

ARAKI

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION
DOCUMENT DIVISION

20 Nov 1947

MEMO FROM: Yale Maxon
TO : Mr. Comyns-Carr
SUBJECT : "Education for War"

1. Subject unpublished manuscript, procured by the writer from CI&E Section in an effort to disprove the contention of both ARAKI and KIDO that the Japanese educational system was not militarized during their tenures as Education Minister, was turned over yesterday to Miss Culverwell for your perusal.

2. Perhaps some of the attached excerpts therefrom, selected by Col. Fixel for use in cross-examination of KIDO, could be used in rebuttal. Apparently no selection was made of items referring to ARAKI.

3. It is requested that subject manuscript be returned to the writer as soon as convenient inasmuch as it is the only revised copy in existence and I have personally signed for it.

YALE MAXON

cc: Case Files
Mr. Brown, less encl.
✓ Mr. Sutton, less encl.

Page

28108
to
28121
28122

OPENING STATEMENT BY MR. McMANUS

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF ARAKI, SADA0
BY MR. McMANUS

The accused identified Exhibit 3161 as his affidavit and verified it.

28124

* The affidavit stated that before he accepted the position of War Minister, he served as Chief of No. 1 Division of the General Staff from January to August 1928; * President of the Staff College until August 1929; Commander of the 6th Division in Kumamoto until August 1931; and Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Department of Military Education.

28125

In these posts, he recognized from his experiences in World War 1 and from his views on the morality of war, as well as from the army's basic principle, the necessity of disassociating the army from the old Prussian style army. He devoted himself to the education and training of troops to promote their moral standard.

While there were many signs of potential unrest in those days, his view on current problems always developed from those of the leaders of Japan, including militarists. He always remained unbiased to any movements which were opposed to each other.

On 15 August 1931 he accepted the post of Director of the General Affairs Bureau which was an advisory position to the Inspector General.

28126

* He learned of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident from the newspapers. He was told that the government had set up a non-expansion policy and so he did not think much of the Incident. At the time of the October Incident, he had been asked by War Minister MINAMI and Chief of Staff KANAYA to subdue the trouble. When he successfully did this, he was informed nothing further as to punishments dealt. At that time he was merely Chairman of the Committee of the Entrance Examinations of the Military Preparatory School and the Military

Page Academy, a position which had nothing to do with current problems. Concerning the circumstances around his acceptance of the post of War Minister at the end of 1931, he was senior member of the Vice-Minister class, and because of this was asked on December 13th by INUKAI to become War Minister. As was customary, he requested * direction of the three Army Chiefs. Their opinion was unanimous and they instructed him to accept the post. He sent his acceptance to INUKAI and became War Minister in his cabinet.

28127

INUKAI testified at the Tribunal that his acceptance was made under extraordinary circumstances but not only was there any uncustomary procedure in connection with it, but neither his predecessor nor anyone informed him of such circumstances. On the days following his acceptance, his predecessor, MINAMI, Vice-Minister SUGIYAMA and KANAYA explained to him the state of affairs at that time. They said that since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, both the government and the army strived to settle it under a non-expansion policy, but that the condition in Manchuria which had been aggravated in the past * was so complicated that both Japanese civilians in Manchuria and the Kwantung Army were still in danger. The governor of the existing regime had lost its grip. Influential personnel had absconded and the rest had established strongholds in various parts. Absolute anarchy was revealed throughout Manchuria.

28128

The army was dually engaged in protecting Japanese nationals and in self-defense to ensure security of the Kwantung Army. The condition was so aggravated that it was impractical to return the troops to their original stations.

Chang Hsueh-liang, who had established in Chinchow District a stronghold for violating Manchurian peace and order, did not keep his promise of evacuating his troops. There was not the slightest indication of his sincerity in fulfilling this promise.

28129 * The Japanese forces from peaceful desires had returned from a half way point in its campaign and this was utilized for propaganda by Chang Hsueh-liang. Chang won victory in this campaign and by instigating a fighting spirit in his troops, caused them to cross the Liao River and over-run districts as far as Mukden. This

Page endangered Japanese nationals and troops. While the League had not appreciated the actual situation, the recent councilors meeting decided to despatch a commission of inquiry and it approved the rightful assertion of reserving their rights and pacifying turbulent elements including bandits. This was what was explained to ARAKI and the conclusion of the three leaders was that if the situation were left alone and caused damage to Japanese nationals, or should the Kwantung Army suffer damage, hostilities would expand all of China and result in serious international relations.

28130 * When ARAKI reported these matters to Premier INUKAI, the Premier told him that self-defense and non-expansion should be the fundamental policy and restoration of law and order and the termination of hostilities in Manchuria should be immediately realized. It should be borne in mind that Chang Hsueh-liang was the man to deal with and the theatre of action should be extremely restricted and not exceed the territory under his domination.

Military action might be required to save the danger to the Chinchow District but in doing so, request should first be made for the withdrawal of the troops under Chang's command from that district.

28131 To the League and other countries related to Manchuria by treaties, a thorough explanation should be made * to gain their complete understanding.

The Premier's opinions were discussed at the cabinet meeting and were made the basic policy. ARAKI made the necessary contact with the Ministers of Finance and Navy to discharge the sphere of duty. The decision was also conveyed by him to the General Staff so as to request them to act accordingly.

In connection with this cabinet decision there was an allegation in Exhibits 187 and 188 to the effect that he had made a plan for the occupation of the Far Eastern Provinces. This was a mistake caused by an incompetent interpreter and was entirely different from the fact. He said he would refer to this matter later. He had never heard that INUKAI intended to petition for an Imperial Command to withdraw the Kwantung Army as was testified by INUKAI, Takashi. INUKAI should have known

Page
28132

well that the Emperor would not have granted an Imperial Command without first having the advice of the General * Staff. He would refute this allegation by a witness.

There was an allegation in Chapter 1 of Appendix A of the Indictment that the INUKAI Cabinet and all subsequent governments adopted and continued this aggression and its gradual extension over other parts of China. Both the INUKAI and SAITO cabinets while he was a member of them never made any such policy. This would be shown by speeches made by cabinet members and witnesses and documents.

28132

Regarding pacification of the Liao-si District, the government expected a peaceful settlement in the Chinchow District through diplomacy, * but after a month of negotiations, there was no sign of withdrawal. Bandit activities along the River Liao were intensified and at the end of December 1931 the situation reached such a stage that Japan had to resort to arms to wipe out the bandits and lawless mobs to save Japanese nationals. ARAKI communicated this decision to the General Staff. In the meantime the government made a proclamation on the 27th to clarify the situation and explained Japan's difficulties.

28134

* On the 28th of December 1931, the General Staff sent to Manchuria from Korea a divisional headquarters and brigade which began action the end of the month. The Kwantung Army had taken measures to cope with the situation and several times requested without response the withdrawal of Chang Hsueh-liang from Liao-si.

Bandit troops on learning that Japan had decided to take measures fled from Chinchow with groups under Chang Hsueh-liang. A unit of Japanese troops under Lt. General MUTO entered Chinchow 3 January 1932 without bloodshed and the Japanese nationals were relieved.

The army then undertook to maintain law and order there, leaving other activities to diplomatic authorities; but during January garrison troops suffered casualties from bandits and the KOGA Regiment was annihilated at Chin-si, but the troops there observed non-expansion and did not take counter-steps.

Page

28135

* The first Shanghai Incident was initiated the middle of July 1932 when Chinese civilians assaulted Japanese priests, killing or wounding them. This induced a clash between the Navy and the Chinese 19th Route Army and many Japanese nationals in Shanghai and the Navy were much in danger. Navy authorities, to discharge their international duty in Shanghai and to serve their troops and protect Japanese there, reported to the government and requested a detachment of troops. The government knew the imminence of the situation and decided to relieve the Navy and protect the Japanese and requested the Army for a detachment.

28136

ARAKI consulted the Chief of Staff and they agreed to conform to government policy * and despatch a minimum force. The Chief of Staff reported to the Throne and after approval the expedition was finally decided upon.

The situation in Shanghai became so critical that a mixed brigade was first sent, and this brigade was on a peace-time footing on account of shortage of time. The UEDA Division also in an immobilized state followed the brigade. The enemy's strength was reported to be about 50,000.

ARAKI strived to settle this Incident in an amicable manner and desired the Chief of General Affairs and Commander UEDA to follow this policy. This resulted in UEDA's advice to the enemy of a peaceful settlement which would be shown by evidence later. UEDA's attempt was not duly responded to, but drove him into a considerable plight.

28137

This request for peace and subsequent hesitation on the part of UEDA * in immediately resorting to action was interpreted and propagandized by the Chinese as a victory over Japanese forces. Such propaganda induced the situation whereby Chinese forces under the Nanking Government joined the 19th Route Army with whom the expeditionary force was confronted. This situation affected the Manchurian situation causing aggravation of law and order there. Even the League proposal to Japan served to enhance Chinese spirit. The situation became serious and the safety of more than 20,000

Page

Japanese nationals was menaced. China took advantage of their aspiration for an amicable settlement and created a situation more dangerous to Japan.

The government requested the Army to save the situation and on the 7th or 8th of February the advance force landed. UEDA arrived in the middle of February and this new crisis was created at the end of the month.

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Because of this renewed request from the government, ARAKI's position required him to devise measures * to save the situation by close cooperation between operational tactics and diplomacy, which meant conforming with political principles of the government.

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He consulted the General Staff and agreed to their appointing Colonel OBATA (Lt. General OBATA, who became Minister of State in the KUNI Cabinet) the Chief of Operations of the General Staff. They agreed to recommend General SHIRAKAWA as Supreme Commander of the Expeditionary Force. In accordance with the suggestion of the General Staff, further reinforcement of two divisions was decided at the cabinet meeting. Preparations were made for this reinforcement and at dawn of March 1st the advance division made a surprise landing at Tzi-liao-kou, behind the enemy. After insignificant resistance * the enemy retreated in conformity with the request the expeditionary force had previously made and SHIRAKAWA ordered cessation of hostilities on March 3. The Chinese followed suit the following day.

Due to the ingenious tactics of the operations force, the primary object was achieved and the incident settled while the main body of reinforcements was still aboard ship. The government and the military, together with the diplomatic authorities, tried to settle the situation upon guarantee of the Chinese to observe law and order.

The Japanese voluntarily withdrew at the end of March to the rear line and one and a half divisions were subsequently returned to Japan. Through the valuable efforts of the committees of the U.S., Britain, France, Italy, Japan and China, a plan for international security and safety in and around Shanghai was set up and a truce signed on May 5th.

Page

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* By the truce agreement the Army had the right to station a part of its force. From a fear that it would be a cause of future trouble and because of respect for Chinese sovereignty, and furthermore, as the expedition's primary object had been accomplished, it was decided to withdraw all troops from China and this was completed at the end of May. At that time there were opinions that the withdrawal was premature. Such opinions were well grounded in view of past experiences in Manchuria and at the early stages of the Shanghai Incident. The moderate attitude at the beginning had given cause for enemy propaganda that they had won the victory and had succeeded somewhat in deceiving the people, with a result that the overall situation was made worse, that the army carried out withdrawal in view of its aspirations for peace.

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While leaving a good impression on the well informed classes of China, * the overall withdrawal spurred the general Chinese public to contempt for the Japanese Army. It had a harmful effect on the Manchurian situation and gave rise to disturbances there. He pointed out that this was the most delicate part of the policy toward China and both the government and the military had many difficulties on it.

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* These circumstances would be shown by the government declaration proclamations of UEDA and SHIRAKAWA, his speeches as War Minister and those in the Diet, concerning the protection of Japanese in and around Harbin. Hsi Hsia, who became Governor of Kirin Province on 30 September 1931, later declared that province independent. Two months later he caused discord with Ting-Chao and Li-Tu of Harbin and the general situation there was thrown into confusion, threatening the safety of Japanese nationals.

The situation became more imminent when Hsi Hsia, in January 1932, determined to conduct his subjugation campaign in the north and started fighting on the 27th. Japanese nationals were compelled to request the Kwantung Army to rescue them and Koreans and Manchurians also frequently made the same request.

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* Four Japanese were murdered, several Koreans taken away and about 4,000 Japanese and 2,000 Koreans endangered. The Kwantung Army ordered aerial reconnaissance but an emergency landing had to be made near Harbin. The

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
September 10, 1947
DEFENSE
ARAKI - Direct

Page 4375

Page

crew were murdered. The government had taken a cautious attitude but as the situation became serious, considered it necessary to take measures to restore law and order and protect Japanese residents. While they were to be protected, the government's policy was that international relations, especially with the Soviet, should not be endangered. The Chief of Staff in conformity with this policy ordered restrictions on the Army as to military actions. This caused operational difficulties and a corps finally succeeded, after hardships, in reaching the outskirts of Harbin. As the object of the campaign was to protect Japanese there, and as it was accomplished, the main body retraced its course without entering the city.

Explanatory speeches by Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA on January 31, 1932, at the Privy Council and the Diet will clarify the circumstances.

28145 After the restoration of law and order in Chinchow, ITAGAKI of the Kwantung Army reported to ARAKI in Tokyo the situation in Manchuria, the independence movement, and Commander in Chief HONJO's view of the situation. According to these reports, each Manchurian Province had declared independence and was in such a precarious condition that a single false step would bring chaos * but there was an aspiration among the influential people of Manchuria to found a new state. This aspiration was getting irresistible, and it was almost impossible for the Kwantung Army which was neither forcing a military administration nor provided with sufficient strength to maintain law and order, not to take this new situation into consideration.

ARAKI learned that the unanimous opinion of those concerned with independence was to have PU-YI as ruler of the new state. HONJO's opinion was to leave the matter to them and not interfere with their aspirations.

On hearing the report, ARAKI thought of the necessity of paying attention to international problems which might arise out of Manchuria's independence declaration. He reported this information, however, to the Premier. The Premier knew what was going on in Manchuria

Page

28146 *and believed that the question of independence should be left alone. He considered, however, that the international problems should be studied. The government's decision was to leave it to the Manchurian people and not interfere as the primary concern was to preserve law and order. The independence movement made further progress and a decision for independence was reached February 28 with an additional resolution to ask PU-YI to become ruler. Independence was declared March 1st, and PU-YI became President on the 9th.

28147 The Kwantung Army wished that the new regime would respect the international treaties and external regulation and base its administration upon the people's will so that an ideal nation under the harmonious collaboration of 5 races should be realized. The attitude * of the Kwantung Army was to watch its development but not interfere with it. However, the preservation of peace and order and protection of Japanese had to be conducted to correspond to the everchanging situation and the Army had discussions with the new regime concerning these local matters. Army reports to the central authorities came to the government which reached the conclusion that there was no alternative but to leave to the discretion and judgment of the Kwantung Army Commander the preservation of peace and order.

ARAKI also followed this policy and carefully watched the situation so he should not make any mistake when counter-measures were to be taken in the future.

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The Foreign Office viewed the problem * as a case of a domestic split of a nation and that independence was not an infringement of international law. All the Army could do was to follow this policy and devote its efforts to carry out its original duty to preserve peace and order and secure the national defense of Manchuria. The new regime consolidated its foundation and so the government to avoid further disturbances decided to cooperate with it. It explained this policy at the 61st session of the Diet.

He never heard that INUKAI sent KAYANO as a special envoy to Nanking for a friendly understanding, as was testified to by INUKAI, Takeshi. If it were

Page true, it must have been of a private nature. Further
testimony that Premier INUKAI talked over the matter with
a section chief of the General Staff, who because of it
was relegated to another post, was wrong. The witness
28149 INUKAI did not mention the colonel's name * but it was
clear that Colonel SHIGETO was meant. SHIGETO was sent
with others because of his relation with the March and
October Incidents. He was made an object of the army's
purging shift. FUJITA gave evidence to this effect.

He had several interviews with the Premier
concerning Manchuria but there was never friction be-
tween them. He dealt with these matters according to
the government's policy, and when a new problem arose
discussed it with the Premier following his decision.
He never perceived in Premier INUKAI any sign of an
aggressive attitude toward international problems. The
Kwantung Army also eagerly wished for ideal progress in
Manchukuo and this was all they desired. This was clari-
fied by the will of HONJO and other evidence.

28150 * He referred next to the question of official
recognition of Manchukuo. This question was purely
diplomatic and under the Foreign Office. The Army
took no step and except for problems concerning peace,
order and national defense, the opinion of the Foreign
Minister was respected.

28151 Manchukuo gradually became a subject of dis-
cussion in and out of Japan. On June 15th the House
of Representatives resolved that official recognition
be given the new state. Japan decided to follow the
Foreign Office which suggested the new state with the
result of an international split of an independent
nation and that recognition would not infringe inter-
national law. Formal recognition was given September
15th * whereupon the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol was signed
and arrangement made for the exchange of Ambassadors.

On recognition, the Kwantung Army was charged
with the new duty of garrison and joint defense of the
new state. This meant that the Army's conduct had an
international complexion. They made it their rule to
confer with Manchukuo authorities before taking any
action. The situation developed to formal recognition
and along with it Japan found it necessary to determine
her attitude toward this state of affairs. She decided

Page to give Manchukuo, in compliance to request, all necessary assistance and to prevent causing disturbances there.

28152 Japan neither intended to make Manchukuo her cat's paw nor violate international law. * This was shown from the speeches of the Premier and Foreign Minister and their answers to questions of the Privy Council. It would also be seen in the speech of Mr. Ting, the Foreign Minister of Manchukuo, on the first anniversary of Manchukuo's foundation. He desired that Manchukuo should develop along the line indicated in her independence declaration toward the goal of becoming an ideal nation, and ARAKI desired she would acquire every qualification for independence.

28153 In the Spring of 1934, when PU-YI visited Japan, ARAKI had an audience with him at which PU-YI emphasized his desire to establish a happy land of ODO. He talked to ARAKI face to face without an interpreter and spoke of his ambition of becoming an Emperor of all China. At that time ARAKI dared to advise him and told him that the Emperor should cultivate the virtue of Emperorship * and become worthy of confidence. There was not the slightest indication that PU-YI would have become a tool of Japan. There was a sign that he would take the initiative to induce Japan in the direction he desired.

Manchukuo's development afterward was not quite what it should have been. ARAKI refrained through dissatisfaction from attending the 10th anniversary celebration and expressed his views on Manchuria to Lord Lytton and others.

As he said in his speech at the 62d Diet Session, Chang Hsueh-liang's activities before the formal recognition of Manchukuo, were carried out to such an extent that Japan had to settle the situation.

28154 The pacification of North Manchuria, Kholombail and Jehol was different * inasmuch as Manchukuo had by that time been founded and recognized. The campaign fulfilled the Army's duties as provided in the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol and was nothing but a domestic affair.

Page

The Pacification Campaign by the Japan-Manchukuo Allied Force was executed because Ma Seng-shan who had once pledged loyalty to Manchukuo plotted rebellion in December 1932, and Jehol in February 1933.

In carrying out these campaigns, he drew special attention of the General Staff to follow the government policy so that the expedition to Kholombail would not cause any bad influence over Soviet relations and warfare in Jehol would not expand itself. He further requested that their action be based strictly on the Protocol and attention paid to terminate hostilities. He requested close contact between the War Office and General Staff.

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In the Kholombail district, they were assisted by the Soviet's good will, and succeeded in saving the Japanese residents.

In the Jehol campaign, the General Staff and Army made it their policy to stop troops at the Great Wall, even at the risk of operational disadvantage. There was an occasion when the troops marched over the wall but they were immediately ordered to return. This caused another attack from the enemy but in a drive after the retreating enemy, reached the Soo River and stopped.

Chang Hsueh-liang withdrew from all official positions and an agreement was reached and the Tangku Truce was signed between Ho Ying-chin, a representative of the National Government, and OKAMURA, representative of the Kwantung Army. Further details would be given by witnesses.

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* In compliance with a request of representative of the National Government, Ho-Ying-chin, cessation of hostilities was discussed by Ho and OKAMURA and a truce signed on the 31st of May. The agreement was confirmed and hostilities virtually ended.

The Manchurian Incident was not a war primarily in the sense of definition of international law; therefore, there was no such procedure as a peace treaty, and only an agreement was reached between the parties to prevent further hostilities. Later, members of the governments of Manchukuo and China met at Dairen to discuss routine

Page matters concerning friendly relations. Japanese representatives also attended but ARAKI did not remember the details.

28157 * Thus the disturbances which had been prevailing in Manchuria at the time of the WAKATSUKI cabinet were completely settled by ARAKI within 1½ years of his acceptance as War Minister. His most important mission as War Minister, which was the settling of hostilities, had been accomplished and he decided to establish plans to stabilize internal and external affairs.

He set up three plans, stabilization of domestic affairs, purification of the army and improvement of foreign relations.

28158 * The first thing he intended to do was to purify the public mind by dispelling the evil causes accumulated after World War I, paying special attention to external and internal affairs and to the specific feature of Japan's national character. The best way was to let the people appreciate the virtue of the Emperor. A practical plan was to petition for general amnesty and to release both the right and left wing political criminals and others, with the exception of those whose crime was particularly atrocious and to give them warning not to repeat their folly.

Secondly, he intended to stabilize the mind of the people in rural districts and fishing districts by relieving them from their extreme poverty.

28159 Thirdly, he thought it necessary to devise measures to settle confusions * in political and ideological circles.

Fourthly, he intended to find means to secure the original character of the army whose reason for existence was in practicing morals, and let it thoroughly understand fundamental principles so that ominous incidents would not recur.

Fifthly, Japan was then confronted with difficult international problems. It was urgent to solve these by making concessions while making full assertions when necessary. Japan needed to determine the minimum extent of her self-existence and be protected from the hitherto precarious state of affairs in Europe.

Page

28160 Under such circumstances the primary thing was to secure peace in the Far East and ARAKI determined to hold an international conference among countries interested in the Far East. His intention was to establish peace after thorough deliberation among the participants of the conference, * and then make it the cornerstone on which to secure world peace.

The matter was too grave to be decided instantaneously and he spent two months in studying the plan and preparing. In September he prepared a basic suggestion and suggested to the Emperor to make a definite plan based on this so that it might be presented to the Diet. The petition for amnesty seemed to be the most difficult but he gained the approval of the Navy Minister and the suggestion was put to the Premier.

There were several objections to amnesty for political criminals but he maintained that however wrong they may have been, their misconduct had arisen from their passion to improve their country's future.

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* It was the unfortunate circumstances in which they had been brought up or their prejudice that had driven them to extremes, but they were valuable subjects.

Premier SAITO ordered the people in charge of this type of work to study the practical side and held conferences among ministers related to the subject matter of the plan. Five-Minister Conferences were held and others concerning rural problems were also held. He attended these conferences with MITSUCHI, the Railway Minister. The conferences met more than 20 times and the plan was thoroughly discussed by the end of the year. Definite plans were set up on several matters.

