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Teng/Ch'iao/HAK
memcon (pm)



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Place: Great Hall of the People, Peking

Time: Thursday, November 28, 1974 - 4:00 - 6:15 pm
& Date

Participants: Chinese Teng Hsiao -ping, Vice Premier

American: The Secretary
Mr. Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
Ambassador Bush, Chief of the Liaison Office
Mr. Philip Habib, Assistant Secretary for East
Asian Affairs
Mr. Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Miss Christine Vick, Secretary's office (notetaker)

Teng: Have you had a good rest this morning?

Kissinger: It was kind of the Foreign Minister to go with us to the Temple. Our Ambassador told me what is going on in China. Then I showed Mr. Rumsfeld the Forbidden City and the German Ambassador who is an old friend, called on my to tell me what is going on in China too.

Teng: What do the Germans think is going on in China?

Kissinger: Frankly, he wanted to hear from me what is going on.

Teng: You can tell him we are digging tunnels here.

Kissinger: And storing grain.

Teng: Right. Three sentences -- dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony. There are the three things we are to note.

Kissinger: As Chairman Mao said last year.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 9/15/03
BY WJ, NARA, DATE 10/31/03



Teng: This, I think, will be our final session here. We will hear you first.

Kissinger: The last word will be the Foreign Minister's tonight and I will have no possibility to reply. I wanted to cover a few odds and ends of yesterday's discussion. First, with respect to our relations with the Arab countries, we have not been inactive, as I told you yesterday, we have 250 million for Egypt and in addition we have given them 150 million for other kinds of various assistance, primarily in the agricultural field and we have asked the World Bank to give them 250 million. So altogether they have received about 650 million. And we have given even Syria 100,000 tons of agricultural products. In the military field, which the Vice Premier correctly mentioned, it is true that the Soviet Union has cut off Egypt and there has not yet been any replacement. We have a massive domestic problem about giving military aid to Arab countries. What we are doing, on a very confidential basis, is we have a rather substantial military assistance program to Saudi Arabia beyond the needs of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, after the next step in the Egyptian/Israeli disengagement agreement, we plan to permit the acquisition of military equipment by Egypt and Saudi Arabia has already set aside 500 million for that purpose. Again, for your information, the Israelis will run out of credits in March and we will link new credits to Israel for the right to sell



Kissinger: arms to Egypt. In the meantime we are encouraging the Federal Republic to also sell arms to Egypt and France needs no encouragement as long as cash is involved. We would also encourage Britain to develop helicopter production in Egypt. I wanted you to know these things on a very confidential basis.

As for the negotiations -- given the Soviet pressure on the radical Arab countries, we believe it is best to conduct the new negotiations rather quietly and then to surface them suddenly. We are discussing with the Israelis a withdrawal of something like 75 kilometers toward the East and about 150 kilometers toward the South, which would return the oil fields to Egypt and would withdraw Israeli forces beyond the passes in the Sinai.

To be quite frank, the schedule we have is to have progress in this direction before the visit of Breshnev to Cairo, but have disclosure only afterward to discourage enthusiasm. But the Egyptians will know that it is substantially achieved before Breshnev gets there. But if they move too far toward the Soviet Union, they will jeopardize it. So, after that we will turn to Syria.

This is our strategy, but it will be pursued without great visible signs until it is practically completed and then I might follow Brezhnev to the Middle East until it is finished. I wanted you to know this.



Kissinger: A word about Iran. I had some long talks with the Shah about (cont.) our relationship and about Afghanistan and Pakistan. I urged the Shah to establish closer relations with the People's Republic. In my judgment he is very prepared to do this.

Interpreter: Closer relations between the United States and the People's Republic?

Kissinger: I talked to him about the US relations with the People's Republic, but because he takes the lead from us, I told him we would favor closer Iranian relations with the People's Republic.

My understanding is that he is very prepared to establish much closer relations with the People's Republic and our impression is that his trip to the Soviet Union was not very reassuring to him.

My understanding is that he would be very glad to visit the People's Republic but since the Empress has been here he would appreciate a visit by a senior Chinese official first so that he would have a good excuse to come here. I say this to you for your information.

I think his basic attitude with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan and India is one which is consistent with what we discussed yesterday.

Also, you should know that we are establishing -- well there are two other things. First, that we are establishing co-production with Iran in various advanced military fields which will put




Kissinger: Iran in a position to be more immediately helpful in surrounding areas. Secondly, with respect to Iraq. Our information is that the Turkish offensive against the Turks is going very badly, partly because a great deal of Russian equipment has been supplied recently to the Turks.

Teng: You mean by the United States.

Kissinger: Yes, through Iran. Our information is that the Iraqi Army is quite demoralized and very unhappy with its Soviet ally. This is again, for your information. And our information, which you also probably know, is that Bhutto's feeling is that he has substantially defeated the Baluchistan problem.

Those were the major foreign policy issues which I wanted to discuss. I have one or two other items which I wanted to raise with you, if I may.

One is we are always under great pressure by the families of individuals who were Missing in Action during the Vietnamese War. We greatly appreciate the information that was given us in the last trip with respect to some American servicemen -- that were lost over China. It would be a great help to us and very much appreciated if any additional information that comes available be passed to our Liaison Office. Secondly,



Teng: We don't presently have any further news. If we do we will pass it.

Kissinger: Well, we can say that you have, no further news and if you have you will pass it.

Teng: Alright.

Kissinger: Secondly, our Liaison Office will submit any question we have and we would be grateful for a report on these specific questions about individuals that come to our attention that may have been missing.

Teng: I don't think they have received anything yet.

Kissinger: No, but we have been given some additional queries and we will raise it in the next day or so.

Teng: Alright.

Kissinger: And finally, we would be very grateful if the remains of any of those who crashed over China or died in China could be returned to the United States, if they can still be found.

Teng: If they can not be found then it will be very difficult.

Kissinger: We have made many unreasonable demands, but we have never asked for the return of unfound remains.

