


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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

STAFF STUDY
OPERATION
"MINNOW"

EDITION 2
12 April 1946

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BASIC OUTLINE PLAN

FOR

"MINNOW"

OPERATIONS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

AGO 500

12 April 1946

"MI. NO. 1"

BASIC OUTLINE PLAN

for

ACTION OF OCCUPATION FORCES IN JAPAN

IN EVENT OF

CIVIL DISTURBANCES

1. DIRECTIVE.

(See chart, Annex 1:)
("Concept of Action by)
("Occupation Forces.")

a. This plan is formulated pursuant to verbal directive of CINCPAC. It provides the basis for coordinated action by elements of Occupation Forces in the event of civil disturbances in Japan.

b. The general objectives of operations provided for in this plan are:

- (1) Maintenance of security of the Occupation Forces and their installations.
- (2) Preservation of military control within Japan and maintenance of internal conditions essential to attainment of the objectives of the occupation.

c. Operations under this plan are based upon pertinent portions of paragraphs 2 and 3, JCS 1380/15, 3 November 1945, and upon FM 27-5, "Military Government and Civil Affairs," and FM 27-10, "Rules of Land Warfare."

2. ASSUMPTIONS.

(See Annex 2;
"G-2 Situation Forecast.")

a. Civilian population.

- (1) That shortages of food, inflation, unemployment and deteriorated living standards may combine at any time to create a condition of public unrest capable of development

into civil disturbances characterized by violence which can threaten the security of the Occupation Forces or the accomplishment of Occupation missions. That such conditions may obtain in areas of varying extent, from those confined to strictly local limits to those covering material portions of the Empire.

- (2) That discontented groups within the population may support disorders prejudicial to the Occupation. Among such groups are:
- (a) Demobilized personnel of the Armed Forces.
 - (b) Members of former ultra-nationalistic societies.
 - (c) Ex-members of the wealthy classes.
 - (d) The Shinto Priesthood.
 - (e) Landowners whose holdings are re-distributed to tenants.
 - (f) Management personnel unemployed owing to dissolution of the ZAIRATSU and consequent industrial stagnation.
 - (g) Personnel barred from public and private office.
 - (h) Other individuals whose livelihood is injured or abolished pursuant to SCAP Directives.
 - (i) The destitute unemployed.
- (3) That potential sources of unrest may be incited to overt action either by elements within themselves or by foreign agents introduced into Japan for the purpose of discrediting the occupation, or both.
- (4) That in view of the above, passive disturbances, such as strikes, political demonstrations, protests against governmental measures and other non-violent evidences of mass desire for changed conditions, possess a potential danger of development into disorders accompanied by violence. That once initiated, such disorders are susceptible of rapid expansion, both in degree of violence and area effected.

- (5) That acts of violence will not necessarily be representative of the attitude of any substantial proportion of the population, and that in all probability the contrary will be true.
- (6) That any appreciable groups involved in acts of violence will be at most only partially armed with hand weapons.
- (7) That initial activity will be limited to organized assassination, sabotage, sniping, raids upon storehouses and mob action. That seizures of arms and ammunition will be a primary objective of such activity.

b. Japanese Government.

- (1) That the Japanese Government lacks the means normally available to a sovereign nation to control serious civil disturbances.
- (2) That any failures by the Japanese Government adequately to control violent disorders will result in a rapid deterioration of its authority and of its ability to comply with SCAP Directives.
- (3) That evolution of Japan toward Democracy may be accompanied by instances of the use of force by either the Japanese Government or the Japanese people.
- (4) That forceful overthrow of the constituted Japanese Government by dissident Japanese elements without recourse to democratic processes may possibly delay the progressive accomplishment of SCAP Directives without a compensating guarantee that the resulting form of government will be supported by the freely expressed will of the people or conform more closely to SCAP policies.
- (5) That disturbances against the Occupation Forces sponsored or incited by the Japanese Government are unlikely.

c. Occupation Forces.

