

27 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Sutton; Mr. Crowe

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief, Investigative Division, IPS
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

HATA

WITNESS

KAWABE, Shozo

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

A staff study compiled by G-2 has been included in the investigation files on the subject witness and is now available

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

E P M
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

22 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. David N. Sutton
FROM : Mr. Smith N. Crowe, Jr.
SUBJECT: Witness - KAWABE, Shozo

The following additional information which is already in evidence is herewith forwarded to you:

1. Record page 3377-3378 - In the affidavit of this witness, he states that General HATA's duties in Central China during 1938, when he was Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Force, were negative in nature and that HATA was in the position of merely maintaining peace and order in Central China. General TADA, Hayao, the Vice-Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo, August 1937 through December 1938, testified as follows:

"As such, I made the plans for the capture of Japanese armed forces --

"THE PRESIDENT: "campaign".

"COLONEL MORROW: Did I say "campaign"?

"(Continuing reading):"

--"culminating in the capture of Shanghai 12 November, 1937, the campaign ending in the capture of Nanking 13 December, 1937, and the campaign which finally resulted in the taking of Hankow 27 October 1938.

"The plans for the capture of Shanghai were made when the incident broke out in Shanghai; during the battle of Shanghai, plans were drawn up for the capture of Nanking, and plans for the capture of Hankow were drawn up in June or July 1938."

2. Record page 7,335 to 7,337 - The following excerpts have a bearing on the affidavit of the above witness in two respects - (1) Regarding the July 7, 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident and (2) Regarding the statement that Japanese armies intended merely to maintain the status quo in Central China during 1937 and 1938.

Exhibit #671A is an excerpt from the newspaper "Japan Advertiser" and is a statement by ARAKI, one of the defendants, and reads as follows:

"Japan's determination to fight to a finish with China and the Soviet Union is sufficient to carry it on for more than a decade."

Exhibit #672 is a telegram from the defendant TOJO, the Chief of the Kwantung Army, Headquarters, dated June 9, 1937, and reading as follows:

"Judging the present situation in China from the point of view of military preparations against Soviet Russia, I am convinced that if our military power permits it, we should deliver a blow first of all upon the Nanking regime to get rid of the menace at our back."

SMITH N. CROWE, JR.
Assistant Counsel

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

22 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. Edward P. Monaghan, Actg. Chf, Investigative Div.
FROM : Mr. Smith N. Crowe, Jr.
SUBJECT: Witness KAWABE, Shozo

In accordance with our conversation of last week, please furnish me with the information concerning the identity of the author of an article on the leaders responsible for the Great War. I am unable to furnish you the exact file citation, since I gave the file to Mr. Larsh in connection with his investigation and he is not now available in his office. The investigation includes the subject matter of this article as well as the authorship thereof.

SMITH N. CROWE, JR.
Assistant Counsel

23 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Smith N. Crowe
FROM : Mr. Richard Larsh
SUBJECT : KAWABE, Shozo

Re your request for a copy of document written by KAWABE (First Name Unknown), entitled "Responsibility of the TOJO Cabinet and of the military circles for the War" investigation was undertaken to determine if the author of this document was KAWABE Shozo.

A thorough search of IPS files was made and failed to unearth the document. Colonel Davis, CIS, who is quite an authority on Japanese through his thirty years experience in Japan, states that an examination of his files fails to disclose the document and also that he is quite certain that KAWABE Shozo never wrote such a document. However, he feels that the document may have been written by Shozo's brother, Torchiro, one-time military representative in Moscow and also one-time member of the Japanese General Staff. This view is also upheld in the fact that an analysis of the document came to us from the Russian Division, IPS.

In view of the above, it is recommended that the investigation be considered closed.

RICHARD LARSH, Investigator,
Investigation Division, IPS

21 April 1947

To Mr. Smith Crowe

Re: Information requested by you from the request for order and process for the production of Kawabe, Masakasu as a witness in behalf of defendant HATA, Shunroku.

It is cited in the request that the facts to be proved by the witness is the policies, utterances, and actions of the defendant Hata during the time in which he is charged by the indictment.

The relevance of the testimony is in its tendency to establish that Kawabe, Masakasu associated with the accused Hata in various capacities at the time charged in the indictment, is in its tendency to establish that the accused took no part in any of the conspiracies charged to him and was not in any wise connected with the planning, initiating or waging of wars of aggression.

J.G. Lambert
J.G. Lambert
Investigator

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

18 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. David Sutton
FROM : Mr. Smith N. Crowe, Jr.
SUBJECT: Witnesses in the China Phase - KAWABE, Chozo

Hereto attached are data regarding the witness
KAWABE, Chozo.

1 Incl :
Data re KAWABE

SMITH N. CROWE, JR.
Assistant Counsel

18 April 1947

MEMORANDUM RE: KAWABE, Chozo

I. Subpoena subject of testimony.

a. I have received no information from the Investigation Department regarding the subpoena subject of testimony. However, the affidavits of this witness have been served on us by the Defense.

b. Defense Document 970 indicates that this witness will discuss the beginning of the China Incident, on July 7, 1937, and disavow that the responsibility lay with the Japanese Army.

c. Defense Document 823, another affidavit of this witness, is an attempt to absolve the defendant HATA from all responsibility under the counts of the indictment. Particularly with regard to his activities in China after the year 1937 is this true. The witness will state that HATA's duties, as Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces, were negative in character, being restricted to the maintenance of peace and order in Central China; that HATA issued strict orders to the units under his command to take the utmost care to maintain military discipline in the City of Hankow after its fall in November of 1938; that there was not a single case of violation of military discipline in Hankow "such as massacre, violence, plunder, etc." that, after the China Affairs Board was founded, political and economic affairs were no longer handled by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Armies in China; that Chinese prisoners-of-war were delivered to the Central Government of China; that the China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the opium problem in China; that the Central China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the Canton or Changkufeng Incidents.

II - Information from the Investigative Division - Witness has been a military man all of his life. He was a commander of a brigade of the North China Garrison Army with Headquarters at Peiping. This brigade was involved in the July 7, 1937, Incident, being on maneuvers near the village of Fengtai, a hour's walk from the Marco Polo Bridge. However, the witness was not present, being in Shanghai Kwan on the Manchurian Border on an inspection trip on July 7, 1937. Witness remained in China with the Central China Expeditionary Forces. From the 1st of September, 1937, until the middle of February 1938, he was attached to the Terauchi Army Group as Vice-Chief of the General Staff. In the middle of February 1938, he was in Shanghai as Chief of the General Staff of the Central China Expeditionary Forces.

(Memorandum re: KAWABE, Chozo (contd))

He was appointed Assistant Inspector General of Military Education in January 1939. In February, he returned to Tokyo to assume this position. He remained at that post until March of 1940, when he went to Manchuria to serve one year. In March, 1941, he was made Commanding Officer of the Imperial Japanese Army in Manchuria. In August, 1942, he became Chief of the General Staff of all Japanese task forces in China. In March, 1943, he became Commanding General in Burma, remaining there until August of 1944.

III - Examination of case file - As examination of the case file on this witness reveals the following:

1. References to the China Incident -

a. Information obtained from CIS MID Military attache in China, December 30, 1942, states that the witness assumed command of the troops in the attack on the Chinese at Marco Polo Bridge, when his commander, General TASHIRO, was sick, and that he supported Colonel MUTA's Regiment in its attack the night of July 7, 1937, on the Chinese Garrison Troops.

b. In the December 20, 1945 interrogations of the witness, there appears the following at 200-15-4, 5:

"Q. Were there any orders to create an 'Incident'?"

"A. As far as I was concerned, I desired good relations with the Chinese and do not know about anything else; there was an agreement with China, and other countries, that Japanese troops could be stationed in Peiping; after July 7, Chinese and Japanese troops became enemies, broke relationships, and the Japanese took Peiping, as a result, for their own protection; the first real fighting took place at Nanyen on July 29th on orders from Headquarters at Tientsi to attack Nanyen, the order coming to me from General Katsuki; there was no special plan for the operation; a division arrived from Korea on July 20th at Tientsin, I think, and my Brigade and the new division took part in the Nanyen fighting.

"Q. Why was the division sent from Korea?"

"A. The division from Korea had arrived for support in connection with negotiations for settlement of the incident of July 7th.

"Q. Did you or your next superior Commander ask for reinforcements

"A. The division must have arrived as a result of orders from Imperial Headquarters; the first time I knew of their presence was at Nanyen on July 29th."

(Memorandum re: KAWABE (contd))

c. In the interrogation of December 20, 1945, at 200-15-8,9 appears the following:

"Q. How far on each side of the Peiping-Tientsin Railway were Japanese guards allowed to be in connection with their duties under the international agreement?

"A. The distance varied at certain points on the Peiping-Tientsin-Mukden line.

"Q. What was the authorized distance at Marco Polo Bridge?

"A. In the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge, the authorized distance was about three kilometers from the railroad at Fengtai and included the Marco Polo Bridge.

"Q. The Chinese version is that the Japanese soldiers were outside the authorized area during the night maneuvers on July 7th; what do you have to say about that?