Finally, in connection with the Missing In Action, -- this is not your direct responsibility or under your responsibility at all, but we have found great difficulty in getting any answers from North Vietnam, as is called for by the Paris Agreement and any influence or advice you could give to Hanoi we would greatly appreciate.



Teng: I thought you had direct channels with the North Vietnamese.

Kissinger: We have direct channels but our persuaveness does not seem to be adequate. Sometime when we have time I will tell you about North Vietnamese negotiating methods. But we will save it for a social occasion. They are unique in diplomatic history. But in this connection, I would like to say one thing. The North Vietnamese have been in total violation of the Paris Agreement in building up forces in the South. We hope that there will not be a major offensive because that would produce serious consequences. We will certainly prevent any offensive on the part of the South Vietnamese.

Teng: From what we have heard, it is the United States and Nguyen Van Thieu who are not abiding by the Agreement.

Kissinger: I think your information is not accurate. President Thieu has recently offered negotiations which implement all the provisions and we are only replacing the equipment that has been lost and therefore it is easy for North Viet Nam to control the rate of loss and our deliveries.

Teng: We feel that this issue is one to be discussed only between you and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the People's Revolutionary Government of South Viet Nam. As to the piece of information when we discussed Cambodia, I remember saying to you that if



Teng: you listen to the information from Lon Nol it won't be accurate. As for the information provided by Thieu, we think it is also unreliable. We think the fundamental question is this. It is good that you have withdrawn your armed forces, but you have not really disengaged. Your feet are still bogged down there and probably all these specific issues all stem from the fact that the fundamental issue has not been completely resolved. I should think that that is true about the entire Indo-Chinese issues too.

Kissinger: I finally want to say one thing about normalization. Secretary Habib has informed me of his conversations here. On the claims/assets agreement, I understand the principal Chinese concern and I will, when I return, ^{see} whether our lawyers can come up with a definition compatible with Chinese principles.

My impression is that the other aspects are soluble and I try to find a way of solving that aspect.

Interpreter: That...

Kissinger: That particular one.

Teng: I hear that he has placed great emphasis on matters of United States law.

Kissinger: That is what I will look into when I return.

Teng: How can U. S. laws govern China? That is not logical.



Kissinger: Mr. Rumsfeld was a Congressmen, he can explain that. I can't.

Teng: How you explain the matter is your business, but our explanation is that U. S. law doesn't govern China.

Kissinger: But there are some Congressmen who think that China is a suberb of Chicago.

Teng: I think that you have touched precisely on the essence of the matter. Perhaps the negotiator on your side reflects that mentality.

Rumsfeld: I could explain it but it would take a great deal of Mao Tai.

Teng: It is not important anyway.

Kissinger: I understand your problem. I owe you an answer and I will try to find a solution. I will talk to the lawyers, for me I could not care. But about the issue here, for me, this is preimarily a political and symbolic matter. So I don't want an acrimonious negotiation. I will see whether we can find a formulation we can submit to you.

Teng: This is an issue of which one hundred years lack of a solution will not be of great consequence.

Kissinger: We will certainly accept the principle that American law does not apply to China.

Teng: I think this is a point that must be confirmed.

Kissinger: That is the easiest problem we have between us.



Kissinger: On other things -- like exchanges, Congressional visits and so forth. I would like to suggest the desirability of changing the pattern a little bit, so that every year is not like the last year. And not expose our relationship to unnecessary speculation in the U. S. to see if any special progress has been made. So if our experts could find some slight variation in the pattern, it could be quite helpful.

In practice with the Congressional visits -- there is one Subcommittee that votes the State Department budget, that has a great interest in coming here. I say this for your consideration.


Teng: We can think that over.

Kissinger: You will be visited in the next few weeks by Senator Mansfield.

Teng: We expressed our welcome to him long ago.

Kissinger: And we have supported it and we appreciate your inviting him. It will be helpful. Senator Mansfield is the majority Leader of the Senate and a former professor of political science at the University of Montana. On foreign policy problems, he is here in his capacity as former professor of political science at the University of Montana.

Teng: We would welcome him in any capacity. And we will see to it that he is taken to a dinner of Hot Pot.



Kissinger: We really favor a very friendly reception for him. But you should remember that what I said to you about foreign policy reflects the views of President Ford and of the United States government.

Teng: And we have understood with regard to the views of various Senators and Congressmen, that their various views do not all represent the government's view, but their own. We won't sign any agreements with them.

Kissinger: This was especially fortunate with regard to the visit of Senator Magnuson. Mao tai left a lasting impression on him.

Teng: (Laughter)

Kissinger: Now perhaps a word about normalization. We have paid serious attention to what the Vice Premier said yesterday and we shall study it very carefully. We believe that the three principles mentioned by the Vice Premier are not insurmountable obstacles. And we have one problem, which the Foreign Minister summed up well in one of our earlier meetings, which is that we do not ask to be a guaranteeing power but we do prefer the solution of the reintegration to be peaceful. We shall think about specific proposals with respect to the three points and we shall submit them to you for your consideration.

In the meantime, we shall undertake a substantial reduction of our remaining military forces in Taiwan. We will give the precise figures to your Liaison Office in Washington before the end of the year.

Kissinger: And we shall also, over the next eighteen months, bring about a reduction in the size and in the status, or at least seniority, of our diplomatic representation. This is independent of whatever we agree on the other three points. These are unilateral steps. These are the major points that I wished to discuss. We will have to discuss something about the Communique.

FMinister: You will remember that I have promised to think up a few simple sentences to bring to your attention. But simple sentences are not easy to conceive and it is much more difficult to write a brief rather than a long Communique.

Kissinger: Bernard Shaw said I didn't have time to write a short letter, so I wrote a long one.


Teng: I think that is a question to be discussed between you and the Foreign Minister.

FMinister: I will inform you when we are ready to discuss. I think it is not possible to solve it here at the table.

Kissinger: Do you mind if two of my associates join us now? We are not going to discuss the Communique.

Teng: It is up to you.