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* Basic study showed progress and a Memorandum was given on matters concerning foreign affairs and national defense in October 1933. Important decisions were also reached concerning rural problems. ARAKI's intention was to establish definite plans for all subjects by the end of January 1934, and to present them to the Diet. The government, army and Diet should seek to stabilize internal affairs and these efforts, together with diplomatic activities, would induce the opening of the Far Eastern Peace Conference.

Page

As he devoted his whole attention after conclusion of the Tangku Truce Agreement to this matter, he did not have much interest in other problems; even when he had some objection to such matters, he let them go.

28163 On 1 January 1934, while the plan was in the midst of deliberation, he fell seriously ill * but as he eagerly wished the plan executed at any cost, he recommended General HAYASHI to succeed him, and he resigned as War Minister.

By that time, the essential parts of his plan were still discussed by the Cabinet Ministers but it was not yet ready to be presented to the cabinet meeting. When he resigned, he sent to the Premier a suggestion of his plan with a letter, and asked him to expedite a cabinet meeting regarding the plan, but the situation failed to develop as he had expected and internal conditions of the army changed. He was dissatisfied with this state of affairs and decided not to be involved in official matters.

28164 HAYASHI had resigned after four months for personal reasons and recommended ARAKI to succeed him, but because of dissatisfaction, he declined to accept. Things turned to the worse, and two years later the February 26 Incident forced himself * and other senior members of the army to leave active service altogether.

For two years after his resignation, he was a War Councillor, but no inquiry of importance was made to him. This was the period when the internal condition of the army was in chaos and as he was outside its central circles, he did not know the helm of military affairs then.

28165 * In regard to international treaty problems, the accused stated that diplomatic affairs were not under the War Minister. As War Minister, he only attended to matters under his charge and disposed of them in accordance with government policy. He knew little of diplomatic matters. A diplomatic decision was made upon investigation and opinion of the foreign ministers. When it had an important bearing upon other departments, the various ministers were consulted, and when it was

Page sufficiently important so as to be related to all departments, it was discussed usually at a cabinet meeting. Otherwise, most were disposed of by the Foreign Minister.

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With regard to international treaties concerning the Manchurian Incident, the WAKATSUKI Cabinet had already invoked the right of self-defense and the Premier and Foreign Minister of the INUKAI Cabinet also declared the continuation of this right of self-defense. He was told that their action was within the limit of action for self-defense about which every signatory of the Non-Aggression Pact had * reserved the right of execution. A prominent scholar of international law defined that self-defense was conducted until pressure by violence and menace is removed. There was a reservation made by Japan on 10 December 1931 at a League Council Meeting which approved of the right of subjugating bandits and lawless elements. The army acted within the extent of this right.

As for problems concerning the independence of Manchukuo and its recognition, Premiers and Foreign Ministers of the INUKAI and SAITO Cabinets gave explanations at the Diet and Privy Councils. They said independence was the result of an internal split and was conducted by her own people and that the nine-power treaty provided no restriction on such action. Independence was realized upon the basis of Manchuria's historical background. They quoted opinions of scholars of international law and said there were instances in which the presence of foreign troops contributed toward independence.

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These explanations * convinced all other members of the cabinet and the army continued in conformity with this policy until the right of self-defense was no more required.

As far as he could remember, these details were contained in the Views of Japanese Government which were submitted to the plenary session of the League.

Relations with the League had been considerably aggravated before the INUKAI Cabinet. Immediately prior to its formation the League despatched its Inquiry Mission. This decision was quite satisfactory and the INUKAI Cabinet

Page hoped the mission would arrive at an accurate recognition of the situation. The army also expected that the mission would make an unbiased conclusion by having contact with the actual conditions. The INUKAI cabinet policy toward Manchuria was immediate restoration and the maintenance of peace and order. It aimed at improvement of international relations by cooperation and understanding. In conformity with this the Army *
28168 minimized military action and devoted efforts to end hostilities.

The manner in which the army settled the Shanghai Incident was a good indication of this policy and its withdrawal from Shanghai improved Japan's international relations. The army continued to concentrate its effort on this point.

The independence and recognition of Manchukuo was studied by both the INUKAI and SAITO Cabinets. By watching the results of this study, both cabinets followed the natural growth of the movement and when convinced of its healthy progress, decided to recognize it formally. In conformity the army strived to prevent acts disturbing peace and order which had barely been restored and to discharge its new task of joint defense of Manchukuo.

28169 With regard to the League, * ARAKI knew that the government had tried to obtain its understanding by tendering them written views of the government on the complexity of the character of the Manchurian Incident and its suggestions for means to maintain peace. When MATSUOKA was sent as plenipotentiary, the government had decided its policy of staying with the League at all costs in order to seek a proper understanding. He thought MATSUOKA was instructed accordingly.

28170 * The Army also strived to bring about a situation in which Japan could remain with the League for a correct understanding of the problem, but there were continued disturbances in Manchuria and before these hostilities were settled the League resolution was passed; the hope of meeting a true understanding from the League having been thus frustrated, Japan had no alternative but to withdraw in accordance with charter provisions. Japan declared by Imperial Rescript and

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
 September 10, 1947
 DEFENSE
 ARAKI - Direct

Page a government communique her determination to collaborate with the world.

28171 While the accused was in office, foreign affairs were not under his jurisdiction and he could not bring into practice his views. All he could do was to discharge the duty of the army in accordance with government policy; to clarify his actions toward international problems, he felt it necessary to state * his fundamental ideology.

28172 Concerning relations with the USSR, he had been in Russia for many years and had a fond feeling toward and a good understanding of that country. Nevertheless he could not advocate the world Bolshevization policy of the Third Internationale. His opposition became more intensified when in 1923 and 1932 Communists plotted an assault on the Emperor. From 1923 to 1931 Japan was subjected to the secret activities of the Communist Party, manifested in labor conflict and other political struggles and the existence of the country became in danger. A publication of the Soviet Ambassador in 1926 and 1927 explained the details of such activities and gave a deep warning to the world. ARAKI took it as a weakness in the ideological status of Japan and did not take it so seriously * as to consider that it strained the relations with the Soviet.

28173 ARAKI stated that he was not inferior to the Communists in his passion to relieve the poor, but his belief was that if the administration under the Emperor based on the country's real doctrine, was realized, not only the poor but all could enjoy better welfare without being forced to anything. He believed that neither violence nor craft was required to provide for the people's welfare. His opinion was that if the Soviet believed in Communism that was their affair, and they should not interfere. Every country is entitled to follow its policy in accordance with its internal conditions. His opposition to the Third Internationale did not go so far as to advocate interference with the Soviet. He felt the necessity at that time of taking self-defense measures * against the menace of Soviet influence and of the policy of the Third Internationale, but he never felt the necessity to prepare for positive military action

Page against the Soviet, to say nothing of taking such action. To cope with the Soviet menace there may have been researches and suggestions among the people dealing with those matters, and he believed that they would have devised measures, but he had reason to believe that such measures should not have exceeded research. The research alleged by the prosecution to have been made by KAWABE and KASAHARA would have been their own opinion as a member of the General Staff, but had no relation with the accused. As far as he knew, no positive plan of the responsible authorities existed against the Soviet. The fact was that the army had once placed much expectation in the change of policy of the Soviet.

28174 He was not necessarily opposed in principle to conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact, but seriously and carefully listened to public opinion. He believed * that before signing such a Pact, all the problems between the two countries ought to be settled. Otherwise, the Pact was destined to fail. He did not admit the conclusions and allegations tendered by the prosecution against him. When he pointed out the obscurity of the borders of Outer Mongolia, it was not from an aggressive intention toward the Soviet. It was a defensive precaution. This could be ascertained from the other parts of the sentence around that expression. These parts said that he sincerely hoped that good Russians would peacefully display their rich natural gifts.

28175 * With regard to relations between China and Japan, they had been told since children to secure a firm and healthy independence for China and thereby bring happiness to her people. Such expressions as "Dobun Doshu" and "Shinshi Hoshu" were often used to denote how the relation between China and Japan should be. This was how his original conception of China was formed and he believed it was the same with all who had an interest in China. His magazine article entitled "To President Chiang Kai-shek and appeal to my brethren" expressed his view in this matter. He advocated that cooperation should be based upon the promotion of
28176 Oriental culture. He expressed this opinion * in 1925 when he talked to some Chinese in Shanghai who are now leaders of that country. As for the means of bringing about perfect independence to China, he gave his personal suggestion to Chiang Kai-shek in the spring of 1932

Page through the staff of the Chinese Legation in Japan.

China is destined to be a friendly neighbor. He sincerely desired perfect independence for her and never dreamed of her division. For that reason he always quoted Outer Mongolian and Sinking problems for comparison.

28177 He viewed the Manchurian Incident as an explosive situation brought to the bursting point by its historical background and complicated affairs. The explosion resulted in the independence declaration by the Manchurian people. It was a natural result caused by the people which could not have been stopped merely by the strength of a limited number without first correcting its cause. If China wanted to get rid of this sinister incident, she would have devised measures after World War I, and for a person like ARAKI, who was charged to deal with it from its halfway mark, the first necessity was to end hostilities. * He considered that if Manchuria should turn out an ideal happy land, whether politically independent or not, and gain the approval of the world, its relation with China and peace in the Far East could somehow be readjusted. He dealt with this matter along these lines. What he really had in mind was to welcome the creation of an ideal land on Chinese soil in anticipation of rehabilitation of its mother land.

When he saw the Manchurians under the hard rigors of living, he could not help but pray for realization of an ideal land as had often been talked of by Manchurian leaders. Not only himself, but all people with broader views, had the same opinion. The main thing was to bring peace between China and Japan. Re-adjustment between China and Manchukuo could be thereafter easily accomplished.

As War Minister, he considered that what was most urgently needed was to end hostilities. This was why he evacuated the troops from Shanghai and advocated after the Tangku Truce Agreement, the opening of a Far Eastern Peace Conference.

28178 * The Marco Polo Incident occurred four years after the Tangku Truce Agreement. It was unnecessary to say this incident had no relation to the Manchurian Incident. He acceded to the request of Premier KONOYE and accepted the post of Cabinet Councillor and Education Minister.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
September 10, 1947
DEFENSE
ARAKI - Direct

Page 4388

Page The Premier's object was to let ARAKI find means to terminate the China Incident. He did his best to comply, but his power was not strong enough.

28179 * On the occasion of the Nanking Campaign, he opposed occupying the city. He felt it was detrimental to the feelings of the people of both countries. It was his belief that if the leaders of China and Japan and other leading countries had deeper appreciation of Sino-Japanese relations, the Marco Polo Incident would not have had the repercussions it did. It was from these same views that before the occupation of Canton and Hankow, he made suggestions and opposed military action there but at that time he was not an army authority, nor in contact with actual affairs, and his hopes therefore were not fulfilled. He never dreamed of aggression against China and so acted accordingly. He placed utmost importance in the culture, and also unity between China and Japan. Concerning relations with USA and Britain, the accused stated that he was not a so-called pro-Anglosaxon. He was a Japanese and could not bear the sight of Japan being in contempt or reduced to destruction. He believed in obeying the Emperor and bringing about peace and welfare on the basis of Japan's original document. He believed so and practiced so. This was not an opinion from divine inspirationism or from dogmatic ultra-nationalism. He trusted it was a most humane principle agreement to the world's omnipresent natural law. He did not try to cater to the trend of making omnipotent Germany and Italy, and was sometimes blamed as a pro-Anglo-Saxon. It was not his practice to flatter or fawn upon others.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
September 10 1947
DEFENSE
ARAKI (DIRECT)

Page 4389

page

28180

*He was unscrupulous in commenting upon what seemed wrong but was never reluctant to praise the right. He could not help feel grateful to the obligations under which he was once placed and always expressed gratitude. He could not understand why he should have been called an opportunist during the war and by those who were obsequious to the current trend to be unpatriotic pro-Anglo-Saxon. It was his constant ideal that war should not be waged to satisfy meaningless desires. War usually was apt to leave behind personal feeling.

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Japan had not fought the United States or Britain. It was his belief that Japan had been under obligation to them for the past ten years in connection with her crisis. Britain in particular had been her ally, and to the U.S. * while Japan owed her much financially, there was no friction. There had only been a slight unpleasantness in connection with the racial problem and the Washington Conference but even on those matters there was sufficient understanding among the learned of both nations. He took it as no more than a mere political problem in which there was no factor of danger.

The relations with the United States after the Manchurian Incident had not always been pleasant. But the main thing hinged upon sentiment and misunderstanding. He believed it was not so deeply rooted as to completely destroy friendly relations.

At the time of the Incident he was worried over the general situation but had faith in Britain's refined diplomacy and the U.S. power of enforcement. Upon this he placed expectation to save the world.

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* He expressed his opinion to many well informed people in both Britain and the United States and wanted to adjust through them League sanctions to prevent the explosion of general unrest. He believed he was doing much good for world peace and warned them unless steps were taken along these lines the European situation suggested a world war.

It was from these fears that he desired to improve the method of applying League Sanctions based upon actual facts. It seemed that the United States had maintained indifference, having stayed outside the League and therefore was in a position to make calm and unbiased judgment on the world's state of affairs.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

Sept 10 1947
DEFENSE
ARAKI (Direct)
page

Page 4390

28183

Britain was in the same position because of her rich experience in international problems. He thought the rest of the countries were too busy rehabilitating the damages of World War #1, * to do anything else. Japan had been recognized as having the power of maintaining Far East security, and he suggested that much could be contributed to world peace if Japan, the United States and Britain discussed the basic policy of peace without prejudice and bias. Because of this conviction he had deliberate discussions over world affairs since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident with British ambassadors and military attaches.

He also appealed to the learned American people to call their attention to the situation in the East. In his speeches and discussions he indicated points on which there should be self-reflections and re-consideration by the U.S. and Britain. It was not his practice to flatter or commit himself to anything unreasonable, to say nothing of the abuse of armed force.

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* It had been his belief that world peace could come only if people based their conduct upon warm-heartedness and natural justice, restricted their selfish desires and gave concessions to others.

When the question of the importation of Siamese rice was much discussed he insisted they should endure economic disadvantages to accede to Siam's request so they could express their appreciation of the warm friendship she had shown for many years. He explained this to rural people to gain their understanding.

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When they negotiated with Lancashire in connection with their exportation of cotton piece goods he insisted they should make the best possible concession and not effect undue pressure. International problems should be settled from that point of view. It was his opinion that in facing League activities or fulfilling international treaties Japan should stand on this belief. She should not lose sight of her ultimate object in selecting the means. He advocated that those in power should be right and those who were right should have power.

He detested most the idea of power to power principle. He believed that all these assertions could be understood by Britain and the United States and desired that they would contribute to world peace. He felt ashamed in even having been alluded to as a person advocating world domination, aggression and expansion.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

Sept 10 1947
DEFENSE
ARAIK (Direct)
Page

Page 4391

28186

* In 1895 he was disturbed with an incident known as the "Three Power Interference" resulted in Japan's retrocession of Liaotung and it caused him to join the army to defend the mother land. He participated in the Russian-Japanese war and in world war #1 he was with the Russian Army at the Eastern Front. He had ample opportunity to witness the nature of war among civilized countries. This experience affected his views of war and became the second epochal period in the history of his ideology. The essence of it was that war, if inevitable, should be a war of human beings and not a struggle among beasts. He got new ideas as to weapons and style of fighting and equipment with a view to lessening war damage and made an appeal to the people in and out of Japan.

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He speculated over the basis of peace and the means to avoid war. He concluded that existing international treaties alone were insufficient to avoid war but sometimes caused war. * There were numerous causes of war but economic pressure, menace of self-existence, denial of national characteristics and racial prejudice were the principal causes. So far as they were not eliminated war was unavoidable. To maintain peace by keeping a certain balance of armament among the nations was a camouflaged peace which could be easily broken by a miscalculation by a nation. Once peace was broken the scale of equipment and installation for war would give cause to boundless calamity. He considered it the duty of civilized nations to study the fundamental causes of war and used every opportunity to propagate this idea to the world.

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After World War #1 a disruption in world thought divided the world into three ideological circles, each contesting the other. He perceived a danger of inducement to war in this conflict and drew the people's attention to the necessity of securing a fundamental ideal for the establishment of peace *. He advocated the amalgamation of eastern and western culture, enhancement of the spirit of mutual concession and KODO.

He endeavored to harmonize the world's interests to avoid potential calamity but unfortunately most countries were indifferent because of their lack of recognition of this ideal and each rushed forward to extend its influence into the world. After World War 1 two world offensives occurred with the support of armed forces. One was the world Bolshevizing Movement and the other Nazism. Japanese attention was drawn to this and the necessity of self-defense impressed her.

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ARAKI considered the most effective defense could be carried out by promoting morality and justice. His views did not admit to territorial expansion. Amalgamation of a nation with its own race and history he definitely rejected. It was one thing to protect ancestral lands and another to expand it. * He considered that a land other than its own could be developed as a source of raw materials under the principle of mutual help. That was why he objected to the amalgamation of Korea and sent a letter to his senior expressing his views and insisting that Japan cooperate with Korea by respecting its civilization. He never entertained an idea of aggression, or world domination.

Territorial expansion was infantile glory which was far from permanent welfare.

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With regard to Manchuria he accepted the post of War Minister when Manchuria was in a turmoil. His attention was devoted to terminating hostilities. He was deeply impressed solely with the miserable conditions of the Manchurian people and took a sympathetic view in the establishment of a happy land. He was impressed when after the founding of Manchukuo, the leaders of that country made Confucianism their principle. * The complicated international problems of Manchuria had not slipped out of his mind but since the independence had been declared he wished the realization of an ideal nation.

As time past it did not develop in the way he hoped and objections and criticisms reached his ears. He worried about this and declined to go to Manchuria to celebrate her 10th anniversary nor attend the celebration in Japan.

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His views of war were definitely opposed to imperialism, exclusive egoism and coercion. His conduct was coherent to this principle. He feared that the manner in which the powers dealt with Germany after World War 1 were portent of future trouble. Pressures imposed upon Germany as well as the attitude of the newly-awakened Germany toward the world were precarious from the standpoint of world peace * and he expressed his desires for the alleviation of such conditions.

Historically Japan's strained situation had been continuous but he had his own ideals because he disassociated himself from movements before and after his tenure as war minister. He went his own way and took no action in concert with people with different views. He endeavored to propagate his ideas throughout the world.

NA NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

September 10 1947

DEFENSE

ARAKI - Direct

page

Page 4392
Page 4393

28191

The equipment and strength of the army was not as good as that of Poland. In 1921 army authorities desired to raise armament standards, to only half of that of the other powers. For this purpose a bill of approximately 460 million yen for ten years running expenses was presented to the Diet and approved. The payment of the whole amount was postponed and by 1931 * 360 million yen was unused. Not one quarter of the original plan was accomplished.

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The accused believed in modern equipment but never dreamed of completing armament for waging war. He regarded the army as a symbol of morality and placed more importance on its spiritual element. He felt the necessity of completing armaments but never considered it in connection with aggression. His opinion was the reverse. He could not bring his ideal into practice having been disrupted by the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents.

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It was from his ideal that in 1932 and 1933 he conceded fifteen million yen and ten million yen respectively from the army budget to the navy and cooperated with the Finance Office and the Navy. He thought it detrimental that the army and navy disagreed over a small amount in the budget and if because of this the Navy minister should resign.* As far as the army was concerned serving the country was its first moral duty. The accomplishment of this mission was more important than a monetary question.

The army budgets in 1932 and 1933 excluding that for the Manchurian Incident was about 170 million yen each. There were virtually no increases in comparison with the preceding years. 1933 showed some decrease. New installments and equipment were paid by appropriating the budget for the following year. Any positive preparation for war was thus impossible.

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The army budget for the Manchurian Incident while he was war minister was 140 or 150 million yen for each of the two years. After Manchukuo's recognition the army had the added task of Manchurian defense by the provisions of the protocol. There was also reinforcements of railway guards. But this involved no material increase of expenses.

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*In attending to joint defense of Manchukuo military installations there were limited to those of a defensive nature. Nothing was undertaken by way of offensive action. He went his own way and took no action in concert with people with different views. He endeavored to propagate his ideas throughout the world.

page

28195

Establishment of railway lines, unification of communication systems and exploitation of natural resources were reasonable necessities for a new state. It was nothing more than an ordinary step that a new nation should take. It was wrong and groundless to accuse that Japan made Manchuria a militaristic base for aggressive war. The military installations were limited to defensive ones.

His view of war and national defense fundamentally differed from other peoples. Armaments of powers therefore did not attract his attention and he did not approve any imperialistic policy or immoral equipment, whether militaristic, ideological or economic. Armament was thus carried out in view of this.

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In his administration of military affairs he abolished discrimination between the rich and poor. He also denounced the system of paying money to become a cadet and equalized the opportunities in military service. Because of this change some college students who wanted to become cadets * may have sought some preparatory military knowledge for enlightenment.

He contended that this was not militarized education. He established a policy which he believed to be the basic condition for army purification and intended to improve the treatment of war wounded. He could definitely say there was not the slightest truth in OUCHI's testimony that during his tenure as war minister he militarized school education. His principal was to make a moral army. Second, to let it display its characteristics by observing the Imperial Way. To realize this reference should be made to his purging after several disastrous incidents. This was why he conducted shifts of military personnel.

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He did his best to quiet young officers who were dissatisfied and in the May 15th Incident there was no participation by any army officer. Throughout his tenure as war minister there was no case * of any such unlawful action. He tried to eliminate the Prussian type and insisted troops should further army virtue and not cause grudge from the opponent and to win the favor and respect of inhabitants where they were stationed. The army was then apt to be ideologically confused with the Prussian Army and this needed correction. He wanted some cabinet members to understand this and rectify the misconception that armament was to wage war. He determined this must be understood by the public and expressed his views in speeches and writings. He requested earnest reflection on current problems and urged the people to place morality as of first importance.

page

28198 The meaning of his speech entitled "JAPAN IN EMERGENCY" offered by the prosecution could be proved by other speeches with "emergency" *in their titles. If the whole of the speech were read his real intentions would be understood. The process of film manufacture and the impression it gave to spectators would be a good indication of his intention also. The speeches were made to introduce his moral views.

Sincerity underlay the Imperial Rescript granted by Emperor MEIJI to the army and navy. The present Emperor showed in his Rescript that the true principle of Japan was based on benevolence. He advocated that the army should observe these principles and his intention was to enhance the virtue of benevolence among the people and this was the first step to have the troops become aware of the true spirit of the army. He believed he succeeded even in the slightest degree in removing imperialistic thought from the army and people.

