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- RESTRICTED -

INTERROGATION NO. 369

Japanese Intell. No. 24

TOKYO

DATE: 14 Nov. 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intell. Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Intelligence Sources Used in Operational Planning.

Person interrogated and background:

Comdr. I. MIYAZAKI was assistant to the Chief of the 1st Section (Operations Planning) of the 1st Department (War Plans) of the Naval General Staff from October 1944 until the end of the war. This section was charged with the responsibility of drawing up estimates of Allied capabilities and intentions for operations planning purposes.

Comdr. MIYAZAKI's background is as follows:

- 1930 - Graduated Naval Academy. Training period on YAKUMO in Inland Sea.
- 1931 - On HAGURO (Cruiser) as Gunnery Officer.
- 1932 - DD MIKAZAKI, as navigator and communications officer.
- 1933 - Navigator aboard IWATE, training Fleet, in MEDITERRANEAN.
- 1934 - Senior Navigator and Gunnery Officer on SS I-22.
- 1935 - Instructor, KURE Naval Barracks; later gunnery officer on ATAGO (cruiser) of 2nd Fleet.
- 1936 - On KISO (cruiser) as Fire Observation Officer SOKUTSU CHO.
- 1937 - Student in Torpedo School, YOKOSUKA.
- 1937 - Torpedo Boat HIRODORI as Senior Officer -FORMOSA-YANGTZE area.
- 1938 - Senior Officer on Cruiser SHIOKAZE.
- 1939 - Senior Officer on DD AKEBONO.
- 1940 - Torpedo Instructor, Naval Academy.
- 1941 - Senior Torpedo Officer on Cruiser AOKA (not at Pearl Harbor) supported operations at GUAM, WAKE, RABAU.
- 1942 - Commanded Cruiser MOCHIZUKI. Fought off GUADALCANAL.
- 1943 - Commanded DD TACHIKAZE in FINCHESHAVEN, NEW GUINEA operation.
- 1943 - Torpedo School, YOKOSUKA Disbursing Officer.
- 1943 - Entered Naval War College.
- 1944 - Commanded DD KIYOSHIMO.
- 1944 Oct.-1945 Aug. - Naval General Headquarters, Operations Plans Section of the War Plans Dept. as assistant. Also small amount of logistics planning for OKINAWA, OGASAWARA, and MARCUS areas.
- 1945 Sept. - Liaison Section, Foreign Office.

- R E S T R I C T E D -



Where interviewed: Meiji Bldg.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. T. M. Curtis, USNR.  
Lt. Comdr. F. Shackelford, USNR.

Interpreter: Lieut. McCoy  
Major J. Pelzel

Allied Officers Present: None.

#### SUMMARY

Comdr. MIYAZAKI, as assistant to the head of the Operations Plans (1st) Section of the War Plans (1st) Department of the Naval General Staff was charged with the responsibility of gathering together all information relating to Japanese and Allied capabilities, evaluating it, and making estimates of Allied intentions for operations planning purposes.

The majority of information supplied Comdr. MIYAZAKI came in pre-digested form from the Intelligence (3rd) Department, and Communications (4th) Department of the Naval General Staff. Additional information was received from the Army.

During the early planning stages for important operations, the heads of the 3rd and 4th Departments and section heads set in on meetings held by the 1st Department. All information was brought together at these meetings. It then became the responsibility of the 1st Department to make a complete analysis of differing reports and produce the final estimate which was submitted to the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet. If approved, orders were issued putting them into effect.

This report covers, in some detail, the information and reasoning behind the estimates made by the 1st Department as to time and place at which landings on IWO JIMA, OKINAWA, and KYUSHU would be made.

