to extend personal attachment to him in all parts, the ingenuity of Demosthenes, though he might have feared the consequences, would not have wanted ground of invective to oppose them, or diligence in making the utmost use of it.

The second of the extant epistles of Isocrates to Philip shows itself to have been written about this time; for it mentions Philip as recently returned from the war with the northern people, in whose country he yet was when the Amphictyons were de-

B. C. 339.  
Ol. 110.2.

Æsch. de  
Cor.



CHAP.  
XLI.

liberating about his election to the command in the Amphisian war. It marks a strong feeling in the old patriot for Philip's safety; it reproves him for risking his person improvidently in battle, exhorts him to friendship with the Athenians, admonishes him not to regard those who, informing him of all the invectives and calumnies vented against him by a party in Athens, would persuade him that the people generally were ill disposed toward him, and concludes with urging him 'to connect his kingdom and his good fortune with the happiness and concord of the Greek nation.'<sup>21</sup> The Amphictyons then, concurring in sentiment with Isocrates and the party of Phocion, came to the resolution of inviting the king of Macedonia to take upon himself the office of their general, and decreed that Cottyphus, their president, should go to him, as their ambassador, to request his acceptance of the appointment.

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 279.

<sup>21</sup> Καλόν ἐστι τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν ἰπάρχουσαν ὑμῖν παρακατατίθεσθαι τῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ εὐνοίᾳ.

It may seem to have been in mere idleness that the editor Auger has assigned the same date to the oration to Philip and all the three letters of Isocrates: probably desiring not to be understood to mean the same day, but only time within which was no material change of circumstances. The oration marks its own date very exactly. There seems little hazard in affirming that the first epistle was sent before it, because it would have been absurdly nugatory after it. Those who will take the trouble, which Auger apparently has desired to avoid, of adverting only to the matter stated in the second and third epistles, will find them clearly marking dates considerably differing.



## CHAPTER XLII.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE ELECTION OF PHILIP KING  
OF MACEDONIA TO BE GENERAL OF THE AMPHICTYONS  
TILL HIS DEATH.

## SECTION I.

*Extraordinary policy of Demosthenes. Confederacy of Grecian states under the influence of the Athenian war-party. Hostilities against Macedonia without declared war. Requisition of forces for the renewed Sacred or Amphissian war. Conclusion of the renewed Sacred war.*

THE election of the king of Macedonia to the office of general of the Amphictyons, making him the constitutional head of a great confederacy of Grecian republics, almost in the moment of failure of the avowed project of the Athenian war-party for a great confederacy against him and his Grecian allies, placed that party in circumstances most discouraging. Opportunity thus was so open for establishing the prevalence of the peaceful, and for consolidating the friendly connexion of all Greece with Macedonia, that ground of hope for the war-party again to obtain the lead might seem hardly discernible. But, as quicksightedness, dexterity, and boldness were never yet so wanted in the cause, so never before were they equally shown. The very conception of what Demosthenes next carried into practice appears extraordinary. Having reached his actual eminence by vehement and persevering

SECT.  
I.

---

7

CHAP.  
XLII.

assertion of the most unlimited democratical despotism, yet unable now to command by the democratical, he applied himself to cultivate, not an aristocratical party, but a depressed relic of the aristocratical branch of the constitution. Few years had passed since Isocrates proposed restoration of authority to the once powerful and venerable court of Areopagus, but proposed in vain. Demosthenes had now formed an interest in that court such that he might use it as his instrument for controlling the sovereign many; and under his direction it assumed power to be an efficacious instrument.

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 271.

In the way which appears to have been, of late at least, usual, and esteemed regular, Æschines had been elected by the people to the office of syndic of the temple of Delos; an office of high honour, and apparently lucrative. The court of Areopagus, perhaps reviving some old claim to interfere in the appointment of offices connected with the religion of the state, not only annulled the election, but took upon itself to substitute Hyperides, an orator of eminence, zealous in the party of Chares and Demosthenes. Whether Phocion and his friends thought this might be a salutary precedent for checking popular despotism, or why otherwise they did not or could not excite the sovereign assembly, generally so jealous of its authority, to support its own act, information fails.

The appointment to the syndicism was however by itself of small consideration; its importance arose from its connexion with other matters. A man of eminence, Antiphon, respected for his quality, formidable by his talents, adverse to the war-party, and as far as appears without other crime, had been banished by a decree of the people. Whether hoping

for protection and a reversal of the decree from the recovered influence of his friends, or under whatever of the various inducements that might present themselves, he returned illegally, and was living in concealment in Piræus. The vigilance of Demosthenes obtaining notice of this, he judged that, at any hazard, the utmost should be made of the opportunity. Unable to gain such information of Antiphon's residence that the officers of justice might be directed in regular course to apprehend him, he assumed to himself authority, with sufficient attendants, to search private houses ; and, having at length discovered the delinquent, took him into custody and carried him to the city.

The people then being assembled, the prisoner was brought before them. The notorious fact of his illegal return from banishment subjected him to capital punishment, but would not warrant the violation of private rights in apprehending him. It behoved Demosthenes therefore to be prepared with means to obviate accusation against himself, or his own ruin might take place of Antiphon's. The mention of a plot to overthrow the democracy would at any time fire the multitude. Of such a plot Demosthenes accused Antiphon ; with the addition that it was concerted with the king of Macedonia. The first measure, he affirmed, was to have been to burn the naval arsenal, with all the shipping there, and for this purpose it was that the prisoner was lurking in Piræus. The peace-party came forward, anxious to defend Antiphon ; but, aware of the inflammable temper of the despotic sovereign, they seem to have rested less on the total deficiency of evidence to the charge than on the opportunity open

SECT.  
I,

---

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 271.

T

CHAP.  
XLII.

---

for directing the popular passion to the notorious violation of the constitution and the rights of citizens in the act of apprehending the prisoner. Whether however argument or influence or passion availed most, the charge was voted groundless, and, as illegally arrested, Antiphon was set at liberty.

Defeat, in such a measure, could not but involve in great danger those engaged in it. Demosthenes therefore, as little averse to aristocratical despotism, if it might serve his purpose, as to democratical, proceeded again to make the court of Areopagus his weapon for defence and offence. The security of an Englishman, in the immemorial rule of the common law, that no man shall be tried twice on the same charge, was not given by the principles of either democracy or aristocracy at Athens. Antiphon, dismissed in pursuance of the sentence of the sovereign people, was arrested again at the instigation of Demosthenes, by order of the court of Areopagus; and not convicted by evidence, but, under the pressure of torture, confessing or uttering what his tormentors asserted to amount to confession, of the purpose of burning the arsenal, he was, by that court, so renowned of old for the equity of its decisions, sent to the executioner. It might be difficult to give credit to report of these facts, had it come on authority less unsuspecting than that of the great orator, the principal agent. Still it may be presumed, it should seem, that proceedings so disgusting, even as he has related them, were not warranted by the celebrated constitution of Solon, nor would have been allowed under that court of Areopagus which Isocrates desired to restore. It were indeed difficult to say what just freedom, what security for individuals, could exist under a consti-



tution that would tolerate the practice of Demosthenes.<sup>1</sup>

SECT.  
I.

---

But a measure of such violence, though carried by the authority of the court of Areopagus, against the declared will of the sovereign multitude, could be supported only by a recovery of prevalence among that multitude; and this was evidently never out of the view of Demosthenes. The ebb and flow of command among the assembled Athenian people was not always produced by any change of popular favour. At this very time, when the war-party failed of the votes wanted to carry one important purpose, the maritime department appears to have been decidedly under their influence: the fleets were employed actively, and probably lucratively, in preying on the Macedonian commerce; while the orators at home, and especially Demosthenes, were asserting in the assembly that Athens maintained faithfully the peace which Philip, they exclaimed, had broken. While the nautic multitude were so employed, the strength of the party might sometimes fail in the general assembly for want of their voices; and yet, to hold their favour, it would be necessary to allow them so to be employed. The inconvenience then of a temporary defeat, resulting from their absence in an unforeseen crisis, would be to be repaired by their zeal for the patrons of their vocation when they returned; and it was apparently in reasonable confidence that he could call in sufficient support that Demosthenes ventured, in the absence of a large proportion of his friends, to

R

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 275, 276.  
Demosth.  
Philip.

<sup>1</sup> Even Plutarch has observed of this affair that it was *σφόδρα ἀριστοκρατικὸν πολίτευμα* (v. Demosth. p. 852). It is obvious that he used the word *ἀριστοκρατικὸν* widely otherwise than with the very creditable meaning which it bore in the age of Plato and Isocrates.

CHAP.  
XLII.

Plut. v.  
Demosth.

use the authority of the court of Areopagus against the authority of the general assembly, and proceed to that extravagance of despotism and cruelty, in the case of Antiphon, which surprised even Plutarch.

Thus, under the conduct of Demosthenes, most ably adapted to his own purposes and those of his party, that party recovered ascendancy in the general assembly, and with it the administration of the affairs of the commonwealth. Their views then were directed, with not less ability or diligence, nor without large success, to establish and extend their influence in other parts of Greece. In Eubœa, divided through all its towns between factions long vehemently hostile to one another, yet the war-party generally overborne, the business must have been of great nicety and difficulty. Nevertheless, attaching able agents to his interest by their interest, and favoured by the scrupulous moderation of the party of Phocion, Demosthenes succeeded so that nearly the whole island was brought under his command. In Megara equally he procured prevalence for the party under his patronage. Corinth, formerly the steady friend of Lacedæmon, the vehement enemy of Athens, had fallen much from her ancient eminence among the Grecian states. After a long series of good administration, that growth of violent faction, of which an account has been formerly given, produced alteration of the constitution and oppression of the people. In the following age Corinth has been noticed by Diodorus only for her connexion with Sicilian affairs through the expedition of Timoleon. On account of her ancient fame her political state now would be matter of curiosity; but Demosthenes has simply shown that, when he was the minister, she was the ally of Athens. From a late writer, the jocular

Ch. 28, s. 9.  
of this Hist.

Lucian, the character of her government and people remains ludicrously exhibited: yet, being in consonance with the other more serious testimonies, the picture may be not wholly unfaithful. The famous cynic philosopher Diogenes at this time, it is said, was inhabiting his tub at Corinth. There, as at Athens, to infuse apprehension of attack from Macedonia, and to excite, if possible, passion enough among the people to lead them to approve and be active in offensive war, was the object of the leaders. All therefore was set in motion: fortifications were repaired, arms fabricated, provisions collected. The whole city thus being in a bustle of military preparation, the philosopher began to roll about his tub in various directions. Being asked Why? he answered, 'he would avoid, for once, the imputation of affecting singularity, and so would not be the only person in Corinth not absurdly employed.' Corinth however was no unimportant addition to the Athenian confederacy. Not only her situation was commanding, but her alliance carried with it, or assisted much toward obtaining, that of Corcyra and Leucadia, which accordingly were among the allies of Athens. Achaia and Acarnania were also in the same interest; decided to it much by their hostility to neighbouring states, allies of Macedonia. Lacedæmon, under treaty still subsisting, was an ally of Athens, and ill-disposed toward Macedonia for the support which Philip had given to the Argives and Messenians. But there was no friendship between the Lacedæmonian government and the war-party in Athens; and the great speculation of Demosthenes at this time, alliance with Thebes, was adverse to any friendly connexion with Lacedæmon. The effectual confederacy of Athens then, under the administration of the war-party, con-

Lucian. de  
Conscrib.  
Hist.



CHAP.  
XLII.

---

sisted of Megara, Corinth, Achaia, Acarnania, Leucadia, and Coreyra.

The acquisition of Thebes, for which Demosthenes appears to have been perfectly willing to forego any advantage to be derived from the connexion with Lacedæmon, might seem on a transient view so to abound with difficulty, and indeed so to be out of all ordinary course of policy, that the purpose might appear even preposterous; yet, in proceeding with the course of events, we find the keen-sighted politician had discovered no inconsiderable ground for it. However extensively aversion to Athens might be a popular passion, yet a party once formed in Thebes in direct opposition to the party desirous of maintaining the connexion with Macedonia would be in the best manner prepared for connexion with the war-party in Athens. According to the probable imputation of *Æschines*, Demosthenes held communication with this party in Thebes when it might have subjected any man to the charge of high treason. Yet so ably the intrigue was managed that a powerful party there was prepared with zeal for connexion with Athens, while not only the two republics were in a state of actual war, but the general prejudices among the people of both were very hostile toward each other.

*Æsch. de*  
*Cor. p. 532,*  
*533.*  
*Demosth. de*  
*Cor. p. 299.*

Meanwhile nominal peace and nominal alliance remaining between Athens and Macedonia, the war-party orators continued their complaints that Philip had broken the peace; and the Athenian navy was busy in maritime depredation, as if war had been declared. Precisely of this time Demosthenes spoke, where he has said: ‘ Philip was without prospect of relief from the hostilities of Athens, unless he could excite the Thebans and Thessalians to be active in

*Demosth. de Cor.*  
*p. 275, 276.*



‘ measures against us : for, notwithstanding the de-  
 ‘ ficient exertion of our military commanders, he was  
 ‘ suffering a thousand evils from the depredations on  
 ‘ the maritime trade of his country. Nothing could  
 ‘ be exported, nothing imported, for the activity of  
 ‘ our cruisers.’<sup>2</sup>

Such was the state of things when Philip, invited by the embassy of the Amphictyons, came to their meeting at Thermopylæ, where alone they appear to have held their sittings since Delphi, through the open hostility of the Locrians on one side, and the uncertain disposition of Thebes on the other, was become insecure. In pursuance then of the duties of the office to which he had been elected, he issued requisitions for the Amphictyonic states to send their contingents of troops for war to be waged under his command. The form of the requisition sent to the Peloponnesians is given by Demosthenes, thus : ‘ The  
 ‘ king of the Macedonians, Philip, to the magistrates  
 ‘ of the Peloponnesians of the confederacy, and to all  
 ‘ the confederates, greeting.’<sup>3</sup> Whereas the Locrians,  
 ‘ called Ozolian, inhabiting Amphissa, are acting of-  
 ‘ fensively against the temple, and, coming with arms,  
 ‘ have plundered the sacred land ; it is my purpose,  
 ‘ with your support, to assert the cause of the god,  
 ‘ and oppose those who violate what is held sacred  
 ‘ among men. I require you therefore to meet me  
 ‘ in Phocis duly armed and bringing provision for

<sup>2</sup> *Ληστῶν*. This word appears to have been used by the Greeks equally to signify a pirate and a ship of war regularly commissioned ; whence it is often difficult to know which has been intended.

<sup>3</sup> . . . *Πελοποννησίων τῶν ἐν τῇ συμμαχίᾳ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς καὶ τοῖς συνέδροις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις συμμάχοις πᾶσι, κ. τ. λ.* De Cor. What the distinctions were between these descriptions of people means for ascertaining seem to fail.

CHAP.  
XLII.

‘ forty days, within the present month, called by us  
‘ Lous, by the Athenians Boedromion, by the Co-  
‘ rinthians Panemus. Those who attend will be en-  
‘ titled to communicate in council; those who fail  
‘ of conforming to the decrees of the confederacy  
‘ will be fined. Farewell.’

It does not appear that any requisition was sent to Athens; where acknowledgment of the election of Philip, not only to be commander in chief, but to be an Amphictyon, had been denied. To Thebes it was not omitted; but so the Athenian party had advanced in power there that obedience to it was refused. Yet, among those fluctuations to which democratical government was so liable, the Macedonian party afterward preponderating, at least for that question, the Theban contingent under the command of Proxenus joined the Amphictyonic army.

Meanwhile in Athens, between parties of strength nearly balancing, stimulated, one by ambition, the other by fear of oppression, the contest of oratory was vehement. The war-party however prevailing, a measure followed of the most decided hostility toward all that part of the Greek nation which acknowledged the Amphictyonic authority, and was disposed to abide by the peace which had ended the Phocian war. The Athenian republic had now in its pay mercenary troops to the amount, according to Æschines, of ten thousand men. All, including apparently those which had been serving in the Hellespont, were sent by a decree of the people to assist the Amphissians in their rebellion against the authority of the Amphictyons. What states, or what party among them had encouraged the obnoxious conduct of the Amphissians could then no longer be doubtful.

Of the war which followed no particulars have

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 275.

Dinarch.  
in Demosth.

Demosth.de  
Cor. p. 275.

Æsch. de  
Cor. p. 536.

been transmitted : remaining information shows only the general result. The Amphictyonic army, directed by the talents of Philip, quickly rendered all the support furnished to the Amphissians vain, and reduced them to unconditional submission. Power was then more in Philip's hands than when the Phocian war was concluded ; yet, notwithstanding the imputation of sacrilege, severity against the vanquished was so avoided that even the adverse orator with all his talent has been at a loss for ground on which he could venture to specify any complaint.

SECT.  
II.

---

## SECTION II.

*Critical situation of the Athenian war-party : political state of Thebes : exertions of Demosthenes to gain the alliance of Thebes : contest of parties at Athens : hostile decree against Macedonia : letters of Philip to the Athenians and Thebans : Elatea garrisoned by Philip.*

THIS new failure, in a cause so generally uncreditable throughout Greece as that of the Amphissians, brought the war-party at Athens, practised in critical situations, into a situation perhaps more critical than any wherein they had before stood. Weakened by double defeat, military and political, yet to retreat or retract now would, more than in any former circumstances, involve surrender of all their importance, and give the government of the republic to their opponents. Nor could they hope to hold their ground without advancing : enterprise more than ever was necessary. Means were not yet wholly wrested from their hands, nor were opportunities, such as able and keen-sighted politicians might use, failing before them. On the contrary,

CHAP.  
XLII.

---

the confederacy under their influence remained apparently undiminished. To the party which, through the dexterous management of Demosthenes and his agents, prevailed throughout Eubœa, the patronage of his party in Athens was necessary, perhaps not less than the command of the island was for them desirable. Similar party interests and local interests continued to hold Megara, Achaia, and Acarnania in their connexion; and Corinth, carrying with her Corcyra and Leucadia, adhered to it. In Thebes principally their cause appears to have felt the shock of the defeat in the Amphissian war. The Theban people indeed had never yet been of their confederacy; but the progress toward the acquisition had been large. Without Thebes then, the support of all the rest would hardly enable them to maintain their ground; but could Thebes yet be gained, hope might again soar high. The very name of Thebes added to the catalogue of their allies, for the recent renown of that state, would be a great acquisition. But the military force also of Bœotia, for its numbers, as well as for its reputation, was very considerable in the scale of the Grecian republics. There was moreover another consideration of no small importance. Could Thebes be gained, the rampart of friendly states around Attica would be completed. The Athenian people would be relieved from apprehension of a powerful enemy on their border, under which they had been long uneasy. Attica would be no longer to be approached by hostile armies but across the territories of allies, who must bear the first brunt of any war. This circumstance, blazoned by the glowing eloquence of Demosthenes, appears to have weighed much with a large portion of the Athenian people, little capable of estimating what



might be, in existing circumstances, the probable efficacy of such a rampart. But perhaps the orator himself depended more on another view, which would have been disappointed by a premature declaration of it. Were Thebes gained, the force of the confederacy would be such that Philip might be blockaded in Phocis, or even attacked there with overbearing numbers, and compelled to seek personal safety, if so he could find it, by flight over the mountains.

The alliance of Thebes, thus a great object for the war-party in Athens to gain, was of course also a great object for Macedonia to preserve. In Thebes meanwhile, with a weak government, the opposition of parties was violent. The party generally ruling was that which, in pursuit of empire, had put forward the Phocian war. In distress produced by that war it had sought the Macedonian alliance. Relieved through the advantages of that alliance from immediate danger, it resumed its purposes of ambition; but upon these that alliance was a check. The same party then, which had been most forward to form that alliance, became most earnest to be relieved from the entanglement. But another party, less desiring empire than just government and domestic security, and fearing oppression to themselves from success in the ambitious purposes of their fellow-citizens, cherished the newly formed connexion with Macedonia, as the best stay of the peace, and even of the constitution of the commonwealth.

Between these two parties the Theban many floated. But circumstances tended to turn the flood rather in favour of the leaders adverse to the Macedonian connexion. The many were very extensively disposed to participate in the ambition of that party, but especially in the ambition to command, as a

sovereign people, the people of all the other towns of Bœotia. Indignation was thus ready among them when the king of Macedonia, with a policy liberal at least, though among the ancients he had extensive credit for a nobler motive, humanity, desired mercy for those whom the Thebans called their revolted subjects, the Orchomenians and others, who had engaged in confederacy with the Phocians. Even after he had consented to the expulsion of those unfortunate people from Bœotia, the charity he extended to them within his own dominions, where he provided many with settlements, was in the eyes of the Thebans suspicious and offensive. On the other hand that party in the Bœotian towns, consisting mostly of the wealthier, who desired emancipation from the sovereignty of the Theban people, or relief against its occasional pressure, looked to the king of Macedonia, in common with most other Greeks in uneasy circumstances, as a general protector; and this was a second, and a stronger cause of jealousy for the Theban many. But among the numerous states of Greece, where, for their smallness, alliances must be numerous, a kindness could hardly be done to one ally, such was the jealousy among them, without offence to some other. Had Philip's purpose been, like Jason's formerly, to hold Greece in subjection by force, Nicæa, placed in his hands by the Phocian general Phalæcus, would have been, for its commanding situation against the strait of Thermopylæ, a possession to be carefully held. Had he kept it by a Macedonian garrison, he would perhaps less have offended the Thebans; but he gave it to their old allies the Thessalians, and thus he excited much their envy and indignation.

These were all circumstances of advantage for

Demosthenes in his purpose of detaching Thebes from the Macedonian alliance, and bringing it to close connexion with Athens. Still however, such was the inveterately hostile disposition of the Theban and Athenian people toward each other, and such the strength of the party in Thebes, not only in the highest degree adverse to such a connexion, but earnest to maintain the existing connexion with Thessaly and Macedonia, that the project abounded with difficulty. The necessities of the war-party however being urgent, and the object great, they were willing to hazard much for it, and bid high. The liberality of a system resembling the Olynthian, which had succeeded as a lure with the Eubœans and Byzantines, would not suit the Thebans, who affected, not equality, but sovereignty. To engage for support to the sovereignty of Thebes over the other Bœotian towns, of whose freedom it had been formerly the boast of Athens to be the patroness, would be indispensable toward any hope of success. But, beyond this, Demosthenes flattered the ambition of the Thebans, leaders and people, with the intimation that Athens would promote their decayed hopes of extensive empire, and consent to hold a second place, at least in military command, under Theban leaders.

That the promising success of secret negotiation in Thebes encouraged the war-party to persevere in vehement opposition to any accommodation with Macedonia, the contest of rival orators afterward gave to public knowledge. Meanwhile the party of Phocion, perhaps suspecting the intrigue, but little informed of it, and at any rate not desiring the Theban connexion for the purposes proposed by their opponents, contended strenuously for abiding

Æsch. de  
Cor.  
Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 285.

CHAP.  
XLII.

---

by existing treaties, and maintaining peace. A decree, first debated in the council and at the board of generals, and by them offered to the assembled people, appears to mark by its inconsistent tenor the struggle with which it was carried. It runs thus: ‘Whereas  
‘ Philip has taken cities in our neighbourhood, some  
‘ of which he has laid waste, and now, setting at  
‘ naught the treaty, and proposing to violate faith  
‘ publicly plighted, he is preparing to invade Attica;  
‘ it is therefore resolved by the council and the people,  
‘ that a herald be sent with an embassy to confer  
‘ with him, and especially exhort him to preserve  
‘ the harmony established between us, and abide by  
‘ the treaty; or at least to allow time for the state  
‘ to deliberate, and, for that purpose, agree to a  
‘ truce till the month Thargelion.’

The preservation of this curious document we owe to Demosthenes; but Philip’s answer to so strange a mixture of invective and solicitation the orator has evidently thought it not for his purpose to state to his audience. What however may have been the answer, at least in part, may be gathered. He had taken no cities of their neighbourhood, and laid waste none. The Phocians had preferred surrendering their cities to him rather than to Grecian republics, under whose power they would otherwise have fallen. Some of them indeed had been laid waste, not by him, but by the oldest and most venerable judicature known to the Greek nation. He was not preparing to invade Attica, nor had any such purpose; but he was already prepared, and well resolved, to defend himself and his allies against a party in Athens, adverse to the peace and freedom of Greece.



But whether the decree passed with or against the consent of the war-party, or rather partly with and partly against their wishes, their negotiation with Thebes, as the concurring testimonies of the rival orators show, did not cease, but was rather prosecuted with increased sedulity. This could not be entirely concealed from Philip, and communication was yet open for him with Thebes, formally still his ally. He therefore endeavoured to obviate the mischief by counter-negotiation. Nor was his success, it appears, inconsiderable; for the Thebans by a solemn act renewed their former peace and friendship with him.

Ep. Philip.  
ad Theb. ap.  
Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 283.

Such proof of the prevalence of the party in Thebes adverse to connexion with Athens alarmed Demosthenes and his friends; and, five weeks after the former decree for the embassy to Philip, another was brought forward for a second embassy, in these terms: ‘Whereas Philip endeavours to excite the Thebans against us, and is preparing to come with his whole army to the places nearest Attica in breach of the treaty subsisting between us; it is resolved by the council and people that a herald and an embassy be sent to him to propose and solicit a truce, that the people may duly deliberate on the existing circumstances, not having yet taken, on their part, any hostile measure.’

End of  
June.

To this decree, and the representations of the embassy, Philip returned a written answer which remains reported by Demosthenes, thus: ‘Philip king of the Macedonians to the Athenian council and people greeting. What your disposition toward us has been from the beginning I am not ignorant, nor with what earnestness you have endeavoured to gain the Thessalians, the Thebans, and the rest of

CHAP.  
XLII.

---

‘ the Bœotians to your party. But now you find  
 ‘ them too wise to submit their interests to your di-  
 ‘ rection, you change your course, and send ministers  
 ‘ with a herald to me to admonish me of the treaty  
 ‘ and demand a truce, having in truth been injured  
 ‘ by us in nothing. Nevertheless I have heard your  
 ‘ ambassadors, and I consent to all your desires, nor  
 ‘ shall I take any step against you, if, dismissing  
 ‘ those who advise you ill, you consign them to their  
 ‘ deserved ignominy. So may you prosper.’<sup>4</sup>

At the same time he judged it expedient to address the Thebans, in a letter reported also by Demosthenes, thus: ‘ The king of the Macedonians,  
 ‘ Philip, to the Theban council and people greeting.  
 ‘ I received your letter by which you renew your  
 ‘ friendship and peace with me. I understand how-  
 ‘ ever that the Athenians are urging everything  
 ‘ that could induce you to concur in their purposes ;  
 ‘ and indeed I did apprehend that you had some dis-  
 ‘ position to yield to their hopes and follow their  
 ‘ lead ; but now I am assured that you prefer the  
 ‘ preservation of peace with me to such submission  
 ‘ of yourselves to the guidance of strangers, and I  
 ‘ rejoice in it. I commend your conduct on many  
 ‘ accounts ; but especially as it places you in se-  
 ‘ curity, and as it evinces good will toward me. I

<sup>4</sup> . . . ἄν περ, τοὺς οὐκ ἄρθῶς συμβουλευόντας ὑμῖν παραπέμφαντες, τῆς προσηκούσης ἀτιμίας ἀξιώσητε. Ἐβρώσθε. This passage and another similar to it in a former communication seem the foundation on which has been built the story of Philip’s demanding ten orators ; the ingenious authors of which would surely have us believe Demosthenes either so uninformed or so modest that he either did not know, or among his numerous published orations would not tell, such a fact : which certainly would have been often to his purpose, could he have obtained credit for it.

‘ trust the advantage to you will be not small, if you  
‘ persevere into it. May you prosper.’

SECT.  
II.

---

Demosthenes, in the whole tenor of his orations of this period, shows, and all that has been transmitted by Isocrates, Æschines, and the historian confirms it, that he had no view to peace: his purpose, and that of his principal associates in politics, was only to gain time for establishing the superiority of their party in Thebes. Were that accomplished, Philip's situation in Phocis might be highly critical. The force of Bœotia might blockade him among the mountains there. The Athenian navy commanded the sea; and his return into Macedonia might be precluded. In Phocis the critical situation of a principal town, Elatea, has been already noticed: it commanded the pass, almost the only way practicable for an army, between Delphi and Bœotia, and also between Delphi and that part of Phocis itself toward Thermopylæ. These interesting circumstances of the place, not likely to escape so able a soldier and politician as Philip, had certainly not escaped the war-party in Athens, nor even public notice. Demosthenes, so long ago as when he delivered the oration called the Second Philippic, told the Athenian people that, the disposition of the Thebans toward the Macedonian alliance being already become doubtful, public rumour went that Philip had in view to fortify Elatea. The orator added that he did not think the pressure then such that the measure would be immediately taken. But things were now altered. Phocis and the whole Amphictyonic confederacy were in danger from the growing connexion of Thebes with Athens. Philip therefore occupied Elatea with a garrison from the Amphictyonic army, and began restoring the fortifications which had been

Demosth.  
Phil. 2.  
p. 69.

demolished at the conclusion of the Phocian war. That this was at all beyond his constitutional power, or even his duty, as general of the Amphictyonic army, bound by many obligations to protect Phocis and give security to the Amphictyonic confederacy, seems no way to appear; yet whether his measures were more than just timely enough to prevent the Athenian party in Thebes from seizing, beyond all limit of any legal claim of theirs, the same important place, following events make utterly doubtful.

## SECTION III.

*Singular decree of the Athenian people: embassy to Thebes: alliance of Thebes with Athens. Power of Demosthenes: operations against the king of Macedonia and the Amphictyonic army.*

LITTLE as the occupying of Elatea with a garrison could be a surprise upon the war-party at Athens, who had so long not only foreseen but publicly spoken of it, and evidently as it appears to have been a measure of just precaution, injurious to none, their ingenuity nevertheless sufficed for use of it in argument among the Athenian people as if it was an actual beginning of hostilities, and to lead to public measures accordingly. The curious detail remains from Demosthenes himself. ‘It was evening,’ he said, ‘when intelligence came to the prytanes, then ‘at supper, that Elatea was occupied. Instantly ‘rising from table, some of them went to the agora, ‘dismissed the ware-sellers, and burned their stalls: ‘others sent to the generals and called the trumpeter: ‘the whole city was filled with tumult.’ Any purpose of these hasty and violent measures, but to excite



tumult, is not in any degree indicated by the orator ; and as Elatea, a Phocian town within the proper district of the Amphictyonic general's command, was separated from the Attic border by the width of all Bœotia, by the whole of the orator's brazen wall yet untouched, no other seems within the bounds of reasonable conjecture.

The following steps were consonant to this outset. Next morning the prytanes convened the council at day-break. Meanwhile the people, alarmed by the proceedings of the past evening, and uncertain of the cause, hastened so to their usual place of assembly that the council had not had time to come to any resolution when among the multitude much impatience was expressed for communication from it. Whatever then might be the impossibility of making regular and proper communication, the sovereign, it appears, was not to be irritated. The council, unprepared with propositions, attended the assembly. The herald proclaimed, in the usual form, that any who would advise the people might speak. Nobody offered himself, though all the generals and all the orators (so Demosthenes affirms) were present. Phocion and his friends of course would wait to learn, from those who could tell, whence the disturbance arose. Chares and his friends left the field open for Demosthenes, who at length gratified the universal impatience by mounting the speaker's stand.

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 285.

The theatrical effect, as it remains described by the orator himself must have been great. His speech, of which only a short abstract has been transmitted, appears to have been full of art, directed chiefly to reconcile the multitude to the hazardous proposal of a close political union with the Thebans, long feared and hated as their hereditary and most

CHAP.  
XLII.

---

determined and injurious enemies. Invective against the king of Macedonia was a principal instrument. ‘Slavery,’ he told the people, ‘was the best lot they could hope for, if Philip succeeded in his ambitious purposes. But if they would form alliance with Thebes, there would no longer be anything to fear from Macedonia; and the Thebans, notwithstanding past differences, had now every disposition to meet them as in a common cause. To obtain so great an advantage however, it was absolutely necessary that their ministers should be unfettered by limitations and instructions: they must have free scope for making such conditions with the Thebans as, under the actual urgency of circumstances, they might see most beneficial for the commonwealth.’

A pause followed the conclusion of the speech. Councillors, generals, archons, all whose official situations most entitled and required them to offer propositions for public measures, were unprepared. Information and time had been wanting, unless for those in the secret with Demosthenes, who came himself every way ready. He presently offered a decree, very remarkable both for tenor and style, reported by himself in a speech afterward made, and which, having been published, has been transmitted. It runs thus: ‘Whereas it appears that Philip king of Macedonia has heretofore transgressed the treaty of peace concluded with the Athenian people, disregarding the oaths and whatever else among all Grecian people is esteemed just, and has possessed himself of towns of no right belonging to him, and has even by force of arms taken some belonging to the Athenian people without any provocation of prior injury from them; and whereas he has recently proceeded to greater extremes in violence

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 288.

‘ and cruelty, placing garrisons in some Grecian  
 ‘ cities, overthrowing the constitutions of some, even  
 ‘ destroying some to the foundation, and reducing  
 ‘ their inhabitants to the condition of slaves, in some  
 ‘ establishing barbarians in the room of Greeks,  
 ‘ introducing them into the temples and among  
 ‘ the tombs, thus doing nothing contrary to the  
 ‘ character of his country and his own manners,  
 ‘ but using extravagantly his present fortune, and  
 ‘ forgetful that, from a small and low beginning,  
 ‘ he has risen to an unhoped-for greatness; and  
 ‘ whereas, while the Athenian people saw him pos-  
 ‘ sessing himself of towns belonging to them in the  
 ‘ barbarian country, they judged it less necessary  
 ‘ to proceed to extremities against him; but now  
 ‘ they see states in Greece itself, some grossly in-  
 ‘ jured, some annihilated, they think it unjustifiable,  
 ‘ and unworthy of the glory of their forefathers to  
 ‘ look on while Greece is enslaved; therefore it is  
 ‘ decreed by the Athenian council and people,  
 ‘ praying and sacrificing to the gods and heroes  
 ‘ protectors of the city and country, and bearing  
 ‘ in mind the virtue of their forefathers, who were  
 ‘ more earnest for the defence of the freedom of  
 ‘ Greece than for the separate welfare of their own  
 ‘ state, That two hundred ships shall put to sea, and  
 ‘ that the admiral’s station shall extend to Ther-  
 ‘ mopylæ; that the commander in chief and the com-  
 ‘ mander of the cavalry shall lead the forces, foot and  
 ‘ horse, to Eleusis; that ambassadors be sent to the  
 ‘ other Greeks, and first of all to the Thebans, be-  
 ‘ cause Philip’s present position is on the verge of  
 ‘ their country, to exhort them not to be dismayed  
 ‘ by Philip, but to defend their own and the common

CHAP.  
XLII.

---

‘ liberty of the Greeks ; to assure them that the  
 ‘ Athenian people, dismissing all consideration of  
 ‘ past differences, will assist them with their strength,  
 ‘ their wealth, and their weapons ; esteeming it  
 ‘ honourable for Greeks to contend for military and  
 ‘ political supremacy among one another, but that to  
 ‘ be commanded by a man of alien blood, and allow  
 ‘ the supremacy to pass wholly away from themselves,  
 ‘ would be unworthy of the glory of the Greeks and  
 ‘ the virtue of their forefathers ; that they do not  
 ‘ esteem the Thebans alien either in blood or race ;  
 ‘ that they bear in mind the good deeds of their  
 ‘ forefathers to the forefathers of the Thebans in  
 ‘ restoring the descendants of Hercules to their pa-  
 ‘ ternal dominion, of which the Peloponnesians had  
 ‘ deprived them, and, conquering in the field those  
 ‘ who opposed them, gave refuge to Œdipus and  
 ‘ those expelled with him ; and, in many other in-  
 ‘ stances, enough known to fame, they have shown  
 ‘ friendship towards the Thebans : therefore the  
 ‘ Athenian people will not now be wanting towards  
 ‘ the Thebans and other Greeks, but will form con-  
 ‘ nexion with them, by alliance of the states, by  
 ‘ allowance for intermarriage among individuals, and  
 ‘ by the full admission of reciprocity of oaths for all  
 ‘ purposes.’<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> In translating always I have adhered to my original purpose, of being as close to the letter as might be, and especially in this curious piece, in his version of which Leland has outranted the original far more than Auger, whose translation is perhaps generally as close as his language or critics would readily allow. He has however here as elsewhere, unwarrantably rendered ἀλλόφυλος *barbare*, which Leland has translated, as nearly perhaps as any modern language can, *foreigner*. Æolian



The decree concludes with naming five ambassadors, Demosthenes, Hyperides, Mnesithides, Democrates, and Callæschrus.<sup>6</sup>

The proposal of such a Philippic, to be adopted as a decree of the sovereign assembly, seems to have been very contrary to the practice of former times, when simplicity and precision characterized their language, and argumentative and extraneous matter were utterly rejected. But the purpose being to overthrow the former system of Athenian policy, and in a great degree new-model the government, by associating the Theban people with the Athenian, carrying as it may to the modern eye the appearance of liberality, was so adverse to established and hereditary prejudices among the Athenian people that it would be likely to need the machinery with which it was introduced to excite popular passion suited to the occasion, and especially the impatience which had prevented the usual previous discussion in the council. The reference to fabulous antiquity, times before a republic was heard of, and the introduction of Hercules and CEdipus, might appear to the modern reader even ridiculous; yet the frequent occurrence of such references among the orators, and especially Isocrates, shows that they were found suiting the public taste of

Greeks and Ionian were to each other, in ordinary Grecian speech, *ἄλλόφρονες*, and hence evidently the anxiety of Demosthenes to assure the Thebans that they were not considered by the Athenians as such.

<sup>6</sup> The French, who, in their late revolutions, have been quick and ingenious imitators, but original scarcely in anything, have set an example which it is to be hoped will not be followed, of depraving the simplicity and decency and dignity, formerly characterising European state-writing, by adopting, and pushing to greater extravagance, the manner of this libellous decree of Demosthenes.

CHAP.  
XLII.

Plut. v.  
Phoc.  
Æsch. de  
Cor. p. 536.

the age. The management of Demosthenes accordingly was successful : Phocion and Æschines opposed in vain : the offered decree was carried, and the embassy hastened to Thebes.

Meanwhile Philip, having provided some security for himself and his allies by fortifying Elatea, neither took any hostile measures, nor made any preparation for offensive war. Informed of what had passed at Athens, he resolved to send also his embassy to Thebes, to obviate the effect of the Athenian negotiation ; and he employed again the ministry of the eloquent Byzantine, Python.<sup>7</sup> The Theban people then were the sovereign to be courted ; and, in the agora of Thebes, Python on one side, Demosthenes on the other (Python for his talents, as Demosthenes himself has indicated, a rival worthy of Demosthenes) exerted their utmost powers. The ready topics for Python were the advantages of peace, generally, and the especial inducements to preserve peace and alliance with a prince of the king of Macedonia's character, such as it stood proved by his conduct from the beginning of his reign ; the respect he had shown for the religion and the general constitution of Greece ; his deference for the particular constitution of every state among the many in which he had an interest ; the fidelity and honour with which he had always observed his engagements ; and the proof of all this in the zealous attachment of so many republics, his actual allies. On the other hand Demosthenes, flattering the Theban war-party, and reproaching the peaceful, inveighed against the king of Macedonia,

<sup>7</sup> The narrative of Diodorus (l. 16. c. 85.) implies that, before the meeting of the embassies at Thebes, the Athenian army had already advanced as far as Chæronea, within a few miles of Elatea ; but the orators show completely that it was otherwise.

and all who adhered to him, with his usual fire and his usual art. His speech appears to have been celebrated in its day, even among the speeches of Demosthenes; perhaps for its effect; for it seems not to have been extant in the time of Dionysius of Halicarnassus; and very likely it had passages adapted to the time and place, but not adapted to answer the orator's purpose in a more extensive publication, so that it probably never was edited.

But eloquence was not a weapon to which alone Demosthenes trusted; he came provided with authority from the Athenian people to offer, at his discretion, whatever Athens could give; and he was bold in his prodigal use of their confidence. If promises and treaties could bind states, Athens was bound to continue its old patronage and protection to the Bœotians generally, but especially to the Plataeans and Thespians, against the sovereignty over them claimed by the Theban people. If democracy, of which Athens boasted to be the patroness, and Demosthenes the most zealous advocate, meant equal rule for all under its influence, and not a most real tyranny in the hands of one set of people over another set of people, and if the recent liberality to the Eubœans and Hellespontines was not a mere time-serving policy, Athens, even unbound by treaties and special promises, should have contended for the equal freedom of all the Bœotians against the claimed sovereignty of the Thebans, and Demosthenes should have exerted his eloquence and his interest in support of it. But Demosthenes, as if a preliminary step in his continually pretended assertion of the freedom of Greece, now engaged that the Athenian people not only should allow the subjection of the Plataeans and Thespians, together with all other

Æsch. de  
Cor. p. 533.

p. 534, 535.

Bœotians, to the Thebans, but that they should exert their utmost strength to assist the Thebans in establishing that subjection. This carried with it to Athens loss of honour only. But Demosthenes ventured upon concessions likely to be more felt. Allowing to Thebes an equal vote in directing, not the military alone, but the naval measures of the confederacy, he engaged that Athens should furnish the whole expense of the fleet, and two thirds of that of the army, and yet that a Theban general should command in chief. Even for the political business he seemed to give a decisive advantage to Thebes; for he stipulated that all the measures of the confederacy should be concerted with the Bœotarchs in the Cadmea.<sup>8</sup> In opposition to such liberality, recommended by the glowing eloquence of Demosthenes, the talents of Python were vain. The majority of votes of the Theban people was in favour of the proposed new alliance with Athens.

The importance, which in this negotiation Demosthenes yielded for the state he represented, he gained, and even more, for himself. His success, gratifying at least his own party, promoted and confirmed his power in Athens. But, what was perhaps more, through the intimacy of the connexion formed with the leading Thebans, and their constant need of countenance from their new ally to support them against opposition at home, he became really prime minister of Thebes; and, through the greater irregularity of the democratical constitution there, he found scope for a bold and ingenious policy to

<sup>8</sup> These matters asserted by Æschines, being uncontradicted by Demosthenes in his reply, must be considered as admitted by him.



exercise even a more despotic authority. Thenceforward accordingly measures in Thebes corresponded with, and were adapted to promote, his purposes in Athens; and, through the means acquired for playing one state against the other, it was a wonderful authority he acquired in both.

The object of the moment was to lead both republics to open war with Macedonia, before the forces which Philip had about him for the little war with Amphissa should be increased, or while he retained only those deemed requisite for securing the order established by his success against the Locrians. Thebes then was made to be the first mover in the business. Solicitation was addressed to the Athenian people, in the name of the Theban people, for an Athenian force to be sent into Bœotia, to support the Thebans in the war against the king of Macedonia; no war at that time having been acknowledged by either party. The Athenian citizens nevertheless were called to arms; the desired support was voted, and a body of horse and foot marched. Meanwhile zeal in the cause was so excited among the Thebans that, on the approach of the Athenian forces, a large body, horse and foot, marched out of the town and encamped, to leave commodious quarters in their houses for their new allies.

It was already late in autumn.\* No troops were yet collected from Eubœa, Corinth, or other more distant members of the Athenian confederacy; but the force of Bœotia alone, added to that of Athens, would probably be much beyond what Philip had about him in Phocis. Moreover on account of the

SECT.  
III.

---

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 299.

B. C. 338.  
Ol. 110. 3.

\* [See extract from *Fasti Hellen.* at the end of sect. 7. of this chapter.]

CHAP.  
XLII.

---

strength and earnestness of the peace-parties, both in Thebes and Athens, and the weight of their leading characters, at least in the latter city, and the necessary prevalence of their arguments with the sober part of both communities, it was much an object to have measures taken that should make war unavoidable. The united forces therefore of Athens and Thebes marched to the frontier of Bœotia against Phocis, and took their station at Chæronea, a few miles only from Elatea.

Of what followed we have information only from the orator's cursory notice of it. His very silence however enough indicates that offensive measures were not begun by the king of Macedonia. Nevertheless two battles were fought; the latter not till it was already winter.\* Neither had any important consequences, or however none favourable to Athens; yet Demosthenes, unable to boast of a trophy, did not fail of the utmost use that united eloquence and policy could make of the incidents. The Bœotian troops held still considerable reputation in Greece, and were considered as formidable for their discipline as well as their valour; but Athenian citizens, accustomed for generations now to avoid actual service, and usually finding from party-leaders, or commanding for themselves, indulgence for neglect of discipline and practice of arms, had lost much of their ancient estimation. To infuse therefore among them a confidence in themselves, and restore, if possible, somewhat of former opinion of them among others, he assured the assembled people, anxious for information, that their troops had gained high credit among their allies both

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 300.

\* [See extract from *Fasti Hellen.* at the end of sect. 7. of this chapter.]

for discipline and valour. The people were gratified with the flattery; and, so the influence of the party prevailed, the meritorious deeds, which apparently would not bear a detailed report, were celebrated by public processions and thanksgiving sacrifices. Of this prostitution of honours the party of Phocion showed their opinion by avoiding to attend the ceremonies. The war-party revenged themselves by imputing such conduct to disaffection toward the commonwealth, and especially, where possibly the imputation might not be wholly ungrounded, toward the democracy.

## SECTION IV.

*Repetition of proposal from the king of Macedonia for peace. Authority of Demosthenes at Athens and at Thebes: final determination for war: preparations during winter: battle of Chæronea.*

It does not appear that Demosthenes himself could state any preparation made even now by Philip for that offensive war against Athens on which he had been so long declaiming as that prince's purpose. On the contrary, considering the open violence of the war-party, there may seem to have been forbearance even beyond prudence; unless Philip, really desirous of maintaining the peace of Greece, hoped to succeed through recovered prevalence of the party of Phocion and Isocrates at Athens. Had Isocrates been his adviser and principal minister, Philip's conduct could scarcely more have corresponded with that venerable patriot's published admonition. As general of the Amphictyonic confederacy it was his especial duty, in the spirit of the Amphictyonic institution,

CHAP.  
XLII.

---

to be the peace-maker of Greece. Accordingly, notwithstanding all provocations received, he did not let the season of military rest pass without renewing assurances to the Athenian and Theban people of his desire still to avoid extremities. Nor did his proposals fail of exciting much interest among both. The contest of oratory ensuing at Athens was vehement. The principal opponent of Demosthenes, according to Plutarch, was Phocion. But every popular passion, desire of gain, desire of power, love of adventure, all was in favour of the war-party cause, except fear. To obviate fear therefore, and to excite desire, Demosthenes exerted all his powers. ‘Apprehension,’ he told the people, ‘on their part was groundless; for all Philip’s peaceful professions only proved his fears. On the contrary, with them hope might reasonably soar high; for, while provision had been made for the security of Attica, such that any apprehension was even absurd, a combination of force had been prepared, sufficient to give promise of success the most beneficial and glorious.’

The superiority obtained by Demosthenes in this contest placed him in a situation very flattering for an ambitious mind. With the eyes of all Greece upon him, he was at the head of one of the causes which divided that unhappy country; the cause (whether properly of democracy, the sanction given to the bondage of the Bœotians under the Theban people should perhaps make doubtful, but) of democratical empire. In Athens, through the circumstances in which he had involved his party, his abilities were so necessary to the other chiefs that they hardly dared refuse him their support for anything. Æschines not unaptly called it ‘a dynasty that he had formed for himself.’ ‘Such was his power,’ said that

Plut. v.  
Phoc.  
p. 748.

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 301.

Æsch. de  
Cor. p. 536.



orator, speaking some years after to the Athenian people, 'that here upon the bema he ventured to tell ' even you that he would go whither he pleased on ' embassy, though you should not appoint him; and ' he threatened the generals that, if any of them opposed his measures, he would move a decree for ' giving rank and authority to the orators on the bema ' above the board of generals.' Demosthenes, in his reply, rather gloried in these imputations than denied them.

SECT.  
IV.

---

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 301.

The Athenian many then, bold behind the brazen rampart of allies which Demosthenes boasted of having raised around Attica, refused all treaty with the king of Macedonia. But the Thebans, exposed to the first attack, and sore still from the evils of the Sacred war, so shrunk from a renewal of similar sufferings that a decree passed their assembly for taking the proposals into consideration. Demosthenes was alarmed; if the Thebans yielded, all was lost, and he was reduced to the condition of a simple orator of Athens; probably in opposition to those who would hold the government. He hastened therefore to Thebes. The recent compact authorizing him to use his eloquence there nearly as at Athens, the Theban people were summoned, and he addressed them. Flattering the war-party, he did not scruple violently to threaten the pacific, swearing 'by Minerva, that ' if any should dare to say peace ought to be made ' with Philip, he would himself seize him by the hair ' and drag him for a traitor to prison.' Little as we know of the Theban constitution, the small addition to former information which may be gathered from the implication of its government in this crisis with the Athenian will certainly not tell in its favour. The violent arrogance of Demosthenes, forbidding freedom

Æsch. de  
Cor.

Æsch de  
Cor.  
p. 538.

of speech to the Thebans in their own assembly, was successful : the Theban people voted as he required.

This was a great triumph, but not a decisive victory. To complete the immediate purpose of the party, in addition to the refusal of negotiation for peace, measures must be taken for actual war. It was already the season for military action, and the energy of Demosthenes had provided that a body of Athenian troops was at Thebes or in the neighbourhood. Orders for its farther movements, while within Bœotia, should regularly come from the Bœotarchs, heads of the executive government of Bœotia, especially chiefs of the military department, and, by the compact with Athens managed under the direction of Demosthenes himself, to be consulted on all measures of the confederacy. Nevertheless Demosthenes, whether against their consent, or without communication with them, procured that the Athenians should march for the Phocian border. The Bœotarchs, surprised and offended, countermanded them. Consulting then at their own board, where neither popular eloquence dazzled nor popular passion interrupted them, they concurred, or at least a majority of them concurred, in dissatisfaction with the present state of things. Whether indeed comparing the immediate evils and the final hazard of the war they were provoking with the advantages of the proposals for peace, to which the people had been persuaded to refuse consideration ; whether the breach with their ancient allies of Thesaly, with any advantages reasonably to be expected from their new alliance with their old enemies of Athens ; whether the general moderation of the king of Macedonia, and the respect he had shown for the constitution and for the people of every state within his sphere of communication, with the arrogance of

the Athenian orator, who assumed to himself to control their assemblies and supersede their own authority as first magistrates; there would appear much reason at least to pause, and look about them. Accordingly they came to a resolution, that the people should be again assembled, and the king of Macedonia's proposals again submitted to their consideration.

A very extraordinary contest ensued between the proper supreme magistrates of Thebes and the foreign orator. It was evidently apprehended that a majority among the Theban many, brought to a juster sense of their interest, and of what was due to the dignity of their government, would support their own first magistrates. Demosthenes was driven to extremity. Venturing so far as to call the Bœotarchs traitors to Greece, he concluded a most violent speech with declaring that, 'if the Thebans, deceived by their leaders, so shrunk from the common cause, he would return immediately to Athens, and move for an embassy to Thebes, to demand a passage through Bœotia for the Athenian army, which would go alone against the common enemy.' Whether the Bœotarchs were, as Æschines says, frightened with the charge, or in whatever way induced or overborne, they yielded, and the resolution was decidedly and finally taken for war.<sup>9</sup>

The war, thus now impending, was not properly of Macedonia against Greece, but of Greece divided within itself; nearly as in the Peloponnesian and

<sup>9</sup> The conduct of Demosthenes, as here related, having been stated by Æschines, in his presence, before the Athenian people, and not denied by him in his reply, stands on evidence far more certain than is often found for such matters in ancient history.



CHAP.  
XLII.

Theban wars formerly, and recently the Phocian. The proper contingent of troops from Macedonia, as a Grecian state of the Amphictyonic league, it may be supposed had joined the Amphictyonic army; though so much is not said by any ancient writer. But it is strongly implied, among the orations of Demosthenes himself, that, beyond this, no Macedonian force had passed Thermopylæ. It was not Philip's way, the orator says, to bring his phalanx; he came attended with an escort of horse, and perhaps some light-armed foot, and he found other troops as he wanted them. The greater part of Greece, averse to the dominion of the Athenian and Theban people, or of Demosthenes, ruling in their name, had engaged in that alliance with Macedonia, of which the Thessalians had given the first example; and Philip was chosen general autocrator of the confederacy.<sup>10</sup> It was his business then during the winter to assemble from the confederated states a force sufficient for the support of their common cause.\*

Demosth.  
Philip. 3.  
p. 123.

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 84.

Demosth. de  
Cor. p. 295.

Ibid. p. 306.

Meanwhile the exertions of Demosthenes, as prime minister of Athens and of Thebes, and principal director of the measures of their confederacy, appear to have been very great and very able. From the Eubœans, Megareans, Corinthians, Achæans, Cor-

<sup>10</sup> Ἀκούετε δὲ Φίλιππον, οὐχὶ τῷ φάλαγγας ὀπλιτῶν ἄγειν, βαδίζονθ' ὅποι βούλεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ ψιλούς, ἰππέας, τοξότας, ξένους, τοιοῦτον ἐξηρτῆσθαι στρατόπεδον. Demosth. Phil. 3. p. 123. Ἠγεμῶν δὲ καὶ κύριος ἤρέθη Φίλιππος ἀπάντων. Demosth. de Cor. p. 295. Philip was elected commander in chief of the Greeks, but no mention is made of a Macedonian force. It seems to have sufficed him that he had, according to the historian, engaged the friendship of so large a proportion of the Greek nation: Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεὺς τοὺς πλείστους τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰς φιλίαν προσηγμένος, κ. τ. λ. Diod. 1. 16. c. 84,

\* [See extract from Fasti Hellen. at the end of sect. 7. of this chapter.]



cyræans, Leucadians, and Acarnanians he collected a mercenary force of fifteen thousand foot and two thousand horse, exclusively of their civic troops, whose number is not stated. From the same people he obtained subsidies, the amount unknown, but probably not great, toward the expenses of the war. In addition to these were the Bœotian civic heavy-armed, commonly reckoned about fourteen thousand, and the Athenian. In what numbers the Athenians were prepared for the field, or whether, since the defeat of their mercenaries in the Amphissian war, they had maintained any force of that description, is not said. Gathering however as best may be from the contemporary writers, (for the round statements of those of later ages are little to be trusted,) the force at the disposal of Demosthenes, in the great contest for the empire of Greece, was of hardly less than fifty thousand men. According to Æschines, there was moreover a large force of Arcadians ready under willing leaders, if only nine talents, less than eighteen hundred pounds, which they either demanded as a bounty, or wanted to enable them to take the field, might have been advanced to them out of the Persian subsidy. This Demosthenes refused, while he appropriated to himself not less than seventy talents. Possibly however Demosthenes doubted the influence of the Arcadian leaders to secure the services of the many, whom he might believe disposed rather to the Amphictyonic cause; and if the troops under Philip were only, as the historian says, thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse, he might think the forces of surer fidelity so ample for the occasion that an addition of troops of less certain disposition, at any expense, might not be desirable.<sup>11</sup>

SECT.  
IV.

---

Æsch. de  
Cor. p. 633.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 84.

<sup>11</sup> Æschines attributes the loss of another advantage also to the

CHAP.  
XLII.

Demosthenes appears to have failed most in the choice of generals to command the great army he had assembled. But very probably, with all the extravagance of power he sometimes assumed, he could not wholly put aside Chares, the patron who had principally opened the way for him to his actual eminence, the beneficial patron also of so many others, and, with all his vices and failings, perhaps yet the most popular man in Athens. It was however provided that the command in chief should not rest wholly with one whose unfitness had already produced so many misfortunes. In the preceding autumnal campaign Stratocles had commanded the Athenian troops.\* Lysicles now was joined in the command with Chares. But among the Theban officers, who

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 85.

parsimony or corruption of Demosthenes: Οὐ δὲ ἔνδειαν μὲν χρημάτων, ἔνεκα πέντε ταλάντων, οἱ ξένοι τοῖς Θεβαίοις τὴν ἄκραν οὐ παρέδοσαν; De Cor. p. 633. The learned annotator Wolf says to this, τὴν Καδμείαν, ὡς οἶμαι, ὑπὸ Μακεδόνων κατεχομένην. (Note on Æsch. de Cor. p. 633.) The learned annotator seems to have forgotten what he must have read in a preceding passage of this very oration, that the Cadmea, so far from being held by the Macedonians, was the very place in which Demosthenes himself principally held council with the Thebans, the place to which, in the phrase of his adversary, he had transferred the powers of the democracy of Athens: καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἄρδην ἔλαθεν ὑφελόμενος, καὶ μετήνεγκεν εἰς Θήβας εἰς τὴν Καδμείαν, κοινωσίαν τῶν πράξεων τοῖς Βοιωτάρχοις συνθέμενος. Æsch. de Cor. p. 535. To such mistakes the most learned may be liable, if they will undertake historical explanation without the previous trouble of historical investigation. I can hardly venture to say what ἄκρα may not have been intended by the orator, except the Cadmea: but circumstances, as far as they have been transmitted, would rather lead conjecture to some fortified height of the Phocian border, the possession of which might have led to better success in the autumnal campaign under Stratocles.

[\* See extract from Fasti Hellen. at the end of sect. 7. of this chapter.]

had served through the long war with Phocis, it is likely there might be more experience of the warfare of heavy-armed in the field than among the Athenian; and it seems not improbable that a juster consideration of the great interests of the cause of his party than Æschines would suggest, a view of the general deficiency of the principal Athenian officers, and of the particular impossibility of denying high command to Chares, assisted at least to induce Demosthenes to desire that, if a Theban did not actually hold the situation of commander in chief, yet in the council of war the Theban scale should preponderate. The nine talents also, saved by the denial of them to the Arcadians, might not be unwanted for the purposes of the campaign.

Such a force as Demosthenes had now assembled the scanty funds of the Grecian republics could not long maintain: it must proceed to quick decision. Meanwhile Philip, persevering in his purpose of avoiding aggression, remained within Phocis till the Athenians and Thebans were already marching toward him. Then he advanced into the Bœotian plain, and took a station near the hostile garrison of Chæronea.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> The narrative of Diodorus seems to imply that before the contention of oratory between Python and Demosthenes at Thebes the army of the Athenian confederacy had taken that station, near Chæronea, which it occupied to the time of the decisive battle.\* But Diodorus, abridging greatly, and perhaps often writing from memory, not unfrequently manages narration so that it is difficult to guess whether he intends the reader should take what precedes or what follows as prior in time; and he still oftener omits, as here, to notice intervening transactions, necessary to connect the parts of his narrative. It is clearly indicated by both Æschines and Demosthenes that in

\* [See extract from *Fasti Hellen.* at the end of sect. 7. of this chapter.]



7 July.  
Ruald. vit.  
Plutarchi,  
c. 1.  
[B.C. 338.  
Cl.\*]

Of the great and decisive battle that ensued no account remains that can give any satisfaction to the military reader. If any was extant even in the time of Diodorus it unfortunately escaped that writer. Equally the king of Macedonia and his son Alexander, then a youth of eighteen, whom no contemporary writer has mentioned to have been present<sup>13</sup>, are described by Diodorus and Plutarch like heroes of the Trojan times, whose personal prowess, rather than the mind of the consummate general, directing the great machine under his command, produced the complete victory which followed. We have formerly observed Thucydides and Xenophon cautious of answering for personal actions in the tumult of battle, and rarely undertaking to report words spoken among individuals. Even how one, about whom universal curiosity would be so interested as Epaminondas, received his mortal wound, or what was his behaviour and conversation in the awful interval till his death, Xenophon, though he must have conversed with many present in the field of Mantinea, has not presumed to say. But public orders, marches previous to a battle, ground occupied, what part of a line was first engaged, what broken, what pursued, and what protected a retreat, we find them frequently reporting. On the contrary, concerning the

the autumnal campaign the Athenian and Theban forces were at Chæronea, and as clearly that they were withdrawn before the meeting of Python and Demosthenes at Thebes. The Latin translator of Diodorus seems to have been aware of this, venturing to correct his author by giving, for ἐξέπεμψεν, the preterpluperfect *miserat*.

<sup>13</sup> Arrian represents Alexander speaking of himself as having been present. Exp. Alex. l. 7. c. 9.

\* [See extract from *Fasti Hellen.* at the end of sect. 7. of this chapter.]



battle of Chæronæa writers of centuries after have undertaken to give, of the former sort much, of the latter almost nothing. It is only generally said, and seems probable, that the contest was sharp. But of the result we have full assurance so far, that the victory of the Amphictyonic army was most complete. The Athenians acknowledged to have lost more than a thousand slain and two thousand taken. Nevertheless the principal brunt of the action is said, and not improbably, to have been maintained by the Thebans. If then these, and the other allies, suffered only in equal proportion with the Athenians, the total loss must have been very great. What was not destroyed or taken was so dispersed that nothing remained to obstruct the conquerors, whichever way they might direct their march.

SECT.  
V.

---

Demad.  
or. fragm.  
Diod. l. 16.  
c. 85.

## SECTION V.

*Consternation at Athens: flight of Demosthenes: condemnation of Lysicles: generosity of Philip. Arrangement for Bœotia. Liberality to Athens.*

INFORMATION of the total defeat of the allied forces at Chæronæa produced at Athens consternation and tumult, such as might be expected where sovereignty rested with the multitude, and the uninformed and improvident were not to take but to give orders; and this in a moment when great hope among them was suddenly disappointed, security, which they had been taught to believe complete through the brazen wall of alliances of which Demosthenes had boasted, was wholly overthrown, and dangers, in kind and amount incalculable, were, as by the shifting of a scene, substituted in their view. Waste of Attica, siege of Athens, all the dreadful evils of ordinary Grecian warfare, would be in their apprehension but

preludes of those unheard-of horrors which the speeches of the war-party orators had represented as to be expected from Macedonian barbarism and cruelty. This agitation of the popular mind was, for those who had been leading the public measures, far more dreadful than the approach of the victorious enemy. Demosthenes had borne arms at Chæronea; whether, in confidence of success, smitten with ambition to claim military merit, or, after all his exhortations to others, ill able to excuse himself from that common duty of all citizens. Escaping in the general flight, he did not scruple, for safer haste, to disgrace himself by abandoning his shield. Under all circumstances he would not venture to show himself in Athens: he went to Piræus, went aboard a trireme, and, with the authority which he could assume, or from his friends in office obtain, he put to sea under pretence of going on duty necessary in the urgency of the republic's affairs, to collect, among the islands, tribute or loans for the treasury.

Æsch. de  
Cor. p. 545.

Chares remained, apparently the most obvious object for popular indignation. But the whole party were in danger; and had the party of Phocion come forward with the common temper and common views of Grecian party, or of party in general, Chares and his associates could hardly have avoided ruin. But Phocion and his friends, with their usual regard for the general good, and perhaps over-scrupulous fear of appearing to press any separate interest, gave their attention rather to remedy the evil situation of public affairs than to punish the authors. Yet that the popular anguish would be assuaged, and the resulting anger appeased, without some signal sacrifice, was hardly to be hoped. With admirable policy then the party of Chares resolved to profit from the apparently

extravagant liberality of their adversaries, by hastening to take the invidious business of crimination into their own hands. Thus they gained at once two great points: they could choose the victim; and they preserved the advantage, which otherwise for a time at least they must have wholly foregone, of appearing still to hold a lead in public measures, and even in popular measures.

Lycurgus, an orator of celebrated talents, was famed, according to Diodorus and Plutarch, for virtue generally, but especially for the integrity with which, during twelve years, he administered the business of the treasury. Possibly it was only some branch of the treasury-business; or otherwise his fame must have rested upon his party; for every older testimony shows the general business of the treasury to have been most scandalously mismanaged. Lycurgus however was certainly, as an oration remaining from him assists to prove, a most zealous advocate for the high democratical cause.<sup>14</sup>

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 88.  
Plut. v. orat.

Of Lysicles, the colleague of Chares in the momentous command at Chæronea, mention is found among ancient writers only in regard to that command, and his fate which followed. Probably he had earned reputation as an officer, but was little

<sup>14</sup> Wesseling, after the usual temper of the lettered of the continent, warm in zeal for the honour of so keen an asserter of democratical principles, would correct Diodorus from Plutarch; who, in the lives of the orators, gives fifteen years to the ministry of Lycurgus; and he would reckon a decree of the Athenian people, there quoted, complete proof of Lycurgus's high merit. Such a decree, the reader who has followed Grecian history will be well aware, proves the prevalence of the party with which Lycurgus was connected when the decree passed, and his eminence in that party, but nothing more.

CHAP.  
XLII.

---

important to the party as a man versed in politics, or of any popular interest. It was resolved that Lysicles should be the victim, to be sacrificed for the safety of the rest of the party, and that Lycurgus should conduct the prosecution. Athenian justice, we have seen, was commonly quick, and not always very formal; of which the death of Lycidas, in what are called the virtuous times of the republic, and the massacre of his family, will, among other things, be remembered in proof. No crime appears to have been alleged against Lysicles, but that he had commanded unsuccessfully. Nevertheless, being told by the prosecutor that 'he ought to be ashamed to live,' (though why more than Chares, unless as far the less practised sinner, is not at all indicated,) the people condemned him to die, and he was executed. Whatever may be thought of the morality of the party of Chares and Demosthenes, whatever may be thought of their patriotism, their policy must be admired. The death of Lysicles had evidently all the effect proposed from it. The popular rage was quieted, and the way was kept open for the party to come forward still in the general assembly on public business as they might see convenient.

Ch. 9. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 88.

Meanwhile the king of Macedonia's conduct after his great victory, was consonant to that high spirit of generosity and humanity which had shone from the beginning of his reign. No pretence was taken, as by the Thebans when they were at the head of the Amphictyonic confederacy, to mix the cause of religion with that of policy, for extending the purposes of either vengeance or ambition. Even that severity, constantly observed in the practice of the republics, to compel the defeated to the humiliation



of a formal acknowledgment of their defeat by a herald soliciting the bodies of the slain, was studiously avoided. Information that the bodies were at the disposal of their friends was forwarded before heralds could arrive. Demades, an orator of the first eminence, was among the Athenian prisoners. Fragments of orations only remain from him; so that the style as well as the estimation of his eloquence may best be gathered from what we are told was said in his day, that Demosthenes was the orator made for the actual state of the Athenian republic, Demades was above it. The Athenian people, amid the severest anxiety and apprehension, deputed Æschines, as a person likely to be acceptable to the conqueror, to learn his purposes, and obviate, as far as might be, his just resentment. But, before Æschines could arrive, Demades had not only received his own freedom, but was authorized to assure the Athenian people that the king of Macedonia had all friendly disposition toward them. As soon after then as conveniently might be all the Athenian prisoners were released. Some, perhaps most, were deficient in common clothing, for which the panoply would be an awkward substitute, and prisoners of war would of course be deprived of this, as appertaining to their arms, and a portion of them. Philip generously directed a supply of clothing for all.

From the field of battle the victorious army proceeded to Thebes. Bœotia was so powerful among the divisions of the Grecian people, and so critically situated for giving either protection or annoyance, readily and extensively, among other states, that to establish there a sure preponderance of the party friendly to the Amphictyonic confederacy and the peace of Greece was most especially necessary for the

SECT.  
V.

---

Demad. or.  
fragm.

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 319, 320.

CHAP.  
XLII.

---

welfare of the whole alliance. The modern reader, especially the English reader, may have difficulty to imagine a worse constitution than that of Athens in this age, with all its advantage of Solon's laws, has been described; yet it seems probable that the constitution of Thebes was greatly worse. The government of Thebes had been changed, not gradually, as that of Athens, but by a rapid and violent revolution, and without any such intervening advantage as that of the legislation of Solon, from a mixed aristocracy, to nearly a pure democracy. The people of Thebes, under this ill-defined government of their own, claimed a democratical dominion over the people of the other towns of Bœotia, to which their previous aristocratical government had allowed a more equal participation of rights. Moreover many Theban citizens were in exile. Probably many had found it advisable to fly in consequence of the victory of Demosthenes in the contest of eloquence with their orator Python. Yet many less eminent men, with more or less zeal, friendly to their cause, remained, and many always adverse to the alliance with Athens, and many rendered so by the ill success of the measure. These were ready to receive the refugees, who would be not unprepared to profit from the event of the battle of Chæronea. Altogether the Athenian party in Thebes found themselves so weakened, and their opponents so strong, that no opposition to the reception of Philip was attempted. The government of course passed into the hands of the Macedonian party. Bœotia then was emancipated. The subjection of its people to the dominion of the Theban people, confirmed by the treaty of alliance with Athens managed by Demosthenes, was abolished, and the more liberal system of the Bœotian confederacy was restored. All

the Theban, as well as all other prisoners, made in the battle of Chæronea, were released without ransom. The common expedient of the Grecian republics to provide tranquillity and safety for the victorious party, driving the disaffected into banishment, sometimes to the amount of nearly half the population, was avoided. That it might not be necessary, the Cadmea was occupied by a garrison from the Amphictyonic army, probably mercenary or standing forces. That any Thebans were banished, that a single individual suffered in person or property, is not said by any writer of better authority than Justin: Plutarch evidently knew nothing of it; nor is anything found to the purpose among all that remains concerning this critical period from the hostile pen of Demosthenes.<sup>15</sup>

Bœotia being thus assured to the Amphictyonic confederacy, liberality might be more safely extended to Athens; and Philip proceeded to show a liberality which, in its day, excited the admiration of Greece, and became, apparently with reason, a lasting theme of eulogy. Few princes have ever had opportunity to exhibit magnanimity and generosity like that now before Philip, and none known to history ever did equally show it. Punishment against his illiberal revilers, authors of so much trouble and so many dangers to himself, and of so many evils to others his friends, being at his command, he not only demonstrated to the world the falsehood of their continual assertions to his disadvantage, but disappointed even their own expectation, after all their experience, of his forbearance. When they were in power he had

<sup>15</sup> Many, finding themselves uneasy under the government of those whom they had been accustomed to govern, might emigrate, or stirring commotion might be afterward banished, whose return Arrian mentions. [Exp. Alex. i. 7. ad fin.]



CHAP.  
XLII.

recommended to the Athenian people to dismiss them, and commit the direction of public affairs to better men, that so the awful crisis, now so alarming, might be prevented. Fallen as they were, he did not even mention them. As soon as it was known at Athens from the report of Demades that favour, beyond hope, might be expected, an embassy was appointed to wait upon him. Meanwhile he had caused the bodies of their slain to be burned with the accustomed ceremonies of respect for deceased friends, and the bones to be placed on carriages to be transported to Athens; and he committed the procession to the charge of his principal minister Antipater, whom he also appointed his ambassador to the Athenian people. So far then from proposing any harsh conditions, he freely offered renewal of peace and alliance upon the former terms: but farther, in manifestation of his disposition as general of the Amphictyons, while he favoured Athens, to maintain the ancient order of things, and, as far as depended upon him, to do impartial justice between state and state, he procured the restoration to the Athenian republic of its town and territory of Oropus, which, in spite of the solicitude, and in contempt of the power of the Athenian people, had been so long held by the Thebans.

#### SECTION VI.

*Persevering scrupulousness of the party of Phocion. Return of Demosthenes. Funeral oration for the slain at Charonea. Third letter of Isocrates to Philip.*

To suppose Philip without a political object in this liberal conduct were to suppose him unworthy to be king of Macedonia, and still more unworthy to be general-autocrator, supreme head of the Am-



phictyonic confederacy, or to have the illustrious Athenian patriots, Phocion and Isocrates, for his friends. What his expectations may have been is not at all indicated in remaining accounts. Among them however, no doubt, was to increase his popularity in Greece, and in this he did not fail; but if he hoped in any degree to gain the adverse party in Athens, who owed every thing to his liberality, he was most completely disappointed.

We are without information of any particulars of the conduct of Phocion and his friends; but it appears that their moderation and scrupulousness, emulating the king of Macedonia's liberality, were excessive. The party of Chares in consequence began presently to look about them with renewed hope. Their defeat at Chæronea, they saw, was not followed up, as they had expected, to the utter extinction of their former prospects: they were not compelled, as so many of their betters had been in better times of the commonwealth, to seek their safety in flight: they were not reduced to a condition, ordinary in the contentions of party among the republics, below that of any other citizens; none of their former legal rights were denied them. Meanwhile the power of the republic not only remained unimpaired, except for the loss of a few lives which the course of a year or two bringing boys to manhood would recruit, but, beyond all hope, increased with the restoration of the town and territory of Oropus. Its comparative importance among the Grecian states was even greatly increased, by the depression of the power of Thebes through the emancipation of the Bœotian towns. But, what was to them far more important, the constitution stood untouched, with all its convenient vices by which they

CHAP.  
XLII.

had risen to power; and nothing seemed to deny them hope, with diligent use of opportunities, again to rise.

Æsch. de  
Cor.

A fortunate occurrence (so, without more explanation, Æschines has described it) afforded opportunity for Demosthenes to return to Athens without meeting popular indignation. It is evident that the large party with which he had been connected, though there were able and celebrated orators among them, felt now not less, but perhaps even more than before, the want of his various superior talents, to direct their measures and restore their fallen cause. Shortly after his return he was put forward as candidate to be elected one of the commissioners of a board for carrying into execution the terms of the peace. In this he failed. But neither himself nor his party were so discouraged. They presently resolved upon a bold measure, singularly calculated to distress their opponents and give some new life to their own faded popularity. They proposed, in the general assembly, that those slain at Chæronea should be honoured with a public funeral, as ancient custom prescribed for citizens falling in battle for their country. The rigid scrupulousness of Phocion and his friends appears to have afforded such opportunity for encouragement to the multitude, formerly at the heels of Chares, and desiring still his profitable patronage, that they were obliged, or thought themselves obliged, to let this motion pass without opposition. An orator was then to be appointed to speak the funeral panegyric. It was not an office for Phocion or his friends, who had wholly disapproved the war. Thus Demosthenes was left to be chosen, according to his own boast, in preference to Æschines, Demades, Hegemon, Pythocles, and all others of their party.

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 320.

An oration has been transmitted among his works as that which he spoke on the occasion. Doubts about it have been entertained by some eminent critics, not however agreeing in their objections; and whatever partial injuries it may have sustained in publication and transcription, the admirable ingenuity with which it has been adapted to the difficulties of the orator's actual situation, and to the necessities and purposes of his party in their depression and difficulties, marks strongly its general authenticity. In the outset he soars into fabulous antiquity; with the same view, apparently, as Isocrates has often resorted to the same artifice, to lead away the minds of his hearers from party-distinctions, which now it was as much his business to blend as formerly to widen. Winding then rapidly down through the Persian wars to the immediate objects of his speech, he connects his subject by observing how those, whose fall he was to celebrate, resembled the heroes, so universally admired, of whom he had before been speaking. He then checks his course to remark that he was aware of difference of political sentiments among his auditory; and he would offend none; for no discourse, he observes, could have the desired effect without some harmonizing disposition in the hearer's mind. Nevertheless he affected to consider the numerous citizens not of ancient Attic blood as those who alone could differ from him. Rushing then again into the midst of his subject, he proceeds, 'It will be said we were defeated: but in defeat these departed heroes had no share. Those who fall, on either side, are conquerors: the honours of victory are equally due to both. But look to the effect of these men's deeds. We owe to them that our country was not invaded. The very circumstances of the peace prove this.'

SECT.  
VI.

---

Demosth.  
or. funebr.  
p. 747.  
ed. Lutet.  
Morel.

Demosth.  
or. funebr.  
p. 748.



‘ The lord of our adversaries was aware that the kindred of such men would be like themselves; and he chose rather to become their friend than to put all to hazard by farther contest.’ Having thus boldly asserted to the Athenian many that they owed nothing to his political opponents for procuring such advantageous terms of peace, and nothing to the conquering prince for granting them, he was aware that some softening was necessary. Eulogy of Philip, which he had not scrupled in some of his most adverse speeches, he would not scruple now; but he managed to put it rather into the mouths of others; and, while he gave praise due to the Macedonian king, he combined with it flattery and instigation to the Athenian people. ‘ Let those who fought against us,’ he says, ‘ be asked, and there is not one but will avow that not their superior military merit produced our defeat, but our incalculable hard fortune, and the skill, the daring courage, the superior mind, of their commander.<sup>16</sup> And this must be evident to all, that the liberty of Greece existed in the souls of these men: they preferred a glorious death to a life of shame; and with them the dignity of the country has perished.’ What

<sup>16</sup> ... τοῦ προεστηκότος αὐτῶν ἐμπειρία καὶ τόλμη καὶ ψυχὴ. [Mr. Mitford has had a faulty text before him. The Greek is: Οἶμαι δ' αὖν, εἴ τις αὐτοὺς τοὺς παραταξαμένους ἐρωτήσῃ, πότερ' ἠγοῦνται ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀρεταῖς καὶ τῇ τοῦ προεστηκότος αὐτῶν ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ τόλμῃ, ἢ τῇ παραδόξῳ καὶ χαλεπῇ τύχῃ κατωρθωκέναι, οὐδένα οὐτ' ἀναίσχυντον, οὔτε τολμηρὸν οὕτως εἶναι, ὄντιν' ἀντιποιήσασθαι τῶν πεπραγμένων. The celebrated French translator, Auger, gives the sense thus: ‘ Qu' on demande aux guerriers qui ont combattu les nôtres, s'ils croient avoir été victorieux par la supériorité de leur courage, et par l'habileté et la hardiesse du prince qui les commande, ou par une faveur inespérée du sort qui nous a été contraire; aucun d'eux, aura-t-il le front de s'attribuer les succès qu'ils ont obtenus?']



next follows, with extraordinary ingenuity imagined and wrought to win the attention and interest the fancy of the actual auditory, will be felt by the reader of aftertimes only in proportion as his imagination may place him in the circumstances of the lower classes of Athenian citizens. It is a catalogue of the wards of Attica, and the heroes, their supposed founders, Erechtheus, Cecrops, Ajax, and others; each name accompanied with a panegyric apostrophe on their merits, most ingeniously varied through the long roll; with a reference to the congenial virtues and merits of those, their successors, in whose honour the actual ceremony was instituted. Hence is drawn, with great advantage, a consolatory exhortation to the parents and other relations of the deceased, with which the speech concludes.<sup>17</sup>

This funeral ceremony, under all its circumstances appears to have been a triumphant measure for the party, and especially for Demosthenes. He no longer feared now to put himself forward again upon the bema. He proposed decrees to provide for the security of the city, by repairs of the fortifications and arrangements for the garrison, and those decrees were passed. He offered himself for an office, which seems to have been important, that of providitor of the victualling of the city, and he was elected. The effects of the victory of Charonea were, as far as the Athenian republic standing by itself was concerned, almost done away: the principal powers of government returned into the hands of the party of Demosthenes and Chares.

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 309, 310.

The disappointment and disturbance ensuing to

<sup>17</sup> Some farther remarks on this oration are, for more convenience, placed at the end of the section.

the peace-party, from this reviviscency of the party of war and troubles, are indicated in the third and last of the extant letters of Isocrates to Philip. In that letter Isocrates says he had had much satisfaction in conversing with Antipater, who had been sent as minister to Athens after the battle of Chæronea; but he proceeds to indicate that he thought the king had afterward rather neglected his friends in Greece. He reminds him that, through the event of that battle, all was in his power: he might, at his pleasure, carry into effect the great purposes of the Amphictyonic institution, compel any refractory republics to the maintenance of peace, and put an effectual check upon that mad ambition which had produced such destructive contentions among them. He professes to consider Philip still as the only person capable of saving the country; and he urges the expedition to Asia, in which the restless might find employment to their mind, as necessary toward providing for the peace of Greece. So bent was he upon this, his favourite project now, he observes, for a great number of years, that if extreme age did not absolutely disable him, he would not content himself with writing, but would wait on the king, to exhort him to the measure. The execution, he proceeds to observe, and justly, as events afterward showed, would be far easier with Philip's present means than the acquisition of his actual power and glory with the strength of the distressed kingdom inherited from his ancestors. He concludes with an observation, which may appear extravagant to the modern reader, unless much observant of the ways of antiquity, that nothing greater could then remain for Philip, unless to be made a god. But for those of his age, even for one of the general wisdom and moral

rectitude of Isocrates, such a sentiment must not be estimated by the measure of the juster notions which Christianity, giving them to Mahometanism, has made the common feeling of men now so widely over the earth. The popular belief among the Greeks that Hercules and others from mortal men had actually become immortal gods, may warrant the expression of Isocrates; which is modest in comparison of the vanity and flattery, not less absurd than immoral and impious, soon after beginning to prevail among the Greeks, and, after them, carried by the Romans to greater extravagance.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> I have had occasion formerly to observe that some critics, of very respectable learning, have taken the fancy to slight Xenophon's indication of his own age, and to prefer testimony to it, very indirect and everyway questionable, from writers living not till some centuries after him. It seems indispensable here to advert to the fancy of some other critics, also of respectable learning, to set aside the testimony of Isocrates to his own existence, and to reckon him dead at the time to which his letter, commonly entitled his third to Philip, is in the text attributed. In that epistle the name Chæronea indeed does not occur; but the battle commonly entitled of Chæronea seems as clearly indicated as if the name had been added. Referring to his oration, formerly sent to Philip, and professing adherence still to the opinions there professed, the writer adds that, what he then proposed and recommended, was now in large proportion accomplished, *through the recent battle, by which the state of Greece was greatly altered.* This could apply to no battle but that of Chæronea. After that battle then Philip sent Antipater (so Polybius assures us) as his minister to Athens. Isocrates accordingly, in his third epistle, expresses satisfaction at the large opportunity he had had for conferring with Antipater. It may then be added that, before that battle, the hyperbole, with which the epistle concludes, must have appeared extravagant, even to minds tinctured as those of the Greeks mostly were; but, after the battle, it would harmonize with popular notions.