"A. I am quite certain that the Japanese had not gone beyond the authorized limits on the night of July 7th; when such maneuvers were to take place, the Chinese Army Headquarters at Peiping was to be notified as to the time and place and, although I was absent at the time, I am certain that the Chinese Headquarters had been notified, but I have no confirmation that Chinese units near Fengtai were notified; in my opinion, the incident occurred because of a general antagonistic feeling between Chinese and Japanese at the time and it seems that young Chinese were bitter against Japanese; I am certain, judging from the later investigation, that the Japanese were within the limits; the grounds had been used previously by the Japanese and were well known to both parties."

d. In the interrogation of December 20, 1945, the witness was asked who the inner group of officers in the Army in Japan were. In answer to this question, he made the following answer, which obviously refers to the July 7th Incident:

"A. I know nothing about what happened, being away from Japan so much, but I have often wondered what the policy at home was; in China, we tried to settle matters by diplomatic means but the home office continued to send more troops; the General Staff in Tokyo was responsible for that, such staff including Prince Kanin (Chief) and Lt. General Tada (Vice-Chief)."

e. In the interrogation of the witness on January 25, 1946, the following appears at 200-27-6:

(Memorandum re: KAWABE, (contd))

"Q. I would like to know whether the offensive action after July 7 in and around Peking resulted from orders from you in China or whether you know the Imperial General Staff in Tokyo brought about these actions of the Japanese troops?

"A. I have nothing definite to go on but I think that the headquarters in Tientsen issued orders in accordance with instructions received from the General Staff in Tokyo.

"Q. What do you base that statement on; what facts or information or hearsay?

"A. I base this on the fact that the division from Korea was an entirely separate organization and would not have moved without orders from higher up."

f. In the interrogation of January 25, 1946, at 200-27-14, the witness stated that he was not present on the night of July 7, 1937, in the area of the Marco Polo Bridge, but was in Shanghai Kwan. He stated the following, which may be of some significance:

"Q. Did you know that these maneuvers were planned and to be carried out at that time?

"A. I did not know maneuvers were scheduled for that day, but as I had given specific orders to concentrate on night maneuvers, I was not surprised that night maneuvers were carried out."

g. In the interrogation of the witness of January 28, 1946, at 200-23-7, the witness stated the following:

"Q. Do you remember that this Chinese General was given an ultimatum about the 26th of July 1937 before the Japanese Army made its advances or do you remember about that ultimatum from the Japanese demanding that all Chinese troops withdraw from the Peking-Tientsin area?

"A. I only know that there was an agreement between Sung Cheh Yua and the Commander of the Tientsin Army; because my position was subordinate to the Tientsin Army I do not know the details.

"Q. Who would be the general who would have made this demand as matters stood then?

"A. Lt. Gen. KATSUKI."

(III.- Examination of case file -)

2. Other facts -

(Memorandum re: KAWABE, (contd))

a. Section 3 of file 200 shows information from CIS stating that while Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army in Burma, the witness issued a statement August 1st, 1944, hailing Burma's independence and awarded 1,000 rupees and a letter of commendation to each of the families of two Burmese who have been honored for special services rendered to the Japanese.

IV - Cross-reference file on case file - An examination of the cross index file reveals the following:

1. In File 319-65-4, the accused MUTO, in an interrogation of April 17, 1946, stated the following:

"Q. General, in early 1937 you had detailed operational plans for possible operations against Russia and also operations in Central China is that not correct?

"A. Yes, those plans were drawn up already when I entered the Operations Section. They had been in existence for a long time.

"Q. General, just how detailed were those plans. Were they in detail as to operations against particular cities?

"A. The General Staff's plans were only general. The details were made by other units. For example, operations involving Manchuria were to be solved by the General Staff of the Manchurian Army.

"Q. Please give me an example of the operational planning for Central China in 1937.

"A. The plans involving China in 1937 were on the premise of a total war with China. These plans included the strength and objective of large units. In general, the attack would be toward Nanking."

2. In the April 2, 1946 interrogation of the accused TOJO, the latter was confronted with a document entitled, "Lessons from the China Incident, #7". This document was published April 15, 1939, by the Inspector General of Military Education. It described the effect of gas and chemical warfare upon the Chinese Army and listed some examples, e. g. "some died of asphyxiation, sticking their noses and mouths into the ground". When asked about this evidence of the use of gas against the Chinese armies, the following appears at 20-200-9, 10:

"A. I don't know about this. I have never seen it before and I did not issue it. It was issued by the Inspector General of Military Education. The responsible officer is Shozo KAWABE. These are all because of defects in Chinese defensive equipment. Many times the Chinese mistook smoke for poison. I

(Memorandum re: KAWABE (Contd))

think that these suffocated because they thought the smoke was gas and choked themselves."

3. In the interrogation of TANAKA, Ryukichi, of May 11, 1936, TANAKA stated the following with regard to the use of non-Japanese in building the Burma Tile and Railroad, at 234-134-2: "In Burma those responsible for gathering workers were KAWABE and KIMURA, both of whom are in Sugamo." TANAKA states that he did not mention this in his testimony before the Tribunal.

V - Evidentiary document card file in Document Division - This source of information has not been examined.

VI - Reference in evidence to witness or to the subject matter of his testimony -

1. Reference to the witness by name:

a. On Record page 2,333-4, Prosecution witness Ching Teh-Chun stated the following:

"This was what happened during the Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident and the War of Resistance thereafter.

"Leading Japanese officers who instigated this Incident were:

"KAWABE, Seiso, Brigadier Commander.

"But the instigator at the very beginning of Japanese aggression in North China was DOHIHARA, Kenji, the same man who instigated the Mukden Incident of 18 September 1931. All these men should be held responsible for the war of aggression.

* * * *

2. Examination of record citations of the subject matter of his testimony has not yet been completed.

VII - Summary of testimony given - This witness has not yet testified.

VIII - Decorations - The memorandum of March 11, 1946, shows the witness having received the following decorations:

1. April 29, 1934 - The Order of the Sacred Treasure, 3d Class, recommended by the War Ministry for achievement in the Manchurian Incident.
2. December 27, 1939 - Order of Verdienst-Kreuz Mit Dem Stern Adler, Deutch Reich, recommended by the Foreign Ministry for the

furtherance of Japanese-German
amity.

3. April 29, 1940 - Military Order of the Golden Kite, Second Grade, and the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun, both recommended by the War Ministry for achievement in the China Incident.

In addition to these, the Curriculum Vitae shows the following:

September 7, 1938 - Conferred the Second Order of Merit with the Order of the Sacred Treasure.

IV - Non-listed investigation -

In an interview with TANAKA, Ryukichi, the latter told me that the witness was the man in command of troops in the area of the Marco Polo Bridge on July 7, 1937. The top commander, TASHIRO, was very ill and died about the 15th of July, 1937. For this reason, KAWABE, who was second in command, was actually in charge. TASHIRO was replaced before the attack on Nanyang by General KATSUKI, the latter ordering the attacks subsequent to the July 7, 1937 ^{night} ~~type~~ maneuver squirmish.

An examination will be made of the documents pertaining to the subject matter of this witness's testimony and will be forwarded as soon as completed.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT (*translation*)

Being duly sworn on oath in accordance with the procedure of my country, I, Masakazu Kawaba, hereby depose and say:

I was born on December 5 in the 19th Year of Meiji at Nōka Higashi-Noziri-mura Higashi-Tochinami-gun Toyama prefecture, which is my permanent address, and I live at 2874 Koganei Koganei-machi Kitatama-gun Tokyo.

My career runs as follows:

1907	graduated from the Military Academy
1915	graduated from the Military Staff College
1936	major-general
1936	commander of the Infantry Brigade stationed in North China
September 1937	vice-chief of the staff of the North China Area Army
February 1938	chief of the staff of the Central China Expeditionary Forces

Def Doc No. 823

January	1939	chief of the Department of the Inspector-General of Military Education
March	1940	commander of the 12th Division
March	1941	commander of the 3rd Army
August	1942	chief of the staff of China Expeditionary Forces
March	1943	commander of the Burma Area Army
December	1944	commander of the Central Army
March	1945	general
April	1945	commander of Whole Air Force

I. I served as chief of the staff under General Shunroku HATA, Commander of the Central China Expeditionary Forces, from February to December, 1938, and later as general chief of the staff under General Shunroku HATA, Commander-in-chief of the China Expeditionary Forces, from August, 1942, to summer, 1943.

II. General HATA was appointed commander-in-chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces in succession to General Iwane MATSUI. His duties, however, essentially differed from that of his predecessor, Commander-in-Chief MATSUI. His was a very negative one, being restricted to the maintenance of peace and order with the strength of about six divisions in the triangular zone connecting Nanking, Hangchow and Shanghai. Therefore he did not take over the duties any report concerning military operations from the ex-Commander-in-Chief MATSUI.

III. In spite of negative restriction of his duties to the maintenance of peace and order, he carried out the Hsueh campaign for the following reason. About the beginning of April, 1938, the North China Expeditionary Forces reached Tsinan while the Central China Expeditionary Force reached the Hwai River. The 10th Division, however, suffered a considerable loss at the battle of Taierhchwang, east of Hsueh, and the 5th Division also was unsuccessful in attacks, thus the North China Expeditionary Forces had difficulties for further advance. It was, therefore, found necessary for the two expeditionary forces to expel to the west the enemy forces and secure their contact. The Imperial Headquarters issued an order to carry out such operation. Under these circumstances the Hata Forces began movement on about May 10 and opened an attack against the enemy forces at Taierhchwang, east of Hsueh, with the strength of about three divisions, while the North China Expeditionary Force attacked them with about four divisions, with the result that the enemy forces were driven away on about May 20 and the battle at Hsueh came to an end.

IV. At ^{the} last stage of the battle at Hsueh namely, about the middle of May, the Imperial Headquarters issued an informal order that we should carry out Hankow operations with the Central China Expeditionary Forces as the main strength. We were then

to continue Hsueh operations on the one hand and prepare ourselves for Hankow operations on the other. This compulsory operation orders threw us into no small panic. In the middle of June, we received ^{from} the Imperial Headquarters a formal order to effect Hankow operations.