With regard to estimates as to where and when landings would be made on the Japanese Home Islands, Commander MIYAZAKI held the personal view that a landing would be attempted in the first part of September. The opinion of other members of the General Staff was that it would come during the first week in October. This estimate was based first upon the earliest date at which it was felt the U.S. would be capable of mounting a major amphibious landing operation, and second, upon the status of the weather as it pertained to utilization of aircraft. The Army and Navy shared the view that the landings would be carried out in either the ARIAKE BAY or MIYAZAKI areas of Southern KYUSHU. This, according to Comdr. MIYAZAKI, was a strategic decision. The following were major factors in making this decision:

1. OKINAWA \* based air power could be best exploited over the Southern KYUSHU Area.
2. KYUSHU is an island and can be cut off from communication with the other islands, and thus isolated.
3. KYUSHU lay strategically between China and the main part of Japan.
4. The ARIAKE BAY and MIYAZAKI areas of Southeastern KYUSHU are by far the most suitable places on the KYUSHU coast for bringing ships close in shore and carrying out large scale amphibious operations.

TRANSCRIPT

- Q. Concerning the TENGO operation plan with which Capt. OHMAE supplied us a copy. What was the purpose for which the TENGO operation plan was prepared?
- A. At the time of the appearance of your task forces, after your operations in the PHILIPPINE Islands, we considered the possibilities of your further moves, and generally decided that IWO JIMA would come first and then OKINAWA. The TENGO Operation Plan was with regard to the area of the EAST CHINA Sea, including OKINAWA. OKINAWA, as far as importance to Japan, was of top priority, so this TENGO plan was set up for the defense of that area. It did not include IWO JIMA, only OKINAWA.
- Q. What was the date of the TENGO Plan?
- A. Generally, from the end of January into February - the plan was drawn up.
- Q. What was your estimate of the date of the landing on IWO JIMA?
- A. From February 10 on.
- Q. Upon what information did you base this estimate?
- A. A study of your previous movements, and also the previous bombing and reconnaissance moves of yours. A reasonable analysis of those two factors with regard to the time of highest probability resulted in the February 10 estimate.
- Q. Did you have a part in the drawing up of the TENGO Plan?
- A. I was concerned with the TENGO Plan only basically - only the basic judgment of time, as given by me to Capt. OHMAE. I assisted only in the basic judgments as to time and place of your attacks. The final details were worked out by others as to force. I had nothing to do with the smaller details.
- Q. What were your sources for estimating the movements of U.S. forces?
- A. I believe it was mainly common sense; by analyzing previous movements of U.S. forces; by Japanese Army and Navy communications interceptions, and judgments out of what intelligence material we had. By the time I entered this work, the PHILIPPINES had been taken, and it was obvious that the U.S., in order to defeat Japan as quickly and as easily as possible, would find it necessary to take both IWO JIMA and OKINAWA. Differing from U.S. methods, our reconnaissance did not work very well. Movements of U.S. task forces, analysis of U.S. bombings, communications interception by the Navy at OWADA and the Army at TAYASHI were very helpful, as Adm. NOMURA has probably explained to you. Prisoner of war interrogations were fruitless. Especially important were our own 5th Department, and the communications interception work done at OWADA. I am not saying this in any way antagonistic towards the Army, but I know that these two divisions supplied us with the most accurate information.

