

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMLAND
Operations, CIS, G-2
Compilation Branch

APO 500
29 July 1947

SUBJECT : AMANO Shoichi
DATE OF BIRTH : 10 May 1898
PRESENT ADDRESS : 37 Yakuoji-machi, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo.
FORMER RANK : Major-General.
DATE OF RETIREMENT: 31 Mar 1946.
PRESENT OCCUPATION: Official of the 1st Demobilization Ministry.

Incl 2

SECRET

20 May 1947

Memo for the files

AMANO, Shoichi

A report from G-2 reveals no information on this witness.

1 - 2

Translated by
Chieko Uwanaga

AMANO Shōichi

DOMICILE : Aichi Prefecture

DATE OF BIRTH 1898, May, 10

1918, May 30 Completed the regular course of the Central
Military Preparatory School.

" Appointed Cadet and attached to the
19th Infantry Regiment. (War Ministry)

June 7 Assigned to the 19th Infantry Regiment.

" Appointed Superior Private, Infantry
(the 19th Infantry Regiment)

Aug. 1 Promoted to Corporal, Infantry
(the 19th Infantry Regiment)

Sep. 1 Promoted to Sergeant, Infantry.
(the 19th Infantry Regiment)

1918, Dec 1. Entered the Military Academy.

1920 May 26 Graduated from the Military Academy.

June 18 Returned to ~~the~~ former regiment.

Promoted to Sergeant-Major, Infantry
Appointed ~~to~~ probational officer
(the 19th Infantry Regiment)

Nov. 22 According to Article 10 of the Military
Replacement Regulations, the following
was decided at the Officers' Selection
Board.

Dec. 25 Appointed Second Lieutenant, Infantry.
(Cabinet)

" Assigned to the 19th Infantry Regiment
(War Ministry)

1921, Jan. 20 Invested with the 8th Court Rank, Senior
Grade.

1923, Dec. 15 Appointed First Lieutenant, Infantry
(Cabinet)

1924, Mar. 1 Invested with the 7th Court Rank, Junior
Grade

1926, Aug. 6 Discharged from the post and assigned
to Cadet Unit of Preparatory course,
the Military Academy. (War Ministry)

1928, Dec. 24 Ordered as a student in the Army
General Staff College. (War Ministry)

1929, Jan. 16 Assigned to the 19th Infantry Regiment
(War Ministry)

May 2 Invested with the 7th Court Rank,
Senior Grade

1930, Mar. 6 Appointed Captain, Infantry
(Cabinet)

1930, Aug. 1 Appointed a battalion adjutant of the
19th Infantry Regiment (War Ministry)

1931, Dec. 12 Appointed a company commander of
the 19th Infantry Regiment; (War Ministry)

1932, Apr. 4 Appointed a company commander of
the 7th Infantry Regiment (the
main post was as before) (39)
(not recorded in the Official Gazette)
(War Ministry)

1932, Dec. 24 Appointed a battalion adjutant of the
19th Infantry Regiment
Ordered to serve with the Inspectorate
General of Military Training
(War Ministry)

1933, Feb. 6 Decorated with the 6th Order of the Sacred
Treasure.

1934, Mar. 5 Appointed a member of the Inspectorate

5

General of Military Training
(War Ministry)

- 1934, June 1. Invested with the 6th Court Rank, Junior Grade.
- 1935, Mar. 30. Stationed in Germany and Holland for Military Research. (War Ministry)
- 1934, Apr. 29. Decorated with the 5th Order of the Sacred Treasure for his services in the 1931-34 Affair.
- 1935 Aug 1. Appointed Major, Infantry (Cabinet)
- 1938 Mar 1. Appointed Lieut.-Colonel, Infantry (Cabinet)
- 1938 Apr. 15. Invested with the 6th Court Rank, Senior Grade.
- June 6. Appointed executive officer of the Army Munitions Deliberation Committee.