- (1) That the reduction of Occupation Forces by demobilization and the dispersion of units and their installations throughout the Empire makes definitive plans necessary to prevent them from being vulnerable to acts of violence and their capabilities for concerted action in serious emergencies adversely affected.
- (2) That current dispositions of troops and installations permits adequate security and defensive measures against minor emergencies and provides reasonable strength for the suppression of local acts of violence.
- (3) That a break-down of Japanese civil government in any locality or area may require the establishment of direct Military Government by the Occupation Forces to maintain law and order and accomplish SCAP Directives therein.
- (4) That in the event of a major uprising, a progressive withdrawal, concentration, and regrouping of forces may possibly be required. That an emergency of any character affecting an area of material extent may require reposition of the Occupation Forces.
- (5) That in civil disturbances among the Japanese population the Occupation Forces will intervene to the minimum extent necessary to assure their own security. That they should be prepared to intervene upon order of the Supreme Commander when the attainment of the objectives of the occupation are jeopardized.

3. OPERATIONS.

a. Concept.

This plan is primarily concerned with emergency military operations of the United States Army and attached Allied Forces against

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threats of varying degree to the security of Occupation Forces and to the authority and control required for the accomplishment of SCAP Directives. It covers arrangements for support by United States Naval Forces insofar as is necessary to provide the required coordination.

The concept visualizes the maintenance of continuous and thorough surveillance of the situation by Occupation Forces with respect to the possibility of disturbances; immediate and complete investigation of disturbances which occur; and prompt reporting procedures to provide successive echelons of the Command with accurate information upon which to determine the necessity for action on higher levels. Civil disturbances and infractions of law normally handled by civil police are not considered to come within the purview of the plan.

In operations under this plan, a clear conception of the authority for and timing of military action by the occupation forces is essential. The occupation forces, when confronted or threatened by violence against themselves, act promptly on the initiative of any element so menaced. This action may be to prevent the violence or to quell it. Only the minimum force is used. On the other hand, the fulfillment of occupation objectives is a subject of wide ramifications and the use of force therein, and its timing, is a matter of judgment by the highest authority. Local civil disorder is not apt to jeopardize the fulfillment of the overall occupation objectives, and in this case action of troops remains primarily of an observational and preparatory nature. Action devoted to quelling such disorders is taken only after other processes have proven to be ineffective, and then on specific direction by SCAP.

Emergencies are classified according to the ability of governmental institutions to continue their functions, which in turn is dictated by the character and severity of the disturbance in the area affected. Classes of Emergency and action taken thereunder may be summarized as follows:

(1) Minor Emergency:

- (a) In this type emergency, Japanese Governmental agencies are able to continue to function. Disorders are characterized by isolated acts of violence, strikes and/or riots of a local character and overt acts against constituted authority by groups comprising a minor proportion of the population.
- (b) Overt acts against the Occupation Forces or their installations are checked at once. Commanders take active defensive and security measures and initiate aggressive action to seek out, disorganize, and apprehend the principals of such activities with minimum involvement of peaceful elements of the civil population. Legal action against individuals involved in disturbances within this sub-category is a responsibility of the Occupation Forces.
- (c) In incidents characterized by violence between elements of the civil population or against the Japanese Government, the civil police are the responsible law-enforcement agency. Surveillance over such disturbances is maintained by Occupation Force Commanders. Facts in the case are reported without delay to SCAP. Occupation Forces prepare to intervene on order to prevent conditions which jeopardize the attainment of occupation objectives and, if directed, to protect the lives and property of innocent civilians. Legal action against individuals involved in disturbances within this sub-category is a responsibility of Japanese authorities.

(2) Limited Emergency:

- (a) In this type of emergency Japanese law-enforcement

agencies in a given area are destroyed or so weakened that they can no longer function effectively and direct U.S. Military Government must be imposed to avoid jeopardy to occupation objectives.