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- Q. What kind of information was secured from Adm. NOMURA's Communications Dept. at OWADA?
- A. First of all, your medium and short wave radio broadcasts. Your communications with your Merchant Marine by area. The frequency of radio messages arriving or issuing from any forward area. Task force communications, urgent communications. In this connection, it was extremely valuable to know the location of HALSEY, NIMITZ, SPRUANCE, and others. Our specialists, no matter how often you changed codes, were able to keep up in interception. As I remember, from the OWADA group, SPRUANCE and HALSEY differed in their communications methods. It was the general impression that HALSEY was the cleverer of the two in his communications methods.
- Q. What sort of information did task force communications reveal?
- A. We made no direct judgments from the task force communications. Before and after an operation, communications were numerous. During an operation, there was usually silence. We could only make a rough estimate by consideration of the communications with the task force supply groups and from the supporters in an operation, but no direct judgment.
- Q. In what way was Adm. HALSEY more clever in his communications transmissions?
- A. I cannot speak as a specialist on this subject, but only from what I heard in OWADA. My general impression was that HALSEY used far less communications than SPRUANCE.
- Q. How could you distinguish whether HALSEY or someone else had made the transmission?
- A. I do not know. I am not a specialist.
- Q. Did you have a hand in estimating U.S. strength and forces to be employed against IWO JIMA?
- A. We knew that you knew our defense forces in any area. We always considered that you would bring from two to three times the number of manpower, and concentrate as fully as possible your task forces.
- Q. Did you make these estimates yourself?
- A. These estimates were made in meetings. As Navy men, we did not consider the number of men of your landing forces. We considered only your task forces. Your task forces were generally known by number, and we considered that as far as possible, you would concentrate full power in any one operation.
- Q. Who attended the meetings at which these estimates were drawn up?
- A. By these meetings, I mean the 1st Department of Headquarters - (Admiral TOMIOKA).
- Q. Did Adm. TAKEUCHI, Adm. ONO, or representatives of the 3rd Dept. attend these meetings?
- A. Those men would be present as representatives of the 3rd Dept. only in the early stages of the meetings where estimates were studied. After the meetings went into the stage of operational planning, they were not present. I believe that differs from the Army method. As I remember, the Army has representatives from other departments even in the final stages.

- Q. Did a representative of Adm. NOMURA's Communications Dept. sit in on these meetings?
- A. A representative from OWADA would be present only in the early estimate stages of the meeting. In the early stages of the estimates, all the various departments are brought together, and it is the duty of the 1st Department to make a complete analysis of these probably differing reports.
- Q. To what extent were captured documents useful as a source of information?
- A. During my short term, from October, I believe that no use was made of captured enemy documents. As to what happened previously, I cannot say. I suggest that you inquire at the 3rd Department for particulars.
- Q. What information was received from Japanese forces in by-passed areas?
- A. We were in wireless communication with all by-passed areas. We had reports of air reconnaissance out of RABAUL. We sent reconnaissance planes from Japan to TRUK. We also had communications with our submarines.
- Q. Were you able to maintain communications with your forces in the PHILIPPINE Islands after our troops had landed?
- A. Yes. We were in communication with our units in the PHILIPPINES. By this year, though, their communications units were moving around far too much to be of much use. The extent of their information was usually your attacks, upon the number of bombs, and such things.
- Q. What kind of information was received from by-passed areas with regard to strength and movement of U.S. forces?
- A. The most important information that we gained from them was the presence and number of air carriers. Other than that, the general information was with regard to your attack conditions, number of planes, number of B-25's, and fighters flying East or West. In WEWAK, for instance, we did not get very important information.
- Q. Were communications difficulties encountered in the exchange of information between Tokyo and the by-passed areas?
- A. I am not a specialist in this work and cannot make clear statements. This is the work of the 4th Department. I believe that communications with RABAUL and TRUK were very successful. As for the other units, I am not sure, nor am I sure of the PHILIPPINES.
- Q. Did Army personnel ever attend meetings held by the Planning Section for the purpose of drawing up their estimates of U.S. strength and capabilities?
- A. No.
- Q. How did you get Army information to be used in making your plans?
- A. The liaison between the Army and Navy for minor matters was done usually by telephone. More important matters, members of the comparable departments would meet. For highly important, large matters, the heads of departments and staff members with comparable duties would meet. I know very little about the methods used by the Army. My own duties were to make initial judgments and work them out with Capt. OHMAE. In working out the actual operational plans, the members of the various departments of the forces - submarine, air, etc.- would meet and set their work out in front of them on a large table, and work out the operational plans there. I personally had nothing to do with the operational plans though I was an observer of the work.