But in the zeal of the schools in following times, for the cause



CHAP.  
XLII.

of Demosthenes and democracy, a story was propagated that Isocrates, oppressed with anguish at the view of the ruin brought upon the liberty of Athens and of Greece by Philip's victory at Chæronea, destroyed himself by a voluntary abstinence from nourishment. Dionysius of Halicarnassus has noticed the story as if he desired it should have credit, but in wayfaring phrase only, so little circumstantial that it might be difficult to report it after him without help from the more explicit account in Plutarch's lives of the orators. But it deserves observation that it was impossible to establish the credit of Demosthenes as a patriot without invalidating either the character of Isocrates or the authority of his written opinions, and especially of this letter. Against his character for honesty and true patriotism nothing has been ventured. His character for wisdom Rollin and some other moderns have questioned, on the modest supposition that they understood the interest of Athens and of Greece better than Isocrates and Phocion. But whatever may be thought of the judgment of Isocrates, nothing, among the politics of all antiquity, is clearer than the evidence in his extant writings that, for himself, his friends, his republic, and all Greece, what he most dreaded was the success of the party of Chares and Demosthenes in the battle of Chæronea. The story therefore of his destroying himself on account of the victory of his friend, the king of Macedonia, is evidently an absurd fable; and yet it must be allowed, seeing the success it has met with, its propagators calculated well, what might seem not easy to calculate, the reception it would obtain from the understandings of some and the disposition of others, altogether a large portion of what has been called the republic of letters, through many generations to late posterity.

The learned translator and editor Auger, in a note on the third epistle of Isocrates, makes this remarkable observation: 'De quo prælio hic agatur, non satis liquet: non de illo certe quod ad Chæroneam fuit commissum, et post quod Isocrates statim e vitâ excessit. Forte loquitur orator de pugnâ illâ per quam bellum Phocicum confectum est.' Where the learned critic found an account of any battle by which the Phocian war was ended, he has not said, and I must own I cannot tell.

Concerning the death of Isocrates there remains notice from writers of high authority. The oldest that has fallen within the scope of my observation is that of Cicero. That very eminent Roman lived near three hundred years after the illustrious Athenian. Writing a treatise upon old age, he mentions the



death of Isocrates among instances of placid elderhood, quietly and desirably completed, in his ninety-ninth year: 'Est etiam quiete et pure et eleganter actæ ætatis placida ac lenis senectus: . . . qualem Isocratis, qui eum librum, qui Panathenæicus inscribitur, quarto et nonagesimo anno scripsisse dicitur, vixit: que quinquennium postea.' Cicero evidently either was un-informed of the story of the fatal anguish of Isocrates, or thought it unworthy of attention.

Next is Dionysius of Halicarnassus, about half a century later, but within which half century a prodigious change had taken place in the situation of the civilized world, through the establishment of the Roman empire on the ruin of the Roman republic. Dionysius says that Isocrates died a few days after the battle of Chæronea, at the age of full ninety-eight, 'having resolved that his life should end with the good days of the republic, while it was yet *uncertain how* Philip would use the fortune which placed him at the head of the Greeks.' Γνώμη χρητάμενος ἅμα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τῆς πόλεως συγκαταλῦσαι τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον, ἀδήλου ἔτι ὄντος πῶς χρήσεται τῇ τύχῃ Φίλιππος, παραλαβὼν τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀρχήν. The expression of Dionysius here may seem to imply a violent death. How far it necessarily implies so much I leave to the learned to determine.

Philostratus wrote about a century after Dionysius, and he gives an account of the death of Isocrates thus: 'Ἀπέθανε μὲν οὖν Ἀθήνησιν, ἀμφὶ τὰ ἑκατὸν ἔτη. Ἐνα δὲ αὐτὸν ἠγάμεθα τῶν ἐν πολέμῳ ἀποθανόντων' ἐπειδὴ μετὰ τὰ κατὰ Χαιρώνειαν ἐτελεύτα, μὴ καρτερήσας τὴν ἀκρίασιν τοῦ Ἀθηναίου πταίσματος. Philostratus seems to have heard of no violence beyond the mere shock from intelligence of the event.

In the life of Isocrates, attributed to Plutarch, but rather supposed of some other, not earlier, but rather later author, is found at length the story of the death of Isocrates grown into fuller size; the very words he spoke, of which there is no appearance that the earlier writers knew anything, are there reported; and yet the whole still bears an incongruous and uncertain shape. 'Isocrates died,' says that author, 'in consequence of intelligence of the battle of Chæronea, which was communicated to him in the palæstra of Hippocrates. Exclaiming, in the words of three verses from three detached passages of Euripides,

Δαναὸς δ' πεντήκοντα θυγατέρων πατήρ,  
Πέλοψ δ' Ταντάλειος εἰς Πίσαν μολών,  
Σιδώνιον ποτ' ἄστυ Κάδμος ἐκλιπών,

CHAP.  
XLII.

' he abstained from food four days, and then expired ; not bearing to see Greece a fourth time subjugated.' Proceeding through various other matters, then the author comes again to his death : ' Some say he died on the ninth day of his abstinence from food, ' others on the fourth, the day of the public funeral of those who ' fell at Chæronea.'

On a view of this account, the questions occur : Did the learned writer mean to compare the aged orator's case to those of Danaus, Pelops, and Cadmus, as if he was to expect banishment from the tyranny of the conqueror ? Or did he mean to compare Philip himself to those ancient heroes, who came from afar and acquired honour with dominion in Greece ? Has the expression, ' Greece the fourth time subjugated,' been intended to imply that, under the prior empire, successively of Lacedæmon, Athens, and Thebes, Greece was as effectually subjugated as now under Macedonia ? Or what should we take to be the value of that expression ?

After all these four writers comes Suidas, who, following some author differing from all, reports that Isocrates reached his hundred and sixth year.

With the revival of learning in Leo the tenth's age was revived, and with new violence, the passion of its cultivators for the political principles of Demosthenes, which involved a desire to represent the great orator himself as a model of the purest patriotism, and to scandalize his great opponent the king of Macedonia. But among denials to these purposes two were glaring, and might seem insuperable ; the constant connexion of Demosthenes with a person of character so universally reprobated as Chares ; and the opposition to Demosthenes, and connexion with Philip, of two persons of characters so universally allowed excellent as Isocrates and Phocion. Men of learning and ingenuity however had their resources ; and among favouring circumstances may be reckoned, what has always been a great hindrance to the extension of Grecian literature, its inaccessibility but through the medium of another dead language. In treating of the circumstances where the connexion of Demosthenes with Chares would come in view, ancient authority has been shoved aside or veiled ; in treating of those where the opposition of Isocrates and Phocion to Demosthenes is most manifested, a step farther has been ventured, and ancient authority has been boldly superseded by modern fancy. The probity and patriotism of Isocrates and Phocion have indeed not been questioned ; but, as before observed, it has not been scrupled to impute to them

ignorance of the interest of their country, the modern sages modestly undertaking to know it better than they.

Such extravagances, whether resulting from misjudgment or artifice, have not equally obtained among our own fellow-countrymen. A note of Taylor's on a proposed correction of Æschines by H. Stephens, both for the explanation it affords and the presumption it reproves, has so much merit that I would not risk injury to it by giving it otherwise than in his own words. The passage speaks of generals *συνεργούντες*, 'acting in concert with,' some of the orators. On the word *συνεργούντες* Taylor says: '*Συνηγαρούντες* habes, mi lector, ex divinatione H. Stephani: quod nollem. Facilius enim fuisset et expeditius, immo levissimo clinamine a receptis deflexisset, proponendo *συνερούντες*. *Sed ille genium et statum istius rei publicæ parum intellexit cum ista scripserit*. In civitate administrandâ Atheniensium, *Par hominum*, rhetor scilicet et imperator, quorum hic auctoritate et rebus gestis, ille linguâ et ore, præcelluit, sibi invicem mutuas semper operas præstabant:

Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν ἄρ' μύθοισιν, ὁ δ' ἔγχρῃ πολλὸν ἐνίκα.

Huic rei abunde favet, et receptam Æschinis lectionem tuetur, insignissimus Plutarchi locus, de fraterno amore, quem exscribo: Οἱ μὲν οὖν καθ' ἑτέρας ὁδοὺς βαδιῶντες οὐδὲν ἀλλήλους ὠφελούσιν· οἱ δὲ βίοις χρώμενοι διαφοραῖς, τὸν τε φθόνον ἐκτρέπονται, καὶ συνεργούσιν ἀλλήλοις μᾶλλον, ὡς Δημοσθένης καὶ Χάρης, καὶ Λισχίνης καὶ Εὐβουλος, καὶ Ὑπερίδης καὶ Λεωσθένης, οἱ μὲν λέγοντες ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ γράφοντες, οἱ δὲ στρατηγούντες καὶ πράττοντες.'

Leland has shown that, when he would venture to think for himself, he could sometimes think well; but he has given himself up strangely to his French predecessor in the history of Philip, Olivier, whose authority, quoted in his margin, appears even ridiculous in company with the names of Thucydides, Xenophon, and the orators; and for the politics of Isocrates and Phocion he has not risked any opinion of his own, but has bowed to Rollin, whom he has quoted at great length. It should however be observed, for the credit of the fellow-countryman of Rollin, the learned translator and editor Auger, that, with his very abundant negligence and wildness, he has sometimes shown great fairness. With the earnest zeal of the continental lettered of his day for democratical principles, he will have Demosthenes a perfect patriot; yet at the same moment, with the spirit of a French gentleman of the old school, he has admitted, though



CHAP.  
XLII.

---

with professed regret, in a phrase quoted in a former note, that the deficient probity of Demosthenes in his private character remained too clearly proved.

To return for a moment to Isocrates then, I will own myself satisfied with the testimony in his third epistle, that he outlived some time the battle of Chæronea, and also with the testimony there, consonant to the whole tenor of his writings, that he rejoiced in the event, as favourable to what had been, for a long course of years, his views for the good of Athens and of Greece. For that then of which he could leave no account, I would give most credit to Cicero, and believe that, after a fortunate, and, as Cicero calls it, a placid elderhood, (not without anxiety, the lot of all, but without great misfortune,) he died in the course of nature.

---

Some remarks on the FUNERAL ORATION of Demosthenes, too long for convenient insertion where the subject occurs in the text, may perhaps best find a place here.

In the extant epistle of Dionysius of Halicarnassus to Ammæus the funeral oration of Demosthenes is twice mentioned; in one place without any doubt expressed of its authenticity; but in the other place as what he desired to consider as spurious. On this the questions occur: Did Dionysius mean to speak of the oration, which has been transmitted to us as the funeral oration of Demosthenes, on the first occasion, or on the second, or on both, or on neither? I will venture to own my opinion that he meant it on both. On the first occasion he is considering the kinds, or genera, of orations, among which he reckons the funeral a distinct kind. Giving the names then of illustrious orators who had left examples of such, he mentions Demosthenes among them. It sufficed him, on that occasion, that a funeral oration was extant among the generally allowed works of that orator. But on the second occasion he is discussing the various merits of the extant works of Demosthenes. His particular opinion of the funeral oration would be then of course to be given. There then he says, not positively that the funeral oration is spurious, but that he was unwilling to believe it genuine; adding his reason in three epithets; he could not bring himself to think a composition so φορτικός, κενός, παιδαριώδης, as the funeral oration, could be the work of Demosthenes.

To appreciate this kind of criticism of such a work, so con-



nected with, and necessarily to be influenced by, the politics of the moment, it may be expedient to consider what Dionysius was, and in what times he lived. Dionysius himself, and all other Greeks, and their fathers and grandfathers, had been living under Roman despotism. Possibly his youth might see the last convulsions of the Roman republic, when it most despotically commanded the civilized world; but no free government was ever within the scope of his conversation. Hence apparently that very limited direction of his mind to politics which is seen in his judgment on Thucydides, and, still more remarkably, on Polybius. A learned, discerning, and elegant literary critic, he looked on the funeral oration with the eye of a literary critic only, except as he shared in that theoretical zeal for liberty, and partiality for democracy, which were almost universal among the lettered under the Roman empire. Little allowing therefore for the extraordinary difficult situation of Demosthenes when speaking the funeral oration, he was disappointed not to find the orator's usual torrent of eloquence, for which the subject might seem peculiarly to call. Hence his epithet *κενός*: the torrent's channel appeared to him, comparatively at least, empty. Equally he would allow little consideration for the arts necessary to obviate jealousy, while the orator endeavoured to conciliate the attention, not of his distressed party only, but of his audience as widely as might be, and convey, as by a fable, the meaning which could not prudently be delivered in plainer terms. Thus that large portion of the composition, which runs into fabulous antiquity, might earn, with Dionysius, the epithet *παιδαριώδης*. It is true that in no other of the extant orations of Demosthenes episodic matter of that kind is found; though with his contemporary Isocrates it is very ordinary. But it may deserve observation that in a decree, formerly noticed in the text, a decree on a most momentous occasion, that which immediately led to the battle of Chæronea, this very artifice has been resorted to by Demosthenes himself. Such references to remote and fabulous times would be surely less generally congruous in a decree than in an oration. But the orator has evidently thought it for his purpose to give to that decree the style and effect of an oration; and with that view has introduced what would be there truly *παιδαριώδης*, were it not suited, through the circumstances of the times, to produce an important effect. One part of the oration thus appearing, to the critic of the court of Augustus, childish, and the rest empty, the whole would of course become, with him, entitled to the remaining epithet *φορτικός*.

CHAP.  
XLII.

---

Having ventured so far to declare my opinion of the criticism of Dionysius, on the supposition, which I think probable, that he had in view the oration in question, it will be the less necessary to add anything upon the far less authoritative opinions of Libanius and Photius, because they seem to have been little considered by modern critics, who have generally avoided notice of any doubt about the authenticity of this oration. The learned John Taylor however is an exception to require some attention. And yet I must own the greater part of his objections, stated in his *Lectiones Lysiacæ*, appear to me futile. For why was an orator, proposing, with a political purpose, to amuse the Athenian people with a panegyric catalogue of the several wards of Attica, to confine himself exactly to the order of the crier's roll? His intention evidently required a kind of poetical freedom. What then is that 'authority of history' which denies to the daughters of a prince of the fabulous ages, Erechtheus, the title which the oration has given them, of Hyacinthides? And what is that other unspecified authority on which the critic would contest, with Homer, the name of the mother of one whose own name is not very familiar in Grecian history, Acamas? Any sophist between the times of Demosthenes and Dionysius, or even between Dionysius and Photius again, probably might have learnt the order observed by the crier in calling over the Attic wards, and the titles of the daughters of Erechtheus, and the name of the mother of Acamas, as well perhaps as Demosthenes himself, but surely as well as any modern critic; and a sophist, fabricating an oration, with the purpose of passing it for the work of Demosthenes, would be the more scrupulously attentive to such insignificant matters, clearly within his reach, as he must be conscious of his deficiency for many of more importance, clearly beyond it. A sophist also of aftertimes would be likely to be less heedful of the art and caution so remarkable in the oration, and he would be especially desirous to give the torrent all the impetuosity, the failure of which so disappointed Dionysius. But hardly any sophist, of times when republics were no more, hardly Demosthenes himself in a later age, could have so adapted his choice and arrangement of matter, or even his choice and turn of phrase, to those very critical circumstances of the moment which Demosthenes himself, with Æschines and Isocrates and others, has laid open to us.

But Taylor has stated objections of another kind, in which I have found concurrence from some whose opinions, as well as Taylor's, on such subjects I respect highly. 'Multa præterea,'

says Taylor, 'contra puritatem Atticam dicta, multa invenuste 'opposita.' Lect. Lysiac. p. 236. ed. Reiske. The first thing that strikes, in regard to these objections, is that they are not found among those of Dionysius: they are described by none of his three epithets. Nevertheless, not desiring that they should not carry all the authority that ought to be allowed to modern criticism on ancient language, I will venture to offer some suggestions.

Considering the extraordinary circumstances under which Demosthenes undertook to speak the funeral oration, which he certainly did speak, it seems likely that he would think it not prudent for himself to publish in writing what he did so venture to speak. But an oration on such a subject, delivered under such circumstances, by Demosthenes, would be, in its day, an object of the most extensive curiosity: it would hardly fail to be published by some person, more or less perfectly; nor could such a publication be indifferent to Demosthenes. He would desire that the matter and arrangement should be such as might produce all the effect of his spoken oration; but he might rather choose that the diction should be what he might deny. The Alexandrine library became afterward the great depository of the literature of antiquity. Possibly the learned men who superintended that library, in collecting the works of Demosthenes, finding the diction of the funeral oration less perfect than could be satisfactory to them, yet thinking it otherwise fit to be received as a work of the great orator, may have ventured to polish some parts, leaving others untouched; whence might arise ground for Taylor's two objections, the 'contra puritatem Atticam dicta,' and the 'invenuste opposita.' Nevertheless, let some phrases be less graceful, and some less purely Attic, and even none from the pen of Demosthenes, yet the whole oration may have come from the age of Demosthenes, differing scarcely in substance, scarcely in arrangement, and perhaps little even in diction, from what he spoke.

## SECTION VII.

*Congress of Grecian states at Corinth. The king of Macedonia elected autocrator-general of Greece for war against Persia. Preparations for war against Persia. Assassination of the king of Macedonia.*

CHAP.  
XLII.

WHILE things were in this disturbed state at Athens, of what was passing elsewhere in Greece we have scarcely any information. Some contention of parties however there would be everywhere. Among those republics which had begun their connexion with Macedonia by voting golden crowns and brazen statues to Philip, and inviting him to hospitality in their cities, and throughout the numerous states in whose forces he had trusted for opposing the armies of the confederacy managed by Demosthenes, there would still exist an anti-Macedonian party. But that party was so depressed by the result of the battle of Chæronea, and so wanted a head capable of showing itself and openly offering patronage, that the winter passed without any event\* for the historian's notice.

B. C. 337.\*  
Ol. 110. 4.

B. C. 336.\*  
Ol. 110.  
Vincent,  
p. 35.

In the next spring\*, whether more stimulated by the instances of his Athenian friends, or by the ambition within his own mind, by views coinciding with those of Isocrates for the good of Greece, or of any interests of the Macedonian kingdom, or principally of his own power and fame, Philip resolved to give up the glorious ease which, by his able and successful, but laborious and hazardous exertions, during near four-and-twenty years, he had brought apparently within his command, and to postpone the improvement of the

[\* See extract from *Fasti Hellen.* at the end of this section.]



kingdom, which he had already so advanced in extent and power, to the purpose of conquest in Asia. From the orators, beyond what has been already stated from Isocrates, hardly anything remains to indicate either his purposes or his measures. The historian's account then, resting as we must upon it, will perhaps best be given as nearly as may be in his own words. 'Philip, the king,' says Diodorus, 'encouraged by his victory at Chæronea, by which the most renowned of the Grecian states had been checked and confounded, was ambitious of becoming military commander and head of the Greek nation. He declared therefore his intention of carrying war, in the common cause of the Greeks, against the Persians. A disposition to concur in his purpose, and to attach themselves to him as their chief, pervaded the Grecian people. Communicating then with all, individuals as well as communities, in a manner to conciliate favour, he expressed his desire of meeting the nation in congress, to concert measures for the great object in view. A congress accordingly was assembled at Corinth. His explanation of his intentions excited great hopes, and so produced the desired concurrence that at length the Greeks elected him general-autocrator of Greece. Great preparations for the Persian war were put forward, and the proportion of troops for every state to furnish was settled.'

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 89.

Successful as Philip thus was in engaging the Grecian republics to his purpose, it is nevertheless shown by the same historian that his power, acquired by the victory of Charonea, if really sufficient, was not used to prevent free debate in the congress. The measures were not carried without opposition; in which some of the Arcadian members distinguished

1. 17. c. 3.

CHAP.  
XLII.

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 91.

themselves by their warmth.<sup>19</sup> But the majority of the Macedonian party appears to have been great. All was finally settled to Philip's satisfaction; so far that, presently after his return into Macedonia, he took preliminary measures, which were a decisive beginning of war with Persia. He sent his generals Attalus and Parmenio into Asia, in the historian's phrase, 'to give liberty to the Greeks;' the obvious meaning of which is, that the force was sent to encourage and support revolt against the Persian dominion.

Scarcely anything remains on the very interesting subject of Philip's administration within his own kingdom. Numerous anecdotes of his private and domestic life have been transmitted; but mostly by writers ignorant or careless of public transactions, which, in their day, were open to the knowledge of all who would observe and enquire, yet bold to relate secret affairs, of which, whether real or not few could tell, and rarely even the few who knew would tell any truth. It seems however too well ascertained that he was not fortunate in his nuptial connexion. Tales of private vices, whether of the wife or of the husband, are less objects for the historian than for the anecdote-writer; a description of men beginning

Plut. v.  
Alex.  
p. 669.

<sup>19</sup> Diodorus says the Arcadians alone opposed the king of Macedonia's purposes. We learn however from much higher authority that the Arcadians were much divided, and that a large proportion of them was most zealous in the Macedonian party. Diodorus seems to have followed, in this part of his narrative, an anti-Macedonian writer, who, according to what we have before noticed to have been the common practice of Grecian party-writers, would call the Arcadians of his party 'the Arcadians,' as eminently, and, in his politics, almost exclusively such.

to abound in Philip's age, long continuing under the Roman empire, and who, in proportion to the grossness of their imputations against exalted characters, and the confidence with which they asserted what, if none could confirm, few could refute, excited extensive curiosity, and made their business lucrative. It may suffice here that the temper of the queen, Olympias, is with probability, said to have been irascible, suspicious, and vindictive. After long disagreement, Philip repudiated her, and married Cleopatra, daughter of one of the most eminent men of his court and kingdom.<sup>20</sup>

Plut. ut  
ant.

Olympias, beside one son, Alexander, had borne him one daughter, also named Cleopatra. After his return from Corinth, his new queen brought him another son, and soon after that event he gave his daughter in marriage to her uncle, Alexander, king of Epirus, brother of Olympias. It was usual, as formerly has been observed, among the northern principalities, though not peculiar to them among the Greeks wherever means were not wanting, to be splendid in festive ceremony on such occasions. Philip seems to have proposed to use the opportunity for advancing his already great popularity among the Grecian republics by uncommon splendour and a magnificent hospitality. He invited from every city some eminent men, omitting none who were per-

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 91.  
B. C. 336.\*  
Ol. 110.  
Vincent,  
p. 35.

<sup>20</sup> Arrian (de Exp. Alex. l. 3. c. 6.) calls Philip's second wife Eurydice. Diodorus (l. 16. c. 93.) and Plutarch and Athenæus and Justin agree in giving her the name of Cleopatra.

[\* B. C. 336. Ol. 111. 'Philip is slain, ἐπὶ ἀρχοντος Πυθοδήμου. Arrian. 'Exp. I. 1. ἐπ' ἀρχοντος Ἀθηγησι Πυθοδώρου . . . ὀλυμπιάς δ' ἤχθη πρώτη πρὸς ταῖς ἑκατὸν καὶ δέκα. Diod. XVI. 91. Eratosthenes apud Clem. Strom. i. p. 336. having fixed the battle of Leuctra to Olymp. 102. 2. proceeds . . . μεθ' ἣν ἐπὶ τὴν Φιλίππου τελευταίην ἔτη τριακονταπέντε. equivalent to Olymp. 111. 1. 'for the death of Philip. The death of Philip and accession of Alexander were 'in the beginning of the year of Pythodemos.' Clinton, Fasti Hellen. p. 150.]

sonally known to him or to any principal persons of his court. Among the entertainments the theatrical, so especially the delight of the Greeks, were provided with care; the most celebrated actors and musicians being engaged from all parts. For the ceremony, not Pella, but Edessa, or Ægæ, the ancient capital of the kingdom, was chosen. The festivity was very numerously and most respectably attended; not only eminent individuals coming from all parts of Greece, but deputations from the principal cities, even from Athens, bringing congratulations in the name of their communities, accompanied with the present, which was become common on great occasions, of a golden crown. In the midst of this joyful solemnity, as Philip was entering the theatre, Pausanias, a Macedonian youth of high rank and great connexions, stabbed him, and he fell dead. The assassin, flying toward a horse prepared for him, was overtaken while mounting; and by a stroke, whether necessary to prevent his escape, or urged by the ill-judging vengeance of the pursuers, his life was instantly ended.

The possibility of gathering anything from him who best could tell being thus precluded, various stories were circulated of the provocation to this atrocious deed; disgusting in their tenor, improbable in many of the asserted circumstances, and altogether confuting one another by their disagreement. In one assertion they mostly concurred, that it was simply the private revenge of the individual; but this was contradicted by the only account of any known authority, which ascribed it to the base policy of the Persian court. In uncertainty thus of the reality, public suspicion of course was busy, and several ex-

24th Sept.\*  
Usher.



alted characters were involved ; the divorced queen Olympias especially ; and the prince Alexander did not escape the horrid imputation which he endeavoured to repel, by asserting he had proof against the agents of the king of Persia. What, in Aristotle's belief, prepared the youth's mind, not creditable to the manners and morals of the Macedonian court, which too much resembled those of the Greek and Roman republics, we have from him in very few words. Pausanias preferred complaint, whether public or private, to the king of gross contumely with which he had been treated by Attalus, a man of the highest rank, and said by some writers to have been uncle to the new queen. Philip, perhaps wisely reckoning that public investigation of such a complaint were best avoided, sent Attalus, as we are told by other writers, out of the way, by appointing him to a military command in Asia. The author of the injury being thus put beyond reach, revenge rankling in the youth's mind, whether instigated by others, which, though not improbable, is left quite uncertain, led him to vent it against the king.

Plut. v.  
Alex.  
p. 669, 670.  
Q. Curt.  
l. 4. c. 1.  
Arrian. l. 2.  
c. 14.

Arist.  
Polit. l. 5.  
c. 10.

The always-avowed principles of Demosthenes, combined with his political relations and his public conduct, seem to have afforded no light ground for supposing that he was, in some degree, privy to the plot. Persia was still the ally of Athens, and Demosthenes was the orator principally employed, as agent of the Persian court for public communication with the sovereign people, and for the management also, it is said, of the distribution of money. He had, at the Macedonian court, apparently among the visitors at the celebrity, a confidential friend, Charidemus. From this man, by a special messenger, he

Æsch. de  
Cor.  
p. 468.

Plut. v.  
Demosth.  
p. 855.

CHAP.  
XLII.

---

received information of Philip's death some time before any others in Athens. The people being assembled, he ventured upon a measure adapted to raise his importance among that numerous description of men on whose favour his power rested: he told them that Jupiter and Minerva, appearing to him in a dream, had given him assurance that Philip was dead; and this assertion he corroborated by an oath. When information of an acknowledged authenticity afterward arrived the people were again assembled. Demosthenes and the orators of his party then did not scruple to propose honour for the memory of the deceased assassin, such as a few years before, by a decree of the Athenian people, had rewarded the living assassin of the king of Thrace; and they added a motion for performing the evangelian sacrifice, which, in better times of the republic, was the ceremony of thanksgiving on receiving news of a great victory. The people decreed both the measures; and, though he had recently lost his daughter, his only child, and custom, esteemed among the Athenians not only decent but sacred, forbade persons under such circumstances to show themselves but in mourning, Demosthenes put on a festal robe of white, and, with a crown of flowers on his head, made himself conspicuous at the ceremony.<sup>21</sup>

Plut. v.  
Demosth.  
p. 355. &  
v. Phoc.  
p. 749.

Æsch. de  
Cor.  
p. 546.

p. 468.

<sup>21</sup> This story of the conduct of Demosthenes altogether might seem extravagant but that, in his reply to Æschines, he has avoided in any degree to contradict it. Even Plutarch's zeal for democracy and admiration of tyrannicide could not carry him so far as to give his entire approbation to the public measures. An idea of gratitude due from the Athenian people to Philip for his generosity after the battle of Chæronea has struck him. Otherwise he appears to have reckoned all as it should have been.

## OCCUPATION OF ELATEA AND BATTLE OF CHÆRONEA.

[FROM MR. CLINTON'S FASTI HELLENICI, PP. 293—295.]

Mr. Mitford supposes a winter to pass between the occupation of Elatea and the battle of Chæronæa. His narrative supplies the following notes of time. After the occupation of Elatea, (p. 125.) he notices the negotiation with Thebes (p. 132.); and then remarks, 'It was already late in autumn B. C. 338. Ol. 110. 3.' (p. 135.)—'Two battles were fought; the latter not 'till it was already winter.' (p. 136.)—'It was Philip's business 'during the winter to assemble from the confederated states 'a force sufficient for the support of their common cause.' (p. 142.)—'In the preceding autumnal campaign Stratocles 'had commanded the Athenian troops.' (p. 144.)—Then he mentions (p. 146.) the great and decisive battle. After the battle of Chæronæa, 'the winter passed (B. C. 337. Ol. 110. 4.) 'without any event.' (p. 170.)—'In the next spring,' (ibid.) (the spring of Ol. 110. 4.) Philip caused a congress to be assembled at Corinth. The result of these dates will be, that the battle of Chæronæa happened in the archonship of *Phrynichus*, [Ol. 110. 4.] about fourteen months after the occupation of Elatea, and less than a year before the death of Philip.

Fasti  
Hellen.  
c. 16.

A single word in Demosthenes\* has probably led Mr. Mitford to this arrangement: δις συμπαραταξάμενοι τὰς πρώτας μάχας, τὴν ᾗ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ καὶ τὴν ΧΕΙΜΕΡΙΝΗΝ, οὐκ ἀμέμπτους μόνον ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ καὶ θάναστος ἐδέξατε . . . ἐφ' οἷς παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ὑμῖν ἐγίγοντο ἔπαινοι, παρὰ δ' ὑμῶν θυσίαι καὶ πομπαὶ τοῖς θεοῖς. And it must be confessed that the conclusion drawn from this passage derives support from the following passage of Plutarch † : εἰσήχθη ἡ περὶ τοῦ στεφάνου γραφὴ κατὰ Κτησιφῶντος, γραφεῖσα μὲν ἐπὶ Χαιρώνδου ἄρχοντος μικρὸν ἐπάνω τῶν Χαιρωνικῶν. That impeachment was instituted by Æschines in the *ninth* month of the archon *Chærondas* ‡ : it would follow then, that the battle, which was subsequent, occurred in the second month of the next archon, *Phrynichus*.

But, on the other hand, three writers, Dionysius of Halicarnassus §, the author of the βίαι τῶν δέκα ῥητόρων ||, and Diodorus ¶, all concur in the year of Chærondas [Ol. 110. 3.] as the

\* De Coron. p. 300. ed. Reisk.

† Demosth. c. 24.

‡ Ἐπὶ Χαιρώνδου ἄρχοντος ἐλαφρολιῶνος ἕκτη ἰσταμένου. Demosth. de Coron. p. 243.

§ In Isocrat. p. 537. ed. Steph.

|| P. 837. E.

¶ XVI. 84.

Fasti  
Hellen.  
c. 16.

date. And this is confirmed by the orator Lycurgus; who prosecuted Leocrates in the *eighth* year after his flight from Athens, which was subsequent to the battle of Chæronea. But that cause had already been determined at the time of the cause of the Crown, because the acquittal of Leocrates is noticed by Æschines\*: ἔτερος δ' ἰδιώτης ἐκπλεύσας εἰς Ῥόδον, ὅτι τὸν φόβον ἀνάνδρως ἤνεγκε, πρόην ποτὲ εἰσηγγέλθη, καὶ ἴσαι αὐτῷ αἱ ψῆφοι ἐγένοντο· εἰ δὲ μία μόνον μετέπεσεν, ὑπερώριστ' ἂν ἦ ἀπέθανεν. The impeachment then of Leocrates, since it preceded the cause of the Crown, must be placed in the close of the year of Aristophanes, and of Olymp. 112. 2. which carries us back to the archonship of Chærondas for the date of the battle.†

In the next place, the transactions recorded of that war will not justify the supposition of fourteen months between the march to Elatea and the decisive battle. Æschines‡, after mentioning the return of Philip from Scythia, and τὴν δευτέραν στρατείαν against the Amphissians, proceeds immediately to the circumstances of the battle as the next event: οὐ Δημοσθένης τὸ τελευταῖον ἀθύτων καὶ ἀκαλλιερῆτων ὄντων τῶν ἱερῶν ἐξέπεμψε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐπὶ τὸν πρόδηλον κίνδυνον; he calls the march of the Athenian forces (to which Demosthenes § refers, ἐξῆτε, ἐβοηθεῖτε, κ. τ. λ.) their *final expedition* ||: τὴν πανυστάτην ἔξοδον. Plutarch ¶ describes the embassy to Thebes, and then speaks of the battle as the next occurrence. The biographer of the ten orators\*\* places the decisive battle immediately after Elatea: Φιλίππου Ἐλάτειαν καταλαμβανομένου, καὶ αὐτὸς (ὁ Δημοσθένης) τοῖς ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μαχασαμένοις συνεξῆλθε. Diodorus †† connects the two events in the same manner; placing both in the archonship of Chærondas. As it is frequently his practice to relate together transactions which made a part of the same campaign, although they did not fall within the same civil year, we may infer that Diodorus, in the author whom he followed, found the two events contiguous, and parts of the same campaign. And this is confirmed by his narrative. After mentioning the success of Demosthenes in the negotiation with

\* In Ctesiph. p. 89, 34.

† If the text of Dionysius ad Amm. p. 746. were genuine,—Ἀριστοφάντος ἄρχοντος, ὀγδόῃ μὲν ἐνιαυτῷ μετὰ τὴν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μαχῆν, ἕκτῃ δὲ μετὰ τὴν Φιλίππου τελευτήν—it would be conclusive against the date of Mr. Mitford, which only leaves a year between Chæronea and the death of Philip. But, as this reading of the passage is only a conjectural correction of Bentley, however probable, (Diss. Phal. p. 528.) I forbear to produce it as evidence.

‡ In Ctesiph. p. 72.

§ De Cor. p. 299.

|| In Ctesiph. p. 88, 40.

¶ Demosth. c. 18. 19.

\*\* Vit. X. or. p. 845. F.

†† XVI. 84.



Thebes, he proceeds\* . . . ὁ δῆμος τῆ τῶν Βοιωτῶν συμμαχίᾳ διπλασιάσας τὴν προϋπάρχουσαν δύναμιν . . . εὐθύς στρατηγούς κατίστησε τοὺς περὶ Χάρητα καὶ Λυσικλέα†, καὶ πανδημεὶ μετὰ τῶν ὄπλων ἐξέπεμψε τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς τὴν Βοιωτίαν. τῶν δὲ νέων ἀπάντων προθύμως εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα καταντώντων, οὗτοι μὲν κατὰ σπουδὴν ὁδοιπορήσαντες ἤκου εἰς Χαιρώνειαν τῆς Βοιωτίας\* οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ . . . ἀπήντησαν μετὰ τῶν ὄπλων, καὶ κοινῇ στρατοπεδεύσαντες ὑπέμενον τὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἔρῳον. Is it credible that Philip should remain with his army a whole year in Phocis, when nothing was transacted ‡? or that the republics, with their narrow revenues, would maintain their forces in the field through so long a period? Mr. Mitford indeed supposes that the auxiliaries to the number of seventeen thousand, whom Demosthenes collected, (p. 143.) were not obtained till after the treaty with Thebes; and that the exertions of Demosthenes for this purpose were made during the ensuing winter. But this is not warranted by ancient writers. Plutarch § affirms the contrary : Βυζαντίοις ἐβοήθησε καὶ Περινθίοις (ὁ Δημοσθένης.) — ἔπειτα πρεσβεύων καὶ διαλεγόμενος τοῖς Ἑλλήσι καὶ παραξύνων συνέστησεν ἐπὶ τὸν Φίλιππον. — ἐπιρμήνης δὲ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, καὶ συνισταμένων κατ' ἔθνη καὶ πόλεις Εὐβοέων, Ἀχαιῶν, Κορινθίων, Μεγαρέων, Λευκαδίων, Κερκυραίων, ὁ μέγιστος ὑπελείπετο τῷ Δημοσθένει τῶν ἀγῶνων

Fasti  
Hellen.  
c. 16.

\* C. 85.

† *Stratocles* is mentioned as general by *Æschin.* in *Ctes.* p. 74, 8. *Στρατοκλέα τὸν ἡμέτερον στρατηγόν.* and by *Polyænus* IV. 2, 2. *Φίλιππος ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ παρατασσόμενος Ἀθηναίοις, εἶξας ἐνέκλινε. στρατηγὸς Στρατοκλῆς ἐκβοήσας,* κ. τ. λ. *Wesseling,* ad *Diod.* XVI. 88., when he pronounced *Polyænus* guilty of error, overlooked this testimony of *Æschines.* But the name of *Lysicles* is verified by the oration of *Lycurgus* against him. It is probable that both *Stratocles* and *Lysicles* were among the nine generals who were the colleagues of *Chares.* Mr. Mitford, in pursuance of his arrangement of this war, imagines (p. 144.) that *Stratocles* had commanded in the preceding autumnal campaign. But it is manifest, from *Polyænus,* that *Stratocles* was among the commanders on the day of *Chæronea.*

‡ *Polyænus* IV. 2, 8. mentions the occupation of *Amphissa* as a transaction of this war: *Φίλιππος ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀμφισσέων ἐστράτευεν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Θηβαῖοι τὰ στενὰ προκατελάβοντο . . . ἔξαπατᾷ τοὺς πολεμίους Φίλιππος, ἐπιστολὴν πεπλασμένην Ἀντιπάτρῳ πέμψας εἰς Μακεδονίαν, ὡς τὴν μὲν στρατείαν τὴν ἐπ' Ἀμφισσέϊς ἀναβάλλοιτο, σπεύδει δὲ εἰς Θράκην. . . ὁ γραμματοφόρος διήκει διὰ τῶν στενῶν. οἱ στρατηγοί, Χάρης καὶ Πρόξενος, αἰροῦσιν αὐτὸν, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀναγνόντες πιστεύουσι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις, καὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν στενῶν ἀπολείπουσι. Φίλιππος δὲ . . . τῆς Ἀμφίσσης ἐκράτησε.* But this event happened when *Chares* commanded the Athenian troops, and consequently, by Mr. Mitford's Chronology (p. 144.), a year would have already passed before the occupation of *Amphissa.*

§ *Demosth.* c. 17.

Fasti  
Hellen.  
c. 16.

Θηβαίους προσαγαγέσθαι τῇ συμμαχίᾳ.\* The auxiliaries then from these states were prepared before, and the alliance of Thebes was the last point accomplished.

I therefore conclude that the actions mentioned by Demosthenes were partial encounters, and preludes to the general action. The decisive battle was fought fifty days † after the news arrived at Athens of Philip's entrance into Phocis. Within this period occurred the capture of Amphissa, and the two engagements designated by Demosthenes as τὴν ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ and τὴν ‡ χειμερινήν. These two encounters would happen in the neighbourhood of Chæronea. Whether the date of Plutarch, in the passage already quoted, in which he makes the battle subsequent to the ninth month of Chæronidas, is to be imputed to negligence, or whether we are to conclude with Corsini § that *Chæronidas* there mentioned is an *archon pseudeponymus*, will occur for inquiry hereafter.

\* Diodorus indeed, XVI. 84., imagines that the Athenians were unprepared, and taken by surprise: Φίλιππος ἐφιλοτιμείτο τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καταπληξάμενος ἀδῆριτον ἔχειν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος. διόπερ ἕφνω καταλαβόμενος Ἐλάτειαν πόλιν καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς ταύτην ἀθροίσας διέγνω πολεμεῖν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. ἀπαρασκευάων δ' ὄντων αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν συντεθειμένην εἰρήνην, ἤλπιζε βραδίως περιποιήσασθαι τὴν νίκην. We know from the orators that this was not the fact. Four months before the occupation of Elatea the Athenians had refused to concur with the other Amphictyons in the election of Philip; and three months before it is manifest from a decree (preserved by Demosthenes p. 282.) that they already regarded him as an adversary.

† Let those, who incline to think that the space of fifty days between the 15th Scirophorion and the 7th Metagitnion is an interval too short for this war, call to mind the narrow limits of the field of action. *Elatea* was about 43 English miles from *Thebes*, 78 from *Athens*, and 23 from *Amphissa*. The road from *Athens* and *Thebes* to *Elatea* was through *Chæronea*; which was distant from *Thebes* about 27 English miles, from *Elatea* 16, and from *Athens* 62. Let the duration of the renewed French war, in 1815, be compared; a war of infinitely greater importance, in which far greater forces were collected from far more distant points; and yet that war was terminated in three months after its commencement.

‡ The word *χειμερινήν* is probably corrupt; perhaps capable of another interpretation. Corsini, *Fast. Att.* tom. I. p. 146., suspects the word; although his conjectural emendation is not fortunate. Reiske renders *χειμερινήν* by *procellosam*.

§ *Fast. Attic.* tom. I. p. 310. 359.

## SECTION VIII.

*Anecdotes illustrating the moral and political character of Philip king of Macedonia.*

IF ever, after the early age of Agamemnon, there was any fair prospect that the Greeks might become a united and happy nation, secure in person and property against oppression and disturbance from one another, and powerful to resist assault from foreign nations, it seems to have been when Philip the popular king of a free people, was, by the apparently free and even zealous choice of a large majority among the republics, vested with that supreme military command, and with that superintending civil patronage, which had formerly been conceded to those who had shown themselves abundantly unfit to hold it, the Lacedæmonian, and successively, the Athenian, and the Theban people. What was his plan for managing the intricate business, (for such a mind as his would not be without a plan,) and equally, in the great undertaking, imposed with it, of war with Persia, what were his views, his premature death and the deficiency of history have deprived us even of foundation for conjecture.

But the very silence of ancient writers, on some topics, is not wholly without indication of the spirit of his government. It is remarkable that, among all the abundant remaining invective against him, injury to the civil rights of the Macedonian people, or the purpose of it, is never imputed. In the few instances then in which we find it asserted that he interfered, with a strong hand, in the government of Grecian states, as, according to the imputation of

SECT.  
VIII.

---

CHAP.  
XLII.

---

Demosthenes, among some of the Thessalian cities, on inquiry it becomes evident that the violence has been that of one party of the Thessalians against another, rather than of Philip against any; for to his lasting popularity among a large majority of the Thessalians testimony is ample. In Macedonia, the frequent contentions for the crown, necessarily disturbing individual security at the time, and preventive of public prosperity, nevertheless probably contributed to the preservation and improvement of general freedom. For policy would require competitors to vie in ostentation of regard for the constitution. To Philip, on his accession, such policy would be especially necessary. His three opponents were supported each by a foreign power. His own cause rested wholly on the Macedonian people; and their attachment, which finally secured him the throne against a confederacy, otherwise apparently overbearing, appears to have attended him through life. Demosthenes has evidently been aware that it would be too much, even for his ingenious policy, to separate the interest of the Macedonian people from that of their king. Despairing of means to set them against him, he has reviled all together. Once we find him telling the Athenian people that the Macedonians were not really so attached to their king as was generally supposed. By this very expression he conveys the most unsuspecting assurance that Philip's general reputation for popularity among his subjects was high. Nor could he, even on this occasion, assign a ground for the dissatisfaction of which he was desirous of impressing a belief, but the frequent calls of Philip upon his people for military service, which would interrupt their domestic enjoyments.

Demosth.  
or. in Epist.  
Philip.

Violent as the spirit of party was among the



Greeks, it was in the course of things that a prince highly, and perhaps in some instances extravagantly, the favourite of one party, was the object of the most rancorous libelling for its opponents. Demosthenes, in one of his early speeches, has endeavoured to obviate the extensively prevailing favourable opinions of Philip by describing him as even contemptible ; a daily drunkard, abandoning himself to amusements the most frivolous at the same time and vicious, among companions the lowest and most unworthy ; envious of superior merit, and driving it equally from his armies, from his councils, and from his society. But the orator seems to have found this bold experiment fail ; for we find it in no instance repeated. He would afterward call Philip faithless, cruel, a barbarian ; but never more a drunkard, or the companion of fools : he would represent him as an object of fear and hatred, but never again of contempt. Sometimes he would even propose him as an example for the Athenians to emulate, and sometimes, for his united advantages of regal rank and universal talent, an example beyond their reach. His abilities, he acknowledges, were extraordinary, and his activity wonderful. Philip alone, he has admitted, could unite in his own person the offices of king and minister, of treasurer and secretary, of general and soldier. Even in that oration where he ventured to represent him as an object of contempt he had before been holding him out to admiration. ‘The love of glory,’ he said, ‘is Philip’s ruling passion. For this he yields to no fatigue ; for this he will face any danger ; preferring a great reputation to all the gratifications of pleasure in quiet and security.’ What led the orator to such contradiction seems not readily imaginable. Whether then any occasional

Demosth.  
Olynth. 2.  
p. 23.

p. 22.

CHAP.  
XLII.

Athen. l. 6.  
c. 17. &  
l. 14. c. 1.

excess in the pleasures of the table, any less decorous amusements of the court, or any kind of extravagances of youth in power, may have afforded any degree of just ground for the scandal, following in the same speech, all remaining information seems too doubtful and imperfect to afford foundation even for any fair conjecture.

Among the extant obloquy of Philip, after that of Demosthenes, a story related by Diodorus may principally deserve notice, and perhaps not the less because the honest historian speaks of it as of doubtful authority; for so it marks the fame and popularity, in his time, of tales at which even his judgment revolted; and the probability is the greater that he gives it, as appears to have been sometimes his way, much in the very words of some earlier author.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 87.

After the battle of Chæronea, he says, Philip gave a feast, as was usual on occasion of a victory. Not rising from table till he had drunk to inebriety, his fancy led him then to go out among the prisoners, and joke with them insultingly on their misfortune. Among them was the Athenian orator Demades, who did not fear to reprove the victorious king, even while he was drunk. ‘The story goes,’ says the historian, ‘that he said to him, ‘O king! fortune has  
‘ ‘put it in your power to be an Agamemnon: are  
‘ ‘you not then ashamed to act the part of a Ther-  
‘ ‘sites?’ Philip, struck with the justness and  
‘ elegance of the reprimand, immediately changed  
‘ his whole conduct. Throwing from his head the  
‘ chaplet,’ (usually worn by the ancients at their feasts) ‘he put an end to the revel, applauded the  
‘ man who had used such freedom, and received him  
‘ ever after among the companions he most honoured.  
‘ Becoming then, through communication with De-

‘mades, familiarized with Attic graces, he dismissed all the prisoners without ransom, and, wholly laying aside the pride of victory, sent ambassadors to Athens, to make peace and alliance.’ It would hardly be supposed it could be a prince who, according to accredited report, was bred under Epaminondas, Pelopidas and Plato, who certainly corresponded with Isocrates, entertained Leosthenes in his court and Aristotle in his family, and, having already attained the mature age of forty-six, was acknowledged the man of the most informed understanding and the politest manners of his times, whose acquisition of the Attic graces, and of the humanity which produced (what does not appear to have been an Athenian practice) the free discharge of prisoners of war, is thus attributed to the accidental meeting with an Athenian orator. Had the historian himself been of less remarkable simplicity, it might seem with the purpose of exposing the preposterous vanity of the Attic schoolmen under the Roman empire, from whom the story apparently originated, that he proceeds immediately from this tale to a more authentic exemplification of the Attic graces by reporting the speech of the orator Lycurgus in accusation of Lysicles, and the condemnation and execution of that unfortunate general. But Demades, as formerly has been observed, was of the most eminent orators of the party of Phocion and Isocrates, and most decided in opposition to the political principles and projects of the party of Demosthenes and Chares. The same spirit then, which led to the fable making the victory of Chæronea produce the death of Isocrates, seems to have led also to that which put reproof of Philip into the mouth of Demades; the

CHAP.  
XLII.

purpose being to gain credit to the cause of Demosthenes and democracy, by infusing the opinion that men of the high characters of Isocrates and Demades were friendly to it.

Plut. v.  
Or.

A story is told on the other hand, exemplifying the arrogance and levity of the character of the Athenian many in that age. When it was announced to the prisoners made at Chæronea that they were all free without ransom, presuming upon Philip's celebrated generosity, they accompanied their thanks with a petition that he would give them clothes in which to go home. Philip said to those about him : ' These people seem to think we have been fighting ' for joke : ' but he nevertheless gave what they asked for. And whether the account of their presumption be strictly true or no, his generous supply of their wants is satisfactorily confirmed.

Polyb. 1.9.  
p. 593.

Testimony is ample that, under Philip, the Macedonian court became the greatest resort of the polite equally and of the learned in that age probably in the world. Aristotle did not refuse his invitation, as it is said Socrates did that of his great predecessor Archelaus. His letter to that celebrated philosopher has been preserved, in all appearance with fidelity, by Aulus Gellius, whose remarks on the occasion may also deserve notice. ' Philip,' says that writer, ' though almost continually engaged in ' the business of wars and victories, yet never was in- ' attentive to polite learning, and the studies that ' adorn human nature. Many of his letters have ' been published, replete with elegance, pleasantry, ' and sound sense. That which, on the birth of his ' son, he wrote to Aristotle, I think worth tran- ' scribing, because it is so adapted to excite parents

Aul. Gel.  
1.9. c. 3.  
Ælian. 1.8.  
p. 15.



‘ to care and diligence in the education of their children.’ Reporting then the letter first in his own language, the Latin, he proceeds to say: ‘ Philip’s own words are these:’ and he adds the original Greek, which may be rendered in English thus: ‘ Philip to Aristotle greeting. I desire you should know I have a son born. Greatly I thank the gods for it; and yet less for the mere circumstance that I have a son than because it happens in the age wherein you are living. I trust that, being put under your care and instruction, he will become worthy of his birth, and of the inheritance awaiting him.’<sup>22</sup>

It is here fully indicated that the king had not then to make his first acquaintance with the philosopher: they were already in habits of communication, and it seems that Aristotle had already engaged himself to undertake the office proposed for him of superintending the education of the child, who became afterward the great Alexander. Collateral evidence also is here afforded, tending to confirm the reports transmitted of Philip’s correspondence with Plato, Theophrastus, and others, eminent in the philosophical schools of Athens. With Aristotle, as a native of Stagira, a Grecian colony on the Macedonian shore, he is likely to have had previous personal acquaintance. Aristotle however, it is certain, passed many years at the Macedonian court in the office of tutor to the prince Alexander.

The admiration which we find Cicero expressing of Philip’s published letters must assist to increase the regret that, excepting the one preserved by Gel-

<sup>22</sup> Aristotle’s father, Nicomachus, is said to have been physician to king Amyntas, Philip’s father. Suid. in Nicom. Ælian. Var. Hist. l. 5. c. 9. He was born a Macedonian, so far as he was of Stagira, a colony of republican Greeks on the Macedonian coast.

lius, all have been lost.<sup>23</sup> But, in an age when anecdote was in vogue, the words of a prince of such singular talents and singular fortune, and so especially celebrated for quickness and pleasantry in conversation, would be likely to be observed and recorded. Numerous sayings ascribed to him have accordingly been transmitted. From Plutarch we have a collection of them among those entitled his *Morals*; where fortunately instigation to go beyond authentic documents did not equally press as in his *Lives*. Words spoken however must always be liable to be incorrectly reported, and to receive different colouring from the interest, the feeling, the fancy, or the recollection of reporters. But, of those attributed to Philip, it is observable that liberality, generosity, gratitude, benignity, good temper, in extraordinary amount, are prominent features. Some are too good, and too strongly indicate their origin from the occasion, to be, in any probability, wholly fictitious. Such are his celebrated compliments to his minister, Antipater, and his general, Parmenio. Having made his council wait one day for his coming, he apologized on entering: ‘I have overslept myself,’ he said, ‘this morning. ‘But it is no matter; for Antipater was awake.’ At another time, conversation turning upon the election of generals at Athens, ‘The Athenians,’ said Philip, ‘are a fortunate people, who can find ten generals

<sup>23</sup> ‘Extant epistolæ, et Philippi ad Alexandrum, et Antipatri ad Cassandrum, et Antigoni ad Philippum filium, trium prudentissimorum, (sic enim accepimus,) quibus præcipiunt ut oratione benignâ multitudinis animos ad benevolentiam alliciant, militesque blande appellando deleniant.’ M. T. Cic. de Off. l. 2. c. 14.

‘Præclare epistolâ quâdam Alexandrum filium Philippus accusat, quod largitione benevolentiam Macedonum consecetur,’ &c. Id. ibid. c. 15.

‘ every year. For myself, in all my life, I could never find but one, Parmenio there.’

SECT.  
VIII.

---

Plutarch, from whom we have these anecdotes, has shown himself so inclined to the reverse of flattery to Philip that it can hardly be supposed he meant to report them favourably beyond the truth. But Athenæus, who has preserved some good and many curious things, among much ineptitude and much profligacy, wanting to swell a list of royal and noble drunkards, was fortunate enough, it seems, to find, in the historical memorials published by Carystius, one of Plutarch’s anecdotes of Philip otherwise told, and in a way exactly to his purpose. We have already observed it asserted by Demosthenes, to the Athenian people, that Philip was daily drunk. When the hour of revelling came, according to Athenæus, he used to say, ‘ Come, let us drink : it is enough that Antipater is sober.’<sup>24</sup>

Among the frequent calls of military business, and the increased variety and magnitude of the political affairs of the Macedonian kingdom during Philip’s reign, it would almost as little be possible as, according to the better civil theory of modern times, it were little desirable, that the monarch should preside in the principal court of justice. Nevertheless, throughout antiquity, prejudice seems to have obtained in favour of the early system, and the execution of the judicial office by the prince in person. An old

<sup>24</sup> Diodorus, l. 16. c. 92., has made report of Philip’s absurd pomp and pretensions at his festival at Ægæ. Alexander is more likely to have given into such extravagance, and apparently did to a great degree ; yet Arrian lets us know that the imputations went in his opinion beyond truth. See Arr. de Exp. Alex. l. 4. [c. 8. sqq. ?] & l. 5. c. 2. & 3.

CHAP.  
XLII.

---

woman of Macedonia, it is said, having a cause in the king's court, urged Philip's personal attention to it; which he did not refuse, but excused delay by alleging want of leisure. The woman, who may have been of high rank and large fortune, for ancient language does not always distinguish such by title, nor ancient writers by description, provoked at length, replied: 'If you cannot find leisure to do justice, cease to be king!' Again, it is said, an old woman pleading her own cause before him, he, with a mind always full, annoyed by the inanity of her lengthened narrative or inept arguments, engaged in conversation with some one near him; upon which the woman indignantly exclaimed, 'I appeal!' Philip, surprised, said, 'Appeal! to whom?' From the king inattentive, she answered, 'to the king giving just attention.' But this story also has been otherwise told, after the taste of Athenæus. Philip, it is said, went to preside in his court of justice after hard drinking; and, obviously affected by it, decided the cause. The old woman, against whom the judgment was given, in such case more justly indignant, though in circumstances less likely to profit from her remonstrance, being asked to whom she would appeal, 'From Philip drunk,' she replied, 'to Philip sober.' But it is not said that the united stimulation of reproach and wine at all deranged Philip's temper; nor does there seem to be anywhere imputed to him the purpose of denying justice or stopping the course of law.

Among Plutarch's anecdotes, Philip's expression of gratitude to the memory of Hipparchus of Eubœa is of a kind not likely to have been invented. Discourse turning upon the death of Hipparchus, some one observed that he died at a mature age. 'Mature



‘ for himself,’ said Philip, ‘ but too early for me ; for ‘ it was before I could make him a just return for the ‘ kindness he had done me.’ Of similar character is the speech reported of him to Philon of Thebes, to whom he in his early youth had had obligations, for which, with the large means afterward within his power, he desired to make grateful recompense. Philon perseveringly refused everything. Philip, vexed at his pertinacity, yet giving him credit for his generosity, exclaimed : ‘ Why will you so mar ‘ my reputation for superiority in beneficence, by ‘ keeping me so much your inferior ?’ At the great Olympian meeting, amid the amusements, party would show itself ; and, whether Philip had horses running, or whatever furnished the opportunity, aversion toward him, in some part of the numerous assembly, was expressed by hisses. The matter being afterward mentioned in his presence, some one observed, ‘ that it was extraordinary behaviour ‘ for the Peloponnesians, who were beholden to him ‘ for important kindnesses.’ ‘ O,’ said Philip, ‘ we ‘ must not mind such things ; for what would their ‘ behaviour have been if I had done them ill turns !’ The malignant calumnies of the Athenian orators being mentioned before him, ‘ I reckon,’ said Philip, ‘ that I have great obligation to the Athenian orators, ‘ for so compelling me to be careful of all I do and ‘ say. It must be my business, by my whole con- ‘ duct, to prove them scandalous liars.’ After the battle of Chæronea, when measures were to be taken for profiting from the victory, and giving secure repose to Greece, some of the more violent party-men suggested that garrisons might be put into the citadels of the adverse states, and so their quiet obe-

dience would be insured. ‘ Such harsh measures,’ said Philip, ‘ might perhaps be most certainly effectual, but I prefer the reputation of being beneficent to that of being powerful.’

Consonant to these from Plutarch is an anecdote related by Seneca, in his treatise on Anger. In the distress of Athens, after the battle of Charonea, occasion requiring a mission to the king of Macedonia, Demochares, one of the coarse popular orators, was appointed with Demades and some others of a different character. What they were instructed to desire was readily granted ; and when they were taking leave, Philip politely asked, ‘ If there was anything more he could do for the Athenian people.’ Demochares abruptly answered : ‘ Yes, hang thyself.’ Indignation broke out among those around, and among his colleagues mixed with alarm. But Philip calmed them, saying : ‘ Let him alone ; and only assure your fellow-countrymen that those who use such petulance are far less disposed to peace and moderation than he who forgives it.’

The extreme profligacy, among the Grecian republics of his age, to which we have observed Demosthenes himself giving the most direct testimony, is very likely to have furnished occasion for a saying attributed to Philip which seems to have been a favourite among ancient and modern writers. Some fortress being spoken of as impregnable, ‘ Could not an ass,’ said Philip, ‘ laden with gold get into it ?’

What he may himself have done by force of gold must ever remain, as formerly has been observed, utterly uncertain. On the other hand, that Demosthenes was the agent of Persia for the distribution

of gold among the Grecian republics in the cause adverse to that of which Philip became the patron, seems fully ascertained by his own omission to answer Æschines on that subject; and it may seem likely that he would be occasionally met with his own weapons. But his assertion simply, obvious as the interest is which would urge him to it, cannot reasonably be allowed more weight than the denial of Philip himself, with expressions of magnanimous scorn, in his celebrated letter to the Athenian people. As far indeed as may be gathered from documents bearing any appearance of impartiality and authenticity, Philip's passions and his policy would both be rather adverse to such a mode of succeeding in his projects. He who, with all his military power, all his military talents, all his personal courage, all his military successes, and all his desire of glory, still professed to prefer conquering by his talent for popularity and persuasion, could surely have no equal gratification in conquering by secret corruption. Nor does it seem easy to discover his want of it. On the contrary, if we should trust his own declaration of his sentiments, as they were expressed and urged, not only in his public letter to the Athenian people, where his own testimony in his own favour will of course be liable to exception, but in written advice to his son Alexander, (and it is to Cicero's approving admiration of them we owe the account,) they were very adverse to such a policy.

M. T. Cic.  
de Off.  
l. 2. c. 15.

Some modern writers, admitting not only the liberal words, but also the generous deeds ascribed to Philip, have not simply followed the adverse orator, but outgone him, in imputing all to sinister purposes. The policy, for the orator, is obvious; the fairness, or the reasonableness, for his followers,

CHAP.  
XLII.

---

not so; unless they would avow themselves careless of the praise of good, and the reproach of evil deeds, the credit of which such practice goes directly to confound, and indeed to make all virtue among men suspicious and doubtful. Its evil tendency, both in morality and in politics, is glaring.

It has been liberally observed by some French writers to the credit of the English character, that, though nowhere party contentions have been more continual, or civil wars more frequent, than in England, yet nowhere has the violence of such contest been equally kept within the bounds of reason and humanity. Nevertheless, even in England, the violence of party divisions led the excellent Addison, not writing with party but with moral and philanthropical purposes, to some observations which, as applicable wherever party rages, and not least to Greece in Philip's age, may well deserve notice here.

Spectator,  
No. 125.

‘ A furious party-spirit,’ he says, ‘ when it is under  
‘ its greatest restraints, breaks naturally out in false-  
‘ hood, detraction, and calumny : . . . it fills a nation  
‘ with spleen and rancour, and extinguishes all seeds  
‘ of good-nature, compassion, and humanity. . . . A  
‘ man of merit, in a different principle, is like an object  
‘ seen in two different mediums, that appears crooked  
‘ or broken, however straight and entire it may be in  
‘ itself. For this reason there is scarce a person of  
‘ any figure in England who does not go by two con-  
‘ trary characters, as opposite to one another as light  
‘ and darkness. . . . There is one piece of sophistry  
‘ practised by both sides ; and that is the taking any  
‘ scandalous story, that has been ever whispered or in-  
‘ vented of a private man, for a known and undoubted  
‘ truth, and raising suitable speculations upon it.  
‘ Calumnies, that have been never proved, or have



‘ been often refuted, are the ordinary postulatums of  
 ‘ these infamous scribblers, upon which they proceed  
 ‘ as upon first principles granted by all men, though  
 ‘ in their hearts they know they are false, or at best  
 ‘ very doubtful.’

SECT.  
 VIII.

---

An exemplification occurs in a debate before a congress in Greece, reported by Polybius, in which the character of Philip king of Macedonia is introduced. One orator begins with stating, as a manifest truth, on which he might safely found his reasoning without danger of contradiction, that Philip, beginning with the Thessalians, reduced Greece to servile subjection. His opponent replies, as confidently, that Philip was notoriously the vindicator of the liberties, of Thessaly especially, but of all Greece. The former, in proceeding with his argument, unable to deny Philip's magnanimous liberality to Athens after the battle of Chæronea, nevertheless, with the malignity of party-spirit, so justly reprobated by Addison, denies him all credit for virtuous purposes: the will, he asserts, was bad, though the deeds were all beneficent and praiseworthy. For better foundation however for invective, he hastens from Athens to seek evil deeds elsewhere; and in Laconia, he says, lands were wasted, houses demolished, and even towns and territories taken from Lacedæmon under Philip's direction. But even here the admission follows, that those towns and territories were not taken by Philip for himself, but given (or perhaps rather restored) to the Argives, Tegeans, Megalopolitans, and Messenians; and toward all these, it seems allowed, Philip's purposes, as well as his deeds, were beneficent. The other orator then replies triumphantly thus: ‘ Granted; Philip did send an army

Polyb. 1. 9.  
 p. 561.

CHAP.  
XLII.

‘ into Laconia.<sup>25</sup> But it is enough known, the Lacedæmonians here present know<sup>26</sup>, that it was not his desire to interfere: on the contrary, invited, and repeatedly urged, by his friends and allies in Peloponnesus, he with difficulty yielded in any degree to their solicitations and remonstrances. Nor, when at length he did take up the business, was it to use his power, though ample, to subdue or to injure any; but, as a beneficent mediator, to repress the violence of his friends, while he struck awe into their enemies, and so brought both to submit their controversies to a peaceful arbitration. Even then he did not assume to himself the decision, but he referred it to a congress of all Greece; and such was the conduct which it has been proposed to stigmatize, as matter for complaint and reproach among the Greeks!’

There is a remarkable passage of Cicero, not in the torrent of an oration to the Roman people, but in the sober course of his great moral work, where wanting for illustration of his argument a character alike illustrious and worthy, he has chosen the prince who has been now so long here the subject of discourse. ‘ Philip king of Macedonia,’ he says, ‘ in magnitude of exploits and splendour of glory was excelled by his son; in affability and humanity he was far superior. Alexander’s conduct was often most shameful, but Philip was always great.’ By this splendid eulogy, of few words, Cicero certainly

M. T. Cic.  
de Off. 1.1.  
c. 26.

<sup>25</sup> Παρεγένετο μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως. p.566. The import of this phrase has been considered in a note at the end of the fourth section of the thirty-eighth chapter of this History.

<sup>26</sup> Ὑμεῖς ἴστε. The speech was especially addressed to the Lacedæmonian members of the congress.

meant to refer the recollection of his own son, whom he was addressing, to historical memorials then extant, though now unknown.

But the judgment of Polybius, for his double advantage of having lived among the dying republics of Greece, and conversed afterward in friendship with the greatest men of Rome, may be reckoned even above Cicero's. That, in his report of the controversy about Philip's conduct, his own sentiments went with the argument of the replying orator, seems sufficiently evident, but, might there be doubt, it is obviated in another passage of his history, where, like Cicero, wanting the example of a great and worthy character, he speaks in his own person of Philip thus: 'The victory over the Athenians at Chæronea promoted Philip's greatness, and the power and splendour of his kingdom, less through the deed of arms than through the humanity and generosity which he displayed after it. By the former he overcame those arranged in the field against him: by the latter he conquered all the Athenians, so that their republic became in a manner his own. Not allowing resentment to influence his measures, he carried the work of war so far only as to command opportunity for using clemency and goodness. He released all his prisoners without ransom; he clothed most of them; he did honour to the slain, sending their bones in procession to Athens, with Antipater commanding. Altogether he so astonished and captivated the minds of the Athenians by his generous magnanimity that, from enemies they became allies, devoted to his service.' The experienced statesman-historian, it is evident, here uses the term 'the Athenians' in the common manner of Grecian writers,

Polyb. 1. 5.  
p. 359.



CHAP.  
XLII.

calling those ‘the Athenians, and even ‘all the ‘Athenians,’ whom he thought most deserving the title, without notice of the powerful opposition, under the lead of Chares, Lycurgus, and Demosthenes.

Under the shadow then of these splendid testimonies, of such high authority, the humbler word of the annalist, whose assistance, in the failure of others, it has been so often necessary to use, not always judicious, but always apparently to the best of his judgment just, may not ill conclude this part of the history. Having related the death of Philip, he proceeds: ‘Thus fell the greatest potentate of ‘his time in Europe. With very small resources in ‘his outset, he acquired the most powerful monarchy ‘that had ever existed among the Greeks. His ‘great success arose less from the force of his arms ‘and the greatness of his victories than from the ‘studious exercise of his extraordinary talent for ‘communication among men, and his obliging disposition and conduct. He is said to have reckoned ‘the valour of the fighting soldier, often as he had ‘made it conspicuous in himself, not matter for the ‘superior officer to glory in. Military science and ‘the power of discourse, the general’s skill and the ‘statesman’s talent of discussion, persuasion and conciliation, he esteemed together princely. Upon the ‘latter he chiefly valued himself; for he used to say: ‘the merit of success in battles he could only share ‘with those who fought under him, but his victories ‘by argument, affability, and beneficence, were all ‘his own.’

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 95.



## CHAPTER XLIII.

STATE OF THE KNOWN WORLD, MORE ESPECIALLY OF MACEDONIA, WHEN ALEXANDER, SON OF PHILIP, SUCCEEDED TO THE MACEDONIAN THRONE.

## SECTION I.

*State of Macedonia when Alexander, son of Philip, succeeded to the throne: circumstances of surrounding countries: Aristotle's treatise on government: constitutions of various states: examples of limited monarchy in Greece.*

HITHERTO the history of Greece has been that of a small nation, of narrow territory, and, for that narrow territory, a small free population, served by numerous slaves; eminent nevertheless, singularly through successful cultivation of science and arts, especially the military and those called the fine arts; respected thence among surrounding people, and, for an accompanying restlessness of enterprising spirit, feared; yet, through defect of political system, continually turning that spirit, with all its support of art and science, against itself, and thus, unless, as a common disturber, rarely formidable to foreign countries. But we approach now the era when, in altered circumstances, conquest in a manner extended Greece over the civilized world, making such impression on human affairs that important consequences, which may be reckoned altogether highly beneficial, have affected late posterity, and

SECT.  
I.

---

remain to be transmitted to future ages. To prepare then for the narrative of so great a revolution, it may be advantageous to look, somewhat beyond what the course of the preceding history would conveniently allow, to the actual circumstances of the nation which was to produce it, and of the countries over which it was more immediately to extend.

The Macedonian kingdom, for ages before Alexander, we have observed of territory extensive enough to be rather overbearing among surrounding states ; yet, with an uncultivated population, and an often-distracted government, generally weak ; more than once nearly overwhelmed ; but recently raised to be the most powerful state of the known world ; the bordering Persian empire only excepted, unless exception should also be made for distant Carthage. The new dominion acquired, westward, northward, and eastward, was over people, not of Grecian blood or language, but whom the Greeks distinguished from themselves by their term barbarian, those of the maritime towns only being Greek. But, southward, the bordering province of Thessaly was esteemed the mother of the Greek nation ; in produce it was the richest of Greece ; and, bound from of old in political friendship with Macedonia, it was become, through the voluntary accession of the prevailing party among the people, in effect a member of the Macedonian monarchy. So far also this example had been followed by the rest of Greece, that the late king of Macedonia was, in all constitutional form, elected chief of the Greek nation ; succeeding thus to that supremacy which had been previously admitted in the Lacedæmonian and Athenian governments, and at one time, by a preponderant portion of the nation, in the Theban. Thus Mace-

donia was now the seat of empire ; and, as formerly under Archelaus, again the refuge and favourite resort of Grecian art and science.

SECT.  
I.

---

But, with these great acquisitions and advantages, seeds of disturbance abounded. In Macedonia itself claims to the throne against the reigning family, sources formerly of ruinous civil wars, had never ceased to be entertained. The recent assassination of the reigning king was suspected to have been promoted by pretenders or their partizans ; and certainty on this subject, if ever obtained, never was made public. Yet that there were still pretenders, waiting only for opportunity, circumstances made afterward manifest. Thessaly then, the oldest ally of Macedonia, the most important, and, while the party actually prevailing there was uppermost, and the family actually reigning in Macedonia continued to reign, the surest, had been, for ages, even among the evertroubled republics of Greece, eminent for troubles and revolutions. But throughout the Grecian states opposition of interests, and hatred between republic and republic, and between parties within every republic, remained in vigour. That large and latterly prevailing portion of the nation, whose views to public advantage, or private, or both, had led them to desire the patronage of the late king of Macedonia, Philip, would now of course look toward his successor for continuance of support against adverse republics, or, whom many still more dreaded, their fellow-citizens of an adverse faction ; but not with equal hope. Considering his youth, his yet untried character, and the uncertainty whose advice he might follow, the prospect for them could not but be most anxious and disheartening ; while, on the contrary, for their adver-

saries, the recent catastrophe would raise fallen hopes, and stimulate to new exertion.

Nor would the various people called barbarians be indifferent on the occasion. Even those brought under the Macedonian dominion, whether having found more oppression or benefit from it, and whether more or less attached to the late popular king, having been universally bred to predatory warfare, would be on the watch for novelty. But the most threatening danger, to Macedonia now, as to all Greece always, since the first extension of the Persian empire to the Grecian sea, was from the overbearing weight of that great empire, with which war was actually begun. Should the administration of the prince, who had succeeded to the Persian throne, be as energetic and able as that of a recent predecessor, Ochus, while a large Grecian military force was in his service, and a large party among the republics, under most able leaders, communicating with his court, and looking to it for patronage, means to obviate the danger would not be within ready calculation.

The countries westward of Greece, sometimes formidable, were so little so now as not to have attracted the notice of historians. The Sicilian Greeks, with all that Timoleon had done for them, apparently had not recovered strength to give trouble beyond the seas which surrounded them; and the days of splendour of the Italian were passed; principally, it seems, through destruction brought upon one another. Carthage, more powerful than all, was probably engaged with the affairs of its extensive acquisitions, deserving indeed the title of an empire, over the rich countries of the north of Africa, and in Spain. Rome had already made progress toward the dominion of Italy;



yet so little was the threatening growth of its power known among the Greeks that in the extant political works of the great philosopher of the day, Aristotle, though he is large on the Carthaginian government, and mentions its connexion with the Etruscans, not the name of Rome is found.

In this state of the world, on the verge of a revolution the most rapid, and excepting the slow rise and fall of the Roman empire, the greatest and most important known in history, what was actually the constitution of the kingdom which was to take the lead in producing it, and what the political circumstances of the numerous connected states, must deserve to be known, as far as, among existing documents, they may be gathered.

The contemporary philosopher Aristotle's treatise on government cannot then but especially deserve attention. Aristotle was a Macedonian born, so far as his birth-place, Stagira, was on the Macedonian shore; a small town founded, of what right or through what wrong we are uninformed, by Greeks from the island of Andros. That island was early subjected to the Athenian people. Possibly the object, in migrating, was to obtain more independency; for, of the severity of the degrading and almost slavish subjection, in which the subordinate Grecian states were held by the imperial democracy of Athens, occasion has occurred to observe large example; and, for the difference of law, in the Athenian judicature, for Andrian citizens and Athenian citizens, a well known comedy, transmitted to us in the Latin language, but from an Athenian original, probably may be trusted. The colonists claimed, for the town they founded, the rights of a Grecian republic; but they were obliged to acknowledge the dominion successively of

CHAP.  
XLIII.

---

the Athenian people, the Lacedæmonian, and again the Athenian, till the peace of Antalcidas, under the king of Persia's mediation, gave them a short independency, which was ended by the revival of the Athenian maritime power. How far they may have had, at any time, better freedom in connexion with the Olynthian confederacy, information fails; but at length, with the other towns which had been of that confederacy, having only to choose between subjection to the Athenian people, and to the Macedonian king, Stagira became, through Philip's successes against the Athenians, re-united to Macedonia. Aristotle's father, Nicomachus, is said to have been physician to king Amyntas, Philip's father, and high in his esteem. Aristotle himself, after having studied some years under Plato, at Athens, settled himself at Mitylene in Lesbos, whence, on invitation, he passed to Philip's court, where he lived long, and after his death continued to be highly respected by Alexander, who, during his extraordinary conquering expedition, appears to have corresponded with him attentively. Thus, far beyond any other writer whose works are extant, Aristotle must have possessed means for giving information concerning the state of Macedonia at that period when such information would be most interesting. The deficiency of it therefore, in his extant works, is highly disappointing, though in his treatise on government the reason is evident. What little notice of Macedonia occurs is however of a very valuable kind; and the treatise will farther deserve consideration for its various information concerning both the principles of government held by the most informed and scientific speculators, and the practice of numerous states, in perhaps the most interesting age of his universally interesting country.

In that treatise, stating some principles as fundamental, and then criticising some of the more eminent of the ideal systems of republican government, which before him had been offered for public approbation, especially those of his master, Plato, he proceeds to animadvert on the governments known in practice, which success might most recommend; and, not limiting himself to Grecian, he considers, together with the Cretan, Lacedæmonian, and Athenian, the Carthaginian. Observations follow on democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, absolute and limited; abounding with objections to all, especially democracy. This he condemns nearly equally with that usurped monarchy which the Greeks denominated tyranny, which, he says, it most resembled. He then remarks that some had reckoned a combination of democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy would make the best government; but the best known example of such a constitution, the Lacedæmonian, was so open to strong objection that the notion had no general favour. In conclusion then he proposes his own idea of the best possible constitution, distinguishing it by the title of Polity.

It may seem that Xenophon's large experience in political and military business, whence the mischief of the prevailing passion of the Greeks for the separate independency of their several little states, and the futility of all projects, tried and possible, for giving them real independency, would be striking to him, with perhaps some particular stimulation from his fellow-scholar Plato's romantic project for a republic, led him to the composition of that elegant romance the *Cyropædia*; the purpose of which is to show how one able man could govern more than half the known world more happily for the subjects than



any of his own fellow-countrymen, struggling with one another for power, could manage their single independent towns in what, no man being master of his own, they miscalled freedom. As a model to be imitated, he could not propose the Persian government under Cyrus ; because, for success in the imitation, a sovereign must always be found with the extraordinary union of talents and virtue which he has ascribed to that great prince, and which has rarely, if indeed ever, existed ; but, as a model, through observation of which the political principles and practice of his fellow-countrymen might be improved, the consideration of it might be highly useful. It may seem too that, in writing those animadversions on the Lacedæmonian and Athenian governments which remain to us, he may have had in view to propose something better adapted to secure freedom and promote human happiness than either those governments, or the Persian monarchical despotism. But Cicero, reckoning that the better, though still very imperfect, constitution of Rome might have been improved by a just combination of the three powers, has confessed himself unable to say what the arrangement should be ; and so Xenophon at last apparently despaired of improving the tumultuary republican system of Greece.

Nevertheless from Aristotle, who had before him all that Xenophon and Plato had written on the subject, who knew both the Greek republics and the Macedonian kingdom, and who had moreover large opportunity for information concerning the bordering Persian empire, some clear improvement on all former Grecian schemes of government, found in experience, and declared in his opinion, so defective, might be expected. But his treatise shows, in a surprising amount, what influence the common Grecian



passion for the separate independency of their several cities might hold on Grecian minds, even the most capacious and acute, when bred in their little illiberal republican principles ; and it may still be within our subject to remark that, as hence may be estimated the difficulty of executing what Isocrates was so continually and earnestly urging, the union of Greece, hence also may be judged how just was Philip's caution in so long hesitating, though invited by a large and apparently a preponderant portion of the Greek nation, to undertake it. Aristotle knew how Greece had been, for centuries, lacerated by the contentions of her little republics, and how, by almost a miracle, they had withstood the efforts of the neighbouring Persian empire, never failing of assistance within Greece itself to subdue them ; he knew that nevertheless, far from independent, after very heroic exertions of many in the common cause, they had been compelled to bow the neck successively to their fellows, the Lacedæmonian people and the Athenian ; he knew that they had owed the short period of their most real independency to a mandate of the Persian king, confirming the treaty of Antalcidas ; he knew what miseries had resulted from the opposition of Thebes to the revived tyranny of Lacedæmon ; truly patriotic as it was at first, but, with success, soon breeding ambition : possessed of this knowledge he was living in the Macedonian kingdom, nearly equal in extent to all the republican territory of proper Greece ; he had in view the Persian empire, holding numerous Grecian republics its tributaries, and possessing means evidently ample, with inclination always ready, wanting only good direction, to overwhelm all. Nevertheless in his treatise nothing is found proposed for the common benefit of Greece, nothing for

CHAP.  
XLIII.

---

Arist. Polit.  
l. 1. c. 4.  
& 5.

improvement of the constitution of the Macedonian kingdom, become the head of the united nation ; and so far from proposing any other union, or approving any, his project, offered for the perfection of government, is as illiberal as those of Minos or Lycurgus, and more contracted. He would have republics equal in population and territory to the smaller only, rather than to the larger, of those actually existing in Greece ; and, though some, he allows, held a different opinion on specious ground, he has contended that slavery, the slave belonging wholly to his master, is reasonable and necessary, and in the course of nature ; and accordingly he would have a few freemen, constituting his republic, served by many slaves. When Minos and Lycurgus lived, the state of the world, or of their part of it, appears to have been such that their plans justly earned the praise of wisdom, as adapted to it. When Aristotle wrote, as well might it be proposed, in modern times, that Geneva, Lucca, or Ragusa should defy surrounding nations with their own force, as his republic ; yet alliance and confederacy seem to have been out of his contemplation. It might indeed be supposed that, intent on physics and metaphysics, he had neglected observation of politics, and written on them from fancy, did not his work show that he had been diligent in using his large opportunities for collecting facts, among the transactions of the various states around him, on which to ground theory. What he has proposed however seems rather an idea of a colony of philosophers, to be founded among barbarians, than what could be seriously offered for improving the condition of the whole, or any part of Greece. We are told none of his works were published while he lived. That on government has obvious inconsistencies, which doubtless would

have been corrected had he completed it for publication; and, in some parts, it seems merely a collection of notes for future use. Yet, among other parts of the work, his projected commonwealth will deserve some farther observation.

In the small independent state which he proposes, which in modern days might rather be called a township, he would have his citizens all sovereigns, like the Genoese and Venetian nobles. Were it possible, he says, he would have them served only by slaves; and to these exclusively he would commit mechanical arts, husbandry, and all trade. But, in failure of slaves of sufficient number, or of sufficient ability, he would allow subjects of his citizens, in a condition somewhat above absolute slavery, such as existed in many of the Grecian republics, distinguished from citizens by the name of Pericæians. These might be either Greeks or barbarians. But whether one or the other, he would place them in a more degraded condition than the Laconian, and some other Pericæians; for, to ensure their subserviency, he would never admit them to hold the arms or use the discipline of the phalanx, but would limit their military service to that of the light-armed; and as they were to have no participation in civil power, their superiority in condition to the slave would be utterly precarious.

That excellent principle of the British constitution, holding that public good consists in accumulation of private good, he has rejected; adopting the contrary principle, which prevailed among the Grecian republics, of an imaginary public good wholly distinct from private; so that the commanding few were as a tyrant, warranted by the constitution to be regardless of individuals. In pursuance of this principle then

CHAP.  
XLIII.

---

he would, like the Cretan and Lacedæmonian law-givers, deny to all his noble citizens the natural rights and dignity and enjoyments of fathers of families; and, contrary to the maxim of the English law, expressed in the emphatical phrase, 'Every man's house is his castle,' he would hardly allow a home. As at Lacedæmon, no man was to live at home; all were to eat at public tables; and there (not as at Lacedæmon, every one bring his own) all were to take the fare publicly provided. As at Lacedæmon, children were to be considered as belonging to the public, and parents were not to interfere in their education. Dignity and civil authority, as at Lacedæmon, were to be the privilege of elderhood only. A legislature he seems to have proposed to make needless by the perfection of his general law, and by the wisdom and virtue which, through education and by his institutions altogether, he would ensure to his elders; so that arbitrary decision on new and extraordinary cases would be, in their hands, he reckoned, safe.

