

THE
PLATONIC DIALOGUES

FOR ENGLISH READERS.

VOL. II.

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THE
PLATONIC DIALOGUES

FOR ENGLISH READERS.

BY
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VOL. II.

ANTISOPHIST DIALOGUES.

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PREFACE.

THE former volume of "the Platonic Dialogues for English Readers" has met with a reception so favourable as to induce me to offer to the public a similar version of another group of those Dialogues.

The Dialogues I now publish I term "the Antisophist Dialogues," inasmuch as they are mainly occupied with discussions in which persons who have been called "Sophists" by Plato and by his commentators, are represented as refuted, perplexed, or silenced. Of such persons there will be found in the following pages, Protagoras, Prodicus, Hippias, Gorgias, Polus, Callicles, Ion, Euthydemus, Dionysiodorus, and Thrasymachus, who is, however, much more prominent in the

First Book of the Republic. But though these persons are all included by some of Plato's admirers under the term *Sophists*,—are all involved by many commentators in that charge of false reasoning and sinister purpose which *we* imply by that term,—and are looked upon by many persons as a sect or party who made common cause, corrupted the moral principles of the Athenians, and were unmasked and put down by Plato; they were, in truth, most diverse in their tenets, characters, position, mode of discussion, and objects; and were, several of them, as strenuous inculcators of virtue and as subtle reasoners as Plato himself. This results from what we know of them from all quarters, and indeed from Plato's own representations. That this is really the case with the so-called Sophists, is a proposition which has been proved and illustrated by Mr Grote, in a manner which combines the startling effect arising from great novelty with the solid conviction arising from plain good sense;—a very remarkable combination to find introduced, in our own day, into one of the most familiar periods of ancient history. I think that the reader of the following pages will find in the Dialogues themselves, and in the Remarks upon them, sufficient evidence of the

general truth of this position. I would, however, refer the reader for a fuller confirmation and illustration of it to the eighth volume of Mr Grote's *History of Greece*.

Undoubtedly some of the interlocutors in the following Dialogues are represented as engaged in mere quibbling, as Euthydemus and his brother, in the Dialogue of that name; and others are made ridiculous by vanity, as Ion and Hippias. But the quibbling in the Euthydemus hardly reaches the dignity of sophistry; and nothing appears to me a more wonderful proof of the sweeping prejudices of the commentators of Plato than this,—that some of them see no difference between this quibbling and the calm consistent moral dissertations of Protagoras. Yet so it is. The “argumentum” of the Protagoras in Bekker's edition of Plato, for instance, begins thus:

“Hujus disputationis idem est cum Euthydemus scopus et argumentum: nempe est inanes Sophistarum speculationes detegantur conspectoque fastu et vanitate contemnuntur et procul rejiciantur.”

The reader of the following pages may judge for himself whether the scope and argument of the Protagoras and the Euthydemus are the same, or are at all alike; and whether in the Euthydemus

there be any speculations; and whether in the Protagoras the speculations of that philosopher are proved to be empty.

Mr Grote has further shown very clearly that if Plato argued as some of the commentators represent him as arguing (in the person of Socrates), he would really be guilty of the duplicity and unfairness with which they charge his opponents. This, however, is not really the case. Plato is in search of a Theory of Ethics solidly and scientifically founded upon Ideas and Definitions, and is always ready to prove that the doctrines of his opponents are worthless, because they cannot be made to supply such a theory. Protagoras, Prodicus, Hippias, Gorgias and the rest, are to him *Sophists* in the disparaging sense, because they cannot meet his demands for such a system; just as Jeremy Bentham might have called Butler, Price, and Clarke, Sophists; or as Coleridge might have called Locke, Condillac, and D'Alembert, Sophists.

In the Dialogues contained in the present volume, Plato, though he rejects the doctrines of his opponents, does not establish a system of his own. The Republic does contain such a system, and may be regarded as the point towards which

these Dialogues converge: although indeed, the first Book of the Republic is really a Dialogue of the Antisophist class, and might very fitly be entitled "Thrasymachus," and included in that class, if it had not been undesirable to dismember the Republic.

I fear some readers will be offended by the inconstancy of my spelling of Greek names. The plain truth is, that I have not the courage to be consistent in what I think to be the right course: namely, that adopted by Mr Grote, of copying the Greek spelling. There are many of the Greek names with which we have become so familiar in the form which they assume in the Latin and in languages the daughters of the Latin, that ordinary readers feel a shock when they see them spelt with a closer approximation to the Greek. Pericles and Alcibiades and Socrates startle us when spelt with a *k* instead of a *c*. Yet it is convenient to write Kimon, not Cimon, that the name may be clearly distinguished from Simon. I have, in the cases of less familiar names, used the *k*; and have in some other cases imitated the Greek spelling. Now that educated Englishmen commonly obtain their knowledge of Greek literature directly from the Greek, and not mediately through

the Latin, it is desirable to obliterate from our literature the traces of the past habit of reading Greek authors in Latin translations.

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PROTAGORAS.

The Title of this Dialogue in Diogenes Laertius is Protagoras, or the Sophists. The second part of the Title describes exactly enough the business of the Dialogue.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROTAGORAS.

WE had before us in the former volume the Platonic Dialogues which probably most nearly represent the manner of Socrates's discourse, and which I have therefore termed Dialogues of the Socratic School, and also those Platonic Dialogues which refer to the trial and Death of Socrates. There are other Platonic Dialogues of different character and context from those. Several of these are written in order to disparage and confute certain opponents whom Plato, and his commentators, following him, have called *Sophists*; and we may therefore group these Dialogues together as the *Antisophist Dialogues*. These Dialogues I conceive to have been written after the death of Socrates; and it will add to their interest if we can obtain some clear conception of Plato's position and circumstances at that period.

What became, after Socrates's death, of his disciples, and especially of Plato? That grievous event showed that Athens was, for the time, a dangerous place of sojourn for those who had admired the sage, and who sought for philosophical and moral truth in the paths in which he had led them on. The proceeding which had taken place was too menacing to be disregarded. The disciples

of Socrates yielded to the storm, and removed themselves from the dangerously excited city. Plato had the more reason to do this, as he had made himself conspicuous by offering his money as the means of paying any fine which might be imposed on Socrates. It is related¹ that he retired to Megara with the other disciples of Socrates. Megara was the home of Terpsion and Eukleides, two of Socrates's admirers, and a city where philosophy was zealously cultivated. Here he may be supposed to have written the *Crito*, the *Phædo*, and the *Apology*; thus raising, as I have said, an enduring memorial of the beauties of his master's character and of the injustice of the Athenians. At Megara there grew up, under the influence of Eukleides, a peculiar system of philosophical opinions of which we may discern traces in some of the Platonic Dialogues, as I may have occasion to notice.

We are told that from Megara, Plato went to Cyrene, the Greek colony in Africa, to the society of Theodorus the Mathematician, of whom he makes mention in the Dialogue entitled *Theætetus*. Thence he went to Italy, and conversed with the Pythagoreans, the influence of whose lore we see in the *Timæus* and in other Dialogues. Thence he is said to have gone to Egypt "to the prophets:" a strange expression, probably implying his intercourse with mystical teachers who claimed supernatural knowledge. And after these travels, he returned to Athens and taught in the *Academia*; a pleasure-ground near the city, where he had a villa; the gardens of which were the scene of his "teaching," that is of his conversations with his admirers, and perhaps of his readings of the Dialogues which I am here about to present.

¹ Diog. Laert. iii. cap. i. sect. 8.

A later writer, (Themistius, who wrote seven or eight hundred years after the event,) tells us that the Athenians soon repented of having put Socrates to death, and punished those who had acted against him. "Meletus was fined. Anytus fled. The people of Heraclea in Pontus stoned him to death. His tomb is still to be seen in the suburb of that city, not far from the sea." But Plato and Xenophon appear to know nothing of this revolution of public opinion and these its consequences. We have seen that in the *Meno*, Plato makes Socrates express pity for Anytus, as not knowing the value of a good education; and in accordance with this, Xenophon tells us that the son of Anytus, not having been initiated in any good pursuit, took to evil courses, and that the father was in evil repute on this ground. If a visitation such as that reported by Themistius had fallen upon him, it could hardly have passed unnoticed in the works of Plato and Xenophon.

But though this story may be untrue, it is probable that after a short time the Socratic disciples might have returned to Athens in safety. Plato's travels are supposed to have occupied several years. He is said to have attached himself to Socrates when he was twenty years old, to have gone to Megara when he was twenty-eight, and to have returned to Athens when he was forty; and then to have begun his teaching in the Academic groves. The Academia was nearly a mile from the city, and the approach to it was through the Ceramicus, which was, as Thucydides says¹, (in his account of the public ceremony at which Pericles delivered his celebrated Funeral Oration in honour of those who had fallen in the

¹ ii. 34.

war,) the most beautiful suburb of Athens: and there were the monuments of the departed brave men. It is a curious circumstance that recently in this locality there was found a stone on which was an inscription in verse in honour of those who fell at Potidæa, where, as we have seen, Socrates served in the army. This inscription is now in the British Museum. The companions of Plato, whose eyes it caught on their way to him, must have had their feeling of the injustice of the Athenians revived by this memorial of a place where Socrates had discharged the duties of a good citizen.

We may trace several lines of thought in the Platonic Dialogues which we may ascribe to this period of Academic teaching; but the line which I now wish to pursue is in some measure a continuation of that followed in the Dialogues of the Socratic school. A main object with Plato was a continuation of the war which Socrates had carried on against the false seeming of wisdom, and against the false pretenders to wisdom. He might go on to do in writing what his master had done in oral discourse;—expose the want of a real substance of science in men of note, and exhibit to ridicule their pretensions, their shallowness, their conceit and self-complacency.

But what Socrates, as he tells us in the Apology, did with regard to statesmen, practical men, artisans, poets, and the like, Plato now wished to do with regard to another class of persons who had recently come into greater prominence:—The professors of education and the teachers of morality and conduct. These persons were of various classes, and held various opinions, though they have, by the commentators of Plato, been all jumbled together under the name of Sophists. They professed to teach young men to debate and

to speak in public; and this was, of course, a kind of instruction highly esteemed in the Greek cities, and especially at Athens, where each man's success in life, and his life itself, might depend on his being able to attack and defend in the public assemblies. Then again the great questions of the foundations of morality were subjects of lively interest, and an able talker who had in his mind a connected system on this subject, which he was ready to propound and defend against all comers, excited great admiration. The persons who had these gifts were resorted to by eager disciples wherever they arrived, were followed by crowds of admirers from city to city, and received large sums, as the reward for their educational services.

This last practice, that of receiving money for their lessons, is always represented by Plato, and was represented by Socrates, as a base and coarse practice. They held that it was a kind of prostitution of the mind; inasmuch as it was a giving for hire that which a right-minded person can only give through affection and esteem. However much we may admire this lofty notion of the office of an educator of youth, we cannot really assent to it as a practical rule. It is contrary to the practice of all times and places. In all ages and nations the education of youth, even the highest kind of education, has been paid for by those who receive it, or their friends; and we do not see in this practice anything degrading or coarse on either side, any more than in paying for the services of an advocate of justice or of a minister of religion. We cannot follow Plato in calling teachers of youth *sophists* on this account.

We may now go on to those which I call the Antisophist Dialogues. They form a kind of

portrait gallery of the conspicuous teachers of the time, whose teaching Plato conceived to be false and mischievous. The pictures are such as these: The highly respected moral teacher *Protagoras*; Prodicus the maker of Apologues and distinguisher of synonyms; the vain and conceited *Hippias*; the quibbler *Euthydemus* and his brother; the empty declaimer *Ion*; *Philebus*, who maintained that pleasure was the guide of life, and *Gorgias*, the celebrated teacher of rhetoric. Their names (except Prodicus, who is included in the *Protagoras*) are the names of so many Platonic Dialogues; all highly dramatic, and many of them containing very remarkable argumentative processes: but for the most part, not involving any positive principles different from those put forward in the two former classes of Dialogues; and often discussing the same questions. Thus in the *Protagoras*, we have the question, Whether Virtue can be resolved into Virtues, discussed in much the same way as in the *Laches*: only that here the professed teachers of Virtue are brought prominently forward as the subject of examination, rather than virtue itself.

One of the most celebrated of the teachers of Socrates's time was Protagoras of Abdera, in Thrace. Besides his occupations as a teacher and public lecturer, in which he was very successful, he wrote several works on philosophy, of which we do not know much about the import. One sentence of his is attacked by Plato, and is understood by the commentators, as if it meant that we have no knowledge except by sensation. He said that "Man is the measure of all things." It is plain that this may mean that man's faculties are the measure of human knowledge above all things; a very blameless doctrine, as seems to me. And even if the expression means that all our knowledge

is derived from sensation, it conveys a doctrine which though, as I conceive, false, is extremely prevalent among many of the most moral, clear-headed, and right-minded persons among ourselves. This doctrine however does not come into play in the Dialogue now before us.

PROTAGORAS.

THE opening or prelude to this Dialogue is a conversation between Socrates and a Friend, who banters him on his well-known fondness for the society of Alcibiades. The Friend says:

“ Whence come you, Socrates? But I need not ask. Of course you have been running after Alcibiades and his good looks. But I must say, that when I saw him the other day, he appeared to me no longer a boy, but a handsome man: still, a man, Socrates, to speak it between ourselves, and his chin covered with a beard.”

SOCRATES. “ What then? Do not you agree with Homer who says, that the fresh-down'd chin marks the sweetest season of manhood¹; and in that Alcibiades now is.”

FRIEND. “ Well! and are you not now freshly come from him? And how is the youth disposed towards you?”

SOC. “ Well, as I think; and not least from what has passed to-day: for he said many things

¹ Odyss. xi. 279. Odysseus says that as he was going to the house of Circe,

“There was I met by Hermes, in shape a youth of the country,
With his chin fresh-down'd, the sweetest season of manhood.”

in my favour and took my part. And certainly I have just quitted his company. But I will tell you what may seem very strange. Though he was there, I paid no attention to him, and often forgot that he *was* there."

FR. "What can have happened to you and 2 to him? You cannot have found any young man more handsome than Alcibiades, at least in this city."

Soc. "Much handsomer."

FR. "How! a citizen of ours, or a stranger?"

Soc. "A stranger."

FR. "Whence?"

Soc. "Of Abdera."

FR. "And this stranger seems to you so handsome, as to be much handsomer than the son of Clinias?"

Soc. "How, my good friend, could he who is most wise fail to seem most handsome?"

FR. "Then you come hither from the company of some wise man?"

Soc. "The wisest of those who are at present a-going, if you think Protagoras to be the wisest."

FR. "Indeed! what say you? Is Protagoras come among us?"

Soc. "Yes: he has been here three days."

FR. "And you come now from his company?"

Soc. "Having talked a great deal and heard a great deal."

FR. "And will you not tell me the conversa- 3 tion, if you have nothing to prevent you? Make that boy get up from his seat and sit down there."

Soc. "With pleasure: and I shall be obliged to you for listening to me."

FR. "And we shall be obliged to you for telling it us."

SOC. "The obligation will then be mutual. Well then, listen.

"In the course of the past night, early in the morning, while it was yet dark, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus, the brother of Phason, beat at my door very loudly with his staff, and when it was opened to him, came in in great haste, and said, in a loud voice, 'Socrates, are you awake or asleep?' and I, knowing him by his voice, said, 'That is Hippocrates. Do you bring some news?' 'None,' said he, 'but good.' 'It is well,' said I. 'But what is the matter, and why are you come so early?' 'Protagoras is come,' said he, standing
4 near me. 'Yes, the day before yesterday,' said I; 'have you only just heard it?' 'Yesterday evening only,' said he. And with this, feeling his way to the bed, he sat down at my feet, and said, 'Yesterday evening very late, as I came from the village of Cenoë; for my slave Satyrus had run away from me, and I was coming to tell you that I was going there to retake him, but something else put it out of my head. And when I returned home, and had supped and was about to go to bed, my brother told me that Protagoras was come. And my first thought was to come to you immediately; and then I thought it was too late. But when I had slept off my fatigue, as soon as I awoke, I got up and came to you as fast as I could.'

5 "And I knowing how brave the man was, and seeing how much he was excited, said, 'And how does this concern you? Has Protagoras done you some injury?' And he replied, laughing, 'By the gods, the greatest injury; inasmuch as he is the only wise man, and does not make me wise.'

'But by Jupiter,' said I, 'if you give him money and persuade him to do it, he will make you wise too.' 'I wish to heaven,' said he, 'that it only depended on that: I would not spare anything which I have nor anything which my friends could give me. And on that very account it is that I now come to you, that you may intercede with him for me. For I am too young to present myself to Protagoras, and have never seen him nor heard him; for I was only a boy when he came here the first time. But I know that all men praise him and say that he is very wise. And why should we not go to him immediately that we may find him still within. He is lodged, as I have heard, with Kallias the son of Hipponicus. Now, let us go.'

"And I said, 'My good friend, let us not go 6 yet; it is too early. But let us get up and go into the courtyard, and walk about there to pass the time till it is light; and then let us go. For Protagoras stays mostly at home. So do not be afraid of missing him. We shall probably find him within.'"

This introductory scene is curious as a picture of manners, and makes a lively prelude to the great scene with the "Sophist," which follows. But before we proceed to that, we are to have our attention fixed on the term *sophist*, which, as we have said, at first meant a person who made the acquisition and communication of wisdom his profession; but which at this time had begun to convey an opprobrious meaning which Plato did not scruple to turn to his controversial purposes.

Socrates goes on in his narration.

"After this we got up and went into the court and walked about. And I thought I would try the wits of Hippocrates a little; so I questioned

him: 'Tell me, Hippocrates,' said I, 'you are going to Protagoras, and are prepared to pay him money for teaching you something; now what do you take him to be, and what are you to become? For instance, if you went to your namesake Hippocrates of Cos, the great physician, and paid *him* money to teach you, and if any one were to ask you; Tell me, Hippocrates, you are going to pay the other Hippocrates money, as being *what?* how would you answer?' 'I should say,' he replied, 'as being a physician.'—'And if you were going to pay money to Polycleitus the Argive, or Phidias the Athenian to teach you, if any one were to ask you; You are going to pay this money to Polycleitus or Phidias, as being *what?* what would you answer?'—'I should say, as being sculptors.'—'So be it,' said I. 'Now you and I are going to Protagoras to offer *him* money, if we are rich enough, and can induce him to take us by giving what we have; and if not by getting help from our friends. If now any one, seeing how eager we are about this matter should say, Tell me, Socrates and Hippocrates, you are going to give all this money to Protagoras, as being *what?* what should we reply? what are we to call Protagoras, as we call Phidias a sculptor and Homer a poet?' 'They call the man, O Socrates,' said he, 'a Sophist.'—'Then we are to pay him this money as being a Sophist?'—'Exactly so.'

8 "And if any one were to ask you, What are you to become by being the pupil of Protagoras, how then?"—And he said, blushing, (for it was now become so light that I could see him,) 'If this case is to be like the others, it is plain,' said he, 'that I am to become a Sophist.'—'But, heaven bless me!' said I, 'would you not be ashamed to proclaim yourself a Sophist in the face of all the

Greeks?' 'In truth, O Socrates, I should, if I were to say what I feel.' "

But Socrates is aware that there is an escape from this conclusion; and he suggests it himself.

"But I said, 'I see: you do not mean that this should be the result of your learning from Protagoras. You mean that it should be part of your education, like what you learnt from the master of grammar, or of music, or of gymnastic. Each of these things you learnt, not as a profession, but as a discipline, as a liberally educated man should do.'—'Yes,' said he, 'that, and not the other, is the way I want to learn from Protagoras.'"

But this reply is to be shown to be insufficient; the Sophist is still a dangerous master.

"'But,' said I, 'do you know what you are going to do, or has it escaped your notice?'—'What is it?' said he. 'You are going to commit your soul into the hands of a Sophist. Now I wonder whether you know what a Sophist is; and if you do not know this, how can you know whether you are putting your soul into good or bad hands?'—'But,' said he, 'I think that I *do* know.'—'Tell me then, what do you suppose a Sophist to be.' 'I think,' said he, 'that as the name indicates, he is a man who knows wise things.'—'But,' said I, 'we might say this of portrait-painters, or of architects, that they know wise things: and if any one were to ask us what kind of wise things the portrait-painter knows, we should say the wise things which enable him to make likenesses, and in the same way in other cases. Now if any one were to ask us, What sort of wise things does the Sophist know? what should we answer? what kind of things does he know how to make? what should we say?' 'O Socrates, he makes men good speakers.'

- 10 “ ‘Well: perhaps we should say right: but the answer does not go far enough. For this answer brings us another question; the Sophist makes men good speakers, *about what?* The musician makes men good speakers about that which he makes men know; about music. Is it not so?’ ‘It is.’—‘Well then about what does the Sophist make men good speakers? Plainly about that which he knows.’ ‘It seems likely.’—‘And what is that which the Sophist knows himself and makes his pupils know?’ ‘In truth,’ he said, I cannot tell you.’ ”

We have here the same Socratic induction which we had in the Alcibiades and elsewhere, to prove that there can be no art of good speaking except the art of knowing what is right. But we have now the teaching of the Sophist disparaged by another comparison. Socrates goes on:

- “ And after this I said, ‘What! do you know to what danger you are going to expose your soul?’
- 11 If you had to put your body in the power of any one, at the risk of his being good or bad, you would make careful inquiries whether it were prudent to do so, and would have called to counsel your friends and relations, and would have deliberated for days. And now about your soul, which you think of far more value than your body, and on which depends your entire well-doing or ill-doing, as *it* is made good or bad—about this you do not communicate with even your father or your brother or any of us your friends, whether you are to commit it or not, to this newly-arrived stranger. But having heard of him late in the evening, as you say, you come early in the morning; not to ask any advice whether you are to commit your soul to him or not, but are ready to spend your own money and that of your friends,

taking for granted as an indisputable point that you must by all means put yourself in the hands of this Protagoras whom you do not know, as you say, and never spoke to, but whom you call a Sophist, without knowing what a Sophist is.'—And he, 12 after hearing me, said, 'It seems so, Socrates, from what you say.'"

Socrates then introduces another comparison. He says:

"'Is not, O Hippocrates, a Sophist, a seller or vender of the articles on which the soul is fed? He seems to me to be something of that kind.' 'What, Socrates, is the soul fed? Pray on what?'—'On the lessons of teachers,' said I; 'and we must take care that the Sophist does not cheat us in selling his wares, as the sellers of food for the body often do. For they, without knowing what is really good for the body, praise all their wares alike; and the buyer knows just as little, except he be a physician or a training-master. And just so these venders of lessons, who carry their wares about from city to city and sell them to every one whom they can persuade to buy, praise all the articles which they sell; but very likely some of these, too, know very little what is good for the soul and what is not: and the buyers know just as little, except any of them be soul-physicians.

"'If then you are a judge of what is good in 13 this way and what is not, you may safely buy lessons of Protagoras or of any one else. But if not, take care, my good friend, that you do not run a dreadful risk in a vital concern; for there is far more danger in buying lessons than in buying victuals. If you buy meat and drink at a shop you take it away in a plate or a pot, and before you eat or drink it, you may at home ask some one who is a judge of such matters whether the stuff is fit to

eat or to drink, and how much and when. But you cannot carry lessons away in another vessel: you must pay down the price and carry away the lesson in your mind as you have learnt it, whether it does you good or harm.

“Now let us consider these matters with our elders, for we are too young to judge of them. But for the present, as we have got under way, let us go and hear what the man says, and then talk to others about it: for Protagoras is not the only personage who is here. There are also Hippias of Elis, and, I think, Prodicus of Keos, and many other wise men.’”

Socrates and his young friend continuing their
 15 conversation, go to the porch of Kallias's house and stay there still talking. “And I suppose,” says Socrates, “that the cunuch who kept the door, (a eunuch door-keeper is a trait of Persian manners, intended perhaps to shew the magnificence of Kallias's establishment,) heard us thus conversing; and it seems he was out of humour at having the house filled with Sophists, and did not want to admit any more. When we knocked, he said,— ‘So! more Sophists! my master is engaged.’ And thereupon he banged to the door with both hands; and we knocked again, and he opened the door a very little and said, ‘Men, do you not know that he is engaged?’ ‘But, my friend,’ said I, ‘we do not come to visit Kallias; and moreover we are not Sophists, so do not be afraid of us. We are come to pay our respects to Protagoras; so pray announce us.’ But even in this way we with difficulty got the man to open the door.

16 “When we entered the house, we found Protagoras walking to and fro in the porch: and there walked with him several persons attending him on each side:—on the one side, Kallias and his bro-

ther; Paralos the son of Pericles, and Charmides; on the other side, the other of Pericles' sons, Xanthippus, and Philippides, and Antimoiros the Mendeian, who has the highest reputation among the scholars of Protagoras, and indeed studies the art professionally, with the intention of being a Sophist himself; and behind them followed others, listening to what was said: and these seemed for the most part to be a knot of strangers, the persons whom Protagoras has picked up from one city or another on his passage; drawing them after him by the magic of his strains, like another Orpheus: in this troop there were however some of our citizens. And in 17 looking at the movements of this troop, I was delighted to see how cleverly they managed to keep out of Protagoras's way as he walked forwards and backwards: when he and those who were with him turned back, these followers wheeled round to the right and the left flanks with the most admirable discipline, and got into the rear again in the most perfect order."

We see here the touch of the satirist in the descriptive manner, as marking the servile obsequiousness, amounting to the ridiculous, of the followers of these masters.

We next have it in the mock-heroic vein; for the speaker, in noticing the other persons present, employs, professedly, the expressions of Homer, in which Ulysses speaks of the heroes whom he saw in Hades¹. We must recollect that the language of Homer was as familiar to the Athenians

¹ Odyss. xi. 569 : .

"There too Minos I saw . . . Then I perceived Orion . . . Tityos too I saw . . .

Tantalus too I beheld sore plagued with wearying torments,
There in the lake he stood, and up to his chin was the water.
There he thirsty stood, yet to drink was never allowed him,

as that of Shakespeare is to us; and the use of it, or parody of it, gave a grace to what was said. "There saw I Hercules; there saw I Sisypus; there saw I Orion;" "There saw I," says Socrates, "Hippias of Elis, sitting in the opposite porch on a sort of throne; and about him on the steps of the throne sat Eryximachus, and Phædrus, and Andron, and of strangers, some of his own city, and some others. They appeared to be questioning Hippias on points of astronomy and natural philosophy; and he from his throne dispensed to them his doctrines and resolved their questions.

- 18 "And there of a truth Tantalus too I beheld. For Prodicus of Keos was one of the guests. He was in a small room which Hipponicus (the father of Kallias) commonly used for a store-room; but his house being so full of company, he had cleared it out and made it a chamber for his guests. And there Prodicus was, still in bed, enveloped in blankets and bed-clothes, and no small quantity of them, as it seemed. And near him, on the neighbouring bedsteads, sat Pausanias and a young friend of his, whom I think I heard called Agathon; and besides this boy there were the two Adimantuses, the son of Kepis and the son of Leucophidas, and some others; but as I was outside the chamber, I could not hear what they were talking about, though I much wished to hear what Prodicus said, for he appears to me a very wise and wonderful man; but in consequence of the deep quality of his

For as oft as the old man stoopt in the rage of his hot thirst
So oft vanisht the flood absorbed in the earth."

Perhaps it was merely the pleasure of using Homeric expressions which induced Plato to quote the introductory phrase of this passage. If there was any further allusion intended, why is Prodicus compared to Tantalus? Some of the commentators say, because he was very rich.

voice there was a sort of resonance in the chamber, which made the words sound indistinctly."

We have here a picture which may remind us of more than one of the descriptions which, in satirical works of fiction of our own time, have been given of what are called Literary Lions, and the hunters and followers of such Lions, and of the demeanour of both parties. With three such Lions as Protagoras, Hippias and Prodicus in his house at once, Kallias, the worshipper of such celebrities, was probably well content to have his house crammed, his servants put out of humour, and his furniture thrown into confusion; while his fellow-citizens crowded to his door before it was daylight to listen to the conversation or declamation of his distinguished guests.

Perhaps the description of Prodicus as still a-bed under a heap of soft coverings, is meant as a satirical contrast to his condemnation of bodily indulgences in the *Choice of Hercules*.

Alcibiades and Critias come in and swell the company, and Socrates soon enters upon the subject which had brought him there, by presenting Hippocrates to Protagoras, and by speaking of the anxiety of his friends that he should be well educated.

Protagoras makes rather a formal and stately 20 speech on the antiquity and dignity of his profession, which however, he says, he was the first to 21 designate without reserve by calling himself a *Sophist*; and was obviously pleased, says Socrates, that we had applied to him rather than to Hippias and Prodicus, much younger men. He says, "I do not send my pupils to astronomy and physics," glancing at Hippias.

His predecessors in the art had, he says, been 22 afraid of the name; but their attempts to cast it

off had only made them be looked upon with more suspicion. "I," he says, "take the opposite course. I say that I am a sophist, and that I teach men. I think that this way of avoiding odium is better than the other;—confession better than denial. And I take all reasonable precautions besides; so that hitherto by God's blessing no harm has happened to me from confessing myself a sophist. And yet I have now been many years in the profession. For my years are not few; by my age I might be the father of any one here. So that much the most agreeable thing to me would be, if you like, to discourse in the presence of all those who are here in the house."

Kallias asks if he shall have the seats arranged for that purpose; to which, says Socrates, we gladly agreed, being all willing to hear such wise men speak; so we took the couches and forms, and ranged them round Hippias, as the steps were highest there; and Kallias and Alcibiades brought Prodicus, having got him out of bed, and with him his companions.

"So I," says Socrates, "saw that he wished to show off in the presence of Prodicus and Hippias, and to let them see that we had come thither as admirers of him. Whereupon I said: 'Why should we not call Prodicus and Hippias and their companions to hear our discourse?' 'Certainly,' said Protagoras."

"As soon as we were seated in this way, Protagoras began: 'Now, Socrates, as all these persons are collected here, say again what you just now mentioned respecting the young man.'
24 And I said: 'I must begin, in the same way as before, to say what we came for. Hippocrates here is desirous of being in your society, and he says he would gladly know from you what will happen

to him, if he habitually associates with you. That was what we were saying.' And Protagoras replied, in a formal manner, 'O young man, your course will be, if you frequent my society, to go home the first day better than you came, and the next day better still, and every day better than the day before.' And upon this I said, 'O Protagoras, this is no such wonderful thing. It may very easily happen. For you, old as you are, if any one were to teach you what you do not know, would become better informed than you are. But this answer is not what we want; we mean *this*— If Hippocrates here were to change his mind, and were to wish to be in the society of that young man who has lately taken up his abode among us, Zeuxippus the Heracleote, and were to go to him as he is now come to you, and were to be told by him, as you now tell us, that by associating with him he shall improve daily, and become better: and if he were then to ask, Improve in what? Become better in what? Zeuxippus would say, In Painting. And so Orthagoras the Theban might promise to improve him in Music. And so to my question about you, Protagoras, I want a similar answer. *In what will he improve?*'"

This is the same line of Dialogue which we have already had in the earlier part, and which we have frequently in Plato. The novelty in this case is the stately but unsatisfactory replies which characterize Protagoras. He says:

"You question well, Socrates, and I have pleasure in answering clearly those who question well. If Hippocrates come to me he will not have to undergo what he would undergo if he had recourse to any other of the Sophists. They spoil the young men's minds. They have just gladly escaped from the tasks of boyhood, and these teachers take them

and put them back again into harder tasks—teach them Logic and Astronomy and Geometry and Music.” And here his eye glanced at Hippias. “But if he comes to me, he will learn that only which he wants to learn. My lesson is, prudence in domestic affairs; how he may best manage his house: and skill in political affairs; how he may manage best the affairs of the state, both in action and in speech.”

This sounds plausible; but the usual Socratic argument soon cuts into it. Socrates asks:

27 “Do I follow you rightly? You seem to me to speak of the Art of Politics, and to promise to make men good political characters.’ ‘That is the very thing, Socrates, which I announce and profess.’ ‘Well,’ said I, ‘you have got a very valuable art, if you *have* got it. For I will not say to you anything but what I think. For, as to my own opinion, I did not think, Protagoras, that this was an art which could be taught; but when you say that you can teach it, of course I cannot disbelieve you. But the reason why I think that it cannot be taught, nor communicated by one man to another, I am prepared to tell you. I think that the Athenians, and the other Greeks also, are wise people. Now I see that when they come together in their public assemblies to deliberate, if they have to decide a question about house-building they take counsel of the architects; if about ship-building, of the shipwrights; and so in the case of all other arts which can be taught and learnt. And if any one whom they do not suppose to be master of the craft, attempts to address them, however handsome or rich or high-born he may be, they laugh him down and hoot him down; and if, when so received, he do not desist from speaking, the policemen pull him down, and per-

haps, if the president so order, put him out of the assembly.

“‘About matters which in their opinion belong 28 to a special craft, that is the course they take; but when the matter to be discussed is the general policy of the State, there may get up to address them any one—tinker, tanner, shopkeeper, sailor, rich, poor, high-born, low-born,—and nobody is surprized, as in the former case, that such a man, having nowhere learnt the art of policy, and never having had a master in it, offers to be a counsellor about it. And so it is plain that they do not think it can be taught.’”

Here is satire as well as argument. And then we have the argument already repeatedly used, and which in the *Meno* gave Anytus so much offence, that if political wisdom were a thing which could be taught, the great politicians would have taught it to their children. Here, however, that argument acquires a new interest by the answer which Protagoras gives to it, and which is clothed in an ingenious and philosophical apologue. Socrates goes on:

“It is not merely the common public of the city which so judges, but private persons, the wisest and best citizens that we have, are not able to impart to others the art which they themselves have. Thus Pericles, the father of these young men who are here present (Paralos and Xanthippus who were mentioned before)¹, had them taught well those branches of learning of which there are masters; but in those matters in which he himself was wise, he neither taught them himself, nor gave them to others to be taught; but left them to roam at their will, like animals without mas-

¹ Section 16.

ters¹, to pick up for themselves such virtue as well as they may.

- 29 “And if you want another example, the same Pericles, acting as guardian of Kleinias, the younger brother of this Alcibiades who is here in the room, at first, from the fear of his being corrupted by Alcibiades, separated him from him and placed him with Aripbron, and had him taught; but before six months were over, he found he could make nothing of it, and allowed him to go back to his brother. I could tell you of many other cases of persons who, though virtuous themselves, could not make any other person better, whether relative or stranger. Now I, Protagoras, looking at these cases, do not think that virtue can be taught. But when I hear your promises, I am shaken, and begin to think that you must have grounds for what you say; for I know that you have seen much and heard much, and found out some things yourself. If then you can make it clear to me that virtue may be taught, do not grudge us the proof, but show that it is so.”

“‘Socrates,’ he said, ‘I will not grudge you this proof; but shall I do it in a tale or mythe, such as an old man may tell to younger men, or in a dissertation?’ Many of the company present desired him to discourse which way he would. ‘It seems then to me,’ he said, ‘to be more agreeable to put it in the form of a tale.’”

Then comes the Apologue, which I shall abridge a little. The language is, as I conceive, intentionally, somewhat poetical.

- 30 “There was once a time when the gods were, but as yet mortals were not. And when the de-

¹ Animals consecrated to the gods were allowed to wander freely.

stined time came for mortal creatures to be, the gods formed them in the bosom of the earth, of a mixture of earth and fire and other elements. And when they were about to bring them into the light of day, they commanded Prometheus and Epimetheus to give to each kind such gifts as were suitable to them. Epimetheus asks Prometheus to allow him to make the distribution: And when I have made it, said he, do you judge it. To some animals he gave strength without swiftness, to the weaker he gave the gift of quickness. To some he gave defensive armour; to those which have no such defence he gave arts which tended to their safety. The small ones had granted to them a flight in the air, or a dwelling underground; the large ones were protected by their largeness; and in this way all were put on an equality of advantages; and so he provided that none of the kinds 31 should perish.

“And when he had thus guarded them from mutual destruction, he next proceeded to protect them from the inclemency of the heavens, covering them with thick hair or firm hide, strong against cold or heat, and a natural coverlet in their beds and holes. And the feet of some he armed with hoofs, of some with hairy cases, of some with bloodless callosities. And then he gave to each its proper kind of food,—to some the grass of the field, to some the fruits of trees, and roots to some. And to some he gave that they should feed on other kinds; but these he made less prolific; while those that were their prey he made most prolific, that the kind might not be destroyed.

“And thus Epimetheus, not wholly wise, saw not that he had expended all his gifts upon the irrational tribes. And now the race of man was left ungifted, nor knew he what to do therewith. 32

And to him thus doubting comes Prometheus, to survey the work, and finds all other animals carefully provided for, but man alone, naked and bare-footed, with no covering and no armour. And now the destined day was nigh, when man must with the rest emerge from earth to the light of day. So Prometheus, in his strait how man might be preserved, steals the special arts of Hephaistos and of Athene in their vehicle of fire: for save in that vehicle they might not be conveyed or used; and so man had gifts which he hoped would make him live.

33 “ And so man had such endowment as belongs to individual life, but he had no gift of life social: *that* was still with Zeus; and into the supreme citadel of heaven, the abode of Zeus, it was not yet granted to Prometheus to penetrate. Grim guards were at the door. He could but reach the common working-rooms where Hephaistos and Athene pursued their favourite work; and gliding in unseen, he stole the art of Hephaistos wrapt in fire, the art of Athene too, and gave them to men, and thus man was empowered to live; but vengeance for the theft fell on Prometheus through Epimetheus' means, as the ancient legends tell.

34 “ So man had gifts divine, and kindred had with gods; and so he alone of creatures acknowledged gods, and altars he would build and images erect. Then too he found the art of sounds and words, and dwellingplaces, and clothing, for body and for feet, and beds, and food from the earth. And with such means, men lived dispersed, and cities there were none. And men were killed by the wild beasts, as weaker still than they. For arts that well sufficed for food were weak against furious beasts. For as yet they had no art of social life, and war is one of these. And then they drew

together, thus to seek their safety, and founded cities; but when they came together they wronged each other, because they had not the social art, and so were again scattered and destroyed.

“ So Zeus had fears for our poor race that it might perish all: and Hermes then he sent, leading with him Justice and Decency, that there might be in cities laws and bonds of union to bind men kindly together. And Hermes asked of Zeus in what manner he should give Justice and Decency to men: ‘Whether as the Arts have been distributed, so shall I them bestow? as thus: one man has the Healing Art in degree sufficient for many others; and so of other arts. Shall I thus distribute Justice and Decency, or shall I give them to all?’ ‘To all,’ said Zeus; ‘let all partake thereof. For cities could not be if but a few had them, as few have the other Arts. And proclaim from me this law, that he who does not share in Justice and Decency be slain, as a disease of his city.’

“ And so, Socrates, and for this reason, both others and the Athenians, if the discourse be concerning the Building Art or any other special Art, deem that few are fitted to give counsel; and if any one who is not of the craft offer his advice, they think it impertinent, as you say; rightly, as I say. But when they proceed to deliberate about the Art Social, which must throughout be directed by justice and moderation, they no less rightly are willing to hear every man, since these virtues all must have, or cities cannot be. Of that, O Socrates, this is the cause.

“ And that you may not think it error to believe that all men think that they have a share of Justice and the other social virtues, take this, another proof. For in other arts, as you truly say,

if any man say that he is a good musician, or master of any other art, when he is not so, they either laugh at him or are indignant against him; and his friends come and try to stop him as if he were mad. But in the matter of Justice and the other social virtues, even when they know a man to be unjust, if this man tell the truth against himself in the presence of many, that which in the other case was thought prudence, is in this deemed madness. They hold that all must say that they are just, whether they are so or not; and that a man who does not pretend to be a just man is a madman. They hold that it is necessary that every man should have this virtue, or cease to be a man.

38 “ Thus they deem that every man may give counsel where justice is concerned, because they think that all have this virtue: such is my account of that. But that they think that men have not this virtue by nature and spontaneously, but that it is a matter of teaching, and is acquired by care where it is acquired, I will now further try to prove to you. On account of those bad qualities which they think that others have, by nature or by misfortune, no one is angry; nor admonishes, nor teaches, nor punishes those that have them, for being such as they are, though we may pity them; for instance, the ugly, or the dwarfed, or the feeble-bodied, who is so absurd as to treat in that way? All know that these qualities and their opposites fall to men's lot by nature and by fortune.

“ But the good qualities which they think that men acquire by study, and exercise, and teaching, if any have not them, but have the opposite bad qualities, against these persons are directed indignation and punishment and admonition. And among those bad qualities are injustice and impiety, and,

in short, all that is opposed to Social Virtue. In those cases every one is angry and reproves the offender, obviously taking for granted that the good quality may be acquired by study and by teaching.

“And, Socrates, if you will consider what 39 punishment can do to the offenders, this too will show you that men think virtue to be a thing that can be acquired. For no one punishes offenders, directing his mind to this point, and for this cause, simply that he has done wrong; no one at least who does not take vengeance irrationally like a wild beast. He who inflicts punishment rationally, does so, not on account of the past offence—for he cannot make undone what has been done—but for the sake of the future; that the offence may not be again committed, either by the same person or by any one who has seen the punishment. And inasmuch as he has this purpose, he judges that virtue can be taught, and punishes for the sake of prevention.

“This then is the purpose which men have 40 when they punish those who wrong them, whether as private or as public persons. And as men in other places punish those who they think wrong them, so do the Athenians your fellow-citizens. So that, by this reasoning, the Athenians are among those who think that virtue may be acquired and taught.

“And thus, Socrates, that your citizens are right though they listen to a tinker or a tanner when he discusses political questions; and that virtue can be acquired and taught, is proved, as appears to me, very sufficiently.”

This exposition will, I fear, appear to the English reader rather prolix. It must be recollected, as I have already had occasion to remark, that an Athenian audience are represented, in these Dia-

logues, as quite insatiable in the article of such discussions. Probably the manner of Protagoras's discoursing was intended, in this and the subsequent part of the Dialogue, to be given with dramatic effect; and though to be tedious in representing tediousness, is a somewhat dangerous experiment in a dramatist, we may read the discourse with interest on that account. Nor is it without considerable merits. The mythe by which the general prevalence among men of Justice and Decency is explained, has great beauty as a philosophical apologue, and is at least as good a lesson of moral instruction as the *Choice of Hercules* of Prodicus. The language, moreover, in which this mythe is narrated, is full of poetical phrases, which suit well with its mythological subject. The two virtues which Hermes is directed to convey to mortals, *Dikê* and *Aidôs*, which I have translated *Justice* and *Decency*, are more literally perhaps, *Right* and *Shame*. Mr Grote¹ paraphrases these as "a sense of reciprocal obligation and right between himself and others, and a sensibility to esteem or reproach from others." And this mutual Sense of Rights and mutual Reverence among men must surely be allowed to be among the foundation-principles of a sound and reasonable morality; and not at all fit to be described as belonging to a base and fallacious system, such as the Commentators are fond of ascribing to "the Sophists," and to Protagoras among them.

But the Socratic argument, If virtue be docible, why did not our most virtuous men teach it to their children? is still to be dealt with. Protagoras thus proceeds:

- 41 "There remains your difficulty about good men, why they do teach their sons other Arts, in

¹ Vol. viii. p. 515 note.

which there are masters, and make them wise in those; but in that art or excellence in which they themselves are good, they make them no better than other men. On this point, Socrates, I will no longer put forth tales but reasons. Now is there or is there not one thing of which all the citizens of a State must partake, if a State there is to be? It is by considering this, that your difficulty is solved, or not at all. But if there be such a thing, and this one thing is not the Art of Building, nor Brass-working, nor Pottery-making, but Justice and Moderation and Piety, and all the social virtues in one; if it be this thing of which all men must partake; and if every man, whatever else he may learn or may do, must do it *with this*, and not do it if he have not this; and if every man, woman, and child, who has not this, must be taught and punished, until by such means he is made better; and if he who is not brought to conformity by teaching and punishment, is to be expelled the city as a thing unholy, or put to death; if this be so, and if, this being so, good men, while they teach their sons other things, do not teach them this, consider what marvellous persons these good men are!

“For that they think this thing *may* be taught, 42 both in their private and in public capacities, we have proved. And the thing being capable of being taught and cultivated, are we to suppose that they teach their sons those things in which there is no punishment, capital or other, for not knowing them, but that in those things in which the punishment is death and exile for those who have not learnt and cultivated them, and besides that, confiscation of their goods, and, in a word, utter destruction, they do not teach and enjoin them with all possible diligence? Certainly, Socrates,

we must suppose that they do. They begin when they are little children, and go on teaching and instructing them as long as they live. As soon as they can understand what is said to them, every one, nurse, mother, tutor, tries in every way to make the child good, taking occasion from every occurrence and word, and pointing out, This is right; this is wrong; this is honourable; this is dishonourable; this is pious; this is impious; do this; do not do that. And if they obey what is said, it is well; but if not, they set them right with threats and blows, like men straightening a
43 crooked piece of wood. And after this, they send them to school, and are far more earnest in their injunctions to the masters to attend to the good conduct of the boys, than to their letters or their music. And the masters do attend to these things; and when they have learnt to read and can understand what is written, they take another step, as they did when they had learnt to speak; they set them upon the forms of the school and make them read there the poems of good poets; and learn them by heart. And in these there are many moral precepts, many narrations, and many praises of the good men of old times, that the boy may be inspired with a desire to imitate them, and may wish to be like such men. And in like manner the music-masters do the same, and take care that the young men are well-behaved, and do nothing wrong. And when they have learnt to play on the harp, they teach other poems of good poets set to music; and make the rhythm and the harmony take possession of the souls of the boys, and soften their natures, and make them regular and harmonious, so that there may be measure and harmony in all that they do and say. For the whole life of man needs measure and harmony.

“ And after this they send them to the master of 44 gymnastics, that their bodies may be fit to second the good impulses of their souls, and may not show any base weakness in war or on any other occasion. Those do this the most who have most the means of doing it; and those are the richest. Their children begin to learn of masters the earliest, and leave off the latest.

“ And when they have done with masters, the State compels them to learn the laws, and to live according to the rules of law, and not to live at random according to their own fancies. And as writing-masters, in order to instruct those who cannot write well, make marks in pencil on the copy-book, and give it to them and make them follow the guidance of those lines, so the State gives them as their guiding lines the laws devised by good ancient lawgivers, makes them follow these, as governing or governed; and whoever deviates from those lines is punished. And the name of this punishment is *Correction*, because it corrects faults.

“ Now when so much care is bestowed on the 45 teaching of what is right, both in private and in public, do you question and doubt, Socrates, whether virtue can be taught? It is no wonder that it is taught, and it would be very wonderful if it were not taught.

“ But why then, you ask, do many sons of good parents turn out bad? I will tell you that too. There is nothing extraordinary in it, if what I have said before be true, that this thing, Virtue, is a thing of which nobody must be devoid, if the state is to exist at all. For if what I say be true, as true it undoubtedly is, consider what the case would be if we were to make the same supposition about any other art, taking any that

46 you please to choose. If a State could not exist except all we its citizens were flute-players, each playing as best he might; and if everybody taught everybody else this art, publicly and privately, and scolded him who played ill, and did not spare his objurgations, as we now, about right and law, do not spare, or conceal our opinion;—for we are gainers by the justice and virtue of others; and so it comes to pass that every one is ready to teach others what is right and lawful;—if in the same way we were very ready and liberal in setting people right about their fluting, do you think, Socrates, that the sons of the good flute-players would play better than the sons of the bad ones? I do not think so. He who had the best talent for flute-playing, whosever son he was, would become a great flutist; he who had no talent would get no credit. Often it would happen that the son of a good flutist would be a bad one, the son of a bad flutist a good one. And yet all would be tolerable players, compared with those who had never learnt to play at all.

47 “And so you must suppose now that a man who appears to you very unjust among those who have been brought up among laws and in human society, is a just man and has a special knowledge of the subjects compared with men who have no moral instruction, no laws, no courts of justice, no universal necessity compelling all to attend to what is right; but who were wild men, such as Pherecrates the poet introduced in his play at the Lenæan festival. If you were to fall among such men, you would think even Eurybatos and Pharondas men that you would be glad to meet, and would wish for their habits which you now think intolerable rascality. But as the case now is, Socrates, you are nice in such matters, because all are teachers of

virtue, each as best he may, though you can find no such teacher. It is as if you were to seek some one who teaches men to speak Greek: you would find none. And so if you tried to find some one to teach the crafts which children learn from craftsmen their fathers and from their fathers' friends who are of the same craft—to find a master who would teach these youths more than they know would not be easy; but it would be easy to find a master to teach those who know nothing. And so it is with regard to virtue and the rest.”

This harangue of Protagoras is undoubtedly prolix, and does not go to the bottom of the matter as Plato wished to do. Yet there is a great deal of truth and good sense in many parts of it: and I have been unwilling to abridge it, because, as I have said, I conceive that it was intended to be characteristic. Some of the arguments we have had in other Dialogues; for instance, in the *Alcibiades* the comparison of the way in which men learn the rule of right to that way in which they learn Greek.

The statement that there were then no masters who taught boys Greek, may perhaps suggest the remark that it does not agree with our practice, for we have among us masters who teach boys English, that is, English grammar. But the grammatical teaching of Greek was at any rate only beginning in Plato's time, and indeed was organized by these very teachers or “Sophists.” Protagoras himself is said to have been the first who technically distinguished the genders of nouns; and Prodicus was noted for his subtlety in discriminating apparent synonyms—a part of his teaching often referred to in these Dialogues.