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*The Manchurian Incident arose from what had been vitally important to Japan. As its ultimate object was to bring peace and welfare to both Japanese and Chinese nationals, army officers and soldiers and the general public were sympathetic toward the Manchurians. Hostilities were not in the nature of a declared war and all captives were immediately released to engage in peaceful work. Those in distress were given funds. There was not a single case of massacre or violence nor any report made to that effect. The Lytton Report admitted this.

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The incident reported by the Chicago Tribune as having occurred near SENKINSAI was only a minor skirmish with local bandits. It was exaggerated and propaganzied as was the usual practice with the Chinese. This was reported by Powell. It was clear by Mr. Powell's testimony * and supported by the Japanese Consul's protest. The skirmish was too small to be reported and he did not know of it. Regarding the circumstances under which the accused became cabinet councillor in the first KONOYE Cabinet, since his withdrawal from active service in March 1936 he had not been satisfied with affairs and led a retired life. During that time there was an occasion when at the outbreak of the China Incident he was extremely worried and suggested to KONOYE his views about peace. In September 1937 Premier KONOYE sent for him. KONOYE was worried about the Incident and asked ARAKI if he had any ideas. It was when the second Shanghai Incident broke out and the situation was serious.

page

28201 The accused told him that if a frontal clash between China and Japan should take place it would not only be against the nation's policy but would have great operational difficulties. The accused* suggested that he should ask OBATA's opinion about these matters but KONOYE said he had OBATA's opinion and was more than ever convinced of the gravity of the situation. He said that was why he had come to him (the accused).

The accused told KONOYE that since affairs had developed to such an extent it would require a person with strong influence among military circles and not a retired soldier to settle the affair. In any case KONOYE would require great resolution. Meantime KONOYE set up an organization of cabinet councillors with about ten people including ARAKI. This body was to seek suggestions to check the expansion of the Incident.

28202 The council was not organized into a regular system. Its members were to make suggestions and there was no right of resolution. It was to hear information and exchange views* and not to discuss fixed agenda.

As the KONOYE Cabinet did not place much importance to it the Council was reduced to a nominal existence and a Councillor was an honorary post. At this time the China Incident had considerably expanded and the troops had approached Nanking.

He told the Premier that to attack and subsequently occupy the capital of China would only make the situation more serious and hinder relations with China. Peace should be sought before the campaign took place. The councillors were of the same opinion and the government authorities seemed to have done their best. However the government lacked resolute determination whereas the military action was under the direction of the Supreme Command which gained more influence and further aggravated the situation.

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About this time peace negotiations were made through the German ambassador in China. The councillors looked forward to its success but the Japanese repeated efforts were frustrated. The councillors did not participate in the negotiations and were not informed of its details but they eagerly expected the government to accomplish it until it proved in vain.

page

Then the Councillors became a mere nominal sinecure. They are charged with atrocities in Nanking but they had neither the authority nor the duty to control such an incident.

KONOYE through his sincere apprehension determined at the end of May to reshuffle his cabinet and selected new members including UGAKI, IKEDA, ITAGAKI and the accused. The accused had some expectation from this renovated cabinet but afterwards KONOYE made it his practice to confer only with the Five Minister Conference that is the ministers of War, Navy, Foreign and Finance and other ministers were not invited.

At that time military preparations were in progress and the cabinet had no authority to check them. While the Premier was indecisive action developed and reached as far as Wuchang, Hankow and Canton. During this time, cabinet members other than those of the Five Minister Council were not immediately informed.

The accused's post was merely chief of the education administration which was outside the realm of current affairs.

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*The Ministry of Education shared with the Minister of Home Affairs the task of surveillance over the General Spiritual Mobilization Organization. The Minister of Education had to write in magazines and make broadcasts in connection with educational matters. The drafts of articles or broadcasts were prepared by the staff and the minister alone made them public. He did not think anything was planned with specific intention or departed from customary practice.

Excerpts of some of his books were tendered by the prosecution. He contended that if the whole had been read instead of excerpts, the excerpts would have been understood.

During the earlier period when he was Education Minister there were some in the cabinet who were inclined toward flattery or fanaticism. Some agreed with Nazism and there were some submerged elements in the schools following communism.

28206

*The situation required persons to regulate it. For this reason he conducted personnel shifts. He appointed competent people who could cope confidently with military requests and other government branches, so that the evil practice of being obsequious to such requests could be eliminated.

Page

28206

At that time the Education Council had already been established (in 1937). This was the highest institution for the renovation of the educational system and comprised as councillors prominent persons of learning and experience. It handled important problems of education and government policies were decided by it. The inception of advocacy for compulsory education at the Youths School dated back to the beginning of the TAISHO Era.

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In 1937 the Educational Admin. Council made a report concerning this. In 1938, at the time of his predecessor, *compulsory education had already been decided upon at a cabinet meeting. The question was again considered by the Council and according to its reply in July of the same year, it was arranged that an Imperial Ordinance be issued in April 1939 for its enforcement. The new system was to give equal opportunity of education to all. It was entirely wrong to interpret it as a militarization of education.

Japan's education system had been formed after the European and American models. The system was popular but afforded more opportunity to the well-to-do and the talented of the poorer class found difficulty in developing their natural gifts. He saw that this was contrary to the original program to let everyone gain his proper place. When the Educational Council submitted its decision that education in Youths School should be made compulsory he took the opportunity to develop education among the working class and to give them opportunity to develop their talent.

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*Japan's most serious apprehension then was the disturbance of ideological circles. Communism had spread among the people. There was a time later when Fascism was followed. This trend gave rise to complications between the liberalism existing at that time and caused chaos.

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*The unfortunate incidents at that time were due to disturbance of thought. On the other hand the rise of the Nippon spirit tended to create a dogmatic nationalish which was apt to fall into extreme rightism and bring danger. The case of this was the fault of perfunctory education which made people lose sight of ideological independence and lofty ideals. To reform this the accused advocated the virtue of benevolence and tolerance which had been the nation's basic spirit. Imperial admonition was his guiding principle and he considered it the code that people should observe.

Page

28210

This principle was different from militarism. It was the one required for the correction of the defect in ideological circles. *The history of physical exercise in military style dated back many years. He had heard of conflict between educational systems and the military with regard to military training in the schools. But neither had his sympathy inasmuch as the conflict seemed to be due to narrow views. It was natural that education placed importance on discipline and cooperation but as the results depended on the character of the one in charge of training there were instances when it was executed in excess.

But there were cases where liberalism was regarded as synonymous to a sloven life and students were left in an irregular and slatternly existence.

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Another tendency was communistic ideology which caused deterioration of the students' spirits by aiding them to disdain discipline, moderation, cooperation and diligence. During the earlier period when he was education minister these tendencies were gaining influence. Students were arrested and detained on the charge of disturbing order. Such students slandered the training as being militarization of school education. There were even some among the teachers who encouraged such students.

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The accused changed the system of training so as to observe moderation between the extremes and tried to promote lefty ideals. The reformation of the Youths Schools equalized the right and duty of education. By the reformation there was no increase in the hours for training and there was no evidence to show it was militarized. Military training in the schools was part of the school education *, and from the viewpoint of educational administration should not have exceeded this.

This was his principle and any request from the army authorities attempting to bring it out of this category met his refusal.

There were occasions when the use of modern weapons was introduced in training in compliance with the requests of students and school authorities. This was not done at the request of the Education Minister. While he was Education Minister he placed importance on the moral element rather than skill of combat. This revealed the virtue of benevolence. He taught students to cultivate morals rather than depend on armed force.

Page

28213 The National Spirit General Mobilization System had been established during the first KONOYE Cabinet. Its object was to straighten the national spirit against the state of affairs after the China Incident. It was established before he was education minister. * Its central executive organ was civilian. Its main object was the improvement of daily live and spiritual restraint.

There was a later tendency for these policies to become dogmatic. The HIRANUMA Cabinet therefore established a committee system to pursue a basic policy and learned people were requested to deliberate so that the Committee could submit its opinion to the government. As Education Minister he was recommended to the chairmanship of the committee but most work was handled by the Intelligence Bureau of the Cabinet.

28214 The committee and staff included many civilians who deliberated on renovation and curtailment of daily living. In spite of its primary objective, the discussion tended to delve into current problems and was diverted from its original purpose * of cultivating the fundamental character of the people.

The most urgent need was to ask the people to undertake a severe introspection into their daily mode of living and concentrate upon endurance and improvement of their daily lives respecting social morality and bring about efficiency in their work. To bring this about the accused established a day of self-introspection called the "serving Day" which was to be the first day of every month. Although there was an opinion that the seventh of every month the day of the outbreak of the China Incident would be a better day, his opinion was that "Serving Day" should be disconnected from the current state of affairs.

His intention was to use it to promote the basic living standards of the people and that is why he made the first day of every month the day for self-introspection.

28215 * The National Spirit General Mobilization was different from the National General Mobilization and Student Mobilization. The former was merely a part of the daily life renovation. His duties as Education Minister were limited to administration and general international problems were outside his scope. He did not recollect whether such matters as KONOYE's declaration of the Establishment of the New Order or ARITA's statement concerning the new order was debated at the cabinet meeting.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

September 10 1947

DEFENSE

ARITA- Direct

Page 4401

page

28213 His non-association with international problems was more conspicuous at the time of the HIRANUMA Cabinet. He knew nothing about matters at that time as all important problems were decided at the Five Ministers Conference.

The Japan-German Cultural agreement was first proposed to him by the Foreign Office and then Japan entered into it. The agreement concerned culture only and had no political significance.

28216 *The exchange of boys between Germany and Japan was executed before his acceptance of the ministership. He did not see in it anything more than an ordinary tourist visit. He wanted to send similar parties to all other civilized countries.

The Khasan and Nomenhan Incidents were reported to the Cabinet as mere skirmishes between border garrisons. The Education Minister was not concerned with it. One thing was clear. The government desired an amicable settlement and the army acted in conformity with this. This was why these incidents were not subjects of discussion at the cabinet meeting. He knew nothing about the Tri-Partite Pact and the Wang-Chin-wei government. He did not know how they were discussed or made.

28217 As for the stationing of troops in FIC and problems concerning the Lesser Southern Group of Islands and Hainan Island, he had no idea of what was going on. * It was a long time after the formation of the Abe Cabinet that he was asked to become a councillor. He thought it was in December, 1939. He knew that the councillor was a nominal position and that he could not be of material service so he first declined to accept. The premier was so persistent that he had to accept.

The ABE Cabinet resigned two months after he accepted and he never had a chance to talk to the premier.

When the YONAI cabinet was formed he was asked to become Home Minister. He considered affairs so grave at that time that he considered it impossible for anyone except those with strong influence over the military, to exercise effective administration and so he refused to accept. He was then asked to become its cabinet councillor but he again declined to accept. When it was persistently

page

asked that his name be listed as a councillor for only nominal purposes he could not very well refuse and became a councillor.

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* He remained a nominal member and did no work. He knew nothing of what was going on in the cabinet. It was however conceivable that both ABE and YONAI cabinets were opposed to the Tripartite Pact and eager to put an end to the China Incident.

In September 1940, about two months after the formation of the second KONOYE Cabinet, Mr. TOMITA, chief cabinet secretary visited the accused and asked him to become councillor of the second KONOYE Cabinet. He had been told that the establishment of the Grand Rule Assistance Association and the conclusion of the Tri Partite Pact were going to be disclosed shortly. These were two important problems over which he had serious apprehension. Since they were to be realized it meant his apprehension could not remain so but developed into something very serious. He decided he could not assist the Cabinet which was to commit those mistakes.

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* He confided these considerations to TOMITA and told him he could not accede. The same day KONOYE visited him and repeated the request. They had a hot discussion and the accused explained to KONOYE that the state of affairs indicated grave consequences and he did not accept his request.

From March 1936 to October 15 1937 and from September 1939 to November 1939, and after July 1940 the accused was in no official position and no public activity was undertaken by him. The anti-comintern pact, the outbreak of the China Incident, stationing of troops in FIC, the Tripartite Pact, and the Pacific war occurred during these periods and he did not think it necessary to say anything about them.

Page

28221 * The accused stated that the prosecution submitted exhibit 187-A as an excerpt of his interrogation. He presumed they meant to submit the interrogation conducted at Sugamo by Morrow and Hyder, which was carried on * more than twenty days between January 18 and March 12, 1946, with the assistance of one or two interpreters. English versions were stenographically recorded the first few occasions, but the procedure was later stopped, whereas the Japanese version was not recorded at all. The interpreters were not fully conversant with Japanese, and there were points on which they failed to come to a mutual understanding because of incompetent interpretation. The record of the interrogation was neither read nor shown to the accused. He was never asked to give or sign a statement in connection with it.

28223 The record, when presented before the Tribunal, contained misunderstandings, complications, and mistakes, and there were diversions from the facts. He could not hold himself responsible for the contents. During the interrogation, interpreters were changed on almost each occasion. So far as he could see, all were unable to thoroughly understand Japanese, and the Japanese state of affairs. * The interpreters themselves seemed to have conscientiously admitted their incompetence.

28224 He felt uneasy, and suggested he should write an outline. If the prosecutors were to make interrogations based on his written statement, it would save considerable time, he told them. It would also convey his ideas accurately and correctly. This suggestion was agreed to, and although he had not much time to elaborate on its contents, he made a statement concerning settlement of the Manchurian Incident, after his acceptance of the post of War Minister, in answer to questions of movements of young officers, the former was handed to Hyder and the latter to Morrow, and he asked them to let him read the English translation. He thought this took place on the 11th or 12th of February, 1946. There was a remark in exhibit 187-C of his having been told * that a copy of the translation would be brought to him. However, the translation was not shown him and the interrogation continued. The manner with which it was carried out filled him with apprehension, but since he had already presented written statements it did not worry him.

Page

After the commencement of the trial, the translation of the documents was handed him, and the prosecution submitted the record of his interrogation in evidence. At that time his counsel tried to explain the circumstances, and subsequently took every opportunity to explain the matter to the Tribunal. At one time a copy of the translation was tendered, but not admitted, on the ground it should be submitted under the individual phase.

28225

* He contended that the written statement made at Sugamo was indispensable to the record of his interrogation, and they should be read together. The record of his interrogation contained several important mistakes. Among them was the allegation that during the Manchurian Incident, he established a plan for occupying Manchuria (exhibits 188-A, B, and C.). This allegation is different from the fact, which could be checked by comparing the date of his written answer to the prosecutors, and exhibits 188-A, B, and C.

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* Another mistake is the allegation that the Privy Council was the party which decided the national policy. This was wrong, from common sense. It was also a mistake in the allegation that the War Minister dictated orders to the Chief of Staff for the dispatch of troops.

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The date when the INUKAI Cabinet decided the outline of Manchurian Policy was not December 17. This mistake arose when the prosecutor insisted that the plenary session of the Privy Council for the deliberation of "Issuance of Bond to cover the Emergency Expense to deal with the Manchurian Incident" was on that date. His statements concerning the basic principle of dealing with the incident was confused by the interpreter with his statement concerning the fact. By this he meant that their conversations as to whether or not attendance at the cabinet meeting was compulsory, * there was an allegation that he stated that Manchurian sovereignty rested with China. That may be so from general conception based on a map, but the fact was different.

The allegation that he directed the independence declaration of Manchuria and its subsequent recognition, was entirely mistaken. This would be shown by evidence. Conversations concerning responsibility of cabinet members and the declaration of the Foreign Minister and those responsible for the China Incident, and circumstances under which he accepted the post of Cabinet Councillor, were only partially recorded, and the record failed to convey the real meaning.

Page

28228 The extent of the authority of the Supreme Command, which was in charge of the expedition, and that of the government was not thoroughly expressed in the record of his interrogation. * He merely stated an instance to show that in ordinary times the government policy is shown to the Supreme Command by the government to make it a basis for the former and decide upon its movement. He did not mean specifically to state the fundamental power and authority of those two organs. When warfare started or the Supreme Command deemed it necessary, it was entitled to a direct access to the Throne, and it could not be said that the dispatch of troops was done only when agreed to by the government.

28229 * Regarding the motion picture, "Japan in Emergency", this was the title of a speech he made in compliance to a request of the Osaka Mainichi Newspaper. It was the time when Japan had to withdraw from the League, and an air of uneasiness prevailed, with confusion, both political and ideological. His speech was to restrain people from corrupt habits and encourage them to further their recognition of international relations, and by doing so to quiet their minds.

28230 In this speech he advocated that the object of national defense was not to wage war, but to protect and secure morals and justice. The troops should not make it their first object to blindly resort to force, but to place the importance in morals first. * He requested self-reflection in order to enhance culture.

28231 * He was not concerned in the manufacture of the film. He trusted that the section of the War Office in charge gave necessary warning for the manufacturers to be careful not to provoke international feeling. His intention was clearly manifested in certain named reels.

28232 He made a speech in the summer of 1933 in which he said that what was needed was the watchword, "Don't reject others, abuse others, or blame others, but cultivate character". He told the younger generation not to be satisfied in finding contentment. They should cooperate in bringing about peace and welfare. They should not criticize, but be genuine and broad-minded. The peace of the world would be realized by observing this. They should be kind to foreigners. * They should teach the world the path of humanity to reach world peace.

Page

He advocated these principles in connection with the expression "Emergency", and tried to introduce these principles into the film. By this he intended to show the aspiration of Japan of cooperating with the world for peace. There were minor points, which because of technical reasons and the intention of the manufacturer to cater to low standards, were not quite up to his original intention, but as a whole he considered the film faultless. He never heard that it made an acute impression.

28233 His articles in "Mombu Jiho" while he was Education Minister, and his speeches and broadcasts during that time, were nothing but routine work and were not delivered in connection with any incident. The prosecution depicted several words as provocative, but he contended that the incident was going on and expressions of that kind were quite common. * His speeches and articles were prepared in such a way that they could be appreciated only when completely read. He never considered them as giving encouragement to the expansion of the Incident or instigating aggression. At no time did he conspire with anyone to commit, nor did he commit himself personally, directly or indirectly, any of the crimes charged by the prosecution. On the contrary, he did everything in his power to avoid war and the strategic consequences in which Japan found herself.

28234

When asked * with regard to exhibit 671-A, a report of his speech in Osaka, in which he was charged to have said that Japan's determination to fight the Soviet and China was sufficiently strong to last more than ten years, the accused stated * that he did make a speech in Osaka on 11 July 1938. The article in the Japan Advertiser in regard to his speech was written in a very vague manner, and it was difficult to grasp its meaning. The facts were that the Political and Economic Research Association asked him to make a few remarks. At that time the question of controlled economy was being discussed, and it was advocated that people should go barefoot, or wear wooden clogs instead of shoes. In such case it would be impossible to endure for a long period of years, and it was his opinion that in such a state of affairs it would be impossible for Japan to endure it. * Therefore, he told the Economic Association that instead of taking hurried steps to enforce controlled economy, they should take time so that things could be done on a sound basis. Immediately after this speech he made another to the same effect, and if that speech were read it would not be necessary for him to make any further remarks.

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Page

- 28237 * The witness identified a copy of a hand written statement tendered by him to the prosecution in February, 1946, in reply to questions of Morrow and Hyder.
- 28239 * Exhibit No. 3162, another hand written statement submitted to the prosecution in February, 1946, was also identified as the document he wrote himself.
- 28245 * The accused was shown a report of an interview with Hugh Byas in January, 1932, recorded in the book, "A Military Record". He stated that in 1932 he did know a correspondent by the name of Hugh Byas, and that he occasionally granted him interviews. He stated that he had seen the book, "A Military Record", before. When asked whether he had read the report of the interview contained in the book, he stated that since he did not understand English well, the time he received a copy he had an English translator explain the book's general outline. Therefore
- 28246 he knew it was a report of his meetings with Byas. *This report was a true and correct report of the interview he granted Byas on January 16. (The document was later rejected).
- 28254 * Exhibit 3163-A, an excerpt from "Diplomatic History of the Shanghai Incident", containing a statement by Ueda concerning his efforts to settle the Incident,
- 28256 * was identified by the accused, but stated that the contents included the instructions which he gave UEDA at the time he left for his post.
- 28270 * Exhibit No. 3163-B, an excerpt from "Diplomatic History of the China Incident", contained a statement by SHIRAKAWA to the 9th Division, expressing his reluctance to fight, was identified by the accused. When asked whether or not he gave SHIRAKAWA such instructions, the accused stated that the policies of the government and the army concurred, and the same instructions were given UEDA at the time of his departure as were given SHIRAKAWA.
- DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BLAKENEY,
Counsel for TOGO.
- 28276 * The accused stated that he had hardly anything to do with the defendant TOGO. He stated that he had read the indictment, and had stated in his affidavit that at no time did he conspire with anyone to commit any of the crimes charged.

Page

- CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. COMYNS-CARR. When asked, he stated that at the time of Manchuria's establishment, persons who * The attention of the Court was called to sections of ARAKI's affidavit with reference to certain testimony and exhibits. As to section 2 of the affidavit, page 1551, section 7, exhibits 187, 222, 223, 225-229, 231, 233, 234, and 241, section 10, 1104, 2216, 2218, 2219; Section 10, 1104, 2216, 2218, 2219; Section 13, 1104, 2222; Section 14 (a), 668, 670, 746, 747, 671-A; Section 14 (b), 667, 671-A, 730; Section 19, 2218; Section 20, page 18569; Section 21, pp. 942, 3963-5, 18548; Section 24, 271, 491, 1291, 2218, 2219. * Reference was made to the part of the affidavit of the accused where he stated that no reliance could be placed on the interrogations because the interpreters were incompetent, and that the interpreters admitted their incompetence. When faced with Mr. Kildoyle, the accused stated that he thought he had seen him before. He did not remember the interpreting on so many as eight occasions, * but he did remember his having interpreted. He did not remember that four of the extracts concerning his interrogation were interpreted by him.

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- When asked if he was one of those who admitted his incompetence, the accused stated that is not so. Since the interpreters changed on many occasions, he could not say who came how many times and who said what. He stated that he could speak a certain amount of English with the help of a dictionary, and at the time of the interrogation had a pocket dictionary. * He did not remember whether it was an English-Japanese or Japanese-English dictionary.

- 28296
- He did not remember whether it was the person who was standing before him whom he addressed himself to, but if he was one of the interpreters he thought it must be remembered that on many occasions the accused could not understand exactly what word was meant. At such times he would pull out his dictionary and point to a certain word and ask if that was the word meant.
- * He remembered that Kildoyle had a large dictionary, but was not sure whether he had both English-Japanese and Japanese-English. He knew that when there was any doubt about a word he consulted the dictionary. That was what made him so uneasy. When asked if, from time to time, he raised a query as to the correctness of the English word used, he stated that on a few occasions the word was one he knew, and when the term implied was one with which he was in doubt the two of them would open the dictionary and look up the word together.