(War Ministry)

1938, Aug. 15. Discharged as a executive officer of the Army Munitions Deliberation Committee. (War Ministry)

1939 Mar. 23. Decorated with the 4th Order of the Sacred Treasure.

1939 Dec. 28. Held additional post as staff officer of the First China Expeditionary Fleet. (War Ministry)

1940 Aug. 1. Appointed Colonel, Infantry (Cabinet).

1940 Aug. 15. Invested with the 5th Court Rank, Junior Grade

1940 Apr. 29. Decorated with the 4th Order of the Golden Kite and the Intermediate Cordon of the Third Order of the Rising Sun, for his

services in the China Incident

- 1944 Aug 1 Appointed Major-General (Cabinet)
(not recorded in the Official Gazette)
- Aug 15 Invested with the 5th Court Rank, Senior Grade.
- 1945 Aug 18 Appointed assistant plenipotentiary to the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces at Manila. (Cabinet)
- 1946 June 15. Appointed ~~an~~ officer who take charge of demobilization business.
- Invested with the second grade.
(Cabinet)
- 1945, Dec 28 Invested with the 4th Court Rank, Junior Grade. (Cabinet)

15 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Mr. Sutton**
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,
Investigative Division, IPS
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

Witness General

WITNESS

AMANO, Shoichi

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Curriculum Vitae

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

E P M
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

371

CURRICULUM VITAE

AMANO Shoichi

Domicile: Aichi Prefecture

Date of Birth: 1898, May, 10

- 1918 May 30 Completed the regular course of the Central Military Preparatory School.
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business.
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(Cabinet)

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
May 8, 1947
DEFENSE - Division III - China
AMANO - Direct

Page 3301

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF AMANO, Masakazu^{SHOICHI}
by Mr. Logan

21,743

The witness stated he lived in Tochigi Prefecture. He identified Exhibit 2564 as his affidavit and verified it.

21,748

The affidavit stated that the 11th Army * completely occupied Wuchang, Hankow and Hanyang on October 25th. Actual progress turned out contrary to expectations. When the main line of

21,749

defense was destroyed, * the enemy abandoned the defense of Wuchang and Hankow and surged backwards westerly along the southern and northern districts of the Yangtze and the Japanese forces were able to enter these districts without bloodshed.

21,750

After the Tapien Mountain break-through, the witness was sent from headquarters to lead the advance corps surrounding the enemy and reached Hankow on November 4th. The city was crowded with residents and with foreign traffic. Shops were open, carrying on a brisk business. Except for the barricade around the French Settlement and the remains of the thoroughly burnt Japanese Settlement, it was difficult to see any significant indication of war's havoc. It was probably due to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had deserted these places prematurely and had retreated without leaving troops for defense that the ravages * which would have been committed by the Chinese were actually very small. Few residents had left their houses previous to the fall.

When the operation commenced, the three principles "don't burn, don't violate, don't loot," which the commander always advocated, were printed and distributed among the army. The commander of the 6th Area Army carried out the campaign to capture Wuchang and Hankow when he was commander of the 11th Army, and he was appointed commander of an Area Army to capture Kweilin and Liuchow. His past policy had always been to defeat Chiang but love his people. When he arrived at his new post he made an announcement that his principle would be to defeat America but love her people.

21,751

The wishes of the Supreme Commander and those of the Area Armies were reflected in the minds of every lower commander and he believed this operation was executed under strict military discipline without violation.

Page

In carrying out Operation No. 1 the thing which was most difficult and hampered progress was the difference in air power. This resulted in the absolute control of the air by the enemy and in stoppage of long-range supply lines, such as water routes and railways.

21,752 At the time of the Changsha campaign the Chinese had 590 planes at the front, with 170 bombers. The Japanese had 220 planes with a force of light bombers of 160. At Hengyang the Chinese had 750 planes with 240 bombers, while the Japanese had 160 planes with 25 light bombers. At Kweilin the Chinese had 800 planes with 300 bombers, while the Japanese had 150 planes with 25 light bombers. * The ratio of Japanese air force to that of the enemy at the beginning of operations grew larger as the operation progressed and as the campaign moved toward the southwest the flight range increased, which made the difference in number seem greater.

21,753 The Japanese air force was unable to go into action in formation during the day. Only a few went in at dawn and dusk. With the inferiority of bombers, both in quality and number, the best the planes could do was to infiltrate into enemy territory at night and bomb out airfields or carry out sniper-like single plane attacks at night on strategic military objectives. A tactic of pattern bombing which would destroy a greater part of a city, as the Sino-American air force did at Changsha and Hengyang * after the Japanese captured them, was something that they could not dream of undertaking.

21,754 In Changsha and Hengyang, the citizens who returned to the cities suffered casualties and lost their homes through indiscriminate bombing of enemy planes. Since with Operation No. 1 the Japanese armies fought directly with those of the United States, caution was taken to observe and prevent violation of international law.