Kissinger: One point that Ambassador Bush raised that I was going to raise. We were considering whether it would be desirable to increase



Kissinger: the Liaison Office by a few spaces. We would transfer some of our functions from Hong Kong to Peking. That would be most appreciated.


Teng: A few spaces.

Kissinger: To handle functions here in Peking.

Teng: You would like to add to the present building.

Kissinger: The first thing is to add to the number of personnel, which in turn would mean we would have to add some additional space.

Teng: We will study that. We have noted what the Dr. has told us and we don't have very much else to say. So let's begin from the final issue that the Dr. mentioned, that is the question of Normalization. The Dr. has mentioned again the question of the time table and I remember that I said last time, what is the need to complicate the matter in such a way. Wouldn't it be better to do it more briskly and to solve the matter briskly. So the pace is not a very important matter. Whether you cut down your forces by a little bit or increase them by a bit, or when you do it; whether you raise them by a bit -- that isn't very important. And since you have already sent your Ambassador there, whether or not it is necessary to lower the seniority is not a very important issue either.



Teng: So, if the solution is not to be brisk, what is the reason to drag the Taiwan issue like the question of the Vietnam and Cambodia issues into such an untidy mess. What is the need to drag along such untiness, because that is not necessary to solve these issues.

And with the question of the three principles that we mentioned in our three previous meetings. There can not be any other consideration about these principles. And we have also said that if you need Taiwan now, we can wait. This in no way means that we do not want to solve this issue as early as possible between the United States and China. It does not mean from a moral and political point of view that we have no right to demand or ask an early solution.

As I mentioned in our earlier discussion on this issue, it is you who are not deflecting to us. Because it is U.S. troops who are occupying Taiwan. Just now the Dr. mentioned certain reductions or certain actions which would be unilateral measures on the part of the United States. What bilateral measures can be called for?

Kissinger: There aren't any called for.

Teng: There is a Chinese saying that it is for the one who has tied the knot to unfasten it. And to sum it up, since you believe the time has not yet come to solve the issue, then we can wait. We can




Teng: We can wait until you have thought this out clearly and then it can be solved briskly. It can be written off at once. We can wait say for a few years. We won't even have to ask you to hurry up. But if it is to be solved, it must be on the basis of the three principles.

Kissinger: I understand this and I believe it can be solved in connection with these three principles. I appreciate the opportunity to do some more thinking about it and I recognize that there is great wisdom, generosity and self restraint on the Chinese side in taking the position which the Vice Premier has outlined here. Because this is something basic in our previous conversations and observations that we owe to you.

If I may say one thing in this connection with the three principles. The principles are accepted. In all of them, the only practical problem we have is how to implement it. The phrase that Chairman Mao quoted that Normalization can be achieved before reintegration is completed...how to express that in practical terms.

Teng: As for the establishment of diplomatic relations, I think we have expressed it clearly in severing diplomatic relations, withdrawal of troops and abolishment of the treaty. And as for how and when the Chinese settle these issues between themselves, that is our own affair and belongs to Chinese internal affairs.



Teng: And we can not undertake any commitments or make any promises in internal affairs like when and how we will do or establish things that pertain to internal affairs.

Kissinger: But theoretically, you could make a general statement of your unilateral intentions. Not to us, but just as a general statement.

Teng: What are we to say in it. Anyway, we think this is something that we are bound to discuss again.

Kissinger: Yes, that is the only remaining issue. The other problems are soluble and let me think about that last question.

Teng: As for the other specific issues, we don't have anything more we think needs to be said. We believe in our discussions these few days, we have had a wide range of views in the international situation. I would like to take this opportunity to make clear our basic concept of this whole question. As Chairman Mao has said repeatedly to visiting guests, the present world is not tranquil.

And the Foreign Minister also mentioned that there is great disorder under heaven. And yesterday, that was just what I was coming to -- then the Dr. mentioned the talk between Chairman Mao and the Danish Foreign Minister.

Kissinger: I agree with Chairman Mao.



Teng: That there is the existence of the danger of a war. No matter how this war might be brought about and if the peoples and countries of the world are not prepared against this, they will suffer. Last time we discussed the Soviet strategy. Of course we have different opinions on that. But our general view and impression is that the Soviet Union is making a _____ (faint?) in the East to attack the West. We think this is more in conformity with reality. It is not a purely theoretical matter. Chairman Mao has actively discussed this before with the Dr. He did not put it in such words in that talk, but it can be summarized to this phrase: "The polar bear is after you."

Kissinger: And it is about equal distance whether he comes East or West, to the United States, I mean.

Teng: That's geographically. As for us, to be honest, our character is to gear neither heaven or earth and we fear neither isolation or embargo. As for nuclear weapons, they are not of any use. Since to speak of nuclear weapons is of others attacking us with nuclear weapons and in this sense, we fear nothing. And Chairman Mao has even mentioned to the Danish Foreign Minister, to this effect, if a war should truly come, would it necessarily be a bad thing?



Kissinger: This is what shook him a little bit.

Teng: And we Chinese believe that if a war should come, it might not be so formidable; it might not necessarily be so bad. There is the possibility that bad things can turn into good things. He also told the Danish Foreign Minister there is no use to be afraid. If it is to come, what can you do to prevent it. Anyway, we are going to make preparations. As for preparations, they are just what we have said before. Tunnels, millet and rifles. Do you know when we began to put forth that slogan, millet, _____ rifles?


Kissinger: In the sixties.

Teng: No, during the Anti-Japanese War. When we were still in the S_____, in essence, we _____rifles the only shortcoming was that in S_____, they didn't grow millet. Once we got to _____, the main staple found was millet. That is why the main staple is millet and rifles. You can say we met millet by accident.

Another matter is that which the Dr. has repeatedly mentioned. the question of firing cannons. It seems the Dr. is very concerned about cannon fire.

Kissinger: I dig tunnels very deeply.