The account given of the Greek education is interesting; nor can it be denied that it represents

what has in all cultured natures been deemed, and would still be deemed among ourselves, a good education; modifying, of course, some of the subjects taught; for instance, omitting music, and introducing certain foreign languages, ancient and modern. That it was not a moral education founded on making morality a science, which was what Socrates and Plato alleged against it, was a defect which has not yet been remedied in education, and which no one now, I think, aspires to remedy.

The mention of Eurybatos and Pharondas as conspicuous for rascality, might at first seem to be a piece of contemporary satire: but it appears rather that these were ancient and proverbial rascals, referred to when terms of abuse were needed. Thus Æschines says of his antagonist Ctesiphon¹, "But I think neither Pharondas nor Eurybatos, nor any of the rascals of old time, was ever such a swindler and cheat as this man."

After having described the way in which men in general come by their moral education, and reconciled his account with the possibility of his own teaching being of some value, Protagoras goes on to describe the way in which he requires his payment. To be paid for such teaching at all was, in the eyes of Socrates and Plato, as I have said, a shocking baseness and coarseness; but if such teachers are to be paid (which certainly we at the present day cannot think anything monstrous), we cannot imagine anything more reasonable and dignified than Protagoras's mode of proceeding.

- 48 He says, "Therefore if there be any one who possesses, even in a small degree, the art of helping men forward in goodness, we are to take it as a happy thing. Now such a person do I profess

¹ Æsch. *in Ctes.* p. 527.

to be: and I reckon that I do see better than other men how men are to be directed to what is good and honourable. In this way I can render services which are worth the hire, and more, as the scholar himself will judge. And of this I am so confident that I proceed in this manner, in requiring my payment. When any one has learnt from me, he pays me, if he pleases, what I ask. But if not, he goes to the temple and states upon his oath what he thinks my lessons have been worth, and so much he pays.

“And thus, Socrates, I have told you my tale, and given you my reasons for saying that Virtue may be taught, and that it is not surprising when good fathers have bad sons, and bad fathers good sons; for [to take one more example] the sons of Polycleitus, youths of the age of this Paralos and Xanthippus [the sons of Pericles], are nothing in comparison with their fathers; and, in like manner, the sons of other artists. Though indeed it is hardly fair yet to pronounce against these young men: there is still hope in them, for they are young.”

“So Protagoras,” Socrates proceeds, “having 49 delivered this long and clever oration, ended his discourse. And I for a long time continued to look at him like a man bewildered, expecting him to say more, and wishing to hear it. And when I found that he really had finished, I with some difficulty collected and roused myself and said, looking at Hippocrates: ‘Son of Apollodorus! how much I am obliged to you for inducing me to come hither; for I reckon it a great privilege to have heard from Protagoras what I have heard. Before, I thought that there was ~~no human instruction~~ by which good men ~~are~~ made good; but now I am convinced.

“ ‘But there is one small difficulty which I still have, which I do not doubt that Protagoras will easily explain, as he has explained so many things in what he has already said. [In this he has a great superiority over other speakers.] For if any one were to hear any of our public speakers discussing about such matters, he might hear the like discourses from Pericles, or any other of our great orators. But if one asks *them* questions about what they have said, they are silent, just as books are, and make no answer, and ask no further question. If any one interrogates them ever so little about what they have said, they are like brazen vessels which when they have been struck go on ringing for a long time, till you put your hand upon them. So our speakers in reply to a short question give us a long harangue.

50 “ ‘But Protagoras here is able both to deliver a long and beautiful discourse, as appears by what we have heard, and also able to answer questions briefly, and when he asks questions to wait for a reply, and to receive it—a gift which is given to few.’

“ ‘So now, Protagoras, I only want one small matter to be quite satisfied, if you will answer me this. You say that Virtue may be taught; and I, if I am to believe any one, will believe you. But a thing which puzzled me while you were speaking, I want you to satisfy my mind about. You said that Zeus sent to men Justice and Decency, and in several other parts of your discourse mention was made by you of Justice, and Moderation, and Piety, and how all these in one were Virtue. Tell me then exactly about these,—if Virtue be one thing, and if the parts of it be Justice and Moderation and Piety; or are all these different names of one and the same thing? That is what I still want to know.’”

We are here brought to one of the fundamental questions of the Socratic School, whether Virtue can be separated into Virtues; from the solution of which, as I mentioned in the Introduction to the *Laches*, Socrates and his disciples appear to have looked for great results. In the sequel of this Dialogue this question is discussed very much in the same way as in the *Laches*; being made to depend on the narrower question, whether *Andria*, Courage, can be separated from the other virtues. But it is in the first place made the subject of discussion in a more general way. Protagoras replies to Socrates's inquiry:

"It is easy, Socrates, to answer that: those 51 which you mention are parts of Virtue, which is one."

"Whether," said I, "as the parts of the face are parts;—the mouth and the nose and the eyes and the ears; or as the parts of a lump of gold, which do not differ one from another, or from the whole, except in largeness or smallness?"

"In the former way, Socrates; as the parts of the face are related to the whole face."

"And," said I, "do men partake of these parts of Virtue, one having one part and another another: or is it necessary that if a man have one he must have all?"

"By no means," said he; "for many are courageous, but unjust; and again, just, but not wise."

"These, then," said I, "are parts of Virtue; Wisdom and Courage?"

"Certainly," said he; "and Wisdom is the greatest of the parts."

"But each of them is different," said I; "one is one thing, another is another.—And has each of them its peculiar property, as the parts of the face have? The eye is not like the ear, nor is its

property the same; and so of the rest; no one is as the rest, in its property, or in anything else. Is it so also with the parts of Virtue: is one not like another, neither in itself nor in its property? It is plain that it must be so if it is like the image which we have taken."

"It is so, Socrates," said he.

52 And I said: "Then no other part of Virtue is like Justice, or like Courage, or like Moderation, or like Wisdom?"

He said it was not.

"Well come," said I, "let us consider together, of what kind each of them is. And first, thus—Is Justice anything, or nothing? I think it is something: what do you think?"

"I think so too," said he.

"But what? If any one were to ask me and you: O Protagoras and Socrates, tell me now, this thing which you just now named, Justice, is it a just thing or an unjust? I should answer that it is a just thing. What would you vote? with me, or otherwise?"

"With you," said he.

"Then I should reply to the question, that justice is such a thing that it is just: would not you also?"

"Yes," said he.

53 "If after this he were to ask, Do you not say also that there is such a thing as Piety? We should say, there is?"

"Yes," said he.

"And is not this something too? We should say it is? or not?"

This too he agreed to.

"And is this a thing of such a kind as to be pious or impious? I should," said I, "be angry with the questioner, and should say: Use good lan-

guage, man. It would be hard for anything else to be pious, if piety itself were impious. What would you say? Would you answer in the same way?"

"Certainly," said he.

"And if after this he should ask us, What did you say a little while ago? Did I not hear you rightly? You seemed to me to say that the parts of Virtue were so related to each other that one of them was not as another—I should say, As to the rest, you heard rightly, but when you think that *I* said this, you did not hear aright. Protagoras here did answer that it was so; but I only asked the question. And if he were *then* to say, he says truly, Protagoras: *you* said the parts of Virtue were not one as another: this is your assertion. What would you then reply to him?"

"It would be necessary, Socrates, to allow that it is so."

"And what, O Protagoras, having allowed this, 54 should we reply to him, if he were to go on to ask: And is Piety then such a thing as not to be just, and Justice such a thing as not to be pious? Is Justice such a thing as to be impious? and Piety such a thing as to be unjust? I for my part should say that Justice was a pious thing, and Piety a just thing. And on your part, if you would permit me, I would reply to the same effect, that either Justice is the same thing as Piety or as like it as possible, and that Justice is as Piety and Piety as Justice in the greatest degree. But consider whether you forbid my making this reply, or whether you agree to it."

"It does not seem to me, Socrates, said he, to be quite so simple a matter; so that one can grant Justice to be a pious thing, and Piety a just thing. There seems to me to be some difference in the

case. But what matters it?" said he. "If you like, let us have Justice a pious thing, and Piety a just thing."

55 "That will not do," said I. "I do not want your *If you like*, and *If you please*, but to prove you or me right. And when I say you or me, I think we shall both come to a conclusion in our argument if we have nothing to do with *if*."

"Well, well!" said he; "Justice has some resemblance to Piety: everything has a resemblance to everything else, *in one way or other*. White is like black in a certain way, and hard is like soft, and things are like their contraries; and so those things which we spoke of, the parts of the face, and said that one was not as another, and that they had different properties, in one way or other they are like, and one is as another. So that in this way you might prove, if you chose, that all things are alike with one another. But to call things alike which merely have something that is like, even if the like part be very small, is not reasonable."

56 And I, surprised, said to him, "Do you think that what is just and what is pious are so related to each other that they have *some small part* like one another?"

"Not exactly," said he; "but it is not so great as you seem to think."

This ingenious argument undoubtedly ends in the defeat of Protagoras. He is proved to have made inconsistent assertions, the blot with which the combatants in these word-fencing matches try to mark their adversaries. The false move which Protagoras makes is the allowing, that Justice is just, Piety pious, and the like. There is really no sense in applying to abstract terms the very adjectives from which they are derived. A *man* may

be just and may be pious: but *justice* is not *just*, except when personified.

There is no doubt a real moral argument involved in these argumentations; but the exposition of it by the application of adjectives and their contraries, to substantives, though a favourite scheme of Plato, cannot be accepted as demonstrative, which he wishes to make it.

Another object in this Dialogue is, I conceive, to show the superiority of the Socratic mode of question and answer to the continuous discourses delivered by the professors whom Plato calls Sophists. This object, and other comparisons of Plato's mode of teaching with that of his rivals, is further pursued in the sequel of the Dialogue. But there is first another argument of a similar kind to be worked out.

This argument, however, I need not give at length. It is briefly this: that *Aphrosyne*, Folly or Imprudence, is the opposite of *Sophia*, Wisdom, which, as we have seen, Protagoras had mentioned as one of the principal Virtues: but *Aphrosyne* is also opposite to *Sophrosyne*, Prudence. Now Protagoras has been made to grant that each moral 57 adjective has only one direct opposite; *good* has *bad*; honourable (*kalon*) has dishonourable (*aischron*); and so of the rest. And then again Protagoras is involved in contradictory assertions.

Though this argument is repeatedly used in Plato, I do not think it can be regarded as of much weight. Moral adjectives cannot thus be arranged in exact pairs of opposites. Folly is opposite to Wisdom: it is also opposite to Prudence: but this does not prove that we can draw no tenable distinction between Wisdom and Prudence. And still less can such an inference be drawn when we have to do with a word of wide

and various application, such as *Sophrosyne* is, as we have seen in the *Charmides*. Such arguments are rather a criticism of moral phraseology, as not being scientifically precise and systematic, like the phraseology of mathematics; which it was not in Greek, and probably never has been or will be in any language.

58 This argument, however, is represented as ruffling the composure of Protagoras. Socrates says, somewhat triumphantly,

“Must it not be then that Prudence and Wisdom are the same thing; and we have already seen that Justice and Piety are nearly the same thing.” He asserted very reluctantly.

59 “But come,” said I, “Protagoras, let us not give it up; let us examine the other parts of virtue. Does any one when he acts unjustly, seem to you to be prudent?”

“I should be ashamed, O Socrates,” said he, “to allow that it can be so, though many men do say so.”

“Should I then address myself to them, or to you?”

“If you will,” said he, “pray argue first against the opinion of the many.”

“It makes no difference to me, if only you answer, whether you have the same opinion or have not. I examine the argument only; and so I who ask and you who answer will be both brought under examination.”

Protagoras at first made plausible excuses, and complained that it was a hard subject; however at length he agreed to answer.

60 “Come then,” said I, “answer me from the beginning. Do any men seem to you to be prudent when they commit injustice?”

“Be it so,” said he.

“But to be prudent is to think rightly?”

He allowed it.

“To think rightly even while they act unjustly?”

“Be it so,” said he.

“If they succeed in their injustice, or if they fail?”

“If they succeed.”

“Do you say that there are things which are good?”

“I do say it.”

“Now,” said I, “are those things good which are useful to men?”

“Nay, by heaven,” said he, “there are many things which I call good, though they are not useful to men.”

“And now Protagoras seemed to me to be disturbed, and to be embarrassed and troubled in answering. So when I saw him in this state, I took care not to irritate him further, and asked him quietly, ‘Do you mean, Protagoras, things which are not useful to any *man*, or things which are not useful *at all*? Do you call such things good?’”

Protagoras had been writhing under the Socratic saw, probably quite as much because it prevented him from speaking at length, as because he saw another defeat impending. At this point he breaks away from his interrogator, and dashes into declamation.

“No,” he said; “but I know many things which are useless to men, meats and drinks and medicines, and a thousand other things: and I know things that are useful: things too which to men are neither useful nor the contrary, but are so to horses; some things to cattle only; some things to dogs; and some things to none of them, but

to trees. And further, some things which are good for the roots of trees and bad for the branches; as dung is good for all plants if laid on their roots, but if you choose to put it upon the young shoots and the buds they are all killed. And so oil is very bad for all plants, and for the hair of all animals except men; but very nourishing to the hair
62 of men, and to the rest of his body. So various and manifold a thing is the good, that this very oil is good for the outside of the body, but for the inside very bad. And therefore all physicians forbid their sick patients to use oil, or direct them to use it in very small quantities in what they eat; only to such an extent as to remove the disagreeable odour of viands and their accompaniments."

Here the Socratic question and answer are quite put aside; and though Protagoras' speech is very little to any purpose except to show his varied knowledge, it is received with applause by his admirers; and the conflict between the two methods begins more clearly.

"When Protagoras had said this, those present declared by a hum of applause, that it was well spoken; and I said:

"O Protagoras, I happen to be a man with a very bad memory; and if any one makes long speeches to me, I forget where the argument is. So as if I were hard of hearing, you would think it necessary, if you were going to talk with me, to speak louder than you speak to other men, pray cut down your answers and make them shorter, if I am to follow you."

"How do you desire me to answer briefly?" said he. "Must I answer more briefly than it is necessary?"

"By no means," said I.

“But as briefly as it is necessary.”

“Yes,” said I.

“And must I answer at such length as *I* think necessary, or as *you* think?”

“I have heard,” said I, “that you are able 63 both to speak yourself and to teach others to speak at great length, so that the discourse never fails: and also, so briefly that no one can say a thing in fewer words than you. If then you are to talk with me, use your second manner to me, your brevity of speech.”

“Socrates,” he said, “I have disputed with many men, and if I had done what you request, and conducted my argument in the way in which my adversary directed, I should have seemed no better than another man, and the name of Protagoras would never have been heard of in Greece.”

“So I—for I knew that he had not pleased 64 himself with his former answers, and that he would not, with his good will, converse as the answerer—thought that there was no longer any use in my staying in that company: and I said,

“Protagoras, I am not at all desirous that our conversation should be carried on in a way that is disagreeable to you. When you will discourse in such a way that I can follow you, I will then talk with you. For you, as they report of you, and as you yourself say, can carry on a conversation either in long speeches or in short ones. For you are a wise man. But I am quite unable to go on with long speeches. I wish I could do it. You, who can do both, ought to have condescended to me, that we might have conversed: but now as you will not do this, and I have an engagement, and could not stay till you had finished your long speeches—for I have business elsewhere—I go.

If it were not so, I could probably have heard you with pleasure.'

65 "And upon this, I got up as about to go away. And as I rose, Kallias took hold of my right hand, and with his left hand seized this cloak of mine, and said, 'We will not let you go, Socrates, for if you depart, our conversation will no longer be the same. I beg you then to remain with us; there is nothing that I could hear with more pleasure than you and Protagoras conversing together. Gratify us all.' And I said—I had now got up, and was going out—'O son of Hipponicus, I always admire your love of wisdom, and I now praise and love it; and I would gladly gratify you, if you asked a possible thing of me. But now it is as if you were to ask me to go along with Krison the Himerean, in his swiftest career; or to run along with and to follow some of the foot-racers and running messengers. I should in such a case tell you that I wish, much more than you can do, that I *could* follow the pace of those persons. If you want to see me and Krison running together, you must ask him to let himself down to my pace; for I cannot run fast, but he can run slowly. If then you wish to hear me and Protagoras, beg him, as at first he answered my questions briefly and to the point, to do the same now. If he will not, how are we to talk together? I thought that conversation was one thing, and speech-making another.'

66 " 'But you see, Socrates,' said he; 'Protagoras seems to make a reasonable proposal, that he should speak as he likes, and you as you like.'

"And Alcibiades interposing, said: 'Kallias, you do not speak well. Socrates here confesses that he cannot make speeches, and in that, allows the superiority of Protagoras; but in answering and in giving and taking arguments, I should wonder if

he came second to any man. If then Protagoras allows that he is inferior to Socrates in conversation, that is enough for Socrates. But if he does not grant this, let him argue by question and answer, not making a long speech on each question, confusing the subject, and not giving a reply to the argument, but running on till the greater part of the hearers forget what the question was. For I will answer for Socrates that *he* will not forget it, though he jests with us, and says he has a bad memory. I think, then, that Socrates speaks most reasonably; for each person must give his opinion.'

"And when Alcibiades had spoken, it was, I 67 think, Kritias who said, 'O Prodicus and Hippias, Kallias appears to me to be strongly on the side of Protagoras: and Alcibiades is always an eager disputant on whichever side he takes up. But we are not called upon to adopt either the side of Socrates or of Protagoras, but to join in requesting both in the mean time not to break up the conversation.'

"And when he had said this, Prodicus said, 'You seem to me to speak well, Kritias; for those who are present at such discussions ought to be hearers *common* to the two parties, but not *equal*: for these are different things: we ought to hear both parties in common, but not to judge both sides to be equal, but to give more approval to the wiser, and less to the worse reasoner. And for my part, 68 Protagoras and Socrates, I beg of you to *debate* in deed, but not to *quarrel*; for friends debate with friends in all good will, but those quarrel who are hostile and ill disposed to one another. In this way the conversation will be most agreeable. For in this way you the speakers will best win the *approval* of us the hearers, not the *praise*: for persons are approved by the sincere judgment of the

hearers without pretence, but persons are often praised by those who do not speak their real opinion. And we the hearers shall have the most *satisfaction*, not *enjoyment*; for we are satisfied when we learn something, and our minds share in new thoughts; but enjoyment is when we eat or take in any other way what is agreeable to the body.' As Prodicus said this, many of those present expressed their approval of it."

We have here Prodicus' noted habit of discriminating near synonyms, very broadly dramatised. His distinguishing *common* and *equal*, *debate* and *quarrel*, *approval* and *praise*, *satisfaction* and *enjoyment*, and the artificial flow and balance of his sentences, is doubtless intended to be characteristic. We have next Hippias dramatised in like manner.

"After Prodicus, Hippias the wise said: 'O men of this company,' said he, 'I regard you all as relatives of one another, and fellow-citizens and members of the same household, by nature, though not by law. For like is related to like by nature; but law, which is the tyrant of mankind, brings things together by force against nature. And this being so, it is disgraceful that we who know the nature of things, and are the wisest of the Greeks, and are, from our interest in such matters, come together into this city, the very head-quarter of wisdom in Greece, and into this the greatest and most opulent house of the city, should not come to any result worthy of this reputation, and should run into disputes, as the most ordinary men might do.

70 I then beg of you, and exhort you, O Protagoras and Socrates, to come to a mutual understanding, allowing us as umpires to bring you together. And neither do you, Socrates, insist upon the extremest brevity of speech, if it is not agreeable to Protagoras, but give the rein a little to your dis-

courses, that they may be more stately and ornate; nor let Protagoras spread all his sails, and rush into the great ocean of oratory, so as to lose sight of land; but steer a middle way between the two. Take my advice in this, and for this purpose, elect a moderator or president or chairman, who shall keep each of you within the due limits of moderate discourse.'

"This pleased them all, and all expressed their approval: and Kallias said that he would not let me go; and they begged me to choose a president. And I said, 'that it was quite intolerable to choose ⁷¹ an umpire for our discourse; for either the person chosen will be inferior to us, and then it will not be right to have the worse man presiding over the better: or he will be equal to us, and then he will be no better than we are, and will be a superfluous appendage. Well then, you will choose some one better than we are. But in truth, I hold it to be impossible to find any one who is better than Protagoras. And if you profess to choose a better, but really take one who is not so, it will be an affront to him, to have a worse man made a moderator over him. To me it makes no difference. But I will do this, that the conversation and the discussion may go on as you wish. If Protagoras will not answer, let him ask me questions, and I will answer, and I will try to show him how questions should be answered. And when I have answered as much as he chooses to ask, let him then in like manner give replies to me. If then he does not like to answer questions, I beg of him, as you beg of me, not to break up the company. And we shall need no president: you will all be presidents together.'

"All agreed that this was the right thing to ⁷² do. Protagoras did not much like it, but he was

obliged to agree to question me; and when he had done this long enough, himself to answer briefly questions asked him. He began his interrogations in some such way as this:—

The importance which Plato gave to the establishment of debate by question and answer in the place of declamation, appears in the prolix discussion of this point, and the pertinacity with which Socrates insists upon it. We have now another of the characteristic practices of Plato's rivals brought into view: their habit of discussing questions in the form of a commentary or criticism of some ancient poet. The difficulty of conveying the purport of this discussion to the English reader is considerable. The language of the ancient poet (Simonides) is obscure from its vagueness, as appears by its being made the subject of different interpretations in the course of the conversation. But more than this; Socrates gives interpretations at one period which appear to be insincere and quibbling, and which he himself afterwards retracts: and he gives his exposition in so prolix and digressive a manner, that he deprives himself of all right to censure Protagoras for the length of his harangue.

Various passages in the poem of Simonides are referred to in the discussion; and perhaps the criticism will be more intelligible if we put together these parts, and thus make a restoration of the poem.

This is the restored poem.

“Indeed a good man truly to become is hard,—
 Square-balanc'd, hands and feet;
 Free from oblique defect.

* * * * *

Nor care I for the speech of Pittacus,
 Wise though the speaker were:
 ‘A good man still to be is hard,’

A gift a God alone may have:
 For man is evil then without escape
 When stress resistless comes.
 He who acts well, a good man sure is he;
 He who acts ill is nought; but those who work
 Good in their common course of deeds
 Are by the Gods beloved.

Me *he* will satisfy
 Who is not evil-soul'd,
 Not helpless, sound in spirit;
 Knowing of rights which form the strength of States,
 Him will I never blame.
 Censure delights me not,
 For infinite the race of Folly's sons,
 And that is fair where foulness does not reign.
 Wherefore I seek not that which cannot be,
 Nor waste in empty hopes my life,
 To find a blameless man
 'Mid all who live on earth's wide fruitful breast:
 Him found, I will declare.
 But each I praise and love
 Willing who nought does evil;
 But to necessity e'en Gods must yield."

Xenophon quotes a passage of another poet which also is introduced into this discussion:

"But a good man is sometimes a good man, sometimes a bad man."

This he quotes to illustrate his assertion that some persons (for instance Kritias and Alcibiades) were good when they were in the habit of associating with Socrates, and became bad when they left him.

Another of the difficulties of rendering this discussion arises from this: that it depends in part on the distinction of the two verbs *to become* and *to be*. This distinction is, in some of the Platonic Dialogues, made to bear the whole stress of the argument; and is difficult to translate, even there. To discover such subtle precision of expression in ancient poetry is, as I suppose, entirely fanciful; but it is a process which serves to bring into view the peculiarities of the Platonic philosophy.

I will now proceed to give an account of the critical discussion. Protagoras, as we have seen, had undertaken to question Socrates. He begins thus:

“I think, Socrates, that it is a great part of a good education to be strong in literature; that is, to be able to understand the things which have been said by the poets, to point out what is rightly said and what wrongly, and to be able to explain and give reasons when asked; and my present question will be on that very subject on which we were speaking, namely Virtue, only transferred into the domain of poetry; that will be the only difference.

“Simonides in one place says to Scopas the son of Creon, the Thessalian, that

‘A good man truly to become is hard,—
Square-balanced, hands and feet;
Free from oblique defect.’

“Do you know it, or shall I repeat to you the whole poem?”

73 “I said, ‘There is no necessity, I am quite familiar with the poem.’

“You say well,” said he. “Now does it appear to you that the poet is right and says well, or not?”

“Perfectly right and well,” said I.

“But does it appear to you that the poet is right, if he makes contradictory assertions?”

“In that case, not right,” said I.

“Think again,” said he.

“My good sir, I have thought sufficiently.”

“Then do you know,” said he, “that as the poem goes on, he says in another place,

‘Nor care I for the speech of Pittacus,
Wise though the speaker were:
A good man still to be is hard?’

“Do you perceive that this is the same man who uttered the former passage?”

“I know,” said I.

“Do you think then that this assertion agrees with the other?”

“I think so,” said I: but at the same time I was afraid that there might be something in what he said. “But,” said I, “do *you* not think so?”

“How can a man agree with himself who first asserts that it is hard to become truly a good man, and then, a little further on, forgets what he had said, and blames Pittacus who had said the same thing, ‘A good man still to be is hard.’ If he blames him, he blames himself. The first assertion or the second must be wrong.”

“This criticism was received with a murmur of 74 applause by the hearers. And I felt as if I had received a hard hit, and almost lost my head. And then, to tell you the truth, in order to gain time for consideration, I turned to Prodicus and addressed him:

“Prodicus,” I said, “Simonides is a countryman of yours: you must come to his assistance. I call you to my aid as Homer makes Scamander call Simois, when Achilles is annihilating him; when he says:

‘Let us, O brother, together resist the rage of our foeman:’
so I call upon you to help me in hindering Protagoras from annihilating Simonides. His defence requires your distinctions of synonyms—the discrimination of *to will* and *to desire*, and the other fine distinctions which we have just heard from you. Now answer whether you think, as I think, that Simonides does not contradict himself. Tell me your opinion. Do you think that *to become* and *to be* are the same thing or different things?”
—“Different things,” said Prodicus.

75 “And so you see, Protagoras, that Simonides does not contradict himself. Pittacus had not said the thing which Simonides says. He had said, ‘A good man still *to be* is hard.’ Prodicus and the others here think, perhaps, with Hesiod :

‘A good man to become is hard ;
For at the gate of Virtue the Gods place labour and hard-
ship ;
But when once you have entered easy thereafter the course is,
Though at the entrance hard.’”

76 Prodicus praised me for saying this : but Protagoras said : “Your correction, Socrates, is worse than the fault that you correct.”

“So, Protagoras,” I said, “I have done no good, and am a bungling doctor, who have made the malady worse.”

“So is it,” said he.

“But how?” said I.

“The poet,” he said, “must be ignorant, if he says that the course of virtue is easy, which all know to be most hard.”

77 Socrates then calls upon Prodicus to help him with another of his verbal distinctions, and asks him whether *hard* may not mean something else than its usual meaning in the mouth of the Keians and Simonides.

78 Prodicus says that *hard* means *bad* ; but Pro-
79 tagoras declares this to be impossible ; and Socrates himself remarks that this cannot be the meaning, for the poet adds,

“A gift a God alone may have.”

80 And so gives up this attempt. And then Socrates offers to give his exposition of this passage, a proposal which Protagoras assents to, and Prodicus and Hippias receive with eagerness.

The exposition of Socrates is, as I have said, very prolix and digressive. Perhaps it was intend-

ed to show that he could beat his rivals at their own weapons; and could, as well as they, build up a long and subtle scheme of dissertation on a few poetical phrases.

He begins with an account of philosophy, which he says, "had its origin in Crete and in Lacedæmon, where," he says, "there were the greatest number of those wise men who are called Sophists, though the Lacedæmonians do not allow this wisdom of theirs to be generally known. They are commonly supposed to excel only in the arts of war: but they really surpass others in the 81 habit of uttering weighty aphorisms; not their men only, but their women and children. If you talk with one of their common men, the greater part of his talk appears very common and ordinary; and then when the occasion offers, he shoots at you a notable sentence, short and compact, like a consummate marksman; so that he who speaks with him appears, in comparison, no better than a child. And it was by uttering such compact aphorisms 82 that those who are called the Wise men, obtained their reputation: Thales the Milesian, Pittacus the Mytilenean, Bias the Prienian, Solon of our Athens, Cleobulus the Lindian, and Myson the Chenæan; and seventh to these six was reckoned the Lacedæmonian Chilon. All these were disciples and admirers of the Lacedæmonian intellectual discipline; and any one may see that this was the turn of their wisdom from the brief apophthegms which are ascribed to each. And these came together, and gave the first-fruit of their wisdom to Apollo in the temple at Delphi; and wrote there these maxims which every body repeats, *Know thyself*, and *Too much of nothing*.

"Why do I mention this? This was the manner of the wisdom of the ancients, a Laconic brevity.

And accordingly the maxim of Pittacus which was circulated among the wise was, *To be a good man is hard*. And so Simonides, being ambitious in these matters, thought that if he could cut up this saying, the *champion* Saying of Greece, and get the victory over it, he would be the champion himself, among the men of his time. And so, as I think, he made the whole of this poem with this aim, to invalidate this maxim.

83 "Let us consider whether this is not so. In the first place it would be absurd to begin with *Indeed*, if he were not answering some previous claim. Pittacus says, 'A good man still *to be* is hard:' Simonides answers, controversially, 'No; Indeed a good man truly *to become* is hard.' And then *truly* is to be joined not with *good*, as if the *truly good* were distinguished from the falsely good; but *truly* is to be transferred and joined with *hard*: and so we have a kind of dialogue. Pittacus says: *O men, a good man to be is hard*; and Simonides replies, *O Pittacus, you speak not rightly: for not to be, but to become a good man, square-balanced, hands and feet and mind, free from oblique defect, is truly hard*. And this *truly* comes in properly at the end.

84 "There are many poetical beauties in the piece, for it is gracefully and carefully written, but it would be too long to dwell on these. But I will explain the general scheme and purpose of it. It is a correction of Pittacus throughout, in every part of the poem. It implies that to become a good man is hard, but still it is possible for a short time. But to remain in this condition, and *to be* a good man, (*to be* implying a permanent and unchangeable state,) is, O Pittacus, impossible, and not the lot of humanity: It is

'A gift a God alone may have ;
For man is evil then without escape
When stress resistless comes.'

The amount of this criticism is, apparently, that Pittacus, instead of saying that it was *difficult* to be a good man, with that implication of permanence which Plato saw in *to be*, should have said it was *impossible*.

But we have now some Platonic reasoning as 85 to the possibility of the good man becoming evil, founded upon the usual kind of Socratic induction.

“ ‘Man is evil then without escape, When stress resistless comes.’

“ But stress resistless cannot make a good man evil, except he be a good man already. In a ship in distress, whom does stress resistless strike? Not a private person, but the commander. A man must be standing up in order that he may be knocked down: he who is already down cannot be overthrown by stress resistless. And so stress resistless can overthrow him only who has some power of resistance. The steersman may be overthrown by a mighty storm; the husbandman by a bad season; the physician by an unmanageable disease. These things may happen to those who are good in each way; as another poet also testifies:

‘For a good man is sometimes a good man, sometimes a bad man.’

A bad man cannot *become* any thing, but must always *be* a bad man.

“And so when the man who has a power of resistance, the wise man, the good man, is struck by resistless stress, he must needs be bad. You say, Pittacus, *to be* a good man is hard, but I say that *to become* a good man is hard, but yet it is possible; but *to be* a good man is impossible.”

86 “ And so in what follows :

‘ He who acts well, a good man still is he :
He who acts ill is naught.’

Now who does act or practise well in any particular thing : in writing for instance ? and what makes him practise well ? Plainly the knowledge of letters. And what practice makes a physician a good physician ? The study of the cure of the sick. Who practises ill is nought. Who then can become a bad physician ? He who is, first, a physician at all, and next a good physician. He may become a bad physician. But we who are not physicians at all, cannot become bad physicians by bad practice. And so a good man may become a bad man by the waste of time or toil, or disease, or any other circumstance. That is bad practice to lose the knowledge one has. A bad man cannot *become* bad ; he is bad already. And so the poem means that *to be* a good man, in the sense of permanent *being* and continuance, is not possible ; but to *become* good is possible ; and to become bad :

‘ And those who work
Good in their common course of deeds
Are by the Gods beloved.’

87 “ And the sequel of the poem shows still more plainly that this is all said in opposition to Pittacus. He says,

‘ Wherefore I seek not that which cannot be,
Nor waste in empty hopes my life,
To find a blameless man
’Mid all who live on earth’s wide fruitful breast :
Him found I will declare.’

So perseveringly close does he attack the maxim of Pittacus :

‘ But each I praise and love
Willing who naught does evil ;
But to necessity e’en Gods must yield.’

And Simonides was not so ignorant as to say that he praises those who do nought evil willingly, as if any one did evil willingly. All wise men know that no one does evil willingly: they know that all who do evil, do it unwillingly, meaning to obtain some good.

“So Simonides does not say that he praises 88 him who does nought evil willingly; the word *willing* refers to himself. He says that he willingly praises those whom he mentions. He knew that bad men willingly take the opportunity of blaming men, but that good men try to avoid this. He had himself perhaps often praised a tyrant or some such person, but not willingly: and he wished to make a distinction from such cases.

“And so he says to Pittacus, I, Pittacus, do 89 not blame you because I am fond of blaming:

‘Me he will satisfy,
Who is not evil-soul’d,
Not helpless, sound in spirit;
Knowing of rights which form the strength of States,
Him will I never blame.
Censure delights me not,
For infinite the race of Folly’s sons.’

So that if any one is fond of censuring, he may have work enough in blaming them.

‘And that is fair where foulness does not reign.’

“He does not say this as if he said that all things are white where blackness does not reign. That would be ridiculous. But that he will take what is moderately good and not blame it. And so he says:

‘Wherefore I seek not that which cannot be,
To find a blameless man
‘Mid all who live on earth’s wide fruitful breast:
Him found I will declare.’

But I do not praise any one in that fashion; I am

satisfied if a man is moderately good, and does nothing bad; all such I love and praise, using the dialect of Mytilene¹, as adapting himself to Pittacus:

‘ Each I love and praise
Willing.’

That is, willingly *speaking*, praise: Who nought does ill. For there are some whom I praise, and unwillingly². You then, Pittacus, if you had said what was moderately reasonable and true, I should not have blamed: but now as you think you are right when you really are quite wrong on most important points, I must decidedly blame you.

90 “‘This, Prodicus and Protagoras,” said I, “appears to be the meaning of Simonides in this poem.”

This commentary is so strained, and the meanings extracted from a few simple and ordinary phrases of an ancient poet are so farfetched, that the dissertation may serve as a caricature on that kind of criticism. Yet Plato plainly intended to show, as I have said, that he could beat his rivals at their own weapons, in this as in other fields of literature. And perhaps he thought that it was really important to show that in an ancient and celebrated poet he could trace the cardinal distinction of *to become* and *to be*; and could verify there the maxim, that no man does evil willingly; a prominent maxim of his school, and one which is discussed in other dialogues.

Plato soon proceeds to show, however, how little he esteems this kind of ingenuity: but first he shows how common such exhibitions were, by

¹ ἐπαίωμι and φιλέω.

² Simonides, though a moral writer, had written in praise of tyrants.

making Hippias offer to deliver a like exposition. Hippias says:

“You, Socrates, appear to me to have expounded the poem well. But I have an excellent dissertation on the same subject, which I will utter to you if you wish it.”

“On this Alcibiades said: ‘Yes, Hippias, another time, if you please; but at present it is but fair to fulfil the agreement between Protagoras and Socrates; that Protagoras, if he pleases, should go on asking; or if he is willing to answer Socrates, that *he* should be the questioner.’

“And I said: ‘I leave Protagoras to take 91 which of the two courses he prefers. But let us leave poems and verses. I should like, Protagoras, to go on with you discussing to the end the subject about which I first interrogated you. For these dissertations about poetry seem to me to be like the company-enjoyments of ordinary and uncultured people. They, because, when they meet to drink together, they cannot entertain each other by their own voices and their own discourse, on account of their want of education, must needs have female minstrels; and engage them at great cost to play to them, and have the noise of instruments to take the place of conversation. But where gentlemen and cultured men meet to drink, you find no piping-women or dancing-women or harping-women; you find them able to entertain one another with their own voices, without these idle and foolish accompaniments, talking to and listening to each other in an orderly way, even when they have drunk a good deal of wine.

““And in like manner, meetings of such persons 92 as most of us pretend to be, do not require to be helped by the voice of any extraneous persons; not even of the poets, from whom they cannot ask

their meaning; and whom those who introduce and quote them make to say, some one thing and some another, without being able to come to any definite conclusion. Intelligent persons put aside such company, and talk really to one another, giving and receiving from one another what they have in their minds. It seems to me that you and I should rather imitate such persons,—should leave the poets alone, and talk to one another, learning each what the other thinks. And if you wish to go on asking, I am ready to give you answers: or if you like, you shall answer me, going on with what we were discussing when we were interrupted, and following it to the end.’

- 93 “When I had said this and other things of the same kind, Protagoras did not say plainly which of the two he would do: so Alcibiades said, looking at Kallias:

“‘Kallias, does Protagoras still seem to you to be in the right, when he will not tell us whether he will argue in this way or not? To me he seems to be in the wrong. Let him either argue or say that he will not argue; that we may know what we are to expect from him: and then Socrates can talk with some other person: or some one else to some other person as he pleases.’

“And Protagoras, through shame, as appeared to me, when Alcibiades said this, Kallias beseeching him and almost all the company present, with difficulty consented to argue, and bade me question him, and that he would answer.

- 94 “And I said, Do not, Protagoras, imagine that I want to argue with you for any other purpose than this, that I may get right on matters on which I have difficulties. For I hold that Homer is right when he says:

‘Two when they travel together, one sees what misses the other:’

We all get on better together than alone. And I discourse with you rather than with another, because I know that you have studied these matters, and are not only good yourself, but can make others good; and openly proclaim that you are a teacher of virtue and culture, and call yourself *Sophistes*, the first that has demanded payment in that character.

“How then should I not invite you to this discussion, and ask you to tell me what you think? It is impossible. So I should be glad to return to the matters that we were discussing, and to learn from you, and to consider with you. 95

“The question was, I think, this. Wisdom, Temperance, Courage, Justice, Piety;—these five names—are they names of the same thing, or does each name belong to a thing having a separate essence and distinct properties, so that the one is not as the other? You said that they were not names of the same thing, but all of them parts of virtue: and not parts, as the parts of a lump of gold are, all like to one another and to the whole, but parts, like the parts of the face, unlike each other, and unlike the whole. If now you still think as you did then, say so. But if otherwise, explain how; for I do not want to make you responsible for your former opinion, if you have changed it. I should not be surprised if you said that then to try me.”

“I tell you, Socrates,” said he, “that those are 96 all parts of virtue: and four of them are tolerably like one another; but Courage is very different from the rest. And you may know that I say truly, in this way. You will find many men who are unjust, intemperate, impious, and unwise, and yet are very courageous.”

We here enter upon a discussion respecting

Courage, very much resembling what we had in the *Laches*. The word *Sophrosyne*, which in a former part of this Dialogue I translated *Prudence*, in order to humour the argument there, I now, for the like reason, translate *Temperance*, for to it is opposed *Intemperance*.

The object of Socrates is to disprove Protagoras's separation of virtues, by showing, for instance, that Courage is the same thing as Wisdom. In the fencing match which follows, Protagoras, made wary by his experience of Socrates's manner, succeeds, in the first two or three rounds at least, in parrying his thrusts. The first argument proposed by Socrates is much the same as one which we find in the *Laches*.

The drama, however, is different in this Dialogue and in the other. There is here first an attempt by Socrates to entangle his opponent in a contradiction as to the relation of Courage and Boldness. "Come now," says Socrates, "let us consider what you say. Are the courageous bold?" "Yes," says Protagoras; "they go at any thing."—"And as to detail. A swimmer who jumps into a deep pool is bold, because he knows how to swim? Is he not? And so in other cases." "Yes," says Protagoras; "you need not multiply cases; if you want to draw a general inference, I allow that those who have the appropriate knowledge are most bold in each kind of action."

Socrates goes on: "Well, but you have seen men very bold who had no knowledge, Protagoras." "Yes, I have seen such men very bold."

SOC. "And are not those men courageous?"

PROT. "If they were, Courage could not be a good thing; (which we have all along supposed that it is). These men are mad."

SOC. "But do you not say that the courageous are bold?"

PROT. "I said so just now."

SOC. "And these so bold men are not courageous then, but mad? And the persons whom we spoke of before are bolder in proportion as they are more knowing of their art; and the boldest are the most knowing. And *as being* the boldest, are the most courageous. And according to this, courage would be the same thing as knowledge or wisdom."

PROT. "You do not rightly recall, Socrates, what 99 I said to you in my answer. I was asked by you if courageous men are bold, and I answered that they were. But whether bold men are necessarily courageous, I was not asked. If you had asked me *that*, I should have said that some are, but not all. But my reply that the courageous are bold, you have not at all shown to be wrong. And then, because those who know their weapons best are most bold, you would prove that courage and knowledge are the same thing. But in this way you might prove too that strength of body is the same thing as knowledge. For proceeding in the same way, you might ask me if strong men are powerful combatants. I should say that they were. And then you might ask me if those who know how to wrestle are more powerful combatants than those who do not know; I should say that they are.

"And then after such concessions of mine, you 100 might say that by the same reasoning as before, knowledge is strength. But in that case I do not say that powerful combatants are necessarily strong; but that strong men are powerful combatants. Power and strength are not the same thing. Power in a combat may come from skill, or from anger, or from madness; strength comes from

nature and a good habit of body. And so in the other case, boldness and courage are not the same thing. So that the courageous are bold, but all the bold are not courageous: for boldness may arise from skill and from anger and from madness, like power; but courage arises by nature and a good habit of mind."

It must be allowed that in this case, Protagoras parries the Socratic attack fairly. We are now to have another argument. This argument is pursued at great length; and is represented as reducing Protagoras to the silence of a discomfited disputant. It would be difficult, I think, to make it intelligible in detail, and the attempt would, I fear, be very wearisome. I will therefore give the purport of it, which is very simple, and one or two traits of the Dialogue. It is, indeed, another of the arguments which we had in the Laches; that the truly courageous man is he who knows what is dangerous and what is safe; and that the coward runs from danger, seeking something which he deems comparatively good; and if his conduct is vicious, it is because his judgment is wrong; and this wrong judgment is to be corrected by teaching him a wiser estimate of things; and thus, to make him courageous, you must make him wise; and so, courage and wisdom are the same virtue.

This, I fear, must appear to the reader rather an elaborate paradox than sound reasoning. But as it is propounded by Socrates here, it is rendered still less like sound morality, by being made to rest on the doctrine that things are good and bad only as they are pleasant and painful: a doctrine which Protagoras repudiates for himself; and only agrees to Socrates going on with it, as a means of following out the argument. If this be a degrading doctrine, as the commentators on Plato

are fond of saying, and as Plato himself maintains in other Dialogues, the degradation, in this Dialogue, must belong to Socrates, and not to his adversary.

I will not follow the interrogations and answers of this part of the Dialogue, but will give the result.

Socrates thus proceeds:

“To live pleasantly is good, to live painfully is 101 bad. But some pleasant things are bad; some painful things are good. Do you agree to this? But do you allow that so far as they are pleasant, they are good; so far as painful, bad?”

“I know not,” says Protagoras cautiously, “whether I can assent so simply as you put the question. It seems to me both more safe, with reference to this present discussion, and more in keeping with the whole course of my life, to say that some pleasant things are not good, and some painful things not bad; some are and some are not; and some are neither good nor bad.”

But Socrates insists: and asks, “Still, so far 102 as they are pleasant, are they not good?” And Protagoras agrees to consider the point. The argument requires that the disputants should consider whether Pleasure or Knowledge, that is whether the Desires or the Reason, be the supreme guide of human life. Protagoras stands up for Reason, but Socrates, on the present occasion, for the vulgar opinion that the Appetites and Desires govern men.

“Now what,” says Socrates, “do you think 103 of Knowledge or Science? Most people think that it is not knowledge or science which guides men, but other springs of action; as anger, pleasure, fear, love. They think that knowledge is a slave, dragged this way and that by these other powers.

Do you think this, or do you think that knowledge is able to rule the man?"

104 "I think," says Protagoras, "that it is; and it would be an especial shame for me not to allow knowledge and wisdom to be the most excellent of human things."

"Very good," says Socrates; "but you know that the greater part of mankind do not agree with us. They speak of men acting so and so because they are *overcome* by pleasure, or pain, or some of these other powers of which I spoke."

PROT. "True, Socrates; but men often speak wrongly."

SOC. "But let us try to teach them rightly."

PROT. "But are we to discuss the expressions of men who speak at random?"

105 SOC. "Yes; I think it may help us to find out what courage is. So if you like I will go on."

PROT. "Go on."

The expression that men are *overcome* by appetite and desire, so as to do what they know to be bad, seems to bring into clear view the separate and antagonistic operations of Desire and Reason in the constitution of man, and is repeatedly used by Plato for that purpose. But if there be no good or bad but pleasure and pain, which is what Socrates here argues upon, this expression may easily be made to lead to the conclusion that knowledge is the proper guide of action, and that therefore all the virtues are only knowledge. And thus Protagoras, when he holds the separate nature of the different virtues, is confuted. It being agreed that they are to argue with the vulgar upon the vulgar phrase, Socrates says:

"Well, then, let us try. O men, when you use such expressions, do you not mean cases as

when men are overcome by pleasures of the body, meat and drink and others, and obey these, knowing that they are bad?" "They would grant it."

"And then we should say, But in what manner 106
bad? Is it not because, though pleasant at present they bring future pains? Would they not say that they are bad, not on account of the present pleasure, but the subsequent pain?" "They would agree."

"And so we should say again, O men, when 107
you say that what is good is painful, do you not mean that exercise, and hard diet, and discipline, and cautery, and the surgeon's knife, and medicines and fasting—that these are painful, but good?" "They would agree."—"Good; not on account of the present pain, but of the future benefit?" "They would agree."

"Then there is nothing which makes them 108
good or bad but pleasure or pain?" "Agreed."

"You follow pleasure as the good, shun pain as the evil?" "Yes."

"The predominance of pleasure or pain makes 109
good or evil." "Yes." "Why do I say this so often? I want to show you what it is that you call being *overcome by pleasure*. So it is settled that pleasure is the good?" "Agreed."

Protagoras is represented as assenting to this 110
argumentation at every step: that is, allowing that the vulgar would assent to it. And now the argument goes on.

"Pleasure being the good, it is absurd to say that a man knowing a bad thing to be bad, does it, carried away by pleasure: or that a man knowing a thing to be good, does it not, withheld by present pleasure. This is plain, if instead of *pleasant* and *painful* we say simply *good* and *bad*, which we have agreed are the same things: for

then we should say, instead of the above expressions, that a man knowing a bad thing to be bad, does it, carried away by what? If we are asked, we must say, *by the good*:—a wonderful answer, truly!”

- 111 Before he goes on with the argument, he notices some objections which may be made. “It will be said, that the bad is not *worthy* to conquer the good. But what *worthiness* is there in pleasure or
- 112 pain, save excess and defect? Or if one say that present pleasure or pain differs from future pleasure or pain; I should reply by asking, In what other way than *as* pleasure or pain? Surely, in no other way. They must be weighed in a balance, and the larger preferred:—the larger pleasure, the smaller pain; and the compounds estimated according to the predominance of pleasure or pain, whether it be present or future, far or near.

“They would agree,” he says, “to this:” and this being granted, the office of knowledge as the guide of human life is easily brought into view.

“The comparison of present and future pleasures as the guide of conduct, requires an Art of Measuring Pleasure.

- 113 “So in magnitudes, those which are near appear large, those at a distance, small. If then we had to regulate our conduct by magnitudes, what art would be the guide of life? The Art of Measurement. The force of appearance would mislead us, the art of measurement would set us right.

- 114 “And so of numbers.

“But as the choice of pleasure and pain is the guide of life, so we must have an Art of measurement of pleasures and pains, and a Science as well as an art.

- 115 “*What* art and science we will consider hereafter: but it must be a *Science*; that is enough for our proof.

“And thus we show you that knowledge or science, where it exists, must rule men’s lives. And what it is to be overcome by pleasure and to do what is bad, we could not tell you when we began, but we can tell you now. It is not to know *what* 116 *is* good and bad. It is want of science. It is ignorance. If we had said this at the first, you would have laughed at us for saying so: but if you laugh at us now, you laugh at yourselves too: for you allow now that those who err in their judgment of pleasures and pains err through false measurement of pleasures and pains. And this error is ignorance—lamentable ignorance.

“And then,” he says, turning to his auditors, and winning them with a compliment not quite sincere, “you should come to Protagoras here, and Prodicus, and Hippias, who can cure you of this ignorance. And you, because you do not know that you are thus ignorant, do not go to these wise teachers, and do not send your children to them. You do not believe that the thing can be taught; and so you save your money instead of giving it to them: to the great detriment both of your public and your private conduct.

“So much for our reply to the common mass 117 of mankind. And I ask you, Protagoras, and you, Hippias and Prodicus—for the cause is a common one—have I spoken truly or falsely?”

They all thought it was perfectly true.

“You confess, then, that pleasure is the good and pain the evil: and I beg not to be met by any of Prodicus’s fine distinctions. Whether he calls it *pleasure*, or *gratification*, or *enjoyment*, or any thing else that you please, Prodicus. But answer my question.”

Prodicus, smiling, assented; and so did the others.

118 The next step is, to declare that men are always governed by their tendency towards what they think good.

“Then, no one does anything worse, when he might do what is better. And to *overcome by one's self* is ignorance, and to *master one's self* is wisdom?”