At the beginning of July we had necessary reinforcements for Hankow operations on orders from the Imperial Headquarters and re-organized the entire forces for the operations. The troops reinforced to us the 2nd Army Under Prince Higashikuni and the troops under Lieutenant-General OKAMURA. Wuchang and Hankow campaign was scheduled for early autumn.

Hankow fell on October 26 and on November 3 Commander-in-Chief Hata made formal entry into the city. At that time people in Hankow remained very calm, order was maintained, the buildings were in good order, and it was difficult to believe that battle was fought in the city recently.

When Wuchang and Hankow fell, we met with resistance of the enemies until we reached a spot two or three 'ri' outside the city, but after that little resistance was made and it was almost a bloodless occupation; therefore the soldiers remained composed and showed no excitement.

Commander-in-Chief HATA not only issued strict orders to each unit under his command to take the utmost care to maintain military discipline, but to prevent disorder in the city after

the occupation, he gave each unit as instructions of the chief of the staff, detailed regulations accompanying the orders. Those instructions indicated the directions the Army and Navy or individual unit of the Army should take, and fixed the areas of occupation by the Army and Navy. We also made a definite agreement with the Navy regarding the use of the buildings in the city, and selected the best soldiers out of each unit to enter the city; that is, we transferred the units engaged in the battle to the rear and sent into the city the very best portion of the 13th Division which was not only full trained and educated but was mild and obedient. As we gave such strict orders and instructions and took every precaution with minute care, we believe there was not a single case of violation of military discipline in Hankow, such as massacre, violence, plunder and etc. Nor did we receive any report or even hear of them. I read in the papers that someone testified to the massacre in Hankow, and I am astounded at such ^{an} inconceivable testimony.

The Army and Navy air forces engaged in Hankow campaign had their bases in Nanking and Kiukiang respectively and were under entirely different command. However, part of the air forces had been transferred to the attack of Canton, and the strength was considerably decreased so that long-distance bombing was not carried out.

V. The Central China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do

with the Canton operations, and we resented at the transfer of part of the air forces.

VI. The Central China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the Changkufeng Incident either. The occurrence of the Changkufeng Incident made it impossible for us to get the air forces which the Japanese Army in Manchuria had promised to give us. As the Central China Expeditionary Forces were in the midst of the Hankow operations at that time, we felt bitter about it.

VII. The Authority of General HATA as Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces was restricted to negative duties relating to the maintenance of peace and order. He had not sufficient strength under him and he had to receive orders from the Imperial Headquarters and get reinforcements upon their instruction in order to make any military movements. He had no authority to act independently.

Commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Forces were restricted to the duties of the strategic operations and military administration, and offensive operations were beyond his authority. His was the authority over the defense of the occupied territories and administration was in the hands of the ambassador after his appointment.

VIII. Since the China Affairs Board was founded, political and economic affairs hitherto handled by the Commander-in-Chief

were transferred to it, but till the set-up of the Board was completed, special service organizations handled them in reality in every place upon request of the Chinese authorities.

IX. As regards to the Chinese prisoners of war, we made it a rule to deliver them to the Central Government of China as there existed no treaty concerning them. Persons responsible for them were the Commanders-in-Chief (i.e. the Commanders-in-Chief of each army under General (HATA), and they acted upon permission of the War Ministry.

X. The Communist Army in China endeavoured to win the people, In the villages under its control all the people offered resistance to the Japanese Army. No sooner had the Japanese Army entered the villages than the communist went underground and they doubled our trouble, because we could not distinguish underground soldiers from the villagers. In those areas we could not but fight the people in general.

XI. The China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the opium problem in China. We had no knowledge of it and we never used the money obtained by traffic in opium. Secret funds of the China Expeditionary Forces was supplied by the War Ministry and we had no other fund. Therefore, it is clear that the Commander-in-Chief had nothing to do with the opium question, but I am not quite certain how far the special service bureau or the special service organizations know about it.

XII. The court-martial of the air force officers who attacked Tokyo in April 1942 was held upon orders of the War Ministry and everything was carried out strictly in accordance with orders.

XIII. The headquarters of the Central China Expeditionary Forces was in Shanghai at first since General HATA was appointed Commander-in-Chief but later it moved to Nanking. Then in March 1941 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Forces in succession to General NISHIO, and the headquarters was in Nanking at that time. Therefore, General HATA stayed at first in Shanghai while he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces (1938) and at the time of Wuchang-Hankow campaign he issued orders of deapatch of troops at the headquarters in Nanking. He left there on August 25 and moved the headquarters to Kiuking where he stayed until October 30. On November 3 he entered Hankow and stayed there until the middle of the same month. After holding a requiem service for the war-dead, he returned directly to Nanking.

XIV. The duty of General HATA as Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces was not a positive one. His was the negative duty of maintaining peace and order in the occupied areas, therefore he laid special stress on the maintenance of military discipline. Soon after his arrival in Shanghai he held the conference of Division Commanders when I remember vividly that he gave whole-hearted instructions concerning the

Def Doc No. 823

maintenance of military discipline. General HATA was not involved in any irksome as he was not engaged in any outstanding operations.

/S/ Masakazu Kawabe

At Sugamo Prison

6 December, 1946.

I, Tomoharu Kokubu, hereby certify that the affiant was sworn to and affixed his signature to the above statement in my presence. (He did not, however, affix his seal as he was not in possession of it)

/S/ Tomoharu Kokubu (seal)

At Sugamo Prison

6 December, 1946

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to state the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ Masakazu Kawabe

37

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

The United States of America, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

DEPONENT; KAWABE, Shōzō

Having first duly sworn an oath as on
attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure
followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

To the questions asked by Messrs. MIYATA and Blakeney, Defense Counsel, at Tokyo, on November 2 in the 21st year of Showa (1946), I, KAWABE, Shōzō, replied as follows:

- Q. Tell us about the term of your service at Peking as Commander of the Infantry Brigade stationed in China.
- A. From April, 1936 (Showa 11) until August, 1937 (Showa 12).
- Q. Tell us about the strength of the army which you, as Brigade Commander, commanded at the time, and how you stationed the troops.
- A. I had two infantry regiments, the strength being about 5,000. The headquarters of the 1st Regiment of Infantry was at Peking. One battalion each was posted at Peking, Fengtai and Tienchin, and one company was sent to Tungchow. The headquarters of the 2nd Regiment of Infantry was posted at Tienchin, where two battalions were also stationed. One battalion was posted at Shanhaikwan and along the railway east of Tienchin. The headquarters of the Brigade was at Peking.
- Q. Where was the headquarters of the Army? And in what manner were the technical corps posted?
- A. The headquarters of the Army was at Tienchin, and cavalry, artillery, engineer and tank corps were also posted there.
- Q. Were there other military organs at Peking?
- A. A Special Service Agency, military attaches to the Embassy and a KEMPEITAI unit were at Peking, and these three were all independent organs.
- Q. Give an outline of the disposition of the Chinese Army at the time of the Lukuochiao Incident.
- A. In North China, the 29th Army under the command of Sung Chieh-y was stationed in the area, including Tienchin, Peking, Paoting and Kalgan. The headquarters of the Army was at Peking, and one division each was stationed near Peking, Tienchin, Kalgan and Paoting.
- In the neighborhood of Lukuochiao, about a battalion was stationed at Manyuen, Peiyuan, Papaoshan and Iwapingchen. It seemed that at Lungwangmiao was posted a part of the battalion.
- Q. Were the Japanese and Chinese armies on good terms before the outbreak of the Incident?
- A. The relations between the both armies were very friendly until the fall of 1936 (Showa 11). Both armies often inspected each other's maneuvers and feats of arms so the friendly relations between both armies were promoted remarkably. But on Sept. 18, 1936 (Showa 11), a skirmish was begun between Japanese and Chinese units when they were marching near Fengtai and passed each other. It was peaceably settled by the efforts of the staff members of both armies. As the resu

part of the Chinese troops stationed at Fengtai were moved elsewhere. This seemed to have left an unpleasant impression on the part of the Chinese Army. And after the Hsian Incident, which took place in December in the same year, the sentiment of the Chinese in the vicinity of Peking generally became unfavorable toward Japan, and the communists' secret maneuvers became more active. Accordingly, it cannot be denied that the Chinese troops were affected by the communist movement. Although in the Chinese higher circles there was still seen a strong trend toward the harmonious collaboration of Japan and China; among the lower circles of the army it was observed there was an anti-Japanese sentiment which was very keen.

Q. How were the relations between you and Mr. ^{Sung Choh-yuang} and other Chinese staff members?

A. I was not especially intimate with Mr. ^{Sung Choh-yuang}, except on the occasions of formal exchange of courtesies. But I was very intimate with Cheng Tsu-chun, the Division Commander. We often exchanged frank opinions about the friendly relations of the two nations. Our opinions were similar on some points.

Q. What sort of instructions were given to you by the authorities as to the attitude of the Japanese garrison forces toward China? And tell us how you instructed your men in line with the instructions from the authorities.

A. It was the fundamental policy of the Army to keep contact with the Chinese Army like a friendly army and bring about better relations between both armies. As a brigade commander, I always kept this in mind and led my men to be on good terms with the Chinese Army. When I went to the General Staff to pay a visit of courtesy after I was appointed Brigade Commander, Major General ISHIMARA, Kenji, who was then Chief of Military Operations, told me privately, clearly showing the intention of the Central Authorities, "The Central Authorities have no intention of fighting a war with China. You will please keep this in mind in line of duty."

Q. What were the duties of the Stationary Force in China?

A. The protection of the official institutions and the Japanese nationals in North China as well as the defense of railway, traffic and communications.

