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# Nationalist China

April 1974

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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20

Armed Forces

## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

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# *Nationalist China*

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## Armed Forces

### A. Defense establishment

The armed forces of the Republic of China (ROC) total about 551,900. They constitute the fourth largest indigenous non-Communist force in Asia, being surpassed only by those of India, South Vietnam, and South Korea. The armed forces consist of the army, navy, and air force, plus the Combined Service Force—a logistical organization accorded equal status with the armed services by the constitution—and a small paramilitary force, the Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters (TGGH). Greatly assisted by the United States, these forces since 1951 have become relatively modern. The individual services are patterned after those of the United States and employ U.S. tactical doctrine and techniques. They are organized and equipped primarily for defense and possess only a small offensive capability. (S)

The Government of the Republic of China (GRC) has a defensive strategy because it holds only the small area of Taiwan, the Pescadores (Penghu) islands, and several island groups off the mainland coast of China, because it is heavily dependent on foreign (United States) military sales support, and because it has relatively small armed forces in comparison to those of its archenemy, the People's Republic of China (PRC). Its military objectives are to defend its territories, to strengthen its armed forces, and eventually to recover mainland China, with its present resources it cannot accomplish these objectives independently. (S)

Defense of GRC territory depends upon control of the sea approaches and air superiority over the Formosa Strait area. Ground defense capability is also contingent upon adequate air and naval support. As ROC air and naval forces cannot guarantee these in the event of a determined PRC attack, ROC defense in such a contingency is critically dependent on active U.S. support, which has been provided since 1954 under a Mutual Defense Treaty. (S)

Political considerations dictate the disposition of approximately a fourth of the ROC ground forces on the offshore islands. These islands offer little either as steppingstones to the mainland or as outposts for the defense of Taiwan, but the probable psychological

effect of their loss requires that they be held, despite the risk to a disproportionately high percentage of ROC strength. They also serve in the view of both the ROC and the PRC, to tie Taiwan to the mainland. Thus a PRC seizure of these islands would be counterproductive by providing a new psychological argument for an independent Taiwan. (S)

Although the GRC has repeatedly voiced its intention to return to mainland China and wrest control from the Communists, such statements have come to be essentially political, intended to maintain morale and inspire continued support of the government by its partisans. The goal of militarily returning to the mainland has quietly been replaced by the GRC with more pragmatic policies since President Nixon's trip to the PRC in February 1972. At that time the United States agreed with the PRC in the joint "Shanghai Communiqué" that all Chinese on both sides of the Formosa Straits consider Taiwan to be part of China, that the Taiwan question is to be settled by the Chinese themselves, and that the U.S. pledges to remove its forces from Taiwan as tension in the area diminishes. U.S. military sales support and guidance continue to be provided to the ROC armed forces that are organized, trained, and equipped primarily for defense. Offensive capability is severely limited. Although the armed forces could airdrop approximately 3,000 troops on the mainland, resupply of these forces would be problematic. The navy, augmented by available merchant vessels, could lift both of its marine divisions (about 19,300 men each) in an amphibious operation in which only light resistance was encountered. However, the ROC could not successfully engage in amphibious operations against the People's Republic of China defenses without massive foreign support. While the GRC had prepared detailed plans in the past for return to mainland China, its primary planning since 1972 has centered on the defense of Taiwan and the offshore islands. (S)

### B. Military history (S)

Although China has a long military history, development of the present modern forces essentially

began with U.S. military aid under lend-lease in early 1941. By late 1941 Chinese forces were being trained and reorganized by the United States. Chinese Air Force personnel were trained in India and the United States as a separate service. After 1943, as part of the Chinese-American Composite Wing, this force fought the Japanese on a minor scale. After 1943, the United States also operated officer training centers in China, and U.S. officers served in the field as instructors and advisers to Chinese units.

The Nationalists emerged from World War II with an army of almost 3 million men organized in 266 divisions, of which 39 (about 500,000 men) had received or were receiving U.S. training and equipment. Except for a headquarters, there was no navy. The air force consisted of eight groups (two bomber, four fighter, one composite, one air transport) and a reconnaissance squadron, and it had about 105,000 men (including almost 1,500 pilots) and nearly 500 U.S. aircraft.

Despite an initial three-to-one numerical superiority over Chinese Communist forces, an air force, and considerable U.S. materiel and advisory assistance, the Nationalist armed forces were ineffective. The Nationalists had long neglected political warfare techniques during the time when the Communists were building a politicized army and political base areas throughout China. Plagued by mass defections, cliques, a defensive complex, poor tactics, poor morale, and inability to coordinate and centralize control, they were finally pushed off the China mainland by the end of 1949. The army had sustained most of the losses in the mainland campaigns, and by late 1949 the armed forces totaled only about 600,000. Most of these men had been withdrawn to Taiwan. Through 1950, defeatism, incompetence, and confusion prevailed, and most offshore island holdings were lost. In mid-1950 the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet began patrolling the Formosa Strait.

In 1951, the United States brought the ROC into the Mutual Defense Assistance Program—now the Military Assistance Program (MAP)—and a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was sent to Taiwan. Since that time the armed forces have been almost completely rebuilt to provide the means for defending Taiwan. They have been reorganized along U.S. lines, officers and enlisted men have been trained in U.S. tactics and techniques, and weapons, including jet aircraft and naval vessels, have been obtained. With MAP support the armed forces have established a sound military organization with the capacity for further improvement and modernization. A command structure has been established with

communications and control permitting employment of these forces in strong defensive positions on GRC-held offshore islands and making possible coordination with U.S. forces in defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores (Penghu). This modern military establishment has a degree of efficiency never previously achieved by ROC forces, but it remains heavily dependent upon U.S. naval and air support in the event of a full-scale attack by the PRC.

MAP support to the ROC declined steadily over the last decade and grant military aid was finally terminated by the United States at the end of June 1973. The GRC, however, is still able to purchase military equipment from the United States under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Act. This change in procurement methods is not expected to decrease the operational efficiency of the ROC armed forces, but it is likely to continue their defensive orientation.