Page

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* After this happened several times he began to feel sorry, and that was why he offered to make a written statement. While he was able to carry on a conversation with the interpreter in Japanese, he had no idea how the terms were translated into English. When it was suggested to the accused that whenever a query was raised the ultimate word put down was agreed to by both after they had consulted dictionaries, the accused stated that that was not the way he felt. It was not true that they only consulted the dictionary when an English or technical word was used. In the phrase "Chian o kaifuku" meaning "restoration of order" the interpreter was unable to get the meaning of the word "chian", mixing it up with the word "Chiang". Asked whether he meant Chiang Hsueh-liang, from that time on he felt uneasy. He did not know whether it was the interpreter before him who did this.

When the conversation turned on a difficult subject, he always felt uneasy. He believed this was the same with all other people interrogated at that time. When faced with Mr. KAWASHIMA, the accused stated that he could not recollect him, although he did remember the one before.

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* He did not remember whether KAWASHIMA was one of those who confessed to incompetence. When faced with Mr. Maxon, he stated that it was difficult for him to remember whether he was the interpreter on three occasions. He did not remember well whether a naval officer was present.

28300

* He did not remember whether Maxon was one who admitted incompetence. He could not state whether he also brought a dictionary with him in case a difficult word arose. He did not recall being told that Maxon taught in Japan when he was Education Minister. He did not know for sure that all interrogations the three took were taken down in full by way of question and answer. He remembered that during the early stages someone took down shorthand notes. He did not know what it was nor what they were writing.

28302

Reference was made to the part of the affidavit in which ARAKI stated that in connection with the Cabinet decision, there was an allegation in exhibits 187 and 188 to the effect that he made a plan for the occupation of the four Eastern Provinces. This was a mistake caused by the interpretation of an incompetent interpreter, and was entirely different from the fact. When asked if he meant that he did not make a plan, he said that was so. Although many of the documents were not at his disposal now, he remembered that shortly after the opening of the trial documents 188-A, B, and C, were presented, and although * all three treated of the same subject, 188-C was comparatively understandable, while in the other two the inter-

Page

preting was inadequate. When re-asked whether he made a plan, he stated he did not.

28303 In connection with his objection to the word "occupation", he remembered he spoke for some time with an interpreter in an attempt to define just what was meant. * Later, in reading over the written account of the interrogation, he saw the word "senryo" for "occupation" for the first time. He did not remember whether that word was actually used during the interrogation.

When asked if he meant to say that whatever was done and decided at that time when he first took office was not concerned with all the four Eastern Provinces, he stated that if it concerned Manchuria it had to do with the four Eastern Provinces.

28304 * It was not correct to say that Manchuria had three Eastern Provinces, and that he chose to occupy Jehol as a fourth. The term "Four Eastern Provinces" was first used by Chiang Hsueh-liang at the time he declared allegiance to the Kuomintang. At that time he had already put Jehol under his control, and referred to the regions he controlled as the four Eastern Provinces. There were no plans to occupy the provinces, either before or after he took office.

28305 When shown exhibit 3162, * a hand written statement he gave to H der on 11 February, 1946, the accused stated that he believed it was a copy. A part of exhibit 3162 stated that on 13 December, 1931, he was appointed War Minister when he considered it most important to stabilize the situation by mapping out a general plan for the solution of problems. At that time bandits were being fought in Manchuria. In North Manchuria, owing to Ma Chen Chan's revolt, the region was in a state of war and the Japanese Army had already occupied Chichihar. Should affairs have been left as they were, there was no telling how far war disaster might have extended. * Strategically, the Japanese Army was at war with Chan Hsin Liang's troops and any slight error might have brought about annihilation. Prior to this they had been humiliated at Nikolayevsk, Chinan and Nanking. So as not to repeat a similar blunder and to avoid an all-out clash and limit disaster, the affair had to be dealt with promptly and decisively. Because the incident had developed unplanned, it was necessary to make a plan. He consulted the Premier, Finance Minister, and Chief Secretary, and it was decided to restore order in the Liausi District and pacify the bandits there.

28306

Page

28307 Because the Diet was not in session, the necessary expense had to be drawn on the emergency expense account. * When the Cabinet action was taken, necessary steps were also taken through the Privy Council and completed some time between the 10th and 20th of December. The plan's aim was to restore public peace in Manchuria. The opponent was the Chiefs of the 4 Eastern Provinces, and the area was the 4 provinces under Chiang's control.

28308 The matter was discussed in the Privy Council, and after questions was approved. EGI said the matter had been set forth logically consistent and clearly, and encouraged ARAKI to go ahead with it and try to restore peace. The proposed expense of 30 to 50 million yen was approved, and necessary procedures taken, and the Supreme Command Department started on operations. In those days Chiang Hsueh-liang seemed to be at Chinchow, and then * moved to Jehol.

To avoid an extension of the war disaster, he decided to limit the force and to move slowly, awaiting Chiang's reconsideration. He did not give a real mobilization order. However, the matter did not get any better, and he suppressed the force from going into positive action until the following spring. They kept the policy not to go beyond the boundary of the last province and stay within the Great Wall. Although after the Jehol operation the troops twice advanced beyond the Wall, yet the Assistant Chief of Staff made an urgent trip to the field at the Emperor's command and ordered them to retreat and stay within the Wall. However, the matter was settled before he left.

28309 * When the accused was asked what was different from the account he wrote himself and the account given in the questions and answers taken by the interpreters, he stated the matter could not be satisfactorily computed unless he told of the circumstances in which he handed the document to Hyder. * In the interrogation, the words, 28310 "occupation of the Four Eastern Provinces" came out, whereas in his written statement he had said it was important that strife going on in Manchuria should cease before it developed into an all out clash. That was where the great difference existed.

Page

The Four Eastern Provinces were not occupied. When asked if his troops, at the end of the occupation, were not in control of every part of them, the accused stated that the real state of affairs in Manchukuo was that after its establishment the Japan-Manchukuo protocol was signed, and under it Japan had the right to station troops there and fulfill her international obligations.

28311

When asked if troops were not stationed without right before the protocol, he stated that Japan's right to station troops along the railway was not so based on treaties. * When later, the Japanese went into action in areas outside, the government declared that the action was taken in self-defense, and since peace and order had not yet been restored the troops did not return into the zone.

Regarding his statement that the troops were to pacify bandits, he stated it was a very detailed affair and difficult to answer. He did not believe by pacifying they meant to kill the bandits.

Reference was made to the affidavit where the accused stated the Manchurian Incident was not primarily a war in the sense of the definition of international law. In another part it stated that strategically speaking, their Army was at war with Chiang Hsueh-liang's troops.

28312

* When asked to reconcile the two statements, he stated that in the first instance he meant that it was not a war as defined in international law. In the second instance he meant that the enemy facing them at that time was really powerful and numerous. Chiang Hsueh-liang's troops were not the bandits he was talking about.

28313

There were many different kinds of bandits. Generally, they were those who acted lawlessly, by disturbing peace and order. * The Japanese Army's duty was to maintain peace and order.

Reference was made to the affidavit where it was stated that the development of Manchukuo, after he left office, was not quite what it should have been, and he was dissatisfied with it and refrained from attending the 10th Anniversary Celebration.

Page

28314 When asked what he was dissatisfied about, he stated that at the time of Manchuria's establishment, persons who exercised sovereignty in Manchuria announced their ideals, stating they wished to establish a bright and peaceful country governed by the Kingly Way, and hoped * to establish a country of high moral character.

Later, he began to feel that the carrying out of these ideals was not in accordance with what he believed in, and the occasion of the 10th Anniversary he remembered reading newspapers carrying statistics on Manchukuo's development. He was dissatisfied that the newspapers had not praised the development of Manchukuo as a bright and peaceful land, governed in accordance with the Kingly Way.

It was because of this feeling that he could not bring himself to attend the commemoration ceremony.

page

28318

*When asked what event in Manchuria caused his dissatisfaction he stated that the question hinged on whether or not the plan for the construction of a land of peace and security in accordance with the principles of the Kingly Way were progressing per schedule. Following his resignation as war minister he had not been in touch with state affairs. He had heard reports about Manchuria from governors of provinces and other officials of the new state. They told him of various aspects such as the extension of railways, economic development etc.

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But not once did he ever hear that the principles of the Kingly Way had been established. That is why he was dissatisfied. He recognized and expressed gratitude to those who devoted efforts to develop Manchukuo which development compared with that of other countries had *been remarkable.

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The second reason for his dissatisfaction came from the fact that he had heard complaints that the establishment of the principles of the Kingly Way had not been to the satisfaction of the people.
* When asked if he did not mean that in Manchukuo all power was really in the hands of the Japanese and Manchukuo was developed for Japan's war industry, he stated that that was not so.

28321

* The development of Manchukuo in accordance with the Kingly Way was not in the proper direction. He was asked whom he blamed for that state of affairs and he replied it was not for him to answer because he was speaking of matters after he left the office of war minister* and he was not familiar with the details of Manchukuo.

28322

Reference was made to the accused's affidavit in which he said his wholehearted attention was devoted to nothing but terminating hostilities in Manchuria. Another part of the affidavit stated that the trouble in Manchuria was completely settled by him within one and a half years of his acceptance of the war ministryship. He was asked if he did not really mean that within one and a half years he had won a complete victory over Chang Hsuch-Liang in the four provinces and completely subjugated them. The accused stated that he could not understand how that passage could be interpreted in that way.

When asked how he had settled the matter except by a complete military victory he stated that as the Incident developed many changes took place and finally an agreement was reached between Japan and China.

page

28323

The question of Jehol was settled * in accordance with the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol. It was under that that the question was settled on behalf of Manchukuo. He stated that after his resignation he was awarded a baroncy in 1935. When asked if the reason he received the baroncy was not because he was the one chiefly responsible for victory in Manchukuo Incident, he replied that the granting of the peerage was a matter for the Imperial Household.

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He did not know what was spoken about because it was not within the provinces of his affairs. * He did not know that Gen. KAWASHIMA worked in his behalf to obtain the peerage for him.

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* It was his belief that with regard to granting a peerage as a result of the Manchuria Incident, such titles should not be granted whether any incident was settled or not. However he advocated that an exception should be made to those who had devoted efforts on the front lines and those killed in action.

28326

It was suggested to the accused that the premier did not want to recommend him but was induced to do so because War Minister KAWASHIMA said the young officers would not be satisfied if he did not get it. The accused stated that the newspapers may not have reported such matters in so many words but there was some confusion as a result of such rumors. He told KAWASHIMA * that if he was considering honoring him to stop it. He believed it would have no effect on the young officers. He did not know what was meant by "young officers" but there were times when he was criticized and denounced by so-called "young officers".

The accused stated that he knew the late Baron HARADA who was for many years personal secretary to Prince Saionji. HARADA may have interviewed him important influential people and others but he did not know. He did not think his reports were necessarily accurate or important.

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* The accused stated that in the summer of 1931 before he was appointed War Minister he was a member and prominent figure in the KOKUHON-SHA Society.* In regard to his acquaintance with HARADA he stated that they were not very close friends. Occasionally HARADA would drop in and there were usually gossip talks on daily topics. Not once did he ever hear that he was going to report to SAIONJI the subject or contents of the conversations. If HARADA had intended to obtain information the information would have been of a very crude and elementary nature.

28331

page

28332 Once or twice they had a very long and intimate conversation but the subject matter had no relation to these proceedings and he would refrain from speaking of it. * Concerning the KOKUHON-SHA, HIRANUMA was its founder and president. It would not be right to describe it as an extreme rightist movement. Asked if he was at that time an idolizer of HIRANUMA he stated that he always respected him for his sound and considered thoughts. When asked if he was a strong political supporter of HIRANUMA he replied that the KOKUHON-SHA had no political significance or meaning.

28333 The motive and purpose of this establishment came about after the great earthquake. A man named NAMBA Daisuke attempted to assault the Emperor. This was the first incident of its kind since Japan's foundation *. They were all very much taken aback by it and agreed such an Incident should never be repeated. The incident was a black spot on their heretofore pristine history. The purpose for the organization was to make it clear to the people as a means of safeguarding against the repetition of such an incident, that the Emperor was constantly concerned with the peoples' happiness and unaware of their discontent.

Later he was not deeply associated with the KOKUHON-SHA but believed its only activity later was the publication of a magazine.

28334 Reference was made to the affidavit of the accused in which he stated that in January 1932 Chinese civilians assaulted Japanese priests and killed or wounded them. * It was suggested to the witness that it began before that and he said he did not think so.

28335 As a result of what was happening in Manchuria there was organized a movement to boycott Japanese goods. He did not remember the particulars of an announcement by the Foreign Ministry of January 12, 1932 that because of the anti-Japanese movement in China, the government was resolved to adopt drastic measures. He did not remember * the statement of the Foreign Ministry that the measures might include the despatch of landing parties or the blockade of Chinese ports.

28336 When asked if at the end of January there were not more than sixty Japanese warships in Chinese ports, he stated he was not familiar with naval affairs. * It was suggested to the accused that it was not only in that attack on the Chinese shops that the trouble with regard to Buddhist monks arise, and he stated he thought it was the Navy

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
September 12 1947
DEFENSE
ARAKI (cross-exam)

Page 4417

- 28337 Ministry * which made the first report of the incident to the cabinet.
28338 He became interested in the Shanghai Incident for the first time when this report was made * about the middle of January. Concerning the matter about the priests and the other incidents he did not know of it. Such report may have been made but he was not sure. When asked if it was his position that he just picked out the incident about which the Japanese could complain and ignored the rest he stated that inasmuch as the Navy was handling such matters and as the Navy Minister was the one who reported it for the first time he remembered the incident of the Buddhist priest. He thought it was about the 20th of January. But since the matter was entirely in the navy's hands before that date he had no interest in it.
- 28339 When asked if he took any interest in the foreign minister's announcement which had been referred to he stated it did not remain indelible in his memory because there were many protests * made to China at that time. He did not know that on January 20 the Shanghai Japanese Consul MURAI presented five demands to the Mayor of Shanghai. When asked if he inquired what demands had been presented and the answer received he stated that since the details related to something that happened about fifteen years before he could not say.
- 28340 He did send troops to Shanghai. When asked if before sending them he didnt trouble to find out the rights and wrongs of the dispute he stated that about the 14th or 15th of February Navy Minister OSUMI told him the Shanghai situation was threatening and asked for army assistance. * That was the first time he heard of it. He had written in his affidavit that the navy also reported to the cabinet and requested reinforcements. Since the matter could not be decided by himself he brought the matter up to the General Staff and they came to the conclusion that there was no alternative but to comply with the request and send reinforcements.
- 28341 The accused was told that he had stated that the first he had heard of the Shanghai Incident was from the Navy Minister but before that had stated that he heard it at a cabinet meeting January 20th. When asked which was the right statement he stated that with respect to the Buddhist Priests he heard that at a cabinet meeting in January, either from the navy or foreign minister. Inasmuch as it was in the hands of the Navy to deal with matters in the Shanghai area, he was not familiar nor interested in it until the request * came from the Navy in February asking for reinforcements.
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28342

* When asked whether he considered it is duty to inquire into the rights and wrongs of this action he stated that he merely placed confidence in the navy because the matters were in their charge. Regarding the five demands presented to the mayor of Shanghai on January 20th such demands may have been presented but he had no recollection. But he thought it did happen because most of the protests were sent by the Foreign Ministry. He did not recall that on the afternoon of January 28th the mayor under protest accepted the five demands and began carrying them out.

28343

He did not recall that in spite of that the Japanese Navy landed reinforcements and attacked the same night. He stated that TAKAHASHI was the Finance Minister in the INUKAI Cabinet and he thought TAKAHASHI spoke the truth. Whether he made the statement to TAKAHASHI with regard to Shanghai that if the Chinese did not retreat twenty kilometers he would continue to batter, he did not remember having made the statement on that particular day.

28344

His belief was that if that did not happen war would have broken out on a larger scale. The hostilities concerned Japan and China and even though the word Sino-Japanese was used, the Chinese 19th Route Army was not under the direct command of the Nanking Government. If the 19th Route Army withdrew twenty kilometers international obligations would be fulfilled, the incident settled and a safety zone created.

It could not have been that he stated to TAKAHASHI that in order to recover the Army's prestige it must be sent to Shanghai to shoot. If TAKAHASHI was alleged to have made such a statement he would be entirely wrong. If that was the case TAKAHASHI would never have agreed.

28345

He did not remember stating on Nov 7 1932 to HARADA that TAKAHASHI was a splendid man. But he did respect him highly. A *part of the affidavit was quoted in which ARAKI stated that he consulted on these matters with the Chief of Staff and they agreed to conform with the government policy by despatching a minimum force.

28346

* The accused was asked if on Dec 6 1932 HARADA came to see him and conversed about JEHOL operations. He stated he did not know when he met HARADA and by the question alone did not recall the subjects discussed. He did not recall asking whether it would not be

- 28348 a repetition of the Nikalsevak Incident if they limited their troops in Jehol to those present there. He did not recall stating *that they should deal with this situation * as they did the Shanghai situation. When asked if he said to finish the matter in the shortest possible time by sending a large force he stated that since HARADA paid unexpected visits and left immediately after some conversation he could not recall what kind of talk was held except on special occasions.
- 28349 * He did not recall saying that the army did not want to send men to Shanghai but it was a fact that the army did not want to send them. * His views were that it was meaningless to conduct warfare and since the navy was handling the matter the hope was that it would put an end to the affair without any need for the army going into action. On that account the army did not want to send troops. The general staff had no plan with respect to sending forces or conducting operations in China and it was a difficult matter whether the High Command would agree to anything of the sort.
- 28350
- When asked if it were not the real truth that he knew about the circumstances and that the navy was in the wrong, he stated that what he said was the truth. He had never considered such a matter as was suggested. He did not think the navy was in the wrong.
- 28351 When asked if he complained to HARADA that the Foreign Ministry gave him no credit for securing a quick settlement at Shanghai, he stated * that he did not remember anything he said to HARADA at any time. If it were something specific he might recall. He might have said certain things to other people but did not recall conversations with HARADA.
- 28352 With regard to the statement in his affidavit where he referred to the advice received on international * law before agreeing to recognize Manchukuo * he got the advice from the Foreign Minister. He thought an outline on such a matter was brought up. He did not recall that two foreign international lawyers were consulted by Japan on that point. He stated that NAKAHASHI was home minister in the INUKAI cabinet. It was suggested to the witness that the opinions of the two lawyers were unfavorable and this was known to the cabinet.
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- 28354
- The opinions were to the effect that the proposed establishment of Manchukuo by Japan's aid and recognition of it would breach international law and that this was before the cabinet in February 1932.

page When asked if this was not right, the accused stated he did not know. He did not remember a cabinet meeting about March 11 1932 where it was decided that in view of the possibility of this being a violation of the Nine Power Pact recognition should be postponed on the surface for the time being.

28356 "He was aware of the fact that a policy decision of that nature was made but did not remember at which meeting. The question in regard to international law came up and the action and policy of the INUKAI cabinet was that it was a continuance of the right of self-defense. Such a right should be continued as long as threats or dangers existed. There was the possibility of the trouble spreading even into Japan.

28357 When asked if he was suggesting that the establishment of Manchukuo was a measure of self-defense he stated that was not so. He had just expressed the views of the international lawyers. With respect to the establishment of Manchukuo, the lawyers' views were * that inasmuch as this was created as a result of a split within a nation it would not be illegal for a party to the Nine Power Pact to grant recognition. This matter was on the agenda a number of times and he thought that Foreign Minister UCHIDA gave a full explanation before the Diet.

28358 * when shown the book entitled "PERTAINING TO THE WHOLE
28359 JAPANESE NATION" the accused stated * that it was not published by him but by a man named SHIBUI he thought, after putting together press stories and magazine articles on subjects on which the accused was supposed to have made talks. When asked if he made the talks he stated he would not be able to explain unless the newspapers and magazines used in editing the book were shown to him.

28360 When shown a page of the book purporting to report a speech made by him on Feb 21 1933 he said he had seen it. A passage from the book stated for what purpose does the League exist? Does it * not exist for the sake of world peace and doesnt the Nine Power Treaty exist for peace in the Far East? If the League of Nations suited the convenience of Europe and America we wish to be excused from it. If the Nine Power Treaty seeks only the convenience of the rights and interests of themselves we must give it a flat refusal.

28360 When asked if he wrote or said this the accused stated that it appeared that the interpretation was somewhat different from what *he was reading.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
September 12 1947
DEFENSE
ARAKI (cross-exam)

Page 4421

page

28361 *But substantially it was all right.

28365 * Exhibit 3164-A, Excerpts from book "PERTAINING TO THE WHOLE JAPANESE NATION" was received in evidence.

28366 * He did not recall a conversation about 21 Aug 1932 with Prince KONOYE about a suggestion that the Manchurian Affair should be settled by direct negotiation. He did not remember a conversation at any time in 1932 with KONOYE about the suggestion from the Chinese Ambassador that the whole matter be settled by direct negotiation.

28368 * The accused agreed that it was written in Exhibit 3164-A that he had stated that it must be at present the first resolution toward the Manchurian question to let Europe and America understand the existence of a spirit whereby they would push ahead by brushing aside everything if anyone laid obstacles in their way. He agreed that it was written there that various countries of the Far East have been objects of oppression of the white races. Japan could not tolerate their highhandedness any more. It was the duty of Japan to oppose the action of any power which was against the Imperial Policy.

28369 * The accused stated that this excerpt was taken from somewhere. It was obvious that the book was created after articles taken from newspapers, magazines were put together in the book. When asked if it was things said by him he stated he had not given the book very careful scrutiny, but at the time the matter of publishing it was brought up he told the publisher that if certain parts were to be extracted and used their sources should be given but no source was mentioned in the book.

28370 * The book was sent to him immediately after it came off the press and since it concerned something which he wrote or spoke about he did not give it close scrutiny. He asked the publisher why he did not indicate sources of the material. When asked if he disputed at the time the accuracy of any part as not being things he said, the accused stated he had not gone into such details.

He agreed that it was written in the book that he had stated that the army spirit lay in exalting the Imperial Way and spreading virtue. Every bullet must be charged with the Imperial Way and the end of every bayonet must have national virtue burnt into it. If any oppose they would give them an injection with a bullet and the bayonet.

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28371

*The accused stated that inasmuch as he did not actually write the article by his own hand some phraseology was very sharp. With regard to press and magazine articles for the purpose of selling them the state of affairs was taken into consideration and strong words were used but generally speaking the thoughts he had in mind were substantially reproduced.

28372

* The accused was asked if at a cabinet meeting of Feb 13 1933 it was decided that the Jehol issue should be looked upon as involving insurgents. In other words, that the army was not going to attack Chinese regular troops but would attack the so-called bandit. The witness stated that there was no decision to the effect as just phrased. From the context of what was read he should think it developed from the

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* policy which was decided and which was that action would be limited to the subjugation of banditry.