Q. Tell us about the plans for military operations of the Japanese garrison forces against China.

A. I never received any instructions for military operations against China.

Q. Please explain about the program of the garrisoning.

A. In accordance with the duty, that is, the order to defend railway, traffic, communication and to protect Japanese diplomatic establishments and Japanese residents, the Brigade, in peace time, scattered its forces along the railway, Peking and Tientsin and the thus stationed forces took charge of the garrisoning of their respective stations.

Q. Please explain about the garrison near Peking.

- . Fengtai, Peking and Tungchow constituted three stations respectively as one unit near Peking, which were put under my command as the Peking garrison district. In Fengtai the commander of the battalion, in Peking the commander of the infantry regiment, and in Tungchow the commander of the company, were ordered to discharge their duties as the commanders of stationary forces.
- . Explain about the preparation for the operations against China which the Japanese garrison forces in China made.
- A. We did not think of fighting with China, so we made no preparation for operations against China. Our forces were the so-called garrison forces; therefore, in organization we had no moving activity and in munitions we had no stock for operations except those which were continually supplied.
- . Was the Brigade charged with duty regarding secret information and the investigation of topography necessary for the army?
- . We were not charged with any such duty.
- . Were you given directions regarding where to place the emphasis in the education and training of the Japanese garrison forces in China?
- . We were given directions about education, but it meant the training which aimed at complete preparation and equipment of the forces and was not aimed at the Chinese army. This was applicable similarly in the case of the forces in Japan. We had no idea of fighting with the Chinese army, so we did not think of aiming at it.
- . Explain about the disposition and the maneuvering areas of the Japanese army near Fengtai.
- . One battalion under the command of Major ICHII was stationed in the Japanese barracks at Fengtai with some infantry guns attached to it. To the north of the barracks there stretched a narrow parade ground, but near Fengtai there were many farms and no maneuvering areas. About three kilometres west of Fengtai, there was the ballast-collecting place of the railway which was not a farm but was a plain well-adapted for maneuvering. After negotiations with China, Japan was granted temporary use of this plain, with Mt. Ichimonji as its center and we were to use it as a maneuvering area. In that district ballast was collected for the Peiping-Mukden Railway.
- . Where was the maneuvering area of the forces in Peking?
- . Though there was a narrow common parade ground for the units of each nation to the east of Kuominkong within the walls of Peking, the Japanese units in Peking used to utilize the exercise grounds surrounding the units of the Tungchow garrison as their area for field exercises.
- . Were they at liberty to use the maneuvering area?
- . Yes, they were at liberty to use it. Hitherto, in case of carrying out maneuvers, the Japanese units had done it by their own choice without the necessity of informing the Chinese authorities of it. However, at the beginning of June, there was a friendly desire from the Chinese, saying,

"As a night maneuver is apt to excite the public, you will kindly inform us of it in advance, by which, we would like to announce it to the public previously so as to prevent any excitement". Understanding this, the Army made it a rule to make an announcement in each case through a military intelligence bureau.

Q. About the time when the incident broke out, did they carry out exercises every night?

A. Yes. Almost every night after the end of June they practised exercises. The units practised furious exercises as it was just before the inspection of the second term.

Q. Were you in Peking on 7 July, the very day of the incident?

A. I was not there. In order to attend to the inspection of the Second Infantry Regiment which took place, at that time, at the maneuvering area at Nantassu, south of Shanhaikwan, I left Peking on 6 June.

Q. Who was the garrison commander while you were absent?

A. The commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment, Colonel MUDAGUCHI, acted for me.

Q. Were all the units in Peking at their permanent stations?

A. Leaving one company in the city, all the Peking infantry regiments were in Tungchow for the purpose of maneuvering. Therefore, only with one company within the walls of Peiping and a battalion at Fengtai, we had had little strength.

Q. How were you informed of the situation about the outbreak of the incident when you were traveling?

A. Throughout the night of 7 July, there was the inspection of exercises. About 3:00 A.M., on 8 July, on the scene of the maneuvers, a slip of paper with something written down as a telephonic report to me from the commander of the Peking Regiment was brought to me from the signal corps. The paper read, "While a company was practising exercises at the maneuvering area of Lukouchiao, we were fired upon by a Chinese unit and one of our soldiers is missing. The Ichiki battalion has been shifted to the guarding formation and is now searching for the missing soldier." I did not reply to it. When morning came, I made contact with the Army Headquarters at Tientsin and determined to return to Peking. As an airplane was fortunately provided by the Army, I left Shanhaikwan at about noon, and after changing to a train at Tientsin and arriving at Fengtai, at about 3:00 P.M., I immediately hurried to Lukouchiao.

Q. Did you visit the Army Headquarters when you passed Tientsin?

A. The train schedule did not permit me to go, but I established contact by telephone at the station to the Chief of Staff, Hashimoto. The Chief of Staff said, "The policy of the Army is to achieve a solution on the spot. You will watch the situation as it is at present." By this I was informed of the Army's policy of localizing the affair.

- Q. Did you suspend the inspection of the Second Infantry Regiment at Nantassu?
- A. I had ordered the regimental commander to continue the inspection.
- Q. Was the regimental commander there when you reached Lukouchi?
- A. Yes. He was there, and reported the situation in general to me as follows:

"After eleven o'clock last night, I received the following report from the battalion commander, ICHIKI, 'A company carrying out exercises was fired upon by a Chinese unit, and as a soldier is missing, a search is now being made for him. The battalion is now concentrating at Mt. Ichimoji in preparation for any emergency.' Then, I, the regimental commander, ordered the battalion by telephone as follows: 'You will await further orders as you are now. It is expected that the investigation parties will be despatched from both Japanese and Chinese sides to the spot to investigate the situation on the spot.' "

"By the mediation of the Military Intelligence Bureau, it was decided to make a common investigation by sending committees from both Japanese and Chinese sides. Then, with a regimental officer, Lt. Colonel MORITA as the chairman, the committee was despatched to the spot. The Chinese chairman was the chief of the Yuanpin-hsien."

"About 2:00 A.M. there was a report from the battalion commander that our units had been fired upon by Chinese armed forces at the Yuanpin-hsien castle. Furthermore, after 4:00 A.M., there was another report that we had again been fired upon by the Chinese. I, the regimental commander, gave the following order, 'It is an insult against the Japanese that the Chinese had fired upon us again, despite the fact that, as it had begun to get light, the Japanese could be easily identified. If you should be fired upon again in the future, your battalion will be free to fight back.' However, it was about 5:00 A.M. when the party of the investigation committee arrived at the spot by automobile and when chairman MORITA was inspecting the spot, the ICHIKI battalion launched an attack, was deployed and was just about to advance. Thereupon, the Lt. Colonel rebuked the battalion commander for the battalion's unlawfulness. When the battalion commander replied that he had just received an order from the regimental commander that the battalion was free to accept the challenge, there was another volley from the Chinese. So Lt. Colonel MORITA told the Chinese committee, 'The unlawful firing of the Chinese units is as you are now actually witnessing. I cannot disregard a battalion commander's determination to accept the challenge. And the Lt. Colonel agreed to the battalion commander's determination. Then after 5:00 A.M. the battalion attacked the Chinese at Lungwangmiao."

- Q. Then what did you, the brigade commander, do upon receipt of that report?
- A. I gave the following order to the units, "Watch the Chinese under present situation. Do nothing rash." At the same

time, I ordered that the casualties be taken care of.

Q. There is talk that the encounter between the Japanese and the Chinese units at Lukouchiao started from an intrigue by a third party. What do you think about this?

A. I cannot say distinctly about that, but after the outbreak of the incident on 7 July, while the Japanese and the Chinese were facing each other, there frequently was unlawful firing every night. Every time such unlawful firing took place, we investigated the situation, but there was no sign that either the Japanese or the Chinese unit had opened fire. It almost seemed that a third party which did not belong to the Japanese unit nor to the Chinese were firing from the intermediate area between the Japanese and the Chinese which were facing each other. And we could assume that it was an intrigue by someone.

Q. After 7 July, both units were facing each other, while negotiations were in progress between the Japanese and Chinese. Did any untoward incident break out during that time?

A. There were successive outbreaks of untoward incidents, such as the unlawful firing at Mt. Ichimoji on 21 July (company commander wounded), the Langfang incident on 25 July, the Kannanmen incident on 26 July, etc. The anti-Japanese sentiment of the lower class Chinese officers and other ranks was most intense.

On this 27th day of February 19

At Tokyo

DEPONENT: KAWABE, Shōzō (seal)

I, KAWABE, Shōzō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) IKEDA, Sumihisa (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

KAWABE, Shōzō (seal)

Case and Crossfiles

Kawabe, Shozo

✓ 1. While Commander in Chief of J Army in Burma, he issued a statement Aug 1, 1944, hailing Burma's independence and awarded 1000 rupees and letter of commendation to each of the families of two Burmese who have been honored for special service rendered to the Japanese. File 200-3

✓ 2. ~~_____~~ ~~_____~~ File 200-5

✓ 3. File 200-6

Offspring incident
✓ 4. 200-15-5 - top Para. China incident

China incident
✓ 5. 200-15-⑤ 67 - War planned with ¹⁹³⁹ USSR and U.S.

China incident
✓ 6. 200-15-8 - Tokyo cont send more troops.

✓ 6. 200-15-9. Says he was not there to

Know that Japanese within 3 mile
limit during maneuvers at Marco Polo
Bridge. July 7.