With such ideas of perfection in government, the constitutions of the Grecian republics of his age would not be likely to have much of his approbation. Democracy accordingly, which he had had large opportunity to see, especially at Athens, he condemns vehemently; prone, he says, beyond other governments, to give opportunity for the tyranny of one, and itself the tyranny of an ill-informed, passionate multitude. Proper aristocracy, apparently his favourite government among those known in practice, he asserts hardly to have existed in his time, having degenerated every where into either democracy or a tyrannical oligarchy. The Greeks of his age, he adds, were solicitous, less for good government than for the



acquisition of power and personal importance; and, among their political struggles, prospect of these failing, they usually gave up contest, and submitted to the dominion of rivals. This indeed is no more than the general character of what has been so often miscalled the ardent spirit of liberty. The real spirit of liberty is not an ardent, but a sober and reflecting spirit. The ardent, rarely failing among zealots for democracy, is not a spirit of liberty, but in the leaders a spirit of ambition, in the multitude a spirit of envy, of licentiousness, and, as it has been too often seen, in ancient and in modern times, of cruelty.

Proceeding to the consideration of monarchy exclusively of that violence upon former constitutions which the Greeks denominated tyranny, he reckons five distinct characters of legal kingdoms; one absolute, four limited. The purely absolute he takes into consideration as ground for useful remark and argument, considering it however as merely ideal. For one man, he observes, cannot rule multitudes without the consent of some among them, on whom therefore he is effectually dependent. The power of the most despotic tyrants, known among the Greeks, rested on the support of a party, and generally, he says, a party outrageously democratical. ‘Tyranny,’ he remarks in another place, ‘is a compound of democracy and the extremest oligarchy, and thus the most oppressive of all governments, partaking of the two worst, and replete with the excesses and all the evils of both.’<sup>1</sup> Therefore those commonly

Arist.  
Polit. 1. 5.  
c. 10.

<sup>1</sup> Ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ὑστάτης σύγκειται καὶ δημοκρατίας διὸ δὴ καὶ βλαβερωτάτη τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ἐστίν, ἅτε ἐκ δυοῖν συγκειμένη κακῶν, καὶ τὰς παρεκβάσεις καὶ τὰς ἀμαρτίας ἔχουσα τὰς παρ’ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πολιτειῶν. Arist. Polit. 1. 5. c. 10.

CHAP.  
XLIII.

‘ called absolute monarchies, as being most nearly so, those of Asia especially, whose people have always been readier for subserviency than the Europeans, are not exactly so. A customary system of law, transmitted through ages, is strictly maintained among them all; and the attachment of the people to the system, derived from their forefathers, at the same time supports and checks the royal authority. Hence those governments have not been subject to revolutions.’

Very similar to this was a kind of monarchy of which many instances had been seen among the little states of Greece. The people of a republic, unable otherwise to obviate the evils of civil contest among themselves, agreed upon the resource of electing a king (or tyrant, as they sometimes entitled him) to absolute power, for the purpose of enforcing the constitutional laws. Some had been so elected for life, and some for a limited period; and such monarchy, the philosopher proceeds to observe, differed from the Asiatic only as it was elective, whereas the Asiatic were hereditary. For this difference he reckons it a second kind of legal monarchy.

These we should hardly now call balanced monarchies, or free constitutions; no balancing civil authority seeming to have had regular establishment in them: an efficient limitation appears only in the means of rebellion which the people possessed, as forming the military of the state. Such apparently was the limitation producing that general respect of the Asiatic princes for the laws and established customs, whence revolutions among them were rare.

The third kind of monarchy, in Aristotle's list, was that more liberal and regularly-balanced con-

stitution, described by Homer as universal in those called the heroic ages, and which has occurred for notice in an early part of this history. For this Aristotle refers to Homer: the king, he says, commanded in war, and presided in religious ceremonies and judicial proceedings. On Homer's authority it may be added that in emergencies he assembled the people, and presided in the assembly.<sup>2</sup>

A fourth kind, the most narrowly limited that could consist with any royal dignity, was seen in the Lacedæmonian kingdom. There the kings, though their persons were esteemed sacred, and their dignity allowed high, had, as kings, no civil authority: they were merely hereditary commanders in chief of the military and hereditary high priests; partaking constitutionally of civil power only as hereditary senators.

It is then remarkable that, as for his own imaginary republic Aristotle has proposed no legislature, so, in describing these several kinds of existing monarchy, he has said of none where any power of legislation rested; and yet it is fully implied that in none, not even the most absolute of the Asiatic, any more than in the old constitution of the Medes and Persians, was a power admitted in the king alone to add to or alter the law.

But, having indicated five characters of monarchy, graduated from extreme despotism to the smallest

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle has inferred, from an expression attributed by Homer to Agamemnon, that personal security against the monarch's power was not duly provided for in this constitution. Probably there were deficiencies and irregularities; yet such an expression, as he has noticed, from a prince commanding, at the time, not in his capital, but in his camp in a distant country, and represented as speaking in anger, seems hardly to carry any decisive information on the subject. [Arist. Polit. iii. 14.]

CHAP.  
XLIII.

extent of power which can any way support the eminence essential to royalty, the philosopher disapproves us with declaring that he proposes to consider the two extremes only; the purely absolute monarchy, which he reckons but ideal, and the most limited of the kinds known in practice, that in which the king had no civil authority; because, he says, the others differed from these only as they more or less approached either. The ideal will hardly be an object here; the other exemplified in the Lacedæmonian constitution, has been in an early part of this history spoken of largely. Incidentally however he is led to some notice of monarchies of the intermediate characters, which will deserve attention.

Arist.  
Polit.  
1. 3. c. 14.

Proposing to illustrate and ascertain the characteristic differences between legal monarchy and illegal, or, according to the Greek terms, kingdom and tyranny, (meaning by kingdom kingly government regularly established, and by tyranny monarchical power founded on the overthrow of a former constitution,) he states, for examples of legal monarchy, the Lacedæmonian constitution, the Athenian, as it stood under the last king, Codrus, the Molossian, and the Macedonian; adding, remarkably enough, the Persian, but only as it stood in the reign of the great Cyrus. In the end then he comes to this extraordinary conclusion; 'At this time,' he says, 'proper kingdoms no longer exist, all having degenerated nearly into monarchies and tyrannies; because fealty to a proper king is simply voluntary; and in these times there is more equality among men, so that none have such supereminent merit as to deserve the elevation. Where power must be supported by fiction or force, it becomes tyranny.' Consonantly with this, he says, in another place,

1. 5. c. 10.



allegiance to a king may be withdrawn by the people at pleasure. Nevertheless he requires force to be employed, if necessary, for the support of his republic, and of all republics; but, how consistently seems not easy to discover, he denies it for the support of monarchal authority, however legally founded. How then the pleasure of the people was to be legally declared; what was to be, if half desired to remove the king, whether to elect another king, or to establish another constitution, and half to support the actual king and maintain the existing constitution; or, if half the opponents of royalty desired a democracy and half an aristocracy, he has omitted to say. Moreover, reckoning election essential to the establishment of proper kingly authority, and voluntary obedience essential to its continuance, and adding that, in his opinion, hereditary succession principally had produced the extensive abolition of monarchy among the Greeks, yet, of his five examples of legal monarchy, three were, as far as history traces them, clearly hereditary. The Athenians are said, in troublesome times beyond any very certain memorials, to have elected Codrus; thus interrupting hereditary succession; and (so little is known of Persian history) possibly Cyrus also may have been king by election, though more generally and probably supposed by inheritance. Homer, to whom Aristotle refers for the most authoritative account of that monarchal constitution which he reckoned the best, shows indeed that in the ages he has described hereditary succession rested on no very certain ground; but, far from warranting the philosopher's revolutionary doctrine, he places the authority of the king, once legally holding the sceptre, under the immediate protection of Jupiter.

SECT.  
I.

---

Arist.  
Polit. 1. 7.  
c. 8. 1. 5.  
c. 10.

Ch. 2. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

Beyond doubt the science of government has been greatly improved in modern ages; not through greater talents of either legislators or philosophical speculators, but principally through the new and extended opportunities for observing what might be raised on the broader bases of the states into which Europe, on the overthrow of the Roman empire, became divided. It cannot now be hazardous to assert, though against Aristotle, that the broader, at least to such extent, are the surer and altogether more advantageous bases; nor hardly will any be found now to contend that either elective monarchy, or such a republic as he has proposed, is desirable. For examples of legal kingdoms, he names Lacedæmon, Molossis, and Macedonia, which were all hereditary. Stating then no reason for afterward denying any legal kingdom to exist in his time, except that none were elective, it seems to follow that, unless for the hereditary succession, (reckoned by him a great defect, yet shown by experience in the course of ages to be essential to internal peace,) the Lacedæmonian, Molossian, and Macedonian were still, in his time and in his opinion, legal limited monarchies.

## SECTION II.

*HISTORY OF MOLOSSIS.*

THE character of the Athenian government, in its various changes from kingdom to democracy, and of the Lacedæmonian, it has been the purpose of the preceding history, as far as remaining documents allow, to unfold. The early Persian seems to have been classed with them by Aristotle only as an example (the less to be gainsaid, as in his age and

country very little known) of his favourite tenets, that monarchy should be elective, and that fealty to legal monarchs should be purely voluntary, so that it might be withdrawn at pleasure. What gleanings then may be found of the history of the small obscure kingdom of Molossis, as a portion of the proper history of Greece, for which, in prosecuting the history of the republics, a place equally convenient has not before occurred, may here deserve notice; and will more particularly require it for the eulogy which Aristotle, though with little explanation, has bestowed on its constitution.

Molossis was one, it is said, of fourteen small states within the country known by the general name of Epirus; but it was of the largest. Its extent and boundaries however, even in Strabo's time, were not to be ascertained; the devastation ensuing the conquest by those among the most flagitious and cruel, though as the most successful, the most renowned of conquerors, the Romans, having obliterated indications; and the Grecian geographer's melancholy picture is largely confirmed by the account even of the Roman historian, Livy. To Aristotle's time, with an advantageous constitution, and force sufficing for defence, but not tempting to seek conquest, the Molossian people seem to have been, for ages, in more fortunate circumstances than were common around them. Their territory was, in large proportion, eminently fruitful. The oracle of Dodona, within it, highly revered always, but especially in the earlier ages, gave it a degree of sacred character. Surrounded mostly by lofty mountains, a large invading force might be checked by very inferior numbers; and the temptation for a small one, with predatory purposes, was much obviated by the circumstances

Theopomp.  
ap. Strab.  
l. 7. p. 469.  
ed. Ox.

Strab. Ibid.

CHAP.  
XLIII.

which made difficulty for carrying off plunder, if it might be seized. The northern part, against Macedonia, and the eastern, against Thessaly, very high land, with the approach everywhere steep and rugged, was itself mostly level enough for cultivation; the soil fruitful, water abounding, and the climate altogether advantageous. If Passaron, the capital of Molossis, was not eminent among cities of the day, it seems to have been because the Molossians were not compelled by circumstances, like the republican Greeks, with exception, as we have formerly observed, almost only for the Eleans, to confine themselves, in crowded habitations, within town walls.

Ch. 3. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

Epirus, though mostly held by people of Grecian speech and lineage, had an intermixture of those called barbarians; Illyrians, and perhaps others. Herodotus however, among earliest, and Plutarch, among late ancient historians, clearly reckon the Molossians a Grecian people. Some expressions of Thucydides and Strabo may perhaps be construed either way. But, as it has been formerly observed, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Strabo concur in showing that all Greece was of mixed population; and how the distinction of Greek and barbarian, unknown to Homer, arose, and what at last it was, always remained uncertain. Strabo however, clearly acknowledging the Macedonian for a Greek nation, assures us that the general language of the Epirots was the Macedonian dialect of the Greek; that where another language, probably the Illyric, was in use, the people commonly spoke both, and that, in habits and manners, most of the Epirots hardly differed from the Macedonians.

Herodot.  
1. 6. c. 126.  
Plut. v.  
Pyrrh.  
Thucyd.  
1. 2. c. 80.  
Strab. 1. 7.

Thucyd.  
1. 2. c. 80.  
Strab. 1. 7.

The governments of the Epirot states were, some republican, with annual chief magistrates, as at Athens,



Thebes, and Rome ; others monarchal. That of Molossis, from earliest tradition, was monarchal ; and whether the people may have been more or less allowed the always questionable dignity of pure Grecian blood, yet the claim of the royal family to the oldest and noblest Grecian origin, resting on tradition, but asserted by Strabo and Plutarch, with Aristotle's assent implied, is not found anywhere controverted. They reckoned themselves direct descendants of Neoptolemus Pyrrhus, son of Achilles ; who, it was said, after the Trojan war, migrating from Thessaly, became king of Molossis. Whatever credit may be due to this lofty pretension, that the Molossian sceptre remained in one Greek family, from times beyond certain history till after Aristotle's age, appears satisfactorily testified.

Strab. l. 7.  
Plut. v.  
Pyrrh.

By advantage of situation and constitution, exempt from great troubles, Molossis, had it had historians, probably afforded little for general interest. Nevertheless we learn from the father of Grecian history that, some generations before his time, it was esteemed respectable among Grecian states. The tale wherein this appears, like many of that writer, somewhat of a romantic cast, nevertheless may have been true in all its parts ; and for the information it affords of an important change of manners and policy among the Greeks, and of the flourishing condition of several republics about the age of the Athenian legislator Solon, some destroyed before the historian wrote, others little heard of since, while Molossis apparently remained unshaken, it may be reckoned of considerable historical value.

Clisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon, under whose rule that little state was eminent among those of Peloponnesus, desiring, the historian says, to marry his daughter to

Herodot.  
l. 6. c. 126.

a man of the greatest consideration and highest worth of all Greece, opened his house for any who, from personal dignity and the eminence of their countries, might have pretensions; that so he might have opportunity to estimate their merits. Thirteen guests, rivals for his favour, are thus described. There came from the Greek colonies in Italy, then flourishing extraordinarily, Smindyrides of Sybaris and Damas of Siris. The former was remarked for going beyond all of his time in the luxury for which Sybaris was renowned. Damas was son of that Samyris who was distinguished by the epithet of the Wise. Amphimnestus came from Epidamnus, on the coast of the Ionian gulf. Males was of Ætolia, brother of Titormus, esteemed the strongest man in Greece, but who had withdrawn from the society of men to reside in the farthest part of Ætolia.<sup>3</sup> Leocedes was son of Phidon, tyrant of Argos; that Phidon, says the historian, who established uniformity of weights and measures throughout Peloponnesus, and, together with his power, (so far, it may seem, beneficially exerted,) was remarked for an arrogance unequalled among the Greeks; for, depriving the Eleans of the presidency of the Olympian festival, he assumed it himself.<sup>4</sup> Two came from Arcadia, Amiantus of

<sup>3</sup> Late writers, Athenæus and Ælian, show that Titormus had wide fame for bodily strength; but information of the cause of his avoiding human society, as the early historian reports, might have been more interesting than their extravagant tales of his feats, while he was eminent in it. His retirement probably procured him the title, which Ælian gives him, of the herdsman. The company with which his brother associated, in the more authentic account of Herodotus, marks enough that the family was eminent among the Ætolians. Athen. l. 2. c. 2. Æl. l. 12. c. 22.

<sup>4</sup> The disagreement, found among ancient writers, concerning

Trapezus, and Laphanes of Pæos. The father of the latter, Euphorion, was celebrated for his extensive hospitality, and had the extraordinary fame of having entertained the gods Castor and Pollux. Lysanias came from Eretria in Eubœa, then greatly flourishing; Onomastus from Elea: Megacles and Hippoclidides were of Athens; the latter esteemed the richest Athenian of his time, and the handsomest: Diacitorides was of Cranon and Scopadæ in Thessaly; Alcon was of Molossis. This simple description of Alcon, combined with what has preceded, enough marks that the Molossians were esteemed a Grecian people, and Molossis then considerable among the Grecian states. One of the Athenians, Megacles, was the successful suitor. His family was of the most eminent of Athens; his father Alcmaeon, whom we have seen leader of a party there, had, in banishment, been honourably entertained by the great king of Lydia, Crœsus. Megacles, succeeding him in eminence with that party, acquired command of the government of Athens; and the great Pericles, who afterward ruled the commonwealth with princely sway, was a descendant of the match with the daughter of Clisthenes by his mother Agariste, who was her grand-daughter.

Ch. 5. s. 5.  
of this Hist.Ch. 12. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

What then among curious matters, in this little detail, especially will deserve notice, is the evidence that the republican jealousy, which afterward, in the most flourishing age of Grecian philosophy, went to the extreme of forbidding intermarriage of

that eminent tyrant, has been noticed in the appendix to the third chapter of this History. Inclined, when engaged in that early part of the History, to hold to the text of Herodotus, as it stands in our copies, all that has fallen in my way since to observe, including some adverse argument, has tended to strengthen my early opinion.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 2.  
s. 11.  
Ch. 26. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

Greeks of different states as a just and even necessary policy of republics, had not yet obtained any such force. Farther then will deserve observation the fallen state of seven of the republics, mentioned by the historian as then among the most eminent of the Greek nation. Already in his own age, less than a century and half later, Argos had wholly lost its pre-eminence; Siris, Trapezus, Pæos, Cranon, and Scopadæ remained hardly names for history; Sybaris was annihilated. In unceasing strife with one another, and within themselves, all the Grecian republics were overborne by Lacedæmon and Athens; powerful chiefly through their constitutions, better adapted for conquest; and Greece was no longer a country in which the road to fame was open to its whole population: political and military eminence, and high consideration, were limited to the citizens of Lacedæmon and Athens.

Ch. 23. s. 6.  
of this Hist.

We have formerly observed Xenophon remarking that, after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, whatever a Lacedæmonian commanded was throughout Greece implicitly obeyed. Before that war the concurrence of Athens was requisite to procure such universal obedience. During the short involution of interests of the leading parties in those imperial republics, even distant Molossis found it expedient to obey their joint injunction. The great Athenian, Themistocles, as we have formerly seen, obnoxious to both, banished from Athens, perhaps in regular course of law, and then, by their joint arbitrary commands, driven from republics friendly to him, hoped at length to find security in Molossis from the liberality of its king, Admetus. Thither however he was pursued by ministers who, in the name of the two imperial governments, demanded the surrender of his person. This the Molossian prince refused;

Ch. 11. s. 4.  
of this Hist.



not however without apology, which apparently a reasonable policy required : but Themistocles was thus enabled to prosecute his flight to the surer refuge which he found in the Persian empire.

When, not long after, that war broke out which, under the lead of the two imperial states, divided the republics during so many years against one another, the northern kingdoms, Molossis and Macedonia, appear to have avoided immediate implication ; neither being mentioned by Thucydides in naming the allies of each party at its beginning. But, among the little states on the southern border of Molossis, hostilities had been previously raging. Incidental information indeed shows war to have been almost unceasing among even the smallest of the republics, even those too insignificant to be noticed by the historians of the nation, unless when any interest of an imperial people was materially implicated. Soon this so engaged the attention of the greater contending powers that it appears to have become expedient or even necessary for the Molossians to choose their party. Macedonia, divided by Molossis from the scene of actual hostilities, was less immediately threatened ; yet its politic king, Perdiccas, was led by apprehension of the consequences to take a part. Not friendly to Lacedæmon\*, but more fearing the wild ambition of the Athenian people, and their means for affecting the interests of his kingdom through their naval power, and yet anxious to avoid provoking their resentment, he sent a thousand men to act under the orders of the Lacedæmonian general commanding in those parts, not

\* [He had actually joined the Athenian alliance. See ch. 14. s. 2. Οὕτω μὲν Σιτάλκης τε ὁ Τήρων, Θρακῶν βασιλεὺς, ξύμμαχος ἐγένετο Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ Περδίκκας ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου, Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς. Thucyd. ii. 29. Yet, on this occasion, he secretly sent troops to the Lacedæmonian commander Cnemus : ἔπεμψε δὲ καὶ Περδίκκας κρύφα τῶν Ἀθηναίων χιλιούς Μακεδόνων, κ. τ. λ. Ib. 80.]

publicly acknowledging them as in his service. At this time the king of Molossis, Tharyps<sup>5</sup>, son of Admetus, was under age, and a regent administered the government. The Molossians, an inland people, had less to fear from the superior navy of Athens than from the preponderant land force of Lacedæmon; while, at the same time, the politics of the Athenian democracy, and its ordinary treatment of those whom it styled allies, would be more alarming than any politics yet avowed by Lacedæmon, or any known conduct of its government. The Molossians in these circumstances decided openly for the Lacedæmonian alliance, and the regent in person led a body to join the Lacedæmonian commander in Acarnania.

Here two matters deserve notice, with a view to the principal subject before us; first, the accordance, in the Molossian practice, with what we have observed to have been generally held among the Greeks, from Homer's age to Aristotle's, that it was the duty as well as the right of kings, and consequently of regents, to exercise in person military command; and secondly, what is more important, the steadiness of the Molossian constitution, in maintaining regular succession to the throne: in Molossis, it appears, a minor was not superseded, as formerly in modern European king-

<sup>5</sup> The name of this prince is found variously written, Tharyps, Tharypus, Tharytas. Thucydides informs us that even the Ætolian dialect of the Greek language, little distant as Ætolia was from Attica, could hardly be understood by an Athenian. (Thucyd. l. 3. c. 95. Ch. 15. s. 6. of this Hist.) Molossis being considerably more distant, it seems likely that a difficulty for writing a Molossian name might arise from peculiarities in the Molossian pronunciation; as with us, greatly as the provincial dialects have within the last half century been wearing out, a Somersetshire man might yet have difficulty to write, or even speak, the name of a man of the Yorkshire dales, after that man's own pronunciation.

doms, (of which, in our own, the reign of our great Alfred is an example,) on account of temporary inability from nonage.

In the progress of the war between the two imperial republics, the contest, as we have formerly seen, was so led to other parts as to afford the happy opportunity used by the little states of Acarnania and southern Epirus, with a wise moderation, rare among the Grecian republics, for establishing a lasting peace among themselves. As then the fidelity of the regent of Molossis to his trust appears honourable both to himself and to the Molossian constitution, so the conduct of the young king afterward would also reflect honour on both. Tharyps is said to have used the opportunity of peace all around his little dominion for going to Athens, the metropolis of science, to acquire knowledge under the professors of all sciences there; and he has had the credit, among the later Greek writers, of having become eminent both for learning, and for able and beneficial conduct in the government of his kingdom. Plutarch's eulogy seems to indicate that much of the advantageous character of the north-western Greeks, maintained, according to the testimony of Polybius, to his age, was owing to the improvements introduced by Tharyps.

Plut. v.  
Pyrrh.  
Polyb. l. 4.  
p. 299.  
Ch. 15. s. 6.  
of this Hist.

Thenceforward Molossis appears to have enjoyed a fortunate historical obscurity, till the great Philip of Macedonia brought it into notice of Grecian writers, in a way alien to the republican system, by marrying Olympias, sister of its sovereign Alexander. Then we get Aristotle's assurance, that the government was a limited monarchy, and of the more strictly limited, nearly resembling the Lacedæmonian; and farther, that it was of great antiquity, being among the oldest known to have subsisted to his time with-

Arist. Polit.  
l. 5. c. 10.  
& 11.



CHAP.  
XLIII.

Plut. v.  
Pyrrh.

out revolution. In treating of the age following that of Aristotle, a very interesting particular of the Molossian constitution is mentioned by Plutarch. According to immemorial custom the Molossians assembled in Passaron, the capital, to swear allegiance to the king; and, among solemn sacrifices, oaths were mutual, the king swearing to maintain the free constitution, and the people not only to support the king in the royal dignity, but also to maintain it in his family.

T. Liv.  
l. 45.

The Roman historian's account of the destructive ravage of Molossis by his fellow-countrymen, almost to the extermination of the people, in the next following age, may then deserve some observation here: for, whatever may be thought of the colouring which he has endeavoured to put upon contests of the Molossians among themselves, concerning the succession to the throne, it is enough evident that the oppression of Roman republican dominion, under which they had been reduced, drove them to the unavailing exertion, for the recovery of their former freedom, which drew on them the flagitious vengeance of the Roman senate; that body which its own historians, in their grossly-flattering pictures, compared, for its dignity, to a congress of kings, yet by facts, which its historians could not conceal, showed itself already, in that boasted era of the republic, a fit instrument for a future Nero. But on that interesting portion of general history this is not a place for more.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Plutarch, in his life of P. Æmilius, has almost exactly copied Livy for these transactions in Molossis. Apparently he has reckoned that, in relating what was so disgraceful to Rome, commanding in his time with absolute power almost the known world, prudence required that he should appeal to the Roman writer for his justification. The narrative of Polybius, now un-



## SECTION III.

*Constitution of the kingdom of Macedonia.*

ARISTOTLE classing together the Lacedæmonian kingdom, the Athenian, the Molossian, and the Macedonian, as examples of limited monarchy, indicates their general character to have been congenial with that of the constitution described by Homer, the oldest known to the Greeks, and from which he considered all legal kingdoms, existing in his time, to have been derived. The three latter however would differ very considerably from the first, whose extraordinary peculiarities nevertheless were ingrafted on the old general system, to which the others, with less deviation, adhered. Probably the Macedonian differed from the Molossian little; perhaps only as, in the course of ages, difference of fortune brought change of circumstances. Of one material difference of this kind we have authentic information. The Molossians maintained themselves within their original limits, or nearly so: the Macedonians, in very early times, extended conquest greatly; so that the territory of the Macedonian monarchy became many

SECT.  
III.

fortunately lost, and known only from a short quotation by Livy's contemporary, Strabo, was, in Livy's age, in all libraries; and probably other accounts were extant, more free than that of Polybius, who could not but be under restraint from his connexion with the Cornelian and Æmilian families. Livy has obviously had in view to soften and apologise for what was notoriously flagitious in the conduct of the Roman senate and its renowned general; and yet even in his account, the arrogance, illiberality, and cruelty of the Roman republican government are strongly marked, and must be to all minds, not of Roman republican temper, highly disgusting.

times greater than that of Molossis. For the circumstances of these conquests, and the immediate result to the conquered people, information fails; but evidence remains that, in the end, the same or nearly the same liberal constitution, pervaded the Macedonian kingdom. Not that the union was perfect, or that the system had not great defects. We have observed, in the preceding history, provinces under the dominion of princes owing allegiance to the general government, yet in circumstances to resist it; as formerly, in the modern European kingdoms, districts under the authority of dukes, lords, marchers, earls, and barons. But as, under the kings of England, conquerors of Cornwall, Wales, and Ireland, the people of those countries were admitted to participate in all the rights of English subjects, so the people of all the countries owing allegiance to the Macedonian crown, participating, we are assured, in the Macedonian name, appear also to have held equal rights as Macedonian subjects. Lyncestis, far from the capital, on the western border against Illyria, had long its own hereditary princes, Greeks from Corinth, a kind of feudatories under the Macedonian kings; yet the people are called by Thucydides Lyncestian Macedonians<sup>7</sup>; and in the sequel we shall have occasion to observe that, in the common government, under one sovereign, there was little if any difference of privilege for the subjects of the different provinces; little even for those not of Grecian race, as the Agrians, who were reckoned among the people called barbarians. But, with this extension of the

Ch. 34. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

<sup>7</sup> Τῶν γὰρ Μακεδόνων εἰσὶ καὶ Λυγκησταὶ καὶ Ἐλειμιῶται, καὶ ἄλλα ἔθνη ἐπάνωθεν, ἃ ξύμμαχα μὲν ἔστι τούτοις καὶ ὑπήκοα, βασιλείας δ' ἔχει καθ' αὐτά. Thucyd. l. 2. c. 99. . . Ἀρβίβατον τὸν Βριμεροῦ, Λυγκηστῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλεία. l. 4. c. 83.

Macedonian name, all the Macedonian people could not assemble for political purposes, like the Molossian, in one place. Those assemblies of the Macedonians therefore, of which we read, apparently must have been either several, in the several provinces, or assemblies only of principal warriors.

Of writers after the age of Aristotle, information concerning the Macedonian constitution might most be looked for from Arrian. But as Aristotle, for cause, sufficiently indicated in his treatise, together with what we know of his situation, has avoided it, so Arrian, high in employment, civil and military, under a despotic government, then pervading the civilized world, appears to have judged it necessary to confine himself to a military history of Alexander. Nevertheless, in the course of his narrative, he speaks repeatedly and decisively of the Macedonian as a limited monarchy. In one passage he sets it in direct contrast with the absolute monarchy of Persia. Classing the Macedonians with the republican Greeks, he says: ‘They were a high-spirited people, whereas the minds of the Persians were humbled and debased by their subjection to a despotic authority<sup>s</sup> ;’ and,

8 Μακεδόνας τε καὶ Πέρσαις καὶ Μήδοις, ἐκ πάνυ πολλοῦ τρυφῶσιν, αὐτοὺς ἐν τοῖς πόνοις τοῖς πολεμικοῖς πάλαι ἦδη μετὰ κινδύων ἀσκουμένους, ἄλλως τε καὶ δούλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐλευθέρους ἐς χεῖρας ἤξειν. Ὅσοι τε Ἕλληνας Ἕλλησιν, κ. τ. λ. Arr. de Exped. Alex. l. 2. c. 7. A curious instance of that malice, observed formerly to have been so common, in modern times, among men of letters of the continent against Philip, in favour of Demosthenes, and against kings, in favour of republics, and thence generally against the Macedonians, is conspicuous in the Latin translation of Vulcanius here. But all his ingenuity has been insufficient to make his Latin hold well together for his purpose of taking the epithet ἐλευθέρους from the Macedonians, to give it exclusively to the republican Greeks serving in each army, so

in the sequel of his narrative, facts are related perfectly warranting this character of the Macedonian constitution; facts not resting on his single authority, but corroborated by a concurrence of ancient testimonies, which will occur for notice in the sequel of this history.

With such assurance that the Macedonian was a limited monarchy, it remains desirable to know what was the extent of the monarch's authority, and what were the constitutional restrictions upon it. Throughout Grecian history, from Homer inclusively downward, equally in regal, aristocratical, and democratical constitutions, the military character and the civil are seen united in every free subject, inasmuch that difference of law for the city and the camp is rarely discernible. In every ancient constitution, unless where tyranny, whether exercised by a single person, or by an oligarchy, or by a democracy, denied to some the privilege, it was equally the right and the duty of every member of the commonwealth to attend in arms at the chief magistrate's call; and, very generally, the chief civil magistrate, so far filling the office of the kings of old, was the chief military

as to force, as he desired, the application of the term *δοῦλοις* to the Macedonians equally with the Persians. The learned editor Gronovius, disposed as he was to the same cause, has had too much respect for his author to favour such perversion of the intended meaning. By his pointing, he has made it clear for the reader that the Macedonians are included under the epithet *ῥλευθέρους*. The words themselves indeed sufficiently mark it. Were confirmation needful, Arrian himself has furnished it in the next sentence, mentioning the Thracians, Pæonians, Illyrians, and Agrians as the barbarians of Alexander's army, and thus distinctly marking the Macedonians as, in his estimation, Greeks. The value of the term *δοῦλοις* has been considered on a former occasion.



commander. The extraordinary constitution of Lacedæmon furnished an exception ; the kings, hereditary chiefs, as of old, in military business, being subordinate in civil. At Athens the refinements of democratical sovereignty provided a different exception ; the polemarch, chief of the war-department, was only third in rank in the college of chief magistrates called archons. At Athens nevertheless experience of the necessities of military business in the course of frequent wars, produced what effectually overbore the principle of that arrangement : a commander in chief was elected, with special power to supersede, in command of the forces, the authority of the polemarch, who was thus reduced to the condition of a civil officer ; a kind of secretary at war. But moreover the general was vested with a civil power, that of calling, at his pleasure, an assembly of the people, which gave him means for an effectual superiority over all the proper civil officers. Less subject to controul than the kings of Lacedæmon, who were under the separate check of the senate and of the ephors, the general of Athens was dependent on none but the assembly of the people ; where the majority, which had raised, was generally disposed to support him ; so that the general was, in effect, for the time, king of Athens.

It is observed by Aristotle, that, among all the nations which, to his time, had acquired celebrity, a state of war had been principally in the legislator's view ; and this more with the purpose of conquest, and the command of neighbouring people, than of the maintenance of peace and security. Stating examples, he remarkably mixes Greek and barbarian ; of the former, noticing only Cretan and Lacedæmonian ; of the latter, Scythian, Persian, Thracian, and Celtic. In proceeding then he mentions insti-

SECT.  
III.

---

Ch. 5. s. 3.  
of this Hist.

Arist. Polit.  
l. 7. c. 14.

tutions, similar in Carthage and in Macedonia, having for their object to excite and maintain a military disposition among the people. The assurance thus that the Macedonians were a military people, and that their military character was supported by popular institutions similar to those of a republic, is important toward elucidation of the character of the government.

It may seem probable that the entertaining of foreign troops for hire, so ordinary among the Grecian republics, originated with tyrants and usurpers. We have observed it remarked by Aristotle, as a criterion for distinguishing kings from tyrants, that kings rested their security on the support of native subjects in arms; tyrants hired foreigners for their guard. Yet how early and how extensively that resource of tyrants was adopted among the republics, insomuch that foreigners, not Greeks only, but barbarians, were entertained by them for hire, and not only to fight their battles in the field, but to defend their walls, and be the protectors of their domestic security, we have also had occasion to remark. Even at Athens we have observed Isocrates complaining of this as a growing evil. But nothing of the kind do we read of in Macedonia. The Macedonian military mentioned by Thucydides to have been so greatly improved by the king his contemporary, Archelaus, was evidently the national force. At a following time, when the Macedonian throne was contested by rival branches of the royal family, the leading men of Lacedæmon, as we have remarked Xenophon, who lived among them, relating, admonished the expelled king, Amyntas, father of the great Philip, that he should engage a mercenary force to recover his kingdom. This remonstrance seems to imply the back-

Arist. Polit.  
l. 5. c. 10.

Ch. 35. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

wardness of a Macedonian prince to resort to an expedient revolting to the Macedonians, to whom he still looked for support. In the same age nevertheless, and in an adjoining country, Thessaly, where Amyntas had powerful friends, the great tagus Jason afforded example of the acquisition and maintenance of dominion by a hired force. But the sequel of Xenophon's narrative indicates that Amyntas obtained his ensuing success by means less likely to excite alarm and offence in Macedonia; his principal assistance, in addition to the native force, whose attachment he preserved, being obtained from that party of the Thessalian people which for ages had been friendly to his family. After this again, two princes, claiming the throne against the sons of Amyntas, successively came into the country with hired troops; but both failed. The silence then of Demosthenes on the subject is proof, more cogent than the positive assertion of a friendly writer, that Philip's power never rested on a hired force. Aristotle has observed well, that those who compose the military of a state can choose whether the existing constitution shall remain or be overthrown. Where therefore the whole nation has been, for ages, as the Macedonian, in the habit of holding and using arms, despotism can hardly be.<sup>9</sup>

Ch. 27. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

Ch. 34. s. 2.

But this, the most powerful of possible checks upon the tyrannical power of a single chief, is that which is most liable to be abused, and become itself tyrannical. Accordingly we have seen its excesses frequent and great among the Grecian republics. Of the Macedonian constitution therefore we want farther to know

<sup>9</sup> Οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὄπλων κύριοι καὶ μένειν καὶ μὴ μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν κύριοι. Arist. Polit. 1. 7. c. 9. p. 582. ed. Paris, 1654.

CHAP.  
XLIII.

what were the regular popular authorities which, in concurrence with those of the prince, completed the sovereign power. For this important matter remaining information is indeed scanty. Classed by Aristotle with the Lacedæmonian, yet in the Macedonian constitution neither a senate is found, as at Lacedæmon, the guardian of aristocratical rights, nor magistrates, like the ephors, armed with authority to maintain the cause of the lower orders. Two writers however, Diodorus and Curtius, speak in direct terms of popular assemblies; marking decisively, so far as their authority goes, a constitutional share of the sovereignty, held, as in the kingdoms of the heroic ages, by the people at large; and it is matter of a kind for which their authority may be least questionable. According to Diodorus, on the death of Perdicas son of Amyntas, when his brother Philip's claim to the throne was disputed by Argæus, assemblies of the people were held, in which Philip's eloquence greatly promoted his cause. On Philip's death he mentions similar assemblies held; and, on Alexander's death, when the question arose, singularly momentous then, and in a case of singular difficulty, who was best entitled to be successor to the newly acquired empire, and, afterward, what measures should follow, all was referred to a general assembly of the Macedonians present, as representatives of the Macedonian people.<sup>10</sup>

The more immediate subject of Curtius has been the criminal law. 'Judgment on life and death,' he says, 'by the immemorial law of Macedonia, was reserved to the people: the king's authority was

Ch. 34. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

Ch. 44. s. 1.

Diod. 1. 18.  
c. 2. & 4.

Q. Curt.  
1. 6. c. 8.

<sup>10</sup> ... ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Μακεδόνων πλήθος ἀνήνεγκε τὴν περὶ τούτων βουλήν. Diod. 1. 18. c. 4.



‘unavailing but under warrant of the law.’ The similarity of the law of our own country, derived from our Anglosaxon forefathers, and formerly common to most of western Europe, will here be striking.

Among the ancients, very generally, the law for the city and the camp, at home and abroad, was the same. According to the Macedonian constitution then, for decision on life and death, at home the people, abroad the army was the jury. Strongly distinguished as civil and military law commonly have been in modern times, this may appear, to modern minds, among what remains reported, most doubtful, and yet is that to which the most undeniable testimony remains. Among the ancients a military power, distinct from the civil, and more arbitrary, seems first observable among the Lacedæmonians, but is first clearly and strongly marked in the history of the Romans. Admitted originally among that great military people, like the tyrannical authority of a dictator, occasionally, on the plea of necessity, the crafty leaders of the Roman councils procured lasting acquiescence under it, by bribing their soldiery with the spoil of the unfortunate people they conquered; and thus, through a union, then peculiar to themselves, of severe discipline and ready zeal, they promoted their conquests. In the sequel of this history instances will occur of practice, among the Macedonians, according to the law mentioned by Curtius. A very remarkable one, of an age later than that to which this volume will extend, it may be advantageous, for immediate illustration and assurance, to notice here.

Polybius lived while the Macedonian kingdom yet existed, and not in diminished splendour; for its

CHAP.  
XLIII.

Liv. l. 45.

Polyb. l. 5.  
p. 357. ed.  
Casaub.

monarch, conquered and plundered by the Romans within the same age, was, according to their great historian, Livy, one of the richest potentates of the time. Polybius, relating what passed in his own country, Peloponnesus, while his father was a leading man there, speaks thus: The commander of a body detached from a Macedonian army, acting under the king in person, was arrested on accusation of high treason. The detachment, alarmed for their commander, of whose crime they were not conscious, sent hastily a deputation to the king, demanding that 'the trial of the accused should await their return to head-quarters; otherwise they should reckon themselves unworthily treated, and should highly resent it.' Such free communication with their kings, the historian proceeds to say, the Macedonians always held.<sup>11</sup> The circumstances being highly critical, for the king's life was threatened, the return of the detachment was not waited for; and indeed the probability that the main body of the army, actually with the king, was legally competent to try the accused, so that nothing was done against the constitution, will be found strengthened by circumstances occurring for notice in the sequel of this history.

With the assurance that the military law of Macedonia gave to the Macedonian people, on foreign military service, even upon accusation of high treason, the privilege of being tried by their fellow-soldiers, the information of Curtius, that the Macedonian

<sup>11</sup> Εἶχον γὰρ ἀεὶ τοιαύτην ἰσηγορίαν Μακεδόνες πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς. Polyb. l. 5. p. 357. ed. Casaub. Hardly will any single word in any other language so strongly mark a free constitution as the Greek term, *ἰσηγορία*, here used by Polybius.

people at home held equal privilege, appears completely supported. Abuses of authority, found under all governments, and prominent in the conduct of all factions among the Grecian republics, would hardly fail in a country agitated as we have seen Macedonia. But, in any monarchy, for the royal authority, limited by the military, to be unlimited by the civil law, controlled legally in the army, to be, by law or custom, uncontrolled in the state, were an extravagance, not merely unlikely, but it may be ventured to say, impossible.

Through the circumstances thus authentically reported, we have assurance, with confirmation yet to come in the course of the history, not only that the royal authority in Macedonia was constitutionally limited, but how it was effectually limited; judgment, in capital cases, being reserved to the people; and the maintenance of this important right being assured by the most powerful warranty, the general possession and practice of arms by the people. Hardly have we equal proof that equal security for individuals was provided by law in any republic of Greece.

It were very desirable to know what was the LEGISLATIVE power in Macedonia. But, as we have observed that Aristotle neither, in criticizing numerous governments existing in his time, has noticed a legislature, nor, in his project for a perfect government, has proposed one, and that, excepting the Athenian, hardly any account remains of the legislature of any republic of Greece, it cannot be surprising if concerning legislation in Macedonia information fails. Aristotle is large on the office of a legislator; meaning one authorized by the popular voice, like Minos, Solon, Lycurgus, and others, to frame a constitution, with a system of law to be complete for all purposes.

CHAP.  
XLIII.

---

Sect. 1. of  
this chap.

But he remarks justly the impossibility of adapting the most voluminous system of law to every possible case; whence it was common among the Grecian republics, he says, to commit much to the magistrate's discretion; so that, in fact, power was given him by the constitution to make the law for the occasion. Possibly Aristotle has been urged to adopt so extravagantly hazardous an expedient, in his own system, by observation of the evils of that opposite extravagance at Athens, complained of, as we have formerly seen, by Isocrates; where decrees of the multitude, the unbalanced sovereign, at the suggestion of demagogues, favourites of the moment, were so multiplied, with such haste and so little circumspection, that, in many cases, the citizens could not know to which of many laws they were in the moment subject.

Ch. 35. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

In the regal governments of the early ages legislation, not less than capital condemnation, evidently rested with the people at large. But, even in the smaller states, this was inconvenient, and in the larger, for regular practice, impossible; whence appears to have arisen the maxim, so extensively adopted, and so decidedly approved and recommended by Aristotle, that laws, once established, were not to be altered; but the magistrate's discretion, for decision adapted to the exigency, rather to be trusted. That the legislative system, throughout the Grecian republics, was very imperfect, Aristotle has largely shown. The Roman republican constitution, probably derived from Greece, confessedly improved through diligent inquiry after Grecian models, and altogether better than any Grecian constitution of which any account remains, had yet, among its excellences, great imperfections. Its legislature was extraordinary. Laws, binding upon the whole people, were made by the



people at large ; assembled, at the discretion of the magistrate, in two ways, so different that they were, in effect, different assemblies ; insomuch that what the people, assembled in one way, would enact, assembled in the other way they would not enact ; and laws binding on the whole people were also occasionally enacted by the senate, without the participation of the people. Such conflicting powers of legislation were likely to produce multiplied, and sometimes inconsistent enactments. But, the Roman democracy being more constitutionally balanced than the Athenian, a discretionary power was allowed to the prætor's court to adapt decisions to the equity of the case. These decisions, recorded, obtained authority as precedents for future decision in similar cases ; and thus that court seems to have furnished the spring-head of systematic equity, as distinguished from law, throughout modern Europe, and especially in our own country, where the system has been far most perfected. Such distinction has been found necessary under all governments, for correction, as our Blackstone expresses it after Grotius, ' of that wherein the law, by reason of its universality, ' is deficient.' But in our constitution alone has the advantage grown of a separation of the two powers ; limiting the courts of law to decision by the letter, and committing the power of relief, where equity may require it, to courts appropriated to the purpose. These, our learned judge proceeds to say, have been ' established for the benefit of the subject ; to detect § 3. ' latent frauds and concealments, which the process of ' the courts of law is not adapted to reach ; to en- ' force the execution of such matters of trust and con- ' fidence as are binding in conscience, though not ' cognizable in a court of law ; to deliver from such ' dangers as are owing to misfortune or oversight ; ' and to give a more specific relief, and more adapted

Blackstone,  
Com. on  
Laws of  
England,  
introd. § 2.

CHAP.  
XLIII.

‘ to the circumstances of the case, than can always be  
 ‘ obtained by the generality of the rules of the positive  
 ‘ or common law. This is the business of our courts  
 ‘ of equity ; which however are only conversant in  
 ‘ matters of property. For the freedom of our con-  
 ‘ stitution will not permit that in criminal cases a  
 ‘ power should be lodged in any judge to construe  
 ‘ the law otherwise than according to the letter. This  
 ‘ caution, while it admirably protects the public liberty,  
 ‘ can never bear hard upon individuals. A man cannot  
 ‘ suffer *more* punishment than the law assigns, but  
 ‘ he may suffer *less*. The laws cannot be strained, by  
 ‘ partiality, to inflict a penalty beyond what the letter  
 ‘ will warrant ; but, in cases where the letter induces  
 ‘ any apparent hardship, the crown has the power to  
 ‘ pardon.’

This excellence of legal system, not found among the republics of Greece, nor in Rome, nor in modern Europe beyond our own country, will hardly be looked for in Macedonia. There nevertheless the criminal law assured a large degree of freedom for the subject, of which hereafter proof will be seen in authentic accounts of the practice. The popular power indeed, under that law, appears to have been most rudely exercised, yet perhaps not more so than in many or perhaps most of the Grecian republics. The course of proceeding resembled very nearly what we find related, on highest authority, of the Jews ; who seem also, conformably to Aristotle’s system, to have been, without a legislative power, limited to the Mosaic law.<sup>12</sup> In Macedonia, the king, as of old, still exe-

<sup>12</sup> ‘ Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, neither shall ye diminish aught from it, that ye may keep the commandments of the Lord your God, which I command you.’ Deuteronomy, c. iv. v. 2.

cuted the office of chief justice of his kingdom; if the authority of the later ancient writers should be admitted, who, in consonance with Homer, have reckoned this not the privilege more than the duty of kings. Thus, like the judges of many Grecian republics, and those proposed by Aristotle for his own imaginary state, the kings of Macedonia would have a hazardous extent of power. But that they had alone authority to make laws binding on their people, any more than the kings of Homer's age, nowhere appears.

Among the Grecian republics we have observed many REPRESENTATIVE assemblies: the Amphictyonic, representing nearly the whole nation; the Calarean, the Panionian, the Phocian, and others, representing portions of the nation; and, beside these, frequent occasional assemblies of the representatives of several confederated states. But no mention occurs of a representative assembly in Macedonia; and a general assembly of all the Macedonian people, as already observed, the extent of the country denied. The several cities and provinces possibly, and even probably, differing in constitution and laws, yet perhaps differed less than those of the modern kingdoms of France and Spain. The Macedonians under their king, as the Thessalians under their tagus, evidently held their several municipal governments in a considerable degree of independency. The revolt of Pydna, under Archelaus, and the measure resorted to afterward for ensuring its future allegiance; the readiness with which, in the earlier part of the reign of Amyntas, so many towns followed their choice to secede from the Macedonian kingdom and become members of the Olynthian confederacy; the revolt again of Pydna, under Philip, managed by one party,

Ch. 42. s. 8.  
of this Hist.

Ch. 34. s. 2.

CHAP.  
XLIII.

Ch. 35. s. 3.  
& ch. 36.  
s. 1. of this  
Hist.

Ch. 39. s. 2.

and its restoration to the Macedonian kingdom by another ; that fact, of such anomalous aspect, yet so fully ascertained, Philip's gratuitous resignation of his sovereignty over the Macedonian town of Anthemus, for the purpose of its becoming a member of the republican confederacy of Olynthus, and finally his popularity among the republics of the Chalcidic peninsulas, and their general disposition to become members of the Macedonian monarchy, in preference to being subject allies of the Athenian commonwealth, matters all resting on the best authorities, concur to indicate principles in the Macedonian government favourable to liberty. All information indeed makes it probable that the municipal constitutions of the Macedonian towns were nearly analogous to those of the towns of Thessaly on one side, and of the Chalcidic peninsulas on another, and less liable to be overborne by the power of the Macedonian crown than the Thessalian by a tagus, or the Chalcidic by the imperial democracy of Athens ; yet better united, through their common attachment to one royal family, hereditary chiefs of the state.

As of the cities, so we find, of the extensive provinces of Macedonia, indication of power constitutionally resting in the hands of the people ; little differing in amount or quality, but as the nature of things commanded ; the people of the cities being in large proportion traders and handicraftmen, those of the country husbandmen, herdsmen, and hunters. In the course of the previous history of Macedonia we have observed great vassals of the crown holding, in the inland provinces, bordering on barbarous nations, extensive lordships with a princely authority ; bearing evident analogy, in office and dignity, to the lords marchers formerly, of England, and over the con-



continent of Europe. Inferior landholders would not be likely to engage the notice of historians of the Greek republics, who have transmitted these circumstances. But the assurance that the Macedonians all held arms, that the popular institutions promoted a military spirit, and in peace encouraged the chase, as advantageous preparation for the toils of service in war, institutions marked as resting on the customary law of the land, and not depending on the pleasure or immediate needs of the monarch, implies the farther assurance that the landholders held civil rights, enabling them to assert a dignified freedom; and that these civil rights extended throughout the provinces of the Macedonian kingdom, is indicated by what presently we shall have occasion to observe. It seems thus altogether probable that each province and each city made regulations for itself, under some superintending controul of the king's acknowledged prerogative. Looking backward then to Homer, and forward to Alexander's history, it seems farther probable that, if laws were made for the whole nation, it was, as formerly in modern Europe, by the nation assembled in arms; its defenders being considered as its representatives. Nor is an instance of this wanting; recorded indeed only by a writer not always to be trusted, yet bearing marks of just authority. Alexander, in the midst of his conquests, exposed himself, in hunting, to great danger in contest with a lion. The Macedonians of his army, the historian says, according to national custom, taking the matter into consideration, decreed, 'That the king should not hunt afoot, nor without attendants of a quality to be answerable for his safety.'<sup>13</sup>

Q. Curt. l. 8.  
c. 1. s. 18.

<sup>13</sup> The passage in Curtius is altogether, I think, among those of value in the work of that able but licentious writer. It accounts reasonably for a story among the most extravagant, of the many

A constitution capable of assuring freedom to a people, with good government and means for defence, (both indispensable toward maintenance of freedom,) is of necessity a very complex machine; insomuch that how it may best be constructed has been a question for many ages, not yet decided. Hence it may be the less matter for wonder, if, in looking to the construction of constitutions found, in practice and effect, most providing those benefits, parts of great importance have escaped the observation of very acute inquirers; so far at least as to have failed of due estimation. But especially those most familiar with valuable things are most apt to undervalue them. Thus it remained for the foreigner Delolme to show the just importance of some matters in the English constitution, overlooked by the many able English writers who had previously written on it. Still, such is the complexity of a free government, very important points remained for circumstances to bring forward into just notice. The French minister of state, Calonne, whom civil discord forced to seek refuge in a foreign land, was led, in his residence in England, to remark the amalgamation of ranks here as a singularity among European nations, and of a most advantageous character; producing a community of interest among the millions of various and widely differing ranks composing the population, whence resulted a harmony, a mutual security, and a national

extravagant that were circulated concerning Alexander; and all that it asserts carries all appearance of having been derived from authority contemporary with the transactions. ‘*Fabulam, quæ objectum leoni a rege Lysimachum temere vulgavit, ab eo casu, quem supra diximus, ortam crediderim. Ceterum Macedones, quanquam prospero eventu defunctus erat Alexander, tamen scivere, gentis suæ more, ne pedes venaretur, aut sine delectis principum amicorumque.*’ Q. Curt. l. 8. c. 1. s. 17. 18.

strength, unseen elsewhere.\* Nevertheless, though intimately connected with this, another matter, of vital importance, remained for another foreigner duly to remark. Local administration in the hands of the people, in divisions and subdivisions, is necessary for the very foundation of freedom in an extensive country. Among ourselves, to whom this is familiar, its peculiarity is apt to escape observation: the supposition that it is, or may be, ordinary elsewhere readily offers itself. But, to the acute foreign observer Divernois, the peculiarity has been striking. Many thousand important offices, very far the greater part of those necessary for local administration, he has observed, are in constant course of performance without salary; and, these being for all ranks, from the peer, through the high sheriff and the juryman, down to the tithingman, and in large proportion taken in rotation, some hundreds of thousands of men thus, each in his degree, partake in the energies of government. Such is the broad basis on which the English constitution rests, and on which legislation by parliament (too generally considered, even at home, but still more by foreigners, as all in all) depends for assurance of its value, and even of its existence. Promotion then being denied to none, but, on the contrary, the ascent easy and ordinary from the condition of the workman for daily pay to that which qualifies for bearing the burthen of tithing and parish offices, and thence to higher, and by degrees to the highest, the English government thus is the completest commonwealth (its ordinary title in queen Elizabeth's days) known in history.

In the Athenian, and probably other Grecian re-

[\* See extract from M. de Calonne's Letter in a note at the end of s. 3. ch. 20.]



CHAP.  
XLIII.

publics, attendance on civil business was required, of the lower people, only in the general assembly and in the courts of justice; and for attendance there a small pay was given. For the higher public offices no pay was allowed; they were imposed as honourable, but often severe, burthens on the wealthy. It was therefore esteemed a valuable reward, for eminent services, to receive a grant of immunity from such burthens. The mention then, by Arrian, of such immunity granted to Macedonians, concurs with various other indications to imply that the provincial administration in Macedonia was not, as in the modern kingdoms of the continent, wholly directed by officers of the monarch's nomination; but, as in the Grecian republics formerly, and the English commonwealth now, imposed principally on those subjects who were of substance to bear the burthen of offices without salary, and to be responsible for the due execution of them.

Arr.de Exp.  
Alex. l. 7.  
c. 10.

How far Aristotle ever avowed to the princes his patrons those political principles, adverse to monarchy, which he has asserted in his political treatise, which, not till after his death, it is said, was published, we do not learn: but as it is obvious that they could not be agreeable to any princes, so it is not less clear that, not only they were inconsistent with the existence of a government for a country of the extent of the Macedonian kingdom, but also that they were highly tyrannical toward a larger portion of mankind than that for which they proposed assurance of freedom. Thus the admission of them would be not more adverse to the inclination of those princes than inconsistent with their duty toward that large portion of the population of their kingdom which had supported them in their inherited claims, and which



was evidently attached to the constitution, as, for ages, it had stood.

Altogether the Macedonian constitution appears to have borne a very near resemblance to that of the modern European kingdoms in early times; when the combined civil and military powers were divided among lordships, similar in essence though various in denomination, dukedoms, marches, earldoms, baronies; all of limited monarchical character; intermingled among which the corporate towns had constitutions truly republican. Lordships and townships together acknowledged the sovereignty of one king; especially his right to command their service in arms for common defence. Slavery existed among them, as among the ancient republics, but apparently a less numerous and more mitigated slavery. The people, of all ranks, above slavery, in cities and throughout the country, held the important right of judgment on life and death, and of bearing arms for common defence against foreign or domestic disturbers of the common peace.

The perfection of civil polity in our own country, raised, in the course of more than ten centuries, within historical information, on foundation formed in times beyond knowledge, has led some eminent men, viewing the improvements at the Revolution and since, and seeing, as in all human institutions ever must be, imperfections yet remaining, to reckon themselves warranted in asserting that, before the Revolution, there was no true liberty here. Surely enough there can be no perfect liberty here, or anywhere on earth: for wherever there is government, the natural liberties of individuals must be subject to control. But without government they are subject to far severer control: the weak being without resource against

the strong, and the few against the many. Question therefore about true, or reasonable, or sufficient liberty may be endless. But, compared with most other nations, (with necessary exception always for war within the country, or its immediate results, overbearing, for a time, civil establishments,) the English nation, it may be fairly said, was always free. Justice is wanting among historians, on that score, even to the Norman reigns. The debt of all posterity to the first of the Plantagenets, the second Henry, is incalculable. The Macedonians then, with institutions of less value than those of our great Alfred, might be reckoned a free people; yet we know not that their institutions were inferior. Such improvements as those of our second Henry, and Edward entitled the first, not to bring the refinements of the Restoration, the Revolution, and after-times, into question, are hardly to be found anywhere else, and therefore not reasonably expected in a country in the circumstances of Macedonia. If then the general deficiency of legislative system in ancient governments appear surprising, it may be well to look at those of modern Europe. In France itself, the wiser and honester of the movers of the late revolution there, anxiously exerting their diligence, with ample powers for searching, to find precedent of revered antiquity for the forms of the free constitution which they desired for their country, were unable to discover, not only the manner of passing a law in the old French assembly of the Three Estates, but any law that could with certainty be referred to that authority. Even for our own country, though its history is perhaps altogether more perfect than that of any other nation, ancient or modern, yet many important circumstances remain in much darkness;

especially in that highly interesting period, the contest for the crown between the houses of York and Lancaster. Even the character of the constitution, under the Plantagenets, has been found to have been not only imperfectly known, but greatly misrepresented. The search among the records of the two houses of Parliament, for precedents for the regency, proposed to be established in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, has produced most important addition to all previous history, and correction for misrepresentations, to which historians, eminent for diligence and ability, in want of it, had been led; those records demonstrating what none suspected, that in the reigns of the fourth and sixth Henries the constitution, however less firmly established, was as well understood, and, in critical and difficult circumstances, in both reigns, as completely acted upon, as it could be at this day.

Toward the character of a monarchy, the questions whence the ROYAL REVENUE arises, and what may be its amount, are important. Thucydides shows that, in his time, the kings of Macedonia held very extensive landed property; and we find no other source of royal revenue intimated, till the customs of some seaports were conceded by the Thessalians to Philip. Yet his predecessor Archelaus, to execute all that has been attributed to him, must have been wealthy. Probably, among the troubles which followed his reign, the royal domains had been injured and diminished. Demosthenes, as formerly we have observed, seems to have thought that to impute to a king of Macedonia bribery with gold would be too extravagant to gain belief: but with timber, oxen, horses, sheep, he did not scruple to insinuate that

Ch. 36. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

Ch. 34. s. 1.



Ch. 39. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

Philip purchased the treasonable assistance of the ministers of his enemies. At a later period of that prince's reign Demosthenes reckoned him rich; not by his land, but by his seaports, where duties were taken on importation and exportation. Those duties seem to have been the only taxes known in the Macedonian kingdom. The kings thus were not dependent upon their subjects for a necessary or perhaps an ample revenue in peace. But they had not what would maintain armies, and were therefore dependent upon their subjects for service in arms, whenever their safety or their ambition, or even the good of the country required it. This formed the great security of Macedonian freedom.

Under such a constitution, however inferior to the British, the Macedonian people, in comparison of others, not excepting any Greek republic of which any information remains, might be happy as well as free; though, for internal improvement, such a constitution was evidently ill calculated, and, even for exertion against foreign enemies, highly defective. Its deficiencies were nearly analogous to those of the French and Spanish monarchies, while yet the kings were unpossessed of despotic power. The Macedonians, under their early princes, we have seen, were conquerors; as with us the Anglosaxons of Wessex. England, becoming under Egbert one kingdom, became only by degrees afterward one state, under one law; the advantageous business, begun by the great Alfred, being completed, not till three centuries after, by the second Henry. But in Macedonia, such advantageous yet difficult combination failing, the extension of dominion, as formerly in France, Spain, and Germany, unless under a prince of rare abilities, producing distraction, pro-



duced weakness. Hence the opportunities for those contests for the crown which have furnished matter for the larger portion of Macedonian history till Philip's reign. Through the deficiency of combination in the government, opportunity was continually open for the interference of foreign influence. Throughout the reign of Perdiccas son of Alexander, though a prince of considerable talents, the intrigues of Lacedæmon and Athens, sometimes alternately, sometimes together, troubled the country. Under still abler princes, the important seaport of Pydna was withdrawn from it at least twice; and probably was among those, the best towns of the kingdom, which, at another time, seceded from it to become members of another state. But, except in that remarkable instance, occurring in extraordinary circumstances, the very inconveniences and defects of the Macedonian government assisted to deny opportunity for any party, not headed by a popular claimant of the crown, to give any great extent to revolutionary intrigue. Generally, if portions of the people might be gained, yet antipathy of portion to portion obviated extensive seduction. But as formerly France, when neither the king was absolute, nor a good government, with one legislature and one jurisprudence, held the country together, was wounded through a duke of Burgundy or a town of Rochelle, so Macedonia was assailed through a prince Argæus or a town of Pydna.

SECT.  
III.

---

Ch. 13. s. 4.  
& ch. 16.  
s. 4. of this  
Hist.

Ch. 34. s. 1.

Ch. 26. s. 2.  
& ch. 34.  
s. 2.

## SECTION IV.

*Comparative view of the constitutions of Thessaly, Lacedæmon, and Rome. Indications of the Thracian constitution. Despotie government unknown in Europe before the rise of republican government in Greece.*

CHAP.  
XLIII.

Ch. 34. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

IN proceeding to notice the circumstances of the states most connected with Macedonia, Thessaly stands foremost for attention. Already occasion has occurred to observe some remarkable particularities of the political division and political union of that eminently fruitful and wealthy country, called the mother of Greece; and also of the old and intimate connexion of a powerful party, among its many republics, with the Macedonian kingdom. That connexion indicates a similarity of manners and character in the people of the two countries; at least in those of higher rank; and this we find also marked in accounts of ancient authors. Neither Macedonians nor Thessalians were given, like the men of leisure in so many of the republics, to science, the fine arts, and all that the Greeks included under their term Philosophy. Neither country had public buildings, especially temples, equal to some even of the smaller and more obscure of the Grecian cities. The people of both delighted in personal magnificence; and especially, like Clisthenes of Sicyon and Laphanes of Arcadia, recently noticed, in a splendid hospitality. But, though their public buildings were inferior, their private dwellings are likely to have been superior to those of the other Greeks; which in the flourishing ages of the republican system appear to have been generally very mean. What little remains from antiquity concerning the

palace and court of the great king of Macedonia, Archelaus, contemporary of Pericles and Thucydides, and patron of Euripides and Zeuxis, indicates even splendour in his palace and court.

SECT.  
IV.

Ch. 34. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

A striking general analogy between the constitutions of Thessaly, Lacedæmon, and Rome, with some important differences, may here deserve notice ; for the Roman constitution, derived from Greece, being more completely laid open to us than any of Greece, will assist toward an investigation of the character of Grecian governments.

The Thessalian constitution, the Lacedæmonian, and the Roman, it is observable, originally all acknowledged one hereditary chief. Afterward Lacedæmon had two chiefs, both hereditary ; Thessaly one, not hereditary, but appointed for life ; Rome generally two, but at times more, sometimes ten, elected annually. All these chiefs, or boards of chiefs, were supreme military commanders ; the Roman especially exercising a despotic authority. The lives of Roman citizens, on military service, were not guarded by law against the power of consuls, or military tribunes, as those of the Macedonians against that of their kings. The spoil of conquered neighbours, bribing the Roman people to allow despotism in military command even to their ordinary chief magistrates, prepared them for tolerating that extraordinary magistracy the dictatorship, which put the whole state under military law, subject to no rule but the supreme magistrate's will. The kings of Lacedæmon had no such authority over the Lacedæmonian people, though Lacedæmonian military commanders would assume it over those whom they called allies. The proper powers of the tagus of Thessaly are little defined by ancient writers. But all the three constitutions acknowledged a di-

Ch. 20. s. 4.



CHAP.  
XLIII.

---

Ch. 24. s. 3.  
of this Hist.

vision of the free population into a higher order, arrogating to itself exclusively the magistracy, and a lower, which participated always nominally in the sovereign power, and sometimes exercised it effectually and almost exclusively. Both orders, in all three, were served by slaves. All three held dominion over subdued neighbours. The sovereignty of the Lacedæmonians we have seen most severe : the Helots and Messenians, not only Greeks, but, the Messenians at least, of the same Dorian origin with the Lacedæmonians, all were in a state of absolute slavery: even those Lacedæmonians called Pericæcians, inhabiting the country, associated indeed in the Lacedæmonian name, were denied the Spartan; and, though not slaves, were yet held in a degrading subordination. The dominion of the Thessalians over the Penestians was less harsh than that of the Lacedæmonians over the Messenians. The character of that of the Romans over the conquered people of Italy, whom they flattered, as the Athenians flattered their subjects, with the title of allies, though avoided by their historians, becomes, in large amount, known from effects, of which memorials remain. The old free population, by drafts for service in unceasing wars, and in other ways less indicated, was nearly annihilated. Its place, for cultivation of the land, was supplied by slaves; the cruel treatment of whom, mostly born to better hopes, produced those called the servile wars, which brought Rome, more than once, to the brink of ruin. In the Lacedæmonian and Roman states then the citizens of the capital arrogated to themselves the powers of government exclusively; those of the other towns, or provinces, with whatever privileges, here more, there less, being really but their subjects. In Thessaly the citizens of no one town appear to have held any ac-



knowledge pre-eminence: but from their separate rights, or claims, evils the most monstrous resulted. So unable was the general assembly of the Thessalian people to maintain its proper sovereign authority that, unless when the one first magistrate, the tagus, could command all, either by popularity supporting military force, as the great Jason, or by a hired military, as the tyrants his successors, the towns would often severally choose their own political as well as civil measures, and make their own wars, and their own alliances, with foreign powers or with one another. A feeling of the enormous mischief of this laxity of their executive government would doubtless contribute to direct that attachment of the higher orders and principal landholders, of all who had the clearest interest in the establishment of civil order, and the least hope from its disturbance, to their kinsman (as from a claimed common descent from Hercules, many of them reckoned him) the king of Macedonia.

The constitution of Lacedæmon (how far as established by Lycurgus is not known) acknowledged in later times two sovereign assemblies, one composed of those of commanding rank, another of wider admission for the population; but, for what were the common and what the several powers and privileges of these different assemblies, information fails. It appears however that, in later times at least, only when public misfortune and danger pressed on the few who held the lead, the more numerous assembly was admitted to any participation of counsel. Two different assemblies, each severally sovereign within the same state, might seem, in speculation, too strange an anomaly to hold in any government, had we not full assurance of the actual exercise of sovereignty in the Roman, through ages, by three; two, differently

constituted, of the people at large, and one, a select and comparatively small body, the senate. Yet, judging from consequences, the evil of this strange competition of bodies for the same authority over the whole state, in the Lacedæmonian and Roman governments, appears to have been hardly equal to that of the division of powers in the Thessalian, where each held authority too independent over different portions of the state.

But there was another monster in the Lacedæmonian government, which the Roman adopted, without any known parallel in the Thessalian. More tyrannical magistracies can hardly be imagined than the ephoralty of Lacedæmon<sup>14</sup> and the tribunate of Rome; though the purpose of both was to obviate tyranny. Nevertheless, such was altogether the deficiency of the ancient republican system that, on comparing the histories of the three governments, a resource so extravagant may seem to have been rather beneficial. This considered, and combined with what we learn of the distractions of Thessaly under its sovereign assembly, and the oppression under single tyrants, the line of policy adopted by the Thessalian nobles, in cherishing, for so many generations, as it appears they did, their connexion with the kings of Macedonia, and at length making their country in a manner a portion of the Macedonian kingdom, may seem to have been not only necessary for their own welfare, but, for the body of the Thessalian people, wise, liberal, and patriotic.

Among the Grecian republics, with various forms

<sup>14</sup> Thus Aristotle, Οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐφορείαν εἶναι τυραννίδα (λέγουσι). Polit. 1. 2. c. 6. And again, Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορείαν ἔχει φαύλως, ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ κυρία μὲν αὐτῆ τῶν μεγίστων αὐτοῖς ἔστι, κ. τ. λ. c. 9.

of sovereign assemblies, we find the legislative and executive powers nowhere accurately separated. In Rome, with a constitution improved upon the Greek, whence it was derived, the same deficiency appears. Ordinary public business indeed was necessarily intrusted to magistrates; king, tagus, consul, archon, Bœotarch, whatever might be their title. But in the democratical states the people always claimed the right to control and even direct, whenever they chose to interfere, every measure of executive government; and often, as any popular orator's view to his own ambitious purposes led him to persuade, they did interfere. Nevertheless, with the extravagance peculiar to that constitution, when the popular mind was strongly pointed to a particular object, they would, under similar stimulation, commit absolute power, with the title of general autocrator, to one man, a popular favourite of the moment. In the aristocratical states, as distinguished from the oligarchal, a few directing the ordinary business, all were called together for legislation; and, in difficult cases, even for authorizing the measures of executive government. This indeed, whether with one or more persons of supereminent dignity at the head of all, appears to have been, from before Homer's time, very generally looked to as the principle of regular and legal government.

But the assembling of all being in small states inconvenient, in large impossible, representative government arose among the Greeks, and became even familiar. We have seen, in the Amphictyonic council, an example of antiquity beyond history. The Callaurean and the Panionian, later, yet very early, were of similar character. Not till aftertimes we find notice of the several congresses of Thessaly, Bœotia, Phocis,



Achaia, Elis, and Arcadia. We have observed formerly that the Amphictyonic, originally proposed as a general council of the Greek nation, lost much of that valuable character through the great early revolution called the return of the Heraclidæ. Not till some ages after, the alarm, occasioned by the expectation of invasion from the overbearing power of Persia, produced a substitute for it, in the assembly of deputies from the several republics, held at Corinth. But the immediate general danger being, beyond hope, soon overborne, the purpose of a general congress was considered as fulfilled, and no such meeting ever acquired regular and permanent establishment. A partial congress was produced by the circumstances which led to the Peloponnesian war; and the eagerness of the Corinthians for engaging the Lacedæmonians in league against Athens made Sparta the place instead of their own town, which, in the general danger, appears to have been reasonably preferred (a sense of general danger often enforcing general prudence) as most commodious for the meeting of deputies from within and without the peninsula. During that long war frequent occasion occurring for the states, associated under the lead of Lacedæmon, to communicate by their representatives, something of form and order seems to have been settled by custom for the composition and proceedings of those congresses; but it does not appear that they ever obtained establishment as constitutional assemblies.

The Athenian democracy ruled those states which had engaged in its alliance with more avowed despotism than, as far as may be learnt from history, any other of the republics which ever acquired imperial sway over states to which the title of republic continued to be allowed. The attendance of their



deputies was commanded constantly at Athens: the congress of the Athenian confederacy thus was a permanent assembly. Its power and privileges however went little beyond representing grievances, and offering petitions, from the subject states; its farther office being only to communicate to those states the commands of the imperial people. When, afterward, the revolting tyrannies of Athens and Lacedæmon produced opportunity for Thebes to rise to empire, under the lead of men singularly deserving popularity, those states which desired to form confederacy with the Theban government sent their deputies to Thebes.

Conformably to Aristotle's observation on the ancient governments in general, the objects of all the representative assemblies of Greece appear to have been military rather than civil, defence or conquest more than domestic regulation or peaceful prosperity. Such indeed was the general partiality of the Greeks for the independent sovereignty of their several towns, and such the occasions of animosity between them, that none, even of the constitutional provincial congresses, appears to have been provided with power to prevent occasional war between town and town, or even to prevent some municipalities within their proper jurisdiction from avowedly taking part with external enemies. Numerous and striking examples of this will have been observed in the histories of Thessaly and Phocis.

Excepting the council of Amphictyons, little information has reached us of the constitution or proceedings of any of the constitutional assemblies. Of that of Bœotia most might be expected; no part of Greece, except Athens and Lacedæmon, having equally engaged the notice of historians and orators.

Yet it remains uncertain, concerning that eminent confederacy, even what was the number of the great presiding officers, the Bœotarchs; whether ten, or only five, or sometimes one number, sometimes the other. Their office, we find, was elective, but who were the electors nowhere appears. Clearly it was annual; and of its character this important matter is fully authenticated, that, for all the cities of the Bœotian league, the Bœotarchs filled the office of the kings of the early ages, presiding in the general council, and commanding in the field; those cities being nevertheless qualified each as a separate republic, having its own legislature and its own administration. In Thessaly a similar authority was vested in one great officer, the Tagus; who so far more nearly approached the condition of the kings of old, as his office, though elective, was for life. Indeed, no first magistrate of any other government of Greece, not even the kings of Lacedæmon, except as their dignity was hereditary, seems to have held so exactly the place of the kings of Homer's age as the tagus of Thessaly.

The state of the Grecian republics southward of Thessaly, and of their connexion with the Macedonian kingdom, for which we have fuller information, it has been the purpose of the preceding narrative to explain. Some remarks on the people called barbarous, whom Philip's arms or policy either united with Macedonia, or brought to subordination, may yet be requisite.

The extensive, and, at one time, very powerful nation of the Thracians, through intercourse with the Greeks for ages, in war and in peace, especially with the Athenians, came of course under notice of the three great historians, Herodotus, Thucydides,

and Xenophon, and, after them, of the great orator Demosthenes. In the accounts of all these writers, who all had superior opportunities for information, the barbarian character is strongly marked in the manners and institutions of the Thracian people ; but with that most remarkable temperament, formerly occurring for notice, so recorded by Demosthenes as to leave no reasonable doubt of its existence, or of its efficiency : living in arms, deifying and worshipping war, illiberal and destructive in warfare, merciless to strangers, though unresisting, and delighting in bloodshed even of women and children, (such anomalies are sometimes found in individuals, as here in a nation,) capital punishment, for whatsoever crime, was denied by their institutions absolutely and effectually. Well then may it deserve observation, that throughout modern Europe, in its early age, in our own not less than in other countries, the same principle was carried into practice, so far that, though private war was largely tolerated, no capital punishment was, for any crime, warranted by law. Among Europeans the inference is naturally ready, that people with property and arms and courage must be free ; that they will not submit to despotism, and that it cannot be forced upon them. This however is seen, in an extended view of the world, not completely founded : Asia, through all ages, and the greater part of Africa, have abounded with contradicting examples. But in Asia and Africa despotism has been maintained through the arbitrary use of the scimitar and bowstring by the sovereigns ; habitually tolerated, authenticated, and even venerated by the people. Securely it may be affirmed that, where capital punishment is effectually forbidden, despotism cannot be. Monarchy however prevailed

Ch. 14. s. 2.  
Ch. 18. s. 6.  
& Ch. 36.  
s. 4. of this  
Hist.



in Thrace; limited by that power which a people, holding arms, possess to maintain established law. At one time we have seen the nation united under one chief, the most powerful of any of his day known to us, except the king of Persia. When afterward divided, submission to one hereditary chief seems to have remained a general principle of the several governments; and hardly more of their policy is known.

The country north of Thrace and Macedonia as far as the Danube was occupied by the Triballians; of whose political institutions our information goes no farther than that they acknowledged one hereditary military chief, by Grecian writers entitled king. Westward, the Illyrians, holding the country bordering on the Adriatic, were more known to the Greeks, who had settlements on their shores. Their government was an hereditary monarchy, with the regal authority liable to restriction, as in Homer's days, by popular power, supported by the universal use of arms. In the sequel of Grecian history an instance will occur of a very ill-judged use of this power by the Illyrian people, when the regal authority failed of its just efficacy, and of great public calamity ensuing. Had we more of Illyrian history, instances probably might be found of abuses of the regal power, for want of a steadier balance; and these more numerous, and to individuals injurious, but less producing great public misfortune.

It has been observed by Aristotle, and after him by other ancient writers, that the people of Asia have always been more disposed to bear despotism, those of Europe to assert freedom. In looking through history to earliest times indeed it seems evident that, as a principle of government, despotism has been of



Asiatic growth ; first introduced into Europe, as far as accounts show, by the thoughtless violence of democracy, giving to a favourite party-leader autocratical powers, either for opposing an adverse party at home, or conducting a favourite enterprise abroad. It must have been by a deep policy, with extraordinary able management, that the Roman senate gained that resource against popular leaders, the dictatorship ; which popular leaders afterward turned against the senate and the whole free constitution. The republican temporary despotism was the germ of the imperial permanent despotism, which extinguished the republic. But till after the general abolition of the ancient monarchies of Greece, and the general establishment of republics, that any European people ever acknowledged an absolute sovereign, no warrant appears among ancient writers.

## SECTION V.

*Causes of deficiency of information concerning the politics and constitutions of Greece in Philip's age. Indications in letters of Isocrates ; in a speech reported by Arrian : measures of Philip, for improving the constitution of Macedonia, and of the Grecian confederacy.*

IN the extant speeches of Demosthenes the reserve and caution becoming a great politician are not less remarkable than the fire and energy for which he has been so justly admired as an orator. To those who seek information or illustration of historical matter it must be disappointing, and may seem surprising, to find how little can be gathered from him, not of the constitution only, but of the state of parties ; not in Macedonia alone, but throughout Greece ;

CHAP.  
XLIII.

---

especially of the governments with which he had the closest political connexion, the Arcadian, Elean, Ætolian, Acarnanian, and, more particularly, the Bœotian. Even for Macedonia, where cause is less obvious, his reserve is striking; especially in those speeches in which he has not scrupled to express his exultation at the revolt of Pydna, and the change of politics of Olynthus and Byzantium. On the other hand, the still greater reserve of the opponents of Demosthenes, friends of the Macedonian alliance, might appear still more surprising, had we not the assurance of Isocrates, with confirmation from Xenophon and from the whole tenor of Grecian history, that democracy denied freedom of speech. And this, strange as it may appear to those who have had no experience of a democratical mixture in government, cannot appear strange among ourselves, where county-meetings, too frequently, and the common-hall of London, continually, exhibit perfect examples of that tyranny of a multitude. Hence the extraordinary fact, that more eulogy of Philip is found in the speeches of his great enemy, Demosthenes, than in those of Æschines, certainly his political friend, and accused of being his pensioner. For it was little less dangerous at Athens to speak well of the Macedonian king and his government than, under either the late republic of France, or the following usurpation, to apologize for the mild despotism of the unfortunate sixteenth Lewis. Such then having been the reserve of orators; of one party from policy, of the other from fear; and the authorities, whence Cicero gathered his judgment of men of that age in Greece, and found ground for his splendid eulogy of Philip, having perished; any authenticated circumstances that may afford light on the general

Ch. 42. s. 8.  
of this Hist.

character of the political state of the country, at the important crisis of Alexander's accession, must deserve consideration.

The inability of Plato, Xenophon, and after them Aristotle, to propose any mode of government for Greece united, which could, even in theory, satisfy even themselves, we have already observed. Isocrates appears to have had no less difficulty; though decided in regard to one point, on which, differing from the first and the last of those eminent philosophers, he agreed with the second, inasmuch as he thought it desirable to have one man of superior dignity for president of the nation. The opinion, that thus most readily, and surely, and even only, the continually convulsed state of the nation could be ameliorated, it appears he entertained long before Philip of Macedonia had acquired the power, or established the character, which at length drew toward him the regard of so large a portion of the Grecian people as their best protector, and the hatred of the rest, as the most formidable obstacle to their purposes. Beside the tract purporting to be a speech of Archidamus son of Agesilaus to the Lacedæmonian people, which has been formerly under our observation, there is extant a letter of Isocrates to that prince, bearing all appearance of authenticity, and marking, within itself, that it was written after the accession of Archidamus to the throne, but several years before any of the extant letters of the same writer to Philip. The purpose, the same as afterward to the king of Macedonia, was to excite the king of Lacedæmon to interfere as a mediator in the quarrels of the republics with one another, and of each within itself; and, having established peace throughout Greece, to proceed, after the example

Ch. 28. s. 9.  
of this Hist.

of his father, Agesilaus, to direct the united arms of the nation against Persia.

The passages in that letter principally to our present purpose are these: ‘I wonder,’ Isocrates says, ‘that, among men of influence, or of eloquence, the general state of the Greek nation, altogether so wretched and so disgraceful, has never appeared an object for their consideration and regard. There is not, in all Greece, a place which is not suffering under the miseries of war, sedition, massacre, evils unnumbered. Perhaps the largest share falls to the Greeks of Asia, whom, by our treaties, we have surrendered; not simply to the barbarians, but also to others, Greeks by origin and language, but barbarians in principle and manners. If we considered rightly what materially concerns us, we should not allow armed bodies to be collected under leaders of no responsibility; herds of outcasts and vagabonds, yet forming really more powerful armies than are maintained by all the Grecian states. Engaged under pretence of war against Persia, they plunder a small part of the king’s territory; but, by force or otherwise, entering Grecian cities, they have overthrown them wholly; killing some citizens, expelling others, plundering property, and committing all sorts of enormities, even against women and children.

Farther then it seems surprising that these enormities appear not at all to have engaged the care of any of those states which have affected to take the lead in Greece. Your father Agesilaus indeed, as an individual in a situation of power, is an exception; but he stands alone. His earnestness to give freedom to the Greeks, and repress the barbarians, was constant. But even he erred in one material point.



‘ Wonder not if, addressing you, I say where I think  
 ‘ he erred in judgment ; for I am accustomed always  
 ‘ to declare my mind freely ; and I should prefer  
 ‘ incurring ill-will so to gaining favour by praising  
 ‘ what is not praiseworthy. So much with regard to  
 ‘ myself. With regard to him then, superior in all  
 ‘ other matters, most temperate, most righteous, a  
 ‘ most able statesman, he was bent eagerly upon two  
 ‘ objects, each separately good, but, for execution to-  
 ‘ gether, impossible : he would at the same time make  
 ‘ war with Persia, and restore, in the Grecian states,  
 ‘ his banished friends ; which, without also providing  
 ‘ for them preponderant power in their several re-  
 ‘ publics, could not be. Thus, through his zeal in  
 ‘ favour of those concurring with him in political  
 ‘ sentiment, evils and dangers arose for all Greece ;  
 ‘ and, from ensuing troubles, means for war against  
 ‘ the barbarians were lost.