## 2. Command structure (C)

The President is the Commander in Chief of the armed forces under the constitution (Figure 1). He is assisted by two advisory bodies—the National Security Council and the Military Strategy Advisory Committee. The National Security Council (NSC) was established by a Presidential decree in January 1967 in accordance with Article IV of the "Temporary Provisions" of the constitution of 1947 for the "Period of Suppression of the Communist Rebellion." It supersedes the National Defense Council as the supreme policymaking body in wartime organization, and its existence is authorized until the end of the period of "Communist Rebellion." Its purpose is similar to that of its American counterpart. It has the power to make the policy concerning mobilization, national defense, national reconstruction, the administration of political affairs in war areas, and all other subjects considered related to its function. It also directs the activities of the National Reconstruction Planning Committee, the National Security Bureau, the National General Mobilization Committee, the Political Affairs Committee for the War Areas, and the Science Development Committee. The council is headed by President Chiang and includes the following members: Premier (concurrently Secretary General of the Council), Vice President, Secretary General and Chief of Staff of the Presidential Office, Chairman and Vice Chairman of the President's Military Strategy Advisory Committee, Ministers of National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Economic Affairs, and Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff. The Military Strategy Advisory






FIGURE 1. National defense organization (U/OU)

Committee is an honorary body, it has no active function

On the cabinet level, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) provides the staff organization through which the President exercises control of the armed forces. The Minister of National Defense, the nominal civilian head of the armed forces, has formal control of the armed forces through the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), who has operational control of the armed forces. The President, however, retains the prerogative of bypassing the Minister of National Defense with orders to be issued by the Chief of the General Staff, MND, directly to the heads of the various services or other agencies concerned. The CGS acts as military adviser to both the President and the Minister of National Defense. Agencies directly subordinate to the CGS are the commanders of the army, air force, and navy, and the Combined Service Force. The Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters, a paramilitary organization primarily concerned with internal security, and the Ma-tsu and Chin-men Defense Commands are subordinate to the MND. Theaters of operation, if activated, would also be directly subordinate to the MND.

**B. Joint activities**

**1. Military manpower (S)**

As of 1 January 1974 there were approximately 3,910,000 civilian males in the age group 15 through 49 who were liable for military service; an estimated 75% of these were qualified to serve. The armed forces

require approximately 100,000 recruits each year, principally as replacements for the army. This requirement will gradually increase as greater numbers of mainland Chinese are released because of age and physical disability.

The estimated number of males available and the maximum number of men fit for military service by 5-year age groups as of 1 January 1974 is as follows:

AGE	TOTAL CIVILIAN MALES	MAXIMUM NUMBER FIT FOR MILITARY SERVICE
15-19	973,000	799,000
20-24	810,000	641,000
25-29	325,000	255,000
30-34	490,000	373,000
35-39	445,000	320,000
40-44	448,000	295,000
45-49	419,000	247,000
Total, 15-49	3,910,000	2,930,000

The average number reaching military age (19) annually during the period 1974-78 will be about 200,000.

**2. Strength trends (S)**

Representative armed forces strengths for the period 1966-73 are shown in Figure 2. Continued efforts under the MAP to reduce the ROC armed forces strength produced minimal results beginning in 1969 when Chiang Kai-shek approved a plan to reduce army strength by 40,000 men. By the end of 1969, much of this reduction had been accomplished. In

FIGURE 2. Approximate personnel strengths of the armed forces (S)

YEAR	GROUND FORCES*	NAVY**	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
1966.....	423,700	82,400	98,300	604,400
1967.....	425,500	74,500	98,300	598,300
1968.....	423,800	74,400	98,300	596,500
1969***.....	405,800	73,980	83,280	563,060
1970.....	408,520	72,110	81,820	562,450
1971 (Jul).....	407,400	74,300	82,600	564,300
1972 (Oct).....	423,100	75,600	82,880	581,580
1973 (Oct).....	396,300	75,900	82,700	554,900

\*Includes army, combined service force, Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters, and armed forces personnel in the Ministry of National Defense.

\*\* Includes Marine Corps personnel.

\*\*\*There was a marked decline in the personnel strengths of the ground and air forces. The increase in strength of the ground forces between 1969 and July 1970 reflects a refinement in the personnel strengths of the MND and the CSF and not an actual increase in army strength itself.

addition, the navy planned to cut personnel by 800, and further force reduction plans for the air force were under study. For political reasons, however, any further reductions in the strength of the ROC armed forces are likely to be slow in coming.

For several years after moving to Taiwan, the GRC hesitated to use Taiwanese in the armed forces, despite the increasing average age of its mainland personnel. In 1954, about 80,000 Taiwanese were inducted—principally for the army—but were released after about a year of service. However, since the revision of the conscription law in 1956, Taiwanese have been legally subject to conscription; they now comprise more than one-half of armed forces personnel strength, a proportion that is expected to increase. Approximately two-thirds of these Taiwanese personnel are in the army, fewer are in the air force, and the smallest number in the navy and marine corps.

The military service law requires all males to register upon reaching 19. They are not subject to callup until the age of 20. The term of service is 2 years for the army (combat arms) and 3 years for the navy, air force, and army technical branches, with assignment determined in part by classification and aptitude test. After release from service the individual is required by law to serve 5 years in an organized reserve unit; he then reverts to the general reserve, subject to callup until age 45. Only the army has organized reserve units for reserve duty following release from regular service. Those reserves with less than 10 years of active and reserve duty are subject to first recall.

Women in the armed forces serve in the Women's Auxiliary Corps (WAC). All have officer status. A WAC battalion is under the supervision of the Political Warfare Department, MND, and a number of other women serve in the political departments of the other services. Their work includes psychological warfare broadcasting, recreational services, and welfare administration.