Teng: I am in favor of that. Cannons must be fired. And the Dr. has that mentioned/the frequency and accuracy of the cannon fire has



Teng: been raised and since the accuracy has been raised, it is quite clear that cannon fire can not afford to cease. We think there might be a necessity to study the matter of whether or not the cannon fire is reasonable. And, therefore, I think it might be of some use to raise this point to your attention. That is, that in many issues now, the United States is in the forefront. The Dr. has mentioned many times ^{here} ~~how~~ the energy question and the food issue. The United States is always in the forefront. You mention the fact that it is Western Europe and Japan and other countries that are most affected by the crises, but they are not in the forefront.

Kissinger: They are also not in the forefront of military defense.

Teng: Of course, it isn't in all issues that the United States is in the forefront, but in the recent period of time, you have been in the forefront on many important issues. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has been hiding behind. For instance in Cyprus and the Middle East, you have also been in the forefront. And no matter how you look at the issue in the Middle East, for the U.S. to foster Israeli expansionism, which is what it is, in essence against 120 million Arab people -- from the political point of view, you are bound to be in a weaker position. Of course, the Dr. has



Teng: repeatedly explained that this is because of domestic issues. No matter out of what reason, so long as the Arab countries are not able to regain their lost territory, the principle issue remains unsolved. Tactics will not be able to settle the problem, the Communique will not be able to solve the issue. There is already some similarity between this and the Indochina issue and the Korean issue too. I don't think that the Dr. will take these views to be ill-intentioned.

Kissinger: No. Mr. Vice Premier, I have summed up our views on many of these issues. The Vice Premier was finished, I understood?

Teng: Yes.

Kissinger: I have summed up the US view on many of these issues. If I could perhaps say one or two words. First of all, I agree with the Chairman, who, I believe, is a very great man. In any event, that it is important to be prepared for war and it is our policy to prepare for all eventualities and not to rely on the words of others or their assurances for peace. And in this analysis and in the manner of the quotation you just mentioned to me, we agree with his analysis of the overall situation.


Whether the attack comes in the East or the West is a subsidiary issue in this respect because wherever it comes it is ultimately intended for us and in this analysis I agree.

If it comes first in the West, it still will affect the East and if it comes first in the East, it will still affect the West. And



Kissinger: in either case it will affect us, but this is not a difference between us. The practical consequences for us -- we have to do the same things in either case.

With respect to the United States being in the forefront. That is imposed on us by the particular necessity of the various analyses you have made. The Vice Premier has correctly pointed out that neither Europe or Japan is in the forefront of the energy problem, even though they are the primary victims. They are also not in the forefront of the defense problem, even though they are the primary victims according to your own analysis. For a variety of reasons, it would be interesting to discuss sometime, neither of these societies are in a position to take a leading role for their own survival without strong American support. This is a historical reality. And if they were to separate from the United States, they would very soon become impotent and what one could call syntensized (?) or (inlandized (?)). And therefore, they are not capable of being a second world under the present circumstances by themselves. It would be much more convenient for us if they could be. And in any event, we believe in what the Vice Premier said earlier -- on equal partnership. And therefore, ^{on} the energy problem -- I wanted to report our view that neither Europe or Japan can



Kissinger: play a strategic role in which you and I agree. -- if at the same time they are demoralized by economic pressures which are beyond their capacity to solve. This is why we are in the forefront.

On the Middle East, I have explained to you our tactics which are complicated. I agree with you that unless there is a fundamental solution, a tactical solution is not going to be permanent. So, on this we are agreed, and I have explained to you what our strategy will be and their strategy will lead inexorably to a radical solution. The Vice Premier knows himself, from his own experience in political and military warfare that if one accumulates enough minor changes, sooner or later a fundamental change becomes _____.

As for Cyprus and the Middle East and the Soviet role, the Soviet Union will not be able to create anything. It can only make noise. We would prefer not to be in the forefront on these issues, and in Cyprus we tried to push Britain into the forefront and that produced its own complications. As to firing cannons, we recognize the necessity and we have our own tunnels and you will consider that you should not hit your own fortifications.

Teng: They haven't.

Kissinger: I am not saying they have, so we rely on you for this.



Teng: You can study our cannons.

Kissinger: We generally do not do any counterbatting fire. But more fundamentally, I think we have had a very useful, very beneficial exchange and in what I consider a friendly spirit of many subjects of common interest. We have always known that we stood for different principles and neither of us have asked the other or will ask the other to transcend the difference.

Teng: That's right.


Kissinger: But both of us have been able to work jointly on these matters which we have understood represent common views. And I believe that this has been fortified by our exchange and I would like to thank the Vice Premier for the warm reception we have had here, the frankness of the exchange; the constructiveness of the dialogue and I believe it has been a very positive contribution to the relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Teng: Do you think that will be all for our talks.

Kissinger: Except for...

Teng: And we should like to take this opportunity to thank the Dr. again for his seventh visit.

Kissinger: for our encounter after the banquet tonight.



Teng: But that has nothing to do with me.

Kissinger: If I may ask a question about releasing whatever we agree on tonight. Our President is giving a press conference tomorrow night at 8:00 Washington time, which is 9:00 Saturday your time. So if we could release it Saturday morning your time, ^{not} it would enable him to answer questions/only on his trip but on my trip too .

Teng: You can solve that.


Kissinger: You are very optimistic. It usually take three nights to settle things with the Foreign Minister.

Teng: (Laughter) Well, that means that the press releast will come out next February.

Kissinger: You tell me when you are ready.

END





PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 29, 1974

No. 514



EXCHANGE OF TOASTS BETWEEN
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND HIS EXCELLENCY CHIAO KUAN-HUA
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
AT A BANQUET HOSTED BY THE SECRETARY
PEKING
NOVEMBER 28, 1974

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Vice Premier, Mr. Foreign Minister, Friends:

On behalf of all my colleagues, on behalf of my wife and my children, I would like to thank our Chinese hosts for the very warm and very friendly reception we have had here.

The Foreign Minister and I reached a very important agreement today, which is that we would keep our toasts short, to spare the mental agility of the press which is here.