‘ Through this error it is now become evident  
 ‘ that, to make war successfully upon Persia, it is  
 ‘ necessary first to reconcile the Greeks with one  
 ‘ another, and put an end to our madness of strife  
 ‘ among ourselves. Formerly I have urged advice on  
 ‘ this subject, which I cannot yet forego. I put it now  
 ‘ for consideration to you, of birth illustrious, as I  
 ‘ have before observed, of the race of Hercules, the ac-  
 ‘ knowledged hereditary military chief of the Lacedæ-  
 ‘ monian commonwealth, bearing the title and dignity  
 ‘ of king, and holding besides the highest personal  
 ‘ reputation of any individual in Greece, whether you  
 ‘ should yield to my persuasion ; or whether, in any  
 ‘ opinion that worthier matters may engage your  
 ‘ attention, you should neglect it. My opinion how-  
 ‘ ever I will freely urge, that you should direct your  
 ‘ mind especially to two things ; first, to put an end

‘ to wars and civil contentions, now raging among the  
 ‘ Greeks with one another, and then to check the  
 ‘ barbarians in their injurious conduct, and deprive  
 ‘ them of their over great share of advantages.’<sup>15</sup> The  
 consonance of the picture here given of the state of  
 the Greek nation in its settlements in Europe and in  
 Asia, with that of Xenophon, formerly noticed, who  
 wrote nearly about the same time, or not long before,  
 will be obvious.

In another extant letter, written some years before  
 that to the king of Lacedæmon, Isocrates has described  
 his feeling of his own situation, as an Athenian citizen,

<sup>15</sup> The learned French editor of Isocrates, Auger, has given  
 the following account of this letter: ‘ Hæc epistola in nullis  
 ‘ extat Isocratis editionibus. In Photii bibliothecam transtulit  
 ‘ Hœschelius, ab Andrea Schotto allatam ex Italiâ. Ego huc  
 ‘ induxi, ratus eam esse Isocrateam, vel saltem in stylo Isocrateo.  
 ‘ Vide Phot. Bibl. p. 330. Hanc eandem reperi in duobus codi-  
 ‘ cibus bibliothecæ regiæ.’ Of a letter admitted by former  
 editors, as addressed by Isocrates to Dionysius of Syracuse,  
 Auger speaks thus: ‘ Extat hæc epistola in editionibus Vossii,  
 ‘ Stephani, et Aldi 1514. sed non arbitror eam esse Isocratis;  
 ‘ cujus nempe dictio longe abhorret a dictione Isocrateâ. Mihi  
 ‘ videtur scripta fuisse a rhetore aliquo, vel sophistâ, ad principem  
 ‘ virum, vel ad aliquem quem favor in eminenti loco posuerat.’

Much as I desire to avoid engaging in questions on such  
 subjects, I reckon I ought not to avoid declaring that I think  
 the learned editor is right in his opinion of both these letters;  
 unless that the latter seems far more likely to have been a mere  
 play of fancy, under the Roman empire, than to have been really  
 addressed to either Dionysius of Syracuse, or to any man in the  
 situation of those to whom any party in the Greek republics  
 would have given the title of tyrant. The whole manner cor-  
 responds with the diction to mark it for spurious, and of that  
 later age, and probably never really addressed to any one. The  
 letter to Archidamus, on the contrary, not only is in diction, as  
 the learned editor says, Isocratean, but also shows a knowledge  
 of Grecian politics of his age which the following rhetors and  
 sophists, judging from their surviving works, appear to have

which may also be to our purpose here. He had among his pupils, as formerly has been observed, the sons of the great tagus of Thessaly, Jason. These youths, after their return to their father's court, sent an invitation to him to visit and make some stay with them there. He excused himself thus: 'For the sake of the society of Jason and Polydamas<sup>16</sup>, I should most willingly accept your invitation. Indeed I think familiar communication between us might be advantageous for all. But many hindrances occur. I am little equal to the journey; and wandering from one's own country ill becomes those of my age; especially one, who, in earlier years, never left it. Moreover I fear the people; for I must speak the truth. Alliances made by us with other states I see presently broken. If that should happen with your government, how could I escape dangerous accusation? It is here difficult.'

Those conversant with the ancient historians, and knowing the deficiency of contemporary testimony to historical matter, from Xenophon's time to that of

been neither solicitous to acquire, nor to have supposed, for readers of their age, at all important for them to regard. Indeed I know nothing of its kind, I will venture to own, carrying within itself evidence of authenticity more satisfactory, to my mind, than the letter to the king of Lacedæmon.

<sup>16</sup> Instead of the name of Polydamas, hazarded in the text, all the known copies of the works of Isocrates, it seems, give Polyaces. Jason, as Auger has justly observed, is a name well known: Polyaces, he says, 'in historiâ nullibi apparet.' I cannot myself doubt but the same eminent person, first the opponent, afterward the associate of Jason, has been intended, whose name, in our copies of Xenophon, is repeatedly given Polydamas. Thus this letter of Isocrates would afford a pleasing testimony to Jason's fair observance of faith and friendship with a man of character represented, by Xenophon, so excellent that it might be desired to have more account of him. Ch. 27. s. 1. of this Hist.

Polybius, will value such effusions of sentiment and scraps of information as these, from one engaged in the public affairs of the intervening age. In the sequel of this Isocrates shows himself an honest monitor, and no friend to absolute monarchy, or to a government, however well administered, supported by a military force of interest distinct from that of the nation. Its purpose, far from being of a flattering tenor, is to dissuade the youths from aiming to succeed their father in his invidious eminence. When, in the most promising state of that eminence, he shortly after lost his life, they were probably too young to take a leading part in such a crisis. What may have been their fate among the following crimes and troubles of their country, among which their uncles, attaining successively their father's dignity, were assassinated, and the worthy Polydamas also perished, we have no information.

To form then a just estimate of Philip's policy toward the Grecian republics, it will be expedient to recollect that, when the confederacy under the lead of Lacedæmon had brought Athens to submission nearly unconditional, the Athenian government was, according to the common Lacedæmonian unvarying policy, totally altered, with the view to its being held in complete subserviency; half the population or more was driven into banishment, and a Lacedæmonian governor commanded a garrison in the citadel. But when Athens was reduced to beg the king of Macedonia's mercy, nothing of the kind followed. On the contrary, such was Philip's magnanimous forbearance toward his most virulent enemies that shortly his Athenian friends found themselves in danger from it. So far had he been from arbitrarily commanding, as the Athenians were wont,



the banishment of citizens from Grecian republics within their power, so far from denying, like the Lacedæmonians, the resort of any to his own kingdom, that his capital and even his court were open to those of all descriptions. An extant letter from Isocrates to his son, afterward the great Alexander, is valuable for large information comprised in few words. This letter was sent at the same time with one to Philip himself; and Isocrates appears to have intended it as a vehicle for unasked advice, which might, with least hazard of offence, and perhaps with best effect, be conveyed in the form of commendation of the young prince's judgment and conduct. Of the numbers professing philosophy, who flocked to Pella, and who were admitted to Alexander's conversation, Isocrates thought many were objectionable: of some he disliked the mode of exercising the talents of their pupils, as unsuitable for one who was to be a statesman; but moreover, the principles, the doctrines, and even the manners, of many he disapproved highly. Possibly Philip may have had a view beyond the philosopher. Hazardous as the admission of exceptionable characters might be, yet to deny means for acquiring a general knowledge of mankind to one who, as a statesman, would have necessarily to communicate with men of all characters, were also hazardous. Possibly moreover Philip might depend on his own power in advice and observation, together with the prince's talents for discrimination, to obviate the evil which Isocrates had apprehended.

After these valuable contemporary notices of the state of Philip's court, a description of the earlier circumstances of Macedonia, in a speech reported by Arrian as having been delivered by Alexander to the Macedonians of his army in Persia, may deserve some

CHAP.  
XLIII.

---

attention. Contrary indeed to what that writer has usually admitted, it is not wholly without rhetorical extravagance. This may mark it as not derived from the generals, whose authority he preferred whenever he could have their guidance. They, on account of their situations, would be likely to avoid the matter in question; which nevertheless has been in Arrian's judgment proper to be given on the best authority he could find for it, and which he thought not unworthy of credit.

Arr. l. 7.  
c. 9.

‘The Macedonians,’ Alexander is stated to have said, ‘were poor and wandering herdsmen, clothed  
‘in skins, living among mountains, and fearing re-  
‘sidence in the better parts of their country, on ac-  
‘count of the frequent inroads of neighbouring people,  
‘Illyrians, Triballians, and Thracians, against some  
‘or other of whom they had almost continually to  
‘defend, in bloody contest, their scanty herds and  
‘flocks. Philip introduced that order, civil and  
‘military, which gave them such superiority over the  
‘barbarians that they no longer wanted safety from  
‘situation, but could provide it by their valour. Towns  
‘then arose, garments of leather were changed for  
‘cloth, and wholesome laws and improved manners  
‘made the people respectable; insomuch that the  
‘barbarians, whom they had been accustomed to fear,  
‘were compelled to acknowledge their dominion.  
‘The greater part of Thrace was united with Mace-  
‘donia; and, the towns of the coast being recovered  
‘to the Macedonian dominion, the people had again  
‘at their own command the advantage of importation  
‘and exportation by sea, for which before they were  
‘dependent on others. Those who obtained com-  
‘mand in Thessaly had been often their terror:  
‘Philip so altered things that the Thessalians and

‘ Macedonians now are united nearly as one people.<sup>17</sup>  
 ‘ Communication with the southern states of Greece  
 ‘ commonly had been difficult, sometimes shut : suc-  
 ‘ cess in the war with Phocis made it, for following  
 ‘ times, sure and easy. Both the Athenians and the  
 ‘ Thebans had aimed at the conquest of Macedonia.  
 ‘ Philip so humbled both that, instead of paying  
 ‘ tribute to Athens, and obeying the mandates of  
 ‘ Thebes, those states owed their safety to Mace-  
 ‘ donian generosity. Finally, settling the affairs of  
 ‘ Peloponnesus, and establishing peace throughout  
 ‘ Greece, Philip was elected general in chief of the  
 ‘ whole nation for war against Persia, not more to his  
 ‘ own honour than that of the Macedonian people.’

It is obvious that the description of the Macedonians here, as wandering herdsmen, would not apply to the inhabitants of Pella, Edessa, Anthemus, and some other towns, but only to that, perhaps the larger extent of the country, where were only scattered habitations, or unfortified villages. What were the new laws we should be glad to know, and still more how they were enacted ; though, that no unpopularity ensued from any assumption of unwarranted power by the prince, is implied in all ancient history. Those laws probably were directed to the regulation of military as well as civil matters, and mostly in the wilder parts of the kingdom ; where, according to the contemporary testimony formerly noticed, Philip held

Ch. 34. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

<sup>17</sup> Ἀπέφηνε. What I have hazarded, as a paraphrase of this word, is warranted by Arrian, as to the matter of fact, in speaking elsewhere of the connexion of Thessaly and Macedonia. The word itself, unwarrantably rendered by the translator Vulcanius, and unnoticed by the annotator Gronovius, sometimes severe in criticism on the translator, may deserve the notice of future editors, and perhaps of lexicographers.

CHAP.  
XLIII.

---

command before he succeeded to the throne. The tribute to Athens, which is found also mentioned by Demosthenes, was no acknowledgment of superiority in the Athenian people over the king or people of Macedonia, but simply a composition for allowance to import and export goods at the towns on the Macedonian shore, held by Athenian garrisons, or by people whom the maritime force of Athens compelled to acknowledge the Athenian dominion of the sea; precisely such a tribute as, in modern times, many European states have been in the habit of paying to the pirates of Barbary.

All information considered, it seems not likely that, through any improvements in the peaceful latter years of Amyntas, or in the two short reigns of his elder sons, both turbulently ended, the state of Macedonia was altogether better at Philip's accession than at the death of Archelaus; whose reign, eminently beneficial, had been followed by violent and lasting troubles. Among the institutions of Archelaus, we have seen, was the Macedonian Olympic festival. A man of the great and just purposes eminently demonstrated in the measures of that prince would hardly then, in such an institution, be without a view beyond a passing amusement for himself, and the little popularity to be gained by furnishing such for the many. The respect in which the whole Greek nation held its four great festivals, the Olympic, Delphic, Nemean, and Isthmian, a respect such as to be of power to stop war for a time, when most raging among the republics, could not have failed to engage his attention. Macedonia, as a portion of Greece, we find was not excluded from an interest in those festivals, nor from a claim upon its princes and people to respect their sacred character, the benefit of which of course they

Ch. 34. s. 1.  
& Ch. 39.  
s. 2. of  
this hist.



were entitled to enjoy; yet, from situation and circumstances, the Macedonians could little conveniently attend the celebration, and but imperfectly profit from the temporary peace which it produced. Macedonia wanted, for its civil government, not equally with republican Greece, yet materially, an improved union of its towns and provinces. Archelaus, we are assured, cultivated peace; but how far, in any of his institutions, his views may have extended, his untimely death has left for uncertain conjecture only.

The immediately following troubles of the country would effectually prevent any early repetition of the festival, and deny all attention to what are likely to have been the objects of the institution. Accordingly no farther account of the Macedonian Olympiad is found till it was revived by Philip, on the conclusion of the Olynthian war. When all the towns of the Macedonian coast, and many of the Thracian, previously claiming each to be an independent sovereign republic, though mostly in vassalage under the Athenian people, were united to the Macedonian kingdom, then was the season which Philip saw advantageous for reviving an institution which would bring his new subjects, before often warring with one another, to friendly association among themselves and with his old subjects; joining in the ceremonies of an amusing religion, and partaking together in the entertainment of theatrical exhibitions. These, which had originated in religious ceremony, seem to have been considered as a regular part of the Macedonian festival.

Ch. 39. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

The next occasion on which the Macedonian Olympiad is found mentioned was when Philip, elected military commander in chief of Greece, became, through the union, ordinary in the republics, of civil with

Ch. 42. s. 7.

military office, the civil as well as military head of the whole nation, stateholder as well as captain-general. Then it was no longer merely an object of policy, but a pressing duty, to devise means for allaying the immoderate jealousies of the Grecian people among themselves, the offspring of their republican system, which denied social intercourse between those of the several towns of one nation, forbade intermarriage, rendered them more violently and inveterately hostile toward one another than toward the most dreaded foreign enemy, and always kept numbers of every state, sometimes half the population, in banishment. Experience of the result of his previous experiment, on a smaller scale, is likely to have been favourable toward trying it on a larger. Bringing eminent men, from all the many republics, to associate at the same time, with one another, and with those of his kingdom, in religious ceremony, and in festival, might do much. But the Peloponnesian Olympiad had often afforded example for more. Not only treaties of peace between the republics often, by mutual agreement, were proclaimed there, but the discussion of interests in question between them had been sometimes referred to that meeting. Altogether it seems obvious that this institution of Philip was of a kind to do more toward harmonizing Greece than his venerable Athenian friend's project of war with Persia. From that alone it does not appear how the desired civil advantages should so result as to have a chance for permanency, though it might promote opportunity for originating them.

Analogy between the political circumstances of the kingdoms of northern Greece, including Macedonia, and of the feudal governments in modern Europe, having been previously observed, the opposite policy

of Philip, and of some princes at the head of those governments, may also deserve notice. The French constitution formerly acknowledged a general assembly of representatives of the whole kingdom, as alone competent to make laws binding on all, and to impose taxes. The court avoided to allow its meeting. The Spanish court, at the head of a constitution perhaps more perfect in most of its parts, yet more defective in union of its parts, used a similar policy. To maintain separation and division, even to encourage and foment jealousies and antipathies between the people of the different provinces, and, holding all subjects under strict restraint, to allow freedom least to the high nobility and great landowners, were prime maxims of state. The success of this policy is too well known: the imperfect liberties of the French and Spaniards were, with little struggle, overborne, and in France a milder and more liberal, in Spain a more oppressive and degrading despotism was established. But the final result we have seen most unfortunate for the royal families of both countries. In one a combination of demagogues, finding means to establish their own communication, and spread their influence among all the disjointed millions, who were without means to communicate among one another, established a nominal republic, which was presently superseded by a complete despotism: in the other, by extent and natural advantages singularly favoured by means to defend itself against foreign aggression, a foreign tyrant's command sufficed to bring the royal family to his prison, and the nation, for a time, to his obedience. The king of Macedonia's premature death, and circumstances following, prevented the perfection of his scheme. But, assembling and blending in friendly union the numberless portions of the nation, which



CHAP.  
XLIII.

---

lords of the bedchamber than of any other with us. Their title was somatophylakes, literally body-wardens; or, for a more modern courtly phrase, it might perhaps be rendered lords of the body-guard. Arrian has given us the names and descriptions of seven at one time composing this body; which seems to have been the limited number, till, on a particular occasion, Alexander added an eighth. To this highly-confidential office only Macedonians, and of the highest rank, were admitted. Among Macedonians then, it is observable in Arrian's account, there was no distinction for those of the original kingdom and those of the afterward acquired provinces: all appear to have been esteemed equally competent for this, or indeed for any high office. A prince even of a people esteemed barbarian, though their territory was reckoned within Macedonia, was among those, as occasion will occur hereafter more particularly to observe, most honoured in Philip's court, and most attached in mutual friendship to his successor. Possibly indeed this prince may have been acknowledged of Grecian race, though his people were not; but in the sequel we shall find his people, the Agrians, also distinguished by their sovereign's attention and esteem.

Philip's care of his son's education has been eulogized by ancient writers. His attention to extend to the rising generation of Macedonian nobility advantages of literature and science, not otherwise easily open to them, though it has not equally met deserved praise, remains yet satisfactorily attested. It is well known that in our own, and other modern European kingdoms, formerly, it was customary, and esteemed advantageous, for boys of good birth and liberal fortune to attend, not only princes, but great



subjects, especially those in high civil employments, as pages. Philip formed a large establishment of pages, sons of the first men of his kingdom, and to these he afforded the utmost opportunity for literary instruction, under the philosophers who attended his court. But, in giving them the benefits of Grecian scholarship, he desired to obviate the illiberality and coarse insolence, which he had often had occasion to observe in democratical manners, by introducing, as a corrective, something of the polish of Asiatic courts. Constantly therefore they were by turns about his person, keeping guard, at night, in his antechamber. When he rode, one of them was to take his horse from the groom, Arrian says after the Persian custom, and hold it while he mounted. When he hunted, in attendance on him, they partook of the sport. When he was employed with his ministers, they studied under philosophers; of whom some, together with the boys, followed him even on military expeditions. Thus military education and civil proceeded together. Nor does it appear that Philip's purpose of improving the polish of the Macedonian court was at all threatening to the freedom of the constitution; balanced as it was by the free allowance, and even large encouragement, for the resort of republican Greeks. Though Aristotle's principles of policy could not be approved, yet no restraint upon discussion of political topics has been noticed by historians: on the contrary, even Arrian's cautious accounts of conversations show that great freedom on such subjects was usual, even at the king's table and in his presence. Whatever Philip's desire of power may have been, it is evident that he found it greater through his talent for cultivating popularity than it could have been by his military force. How small this

Arr. de  
Exped.  
Alex. l. 4.  
c. 12.

CHAP.  
XLIII.

---

really was, and how unequal his revenue to either the maintenance of a large standing army, or to the political corruption which interested malignity imputed to him, becomes, in all accounts of his son's reign, abundantly manifest.

Such then, as far as information remains, was the state of the Macedonian government and court, at the time of Philip's death.

## CHAPTER XLIV.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE ACCESSION OF ALEXANDER SON OF PHILIP TO THE MACEDONIAN THRONE TILL THE CONCLUSION OF THE WAR WITH THE NORTHERN NATIONS, AND THE RESTORATION OF DISTURBED UNION AMONG THE GRECIAN REPUBLICS.

## SECTION I.

*Authorities for the ensuing history. Alexander's boyhood: first measures after his accession to the Macedonian throne: election to the supreme dignity in Thessaly: admission to his seat in the council of Amphictyons: election to the office of stateholder and captain-general of the Grecian republics.*

THE extraordinary splendour of fortune and celebrity attained by Alexander son of Philip, and the interest of a large portion of the world, through following ages, even to the present day, in the consequences of his achievements, so engaged the attention of writers and the curiosity of readers that more histories of him have been published, more by contemporaries, and more by writers of after times, than are known of any other person. Letters and all sciences being in his age highly cultivated among the Greeks, men qualified to record great transactions would be numerous. But among many and rival authors, inducements to the undertaking would be various, and interests opposite; and some would have better, and others inferior, means of information. And, though literary works abounded, copies of

SECT.  
I.

---

CHAP.  
V

---

them, in failure of the advantages of printing, were few and dear. Thence public reading was a profession : companies assembled to hear ; and a library, or sometimes a single work unpublished, was a fortune to the possessor. Few could study in the closet ; few could compare, otherwise than by memory, one account with another. Thus great opportunity was open for ingenious writers, if unscrupulous, to put forward any report, especially of transactions in parts so remote and little known as those into which Alexander penetrated. Hence, while we lament the loss of all the many histories written by his contemporaries, we find the most judicious of the later ancient authors, who compiled from them, complaining of difficulty, often found, for satisfactory selection, among extravagancies and contradictions.

Nevertheless, to the modern inquirer, entering upon investigation of the events of Alexander's reign, it must be gratifying to find that materials were given from authorities higher, and more various, than, as far as accounts of such matters remain, for any other portion of ancient history. Narratives of his campaigns were written by two men of the highest rank in the army under him, Aristobulus and Ptolemy ; and published, not while he lived, when freedom, which might have been restrained by unworthy, must have been by just considerations ; nor so long after his death but that numerous witnesses to most of the transactions related were yet alive. The narratives of Nearchus and Onesicritus, who commanded his fleet in the extraordinary voyage along the shore of the Indian ocean, for some extravagances admitted in them, were less respected by antiquity ; and yet are found quoted, for some important matters, by highly respectable ancient



writers. A report of his marches and encampments by the two principal engineers of the army, Diognetus and Beton, was published. The royal daybook, as it was called, being a register of the daily transactions of the king himself, noted, it is said, by Eumenes of Cardia, his principal secretary<sup>1</sup>, and Diodotus of Erythræ, probably assistant secretary, would have been of the highest value, had it been transmitted complete. Being however but a dry register of facts, little inviting for the audiences at public readings, copies of it probably were little multiplied, and it remains quoted only for the last days of Alexander's life, of which however we have from it a very interesting detail.

Athen.  
Deipnos.  
l. 10. c. 10.

Nor has the history of Alexander, like that of the Roman republic, rested on those partial to him. Party-spirit remained, in his day, high among the Grecian republics, and one party held constant connexion with the Persian court while that court existed; so that partiality on one side was combated by partiality on the other. Of nine authors his contemporaries, whose names and characters are transmitted to us, the five already mentioned included, some were warmly adverse to him, and the works of all were before those later ancient writers on whom we now depend for the history. These are Diodorus and Strabo, of the Augustan age; Curtius, of date unascertained; Plutarch and Arrian, contemporary with Trajan and Adrian; to whom may be added Justin, the abbeviator of Trogus Pompeius, beside other writers who afford occasional assistance. Dissatisfaction with numerous preceding accounts induced Arrian, as he has expressly declared, to com-

<sup>1</sup> Ἀρχιγγραμματεὺς. Plut. v. Eum. init.

pile and publish his own; and, though of the latest age, being yet, by situation in life and practice in business, military and political, far the most qualified for a historian of Alexander, he has always held the highest estimation. His method indeed is most satisfactory. He has professed to rely principally on the accounts of the generals Ptolemy and Aristobulus. But those officers, often employed on different services, appear each rather to have proposed to publish his own memorials than a complete history of their king. Their joint testimony Arrian has admitted as decisive; where they have differed he has stated their differences; and where one has omitted (apparently as not having been within his observation) what the other has related, he has named the one whom he followed. For matters derived from neither he has noticed the failure of their authority. In all that remains from antiquity no example is found of equal care to examine differing accounts, and avoid to mislead the reader's opinion. The annals of Diodorus then, and several works of Plutarch, are valuable for light they afford on the affairs of the Grecian republics, of which Arrian, unfortunately for posterity, has furnished little. Strabo elucidates and confirms much through his geographical researches, which led him occasionally to notice historical circumstances. Curtius had talent, as well as materials, for better things than he has done; whence, among his theatrical matter, adapted to the public fancy of his age, but misplaced in history, and therefore offensive to sober judgment even when amusing by its ingenuity and eloquence, some information, not given by others, but still more, some illustration and confirmation of matters reported by others, may be gathered. Altogether thus, what-

soever the fanciful or the interested ingenuity of many able ancient writers, using opportunities offered by remoteness of scene, and scantiness of means for comparing accounts, may have been tempted to add or alter concerning events in the plainest narrative singularly interesting, it may be affirmed that, for the more public, and all the more important matters, no part of ancient profane history has been transmitted more authenticated than that of Alexander.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The singular state and the interesting character of the history of Alexander led the Royal Academy of Inscriptions and Polite Literature at Paris to propose, as the subject for its prize, in the year 1770., a Critical Examination of the ancient Historians who have written on it. Of the works offered that year none satisfying the Society, they repeated the proposal of the subject in the year 1772., when the prize was adjudged to the baron of Sainte Croix. His Treatise, though composed at a very early age, has been much noticed by the learned, and always with such high approbation that there can be no hazard in referring those to it who may desire information on a subject of criticism as extensively interesting as perhaps any relating to ancient history.

It may perhaps be due from me to acknowledge obligations of more than one kind to the baron of Sainte Croix. Through introduction from my very learned friend, then also a very young man, for one who had already acquired so much literary fame, Mr. Villoison, I was kindly entertained by him in November 1776., and again in March 1777., in his house at Mourmoiron, in the county of Avignon, which he made his residence when, after the death of his uncle the general Sainte Croix, who commanded at Belleisle when taken by our army under general Hodgson, and gained the esteem of that army, he quitted the military service. His conversation was among the stimulants to me, in recollection afterward, to apply myself to the work which has been my most gratifying amusement, among avocations public and private, now above forty years. He had had an idea of undertaking such a work himself, which I endeavoured to encourage; but he said, adverting to the restrictions upon

CHAP.  
XLIV.

---

The extraordinary fame acquired by that prince in early manhood would of course excite curiosity for the circumstances of his earlier years. Many accordingly remain reported. Elegance of form he is said to have inherited from both father and mother; not large, yet with more than ordinary power of limb; and the many portraits of him, in coins yet extant, so agree in advantageous representation of his features as to give assurance that his countenance was of the best models of masculine beauty. The anecdotes regarding his mind are mostly consonant enough to the character he afterward so splendidly exhibited; indicating, together with that bold and enterprising spirit which directed his brilliant course, the inheritance of a large share, conspicuous even in boyhood, of his father's uncommon readiness of judgment, and superiority of talent for communication among men. These however are unsupported by any claim of contemporary authority, nor has Arrian noticed them; one important matter only excepted, which is fully warranted, that he had the advantage of education under Aristotle, the man perhaps of the most acute and capacious mind of all the Greek philosophers from whom any writings remain, super-

the press in France, and the advantage which familiar acquaintance with a free constitution, through association in its energies, offered in England: 'Only an Englishman could write a history of Greece.' A letter from him, marking, by its conciseness, his apprehension of dilating, and obscurely indicating that his family had suffered in the recent revolution, reached me in the year 1801., when the First Consul's view of his interest led him to desire present peace with this country. The much to be lamented death of Mr. Villoison has since been announced in the newspapers. Farther of the baron of Sainte Croix my inquiries have gained me no intelligence. [During the revolution he suffered loss of property and imprisonment, and died in March 1809.]



intended by a statesman and military commander, perhaps excelled in no age anywhere, his father.

The splendid festival, which had been engaging the numerous concourse attracted by Philip's politic magnificence to the Macedonian court, ended of course abruptly on his death. Tumult, immediately ensuing, appears however to have subsided on the quickly following death of the assassin. Alexander's friends assembled about him. Arming themselves, they conducted him, according to the custom, (grown out of the frequently convulsed state of the government, and extensively the custom of early times,) in military procession to the throne, and without opposition seated him there.

In the complicated, new, and variously difficult circumstances in which Philip's tragical and wholly unexpected death left the government, Alexander's conduct, at his early age, displayed most advantageously the result of his excellent education; being indeed rather what might most be wished for than what ordinary experience among mankind would warrant to expect. What credit should be given to tales of violent preceding differences between Alexander and his father, disgraceful, if true, certainly to both, and possibly current in report in their age, though coming to us only from writers of centuries after, must be left to the judgment of their readers. But toward the justness of such judgment the combined consideration is necessary, of the state of parties in Macedonia at the time, of the common violence of faction throughout Greece, of the inducements to propagate scandal in the Grecian cities, not only as a political engine, but as a profitable merchandise,

SECT.  
I.

OL. 110.  
B. C. 336.\*

Arr. l. 1.  
c. 26.

[\* See p. 173.]

CHAP.  
XLIV.

---

The extraordinary fame acquired by that prince in early manhood would of course excite curiosity for the circumstances of his earlier years. Many accordingly remain reported. Elegance of form he is said to have inherited from both father and mother; not large, yet with more than ordinary power of limb; and the many portraits of him, in coins yet extant, so agree in advantageous representation of his features as to give assurance that his countenance was of the best models of masculine beauty. The anecdotes regarding his mind are mostly consonant enough to the character he afterward so splendidly exhibited; indicating, together with that bold and enterprising spirit which directed his brilliant course, the inheritance of a large share, conspicuous even in boyhood, of his father's uncommon readiness of judgment, and superiority of talent for communication among men. These however are unsupported by any claim of contemporary authority, nor has Arrian noticed them; one important matter only excepted, which is fully warranted, that he had the advantage of education under Aristotle, the man perhaps of the most acute and capacious mind of all the Greek philosophers from whom any writings remain, super-

the press in France, and the advantage which familiar acquaintance with a free constitution, through association in its energies, offered in England: 'Only an Englishman could write a history of Greece.' A letter from him, marking, by its conciseness, his apprehension of dilating, and obscurely indicating that his family had suffered in the recent revolution, reached me in the year 1801., when the First Consul's view of his interest led him to desire present peace with this country. The much to be lamented death of Mr. Villoison has since been announced in the newspapers. Farther of the baron of Sainte Croix my inquiries have gained me no intelligence. [During the revolution he suffered loss of property and imprisonment, and died in March 1809.]

intended by a statesman and military commander, perhaps excelled in no age anywhere, his father.

The splendid festival, which had been engaging the numerous concourse attracted by Philip's politic magnificence to the Macedonian court, ended of course abruptly on his death. Tumult, immediately ensuing, appears however to have subsided on the quickly following death of the assassin. Alexander's friends assembled about him. Arming themselves, they conducted him, according to the custom, (grown out of the frequently convulsed state of the government, and extensively the custom of early times,) in military procession to the throne, and without opposition seated him there.

In the complicated, new, and variously difficult circumstances in which Philip's tragical and wholly unexpected death left the government, Alexander's conduct, at his early age, displayed most advantageously the result of his excellent education; being indeed rather what might most be wished for than what ordinary experience among mankind would warrant to expect. What credit should be given to tales of violent preceding differences between Alexander and his father, disgraceful, if true, certainly to both, and possibly current in report in their age, though coming to us only from writers of centuries after, must be left to the judgment of their readers. But toward the justness of such judgment the combined consideration is necessary, of the state of parties in Macedonia at the time, of the common violence of faction throughout Greece, of the inducements to propagate scandal in the Grecian cities, not only as a political engine, but as a profitable merchandise,

SECT.  
I.

OL. 110.  
B. C. 336.\*

ARR. I. 1.  
c. 26.

[\* See p. 173.]



CHAP.  
XLIV.

---

which even idleness found highly alluring, of the talents of those, both politicians and traders in scandal, who had a pressing interest in spreading such tales, and of the opposite indication of Alexander's public measures, on succeeding to the throne, as they remain concurrently reported by ancient authors.

ARR. 1. 3.  
c. 6.

We have Arrian's assurance that the repudiation of Alexander's mother, and Philip's second marriage, produced, as was likely, some degree of breach between father and son; insomuch that five of Alexander's most intimate friends either were banished, or thought it prudent to withdraw from the court. Hence however it is the more to Alexander's credit that, on his father's death, no animosity appears to have influenced his measures. His father's friends and principal counsellors remained his friends and principal counsellors. Not the philosopher Aristotle only, his preceptor, but all the able statesmen and military men, whom Philip's penetration had selected, in the course of his busy reign, for his ministers, his generals, and, in all departments, his immediate assistants, were retained and principally trusted by Alexander. His young friends, who had fled from Philip's anger or suspicions, namely, Harpalus, Erigyius, Laomedon, Nearchus, and Ptolemy son of Lagus, were recalled, and we shall find all becoming afterward eminent under him; but no new man, no favourite peculiar to himself, appears to have been immediately raised to any of the first offices, civil or military.<sup>3</sup> According to custom, he was to address

<sup>3</sup> The scandal against the mother of Ptolemy, distinguished from others of that name as son of Lagus, that he was really son of king Philip, has no countenance from Arrian. Ptolemy, Warlike, appears to have been a favourite name among the Mace-



the Macedonian people; how assembled, unfortunately we fail to learn; but his father's popularity, and his claim to succeed to it, we are assured were his theme.

SECT.  
I.

---

'The king's name,' he told the anxious many, 'is changed; but the king, you shall find, remains the same.' A more powerful testimony to Philip's popularity in Macedonia, or to Alexander's respect for him, can hardly be imagined; and, though reported only by Diodorus, yet by the concurrently warranted fact, that the king's confidential assistants, Philip reigning, remained the king's confidential assistants, Alexander reigning, affords it a basis on which it well may rest.

Diod. 1.17.  
c. 2.

Funeral obsequies were of course an immediate care of the new court, and they were celebrated with just magnificence. Inquiry concerning the crime which produced the catastrophe was also immediately instituted. That a plot for a revolution had been formed seems fully indicated. Amyntas, son of Antiochus, of a branch of the royal family which had formerly claimed the throne, fled, and took his

Diod. *ibid.*

donians, and another Ptolemy son of another Philip, we shall, in the sequel, find of high rank in Alexander's army, whence possibly the careless or impudent story-mongers of antiquity may have taken their ground. A third Ptolemy, not less eminent, is distinguished as son of Seleucus. Gronovius has given a note on these several contemporary Ptolemies, altogether good, but stating a difficulty about the time of the appointment of Ptolemy son of Lagus to the confidential office of *σωματοφύλαξ*, lord body-warden, the solution of which appears to me obvious. Arrian has meant, in the sixth chapter of his third book, where he mentions the recal of Alexander's five fugitive friends, to speak only generally of the dignities to which they were afterward raised: in the twenty-sixth chapter of the same book he mentions the occasion on which Ptolemy son of Lagus was appointed lord body-warden, as he had also mentioned the promotion of Harpalus, and the others, as it occurred.

residence at Ephesus, then ruled by an aristocratical party, under patronage of the Persian court. Heromenes, Arrhabæus, and Alexander, sons of Aeropus, of another branch, had been engaged in the plot, according to Arrian, notoriously. Nevertheless, whatever information the inquiry produced, severities appear to have been avoided. Even the retreat of Amyntas from Macedonia was, the historian says, the result rather of disgust than apprehension. Alexander, son of Aeropus, had been among the foremost, on Philip's death, to attend his son in procession to the throne; and this the young king magnanimously accepted as atonement, insomuch that he not only forgave the discovered treason, but continued to receive his kinsman and namesake as a friend, and even distinguished him with favours.

Quiet being preserved in Macedonia, which, according to Plutarch, not without large confirmation from Arrian, had been formidably threatened<sup>4</sup>, Alex-

<sup>4</sup> ... Προδοσίαι ... Πᾶσα δὲ ἕπουλος ἡ Μακεδονία πρὸς Ἀμύνταν ἀποβλέπουσα καὶ τοὺς Ἀερόπου παῖδας. Plut. de Fort. Alex. p. 327. Diodorus relates that Attalus, commanding jointly with Parmenio in lesser Asia, engaged in treasonable practices, of which information was given to Alexander; that Hecatæus was sent with a considerable body of troops to arrest, or, if that could not be, to dispatch Attalus by assassination, *δολοφονῆσαι*, and that in consequence Attalus was assassinated. Here it may be observed that the march of troops into Asia under Hecatæus, if real, would be notorious, and the death of a man of Attalus's eminence would be notorious. But conspiracy and assassination are commonly secret matters, which nevertheless Diodorus has had the habit of reporting with as much assurance as if he were himself an accomplice. Neither Arrian, nor even Plutarch, though mentioning other conspirators, have a word about the conspiracy or assassination of Attalus, which Arrian, had he given any credit to it, would the less have omitted to notice, on account of that eminent person's situation in military command.

ander and his able council could direct their views abroad. Among the people of the Grecian republics the news of Philip's death could not but make great impression; exciting great fears in one party, and great hopes in the other. The party depressed by the event of the battle of Chæronea still held, through the liberality of the conqueror, and the vigour of the Grecian institutions and character, almost all its former means; and it was still headed by the most renowned orator and politician the world had known. This party would of course look eagerly for opportunity to recover its lost eminence. The other party which had been relieved by the prevalence which that battle gave to the politics of Isocrates and Phocion, would look with terror toward a return of the democratical oppression which remains exhibited to us, in pictures from the life, by the correct hands of Isocrates himself and of Xenophon. The immediate measures of Demosthenes at Athens, formerly noticed, were then as a signal for his party throughout Greece to rally and prepare for action, and for those who dreaded democratical empire to tremble.

Ch. 42. s. 7.  
of this Hist.

The attention of Alexander's council was first directed, as first required, more especially to Thesaly; the oldest, the closest, and the most valuable ally of the Macedonian kingdom. There fortunately that attachment to the reigning branch of the Macedonian royal family, which had enabled Alexander's

Farther reasons might be adduced for discrediting Diodorus's tale, for which however among the various and contradictory histories of Alexander which disgusted Arrian he may probably enough have found what he thought authority to be followed. But as, even in his account, the circumstances had no consequences, though perhaps requiring this notice, they seemed no object for the text.



CHAP.  
XLIV.

grandfather to recover his lost throne, was found remaining in vigour; and, by election of the general assembly of the states, Alexander succeeded to the honours and power enjoyed by his father; nowhere distinctly described by ancient writers, but sufficiently marked as including, with the military command in chief, a presidency also in the political administration. Apparently it was the office and dignity to which the title of *Tagus*, peculiar to the Thessalian constitution, was appropriated; a title familiar with Xenophon, but neglected by writers under the Roman empire, our principal informants for the history of these times; even the Greeks being then become careless of Thessalian titles and of the long-perished constitution itself to which they belonged. The Thessalian states moreover assured Alexander of their support for his election to the greater office, held also by his father, of commander in chief and head of the confederacy of all Greece.<sup>5</sup>

This ready success was of very great importance; not only for the high value of the connexion with Thessaly, but as necessary toward the maintenance of the connexion formed by Philip with all southern Greece. Alexander could now proceed securely to Thermopylæ, where the Amphictyonic council was assembled, in which, without opposition, as far as we are informed, he took his inherited seat. This again was an important step toward what was next in view, his election to the office of stateholder and military commander in chief of the confederacy of the Greek

<sup>5</sup> Πρώτους δὲ Θετταλοὺς ὑπομνήσας τῆς ἀρχαίας ἀφ' Ἡρακλέους συγγενείας, καὶ λόγοις φιλανθρώποις, ἔτι δὲ μεγάλαις ἐπαγγελίαις, μετεωρίσας, ἔπεισε τὴν πατροπαράδοτον ἡγεμονίαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος αὐτῷ συγχωρῆσαι, κοινῶ τῆς Θετταλίας δόγματι. Dioid. l. 17. c. 4.



nation. In opposition to this Demosthenes was continuing to exert all his abilities and all his diligence. The moment, highly critical for both king and people of Macedonia, was perhaps yet more awful for every thinking man of every Grecian republic. Vehemently as all who had concurred in politics with Isocrates dreaded the restoration of empire to the Athenian democracy, and miserable as the view was of returning to that state of division, jealousy, fear, trouble, and various wars which, with the flattering name of universal independency, had followed the battle of Mantinea, and much as many might have been hitherto satisfied with the prospect under the Macedonian supremacy, doubts and fears could not but arise, when, for the known talents, the large experience, and the tried liberality of the late king, it remained, in the existing most critical circumstances, to see what would be the character and what the conduct of a youth scarcely beyond boyhood. This chance however, notwithstanding every exertion of Demosthenes in opposition, obtained the general suffrage. According to established usage of the Grecian republics among themselves, those states which proposed to maintain, with the new king, the treaties of friendship and alliance made with his predecessor, should send embassies to assure him of it, carrying compliments of congratulation on his accession. From the republics which had already profited from the Macedonian alliance to secure them against the dominion of the democratical leaders at Athens, embassies were hastened, and quickly the measure became general. Alexander received all with an engaging attention, referring always to his father's popularity in Greece, to which he declared his earnest desire to

CHAP.  
XLIV.

succeed.<sup>6</sup> Athens, omitting to concur in this compliment, might fear to remain alone in a situation indicating hostile purpose. At length therefore it was decreed that an embassy should carry the congratulation of the Athenian people to Alexander, with the profession of desire to maintain the friendly connexion formed with the late king his father.

Athens having thus concurred in friendly communication, nothing remained to forbid the proposal of a meeting of all the republics, by their representatives in congress, conformably to former practice, to consult on common concerns; and the war already begun with Persia pressingly required such consultation in common. Corinth therefore was named for the place of meeting; preferred, apparently, by Alexander now, as by Philip formerly, not only as, by its situation on the isthmus, most equally convenient for the republics within and without the peninsula of Peloponnesus, but also because, being deep among them, and far from Macedonia, it was of all convenient places, the least liable to jealousy of the interference of an over-awing power that might control freedom of debate. Accordingly, as the proposal formerly to confer on Philip the military command of the whole nation had been freely and warmly opposed by the deputies of some of the Arcadian towns, so now the Lacedæmonian deputies not only declared their dissent, but asserted a right of superiority in their own state. Not unreasonably indeed it might be expected that the kings of Lacedæmon, and with them all the Spartan

Arr. 1. 1.  
c. 1.

<sup>6</sup> . . . ταῖς πρεσβείαις χρηματίσας φιλανθρώπως, παρεκάλεσε τοὺς Ἕλληνας τηρεῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν τὴν πατροπαράδοτον εὐνοίαν. Dioid. 1. 17. c. 2.

elderhood, accustomed to hold imperial dignity and power among the republics, though in adverse circumstances they had conceded the point to Philip's mature talents and wide fame, would be indignant at the proposal for a Macedonian youth hardly beyond boyhood. The terms in which their dissent is reported to have been declared are consonant to all we read of the combined pride and coldness of the Spartan character: 'It had been the custom of the Lacedæmonians,' they said, 'to obey none, but on the contrary it was their admitted privilege to lead others.' Alexander nevertheless was chosen by a great majority.

The opposition of Lacedæmon, alone noticed by extant writers, but concerning which and its sequel all concur, affords most satisfactory evidence of an important historical truth, namely that Alexander's election was the result of choice in the republics, and that the reports of some ancients, the favourite authorities of many moderns, that a military force attending him left the assembly no freedom of choice, have been merely the malicious calumnies of a disappointed party. That some votes were decided by fear is not improbable. Fear of one another we have continually seen a powerful agent among the Grecian republics; but no account of any value shows it in any degree likely that Alexander had led any army from Macedonia, or had even collected any among the friendly republics. The freedom of the assembly indeed is warranted, not only by what all admit, the declared dissent of the Lacedæmonian deputies, but still more by what followed. The Lacedæmonian government not merely avowed its approbation of the conduct of its deputies, but refused obedience to the decree of the congress of the nation, denying its contingent of



CHAP.  
XLIV.

---

troops for the army to be employed in the common cause against the foreign enemy. If blame were imputable to the Macedonian administration, it may seem to be for an over-scrupulous lenity, in refraining from any measures against Lacedæmon for such contumacy. What indeed, in the instance immediately before us, should have been the course for the superintending administration to take, might probably have been matter of much question among even the most dispassionate Greeks of that day. The most regular in theory apparently was to refer the matter to the council of Amphictyons. But the revival of this course by the Thebans, after long disuse, had produced the Sacred war, which would not recommend it; and the composition of that council, we have observed, was indeed not such as could make it a satisfactory or fit tribunal for decision of such causes. Looking then for precedent to former times, even those usually called the best times of Greece, we have seen the Lacedæmonian oligarchy taking upon itself, on two occasions, to punish with death the leading men of Thebes, and on a third a large portion of the male population of Platæa; and we have seen the less scrupulous democracy of Athens, in the three instances of Scione, Melos, and Sestus, not only murdering the whole male population, but selling all the women and children to slavery; a fate decreed also for Mitylene, though not executed. Such conduct would have been perhaps as little prudent for Alexander as fitting in itself. Possibly then the young prince and his council took the wisest and best course, in avoiding any measures against Lacedæmon; not so much as reproach or remonstrance remain reported; and this forbearance appears consonant to the whole conduct of the congress, as far



as accounts go; marking, in those who led its councils, a scrupulous respect for a free constitution, and prudence derived from practice in communication with a free people. On this subject farther light will come from events at intervals following.<sup>7</sup>

For the moment it appears that matters were advantageously composed, quiet being established throughout Greece. War with Persia remained in the contemplation of all, to be conducted by a youth of twenty, as commander in chief. Asia, as we have formerly seen, was always a favourite field for Grecian adventurers in arms; and youths, and possibly some beyond early youth, eager for adventure, might reckon their personal chance of advantage not less

<sup>7</sup> Arrian, whose principal object has been a military history of Alexander, is very concise on the business at Corinth, as having nothing of military character. But his account, and equally that of Diodorus, implies that an army was needless, and that any show of military force would have been adverse to Alexander's purpose, which evidently was to conciliate the republican Greeks, as his father had conciliated them. Plutarch gives a very different picture, in his too usual way; lively, but without regard either to authority or probability, and without just consideration even of the honour of his fellow-countrymen, which it was his constant purpose to exalt. Alexander, he says, by the suddenness and rapidity with which he led a Macedonian army into Bœotia and onward, deterred opposition. Those who, adverting to the common character of Plutarch's narrative, will consider at the same time what Demosthenes has said about Macedonian troops in Greece, and what even were the probable means of Alexander for leading an overbearing army thither, may estimate for themselves the credit due to him in this instance. But Diodorus, without notice of any military force under Alexander in Thessaly, places him at the head of an army in Bœotia. Apparently here, as the learned Dodwell says of him on another occasion, Diodorus has confounded times and circumstances. On a following occasion we shall find Alexander, in Arrian's account, consistently with all probability, at the head of an army in Bœotia.

CHAP.  
XLIV.

---

for the change of their expected leader from a prince of consummate experience in politics and war for one so new in both. Preparation therefore was zealously put forward among the republics, while, in autumn already advanced, Alexander, returning into Macedonia, directed his attention to the same point there.

## SECTION II.

*Unquiet state of Greece: Macedonia threatened by the northern nations: Measures of Demosthenes: war in Thrace; on the Danube; in Illyria.*

THE decision of the congress at Corinth, that the supremacy in the confederacy of Grecian states, formerly held successively by Lacedæmon, Athens, and Thebes, and recently by Philip king of Macedonia, should be continued to the Macedonian monarchy in the person of the youthful Alexander, relieved that large part of the nation connected by interest and concurring in sentiment with Isocrates and Phocion of Athens from the fearful alternative of subjection to the rod of democratical empire, or an immediate renewal of contest in arms to avoid it. Circumstances nevertheless remained of anxious aspect. War was to be diverted from Greece by being carried into Asia, a wide and alluring field for the range of unquiet spirits; some of whom the quiet perhaps might be glad to spare; and on this ground Isocrates had recommended war against Persia. But Isocrates was no more, and the prince in whom he had confided for the advantageous execution of a great enterprise, and who had respected him, was no more. Thinking men, among the Greeks, might feel somewhat the less, through the habit of untoward prospect; yet, that so

much depended on a youth of twenty, however advantageously he might have shown himself in various communication on arduous and difficult matters, would remain an awful consideration ; while the consummate politician, who, in his public speeches, had not scrupled to boast of his connexion with the Persian court and of his means to employ Persian wealth to promote the interest of his party, remained the leader of that still powerful party. Should the war be successful, the ultimate result was doubtful: on the other hand, should it be unfortunate, the lot of the now prevailing party could hardly fail to be wretched.

Before the usual season for beginning military operations however, intelligence reached the Macedonian government, and quickly became public, which imperiously checked the prosecution of purposes previously entertained, and made most serious consideration of new measures necessary. Concert among the nearly surrounding barbarous nations had been so ably managed, that Macedonia was at once threatened on three sides ; on the west by the Illyrians, on the north by the Triballians and those Thracians whom the Greeks distinguished by the epithet autonomous, or independent, and on the east by men whom Arrian distinguishes only by the title of traders, but whom his phrase, describing their armour, suffices to mark for Greeks.<sup>8</sup>

About the Grecian seas we have formerly observed men abounding, in character resembling the pirates of the same seas in modern ages, or the buccaneers of the western Indies, and not widely differing from European smugglers, or mixing those characters ; all mariners, and many of them traders by profession,

<sup>8</sup> Ὀπλισμένοι.



CHAP.  
XLIV.

Ch. 40. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

but robbers when opportunity offered ; originally subjects of various states, but owning allegiance, unless for present profit or present distress, to none. When Athens was all-powerful at sea, it was the interest of the Athenian government to hold such people in order. But, among the deficiencies of democratical government, we find strongly represented by Demosthenes himself, that less than any other government could it restrain the irregularities of those to whom it committed authority. Thus irregular traders and even pirates were commonly licensed by the Athenian naval commanders for their own profit and that of those who served under them. The reduction then of all the little commercial and piratical republics of the northern shores of the Ægean under the superintendence of the Macedonian government, which commanded the land and was also powerful at sea, gave a new check to the opportunities of the piratical and smuggling traders, evidently a powerful set of men. Thus they would be prepared for connexion with the anti-Macedonian party in Greece, especially at Athens, to whom their habits of communication, in the way of trade, with the barbarians of the northern continent, would, among other considerations, make them objects to cultivate an interest with.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> ‘ Difficilior, cogitanti mihi, scopulus est, quid hoc loco faciant mercatores,’ Gronovii annot. in Arr. l. i. c. 1. I am disposed to give credit to annotators who will notice difficulties which they cannot solve. Of the difficulties here I commit my solution to those who will study the history of the Greek republics among the contemporary writers. The phrase *Ὅσα πυκνοτέρα τῆ φάλαγγι*, the subject of the learned editor’s next note, seems, for explanation, only to require what he appears to have omitted, attention to the order stated by Arrian to have been given by Alexander, *λύσαι τὴν τάξιν*.



Demosthenes was at this time exerting his utmost diligence to excite troubles for Macedonia. He did not scruple to make common cause with the Persian satraps for the purpose of making his party the commanding party among the Greek republics. Writing to the Persian satraps of the western provinces, he urged them to use the advantages of the moment, when a boy of contemptible talents was captain-general of the Greeks.<sup>19</sup> Though not remaining directly said, it seems largely indicated, that Demosthenes was the politician who brought about the northern confederacy, and that the traders were his agents for the extensive communication managed among the barbarous nations. Influence failed with the eastern Thracians. These perhaps, both chiefs and people, found the dominion of the Macedonian king not less liberal than either that formerly of their great sovereigns, Teres and his successors, of their own nation, or, as far as it had been experienced among them, that of the imperial people of Athens. Habitually and perhaps constitutionally impatient of peace, they might look toward war in Asia, in fellowship with the Macedonians, as likely to afford gratification in its way, beyond any other. But the traders gained those Thracians of the northern highlands, whom the Greeks styled independent. This title seems to have been given them, not because they had a freer government, or were less dependent on foreign powers, but because they had avoided political connexion with the great body of the Thracian people. Beyond the independent Thracians, northward and westward, was the country of the Triballians, extending from the northern boundary of Macedonia to the Danube. These had been among the most formidable of the

Plut. v.  
Demosth.  
p. 856.  
Diod. Arr.

<sup>19</sup> Παῖδα καὶ μαργίτην ἀποκαλῶν αὐτόν. Plut. v. Demosth. p. 856.

people with whom Philip was engaged in his war with the northern nations. They acknowledged monarchical government. Whether the condition of the many had been worse or better since Philip's victories extended his power among them, their king's ambition however would be checked and his importance lessened. From whatever motives, the negotiation of the traders was successful here : together with the independent Thracians, the king of the Triballians became their ally for the purpose of war with Macedonia.

In this critical emergency, the defence of Macedonia against the Illyrians, who most threatened immediate inroad, was committed to Parmenio\* ; who, in the late king's estimation, was the ablest general of the age. Alexander himself took the lead of the army for the offensive war, which it was judged advisable to hasten against the Grecian enemy, apparently rebelling subjects, the traders. Their purpose seems to have been to seize some strong maritime position, perhaps Amphipolis itself, which might ensure their communication with the sea, and with any maritime allies, Athens especially ; while the Macedonian arms, as they hoped, would be required for defensive war against the Illyrians and Triballians.

[\* A writer in the Quarterly Review, (Vol. XXV. p. 161.), has pointed out the inconsistency of this passage with a statement subsequently made, near the commencement of s. 1. ch. 46. It is there said that, 'during Alexander's wars with the northern people and in Greece, Parmenio maintained himself in Ætolia with the small force which had been placed under his orders by Philip.' This accords with what is found in Diodorus, xvii. 7. Ἄμα δὲ τούτοις πραττομένοις Παρμενίων Γρύνιον μὲν πόλιν ἔλων κατὰ κράτος ἔξηνδραποδίσατο. Πιτάνην δὲ πόλιος κούντος αὐτοῦ, κ. τ. λ. And Mr. Mitford, in note 3, on s. 2. ch. 46, expresses his satisfaction that the narratives of Diodorus and Arrian 'meet in perfect harmony.']

But the rapidity with which Alexander assembled an army at Amphipolis so disconcerted them that they abandoned, not only the coast, but all the rich plain, left Philippi and its gold-mines, among the lower hills, behind them, and withdrew to the mountains ; where, in a situation singularly strong, they were joined by their barbarian allies.

Arrian attributes to Alexander himself the bold, perhaps rash measure of attacking them there. In modern times missile weapons, of power beyond the imagination of former ages, give, to the more civilized, a decided superiority over uncultivated nations. In antiquity, on the contrary, a superior defensive armour, and a tactic adapted to close fighting, principally set the Greek above the barbarian. The shield of the Grecian heavy-armed was very large and strong : the Macedonian, improved whether by Archelaus or by Philip, was superiorly so ; and, being rectangular, formed, in close array, a kind of wall. The Macedonian phalanx thus, with its long spears, powerful to offend where it could reach, was, on even ground, nearly invulnerable. But it had eminently the defect of unfitness to act on broken ground. There, the arrangement of the shields becoming necessarily disordered, the soldier was exposed to wounds from missile weapons, unable to return them. The traders were heavy-armed, and formed in phalanx, but too weak in numbers to meet the Macedonians in open field. The Thracians, apparently numerous, were, by the custom of their nation, middle-armed, and excelled in that discipline. Carrying, for defence, a target or small shield, for offence two javelins, though utterly incapable of standing the shock of the phalanx, yet they could wound from a distance ; and when opportunity for this failed, they



CHAP.  
XLIV.

---

could, by their lightness, avoid action with the heavy-armed. Suited thus for highland warfare, they were especially qualified to support the small body of their heavy-armed allies, in guarding the pass. The traders and Thracians together then took their station on the verge of a quick declivity, where the road was inclosed between precipices. There they formed a rampart of waggons; and placed, before these, other waggons, prepared to be set in motion down the steep, so as to act as an artillery against an approaching enemy.

Alexander, informed of all circumstances, in giving orders for assault upon a force so advantageously posted, and in so uncommon a manner prepared, directed that his phalangites, in advancing, should observe carefully the ground and its resources; and that, when the waggons should be put in motion, all who could find security from projections of rock should hasten to such shelter, and that the rest should lie flat on the ground, covering themselves with their compacted shields. Arrian, himself an experienced officer and an eminent tactician, and professing to follow the narratives of generals who served under Alexander, proceeds to say this was so executed that the greater part of the road remained clear while the waggons rolled down the hill, and that, of the soldiers reduced to depend upon their shields for protection, none were killed. The momentary danger being over, the phalanx rapidly formed, and advanced, giving the regular military shout, while the bowmen whose shots far exceeded the cast of the Thracian javelin, discharged their arrows from behind, and from the heights on each side. Alexander's bold and active temper would not allow him to be merely a spectator of the action, in

Arr. l. 1.  
c. 1.



an age when it was usual for commanding generals to be personally engaged. He took himself the lead of a body of heavy-armed foot, distinguished by the title of hypaspists, who seem to have been selected for their ability for rapid movement in complete armour, and, with these, the Agrians, who were, like the Thracians, middle-armed. The enemy, disheartened by the failure of effect of their stratagem, galled by missile weapons, unqualified to stand the shock of the phalanx in front, and attacked by Alexander in flank, took to precipitate flight, abandoning their camp, in which were their women and children, constant companions of the wild hordes in their warfare. These, with the attending slaves, less unhappy in their change of lot, would be probably the most valuable portion of the booty; the whole of which was presently sent off under an escort to be sold among the Grecian towns of the coast, for the benefit of the victorious army.

The extensive territory of the Triballians, reaching to the Danube, was now open to the Macedonian arms; and if the chief desired to carry war thither, the recent event might have sufficed to make a short-sighted soldiery willing. But the country was not without inviting circumstances; mostly plain, of highly fruitful soil; and, though its people were without science, and little versed in arts of luxury, yet they were not without what, with the natural advantages, supported a large population; so that, not only subsistence might be gained by the sword, but also booty, which the institutions of the Grecian republics made of sure value; men, women, and children for the slave-markets. It appears probable, from the sequel, that assurance had been received of the safety of Mace-

Arr. 1.1.  
c.2.

CHAP.  
XLIV.

---

donia under the able management of Parmenio.\* Thus Alexander's immediate counsellors, with a view to check future attempts against their country, might be led to approve the ambition natural for a youth of Alexander's age, to emulate his father's glory, and, like him, carry war as far as the Danube. Such an expedition, it appears, had been so far provided for that vessels, adapted to the navigation, had been ordered from Byzantium to proceed up that river. The army then descending from the mountains, the Triballians were so aware of the inferiority of their arms and discipline for contest in the plains that without an attempt to defend their cultivated fields, they fled with what property they could carry, their king Syrmus leading. The islands of their great boundary river were their first choice for refuge; but these not sufficing for all, the remainder occupied the extensive woods and marshes on the banks of the Lyginus, a tributary stream.<sup>11</sup> Uneasy however there, and in want, they issued to attack the invaders, but were defeated, with much slaughter. Alexander then, in a march of three days, reaching the Danube, made an attempt upon one of the islands; but his vessels not sufficing to carry a competent force at once, the garrison was too strong for him, and he received a check.

Beyond the Danube was the country of the Getes or Goths. Degrees of barbarism were not in those parts, it appears, to be measured by degrees of latitude, or distance from Greece. Circumstances re-

[\* See p. 304.]

<sup>11</sup> There is, in our copies of Arrian, an error of transcribers here, for which Gronovius has proposed an ingenious and probably just correction, which has been adopted for the text.

ported by Arrian would indicate the Getes to have been of more settled life, and thence more civilized, than the concurring accounts of the three early historians, all personally acquainted with the Thracians, represent that nation; even the part bordering on the Grecian colonies. Where Alexander reached the Danube, the land beyond was, in Arrian's account, to a great extent, as one field of wheat, of the most luxuriant growth. Skilled therefore apparently not inconsiderably in husbandry, but ignorant of navigation, beyond that of a canoe, the Getes depended upon their great river for complete security against invasion from the southward. But Alexander had provided means beyond their contemplation. The vessels from the Euxine were capable of carrying horses, and such they had never before seen. Fifteen hundred cavalry were thus put across, apparently by night, while four thousand foot also passed; some in canoes of the country, and the rest on skins, the soldier's ordinary bed, stuffed with straw. Arrived thus on Gothic ground, not far from the capital city, which stood, not on the river, but near it, the corn was found of height to conceal the march of the infantry. The Getes had assembled, according to report, to the number of ten thousand foot and four thousand horse. The phalanx, on emerging from the corn, presently took the closest order. Advancing then with shields hardly admitting any sight of what bore them, and with spears presented in even line, the cavalry at the same time moving with a regularity wholly new to the Getes, previously wondering how such a force could so suddenly cross their great barrier of water, in extreme surprise and alarm they fled. Their capital was unfortified, having been supposed safe, with the river on one side, and

CHAP.  
XLIV.

---

an extent of their own country on all others. It was now abandoned, and so hastily that booty was found there in kind and amount highly gratifying to the Macedonians.

Though provocation to this hazardous enterprise is little intimated by the historian, yet its policy perhaps may be gathered from the result. Gratification to the soldier by booty we have often had occasion to observe a common and even necessary object in ancient warfare ; and the attainment of this, in a situation and by means so unlooked for, and with so many apparent obstacles overcome, would promote the notion that nothing was impossible for the army under its bold and fortunate young commander. Yet it may possibly not have been with any direct view to such an enterprise that his able counsellors procured vessels from the Euxine to be brought, by a laborious and hazardous navigation, so far against the stream, but rather to ensure a supply of provisions for the army in a hostile country, so remote and so little known, or means of retreat in case of misfortune. Conquest, to be retained beyond the Danube, was evidently not the purpose. The body of the army quickly recrossed the river, leaving the care of the booty to a detachment, which hastily followed with it.

Advantage from these measures, so largely successful, soon became manifest. The hazardous enterprise beyond the Danube might have afforded hope, for Syrmus and the Triballians, of delivery from an overbearing enemy ; but the rapid return of the victorious army produced such despondency that Syrmus presently sent an embassy to ask respectfully upon what terms he might have peace for himself and his people ; and, shortly after, ministers came



from all the surrounding states, professing the purpose of friendship, and desiring a return of it. A kind of congress was thus formed, in which the ministers of the Celts, or Gauls, the extent of whose settlements, in this age, eastward of that afterward called Cisalpine Gaul, is unascertained, were noticed for the lofty tone with which they offered friendship, anxious at the same time to obviate hostility.<sup>12</sup> All were so received that treaties of peace and friendship were concluded with all, sanctioned, for each nation, by its peculiar religious solemnities.

SECT.  
II.

Arr. l. 1.  
c. 3.  
Strab. l. 7.

The confederated powers westward of Macedonia, the Illyrians, under Clitus son of Bardylis, and the Taulantians under Glaucias, though they had been foremost to threaten, had still delayed to act. Apparently they had been disconcerted by the early and complete overthrow of their allies on the eastern side, the Thracians and traders. After the quickly ensuing defeat of the Triballians, they might have expected invasion of their own country to be the next object of the victorious army. But information that Alexander was engaged in the hazardous project of carrying war beyond the Danube, with perhaps exaggerated intelligence of difficulties and dangers deep in the northern continent, encouraged them in

<sup>12</sup> The account of the embassy of the Gauls, in which Arrian and Strabo concur, the latter informs us, was from Ptolemy. It is left uncertain where exactly this branch of the widely-spread nation of the Celts lived; and it seems a little presumptuous in some modern authors, I think the respectable Guischart among them, on such grounds as moderns can have, to deny a fact so warranted as this embassy. Were Ptolemy's authority not in itself sufficient, Strabo and Arrian were likely to be as well qualified to judge of it on the score of probability as any moderns; at least they would have more ground within their reach.

CHAP.  
XLIV.

---

their former purpose of invading Macedonia, and enabled them to induce neighbours, before hesitating, to favour their purpose. From their own mountains they could descend with their light troops into the Macedonian plains; while the Macedonian phalanx could not, with any ease or security, enter their country, but through that of the Autariats. These, apparently subjects of the Macedonian crown, but holding their own free constitution, were engaged to refuse passage for a Macedonian army. The confederated princes then formally renounced the alliance concluded with the late king of Macedonia, Philip; and, for their losses of power and dominion sustained from him, proposed to revenge themselves on his son.

Alexander had fortunately settled, and mostly concluded, treaties of friendship with all the northern powers, when information of this revived danger for Macedonia reached him. His temper, stimulated by recent success, would want no urging to adopt the advice of able counsellors, that the best defence for a country, threatened with invasion, was to give the enemy employment at home. But the contumacy of the Autariats was an obstacle requiring the first attention. Fortunately among the friends about him was one who best could obviate it. Bordering on the country of the Autariats was that of the Agrians; within the Macedonian kingdom, but themselves not of Grecian race. Nevertheless their prince, Langarus, now serving with Alexander, had been his companion from boyhood. Bred in the Macedonian court, Langarus yet was popular in his principality. Undertaking that the Agrians should so keep the Autariats in awe as to prevent any serious opposition to the Macedonian army in traversing their country,

Arr. 1. 1.  
c. 5.

Strab. 1. 7.

he effected what he promised. Here we find marked, at the same time, something of the liberal constitution of the Macedonian kingdom and of the liberal character of Philip's policy. The hereditary chief of a distant province, which seems to have been much in the circumstances of our counties palatine of old, was so made his own and his son's friend that, holding power to be a valuable friend, he had the disposition also.

Thus relieved from a threatening difficulty, Alexander advanced into Illyria so speedily as to reach Pellion, the capital, before the promised assistance of the Taulantians had joined the Illyrian forces. Clitus therefore, fearing to meet the Macedonians in the field, directed his attention to the protection of the city; and with this view took a position so advantageous that Alexander, ably advised, rather than attack him there, proceeded to plunder the country around. Thus, while his own army was gratified, the Illyrians, naturally impatient of confinement in a stationary camp, became so irritated that their prince could no longer restrain them; they would be led to battle. Yielding then to the pressure of the moment, against his opinion of what prudence required, he sought to obtain from the favour of his gods a success of which, with his human means, he had no clear hope. The singular and horrid rite is said to have been of ancient custom in the country: three boys, three girls, and three black rams were, with prescribed ceremonies, killed together at the altars. His army then quitted its advantageous position, confident of divine favour. But no courage, no enthusiasm could enable men, with the Illyrian arms and discipline, to contend with the Macedonian phalanx on ground suited to its action. The Illyrians, overborne, took

CHAP.  
XLIV.ART. I. I.  
c. 6.

to profuse flight ; and, their camp becoming the prey of the conquerors, the relics of the victims of the abominable sacrifice, found there, assured the Macedonians of the truth of what had been related to them.

The arrival of Glaucias however, soon after, with the Taulantian army, gave encouragement and opportunity for the dispersed Illyrians to reassemble under their king. The country abounded with rugged mountains and productive valleys ; affording thus choice of strong posts, and abundant subsistence for forces holding them. It was that country which, in a modern age, became famous through the stand made against the Turks, in the fulness of their power, by another Alexander, commonly described by his name in the Turkish corruption, Scanderbeg, and which the exertions of the Turkish empire, surrounding it, have never yet been able completely to subdue. Here the united Illyrians and Taulantians took a position so strong that the Macedonians again judged attack upon them unadvisable. But while they hesitated, scarcity, especially of forage, began to press ; for all near had been carried off by the enemy, and opportunity for wide range of cavalry was not open here as among the northern plains : abundance was to be obtained only by going far, and not so without venturing through dangerous passes, among lofty mountains and extensive woods. The arms, and the art of war, of the Illyrians and Taulantians, ill adapted for pitched battle, were excellent for harassing an enemy. The combined kings therefore would not quit their strong position ; but so watched opportunities for partial action that at length it was judged necessary for almost the whole of the Macedonian horse to go out in body for supplies. Its return, so



ably the enemy's measures had been concerted, was intercepted. The commanding officer's vigilance avoided a snare prepared for him ; but he could not advance without meeting destruction almost 'certain. He took a position however which he maintained till the whole Macedonian infantry was led to his relief. By an able movement then, though not without both difficulty and hazard, employment was so found for the enemy that the cavalry, yet still not without difficulty and hazard, at length joined the infantry and immediate danger ended.

Want however pressed more than ever, and opportunity for advantageous action the wary enemy as much denied as ever. The resource at length was a feigned flight. The enemy followed ; but cautiously, keeping the highlands. Little regularly disciplined, but, taught by severe experience, they had, since their defeat, been obedient to their prudent leaders. But now, supposing victory in their hands, they could no longer be restrained to due observance of order. And here we find illustration of what was observed in treating of the Thracian constitution, that wherever the people are the army, popular power will ensure popular freedom. Irregular and defective as the Illyrian constitution may have been, the monarchy was not absolute. Probably Alexander's able advisers may have reckoned upon the licentious use of popular power by the Illyrians, and possibly they may have hoped for the farther advantage which ensued. Clitus and Glaucias, not remitting their caution so as to quit the hills, yet either misjudged in choosing a station, or, in failure of one directly in their course such as they might desire, they ventured to encamp for once upon disadvantageous ground.

Ch. 43. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

Alexander, with his forces ably disposed for the purpose, attacking them there, put them completely to rout. Clitus retreated to his capital; but, whether more doubting the strength of its fortifications, or the fidelity of his people, when the disgrace of defeat had befallen him, and the pressure of a victorious enemy irritated them, he presently fled after his ally, Glaucias, who had withdrawn into his own country.

Whether any treaty of peace with either princes or people followed this victory, the historian, attentive principally to military affairs, and attracted by the importance of what occurred elsewhere, has omitted to say. Intelligence reached Alexander of commotions in Greece; so serious that composition with the Illyrians and their allies was highly desirable. The recent victory afforded facilities, and hard conditions appear not to have been insisted on. It seems likely that Alexander, deferring to able counsellors, was satisfied to have the treaty which had been made with his father, with little variation, renewed, and that the Illyrian and Taulantian princes, reckoning it fortunate that their unsuccessful aggression produced no worse consequences, gladly rested on it; for, as far as the silence of historians may afford indication, the Macedonian western border remained in peace.

## SECTION III.

*Combination among the Grecian republics under Demosthenes: revolution of Thebes: Greece again divided against itself: destruction of Thebes: composition with Athens, Elea, and Ætolia, and peace restored throughout Greece. Repetition of the Macedonian Olympic festival.*

IT was thus Alexander's fortune now, as in his wars with the northern nations, that the enemies by whom he had been pressed were already brought to terms of accommodation, when new ones required his utmost attention. The disposition of the party in Athens, adverse to the Macedonian alliance, had been so openly demonstrated in the conduct of Demosthenes, its principal leader, and the connexion of that party with a party in almost every republic of the nation was of such notoriety, and its connexion also with the Persian court had been so avowed, that Alexander's able council could not be wholly unprepared to expect adverse movements among the Grecian republics. The absence of the authority, chosen by the congress of the nation to moderate between discordant republics and contending parties, affording opportunities, the circumstances of Greece were become as uneasy and threatening for families of property, and for domestic life altogether, as in any period described by Xenophon or Isocrates.

At this time, according to Plutarch, in consonance with all other writers, Demosthenes held a complete superiority in the Athenian assembly; yet the combination that he had been able to form within Greece appears not so extensive as to have been formidable to the Macedonian confederacy, had it not been supported by powerful connexions abroad. According

SECT.  
III.

---

Plut. v.  
Demosth.  
p. 856.

CHAP.  
XLIV.

Plut. v.  
Demosth.  
p. 855, 856.

Ch. 39. s. 8.  
of this Hist.

to Plutarch he had such consideration at the Persian court that rescripts had reached the satraps, commanding their attention to him as agent for the affairs of the empire with the Grecian republics, and prescribing the sums of money which they should advance him for the service. Of all the jarring portions of the Greek nation, nowhere was opposition in politics so violent as at Thebes ; nowhere, in one party, such vehemence of attachment to the politics of Demosthenes ; in the other, to the patronage of the king of Macedonia. From earliest history indeed no part of Greece appears to have been the scene of such constant and violent hostilities within itself as Bœotia. In the fabulous ages it afforded principal subjects for the tragic poets : within historical times, nowhere else do we read of the fate of Grecian towns, suffered from Greeks of the same province and political association and claim of common rights and common lineage, like that of Plataæa, or Thespiæ, and, even while Pelopidas and Epaminondas were, if not the leaders on the occasion, yet among the leading men, that of Orchomenus. On the conclusion of the Sacred war, the interest of Thebes, then the ally of Macedonia, prevented, as we have seen, the rebuilding of Thespiæ and Plataæa, and the restoration of Orchomenians and others, banished for opposition to Thebes. Through the battle of Chæronea afterward these benefits were obtained, and all the Bœotian towns were delivered from the dominion of the Theban people. Philip superintending, a liberality, unusual in Grecian politics, was extended to the defeated party : few or none were banished ; enjoyment of civil rights was engaged for to all. That party however, before commanding, being now inferior, holding liberty but not power, would not cease to desire the lost superiority ;



and if power, in the hands of those who had been its adversaries, were ever exercised illiberally or indiscreetly, being little under control, in civil matters, from the military head of the nation in distant Macedonia, they would of course be more eager to regain their lost superiority. Sources of fermentation and disturbance were so ready, in the population of a republic so composed, that the regular means of a republican constitution could not enable those who desired quiet to maintain it. This had been so strongly felt that, under a vote, as we have seen, of the Amphictyonic confederacy, and evidently with the approbation, and probably at the desire, of the party in Thebes which favoured the Amphictyonic and Macedonian alliance, a garrison from the Amphictyonic army was placed in the Cadmea, to be ready to assist in keeping the public peace.

At the time of which we have now to treat, two officers, Amyntas and Timolaus, commanded in the Cadmea with joint authority. From their names among other indications, it seems probable that one was a Theban, the other a Macedonian. Such combined command we have seen familiar and ordinary among the Greeks; and the association of a Macedonian with a Theban may have been here required, less by any ambition or assumed authority of the Macedonian government than by the habitual jealousy of the people of Thebes entertained among the Bœotian towns, together with their habitual subordination to Thebes; whence, though averse to the single superiority of a Theban, even of the friendly party, yet they had difficulty to claim, for a citizen of any other state, equality with a Theban.

ARR. 1. 1.  
c. 7.

This resource of maintaining a garrison in the Cadmea, the mildest perhaps that could be effectual

CHAP.  
XLIV.

for restraining open turbulence, would not however soften animosities or cheer disappointment. Those Thebans who had been the first in their own city and in all Bœotia, some of them looking to be first in Greece, habituated to activity in ambitious pursuits, could not rest in domestic quiet, or in civil inferiority under those they envied or hated. The vigilance, the experience, the talent of gaining the minds of men, in which Philip excelled, might perhaps, in course of time, have introduced more harmony among a population so inheriting hostility within itself, and through life exercised in it. But the ablest ministers, whom Alexander could employ or the Thebans of his party elect, while himself engaged in distant warfare, could hardly fail to find difficulties insuperable, when, in opposition to them, sometimes in open assembly, but still much more by secret negotiation, the able and indefatigable Demosthenes was exciting and combining insurrection.<sup>13</sup>

Banishment on account of party difference was so ordinary among the Greeks that if some eminent Thebans left their country by sentence of exile, or without it, when, after the battle of Chæronea, their city yielded to the Amphictyonic army, it may have been thought, by writers of the time, little matter for notice. The defeated party generally could not but be uneasy under power in the hands of those to whom they had been violently hostile; and some might dread, possibly not without feeling that they had earned, personal animosity. Finding themselves therefore uneasy, and perhaps unsafe, at home, they may have emigrated; and plots, unmentioned in his-

<sup>13</sup> Αἱ δὲ πόλεις, πάλιν τοῦ Δημοσθένους ἀναρρήπιζοντος αὐτὰς, συνίσταντο, κ. τ. λ. Plut. v. Demosth, p. 856.

tory, may afterward have given occasion for banishment. Some eminent Thebans however, we are assured by Arrian, were in banishment, the mass of their party remaining in the city. Yet so the purpose of commotion was concealed that Amyntas and Timolaus, commanders of the garrison of the Cadmea, thinking the protection of their fortress needless for themselves, resided in the city below. Possibly indeed their residence in the town rather than in the citadel may have been pursuant to instructions, for dissipating fears, obviating jealousies, cultivating popularity, and infusing confidence.

Such appears to have been the state of things, when a rumour was circulated, unknown whence arising, that the young king of Macedonia was dead. Though this, if credited, could not fail to affect the public mind strongly, to alarm those desirous of resting under the existing order, and to excite hope in the large adverse party, yet the men in power seem to have thought no measures in consequence necessary. In one night both the commanding officers of the Cadmea were assassinated in the city where they resided. Criers then immediately went round, summoning the people instantly to assemble. Alarm was universal. The people meeting, in various expectation, were surprised to find, not the magistrates, but the exiles, with those resident citizens known to be most friendly to them, in possession of the bema. The first speaker began with boldly asserting that the rumour, which all had heard, of Alexander's death, was perfectly authenticated. He proceeded then to urge the expediency of using the opportunity offered by the gods, for breaking the accursed yoke of Macedonia, and asserting their freedom. The magistrates meanwhile, uninformed of the catastrophe of the

SECT.  
III.

Arr. 1. 1.  
c. 7.

Arr. Ibid.

CHAP.  
XLIV.

military commanders, and anxious, in such an emergency, for their support, waited hesitating. The bold leaders of the conspiracy, thus alone speakers, presently proposed to the assembly, That the alliance with Macedonia should be renounced, and that the garrison in the citadel should be expelled. Acclamation was ready from those prepared: others, in fear and uncertainty, were silent; the conspirators assumed that the sovereign people had decreed as had been proposed, and proceeded diligently to give efficacy to this mandate of the surprised assembly. All whom they could trust, and as many more as they thought they might restrain, were collected in arms. Siege was laid to the citadel, and works of contravallation and circumvallation, such as are first noticed in extant history to have been used by the Lacedæmonians against Plataea in the Peloponnesian war, were begun.

Thus, by a principal city, in nearly the middle of Greece, revolt was declared against the general confederacy of the republics. Nearly about the same time, and clearly in concert, the Perrhæbians, subjects of those who assumed to be eminently Thessalians, nearly as, in modern times, the Grisons and other Alpine people were subjects of the Swiss, rose in revolt. The Thessalian general assembly, inquiring into the business, and informed of the revolution at Thebes, were so satisfied that the new Theban government was connected with the party of Demosthenes, now prevailing in the Athenian assembly, and that from them had come the instigation for their subjects to revolt, that they declared war against both Athens and Thebes.

These circumstances, reported to Alexander in his camp in Illyria, left no room for deliberation but about the manner in which the rebellion, so effectually



ally begun against the general confederacy of Greece, and the war so immediately threatening Macedonia itself from Thessaly, should be most advantageously met. Alexander's temper, not less than the ancient principles of monarchy, and the most accredited examples of former times, decided that he should himself go where danger in the field and difficulty in council were likely most to occur. Speed was urgently required. With a small chosen body therefore he took the shortest road, but of singular difficulty, over a country of rocky and wooded mountains, at this day the least known of all Europe from either ancient description or modern examination: the provinces of Eordæa and Elymiotis, and the craggy summits of Tymphæa and Paravæa, are the names which, without other description, Arrian gives. The distance was, comparatively, not great, yet the historian mentions it as an extraordinary march, that in seven days he reached Pellene in Thessaly; and that, having crossed that plainer country, and passed the strait of Thermopylæ, he was on the sixth after in Bœotia.

The revolution at Thebes appears, in all accounts, to have been ably conducted; hardly less than that, more celebrated, by which formerly the same city had been delivered from subjection to Lacedæmon. The narrative of Diodorus, valuable here for what has not fallen within Arrian's purpose of a military history, marks it to have been planned at Athens. Demosthenes, he says, furnished a large quantity of arms, for which no payment was required. Apparently, and farther indication will ensue, Persia was the paymaster. At the instance of Demosthenes the Athenian people voted assistance in arms to the Thebans. These however, perhaps jealous of De-

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 8.

CHAP.  
XLIV.

Arr. 1. 1.  
c. 7.

mosthenes and the Athenians, desired that events should be waited for before any Athenian force were sent to them, and so none immediately moved. As if aware then that, to contend successfully against the popularity of the Macedonian government, its liberality must be emulated, the able leaders of the revolution seem, against ordinary republican practice, to have checked all violence in their followers: beyond the assassination of the two military commanders, the careful historian, who most gives the particulars, mentions neither bloodshed, nor even any banishment.<sup>14</sup> But it was not the same thing to contend now with the established popularity of the Macedonian supremacy, as formerly with the power of Lacedæmon; which had become odious through a conduct certainly very different from that by which it had risen; less described by ancient writers, but most advantageously characterised by that remarkable testimony, the refusal of the people of the other republics to act, even in naval service, with which the Lacedæmonians were so little conversant, under any but a Lacedæmonian commander. The arrival of Alexander at Onchestus in Bœotia, beyond all expectation, and beyond even supposition of what was possible, as it surprised the Theban leaders, so it greatly alarmed them. Not the force he had brought was formidable, but the effects among the Theban people; the animation arising among those whom terror and necessity only had induced to acquiesce under the late revolution, the fears of its decided friends, and the revived uncertainty of

<sup>14</sup> Plutarch, in his life of Demosthenes, giving a summary of the revolution and its consequences, as far as Demosthenes was concerned, says many were killed with 'the arms which Demosthenes furnished; but without specifying on what occasion. In the following war no doubt many were killed.

the many, less determined to either cause. Alexander had hoped, so his historian says, by the uncalculated rapidity of his march, to have the satisfaction of composing matters without bloodshed ; and he was so near succeeding, such was the evident temper prevailing among the Theban people assembled on the occasion, that the bold leaders carried a vote for opposing him only by an extraordinary fiction. They ventured the hazardous assertion that the Alexander, now with the small force at Onchestus, was not the king, son of Philip, who certainly was dead, but another Alexander, the son of Aeropus ; of the royal family, but not even commander of that small force ; for Antipater, they said, commanded in chief. Thus, with difficulty, was obtained the rejection of a proposition for negotiation. The able leaders then hastened measures for obviating, as far as might be, proposals from either side. A body of horse, attended with light-armed foot, was sent out to attack the guard of the captain-general of Greece, who had yet committed no hostility against them, but, on the contrary, was known to be anxious for an accommodation. They killed some, unprepared to expect such hasty overbearing violence, and pushed on so far as to insult the main body with ill language. Arrian, mentioning that provoking language was used, has not specified it. Diodorus relates that Alexander, in serious earnestness to avoid the necessity of using arms, had caused proclamation to be made, inviting all Thebans, without distinction, ‘ to partake of the common peace of Greece.’ The reply to this, he says, from the ruling Thebans, was a proclamation by a herald of powerful voice, inviting all those in Alexander’s army, who would concur with the great king (meaning the king of Persia) and the Thebans, to join

Arr. 1. 1.  
c. 7.