Following the withdrawal from the mainland, morale of the armed forces was dangerously low. As adequate food, clothing, and shelter were acquired, and MAP-supported reequipment and training increased proficiency, morale rose but is more recently feeling the effects of stagnation and low pay. The Taiwanese are resigned to military service, but currently only about 4% serve beyond the obligatory period. The armed forces, predominantly Taiwanese in the lowest grades of service (9 out of 10 army privates are Taiwanese), are well disciplined and ready to perform their primary defensive mission. However, the morale of the average Taiwanese conscript might not stand the test of severe combat conditions in offensive operations away from Taiwan. Therefore, GRC planning for "return to the mainland" operations envisions using, in the initial phases, only elite troops with high morale.

### 3. Training (S)

Military training is patterned after that of the United States. U.S. military training publications, programs, techniques, and equipment are used. Almost all of the schools are modeled after their American counterparts. Instructors are advised by MAAG personnel assigned to the schools and training centers. Senior officers may attend the National War College, subordinate to the Presidential Office, for instruction on defense problems. The MND operates the Armed Forces University, which includes the old Armed Forces Staff College and the three Service Command and Staff Colleges. Additionally, the MND operates the Political Staff College, which trains political personnel, including civil affairs/military government personnel and members of the WAC. Approximately 10% of the ROC Officer Corps are political cadre serving in units, staff sections, and schools throughout the armed forces. Selected officers from all services also attend the Institute of Revolutionary Practice, an advanced school of strategic studies sponsored by the Kuomintang (National People's Party—KMT). While an increasing number of joint and combined exercises have tended to improve military capabilities, political warfare

indoctrination has provided the "why we fight" rationale for the members of the ROC armed forces.

**4. Military budget (\$)**

The military budget of the Republic of China is prepared by the Minister of National Defense for all the armed forces, submitted to the Executive Yuan for inclusion in the national budget, and finally forwarded to the Legislative Yuan for approval. Although there is no service breakout, the FY73 (ended 30 June 1973) defense budget of the central government indicates that personnel costs amount to 52% of the total, operations and maintenance 32%, and investment 16%. Military budgets of the central government for the years 1970 through 1973 are shown in Figure 3.

**5. Economic support and logistics (\$)**

The economy provides substantial support to its defense establishment. Rapid economic growth in recent years has enlarged the industrial sector to a point where it makes a significantly greater contribution than agriculture to the gross national product. Agricultural output is sufficient to meet the demands for food resulting from rapid population growth and rising incomes and also to provide a surplus for export. Industrial production is dependent on imports of raw materials, capital goods, and fuels.

The Republic of China has facilities capable of producing a number of military items, but cannot produce the most sophisticated weapons, which have been supplied by the United States. Locally produced items include small arms, mortars, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, explosive devices, quartermaster supplies, and ammunition up through 155-mm artillery projectiles. In addition, a small number of general purpose military trucks up to 2½ tons are

assembled with most of the major components imported from the United States. The country's naval ship construction capabilities are limited to landing craft. The Republic of China has a diminutive aircraft industry which produces a few piston engine trainers and assembles UH-1 helicopters. F-5E fighter aircraft will also be coassembled on Taiwan in a program supported under U.S. Foreign Aid Sales Act (FAS) funding. Almost all of the equipment used by the armed forces has been provided by the United States as grant aid under its Military Assistance Program (MAP), which terminated in mid-1973. U.S. military assistance extended to the Republic of China during the period 1951 through 1972 totaled about US\$3.4 billion. In addition, Japan has sold military equipment worth \$3.3 million and Israel \$1.8 million to the Republic of China.

The Combined Service Force (CSF) is a separate organization within the regular armed forces that is responsible for munitions production, finance service, survey and mapping, and certain morale and welfare activities for all the armed forces. Its total strength is 6,300. Until 1955, the CSF was responsible for determining requirements and procuring and distributing supplies for all the armed forces. In May 1955, each service was made responsible for its own procurement except for locally produced items (chiefly ordnance) and all contracts of US\$5,000 and over, which remain the responsibility of the CSF. All three services have patterned their supply organizations after those of their respective U.S. counterparts, and supplies are classified according to the U.S. system. Inasmuch as the army is the largest user of many common-use items (vehicles, ammunition, and small arms), it was charged with some of the servicewide functions previously performed by the CSF. The CSF is responsible for procurement of specified common-use items for all services and for receipt, storage, and distribution of all army MAP items and specified MAP items for the navy and air force. A Joint Transport Command was established under the MND in 1962 to control all ground, air, and sea transport command-deerred during any emergency. Lack of experience in planning and operating a modern supply system is a continuing handicap, but this situation is being improved.

**6. Uniforms and insignia (U/OU)**

Uniforms worn by the armed forces of the ROC are generally similar in design, material, and color to those of the counterpart services in the armed forces of the United States. The one exception is the uniform of navy seaman ratings, which resembles that of

**FIGURE 3. Military budgets (\$)**  
(Millions of U.S. dollars)

	FY70*	FY71	FY72	FY73
Defense budget .....	452.0	563.0	820.0	712.6
Defense budget as a percentage of the central government's budget...	48.3	48.7	61.2	**58.5
Defense budget as a percentage of GNP.....	9.5	9.7	10.0	9.2

\*Fiscal year: Ends 30 June of the designated year.  
 \*\*Differs from percentage cited in the Economy Chapter where the defense share of the budget is based on the consolidated expenditures of the central, provincial, and local governments.

comparable ratings in the British Royal Navy. All officer personnel are authorized full dress uniforms, complete with ceremonial swords for special occasions. The standard material for winter uniforms is wool serge and for summer, cotton herringbone twill or khaki.

Insignia of grade is worn on shoulderboards, shoulderloops, on the collars of uniform shirts and fatigues, or on the sleeves. The navy's seaman ratings are subdivided into three categories depending upon duty assignment—Deck Group, Engineering Group, and Miscellaneous Group. The Deck Group is identified by horizontal stripes, the Engineering Group by chevrons, and the Miscellaneous Group by inverted chevrons, all of which are worn on the upper sleeve.

Admirals 1st and 2d class display similar markings of grade when wearing a uniform on which grade is indicated on the sleeves, but on uniforms where grade is indicated on shoulderboards, the admiral 1st class displays four stars and the admiral 2d class three stars.