I do want to say that this visit, my seventh to the People's Republic, continues the progress that has been made on each previous occasion. We reviewed international problems and deepened our common understanding. We committed ourselves to continuing the process of normalization along the lines of the Shanghai Communique. Beyond the formal exchanges, we gained a better understanding of the Chinese point of view, which we will take seriously into account in conducting our foreign policy.

I said when I arrived here that the process of improving relations between the People's Republic and the United States is a fixed principle of American foreign policy. This principle was reaffirmed and strengthened during our conversations.

So, my colleagues and I and my family leave with very warm feelings and a feeling of substantive satisfaction.

In this spirit, I would like to propose a toast to the friendship of the Chinese and American peoples, to the good health and long life of Chairman Mao, to the good health and long life of Premier Chou En-Lai, to the good health and long life of the Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister. *Gan bei.*

Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-Hua

Mr. Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger, all the other American guests, comrades and friends:

First of all, on behalf of all my Chinese colleagues present, I wish to thank Secretary of State Kissinger for giving this banquet tonight to entertain us.



For further information contact:

In the last few days, our two sides have, in a candid spirit, reviewed the development of the international situation over the past year and exchanged views on international issues of common interest and the question of Sino-American relations. This has increased our mutual understanding and deepened our comprehension of our common points. Both sides have expressed their readiness to work, in accordance with the principles established in the Shanghai Communique, for the continued advance of Sino-American relations.

Dr. Kissinger and his party are leaving Peking tomorrow for a visit to Soochow before returning home. Here we wish them a pleasant journey.

I propose a toast to the friendship between the Chinese and American peoples, to the health of President Ford, to the health of the Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger, to the health of all the other American guests, and to the health of all comrades and friends present here.
Gan bei.

* * * * *



CH'iao/HAK
Memcon



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Lin Ping, Director, Department of American and
Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of
American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Notetaker
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
Amb. George Bush, Chief, USLO Peking
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs
Lora D. Simkus, Notetaker

PLACE: Meeting Room
Villa 18, Guest House, Peking

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, November 28, 1974
9:45 - 11:15 p. m.


SUBJECT: Drafting of Communique of Visit

Kissinger: You are outnumbered tonight.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But we have 800 million.

Kissinger: But if they are not here, you are outnumbered.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: This morning I told you about our basic thinking. And our thinking is to try our best to avoid superfluous words and to inquire and to put main things in the most prominent place. Of course, our assessment of these talks is they have been very beneficial. This wide range of exchange of views has been very good. That is one thing. And, of course, the important substantial part of what you will want to say is that both sides have decided that your President will visit China.



~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

NBC MEMO, HANDBOOK, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 9/15/03
BY lsm, NARA, DATE 10/31/03

Kissinger: This is what we did in July, 1971.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: So we made up a few words. It took me a whole day to compose three sentences! It shows that our effectiveness is very low. But because this morning you insisted I make a try, I could only do so.

So the three items we will be thinking of putting into the announcement would be three main thoughts:

The Secretary of State visited certain places from when to when -- the two sides had pleasant talks. The formal wording is:

"Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, visited the People's Republic of China from November 25 through November 29, 1974. The Chinese and U.S. sides held friendly and useful talks. Knowing of the expressed desire of President Gerald R. Ford to visit China, the Government of the People's Republic of China has extended an invitation to President Ford to visit China in 1975. President Ford has accepted this invitation with pleasure."

Kissinger: At any rate.... well, for one thing, I don't know whether President Ford had expressed a desire that you could know of to visit the People's Republic of China.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Through you.

Kissinger: I think, frankly, we should use a frankly different formulation from the 1971 communique. This quite candidly is my view on the subject. I have two suggestions. I have no great.... One is -- and I have to do it in light of our opinion -- to say only that in two previous visits we accomplished two pages on the talks and to deal with these four days with six or seven words is going to be noticed. I think we should at least say, "and reaffirmed the principles of the previous communiqués" or something like this. Now, as far as the invitation is concerned....this point can be made with an additional sentence. It does not require a paragraph. With respect to the invitation, I think it would be best to relate it to the statement in our communique last year of the desirability of frequent exchanges at authoritative levels. And say, "in the light of the decisions in the year 1973 of the desirability of frequency of exchanges, the Government has extended an invitation to President Ford." Those are my two suggestions except to express protest for my associates whose names are not being mentioned. But that is a question of internal policy.



Ch'iao Kuan-hua: There is no question the names have been published in the Chinese press numerous times.

Kissinger: I am sure Rumsfeld's wife has read it in the People's Daily.

Those are my two suggestions.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Now on the first point, our idea is that since during this visit of yours, both of us have made two speeches respectively, so I think we have said quite a lot. So we don't think it necessary to keep on repeating the same words. Of course, you told me about your thinking this morning. Nevertheless, we would still be willing to see the sentence you would be willing to produce. That is one thing. And the second point which I think all the friends here on your side know is that the actual sequence of events was our side first invited your Secretary of Defense, Mr. Schlesinger, and your side suggested President Ford.

Kissinger: Were you very surprised?

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Were you surprised?

Kissinger: I was surprised by the invitation to Schlesinger, but I understood its significance. [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: And on our side, of course, we believe that your proposal of President Ford's visit is very important, too, but to be frank, perhaps we weren't so surprised as you to the previous invitation to the Secretary of Defense.


Kissinger: Since you made it, you should not be surprised.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: My surprise did not equal your surprise. [Laughter] But I must remind you that the invitation stands -- it is a standing one.

Kissinger: I know. That is understood.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Actually, the 1973 statement was a redirection of the Shanghai Communique about the authoritative levels.

Kissinger: [To Mr. Lord] Have we got the Shanghai Communique here? [Mr. Lord produces a copy.]



Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Because in...

Kissinger: We can refer to the Shanghai Communique, too. The 1973 communique -- the Shanghai Communique -- says they will stay in contact. "The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time." In the [November] 1973 communique we said, "The two sides agreed that in present circumstances it is of particular importance to maintain frequent contact at authoritative levels in order to exchange views." It is a better formulation.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But I should think the basic thinking is consistent.

