



**S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330704**

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO  
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA  
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

4 July 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,  
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Detainee Assessment Brief ICO Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000713DP (S)

## **JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment**

### **1. (S) Personal Information:**

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Mohammed Muti-Zahran
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Muhammad Murdi Issa al-Zahrani, Osama al-Shaiba, Ahmadullah, Ahmed Allah, Fahad,
- Place of Birth: Taif, Saudi Arabia (SA)
- Date of Birth: 1969
- Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-000713DP



**2. (U//FOUO) Health:** Detainee is in overall fair health.

### **3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:**

**a. (S//NF) Executive Summary:** Detainee is an admitted member of al-Qaida who swore *bayat* (oath of allegiance) to Usama Bin Laden (UBL). Detainee is associated with numerous high-level members of the al-Qaida network. Detainee admitted his involvement in planning the assassination of Northern Alliance General Ahmad Shah Masoud and also participating in the assassination of another Northern Alliance commander. Detainee served in a special four-man reconnaissance unit which carried out deadly missions against the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA) forces in the spring and summer of 2001. Detainee admitted he received extensive militant training including the use of explosives. Detainee has indicated his intention to rejoin the fight if released. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies

**CLASSIFIED BY:** MULTIPLE SOURCES  
**REASON:** E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)  
**DECLASSIFY ON:** 20330704

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- A **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value

**b. (S//NF) Summary of Changes:** The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Additional information on detainee's training and activities

#### 4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

**The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.**

**a. (S//NF) Prior History:** From 1988 to 1990, detainee attended a technical school in Jeddah, SA where he received a degree in diesel engine maintenance. For six months in 1992, detainee worked for a medical tools import company. From 1992 to 1999, detainee worked in Jeddah as an assistant in the legal department of the Safoula Oil Production Company.<sup>1</sup> From 1995 to 2000, detainee attended approximately eighteen to twenty-four months of specialized training in al-Qassim, SA supported by Shaykh Hamud al-Uqla.<sup>2</sup> During an undisclosed period, detainee attended a school that trained electrical technicians on explosive techniques because he wanted to learn how to carry out attacks using explosives.<sup>3</sup>

**b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel:** As a Muslim, detainee felt a personal responsibility to participate in jihad.<sup>4</sup> A key turning point in detainee's decision to go fight jihad was a *fatwa* (religious edict) issued by Shaykh al-Uqla declaring jihad should be waged against Americans.<sup>5</sup> In probably early 1999, he approached an extremist facilitator, Muhjin Abdullah al-Taifi, whom he had known since he was a teenager. Muhjin escorted detainee from Jeddah via Kuwait City, Kuwait, to Karachi, Pakistan (PK). After three days in

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<sup>1</sup> 000713 KB 08-AUG-2002, 000713 302 06-AUG-2002

<sup>2</sup> TD-314/48220-02, 000713 MFR 16-JUL-2003; Analyst Note: Shaykh Hamud al-Uqla was one of the first shaykhs to issue *fatwas* (religious edicts) calling on Muslims to support the foreign mujahideen helping Afghans fight the Soviets. In 1995, he was among several clerics arrested for criticizing the Saudi royal family's pro-western policies. After the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US, he issued fatwas declaring that those supporting US and coalition forces against Muslims were themselves nonbelievers. His fatwas justified the attacks and asked Muslims to defend the Taliban. Additionally, until his death in 2001, Shaykh Uqla helped raise money for UBL.