- (b) In this type of emergency a proclamation by SCAP defines the area of "Limited Emergency", directs establishment of military government and prescribes the action to be taken by Occupation Forces. The provisions of FM 27-5, "Military Government and Civil Affairs," and FM 27-10, "Rules of Land Warfare" govern operations. Control of all disturbances becomes a responsibility of Occupation Forces. Available Japanese agencies are employed to the limit of their capabilities.

(3) Major Emergency:

- (a) In this type of emergency a condition of rebellion against constituted authority exists of such magnitude that public order and safety cannot be factually maintained or SCAP Directives enforced by either Japanese Civil Government or SCAP Military Government agencies.
- (b) Under these conditions SCAP declares that neither civil nor military government is able to exercise its functions in a given area due to armed action by an organized or quasi-organized enemy or general uprising among the inhabitants. He directs full-scale military operations to restore normal processes of government and insure accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation. FM 27-10, "Rules of Land Warfare" apply.

b. Employment of Forces.

(1) Organization.

(See chart, Annex 3 b (1), "Tactical Organization of Occupation Forces in Japan, 1 July 1946.")

(2) Forces.

(See chart, Annex 3 b (2), "Deployment of Occupation Forces in Japan as of 1 July 1946.")

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS and UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC - Command of U.S. Army resources in the Pacific.
Command or control of Occupation Forces.

Arrangements with CINCPAC and Major Commands for support and reinforcement of "MINNOW" operations as required.

Internal security and defense of GHQ installations in the Tokyo area as permitted by available GHQ Troops.

(a) EIGHTH ARMY - Ground defense of Occupation Forces and installations in Japan.

"MINNOW" planning, in conjunction with PACUSA and COMNAVJAP where elements of their commands are concerned.

Operations of ground forces, "MINNOW" operations.

(b) PACUSA

- Air transport of troops, equipment and supplies within Japan as arranged with CG, Eighth Army.

Combat Air support of "MINNOW" operations in conditions of "Major Emergency" as arranged with CG, Eighth Army; in other conditions as directed by SCAP.

Local defense of Fifth Air Force installations as arranged with CG, Eighth Army.

Preparation of air elements for movement from areas in the Pacific outside of Japan as directed.

(c) COMNAVJAP

- Direct Naval support of "MINNOW" operations as directed by SCAP.

Local defense of naval installations in Japan as arranged with CG, Eighth Army.

(d) XXIV CORPS

- Preparation and mounting of such ground elements from Korea as may be directed.

- (e) AFWESPAC - Preparation and mounting of U.S. Army Forces from Western Pacific as directed.
- (f) AFMIDPAC - Preparation and mounting of U.S. Army Forces from Middle Pacific as directed.

(3) Operations Required:

(a) General Security.

In actual or threatened disturbances of whatever character, the commander of Occupation Forces immediately responsible for the area concerned institutes the following measures under detailed instructions of the CG, Eighth Army:

1. Provides for security of Occupation Forces, their installations, and essential routes of movement.
2. Investigates actual or potential disorders with particular reference to the objectives of parties responsible, and renders full report by the most rapid means to the next higher echelon of command.
3. Maintains thorough surveillance of activities in the area affected. If attacked, military personnel engaged in surveillance are authorized to employ necessary force.

(b) Action in Minor Emergency.

This category requires no formal declaration.

1. In this category, where overt acts are committed against the Occupation Forces or their installations, the Commander concerned takes direct action to the extent necessary to secure his forces and to apprehend and punish the parties responsible. In such operations, the following considerations govern:
 - a. While the provisions of Chapter 11, FM 27-10, "Penalties for Violation of the Laws of War," are applicable, the taking of hostages and the

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execution of reprisals are forbidden except upon specific authority of SCAP in each case.