All action was in accordance with the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol. Before the Jehol issue was brought up the Cabinet's decision was to prevent issues with China from developing into a war.

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When asked if the Cabinet on Feb 13 1933 decided that to avoid further trouble with the League the campaign in Jehol should be described as being against insurgents and bandits and not against the Chinese regular troops, the accused stated that from the manner in which the passage was written it seemed to him as an insult against the nation, the cabinet and the army.

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*If HARADA was alleged to have written it it was his own private view. The cabinet decision was that all action should be taken on the basis of the Protocol. The problem was with regard to the scope of the action and he did not think it involved anything vis-a-vis regarding bandits or Chinese regulars. The decision was that since this was an internal problem of Manchukuo and since the army was taking action, such action should be calculated so as not to lead to general hostilities.

He did not recall if at that meeting the question of the reply to the League's note and the question whether Japan should withdraw from the League was also considered. It was suggested to the accused that this proposed representation of the Jehol campaign was decided so as not to complicate things with the League.

page

28376

* The accused stated that he did not recall whether there was such a cabinet meeting at that time. He was merely guessing at the question. When asked if the actual effect of the Jehol campaign was to drive Chinese regulars out, he stated that he did not know how many Chinese regulars there were and he was not familiar with actual operations. But if Chinese regulars were there that would be the case.

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* From the operational order he could presume that if regulars came into Jehol and hindered pacification and subjugation in that area, military action would be taken to clean them up. Naturally as Jehol became a part of Manchukuo if Chinese troops came in and took a challenging and provocative attitude then troops on the Manchukuo side would naturally resort to military action. The accused was asked if it was not the true situation that as he said in his affidavit after he drove Chang Hsueh-liang out of China he established himself in Jehol and after that he drove him out of there. The accused stated that was difficult to answer.

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He had already replied that the Jehol question was purely a domestic one of Manchukuo and the action was taken on the basis * of the Protocol. Since it was a domestic question it was not for them to interfere.

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" The accused recognized a page of the Great Manchurian Diary of the Japanese Army for the year 1933 as a telegram bearing his signature.

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* Exhibit 3165-A, a handwritten telegram dated 8 Apr 1933, excerpt from the Secret Manchurian Diary bore the signature of ARAKI, Vice Minister YANAGAWA, Bureau Chief SHIGEATSU, Section Chief YAMASHITA and was sent from ARAKI to the Commander of the Kwantung Army *. It stated that by close cooperation of the Japanese and Manchurian armies they had great success in clearing Jehol of bandits. The foundation of Far Eastern Peace had been built up and they expressed deep gratitude to the officers and men.

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* When asked if at a cabinet meeting February 15, 1933 it was discussed whether Japan should withdraw from the League, the accused stated that he was uncertain of the date but thought the question concerning the League came up for discussion. He denied that he and UCHIDA immediately offered a resolution to withdraw.

page

28383

* He was asked if after it had been decided by the cabinet to withdraw from the League if there was a draft which he approved with the words "As the national policy of the Imperial Government in connection with the recognition of Manchuria", he stated that since the Rescript on that occasion was made public if he saw the text he might be able to find out whether such words were used.

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He did not remember the details about the preliminary discussions but remembered that the draft was first made by the Foreign Office. Since it was in connection with an Imperial Rescript certain modifications were made by the cabinet meeting and discussions on such matters held there.

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* When asked if he objected to the words "independence of Manchuria" being included in the Rescript on the ground that the term might be inconvenient at the time when Manchuria should merge with Japan, the accused stated that nothing of the sort happened. It would be outrageous to say that he was always in favor of the annexation of Manchuria. He never dreamed of executing his plans after his resignation from the government.

28387

* The accused was asked if there was a proposal in the cabinet that the Rescript should contain phrases to the effect that the civil and military should work in harmony and there should be respectful admiration and good feeling between superiors and subordinates, he stated he never made a statement to any such effect.

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* He stated that it would be ridiculous to imagine that in October 1933 it would be true to say that the army was determined to attack Russia in 1935 and the navy determined to attack the U.S. in 1936. * He did not recall a cabinet meeting 5 Dec 1933 in which

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there was a discussion about the attitude of the U.S. and Europe toward Japan with regard to trade matters and tariff rates. The accused was asked if Finance Minister TAKAHASHI said the trouble was not merely with regard to trade relations but arose from the fact that the army and navy were claiming that 1935 and 1936 would be critical years and propaganda was conducted as if Japan was on the verge of war with Russia and the United States.

The accused replied that such words as crisis or crises were used but because it was a crisis did not mean that there was any intention to engage in or start a war. He never heard such a thing from TAKAHASHI.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

September 12 1947

DEFENSE

ARAKI (cross-exam)

Page 4425

28391 The accused was asked if he did not reply to TAKAHASHI, turning pale with anger that that was not true and there would be a crisis; that the military had no intention to start a war today but they must make preparations *. He stated that there was one occasion in which he engaged in a heated argument with TAKAHASHI but that was not the question which was debated.

28392 He did not recall showing to KONOYE and later to HARADA in November 1932, a plan he had for a national policy. He did not recall * that the policy consisted of items concerning executing an emergency policy to increase national strength for two years and to maintain friendly relations with the U.S. meanwhile.

The accused was asked if in explaining the policy to HARADA he put forward as an alternative policy the policy mentioned in his affidavit calling for an international peace conference for the Far East. He replied that at the end of 1932 the Manchurian question was not settled and he thought of nothing but to bring that question to a speedy conclusion.

When asked if he considered that within two or three years he must perfect Japan's defense, complete preparations and assert her intent by a show of force whether in peace or war, he answered that he did not think he had any occasion to talk on such matters with HARADA.

28393 * He asked if TAKAHASHI objected to his plan on the ground that it would take four or five years and cost too much he stated there
28395 *was no such thing. The accused stated he had not opposed the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Russia. The opinion common in the cabinet was that since there were many issues between Japan and Russia those should first be settled, and that a nonaggression pact should be concluded only after full sincerity and good faith had been shown by both sides following such settlements.

28396 When asked if at a cabinet meeting Jan 13 1933 he had an argument with TAKAHASHI concerning the nonaggression pact in which *TAKAHASHI asserted and ARAKI denied that the army and Kempetai were controlling public opinion and newspapers by threats, the accused stated that TAKAHASHI was the man he respected most. Because of this they often conducted unreserved exchange of views but he did not recall any such argument taking place in the cabinet meeting on a day in January. There was no argument on that subject at any cabinet meeting.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
 Sept 12 1947
 DEFENSE
 ARAKI (cross-exam)

page

He did not know if at a cabinet meeting the 1st of Feb 1933 there was complaint raised that the army was instigating newspapers to advocate withdrawal from the League. He had said that it was the newspapers who were writing this and not at his instigation.

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* When asked if TAKAHASHI had said that the accused could stop the newspapers if he liked and asked him why he did not, he stated that newspapers were outside his jurisdiction.

He stated that he knew Major AKIKUSA but did not support him in organizing plots against the Soviet among White Russian emigrants. When asked if he had given an interview to a White Russian named Rodzaevsky, he stated that he learned of the name for the first time when an affidavit from him was presented. He knew that a number of White Russians visited Tokyo but he did not know their names. He had never given permission to Rodzaevsky or anyone else to publish an interview in the newspaper "Our Way".

28398

* He knew a man named Semenov for many years but never discussed with him plans for cutting off the Maritime Provinces from the Soviet.

* The accused was asked if on Dec 9 1933 he and the Navy Minister issued a statement in the press about the suggested crisis of 1936 and denounced a movement which they said was seeking to alienate the public minds from the military. The accused stated that following decisions made with regard to national defense and diplomacy at the Five Ministers Conference, he thought something of that kind was issued by the Foreign Office. As to its contents he could not say by such a bare outline of it but it was possible he thought, that such a statement was issued.

28399

He did not know if it was true that KOISO during the Manchurian campaign sent Kempei-tai members to China and Manchuria disguised as laborers. * He did not recall saying so to HARADA August 3 1939.

He agreed that in 1939 in the HIRANUMA Cabinet he was Minister of Education and KOISO of Overseas Affairs. He did not tell HARADA a number of things against KOISO, including the one mentioned.

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* It was no such thing that in regard to the money sent from

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

Sept 12 1947

DEFENSE

ARAKI (cross-exam)

Page 4427

page

the Manchurian Secret Fund to KOISO in December 1933, he ordered KOISO to send back a million yen. He did not know if it were a fact that one million yen was sent to the War Ministry and it was outrageous to say that it was used by him for army propaganda.

He agreed that he was a cabinet councillor after October 1937 in the first KONOYE Cabinet.

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* He had stated in his affidavit that he objected to the occupation of Nanking and that it would make relations with China worse. He agreed that in May 1938 he became Education Minister in that cabinet.

He recalled that Nanking fell on Dec 13 after he became Education Minister. He had not read accounts of atrocities at Nanking. That time he did not even hear of it as a rumor.

What he advocated with regard to the army was contrary to what took place at Nanking.

Page

- 28405 * The accused stated that it was his view that the entry into Jehol was done under the Japan-Manchukuo Pact of September 15, 1932. It was not true that it had been decided as early as December, 1931, that Jehol was to be included in the area of operations.
- 28406 * Since no one would know who the opponent was to be in the Chinese Army, no one could tell how far the Army would be able to go. Therefore, since the one responsible for the unsettled affairs in Manchuria was Chiang Hsueh-liang, accounts had to be settled with him. The problem came up as to how far Chiang's authority extended. Since it extended to Jehol, that was what they decided on. Their real desire was not in the use of armed force, but the INUKAI Cabinet wished to settle things peacefully and quickly. That was the main outline of the INUKAI Cabinet's policy. (Reference was made to exhibit 3162. in connection with that answer).
- 28407 The accused stated it was not true that operations against Jehol actually began in July 1932 and continued through August 1932. * At the time he heard nothing whatsoever concerning atrocities at Nanking. He first heard of it when testimony was given before the Tribunal. Cabinet advisers were not shown reports coming from the Consul-General at Nanking. He did not know that military were sent to Nanking to investigate the matter.
- 28408 * He had never seen an account in Japanese newspapers concerning the massacre of Chinese. He knew that MATSUI was replaced in February, 1938, but didn't know the circumstances nor did he inquire into the reasons. He knew that on 16 January 1938, the KONOYE Cabinet decided to have no further negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. At the time of this announcement, all cabinet advisers gave strong opinions concerning the phrase "No further dealings with the Chiang Regime". The phrase was ambiguous and the wording not of the best. No one could predict what the effect of such a statement would be.
- 28409 * When asked if the decision was not to fight to a finish with China, he stated that Cabinet advisers hardly heard anything of such a nature. The Cabinet issued the statement, and the accused felt it was very kind of it to show the statement at all before it was published. * The
- 28410 opinion of practically all cabinet councillors was that although the wording was ambiguous, it meant that all negotiations with the Chiang Regime would be cut off.

Page

He did not know what was discussed at the Cabinet meeting, but did know that the statement to the effect that Japan would not deal with the Chiang Regime was issued without alterations.

28411 When asked why in May, 1938, he joined the government which had rejected his advice on all vital questions of policy, he stated that he felt it was still * too early for him to go completely into retirement, and he should make one more effort for his country. He also accepted partly because of KONOYE's urgent pleas. When the accused met KONOYE later and asked him about the statement, KONOYE said that he did not issue it with the thought that negotiations with the Chiang regime would be cut off. If that regime re-considered, they were willing to take up the negotiations again. He did not remember that the statement was repeated in December, 1938, or that steps were taken by the Cabinet to establish Wang Ching-wei as a rival government.

28412 When asked why he remained a member of the Cabinet which continued to act in opposition to his policies, the accused stated that he still felt there was * some way his hopes could be realized. He bent all efforts to that end, but because of his Cabinet position he had no means of knowing about the policies nor of those matters. His advice was not sought. He did not even know when Wang Ching-wei came to Japan.

28413 The accused stated that during the time he was in the first KONOYE and HIRANUMA Cabinets, matters were decided by the 5 Minister's Conference, and he was not consulted. He was asked if it were not the truth that no decision taken by the 5 Minister's Conference could be put into effect until it had cabinet approval. He stated that would be so if a policy was actually carried out after being decided upon, but at that time hardly any important policies were decided. He was not sure whether he was present on 10 June, 1939, when the HIRANUMA Cabinet decided to establish the Wang Ching-wei regime. * He did not even know that Wang had been brought to Japan at that time.

He did not recall making a speech on the first anniversary of the China Incident, in which he stated that Japan would not lay down arms until anti-Japanese China was completely crushed. He believed such a speech must have been taken from the Monbu Ji Hyo, or another document referred to before.

Page

28414 The Education Ministry review (Monbu Ji Hyo) was published by the Ministry, and there was a section which handled it. Somebody must have written that statement, and perhaps he had glanced through it. There was nothing more than that. He remembered that when he was shown one of those monthlies, he did remember it. That was the extent to which the matter went. * If the whole document were looked at, it would be found that the real import of the article did not include such an idea. (Exhibit 2281).

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. McMANUS.

28415 * The accused stated that he had been interrogated 20 odd times. The three interpreters who had appeared in the court were not the only ones which appeared before him at Sugamo. There were others.

28418 * The accused was handed a document which was a statement from Commander SHIRAKAWA regarding the cessation of hostilities in the Shanghai Incident. He was asked if he were personally responsible for the statement. He stated that previous to SHIRAKAWA's departure, he instructed him as he had instructed Commander UEDA that the ideas of the government and the military were the same as those subsequently embodied in his statement. He believed that the statement was issued in accordance with his intentions. that the matters should be solved without recourse to arms.

28419 * The accused stated that the policy of non-
28420 expansion was not restricted to China Proper, but applied everywhere. * He was asked if he knew anything about the Japanese plan OTSU. The accused stated that he believed the OUSU plan was an operational plan. He did not know about it.

28421 * The accused stated that on 11 May, 1932, he made
28423 a statement concerning the withdrawal of troops from Shanghai. * On October 30, 1933, he had suggested an Asiatic Peace Conference for all countries concerned to participate for the promotion of world peace.

28424 The accused * identified a document handed to him as a report written down by a newspaper man who came to see him concerning the proposal he had made for the holding of an Asia Pacific Conference. He did not know anything, however, regarding the latter part of the document.

Page

- 28425 * When asked if he did make such a suggestion, he stated that his affidavit showed the efforts he made toward the realization of the conference after the Tangku truce.
- 28429 * Exhibit 3166, a letter dated 20 January 1934, from ARAKI to Premier SAITO concerning basic suggestions for the emergency, was received in evidence.
- 28432 * Exhibit 3163-A, a statement by General UEDA to the Commander of the 19th Route Army, dated 18 February 1932, stated that the Chinese Army was to stop fighting at once and complete withdrawal from the present front at 0700 February 20. Withdrawal must be completed by 1700 February 20 from a described area. Furthermore, fortresses and other military facilities within this area must be withdrawn and not re-established. The Japanese Army would not shell, bomb, nor pursue after the Chinese Army commences to withdraw. However, reconnaissance planes will not be restricted. * After withdrawal, the Japanese will hold only the area in the Hung Kiu vicinity. After withdrawal, the Japanese will send investigators to the zone to ascertain execution. The Chinese Army must thoroughly protect the lives and property of Japanese nationals in the Shanghai area. If protection is not complete, appropriate steps would be taken. Effective measures were also to be taken against guerrillas. Separate negotiations concerning the protection of foreigners in the Shanghai area would be made.

- 28434 As for prohibiting anti-Japanese movements, the promise Mayor WU made to Consul-General MURAI on 28 January must be carried out strictly. Japanese diplomats would principally negotiate separately about this item. * If these items are not carried out, the Army would be compelled to take free actions against the Chinese Army. All the responsibility arising as a result would be borne by the Commander of the 19th Route Army.

- 28435 From exhibit 3163-B, the statement of Commander SHIRAKAWA, dated 1 March, 1932, to the Ninth Division, stated that he had just arrived to take command of the Shanghai Army, to protect Japanese there in cooperation with the Navy. However, Japan had made every effort to settle the matter peacefully, it had been in vain. Now that the Ninth Division had taken to arms, * the Chinese were going to resist with heavier preparations and a larger force. Japan was thus obliged to increase her forces.

Page

They did not, however, want to fight and complicate the matter. If the Chinese accepted their demands and evacuated, they would not hesitate to cease military action. They would be faithful neighbors with the Chinese people and maintain harmony with all countries. He intended to do his best not to enlarge the incident and to limit it and settle it quickly to protect the Japanese people fully and restore order to East Asia.

- 28436 * Exhibit 3167, a report by ARAKI to the House
of Peers on 23 March 1932, stated that the anti-Japanese
28437 * movement in China, which has been a great hindrance to
peace in the Orient, had precipitately enlivened its
activities lately. The rights of Japan had been ignored
by Manchurian authorities and pressure placed on Japanese
and Koreans. Their insolence has resulted in the slaughter
28438 of these people. * This situation culminated in the murder
of Japanese army officers. They had tolerated these out-
rages with patience. The state of things had grown worse,
and challenged by the violence of Chinese soldiers near
Mukden, the Japanese have been forced to rise against their
will, in self-defense.

Since then, the army had faced with minor forces an enemy which outnumbered them, with continuous operations night and day under difficulties. An encouraging resolution had just been received, and they had met with enthusiastic support, borne of public wrath. Thus unified, the people had gone through many international crises.

- 28439 At present, the Japanese force in Manchuria
* numbered less than 30,000, and were stationed in a vast
area two and a half times as large as the Empire. They
were directly charged with protecting the lives and property
of one million Japanese and Koreans, and indirectly with
the preservation of peace and welfare of thirty million.
The soldiers had fulfilled their duty and took their stand
in the lifeline of national defense and safeguarded security.

- 28440 At the outbreak of the Incident the Japanese force
consisted of only 10,400. The force around Mukden was only
4,000 strong at the time of the Incident. The Chinese army
approximated 220,000, with 14,000 stationed near Mukden.
At the outbreak of the conflict, a brigade was sent from
Korea, and other troops have been sent to meet the require-
ments. * In this manner, minor forces have stripped
Manchuria of the menace near the Liachsi and swept away
disturbances in North Manchuria.

Page

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Page

Bandits had been suppressed and pacified with few casualties on the part of the Japanese. However, the circumstances deemed of no optimism, and the authorities were engaged in measures to cope with the situation. They hoped for eternal peace in Manchuria and her development even from the standpoint of Japanese national defense. This condition necessitates the existence of the present forces and more if possible.

28441 Concerning affairs in the Shanghai vicinity, the army saw the necessity of taking deliberate measures, judging from its character which was different from Manchuria, at the end of February the Cabinet council decided to send * reinforcements. The authorities wished for an immediate solution without bloodshed and repeatedly negotiated with the Chinese, who showed no sincerity and replied with bombardment. It was a matter of regret that Japan was compelled to exchange fire.

28442 The Chinese army was reinforced with guards under Chiang Kai-shek, in addition to the 19th Route Army. The total strength was six divisions, who threatened to take the offensive. Therefore, two Japanese divisions and adjunct troops were dispatched, and early that month, with one blow, they defeated the main body of the enemy. At present, Japanese forces were assembled in a limited area in a state of suspension of hostilities, with a view to restoring peace. In harmony with the fundamental government policies and in cooperation with the navy, the army * had succeeded in attaining its object and avoiding a full-scale conflict. The object in sending troops to Shanghai was to protect Japanese residents and preserve peace in the International Settlement. So long as China did not menace with a large-scale offensive, the authorities had decided to withdraw the forces on their own accord. The middle of the month, a division and a brigade had been instructed for evacuation, and were then under transportation.

28443 In view of present conditions, a careful examination of the incident showed that it was not one incomparable in its gravity with the Siberian expedition or the Manchuria Incident, but might be said to rival even the Russo-Japanese war in importance. It was natural that the morale of the soldiers and the nation had been enhanced. It was their earnest desire to safeguard the nation's security and the * peace and welfare of the people by virtue of their loyalty, devotion, and thus see a glorious conclusion.

Page

28444 Army and navy cooperation as demonstrated during the latest operations, was unrivaled and were of special attention. With the virtue of His Majesty and the devotion and loyalty of the soldiers, it had been clarified that the army deserved the high regard of the world, and it can take a resolute stand with the unanimous support of the people. The new dawning light of peace was being noticed in the Orient. The authorities concerned were determined to tide over the crisis by united efforts, to secure national defense, exalt prestige abroad, extend national virtues at home, and to abide by the Imperial Way. They were determined to make a contribution toward perfect peace in the Empire, and redoubled efforts * for the fulfillment of their heavy responsibility in guarding and maintaining the Imperial Throne.

28446 * From exhibit 3166, a letter dated 20 January, 1934, from ARAKI to Premier SAITO, it was stated that the present situation might appear different when looked at from different angles, but he firmly believed that it was not an emergency situation, but a critical juncture, at which the Empire's fate was at stake. Opinions seemed to differ as to whether or not a crisis in Japan would result, but really important affairs are apt to arise without a days notice. His opinion was that a nation must be ready at all times to avoid trouble and secure a * basis for further development. He was not inclined to believe they could take a rose-colored view of things. Potential danger was often made actual when people avoided tackling difficult problems and sought to comfort themselves by taking a light view.

28447 He didn't believe it far-fetched or intentional pessimism if unforeseen difficulties in the immediate future were forecast. This was the moment when national unity was required to bring about the Empire's prosperity. He had already expressed his views on various occasions, including that of the Five-Minister Conference, to cope with the situation. He took the liberty of making further suggestions, and he solicited the Premier's consideration over the future of Japan and asked that it be put into practice.

Page

28448

* it had not entirely slipped his notice that some people had misgivings concerning the military attitude toward international problems. He would state that this attitude had been consistent and rigid in the past, and would remain so, vis-a-vis those whose ideology and views were not reconciled with the national character. He had been exerting what service he could toward promoting Japan's position among the powers, and their confidence in Japan. He explained to them wherever possible the principle of the Empire's foundation in connection with national policies and principles of the present. His intention in doing so had been to seek efforts among the powers so that the Empire would not be entirely isolated. He hoped the Premier would render his assistance in realizing closer relations between the foreign and military authorities, with whose cooperation Japan might maintain her superior position in the international community, and that her

28449

* rightful claim might be duly complied with.

It was an urgent matter to inspire the people with the moral sense of the Empire and to reveal the essential qualities of its culture by perfecting national power based on nation-wide harmony, and moreover, to strengthen recognition of the national structure, further peace and security, and expedite the establishment of peace in East Asia and the Pacific.