<sup>3</sup> IIR 6 034 0776 04

<sup>4</sup> IIR 6 034 0262 05

<sup>5</sup> ➤IIR 6 034 0776 04

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Karachi, they traveled through Quetta and Peshawar, PK, to Jalalabad, AF.<sup>6</sup> In Jalalabad, Muhjin al-Taifi referred detainee to North African extremist Jaffar al-Jazairi, aka (Omar Chabani), who, in turn, referred detainee to his associate, Talha al-Jazairi.<sup>7</sup> Talha introduced detainee to al-Qaida trainer, Abdul Wakil al-Masri.<sup>8</sup>

**c. (S//NF) Training and Activities:** During the summer of 1999, detainee attended explosives training at the Algerian House in Jalalabad.<sup>9</sup> From late-summer 1999 to May or June 2000, detainee received specialized al-Qaida training focused on intelligence collection techniques, explosives, bombings, hijackings, mechanical repair, hotwiring, poisons, and forced entry.<sup>10</sup> Abdul Wakil provided additional explosives training to detainee. Wakil also provided training on techniques to infiltrate enemy territory to detainee, Gharib al-Sanaani, and Talha al-Jazairi.<sup>11</sup> Detainee claimed he completed the training at the Algerian House in approximately January or February 2001, and then traveled to the frontline in Bagram, AF.<sup>12</sup> Detainee was on the frontline for two to three months when he was shot in the leg. He was transported to the hospital in Kabul, AF and received medical treatment for his wound. After two days, detainee returned to the frontline where he stepped on a land mine which led to the amputation of the lower portion of his left leg.<sup>13</sup>

## **5. (U) Capture Information:**

**a. (S//NF)** After two months in a hospital in Kabul, detainee was moved to an unidentified Afghan house in Peshawar where he stayed for two days. Detainee was later taken to a house in Lahore, PK, which was rented by Riyadh, aka (Nur Zuman).<sup>14</sup> Detainee was captured by Pakistani police on 2 May 2002 in a raid on a safe house in Lahore. Detainee was captured

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<sup>6</sup> 000713 KB 08-AUG-2002, Analyst Note: A variant of Muhjin is Mihjan. Muhjin al-Taifi is assessed to be deceased al-Qaida recruiter and facilitator Abu Muhjin al-Taifi, aka (Abu Muhjin al-Sharif), aka (Marwan Muhammad Naman Mujahid) - see IIR 6 034 0960 04, CIR-316-07159-04.

<sup>7</sup> Analyst Note: Jaffar al-Jazairi is assessed to be deceased al-Qaida North Africa Network facilitator Abu Jafar al-Jazairi.

<sup>8</sup> IIR 6 034 1322 04

<sup>9</sup> IIR 6 034 0021 05, Analyst Note: The Algerian house is assessed to be the Algerian Guesthouse operated by Abu Jaffar al-Jazairi in Jalalabad.

<sup>10</sup> IIR 6 034 0075 05

<sup>11</sup> IIR 6 034 1322 04

<sup>12</sup> TD-314/48220-02, Analyst Note: A variant of Gharib is Gareeb. Gharib al-Sanaani took charge of the front lines after the death of front line commander Abd al-Salaam al-Hadrami.

<sup>13</sup> 000713 SIR 19-AUG-2002

<sup>14</sup> Analyst Note: Nur Zuman is assessed to be Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) associated facilitator, Riaz Ismail, aka (Nur al-Zaman). LT is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) counterterrorism (CT) Priority 1 target. Priority 1 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the President, Vice President, DNI, and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests. This includes those preparing to employ Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

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along with the following individuals: Nur Zuman; Hedili Abdoul Hedi Hammami, ISN US9TS-000717DP (TS-717); Abdullah Bin Omar, ISN US9TS-000721DP (TS-721, transferred); and Jihad Ahmed Mustafa Diyab, ISN US9LE-000722DP (LE-722). Pakistan officials released Nur Zuman, but transferred detainee, LE-722, TS-717, and TS-721 to US custody no later than 6 June 2002.<sup>15</sup>

**b. (S) Property Held:** None

**c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO:** 5 August 2002

**d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO:** To provide information on the following:

- Algerian training compound, associated personnel, training, and trainees
- Jalalabad safe house operator Jaffar al-Jazairi
- Recruiter and travel facilitator Muhjin Abdullah al-Taifi
- Illegal passport activities and processing in Saudi Arabia