“And this ignorance is, to have a false opinion on these weighty matters?”

“So no one chooses the evil, or what he thinks evil, willingly: it is not in human nature to do so. And no one chooses the greater of two evils when he might choose the less?”

119 All agreed to all this.

“What then are Fear and Terror? And I ask you, Prodicus, are they not the expectation of evil?”

Protagoras and Hippias agree; Prodicus thought that *fear* was, but that *terror* was not this.

“Well, Prodicus,” said I, “it makes no difference. But this is the inference. Will any one run upon what he fears, when he might avoid it? Is it not impossible, from what has preceded? For what he fears, he believes to be evils; and what he believes to be evils, on those no one will run.”

“Agreed.”

And now we come to the concluding moves of the game, and the defeat of Protagoras.

“Fear is the apprehension of evil. Cowardice is an unwise estimate of evil. Courage a wise estimate. Therefore courage is wisdom.

120 “These things being so,” said I, “O Prodicus and Hippias, let Protagoras here explain to us, how what he answered at first is right:—not first of all; for that was that the five parts of virtue were all different—not that: but what he said afterwards: namely, that four of the parts were

tolerably like one another, but that the other, Courage, was widely different from the rest. And you may know this, said he, by this proof: you will find men who are unjust, intemperate, unwise, but very courageous: this will show you that courage differs much from the other parts of virtue. And I then wondered at this answer; and still more, when I went on examining it along with you. I asked him if he said that the courageous were bold. Yes, he said: they go forward boldly. Do you recollect," I said, "Protagoras, that you 121 answered thus?—He allowed it.—And I said: 'Tell me, against what things do the courageous go forwards, and against what do cowards?—Do not cowards go against what they think safe, courageous men against what they think dangerous?'—'So men say, Socrates,' replied Protagoras.—'That is true,' said I; 'but that is not what I ask. What do you say the courageous go against? Against what is dangerous, that is, that which is evil, believing it to be evil?'—'That,' said he, 'by what you have said, you have shown to be impossible'."

When Socrates had reduced his opponent to this stage of meekness and passiveness, there was small merit or difficulty in completing his defeat. There are indeed some additional steps introduced, but these rather confuse the argument. It is de- 122
clared that cowards have ignoble fears and ignoble confidence, while the courageous have a noble confidence; but the introduction of these terms, *noble* and *ignoble*, is a desertion of the logical method so laboriously pursued in a great part of the dialogue. There was no use in analysing pleasure, fear and the like, if these new and unanalysed terms are to decide the question.

The argument as founded on the previous

course of the Dialogue is, that cowards are cowards through ignorance—through a false estimate of future evil, and a mistaken fear.

The argument then proceeds thus to the end. Socrates says,

123 “But that which makes cowards to be such is Cowardice, and that which makes the courageous to be such, is Courage?”

PROT. “Yes.”

“But we found that cowards were such by ignorance?”

PROT. “Yes.”

“And so Cowardice is Ignorance? Ignorance about dangers?”

He nodded.

“But,” said I, “the opposite of Cowardice is Courage?”

He agreed.

“And is not true Knowledge concerning dangers opposite to that Ignorance?”

Here too he nodded.

“But that Ignorance was Cowardice?”

“Then the Knowledge of what are dangers and what are not is Courage?”

124 He would not even nod, but held his peace.

And I said; “What! will you neither assent nor dissent to what I say?”

“Finish yourself,” said he.

“I have only one thing more to ask you, whether you still think that there are men who are very courageous and very ignorant.”

PROT. “You are very pertinacious, Socrates, in requiring me to answer. I will, then, oblige you so far, and say, that from what has preceded it is impossible that it should be so.”

“I have only asked you all these questions,” said I, “that we might determine what virtue is.

For I know if *that* be made clear, that other points would be determined also, about which you and I had so long a discussion, I saying that virtue is not a thing which can be taught, and you saying that it can."

We have then a sort of personification of the inquiries in which they had been engaged, of the same kind as that which we had at the end of the Charmides.

"And the End of our Inquiry seems to turn 125 round upon us as a man might do, and to reproach us and laugh at us: and if it had a voice, it might say: You are very absurd, Socrates and Protagoras: you, having said in the beginning, that virtue cannot be taught, are now turned round and say the reverse: trying to show that all things are knowledge; both justice and temperance and courage; whereby it would appear that virtue may be taught. For if virtue were anything else than knowledge, as Protagoras tries to show, plainly it would not be a thing which could be taught. But if it be knowledge, as you, Socrates, try to prove, it is a wonder if it cannot be taught. And Protagoras, who then said it could be taught, is now trying to prove that it is anything rather than knowledge: and so, not a thing which can be taught.

"I, Protagoras, looking at this confusion of views, am still confident that they will at last become clear. And I should like to reconsider these subjects with you. That Epimetheus, whom you spoke of, (whose name means Afterthought,) may have misled us in this inquiry, as he used us ill in his distribution of gifts. I like Prometheus, (Forethought,) in your fable, the better of the two. I have taken him for my guide; and forecasting all through life, I try my thoughts on these subjects,

and should like to go on considering them with you."

And Protagoras said:

"Socrates, I praise your zeal and perseverance in disputation. For as I do not think I am a bad man in other ways, so am I the least envious of men. I have said of you to many, that I admire you more than any other man that I have met with, and much beyond those of your age. And I tell you that I should not wonder if you should become illustrious for your wisdom. And about these matters we will discuss, if you please, at some future time: but now it is time to turn to something else."

And I said: "That is what we must do, if you please. For it is now time for me to go to the engagement which I mentioned; and I stayed only to oblige my excellent friend Kallias."

"Having said and heard so much, we departed."

REMARKS ON THE PROTAGORAS.

I THINK no one attentively reading this Dialogue can suppose it intended to convey the impression that Protagoras suffers a *humiliating* defeat in the combat of argument; or that his discourse is an example of gross sophisms victoriously refuted. Indeed, though the commentators speak of this Dialogue as one of the examples of the false and degrading doctrines of "the sophists," I do not know that any of them has pointed out any part of Protagoras's reasoning as sophistical. He holds that courage is a virtue distinguishable from justice and from temperance; but this is a doctrine which the admirers of Plato can hardly hold to be sophistical, since it is the doctrine of Plato himself in the *Republic*. And that which is commonly regarded as a degrading doctrine, the thesis that *the good* is identical with *the pleasant*, is held not by Protagoras, but by Socrates; and is assented to by Protagoras only for argument's sake, with the protest that it is different from the doctrine which he has always maintained. Indeed there seems to be in the Dialogue no good reason why Protagoras should be reduced to silence in the end of the argument. He had only to say that he had agreed to answer Socrates arguing against the vulgar opinion; and that if, according to that opinion, the different virtues could not be distinguished, *that* was no concern of his. That he could not have distinguished Courage, Temperance, Justice and Wisdom as Plato afterwards did in the *Republic*, may be true; but that could hardly make a man a sophist in the odious sense of the term.

The terms on which Protagoras and Socrates part are manifestly those of mutual respect. Protagoras is represented as being much older than Socrates, and as having established a high reputation as a moralist and professional teacher. For Socrates, a young man of no professional reputation, to be able to hold his

ground in a long debate with such an opponent, was glory enough, without the exaggeration of representing him as showing his antagonist's discourse to be worthless. Indeed this is so far from being the representation given, that the authority of Protagoras is carefully claimed to elevate Socrates's character as a philosopher. The reputation of Protagoras was too well established to be demolished by a hostile Dialogue; but in reality there is no attempt made to demolish it; only it is implied that, even in Protagoras's opinion, Socrates might hereafter become as celebrated as he himself was.

As to the time when the Dialogue is supposed to be held, since Protagoras speaks of himself as an old man in comparison with the rest of the company, we may suppose him to be 60 and Socrates 40 or 38, which would place the Dialogue B.C. 430; the period when Pericles governed Athens, which agrees with the reference here made to him and his sons.

In its point of view, this Dialogue agrees with the Dialogues of the Socratic School. The arguments are nearly the same as those in the Laches, Charmides, and Meno. But an object of no less importance than the moral arguments is the assertion of the superior value of the Socratic method of seeking truths over the prevalent modes of professorial dissertation and commentatorial discussion of the poets. This would agree with the supposition that it was published by Plato, or read to his disciples and friends, when he returned to Athens twelve years after the death of Socrates, and established himself in the Academia with the purpose of following out the Socratic search of truth.

THE GREATER HIPPIAS.

The title *Hippias, or Concerning the Beautiful*, describes the main subject of this Dialogue. ·

INTRODUCTION TO THE GREATER HIPPIAS.

HIPPIAS is one of the "Sophists" whom we have seen in the Protagoras, making part of the great gathering of such persons at the house of Kallias the rich Athenian. He is there represented as discoursing in a somewhat pompous and artificial style, as introducing into his discourse something of astronomy and mathematics, and as carrying on a sort of rivalry with Protagoras in the profession of an instructor of young men. He was of Elis, a city of Peloponnesus, and was employed by his own city as an ambassador on various occasions; a circumstance which Plato regards as inconsistent with his character as a philosopher. We in modern times have seen so many professors and literary men in France, Germany, Belgium and America become ambassadors and ministers of state, that we can hardly sympathize with Plato in his view of this as an inconsistency and degradation. Hippias is represented also as a very accomplished but very vain man.

He boasted indeed to have made himself master of all the manual as well as intellectual arts, and appeared, at the Olympic games, wearing clothes that were made by himself and a seal-ring which he had himself engraved, as we are told in the Lesser Hippias. He had an art of

memory, and could repeat fifty names upon hearing them once over, as he boasts in this Dialogue, § 12.

In Plato's Dialogue he is introduced as just arrived at Athens. Xenophon gives us a Dialogue which passed between him and Socrates on such an occasion, but that has no resemblance with this Imaginary Dialogue of Plato, which appears plainly intended in the first place to exhibit the vanity of the man, represented with the full license of comedy.

But the Dialogue has also another professed object; namely, the discussion of the question, What is the Beautiful? or of the Definition of Beauty. A question very much approaching to this has excited a good deal of interest in modern times, and has produced such works, for instance, as Burke *On the Sublime and Beautiful*; Alison *On Taste*, and the like. But perhaps we may say that those writers seek a physiological analysis of the *sense* of Beauty, while Plato demands a definition of the *essence* of Beauty. Moreover they attempt to solve the problem in their treatises, while Plato's Dialogue is entirely employed in proving all proposed solutions to be untenable. But, in reality, Plato's object is not so much the solution of the problem as the justification of the inquiry. He wishes to show that a true philosopher cannot help seeking for such definitions of the essence of things; that this is an aim worthy of man and his intellectual powers; and that the aims of such men as Hippias, who had no higher purpose than to delight and persuade popular assemblies, were unworthy of the lovers of true wisdom.

It was natural and intelligible that Plato, when establishing himself at Athens, after his travels,

and inviting the attention of the Athenians to his speculations, should thus attempt to disparage those who belonged to the opposite school. Hippias might be regarded as the representative of that school in the generation of Socrates, as Protagoras was in the preceding generation.

THE GREATER HIPPIAS.

SOC. “Hippias the handsome and the wise! What a long time it is since we saw you at Athens!”

HIP. “How should I have time to visit Athens, Socrates? Whenever Elis, my own city, has any business to transact with any other city, my fellow-countrymen immediately come to me, and entreat me to undertake the office of ambassador for them. In fact, they consider that no one judges so well of public business, or knows so well what is best to be said in transactions between one state and another. I have often been to other cities; but particularly to Lacedæmon, to treat of many matters of the greatest importance. And this is the reason why, as your question implies, I am not often seen in this neighbourhood.”

The picking out Lacedæmon in an especial manner as the scene of Hippias’s labours, is meant to add to the dignity of his pretensions, both on account of the importance of that state, and the severe and practical genius of its statesmen; and this selection is turned to account afterwards in the Dialogue. Socrates replies:

2 “Ah! this it is, Hippias, to be really a wise and accomplished man! You are so fortunate as to have it in your power, in your private capacity, to get large sums given you by young men, and yet to be in the condition of giving them some-

thing more valuable than you receive; and in your public capacity you are able to render to your city services such as give a man an eminent place and a high reputation."

So much for compliment. And now for the insidious Socratic attack. And first on the Platonic ground of the incompatibility of philosophy with active political life. Socrates goes on:

"But, Hippias, what is the reason that those men of old time who were called wise, Pittacus and Bias and Thales, and the rest, down to Anaxagoras, all, or almost all, appear to have abstained from taking a part in practical politics?"

HIP. "Simply, Socrates, because they had not ability and capacity enough to attend to private and public matters at once."

This leads to the question whether philosophy had really made any progress since that former time. And this was, as we learn from Xenophon, a question really discussed between Socrates and Hippias when the latter returned to Athens after a long absence¹. On that occasion he found Socrates making his familiar remark, How strange it was that any one knew when a youth might learn to be a shoemaker or an architect, but no one knew when his son might learn to be a just man. Hippias said scornfully: "So, Socrates, you go on saying the same things which you were saying so long ago." Socrates answered, "Even so: I say the same things about the same subjects. You, I suppose, have learnt so much that you never say the same thing over again." And Hippias replied, "Undoubtedly I try to say what is new." The same tendency is brought out by Socrates's question in the present Dialogue.

"Then tell me, I entreat you, does the matter 3

¹ *Mem.* iv. 4.

stand thus: that as other arts have made great advances, insomuch that the old artists are good for nothing by the side of our modern ones: so this art of you sophists—professors of wisdom—has made progress no less; and we may venture to say that the wise men of old were small persons compared with you of the present day?"

HIP. "You describe the case quite correctly."

Soc. "So that, O Hippias, if Bias were to come to life and appear among us, he would get himself laughed at; as the image-makers tell us that if Dedalus were alive now and made only such things as those by which he acquired his fame, he would be scouted."

HIP. "Undoubtedly, Socrates, the matter is as you say. But still I must observe that I am in the habit of praising the ancients and those who have gone before us, rather and more than our contemporaries: both to escape the envy of the living and the wrath of the departed."

Soc. "You do and think rightly in taking this course, in my opinion. And I can add my testimony to yours, that the art of combining public business with private has really made progress 4 in our time. For this Gorgias of Leontium, a Professor of eloquence, came here an ambassador publicly sent by the Leontines as the best person to manage their interests: and he both made a favourable impression in the public assemblies, and by his private lectures and instructions obtained large sums from our young men. And if you want more examples, there is my friend Prodicus, who has often been sent as ambassador to various places; and came very lately from Keos, and spoke with great effect in the council, and also gave lectures in private, and received I know not what immense sums of money in payment.

Now of these older sages, none ever thought it his business to require payment, nor to exhibit his wisdom to a miscellaneous audience: so simple were they! They had not discovered what a valuable thing money is. But each of the persons whom I have mentioned makes more money by his lectures than any artizan or artist whatever does from his business. And still earlier than these, there was Protagoras."

HIP. "I assure you, Socrates, you have no 5 adequate notion what a grand business this is. If you knew how much money I make, you would be astonished. I will pass by other cases. But once when I went to Sicily, though Protagoras was then there, in the full bloom of his reputation, a person much older than myself, I, young as I was, in a very short time made more than 150 minæ: and from one very small place, Inycus, more than 20 minæ. I went home and gave this money to my father, to his great astonishment and that of our neighbours. And in truth, I believe I have made more money than any other two Professors together."

SOC. "You tell me, Hippias, what is much 6 to your credit, and give me a strong proof both of your wisdom, and of the superiority of the men of our day to the ancients. Those ancients were very stupid people according to your account. For Anaxagoras is said to have taken a very different line. When a quantity of property was left to him he took no care of it and lost it all, so foolish was he with all his wisdom. And similar stories are told of others of the wise men of old. You, on the contrary, appear to put it forwards as a proof of your wisdom, compared with the ancients—and in truth you have many to agree with you—that a wise man must be in the first place wise for

himself: and that the definition of the wisest man is, he who makes most money."

We have here one of Plato's charges against the so-called sophists clearly brought out, and fastened upon them with ironical composure;—that they made money by their philosophy, and as it is here put, that their money-getting power was held to be the measure of their philosophy. After this the Dialogue goes on to other subjects.

- 7 First Socrates asks, whether Hippias had made much money at Lacedæmon; and as it appears that he had not, why not?

SOC. "Be that as it may. But tell me: where did you get most money? I suppose at Lacedæmon, as you have been there oftenest?"

HIP. "Quite the reverse, Socrates."—SOC. "What! you got least there?"

HIP. "Not a penny."

SOC. "Prodigious! And yet your wisdom can make your disciples wiser and better?"—HIP. "Very much so, Socrates."

SOC. "And were you able to improve the sons of the Inyceans, but not those of the Spartans?"—HIP. "Not so."

SOC. "Then do the Sicilians desire to be improved, and the Lacedæmonians not?"—HIP. "The Lacedæmonians, Socrates, are very zealous on that point."

- 8 SOC. "Then did they abstain from frequenting your lectures from want of money?"—HIP. "No, they have money enough."

SOC. "Then how does it happen? Perhaps the Lacedæmonians can teach their children better than you can? Do you allow this?"—HIP. "By no means."

SOC. "Then could you not persuade the young men? Or could you not persuade the fa-

thers? Surely they did not grudge a good education to their sons. Lacedæmon is well governed: and in well-governed states virtue is most prized: and you know better than any one how to teach it; and therefore ought to find pupils in well-governed Greece, rather than in luxurious Sicily."

Hippias assents to each of these suggestions, but finally states as the reason why he had no pupils at Lacedæmon, that it is against the laws of the Lacedæmonians to innovate in education. Socrates urges that a law which forbids people to improve is against the very object of law. But we need not dwell upon this argument. He then asks, "What is it, Hippias, that the Lacedæmonians like so well to hear you discourse about? I suppose about the stars and the heavenly bodies, which you know so well." "No," Hippias says; "they will not tolerate such subjects." "Geometry then?" Socrates asks. "No," says Hippias; "they care so little for mathematics that the greater part of them cannot count." "So that," Socrates says, "they are far from listening to your demonstrations on those subjects. Is it then the subjects which you have studied so exactly, the force of letters, and syllables, and rhythms, and harmonies?"—HIP. "Harmonies and letters, forsooth!"

Soc. "What then is the subject on which they hear you with pleasure and praise you? You must tell me, as I cannot guess it."

HIP. "The genealogies of Heroes and Men, the founding of cities, and archæology in general. They are so curious on these subjects that I am obliged to study them on purpose."

Soc. "Upon my word, Hippias, you are lucky that the Lacedæmonians do not require you to

give them the catalogue of our governors from Solon downward. If they did, you would have trouble enough in learning them."

HIP. "How so, Socrates? I can recollect fifty names after once hearing them."

13 SOC. "You say truly. I was not thinking that you were talking of power of memory only. I think that probably the Lacedæmonians like to hear the many stories which you know, as children like the tales of old women."

HIP. "And I assure you, Socrates, that I got great credit by a discourse concerning the best employment for a young man. I have a piece written on this subject, excellent in other respects, and also in the choice of the persons. This is the scheme and introduction of the piece: When Troy was taken, it is said that Neoptolemus [the son of Achilles] asked Nestor what were the employments in which a young man must engage so as to obtain a good name; and hereupon Nestor speaks and recommends several proper and honourable courses and beautiful actions of various kinds. I read that
14 there, and am to read it here three days hence, in the school of Philostratus, along with other things, well worth hearing. Eudicus, the son of Apamantus, begged me to give this reading. I shall be glad if you will come yourself thither, and bring any one else who is a proper judge of such things."

SOC. "That I will do, if it please God, Hippias: but now for another subject."

It is plain, as Mr. Grote says, that the advice which was given under such a form must needs have been pure and moral, so far as the writer could make it so; and that in this instance, and in other instances for the like reasons, the teaching of Hippias could not have been immoral,—a cha-

racter which the commentators love to ascribe to the teaching of the sophists.

The subject of the Dialogue then changes, and becomes an inquiry, What is The Beautiful? (*to kalon*): that Essence of Beauty by the presence of which all beautiful things are beautiful. The main point here is the comedy produced by Hippias's want of logical precision in understanding the question. Socrates does not propound his questions and his difficulties in his own person; but states them as being suggested by another person with whom he had been conversing on the subject.

Soc. "Pray answer me one thing which I 15 have luckily recollected. I was talking with a man who got me into a puzzle when I was speaking of some things as beautiful and some as ugly. Now, said he, do you, Socrates, know anything about beautiful and ugly? Tell me, if you can, what is the Beautiful? And I, in my stupidity, could make him no proper answer.

"I went away angry with myself and ashamed of myself, and vowed that as soon as I could meet with one of you wise men, I would learn from him what I ought to say, and would go back to the man who asked me the question, and renew the combat. And now, as I may say, you come in beautiful season; and you must tell me exactly what the Essence of Beauty is; and make me understand it exactly, that I may not suffer a second defeat, and get myself laughed at. It will be a small matter for you to do me this service."—HIP. "Quite an insignificant task."

Soc. "And then I shall be well prepared, and no one will triumph over me another time."

HIP. "No one; or my profession would be worth little."

16 SOC. "Well, by Juno, Hippias, it will be a grand thing if we put this man down. But shall I trouble you, if I adopt this man's way of talking, and propose objections to your answers, that you may make me understand them more completely? For I know pretty well what he would say. So if it makes no difference to you, I will propound to you my difficulties, that I may learn your meaning the better."

* HIP. "By all means propound your difficulties. This is a small matter. I can teach you to solve much harder questions, so that no one can prove you wrong."

SOC. "You talk delightfully. As you allow me, I will ask. Well, then, if you were to read to him that discourse of which you have spoken, about beautiful actions, when he had heard it to
17 the end he would fasten upon this notion of *beautiful*,—for I know his way;—and would say, O Elean stranger, are not things beautiful by Beauty, as men are just by Justice, and good by Goodness? And is not Beauty something? What is it? What is the Beautiful?"

HIP. "Does the person who puts this question ask anything except, What is beautiful?"

SOC. "That is not it, I think, Hippias, but, What is *the* Beautiful?"

HIP. "What difference is there between this and the other?"

SOC. "Do you see no difference?"

HIP. "There is none."

SOC. "You know best; but yet consider a moment. He asks you not what is beautiful, but what is *the* Beautiful."

HIP. "I understand, and I will give him such an answer as will never be proved to be

wrong. If you would know the truth, a fair maiden is a beautiful thing."

SOC. "By my troth, Hippias, a beautiful and 18 brilliant answer! If I answer so, shall I have answered the question, and rightly, and without fear of being proved to be wrong?"

HIP. "How can you be proved to be wrong, Socrates, when all the world agrees that you are right?"

SOC. "Good; but let me see that I know my lesson. The man will ask me: Tell me, Socrates; all things that you call beautiful, are beautiful because there is something *absolutely* beautiful? Now I tell you that a fair maiden is a beautiful thing, and that all beautiful things are beautiful because of that beautiful thing."

HIP. "Do you think he will try to show that what you say is not right, or that he will not be laughed at if he tries?"

SOC. "That he will try, I know right well: whether he will be laughed at, the event will show. What he will say I will tell you."—

HIP. "Say on."

SOC. "He will say, How amusing you are, 19 Socrates! and will ask me whether a fine horse is not a beautiful thing: and whether a fine lyre is not a beautiful thing. And thus," says Socrates, "from what I know of the man's ways, I am sure that he will ask me, My good friend, is not a beautiful pot a beautiful thing?"

HIP. "But, Socrates, who is this man? He must be some very ill-bred person, to introduce such common things into a serious subject."

SOC. "Oh, Hippias, he is not at all a polished gentleman, but a vulgar fellow, who cares for nothing but the truth. But yet the man must be answered, and I will make the first move. If a

pot is made by a good potter, smooth, round, and well baked, like those six-quart pots with two ears which are made with the wheel; I should say it is a fine pot and a beautiful thing. Is it not? Answer."

HIP. "Why yes, Socrates; a well-made pot is beautiful; but such a thing is not to be compared with a beautiful house or a beautiful woman."

SOC. "Good. I know then how we are to answer the man. We are to say, O man! do you not know what Heraclitus so well said, that the most beautiful ape is ugly when compared with a man; and so the most beautiful pot is ugly when compared with women as a class, as Hippias the wise now says. Is that right?"

HIP. "You have answered well, Socrates."

SOC. "Well; but listen, for I know what he will then say: And if, Socrates, any one compare maidens as a class with goddesses as a class, they will be ugly, as pots are compared with maidens. Will not the most beautiful maiden be ugly in that
21 comparison? Does not Heraclitus whom you quote say this too; that the wisest of men compared with a god is no better than an ape, both in wisdom and beauty and everything else? Well then, are we to confess that the fairest maiden is ugly when compared with divinities?"

HIP. "Who can contradict that, Socrates?"

SOC. "But if we confess that, he will laugh at us, and will say, O Socrates, do you recollect the question which was put to you? Yes, I should say, it was, What is The Beautiful?—the essence of Beauty. And then he will say, When you are asked again, you give me, for a beautiful thing, a thing which is just as much ugly as beautiful!—ugly in one comparative view, as beautiful in

another. What am I to say? If, he may go on, I had asked you to name a thing which was *both* beautiful *and* ugly, you would have answered right."

This argument, that the beauty of a fair maiden cannot exhibit the essence of beauty, because, in a certain comparison she is ugly, not beautiful, is regarded as decisive. The argument goes on now to another point, depending on this essence of Beauty being that which *makes* things beautiful. The supposed third person, whose questioning Socrates reports, now introduces this view:

"And then, does the essence of Beauty—that which gives handsomeness to everything and makes it beautiful when it is added to the thing—does that appear to you to be a maiden, or a horse, or a lyre?"

Hippias, grossly misunderstanding the kind of addition which is meant, is ready with an answer.

HIP. "Well, Socrates, if this be what he 22 seeks, it is a very easy matter to say what it is that makes everything handsome and beautiful when it is added to the thing. The man must be very stupid, and ignorant about handsome things, not to know it. You may tell him that what he has asked about is gold; gold makes everything handsome. He will then be quite silenced, and will not have a word to say. For we all know that however ugly a thing may be, if it be adorned with gold it becomes beautiful."

SOC. "Ah, Hippias, you do not know the man, how hard he is to satisfy. He will not take this answer."

HIP. "But what is that to the purpose? If it be right, he must either take it or be laughed at for not taking it."

Socrates then proceeds to show, as indeed it is

not difficult to do, that gold does not always make
 23 things beautiful. "Phidias," he says, "was an excellent sculptor, and knew what was beautiful. In the great statue of Athena, he did not make the eyes and the face and the feet and the hands of gold; he made them of ivory; and the iris of the eye he made of beautiful stones. How did these come to be beautiful? Are ivory and stones beautiful, as well as gold?" "Yes," says Hippias, "if they are *suitable*."

Here we have another notion introduced, that suitability or fitness is the essence of Beauty. This Socrates proceeds to deal with in a very homely way. He says,

24 "Well then, when any one takes the beautiful pot of which we spoke before, and cooks in it a beautiful mess of porridge, which is the more suitable spoon? One of gold or one of fig-tree-wood?"

HIP. "Bless me, Socrates! what a man this is that you speak of! Will you not tell me who he is?"

SOC. "Oh, you would not know his name, if I were to tell it you."

HIP. "Well, I am very sure that he is a very ignorant man."

SOC. "A very troublesome fellow! but what shall we say about the spoons? Which of the two suits the porridge and the pot? Must we not say the wooden one? It gives the porridge a flavour, and will not, as the gold one probably would, break the pot, and put out the fire, and leave the guests supperless. I think the wooden spoon is the *fitter*, except you have anything to say against it."

25 HIP. "Why, Socrates, no doubt it is fitter: but I would not say such things to the man who asks these questions."

SOC. "Quite right in your case, my friend: it would not be suitable for you to have such words in your mouth, wearing such fine clothes as you do, and such beautiful shoes, and having a high reputation among the Greeks; but *I* lose nothing by rubbing against this man. So help me to answer. For if the wooden spoon is the more suitable, he will say, it must, according to what we have said, be the more handsome. So, Hippias, shall we confess that the wooden spoon is handsomer than the golden spoon?"

HIP. "Shall I tell you, Socrates, what you may say to the man to get rid of his endless questioning?"

SOC. "By all means. But first tell me about the spoons, which is the more fit and the more handsome."

HIP. "Well, if you must, tell him that the 26 wooden one is."

SOC. "Now tell me what you were going to say: but the answer that gold makes things handsomer, appears to me to be disposed of; for gold, it seems, does no more than wood in this way.

"But what do you now say is *The Beautiful*?"

We have another attempt by Hippias to answer the question, but one implying such very loose notions of its meaning as almost to go beyond the limits of this kind of satire. Hippias says, "As you are seeking something which is beautiful always and never otherwise, I will tell you: and if any one can contradict it, say that I know nothing.

"It is a beautiful thing, when a man has lived in health, wealth, and honour, to reach old age, and having buried his parents handsomely, to be buried splendidly by his descendants."

SOC. "Bravo, Bravo, Hippias! how grandly

and how worthily of yourself you have answered! By all the powers, I admire you, you seem so well disposed to help me. But we have not yet hit our man in the right place. On the contrary, he will laugh at us more than ever."

27 HIP. "He will laugh on the wrong side of his face, Socrates. If he has got nothing to say to this, and only laughs, he will make himself ridiculous, and will be laughed at by the bystanders."

SOC. "Perhaps it is so; but after such an answer as that, perhaps he will not be content with laughing at me."—HIP. "What else?"

SOC. "If he has got a stick in his hand, and if I do not quickly get out of his way, he will try to give me a taste of it."

HIP. "How say you? What! is the man your master? If he does what you say, will he not be brought before the magistrates and punished? Is there no law in Athens? Are the citizens allowed to beat each other without justification?"

SOC. "No, that is not allowed."

HIP. "Then this man, who beats you without justification, will be punished."

SOC. "I think not, Hippias. If I were to give such an answer, it would be a justification."

HIP. "Well, if you think so, I think so."

SOC. "But shall I not tell you why I think such an answer would justify his beating me? Will you too beat me without hearing me? or will you listen to my reason?"

HIP. "It would be shocking, Socrates, not to listen. What do you say?"

28 SOC. "I will tell you, adopting his character, so that I may not use to you the harsh and coarse expressions which he uses to me: for he will say, Socrates, do you think that you do not deserve to

be beaten, when you have been pouring out a rhapsody which has no connexion with my question? How so? I shall say. How? he will reply: do you not recollect that we asked what was that Beauty itself, which makes everything beautiful; whether it be stone or wood, or man or god, or act or doctrine? I ask you what this Essence of Beauty is; and I cannot make you understand, any more than if I were talking to a stone—to a nether millstone, which has no ears and no brain. And would you not be angry, Hippias, if I, frightened, should say, This is what Hippias told me was Beauty, when I asked him, as you ask me, What is that which is universally and always beautiful? How say you? Will you be angry?"

It is to be noted that by this figment of a third 29 person, Plato does contrive really to charge Hippias with intense stupidity in very rude language. Perhaps some such assertion concerning The Beautiful had been published by Hippias or some of Plato's contemporaries, so as to give occasion to this vehemence.

But besides that this declamatory sentence of Hippias is nothing to the purpose of the philosophical inquiry, it is attacked as being untrue. Hippias says,

"I am quite sure, Socrates, that what I have described is a beautiful lot for all, and will appear so to all."

Soc. "And will be so? he will ask; for the beautiful is always beautiful."

HIP. "Yes."—Soc. "And always was so."
—HIP. "And always was so."

"Then was it true," it is asked, "of the heroes, Achilles and the rest, the sons of gods? They could not have this beautiful lot of burying their parents."

At this move Hippias is disturbed.

“Bless the man!” he says: “these questions about divine persons are hardly reverent.”

30 Socrates, however, declares that this account of the beautiful appears to be demolished as much as the fair maiden and the porridge pot, and that his interrogator will have good cause to scold him. He goes on to express, and in the same figure of speech, his dissatisfaction with the existing philosophy.

“So my critic speaks to me, Hippias. But sometimes he seems toucht with pity for my ignorance and blindness, and suggests to me whether so and so is The Beautiful, or anything else which may be the subject of consideration.” — HIP.
“How, Socrates?”

Soc. “I will tell you. My good Socrates, says he, pray make an end of these and the like answers. They are very foolish and untenable. But go back to what was said about fitness:—that gold and everything else made things beautiful when it had fitness. Consider this fitness, whether it is the essence of Beauty which we seek.

“I am accustomed to conform myself to his suggestions: for I do not know what to answer. And you, do you think that beauty is fitness?”

We now have the discussion of the doctrine that
31 fitness makes things beautiful. But the question is asked about fitness: “Makes things *be* beautiful,
32 or makes them *appear* beautiful?” “Both,” says Hippias, at first. “But,” says Socrates, “does
33 what is beautiful, always appear beautiful? Laws and institutions for instance. Is there not great ignorance among men on this subject?” Hippias allows that there is. “Then does fitness make things *be* or *appear* beautiful?” Hippias now says, “Appear.”—And Socrates cries, “Alack! there we

have lost our hare; for we wanted to find what makes things *be* beautiful."

"Well," says Socrates, "let us not give it up, 34 my friend; I still hope we shall discover what Beauty is."

Hippias, somewhat shaken in his self-confidence, but not much, says: "Certainly, Socrates, it is not very hard to find. I am sure that if I were to go into retirement for a short time, and consider in my own mind, I should give you an account of it more exact than exactness itself."

Soc. "Do not speak too confidently, Hippias. You see what a quantity of trouble the thing has already given us. Take care that the Object of our search does not get angry with us, and run still further away. I dare say you will find it easily when you come to be alone. But pray do me the favour to find it in my company. If you will do this, we can go on with our search, and if we find it, it is well; and if not, I must bear my disappointment, and you can make the discovery afterwards: and if we find it now it is best; for then I will not trouble you by asking what you found out by yourself."

From this point of the dialogue the suggestions what Beauty is, come from Socrates; though probably they are assertions which had been made by his contemporaries; and these are discussed. In some of them the signification of *beauty* or *beautiful* is extended so as to be very vague, and in others the arguments are very subtle and recondite; and on both accounts this portion is difficult to translate. I will mention the suggestions briefly.

Socrates first suggests that the useful is the beautiful. Eyes are beautiful, which are useful in 35 seeing. The whole body is beautiful, and each part has its beauty, because of its use; one part for

running, another for wrestling. Animals are beautiful in the same way; a horse or a cock is beautiful to run or to fight. All carriages, ships, tools, instruments are beautiful when they are useful. Laws and institutions have their beauty when they have their use. We call all these *beautiful* looking at their use; considering how they are useful, and for what; and when they are useful, we say that they are beautiful; and when not, not."

Hippias assents to this, being now reduced to the office of a mere secondary person: and Socrates proceeds to refute his own proposition.

"To be useful is to be effective to some purpose. Effective usage, power, then, is a beautiful thing." To this Hippias cordially assents, and breaks out in praise of political power. "But," says Socrates, "men do far more evil than good. What they do, they must have the power of doing. Is this power of doing evil a beautiful thing?" "Far from it." "Then power, effectiveness, usefulness for a purpose, is not necessarily beautiful."—"No," says Hippias; "but usefulness for a good purpose is."

This doctrine is then attacked on another side. (The doctrine is the same though the word is altered¹.) "That which is useful for good is beautiful; namely that which is the cause of good. The beautiful then is the parent of the good; the good the offspring of the beautiful. But the cause is not the effect: the parent is not the child. And so the beautiful is not good, and the good is not beautiful."—Both the speakers dislike and reject this result; and declare that the doctrine from which it follows is no less absurd than the former attempts, the fair maiden and the rest of them.

¹ ὠφέλιμον for χρήσιμον.

After fresh expressions of perplexity on the 40 part of Socrates and of confidence in his own powers on the part of Hippias, another definition of The Beautiful is attempted, and discussed at great length, and, as I have said, with great subtilty: though it appears to me that the definition is of little philosophical interest, and the arguments prove little or nothing.

“The beautiful is that which is agreeable to the senses of sight and hearing.”

Hippias assents.

“But,” says Socrates, “how does this apply 41 to beautiful actions and beautiful laws? Shall we say that they are beautiful when they are pleasant to the eye and the ear?”

HIP. “That difficulty, Socrates, will perhaps escape the notice of the man we have to do with.”

SOC. “But, by my troth, Hippias, it will not escape the notice of the man to whom I should be most ashamed to talk nonsense, and to pretend that I had a meaning when I had none.”

HIP. “Who is he?”

SOC. “Socrates the son of Sophroniscus, who will not let me talk as if I had got to the bottom of this matter when I have not done so, any more than he will let me say I do know when I do not know.”

HIP. “Well, then, I must grant that about laws, the meaning of *beautiful* seems to be different from what we have said.”

Socrates then suggests that there is another difficulty: and passing by such cases as that of laws, propounds other objections.

“First, why do you take the senses of sight 42 and hearing alone? Why not the other senses also? Why do you not say that what is pleasant to the taste and the smell is beautiful? We must

reply, Because we should be laughed at if we did. The Many would reject our doctrine.

- 43 "But, our opponent would say, I did not ask for the opinion of the Many. I asked what the Beautiful *is*.

"But to take another course of argument. That, you say, which is agreeable to sight and
44 hearing is beautiful. But explain. Do you mean that which is agreeable to both senses or to one? We must reply, that that which is agreeable to sight and that which is agreeable to hearing are separately beautiful, and that which is agreeable to both.

"And the cause why the agreeable to sight is beautiful is not that it comes through the sight; for that which comes through the hearing is beautiful also.

- 45 "And is this which makes sight and hearing sources of beauty, something which they have in common, and each separately?"—"It is."

"If then there be anything which they have in common together, and which each has not separately, that cannot be the source of beauty."

- Hippias here interposes, and says that it is quite absurd to suppose that they can have anything in common together, which each has not separately.
46 Socrates says, with affected deference, "Of course you are right; but I seem to myself to see that what you say is impossible is nevertheless true."

HIP. "You are quite wrong."—SOC. "I thought I saw it, but I cannot believe it, as you do not think it reasonable—you who have earned more money than any one by your wisdom—I having never earned anything. I am thinking, my friend, that you are playing with me and misleading me as to your real opinions, so clearly do I seem to see what I say."

HIP. "If you try to explain your notions, you will see, Socrates, that I am not playing with you."

SOC. "Still it appears to me that what neither 47 you are nor I am we may *together* be; and what we together are, neither you nor I may be."

HIP. "Why this is more monstrous than what you said before. Consider. If we are both just, we must each of us be just. If either be unjust, both cannot be just. And so if each is healthy, each sick, each wounded, each maimed, are not both so? If both were golden, or brazen, or if you like, high born, wise, old, young, anything, must not each be so? The fact is, Socrates, that you do not look at things on a large scale, you and those you converse with habitually. You abstract The Beautiful, and the other qualities 48 of things, from the things themselves. And thus you do not see how extensive and comprehensive the nature of things is. And now you are got so far wrong, that you think there may be some attribute or quality which belongs to both together, and not to each separately: or which belongs to each separately, and not to both together. So irrational and puzzle-headed, so shallow and unreasoning, is your set."

SOC. "Well, Hippias, if we are so, we must recollect the proverb, People are not what they would be, but what they can be. You do us a great deal of good with your admonitions. I did think as I have said: shall I tell you why I thought so?"

HIP. "I know beforehand what you have to say: but say on."

Socrates then unmasks the battery which he had been keeping out of sight so as to draw Hippias on to this fatuous confidence and insolence. The arguments, though intended to be triumphant,

as I conceive, are rather like what we are in the
 49 habit of calling scholastic quibbles. They are to
 prove that it is not true that what *each* is *both* are.
 And this is the proof. "I am one, you are one;
 but together we are not one, but two. Separately
 we are odd, for one is odd: together we are even,
 for two is even." This is accompanied with a
 profusion of expressions of humility. "I suppose
 you say that as together we are two each is two:
 as each is one, together we are one. The exten-
 sive and comprehensive nature which Hippias
 studies will not allow it to be otherwise."

50 This is regarded as settled: and Socrates then
 returns to the doctrine that The Beautiful is that
 which is agreeable to sight and hearing.

51 "Shall we say that The Beautiful belongs to
 52 the two senses, not to one only?" "What hinders
 us from saying so?" asks Hippias. "This," says
 Socrates, "seems to me to hinder. You mentioned
 qualities that, if they belonged to both, belong also
 to each. I mentioned qualities which belonging
 to each did not belong to both, or belonging to
 53 both, did not belong to each. Now in which class
 do you place the Beautiful? Surely it is absurd
 that if both are beautiful, each should not be so
 also."

HIP. "So I think, Socrates."

SOC. "You do well, and thereby save us from
 further discussion. For if the beautiful belongs to
 this class, the beautiful cannot be that which is
 agreeable to sight and hearing; for that belongs to
 the other class, that which is agreeable to sight
and hearing, not to each separately, as we agreed,
 Hippias. That definition leads to an impossi-
 bility."

This elaborate refutation of the doctrine that
 The Beautiful is that which is agreeable to the

sight and hearing conjointly, seems to us very superfluous, and the argument overstrained. A few words are added to show that this definition leads to the same difficulties as the former ones: and then Hippias again criticises the whole of Socrates's style of discussion, and Socrates's reply closes the Dialogue.

“ But now, Socrates, what do you think all this amounts to? Clippings and slices of discourse, minced small, as I told you before. What is really fine and valuable is, to be able to stand up in a public assembly or judicial court, or before any other auditory, and to convince them, and to go away carrying off, not a small prize, but the greatest prize that a man can receive, the preservation of himself, his possessions, his friends from threatened condemnation. These are the things at which a man should aim, putting away all that minute criticism, which leads to trifling and quibbling such as we have been engaged in.”

Soc. “ My dear Hippias, you are a happy man, in knowing what a man ought to do, and in doing it well, as you say. As for me, I am under the influence, it would seem, of some strange power, so that I am ever in doubt and difficulty; and when I disclose my doubts to you wise men, I am met with scorn and disdain. You all tell me what you now tell me, that what I am working at is silly and small and of no value. And when I adopt your opinion and say what you say, that it is far better to be able to stand up and speak in a court of justice or any other assembly, I am always taken to task by others, and especially by the man of whom I speak. For he is close to me, belongs to me, and lives in my house. When I go home and say these things, he asks me if I am not ashamed to talk of beautiful actions, when it

has been proved so clearly that I do not know what Beautiful is. ‘How can you know,’ he says, ‘whether a man made a beautiful speech or did a beautiful action, who do not know what is Beauty? And being in such a state of mind, how can you think that it is better for you to live than to die?’ It has been my lot, as I say, to be ill spoken of and reviled by you, and the like by him. But perhaps it is necessary that I should undergo all this: I do not grudge it, if I am to be bettered by it. So, Hippias, I am benefited by your conversation and by his. I think I see the truth of the proverb, What is beautiful is difficult.”

REMARKS ON THE GREATER HIPPIAS.

THE last speech of Socrates expresses what I conceive to be the moral of the piece, which I have already noted in the Introduction; namely, that the wise man ought to pursue, and that Plato was resolved to pursue, his inquiries into the Essences of things; to attempt to discover the *Idea* of Beauty, for instance, however much he might lose by it, and however the world might laugh. The publication of such opinions may be very naturally conceived to have taken place when he fixed himself in the Academia, after his travels. We may suppose that he read the *Hippias* and *Protagoras* to his friends assembled there.

The hypothetical or dramatic period of the *Hippias* offers no difficulty; for, as we have seen, Hippias did visit Athens repeatedly during the time of Socrates, and conversed with him there.

Hippias is here represented as a very vain man with a very illogical head. By some commentators his part of the dialogue is supposed to exhibit glaring sophistry; but it really exhibits only shallowness and conceit. Those who talk of “sophistry” in such cases ought to tell us what is the true Platonic doctrine

against which the opponent argues sophistically. It is plain that no such doctrine is contained in this Dialogue.

The various accounts which are given of Beauty in the course of the Dialogue are all supposed to be refuted in the Dialogue. The opinions may be all of them untenable; and yet the refutation may fail to be satisfactory to us. For instance, when it is asserted that the Useful (§ 38) is the Beautiful, the disproof is that the Useful is the Cause of the Good; thus the Beautiful would be the Cause of the Good; but the Cause is different from the effect, and thus the Beautiful is different from the Good.

The most elaborate of these refutations, and that which purports to end with a demonstration, is directed against the doctrine that Beauty is what is agreeable to the sight and hearing (§ 40). The argument against this doctrine, which, as I have said, claims to be demonstrative, requires, as it seems to me, that the doctrine should assert the beautiful to be that which is agreeable *both* to sight and hearing,—a thesis so narrow as to be hardly worth refuting.

Ast holds this Dialogue to be merely an imitation of Plato, on the ground of its resemblance in various passages to others of the Dialogues; and because it is *unplatonisch*,—a word which appears to stand with him in the place of argument, or to be employed on grounds that will not bear a moment's examination.

For instance, he says (p. 460): “Unplatonie is it when Socrates asks whether the Sophists' Profession has made so great progress; and soon after himself proves that it has done so, and confirms the fact by examples.”

The reader will recollect what is the amount and character of this inconsistency; and will then wonder, I think, that it should be alleged as an inconsistency by any one reading the Dialogue with attention. Socrates says: “Are you wise men of modern times really wiser than the wise men of the old times?” And then adds, “On consideration I see that you are. You are wise for yourselves. You know how to make money.” Another reason is that Hippias is represented as so stupid and ignorant, does not understand Socrates's persiflage, and gives the silliest answers. I do not think that the caricature in this instance goes further than it does in many other Dialogues of Plato.

And it must be granted that there are several others which Ast rejects on the like grounds. But this proceeding is not only quite arbitrary, but impossible to carry out. It is quite arbitrary; for it is to assume an imaginary Plato, different from him whom we have presented to us by the collective character of the Platonic Dialogues; and to pick out a portion of this collection to suit our imaginary author. But we cannot carry out this construction of an arbitrary imaginary Plato. For we have in the *Republic*, which no one thinks of rejecting, (indeed, what would remain if they did?), caricature as strong as that which occurs in the Dialogues so rejected. In the *Republic* we have Thrasymachus, a sophist of note, represented as losing his temper, and using the rudest and coarsest language. The like in the *Gorgias*, which Ast does not reject. Add to this, that when we collect all the Dialogues rejected on such grounds by Mr. Ast,—the Charmides, Laches, First and Second Alcibiades, the Euthydemus, the Ion, the Menexenus, the Crito, the Meno, the Apology of Socrates, the Greater and the Lesser Hippias, not to speak of the Laws and the Epinomis,—we have a very wonderful Pseudo-Plato brought before us. For these Dialogues are full of dramatic representations as lively, and, to the taste of most readers, quite as refined, as those which are not thus condemned. The philosophical import of these Dialogues falls in quite coherently with the best view we can obtain of the formation of Plato's ethical system, as will appear further from other Dialogues. And the very point on which they are condemned as being unplatonic, the satirical caricatures of the sophists, is precisely one of the points which we know to have been noted as characteristic of Plato at the very time that his Dialogues were published. "Here," said Gorgias, on reading his Dialogues against the Sophists, "here we have a new Archilochus!" referring to the celebrated fierce satirist of the earlier time. If all the Dialogues which I have mentioned as rejected by Ast for being unplatonic were written by one man, we might almost ask which was the real Plato? which was really the new Archilochus? or who was this new Archilochus, if he was not Plato?

THE LESSER HIPPIAS.

The Lesser Hippias has the additional title, *Or of Falschood*. Its purport is, as will be seen, to maintain the whimsical paradox, that in some cases falsehood may be a better proof of wisdom, and therefore of virtue, than truth is.

INTRODUCTION TO THE LESSER HIPPIAS.

THE Dialogue called the Lesser Hippias is very consistent with the Greater Hippias in its depiction of that Teacher. He is represented as having first delivered a lecture upon Homer at Athens: and as professing a willingness to answer any question on the subject. On this, Socrates engages him in a discussion on the character of Odysseus (Ulysses). This discussion turns at first upon an assertion which appears a very puerile quibble when taken by itself, but which is not entirely so when taken in connexion with the original Socratic notion, or experimental proposition, that Virtue is Knowledge. For if virtue be knowledge, a man who knows the truth and tells the opposite, is more virtuous than he who unknowingly says what is false: just as he who tries to miss the mark and misses it, is a better marksman than he who tries to hit and misses. This paradox—one mode of trying the correctness of the doctrine that virtue is knowledge—appears also in other parts of the Platonic Dialogues. In the Lesser Hippias it is illustrated by reference to the character of Ulysses. Hippias had said that Achilles was represented as the bravest of the Greeks, Nestor the wisest, and Ulysses the most cunning, crafty, versatile¹. Socrates asks what is the

¹ πολυτροπώτατον.

meaning of this phrase, "most cunning:" and thus leads to the discussion which I have mentioned. The arguments may be considered as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the doctrine that virtue is knowledge: for it is made to lead to the conclusion that it is the act of a good man to commit injustice intentionally.

This Dialogue proceeds upon the Socratic view, and therefore is really one of the Dialogues of the Socratic School, and does not belong to the class in which we are now engaged. Hence I shall abridge the translation, taking part only of the drama.

THE LESSER HIPPIAS.

EUDICUS. "Well, but Socrates, why are you ¹ silent while Hippias is making this exhibition of his talent? why do you not join in the general praise of it, or show it to be wrong if any part of it appears to you to be wrong; and especially as all the rest of us also have some pretensions to be students of philosophy?"

