

ARTICLE III.



MATERIALS FOR THE HISTORY

OF THE

MUHAMMADAN DOCTRINE

OF

PREDESTINATION AND FREE WILL:

COMPILED FROM ORIGINAL SOURCES.

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THIS collection of materials for the history of opinion, in the Muhammadan world, as to the relations between divine sovereignty and human freedom, is presented to the Oriental Society with full consciousness of its incompleteness and want of a more thorough elaboration. But the interest of the subject may, perhaps, be relied upon to make up for all imperfections in the presentation of it; and the more, as it is not known that any one has as yet treated the subject specially, in the way now proposed. My plan is first to bring together some of those expressions of the lyric muse of the Arabs, either uttered before the time of Muhammad or early post-islamic, effusions of grief or vauntings of heroic ardor, which indicate the direction of the Arab mind, at that early period, with respect to the two opposite phases of belief based upon the consciousness of personal human efficiency, on the one hand, and the persuasion of a superhuman overruling power, on the other. I will then endeavor to show, somewhat in detail, though not exhaustively, the teachings of the *Kurân*, and the opinions of Muhammad as handed down by tradition, on the subject of predestination. The last part of my paper will be given to the presentation of various opinions to which Muslim theologians and philosophers were led, when the same great theme was revolved and labored over by them, under the inspiration of fresh scientific ardor.

1. Judging from remains of the most ancient poetry of the Arabs, their inmost souls, in "the age of ignorance," gave back no reflection of dreaded or devoutly worshipped divine power. Though they had their named deities, whose images were set up in the Ka'bah, and practised sacrificial rites, yet it is evident that they were not animated by the spirit of religious reverence: when most conscious of human feebleness, they seem not to have entertained any notion of being in the hands of a divinity, or divinities, whom they might propitiate by service and offerings, but to have given themselves up to the undefined apprehension of an irresistible, blind fatality. The early Arab popular poetry differs, therefore, widely in its spirit from that of most other nations in a corresponding stage of progress: for, in general, the nearer we approach to the fountains of national literature, the more distinctly do we see the powers of heaven reflected in that current of feeling which reveals itself in popular songs. Yet the ancient Arabs were not unimaginative—far otherwise, they were delicately sensitive to those impressions of natural phenomena from which mythologies have been wont to originate. Their hardy nomadic life, with its struggles and vicissitudes, was, perhaps, a bar to that meditative pondering on the appearances of nature which might have imparted to them a spiritual significance, making them emblems and manifestations of supernatural being. It may be, also, that what is here referred to had to do with a certain race-tendency to the abstract, in the conception of divine existence, which a distinguished orientalist,\* whose way of dealing with the supposed fact I cannot accord with, thinks to have discovered among the Shemites—the individualizing of the notion of superhuman power having been thereby restricted. But what concerns us most is the presentation of evidence of the fact that the early Arabs were fatalists, not the explanation of it. Hear, then, Zuhair, in his Mu'allakah, saying:†

رَأَيْتَ الْمَنَايَا خَبِطَ عَشْوَاءَ مِنْ نَصَبٍ تَمَنَّتْهُ وَمَنْ تَخَطَّى يِعْمَرُ فِيهِمْ

"Fate, to me, is like a stumbling, eyeless camel—

Whom it hits it kills, whom it misses lives and grows old;"

and Tarafah, author of another of the seven poems, who says:‡

أَلَا أَيُّهَا ذَا اللَّائِمِيِّ أَحْضِرِ الْوَعْيَى وَأَنْ أَشْهَدُ اللَّذَاتِ هَلْ أَنْتَ مَخْلُودِي  
فَإِنْ كُنْتَ لَا تَسْطِيعُ دَفْعَ مَنِيَّتِي فَدَعْنِي أَبَادِرَهَا بِمَا مَلَكَتْ يَدِي

\* Renan, in his *Nouvelles Considérations sur le Caractère Général des Peuples Sémitiques, et en particulier sur leur Tendance au Monothéisme*. Paris, 1859.

† v. 49, ed. Arnold.

‡ vv. 56, 57.

“O whoever blames me for presence in the fight,  
And that I join in pleasures, canst thou make me immortal?  
But, art thou powerless to repel my fate,  
Then leave me, 'ere it comes, to enjoy whatever I get.”

In a similar strain says Ka'b Bin Zuhair:\*

فان تهلك جوى فكل نفس سيجلبها لذلك جالبوها

“But if, O Juwaiy, thou perishest,  
So will all beings have their spoilers;”

and 'al-'Utbi:†

وقاسمنى دهرى بنى مشاطرا فلما تقضى شطره عاد فى شطرى

“My fate divided with me my sons, on shares,  
And, after its portion was used up, assailed mine.”

So Waddâk Bin Thumail 'al-Mâzanî expresses a stoical submission to destiny thus:‡

تلاقوهم فتعرفو كيف صبرهم على ما جنت فيهم يد الحدثنان

“Meet them, and ye will know how patient  
They are in bearing the injustice of fortune;”

and again 'Amrû Bin Ma'di Karb:§

كم من اخ لى صالح بوائه بيدي لحدنا  
ما ان جزعت ولا هلعت ولا يرد بكاي زندا

“How many a true brother to me  
Have I buried with my own hands,  
Nor sorrowed, nor bewailed,  
Seeing my weeping would not profit!”

To these specimens belonging to the age before Muhammad may be added the following, from early post-islamic times, which breathe the same spirit.

Says 'al-Huraith Bin Zaid 'al-Khail, of the time of 'Umar:||

فلا تجزعى يا ام اوس فانه تصيب المنايا كل حاف وذى نعل

“But mourn not thou, O mother of Aus,  
For fate seizes as well the sandalled as the barefoot;”

and Fâtimah Bint 'al-'Ajjham, said to have been a cousin of Muhammad:¶

كل ما حى وان امرؤ وارده الحوص الذى وردوا

“All the living, though they be princes,  
Will come to the same cistern as these;”

\* *Hamasa* Carmina, ed. Freytag, p. 441.

† *Hamasa*, p. 57.

‡ *Hamasa*, p. 389.

† *Hamasa*, p. 478.

§ *Hamasa*, p. 83.

¶ *Hamasa*, p. 414.

and Duraid Bin 'aṣ-Ṣimmaḥ, a contemporary of Muḥammad:\*

قتال امرئ أسى أخاه بنفسه ويعلم أن المرء غير مجلد  
 "Fighting as a hero fights, aiding his brother with his life,  
 And who knows that man is not immortal;"

and the same again:†

أبى القتل إلا آل صمة أنهم أبو غيره والقدر يجرى إلى القدر  
 "Slaughter is bent upon the race of Ṣimmaḥ,  
 Nor seek they aught else—fate meets fate;"

and again:‡

تقول ألا تبقى أخاك وقد أرى مكان البكا لكن بنيت على الصبر  
 "Says she: Mourn'st thou not for thy brother? and I see cause  
 For mourning, yet stand fast in patience;"

and 'Iyâs Bin 'al-'Aratt:§

همت بان لا اطعم الدهر بعدهم حياة فكان الصبر ابقى واكرما  
 "I thought no more to relish life, deprived of them;  
 But patience holds out, and is to be preferred in honor."

But there are other passages to be met with, in this later poetry, which indicate that the publication of the *Kurân* gave a new turn to the flight of the Arab muse, by leading it to the recognition of a personal Deity.

For example, we find 'Abû-Khirâsh 'al-Hudhailî, contemporary with 'Umar, in an elegy on the death of a son slain in blood-revenge, expressing himself thus:||

حمدت الاهی بعد عروة ان نجا خراش وبعض الشر أهون من بعض  
 "Deprived of 'Urwah, I praise my God  
 That Khirâsh is spared—one calamity is lighter than another;"

and a sense of dependence on divine sovereignty is expressed by 'Abdah Bin 'at-Ṭabîb, in a lament on the death of *Ḳais Bin 'Âsim*, as follows:¶

عليك سلام الله قيس بن عاصم ورحمته ما شاء ان يترحمنا  
 "The peace of God be to thee, O *Ḳais Bin 'Âsim*,  
 And his mercy so long as he pleases to be merciful;"

also by *Ḳutailah*, thus:\*\*

يا راكبا ان الاتيل مظنة من صبح خامسة وانت موقف  
 "O horseman, 'al-Uthail is a place thou may'st think to reach  
 On the fifth day, at dawn, if thou art helped of God."

\* Hamas, p. 379. † Hamas, p. 381. ‡ Hamas, p. 380. § Hamas, p. 461.  
 || Hamas, p. 365. ¶ Hamas, p. 367. \*\* Hamas, p. 437.

2. Let us now inquire into the teachings of the *Kurân* on the subject of divine sovereignty: first determining the signification

of the root *قَدَرَ*, as used in the *Kurân*, from which comes *الْقَدَرُ*, the Muslim term for predestination; and afterwards citing other texts which relate to the sovereignty of God in general, or declare his sovereignty with reference, particularly, to human actions. I will begin by bringing forward the few passages in which derivatives from *قَدَرَ* are employed in other senses than as predicating any thing of the Deity, as follows:\* ii[xci]. 237,

“the rich man is obligated for what he can command (*قَدْرُهُ*), and the poor man for what is at his command (*قَدْرُهُ*);” ii[xci]. 266, “they have no sovereign control over (*لا يقدرون على*) that which they acquire;” v[cxiv]. 38, “before ye get the control over them (*تقدروا عليهم*);” x[lxxxiv]. 25, “and the people of the earth imagine that they have command of it (*قادرون عليها*);” xiii[xc]. 18, “he sends down water from heaven, so that water-

courses flow to their utmost capacity (*بِقَدْرِهَا*);” xvi[lxxiii]. 77, “a servant under a master, who has no disposing power over (*لا يقدر على*) any thing;” xxxiv[lxxxv]. 10, “saying: Make thou

coats of mail, and use judgment (*وقدِّر*) in the interchaining;” xxxiv[lxxxv]. 12, “and stationary basins (*قَدُور*, lit. measures);” xlviii[cviii]. 21, “and other things which ye have not at command (*لم تقدروا عليها*), which God holds in his own hand;” lvii[xcix]. 29, “because they who are taught by written revelation [Jews and Christians] know not that it is not theirs to command

any thing of the favor of God (*الألَّ يقدرون على شيء من فضل الله*);” lxviii[xvii]. 25, “and in the morning they went out with a determined purpose (*وعدوا على حرد قَادِرِينَ*);” lxx[xlvii]. 4, “on a day the measure of which (*مقدارة*) will be fifty thousand years;”

lxxiv[ii]. 18–20, “he considers and determines (*قدِّر*)—so let him be slain! how does he determine (id.)?—and again, let him be slain! how does he determine (id.)?” lxxvi[lui]. 16, “wine-jars

of silver, of which they shall have absolute command (*قَدْرُوهَا*) *تقدِيرًا*.”

\* All our citations being from the Arabic text, the received order of the *Sûrahs* will be followed; but the number of each as chronologically determined by Rodwell (*The Koran: Transl.* . . London, 1861), chiefly after Weil, Muir, and Nöldeke, will be inserted in brackets, that the reader may know, as to all cases in which doctrinal views are expressed, whether they were earlier or later views of the Prophet.

From these examples it would seem that the generic idea of *قدر* is *to have disposing power*. We will next pass in review all those passages of the *Kurân* in which any form derived from this root is used to express relations of the Deity to the world: ii [xci]. 19, "and if God had pleased, he would have taken away their hearing and their eyes—verily, God is a supreme sovereign

(*على كل شيء قدير*);" ii [xci]. 100, "whatever verse we abolish or cause to be forgotten—we bring a better than that, or its like: knowest thou not that God has all things at his

command (*على كل شيء قدير*)?" ii [xci]. 103, "but pardon and forgive, until God shall come with his mandate—verily, God is

sovereign over all (*على كل شيء قدير*);" ii [xci]. 143, "wherever ye may be, God will bring you together—verily, God controls all things (id.);" ii [xci]. 261, "and so, after all has been made plain to him, he says: Verily, God has all things under his control (id.);" ii [xci]. 284, "to God belongs whatsoever is in the

heavens and whatsoever is on the earth; and whether ye disclose that which is within you, or conceal it, God will reckon with you for it; and he pardons whom he will, and punishes whom he will—inasmuch as God is a supreme sovereign (id.);" iii [xcvii]. 25, "say thou: O God, sovereign disposer of dominion, thou givest rule to whom thou wilt, and takest away power from whom thou wilt; thou exaltest whom thou wilt, and humblest whom thou wilt: all good is at thy disposal—verily, thou art a supreme sovereign (id.);" iii [xcvii]. 27, "and God knows whatsoever is in the heavens and whatsoever is on the earth, and God governs all things (id.);" iii [xcvii]. 159, "and do ye, after a disaster has befallen you, the like of which ye have twice already met with, say: Whence is this? Say thou: It is of yourselves—verily, God orders all things (id.);" iii [xcvii].

186, "and to God belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth—God is sovereign over all things (id.);" iv [c]. 132, "if he pleases, he will put you away, O men, and bring in others—God has sovereign power so to do (*كان على ذلك قديرا*);" iv [c].

148, "whether ye perform a virtuous deed openly or secretly, or whether or not ye find excuses for a vicious act, verily God

is a sovereign pardoner (*كان عفوا قديرا*);" v [cxiv]. 20, "to God belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth, and the intervening space, inasmuch as he creates what he will—and God

is sovereign over all things (*على كل شيء قدير*);" v [cxiv]. 22, "O people taught by revelation, our Messenger came to you with convincing proofs, when prophecy was intermitted . . .—God has all things at his disposal (id.);" v [cxiv]. 44, "know-

est thou not that the dominion of the heavens and the earth belongs to God, who punishes whom he will and pardons whom he will; and that God is a supreme sovereign (id.)?" v [cxiv]. 120, "to God belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth, and whatsoever they contain is his, and he is sovereign over all things (id.);" vi [lxxxix]. 17, "and if God touches thee with evil, there is no one but himself to remove it; and if he touches thee with good, he is a supreme sovereign (id.);" vi [lxxxix]. 37, "and they say: If there has been no sign sent down to him from his Lord [we will not believe]; say thou: God has sovereign power to send down a sign (ان الله قادر على ان

ينزل آية);" vi [lxxxix]. 65, "say thou: He has sovereign power (القادر على) to bring upon you a punishment, either from above or from beneath your feet;" vi [lxxxix]. 91, "nor do they esti-

mate God agreeably to what is due to his sovereignty (قَدْر), when they say that God makes no revelation to a mortal"—comp. xxii [cvii]. 73, and xxxix [lxxx]. 67; vi [lxxxix]. 95, 96, "verily, God is . . . the divider of the dawn, and he hath made the night for repose, and the sun and moon for reckoning—those things are the ordinance (تقدير) of the Almighty, the All-wise;" viii [xcv]. 42, "and know ye that a fifth part of whatsoever ye take as spoil belongs to God and to the Messenger . . . and that God is

sovereign disposer of all things (على كل شىءٍ قدير);" ix [cxiii]. 39, "if ye go not out, God will punish you with a sore punishment, and will substitute some people in your stead: ye will not harm him, inasmuch as God has all things at his command (id.);" x [lxxxiv]. 5, "it is he who set the sun for a shining

light, and the moon to give radiance, and ordained for it (قَدْر) stations, that ye might know the number of the years"—comp. xxxvi [lx]. 39; xi [lxxv]. 4, "to God ye will give account, and

he is a supreme arbiter (على كل شىءٍ قدير);" xiii [xc]. 9, "God knows what each female bears in her womb, nor doth the womb either shorten or prolong its time—it is his to ordain all things

(وكل شىءٍ عنده بمقدار);" xiii [xc]. 26, "God enlarges bounty to whom he will, using sovereign discretion (ويقدر)"—comp. xvii [lxvii]. 32, xxviii [lxxxix]. 82, xxix [lxxxix]. 62, xxx [lxxxiv]. 36, xxxiv [lxxxv]. 35-8, xxxix [lxxx]. 53, and xlii [lxxxiii]. 10; xv [lvii]. 21, "nor is there any thing not provided beforehand by us, or which we send down otherwise than according to a fore-

known decree (وان من شىء الا عندنا خزائنه وما ننزله الا بقدر معلوم);"

xv [lvii]. 59–60, “excepting the family of Lot, all of whom we spare; save his wife, whom we have ordained to be a loiterer (قَدَرْنَا أَنهَا لِمَنِ الْغَابِرِينَ)”—comp. xxvii [lxviii]. 58; xvi [lxxiii]. 72, “God has created you, and he will hereafter call you to himself; and some of you will be reduced to the most abject senility, so as, after having had knowledge of things, to be cognizant of nothing—God is all-wise, a supreme sovereign (قَدِيرٌ);” xvi [lxxiii]. 79, “the secrets of the heavens and the earth are God’s; nor is the matter of the resurrection-hour aught but as a wink of the eye, or rather it is more within his power than that—God has all things at command (عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ);” xvii [lxvii]. 101, “and do they not see that God who created the heavens and the earth has sovereign power (قَادِرٌ) to create such beings as they are?”—comp. xxxvi [lx]. 81; xviii [lxix]. 43, “and propound to them a similitude of this present life, which is like water sent down by us from heaven, so that the plants of the earth are fattened by it, and on the morrow become stubble scattered by the winds—God disposes of all things (عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ مُّقْتَدِرًا);” xx [lv]. 42–3, “so thou didst tarry for years among the people of Madyan; and afterwards thou wast confronted by a divine decree (جِئْتَنِي عَلَىٰ قَدَرٍ), O Moses, inasmuch as I had chosen thee for myself;” xxi [lxv]. 87, “for he imagined that we should not have the disposal of him (لَنْ نَقْدِرَ عَلَيْهِ);” xxii [cvii]. 6, “those things evidence that Allah is the True God, and that he vivifies that which is dead, and that he has supreme power (عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ);” xxii [cvii]. 40, “they are authorized who fight because of injuries received, and it pertains to God’s sovereignty to defend them (وَأَنَّ اللَّهَ وَآلَهُ نَصْرَهُمْ لِقَدِيرٍ);” xxiii [lxiv]. 18, “and we send down water from the heavens, according to a divine decree (بِقَدَرٍ); and we cause it to remain upon the earth, inasmuch as it is at our sovereign discretion to take it away (وَأَنَّا عَلَىٰ ذَهَابٍ بِهِ لِقَادِرُونَ)”—comp. xliii [lxi]. 10; xxiii [lxiv]. 97, “and indeed we have sovereign power (لِقَادِرُونَ) to show thee that which we threaten them with;” xxiv [cv]. 44, “God creates what he will—verily, God is a supreme sovereign (عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ);” xxv [lxvi]. 2, “and who created all things, and determined respecting the same with absolute determination (فَقَدَّرَهُ تَقْدِيرًا);” xxv [lxvi]. 56, “and



thy Lord is a supreme sovereign (قَدِيرًا);” xxix [lxxxix]. 19, “say thou: Go ye to and fro on the earth, and behold how he made the world from the beginning—hereafter will God bring forth another creation—verily, God has all things at his command

(عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ);” xxx [lxxxiv]. 49, “behold thou the imprints of the mercy of God: how he vivifies the earth, after it has died—in very deed, a restorer of life to the dead is there, and all things

are at his bidding (وَهُوَ عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ)—comp. xli [lxxxi]. 39, and xlii [lxxxiii]. 7; xxx [lxxxiv]. 53, “he creates what he will, seeing that he is the All-wise, the Supreme Sovereign (الْقَدِيرُ);” xxxiii [ciii]. 27, “and hath caused you to inherit their land, and their dwellings, and their wealth, even a land which ye had

not trodden—God is a supreme sovereign (عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرًا);” xxxiii [ciii]. 38, “no blame rests upon the Prophet in respect to that which God ordains for him as the divine rule of conduct, nor were previous prophets to blame for what was permitted to them—and God’s ordering is in accordance with a determined

decree (وَكُلَّ أَمْرٍ أَلَّهَ قَدَرٌ مَّقْدُورًا);” xxxiv [lxxxv]. 17, “and we or-

dained (وَقَدَّرْنَا) journeying amidst them;” xxxv [lxxxvi]. 43, “and have they not journeyed to and fro in the earth, and so beheld what hath been the punishment of those who were before them, and were mightier than they? nor is any thing in heaven or earth too much for him to do, seeing that he is all-wise, a supreme sovereign (قَدِيرًا);” xxxvi [lx]. 38, “and the sun proceeding to its place of rest—that is an ordinance (تَقْدِيرٌ) of the Almighty, the All-wise;” xli [lxxxi]. 9, “and set thereupon

mountains, rising above it, and blessed it, and apportioned (قَدَّرَ) thereupon its aliments, in four days, equably, for those who should seek after them;” xli [lxxxi]. 11, “and we have adorned the physical heavens with lights, with watchful care—that is an ordinance (تَقْدِيرٌ) of the Almighty, the All-wise;” xlii [lxxxiii]. 26, “and if God had bestowed largely of bounty upon his servants, they would have become transgressors in the earth: but he sends down whatsoever he will, according to a divine decree

(بِقَدَرٍ);” xlii [lxxxiii]. 28, “and among his signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and of the animals which he hath distributed therein, which he has sovereign power to gather when he will (وَهُوَ عَلَىٰ جَمْعِهِمْ إِذَا يَشَاءُ قَدِيرٌ);” xlii [lxxxiii]. 49, “or he gives both together, males and females, and makes whom he will to be childless—he is indeed all-wise, a supreme sove-

reign (قدیر) ;” xliii [lxi]. 41, “or we shall show thee that with which we threaten them, and so indeed have the sovereign disposal of them (فأنا عليهم مقتدرون) ;” xlvi [lxxxviii]. 32, “and do they not see that God who created the heavens and the earth, and faltered not in creating these, has power to vivify the dead (قدیر) ?—nay, he has sovereign control (يقدر علي أن يحيي الموتى) over all things ;” xlviii [cviii]. 21, “and other things which are not at your command (لم تقدروا عليها), but which are truly within his grasp, inasmuch as God is sovereign disposer of all things (علي كل شيء قدیر) ;” liv [xlix]. 12, “and we have made the earth to burst forth with fountains, so that water comes, in obedience to a fore-ordained mandate (فالتقى الماء على أمر قد قدر) ;” liv [xlix]. 42, “they discredited all our signs, and so we took them in hand as a sovereign (مقتدر) mighty one ;” liv [xlix]. 49, “verily we have created all things according to a fixed decree (بقدار) ;” liv [xlix]. 54–5, “the pious will be in gardens watered by a river, in an abode of righteousness, in the company of a sovereign (مقتدر) king ;” lvi [xlv]. 60, “we have decreed (فقدّرنا) for you your several deaths, and nothing prevents us ;” lvii [xcix]. 2, “to him pertains the dominion of the heavens and the earth ; he makes alive, and causes to die ; and he has the sovereign disposal of all things (علي كل شيء قدیر) ;” lix [cii]. 6, “but God gives power over whom he will to his Messengers ; and God has the sovereign disposal of all things (id.) ;” lx [cx]. 7, “it may be that God will put love between you and those with whom ye are at enmity—inasmuch as God is a sovereign (قدیر) ;” lxiv [xciii]. 1, “he is exalted—whatsoever is in the heavens, and whatsoever is on the earth, is God’s ; to him belongs the dominion and the praise ; and he has the sovereign disposal of all things (علي كل شيء قدیر) ;” lxv [ci]. 3, “verily, God accomplishes what he ordains—he hath established for every thing a fixed decree (قدرا) ;” lxv [ci]. 7, “and let him to whom is measured out his bounty (ومن قدر عليه رزقه) disperse abroad of that which God has given him—God requireth not of any person except what he hath given to him ;” lxvi [cix]. 8, “and do thou pardon us!—verily, thou art a supreme sovereign (علي كل شيء قدیر) ;” lxvii [lxiii]. 1, “blessed be he who holds the dominion, and who has the sovereign disposal of all things (id.) ;” lxx [xlvi]. 40–1, “verily, it is at our sovereign discretion (لقادرون)

انا) to substitute a better people in their place, and nothing prevents us;" lxxiii [iii]. 20, "but God has the measuring out (يَقْدِرُ) of the night and the day;" lxxv [xl]. 3-4, "do men suppose that we shall not bring together their bones?—nay, we have sovereign power (قَادِرِينَ) to finish out even the extremities of their fingers;" lxxv [xl]. 40, "has not such a one sovereign power (أَلَيْسَ ذَلِكَ بِقَادِرٍ) to vivify the dead?" lxxvii [xxxvi]. 21-3, "which we put in a safe place, for a foreknown destiny (إِلَىٰ مَعْلُومٍ فَتَقَدَّرْنَا), for it belongs to us to apportion destiny (فَتَقَدَّرْنَا)—hail then to the fore-ordainers (فَنَعْمَ الْقَادِرُونَ)!" lxxx [xxiv]. 19, "he created him, and allotted to him his destiny (فَقَدَّرَهُ);" lxxxvi [xxii]. 8, "verily he has sovereign power (لِقَادِرٍ) to bring him to account, on the day when secrets shall be made manifest;" lxxxvii [xxv]. 1-3, "extol the name of thy Lord, the Most High, who made the world, and fashioned it to completeness, who fore-ordained (قَدَّرَ), and guides accordingly;" lxxxix [xxxix]. 16, "or when he tries him by measuring out to him his bounty (فَقَدَّرَ عَلَيْهِ رِزْقَهُ);" xc [xviii]. 4-5, "most surely have we created man in a state of trouble—does he suppose that no one has the sovereign disposal of him (يَقْدِرُ عَلَيْهِ)?" xcvi [xxi]. 1-4, "we revealed it on the night of destiny (الْقَدَرِ): and how shall one make thee to know what is the night of destiny? the night of destiny is better than a thousand months; thereon the angels and the spirit descend, by the permission of their Lord, to execute all his mandates."