- b. The force employed is the minimum required to attain the objective. Every care is exercised to avoid involvement of innocent parties or their property.
- c. While taking such measures as may be necessary to accomplish the objective, the troops conduct themselves under the general principles prescribed in FM 27-15, "Military Law in Domestic Disturbances."
- d. The operation of Japanese law-enforcement agencies remains under control of the Japanese Government. In event of non-cooperation, with Occupation Forces, report is made through channels by the most rapid means.

- 2. In cases of violence between Japanese or between Japanese and non-Japanese residents (other than Occupation Forces and their civilian components), responsibility for preservation of public order and safety rests with Japanese authorities. In such cases, other than the security measures outlined in sub-paragraph 1 next above, the CG, Eighth Army, or his designated representative, avoids intervention by Occupation Forces except as directed by SCAP.

In event of such disturbances:

- a. Occupation forces prepare to intervene to the extent necessary to insure enforcement of SCAP Directives in the affected area.
- b. Offenders against public order and safety who may come into military custody in disturbances under this category and are not involved in

attack against Occupation Forces are turned over to Japanese authorities for disposition.

(c) Action in Limited Emergency. (See Annex 3 b (3) (c): "Direct Military Government").

1. This category of emergency becomes effective upon declaration by SCAP of a state of "Limited Emergency" in a defined area, with directive to CG, Eighth Army to establish direct Military Government therein.
2. In operations of Occupation Forces under a condition of "Limited Emergency," the following conditions govern:
 - a. The powers and limitations of a commander of occupied territory as specified in Chapters 10 and 11, FM 27-10, "Military Occupation and Government of Enemy Territory," and "Penalties for Violation of the Laws of War" apply to CG, Eighth Army, or his designated representative.
 - b. CG, Eighth Army, or his designated representative, conducts direct Military Government under the provisions of Annex 3 b (3) (c), "Direct Military Government," with such modifications as may be prescribed by SCAP at the time.
 - c. Existing agencies of the Japanese Government in the designated area pass to operational control of CG, Eighth Army, or his designated representative, for the duration of the emergency.
 - d. CG, Eighth Army becomes responsible for enforcement of current SCAP directives within the area of "Limited Emergency." He is empowered to modify or suspend operation of such

directives within the affected areas as required by the situation, informing SCAP of decisions thereon. Provisions of letter, this Headquarters, AG 386.2, 13 February 1946, subject: "Surveillance of Enforcement of SCAP Directives," are suspended for the duration of the emergency. Agencies of GHQ SCAP assist the CG, Eighth Army in accomplishment of SCAP directives within the affected area as requested by the latter.

- e. CG, Eighth Army recommends to SCAP progressive relief of areas or sub-areas from a state of "Limited Emergency" as rapidly as conditions warrant.

(d) Action in Major Emergency. (See Annex 3 b (3) (d), "Strategic Areas for Retention at All Costs.")

- 1. a. This condition becomes effective upon declaration by SCAP of a state of "Major Emergency" in a defined area, accompanied by directive to Occupation Forces to conduct military operations therein to the extent necessary to re-establish military control and normal processes of government in the area concerned.
- b. SCAP declares a state of "Major Emergency" upon notification by CG, Eighth Army that responsibilities assigned under a state of "Limited Emergency" cannot be carried out in the area concerned with the forces available.
- 2. In military operations under a state of "Major Emergency," the following considerations govern:
 - a. Military operations are conducted under the provisions of FM 27-10, "Rules of Land Warfare."

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- b. CG, Eighth Army is charged with the conduct of tactical operations, supported by CG, PACUSA and COMNAVJAP.
- c. CG, Eighth Army is charged with military government functions in areas under his military control.
- d. SCAP terminates the state of "Major Emergency" in areas or sub-areas as rapidly as CG, Eighth Army signifies that he is able to assume responsibility therein under a lesser category of emergency.
- e. The following general areas, listed in order of importance, are considered as vital strategic areas to be held by Occupation Forces at all costs:

Tokyo-Yokohama Area	Tokyo, Yokohama, Yokusuka, Haneda a/d.
Osaka Area	Osaka, Kobe, Itami a/d.
Fukuoka-Shimonoseki Area.	Fukuoka, Itazuke a/d. Ashiya a/d Moji, Shimonoseki.
Aomori Area	Aomori, Hachinohe a/d.
Kure Area	Kure Iwakuni a/d.