28450

Because of international crises in 1935 and the tendency toward renovation among jurisdictional courts and other circles, unfavorable social trends were expected to be revealed, which were liable to produce unrest among the people, and world communities in particular. Combined * with the disturbance in educational circles and the labor field, conditions would be aggravated, and some, if not all military personnel, might be influenced and led into restlessness. The present situation seemed to be apparent tranquility, but it was not his opinion that it would be impossible for the government to tide over the difficult situation unless means were devised to dispel prevailing unrest. These tendencies refused to be driven away by ordinary or mediocre measures. The affairs in Japan should be a matter of religious service.

The fundamental aims should enable the people to live in peace and contentment, by observing such virtues as worship of gods, intimacy between the sovereign and his subjects, and perfect harmony between high and low. They should act in observance of virtues peculiar to the Empire and reject both Communism and Fascism.

Page

28451 A tendency should be adjusted after it is taken into consideration, and then directed to a proper course.
* Natural tendencies do not always take reasonable courses. Those who govern must devote themselves to assisting in the Emperor's rule, in conformity with nature, and by transcending reason to bring about the development of national power and let the people live peacefully.

28452 Since these tendencies had gathered strength and the crisis was impending, they must be prompt in judging where the trend would lead. They must sacrifice themselves to render allegiance and assistance to the Emperor. Since appeal to the Emperor and then to transgress the Imperial Way would constitute an act deserving death, they must petition the Emperor to grant amnesty for past crimes. Thus, they could purify life and drive the offenders to devote themselves to a new way of living in expiation of their sin. This could effect a complete change of public feeling,
* and they must carry out large-scale reforms in government. For this purpose they should have to request Imperial decision so the people might be informed on the plan, and should have to adjust this tendency. By thus establishing the basis of national power, they must discharge their great duty of assisting the Throne.

28453 * From exhibit 3166, letter dated 20 January, 1934, from ARAKI to Premier SAITO, it was stated that by judging the international situation, they could determine policies, especially those toward the Soviet, U. S., and China. Certain policies must be decided on while preparations were being made for a peace conference to establish a basis for peace in East Asia and the Pacific.

28454 The policy toward the Soviet should mainly concern international relations. Toward China, U. S. and the League, it concerned mainly with Manchurian problems.
* Policies toward Britain and the U. S. mainly concerned the London Disarmament Conference, and toward Britain, U. S. and China concerned international economic relations.



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al)

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT (Revised)

DEPONENT: ARAKI, Sadao

I, ARAKI, Sadao, make oath and say as follows:

- 1. Circumstances up to my acceptance of the post of War Minister

I served as the Chief of No. 1 Division of the General Staff from January 1928 to August 1928; President of the Staff College until August 1929; the Commander of the 6th Division in Kumamoto until August 1931, and Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Department of Military Education.

While I was in the service of those posts, I recognized from my experience in World War I and from my views on the morality of war, as well as from the basic principle in founding our army, the necessity of disassociating our army from the old Prussian style army, and so I devoted my whole hearted attention to the education and training of troops with the final object of promoting their moral standard.

The general situation in those days was by no means eventless. On the contrary, there was every sign of potential unrest. However, my view on the current problems was always different from the opinions of the leaders of Japan, including those of militarists, and I always remained unbiased to any of the movements which were opposed to each other.

It was on August 15, 1931 that I arrived in Tokyo to accept the post of the Director of the General Affairs Bureau of the Department of Military Education. This was an advisory position to the Inspector-General of the Department of Military Education.

The outbreak of the Manchurian Incident was known to me from the newspaper. I was told that the government had set up a non-expansion policy, and so I did not think much of this incident.

On the occasion of the October Incident, I happened to have been asked by War Minister MINAMI and Chief of General Staff KANAYA to subdue the trouble. I successfully discharged this task, but was informed nothing further as to the punishment of the people involved in this incident.

At that time, I was merely the Chairman of the committee

Def. Doc. #2488

of the entrance examination of the Military Preparatory School and the Military Academy, a position which was to be occupied by the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Department of Military Education as was regulated in that Department, and which had nothing to do with the current problems.

2. Circumstances around my acceptance of the post of War Minister.

At the end of 1931, I was the senior member of the Vice-Minister class, and because of this, I was asked on December 13th by Mr. Tsuyoshi INUKAI to become War Minister. As was customary with the army at that time, I reported this matter to and requested direction of the Three Chiefs of Army (War Minister, Chief of the General Staff, and Inspector-General of the Department of Military Education.) The opinion of the Three Chiefs was unanimous and they instructed me to accept the post. Thus I sent in my acceptance to Mr. INUKAI and became War Minister when the INUKAI Cabinet was formally organized on the same day. Mr. INUKAI at this Tribunal testified that my acceptance was made under some extraordinary circumstances, but not only was there any uncustomary procedure in connection with my acceptance, but neither my predecessor nor any person of importance at that time informed me of such circumstances.

On the following day of my acceptance of this new post and the subsequent day, War Minister MINAMI, my predecessor, Vice-Minister SUGIYAMA, and Chief of the General Staff KANAYA gave me the explanation of the state of affairs of Japan at that time, the outline of which was as follows:

(a) That since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, both the government and the army authorities strived to settle the trouble under a non-expansion policy, but that the condition in Manchuria which had been aggravated for many years in the past, was so complicated that both the Japanese civilian inhabitants in Manchuria and the Kwantung Army were still in danger. That the Government of the existing Manchurian regime had lost its grip, some of its influential personnel had absconded while the rest of them had established their own strongholds in various parts of Manchuria, and an absolute state of anarchy was revealed throughout Manchuria.

(b) That the army authorities, in view of their primary duty, was dually engaged to cope with this situation -- protection of the Japanese nationals and their rights and interests in Manchuria was one and self-defensive to insure the security of the Kwantung Army was the other. That the condition, as had been made clear by the second declaration of the WAKATSUKI Cabinet, was so aggravated that it was impracticable to return the Japanese troops to their original stations.

(c) That Chang Hsue-liang, who had established in Chinchow District a stronghold for violation of peace and order in Manchuria, did not keep his promise of evacuating all

all the troops under his command from the Chinchow District, and that there was not the slightest indication of sincerity to show that some day he might fulfill this promise.

(d) That the fact that the Japanese force from a desire for peaceful settlement had returned its troops from half way point of its campaign to Chinchow was utilized by Chang Hsue-liang for his propaganda. He was busy propagandizing that he and his troops won the victory in this campaign and by thus instigating the fighting spirit of the troops, caused them to cross the Liao River to appear and overrun the districts as far as near Mukden. That this very much endangered Japanese nationals and the troops at the foremost front.

(e) That while the League of Nations had not appreciated the actual situation in full, the recent councillors meeting decided to despatch a commission of enquiry and that it approved our rightful assertion of reserving our rights of pacifying bandits and other groups of turbulent elements.

The above were the outlines of the actual state of affairs explained to me by those three important people of the army, and their conclusion was that if the situation was left alone, and if it should cause any damage to the Japanese nationals or should the Kwantung Army suffer any serious damage from it, the hostility would expand all over China and would result in serious international relations.

3. Determination of government policy.

When I reported these matters to Premier INUKAI, he, in his capacity as the president of a political party, and being aware of the gravity of Japan's internal and external situations more fully than I, told me his opinion as follows:

(a) Self-defense and non-expansion should be the fundamental policy to cope with the situation, and based on this policy, the restoration of law and order and termination of hostilities in Manchuria should be immediately realized.

(b) It should be borne in mind that Chang Hsue-liang, the violator of law and order, was the man to deal with, and as such, the theatre of action must be extremely restricted, and on no occasion should it exceed the territory under his domination.

(c) Military action may be required to save the imminent danger to the Chinchow District, but even in doing so, a request should be first made for the withdrawal of the troops under Chang's command from that district so that the root of future evil will be eliminated.

(d) To the League of Nations and other countries which were related to Manchuria by treaties, a thorough explanation should be made in order to gain their complete understanding as to the real state of affairs of Manchuria.

These opinions of the Premier were discussed at the

Cabinet meeting and were made the basic policy of the INUKAI Cabinet. In accordance with this decision, I made the necessary contact with the ministers of Finance and Navy to make preparation for the War Office to discharge its sphere of duty. This decision was also conveyed by me to the General Staff so as to request them to act accordingly.

In connection with this decision of the Cabinet, there is an allegation in Exhibit No. 187 and No. 188 to the effect that I made a plan for the occupation of the Four Eastern Provinces. This is a mistake caused by the interpretation of an incompetent interpreter and it was entirely different from the fact. I shall refer to this matter at the latter part of this statement under 28.

I have never heard, not even as a rumor, that the Premier INUKAI had the intention of petitioning for an Imperial Command to withdraw the Kwantung Army, as was testified to by Mr. Takeshi INUKAI before the Tribunal. Premier INUKAI, as clever as he was, should have known quite well that the Emperor who was an ardent observer of the Constitution would not have granted an Imperial Command for the withdrawal of troops without first having the advice of the General Staff. I shall refute this allegation by a witness who will testify to the matters concerning the Supreme Command.

There is also an allegation by the Prosecution in Chapter 1 of Appendix A of the Indictment that after the INUKAI Cabinet was formed -- "The Japanese government which came into power on the 13th of December of 1931, and all subsequent Japanese governments adopted and continued this aggression and its gradual extension over other parts of China." That both the INUKAI and SAITO Cabinets, while I was a member of them, had never made any such policy shall be fully shown by the several speeches made by the responsible members of the two Cabinets at public occasions, and several witnesses and documentary evidence which are to be submitted before the Tribunal will corroborate this.

4. Pacification of Liao-si (West of the Liao River) District

The Japanese government, in conformity with the abovementioned policy, expected a peaceful settlement of the troubles in the Chinchow District through diplomatic negotiations, but almost a month had vainly passed since the commencement of the negotiation and there was not a sign of their withdrawing from the district. On the contrary, the activities of the bandits along the River Liao coast were more intensified and at the end of December 1931, the aggravated situation reached such a stage that the Japanese government had to resort to arms to wipe out the stronghold of the bandits and the lawless mobs in order to save the Japanese nationals from danger. I communicated this decision of the government to the General Staff. In the meantime, the government made a proclamation on the 27th to clarify the situation and explained to the world the difficulties that Japan was confronted with.

On the 28th of the same month, the General Staff despatched to Manchuria from Korea a divisional headquarters and a brigade, the main body of which began action at the very end of the month.

The Kwantung Army by this time, in view of the daily occurrence of various casualties, had taken several measures to cope with the situation, and had several times requested without response the withdrawal of Chang Sue-liang and his men from the Liao-si District.

However, the bandit troops, upon learning that Japan had decided to take a decisive measure, fled from the Chinchow District, together with the groups under Chang Sue-liang's command. Thus, a unit of Japanese troops under command of Lt. Gen. MURO made its entry into the city of Chinchow on January 3rd, 1932, without resorting to bloodshed and the Japanese nationals were relieved.

After this campaign, the army undertook the task of maintaining law and order in that locality, leaving the rest of the activities to the diplomatic authorities. However, during the month of January, the troops of the garrison forces suffered several casualties inflicted by bandits in various parts of the locality, including the annihilation of KOGA Regiment at Chin-si, but the troops on the spot, observing the principle of non-expansion policy, endured it and did not take any counter steps.

5. The First Shanghai Incident.

The cause of expedition and the policy of the Army.

The First Shanghai Incident was initiated when, in the middle of July 1932, a body of Chinese civilians assaulted a party of Japanese priests and either killed or wounded them. This incident induced a clash between the Japanese Navy and the Chinese 19 Route Army, and a great number of Japanese nationals in Shanghai as well as the navy itself were very much endangered.

The Navy authorities, in view of discharging their international duty in Shanghai as well as to save their own navy troops and protect Japanese nationals in that city, reported the case to the government and requested a detachment of army troops to Shanghai. The government knew the imminence of the situation and decided upon a policy of relieving the navy and protecting the Japanese nationals on the spot, and requested the army for a detachment of troops.

I consulted on this matter the Chief of the General Staff and we agreed to conform with the government policy by despatching a minimum force. The Chief of the General Staff reported the matter to the Throne and upon the approval of His Majesty, the expedition was finally decided upon.

By this time, the situation in Shanghai had become so critical that a mixed brigade was first despatched, in accordance with the request of the navy, by a destroyer,

and this brigade was on peace time footing on account of the shortage of time. Then the UEDA Division, also in a state of being immobilized, followed the brigade. The strength of the opponent at that time was said to be about 50,000.

In conformity with the policy of the government, I strived to settle this incident, as much as possible, in an amicable manner, and desired the Chief of General Affairs and Divisional Commander UEDA to follow this policy. This resulted in Divisional Commander's UEDA's advice to the opponent of the peaceful settlement, which will be shown in evidence in Dof. Doc. No. _____. This attempt at peaceful settlement by Divisional Commander UEDA was not duly responded to, and on the contrary, it drove him into a considerable plight.

This request for peace and subsequent hesitation on the part of Divisional Commander UEDA, in immediately resorting to action, was interpreted and propagandized by the China side as their complete victory over Japanese forces, and the propaganda induced a situation whereby the Chinese force under the direct control of the Nanking Government joined the Canton 19th Route Army with whom the expeditionary force was confronted. Moreover, this new situation affected the situation in Manchuria and caused further aggravation of law and order there. Even the proposal made by the League of Nations to Japan served to enhance the spirit of the Chinese people. The situation became extremely serious, and the safety of more than 20,000 Japanese nationals was menaced. Thus China's side took advantage of our aspiration for an amicable settlement and created a new situation more dangerous to Japan.

Worried with this added difficulty, the government requested the army to immediately save this situation. It was either on the 7th or 8th of February that the advance party of the army expeditionary force landed on the spot. Divisional Commander UEDA arrived there in the middle of February and this new crisis was created at the end of the same month.

On account of this renewed request from the government, my position required me to devise measures to immediately save the situation by means of close cooperation between operational tactics and diplomacy, that is to say, the measures complying with the operational request of the General Staff on one hand, and conforming with the political principle of the government on the other.

On this matter I consulted the General Staff and agreed to their appointing Colonel Binshiro OBATA (Lt. Gen. OBATA, who became Minister of State in the Prince KUNI Cabinet immediately after the surrender) the Chief of operations Section of the General Staff. We also agreed to recommend General SHIRAKAWA as the Supreme Commander of the Expeditionary Force as the most appropriate person with sufficient faculty who would maintain close cooperation with the local

diplomatic agent to take timely measures in terminating the hostilities. Then, in accordance with the suggestion of the General Staff, further reinforcement of two divisions was decided upon at the Cabinet meeting.

Various preparations were made for this reinforcement and at dawn of March 1st, the advance division of the expeditionary force made surprise landing at Tzi-liao-kou, a strategic point behind the enemy. The enemy after some insignificant resistance retreated beyond the 20 kilometer line and as the retreat was in conformity with the request that the expeditionary had previously made, Supreme Commander SHIRAKAWA immediately ordered cessation of hostility on the 3rd of March. The Chinese army followed suit on the following day.

Thus, due to the ingenious tactics of the operational force, the primary object of the expedition was achieved and the incident was settled while the main body of the reinforcements was still on board ship.

The Government and the central military authorities, hand in hand with the activities of the diplomatic authorities, endeavoured to settle the whole situation upon guarantee of the Chinese side to observe law and order in the future.

The Japanese troops voluntarily withdrew at the end of March to the rear line and one and one half divisions of the expeditionary force were subsequently returned to Japan. Then, through the valuable efforts of the committees of the U.S.A., Britain, France, Italy, Japan and China, a plan for international security and safety in and around Shanghai was set up and a truce agreement between Japanese and Chinese troops was signed on May 5th.

By virtue of the provisions of the truce agreement (Section 3, Appendix 2), the army had the right of stationing there a certain part of its force. However, from fear that it would turn out to be the cause of future trouble and because of respect for Chinese sovereignty, and, furthermore, as the primary object of the expedition had been accomplished, it was decided upon to withdraw, at the risk of various difficulties, all the troops from China and the withdrawal was completed by the end of May.

At that time, there were opinions among the people, however, in and out of office, that the over-all withdrawal was still premature. The opinions were regarded to be well grounded in view of past experiences, because both in Manchuria and at the early stages of the Shanghai Incident, our moderate attitude in the beginning seemed to have given cause to the enemy to make propaganda that they had won the victory, and that it succeeded to some extent in deceiving the people with a result that the over-all situation was made worse on account of this.

Nevertheless, the army, in view of its aspirations for peace, carried out the over-all withdrawal. Unfortunately, while giving a good impression among a part of the learned and well-informed classes of Chinese people, the over-all withdrawal did nothing more than to spur the Chinese general public and to create amongst them a contempt for the Japanese Army. In fact, it had a harmful effect over the situation in Manchuria and gave rise to further disturbances there. I may point out here that this was the most delicate part of the policy toward China, and both the government and the army authorities had many

difficulties on this particular point.

These circumstances will be fully shown by the government declaration, proclamations made by Divisional Commander UEDA and Supreme Commander SHIRAKAWA, my several speeches made in the capacity of War Minister concerning the withdrawal of troops and also those made in the Diet sessions, all of which will be tendered in evidence.

6. Protection of Japanese nationals in and around Harbin.

HSI HSIA (a member of the Monarchist Party) who became the Governor of Kirin Province on September 30, 1931, subsequently declared the independence of his Province. However, after two months of this declaration, he caused some discord with TING-CHAO and LI-TU of Harbin, and because of this conflict, the general situation in and around Harbin was thrown into confusion, threatening, at the same time, the safety of Japanese nationals residing there.

The danger became more imminent when HSI HSIA, in January, 1932, determined to conduct his subjugation campaign toward the north and started fighting on the 27th. This urgent situation compelled the Japanese nationals to request the Kwantung Army for their rescue, and the Koreans and Manchurians of the same district also frequently made the same request.

In the meantime, it happened that four Japanese were murdered, several Koreans were taken away, and about 4,000 Japanese and 2,000 Koreans were placed under extreme danger. The Kwantung Army ordered an aerial reconnaissance of the district, but the aircraft had to make an emergency landing near Harbin, and the crew, who were commissioned officers of the Kwantung Army, were murdered.

The government had taken a cautious attitude toward this district, but as the situation became so serious the government considered it necessary to take measures to restore law and order in that district and to protect the Japanese residents.

However, while the Japanese residents were to be protected, the government made it a policy that the international relations, especially the relation with the Soviet Union, should not be endangered. The Chief of General Staff, in conformity with this policy, ordered some restrictions to the Kwantung Army as to its military actions.

The restrictions caused much difficulty to the Kwantung Army in its operation, and a corps of the Army finally succeeded, after considerable hardships, in reaching the outskirts of the City of Harbin.

As the object of this campaign was to protect the Japanese nationals in that district, and as the object was thus accomplished, the main body of the expeditionary force retraced its course without even entering the city of Harbin.

The explanatory speeches made by Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA on January 31, 1932, at the plenary session of the Privy Council and the 62nd session of the Imperial Diet,

the minutes of which will be tendered in evidence, will clarify the circumstances in which this campaign was carried out.

7. Independence declaration of Manchoukuo and its recognition; also the attitude of the Japanese central military authorities toward it.

Soon after the restoration of law and order in Chinchow, I think it was in the beginning of January, 1932, Staff Officer ITAGAKI of the Kwantung Army came to Tokyo and reported to me the situation in Manchuria, the picture of the independence movement and Commander-in-Chief HONJO's view of the general situation.

According to the reports I received, each Province of Manchuria had declared its independence and it was in such a precarious condition that a single false step would lead the whole situation into a state of chaos where each local regime held its own sphere of influence. On the other hand, there was an aspiration rapidly developing among the influential people all over Manchuria to found a new state. In fact, this aspiration was getting so irresistibly strong among them that it was almost impossible for the Kwantung Army, which was neither forcing a military administration nor was it provided with sufficient strength, to maintain law and order without seriously taking this new situation into consideration. In connection with this report, I further learned the following facts: That the unanimous opinion of those who were concerned in this independent movement was to have Mr. PU-YI as the ruler of the new state; that Commander-in-Chief HONJO's opinion was to leave the matter to them and not to take any measure which might interfere with the zealous aspiration of the Manchurian people.

On hearing this report, I thought of the necessity of paying attention to the international problems which might arise out of Manchuria's independence declaration. However, I reported this information to the Premier.

The Premier and known by that time what was going on in Manchuria and was of the opinion that the question of independence should be left alone, only he considered that the international problems as mentioned in the above should be studied.

The decision of the government on this problem was also to leave it alone to the Manchurian people and to make no interference with it inasmuch as the primary concern of the government was in preservation of law and order.

In the meantime the independence movement in Manchuria made further progress and then a decision for independence was reached on February 28th among the influential people of Manchuria with an additional resolution to ask Mr. PU-YI to become its ruler. Then, the independence was declared on March 1st, and Mr. PU-YI became its President on the 9th of the same month.

The Kwantung Army, whose primary duty was to secure the peace and order in Manchuria, wished that the newly born regime would respect, as it had declared, the international treaties and external regulations, and

would base its administration, internally, upon the people's will, so that an ideal nation where in the King's Way is fully observed under the harmonious collaboration of five races, a real happy land, free from all the unfortunate incidents in the past, should be realized. The attitude of the Kwantung Army was that of watching its development, but not to make any interference with it.

However, preservation of peace and order and protection of Japanese nationals, which were the main duties of Kwantung Army, had to be conducted in such a way as would correspond to the ever changing situation, and so the Kwantung Army had discussions with the new regime concerning these local matters exclusively.

These reports from the Kwantung Army to the central military authorities were reported to the government by the latter as soon as they were received. The government, in view of the actual state of affairs in Manchuria, reached the conclusion that there was no alternative but to leave to the discretion and judgment of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army the preservation of peace and order in Manchuria and decided to observe the further development of the situation.

I also followed this policy of the government and carefully watched the situation so that I should not make any mistake in the future when counter measures were to be taken.

The Foreign Office viewed this problem to be a case of a domestic split of a nation and that the independence was no an infringement of international law. Under the circumstances, all that the army could do was to follow the policy of the government and devote its efforts in successfully carrying out its original duty of preserving peace and order and securing the national defense of Manchuria.

In the meantime, the new regime gradually consolidated its foundation and so the government, with a view to avoiding further disturbances in Manchuria, decided to cooperate, whenever possible, with the new regime. The government made explanation of this new policy at the 61st session of the Imperial Diet. (Def. Doc.).

