

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (TRANSLATION)

Deponent: HOSHINA, Zenshiro

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

- 1). I am former Vice Admiral in the Navy. I was Chief of Military Preparations Bureau, Navy Ministry from November 15, 1940 to May 1945. On May 15, 1945, I assumed the post of Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, and held that position up to November 17, 1945. Therefore, I am familiar with the duties of Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau.
- 2). The Naval Affairs Bureau, as set forth in the government established organization of Navy Ministry, like other bureaus in the Navy Ministry, is subject to the commands and orders of the Navy Minister, and functions under the direct supervision of the Vice Navy Minister. Therefore, as Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, OKA was responsible like chiefs of other bureaus, only to the Navy Minister in the performance of his duties.

- 3). The Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau drafts plans for matters within his functions as provided for in the government-established organization of Navy Ministry; submits them to the Navy Minister for his approval; and goes through the routine procedure to execute such approved matters. So, OKA carried out his duties as one of the aides to the Navy Minister.
- 4). Since OKA was no more than a mere assistant to the Navy Minister, he had no authority to make decisions pertaining to the opening of war nor did he possess any power to ^{sway} important state policies.
- 5). As Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, OKA could not resign from his office on the ground that his opinion was different from that of the Navy Minister or that of the Vice Navy Minister. But when being appointed OKA's consent was not required. On the other hand, although the Navy Minister and the Vice Navy Minister are naval officers, since their status are those of civilians, they are free to submit their resignations at any time. Also they are appointed upon their consent.
- 6). In the interrogation of Admiral Nagano (Court Exhibit # 1197) it appears that the Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau drafted operational plans (this error was corrected in the court). This sort of operational plans were drafted by the Naval General Staff. The operational plans for Pearl Harbor and other operational matters were the responsibility of the Naval General Staff or the Commander-

in-Chief of the Fleet, and OKA, as Director of Naval Affairs Bureau, who was in charge of naval administration, was not connected therewith.

7). When it was necessary to negotiate with outsiders in handling matters coming within its jurisdiction as set forth in the government-established organization of Navy Ministry, it was customary for the Ministry to do so through the Naval Affairs Bureau. For that reason the Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau or members of the Bureau, as a matter of convenience in maintaining liaison between the Navy and the various Ministries of the Government were frequently appointed as ^{members of the committees} councillors or/of those Ministries.

In other words among various jurisdictional matters there were some which involved other Ministries, and which often required their cooperation. For this reason when it was necessary, committees were organized, the members being appointed from the various Ministries concerned. As members of these committees, the Navy Ministry dispatched men from its appropriate bureaus and whenever matters came under the jurisdiction of the Naval Affairs Bureau, men within the Bureau were appointed as members to such committees. In most cases it was the custom to appoint as committee members the Chiefs of bureaus or chiefs of sections and their principal duties were to act as liaison men.

Because there were so many committees, with the exception of important committees which Chiefs of Bureaus and sections themselves

attended, in most cases the principal persons within the bureau attended these committee meetings so it was not often that OKL. attended in person.

The examples are given in the following:

- a) As Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau OKL. was automatically appointed an official of the National General Mobilization Committee. However, the bills introduced in the meetings were prepared by the Planning Board or by the ministries concerned. Due to his other numerous duties, it was rare that he attended these meetings in person.
- b) As Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, OKL. was automatically appointed a councillor of the Planning Board. It was customary to submit important matters prepared by the Planning Board to the meeting of councillors, but as compared with councillors from other Ministries, OKL. did not possess special authority and he seldom attended the committee meetings.
- c) As Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, OKL. was automatically appointed a councillor of the Manchuria Affairs Bureau, but since the Navy had little to do with Manchuria, his appointment was merely nominal. The person in charge of the matters concerned or a section chief of the Bureau attended the meetings, and OKL. rarely attended.
- d) As Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, OKL. was automatically appointed a councillor of the South Seas Board in the Over-

seas Affairs Ministry, but its meetings were rarely held.

e) As Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, OKL. was automatically appointed a member of the Cabinet Information Section. It held regular luncheon meetings and views on the problems submitted by the Information Section were exchanged.

There was no connection whatever with the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact or the Tripartite relations.

Either a section chief or a member from the Naval Affairs Bureau attended the meetings and OKL.'s presence was very rare.

f) As Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau OKL. was automatically appointed a member of the Admirals Committee. The Admirals committee held meetings principally to discuss the matter promotion in the navy, but not one meeting was held during his tenure of office.

During the time I was Chief of Military Preparations Bureau in the Navy Ministry, I was not only directly associated with OKL. in connection with my duties, but socially as well I was in contact with him. Therefore, I know well that OKL. worked hard to avoid war with the United States. As a Chief of one of the bureaus in the Navy Ministry, I constantly exchanged views with OKL. and I know that he had a strong desire that Japan should avoid war with the United States and that he did not keep his desire to himself. When the negotiations ended unsuccessfully, he was very much disappointed.

Def. Doc. # 2737

On this 7 day of Oct., 1947.

At Tokyo.

DEPONENT/S/ : HOSHIN., Zenshiro (seal)

I, SOMIY., Shinji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, At Tokyo.

Witness:/S/ SOMIY., Shinji (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ HOSHIN., Zenshiro (seal)