Ground force and air force personnel display branch of service or specialty insignia, respectively, on each collar tab of the uniform coat. Naval forces personnel display specialty insignia on the sleeve above the indicator of grade. The principal uniforms and insignia are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5.

### C. Army (S)

The army sustained most of the losses in the mainland campaigns against the Communists, and the remnants that reached Taiwan were poorly equipped, loosely organized field armies using a blend of foreign tactical doctrines. Under the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP), the army has been rebuilt into a force based on the U.S. field army concept and using U.S. Army tactical doctrines and techniques.

In 1958 a major reorganization of the infantry divisions commenced that increased the army's support and firepower capability. Late 1969 and early 1970 saw force reductions and further reorganization directed toward achieving economy of force and flexibility. Capabilities continue to be improved through training and acquisition of more and better equipment. Recruit, active duty reserve, and reserve officer training have been placed under a reorganized and strengthened 9-division reserve system.

The ground forces are well prepared to defend Taiwan and other possessions and are capable of maintaining internal security, but without foreign assistance they could not withstand a prolonged and determined assault by PRC forces. Most units have


achieved a satisfactory degree of combat readiness, and many have even attained a high degree. In general, the capabilities of the ground forces have been limited by a lack of armored personnel carriers, medium tanks, medium artillery, light aviation, modern communications, electronics equipment, logistical support, and personnel training programs.

### I. Organization

The General Headquarters, Army (GHQ Army), directly subordinate to the MND, controls training, administration, and logistical support of the army. The Chief of the General Staff, MND, exercises operational control through territorial defense commands. He is assisted by four general staff sections (Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Planning, and Organization and Training), 11 special staff sections, and a political department that performs a wide variety of functions whose aim is to insure loyalty of the troops to the regime. Headquarters of the Army Logistical Command serves as the general staff logistical section.

The largest administrative and tactical unit of the ground forces is the field army. Organized along the lines of a U.S. field army, the ROC field army normally consists of a headquarters, organic service and support troops, and two or more corps. Field armies have only about 40% of the total personnel strength and approximately 11% of the supporting troops that might be found in their U.S. counterparts. The corps normally consists of a headquarters, organic service and support troops, and less than 25% of the artillery units usually found in a U.S. corps.

Until 1969, the army's basic major combat unit was the "forward look" infantry division. It had an authorized strength of 10,824 and was organized along the lines of a U.S. Army World War II infantry division. By the end of 1969, "forward look" infantry divisions, now called "heavy" divisions, were reorganized under a three-brigade, battalion-flexible concept. The heavy infantry division has an authorized strength of 10,614 men and includes one medium and three light artillery battalions but no armor or aircraft. Two of the heavy infantry divisions were inactivated, and their basic cadre personnel were assigned to reserve division cadres. The army has three armored brigades of 3,539 personnel, with two tank battalions and one armored infantry battalion. In addition to the army's 12 heavy infantry divisions, there are also 6 light infantry divisions, organized with their 5 battalions directly under the division headquarters. These divisions, with a strength of 4,562



### GROUND FORCES



- GENERAL OF THE ARMY
- GENERAL 1ST GRADE
- GENERAL 2D GRADE
- LT GENERAL
- MAJOR GENERAL
- CAP INSIGNIA
- COLONEL
- LT COLONEL
- MAJOR
- CAPTAIN
- 1ST LIEUTENANT
- 2D LIEUTENANT

### NAVAL FORCES



- ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET
- ADMIRAL 1ST AND 2D CLASSES
- VICE ADMIRAL
- REAR ADMIRAL
- COMMODORE
- CAPTAIN
- COMMANDER
- LT COMMANDER
- LIEUTENANT
- LIEUTENANT J.G.
- ENSIGN
- CAP INSIGNIA

### AIR FORCES




- GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE
- GENERAL 1ST GRADE
- GENERAL 2D GRADE
- LT GENERAL
- MAJOR GENERAL
- CAP INSIGNIA
- COLONEL
- LT COLONEL
- MAJOR
- CAPTAIN
- 1ST LIEUTENANT
- 2D LIEUTENANT
- LAPEL INSIGNIA

FIGURE 4. Officers' uniforms and insignia (U/OU)




SERVICE UNIFORM

### GROUND FORCES



SERVICE UNIFORM  
PETTY OFFICER

### NAVAL FORCES



SERVICE UNIFORM

### AIR FORCES




FIGURE 5. NCO and enlisted men's uniforms and insignia (U/OU)

men each, perform security missions on Taiwan and on the offshore islands.

The air defense artillery group is under the operational control of the air force but is staffed by army personnel. Activated in late 1962, it has three missile battalions—two Nike-Hercules and one Hawk.

### 2. Strength, composition, and disposition<sup>1</sup>

The army, with a strength of approximately 347,000, includes two field armies, six corps, 18 infantry divisions (12 heavy, six light), three armored brigades, one armored infantry brigade, an airborne force command of two airborne brigades, two armored cavalry regiments, four special forces groups, one air defense missile group (under air force control), and an air arm. Five of the heavy infantry divisions, two of the light infantry divisions, four armored battalions, and support units are stationed on the offshore islands. The remainder are on Taiwan and the Pescadores (Penghu) islands, predominantly in the northern half of Taiwan in the First Field Army area. Army Aviation has the primary mission of command support and liaison and is organized into three aviation companies. Its inventory comprises 117 U.S.-built aircraft (15 Cessna O-1E, 7 BIRDDOG U-17A (Cessna 189), and 8 Hughes OH-6 CAYUSE, 22 OH-13 SIOUX, 41 UH-1H IROQUOIS, 14 UH-1A BEAVERS, and 10 Pzmany PI-1).