**6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account:** Detainee is forthcoming in the details of his extremist intentions and militant training in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. Detainee is willing to discuss his own activities, but is careful not to provide information that would be detrimental to any of his associates. He has provided much background information that is of interest however, there is no corroboration from other sources. Detainee's claim of his dates of travel to Afghanistan, role within the al-Qaida network, level of association with known al-Qaida operatives, dates of attendance in training programs, and individuals with whom he trained are questionable. For instance, he reports receiving training at the Algerian House until about May 2000, but also stated he completed training at the Algerian House in February 2001. This indicates that he probably withheld details of his activities during this period. Detainee and at least two others with whom he was caught, all claimed to have injuries requiring a doctor and it is probable that Nur Zuman facilitated the health and care of wounded fighters after they fled Afghanistan.

**7. (U) Detainee Threat:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

**b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:** Detainee is an admitted member of al-Qaida who swore *bayat* to UBL and who has indicated an intention to resume extremist activities if released. Detainee was a close associate of al-Qaida members including UBL,

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<sup>15</sup> 000722 MFR 22-AUG-2002, 000713 KB 08-AUG-2002, 000713 INITIAL SCREENING 06-JUN-2002

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Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Muhammad Atif. Detainee admitted participating in the planning of Ahmad Shah Masoud's assassination (possibly in support of the 11 September 2001 attacks) and serving in a special reconnaissance and sabotage unit. Detainee participated in a long-term militant training program in Saudi Arabia prior to going to Afghanistan and attended advanced terrorist training courses in Afghanistan. Detainee also admitted killing an Egyptian suspected of spying. Detainee has indicated his intention to engage in militant activities after his release.

- (S//NF) Detainee is an admitted member of al-Qaida who swore *bayat* to UBL and would rejoin al-Qaida if released.
  - (S//NF) Detainee stated, "I am honored as a man to belong to al-Qaida."<sup>16</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee admitted he swore a "death *bayat*" to UBL. According to detainee, this is the most serious form of *bayat* and is binding for life. Detainee would be obligated to obey any order given by UBL, and this loyalty would transfer to whoever succeeded UBL as the leader of al-Qaida. Detainee swore *bayat* after having many questions posed to him in a private meeting with UBL.<sup>17</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee stated, "I love this life, the life that I have chosen... Once someone chooses jihad as his life, there is no going back."<sup>18</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee stated "I fought before and I will fight again", and if released he will "rejoin the jihad" wherever he is needed.<sup>19</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee met regularly with UBL and al-Qaida leadership and has admitted associations with other al-Qaida and extremist group members.
  - (S//NF) Detainee reported he met with UBL once every three to five months.<sup>20</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee has not provided details of his visits.)
  - (S//NF) Detainee met with al-Qaida military commander Abu Hafis al-Masri, aka (Muhammad Atif), once or twice a month.<sup>21</sup> Detainee also stated he liked al-Masri very much and spoke with him many times as a friend. Detainee stated al-Masri even visited him in the hospital after he was injured by the land mine.<sup>22</sup> (Analyst Note: Abu Hafis al-Masri was al-Qaida's chief of military operations.)
  - (S//NF) Detainee stated he met and shook hands with al-Qaida's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, while on the front line at Bagram. Detainee also stated he spoke with al-Zawahiri about the USS COLE bombing and the crashing of an Egyptian airliner by an Egyptian extremist.<sup>23</sup> Al-Zawahiri also talked to detainee

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<sup>16</sup> IIR 6 034 1189 04