All these passages represent the Deity either as (1) having absolute disposing power, or (2) using sovereign discretion, or (3) fore-ordaining; and we here find not only the phenomena of the physical world, but also the destinies of men, and even human action and feeling (see xv [lvii]. 60, and lx [cx]. 7), subordinated to the divine control. We also see that الْقَدَرُ had already acquired the special sense of 'destiny predetermined by God' (see lxxvii [xxxvi]. 22).

To complete this part of our investigation, it remains to take the testimony of those texts of the *Kurân* which declare divine sovereignty in other terms. I shall not attempt to exhaust this class of texts, but shall only bring forward some fair specimens of it, and especially those which speak of the sovereignty of God as involved in human action: ii [xci]. 99, "they who are infidels among the people favored with written revelations, and among the idolaters, like not that any favor should be bestowed by

your Lord on you, whereas God distinguishes with his mercy whomsoever he will (يختص برحمته من يشاء);" iii [xcvii]. 77, "will they then lust after another religion than that of God? while to him are subject all beings in the heavens and on the earth, whether they will or no (وله اسلم من فى السموات) and (والارض طوعا وكرها), and will be made to give account;" iii [xcvii]. 92, "and whoever may disbelieve, yet, verily, is God independent of all creatures (غنى عن العالمين);" iii [xcvii]. 139, "nor does it happen to any person to die except by the permission of God, according to a determined decree (بإذن الله كتابا مؤجلا);" iv [c]. 80, "and if any good happens to them, they say: This is from God; and if evil befalls them, they say: This comes of thee: say thou, that every thing is from God (كل من عند الله);" v [cxiv]. 1, "verily, God appoints as he pleases (بحكم ما يريد);" vi [lxxxix]. 59, "and with him are the keys of mystery, which no one knows but himself; and he knows whatsoever is on the dry land and in the sea; and not a single leaf falls without his knowledge; nor is there one seed-grain in the darkness of the earth, nor green thing, nor dry, which is not entered in a plain book (الا فى كتاب مبين)"—comp. x [lxxxiv]. 62; ix [cxiii]. 51, "say thou: There shall no evil befall us, but what God fore-ordained for us (ما كتب الله لنا);" xi [lxxv]. 1, "a book of which the verses were predetermined (احكمت), and afterwards set forth, from the presence of a discerning ordainer;" xi [lxxv]. 8, "every thing is entered in a plain book (كل فى كتاب مبين);" xi [lxxv]. 108-9, "as for the miserable, they will be in Hell, where they will sigh and howl, abiding there so long as the heavens and the earth endure, save the will of thy Lord—verily, thy Lord does that which he pleases (الا ما شاء ربك ان ربك فعال لما يريد);" xiii [xc]. 2, "it is God who reared the heavens without supports—ye behold them—and, more than that, possesses the throne of dominion, and constrains sun and moon to do his bidding: every thing runs its course to a predetermined end (كل يجرى لاجل مسمتى)."

The passages relating to divine sovereignty as respects human action arrange themselves under three heads: 1. those which affirm a divine agency as involved in human action; 2. those which declare human responsibility; 3. those in which God's agency is represented as conditioned by that of man.

1. Passages affirming a divine agency in human action: ii [xci.] 5-6, "as for the unbelievers, it matters nothing to them, whether thou warnest them, or dost not warn them: they will

not believe; God hath sealed up their hearts and their ears (ختم الله على قلوبهم وعلى سمعهم), and the darkness of night is over their eyes;" ii [xci]. 28, "and when thy Lord said to the angels: I am about to place on the earth a vicegerent [i. e. man], they said: Wilt thou place thereon one who will work corruption there, and shed blood, while we magnify thee with praise, and say: Hallowed be Thy name? to which he replied:

I know what ye know not (أتى اعلم ما لا تعلمون);" ii [xci]. 209, "and God guides into the right path whomsoever he will (والله) (يهدي من يشاء الى صراط مستقيم);" ii [xci]. 254, "and if God had so willed, they would not have contended with one another: but God does what he pleases (ولو شاء الله ما اقتتلوا ولكن الله يفعل)"; iii [xcvii]. 172, "and let not the unbelievers imagine that our long suffering towards them is a favor to them—we bear long with them only in order that they may add to their iniquity

(أئما نملى لهم ليزدادوا أثما)"; iv [c]. 32, "God is pleased to make your burthens light, inasmuch as man is by nature infirm (وخلف) (ومن يرد الله فنننه)"; v [cxiv]. 45, "and as for those whom God chooses to entangle (ومن يرد الله فنننه)"; v [cxiv]. 45, "and as for those whom God chooses to entangle—these are they whose hearts God

chooses not to purify (لم يرد الله ان يظهر قلوبهم)"; vi [lxxxix]. 25, "and among them are some who listen to thee whose hearts we have veiled, lest they should discern the revelation, and into whose ears we have put deafness (وجعلنا على قلوبهم أكنة ان يفقهوه)

(وفي آذانهم وقرا), and who, if they should witness all possible miracles, would not believe in them;" vi [lxxxix]. 107, "and if God had so willed, they would not have been idolaters (ولو شاء) (الله ما أشركوا)—comp. vi [lxxxix]. 149, "the idolaters will say: If God had so willed, we should not have been idolaters, nor our fathers, nor should we have done any thing unlawful: thus did they who were before them falsify, until they tasted our punishment: say thou: Is there knowledge with you?—then produce it for us; ye do but follow after conjecture, ye do but advance opinion: say thou: It belongs to God to certify decisively—if, then, he had so willed, he would have directed all of you (فلو شاء لهداكم أجمعين)"; vi [lxxxix]. 111, "and if we had caused the angels to come in to them as guests, and the dead had spoken to them, and we had called up every thing before them, they would not have believed unless God had so willed (ما كانوا)"; vi [lxxxix]. 123, "in like manner have we put in every city certain great men, to be its sinners, in order

that they might practice their deceptions therein (جعلنا في كل قرية) (ص ١٣٨)؛ (الأكابر مجرميها ليبيكروا فيها)؛ vi [lxxxix]. 138, “and so have the accomplices of many of the idolaters allured them to kill their children, that they might destroy them, blinding them to their duty: and if God had so willed, they would not have done this (ولو شاء الله ما فعلوه)—therefore let them alone, and their deceptions;” vii [lxxxvii]. 41, “and if God had not guided us, we

should not have been directed (وما كنا لنهتدى لولا ان هدانا)؛ vii [lxxxvii]. 154, “and Moses chose seventy men against our appointed time; and, when the earthquake came upon them, he said: O Lord, if thou hadst so willed, thou wouldst have destroyed them before, and me also: wilt thou destroy us on account of what fools among us have done?—it [the earthquake] is but a trial on thy part, wherewith thou dost lead astray whom thou wilt, and dost direct whom thou wilt (ان هي)

؛ (الا فتنتك تضلّ بها من تشاء وتهدى من تشاء)؛ vii [lxxxvii]. 178, “and in very deed have we created for Hell many genii and

men (ولقد ذرأنا لجهنم كثيرا من الجن والانس) —who have hearts with which they discern not, and eyes with which they see not, and ears with which they hear not;” viii [xcv]. 24, “and know ye that God interposes between a man and his heart (يجول بين امرء)؛ (وقلبه)؛ viii [xcv]. 64, “hadst thou expended all the riches of the earth, thou wouldst not have joined their hearts in friend-

ship; but God hath united them (ما اتقت بين قلوبهم ولكن الله اتق) (بينهم)؛ ix [cxiii]. 86, “and let not their wealth and their children excite thine admiration—God purposes only to punish them therewith in this life, and that their souls should expire in

unbelief (انما يريد الله . . . وتزهدف انفسهم وهم كافرون)؛ ix [cxiii]. 88, “they were content to keep company with opposers, and their hearts were sealed so that they should not perceive (وطبع)

(على قلوبهم فهم لا يفقهون)؛ xi [lxxv]. 36, “and my warning, though I should desire to warn you, would not profit you, if God should be pleased to lead you into error (ان كان الله يريد ان)؛ (يغويكم)؛ xi [lxxv]. 120, “and if thy Lord had so willed, he would have made men one people; and only they on whom thy Lord had mercy cease to be at variance with one another; and for that did he create them (ولذلك خلقهم)؛ xii [lxxvii]. 53,

“the soul prompts to evil, save that my Lord is merciful (ان

؛ (النفس لامارة بالسوء الا ما رحم ربي)؛ xxxix [lxxx]. 58, “or lest it [the lost soul] say: If God had guided me, I should certainly

have been one of those who fear him (لوان الله هداى لكنت من)

xi [xxiii]. 7-8, "and by a soul, with God's fashioning it to completeness, and inspiring it with its wickedness and its piety (ونفس وما سواها فالههها فجورها وتقواها)";

2. Passages which declare human responsibility: iv [c]. 111, "and whosoever gets to himself a sin, gets it solely on his own

responsibility (ومن يكسب اثما فاتما يكسبه على نفسه)"; v [cxiv]. 100, "say thou: Wickedness and goodness are not indifferent

[to God] (لا يستوى الحبيث والطيب)"; vi [lxxxix]. 69, "and let alone those who make a sport and a mockery of their religion, and whom this present world has deluded; and thereby bring to remembrance that any soul perishes for what it has got to itself (ان تبسل نفس بما كسبت)"; vii [lxxxvii]. 27, "and when they commit a deed of shame, they say: We have found that our fathers did so, and God obliges us to do it: say thou: Surely,

God requireth not shameful doing (ان الله لا يأمر بالفحشاء)"; ix [cxiii]. 35, "on the day when their spoils shall be heated in the fire of Hell, and their foreheads, and their sides, and their backs, shall be cauterized therewith—this is what ye treasure up for yourselves: may ye taste, then, that which ye lay in store (هذا ما كنزتم لانفسكم فذوقوا ما كنتم تكنزون)"; ix [cxiii]. 71, "have they not heard the story of those who were before them—the people of Noah, of 'Âd, and of Thamûd, and the people of Abraham, and the Midianites, and the inhabitants of the cities which were overthrown, to whom their Messengers came with convincing proofs? for God is not such that he would do them injustice, but they did injustice to themselves (ولكن كانوا انفسهم)"; ix [cxiii]. 112, "verily, God hath purchased of believers themselves and their possessions, at the price of their hav-

ing Paradise (ان الله اشترى من المؤمنين انفسهم واموالهم بان لهم الجنة) —they contend in the way of God, and kill and are killed, upon a solemn engagement on his part, certified in the Law and the Gospel, as well as in the Kūrân: and who is more faithful to his promise than God?—be ye glad, then, of your bargain which ye have made (فاستبشروا ببيعكم الذى بايعتم به)"; x [lxxxiv]. 31, "yonder will every soul experience that which it hath bargained

for (هنالك تبلوا كل نفس ما اسلفت)"; x [lxxxiv]. 108, "so then, whosoever is directed, it is solely a matter pertaining to himself; and whosoever goes astray, he himself bears the whole respon-

sibility of his wandering (فمن اهتدى فانما يهتدى لنفسه ومن ضلّ) فانما يضلّ عليها.”

3. Passages which represent God's agency as conditioned by that of man: ii[xci]. 9, “in their hearts is a disease, and so God increases their disease (في قلوبهم مرض فزادهم الله مرضا)”; ii[xci]. 24, “and as for the unbelievers, they say: What is it which God intends by this, as a parable? [Thus] he leadeth astray, as well as guideth, many thereby; but he doth not lead astray

thereby any except wicked doers (وما يضلّ به الا الفاسقين)”; ii[xci]. 82, “and they say: Our hearts are uncircumcised; nay, but God has cursed them for their unbelief (بل لعنهم الله بكفرهم)”, and so they believe little”—comp. iv[c]. 49; ii[xci]. 266, “and God doth not direct disbelieving people (والله لا يهدي القوم الكافرين)”; iii[xcvii]. 80, “seeing that God doth not direct wicked people (والله لا يهدي القوم الظالمين)”; iii[xcvii]. 96, “and how can ye disbelieve, when the verses from God are read to you, and his Messenger is in your midst? whosoever takes hold on God is guided aright (ومن يعتصم بالله فقد هدى الى صراط مستقيم)”; iv[c]. 154, “so then, because of their breaking their engagement, and disbelieving the divine miracles, and killing the prophets, iniquitously, and their saying: Our hearts are uncircumcised—nay, but God has sealed their hearts with their own unbelief (بل) (طبع الله عليها بكفرهم), so that their faith is but small;” v[cxiv]. 16, “but, on account of their breaking their covenant, we have

cursed them, and made their hearts hard (فبما نقضهم ميثاقهم لعناهم) (وجعلنا قلوبهم قاسية)”, so that they pervert the word of God, and forget a part of that which they were reminded of;” v[cxiv]. 18, “there has indeed come to you from God a light, and a plain book of revelation, wherewith God guides in paths of peace those who follow his pleasure, and permissively leads them out from

darkness into light (ويخرجهم) (من اتبع رضوانه سبيل السلام ويخرجهم)”; vi[lxxxix]. 108, “and revile ye not those beings to whom they pray beside God, so that they vilify God in enmity, through ignorance—in the same way [in which they are deluded] do we make fair to every people its

own doings (كذلك زينا لكل امة عملهم)”; vi[lxxxix]. 109–10, “say thou: Miracles are a prerogative of God alone; and how hard is it to persuade you that, if they were wrought, these would not believe, and that we turn away their hearts and their eyes,

forasmuch as they did not believe in the revelation at once (ونقلب)



(أفئدتهم وأبصارهم كما لم يؤمنوا به أول مرة  
in their iniquity;” vii[xxxvii]. 26, “we have made the devils to  
be the familiar associates of those who are unbelievers (أنا جعلنا

);” vii[xxxvii]. 99, “but they  
could not believe in that which they had declared before to be  
false—thus it is that God seals up the hearts of unbelievers  
(كذلك يطبع الله على قلوب الكافرين)  
[xxxvii]. 143, “I will turn aside from my miracles those who

magnify themselves in the earth (سأصرف عن آياتي الذين يتكبرون)  
unrighteously; and, though they should behold all  
possible miracles, they will not believe in them; and, though  
they should perceive the path of rectitude, they will not take it;  
and, though they see which is the way of error, they will take  
that for their path;” viii[xcv]. 55, “that shall be, because God  
changes not as to any favor which he bestows upon a people,  
until they change as to what depends upon themselves (ذلك بان)

);” ix[cxiii].  
128, “God turns aside their hearts, because they are a people

without understanding (صرف الله قلوبهم بأنهم قوم لا يفقهون);” x  
[xxxiv]. 9, “as for those who believe, and perform the acts of  
goodness, God will direct them in recompense of their faith

(ويهديهم ربهم بإيمانهم);” x[xxxiv], 99–100, “and if thy Lord had  
so willed, all who are on the earth would have believed together  
—wilt thou, then, urge men to become believers, seeing that it  
belongs not to any soul to believe without the permission of  
God, and he lays the penalty [of unbelief] upon those who are  
void of discernment (ويجعل الرجس على الذين لا يعقلون)?” xiii  
[xc]. 12, “God changes not as to what concerns any people,  
until they change in respect to what depends upon themselves

(إن الله لا يغير ما بقوم حتى يغيروا ما بأنفسهم)  
xiii[xc]. 27, “say

thou: Verily, God leads astray whomsoever he will, and directs  
to himself those who are penitent (إن الله يضل من يشاء ويهدي  
إليه من أناب).”

Such was Muhammad’s doctrine of divine sovereignty, as de-  
veloped in the Kurân. It seems, then, that he no more denied  
human freedom than he predicated of God a sovereignty em-  
bracing even the actions of men: while, as for the reconciliation  
of these seemingly opposite positions, whether designed or not,  
the language of the Kurân appears to imply a contingency of

the determinations of the Deity, in respect to human action, upon the foreseen issues of man's exercise of his moral liberty; and that man might cease to be free, by way of divine penalty for the misuse of freedom.

But there are traditions which claim to give us Muḥammad's teachings on this subject. All these, also, deserve to be considered: for, if not found positively inconsistent with the Kūrān, their universal acceptance by Muslims, as authentic, must carry our acknowledgment of them along with it; besides that, even if their authenticity be doubted, they still constitute a highly important chapter, and one hitherto unpublished out of the pale of Islām, of early Muslim speculation on this most interesting subject. I shall, therefore, cite these traditions here, in full, in the order and form in which they are embodied in the collections of Bukhārī and Muslim, omitting, however, the repetitions, by different lines of descent, in the same collection, as well as other traditions which vary from those cited only in trivial points, and bringing together the parallel traditions of the two authorities.\* We will first introduce Bukhārī's Chapter of Predestination (باب في القدر), beginning as follows:

"We are told as a tradition by 'Abu-l-Walīd Hishām Bin 'Abd-al-Mālik, that Shu'bah tells us, saying: Sulaimān 'al-'A'mash related to me the following: I heard Zaid Bin Wahb, on the authority of 'Abd-allāh—to whom may God be gracious! say: The Messenger of God . . . , who is the True, the Trusted, gave the following to be handed down as a tradition, saying: 'Any one of you is made up in his mother's womb in the course of forty days, after which, for the same length of time, he is blood coagulated, and then, for the same time, a mass of flesh; afterwards, God sends an angel who is charged with four decrees, signifying his allotment of good, his moral conduct, his term of life, and whether he is to be one of the miserable or one of the blessed. Therefore, by God, any one of you (or, a man) may conduct himself as do those destined for Hell, until the distance between him and it is not two spans (or, an ell), and yet the registered decree shall prevent him, so that he shall conduct himself as do those destined for Paradise, and accordingly enter therein: and a man may even conduct himself as do those destined for Paradise, until the distance between him and it is not an ell (or, two ells), and yet the registered decree shall prevent him, so that he shall conduct himself as do those destined for Hell, and accordingly enter therein.' Adam's reading is 'only an ell (or, two spans)'—

قال ان احدكم يجمع في بطن امه اربعين يوما ثم علقه مثل ذلك ثم يكون مصغة مثل ذلك ثم يبعث الله ملكا فيومر باربع برزقه [وعمله]

\* We use the MS. copy of Bukhārī's *Sahih*, and the edition of Muslim's *Musnad 'as-Sahih*, specified in vol. vii, p. 61, of this Journal. The passages quoted from the former may be found on foll. 294-5, recto; those from the latter on pp. 568-79 of Part ii.

واجله وشقى او سعيد فوالله ان احدكم او الرجل يعمل بعمل اهل النار حتى ما يكون بينه وبينها غير باع او ذراع فيسبف عليه الكتاب فيعمل بعمل اهل الجنة فيدخلها وان الرجل ليعمل بعمل اهل الجنة حتى ما يكون بينه وبينها غير ذراع او ذراعين فيسبف عليه الكتاب فيعمل بعمل اهل النار فيدخلها قال ادم الا ذراع او باع —

The same tradition is given in Muslim's Book of Predestination (كتاب القدر), thus:

"We are told as a tradition by 'Abū Bakr Bin 'Abī Shaibah, that 'Abū Mu'āwiyah and Waki' inform us as follows; and we are told by Muḥammad Bin 'Abdallāh Bin Numair 'al-Hamadānī, to use the words of the latter (واللفظ له): We are informed by my father, by 'Abū Mu'āwiyah, and by Waki', saying: We are informed by 'al-'A'mash, on the authority of Zaid Bin Wāḥb, on the authority of 'Abdallāh—to whom may God be gracious! saying: The Messenger of God . . . , who is the True, the Trusted, gave the following to be handed down as a tradition: 'As for any one of you, his generation in the womb of his mother is effected in the course of forty days, after which, for the same length of time, he exists there in the form of coagulated blood, and then, for the same time, as a mass of flesh; afterwards, the Angel is commissioned to breathe the living spirit into him, and is charged, in four words, to write down his allotment of good, his moral conduct, his term of life, and whether he is to be one of the miserable or one of the blessed. Therefore, by him beside whom there is no God, any one of you may even conduct himself as do those destined for Paradise, until there is only an ell between him and it; and yet the registered decree shall prevent him, so that he shall conduct himself as do those destined for Hell, and accordingly enter therein: and any one of you may even conduct himself as do those destined for Hell, until the distance between him and it is only an ell; and yet the registered decree shall prevent him, so that he shall conduct himself as do those destined for Paradise, and accordingly enter therein'"—

ان احدكم يجمع خلقه فى بطن امه اربعين يوما ثم يكون فى ذلك علقه مثل ذلك ثم يكون فى ذلك مضغة مثل ذلك ثم يرسل الملك فينفخ فيه الروح ويومر باربع كلمات بكتب رزقه وعمله واجله وشقى او سعيد فوالذى لا اله غيره ان احدكم ليعمل بعمل اهل الجنة حتى ما يكون بينه وبينها الا ذراع فيسبف عليه الكتاب فيعمل بعمل اهل النار فيدخلها وان احدكم ليعمل بعمل اهل النار حتى ما يكون بينه وبينها الا ذراع فيسبف عليه الكتاب فيعمل بعمل اهل الجنة فيدخلها—

. . . . .

