


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HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(Pacific)  
Military Analysis Division



ANSWER TO MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION QUESTIONNAIRE #4

KURILE AND ALEUTIAN AREA.

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I. The Japanese Army Air Force command organization in HOKKAIDO, KURILES, and KARAFUTO at the commencement of hostilities, Dec 7 1941.

Before the commencement of hostilities, the 62nd HIKOSENTAI (Heavy Bomber) was sent to the South.

II. Since there was no Army Air Force, there was no plan for joint operation with the Navy.

III. From the end of July 1943, the Army 54th HIKOSENTAI (24 Type 1 Fighters) was deployed on the KITANODAI airport on PARAMUSHIRO. They were charged with the air defense of KASHIWABARA BAY and were to participate in operations in the ALEUTIANS area.

IV. 1. On 15 August 1943 the disposition of the Army Air Forces in the KURILE Is. and KARAFUTO was as follows:

PARAMUSHIRO (KITANODAI) - 54th HIKOSENTAI (Type 1 Fighters)

24 planes;

About 30 flight crew members

MATSUWA ISLAND - Ground maintenance personnel, about 30 men

ETOROFU ISLAND - Ground maintenance personnel, 30 men

KARAFUTO (OCHIAI)

20th HIKODAN Hq

3rd HIKOSENTAI (twin-engined light bombers)

20 planes

80 crew members

2. Basic plan for the use of the aforementioned units.

54th HIKOSENTAI was principally to provide air defense for

KASHIWABARA BAY and with one part was to maintain an anti-sub patrol of the PARAMUSHIRO STRAITS.

The 3rd HIKOSENTAI was to continue training and also maintain an anti-sub patrol of the SOYA STRAITS.

3. Conclusions drawn by the Japanese concerning the capabilities and plans of the Allies in the North Pacific:

The American air strength, made up of B-24's, B-25's, P-38's, and P-40's was thought to total about 200 planes. We concluded that with ATTU and KISKA as advance bases they were preparing to carry out offensive operations against the KURILES.

V. 1. Changes in the disposition and strength of the Army Air Force in the KURILES and KARAFUTO from 15 August 1943 to 15 August 1945.

2a. The 20th HIKODAN moved to KITANODAI in April 1944. It was in command of the Air units in the Northern KURILES but when the main elements of the Air units were transferred to the Philippines in November, it moved to HOKKAIDO.

b. The 54th HIKOSENTAI (Fighters) was located at KASHIWABARA from the end of July 1943. In Oct. 1944 one (1) Chutai (6 planes) was transferred to the PHILIPPINES. 10 March 1943, one (1) Chutai (6 planes) of the 3rd HIKOSENTAI (Twin-engine light bombers) was deployed to MATSUWA ISLAND and was responsible for the anti-sub patrol of the KURILE Sector. The main strength (about 20 planes) was at OCHIAI in KARAFUTO where it was principally engaged in training but was also responsible for the anti-sub patrol of the SOYA STRAITS. In October 1944, the entire force was transferred to the PHILIPPINES. After this transfer was made, a replacement unit, the CHOKKYO HIKOTAI (4 Direct Support Planes) of the Northern Army, moved from HOKKAIDO, to OCHIAI and was made responsible for the anti-sub patrol of the SOYA STRAITS.

c. The 67th HIKOSENTAI (Attack Planes) was located at YANEHETSU, in HOKKAIDO. In March 1944 one part of it (6 planes) was sent to SHINONOMEHARA. Then in April of the same year the unit's strength (20 planes) was also transferred to SHINONOMEHARA. They were charged with the anti-sub patrol of the Southern KURILES. In October, 1944 the entire unit was transferred to the OKINAWA Area.

d. That is to say, at the outset, the strength was disposed with the

primary objectives the air defense of the harbors and Strategic Points in the KURILES -- KARAFUTO Area, and anti-submarine patrols and protection of defensive surface craft, but with the commencement of the LEYTE Operation, almost the entire strength was drained out of the KURILES-KARAFUTO Area, and sent to that area (LEYTE).

e. The 32nd HIKOSENTAI was transferred from MANCHURIA to KEMERETSU in April 1944. In May it was deployed at MATSUWA Island and in October it was transferred to the PHILIPPINES.

3. Estimate of Allied capabilities and intentions as related to the above mentioned changes.

After the American occupation of ATTU and KISKA in the summer of 1943, the American offensive in the KURILES Area after the spring of 1944 and the operations in the PHILIPPINES, SAIPAN and OKINAWA, victory was judged to be almost impossible.

4. Senior Army Air Officers in the aforementioned area up to the end of June 1945 were:

Lt. Gen. HARADA, Uchiro

Lt. Gen. SATO, Shochi

Col. MARITA, Mitsugi, Chief of Staff of 1st HIKO SHIDAN

(They should be available for interrogation)

5. Joint operations with the Navy.

The Navy was principally charged with repelling American Naval attacks and the Army with the air defense. In anti-submarine patrols, the Army and the Navy cooperated.

VI. Loss of Japanese Army Air Force planes and casualties of crew members in the KURILES, KARAFUTO and ALEUTIANS from Dec. 7 1941 to Aug. 15, 1945, were as follows (see chart).

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AIRFORCE LOSSES IN THE KURILES, KARAFUTO, AND ALEUTIANS FROM DEC.  
7, 1941 to AUG. 15, 1945.

MONTH	54 HIKOSENTAI Type 1 Fighter Plane		3 HIYOSENTAI Type 99 Twin- Engine Light Bomber	67 HIKOSENTAI Type 99 Attack Plane	
	Battle Losses	Other Losses	Battle Losses	Other Losses	Battle Losses
1943					
Aug.	1 Plane 1 Man	2 Planes		1 Plane	
Sep.	2 Planes 2 Men	5 Planes		2 Planes	NOT YET IN AREA
Oct.	0	3 Planes		2 Planes	
Nov.	0	20 Planes (Strong Winds)		1 Plane	
Dec.	0	0		0	
1944					
Jan.	0	0		0	0
Feb.	0	0		0	0
Mar.	0	0		0	NO 0
Apr.	0	2 Planes	1 Plane 5 Men	1	COMBAT 1 Plane
May	0	3 Planes			LOSSES 1 Plane
Jun.	0	3 Planes		2	1 Plane 2 Men
Jul.	1 Plane 1 Man	3 Planes		1	2 Planes
Aug.	0	4 Planes		2	2 Planes
Sep.	1 Plane 1 Man	2 Planes		1	1 Plane
Totals	5 Planes 5 Men	47 Planes	1 Plane 5 Men	13 Planes	8 Planes 2 Men
		Total Losses	74 Aircraft 14 Men		

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