<sup>17</sup> IIR 6 034 1153 04

<sup>18</sup> IIR 6 034 0262 05

<sup>19</sup> > IIR 6 034 0262 05

<sup>20</sup> IIR 6 034 1189 04

<sup>21</sup> IIR 6 034 1189 04

<sup>22</sup> TD-314/47474-02

<sup>23</sup> IIR 6 034 0863 04

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- about an attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia.<sup>24</sup> Al-Zawahiri visited detainee at least three times in the hospital, where detainee was recuperating from wounds received from a land mine.<sup>25</sup>
- (S//NF) In addition to facilitating detainee's travel to Afghanistan, Abdul Wakil and detainee met every three or four days after detainee joined al-Qaida.<sup>26</sup> (Analyst Note: Abdul Wakil is assessed to be Mustafa Muhammed Fadhi, aka (Abd al-Wakil al-Masri), aka (Abd al-Wakil al-Somali), the front line commander who assumed command from Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi, aka (Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026).)
  - (S//NF) Detainee claimed to have known Abd al-Aziz al-Umari since 1995 when they attended training together in al-Qassim.<sup>27</sup> Detainee stated he saw al-Umari several times in Afghanistan in 2001.<sup>28</sup> (Analyst Note: Abd al-Aziz al-Umari was a hijacker on American Airlines Flight 11 on 11 September 2001.)
  - (S//NF) Hamud Dakhil Hamud Said al-Jadani, ISN US9SA-000230DP (SA-230, transferred), stated detainee was a mujahid who helped Saud al-Jiddawi, an al-Qaida recruiter and facilitator.<sup>29</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee met Abu Khabab al-Masri "quite a few times". Detainee trained to develop and use explosives, but claimed not to have attended poisons training because he was afraid of working with poisons.<sup>30</sup> (Analyst Note: Midhat Mursi al-Sayyid Umar, aka (Abu Khabab al-Masri), provided poisons and explosives training at both the al-Faruq and Khaldan training camps, and later ran the Daruntah Camp, near Jalalabad, where he also provided this type of training.)
  - (S//NF) Detainee resided in a house in Lahore that was operated by an individual named Riyadh, aka (Nur Zuman). (Analyst Note: Nur Zuman is assessed to be Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) associated facilitator Riaz Ismail, aka (Nur al-Zaman).)<sup>31</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee admitted serving in a special four-man reconnaissance unit made up of members from al-Qaida and Algerian militants. This team carried out reconnaissance, sabotage, and deadly missions against the UIFSA forces in the spring and summer of 2001, possibly in support of the 11 September 2001 attacks.
    - (S//NF) Around July 2001, this team assassinated al-Baba Jumba, the commander of UIFSA forces on the Bagram front.<sup>32</sup>
      - (S//NF) Detainee stated that al-Baba Jumba was selected to be assassinated because UIFSA leader Masoud had made him commander of the UIFSA forces on

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<sup>24</sup> > IIR 6 034 0801 04

<sup>25</sup> IIR 6 034 0235 07

<sup>26</sup> IIR 6 034 1189 04

<sup>27</sup> IIR 6 034 1224 04

<sup>28</sup> IIR 6 034 0775 04

<sup>29</sup> 000230 SIR 02-SEP-2005

<sup>30</sup> > IIR 6 034 1326 04

<sup>31</sup> TD-314/25230-04, Analyst Note: A variant of Riyadh is Riaz.

<sup>32</sup> TD-314/48664-02

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the Bagram front. Planning for the operation took two months. On the day the operation was to be carried out, a military truck containing a bomb was parked in front of al-Baba Jumba's house. The operation was timed to take place at mid-day when al-Baba Jumba was home, taking a nap. The explosion killed not only al-Baba Jumba, but also 12 of his bodyguards. Detainee admitted he participated in the numerous surveillance missions that were carried out to collect the information the special team needed to plan al-Baba Jumba's assassination.<sup>33</sup>