Bukhârî proceeds :

“ We are told as a tradition by Sulaimân Bin Harb, that Hammâd tells us, on the authority of 'Ubaidallâh Bin 'Abî Bakr Bin 'Anas, on the authority of 'Anas Bin Mâlik—to whom may God be gracious! on the authority of the Prophet . . . , saying: ‘God appoints over the womb an angel, who reports: O my Lord, genital seed—O my Lord, coagulated blood—O my Lord, a mass of flesh; and, whenever God is pleased to determine the nature of the new being, the angel inquires: O my Lord, a male or a female? miserable or blessed? and so: What is the allotment of good? and: What is the term of life? and it is written down accordingly in the womb of the mother’”—

قال وكَّل الله بالرحم ملكا فيقول أى رب نطفة أى رب علقة أى رب مصغة  
فاذا أراد الله أن يقضى خلقها قال أى رب اذكر أم أنتى شقى أم سعيد فإنا  
الرزق فإنا الاجل فيكتب كذلك فى بطن أمه —

Parallel with this we have from Muslim the following traditions:

“ We are told as a tradition by Muḥammad Bin 'Abdallâh Bin Numair and Zuhair Bin Harb, saying, to use the words of Ibn Numair: We are informed by Sufyân Bin 'Uyainah, on the authority of 'Amrû Bin Dinâr, on the authority of 'Abu-t-Tufail, on the authority of Hudhaifah Bin 'Asid, who carries the tradition back to the Prophet (يبلغ به أنبى) . . . saying: ‘The Angel visits the seed, after it has remained in the womb forty or five and forty nights, and inquires: O my Lord, miserable or blessed? whereupon one or the other is written down; and: O my Lord, a male or a female? when one or the other is written down. He also writes down the moral conduct of the new being, its career, its term of life, and its allotment of good. Then [it is said to him]: Roll up the leaves, for no addition shall be made thereto, nor any thing taken therefrom’”—

قال يدخل الملك على النطفة بعد ما تستقر فى الرحم بأربعين أو خمسة  
وأربعين ليلة فيقول يا رب أشقى أو سعيد فيكتبان فيقول أى رب اذكر أو  
أنتى فيكتبان ويكتب عمله وأثره واجله ورزقه ثم تطوى الصحف فلا  
يزاد فيها ولا ينقص —

“ I am told as a tradition by 'Abu-t-Tâhir 'Ahmad Bin 'Amrû Bin Sarh, that 'Ibn Wahb informs us, saying: I am informed by 'Amrû Bin 'al-Ḥârith, on the authority of 'Abu-z-Zubair 'al-Makkî, that 'Amir Bin Wâthilah told him as a tradition, that he heard 'Abdallâh Bin Mas'ûd—to whom may God be gracious! say: He will be a miserable one who is pronounced miserable in his mother's womb; and he a blessed one to whom the other alternative is foretold (يقول الشقى من شقى فى)

(بطن أمه وأنسعيد من وعظ بغيره whereupon he [Amir] went to one

of the Companions of the Messenger of God . . . whose name was Hudhaifah Bin 'Asid 'al-Ghifari, and told him as a tradition what 'Ibn Mas'ud had said : then said Hudhaifah : And how can a man be one of the miserable, without moral conduct (وكيف يشقى رجل بغير عمل) ? to which the reporter replied : Dost thou wonder at that ? and yet I heard the Messenger of God . . . say : ' When the seed has lain for two and forty nights, God sends an angel to it, who gives it form, and creates its senses of hearing and sight, and its skin, flesh, and bones ; after which he says : O my Lord, a male or a female ? and thy Lord determines as he will, and the Angel writes it down ; then he inquires : O my Lord, the being's term of life ? and thy Lord says what he will, and the Angel writes it down ; and again he inquires : O my Lord, the being's allotment of good ? and thy Lord determines as he will, and the Angel writes it down. Then the Angel goes forth with the written leaf in his hand, neither adding to, nor taking aught from, a single mandate '—

يقول اذا مرّ بالنطفة اثنتان واربعون ليلة بعث الله ملكا فصورها وخلف سمعها وبصرها وجلدها ولحمها وعظامها ثم قال يا رب اذكر ام انتى فيقضى ربك ما شاء ويكتب الملك فيقول يا رب اجله فيقول ربك ما شاء ويكتب الملك ثم يقول يا رب رزقه فيقضى ربك ما شاء ويكتب الملك ثم يخرج الملك بالصحيفة في يده فلا يزيد على امر ولا ينقص—

"I am told as a tradition by Muhammad Bin 'Ahmad Bin 'Abi Khalaf, that Yahya Bin 'Abi Bukair informs us, that Zuhair 'Abu Khathamah informs us, saying : I am told as a tradition by 'Abdallah Bin 'Ata', that 'Ikrimah Bin Khâlid told him as a tradition, that 'Abu-t-Tufail told him as a tradition, saying : I entered the abode of 'Abu Sariḥah, Hudhaifah Bin 'Asid 'al-Ghifari—to whom may God be gracious ! whereupon he said : I heard, with these my own ears, the Messenger of God . . . say : ' The seed lies in the womb for forty nights, after which the Angel gives it form ' (says Zuhair : my belief is that he said '[the Angel] who creates it'), and inquires : O my Lord, a male or a female ? whereupon God prescribes either a male or a female ; afterwards he inquires : O my Lord, straight or crooked ? whereupon God prescribes a being either straight or crooked ; he also inquires : O my Lord, what is its allotment of good ? what is its term of life ? what is its character ? after which God fixes that it shall be either one of the miserable or one of the blessed '—

يقول ان النطفة تقع في الرحم اربعين ليلة ثم يتصور عليها الملك قال زهير حسبته قال الذي يخلقها فيقول يا رب اذكر او انتى فيجعله الله ذكرا او انتى ثم يقول يا رب اسوي او غير سوي فيجعله الله سويا او غير سوي ثم يقول يا رب ما رزقه ما اجله ما خلقه ثم يجعله الله شقيا او سعيدا —

Returning to Bukhârî, we read as follows :

“Chapter of the Conclusiveness of Divine Knowledge (باب جفّ  
القلم على علم الله).

“The fundamental idea of this chapter is that God exists in a single state of knowledge (وأصله الله على علم). Says ‘Abû Hurairah: The Prophet . . . said to me: ‘The pen of thy destiny is dry (جفّ القلم) (بما أنت لآتي);’ says ‘Ibn ‘Abbâs: She was prevented by those who were themselves prevented by those pronounced blessed (سبقت لهم السعد).

“We are told as a tradition by ‘Adam, that Shu‘bah tells us, that Yazîd ‘ar-Rashîk tells us, saying: I heard Muṭarrif Bin ‘Abdallâh Bin ‘ash-Shikhkhîr tell as a tradition, on the authority of ‘Imrân Bin Ḥuṣain—may God be gracious to them both! saying: Said a certain man: O Messenger of God, does God distinguish those who are to be in Paradise from those who are to be in Hell? he replied: Yes; said the other: To what purpose, then, do moral agents work? he replied: Every one works in accordance with his character, or as he is divinely furthered—

قال رجل يرسل الله أيعرف أهل الجنة من أهل النار قال نعم قال فلم يجعل  
العاملون قال كلّ يجعل لما خلق له أو لما يسر له —

The parallel traditions recorded by Muslim are the following:

“Every one is Furthered according to his Character (كلّ ميسر لما  
خلق له).

“We are told as a tradition by ‘Uthmân Bin ‘Abî Shaibah, Zuhair Bin Ḥarb, and ‘Ishâk Bin ‘Ibrâhîm, saying, to use the words of Zuhair (‘Ishâk has أنا, while the two others have لنا): We are informed by Jarîr, on the authority of Maṣṣûr, on the authority of Sa’d Bin ‘Ubaidah, on the authority of ‘Abû ‘Abd-ar-Rahmân, on the authority of ‘Alî—to whom may God be gracious! saying: We were at a funeral in the Baḳî ‘al-Gharkad, when the Messenger of God . . . came to us and sat down, and we sat down around him—he having by him a staff (محصرة); so he leaned over and began to strike the ground with the end of his staff, and said: ‘There is no one of you—there is no soul born whose place, whether Paradise or Hell, has not been predetermined by God, and which has not been registered beforehand as either miserable or blessed.’ Thereupon, says the reporter, a certain man said: O Messenger of God, shall we not, then, await our registered destiny, and let conduct alone? to which he replied: ‘Whosoever is destined to felicity, will set himself to the conduct of the blessed; and whosoever is destined to misery, will set himself to the conduct of the miserable,’ and added: ‘Work ye, seeing that every one is divinely furthered: as for those destined to felicity, they are furthered to the conduct of the blessed; and as for those destined to misery, they are furthered to the conduct of the miserable.’ Afterwards he read the

verse 'Those who are liberal, and fear God, and recognize virtue as a reality, we will help forward to felicity; and those who are parsimonious, and seek gain, and charge virtue with pretence, we will help forward to perdition'—

قال ما منكم من أحد ما من نفس منقوسة إلا وقد كتب الله مكانها من الجنة والنار والا وقد كتبت شقية او سعيدة قال فقال رجل يا رسول الله افلا نمكت على كتابنا ونلح العجل فقال من كان من اهل السعادة فسيصير الى عمل اهل السعادة ومن كان من اهل الشقاوة فسيصير الى عمل اهل الشقاوة فقال اعملوا وكلّ ميّسر اما اهل السعادة فيبيّسون لعل اهل السعادة واما اهل الشقاوة فيبيّسون لعل اهل الشقاوة ثم قرأ فاما من اعطى واتقى وصدق بالحسنى فسنيسره لليسرى واما من بخل واستغنى وكذب بالحسنى فسنيسره للعسرى —

"We are told as a tradition by 'Abû Bakr Bin Abî Shaibah, Zuhair Bin Harb, and 'Abû Sa'id 'al-'Ashajj, saying: We are informed by Waki', as follows; and we are told as a tradition by 'Ibn Numair, saying: We are informed by my father; both of whom [i. e., Waki' and the father of 'Ibn Numair] say: We are informed by 'al-'A'mash, as follows; and we are told as a tradition by 'Abû Kuraib, to use his words: We are informed by 'Abû Mu'awiyah, that 'al-'A'mash informs us, on the authority of Sa'd Bin 'Ubaidah, on the authority of 'Abû 'Abd-'ar-Rahmân 'as-Sulamî, on the authority of 'Alî—to whom may God be gracious! saying: the Messenger of God . . . was seated on a certain day, having in his hand a staff (عود), with which he kept striking the ground: so he raised his head, and said: 'There is no soul of you whose abiding-place, whether Paradise or Hell, is not known beforehand;' to which those addressed replied: O Messenger of God, to what purpose, then, do we work?—if this is so, shall we not resign ourselves to God? the Prophet answered: 'Nay, work ye, for every one is divinely furthered in accordance with his character.' Afterwards he read the verse 'Those who are liberal, and fear God, and recognize virtue as a reality,' and so on to the words 'we will help forward to perdition'—

فقال ما منكم من نفس الا وقد علم منزلها من الجنة والنار قالوا يا رسول الله فلم نعمل افلا نتكل قال لا اعملوا فكلّ ميّسر لما خلف له ثم قرأ . . .

"We are told as a tradition by 'Aḥmad Bin Yûnus, that Zuhair informs us, that 'Abu-z-Zubair informs us as follows; and we are told as a tradition by Yahya Bin Yahya, that 'Abû Khaithamah informs us, on the authority of 'Abu-z-Zubair, on the authority of Jâbir, saying: Su-

\* Kūrân, xcii[xvi]. 5-10.

râkah Bin Mâlik, son of Ju'sham, came, and said: O Messenger of God, explain to us our religious condition—was it unchangeably written, and predetermined, that we should be so disposed as we are, at this time, touching present conduct, or, on the other hand, is our character a casual incident? to which the Prophet replied: 'Not so, but rather was it unchangeably written thus, and predetermined;' the other rejoined: What, then, avails conduct? Zuhair adds: Afterwards, 'Abu-z-Zubair said something which I did not understand; so I inquired what the Prophet said, and he replied: 'Work ye, for every one is divinely furthered'—

قال يا رسول الله بيّن لنا ديننا كأننا خلقنا الآن فيما العمل اليوم أفيما جئت به الأقدام وجرت به المقادير أم فيما نَسْتَقْبِلُ قال لا بل فيما جئت به الأقدام وجرت به المقادير قال ففيم العمل قال زهير ثم تكلم أبو الزبير بشئٍ لم أفهمه فسألت ما قال فقال اعملوا فكل ميسر —

"I am told as a tradition by 'Abu-t-Tâhir, that 'Ibn Wahb informs us, saying: I am informed by 'Amrû Bin 'al-Hârih, on the authority of 'Abu-z-Zubair, on the authority of Jâbir Bin 'Abdallâh—may God be gracious to them both! on the authority of the Prophet . . . of a tradition to the same intent as the foregoing, in which it is said: Then said the Messenger of God . . . 'Every moral agent is furthered to his own conduct' (كُلُّ عَامِلٍ مَيْسِرٌ لِعَمَلِهِ).

"We are told as a tradition by Yahya Bin Yahya, that Hammâd Bin Zaid informs us, on the authority of Yazid 'adh-Dhuba'i, that Mutarrif informs us, on the authority of 'Imrân Bin Ḥuşain—to whom may God be gracious! saying: Some one said: O Messenger of God, are those who are to be in Paradise distinguished from those who are to be in Hell? to which, says the reporter, the Prophet replied: 'Yes;' when the other rejoined: To what purpose then do moral agents work? and the Prophet answered: 'Every one is divinely furthered in accordance with his character (كُلُّ مَيْسِرٌ لِمَا خَلَقَ لَهُ)."

"We are told as a tradition by 'Ishâk Bin 'Ibrâhîm 'al-Hanzali, that 'Uthmân Bin 'Umar informs us, that 'Azrah Bin Thâbit informs us, on the authority of Yahya Bin 'Ukail, on the authority of Yahya Bin Ya'mar, on the authority of 'Abu-l-'Aswad 'ad-Dili, saying: I was addressed by 'Imrân Bin Ḥuşain as follows: Thinkest thou that what men now do, and endeavor after, is something determined for them, and which a preventing predestination made it previously necessary that they should do? or are their actions casual incidents, consequent upon what their Prophet has announced to them, and their proved obligations? Then said I: Nay, the actions of men are determined for them, and made previously necessary to be done by them; whereupon the other, as the reporter goes on to say, rejoined: Is there no such thing as wrong-doing? at which, continues the reporter, I was greatly



alarmed, and said : All things are of God, and subject to his controlling hand ; ‘so then his doing shall not be questioned—it is they who shall be inquired of.’\* Then he said to me : God have mercy on thee ! I intended, by what I asked thee, only to measure thine understanding ; there came to the Messenger of God . . . two men of Muzainah, and said : O Messenger of God, dost thou think that what men now do, and endeavor after, is something determined for them, and which a preventing predestination previously assigned to them ? or are their actions casual incidents, consequent upon what their Prophet has announced to them, and their proved obligations ? to which he replied : ‘Not so, but rather are the actions of men determined for them, and previously assigned to them ; and a verification of this is the following from the Book of God : “and by a soul, with God’s fashioning it to completeness, and inspiring it with its wickedness and its piety”’†—

قال قال لى عمران بن حصين ارأيت ما يعمل الناس اليوم ويكدحون فيه  
أشئى قضى عليهم ومضى عليهم من قدر ما سبق او فيما يُستقبلون به  
مما اتاهم به نبيهم وثبت به الحجة عليهم فقلت بل شئى قضى عليهم ومضى  
عليهم قال فقال افلا يكون ظلما قال ففرغت من ذلك فرأى شديداً وقلت كل  
شئى خلف الله وملك يده فلا يسئل عما يفعل وهم يسألون فقال لى يرحمك  
الله أنى لم ارد بما سألتك الا لاحزر عقلك ان رجلا من مزينة اتيا رسول  
الله صلى الله عليه وسلم فقالا يا رسول الله ارأيت ما يعمل الناس اليوم  
ويكدحون فيه أشئى قضى عليهم ومضى فيهم من قدر قد سبق او  
فيما يستقبلون به مما اتاهم به نبيهم وثبتت الحجة عليهم فقال لا بل  
شئى قضى عليهم ومضى فيهم وتصديق ذلك فى كتاب الله ونفس  
وما سواها فالهمها فجورها وتقواها —

“We are told as a tradition by Kūṭaibah Bin Sa’id, that ‘Abd-al-’Aziz, meaning the son of Muḥammad, informs us, on the authority of ‘al-’Alā’, on the authority of his father, on the authority of ‘Abū Hurairah—to whom may God be gracious ! that the Messenger of God . . . said : ‘A man may even for the greater part of his life conduct himself as do those destined to Paradise, and for all that be fixed to act after the manner of those destined to Hell ; and a man may even for the greater part of his life conduct like those destined to Hell, and for all that be fixed to act like those destined to Paradise’”—

قال ان الرجل ليعمل الزمن الطويل بعمل اهل الجنة ثم يختمر له عمله  
يعمل اهل النار وان الرجل ليعمل الزمن الطويل بعمل اهل النار ثم يختمر  
عمله بعمل اهل الجنة —

\* Kūr., xxi[lxv]. 23.

† Kūr., xcif[xiii]. 7-8.

“We are told as a tradition by *Kuṭaibah Bin Sa’id*, that *Ya’qūb*, meaning the son of *’Abd-’ar-Rahmān ’al-Kārī*, informs us, on the authority of *’Abū Hāzim*, on the authority of *Sahl Bin Sa’d ’as-Sā’idi*—to whom may God be gracious! that the Messenger of God . . . said: ‘A man may even exemplify the conduct which leads to Paradise, as respects appearance to men, while yet he is one destined for Hell; and a man may even exemplify the conduct leading to Hell, as respects appearance to men, while yet he is one destined for Paradise’—

قال ان الرجل ليعمل عمل الجنة فيما يبدو للناس وهو من اهل النار وان  
الرجل ليعمل عمل النار فيما يبدو للناس وهو من اهل الجنة —

We have next from *Bukhārī* the following chapter:

“Chapter of the saying ‘God best knows what would have been their conduct.’”

“We are told as a tradition by *Muḥammad Bin Bashshār*, that *Ghundar* tells us, that *Shu’bah* tells us, on the authority of *’Abū Bishr*, on the authority of *Sa’id Bin Jubair*, on the authority of *’Ibn ’Abbās*—may God be gracious to them both! as follows: The Prophet . . . was inquired of respecting the children (أولاد) of idolaters; whereupon he said: ‘God best knows what would have been their conduct (الله أعلم) (بما كانوا عاملين).’”

“We are told as a tradition by *’Ishāk*, that *’Abd-’ar-Razzāk* informs us, that *Ma’mar* informs us, on the authority of *Hammām*, on the authority of *’Abū Hurairah*—to whom may God be gracious! saying: Said the Messenger of God . . . ‘No one is born who is not born religiously constituted, so that it is one’s parents who make him to be either a Jew or a Christian; like as ye take up the beast at its birth—do ye find upon it any mutilation, until ye yourselves mutilate it?’ to which it was replied: O Messenger of God, hast thou then in mind those who die in infancy? and the Prophet returned for answer: ‘God best knows what would have been their conduct’—

قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم ما من مولود الا يولد على الفطرة فأبواه  
يهودانه وينصرانه كما تنتجون البهيمة هل تجدون فيها من جداء حتى  
تكونوا انتم تجدعونها قالوا يوسول الله افرأيت من يموت وهو صغير قال  
الله أعلم بما كانوا عاملين —

The following parallel chapter is from *Muslim*:

“Chapter of the saying ‘Every one born is born religiously constituted.’”

“We are told as a tradition by *Hājib Bin ’al-Walīd*, that *Muḥammad Bin Ḥarb* informs us, on the authority of *’az-Zubaidī*, on the authority

of 'az-Zuhri, saying: I am informed by Sa'id Bin 'al-Musaiyab, on the authority of 'Abû Hurairah—to whom may God be gracious! that he was wont to say: The Messenger of God . . . said: 'No one is born who is not born religiously constituted, it being one's parents who make him a Jew, or a Christian, or a Magian; like as the beast brings to birth an unmutilated beast—do ye discover thereupon any mutilation?' after which 'Abû Hurairah would add: And read ye, if ye will, the verse '[set, then, thy face to the true religion, as one converted,] to God's religion in the constitution of man, to which their nature leads men—let there be no perversion of God's creative work'\* and so on”—

قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم ما من مولود الا يولد على الفطرة ابواه يهودانه وينصرانه ويمجسانه كما تنتج البهيمة بهيمة جمعاء هل تحسون فيها من جدعاء ثم يقول ابو هريرة واقراءوا ان شئتم فطرة الله التي فطر الناس عليها لا تبديل لخلق الله الاية —

“We are told as a tradition by Zuhair Bin Harb, that Jarîr informs us, on the authority of 'al-'A'mash, on the authority of 'Abû Şâlih, on the authority of 'Abû Hurairah—to whom may God be gracious! saying: The Messenger of God . . . said: 'No one is born who is not born religiously constituted, so that it is one's parents who make him a Jew, or a Christian, or an idolater;' then said a certain man: O Messenger of God, hast thou in view the case of one who has died before being taught? to which the Prophet replied: 'God best knows what would have been their conduct'”—

قال . . . ما من مولود الا يولد على الفطرة فأبواه يهودانه وينصرانه ويمجسانه فقال رجل يا رسول الله أرايت لو مات قبل ذلك قال الله اعلم بما كانوا عاملين —

“We are told as a tradition by 'Abû Bakr Bin 'Abî Shaibah and 'Abû Kuraib, saying: We are informed by 'Abû Mu'âwiyah as follows; and we are told as a tradition by 'Ibn Numair, saying: I am told as a tradition by my father (the tradition, in either form, being on the authority of 'al-'A'mash, and sustained like the foregoing—كلاهما عن), saying, as it is in the tradition of 'Ibn Numair: 'No one is born who is not born religious;' or, as the expression is in the report of 'Abû Bakr, on the authority of 'Abû Mu'âwiyah: ' . . . who is not born of this religion'—whereby the reporter intended to make plain the language of the tradition; or, as it is expressed in the report of 'Abû Kuraib, on the authority of 'Abû Mu'âwiyah: 'No one is born who is not born constituted of this religion'—by which the reporter meant to interpret the language of the tradition”—

\* Kur., xxx[1xxiv]. 29.

ما من مولود يولد الا وهو على الفطرة . . . الا على هذه الفطرة . . . ليس  
من مولود يولد الا على هذه الفطرة . . . —

“We are told as a tradition by Kūtaibah Bin Sa’id, that ‘Abd-’al-’Aziz, meaning ‘ad-Darāwardī, informs us, on the authority of ‘al-’Alā’, on the authority of his father, on the authority of ‘Abū Hurairah—to whom may God be gracious! that the Messenger of God . . . said: ‘Every man is brought forth by his mother religiously constituted—it is his parents who make him, afterwards, a Jew, or a Christian, or a Magian; but, if they are Muslims, he is a Muslim. Every man whom his mother brings forth is buffeted on both sides by Satan, excepting Maryam and her son’”—

قال كل انسان تلدّه امّه على الفطرة ابواه بعد يهودانه وينصرانه او يمجسانه  
فان كانا مسلمين فسلم كل انسان تلدّه امّه يكثر الشيطان فى حننيه  
الا مريم وابنها —

“I am told as a tradition by ‘Abu-t-Tāhir, that ‘Ibn Wahb informs us, saying: I am informed by ‘Ibn ‘Abī Dhi’b and Yūnus, on the authority of ‘Ibn Shihāb, on the authority of ‘Atā’ Bin Yazid, on the authority of ‘Abū Hurairah—to whom may God be gracious! that the Messenger of God was inquired of respecting the children (أولاد) of idolaters; whereupon he said: ‘God best knows what would have been their conduct’”—

ان رسول الله . . . سيئل عن اولاد المشركين فقال الله اعلم بما كانوا  
عالمين —

“We are told as a tradition by Yahya Bin Yahya, that ‘Abū ‘Awānah informs us, on the authority of ‘Abū Bishr, on the authority of Sa’id Bin Jubair, on the authority of ‘Ibn ‘Abbās—may God be gracious to them both! saying: The Messenger of God . . . was inquired of respecting the little children of idolaters; he replied: ‘God best knows what would have been their conduct, since he created them’”—

سيئل رسول الله . . . عن اطفال المشركين قال الله اعلم بما كانوا عالمين ان  
خلقهم —

“We are told as a tradition by ‘Abdallāh Bin Maslamah Bin Ka’nab, that Mu’tamir Bin Sulaimān informs us, on the authority of his father,

\* i. e., the Virgin Mary and Jesus.

† We here omit two traditions, which vary from the last only by substituting ذرارى المشركين “offspring of idolaters,” or . . . اطفال “little children of . . .” for . . . اولاد.

on the authority of Raḳabah Bin Maskalah, on the authority of 'Abū 'Ishāḳ, on the authority of Sa'id Bin Jubair, on the authority of 'Ibn 'Abbās, on the authority of 'Ubaiy Bin Ka'b—to whom may God be gracious! saying: 'As for the boy whom 'al-Khadhir slew,\* he was sealed for an infidel, and, if he had survived, would have made trouble for his parents by disobedience and unbelief"—

قال رسول الله . . . ان الغلام الذى قتله الحضر طبع كافرا ولو عاش لارهق  
ابويه ضغيانا وكفرا —

Resuming the thread of Bukhârî's collection, we come to the following chapters:

"Chapter of the clause 'and God's ordering is in accordance with a determined decree (وكان امر الله قدرا مقدورا) †

"We are told as a tradition by 'Abdallāh Bin Yūsuf, that Mālik informs us, on the authority of 'Abū-z-Zinād, ‡ on the authority of 'al-'A'raj, on the authority of 'Abū Hurairah—to whom may God be gracious! saying: The Messenger of God said: 'Let not a woman ask that her sister be divorced, because she herself is solicitous for her own maintenance, and anxious to be married; for she will have what is decreed to her"—

قال رسول الله . . . لا تسئلى المرأة طلاق اختها لتستفرغ حفتها ولتنكح  
فان لها ما قدر لها —

"We are told as a tradition by Mālik [Bin] 'Ismā'il, that 'Isrā'il tells us, on the authority of 'Āsim, on the authority of 'Abū 'Uthmān, on the authority of 'Usāmah—to whom may God be gracious! saying: I was present with the Prophet . . . when there came to him a messenger on the part of one of his daughters (Sa'd, 'Ubaiy Bin Ka'b, and Mu'ādh being also present with him), to say that her son was at the point of death; whereupon the Prophet sent her this message: 'To God belongs both what he takes away and what he grants; every one has a fixed term of life; be thou, then, patient, and consider"—

فبعث اليها لله ما اخذ ولله ما اعطى كل بأجل فلتنصبر ولتحتسب —

"We are told as a tradition by Hibbān Bin Mūsa, that 'Abdallāh informs us, that Yūnus informs us, on the authority of 'az-Zuhri, saying: I am informed by 'Abdallāh Bin Muḥaiyir-riz 'aj-Jumahī, that he was informed by 'Abū Sa'id 'al-Khudrī, that, while he was sitting with the Prophet . . . there came a man who was one of the Helpers, and said: O Messenger of God, we are taking a woman captive, and prefer the money—what thinkest thou as to [the necessity of] the public deposit in pledge? to which the Messenger of God . . . replied: 'Is your doing so a

\* s. Kur., xviii[lxix]. 73-5, and comp. v. 79.