The witness identified Exhibit 2565 as a document issued in the name of the Commander of the China Expeditionary Force, with instructions to its soldiers with regard to the civilian population. It was announced to newspapermen and released to the newspapers. These were the details of the

Page

21,755 concrete presentation of the three principles mentioned in his affidavit. The original order has been burned and does not exist. * When asked whether this was a true copy as published in the Asahi Shimbun on July 6, 1944, the witness stated he did not know whether at that time it was published or announced in the paper. The contents include the order. * With respect to the burning of the original, the secret military documents were ordered to be burned by orders of the Central Commander, issued about August 15, 1945.

21,756

21,757 The Chinese Expeditionary Force * burned all the documents it had in its possession. Regardless of whether the documents were secret or not, they were all burned together by the army. The contents of this particular excerpt were issued at the time of the Hsiangkuei operation in 1944. When asked why the order * dated June 20, 1943 was not published until July 6, 1944, the witness stated that the contents were similar. It was issued at that time just prior to the start of the Hsiangkuei operations as instructions to the officers and men and it was shown to the press to show Japanese intention.

21,758

21,759 Exhibit 2565 * was published with the title, "Embrace the People with Great Love." It stated that those stationed in the front line to execute the Holy War should especially embrace the people of China with great love and to conduct themselves so as not to be shameful in the eyes of heaven and earth. They must not loot, rape, or violate the innocent people and must not burn their houses. Except for official business they must not enter private homes or take or destroy any utensils. They must pay reasonable compensation when they purchased things; they were to regard the prevailing currency * as though it could be circulated freely as before. Coolies were not to be requisitioned arbitrarily. Even those seemingly harmful to the army, excepting those directly hostile, should not be punished arbitrarily but should be treated according to orders. Soldiers of the Chungking army who surrendered by ceasing resistance and bringing a certificate must be reported to superior officers at once and their orders carried out.

21,760

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
May 8, 1947
DEFENSE - Division III - China
AMANO - Cross

Page 3304

Page

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY Mr. Comyns Carr

21,761

When asked what was done by way of arbitrarily punishing those whose conduct was directly hostile, the witness said that actually because he was not stationed at the front lines he did not know about this point. * These were put in as a preventative measure so that these things would not occur. When asked by the President whether a Japanese private could shoot anybody whose conduct he regarded as directly harmful, the witness stated when the person is engaging in hostile acts he can be dealt with accordingly. By punishing them arbitrarily there is included the meaning that acts of atrocity should not be permitted.

21,762

The certificate mentioned in the order was a piece of paper, postcard size, * on which it was said that the bearer would be given preferential treatment. Regulations for the general handling of such matters was carried out. He believed that the certificate said that those possessing them would be given special or preferential treatment. He did not believe that the document was an invitation to the troops to shoot those who did not have certificates. When asked whether it would be an invitation to a private Japanese soldier to shoot an unarmed civilian who displayed hostility in some way, the witness stated it did not invite them to do so. In fact, it told them they should not do so. The President noted there was no provision for punishing those who break the order.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

--VS--

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

Sworn Deposition

Deponent: AMANO Shoichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in our country I hereby depose as follows:

AMANO, Shoichi

I The Date of Birth: May 10th, the 31st year of Meiji (TN: 1898).

II Permanent Domicile: No. 18, Tannotsuchida, Katano Village,
Nukada Gun, Aichi Prefecture.

Birth-place: Same as permanent domicile.

Present Address: Nishida, Toyohara Aza, Nasu Village, Nasu Gun,
Tochigi Prefecture.

III Outline of my background:

In December, 1920: Commissioned 2nd Lieutenant, Infantry.

In December, 1931: Graduated from Army War College.

In December, 1932: Appointed Member of the Office of the
Inspector General of Military Training.

In August, 1935: Promoted to Major, Infantry.

In August, 1935: Appointed Resident-officer in Germany.

In March, 1938: Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel.

In July, 1938: Appointed Staff Officer with the 2nd Army of the Central China Expeditionary Forces.

In December, 1938: Appointed Staff Officer with the 11th Army of the Central China Expeditionary Forces.

In July, 1940: Appointed Instructor in strategy at the Army War College.

In August, 1940: Promoted to Colonel.

In February, 1941: Appointed Chief of a Section of the General Staff.