(4) Coordination.

- (a) CG, Eighth Army is charged with the coordination of local defense plans for Air, Naval and GHQ installations within the framework of Eighth Army plans, and with the provision of additional protection to GHQ and operational air installations to the extent necessary to insure continued functioning of the agencies con-

defense of specific air installations to be beyond the means available, he may, with the exception of air installations included in "Strategic Areas for Retention At All Costs" (sub-paragraph (3) e above) recommend to SCAP evacuation of such installations,

(b) SCAP directs naval support by COMNAVJAP of Eighth Army forces in "MINNOW" operations upon request by CG, Eighth Army.

(c) 1. Coordination of combat air support of the ground operations of Eighth Army by PACUSA is conducted under established procedures. Combat air support in "Minor" and "Limited" emergencies is limited to operations specifically directed by SCAP in each case.

2. Troop carrier air support of Eighth Army Forces in "MINNOW" operations is provided by CG, PACUSA within the limits of available troop carrier aircraft upon direct request by CG, Eighth Army.

(d) CINCAFPAC provides reinforcements from sources outside Japan upon request by CG, Eighth Army or CG, PACUSA.

(e) SCAP arranges with CINCPAC for any required augmentation of Naval support of "MINNOW" operations.

(f) SCAP directives declaring "Limited" and "Major" emergencies, and directing intervention by Occupation Forces in intra-Japanese disputes in "Minor Emergencies," specify any restrictions or amendments to powers of Occupation Force Commanders as outlined in the preceding paragraphs which are of particular application in the emergency concerned.

4. LOGISTICS. (By G-4).

5. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. For signal communications matters applying specifically to "MINNOW" operations, see Annex 5 a, "Signal Communications."

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ANNEXES

"MINNOW"

BASIC OUTLINE PLAN

for

ACTION OF OCCUPATION FORCES IN JAPAN

IN EVENT OF

CIVIL DISTURBANCES

- 1 Chart, Concept of Action by Occupation Forces.
- 2 G-2 Situation Forecast.
- 3 b (1) Tactical Organization of Occupation Forces in Japan.
- 3 b (2) Probable Deployment of Occupation Forces in Japan as of July 1946.
- 3 b (3) (c) Direct Military Government.
- 3 b (3) (d) Strategic Areas for Retention at all Costs.
- 5 a Signal Communications.