Kissinger: Oh, yes, it is consistent.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But the sequence of events was we first invite your Secretary of Defense and then you proposed inviting your President. Do you have any wording?

Kissinger: We could say the Chinese invited the Secretary of Defense to the United States. [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: I agree. My idea was we don't on this issue -- we would not need to quote any communique, because you are authoritative, too. Isn't that true?

Kissinger: You knew you would get me at my weak point. I want to thank you on behalf of my father for mentioning me first here tonight. [Laughter]

We could use a more neutral formulation. For example, I don't have the exact... Let me give you the idea.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: So maybe for your convenience, we could have a short break and you could discuss it and then you could give us your wording.

Kissinger: Why don't we have 15 minutes? Will you be in this building? Will you stay here?

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: You can drive us off -- out of this room. [Laughter]

Kissinger: There are more of us.



Ch'iao Kuan-hua: [Turns back as he leaves room] Including both of your points?

Kissinger: Yes. It will be about two pages, but only four sentences. I will draft it in German. [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: If so, are you going to change Soochow to Hangchow? [Laughter]

[There was a break between 10:02 p.m. and 10:21 p.m., during which the new draft communique was typed.]

Kissinger: We have... Why don't I give it to you? We have added one sentence and changed one a little bit. We picked up the adjectives you had used and mentioned the atmosphere because it was mentioned in every previous communique and should be noted.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: So my initial reaction beginning from the end... shall we work from the end upwards?

Kissinger: I think you accept the first sentence.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Our feeling is that the phrase "to deepen contacts at authoritative levels" would, quite on the contrary, lower the importance of President Ford's visit, because I recall when I was in New York and we toasted each of you, we specifically mentioned President Ford, and when you met with the Premier at the hospital, he asked you to give his regards; and in this evening's toast, we also mentioned President Ford.

Kissinger: We can take that out. We don't need that sentence. You are saying something extremely offensive -- you know that. You have said I am an authoritative level and by mentioning the President at my level, we are lowering it. Old friends can speak frankly.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: It is a good thing knowing each other for a long time.

Kissinger: Let's take it out.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: And as for the formation of the rest of the sentence, we would also suggest some changes. That is...

Kissinger: We can take the word "President Ford" out. [Laughter]



Ch'iao Kuan-hua: That is what you said.

Kissinger: [Referring to Rumsfeld] He is not used to this method of negotiation.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: We think it might be better to say "the two sides agree that President Ford would visit the People's Republic of China in 1975." In Chinese, it wouldn't seem useful to mention it more.

Kissinger: What adjective would be useful?

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Because to us the visit of such a person of high rank as the President to the People's Republic of China would be a very important event, and to characterize it as being of use or not of use is not the question.

Kissinger: I would say this. In English, to say President Ford would visit the People's Republic of China in 1975 is too stark. Can we say "to deepen contacts -- and leave out authoritative -- President Ford will visit the People's Republic of China in 1975."

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: It also would give the impression that the purpose of the President's visit would be merely for the sake of deepening contacts.

Kissinger: It is a good point.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: My school of thinking is it would be better to say less than to say too much.

Kissinger: I understand your point. I just don't want to make you overconfident. [Laughter]

Let me provisionally accept it. Let's see what else we have got.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: So, let's go up a sentence. So my view of the Shanghai Communique and subsequent joint statements is that between parent and child. So, in both your toast and mine, we only mentioned the Shanghai Communique. That is a well-known document in the world.

Kissinger: You want to drop the word "subsequent?"

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: So perhaps for the sake of brevity we could just mention the Shanghai Communique.



Kissinger: I would like to see an artist at work. Now that you knocked out the end of the sentence, are you going to take out the beginning? [Laughter]

All right. Shall we go up one more? All right, we will take it out. We have agreed on the word "Announcement" though? [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: We are working from the bottom up. [Laughter]

Kissinger: This is nothing -- the Shanghai Communique was negotiated in Chinese. I never saw the English text.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But later on, they were all published in both.

Kissinger: I have to say something to you that impressed us very much. We trusted you to produce the Shanghai Communique. Wherever you had a choice, you picked the Chinese word that we used on the draft that gave us a slight advantage.

We accept that sentence.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: The term "wide-ranging"...

Kissinger: That was last year; in a conversation with Chairman Mao this word was used.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: We can consider characterizing the talks as frank, wide-ranging and beneficial. As for the atmosphere, I don't think it was used in any other communique. That was in the press release.

Kissinger: It was... Here it is with the Chairman.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But that was just the news.

Kissinger: And in 1973, we said "in an unconstrained atmosphere." The danger of eliminating it makes, in reality... We know what occurred. It is because the two previous communiqués had this reference.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Perhaps I could explain it a bit. Because the meeting with the Chairman would be one meeting in itself. So the atmosphere characterized the atmosphere of that meeting. This here would characterize the whole set of talks.



Kissinger: You don't think they were friendly? [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Would that indicate that all of the words used to characterize the talks did not happen? So, frankly, my views are that the question of whether or what the atmosphere was like -- actually, the characterizing of atmospheres in communiques is a foreign influence and we don't think it is very necessary. So our thinking is to conduct it in a more straightforward way. Atmospheric things are not substantial.

Kissinger: Could we say "in a straightforward atmosphere?" In 1973, I want to point out, we said all these talks were conducted in an unconstrained atmosphere. Frankly, I don't think what we say about atmosphere... For example, I don't think the New York Times would say the talks in Peking were conducted in a friendly atmosphere. It is simply that the China watchers will notice there was an unconstrained atmosphere in 1973, then there was a friendly atmosphere, and now nothing. That is the only point.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But "frank" also is an atmosphere. Only friends can talk very frankly.

Kissinger: In that case, let's drop "frank." [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But if we are ready to talk about atmosphere, it might be more accurate to characterize these talks as being frank and unconstrained.

Kissinger: Why don't we say frank, unconstrained, wide-ranging and mutually beneficial? [Laughter]

Rumsfeld: And add "constructive."

Kissinger: Let's leave out the word "atmosphere."