SOC. "Indeed, Eudicus, I would willingly ask Hippias about what he has just said respecting Homer. I have heard from your father Apeman-tus that the *Iliad* of Homer is a finer poem than the *Odyssee*; and finer on this account, that Achilles is a finer character than Odysseus: for the one poem has Odysseus for its hero, the other Achilles. If Hippias will allow me, I should like to ask him about these two characters, which he thinks to be the better; since he has already told us so many things of so many kinds about different poets, and about Homer in particular."

EUD. "I am sure that Hippias will not grudge ² to answer if you ask him. Pray, Hippias, if So-crates asks you any questions, will you not answer?"

HIP. "It would be very inconsistent in me, O Eudicus, if I go every Olympiad from my country Elis up to Olympia, to attend the con-course of Greece, and in the temple undertake to discourse publicly on any subject proposed by any person there, and to answer any questions

which any one may ask ; and if I should now try to escape the questioning of Socrates."

SOC. "You are a happy man, Hippias, if every Olympiad you can go to the temple with so much hope and so much confidence in your wisdom. I should be surprised if any of the combatants in the games there, is so fearless and confident in the powers of his body, as you are in the powers of your mind."

HIP. "Perhaps, Socrates, it is so with me. And from the time that I began to assume this championship at Olympia, I never yet met with any one who could beat me."

SOC. "Your high reputation, Hippias, reflects great credit both on Elis your city, and upon your parents. But what say you about Achilles and Odysseus?"

And then the subject is discussed. In the course of the discussion it is maintained that only a Geometer or an Astronomer can deliver false Geometry or Astronomy ; for he only knows what is true or false in those subjects. And in pursuing this notion we have some curious particulars about Hippias. Socrates says,

"Come, Hippias, look broadly at all sciences, and see if it is not so in all. You know more about sciences, and about more sciences, than any body else.. I have heard you boast of your wisdom in a way that made one wonder in the forum and in the exchange. You said that you once went to Olympia, every article which you wore about you being of your own making: the ring on your finger, you had engraved, and another seal which you had; and your oil-vessel and skin-brush which you used in the bath; and the shoes which you wore you had made yourself; and your coat and tunic you had yourself woven:

and what excited the greatest admiration, your girdle of fine workmanship like the Persian ones, you yourself had embroidered. You said too that you had brought poems,—epics, tragedies and dithyrambics,—and compositions in prose on all sorts of subjects; and that you were superior to everybody there in those arts, and besides, in rhythm and harmony and grammar, and many other things which I just remember; and besides these, an Art of memory, which had nearly escaped *my* memory, but which you thought your most brilliant invention. Now try the question in all these arts; and you will have the same result.”

The subject is followed through many examples, which I omit.

The paradox that the man who intentionally does wrong and unjust things, is a better man than he who does such things unintentionally, seems to be solved at last in a very simple way, by saying, that the good man never *does* intentionally do such things. This seems to be the Socratic conclusion. He says,

“So then he who intentionally does wrong and unjust things, Hippias, *if there be any such person*, can be no other than the good man.”

HIP. “I cannot agree with you in that, Socrates.”

SOC. “I cannot agree with myself: but so it seems to follow from our reasoning. But I am quite puzzled, and cannot come to an agreement with myself. And it is no wonder that I, a plain simple man, am puzzled: but if you wise men are puzzled too, that is a terrible thing for us, for we cannot come to you to get set right.”

REMARKS ON THE LESSER HIPPIAS.

THAT there were difficulties in the doctrine that Virtue is Knowledge, and that the Professors of Wisdom could not help men out of these difficulties, was, as I have said, the original view and starting-point of the Socratic philosophy; and that which Plato first tried to make clear, as Socrates had done before him. So far, then, this Dialogue falls in with the course of ethical speculations which we ascribe to Plato. We find also in the mention of Ulysses a sort of anticipation of the manner in which he is spoken of in the *Republic*; where (sportively) he is taken as an example of a man who is good, because he is a good thief,—who understands all about property, because he can not only keep his own, but acquire other people's.

As to the form and style, Socher and Schleiermacher hold that there is nothing to be said against the genuineness of the Lesser Hippias; but they doubt whether the *doctrine* be Platonic: that it is *Socratic*, however, there is no doubt, for in Xenophon¹, Socrates leads Euthydemus to the very conclusion to which he leads Hippias in this Dialogue,—Which of the two is the more unjust, he who commits the wrong intentionally, or he who does it unwillingly? And after some turns of the dialogue, Euthydemus has to acknowledge that it is the former. And Aristotle refers to this proposition as maintained in the *Hippias*, but does not refer the *Hippias* to Plato. The doctrine, he says, that a man who tells falsehood intentionally is better than a man who does it unintentionally, maintained in the *Hippias*, is a fallacy: it is supported there by induction—as a man who limps intentionally is better than a man who limps and cannot help it. But, says Aristotle, this comes of calling the *imitation* of limping, limping; which, properly speaking, it is not.

Aristotle's testimony is not decisive, but affords some probability; and there appears to be nothing on the other side.

The *Lesser Hippias* is, as I have said, a Dialogue of the Socratic School in its matter. We may therefore suppose it to have been written at an early period. And this would explain how it came to pass that Plato wrote two *Hippiases*. Hippias came very naturally again into the picture-gallery of the Antisophist Series.

¹ *Memorab. Soc.* iv. ii. 19, 20.

U N.

The *Ion* has a multiplicity of titles, *Ion, Or of the Iliad—Or of the Poetical character—Or of Poetical Interpretation*. All these are to a certain extent appropriate; but none of them describe the thesis really sustained, that *Poetry is not Science*.

INTRODUCTION TO THE ION.

ALTHOUGH I place this Dialogue in the Anti-sophist Class, Ion was not, properly speaking, a "Sophist," or Professor of Philosophy, but a *Rhapsode*, one of those persons who repeated and expounded the ancient poets, and especially Homer; and who also, it would seem, occasionally improvised or composed verses themselves. These Rhapsodes seem to have been held to be shallow and foolish persons generally. They are so spoken of, even by the temperate and matter-of-fact Xenophon. In Xenophon's *Banquet* (c. 111), Niceratus having congratulated himself that his father had made him repeat the whole of the Iliad and Odyssee by memory, Antisthenes says, "Why, the Rhapsodes can do that, and do you know a more foolish race than the Rhapsodes?" "That is," says Socrates, "because they do not know the meaning of what they recite." And in the same way in the *Memorabilia* (B. iv. 2, 10) Socrates says to Euthydemus, "Do you wish to turn Rhapsode; for you say that you possess the whole poems of Homer?"—"Certainly not," said he; "for I am quite aware that the Rhapsodes, though they know Homer so well, are themselves very foolish."

One of these Rhapsodes, foolish, vain, and shallow, is Ion the Ephesian; whom Socrates falls in with as he is returning from a competition-meeting

at Epidaurus, at which he has carried off the prize, and thus arises the Dialogue.

I place it in the Antisophist Class; for like the others of that class, it contains a dramatic exhibition of the logical weakness of a noted Professor. It may be considered as the Platonic dramatisation of passages in Socrates's conduct such as he describes in the *Apology*, § 7; where he says that, in cross-examining all classes of persons, he went to the poets, and found that they did not know the meaning of their own verses; and hence inferred that they composed their verses by a sort of blind inspiration, and not by such a wisdom and insight as *he* sought.

ION.

SOC. "Health to Ion! Whence come you here? From your own city Ephesus?"

ION. "By no means, Socrates, I come from Epidaurus, from the Asclepian festival."

SOC. "Do the Epidaurians then offer a prize to Rhapsodes in honour of the God?"

ION. "Yes; for that and the other kinds of poetry and music."

SOC. "Well! and were you a competitor? and with what success?"

ION. "We got the first prize, Socrates."

SOC. "Bravo! come, we shall get the prize at the Panathenaia too."

ION. "Even so, if it please God."

SOC. "I have often, Ion, admired your profession, you Rhapsodes. It is considered proper in you to be always richly clad in your persons, and it is your constant business to study many other good poets, and more especially Homer, the best and most divine of poets; to enter into his thoughts, not merely to know his words: this is an enviable lot. For a man would not be truly a Rhapsode if he did not understand what the poet says. The Rhapsode could not interpret the poet's meaning if he did not know it. This is, as I say, an enviable lot."

ION. "You say truly, Socrates: and this is the part of my art which has cost me most labour;

and I think I know my Homer better than anybody. Neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus of Thasos, nor Glaucon, nor any one that ever was, can point out so many beautiful things in Homer as I can."

SOC. "You say well, Ion; and I am sure you will not grudge imparting some of them to me."

ION. "And it is worth hearing, Socrates, how I have beautified Homer. His admirers ought to present me with a golden crown."

2 SOC. "I will manage to find time to hear you. But at present I will only ask you one thing; are you so clever about Homer only, or about Hesiod and Archilochus also?"

ION. "No, I study Homer only: that seems to me enough."

Socrates then goes on to introduce his favourite doctrine that no one can judge of what a poet or any one else says, except he be master of the subject about which the discourse is; and thus, must have a professional and scientific knowledge of each such subject. If Homer or Hesiod speak about divination, it is the diviner who knows
3 whether they speak well. If any one speak about numbers, it is the arithmetician who knows if he speaks rightly; if about the preservation of health, it is the physician; and so, generally. "And so, my good friend, if we say that Ion is a good judge of Homer, he must be a judge of the other poets also, who speak of the same subjects."

ION. "Then what is the cause, Socrates, that I cannot attend to the poetry of other poets, but absolutely go to sleep when they are talked of, and have nothing to say about it; but when Homer is the subject, I am forthwith animated and fluent?"

Socrates says, "that he can guess how it is, but that certainly it cannot be by any Art or Science;" a conclusion which is the main thesis of the Dialogue.

Socrates proceeds to illustrate this thesis at 4 length; first asking Ion if he will listen to him.

ION. "Yes, assuredly, Socrates: I like to listen to you wise men."

SOC. "I wish your words were applicable, Ion. But the wise men are you the Rhapsodes, and the Dramatic Actors, and the Poets whose poems you rehearse. I can utter nothing but the truth, as you may expect it from an ordinary person. But as to the point I asked you about, just see how easy it is even for an ordinary person, and for every one, to know that the power of criticising in any art must extend to the whole art, and cannot be confined to a power of understanding one particular artist."

This is proved by an induction from painting, statuary, and music.

SOC. "Did you ever know a person who could discourse well about Polygnotus and Aglaophon, and explain their merits and demerits, and could not judge of other painters? who was sleepy and had nothing to say when *their* works were exhibited, but animated and fluent when Polygnotus was the theme? Or did you ever know any one who could talk well of the merits of Dædalus or Epeius, but who at the work of other sculptors was sleepy and had nothing to say?

"And I think it is the same thing in music;—in fluting, or harping, or *rhapsoding*, you never met with a man who can talk cleverly about Olympus or Thamyris, or Orpheus, or Phemius the Ithacan, but who about Ion the Ephesian has nothing to say, as to whether he rhapsodes well or ill."

ION. "I cannot contradict you, Socrates; but the case with me is as I say. Can you explain it?"

5 SOC. "I think I can, Ion; and I will tell you what I think it is. This talent of yours of discoursing well upon Homer is not an Art—a skill founded upon the possession of principles of clear knowledge,—but it is a divine Power which moves you."

This doctrine that the talent was Inspiration, does not, in Plato's opinion, place it above, but below Science; as I have remarked in the Meno, section 41. Socrates proceeds to give a very remarkable illustration of this talent by comparing it with Magnetism.

"It is like what we see in that stone which Euripides calls the Magnet, and which most persons call the Heracleian stone. This stone not only draws to itself iron rings, but also imparts to those rings the power of doing what it does itself,—the power of drawing other rings; so that you may have a long chain of rings hanging from one another; and all these are held by the power of the original stone.

"And in like manner the Muse. The influence of her inspiration inspires the poet; and he communicates the inspiration to others; and so there is formed a chain of inspired enthusiasts. Poets write under the influence of Inspiration, and so do great musical composers. They do not act by conscious art; they are not possessed of their own faculties when they compose; they are in a sort of delirium, as the Corybantes are when they dance. When they give voice to their songs, adding to their words harmony and rhythm, they are, as it were, possessed. The Bacchæ when they are under the influence of *their* possession, can draw

honey and milk out of the river, but cannot do it at other times. And so the soul of poets does the like; and so they tell us that, 'They cull their strains from the honey-flowing fountains in the groves and gardens of the Muses, and bring them to us, flying about like bees;' and they say truly: for a poet is a being light, volatile, sacred. He cannot compose poetry till he is inspired, and has lost his senses and his intellect. So long as he retains these, every man is incapable either of producing poetry or of uttering oracles. And so it is not by a scientific art that they say their fine things, as you say yours about Homer. And each does that which his special Muse drives him to; one makes odes, another eulogiums, another dancing songs, another iambics, and each is good for nothing in the other things. This is, I say, the result not of a scientific art, but of a Divine Influence: for if it were a scientific art of poetry, he would be able to do all alike.

"And so the God takes away their intellect and uses them as interpreters, as he does the oracle-utterers, and the diviners; that we the hearers may know that it is not the men themselves who say these fine things, but the God himself who speaks to us through them.

"You have in Tynnichus, the Chalcidean, a very strong proof of this. He never wrote any other poem that any one thought worth mentioning, only that Triumphal Ode, nearly the most beautiful Ode that ever was written, and certainly, as he says, 'An utterance of the Muse.'

"By such examples as these the God appears to me to show us, so that we can have no doubt of the fact, that those beautiful poems are not human nor of men, but divine and of the Gods. And the poets are the interpreters of the Gods, each

possessed by his special deity. And so the God purposely uttered the best poem through the worst poet.

“Do I seem to you to speak truly, Ion?”

ION. “I think you are quite right, and your discourse touches me deeply. I think that the Poets are by the divine appointment the Interpreters of the Gods to us.”

6 SOC. “And you Rhapsodes are the Interpreters of the Poets?”

ION. “That too is true.”

SOC. “Then you are Interpreters of Interpreters.”

ION. “Certainly.”

SOC. “But tell me this, Ion; and do not have any reserve in answering what I ask: When you recite the epic strains so well, and captivate the spectators,—when you sing of Odysseus leaping upon the floor, suddenly appearing to the eyes of the suitors and pouring out the arrows before his feet—or Achilles rushing down upon Hector—or the pathetic passages concerning Andromache, or Hecuba, or Priam—are you master of yourself, or are you out of yourself? Does your soul, in her enthusiasm, think that she is present at the scene, in Ithaca, or in Troy, or wherever else it may be.”

ION. “What a strong proof of what you say is that which happens in such cases! I will conceal nothing from you. When I recite pathetic passages, my eyes are filled with tears; when I utter something terrible or awful, my hair stands on end with fear and my heart beats strongly.”

SOC. “Well now, Ion, can we say that *that* man is in his senses, who, clothed in beautiful attire and with a coronet of gold on his head, weeps at feasts and festivals, having lost nothing;

or is full of fear when surrounded by twenty thousand friends, not one of whom will do him any wrong, or take anything from him?"

ION. "To tell the truth, Socrates, we can hardly say that he is."

SOC. "And do you not know that you put 7 many of the spectators in a like condition?"

ION. "Right well I know it. When I look up from the stage, I see them weeping, and expressing fear and awe in sympathy with the poem. I am obliged to attend to such things. If I make them sit down weeping, I may laugh to think of the money I shall get: if I make them laugh, I shall have to cry for want of money."

SOC. "And do you not see that this spectator is the last ring of the chain suspended by the power of the magnet, of which I spoke to you. You the Rhapsode, and the Actor, like you, are the middle ring. The Poet is the first ring; and it is the God who by all three draws the soul of man which way he will, hanging them one from another. And so there is a chain of higher and lower artists and subordinates, which hang from the Muse, not immediately but mediately.

"And one of these chains hangs from one Muse, another from another. And being so held we call being *possessed*; some are held and filled with enthusiasm by Orpheus, some by Musæus: most are possessed by Homer, and of these, you, Ion, are one. And hence it is, that if the poems of other poets are recited you are sleepy and have nothing to say: but when any one utters anything from Homer, you are awake, your soul leaps up, and you have plenty to say.

"For what you say, you do not say by art and science, but by divine impulse."

After a few words more they go to another subject. Ion is not quite convinced: he says,

“You speak well, Socrates; but I think you will hardly persuade me that when I praise Homer, I am possessed and delirious. I do not believe that you would think so, if you heard me discoursing about Homer.”

Soc. “I should like to hear you; but first answer me this. Of the things which Homer says, *about what* are those on which you speak well? Surely not about all.”

ION. “Yes: about every one.”

Soc. “But not about those which relate to subjects of which you are ignorant?”

ION. “But what subjects are those of which Homer speaks, and of which I am ignorant?”

9 Soc. “Does not Homer often speak of various arts? About chariot-driving for instance. If you recollect the passage I will tell you what I mean.”

ION. “I will tell you: I recollect it.”

Soc. “Repeat to me what Nestor says to Antilochus his son, giving him advice how to turn the goal in the race at the funeral of Patroclus.”

ION. “That mark in view, thy steeds and chariot push
Near to it as thou may'st; then, in thy seat
Inclining gently to the left, prick smart
Thy right-hand horse, challenging him aloud,
And give him rein; but let thy left-hand horse
Bear on the goal so closely, that the nave
And felly of thy wheel may seem to meet,
Yet fear to strike the stone.”

Soc. “That will do. Now who must know whether Homer speaks rightly or not? a charioteer or a physician?”

Ion of course answers, a charioteer; and then we come to the so frequent Socratic reasoning: each Art has its separate purpose and object: as

the art of the charioteer and physician differ, so does the art of the charioteer and the rhapsode. They then take another passage.

SOC. "When Homer says that Hecamede, Nestor's attendant, gave to Machaon, wounded, a potion which is thus described¹ :

'The graceful virgin in that cup a draught
Mix'd for them, Pramnian wine and savoury cheese
Of goat's milk, grated with a brazen rasp,
Then sprinkled all with meal'—

whether Homer says right or not, is it the business of a physician or a rhapsode to know?

"And when Homer says² :

'Sudden down she rushed,
As sinks the bull's horn with its leaden weight,
Death bearing to the ravens of the Deep'—

does a judgment about this belong to the Fisherman's Art or the Rhapsode's? Which can say whether it is right or wrong—the Art Halieutic or Rhapsodic?"

ION. "Plainly the Art Halieutic."

Socrates then proceeds to show that there are 10 in Homer many references to the Art of Divination. And he then says, "Now as I have shown you passages where Homer speaks of the Art of the Charioteer, the Physician, the Fisherman, the Diviner, do you, with your great skill in Homer, tell me of the passage where he speaks of the Art Rhapsodic, which the Rhapsode is especially fitted to criticise."

Ion boldly replies, "I say, Socrates, that all the passages are of that kind."

SOC. "Surely not all, Ion. Are you so forgetful? A Rhapsode should not have a bad memory."

ION. "What have I forgotten?"

¹ *Il.* xi. 768.

² *Il.* xxiv. 80.

Soc. "Do you not recollect that you said that the Rhapsode's Art is different from the Charioteer's."

Ion is thus proved to be inconsistent with himself; but he does not so readily give up the defence of his own Art. Socrates says,

11 "So the Art Rhapsodic, and the Rhapsode, do not include a knowledge of everything, even by your own account."

ION. "Everything except such things as you have mentioned."

Soc. "But 'such things' include almost all the subjects of other Arts. And if not all, what does it include?"

Ion then gives his own view :

"Why I think it teaches what it is suitable for a man to say, what for a woman; what for a slave and what for a freeman; what for a commander and what for a subordinate."

Socrates here resorts to his usual question, "To say *about what?*—What! Do you mean that what it is suitable for the commander of a ship to say in a storm, the rhapsode will know better than the pilot?"

ION. "No; in that case the pilot."

Soc. "Or what for the director of a man labouring under disease it is suitable to say, will the rhapsode know better than the physician?"

ION. "Not that."

Soc. "But what it is suitable for a slave to say? If the slave be a cattle-keeper, will the rhapsode know better than the cattle-keeper what to say to soothe a mad bull? Will he know what it is suitable for a woman to say about her work in wool?"

To all this Ion is obliged to answer No. But Socrates at length comes to a more favourable case.

“What it is suitable for a general to say when making a speech to his soldiers?”

ION. “Yes, *that* the rhapsode well knows.”

SOC. “How? Is the Art Rhapsodic the Art Strategic?”

ION. “I should certainly know what a general ought to say.”

SOC. “Perhaps you *are* a general, Ion; for if you were at the same time a horse-dealer and a harper, you would know good horses from bad; but if I were to ask you by which of your arts you know them, whether as a horse-dealer or as a harper, what would you reply?”

ION. “As a horse-dealer.”

SOC. “And if you know good from bad harp-playing, you would do so as a harper, not as a horse-dealer. Now as you know Strategic, do you know it as a strategist or as a rhapsode?”

ION. “It seems to me to make no difference.”

SOC. “What, is Art Rhapsodic and Art Strategic the same thing?”

ION. “The same.”

SOC. “So that he who is a good rhapsode must also be a good general?”

ION. “Certainly, Socrates.”

SOC. “And he who is a good general must be a good rhapsode?”

ION. “That does not appear to me so clear.”

SOC. “Well, but you think that he who is a good rhapsode must be a good general. As you are the best Rhapsode in Greece, are you also the best General?”—ION. “I assure you, Socrates, that I have learnt from Homer no less than this.”—Socrates then does not hesitate to ‘fool to the top of his bent’ the self-conceited singer. “How is it, then,” he says, “that you go on cir- 12
cuits among the Greeks, in the garb of a Rhap-

sode, and do not offer yourself as a General?" Ion answers with the simplicity of blind vanity: "The fact is, Socrates, that my city, Ephesus, is kept under by yours; and has generals found for it. Athens and Lacedæmon will not make me a general. Their citizens think they can fill such offices themselves." Socrates treats this as a slight difficulty, and says: "No, no. The Athenians will choose Ion the Ephesian as their general if he be worthy. What! are not you Ephesians originally Athenians? And is not your city a city of the first class?"

The ridicule is here, one might suppose, manifest enough, and yet within the limits of fair comedy. And satire of this kind is the usual tone of this class of the Platonic Dialogues. Yet some have, on the ground of this satirical tone, rejected the Dialogue as spurious. Others cannot find in it any serious doctrine; and yet we have in it the doctrine which Plato repeatedly inculcates, and especially in the *Meno*:—that poetry is not science, —is not philosophy,—cannot supply a basis for philosophy. And this doctrine is plainly expressed in the close of the Dialogue, though in the usual form of Socratic banter. "Ah," says Socrates, "you use me ill. You pretend to understand Homer, and to expound his merits by virtue of an art and science which you possess; and yet you will not impart to me this art or science. And when I beg and entreat you to do so, you assume all kinds of shapes, like Proteus, and at last turn out on my hands—a General."

"But if it is not as possessing an art¹ that you expound Homer, but as being possessed by Homer; if, governed by a kind of inspiration, but not by knowledge, you say your fine

¹ ΤΕΚΝΙΚὸς ὤν.

things about the Poet (which I hold to be the case), then you do me no wrong. So choose. Which will you be, a wrong-doer, or a divine man?" ION. "By all means a divine man. It is a much finer thing to be." SOC. "Good! Take the fine thing; but recollect you are not a man possessing an art founded on a science."

The reader will recollect that the expression, a *Divine Man*, is used in the same disparaging way in the *Meno*, and in the Socratic sketch *On Virtue*.

REMARKS ON THE ION.

ONE obvious point which results from this Dialogue is the Doctrine that the Talent of the Poet is not Science or real knowledge, but is a Divine Inspiration; and hence, according to the Socratic view, is something inferior to Science. Schleiermacher, after his manner, says that this result of the Dialogue is so directly given that it cannot be what Plato intended. This notion that Plato always had some intention different from the obvious purport of his writing, I have ventured throughout to reject.

The illustration taken from the Magnet, Sections 5 and 7 of this Dialogue, are remarkable as disclosing^{ly} the knowledge which the Greeks possessed of the fact that the magnetic virtue or power of attraction is communicated by contact to pieces of iron, so that several of these are thereby made to hang from the original magnet in the way of a chain. The application of this as an image of the influence of the Spirit of Poetry, through the chain of human minds, the Poet, the Reciter and the Hearer, shows both how real and how mysterious Plato conceived this influence to be. And even up to the present day magnetism is frequently

used as an image and as an expression of some real and undeniable but mysterious and inexplicable influence exercised by body or soul upon body or soul.

The notion that a gift which could only be regarded as a divine inspiration was different from and inferior to the clear insight which the philosopher aimed at, and could not satisfy him as the end of his researches, is accordant with the Socratic and Platonic attempt to resolve wisdom and virtue into knowledge; as I have already remarked in the *Meno*.

EUTHYDEMUS.

The title of this Dialogue in Diogenes Laertius, *Euthydemus*,
or *The Wrangler*, is quite appropriate.

INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYDEMUS.

THE Euthydemus is a dialogue which, in virtue of its internal character, we must at once assign to the class of Anti-sophist Dialogues which we ascribe to the second period of Plato's life, between his fortieth and his fiftieth years, when he was mainly employed in exposing by written works the unphilosophical and pseudo-philosophical pretences of the teachers and pretenders against whom Socrates had begun the attack; and while as yet, his own ethical system being unformed, he continued to propound the Socratic arguments against such teaching. The latter tendency appears in an early part of the Dialogue, when the boast of the professors of wisdom, that they can teach virtue, is met by the usual Socratic inquiry, Whether Virtue *can* be taught. The war against the pretences to logical subtlety and victorious argumentation is carried on by the exhibition of a strange accumulation of the most outrageous sophisms, or rather mere quibbles, which are put in the mouths of the two professing teachers, and enthusiastically applauded by their followers. The names of these two teachers, Euthydemus and Dionysiodorus, are hardly mentioned elsewhere (for this Euthydemus of *Chios*, as he is described, cannot be the Euthydemus the Athenian, whose conversation with Socrates Xenophon relates); and in this way the

Dialogue now before us differs from most others of this class, in which the principal characters are men of great name in the pretended philosophy of the time,—Protagoras, Hippias, Gorgias. And perhaps from the obscurity of the names of the persons thus exposed, we may collect that in this case Plato intended especially to expose the thing,—this quibbling sophistry, and the fatuous servility of its admirers; and hence perhaps we may collect that these were evils which prevailed at Athens at the time when the Dialogue was published. The supposed time of the drama is, however, as in the other dialogues of this class, placed in the life-time of Socrates; though not in his youth, as in the Protagoras, but in the period when he might be called aged, at least for a learner of a new science. The conversation is related by Socrates to his friend Crito; and is full of dramatic movement, as the Dialogues of this class generally are.

EUTHYDEMUS.

THE Dialogue begins by Crito asking the particulars of the conversation which had taken place the previous day.

CR. "Who was it, Socrates, that you were talking with yesterday in the Lyceum? There was a great crowd standing round you, so that I, though I came near and tried to listen, could not collect clearly what was said. By peeping under the arms of the bystanders, I saw you; and I think it was some stranger that you were conversing with. Who was it?"

SOC. "Which do you ask about, Crito? For there were two of them."

CR. "The person I mean was on your right, sitting next but one to you. And between you was Axioclus's boy. He seemed to be very intent upon the conversation; and his age may be not very different from that of my boy Critobulus. But he is older in years, though younger in appearance,—that boy really younger, though seeming older,—a fine-looking pleasing boy."

SOC. "The person you ask about, Crito, is Euthydemus. And the person who was sitting on my left hand was his brother, Dionysiodorus; he too took a part in the conversation."

CR. "I do not know either of them, Socrates."

SOC. "And yet these gentlemen are, like others we have known, sophists, teachers of wisdom."

CR. "What country are they of? And what sort of wisdom do they teach?"

- 2 Soc. "As to their country, they are, I believe, originally of Chios; but they emigrated thence to Thuriæ. And being sent away from that place, they have been long moving about in this region. But as to the nature of their wisdom, which you inquire about, I assure you, Crito, wonderful as it may seem, they are absolutely wise in *everything*. I never knew before what was meant by persons being masters of all weapons: these men are ready for every kind of combat; not like the Acarnanian brothers, the pancratiasts, for those only undertook bodily contests; but these gentlemen are, in the first place, very formidable in bodily exercises, and know tricks by which they can conquer any opponent. They can fight in armour, and will teach the art to others for a consideration. And moreover they deal with the contests of the judicial courts; and are men of the utmost ability, both in arguing in such cases themselves, and in teaching others, both to plead causes, and to draw up arguments in cases of judicial proceedings. And a little while ago, this was all that they pretended
- 3 to; but now they have added the consummation of their pancratiastic art, their mastery of universal combat. For the only kind of contest in which they did not engage before, they have now taken up so effectually, that no one can stand against them, they are so clever in contradicting everything which is said, and proving the speaker to be in the wrong, whether it be true or false.

"And I assure you, Crito, I have thought of entering myself as a pupil with them; for they say that they can in a short time make any one else clever in this same art."

CR. "But alack-a-day! Socrates, are you not

afraid of your age? Do you not think you are too old to learn this art?"

Soc. "Not at all. I have good proof that it is not too late, and good encouragement to set about it. For the two teachers themselves were what one may call aged when they began to practise this art of theirs,—this art of argumentation, which is what I want to learn. Yesterday or the day before, so to speak, they had not yet begun to be sages. There is, however, one thing which I am afraid of,—that I may do them discredit as a pupil. This is what happens at present with regard to Connos the harpist, son of Metrodorus. I go on learning the harp from him; and the young fellows, who go to the same school, laugh at me, and call him *Do-the-old-boys*¹. I am afraid that these two strangers may get snubbed in the same way; or perhaps they will be so much afraid of this that they will refuse to take me as a scholar. But to avoid this, I can tell you, Crito, that I have already, upon the spot, persuaded some elderly people to be my fellow-pupils, and I shall try here to persuade more; and I want you to come with me to school. And we will take your boys with us, as a bait to catch these wise men; for they will want to have *them* so much, that they will admit *us* along with them."

CR. "There is nothing to prevent this, Socrates, if you wish to have it so: but first tell me about the wisdom which these wise men possess; what kind of wisdom it is, that I may know what we are going to learn."

Of course it is obvious that this respect for the wisdom of these new teachers, and the willingness to incur the ridicule of learning it at an advanced age, are all ironically assumed, in order to give

¹ γερωντοδιδύσκαλον.

force to the exposure of the emptiness of this wisdom, when the time comes. The supposed Crito treats the proposal of his master in the same spirit; and after this preface, we come to the main portion of the Dialogue, the conversation between Socrates and the two new teachers: the boy Clinias, the son of Axiochus, sitting between them, and being made the subject on which they try their experiments, or make their displays of argumentation. Socrates willingly agrees to narrate this. He says:

“ You cannot be more willing to hear than I am to tell. I cannot pretend that I did not pay attention to what they said; for I paid great attention, and recollect it well, and will try to tell you
5 the whole story from the beginning. By some special providence, I happened to be sitting there where you saw me, alone, in the undressing-room, and I was already thinking of rising from my seat: but as I began to do so, the accustomed sign of my divine monitor stopped me, so I sat down again; and soon after, these two persons, Euthydemus and Dionysiodorus, came in, and with them several other persons, whom I took for their disciples. When they had come in, they began walking in the covered Race-ground; and they had hardly taken two or three turns, when in comes Clinias, who, you truly say, has paid great attention to his studies. And behind him there were many of the boy’s admirers; and among the rest Ctesippus, a young man of the Pæania quarter of the city, gentlemanlike and good-looking in his appearance, but proud and haughty, as young men are. So Clinias, seeing me as he entered, came right across to me, and sat down at my right hand,
6 as you truly say. When Dionysiodorus and Euthydemus saw this, they at first stood over against

us and spoke together, looking at us from time to time (for I watched them very narrowly); and then coming up to us, one of them, Euthydemus, sat down by the boy, and the other next to me, on my left hand; and the rest of the company, just as it happened. I greeted them as persons whom I had not seen for some time; and I then said to Clinias: 'Now, Clinias, these are two gentlemen who are very clever, Euthydemus and Dionysiodorus; and clever, not in little things, but in very great things; for they know all about war; everything that a man must know to be a good general; how an army should be regimented and officered, and drilled to use its weapons. And then they can teach you to defend yourself by pleading in a court of justice, if any one attacks you.'"

We have still the ironical strain of assumed simple belief in and deference for the Professors kept up; and now they are to speak for themselves. Socrates goes on:

"On my saying this, they showed a contempt 7 for me; they looked at one another and laughed; and Euthydemus said: 'We no longer consider the matters which you speak of, Socrates, as serious studies. They are mere *bye-play* in comparison with our real work.' And on this I, full of admiration, said: 'Your work must be something very grand indeed, if those other matters are *bye-play*. I beg you, for goodness' sake, tell me what this grand thing is.' 'We conceive, Socrates, that we can teach men Virtue, better and faster than anybody else.' 'Gracious heaven!' cried I, 'what an operation do you speak of! By what wonderful luck did you get hold of that power? I assure you I had continued to think of you as I just now said: that your great accomplishment was fighting in armour; and so I told persons. For when you

were here formerly, I recollect that *that* was what you professed; but if you now really profess the art which you speak of, I must say to you, *Be propitious!* For really I must address you as Gods, and beg you to excuse what I have, in my ignorance, uttered. But consider well, Euthydemus and Dionysiodorus, whether you say truly. The matter is so great that you cannot be surprised at a little incredulity.' 'You may rest assured, Socrates, that the thing is so.' 'I congratulate you on your possession more than I would the great king (of Persia) on his empire. But tell me one thing. Do you intend to exhibit to us this wisdom of yours? or what is your design?' 'We are here for that very purpose, Socrates, that we may exhibit it, and teach it, if any one will learn.' 'I will engage to you that everybody will be willing to learn, who has not learnt already; myself in the first place; and then Clinias here, and Ctesippus, and these others,' said I, pointing to the admirers of Clinias; for they had gathered to us and were standing round. Ctesippus was at first, I think, sitting at some distance from Clinias. But when Euthydemus, in addressing me, leant
 8
 9 forwards, he prevented Ctesippus from seeing. So Ctesippus, both because he wanted to gaze at Clinias, and liked to hear us talk, was the first to get up and stand opposite to us; and then the others did the same, and stood round us; both the admirers of Clinias, and the friends of Euthydemus and Dionysiodorus. So I, pointing to them, said to Euthydemus that we were all willing to learn. And Ctesippus cordially assented, as did the others; and they invited him to give a specimen of his skill and wisdom in the presence of us all."

We have here the characters brought upon the stage, and grouped, with a minuteness of descrip-

tion, as to the effect of the slight impulses which shape the group, peculiarly characteristic of Plato. We have then forthwith a Socratic tinge given to the discussion which ensues.

“Then I said: ‘By all means, Euthydemus and Dionysiodorus, I beg that you will gratify these gentlemen, and let me see a specimen of your art. But it is obvious that it would be too much trouble to give such specimens in a general way; but tell me this one thing: whether your power of making a man a good man applies only to a man who is already persuaded that he ought to learn from you to be so; or whether it applies also to a man who has not such a persuasion, because he does not think that virtue is at all a thing which can be taught, or does not think that you are teachers thereof. Tell me, is it a part of this same art of yours to convince a man that virtue is a docible thing? Are you the persons from whom one may best learn this? or is it otherwise?’ ‘Yes, Socrates,’ said Dionysiodorus, ‘it is a part of the same art.’ ‘And you are the persons who, of all living men, can best turn men to philosophy and the study of virtue?’ ‘So we flatter ourselves, Socrates.’ ‘Well; as to the rest of your exhibition, put it off to another time. But as a specimen, let us see this. Convince this youth that he ought to attend to philosophy and virtue; and you will do a favour to me and to all these gentlemen. For the case as to the youth is this: both I, and all the rest of us, are very desirous that he should be as good as he can be made to be. He is the son of Axiochus; the grandson of the old Alcibiades, and the cousin of the present Alcibiades; his name is Clinias. He is very young; and we are afraid about him, as people are afraid about young persons, that some

one may get hold of him in spite of our care, give
 11 his mind a wrong turn, and spoil him. So it is
 very lucky that you are come to help us. And
 now, if you have no objection, make an experiment
 of your art upon the youth; and let the conversa-
 tion be carried on in our presence.' When I had
 thus spoken, Euthydemus said, very bravely and
 boldly, 'We have no objection, Socrates, if only
 the young man will answer our questions.' 'To
 answer questions,' said I, 'is a thing to which he
 is accustomed. For these, his friends, often go to
 him and ask him questions of various kinds; so
 that he has a moderate share of confidence in
 answering.' "

And now we are ready for the conversation
 which has thus been somewhat laboriously pre-
 luded. The author, indeed, is by no means blind
 to the sort of mock-heroic dignity which he has
 thrown round his scene. And he shows his sense
 of this aspect of his drama still more clearly, by
 prefacing his account of the conversation with a
 mock-epic invocation. He goes on:

"What came after this, Crito, how can I tell
 aright? Not small the task to call back to mind
 and repeat sayings of prodigious wisdom. I must,
 in beginning my narrative, do as the poets do, and
 invoke the Muses and Mnemosyne. Thus then, I
 12 think, did Euthydemus begin: 'O Clinias, what
 kind of men is it that learn, the wise (that is, the
 knowing) or the ignorant?' And the boy, taking
 the question as a hard one, blushed, and, as if at a
 loss, looked at me. And I seeing that he was
 embarrassed, said, 'Take heart, Clinias, and an-
 swer bravely which you think true. Perhaps it
 will bring you a great deal of good.' And in the
 mean time, Dionysiodorus, bending a little towards
 my ear, and smiling benignly, said, 'I tell you

beforehand, Socrates, that whichever answer the boy makes, he will be proved to be in the wrong.' And in the mean time, Clinias had answered, that it is the knowing who learn."

The mode of refutation of this assertion by 13 Euthydemus may easily be supposed. Those who teach, for instance, grammar, or harp-playing, teach those who are ignorant of those arts. And thus it is not the knowing, but the ignorant who learn. This Clinias then acknowledges.

This does not appear to us very subtle or profound; but the adherents of the new teachers were prepared to applaud what was said by their master. "They broke out," the narrator says, "like a Chorus when the Leader gives the signal, into a tumult of cheers and laughter. But before the boy could well recover his breath, Dionysiodorus took up the question on the other side; and asked, 'Tell me, Clinias, when your master makes his scholars repeat to him what they have had to learn, who have learnt it, they who know it, or they who are ignorant of it?' 'Those who know it,' said Clinias. 'Then,' said he, 'it is the knowing who learn, and not the ignorant; and what 14 you answered to Euthydemus just now was not right.'

"Then the adherents of the two teachers laughed mightily and applauded, admiring their cleverness; and we others," says Socrates meekly, "held our tongues as people put to confusion. And Euthydemus, seeing this, and resolved to make us admire him still more, kept his hold on the boy, and like a clever dancer making a double beat on the same spot, redoubled his questions. He said, 'What do learners learn—that which they know, or that which they do not know?' And again Dionysiodorus lightly whispered me: 'This again, Socrates,

is a passage like the other.' 'Heavens!' said I, 'and yet how clever the former interrogation was.'

15 'All our interrogations, Socrates,' said he, 'are invincible.' 'And that is the reason,' said I, 'that you are so much admired by your disciples.' In the mean time Clinias had answered, that learners learn what they do not know. And he then began to ply him with the same examples as before. 'Well,' said he, 'but do not you know your letters?' 'I do.' 'All of them?' He assented." He then goes on to make the youth confess, by the same sort of interrogations, that when the school-master dictates anything to be written down, he dictates letters: "And then," he says, "is it you who know your letters, who learn your lesson from him, or the ignorant pupil who does not know his letters?" "No," says Clinias, "it is not he, but I who learn them." "And you learn what you knew before, since you knew all your letters before? And so your answer was wrong."

And here again, when one of these performers has proved one side, the other is ready to confound the subject of their questioning, by proving the other. "Euthydemus had hardly said this, when Dionysiodorus caught the ball and sent it back again, aimed at the poor youth; and said, 'Euthydemus is misleading you, Clinias. For tell me; is not to learn, to receive a knowledge of that which you learn? And is not to know, to have knowledge already? And who receives a thing—they who have it, or they who have it not? Of course, they who have it not. So they who learn must be they who have not knowledge, not they who have.' All this Clinias is obliged to allow."

The two professors are about to subject the youth to a third see-saw of the same kind, when

Socrates interferes, explains to Clinias that all this is mere trifling, which he is to take as sport; and points out the fallacy of the arguments which had been employed. "I saw," says Socrates, "that the boy was fairly bewildered¹, and was afraid he would turn soft, so I encouraged him." The encouragement was clothed in an image which is no longer familiar to us. "These professors," 17 he says, "are treating you as those are treated who are initiated into the mysteries of the Corybantes. The initiators place the neophyte in the midst, dance round him, and seize and mock him, till he is no longer master of himself; and after that admit him to the participation of their mysteries. These performances of our friends are the first rites of their philosophical initiation; they have hitherto been playing with you, but now they will initiate you. But as to what they have been saying in the way of argument, we must, as Prodicus says, distinguish exactly the meanings of words. You did not consider that people talk of *learning* a thing in two different senses; the one, when having no knowledge of it to begin with, you acquire a knowledge of it afterwards; the other sense, when having knowledge already, you apply it to a thing to be done or said. This is more commonly called *understanding* a thing, but sometimes also *learning* it. And it appears by what has passed, that you were not aware that the word *to learn* has two opposite significations; being applied to those that do know a thing, and to those that do not know it. And the same may be said of the second question; when they asked you whether men learn what they do know or what they do not know."

¹ γνούς βαπτίζομενον τὸ μεράκιον.

18 He then goes on to administer a quiet rebuke to the Professors by treating these mere quibbles of theirs as not seriously intended. •

“These,” he says, “are the mere sports of those who are employed in teaching. And so I say that these gentlemen have been sporting and trifling with you. I call this *trifling*, on this account—that if a man knew many turns of this kind, or even knew all such that are, he would not thereby know in the smallest degree how things really are, and would only be able to perplex men by ambiguous words;—tripping them up, and throwing them down, by some unexpected trick; just as some people snatch the stool from beneath a man who is sitting down, and when he falls on his back, laugh and chuckle. They have been playing you such tricks as that. And that being over, of course they will now talk seriously to you. And I will set the example, that they may be induced to do what they have promised.”

19 After this civil expression of his contempt for the specimens of their art which they have shown, he goes on, still in all seriousness, to give his own views of the way of persuading a young man of the importance of studying wisdom and virtue. “I will show you,” he says, “how I conceive the matter, and what ~~kind~~ kind of philosophy I want to hear. If I do this in a way which you think common and ridiculous, bear with me, and do not laugh me down. It is my desire to hear your wisdom which makes me ready to improvise an argument of my own.” He then goes on, by interrogating Clinias, to lead him through principles
20 of this kind: That all men desire happiness¹; that happiness consists in the possession of good things

¹ εἰς πᾶν τρεῖν.

of various kinds: health, wealth, honour, power, and the like;—but yet, not in the mere possession of these things, but in their use; and again, not merely in their use, but in their right use. Now what the *right* use of anything is, wisdom and 25 science alone can teach us; and hence wisdom and science are the most precious things in the world, and what men ought by all means to strive to acquire.

To all this, brought out in a somewhat prolix manner, Clinias cordially assents. “And I,” says 28 Socrates, “hearing this with pleasure, said, ‘There, Euthydemus and Dionysiodorus, there is my specimen of what I wish the first steps of a young man’s education to be; common-place perhaps, and tediously brought out: now let one of you show us how the like may be done in a more artist-like fashion. Or if you do not choose to do this, go on where I left off; and as it is agreed that he ought to get science, in order to be happy and good, explain whether all science is necessary or some one particular science. For as I began by saying, we are very desirous that this young man should be wise and good.’”

We are here brought round to the Socratic view of the nature and claims of virtue, which is implied or asserted in all the early Dialogues of Plato, and which may, I conceive, be taken as an indication of a comparatively early date. And in delivering this doctrine here, it is evident that Plato wished to give a piece of grave and serious moral reasoning, which should stand in favourable contrast with the frivolous, captious, and worthless arguments of the class of persons ridiculed under the characters of Euthydemus and Dionysiodorus. The rest of the Dialogue is mainly employed in exhibiting examples of their quibbles far more

extravagant and puerile than those already given; and indeed so extravagant and so puerile, that we cannot but wonder that Plato should have thought it worth while to accumulate such a collection of them, and even to represent Socrates as joining in the production of sophisms of the like kind, as if to carry these professors of argumentation to the full height of the absurdity which they were capable of uttering.

This exhibition involves a good deal of comedy. The quibbles of the two sophists excite some anger in their hearers; but they, undaunted and inexhaustible, are quite ready to quibble upon the expressions in which this anger explodes. Socrates begins this narrative by saying to Crito: "Having said this, I was very curious to know what they would say, and how they would set about the task of convincing the young man that he ought to pursue wisdom and virtue. Accordingly the elder of the two began, and we all looked to him, expecting to hear some wonderful discourse; and certainly a wonderful discourse we did hear; a discourse, Crito, which is worth your listening to, in the way of a discourse to urge a young man to virtuous courses."

I must abridge this wonderful discourse of Dionysiodorus, and perhaps by doing so I can the better give some of the points of it, so far as the difference of the habitual mode of speaking and arguing on such subjects between the Greeks and us admits of their being rendered. Dionysiodorus begins by a series of questions to this effect: "You really and seriously wish this young man (Clinias) to become wise? But he is not wise
30) now, as you allow. You wish him then to be what he is not; and to be no more what he is? You wish him to be himself no more; that is, you wish

there may be an end of him?" The use of such expressions much disturbs the admirers of Clinias. Socrates is troubled; and Ctesippus, more fierce, says: "Friend from Thurii, if it were not a rude thing to say, I should say, Be your expression on your own head! May there be an end of *you* rather. How dare you say that we wish that this dear youth should cease to be? It is false."

Hereupon, as I have said, Euthydemus is quite 31 ready with another quibble. "So, Ctesippus," he said, "you think it possible for a man to say what is false?" "Certainly." "But when a man says what is false, he says the thing that is not. Is it not so? And if a man says the thing that is not, he says nothing; and therefore cannot tell a falsehood."

From this they are soon led to another quibble. 32 Ctesippus says that though a man cannot speak of things that are not, he can speak of things that 33 are, *as they are*; and that this is what honest truth-telling people do. Hereupon Dionysiodorus forthwith fastens. "So," he says, "you would have men speak of things *as they are*; that is, I suppose, of the good, speak well; of the bad, speak ill." Euthydemus interferes, to carry the illustration further. "Do they," he says, "speak greatly of the great, and warmly of the warm?" Ctesippus takes up this strain somewhat fiercely: "Yes," he says; "and of the frigid they speak frigidly, and they say that their conversation is full of frigid conceits." "Ah," says Dionysiodorus, "you are abusive, Ctesippus, you are abusive." "Troth, not I," said Ctesippus. "I have a great regard for you. But I advise you as a friend, do not be so rude as to say that I want my dearest friends to come to an end." Socrates then interposes to 34 soothe the disputants; still insisting upon it that the stranger shall show how they can make men

wise and good. "Let them," he says, "make an end of us, as we are, if they will bring us out again wise and good. I am ready to venture, and to let Dionysiodorus put me in his Medea's kettle. He may boil me up if he likes, provided he will
 35 make a good man of me." "Oh," says Ctesippus; "they may skin me as Apollo did Marsyas, if they will make my skin not into a water-bag, but into a virtue-bag. Dionysiodorus thinks I am angry with him, but I really am not; only if he says what I think wrong, I must contradict him; but contradicting is not abusing a person."

Here again Dionysiodorus is ready with his trick of fence." "Ah!" he says, "you think there is such a thing as contradicting."—"Certainly; do not you?"—Dionysiodorus then proceeds to argue, much in the same way as before, that if of two persons, one say the thing as it is, and another say the thing as it is not, the latter says nothing, and therefore
 36 there can be no contradiction. Ctesippus is here represented as reduced to silence: but Socrates steps in and carries the discussion to the opinion of Protagoras, that there can be no such thing as false assertion, no such thing as false opinion. This discussion again brings out some of the quibbles of the Sophists. But in a short time Socrates gives the discussion a serious turn, and goes on with the
 42 Socratic reasoning which he had begun before; and pursues the inquiry, If Virtue be a kind of knowledge, what kind of knowledge is it?

In this investigation, as commonly in similar passages, Socrates at last professes himself to be at
 50 a loss what conclusion to come to; and the game
 51 is again thrown into the hands of the Sophists.

Euthydemus begins to prove, with great importance of manner, that Socrates already has this
 52 knowledge. But here the quibbles become still

more extravagant, and we may say, farcical; as we may judge by one of the last of them. "This dog, having puppies, is a father; but he is yours; therefore he is your father." Along with all this absurd quibbling there is a good deal of drama: the Sophists being sometimes defeated and silenced for a moment, and Ctesippus indulging in a horse-laugh as his manner was, and Clinias also laughing, which made Ctesippus look ten times as large as before. But the Sophists go on undaunted still, and prove that as cooking *belongs to* a cook, you ought to cook the cook; and in like manner, hammer the smith, and pot the potter. The force of quibbling can no farther go, and Socrates has nothing left but to admire this wonderful wisdom. And after a few more such turns the Sophists are left in possession of a triumph, laughing, and surrounded by applause, "so that the very pillars of the Lyceum seemed to applaud and chuckle. And I was left thinking that I had never seen men so wise as these." And accordingly he makes a speech to them, full of humility and admiration.

After this narrative, as the close of the dialogue, comes a conversation between Socrates and Crito, to whom he had been giving this account. Crito says that he had heard one of the persons present blame Socrates for lending himself to this trifling. "And I thought," says Crito, "that 77 though it might be well to talk with such persons, it was not well to do it before so many people."