Diod. 1. 17.  
c. 9.

them 'in giving liberty to Greece, and abating 'its tyrant.' Diodorus, having drawn this part of his narrative evidently from a writer warm in the Demosthenic, in opposition to the Macedonian interest, the testimony to this open avowal of the patronage of Persia is highly remarkable.<sup>15</sup>

Arrian has not stated the amount of force that Alexandria led from Illyria into Bœotia. The Agrians are mentioned, middle-armed highlanders, peculiarly qualified for such a march. Some cavalry would probably accompany, but perhaps no heavy-armed. Combining what Arrian has indicated with the assurance of Demosthenes, that Philip never led more than a small escort from Macedonia into Greece, and considering the probable means of Alexander to conduct and maintain a Macedonian army there, it seems not likely that the force he led was much greater than had usually attended his father. Among the northern nations, all hostile, he could support his army with what, in success, he could take there. In Greece, on the contrary, his business was not to find enemies, but to support friends, and to conciliate, if it might be, those who were not so; at any rate, not to irritate by injuring the country at large. The soundness

<sup>15</sup> Diodorus's narrative, even of the military transactions attending this revolution of Thebes, is more worthy of attention than his accounts of battles commonly are found. Differing widely as it does from Arrian's, it shows its foundation on the same facts, the differences being hardly other than might be expected between the report of a military man, meaning to represent things as they were, and that of a politician, such as Diodorus appears to have drawn from, earnest to put forward the interest of his party and exalt the fame of those who had suffered in its cause; though perhaps here and there may be distinguished a dash of the colouring more peculiar to the philosophical Greek writers under the Roman empire.



then of the judgment, probably that of able advisers to whom his good sense led him to defer, which trusted in the popularity of that cause of which the king of Macedonia was the acknowledged head, soon became manifest. Nowhere the consequences of the revolution in Thebes were so dreaded as among the Bœotians themselves. The new liberality of the leaders, avoiding injury to persons and estates, so different from what had been usual in Bœotian revolutions, was mistrusted, or came too late. It does not appear that they gained any effective partizans out of Thebes; while all the principal men and best forces of the north of Greece hastened to join the standard of the general-autocrator of the nation, looked to as their constitutional chief, the legal and willing protector of their common rights. Thus Alexander was soon in circumstances to take offensive measures.

Well informed then of the disposition of a large portion, even of those within the walls of Thebes, to concur with those who had thus placed themselves under his command without, avoiding hostile measures, he approached the town, passed it, and encamped on the farther side, near the gate leading to Eleutheræ and Athens. Here he seems to have had a double purpose; to show himself ready yet for negotiation, and even to invite it; and farther, to be in a situation to intercept hostile re-enforcements on the only side on which it was likely any might approach. Desire of negotiation prevailed in Thebes, notwithstanding any engaging conduct of the new rulers. The unambitious of all descriptions, whose first objects were peace and safety, could not but desire it. Nevertheless the watchful and active and well-judging diligence of the new leaders was so effectual that all

CHAP.  
XLIV.

---

endeavours to obtain a popular vote for negotiation failed.

The able men, thus far successful in their hazardous enterprise, had not undertaken it in any vain confidence in even the utmost strength of Thebes, with the utmost assistance that could be hoped for from their party among the other towns of Bœotia: they looked to Athens, and the talents of Demosthenes, now ruling there, and to the influence of Demosthenes and his party in other republics, and to the power of Persia, ready with its wealth, under the direction of Demosthenes, to support all. But Demosthenes and his principal partizans within Greece evidently had been disappointed in their expectation of the amount of difficulties to be met by Alexander from his barbarian enemies on three sides of Macedonia, while they were preparing troubles for him on the fourth. The northern wars being advantageously ended, and Alexander, beyond all expectation, already in Bœotia, and the northern Greeks flocking to his standard, the general hopes of the party fell, and the power of Demosthenes, in the Athenian assembly itself, was immediately shaken. Anxious to hold still what he could, he undertook an embassy to the king of Macedonia, surrounded by his republican Greek allies. But those republicans were the most vehement and determined enemies to the great orator, and his partizans throughout Greece. Going therefore no farther than the Bœotian border, he returned without executing in any degree his commission. His adversary Æschines, some years after, speaking of this curious fact to the assembled Athenian people, told them that Demosthenes took fright, but without saying at what. Diodorus, relating the same fact,

Plut. v.  
Demosth.  
p. 856.

Æsch. de  
Cor.

mentions the supposition entertained, that the connexion of Demosthenes with the Persian court, and an apprehension of giving umbrage there by making himself the instrument of friendly negotiation between the Athenian and Macedonian governments, impelled him to the very irregular step which, apparently, must have been difficult for him to excuse to the people his sovereign.<sup>16</sup>

Diod. l. 17.  
c.4. Plut. v.  
Demosth.  
p. 856.

<sup>16</sup> We find this extraordinary fact stated by Æschines to the Athenian people, and virtually admitted by Demosthenes through omission of notice of it in replying. Æschines, speaking of what was then in the memory of all present, has not mentioned the time or occasion of the embassy. Diodorus, giving it to Alexander's first coming into Greece, nevertheless mentions, as what occurred at the same time, the removal of goods from Attica into Athens, in fear of immediate invasion from the army under Alexander; which, according to better authority, clearly marks the matter as following the destruction of Thebes, where Plutarch places it.

The connexion of Demosthenes with the Persian court having not only been imputed to him by his personal adversary Æschines, and implied by his respectable contemporary Isocrates, with the additional testimonies of the latter ancients, Polybius, Diodorus, Plutarch, Arrian, and Justin, but avowed and glorified in by himself, as a measure of policy that should do him credit with his fellow-citizens of his party, one cannot but admire the management of some among the ancients, and among the moderns Rollin eminently, to put that connexion out of sight, for the purpose of maintaining their assertions, that the great orator was a pure Grecian patriot. A passage of the versified historical anecdotes, by John Tzetzes, of the twelfth century, may deserve notice; not for any confirmation of the imputation against Demosthenes, but for evidence of the effect of the management of his partizans and of his politics. The story, says Tzetzes, was well known to a few, but not generally, and therefore he would tell it:

Φέρεται δὲ λόγος οὐ πολλοῖς, γνώριμος δὲ βραχέειν,  
Ὡς ὁ Δαρείος, ὁ Περσῶν ἐκείνος αὐτοκράτωρ,  
Ἀκηκοὺς Ἀλέξανδρον μέλλειν στρατεύειν Πέρσας,  
Χρήμασι δεξιῶσασθαι πολλοῖς τὸν Δημοσθένην,  
Ὅπως ἂν ἀσχολήσειεν αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι.  
Ὁ δὲ Θεβαίους δυστυχῶς ἐγείρει κατ' ἐκείνου.

Joan. Tzetz. Hist. Chil. VII. 139.

CHAP.  
XLIV.

---

The disappointment to the Theban leaders, at the failure of support from Athens, must have been great and disheartening. Nevertheless, contemplating the change to ensue to themselves, with even the best terms that could be hoped for from negotiation, that, from chiefs of their city, aspiring to be chiefs, or among the chiefs, of Greece, there could be the choice for them but of emigration, or of living without power under the rule of those who would suspect and perhaps hate them; and possibly still cherishing some hope, founded on their knowledge of the congenial feelings of numbers in different parts of Greece, they so persevered in their exertions to prevent any vote of the assembled Theban people in favour of a capitulation, or any negotiation, that none ensued.

Arr. 1.1.  
c. 7.

Alexander nevertheless persevered in avoiding offensive measures; waiting the result, which time might produce, with a patience indicating a just deference to well-judging counsellors about him. But he had not yet acquired art or authority to infuse or command such patience in all under him. Soldiers, commonly uneasy in inaction, are especially so when they reckon themselves superior to the enemy. Among the Greeks of the Amphictyonic confederacy, impatience would naturally arise, and perhaps some indignation, at the delay, required by no necessity obvious to them, of measures for relieving their friends and kinsmen blockaded in the Cadmea. Opportunity was observed, by those nearest the Theban circumvallation, for advantageous assault upon it, and they broke in. Perdiccas, who commanded that part of the army, whether having directed or en-

c. 8.

The measure of the verse here is of the kind called *στίχοι πολιτικοί*, and, with attention to the marked accent, will be familiar to the English reader.



couraged the measure or no, was presently where his duty would require. His brother officer, Ptolemy, seems, according to Arrian's account, scrupulously to have avoided, in his narrative of the affair, both to accuse and to acquit him; whence irregularity may be suspected. The measure however was clearly rash. Perdiccas was presently overpowered. Amyntas, commanding the division next in the line, hastened to his support; but even their united force was unequal to that presently brought against them.

Alexander, quickly informed of all circumstances, ordered the bowmen of the army, together with the Agrians, middle-armed, to the relief of his distressed divisions. Middle-armed and bowmen were troops adapted to cover a retreat, but not to meet and overbear the Theban heavy-armed. It may seem that Alexander's experienced and judicious advisers, knowing what difficulties Philip had found in his endeavours to restrain the excesses of republican troops and moderate the violence of republican counsels, feared the consequences of success in arms against the Thebans, and desired, if possible, still to bring matters to issue by a negotiation. But the light troops did not suffice to enable those first engaged to effect their retreat. Perdiccas was severely wounded, and Eurylotus, a Cretan, commander of the bowmen, was killed.

The Theban chiefs, on the other hand, holding their leading situations through a policy which necessarily conceded absolute power nominally to the rash many, though with the hope that it might be only nominally, were likely to want authority for restraining zeal within the bounds which prudence would require. Possibly also, abandoned as they were by those of the other Grecian states, in whose

CHAP.  
XLIV.

---

co-operation they had confided for means of ultimate success, and perhaps not without some mixture of despair with their small hope, they thought an unforeseen opportunity, like that now offering, if pushed to the utmost, might afford them the best chance for overcoming the hardly superable difficulties before them. Their troops however, led by that contagious influence which directs multitudes reckoning on their power, would not be contented with defeating the attack on their lines; but, with or without orders, would make their success at once complete, by defeating the whole opposing army. They so pressed on the retreating enemy that it was found advisable for Alexander to lead out the whole of his heavy-armed to oppose them. In their eagerness to profit from victory, supposed already theirs, the Thebans had lost much of that good order in which they had first met the adverse phalanx. The reverse then was rapid. Presently overborne, they fell back toward their contravallation. The garrison of the Cadmea, from their lofty situation, anxious observers of all events, seeing their foes approaching in disorder, issued and attacked them in flank. Such then was the contagion of alarm and the deficiency of command among the Thebans that hardly an attempt was made to defend their lines. For all immediately to take regular arrangement there was impossible. Those nearest the city therefore pushed forward toward the gate, opened to receive them. Who should go and who should stay, in the failure of order, being uncertain, all became eager to reach the protection of the city-walls. But before such numbers, in such confusion, could enter, the enemy was upon them, and to shut the gate against the pressure being impossible, it came into his possession.

In this change, almost instantaneous, from extravagant hope to ruin, for the Theban leaders to restore any order or hold any command among their dismayed people, even those most attached to them, would be difficult; and the disposition of a large proportion always adverse to them, and confident of favour from their enemies, would make any salutary measures nearly impracticable. In this imminent wreck therefore the greater part of the wealthier men, serving on horseback, successors of those, who, under Epaminondas, had been the most renowned cavalry of Greece, considerate of their personal safety when all other consideration appeared hopeless, fled by a gate opposite to that by which the enemy had entered. This example was presently followed by most of the infantry who obtained knowledge of it, and could find opportunity. Regular resistance to the enemy was attempted only about the temple of Amphion, and not there long maintained. Then Plataeans, Thespians, Orchomenians, Phocians, and others of the conquering army, who, having formerly suffered from Theban tyranny, had dreaded a renewal of it through the recent revolution, gave a loose to the furious passions. Ranging the town, careless of commands, which rarely any could hear, they slaughtered equally the resisting and the unresisting; not sparing even women and children; even the sacredness of temples not affording protection. A kind of intoxication of fury urged their destructive course, so that, says the historian, the extent of the calamity exceeded, not more all previous apprehension of the sufferers than all previous purpose of the perpetrators.

Arr. 1. 1.  
c. 9.

Whether by any precaution, within human foresight, or by any exertion, not made in the emer-

CHAP.  
XLIV.

gency, Alexander, or any of his generals, could have prevented or lessened these horrors, accounts remaining will not warrant a decision; but, that the temper which produced them sprang from the political constitution of Greece, and was nourished by events and circumstances prior to any Macedonian influence among the republics, is abundantly evident. The slaughter, we are told, was not all from the avowed enemy. Slaves of the Thebans themselves, who, through the circumstances and incidents of their servitude, bore ill will to their masters, in a spirit of vengeance, joined in the work of bloodshed.

As far however as any constitutional course was established for matters of common concern among the Grecian republics, what followed these violences appears to have been conducted in a constitutional course, exactly analogous to the proceedings on the conclusion of the Sacred war. Representatives of the republics were assembled.<sup>17</sup> Alexander, limiting himself to the proper office of stateholder and military commander in chief, referred decision on all matters of common interest to the congress. Such is the direct assertion of Diodorus; and Arrian's concise account and all anecdotes reported by Plutarch and others concur in marking that his interference, as far as he used any, was directed to compose differences, soften animosities, and obviate severities. To reduce Thebes lower than the recent destruction had brought her

Diod. 1. 17.  
c. 14.  
ARR. 1. 1.  
c. 9.

<sup>17</sup> Arrian's expression on the occasion rather implies that the representatives only of those republics, whose troops composed the victorious army, formed the congress. Diodorus speaks of it as a regular congress of the nation, wherein representatives of all the republics, at least, might attend: *Τοὺς δὲ συνέδρους τῶν ἙΛΛΗΝΩΝ συναγαγὼν, ἐπέτρεψε (ὁ βασιλεὺς) τῷ κοινῷ συνεδρίῳ πῶς χρηστέον τῇ πόλει τῶν Θεβαίων, κ. τ. λ. 1. 17. c. 14.*



could apparently be no more for the interest of the king of Macedonia, than of the Grecian people altogether. But the sovereign assembly consisted in large proportion of Thessalians, Phocians, and Bœotians; born hostile to Thebes, and educated in sentiments of animosity; the Bœotians especially, moved, in addition to a sense of past injuries, by recent fear of renewed and worse oppression, and ready to use the public avowal of Persian patronage, by the Theban rulers, to confirm and aggravate the old accusation, that Thebes was always the ready tool of Persia to enslave Greece. The assembly proceeding to deliberation with a prevalence of such sentiments, the decree resulting was, that the Theban state should be annihilated, the town utterly destroyed, the surviving women and children sold to slavery, families of proved attachment to the conquering cause only excepted; that the territory should become the property of the conquering allies, including the friendly Thebans, to be duly divided among them; and, for assured execution of these resolutions, that a garrison, from the allied army, should hold the strong fortress of the Cadmea.

Uncreditably severe as this decree was, and unbecoming the character, which the Greeks affected to claim, of general humanity, liberal patriotism, and universal regard and respect for the Grecian name and blood, yet, in the course of Grecian history, we have had occasion to observe example not only furnished but exceeded. Ruin still more severe, it is Arrian's remark, had befallen Grecian states from Grecian hands directed by Grecian minds, especially Plataea, Melus, and Scione: but those, he adds, were smaller states: the amount of lives lost, and of political importance overthrown by the

destruction of Thebes, was so much the greatest, ever to that time experienced in Greece, that the impression on the general mind was the stronger, and the catastrophe became matter for the more extensive and pointed remark. Apparently the historian would limit his observation to times regularly historical, and after the return of the Heraclidæ.

But, as in the course of human affairs is not uncommon, with works of destruction works of charity went hand in hand. Orchomenus, Plataea, and Thespiæ, so often, and sometimes so cruelly oppressed by the Thebans, appear to have been at this time not absolutely desolate, but in a state of great depression, with scanty population, under the jealous rule of the imperial people of Thebes; who, to ensure their submission, had destroyed the fortifications, and forbidden the restoration of them. The emigrated families were now invited to return, and houses were built for them. Thus Orchomenus, Plataea, and Thespiæ were restored to the rank of free cities of Bœotia; walls were added for their defence; and the favoured Theban families, whose residences were destroyed in the general ruin of their town, were settled among them.

That Alexander took any part in these works, either of destruction or restoration, is not said. But anecdotes remain of his interference in favour of objects of the vengeance of his republican friends. Arrian has given credit to the report that his influence preserved the house, which had been Pindar's residence, from demolition, and all persons connected by blood with Pindar, from slavery. Plutarch's purpose, in his life of Alexander, has been, evidently enough, not to favour him, but to exalt his own fellow-countrymen the Bœotians, and, as the most eminent

of them, especially the Thebans. Yet his anecdotes, though some with a contrary object, all really tend to Alexander's credit. One, however embarrassed with absurdities, may deserve notice for the favour it has found from some ancient, and many modern, writers. A noble lady of Thebes, Timoclea, violated by the commander of the Thracian troops, (whether there were Thracian troops in Alexander's army matters little,) revenged herself by a stratagem through which she put him to death. He inquired for treasure. She told him much had been thrown into a well in her garden, to which she conducted him. He incautiously looking down, she pushed him in, and overwhelmed him with stones. Taken in the fact by the barbarians under his command, she was not destroyed by them, as many unoffending women and children, we are assured, were by Greeks of the army, but carried immediately before Alexander, as to a civil judge in a peaceful city. Walking up to him with a firm step and unabashed countenance, he asked who she was. She answered boldly: 'I am the sister of Theagenes, who fell at Chæronea, fighting at the head of the force he commanded, against your father, for the liberty of Greece.' This sufficed for the generous prince. Admiring her fortitude, he so interfered in her favour, as to save her and her children from the slavery to which all the women and children of her party, without distinction of rank, had been condemned by the decree of the republican congress.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> In justice to Plutarch it should be recommended to the reader to judge of him from his own words, or those of a faithful translator, and not reckon him answerable for the improvements of this favourite story found in the narrative of some modern historians.

Plut. v.  
Alex.  
p. 671.

Plutarch, who has commonly undertaken to know much of the thoughts of those whose lives he has written, avers that the catastrophe of Thebes remained through Alexander's life a sore in his mind. It may indeed well be believed to have grieved him at the time, and to have been always of unpleasant recollection; unless for the act of generosity which it put in his way to perform. The ancient and the recent fame of that city; the claim of the Macedonian royal family to be descended from the Theban Hercules; the connexion of his father with Thebans, the most eminent men of their age; the attachment of a large portion of the citizens to his family and to himself, all must have tended to make him deplore the calamity of which he has by some been accused of being the author, but which, according to all appearance of fair testimony, it is noway likely he could have prevented. The most disgraceful circumstance, the deliberately cruel sale of the women and children, might appear most within his power to have checked. But, to stem the violence of temper of the republican Greeks, which Philip, with large experience and established influence in aid of very superior talents, could do but very incompletely, it seems hardly reasonable to expect of Alexander, a youth of twenty-one, with whatever support from able advisers. At the head of an army only in small part his subjects, and new in presidency over a confederacy of republics such as we have seen those of Greece, to prevent a measure on which that army and the republics furnishing it were bent, must have been of difficulty which no rational politician will now undertake to estimate. It may seem fairest to gather his disposition rather from accounts of what he did than of what he failed to do; especially afterward, in matters



for which he was completely master. If we may trust Plutarch, not always his friend, throughout his following life he never denied favourable attention to any application from a Theban.<sup>19</sup>

Plut. v.  
Alex.  
p. 671.

Arrian has not undertaken to state the numbers killed on either side in this bloody business. Diodorus and Plutarch, less scrupulous, concur in reporting the Thebans slain to have been six thousand; the surviving sold thirty thousand. The slain would hardly be very exactly numbered; but of the sold an account would be taken, and made public in the distribution of prize-money to the conquering army. According to Arrian, hardly any Theban, who did not fly, survived, except the known friends of the conquerors; yet the slaves of both sexes, spared as objects of profit, together with the Theban women and children condemned for sale, may well have amounted to the number asserted.

Diod. 1.17.  
c. 14.  
Plut. v.  
Alex.

Of what passed at Athens, what may have been the contest between the parties of Demosthenes and Phocion, during this, one of the most momentous periods of Grecian history, scarcely any memorials remain. In this deficiency, the concise mention, by Diodorus, of the vote of the Athenian assembly for military support to the Thebans, is important, as it shows that the party of Demosthenes had gained an ascendancy. But that vote, it seems evident, was never so acted upon that any military assistance was given to Thebes. Yet, when the city was taken, the fugitives mostly directed their course to Athens, as the refuge in which they had best hope; and the

<sup>19</sup> Plutarch's expression is stronger, even to some appearance of extravagance; but I think may be fairly enough interpreted as in the text:

CHAP.  
XLIV.

ARR. I. 1.  
c. 10.

result showed that they had ground for depending upon a strong feeling, among the leading Athenians, of an interest in their fate. Information of the catastrophe arrived in the season of the greater Eleusinian mysteries. It produced immediately an order to stop that ceremony, held so awfully sacred. Such then was the apprehension of immediate invasion from a powerful army, adverse to the pretension of the Athenian people to be sovereigns of Greece, that those who had property in the country very generally directed their utmost diligence to bring everything portable within the walls. Meanwhile an assembly of the people was held. Demosthenes and the principal men of his party avoided to come forward; perhaps more fearing some passionate vote of the multitude, of which Athenian history affords so many examples, than any vengeance of the young king of Macedonia, or even of the republican Greeks, his allies. The friend of Phocion, Demades, whose talents as a speaker were held by some even superior to those of Demosthenes, took the lead. He advised that an embassy should be now, though late, sent to Alexander, the ally of Athens, the captain-general of Greece, to congratulate him on his safe return from the northern wars, and to apologize, as best might be, for the recent counsels of the government. The embassy accordingly was voted. Demades, known to have been highly esteemed by the late king of Macedonia, Philip, and therefore supposed likely to be more acceptable than most others to Alexander, was appointed its chief<sup>20</sup>, and

ARR. I. 1.  
c. 11.

<sup>20</sup> According to Plutarch, in his life of Phocion, the party of Demosthenes so prevailed in the assembly that the embassy was composed of his friends, and Alexander refused to receive it;

Æschines, as we learn from Demosthenes, was a member.

Demosth.  
de Cor.  
p. 319.  
ed. Reiske.

Alexander of course would be apprized of the political contest at Athens, and aware that one large party was as decidedly friendly to him as the other was vehemently hostile. Continuing however to follow his father's example, he received the embassy, not only with politeness, but with favour. Professing himself gratified by it, he added assurance that, notwithstanding the measures which their assembly had lately been persuaded to sanction by its decrees, his esteem for the Athenian people, and his friendly disposition toward them, remained unshaken. Yet, whether from himself, or required by a vote of the general confederacy of the Greeks, he demanded the surrender of ten Athenian citizens, to be dealt with according to the common law of Greece; accused as common enemies; authors formerly of the troubles ended by the battle, so calamitous to Athens, near Chæronea, and recently of those which had produced the destruction of Thebes. Of the ten, the most known from remaining history were Demosthenes, Chares, Lycurgus, Ephialtes, and Charidemus.

This demand was communicated, as we have seen was the custom of the age, in a letter from Alexander

but the dismay and resulting discontent, on its return, were such that the party of Demosthenes was obliged to give way, and Phocion was placed at the head of a second embassy. It must be for the reader to weigh Plutarch's assertion against the omission of all notice of the failing embassy by Arrian and Diodorus. For the rest, it is not unlikely that Phocion may have been one of the embassy with Demades, not as an inferior, and yet may have allowed Demades, who, in all accounts, had more the talents both of a courtier and a negotiator, to be, as the other historians say, the leading speaker.

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 15.  
Plut. v.  
Alex. &  
Phoc.

to the Athenian people. An assembly was summoned to consider it. The persons demanded, and their friends, were in extreme alarm; and, even among those not of their party, many desired that the humiliation of the republic, and perhaps also the severity expected toward the individuals, might be avoided. But the austere principles of Phocion led him, it is said, to insist that, for the common good, those individuals ought to be surrendered, and even to be forward to surrender themselves. Where party was so violent, as at this time at Athens, and such pressing interests were afloat, reports on light and mistaken grounds would gain currency, and calumnies against eminent men would abound. The fame of Phocion, like that of Isocrates before him, has extraordinarily escaped the spirit of calumny. But imputation went against the two great orators on this occasion. Demosthenes, it was said, and his principal friends, had the meanness to solicit favour from their opponent, Demades, and he had the meanness to sell it; pledging himself, for five talents, about a thousand pounds sterling, to use his utmost interest and diligence to obtain from Alexander, and his allies, a remission of the demand for the surrender of the ten orators. The currency of such a report tends at least to mark the character of the times at Athens. The character of Demades has not been transmitted pure, yet considering the common conduct of his party, as well as what a just attention to the dignity of the commonwealth, and perhaps the best interest of his party, would require, it may be believed that a bribe would not be necessary to lead him to the line of conduct he took. In pursuance however of a decree, prepared, it is said, by him, another embassy was sent to Alexander, soliciting for the

Plut. v.  
Phoc.



republic, disposed as it was to concur in everything for the common good of the nation, the favour that its obnoxious citizens might be left to the judgment of its own tribunals. The petition or remonstrance, said to have been very ably drawn, produced its effect; incompletely only so far as it was insisted still that Charidemus should be banished from the territories of the confederacy. Charidemus was that friend of Demosthenes who had served him as a spy at the Macedonian court, where he was hospitably entertained at the time of Philip's death, of which he so diligently and dexterously forwarded the intelligence. It has been, consonantly with all likelihood, also supposed that he was the Charidemus whom we have seen formerly eminent as son-in-law of the king of Thrace, and esteemed, as a military commander, by Iphicrates; and in the sequel we shall again find him eminent in another remarkable situation.

Ch. 42. s. 7.  
of this Hist.

Amid the deficiency of our information concerning this interesting transaction, in which, on one side the dignity and independency of the Athenian republic, on the other the authority of the general confederacy of Greece, were implicated, the usual moderation of the party of Demades and Phocion seems indicated; in the conduct of Alexander his father's liberality is conspicuous. Plutarch, who has preserved some things meriting attention for reasons wide of his views in reporting them, has attributed to Alexander, on this occasion, an observation which deserves notice: that prince, he says, admonished the embassy that, in case of misfortune to him, their commonwealth, conducting its affairs justly, must command Greece. Plutarch's object evidently has been to raise his reader's idea of the importance still of the Athenian commonwealth, stripped as it was

Plut.  
Alex.  
p. 749.

CHAP.  
XLIV.

of naval empire and subject republics ; and to this the story is justly adapted : but, if true, and there seems no adverse probability, it clearly marks also Alexander's just consideration of the situation he held ; that he was, not by violence, but in all legitimate course, the successor to the authority formerly held by the governments of Athens and Lacedæmon, as chiefs of the Greek nation ; and that this authority, by being deferred to a king of Macedonia, was not put out of course, but might afterward be committed to any other power, regal, aristocratical, or democratical, as a general assembly of the republics of the Greek nation might decide.

The transactions at Athens, quickly known throughout Greece, were admonition for the political leaders everywhere. Among the Arcadians, inland men, depending on agriculture and not on commerce, a bold honesty, with a mistaken policy, has, throughout Grecian history, been occasionally observable. All the other republics, where a disposition to favour Thebes against the Macedonian connexion prevailed, had temporized ; but some Arcadian towns had gone so far as to declare their disposition by public acts, voting succour. The failure however of the party of Chares and Demosthenes to maintain a leading influence at Athens, produced the immediate downfall of the cause of imperial democracy, even among democracies. Those of Arcadia, with the wild despotism peculiar to that species of government, by a vote, condemned the leading men, who had persuaded to the Athenian connexion, to death, as guilty of treason by misleading the public mind. The Eleans were more moderate. They hoped, and it appears not without reason, to find such liberality in the Macedonian supremacy, that a decree, which they

passed, for the restoration of all their fellow-countrymen who had been banished for their attachment to it, or had fled in fear of worse, would be accepted as satisfactory atonement. The Ætolians, generally characterised as almost barbarians among the Greeks, appear, on this occasion, in the account of Arrian, to have held the more dignified conduct. They simply sent an embassy to Alexander, to apologize for measures recently directed by bad advisers, and to declare their desire of future friendship with Macedonia, and of concurrence in that confederacy of Grecian republics, of which the king of Macedonia was the head. No indication appears of any purpose of the Macedonian government, under Alexander, any more than formerly under Philip, to interfere, as the Lacedæmonians and Athenians and Thebans often had done most arbitrarily and violently, in the internal affairs of any republic. All apologies were accepted. The Lacedæmonians persevering in refusing to acknowledge Alexander as captain-general of the nation, and to place their contingent of troops under his orders for war against Persia, no measures of compulsion were taken. Freedom of decision, for its own affairs, being allowed to every state, and disturbance of the public peace only forbidden, quiet, in an uncommon degree, appears to have prevailed throughout Greece.

Alexander returning, under these favourable circumstances, into Macedonia, the occasion was judged proper for a celebration of that festival, called the Macedonian Olympic, interrupted by his father's death. Both Diodorus and Arrian expressly mention it as a regular celebration of the festival instituted by Archelaus. It were highly desirable to know what passed, of public importance, at a meeting

Arr. l. 1.  
c. 11.  
Diod. l. 17.  
c. 16.

CHAP.  
XLIV.

---

which was so adapted to promote, or afford means for, most important political measures, in a country constituted like Greece. But the historians under the Roman empire, whether treating of Greek or Roman affairs, Tacitus almost alone excepted, have rarely attended to the character of great political measures, and the springs of great revolutions. The ensuing expedition against Persia, and its consequences within as well as without Greece, without consideration for the mechanism which produced them, seem to have engrossed the minds of the authors of all extant ancient works on this interesting portion of history.



## CHAPTER XLV.

SUMMARY VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF PERSIA FROM THE  
REIGN OF DARIUS NOTHUS TO THE ACCESSION OF DARIUS  
CODOMANNUS.

## SECTION I.

*Circumstances of Persia in the reigns of Darius Nothus and  
Artaxerxes Mnemon.*

BEFORE we proceed with Grecian affairs, a view, such as remaining memorials furnish means for, of the recent history and actual circumstances of the vast dominion of the kings of Persia, will be requisite; and, as preparation for the narrative to follow, more advantageously introduced here than in the previous general prospect of the political circumstances of the then known world.

SECT.  
I.

---

When the victorious progress of the great Cyrus first extended the empire of the east to the verge of the Grecian republics, from which before it had been divided by extensive kingdoms, the Greeks, though their superiority in the art of war, acquired in contests among themselves, had brought their troops into request as mercenaries, never yet had shown themselves, toward the greater powers of the age, a formidable people; and, small as their states were severally, with clashing interests, they might well appear, to the mighty conquerors, of little account among nations.

But, beside skill in arms, the superiority which the Grecian institutions were adapted to give through

CHAP.  
XLV.

---

cultivation of talents and advancement in science, raised individuals so educated to notice and estimation among the new lords of Asia. So early as the reign of the first Darius we have seen a Greek, from the colonies in Italy, principal physician in the distant court of Susa. Wherever indeed we have light on the practice and policy of the Persian government, we find it liberal to persons of the various nations under its dominion; and, as if considering itself entitled to paternal command and owing paternal duties everywhere, scarcely distinguishing between those born its subjects, and those becoming so, whether by conquest, or voluntary submission, or even as suppliants: all were admitted to share its favours who might earn them by services. This policy, certainly adapted to a system of conquest and extensive empire, and ably used by the great Cyrus, did not however originate with him, having long before been practised by the Median and Assyrian governments.

Nevertheless Grecian fame might have remained always limited, as it was afterward under the military despotism of Rome, to excellence in arts and sciences, but for the impulse given by the Persian invasions, and especially that under Xerxes. By these the ever-jarring republics were driven to submit themselves to a temporary union, under men, fortunately then ready among them, of uncommon talents and energy. The superiority of the arms and tactics, peculiar to the nation, gloriously demonstrated, under the conduct of these men, in its defence against the unnumbered armies of Persia, forced the Persian officers, afterward superintending the western provinces, to respect them, and produced the policy of engaging Grecian troops for the Persian service, as they had before been engaged for the Egyptian, and

perhaps others, yet never led to any improvement of the discipline of the native troops of the empire upon the Grecian model. The Persian government, in the habit of considering all nations as made to be its subjects, required the service of the people of its several provinces, armed and trained in their several ways ; and appears to have reckoned that, where its force could not compel, its wealth might sufficiently command.

Of the liberality then with which the Persian government would reward Greeks in its service, and maintain faith with them, even in unfortunate circumstances, we have seen eminent examples in the instances of Gongylus, the fugitive from Eretria, Demaratus, the exiled king of Lacedæmon, and the illustrious Athenian, Themistocles. The effect of this policy, highly threatening to Greece, was fortunately checked by the successes of the Grecian arms on the eastern shores of the *Ægean* ; begun under Leotychides and Xanthippus, and greatly extended under Cimon ; which to the spirit of patriotism and self-esteem, excited by the victories over the Persians, added the power of the opinion that it might be not only more honourable but more profitable to take plunder in war against them, than to receive pay in their service.

The ensuing divisions however of the Greeks among themselves afforded great opportunities for the Persian government ; which, as we have formerly seen, were not wholly neglected. But, under the first Artaxerxes and the second Darius, the energy of that vast body became so slackened that it could no longer control its own limbs : its provinces, under their several governors, became almost as much divided as the Grecian republics ; and it was no longer one

CHAP.  
XLV.

---

government commanding a vast and well-compact empire, with which the Greeks had to contend; for equally wars and negotiations, hostilities and alliances, however the king's name might be used for ostensible authority, were oftener affairs with the several satraps, generally more or less hostile to each other.

The appointment of the younger Cyrus to a superintending command over all the western division of Lesser Asia, checking this irregular state of things, made a great and alarming change for the Greeks; then indeed united under the lead of Lacedæmon, but far from disposed to rest in such union. Fortunately however for them, the ambition of Cyrus had a more immediate and greater object than the conquest of Greece; and, toward the attainment of that object, it was important to conciliate the Greeks. With the failure then of his great enterprise things returned nearly to their former course; and, the renewed distraction of the western provinces inviting, and the example of the Cyrean Greeks, returned from the centre of the empire in defiance of its power, encouraging, Agesilaus, with a very small army, and mostly of Asian Greeks, so succeeded in offensive war against the vast empire of Persia as to overrun some provinces, and alarm even the distant throne.

At the very time when Cyrus reckoned the Grecian force in his army indispensable toward the success of his attempt against his brother's throne, there were Greeks in confidential situations about his brother's court. Two of these, Dinon and Ctesias, published histories of Persia. The latter was physician and surgeon to the king; and, if his word may be taken, sometimes employed in important state affairs. Beyond reasonable doubt however, in his medical office, he was often about the person of Artaxerxes.



Fragments of his work, of some extent, remain : of Dinon's, a quotation or two only has been transmitted. But both works were entire before Plutarch, when, among his lives of eminent Greeks and Romans, he fancied to insert that of Artaxerxes Mnemon ; alone, of those commemorated in that work, completely a foreigner to both Greece and Rome. Plutarch professed to write lives, not histories. Artaxerxes cannot have been his object either for glory of actions, or for any eminence of character. The variety and importance of events, in a reign of more than common length, over an empire of far more than common extent, population, and wealth, were what would make biography interesting. Plutarch appears to have consulted and compared the works of Dinon and Ctesias ; but his life of Artaxerxes, beyond what he has gathered from Xenophon of the expedition of Cyrus and the return of the Greeks, is little more than a tissue of family intrigues, dark plots, private conversations, and private crimes. What it affords principally worthy of historical notice is the assurance, consonant with all other remaining information, that the Persian government had fallen so much into the hands of the eunuchs of the palace, and was so managed by them, that, even to persons with the advantage of approach to the royal person, which Ctesias possessed, its counsels would be hardly known at all, its measures but imperfectly, and even events the most important, in the provinces, often very uncertainly.

But little as came to public knowledge of the councils of the court, and even of the public transactions of the empire, at any distance from the scene of the business, yet the affairs of the western provinces, on which the Greek colonies bordered, and

---

 SECT.  
I.

 Plut. v.  
Alex. init.

CHAP.  
XLV.

among which Greeks were employed, became necessarily open to be known among the Greeks, with more or less exactness; and generally with more than to persons in the capital of the empire. Judging then from Plutarch's account of the life of Artaxerxes, the discretion of Diodorus may be commended for confining his narrative generally to transactions in which Grecian interests were implicated, or Grecian officers employed. Those transactions, as they have occurred for notice in the foregoing history, show the administration of Artaxerxes neither able nor fortunate. His contests, or rather those of his satraps, with the Greeks, we have seen far from glorious. His attempts to recover Egypt were wholly and rather disgracefully unsuccessful. It is said to have been about the twentieth year of his reign, and the fifty-second of his life, that he undertook in person an expedition against the Cadusians, inhabiting the country between the Caspian and the Euxine seas, now Circassia and Georgia. So ill was this expedition planned, or executed, that, after considerable loss, the great king obtained by treaty, with difficulty, through efforts of policy, safety for himself and army, by a dishonourable retreat.

Strab. l. 11.  
p. 507. 510.  
Diod. l. 15.  
c. 8. & 10.  
Plut. v.  
Artax.  
Ol. 98. 4.  
B. C. 385.

For the general mildness of his government however, according to the concurring assurances of Diodorus and Plutarch, Artaxerxes Mnemon was popular; till, as the latter says, toward the end of his reign, finding himself lowered in general esteem by his failures in military enterprises, he turned, whether from provocation or fear, to a course of cruelty. But as far as particulars stated by those writers indicate, it seems probable that the cruelty of Artaxerxes was not toward his people at large, nor perhaps toward any, in his intention, beyond a just and even necessary

severity, principally exercised against great men, disturbers of his and the public peace; though being, after the manner of oriental jurisprudence, hasty, it might often be ill-judged, and thence unjust. Among those disturbers, his sons are said to have been eminent. Of a very numerous acknowledged male progeny, three only were of that legitimate birth which qualified them, according to the laws of the empire, for succession to the throne. But, so unfortunately unascertained was the law concerning the course of succession, each of the three claimed priority of right. The pretensions of the two younger, a preference for primogeniture being admitted by the Persian law, are not apparent in ancient accounts; yet they seem to have had in public opinion some speciousness, possibly founded on the decision in favour of Xerxes, son of the first Darius; for the old king, to end a dispute so threatening to the peace, not of the royal family only, but of the empire, resorted to the hazardous expedient of associating his eldest son, Darius, who had already reached his fiftieth year, in the royal dignity and authority.

Ch. 8. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

Thus Artaxerxes may seem to have done the office of a parent to the empire, as well as to his son. But of this paternal kindness, and not less of the imperial office, Darius is said presently to have shown himself most unworthy. The circumstances, as related by Plutarch, for their consonance with the general character of Asiatic history, in the scantiness of our information concerning the great empire in question, may deserve some notice.

Plut. v.  
Artax.

It was customary in the Persian, as we find in other eastern courts, for the king, in rewarding merit, to promise the favoured person, for a present, whatever he would ask; in confidence, no doubt, supported by

CHAP.  
XLV.

---

experience, that abuse of so wide a licence would rarely occur; the fear of future resentment, from a hand unrestrained by law, offering a powerful check. But Darius, no longer in the condition of a subject, equally unrestrained by a sense of fear and of decency, asked one of his father's concubines. If such an abuse of confidence would in every part of the world be offensive, most especially it would among the southern Asiatics. Nevertheless Artaxerxes, pressed, whether by the rigour of the custom or regard for his promise, conceded the woman demanded. She was a Greek, of superior education and accomplishments; formerly a favourite of Cyrus, the king's brother, taken when he was killed; and of course now of advanced age. Presently however, whether stimulated most by a sense of affront, or whatever other feeling, Artaxerxes, if before wrong in concession, now more so in exertion, took her away again. To do this, and maintain it, as Plutarch says he did, in giving his son participation in dignity he must have retained more than an equal share of authority. To prevent then, in all contingencies, any future possession of the woman's person, he caused her to be consecrated a priestess of Anitis, whom the Greeks considered as the Median Diana.

Darius was thus likely to be exasperated. About the same time Tiribazus, the most powerful satrap of the empire, versed in great commands, eminent for important services, and actually holding the situation of first minister, received from the old king an affront, unprovoked, of a kind especially to excite resentment. It was usual, we have seen, for the kings of Persia, then as now, to give their daughters in marriage to the great men of the empire. Artaxerxes, after having promised one of his daughters in marriage to Tiri-



bazus, using the power which the Magians are said to have warranted to Cambyses son of Cyrus, for the king to dispense even with the moral order held sacred for all Persians, married her himself. Tiribazus and Darius engaged in plot together to assassinate Artaxerxes ; but, powerful as they were, to have means for their purpose they reckoned it necessary to gain some of the eunuchs of the palace. One of these betrayed them ; and, as they were proceeding with a chosen band to execute the abominable design, they were met by the palace-guard. Tiribazus, resisting, was killed on the spot ; Darius, with many of his accomplices, being taken, was, in the summary course of Asiatic justice, presently condemned and executed.

The wretched old king, having, by this series of shocking circumstances, lost his eldest son, his chosen associate and successor, might perhaps fear resentment from the two younger, whose claims against their elder brother he had resisted, rather than hope for gratitude from them for any favour in his power. In a situation thus to feel keenly the want of a friend, in whom he might confide, he brought forward Arsames, one of his illegitimate sons, as his confidential agent and principal minister. Of the surviving legitimate princes, the younger, Ochus, bold and ambitious, is said so to have impressed the weak mind of his elder brother, Ariaspes, with apprehension of a cruel death intended for them by their father, as to have driven him to end his own life by poison. Ariaspes however died. Ochus remaining then alone to claim the legal succession, the power, the talents, the popularity of Arsames, and his favour with their common father still remained threatening to his right, and, as Asiatic courts have been through all ages constituted, to his safety. Arsames however was assassinated, and his

CHAP.  
XLV.

death was attributed to the son of Tiribazus, in association with Ochus.

Ch. 28. s. 8.  
of this Hist.  
B. C. 362.\*  
Ol. 104. 3.

[See vol. v.  
p. 307.]

It was when the court was in this state (if Plutarch may be trusted for the more secret horrors, and Diodorus for the more public events and the dates) that the great rebellion of the western provinces broke out, which has been formerly noticed; and among these troubles of his family and his empire, in the next year, (eminent among Grecian epochs by the battle of Mantinea,) the forty-fourth of his reign, and about the seventy-sixth of his age, Artaxerxes Mnemon died.<sup>1</sup>

## SECTION II.

*Reign of Artaxerxes Ochus: fortune of a Grecian family: revolt of Phenicia and Cyprus suppressed; Egypt reconquered: administration of Bagóas in the east, and of Mentor in the west of the Persian empire. Circumstances threatening to Macedonia and all Greece: death of Ochus, and troubles ensuing: accession of Darius Codomannus.*

OCHUS had so made his party good with the eunuchs of the court that he was immediately master of the palace. Nevertheless, though clearly legal heir to the throne, he so feared the power or the popularity of his father's spurious progeny that, to obviate disturbance from them, he kept his death secret; and,

<sup>1</sup> For these numbers Diodorus, who, though often inexact, was a chronologer, has justly obtained general credit in preference to Plutarch; who, for his desultory kind of history coherence of times being unimportant, has not scrupled to give sixty-two years to the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon, and to his life ninety-four. [\*According to Mr. Clinton's calculations, Artaxerxes Mnemon reigned forty-six years, and was succeeded by Ochus B. C. 359. See Fasti Hellen. p. 312.]

among orders in his name, issued a decree associating himself, as his brother Darius had been associated, in the imperial dignity. In the course of ten months, while he maintained this imposture, he managed, on the principle and nearly after the manner of the modern Turkish government, the assassination of all his illegitimate brothers, to the number of eighty. Announcing then his father's decease, he assumed the imperial authority as sole sovereign, taking the name of Artaxerxes; the purpose being, according to Diodorus and Plutarch, that he proposed to emulate his father's mild virtues and general cultivation of peace, which had endeared his memory.

What troubles ensued, or whether any, in the centre, or on the northern, eastern, or southern frontier of his extensive empire, though probably all would not be quiet, the Greeks, our only informants, appear not to have known. Their intelligence was limited to the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, Ægean, and Euxine seas; a wide extent however, where revolt was throughout actual, or ready.

At the northern point, where the Euxine and Ægean meet, Artabazus, satrap of Lower Phrygia, maintained the opposition in which, with the hired advantage of Grecian troops, we have seen him formerly successful. At the southern extremity, Egypt, long since asserting independency under native princes, and, notwithstanding divisions within itself, baffling the efforts of the Persian empire against it, continued to baffle them. For the large interval, the early defection of the great satrap Orontes from the rebel confederacy afforded great relief to the imperial government; but still, in that

Ch. 36. s. 3.  
& 6. &  
Ch. 37. s. 5.  
of this Hist.

CHAP.  
XLV.

important portion of the empire, an adverse disposition remained.

Nevertheless, during the first five years of the reign of Ochus, nothing passed, even in the provinces most within the sphere of Grecian intelligence, of which any report has been transmitted; unless the rebellion said to have been obstinately and ably maintained by Datames, satrap of Cappadocia, but of which account remains only from the Roman biographer Nepos, should be attributed, as seems probable, to that period. In the sixth year, while the Athenians were engaged in that impolitic and ill-managed war with their subject-allies in which their great general Chabrias wasted his life, and the profligate Chares acquired the lead which he so long held of the councils and armies of the republic, preparations in the Phenician harbours, with undeclared purpose, alarmed all Greece, and especially Athens.

Ch. 36. s. 6.  
of this Hist.

There, as formerly it has been observed, the effect considerably promoted the disadvantageous and disgraceful treaty of peace which the Athenians concluded with those who, with the flattering title of allies, had been their subjects. What use the Persian government made of the naval preparations, which perhaps did not equal report, we have no information; but it was about this time that, for the reduction of the Lower Phrygia, the great land force was sent which, with the assistance of hired Grecian troops, and of the talents of their Theban leader, Pammenes, the friend of Epaminondas, the satrap Artabazus defeated.

Ch. 37. s. 5.  
of this Hist.

It is likely to have been a part of the policy of the Persian government to alarm the Greeks, with the view to keep their forces at home; while the object



of its armaments, at least the first object, was evidently, not war with them, but the recovery of its own revolted provinces. It may probably have been at this time that Ochus conducted, in person, as the mention of the business by Isocrates implies, an expedition against Egypt, in which success totally failed him. Nevertheless war was still prosecuted against the revolted satrapy of Lower Phrygia. After four years farther resistance the satrap's financial means apparently so failed that he could no longer maintain his Grecian mercenaries. Dismissing them therefore, to the number of about four thousand, and abandoning his satrapy, he had the good fortune to find hospitable refuge in the court of Philip king of Macedonia.

Isocr. or. ad  
Phil. p.374.

The fortune of a Grecian private family, deeply implicated with the great political events of the age, here becomes matter for history. The Lower Phrygian or Bithynian satrapy, situated at the north-western extremity of the Persian empire, was separated from the capital, not merely by great distance, but by circumstances of the intervening provinces, both natural and political, which would make communication always slow, often precarious, and sometimes perhaps nearly impossible. It was a critical command, obviously important and necessarily hazardous. For the great officer therefore succeeding to it, whether by any right of birth, or by pure grace of the crown, it would be a matter of obvious prudence to advert to that connexion with the Grecian republics which not only his predecessors in the same command, but all the satraps of the western provinces had been for a long time in the habit of cultivating. It is so gratifying in the course of eventful history, to meet, beyond expectation, an old acquaintance of pleasant

CHAP.  
XLV.

Ch. 25. s. 1.  
& 3. of  
1. Hist.

Ch. 24. s. 5.  
of this Hist.

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 2.

character that the desire is natural to give credit to the indications that Artabazus, satrap of Lower Phrygia, was son of his predecessor in the same satrapy, Pharnabazus, the associate of the eminent Athenians, Conon and Iphicrates, and afterward successively the opponent and the friend of the king of Lacedæmon, Agesilaus. Xenophon's narrative shows that Pharnabazus reckoned on a right to his satrapy, independently of the king's favour. Artabazus, who succeeded him in it, had a son named Pharnabazus. On the highly probable supposition then that Artabazus was son of the elder Pharnabazus, communication with the Greeks would, from early years, be familiar to him; and if he was that son of Pharnabazus who, on occasion of his father's conference with Agesilaus, described by Xenophon, pledged himself in friendship to that prince, and was afterward entertained by him at Lacedæmon, he must have been familiar with Grecian manners, and probably with the Grecian language.<sup>2</sup> What however we are assured of is, that he married a Grecian lady of the island of Rhodes, recommended to his regard, it seems likely, by a superior understanding concurring with beauty. The numerous progeny she

<sup>2</sup> I know not that the parentage of Artabazus remains mentioned by any ancient writer; an omission which, if he was son of Pharnabazus, who in the preceding command of the same satrapy had so much communication with the Greeks, may seem extraordinary. Nevertheless the circumstances of Pharnabazus son of Artabazus, reported by Arrian, (l. 2. c. 1.) on an occasion which will occur for future notice, combined with the fact of the succession of Artabazus to the Bithynian satrapy, and the sentiments which we find put into the mouth of the elder Pharnabazus by Xenophon, concerning his right to that command, strongly favour the supposition that Artabazus was son of the elder Pharnabazus.

bore him, eleven sons, it is said, and ten daughters, indicates the permanence of his attachment ; and the eminence to which the connexion introduced two of her brothers afforded them opportunity to show that talents were the inheritance of the family.

Diod. ut  
ant.

It appears indicated, in mention of Artabazus by Demosthenes, that his revolt, so long maintained, had originated in that kind of contest which we have seen so ordinary among the satraps, amounting to actual war between them ; each claiming to be the more loyal subject of the crown. His opponents, with possibly better interest in the court, had readier means of communication with it. We have seen, in the report of Xenophon, his predecessor Pharnabazus, whose character remains altogether advantageously represented, declaring he should not, in certain cases, scruple decided opposition to the chief of the empire ; and to this extreme possibly Artabazus may at length have proceeded. When, in consequence of the vigorous and persevering measures pursued by Ochus, he was at length compelled to fly from his satrapy, one of his wife's brothers, Memnon, accompanied him to the Macedonian court. Another, Mentor, with four thousand Grecian soldiers under his orders, engaged in the service of Nectanebos king of Egypt.

Demosth.  
in Aristocr.  
p. 672.

Ch. 24. s. 5.  
of this Hist.

But while one of the most distant provinces was thus recovered to the Persian empire, new revolt was brooding in a quarter where hostility would be far more dangerous, and loss of territory far more injurious. At this time, hardly twelve years since the suppression of the great rebellion of the west, the cities of Phenicia are represented in a state of riches and prosperity, and even freedom, largely indicating, that the terms granted them, on returning to allegiance, had been favourable, and that, in the admi-

CHAP.  
XLV.

nistration ensuing, the old liberality of the Persian system had not been discontinued under Artaxerxes Ochus. Sidon appears to have been the wealthiest mart then in the known world, unless Carthage might surpass it. Nevertheless a new rebellion arose in manner marked by Diodorus concisely but perspicuously, and with all consonance to probability. The governing satrap had his residence at Sidon, in a splendid palace belonging to the crown, with a paradise, as it was called, containing a pleasure-garden, and an adjoining park for beasts of chase. His business appears to have been to receive the regulated tribute; to transmit what was to go to the royal treasury; with the rest to maintain a sufficient military force for keeping the public peace; and to interfere with arbitrary authority wherever that peace might be threatened: but, under this impending control, the country, with a constitution of republican character, was governed by its own magistrates, according to its own laws and customs. Not Sidon alone, but every Phenician city appears to have had its own municipal government, in a considerable degree of independency; and all were united under a supreme council, composed apparently of deputies from each. It may seem then to have been beyond liberality, rather negligence or weakness in the satrap, which allowed this subordinate government to form for itself a new capital, where the supreme council held its sessions; the purpose apparently having been to withdraw itself from his inspection, and its proceedings from his ready knowledge. Thus arose the town called Tripolis, Tripletown, from the three cities, Sidon, Tyre, and Aradus, having contributed principally to its construction and population. These circumstances considered, it cannot appear wonder-

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 41.  
Strab. 1. 16.



ful, that the satrap, whether the same, or rather a successor, possibly erring as much now in rigour as before in easiness, should earn the imputation from among those who had been so indulged, of acting, according to the historian's phrase, injuriously and proudly.

But before the severer course was resorted to by the satrap, the plan of rebellion seems to have been already formed, and great preparation for acting upon it made. The revolters not only were largely provided with arms, but had a considerable fleet at their command; whether gaining to their party that large portion of the royal navy which Phenicia commonly furnished, or using only the means which the maritime commerce of the Phenician ports afforded. But moreover communication had been so held with the king of Egypt, and apparently also with the satrap of Lower Phrygia, that alliances had been formed, or were ready, with those avowed enemies of Persia. The title of king, with which Tennes, the chief of the Sidonians, was qualified, would not mark rebellion against the great king, sovereign of the Persian empire, who, we find, allowed many princes, his vassals, to hold it, but it implies combination and order, civil and military, among the revolters, over whom the Sidonian prince presided.

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 41.

Such appears to have been the state of things when one important link in the chain of revolt was broken, by the necessity to which Artabazus was reduced of abandoning his satrapy. That event, highly threatening to the Phenician revolters, would be alarming also for the king of Egypt, Nectanebos. Egypt could hardly be invaded by a power to which Phenicia was hostile. It was therefore highly important for Nectanebos to support the Phenicians; and, at the request

CHAP.  
XLV.

---

of Tennes, he allowed Mentor, with the Greeks under his command, whom he had engaged for service in Egypt, to stop at Sidon.

The sequel is very defectively related by the historian. A force being acquired so considerable among Asiatic armies as four thousand Greeks, with a commander of ability before and afterward conspicuous, no military measure is noticed as following. But the king of Persia, Ochus, whether before yielding to indolence, which has been imputed, or rather, as seems probable, embarrassed by circumstances of his wide empire unknown to the Greeks, had now resolved to take in person, on the spot, the direction of arms and negotiations in the troubled western parts. In a constitution like that we have observed in Phenicia party-divisions would rarely fail. Comparing what we are informed of events now with what we have heretofore seen ordinary among the Grecian republics, it may appear even probable that Tennes found himself and all his party needing support against fellow-citizens more than against all other enemies. Whether the first overture went from him, or came from the king of Persia, Mentor was gained. The sovereign of the Persian empire and the subordinate prince of Sidon came to terms, and the city of Sidon returned under the Persian dominion. According to the historian, numerous executions followed, ending with that of Tennes himself, ordered by Ochus in pure wantonness of cruelty and ill faith; the Sidonians destroyed themselves and their families to the number of forty thousand persons, each firing his own house; and immense wealth came to the royal coffers from the sale of ruins, among which the gold and silver of the richest city of the world were melted. The credit due to this part of the story

must be left to the judgment of those versed in Asiatic history, and familiar with the manner and character of the writer. It is however ascertained that Mentor and the Greeks under him did not fear to enter into the service of a sovereign so represented a monster; and, for what may have been fictitious and what exaggerated, in the extant reports of his actions and character, the sequel will at least assist conjecture.

Among the Phenician towns, and probably within each, was a party for, and a party against the revolt; and not Tennes alone was accused of treachery. In the want of union therefore, when Sidon was reduced, the other towns, little capable of resistance, yielded without an effort. But it is remarkable that, though the Sidonians are said with their town to have burnt all their ships, yet the Persian king had presently a fleet superior to any of the age; unless the Carthaginian, not likely to come within contact, should be excepted. Either then the report of that destruction was fictitious, or the many other sea-ports of Phenicia and Syria repaired it; perhaps in the spirit of civil contest, or perhaps, through loyalty to Ochus, with ready zeal; for of his cruelty, through all the sequel of his reign, no specified example is found.

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 45.

A commanding fleet however enabled him to proceed from the recovery of Phenicia to that of the island of Cyprus. The population there was mostly Grecian; yet, not Mentor only, bred in a satrap's court, but other Greeks, of the highest character among the republics, engaged in his service. Superior forces of sea and land thus co-operating, the whole island was soon reduced to acknowledge again the sovereignty of the Persian king. Apparently

c. 46.

there was little bloodshed, all being quickly settled by a liberal composition. The nine cities of the island, allowed to hold their several municipal governments, were each placed under the superintendency of a chief of a party, answerable for due remittance of the tribute to the supreme government of the empire. These appear to have been mostly Greeks, and they mostly took the title of king.<sup>3</sup>

The possession of Cyprus, after that of Syria and Phenicia, was principally necessary toward the Persian's next object, the recovery of Egypt. He could now, without interruption, supply and assist, by sea, his own forces acting there, and preclude such advantages to his enemies. The enterprise nevertheless was of very considerable difficulty; the amount of which may be estimated, in some degree, from the

<sup>3</sup> . . . ἐξέπεμφεν εἰς τὴν Κύπρον ἐπιστήσας στρατηγούς Φωκίωνα τὸν Ἀθηναῖον καὶ Εὐαγόραν, κ. τ. λ. Diod. l. 16. c. 42.

. . . κατὰ τὴν Κύπρον Σαλαμινίων πολιορκουμένων ὑπ' Εὐαγόρου καὶ Φωκίανος, κ. τ. λ. Diod. l. 16. c. 46.

It seems to have been reasonably doubted among the critics whether this mention of the name of Phocion, though twice occurring in our copies of Diodorus, should be taken for evidence that the great Athenian statesman and patriot, the friend of Isocrates and Philip, lent himself for hire to fight the battles of Persia, for the subjugation of Grecian settlements. Plutarch, who has given that eminent man military fame unnoticed by any other writer, mentions nothing of his commanding in Cyprus. Cornelius Nepos says that, though he commanded armies often, yet no account of his military services remained; meaning perhaps no detailed account; for testimony to his ability and success in military command in Eubœa remains to us at this day, as observed in the fifth section of the twenty-eighth chapter of this history, from Æschines. Whether then, in the passages above cited, Diodorus has intended the great opponent of Demosthenes, or some other person of the name of Phocion, or his transcribers have corrupted a name of nearly the same orthography, must be left in doubt.



failure of great efforts to accomplish it in former reigns, repeated in the course of above sixty years since the revolt. Grecian troops had been formerly employed for the purpose, under the most eminent Grecian generals; but they had been opposed by Grecian troops in the service of the Egyptian kings, who had also had some of the most eminent Grecian generals in their service; at one time, as we have seen, the king of Lacedæmon, Agesilaus.

It seems likely that Ochus, bred in the centre of the empire, separated by the great desert from the provinces communicating immediately with the Greeks, would not readily believe the superiority of the Grecian military, and thence, in his first expedition against Egypt, may have incurred the disgrace noted by Isocrates, who says he earned there the character of being unfit either to preside over an empire, or to command an army. He gained however a lesson from which he showed himself capable of profiting. His resource was certainly not the most honourable for the Persian name, nor without obvious hazard to the empire; but it was perhaps, in the decay of the Persian military system, and in the circumstances altogether in which the empire had devolved to him, what alone could afford any reasonable hope of success. The season was favourable for engaging Grecian troops of the best quality of those who could be expected to go out for hire; that remission of the Sacred war in Greece then occurring, and that consequent suspension of the hostilities of the Greeks against one another, which preceded the war, soon after beyond all expectation breaking out, of Olynthus, supported by Athens, against Macedonia. Then it was that Persian agents, as formerly related, went to all the cities of Greece to hire troops; and

SECT.  
II.

---

Isocr. Or.  
ad Phil.

B. C. 351.  
Ol. 107. 2.

Ch. 38. s. 5.  
of this Hist.

two men of the first eminence in two of the principal republics, Lacrates of Thebes, and Nicostratus of Argos, were engaged as commanders. It was about the same time that the Thebans sent their begging embassy to the Persian court; perhaps not then at its usual residence beyond the great desert, but, on account of the great objects of business in view, within readier reach from Greece, in Syria. The circumstances already noticed were obviously favourable, and might even invite such a solicitation; so that we may reasonably believe the historian that the embassy was successful, obtaining for the republic it represented what, in modern times, would be called a subsidy. The Grecian force engaged for the Persian service all passed by sea to Sidon; where joining the troops under Mentor, the largest Grecian army was formed that perhaps ever was employed in a foreign service.

B. C. 350.  
Ol. 107. 3.

Providing thus the most effective military means, Ochus seems, in the historian's plain and probable account, to have taken ably and vigorously the best measures for obviating danger to himself and his empire from such an engine as an army of foreigners. He assembled an Asiatic army, balancing by numbers, in a great degree, if not wholly, the superiority of the Greek in discipline. Dividing then his Grecian troops among his Asiatics, he gave separate commands to Nicostratus, Lacrates, and Mentor, and associated with each a Persian colleague. Jealousies, which such an arrangement could hardly fail to produce, arose, and proceeded to a very threatening extreme; yet Ochus, holding the command in chief himself, observed all so watchfully<sup>4</sup>, and interfered

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 47.

<sup>4</sup> Αὐτὸς δὲ (ὁ βασιλεὺς), τὴν λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἔχων, ἐφῆδρευε τοῖς ἄλλοις πράγμασι, κ. τ. λ. Diod. l. 16. c. 47.

so judiciously, while he checked the evil of the spirit, fostering the good, that he not only obviated the danger from contention among one another, but excited in the Asiatics an emulation in action against the enemy, which even drew praise from the Greeks. The difficulties, which the nature of the invaded country opposed, were singular; and those arising from the skill and valour of the enemy are also mentioned as great. Diodorus ascribes the former success of Nectanebos against the armies of Ochus to the abilities of Diophantus, an Athenian, and Lamius, a Spartan general. These, in the delay of farther measures against him, had been dismissed; but a considerable body of Greeks had been retained, or newly engaged, under another Grecian general, Clinius of Cos. The overbearing force however of the Persian army, directed by the abilities of the Grecian generals serving in it, and supported by an unfailing treasury, succeeded as might be expected. Clinius was killed in an early engagement. The Greeks in the Egyptian service then seem to have become extensively ready to desert or betray it; and Nectanebos, driven successively from all the strong holds of his country, fled into Ethiopia. Thus Egypt, alienated above sixty years, was, in a few months, recovered to the Persian empire.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 47.

c. 51.

In this expedition Ochus gained extensive credit among the Greeks for talent, exertion, and liberality. The Egyptians would not be likely to speak of him generally so well. His ill success against them in the early part of his reign, after so many previous failures of the Persian arms in repeated efforts during half a century, seems to have led them to designate the inefficacious perseverance by representing him, in hieroglyphical symbol, as an ass; and, according to

Ibid.

CHAP.  
XLV.

Plut. de Is.  
et Osir.  
p. 363.

Plutarch, they called him commonly the ass. If then the historian Dinon, a contemporary, as quoted by Plutarch, should be believed, he resented this insult with wit, imprudence, and illiberality; all especially unbecoming a great prince: 'Your ass,' he said, 'shall eat your god:' and so he had their sacred ox, the representative of their god Apis, butchered and served at his table. Possibly some violence against the Egyptian superstitions may have furnished foundation for this story; which however must remain, like most of the many stories of witty words, reported by ancient writers, and often the facts connected with them, uncertain whether they should not be principally attributed to the ingenuity of the reporters. It was not till after his successes that the Egyptians gave him another symbol and name, the sword; by which, according to Plutarch, still in his age, they distinguished him in their catalogue of the Persian kings; he says, for his cruelties, but specifying none; and from the narrative of Diodorus it might rather seem to have been, as indeed the symbol itself implies, for his military successes, and the vigour of conduct by which they were obtained.

It has been usual, in the oriental courts, from times beyond history, to commit occasionally the highest public offices, civil and even military, to eunuchs: even the great Cyrus, according to Xenophon, approved this policy. A eunuch, named Bagóas, said to have been an Egyptian born, was the colleague of Mentor in military command, in the war of Egypt. The account of him altogether marks uncommon vigour of mind, with a temper of some violence, but capable of correcting itself. His dissensions, as reported by Diodorus, first with the



Theban general, Lacrates, and then with his colleague, Mentor, supported by the troops on each side, were of the most ruinous tendency to his sovereign's service; and, on the latter occasion, his own life was in imminent danger. Reckoning then that he owed his preservation to Mentor's generosity, with reconciliation a friendship grew between them, which was ever faithfully maintained by both. The historian's account of the conduct of Ochus also, in a business so critical, when it was most important for him to have the best services, and completest co-operation of all under him, implies temper and judgment. Notwithstanding any misconduct into which passion or mistake, or both, had led those two eminent persons, he conceived so highly of them that, on returning to his capital, he made Bagóas his prime minister, and he committed to Mentor a command more extensive than had ever before been intrusted to any subject; not excepting that given by the partiality of the second Darius to his favourite son Cyrus. It is said to have included all the western provinces of the empire from the Euxine sea to the border of Ethiopia. In farther favour then he not only pardoned the rebellion of Mentor's brother-in-law, Artabazus, but restored him to the satrapy of Lower Phrygia, and advanced Memnon, brother of Mentor, who had fled with Artabazus, to offices of trust and power. Evidently, like the younger Cyrus, he saw the general superiority of the Grecian character, and he appears equally to have used it with generosity, dignity, and discretion. His liberality in rewarding that part of his Grecian army, which, after the conquest of Egypt, he dismissed, would promote that honourable report of him, in his own age, which the narrative of Diodorus indicates to have prevailed, and would facilitate

Diod. 1. 16.  
c. 47. & 52.

CHAP.  
XLV.

the levy of Grecian troops for him in the sequel, when, as the same narrative implies, he used their services even in the interior of his empire.

If Diodorus should be believed, Ochus, returning from the war of Egypt to his capital, abandoned himself, for the rest of his reign, above eleven years, to luxury and idleness; committing the supreme direction of affairs in the body of his empire, eastward of the great desert, wholly to Bagóas, in the western provinces to Mentor. All however, that seems reasonably to be inferred is, that no wars, or material troubles, disturbed the centre and east of the empire, or none of which information reached the Greeks. Of wars with some of the northern nations however we find notice; and the historian mentions that Ochus was never at a loss for Grecian troops, which Mentor forwarded to him as his occasions required; thus implying that his diligence, and watchfulness, and just policy, which had been so advantageous in the Egyptian war, did not afterward wholly cease. That the business of the west meanwhile was ably and faithfully conducted, under the administration of Mentor, the Greeks had more opportunity to know. Everywhere throughout his extensive viceroyalty, the rebellious and contumacious were brought to order; and the order was such that the country flourished under it. Never, since the march of the army under Xerxes to Greece, had the Persian empire shown itself so formidable. Egypt and Cyprus being recovered, and subordination throughout the west of Asia restored, the Persian government could again extend its arms into Europe. The effectual check to Philip, king of Macedonia, at Perinthus and Byzantium, evidently came from Persia, and was probably managed by Memnon,

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 75, 76,  
77.

brother of Mentor, who held a command mentioned by Aristotle, as well as by Diodorus, extending to the Propontis.

Arist.  
Econ. 1. 2.  
Diod. 1. 17.  
c. 50, 51.

Under this vigorous administration it was that the Persian court became the ally of the Athenian democracy, in opposition to the growing power of the Macedonian kingdom, and of that large portion of the Grecian republics, including a balancing party in Athens itself, which preferred the presidency of the king of Macedonia to that of the Athenian many, under the patronage of Persia. The favourite project of Isocrates, for composing the troubles of Greece by uniting the nation in war against Persia, had originated, evidently, during the weak reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon; when the successes of the Greeks in the service of Cyrus, and those afterward obtained by Agesilaus, afforded encouragement for it. Early in the reign of Ochus farther encouragement arose, from the defeat of his first measures against Egypt, and the ensuing revolt of Phenicia and Syria. It was when thus almost all the west of the empire was in rebellion that Isocrates addressed to the king of Macedonia that styled the oration to Philip, wherein those circumstances are mentioned as existing. Probably none understood better than Isocrates the particular interests of Athens, and the complicated politics of all Greece; but Philip would have earlier and better information of affairs in Asia, and of the characters of men in leading situations there. Apparently he bore patiently, with little answer, his venerable friend's reproaches, on a subject on which it would have been hazardous to open himself in writing. The new aspect, which after the conquest of Egypt, the west of the Persian

Gr. a Phil.  
p. 274.



CHAP.  
XLV.

---

empire assumed, would itself be an answer for him to Isocrates, and the more important circumstances would be known to all Greece; while also the intimacy maintained between the leaders of the high democratical party at Athens and the Persian court, or the governors of its provinces, through whom possibly alone any communication may have existed, was notorious. Then followed the bold and extensive project of the singularly able orator-politician, which was defeated by the event of the battle of Chæronea; a project which would have been rash and unwise, but for assurance of support from Persia and confidence in the satisfaction, not perhaps of all, but of a large proportion of his party, his Theban friends especially with the great king's patronage. Philip, even after his complete success against the combination within Greece, thought the state of things not such (for so the third and last of the extant letters of Isocrates to him clearly indicates) that he should be led to offensive war against Persia. The former obstacles to political union in Greece were indeed, in large amount, removed; but the jarring spirit still was extensive there. So much the funeral oration of Demosthenes largely shows; while Persia, with all her provinces obedient, still possessed all the vigour to which she had been lately raised. Isocrates, in the letter last mentioned, shows himself aware that Philip continued to differ from him in opinion concerning war with Persia; and thence he proceeded to declare that, but for his extreme elderhood, he would take the journey to Macedonia, to confer with the king on the subject on which he had been so many years so earnest, and always with full persuasion that what he advised could alone save Greece from destruction.



Such was the state of things when, in the year following that of the battle of Chæronea, the twelfth after the conquest of Egypt, Artaxerxes Ochus king of Persia died; the historian says poisoned by his minister and favourite Bagóas. It has failed few writers of the history of princes to find occasion for noticing the frequency of the imputation of their death to poison, and the general uncertainty of such imputation. Arses, said to have been the youngest son of Ochus, was raised to the throne. All his other sons are reported to have suffered the fate which, after so many ages, remains common for persons in their unfortunately lofty situation among the Asiatic realms, and in the Turkish empire, even in Europe; wherefore, though neither their number is mentioned, nor whether poison nor what else was the instrument, yet that they were put to death may appear not improbable; and, Bagóas continuing to hold the office of prime minister, it must seem that all measures of importance would have at least his sanction. Yet there are accompanying stories which must throw doubt largely over these anecdotes of the Persian court, were they not in themselves open to much doubt. Diodórus says it was in revenge for the slaughter of the god Apis, twelve years before, and the contempt altogether expressed by Ochus for the Egyptian superstitions, that Bagóas, after having conducted the affairs of the empire ably and faithfully twelve years, murdered his sovereign, through whose favour he held his lofty situation. But this, it appears, did not satisfy the appetite of after-ages for strange stories. Ælian, not indeed a historian, but a professed story-teller, has not scrupled to relate

B. C. 339.\*  
Ol. 110. 2.  
Diod. l. 17.  
c. 5.

[\* According to Mr. Clinton, Ochus was succeeded by Arses B. C. 338. See Fasti Hellen. p. 312.]

CHAP.  
XLV.

that Bagóas gave the mangled flesh of the body of Ochus to be devoured by cats, and the bones to be made into sword-hilts; yet that he enjoyed this delicious revenge of the honour of his ox-god but in secret, causing another body to be publicly buried with royal honours for that of the king. It is with a view to the history of literature, and a just estimate of the credit so very variously due concerning political and military matters, and historical facts generally, to those whom the modern learned have so generally ranked together as classical writers, that this story, unknown to or rejected by Diodorus, Plutarch, and even Justin, has been so far noticed here.

Arses lived only to the third year after his elevation; destroyed then, according to report, by Bagóas, who remained always prime minister. A prince, descended, according to Diodorus, from the second Darius, by a brother of Artaxerxes Mnemon and the younger Cyrus, (but, as Xenophon's account implies, by a different mother,) had escaped the proscriptions of the royal family under both the late reigns. Not only spared by Ochus, but, for military merit, in war with the fierce nations of the northern frontier, raised to the satrapy of Armenia, he had maintained friendship with Bagóas, who favoured his succession to the throne. Before called Codomannus, he now took the name of Darius. It would hardly be with the same view with which Bagóas is said to have preferred the helpless youth of Arses to the abler age of his elder brother, that a prince in the vigour of manhood, versed in the business of government, and eminent as a soldier, would have in preference the support of a wily politician; yet, according to Diodorus, Bagóas,

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 5.  
Strab. l. 15.  
p. 736.  
Ol. 111. 2.  
B. C. 335.\*

[\* According to Mr. Clinton, l. c., Arses was succeeded by Darius Codomannus B. C. 336.]

who had found himself unable to govern young Arses, proposed to govern Darius. Very soon after the elevation of Darius however he died ; and the story transmitted is that, attempting to administer a poisoned potion to the king, he was compelled by him to drink it himself. How these circumstances should, with any certainty, be known, is left for conjecture ; and to reconcile them with other reported circumstances, of readier notoriety, has been omitted by the historian. Friendly correspondence between the minister Bagóas and the Grecian satrap Mentor appears to have remained uninterrupted while the former lived ; and yet, after his death, not only the great viceroyalty, first committed to Mentor, by Ochus, was continued to him, but the favour and confidence with which he was honoured by Darius appear to have equalled that enjoyed under any former prince, and, as we shall see in the sequel, were extended to his family after him. Under his government the west of the empire, except as far as hostilities were carried by Philip king of Macedonia, seems to have been generally quiet and flourishing. The court and the central provinces, disturbed by the circumstances, whatever they may have been, which produced or followed the death of Ochus, remained evidently in a troubled state when Darius Codomannus acquired the throne.

## CHAPTER XLVI.

ALEXANDER'S EXPEDITION AGAINST PERSIA; FIRST  
CAMPAIGN.

## SECTION I.

*Preparations of Greece and Persia for war; transactions previous to the passage of the Grecian army into Asia.*

CHAP.  
XLVI.

---

IT was not till after the death of Artaxerxes Ochus, and the commencement of troubles in Persia, attending and following it, that Philip of Macedonia, yielding at length to the instances of his excellent friend Isocrates, avowed the purpose of delivering the Greeks of Asia from the Persian dominion, and, as we have seen, began hostilities by sending a military force into Æolia under Parmenio. The death of Arses had followed, and Darius Codomannus had succeeded to the empire, when Alexander, having happily terminated his wars with the northern barbarians, and composed the affairs of Greece, violently disturbed by the circumstances among which the revolution in Thebes was prominent, had opportunity to prosecute the great enterprise.

Meanwhile the change which had taken place in the circumstances of Persia was not encouraging for it. The new king, Darius, coming to the throne with the advantage of reputation as a soldier, appears to have begun his reign with vigour and prudence. The troubles of the court and the centre of the empire



were composed, so far, at least, that he could give some attention to the extreme west and to Greece; and he made formidable preparation of land and sea forces, not only with the purpose of resisting the invasion of Asia, but openly threatening to retaliate by invading Europe. This demonstration however seems not to have been followed by any effectual exertion. During Alexander's wars with the northern people and in Greece Parmenio maintained himself in Æolia with the small force which had been placed under his orders by Philip\*, and afforded support to friendly Greeks there who had revolted against the Persian dominion. Diodorus attributes the remission of the vigour, which had been apparent in the new king of Persia's early measures, to his contempt of Alexander's youth. But it was from no such sentiment that he would allow Parmenio to retain the footing in Asia which he had acquired. Of what was passing in the great empire, beyond the western frontier, the historian evidently could tell nothing. But it seems probable that the engagement of Alexander in the wars raised by the policy of Demosthenes, with support from the treasury of Persia, provided for Darius a leisure not unwanted for arranging the various business of his vast dominions, and perhaps for attention to wars elsewhere, without or within them. When however the leisure arrived for Alexander, on the conclusion of the Theban war, to turn his arms toward Asia, the attention of the Persian government to preparation against him was renewed. According to Diodorus, powerful armies were assembled, a large fleet was equipped, and commanders of high reputation were appointed. Among these the Greeks, Mentor and Memnon, connected with the Persian empire,

[\* See Note p. 304.]

CHAP.  
XLVI.

not only by long service under it, but by the marriage of their sister with the satrap of Lower Phrygia, were eminent. Through their agency a large body of Greeks was engaged ; while no small portion of the Grecian people, with Demosthenes at their head, was disposed to the Persian cause. A curious and interesting fact, incidentally noticed in an oration of Æschines, shows the publicity of this connexion, and, in no inconsiderable amount, its character ; and remaining uncontradicted in the reply of Demosthenes, yet extant, may be esteemed fully authenticated. It was not long, the orator says, before Alexander passed into Asia (apparently it was after the conclusion of the Theban war) that an official communication was made from the Persian court, in the form, then usual, of a letter from the king of Persia to the Athenian people. In this letter, abounding, according to the orator, with reproaches in haughty style to the Athenians for their late conduct, (no longer directed by Demosthenes and his associates of the Persian party, but by Phocion and the Macedonian party,) he especially assured them ‘that they should have no more money from ‘him.’

Æsch. de  
Cor.  
p. 632.

To the people of Macedonia, who, by their late king’s successful career of twenty-four years, had been established in a state of civil security, perhaps hardly at that time known elsewhere, the prospect could not but be anxious and awful. They did not want, like the subjects of the Grecian republics, war abroad to give them peace at home. But their country, though to a great extent rich in soil, yet uncultivated and thinly peopled, wanted the improvement which the attention of the government to arts of peace should have provided ; and, for improvement of the government itself, good in general principle, but very de-

fective in various points, and wanting accommodation to the new circumstances of advantage in which the kingdom was placed, peace was needful. Well therefore, however in opposition to the earnest remonstrances of the Athenian patriot Isocrates for the good of republican Greece, might they be disposed to recommend to their youthful sovereign, to consider first his duty to his proper kingdom; and with that view to follow a course that might have invited another youth. It is said that the two of his council the most esteemed by his father, Antipater and Parmenio, advised him to use the existing opportunity, of peace more than commonly assured, to marry; and not till an heir to the throne he had inherited, and to the increase of dominion he had in view, should be born, to hazard his people's happiness and his own life in pursuit of such acquisition.

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 16.

But the sober office of kings, to provide for all, to whom they should be fathers, domestic quiet and permanent welfare, was less of the taste of Alexander's years. His ardent mind, though far from insensible to love, and also far from insensible to his people's prosperity, was bent upon war and conquest. That the considerations which, after long deliberation, had decided Philip's mature judgment, should, with the added force of paternal example, lead Alexander to the same decision, can indeed hardly be imputed to him for blame. Among the Macedonians themselves, though sober men would fear the result for their country, yet many of warmer and less thoughtful tempers would exult in the prospect of war in the rich provinces of Asia, against a people accustomed to shrink before Grecian arms, where they might find reward for their recent labours and perils, undergone in a comparatively poor country and rough



climate, against the fiercest of barbarians. The venerable Isocrates no longer lived to promote their wishes by his authority and the eloquence of his pen ; yet, among his numerous surviving partisans, in Athens, and throughout Greece, many would be disposed and able to assist the cause. The amount then, and the superior quality, and the ready will, of the military force that Greece at that time could furnish, when, after wars hardly ceasing for centuries, all now was peace at home, might not only invite a youth of military disposition, the acknowledged head of that force, to put it in action, but even urge for the consideration of the soberest statesmen, whether the present opportunity of the union of that force should not be used. Thus only, it might be urged, there could be hope to provide future security for the country ; to obviate invasion, which had been threatened ; to give a turn to the public mind favourable to the union so happily formed ; to strengthen the Grecian cause by associating that large portion of the Grecian people which, for ages, had been accustomed to acknowledge vassalage and pay tribute to Persia ; and thus to set at a greater distance the boundary against an enemy, however generally failing in exertion, always of most formidable power.

Justin probably had some warranty for his assertion, that official returns were made of the military force of every republic of Greece at this time, and that the total exceeded two hundred thousand men. Comparing all extant authorities, little as Justin's alone may be, this report may seem not extravagant. The republics had been for so many years in almost a constant state of warfare that not only for every citizen to be familiar with arms would be required, but a large proportion must have had practice in



either field or garrison service; and it appears probable that a great part of Justin's stated number might have been put on duty for a campaign within the country, whether in war among the republics, as that by which Epaminondas acquired fame, or against a foreign invader, as that earlier, more glorious for the nation, in which the host of Persia was nearly annihilated at Plataea; but, for war in Asia, other considerations were necessary. The professed purpose, important not only for credit and glory, but as a step to any ulterior purpose, was to withdraw all Grecian cities from foreign dominion. The maintenance, and, if it might be, the increase of popularity for the chief was the more necessary, as Greece, however grown in military numbers, was now, not less than at the time of the Persian invasion, poor in purse, and divided in political sentiment; the heads of a large party, now as then, actually holding friendly communication with the foreign enemy. Till therefore the first purpose, the liberation of the Grecian states, was so far attained that war might be carried into the country beyond them, pay, and not plunder, must maintain the army.