- Q. Did representatives of the foreign office ever attend meetings of the Planning Department.
- A. Absolutely not.
- Q. How was information passed on from the foreign office to the Planning Dept. of the Navy General Staff?
- A. For use in operational planning, reports from the foreign office were useless.
- Q. Why is this so?
- A. They had no military value whatsoever. Reports from neutral countries were mostly concerned with diplomatic affairs. They had no military intelligence, no military mind.
- Q. Were messages sent by dispatch from the legation in Madrid ever received directly by the Navy Dept.?
- A. I am not sure about this as it is mostly the 3rd Department's work. I believe that wherever we had Attaches, we received direct communications from them. We did not have some from SPAIN, but whether they came from MADRID or not I am not sure. I know that we got direct information from Adm. ABE in Germany.
- Q. What was Adm. ABE's assignment in Germany?
- A. Adm. ABE is at present in SWEDEN, and through the Navy Department here he is now trying to return via America.
- Q. What was his assignment in Germany?
- A. He came under the military exchange made between Germany and Japan, and he was the Navy representative from Japan. The army also sent a man. From Germany, I believe it was Adm. VENICKE who arrived here.
- Q. What information did you receive from Adm. ABE while he was the Navy representative in Germany?
- A. Mostly technical matters (military installations and equipment) with regard to their air forces and Navy.
- Q. Do you consider that any of the information received from Germany was useful to the 1st Department for planning purposes?
- A. It was hardly ever used in operational planning.
- Q. What was the estimate of the Planning Dept. as to the date on which U.S. forces would land on OKINAWA?
- A. From the middle of March to the end of March. Generally, around the twentieth.
- Q. Did you not think that there was some possibility that landings might be attempted in the FORMOSA area?
- A. The Army considered this possibility very strongly, but the Navy did not agree.
- Q. What was the Navy's reason for the emphasis on OKINAWA rather than FORMOSA?
- A. We in the Navy considered that your forces would not take FORMOSA and thereby spill unnecessary blood. Once you had taken the PHILIPPINES, FORMOSA is under your control, and also you had sufficient task forces to take OKINAWA.

- Q. Did you ever consider that landings might be made on the coast of CHINA prior to the landing on OKINAWA?
- A. We considered that if a landing was to be made at all, it would be a small operation by KINCAID's 7th Fleet around SWATOW, but that this would not be a major operation whatsoever. We considered that the landing on the coast of CHINA would be more for a political objective rather than any direct military operation against Japan, that it would possibly be an attempt by the U.S. to establish a CHINA supporting route ahead of ENGLAND who was working from the BURMA side, but as a major operation, it was not thought to be possible.
- Q. How did you arrive at your estimate as to the date of the expected landing on OKINAWA?
- A. We considered that the IWO JIMA operation was not a major operation but a minor one with regard to forces used. I personally, as you know, was aboard ship most of my time in the Navy, and I knew that Headquarters estimates were very apt to be slow, behind the time of your actual moves. By common sense, I worked out, using reports from OWADA, shipping concentrations and information as to the complete formations of U.S. landing forces, and estimated the earliest possible move on your side. I foresaw the heavy KYUSHU attacks in support of this operation, thereby getting timing very correctly. It was obvious to us that you had sufficient land forces to cover two or three times our defense units in OKINAWA, which is the way you always operated. You also had supply bases. The damage done to your task forces at IWO JIMA was slight. Therefore, they could be brought around. From general long term statistics, accurate estimates could be made.
- Q. At the time that estimate was made, how did you know the strength of our ground forces available for the attack on OKINAWA?
- A. This was the 3rd Department's work. Your divisions in the Pacific Area were known by name and number from your own reports. We could follow statistically their operations, their rest periods. The problem now was to estimate where the assembly point would be. This could be easily deduced from the frequency of communications from supply and transport ships in concentrated areas, such as the PHILIPPINES; following frequency graph curves we had kept over long periods. One of your greatest mistakes and one of the greatest sources of information for us was your frequent and constant communications with the Merchant Marine. This is the BAMS system. (BAMS - Broadcasting Allied Merchant Ships).
- Q. What kind of information did you get from BAMS?
- A. The frequency of communications was followed from area to area, such as you set up in the PHILIPPINES Area. You could follow movements from HAWAII to WAKE by following the volume of communications from HAWAII to WAKE. It was as though you said, "Please listen to this". Another method we used was to follow the volume of your reconnaissance and air cover communications; when a high volume of communications was heard in one area, it usually designated a squadron of ships leaving or arriving. By following that squadron and its steps from island to island, we could follow movements.
- Q. Were you able to tell the names of ships from these broadcasts?
- A. The actual name of the ships were unknown. It was not necessary. What we were after were concentrations. We could follow the call signals of any one ship and could deduce whether that ship, previously at one point, was now at this point.