~~7/200-18-4 China incident. orders to
Chinese to maneuver.~~

✓ 200-27-14. - China incident
✓ 200-25-6 " "

Case Index and Cross-index

Kawabe

1. Art. "Resp. of Tojo Cab. and Mil. circles for the War." Have invest. find who auth. Kawabe was. File 405-80
- ✓ 2. File 53-28 - Use of gas on China. Report issued by Inspector - General of Military Education. Res. was Kawabe's says Tojo: 20-200 - Apr 1939
- ✓ 3. File 234-134-2. A Kawabe was resp. for getting workers for Burma - Siam RR. He was in Sugamo. ~~What's the~~ ~~Some witness~~
- ✓ 4. ²³200-~~205~~-7 middle. - China raid.

aff. of Kawabe - 823

1. ~~to~~ pg 4, states order maintained in Hankow after Hata took it. Hata issued orders to maintain military discipline.
2. Says no ill-treatment in Hankow. (some testimony on Hankow in rec?)
3. Central China Exped. forces had nothing to do with the Canton operations.
4. Hata had to receive orders for military operations because he had insufficient force and had no auth. to act independently.
5. Admin. handled by Spec. Services of Central China Exped. force until China Affairs Bd setup (when), p 6

6. It was a ~~practice~~ to rule to deliver Chinese PWs to Central Govt of China, as there existed no treaty as to them. Respon. was on Army Commanders under Gata.

7. China Exp. Force had nothing to do with the opium problem in China. Did not use money obtained by traffic in opium. Civ. C had nothing to do with opium question.

8. Court martial of Air Force officers who attacked Tokyo, April 1942 was done by orders of War Ministry.

9. Aff. 970. ~~Jap. Jap.~~ Jap not respon. for Marco Polo incident.

REPORT BY: H. SHIMOJIMA
5 Feb 47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: KAWABE, Shozo

Address: Unknown

Formerly a Lt. General. Subject was No. 2 man in the Inspectorate General of Military Education, and prospective witness re July 7 Incident.

KAWABE is subject of IPS Case File No. 302 and File 20.

COPIES: 3 File 302 ✓
3 " 20
1 Mr. Newbill

KAWABE, Masakazu

Request by: UMEZU, Yoshijiro

Address: at present in Sugamo Prison.

He was a General in the Japanese Army.

The facts to be proved by witnesses are the policies, utterances and actions of defendant UMEZU during the period in which he is charged by the indictment.

The relevance of the testimony is in its tendency to establish that UMEZU took no part in any of the conspiracies alleged in the indictment, and was not responsible for the planning, initiating or waging of wars of aggression.

Documents:

1. Principles of plans of operations of the Imperial Army 1940-1943
2. Principles for preparation of operations of Kwantung Army 1942
3. Operations plan of Kwantung Army 1940-1944
4. Border Guard Regulations of Kwantung Army - Sept or Oct 1939

Location of documents - Secret Instruction File. Headquarters of Kwantung Army, (Operations Room) Hsingking, Manchuria.

The relevance of these documents is that they will prove the character and scope of operations and other plans of the Japanese Army, and notably of the Kwantung Army, vis-a-vis the USSR.

KAWABE, Shozo

Additional information from the Chinese files, Chinese Division.

The subject is called as a witness on behalf of the accused HATA, Shinroku, but he is also believed to be the same person as KAWABE, Masakazo, another witness called by the accused UMEZU.

The subject is the senior brother of Lt. Gen. KAWABE, Torashiro, another witness called in connection with Manchurian phase, on behalf of OKAWA, MINAMI, ITAGAKI, HOSHINO and OKAWA.

The subject was twice Military Attache to Germany. (Dates unknown)

Particular importance should be attached to the part the subject played in connection with the outbreak of the Marco-polo Bridge Incident, on and after 7 July 1937 around Peiping.

His name appeared in the direct testimony of Ching (See Court Record p.2.333. spelled as KAWABE, Seiso, but ascertained to be the identical person. He was the Brigadier Commander at that time).

The subject came to North China in May 1936, as Brigadier Commander under the Commander in Chief, Lt. Gen. Tajiro, of the North China Japanese Garrison Forces at Tientsin. When the Marco-Polo Bridge Incident broke out, Lt. Gen. Tajiro was ill and the subject took great responsibility. He gave order and support to MUTAGUCHI, Renya, the Regiment Commander at Marco-Polo Bridge (also a witness to be called by the accused UmezU, mentioned in Court Record on P. 2.333).

After the war broke out between Japan and China, the subject participated in battles in the provinces of Hopei, Shansi, Honan, Hupeh.

Jan 1939, he left China and became the Director of General Affairs, Inspectorate General of Military Training.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Operations, CIS, G-2
Compilation Branch

SUBJECT, KAWABE, Lt. General Masakazu (Shozo)

Chief of Staff of Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China; prior to his appointment as Supreme Commander of Japanese Forces in Burma. He was also prominent in 'Lukouchiao Incident'; he supported Colonel Muta's mixed Regiment in its attack of the Chinese Garrison troops; later he fought in Central China; he comes to position of Chief of Staff in China determined to liquidate China Incident and strengthen the National Government (Nanking). He is from Tokyo and is the brother of Torajiro KAWABE, who was formerly Chief of Staff of Nation Defense Headquarters; at the Military Academy he was classmate of Lt. Gen. HOMMA, TANAKA, and ISHIKADA. After graduation he was an instructor at the Infantry School; in 1936 he was promoted to Major General and joined the Headquarters of Lt. Gen. TAJIRI who was Commander of the Japanese garrisons in North China; at the time of Lukouchiao Incident TAJIRI was ill and KAWABE was left in Charge. After fighting in Hopeh, Shansi, Honan and Hupeh he was transferred to the post of Chief Supervisor of Military Education in January 1939 and in the following March he was made a Lt. General; always been ambitious to be the Minister of War; an advocate of war on Russia like General YAMADA who is one of the most radical fascists.

SOURCE: MID, Military Attache in China, 30 December 1942
OSS R & A FE, Washington, 19 July 1944.

belk to Tanaka ~ this witness

Name:

Watabayue
SHOZO KAWABE

Census register: A commoner of TOYAMA Prefecture

The date of birth: Dec. 5, 1886

Mar. 29, 1905	Graduated from TOYAMA prefectural TAKAOKA middle-school.	
Jul. 15, 1905	Appointed to be a cadet, and distributed to the thirty fifth infantry regiment.	
Dec. 1, 1905	Entered into the military academy.	
May 31, 1907	Graduated from the military academy and turned back to the former regiment.	
Jun 5, 1907	Appointed to be a probationary officer.	
Dec. 26, 1907	Appointed to be a 2nd Lt. infantry, and attached to the thirty-fifth infantry regiment.	
Mar. 20, 1908	Conferred to the senior grade of the eighth class court rank.	
Nov. 30, 1910	Appointed to 1st Lt., Infantry	Cabinet
Feb. 10, 1911	Conferred to the junior grade of the seventh class court rank.	
Dec. 13, 1912	Appointed to be the entrance into the Military Staff College.	
Apr. 21, 1916	Conferred to the senior grade of the seventh class court rank.	
Aug. 18, 1916	Appointed to be the service to the Inspector General of the Military Education.	
Aug. 6, 1917	Appointed to be a captain of infantry.	
Nov. 5, 1917	Released from the Inspection General of Military Education	War Ministry
Dec. 4, 1917	Released from present position, Appointed to be the company commander of the thirty-fifth infantry regiment	War Ministry
Apr 1, 1918	Released from the official position and appointed to be the residence at Switzerland for the investigation of military affairs.	

Nov. 1, 1919	Conferred to the fifth order of merit with the order of sacred treasures. (A money grant 620 yen) (for the military merit from 1915 to 1920)	
Jun 30, 1920	Conferred to the junior grade of the sixth class of court rank.	
July 11, 1920	Released from the residence at Switzerland, Appointed to the member of Inspector General of Military Education and the acting of the staff.	War Ministry
Aug. 6, 1922	Appointed to be a major of infantry.	Cabinet
June 18, 1924	Released from the present position and appointed to the general staff.	War Ministry
Aug. 7, 1924	Appointed to additional post as the adjutant of Marshal under the Marshal Viscount, Kageaki KAWAMURA.	War Ministry
Mar. 2, 1925	Released from the additional post.	War Ministry
Aug. 2, 1925	Conferred to be the senior grade of the sixth class of court rank	
July 26, 1927	Appointed to be a lieutenant-colonel of infantry	Cabinet
Nov. 11, 1927	Appointed to the additional post as military science instructor of the Military Staff College	War Ministry
Nov. 29, 1927	Conferred to the fourth order of merit with the order of sacred treasures	
Aug. 1, 1929	Released from the present position and additional post.	War Ministry
Aug. 1, 1929	Appointed to be the military officer at the Imperial Embassy in Germany	Cabinet
June 3, 1930	Appointed to the additional post as the Technical Headquarters officer in Germany and the Aviation Headquarters officer in Germany.	War Ministry

Aug. 1, 1931	Appointed to be Colonel of infantry	Cabinet
Sept. 15, 1931	Conferred to be the junior grade of the fifth class of court rank.	
Feb. 6, 1932	Released from the present position,	Cabinet
	Released from the additional post,	War Ministry
	Appointed to attach of the General Staff.	War Ministry
Apr. 11, 1932	Appointed to the sixth regimental commander.	
Aug. 1, 1933	Appointed to the educational commander, instructor and member of consideration section of the infantry school.	
Mar. 5, 1934	Appointed to the chief of the first section of Inspector-General of Military Education and member of investigation section of the military correspondence school.	War Ministry
Apr. 14, 1934	Appointed to be the committee of war material investigation meeting.	Cabinet
Feb 14, 1935	Appointed to the additional post as member of the military automobile school investigation section.	War Ministry
Mar. 26, 1935	Appointed to be the mission of the first special investigation	War Ministry
Apr. 29, 1934	Conferred to the third order of the merit with the order of sacred treasures. (for the merit from Showa 6 to 9 incident.)	
Mar. 7, 1936	Appointed to be Major-General.	Cabinet
	Appointed to attach as the Inspector General of Military Education.	War Ministry
	(No insertion on the official gazette)	
	Released from the war material Investigation Committee.	Cabinet
May 1, 1936	Raised to the senior grade of the fifth class of court rank.	