Most arms and equipment are of U.S. WW II design and origin and were provided through U.S. military aid programs. Combined Service Force (CSF) plants produce limited amounts of recoilless rifles, small arms, and 2½ and ½-ton trucks. With the exception of 8-inch howitzer and 76-mm tank rounds, CSF arsenals are operating below capacity due to lack of funding. The reorganization left the army 50% short of M-41 tanks authorized by its table of organization and equipment, but the use of older M-24 tanks and M-18 gun carriages reduced the tank shortage to 5%. Only a small portion of the 990 authorized M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) are on hand. Shortages in troop-lift helicopters, nondivisional general support artillery and artillery prime movers, and engineer, maintenance, and modern tactical communications equipment also exist.

Included in the army personnel strength is the non-MAP-supported Anti-Communist National Salvation Command (ACNSC), with a strength of about 5,500. Largely comprising former guerrillas from the coastal

<sup>1</sup>For detailed, current information, see *Order of Battle Summary, Foreign Ground Forces*, and the *Military Intelligence Summary*, both published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

provinces of the mainland, these highly qualified troops have exceptional *esprit de corps* but are not always submissive to strict military discipline. The ACNSC has been trained and largely re-equipped according to regular army standards; its one artillery and six infantry battalions provide the garrison of the Wu-chiu and Tung-yin Defense Commands, which are under the operational control of the navy. The ACNSC also has one sea assault battalion which is assigned to the Wu-chiu, Tung-yin, and Penghu Commands as needed.

### 3. Training

Training is designed to prepare individuals and units for combat and uses U.S. doctrine, techniques, and equipment. Individual training starts with the basic training programs conducted at recruit training centers and continues through a system of advanced schooling for technicians, noncommissioned officers, and officers. The first 4 months of recruit training include basic and advanced individual training, basic unit training, and political indoctrination. Upon completion of basic training, most recruits are assigned directly to units. Specialists either receive on-the-job training in a unit or, in certain instances, may be assigned first to a service school and then to a unit. Special courses for enlisted personnel are conducted at the 10 branch and technical service schools and the two NCO schools of the army. These courses are adequate to provide the army with school-trained NCO's and specialists for duty with units and as instructors. Schools for enlisted personnel are also conducted at the division and special-unit level as needed. All branch and technical service schools have basic and advanced courses for officers. After successful completion of the advanced course of their particular service, officers may be selected to attend the Army Command and General Staff College (C&GSC) at Taipei, the highest service school in the army and roughly equivalent to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

Training of units is conducted in three phases—unit training (to company level), advanced unit training (battalion and regiment), and combined arms (regimental combat team) training. Training of large units (division and corps) is accomplished by field maneuvers held immediately after completion of advanced unit training. Emphasis is being placed on training that will steadily improve the capabilities of army units to participate in joint operations. Some practical experience and training at this level is afforded by operations on the offshore islands of Ma-

tsu and Quemoy (Chin-t'en Tao). The army training program is generally effective, although combined arms, joint operations, and live-fire crew training are inadequate.

On its own initiative the ROC has undertaken the intensive, specialized training of elite units (i.e., the airborne brigades, special forces groups, and several of the "heavy" divisions) to prepare them for specific roles in "return to the mainland" operations. Similarly, the ACNSC and selected intelligence personnel have undergone rigorous training for advance missions against the People's Republic of China.

#### 4. Logistics

Army unit requisitioning and supply procedures generally follow those of the U.S. Army. Some specified common-use items are procured by the CSF and others by the army; items procured by the army are for the navy and air force as well as for the army itself. Procurement of other than common-use items is a service responsibility of the logistic section of the General Headquarters of the Army. Maintenance generally follows U.S. Army concepts, but ROC installations are less efficient for the following reasons: facilities have fewer personnel and less equipment; spare parts are often scarce; and the Chinese maintenance man lacks the experience of his U.S. counterpart.

There has been a continuing effort to strengthen the army logistical system, chiefly through training and reorganization of logistical support units. In late 1961 a special army logistics unit was established under Army General Headquarters to plan and coordinate logistical readiness for mainland operations. Army transportation in a war situation would be inadequate.

#### D. Navy (S)

The navy is a moderately effective force. It has improved since the 1949 Nationalist withdrawal from the mainland, largely because of U.S. aid under the MAP, which has included ship procurement, logistic support, and training. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) have been more significant with the termination of MAP material aid at the end of FY73 (30 June 1973). In addition, the navy is starting to procure third-country material, its first appreciable purchase being a tanker bought in October 1969 (Figure 6). The navy has a fair capability for engaging PRC naval forces of similar size and composition, but the intervention of PRC submarines, large numbers of fast patrol craft, and aircraft, along with extensive mining, would overwhelm it.

Primarily a defensive force, the navy has the principal missions of 1) providing naval defense of Taiwan and the offshore islands and resupplying the islands, and 2) maintaining sea control in the Formosa Strait area. For carrying out the first mission, the navy is considered adequate and has not as yet been challenged by the PRC. For its second mission, however, it is inadequate. Incidents between GRC and PRC naval craft in August and November 1965 resulted in the loss of three ROC ships, totaling some 2,500 tons displacement, and over 300 lives. Since then, ROC naval elements have generally avoided contact with the PRC Navy, and it is obvious that it could not control the strait without the assistance of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. This situation is the consequence of the continuing buildup of the PRC Navy and the relatively static state of the ROC Navy.

Within the navy as well as the other services, lack of planning and coordination has hindered effective action. On individual ships, proficiency in gunnery is




FIGURE 6. Tanker built in 1969 in Japan for the Republic of China Navy (U/OU)



considered good, and antisubmarine warfare, air defense, and minelaying and minesweeping capabilities are improving. Defensively, the navy is capable of carrying on limited patrol and surveillance of the Taiwan, Pescadores, and offshore island areas as well as of logistically supporting the forces on the offshore islands. It is also capable of conducting limited antisubmarine warfare and mine warfare operations, of supporting amphibious assaults within a 250-mile radius of Taiwan, and of carrying out limited offensive operations such as shore bombardment, interdiction of shipping in the Formosa Strait, and minewarfare. The navy is considered capable of performing only a few tasks concurrently. Naval operations would also be restricted by the inability of ships to remain at sea for extended periods, primarily because of a lack of effective mobile logistic support.