Socrates asks of what class the critic was, and 78 hears that he was not a public speaker, but a writer of speeches, a class which had grown up in Athens. To this class Lysias, Isocrates, and other so-called orators, belonged; but no names are here mentioned. Socrates says these are a set of persons whom Prodicus called *the Borderers*, between

politicians and philosophers. And on account of this position of theirs, Socrates, that is Plato, disparages them. "If politics," he says, "be the right course, men should take to that; if philosophy, to that. The intermediate line cannot be the best line."

81 Crito then expresses the difficulty which he feels about the education of his sons. He says, "I chose their mother with care, I have collected a fortune for them with diligence; it would be absurd to care less for their education than for those matters; yet when I look at the character of our professed teachers, I am discomfited; they seem to me in general so worthless."

82 Socrates replies, that "the worthlessness of those who profess to teach philosophy does not deprive philosophy of its value. That we must well and carefully weigh the thing itself. If you find it bad, reject it; but if good, as I think it is, follow it courageously, and study it diligently, you and your children."

And so the dialogue ends.

REMARKS ON THE EUTHYDEMUS.

AST holds the Euthydemus to be spurious, on the ground of its being beneath the high and scientific view of Platonic composition; and of its being employed in the empty ridicule of empty quibbling. And he holds further, that a person familiar with the Platonic spirit cannot believe that Plato has devoted an especial Dialogue to the exposure of Sophistry and Wrangling—a subject which is so worthless, and which he had so often exposed in his bye-play.

To say that any one who differs from us as to the genuineness of any of the Platonic dialogues is unacquainted with the Platonic spirit, is an easy way of disposing of the subject: only it has this disadvantage, that it can be employed on one side as easily as the other, by any one who does not shrink from the dogmatism and presumption which it involves. A person will best show his acquaintance with the Platonic spirit, by catching and pointing out the opinions, doctrines, arguments and illustrations in which this spirit shows itself; and he who, not doing this, holds that he has authority to say what is conformable to the spirit of Plato, and what is not, may be left to his own fancies, as neither needing nor deserving refutation.

It is difficult to understand how any one, recollecting the *Cratylus*, the discussion with Polus in the *Gorgias*, with Thrasy-machus in the *Republic*, and several others, can doubt whether Plato thought it worth while to expose at length quibbling and sophistry. If such practices prevailed, it was not their worthlessness and emptiness which superseded the necessity of exposing them; on the contrary, these were exactly the reasons why the exposure was necessary.

To which we may add, that the serious part of the Dialogue bears a large proportion to this comic part, and is taken up with expounding Platonic doctrines in a Platonic manner and with a Platonic drama. To this it is replied, that the serious parts are mere Socratic doctrines, not Platonic.

We answer, that they are *Platonic expositions* of Socratic doctrines, as much as any others of the earlier Dialogues.

GORGIAS.

THE title of this Dialogue in Diogenes is *Gorgias, or Of Rhetoric*; and certainly, an important portion of it is employed in discussing the Value of Rhetoric: and the discussion of the value of Political Power, which also occupies much of the Dialogue, is connected with the question about Rhetoric.

INTRODUCTION TO THE GORGIAS.

THE assembly of persons into which we are introduced in the *Gorgias* is not quite so distinguished as it is in the *Protagoras*; yet Gorgias himself, the main figure, was no less eminent than *Protagoras* or *Hippias*, and was one of those ambassador-orators of whom *Plato* speaks elsewhere. He came on an embassy to Athens, and his reputation in ancient times was so great that we hear of such men as *Pericles*, *Alcibiades*, *Thucydides*, being his pupils in oratory. He was also an acute speculator. Among the works of *Aristotle* we have a short treatise, containing a review or extract of a work of *Gorgias* in which he proves that Nothing can exist. In *Plato's* Dialogue he is not treated otherwise than respectfully, though he is represented as having the worse in the argument; but the disgrace of a complete defeat, pushed to a ridiculous extent, is reserved for his followers, *Polus* and *Callicles*. *Polus* is a Sophist, a disciple of *Gorgias*, of whom we hear in the

course of the Dialogue, what Suidas also confirms, that he wrote a work on Art. Callicles does not appear to have been a professional Sophist. He is the host of Gorgias at Athens, and pushes his assaults against the foundations of ordinary morality much further than his companions, and indeed probably much further than many of the so-called Sophists did; speaking after the manner of a fearless extempore speculator, who was resolved not to be frightened by conventional moral phrases.

Among these persons, and Chærephon, the friend of Socrates, the dialogue is thus carried on.

GORGIAS.

SOCRATES and **Chærephon** come with the intention of hearing **Gorgias** converse, or declaim, but come too late. He has already finished his display of eloquence. **Chærephon** expresses his disappointment, by reference to a proverb, used also in English, which recommends us to come in at the beginning of a feast, and at the end of a fray. He says :

CHÆR. "This is the way one likes to come in for one's share, when the matter is a fray."

SOCRATES. "What? are we, as they say, a day after the feast?"

CALLICLES. "Indeed you are; and a very dainty feast it was. **Gorgias** has just been saying many very fine things."

SOC. "O **Callicles**, **Chærephon** it is who is in fault. He kept us dawdling in the *Agora*."

CHÆR. "No harm done, **Socrates**. I will set the matter right. **Gorgias** is my friend; and he will show off for us, now if you like, or if not, at another time."

CALL. "What, **Chærephon**, does **Socrates** wish to hear **Gorgias** talk?"

CHÆR. "We came exactly with that object."

CALL. "Then come home with me; for **Gor-**

gias is staying with me, and he will give you a specimen of his discourse."

SOC. "You are kind to say so. But will he converse with us? I want to ask him what is the real purpose of the art which he possesses: what he professes; what he teaches. As for any other specimen of his discourse, that he may give us, as you say, another time."

CALL. "There is nothing like asking him, Socrates. This very thing was one of the points of his discourse. And he invited everybody who was in the house to ask what questions he would, and said that he would answer any thing."

3 ●SOC. "You tell me what I am glad to hear."
—"Well, Chærophon, ask him."

CHÆR. "What am I to ask him?"

SOC. "What he is."

CHÆR. "How do you mean?"

SOC. "Why you know if he was a man who made shoes, he would answer that he was a cordwainer. Do you understand?"

CHÆR. "I understand, and I will ask him. Tell me, Gorgias, does Callicles here tell us truly, that you promise to answer any question which any one asks you?"

GORGIAS. "He tells you truly, Chærephon. I have just been making that promise. And I may say, that for many years nobody has asked me any new question."

CHÆR. "And you find it easy to answer, Gorgias?"

GOR. "You may try, Chærephon, if you please."

But here Polus, the disciple, puts himself forward to answer in the place of his master, who has, he says, been speaking for some time, and must be fatigued.

CHÆR. "What, Polus, do you think that 4
you can answer better than Gorgias?"

POLUS. "What matters that, if I answer
well enough for you?"

CHÆR. "Nothing at all. Answer then, if
you please."

POL. "Ask."

CHÆR. "I ask then, If Gorgias were master
of the art which his brother Herodicus practises,
what should we call him? what we call *him*?"

POL. "Even so."

CHÆR. "We should be right then in calling
him a physician."

POL. "Yes."

CHÆR. "And if he were skilful in the art
practised by Aristophon and his brother, what
should we call him?"

POL. "Of course an animal-painter."

CHÆR. "Well, then, he is in fact master of
a certain art. What is it right to call him in con-
sequence of this art?"

Polus, instead of answering directly, begins to
discourse about Art in general, in a manner which
is probably either an extract from his treatise on
that subject or an imitation of it. He was noted
for his artificially balanced style.

"O Chærephon, there are among men arts
many, experimentally invented from experience
which has been acquired; for by experience life
proceeds according to art, but without experience
life must go on according to chance. And of these,
different arts are differently possessed by different
men; and by the best, the best. Of these last
is Gorgias; the most excellent of arts is that
which he professes."

We may note, in passing, the peculiarities of
style which are here exhibited, or perhaps cari-

catured; especially the jingle of inflexions of the same root¹.

We may note also the indication of a philosophy opposed to that of Plato. For what *he* sought was not an art borrowed from experience, but an art derived from principles, as we shall see.

But of course the immediate point is, that this declaration is not an answer, as Socrates remarks.

SOC. "O Gorgias, Polus appears to be well skilled in constructing phrases; but what he promised Chærephon, he has not done."

GOR. "What in particular, Socrates?"

*SOC. "He does not seem to me to have answered the question asked."

6 GOR. "Well then do you, if you like, ask him."

SOC. "No. If you will permit me, I would much rather ask *you*. For it is plain from what Polus has already said, that he has studied rather the art of Rhetoric, as it is called, than the art of logical conversation."

POL. "How is that so, Socrates?"

Here we have the controversy between Rhetoric and Dialectics, Gorgias and Plato, fairly brought into view. Socrates answers:

SOC. "Because, Polus, when Chærephon asked what art Gorgias was skilled in, you begin to praise his art, as if some one had blamed it; but you do not answer what it is."

POL. "Did I not answer that it was the most excellent of arts?"

SOC. "Sure enough you did. But nobody asked what was the quality of Gorgias's art, but

¹ ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρωσ εὐρημέναι—ἐμπείρια γὰρ, &c. ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως—τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἀριστοί.

Experimentally invented from experience; for by experience, &c. Arts different, differently possessed, &c. And of the best, the best.

what art it was, and what we must call Gorgias. Now, as when Chærephon proposed questions to you before, you answered briefly; do so still; and tell what is this art, and what we are to call Gorgias, or rather, do you tell us what we are to call you—as master of what art.”

GOR. “Of Rhetoric, Socrates.”

SOC. “Then we are to call you a Rhetorician, 7 or speaker?”

GOR. “And a good one, Socrates, if you want to call me what ‘I boast myself to be,’ as Homer says.”

SOC. “I want to do that.”

GOR. “Then so call me.”

SOC. “And we may say that you can make others such as you are?”

GOR. “That is what I profess both here and elsewhere.”

SOC. “Now would you have the kindness, Gorgias, to go on conversing with me as we are conversing now, asking and answering; and lay aside for the present that prolixity of discourse which Polus was beginning to practise? Do not run from what you promised, but have the kindness to answer briefly what is asked.”

GOR. “There are questions, Socrates, to which the answers cannot be short; but I will try to make all of them as short as possible. For this is one of the things on which I pique myself,—that no one can put a thing into fewer words than I can.”

SOC. “That is just what I want, Gorgias. 8 Pray give me a specimen of this branch of your art, your conciseness. Your prolixity you may display to us hereafter.”

GOR. “Go on. You will say you never heard any one shorter.”

SOC. "Come then. You say you are master of Rhetoric, and that you can make other persons speakers. Now what things is Rhetoric engaged about? As, for instance, you know, weaving is employed in making clothes. Is it not?"

GOR. "Yea."

SOC. "And music about making tunes?"

GOR. "Yea."

SOC. "By Juno, Gorgias, I admire your brevity. Nothing can be shorter."

GOR. "I think that I do it pretty well."

Of course we see the urbane compliance of Gorgias with Socrates's wish, and his easy confidence in success. We are to expect that this confidence will lead to a defeat, but, as I have said, not to a disgraceful defeat. Plato knew too well Gorgias's talents and skill, and also his reputation, to think it prudent to represent him as a contemptible adversary or an easy conquest. Indeed Plato would probably rather have to be content with justifying his own views, than to aspire to ride triumphantly over a person of such established reputation as Gorgias. But though this snip-snap dialogue pleased Socrates, and was defended by Plato, it has, upon paper, as I have said, the disadvantage of bringing out the truth very slowly. And we may, as I have also said, sometimes, I think, abridge the exposition of the doctrine delivered by not breaking the conversation into such minute particles. By making the separate speeches longer, we may make the whole conversation shorter. I shall not, therefore, think it necessary any further to adhere to Plato's interlocutions exactly, but shall rapidly give the purport of them, and the point to which they tend. The dialogue then proceeds from the point which I have already

9 described. Different arts being employed about

different things, about what things is Rhetoric employed? About words.—And about what words? About the words which tell the sick how they are to get well?

No—Not about all words then?—No.

Here we should naturally expect the next move in the game—About what words then? But this does not come till afterwards. We have first Gorgias's teaching added to his speaking.

You make men able to speak—Yes—Then of course to *think* about the things about which they speak?—Of course—But as we were saying, the art of medicine it is which makes men able to speak and think about sick people? It must needs be so—Then medicine also is concerned about words? Yes.—That is, the words which describe diseases?—Even so—And so the art gymnastic is concerned about words which concern the condition of the 10 body?—And so each art is concerned about words; namely, the words which relate to the matter to which that art refers.

Gorgias must have felt that he was losing ground, but he assents.

SOC. "Then why do you not call the other arts also Rhetoric, since they are about words, if you call your art Rhetoric, which is about words?"

GOR. "Because, Socrates, in other arts the knowledge involved refers to manual acts, but Rhetoric has nothing to do with such acts, but is entirely concerned with words. On this account I call it Rhetoric."

The arts which deal with material processes 11 being thus set aside, Socrates refers to another class of arts which have nothing to do with matter: as Numeration, Arithmetic, Calculation, Geometry, and the like. He says, "Rhetoric, it seems,

must be one of these. And yet I suppose you would not call any of these Rhetoric." Gorgias assents that he would not. Socrates then requests him to complete his definition. "Thus," he says, "if any one asked me to define Arithmetic or Numeration, I should say, first, that it was one of the arts which work by words. And if he were to ask again, words about what? I should say, words about odd and even numbers." (The Greeks of Plato's time speculated much about the properties of odd and even numbers.) "And so if any one were to ask me about Astronomy, and I should say that it works by words; and he again were to ask, but

14 about what, Socrates, are the words of astronomy? I should say, about the motions of the stars, and the sun and the moon, and their relative velocities." Gorgias says that this is right. Socrates then urges again: "About what are the words of Rhetoric?" Gorgias appears to have some misgivings as to the effect of a direct answer, for he gives for reply, that the words of Rhetoric refer to the most important and best things possible. Socrates makes this answer a subject of pleasantry; refers to a social song—a glee as we should call it—in which different persons in succession assert different things to be the best things possible—

16 Health and Wealth and Beauty.—He adds, "The Physician, the Gymnastic master, the money-making man, would each contend that the thing which it was their business to procure,—Health, Bodily Strength, Riches,—was the best thing in the world. And then we should have to say to each, My friend, here is Gorgias who contends that his art procures a better thing than yours does. And then we may be sure he will ask, *what is* this better thing: let Gorgias say. So you see, Gorgias, you must needs answer *them*, as well as me; and

tell us what is this best of things that men can have, which you can procure them."

Gorgias appears by this time to have become weary or afraid of giving very brief and simple answers. He replies, in a somewhat rhetorical manner, that the good thing in question gives the possessor freedom and political power. And So-17 crates still asking what it is, he says, "It is the art of persuading both in the court of justice and in the public assembly, and in any other meeting of citizens. And by means of this power," he says, "you make the physician, and the gymnast, and all become your servants; and the moneyed man makes money not for himself, but for you."

Soc. "Now I understand. Rhetoric is the Art of Persuading. This is the whole of its office; or have you anything to add?"

Gor. "No. You have defined it sufficiently well. That is the sum of its object."

Socrates then proceeds, after some apology, to analyse this account of Rhetoric in his usual inductive method, by the example of other arts. But he soon proceeds to a distinction more peculiarly Platonic; the distinction of real knowledge or Science, and Opinion. He says, "Other arts 20 give us knowledge: thus arithmetic gives us certain knowledge about numbers. Is not this persuading us of certain truths? Is not arithmetic, then, also an Art of Persuasion? And so of other arts. What particular kind of persuasion then does Rhetoric aim at?"

Gorgias answers, the art of persuasion in ju-21 dicial bodies, and other assemblies. And indeed that this was his meaning, was before tolerably obvious, as Socrates observes: but he adds that he wished not to take advantage of a hasty expression.

- He then proceeds to lead Gorgias to self-contradiction, by a somewhat prolix course, which I must abridge. There is, as Gorgias allows, true and false opinion, but not true and false knowledge. Rhetoric can only produce opinion, not
- 22 knowledge. How should it, in so small a time as that of a speech, convey the knowledge of right and wrong? How can rhetoric supply the place
- 23 of knowledge? If the assembly wish to choose a physician or a ship-builder, do they not need a knowledge of medicine or of ship-building to make
- 24 a right choice? Does your Rhetoric help your pupils to speak on such subjects, or only about right and wrong in general? Gorgias in reply says he will give a full account of his art. He asserts that even on points of technical character, as building, rhetoric gives its possessor the power of conversing. In this way Themistocles and Pericles were the authors of the docks and walls of Athens.
- 25 In this way, if the accomplished orator wished to get himself chosen for a medical office, he would be able to triumph over the mere physician.
- 26 But the art is to be used within proper limits.
- 27 If a man who has learnt gymnastics or wrestling were to give his friend a heavy fall, or his father a straightforward hit, you are not on that account to blame the arts of wrestling or boxing, or the teachers of those arts. *They* taught them with the intention of the art being used on right occasions, and it is the pupil's fault if he transgresses
- 28 this rule. And in the same way of Rhetoric. The accomplished orator can persuade in any case; but if a man who has learnt this Art uses it for wrong purposes, the Art is not to be blamed.
- 29 This is Gorgias's case, as our phrase is. And Socrates, before setting himself to point out a contradiction in it, prepares the way very cautiously.

He says: "Some people, when they dispute and cannot agree, become cross and use bad language. Now if there be any danger of this, let us stop 30 where we are. But if you are like me, we may go on. What do I mean when I say, *like me*? I mean that I am very glad to convince another when I am right; but no less glad to be convinced by another when I am wrong." Gorgias says he 31 has the same feelings. Socrates then proposes that the company should go away if they are tired or have business. But they, with that insatiate appetite for witnessing conversational discussion and logical fencing-matches, which is always supposed in the Platonic dialogues, answer by a loud cheer. "You hear it," says Chærephon. "I hope I shall never be so busy as not to have time for such a gratification." And Callicles says he should 32 like to listen to them the whole day long.

Socrates then proceeds: "You say the Orator will, on sanitary subjects, persuade better than the physician; not teach or convey real knowledge, but persuade. But whom will he persuade? The 33 ignorant, plainly. Rhetoric is a mechanism for making a man who is ignorant appear to the ignorant, to know."—GORGIAS. "And is not that a very great thing?"—SOC. "Whether it be a 34 great thing we will see by and bye. But is it so with regard also to right and wrong, good and bad? Is the Orator ignorant what these really are, and has he only got a mechanism which makes him seem to know? When young men come to you to be taught rhetoric, is this knowledge of right and wrong a thing foreign to your business? Or must they really know something on that subject, either before they come to you, or learning it from you?" Gorgias acknowledges that such knowledge is necessary; a concession for which he

is afterwards taken to task by his disciple Polus. And this is really the great point in Plato's argument: that Rhetoric necessarily assumes the knowledge of right and wrong; that is, it assumes and depends upon Ethical Philosophy. But Plato pushes the argument further than this; further, indeed, than it is true, and attempts to make Gorgias's position worse, by a reasoning which takes the usual inductive form, but which really involves a fallacy.

- 35 "The Rhetorician then," Socrates says, "must have a knowledge of right and wrong;" (or, as we more commonly translate the Greek words, of matters Just and Unjust). "But now he who knows of matters of building is an architectural, or, rather, a tectonical man; he who knows of matters of music is a musical man; he who knows of matters of medicine is a medical man: and so he who knows of matters just is a just man. And so your Rhetorician is necessarily a just man, and therefore he cannot use his art unjustly, which was
36 what you were supposing him to do a little while ago, in your defence of the art."

It is plain that this is a fallacy; for by the analogy of the other cases, a knowledge of justice would make a man, not a just, but a *judicial* man; a knowledge of morality would make a man, not a moral man, but a *moralist*; a knowledge of right would make a man, not a righteous man, but a *jurist* or master of natural law. The fallacy is transparent enough to us; but to a certain extent the basis of it was assumed in the Socratic notion—the early Platonic supposition that Virtue, Righteousness, Justice, is some kind of Knowledge.

- 38 At this point of the dialogue, however, Polus, as we have said, points out the false move which

Gorgias had made, and the conversation devolves on him.

Polus, as I have said, interposes, when Gorgias has been involved in a seeming contradiction. He says to Socrates, "You know that Gorgias was naturally ashamed to deny that a student of rhetoric must needs know about right and wrong; and from this concession, made through modesty, you drew a contradiction, as you love to do. But you know very well that any one would be ashamed to confess that he does not know what is right and wrong. It is very rude¹ to use such arguments."

To this Socrates replies with ironical thanks for his correction; begs him to take back the rash concession, and resume the argument, if only he will converse, and not make long speeches. "What," says Polus, "am I not to speak as long 39 as I choose?" "Certainly," says Socrates; "what would Athenian freedom be if you might not do that? But then, by the same freedom, I may go away if I choose." This brings Polus to reason. Socrates says, "Answer or ask, which you please," Polus chooses to ask.

POLUS. "Well, Socrates, as you are not satisfied with Gorgias's account of Rhetoric, what do you say it is?"

SOC. "You mean, what Art?"—POL. "Yes."

SOC. "I do not think it an Art at all."—

POL. "What is it then?"

SOC. "It is what you, in an Essay of yours which I was lately reading, say is the origin of Art."—POL. "What do you mean?"

SOC. "It is an empirical practice²." (We have already had the passage in which Polus speaks of art derived from experience.)

¹ πολλή ἀγροικία.

² "une espèce de routine."—Cousin's *Translation*.

POL. "You think Rhetoric an empirical practice. A practice of what?"

SOC. "Of producing gratification and pleasure."

We must recollect that Art, in the sense in which Plato uses the term, means an Art founded on a Science, as land-measuring is founded on geometry, or the raising of weights on mechanics. We might render *ἐμπειρία*, an *empirical art*, in opposition to *τεχνή*, a *scientific art*; but the need of marking the opposition makes us try to vary the phrase, and avoid the word *Art*.

Socrates begs Polus to go on questioning him, that he may bring out the whole of his meaning.

41 "Ask me," he says, "What art is Cookery?" Which Polus does.

SOC. "It is no scientific art."—POL. "What then?"—SOC. "An empirical art, or knack."

POL. "A knack of doing what?"—SOC. "Of providing gratification or pleasure."

POL. "Is then Cookery the same as Rhetoric?"—SOC. "No. But it is a branch of the same business."—POL. "What business?"

Before going on, Socrates apologizes (to Gorgias) for anything which may seem rude in his explanations: "I am afraid," he says, "Gorgias may think I am ridiculing his profession¹;" and being encouraged, propounds his view. "This business," he says, "is no art founded on science, but a practical trick of bold, clever men of the world². It may be called, in its general form, the
42 *Art of Gratifying*³. Of this art, Cookery is one branch; Rhetoric is another.

¹ μή σήηται με διακωμωδεῖν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα.

² ψυχῆς στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

³ κολακεία, Flattery; but *Flattery* does not convey the meaning.

“In fact,” he says, “there are two things to consider, the body and the mind. There are arts which provide for the good of these respectively: Medicine and Gymnastics for the good of the body; Jurisprudence and Ethics for the good of the mind. To these four genuine arts, there are four spurious arts which correspond, mimicking them, but aiming at gratification only, not at good: Cookery and Cosmetic Art try to supersede Medicine and Gymnastics; and so the Sophistic Art and Rhetoric try to supersede Jurisprudence and Ethics. We may make,” he says, “a mathematical pro- 46
portion:

“Cosmetic is to Gymnastic as Cookery is to Medicine; or rather thus:

“Cosmetic is to Gymnastic as Sophistic is to Jurisprudence; and

“Cookery is to Medicine as Rhetoric is to Ethics.”

This is the conclusion, or nearly the conclusion, 47 of the discussion on Rhetoric. Here the matter of 48 the Dialogue changes, and passes from Rhetoric to Ethics, by the introduction of the conception of *Good*, as a thing, or rather as *the* thing, which men aim at, and cannot but aim at. Polus says that Rhetors—accomplished orators—have great power in political bodies. Socrates denies this, to the astonishment of his adversary, who says, Οὗτος 50 ἀνὴρ!—What a man it is! And indeed it must be allowed, I think, that the argument of Socrates is rather subtle than convincing. The principal purpose of this portion of the Dialogue, § 48 to § 66, is to show the steadiness with which Socrates adheres to his doctrine, that nothing which involves unjust action—wrong-doing—can be a good. He will not yield to the strongest case, nor to ridicule, nor to a majority. He insists upon it that

his opponent and all men really agree with him. The allusions to the success of nefarious attempts to obtain power, and especially to a man going into the agora with a dagger in his sleeve, appear suggested by the oligarchical revolution at Athens and the usurpation of the *Four Hundred*, as we shall see.

- Socrates says, "These successful orators have not great power; for they do not do what they wish." POL. "How is that? Do you not confess that they do what seems best to them?"—
- Soc. "That I confess; but they do not do what
51 they wish: for they wish to do what *is* best, and they do not know what is best." At this Polus exclaims; says that Socrates utters wretched paradoxes¹. Socrates, however, still stands to his point, and proceeds to support it by adducing the distinction of final ends and intermediate ends: A man takes medicine, and in so doing does what seems best to him; but this is not what he wishes. What he wishes is to get rid of a disorder. The
52 medicine is taken as a means, not sought as an end. And so in other cases. And so every thing
53 which we do is done with a view to some good. When men exercise what you call political power, when they put their enemies to death, or drive them into exile, they do it because this is what they think to be good; and if they are mistaken, and it is not really good, they do not do what they wish. To this Polus is supposed to be forced to assent.
- 54 But here Polus breaks away from strict logic, and makes a personal appeal. "Why," he says, "you yourself, Socrates, would like to be able to do what you might like in the city. You, when you saw another able to cause the death, or to take the possessions of another, would envy him."

¹ σχέτλια καὶ ὑπερφυῆ.

Socrates, never off his guard, immediately takes to his strong position. He says: "Do you mean justly or unjustly?" And when Polus says "Either:" he expresses horror. He says: "Do not 55 say shocking things. We are not to envy such wretched men as those who unjustly put others to death." And hereupon the contrast between the two schools is brought sharply out. Polus takes for granted that it is better to do wrong than to suffer wrong. This Socrates denies. He holds that it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong; and adheres to the assertion with pertinacity, in spite of Polus's stating the strongest cases: thus at least showing a strength of conviction which deserves our respect, even though we may not be convinced by the arguments.

The arguments which Socrates uses in defence 56 of this conviction are various. He says: "If I should go into the crowded agora with a dagger in my sleeve, and should say, Now, Polus, I have power of life and death over every man here. You would say, Such power is worthless; for the exercise of it is followed by punishment. And so you see power alone is not necessarily a good thing."

Thucydides relates¹ that the four hundred conspirators of the oligarchical party went into the Senate-house each with a concealed dagger, and expelled the senators (B.C. 412). Probably Plato had this event in his mind when he wrote the passage just given. In that case the wrong-doers were not long successful; for the four hundred were soon afterwards put down by the people, guided by Theramenes, and some of them put to death. But Polus soon propounds an example of apparently

¹ VIII. 69; Grote, Vol. VIII. p. 51.

successful wrong-doing,—Archelaus, the tyrant of Macedon, who is often quoted in Plato for the like purpose. Socrates, in passing from the former example, says:

57 “So, my good friend, you now think that to do as one likes is a good thing only *when* it leads to no bad consequences. Without this condition it is a bad thing. Well, let us consider this question. We agree that it is sometimes good to do what we have mentioned, to kill and banish and despoil our enemies; and sometimes not good. But where do we draw the line between the cases where it is good and where it is not good?”

POL. “Answer your own question, Socrates.”

SOC. “Well, if you like better that I should answer, I say that it is good to do these things when we do them justly; and bad, when we do them unjustly.”

POL. “How very hard, truly, it is to refute you, Socrates! Why even a child would prove you to be in the wrong.”

SOC. “I should be very much obliged to the child; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will do it, and free me from my wild notions. Pray do not grudge the trouble, in favour of a friend, but prove me in the wrong.”

58 POL. “Well, Socrates, there is no need to go back to old stories to prove that point. Facts of yesterday and the day before suffice to confute you, and to show that many wrong-doers are happy men.”

SOC. “And what facts are those?”

POL. “Do you see this Archelaus, the ruler of Macedonia?”

SOC. “If I do not see him, I hear of him.”

POL. “Well, does *he* seem to you to be happy or miserable?”

SOC. "I do not know, Polus. I never met the man."

POL. "Bless me! how do you mean? Would you know that, if you were to be with him; and do you not know in other ways that he *is* happy?"

SOC. "Truly, not I."

POL. "Why, Socrates, it is plain that you would not say that you know even the Great King to be happy."

SOC. "Even as I say, Polus: a good and virtuous man or woman, I say, is happy, and an unjust and wicked one I say is miserable."

POL. "Then according to your account Archelaus is miserable."

SOC. "Yes, my friend, if he is wicked."

POL. "Wicked! how is he not wicked? He had not the shadow of a claim to the kingdom; he was the son of a slave-woman who belonged to Alketos the brother of Perdiccas, and by rights he himself was the slave of Alketos. If he had intended to do what was right he should have put himself under Alketos as his slave, and been happy after your fashion: but now that he has done all possible wickedness, it is wonderful how miserable he is become. First, he sent for his master, this uncle of his, Alketos, pretending that he would give back to him the kingdom which Perdiccas had taken from him. He received him with apparent cordiality, entertained him, made him drunk, him and his son Alexander, his own cousin, a young man about his own age, put them into a carriage, carried them off by night, and killed them both and made away with their bodies. When he had done this, he did not at all perceive that he had made himself thoroughly miserable, nor show any signs of repentance; shortly after, he took his own brother, the son of Perdiccas, a boy of about seven

years, to whom the kingdom by right belonged ; and he would not make himself happy by bringing this boy up well and then giving up the kingdom to him, which would have been the just course ; but he threw him into a well and drowned him, and then told his mother, Cleopatra, that he fell
60 in, running after a goose. And so having done more unjust things than any other of the Macedonians, he is, of course, the most miserable of all the Macedonians, not the most happy : and perhaps there is more than one Athenian, beginning with you, who would rather be any other Macedonian than be Archelaus ? ”

How does Socrates meet and parry this bitter and contemptuous irony ?

Soc. “ At the outset of our discussion I gave you credit, Polus, as being well instructed in rhetoric, but I said that you had not studied dialogue. And now, what is all this talk, with which a child would confute me, but mere rhetoric ? with which you have, I suppose, confuted my assertion that the wrong-doer is not happy. How, my good friend ? I do not allow any one thing which you have said. ”

POL. “ You will not allow it, but you think as I say. ”

Soc. “ My good sir, you try to put me down by rhetoric, as advocates put down their opponents in the courts of justice. There, a man gains the victory if he brings forward many and respectable witnesses in favour of his assertions, and if the
61 opposite side adduces one only or none. But that way of proof is worth nothing in the establishment of truth. A man may be condemned by an accumulation of plausible false witnesses. I have no doubt that if you want witnesses to prove me wrong, you may have almost the whole of Athens, in-

cluding the richest and most eminent persons, such as Nikias and Aristocrates, and the whole house of Pericles, and any other good family which you may pitch upon. But I stand single, and am not convinced, nor can you convince me, though by bringing together your false witnesses, you try to eject me from the domain of truth and of existence."

This last expression is rendered by the translators in general "to eject me from my substance and from the truth;" and undoubtedly the word commonly means *substance* in the sense of *possessions*, as well as *existence*. But it does not appear how Polus was attempting to deprive Socrates of his property: he might be said to be trying to eject him from existence by proving the unreality of his opinions. The passage appears to contain an allusion to the persecution of Socrates by false witnesses.

It is natural to ask, Why are Nikias and Pericles produced as witnesses about Archelaus, when they were dead before his time? Apparently, it is not their opinions, but their lives, which are supposed to be evidence of the assertion of Polus, that power is a desirable thing; for both obtained great power in the state. In the Greek of Plato, the prosperity and wealth of Nikias and of Aristocrates are illustrated by the costly offerings which they placed in the temples. This trait I have omitted. Socrates goes on:

"For my part, if I do not bring you yourself to bear witness to the truth of what I say, I shall think I have done nothing which really answers the end of our discussion; and I think that you have done nothing in the same way, unless I, singly, bear witness in your favour, and you set all the others aside.

"The way of proof which you and many others 62

admire is one; but there is another which I stand up for. Let us compare them, and see if they lead to different results; for the questions about which we are debating are not small matters. They are the things which it is the finest thing in the world to know, and the vilest thing not to know. For the main point is to know or not to know who is a happy man and who is not. And in the special case which we were considering you think it possible for a man to be happy and yet unjust and a wrong-doer: for you think Archelaus a wrong-doer and yet happy. Is not that your opinion?"

POLUS. "Even so."

SOC. "And I say it is impossible. And this is the point in dispute between us."

Before Socrates brings his proofs, he pushes his doctrine still further, so as to make the paradox
63 stronger. He says that the wrong-doer is more miserable if he escape punishment than if he be punished. "Will you," he says, "refute this?"

Polus says, ironically, "Why this is harder to refute than the other?"

Socrates replies: "It is simply impossible, Polus; for truth cannot be refuted."

Polus then puts his example strongly.

"What! If a man, attempting to seize the supreme power by wrong-doing, be detected, and if thereupon he be put to the rack, mutilated, his eyes burnt out with hot irons, and after suffering all kinds of torture in his own person, see his children and his wife tortured, and then at last be crucified or burnt alive; is this man more happy than if he were to escape, and become the supreme ruler in his city, and spend his life in doing what he likes, envied and reckoned happy by his own citizens and strangers? Do you say that it is impossible to disprove this?"

Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily, who was deposed by Timoleon, had to witness the degradation and death of his children and his wife, as Plutarch tells us¹; but those events took place after Plato's time, and cannot be here referred to. They show, however, that Polus's case was conceived according to the practice of the times. And how does Socrates deal with this formidable picture?

Soc. "My excellent Polus, you now present to me a raw-head-and-bloody-bones image, as before you offered witnesses: but you do not convince me. But just tell me again one little point. You said a man seizing the supreme power *by wrong-doing*, did you not?"—POL. "I did." Soc. "Then I say that neither the man who seizes supreme power by wrong-doing is happy, nor he who is punished for the attempt. Of two miserable men you cannot say that one is *happier*. But the more miserable is the man who escapes the punishment and becomes the tyrant.

"But how is this, Polus? Do you laugh? 65 This is another of your kinds of proof, when one says anything, to laugh at it, not to refute it."

POL. "Is it not sufficient refutation, Socrates, when you say things which no mortal man can agree to? For ask any of these bystanders."

Soc. "O Polus, I have no skill in political practices. Last year my tribe having the first turn, I was appointed, by lot, president of the Senate, and had to take the votes; and I got laughed at for not knowing how to take the votes of an assembly; so do not ask me to collect the votes of the persons present. And if you have no better kind of proof than the specimens which you have given us, put the matter in my hands for a while, and try the kind of proof which I think

¹ *Life of Timoleon*, XIII.

ought to be given. I am able to produce only one witness of my assertions, namely the person with whom I am talking. I can collect only one man's vote: as for the crowd, I do not even speak to it. Consider then whether you will allow me to refute you, giving answers to what I ask. For I think that both you and I and all mankind do really deem wrong-doing to be worse than wrong-suffering, and to escape punishment to be worse than to suffer punishment."

66 POL. "I say that neither I nor any other man thinks so. Would you yourself rather suffer wrong than do wrong?"

SOC. "I and you and every body."

POL. "Neither I nor any body."

SOC. "Well then, will you answer my questions?"

POL. "By all means. I am anxious to hear what you will say."

And thus the fencing-match begins. We must suppose that the method of analysing doctrines and ideas by means of dialogue was a novelty, as indeed it had begun with Socrates; and that Plato was bent upon proving the superiority of this method to the strongest rhetoric. Certainly he cannot be accused of understating his adversary's case. Of course he gives the victory to Socrates; but whether it be possible to put his arguments into English so that the reader shall assent to this conclusion, it is difficult to say. I shall try to give the effect of some of these, abridging them, and not attempting to preserve all the turns of the Dialogue.

The mode in which Socrates conducts the argument with Polus is this. The question is about *good* and *bad*. Socrates asserts doing wrong to be *worse* than suffering wrong—Polus asserts the

contrary, that to suffer wrong¹ is worse. But in order to obtain some fulcrum for stirring these abstract terms, *good* and *bad*, *better* and *worse*, from this sophistical use, which men thus dared to make of them, in opposition to the universal moral feeling of mankind, Socrates introduces another pair of abstract terms, with which the immoral sophists and paradox-mongers had not yet dared to take this liberty,—*kalon* and *aischron*, *kallion* and *aischion*, which I shall translate *handsome* and *ugly*, *more handsome* and *more ugly*. Polus is supposed to be at once obliged to allow that though to suffer wrong is *worse*, to do wrong is *uglier*.

It is difficult, as I have already said, to find any mode of translating *kalon* and *aischron* into English, so as to enable us to exhibit the part which they play in the moral discussions of the Greeks. The words mean *beautiful*, *fair*, *excellent*, on the one hand, and *ugly*, *foul*, *vile*, on the other. If we are allowed for a moment to suppose *handsome* and *ugly* to represent those opposed words, we shall be able to represent the argument, which I wish to do on account of its very ingenious structure.

If of two things, Socrates argues, one is more 67 handsome than the other, it must either be more pleasant or more useful. And of two things, that which is the more ugly must be either more painful or more hurtful, that is, worse. Now you allow that wrong-doing is uglier than wrong-suffering. Therefore it is either more painful, or it is a worse thing. But is wrong-doing more painful than wrong-suffering? certainly not. It remains therefore that wrong-doing, though it may be more agreeable than wrong-suffering, is a worse thing.

¹ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακίον.

This argument may be compared with some of the demonstrations concerning ratios in Geometry. It is as if we had to determine whether the relation of wrong-suffering to wrong-doing be a ratio of greater to less, that is, in this case, of better to worse. It is allowed that the relation is that of less handsome to more handsome; but it is also a relation of more pleasant to less pleasant; and therefore it must be a relation of worse to better, in order to counterbalance the superior relation of pleasantness, and to make it still inferior in handsomeness. This may seem a fanciful comparison; but it appears very probable that the strong impression which geometrical proofs had made upon Plato and his school led them to seek for the like proofs in moral subjects.

But it is evident that the whole force of the argument depends upon the supposition, or fact, as at that time it might be, that the opponent was ready to allow that wrong-doing was ugly, and uglier than wrong-suffering; and that what was uglier was either more painful, or worse. I do not conceive that we could now look for such concessions from those who maintain what are commonly called immoral or licentious paradoxes—the class of adversaries with whom Socrates here has to do; and therefore this argument, however ingenious, is no longer, I conceive, of any value in moral philosophy, at least in this form.

The remainder of the discussion with Polus contains arguments which rest on the same basis. Thus the question is examined, whether it be an evil for a worker of injustice to be punished. And the negative is thus demonstrated (§ 70): To be punished is to be chastised:—to chastise is to afflict *justly*;—justice is handsome (*καλόν*), something excellent and admirable:—if handsome,

it is either pleasant or good:—but it is not pleasant:—therefore it must be good.

Again (§ 73), a proof is offered that injustice is not only an evil, but the greatest of evils. For evils, it is urged, are of three kinds: ills of fortune, bodily ills, and ills of the soul. Of these the ills of the soul are *aischista*,—the vilest, ugliest, foulest. But that which is the ugliest thing, is either that which is most painful or most harmful—that which brings the greatest pain, or the greatest bane¹, or both. Therefore since evils of the soul are the ugliest, they are either the most painful or the most baneful: but they are not the most painful:—therefore they are the most baneful:—that is, the most evil—the greatest evils.

The reader will see, by the imperfection of these translations, which I know no way of remedying, that these proofs, as I have said, cannot be made convincing or persuasive to *us* in this form. We have no words corresponding to *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν*, which will bear to be thus made the hinges on which so weighty an argument turns. We are not, however, to infer from this that the argument has now lost its force. On the contrary, it has, in all ages of moral speculation, recurred, in other shapes and other phrasology, and involves an essential step in the progress of moral conceptions. Among the Romans the terms *honestum* and *turpe* took the place of *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν*, and arguments depending upon these terms were among the most common furniture of the philosophical schools of Rome. But moreover other terms were introduced to express nearly the same idea, and to hold the same place in the course of moral reasonings. It was

¹ λύπη, βλάβη.

asserted that justice was *according to man's nature*, and injustice *contrary to man's nature*, in a peculiar sense, which made the doctrine the basis of the most earnest school of moralists. Injustice was declared to be more contrary to man's nature than loss, or pain, or death itself. And the English reader will recollect that this phraseology has been adopted among ourselves by a moralist of no less consequence than Butler; and has been taken by him as the fittest text for a commentary in which the nature of man and the grounds of morality are to be explained. This notion, of what is *according to the nature* and *contrary to the nature* of man, may be conceived as taking the place of the *kalon* and *aischron* of the Platonic School. And if we conceive the sense of the more modern phrase in a steady and distinct manner, we may found upon it arguments of the same kind as those used in the *Gorgias* to confute Polus.

But whether we take the phrase, "according to nature," or any other, to hold this place in the argument, the moral reasoning thus expressed is important and fundamental. *Good* and *bad* are terms which may, in a loose and vulgar way, be used merely to designate the objects of our desires, and the contrary; and thus, may not seem to imply anything but desire or aversion. But desire and aversion do not compose the whole of our nature. We not only desire some things and recoil from others, not only find things pleasurable and painful, not only like and dislike, but we also approve and disapprove. By our human nature we cannot help looking upon human actions with approbation and disapprobation. By our human nature—a common nature with a common understanding and a common expression of this understanding—we cannot help expressing this approbation and

disapprobation in the most universal and familiar use of language. If we will apply *good* and *bad* to objects of mere sensual or animal desire and aversion, without any regard to approval and disapproval, the words express a small part of our thoughts. We have a moral nature which is not so expressed. We may choose to say that unjust gain is a good, meaning by that that we or some other men aim at it, and like it when they can get it; but there is, notwithstanding this, a meaning in saying that injustice is a bad thing, and an unjust man is a bad man; and this meaning is a more deep and universal expression of our human sentiments and emotions than any mode of speaking which turns our thoughts merely to the pleasurable feelings arising from desire gratified. And this is so, whether or not we can find any simple terms like *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν*—*honestum* and *turpe*—which cannot be torn away from the sentiment of approval and disapproval.

In the progress of the conversation in which these arguments are brought out, Polus is represented as compelled to assent to Socrates's conclusions. After it has been proved that wrong-doing is worse than wrong-suffering, Socrates says:

“And already, some time ago, it was allowed 68 by you, as it is allowed by men in general, that wrong-doing is uglier than wrong-suffering.”—POL. “Yes.”

Soc. “Then would you choose that which is both worse and uglier instead of that which is better and handsomer? Do not be afraid of answering, Polus—it will do you no harm. Give your answer frankly, as if I were a physician whom you were consulting, and reply to my question.”—POL. “I would not choose it, Socrates.”

Soc. "Nor any one else?"—POL. "Nor, I think, any one else."

Soc. "Then what I said is true: that neither I nor you nor any one else would choose wrongdoing rather than wrong-suffering. It is a worse thing."—POL. "So it appears."

Soc. "You see then, Polus, that there is a great difference between your proof and my proof. You get everybody except me to agree with you, and I am content to have you, without any one else, agreeing with me, and showing that I am
69 right. I get your vote, and I care not for the others. So much for that. Now let us go to our second question, and consider whether for a wrong-doer to be punished is the greatest of evils, as you thought; or that not being punished is a greater evil, as I thought."

And then the argument proceeds as I have stated. It proceeds mainly on the ground that vice is a disease, and chastisement the medical treat-
77 ment of it. "And hence those wrong-doers who shun punishment, are like diseased persons who look only at the pain which accompanies medical treatment, but are blind to the usefulness of it, and do not know what a wretched thing it is, not to have a sound mind in a sound body, but a mind vicious, depraved, corrupted. And this is the reason why they do their utmost to escape punishment, that is, to avoid being delivered from the greatest of evils: for this end they use their money, and their friends, and all their powers of eloquence. And now, Polus, that we have agreed on these points, do you see what follows? or shall we now collect it?"

POL. "Do so if you please."

Socrates then collects from what has been said

that since wrong-doing is the greatest of evils, since chastisement is the deliverance from this evil, and since to escape chastisement implies a permanence in this condition of evil; therefore to do wrong is only the second of evils in order; and that the greatest of all evils is to do wrong and not to be chastised: and to this Polus assents.

Soc. "And is not this what we were talking 78 about, my friend? You said that Archelaus was most happy, in that having done the most extreme wrongs, he escaped all chastisement; and I, on the contrary, maintained that if Archelaus or any one else does wrong and is not chastised, he is especially miserable: and that the wrong-doer is more miserable than the wrong-sufferer. Was not this what I said? And did I not say true?"

Polus again assents.

Soc. "Good. But if this be true, what, O Polus, is the great use of rhetoric? For it follows from what has been said, that a man must avoid wrong-doing as a sufficient evil in itself: but if he incur this evil, he should offer himself to the officer of justice as a diseased man offers himself to a physician, that the disease of his soul may not become inveterate and poison his soul. Does not this follow from what we have said?"

Polus still assents.

79

Soc. "And so rhetoric, or the art of defending one's self, or one's parents, or friends, or children, or country, when they have done wrong, is of no use to us, Polus, unless we were to invert its uses. It would be our business to plead in accusation of ourselves, in the first place, and then of our dearest friends who commit any wrong. We should not conceal the wrong, but bring it to light, that the offender may be chastised and made whole. We must induce the offenders to submit to

punishment bravely, with their eyes shut, as if they were submitting to a surgical operation: if they are judged worthy of stripes, submitting themselves to stripes; if of chains, to chains; if of fine, paying the fine; if of banishment, leaving the country; if of death, dying: and we must take, I say, the place of the first accuser of one's self and of one's dearest friends, and use rhetoric for that purpose, in order that the transgression being made clearer, they may be delivered from that greatest evil, wrong-doing. Are we to say this, or not, Polus?"

80 POL. "It seems to me absurd, Socrates; but it seems to follow what has been said."

SOC. "Well then, we must either disprove that, or accept this."

POL. "Even so."

SOC. "And taking the other side, we must say that if we really want to do a man harm, we must endeavour, when he has done wrong, to prevent his being punished; if he be brought before the tribunal, to get him off; if he has stolen a sum of money, not to make him return it, but make him keep it, and employ it in wicked uses: if his crime deserve death, that he do not suffer death; but if possible, that he never die, but be immortal in crime, or at least live in it as long as possible.

81 There, Polus, that is what rhetoric is good for. It is of no use to a good man."

This is somewhat strong doctrine; and we may doubt whether the reasoning by which it is supported is very solid. The notion that chastisement in the way of stripes, chains, fine, exile, and even death itself, cures the soul of disease by the same kind of definite operation by which excision and cautery heal the body, is a very crude and material assumption; and the supposition of a good man who not only has enemies, but enemies

whom he is ready to damage even by fastening diseases on their souls, is also very coarse.

Polus however is supposed to be thus silenced; Callicles the host of Gorgias, one of the bystanders, now takes up the cudgels.

Callicles has been driven beyond all bounds of patience by what he conceives to be the trifling and hypocritical sophistry of Socrates, and by the abjectness with which Gorgias and Polus have made concessions to him in the course of their conversation with him. He rushes upon Socrates with an impetuous vehemence of contempt and self-confidence, which, it appears at first, will admit of no repulse. His attack is however received with calmness, with ironical or playful apologies for what has been said, with steady assertions that the speaker has been in earnest, with humble inquiries as to the meaning of the new assailant in his expressions; and he is finally involved in a disputation, in which he, in turn, is driven from one point to another, defeated, and reduced to silence.

Callicles says, "Tell me, Chærephon, is Socrates in earnest or jest?"

CHÆR. "He seems to me to be very much in earnest. But there is nothing like asking him."

CALL. "By Jupiter, it is what I want to do. Tell me, Socrates, are you in earnest or in jest? If you are in earnest, and all this is true, we are all wrong. We—all men—are doing just the opposite, it appears, of what they ought to do."

SOC. "Callicles, we have each our favourites. I like philosophy, you like popularity. You say what your favourite the People wishes; I say what Philosophy dictates. She is always consistent 83 with herself. And I must always be consistent with myself."

To this Callicles makes a reply which points out the second of the opposing tendencies which existed between the school of Plato and the school of Gorgias. In the one, as I have said, philosophical truth, in the other, political success, is taken as the guide of life.