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Shall we conclude an agreement that we will never talk about atmosphere in the future? [Laughter]

Kissinger: I think that would be tremendous news all over the world.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: I would like now to solicit your opinion as to whether we should cut off the head of the announcement?

Kissinger: You mean the word "Announcement?" [Laughter]



Ch'iao Kuan-hua: No, the first sentence.

Kissinger: My father wouldn't stand for that. [Laughter] I will leave the heading to you.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: It doesn't really matter.

Kissinger: We don't really need a heading.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: We can cut off the head; that is the "announcement." We will not be cutting the head -- we will refrain from discussing the questions of outer space.

Kissinger: You just don't call it anything?

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Call it a News Release or a Press Release?

Kissinger: There are three options: To say nothing and just put it out -- it speaks for itself -- or, call it a Communique, or call it an Announcement. If we give the heading in English, "Communique" or "Joint Statement" is better.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: "Communique" would also be accepted.


Kissinger: We will call it "Communique." Are we then agreed on the heading?

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: So let's read it again.

Kissinger: "Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, the U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, visited the People's Republic of China from November 25 through November 29, 1974. The Chinese and U.S. sides held frank, wide-ranging and mutually beneficial talks. They reaffirmed their unchanged commitments to the principles of the Shanghai Communique. The two sides agreed that President Gerald R. Ford would visit the People's Republic of China in 1975."

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Actually, you don't need in the final sentence: "The two sides have agreed."

Kissinger: If we played chess with each other, it would be an interesting game. Because I can predict your moves. It looks better in English to have it in. However, it is improbable that we would come here without an invitation and technically extremely difficult.



Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But you, yourself, come here for the seventh time. Every-time the announcement of your visit is "Both sides have agreed..."

Kissinger: But I am only an authoritative level. We don't consider it appropriate for our President to travel without an invitation.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: But it actually would be an agreement between the two sides where they consulted with each other and agreed upon the following. Of course, we had also thought it possible to say, "The two sides agreed through consultation."

Kissinger: Oh, unanimously! [Laughter] We went through this in July 1971. It is a little bit embarrassing for me to sort of say I make President Ford come to China, which is the implication, and therefore we would like some implication of decision by him. That is why we wanted the word "accepted."

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Then what about "The two governments agreed..." or "the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States agreed," to avoid the impression that you were the one who decided the matter. It doesn't stand very logically as it is now: "The two sides agreed..." Of course, when the President comes, it will be on invitation. That is normal procedure. This is just an agreement now.

Kissinger: Okay, we will accept it. It doesn't make any difference.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: What is the meaning of the agreement? It is that the two sides consulted each other. One side made a proposal, the other side accepted it and that is an agreement. In the winter of 1971 -- November -- the announcement issued then was "The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States agreed that the visit of President Nixon would begin on the date of February ____."

Kissinger: Okay. We will drop the last sentence.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Would you want to change "the two sides" to "the two governments?" We don't have any definite opinion on that. If you want to avoid the possible misunderstanding that you just now mentioned, you could use "the two governments."

Kissinger: Okay. Let's say "the two governments agreed." Okay, you got it down to three sentences again. No, four. [Laughter]



Ch'iao Kuan-hua: So, it took you one hour to write three pages, and it took me a whole day to write three sentences. And now it took you an hour, and with your assistance, it has been increased to four sentences.

Kissinger: Now those of you present know why it took a week to do the Shanghai Communique. [Laughter]

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: All the new colleagues will understand. But I must also say here that I have to report this to our government first, before it can be finalized. You are very fair about our procedures.

Kissinger: Oh, yes. I am experienced.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: And I will tell you if there are any suggested changes.

Kissinger: When will you do that?

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Can I jump from this to the time of release? I don't think there will be any question about that.

Kissinger: It is now short enough that President Ford could read it at the beginning of his Press Conference which is 9:00 a.m. Saturday, Peking time.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Well, I will give our reply on whether there are any other changes as soon as possible. But anyway, in any case, it won't be when you are just entering your plane.

Kissinger: Tomorrow morning? Tomorrow evening? I have this practical problem. Given the differences in time now, it is still the working day in Washington. Whatever happens tomorrow, all day tomorrow is night in America. Moreover, I don't have communications in Soochow; I won't until I get to the plane in Shanghai. I tell you what I will do. I will send this to Washington. If I can get any changes tomorrow morning -- they will not be major, I am sure -- they can work with this and then we can change it. We will not consider it official until we have heard from your government.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: And we will try to give a reply as soon as possible. If possible, tomorrow morning.

Kissinger: Yes. It is not a decisive matter because we have 34 hours. I have communications on my plane so as soon as I reach Shanghai, we can make any corrections needed, and we can make preliminary arrangements



on the basis of this text. I have worked with you before. Your suggestions will be mine. If you could get Mr. Lord's name in it, his mother would appreciate it. [Laughter]

Do you wish us to type it and give you the correct version? Can you wait five minutes?

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Yes.

[The new draft Communique was typed]

Kissinger: Can we make an agreement that when President Ford is here we will not negotiate an agreement? We will do it ahead of time.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: Of course! Otherwise, the visit would be prolonged.

Kissinger: Very long. Actually, the last time, we had two-thirds done before we came here. Three-fourths, even. All right, you let us know.

Ch'iao Kuan-hua: [As he was leaving the meeting room] Dr. Kissinger, you will visit before the President?

Kissinger: I think probably I will have to come here two months before he visits. Mr. Foreign Minister, again, thank you for your cooperation.

[The meeting concluded at 11:15 p.m.]





MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

November 29, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

B *MC-7*

The Secretary asked that I pass the following report to you.

"This will recap my final substantive meeting with the Chinese on Thanksgiving Day. I met with Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Ch'iao Kuan-hua in the Great Hall of the People for a two-hour wrap-up session which was perhaps the most interesting meeting of the trip. I had laid out our position on international issues and normalization the first day and Teng had responded the second day. This final meeting covered loose ends, went into more depth on a few issues, and afforded both sides an opportunity to make closing philosophical commentaries. The basic elements were, once again, Chinese preoccupation with Soviet hegemony; a mutual agreement to leave the normalization issue where it is now with our studying possible formulas; and the philosophic inconsistency of the Chinese positions on Third World issues.