Certain weaknesses have stemmed from the lack of naval tradition and the failure of senior officers to delegate responsibilities to subordinates. There have also been marked deficiencies in equipment. Most of the ships are over 27 years of age and have experienced hard usage; sonar and anti-aircraft warning equipment are of WW II vintage. Among the improvements being introduced are the modernizing of the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability by installing more modern sonars and electronic-countermeasures (ECM) equipment and providing homing torpedoes; by adding modern minesweepers, ASW ships, and patrol craft; and by providing additional destroyers.

### 1. Organization

The navy is under the administrative command and operational control of the Commander in Chief, Navy. Within naval headquarters at Taipei, the Commander in Chief is assisted by two principal deputies, the Deputy Commander in Chief for Administration and the Deputy Commander in Chief for Operations. Also reporting to him is the Commandant, Marine Corps. Directly subordinate to the Deputy Commanders in Chief are the Chief of Staff and two special units—the Political Warfare Department and the Operational Research and Inspection Committee. Under the Chief of Staff there are two functional staff groups—general and special. The general staff group is composed of six bureaus (Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Planning, and Comptroller) and the Communication and Electronics Department. The special staff includes Bureau of Ships, Medical Department, Judge Advocate Department, and Dependents Administration Department.

The Naval Logistics Command, established in mid-1970, handles approximately 70% of the money budgeted to the navy. Its headquarters is in Tso-ying where the logistics resources, including the four naval shipyards and supply depots located at the various bases, are consolidated under one command.

The shore establishment of the navy is divided into the First, Second, and Third Naval Districts, with headquarters at Tso-ying, Ma-kung, and Chi-lung, respectively. Under each district there are several shore establishments such as defense units, harbor service teams, shipyards, and hospitals. The First Naval District consists of the southern portion of Taiwan; the Second, the Pescadores (Penghu) and the Quemoy (Chin-men Tao) complexes; and the Third, the northern portion of Taiwan.

Except for small patrol and harbor craft assigned to the naval districts, naval forces afloat are organized for administrative purposes into the Fleet Command. It is composed of the Amphibious Force, the Surface Force, the Minewarfare Force, the Service Force, and the Fleet Training Command. Operationally, the fleet is organized as Task Force 62, which is composed of several task groups to accomplish specific assignments. The Commander Surface Force serves also as Commander Task Force 62. A vice admiral, he is subordinate to the Chief of Staff (vice admiral) and the Deputy Commander in Chief for Operations (vice admiral).

### 2. Strength, composition, and disposition<sup>2</sup>

The personnel strength of the navy as of October 1973 was about 75,900, of which 38,200 were in the marine corps and the remainder in general service.

The operating forces of the navy consist of 18 destroyers, 2 destroyer escorts, 14 patrol boats, 10 motor torpedo boats, 23 minewarfare, 29 amphibious ships, and about 323 minor amphibious craft. Additionally, there are about 105 auxiliary ships and service craft, five floating docks, and two conventional submarines to be used for ASW training only. The navy also has operational control of 10 air force Grumman S-2A Tracker aircraft, operated and maintained by the air force from Ping-tung South airfield, in southern Taiwan about 10 miles northeast of Kao-hsiung. The majority of the combatant ships are former U.S. warships of conventional WW II

<sup>2</sup>For current information, see the *Automated Naval Order of Battle (Ships)*, Volume IV and the *Military Intelligence Summary*, both published quarterly by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Brief information on Ping-tung South airfield is given in this General Survey in the section on Transportation and Telecommunications.

design. These ships have good endurance and sea-keeping qualities and are maintained in fairly good material condition.

### 3. Training

Since World War II the navy has patterned its training after that of the U.S. Navy. From 1949 on the sole source of foreign naval assistance and advice has been the United States.

Training curriculums are similar to those of comparable U.S. Navy schools; however, the training facilities are poorly equipped and have overlapping responsibilities. Training facilities include the Naval Institution of Technology, the Naval Academy, the Naval Technical Training School, and the Rating School. Except for relatively few courses for which it is necessary to send officers to the United States, courses offered by the Technical Training School meet specialist officer training needs. The Fleet Training Command is responsible for the afloat and shore training of personnel attached to the fleet and maintains an afloat and a shore training center at Tso-ying.

Recruit basic training is conducted for 16 weeks at the Recruit Training Center in Tso-ying. Afterward, selected 3-year draftees can qualify as petty officers on successful completion of classification training. This training ranges in length from 12 to 39 weeks and includes courses for quartermaster, signalman, radarman, engineman, and other basic rates.

The principal training center for enlisted men who have volunteered is the Rating School at Tso-ying. Training at the school includes a 2-year basic and classification course for volunteers who must have at least a 6th-grade education. After graduation, they are appointed 2d-class petty officers, receive a Technical School diploma, and are required to serve a 10-year enlistment. The Naval Training Center trains about 4,000 recruits and over 3,000 other enlisted personnel annually.

### 4. Logistics

The navy supply system is patterned after that of the U.S. Navy, i.e., a centralized inventory control system. The system is headed by the Bureau of Logistics, which provides both policy and technical guidance to all supply echelons of the system. The Central Inventory Manager is Supply Command. Common-use items are procured for the navy by the CSF and the army. The four naval shipyards—in Kao-hsiung, Tso-ying, Ma-kung, and Chi-lung—and a central general stores and ships' parts depot at Tso-

ying submit stock status information to the Supply Command. These points store, issue, and account for the supplies within their respective areas and provide support for subordinate and/or supported units, such as ships and stations. The Inventory Control Department has an automatic data-processing system for mechanized inventory controls of system stocks. Bunker and diesel fuel are locally refined from crude oil imported largely from the Middle East. The transportation system suffices for the internal movement of supplies and equipment in peacetime.

Taiwan's naval ship construction capability is limited to the construction of small naval craft at naval shipyards in Tso-ying, Kao-hsiung, and Ma-kung. Production has included mechanized landing craft (LCM) and vehicular personnel landing craft (LCVP). However, components used in ship construction must be imported. A technical assistance contract for the in-country production of patrol gunboats has recently been discussed with the United States.