CALL. "Socrates, it is you who really have recourse to popular fallacies and puerile clap-traps. 84 And now you have played the same trick upon Polus which he complained of your playing upon Gorgias. For he remarked that when you asked Gorgias whether, if a pupil came to him not knowing the difference between right and wrong, he would teach it him, he was ashamed to say that he would not; and succumbed to the prejudices of men; and so was driven to a self-contradiction, which is just what you like. He was right in laughing at you when he did. And now he gets laughed at in return; which I think he ought to have avoided. He ought never to have granted to you that to commit injustice is uglier than to suffer injustice; for from this concession he was involved in embarrassment in argument, and at last reduced to silence. But he said what he did, being ashamed to say what he really thinks. The fact is, that you, for the sake of gaining people's opinions by specious assertions, confound what is handsome by nature and what is handsome by instituted law; whereas the two are commonly opposed to each other; and of this difference you take advantage, to puzzle and confound your adver- 85 saries. As in the question between doing and suffering injustice, Polus said which was uglier according to instituted law, and you followed it out as if he had meant *by nature*. By nature, *that* is the uglier which is the worse, that is, to suffer wrong; but by law, to do wrong is uglier. In fact, to

submit to wrong is not the act of a man but of a slave, who had better die than live; for such is the condition of a man who, though wronged and insulted, cannot help himself, nor succour those whom he cares for. But the fact is, that those who make the laws are the weak and the many among mankind. And so, according to their own views and their own interests, they make their laws, and assign their praise and their blame; and being under the fear of the strong men among mankind, who have power to take a large share to themselves—afraid that they will take a larger share,—they say that it is an ugly thing to take the lion's share, and unjust; and that this is injustice,—to claim to have more than others. In truth 86 they are well content, if being the weaker, they are allowed to have an equal share. And therefore it is that to claim more is called ugly and wrong and unjust. But Nature tells another story, and teaches that it is just that the better man should have more than the worse, and the stronger than the weaker.

“ And you may see in every quarter proofs that this is so; in other animals, and in the histories and proceedings of states and nations, you may see that they judge this to be right, that the stronger should rule over the weaker, and have a larger share than he. By what other right did Xerxes make war against Greece, or his father against the Scythians? and a thousand other like cases. They proceeded according to nature; and by my faith! according to a law, namely, the Law of Nature, though not according to the Law of Man. We take these men, the best and strongest of men, when they are young, and as we do with young lions, we tame them by tricks and charms; persuading them that men ought to have what is equal, and that this is handsome and right.

87 “ But I reckon that if there appear among them a man of strong character, he will shake off and tear in pieces all these restraints, and trample under foot our written statutes and our enchantments and formulæ, and our laws contrary to nature, and will stand up among us as a Master, though we may have made him a slave; and then blazes forth the Right of Nature.

“ And Pindar appears to have said much the same thing that I am saying, in the ode in which he sings :

‘ Law, king of all,
Leads in his mighty hand
The strength of men and gods,
And justice dwells with strength,
This Hercules may show,
Who took the unbought (oxen).’

I do not recollect the verses, but they are to the effect that he took the oxen, though Geryon neither gave them nor sold them; it being right by nature that oxen and everything else should belong to the better man, and that the property of the weaker belong to the stronger.

88 “ Philosophy is a pretty thing, O Socrates, if any one take a small dose of it in youth; but if it be pursued too far, it is the destruction of a man. However naturally good his character may be, if he go on philosophizing into middle life, he becomes necessarily strange to all those businesses which a man must be familiar with in order to be an eminent and distinguished man. He will be ignorant of the laws of his city; ignorant of the modes of dealing with men in private and public affairs; ignorant of human pleasures and human desires; and, in fact, quite unacquainted with human life. And so such, when they have to meddle with any business, public or private, make themselves ridiculous; as I suppose the politi-

cians, if they were to come into your schools, would be ridiculous. It is as Euripides says :

‘ Each shines in that, each spends his force on that,
Gives to his favoured study all the day,
That better and still better he may be.’

But where he knows that he is not strong, he avoids the subject and disparages it, through self-complacency, as a way of praising himself. But it is best, I believe, to know something of both.

“ Philosophy is a good thing to cultivate up to 89 a certain point, as a branch of education. It is very well for a boy to philosophize; but when a grown man goes on philosophizing the thing is ridiculous. When I see a man doing this, it seems to me just as when a man speaks with a childish lisp. A childish lisp is very well in a child; it is graceful even, and suitable to his age, and smacks of good family. When I hear a child pronounce his words with extreme precision, it sounds in my ears harsh and slave-like. But when one hears a man lisp, one longs to beat him¹. And this is my feeling with regard to philosophy. It is good and graceful in a boy; a necessary mark of a large and liberal education. A man will come to nothing good or great who does not begin with that. But when I see a grown man philosophizing, he seems to me, Socrates, to want a beating². A man 90 who follows such a practice, though he may be a noble fellow to begin with, soon becomes a coward, a skulker. He keeps away from the agora, and places of public resort in the middle of the city; and yet it is *there*, as the poet said, that men become distinguished. He slinks into corners for the rest of his life, herding with three or four

¹ καταγέλαστον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον.

² πληγῶν δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ.

boys, and whispering with them, but never saying anything really frank, noble, and to the purpose."

"The poet" here is Homer, and the allusion is to a line in the *Iliad* (ix. 441), describing Achilles when young :

"As yet knowing nothing of battle,
Nor of the forum's throng, where minds are trained to glory."

This sarcastic description of Plato and his "school" in the *Academia*—for that of course is meant by this account of the consequence of a man addicting himself to philosophy—is still further pointed by an allusion to a play of Euripides, *The Antiope*. The play is now lost, but the passage referred to appears to have been a remonstrance addressed by the brave Zethus to the effeminate Amphion, his twin-brother. The passage has been conjecturally restored by Valcknaer; and in doing this he has happily noted a remark of an old commentator, Olympiodorus, who says that Plato, in quoting Euripides, changes *γυναικώδει*, *womanish*, into *μειρακιώδει*, *boyish*. The passage may be supposed to have run thus :

"You, O Amphion, shun what you should seek,
And, gifted with a soul of noble strain,
Degrade it by the habits of a woman ;
You raise no voice of weight in judgment-halls,
Nor find the words on which persuasion waits,
Nor show the young the generous path of youth."

Plato so far acknowledges the sting of this sarcasm that he makes Socrates, at a later period of the Dialogue, after he has silenced Callicles, say that he would have liked to answer this part of the attack.

Callicles here goes on : "Now really, Socrates, I have a friendship for you; and I have the same sentiments towards you which Zethus has towards Amphion, in Euripides, whom I just now quoted. I am disposed to say to you what he says to his

brother; 'You, Socrates, shun what you should seek, And, gifted with a soul of noble strain, Degrade it by the habits of a boy. You raise no voice of weight in judgment-halls, Nor find the words on which persuasion waits, Nor show the young the generous path of youth.'

"And yet, my dear Socrates—and pray do not 91 be angry with me, for I speak out of a regard for you—does it not appear to you a vile thing to be in the condition in which I conceive you to be, and all those who spend their lives upon philosophy? Any man might take you and drag you to prison, urging against you charges of which you are entirely innocent; and you would not know which way to turn yourself. You would lose your self-possession, and gape without being able to utter a word: and when you were brought before the judges, however contemptible your accuser might be, you would be put to death, if he chose to assign death as the punishment. Now what sort of an art is that which, taking hold of an originally able man, makes him so helpless that he can neither help himself nor anybody else, nor protect them from the extreme of danger;—that he is exposed to be stripped of all his property, and to live in the city a dishonoured man: a man, to speak bluntly, that you may strike on the face and not be made to answer for it?"

It must be allowed that Plato puts his adversary's case strongly. The allusion to the fate of Socrates is obvious. Callicles still goes on:

"No, my good friend, do not persist in this 92 folly. Take my advice; and give over your argumentations; adopt an honourable course of action, a course from which you may obtain the reputation of real ability; leave these refinements to others, these frivolities or fooleries, or whatever one is to

call them, which will put you out of society. Imitate those who do not convince men about these minute questions, but who secure life and fame and all other good things."

Socrates has now to rally his powers and to repel this vehement assault. He begins by laborious expressions of civility and obligation, in which there is a good deal of irony. These I may abridge. They are to this effect.

"If my soul were of gold, do you not think that I should be very glad to find a touchstone, which shows if gold be pure; that by such a touchstone I might ascertain if my soul were in good condition?"

CALL. "Why do you ask this, Socrates?"

SOC. "I will tell you. I think that you are such a touchstone for me."

CALL. "How so?"

SOC. "If you agree with me about the opinions which I have in my soul, I know that they must be true. In fact, the person who is to act as such a touchstone of the soul must have three things, all which you have; knowledge, goodwill, and free
93 speech. Some are not able to act this part because they are not wise, as you are. Some are wise enough, but do not care about me, as you do. And then our foreign friends, Gorgias and Polus, are both wise and well-disposed to me, but they rather want freeness of speech. They are too modest. Is not this plainly the case? Each of them has been driven to contradict himself in the face of all this company, and on most important points, by mere modesty. But you have all the requisite qualifications. You are well-instructed and well-disposed to me. How do I know this? I will tell you. I know that there are four of you who pursue knowledge together; you, and Tisan-

der, and Andron, and Nausikydes. And it so happened that I once heard you consulting how far such studies ought to be carried; and the conclusion to which you came was, that philosophy was not to be followed into its abstruse parts. You advised one another to take care not to spoil your characters by pursuing wisdom too far. So now, 94 when I find you giving me the same advice which you gave to your most intimate associates, it is a satisfactory proof to me that you are well-disposed to me.

“ And as to your being free of speech and unfettered by shame, you yourself tell us that it is so, and what you said a little while ago proves it very sufficiently. And so anything said by me which you allow to pass will have been fully tested, and will need no further criterion. You will not let it pass either for want of knowledge or for timidity: you will not make any concessions to me with the purpose of deceiving me, being, as you say, my friend. And thus the result of our agreement will be the real truth.

“ And nothing, O Callicles, can be more interesting than the inquiry about which you have given us a lecture;—what a man ought to be, what he ought to study, and how far, in youth and in age. For you may be well assured that if anything in my way of life is wrong, I go wrong without intending to do so, and because I know no better. So pray go on lecturing me. Do not get tired of 95 doing so; but show me fully what is the object at which I ought to aim, and how I may attain it. And if you find that I assent to what you say now, and at some later period do not do what I have agreed to, look upon me as a worthless creature, and never give me advice again.

“ But now tell me again from the beginning,

what you and Pindar say is right and just by nature;—That the better man should take by force that which is held by the worse, and that the better man should rule the worse, and that the stronger should have more than the weaker? That is what you say is right and just, if I remember.”

CALL. “I said so then, and I say so now.”

Some of the arguments used in the discussion with Callicles I may pass briefly over. When Callicles says, that by the law of nature the more
96 powerful, the *better* men, have a right to a greater share of the things of the earth, Socrates urges that the many are more powerful than the few, and that the many demand a just, that is, an equal division. Callicles is then driven to say, that by *better* he means *wiser*. And thus there is conceded by him a new distinction, in addition to that of mere brute force; and from this distinction the argument may be conducted to moral distinctions, as is done elsewhere.

But I turn rather to those arguments which bear upon the question of the identity or difference of the *agathon* and the *hedu*, good and pleasure.
103 There is a discussion whether happiness consists in the gratification of desire. Desire is the supplying of some need—the filling of some void. This is allowed. Those then, Socrates urges, who, with large desires, are constantly gratifying them, are like casks with the spout open, the fluid constantly running in and running out. Callicles, however, does not yield to this illustration. He says, the running cask is at least as like to happiness as the full one which has no movement at all, and is still as a stone. Then Socrates uses a coarse but pungent argument, which he also uses on the same

subject in the *Philebus*. He says, "if to gratify the desires be happiness, to itch and to scratch is happiness;" and this too Callicles impatiently assents to. "But," says he, "are you not ashamed 108 to carry the discussion to such subjects?" "No," says Socrates; "the shame is for those who say that happiness consists in the gratification of the desires, whatever these be; and who do not distinguish good from bad pleasures."

But the discussion of the *hedu* and the *agathon*, pleasure and good, is more directly resumed in the subsequent part of the dialogue, and is introduced with all the formality of a legal proceeding. 110 "Callicles of Acharnæ says that Pleasure and Good are the same thing. Socrates of Alopekè denies this; and thereupon issue is joined." The arguments now used are of a more technical kind, and again depend much upon the received phrases or maxims of the philosophers. I will notice some of them. This is one of Socrates's proofs, that pleasure and good are different. It is established by a consideration of various examples, that the pleasures of the body are accompanied or preceded by pains: as the pain of a craving appetite enters into the pleasure of the appetite gratified. And then Socrates argues that since to thirst is a pain 113 and to drink is a pleasure, to be thirsty and to drink is both a pain and a pleasure. But the same act cannot be both a good and an evil. Therefore pleasure and pain are not good and evil. And again, this argument is given. We love 114 thirst and the pleasure of drinking at the same moment; but we cannot love evil and good at the same moment: therefore, again, pain and pleasure cannot be good and evil. Again, it is urged that the wise and the foolish, the brave and the cowardly, feel pain and pleasure alike, or nearly alike:

but these characters cannot possess good and evil alike; for they are, the wise and the brave, good; the foolish and the cowardly, bad: and they must be good and bad by possessing goodness and badness. Therefore goodness and badness, which they possess in such unequal degrees, cannot be the
 115 same with pleasure and pain, which they possess in degrees equal or nearly equal.

These arguments do not strike us as very overwhelming; nor are they so, as I conceive, except so far as they are different forms of the argument which I have already stated. But they are represented as compelling Callicles at least to acknowledge that some pleasures are better, and others worse. He does this rather sullenly. He says,
 117 "I will not contradict you, Socrates: but really if one makes any concession to you, you get hold of it and hold it fast, as a child does what is given him. Of course I allow that some pleasures are better, some worse." Socrates replies, that *he* has been treated as a child; but he forthwith proceeds to draw consequences from the admission of Callicles: I will give this more at length.

CALLICLES. "All this while, Socrates, that I have been listening to you and making concessions to you, I have been thinking that if one grants anything to you, even in jest, you keep fast hold of it as children do of things that are given them. Do you suppose that I, or that any man, does not think that some pleasures are better and some worse?"

Socrates has here the opportunity of charging Callicles with inconsistency, which he does in his playful vein, affecting to pout.

118 "Aha, Callicles, how crafty you are! It is *you* who treat *me* as a child; sometimes telling me

that things are so and so, and then that they are otherwise, and thus leading me wrong. When we began, I did not think you would have willingly deceived me; for I took you for my friend. Well! I have been deluded; so now, according to the old saying, I must make the best of things as they are, and take what you give me. And it seems that what you now say is, that some pleasures are good and some bad. Is that so?"—
CALL. "Yes."

Socrates proceeds to draw out the consequences of this admission: and of course it is evident, without depending upon any refinements of language or subtilty of reasoning, that he who allows pleasures to be *better* and *worse*, has some other idea and standard of *good* than its being merely pleasure. The inference is, that good pleasures are to be pursued, bad ones avoided; and that thus pleasure is to be aimed at for the sake of good, not good for the sake of pleasure; and to this Callicles 119 assents, as Polus had done before.

This doctrine is then applied to the estimation of various arts and different courses of life, as they aim at good or at mere pleasure; and to this discussion Socrates invites Callicles with great earnestness.

"For friendship's sake, Callicles, do not allow 120 yourself to jest with me, nor to say anything that comes uppermost, though you do not think it; nor take what I say as if I were in jest. For you see that the matter about which we are talking is one which every one of the smallest sense must see to be of the highest importance;—in what manner one ought to live; whether in the way to which you exhort me, acting like a man, as you say; that is speaking in the public assemblies, practising rhetoric, and carrying on the political sys-

tem which you carry on; or whether one ought to adopt the philosophical life: and how these differ from one another. So perhaps it is best to proceed as I have attempted to proceed, to distinguish and separate the one from the other; and coming to an agreement about them, if there be two different lives, to consider in what they differ, and which
 121 life one ought to live. Do you not understand me?"—CALL. "Not quite."

Soc. "I will try to make it clearer. You and I have agreed that there is the Good and the Pleasant;—that they are different;—that each may be the object of pursuit, arrived at by certain definite courses of life: the pursuit of pleasure and the pursuit of good. Begin by agreeing to this, or dissenting."—CALL. "I agree."

Soc. "Well, come now. Grant too what I said to Gorgias and Polus, if it seemed to you to be truly said. I said that Cookery seems to me a trick, Medicine an art; for Medicine can give reasons for what it does, and assigns causes of the effects it produces: but Cookery aims at pleasure simply and solely, not regarding the nature or the cause of Pleasure: it is a merely irrational trick and empirical knack, proceeding entirely on the recollection of what it has been accustomed to do,
 122 so as to produce pleasure. Now consider whether this seems to you to be rightly said. And whether there are not other arts, some of them scientific, taking some account of the *good* of the *soul*; others superficial, like that which has been mentioned, aiming only at the *pleasure* of the *soul*, and how it is to be procured; but not considering what pleasures are better, what worse; nor caring whether it is better or worse to aim at pleasure. It appears to me, Callicles, that there are such arts. Any such art I call *Kolakia*—an art of Pleasing—

either with regard to the body or the soul, or whatever it be. Do you assent to this which we have agreed to, or do you dissent?"

CALL. "Not I. I agree to it, in order that you may proceed with your argument, and in order that I may oblige Gorgias."

SOC. "And is this true when the pleasure or the good of several or of many is aimed at, as well as when of one?"—CALL. "Yes."

SOC. "So that it is possible to aim at pleasing a crowd of persons, without aiming at what is good?"—CALL. "I conceive so." 123

SOC. "And now can you tell me what are the arts which do this? or rather, if you please, as I ask about them in turn, do you tell me which you think are of this class and which not. And first, music and all musical arts; fluting, fiddling, and public performances on the cithara."

CALL. "I think they are."

SOC. "And so the public choral exhibitions and the accompanying dithyrambics: are not those of the same kind? Do you suppose that Kinesias and Meletus care to say what will make the hearers better, or what will please the mob of spectators?"

CALL. "The last, clearly, Socrates, at least so far as Kinesias is concerned."

SOC. "And how about his father Meles? Did he seem to you to aim at what was best in his harping? In truth you might say that he did not aim at what was pleasant either: for his performance was excruciating to the hearers. But as to harping in general: consider; does not it and every kind of music appear to you to have been invented for the sake of pleasure?"

CALL. "It does."

We see strokes of satire thrown in to season

the argument. Meles was a bad player, and Kinesias is said to have been a bad man. After music comes tragedy; and here we find that Plato does not allow it that high office of purging the soul by pity and terror which Aristotle assigns to it.

SOC. "And what shall we say of that august and magnificent kind of poetry, Tragedy? At what does she aim? Is her purpose and her study, think you, merely to please the spectators, or does she make it her strenuous determination that if there be anything that is agreeable and welcome to the audience, but bad for them, *that* she will not say: if there be anything unpleasant but salutary, that she will say and sing, whether they like it or not? Which of these seems to you to be the course that Tragic Poetry takes?"

CALL. "It is plain, Socrates, that it aims rather at pleasure and the gratification of the spectators."

SOC. "And did we not say, Callicles, that such an art is *Kolakia*—a mere gratificatory art?"

CALL. "We did."

SOC. "And if from any poetry we take away the melody and rhythm and metre, does anything remain but words? And are not these words addressed to the public—to a mere popular audience?"

125 And so Poetry is a kind of popular oratory. The poet in the theatre is merely a popular orator. And so we have here a rhetoric addressed to a popular body, which includes women and children as well as men, and slaves as well as freemen. And such a rhetoric we admire not. It is merely a gratificatory art." To all this successively Callicles assents.

This is a noticeable passage, for the evidence which it gives us that, in the time of Plato, women, children and slaves were admitted to the theatre;

and accordingly Hieronymus Müller in his translation of the *Gorgias* (*Note* ⁵⁵) acknowledges himself convinced by this passage of the fact of which he had previously doubted.

Socrates now goes on to public speaking, more properly so called.

Soc. "Good. And now the speaking that is addressed to the Athenian people, and to other populations of freemen; what are we to say of that? Do the speakers in such cases seem to you to aim at the highest good; to consider how the citizens may, as far as possible, be improved by their orations? or do they too aim only at the gratification of the citizens;—for the sake of their own advantage neglecting the advantage of the public:—dealing with the people as with children, trying only to humour them, and not caring an atom whether they are made better or worse?"

CALL. "Your question does not admit of a simple answer. There are some who, in addressing the people, really care for their interests: there are others such as you describe."

Soc. "That is enough. For if there be these 126 two kinds, one of them is mere art-gratificatory, and base mob-flattery. The other is a good and honourable work, to try in what way the characters of the citizens may be as much as possible improved, and to retain a strenuous determination to say what is best to be said, whether it be agreeable or distasteful to the hearers. But you never saw such a Rhetoric as this. Or if you can mention any speaker who has done this, why will you not let me too know who he is?"

CALL. "In faith, Socrates, I cannot name to you any of the present generation of speakers."

Soc. "Well, but can you tell me of any of the older orators who improved the character of

the Athenians, so that they were better when he had done with them than they had been when he began? I do not know any one who did so."

CALL. "What? do you not hear Themistocles spoken of as having been a good man, and Kimon, and Miltiades, and Pericles too, who is lately dead?"

Soc. "Certainly, Callicles, if that which you some time ago said was virtue was really so;—namely, the gratifying the desires of one's self and of others. But if this be not so: if, as afterwards we were obliged to confess, there are some desires which by being gratified make men better, and so, the object is to fulfil these; others which make men worse, and the object is not to fulfil those;—and if there is an art which aims at this object, can you tell me any of those you have mentioned who was master of that art?"

CALL. "I cannot exactly tell you."

127 Soc. "O! if you seek well, doubtless, you will find him. Let us quietly consider if any of those men was such a person."

In this way the poetry, oratory, and politics of the time are very decidedly condemned as worthless in comparison with philosophy. We have now a doctrine of philosophy propounded in the usual inductive way.

Soc. "We seek for a man who aims at what is best, not casually or occasionally, but of set purpose and steadily, as other public speakers aim most at *their* private ends, and has in his mind an idea of that which he aims at. So the painter, the architect, the ship-builder, puts in a settled order all the parts that he plans, and makes them all fall in with and conform to a settled plan, so as to bring out a regular and orderly whole."

CALL. "So be it."

SOC. "And so a house is made good by order 128 and arrangement, and bad by the want of them; and so a ship; and so the human body: the physician tries to give it a good constitution. And how of the soul? Will it be good without order and a constitution, or with them?"

Callicles of course confesses that the necessity is the same in this case.

SOC. "And what in the body do we call that which is the result of order and right arrangement?"

CALL. "I suppose you mean that we call it health."

SOC. "I do. And now what do we call the result in the soul of order and right arrangement? Try to find and to tell me the word, in this case as in that."

CALL. "Why do you not declare it yourself, Socrates?"

SOC. "If you like it better so, I will say it. And if I seem to you to say rightly, tell me so; but if not, refute it, and by no means let it pass unquestioned.

"The name for the result of a right constitution of body seems to me to be *healthfulness*, from which arise health and other bodily excellencies. And in like manner the result of a right constitution and order of the soul is *lawfulness* (that is, *law-regardingness*) and law: and by this, men are law-regarding and orderly: and this is Justice and Self-control. Do you grant this, or not?"

CALL. "So be it."

SOC. "And thus the philosophical and good 129 *rhetor* of whom we speak, will do everything with reference to the improvement of the character of those whom he addresses; whatever he says, whatever he does. If he gives he will give, if he takes

he will take, always having his mind fixed on that object;—how to infuse justice and self-control into the minds of the citizens, and to expel injustice and self-indulgence;—to generate in them all the virtues, to eradicate all the vices. Do you grant this?"

CALL. "I grant it."

SOC. "To be sure! for what is the use of giving to a diseased body the most luxurious meats and the most exquisite drinks? They will do it no good. Rather the contrary. It is no advantage to a man to live with a body thoroughly diseased. Life must to such a one be miserable. To gratify the desires, to eat and drink as much as one likes, the physicians permit to a man in health, but never to a sick man." All this Callicles grants in succession. And now his defeat is impending, which indeed, after he had made all these concessions, it is not difficult to bring about.

130 SOC. "And, my excellent Sir, is not the same the case with the soul? So long as *it* is in a bad condition, since it is unreasonable, ill regulated, ill constituted, it is not to have its desires indulged; it is not to be allowed to have anything, except what will make it better. Do you assent or not?"

—CALL. "I assent."

SOC. "For so it is better for the soul itself."

—CALL. "Even so."

SOC. "But is not chastisement or correction the restraining of a person from what he desires?"

—CALL. "Yea."

SOC. "Well then, is chastisement better for the soul than the need of chastisement, as you thought a little while ago?"

CALL. "I do not know what you mean, Socrates; ask somebody else."

SOC. "Here is a man who will not bear

one's doing him good: he will not endure what we are talking of, *correction!*"

CALL. "I care not for anything you can say. I only answered you for the sake of Gorgias."

SOC. "Be it so. What shall we do then? 131 Shall we break off in the middle of the debate?"—

CALL. "You know best what you will do."

SOC. "They say one should not leave stories half-told. One ought to bring them to a head, that they may not wander about like headless things. Answer what remains, that our debate may come to a head."

CALL. "You are very troublesome, Socrates. If you will take my advice you will drop the debate, or else carry it on with some one else."

SOC. "But who will take it up? Do not let us leave the matter imperfect."

CALL. "Can you not finish it yourself; either speaking right on, or answering your own questions?"

SOC. "And so as Epicharmus says:

'What two men said before, one man says now.'

This verse of Epicharmus is also quoted by Athenæus¹, with this notice of the occasion of it—"As the man said when the dog did not answer him." It will be seen that Callicles is represented as utterly silenced, as Polus had been before. And now Gorgias himself is brought into the Dialogue, not to receive a disgraceful defeat, but to give Socrates the opportunity of delivering his determination of the question, in a more solemn manner. He once more reminds the company how important the subject is, so that the determination of the true and the false thereupon is a common gain to all; and then says: "If it must be so, I 132

¹ *Deipn.* VII. 16.

will tell you how the matter appears to me. But if any of you think that I am wrong in anything that I say, let him dissent and confute me. For I do not say what I say as knowing it to be certainly true, but I seek for the truth in common with you; so that if he who contradicts what I say appears to be in the right, I will be the first to confess it. This I say, if you like to have the discourse finished. But if you do not wish that, let us leave it and go our way."

GORGIAS. "No, Socrates, I do not at all think that we should separate, but that you should finish your discourse; and I think the others are of the same opinion. And I myself wish to hear you wind up what you have said."

Soc. "I, Gorgias, would willingly have continued the debate with Callicles here, and would have given him Amphion's answer to Zethus (see § 90). But since, Callicles, you decline to finish the debate, at least listen to me; and if you think I say anything which is not right, and if you prove me wrong, I shall not be angry with you, as you are with me; on the contrary, you shall be recorded as my greatest benefactor."—CALL. "Go on, good Sir, and finish."

Socrates has now the field to himself, and he proceeds to recapitulate the course which the argument has taken. This he does, retaining the form of dialogue; but the exposition will be clearer if I omit, for the most part, the interruptions which that form occasions. So given, the discourse becomes a statement of Plato's philosophy at this period; that is, at a stage of his doctrines preceding that which the Republic presents; namely, when he regarded the soul of man as a *constitution*, but had not yet discerned clearly what were the component elements of that constitution. From

this view he deduces the existence and the obligation of the several virtues.

SOC. "Now listen to me while I recapitulate 133 the discourse which we have had from the beginning. The Good and the Pleasant are not identical, as I and Callicles agreed. Is the Good to be sought for the sake of the Pleasant, or the Pleasant for the sake of the Good? The Pleasant for the sake of the Good. Now *that* is Pleasant, by the presence of which we receive pleasure; *that* is Good, by the presence of which we are good. But we are good, and everything else which is good, is good by the presence of some Goodness or Virtue. But the Goodness or Virtue of anything, whether it be a body or any bodily structure, or a living thing and a soul, cannot be a thing which belongs to it by chance and accident; it must come by some order and appropriateness and rightness of its parts. And so virtue in everything is something implying a certain Order in its parts;—a Constitution. In every kind of thing, its appropriate Constitution it is, which makes it good. And thus a soul which has its proper constitution is better than one which has not. Such a soul is rightly constituted. But a rightly constituted soul is under control;—is temperate. And so a soul which is temperate is good. I cannot say any- 134 thing different from this, Callicles; pray can you?"

CALL. "Say on, my good friend."

SOC. "I say, then, that if a soul which is temperate is good, a soul which is intemperate is bad. And a temperate soul, a soul under due control, will do what is right towards the gods and towards men. It would not be under due control, if it did not. Now what is right towards man, is *justice*; what is right towards the gods

is *piety*: and he who does such things, is *just and pious*. And such a man must also be *brave*; for he whose soul is under due control, will seek what he ought to seek, and fly what he ought to fly,—be it acts or men or pleasures or pains; and will endure the stress of pain or danger when he ought to do so. And thus the man of rightly regulated soul, being, as we have said, just and brave and pious, must be in all respects a good man; and as a good man, must do well, whatever he does. And he who does well, must be happy; and the bad man who does ill must be wretched. And this bad man must be the man who is under no control, whom you praised a little time ago.”

The opposition to these doctrines is by this time exhausted, and Socrates goes on without being interrupted.

“I say that this is so, and hold this to be the truth. And if it be true, I say that he who desires to be happy must aim at and practise self-control; and must shun the absence of control, with all his powers. He must endeavour, in the first place, not to need Correction; but if he need it, or if any one that he cares for does, Man or State, he must try that it may be bestowed, if there is to be any hope of happiness. This seems to me to be the purpose, end and aim of life. We must try, as much as possible, to cultivate temperance and justice, if we wish for happiness. We must not, as has been held, let our desires expand uncontrolled, and then try to fill them,—a bottomless abyss of evil;—the life of a highway-robber. A man who takes that course must be hateful to men and gods. He can have no fellow-feeling with other men; and when there is no fellow-feeling, there can be no friendship. And the wise affirm, Callicles, that heaven and earth and gods and men

are held together by the attraction of a general sympathy; by friendship and orderliness and control;—(and therefore this universe is called *Kosmos*, *Order*—) not by disorderliness and uncontrol. You do not appear to me to have duly considered this. You do not see how great is the force, in matters both divine and human, of that *equality* which geometers talk of. You think that *inequality*—a greater share than others have—is the thing to aim at. You care nothing for geometry.”

Having thus, as it is here supposed, refuted Callicles by reasoning, Socrates proceeds to reply to the taunts which he had thrown out.

“But if this be true and indisputable, that men are happy by having justice and temperance, and that bad men are wretched by *being* bad, we must see what follows. All those consequences follow, Callicles, about which you asked me when you began. You asked me if I was in earnest, when I said that a man ought to be the accuser of himself, of his son, of his friend, if any of these did anything wrong, and that the art of speaking ought to be employed for this purpose. And the concessions which you thought that Polus made through modesty, were all true;—that as to do wrong is uglier than to suffer wrong, so is it worse; and that he who is to be truly an orator, must be a just man and acquainted with the principles of justice; which Polus before said that Gorgias had conceded through mere modesty.

“This being so, let us consider whether the 137
taunts which you addressed to me are true or not;—that I have no power of helping myself or my friends and relatives, nor of protecting them from the greatest calamities;—that I am at the mercy of any one who chooses to attack me, like a man out of the pale of society and the protection of the

law;—that I am helpless if any one should, according to your juvenile freedom of expression, smite me on the face, or take from me my property, or eject me from the city, or—the last of inflictions—put me to death. To be in such a condition, is, as you say, the vilest of lots.

“What I say is, what I have already repeatedly said, and what I must say again. I do not think, Callicles, that to be smitten on the face *is* the vilest of lots, nor if any one should cut my purse, or wound my person: but that to smite me, and to take my property *wrongfully* is worse and viler. And so, generally, robbery and kidnapping and housebreaking, and any wrong done to me and my property, are more ugly and vile in him who does them, than in me who suffer them.

138 “This has been said already in the former part of our conversation, and—if I may be allowed to use a strong expression—has been banded firm with words of iron and of adamant, as this company have allowed: and these bands you, and a stronger man than you, will not loose.

“My assertions are always the same. I do not see fully how these things are so: but the conclusions at which I have arrived are so certain, that no one can contradict them without being ridiculous. I then still hold that so they are. And if they are so;—if wrong-doing is the greatest of evils to the wrong-doer;—if a still greater evil, if greater be possible, is to do wrong and not to be corrected;—what kind of service is it that a man is ridiculous for not being able to render to himself or to his friends? Is it not the service of averting this greatest evil? This must be the greatest disgrace, not to be able to do *this* good turn, for one’s self, one’s friends, one’s relatives. And the next in order of disgraceful things, must be, not to be able

to avert the second-worst evil; and the third, the third; and the rest in order, in the same way. The honour and grace is to be able to give *such* help: the dishonour and disgrace not to be able to give it. Is it so, Callicles, or otherwise?"—CALL. "Not otherwise."

When Callicles has been driven to make this admission, it might seem that the Dialogue has sufficiently reached its catastrophe, both of argument and of drama. This however does not satisfy Plato. We have another elaborate argument entered upon, to prove, from the propositions already established, that the statesmen who had hitherto ruled Athens had failed in their task; and as subsidiary to this, that rhetoric is an art of small value. But previously to these steps, we have the maxim, that no one does wrong willingly, applied to involve Callicles in a contradiction.

This argument is to the following effect:

"Taking the two things, wrong-doing and 139 wrong-suffering, we now say that wrong-doing is the greater evil of the two. Now how are we to protect ourselves from these two evils? Is it to be done by Will or by Power? To protect ourselves against wrong-suffering, it is plain that we need Power." This Callicles assents to. "And is it by Will that we protect ourselves from wrong-doing? If a person do not *will* to do wrong, is it certain that he will not do so? Why do you not answer, Callicles, to this question, as you did to the former one? Were we not right, Polus and I, in the former discussion; when we came to the argument that *no one* wills to do wrong; that he who does wrong does it unwillingly?"

CALL. "Be it so, Socrates, that you may 140 finish your argument."

SOC. "Well then, we must acquire Power,

as well as Will, to avoid wrong-doing. What Power then are we to aim at for this purpose? I will tell you what I think; consider if you agree with me. We must either ourselves govern the community in which we live, or we must be friends with the rulers who do govern it."

Callicles, unwitting of the conclusions to which his agreement with Socrates on this point is to lead, says:

"See, Socrates, how ready I am to praise you when I can! This seems to me extremely well said."

Soc. "And you agree with the ancients, that like is friends with like? So if the ruler be a man fierce and savage, he will be afraid of those who are good and gentle, and will not be friends with them? And yet if any be weak and feeble he will not be friends with *him*. He will despise him? None can be friends with him, except he who is like him? And so in this city, any one, to be friends with the ruling power, must be like the ruling power in temper and opinion? Such a one will be powerful here: no one will wrong him. Is it not so?"

All this Callicles assents to.

Soc. "And so he will be safe from suffering wrong, and will be powerful in the city; which is what you talk so much of?"—CALL. "Yes."

Soc. "But thus imitating the ruling power, and protected by its sympathy, he will not escape the greater evil of being harsh and perverted in soul?"

142 CALL. "You turn things strangely, Socrates, I know not how. Do you not know that the original thus imitated will inflict death upon the non-imitator?"

Soc. "That, Callicles, I must needs know, if

I am not deaf: I have been told it so often by you and Polus now, and by the citizens in former times. And I tell you in return, that he may kill me if he will, but that then it will be a wicked man killing a virtuous man."

CALL. "And is that a thing to protest against as the greatest of evils?"

SOC. "Not, according to our *reasoning*. Do you think that the supreme object of a man ought to be to live as long as possible, and to study those arts which may save him in all danger of life, as you advise me to study rhetoric?"

CALL. "And right good advice it is that I give you."

Here the nature of rhetoric, as I have said, again comes under consideration, and the argument has now a touch of humour in it. The thesis is, however, the somewhat exaggerated Platonic doctrine, that to prove that an art tends to save men's lives, does not prove it to be a valuable art. Socrates, for this purpose, employs his favourite process of induction. He says:

"Well but, my excellent friend, does the art ¹⁴³ of swimming seem to you to be a very dignified art?"—CALL. "Truly, no."

SOC. "And yet *that* art saves men's lives, when accidents happen in which they need that art. But if you think that this art is too trivial a matter, I will mention another to you—the shipman's art. There is an art which not only saves men's lives, but preserves bodies and goods from the extremest dangers, just as much as rhetoric does. And yet this art does not profess to be anything great and magnificent. If a man is brought, by its ordinary service for instance, from Egina to this city, it asks of him two obols. And even if it brings men all the distance from Egypt, or from

Pontus, and brings in safety, as I have said, the man himself, and his children, and his property, and the women of his household, and lands them in the harbour, it asks two drachmas. And the man who possesses this art, and has performed this service, comes on shore, and walks along the quay, 144 beside his ship, like the most ordinary person. I suppose he knows enough to know that it is quite uncertain to which of his passengers he has rendered a great service, in saving them from being drowned, and to which of them he has rendered a disservice; for he knows that when he lands them, they are no better than they were when they embarked, either in their bodies or their souls. He knows that if any one of them who is labouring under dire diseases, has escaped drowning, he is unfortunate in having escaped, and has had no service rendered him. And if any of them is diseased in that part of him which is far more precious than his body—in his soul—and if such a man is preserved to live, whether from the dangers of the sea, or of the judgement-hall, or of anything else,—he knows that it is not better for such a miserable man to live; for he must live ill.

“And so there is no law which confers dignity upon the ship-man, though he *does* preserve our lives. Nor is there any dignity conferred on the civil engineer, for he too saves men’s lives as much as the ship-man, or the commander of armies, or any one else. He often preserves whole cities.

“He might magnify his art and exhort us all to become engineers, and say that there is no art to be compared with his. He would have plenty 145 to say on that score. And yet you despise him and his art, and look upon him as an inferior person, and would not give him your daughter to wife, nor take his daughter to be your wife. And

yet, upon your own principles, why do you look down upon the engineer, and the ship-man, and the rest that I have mentioned? You have no right to do so, as being a better man and of a better class than they are. If to be *better* is not what I affirm, but what you say;—to be able to save one's self and one's *havings*, of whatever sort one may be, it is ridiculous in you to turn up your nose at the engineer, and the physician, and the other persons, whose professional employment it is to save men's lives. But consider, my excellent sir, whether the great and good thing really be not something very different from saving lives, and having one's life saved: consider whether it be not this:—to live whatever time may be granted, living truly as a man, and not caring anxiously for one's life: leaving that to the gods, and believing, as the women say, that what must be will be; but trying for the time, whatever it may be, to live well."

There is something humorous in ascribing the unassuming manner of the steersman of a passage-boat, to a large philosophical view of the doubtful value of human life. A transition is now made to an argument which is put forward to prove the want of real worth and real ability in all the statesmen who had ruled Athens. The argument is to this effect. By making ourselves like the ruling power, we may, as has been said, escape the minor evil, wrong-suffering; but to escape the *greater* evil, wrong-doing, we must make the community in which we live, just and righteous. The great statesmen were even so far from doing this, that they all suffered from what their friends called its injustice: a plain proof *how ill* they had performed their highest task. This dialogue intervenes, and makes the transition.

- 146 “Is it to be a man’s object to assimilate himself to the community in which he lives? Are you to make yourself like the *Demus*, the People of Athens, that you may be powerful in Athens? Are you and I to charm the People of Athens, as the Thessalian women charm the moon, and damage themselves while doing so? And do not think that you can gain this power any other way than by *being like* the People. Any one who is different from it in temper and disposition, whether for better or for worse, will not succeed. You must have the same sentiments and feelings as the party
- 147 whose favour you seek, whether it be Demus the Athenian People, or Demus the son of Ppyrilampes¹.” Callicles doubts this; but Socrates assures him that he will find it true.

Socrates then goes on: “Recollect, we said that there are two ways of dealing with anything which is under our care, be it body or soul; two ways of tending it: one, by promoting its pleasure; the other by promoting its real good. Did we not settle the matter so? And the former is an unworthy kind of art; a mere art of gratification. Was it not so?”—CALL. “Be it so, if you please.”—SOC. “And the other was the art of making it good, be it body or soul. Are we not then to employ such an art on the City and on the Citizens; and make them good, so far as is possible? For unless this be done, as we have already shown, all other arts and all other acquisitions are worthless:—all worthless, unless the character of those for whom the acquisitions are made—wealth or power or whatever else—be virtuous and elevated?”—CALL. “By all means, if you wish it.”

148 Soc. “But now, if you and I were to exhort

¹ Callicles’s admiration for this youth was notorious, and has already been referred to in the Dialogue.

one another to exercise in a public way any art—the art of building ships, for instance, or houses, or docks, or temples—we must first consider and examine whether the person so exhorted knew the art he was called upon to practise; and, as a way of showing this, whether he had executed any work belonging to the art:—whether he had built any great buildings;—and if he had not, we should think it absurd for him to undertake public works. And so if one were to exhort me to practise the physician's art on behalf of the public, you might reasonably ask, But this Socrates, is he able to keep *himself* in good health? Has he performed any cures on any other persons? And so I might ask about you in similar case. And if we could not show that any one had ever been the better for our medical skill, would it not be absurd to expect that men should trust us with a public office of this kind:—should let us learn the potter's art in making the largest pitcher, as the proverb says?"—Callicles assents. 149

Soc. "Well then, my very good friend, as you yourself are setting about the conduct of public affairs, and exhort me to do the same, and reproach me with folly and meanness because I do not do it, must we not ask the like questions, and say, Has Callicles made any of the citizens better than he was before? Is there any among them who was wicked, unjust, intemperate, and who through Callicles's means is virtuous and good? citizen or stranger, slave or freeman? 150 Tell me, Callicles: if any one were to catechize you on this point, what have you to say? whom will you say that you have improved by your intercourse with him? You do not tell me whether there is any such private specimen of your skill, as a prelude to your public ministrations."

CALL. "You are captious, Socrates."

SOC. "I do not make the inquiry through captiousness; I really want to know in what way you think that the affairs of this city ought to be administered. Will you aim at any other object, in your administration, than that the citizens may be made as good as they can be made. Have we not often already agreed to the conclusion, that a true politician ought to aim at this? Have we agreed to this or not? answer! We *have* agreed: I will answer for you.

151 "And if this is the thing which a good man should endeavour to secure to his city, now recall the names of those men whom you mentioned a little while ago, and tell me if they still seem to you to have been good statesmen, Pericles and Kimon and Miltiades and Themistocles."

CALL. "I think they were."

SOC. "Then, being good statesmen, each of them made the citizens of the state better than they were before? Did he do this or not?"

CALL. "He did it."

SOC. "Then when Pericles first came forward in the public assemblies, the Athenians were worse than when he made his last speeches?"

CALL. "Perhaps."

SOC. "There is no *perhaps* in the case, my good sir; it must necessarily be so, as a consequence of what we have agreed to, if he was a good statesman."

CALL. "And what then?"

SOC. "Nothing. But tell me this too; whether the Athenians are commonly said to have been improved in character by Pericles, or, on the contrary, to have been corrupted by him. I hear it said on the other side that he made the Athenians idle and cowardly and talkative and covetous,

he first establishing the payments which are made to them from the public treasury."

CALL. "You hear this from the opposition party, Socrates, the admirers of Spartan ways, men of no note or value."

SOC. "Well; but there is another thing which I do not merely hear, but which you and I certainly know; that at first Pericles was in great favour with the public, and they never passed a vote throwing any blame upon him, so long as they were [according to you] in their worse character: but that when he had made them [as you say] good and virtuous, towards the end of his life, they voted him guilty of embezzlement, and were very near condemning him to death as a malefactor."

CALL. "Well! was Pericles a bad man on that account?"

SOC. "If he had been a herdsman who had the care of horses and asses and oxen, and if he had done the like;—if he had received them free from vice, not given to kick or bite or shy, and if in his hands they had shown the vices of bad training, he would have been reckoned a bad herdsman. Do you not think that he is a bad keeper of any animal, who receives it tame and quiet, and delivers it up more wild and savage than he received it?"

CALL. "A bad trainer, by all means, to oblige you."

SOC. "And oblige me also by answering me this: whether man is an animal or not?" CALL. "Of course he is."

SOC. "And was not Pericles a trainer of men?" CALL. "Yes."

SOC. "Well then: ought they not, as we have agreed, to have become by his training of them, more just than they were before, he being a good statesman?" CALL. "Certainly."

SOC. "Well, but are not just men mild and gentle, as Homer says? What do you say? Do you agree with him?" CALL. "Yes."

SOC. "But he made them more fierce and savage than they were when he took them in hand;—more fierce and savage against himself, too; the last case in which he could like such a temper?"

CALL. "Do you wish me to assent to this?"

SOC. "If I seem to you to be saying what is true." CALL. "Then so be it."

SOC. "Then Pericles was not a good statesman, according to this showing."

CALL. "So you say."

SOC. "And so *you* must say, after what you have agreed to."

And thus Pericles is disposed of. Other statesmen are next brought under consideration.

"And now tell me about Kimon. Did not those whom he guided and trained banish him by the ostracism, so that for ten years they might not hear the sound of his voice?"

"And Miltiades, who had been their leader at Marathon, they sentenced him to be thrown into the pit; and into it he would have been thrown, had not the president interposed his *veto*."

154 "And yet these, if they had been good statesmen, as you say, could never thus have come to grief. You do not find that good charioteers keep their seats in the beginning of their practice, but when they have trained their horses and practised themselves, are then thrown out? Such things do not happen in chariot-driving, or in anything else. Do you think they do?"

CALL. "I do not."

SOC. "And so our former assertion was true, that we do not know of any man who has been a

good statesman in this our city. You allow that none of our present men are so, but stand up for those of former times; but these now appear to be no better than the others. So that if these were rhetors, they had not got the true rhetoric—for if they had, they would not have fallen. They had only the art of flattering their audiences, by which they ingratiated themselves for a time.”

Socrates then proceeds further to develop his condemnation of the practice of Athenian statesmen, by referring again to the distinction laid down in the previous part of the Dialogue, of arts which merely gratify, and arts which improve their subject. Callicles still stands up for the famous statesmen.

CALL. “And yet, Socrates, it will be a long time before you will find any of the men of our time doing such great things as the smallest of these did.”

SOC. “My good Sir, I do not find fault with them, as ministers to the City’s desires. They seem to me to have been better ministers of that kind than the men of our day: they had more ability in procuring to the City what it desired. But in the task of transferring the desires of men to better objects, not yielding to them, but controlling them and directing them by compulsion and suasion, so as to make the citizens better men—in this they were not at all superior to these. And yet *that* is the only object of a good statesman. I grant that in furnishing us with fleets and walls and docks, our former statesmen were more effective persons than our present men.

“But you and I follow an absurd course in 155 our conversation. During all this while that we are talking together, we go over and over again the same round, and misunderstand each other.

I think that you have often granted and agreed that there are two ways of dealing both with the body and with the soul. One of these ways is ministerial—it merely provides what is needed; food when the body hungers, drink when it thirsts; and if it feel the cold, clothes, coverings, shoes, and the other things which the body craves. I use the same images again and again, that you may the more easily understand me. He who provides for these needs, the victualler, the vintner, the tailor, the sauce-seller, the shoemaker, the weaver, may seem to himself to be a person who provides for the good of the body; and may seem so to any one who does not consider that, besides these arts, there are the art of Training and the art of Medicine, which really aim at the *good* of the body, and which ought to control and direct those other arts, because *they* know what in the way of meat and drink is really for the good of the body, which those other arts themselves do not know: and that therefore those other arts are servile, subordinate, undignified trades, but that the Gymnastic skill of the Trainer and the Medical skill of the Physician belong to scientific professions; and these arts are the mistresses of those.

156 “ Now that the same is the case with the soul, you seem to me sometimes to understand when I tell you, and acknowledge what I say to be true. And then, a little while after, you come and tell me that certain men have been good and great citizens; and when I ask you, *Who?* you produce to me men who are such in political matters. Then it is as if I had asked you who are good men in training the body, and you had replied, quite seriously, Thiarion the baker, and Mithaikos the sauce-seller, who wrote the receipt-book, and Sorambes the vintner; and had told me that these

are great men—one as selling superb loaves, the other magnificent sauces, the other prime wines. And then perhaps you would be angry if I were to say, My good Sir! you know nothing about training. Those you are telling me of are the ministers and caterers to men's appetites, who have no knowledge of what is really good for men. These persons may very likely pamper and fatten men's bodies for a time, and then make them lose the flesh they had before. And then, perhaps, the men who thus suffer, not knowing the true cause of the change, would not accuse those who supplied them with these luxuries as the cause of their ill-condition, but any who happen to be their advisers for the time. And if it be after a considerable interval of time that their former high-fed condition produces disorder, they will quarrel with those who are then about them, and do them a mischief if they can, and will praise their former ministers who are really the cause of the disease.

“You now, Callicles, are doing something very 157 like this. You praise the men who fed the citizens to the full of their desires. And now they say that these men made the City great. But that its greatness is a state of tumour and disease produced by those former statesmen, they do not perceive; [and yet it is so]: for they have provided harbours and docks and walls and roads, but have neglected temperance and justice.

“And when the catastrophe comes, and the break-down of this frail system, then they will accuse, as the causes of the evil, their advisers for the time, and will praise Themistocles and Kimon and Pericles, who are really the cause of their woes. And if you do not take care, perhaps they will fasten upon you, and upon my friend Alci-

biades. When they have not only lost all that they have recently acquired, but what they originally had, they will attack you who are not the causes of their misfortunes, though you are perhaps accessory causes.

158 “But there is one irrational thing which I see taking place now, and which I hear of as having happened to those older men. Whenever the city falls upon any of these, and condemns him as a wrong-doer, they are full of anger and complaint as persons who are basely treated, after having done the State eminent services. They are most unjustly ill-used by the City, according to their story. But is this so? The whole of this representation is a falsehood. No ruler of a State can be unjustly treated by the State. The same rule applies to statesmen which applies to teachers of morality (Sophists). For these teachers, wise as they are in other matters, are very absurd in this;—that while they profess to be teachers of virtue, they often complain of their pupils as behaving ill to them, both in refusing to pay them for their instructions, and in showing no gratitude for the benefits which they have received. What can be more absurd than this?—that men who have been made good and just, who have had injustice taken out of them by their teachers, and justice put into them, should still act under the influence of injustice, an attribute which they no longer have? Is not this, my friend, the height of absurdity?