- (S//NF) Detainee stated he was on the planning committee to assassinate UIFSA and Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Masoud. Detainee further stated that Gharib al-Sanaani and Talha al-Jazairi were also on the planning committee with him.<sup>34</sup> (Analyst Note: Massoud was assassinated on 9 September 2001 in what some have called a signal for the 11 September 2001 attacks. It is also believed that al-Qaida orchestrated the assassination as a means to appease Supreme Taliban Commander Mullah Muhammad Omar. Detainee reported he received training with Gharib and Talha at the Algerian House.)
- (S//NF) Detainee received and provided advanced terrorist training.
  - (S//NF) Detainee admitted attending a two-year specialized terrorist training program supported by radical Shaykh Hamud al-Uqla in al-Qassim, SA during the 1990s. This specialized training included studying the Koran, assassination, interrogation and resistance to interrogation training in addition to how to treat the enemy, how to deal with the capture of an enemy, and a more in-depth extremist training.<sup>35</sup> (Analyst Note: These topics correspond with those presented in the al-Qaida Manual, also referred to as the Manchester Document, and other extremist training documents.)
  - (S//NF) Detainee received battlefield training, night combat training, and advanced training including building entry, conducting assassinations, and self-defense. Detainee claimed one of his trainers was North African extremist Abu Jaffar al-Jazairi (deceased), who operated an Algerian guesthouse.<sup>36</sup>
    - (S//NF) Abu Jaffar al-Jazairi was an al-Qaida facilitator for the Global Jihad Support Network (GJSN) with affiliations to the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) and other extremist organizations operating in Europe. Abu Jaffar, a principal associate of senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), operated guesthouses for extremists traveling to Afghanistan for training at al-Qaida camps in Jalalabad and elsewhere.<sup>37</sup> Abu Jaffar was the director of the

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<sup>33</sup> TD-314/48664-02

<sup>34</sup> IIR 6 034 0773 04, TD-314/48664-02, IIR 6 034 0801 04

<sup>35</sup> 000713 MFR 16-JUL-2003

<sup>36</sup> TD-314/05936-03

<sup>37</sup> TD-314/19998-02, IIR 6 832 0132 02, IIR 6 853 0137 02, IIR 6 034 0265 05, IIR 2 340 6384 02

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Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) camp located near Jalalabad.<sup>38</sup> A French Government assessment alleged that Abu Jaffar was the representative in Afghanistan for the Algeria-based extremist network and was directly implicated in plotting the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud.<sup>39</sup>

- (S//NF) Detainee, along with Gharib al-Sanaani and Talha al-Jazairi, received training in techniques to infiltrate enemy territory from Abdul Wakil.<sup>40</sup> Additionally, Abdul Wakil taught detainee how to use codes and equipment for battlefield communications, and how to make a hand held radio into an improvised explosive device (IED).<sup>41</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee admitted attending six months of explosives training held for specially selected al-Qaida members who had attended previous explosives training. This advanced course was a special program for demolition and destruction.<sup>42</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee stated after completing the six months of advanced explosives training, he attended eighteen months of special operations training led by Abdul Rahman Hamza. This training reportedly specialized in special operations such as kidnappings, assassinations, bombings, poisons, weapons training, and suicide missions. According to detainee, only the most trusted and very secretive members of al-Qaida were selected for this training.<sup>43</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee admitted attending a school that trained electrical technicians because he wanted to learn how to conduct attacks using explosives.<sup>44</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee does not specify a date or location for this training. Detainee's interest in the training is probably due to the use of electrical timers and detonators to trigger explosives.)

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<sup>38</sup> IIR 6 034 0265 05, IIR 2 340 6384 02, Analyst Note: Halim Amal Trabelsi, wife of Nizar Trabelsi aka (Abu Qa'qa), also reported Abu Jaffar ran the House of Algerians (see TD-314-19998-02).