Naval ship repair, modernization, and conversion are effected at four naval shipyards in Kao-hsiung, Tso-ying, Ma-kung, and Chi-lung (Keelung). Activities have included the maintenance and overhaul of ships up to destroyer size, the rehabilitation of tank landing ships (LST), and the conversion of high speed transports (APD) to patrol escorts (PF).

### 5. Marine Corps

The Chinese Marine Corps (CMC) is a balanced force, organized and trained as an amphibious assault landing force. The CMC is organized along the lines of the U.S. Marine Corps. Its basic combat elements consist of two divisions, one LVT (landing craft, vehicle, track) regiment, and one VMO (marine observation squadron). For administrative and service support there is a combat service regiment, a signal battalion, a headquarters battalion, and a guard battalion. The marine divisions are triangular, having three infantry regiments of three battalions each. In addition, the CMC conducts its own training under the Marine Corps School, the NCO School, the Recruit and Reserve Training Center, and the Heng-ch'un Training Base. A small marine aviation unit equipped with seven O-1E aircraft and six UH-1B helicopters based at Tso-ying Marine Air Station provides aerial observation for naval gunfire spotting, battlefield surveillance, and command liaison support. The GRC Army maintains marine corps aircraft. The CMC has an authorized personnel strength of 38,700, but actual strength approximates 38,200.

The Commandant, Marine Corps, is directly subordinate and responsible to the Commander in Chief, Navy. He is assisted by one Deputy Commandant. The organization also includes a separate political section charged with political indoctrination, security and morale affairs for Marine Corps personnel. Since 1967 a marine division has been deployed to the Penghu islands, divisions being rotated annually. CMC amphibious techniques, patterned after U.S. doctrines and procedures, have attained a good standard of proficiency. Command and control is best at the battalion level and progressively decreases at the higher headquarters level. CMC equipment is primarily of Korean war vintage but is adequate in both quantity and state of maintenance. Shortages in modern communication equipment limit CMC effectiveness in combined operations, nevertheless, CMC units probably represent the best trained and most combat-ready organizations in the ROC military forces.

**E. Air force (S)**

With MAAG and MAP assistance, the Chinese Air Force (CAF) has acquired an inventory that includes modern jet fighter interceptors and air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles. The tactical fighter squadrons fly the Northrop F-5, the Lockheed F-104 (Figure 7), the North American F-100, and the older North American F-86 (Figure 8).

The primary mission of the air force is the air defense of Taiwan, including operational control of the ROC Army's surface-to-air missile units. Should a counteroffensive to regain the mainland be launched, the air force's mission would also include aerial




FIGURE 7. U.S.-supplied F-104's of the GRC Air Force (C)

reconnaissance, destruction of PRC naval and air forces, and support of ROC ground and naval operations, missions for which it would be ill equipped.

The air force has no strategic offensive capability and could not mount an effective air attack upon the mainland. It could defend effectively against isolated intrusions, reconnaissance flights, and unauthorized overflights under most conditions. During daylight visual flight conditions it can also defend against a force of approximately its own size, but during night or instrument flight conditions it is almost totally dependent on one fighter wing of 104G's. The air force has the technical ability to operate its integrated air defense system comprising fighter/interceptors, Hawk and Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missiles, and antiaircraft artillery. Its air facilities are excellent and




FIGURE 8. F-86F's of the GRC Air Force (U/OU)

comprise an important airbase complex within 1,000 nautical miles of most of the important potential targets in the PRC. The early warning (EW) radar coverage from ground installations on Taiwan and the Pescadores (Penghu) islands is fairly good; radar on Quemoy and Ma-tsu Tao has a lesser capability. The air force conducts peripheral reconnaissance along the PRC's coast, and its psychological warfare leaflets occasionally penetrate to the interior. Its transport capability is adequate since the C-46 aircraft assigned to the 6th Troop Carrier Wing were replaced by C-119 aircraft.

Chief weaknesses are a limited number of all-weather fighters, a corrosion problem on the F-104G aircraft, a reluctance to program and fund sufficient stock levels, a topheavy, overstrength personnel structure, deteriorating morale among pilots, and the incompatibility of communications equipment with army and navy equipment. A modernization program has replaced the F-86's with F-5's, F-104's, and F-100's. Even with the new aircraft, however, the air force will remain numerically inferior to the PRC Air Force, which could overwhelm the air defenses of Taiwan. Reconnaissance capability of the CAF is marginal, depending on Lockheed RF-104G aircraft. The Grumman S-2A aircraft have been assigned an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) mission. This unit was declared combat-ready in March 1969.

### 1. Organization

Operationally subordinate to the Chief of Staff, MND, the Commander in Chief, Air Force, has operational and administrative control of the air force. He is assisted by a Deputy Commander for Operations, a Deputy Commander for Administration, and a staff that includes an Air Force Inspector General and an Air Force Political Warfare Officer. An Operations Planning Committee advises him on all war plans.

The general staff in air force headquarters is directed by the Chief of Staff with the assistance of two Vice Chiefs of Staff; these two officers are responsible for the coordination of staff activities and for cooperation in determining policy on all matters concerning the air force. The Office of the Chief of Staff is organized functionally into the offices of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff (for Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, and Organization); the Comptroller General's Office; and four divisions—Communications, Judge Advocate, Medicine, and General Affairs.

The air force has four major commands: two combat (Combat Air Command and Air Defense

Artillery Command) and two noncombat (Air Training Command and Air Service Command). Except in the Air Defense Artillery Command (ADAC), the field units of the commands are organized into wings, groups, and squadrons. The ADAC is composed of four air defense artillery regiments, which are tactically deployed in critical areas of Taiwan, the Pescadores (Penghu) islands, and the offshore islands. The transport squadrons are controlled directly by General Headquarters (GHQ), CAF. The ASW squadron is assigned to the air force but is under the operational control of the navy.