Aug. 26, 1937	Appointed to staff officer of the northern China direction troop (no insertion on the official gazette)	War Ministry
Sept. 7, 1938	Conferred to the second order of merit with the order of the sacred treasures	
Feb. 9, 1939	Appointed to the investigation committee of text-book	Cabinet
Mar. 9, 1939	Appointed to be Lieutenant-General.	Cabinet
May 15, 1939	Raised to the junior grade of the fourth class of court rank.	
Sept. 12, 1939	Appointed to be the representative of Inspector-General of military education	War Ministry
Oct. 14, 1939	Released from the representative of Inspector-General of Military Education.	War Ministry
Mar. 27, 1940	Released from the investigation committee of text-book.	Cabinet
Mar. 9, 1940	Dismissed from the present position and additional post.	War Ministry
Mar. 9, 1941	Appointed to the commander of the twelfth division.	
Mar. 1, 1941	Appointed to the commander of the third Army.	Cabinet
June 2, 1941	Raised to the senior grade of the fourth class of court rank.	
Dec. 12, 1941	Conferred to the first order of merit with the order of the sacred treasures (stopped by the orderment of KUNNAI HATS 898 on the 23rd Oct 1940)	
Apr. 29, 1940	Raised to the second order of merit with the order of Golden Kite. Raised to the first order of merit with the order of the great rising sun. (Merit for the China Incident)	
Mar. 18, 1943	Appointed to the commander of Burma direction army. (no insertion on the official gazette)	

July 1, 1944	Raised to the junior grade of the third class of court rank.	
Dec. 1, 1944	Appointed to be the Commander of central direction Army.	Cabinet
Feb. 1, 1945	Appointed to the commander of the fifth direction Army and additional post as the commander of supervision of central direction. (no insertion on the official gazette)	Cabinet
Apr. 9, 1945	Appointed to the General	Cabinet
Apr. 7, 1945	Appointed to the commander of the General Air Forces. (no insertion on the official gazette)	Cabinet
Oct. 1, 1945	Appointed to the Commander of the First General Army. (no insertion on the official gazette)	Cabinet
May 15, 1945	Appointed to the commander of the First Demobilization. (no insertion on the official gazette)	Cabinet

REPORT BY: H. SHIMOJIMA
5 Feb 47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: KAWABE, Shozo

Address: Unknown

Formerly a Lt. General. Subject was No. 2 man in the Inspectorate General of Military Education, and prospective witness re July 7 Incident.

KAWABE is ^{MENTIONED IN} ~~subject~~ of IPS Case File No. 302 and File 20.

COPIES: 3 File 302
3 " 20
1 Mr. Newbill

KAWABE, Shozo

Request by: HATA, Shunroku

Address: Not stated

He was formerly a Lt. General in the Japanese Army.

REPORT BY: JOHN A. CURTIS
20 Feb 47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: KAWABE, Shozo

Curriculum Vitae on the above named subject is contained in subject's personal file No. 200, serial 25.

COPIES 4 File
1 Mr. Newbill

Kawabe.

Pg 35, Memo Mar 11, 1947. 4 Decorations.

put in
file ?
→

Enter

DOSSIER

KAWABE, Masakazu (Shozo)
(Case File No. 200)

(In Sugamo Prison)

I. STATUS OF SUBJECT:

- A. Arrest was ordered by letter to Imperial Japanese Government of 1 December 1945, GRQ, SCAP, AG 383.7 CI, subject: Apprehension of Japanese Personnel.
- B. Entered Sugamo Prison 13 December 1945.

II. DIRECT AND IMPLIED CHARGES AGAINST THE SUBJECT:

- A. The proposed charge is that the subject planned, prepared, initiated and waged aggressive warfare, and conspired to perform the same in that he:
 - 1. Was Chief of the Section of the Inspector General of Military Education of the War Ministry in 1934;
 - 2. Was Detachment Commander in North China at the outbreak of the China Incident and participated in the initial fighting at Marco-Polo Bridge;
 - 3. Was Assistant Inspector of Military Education in 1939 and in September of 1939 became Inspector General of Military Education, holding this post until December of 1940;
 - 4. Was Chief of the General Staff of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China from August 1942 until March 1943;
 - 5. Was Commander in Chief of the Burma Theater Army from March 1943 until August 1944, in which capacity he issued the Declaration of Burmese Independence. (Tab A)

III. FACTS REFLECTED FROM THE FILE:

- A. Curriculum Vitae shows following pertinent information:
 - 1932 Feb - Assigned to General Staff
 - 1932 Apr - Returned to Japan
 - 1932 Apr - Commander, 6th Infantry Regiment, Nagoya

1933 Aug - Commander, Infantry Corps attached to Infantry School and concurrently appointed instructor; Member, Post Graduate Course
 1934 Mar - Chief of 1st Section, Inspectorate General of Military Education. Concurrently member, Post Graduate Course, Military Communications School
 1934 Apr - Member, Deliberation Committee for War Supplies
 1934 Apr - Decorated, 3rd Class Order of Sacred Treasure in recognition of Service in the Manchurian Incident.
 1935 Feb - Member, Post Graduate Course, Military Motor-Car School
 1935 Mar - Member, Staff of First Special Military Inspector
 1936 Mar - Promoted to Major-General. Assigned to Inspectorate General of Military Education
 1936 Apr - Commander of North China Garrison Infantry Brigade, Peking Headquarters
 1936 May - Raised to Senior 5th Court Rank
 1937 Aug - Vice-Chief of Staff of North China Expeditionary Force, Tientsin
 1938 Feb - Chief of General Staff of Central China Task Force, Shanghai
 1938 Sept - Decorated, 2nd Class Order of Sacred Treasure
 1939 Jan - Returned to Japan. Assistant Inspector General of Military Education, Tokyo
 1939 Feb - Member, Textbook Investigation Committee
 1939 Mar - Promoted to Lieutenant-General
 1939 May - Raised to Junior 4th Court Rank
 1939 Sept - Acting Inspector-General of Military Education
 1940 Apr - Decorated, 2nd Class Order of Golden Kite and 1st Class Order of Rising Sun in recognition of service in Sino-Japanese Incident
 1940 Dec - Relieved from principal and concurrent office and Textbook Investigation Committee
 1940 Dec - Commander, 12th Division of the Kwantung Army, Manchuria
 1941 Mar - Commander, 3rd Army in Manchuria; Headquarters at Mutenkiang
 1941 June - Raised to Senior 4th Court Rank
 1942 Aug - Chief of General Staff of Japanese Task Force in China; Headquarters at Nanking. Succeeded General USHIROKU Jun
 1943 Mar - Commander-in-Chief, Burma Theatre Army. Succeeded by Lt. General KIMURA Heitaro
 1944 July - Raised to Junior 3rd Court Rank
 1944 Aug - Returned to Japan
 1944 Dec - Commander-in-Chief, Central Army Area, Headquarters at Osaka. Succeeded Lt. General IIDA
 1945 Feb - Commander-in-Chief, 15th Theatre Army and concurrently Commander-in-Chief, Central Army Area
 1945 Mar - Promoted to full General
 1945 Apr - Supreme Commander of the Army Air Force. Served in this capacity until the surrender
 1945 Oct - Commander-in-Chief of 1st Army Demobilization Area
 1945 Nov - Retired
 1945 Dec 12 Interned in Sugamo Prison as a war crimes suspect

B. Memoranda from staff sections:

1. Reports of December 4 and undated reports, four in number. These reports are based upon CIS files and upon examinations of the newspaper files. They give the same material as is found in the curriculum vitae above, with the exception of one. The latter was obtained from the CIS library and states that KAWABE awarded one thousand rupees and a letter of commendation to each of two Burmese families who were honored for special service rendered to the Japanese. This was done in 1944.
2. Report, the origin of which was the CIS card file. This states that the subject was present at the establishment of the Burmese National Independence Preparatory Committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Ba Maw on May 8, 1943. He conferred on August 12, 1943 with Sobhas Chandra Bose from British Malaya and gave the latter an outline of events which would attend the Indian armed defensive against the British in India and indicated (report not clear) that Bose could now draft concrete plans for the offensive. The subject played an active part in the India-Burma Campaign as Supreme Commander of the Imperial Japanese Forces. The report indicates that the original source of this information was from Japanese and American newspapers.
3. Report based upon CIS card file. This contains a resume of subject's positions up to April 8, 1942 as found in a report of the Domei newspaper of that date. The report goes on to say that the subject was a brilliant strategist and would be able to utilize the valuable experience gained in previous service in China in his new post as commander of the Japanese forces in Burma and thus the present appointment was looked upon with high expectation by the local military experts.

The report includes a prior report of the U.S. Military attache in China of December 30, 1942. The attache stated that the subject was prominent in the Marco-Polo Bridge Incident and later came to the position of Chief of Staff in China determined to liquidate the China Incident and strengthen the puppet government in Kwantung. He also stated that at the time of the Marco-Polo Incident the local commander was ill and the subject was left in charge of the troops. He stated the subject had always been ambitious to be a minister of war and was an advocate of

4. Report of Lieutenant Colonel B. E. Sackett of the International Prosecution Section under date of December 19, 1945. This stated that subject was imprisoned and was present during all the important actions of the Japanese Army in China, was known as a trouble maker, and that the CIS had no objection to his being released for Indian Nationalist Army Trials.
5. Undated report, stating that according to CIS files the subject was apprehended for his part in Japanese aggression in China and Burma, as well as activity in Japan Military Training and Education.