Information concerning the revenue of the late king of Macedonia, Philip, though much declamation remains imputing to him corrupt influence through his wealth, we have observed to be very loose and uncertain. But the concurrence of ancient writers is complete in asserting that, at his death, his treasury was found exhausted. From Arrian we have report of a speech of Alexander, declaring that his father, with not sixty talents in his treasury, perhaps twelve thousand pounds sterling, left it encumbered with a debt of five hundred talents, about a hundred thousand pounds sterling. Nevertheless, whether

CHAP.  
XLVI.

---

from confidence in the solidity of the sources of the Macedonian revenue and in the faith of the government, or from zeal for the Persian war, credit did not fail. Alexander borrowed eight hundred talents, about a hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling, to put forward his proposed expedition. The debt however, thus altogether not more than two hundred and sixty thousand pounds, is said by Plutarch and others to have been considered as threatening ruin to the royal revenue of Macedonia.<sup>1</sup>

In such circumstances Alexander, however he might have a view to great undertakings, could not employ numerous forces. But encouragement was not wanting for great enterprise with a small army. The force which, under Clearchus, had defied the power of the Persian empire in its centre, and afterward, under Xenophon and others, maintained that defiance in retreating to its extremity, was originally less than thirteen thousand men. That which passed from European Greece under Agesilaus was no more than eight thousand foot. On account of the difficulty of transport across the Ægean, and the obstacles to a march through Bœotia, Thessaly, Macedonia, and Thrace, he carried no cavalry. Yet, through his popularity among the Greeks of Asia, and the prospect of profit which was against Persia afforded, he soon raised such a force of cavalry, and so added to his infantry, as to be in circumstances to make the Persian provinces find subsistence and pay for all.

Ch. 24. s. 3.  
of this Hist.

<sup>1</sup> Even those latter ancient writers, and numerous moderns, their disciples, who have represented the riches of Philip as the great instrument of his successes, have not scrupled to paint, in strong colours, Alexander's poverty. I am not aware that any one of them has proposed to reconcile the striking contradiction.

Agreement, more than common about military numbers, is found in ancient accounts of the army assembled under Alexander for the Persian expedition. The most particular extant is from Diodorus. All the republics of Greece together, he says, furnished no more than seven thousand foot, of their civic troops. Five thousand mercenaries were added ; whether at the common expense of the confederacy, or paid by the Macedonian treasury, remains unsaid. The Macedonian foot are stated at twelve thousand. Thus the whole of the heavy-armed, or infantry of the phalanx, would be twenty-four thousand. The Odrysian Thracians, Triballians, and Illyrians, probably all, in their national manner, middle-armed, are reckoned together five thousand ; the Agrians and bowmen one thousand ; the infantry thus of all descriptions thirty thousand. The Agrians were highlanders of northern Macedonia ; middle-armed, but eminent among the middle-armed. The commanding officer of the bowmen was a Cretan, and it seems likely that those under him were mostly Cretans.

The greater part of Greece, as we have formerly observed, is a country little adapted either to the breeding of horses, or to the action of cavalry ; in-somuch that some, even of the more powerful states, had none on their ordinary military establishment. Six hundred are said by Diodorus to have been now furnished by the republics south of Thermopylæ. Small as this force may seem, it was rather beyond the proportion of cavalry to infantry most ordinary in the armies of southern Greece. But Alexander, with other very great advantages, unpossessed by Agesilaus, had not his difficulties for cavalry. His Thracian dominion almost touched on Asia, divided

SECT.  
I.

---

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 17.

Arr. l. 1.  
c. 11.

CHAP.  
XLVI.

---

only by the narrow channel of the Hellespont. The transport thus was easy; and Macedonia and Thessaly had more horse, and better, than all Greece besides. Each country furnished fifteen hundred. Thrace and Pæonia added nine hundred. Thus the whole cavalry would be four thousand five hundred, and the army altogether thirty-four thousand five hundred. Alexander's generals, who published histories of his wars, would probably be disposed rather to extenuate than amplify his numbers. According to Plutarch, Aristobulus stated the infantry at thirty thousand, the cavalry at four thousand, but Ptolemy allowed the cavalry to be five thousand; and another writer, Anaximenes, reported the horse to have been five thousand five hundred, and the foot forty-three thousand. Arrian states only, in general terms, that the infantry, including light-armed of all descriptions, exceeded thirty thousand, and the horse five thousand, so that the whole would approach thirty-six thousand. Though not exactly confirming the detail of Diodorus, he little contradicts it; perhaps indeed not at all; our copies of Diodorus differing. As a rough sketch therefore of the composition of the army, that detail may perhaps be considered as reasonably exact.

Plut. de  
Fort. Alex.  
p. 327.

Small as the force, in the highest estimate, may appear, to contend with the myriads of Persia, yet it was such as Persia had never measured her strength with since her overthrow at Plataea, in the middle of Greece. Her great advantages however remained, in the immense superiority of her revenue, and in the political dissensions of the Greeks. Yet, on the other hand, through those very dissensions zeal was the more ardent among the partisans of the Macedonian connexion. The prevailing voice thus was



for war with Persia, under the command of the young king of Macedonia, elected captain-general of Greece. The forces were assembled at Amphipolis ; from the northern parts by land, from the southern by sea, and thence, in spring of the year before Christ three hundred thirty-four, marched together to the Hellespont.

SECT.  
I.

---

OL. 111. 3.  
B. C. 334.

Though our information of what passed meanwhile in the Persian empire is very defective, evidently something had again checked the vigour of its councils, or perhaps required their earnest direction another way. Through some cause however the exertion and the precaution, which the circumstances wanted on the threatened frontier, failed. Of Mentor, whose talents and whose fidelity had been so valuable to the late king, Ochus, and whose merit Darius had the discernment so to appreciate as to continue him in the great command in which, on his accession, he found him, no farther mention is found. It seems altogether likely that about this time he died ; and that to his loss may be attributed the defect of management, civil and military, and the failure of proper combination, which all accounts indicate to have ensued in the western provinces, and especially in those most exposed to attack from Greece. The military command, in the moment perhaps the most important in the empire, had been committed to his brother Memnon, whom we have seen formerly, in exile from the Persian dominion, residing at the Macedonian court, and recalled when his brother-in-law Artabazus was restored to his satrapy of the Lower Phrygia. Memnon's commission was for the district separated by the narrow water of the Hellespont only from the Macedonian dominion. The service of Artabazus himself apparently might have

CHAP.  
XLVI.

been valuable in his satrapy, within which Memnon's command lay : but he had been called to attend the king's immediate councils<sup>2</sup>, where doubtless also his knowledge of Greece and the Greeks, from much communication and long acquaintance, might also make his information and advice highly important. Yet there is appearance that a jealousy of his Grecian connexion may have occasioned his removal, and that, though ostensibly in high honour at the Persian court, he was nevertheless there reckoned a hostage for ensuring the fidelity of his Grecian brother-in-law, in the critical command intrusted to him. His satrapy meanwhile was committed to Arsites, as lieutenant-governor. This great officer, as Arrian shows, was on terms not perfectly confidential with Memnon, whose command, otherwise critical, was the more so, as the immediate command against him was in the hands of the consummate Macedonian general Parmenio. We learn variously, and from Arrian decisively, that the satraps were high treasurers of their respective provinces. Memnon's\* commission seems to have been simply military. For pay for his troops, the tribute assessed on certain Greek towns acknowledging the supremacy of the Persian crown was placed at his disposal ; but for extraordinaries he seems to have been dependent on the satrap, or his vicegerent. Wanting money then, his credit with the citizens of the commercial Greek town of Lamp-

Arist.  
Œcon.  
1.2. p. 692,  
ed. Par.  
1654.

<sup>2</sup> This, not here said by Diodorus, becomes evident from what followed, as reported both by Diodorus and by Arrian.

[\*In preceding editions *Mentor* has been wrongfully allowed to stand here, and hence to be repeated in one or two following passages. That this had originally occurred from mere inadvertency on the part of the historian is proved by the passage to which reference is made in the margin : Μέμνων Ῥαδίου, κυριεύσας Λαμφιάκου, δεηθείς χρημάτων, κ. τ. λ.]

sacus, on the Propontis, enabled him to borrow of them what supplied his immediate need, pledging the general taxes for repayment. But with the season for collecting the taxes his need returned, and he was obliged to refer repayment to a future day. Again he was reduced to the same necessity, and, at length, the failure was such that he could no longer procure corn sufficient for the regulated distribution to his troops for their subsistence. In this distress it appears he had the popularity and talent to persuade both the townsmen to wait patiently for repayment of their loan, and the soldiers to acquiesce under a short allowance.

This information from the contemporary philosopher, who lived in the courts of Philip and Alexander, concurs with Arrian's report of following matters to give all probability to that of Diodorus, of those more immediately ensuing. Memnon received orders from his court to reduce the Grecian town of Cyzicus, on the Propontis, which, under encouragement probably, from Parmenio, had revolted, and refused the accustomed tribute. From Æolis, where he was opposing Parmenio, he hastily crossed Mount Ida; but failing to surprise the town of Cyzicus, which had been his purpose, he could do no more than plunder the territory, from which he collected valuable booty, and then hastily returned. His short absence however was not unattended with inconvenience. Parmenio had used the opportunity for taking Grynium, a considerable town, one of the four of the lordships which the family of the Eretrian Gongylus had enjoyed from the munificence of the Persian court, and he proceeded to lay siege to Pitana. Memnon's approach relieved that place, and a Persian force, probably cavalry, being collected to strengthen his Grecian army, the Macedonian general Callas was defeated in



CHAP.  
XLVI.

the Troad. The walls of Rhœteum however, after no very severe loss, (for Callas appears to have been an able officer,) afforded him refuge, and Memnon, held still in check by Parmenio, could little prosecute the advantage gained.

## SECTION II.

*Passage of the Grecian army into Asia: Alexander's visit to Troy: difficulties for the direction of the march: measures of the Persian generals: battle of the Granicus.*

Arr. 1. 1.  
c. 11.

SUCH nearly appears to have been the state of things in that critical angle of the Persian empire when Alexander arrived with his army at Sestus on the Hellespont. There he found his fleet of a hundred and sixty triremes, with round ships, as the Greeks described vessels of burthen, in number together ample for the speedy passage of the strait. The Persian government, possessing a fleet of overbearing force, had unaccountably neglected to provide that it should be where it was so urgently wanted. Memnon, with an army barely able to maintain contest with the small force under Parmenio, and watched by that force, could not attempt to face Alexander. Parmenio himself therefore, whose local knowledge, acquired in his command in Asia, would add to the value of his general superiority of military talent and experience, was sent for to superintend the transport.<sup>3</sup> Under his direction the army crossed the strait from Sestus to Abydus in all quietness, Alexander having

[B. C. 334.  
Cl.]

<sup>3</sup> Arrian giving no account of transactions in Asia before Alexander's arrival there, we depend upon Diodorus for information where Parmenio was while Alexander was engaged in the wars with the northern nations and the disturbances in Greece. It is therefore highly satisfactory to find that the two narratives meet in perfect harmony. [See note p. 304.]



meanwhile leisure for whatever amusement might invite him.

Those who have experienced the emotions, natural to all who have had the advantage of a classical education, on first approaching Athens, on first approaching Rome, on first even seeing the Mediterranean or the Adriatic, or any scene interesting to the imagination through acquaintance with the admirable authors of classical antiquity and the persons and events they have celebrated, will conceive what might be those of Alexander on this occasion; a youth of twenty-two, bred under Aristotle, approaching the ground described by Homer, in that poem which had been from childhood his delight, as to this day it has remained of all ingenious minds fortunate enough to be acquainted with it, and must continue to be while letters exist: but to estimate the keenness of his feeling the farther consideration is necessary, of his own reputed consanguinity with the principal heroes of that exquisite poem, of his father's glory, worthy of such an ancestry, and of what he had himself already, at his early age, acquired. With his mind thus stimulated, before quitting Europe, he would visit the tomb or barrow of Protesilaus, near Eleus, about twelve miles from Sestus. Protesilaus, leading the landing of Agamemnon's army on the Asiatic shore, is said to have found it so otherwise guarded than on Alexander's arrival that he was presently killed by Hector. In honour of the hero so falling, and to intercede with the gods for better fortune for himself, Alexander had sacrifice performed in his presence on the barrow. Earnest then to explore the site and territory of Troy, he embarked at Eleus, and crossed to the place on the opposite shore, reputed the station of Agamemnon's fleet; whence it derived the name,

retained to Alexander's age, of the Achæan port. It was his fancy, it is said, to take the tiller from Menœtius, the master of the trireme, and be himself the steersman during the passage. Midway he lay on his oars, while, on the deck, a bull was sacrificed to Neptune and the Nereids, and, from a golden ewer, he poured libations upon the waves. It was farther his fancy for himself, full-armed, to be the first to land. As thanksgiving offerings then for his quiet passage, he directed altars to be raised where he embarked and where he landed, to Jupiter Apobaterius, the protector of debarkation, and to Minerva, and Hercules. After these pious offices he proceeded to the place where Troy had stood.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> These particulars are mentioned by Arrian; but with his usual caution, introduced, or qualified, with the expressions 'Ο πλείων λόγος κατέχει — Λέγουσι δὲ — Καὶ ταῦτα λέγουσιν — Λόγος κατέχει — Οἱ δὲ λέγουσιν — Ὅς ὁ λόγος: thus intimating that, though worthy of notice, he did not reckon them resting on authority equal to that to which he deferred for matters of more importance, which he has related without such qualification.\*

An inept note of Gronovius, urging difficulty where there is absolutely none, as if Menœtius might not have been the regular master of the royal trireme, though Alexander indulged his fancy to take the helm during the passage of the Hellespont, can be worthy of notice only that it may not impose on those utterly unacquainted with marine affairs. The matter indeed is little enough important. The complement to Alexander from Chares, immediately after related, is of other weight.

[\* Mr. Mitford perhaps does not attach sufficient value to phrases of this kind. Bentley, in his incomparable Dissertation on Phalaris, having occasion to notice the use of λέγεται by Athenæus, says: 'λέγεται is so far from being a token of want of evidence that it is principally used upon the contrary account, when the generality of writers are agreed. When a single witness says a thing, he is commonly mentioned by name; but when the evidence is numerous, and cannot all be brought in, then they say λέγεται or φασί.' P. 121. ed. Lond. 1699. Wolfius, in his Prolegomena ad Homerum, makes a similar remark: '... notandum est, illud φασί de rebus vel certissimis usurpari in *famá minime obscurá*, non de iis quæ a nonnullis sive paucis traduntur. De his Græce est φασί ἐνιοί, φασί τινες.' P. lxxvii. n. ed. Hal. Saxon. 1795.]

At this time Chares, the first great patron of Demosthenes in his political career, afterward his associate in the administration of Athens, was residing in the neighbourhood, at the sea-port town of Sigeum. Eminent men of Athens, we have seen formerly, taught, by the experience of ages, the danger of political eminence there, commonly sought establishment in some state beyond the ready reach of an arbitrary vote of the Athenian many, where, in case of need, they might find security, and Sigeum was the retreat of Chares. How far he remained yet in favour with any party, or in what degree he was obnoxious at Athens, we have no information; but that his politics were little founded on any principle beyond that of his own advantage, is indicated in all accounts. He hastened now to compliment Alexander on his arrival in Asia. Others, Greeks and Asiatics, Arrian assures us, did the same, but Chares alone was of eminence for the historian to distinguish by name.

On the site of ancient Troy was, at this time, only a village; still however retaining the venerable name of Ilion, and farther supporting respect by temples, revered, among other reasons, for the relics they contained. In a temple of Minerva were consecrated suits of armour said to have been preserved from the time of the Trojan war. Alexander performed sacrifice there, on an altar dedicated to Jupiter, with the title of Hercius, the protector of boundaries; and, together with that chief of the greater Grecian deities, he addressed vows to Priam, as a hero or demigod; with the purpose, Arrian says was reported, of averting the anger of the ever-living spirit of the king of ancient Troy from the progeny of Achilles, of whom, through his mother, he was



CHAP.  
XLVI.

---

reckoned to be. Dedicating then, in the temple of Minerva, the armour he bore, he took away, as in exchange, one of the ancient panoplies, to be carried before him in future, on solemn occasions, and especially on going into battle. Having gratified his curiosity, and, whether more to satisfy his own mind, or to gain credit for assurance of divine favour to his purposes, having fulfilled offices of piety in his day reckoned becoming, he hastened to rejoin his army, which had completed the passage of the strait, and was already assembled in camp near Arisbe.

Still for proceeding on the great professed object of the expedition, the liberation of all Grecian cities from the dominion of Persia, various difficulties were before him. In all those cities were contesting parties, and in some of the most powerful the prevailing party was adverse to the proposed change, called liberation. Generally the Persian government had so much protected and so little oppressed the Grecian settlements in Asia that many reckoned their allegiance to the Persian king rather an advantage than a misfortune. Mostly however the Persian government favoured either that superiority of one eminent man, which the Greeks described by the term tyranny, or that government by the most eminent individuals, which they called oligarchy. But this preference resulted only from the particular circumstances of the case which required it. The liberal despotism of Persia would patronise democracy in its subject states, if the peace of the country was maintained, and the tribute to the crown regularly remitted. Everywhere however one party being adverse to the Persian, very generally it was the democratical party. Hence Philip, who had avoided, as far as might be, whatever would mark predilection for any party principles in proper Greece,



had been induced to profess himself the patron of democracy in Asia; and Alexander, in this as in so many other things, followed his steps.

SECT.  
II.

---

The line of march then, for reaching the principal Asiatic-Grecian cities, was not of easy choice. The lofty and extensive highlands of Ida immediately intervened. The shortest road, but otherwise most disadvantageous, abounding with opportunities for an opposing force, was directly over those highlands. The more circuitous way westward, by the towns of the coast, would apparently on many accounts have been to be preferred; but Memnon's attention, fixed, by various considerations, principally to that line, had provided obstacles. A third remained, by the eastern roots of the mountains. This was much more circuitous, yet among its difficulties and dangers it had also its advantages. By taking that road it might be hoped that contest with the powerful body of Grecian troops in the Persian service would be avoided; instead of the able Memnon, satraps would command; and the country being all hostile, the army might live at its expense: whereas, among the Grecian settlements, subsistence must be paid for<sup>5</sup>, and offence cautiously avoided. In these circumstances Parmenio's previous opportunities for observation and inquiry would be highly conducive toward the best decision. Alexander resolved upon taking the circuitous inland road.

<sup>5</sup> If, for this, not said by Arrian, but perhaps obvious enough of itself, authority were desired, the conduct of the Cyrean Greeks, returning from Upper Asia, among the Grecian towns on the coast of the Euxine, but more particularly that of Agesilaus among those of the coast of the Ægean, may be referred to, as related, on the authority of Xenophon, in the third section of the twenty-fourth chapter of this history.

Whether through mere remissness, or by what troubles prevented, the Persian court intermitted that just attention said to have been given, on the first accession of Darius, to the invasion threatened from Macedonia, we still fail to learn. It seems to have been assumed, or hoped, that Memnon's Grecian force and his interest among the Grecian cities, together with the disposition of a party in every city, if not to favour the Persian supremacy, yet to profit from Persian patronage for maintaining itself against an adverse party, would suffice for the security of the coast, with its numerous and wealthy commercial towns; and that the satraps, who were as princes of the interior country, with vassals, deeply interested in its protection against a plundering enemy, would make such an extent of continent as Lesser Asia, so divided by lofty mountains, the grave of an invader. But though Memnon's military means were crippled by deficiency of pecuniary means, yet how justly the Persian court reckoned upon his talents and fidelity, and how well altogether he deserved the estimation which historians have concurrently attributed to him, seems not least indicated by the difficulties which Alexander resolved to encounter, in preference to those which Memnon had prepared for him. The country through which he was to pass was the satrapy of Lower Phrygia, called by Arrian, and some others, Phrygia next the Hellespont; but, Bithynia forming a large portion of it, and Dascylium, the satrap's principal residence, being within that country, we find him sometimes entitled satrap of Bithynia. Long held by Pharnabazus, and after him by Memnon's brother-in-law, Artabazus, in his absence, Arsites now presided, with a title, as given by

Arrian, corresponding with ours of lieutenant-governor.<sup>6</sup> Alexander, with the purpose of reaching the Grecian settlements southward, to avoid the heights of Ida, was necessarily to stretch far eastward, and begin even in a northerly direction. Percote is mentioned as the town first in his way. Lamp-sacus next, a considerable Grecian city on the Propontis, was not friendly. A mutual interest having led it to be upon good terms with the satrap, Memnon's influence would easily prevail there; and its population was numerous enough, and its walls strong enough, to enable it to dare a siege. Alexander therefore, to whom quick progress was highly important, leaving it on his left, proceeded by Herimotus to Colonæ.

The direction thus taken, and the rapidity with which it was pursued, seem to have surprised as they alarmed Arsites, and all the governors of provinces bordering on his satrapy. Spithridates<sup>7</sup>, ruling the extensive and rich country, formerly the kingdom of Cræsus, and afterward the satrapy of Tissaphernes, had probably expected that Memnon's military force and military talents, and the walls of the Æolian Greek towns yet in the Persian interest, would long employ Alexander before he could reach Ionia, which was an appendage of his satrapy; and that, before danger could approach any part of his country, beyond that held by Greeks, a royal army might arrive to overwhelm the daring invader. The military force on which a Persian governor depended for preserving the peace of his country, as we have formerly observed, was principally cavalry. Spithridates, and four

<sup>6</sup> Arrian, entitling Spithridates ὁ Λυδίας καὶ Ἰωνίας σατράπης, adds, καὶ Ἀρσίτης ὁ τῆς πρὸς Ἑλλησπόντῳ Φρυγίας ὑπαρχος. De Exped. Alex. l. 1. c. 13.

<sup>7</sup> In Diodorus's orthography Spithrobates.



other eminent men, by Arrian entitled generals, (apparently governors of districts, who commanded each the troops of his district,) hastened, with all the force they could collect, to support Arsites. Meanwhile Memnon's activity appears to have equalled or even exceeded Alexander's. Having ascertained the hostile army's course, with his heavy-armed Grecian foot he outstripped its march, and joined the satraps at Zelia in Bithynia. Possibly the heights of Ida afforded him a shorter way, which, though rugged and difficult, might be well known to him or those under him. The army, thus assembled to oppose Alexander, consisted, according to Arrian, of twenty thousand Persian cavalry, and nearly an equal number of regular heavy-armed foot; not probably all Greeks, for among Grecian mercenary soldiers men of various nations were often admitted, but all trained in the Grecian discipline of the phalax. The light-armed foot, after the common practice of the Grecian military writers in stating numbers, Arrian has omitted to notice.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> This we have had occasion formerly to observe of both Thucydides and Xenophon, and thus there is in Arrian's account no absolute contradiction of Diodorus, who makes the Persian infantry a hundred thousand. Not that it seems probable the fighting men were so many. But Herodotus, in enumerating the army under Xerxes, not only specifies the light-armed soldiers, but also the followers of the camp; often, in Asiatic camps, more numerous than the fighting men. Thus the army at Zelia may have been of the full number reported by Diodorus.

That Arrian, in stating the foot of the army at Zelia as near twenty thousand men, meant to speak of heavy-armed foot only, Greeks, or armed and trained in the Grecian discipline, I think sufficiently evident in a collation of his expressions: 'The Persian generals encamped at Zelia,' he says, *ξὺν τῇ ἵππῳ τε βαρβαρικῇ καὶ τοῖς Ἑλλησι τοῖς μισθοφόροις*, l. 1. c. 13. and these phrases follow, *Περσῶν δὲ ἱππεῖς μὲν ἦσαν ἐς δισμυρίους, ξένοι δὲ πᾶσι μισθοφόροι ὀλίγον ἀποδέοντες δισμυρίων*, c. 15., *ξένους τοὺς μισθοφόρους*, c. 17., *τοὺς μισθοφόρους Ἑλληνας*, *ibid.* Among the *μισθοφόρους Ἑλληνας*



Probably they were several thousands, though time and circumstances would not have served for assembling them in numbers equal to their usual proportion in Persian armies.

Arrian, generally scrupulous, has undertaken to state what passed at a council of war, of which Memnon was a member, through whose communication indeed it may have become known. Memnon, he says, delivering his opinion to the council, said: 'We are considerably outnumbered by the enemy in regular infantry. I cannot therefore recommend a battle against a very superior force of the best disciplined troops, commanded by the most practised officers in the world. A great superiority in cavalry is our advantage, and it should be used. The enemy, if he advances, should be allowed neither to eat nor rest. Our horses' feet would suffice to destroy the harvest growing in his way; and even if towns could afford him shelter and refreshment, they should not be spared.' Arsites exclaimed against this: 'It is our duty,' he said, 'with the ample means we possess, to protect those committed to our care; nor will I patiently suffer a single house or a single inhabitant within my province to be injured.' In this sentiment the other Persian generals concurred.

It is evident, from Arrian's narrative, that he reckoned Memnon's counsel wise; and Alexander's we know from Xenophon, men not of Grecian birth were often admitted: but *ξένοι μισθοφόροι* seems to have been a description for none but heavy-armed soldiers trained in the Grecian manner, mostly Greeks, or passing for such. The heavy-armed mercenary Greeks of Alexander's army are termed by Arrian *ξένοι μισθοφόροι*.

Gronovius's proposed amendment of the monstrous statement in our copies of Justin, making the Persian infantry, at the ensuing battle, six hundred thousand, is ingenious, and it may be but justice even to a writer so given to extravagance as Justin to reckon it probable.

advance, undertaken perhaps in some confidence that a blow might be struck against the satraps before Memnon could bring his regular infantry to their support, highly hazardous, if not even rash. He thought that Alexander's army might have been effectually stopped, if not even destroyed, by the execution of Memnon's plan.<sup>9</sup> The Persian generals, he says, were jealous of Memnon; not suspecting him of infidelity to the cause he had engaged in; but, knowing the king valued him highly for his military talents, they supposed he would desire a protracted war, that the need of his services might not cease. On the other hand, personal motives for the determination of the Persian chiefs are obvious; but mixed with considerations both of public welfare, and of the special in-

<sup>9</sup> Memnon's ought, I suppose, to be the plan for England, should an enemy ever, in any great force, invade our island. Even should it be our misfortune that he commanded the sea, and could pour successive myriads of infantry upon us, our management still must be wretched if we could not maintain the Persian superiority against him. We should be beyond measure superior in cavalry and in artillery. Landing should of course be diligently watched and vigorously opposed. But that once effected, no battle should be fought. A battle might be desirable for the commanding general's fame, but at no rate for the nation's good. Whichever way the invader turned from the coast, the country should be waste before him. A superior cavalry should attend all his steps; he should find nothing to eat, and he should never sleep in quiet. The more his myriads the sooner he would starve. Nearly thus, after so many battles in which Roman generals, eager for fame, lost their armies and their lives, and brought Rome to the brink of ruin, Fabius baffled Hannibal; and thus, before him, without the glory of a battle, Gylippus destroyed the Athenian army in Sicily. When invasion was expected from Bonaparte, measures in pursuance of such a system, at first earnestly recommended by government, and zealously put forward by the country, were suddenly countermanded, and a contrary purpose declared; at which I must own I wondered and shuddered. Those who then led our military councils were not Wellingtons.

terests of the crown, committed to their charge. Their vassals' property and their own would suffer from the execution of Memnon's plan ; with them the king's revenue must also suffer ; distress must come upon thousands, for whose relief no provision had been, nor perhaps could be, in adequate amount, made ; and, should the completest success against the enemy follow, whether they might most incur the approbation or indignation of the distant court for the means, was perhaps a question for their serious consideration. Jealousy then of a foreigner in high command, whatever his merit, could only in very extraordinary circumstances, in any country, be otherwise than patriotic and reasonable. The sentiments of Arsites were accordingly approved as becoming a Persian patriot, and it was resolved to give Alexander battle.

Near Zelia an advantageous position offered itself at the ford of the river Granicus, which seems, in Arrian's account, who knew the country, to have been the only passage of that river, readily practicable for an army, between the highlands of Ida, where it has its source, and the Euxine sea. Issuing from the heights at once a plentiful stream, it crosses the plainer country in a deep and rocky channel. At the ford it is still rapid, and of varying depth, with loose stones in its bed. But there the rocks of the right bank receding leave a low flat, in the dialect of the north of England, where the thing is familiar, a haugh<sup>10</sup>, of considerable extent, though of length against the stream no more than that the Persian cavalry, in line, might occupy nearly the whole bank,

<sup>10</sup> This word, lost in the common speech of the south, remains nevertheless in names of places, with varied orthography, Howe, Ivinghoe, Luton Hoo, and others.



CHAP.  
XLVI.

ARR. I. I.  
c. 17.

from where the cliff recedes to where it again meets the water. The Persian generals, confident in their native strength, and perhaps most of them little knowing, from any experience of their own, the value of their Grecian foot, occupied the flat with their cavalry, and placed the Greeks, as a reserve, on the higher ground behind it, the boundary of the torrent's violence in winter floods. The immediate command of this powerful body of foot was committed to a Persian general, Omares, while Memnon was with the Persian generals at the head of the left wing of their cavalry; whether desired for his advice, or rather required through jealousy, as may seem indicated by the circumstance, added by Arrian, that his sons were with him there.<sup>11</sup>

c. 14.

Alexander approaching the ford early in the day, and informed by his forerunners of the enemy's position, hastened with some of his principal officers to examine it. Parmenio, observing the difficulties presented, recommended encamping for the night, in expectation that the enemy, inferior in infantry, would leave the passage free before morning. Against this Alexander urged 'the advantage, for the great business they had undertaken, of beginning with a blow that might surprise and terrify, and the importance of not allowing the long-established opinion of Grecian superiority to slacken for a moment.' But what Memnon had recommended in the Persian coun-

<sup>11</sup> Diodorus says that Memnon was associated with a Persian general, the satrap Arsamenes, in the command of that wing; (Diod. I. 17. c. 19.) which Arrian's account neither contradicts nor warrants, but leaves it at least doubtful whether Memnon had any command. What has led Guischart, in his commentary on the battle of the Granicus, to attribute to Memnon the command in chief there, he has not said, and I have been unable to discover.



cil of war would hardly escape Parmenio, nor probably Alexander ; who, with a most acute mind, had already, for his years, large experience in military command. The opportunity which was offered for a battle, once missed, might not be found again, and the greater difficulties and dangers, that Memnon's advice would have prepared, might remain for them. Alexander resolved immediately to make the attack which the Persians appeared resolved to wait for.

On his side of the river it appears the bank offered no material obstacle to regular formation at his choice. With the purpose then of forcing the passage, he gave his line an extent, as nearly as might be, commensurate with the enemy's ; his horse holding the extreme of each wing. On his farthest right, which was first to come in contact with the enemy, he placed that superior body of heavy cavalry entitled the royal companions. To prepare for the attack by these, and support it, they were attended by the Agrians, middle-armed, eminent for skill with the dart, and by the whole body of bowmen. Parmenio's eldest son, Philotas, commanded all. Next in the line were the Macedonian heavy horse, and that commanded by Socrates, with the Pæonian middle-armed, all under Amyntas son of Arrhabæus. Adjoining these were a select body of the royal companion-infantry, styled hypaspists<sup>12</sup>, under Nicanor, Parmenio's second son.

<sup>12</sup> I have been unable to ascertain what distinguished the hypaspist from the phalangite, the ordinary hoplite or heavy-armed. Gronovius, giving for ὑπασπιστῆς the Latin *scutatus*, and the lexicographers *armiger*, are unsatisfactory. Guischartd has supposed that the hypaspist, though bearing a proper panoply, was altogether lighter armed than the ordinary hoplite ; on what authority he has not said, and I have not found ; unless the circumstance that the hypaspists were always among Alexander's chosen

The phalanges held the centre, under Perdiccas son of Orontas, Cœnus son of Polemocrates, Craterus son of Alexander, Meleager son of Neoptolemus<sup>13</sup>, Amyntas son of Andromenes, and Philip son of Amyntas; names, for their recurrence in the sequel, deserving notice here.<sup>14</sup> Next the phalanges, on the left, was the Thracian horse, under Agathon; then the auxiliary Grecian horse of the republics south of Thessaly: the extreme of the left wing was held by the Thessalian horse, under Callas son of Harpalus, who had distinguished himself in service under Parmenio, in Æolia. All the light-armed of the army thus were given to the right wing, to check the enemy's efforts against that division of the cavalry with which it was proposed to make the first impression.

The custom of war of the heroic ages, when the chief generals were the most forward combatants, remained, in large amount, to the most polished times of Greece. Brasidas, we have seen, in the days of Thucydides, and, in those of Xenophon, even the sage Epaminondas, when on his life the fortune of

bodies for rapid enterprise might be reckoned a sufficient foundation. But we have formerly observed, after Xenophon, young Lacedæmonians so excelling in vigour of limb and practice in arms as, with all the encumbrance of the arms of the phalanx, to overtake their lighter armed enemies in flight; and Arrian mentions, on many occasions, Alexander's selecting the more active and vigorous of his phalangites to attend him, together with the hypaspists, for rapid and rugged marches. The question therefore remains whether the hypaspist was chosen for his lighter armour, or for his superior power to carry the heavier.

<sup>13</sup> Meleager is afterward so described: to his name alone his father's is not added here.

<sup>14</sup> The account of the phalanges, in our copies of Arrian, is rather confused, but I think he has meant to number six, as in the text above.

his party throughout Greece depended, so fell. Among the Persians the prowess of the satrap Pharnabazus, and still more the death of the younger Cyrus, are eminent examples. But yet more recently, and especially more an example for Alexander, his father Philip, according to the unsuspecting testimony of the hostile great orator, had been wounded in battle in every part of his body. Such example a youth like Alexander, exulting in vigour of mind and limb, would not be backward to follow. Modern weapons have produced a necessity for the modern practice of generals, in land-service, to observe and direct from a distance comparatively secure. But, in naval war, the commander of the largest fleet, like the generals of old, in no situation of advantage to see and direct, such still is imperious custom, mixes in battle equally with the lowest seaman. Alexander accordingly, committing the command of the left wing of his army to Parmenio, took himself the immediate lead of the right; which, in pursuance of the concerted plan, was first to meet the enemy.

Meanwhile the Persian generals, watching, from the opposite bank, all movements, gathered, from the splendour of the armour and habiliments of Alexander, and his immediate attendants, where he had his station; and, as far as time and circumstances would allow, they drew their choicest troops toward that point. This movement could not be so made as to be unobserved from the Grecian army; and, its purpose being conjectured, Alexander was confirmed by it in his plan. Could he defeat that part of the hostile force, he trusted, judging from large and able information of the character of Asiatic armies, that the rest would not long stand.

CHAP.  
XLVI.

---

An advanced body, infantry with cavalry, the former under Amyntas son of Arrhabæus, the latter under Ptolemy son of Philip, crossed the river first, and began the battle. The Persian cavalry carried javelins, light enough to be thrown by the arm, in which then, as still at this day, being trained to it from early youth, they were highly dexterous. In closing they mostly used the cimeter. The Grecian horseman carried a lance for close action, but no missile weapon. The Grecian advanced bodies were received with such firmness, by numbers very superior, on ground of great advantage, that they were quickly compelled to retire, with considerable loss. Nevertheless the employment they gave enabled the main body, led by Alexander himself, to cross the more quietly. But on approaching the bank it suffered, and on reaching it was so met in stationary fight that Arrian, following the account of the Macedonian generals, characterises the action by comparing it to a contest of heavy-armed infantry. Alexander's lance was disabled. Turning to Aretes, his master of the horse<sup>15</sup>, for another, that officer could only show him one equally injured, so warmly had he also been engaged. The extraordinary skill of the Persian horsemen, to disable an enemy's lance, has heretofore occurred for notice in Xenophon's account of an action where he was engaged under Agesilaus. There the Persian, hardly equal in numbers, as the candid historian allows, overbore the Grecian cavalry; but these were Asiatic Greeks, and very recently raised. The very superior practice of those under Alexander, animated by his example,

Ch. 24. s. 3.  
of this Hist.

<sup>15</sup> Ἀναβολεὺς τῶν βασιλικῶν is the title of Alexander's attendant, which it has been ventured so to render.



gave prevalence to their superior formation and superior weapons against very superior numbers, and the Persians gave way.

Singularly formidable in desultory action with a large field, the Persian cavalry, though they would sometimes charge in a sort of column, as in the battle noticed from Xenophon, seem to have been quite unqualified by their discipline to charge in line. But, if a discharge of javelins on a gallop, or, at most, a rush afterward at a point, did not break the enemy, so excellently were their horses trained to stop and wheel, that they would instantly withdraw on a gallop, confident of outstripping pursuit, and prepared to turn and renew action in their own desultory way.

A short leisure was thus afforded to Alexander, and Demaratus, a Corinthian, of the band of royal companions, was the first to supply him with a sound lance. Hardly sooner was he thus provided than he observed a powerful body of Persian horse returning to charge, and a leading officer considerably advanced before it. In the warmth of mind of the moment he rode onward so hastily that, before his attendants could join him, he had with his lance killed the leading officer, but, almost in the same instant, lost part of his helmet by a stroke from another's sword, whom yet with his shortened lance he killed also. Nearly surrounded now by enemies, one of them was aiming a sword-stroke at him, which might have been fatal, when Clitus son of Dropis, one of his lords of the body-guard, arrived so critically as to disable the uplifted arm by a wound in the shoulder. It was afterward found that the first killed by Alexander was Mithridates, a son-in-law of Darius, commander of the cavalry of the army, the second Rosaces, a

CHAP.  
XLVI.

man of great eminence ; and the officer wounded by Clitus was Spithridates, satrap of Lydia, who died, not long after, of the wound. So the Persian great still held it their office to be foremost in battle, and so, beyond just policy, they performed the supposed duty.

Through the retreat of the Persian cavalry first engaged, and the check in their return to onset, by the death of their principal officers, the right wing of the Grecian army had leisure to gain footing on the plain ground of the meadow. Meanwhile the left wing, under Parmenio, had severe contest with the Persian right. In this contest the Thessalians, always esteemed among the best of Grecian cavalry, particularly distinguished themselves ; and the Persians, weakened, as before mentioned, to strengthen their other wing, were compelled to give way.<sup>16</sup> Through the employment given by the Thessalians, the Grecian infantry of the left wing crossed the river with little loss, and formed on the meadow in regular order. The Persian cavalry, plied with missile weapons by the Grecian light troops, while the

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 19. & 21.

<sup>16</sup> Though it may be hardly too much to say, of the numerous descriptions of battles which remain to us from Diodorus, that not one is altogether rational, yet credit seemingly may be given him for his testimony to the discipline of the Thessalian horse, and the credit it gained at the battle of the Granicus. Arrian has wholly omitted notice of what was done by the wing under Parmenio ; perhaps because the generals, to whose accounts he trusted, had described only what they were witnesses to in the right. But it may be ventured to add of Diodorus, that this part of his compilation is among those for which he has been most fortunate in his choice of authorities ; and what he has related of the battle of the Granicus, supplying Arrian's deficiency, harmonizes with all that Arrian has related.

protended spears were advancing, having looked in vain for example or orders from their officers, killed or disabled, presently took to disorderly flight.

SECT.  
II.

The infantry, thus abandoned, was however alone a formidable army, but it wanted a head. The Persian, Omares, its commander, probably unversed in Grecian tactics, and, in Arrian's account, unprepared by instructions or previous concert for the circumstances, was at a loss for measures. Nevertheless he stood, and the troops under him stood, where they had been stationed,<sup>17</sup> witnesses of the flight of the cavalry which should have rallied, if not for farther action by itself, yet for their support, and witnesses also of their enemy's measures for attacking them. Alexander, allowing no distant pursuit of the defeated cavalry, collected his troops, and, according to the practice introduced by Epaminondas and adopted by Philip, directed his attack not against the whole line, but, with a condensed force, against the centre of the Persian Greeks. Their resistance was brave, but unavailing. Presently broken, through the superior conduct of their enemy, his cavalry fell upon their disordered ranks. To rally them was impossible; to fly useless; and quarter was little given. About two thousand are said to have been made prisoners, wounded, or falling as if wounded, and so avoiding the immediate fury of pursuers. Thus Alexander's victory was complete.

Arr. l. 1.  
c. 17.

The number slain, of the Persian army altogether, Arrian has not undertaken to say; whence it may be conjectured that those who have undertaken it had no good authority to follow. But, in his and in all

<sup>17</sup> Ἐξεστράπη Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπὶ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς μισθοφόρους ὃν τὸ στῖφος ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ἐτάχθη, ἐκπλήξει μᾶλλον τι τοῦ παραλόγου ἢ λογισμῶν βεβαίως, ἔμενε. Arr. l. 1. c. 17.

CHAP.  
XLVI.

---

accounts, the loss, whatever in numbers, was important in quality. Nine men, of great eminence, are named as having fallen. Spithridates, satrap of Lydia and Ionia, Rosaces, said by Diodorus to have been his brother, and Mithridates, the king's son-in-law, have been already mentioned. Pharnaces, the queen's brother, Arbupales, described by Arrian as of the royal family, Mithrobuzanes<sup>18</sup>, satrap of Cappadocia, Omares, commander of the mercenaries, and two other generals, are also in Arrian's list of the killed in the field. Arsites, that writer adds, having fled to the capital of his satrapy, unable to bear the consideration that his advice, prevailing in the council of war, had produced so great a calamity, added himself with his own hand to the number of great officers lost.

On the Grecian side none of the rank of general, but no less than twenty-five of the order of companions, apparently most in the contest about Alexander's person, were killed. Of the other cavalry little more than sixty are said by Arrian to have fallen, and of the infantry only about thirty; numbers for which, likely enough, he had the authority of Macedonian generals, yet, judging from his own account of the action, probably much extenuated. Funeral honours for the slain were Alexander's next care; in which nothing that could gratify their surviving friends, and excite emulation among their surviving comrades in arms, was omitted. The substantial reward of perpetual immunity from taxes (what taxes indeed we should be glad to know) for their parents and posterity would especially engage the gratitude and attachment of the more considerate

<sup>18</sup> Otherwise written Mithrobarzanes.



among them. The twenty-five companions were honoured by employing the celebrated Lysippus to represent them in statues of brass, which were placed in the city of Dium in Macedonia. Liberality was extended, against the common practice of the Grecian republics, even to enemies: the rite of burial was performed for the Persian slain, and even for the mercenaries in the Persian service; though the survivors of these, as traitors to their country taken in the actual use of arms against it, were condemned to slavery. They were of various Grecian republics; some Athenians. To the wounded of his own army Alexander gave the most flattering personal attention. Not only he saw that whatever their cases needed was supplied, but inquired of each into the circumstances of the action, and encouraged the boastful tale of their several deeds.

To send home report of a victory so glorious, obtained with loss, not indeed satisfactorily reported to us, yet, for the greatness of the occasion, probably altogether small, was a grateful part of the business before him. Athens, for the sake of his hereditary friends there, those who had honoured his father, and whom his father had honoured, as well as for their leading influence among the republics, was perhaps entitled to his distinguishing attention, and received it. Three hundred complete suits of Persian armour, sent as a present to the Athenian people, were dedicated in the temple of Minerva, with this inscription: ALEXANDER, SON OF PHILIP, AND THE GREEKS, EXCEPTING THE LACEDÆMONIANS, OFFER THESE, TAKEN FROM THE BARBARIANS OF ASIA.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> The origin of the name of Asia is utterly uncertain, but already in the time of the father of profane history it appears to

## SECTION III.

*March into Lydia: surrender of Sardis: circumstances of Ephesus and other Grecian cities of Asia. Opposition of Miletus: late arrival of the Persian fleet: Miletus taken. Efficiency of the Persian fleet obviated by measures ashore. Pecuniary distress of Alexander.*

CHAP.  
XLVI.

---

THE consequences of the victory of the Granicus were very great. It was not a little matter that in Greece the hopes, the influence, the activity of the

have designated among the Greeks the continent now so called, as far as it was then known. He distinguishes the country since called Lesser Asia by the description of Asia within the Halys.

Nevertheless the name Asia has been used by later ancient writers with various narrower significations, a matter not unnecessary to be adverted to for duly understanding them. The diligent authors of the Ancient Universal History have collected those significations. Names of countries have mostly originated from the names of the people possessing them, and have been extended, or contracted, or changed, as possession has altered. Thus Græcia had its name from the Greeks, and, within it, Laconia, Bœotia, Acarnania, Thessaly, and Macedonia, from their possessors the Lacons, Bœots, Acarnans, Thessals, and Macedons. In more modern times England and France so obtained their present names. That longer form of those Grecian names which would indicate the people to have had them from the name of the country, instead of giving their name to the country, has been the produce of modern fashion only. Nevertheless many ancient people have gained names from the places they inhabited. Thus Peloponnesian became a collective name for all the various inhabitants of the peninsula of Peloponnesus. The names Spartiat, or Spartan, and Lacedæmonian, distinguished those Lacons who inhabited Sparta or Lacedæmon. The Dorians who obtained possession of Corinth were called Corinthians; and when Athens acquired renown those previously called Attics took the name generally of their capital, and were called Athenians.

Persian party were instantly checked. But in Lesser Asia the result amounted to immediate conquest of a large portion of that extensive and rich country. The Persian cavalry being dispersed, and the Grecian force in the pay of Persia, the largest to that time known in a foreign service, annihilated, even Memnon was at a loss for resources. His situation indeed among the satraps, after losing the present support of his brother-in-law Artabazus, seems always to have abounded with difficulties. Apparently now he despaired of Æolia; no longer indeed important as a frontier country, for the victorious enemy was within the frontier. He hastened to Ionia, where his early presence might assist to lessen the impression of the news to arrive, and where his exertions might most contribute to check the conqueror's progress. The large satrapy of Lower Phrygia, including Bithynia and Æolia, was by the death of Arsites so left without a chief capable of directing effectual resistance that Alexander proceeded immediately to reward the merit of Callas, the general commanding his Thessalian horse, by appointing him to the office and dignity of its satrap. Alexander's measures then were conciliating and politic. Numbers of the people had fled to the mountains: protection being promised, they returned to their houses: the Greeks of the town of Zelia, who had acted with the enemy, he pardoned, as having been under compulsion: Dascylum, the capital of Bithynia, the favourite residence formerly of the satrap Pharnabazus, being held by a garrison, Parmenio was detached against it: the garrison withdrew on his approach, and the town submitted. The revenue of the province was then put in course to come into the king of Macedonia's treasury. In the adjoining satrapy of Lydia, including Ionia, still

CHAP.  
XLVI.

---

larger and richer, though it had lost its chief, Spithridates, yet a Persian governor, Mithranes, with a regular garrison, held the castle of Sardis, the capital. That fortress was both by nature and art of uncommon strength, and the city had, within its walls, a large population. The wealthy Lydians indeed would desire to avoid war at their doors; perhaps careless whether a Persian or a Macedonian garrison held their castle, and whether their tribute went to Babylon or Pella; or perhaps they might rather desire a change of dominion. Even the satraps we have seen, as feudatory princes, often at war with the sovereign or his officers, and, in one remarkable instance, avowing a claim of right to defection: but the officer intrusted with the care of a fortress of singular importance and strength, with a competent military force, was in a different situation. Nevertheless Alexander, after marching from the Granicus through a great extent of country as in peace, was met about seven miles from Sardis, by Mithranes, accompanied by the magistracy of the city, all together throwing themselves on his mercy and generosity. How Mithranes could excuse himself to his sovereign and country does not appear. Alexander however, as policy would persuade, received him well, and treated him with honour; and, pursuing still his father's liberal system, gratified the Lydians, by granting to the whole kingdom its ancient constitution and laws.<sup>20</sup>

Arrived at Sardis, he ascended into the citadel.

<sup>20</sup> One cannot but here recollect, and recollecting admire, those writers, ancient and modern, who would represent Philip as one of the deepest politicians the world ever saw, and yet do not scruple to impute to him a conduct directly tending to defeat a politician's purposes, ill usage to those who betrayed an important trust to serve him.



The strength of that fortress engaged his admiration. With any firmness of resistance it must either have delayed his farther progress most inconveniently, or made it very hazardous. Apparently felicitating himself on the easy acquisition, he resolved to build there a temple to Jupiter. He was looking for a situation, when a supervening thunder-shower fell, and with particular violence about the palace of the ancient Lydian kings. This was esteemed to indicate the deity's preference of the spot, and he ordered the temple to be there erected. It may seem however little likely that a pupil of Aristotle, whose sublime conception of the one God, in whom all nature lives and moves and has its being, has been formerly noticed, would be very solicitous about the place where a cloud might drop, unless through a politic regard for the superstition of the many, who reckoned the air in the division of portions of the world among their numerous deities, the particular seat of the reign of Jupiter.

Ch. 2. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

The pressure however of matters of more serious importance allowed little leisure in this great capital, for those of ceremony or amusement. With a rapidity beyond hope or foresight a great dominion had already been acquired behind the Grecian states; those states themselves remaining yet under the dominion of Persia, from which it was the professed object of the expedition to deliver them: an object now of increased importance, as, in an enemy's hands, they intercepted the communication with the Grecian sea. But this object presented no small difficulties, as in every one of those states was a party, in some a preponderant party, zealous for the Persian supremacy, and especially attached to the able and popular Memnon, to whom the king of Persia had committed the

CHAP.  
XLVI.

---

chief command over them. On the other hand however in every one also an opposing party was not less zealous in the cause of the Grecian confederacy under Alexander; and especially in the two most important for wealth, population, and situation, Ephesus and Miletus, circumstances pressed for his immediate attention.

In Ephesus the contention between an aristocratical, or oligarchal, (for historians rarely distinguish them,) and a democratical party, had been recently violent. Ionia is, by the Grecian writers, often entitled a satrapy; but at this time, and indeed generally, Ionia was united with the Lydian satrapy. Though it appears to have been the ordinary system of the Persian government liberally to allow the people under its extensive dominion to rule themselves in their own way, interfering only when its supremacy was threatened, yet commanders of provinces, looking, whether to their own interest, or their opinion of public interest, might often contravene this system. In Ephesus, under Persian patronage, the aristocratical had been the ruling party. The publication of the late king of Macedonia Philip's declaration that he would himself pass into Asia, to deliver the Grecian cities there from Persian bondage, would of course excite fermentation of party politics. Assurance then arriving that a force under Parmenio, esteemed the ablest general of the age, had actually crossed the Hellespont, the democratical Ephesians rose and overpowered their opponents; and while Demosthenes was endeavouring to persuade all Greece that Philip was the most odious and dreadful of tyrants, they erected a statue to him, as the great vindicator of freedom, the patron of democracy. As often happens however in such insurrections, they had ill-judged

their time. Memnon, then commanding in Æolia, at some hazard for that province, repairing to Ephesus, restored the superiority to the friends of the Persian supremacy. The statue of Philip then was overthrown, and the sepulchral monument erected in honour of Heropythus, leader of the democratical cause, who seems to have fallen in it, was demolished. No capital execution, no exile, no personal severity of any kind appears to have followed against the defeated; but a body of Grecian mercenaries was left in garrison, for the security of the order of things now established.

Memnon's policy, liberal at the same time and vigorous, might have been effectual for its purpose, but for the battle of the Granicus, and its consequences, Alexander's rapid march southward, the ready submission of the extensive Persian provinces in his way, and finally the surrender of Sardis. With these unexpected events hope rose as a meteor before the democratical party, and they became eager for a new revolution. The Grecian mercenaries of the garrison, whom report would reach of the fate, both of their fellows slain at the Granicus, and of those who survived, took alarm. Amyntas son of Antiochus, a Macedonian of regal descent, who had fled his country, suspected of treasonable practices against the reigning family, was residing at Ephesus under Persian protection. In concert with him the Grecian mercenaries, they betraying their engagement, he the hospitality afforded him, seized two triremes in the harbour of Ephesus, and deserted in them. Servile fear being thus removed from the many, no noble passion took its place, but democratical fury broke loose. Syrphax, a leader of the aristocratical party, fled for refuge to the temple (that so celebrated of



CHAP.  
XLVI.

Diana, though not named, seems implied in the historian's account) with his brother's children and his own son. Regardless of the sacredness of the asylum, the people dragged them out and stoned them to death. All who had been accessory to the invitation of Memnon, to the overthrowing of the statue of Philip, to the destruction of the monument of Heropythus, with the added imputation of spoliation of the temple, were then demanded for massacre, in the forms of democratical justice.

Information of these circumstances was hastened to Alexander, with solicitation from the triumphant party for his support in the superiority, which neither party could maintain without foreign patronage. The object was of such importance that he allowed himself only three days at Sardis to make arrangements for the government of the rich and extensive countries of which he was become the sovereign. The general direction, civil and military in Lydia and all the appendant districts, which together had formed the satrapy of Spithridates, he committed to Asander son of Philotas<sup>21</sup>; but the superintendence of the treasury and collection of taxes he made a separate department under Nicias; and the custody of the citadel he made also a distinct command under Pausanias, one of the order of companions. It appears to have been in proposed indulgence to the people of Argos, who had distinguished themselves among the democratical republicans of Peloponnesus by zeal in favour both of

Arr. 1. 1.  
c. 18.

<sup>21</sup> We find all the Macedonian names Greek; and, as among the republics, and formerly among the Welsh, distinction of the many of the same name was provided only by addition of the father's and other progenitors' names. Philotas, father of Asander, could not be the young friend of Alexander of that name, son of Parmenio.



his father and himself, and also as a mark of his confidence in them, that he left the Argives of his army for its garrison.

With his diligence, one day fortunately sufficing for the march from Sardis, he arrived at Ephesus in time to command mercy. Of the fury of civil contest among republicans he had seen a disgusting amount at Thebes, when he had neither experience nor force to enable him to choose his measures. Knowing now, says the historian, that, in popular commotions, not the guilty only, not even party-opponents only suffer, but that private resentment, private avarice, all evil passions, finding opportunity of gratification, use it, he forbade farther severities, and he was obeyed. The ancient democratical government was, under his sanction, established. The chiefs of the party, banished by the aristocratical party, were reinstated. A delicate question then occurred. A tribute had been assessed upon every Grecian city for the Persian treasury. When formerly delivered from the Persian yoke, as it has been commonly phrased, by the Athenians, or Lacedæmonians, a tribute still had been required for the Athenian or Lacedæmonian treasury; but on pretence of using it for the common good of Greece. Was then such tribute now to be still required for the benefit of the Grecian cause against the Persian? Alexander, wanting revenue much, nevertheless considered popularity as what his circumstances and views wanted yet more. The tribute apparently was not of oppressive amount, yet he would not take it for himself. The venerated temple of Diana at Ephesus was in such a state through age that it had been in contemplation to rebuild it. Not remitting the tribute then, he directed that the sums formerly

CHAP.  
XLVI.

ARR. I. 1.  
c. 18.

raised for the Persian king should in future be paid to the goddess. His conduct altogether was highly popular. Widely, says Arrian, as he earned favour and praise, he succeeded nowhere more completely than at Ephesus.

c. 19.

The circumstances which produced the easy acquisition of that important city, and the judicious use of opportunities for popularity there, appear, after the battle of the Granicus, to have been principal leading steps to his great following fortune. Ephesus was the first Grecian city, southward of mount Ida, that embraced his party. After its example deputies now arrived from Magnesia on the Mæander, and from Tralles, offering allegiance. Parmenio was dispatched, as the king's commissioner, to accept it, taking with him five thousand foot, and two hundred horse of the body of companions. The selection of so eminent a military man for an office nominally civil, and the amount of force committed to him, indicate that there were in those cities either strong parties in the Persian interest, or mercenary garrisons, supposed more faithful to their engagements than that of Ephesus. The friendly however on Parmenio's arrival made their offer good. Apparently information had been received of a similar disposition among the many Ionian cities northward, and also in those of Æolia which had not been formerly gained by Parmenio during his command there. A nearly equal force being sent in that direction, under a commander of far less note, Alcimalus son of Agathocles, so the example of Ephesus assisted the fame of Alexander's victory and liberality that this mission was also, without effort noticed by historians, completely successful. The proposal offered to the several states was

simply to join the general confederacy of the Greek nation, decreed by the congress of Corinth; and, on a declaration of accession to this, a democratical constitution was warranted to all the cities, and exemption from tribute.

Within Ionia, Miletus alone now remained in connexion with Persia; but Miletus was the most powerful of the Asiatic-Grecian cities, or second only to Ephesus. Its constitution was already democratical; yet such had been the politic liberality of the Persian supremacy, and such the popularity of Memnon's administration, that, little feeling the tribute assessed on their lands, the Milesians resolved to persevere in allegiance to the Persian king. Over late indeed, the Persian court had adopted that measure which so much assisted this determination, the appointment of Memnon to the chief command; yet which probably the Persian king, with all his despotism, might have been unable, for the opposition of his satraps, previously to manage. Memnon, on retiring from the Granicus, where so many fell, aware of the jealousy to which, as a foreigner, and especially as a Greek, he must be liable, had, for his first step, sent his wife and children to the capital, as pledges of his fidelity. Opportunity to use his services was much opened by the circumstances of the battle of the Granicus. Accordingly the liberal and well-judging monarch, consideration of the long and able and faithful services of his brother Mentor probably assisting the determination, sent him a commission to command in chief along the whole of the Asiatic coast of the empire; and directed the commanders of a fleet, said to have been of four hundred triremes, whose crews would be not

Arr. 1. 1.  
c. 21.  
Diod. 1. 17.  
c. 23.



CHAP.  
XLVI.

---

less than a hundred thousand men, to co-operate with him.

Meanwhile Alexander, with a conquered continent behind him, having again reached the Ægean sea, the co-operation of his fleet would be important, and it was accordingly ordered to join him. Hastening arrangements then at Ephesus, he concluded them with a magnificent sacrifice to Diana, all his troops present marching in the procession, armed and formed as for battle. On the following day he moved for Miletus. That city, in the peace long enjoyed, under liberal protection of the Persian government, had so flourished by commerce that, confident in the continuance of that protection, its increased population had raised a new town, beyond its ancient walls, with little care of fortification for it. On Alexander's approach this was evacuated by the Milesians, and was presently occupied by his troops. His fleet of a hundred and sixty triremes had already entered the bay. In the island Lade, which commanded the approach by sea to the city<sup>22</sup>, four thousand men from the army were placed. The very superior fleet of Persia arrived three days after. Its commanders, apparently surprised to find approach to the city precluded, withdrew to the neighbouring roadstead of Mycale, but returned next day and offered battle. This however the Macedonian admiral prudently declined. Concurring accounts show Alexander's understanding, both for extent and quickness, extraordinary, and the amount of his

<sup>22</sup> It has formerly occurred for notice that what was then the bay of Miletus has now been, for some centuries, a marsh, and Lade a hill in it. Chap. 7. s. 2. of this History.



experience, both in military and political business, was such as few besides ever had at his years ; yet it may be thought that Arrian has strained compliment a little, imputing rash counsel to the veteran Parmenio, esteemed by Philip the ablest military commander of his age, that he might attribute to the youthful king the sober prudence which corrected it. Parmenio, he says, urged for engaging the Persian fleet : Alexander refused to allow it ; and the reasoning ascribed to him seems clearly good. Arrian shows himself continually so scrupulous of asserting, without respectable authority, that it seems due to him to suppose he had respectable authority here ; yet in the sequel of the history ground may appear for suspecting that his authority was from those unfriendly to Parmenio.

The siege of Miletus, without delay begun, was prosecuted with the best art of a cultivated age. Battering machines, large and weighty, brought by the fleet, were advanced against the walls. The Persian fleet repeatedly gave opportunity for battle, would the Grecian come out of the harbour, but showed no disposition to attack it there. The troops and people in the town thus seeing all effectual attempt for their relief declined by so great a force, on which they had much depended, began to despair of means to support the contest. Having consulted therefore about a capitulation, they sent to Alexander a proposal of neutrality, offering their port to be open to the ships, and their town to the troops, of both the belligerent powers. This being refused, with improvident valour, and a fidelity which does honour hardly less to the Persian government which inspired it than to themselves, much perhaps being due particularly to Memnon, but surely much also to the

government which selected and authorised such an agent, they resolved to brave all chances. Their walls however did not long withstand the power of Alexander's machines, directed by the skill of his engineers. A breach was made, by which the Macedonian forces entered. The small body of regular soldiers of the garrison, and the Milesian armed people, quickly overpowered, sought safety by flight. Many got aboard the vessels in the harbour; but so watched by the Macedonian fleet that all were taken. Many meanwhile, weak to resist, and without opportunity to fly, were killed; quarter, in the sack of a fortified place, being little in the practice of the age. About three hundred of the regular soldiers, throwing themselves into the sea, and using their large shields as rafts, to support them with their armour, passed to a small island, near the town, whose rocky cliffs were as walls, and there prepared to defend themselves. Alexander directed attack upon them; but, being informed they were all Greeks, and giving them credit, says the historian, for their faithful and courageous adherence to the service to which they had pledged themselves, not without example, through a long course of years, warranted at different times by the legislatures of all the principal republics of the nation, he sent to offer them quarter, on condition of renouncing the Persian, and entering into his service. The great Persian fleet was at anchor within their sight, without the least manifestation of a purpose to move. Hopeless therefore of relief they yielded on the terms offered. Nothing then remaining hostile within Miletus or its territory, Alexander admitted all the surviving people to his friendship, and placed the Milesian state, with its old constitution and laws, (so much the expressions

of, both the historians appear to indicate,) upon the same footing of immunity and freedom as all other Grecian states, which had acceded to the general confederacy of the nation under his supremacy.<sup>23</sup>

It has occurred formerly to observe, in many examples, how ill the ships of war of the ancient construction, though a construction admirably adapted to the ancient mode of naval action, could keep the sea. A harbour ready, and supplies from land, almost daily, were indispensable for them. A fleet thus was liable to annoyance from an army; and as Alexander's fleet could not cope with the very superior force of the Persian, manned with Phenicians and Cypriots, mariners equal to any of the Mediterranean, his next measure was to use his army against it. Stationing a considerable force, foot and horse, in situations to command landing-places and prevent

<sup>23</sup> ... τοῖς μὲν Μιλησίοις φιλανθρώπως προσηγήθη. Diod. l. 17. c. 22. Αὐτοῦς δὲ Μιλησίους ... ἀφῆκε, καὶ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι ἔδωκεν. Arr. l. 1. c. 20.

Diodorus has evidently followed good authorities for much of the history of Alexander. But for his great compilation, when books, being only in writing, were of course dear, and extensive libraries few, the labour always, the difficulty often, and the impossibility perhaps sometimes, of reaching the authorities to be desired, may account for, and even excuse, many of the obvious defects in his work. He makes the great body of his hundred thousand men, engaged at the Granicus on the Persian side, retreat to Miletus, and there he places Memnon and many satraps, or Persians of great eminence, during the siege. Arrian makes no mention of Memnon there, or of any Persians of any degree. On the contrary his account clearly implies that Memnon was elsewhere, and that no Persians, or none in any authority, were there. It may suffice to consider the relative situations of the Granicus and Miletus, and the circumstances of Miletus and of the intervening country, to be aware that Arrian's is not more the most authoritative account than the most probable, and indeed that Diodorus's is utterly improbable.



CHAP.  
XLVI.

---

watering, he so distressed that overbearing fleet that it left the road of Mycale, and took its station at the neighbouring Greek island of Samos. Battle was again offered to Alexander's fleet, which however would not quit its secure port. An attack was then made upon a part of it; but this so failed that five ships were lost, and soon after the great Persian fleet finally quitted the coast.

Alexander's successes, now obtained, were far beyond all previous rational calculation. Yet, though the rich provinces of Lower Phrygia and Lydia were conquered, and all the commercial republics of the coast, from the Propontis to the border of Caria, brought to coalition with the Grecian confederacy, Alexander found himself wanting means to maintain the very moderate forces of land and sea with which his conquests had been made; so scanty were the resources with which he had engaged in his great undertaking. A council was called to consider the difficulty, and it was put in question whether farther service of the fleet might not be dispensed with, and the expense of its maintenance saved. The Persian fleet was clearly too powerful to be prudently met by any that Alexander had means to raise. Naval war therefore was not desirable for him. Moreover the enemy themselves had, for the present at least, abandoned it, having quitted the neighbouring seas, and evidently for a cause which would prevent their ready return to any purpose: they had not a port in the Ægean, or near it, where they could find supplies, or perhaps be assured even of necessary shelter. On this consideration the council determined that the fleet, reserving only what might be wanted for the convoy of weighty machines for sieges, should be sent home and laid up.



Alexander's poverty, after all his recent acquisitions, being thus manifest, it may be wondered rather what could have been Philip's plan, when, with his large experience, he at length resolved upon war in Asia, than that he so long bore unmoved the solicitations and remonstrances in which, among his friends in the Grecian republics, Isocrates probably was not singular. Perhaps, after long and careful circumspection, satisfied not only that Isocrates justly reckoned peace between the republics otherwise impossible, but, farther, that quiet for Macedonia itself must be precarious when the republics were in tumult, he chose war in Asia as least among hazards and evils, as well as most promising positive benefits. It may well then be supposed that Philip's mature age would have hazarded less than Alexander's youthful ardour; that he would not have afforded opportunity for the measures advised, though in vain, by Memnon, for the destruction of his army or the ruin of his enterprise; that, on the contrary, he would, like Agesilaus before him, have secured the friendship and co-operation of all the Grecian settlements on the coast, before he would have proceeded to the interior of Phrygia and Lydia.

Nevertheless the success, which attended the boldness of Alexander's measures, may tend both to warrant the advice of Isocrates, and to justify those Macedonians who, in council, may have assented to the plan followed by their youthful king. With the satrapies of Phrygia and Lydia conquered, and all the Grecian settlements of the Asiatic shore of the *Ægean*, as far as Caria, brought to alliance, much of the summer yet remained. To Caria Memnon had withdrawn, with his new commission, intended to give him authority widely over a country then no

CHAP.  
XLVI.

---

longer in the grantor's power. With the loss of provinces to the Persian empire probably the supplies failed to which the court had trusted for making Memnon's new authority effectual. Unable however to attempt the recovery of what was lost, the defence of what remained to his sovereign, within the wide district committed to him, became Memnon's care. But even there difficulties had been prepared for him, and advantages for his opponent, by those whose interest as well as duty should have made them his best supporters.

#### SECTION IV.

*Constitutions of Asiatic states: circumstances of Caria: Ada queen of Caria: difficulties of Memnon: siege of Halicarnassus.*

It is largely indicated, by ancient writers, that much of the character of the political constitution, described by Homer, was preserved, not only in the European principalities northward of the Grecian republics, but also extensively in lesser Asia, and through Syria to the borders of Arabia; even Palestine, with all the peculiarities of the Jewish institutions, not forming an exception. That country, with a system of law more perfect and better defined than any other known of the early ages, appears to have remained almost without a constitution, civil or military; till at length the people, suffering under the misrule of their chief magistrates, entitled judges, concurred in desiring an hereditary monarchy, such as that under which they saw neighbouring nations quieter through civil, and more powerful through military order. This we have observed to have been not an uncommon resource of the Grecian republics,

in similar circumstances. With authority then, necessary for the desired purposes, committed to the king, the law, by which his conduct should be regulated, remained as before; and, however the authority may have been abused, the law, we find, more held its force in ancient Palestine than in some modern European states. Everywhere private interest must occasionally yield to public good. In the Britannic empire an act of the concurring branches of the legislature is required to warrant any interference with private rights on the public account. In France formerly a simple command of the king sufficed for taking any man's land, at its estimated worth, for public purposes. In the kingdom of Naples, and perhaps some other European states, the king, paying only the price set by his own officers, might take any man's land for his own use or pleasure. Under the Jewish law private property was so much better assured that even the tyrant Ahab could not so take Naboth's vineyard; even the daring wickedness of his wife would not so venture upon an open breach of the right of an individual. The authentic history of those persons indeed remarkably illustrates the state and condition of both governments and people under that constitution which prevailed so extensively in the early ages; a king, without a legislature, ruling under established law, and arms in the hands of the people forming the sanction of the law. Here then appears the reason of that general satisfaction of the western Asiatics with their governments, remarked by Aristotle, whence civil troubles, so ordinary in Greece, were among them rare. The establishment of hereditary right prevented that contest for supremacy which was continually lacerating the Greek republics; and arms in the hands of the people, though not pro-

Kings, b. 1.  
c. 21.

Ch. 43. s. 1.  
of this Hist.



CHAP.  
XLVI.

---

viding such regular security for individuals as a legislature, mediating between king and people, may ensure, yet, by giving importance to the people in body, deterred extensive oppression.

Herodotus informs us that the ancient Lydian law nearly resembled that ordinary in Greece; thus indicating that private rights were assured by the law in Lydia, under a hereditary monarch, nearly as in Greece under yearly magistrates. But the people of Lydia, an inland country, had not maintained their liberties against the despotism of Persian satraps equally with the Asiatic Greeks, who, with other advantages, had those of maritime situation; and thence Alexander had the opportunity to ingratiate himself with the Lydians by restoring their ancient constitution. When the great Cyrus compelled all Lesser Asia to acknowledge his supreme dominion, it seems likely that Caria had a politic prince, who obtained favourable terms. Caria continued, to the time with which we are engaged, to be governed by its hereditary native sovereigns, though owning homage to the Persian crown. The people were reckoned, by the republican Greeks, among barbarians; yet their character was good among surrounding nations; their government was orderly, and both their language and their religion appear to have been very nearly Grecian. On a fine harbour of their coast arose the Grecian city of Halicarnassus; which, among the Grecian cities of Lesser Asia, yielded in population and wealth, if to Miletus and Ephesus, to them only. It became the capital of the Carian princes, and yet its Grecian quality appears never to have been disputed. On the contrary, men of whom Greece was proud were among its natives; two, of distant ages, being of the first rank among historians, Herodotus and Dionysius.

Arr. l. 1.  
c. 24.



The princely family seems to have been generally popular in its own country, and respected abroad; frequently holding alliance with the leading Grecian republics, and at the same time maintaining its estimation among the vassals of the Persian empire. Marriage between brothers and sisters, esteemed at Athens creditable, was so also in Caria; the princely family commonly married within itself; and an extraordinary order of succession had favour there, recommended, according to Arrian, by the popularity of the renowned Semiramis, of very early times, queen of Assyria; the widowed queen succeeded her husband. Twice already we have had occasion to observe the widows of deceased princes filling the throne of Caria; the heroine Artemisia, who fought under Xerxes, and another Artemisia, who erected, in honour of her deceased husband and brother, Mausolus, that sepulchral monument, which, for its magnificence reckoned among the seven wonders of the world, has furnished a title in all European languages for sepulchral monuments of superior splendour.

Ch. 8. s. 5.  
& ch. 38.  
s. 5. of this  
Hist.

Strab. l. 14.  
p. 656.  
vel 969. ed.  
Casaub.

The second Artemisia was succeeded in the Carian throne by her husband's brother and her own, Hidrieus. He had married his and their sister, Ada, who, on his demise, claimed the succession. But an eminent Persian, Orontobates, had married the daughter of Pexodorus, a third brother; and, having perhaps opportunity, at the distant court, to represent both Carian laws, and facts in Caria, otherwise than as they were, he obtained a grant of the principality for his father-in-law and himself. Ada, resisting as far as she was able, maintained herself in one strong place, Alinda: of the rest of the country Pexodorus and Orontobates gained possession.

Diod. l. 16.  
c. 69. & 74.  
& l. 17.  
c. 24.  
Arr. l. 1.  
c. 24.

Alexander appears to have owed his already great

success hardly more to the excellence of the military force, from the private soldier up to the chief generals, prepared by his father, than to the liberal system of policy, equally prepared by his father, and with remarkable steadiness pursued by himself. The constitution of Lydia, perhaps little touched by the great conqueror, Cyrus, had been overwhelmed by the military despotism afterward committed to or assumed by the satraps. Thus, in modern Europe, the constitution of the kingdom of Naples, especially of the island of Sicily, derived from the Norman conquerors, and considerably resembling the ancient Norman and the English, was overwhelmed by a military despotism in the hands of the viceroys, whom the courts of Madrid and Vienna, prevailing alternately in their claims to the succession, sent to govern those beautiful, naturally rich, and eminently unfortunate countries; that constitution always holding existence, though sickly, weak, and inefficacious. The Lydians therefore, rejoicing in the restoration of just vigour to the overborne ancient laws of the country, might also not unreasonably hope that, should griefs in future arise, their complaints might more readily and effectually reach a sovereign of Grecian manners, residing at Pella, than one hardly visible but to eunuchs, in some one of his several capitals beyond the great desert.

These advantages of Alexander made difficulties for Memnon. Sardis apparently, after the loss of the battle of the Granicus, should have been the rallying point for the Persians. But the fall of so many men in the highest commands, especially of Spithridates and Arsites, seems to have paralysed the Persian administration throughout the country; and this, if anything, might excuse the officer who sur-

rendered the citadel of Sardis. Very possibly, without prospect of succour from any quarter, he could not command his own garrison. The support of the Persian cause seems to have devolved upon the foreigner, Memnon; even before the new commission, extending his powers, reached him; and his means appear to have been limited to the mercenary force that he could himself raise and maintain, with only an uncertain interest in some of the Grecian cities. In Ephesus that interest had failed: in Miletus it had been overborne by arms.

But in Halicarnassus it still prevailed. The Carians were, like the modern Swiss, much in the habit of hiring themselves for military service to any power: according to Strabo, the mercenary force entertained among the republics of Greece itself was composed commonly in large proportion of Carians. If then Memnon could maintain himself in Caria through the approaching winter, support from the centre of the empire might reach him before spring; and, with Caria left behind hostile, Alexander's progress eastward, should he attempt it, would be highly hazardous.

But with a military command now wide, Memnon's pecuniary means remained evidently narrow. In Caria the civil government rested with Orontobates; the people were attached to Ada. However then, Memnon, for his sovereign's interest, might have desired to favour Ada, for his sovereign's interest and his own it was imperious upon him to be well with Orontobates. Circumstances thus invited Alexander to that country; they required speed, and he did not delay. On his way Ada met him: she ceremoniously adopted him as her son, and he accepted the title. Then she surrendered to him her strong

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 24.  
Strab. l. 14.  
Arr. l. 1.  
c. 24.



CHAP.  
XLVI.

fortress of Alinda ; and through her example and her influence, supported by the fame and the presence of his army, she procured that his march of near a hundred miles across Caria should be as through a friendly country ; the towns on all sides offering submission, or yielding on the first summons.

ARR. 1. 1.  
c. 21.

Memnon meanwhile, aware of his disadvantages, had drawn together all his strength within the walls of Halicarnassus. That city Alexander prepared immediately to besiege. It was strong by local circumstances ; and, to the fortifications carefully raised by the wealthy princes of Caria, Memnon had made such additions as the improved science of his age recommended. Greeks, or regular soldiers trained in the Grecian discipline, were numerous in the garrison ; Persians, or Persian subjects, not Greeks, were also numerous ; and there were many ships of war in the harbour, whose co-operation might be important. Under all circumstances it seems to have been matter of no ready decision, for the invader, how and where to begin attack upon the place. But, on the northern side of the peninsula, on whose southern shore Halicarnassus stood, was the seaport town of Myndus. A party there, restrained from following openly the general propensity of the Carian people, sent private communication to Alexander, promising to open a gate to him if he would come by night. The possession of Myndus was thought so important toward the acquisition of Halicarnassus that he went himself, with a strong body : but on his arrival at the appointed gate, all was close, without a symptom of any stir in his favour. Having depended upon the concerted admission, he was unprovided even with scaling-ladders ; yet, unwilling to return with nothing done, and hoping still for some



co-operation within on his showing himself with a powerful force without, the soldiers of his phalanx were set to undermine a tower of the wall, and they brought it to the ground. But it appeared that secrecy had not been duly observed by the favouring party. Not only its measures were watched and their efficacy obviated, but such communication had been made to Memnon in Halicarnassus that assistance was sent by sea, which, with the first day-light, was seen arriving. At the same time it was found that the enemy had defences behind the ruined tower, so that its fall did not make a practicable opening. Circumstances thus admonishing, Alexander prudently returned without delay to the greater object, Halicarnassus.

That city was surrounded with a ditch, according to Arrian, thirty cubits wide and fifteen deep. Before engines could be brought against the wall therefore the ditch must be filled; a work of great labour and danger, under interruption from the enemy's weapons, discharged from above in safety and leisure. It was nevertheless accomplished. Moveable towers, to protect the besiegers, and engines, both for battering the walls and for throwing weapons, were then advanced. The garrison sallied to destroy them, but were repulsed, and the action was made remarkable by the death of a prince of the royal family of Macedonia, Neoptolemus, who fell fighting on the Persian side.<sup>24</sup> Miners being then employed, together with the battering engines, two towers, and the wall between

Arr. 1. 1.  
c. 22.

<sup>24</sup> This remarkable circumstance is distinctly stated by Arrian. Diodorus speaks of Neoptolemus as holding high rank in the Macedonian army; apparently through mistake, to which a writer must be more liable in his large and multifarious collection than in Arrian's simple narrative.

them, were reduced to ruins. The garrison, issuing, set fire to the sheds of the besiegers, and to the brush-wood used in the approaches, and they destroyed some of the machines; but they were repulsed before they could complete their purpose. Diodorus mentions two Athenians, Ephialtes and Thrasybulus, as eminent among the officers of the garrison; and relates of them, probably following some Athenian writer, what adds to the various demonstrations occurring of the principles and temper of the party of Demosthenes. Some bodies of Macedonians killed having fallen into the power of the garrison, Alexander, by a herald, with the usual formalities, desired them for burial. Ephialtes and Thrasybulus opposed the request: Memnon however granted it. In a following sally the contest was sharp. On the Macedonian side Ptolemy, one of the lords of the body-guard, Clearchus, the commanding general of the bowmen, and some other officers of distinction, were killed. The garrison nevertheless being at length overcome, were pursued so closely that the town might have been taken, if, to obviate the promiscuous slaughter and destruction, not to be prevented in storming a populous city, Alexander had not commanded retreat. Among the Halicarnassian people a party was friendly to him, and it seems to have been the strength of that party which impelled Memnon and Orontobates to their quickly following measure: despairing of means to hold the town, they withdrew their troops by night, and, to prevent the enemy's immediate entrance and communication with the party which favoured him, they set fire to their own machines and works of timber at the breach. The flames, probably beyond their intention, communicated to the nearest houses, and extended

[Diod. 1. 17.  
c. 25.]

widely. Alexander, informed by some of the townsmen that the garrison was withdrawn, directed that, in taking possession, injury to the remaining peaceful inhabitants should be avoided. Part of the force retiring from the city strengthened the garrison in the castle: the rest passed to the Greek island of Cos<sup>25</sup>, where an administration friendly to Persia prevailed.

The castle of Halicarnassus, strong by situation, diligently fortified by art, and well provided, might still sustain a long siege. But, as it could not contain a numerous garrison, and little danger would ensue to acquisitions already made from leaving it in the enemy's hands, Alexander proceeded to other objects which more pressingly required attention.

<sup>25</sup> Αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν πόλιν εἰς ἔδαφος κατασκάψας, αὐτῆς τε ταύτης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Καρίας φυλακὴν ἐγκαταλιπὼν, κ. τ. λ. The writer of the Ancient Universal History has understood the city destroyed to have been Tralles, in which I think him clearly wrong, though the passage in Arrian, as applicable to Halicarnassus, is far from satisfactory. Diodorus however affirms distinctly that Alexander destroyed Halicarnassus, and from him it appears that the neighbouring island, which Arrian has described only as the island, without a name, was that of Cos. Arr. l. 1. c. 24. Diod. l. 17. c. 27.

## CHAPTER XLVII.

ALEXANDER'S WINTER CAMPAIGN IN ASIA, AND MEASURES OF THE PERSIAN ARMAMENT UNDER MEMNON AGAINST GREECE.

## SECTION I.

*Financial difficulties of Alexander. Winter measures: Lycia subdued. A plot against Alexander.*

CHAP.  
XLVII.

---

WITH extensive dominion acquired, and great political influence attending it, the expenses incurred, and those which present circumstances and purposes demanded, appear to have exceeded the acquired means. The increase from Phrygia and Lydia probably was considerable; but from the Grecian territories hardly any, and from Caria little. The policy by which Alexander held the voluntary allegiance of the Asiatic Greeks, and obviated the necessity of multiplying garrisons which he could not maintain, made the utmost caution and delicacy in requiring pecuniary aid from them, if not even a total abstinence from the attempt, necessary. But he could not hope to hold his conquests, so rapidly made, without being prepared against powerful efforts of the great empire of Persia to recover them. His army therefore must be not only maintained, but recruited and increased; and means for its maintenance, which Macedonia could not, and the republican Greek states would not furnish, must be sought in the conquered coun-



tries. If then the revenue of these was considerable, it seems yet highly probable that the management of it was both unskilful and improvident. The unexpected early departure of the Persian fleet had indeed afforded opportunity, though not without hazard, and hardly without inconvenience, for sparing the attendance of the Macedonian. But that powerful fleet, it must be supposed, would return in spring; and what, under the direction of such an officer as Memnon, might ensue in the extensive field for naval operations, the Asiatic-Grecian towns, the Ægean islands, and the maritime republics of Greece itself, must be matter for more serious consideration.

Altogether it appears likely that, to keep what he had acquired, the best policy for Alexander was to proceed to farther conquest. His attention then seems to have been judiciously directed to obviate the inconvenience of his naval inferiority, by using immediately, regardless of season, his superiority by land for depriving the enemy, the most extensively that might be, of means for the shelter and refreshment indispensable for ancient navies; while, at the same time, he might extend his dominion over provinces, left without adequate means of resistance, whence revenue might be drawn. If then he might so extend it as to make the river Halys his frontier, which is said to have been the object of Agesilaus, but still more, if he could carry conquest to the chain of mountains of Taurus and Caucasus, which separate the Lesser, or that called by the Greeks the Lower, or the Hither, from the Upper, or the Farther Asia, he might make the defence of the wider easier than that of the narrower conquest.