† Kur., xxxiii[cii]. 38.

‡ MS. has الردنان.

fact?—then it rests not upon you that ye do not so;\* not a breath of life, of which God has written down that it should go forth, fails to be”—

فقال يرسل الله انا نصيبُ سببها وحبب المال كيف ترى في العزل فقال رسول الله . . . اوانكم تفعلون ذلك لا عليكم ان لا تفعلوا فانه ليست نسمة كتب الله ان تخرج الا هي كايئة —

“We are told as a tradition by Mûsa Bin Mas’ûd, that Sufyân tells us, on the authority of ‘al-‘A’mash, on the authority of ‘Abû Wâ’il, on the authority of Hüdhaifah—to whom may God be gracious! saying: The Prophet . . . addressed to us a discourse in which, even to the pomp of the resurrection-hour, he omitted not to speak of any thing which whoever has knowledge of knows for certain, and whoever is ignorant of is positively ignorant of;† should it be my lot to see what he told us, without having borne it in mind, then shall I recognize that which a man recognizes from whom something has been hidden, which he afterwards sees and recognizes”—

لقد خطبنا النبي . . . خطبة ما ترك فيها شيئا الى قيام الساعة الا ذكره علمه من علمه وجهله من جهله ان كنت لارى الشئ قد نسيت فأعرف ما يعرف الرجل اذا غاب عنه فراه فعرفه —

“We are told as a tradition by ‘Abdân, on the authority of ‘Abû Hamzah, on the authority of ‘al-‘A’mash, on the authority of Sa’d Bin ‘Ubaidah, on the authority of ‘Abû ‘Abd-‘ar-Rahmân ‘as-Sulamî, on the authority of ‘Ali—to whom may God be gracious! saying: We were seated with the Prophet . . . , who had by him a staff with which he kept striking the ground, when he said: ‘There is no one of you whose place of abode, whether Hell or Paradise, is not already prescribed;’ whereupon a man of the company said: O Messenger of God, shall we not resign ourselves to God? and the Prophet replied: ‘Nay, work ye; for every one is divinely furthered;’ after which he read the verse ‘Those who are liberal, and fear God,’ and so on”—

وقال ما منكم من احد الا قد كتب مقعده من النار او من الجنة فقال رجل من القوم الا نتكل يرسل الله قال لا اعملوا فكل ميسر ثم فراء فاما من اعطى وانتقى الآية —

“Chapter of Moral Conduct as settled by Final Manifestations (باب العمل بالخوانتم).

“We are told as a tradition by Hibbân Bin Mûsa, that ‘Abdallâh informs us, that Ma’mar informs us, on the authority of ‘az-Zuhri, on the

\* i. e., if a capture has been once made, the responsibility to the public treasury for it is not to be evaded: once a fact, always a fact.

† i. e., all those events of the future which, constituting the secret counsel of God, can be known only by divine revelation.

authority of Sa'id Bin 'al-Musaiyab, on the authority of 'Abū Hurairah—to whom may God be gracious! saying: We were present with the Messenger of God . . . at Khaibar, when the Messenger of God . . . said of a man in his company who loudly professed to be a Muslim: 'This is one of those destined for Hell;' but, after the battle had come on, the man fought most vehemently, and got so many wounds that he was brought to a stand; whereupon there came one of the Companions of the Prophet . . . and said: O Messenger of God, hast thou seen the man whom thou didst announce to be destined for Hell?—he has just been fighting most vehemently in the cause of God, so as to get many wounds; to which the Prophet replied: 'Is it not so, that he is one of those destined for Hell?' At this some of the Muslims were almost disconcerted; meanwhile, however, the man, having received a most severe wound, reached with his hand to his quiver, and drew thence an arrow, which he stuck into his throat. Then came certain men of the Muslims in all haste to the Messenger of God . . . and said: O Messenger of God, God hath verified thy declaration—such a one has just pierced his throat, and killed himself; whereupon the Messenger of God . . . uttered these words: 'O Bilāl, rise and call to prayer; no one but a believer shall enter Paradise, nor is it consistent for God to use the instrumentality of a wicked man for the succor of our religion'—

فقال رسول الله . . . لرجل ممن معه يدعى الاسلام هذا من اهل النار فلما حضر القتال قاتل الرجل من اشد القتال وكثرت به الجراح فاقبنته فجاء رجل من اصحاب النبي . . . فقال يرسل الله أرايت الرجل الذي تحدثت انه من اهل النار قد قاتل في سبيل الله من اشد القتال فكثرت به الجراح فقال النبي . . . أما انه من اهل النار فكاد بعض المسلمين يرتاب فيبينما م على ذلك ان وجد الرجل الم الجراح فاهوى بيده الى كنانته فانتزع منها سهما فانحصر بها فاشتد رجال من المسلمين الى رسول الله . . . فقالوا يرسل الله صدق الله حديثك قد انحصر فلان فقتل نفسه فقال رسول الله . . . يا بلال قم فاقن لا يدخل الجنة الا مؤمن وان الله ليؤيد هذا الدين بالرجل الفاجر —

"We are told as a tradition by Sa'id Bin 'Abi Maryam, that 'Abū Ghassān tells us, saying: I am told by 'Abū Ḥāzim, on the authority of Sahl—to whom may God be gracious! that a certain man, most forward among those who professed islamism, without being in any way dependent upon the Muslims, was on a foray which he made in company with the Prophet . . . when the Prophet . . . looked at him and said: 'Whoever would like to look upon a man who is destined for Hell, let him regard this man;' whereupon one of the company followed after him (he being at that very time engaged in most vehement conflict with the idolaters), until, having been wounded, the man desired to hasten his death, and so pressed the sharp point of his sword into the middle of his breast, until it came out between his shoulder-blades. Then the

one who had followed after him went in haste to the Prophet . . . and said : I bear witness that thou art the Messenger of God ; to which the Prophet replied : ' What does that mean ? ' said the man : Thou didst say of such a one ' Whoever would like to look upon a man who is destined for Hell, let him regard him ; ' now he was one of the most forward among us, without being in any way dependent upon the Muslims, but I own that he died not in the faith, for, having been wounded, he desired to hasten his death, and so has killed himself. Thereupon said the Prophet : ' A man may even conduct like one destined for Hell, although he be destined for Paradise ; and may even conduct like one destined for Paradise, although he be destined for Hell ; and moral conduct is settled only by its final manifestations '—

ان العبد ليعمل عمل اهل النار وانه من اهل الجنة ويعمل عمل اهل الجنة وانه من اهل النار وانما الاعمال بالخوانيم —

“ Chapter that Vowing to God turns a Man over to Predestination (باب القاء النذر العبد الى القدر).

“ We are told as a tradition by 'Abū Nu'aim, that Sufyān tells us, on the authority of Maṣūf, on the authority of 'Abdallāh Bin Murrāh, on the authority of 'Ibn 'Umar—may God be gracious to them both ! saying : The Prophet . . . forbade vowing to God—he said : ' It profits nothing ; only from an avaricious being does one gain by vows '—

قال نهى النبي . . . عن النذر قال انه لا يرد شيئا وانما يستخرج به من البخيل —

“ We are told as a tradition by Bishr Bin Muḥammad, that Ma'mar informs us, on the authority of Hammām Bin Munabbih, on the authority of 'Abū Hurairah—to whom may God be gracious ! on the authority of the Prophet . . . saying : ' Vowing to God brings the son of Adam nothing which I have not fore-ordained, but turns him over to predestination for that which I have fore-ordained for him—it is from an avaricious being that one gets any thing by vows '—

قال لا يات ابن ادم النذر بشئ لم يكن قد قدرته ولكن يلقبه الى القدر وقد قدرته له استخراج به من البخيل —

“ Chapter of the saying ' There is no power, nor strength, but through God.'

“ I am told as a tradition by Muḥammad Bin Muḥātil 'Abu-l-Hasan, that we are informed by 'Abdallāh, that we are informed by Khālid 'al-Ḥadhldhā', on the authority of 'Abū 'Uthmān 'an-Nahdī, on the authority of 'Abū Mūsa—to whom may God be gracious ! saying : We were with the Messenger of God . . . on a foray ; now he had enjoined upon us not to ascend any rising ground, nor go over an eminence, nor descend into any water-course, without raising the cry of 'Allāh 'akbar ; so then, proceeds the reporter, the Messenger of God . . . approached some of us, and said : ' O men, restrain yourselves ; for ye call not upon one who



is deaf, nor upon one at a distance—it is only a hearing and seeing God whom ye invoke;’ after which he added: ‘O ’Abdallâh Bin K̄ais, shall I not make you acquainted with a saying which is one of the treasures of Paradise, namely, “There is no power, nor strength, but through God (لا حول ولا قوة الا بالله).”’

“Chapter of the saying ‘He is secured whom God secures.’

“A securer (عاصم) is one who keeps from any thing (مانع). Says Mujâhid: Being suffered to go at large, unrestrained by the truth, they fall into error (سدأ عن الحَق يتردون في الضلالة) \* is equivalent to اغواها, ‘he led her astray.’

“We are told as a tradition by ’Abdân, that ’Abdallâh informs us, that Yûnus informs us, on the authority of ’az-Zuhrî, saying: I am informed by ’Abû Salamah, on the authority of ’Abû Sa’id ’al-Khudrî—to whom may God be gracious! on the authority of the Prophet . . . saying: ‘There is made to succeed no successor [in human descent] who has not two inclinations, one prompting him to good, and impelling him thereto, and the other prompting him to evil, and thereto impelling him; and he is secured whom God secures’”—

قال ما استخلف خليفة الا له بطانتان بظانته تأمره بالخير و تحضه عليه  
وبطانته تأمره بالشر وتحضه عليه والمعصوم من عصم الله —

“Chapter of the following passages: ‘There is a fixed decree that the people of any city which we destroy shall not repent (حرام على) (قوية اهلكتناها انهم لا يرجعون انه لن يؤمن من قومك الا) ’; ‘No one of thy people will believe, excepting those who have already believed (من قد آمن) ’; ‘nor will they beget other than impious, unbelieving offspring (ولا يلدوا الا فاجرا كفارا).’†

“Says Mansûr Bin ’an-Nu’mân: We are told as a tradition by ’Ikrimah, on the authority of ’Ibn ’Abbâs, that the reading وحرم was in the Abyssinian text.

“We are told as a tradition by Maḥmûd Bin Ghailân, that ’Abd ’ar-Razzâk tells us, that Ma’mar informs us, on the authority of ’Ibn Ṭâ’us, on the authority of his father, on the authority of ’Ibn ’Abbâs—may God be gracious to them both! saying: I think of nothing more like insanity than that which ’Abû Hurairah says, on the authority of the Prophet . . . namely: ‘God fore-ordains for the son of Adam his measure

\* A necessary correction of the reading of the MS., دسأها.

† s. K̄ur., xxi[lxv]. 95; xi[lxxv]. 38; lxxi[li]. 28. Baiḥāwî notices two interpretations of the word حرام in the passage first cited: 1. ممتنع على أهلها غير, which requires the translation “It is repugnant to (or, not imagined by) the people of any city, etc., that they will not come to repentance;” 2. عزم وموجب عليهم, according to which the passage has the meaning given to it in the text, which seems most pertinent to the contents of the chapter—s. Beidh. Comm., ed. Fleischer, i. 623-4.

of lewdness—to that he attains without fail; now lewdness of the eye consists in look; and of the tongue, in speech; and the soul desires and passionately craves, while the pudendum sanctions or repudiates the emotion”—

ان الله كتب على ابن ادم حظّه من الزناء ادرك ذلك لا محالة فزنا العين  
النظر وزنا اللسان المنطق والنفس تمنى وتشتهى والفرج يصدّق ذلك  
ويكذبّه —

This last tradition is also given by Muslim, under the heading of the Fore-ordaining for the Son of Adam of his Measure of Lewdness, with only two unimportant verbal variations: *العينين* for *العينين*, and *المنطق* for *المنطق*; after which he has the following:

“I am told as a tradition by ‘Ishâk Bin Mansûr, that ‘Abû Hishâm ‘al-Makhzûmî informs us, that Wuhaib informs us, that Suhail Bin ‘Abî Şâlih informs us, on the authority of his father, on the authority of ‘Abû Hurairah—to whom may God be gracious! on the authority of the Prophet, saying: ‘The son of Adam has his measure of lewdness fore-ordained for him—to that he attains without fail; now lewdness of the eyes consists in look; and of the ears, in hearing; and of the tongue, in speech; and of the hand, in violence; and of the feet, in a straddling gait; and the heart loves and desires, while the pudendum sanctions or repudiates the emotion’”—

قال كتب على ابن ادم نصيبه من الزناء مدرك ذلك لا محالة فالعينان زناها  
النظر والاذنان زناها الاستماع واللسان زناه الكلام واليد زناها البطش والرجل  
زناها الخطى والقلب يهوى ويتمنى ويصدّق ذلك الفرج ويكذبّه —

Bukhârî continues:

“Chapter of the clause ‘and we appointed the vision which we caused thee to see, only as a trial for men.’\* ”

“We are told as a tradition by ‘al-Humaidî, that Sufyân tells us, on the authority of ‘Amrû, on the authority of ‘Ikrimah, on the authority of ‘Ibn ‘Abbâs—may God be gracious to them both! as follows: ‘And we appointed the vision which we caused thee to see, only as a trial for men,’ that is, the reporter adds, a veritable vision which the Messenger of God . . . was made to see on the night in which he was transported to the temple of Jerusalem”

وما جعلنا الرؤيا التي أريناك الا فتنة للناس قال هي رؤيا عين أريها رسول  
الله . . . ليلة أسرى به الى بيت المقدس —

\* Kur., xvii[lxvii]. 62.

“Chapter of the Dispute between Adam and Moses in the Presence of God.

“We are told as a tradition by 'Alī Bin 'Abdallāh, that Sufyān tells us, saying: We committed to memory the following, at the dictation of 'Amrū, on the authority of Tā'us, namely: I heard 'Abū Hurairah—to whom may God be gracious! say, on the authority of the Prophet . . . : 'Adam and Moses disputed with each other. Said Moses: O Adam, it is thou, our father, who didst frustrate our destiny, and eject us from Paradise; to whom Adam replied: O Moses, thou art he whom God did specially favor with converse with himself, and for whom he traced lines of writing with his own hand—dost thou blame me for doing what God predestined for me forty years before he created me? Therefore Adam got the better of Moses in the dispute; and so did Adam three times get the better of Moses”—

قال أحتجّ آدم وموسى فقال موسى يا آدم انت ابونا خيبتنا واخرجتنا من الجنة قال له آدم يا موسى انت اصطفاك الله بكلامه وخطّ لك بيده اتلومني على امر قدّر الله عليّ قبل ان يخلقني باربعين سنة فحجّ آدم موسى فحجّ آدم موسى ثلاثا —

Here we have to insert a parallel chapter from Muslim, as follows:

“Chapter of the Dispute between Adam and Moses—may the benediction and peace of God rest upon them both!

“I am told as a tradition by Muḥammad Bin Ḥātim, 'Ibrāhīm Bin Dīnār, 'Ibn 'Abī 'Umar 'al-Makkī, and 'Aḥmad Bin 'Abdah 'aḥ-Dhabbī—by all, on the authority of 'Ibn 'Uyainah, saying, to use the words of 'Ibn Ḥātim and 'Ibn Dīnār: We are informed by Sufyān Bin 'Uyainah, on the authority of 'Amrū, on the authority of Tā'us, saying: I heard 'Abū Hurairah—to whom may God be gracious! say: The Messenger of God . . . said: 'Adam and Moses disputed with each other. Said Moses: O Adam, it is thou, our father, who didst frustrate our destiny, and eject us from Paradise; to whom Adam replied: It is thou, O Moses, whom God did specially favor with converse with himself, and for whom he traced lines of writing with his own hand—dost thou blame me for doing that which God predestined for me forty years before he created me? Therefore Adam got the better of Moses in the dispute; and so did Adam [three times\*] get the better of Moses.' In the tradition as given by 'Ibn 'Abī 'Umar and 'Ibn 'Abdah, we have, in the words of the one, '[It is thou] for whom he traced (خطّ),' and, in the words of the other, 'for whom he wrote (كتب), the Law, with his hand.”

“We are told as a tradition by Ḳutaibah Bin Sa'īd, on the authority of Mālik Bin 'Anas, in that which was read to him for his correction

\* ثلاثا being supplied in the printed text.

(فِيمَا قَرَّبَى عَلَيْهِ), on the authority of 'Abu-z-Zinâd, on the authority of 'al-'A'raj, on the authority of 'Abû Hurairah—to whom may God be gracious! that the Messenger of God . . . said: 'Adam and Moses—peace be to them both! disputed with each other, and Adam got the better of Moses. Said Moses to him: It is thou, Adam, who didst spoil mankind of their rectitude, and eject them from Paradise; to which Adam replied: Thou art he to whom God gave the knowledge of all things, and whom he favored above all men as his Messenger; and Moses said: So it is; and Adam rejoined: Thou, then, blamest me for doing that which was fore-ordained for me before I was created?"—

قال نحاج آدم وموسى عليهما السلام فحج آدم موسى فقال له موسى انت آدم الذى اغويت الناس واخرجتهم من الجنة فقال آدم انت الذى اعطاه الله علم كل شئ واصطفاه على الناس برسالته قال نعم قال فنلومنى على امر قدّر علىّ قبل ان اخلف —

"We are told as a tradition by 'Ishâk Bin Mûsa Bin 'Ubaidallâh Bin Mûsa 'al-'Anṣârî, that 'Anas Bin 'Iyâdh informs us, saying: I am told as a tradition by 'al-Hârith Bin 'Abî Dhubâb, on the authority of Yazîd, that is, the son of Hürmuz, and by 'Abd-'ar-Rahmân 'al-'A'raj, saying: We heard 'Abû Hurairah—to whom may God be gracious! say: The Messenger of God . . . said: 'Adam and Moses—peace be to them both! disputed with each other in the presence of their Lord, and Adam got the better of Moses. Said Moses: Thou, Adam, art he whom God created with his hand, and into whom he breathed of his spirit, and whom he caused his angels to do homage to, and made to dwell peacefully in his Garden; and after all, thou by thy crime didst lay prostrate the race of man; to which Adam—peace be to him! replied: It is thou, Moses, whom God specially favored as his Messenger, and to whom he granted special converse with himself, and gave the tablets containing an explanation of all things, and whom he made to come near to himself as a confidant—tell me, then, how long thou hast found it to be, before I was created, that God wrote the Law; Moses answered: Forty years; and Adam continued: Hast thou, then, found it written in the Law that Adam disobeyed his Lord, and lost his rectitude; to which Moses replied: Even so; and Adam said: Dost thou, then, blame me on account of my conducting as God prescribed for me that I should, forty years before he created me? Therefore, added the Messenger of God . . . did Adam get the better of Moses?"—

قال رسول الله . . . احتج آدم وموسى عليهما السلام عند ربهما فحج آدم موسى قال موسى انت آدم الذى خلقك الله بيده ونفخ فيك من روحه واسجد لك ملائكته واسكنك فى جنته ثم اهبطت الناس بخطيئتك الى الارض قال آدم عليه السلام انت موسى الذى اصطفاك الله برسالته وبكلامه

واعضناك الالواح فيها تبليان كل شى وقربك نجيبا فيكم وجدت الله كتب  
التورة قبل ان اخلف قال موسى باربعين عاما قال ادم فهل وجدت فيها  
وعصى ادم ربه فغوى قال نعم قال افتلومنى على ان عملت عملا كتبه الله  
على ان اعمله قبل ان يخلقنى باربعين سنة قال رسول الله . . . فحجج ادم  
موسى —

“I am told as a tradition by Zuhair Bin Harb, and Ibn Hātim, saying: We are informed by Ya'kūb Bin 'Ibrāhīm, saying: We are informed by my father, on the authority of 'Ibn Shihāb, on the authority of Ḥumaid Bin 'Abd-'ar-Raḥmān, on the authority of 'Abū Hurairah—to whom may God be gracious! saying: Said the Messenger of God . . . 'Adam and Moses disputed with each other. Moses said to Adam: Thou art he whose crime ejected thee [and thy race in thee] from Paradise; to whom Adam replied: It is thou, Moses, whom God specially favored as his Messenger, and to whom he granted special converse with himself; and yet thou blamest me for doing that which was fore-ordained for me before I was created. Therefore Adam got the better of Moses” —

قال رسول الله . . . احتجج ادم وموسى فقال له موسى انت ادم الذى  
اخرجتك خطيئتك من الجنة فقال له ادم انت موسى الذى اصطفاك  
الله برسائنه وبكلامه ثم تلومنى على امر قد قدر على قبل ان اخلف فحجج  
ادم موسى —

Returning to Bukhārī, we read:

“Chapter of the saying ‘There is no one to refuse that which God bestows.

“We are told as a tradition by Muhammad Bin Sinān, that Fulaih tells us, that 'Abdah Bin 'Abi Lubābah tells us, on the authority of Warrād, an intimate of 'al-Mughīrah Bin Shu'bah, saying: Mu'aiwah wrote to 'al-Mughīrah as follows: Write for me what thou didst hear the Prophet . . . say, after prayer. So some one set down in writing, for 'al-Mughīrah's correction (فاملئ على المغيرة), the following: I heard the Prophet . . . , after prayer, say: ‘There is no God but Allāh alone—he has no associate; O God, there is no one to refuse that which thou bestowest; and no one to grant that which thou refusest; nor does striving avail any one against thee” —

سمعت النبى . . . يقول خاف الصلاة لا اله الا الله وحده لا شريك له اللهم  
لا مانع لما اعطيت ولا معطى لما منعت ولا ينفع ذا الجدد منك الجدد —

“Chapter of Those who Take Refuge with God from the Vexation of Misfortune and the Ills of Destiny; and of the Divine Declaration ‘Say

thou : I take refuge with the Lord of the dawn, from the evil of created things باب من تعوذ بالله من درك الشقاء وسوء القضاء وقوله تعالى قل أعوذ

\*(بِربِّ الفلق من شرِّ ما خلق

“We are told as a tradition by Musaddid, that Sufyân tells us, on the authority of Suma, on the authority of ‘Abû Sâlih, on the authority of ‘Abû Hurairah—to whom may God be gracious! on the authority of the Prophet . . . saying: ‘Take ye refuge with God from the pressure of calamity, the vexation of misfortune, the ills of destiny, and the malice of enemies’”—

قال تعوذوا بالله من جهد البلاء ودرك الشقاء وسوء القضاء وشماتة الأعداء —

This last chapter has its correspondent, in purport, in the following from Muslim :

“Chapter of the Command to be Strong, to Cease from Weakliness, to Ask Help of God, and to Leave Decrees to him (باب في الأمر بالقوة) (وترك العجز والاستعانة بالله وتفويض المقادير إليه

“We are told as a tradition by ‘Abû Bakr Bin ‘Abi Shaibah, and ‘Tbn Numair, saying: We are informed by ‘Abdallâh Bin ‘Idris, on the authority of Rab‘ah Bin ‘Uthmân, on the authority of Muḥammad Bin Yahya Bin Ḥabbân, on the authority of ‘al-‘A‘raj, on the authority of ‘Abû Hurairah—to whom may God be gracious! saying: The Messenger of God . . . said: ‘The strong believer is better and more dear to God than one who is weak, and there is some good in every thing; eagerly seek to profit, ask help of God, and be not weakly; and, if any ill befalls thee, say not: Had it been my doing, it would have been so and so, but say: It is God’s decree, and whatever he wills he does—that, indeed, for all thou mayest have set thyself to acting like Satan [by arrogating to thyself wisdom superior to God’s]’”—

قال رسول الله . . . المؤمن القوي خير وأحب إلى الله من المؤمن الضعيف وفي كل خير احرص على ما ينفعك واستعن بالله ولا تعجز وإن أصابك شئ فلا تقل لو أني فعلت كان كذا أو كذا ولكن قل قدر الله وما شاء فعل فإن لو تفتح عمل الشيطان —

Bukhârî continues as follows :

“Chapter of the clause ‘God interposes between a man and his heart (باب بحول بين المرء وقلبه)†

“We are told as a tradition by Muḥammad Bin Mukâtil ‘Abu-l-Ḥasan, that ‘Abdallâh informs us, that Mûsa Bin ‘Uqbah informs us, on the authority of Sâlim, on the authority of ‘Abdallâh—to whom may God be gracious! who frequently said: One of the customary oaths of the

\* s. Kur., cxiii[vi]. 1-2.