C. Summary of interrogation of subject:

1. Report by Lieutenant S. E. Healy under date of January 29, 1946. This is a summary of the interrogation of the subject on Nov. 2, 1945 by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. The subject discussed military affairs regarding general plans for countering the expected invasion of Kyushu Island and certain fighter plane tactics and production. He stated that Japan attacked the United States without any large scale planning for a long war.
2. Undated report by Lieutenant S. E. Healy. This is a summary of the interrogation of the subject on November 13, 1945 by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. The summary consisted primarily of discussions of technical military matters, but it also included statements that Japanese pre-war preparations were directed primarily against Russia, and that Japanese intelligence was slanted, not toward a Pacific war, but one with Russia.

III.

C. Summary of interrogation of speech.

3. Interrogations of December 20, 21 and 26, 1945.

In these interrogations the subject corroborated the facts found in the Curriculum Vitae set out above. He stated that the Kwantung Army was a different organization from the North China Garrison Army. The subject was the Commanding Officer of an infantry brigade of the latter Army on July 7, 1937. He stated that as far as he was concerned he knew of no plan to create an incident and that he desired good relations with the Chinese. He stated that the Japanese took Peiping for their own protection, and the order pertaining to operations upon Nan Yen came to him from the Commanding General, KATSUKI. He stated that a division from Korea was sent to support the operations after the incident, and he thought that this must have arrived as a result of orders from Imperial Headquarters. He stated that the training in military education when he was Vice Inspector was concerned with the possibility of war with Russia. He stated that he did not know of any plan for war with the United States in 1941 and that this decision was made by higher military officers. He said he felt the responsibility lay with the Chief of the General Staff, General SUGIYAMA, and General TOJO. With regard to the China Incident he stated that he knew nothing about what happened in Japan but often wondered what the policy at home was. He stated that the men on the spot tried to settle matters by diplomatic means, but the General Staff continued to send more troops to China. He stated that the Japanese had not gone more than 3 kilometers, which he said was an authorized distance, beyond the Peiping-Tientsin Railway on the night of their maneuvers, July 7, 1937, and that he felt that Chinese Headquarters had been notified of the maneuvers, but he had no confirmation of the fact that the Chinese units near Fengtai were notified.

4. Interrogation of January 25, 1946.

The subject stated that he thought orders involving operations at the time of the China Incident were destroyed by the Japanese Armies in China, because he himself had issued orders for the destruction of papers in connection with his regiment when he was in Tokyo at the time of the surrender. He did this without any orders from above and felt that the same step would be taken by commanders in China. He describes the attack on Nan Yen in some detail and stated that as far as he knew the attack was an independent order which designated Nan Yen as the objective and

that the purpose was to destroy Chinese units around that place. He thus indicated that, as far as he knew, it was not a part of an overall attack on larger objectives. He stated that he thought the offensive action after July 7 resulted from orders from the General Staff in Tokyo since the division from Korea which participated could not have been moved up without orders from this source. He stated that he believed there were at this time two factions within the Army itself, one favoring peaceful settlement in China, and the other opposing the early settlement of the China Affair, and that shortly after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident a messenger from the War Office in Tokyo arrived on inspection and expressed satisfaction at the peace and quiet prevailing at the time. Against this, reinforcements from Korea were being dispatched. He further states that in his opinion orders relating to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident were destroyed not to hide aggressive action and that he himself would prefer that the Nan Yen orders and records had been kept. He stated that his reason for destroying the documents on his own accord was that he felt that American forces would soon be invading Japan. He also stated that there was a general letter circulated from the War Ministry stating that documents should be destroyed but that this was not in the nature of an order. Coming back to the July 7th Incident he stated that his duties at that period of time were the protection of railway communications and that on July 7th he was in the vicinity of Shanghai Kwan and he stated that he had prior to that time given specific orders to concentrate on night maneuvers but that he did not know that maneuvers were scheduled for that particular night.

5. Interrogation of January 26, 1946.

Subject stated that the subordinate in charge of maneuvers at the Marco Polo Bridge on the night of July 7th was Major ICHIKI and that he died on Guadalcanal. Colonel MUTAGUCHI, who would have been in command was absent in Peiping at the time. He stated that Colonel MUTAGUCHI reported to Headquarters there on the outbreak of the incident and that he assumed this report was sent to Tokyo. In this interrogation the subject states that he is not sure that Chinese authorities were notified of night maneuvers, but Colonel MUTAGUCHI (now in Sugamo Prison) should have notified the Chinese authorities. He stated that there were approximately 6,000 Japanese troops in the area at the time of the fighting around Peiping. He stated that when he was Chief of Staff of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in Central China, these forces consisted of some 2,000 troops. He referred again to the maneuvers of July 7th. He stated that the object in such training was that an inspection

period was approaching and that they were carried out in the usual manner and in the usual maneuver area, with no plan to advance beyond this area. He stated that after an agreement was reached on the incident on the spot he was ordered to supervise withdrawal of Chinese troops west of the river spanned by the Marco Polo Bridge, that they encountered sporadic Chinese firing in the operation and that according to interrogation reports the Chinese were bringing up more troops and centering them at Nan Yen. In answer to the question whether the Japanese were not looking for trouble at this time, he stated that, from the Chinese point of view, the Japanese insistence upon the withdrawal of Chinese troops west of the river could be looked upon as taking an aggressive attitude, but the troops under his command did not take any overt aggressive action. At the end of the interrogation he stated that he did not belong to Sakura Kai (the Cherry Blossom Society).

6. Interrogation of January 28, 1946.

The subject stated that during his connection with the section of the Army which dealt with training that no training was given to the troops with reference to possible operations in the Philippines, Hawaii, Burma, French Indo-China, Netherlands East Indies or Australia. He said operations regarding Central and Southern China were known only to the top military personnel. He stated that the military staff college training was aimed primarily with a war with Russia in mind. He stated that his duties as Commander in Chief of the General Army Air Command was with regard to Air Forces in Japan only, but that units under his command conducted the kamikaze attacks at Okinawa. He stated he did not know HIROTA, Koki. Referring again to the July 7th Incident he said that there was an agreement with China permitting maneuvers in the area in which these maneuvers were held, that it was not a result of the Tientsin Agreement made after the Boxer Rebellion. In this interrogation he stated that Colonel MUTAGUCHI, Renya, notified the Chinese of the maneuvers which were to be held, by special messenger to the Governor of the five North China provinces. He stated the reason he knew this was that he received a report to this effect from Colonel MUTAGUCHI. He stated there was one battalion of Colonel MUTAGUCHI's regiment on maneuvers that night which was using live ammunition against the rules pertaining to night maneuvers of this site.

7. Interrogation of March 15, 1946.

This interrogation merely reiterates the information which appears above on this subject. He continued to claim that the Incident of July 7, 1937, was entirely unpremeditated.

8. Interrogation of April 30, 1946.

The subject was interrogated on his visit to General OTT after the February 26, 1936 Incident, to determine whether he had asked OTT's advice as to how to reorganize the spirit and system of the Japanese Army, the point being that this indicated he had knowledge of details of the Army plan of expansion. The subject stated that he was leaving for Peiping and had contacted OTT for the purpose of bidding him goodbye.

9. Interrogation of April 30, 1946.

The subject was interrogated as to his knowledge of ARAKI's, Sadao, responsibility for the Manchurian Incident. This was on information that the subject was an interpreter for General ARAKI. He stated that he had never acted as interpreter for ARAKI except at a social function he was asked by OTT to interpret, and that the conversation dealt with an explanation of the Japanese Emperor's system of Government.

D. Summary of the evidence given by the subject testifying as a witness in the case of United States et al against ARAKI, Sadao et al.

1. On April 22, 1947, the subject took the stand and identified Exhibits Nos. 3479 and 2479-A as his affidavits and stated their contents were true and correct. At this time only the personnel record of the defendant, a part of Exhibit No. 2479-A, was read into the Record. This does not differ from the Curriculum Vitae set out above in this report. In Exhibit No. 2479, the subject stated that he was Commander of an Infantry Brigade in China at Peiping at the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. One of the companies under his command was stationed at Fengtai and was the company participating in the initial fighting at the Marco Polo Bridge. At the time of the skirmish he was in Shanghai Kwan inspecting one division of the troops under his command which were stationed near Tientsin. The duties of the stationary forces in China, of which his troops were a part, was to protect official institutions and Japanese nationals in North China and to defend railways and communications. Prior to the Incident he stated he had never received any instructions for military operations against China. They had operational plans which were to be carried out on orders if it was necessary to do so to discharge their duties as Commanders of the stationary forces. He stated that after negotiations prior to the Incident, Japan was granted temporary use of the plain near Fengtai as a maneuvering area and in this area ballasts were collected for the Peiping-Mukden railway. This was the plain upon which the maneuvers were held during the night of July 7, 1937. He stated that he had received a report at 3 a.m. on July 8,

from the scene of maneuvers near Fengtai, which stated that the troops had been fired on by Chinese units and one of the soldiers was missing. He did not suspend inspection operations at Shanghai Kwan in the morning, but he left Shanghai Kwan about noon on July 8 and arrived at Fengtai about 3 a.m. on the 9th. He said that he had established contact by telephone with the Chief of Staff, HASHIMOTO, who told him that the Army policy is to achieve a solution on the spot, thus localizing the affair. He stated that he gave an order upon his arrival upon hearing the report from his subordinate to watch the Chinese under the present situation and to do nothing rash. The above is that part of the direct examination which pertains to the responsibility of the subject with regard to the Incident. The cross-examination did not produce any facts by which we might place any more responsibility upon the subject than is indicated by the above direct examination. (Record pp. 20,517--20,547)