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CATEGORY OF EMERGENCY	ACTION BY OCCUPATION FORCES IN THE AFFECTED AREA	CIVILIAN REACTIONS
<p><u>MINOR EMERGENCY:</u></p> <p>DISTURBANCES DIRECTED AGAINST OCCUPATION FORCES OR THEIR INSTALLATIONS.</p>	<p>(a) PROVIDE SELF-SECURITY. APPREHEND AND PUNISH OFFENDERS. AVOID INVOLVEMENT OF PEACEFUL POPULATION. INVESTIGATE AND REPORT. MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE.</p>	<p>RAIDS UPON SNIPING, SABOTAGE, ASSASSINATIONS, MOB ACTION, ORGANIZED SMALL</p>
<p>DISTURBANCES BETWEEN ELEMENTS OF THE CIVIL POPULATION OR DIRECTED AGAINST THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.</p>	<p>(b) PROVIDE SELF-SECURITY. INVESTIGATE AND REPORT. MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE. AVOID INTERVENTION. IF CIVIL AGENCIES FAIL, REPORT TO SCAP AND BE PREPARED TO TAKE ACTION TO RESTORE CIVIL AUTHORITY. IF ATTACKED, APPLY (a) ABOVE. TURN OVER CIVIL OFFENDERS TO JAPANESE AUTHORITIES.</p>	<p>DEMONSTRATIONS, STRIKES, FOOD OR LACK OF FOOD, TERRORISM, POLITICAL MOB AGITATION, POLITICAL BY VIOLENCE</p>
<p><u>LIMITED EMERGENCY:</u></p> <p>JAPANESE CIVIL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FACTUALLY INCAPABLE OF FUNCTIONING.</p>	<p>UPON DECLARATION OF "LIMITED EMERGENCY" BY SCAP: ESTABLISH DIRECT MILITARY GOVERNMENT. ASSUME OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF EXISTING CIVIL AGENCIES ENFORCE SCAP DIRECTIVES. (SEE ANNEX 3b(3)(c) - "DIRECT MILITARY GOVERNMENT.")</p>	<p>PERSISTENCE OF DISTURBANCES</p>
<p><u>MAJOR EMERGENCY:</u></p> <p>SITUATION PREVENTS FACTUAL FUNCTIONING OF EITHER CIVIL OR MILITARY GOVERNMENT.</p>	<p>UPON DECLARATION OF "MAJOR EMERGENCY" BY SCAP: CONDUCT FULL-SCALE MILITARY OPERATIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF FM 27-20, "RULES OF LAND WARFARE". (MAY INVOLVE REGROUPING OF FORCES AND/OR REINFORCEMENT)</p>	<p>WIDESPREAD BY AN ORGANIZED GENERAL UNINHABITABLE</p>

"CONCEPT OF ACTION BY OCCUPATION FORCES."

	CIVIL DISTURBANCE OCCURRING	GOVERNMENT EXISTING
	RAIDS UPON INSTALLATIONS. SNIPING. SABOTAGE. ASSASSINATIONS. MOB ACTION. ORGANIZED AGGRESSION BY SMALL GROUPS.	JAPANESE LOCAL AND NATIONAL CIVIL GOVERNMENT.
IL, ION HORITY. ABOVE. ERS TO	DEMONSTRATIONS. STRIKES. FOOD OR LABOR RIOTS. TERRORISM. POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS. MOB AGITATION. POLITICAL CHANGES CHARACTERIZED BY VIOLENCE.	CIVIL GOVERNMENT.
LIMITED ARY TRICE NCIES S. DIRECT T.")	PERSISTENT OR SERIOUS CASES OF DISTURBANCES LISTED ABOVE.	DIRECT U. S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.
MAJOR ITARY -10, ARE" OF CEMENT)	WIDESPREAD SERIOUS DISORDERS BY AN ORGANIZED OR QUASI-ORGANIZED ENEMY. GENERAL UPRISING AMONG THE INHABITANTS.	NO CONSTITUTED CIVIL AUTHORITY.

SCAP
AFPAC




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
ANNEX 3 b (1)

TACTICAL
ORGANIZATION OF OCCUPATION
FORCES IN JAPAN
1 JULY 1946

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


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ANNEX 3 b (2)
PROBABLE
DEPLOYMENT OF
OCCUPATION FORCES
IN JAPAN, 1 JULY 1946



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
ARMY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC
AND
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

Scale: 1:1,000,000
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J A P A N S E A

FUKUOKA-SHIMONOSEKI AREA


FUKUOKA
MOJI
SHIMONOSEKI
ITAZUKE AIRDROME
ASHIYA AIRDROME
PORT FACILITIES

OSAKA AREA

OSAKA
KOBE
ITAMI AIRDROME
MAJOR SUPPLY BASE
PORT FACILITIES

KURE AREA

KURE
IWAKUNI AIRDROME
BASE & PORT FACILITIES



"STRATEGIC AREAS FOR RETENTION AT ALL COSTS."