† Kur., viii[xcv]. 24.

Prophet . . . was: ‘No, by him who turns hearts about (لا ومقلب القلوب)’—

Corresponding to this Muslim gives us the following:

“Chapter of God’s Disposing of Hearts as He will (باب تصريف الله) (القلوب كيف شاء).

“I am told as a tradition by Zuhair Bin Ḥarb, and ‘Ibn Numair—both reporting on the authority of ‘al-Mukri’—saying, to use the words of Zuhair: We are informed by ‘Abdallāh Bin Yazīd ‘al-Mukri’, that Ḥayāt informs us, saying: I am informed by ‘Abū Hānī’, that he heard ‘Abū Abd-‘ar-Rahmān ‘al Hubulī say, that he heard ‘Abdallāh Bin ‘al-‘Āṣ—may God be gracious to them both! say, that he heard the Messenger of God . . . say: ‘All the hearts of the children of Adam are held between two fingers of the Merciful, as one heart, which he governs as he will;’ after which the Messenger of God . . . said: ‘O God, disposer of hearts, so govern our hearts that we may obey thee!’—

يقول ان قلوب بني ادم كلها بين اصبعين من اصابع الرحمن كقلب واحد  
يصرّفه كيف يشاء ثم قال رسول الله . . . اللهم مصرف القلوب صرف قلوبنا  
على ضاعتك —

Bukhārī adds the following tradition:

“We are told as a tradition by ‘Alī Bin Ḥafṣ, and Bishr Bin Muḥammad, saying: We are informed by ‘Abdallāh, that Ma‘mar informs us, on the authority of ‘az-Zuhri, on the authority of Sālim, on the authority of ‘Ibn ‘Umar—may God be gracious to them both! saying: The Prophet said to ‘Ibn Ṣaiyād: ‘Guess what my thought is;’ to which the latter replied: The smoke; the Prophet . . . rejoined: ‘Be gone, but not to exceed thy destiny;’ said ‘Umar: Permit me, and I will sever his neck; the Prophet replied: ‘Let alone—if that is to be, the power to do it is not in thee; and if not to be, in vain wouldst thou kill him’—

قال النبي . . . خبأت لك خبيئاً قال الدخّ قال اخسأ فلن تعدو قدرك قال  
عمر ايذن لي فاضرب عنقه قال دعه ان يكن هو فلا تطيقه وان لم يكن  
هو فلا خير لك في قتله —

Then come two chapters with which Bukhārī completes his collection of traditions on the subject before us:

“Chapter of the clause ‘Say thou: There shall no evil befall us, but that which God fore-ordained for us (باب قل لن يصيبنا الا ما كتب الله لنا) — (\*‘باب قل لن يصيبنا الا ما كتب الله لنا) —  
قضى being used in the sense of قضى.

“Says Mujāhid: Not seducers of, i. e., not leading astray, any but those whom God fore-ordained, i. e., predestined, to come to Hell; for

\* Kur, ix[cxiii]. 51.

he guides by a predestination to misery as well as to felicity, and like as cattle are led to their pastures"—

قال مجاهد بغانمين بمضلين الا من كتب الله انه يصلى الجحيم قدر فهدى  
قدر الشقاء والسعادة وهدى الانعام لمرانها —

"It is a tradition of 'Ishāk Bin 'Ibrāhīm 'al-Hanzālī, that 'an-Nadhīr informs us, that Dā'ud Bin 'Abi-l-Furāt tells us, on the authority of 'Abdallāh Bin Baridah, on the authority of Yahya Bin Ya'mur, that 'Ā'ishah—to whom may God be gracious! informed him, that she inquired of the Messenger of God . . . respecting pestilence; whereupon he said: 'It is a punishment inflicted by God upon whomsoever he pleases, but which God makes to be a mercy to believers: no mortal, being in a city where there is pestilence, who waits in the midst of it, not leaving the city, patient and collected, knowing that no evil will befall him but that which God fore-ordained for him—shall he not have a like reward with the martyr?'"—

اخبرته انها سألت رسول الله . . . عن الطاعون فقال انه كان عذابا يبعثه  
الله على من يشاء فجعله الله رحمة للمؤمنين ما من عبد يكون في بلدة  
يكون فهو يكت فيه لا يخرج من البلدة صابرا محتسبا يعلم انه لا يصيبه  
الا ما كتب الله له الا كان له مثل اجر شهيد —

"Chapter of the following clauses: 'and if God had not guided us, we should not have been directed; 'if God had guided me, I should certainly have been one of those who fear him.'\*

"We are told as a tradition by 'Abu-n-Nu'mān, that Jarīr, that is, Bin Hāzīm, tells us, on the authority of 'Abū 'Ishāk, on the authority of 'al-Barā' Bin 'Āzīb—may God be gracious to them both! saying: I saw the Prophet . . . on the Day of the Ditch, carrying earth with us, when he said: 'By God! were it not for God, we should not have been directed, we should not have fasted, we should not have prayed. Do Thou, then, inspire us with a tranquil mind, and make firm our feet, that we may bear the onset of the idolaters who have defied us. Hard is it for us, when God is pleased to try us! In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate'"—

وهو يقول والله لولا الله ما هتدينا ولا صمنا ولا صلينا فانزلن سكينتنا علينا  
وقببت الاقدام ان لاقينا والمشركين قد بغوا علينا اذا اراد فتنه ابينا بسم  
الله الرحمن الرحيم —

There remain a few traditions to be cited from Muslim:

"Chapter of the Writing of the Decrees before the Creation (باب كتب)  
(المقادير قبل الخلق).

\* Kur., vii[*lxxxvii*]. 41, and xxxix[*lxxx*]. 58.



"I am told as a tradition by 'Abu-t-Ṭāhir 'Aḥmad Bin 'Amrū Bin 'Abdallāh Bin 'Amrū Bin Sarh, that 'Ibn Wahb informs us, saying: I am informed by 'Abū Hānī' 'al-Khawlānī, on the authority of 'Abū 'Abd-'ar-Raḥmān 'al-Ḥubulī, on the authority of 'Abdallāh Bin 'Amrū Bin 'al-'Āṣ—may God be gracious to them both! saying: I heard the Messenger of God . . . say: 'God wrote the decrees respecting created things fifty thousand years before he created the heavens and the earth;' and, adds the reporter, the throne of God is upon the waters"\*—

يقول كتب الله مقادير أخلّيف قبل أن يخلق السموات والأرض خمسين  
الف سنة قال وعرشه على الماء —

"Chapter of the saying 'Every thing is by predestination, even to infirmity and acuteness of mind.'

"I am told as a tradition by 'Abd 'al 'A'la Bin Ḥammād, saying: I read to Mālik Bin 'Anas for his correction, as follows; and we are told as a tradition by Kūtaibah Bin Sa'id, on the authority of Mālik, in that which was read to him for his correction, on the authority of Ziyād Bin Sa'd, on the authority of 'Amrū Bin Muslim, on the authority of Ṭā'us, that he said: I once caught up with certain men among the Companions of the Messenger of God . . . who were saying: 'Every thing is by predestination;' and I heard, adds the reporter, 'Abdallāh Bin 'Umar say: The Messenger of God . . . said: 'Every thing is by predestination, even to infirmity and acuteness of mind (or, acuteness of mind and infirmity)'"—

أدرکت ناسا من اصحاب رسول الله يقولون كل شئ بقدر قال وسمعت عبد  
الله بن عمر يقول قال رسول الله . . . كل شئ بقدر حتى العجز والكيس او  
الكيس والعجز —

"Chapter of the divine declaration 'Verily, we have created all things according to a fixed decree.'†

"We are told as a tradition by 'Abū Bakr Bin 'Abī Shaibah, and 'Abū Kuraib, saying: We are informed by Waki', on the authority of Sufyān, on the authority of Ziyād Bin 'Ismā'il, on the authority of Muhammad Bin 'Abbād Bin Ja'far 'al-Makhzūmī, on the authority of 'Abū Ḥurairah—to whom may God be gracious! saying: There came some idolaters of the tribe of Kuraish to dispute with the Messenger of God . . . respecting predestination; and then were revealed the verses 'On the day when they shall be trailed along in Hell, on their faces, while these words are spoken: Taste ye contact with the infernal fire. Verily, we have created all things according to a fixed decree (أنا كل شئ خلقناه) أنا كل شئ خلقناه) (بقدر).'"

"Chapter of the Mention of one who Died in Boyhood, and of the

\* comp. Ps. xxix. 10, The Lord sitteth upon the flood; yea, the Lord sitteth king forever.  
† Kur., liv[xlix]. 49.

Creation of Persons for Paradise, and for Hell, while yet in the Loins of their Fathers (وخلق اهل الجنة واهل النار وهم في اصلااب ابايهم).

"We are told as a tradition by Zuhair Bin Harb, that Jarir informs us, on the authority of 'al-'Alâ' Bin 'al-Musaiyab, on the authority of Fudhail Bin 'Amrû, on the authority of 'Â'ishah the daughter of Talhah, on the authority of 'Â'ishah the Mother of the Faithful—to whom may God be gracious! saying: A certain boy was taken away by death, respecting whom I said: Happy is he! a sparrow among the sparrows of Paradise has he become; whereupon the Messenger of God said: 'And dost thou not know that God made both Paradise and Hell, and accordingly creates some persons for the one and some for the other?'—

قلت توفى صبى فقلت طوبى له عصفور من عصفير الجنة فقال رسول الله . . .  
اولا تدريين ان الله خلق الجنة وخلق النار فخلق لهذه اهلا ولهذه اهلا—

"We are told as a tradition by 'Abû Bakr Bin 'Abi Shaibah, that Waki' informs us, on the authority of Talhah Bin Yahya, on the authority of his aunt 'Â'ishah the daughter of Talhah, on the authority of 'Â'ishah the Mother of the Faithful—to whom may God be gracious! saying: The Messenger of God . . . was called to the funeral of a boy who belonged among the Defenders of the Prophet; upon which I said: O Messenger of God, happy is this boy! a sparrow among the sparrows of Paradise is he—no evil did he, and no evil will touch him; then said the Prophet: 'Or else the reverse of that; O 'Â'ishah, verily God creates some persons for Paradise, whom he creates therefor while yet in the loins of their fathers; and he creates some for Hell, whom he creates therefor while yet in the loins of their fathers'—

قالت دعى رسول الله . . . الى جنازة صبى من الانصار فقلت يا رسول الله طوبى لهذا عصفور من عصفير الجنة لم يعمل السوء ولم يدركه قال او غير ذلك يا عائشة ان الله خلق للجنة اهلا خلقهم لها وهم في اصلااب ابايهم وخلق للنار اهلا خلقهم لها وهم في اصلااب ابايهم —

"Chapter on the Fixing of Terms of Life and Portioning of Allotments, beyond the power to anticipate or defer (باب فى ضرب الاجال)

(وقسم الارزاق لا يجعل شى ولا يؤخر).

"We are told as a tradition by 'Abû Bakr Bin 'Abi Shaibah, and 'Abû Kuraib, saying, to use the words of 'Abû Bakr: We are informed by Waki', on the authority of Mis'ar, on the authority of 'Alkamah Bin Marthad, on the authority of 'al-Mughirah Bin 'Abdallâh 'al-Yashkuri, on the authority of 'al-Ma'rûr Bin Suwaid, on the authority of 'Abdallâh, saying: 'Umm Hâbibah the wife of the Prophet . . .—to whom may God be gracious! said: O God, spare to me my husband, the Messenger of God, and my father 'Abû Sufyân, and my brother Mu'âwiyah! and thereupon, continues the reporter, said the Prophet . . .: 'Thou hast asked of God respecting terms of life already fixed, days numbered, and allot-

ments portioned out—of which nought is to be anticipated, before its time, nor deferred thereafter; hadst thou asked of God to save thee from the punishment of Hell (or, from punishment in the grave), it would have been better (or, more meritorious). The same reporter says: Mention was also made, in the presence of the Prophet, of the male apes (says Mis'ar: While I was the Prophet's guest [mention was made etc.]), and of the swine, representing men transformed;\* then said the Prophet: 'Verily, God doth not give progeny and offspring to men transformed into lower animals† —the male apes and swine existed already, before the transformation spoken of'—

فقال النبي . . . قد سألت الله لاجال مصروبة وإيَّام معدودة وأرزاق مقسومة  
 لن يجعل شياً قبل حلّه أو يؤخّر شيئاً عن حلّه ولو كنت سألت الله أن  
 يعيدك من عذاب النار أو عذاب في القبر كان خيراً أو أفضل قال وذكرت  
 عنده القردة قال مسعر وأواه قال والخنازير من مسخ فقال إن الله لم يجعل  
 لمسخ نسلاً ولا عقباً وقد كانت القردة والخنازير قبل ذلك —

It seemed proper, in citing these traditions, to give what may be called their genealogy, in the very terms of the collections from which we derive them, not merely for the sake of making more familiar the external forms under which these traditional memorials of Muhammad have been handed down, but also because their genealogical descent constitutes the main ground of their being esteemed authoritative by the Muslims themselves.‡ Yet it is not proposed to enter into a critical examination of the external history of these traditions, in order to passing judgment upon their claims to be regarded as authentic; but, taking it for granted, in reliance upon the decision of two traditionists of the highest authority, that their genealogy is unexceptionable, we may be satisfied to receive them with full confidence, as expressing opinions of Muhammad, if we find their contents consistent with the testimony of the *Kurân* as already presented; and perhaps the question of their authenticity may be allowed to rest on such internal evidence the more confidently, for the very reason that the contents of a tradition, being regarded by the Muslim doctors themselves as of only secondary importance in respect to its acceptance, are the less likely to have been tampered with by the generations which have transmitted it, while, at the same time, it is not to

\* s. *Kur.*, v[*cxiv*]. 65.

† i. e., no new species of beings is created by such transformation.

‡ s. this *Journal*, vii. 88.

be supposed that they would neglect the kernel in caring for the shell.

What then do the foregoing traditions teach on the subject of predestination? They declare that in the remote ages of eternity—"fifty thousand years" says one "before he created the heavens and the earth" (p. 145)—God passed certain unchangeable decrees in respect to all created things, including, for man, not only allotments of physical good and evil, and intellectual abilities, but determinations of moral conduct, and decisions as to destiny in the future world. Even wicked human conduct is represented as decreed by God: "God fore-ordains for the son of Adam his measure of lewdness—to that he attains without fail" (s. pp. 137-8); yet not so as to involve the denial of freedom to do right, for, in the very traditions here alluded to, it is implied that the will has control over those indulgences of the emotional nature which constitute sin.

As to the origin of human sinfulness, it is taught that all men are born "religiously constituted," or "religious," or "of this religion," i. e., in a condition of ability to conform to the religion which Muhammad claimed to be the true (p. 131); and this point is significantly illustrated by the saying: "like as ye take up the beast at its birth—do ye find upon it any mutilation, until ye yourselves mutilate it?" (p. 130, and comp. p. 131). Hereditary depravity, then, is denied. All departures from truth and rectitude are referred to parental instruction: "it is his parents who make him, afterwards, a Jew, or a Christian, or a Magian" (p. 132); and, also, to fierce besettings of Satan: "Every man whom his mother brings forth is buffeted on both sides by Satan" (*ibid.*)—Jesus and the Virgin Mary alone being exempted. Yet something of infirmity is recognized as pertaining to human nature, for men are said to stand in need of divine guidance, in order to right conduct (p. 144); and the Prophet is reported to have declared, as "one of the treasures of Paradise:" "There is no power, nor strength, but through God" (p. 137), and again: "There is made to succeed no successor [in human descent] who has not two inclinations, one prompting him to good, and impelling him thereto, and the other prompting him to evil, and thereto impelling him; and he is secured whom God secures" (*ibid.*). Nor is the divine influence which man needs, in order to right doing, supposed to be limited to the arrangement of outward circumstances, for "All the hearts of the children of Adam," said the Prophet, as reported, "are held between two fingers of the Merciful, as one heart, which he governs as he will" (s. p. 143). The old question of the moral condition of infants, however, is met by an implied denial of their having any positive moral character: "God best knows what would have been their conduct" [had they lived to maturity] (pp. 130-2);

—which, according to one tradition, was said in immediate connection with the denial of hereditary depravity already referred to.

There is an implied reservation of human liberty, also, in the manner in which is set forth the preventive power of the divine decrees respecting future destiny; for, while it is said that “God made both Paradise and Hell, and accordingly creates some persons for the one and some for the other” (p. 146), and even that “he guides by a predestination to misery as well as to felicity, and like as cattle are led to their pastures” (p. 144)—(if these are words of Muhammad) it is likewise affirmed that “any one of you may even conduct himself as do those destined for Paradise, until there is only an ell between him and it; and yet the registered decree shall prevent him, *so that he shall conduct himself as do those destined for Hell, and accordingly enter therein*: and any one of you may even conduct himself as do those destined for Hell, until the distance between him and it is only an ell; and yet the registered decree shall prevent him, *so that he shall conduct himself as do those destined for Paradise, and accordingly enter therein*” (p. 123). Again, that a man is not borne along by irresistible fatality to Heaven or to Hell, but is himself the prime procurer of his own future destiny, is explicitly taught: “There is no one of you,” the Prophet is reported to have said—“there is no soul born whose place, whether Paradise or Hell, has not been predetermined by God, and which has not been registered beforehand as either miserable or blessed;” whereupon a certain man inquired: “O Messenger of God, shall we not, then, await our registered destiny, and let conduct alone?” to which the Prophet is said to have replied: “Whosoever is destined to felicity, will set himself to the conduct of the blessed; and whosoever is destined to misery, will set himself to the conduct of the miserable. *Work ye, seeing that every one is divinely furthered*: as for those destined to felicity, they are furthered to the conduct of the blessed; and as for those destined to misery, they are furthered to the conduct of the miserable” (p. 126); while, according to another tradition, it was said by the Prophet: “Every moral agent is *furthered to his own conduct*” (p. 128), or, as another has it: “Every one is *divinely furthered in accordance with his character*” (ibid.).

On the other hand, the doctrine that character and conduct are not matters of contingency, but are included within the scope of the decrees of God, is equally well guarded. To the inquiry: “O Messenger of God, dost thou think that what men now do, and endeavor after, is something determined for them, and which a preventing predestination previously assigned to them? or are their actions casual incidents, consequent upon what their Prophet has announced to them, and their proved obligations?” (in another tradition: “was it unchangeably writ-

ten, and predetermined, that we should be so disposed as we are, at this time, touching present conduct? or, on the other hand, is our character a casual incident?") the Prophet is reported to have replied: "Not so, but rather are the actions of men determined for them, and previously assigned to them" (s. pp. 128-9).

One tradition, indeed, reported by Bukhârî and Muslim together in several forms, respecting an imagined dispute between Adam and Moses, might seem to imply that divine predestination excludes blameworthiness: "Said Moses: O Adam, it is thou, our father, who didst frustrate our destiny, and eject us from Paradise; to whom Adam replied: O Moses, thou art he whom God did specially favor with converse with himself, and for whom he traced lines of writing with his own hand—dost thou blame me for doing what God predestined for me forty years before he created me? Therefore Adam got the better of Moses in the dispute" (s. p. 139, and comp. pp. 140-1). But these words put into the mouth of our prime progenitor: "dost thou blame, etc." are an *argumentum ad hominem*, intended to silence one who fails to recognize the moral liberty of the race—comp. the expressions attributed to Moses: "didst frustrate our destiny," "didst spoil mankind of their rectitude" (p. 140), and "didst lay prostrate the race of man" (*ibid.*).

The preceding remarks cover all the important theoretical part of Muhammad's teachings, reported by tradition, with respect to predestination. But there are embodied in the traditions under review some practical principles, bearing upon the subject, which also claim our notice.

A certain passiveness in regard to outward circumstances is enjoined as follows: "no mortal, being in a city where there is pestilence, who waits in the midst of it, not leaving the city, patient and collected, knowing that no evil will befall him but that which God fore-ordained for him—shall he not have a like reward with the martyr?" (p. 144); and again, when one of the Prophet's wives had prayed to God to spare her husband and her father, Muhammad is reported to have said: "Thou hast asked of God respecting terms of life already fixed, days numbered, and allotments portioned out—of which nought is to be anticipated, before its time, nor deferred thereafter; hadst thou asked of God to save thee from the punishment of Hell (or, from punishment in the grave) it would have been better (or, more meritorious)" (pp. 146-7); also, on another occasion, in reply to a message from one of his daughters, to inform him that her son was at the point of death, the Prophet is reported to have said: "To God belongs both what he takes away and what he grants; every one has a fixed term of life; be thou, then, patient, and consider" (p. 133).

On the same ground, vowing to God is forbidden: "Vowing

to God brings the son of Adam nothing which I have not fore-ordained, but turns him over to predestination for that which I have fore-ordained for him" (i. e., he gets it not for his vowing, but because it was fore-ordained for him)—"it is from an avaricious being that one gets any thing by vows" (s. p. 136).

Again, it is set forth as becoming the believer to seek profit by the "some good in every thing," asking help of God, and trusting in him, when ill befalls, with the injunction: "say not: Had it been my doing, it would have been so and so, but say: It is God's decree, and whatever he wills he does" (p. 142).

It appears, then, from this review, that the doctrine of predestination which Muslim tradition ascribes to Muḥammad, though more fully developed, indeed, than the teachings of the *Kurân* on the same subject, is entirely consistent with the latter; for while, on the one hand, we seem to find a system of absolute election and reprobation, there is a doctrine of human freedom unmistakably presented, on the other, compelling us to qualify the sharper assertions of divine predestination in harmony with it. We may add, in passing, that the language of tradition seems often to be a reflection, or even a repetition, of that used in the *Kurân*. It is also worthy of remark, with regard to the style of these traditions, that the concrete form of their doctrinal statements is fitted to encourage confidence in their being genuine, especially when one contrasts this mode of presentation with the abstract tenor of the discussions on the subject of predestination, and kindred topics, which arose in the schools of the Muslims, after Muḥammad's generation had passed away.

3. In pursuance of the plan proposed, I shall now simply excerpt what is to be found relating to predestination in Shahrastâni's exposition of Muslim theologico-philosophical speculations, up to his time in the twelfth century. No such summary has been drawn up hitherto; and, indeed, Shahrastâni's *Book of Religious and Philosophical Sects*, while perhaps the most important original authority which we have, covering the whole field of Muslim philosophy, could be consulted, till of late, by only a few of those whom its statements especially concerned; and is now known, beyond the circle of professed orientologists, only by the German translation of Haarbrücker, which can be scarcely said to suffice for the reader to whom the original Arabic is not also intelligible. Some brief explanations will be thrown in, here and there, to make our author's meaning more clear, and some chronological data will be added;\* but I shall not attempt,

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\* Our author's arrangement, which seems to be in chronological sequence, may serve to determine, approximately, the periods of some of the theologians named.

at present, independently of this author, either to point out the possible historical connections, or to unfold the metaphysical origin, of any of the opinions stated. However inviting a field of research it may be, to ascertain the genesis of these speculations, I do not feel myself prepared to enter upon it in the way of original investigation; and even the latest writers on the Scholastic philosophy whom I have consulted, Hauréau, Rousselot, and Ritter, offer but little assistance in such an inquiry. All these writers confine their remarks upon the philosophy of the Arabs, for the most part, to the various modifications of Aristotelianism which grew up among them, to the neglect of the doctrines of the *Kurân*; and it would, certainly, have been less to their purpose to inquire into those speculations by which disciples of Muḥammad who professed to keep within the limits of received doctrine, sought to shape their religious belief to the requirements of widening philosophical culture. The same point of view is that chiefly taken by Munk and Renan, also, in their late valuable publications relative to Arab philosophy. The more simple statements of the *Kurân*, and those of the great collections of tradition, might have, also, led us to some interesting comparisons; for there is a striking similarity between the *Kurânic* doctrine of predestination and the Biblical, inasmuch as both enunciate the opposite truths involved, with equal boldness, and a seeming unconcern about their reconciliation; nor can it be doubted that the definitions thrown around the subject by Muslim tradition, imperfect as they are, savor much of what has been called the Greek anthropology.\* But I could not well pursue even these more obvious lines of comparison.