<sup>39</sup> IIR 6 832 0132 02, Analyst Note: The Global Jihad Support Network (GJSN), formerly known as the North African Extremist Network (NAEN), is an NIPF CT Priority 1 target. The GSPC is now known as al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is also a Priority 1 target. Priority 1 targets are defined as terrorist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that poses a clear and immediate danger to U.S. persons or interests. The GJSN is composed of individuals, most of them from North Africa, the Levant, or Saudi Arabia, and who reside in those countries or in Europe or South Asia. The network provides various services including logistics and fundraising, and helps move operatives from country to country as needed. The GIA is a Priority 3 target, Terrorist/extremist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and the capability to attack US persons and interests, but are believed to pose somewhat less threat to US interests around the world than Priority 2 groups or countries; or have demonstrated intention to attack US persons and interests and are taking action to develop or acquire WMD capability.

<sup>40</sup> IIR 6 034 1322 04

<sup>41</sup> >IIR 6 034 1323 04

<sup>42</sup> 000713 SIR 21-SEP-2004

<sup>43</sup> IIR 6 034 1482 04

<sup>44</sup> IIR 6 034 0776 04



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- (S//NF) Detainee stated although he was not a trainer and because of his extensive battlefield experience he did provide informal instruction to others on infiltration techniques and how to conduct clandestine reconnaissance missions.<sup>45</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee fought on the front lines against the Northern Alliance.
  - (S//NF) Detainee stated he was fighting with the Algerian Group on the front lines near Konduz and Khanabad, AF.<sup>46</sup>
  - (S//NF) SA-230 stated detainee and detainee's good friend, Samarqand al-Jiddawi, were in Konduz and Mazar-E-Sharif, AF together.<sup>47</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee stated that while in Afghanistan, he executed an Egyptian suspected of spying on the extremists on behalf of the Egyptian government.<sup>48</sup> Detainee also claims to have personally participated in the interrogation of several suspected spies during his time in Afghanistan and Pakistan.<sup>49</sup>

**c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct:** Detainee is assessed as a **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been mostly compliant and rarely hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 44 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 12 May 2008, when he refused to attend an appointment. He has three Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 1 January 2008, when he spat on the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, unauthorized communications, damage to government property, attempted assaults, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of six Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and four so far in 2008.

**8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be of **HIGH** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 25 June 2008.

**b. (S//NF) Placement and Access:** Detainee swore *bayat* to and frequently met with UBL. Detainee was also associated with other senior al-Qaida members and other extremist elements. He participated in advanced and specialized training in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. Detainee traveled to Afghanistan to participate in jihad, helped plan attacks as a member of a specialized unit, and fought on the frontlines in Afghanistan.

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<sup>45</sup> TD-314/47474-02

<sup>46</sup> TD-314/42417-02

<sup>47</sup> 000230 SIR 02-SEP-2005

<sup>48</sup> IIR 6 034 0831 04

<sup>49</sup> >IIR 6 034 0055 05

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**c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment:** Detainee has information about mid-to-high level al-Qaida operatives and members. Detainee can also provide information about the al-Qaida structure, Algerian guesthouses, past and future terrorist operations, other JTF-GTMO detainees, meetings attended, and specifics about advanced training he received.

**d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:**

- Information about mid to high level al-Qaida operatives to include UBL, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Nur al-Zaman
- Information about al-Qaida operations, communications, and critical nodes
- Information on the Algerian Guesthouse and guesthouse system
- Information on Algerian detainees at JTF-GTMO
- Information on North African terrorist groups, command and control
- Past and future terrorist operations
  - USS COLE bombing
  - Egyptian airline crash
  - Other operations
- Additional information on JTF-GTMO detainee population
- Detainee's knowledge of clandestine reconnaissance and infiltration techniques
- Saudi Arabia stability
- Terrorists and foreign fighters training, motivation
- Al-Qaida associated movement information operations
- Location of military and civilian medical help supporting al-Qaida
- Terrorist operations in CENTCOM AOR
- Improvised explosive devices
- Motivational factors instilled in al-Qaida and Taliban figures for profiling purposes

**9. (S) EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 9 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



D. M. THOMAS, JR.  
Rear Admiral, US Navy  
Commanding

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\* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.