These being important considerations, it quite suited Alexander's temper to resolve that winter

CHAP.  
XLVII.

Arr. l. 1.  
c. 25.

should not be for him, as in the ordinary course of Grecian military service, a season of rest. Unsparing of himself, he seems however to have been strongly disposed to be considerate of others. To his army he would allow, as far as the important services in view would permit, the usual winter indulgences. In selecting then for leave to go home, he preferred the newly married, of all ranks, who had left wives there. Three general officers coming under the description, Ptolemy, a lord of the body-guard, son of Seleucus, Cœnus son of Polemocrates, and Meleager son of Neoptolemus, commanded the march. This arrangement was very generally satisfactory and gratifying. At the same time future purposes were promoted by giving every one, of those thus indulged, authority to engage recruits, in any number, to accompany his return to the army in spring.

Alexander then rewarded together the princess Ada's services, and the ready loyalty of the Carian people, by committing to her the princely dignity and authority, and confirming to them their ancient political constitution. In that constitution, hardly farther made known to us, merit is implied by intimations remaining of the satisfaction of the people with their government, and of the general quiet of the country, during ages, while the princes were famed for riches and splendour; creditable all to the benignity of the Persian supremacy, to which all had been subject.

In arranging command for the military measures in view, Alexander took himself that of greater fatigue and privation, for which youthful vigour might be requisite, the expedition for reducing the sea-port towns of the mountainous shore, stretching from Caria eastward. To the veteran Parmenio he com-

mitted the quieter business, but of extensive and critical trust, to superintend the communication with Macedonia and Greece, and the affairs of all the acquisitions in Asia. Sparing then his new subjects of Lydia, who had so readily transferred their allegiance to him, he required of Parmenio to raise, in the countries yet subject to Persia, contributions in money as well as in provisions for the subsistence of his forces. Cavalry in the country through which he proposed himself to lead would be difficult to maintain, and comparatively little useful. Selecting therefore only a small body of the fittest for the difficult service, he committed the rest to Parmenio, together with the battering engines, and whatever could be any way spared that might inconveniently impede progress in a mountainous country.

Marching then with his chosen troops, he found that the fame of his successes and his liberality had very advantageously prepared his way. Within Caria, on the border of Lycia, the strong town of Hyparna was yet held for the Persian king. The townsmen, after the example of the rest of the country, and of their princess Ada, seem to have been ready to change their allegiance, but were restrained by a garrison of mercenaries; a term always implying troops trained in the Grecian discipline; and if not all, yet partly Greeks, and under officers mostly Grecian. Alexander offered these leave for free departure, which was accepted, and he became master of the place without a blow. Entering Lycia then, four principal towns of the more mountainous western part, Telmissus, Pinara, Xanthus, and Patara, readily submitted, and thirty smaller towns presently followed the example. The eastern, called Lower Lycia, a more level country, afforded less natural advantages for defence; yet,



CHAP.  
XLVII.

---

midwinter already advancing, the people appear to have reckoned upon time to choose their measures. Alexander however, continuing his march, deputies from Phaselis, the principal city of that part, met him, with a present of a golden crown, and solicitation for his friendship; and, his favorable acceptance of their submission encouraging, similar addresses followed soon from all the country.

Art. 1. 1.  
c. 26.

The gratification of this flow of prosperity was here checked by intelligence of matter very unpleasant in itself, yet still attended with very fortunate circumstances. Parmenio, proceeding according to the concerted plan, by Sardis into Phrygia, found no such opposition as to engage the notice of historians. The satrap Atizyes, neither by an army under his command, nor by any attachment of the Phrygian people to the Persian government, enabled to make any effectual resistance, had nevertheless entertained hopes from other circumstances. The Macedonian prince Amyntas, son of Antiochus, on withdrawing from Ephesus, as formerly related, had proceeded to the Persian court, where he was favorably entertained. Asisines, a Persian of high rank, on a mission from the court of the satrap of Phrygia, was arrested by a Macedonian party; and being examined, it was discovered that Amyntas held communication with his kinsman, Alexander son of Aeropus, called the Lyncestian, formerly implicated with him in treasonable practices against the reigning king Alexander, but now serving under Parmenio in the important command of the Thessalian horse. Circumstances farther indicated that a plot was in agitation for assassinating the king, and, with the Persian monarch's promised assistance, placing the son of Aeropus on the Macedonian throne. Parmenio, with information of what

Ch. 46. s. 3.  
of this Hist.

Ch. 44. s. 1.  
of this Hist.



had been discovered, sent Asisines in custody to the Macedonian head-quarters. A council was held for his examination, and his evidence is said by Arrian to have been strong in proof of the Lyncestian's guilt. The unanimous opinion of the council however was declared, that he ought to be immediately removed from his command; and Arrian adds that it was freely observed to the king, by some of the members, that he had been imprudent in intrusting the best and most powerful cavalry of the army to one whose fidelity was so reasonably to be doubted.

Throughout Arrian's account of the alleged treason there is observable a character of caution, and solicitude to avoid assertion beyond warrant, widely different from the commonly bold manner of Diodorus and Plutarch in relating similar dark transactions; and perhaps not the less reasonably satisfactory for the superstition, in harmony enough with what is ordinary with those writers, blended with it. The only stated evidence of the treason, that would be admitted in our courts, was the confession of Asisines, in a private examination, or what those present at that examination asserted him to have made; but this was corroborated, for ancient minds, by recollection of a previous prodigy. Alexander, while engaged in the siege of Halicarnassus, taking his rest during the mid-day heat, a swallow fluttered about his head, twittering with peculiar earnestness; and though, with his hand, he endeavoured to drive away the disturbing animal, it would not leave him till he was completely awakened. This was thought so far out of the common course of nature that the soothsayer, Aristander of Telmissus, was consulted upon it; and he declared it to be a divine admonition, importing that treason against the king was preparing by some

CHAP.  
XLVII.

---

person in habits of friendship with him. Suspicion is said to have been then entertained of the son of Aeropus ; but Alexander would give no credit to it on such ground, and the matter passed. It is then not undeserving of observation that a man of Arrian's rank, education, and practice in affairs, civil and military, in the enlightened age of Adrian and the Antonines, speaks of that portent, and the seer's interpretation, as if he concurred with those with whom, he says, it had much weight at the time, and was reckoned to afford important confirmation to the deposition of Asisines.

The Macedonian constitution, we have seen, allowed judgment, in capital cases, at home only to a popular tribunal, and, on military service, to the army at large, and it seems evident that the testimony against the son of Aeropus was not such that it could be prudent to bring him before such tribunals. But what security the Macedonian law gave against arbitrary imprisonment we have no information. In every regular government, even the most jealous of liberty, it has been found necessary, for public safety, to allow somewhere, and under some restrictions, the power of imprisonment at discretion ; and, if in no government of antiquity, made known to us, this power has been under good regulation, we must not condemn the Macedonian if it did not provide security for the subject equal to what is peculiar to our own. That the appointment of the son of Aeropus to the command of the Thessalian cavalry had excited extensive disgust in the army is positively said by Arrian ; who also shows that he was upon no good terms with Parmenio, under whose command he had been placed. It seems likely that he had conducted himself haughtily to the officers generally ; among whom a

large party evidently was adverse to him. But the body under his particular command was supposed attached to him; and this, according to Arrian, occasioned the course taken with him, which is, in more than one view, remarkable. A confidential officer, Amphoterus, brother of a favourite general, Craterus, was sent in the disguise of an Asiatic dress, bearing no written orders, it being deemed unsafe, says the historian, to send anything in writing on the subject, but, by oral communication only, authorising Parmenio to arrest the son of Aeropus. This was quietly executed, and so the matter, for the time, rested; and, whether or no the purpose of treason was proved, or any reasonable presumption of it established, it appears evident that the appointment of the accused to the highly confidential command which he had held had been made in a youthful spirit of generosity, with too little consideration of circumstances, and that his removal from it was, in no small degree, necessary to the satisfaction of many principal officers, and the general quiet of the service.

This anxious business being so far settled, Alexander proceeded in the execution of his plan for depriving the enemy of means for maintaining a fleet in any part of the coast where it could be formidable. In advancing eastward, a chain of mountains was to be passed, the boundary of Lycia; the first important town beyond them was Perga, in Pamphylia. The way over the highlands was very rugged and inconvenient. A better road, but much more circuitous, by the shore, where the mountain meets the sea, was dangerous; and sometimes, when a southerly wind blew, impracticable. The wind at the time was southerly; yet Alexander, after all inquiry made, sending the lighter troops, under guides, over the



CHAP.  
XLVII.

---

Plut. v.  
Alex.  
p. 673, 674.

mountains, would himself lead the heavy-armed the readier though hazardous way. Against the sea was a lofty cliff called the Ladder, and it happened that, before he arrived there, the wind shifted to the north, so that, the waves being driven from the shore, he passed safely, none wading above the middle. This incident is said by Arrian to have been noticed at the time by Alexander himself, as importing divine favour to his enterprise; an observation perhaps more of policy than of presumption. But among his fervent partisans in Greece, as Plutarch informs us, the story was made quite miraculous; whence their adversaries, with incitement, had opportunity to turn it to ridicule. The celebrated Menander in one of his comedies introduced the exclamation, 'what an Alexandrian story! If he wants to pass the sea he has only to command, 'let there be a dry road for me.'" The biographer however adds, that a letter of Alexander's was in his time extant, describing the passage of the Ladder, and felicitating himself on his good fortune there, but not at all imputing it to any thing beyond the common course of nature. This information, not contradicting Arrian's report, is valuable, both as testimony to Alexander's character, and as showing what circumspection is requisite in estimating both the truth of the wonderful, and the justness of the satirical, among the works of the ancients. But whatever Alexander's faith may have been, or whatever his words, the circumstances of the passage of the Ladder, as they are concurrently related, would be likely to diffuse, or establish, among his troops, the belief or the hope that wherever he led they would be successful.



## SECTION II.

*Character of the country and people of the Interior of Lesser Asia. Pamphylia subdued. Progress of Alexander in Phrygia. Circumstances threatening to Alexander. Pisidia subdued.*

THE ridge of Taurus, the longest and loftiest range of mountains of the old world, divides the peninsula of the Lesser Asia into two unequal parts. From the promontory of Mycale, against the Ægean sea, it stretches eastward to the border of Syria; then shooting branches, southward to the Mediterranean, northward to the Euxine, it forms a complete barrier for the peninsula against the Greater Asia. The main body of the mountains proceeds north-eastward, beyond the Caspian, dividing Mesopotamia from Armenia and adjoining countries. From the long but narrow country which it leaves against the Mediterranean, comprising Lycia, Pamphylia, and Cilicia, its lofty and ragged range makes communication with Phrygia, and other parts northward, everywhere difficult.

The character of the people of the western coast of this great peninsula, occupied, in Homer's account, by communities at least as civilised as any then in Europe, and afterward extensively colonized from Greece, has already been much under our observation: among them arose some of the principal fathers of philosophy and the fine arts. The widely different character of some of the people of the interior has occurred also for notice, after the information of Xenophon, who traversed it with the army under the younger Cyrus, between sixty and seventy years before Alexander. This character, it

SECT.  
II.

---

Arr.  
l. 5. c. 5.

CHAP.  
XLVII.

Strab. l. 12.  
p. 822.  
ed. Ox.

appears, was maintained in the age of the historian Diodorus and the geographer Strabo, three hundred years after Alexander; an age among those most affording opportunity for wide information of the state of nations; when peace was established for the world, in singular extent, by Augustus Cæsar. The same character is imputed to the same people by Arrian, who was born and mostly lived in that great peninsula, about a century and a half later, while the Roman empire still retained its highest power; and, according to all accounts of modern travellers, the same character remains in the same fine country under the Turkish empire, little altered to this day. The people who held the extensive plainer regions, the Lydians, Phrygians, and Carians, are described by ancient writers as peaceful and orderly. But those of the highlands, like the Scottish and Welsh formerly, living in arms, were in a state of ceaseless war; among one another for wrath; against their fellow-subjects of the plains for plunder; the superintending government sometimes interfering to check, but never so as to suppress, the lawless course.

The Isaurians, between Phrygia and Pamphylia, to the geographer's age, were all robbers; and so expert in arms, and holding such fastnesses, that it was matter of triumph and the assumption of a new title, for a Roman consul, at the time of the greatest power of the Roman commonwealth, to subdue them. The Pisidians, westward of Isauria, were of similar character. These, and apparently all the highlanders, were, like the Scottish highlanders, divided into clans under their several chiefs.<sup>1</sup> Indeed in such a country,

<sup>1</sup> Τῶν δ' οὖν θρεινῶν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, Πεισιδῶν οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι κατὰ τυραννίδας μεμερισμένοι, καθάπερ οἱ Κίλικες, ληστικῶς ἤσκηνται. Strab. l. 12. p. 825. ed. Ox.

so constituted, small proprietors could not exist : all of necessity herded under leaders. The many thus were in a great degree dependent on their chiefs, who were also in no small degree dependent on them. Strabo, living in an age when republican sovereignty had been everywhere abolished, yet the memory of that form of government, so flattering in theory, so universally failing in practice, was recent, expresses wonder at the Cappadocians, who declined what the Romans, generosity being the pretence, but policy the real motive, offered them with the name of freedom ; meaning a republican constitution, but subject to the control of the Roman senate and people. They could not, they said, govern themselves ; neither their habits nor their circumstances would enable them to maintain civil order through their extensive country, without a chief to superintend all, and suppress lawless contest among equals. The geographer describes a remarkable chief who, a little before his own age, ruled Cappadocia. Whether a Greek, or only bearing a Grecian name, by valour and talent, with an unscrupulous policy, Amyntas had accumulated lordships as his private property, to the extent of no inconsiderable kingdom. In Lycaonia he held a wide territory. The country, in Arrian's account, resembled Salisbury plain, and those similar parts of England, little seen elsewhere in Europe, which, in modern phrase, are distinguished by the name of Downs ; a term formerly applied to highlands generally, but now limited to lands rising, mostly without abruptness, above the country around ; woodless, waterless, or with springs only at extraordinary depth, but affording excellent pasture for sheep. Amyntas, able to protect his property, had three hundred flocks maintained for him on the Lycaonian

Strab. l. 12.  
p. 783. ed.  
Ox.

CHAP.  
XLVII.

---

downs. By services to the celebrated Mark Antony, then commanding the Roman armies in Asia, he acquired such favour as to be raised by him to the kingdom of Cappadocia. But, insatiable in rapacity, he was at length cut off through treachery in his own household. A century and half after, under the emperor Trajan, a chief of robbers, in the country north of Lycaonia, was of such eminence as to engage the notice of the historian Arrian, with the view to exemplify, for his contemporaries, the state of the country in Alexander's time: when, throughout Cilicia, civil society was of the ancient turbulent character; and even the Pamphylians, though holding a very productive soil, falling most advantageously, in varied form, southward from the mountains of Taurus to the Mediterranean sea, had a strong propensity to the predatory life, and would not (they are Strabo's words) let their neighbours live in quiet.<sup>2</sup>

For people tolerated in such a course, during many ages, by the weakness or remissness of a government whose supremacy they acknowledged, the boons of independency and immunity, by which Alexander had won the civilised and peacefully inclined, would have no allurements, if accompanied with the requisition to live in peace with their neighbours. They reckoned the tribute to the great king, their subjection being otherwise little more than nominal, cheap purchase of licence to follow their predatory habits, and preferable to the most perfect immunity and independency, in awe of a neighbouring government able and vigilant to repress their excesses.

<sup>2</sup> Οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐμόρους ἕωςσι καθ' ἡσυχίαν ζῆν. Strab. l. 12. p. 824 ed. Ox.



Through the greater part of Lycia, where Alexander now was, the arts of peace were cultivated, and a better civil order was established; but toward the eastern border, where a bay of the Mediterranean nearly meets the root of Taurus, a predatory clan held the strongly-situated town of Marmara. Alexander's way into Pamphylia, which he proposed to reduce, was along the valley which this town commanded. The body of his army passed unmolested; the baggage and stores, with cattle for the subsistence of all, following, under a guard supposed sufficient, as in a country of friends and allies. But the sight of the cattle, under so slight an escort, was too tempting for the Marmarean youth; whom the elders, more provident of consequences, seem to have been unable to restrain. When the principal military strength was considerably advanced, they issued from their hold, killed some of the escort, who vainly resisted overbearing numbers, and compelled the slaves, who attended the cattle, to obey their orders, and become, together with the beasts, their property. Alexander, who before had reckoned the reduction of such a nest of barbarians not a matter for delaying his progress to more important objects, now resolved not to risk the evils which the allowance of impunity for their conduct might produce. Halting his army, he laid siege to their rock, with machines the more alarming as they were new to the Marmareans. The elders desired immediately to capitulate; but the younger, perhaps fearing to suffer as authors of the recent outrage, refused concurrence; and, holding council among themselves, agreed in the atrocious resolution to kill all the women, children, and old men, and then, by night, force their own way across the besiegers' lines to the

CHAP.  
XLVII.

neighbouring mountains. A general feast preceded this purposed impious sacrifice. The best provision of meat and drink was produced for common use; and when all had taken their fill, the signal for what was to follow was given by setting fire to all the houses. Six hundred of the youth however had the virtue to refuse concurrence in the decreed massacre of parents, wives, and children; and the historian has not said how far the bloody purpose was executed. The projected sally however was in considerable amount successful; many of the Marmarean youth reaching the mountain fastnesses.<sup>3</sup>

After this perhaps necessary example, Alexander, proceeding by the shore eastward, was met by deputies from Aspendus, a considerable Grecian colony in Pamphylia, originally from Argos. The business of the mission was to declare the readiness of the Aspendians to accede to the terms proposed for the Grecian cities of the west of Lesser Asia, but to request especially that they might not be subjected to the control of a garrison. This Alexander readily granted; but he required that the horses, formerly furnished by the Aspendians as a portion of their tribute to the crown of Persia, should, now and in

<sup>3</sup> This remarkable business of Marmara, related by Diodorus, is unnoticed by Arrian, whose narrative, always respectable for what it undertakes to warrant, is however far from being so complete as, by mere omission, to invalidate whatever may remain related by others. In many parts indeed it bears the appearance of an unfinished work. Thus, previously to the march for Marmara, we are led to expect notice of matters at Perga, but they remain untold. The narrative of Diodorus here, for the most part, is remarkably consonant with Arrian's, and what he has added concerning the Marmareans is consistent with Arrian's as well as all other testimonies to the general character of the Asiatic highlanders.

future, come to him; and farther, pecuniary need probably pressing, that they should immediately pay a subsidy of fifty talents, about ten thousand pounds sterling. The deputies assented, and took their leave.

Perga, on the river Cestrus, about seven miles from the sea, having, on a mountain summit near it, a temple of Diana, of some celebrity, was the first town in Alexander's way, within Pamphylia. Here measures seem to have been previously arranged to mutual satisfaction, whence nothing occurred for the historian to notice. Sida, the next town, was a colony from Cuma, in Æolis; but the people having mixed much with those around them, had lost the language of their Grecian forefathers. No resistance from them is mentioned; but the place, probably being, for its opportunities, important, a garrison was left there.

Strab. l. 17.  
p. 953. ed.  
Ox.

Next was Syllium, a fortress strong by nature, and garrisoned for the king of Persia with regular mercenary troops. On his way thither Alexander met intelligence that the Aspendians had denied admission for those whom he had dispatched to receive the ratification of the convention made with their deputies, and would neither pay the money, according to agreement, nor deliver the horses, but were preparing for defence. Probably report from their deputies of the smallness of his numbers may have encouraged them to this conduct. Reckoning it to require his first animadversion, he passed Syllium, which was too strong to be taken by a sudden assault, and hastened towards Aspendus.

That city, of some consideration for its wealth and population, and consequent power and influence among the Grecian and perhaps other towns of the



CHAP.  
XLVII.

---

coast, was however much more important for its situation on the river Eurymedon, one of the very few of the Mediterranean sea offering a secure and ample harbour for shipping. It will be remembered as the scene of the celebrated double victory of the Athenian Cimon, obtained in one day over the Persian forces of sea and land, during the reign of Xerxes. Liberated then from the sovereignty of the Persian king only to fall under the control of the Athenian people, and again compelled to be tributary to Persia, when the contentions of the Greek republics among themselves disabled them from vindicating so distant a dominion, Aspendus had flourished under the restored patronage of the Persian government. The original occupancy by colonists from Argos was of a rock with precipitous sides, one of them washed by the Eurymedon, the summit offering space for a considerable town. A populous suburb had now grown on the lower ground. This, though fortified enough for defence against neighbouring barbarians, being unfit to resist the Grecian art of attack, the Aspendians deserted it on Alexander's approach, and he quartered his army in it. Perhaps his detention by the previous siege of Syllium had been calculated upon by the Aspendians, and his unexpected early arrival had prevented the collection of provisions to enable a place, otherwise so strong, to maintain a siege. Probably enough also the ordinary political contest in Grecian towns existed there; so that the party which had prevailed to carry the profligate vote for breaking the treaty made by the authorised delegates, were unable to maintain their superiority when siege was impending from an army bearing the character of irresistible. Capitulation was presently offered on the former terms; but these, though to prosecute the



siege would have been highly inconvenient, Alexander refused. He required now, together with the horses, as before, double the contribution in money immediately ; in future a yearly tribute ; subjection to a governor, or, in Arrian's phrase, a satrap, whom he would appoint ; submission of a dispute existing with some neighbouring people, concerning a territory, to impartial arbitrators ; and hostages to ensure the performance of these conditions. All was agreed to. No garrison is mentioned to have been left. Not improbably the party which carried the vote for capitulation, apprehensive of suffering from that which had carried the vote for breaking the former treaty, might desire that powerful men of that party should be taken as hostages, and that a Macedonian governor or satrap, whom they would support, should be appointed to command peace within their walls. Thus the necessity for a garrison, which could ill be spared from the army, might be obviated.

Not far eastward of Aspendus begins that portion of Cilicia distinguished by the name of the Rough ; consisting almost wholly of a mountainous branch from the range of Taurus, extending to the sea. On the coast are some small sea-ports : the interior, divided by deep narrow valleys, offering everywhere difficulties for an army, had little to invite and much to forbid. It seems probable therefore that Aspendus was the last considerable object in that direction. But it seems farther probable that some intelligence had arrived of Memnon's threatening measures, which principally decided Alexander's next proceedings.

The king of Persia, dissatisfied with his admiral who commanded at Miletus, had put a fleet of three hundred triremes under Memnon's orders, and had largely supplied him with money. Clearly master

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 29.

Arr. 1.2.  
c. 1.

of the sea thus, Memnon was enabled also to raise a land force of the best kind, Greeks, or men trained in the Grecian discipline. In every republic of Greece moreover was a party ready to join him. The ill humour shown by Lacedæmon, on the election of such a youth as Alexander to the chief military command of all the Grecian states, far from abating, had been successfully fomented by its king, Agis, who desired himself to succeed to the ancient eminence of his predecessors. The party of Demosthenes, not certainly with any purpose of promoting the superiority of Lacedæmon, was however always ready to concur in opposition to the Macedonian interest; and Agis, without great talents to excite jealousy, was a prince of some popular virtues to recommend him, and promote any cause he engaged in. Under the lead of Agis thus a Lacedæmonian party was gaining strength among the republics of Peloponnesus; and to receive Memnon as an ally, a Greek at the head of a land force in large proportion really, and perhaps all nominally Grecian, did not carry to Grecian minds the offensive character of assisting a foreign invasion, in the same manner as if the commander had been a Persian, and the army barbarian. To reconcile the Greeks then more extensively to the Persian connexion, Memnon held out, as the basis for his conduct, the treaty formerly negotiated by Lacedæmon with Persia, commonly called the Peace of Antalcidas; which, however on one hand really objectionable, and on the other beyond reason and truth reprobated by party-writers, was yet in its day, as we have formerly observed, extensively popular. By this treaty, it will be remembered, all Grecian cities were to be completely independent; no longer acknowledging, as formerly, the superiority of Lacedæmon, Athens, or

Ch. 25. s. 7.  
of this Hist.

any other republic. This, originally aimed against the sovereignty which the Athenian people, through their naval superiority, held over the islands of the *Ægean*, and many maritime towns of Lesser Asia and Thrace, was for a time, we have seen, effectual for its purpose; while Lacedæmon, disavowing command, retained an influence, nearly equal to sovereignty, over a large part of Greece itself. Now it was aimed against that authority committed to the king of Macedonia which had formerly been allowed by the Grecian states to Lacedæmon, Athens, and Thebes, as imperial republics; and it was an advantage for Memnon that, by the treaty of Antalcidas, the king of Persia had been the admitted patron of the independency of the Greek republics, when the kings of Macedonia had not yet aspired to such eminence.

The recal of the Persian fleet to the *Ægean*, under such a commander as Memnon, with a disposition thus prevailing, in several republics, to give him a friendly reception, placed Alexander in circumstances highly critical. A hostile fleet, commanding the *Ægean*, with a detached squadron, stationed in the Hellespont, might both prevent the passage of recruits from Europe to re-enforce his army in Asia, and deny his own return to relieve his allies and subjects, threatened with invasion. Meanwhile Darius was collecting an immense Asiatic army, having also a considerable Grecian force in his service, to meet Alexander if he advanced, or follow him if he retreated.

In these circumstances to rejoin without delay the body under Parmenio, and provide, while opportunity was clear, for enabling the absent with leave to return from Europe, with whatsoever recruits they might bring, was of pressing consideration. Gordium



the ancient capital of the Hellespontine or Lower Phrygia, Alexander's first conquest from the Persian empire, was the place appointed for the absent with leave and the recruits to proceed to. He resolved without delay to direct his own march thither; but the way had considerable difficulties. The part of Taurus to be crossed was a wide tract of highlands, the country of the Pisidians; all freebooters, and yet not so savage as not to have fortified towns. Telmissus, otherwise written Termessus, was one of the principal. Its people, like some of the Scottish highlanders of old, to the profession of robbery added that of prophecy; for their skill in which they had for centuries maintained a high reputation among nations around. Aristander, Alexander's favourite seer, already noticed as interpreter of the prodigy of the swallow at Halicarnassus, was a Telmissian. For the most convenient road, perhaps almost alone practicable for an army, he must return to Perga, and then proceed by Telmissus. But the Telmissians, jealous of his purpose, and confident in their strength, resolved to deny his army the passage. Their town occupied the summit of a very lofty rock, precipitous on all sides, commanding the rugged way through a narrow glen. When Alexander approached, the heights were occupied by the Telmissians in arms. He halted, and, after examining the circumstances, encamped, and kept all quiet within his lines. Thus he gave rest to his troops, while the Telmissians, like many other barbarians, bold, active, and individually skilful, but irregular and impatient, became tired of their situation on the mountains, unsheltered in a wintry atmosphere, insomuch that, leaving a guard on each hill, the main body of them withdrew into the town. Upon this Alexander had reckoned. Sending then his



light-armed up the hills, to positions whence their missile weapons could reach the guarded posts, these were soon abandoned, and his army, hastening through the narrow, encamped on the plainer ground beyond.

But the Pisidians were not, any more than the Scottish highlanders of old, under due control of one regular government. The several clans, all enemies to all mankind besides, unless where particular circumstances led to particular compacts of friendship, were often most hostile to one another. Possibly it was because the Telmissians had resolved upon hostility to Alexander, that the Selgians, another Pisidian clan desired his friendship. A deputation came from them soliciting alliance, and offering their services. Such a mission could not but be welcome: the deputies accordingly were gratified with their reception; a treaty was presently concluded; and the Selgians proved always faithful and valuable allies.

Arr. 1. 1.  
c. 28.

They would willingly have joined Alexander in arms against Telmissus; but that place was too strong to be taken without a delay which his circumstances would ill allow, and another object required his immediate attention. Salagassus, a large town, the seat of a clan esteemed, though all the Pisidians were warriors, the best warriors of the nation, was necessarily to be passed; and, being connected with Telmissus, and hostile to Selgium, the Salagassians were of course hostile to Alexander. The Telmissians were diligent in hostility. Acquainted with byways over the highlands, they reached Salagassus before him, and with its people took an advantageous position for disputing his passage. From ambuscades judiciously placed then they attacked, nearly at the same time, each flank of his advanced guard of bowmen, and presently overpowered it. But the Agrian

targeteers following, with better defensive armour and more regular discipline, stood their ground till the phalanx came to their support. The Pisidians, deficient in armour and order and experience, were led by their courage to close, where they should only have annoyed at a distance: many were killed; and, utterly unable to make an impression, the survivors took to flight. In this they mostly found safety; for the heavy-armed were incapable of following them among the highlands, and their knowledge of the rugged and difficult ground made the pursuit of the light-armed hazardous and little efficacious. But as, in the mountain ways, numbers would hinder each other's escape, some fled by the plainer road to the town. These Alexander followed with his cavalry, and entering with them became master of it.

His success thus in action against the Salagassians, the most powerful of the Pisidian clans, together with his previous liberality in negotiation with the Selgians, opened such facility that he was induced to proceed to the complete reduction of a nation so capable, as well as disposed, to be injurious to all around them. Possibly intelligence from the Ægean and from Greece, relieving former apprehensions for that quarter, may have assisted toward this determination. The example of the Selgians however encouraging, and his terms offered to all being probably liberal, many clans immediately acceded to them; some strong places he besieged, and shortly all yielded.

The fame of the power of his arms, shown in reducing, with his small numbers, this nation of robbers, so long allowed, by the remissness of the mighty government of Persia, to be the annoyance of one of the most productive countries of the world, prepared facility for making his next acquisition, and improved

value for it when made. A march of five days brought him to Celænæ, the capital of the Greater Phrygia. The town was little fortified; the inhabitants not soldiers, nor probably solicitous whether they were to pay tribute to a Persian or a Macedonian king; its castle was singularly strong and had a garrison, but only of one thousand Carian, and one hundred Grecian mercenaries. So scanty being the force to which the defence of the capital, and apparently almost the whole of the Greater Phrygia, was committed, discredit seems not imputable to the garrison for what followed. On being summoned they offered to withdraw, if, within a day named, they were not relieved. This was agreed to, and no relief arriving the place fell of course.

SECT.  
III.

---

## SECTION III.

*Measures of the Persian armament under Memnon: conquest of Chios: progress in Lesbos: death of Memnon: conquest of Lesbos completed by Memnon's successors. The Persian land-force recalled from the Grecian seas: war prosecuted by the Persian fleet.*

WHILE Alexander was thus proceeding fortunately and rapidly in conquest far from home, his able adversary Memnon had been providing for him difficulties and dangers at his door. Aware that an able and indefatigable enemy, regardless of seasons, could not be effectually opposed but with equal disregard of season and of rest, he would not await the spring to call the fleet from the ports to which, under its former commander, it had withdrawn. The coast of all the continent bordering on the Ægean sea was in the enemy's hands, with a victorious army to main-

Arr. 1. 2.  
c. 1.



CHAP.  
XLVII.

---

Ch. 46. s. 2.  
of this Hist.  
Arr. 1. 1.  
c. 12.

tain the possession ; but the numerous islands were open to a commanding fleet, for attempts of either arms or policy. Memnon sailed to Chios, where matters had been so prepared, by negotiation with those friendly to the Persian connexion, that, at the sight only of his fleet, the adverse were appalled, and the whole island yielded without a blow. The Athenian Chares, who had not scrupled, with feigned respect, to wait upon Alexander on his first arrival in Asia, now joined Memnon in promoting, on the Asiatic shores, the cause which Demosthenes was promoting in European Greece. Known through the great commands he had held, and respected by the Persian party as the friend of Demosthenes, he seems to have had interest particularly in Lesbos. Thither Memnon proceeded with his fleet. Three of the four principal towns presently submitted : to Mitylene, alone resisting, he laid siege.

Arr. 1. 2.  
c. 1.

Already thus he had ports for the refuge of his fleet, and that fleet could in a great degree command supplies. He could therefore hold very promising language to the friendly throughout Greece, as well as formidable threats to the adverse. He declared that, after reducing Mitylene, he would proceed to the Hellespont. His fleet would at once give him complete command of the strait. Neither re-enforcement then should pass from Europe to Alexander in Asia ; nor should Alexander return to Europe ; but he would himself, with the assistance of his Grecian allies, invade Macedonia, while the king of Persia, the friend of Grecian independency, with overbearing numbers, would annihilate the small force which had hitherto been, so beyond expectation successfully, invading his dominion. In the midst of these great



projects, Memnon was seized with sickness in his camp before Mitylene, and he died there.

The chief command then, till the king's pleasure might be declared, devolved upon the satrap Autophradates, jointly with Pharnabazus, son of the satrap of Lower Phrygia, Artabazus, and nephew of Memnon. These officers, prosecuting their predecessor's measures, shortly reduced the Mitylenæans to desire to capitulate, and treaty was not denied them. It was then liberally required on their side, and liberally admitted on the other, that the auxiliaries, sent by Alexander to assist them, should withdraw under safe conduct. On the other hand it was required, that the connexion of Mitylene with Persia, according to the terms of the peace of Antalcidas, should be renewed; that the monument inscribed with the treaty concluded with Alexander should be destroyed; that the exiles of the Persian party should be restored.

Thus far the business left by Memnon seems to have been carried on well. But Arrian's account of the sequel indicates that his successors in command had not inherited his spirit of honour and liberality, or that which had distinguished Pharnabazus, whom we suppose the grandfather, or Artabazus, the yet living father of one of them. To control the civil government, Diogenes, one of the restored exiles, was appointed to that dignity which the Greek writers designate by the title of tyrant. To ensure power with that dignity, they placed a garrison in the city; under the command of a Greek indeed, but a stranger to Mitylene, Lycomedes of Rhodes. They proceeded to raise a heavy contribution; beginning with arbitrary exactions from the wealthy, and then extending an assessment to all ranks. Those conversant with

CHAP.  
XLVII.

---

Grecian history however will be aware that, as the numerous party, which had before held democratical sovereignty, were by the capitulation to retain all civil rights, though probably under a more tempered constitution, yet the Mitylenæans of the Persian party were likely to be perilously situated without a continuance of Persian protection; whence it is not unlikely to have been at their desire, as necessary for their safety, that a supreme magistrate, whom the other party would style tyrant, was appointed, and a body of those regular troops, distinguished by the term mercenaries, was left in garrison. But how far any of the measures were really infractions of the treaty, Arrian's succinct account, apparently not derived from the eminent men his guides for Alexander's actions, nor from any friend to the Persian party among the Greeks, affords no fair ground to judge.

Arr. 1. 2.  
c. 2.

It is however on all accounts evident that Memnon's death deranged the purposes of Darius and his council. On the advantageous progress of his measures in Europe the success of those proposed to be pursued in Asia would much depend. A successor qualified by talents and experience and popularity and trustworthiness, for the business of Memnon's commission, would hardly be found. Had one of either nation the two former qualifications, yet no Persian could have his interest with the Greeks, nor was any Greek so connected with Persia. Memnon's great designs therefore perished with him. An order came from the court for Pharnabazus to conduct the land force of the armament to Lycia. Arrived on the Lycian coast, he was soon joined by Thymondas, son of Memnon's brother, Mentor. That officer came commissioned to conduct the army, mostly, if not

wholly, Grecian, to the Syrian coast, to meet the king coming from Upper Asia; and he brought a commission for Pharnabazus, apparently in conjunction with Autophradates, to command in chief in the same extent as his late uncle, Memnon. Pharnabazus accordingly, delivering the army to Thymondas, hastened to rejoin the fleet.

That fleet still commanded the sea, but the great objects of the armament were ashore. Deprived therefore, of a co-operating land force, nothing great could be undertaken. But the small island of Tenedos, for its neighbourhood to the Asiatic coast and to the Hellespont, was a desirable acquisition. The people were generally disposed to connexion with the Grecian confederacy under Alexander; but, knowing the inability of that confederacy to afford them maritime protection, and utterly unequal to effectual resistance with their own strength, they changed their allegiance, on being allowed the same terms which had been granted to the Mitylenæans.

The return of the Persian fleet to the Ægean, and the vigorous measures threatened while Memnon lived, had induced Alexander to strain his means for equipping and maintaining a naval force again. His admiral, Hegelochus, was directed to assemble what ships he could in the Hellespont. His viceroy, Antipater, watching, from Macedonia, every movement, had previously collected a squadron, principally from the friendly ports of Eubœa and Peloponnesus, which he had placed under the command of Proteas. Though no hope could be entertained of raising a fleet competent to meet the Persian in a general action, yet protection might be given to trade, and to threatened parts of the coast, and advantage might be looked for against detached squadrons. When the Persian



CHAP.  
XLVII.

---

admirals led the main body of their fleet to Tenedos, they detached ten Phœnician ships, under Datames, a Persian, to the Cyclad islands; apparently to raise supplies by prizes and contributions. Datames was in his station at Siphnus, when Proteas attacked him by surprise, at daybreak, with a superior force. Datames escaped, with only two ships; the other eight were taken, with their crews.

Intelligence of the death of Memnon, and of the withdrawing of the Persian land force from the Ægean, relieved Alexander from the apprehension of any very formidable invasion of his kingdom, or of the states of his allies; and the movement of the Grecian forces in the Persian service, from all parts, to join the king of Persia, marked for him the point to which he should principally give his attention. It was now evidently the enemy's purpose to direct his utmost collected strength to the recovery of the dominion lost. Alexander's business therefore would be to provide for the maintenance of his possession of that great peninsula, of which he was already nearly master, and to keep the enemy far from Macedonia and Greece, by the barrier of mountains on its eastern verge, or to meet him still beyond them. Accordingly allowing himself only ten days at Cœlænæ, to regulate the affairs of the extensive country of Upper Phrygia, which had been so abandoned to him, he committed the office and dignity of satrap of that province to Antigonus son of Philip. The situation of general of the auxiliary troops, which Antigonus had held, thus became vacant. Alexander seems always scrupulously to have left the separate command of the troops of each Grecian republic to their several officers, but never yet to have trusted a republican general with a more extensive authority.



Balacrus son of Amyntas was appointed commander of the auxiliaries in the room of Antigonus.

SECT.  
IV.

---

#### SECTION IV.

*Recruits from Europe : embassy from Athens : story of the Gordian Knot : submission of Paphlagonia and Cappadocia : Plutarch's treatise on Alexander's fortune.*

FROM Celænæ Alexander proceeded to Gordium, the ancient capital of the northern, the Lesser or the Hellespontine Phrygia, or perhaps of the whole country of that name. There he had the good fortune to be joined by the troops allowed to go home for the winter, with their recruits. The scantiness of the re-enforcement marks the powerful effect of Memnon's measures, and indicates what the check, which he was providing for Alexander, might have been had he lived. Apprehension seems to have pervaded, not governments only but individuals generally, in expectation that, with the great force under Memnon, in a situation to intercept Alexander's return, and with the might of Persia, under a king bred a warrior, advancing against him, he must be overwhelmed. The hope of booty, on former occasions so alluring, had lost its power: a hundred and fifty horse joined from Elis, but not a single recruit from any other republic. Macedonia itself sent no more than about a thousand foot and three hundred horse.

No account remains of political transactions among the republics during the crisis; but, while Alexander was at Gordium, an embassy from Athens joined him, charged with an extraordinary request, which, together with the answer to it, affords interesting indica-

tion. Among the Grecian prisoners made at the battle of the Granicus, and now in confinement in Macedonia, many were Athenian citizens. The declared purpose of the embassy was to obtain the free dismissal of these men, who had been taken in the enemy's service, fighting against that confederacy of the Grecian republics, of which Athens was a member. Irregular, and even offensive, as this request appears, yet, in the actually critical state of things, it seems to have been thought advisable to avoid an irritating answer. 'But,' says Arrian, 'it was deemed ' unsafe, war raging, to set all Greeks free from the ' fear of carrying arms against their country; and ' therefore it was replied to the deputation, that, ' when matters were satisfactorily settled with the ' common enemy of Athens and all Greece, then ' would be the fitter time to consider of favour for ' those who had been fighting against their country ' in his cause.'<sup>4</sup> Evidently this mission must have

<sup>4</sup> One cannot but admire the inconsistency of some ancient writers, and many modern, who have related this transaction, and have also related the execution of Phocion at Athens, occurring a few years after, and had before them the evidence in the celebrated speeches of the great contending orators of the day, entitled *On the Crown*, that all Greece was more free under Philip and Alexander than under the supremacy of the Athenian or Lacedæmonian republics, and yet have not scrupled to assert that Greece, previously a model of free government, was enslaved by Philip and remained so under Alexander. To which of those writers should be imputed only weak credulity or rash assertion, and to which wilful and insidious falsehood, their readers, attending to existing evidence, will judge. It is however due to the ancients to observe that none of them has gone so far in extravagance as to furnish warrant for what several moderns have been bold enough to assert as on their authority; some of our own country; but, in this matter, always outdone by those of the continent.

been a measure of the Persian party in Athens, under Demosthenes, which Æschines shows to have remained always powerful; so that, if not holding a decisive lead in the republic, it could yet, for some questions, overbear the party of Phocion. A proposal for obtaining the release of Athenian citizens, prisoners of war, would, in a general view, be popular; and might be so brought forward by an ingenious orator that, however variously objectionable, it might be thought by Phocion's party, with their usual scrupulousness and moderation, proper to decline strong opposition to it.

Alexander, while at Gordium, would of course visit the castle in which was preserved the Gordian knot; then of fame among surrounding people, and, through his notice of it, afterward celebrated over the civilised world. The story, as related with some variations by several ancient authors, and with great simplicity by Arrian, is the more a curiosity, as coming from a man of his eminence in his enlightened age.

At a remote period, that respectable historian says, a Phrygian yeoman, named Gordius, was holding his own plough on his own land, when an eagle perched on the yoke, and remained while he continued his work. Wondering at a matter so apparently preternatural, he deemed it expedient to consult some person among those who had reputation for expounding indications of the divine will. In the neighbouring province of Pisidia the people of Telmissus had wide fame for that skill: it was supposed instinctive and hereditary in men and women of particular families. Going thither, as he approached the first village of the Telmissian territory, he saw a girl drawing water at a spring; and making some

Arr. l. 2.  
c. 3.



inquiry, which led to farther conversation, he related the phenomenon. It happened that the girl was of a race of seers : she told him to return immediately home, and sacrifice to Jupiter the king. Satisfied so far, he remained anxious about the manner of performing the ceremony, so that it might be certainly acceptable to the deity ; and the result was that he married the girl, and she accompanied him home. Nothing important followed till a son of this match, named Midas, had attained manhood. The Phrygians then, distressed by violent civil dissensions, consulted an oracle for means to allay them. The answer was, ‘ that a cart would bring them a king to relieve their ‘ troubles.’ The assembly was already formed to receive official communication of the divine admonition, when Gordius and Midas arrived in their cart to attend it. Presently the notion arose and spread, that one of those in that cart must be the person intended by the oracle. Gordius was then advanced in years. Midas, who already had been extensively remarked for superior powers of both body and mind, was elected king of Phrygia. Tranquillity ensued among the people ; and the cart, predesigned by heaven to bring a king, the author of so much good, was, with its appendages, dedicated to the god, and placed in the citadel, where it was carefully preserved. The yoke was fastened with a thong, formed of the bark of a cornel tree so artificially that no eye could discover either end ; and rumour was become popular of an oracle which declared that whoever loosened that thong would be lord of Asia ; the name Asia being then, in its most common acceptation, limited to the portion afterward distinguished as Lesser Asia. The extensive credit which this rumour had obtained, and the reported failure of the attempts of many



great men, gave an importance to Alexander's visit to the curiosity, on which, as it seems from Arrian's account, he had not previously calculated. While, with many around, he was admiring it, the observation occurred that, his purpose being to be lord of Asia, he should, for the sake of popular opinion, have the credit of loosening the yoke. Accordingly they agreed in asserting, in general terms, that what the oracle required, for a conqueror of Asia, had been accomplished by Alexander. Some writers have reported, apparently for the sake of a pithy saying, that he cut the knot with his sword; but Aristobulus, who, as one of his generals, is likely to have been present, and otherwise would have had means for the best information, related that he wrested the pin from the beam, and so, taking off the yoke, said that was enough for him to be lord of Asia. Nevertheless Arrian adds that, among contradictory accounts, he could not satisfy himself what Alexander really did on the occasion. This however is obvious; that few if any former visitors could well dare to commit violence on the knot; but Alexander was in circumstances to use it as he pleased. What follows then, in the historian's account, may deserve notice, as marking opinions held by those above the vulgar, both in Alexander's time and his own. Thunder and lightning, on the following night, he says, confirmed the assertion that Alexander had effected what the oracle had declared was to be done only by one who should be lord of Asia. Accordingly, on the morrow, he performed a magnificent thanksgiving sacrifice, in acknowledgment of the favour of the gods, thus promised. Such religious ceremony, whatsoever of faith or devotion may have prompted it, evidently was what policy might recommend.

Information had now reached Alexander that the king of Persia had made great preparations for re-vindicating his lost dominion, and had already crossed the great desert to take himself the command in chief of his numerous forces ; thus showing his disposition to energy, and his purpose of maintaining the military reputation acquired in early youth. For Alexander then, whether with a view to farther conquest, or only to keep what he had made, it was most important to hold the great chain of mountains, the natural defence of Lesser Asia, as a barrier which no enemy should pass. But within that barrier two extensive provinces, Cappadocia and Paphlagonia, still acknowledged the Persian dominion. Of the former especially, it behoved him to be master, for it commanded one side of the pass by which, almost alone, a great army could cross the ridge of Taurus, and have free communication between the Lesser and the Greater Asia. The importance of that pass we have formerly observed, in Xenophon's account of the expedition of the younger Cyrus. From Gordium therefore Alexander hastened eastward to An-cyra. There his measures were to be chosen ; whether for moving northward, to reduce Paphlagonia ; or, with the hazard of leaving an enemy behind him, hastening through Cappadocia, to seize the passes ; or, with certain inconvenience, and probable danger, to divide his forces for both purposes.

Cappadocia, apparently from its first conquest by the great Cyrus, had been governed by Persian satraps ; but Paphlagonia like Caria, and, as we have observed formerly, Cilicia had been left to their own hereditary princes, as a kind of feudatories of the Persian empire. The Prince of Paphlagonia, when Xenophon, with the Cyrean army, was considering of marching across

Ch. 23. s. 5.  
& ch. 24.  
s. 5. of this  
Hist.

his country, could command the service, not probably for distant enterprise, but for home defence, it was reckoned, of a hundred thousand horse. With such powerful means, and a situation little liable to control from the navy of Persia, and not readily from its armies, the Paphlagonian princes appear to have maintained greater independency than the Carian. We have formerly seen one of them, in alliance with the king of Lacedæmon, Agesilaus, making war against the king of Persia's satraps; then taking disgust at his new connexion; and, on his repentance, immediately readmitted, as an independent prince might be, to his former connexion with the Persian crown, in alliance rather than subjection. What were the political circumstances of the country now, and whether fear excited by the renown of Alexander's great and uninterrupted successes, or indignation at the neglect of the Persian government and the conduct of its satraps, together with failure of ready means to have intelligence of the actual measures of the court, or what other view instigated, we are uninformed; but an embassy from Paphlagonia met Alexander at Ancyra, to solicit his friendship. Arrian describes it as an embassy from the Paphlagonian people, offering their allegiance to Alexander; apparently such as formerly to the Persian king; but requesting immunity from the admission of foreign troops into their country. On a basis so relieving to Alexander, in his actual circumstances, a treaty was presently concluded; and the care of the new paramount sovereign's interest in Paphlagonia was committed to Callas, his satrap of the Lower Phrygia. The army then traversing Cappadocia, the whole country, as far as Taurus, submitted, and Alexander appointed Sabictas, a Mace-

Ch. 24. s. 5.  
of this Hist.

Arr. 1. 2.  
c. 4.



donian<sup>5</sup>, to the duties and dignity of satrap there. Thus easily was the dominion of two extensive provinces acquired, and the reduction of all the peninsula of Lesser Asia, within the great mountain-barrier, completed.

The treatise entitled 'On Alexander's Fortune,' attributed to Plutarch, lively and ingenious, though not without a considerable mixture of absurd arguments as well as bold assertion, really a panegyric of the virtues and talents of the hero, denying to Fortune any share with them in his successes, may deserve some notice here.

The moral philosopher begins with reproaching his goddess, Fortune, for delaying Alexander's successes in Asia two years, by raising troubles for him in Europe. Possibly a speculator, less bent upon panegyric, and more upon just investigation, might rather reckon the delay, and the employment, of those two years, highly advantageous to Alexander, and steps to his following achievements, by completing his military and political education; whence he entered upon his Asiatic expedition, not an inexperienced boy, but a youth who had had the advantage of uncommon extent, both of observation and practice, in arduous business, civil and military. Had then that vigour and vigilance of the Persian government, demonstrated, a few years before, in the conquest of Egypt and the defence of Byzantium, continued only so far that its irresistible fleet, instead of being too late at Halicarnassus, had been timely at the Hellespont, how Alexander, with all the advantage not of his own talents only, but of very superior assistants raised

<sup>5</sup> 'Id utique esse Macedonicum evincit vel sola terminatio.' Annot. Jac. Gron. 15. in Arr. l. 2. c. 4.



under his father, could ever have reached the Asiatic shore with an army equal to any important enterprise, would be difficult for the most ingenious panegyrist to show. Favoured as he was by fortune, if fortune we should call it, with an uninterrupted passage; favoured afterward by the rejection of Memnon's plan of operations, calculated, in Arrian's opinion evidently, to have been fatal to his expedition; still, when battle was resolved on, had Memnon been allowed to direct the order in the usual way of Grecian tactics, placing the Grecian phalanx in the first line, on the river's brink, with complete armour and protended spears, and the Persian cavalry on the higher ground behind, ready to support the infantry, wherever pressed, and cover its retreat, if compelled to give way; whether Alexander, with or without the counsel of his able advisers, would even have attempted to force the passage, in Arrian's account may seem to be matter for question. But the passage of the Granicus with or without contest effected, (had Memnon's advice only been so far followed that the satraps, with their overbearing cavalry, had attended Alexander's march, though destroying nothing, but compelling only the removal of supplies removable,) that he might have reached Sardis, perhaps the retreat of the Cyreans may show to have been possible; but it would have been slowly, with difficulty, and not without loss. Sardis then would not have fallen to him without an effort; and how he could have managed the siege of such a place, and in what time probably have succeeded, it would require much boldness to say. Ephesus then, though a friendly party was there, could not have been acquired without a second siege: all southward was hostile; and, even as circumstances were, the arrival of the overbearing fleet of Persia ended all

co-operation of his fleet with his army. The probability then seems that, in the best event, Alexander must have turned northward, to find winter quarters among those Grecian towns which Parmenio's measures had prepared to receive him; and, instead of all Asia within Taurus conquered in one year, he must have begun his second campaign, if at all capable of offensive operation, with measures against the strongest cities of the Grecian colonies on the western coast. Alexander's fortune, in this his first campaign in Asia, certainly was extraordinary: his readiness, quicksightedness, judgment, and indefatigability to use fortunate contingencies, whether conceiving himself, or deciding upon the advice of older men about him, form his just and extraordinary praise.

## CHAPTER XLVIII.

## ALEXANDER'S SECOND CAMPAIGN IN ASIA.

## SECTION I.

*March over Taurus into Cilicia : Alexander's illness at Tarsus. Measures for completing the conquest and holding possession of Cilicia. Measures of Darius : composition of his army : alliance with Lacedæmon. Hazardous situation of Alexander. Simultaneous invasion of Syria by Alexander and of Cilicia by Darius : Alexander's hasty return into Cilicia.*

ALL Asia within Taurus (so the Greeks described the country included between that range of mountains and the Ægean and Euxine seas,) now acknowledging Alexander's sovereignty, Cilicia, along the coast of the Mediterranean, yet owned fealty to the Persian empire. Hence, though the ready accession of Paphlagonia, and, its apparent consequence, the despair of the king of Persia's officers in Cappadocia to offer any effectual resistance, were advantages beyond hope, yet, before Alexander could reach the Gate, as it was called, of Taurus, against Cilicia, a strong body of the enemy's troops had occupied it. Information of this met him at the place where, says Arrian, the younger Cyrus had encamped, previously to crossing the mountains. Immediately he resolved to lead himself a body to dispossess them. With the light troops of his army, and a small select body of heavy-armed, he marched in the evening, with the view to surprise the Persians at day-break. But here

SECT.  
I.

---

OI. 111. 4.  
B. C. 333.

again his good fortune was conspicuous. He failed, says Arrian, in his purpose of surprise; for the Persian troops, having intelligence of his approach, were so impressed with the idea that his valour and fortune were irresistible, that they withdrew and left him free passage. The historian's following narrative however shows that there might be other cause than mere panic for their retreat. In some parts of Cilicia revolt was ready; and, unless the Persian commander could have time to collect provisions, which might enable him to subsist in his post, should the Cilicians blockade him on one side, and the Greeks attack on the other, his situation would be hopeless. On the following day Alexander's whole army without interruption reached the champaign Cilicia. There intelligence met him, that the measures of Arsames, the king of Persia's commander in chief in Cilicia, before calculated only for resistance, now on the contrary indicated the purpose of hasty retreat; and that the citizens of Tarsus, the capital, were in consequence vehemently fearful that he would first plunder the place. Alexander, allowing himself no rest, hastened with his cavalry and light infantry to prevent this, and succeeded. The Persian forces withdrew, leaving the city uninjured. But the consequence of the exertion to Alexander was a violent fever. His general Aristobulus, in his narrative, ascribed this to simple fatigue; possibly reckoning it unimportant to add what others have related, perhaps not without some foundation. Arriving, they say, greatly heated, and admiring the clearness of the river Cydnus, which flows through the town, he was informed it was celebrated for its coolness in the summer heats, coming, in rapid course, from snow-topped mountains; and the extreme fervour of a Cilician



summer, in the lowlands near the coast, would be the more felt through the quick change, in his hasty march, from the frozen air of the highlands. Thoughtless of consequences, as the fancy of the moment impelled, he stripped; and, plunging in, amused himself sometime with swimming. Very soon he was seized with violent illness, insomuch that his life was despaired of by all but his favourite physician, Philip, an Acarnanian. In this crisis a letter came from Parmenio, advising him to beware of Philip, who, it was reported, had been bribed by Darius to poison him. Philip was handing him a draught when the note was brought, which Alexander, after reading, delivered to the physician; and, observing his countenance undisturbed by it, confidently drank the potion. Philip calmly assured him that he was justly without alarm on account of what the note indicated, or on any other account; he would be shortly well: and the physician's knowledge was proved, as well as his honesty, by the king's rapid recovery.

Cilicia was a country, from various circumstances, of great importance to the contending powers: it was narrow, but, with a great length of seacoast, abounding with harbours; the soil, in large part, was highly fruitful; the inland boundary was of mountains hardly practicable for an army; the situation was critical against Syria by land, and between Greece and Phenicia by sea; and it afforded the best and almost only passes, easily practicable for an army, between the Greater and the Lesser Asia. For Alexander it was most important to secure the possession of this country, whether his purpose were farther conquest, or merely the maintenance of that already made. Cilicia was divided by nature into the Plain or Champaign, eastward, and the moun-

CHAP.  
XLVIII.

Ch. 23. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

tainous, called the Rugged Cilicia, westward. The Plain Cilicia had usually acknowledged the dominion of a prince, as we have formerly seen in the time of the younger Cyrus, bearing the title of king of Cilicia, but owing fealty to the king of Persia, or, in his Grecian title, the Great King. The Rugged Cilicia was divided among clans, under chiefs, asserting independency, and warring with all their neighbours; as in the other mountainous parts of Lesser Asia. Along all the coast, at intervals, Grecian settlements had been established; a circumstance affording great advantage for Alexander; for among them, unless where, through the divisions of the Greeks among themselves, some strong political interest or prejudice interfered, the people would receive him and his army as fellow-countrymen. But, as in Greece itself, so in all its colonies, opposition of political interest and prejudice was apt to arise and be violent. The Cilician colonies moreover, habituated to the Persian supremacy, had flourished under it. Intelligence therefore of the king of Persia's great preparations, and near approach with a numberless army, to vindicate that supremacy, could not be without effect: for those in maritime situations, and for all who depended on commerce, the clear superiority of the Persian marine offered matter of most serious consideration; and moreover the people of the Rugged Cilicia, like the highlanders of the rest of Asia, would be adverse to any change that might bring restraint upon their inveterate habit of living upon their neighbours' goods.

With these circumstances before him, the first object for Alexander was to secure the pass into Syria; whether to prevent the enemy from entering, or to have means for carrying war without. Par-

menio therefore was sent thither, with the greater part of the heavy-armed foot. Alexander, as soon as his state of health would permit, chose for himself, as he was wont, the more active service ; proceeding to complete the reduction of the large portion of Cilicia westward of Tarsus ; where, even of the plain country and among the Grecian colonies, much remained to be brought to regular obedience.

For this expedition he took only a small chosen body of the phalanx, but all his light troops. In the first day's march he reached Anchialus, a town said to have been founded by the king of Assyria, Sardanapalus. The fortifications, in their magnitude and extent, still in Arrian's time, bore the character of greatness, which the Assyrians appear singularly to have affected in works of the kind. A monument representing Sardanapalus was found there, warranted by an inscription in Assyrian characters, of course in the old Assyrian language, which the Greeks, whether well or ill, interpreted thus : ‘ Sardanapalus son of Anacyndaraxes in one day founded Anchialus and Tarsus. Eat, drink, play : all other human joys are not worth a fillip.’ Supposing this version nearly exact, for Arrian says it was not quite so, whether the purpose has not been to invite to civil order a people disposed to turbulence, rather than to recommend immoderate luxury, may perhaps reasonably be questioned. What indeed could be the object of a king of Assyria in founding such towns in a country so distant from his capital, and so divided from it by an immense extent of sandy deserts and lofty mountains, and, still more, how the inhabitants could be at once in circumstances to abandon themselves to the intemperate joys which their prince has been supposed to have recommended,



CHAP.  
XLVIII.

---

is not obvious. But it may deserve observation that, in that line of coast, the southern of Lesser Asia, ruins of cities, evidently of an age after Alexander, yet barely named in history, at this day astonish the adventurous traveller by their magnificence and elegance, amid the desolation, which, under a singularly barbarian government, has for so many centuries been daily spreading in the finest countries of the globe. Whether more from soil and climate, or from opportunities for commerce, extraordinary means must have been found for communities to flourish there; whence it may seem that the measures of Sardanapalus were directed by juster views than have been commonly ascribed to him. But that monarch having been the last of a dynasty, ended by a revolution, obloquy on his memory would follow of course from the policy of his successors and their partisans.<sup>1</sup>

Alexander, proceeding from Anchialus still westward, came to Soli, whose leading inhabitants had manifested a disposition to the Persian cause. Requiring of them therefore a contribution of two hundred talents, about forty thousand pounds, he placed a garrison there. Thence, with a force adapted to the service, he went on to the highlands of the Rugged Cilicia; and in seven days, some by force, some by treaty, he brought all to acknowledge his sovereignty. Returning then to Soli, the grateful intelligence met him, that his generals Ptolemy and Asander, whom he had left to oppose the Persian force remaining in Caria, had been completely successful: that Orontobates, the Persian commander

<sup>1</sup> The inconsistency of traditions concerning Sardanapalus is striking in Diodorus's account of him.



in chief there, had been defeated in battle, with considerable loss : that the castle of Halicarnassus presently after surrendered to his forces ; and that the towns of Myndus, Caunus, Thera, Callipolis, and Triopium, together with the island of Cos, had then desired the conqueror's acceptance of their allegiance.

Alexander seems to have profited from all circumstances; as a diligent, able, and liberal politician. To circulate, in these distant parts, on the verge of the Greater Asia, the news of the successes of his generals on the shores of the Grecian seas, for encouragement to the friendly and intimidation to the adverse, he celebrated, at Soli, what seems to have been a repetition nearly of the Macedonian Olympic festival. Difference appears only in the principal object of religious ceremony. Æsculapius being the favourite deity, worshipped as protector of the place, to him the magnificent sacrifice was dedicated, the whole army joining in the procession. Athletic exercises and theatrical exhibitions, as in the Macedonian Olympic, followed. These ended, his policy was directed to attach the Solian multitude to his interest. Attributing the adverse measures of their government, and the demonstrated attachment to Persia, to the influence of their principal men, he granted them a democratical constitution. Thus apparently he provided that, without a garrison, which he could ill spare from his army, the place should be held in his allegiance. He proceeded then to Magarsus, where he offered a magnificent sacrifice to Minerva, and the historian mentions no other transaction. This however was probably not without a political purpose and corresponding effect: a pleasant remembrance of a plentiful and joyous feast would remain among the people. Mallus, a colony from

CHAP.  
XLVIII.

---

Argos, the next city in his course, required other attention. Civil dissension was violent there. His claim, for himself and all Macedonians, to be of Argive origin, afforded advantageous opportunity for offering to mediate between the parties. Accordingly he succeeded in composing their differences, and then earned the gratitude of all, by granting to the Mallian state immunity from the tribute assessed on it by the Persian government. Religious ceremony in honour of Amphiloachus, a favourite hero of the Mallians, his army attending, as a flattering compliment, assisted to fix their attachment.

While Alexander thus ably took measures for cementing his acquired sovereignty of Lesser Asia with his old dominion, the king of Persia, Darius, had been also diligent in measures for recovering what he had lost ; and his means were powerful. The encouragement for Greeks of eminence, driven from their country, or dissatisfied with it, to seek refuge in the Persian empire, we have formerly had occasion to observe. Several from the republics, and some from Macedonia, were at this time attending the Persian court. The value then of troops trained in the Grecian discipline, and the urgent need of them, if only for opposing the Greeks of the numerous settlements on the extensive seacoast of the Persian empire, had now been so long and so variously experienced, that Grecian mercenaries were become as regular a part of the military establishment of that empire as, in the service of France, the Swiss and Irish regiments, and in that of Holland the Scottish : no satrap of the provinces bordering on the Mediterranean seems to have been latterly without them. When, after Memnon's death, the Grecian troops of his armament were ordered to Asia, other Grecian troops in the Persian service seem

to have been called, from all parts, to strengthen the army under the king's immediate command. Our copies of Diodorus make their collected numbers a hundred thousand. Arrian reports them thirty thousand; which seems not beyond probability. He mentions also what indicates farther the sense entertained, by the Persian government, of the expediency of improving the composition of their Asiatic force, by arming and training a portion of it, in the Grecian manner, for close fight.<sup>2</sup> A body of sixty thousand was so trained: he calls them Cardacs; possibly because the Cardacs, or Cardoos, whom Xenophon describes as among the most warlike of the northern people of the Persian empire, were numerous among them. Trained in the Grecian discipline, they had their station in the line with the Greeks in the Persian service. Of the rest of the infantry, some would be middle-armed, but the greater part light-armed, and formidable only in desultory action. But the cavalry, as usual in Persian armies, formed the principal strength of that under Darius. Arrian has not undertaken to state the number; which however of course would be great, and their kind the best that the empire could furnish. Uncertain of the amount of cavalry, the amount of infantry would be less to be ascertained. In the time of Xerxes we have seen

Arr. 1. 2.  
c. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Ὀπλιῖται δὲ ἦσαν καὶ οὗτοι. Arr. 1. 2. c. 8. This phrase completely indicates that those spoken of were armed and trained for close fight, in the Grecian manner, or nearly so. The name, and some circumstances of character, combine to mark the Cardacs of Arrian for the same people with the Cardoos or Cardooks, described by Xenophon; who indeed mentions nothing of their having either arms or discipline for close fight, yet possibly they might be chosen as the readiest among the Asiatics to adopt the novelty. Xen. Anab. 1. 3. c. 5. & ch. 23. s. 4. of this Hist.



CHAP.  
XLVIII.

---

the method of numbering the infantry of a Persian army, as described by Herodotus, grossly defective. Possibly there may have been improvement since, though through all ages changes of custom have been little common in Asia. But when it is considered that the most exact and informed historians, Thucydides and Xenophon, rarely answer for the amount of light-armed, even of the small numbers of a Grecian army, it may be imagined how far credit should be given, even to Persian calculations, if any remained, of Persian multitudes, though it may reasonably be believed they were very great. Arrian himself therefore must be understood as stating only loose report, when he says that the whole number of fighting men assembled under Darius was six hundred thousand.

But if only his Grecian troops were thirty thousand, they were a body such as no Persian king before him had ever commanded. Less than thirteen thousand had formed the main strength of the younger Cyrus's army. Ochus had perhaps a greater number in Egypt. The force however under Darius, though his army may have been formerly outnumbered, seems to have exceeded, in effectual strength, any of which ancient history speaks.

But, according to the general custom of the East, multitudes attended the march of Darius who would not add to his army's strength. His wife, his children, his mother, were inmates of his camp; and oriental custom seems to have required licence for such indulgence to every officer, and even to every soldier; so that, with the train of the great for ostentation, and of the inferior for gratification, added to the necessary followers of a camp, the unarmed of a Persian army very greatly exceeded in number the fighting



men. The inconvenience and even weakness unavoidably resulting are obvious.

SECT.  
I.

---

Grecian troops to oppose to Grecian troops were however not the only advantage that Darius derived from Greece. He had opportunity to profit also from Grecian counsellors. In former times we have seen the generous policy of the Persian court, not only affording protection to eminent men driven from the Grecian republics, but raising them to high consideration in the Persian empire, and perpetuating the advantage for their families. Nor was the beneficial patronage limited to those eminent enough to be recorded by name in history, as the Spartan king Demaratus, the illustrious Athenians Themistocles and Conon, the Eubœan Gongylus, and others. From the time of the first Darius, a Greek physician seems to have been of the regular establishment of the Persian court. Since Memnon's death we have observed a son of Mentor, his brother, high in military command. Of other Greeks received with distinction, those remaining described were Amyntas son of Antiochus, and Alexander son of Aeropus, of the royal family of Macedonia; Aristomedes, a Thessalian of Pheræ; Bianor, an Acarnanian; and more esteemed, or, through his talents and activity and the estimation of his employers, more prominent than any, an Athenian, Charidemus; whom concurring indications mark for that friend of Demosthenes who sent from the Macedonian court the early information of Philip's death, of which we have observed the great orator making an extraordinary use. A friend of Demosthenes, according to all accounts, would be likely to be well received at the Persian court; and talents seconding an advantageous introduction, Charidemus is said to have been admitted, not only to much com-

Ch. 7. s. 3.  
Ch. 11. s. 4.  
Ch. 24. s. 1.  
Ch. 28. s. 9.  
of this Hist.

Ch. 42. s. 7.  
of this Hist.

Diod. 1. 17.  
c. 30.

Plut. v.  
Alex.

munication with the Persian ministers, but even to council with the king.<sup>3</sup>

The advantage of a party within Greece, recently most threatening to Alexander, had been greatly lessened by Memnon's death.<sup>4</sup> Hopes were checked by the loss of his approved talents, and zeal would be damped by the substitution of a Persian instead of a Grecian commander in chief. But, among the various springs of Grecian politics, one formerly of great power, but latterly inert, was gaining new energy. The Lacedæmonian constitution, as we have remarked Aristotle observing, was formed for war, and wholly unqualified for peace. As if then purposely to provide against what a love of ease

Ch. 35. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus, according to the extant copies of his work, says Charidemus had been in high favour with Philip king of Macedonia, both as a meritorious military officer in his service, and as a confidential cabinet counsellor, if not even prime minister. The discordancy of this with testimonies of Arrian, Plutarch, and Dinarchus has been justly noticed by Wesseling. But we have seen a Charidemus, and probably the same, about twenty-two years before, eminent in command under Iphicrates, and trusted for important business by him. Whether then, where Diodorus may have written ἸΦΙΚΡΑΤΕΙ, the transcribers, from some blotted or worn copy, or obsolete form of letters, may have given at a guess, ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟΥ ΤΩ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙ, or whether the historian's simplicity may have been misled by some ingenious writer of the party of Demosthenes into a notion utterly repugnant to all indications from other authors, and without support from anything besides related by himself, or what else may be supposed, I must leave to those who may have inclination and leisure for the inquiry. Charidemus was certainly a man so eminent that it were desirable to have fuller and clearer information about him.

<sup>4</sup> Diodorus has noticed the relief which Memnon's death afforded to Alexander in strong terms, probably after some writer of Alexander's age: Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ . . . πυνθανόμενος . . . τὸν Μέμνονα . . . μέλλοντα στρατεύειν ἐπὶ Μακεδονίαν . . . οὐ μετρίως ἠγωνία. Ὡς δ' ἤκόν τινες ἀπαγγέλλοντες τὴν τοῦ Μέμνονος τελευτήν, ἀπελύθη τῆς πολλῆς ἀγωνίας. Diod. l. 17. c. 31.

might lead to, its kings, at home really subjects, were, in the command of armies abroad, really kings; so that stimulation was especially strong for them to desire perpetual war. Lacedæmon had now a young king of a temper to second and stimulate the characteristic propensity of the constitution, and to be eager for the advantages of a state of war for himself. Many circumstances contributed at this time to favour his purpose. The death of Memnon, greatly darkening the prospect of final success for the anti-Macedonian party throughout Greece, made an opening for Agis, of a kind to allure an ambitious mind. Memnon, while he lived, would, from the great means he commanded, necessarily be looked to as the Grecian head of that party. But a Persian succeeding to the command of the principal force employed in the cause, a king of Lacedæmon might well look to superiority over all others of the Grecian part of the confederacy. The Lacedæmonian people, at the same time, would feel that no ray of the glories of the Granicus was theirs; that victory, and every following success of Alexander, would only enhance any prior aversion to accede to the common confederacy of Greece under his presidency. Alexander then being at the farther end of Lesser Asia, Darius moving against him with an army, the Greeks of which alone were said to be nearly equal in number to the whole force under Alexander, and the Persian fleet completely commanding the Grecian sea, such a concurrence of circumstances was powerfully inviting for Lacedæmon to attempt the recovery of her old pre-eminence in Greece. In several of the Peloponnesian republics, a powerful, in some an overbearing party favoured the view. Athens was nearly divided; none there indeed were willing to promote



CHAP.  
XLVIII.

ARR. 1. 2.  
c. 15.

the power of Lacedæmon, but the party adverse to the Macedonian supremacy was so strong, or so daring, that an Athenian agent, whether constitutionally appointed, or accredited only by the party, (for we are assured by Demosthenes that he did not scruple himself to give example of irregularity so adverse to all principle of good government,) attended the Persian court, together with a Lacedæmonian minister, in all its motions.

Ch. 27. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

Such, as nearly as may be gathered, was the state of things, when Agis, whether more stimulated by selfish ambition, or by that narrow patriotism which we have seen the most ordinary Grecian political virtue, or by any nobler view, active however and daring, went with a single trireme on a mission from his government (for such an office we have formerly observed even his great predecessor Agesilaus undertaking) to the commanders of the Persian fleet, Pharnabazus and Autophradates. What treaty was concluded, or what arrangements were settled, Arrian, who does not commonly venture to relate after deficient authorities, has not said; but events demonstrated a close ensuing connexion and co-operation between the Persian commanders and the Lacedæmonian government.

Meanwhile Darius, having led his immense army across the extensive plain of Syria, had taken a station near the town of Sochi, near its western extremity, about two days' march from that pass of the mountains, bounding Cilicia eastward, which was called the Syrian Gate; the most practicable for an army of any across those lofty and rugged highlands. There it was to be considered whether to await the bold invader, in expectation that he would venture upon the apparently rash enterprise of issuing from



his present barrier of mountains, to contend, in a country adapted to the action of cavalry, with an army whose cavalry alone perhaps outnumbered him, or rather to advance and force his barrier, and pursue measures against him within it. Darius's Grecian counsellors are said to have advised the former course. They did not doubt, they declared, but Alexander would advance, and hazard war in the plains of Syria; and then, a superior cavalry, with unnumbered troops of missile weapons, might destroy his whole army without ever coming to a pitched battle. But the Persian advisers, it is said, differed nearly as in the consultation previous to the battle of the Granicus, and for similar reasons. Desirable indeed it might have been to follow the course recommended by the Greeks, had circumstances been favourable. But long rest could not suit an army of the numbers and composition of that under Darius. To subsist it would be difficult; to maintain confidence and zeal in long inaction, impossible; nor, it was reckoned, could it become the monarch of the Persian empire, at the head of so great a force, to wait for attack, when an invader, with numbers so inferior, was in possession of so many of his provinces. Darius however, whether conceding to the Greeks, or using his own judgment; waited some time on his ground.

Alexander was yet at Mallus when information arrived that Darius had crossed Syria and was encamped near Sochi. For him then, hardly less than for his antagonist, the measures most advisable were not of easy decision: in a country fruitful but narrow; enclosed between the sea and ranges of lofty mountains, with few passes readily practicable for an army; the sea completely at the enemy's com-

Arr. 1. 2. \*  
c. 6.

mand; the people, even those of Grecian origin, variously disposed; principally deriving political principle from party-interests, and that party-spirit which would arise out of ancient quarrels among themselves; while, with regard to those who were contending for empire, the Greeks as well as others were mostly ready to join the stronger. It is with probability said that information of the near approach of Darius, with overbearing numbers, marking both his disposition and ability to vindicate the dignity and integrity of the Persian empire, made extensive and powerful impression in the provinces which had submitted to Alexander, and especially in Cilicia. Altogether perhaps Alexander could as little rest inactive as the Persian king; insomuch that it might be a question for his council, whether the best measure for defending the great dominion acquired were not to seek the enemy beyond it.

This however Alexander's bold and active temper resolved upon. Sounding the disposition of his army, and finding it to his wish, he proceeded to Issus, passed the strait near Myriandrus, and encamped on the Syrian side. Historians say, even Arrian in some degree concurring, that his purpose was to attack the immense army of Darius, wherever he might find it: and probably enough this may have been given out, though the measures really concerted with the able officers about him may never have come to public knowledge. Such however appears to have been the necessity of his circumstances that, when the Greek refugees at the Persian court undertook to assert that he would seek Darius, they may probably have gone farther, and said, not without reason, he must do so, or evacuate Cilicia, and perhaps retire to

the Greek settlements at the farther end of Lesser Asia.

SECT.  
I.

But Alexander's detention by illness at Tarsus, and then by the expediency of composing civil differences and ensuring regular government in a country situated so critically as Cilicia was, disappointed Darius's Grecian advisers, who had expected his earlier advance. The Athenian Charidemus, arrogant and presumptuous, of an intriguing disposition, making himself obnoxious to many, perhaps to Greeks not less than to Persians, with integrity at best doubtful, formerly a spy at the Macedonian court, became suspected at the Persian. Occasion thus being taken, more immediately from insolence, it is said, in urging advice to the king himself, he was arrested, and, in the summary manner of oriental judicature, condemned and executed.<sup>5</sup>

ARR. 1. 2.  
c. 4.

Darius then resolved no longer to check the impatience of his army; and the ensuing measures appear, neither in design nor in execution, those of men incapable of forming and conducting great military movements. The Syrian gate, another Thermopylæ,

<sup>5</sup> This seems what may with most certainty be gathered from Diodorus's tale, who has undertaken to relate minutely what passed in a Persian cabinet council, with the king present; the credit due to which the judicious reader will estimate. Perhaps it may rather reasonably be doubted whether either the manner or the cause of Charidemus's death were known to any from whom Diodorus could derive the report.

It is indeed to be regretted that all information concerning the residence of this eminent person at the Persian court, and his catastrophe, depends upon such writers as Diodorus and Curtius; who, so far from Arrian's scruple to choose among reports of what the Grecian prince did in public, have not feared to relate, without any reserve, in the manner of romance writers, what the Persian prince did and said in his cabinet council, and even what he thought afterward, in his closet or his bed.



CHAP.  
XLVIII.

being in the enemy's possession, it was not proposed there to force a passage. Farther inland was a way, called, from the neighbouring town of Amanus, the Amanic gate; difficult, but not impracticable, even for carriages, when hands enough, under able direction, might be commanded to improve it. It was found wholly unguarded, so that the Persian advanced body reached Issus unopposed. There some Macedonian sick and wounded had been left, whom, with wanton barbarity, they put to death. Arrian has not scrupled to say this was ordered by Darius; which yet may reasonably be doubted. If Arrian has made himself at all obnoxious to the imputation of partial or hazardous assertion, it is for what relates to the conduct and character of Darius. And here it may be observed, that what orders Alexander gave he might know from the Macedonian generals, his usual guides; but what were those to be properly attributed to Darius would not be equally open to his knowledge or theirs. Among testimonies, from ancient writers, favourable to that prince's character, those to his mildness and generosity are large, and, if any concerning a Persian monarch, they seem entitled to credit. The massacre, from all we know of oriental warfare, appears probable enough; not however commanded by any, but resulting from the ferocity common among disorderly troops, and especially orientals.<sup>6</sup>

Arr. 1. 2.  
c. 7.

Q. Curt.  
1. 3. c. 8.  
s. 5.

<sup>6</sup> Curtius, giving a very different character of Darius, who, he says, was 'sanctus et mitis,' also relates the story with some difference. The unfortunate sick and wounded found at Issus were, according to him, not immediately put to death, but, 'instinctu purpuratorum, barbarâ feritate sævientium,' their hands were cut off, and with the stumps seared they were led round the camp, and then sent to Alexander to report to him

1. 3. c. 8.  
s. 14. 15.



This movement of the Persian army was so utterly beyond the expectation of Alexander and his officers that not only the Amanic gate had been considered as not requiring attention, but, even at the principal pass, the Syrian gate, no guard had been left. On the night after he reached Myriandrus an uncommonly violent storm of wind and rain checked the usual operation of exploring; and the first information that the Persian army was already within the mountains did not readily obtain credit. As far as remaining accounts afford means for judging, the principal deficiency in Darius's measures was the failure to have a fleet, which he might so readily have commanded, to meet him on the coast. Opportunity thus was left open for Alexander, in his actual situation, to observe the Persian army, and gain intelligence by sea, when by land it was prevented. He was not without some attending vessels, of a kind adapted for dispatch; one of which, sent across the bay of Issus, returned soon with information, that a camp, of extent to indicate a very large army, might be distinctly seen, without even approaching the shore.

Arrian's candid narrative shows, against his direct expressions, that this raised serious alarm in Alexander's council. It is indeed obvious that, had the

what a formidable force they had seen. Curtius seems to have had large materials before him, and perhaps the best; and it is therefore to be regretted that he has cared for nothing but to charm his readers with round periods, and theatrical effect of narrative, and to incense them against the 'purpurati' of his own age; which has been the general object of the democratical writers under the Roman empire, in the colour they have given to transactions and characters of former ages.

CHAP.  
XLVIII.

enemy, with both the gates occupied, brought his fleet to co-operate with his army, not only the return into Cilicia, but communication with all the recent conquests, and also with the old country, both by land and sea, would have been shut for Alexander; and his army would have remained without an object but escape from the vast extent of the Syrian and Mesopotamian plains; where, harassed by the enemy's cavalry and bowmen, like the Roman army under Crassus, between two and three centuries after, it might have perished ingloriously, without a battle. But, this having been omitted, the measures, which the crisis required, were, with an instant's deliberation, taken. The army was directed immediately to take refreshment of victuals, and then, by short repose, prepare for marching. But a retrograde movement has a tendency to discouragement, which it was important to obviate; and the evidence of energy, even a masterly energy, in the king of Persia's councils, and of surprise upon Alexander and his able advisers, might enhance the effect. In this crisis Alexander summoned all the commanders of the several bodies of his army. Addressing them he said that 'the step which Darius had taken was precisely that which they might most desire. The worse advice, and not that of the Grecian officers about him, had certainly prevailed; or rather some divine impulse had led him where neither his powerful cavalry, nor his multitude with missile weapons, could act efficaciously, nor even the greatness and splendour of his army could be displayed. The deity seemed thus to have demonstrated his purpose that victory should be theirs, and that the Persian empire should

Arr. 1. 2.  
c. 6. & 7.

‘ pass into their hands.’<sup>7</sup> Zeal for his service, and eagerness to contend for the great rewards proposed, being demonstrated by all, he dispatched a body of horse and bowmen forward to occupy the pass. Following immediately himself with the whole army, he reached the gate about midnight, and found his advanced body in possession of it. No enemy appearing near he allowed rest for the remainder of the night, and at daybreak pursued his way. Fortunately he had time to clear the narrow, and gain ground on which his phalanx might take its regular order, without meeting anything hostile.

While such cares pressed upon Alexander’s youth, with his ambitious projects, enough remains, imperfect as our information of Persian affairs is, to show abounding matters of anxiety for the age of Darius, mature for consideration. From earliest accounts to the present day, an oriental throne has never been exempt from danger ; and what has been transmitted of the circumstances which produced the death of Ochus, and of those following, which led to the elevation of Darius, suffices to indicate that his situation may have been, in distressing amount, precarious. Scarcely otherwise, and not even without something approaching despair, could that have been of which we are amply assured ; that when, on resolving upon the forward movement across the mountains, the great officers, and perhaps all others, were allowed to send their families, for safety, to the

SECT.  
I.

Arr. 1.2.  
c.8.

<sup>7</sup> Arrian has adopted as his own the sentiments which he puts, on this occasion, into Alexander’s mouth, whom the clearest policy would lead to maintain such. But, if Arrian really held them, he must apparently have been led rather by the final event, than by any consideration of the previous circumstances, as he himself has reported them.



CHAP.  
XLVIII.