2. On May 7, 1947, the subject again testified by his affidavit, Exhibit No. 2479-A. This testimony deals with his participation in campaigns in China after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. He stated that he was Chief of Staff under General HATA from February to December, 1938, when HATA was Commander of the Central China Forces, and later General Chief of Staff under HATA from August, 1942, to the summer of 1943, when HATA was Commander of all of the China Expeditionary Forces. He participated in the Hankow campaign. He stated that there was no violation of military discipline by the Japanese soldiers and he was astounded at the testimony that there had been a massacre at Hankow. He also stated that political and economical affairs in China were handled by the Army until the establishment of the Wang Chin-wei regime in March of 1940. He stated that the China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the opium problem. He stated that HATA had stressed the maintenance of military discipline. On cross-examination, in answer to the question whether his statement in direct examination that HATA's duties were negative in character was not contradictory to the fact that military operations were conducted under HATA's command, the subject stated that he had first mentioned primary duties and that the operations were new duties which were later entrusted to HATA. He stated that in the areas where the communist Armies were active it was difficult to distinguish between the communist Army and the Chinese people in general and Japanese forces assigned to punitive action against the communist Armies had extreme difficulty in identifying the troops. He stated that extreme caution and care was required of the Japanese forces. The re-direct examination was calculated to absolve HATA of atrocity charges with relation to the Hankow campaign and included the identification by the subject of orders of HATA urging the maintenance of military discipline.

E. Other facts reflected in the file.

1. Report by Lt. S.E. Healey, under date of January 23, 1946. This states that all principle and immediate available sources of information concerning the subject, except for further interrogations, have been covered.
2. Report by Lt. S.E. Healey, under date of January 31, 1946. This states that a check of files of newspapers at the Asahi Shimbun failed to reveal any additional information on the above subject.
3. Report by 1st Lt. R.H. Gilliland, under date of February 20, 1946. This states that it includes the records of the Personnel Section, Cabinet Secretariat, Diet Building in Tokyo, dealing with the subject. In other words, the Curriculum Vitae on this subject was substantiated by these Japanese records.
4. Report to Mr. Joseph B. Keenan, Chief of Counsel, by Lt. Col. William T. Hornaday, under date of February 12, 1946. This is a summary of evidence found in the interrogations of the subject, all of which is found in the summarization of the same in 3C of this report.
5. Interrogation of KAWAGISHI, Banzabaro, on April 3, 1946. KAWAGISHI was Commanding General of the 20th Infantry Division, stationed at Seoul, Korea, on July 12, 1937. On that date he received orders from the Chief of Staff to advance his division to Tientsin, China. He stated that the Commander of the garrison troops in North China, General KATSUKI, did all that he could to effect an on the spot settlement of the Incident. He stated that on July 26, 1937, he received written orders from KATSUKI for a general offensive against Chinese troops stationed at Nan Yen. In this attack the subject was to support him with a brigade. The interrogation does not contain anything detrimental to the subject.
6. Court Exhibit No. 198. This is a factual account of the July 7, 1937, Incident and was signed by General CHING, Teh-Chun, the former Mayor of Peiping, under date of April 2, 1946. This statement names the subject as one of the instigators of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.
7. IPS Document No. 1867. A summary of the interrogation of Ba Maw, former Burmese Premier, signed and certified by Ba Maw, under date of May 22, 1946. This statement implicated the subject with regard to his activities in Burma as Commander in Chief of the Burma Theater. He stated that Marshall TERAUCHI, the Commander in Chief of the Japanese

forces in southwest Asia had the primary responsibility for the construction of the Burma-Thailand railway, which cost the lives of so many civilian laborers, and it was not the primary responsibility of the Commanding General of the Japanese Army in Burma. He stated there was some agitation for independence at the time the subject was Commander in Chief in Burma and the Kempei Tai ordered the civil government to assist in searching out and seizing the leaders of the resistance movement. Ba Maw protested to the subject with respect to these orders. The subject angrily termed him an enemy of the Japanese nation and directed the Kempei Tai to proceed with the stamping out of the resistance movement. He stated that the Kempei Tai uniformly adopted measures throughout Burma which were oppressive, barbaric and consisted of torture. He stated also that it was very difficult to obtain information with respect to treatment being accorded allied prisoners of war. On one occasion, however, early in 1944, the Burmese police authorities reported to him that American flyers had been paraded in the streets of Rangoon under humiliating circumstances and that when the Burmese population attempted to offer food, water and tobacco to the prisoners, the Japanese threatened severe reprisals. On another occasion the Burmese Home Minister reported to the Cabinet that the Japanese had arranged to behead American flyers captured in Burma and had requested the Burmese authorities to carry out the executions as an example of the solidarity existing between Japan and Burma. He stated that the Burmese civil government was headed by him but was at all times subject to the persistent pressure of the Japanese Army, whose policy it was to make Burma a puppet state of that Army. The ministers of the Burmese civil government were under constant surveillance by the Kempei Tai. This statement of Ba Maw's is not a matter of evidence in the case of the United States et al against ARAKI, Sadao et al, probably for the reason that on May 30, 1946, Ba Maw stated that he was unable to testify in the trial unless he was compelled to do so.

F. No additional pertinent information is to be found in SAIONJI's Diary.

G. No additional pertinent facts are to be found in the index, prepared by Commander Maxon, of IPS documents.

IV. DISCUSSION.

It is respectfully submitted that the following points may be helpful in an evaluation of the evidence in substantiating charges against the subject:

1. The subject was, throughout his career, a military man. Until the year 1938 when he became the Chief of Staff of the Central China Expeditionary Forces under General HATA, he had not held any extremely high positions in the Army.

2. The subject was never a Cabinet member or Chief of the General Staff of the Army. It is therefore difficult to charge him for preparing or planning aggressive warfare without proof that he was a part of the conspiracy so to do. In other words, the positions he held would not seem to, in themselves, make him chargeable under a Class A war crimes charge.
3. In 1934 and again from September, 1939, to December, 1940, the subject was connected with military training. The first time as Vice Inspector of Military Training in the War Ministry, and in 1940 as Inspector General of Military Training. In addition he was assigned to the Military Training Section on at least one other occasion. Other than an assumption that, because of these positions, he must have known of the Japanese militaristic plans from 1934 until 1940, there seems to be no evidence in the file to indicate that he was a part of a conspiracy indictable under a Class A war crimes charge.
4. The subject was Commander of an Infantry Brigade, a company of which was initially involved in the China Incident of July 7, 1937, at Marco Polo Bridge and the subject himself was, at that time, only a short distance away in the Chinese city of Shanghai Kwan, about four hours by automobile from the scene of the Incident. The subject stated that he was only a subordinate Commander of the troops participating in the fighting at this time, that both himself and his Commander made efforts to achieve a settlement of the affair on the spot, that the Japanese troops took no aggressive action, and that his troops did not move in such aggressive action until several days later when they were ordered to do so by higher command. The evidence in the file would seem to substantiate this position and the evidence in the case so far could not, in my opinion, be used to contradict these statements with regard to the subject's participation and responsibility for the events of that period. However, in the Prosecution's case, there is a statement by CHING Teh-Chun which makes the general statement, without going into details, that the subject was one of those responsible for the instigation of the Incident.
5. There is no question but that the subject was a participant in the waging of aggressive war in China from September, 1937, until the end of 1938, and again from August, 1942, to March of 1943. There is no evidence in the file to indicate knowledge of or participation in a conspiracy other than the mere fact that he held the positions of Chief of Staff of the Japanese Armies at those times.
6. The subject was Commander in Chief of the Japanese Armies in the Burma Theater from March, 1943, to July, 1944. During this time, the Japanese instigated the independence of Burma and completely controlled the country. There would seem to be little question that there was much mistreatment of the native populations and of war prisoners in Burma at this time. There is

evidence of this in the file in the statement of Ba Maw, referred to above.

7. The subject was never a member of the ultra nationalistic societies. An independent check in the work entitled "The Brocade Banner", which deals with these societies and their members has been made and the subject's name does not appear as a member of any of the said societies.

Evaluation of KAWABE Shozo (Kawakura)
Lt General at the time of Arrest

Evaluation of KAWABE, Shoro (Masakaru) at time of Internment - Dec 1945.

KAWABE Shoro (Masakaru), Lt. General

"Graduate of Military Academy and Staff College, was commander of Non-Commissioned Officer's Corps at Infantry School, Chief of Section I of Inspectorate General of Military Education, served as military attache to Germany. KAWABE was detachment commander in North China at the outbreak of the China Incident (Peking). In 1939 he became Assistant Inspector of Military Education, after which he was Chief of General Staff of Japanese Army in China. He was Commander in Chief of the Burma Army in 1943 - 1944, in which capacity he issued the declaration of Burmese Independence. When relieved he became Commander in Chief of the Central Army Command (Japan), attached to GHQ, and eventually CG of the First Reservists Command.

"KAWABE should be apprehended for his part in Japanese aggression in China and Burma as well as for his activity in Japanese military training and education.

"He qualifies under Paragraph 7-a. of Joint Staff Basic Directive for Post Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper of 3 Nov., 1945."

Arrested 12 December 1945 - Sugamo Prison.