I have never heard that Premier INUKAI dispatched Mr. KAYANO as a special envoy to the Nanking Government for a friendly understanding, as was testified to by Mr. Takeshi INUKAI. Even if it were true, it must have been of a private nature. Mr. INUKAI's further testimony that Premier INUKAI talked over the matter with a chief of a section of the General Staff and that the chief of the section, because of this talk, was relegated to an other post is entirely wrong. Mr. INUKAI did not mention the name of the Colonel, but from his testimony that the Colonel was relegated to the Commander of the RANAN Regiment and also from the testimony given by witness FUJITA, it is clear that he meant Colonel SHIGETO. Colonel SHIGETO was sent out of the central military authorities, together with other people, because of his having had some relation with the March and October Incidents, and because of this, he was made an object of the army's "purging shift" of military personnel. Witness FUJITA also gave his evidence to this effect.

I had several interviews with the Premier to discuss the Manchurian problems, but never had we any friction of opinion between us. I always dealt with the matters in accordance with the fixed policies of the government, and whenever a new problem arose, I fully discussed it with the Premier and followed his decision about it.

With regard to Premier INUKAI's attitude toward the international problems, I never perceived in him any sign of an aggressive attitude. Not only Premier INUKAI alone, but the Kwantung Army was eagerly wishing for the ideal progress of Manchoukuo and that was all that they desired for this new country. This fact has already been clarified before this Tribunal by the will of late General HONJO and other evidence.

PART II.

Next I shall refer to the question of official recognition of the state of Manchukuo. Primarily this question, which was purely an international diplomatic matter, was under the charge of the Foreign Office; accordingly, the Army did not take any step in this matter and except for those problems which concerned the maintenance of peace and order and problems of national defense that might arise therefrom, I respected the opinion of the Foreign Minister and left everything to his care.

Manchukuo, since its foundation, had gradually become a subject of discussion both in and out of Japan, and the House of Representatives, on June 15th, made a resolution at its plenary session that an official recognition should be given to this new state.

The government of Japan, after careful consideration of the matter, decided to follow the views of the Foreign Office, which suggested that the new state was the result of an internal split of an independent nation and that recognition of such state which acquired its legal independence would not in any way infringe international law. Necessary procedures were then taken and the formal recognition was given on September 15th, whereupon the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol was signed and an arrangement was made for the exchange of Ambassadors.

Upon this formal recognition, the Kwantung Army was charged with the new duty of garrison and joint defense of the new state. This new additional duty meant that the entire conduct of the Kwantung Army bore an international complexion by representing the two independent countries - Japan and Manchoukuo, and so they made it their rule to confer with the Manchoukuo authorities before they took any action in connection with the national defense and maintenance of peace and order.

Thus the situation made its natural development from its formation to formal recognition, and along with this development, Japan found it necessary to determine her attitude toward this state of affairs. The government of Japan, from her desire for the sound development of Manchoukuo as her friendly neighbourer, decided to give Manchoukuo, in compliance with her request, all the necessary assistance in her power, and by doing so, to take measures to prevent activities causing disturbances in Manchoukuo.

That Japan had neither the intention of making Manchoukuo her cat's paw, nor violating international law can be easily ascertained from the speeches made by the Premier and the Foreign Minister at the Imperial Diet as well as from their answers to the interpellations at the Privy Council. This will also be seen in the speech broadcasted by Mr. Ting, Premier of Manchoukuo, on the first anniversary of Manchoukuo's foundation, in which he expressed his zealous ideal of founding a new state.

Personally I desired that Manchoukuo should develop soundly along the line as was indicated in her independence declaration toward the goal of becoming an ideal nation, and would acquire every necessary qualification for an independent country.

when
In the spring of 1934, /Mr. Henry Pu-Yi, Emperor of Manchoukuo, visited Japan, I was given an audience with him for several hours. Mr. Pu-Yi eagerly and strongly emphasized his desire of establishing a happy land of CDO (King's Way) and at a later stage of the conversation, he sent the interpreter away and talked to me face to face by way of writing on a sheet of paper, his ambition of becoming the Emperor of all China, thereby restoring his ancestral old Chin Dynasty there.

On this occasion I dared to give him advice and said that what the Emperor should do was to cultivate the virtue of Emperorship, as he had declared when he ascended the Throne, and to become worthy of confidence both in and out of the country.

As this conversation will show, there was not the slightest indication that Mr. Henry Pu-Yi would have become a tool of the Japanese government; on the contrary, there was even a sign that he would take the initiative to induce the Japanese government in the direction he desired.

The development of Manchoukuo after that was not quite as it should have been. Dissatisfied with this state, I refrained from attending the 10th anniversary celebration of its foundation, and I broadcast what I had in mind about the situation. My views and belief on Manchuria had been fully expressed in my talk with Lord Lytton and others.

As was explained in my speech at the 62nd session of the Imperial Diet, Chang Hsue-liang's activities, before the formal recognition of Manchoukuo, of causing disturbances in Manchuria were carried out to such an extent that it compelled Japan to take measures to settle the situation.

10. Pacification of North Manchuria, Kholombail and Jehol.

The pacification campaign of North Manchuria, Kholombail and Jehol was somewhat different in nature, inasmuch as Manchoukuo had been founded and recognized by that time, and the military action was taken to discharge the army's duty to both Japan and Manchoukuo. In other words, the campaign was an action fulfilling the army's duty as was provided in the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol, and it was nothing but a domestic affair of Manchoukuo.

Pacification campaign by the Japan-Manchoukuo Allied Force over North Manchuria was executed because Ma Seng-shan who had once pledged his loyalty to Manchoukuo plotted a rebellion of Su Ping-wen in December, 1932, and Jehol at the end of February, 1933, because of a rebellion by Tan Wanglin.

In carrying out those campaigns, I drew the special attention of the General Staff to follow the government policy so that the expedition to Kholombail would not cause any bad influence over Soviet-Japan relations and warfare in Jehol would not expand itself over North Manchuria. I further requested them that their action should be based strictly on the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol and utmost attention be made in bringing about the termination of hostilities. I also requested the maintenance of a very close contact between the War Office and the General Staff.

In Kholombail district, we were assisted greatly by the good will of the Soviet Union and succeeded in safely saving the Japanese residents, and the pacification was ended at that.

In the Jehol campaign, the General Staff and the Kwantung Army made it their policy to stop the advance of troops at the line of the Great Wall, even at the risk of operational disadvantage. There was once an occasion when the troops marched over the Great Wall, but they were immediately ordered to return. This action caused another attack from the enemy, but our troops in a drive

after the retreating enemy, reached the Soo River and stopped there. Thus the policy of the government and the central army authorities was strictly adhered to by the troops of the Kwantung Army.

In the meantime, Chang Hsue-liang actually withdrew from all official positions and an agreement was reached and the Tangku Truce was signed between HO YING-CHIN representative of the National Government and Major General OKAMURA, Vice Chief of Staff and the representative of the Kwantung Army. Further details of this will be given by witnesses ENDO, SABURO AND TAKEDA, Hisashi.

11. Conclusion of the Tangku Truce Agreement.

In compliance with the request of Mr. HO YING-CHIN, Deputy Chairman of the Peking Sub-committee of the National Government Military Committee, on May 25th, 1933, cessation of hostility was discussed between Mr. HO and Major General OKAMURA, representative of the Kwantung Army, and the Truce Agreement was signed on the 31st of May of the same year. The agreement was confirmed by the governments of Japan and Manchoukuo in due course, and thus the hostilities in Manchuria virtually ended.

The Manchurian Incident was not primarily a war in the sense of definition of international law. Therefore, there was no such procedure as a peace treaty. Only an agreement was reached between the two parties as to several arrangements to prevent occurrence of further hostilities in the future.

Subsequently, the members of the government of Manchoukuo and those of China met at the DAIREN Conference to discuss practical routine matters concerning the maintenance of friendly relations between China and Manchoukuo. Some members of our government who were in charge of such matters also attended the conference, but as the matter did not directly concern the relations between Manchoukuo and Japan, I do not remember the details.

Thus the disturbances and hostilities which had been rampantly prevailing all over Manchuria at the time of the Wakatsuki Cabinet which had created a potential danger, such as would induce at any time an all out clash between China and Japan, were completely settled by me within one and half year of my acceptance of War Ministership to the INUKAI Cabinet which succeeded the Wakatsuki Cabinet, and the mission charged to the army of terminating hostilities was fulfilled.

12. Policies I adopted after the Tangku Agreement.

My most important mission as War Minister which was settling the hostilities having been thus accomplished, I decided to take this opportunity to establish plans to stabilize several internal as well as external affairs. I set up the following three main principles and determined upon their realization.

1. Stabilization of domestic state of affairs which had been in absolute chaos since the beginning of the Showa Era.
2. Complete purification of the Army so as to base itself on the principle of the foundation of the Imperial Army.
3. Improvement of foreign relations, through which to secure peace of the world, and of the Far East in particular.

In June, 1933, when the Imperial Diet closed,

I set forth to establish a practical plan to execute these principles.

The first thing I intended to do was to purify the public mind by dispelling from Japan all the evil causes accumulated since World War I, paying at the same time special attention to the internal as well as external state of affairs and to the specific feature of Japan's national character. The best way to accomplish this task was to let the people appreciate the virtue of benevolence of His Majesty the Emperor. One of the practical plans for this purpose was to petition for the grant of a general amnesty and to release both the right and left wing political criminals and other criminals with the exception of those whose crime was of particularly atrocious nature, and to give them firm warning not to repeat the same folly.

Secondly, I intended to stabilize the mind of people of the rural district and fishing villages by establishing means of relieving them from the extreme poverty in which they were at that time.

Thirdly, I thought it necessary to devise fundamental measures to settle the confusions and disturbances in political and ideological circles.

My fourth intention was to find means to secure the original character of the Imperial Army whose reason for existence was in practicing morals, and let it thoroughly understand the fundamental principles of founding the army, so that the occurrence of ominous incidents, which had been rather frequent in the past, would be prevented in the future.

Fifthly, Japan at that time was confronted with several difficult international problems. I considered it of urgent necessity to solve all of those problems by making the utmost concession that we could afford, while making full assertions on what we had to assert. What Japan needed then was to determine the minimum extent of her self-existence and protect her from being affected by the hitherto precarious state of affairs in Europe.

Under these circumstances, what should have been done before anything else was to secure peace in the Far East, and in order to do so, I determined to hold an international conference among the countries interested in Far Eastern affairs. My intention was first to establish peace in the Far East and on the Pacific after thorough deliberation upon pending matters among the participants of this international conference, and then make it the corner stone on which to secure the world's peace.

The matter was, however, too grave to be decided instantaneously. I spent the whole of July and August in studying practicability of this plan as well as in preparation of preliminary matters. In September I prepared a basic suggestion for this plan, and suggested to the Premier to make a definite plan based on my suggestions, so that it may be presented for deliberation at the Imperial Diet.

Petitioning for amnesty seemed to me the most difficult problem. On this question, I gained the approval of the Navy Minister, and the suggestion was put to the Premier as an agreed opinion of both Navy and Army.

There were several objections to the amnesty to be granted to the criminals of the extreme right and extreme left wings. I maintained that however wrong they may have been, their misconduct had arisen from their passion to improve the future of their country and community.

Def Doc No. 2488

It was the unfortunate circumstances in which they were brought up or their narrow prejudice that had driven them to blindly rush to such an extreme ideal. They were nonetheless valuable subjects of His Majesty to whom His virtue of benevolence should equally be extended. I insisted that this was the characteristic feature of our national polity, and endeavoured to realize it.

The question having developed thus far, Premier SAITO ordered the people of the government in charge of this type of work to study the practical side of this plan, and, apart from this, he successively held conferences among the ministers who were related to the subject matter of the plan. Five Minister Conferences concerning foreign affairs and national defense were often held and other Five Minister Conferences concerning rural district problems being that they were a part of domestic political problems were also frequently held. I attended these conferences together with Mr. MITSUCHI, Minister of Railways.

Both of these conferences met more than twenty times and the gist of the plan was thoroughly discussed by the end of the year. There were several matters of which even definite plans were set up.

The basic study of the plan showed due progress and a communique in the form of a memorandum was given on matters concerning foreign affairs and national defense in October 1933. Some very important decisions were reached concerning rural district problems which were part of the problems for the domestic council.

My intention was to establish definite plans for all the subject matters by the end of January 1934, when the Imperial Diet was expected to be convened, and to present them to the Diet for deliberation. The government, army and Diet should seek for the stabilization of internal affairs by their respective functions, and these efforts, combined with the activities of the diplomatic branch would induce the whole situation to opening the Far Eastern Peace Conference. This was my intention and I did my best for its realization.

As I devoted my whole attention after conclusion of the Tangku Truce Agreement to this matter, I had not much interest in other problems and even when I had some objection or different opinion on some matters, I usually let them go at that.

On the First of January, 1934, while the plan was in the midst of deliberation, I fell seriously ill and was confined to bed. However, as I most eagerly wished to execute this plan at any cost, I recommended General HAYASHI as my successor, and I resigned from the post of War Minister.

By that time, the essential portion of my plan was still being discussed, part by part by the respective Cabinet Ministers but it was not yet ready to be presented to the Cabinet meeting. Such having been the case, when I was resigning from my post, I sent to the Premier this suggestion of my plan, together with a letter, expressing all my views and beliefs, and asked him to expedite the opening of the Cabinet Meeting for this plan.

Unfortunately, not only the general situation failed to develop as I had expected but the internal conditions of the army authorities changed radically. Dissatisfied with the state of affairs I decided to avoid being materially involved in any of the official matters. My successor, General HAYASHI, after four months' tenure of office, had to resign for personal reasons and recommended me as his successor, but because of this dissatisfaction, I persistently declined its acceptance.

In the meantime, things completely turned to the worse, and after two years from the time of my resignation, the 2.26 Incident forced myself and other senior members of the army to leave active service altogether.

For two years from my resignation from the War Ministry to retirement from active service, I occupied the post of a War Councillor, but not a single enquiry of important

nature was made to me, and so there is nothing to state about this period.

Further, this was the period when the internal condition of the army was in absolute chaos, and as I was always placed outside its central circles, I did not know the helm of military affairs at that time. All of these conditions will be shown by documentary evidence and witnesses.

13. International Treaty Problems.

Diplomatic affairs were not under the charge of the War Minister. As the War Minister, I only attended to what matters were under my charge and disposed of them in accordance with the policy determined by the government and so I did not know much of the diplomatic matters.

Decision of a diplomatic affair was usually done upon investigation and opinion of the Foreign Minister. When it had an important bearing upon other departments of the government, the Minister of such Department was consulted, and when it was sufficiently important as to be related to all Departments in a general way, it was usually discussed at the Cabinet meeting. Otherwise, most of them were disposed of by the decision of the Foreign Minister.

With regard to international treaties in connection with the Manchurian Incident, the WAKATSUKI Cabinet had already invoked the right of self-defense, and the Premier and Foreign Minister of the INUKAI Cabinet also several times declared the continuation of this right of self-defense.

I was told that our action was within the limit of action for self-defense, about which every signatory of the Non-Aggression Pact had reserved the right of execution, and a prominent scholar of international law defined, "The act of self-defense is conducted until pressure by violence and menace is removed." Moreover, there was a reservation made by Japan on December 10th 1931 at the Council Meeting of the League of Nations, which was approved by the Council, of the right of subjugating bandit troops and lawless elements. The army acted within the extent of this right based on the policy determined by the government.

As for the problems concerning independence of Manchoukuo and its subsequent recognition, Premiers and Foreign Ministers of the INUKAI and SAITO Cabinets gave explanations at the Imperial Diet and the Privy Council. They said that the independence was a natural result of an internal split of a nation conducted by her own people and that the Nine Power Treaty had not provided any restriction on such action. They further said that the independence was realized upon the basis of the historical background in Manchuria. They quoted several opinions of some of the scholars of international law and said that were several instances in which the presences of foreign troops contributed toward the realization of independence.

These explanations convinced all other members of the cabinet and the army continued its action in conformity with this fixed policy until execution of the right of self-defense was no more required. As far as I remember, all of these details were contained in the Views of Japanese Government which were submitted to the plenary session of the League of Nations.

The relation with the League of Nations had already been considerably aggravated before the INUKAI Cabinet, perhaps due to lack of proper explanation of the situation. It was immediately prior to the formation of the INUKAI Cabinet that the League of Nations decided to dispatch its Enquiry Mission. This decision was quite satisfactory to us and the INUKAI Cabinet hoped that the Mission would

arrive at an accurate recognition of the situation based on the actual state of affairs. The army also expected that the Enquiry Mission would make an unbiased conclusion toward peace by having contact with the actual conditions on the spot in the light of the historical background.

As I have stated above, the policy of the INUKAI Cabinet toward Manchuria was immediate restoration and subsequent maintenance of peace and order, and it aimed at improvement of international relations by giving cooperation and correct understanding to the problems among nations.

The army, also in conformity with this policy, minimized its military action and devoted its efforts in immediately bringing about the termination of the hostilities. The manner in which the army settled the Shanghai Incident was a good indication of this policy of the army and its overall withdrawal from Shanghai served to improve, more or less, Japan's international relations. Encouraged with this fact, the army continued to concentrate its effort on this point.

The independence of Manchoukuo and its formal recognition was studied, as was stated above, by both the INUKAI and SAITO Cabinets. By keeping a watch on the result of this study and on the prerequisite for peace and order in Manchuria, both cabinets followed the natural growth of this movement and when convinced of its healthy progress, decided to give it formal recognition. The army, in conformity with this policy of the government, strived to prevent actions disturbing the peace and order, which had barely been restored after several uprisings, and to discharge its new task of joint defense of the state of Manchoukuo.

With regard to the League of Nations, I knew that the government had tried to obtain its understanding by tendering them written views of the government on the complexity of the character of the Incident and its suggestions for the means of maintaining peace in the future. When Mr. MATSUOKA was dispatched by the government as its plenipotentiary, the government had decided its policy of staying with the League at all costs in order to seek a proper understanding, and I think Mr. MATSUMA was instructed accordingly.

The army, also in conformity with the government policy, strived to bring about a situation in which Japan could remain with the League in order to afford them a correct understanding of the problem. However, there were continued disturbances and unrest in various parts of Manchuria and before these hostilities had been settled, the resolution of the plenary session of the League of Nations was reached. The hope of Japan's getting a true under-

standing from the League having been thus frustrated, Japan had no alternative but to withdraw from it in accordance with the provisions of Article I and 3 of its regulations. Nevertheless, Japan declared to the world by an Imperial Rescript and a government communique her determination of collaborating with the world. This will also be testified to by documents and witnesses.

14. My views and thoughts on foreign affairs.

While I was in office, foreign affairs did not come directly under my jurisdiction, and accordingly, I could not bring into practice my views on those matters. All I could do was to discharge the duty of the army in accordance with the fixed policy of the government. But in order to clarify the grounds on which my actions toward the international problems were based, I feel it necessary to state herewith my fundamental ideology on international problems and the subsequent steps that I undertook at that time.

(a) Relation with the Soviet Union.

I had been in Russia for many years and was one of those who had a fond feeling toward and a good understanding of that country. My article in the monthly magazine "Russia" correctly conveyed my true sentiment. Nevertheless, I could not advocate the world Bolshevization policy of the Third Internationale. My opposition to this principle and measures against it was more intensified when in 1923 and 1932 members of the Communist party plotted an assault on the person of His Majesty the Emperor.

In fact, from the end of the TAISHO Era (about 1923) to the earlier period of the SHOWA Era (about 1931), Japan was thoroughly subjected to clandestine activities of the Communist party manifested in the form of a labor conflict and other political struggles of sinister nature, and the existence of the country was endangered as it never had been before. A publication of Mr. Besedovsky, the Soviet ambassador in Japan in 1926 and 1927, explaining the details of such activities, gave a deep warning to the world. I took it as the weakness in the ideological status of Japan, and did not take it so seriously as to consider that it strained the relation between the Soviet and Japan.

I may say that I am not inferior to the Communist party in the passion to relieve the poor class of people, which, I understand, is one of the tenets of that party. However, my belief is that if the administration under the Emperor based on the original doctrine of this country is realized, not only the poorer class of people, but the whole people in general can enjoy better welfare without being forced to anything. This was clearly manifested in the message of one of the Emperors who said, "Should there be a single person among the whole population who is not given his proper place, we are to blame for that." I believed that neither violence nor crafty measures was required in providing welfare to the people. My opinion was if the Soviet Union believed in communism, that was their affair and we had no reason to interfere with it. Every country is entitled to follow its own policy in accordance with the internal condition of that country. This having been my conviction, my opposition to the Third Internationale did not go as far as to advocate interference with the Soviet Union.

I felt at that time the necessity of taking self-defensive measures against the menace of eastward infiltration of the Soviet influence and of the very active policy of the Third International of bolshevizing the whole world, but never had I felt the necessity of preparation of any positive military action against the Soviet Union, to say nothing of taking such action.

To cope with this menace of the Soviet Union, there may have been several researches and suggestions among the people whose duty was to deal with such matters, and I believe those in charge of the matters would have devised measures within the extent of their duty, but I have reason to believe that such measures should not have exceeded the extent of research. The research alleged by the prosecution to have been made by KAWANO and KASAHARA would have been one of their opinions as members of the General Staff, but whatever it may have been, it had no relation with me. As far as I knew, no positive plan of the responsible authorities against the Soviet Union existed. On the contrary, the fact was that the army had once placed much expectation in the change of policy of the Soviet Union.

To the conclusion of that Non-Aggression Pact, I was not necessarily opposed in principle, but I seriously and carefully listened to public opinion what before signing such pact as the Non-Aggression Pact, all the pending problems between the two countries ought to be settled upon the basis of sincerity by both parties, as otherwise, the pact was destined to fail and was apt to leave cause for future trouble.

I do not admit the conclusions and the allegation tendered in evidence by the prosecution against myself. When I pointed out the obscurity of the borders of Outer-Mongolia, it was not from an aggressive intention toward Soviet as it was a defensive precaution. This can be easily ascertained from the other parts of the sentence around that expression.

I sincerely hope that good Russians will peacefully display their rich natural gifts.

(b) Relation between China and Japan.

With regard to the relation between China and Japan, we have been told since we were children how eagerly our seniors of high ideals and experiences endeavored, since the MEIJI Era, to secure a firm and healthy independence for China our good and friendly neighbour, and thereby to bring happiness to the people of our friendly nation. Such expressions as DOBU DOBU (same character and same race) and SHINSHI HOSHA (relation between lips and teeth, and wheels and axis) were often used to denote how the relation between China and Japan should be. This was how my original conception of China was formed, and I believe it was the same with all the people who had some interest in China. My article in the magazine BUNGEI SHUNJU entitled "To President Chiang Kai-shek and appeal to my brethren" expresses my view and conception in this matter.