In December, 1942: Appointed Staff Officer with the China Expeditionary Force.

In August, 1944: Promoted to Major-general.

In September, 1944: Appointed ^{Assistant} ~~Deputy~~-chief of Staff of the 6th Area Army.

In February, 1945: Appointed Chief of a Section of the General Staff.

IV Concerning Our Triumphant Entry of Hankow.

In order to besiege Wuchang and Hankow, the 2nd Army advanced westerly, south of the Hwai River first of all intercepting the Peking-Hankow railway in the vicinity of Sinyang. Thereafter turned south and based on a plan of surrounding and capturing Chinese troops in the Wuchang-Hankow area in conjunction with the 11th Army departed towards

Def. Doc. # 1353

the end of August from the vicinity of Luechow its place of muster. They besieged Sinyang in the early part of mid-October and on the 20th of the same month with its main force frustrating

Def. Doc. No. 1353

the enemy troops who were put to rout to the west in overflowing numbers from the district containing west of the Peiking-Hankow Line and the Tapieh Mountains, and occupied such important posts as Yingshan, Tean, and Yingcheng situated on the route of the enemy's retreat by the 26th of the same month.

In the meantime the 11th Army, defeating the enemy stationed along the Yangtze River, completely occupied Wuchang, Hankow, and Hanyang on the 25th of October.

At the time, Chiang Kai-shek had the main defence line extending from the Tapieh Mountains in the south to Tien kia-chen in the north and moreover had built not only several positions at the front in the eastern and northern areas but also a rear line of positions extending from south to north at Tayeh together with positions fortified doubly in the immediate neighborhood of Wuchang and Hankow. Here he had stationed more than one hundred and several scores of divisions in these positions and assigned them with the duty of defence. In other words, it was inevitable that the Chinese armies would plan to wage a decisive battle against us in the area around Wuchang and Hankow, and with much apprehension we had to take into consideration the likelihood of powerful reinforcements from both North China and South China. It was also observed that the Japanese army even after they seize the main line of defence from progress of their operations would still be compelled to engage in the difficult direct assault of Wuchang and Hankow.

On projecting the military operations at the end of August, the Commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Force in Central China

Def. Doc. No. 1353

distributed to every army under his command a notice showing its officers and men in what manner they should behave on their entry into Wuchang and Hankow. Its contents contained such provisions necessary to orderly entry as to avoid the outbreak of international disputes, selection of troops and the limitation of strength of the troops after entry, agreement between the Army and Navy on the districts for policing and methods of maintaining order among the residents along with a map on which localities of rights and interests of European and American States were minutely drawn. The 2nd Army set about making a brief note showing its officers and men how to behave themselves on their entry into Wuchang and Hankow based on the above but taking it into consideration that there was no knowing what aspect of operations might be occasioned, on making a direct attack on Wuchang and Hankow in the furtherance of present operations, although they were supposed to take charge of the complicated area of lakes, marshes, and rivers lying north-west and due west, the Army made only general rules and showed them informally to the corps under its command retaining for a while the selection of the unit and the minimum strength of the unit to enter

in accordance with the circumstances and situation at the time.

The actual progress of our operations, however, completely turned out contrary to our expectations. When the main line of defence was destroyed (The average distance from the front of this line and either Wuchang or Hankow is about 40 ri. (RN: 1 ri is approximately 2½ miles), the enemy abandoned the defence of Wuchang and Hankow and was so badly routed as to surge backward westerly along the southern and northern districts of the Yangtze River that the Japanese forces were able to make a triumphal entry into Wuchang and Hankow without bloodshed.

After the Taping Mountain break through operations, I was dispatched from Army Headquarters to lead the operations of the advanced corps surrounding the enemy and reached Hankow on November 4th. At that time the City of Hankow was, however, crowded with its residents and above all, the traffic of Europeans, Americans, women, and children was frequent and the shops there were open everywhere carrying on a brisk business quite contrary to the expected loneliness and dreariness immediately following a siege. But for the barricade surrounding the French Settlement and the remains of the Japanese Settlement which was thoroughly burnt down, it was difficult to discover any significant indication of war's havoc. It was probably because Chiang Kai shek deserted Wuchang and Hankow prematurely and had retreated without leaving troops for the immediate guard and defence of Wuchang-Hankow, because the majority of the Chinese soldiers at the front had been prompt in fleeing west with but a few passing through Wuchang and Hankow that the ravages that probably would