### 2. Strength, composition, and disposition<sup>1</sup>

The CAF personnel strength is approximately 82,700; of this number 1,700 are trained pilots and about 20,000 are in the Air Defense Artillery Command. The air force has a total of 385 aircraft in its inventory. The 453 aircraft in operational units include 246 jet fighters (F-86F, F-100A and F, F-104A, B, and G, and F-5A and B (Figure 9)), 124 prop transports (C-119C and C-123R), 7 jet reconnaissance aircraft (RF-104G), 23 helicopters (UH-1H Iroquois and Grumman HU-16A Albatross), all air rescue helicopters, 43 trainers (Lockheed T-33A and Northrup T-38A Talon), and 10 antisubmarine-warfare aircraft (S-2A).

The CAF loaned 48 F-5A aircraft to the Republic of Vietnam in November 1972. Twenty F-5A's will be returned to the ROC. The remaining 28 will be replaced by the F-5E under a U.S.-supported program to coproduce an eventual 100 F-5E's in Taiwan.

Tactical units consist of four tactical fighter wings, one composite wing, and one transport wing; all are stationed on the island of Taiwan. There are five tactical fighter groups, one tactical reconnaissance group, and two transport groups. Combined, these groups have a total of 24 squadrons—11 tactical fighter, three all-weather fighter/interceptor, one reconnaissance, six transport, one search and rescue, one forward air control, and one combat crew training unit.

The combat forces of the Air Defense Artillery Command consist of 10 battalions equipped with 90-mm guns, 15 battalions with 40-mm automatic weapons (AW), and 12 attached army AW batteries, also with 40-mm guns. Each battalion consists of a

<sup>1</sup>For current information, see the *Free World Air Order of Battle* and the *Military Intelligence Summary*, both published quarterly by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Nationalist China's air facilities system is summarized and a few details of fields used by the military are given in this General Survey in the section on Transportation and Telecommunications.




FIGURE 9. F-5A FREEDOM FIGHTER of the GRC Air Force (U/OU)

headquarters battery and four firing batteries. The attached army AW batteries provide local air defense for air force installations. There are three operational missile battalions. As more surface-to-air missiles are phased into the air defense system it is planned to phase out a number of air defense artillery units

### 3. Training

The Air Training Command is responsible for all flying and technical training. It operates the Air Recruit Training Center and seven major schools—Air Force Academy, Air Preparatory School, Air Technical School, Air Defense School, Air Communications and Electronics School, Air Command and Staff College, and Tactical Air Operations School. The training programs are satisfactory in concept, scope, and supervision, and the instruction is well conducted. The pilot training program normally graduates 50 qualified pilots per year, all of whom incur a 7-year military commitment. The economic boom on Taiwan that has improved the living standards of civilians has not extended to these pilots. Their relative social status has therefore decreased, prospects for advancement appear slight, and morale has diminished. English-language training is available in the training centers and in combat wings.

Training equipment for basic courses in the Air Technical School and the Air Communications School is adequate, but that for advanced courses is not. The limited technical backgrounds of many recruits is one hindrance which the intensified, on-the-job training program may reduce.

### 4. Logistics

The main CAF supply and maintenance agency is the Air Service Command, which receives, stores, and distributes supplies through two strategically located depots, one at Taipei and one at T'ai-nan. In the mid-1960's a Command Equipment Management Center was established to machine-process equipment documents, manage distribution of supplies to meet priorities, and to improve overall management control.

All aircraft, missiles, and defense radars are U.S. manufactured, and most replacement parts are procured in the United States by commercial agents of the Ministry of National Defense. Difficulties have been caused by the inability to procure parts and by disruptions in the delivery process from the United States. The U.S. Air Force Supply system is used. The GRC is reluctant to program and fund stock levels sufficient to meet demand, and only enough supplies are kept on hand to meet basic requirements at peacetime attrition rates. The air force is responsible for its own supply acquisition. Common-use items are procured for it by the Combined Service Force.

Distinct progress has been made in materiel control, aircraft records, and general aircraft maintenance. The maintenance control facilities and trained personnel in the combat wings have made the maintenance system effective. The last aircraft engines in the inventory that required foreign maintenance were those of the F-5, but in mid-1968 the air force also began overhauling those on Taiwan, thereby raising its overhaul and maintenance capability to include all aircraft engines in the inventory. Major repair facilities are located at T'ai-chung and at Ping-

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tung South airfield, with base-level maintenance carried out at the other operational airbases. Substantial Inspection and Repair As Necessary (IRAN) facilities exist at the Air Asia Company, Ltd., and the China Air Lines, Ltd. Both companies' facilities are engaged in U.S. Government maintenance contracts. Their IRAN maintenance compares favorably in quality and flow times with U.S. standards. The CAF generally does not perform preventive maintenance if it can be avoided. The corrosion problem on aging aircraft, particularly F-104's, has consequently become quite severe. Technical assistance for maintenance of various types of equipment is being furnished by MAAG personnel and contract representatives, where required.

An Aero-Industry Development Center (AIDC) was reorganized into its present structure at Tai-chung in 1969, with the mission of research, development, production, and planning of the ROC aircraft industry. Production of the Bell helicopter, UH-1H, takes place at this facility, and a total of 50 will be assembled. The F-5B/E assembly coproduction program will also be under the direction of AIDC. The CAF considers it quite important to develop the AIDC

as the first step in forming a nucleus of knowledge and skill from which more advanced and economically beneficial projects can be realized.

#### F. Paramilitary forces (S)

The Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters (TGGH), with an estimated strength of 27,900, is subordinate to the MND through the National Security Bureau. Under the existing condition of modified martial law, however, certain of its activities which normally would be considered the responsibility of civil government are subject to administrative supervision by the Taiwan Provincial Government. The missions of the TGGH include counterinsurgency and the control or suppression of subversion on Taiwan, antiriot and civil defense action, and command of all internal security forces in the enforcement of martial law. The TGGH comprises four regional garrison commands and four garrison regiments. Usually two or three regular army divisions are under operational control of the TGGH to support it in emergencies. These divisions are assigned on a rotating basis.