I advocated that the cooperation of China and Japan should be based upon the promotion of Oriental culture which is further based on the union of eastern and western culture. I expressed this opinion of mine in 1925, when I had a chance of talking to some of the Chinese people in Shanghai who are now engaged in important tasks as leaders of that country. As for the means of bringing about perfect independence to China, I had the occasion of giving my personal suggestion to President Chiang Kai-shek in the spring of 1932, through the staff of the Chinese Legation in Japan.

China is destined to be our friendly neighbor. I most sincerely

desire perfect independence for this country, but never had I dreamed of her division. This is the reason why I always quote the Outer Mongolian and Sinking problems for comparison.

I viewed the Manchurian Incident as a kind of explosion of a situation which had been brought to the bursting point by variegated historical background and the complicated state of affairs of Manchuria at that time, and the explosion resulted in the independence declaration by the people of Manchuria. In other words, it was the natural result, caused by the influence of the mass of the people, which could not have been stopped merely by the strength of a limited number of people, without first correcting its cause. If China wanted to get rid of this sinister incident, she should have devised adequate measures immediately after World War I and for a person like myself who was charged to deal with this Incident from its half way mark, the first necessity was to put an end to the hostilities. I considered that if Manchuria should turn out to be an ideal happy land, whether politically independent or not, and gained the approval of the world, its relation with China and peace in the Far East for that matter could be somehow readjusted in the future and I dealt with this matter along this train of thought. What I really had in mind was to welcome the creation of an ideal happy land on a part of Chinese soil, in anticipation of rehabilitation of its mother land.

When I saw the Manchurian people who had been under the hard rigors of living, I could not help praying for realization of an ideal happy land of ODO (King's Way) as had often been talked of by the leaders of Manchuria. It was not myself alone, but all the people of broader views who had the same opinion as above. The main thing was to bring peace immediately between China and Japan and let the world recognize the fact. Readjustment of relations between China and Manchoukuo could be thereafter easily accomplished.

With this view in mind, I considered as War Minister that what was required most urgently was to terminate hostilities. This was the reason why I evacuated all the Japanese troops from Shanghai, and advocated after the Tangku Truce Agreement, the opening of a Far Eastern Peace Conference. This will be proven by witness and documents.

The Marco Polo Incident occurred four years after the Tangku Truce Agreement. It would hardly be necessary to say that this Incident had no relation to the Manchurian Incident. I acceded to the request of Premier KONOYE, accepted the post of Cabinet Councillor and Education Minister in his cabinets. The object of the Premier was to let me find means to terminate the China Incident. I did my best to comply with the request of the Premier, but my power was not strong enough to bear any fruit along this line.

On the occasion of the Nanking campaign, I opposed the act of occupying the enemy capital. I thought it was detrimental to the feelings of the people of both countries in the future. This was why I deplored the occupation of that city.

It was then I thought of the poem of seven steps of Tsao Tzu-kian.

It is my belief that if the leaders of China and Japan and the leading countries of the world had a little deeper appreciation of the relations between China and Japan, the Marco Polo Incident would not have had such repercussions as it did.

It was from these same views that before the occupation of Canton and Hankow, I made my suggestions and opposed the military action against those cities. However, at that time I was not a member of the army authorities, nor was I keeping contact with the actual state of affairs and so my hopes were not fulfilled. I have never dreamed of aggression against China and

never acted accordingly. In fact, I placed my utmost importance in the cultural and spiritual unity between China and Japan.

(c) Relations with the U.S.A. and Britain.

I am not a so-called pro-Anglo-Saxon, nor am I, of course, an anti-Anglo-Saxon. I am a Japanese. I can not bear the sight of Japan being held in contempt by others or being reduced to destruction. Moreover, I am of the opinion of obeying His Majesty the Emperor and bringing about peace and welfare upon the basis of the original doctrine of Japan. I believed so and I have practiced so. This was not an opinion formed from so-called divine-inspirationism or from dogmatic ultra-nationalism. On the contrary, I trust it is a most humane principle agreeable to the world's omnipresent natural law. With this principle in mind, I did not try to cater to the current trend of making omnipotent Germany and Italy. Because I did not do so, I was sometimes blamed and abused as a pro-Anglo-Saxon. It has not been my practice to flatter or fawn upon others. I was sometimes unscrupulous in commenting upon what seemed to me wrong, and warned about the same, but I was never reluctant in praising what I believed to be right. Above all, I cannot help feeling grateful throughout my life to the obligation under which I was once placed. On such an occasion, I always expressed my gratitude whatever the reason for the obligation may have been. It was in this sense that I opposed the suggestion that the monument of Commodore Perry in KURIHAM should be removed. I expressed similar types of opinions on several occasions. It was one thing I could not understand why, because of my above belief and attitude, I should have been called during the war by the opportunists and by those who were obsequious to the current trend to be an unpatriotic pro-Anglo-Saxon.

It was my consistent ideal that war should not be waged to satisfy meaningless desires. Except for some special occasions, war is apt to leave behind it certain aftereffects of personal feeling. Japan had never fought against the U.S.A. or Britain. On the contrary, it was my belief that Japan had been under the obligation of those two countries for the past ten years in connection with the crisis with which Japan had been confronted. Britain in particular was our ally for many years in the past, and to the U.S.A. while we had owed her much financially, there was not the slightest friction of feeling.

There had only been a slight unpleasant feeling between the two nations in connection with the racial problem and the Washington Conference. However, even on these matters, I think there was sufficient understanding among the people of learning and fame in the U.S.A. and Japan. Furthermore I did not take it any more than as a mere political problem, in which there was not the slightest factor of danger for the relations between the two countries.

To be quite frank, the relation between the U.S.A. and Japan after the Manchurian incident had not always been a pleasant one. Of course each party must have had its own reason to remain so, but the main thing hinged upon sentiment and misunderstanding, and I believed it was not so deeply rooted as would completely destroy the friendly relation which had existed between the two countries.

PART III

During the time of the Manchurian Incident, I was one of those who was worried over the general situation of the world. I had had sincere faith in Britain's refined diplomacy and the U.S.A.'s power of enforcement, and upon those I placed much expectation to save the world from the deteriorated situation facing it.

I expressed my opinion to many of the well-informed people of learning and fame in both Britain and America and wanted to adjust through those people the application of the sanctions of the League of Nations, and also, more importantly, to prevent the explosion of the general unrest which was then prevailing all over the world. I believed I was doing much good for the sake of world peace, and I repeatedly warned them that unless steps were taken along the line as I suggested, the situation in Europe was suggestive of a world war.

It was also from my fear of the above that I desired that those people improve the method of application of the sanctions of the League of Nations, based more upon the actual facts than anything else.

It looked to me that the U.S.A. had maintained an indifferent attitude having stayed outside the realm of the League of Nations, and therefore, was in a position to make a calm and unbiased judgment of the world's state of affairs and Britain was also, in my opinion, in the same position, because of her rich experience in dealing with important international problems. The rest of the countries were, I thought, too busy in rehabilitating the damages of World War I to do anything else.

Japan had been recognized as having the power of maintaining the security of the Far East, and so I considered that much could be contributed to the world's peace if those three countries, Japan, U.S.A. and Britain, discussed the basic policy of peace in the world without prejudice and bias.

Because of this conviction, I had deliberate discussions over the world's state of affairs since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident with Sir Lindley and other successive British Ambassadors to Japan and Major-General Piggot, British Military Attache and others. I also appealed to the learned American people to call their attention to the situation in the East. Mr. Releigh, lecturer of the Oxford University was another person with whom I had a long discussion. I also appealed to a group of foreigners in my speech at Karuizawa in the summer of 1934.

In these speeches and discussions, I frankly indicated the points on which I thought there should be self-reflection and reconsideration on the part of the U.S.A. and Britain. It had not been my practice to flatter, nor was it my habit to commit myself to anything unreasonable, to say nothing of the abuse of armed force.

It had been my belief that world peace could only exist if people based their conduct upon warm-heartedness and justice of natural law, restricted their selfish desires and conceded to others to the utmost to such an extent as would not impair their self-existence.

At the time when the question of importation of Siamese rice was much discussed in Japan, I insisted that we should endure some economical disadvantages to accede to the request of Siam so that we could express our appreciation of the warm friendship that Siam had shown us for many years in the past. I explained this to the people of rural districts in order to gain their understanding of the question.

When we had an occasion of negotiating with Lancashire in connection with our exportation of cotton piece goods, I insisted that we should make the best possible concession in the negotiation and should not effect any undue pressure upon Lancashire, and that all international problems should be settled from a broad point of view. This conduct of mine was always based upon the belief as I have stated above.

It was my opinion that in facing the activities of the League of Nations or fulfilling the provisions of international treaties, Japan should always stand on this belief, that by no means should she lose sight of her ultimate object in selecting means. I advocated from the same belief that those who had power should be right and those who were right should have power. The idea of power to power principle was one thing I detested most.

I believed that all of these assertions could be fully understood by Britain and America, and heartily desired that by understanding them, they would contribute to the peace of the world. I feel ashamed in being even alluded to as a person advocating world domination or aggression and expansion.

My Ideas

In 1895, I was much disturbed with an incident known as "Three Power Interference" which resulted in Japan's retrocession of Liaotung, and it caused me to join the army to defend the motherland.

I participated in the Russo-Japanese War when I was a Lieutenant. In World War I, I was with the Russian Army at the eastern front of Europe and had ample opportunities of witnessing the true nature of war among the civilized countries.

This experience affected greatly the views of war which I had had by that time, and became the second epochal period in the history of my ideology. The essence of my new ideology was that war, if inevitable, should be the war of human beings not the struggle among beasts. I came to have new ideas as to weapons, style of fighting and equipment for national defense, and with a view to lessen the war damage have made an appeal based on this idea to the people both in and out of Japan for the past twenty years.

Parallel with the above advocacy, I speculated over the basis of peace, namely, the means with which to avoid the occurrence of war. I came to the conclusion that the existing international treaties alone were not only virtually insufficient to avoid war, but they sometimes caused war, and I intended to improve this shortcoming.

There were numerous causes of war, but economic pressure, menace on self-existence, denial of the special characteristics of a nation and racial prejudice constituted their principal part and so far as they were not completely eliminated, war was unavoidable. The method of maintaining peace by way of keeping a certain balance of armament among the nations was nothing but a camouflaged peace, which could be easily broken by a miscalculation on the part of a nation over the balance of her armament and that of other nations. Once the peace was broken, the scale of equipment and installation for war and the selected arms of precision would give cause to boundless calamity. I, therefore, considered it the duty of a civilized nation to go a step forward to study the fundamental cause of war, and take every possible opportunity to propagate this idea to the people of the world.

There was another point to be considered. After World War I, a disruption took place in the world of thought dividing the whole world into three ideological circles, and each circle contested one another beyond the barrier of economy and living.

I perceived a danger of inducement to war in this conflict of thought. I drew attention of the people to the necessity of securing a fundamental ideal for establishment of peace, and in order to achieve this purpose, I advocated the amalgamation of eastern and western culture, enhancement of the spirit of mutual concession, and, in order to heighten the sense of sympathy I advocated KODO (Imperial Way).

Thus, I endeavoured to harmonize the interests of the world to avoid the potential calamity, but unfortunately most of the countries of the world were indifferent to this advocacy because of their lack of recognition of this fundamental ideal and each rushed forward to expand its influence into the world according to its long entertained or newly harboured ideal.

After World War I, two world offensive movements occurred with the support of armed force, one was the World Bolshevizing Movement and the other was Nazism as a totalitarian nation. Japan's attention was drawn to this and the necessity of self-defense impressed her. I personally considered that the most effective self-defense could be carried out by promoting the sense of morality and justice.

Primarily, my views of peace or views of life do not admit of territorial expansion. Amalgamation of a nation which had its own race and history was one thing I definitely rejected. I said it was one thing to protect the land of their ancestors and it was quite another to expand it. I considered that a land other than its own could be developed as a source of raw materials under the principle of mutual help. That was why I objected to the amalgamation of Korea and although I was abroad when it took place, I sent a letter to my senior, expressing my views, and insisted that Japan should cooperate with Korea by respecting its civilization.

Such having been my views, I can clearly declare that never in my life have I entertained an idea of aggression, to say nothing of world domination.

If I may be allowed to express my views, such ambition as territorial expansion is nothing but an infantile glory which is far from permanent welfare.

With regard to Manchuria, I accepted the post of War Minister when Manchuria was in a turmoil of disturbances. My whole-hearted attention was devoted to nothing but terminating the hostilities. As I was so deeply impressed solely with the miserable conditions in which the Manchurian people lived I took a sympathetic view in the establishment of a happy land of King's Way (KODO). Further, I was favorably impressed when, after the foundation of Manchukuo, by the zealous aspiration of the Manchurian people, the leaders of that new country made Confucianism, a doctrine originated in China, their principle for creation of an ideal country. The complicated international problems of Manchuria had not slipped out of my mind, but since the independence had been declared, I wished from this sense of morality, the realization of an ideal nation.

However, as time passed, it did not develop in the way that I had hoped and several petitions and bitter criticisms of the Manchurian people reached my ears. Worried over this situation as I have stated in the above, I declined to go to Manchuria to celebrate her tenth anniversary of independence and did not attend the celebration held in Japan.

I have already stated that my views of war, nation and peace which I had had since my participation in World War I, were definitely opposed to imperialism, exclusive egoism and the coercion

control principle. My conduct was always coherent to this principle. I feared that the manner in which the powers, after World War I, dealt with Germany were portent of future trouble. Pressures which all the countries that won victory over Germany, (including Japan) imposed upon this defeated country as well as the attitude of the newly awakened Germany toward the world were quite precarious from the standpoint of world peace, and because of my aforementioned views, I expressed my desire, whenever I could, for the alleviation of such conditions.

Historically, the strained situation of Japan in the past has been continuous, but as far as I was concerned, I had my own ideal as above stated and because of this, I disassociated myself from the movements before and after my tenure of War Minister. I went my own way in accordance with my ideas, and did not take any action in concert with the people who had different views. On the other hand, I endeavored to propagate my idea of international morality and beliefs throughout the world.

15. Armament and my policy in directing the Army.

The equipment and strength of our army was so poor that it was not even as good as that of Poland. In 1921 the army authorities desired to raise the standard of armament of the entire Japanese Army to only half of that of the other powers at the time of World War I. For this purpose, a bill of approximately 460 million yen for running expenses for ten years was presented to the Diet and was duly approved. However, the payment of the whole amount was successively postponed and in 1931, which was a year before the Manchurian Incident, the sum of 360 million yen was still left unused. That is to say, not even one quarter of the original plan was accomplished.

I had my own view toward the establishment of the army and war, which which I had harbored since World War I. I believed in the necessity of modern equipment for an independent nation, but I had never dreamed of completing armament for the sake of waging war. I regarded the army as a symbol of morality and placed more importance on its spiritual element. I felt the necessity of a completion of armament, but I never considered its completion in connection with preparation for aggression. On the contrary, my opinion was just the reverse. However, I could not bring this ideal of mine into practice, having been disrupted by the necessity of settling the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents.

It was also from this ideal of mine that in 1932 and 1933, I conceded the sum of 15 million yen and 10 million yen respectively from the Army budget to the Navy and cooperated with the Finance Office and Navy Office. I thought it would be detrimental to the credit of Japan if the army and navy disagreed with each other for a matter of a small amount in the budget and if, because of this, the Navy Minister should resign from his post. As far as the army was concerned, serving the country under the complete harmony of the army and navy was its first moral duty and accomplishment of this mission was considered by it much more important than a monetary question of ten or fifteen million yen.

The army budgets in 1932 and 1933, excluding the budget for the Manchurian Incident, was about one hundred and seventy million yen each and there are virtually no increases in comparison with those of preceding years. On the contrary, 1933 showed some decrease. New installations and equipment which had to be provided to cope with the incident were paid by appropriating the budget of the following year. Under such circumstances, any positive preparation of war was impossible.

The army budget for the Manchurian Incident while I was War Minister was one hundred and forty or fifty million yen each for the two successive years. After the recognition of Manchukuo, the army was charged with the added task of Manchurian national defense by the provisions of the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol. Also, there was some reinforcement of railway guards in compliance with the expansion of the railways to be guarded, but this did not involve any material increase of expense. In attending to the joint defense of Manchoukuo, the military installations in Manchoukuo were limited to those of a defensive nature, and nothing was undertaken by way of offensive action.

Establishment of railway lines, unification of communication systems and exploitation of natural resources were the reasonable necessities for a new state on her way to development; also from the necessity of maintaining law and order. It was nothing more than an ordinary step that a newly born nation should take, and Manchukuo merely did it. It is definitely wrong and groundless to accuse that Japan made Manchuria a militaristic base for aggressive war. To further support this, the military installations in Manchukuo were limited to those of defensive nature.

As I have stated before, my view of war and view of national defense, which I had harbored since World War I, was fundamentally different from those of other people. Therefore, armaments of powers did not attract my attention and I did not approve any imperialistic policy or immoral equipment, whether militaristic, ideological or economic. The armament was consequently carried out in view of this consideration.

In the administration of military affairs, I abolished discrimination in treatment between the rich and the poor. I also denounced the system of paying money to become a cadet and equalized the opportunity in military service. Because of this change some of the college students who wanted to become cadets, may have sought some preparatory military knowledge out of their desire for enlightenment. I contend that this cannot be called militarization of education.

I also established a policy which I believe to be the basic conditions for the purification of the army and intended for the improvement in the treatment of war wounded.

Since this was my principle even in armament, I can definitely say that there was not the slightest truth in the testimony of witness OUCHI that during my tenure of office as War Minister, I militarized school education.

The guiding principle in my direction of the army was first to make an army based upon morality, the principle upon which the army was founded and second to let it display its characteristics as an army which observed the Imperial Way. In order to realize this, refer to my purging in the aftermath of several disastrous incidents in the past. This was the reason why I conducted shifts of several of the military personnel. I did my best in quieting the young officers who had been dissatisfied with the situation and in the May 15 Incident, there was not one participation in it by any army officer and I am proud to say that throughout my tenure of office as War Minister, there was not a single case of any such unlawful action.

I further endeavored to eliminate the Prussian type from the army. I insisted that the troops should further the virtue of the army to such an extent that they would not cause grudge from an opponent, and to win the favor and respect of inhabitants wherever they might be stationed. Our army in those days was apt to be ideologically confused with the Prussian army and such conception needed correction. I, first of all, wanted some of the members of the cabinet to understand this spirit and with it to rectify the common misconception that armament was for the sake of waging war. I determined that this must be thoroughly understood by the whole public and whenever possible expressed my views in speeches and other writings.

With regard to the strained situation of Japan, I requested the earnest reflection of the people over the current problems and urged them to place their first importance in the promotion of morality.

The real meaning of my speech entitled "Emergency Japan" which was offered in evidence by the prosecution can be proved by many other speeches bearing "emergency" in their titles. If the whole of this speech is read without prejudice, I believe the real intention of mine will be understood. The process of manufacture of this film and the impression that this film gave to the spectators will also be a good indication of the intention with which I made this speech.

All of these speeches were made with a view to introducing my moral views which I gained through my experience in World War I.

What underlies the Imperial Rescript granted by the late Emperor MEIJI to the army and navy personnel is the sense of sincerity. The present Emperor showed in his Imperial Rescript granted when he ascended the Throne that the true principle of the foundation of Japan was based upon the spirit of benevolence. I advocated that the army should observe the principle of those Imperial Rescripts and should exert their best to discharge its duty. My intention was to enhance, by my advocacy, the virtue of benevolence of the Emperor among the people, and this was, I thought, the first step to let the troops completely become aware of the true spirit of the Imperial army. By their efforts, I believe I succeeded, even in the slightest degree, in removing imperialistic thought from the army and also from the people and prevented them from egoistical conduct.

16. Military discipline during the Manchurian Incident.

The Manchurian Incident arose from what had been vitally important to Japan. As the ultimate object of this incident was to bring peace and welfare to both Japanese and Chinese nationals, the officers and soldiers of the Japanese Army at the front as well as the general public in Japan were sympathetic toward the Manchurians and other people on the spot. The hostilities were not of the nature of a declared war, and so all the captives were immediately released and were given assistance to engage in peaceful work. Those who were in distress were given relief funds. These facts were made clear by the report of those who inspected conditions there. There was not a single case of massacre or violence, nor was there any report made to that effect. Lord Lytton's Report admitted this fact.

The incident which was reported by the Chicago Tribune as having occurred near SENKINSKI was nothing but a minor skirmish between a small squad and a body of local bandits. This was exaggerated and made the subject of propaganda as was the usual practice with the Chinese people, and the propaganda was reported by Mr. Powell and was inserted in the paper as it was. This is clear by the testimony of Mr. Powell himself, and the same may be supported to some extent by the protest of the Japanese consul. The skirmish was too small to be reported to me, so I did not know of it.

17. The circumstances under which I became Cabinet Councillor in the First KONOYE Cabinet.

Since my withdrawal from active service in March 1936, I had not been quite satisfied with the state of affairs and was leading a life of a retired man. During that time there was an occasion when, at the outbreak of the China Incident in July 1937, I was extremely worried about the situation and suggested to Prince KONOYE my view on means of bringing about peace.

It happened in September 1937 that Prince KONOYE who was the Prime Minister at that time sent for me. When I saw him, he was very much worried about the China Incident and asked me if I had any idea as to the means of saving the situation. It was the time when the Second Shanghai Incident had broken out and the situation was really serious.

I told him that if a frontal clash between China and Japan should take place, it would not only be against the policy of our country, but would also cause great difficulty for Japan from the operational viewpoint. I suggested that he should ask Lt. Gen. OBITA's opinion about those matters, but he told me that he had had Lt. Gen. OBITA's opinion already and that from his opinion he was more convinced of the gravity of the situation. He said that it was the reason why he came to me and wanted my unreserved opinion for saving the situation.

I told him that since the state of affairs had developed to such an extent as those existing, it would require a person with strong influence among military circles, not a retired soldier like myself, to settle the affair. I added that in any case, Prince KONOYE would require a great deal of resolution to cope with the situation.

In the meantime, Premier KONOYE set up an organization of Cabinet Councillors and about ten people including myself were appointed the Cabinet Councillors. The object of this organization was to seek suggestions to check the expansion of the incident and to settle it.

18. The functions of the Cabinet Councillors and my suggestions to the Premier.

The Cabinet Council was not organized into a regular system of a council. Its members were to make their individual suggestions to Premier KONOYE and the Council had no recognized right of resolution. The Councillors were to meet regularly once or twice a week. However, it was to hear the latest information from the government or to exchange each other's views, and not to discuss any fixed agenda.

As the KONOYE Cabinet did not place much importance in this system, the Cabinet Council was gradually reduced to a nominal existence and a Councillor was an honorary post for which no pay or other form of treatment was given. At the time when this system was established, the China Incident had considerably expanded and the troops had reached somewhere near Nanking.