




S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20300805

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF GTMO-CG

3 August 2005


MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for
Continued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9TI-000076DP

JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (FOUO) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Ruhmedin H Sharpov
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Rukniddin Fayziddinovich Sharipov
- Place of Birth: Lenenabad, Tajikistan
- Date of Birth: 15 September 1981
- Citizenship: Tajikistan (TI)
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9TI-000076DP



2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. Detainee complained of chest pain a few times, but there have not been findings on chest X-rays. He was on a hunger strike in Oct 02. He is not on medication and has no known drug allergies. He has no requirements for special care or travel.

3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee be Transferred to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD).

b. (S//NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) on 17 January 2004. For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed as a member of the Islamic Movement

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20300805

S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20300805

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9TI-000076DP

of Uzbekistan (IMU), which is associated with Al-Qaida and it's global terrorist network. Detainee went through extremist military training at IMU training camps in both Tajikistan (TI) and Afghanistan (AF). It is assessed that detainee has been indoctrinated into the Islamic extremist ideology and knowingly joined the IMU for jihadist purposes. Detainee is a fugitive from Tajikistan and is wanted for violating Tajikistan's laws and international borders. It is assessed this detainee is a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee was born 15 September 1981 in Kojand, Isfara, Tajikistan (TI). He went to Topi, Pakistan (PK) when he was five and remained there until age 15. In Pakistan, he attended Jabha Primary School for grades one through five and Government High School through 10th grade. Then he attended Government Degree College where he studied Civics, Pashtu, and History. Detainee stated he returned to Isfara when he and a friend, Tsabit Vakhidov, US9TI-000090DP, ISN 090, were recruited for service with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee and two of his friends, Farad (LNU) and ISN 090, left Isfara by train destined for Russia to find work. While they were at the train station in Dushanbe, TI, detainee claimed they met a man by the name of Rostam who recruited them to join what they believed to be the Tajikistan military. Rostam told them that they would be paid USD \$300 a month in wages if they joined. They agreed and detainee said they went to Tavit Dara, TI. They arrived at an Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) training camp called Camp Lajard, near the city of Lajard, TI. (Analyst note: The IMU is a Tier I target. Tier 1 targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated the intention and the capability to attack US persons or interests).

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee said Ahmed was the leader of IMU and the commander of the camp. He spoke Tajiki and was either from Tajikistan or Uzbekistan. Detainee indicated that there were only IMU leaders and followers at Camp Lajard. He said that he received one day of training on the Kalashnikov rifle, one day of training on a machinegun, and one day training on a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) while at the camp. He also indicated he trained on a shoulder-fired weapon, but he could not provide the name of the weapon. He said he stood guard at the main gate of the camp armed with a Kalashnikov rifle. There were about 200 soldiers at this camp. After this training, detainee and others were flown to Konduz, AF in helicopters provided by the Tajikistan government. Detainee did not know where he was flying. Ahmed only told

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9TI-000076DP

him that he was going to a warmer place. Detainee said he was issued a Kalashnikov rifle for his helicopter flight to Afghanistan. Detainee believes he arrived into Afghanistan sometime after Ramadan of 2000.

d. (S//NF) Capture Information: Detainee travel with other IMU fighters from Kabul to Mazar-E-Sharif, AF. Just before they arrived in Mazar-e-Sharif, they were told to surrender to Dostum's forces. Detainee was present at the Mazar-e-Sharif prison uprising. Detainee had his hands tied behind his back and was on his knees when fighting started in the prison. Detainee began to run and was wounded. He received three shrapnel wounds on his right foot. During the fighting, he went back to the house and went into the basement where there were many other Pakistani and Arabic-speaking prisoners. Only one of the prisoners in the basement had a Kalashnikov. Detainee heard that Dostum's forces threw a grenade into the house. The grenade killed some of the prisoners in the basement and injured others. Detainee spent about 5-6 days in the basement. He was detained with Arabs and Pakistanis who had been hiding in the basement of the Qalai Janghi prison.

e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 14 January 2002

f. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Detainee may be able to provide general to specific information on the training and relocation of Tajik youth into Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban.
- Detainee may be able to provide general to specific information on the unit that formed the Uzbek movement in Mazar-E-Sharif.

5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:

- (S//NF) Detainee admitted being an IMU member. Detainee attended the IMU militant training camp located in Tavildara, TI. The Tavildara camp was located in a valley near the city of Lajar, TI.
 - (S) Detainee trained at Tavildara training camp along with Abdul Mochid-Sobed Wahedof, US9TI-000090DP, ISN 090 and 200 other IMU members. They were

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9TI-000076DP

transported from Tajikistan to Afghanistan in eight probable MI-8 helicopters in January of 2001.

- (S//NF) The Tavildara training camp had been the primary training facility for the IMU prior to the 9/11 attacks on the United States. The IMU also had training facilities in Garm, Hoit, the Karitigin Valley, TI, and a Taliban sponsored training facility near Mazar-E-Sharif. The IMU had a facility in Kabul, AF along with three others in northern Afghanistan. Tavildara camp had the estimated capacity of 100 militants at any given time. Tavildara camp is a staging area for ingress into Afghanistan.
- (S) Primary training at Tavildara included: Basic infantry tactics, operation and maintenance of the AK-47 and PK machine gun, and proper handling and use of hand grenades. (Live firing was limited due lack of ammunition)
- (S) Detainee contended he received no military or weapons training while in Camp Lajar. He did train on the Kalashnikov and RPGs at the Taliban sponsored training facility at Mazar-E-Sharif. He said he never fired any weapons in training but learned how they operated.
 - (S) Analyst Note: Detainee left his village with his boyhood friend ISN-090. It is assessed that they were both recruited to join the IMU prior to leaving their homes. Both detainees stated that they were headed for "Russia" to seek jobs. Neither detainee had a specific destination in Russia. Detainee did not explain where they got finances to take the train. It is much more likely that someone in their village recruited them and that "Rostam" was scheduled to meet with them on the train and escort them to the Tajikistan training camp.
- (S//NF) Detainee, ISN 090, Abdulkarim Tursunabaeyich, US9TI-00641DP (ISN 641), Yusuf Valiyevich, US9TI 00083DP (ISN 083), Sagdi Sharipovich, US9TI- 00665DP (ISN 665), and Mekhrubon Faizuppoyevich, US9TI-00077DP (ISN 077), are wanted by the Tajikistan Government for violation of section 401 of the Tajik criminal code.

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee's overall behavior pattern has been compliant with spikes in aggression, with the most reports coming from harassment of the guard force

6. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determined detainee is of LOW intelligence value.

- (S) Detainee has knowledge of IMU operations and IMU training facilities in Tajikistan and Mazar-E-Sharif, AF. Detainee should know about IMU leadership and their activities. Detainee should have knowledge of IMU recruiting activities in Tajikistan along with ingress/egress movements to and from Tajikistan/Afghanistan for those recruits.


JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9TI-000076DP

b. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Detainee should have information on IMU recruiting operations and IMU training facilities in Tajikistan and Mazar-E-Sharif, AF
- Detainee should have information on IMU leadership and their activities
 - Detainee should be able to provide physical characteristics and locations of IMU leaders
- Detainee should have information on ingress/egress operations used by the IMU to infiltrate IMU personnel into and out of Afghanistan from Tajikistan.

7. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 10 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.


JAY W. HOOD
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding