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Included Document Is "Comparison of War Department and Joint Committee Principles". The Document Itself Is Not Directly Related Either to Pearl Harbor Attack or Police Reorganization

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COMPARISON OF WAR DEPARTMENT AND JOINT COMMETTEE PRINCIPLES

I. OPERATIONAL AND INTELLIGENCE WORK REQUIRES CENTRALIZATION OF AUTHORITY AND CLEAR-OUT ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY.

FM 101-5, Staff Officers Field Manual clearly defines the duties of a commander (par. 4) and allocates responsibilities and duties to the general staff (Section II). It clearly makes the C of S (Dep. C of S) responsible for the coordination, smooth and efficient operation of the General Staff (par. 11).

The General Staff of the War Department as at present organized does not change the responsibility of the C of S (DC of S) but does assign duties of coordination to DP and O without giving full responsibility to i sue orders. DP and O can operate under the principle of cooperation (Par 5.)

Par 6, FM 101. 5, "Authority" - "A staff officer as such has no authority to command. All policies, decisions, and plans whether originating with the commander or with the staff must be authorized by the commander before they are put into effect. When a staff officer by virtue of delegated authority issues an order in the name of a commander, responsibility remains with the commander even though he may not know of the order."

II. SUPERVISORY OFFICIALS CANNOT SAFELY TAKE ANYTHING FOR GRANTED IN THE ALERTING OF SUBORDINATES.

Par. 71k, FM 101-5, "In combat orders it is essential that there be no opportunity for misunderstanding by any subordinate of the exact intended meaning of all terms used."

III. ANY DOUBT AS TO WHETHER OUTPOSTS SHOULD BE GIVEN INFORMATION SHOULD ALWAYS BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF SUPPLYING THE INFORMATION.

Par 190, FM 100-5, "Information collected by higher head-quarters is transmitted automatically to lower headquarters."

Par 238, FM 100-5, "Adequate and timely information is the basis of all security measures."

Par 234. FM 100-5, "As required by the situation, military intelligence is disseminated to subordinate units in field orders, messages, or copies of periodic or special intelligence reports. The means of dissemination must be appropriate to the time available."

Par 7, FM 101-5, "A staff officer should visit subordinate units to acquaint them with conditions which cannot be explained in orders."

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IV. THE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY OR ISSUANCE OF ORDERS ENTAILS THE DUTY OF INSPECTION TO DETERMINE THAT THE OFFICIAL MANDATE IS PROPERLY EXERCISED.

Par 2b, FM 101-5, "Within the scope of authority, it (General Staff) supervises the execution of plans and orders and takes such other action as is necessary to carry out the commander's intention."

Par 8d, FM 101-5, "The General Staff group supervises the execution of orders to insure understanding and execution in conformity with the commander's will."

Par 58, Fa 101-5, "His (commander) final step is supervision to insure conduct of the operation in accord with his orders."

Par 63. FM 102-5, "The responsibilities of the commander and his staff do not and with the issue of the necessary orders. They must insure receipt of the orders by the proper commanders, make certain they are understood, and enforce their effective execution."

V. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OFFICIAL ORDERS MUST BE FOLLOWED WITH CLOSEST SUFERVISION.

Par 127, FM 100-5, "Personal conferences between higher commanders and his subordinates who are to rewrite his orders are usually advisable, that the latter may arrive at a correct understanding of the plans and intention of their superior."

Par 142, FM 100-5, "After providing for the issuance of orders he (commander) will visit his commanders and his troops in order to inspire confidence and to assure himself that his orders are properly executed."

VI. THE MAINTENANCE OF ALERTNESS TO RESPONSIBILITY MUST BE INSURED THROUGH REPETITION.

Par 6, FM 100-5, "The form of wording of the instructions is not so important as their clarity. An energetic follow-up must insure that they are effectively executed or are modified at the proper time to fit a changing situation."

VII. COMPLACENCY AND PROCRASTINATION ARE OUT OF PLACE WHERE SUDDEN AND DECISIVE ACTION IS OF THE ESSENCE.

Par 124, FM 100-5, "Every individual from the highest commander to the lowest private must always remember that inaction and neglect of opportunities will warrant more severe censure than an error of judgment in the action taken."

Par 111, FM 100-5, "The first demand in war is decisive action."

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VIII. THE COORDINATION AND PROPER EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE IN TIME OF STRESS MUST BE INSURED BY CONTINUITY OF SERVICE AND CENTRAL-IZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN COMPETENT OFFICIALS.

Par 109, FM 100-5, "A wise and capable commander will see that the men assigned to the component groups of his unit are compatible and that the composition of the group is changed as little as possible. XXX He will see that demonstrated efficiency is promptly recognized and rewarded.

IX. THE UNAPPROAGRABLE AND SUPERIOR ATTITUDE OF OFFICIALS IS FATAL: THERE SHOULD NEVER BE ANY HESITANCY IN ASKING FOR CLARIFICATION OF INSTRUCTIONS OR IN SERVING ADVICE ON MATTERS THAT ARE IN DOUBT.

Par 106, FM 100.5, "A spirit of unselfish cooperation with their fellows is to be fostered among officers and men. The strong and capable must encourage and lead the weak and less experienced. On such a foundation, a feeling of true comradeship will become firmly established and the full combat value of the troops will be made available to the higher commander.

Par 105, FM 100-5, "The commander should extend prompt recognition for services well done, lend help where help is needed, and give encouragement in adversity. Considerate to those whom he commands, he must be faithful and loyal to those who command him. A commander must live with his troops and share their dangers and privations as well as their joys and sorrows. By personal observation and experience he will then be able to judge their needs and combat value. A commander who unnecessarily taxes the endurance of his troops will only penalize himself. The proper expenditure of combat strength is in proportion to the objective to be attained. When necessary to the execution of the mission, the commander requires and receives from his unit the complete measure of sacrifice.

X. THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR IMAGINATION AND RESOURCEFULNESS ON THE PART OF SUPERVISORY AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS.

Preface, FM 100.5, "Set rules and methods must be avoided. They limit imagination and initiative which are so important in the successful prosecution of war."

Par 285, FM 100-5, "A commander who is ingenious and resourceful in the use of tactical strategems and ruses will often find methods
of deceiving or misleading the enemy and of concealing his own intentions. Feints, demonstrations, and simulated concentrations may be
employed to mislead the enemy regarding the strength, time, or place
of attack. The main attack may be accomplished or preceded by secondary attacks made in such a manner as to conceal the location of the
main attack. A carefully screened withdrawal may be employed to deny
the enemy the choice of the time and place of attack. Marches by day
and return by night and the movement of empty truck columns have been

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employed to create the impression of great activity. Fake concentrations; simulated bivouacs, airdromes, and radio installations; dummy field fortifications, artillery positions, tanks, and airplanes; and many other such means have been successfully employed. It often is practicable to deceive the enemy regarding our plans and intentions by changing any routine procedure which may have come to his attention.

The dissemination of false information designed to deceive or mislead the enemy as to our intentions, capabilities, morale, or dispositions, such as, for example, the deliberate loss of orders or prisoners always introduces an element of danger because our own plans and decisions are apt to be influenced by the assumption that the enemy has been deceived. Such measures may be adopted only by the theater commander or by his authority."

When our enemies operate in the above manner, our G-2 must be qualified.

XI. COMMUNICATIONS MUST BE CHARACTERIZED BY CLARITY, FORTHRIGHT-NESS, AND APPROPRIATENESS.

Par 154, FM 100-5, "Orders must be clear and explicit and as brief as is consistent with clarity. Short sentences are easily understood. xxx

XII. THERE IS GREAT DANGER IN CARELESS PARAPHRASE OF INFORMATION RECEIVED AND EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO INSURE THAT THE PARAPHRASED MATERIAL REFLECTS THE TRUE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ORIGINAL.

Sec Principle No. 11, above.

Par 382, FM 100-5, "xxx Secrecy precautions must not jeopardize the success of operation. xxx"

XIII. PROCEDURES MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE TO MEET THE EXIGEN-CIES OF UNUSUAL SITUATIONS.

Par 10, FM 101-5, "Flexibility of operation. - Although the General Staff group is organized into 4 sections there is much overlapping of duties; coordination and prompt interchange of information between sections are essential."

XIV. RESTRICTION OF HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION TO A MINIMUM NUMBER OF OFFICIALS, WHILE OFTEN NECESSARY SHOULD NOT BE CARRIED TO A POINT OF PREJUDICING THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION.

Par 157, FM 100-5, "During the planning stage it usually is desirable to confine knowledge of contemplated operations to the minimum number of commanders and staff officers. As the hour of action

approaches, successive echelons of command should be given timely information of the commander's intentions so at the time of entry into action no unit will be in doubt as to its mission or the plan of the higher commander."

Par 282, Fr. 100-5, "xxx Secrecy precautions must not jeopardize the success of operations by withholding information necessary to the forces involved."

XV. THERE IS GREAT DANGER OF BEING BLINDED BY THE SELF EVIDENT.

Par 132, FM 100-5, "The capabilities of the opposing forces and the possible effect of their employment must be continually evaluated. The commander must guard against the belief that he has discovered the enemy's intentions and consequently ignoring other lines of action open to the enemy."

XVI. OFFICIALS SHOULD AT ALL TIMES GIVE SUBORDINATES THE BENEFIT OF SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION.

See principle No. 3, above.

XVII. AN OFFICIAL WHO NEGLECTS TO FAMILIARIZE HIMSHLF IN DETAIL WITH HIS ORGANIZATION SHOULD FORFEIT HIS RESPONSIBILITY.

Par 104, FM 100-5, "A good commander xxx keeps in close touch with all subordinate units by means of personal visits and observations."

Par 122, FM 100-5, "Command and leadership are inseparable. Whether the force is large or small, whether the functions of the command are complex or simple, the commander must be the controlling head; his must be the master mind."

XVIII. FAILURE CAN BE AVOIDED IN THE LONG RUN ONLY BY PREPARATION FOR ANY EVENTUALITY.

Par 120, FM 100-5, "To guard against surprise requires a correct estimate of enemy capabilities, adequate security measures, effective reconnaissance, and readiness for action of all units."

XIX. OFFICIALS, ON A PERSONAL BASIS, SHOULD NEVER COUNTERMAND AN OFFICIAL INSTRUCTION.

Par 150, FM 100-5, "The authority to issue orders is an inherent function of command. Orders normally are issued to next subordinate commanders. Bypassing the normal channels is resorted to only in urgent situations; in such cases both the commander issuing

approaches, successive echelons of command should be given timely information of the commander's intentions so at the time of entry into action no unit will be in doubt as to its mission or the plan of the higher commander."

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and the commander receiving the order should notify intermediate com-

Par 154, FM 100-5, "Orders must be clear and explicit and as brief as is consistent with clarity. Short sentences are easily understood. Clarity is more important than technique. The more urgent the situation, the greater is the need for conciseness in the order. Any statement of reasons for measures adopted should be limited to what is necessary to obtain intelligent cooperations from subordinates. Detailed instructions for a variety of contingencies, or prescriptions that are a matter of training, do not inspire confidence and have no place in an order."

XX. PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL JEALOUSY WILL WRECK ANY ORGANIZATION.

See Principle No. 9, above.

XXI. PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP, WITHOUT MORE, SHOULD NEVER BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF LIAISON AS CONFUSED THEREWITH WHERE THE LATTER IS NECESSARY TO THE PROPER FUNCTIONING OF TWO OR MORE AGENCIES.

The methods of effecting liaison are fully covered in Section V. FM. 101-5.

XXII. NO CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE PERMITTED AS EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO PERFORM A FUNDAMENTAL TASK.

Par 123, Ft. 100-5, "Decision as to a specific course of action is the responsibility of the commander alone. While he may accept advice and suggestions from any of his subordinates, he alone is responsible for what his unit does or does not do."

XXIII. SUPERIORS MUST AT ALL TIMES KEEP THEIR SUBORDINATES ADEQUATELY INFORMED AND, CONVERSELY, SUBORDINATES SHOULD KEEP THEIR SUPERIORS INFORMED.

Par 225, FM 100-5, "All subordinates of a command are responsible that their immediate commander is promptly and fully informed of the situation."

Par 190, FM 100-5, "Information collected by higher head-quarters is transmitted automatically to lower headquarters."

Par 230. FM 100-5, "Important and urgent information xxx is sent by the most rapid means available to all headquarters affected, without regard to the usual military channels."

Inspector General Duties.