Muslim theologians, as Shahrastâni informs us,† have differed among themselves on the following points: 1. the divine unity, 2. divine justice, 3. the promises and threatenings of God, 4. revelation, 5. human reason.

The orthodox doctrine of divine justice is defined to be "that the Supreme God is just in his doings in the sense that he exercises sovereign discretion in his kingdom and dominion, doing what he wills, and ordaining as he pleases (انه متصرف في ملكه)

(وَمَلِكُهُ يَفْعَلُ مَا يَشَاءُ وَيُحْكِمُ مَا يَرِيدُ): for justice," it is said, "consists in putting things in their right places, which is sovereignty of control in accordance with the promptings of choice and the requisitions of knowledge, while injustice is the opposite; so that no iniquity in ordaining, or injustice in disposing, is to be imagined as pertaining to God"—in short, that the character of God

\* s. Shedd's *History of Christ. Doctr.*, New York, 1863, ii. 26-42.

† pp. 28-9 of Cureton's edition.



as a just being, in the view of his creatures, depends not upon his acts, but is to be assumed, whatever his acts may be, or seem to be. The Separatists, on the other hand, defined justice to be "conformity to the dictates of reason with regard to what is wise (ما يقتضيه العقل من الحكمة), that is, the governing of action by the standard of rectitude and utility." Such is the fundamental difference of system which we shall find carried out in the speculations to be brought forward, touching the relations of God to the world.

Accordingly, as to the third point, those reputed orthodox denied that there is any ground in the nature of things for the divine threatenings and promises, or for the divine commands and prohibitions; but resolved both into "an eternal fiat of God (كلامه الأزلي), so that every one who is saved, and partakes, as he must, of reward, is saved by virtue of divine promise (فيوعده); and every one who is lost, and partakes, as he must, of penalty, is lost by virtue of divine threatening (فيوعبه); and accordingly nothing befalls any one by a necessity arising from the require-

ments of reason (فلا يجب عليه شيء من قضية العقل)." But the Separatists affirmed that there is no such eternal fiat, and that all the divine commands and prohibitions, promises and threatenings, are contingent (بكلام تحدث), "so that whoever is saved merits reward for his conduct, and whoever is lost merits penalty for the same; and that reason, having respect to what is wise, requires these allotments (العقل من حيث الحكمة يقتضى ذلك)."

Tradition shows, as we have already learned, that in the minds of the followers of Muhammad, in his own day, there was a conflict between the sense of human responsibility and belief in divine sovereignty; and we have also seen that the teachings of the Kurân left open the way to just that opposition of views which is brought out by Shahrastâni in the statements here referred to. But we learn from our author, more particularly,\* that "in the latter days of the Companions of the Prophet arose the new doctrine of Ma'bad 'aj-Juhanî, Ghailân 'ad-Dimashkî and Yûnus 'al-'Aswârî, consisting in the maintenance of human ability, and a denial of all relation of moral good and evil to divine predestination (في القول بالقدر وانكار اضافة)

(الخير والنشر الى القدر); and that their views were further developed by Wâsil Bin 'Atâ' 'al-Ghazzâl and his pupil 'Amrû Bin 'Ubaid;† but that Wâsil and his followers were the first to be

\* pp. 17-18 as above.

† Who both lived in the first half of the eighth century: s. p. 155, and Ibn Khalik., ed. De Slane, p. 536.

designated by the name of Mu'tazilah, or Separatists. At a later period, "some of the masters of the Mu'tazilah gave themselves to the diligent reading of the works of the Philosophers,\* when translated in the days of 'al-Ma'mûn [in the early part of the ninth century], and so incorporated their methods with their own, and formed a special branch of science under the name of 'al-Kalâm," that is, the Science of the Divine Word, or dogmatic theology.†

We have now to follow the details of our author respecting the doctrines of the Mu'tazilah, and of the several subordinate sects included under that name, so far as they bear upon the subject of predestination.

First, then, from his specification of some points on which all the Mu'tazilah concurred, we derive the following particulars.‡ It was an opinion common to them all, that "eternity is the distinguishing attribute of the Divine Being;" and they all denied the existence of eternal divine qualities, on the ground that, being eternal, they could only be conceived of as so many separate divinities. Their language on this point was that God "is knowing by virtue of his being, powerful by virtue of his being, living by virtue of his being—not by knowledge, power, and life as eternal qualities, and ideas subsistent in him (هو عالم لذاته قادر)

” (لذاته حتى لذاته لا يعلم وقدرة وحيوية في صفات قديمة ومعاني قديمة به

In like manner, "they all denied that willing, hearing, and seeing are ideas subsistent in the Divine Being, though differing as to the modes of their existence, and their metaphysical grounds."

"They also agreed in believing that man is the creative efficient of his actions, good and bad (أن العبد قادر خالق لافعاله), and gets reward and punishment in the future world, by merit, for what he does; and that no moral evil or iniquity, or action of unbelief or disobedience, can be referred to God, because, if he has caused unrighteousness to be, he is himself unrighteous (لأنه لو خلق الظلم كان ظالما).

"They all believed, also, that the All-wise does only that which is beneficial and good (إلا الصلاح والخير), and that a regard to the interests of men (مصالح العباد), in the light of wisdom, is incumbent upon him; though they differed as to his being obligated to secure the highest good, and to bestow grace (وأما الأصلح) (واللطف ففي وجوبه خلاف عندهم."

\* i. e., the works of Greek philosophers, chiefly of the school of Aristotle; those of the Muslims who gave themselves up to the methods and views of that school were consequently called Philosophers, and we shall find the name frequently used in this sense.

† Munk, in his *Mélanges de Philos. Juive et Arabe*, p. 312.

‡ pp. 30-1 as above.

Of what our author says of the doctrines of the several sects of the Mu'tazilah, the following statements are to our purpose.\*

"The *Wāsilīyah*—followers of 'Abû Hudhaifah Wāsil Bin 'Atâ' 'al-Ghazzâl, a pupil of 'al-Hasan of Basrah . . . both of whom lived in the days of 'Abd-'al-Mâlik and Hishâm Bin 'Abd-'al-Mâlik [A.D. 684–743]. In the West, at the present time, there is a small remnant of them. . . . Their separatism turns upon four fundamental points: 1. The denial of knowledge, power, will, and life as qualities of the Creator." . . . Wāsil took up this doctrine on the ground that all men recognize "the absurdity of the existence of two [or more] eternal, infinite divinities, . . . but it was only after study of the works of the Philosophers that his followers came to entertain it. Their speculations on the subject led them, at length, to reduce all divine qualities to the fact that God is knowing and powerful (إلى كونه عالما قادرا), and afterwards to determine that knowledge and power are qualities of the nature of essence (صفتان ذاتيتان), which are to be accounted as going to make up the eternal essence (فما اعتباران للذات القدیة)—according to the expression of 'aj-Jubbâ'î,† or states (حالتان)—according to that of 'Abû Hâshim;‡ while 'Abu-l-Husain of Basrah§ was inclined to reduce the two to one, namely, the quality of a knowing being (العالمیة), which is precisely the teaching of the Philosophers." . . . 2. Their way of maintaining predestination. "On this point, Wāsil only followed in the steps of Ma'bad 'aj-Juhanî and Ghailân 'ad-Dimashkî, though he made more of it than of his doctrine with respect to the divine qualities. Accordingly, he said that the Creator is wise and just, and that it is inadmissible to refer evil and iniquity to him; that it cannot be that he prefers on the part of men the opposite of what he commands, and that, having ordained what their conduct should be, he afterwards recompenses them for the same: so that man is the doer both of good and evil, and therefore faith and unbelief, obedience and disobedience, are his own acts; and he is recompensed for what he himself does; and the Lord has put all acts and their issues within the scope of man's power (اقدره على ذلك كله). . . . He also said that it were absurd for a man to be told to do any thing, if he is unable to do it (يستحيل أن يخاضب العبد) (بافعل وهو لا يمكنه أن يفعل), that man is conscious of efficiency in himself, and of being an agent (وهو يحس من نفسه الاقتدار والفعل), and that whoever denies this denies demonstrative truth; and he used passages of the *Kurân* [as well as arguments from rea-

\* pp. 31–59 as above.

† Born in 861, died in 933: Hammer-Purgstall's *Lit.-Gesch. d. Ar.*, iv. 207.

‡ Died in 933: *Lit.-Gesch. d. Ar.*, iv. 300.

§ Lived at Baghdád, and died there in 1044: Ibn Khallik, p. 675.

son] to prove these assertions." . . . Wâsil "referred that term of tradition 'predestination' to trial and deliverance, adversity and prosperity, sickness and health, death and life, and other doings of God, exclusive of moral good and evil, virtue and vice, regarding men as responsible for the latter (دون الخبير والشر) (والمحسن والقبيح الصادرين من اكساب العباد)"; and it is in the same sense that the whole community of the Mu'tazilah employ that term." . . .

"The *Hudhailiyah*—followers of 'Abu-l-Hudhail Ḥamdân Bin 'Abu-l-Hudhail 'al-'Allâf" . . . who became one of the Mu'tazilah under the teaching of 'Uthmân Bin Khâlid 'at-Ṭawîl, who was himself taught by Wâsil . . . 'Abu-l-Hudhail "held to ten fundamental points which were his own: 1. That the Creator is a knowing being by virtue of knowledge, but that his knowledge is his essence; powerful by virtue of power, but that his power is his essence; living by virtue of life, but that his life is his essence"—a view adopted from the Philosophers, who held that the divine essence is strictly one, and that its qualities are not separate therefrom, and subsistent in it, but constitute that essence itself.\* . . . "But if 'Abu-l-Hudhail affirmed these qualities to be modes (وجوها) of the divine essence, he made them to be just the same as the hypostases (أقنيم) of the Christians, or the states of 'Abû-Hâshim.† 2. That there are volitions of the Creator without any subject in which they inhere (أرادات لا محل لها يكون) (البارى تعالى مريدا بها) . . . 3. That the fiat of God "is partly without any subject in which it inheres, to wit, his command to be, and partly inherent in a subject, as, for instance, an injunction or a prohibition, an announcement or an interrogation;" and he distinguished between "the creative mandate (امر التكوين) and the order imposing obligation (امر التكليف)." 4. That in his present state of being man possesses a determining power of will, but that "in the states of final retribution all human movements are ruled by necessity, men having no power over them, and all of them being generated by the Creator (كلها ضرورية لا قدره للعباد عليها وكلها مخلوقة للبارى) because, if within the power of men, they would be laid upon them as duties to be performed (اذ لو كانت مكتسبة للعباد لكانوا مكلفين بها) [and so men would be again under probation]." . . . 6. That "free will (الاستطاعة) is an accident (عرض), additional to perfection of development (السلامة) and soundness (الصحة)." He distinguished between actions of the heart and actions of the corporeal members, affirming that

\* comp. the Scholastic definition of the Deity as "actus purus."—N. P.

† s. pp. 155, 169.

the former could not be fully effected without ability (القدرة) and free will, but that the latter might be: he also held free will to be a sort of inchoate action. He taught, moreover, that "whatever is brought about through the medium of action on the part of man (ما تولد من فعل العبد) is his doing, except [the perceptions of] color, taste, smell, and the like, which are inexplicable," and excepting also all comprehension and knowledge obtained in the way of instruction, which he regarded not as the learner's work, but as called into being by God (الله تعالى) (يبدعهما فيه وليس من افعال العباد). ... 8. That a certain time is definitely fixed for the termination of a man's life, "unless he dies by violence (ان لم يقتل)"; and that not all things which God has made are things bestowed by him—such as are in fact useful to men [whether expressly allowed to them or not] being, indeed, properly called bounties created by God for them (ما خلق الله) while, of things in respect to the use of which God has made known his will, only those allowed to men, not those which are forbidden, are to be regarded as divine gifts. 9. As 'al-Ka'bi\* reports, that "God's willing is something distinct from that which is willed: for his willing of that which he creates is his creation thereof, but his creation of a thing is not the thing itself—nay, according to him, creation is a fiat without any subject in which it inheres [being divine essence itself]† (ارادة الله غير المراد فارادته لما خلقه)‡

(خلق له وخلق له للشئ عنده غير الشئ بل اخلق عنده قول لا في محل). ... 'Abu-l-Hudhail died A.H. 235 [A.D. 849-50], in the beginning of 'al-Mutawakkil's khalifate."‡ ...

"The *Nazzâmîyah*—followers of 'Ibrahîm Bin Saiyâr 'an-Nazzâm, § a diligent student of the books of the Philosophers, some of whose dogmas he incorporated into the system of the Mu'tazilah." This theologian "separated himself from others of his denomination in respect to several particulars: 1. In maintaining the doctrine that men have the determining power over

moral good and evil (القول بالقدر خيرة وشره منّا), he went so far as to say that God has no ability in respect to moral evils and sins (ان الله تعالى لا يوصف بالقدرة على الشرور والمعاصي وليست هي مقدورة) (للبارى); wherein he differed from his fellow-theologians, inasmuch as they held that God is capable of misdeeds, though not

\* Died in 929: Ibn Khallik, p. 354. This date will serve to determine more nearly the periods of certain theologians yet to be named, of whom 'al-Ka'bi speaks.

† s. p. 156.

‡ s. also 'Ibn Khallik, p. 673.

§ Of Basrah, a nephew of 'Abu-l-Hudhail; he died in 846-6: s. De Slane's transl. of 'Ibn Khallik, i. 186, note (4).

an actual doer thereof." He maintained that God must needs be wholly clear of that which is vicious, and that, "therefore, the Doer of Righteousness is possessed of no ability in respect to unrighteousness (فيجب أن يكون مانعا ففاعل العدل لا يوصف بالقدرة) (على الظلم الاختيار) in the Divine Being he added that, as regards things of the present life, God "has power only to do that which he knows will benefit his creatures (انما يقدر على فعل ما يعلم أن فيه صلاحا لعباده)" and that he has no power to increase or diminish the penalties of the future world, or to diminish its rewards. It was urged against him as an unavoidable inference from these positions, that God must be regarded as subject to a natural necessity (مطبوعا), and controled by a superior force (مجبورا), in what he does, "for that he only who can choose between doing and not doing is truly possessed of power (فإن القادر على الحقيقة من يتخير بين الفعل والتبرك) —which he retorted by saying that those who affirm God to be capable of misdeeds, and yet that his doing evil would be an absurdity, equally restrict his freedom. He borrowed these views from the ancient Philosophers, who maintained that God has no reserved power, but that what he actually originates and causes to be is the measure of his ability (فما أبدعه وأوجده هو المقدر) . . .

2. He denied that God exercises volition in any proper sense: "for, if he be said to govern his own actions by volition, the meaning is that he causes them to be, and originates them, in accordance with what he knows (فإذا وصف بها شرعا في أفعاله فالمراد)

(بذلك أنه خالقها ومنشئها على حسب ما علم) and if he be said to will human actions, the meaning is that he commands those actions (وإذا وصف بكونه مريدا لأفعال العباد فالمعنى به أنه أمر بها) . . .

4. Respecting the human constitution, he taught, with the Philosophers, that "the essential constituents of man are soul and mind, together with body as the instrument and mould of sensibility

and intellect (في الحقيقة هو النفس والروح والبدن ألنها وآلبها) . . . but "that mind is a subtle matter (جسم لطيف), involved in the body, which enters with its particles into that mould, as watery quality enters into the rose, oily quality into sesamum, and fatty quality into milk." The distinguishing prerogatives of mind, in his view, are force (قوة),\* free will (استطاعة), life (حياة), and choice (مشيئة); mind "has free will in and of itself, and all action presupposes it (وهي مستتبعة بنفسها والاستطاعة قبل الفعل) . 5. He affirmed, as 'al-Ka'bi states, that whatever action transcends any

\* i. e., undoubtedly, the power to originate motion, or effects, in matter.—N. P.

particular subject of ability must be God's doing by means of a necessity of nature (أن كل ما جاوز محل القدرة من الفعل فهو من فعل) (الله تعالى بإيجاب الخلقه), e. g., the movement of a stone, which is thrown upwards, and returns to its place when the impelling power is spent. . . . 8. "It was a part of his teaching, that God created all existing things, as now constituted, at one stroke—minerals, plants, animals, man (خلق الموجودات دفعة واحدة على) (ما هي عليها الآن معادن ونباتات وحيوانات وانسانا)—that is to say, for example, that, so far as creative agency is concerned, Adam did not exist before his posterity, . . . so that the seeming priority and posteriority of existence is only in manifestation, not actual. Here too he borrowed from the Philosophers. . . . 12. He held that, without a revelation, man is capable, by reflection, of recognizing the Creator, and of distinguishing between virtue and vice, . . . "and he said that, in order to a genuine power of choice, there must needs be two suggestions, one bidding to go forward, and the other to hold back (لا بد من خاطرين احدهما يأمر بالافدام) (والاخر بالكف ليصح الاختيار) . . . He said also, with respect to the future life, that the mercy of God to infants is like the mercy of God to brute beasts.

"Al-'Aswâfî agreed with him in all his views, but went beyond him so far as to say that God has no ability in respect to what he knows he will not do, nor as to what he has announced that he will not do (أن الله تعالى لا يوصف بالقدرة على ما علم أنه لا) (يفعله ولا على ما أخبر أنه لا يفعله); while man has such ability, because human ability is adapted to contraries, and every one understands that of two contraries one or the other is known to be sure not to be (مع أن الانسان قادر على ذلك لان قدرة العبد صالحة) (للصديق ومن المعلوم أن احد الصديقين واقع في المعلوم انه سيوجد دون الثاني) . . . 'Abû Ja'far 'al-'Iskâfî\* and his followers of the Mu'tazilah also agreed with him, and said, in addition, that God has no ability in respect to the unrighteousness of any rational beings, but only in respect to that [which is only apparent] of infants and the insane (أن الله تعالى لا يقدر على ظلم العقلاء وإنما) (يوصف بالقدرة على ظلم الاطفال والمجانين) . . .

"The *Hâ'itîyah* and the *Hadathîyah*—followers of 'Aḥmad Bin Ḥâ'it and of Faḍl Bin 'al-Ḥadathî, who were both of the school of 'an-Nazzâm, and diligent students of the books of the Philosophers, and coupled with the teaching of their master three new doctrines: . . . 2. The doctrine of metempsychosis: they be-

\* Of 'Isfârâ'in, a pupil of 'Abû 'Ishâk of that city; he died in 1062: s. De Slane's transl. of 'Ibn Khallik., ii. 123, note (2).

lieved that God produced his creatures sound, entire, rational, perfect, in another world than this in which they now are (أبدع

(خلقهم اصحاء سالمين عقلاء بالغين في دار سوى هذه الدار التي هم فيها اليوم), and created within them a recognition and knowledge of himself, and lavished his mercy upon them, . . . so that from the first he made them to owe gratitude to him; and that some obeyed all his commands, while others were disobedient to all, and others in part obedient and in part disobedient; and that they who obeyed him in every thing were permanently established by him in the world of bliss wherein he first placed them, while they who disobeyed him in every thing were ejected thence into the world of punishment, that is, Hell; and that they who were partly obedient and partly disobedient were driven out by him into this world, in which he clothes them with these gross bodies, and tries them by misfortune, distress, hardship and indulgence, pains and pleasures, in various animal forms, human and other, according to the measure of their criminality; . . . and that the animal ceases not to exist in this world, time after time, and in form after form, so long as its sins, together with its virtues, cleave to it.\* . . .

“The *Bishrīyah*—followers of Bishr Bin ‘al-Mu’tamir, who was one of the most eminent of the doctors of the Mu’tazilah, and the originator of the doctrine of production by generative action (التوليد lit. generation), which he carried to the furthest extreme. He differed from others of the same general way of thinking in six particulars: 1. That he thought it might be that [perceptions of] color, taste, and smell, and all perceptions obtained by hearing and sight, are the result of generative action upon man from without, involving the existence of causes of

those perceptions (انه زعم أن اللون والطعم والرائحة والادراكات كلها من السمع والبرؤية يجوز أن تحصل متولدة من فعل الغير في الغير إذا كانت (أسبابها من فعله) †—a view which he adopted from the naturalistic school of Philosophers, only that they make no distinction between what is produced by generative action (المتولد) and what is effected by an exercise of power [on the part of man] (المباشر) [regarding all effects as resulting from natural laws], and often expressly define power otherwise than our theologians, the capability of being acted upon by a [blindly] active force (قوة الفعل وقوة الانفعال) being something different from power in

\* The theodicy of these two teachers, then, regarded moral evil in the world as the result of freedom in a prior state of existence, and natural evil as disciplinary, designed for the removal of impurities caused by the abuse of that freedom.

† s. p. 157.



the sense of our theology. 2. His saying that free will consists in corporeal wholeness, and entire soundness of limbs (الاستطاعة هي)

(سلامة البنية وصحة الجوارح وتخليها من الافات); and his affirming, not that man acts freely in the first stage of action [namely, that of volition], but not in the second [that of the execution of volition], but that man is an agent, and that there is [properly speaking] no action on his part except in the executive stage (الانسان يفعل والفعل لا يكون الا في الثانية). 3. His doctrine that God might punish an infant (ان الله تعالى قادر على تعذيب) (الطفل), though, if he were to do so, he would be treating him unjustly (ولو فعل كان ظالما اياه); which, however, he would not declare in so many words, choosing rather to say that, were God so to do, the infant would be proved to be a rational adult, guilty of some crime for which he deserves punishment—which is a contradiction in terms.” 4. That, as is stated by ‘al-Ka’bī, “he spoke of God’s exercise of volition as an act of his in a two-fold relation (ارادة الله تعالى فعل من افعاله وهي على وجهين), being both a qualification of essence (صفة ذات) and a qualification of action (صفة فعل): a qualification of essence—for God is perpetually willing all his own actions and all the obediences of his creatures, since he is all-wise, and the All-wise cannot know what is beneficial and good without willing it; and a qualification of action—for he thereby wills his own doing, at the instant of its actualization (في حال احدثه), so that his exercise of volition is [virtually] a creation thereof, though prior to [actual] creation, because that whereby a thing is cannot be contemporaneous therewith; and thereby, also, wills the doings of his creatures, which amounts to commanding those doings. 5. His saying that there is a [measure of] divine grace of which the bestowment would secure such conversion of all mankind to the faith that they would merit the same reward as if they had believed without that grace, and even more

ان عند الله تعالى لطفًا لو اتى به لآمن جميع من في الارض ايمانًا); (يستحقون عليه الثواب استحقاقهم لو امنوا من غير وجوده وأكثر منه); but that God is not obligated to deal thus with his creatures; and that a regard to the highest good is not the rule for him (ولا يجب عليه رعاية الاصلح), because, as there is no limit to his command of what is beneficial, there is to him no such thing as an absolutely highest good (لانه لا غاية لما يقدر عليه من الاصلاح فما); (من اصلح الا وفوقه اصلح his creatures with ability and free will, and to remove incidental hinderances by means of invitations and messages, . . . and that, in order to the exercise of the power of choice, on the part of

man, in his action, the two-fold suggestion\* is not essential, which, indeed, comes not from God, but from Satan." . . .