Q. Did you not get from the Germans the BAMS basic code?

A. I do not know, although I believe that OWADA did this independently. As is obvious from my history, I have spent nearly all my time aboard ships. The Japanese system differs from the American system. Whereas you have a man two or three years in the fleet, taken ashore for work, and then back again, the Japanese system has been mainly to keep the man in Headquarters over very long periods of time, until Headquarters gets out of touch with actual Navy conditions. I personally regret very much that I had not been brought as a fresh man into Headquarters much earlier - in the early part of 1944. I believe that we would have done a lot better if some of us had been there earlier, if we had changed our tactics earlier. Your forces and movements were obvious to us and your strength was known to us, although in the end, finally, we would have lost. For instance, at OKINAWA, we would have caused far more damage to your forces than was done. I admire your methods of statistical analysis and the handling of information. OWADA and the 5th Department, although possibly inferior to your comparable sections, were doing extremely good work, and were highly important to the Navy.

Q. Can you describe what statistical methods were used? Would you elaborate on that a little and tell us how that statistical analysis was made?

A. This was done by the 3rd Department and OWADA. We kept complete statistics on all bombing attacks, and we estimated the size, number of cities that you would attack, statistics on transportation disruption - all fairly obvious. We kept close watch on the ratio of air losses during your air attacks on the mainland of Japan proper, and estimated as to whether our production could keep up at that ratio or not. We made a study of your landing in Europe and had full statistics on the movements previous to, and during, the landing. This is mostly by 3rd Department. Whereas you had many men, and fine offices in which to do this work, we were forced to use extremely poor facilities. I believe that we did our work very well. When I entered, I furthered this type of work.

Q. The 3rd Department had relatively few men assigned to it. Were these few men entirely responsible for the statistical analysis of data?

A. The 3rd Department had a great number of men, and even the 5th Section, the American Section, had several tens of men.

Q. Weren't these many tens of men assigned only during the spring of this year?

\*A. I think that was sometime last year; it was before I entered in October because when I entered they were there.

Q. Were they assigned directly to the 5th Section of the 3rd Department.

A. I believe that these men joined the 5th Section gradually, and that the section grew from the beginning of the war to a sufficient size by the time I joined in October, 1944.

Q. In the 5th Section there is an A, B, C, and D member. Were these men assigned to any one member or did they work directly under the Head of the section?

A. I am unable to give the answer to that question. I was not concerned closely with it. I believe that the names and organization have been given to the Allied forces. I remember the staff as being four or five men.

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\* This has been checked. Thirty seven newly trained Reserve Officers joined the 5th Section in the summer of 1944.



- Q. The Communications Dept. at OWADA performed statistical analyses of communications interceptions. Can you tell us how many people were assigned to this work?
- A. I have been to OWADA only two or three times and have not seen it completely. I believe that the Statistics Section had quite a number of men.
- Q. Can you tell us anything, in addition to what you have already, described, about the methods of statistical analysis work done at OWADA?
- A. I think it would be better if you asked directly at the 3rd Section for this information as I am not able to give you a great deal.
- Q. Did the TENGO Plan, as originally written in January or February of this year, cover the estimate as to possible landings on the Japanese homeland?
- A. The TENGO Plan covered only OKINAWA and the Southern Area, but the KETSUGO Plan covered the eventuality of any landings on the Japanese homeland, did not include KARAFUTO or the KOREAS.
- Q. Was the TENGO Plan revised from time to time as further information was secured?
- A. It did not change. It was a plan, was set up, and not changed.
- Q. Was there a further estimate or plan made on 1 June regarding the estimates in connection with the defense of the Japanese mainland?
- A. There was a plan made up at that time. However, I was not specifically concerned with it. I believe it was in June.
- Q. Were you not in the 1st Section of the 1st Department in June of this year?
- A. Yes. I was in the section at that time.
- Q. What was your estimate then as to where and when the Allied landings would occur on the Japanese mainland?
- A. Our estimates were always a little bit earlier than the actual facts, inasmuch as the decision as to when and where the American forces would land was a matter of higher authority, and my estimate was only an estimate. However, in my opinion, I thought that the American forces could make a landing possibly as early as the early part of August, that it depended upon the status of the weather as it pertained to the utilization of bombers. Actually, in my personal estimate, I expected landings in the first part of September. However, there were several opinions, and the opinion of certain members of the General Staff was that it would come in the first part of October. That pertained to KYUSHU. It was my opinion that landings would be carried out in the Southern part of KYUSHU on either the East or the West coast, in either the ARIAKE BAY or MIYAZAKI Areas. This opinion was also held by the Army.
- Q. Upon what information was this opinion based?
- A. This was a strategic decision. It depended, in the first instance, on air superiority being obtained in the OKINAWA Area. This was a judgment based upon no particular piece of information. I based my decision upon the past experiences of the war, particularly such a factor as the fact that as KYUSHU was an island, air superiority could be obtained over it. And it was almost without communications, particularly railroad communications with the rest of Japan. Moreover, it lay strategically between the main part of Japan and China.

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- Q. Based on this, how many divisions of Japanese troops were moved into KYUSHU?
- A. I do not remember. I was not directly concerned. The operational information on the movement of our own troops, and similar matters, was not a matter within my province. My job was specifically that of estimating American intentions.
- Q. Inasmuch as the communications were poor, especially railroad with regard to transportation had the estimate been wrong, the results would have been most serious for Japan. Isn't that so?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You must have been very sure of your estimate then.
- A. It is true that the results would have been disastrous if my estimate had been wrong. However, based on my past experiences, I felt sure that the American army would land nowhere, in this initial operation, except on KYUSHU. I did not feel that it was at all likely that the Americans would land on HOKKAIDO, and the landing in the Tokyo area, I felt sure, would be subsequent to KYUSHU.
- Q. In addition to what you have already told us, would you further elaborate on your reasoning and the information which brought you to this conclusion?
- A. In addition to what I have already said, there was practically no other method of reasoning that I used, but my method of reasoning was purely a tactical judgment.
- Q. Was it upon this judgment alone then that the deployment of Japan's forces was based for the defense of the home islands?
- A. It was not my decision alone. As I have explained before, the final decision was arrived at by a comparison of the decisions of all of the officers working on this subject in the 1st Section - TOMIOKA, OHMAE, and others. The final decision was that believed by the group to be wisest by them after considerable discussion.
- Q. Based upon this decision, was a plan for the defense of KYUSHU and Japan drawn up?
- A. The plan for the defense of KYUSHU was an Army affair since, after all, they were the ones primarily concerned. However, inasmuch as we had practically no Navy left at that time, and inasmuch as our air force was greatly depleted, the ends of both the Army and Navy were practically identical. Consequently, all of the Naval Air, as well as the bulk of the Army Air, was concentrated, as a result of this estimate, in the Western part of the island, from the KYOTO Area West and South. The KETSUGO Operation Plan applied only to air operations inasmuch as outside of air operations against the fleet prior to its landing, there was very little we could successfully have done. The plan did not apply beyond such a time as the American forces might have secured a firm foothold.
- Q. Was that plan drawn up by the 1st Department?
- A. It was made up by the Combined Fleet.
- Q. What was the date of that plan?
- A. I do not remember.

- Q. Was it about the first of June?
- A. As this is a matter of aircraft, I do not recall.
- Q. However, the estimates in the plan dealing with the time and place of the expected landing were furnished by you, were they not?
- A. The Combined Fleet was of the same opinion as we were.
- Q. Did the Combined Fleet go through the same procedure as the General Staff did?
- A. The actual decision was worked out between the General Staff and the Combined Fleet. Inasmuch as I was not directly concerned with the conferences carried on between the Combined Fleet and the General Staff, I do not know where or when meetings were held, but conferences were carried on frequently between the two.
- Q. What was the basis for your estimate that landings at KYUSHU might be made at ARIAKE?
- A. On the basis of the opinion of the LEYTE landings, it was quite likely that landings would be made in this area. Another reason was that ARIAKE is the only place in KYUSHU where a fleet can go close to shore.
- Q. In the plan that was developed, of which Capt. OHMAE gave me a copy, the numbers of ships in various classifications available for the landing was given. We would like to know upon what information these estimates were based.
- A. This estimate came to us from the 5th Section which is the section in the 3rd Department concerned with American fleet strength, based upon their past information of the fleet, plus information gathered at OKINAWA. Such information was quite easy to gather inasmuch as we were able to observe landings there and to observe fleet units throughout the majority of the campaign.
- Q. Are you familiar with a document produced by the 3rd Department of the Navy General Staff in March 1944 in which U.S. carriers are listed by name, together with the numbers of air groups assigned to these carriers? It must have been a well known document to everybody in Planning. It would have been basic.
- A. I am familiar with the information obtained. I am not familiar with the document itself. This was made up by the 5th Section.
- Q. Did captured documents provide the information given here, or was it some other method?
- A. I do not know what information it was based upon.
- Q. To what extent did aviators shot down over Japan provide useful information in making the estimates we have just discussed?
- A. That was a matter of the 5th Section, and I have not heard of any particularly important information. Such persons shot down would not have had much information on future operations.
- Q. What did you estimate the U.S. moves would be after the landings on KYUSHU?
- A. The U.S. landings would be on the KANTO PLAIN.
- Q. How long after the KYUSHU landings did you estimate it would be before that operation took place.
- A. Three to four months after the end of the KYUSHU Operation.

- Q. Were all members of the Japanese Merchant Marine members also of the Japanese Imperial Navy?
- A. Those that had training in navigation and similar subjects entered the Japanese Navy after the war began. These personnel were very few in the Merchant Marine.
- Q. Were not officers of the Merchant Marine also officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy?
- A. Yes. All officers were reserve officers in the Japanese Navy.
- Q. That was true prior to the war also?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Could you tell me what system the Navy employed for securing information from Merchant Marine officers? Were regular reports made (prior to the war)?
- A. I have never heard of any being made inasmuch as I came into the section in October of last year.
- Q. As Commanding Officer of a destroyer during the latter part of the war, what is your estimate of the adequacy of information furnished you which you required to do your work?
- A. While I was captain of a destroyer, I received practically no intelligence information. Intelligence is, after all, more a function of the Fleet Headquarters. Furthermore, the only way to receive it at sea is by wireless, and my wireless was always full of operational reports. Such matters as American naval strength and movements of American vessels I did not receive information on. However, during the period of the GUADALCANAL Operations, we received a little information as to the sightings made by reconnaissance aircraft. Outside of that, practically nothing.
- Q. Were your communications facilities satisfactory?
- A. Communications were good until the time of the SOLOMONS Operations. After that, we found it progressively more difficult, due largely to enemy action. For example, in my destroyer squadron, the lead ship was sunk, another ship was sunk, and under such conditions, which were frequent, communications became very difficult as the war wore on.
- Q. What was the date of your departure from Japan to participate in the occupation of WAKE?
- A. The early part of November 1941.
- Q. Did you know at the time of your departure what your destination and mission was?
- A. No. I had no information.
- Q. What did you think it was?
- A. I felt sure that some sort of engagement was in the offing. I had no information, however, of the objective operations against PEARL HARBOR. All such matters were kept strictly secret. The first information I had at the beginning of the war was in the early part of December, the 7th or 8th. I did not participate in the GUAM operations. They kept such news very secret so I naturally had no information.