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XXIV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF ANY ESTABLISHMENT MUST BE DESIGNATED TO LOCATE FAILURES AND TO ASSESS RESPONSIBILITY.

Par 169, FM 100.5, "Every commander is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of the signal communication system of his unit and for its efficient operation."

Par 41, FM 101-5, "A system of staff section resords is essential."

XXV. IN A WELL-BALANCED ORGANIZATION THERE IS CLOSE CORRELATION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY.

Par 1, FM 101-5, "The commander alone is responsible to his superior of all that his unit does or fails to do."

Par 6, FM 101-5, "A staff officer as such has no authority to command. All policies, decisions, and plans whether originating with the commander or with the staff must be authorized by the commander before they are put into effect. When a staff officer by virtue of delegated authority issues an order, in the name of the commander, responsibility remains with the commander even though he may not know of the order."

Joint Committee of Congress on Pearl Harbor 25 Principles

17 Feb 1947

FROM: Col. Bratton TO: Operations

PHONE:

P.S.D.

C.I.C.

(in turn)

3

Each section listed above will comply with comment #2 and return at the earliest practicable date.

2 Incls. 1-List of 25 Principles 2-Comments

R.S.B.

FROM: CIS/Opns

TO: PSD

TO: CIC

Forwarded.

R.G.D.

PHONE: 2-3098

PSD/HEP/sm 21 Feb 47

NAME: Lt. Col. Benton

1. Corrections have been made of procedures which were in violation of the twenty-five principles arrived at by the Joint Committee of Congress on investigating Pearl Harbor.


5

2. There are no violations in PSD of the twenty-five principles beyond the authority of this organization to correct.

Incls: n/c

FROM: PSD

H.E.P.



Report of Joint Committee, 5 Mar 47 Congress of the U.S. on the Pearl Barbor Attack

Deputy Chief, CIS

Col. Duff Col. Pulliam Col. Putnam

Col. Homan

2-5712 Capt.H.E. Thompson

1. Transmitted herewith are the 25 Command Principles gleaned as a result of the Report of the Joint Committee, Congress of the U. S. on the Pearl Harbor Attack.

2. It is essential that this compilation be kept on file in each CIS sub-division as a subject for constant study with a view to its continuous application.

5 copies - 25 Command Principles.

Capt.H.E.
Thompson

Col. Putnam

Col. Homan

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5 Incls:

5 copies - 25 Command Principles.

La R. S. B. -.

1.

COL.

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TO THE WAR

Comparison of WD and Joint Committee Principles.

GB/CIS/WDW/jk 22 April 1947

JIS

Opns Div

Lt Col Blackwell

Request the attached pamphlet, "Comparison of War Department and Joint Committee Principles", be circulated so that all officers in your section may read and fully understand the contents contained therein.

Incl:

As stated

787% DR.S.B.

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I hereby certify that I have read and understand the attached pamphlet "Comparison of War Department and Joint Committee Principles".

Namo

Colonel H. E. Pulliam

Lt. Col. John A. Benton

Lt. Col. R. T. Battey

Major Wallace Smith

Date Signature

6 May 47

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I hereby certify that I have read and understand the attached pumphlet "Comparison of War Department and Joint Committee Principles".

Name

Capt. Frank M. Meals (USCG) 24 april

Capt. John R. Wilson

Major Rinold Ohman

Capt. Allan D. Newton

Lt. Martin Reinfield

Lt. Kenji Sayama

30 april 47 Rollan D. Tenton 29 441.47 allan D. Tenton May 47 Methai John 30 april 47 Kenji Sayama

I hereby certify that I have read and understand the attached pamphlet "Comparison of War Department and Joint Committee Principles".

Capt. R. F. Holton 24 apr. 47 R. F. Holton

Capt. E. M. Arenschield 24 apr. 47

Capt. B. F. Hill

Capt. James Nealon

Capt. Clyde Phelps

Lt. James McCarthy

Date

Signature

R. F. Holton

R. F. Hol

I hereby certify that I have read and understand the attached pamphlet "Comparison of War Department and Joint Committee Principles".

Name

Major Alfred Oliver

Major George Kimmel

Capt. Leo Fomenko

Capt. Isaac Lewis

Capt. Robert Knight

Lt. Morris Foist

Date

Signature

alfred L. Oliver

Robert T. Kingler Leave Hornio E. Forst.

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