"The *Mu'ammariyyuh*—followers of Mu'ammad Bin 'Abbâd 'as-Sulamî, who went beyond all other advocates of human ability (وهو اعظم القدرية) in subtleties against the reality of the divine attributes, and of predestination of moral good and evil by God. . . . Among the particulars in which he differed from others of his denomination are the following: 1. That God creates nothing except bodies (الاجسام), so that accidents (الاعراض) are developments from bodies (اختراعات الاجسام), either by a natural necessity (طبعاً)—as in the case of fire, which originates burning, and the sun, which originates warmth, and the moon, which originates color—or conditioned by the power of choice (اختياراً), as in the case of an animal, which originates motion and rest, copulation and separation; and both the coming into existence of body and its ceasing to be (حدوث الجسم وفناءه) are, in his view, also accidents—strangely, indeed, for how could he say that either the one or the other is through the action of body itself? moreover, on the principle that the Creator originates no accident, he originates neither the existence of body nor its destruction, because its existence [as well as destruction] is an accident; from which it follows, by unavoidable inference, that no activity at all pertains to God. . . . 2. That accidents are permanent in the several species of things to which they belong (لا تتناهي في كل نوع), and that every accident subsists in a subject, though its subsistence therein is only by virtue of some idea [of the human mind] which requires it (كل عرض

كأمر) —which results in the fallacy of the circle." On the ground of this view of accidents as only ideally subsistent Mu'ammad and his followers were called Idealists (اصحاب المعاني). . . . 3. "As 'al-Ka'bî reports, that God's willing of any thing is neither God himself [that is, divine essence], nor the creation of that thing by him, nor an ordering of it, nor an announcement thereof, nor a judgment respecting it—intimating some unknown and incomprehensible thing. He likewise held that to man pertains no activity except that of will (ليس للانسان فعل سوى الارادة), either directly causative (مباشرة) or acting through generative action from without (توليداً); and that all actions which are made obligatory upon him . . . resolve themselves into the exercise of volition on his part (كلها مستندة الى ارادته) . . .—which

\* s. p. 159.

finds its explanation in his doctrine with respect to what truly constitutes man, namely, that he is "an idea,\* or a substance, without body (معنى أو جوهر غير الجسد), which knows, has ability, chooses, and discerns, while it neither moves nor rests, nor takes color, nor occupies place, nor is either seen or felt or touched, nor takes one position instead of another, nor is embraced by space or limited by time, but, on the other hand, is itself the regent of the body (مدير للجسد); and that his association with the corporeal is an association of regulation and disposal"—a view which he borrowed from the Philosophers . . . 4. He is reported to have denied the eternity of God . . . and to have said "that God knows [only] of priority [of existence] in time (يشعر بالتقدم الزماني)" . . . and to have insisted upon distinguishing between creation and the thing created, and between production and the thing produced [making God not answerable for the latter]; "and Ja'far Bin Harb reports that he affirmed it to be absurd that God should know himself, because that would lead to the confounding of subject and object of knowledge; and absurd that he should know things which are apart from himself, just as his having the sovereign disposal of all existing things is held to be absurd, inasmuch as he himself is an existence. But perhaps this statement is erroneous, . . . so that what 'Ibn 'Abbâd maintained was that it should not be said that God knows himself, because that would lead to a distinction between [God as] the knowing and [God as] the known; nor that he knows things which are apart from himself, because that would imply a knowledge dependent upon what is external to himself, of derived origin." . . .

"The *Muzdârîyah*—followers of 'Îsa Bin Şabiḥ, called 'Abû Mûsa, and distinguished by the epithet of 'al-Muzdâr, a disciple of Bishr Bin 'al-Mu'tamir . . . who lived a life of devout seclusion, and bore the name of Monk of the Mu'tazilah. He differed from others of his party in several particulars:" 1. He said "with respect to power (القدر), that God might (يقدر) lie and be unjust, and that, were he so to do, he would be a lying, unrighteous deity—[in other words, that the same criterion of right and wrong which applies to man, both as regards power to do either, and the putting forth of that power in act, is applicable to God]. . . . 2. As to generative action upon man from without (التولد), he professed the same doctrine as his master, adding thereto that, by virtue of such generation, one and the same action may proceed from two agents (جوز وقوع فعل واحد من فاعلين على سبيل التولد)" . . . but "he regarded as infidels those who say that the conduct of men is created by God (أن أعمال العباد مخلوقة لله)" . . .

\* Probably, in the sense of the Platonic emanation-system.

“The *Thumâmîyah*—followers of Thumâmah Bin ‘Ashras ‘an-Numairî, a man of slender faith in religion, and dissolute character. . . . Among his peculiarities of doctrine were the following: 1. That actions produced by generation from without (الأفعال المتولدة) are actions of no agent: since one may not refer them to that generative agency by which their causes exist,\* thereby involving, by necessary inference, that such action may be owing to the operation of a cause without life, as when a cause acts and dies, and the product of its generative action comes into existence subsequently (حتى يلزمه أن يضيف الفعل) (الى ميت مثل ما اذا فعل السبب ومات ووجد المتولد بعده); and since they are not referable to God, because such reference might lead to imputing to him what is vicious, which is absurd. . . . 2. That infidels, idolaters, Magians, Jews, Christians, Dualists, and Deniers of Immortality, will be turned to dust at the resurrection; and in like manner, beasts, birds, and the infants of believers. 3. That free will (الاستطاعة) consists in completeness and entire soundness of the members of the body, and is a pre-requisite to all action (قبل الفعل). . . . 6. That man is an agent only in volition (لا فعل للإنسان الا الإرادة), and that whatever exceeds the province of the will [in human action] originates without an originator (وما عداها فهو حدث لا محدث له).” Furthermore, ‘Ibn ‘ar-Rawandî states as the opinion of Thumâmah, that “the world is God’s work by virtue of his nature (العالم فعل الله تعالى بظباعه), meaning thereby, perhaps, what the Philosophers mean when they speak of a necessity of being (الاجاب بالذات), in contradistinction to production in accordance with volition,” which involves the idea of the eternity of the world, “since a necessary result is implied by a necessitating cause (ان الموجد لا ينفك عن الموجد). Thumâmah lived in the days of ‘al-Ma‘mûn, and was a man of position in his court.”

“The *Hishâmîyah*—followers of Hishâm Bin ‘Amrû ‘al-Fûṭî, who went to a further extreme than others of the Mu‘tazilah in the assertion of human ability, refusing to admit of any sort of reference of certain actions to the Creator (وكان يمتنع من اطلاق) (اضافات افعال الى البارى to him;” and saying “that God does not unite the hearts of believers, but that believers come together by their own power of choice (باختيارهم), notwithstanding the Revealed Book declares: ‘thou wouldst not have joined their hearts in friendship; but God hath united them;’† and that God makes not believers to love

\* s. p. 160.

† Qur., viii. 64—s. p. 118.

the faith, nor renders it precious to their hearts, although the Supreme has said: '[But God] has made you to love the faith, and rendered it precious to your hearts;'"\* and yet more vehemently and contumaciously denying that God stamps any one with a particular character, or seals the heart, or shuts it up, and the like, notwithstanding the Revealed Book declares each and all of these things [as, for example]: 'God hath sealed up their hearts and their ears,'† and 'nay, but God has stamped upon them their own unbelief,'‡ and 'We have put a barrier before them, and a barrier behind them.'§ . . . Another of the doctrines which he originated was "the denial that accidents prove God to be a creator, or are valid as proofs [of any thing], while he asserted, on the other hand, that bodies do

prove a divine creator (قوله ان الاعراض لا تدل على كونه خالقا ولا)

قوله ان الاعراض لا تدل على كونه خالقا . . . He held also that, though a man should have obeyed God all his life long, a foreknowledge on the part of God that he would have annulled his good deeds by some great crime [if he had lived longer] would be sufficient ground for his forfeiting reward; and the same, on the reverse supposition. A follower of his, the Mu'tazilite 'Abbâd, "abjured altogether the doctrine that God is the creator of an infidel, inasmuch as the infidel is made up of infidelity and man, and God does not create infidelity." . . . 'Al-Fûtî held, moreover, "that things, before they exist, are nonentities, and not things, though, after they have ceased to exist, they may still be called things (ان الاشياء قبل كونها معدومة وليست اشياء وهي بعد ان تعدم عن وجود تسمى اشياء); and, in accordance with this notion, rejected the doctrine that God always has knowledge of things before their existence—because they might not, then, be called things." . . .

"The *Jâhizîyah*—followers of 'Amrû Bin Bahr 'aj-Jâhiz, one of the most eminent men among the Mu'tazilah, and their principal author, who, after having devoted himself to the study of many books of the Philosophers, made out a system of eclecticism, to which he gave currency by the aptness of his exposition and the beauty of his finished eloquence. He lived in the days of 'al-Mu'tasim and 'al-Mutawakkil [A.D. 833-61]."<sup>||</sup> The following are some of the peculiarities of his doctrine: 1. He held

"that all cognitions have a necessity of nature (ان المعارف كلها)

\* Kur., xlix. 7.

† Kur., ii. 6—s. p. 117.

‡ Kur., iv. 154—s. p. 120: Flügel's text reads طبع الله عليها.

§ Kur., xxxvi. 8.

|| Hâji Khalifah says he died in A.H. 255, or A.D. 868-9: H. K., ed. Flügel, i. 205.

(ضرورية طبعاً), while nothing of that sort pertains to the actions of men; but that men have no merit except for volition (وليس وللعباد كسب سوى الإرادة), [all other apparently] human actions being a product of nature (و يحصل أفعاله طبعاً), as Thumâmah said. It is even handed down that he denied the originality of volition, and its constituting a distinct genus among accidents (أنه أنكر أصل الإرادة), saying that, when an agent is rid of the state of inertia, and comes to know what he is going to do, he is, then, in the true sense a being who wills (إذا انتفى السهو) ; and that, as to volition connected with the action of others, that is [merely] an inclination of feeling towards it (الارادة المتعلقة بفعل الغير) . (فهو ميل النفس اليه). To these views he added the assertion of innate tendencies pertaining to bodies, in accordance with the doctrine of the naturalistic school of Philosophers, and affirmed that different bodies have their appropriate actions. He also held it to be absurd that substances should be non-existent, and consequently regarded accidents as the variable element of existence, while substance is necessarily permanent. . . . He agreed with the Philosophers as regards the denial of the divine attributes, and, in conformity with the system of the Mu'tazilah, affirmed that man has the determining power over moral good and evil (القدر خيره وشره من العبد); and 'al-Ka'bî relates that he said, that the exercise of volition is attributed to the Creator in the sense that inertia and ignorance respecting his own actions are inconsistent with the idea of God, and that he can not be over-ruled and defeated [as to his own acts] (يوصف البارئ تعالى)

بأنه مريد بمعنى أنه لا يصحّ عليه السهو في أفعاله ولا الجهل ولا يجوز أن . . . (يغلب ويقهر).

"The *Khaiyâtiyah* — followers of 'Abu-l-Husain Bin 'Abî 'Amrû 'al-Khaiyât, the teacher of 'Abu-l-Kâsim Bin Muhammad 'al-Ka'bî, both of whom were of the Mu'tazilah of Baghdâd, and held to one and the same system of opinions, only that 'al-Khaiyât went to great lengths in affirming that what is non-existent

is a thing (في اثبات المعدوم شيئاً), saying that a thing is whatever one knows and predicates of (الشيء ما يعلم ويخبر عنه), and that substance in the state of nonentity is substance, and accident is accident, and so in general of all designations of genera and species, even to affirming that black is black in the state of nonentity; so that there remains only the quality of existence, or the qualities necessarily implying existence and coming into being [to be regarded as not pertaining to the non-existent]; and he used the expression 'subsisting' as applicable to the non-

existent (واضلف على المعدوم لفظ الثبوت). Respecting the denial of the attributes of the Creator, as well as in respect to human ability . . . he was of the same mind with all other Mu'tazilah.

"'Al-Ka'bî deviated from his teacher in several particulars:

1. That volition as pertaining to the Creator is not a quality sub-

sistent in his essence (ان ارادة البارى تعالى ليست صفة قائمة بذاته), that he does not exercise volition by virtue of being what he is (ولا هو يريد لذاته); and yet that it is not any thing contingent (ولا ارادته حادثة), either originating in [the divine essence as] a subject (فى محل), or without inherence in a subject (لا فى محل); but that, when it is affirmed of him, in general, that he exercises volition, the meaning is [simply] that he is knowing and powerful, and neither is compelled nor resists opposing force, in his doings (نعمناه انه عالم قادر غير مكبره فى فعله او لا كاره); moreover, when he is said to will his actions, that the meaning is that he originates them agreeably to his own knowledge (انما قيل هو اذا يريد لفعاله فالمراد به انه خالف لها على وفق علمه); and, when it is said that he wills actions of his creatures, that the meaning is that he commands them, and takes complacency in them (فالمراد انما قيل هو). . . .

"The *Jubbâ'iyah* and the *Bahshamîyah*—followers of 'Abû 'Alî Muhammad Bin 'Abd-'al-Wahhâb 'aj-Jubbâ'î and his son 'Abû Hâshim 'Abd-'as-Salam,\* who were both of the Mu'tazilah of Baṣrah, and differed from their fellow-theologians, as well as from one another, in certain particulars. Among the points on which they both differed from others of their party are the following:

1. That they firmly believed in contingent volitions, not inherent in [the divine essence as] a subject, by virtue of which the Creator is spoken of as a being who wills (اثبتنا ارادات حادثة لا فى محل): that there is a magnifying of himself [in volition] not inherent in [the divine essence as] a subject, when he wills to magnify his own being; and a vanishing away [in volition], not inherent in [the divine essence as] a subject, when he wills that the world should vanish away (وتعظيما); (لا فى محل اذا اراد ان يعظم ذاته وفناء لا فى محل اذا اراد ان يفنى العالم); and that the speciality of qualification expressed by these [several] attributes [commonly ascribed to God] constitutes the Deity,

without his being inherent in a subject (واخص اوصاف هذه الصفات). But to affirm that whatever existences are accidents, or to be judged of as accidents, are without a subject (واثبتنا موجودات فى اعراض او فى حكم).

\* s. p. 155, notes †, ‡.

(الاعراض لا محل لها), is like affirming that whatever existences are substances, or to be judged of as substances, are without place, and is akin to the doctrine of the Philosophers, inasmuch as they hold that there exists a certain [primordial] Reason which is a substance without subject and without place, and the like of the Universal Soul and the Immaterial Intelligences." . . .

3. That "they agreed . . . in affirming that action pertains to man, in the way of origination and first production (على قول) (بإثبات الفعل للعبد خلقاً وابتداءً); and in ascribing moral good and evil, obedience and disobedience, to him, in the way of sovereignty and prerogative (واضافة الخير والشر والطاعة والمعصية إليه) (استقلالا وأستبدادا); and that free will (الاستنطاعة) is a pre-requisite to action, and a power additional to bodily completeness and soundness of the members. Both also affirmed that corporeal structure is a condition of subsistence to the ideas which are essentially involved in [human] life (وإثباتنا البنينة شرطاً في قيام) (المعاني التي يشترط في ثبوتها الحيوة) . . . 5. Both were also of opinion, that God withholds from his creatures nothing which he knows would lead them to obedience and self-consecration, if he were to do it for them, of that which is beneficial, or most advantageous,

or gracious assistance (إن الله تعالى لم يبدخر عن عباده) شيئاً مما علم أنه إذا فعل بهم أتوا بطاعة والتوبة من الصلاح والأصلح (واللطف) . . . and that one may not say that God has power to do any thing more advantageous than what he actually does

for his creature (إنه تعالى يقدر على شئ هو أصلح مما فعله بعبده) ; and that all convictions of duty are gracious gifts." . . .

As to points wherein they disagreed: 1. "Respecting the attributes of the Creator, 'aj-Jubbā'ī maintained that the Creator is knowing by virtue of his being, and powerful and living by virtue of his being; and this expression 'by virtue of his being (لذاته)' meant, with him, that he did not define the fact of God's knowing by ascribing to him the quality of knowledge, or any state of existence by which his having knowledge is necessitated (ومعنى قوله لذاته أى لا يقتضى كونه عالماً صفة في علم أو حال) : whereas, in the view of 'Abû Hâshim, God is knowing 'by virtue of his being,' in the sense that there pertains to him a certain state of existence which constitutes a qualification distinguishable from his being an existing essence (بوجب كونه عالماً), and yet known only as conditioned by the divine essence, not as separate therefrom (وإما تعلم الصفة على الذات لا بانفرادها) . . . Abû Hâshim said that human reason discovers a necessary distinction



between the knowledge of a thing, in general, and the knowledge of it as respects a certain quality (والعقل يدرك فرقا ضروريا)

(بين معرفة الشيء مطلقا وبين معرفته على صفة); so that one who takes cognizance of the divine essence does not [thereby] recognize it as a knowing essence, any more than one who takes cognizance of substance [thereby] knows it to be something extended, receptive of accident; and that mankind undoubtedly perceive an agreement of existences in one respect, and a disagreement in another, and must know that what they agree in is different from that in which they disagree; and that no rational being denies the reality of these differences determined by the reason; and that they are not reducible to [simple] essence, or to accidents independent of essence—which latter supposition would lead to the notion that accident subsists in accident. It is therefore made out, [he said,] by necessary inference, that they are states (انها احوال); so that [for example] the knowledge of the Omniscient is a state, constituting a qualification independent of his being an essence (فكون العالم عالما حال في صفة وراء)—that is to say, the mental conception of the quality is distinct from that which is formed of the divine essence (أى المفهوم من الذات)—and the same may be said of his power and life; and, in addition to this, he affirmed as pertaining to the Creator another [generic] state, by which these [special] states are necessitated. His father, as well as all who denied the reality of [these] states, disputed his reasoning, and reduced the agreement and diversity [of existences] to mere words, and generic names (الى الالفاظ واسماء الاجناس): they said that states do not agree in being states, and disagree in certain specialities, and that so it is with respect to divine qualities; and that, otherwise, one is driven to affirm one state as belonging to another, and commits the fallacy of the circle. . . . 3. The two were also at variance with each other in respect to certain questions pertaining to the subject of divine grace. Supposing the case of a person about whom the Creator should know that, were he to believe with the aid of grace, his reward would be less, on account of the lightness of his task, and that, were he to believe without grace, his reward would be greater, on account of the greatness of the toil which he would go through, 'aj-Jubbâ'î said that it would not be right for the Creator to lay duty upon him, without bestowing grace; and he made no distinction between the case of such a person and that of one of whom it should be known that he would render no obedience to God, at all, except with the aid of grace; and said that, if God should impose obligation, without supplying grace, he would necessarily take advantage of one's condition of infirmity, and not

[as he might] do away with it (ويقول أن كلفه مع عدم اللطف لوجب). But 'Abū Hāshim differed from 'aj-Jubbâ'î as to some of the points involved in this case: he said that it would be right for God to require belief under the more arduous condition, without grace. 4. They differed, furthermore, with regard to the infliction of pain by way of retribution, 'aj-Jubbâ'î saying that it may be inflicted, retributively, by anticipation (بجوز ذلك ابتداء لاجل العوض), and basing thereon the pain suffered by infants; whereas his son said that it would not be right that infants should suffer, if their suffering were not retrospectively retributive (أما بحسن ذلك) (بشروط العوض والاعتبار جميعا) . . .

"Both 'aj-Jubbâ'î and his son maintained that God would not be bound to do any thing for his creatures in this life [to help them to obedience], if he had not prescribed for them their duty, either through the medium of human reason or by positive law; but that, on the other hand, since he has made it obligatory upon them, in the apprehension of their own rational faculties, to do what is required [in the revealed law], and to avoid vicious actions, and since he has, at the same time, given to them by creation a passion for that which is vicious, and an aversion to that which is virtuous (وخلف فيهم الشهوة للقبیح والنفور من الحسن), and made them to have all blameable natural dispositions, it is incumbent upon him, while thus prescribing duty, to perfect [the exercise of] human reason, to suggest arguments, to come

to the support of human ability and free will (ونصب الأدلة والقدرة), and to provide means [of moral culture], so that he may do away with their weakness in respect to his commands; and that he is bound to do for them whatever is most likely to lead them to the performance of the duties imposed upon them by him, and to deter them from that vicious conduct which he has forbidden to them. . . .

"The later Mu'tazilah, such as the Kādhi 'Abd-'aj-Jabbâr and others, pursued the path marked out by 'Abū Hāshim. But 'Abu-l-Husain of Baṣrah set himself in opposition, and, having critically examined the arguments of his masters, went so far as to charge them with unreliable and futile reasoning, and took up other views on several points: as, for example, that he denied the reality of state (الحال),\* and that the non-existent is a thing; . . . and affirmed that existences are distinguished from one another in essence (أن الموجودات تنمايز باعيانها)—which followed from the denial of state; and that he reduced all the divine

\* s. p. 169.

attributes to the fact that the Creator is knowing, powerful, and all-embracing. He also leaned to the doctrine of Hishâm Bin 'al-Hakam, that things, before their existence, can not be known. He was, in fact, a Philosopher in his views, only that he passed off his opinions upon the Mu'tazilah by clothing them in the garb of dogmatic theology." . . .

With these statements we come to the end of what Shahrastânî informs us of the opinions of the Mu'tazilah, bearing upon the subject of predestination. It remains to collect from our author the views entertained on this subject by parties opposed to the Mu'tazilah, and to all those who held to a determining power of the will.\*

"The *Jabarîyah* (الجبرية lit. Absolutists). The doctrine of absolutism is the denial that man is really responsible for action, and attributing human action to the Lord as its author (الجبر)

(هو نفى الفعل حقيقة عن العبد وإضافته الى الرب تعالى). There are, however, some shades of difference among those who hold this doctrine: for we have the Unmixed *Jabarîyah*, who do not maintain that either action or ability to act belongs, in any sense, to man (لا تتبنت للعبد فعلا ولا قدرة على الفعل أصلا); and the Moderate *Jabarîyah*, who hold that man has an ability which is not at all efficacious (تتبنت للعبد قدرة غير مؤثرة أصلا). But whoever affirms that created ability has any efficaciousness in respect to action, and calls that an appropriation (كسبا), † is no maintainer of absolute sovereignty on the part of God (فليس جبري); although the Mu'tazilah call by the name of *Jabarîyah* all those who do not maintain that created ability has sovereign efficacy, in the way of origination and first production of action; and they ought, in order to be consistent, to call by the same name those of their own party who say that actions generated by influence upon man from without are referable to no doer, ‡ inasmuch as such actions are held by them to be produced independently of any efficaciousness of created ability." . . . We have heard that the *Jabarîyah* claim as followers of theirs the *Najjârîyah* and the *Dhirârîyah*, whom we accordingly reckon as such. . . .

"The *Jahmîyah*—followers of Jahm 'Ibn Safwân, one of the Unmixed *Jabarîyah*, whose new views were first promulgated at Turmudh, and whom Sâlim Bin 'Aḥwaz 'al-Mâzinî put to death at Marv, in the latter part of the reign of the Umayyades. § He agreed with the Mu'tazilah in the denial of the eternal attri-

\* pp. 59-85 as above.

† s. p. 173.

‡ s. p. 164.

§ About the middle of the eighth century.

butes [of the Deity], but went beyond them in several particulars: 1. He declared it to be inadmissible that the Creator should have predicated of him any attribute which is ascribed to his creatures, because that would inevitably lead to an anthropomorphism (تشبيها); and therefore he denied that God possesses [the attributes of] life and knowledge, but maintained that he is powerful, an agent, and a creator—because to none of his creatures is given the attribute of ability, or the faculty of

action, or creativeness (فنفى كونه حيًّا علماً واثبت كونه قادراً فاعلاً)

2. He maintained that the Creator has contingent cognitions, not inherent in a subject (علوماً حادثة للبارئ تعالى لا في محل): he said that it was impossible that God should know a thing before its creation, for [said he], if he knows and then creates, does his knowledge [after the creation of a thing] remain the same as before, or not?—if the former, then is it ignorance, because to know that a thing will exist must differ from knowing that it already exists; but, if his knowledge does not remain as before, then there is a change in it, and what is subject to change is created, not eternal [and thus it is proved, that no eternal quality of knowledge pertains to the divine essence]. He agreed in this with Hishâm Bin 'al-Ḥakam, who . . . said that if the contingency of knowledge [as a divine quality] is to be maintained, one must suppose either that it originates in the essence of God—which would lead to the idea of a change in the divine essence, and to the conception of that essence as subject to contingences (وإن يكون محلاً للحوادث), or else that it originates in some subject [other than the divine essence]—in which case it would be ascribable thereto, and not to the Creator (وأما أن يحدث) واما أن يحدث (في محل فيكون المحل موصوفاً به لا البارئ تعالى); so that evidently

it is not quality inherent in a subject (فتعيين أنه لا محل له): and accordingly Hishâm held to [manifold] divine cognitions, which are contingent, corresponding to the number of existing things known to God (فاثبت علوماً حادثة بعدد المعلومات الموجودة). 3. He said respecting created ability (القدرة الحادثة), that man has no determining power to do any thing, and possesses not the attribute of free will (إن الانسان لا يقدر على شيء ولا يوصف بالاستطاعة),

but is only the subject of absolute divine sovereignty in his actions (وإنما هو مجبور في أفعاله), without ability on his own part, or will, or power of choice (ولا قدرة له ولا إرادة ولا اختيار); and that God absolutely creates actions within him, just as he produces activity in all inanimate things (وإنما يخلف الله تعالى الأفعال فيه على)

الجمادات (وحسب ما يخلف في سائر الجمادات); and that it is in a metaphorical sense that man is said to act (وينسب اليه الافعال مجازاً), just as with inanimate things: for example, when it is said that a tree brings forth fruit, or that water runs; . . . and that reward and punishment are subject to absolute divine sovereignty, like human actions (والتنواب والعقاب جبر كما الافعال جبر). He said, moreover, that, if the absolute sovereignty of God is to be maintained, moral obligation must also be under sovereign control (إذا ثبت الجبر فالتكليف أيضا كان جبراً) . . .