“Truly you have led me to make a speech, Callicles, by declining to answer my questions.”

CALL. “And yet [as you pretend] you cannot speak, except one answers you.”

SOC. “That is the case generally, but I now go on speaking continuously, because you do not answer me. But in the name of Friendship, does

it not appear to you absurd, that he who boasts that he has made a man good should forthwith complain of him for being bad?"—CALL. "It does."

SOC. "And do not you hear such complaints from those 'Sophists' who profess to teach men virtue?"

CALL. "I do: but why do you talk of such insignificant persons?"

SOC. "But what do you say of those who profess to be the directors of the City, and to see that it is made as good as it can be made; and then when the occasion arises, complain of it as being thoroughly bad?"

"Do you not see that there is no difference between the one case and the other; between these and those? My good Sir, the 'Sophist' is the same kind of person as the 'Rhetor,' or very near it, as I said to Polus. And you are so prejudiced that you think one of these things, Rhetoric, to be a very fine thing, and despise the other. And yet in truth 'Sophistic' is a finer thing than Rhetoric; the art of teaching morality is a higher office than the art of speaking on public occasions; as Law-making is a higher business than Law-administering in the courts, and Training the body to keep it well, a better thing than Physicking it when it is ill. I certainly thought that both Public Speakers and Moral Teachers were precluded from complaining that the thing on which their instructions have been bestowed behaves ill to them; for this is really blaming themselves, and declaring that they have done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is it not so?"—CALL. "Certainly."

This doctrine,—that if a statesman is ill-used by the people whom he serves it is his own fault,

because he ought to have raised them to such a pitch of virtue that they ill use no one;—is, again, a Platonic exaggeration, which can hardly find assent in our age. It is, however, pursued still further.

Soc. “To bestow their benefits without reward seems to belong properly to those professions alone (the Moral Teacher and the Statesman) if our principles are true. For if a man receive any other benefit,—if, for instance, he be enabled to run fast by a Trainer, when he has got all the speed he can, he may refuse to pay his teacher, unless the Teacher take the money at the same time that he imparts his lessons. [And so such a pupil may be unjust and ungrateful:] for men are unjust and ungrateful, not by the attribute of slow-pacedness, but by the attributes of injustice and ingratitude. Is not this so?”—CALL. “It is.”

Soc. “But if any one can make men good, and take out of them injustice and ingratitude, he may safely do it without stipulating for pay.”

To this Callicles assents; and here we have another of the Platonic theses, that it is wrong and base to give good education for money.

161 “Therefore it is that there is no disgrace in taking money for advice given on other subjects;—as in taking the opinion of an architect about building, or the like. But in this question, how a man may be made virtuous, and may best manage his household or his city, it is regarded as mean not to be willing to give advice, except on condition of receiving money. And of this the cause is, that of all benefits, this alone makes him who receives it wish to repay benefit in return. And so, the wish to return the benefit is a good sign that a benefit has been received.”

And now, the two kinds of statesmanship hav-

ing been thus distinguished and opposed, (I fear with a good deal of prolixity and repetition,) the controversy between Socrates and Callicles becomes somewhat more close and vehement. Socrates asks :

“And now, Callicles, tell me to which of these two kinds of public service you invite me: that of making the Athenians good, like a physician; or that of ministering to their gratification, [like a provider of luxuries]. Tell me, truly, Callicles. You can have no difficulty in doing so. You began by speaking very freely; pray go on and finish. Tell me fairly and frankly.

CALL. “I say then, as ministering to them.”

SOC. “You invite me then to minister to their gratification; to be a flatterer of the people?”

CALL. “Unless you like better to be called a victim¹ of the people: for if you do not do what I advise you—”

SOC. “Do not say again what you have often said, that any one who pleases will put me to death, that I may not have to say again what I have also said, that it will be a bad man putting to death a good man: do not say that he will take away my property, that I may not say that when he has taken it, he will not keep it and use it to good purpose; but as he took it wrongfully he will use it for vile purposes, and therefore ill.”

CALL. “It seems to me, Socrates, that you do not really believe that you will have to endure any of these misfortunes. You think that you dwell apart from the world: and are not to be dragged into a court of justice perhaps by some wretched insignificant fellow.”

SOC. “I should be very foolish, Callicles, if I did not think that in this city any one may suffer

¹ Literally, “a booty of the Mysians,” a proverbial expression.

anything which man can suffer. But I know that if I am dragged into a court of justice, and brought into danger of my life, on any such grounds as you speak of, he who takes me there will be a bad man. For no good man will bring before a tribunal a man who has done no wrong. And it will be nothing wonderful if I am put to death. Do you wish me to tell you why I look for such an event?"

CALL. "By all means."

163 SOC. "I think that I am one of a very small number in this city, if I am not the only man, who has true views of Politics, and aims at right political ends. And thence it comes that I do not speak to please; I do not aim at what is most pleasant, but at what is best; and as I do not aspire to any of those fine arts to which you exhort me, I shall not have anything to say before the tribunal. I shall be in the condition which I described to Polus. I shall be exposed to a judgement such as a physician might receive from a tribunal of boys, the sweetmeat-seller being his accuser. For consider what the physician could say, if his accuser were to open thus: 'O Boys, this man has done you much evil, and he torments the younger ones among you, lancing you and burning you, and starving you and stewing you, till you can hardly bear it: he gives you bitter draughts and makes you hungry and thirsty, and does not give you all kinds of dainties as I do.' What do you suppose that the physician, in such a strait, would be able to answer? If he were to say the truth, 'O Boys, I did all this for your good,' do you not suppose that they would make a great outcry?"

CALL. "Perhaps. It is most likely."

164 SOC. "And would he not be at a loss what to say next?"

CALL. "Certainly."

SOC. "This, I well know, would be my case, before an Athenian tribunal. I could not tell them of gratifications which I had procured them, which *they* think benefits and gains. I envy not either those who procure these things, or those for whom they are procured. But if any one says either that I corrupt the young by infusing doubts into their minds, or calumniate the older by bitter speeches, in public or in private, I shall not be able to say the truth, 'I am right in these things, which I do and say: it is for your interest, O Judges, and nothing else, that I do them,' so that the event for me must be as it may."

CALL. "But, Socrates, does a man appear to you to be in a good case, who is exposed to such dangers and cannot help himself?"

SOC. "Yes, Callicles, if he has one thing, 165 which you have repeatedly granted that he may have:—if he is conscious that he has never done anything wrong or said anything wrong towards men or Gods. We have repeatedly agreed that that is the best self-help that a man can have. If any one could prove to me that I have not this help for myself—prove it before many, or few, or face to face alone, I *should* be ashamed: and if I were put to death for the want of such help, I should be indignant against myself. But if I die for want of that ingratiating rhetoric, I know well that you will see me bear my death calmly. For death itself, no one fears who is not irrational and cowardly; but to act wrongly, he does fear."

This tone of lofty disdain of the power of the People and the Leaders of the People, and steady determination to meet the event with calmness, even if it were death, was obviously suggested by the fate of Socrates, and his demeanour as it approached. And in this way the Gorgias may be

regarded as a sequel to the Phædo, and as an additional tribute of Plato to the moral and philosophical majesty of his master. But the Dialogue, being as I suppose, written and published when Plato had established himself at Athens after his return from his travels, must also be regarded as a profession of the principles by which he was resolved to regulate *his own* life. He must be understood as adopting for himself this stern defiance of popular opinion, and as declaring that come what might of it, he would not make popular eloquence the object of his teaching, nor mix himself with popular transactions, nor adopt popular cries, even when they were recommended by men of great literary reputation, like Gorgias, or powerful demagogues, such as Callicles aspired to be. They might repeat, as long and as loud as they would, the current assertions, that pleasure was the supreme good, that to be weak was to be miserable, that power was the natural aim, force the natural master, of man: but Plato was resolved to go on asserting that there was a good higher than pleasure; that the good man, however weak, was not miserable but happy; that power acquired unjustly ought not to be aimed at; that the strength of law was greater than the strength of man; that to suffer wrong was better than to commit wrong; that to be wicked and not to be corrected was the greatest of calamities. Plato could and did hold these doctrines; and confirmed them by arguments more and more systematic, as he went on speculating in the Academia. In the *Republic* they are sustained by a system of psychology. In the *Gorgias*, though the same convictions are there, and are expressed again and again in the most absolute manner, the arguments are looser and vaguer; and though they are represented as re-

ducing the adversary to shame and to silence, if not to agreement, would probably not have that effect in reality. In fact, the strength of the argument amounts to this: that death is not an evil, and that therefore it is no such great misfortune not to have that power of public persuasion which may avert death when a person is publicly attacked. This is the point to which the Dialogue has now come round. And Socrates supports this conviction here, as he does in the *Phædo*, by dwelling upon the traditions or mythical representations of a future state of man, fashioning them partly, no doubt, to his own fancy. He goes on, from the point at which we have arrived:

“For the soul to descend to Hades full of all manner of wickedness,—this is the greatest of evils. If you please I will tell you my tale to show that this is so.”

CALL. “As you have pursued the subject so far, pursue it to the end in the way that you say.”

The description which Socrates proceeds to give of the places of men’s souls in a future life, agrees in its important points with the account given in the *Phædo* (§ 143); to the effect that those who lived a life neither very good nor very bad are gradually purged from their misdeeds; and those who have been guilty of deeper crimes are cast into Tartarus, whence they never come forth: while those who have lived a life of eminent holiness are placed in glorious habitations. I will abridge the mythological part of the account which is now given. “You,” says Socrates, “will think it a myth, but I hold it to be a true story.”

“In the time of Kronos (Saturn), before the 166 reign of Zeus (Jupiter), the law was that those among mortals who had lived a just and holy life,

went after death to the Islands of the Blessed; but those who had lived in injustice and impiety were taken to the abode of punishment called Tartarus. But at that period, men were judged in their lifetime, and by living Judges, who pronounced their sentence the very day on which they were to die. And hence the judgements were often erroneous; and Pluto (the king of Tartarus) and the Guardians of the Isles of the Blessed went to Jupiter
167 and told him that persons came to each place who were not worthy thereof. Jupiter said, 'I will put an end to this injustice. The reason why the judgements are bad at present is that men are judged clothed in their habiliments. Often corrupted souls are clothed with beautiful bodies and with wealth and rank, and accompanied by crowds of witnesses ready to testify that they have lived well; and so the Judges are dazzled and misled. And the Judges too, while they try each case, are themselves enveloped in an outward garment, which may cause them to mistake. Their soul has to judge through eyes and ears and bodily organs in general. All this is an obstacle to a right judgement. In the first place they must no longer foreknow the day of their death, as now they do. This, Prometheus, the moulder of man, has already been directed to alter. In the next place, they must be judged absolutely naked, and therefore, after their death. The Judge too must be naked: he also must be a dead man, and must judge each man, on his death, soul immediately dealing with soul, and all the accompaniments and ornaments of the man being left upon earth, that so the judgement may be just.

168 "I already know this,' said Jupiter, 'and I have established as my Judges, my three sons, Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Æacus: the two former

from Asia, the third from Europe. These, after their death, shall sit as Judges in the meadow where one road divides into two, the one leading to the Islands of the Blessed, the other to Tartarus. Rhadamanthus shall judge the Asiatics, Æacus the Europeans, and Minos shall decide as supreme authority in doubtful cases; and so the judgements shall be infallibly just.'

"This, Callicles, I have heard, and this I believe to be true. And this is the conclusion which I draw. Death is nothing more than the separation of two things, the soul and the body. And when they are separated, each retains very nearly the habit and character which it had when the man was alive. If any one was large in body 169 from nature or feeding, his corpse is large: if he was fat, his carcase is fat: if he wore long hair, his dead body has long hair: if he was one who had often earned a scourging, his body will show the stripes: if he had wounds, there will be the scars: if any of his limbs were broken or distorted, so will it be in his dead body. In short, whatever characters his body had during his life-time, it preserves for a certain time afterwards.

"Now the same is, I conceive, Callicles, the case with the soul. All such characters are manifest in the soul, when it is divested of the body, whether they be characters bestowed by nature, or acquired by habit.

"So when men come before their Judge, Rhadamanthus or Æacus, he examines each soul, without knowing whose soul it is. And so, often when he has before him the Great King, or some other King or Potentate, he finds it utterly unsound, covered with stripes and wounds, the results of injustice and perjury, scored on the soul by its own actions; or utterly distorted by lying and false

pretences, and want of truth: or ugly and foul with the effects of pride and intemperance. And thereupon he forthwith sends it to the place of custody, where it will receive the suitable infictions.

“Now all just punishment either leads to the improvement of the person punished, making him better; or serves as an example to others, who, seeing what he suffers, amend themselves. Those who are punished with a view to their reformation are those who have committed expiable crimes: and it is by pain and suffering, either here or in Hades, that their amelioration is effected: the purification of the soul from vice cannot be effected any otherwise. But they who have committed extreme crimes, and are thus beyond the power of cure, are made to be examples. They themselves are not bettered by their sufferings: but others are benefited by them, seeing the terrible torments which they suffer through all time; hung up as a dreadful example in that prison-house of Hades, a spectacle and a warning to wrong-doers who are constantly arriving. And I say that Archelaus will be one of these, if what Polus says about him be true; and any other tyrant like him. And I think that the greater part of those who are thus made examples of are tyrants, and kings, and potentates, and great men. For these being possessed of the greatest power can commit the greatest crimes.

172 “And what Homer says agrees with this. For he has put in Hades, and subjected to endless torments, kings and princes, Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityos. But Thersites, and other worthless persons who were private men, he has not placed under these torments, as being incurable. Such had not the power of doing extreme ill, and so far were happier than those who had.

“But yet, Callicles, there is nothing which prevents the powerful of the earth from being good men; and very worthy of admiration are they when they are so. For it is a difficult and a most laudable thing when a man has full power to do wrong, that he should live doing rightly. Few are they who do this. But some such there have been, both here and elsewhere, and I trust there will be yet others. One there was celebrated even through all Greece, Aristides, the son of Lysimachus (called the Just); but the greater part of powerful men are bad men.

“And so when such a man comes before Rhadamanthus, he brands him and sends him to Tartarus, to purgation or to punishment. But if he sees a soul which has lived well and according to truth, a private man’s or any other, but especially that of a philosopher, who attends to the real business of life and does not meddle with extraneous matters, he looks upon it with complacency and sends it to the Islands of the Blessed. So judges Rhadamanthus; Æacus does the like, each holding a wand; and Minos sits apart looking on as inspector, having a sceptre of gold, as Homer says:

‘Holding a sceptre of gold, and judging Souls of Departed.’

“I, Callicles, believe this; and make it my aim that I may appear before my judge with my soul sound and healthy. I put aside the honours and objects of men in general. I aim at truth alone: I try to live and I shall try to die, when the time arrives, as virtuous as I can.

“And I exhort all men to do the same, so far 174 as my powers extend. I exhort you, as you have exhorted me, to this life, to this conflict; which I say is worth all other conflicts: and I warn

you, as you have warned me, that you will not be able to make your defence, when that day of judgement comes which I have described; but when you come before Æacus, and he has you under question, you will gasp and turn giddy;—you there, as I here;—and perhaps some by-stander may insult you, and smite you on the cheek.

“You think this is a mythe—you despise it as an old woman’s tale. One might despise it reasonably, if we could find anything better and truer. But now you see that you three, three of the wisest men in Greece, you and Polus and Gorgias, you are unable to prove that we ought to lead any other life than such a one as will be of advantage to us when we go to that place. On the contrary, among so many opinions as we have discussed, all the rest being refuted, this only remained unshaken, that we are to avoid doing wrong more than suffering wrong;—that before all things a man must study not to seem but *to be* a good man;—that the next good thing after being good, is to be punished if one be in any way bad:—that all arts of mere gratification for one’s self or for others, for the many or the few, are to be shunned:—that we must use rhetoric, and every other art, for good ends only.

175 “Take my advice: follow this course, by which you will be happy living and dying, as our reasoning shows. Let who will despise you as senseless, and insult you as he pleases, and, forsooth, inflict upon you that blow of ignominy of which you have spoken. It will do you no harm, if you are really good and virtuous, really a cultivator of virtue. And then, when we have cultivated *that*, you and I, we will set about politics, or whatever it may be, quite certain to judge better than we can now. For it is a shame for us, being such as

we are, we should give ourselves airs, as if we were something great;—we who cannot agree with ourselves from one moment to another, even about matters of the utmost importance, so profound is our ignorance.

“Let us then follow the reasoning in which we have been engaged, as a guide—which tells us that this is the best course of life—in the practice of justice and all other virtue to live and to die. Let us follow this reasoning, and exhort others to do the same; not that reasoning which *you* exhort me to follow: for that, O Callicles, is nothing worth.”

REMARKS ON THE GORGIAS.

THERE is no difficulty about the dramatic period of the Gorgias. Gorgias, who was probably not more than twenty years older than Socrates, and lived to a very advanced age, might easily meet him at Athens. The Dialogue is supposed to be held some time after the death of Pericles (B. C. 429), who is reckoned among the ancient statesmen, and before the death of Alcibiades (B. C. 404), who is spoken of as one of the present ones. Athenæus (xvi. p. 505) mentions some circumstances connected with Gorgias. He says that when he had read this Dialogue, he said to his friends, “What a great satirist Plato is!” And again, when Gorgias went to Athens, after he had placed a golden statue of himself as an offering in the temple at Delphi, Plato said, when he saw him, “So the beautiful golden Gorgias is come!” to which Gorgias replied, “Athens, too, has produced a beautiful new Archilochus;” referring to the bitter satirist of that name.

The first part of this Dialogue is on the subject of Rhetoric, one of Gorgias's greatest accomplishments. We are told by

ancient authors that his style was artificial and over-carefully balanced. It so happens that we have, preserved to us in an ancient Scholiast, a specimen of his composition, of which I shall quote a portion, to exemplify the manner of the school against which Plato directed his attacks. It is a portion of a funeral oration, a very favourite kind of rhetorical exercise among the writers of that time.

GORGIAS'S FUNERAL ORATION.

“What did these men lack which men ought to have; or what was there in them which men ought not to be? I might say what I choose, but I rather choose to say what I ought; shrinking from a tempting of providence, shunning the envy of men. For these men had virtues divine, but a mortality which was human; they preferred reasonable equity to rigorous justice, and the precision of law to the rigid rules of language; thinking this the most divine and universal rule—for doing and for speaking and for abstaining—the right thing in the right place; and practising the two best things which can be, the wisdom which plans and the skill which executes; thus becoming the helpers of those who suffer by wrong, the punishers of those who flourish by wrong.”

Polus of Agrigentum, who accompanied Gorgias to Athens, and is represented in the Dialogue as an admiring pupil of his, was also noted for his balanced style, of which we have a quotation or imitation in the Dialogue itself, section 5. The main argument held with Polus is, however, about right and wrong, good and bad; and here he is represented as so completely defeated that Callicles rushes in to the rescue.

Callicles, as Mr Grote has observed, is not a “Sophist” in the technical sense of the term. He defends the immoral philosophy which we express by the phrase *Might is Right*. That such an immoral philosophy prevailed in Greece, and was especially asserted at Athens, we can show from the history of the time; and this current assertion of an immoral philosophy was felt, I conceive, by Plato as an especial call to establish, if it might be, a moral philosophy on solid grounds.

Among many less marked instances of the prevalence among the Greeks of an immoral philosophy asserting Might to be Right, we may take as a very conspicuous example the celebrated *Melian Controversy*, given in the fifth book of Thucydides. In that passage, the assertion that Might is Right, and the reply to the pleas which such an assertion evokes, are given in a form curiously dramatic. I will state some of the points of the controversy.

In the course of the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians, having become masters of the sea, resolved to conquer the island of Melos, one of the Cyclades, a colony of Lacedæmon. They sent an armament thither which summoned the Melian people to surrender, and to become a subject-ally of Athens. The proposition was, according to Thucydides, discussed between the Council of the Melians and the Envoys of Athens; and the arguments, or rather, the declarations of their principles of conduct by the Athenian Envoys, with the replies of the Melians, are given in the form of a dialogue. This dialogue, if we suppose, with the most eminent modern historians, that it is in its actual form not an exact account of what really passed, but a composition of Thucydides, must still be supposed to be a composition in which the historian presents the principles of action which the Athenians professed on that and similar occasions. And the principles thus professed are the doctrines of those who refuse to treat the relations of contending parties on the grounds of justice:—who put forwards power as its own justification, and who present interest as the only intelligible ground of action. The Athenians say, that they reject all appeals to justice as distinct from political expediency, because they wish to prevent a waste of words. They say that justice, in the reasonings of mankind, is settled according to compulsion on both sides. The strong do what their power allows, the weak submitting to it. The Melians in reply urge that even justice, however little cared for on its own account, may be recommended by its expediency:—that it is not expedient for Athens to break down the common moral sanction of mankind, but to retain a reputation for justice and equity. The dialogue goes on in the same strain, the Melians urging grounds of equity, and the Athenians refusing to recognize any ground of action but power. The conference did not

go beyond this point. The Melians refused to submit. The Athenians stamped the reality of their professed principles upon the island in the most bloody characters. They took the city, put to death all the males, and sold the women and children as slaves. It was plain that the cruel doctrine which was declared by the Athenian envoys in the Melian conference had a strong and practical hold upon the Grecian mind; and that so far, an immoral philosophy was already predominant in Greece. And so far as the prevalence of such an immoral philosophy could give occasion to the formation of a moral philosophy which should, if possible, correct and condemn injustice, violence, and cruelty, it is evident that the occasion was there; and that if there could arise a moral philosopher who could prove such exercise of power and such disregard of equity to be a monstrous violation of the order of the world, the time was come, and the man was needed.

But it may be said that the domination of violence and the disregard of justice have been prevalent in all ages; and that this conduct of the Athenians towards the Melians, however unjust and cruel, may be paralleled in all times, even in the most modern; and that therefore there is nothing in such an event to mark a peculiar epoch, or a peculiar stage of progress, in ethical speculation. The historian who has most recently narrated the tyrannical bearing of the Athenians towards the Melians has, probably with the wise and virtuous purpose of making the story convey a moral to his own countrymen, and of warning us against supposing the England of our day vastly superior in public morality to the Athens of the Peloponnesian war, noted, as not unlike the language of the Athenian Envoys, the language of the English Envoy to the court of Denmark; the Envoy, namely, who in 1807 demanded the surrender of the Danish fleet into the custody of England, under the menace of the bombardment of Copenhagen, which afterwards took place. When the Prince Regent of Denmark expressed indignation at this demand, the English Envoy answered that "War was war; that people must make up their minds to what was inevitable, and that the weaker must yield to the stronger." Certainly this language comes very near to that of the Athenians at Melos. And instead of attempting to draw any distinction in the two cases, as might perhaps fairly

be done, we shall do better to acknowledge that such language, used at any time, belongs to a very low standard of political morality. But still we may venture to say, that such sentiments as those expressed by the Athenians, and their currency at that time, were among the principal occasions which gave rise to the moral philosophy of Plato and his contemporaries. The indications that this was the case, cannot be mistaken. Plato expressly condemns, as a cruelty which ought to be abolished, the practice of Greeks, even in war, making slaves of Greeks. And with regard to another of the classes of political events which forced into notice the question, What are we to say of successful and triumphant injustice? namely, the successful attempts of criminal usurpers, *Tyrants*, as they were usually termed, he again and again employs himself in proving that they are not really successful—that they are not happy—that they are not to be envied—that the just man, the virtuous man, however apparently depressed by adverse fortune, is superior to these purpled criminals. Whether or not we may regard his arguments on this subject as satisfactory,—his reasonings as convincing,—at any rate, this is one of the points which he most earnestly and assiduously sets himself to prove. It is the key-note of some of his most laboured and finished dialogues, as the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*; and thus, in the prevalence of such spectacles of successful wrong, and in the currency of such attempts to confound right and wrong by the use of abstract terms and arguments—in the prevalent manifestations, in short, of an *immoral* philosophy, we see the occasion which led him to endeavour to construct a true and solid moral philosophy.

In the various Platonic Dialogues we trace the author's system of moral philosophy in various stages. In the Dialogues of the Socratic school he proceeds upon the Socratic principle that Virtue is Knowledge; apparently believing that if this can be established and applied, Virtue will have in itself the evidence of its Obligation, as Knowledge has in itself the evidence of its Truth. But in the *Gorgias* he does not adhere to the conception of Virtue as a kind of Knowledge, but declares it to assist in a certain Constitution of the mind; a doctrine afterwards fully unfolded in *The Republic*. In this view the obligation of Virtue

is that Vice is a Disease of the mind, and therefore is necessarily misery.

In translating the controversy held with Callicles, I have sufficiently criticized the arguments employed by Socrates to this effect. Those which are addressed to Polus in the earlier part of the Dialogue depend much, as I have there remarked, upon relations of words which cannot now be exactly rendered.

Probably a step which was regarded as important by Plato is the distinction of Arts into Arts aiming at mere gratification—*Kōlakic* Arts, and Arts aiming at Good—*Scientific* Arts; a distinction which is employed to the disparagement of Rhetoric.

Callicles despises the *Sophist* as indicated by that name; but yet the Gorgias must be regarded as the most elaborate and most important of the *Antisophist* Dialogues; meaning by that term the Dialogues which are employed in urging the claims of Truth and Philosophy against Rhetoric and Political Success. And it was probably written soon after Plato, on returning from his travels, established himself at Athens, with the purpose of pursuing truth and teaching philosophy.

PHÆDRUS.

Phædrus or concerning the Beautiful is the title in the editions of Plato; but if there is to be a second title, it should be, *or Of Love.*

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHÆDRUS.

WHEN, at Athens, a man of acknowledged ability, culture, and knowledge of the world put himself forwards to cultivate and instruct the minds of his countrymen, and especially of young men, as Plato did on resuming his residence there after his travels, the first question which occurred was, Why do you not take for the principal subject of your instruction, eloquence, and especially political eloquence, the mistress of public bodies and of private persons ;—the accomplishment which alone can give security, power, and honour?

To this Plato would answer, as we have seen in the Gorgias, that he did not think it consistent with the habits of mind and the moral principles of a philosopher to take a share in politics, as states were then governed.

But if this repudiation of public life and public oratory were conceded to Plato's peculiar views and feelings, a further question might be asked. Written composition as well as oratory was now much cultivated at Athens. The masters of this art not only taught their pupils and admirers to make speeches, but wrote speeches for them,—composed orations which others were to deliver. And this was done with regard to private as well as public affairs: Essays or Declamations were written on imaginary lawsuits, such as we have in Quintilian, or on hypothetical social questions, as we find in

the Phædrus, to which Dialogue we now proceed. Granted, Plato's critics might say, that you are right in not involving yourself in politics: still there are other kinds of composition in which some of your contemporaries have distinguished themselves. Lysias and Isocrates are admired as beautiful writers. Others have not only given examples, but rules and precepts for such writing. Ought not you to show yourself at least able to do something of this kind? Can you write speeches such as Lysias writes? Can you give rules of composition, and criticisms of admired writers as others do? If you are to take a leading place in the literary world of Athens, you ought to show that you can do this. If you decline such a trial, you must expect that the public will not regard your assertions that you are a philosopher and that your adversaries are sophists.

To such a challenge as this, the Phædrus is a reply. Phædrus is an ardent admirer of Lysias and his compositions, and Socrates, who is always the organ of Plato's sentiments in the Dialogues, thus accosts him.

PHÆDRUS.

SOCRATES. "My dear Phædrus, whence came you and whither go you?"

PHÆDRUS. "From Lysias the son of Cephalus, Socrates. And I go to take a walk outside the wall of the city: for I have been sitting in the room a long time, ever since daybreak. And I am going to follow the advice of our common friend, Acumenus, [the physician,] and to take my walk on the high-road; he says that it is more refreshing than the exercising grounds."

SOC. "He says well, my friend. So Lysias it seems was in the city." **PH.** "Yes, he was staying with Epicrates, in that house called Morychia, which is near the temple of Olympian Jupiter." **SOC.** "And what was the nature of the party? of course Lysias was regaling you with his compositions." **PH.** "You shall hear, if you have leisure to go along with me, and listen." **SOC.** "What, man! do you not think that, as Pindar says, if I had not leisure, I should make it, to hear the results of your and Lysias's studies?" **PH.** "Lead on then." **SOC.** "Now recite."

PH. "Well, Socrates, the subject of the discourse was somewhat in your way, for it was on the subject of Affection. A person is represented as pleading very ingeniously that a cool and prudent regard is more valuable than a passionate love."

* We may suppose that a frigid and paradoxical topic like this was taken as a subject by the writer that he might exhibit his skill. We can imagine what ingenious antitheses and conceits would have been extracted from it by one of those whom Johnson calls our "metaphysical poets," Cowley or Donne, or Cleiveland. But the nature of the subject does not much affect the parts of the Dialogue which I shall translate.

Soc. "The generous-minded man! I wish he would prove that affection should be given to a poor man rather than to a rich one;—to an old man rather than a young one;—and to the qualities which I and most of us have. Then his composition would be pleasant and comfortable doctrine. Why, I am so eager to hear, that if you were to walk on and on as far as Megara, and then, like Herodicus, touch the city-wall and come back, I would not leave you."

3 PH. "What do you mean, good Socrates? Do you think that what Lysias, the best writer of our time, has composed in a long period of studious leisure, an ordinary person like me can deliver by memory in a worthy manner? That, I assure you, is very far from being the case. I would give a great deal to have it so."

Soc. "O Phædrus, if I do not know what Phædrus's ways are, I shall forget to know myself. But neither the one nor the other will happen. I know that he, when he was employed in hearing Lysias's discourse, did not hear it once over only, but requested to have it repeated to him again and again: and Lysias readily consented. And still, this was not enough for him, but at last he got the manuscript, and looked at the passages which he was most curious about. And then, having sat from early morning, he went to take a walk. And

I believe, by my troth, knowing by heart the composition, unless it was a very long one; and went outside the walls to think it over. And there, meeting with a man who had an extraordinary weakness for hearing compositions read or repeated, and seeing him walking the same way, was delighted to have a companion as enthusiastic as himself: and when this lover of literature asked him to recite, he pretended that he did not wish to do so; though in fact, if he had not found him a willing listener, he would have forced him to hear. So pray, Phædrus, ask this person to oblige us, which he will be sure to do."

PH. "Well, I see that my best plan is to recite this composition as well as I may: for you seem as if you would not leave me till I do it some way or other." SOC. "I seem exactly as I really am." PH. "I will then do so. For in truth, Socrates, I did not learn the words exactly. But I can state the sense of most of his arguments from the beginning."

SOC. "But first, my dearest friend, let me see what that is which you have in your left hand under your cloak. I guess that it is the very discourse itself. Now if it be, you must think of me thus, that I love you very much: but that when Lysias himself is here, I am not disposed to let you practise your memory upon me instead of my listening to him. So, come; let me see it."

PH. "Stay, Socrates. You have given me a great disappointment, Socrates. I wanted to exercise myself upon you. Well, where shall we sit down and read?" SOC. "Let us turn from the road and go by the Ilissus: and there sit down in any quiet place which we may find." PH. "It was lucky, it appears, Socrates, that I came out barefoot. You are always so. It is best to walk

along the course of the river, in the water; and very pleasant in this hot weather and at this hot time of the day." Soc. "You go first, and look out a place where we may sit." PH. "Do you see that very lofty plane-tree?" Soc. "I see it." PH. "There is shade, and a gentle breeze, and grass to sit upon, whenever we choose our resting-place." Soc. "Go to that place." PH. "Tell me, Socrates, is not the place somewhere here where Boreas is said to have carried away Orithyia?" Soc. "Such is the story." PH. "And is this the exact place? The water is pleasant and pure and clear, and the place a fit one for maidens to sport in." Soc. "This is not the place, but two or three furlongs further down, where we crossed towards the temple of Diana; and near there is an altar to Boreas!"

The idyl-like grace and sweetness of this introduction has often been admired; but the reader will easily suppose that the Dialogue soon takes a turn to other matters, more especially belonging to the Socratic field of thought. Phædrus asks Socrates if he believes the tale of Boreas. Socrates says it might be possible to give a rationalizing account of it, as some of the philosophers of that time were disposed to give of many of the old mythological fables; adding:

"It might be that the damsel was blown by the north wind over the brink of a precipice, and so the story arose of her being carried away by Boreas. But," he says, "if we set about giving such explanations, we shall give ourselves endless trouble and difficulty. We must explain what is the true account of the Centaurs, made up of Man and Horse, and of that monstrous Chimæra, and those terrible Gorgons, and the winged horse Pegasus, and numerous other monsters. If a man

chooses to use his mother wit in giving the most probable shape to each of those stories, he will have plenty to do. For my own part," says Socrates, "I have not time for this. And the reason of this want of leisure, my friend," he adds, "is this; I have not yet solved the problem of the Delphian inscription, *Know thyself*; and it appears to me absurd, when I do not yet know *that*, to speculate about extraneous things. So I leave such matters alone, and believe in what is established by law; and, as I have said, I do not inquire about other creatures, but about myself. I examine whether I am some strange monster, with more shapes than Typhon, and more savage; or whether I am a milder and simpler animal, participant of a divine and intelligent nature. But, my friend, while we speak thus, are we not come to the tree to which you were leading?"

PH. "This is the very place."

SOC. "By Jupiter, it is a pleasant retreat. It is a very high and wide-spreading tree, and the space is lofty and shaded in by beautiful shrubs, and is full of the fragrance of the herbs below, so that it is most agreeable. And here is a most beautiful rivulet flowing under the tree, of very cold water, as one may feel with the foot. By the images which are here, it seems to be a fountain of the Nymphs and Achelous. How lovely and sweet is the air of the place! and it has a shrill summery sound with the chirp of the grasshoppers. And the grass slopes most conveniently for one to lay one's head on, and seems to greet us as welcome strangers."

PH. "Why, you wonderful man, you are talking rather oddly: really, as you say, you are like a stranger, and not like an inhabitant of the place.

You never go into foreign parts to see sights, and scarcely ever go beyond the city-walls."

Soc. "Excuse me for that, my excellent friend; I am fond of learning something, and the hills and the trees cannot tell me anything, but the men in the city can. But you have found the way to cure me of my home-keeping propensities. As men lead cattle onwards by holding some food or fruit before their noses, so you lure me on with the discourse which you have in your book there, and, for aught I know, will lead me all round Attica, or where you please. Now that we are here, I will lie down, and do you take what attitude you please, and read to me."—PH. "Listen."

This, the reader will perceive, sounds like the beginning of a day of literary enjoyment of two friends in the open air;—a sort of May-day among the Muses; and so it is treated. Socrates and Phædrus banter each other in the style that we have heard; for Phædrus also is allowed his turn in this game. They quote and improvise, and criticize and jest; and Socrates gives a mythe about the grasshoppers (§ 91), and says that these creatures would laugh at them and despise them if they could not keep themselves awake through the noon with their own conversation. Socrates delivers discourses of various kinds as examples of what composition may be. First, one in plain prose like that of Lysias. Then one in a sort of ornate poetical style, which he says sounds like a Dithyrambic, and which is preceded by an invocation of the Muses. And then one in a more elevated poetical strain, which he calls a palinode or retraction of his blasphemy against Love—full of strange mythology and strange metaphysics, and mythical visions of the nature of the soul and its destiny. In this part occurs the celebrated image of the Human

Soul as a charioteer drawn in its car by two horses, one white, one black; one of a good, the other of an evil temper: these horses represent Reason and Desire, and the task of the charioteer who has to make them run together is hard.

I will translate this, or at least, portions of it, as best I may; and first we are to listen to Phædrus reading the Discourse of Lysias on the stated theme.

THE DISCOURSE OF LYSIAS.

11

“And thus you are informed of the state in which I am, and you have heard my petition for that which would I think be good for me. Nor do I think it reasonable that I should fail in my request, on that account, that I am not a lover. For Lovers will repent of any good office they render you, as soon as the fervour of desire is past: but such friends as I am, never come to a time when they have reason to repent: for they do good offices not by any compulsion, but spontaneously; they do good offices as far as their power reaches, according to their judgment of their own circumstances. Further: Lovers often reflect how much they have neglected their own affairs on account of their love, and what benefits they have conferred: and reckoning the labour they have bestowed upon their pursuit, they consider that they have done all that the object of their love can claim. But those who are not lovers can make no such excuse of neglect of their private affairs, nor the enmity of relatives which they have incurred: and thus so many causes of mischief being removed, they have nothing to think of but how most readily they may do all which may gratify the person in question.”

He then proceeds to argue that Lovers are in- 12
constant.

- 13 That those who are not in Love will be less elated with success.
- 14 That the Non-lover will be less suspected.
- 15 That Friendship is less liable to take offence.
- 16 That Friendship is more desirable than Love.
- 17 That Lovers are more to be pitied than envied.
- 18 That Affection may exist without Desire, as we see in Parents, Children, Brothers.
- 19 That to urge that it is right to show favours to those who most need them is not a valid argument. We do not ask beggars to our tables, but friends. And then he sums up these arguments.
- 20 “And so you should bestow your favours, not on those who need them most, but on those who can best give something in return: not on those who love most, but on those who are most worthy: not to those who love your youth only, but to those who will share their possessions with you when you are grown older: not to those who as friends show their jealousy of favours shown to others, but to those who modestly are silent to all: not to those whose affection is but for a season, but to those who will be the same through life: not to those whom, after desire is gratified, will seek excuses for estrangement, but to those who when the season of desire is fled, will then show their good qualities.
- 21 “Bear this in mind, O thou whom I address: and recollect that Lovers are perpetually assailed by the remonstrances of friends, telling them that Love is full of danger: but no one was ever rebuked for not loving, nor has their want of love ever been supposed to be a dangerous thing.
“And so I think I have said enough to convince you; but if you have to ask, what you think I have omitted, ask on.”
- 22 PH. “How does it seem to you, Socrates?

Is it not admirable, both in other respects, and as to the style?"

I have so little confidence in the reader being of Phædrus's opinion, that I have omitted a great part of this discourse. It will probably be regarded by most English readers as a paradox without even the grace of much ingenuity. At a later period of the Dialogue it is criticized by Socrates. Here he gives it ironical praise.

To Phædrus's question how it pleases him, Socrates replies :

"Wonderfully, my dear Phædrus: so that I 22 am transported out of myself. Indeed *you* contributed to that effect; for I saw the joy you had in the composition while you were reading it. And, thinking you a better guide than myself in such matters, I allowed myself to be carried away by a sympathy of admiration with your dear self."

PH. "Well, well! I see you are jesting."

SOC. "Do you not think I am in earnest?"

PH. "Not at all. But in the name of Friendship, do you think that any other man in Greece can say finer things and more of them, on the same subject?"

SOC. "Stay: let us know what we are talking 23 about. Are we to praise your author because he has said what he ought to say, or merely for having put what he has said into clear, neat, well-turned language? If we are to consider the substance, I must take it on your authority, for such is my stupidity that it escaped me altogether. I attended only to the rhetorical skill displayed in the piece, and with that, to tell the truth, I thought that even Lysias himself could hardly be satisfied. I thought, Phædrus, if you will allow me to say so, that he said the same thing two or three times over, as if he had not any great

fertility in producing many views of the same subject: or perhaps he did not care for such repetition. Indeed he appeared to me to have a sort of vanity in showing that he could say the same thing in different ways, and each very well."

PH. "You are all wrong, Socrates. That is exactly the merit of the composition, that he has said everything which belongs to the subject and is worthy to be said, omitting nothing: so that no one can add to what he has said anything more or anything better."

SOC. "In that I am unable to agree with you. If I should, out of complaisance, agree to what you say, there are among the ancients wise men and wise women who have spoken and written on such subjects, and who will prove me to be wrong."

24 PH. "Who are they? And where have you found anything of theirs better than this?"

SOC. "I cannot tell you exactly: but it may have been in the beautiful Sappho, or the sage Anacreon, or even some of the prose-writers." PH. "What makes you think so?" SOC. "I will tell you. I feel that at present my heart is full of things beyond those which I have just heard, and not worse than those. And that these do not come from myself I well know: I am too conscious of my own incapacity. It remains then that I must have received from foreign fountains this stream with which I overflow. And yet such is my stupidity that I cannot now recollect how and from whom I heard these things."

This promise of a rival essay to be delivered by Socrates, is eagerly caught at by Phædrus, according to the Athenian spirit.

25 PH. "My excellent friend, you speak charmingly. Whence and how you heard those things,

I do not ask you tell me: but do that which you say. Do *you* engage to produce finer things and not fewer than those which are in this written composition, not repeating those: and I engage, as the nine archons do when they undertake their office, that if you succeed I will place in the temple at Delphi a golden statue the size of life; or rather two, one of you and one of me."

Soc. "You are an invaluable friend, Phædrus; and you are better than gold, if you suppose me to say that Lysias has missed all the points of his subject, and that I can treat the same subject without repeating anything which he has said. I suppose the very worst writer could hardly make such a miss as that. And with regard to this particular 26 case, do you suppose that any one, having to urge that you are to favour one who is not a Lover rather than one who is, should pass by those points, the praise of prudence and the blame of imprudence, which are inevitable topics, and should excogitate other different ones. Of course you must allow him those; and in them the merit must be, not the invention, but the management; but in others less obvious you may praise the invention as well as the management."

PH. "I agree to what you say: you talk reasonably. Well, I will allow you to assume that a man in love is more out of his senses than a man who is not: and now you are to say more and finer things than Lysias has said: and then I will set you up in gold at Olympia to stand by the colossal statue of Jupiter which the Cypselids offered."

Soc. "You take the matter seriously, Phædrus. I only wanted to tease you by attacking your favourite. Do you really think that I can

attempt to say anything which shall stand a comparison with his cleverness?"

PH. "Ah! you are now brought into the same scrape in which I was a little while ago. No. You must speak a speech as best you can; if you do not wish to make me repeat a scene so frequent in comedies, and to return to you what you said to me, word for word. Do not compel me to say¹, O Socrates, if I do not know Socrates's ways I shall forget myself: he desires to make a speech, but he is coy. Know that we depart not hence before you have uttered what you said you had in your breast. We are alone in a desert place. I am the younger and the stronger. Agree to what I propose, and do not compel me to have recourse to violence."

28 SOC. "But, Phædrus, I shall make myself ridiculous if, stupid as I am, I compete with a great writer on his own subject."

PH. "I will tell you what: if you do not make an end of your excuses, I will say a word which will force you to speak."

SOC. "Then pray do not say it."

PH. "Yes: I will say it. I will swear a mighty oath. I swear to you—by whom, by what god shall I swear?—shall I swear by this plane-tree? Yes: if you do not deliver me your speech in its presence, I will never repeat to you any discourse, any composition, of any one."

SOC. "Ah! you malicious man! How well you know the charm to bind to your will a man so fond of discourses as I am."

PH. "Now, what further excuse have you?"

SOC. "None. As you have sworn, it must be done. How could I deny myself so great a luxury as you threaten to take away?"

¹ See § 3.

PH. "Speak on then."

SOC. "I will tell you what I will do."

PH. "What is it?"

SOC. "I will cover my head with my mantle while I speak, and run through the speech as fast as I can, that I may not catch your eye, and be put out by my bashfulness."

PH. "Only speak. For the rest do as you like."

SOCRATES, IN OBEDIENCE TO PHÆDRUS (see § 46).

"Aid me, ye Ligyan Muses.

29

"Aid me to raise the mythic strain which this excellent man compels me to utter, that his companion, ever before by him deemed wise, may so be deemed yet more.

"There was once a boy, say rather a youth, beautiful exceedingly. Many were his Lovers; but one of them, a subtle spirit, loving him not less than the others, persuaded the youth that he loved him not; and once when he sought his favour, tried to persuade him that he ought to grant it rather to one who loved him not than to one who loved him. And thus he said:

"Beyond all other ways, O fair boy, is there this especial way to take good counsel;—namely, to know what that is concerning which you deliberate; which unknown, you needs will aim quite awry. And yet how few are there who are aware that they know not the essence of each thing. And so they proceed as if they knew. They put the matter incoherently at the beginning of their inquiry: and as they go on they run into inconsistency, as may be expected, with themselves and with others. Let not thee and me fall into this error which we thus blame in them. But since

the question with us is, whether you are to grant your Friendship to a Lover rather than to one who is not so, let us begin by defining clearly and in agreement with ourselves, what Love is, and what is its power: and then let us found our inquiry on this our definition, and examine whether Love is the source of Good or Harm.

30 “Now that Love is a kind of Desire is plain to all; but that those who love not, yet desire certain things, we know. How then shall we distinguish the Lover and him who is not one?

“We must recollect that there are in each of us two Ideas which rule and lead us, and whom leading we follow: the one an Instinct, the Desire of Pleasure; the other an acquired Opinion, which aims at Good. And these two Principles sometimes are in agreement, sometimes are at variance: and when at variance, sometimes the one, sometimes the other prevails. When the Opinion which acting by Reason draws us to Good prevails, we call it *Sophrosyne*, *Self-Control*: when the Principle which irrationally draws us towards Pleasure governs in us, we call it *Hybris*, *Uncontrol*. Now this Uncontrol has many names, as it has many kinds and many divisions.

31 “And of these kinds when any is conspicuous in any one, it stamps him with a cognate name;—no honoured or fair names are they. When the desire of eating overcomes the rational love of food, it is gluttony: the man is a glutton. When the desire of drink tyrannizes, we know what the man is called; (namely a drunkard); and so when any of the desires, the sisters of these, rules, we have an appropriate designation ready.

32 “And thus the irrational desire which tends to beauty, when it overmasters the Opinion which tends to Good, and is corroborated by the kindred

desires, it is Love; (and is called Eros from the Strength (*Romè*) it thus receives)."

Socrates here interrupts himself, and says:

"My dear Phædrus, do you observe, as I observe, that an extraordinary thing has happened to me?"

PH. "Yes, indeed, Socrates; you are become very unusually fluent."

SOC. "Therefore listen to me in silence: for of a truth the place does seem to breathe inspiration. So that if, as I go on, I am transported by the Nymphs of the locality, you are not to wonder. I am very nearly uttering dithyrambics."

And now for the sequel, Love being thus defined.

He then goes on to urge the usual topics against 33 surrendering ourselves to the dominion of Love, as at variance with self-guidance, with philosophy, with family ties: and still more incongruous if there 40 be a disparity of years. The person addressed is warned against Lovers by considerations such as might be employed in a like exhortation among us at present. Such was the tone of Athenian conversation, and in this strain is the rest of this composition, and so it continues to the end. The object of the address is warned against giving the affections to a Lover who will after awhile become faithless, capricious, jealous: whose society will then be both disagreeable and hurtful: hurtful in many ways, and especially in the way of preventing the culture of the soul, "than which nothing more precious is or can be in the sight of men and gods. These things, O young person, lay to heart, and reflect that the addresses of a Lover flow not from affection, but from a kind of appetite:

'Lovers love with a love like the love of the wolf for the lambkin.'

41 "And there is what I have to say, Phædrus. You will hear no more; for that is the end."

PH. "I thought it was only the middle. You ought to have a second part, setting forth the merits and claims of the non-lovers. Why do you stop, Socrates?"

42 SOC. "Do you not perceive, my dear friend, that I am no longer uttering dithyrambics, but am sunk down to hexameter. If I undertake a paenegyric, assuredly the Nymphs, to whose intoxicating influence you purposely exposed me, will drive me mad. Of course the good that is to be said of the one is just the opposite of the bad which was said of the other. And so I will wade the river and go away, before you do anything worse to me."

PH. "Do not do that, Socrates, while it is so hot as it is. Do you not see that it is High Noon, as they call the time of greatest heat? Let us sit and talk a little about what we have been saying, and go away when the heat has somewhat abated."

SOC. "You are a wonderful man for your love of literary discussion, Phædrus!—something quite superhuman. I do not think any body has been the cause of so many pieces of composition as you have, including what you have made yourself and what you have induced others to make. Of course I except Simmias the Theban."

We have seen in the Phædo that Simmias was a very eager hearer of Socrates. This occupation of listening to literary exercises, such as those here given, and then criticizing them, which both Socrates and Phædrus are represented here as enjoying so much, is not likely to have the same charm for the English reader; and therefore I have abridged these exercises, and only given specimens

of them. But the subject of this Dialogue is not merely such exercises and such criticisms. It is intended also to convey, in a highly poetical form, some of the leading points of the Platonic philosophy. For this purpose Socrates utters another lyrical strain on the subject of Love, which is thus introduced: he goes on:

“And now you are likely to be the cause of another discourse.”

PH. “I do not regard that as a declaration of war, but as an announcement of something very pleasant. But how is it so?”

SOC. “When, my dear friend, I was going to ⁴³ cross the stream, the accustomed sign of my Divine Monitor stopt me. You know it is constantly interfering when I am going to do anything—and I seemed to hear a voice which forbids me to depart before I have cleared my conscience, which appears to have a load upon it. I am dull in spelling out the meaning of such notices, but I see now what it means. I had twinges while I was speaking, and like the Poet Ibycus,

‘I fear’d the Gods might that condemn
Which blinded men admire.’”

He then goes on to say that he was afraid he ⁴⁴ had been guilty of an impiety against the Divinity of Love, in speaking as he had done, against the influence of love. He says that this offence is to be expiated by a Palinode, a poetical retractation, of which there was an ancient example given by the poet Stesichorus. He, as a punishment for having spoken ill of Helen, was by her influence struck blind; and wiser than Homer was, he perceived the cause of his calamity, as a favourite of the Muses might do; and repaired his fault by these verses:

'Not true is that discourse we held of yore.
Ne'er didst thou mount the lofty Trojan ships,
Or seek the towers of Pergamos.'