"I began the meeting by running over some miscellaneous issues:

"-- On the Middle East, I detailed further our military assistance programs as well as the prospects for diplomatic progress. I said that we foresaw negotiating possibilities on the Egyptian-Israeli front but would be working more quietly behind the scenes until negotiations were virtually completed. This would allow us to deflect Soviet pressure on the Arabs; we hope to make significant progress before Brezhnev visits Cairo but not complete negotiations until after his visit so that Egypt would have to be reasonable.

"-- I underlined the important strategic role that the Shah of Iran could play and said that I thought he was prepared to establish closer relations with Peking. I also noted some growing Iraqi dissatisfaction with Moscow.

"-- As I have done on my previous visits, I brought up the subject of our MIA personnel in or near China and as a result of Vietnam.

SECRET/SENSITIVE



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

MR 97-7, # 31; NSC 644C 12/5/97

By *lit* NARA, Date *1/20/98*


I said that we would appreciate any new information that they might have as well as the return of any remains; our Liaison Office would be giving them specific information on a few cases. They said they had no new information and would let us know if anything developed. This will be helpful with the concerned families. I also asked the Chinese to nudge Hanoi on our MIA's in Vietnam, but I seriously doubt that they will do anything.

"-- I then warned of serious consequences if North Vietnam were to launch a major offensive, citing their violations and recent preparations. I noted that Thieu had made an offer to negotiate on all the political aspects of the Paris peace agreements. Teng stonewalled us on this issue, saying that both the South Vietnamese and we were violating the Paris peace agreement and that we were still bogged down in Vietnam with our military assistance. I do not believe they want Hanoi to heat things up, however.

"-- On bilateral matters which had been discussed in separate counterpart talks, I said that we would try and find a new legal formula to solve the last significant issue in the claims/assets problem which is complicating our trade with the PRC. I noted the symbolic importance of our bilateral exchange program and suggested that there be more balance as well as variety. I also gave a boost to Congressional visits. I said that we favored the visit of Senator Mansfield to the PRC which would begin on December 7 for three weeks, but he was not a spokesman of U.S. foreign policy. I was thinking particularly of Cambodia, where Mansfield has a special interest and relationship with Sihanouk. Teng assured me that the Chinese distinguished between the individual views of Congressmen and official U.S. policy.

"-- On normalization, I stressed the importance of some statement about a peaceful settlement on the Taiwan issue and said that we would think over the various principles that had been discussed on this trip to see whether further progress could be made. I indicated that we would continue the gradual reduction of our presence on Taiwan in any event.

"Teng professed Chinese lack of interest in a gradual process and said that they would prefer a brisk solution. However, if the U.S. were not ready to meet Chinese principles, Peking could wait. They did wish to solve this question, he said, but only in accordance with their principles. There was some further discussion during which we agreed that no further progress could be made during this trip, but that we would think the matter over further.



"Teng then launched into a philosophical discussion of familiar Chinese themes, perhaps under Mao's instructions. He stressed that the world is in great turmoil and that one had to be prepared for eventual war. He then stressed that the initial Soviet threat was against the West rather than China and said that the "polar bear" was after us. He said that they were ready for war and were not afraid of it. I again pointed out that whether the initial attack was against the West or the East, the ultimate danger remained the same.

"We then had an exchange on the stepped-up Chinese rhetorical attack on us on Third World issues. I had hit him hard on this previously and he seemed defensive. I pointed out that it was inconsistent for the Chinese to want us to have an active foreign policy in order to counter Moscow, while at the same time China attacked us publicly in such areas as the Middle East, where we are trying to erode Soviet influence, and the energy situation, whose weakening of the West could not be in China's interest. In short, I said the Chinese should make sure that their rhetorical cannons did not hit their own fortifications. I emphasized the importance of U.S. leadership; the need for close cooperation with Europe and Japan who otherwise would be demoralized; and our strategy in such areas as the Middle East and Cyprus.

"We then closed on a cordial note with both sides agreeing that the exchanges had been very helpful and candid, and the trip productive. It was clear to both of us that despite our philosophic differences, which we have always acknowledged, we can work together on many international issues of primary concern.

"That evening I hosted a return banquet at the Great Hall of the People. The Foreign Minister's toast, like the Chinese toast last year at the return banquet, was brief and somewhere between correct and friendly. I tailored my own remarks accordingly, giving them a modest upbeat quality. After dinner we worked out, without difficulty, the brief communique announcing your trip to the PRC. We had prepared a longer draft similar to the one used on last year's trip, but it would have essentially repeated Shanghai Communique principles and further plans for trade and exchanges, etc. The Chinese suggested that we should have a brief dramatic announcement of your trip whose importance would speak for itself, rather than cluttering up the text with reiterating of past statements. I agreed with the Chinese view, which I think was correct, and merely modified their text to give a positive description of our conversations and state the unchanged commitment to normalization by both sides.



"Friday we visited Soochow with its exquisite gardens and canals, full of beautiful proportions and great variety of perspective. It was a balmy day, the gardens were tranquil and everyone on both sides loosened up amidst great cordiality. It was a warm and very pleasant personal ending to the visit.

"I will be sending you further analyses of the trip's significance, although I have already reported the main substantive themes. I will also discuss some of the more sensitive aspects with you personally."





TOTALLY EMBARGOED FOR
RELEASE AND WIRE TRANSMISSION
UNTIL 11:00 A. M. (EST)

NOVEMBER 29, 1974

Office of the White House Press Secretary

JOINT U. S. -PRC COMMUNIQUE

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, U. S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, visited the People's Republic of China from November 25 through November 29, 1974. The U. S. and Chinese sides held frank, wide-ranging and mutually beneficial talks. They reaffirmed their unchanged commitment to the principles of the Shanghai Communique. The two Governments agreed that President Gerald R. Ford would visit the People's Republic of China in 1975.

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