“The *Najjârîyah*—followers of ‘al-Ḥusain Bin Muḥammad ‘an-Najjâr,\* whose doctrine gained the acceptance of most of the Mu‘tazilah of Rai and its vicinity. . . . They agreed with the Mu‘tazilah in the denial of the [divine] attributes, namely, knowledge, power, will, life, hearing, and sight, and at the same time agreed with the Ṣifâtîyah in viewing conduct as created [by God] (في خلف الاعمال). ‘An-Najjâr said that the Creator exercises volition in and of himself, just as he knows in and of himself (البارى تعالى يريد لنفسه كما هو عالم لنفسه); and so he could not avoid the inference that every thing depends upon the divine will (فالزم عموم التعلق), and was compelled to say that God wills moral good and evil, as well as benefit and injury. He also said that what is meant by his exercising volition is, that he is not a being who acts under constraint, or is forced (انه غير مستكبر ولا مغلوب). Furthermore, he said that God creates the conduct of his creatures, good and bad, virtuous and vicious, while man appropriates the same (والعبد مكتسب لها); and held that there is an influence exerted [with respect to conduct] by created ability (تأثيراً للقدرة الحادثة), which he called appropriation (كسبياً), agreeably to the view maintained by ‘al-‘Ash‘arî, with whom he accorded also in holding that free will is an accompaniment of human action (ان الاستطاعة مع الفعل) [and not a prerequisite, in the sense of power to originate volition]. . . . Muḥammad Bin ‘Īsa, known by the appellation of Burghûth, Bishr Bin ‘Attâb ‘al-Marîsî, and ‘al-Ḥusain ‘an-Najjâr, stood near to one another in their opinions; and all maintained that God’s will-ing ceases not as respects whatsoever of moral good and evil, belief and infidelity, obedience and disobedience, he knows is to come to pass (كونه تعالى مريداً لم يزل لكل ما علم انه سيحدث من) —(خير وشر وأيمان وكفر وطاعة ومعصية) —which most of the Mu‘tazilah would not admit.”

“The *Dhirârîyah*—followers of Dhirâr Bin ‘Amrû and Ḥafṣ

\* s. Lit.-Gesch. d. Ar., v. 248.

'al-Fard,\* who agreed in abstracting all qualities from the Divine Being (في التعطيل), inasmuch as they said that the Creator is knowing and powerful in the sense of not being ignorant and weak, and held the intrinsic nature of God to be something which he himself alone has cognizance of (وإثبتنا لله تعالى ماهية لا يعلمها إلا هو)—a doctrine which they declared to have been handed down on the authority of 'Abû Hanîfah—to whom may God be merciful! and of certain men of his school, and the import of which they said to be that God knows himself by intuition, not by demonstration, nor by communicated information (شهادة لا بدليل ولا خبر), while it is through these [imperfect media] that we know him. . . . These two teachers also maintained that the actions of men are really created by the Creator, and that mankind appropriate them, in the strict sense. At the same time they admitted the possibility of an action's taking place as the joint product of two actors (وجوزوا حصول فعل بين فاعلين). They held, moreover, that God can transmute accidents into bodies, and that free will and inability appertain to the body, and are corporeal (والاستطاعة والعاجز بعض الجسم وهو جسم) . . .

"The *Şifâtîyah* (الصفاتية lit. Attributists). Be it known that most persons adhering to the primitive faith were wont to maintain that certain eternal attributes pertain to God, namely, knowledge, power, life, will, hearing, sight, speech, majesty, magnanimity, bounty, beneficence, glory, and greatness—making no distinction between attributes of essence and attributes of action; . . . and were wont to hold to certain descriptive attributes (صفات خبرية), as, for example, hands and face, without any other explanation than to say that these attributes enter into the revealed representation of the Deity, and that, accordingly, they had given them the name of descriptive attributes. Thus it came to pass that, after the Mu'tazilah denied the [divine] attributes, while men of the primitive faith affirmed their real existence, the latter received the appellation of *Şifâtîyah*, and the Mu'tazilah that of Mu'aṭṭilah (معطلة lit. Voiders). But some of those who were of the primitive faith, in maintaining the reality of the [divine] attributes, went to the extreme of likening them to attributes of created things (التشبيه بصفات المحدثات); while others were content to hold that there are certain [divine] attributes, which are proved by acts, and went not beyond the statements of Revelation. Two parties thus arose, of which the one explained the [divine] attributes figuratively, according to the expressions applied to them, and the other came to a stand in respect to figurative interpretation, saying: 'We know,

\* Both probably not later than the ninth century: s. Lit.-Gesch. d. Ar., v. 248.

by force of reason, that there is nothing to which God bears resemblance—that he is not like any thing created, nor any thing created like him; and for us that is decisive; but what may be the meaning of such language as we meet with [in the Kurân], touching the matter, like those words of God: ‘The Merciful is seated upon the throne’\* . . . we know not.” . . . At a later period, certain persons went beyond what had been professed by any who held to the primitive faith, and said that, undoubtedly, those expressions [denoting the attributes] are used in the literal sense, and are to be interpreted just as they stand, without resort to figurative interpretation, and at the same time without insisting upon the literal sense alone, whereby they fell into pure anthropomorphism (التشبيه الصرف), in violation of the primitive Muslim faith. . . .

“The ‘*Asha’rîyah* [a subdivision of the *Şifâtîyah*—followers of ‘Abu-l-Ḥasan ‘Alî Bin ‘Isma’îl ‘al-‘Asha’rî,† so named from ‘Abû Mûsa ‘al-‘Asha’rî,” . . . whose doctrinal views were the same as those of ‘Abu-l-Ḥasan, and of whom the story is told that, in answer to ‘Amrû Bin ‘al-‘Âs, who asked: “Does God determine something for me, and then punish me on account of

it (ايقدر على شيئاً ثم يعذبني عليه)?” he said: “Yes,” and that, when ‘Amrû inquired: “Wherefore?” he replied: “Because he does thee no injustice.” . . . ‘Abu-l-Ḥasan said: “These attributes [of the Deity] are eternal, subsistent in the essence of God

(فأبنة بذاته تعالى): we say not that they constitute the Deity, and are nothing more [than simply divine essence]; neither do we deny that they constitute the Deity, and are not additional to his essence (لا يقال في هو ولا غيره ولا لا هو ولا لا غيره). As for proof that God speaks by an eternal word, and wills by an eternal will (ومريد بأداة قديمة), said he, it is evident that God is a sovereign, and, as a sovereign is one to whom it belongs to command and prohibit, so God commands and prohibits; there is, then, no alternative but that he commands either by an eternal ordering or by an ordering in time, and, if his ordering is in time, that it originates either in his own essence, or in some [other] subject (او لا في محل), or without inherence in a subject (او لا في محل); but that it originates in his own essence is absurd, because one would have, on that ground, to admit that God is subject to contingences (ان يكون محلاً للحوادث), which is absurd; and that it inheres in some [other] subject is also absurd, because, if so, it must be attributed to that subject [and not to the Deity];

\* Kur., xx. 4.

† Of the latter part of the ninth, and first half of the tenth, century: Ibn Khallik., p. 452.

and that it originates without inherence in a subject is absurd, because inconceivable; therefore, it plainly appears that his ordering is eternal, subsistent in him, a quality pertaining to him; and the same analysis applies to [God's] willing, hearing, and seeing. He also said that God's knowledge is indivisible, embracing all things cognizable—the impossible and the possible, the necessary, the existent and the non-existent

وعلمه واحد يتعلق بجميع المعلومات المستحيل والمجايز والواجب والموجود) (والمعدوم)؛ and that his power is indivisible, extending to all things which are normal, within the range of possibility (يتعلق

بجميع ما يصح وجوده من المجاوزات)؛ and that his will is indivisible, reaching to all things which admit of special determination (يتعلق بجميع ما تقبل الاختصاص) . . . He said, moreover, that the will of God is indivisible, eternal, embracing all things subject to volition, whether determinate actions of his own, or actions of his creatures—the latter, so far as created by him, not as they are their own actions by appropriation (وأرادته واحدة)

أزلية متعلقة بجميع المرادات من أفعاله الخاصة وأفعال عباده من حيث (إنها مخلوقة له لا من حيث أنها مكتسبة لهم)؛ and, further, that God wills all things, morally good and evil, beneficial and injurious; and, as he both knows and wills, that he wills on the part of his creatures what he knows, and has caused to be registered in the memorial-book (وكما أراد وعلم أراد من العباد ما علم وأمر القلم حتى) (كتب في اللوح المحفوظ)—which foreknowledge constitutes his decree, his decision, and his determination, wherein there is no varying nor change (فذلك حكمه وقضائه وقدره الذي لا يتغير ولا يتبدل)؛ and that it is a violation of common sense to speak of something as predestined generically, which it is impossible should actually happen (وخلاف المعلوم مقدور الجنس محال الوقوع) [there being a foreknowledge that it will not happen]. These statements prove that his doctrine admitted of obligation to do that which is impossible.\* Yet he held it to be absurd to suppose that there can be moral obligation without any power at all over action. "He said that man's having power over his actions follows from his perceiving within himself a necessary distinction between movements which result from threatening and terror and those which come of the power of choice and volition—a distinction amounting to this, that movements which result from the power of choice take place under the condition of ability, and are dependent

\* i. e., since God predestines only what he foresees will take place, he predestines some men to be vicious, for whom, then, it is impossible, in respect to foreknowledge, that they should be virtuous; and yet all men are under obligation to be virtuous.



upon the power of choice in a being possessing ability (والعبد) قادر على أفعاله إذ الانسان يجد من نفسه تفرقة ضرورية بين حركات الرعدة والرعدة وبين حركات الاختيار والإرادة والتفرقة راجعة الى أن الحركات (الاختيارية) حاصلت تحت القدرة متوقفة على اختيار القادر and, furthermore, he said that appropriated action is that which is predestined by means of created ability, and takes place under the condition of created ability (المكتسب هو المقدر بالقدرة الحاصل تحت) (القدرة الحادثة). On the principles of 'Abu-l-Hasan, however, no influence in respect to origination [of action] pertains to cre-

ated ability (لا تأتيم للقدرة الحادثة في الاحداث) ; because all original existence comes of one determining act (لان جهة الحدوث) (قضية واحدة), the same for substance and accident, so that, if there pertains to created ability any influence in determining original existence, the same must be attributed thereto with respect to the original existence of every thing, even to supposing it adequate to produce colors, tastes, and smells, as well as substances and bodies; and so one would be led to admit that the heavens and the earth owe their existence to created ability—not to say, that God limits himself to creating, in the way of subordination to human ability, or under the condition thereof, and in concurrence therewith (اجرى سنته بان يخلف عقيب القدرة الحادثة او تحتها ومعها), whatever [human] action is to take place, when man wills it and applies himself thereto. Such action [as his theory supposes on the part of man] is called by 'Abu-l-Hasan an appropriation (كسبا): it is therefore created by God [alone], so far as respects causing to be and origination (فيكون خلقا من الله تعالى ابداعا) (واحداتا) ; and appropriated by man, in respect to taking place under the condition of human ability (وكسبا من العبد حصولا) (تحت قدرته).

“The Kâdhi 'Abû Bakr 'al-Bâkillânî\* departed somewhat from this definition, for he declared it to be incontrovertibly proved that created ability is not adequate to causing [action] to be (لا تصلح للايجاد), and yet that all the qualities of action, or its modes and distinguishing features, are not involved in its mere existence (لكن ليست تقتصر صفات الفعل او وجوهه واعتباراته على) (جهة الحدوث فقط)—on the contrary, that there are other modes [of things] besides existence; namely, that substance is substance, extended, and receptive of accident, and that accident is accident—color, blackness, and so forth—which [modes] constitute states (أحوال) in the view of those who hold to states of being: now, said he, that action takes place by means of created ability, or under the condition thereof, is a special rela-

\* Died in 1013: Ibn Khallik, p. 674.

tion [pertaining to its existence]; and its thus taking place is called an appropriation, and constitutes the influence of created

أثرها في الحالة الخاصة وفي جهة من جهات الفعل حصلت من) ability كون الفعل حاصلًا بالقدرة الحادثة أو تحتها نسبة خاصة (يسمى ذلك كسبا وذلك هو أثر القدرة الحادثة and since, he also said, it is a question, on the principles of the Mu'tazilah, whether ability, or the original power [which they ascribe to man], exercises its influence in producing a [constant] state, that, namely, of existence and being, or [simply] effectuates some one of the modes of action (فإذا جاز على أصل المعتزلة أن يكون)

تأثير القدرة أو القادرية القديمة في حال هو الحدوث والوجود أو في وجه (من وجوه الفعل why must the influence of [our] created ability be exercised in the production of what is a [constant] state, to wit, the speciality of the existing, and not rather upon one of the modes of action, namely, for example, that motion takes a

فلم لا يجوز أن يكون تأثير القدرة الحادثة في حال) particular form? هو صفة للحدوث أو في وجه من وجوه الفعل وهو كون الحركة مثلا على

and as one may not ascribe to the Creator any part of that which [wholly] belongs to the creature, so may not be ascribed to the creature any part of that which [wholly] belongs to the Creator. Accordingly, the Kādhī maintained that created ability exercises an influence [upon human action], and that its influence [thereupon] is the characteristic circumstance pertaining to it; which circumstance constitutes a certain aspect of [human] action, springing out of the connection between created ability and action—an aspect in harmony with reward and

وأثرها في الحالة الخاصة وفي جهة من جهات الفعل حصلت من)

تعلّق القدرة الحادثة بالفعل وتلك الجهة هي المتعيّنة لأن تكون مقابلة (بالثواب والعقاب) . . . But the Imâm of the two sacred cities, 'Abul-Ma'âli 'aj-Juwainî\* . . . deviated a little from this explanation [of the Kādhī], and said that the denial of ability and free will is something which reason and consciousness disavow (أما نفى

القدرة والاستطاعة لنا بإياه العقل والحسّ); that to affirm an ability without any sort of efficacy is equivalent to denying ability altogether, and that to affirm some unintelligible influence [of ability] which constitutes some circumstance or other amounts to the denial of any special influence; and that, inasmuch as states, on the principles of those who maintain them, are not to be characterized as existing or non-existing [but must be explained

\* Died in 1085: Ibn Khallik., p. 403.

by reference to their origin], action on the part of man [regarded as an existing state] is to be attributed, really, to his own ability (فلا بد اذا من نسبة فعل العبد الى قدرته حقيقة) —not that this is put forth in the way of origination and creation (لا على وجهه) —(الاحداث والخلق) —for creation is understood to be a causing of something to arise, by supreme power, out of non-existence, and mankind are just as conscious of not having supreme power as they are of having efficiency (الاقتدار) —but that action depends for its existence upon ability [in man] (فالفعل يستند وجودا الى) (القدرة), which itself depends for its existence upon some other cause, its relation to that cause being the same as the relation of [human] action to [man's] ability, and so one cause depends upon another until the Cause of causes (مسبب الاسباب) is reached, namely, the Creator of causes and their operations (الخالف المستغنى على), the Absolute Self-sufficing (للاسباب ومسبباتها الاطلاق); for every [secondary] cause is in one respect self-sufficient, and in another respect dependent (مستغنى من وجه محتاج)

(من وجه الغنى), while the Creator is the Absolute Self-sufficing (المطلق), who depends not, nor is deficient in any thing. This view of the subject was borrowed by 'Abu-l-Ma'âli from the Philosophers of the theistic school, but he originated its presentation in the garb of dogmatic theology. . . .

"We return, now, to the theological views of the originator of the system. 'Abu-l-Hasan 'Alî Bin 'Isma'îl 'al-'Ash'arî said [furthermore] that, inasmuch as the Creator (الخالف) is truly the Originator (البارئ), with whom no other [person or thing] is associated in creation, his most distinguishing characteristic is the power of original production (القدره على الاختراع), by which, said he, his name of 'Allâh is to be explained." . . . 'Al-'Ash'arî said, also, that, "if he [who has committed a great sin] repents, he would not affirm it to be obligatory upon God, by virtue of any decision of reason, to accept that person's repentance, since he is the Imposer of Obligation, and no obligation is imposed

upon him (ان هو الموجب فلا يجب عليه شئ); but rather that Revelation declares that the repentance of the penitent will be accepted, and the cry of the needy answered; and that God rules as a sovereign over his creatures, doing what he wills and determining as he pleases (وهو المالك في خلقه يفعل ما يشاء ويحكم ما يريد); so that, were he to cause all men to enter Paradise, there would be no injustice, and, if he were to send them all to Hell, there would be no wrong-doing: because injustice is the ordering in respect to things which do not come within the

sphere of control of the orderer (هو المتصرف فيما لا يملكه المتصرف), or the inverting of established relations of things (وضع الشيء في) (المالك المطلق), and God is the Absolute Sovereign (غير موضعه), on whose part no injustice is imaginable, and to whom no wrong can be attributed; . . . and that nothing whatever is obligatory upon God, by virtue of reason (ولا يجب على الله تعالى شيء ما بالعقل) —neither that which is beneficial, nor that which is most advantageous, nor gracious assistance . . . and that the ground of [human] obligation is nothing which constitutes a necessity binding upon God (وأصل التكليف لم يكن واجبا على الله) . . . Furthermore, it was part of the doctrine of 'al-'Ash'arî that "faith and obedience are the result of divine aid, and unbelief and disobedience the result of God's failing to assist (والإيمان والطاعة بتوفيق الله تعالى والكفر والمعصية بخذلانه); and he held this divine aid to be a creation of power to obey (خلق القدرة على الطاعة), and God's failing to assist to be a creation of power to disobey (خلق القدرة على) (المعصية); but some of his followers regarded the furtherance of causes of moral good (تيسير أسباب الخير) as constituting the divine aid, and the reverse as constituting the failure to assist."

"The *Karrâmîyah*—followers of 'Abû 'Abdallâh Muḥammad Bin Karrâm, whom we count as one of the *Sifâtîyah* because he was an assertor of the divine attributes, though he ended with ascribing materiality to God, and the profession of anthropomorphism. . . . They held, also, that to God pertains an eternal choice, which has to do with the original principles of created things, and with contingences of his own essence (مشيئة قديمة متعلقة بأصول الأحداث والحوادث التي تحدث في ذاته); and they affirmed that there are volitions [on the part of God] which come into existence in time, having to do with the specialities of created things (أرادات حادثة تتعلق بتفاصيل الأحداث). But it was universally agreed among them that things contingent [to the divine essence] are not necessary qualifications of the Deity, and do not constitute attributes pertaining to him; so that those contingent acts of speaking, willing, hearing, and seeing [referred to in the *Qurân*], happen to the essence of God, without his becoming thereby a speaker, exerciser of volition, hearer, or seer, while his actual production of these contingences does not constitute him a producer, or creator; but he is a speaker only by virtue of his speaking-quality, a creator only by virtue of his creating-quality, and an exerciser of volition only by virtue of his willing-quality—each of which qualities is the same as his power in respect to the several things

referred to وإنما هو قائل بقايلينه وخالف بحالقيته ومريد بمريدته) (وذلك قدرته على هذه الاشياء). It was, however, a fundamental principle with them, that the contingences which God originates in his essence necessarily abide (واجبة البقاء), so that their non-existence were an absurdity; since, if they could become non-existent, there would be permutable contingences of the divine essence, and the substance [of the Deity] would partake of this alteration إذ لو جاز عليها العدم لتعاقبت على ذاته الحوادث ولشارك) . . . Another fundamental principle of theirs was, that whatever ordinance God originates in his essence is either causative, that is, active and resulting in something done, or non-causative (namely, either declarative, or directive and prohibitive), constituting actions, so far as that it gives evidence of power [to act in the way of enforcement], yet not resulting in any thing done (ومن اصلهم أن ما يحدث في ذاته من الامر) فنقسم الى امر التكوين وهو فعل يقع تحته المفعول والى ما ليس امر التكوين وذلك اما خبر واما امر التكليف ونهى التكليف وهى افعال من . . . " (حيث دلت على القدرة ولا يقع تحتها مفعولات

[Ibn al-Haiṣam, one of the Karrāmīyah] "said, also, that the Creator knows from eternity what will be, in the way in which it will be (البارى تعالى عالم فى الازل بما سيكون على الوجه الذى) (سيكون); and wills the carrying out of his knowledge in [the existence of] those things which are the subjects of his knowledge (وشاء لتنفيذ علمه فى معلوماته), so that his knowledge becomes not ignorance; and exercises volition in respect to what is created in time by him who creates through a volition arising in time [i. e. man] (يخلق فى الوقت الذى يخلق) (بارادة حادثة); and to every thing created by his word says 'Be,' whereby it exists (حتى يحدث)—which constitutes the difference between causation and that which is caused to be, and between creation and that which is created (بين الاحداث والمحدث والخلق) (والمخلوق). He said, moreover, that he and his party held to predestination of moral good and evil by God (القدر خيرة وشره من) (الله), and that God wills all things which are, bad as well as good, and creates all existences, including both virtue and vice (وانه) (اراد الكائيات كلها خيرا وشرها وخلق الموجودات كلها حسنها وقبحها); while, at the same time, they maintained that man is an agent by virtue of created ability (ونثبت للعبد فعلا بالقدرة الحادثة), whose action they called an appropriation, and that created ability operates to secure an advantage not included in the action's being done, or created, by the Creator (والقدرة الحادثة مؤثرة)

(في اثبات فأيمة زأيمة على كونه مفعولا مخلوقا للبارى—that advantage being what gives play to conviction of duty, and this opening to moral conviction being the ground of reward and punishment تلك الفأيمة هي مورد التكليف والمورد هو المقابل بالثواب) والعقاب.” . . .

A review of the whole ground which we have thus gone over naturally leads to the inquiry how it came about that predestinarianism, though only one side of the doctrine of the relations of God to human conduct and destiny, as presented in the *Kurân* and tradition, and notwithstanding all efforts of philosophy to develop the consistency of free will with predestination, should have finally predominated as it did in the speculations and practice of the Muhammadan world. The answer to this inquiry must be found, we apprehend, in a certain degeneration of the Arab mind, in general, which began even in the next age after that of Muhammad, under the mingled oppression and relaxing influence of governmental absolutism, alike secular and religious, unfitting it to assert its birthright of freedom, and limiting it to such activity as might consist with bondage to the ruling power of the state. It is obvious that no doctrine of free will could become predominant under the dominion of absolute princes, while, in such a condition of things, the tendency was almost irresistible to magnify the doctrine of divine decrees. Let it be considered, also, that such degeneration of the national mind was the more natural because, as we have seen, fatalism was the normal belief of the Arabs, so to speak, in their state of semi-civilization before Muhammad.

These remarks suggest another, on a kindred topic of inquiry. Too much stress, we think, has been laid upon their belief in predestination as accounting for the heroism of the first Muslim conquerors: the predominance of that belief belongs, in our view, to “the age of ignorance,” and to a nearly related period of degeneration; while we are disposed to ascribe the heroic achievements of the personal followers and early disciples of Muhammad fully as much, at least, to an awakened consciousness of power in their own wills, as to the persuasion of a favoring divine predestination, or to a self-abandonment to absolute divine decrees.

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In correcting the proof-sheets of the latter half of this article, I have been assisted by criticisms and suggestions of my friend Noah Porter, Professor of Moral Philosophy and Metaphysics in Yale College, whose signature is affixed to two of the notes on the preceding pages.