Ch. 23. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

interior, Darius took his own family, his wife, his daughters, his mother, and his infant son with him, to share the difficulties and dangers of the adventure resolved upon. Whether this was thought necessary toward maintaining confidence among the troops, and engaging them to hold by their king, or the unfortunate monarch doubted where to place his family in safety away from himself, though both considerations may have weighed, a third seems difficult to imagine. The younger Cyrus, if Xenophon may be trusted for the assertion, professed his confidence, not in the military power only, but also in the fidelity of his Grecian troops rather than of his Asiatics; and the Greeks in foreign service, as far as our accounts go, all indeed from Grecian writers, mostly acted so as to maintain that reputation for trustworthiness on which their trade of war rested. Thus Darius may have reckoned his family safest where his Grecian force was to attend him.

## SECTION II.

*Numbers of the contending armies in Cilicia: battle of Issus.*

THE report which Arrian has thought worthy of his notice, that Darius's army was six hundred thousand fighting men, may seem to imply that such were the numbers in Cilicia.<sup>8</sup> Plutarch gives six hundred thousand to the army in Syria, not specifying fighting men; and if he meant to include all the followers of a Persian camp, he may not have exceeded probability. Diodorus confidently says the army in

<sup>8</sup> Ἐλέγετο γὰρ ἡ πᾶσα ξὺν Δαρείῳ στρατιὰ μάλιστα ἐς ἑξήκοντα μυριάδας μαχίμους εἶναι. Arr. l. 2. c. 8.



Cilicia was five hundred thousand. But Arrian has not declared his belief that such a multitude of six hundred thousand fighting men, and their necessary followers, was led by Darius, the hasty march, by a difficult and little-used mountain road, from Syria into Cilicia. Perhaps conjecture of the force, really under him there, may best be drawn from that historian's statement of the several numbers of four particular bodies, combining with it his report of the circumstances of the march and of the following battle. The Grecian mercenaries he reckons, as we have seen, thirty thousand; and no account shows it improbable that a Persian king should have had a Grecian force of that, or even a greater amount, in his pay, or that such a force may have attended Darius into Cilicia. The Cardacs he states at sixty thousand. We have formerly had occasion to notice the loose way of reckoning numbers in the Persian service, used by the Persian generals themselves in the time of Xerxes. If Curtius might be trusted for such a fact, the same rude and most inexact method was used by Darius's generals, for ascertaining the force assembled in the Mesopotamian plain. Of the Greeks in the Persian service regular rolls must have been kept, both by themselves and by Persian officers, to ascertain the pay to be demanded on one hand and issued on the other; and various information concerning them would be circulated in Greece and its colonies, through the occasional communication of individuals in foreign service with their friends at home. But Grecian reports of the numbers of all other troops in the Persian service must have been liable to great uncertainty: of horse however less than of foot; and Arrian states the horse under Darius at thirty thousand. He states

Ch. 7. s. 8.  
of this Hist.

then twenty thousand light-armed infantry employed in one place, while a considerable body of the same arms was employed elsewhere. Those actually enumerated make together a hundred and forty thousand men bearing arms ; a very extraordinary force, it will be allowed, to have made the difficult, rapid, and concealed march, in the concurrent accounts of ancient writers ascribed to it.

Those writers, stating the numbers of the Persian army, probably after reports which, however exaggerated, had currency, have all omitted notice of the force of that under Alexander, which seemingly must have been more within their opportunity to know ; for, though nothing exact concerning it may have been made public, yet ground for calculation, of this comparatively small number of their fellow-countrymen, would be more within the means of Grecian writers than of the Persian multitudes. Even among accounts extant, some grounds are apparent, which, though very defective, may be not wholly undeserving of observation. The force which Alexander led from Europe we have observed to have been stated, by different writers, with a degree of concurrence which vouches for their approach to exactness. The force previously under Parmenio in Asia is not equally indicated. The numbers killed at the Granicus, and in some other actions, we find also stated, probably under the truth : in several, where some must have fallen, the loss is unnoticed. The dismissal of a few, and their return to Greece, is mentioned ; loss by sickness not so. For acquisition of force, the account of recruits joining at Gordium, and of mercenaries passing from the Persian service into the Macedonian, may be reasonably correct. But not a word is found of any gained from the

Asiatic-Grecian cities. Alexander's desire to increase his numbers is evinced by Arrian's assurance of his unlimited commissions for raising recruits in Europe. The army with which Agesilaus acquired renown in Asia was mostly of Asian Greeks; the cavalry wholly so. That Alexander therefore would fail to profit from opportunities open, to him at least equally as to Agesilaus, cannot be likely; and indeed, in a letter from himself to the Persian king, recorded by Arrian, which will occur for future notice, the service in his army of those who had been subjects of the Persian empire is mentioned. The certainty being thus established that he had some such force, the probability will be strengthened, by what will appear in the sequel, that whether of civic troops, or mercenaries, or rather both, from the Æolian and Ionian and Carian cities, the accession had been very considerable; so that, notwithstanding some garrisons had been left behind, it is probable that the army which Alexander led into Syria was considerably more numerous than that with which he had crossed the Hellespont.

Arr. l. 2.  
c. 14.

It was evidently Darius's object to prevent Alexander's return into Cilicia. Disappointed, by his enemy's rapidity, of opportunity to occupy the Syrian gate, he took ground near it, which was considerably advantageous for his purpose. The river Pinarus, issuing from the mountains between the Syrian gate and the Amanic, first in a westerly course, turns then southward to the Mediterranean sea. The channel near the mountains is between high and precipitous cliffs. Toward the sea the banks are lower, and the ground on each side is sufficiently favourable for the action of cavalry. Here, his force sufficing, Darius occupied the whole right bank, from the mountains

c. 10.



CHAP.  
XLVIII.

---

to the shore, so that neither flank could be readily turned. To prevent molestation, while making his disposition, he sent his cavalry, in number thirty thousand, with infantry of missile weapons, twenty thousand, across the river. On the margin of the stream he placed his heavy-armed; the Greeks in the centre, the Cardacs on each flank; so that the left division of these reached the root of the mountains: the nearest heights were occupied by a body of light-armed. Where the bank of the stream afforded less advantage for defence, he raised earthworks. All this was completed without molestation. He then recalled his advanced forces, and, with his cavalry, occupied the right bank from the right flank of his infantry to the sea. Thus advantageously posted for contest, having the champaign Cilicia in his rear, he had the additional most important advantage of commanding all that fruitful country for subsistence. Thus his situation seemed highly promising, while the enemy's was full of difficulty and danger.

It appears indeed, from Arrian's narrative, notwithstanding some adverse declamation, that necessity required, and alone could justify the attack which Alexander presently resolved to make, unless he could provoke the enemy to attack him. Measures were taken with his usual quickness; and, profiting no doubt from his usual able advisers, with great judgment. One advantage the position of the adverse army afforded him: that army held the exterior of the curve formed by the river; the interior was left for him. Thus, along the shorter course, on his side, from the mountains to the sea, he also could extend his line, so that his flanks, equally with the enemy's, were secure. Having then ascertained his



adversary's formation, he placed his Macedonian phalanx over against the Greeks in the Persian service : his republican Greeks he divided on each flank, to oppose the Cardacs and the cavalry. The command of his left wing, occupying the ground next the sea, where cavalry might act advantageously on either side of the stream, and where the formidable charge of the numerous Persian cavalry might be expected, he committed to Parmenio. The immediate command of the right wing he took himself, with the apparently desperate purpose of attempting to force the strong position of the enemy's left ; but still not without hope that the enemy might be imprudent enough to quit that position and attack him.

For the chance of this he waited some time, in order of battle, on the bank of the stream. But the Persians, aware of their advantage, and of his necessity, without showing any disposition to advance, continued their works for still strengthening their ground. That ground however, though naturally strong, was yet not without also a natural disadvantage. There was a kind of bay in the mountain, at whose foot the stream had its course, so that to defend the left bank, their line was necessarily curved inward, with its rear toward those heights which they had occupied with troops of missile weapons. Nevertheless, with the advantage of the ground and the measures taken, reckoning their left secure, they resolved there to await attack, should the enemy venture to make it, while drawing nearly all their cavalry to their right, and confident in the skill and valour of that force, as well as in the great superiority of its numbers, they would be themselves there the assailants. As at the battle of the Granicus, so still more here, under their sovereign's eye, the first no-

Arr. l. 2.  
c. 10.

bility of Persia would be eager to distinguish themselves; not without reasonable hope, and even confidence, that they could overbear the enemy's cavalry, and, then proceeding to the flank and rear of his infantry, which would be opposed in front by the Persian-Greek phalanx, so formidably posted, they might annihilate his army.

Alexander, apparently meaning to draw the pressure of action as much as possible toward the mountains, had taken his Thessalian as well as Macedonian horse to his right, giving to his left only the republican Greek. This however, probably, would be a powerful body, strengthened since his arrival in Asia, from the Asiatic cities. But, the assembling of the Persian horse being observed, and its direction indicating the enemy's purpose to attack with his right, Alexander detached the Thessalian horse and some chosen foot to re-enforce Parmenio. No time was then to be lost for his attack resolved upon against their left. Accordingly he detached his middle and light-armed, mostly highlanders, the former, especially, eminent among troops of their kind, to drive the Persians from the heights. This was quickly effected; and they occupying those very heights, the Persian heavy-armed on the river's brink were open to their missile weapons in flank and rear. The attention of that formidable body being thus drawn to an enemy whose blows they could not return, Alexander seized the moment for leading his phalanx of republican Greeks across the stream, and up the opposite bank, to attack in front.

Arrian describes this part of the Persian line as composed of those Asiatics whom he calls Cardacs, to the number of thirty thousand, armed and trained for close action in the manner of the Grecian phalanx.

It is however unlikely that, in discipline of the soldiers, and, still more, that in skill of the officers, this body was equal to the Greeks, whether of the Macedonian or the Persian army. Alexander, with his phalanx of republican Greeks, quickly put them to flight.

Arr. 1. 2.  
c. 10.

The Macedonian phalanx seems to have waited this event as the prescribed signal for proceeding on the hazardous, and otherwise apparently almost hopeless, enterprise upon the strong position of the Persian Greeks; a body mostly trained under the deceased Memnon, and commanded by officers appointed or approved by him. These men, says Arrian, solicitous, though in a foreign service, to show themselves worthy of the ancient fame of their nation, as the Macedonians were to maintain their new renown, the contest was very severe. The Macedonians, it appears, though our accounts come from Macedonians, suffered heavily.

Ibid.

One general and a hundred and twenty-five officers of inferior rank were killed. But Alexander's first bold measure proved the key of victory. On the flight of the enemy's left, the Greeks of the confederacy occupying its ground, he was on the flank of the Persian Greeks. The Macedonians, before severely pressed, thus found relief, of which they made such use that the Persian Greeks were nearly all put to the sword.

Meanwhile Darius, scrupulous to observe the ancient customs of his nation, had taken post, conspicuous in his chariot with four horses abreast, in the centre of his army, and thus necessarily near his Grecian troops. This impolitic, however well-meant and bold exhibition of himself, marked for the enemy whither their efforts should especially be directed. Attack is said to have been so pressed upon him that his horses, wounded, became ungovernable; and the

c. 8. & 11.

Diod. 1. 17.  
c. 34.



Arr. 1.2.  
c. 12.  
Plut. v.  
Alex.  
p. 669.

heaps of dead bodies and arms in their way so impeded and alarmed them that he might have been carried into the enemy's ranks, but for the gallant exertion of his brother Oxathres, who, at the head of a body of horse, charged the enemy so vigorously as to give opportunity for the ready and zealous servants of the household to bring up another chariot, into which the king removed.<sup>9</sup> Alexander received a wound, according to one Grecian author, from Darius; but Plutarch observes that Alexander's letter to Antipater, in his time extant, describing the battle, and mentioning the wound, says not from what hand it came; and, according to Arrian's account of the order and progress of the battle, the Persian Greeks had been thrown into confusion by the complicated attack upon them, before Alexander could approach Darius. The Cardacs of the right wing, new in the discipline of the heavy-armed, when the Greeks, who were to be their example, were overborne, appear to have made no stand. For Darius himself then, his left having fled from the field, his centre being completely overborne, retreat was no longer avoidable.

But the cavalry of the Persian right was yet maintaining obstinate contest with the Macedonian left. Had Alexander's success, in his daring, yet well-concerted and well-conducted, enterprise against the Persian left, been less rapid and less complete, there is much appearance in Arrian's account, that, through the overbearing power of the Persian horse against his left, Parmenio's abilities, and all the valour of the

<sup>9</sup> For anecdotes of this kind, accounts of battles by Diodorus and Plutarch may sometimes have some value. Indeed Plutarch's life of Alexander, notwithstanding much mixture of romance with history, for his frequent reference to authorities, deserves attention.



troops he commanded, might have been unavailing: that wing being compelled to retreat, the Persian horse would have gained the rear of his right, and his whole army might have been destroyed. As things were, all the skill of Parmenio, and all the excellence of the Thessalian cavalry, appear to have been necessary to keep the battle balanced. But when the rout of the rest of their army was complete, and the king had retired, then the Persian horse began to retrograde.

Arr. l. 2.  
c. 11.  
[B. C. 333.  
Cl.]

No accounts remaining from Persian writers, or from any friend of the Persian cause or name, historical justice will require liberal consideration for all indications in favour of the conduct and character of Darius against the imputation of Grecian writers, but especially against imputation of what they were unlikely to know by any certain or authentic information. Arrian, not noticing the action about the king of Persia's chariot, or the bold and successful exertion of Oxathres, (probably unnoticed by the Macedonian generals whose narrative he followed, yet indicated by Diodorus to have had credit among the Greeks,) has attributed to Darius an early and cowardly flight. But against this aspersion his own candid narrative affords strong testimony. He relates that Darius retreated, still conspicuous, in his chariot; and, not till the way became impracticable for wheels, took to his horse. This was a matter open to wide observation; and it powerfully shows that his purpose was not concealment, or rapid flight, or anything like desertion of his duty to his army and station. What we have observed farther related by Diodorus was of a kind also necessarily open to the observation of many: Darius, in the heat of action, in great personal danger, and in circumstances which might perhaps have

Arr. l. 2.  
c. 11.

Diod. l. 17.  
c. 34.

CHAP.  
XLVIII.

---

justified, in most eyes, his quitting a chariot for a horse, nevertheless would not so condescend, but, when under necessity of abandoning one chariot, mounted another, offering himself still as the conspicuous object of the enemy's efforts. The Persian custom indeed so required, insomuch that on it his hope of success in no small degree depended. Accordingly his disappearing at length from the field was, in Arrian's account, as a signal for the Persian cavalry of his right, hitherto maintaining an equal or perhaps advantageous contest, to retreat. It seems however clear that, when the left and centre of his army were put to flight, retreat would be absolutely necessary for the cavalry of its right, even if victorious; for otherwise, presently inclosed by the conquering part of the enemy's line, between the mountains and the sea, and there overborne by the force and discipline of the phalanx, it might have been wholly destroyed. But even the Macedonian generals present, from whom Arrian had his information, may have little known what orders passed from Darius to that cavalry, or, having heard, they may have been careless of reporting. This however seems evident, that, when all the rest of his line was defeated, Darius could look to that cavalry alone for protection of his camp; and, if any credit may be due to the account given by Diodorus of action about his person, so close that his horses were wounded, and of the gallant exertion of his brother Oxathres with a body of cavalry which extricated him, (which is no way adverse to Arrian's detail of the circumstances of the battle,) it may seem most probable that it was in an endeavour, with the cavalry, recalled from successful or at worst doubtful action with Alexander's left, to save the camp that this happened. But all

Asiatic history shows that to make an orderly retreat was hardly in idea with Asiatic armies. Even the able Memnon seems to have been unable to maintain any regularity in retiring from the Granicus. Hence the greater credit is due to Darius for the fact, among the best attested of the battle of Issus, that, amid all the confusion and dangers of the flight, he kept his chariot, offering himself conspicuously as the object equally of assault for the enemy, as of encouragement for his own troops: evidence, equal to almost any in ancient history to such a matter, against all the malicious or wanton obloquy of some ancient, and more modern, writers, that, with his mind firm, he was attentive to the duties and dignity of his station.

All Asiatic history then farther shows, that to the great men about him, his principal counsellors and officers, his particular preservation would be of the utmost importance. On his death great commotion throughout the provinces of the empire could not fail: a revolution, ending their eminence, depriving them of property, and leaving hope of safety for their lives only in flight, would be probable consequences.<sup>10</sup> How far then, in an Asiatic army defeated, he could command the course of others, or even his own, no remaining information will warrant us to say, or hardly even to conjecture. But looking to what remains of Persian history, and considering with it the character, to this day, of eastern governments, it may appear probable, that, when his exertions to protect his camp failed, his hope of having a place of refuge for his family, if, by any happy turn, they could ever again

<sup>10</sup> Thus, on a following occasion, Curtius has well observed: *'Amisso rege, nec volebant salvi esse, nec poterant.'* l. 4. c. 15.



CHAP.  
XLVIII.

join him, depended on his outstripping, in flight, even rumour of his defeat. Mounting therefore his horse, he pressed forward through the highlands, and then hastened toward his capital, to meet there the dangers of his circumstances; which, with every best exertion on his part, so all accounts of the Persian empire show, would from his own subjects be highly threatening.

Arrian affords no reason to suppose that the two kings were ever very near one another in the action. On the contrary, he says Darius was considerably advanced in retreat, probably toward his own camp, before Alexander, attentive to the circumstances of his left wing, with difficulty maintaining itself against the Persian cavalry, ventured to pursue. When that cavalry retreated, then he took the command of his own cavalry for the purpose. The object for the fugitives was, by the Amanic pass, to re-enter Syria; the cavalry holding the more level ground, as far as it would serve, the infantry hastening to the shelter of the mountains. Darius's chariot, which he had quitted, slow among the difficulties of a mountain road, was overtaken, and in it were found his shield, bow, and cloak. Night was approaching; and, no probability appearing that he could himself be overtaken, Alexander gave over pursuit. Returning to the Persian camp, and finding his troops in quiet possession of it, he went to the royal tent, which had been put in complete order for the defeated monarch's lodging. While looking around, he heard the shrieks of women near. On this he sent Leonnatus, one of his principal officers, to inquire the cause; who presently returned with information that the queen of Persia was in a neighbouring tent, with her two daughters, her infant son, and the king's mother;

Arr. l. 2.  
c. 11. 12.



that intelligence had been officiously communicated to them of the capture of the king's chariot, with his shield, bow, and cloak, whence they had been led to conclude, or to fear, that the king himself was killed; and thence arose the loud lamentation which had been heard. Alexander sent immediately information, that, though indeed those spoils had been taken, yet Darius had outstripped pursuit, and was probably safe; adding assurance that the princesses need apprehend nothing for themselves; their treatment should be what became their royal rank; and that even toward Darius he had no personal enmity; their contest was for empire only.

These particulars Arrian has given on the joint authority of Ptolemy and Aristobulus; of whom the former attended Alexander in pursuing Darius. Other writers reported farther, that, on the next day, Alexander visited the princesses, accompanied by his favourite officer Hephæstion. On their entering the apartment together, the king not being pointed out, Sisygambis, the queen mother, in the usual way of adoration to Persian kings, threw herself at Hephæstion's feet. Hephæstion, drawing back, pointed to Alexander, who immediately relieved the aged princess's confusion, by telling her she had made no material mistake, for he to whom she had addressed her devotion was another Alexander. 'This,' says Arrian, 'I relate, neither as ascertained, nor as unfit to be believed; but at any rate I esteem it honourable for Alexander that such speeches, and such manners, have been reckoned warrantably to be attributed to him, as consonant to his character.'

Arr. l. 2.  
c. 11.

All accounts of the battle of Issus make the slaughter very great, and it is remarkable that in

none, of any credit, is there any mention of prisoners.<sup>11</sup> That none were made from the Persian left, first defeated, may be accounted for by the urgency for Alexander immediately to direct his utmost attention to the unbroken part of the Persian line. Combined circumstances make it probable that to the Persian Greeks quarter may have been denied. In Alexander's council it may have been reckoned inexpedient to leave opportunity for such applications, in favour of men taken in arms in a foreign service, against the troops of the general confederacy of the Grecian republics, as that which, at Gordium, had reached him from Athens. Of anything done by the Persian infantry on the right of the Greeks in the Persian service no notice is taken by Arrian; whence it may be inferred that their resistance, through imperfection of discipline, was weak, and their flight decided by the overthrow of the troops next them. The Persian Greeks, as Arrian's account shows, were nearly surrounded: their resistance was considerably destructive to their enemies, especially the Macedonians; but it seems likely that the greater part of themselves fell in the battle. The slain on the Persian side altogether are reckoned by Arrian ten thousand horse and a hundred thousand

<sup>11</sup> A writer so careless of authority as Justin may have reckoned his own computation of forty thousand prisoners a proper appendage to his report of a hundred and ten thousand slain; which, however extravagant, is below Plutarch's, and only ten thousand more than that which Arrian has thought worthy of mention. Prisoners numerous no doubt there would be, slaves and others attending the camp; but the concurrent failure of Diodorus, Plutarch, and Arrian to notice prisoners carrying arms affords strong presumption that few such were made.

foot. Such round statements of numbers, in circumstances not to have them ascertained, must be subject to the reader's discretion for reduction within likelihood. The Macedonian generals might probably have known the number of Greeks lost on the Persian side ; yet not only the mention of the total number has been avoided, but notice of any eminent person among them has been avoided. The survivors, reckoned by Arrian about eight thousand, seem to have been indebted for means of escape to the vigorous action of the Persian cavalry against Alexander's left wing<sup>12</sup>, which compelled him so to re-enforce it from his right that the defeated parts of the enemy's line could at first be pursued only with infantry. Thus the surviving Persian Greeks, under the command of Thymondas son of Mentor, with the Macedonian prince Amyntas, and the Thessalian and Acarnanian officers Aristomedes and Bianor, were enabled to maintain some order in retreat over the mountains into Syria.<sup>13</sup> Five Persian officers of the

<sup>12</sup> Οἱ ἰππεῖς τῶν Περσῶν . . . εὐρώστως ἐνέβαλλον εἰς τὰς ἴλας τῶν Θετταλῶν, καὶ ταύτη ξυνέστη ἵππομαχία κρατερὰ. Arr. l. 2. c. 11.

<sup>13</sup> For the interesting character of many circumstances of this great battle, and the importance of its consequences, I have been desirous to give the fullest and clearest account of it that I could find warrant for. Arrian, following no doubt faithfully as well as ably the accounts of the generals engaged in it, his usual guides, but, in his usual way, abridging much, though generally luminous, is sometimes otherwise ; and indeed, in relating a great and extensive battle, without an attending plan, some deficiency of clear delineation can hardly fail. Always respecting the matter, I have in some parts deviated from the order of his narrative.

Curtius reports (l. 14. c. 1.) that eight thousand Greeks who had been in the Persian service at the battle of Issus, returned to Greece, and were engaged by Agis king of Lacedæmon to act against Macedonia. Agis could little, if at all, entertain mer-



highest rank are said to have been killed ; three of them satraps who had been engaged at the Granicus, and who, though even Grecian accounts give them the praise of valour for their conduct there, nevertheless, through feeling of the disgrace of defeat, may have been led to be prodigal of their lives on this following occasion. The loss on the Macedonian side was severe. It seems to have been proportionally greatest in Alexander's wing. One general, Ptolemy son of Seleucus, and a hundred and twenty others of some distinction fell.<sup>14</sup> But the victory was most complete. Whatever then might be most grateful to the army, console the friends of the slain, and excite the emulation of the living, was Alexander's care. On the day after the battle, while preparation was making for burying the dead, though lame with the wound received from a sword in his thigh, he visited and conversed with all the wounded. The funeral obsequies were then performed with the utmost military pomp, and Alexander himself spoke the oration celebrating the merit of the slain. Rewards to the living followed ; money to some, offices to others, honours to all. Those noticed are Balacrus son of Nicanor, who was appointed to the satrapy of Cilicia ; Menes son of Dionysius, who was made a lord of the body-guard in his room ; Polysperchon son of Simmias, who was raised to the command vacant by the death of Ptolemy son of Seleucus ; and the people of Soli, on whom the contribution of fifty talents, ten thousand pounds sterling, had been im-

Arr. 1. 2.  
c. 13.

cenary troops from the Lacedæmonian treasury ; but the Persian money, of which Freinsheim, not without warrant, speaks, in his supplement to Curtius (l. 6. c. 1. s. 6.), would give him means. Yet probably the number is exaggerated.

<sup>14</sup> Τῶν οὐκ ἡμελημένων Μακεδόνων. Arr. 1. 2. c. 10.



posed : this requisition was remitted, perhaps for the merit of their troops in the battle ; and their hostages were restored, perhaps in consideration of the effect of the victory, whence their defection to the Persians again was supposed no longer to be apprehended.

## SECTION III.

*Consequences of the battle of Issus, in Greece and in Asia : submission of Syria : deputation from Darius to Alexander : Ministers from the adverse party in Greece to the Persian court taken.*

PHARNABAZUS and Autophradates were still at Siphnus with the Persian fleet, and the king of Lacedæmon, Agis, was also still there, endeavouring to stimulate them to pursue Memnon's purpose of invading Macedonia, and supporting the Persian party among the Grecian republics in taking arms against the Macedonian, when intelligence arrived of the events near Issus. Hopes then instantly fell, and in their stead arose the fear of losing the acquisitions made. The disposition of the Chians being especially apprehended, the Persian commanders went thither, with twelve ships of war and fifteen hundred mercenary soldiers. Ten ships, with a subsidy of thirty talents, about six thousand pounds sterling, they committed to Agis. He sent them to his brother Agesilaus, with orders to proceed immediately to Crete, to prevent adverse movements there. With the same object he remained himself among the Cyclad islands : but Autophradates, whether in pursuance of orders from his defeated king, or only aware of the uncertainty of the allegiance of all the maritime states of the Persian empire, any longer than force might

Arr. l. 2.  
c. 13.

control them, sailed for the Asiatic coast. The harbour of the destroyed city of Halicarnassus offering convenience for his fleet, which no maritime strength of the enemy could contest, he put in there, and Agis there joined him.

Meanwhile Alexander, relieved from great perils, which had threatened, at the same time, himself and the army with him abroad, and his dominions at home, could now choose his measures. Perhaps a prince of Philip's mature age, and large experience, having made a conquest such as that already achieved by Alexander, calculating then his probably remaining years, and aware that more would be wanting, with the best talents, to mould such extent of territory and variety of population into one well organised state, and aware also that increase of dominion, beyond a certain extent, does not always bring increase, and still less permanence, of power, might have been disposed to rest on an acquisition possessing such extraordinary advantages for making, with his old dominions, one compact and singularly powerful empire. Not only however such speculation was less inviting for Alexander's years, but opportunities open for securing, by farther successes, the great acquisition made were such, and the means of safely stopping at a given point in a career of conquest so uncertain, that it might be difficult even for prudence to decide that those opportunities should not be used. It would be known, and probably observed in council, that Agesilaus had reckoned more, than had yet been done, necessary to reduce the Persian empire to an extent consistent with the safety of surrounding nations ; and had accordingly proposed, not indeed to conquer for himself or for Lacedæmon, if Xenophon may be credited for his friend's moderation, but to

sever from Persia all her provinces bordering on the Mediterranean sea, and make the great desert her western boundary. Not only then the fact, that all those provinces were not many years ago in revolt, would encourage, but the friendship of some was known to be ready, and from some even invitation came. If Alexander's ambition thus was roused by his successes, that also of many about him might be so: his army was willing, and he resolved still to prosecute conquest.

Returning therefore on his steps into Syria, all was found favourable; the country deserted by the Persian officers, the people ready to obey his commands. Accordingly he appointed Menon son of Cerdimas, with the title of satrap, to the government of that part called by the Greeks Cœlesyria, committing to his orders a competent force of cavalry of his allies, probably the Asiatic Greeks; and he sent a strong body, under Parmenio, to take possession of Damascus, the principal city of all Syria, the depository of the king of Persia's treasure, and the refuge of numbers who had fled before the conqueror. With the rest of his army he proceeded for the Phenician coast.

Arr. 1. 2.  
c. 13.

We have had occasion formerly to observe that Phenicia was divided among republican governments, nearly resembling those of Greece, but perhaps more especially the Grecian states of western Asia; or still rather those of Cyprus; having each a chief, who assumed the title of king; popular powers everywhere large; but all under the control of a Persian satrap. No satrap now however appears to have remained there. The people, or their princes, or both together, had thus been led to choose their party. Alexander, on his march, was met by Straton,

sent by his father, Gerostratus, king or chief of Aradus, whose dominion extended over the northern part of Phenicia, including the large and wealthy seaports of Marathus and Mariamme. Its title came from the small island of Aradus, overagainst Marathus, in which, evidently for security, was the chief's principal residence. Probably negotiation had preceded. The Aradian ships were serving with the Persian fleet; but Gerostratus was ready for a change of sovereignty. What came to general knowledge was, that Gerostratus offered to Alexander that allegiance, for himself and his country, which had before been paid to the king of Persia; in token of which he sent a present of a golden crown, which Straton was allowed to place, in public, on Alexander's head, who then proceeded to Marathus.

Meanwhile Parmenio obtained possession of the city of Damascus, the principal of all Syria, where was found Darius's military chest, with a very large treasure. He had moreover taken four important prisoners; persons commissioned, one from Lacedæmon, one from the anti-Macedonian Athenians, and two from the anti-Macedonian Thebans, to hold communication with the Persian court. These he sent to Alexander.

The unhappy Darius meanwhile had been so far fortunate as to reach his capital in personal safety, and in time to prevent any material commotion. Among the enervated people of the rich provinces of the south political character is hardly discernible in ancient history, farther than that they were, beyond others, contented to live under despotism. The Persian sovereignty was generally unpopular among them, but apparently Darius not personally so. Among the people of the extensive northern



provinces, a military people, where he had been known, and had held command before his accession to the throne, loyalty toward him prevailed. Thus, after all his losses, he was still in possession of great means for maintaining contest. Arrian relates, as a report generally received, and to which he gave credit, that, soon after the battle of Issus, a confidential eunuch, a principal attendant of the captive queen of Persia, Statira, found means, possibly with leave, to go to her unfortunate husband. On first sight of him, Darius hastily asked if his wife and children were living. The eunuch assuring him that not only all were well, but all treated with respect as royal personages, equally as before their captivity, the monarch's apprehension changed. The queen was generally said to be the most beautiful woman of the Persian empire. How, in the usual concealment of the persons of women of rank, throughout the eastern nations, hardly less in ancient than in modern days, this could be known, unless from report of the eunuchs of the palace, Arrian has not said; but his account rather implies that her face had been seen by some of the Grecian officers. Darius's next question however was said to be, 'Was his queen's honour tarnished, either through her own weakness, or by any violence?' The eunuch, protesting with solemn oaths, that she was as pure as when she parted from Darius, and adding, that Alexander was the best and most honourable of men, Darius raised his hands toward heaven and exclaimed: 'O great God! who disposses of the affairs of kings among men, preserve to me the empire of the Persians and Medes, as thou gavest it: but, if it be thy will that I am no longer to be king of Asia, let Alexander, in preference to all others,

Arr. 1.4.  
c. 20.

CHAP.  
XLVIII.

---

‘succeed to my power!’ The historian then adds his own remark, ‘So does honourable conduct win the regard even of enemies.’

This, which Arrian has judged not unworthy of a place in his military history of Alexander, is obviously not like numberless stories of private conversations related by Diodorus and Plutarch, and Curtius and others, what none who were likely to know would be likely to tell; but, on the contrary, what, no way requiring concealment, the eunuch would rather be forward to relate; so that, not improbably, many Greeks, and, among them, some acquainted with his character, and able to estimate his veracity, might have had it from himself. It seems thus altogether not unlikely that the eunuch’s report was among stimulations for Darius to send a deputation to Alexander, which reached him at Marathus. The persons deputed bore a letter from the Persian king, representing that, between Artaxerxes Ochus and Philip there had been friendship and alliance: that, after the accession of Arses, Philip, without provocation from Persia, had begun hostilities, which Alexander, passing into Asia, had prosecuted to the very severe injury of the Persians; whence Darius was impelled to place himself at the head of his army, to protect his subjects, and defend his own inherited rights: that God’s pleasure had disposed of victory, and it now remained for himself to solicit, as a king from a king, the release of his wife and family, and to offer to treat of peace and friendship; for which purpose he proposed that Alexander should send ministers to him with sufficient powers.

Arr. 1. 2.  
c. 14.

Communications of this kind appear to have been always, in regular course, laid by Alexander before

his council. What provoked a reply of a character widely different from that of Alexander's conduct toward the Persian princesses, and even contradicting his reported assurance to them that he had no personal enmity toward Darius, ancient history has not said. Ground for conjecture seems only furnished by the fact of the capture of the Grecian deputies, from whom, or from whose writings seized, information of matters before unknown may have been gained. The answer to the Persian, in the form of a letter from the Macedonian monarch, is given by Arrian confidently thus :

‘ Your predecessors, unprovoked, invaded Macedonia, and the rest of Greece<sup>15</sup> to the great injury of the people. I, elected general of the Greeks, have invaded Asia to revenge, not that ancient aggression only, but also recent wrongs. You supported the Perinthians, who had injured my father. Your predecessor Ochus sent forces into that part of Thrace which is within our dominion. In your own public letters you boasted to all the world of being a patron of the conspiracy which produced the assassination of my father. You yourself, with the eunuch Bagóas, assassinated Arses, and seized the empire, in violation of the law of Persia, and in wrong of the Persian people. Moreover you sent your rescripts to the Greeks, inciting them to war against me, and offering them subsidies to support it ; which the Lacedæmonians alone accepting, all others rejected. Nevertheless your emissaries did not cease their intrigues for corrupting and alienating my friends and allies, and disturbing the peace of Greece, which, through

<sup>15</sup> Μακεδονίαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα. Arr. l. 2. c. 14.



CHAP.  
XLVIII.

---

‘ my endeavours, had been established. On these  
 ‘ accounts I have made war against you, who have  
 ‘ been so the aggressor. Having then overcome in  
 ‘ battle, first your generals and satraps, and then  
 ‘ yourself, and having so, through the favour of the  
 ‘ gods, possessed myself of the country, all your  
 ‘ former subjects and adherents, even those who had  
 ‘ borne arms against me, if they have come to me  
 ‘ for protection, have been received kindly ; and  
 ‘ they have served me in arms, not by compulsion,  
 ‘ but with goodwill. I therefore, as now lord of all  
 ‘ Asia, invite you to come to me. If you have any  
 ‘ apprehension for your safety, send a confidential  
 ‘ person to receive my pledged faith. When with  
 ‘ me, ask for your wife and family, and whatever else  
 ‘ you may desire, and you shall have all : ask freely ;  
 ‘ nothing shall be refused. But whenever hereafter  
 ‘ you would communicate with me, I must be ad-  
 ‘ dressed as king of Asia, lord of all you possess and  
 ‘ of all you can desire : otherwise I shall reckon my-  
 ‘ self affrontingly treated. If you propose yet to  
 ‘ dispute the sovereignty with me, be it so, and expect  
 ‘ me : I shall seek you wherever you may be to be  
 ‘ found.’

It must here deserve consideration that we want the reply of the Persian court to the charge of its having been implicated in the assassination of Philip. Possibly it might deny that its words, in the original language, bore the meaning imputed by Alexander, or were at all so intended. Yet assassination, warranted even by the philosophy of the democratical Greeks, being also familiar in the practice of the despotic courts of the east, and the democracies and the court of Persia having been in league together against Philip, Alexander’s letter cannot but furnish



ground for suspicion, at least, against the agents of the Persian court, if the king himself might be clear. The supposition that information, of a kind to irritate Alexander against that court, was given by the captive Grecian deputies, or found in writing among their effects, whether then wholly new, or only confirming what had been discovered among the Persian state-writings at Sardis, may appear strengthened by Alexander's conduct toward those deputies; which seems altogether to show the liberality of which his father had given the great example, and the purpose of following still the noble policy of attaching men by benefits rather than by power. They were evidently obnoxious to the charge of rebellion, as much as any whom the Lacedæmonians punished with death as for high treason, in favouring the Persians in the invasion of Greece under Xerxes. Two were Thebans, Ismenias\* and Dionysodorus. Alexander freely released both; stating for reasons, his respect for the family of the former, which was of the most illustrious of Thebes, and his consideration of the personal dignity of the other, as a victor in the Olympian games. The Athenian, Iphicrates, being son of the renowned general of that name, the protector of his father's infancy, appears to have needed no other recommendation. The Lacedæmonian, Euthycles, was kept some time in arrest, but in no close confinement, and at length was dismissed like the others.

[\* Not *Ismenias*, but *Thessaliscus*, son of *Ismenias*, according to Arrian, whose narrative Mr. Mitford is here following . . . Θεσσαλίσκος δὲ Ἰσμηνίου, κ. τ. λ. ii. 15. and again, ἰδίᾳ δὲ Θεσσαλίσκον μὲν αἰδοῦ τοῦ γένους ἀφιέναι εἶπεν, κ. τ. λ. *ibid.* With the exception of *Iphicrates*, the names are altogether different in Quintus Curtius.]

## SECTION IV.

*Parties in Phenicia : submission of Sidon to Alexander : deputation from Tyre : siege of Tyre : second deputation from Darius : Tyre taken : siege of Gaza.*

CHAP.  
XLVIII.

---

BETWEEN the small states of Phenicia, as between those of Greece, appear to have been jealousies and antipathies of no small violence. When the Persian empire was extended to the Mediterranean and Ægean, it would soon be found, by the distant court, that naval power was important, and even necessary to it. The Phenicians then, furnishing the principal means for such power, acquired an importance with their sovereigns, whence they appear to have been treated with respect beyond other conquered subjects. But, among the Phenicians, the Tyrians had obtained a preference; and hence, in Sidon, the elder town, still holding an apparent superiority as capital of Phenicia, a party adverse to the Persian interest would the more readily become the prevailing party. A deputation from that city invited Alexander to take their state under his protection as its sovereign, and no opposition appears to have shown itself.

Arr. 1. 2.  
c. 15.

From Marathus he proceeded southward. The town of Byblus, on his approach, yielded by capitulation; and, as he still proceeded, a deputation met him from Tyre, with the son of the chief, Azelmic, whom Arrian entitles king, at its head, offering him allegiance. Azelmic himself was at the time serving under the Persian admiral, Autophradates, in the command of the Tyrian squadron of the Persian fleet. It appears probable that the purpose of the deputa-

tion was but to temporise. The Tyrians, favoured by the Persian court beyond others, even of the Phenicians, were unlikely to be willing to transfer their allegiance from the Persian monarch, under whom, in maritime affairs, they were chief, to a Grecian, under whom, the Greeks being a rival maritime people, they could hope to be but secondary. Alexander, apparently aware of their disposition, returned his thanks for their friendly professions, and desired they might be informed, that it was his intention to visit their city, for the purpose of sacrificing to Hercules; 'not the Grecian hero, his ancestor,' says Arrian, 'but another Hercules, worshipped by the Tyrians many ages before him, in a temple the oldest known on earth.' The Tyrians replied that, in all besides, they were ready to obey Alexander's commands; but they desired to decline admitting within their walls equally Persians and Macedonians.

This answer Alexander submitted to a numerous council of war, such as was customary, it appears, in the Macedonian kingdom, as well as in the Grecian republics: together with the generals it consisted of all the taxiarchs and ilarchs (colonels, if modern phrase should be used, of infantry and cavalry) of the republican Greek and other auxiliary troops, as well as of the Macedonian. To this assembly Alexander addressing himself said: 'To me it appears that our proposed expedition against Egypt cannot be safely undertaken while the Persians remain masters of the sea; nor can it be prudent to proceed into the interior of the empire against Darius, while the disposition of Tyre remains doubtful, and Cyprus and Egypt acknowledge his authority. I attribute the more weight to this consideration, on account of the actual state of Greece; where, according to

ARR. 1. 2.  
c. 16, 17.



CHAP.  
XLVIII.

‘ recent intelligence, Lacedæmon has taken part  
 ‘ openly with our enemies, and Athens holds to en-  
 ‘ gagements with us more through the fears of the  
 ‘ adverse than the power of the friendly there. But,  
 ‘ with Tyre, all Phenicia being in our power, the  
 ‘ Phenician seamen, now forming the largest and  
 ‘ best part of the Persian navy, having no longer a  
 ‘ motive to fight for others, would probably be in-  
 ‘ duced to join us. Cyprus would be likely to follow  
 ‘ the example; or, no hostile naval force preventing,  
 ‘ would be readily subdued. The invasion of Egypt  
 ‘ then would be easy; and, the enemy being deprived  
 ‘ of all maritime territory, and so without means to  
 ‘ maintain a fleet, nothing would remain to be feared  
 ‘ for Greece and our homes, should we proceed to  
 ‘ Babylon, or whithersoever else.’ The resolution  
 followed, that, if the Tyrians persevered in refusing  
 a complete connexion of interest, siege should be  
 laid to Tyre.

Diod. 1.17.  
c. 40.  
Strab. 1.16.

Ch. 28. s. 9.  
of this Hist.

That city covered an island, less than half a mile  
 from the main land of Phenicia. A view to security  
 only could have led the Tyrians originally to the  
 choice of a situation so abounding with inconvenience;  
 as, many centuries after, it led the Venetians and the  
 Amalfians to analogous situations. But the site of  
 Tyre was preferable to that of Venice, as, instead of  
 a marsh, among shoals, denying the approach of  
 large ships, it was a rock, with deep water around,  
 yet with a shore affording means for commodious  
 harbours; and still more perhaps it was preferable  
 to that of Amalfi, whose disadvantages have been  
 formerly noticed. Wealthy by their commerce, which  
 for its own sake the Persian government favoured, the  
 Tyrians, to the natural strength of their situation,  
 had added fortifications of uncommon magnitude.



Probably the connexion they always maintained with their colony of Carthage, the most powerful maritime state of the age, had assisted to give them importance with the Persian government; and it now promoted encouragement to maintain the connexion with the Persian government, which the prevailing party among them preferred. Reckoning their city impregnable without a superior fleet, and confident that Alexander had not means to raise a fleet equal to theirs, they resolved to defy assault.

Alexander and his army, habituated to overcome difficulties, engaged eagerly in this new undertaking. But it was not obvious, without naval force, how even to approach the town. A great work however was undertaken, carrying out a mole from the mainland. The channel being shallow near the shore, the business at first was comparatively easy; but as the work advanced the water deepened, and the workmen were not only more exposed to annoyance from the enemy's vessels, but also came within reach of shots from bows and engines on the city-walls, which were, on that side, of uncommon height. Wooden towers were built to protect them, covered with hides for security against fire. But the advantage which the Tyrians possessed in having means to act by water, of which their opponent was destitute, enabled them, by a bold and well-planned effort, to burn his towers, and extensively destroy his preparations.

Alexander was now aware that without a fleet his measures against Tyre must fail; and such a failure might produce even fatal consequences. He therefore resolved to have a fleet. Accordingly sending orders where he might command, and ministers wherever negotiation might be expected to avail<sup>16</sup>, he went him-

ARR. 1. 2.  
c. 17. 18.  
Diod. 1. 17.  
c. 40.

ARR. 1. 2.  
c. 21.

c. 19. 20.

<sup>16</sup> This seems clearly implied in Arrian's narrative, though his

CHAP.  
XLVIII.

self to Sidon, to inquire what naval force might be raised there. Thence he proceeded to Antilibanus, a mountainous tract, abounding with timber, whose people had not been disposed to acknowledge his authority. Partly by arms, partly by negotiation, he brought all to submission. Meanwhile his usual good fortune, promoted by the fame of the battle of Issus and its consequences, attended his negotiations beyond sea. Enylus prince of Byblus, learning that his state had yielded to Alexander, entered into the views of Gerostratus prince of Aradus. Together they deserted the Persian fleet under Autophradates, led their squadrons home, and professed themselves at Alexander's orders. The number of Phenician ships of war thus acquired was eighty. About the same time naval assistance arrived at Sidon from the allies; ten ships from Rhodes, three from the Cilician towns of Soli and Mallus, and ten from Lycia; and, not long after, the Cyprian princes, if not all Greeks, yet mostly, and the rest Phenicians, being assured that not only all Lesser Asia, but also all Phenicia, except Tyre, had yielded to Alexander, followed the example of the Sidonian and Byblian in deserting Autophradates, and came with a hundred and twenty ships to offer their services. The Greeks apologised for their engagement under the Persians. Alexander gratified them with the declaration that he considered them as having acted under unavoidable compulsion, and he showed favour to all. Nearly about the same time an accession arrived to his land force of four thousand mercenaries from Peloponnesus. These, prepared by the voyage for service a-shipboard, were put into his triremes,

explanation has here, as in some other places, a deficiency that seems to show the work never received the author's finishing hand.

to act as marines. Thus he at once strengthened the crews, and provided security against treacherous purposes, should any such be entertained among his new subjects. Sailing then from Sidon to offer battle to the Tyrians, he took himself the command of the right wing of his fleet.

The Tyrians, before completely commanding the sea, were surprised at the approach of a fleet so beyond their expectation greater than they had force prudently to meet. They directed their views therefore to the security of their ports, on different sides of their town, together with the defence of their walls. They had had in contemplation to send most of their women and children, with the men beyond military age, to Carthage; but, confident in their strength, they had delayed the measure: a small part only was gone, and they could not now spare ships or seamen to transport the rest. But with their republican government, under a chief entitled king, they were not without party distractions. Perhaps the spirit of hostility toward the foreign enemy, in the prevailing party, had been stimulated by opposition among fellow-citizens, when, having taken a vessel coming from Sidon, they led those found aboard to a part of their wall in sight of the besieging army, and there, with ostentatious malignity, putting them to death, threw the bodies over into the sea.

ARR. 1. 2.  
c. 24.

When they thus demonstrated such a determined spirit of virulence, the force prepared against them was already such that final success, in resistance, was no longer within reasonable hope, unless they might obtain relief from either Persia or Carthage: the enemy, commanding the sea, could starve them into submission. But this might be a tedious process, and



CHAP.  
XLVIII.

---

Alexander's purposes required quicker decision. He wanted to proceed against Egypt, before the Persian government could so recover from the shock of the battle of Issus as to send support to that important dependence of the empire. He therefore collected hands from all the neighbouring country to put forward his mole, by which he had proposed to make his attack. But the strength of the place in that part was such, and the besieged conducted their defence so ably and vigorously, that he soon saw it necessary to alter his plan. Wholly unpractised in maritime affairs, he had however practised men about him, and he possessed sagacity to appreciate their advice. Accordingly he resolved to carry on the siege by his fleet. The southern wall appearing most assailable by shipping, the engines were directed thither, and a breach was made. In a hasty attempt to storm however he was repulsed. But, waiting then for a day of perfect calm, so that his numerous fleet might, with oars, be conducted at the same time to every part of the wall that a vessel could approach, the attention of the Tyrians being thus divided, a large part was overthrown. The ships carrying the battering engines were then withdrawn, others with pontoons were in all haste advanced, and himself took the lead of the main body for storming. The resistance of the Tyrians was vigorous. Admetus, the officer who commanded the forlorn hope, after he had mounted the breach, was killed upon the ruined wall. But Alexander, with his select body, being at hand, the nearest towers were presently carried, and possession was obtained of that part of the fortification. To penetrate immediately into the town was yet difficult ; but by the summit of the wall itself he forced



his way to the palace, and thence the descent into the body of the place was easier.

SECT.  
IV.

Meanwhile the southern port, defended by gates or chains, being attacked by the Phenician fleet, and the northern, protected only by triremes moored with their beaks outward, by the Cyprian, both were forced. The usual horrors of the storming of a populous city could not then be entirely prevented. About eight thousand Tyrians, according to Arrian, were killed. The king, Azelmic, with many of the principal men, and some Carthaginian deputies, who happened to be present, took refuge in the temple of Hercules. Opportunity being thus afforded for Alexander to interfere for their protection, not only their lives were spared, but they were generously presented with liberty. All others taken, strangers as well as Tyrians, to the number of about thirty thousand, were, according to the practice of the age, sold to slavery for the benefit of the conquering army.<sup>17</sup>

B. C. 332.\*  
Ol. 112. 1.  
Arr. 1. 2.  
c. 24.

Meanwhile Darius, with means yet great, but not to be readily collected, evidently found himself distressed by the rapidity, as well as vigour, with which his opponent pressed forward in conquest. The siege of Tyre was yet but in progress, when a second deputation from him reached Alexander, bringing the offer of ten thousand talents, about two millions

[\* See extract from Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, preceding the Index.]

<sup>17</sup> Arrian's detail of this remarkable siege will deserve the attention of those curious after the military of the ancients. Diodorus, in relating the military operations of Alexander, has mostly followed the same good authorities as Arrian, and has drawn some matters not unworthy of notice from those whom Arrian has neglected. The frequent ineptitude, which he has introduced among them, may indeed sometimes provoke a smile from the judicious reader.

sterling, for the ransom of his family, and proposing a treaty of peace and alliance, with the farther offer of his daughter in marriage, and all the country between the Euphrates and the Mediterranean sea, for her dower. The proposal was laid before Alexander's council, and tradition of words passing on the occasion has become celebrated: 'If I were Alexander,' it is reported Parmenio said, 'I would accept the terms:' 'and I,' replied Alexander, 'were I Parmenio.' The answer returned to the proposal imported, that he neither wanted money from Darius, nor would accept a portion of the empire of which he reckoned the whole his own; and if he chose to marry Darius's daughter, his prisoner, he should not ask Darius's leave. Something of pithiness, in the answer to Parmenio, has obtained admiration from some, in ancient and in modern times. But with this there is a petulance so little becoming from a youth, however lofty in station, to so highly respectable an elder, and so contrary to the good manners which all accounts show to have prevailed in Philip's court, while in the answer to the unfortunate head of the Persian empire there is a harshness so nearly approaching brutality, the very reverse of that politeness and generosity to which Alexander had been bred, and which we have observed him frequently demonstrating, that, as Arrian merely states report without an author, allowance for doubt of its exact conformity to truth may be claimed; and perhaps it may not unreasonably be suspected that the story has received its actual colouring from the worst taste of the democracies of Alexander's age, or of the vicious court, afterward, of the Roman empire. Nevertheless that Parmenio, and with him all the more sober-minded and reflecting men of the council, would reckon it,

not for themselves only, but even more for their country, desirable to rest on the great acquisition of empire proposed to be assured to their prince by the terms offered, can hardly be doubted. What however came with certainty to public knowledge was, that the deputation from the king of Persia produced no accommodation.

During the siege of Tyre, the disposition of that populous neighbouring country, called by Arrian the Palestine Syria, including Judæa and Samaria, could not be indifferent to Alexander. According to that historian, the whole had acceded to his interest before Tyre was taken; Gaza only, a strong fortress on the coast, with a garrison under a Persian governor, resisting. The circumstances of the submission of the Jews, and the terms they obtained, would be interesting to us. But it appears they afforded nothing to attract the notice of Diodorus, Curtius, Plutarch, Arrian, Justin, or any heathen writer of Alexander's history whose work is extant; though of the defence of Gaza, under the Persian governor Batis, a eunuch, their account is large, and Arrian's especially particular.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> The story found in our copies of Josephus, and of the book of Maccabees, has been the subject of much discussion among very learned modern critics. According to those books the Samaritans at once acceded to Alexander's demands: the Jews, pleading their oath of allegiance to the Persian king, refused. Alexander in person led his whole army to compel them to submission. The high priest, Jaddua, divinely instructed, went out to meet him, arrayed in the robes of his office, attended by the priests in the attire of their order, and followed by the whole people in white garments. Alexander also had been favoured with a divine admonition; in consequence of which, on the approach of the suppliant throng, he fell prostrate before the high priest, as a person divinely commissioned; and the result was, that he not only showed high favour to the Jews, but carried it



Apparently Gaza, an insulated fortress, in a country not friendly to Persia, could have given Alexander little trouble, had he left it behind him, as he had left the citadel of Halicarnassus, and some fastnesses in Lycia. But his extraordinary achievements appear to have operated upon his mind as stimulation to con-

to such extravagance as to show extraordinary illiberality and ingratitude to their religious adversaries, the Samaritans.

The objections to this story, ably discussed by Moyle, are well though briefly stated in a note of the eighth volume of the ancient Universal History. The recent attempt of the very learned Dr. Hales of Dublin, in his Chronology, to overbear those objections, marks a mind highly desirous that the story should have credit, and will, I think, hardly convince any other. Arrian's account of Alexander's transactions with Palestine, those at Gaza excepted, is dispatched in these few words, ἤν αὐτῷ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῆς Παλαιστίνης καλουμένης Συρίας προσκεχωρηκότα ἦδη. Arr. l. 2. c. 25. Indeed it cannot but appear utterly unlikely that, if Alexander really led his whole army, or but a part, to Jerusalem, the military writers, his companions, and all other Greeks, his contemporaries, should fail to notice such a march; and, if any of them recorded it, that five such writers after them as Diodorus, Curtius, Plutarch, Justin, and Arrian, the four former eminently fond of the marvellous, the last remarkable for solicitude to be exact, all having not only those military writers, but many other histories of Alexander before them, should concur in a total omission of matter so remarkable as that related in the books aforementioned.

One suggestion it may perhaps be allowed to add. All accounts of Alexander's transactions, and especially Arrian's, show it likely that, if he did not go himself to Jerusalem, he would send, to receive the submission of the Jewish people, an eminent officer instructed to treat them with liberality. The high priest would be a person to communicate with. In meeting the general he would hardly make the mistake attributed to the mother of Darius, when Alexander visited her after the battle of Issus, and persevere in it. Yet possibly the story, circulated perhaps with some extravagance at first, might, in course of years, and in repeated telling, receive such gradual improvement as to come out, at last, among the Jews, that which has been transmitted.



tend with difficulties, and rather to seek them ; and the idea would be ready that it was due to his acquired fame, and requisite for his view of farther conquest, not to allow an insulated fortress to defy him with impunity. Gaza was situated about two miles from the sea, on a lofty mound, in a territory of deep sand, denying every material for forming approaches. The people of the adjacent country were assembled to assist in the works necessary for the siege : timber and even earth were to be brought from a distance. With immense labour a mound was formed, equal in height to that on which the town stood, so that battering engines could be applied. The expense of the siege of Gaza in lives, money, and time, less than of the siege of Tyre, was however, in proportion to the importance of the object, greater. Alexander himself, impatient, leading an assault received the severest wound he had yet experienced : he was for some time disabled by it. His example nevertheless, and his suffering, exciting emulation among his troops, and all his principal officers putting themselves forward for hazardous enterprise, the place at length was stormed ; though such was the desperate valour of the garrison that, according to Arrian, every man of it died fighting. The women and children were sold for the benefit of the conquerors ; the place was given to a colony of the neighbouring people.

Arr. 1. 2.  
c. 27.

## SECTION V.

*Expedition to Egypt. Olympian festival at Memphis. Alexander's religion. Foundation of Alexandria. Journey to the temple of Jupiter Ammon.*

CHAP.  
XLVIII.

Arr. 1. 2.

c. 11.  
[B. C. 333.  
Cl.]

Diod. 1. 17.  
c. 48.

B. C. 332.  
Ol. 112. 1.  
Diod. 1. 17.  
c. 48.

THE acquisition of the rich country of Egypt was Alexander's next object, and circumstances favoured the enterprise. Sabaces<sup>19</sup>, satrap of the country, had attended Darius at the battle of Issus, and fell there. Amid the wreck of high hopes, for those in the Persian service, resulting from the event of that battle, the emigrant Macedonian prince Amyntas appears to have seen, in the calamity to the empire wherein he had found refuge, hope of new fortune for himself. Knowing that Egypt had been drained of troops to swell the army under Darius, and that the Persian government was very unpopular there, he formed a project for making himself master of the country. With specious display of prospect in adventure, rather than with wealth he could possess, he engaged four thousand of the Grecian mercenaries, in the Persian service, who had escaped from the field of Issus, to act under his orders. At Tripolis, on the Syrian coast, he found vessels, which in the paralysis of government among the western Persian provinces, with the force under him, he could command. With these he proceeded to Cyprus, where he engaged additional adventurers, and then led all to Egypt. On his arrival he proclaimed the death of the late satrap, Sabaces, and asserted that he came himself commissioned by

<sup>19</sup> In our copies of Diodorus the name is Tasiaces, [al. Στασιάκης.]  
Diod. l. 17. c. 34.

the king to succeed to the government. Mazaces, who seems to have been left with the chief command, when Sabaces went to attend Darius in Syria, was without means for effectual resistance, unless he could persuade the Egyptians themselves to take arms under him. Amyntas penetrated as far as Memphis, the capital, one of the most populous towns of antiquity, whence has grown Cairo, one of the most populous of modern ages. The Memphians, little attached to the Persians, were yet not disposed to submit to the Macedonian adventurer: Amyntas, without pecuniary resources, could only subsist his troops by plunder of foes, if he could find and overcome them, of friends, if he could not. The Memphians shutting their gates against him, he plundered the country around. Issuing for its protection, he defeated them. But, when the nearer fields yielded no more, whether it became necessary, in extending excursion, to divide his strength, or, as is probable, he failed of authority to maintain due order, the Memphians, observing opportunity, attacked his dispersed force, and, with the greater part of his troops, Amyntas himself fell.

These events were recent when Alexander arrived with his army before Pelusium, the key of Egypt by land as well as its principal sea-port, and his fleet anchored in the harbour. The impression, both on Persian officers and Egyptian people, was very different from that made by the pretended satrap, when the conqueror of Lesser Asia and Syria, the hero of the Granicus and Issus, whom the previously supposed impregnable fortresses of Tyre and Gaza could not withstand, showed himself at the head of his combined land and sea forces. The Egyptian people seem to have been ready to receive and even welcome the invader: Mazaces, yielding to necessity, surren-



dered whatever depended on him ; and that formerly powerful and still wealthy kingdom, which had so long defied the force of the Persian empire, became an addition to Alexander's dominion without a blow. Thus Persia was completely excluded from the Mediterranean and Ægean seas, and Macedonia, head of the Grecian confederacy, commanding the coast from Sicily and Italy to the Libyan desert, was become, perhaps without excepting even Carthage, the first maritime power in the world.

Hitherto we have seen Alexander, as a soldier, displaying, with the most ardent courage, uncommon prudence, (uncommon certainly for his years, even if only decided by the ablest advice,) and, as a politician, highly liberal, though with ambition always apparently the main mover. In Egypt first we find another and a noble feature of his great character displayed. He would know the country that he had so acquired, and the people so become his peaceful subjects, and establish suitable regulations. No other purpose is indicated in his march up the country, on the right side of the Nile, as far as Heliopolis, crossing the river there, and returning on the other side to Memphis. In that great capital then, to produce harmony between his new subjects and his old, by bringing them acquainted with one another, among ceremonies of religion and amusement, he repeated the celebration of a festival in the manner of the Macedonian Olympic. The Persians, from their first conquest of the country under Cambyses son of the great Cyrus, had made themselves generally odious by offensive demonstrations of contempt and scorn for all that, in religious belief and religious ceremony, the Egyptians held most sacred. Indeed to men bred, like the Persians, to exalted notions of the



Deity, in a religion approaching primeval purity, it might be difficult to behold, without some indignation and abhorrence, and at the same time perhaps with a disposition to ridicule, the preposterous ceremonies which were public, whatever might be the more secret belief of the learned, among the Egyptians; and possibly they might not unreasonably object to them, not only that they were derogatory to the dignity of the great Author of nature whom they adored, but also adverse to the effect which religious faith should have on human morals. On the contrary, with the polytheistical principles of Greece, liberality was not requisite to produce respect for the religious belief and religious ceremonies of all nations: superstitious hope and fear would suffice. Jupiter being supposed powerful in the air, Neptune on the sea, Pluto under the earth, Juno at Argos, Minerva at Athens, Diana at Ephesus, it would be but in course to believe, or at least to apprehend, that Apis might hold the greatest divine sway in Egypt.

From the numerous and continually recurring instances, reported by ancient writers, of Alexander's attention to what in his age had popular consideration as religious duties, some moderns have imputed to him a religious and some a superstitious turn of mind. Positive information however failing, it were perhaps not only otherwise fairest, but also most consonant to all the best testimonies extant, to suppose that his religious belief was nearly that of Socrates, Xenophon, Plato, and more especially Plato's pupil, his preceptor, Aristotle. Holding then, with Aristotle, that one Almighty Power made and preserves the universe, it might not be inconsistent to hold, with Socrates, that, in the want of certain instruction from the Deity himself, it was safest and most becoming,

Ch. 6. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

Aristot. de  
Mundo, c. 6.  
Ch. 2. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

CHAP.  
XLVIII.

Xenoph.  
mem. Socr.  
l. 1. c. 1.  
s. 3.

Ch. 23, s. 5.  
of this Hist.

Arr. 1. 3.  
c. 1.

with regard to matters of ceremony, for all men to follow the customs of their forefathers; the belief being very general that the Deity communicated with their earliest forefathers. He might not improbably, and perhaps not improperly, go farther, and hold; with Xenophon, that it became statesmen and military commanders to use even popular superstition for honourable and salutary purposes. Clearly his purposes appear to have been honourable and salutary in showing, contrary to the Persian practice, though honourable motives might also influence the Persians, high respect for the venerated god of the Egyptians. He himself assisted in the ceremony of sacrifice performed to Apis. With this measure of conciliation for his new subjects he combined measures of gratification for the Greeks. Accustomed even to seek new deities, to suppose something of divine essence in every part of inanimate nature, and taught, by inquirers concerning the antiquities of their country, to look to foreign parts for the origin of their religion, and for the birthplace of some of the most eminent of their reputed gods and goddesses; the addition of Apis to their catalogue would not be likely to excite extensive, if indeed any, offence. But, not to leave the effect negative, Alexander sent to Greece for the persons most eminent as public performers in all the amusements of the theatre; and the labours and dangers of past campaigns were forgotten, or, in recollection, even enjoyed; among the gratifications at great expense provided.

Of the revenue, that essential engine, political and military, which Alexander had now acquired by his extensive conquest, comprising some of the richest countries of the world, accounts are among those failing. That however the poverty, under pressure

of which he originally engaged in his great enterprise, little relieved by the successes of the first summer, was now done away, so that from a needy he was become a wealthy prince; appears beyond doubt. Liberal and magnificent even to appearance of prodigality in expense, he was however attentive to the sources by which liberality and magnificence could be supported. Having surveyed much of a country very extraordinarily productive, watered by one of the largest rivers of the world, discharging itself, by seven mouths, into the Mediterranean sea, whence the greatest facilities for commerce might be expected, he learnt that nature had denied it a convenient haven. That of Pelusium, at the most eastern mouth of the Nile, was very defective, and offered little opportunity for improvement. Canopus, on the eastern side of the most westerly mouth, had a landing-place for vessels, but still more inconvenient. Alexander nevertheless would examine it. Canopus itself was found unsatisfactory; but on the western side, between the river and the lake Mareotis, a situation was offered which, under the able advice within his means to command, he judged to have those circumstances of nature improveable by art, so as to make it singularly promising for the site of a great commercial city. It was among the advantages of his extraordinary fortune to find, in every line, men of his nation qualified to second his great ideas, and among his extraordinary talents to be generally unerring in selecting them. As an architect, Dinocrates had already acquired superior reputation, especially in building the new temple of Diana at Ephesus. He added greatly to that reputation by the design and execution of the buildings of the new city, near the western mouth of the Nile, which, from



CHAP.  
XLVIII.

its magnificent founder, had the name of Alexandria. For wholesomeness, everything was adapted to the climate; for commerce, every thing to the greatest convenience; for magnificence and beauty, the streets excelled in length and width the temples of the Grecian and Egyptian gods, and the markets and other public buildings in extent and elegance; and for security, the sea on one side, the lake Mareotis on another, and strong and lofty walls all around, that city was eminent. Many circumstances seem to have concurred to offer facility for making this new city a Grecian colony. The Egyptians, under their native kings before the Persian conquest, as we have formerly seen, had been familiarized with the establishment of Greeks among them, for both commercial and military purposes. Many men of Alexander's army, disabled for active service, but still valuable for garrison duty, and without prospect at home, would be likely to rejoice at the advantages offered for citizens of the rising town; and the rewards here given for past services would encourage the young and able to enlist for new adventure. Thus would be provided, at the same time, security for conquest made, and means for farther conquest.

Ch. 6. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

Arr. 1. 3.  
c. 2.

Alexander was yet busy with this great work, in which utility of design so vied with magnificence of execution, when his admiral, Hegelochus, arrived from the Ægean sea, reporting very important advantages which had resulted from the near dissolution of the Persian naval power, through the defection of the Phenicians and Cyprians. In the island of Tenedos, the party adverse to the Persian supremacy had revolted, and renewed their connexion with the Grecian confederacy under the supremacy of the king of Macedonia. In the more powerful



island of Chios, not only those whom Autophradates and Pharnabazus had raised to sovereign authority there had been overborne, but Pharnabazus himself was made prisoner. In Lesbos the counter-revolution was equally rapid. The services of the Athenian Chares to the Persian cause had been rewarded with the government of Mitylene, but he was unable now to hold it: Mitylene and all Lesbos renewed the former connexion with the Macedonian confederacy. The friends of that confederacy in Cos sent a deputation to the Macedonian admiral, representing that they were ready to rise. Hegelochus sent them sixty triremes under Amphoterus; and, following soon with the rest of the fleet, he found his officer's success already complete. Aristonicus, under Persian patronage, tyrant of Methymne in Lesbos, had used the means in his hands for depredation upon the commerce of the Ægean, and took himself the command of a squadron of five small vessels adapted to the purpose.<sup>20</sup> Putting into the port of Chios, uninformed of the recent revolution there, he was made prisoner, with all his crews. These, to a man, perhaps hardly warrantably, were put to death as pirates. Aristonicus, Apollonides, Phisinus, and Megareus, who had been chiefs of the Persian party in Chios, were brought, in the squadron attending Hegelochus, to receive from Alexander himself their doom. Pharnabazus, probably less obnoxious, and therefore less strictly guarded, had escaped, and it may rather seem with permission.<sup>21</sup> Of the other prisoners, those who had

<sup>20</sup> Ἡμιολίαις ληστρικαῖς. Arr. l. 3. c. 2.

<sup>21</sup> He went to Cos. A powerful Persian party was among the population of that island; but, according to the historian's previous information, it had already been overborne by the party

CHAP.  
XLVIII.

held the dignity of tyrant were sent home to be judged by their people; except Apollonides, who, whether as a measure of more mercy, or some political consideration required it, (possibly as a leader in piracy he might be popular among the seamen of the Ægean,) was placed in close confinement at Elephantine in Egypt. Thus was completed the reduction of the islands of the Ægean under Alexander's empire, which now extended from the Adriatic sea to the great Asiatic desert on one side and the African on the other.

An expedition of no small difficulty and danger, though no opposition in arms was apprehended, then invited Alexander's fancy; an expedition, to ready view, more of curiosity than of ambition, or of any obvious utility; though it is possible that views both of ambition and of extensive utility to mankind may have had a share in the purpose.

Far within the vast desert of sand bounding westward, the narrow length of habitable Egypt are some small tracts of well watered and highly fruitful soil, scattered, as islands in an ocean. Extreme distress only, in the urgency for men to avoid fellow-men, can be imagined to have impelled any to the adventure by which treasures so hidden were first discovered. Security however being attained, population would grow; and with it wants, beyond what the scanty extent of useful soil could supply. Thus, in course of time, the quiet possessors of the little territories were impelled to the hazardous under-

of the Grecian confederacy. No violence being mentioned as attending the revolution, it is possible that, even after it, Pharnabazus may have been safe among his friends of the Persian party there.

taking or retracing the steps of their forefathers over the wilderness of sand, the protector of their quiet, to communicate with the warring world. A natural production highly valuable in neighbouring countries, a salt for culinary purposes, of uncommon purity, in quantity far beyond the need of the small population, was found, in one of these sequestered spots, which became known by the name of the Land of Ammon. This commodity, carried to Egypt, obtained extensive demand, with an importance heightened through its request among the priesthood for sacrifices. It appears likely that early settlers in the land of Ammon, perhaps the first, possessed what is called, in holy writ, ‘All the wisdom of the ‘Egyptians.’ They possessed however what enabled them to establish, in more perfection than was then common, the law and order necessary to the well-being of societies. In the earliest period in which history notices them, they had acquired extensively the reputation of superior sanctity for their abode, and of such favour from the deity, as enabled them to reveal to others his purposes. Already in the age of Herodotus the oracle of Jupiter Ammon had been of fame from time beyond his means to trace; though he mentions tradition, but evidently fabulous, of its having originated in the same manner, and at the same time, with that of Dodona, esteemed the oldest of Greece. Report went, which, though slighted by Strabo as also clearly fabulous, yet Arrian found so prevailing as to be induced to notice it, that the ancient heroes, Perseus and Hercules, reckoned among Alexander’s progenitors, had consulted the oracle of Ammon. Such a notion, however unfounded, having had, as seems probable, some popularity in Alexander’s age, might stimulate

ARR. I. 3.  
c. 4.



CHAP.  
XLVIII.

Herodot.  
1. 1. c. 46.

Arr. 1. 3.  
c. 2.

the desire, not unnatural in a youthful breast, to emulate the course of those renowned ancestors. That Cræsus king of Lydia consulted the oracle of Ammon, as Herodotus relates, is perfectly within probability; and altogether Alexander's desire of communicating with a seat of prophecy of such ancient and extensive fame, would not, in its day, be generally considered as unbecoming a prince of great designs. The story cherished by the profligate temper of after-times, that the god Jupiter Ammon had an intrigue with the Queen Olympias, Alexander's mother, was moreover, according to Arrian, already in public rumour. But to gain assurance of success to his views for the future, or, as Arrian says, a pretence to assert that he had such assurance, is likely to have been a principal motive.

Independently however of greater purposes, a curiosity to see the place, and a disposition to make light of difficulties and dangers incident to the journey, were of the character of his youthful age and adventurous temper. Nevertheless he did not neglect what prudence might require, for security to himself and companions, in the adventure. He took with him an escort, described as a small army; and he chose the road, not the shortest, but the least difficult for the accommodation of numbers. About two hundred miles he proceeded along the shore of the Mediterranean sea to Parætonium. The whole tract was desert, yet at intervals furnishing water in wells. Turning then inland for the rest of the way, water must be carried. An evil, not uncommon, but which apparently, at that season, it was hoped to escape, put the whole escort in extreme peril. A strong southerly wind, raising the sand, so obliterated all signs of way that the guides were utterly



at a loss. A prodigy, according to both the great men of Alexander's army who wrote his history, relieved him and his followers from threatened destruction. Ptolemy related that two dragons (large serpents were so called by the Greeks) appeared at the head of the army, uttering sounds that seemed like speech. Alexander commanded to follow them, and they led directly to the seat of the oracle. Aristobulus differed only in calling the conducting animals ravens; and for this he seems to have had credit from most following writers.

It cannot but excite surprise, that two such men as Ptolemy and Aristobulus should have gravely given to the world either story as fact within their knowledge. Those stories indeed have come to us only in a very succinct abstract, from their unfortunately lost works, by Arrian; which, high as that writer's authority is, will hardly warrant a decisive judgment on the subject. That subject however has engaged the attention of eminent modern inquirers. The very learned Bryant, looking to the familiarity of figurative speech among the eastern people generally, and the particularities which we learn of the ancient Egyptians, has supposed that the appellation of Ravens, borne as a distinguishing title by some of the Egyptian priests, gave occasion for the more popular story, that of Aristobulus, to which alone he has adverted. Priests, and attendants of the temples, would, in all probability, be among the guides. But the serpent, as well as the raven, was among sacred symbols of the Egyptians. If then some of the priests were, either in Egyptian or Grecian speech, distinguished by the title of dragons, while others were called ravens, the difference between the two eminent writers would be utterly un-

CHAP.  
XLVIII.

important, and both accounts would be divested of all improbability. Whether then it were so, or whether it may have been the deliberate purpose of those eminent writers to take a simple fact as ground for fable, suited to excite public respect for their prince, among a credulous and wonder-loving people, must be left to the reader's judgment. Indeed in Arrian's narrative, we are not yet at an end of the miraculous. In prosecuting the march, under guidance of the divinely-inspired animals, the water, carried for the army, failed. Distress was already great, and apprehension unbounded, when a heavy rain afforded the necessary supply; and whether this was in or out of the ordinary course of the season, it passed for another prodigy, indicating the favour of the deity to the prince who voluntarily incurred such hardship and danger with a religious purpose.<sup>22</sup>

Arr. l. 3.  
c. 3.  
Diod. l. 17.  
c. 49.

<sup>22</sup> The learned annotator on Strabo, in the Oxford edition, has proposed another explanation of Aristobulus's story, affording however no relief for Ptolemy's. 'Quid autem mirum (he says) si milites, in desertis, aquarum expertibus, vagantes, ab avium volatu, fontes sylvasque petentium, se non procul ab Ammonis templo abesse judicarent?' p. 1153. The value of this imagination will best be estimated by those who have visited the sandy deserts of the hot climates, or are familiar with the best accounts of them. In favour of Bryant's interpretation, what Herodotus relates of the founders of the oracle of Dodona may deserve to be remembered: from some peculiarities of their speech, he says, on their first arrival from beyond sea, the people of the country called them pigeons; whence tradition passed to posterity that birds, with power of human speech, established the oracle. But the raven, it is well known, is a bird of extraordinary intelligence, disposed to become very familiar with men, and, when habituated to their society, unwilling to leave it. Many will yet remember the Cheshire raven, that marched on wing, let the expression be excused, from that distant county through London with its regiment of militia, in the year 1781, to the camp on Coxheath, near Maid-

The island of valuable soil in the ocean of sand, to which Alexander had been directing his course, is said to have been little more than five miles across, each way. Its beauty and fruitfulness, and altogether the pleasantness for which it was celebrated, would be the more striking from the contrast with all around and near it. The air is said to have been deliciously cool, at least for those parched with the burning atmosphere of the desert. Springs of the finest water were plentiful; and the abundance of trees, mostly bearing refreshing fruits, afforded a shade, in such a climate, among the greatest of luxuries.

Arriving at this favoured abode, Alexander was received with the respect which the fame of his actions and power would prepare, and with the goodwill which his disposition to respect the oracle would conciliate. Proceeding with the prescribed ceremony to consult the god, the answer, as Arrian's account indicates, was given to him alone. What it was, the historian has not undertaken to say, farther than that Alexander declared it satisfactory. The conclusion seems reasonable that neither Ptolemy nor Aristo-

stone in Kent, and, in an unfortunate excursion thence, was shot by a neighbouring farmer. I know not whether it may be extravagant to suppose that, as pigeons are trained to be messengers, ravens might be trained to be guides. Such a supposition need not lessen the value either of Bryant's interpretation, or of what it has been ventured to offer concerning Ptolemy's account. If, among the priests, guides of the army, the superior were entitled dragon-priests, and those who had the care of birds, trained to lead the way, were of inferior rank, which, all things considered, seems no very extravagant supposition, one of the eminent writers may have considered those who held command to have been the guides, while the other may have spoken only of the subordinate, who were the efficient indicators.



bulus had reported it, and that Arrian gave no credit to the accounts of others.

The extraordinary natural circumstances of the little territory then engaged Alexander's attention; and he expressed himself altogether much gratified with his expedition. Having satisfied his curiosity he returned, according to Aristobulus, the way he came; but, according to Ptolemy, by the shorter way directly to Memphis. Perhaps it may here be allowed to suggest that the second difference of those writers, who both had superior means of information, may have been less real in their own than it appears in the later historian's account. It seems likely the body of the army would return the way it came, as the only way reasonable for an army to attempt, and that Aristobulus, attending it to Alexandria, reported its march; but that the king, with such a body of horse only that sufficient water might be provided for it, took the far shorter course to Memphis, where, as the sequel shows, business required him; and Ptolemy accompanying him, related that to which he was a party.

At Memphis embassies from many Grecian republics were waiting Alexander's arrival, or came soon after. All, according to Arrian's expression, obtained all they desired; which may imply that they obtained whatever could be reasonably granted; and, if all were not completely satisfied, yet such was Alexander's conciliating manner, that, though his liberality could not meet all their wishes, they still went away gratified. A magnificent sacrifice to Jupiter followed; and the amusements of the Macedonian Olympian festival, gymnastic games and theatrical exhibitions, with music, were repeated for the gratification of the army and people.



To regulate the government then of a country so valuable, yet, for centuries, so habituated to disturbance, as Egypt, became an important consideration. Arrian's account of the arrangement is very concise, yet variously interesting. As before through concerns of religion, so now in settling the civil administration, Alexander showed the liberal purpose of conciliating the people. He would have the ancient law of the country maintained, and he proposed to appoint two Egyptians, Doloaspis and Petisis, to be civil governors. The latter however declining the highly honourable yet arduous office, the whole authority was committed to Doloaspis.

ARR. 1. 3.  
c. 5.

The military command in chief obviously could be with prudence entrusted only to Macedonians, of high rank, and of character to deserve high confidence. Balacrus son of Amyntas, a lord of the body-guard, and Peucestas son of Marcatatus were appointed to it. The two important military stations, till the new city of Alexandria might vie with them, were Memphis, the capital, and Pelusium, called the key of Egypt; being the principal seaport, situated where the fruitful soil meets both the eastern desert and the Mediterranean sea. To the military command of these, under the superintendence of the joint commanders in chief, he appointed also Macedonians, committing the former to Pantaleon of Pydna, the other to Polemon son of Megacles, of Pella. Hitherto we find Arrian distinguishing Macedonians in the common way of Grecian family description, by the addition of the father's name only. For republican Greeks the mention of their republic is his common and obviously necessary distinction; and this affords indication of the extent in which he used the services

CHAP.  
XLVIII.

---

APP. 1. 2.  
c. 22.

of the republicans, and the rank to which he admitted them. Androcles of Amathus in Cyprus is named as commanding a ship of war at the siege of Tyre. The Cyprian-Greek cities, with the title of allies, furnishing a large squadron to the fleet, this would be in course. But no account remains of naval assistance from the Italian-Greek states; yet an Italian-Greek officer, Pasicrates of Thurium, also commanded a ship of war in Alexander's fleet at Tyre. The description now of the Macedonian Pantaleon by his town only may seem to indicate that he was raised to the dignity of a royal companion, and then to the important military government of the capital of Egypt, from a rank inferior to that in which the two commanders in chief were born, who are distinguished only, as supposed enough so distinguished, by the addition of their fathers' names; Balacrus, as son of Amyntas, it will be observed, being clearly marked for a different person from Balacrus, appointed by Alexander satrap of Cilicia, who is described as son of Nicanor. It may then deserve remembrance that Pydna is recorded to have been twice in revolt, under the influence of a democratical party, against the Macedonian kingdom; though the inference will be doubtful whether disaffection there was, in Alexander's opinion, done away, or whether Pantaleon had been eminently of the loyal, in opposition to the democratical party.

It is however evident that Alexander, with the successes which gave him increased power, and with it increased security, extended his liberality to the republican Greeks. Hitherto, though the civic troops of the several republics, and also the several bodies of mercenaries, were severally under their own officers,

yet Macedonian officers commanded all. But now a very extensive command over the Grecian troops<sup>23</sup> in Egypt was given to Lycidas, an Ætolian. That high trust however was not committed to him in total independence of other officers, yet still republican Greeks, Ehippus, a Chalcedonian, and Æschylus, called by Curtius a Rhodian; though what was the controlling authority, with the title of overseers<sup>24</sup>, committed to them, is not said. But as ages ago there were Greek colonies established about the mouths of the Nile, the Egyptian Greeks might be numerous. Altogether it may seem likely that, Lycidas holding the military command, the authority of Ehippus and Æschylus was civil. Eugnostus son of Xenophantus was appointed to an office, very uncertainly farther described than by the title secretary<sup>25</sup>, but which is marked as important, not only as Arrian esteemed the appointment matter for notice, but also as Eugnostus was of the rank of royal companion. The district, called by the Greeks Heroopolis, on the eastern side of the Delta, reckoned rather of Arabia than Egypt, was committed to Cleomenes, who seems to have been a Greek of the ancient colony of Naucratis. A province immediately westward was also made a separate government under Apollonius son of Charinus. These appear to have been important toward commanding the communication between Egypt and Asia, and between Memphis

SECT.  
V.

[Arr. 1. 3.  
c. 5.]

<sup>23</sup> τῶν ξένων. We find the mercenaries often clearly intended by that title. The forces of the Greek republics, serving with Alexander, are commonly distinguished in Arrian's narrative by the title of Ξύμμαχοι. And yet it may seem that each term has been sometimes intended to include both. Possibly careful observation might relieve the doubt.

<sup>24</sup> Ἐπίσκοποι.

<sup>25</sup> Γραμματεὺς ἐπὶ τῶν ξένων.

CHAP.  
XLVIII.

---

and Pelusium. Orders were publicly issued for all these officers, in their several capacities, to respect the ancient laws of the several cities and districts. Thus the overseers and secretary would form a board of general administration for the Greeks; every colony holding, for its own affairs, its old republican government; while the Egyptian governor would hold the king's authority, according to the ancient constitution of the country.

END OF THE SEVENTH VOLUME.





UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA  
AT  
LOS ANGELES  
LIBRARY




University of California  
SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY  
405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1388  
Return this material to the library  
from which it was borrowed.

UC-SAN R-UM 1995

REC'D LD-UM  
JUN 20 1995

APR 15 1996






3 1158 00955 3859

D F

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY



A 000 216 946 4

1838  
v.7

NOV 19 1900

HF  
214  
M69h  
1838  
v.7

Un