- Q. Were there transports in the force which you accompanied?
- A. There were neither transports nor troops in the convoy.
- Q. What made up your force?
- A. They were all combatant ships.
- Q. Where and when did the troop ships join your force?
- A. The troop ships did not meet our force.
- Q. Did your force participate in the occupation of WAKE?
- A. Our itinerary was from Japan past GUAM, TRUK, KWAJALEIN, and WAKE where we participated in the occupation. Because your force put up such a magnificent fight, we thought there were many more than there actually were. We left in the early part of November to participate in the WAKE Operation. At the time of the RABAUl occupation, in March of 1942, my force was in the BISMARCK Sea, but we did not actually participate in the occupation.
- Q. Was your defense of OKINAWA upset by the fact that the assault was made on 1 April instead of the last part of March as you had expected?
- A. We thought that you would land in the middle of March. Consequently, the fact that you delayed your landing by even such a small period helped us in our preparations somewhat. If you had come in March, we would not have been as nearly well prepared for you as we were. If you had delayed one more month, we would have been able to win.
- Q. What made you so sure that the landing would be attempted on OKINAWA rather than other islands in the RYUKYU Group?
- A. Because OKINAWA is an excellent place for airfields and fleet anchorage, and the others are not.
- Q. To what extent was the TOKUMU BU helpful in furnishing useful information?
- A. No such unit in the Japanese Navy that I know of. At the time of the CHINA incident, the Army had the TOKUMU KIKAN. During the war I believe this was disbanded even in the Army. There is no such organization in the Navy.
- Q. Did you ever hear of Admiral CHUDO?
- A. I have heard his name, but I do not know him.
- Q. Do you know through what sources you got any specific details as to what air groups were aboard which carriers?
- A. That was a job of the 5th Section. I do not know. I had no dealings with anything of that kind.
- Q. Did you have in your section other people under you who helped you with the analysis of the great quantity of material flowing in to you?
- A. The work in the section was done by a number of officers working together - Capt. OHMAE and other officers. The statistical work was done by Headquarters. We all worked together in the same room, OHMAE, TERAII, and a number of other officers. In writing my decisions, I found that I needed a certain piece of information, and I would say, "Let me have your data on this". I do not know where they got it. I was Capt. OHMAE's assistant in all these matters - air, army, navy.

- Q. Where was the organization that screened the great amount of information coming in from all sources? Who summarized all the information that Adm. TAKEUCHI received and passed on to you?
- A. There is only the 5th Section. The 5th Section had charge of analysis, statistical work, etc. The Combined Fleet staff received the same information that we did directly from the 5th Section and OWADA.
- Q. From the questions that have been asked today you have some idea of the purpose of our conversations, and what we are trying to put together concerning the relationship between source of information and planning. From your knowledge, what occurs to you that has further bearing on the subject?
- A. I want to explain the setup of our physical communications which in many respects permitted a good deal of inefficiency in our operations. The 5th Section was at HIYOSHI. The Communications Section was at OWADA. The 1st Section was close by the Naval Department. Furthermore, the Army Intelligence Sections were similarly scattered out. All communications were dependent upon telephone. The Japanese telephone system is ordinarily bad. Furthermore, as a result of your bombings, oftentimes it was impossible to gain any sort of communication with these various outlying sections from which our information came. Consequently, it was very difficult to gather together information rapidly and completely.
- Q. Where was the Grand Fleet Headquarters?
- A. It was in the operations area, wherever that happened to be. In the latter part of the war, it was in KYUSHU.
- Q. Where was Adm. OZAWA located in the latter part of the war?
- A. In Tokyo.
- Q. Was he Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet?
- A. Yes. The Combined Fleet Headquarters moved to Tokyo in the latter part of the war.
- Q. How were you listed? Under what title in the Table of Organization within the 1st Section?
- A. I do not remember exactly where I was listed. I was actually Capt. OHMAE's assistant. I was carried on the list under both the Administrative and Planning Sections of the 1st Department. My job was intelligence evaluation under Capt. OHMAE.

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