And when he had uttered this Palinode, he forthwith recovered his sight. And so, I will be even more prudent than he was; before Love does me any harm, I will propitiate him by uttering a Palinode, not as before, hooded in my mantle, but with head uncovered."

45 PH. "You could not tell me anything more agreeable."

SOC. "You must see the extreme impropriety of our two former discourses, both mine and that which you read from the scroll. Any one of good breeding and good character who knew what real love was, when he heard us speaking of love being for slight causes turned into jealousy and dislike, would suppose that we had wholly lived among common sailors, and never knew what a generous and sincere affection was. So I shall try to sweeten the sour things which I said, and I recommend Lysias to do the same."

46 PH. "Depend upon it he will, if you lead the way."

SOC. "I believe that he will, for you are the man to make him do it."

PH. "Now say on."

SOC. "But where is the youth [the imaginary object] whom I addressed? Let him listen to me again before it is too late."

PH. "He is here, and will listen."

SOC. "O beautiful boy, bear this in mind. The former discourse which I delivered was that of Phædrus the son of Pythocles, a man of the Myrrhinós quarter in Athens; that which I am about to deliver is that of Stesichorus, the son of Euphemus, of Himera in Sicily."

SOCRATES IN IMITATION OF STESICHORUS: A
PALINODE OF HIS BLASPHEMY AGAINST
LOVE.

“Not true is that discourse which says that the Beloved One should show favour rather to one who loves not than to the Lover, because this one is in a phrensy, and that a sober man. For if to 47
be in a phrensy were simply and always an evil, that might be truly said: but it is not so; the greatest blessings which men receive, come through the operation of phrensy, when phrensy is the gift of a deity. The prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona,—many are the benefits which in their phrensies they have bestowed upon Greece; but in their hours of self-possession few or none. And too long were it to speak of the Sibyl and others, who, inspired and prophetic, have delivered utterances beneficial to the hearer. Indeed this 48
word *phrenetic*, or *maniac*, is no reproach; it is identical with *mantic*, prophetic.

“And oft when diseases and plagues have fallen 49
upon men for the sins of their forefathers, some phrensy too has broken forth and has pointed out in prophetic strain how the sin might be expiated and the gods appeased.

“And a third kind of phrensy, the inspiration and possession which comes from the Muses, seizes the tender and virgin soul; and so transports it that it utters itself in odes and poetic strains, and adorns with its graces the deeds of ancient men, and teaches those of its own generation. And he who, untouched by the phrensy of the Muses, ventures within the poetic doors, deeming that he can be a poet in virtue of his Art alone, fails of

his aim ; nor can the poetry of one so calm bear comparison with that which flows from the phrensy of inspiration.

50 “ So many and yet more great effects could I tell you, of the phrensy which comes from the Gods. And so let us not be affrighted by any fear of this word *phrensy*, to think we must needs prefer the calm to the phrenetic friend. The phrensy of Love is the greatest blessing which the Gods can give to the Lover and to the Beloved One.

“ The proof of this, the seeming wise will reject, but the truly wise will know its truth. And therefore we must first rightly explain the nature of the Soul human and divine, its passions and its actions. And thus our proof begins.

51 “ Every soul is immortal : for that which ever moves, lives ever. That which is moved by another, when it ceases to move, ceases to live. That which moves itself, moves for ever, being its own source of action, and the source and principle of action in things which are moved by it. A principle is not produced by something else. For all that is produced must be produced by a principle, but *it* from none. For if it were by aught produced, a principle it were not.

52 “ And since it is not produced, it also cannot be destroyed. For if a principle were lost, it could not spring again from aught, nor aught from it, since all things spring from a principle. If the principle which moves itself, the source of motion, were to cease, all the heavens would stand still, and the universe would fall together, and there could be no source from which motion might again begin.

53 “ Since that which moves itself is thus immortal, let us not hesitate to declare the nature of the Soul [to be that it moves itself, and is therefore

immortal]. For a thing that is moved from without has no soul, but that which is moved from within has a soul. The self-moving principle is Soul, and the Soul is ungenerated and immortal.

“To speak of the Soul fully and worthily, we should need a large and divine eloquence. To describe it by comparison, a smaller and merely human discourse may suffice: this let us give.

“The Soul is like a Charioteer who is drawn by 54 a pair of winged horses. Among the Gods the charioteers and the horses are all faultless; but among men they are of mingled qualities. The charioteer guides the pair; one of the horses is of good disposition and of good breed: the other the reverse; and thus the task of the charioteer is hard.”

He then proceeds to convert this image of the soul into a mythe involving the relations of human to divine souls. The divine souls travel ever in a superior region. The human souls labour to ascend into this region, but the evil steed which is attached to the car drags them downwards in their ascent, and often frustrates their attempts, and involves them in lower forms of human life and even of brutal life; for the soul shifts from body to body as evil life is finished. The felicity 60 which divine souls possess, and that to which human souls aspire, is that of seeing the Truth; the field of Truth is the divine pasture of the soul. It is by having seen the Truth, that man 62 resumes the human form in a second life. For this purpose men must understand general propositions¹, that which is by reason collected into our Ideas from many Sensations². And these are

¹ κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον.

² ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναρόμενον.

what the mind recollects, as having seen when it was journeying with the divine souls, and contemplating real essences, and gazing down on the being that *really* is¹.

63 “And thus we come to that point at which we were aiming. The Soul recollects the reality of Beauty which it has seen in its supernal travels; it tries to soar aloft towards it, but in vain, its wings do not suffice; it can only gaze upwards; and thus neglecting things below, it is held to be frantic. This is the best of all the forms of phrensy: the phrensy of the Lover of the Beautiful.

“Every human Soul has (in a previous state of existence) contemplated some of these real essences (as that of Beauty); otherwise it would never have been lodged in a human body. But all do not recollect with equal ease these realities. Few recollect them well; but they who do, when they see any resemblance of them here below, are transported; are no longer masters of themselves: and yet they cannot tell the cause of their emotion.

64 “Justice, and Purity, and the other precious realities, of which our Souls acknowledge the value, have no visible splendour when they are seen in their images here below; hardly, and in few instances only, can men discern them with their earthly organs. But Beauty, which we saw in that happy region, in that gorgeous company, with our then undimmed faculties, calmly shining in the midst of a serene light, impressed itself more strongly on our memory. We linger with delight on the remembrance.

65 “Hence, when we are come hither, we discern traces of it by the aid of the most piercing of our

¹ ἀνακύψας εἰς τὸ δὲ οὐρανῶν. So in § 58 he speaks of the soul as seeing *real* Justice and *real* Self-control in its celestial travels. See further on, p. 287.

senses, the sight. Any of the real essences, in themselves so loveable, would excite deep love in us, if it could affect our sight and appear to us in a visible image; but to Beauty alone is allotted that privilege, that it is both most visible and most loveable.

“And thus he whose recollection of Divine 66 Beauty is not fresh, and whose Soul is corrupted, is not easily drawn towards real Beauty here, when he sees what here on earth bears the name of Beauty. He has no reverence for it; it excites in him only brutal desire; he has no shame nor self-control. But he whose memory of the heavenly spectacles is still fresh and vivid, when he sees the divine countenance of Beauty well imitated by an earthly form, is first struck with awe, and his ancient fear returns; then he contemplates it and reverences it as divine, and would worship it as a god, if it were not that he would be deemed mad. He burns like a man in a fever. The influence or 67 the effluence of Beauty sends into him a heat which melts the gummy coatings which hindered his wings to grow: the quills and feathers of his pinions feel the vivifying warmth. And when that 68 beloved object is removed, the pores close, and the growth of the wings is stopped, and the influences which prompted them struggle in vain for issue; the Soul is tormented and agitated, and yet delighted with the recollection of the Beauty which has excited its emotions. It seeks sight of the 69 Beloved Object; it breathes again; nothing is to it so precious as the Beloved One: it forgets all, father, mother, brothers, sisters, friends, companions: it cares not for the wasting of goods; it is ready to be a slave, and to lie on the ground if it may be near the Beloved Object. It can find no physician but the Beautiful One.”

“And this is Love.”

70 (Then the different kinds of love are described
71 according to the different Gods, Jupiter, Mars,
72 Juno, Apollo, whom the Soul has followed in its
73 supernal circuit. The Lover tries to find in the
Beloved Object the qualities of the God, or to
educer them—the follower of Jupiter, a command-
ing character; of Juno, a royal spirit; and so of
the rest.)

74 “And thus the course to which true Love does
tend has a divine origin; and is to the person
beloved a source of blessing and happiness con-
ferred by the Lover.”

Returning to the chariot and horses, the one
75 is white and docile, the other black and perverse.
“When the charioteer sees an object which inspires
love, the better courser obeys the rein, the evil steed
minds nor spur nor whip, and rushes to sensual
76 pleasure unrestrained. A fierce struggle ensues
77 between the Charioteer and him, and he is finally
78 subdued.”

79 Yet under certain circumstances the victory is
80 again lost.

81 “And then their Souls quit their bodies un-
82 winged, though with some feathers growing. They
83 have commenced the celestial journey; they will
live a bright life with each other, with like wings,
for the sake of their love.

“Such great blessings, O boy, and so divine,
will Love give you. While the intercourse of one
who loves you not, mingled with earthly prudential
thoughts, occupied by frivolous cares, produces
in the Soul of the Beloved Object a servile pru-
dence, which may be a virtue in the eyes of the
multitude, but makes it wander destitute of the
light of reason, nine chiliads of years, revolving
round the earth, and under the earth.

“To thee, O Love, I dedicate this Palinode: 84 and beg thee to pardon me for my former strain. Lysias is to blame. Turn him to philosophy, as his brother Polemarchus has been turned; that Phædrus here, who loves him, may give himself to a love approved by philosophy.”

This mythe is, as I have said, a celebrated part of Plato's writings. The Charioteer with his two steeds, the good and the bad one, represents man with his springs of action, Reason and Desire, which move him, and which he has to guide. This image may be considered as a step towards the account of the constitution of man given in the Republic, where the principles of the soul are stated as three, Reason, Desire, and Anger.

Another part of this mythe, bearing in an important manner upon the Platonic philosophy, is the representation of the soul as traversing celestial regions before it is joined to the body; and in those regions acquiring a sense of the essences of things which it retains afterwards, and which is the ground-work of Reason in its highest sense. The region in which these Essences or Ideas reside is described in § 58 as *the supercelestial*¹: “The colourless, formless, impalpable essence which really is can be contemplated only by that Intuition (*Nous*) which guides the Soul. In the region of this Essence is the place of real knowledge. The Divine Souls, and every Soul about to fulfil its true destiny, when it sees that *which* is, loves it, and rejoices to contemplate the Truth, as long as its movement in its orbit permits it to do so. In the course of its revolution, it sees Justice, it sees Self-Control, it sees Knowledge, not as mutable things, nor as attributes of what *we* call *Beings*, but *the*

¹ τὸ ὑπερουράνιον.

*essence of each as it really is*¹. And having gazed upon these and other real essences, and fed upon them, the soul again enters the inside of the heavenly sphere, and thus comes home."

After Socrates has delivered his Palinode, ending with a wish that Phædrus may be fully possessed by the love of philosophy, Phædrus says, "I wish that too, Socrates." But they then turn to a discussion on the dignity of authorship, about which Phædrus has misgivings, and which Socrates pretends to uphold by a whimsical argument. Phædrus praises the discourse of Socrates, and says:

85 "I am afraid if Lysias tries to rival it, he will appear mean, even if he make the attempt. But I doubt whether he will do so. For not long ago, my excellent friend, one of our political men made his authorship a matter of reproach, and called him *a scribbler*. So that perhaps he will, as a matter of dignity, abstain from writing."

Soc. "That is quite absurd, young man. You do your friend injustice, if you think that he is so easily frightened with a word. Do you suppose that he who thus reproached him was in earnest?"

86 ΠΙ. "It appeared that he was. And you know very well, Socrates, that the most powerful and dignified persons in each State are ashamed to write discourses, and to leave written compositions

¹ In the laborious manner in which Plato accumulates inflexions of the verb *to be*—*τὴν ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἔστιν ὃν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οἶσαν*—we see a tendency which has generally prevailed among metaphysicians, and which in Latin gives currency to such words as *ens, esse, essentia*, and the like.

The Platonic doctrine of Innate or Connate Ideas, as the sources of Truth, is embodied in the mythological imagery of the travels of the Soul through celestial and supercelestial regions before its junction with the body. Apparently Plato was of opinion that the construction of such myths was quite within the limits of the philosopher's privileges.

behind them; being afraid of being, in after times, regarded as mere authors."

SOC. "There is a side of the subject which you do not see, Phædrus. What? Do you not know that our great statesmen are most fond of writing essays and leaving their compositions behind them? And when they have written an essay, they are so fond of having it praised, that they write at the head of it the names of those who praise it."

PH. "How do you mean? I do not under- 87 stand you."

SOC. "Do you not know that in a politician's composition, the name of his admirer is written at the beginning of it?" PH. "How?"

SOC. "He writes thus: *It seemed good to the Senate, or to the People, or to both; on the motion of such a one*, naming himself very gravely, and with terms of high praise. And then to show to his admirers how clever he is, he often writes a long essay: for is not such a production a written essay?" PH. "It is."

SOC. "And if his essay stands, he goes home 88 as glad as the author of a successful play goes out of the theatre: and if it be rejected or rescinded, and he declared a bad writer of such essays, he is in grief, and is condoled with by his friends. So it is plain they do not despise, but aspire to this art of writing. And when a man writes with such power as Lyncurgus, or Solon, or Darius did, and so is an *immortal* writer, is he not reckoned a sort of god both by his contemporaries and by his readers in after times?"

To all this, in successive sentences, Phædrus assents. It seems that Plato, though he did not admire such writers as Lysias, would not allow

them to be contemptuously treated by the politicians, whom he admired still less.

89 The two friends then go on to more detailed criticisms, still enjoying their idyllic leisure. Socrates goes on :

“No. It is not writing which is disgraceful, but writing ill. And what is the art of ably writing a political law or a literary essay, in verse or in prose, shall we, Phædrus, inquire of Lysias, or of any one else?”

PH. “Shall we inquire, do you ask? What do we live for, but to pursue such inquiries? Not for the pleasures of the body, which are all mixed with pain, and are justly called slavish pleasures.”

90 SOC. “We have leisure for our inquiry, as it seems. And the grasshoppers that chirp in the heat over our heads seem to talk about us as they sing and look down upon us. And if they were to see us two doing as many do, not talking but sleeping in the noon-day heat, and lulled by them for want of thought in our own minds, they would very rightly laugh at us, and think that we were two slaves who are come to their place of resort, at the fountain, to take their noon-day sleep like cattle. But if they hear us conversing together, and going on [like Ulysses] in spite of the songs of these new Sirens, they will perhaps give us the gift which the gods allow them to give to men.”

PH. “What gift is that? I do not recollect to have heard of it.”

SOC. “Fie! A lover of the Muses ought not to be ignorant of such things. It is said that these creatures were men before the Muses were in existence. And when the Muses came into being and music began to be heard, they were so transported with delight, that they left off eating and

drinking, and went on singing till they died. And 91
 so from that time the race of grasshoppers had this
 gift bestowed upon them by the Muses, that they
 have no need of food, but live without meat or
 drink, and sing on and on till they die. And then
 they go to the Muses, and each reports who is his
 favourite among men that are here. To Terpsi-
 chore they report those who excel in dancing, to
 Erato, those who shine in love-poetry, and so on
 in other matters: but to Calliope the eldest, and
 her next sister Urania, those who occupy them-
 selves with philosophical conversation, and admire
their music: and their music is about the Heavens
 and about Beauty [as the names *Urania* and *Cal-
 liope* indicate]; so there is good reason to go on
 talking, and not to go to sleep in the noon-day.”

It is of course understood, that this pretended
 mythe is really improvised by Socrates, in order
 to supply a reason for continuing the conversation.
 They then proceed to discuss various questions,
 which I may abridge, as the reader may not wish,
 like these two friends, to draw out a long summer's
 day in rambling talk. First they discuss the ever- 92
 recurring Socratic and Platonic theme, whether a
 man can speak or write well about a thing without
 accurate knowledge of the thing: and especially if
 the thing be a matter of right and wrong: then, 95
 whether Rhetoric be a true scientific art or not.
 And then all the writers on Rhetoric, most noted
 at that time, are passed in rapid review, with Ho-
 meric allusions, and other strokes of satire. Gor- 96
 gias and Thrasymachus are spoken of as Nestor
 and Odysseus. Zeno the Eleatic is Palamedes. 97
 And then they return to the discourse of Lysias,
 and read over again the first paragraph of it; and 101
 compare it with the rival essays which Socrates
 had delivered. And then Socrates propounds a 102

- doctrine concerning the relation of Rhetoric, and what he calls *Dialectic*; which here is described as the art of treating a subject according to its natural divisions: and this doctrine is applied to the compositions which have been delivered; with a vast preference assigned to those of Socrates; showing, he says, how much more skilful are the Nymphs of Achelous, and Pan, (to whom, as we have seen, § 9, he had discovered the place to be dedicated,) than the Hermes of Lysias the son of Cephalus. And again, Phædrus is made to read the beginning of his friend's essay, and Socrates ridicules it, and declares that it is so far destitute of logical organization, that it makes no difference which sentence comes first and which last. Then Socrates resumes the classification of different kinds of phrensy which he had given in his last discourse, and finds in it an example of *Dialectic*¹.
- 112 Socrates then proceeds to criticise the precepts given by writers on Rhetoric, as Tisias and Evenus and Theodorus;—their technical divisions
- 113 of a speech—the Proem, the Narrative, the Proofs, the Probabilities, and the like; and which are to be long and which are to be short. “Prodicus,” says Socrates, “once laughed at these rules, and said that his rule was the best, that they should neither be long nor short, but of the right length.”
- 114 Then Socrates mentions Hippias, “who will, I suppose,” he says, “agree with Prodicus; and Polus, with his museum of phraseology: and Protagoras, with his propriety of expression: and Thrasymachus, with his pathetic declamation about age and poverty, a speaker to excite and then to soothe the passions of an assembly.”

¹ I have further discussed this point in a paper which is published in the Appendix to the *Philosophy of Discovery*.

And yet once more Socrates proceeds to teach 115 that all art is of no real use unless a man knows when to use the art: and illustrates this by induction from Medicine, and Tragic Poetry, and such 117 public speaking as that of Pericles.

“All art,” Socrates adds, “to be truly great, 120 must include what the enemies of philosophy call subtle and transcendent speculations; and so, Pericles elevated his conceptions by his intercourse with Anaxagoras, and by his contemplations concerning *Nous*.”

Then there is a basis of rhetoric suggested in 121 the study of the characters of men, as likely to be influenced by it: they are to be classified and distinguished with this view: and so at length 126 the discussion concerning Rhetoric is concluded.

But having finished this discussion, another question is opened of a wider kind: whether written composition be in truth a good way of communicating with men. “We must really ex- 133 amine,” Socrates says, “the advantage of writing altogether.” And then, according to his manner, he delivers a mythological tale of a certain Egyptian deity named Theuth, who invented numbers, and 134 reckoning, and geometry, and astronomy, and dice and chess; and who also invented letters. Then Theuth went to his superiors; to Thamus, the king of Egypt who dwelt in that great city which the Greeks call Thebes, and to Ammon the deity: and to them he showed his inventions, and they commended or discommended these several inventions according to their merits. Letters, that 135 is, the art of alphabetical writing, Theuth recommended as an aid to the memory and a source of wisdom: but Thamus more wisely told him that they would have an opposite effect, and would weaken the memory by making men depend on

external aids: that they would not be an aid to memory, but a substitute for memory: a source not of wisdom, but of opinion. Men will learn much without having masters, and will seem to know when they are really ignorant.

136 "Ha!" says Phædrus, "you have Egyptian tales, and any tales you please, ready to your hand."

137 Socrates, however, goes on with his disparagement of writing. "It is," he says, "like painting a picture of a man. The picture looks alive; but if you speak to it, it preserves an impenetrable silence. It is the same with written compositions. You might think from what they say that they had some sense; but if any one who wants to get at their sense asks them anything, they still say the same thing over and over again. And when anything is once written, it goes on circulating round and round among those who want to hear it, and among those who have nothing to do with it, just the same. And if it is misunderstood or attacked, it always must run back for help to its father, the author: it cannot help or defend itself."

"Quite true," says Phædrus.

"Now," Socrates resumes, "let us look at its nobler brother, spoken discourse, and see how much superior *it* is. It is written in the soul of the intelligent hearer. It can defend itself. It does know whom to address and whom to turn away from." "And so," as Phædrus rejoins, "it is according to you a living, speaking thing, of which written discourse is only the dead image."

Socrates goes on to illustrate this by another image. If a gardener had seeds of precious plants, would he be content with planting them in flower-pots and making them flourish for a few days? No: he would plant them in a proper soil,

and be content to see them grow in the course of months. And so, when any teacher has the seeds 139 of Justice and Goodness and Beauty to plant, he will not take a short course, of planting them with a reed-pen in the black water which we call ink. No: if *he* ever plants in the temporary flower-beds of written composition, it will be something which belongs to mere amusement—and no doubt, a very good kind of amusement, better than eating and drinking. But he will 140 have an object above mere amusement: to make Justice and Goodness the business of his life: and to plant them in congenial souls, by the aid of reason; and the seeds of thought which he will plant will be fruitful, and will produce like thoughts in other souls; and thus will have a self-preserving power and a self-perpetuating power. They will be fruitful and will be transmitted from soul to soul so as to be immortal; a constant source of happiness to man.” He then goes on to appreciate from this point of view the compositions and aims of his contemporaries. “Whether it be Lysias or any one else who aims at mere amusement in literature, tell him it is poor work. You and I, Phædrus, look to something higher.”

And we then have the moral of this discussion thus delivered:

Soc. “And so we have trifled with this sub-144 ject of composition long enough. And now do you go and tell Lysias that we two went down into the rivulet of the Nymphs and the retreat of the Muses, and received a message to all writers—to Lysias and all the prose-writers; to Homer and all the poets; to Solon and all the politicians and lawgivers; if what each has written, he has written knowing the truth, and able to defend it, and to speak better things than he

has written, he is to be called by a name not borrowed from the distinctions which we have maintained, but from the serious manner in which he has treated his subject."

145 PH. "And what name is that?"

Soc. "To call a man *wise* is too high a title. God alone is wise. It is more suitable to call him a *lover of wisdom*—a *philosopher*."

PH. "Very suitable."

Soc. "But he who has nothing better to give us than a written composition which he has made by putting together bits, and remodelling it again and again in the way of correction, you may call him a poet, a prose-writer, a lawgiver or whatever he may be, but not a philosopher."

There is still one point to be noticed; Plato's opinion of another of his contemporaries; "You must not," says Phædrus, "forget to notice your
146 own friend, Isocrates. What message are we to take to him? what are we to say of him?"

Soc. "Isocrates, O Phædrus, is young: but I will tell you what I guess of his future career. I hold him far superior in his talents to the composition-school of Lysias, and to be of a finer nature. If he improve by practice, he will far surpass anything which he has yet produced; and still more, if he takes a higher aim: for there is philosophy in the man's mind."

PH. "And now let us go, for the heat is no longer so oppressive."

Soc. "Let us first utter a prayer to the Gods of the place:

"Oh sweet Pan, and ye other Gods whoever ye be, grant to me to be beautiful within; and that my outward havings may be propitious to my inward condition. Let me think him rich who is

wise: and may I have as much wealth as a wise man may have and may use.

“Have we anything else to pray for, Phædrus? There is my prayer.”

PH. “Pray it for me too, for friends have all things in common.”

SOC. “Let us go.”

REMARKS ON THE PHÆDRUS.

IN the Introduction to this Dialogue I have explained the views with which I conceive it to have been written. These views in some measure account for the mixture of literary, philosophical, and ethical discussions which it contains; though when all allowance has been made on this ground, the Dialogue must still be regarded as prolix, rambling, and fantastical: and so far, a fit representation of the talk of two friends through a long summer's day. We need not wonder that some critics, as Diogenes Laertius tells us, found it tedious.

Diogenes tells us in the same place¹ that some writers said it was the first written of Plato's Dialogues, and found in its scheme the marks of early youth. This opinion is at variance with our supposition that it was written after Plato's return from his travels, and therefore after the Dialogues of the Socratic school.

It is urged as a proof of the early date of this Dialogue, that it is highly poetical and imaginative in the mythical part. That no doubt it is: but the doctrine that such activity of the poetical imagination belongs peculiarly to the youth of a writer is quite baseless. The activity of the imagination and the boldness of its creations seem rather to increase with age than to decay, in poetical minds. In Plato himself we have, in the *Republic* and the *Timæus*, which all critics assign to a late period of his writing, mythical inventions as bold as anything in the *Phædrus*. And poetical invention as the vehicle of a wide and elevated

philosophy is especially the work of the poetical philosopher in his riper age. To take the instance of our own time, Göthe's latest inventions (in the Second Part of *Faust*) are more bold and fantastical than anything which he had written before.

And it is to be remarked that besides the mythical part, the *Phædrus* includes great stores of literary knowledge, critical power, and views of the rules of composition, which belong to a ripe philosopher rather than to a young man. He criticises in a bold, brief, and masterly manner, a great number of writers on rhetoric, and rhetorical writers; propounds a psychological theory of rhetoric himself; and draws a comparison between written and spoken instruction which mark the habits of mind of a person long familiar with such speculations.

Schleiermacher, indeed, with his notion of the system which runs through Plato's writings, conceives that the first published parts of this system are the *Phædrus*, which contains the internal, and the *Protagoras* which contains the external form of Plato's method of instruction:—as if a speculative writer must needs publish a treatise on method, before he publishes the truth to which his method has led him;—as if a system and a method clearly explained were not the last results of a philosopher's labours, rather than the first.

In the *matter* of the *Phædrus*, even in the mythical matter, we have indications of a later not of an earlier period. The doctrine of Ideas, as something which the soul brings with it when it joins the body—the mythical expression of the Platonic Doctrine that *to learn is to recollect*—occurs here. It occurs also in the *Meno* and in the *Phædo*. In the *Meno* the soul acquires those Ideas in Hades: in the *Phædo* the ideal world incloses this earth and extends above it into purer space, where the ether is to our air as air is to water. In the *Phædrus* the region in which the soul acquires its Ideas, the sources of true Reason, are the celestial and the supercelestial spaces. Plato might in the progress of his thoughts, ascend from the former to the latter of these philosophical mythes: is it at all likely that he would, in such a progress, descend from the latter to the former?

Again: with regard to the active powers of the soul. The image of the charioteer and the two horses by which the soul is represented, would agree very closely with the view given in the

Republic, if we were to regard the charioteer as Reason, and the two steeds as Desire and Anger as Plutarch understands the image. But if the two horses are Reason and Desire, still there is an approximation to Plato's ultimate view—that of the *Republic*, such as we do not find in any other Dialogue.

But the argument which appears at once to decide that the *Phædrus* cannot be a very early written Dialogue, is the labour and energy which are in it employed to show that there is little use in trying to teach by writing. It seems ridiculous to suppose that Plato the philosopher began his career as a writer by maintaining that philosophy cannot be taught by writing. It is very possible that he might begin his labours as an oral teacher in that way: and therefore we may imagine the *Phædrus* to be written soon after he began to teach at Athens, after his travels: and to have been intended, as I have said, to assert and support his claim to be heard on all subjects of philosophy, literature, and poetry.

The hypothetical date of the Dialogue appears (from the names of persons mentioned as living) to be about seven years before the death of Socrates, at which time Lysias was 52 years old and Plato 23. At this time Isocrates was about 30. Now Isocrates was one of the most eminent of the rhetoricians: he is mentioned in the *Phædrus*. How does the mode in which he is mentioned agree with the supposition of the time of the publication of that Dialogue? What is said of Isocrates is this. Socrates at the end of the Dialogue, in reply to an interrogation of Phædrus, speaks of him with great regard and admiration. "He is yet young," he says; "but I opine that he is very far superior to the composition-school of Lysias in his talents: and if he improve by labour, and still more, if he take a loftier aim, he will produce far greater things than he has yet done: for there is philosophy in the man's mind." A prophecy like this was not likely to be published by Plato till the event had confirmed it:—as in the *Protagoras* he makes that speaker prophesy that Socrates will be eminent in philosophy. But seventeen years later, at which time we suppose the Dialogue to have been published, when Isocrates's reputation as a great writer was fully established, and when Plato wished to make an exception in his favour from the disparaging criticism which he was dealing upon

rhetoricians of the school of Lysias, this was a graceful and kindly mode of attaining that object.

Schleiermacher, as I have said, makes this Dialogue the first which Plato published. Strangely enough, this very passage concerning Isocrates is one of the points of his proof. It is, he says, impossible that this prophecy could have been delivered much later than the time at which the Dialogue is supposed to take place. Let us hear why. "Because, either the Prophecy was not fulfilled, Isocrates did not realize these anticipations, and then Socrates would be made to prophesy falsely." Good,—that is decisive for that side of the dilemma—now for the other! "Or else the prophecy *was* fulfilled, and then it would be ridiculous to put the success in a prophecy long previous." Why so? What is there ridiculous in such a proceeding? Is it not a common art of poets to put in the mouths of their characters, presages of what they knew had happened? So Virgil prophesies of Marcellus after he was dead:

O dilecte puer si qua fata aspera rumpas
Tu Marcellus eris!

And again of Augustus in his lifetime:

Hic vir hic est tibi quem promitti sæpius audis,
Augustus Cæsar Divum genus; aurea condet
Sæcula qui rursus Latio, regnata per arva
Saturno quondam; super et Garamantas et Indos
Proferet imperium.

And so in our own poet, the prophecy concerning Queen Elizabeth written in the time of her successor:

This royal infant (Heaven still move about her!)
Though in her cradle, yet now promises
Upon this land a thousand thousand blessings,
Which time shall bring to ripeness: she shall be
A pattern to all princes living with her
And all that shall succeed.

And the rest of the passage.

Does not Plato himself do this in the *Protagoras* concerning Socrates? And in fact, so far from being ridiculous, is it not, as we have said, a strong evidence of good feeling and good taste on the part of Plato?

THE MENEXENUS.

The Menexenus is quoted by Aristotle under the name of *the Funeral Oration*, as we shall see.

THE MENEXENUS.

THE Phædrus, according to us, is intended, among other things, as a proof on the part of Plato that he could, if he chose, produce compositions of the same kind of excellence which was admired in the productions of the rhetoricians, whom we may regard as his rivals. We have, we conceive, in the Menexenus, another specimen of the same kind. It may be supposed that if the Phædrus was felt as having proved that Plato could, if he chose, emulate with success the erotic declamations of Lysias, still those who admired the rhetorical school and were adverse to that of Plato might say, In such trifles he may have some skill: but the case would be different if he were to have to produce an oration on some important and solemn occasion,—a funeral oration, for instance, to be delivered in the name of the state at the public obsequies of those who have fallen in battle for their country; such as was the celebrated oration of Pericles, and such as Lysias composed a few years ago. Could Plato, suddenly called upon, produce such a work as this?

To this question, proposed as it is in the Menexenus, Socrates answers, that it does not appear to him difficult;—that orators who are concerned with such occasions have their stock of

common topics ready prepared: praise the dead, the living, the state;—put men in infinite good humour with themselves: so that, he adds, for three or four days after hearing such a discourse, I hardly seem to tread upon earth, but rather to be in the Islands of the Blest.

Upon being further pressed to say whether he really thinks that such a discourse is easily produced, Socrates proceeds to say, that only the day before, Aspasia had repeated such an oration to him, partly composed of fragments which she had prepared for Pericles, and which he had not used, and partly of new matter. Surely the satire here is transparent enough. It is insinuated that this rhetorical flattery of the people is easy; that its success depended much upon the self-conceit of the hearers. Further it is implied, by the reference to Aspasia, that even a woman could write such discourses. The current story of Aspasia making Pericles's speeches for him, was, of course, a popular scandal which we cannot seriously believe; but it served to give the desired colour to the performance here; and as a basis for the invention, Socrates was known to have frequented the company of Aspasia. The discourse which is thus announced follows: and, of course, in proportion as it is really a solid and striking oration for such an occasion, the greater is the triumph of Plato over the rhetoricians: but this introduction shows that not the excellence of the composition, but this triumph of Plato, and the satirical disparagement of his adversaries, was the object of the work. "You are always ridiculing the rhetoricians," says Menexenus to him. This plainly shows what he was here doing.

The discourse contains a survey of the history of Athens down to the time of the Peace of An-

talkidas. Now this was four years after Socrates's death. What are we to say then of this gross anachronism, as it appears? Why did Plato make Socrates speak of things which happened long after he was dead? How are we to dispose of this difficulty?

Schleiermacher would dispose of this difficulty very simply but very cavalierly. 'The Discourse is a genuine work of Plato, but the Introduction and Conclusion are spurious, added afterwards.'

This solution is, as I have said, very prompt and bold. But the course taken is also very arbitrary. If we may be so bold as this, other courses are open to us, which we ought to be told why we may not follow. Why should we not, if we are to reject some part of the work, reject all the historical references later than the time of Socrates? Or why not say, as it appears that Leo Allatius did say on the strength of this Dialogue, that Socrates was not condemned and put to death in the first year of the 95th Olympiad: he lived at least fourteen years later. There is his own word for it in the *Menexenus*.

But further, this solution leaves new difficulties. By omitting the Introduction to the Dialogue, we lose, as *we* hold, the very purpose and object of the work;—all its significant satire. But at any rate we lose all the Platonic and dramatic character of the Dialogue. It then becomes a mere insulated culogium of Athens and Athenians. Is it likely that Plato, instead of one of his usual lively dramatic Dialogues, should write such an essay? Is it likely that he should write on such a thesis? Did he admire the Athenian Demos and its conduct? We shall see in the *Republic*, how sarcastically he speaks, when he is plainly referring to it. Was he likely to come forwards on such a

public occasion? We have innumerable passages in his writings in which he expresses his utter repugnance to public office. The *Menexenus*, then, was not written simply with a view to praise the Athenians and to obtain their applause for doing it well, as if these were great objects, worthy of Plato. They must have been pursued (for in the *Menexenus* they *are* pursued) as subordinate to some other, higher, truly Platonic object. What could this be? According to us, it was to show that even for those who could compose such discourses, there were still higher and better subjects of study—philosophy and truth instead of rhetoric and political power. And this, when Plato was beginning publicly to teach philosophy at Athens, was exactly what he wanted to impress upon the Athenians.

But further: as to this *Introduction* to the *Menexenus*; we have, as it happens, the express testimony of Aristotle¹ to its genuineness. He quotes it: “It is easy, says Socrates, in the Funeral Oration, to praise the Athenians before Athenians:” an expression which occurs in the introductory dialogue between *Menexenus* and Socrates. We can then have no doubt that Aristotle knew nothing of the Funeral Oration detached from its framework.

But what then are we to say to the anachronism which makes Socrates speak of events which happened long after his death? Simply this, as seems to me; that Socrates is habitually and conventionally the predominant figure in all Plato's Dialogues; and that this habit and convention was to be retained even where it involved a gross anachronism:—indeed the more harmlessly because

¹ *Rhet.* III. 14.

the anachronism was so gross: for this circumstance removed the pretence of historical exactness, and showed that the literary relation of the speakers and their sentiments was the point to be looked upon mainly. The Socrates of Plato's *Dialogues* often expressed opinions at which Plato did not arrive, till long after the death of Socrates, and even in consequence of the death of Socrates: he might therefore refer to events which happened to the Athenians after that event. In short, Socrates was there a philosophical not a historical character.

For want of seeing the purport of the *Menexenus*, Ast calls it tasteless, childish, silly, and gravely propounds the question whether, when Socrates gives himself out as a pupil of Aspasia, this is not a jest against the Orators, that a woman surpasses them? The jest does not appear very obscure: Menexenus had said to Socrates, 'You are always jesting upon the orators.' And of Plato's jest upon them, involved in this Dialogue, we may say, with Speed in the *Two Gentlemen of Verona*,

"O jest unseen, inscrutable, invisible,

As a nose on a man's face or a weathercock on a steeple!"

I have not translated this Dialogue, thinking that it would be felt to be rather prolix as a jest, and not pertinent to the general course of Plato's writings as a piece of earnest.

PHILEBUS.

PHILEBUS.

THE Philebus cannot properly be classed with the *Anti-Sophist* Dialogues, of which I have been giving an account; for neither Philebus, from whom the Dialogue is named, nor Protarchus, who takes the principal share in the discussion with Socrates, are known as Sophists. But inasmuch as the discussion turns mainly on the doctrine that Pleasure is the Supreme Good, a doctrine which the commentators are fond of ascribing to "the Sophists;" and inasmuch as, besides, some steps in the progress of ethical speculation from the Socratic to the later Platonic view, are indicated in this Dialogue, I will make some remarks upon it.

The Dialogue has not the dramatic movement and satirical liveliness of the *Anti-Sophist* Dialogues which we have been engaged with; and indeed, though it is written in the form of a Dialogue, it is really a simple and direct exposition of several Platonic doctrines and arguments; and would, to our apprehension, become for the most part, more clear, if the interlocutions were suppressed.

With regard to the question discussed, I may make the following remarks.

The ancients, we are told, were accustomed to divide Morality into three parts. *Of Virtues—Of Duties—*and *Of the Supreme Good*. This division is not, as I conceive, a philosophical distribution of the subject, although it is recognized in a certain sense by Schleiermacher. It is not even a

division according to which we can arrange the ethical works of the Greeks and Romans; for most of them treat of more than one of these divisions. But it is a notice of terms which are constantly used in the moral discussions of ancient writers; and it may serve to remind us that the discussion of the same moral question may assume different forms, as it is conducted under one or another of these terms. One great division of Ethical Philosophy, the *Classification of Duties*, must be closely connected with the *Classification of Virtues*, if any such classification be possible; the one classification must necessarily depend upon the other.

Another great point in Ethics, the *Foundation of Morality*, may be expressed, no doubt, by asking what are the grounds of the Authority of Virtue in general, or of Justice in particular; but it may also be expressed by asking—and this is the way in which it often was expressed among the Greek and Roman speculators—by asking what is *the Good*—τὸ ἀγαθόν—the really good thing—the *Summum Bonum*, the greatest—the supreme—the ultimate Good. For *good* was conceived as the necessary ground of action, so that when it was determined what was *good*, it was thereby determined what men ought to do and why they should do it. And the doctrines adverse to the claims of virtue, of which we have seen the refutation, in other forms, in the Platonic Dialogues, were also discussed and refuted in terms of this other phraseology. Of those adverse opinions, one which was constantly put forwards, and which has served as a battle-field for Moral reasoners from the earliest time to our own, was expressed by saying that Pleasure is The Good—the only real Good. And this mode of expressing an opinion adverse to the views asserted or implied by more enthusiastic moralists, was already in com-

mon currency in Plato's time, and is examined by him at great length in various dialogues. We can easily understand that there was always much to recommend this doctrine to common acceptance. It has the look of being the protest of common sense and common experience against the over-refinements, subtleties, and exaggerations of professed and self-applauding moralists; and it is capable of being explained so as to remove a great part both of what is paradoxical, and of what is shocking to pure and kind souls, in its first impression. That it expresses one side of a comprehensive and deep-seated antithesis, we cannot fail to suppose, when we consider that it is even now the formula of one of the principal schools of moral speculators among ourselves. And as Plato's works contain, not only the earliest discussions of this antithesis which we possess, but some of the most subtle and ingenious modes of arguing upon the question, which have been devised to this day, it will be worth our while to look at those parts of the Platonic Dialogues for a few minutes.

The Philebus is one of the dialogues which turns in a great measure upon this question. But I think we may venture to say that not only is not the question satisfactorily solved in this dialogue, but the antithesis, as an antithesis in ethical doctrine, is not properly stated, and the progress of the Dialogue is mainly occupied in advancing somewhat nearer to the precise statement of the moral question; which is more completely discussed in other dialogues. The clear intellectual development of the Greeks, the pleasure they had in the acquisition of knowledge, and their consciousness of possessing (in geometry and arithmetic) examples of certain, indisputable, unalterable truths, led them, as I have said, to

look upon Speculative Truth, and the apprehension of such Truth, with an intense admiration. They saw too that knowledge, of one kind or another, was a very important element in all the spheres of human action. They were hence tempted to apply to Knowledge or Thought, in its highest and most comprehensive sense, any term which could express its excellence or their esteem for it: and hence, they were led to consider whether *it* was not *the Good*, which they acknowledged as the highest form of excellence. Accordingly in the Philebus, the question is so stated, whether Pleasure or Knowledge (*φρόνησις*) be The Good: and from this point, the discussion starts. If the question were, at present and in this country, thrown down among the ranks of opposing schools of moralists, whether pleasure or knowledge be the best guide or the right object of human action, it would probably be generally objected that the alternative was not between two things really antithetical—that pleasure and knowledge, as objects of action, or as guides of action, are not objects or guides in the same sense,—that they are not co-ordinate things. One school would maintain that knowledge, as an object of action, is only a kind of pleasure;—that the pleasure of knowledge may very properly be reckoned among the objects of action; and that its being so, makes no exception to the rule that pleasure is the only real, and therefore is the right object of action. And those who maintain that pleasure is not the sole and is not the right end of human action, would still be far from agreeing with the doctrine opposed to this in the Philebus, that (§ 1) “Thought and knowledge and memory and true opinion and right reasoning” are the things which are to be conceived as the foundation of the opposite doctrines or the means of expressing it.

But I conceive we may in some degree explain the selection of the antithesis which is thus stated in the Philebus; and also elsewhere, for instance as we shall see, in the sixth Book of the Republic; and which was evidently a familiar form of propounding the fundamental question of morals in Plato's time. The Greek philosophers had found, in speculative truth, something, as they conceived, much more stable and permanent and more universal in its nature, than anything which was derived from the senses. And they conceived that something which was so comprehensive and necessary as Truth of this kind was, might best agree with the notion of Good in its most comprehensive and compulsory shape. They had speculated much upon the nature of knowledge in general, and of this necessary and universal knowledge in particular: and in such speculations about knowledge, its origin, conditions, and results, Plato had taken a great part. It was natural, then, that *he* should employ himself in considering the Antithesis thus presented; and at least in examining whether or not it truly represented, as it proposed to do, the great Fundamental Antithesis, by the solution of which we are to obtain a real ground for morality. This we may consider as the purpose of the Philebus.

According to this purpose, a considerable part of this dialogue is occupied in examining Pleasure by reference to the characters which had already been seen to exist in Knowledge. Knowledge of some kinds is permanent and stable, universal and necessary. Knowledge of other kinds is transitory and fleeting, doubtful, partial, limited, and casual. And Good, being the highest object which we can conceive, the necessary object of action, must be of the former and more excellent kind. But Pleasure is manifestly a thing of the latter kind;—transitory and fleeting, partial and limited, having

none of the marks of that perfection which The Good must have.

This I conceive to be the general argument of the Philebus: but it is followed out in various directions, and made the occasion of various expositions and analyses.

This indeed is distinctly expressed in one part of the dialogue where (§ 125, 126) the argument is made to turn on the distinction and opposition of οὔσα and γένεσις, *existence* and *generation*. And the conclusion is expressly drawn, Ἄρ' οὖν ἡδονή γε εἶπερ γένεσις ἐστὶν εἰς ἄλλην ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὀρθῶς θήσομεν. In agreement with the course which we are taking in our examination of the Platonic dialogues, we have to ask what is this argument in its permanent effect upon moral philosophy, and how are we to express it so that this purport shall be apparent. The French translator uses *phenomenon* for γένεσις—and if we were to take this suggestion, we might give as the equivalent of the proposition just stated—*Pleasure being a transient phenomenon cannot be placed in the same class with Good, which is a permanently existing thing*. The German translator, Schleiermacher, has recourse to the antithesis, which plays so great a part in the metaphysics of his own country, between *werden* and *sein*—*becoming* and *being*. And if we were to try to follow him we might say—*Pleasure, being only a state of transition, cannot be placed in the same class with Good, which is a state of complete existence*. But I do not think that either of these translations would be felt to have much force, or indeed any force, as an argument by a person acquainted only with modern habits of thinking on such subjects. Nor would either of them contain the effect of the argument by which this conclusion is, in Plato's dialogues,

supported;—namely that the *γένεσις* takes place for the sake of the *οὐσία*; and that *that* for the sake of which another thing takes place must be The Good in that relation:—and that *that* which is for the sake of another thing is not The Good in that relation. For we cannot with any meaning say that the transient phenomenon takes place for the sake of the permanently existing thing; or even that the state of transition takes place for the sake of the state of complete existence. Nor can we, perhaps, at present give the force of the argument in the connexion of thought in which it originally stands, nor without further development. But there is an argument to which this points and tends, and which still has its force and value for us: and which does, I think, represent the permanent and really valuable part of this argument. We may state the argument thus. There is an essential difference between Pleasure and Good; for we recognize Good as an end, but Pleasure only as a Means. We do not *approve* of Pleasure as a motive of action, except when it tends to the Good of the actor: and thus we acknowledge an essential difference between the two. In this form the argument has still its force; it expresses a conviction which is universal among thoughtful men, and which enters naturally into the foundations of our moral systems.

There are various other arguments contained in the Philebus, which I shall not attempt to follow—especially as the main conclusion of the dialogue is, that of the things opposed to each other in the outset—Pleasure and Knowledge—neither is by itself the proper end of life: but rather, some compound of various elements; or some higher object, of which certain characters are given—such as that it must be marked by fixity, purity, truth, and distinctness (*εὐλκρινές*). And that in

the vestibule of this Highest Good (§ 155), and as marks of its nature, are to be discerned *Measure* and *Proportion*; which however are not distinctive of it, since they belong rather to the *καλόν* than to the *ἀγαθόν*—to the Beautiful than to the Good; that there belongs to it also *Truth*: and that thus the highest object is to be judged of by its containing these three elements, Measure, Proportion, and Truth:—and this being established, it is plain, the Platonic Socrates and his hearers agree, that Knowledge partakes more of the nature of the supreme good than pleasure does; and then here, as in the Republic, a sort of proclamation (§ 158) of the result is made: “Let it be known everywhere, O Protarchus, to the present by your acknowledgment, to the absent by your messengers, that Pleasure is not the First Good; but that the first is Measure¹ (le juste milieu—das Mass); the second is Proportion—the third is Reason and Insight² (Vernunft, Einsicht)—the fourth, Knowledge and Art—and Pleasure only the fifth.”

I must confess that this conclusion appears to me very much wanting in distinctness and definiteness. The five things which are thus arranged appear to me to be by no means co-ordinate notions, or things among which any order of parallelism or succession—of superiority or inferiority—can be asserted. They are not, in any like sense, the guides or the objects or the foundations of human action, which is the point of view in which the discussion of some of them was undertaken, and the point of view in which the dialogue interests us as moralists. Perhaps this habit of placing the subjects of controversy in a class according to order of merit, and of proclaiming the result in a public manner, was become so familiar

¹ πῆ περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον.

² σοφίη καὶ φρόνησις.

to the Athenian People by means of their public spectacles, that it seemed to be the most graceful and proper mode of terminating the controversy; and thus this conclusion of the *Philebus* is parallel to that of the *Republic* (B. IX.) on the same subject, by reason of the habits of thought which commonly suggest such illustrations.

I must however notice, before I leave this dialogue, that I have passed over much which occurs in it of a very interesting character; as, the account of the various passions;—of the mixture of pain and pleasure which they involve;—of the relation of pleasure to knowledge;—and of the different kinds of knowledge to each other. These speculations make the *Philebus* a dialogue full of interest for the students of Plato and of Greek Philosophy. And I think it may be supposed that some of the psychological analyses and the resulting definitions were really novel attempts on the part of Plato to give definitions of words which had previously been loosely used, or imperfectly and partially explained.

As examples of these definitions I may take that of *Sensation* (§66), That “when the soul and the body have a common affection and a common motion, this is Sensation.”

That of *Memory* (§ 67), That “it is the preservation of Sensation,” or as we might perhaps better express it—“Memory is preserved Sensations.”

That of *Recollection* (*ἀνάμνησις*) § 67, That “it is when the soul, collected and withdrawn within herself, recalls by herself and without the body’s aid what she has formerly experienced in common with the body.”

Perhaps the happiest of these definitions is that of *The Ridiculous*;—though indeed it is not so much a philosophical definition, as one of those epigrams in the form of definitions, of which we have

many examples in modern as well as ancient times (§ 107).

“The Ridiculous (*τὸ γελοῖον*) is a habit of mind which reverses the Delphic precept, and says, *Do not know thyself.*”

We find, by what follows, that Plato's thought in this definition was, that men become ridiculous by not knowing the points in which they are weak. Thus, (to take examples from him, though not his examples,) Ion, in the Dialogue of that name, is ridiculous, when he thinks he has the talents of a general because he can recite Homer's speeches; Callicles, in the Gorgias, is ridiculous when, impelled by confidence in his own views, he attempts to put down Socrates with contempt, and is shown to have the worse of the argument; Alcibiades is ridiculous, when he aspires to rule Athens by persuasion, and confesses that he cannot persuade his uncle to allow him to rule the family. Plato divides the persons who thus mistake themselves into three classes (§ 105): those who think themselves more rich than they are; those who think themselves more beautiful; and those who think themselves more wise. And those, he says, who have this false opinion of themselves, and who have no real strength, so that when they are laughed at they cannot retaliate, you may justly call *ridiculous*.

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