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30 August 1963

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**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

**SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting, Situation Room at the White House, 29 August 1963, 1430**

1. In attendance were Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Tom Parrott and, for appropriate items, Colonel Steakley of JRC and Mr. Bruce Cheever of CIA.

2. The monthly reconnaissance forecasts for both NRO and DOD were approved in toto, although Secretary Johnson withheld replenishing the Laos bank (since we still have a credit of one) until he had been briefed by Lundahl as to just how effective this photography was. He appears to have some doubt that we are getting anything that's worthwhile.

3. On the problem of negotiations for an Indian base it was the consensus that we should not approach Sarit at the present time for use of Takhil unless there were overriding intelligence requirements approved by USIB at the next meeting. Gilpatric showed me a memorandum from General Carroll urging that we get the photos and after the meeting I noted a somewhat less enthusiastic urging from Sheldon. While the Special Group did not seem to be enthusiastic about making the flights, they agreed to withhold judgment pending a USIB reaction from the meeting next Thursday. Please have it placed on the agenda for discussion.

4. There was some discussion on the support of autonomous anti-Castro groups and some concern as to what reactions we might expect from Castro. Mr. Bundy asked that this item be held over for the meeting next week at which time he would want to obtain Mr. McCone's views since Mr. McCone had stated that he wanted to take another look at the matter. The Group (particularly Johnson) did not seem to be enthusiastic about using a British-owned island without telling the British. There were warm remarks made about Mr. Pawley's capabilities although Bundy expressed some

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concern that since Pawley had been such a staunch supporter of the Agency and of any Governmental activities regardless of party lines, he might not be the proper man to use as a cutout. Please see that this item is placed on next week's Special Group (5412) agenda and that Mr. McCone has formulated his views.

5. Financial support for the Institute for Political Education in San Jose, Costa Rica, was approved without comment.

6. The minutes of the 15 August meeting were approved and I informed them that the sidewinder missile for the defensive armament for GROSBEAK aircraft had already been compromised so there was no problem there.

7. The only discussion on the covert action program in <sup>11</sup>(Italy) for FY '64 was Mr. Bundy's comment that for the first time the President had not questioned the magnitude of the expenditures.

8. Mr. Cheever reported on the two approved sabotage operations and Johnson questioned whether the leaving behind of equipment might be a form of subversion. Cheever assured him that lots of people leave behind equipment, particularly when they are getting shot at and he did not think there was a security problem here.

9. The Group agreed that the Agency should prepare a memo or a report as to what reactions as to type, magnitude, and timing we might expect from Castro as these sabotage operations continue. There was some thought that he might make some covert moves to embarrass us in Guantanamo, perhaps in connection with our water supply. Please have such a memorandum prepared.

10. The meeting broke up in good order.

SIGNED

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Acting Director

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