Def. Doc. # 1353

have been committed by the Chinese soldiers were actually very small with the result that these some places escaped both direct and indirect ravages of war. There were very few residents who had left their houses previous to the fall of these places also. In other words, on the triumphal entry into Wuchang and Hankow, there was neither a skirmish nor a battle for clearing the streets of enemy soldiers with the exception of a slight resistance offered by an enemy unit of little strength in the neighborhood of Tai-chia-shen, in the outskirts of the city. So the Japanese forces were able to effect a peaceful entry with grand ceremony without any bloodshed. Therefore, of the dos and don'ts made by each corps in compliance with the Expeditionary Force Commander's orders, only the principal rules for the prevention of friction, for the maintenance of military order, and for policing and guarding in general became required to be observed as the matters concerning the enemy no longer needed to be considered.

Furthermore let me describe the characteristic qualities of the Yangtze River based upon the remarks of the dwellers and the elders in addition to experiences which I have had in connection with this matter.

The Yangtze River, during the year varies greatly in the volume of water from increasing greatly to decreasing a great deal at other times as in the neighborhood of Hankow where it is some 50 ft. in depth at its high and about 7 ft. deep at its low. At the time of entry, the decrease of water was comparatively slow to the average year and presented a very rare phenomenon in that it was more than 20 ft. deep even at the beginning of November affording the navigation of vessels of pretty fair size. Again the Yangtze River is not so great in its

flowing velocity on the surface but with the increase of depth below the surface the flowing velocity gains with much greatness and added to this are many whirlpool spots. So anything once thrown into it hardly ever floats to the surface again and it is common for it to continue flowing downstream in its submerged state. It is also said that anything happening to drift into shallows while flowing sub-surface and comes to the surface thence forth keeps flowing afloat. In other words, this special characteristic holds true not only in the middle of the stream but also near the banks so the Yangtze is said to be a river with most dangerous characteristics in which lies the reason why there are hardly any dwellers who dare to swim in it even in the summer season.

v. Concerning Operations No. 1

It was not until the latter part of 1943 that the operations in the Middle Pacific gradually shifted to the western area of the ocean and the American Air Forces threatened to become powerful in the interior of the Chinese Continent. As we had to expect difficulties in the pursuit of our war effort would become greater in the near future from airraids upon our home land, interception of communication and traffic between us and the Southern Sphere, the Imperial Headquarters in January, 1944, ordered the Japanese Expeditionary Force in China to put into force the operations of overthrowing the main bases of the enemy air force in South-western China.

Of course, though we intended to make it impossible for the U.S.A. to establish connections with China directly in the South China

area and to open up the land traffic between our country and the Southern Sphere and to secure it as an additional objective in the pursuit of the operations in question by separating South-eastern China from Chungking by having our force's wedge into the Hsing-kwei district, the fundamental duty with which our Expeditionary Force in China was charged was in defeating and destroying the Chiang government, so the seizure of positions such as the air force bases was not our sole object. We made it an object of operations to precipitate that government into decline by administering all sorts of war policies jointly.

Hereupon, the Commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Force in China had the North China Area Army start operations for opening up the Peking-Hankow Railway Line in late mid April with a force of several divisions and succeeded in doing so in one month. From the end of May the 11th Army (having the strength of about eight divisions) advanced on the area along the "siang-Kwei Line" and besieged Changsha and Hengyang. In September, under the leadership of the 6th Area Army Commander, the 11th Army from somewhere near Hengyang and the 23rd Army (having the strength of about three divisions) from the Kantong districts operated jointly and captured Hweilin and Livchow in the middle of October, and finally in the beginning of the following year of 45, having established communications between the Kiangsi air force base and the Peking-Hankow Line attained air objective after nine months' of strenuous operations. The peculiar character of this operation was the great difference between our strength and that of China (with increased Americanized troops) especially between

our air force and that of her which made this operation unusually difficult, especially our transportation of supplies. Our task of transportation met with increased difficulty as the operation moved towards south.

1. The Commander-in-chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Force in China, called the commanders of all Armies and Area Armies to the Nanking Army barracks in the middle of March '43, and revealed his plans for operations, gave them instructions and asked them to reach their goal successively.

At that time, as Senior Staff-officer in charge of planning operations, I drew up the manuscript of the Commander-in-chief's instructions. I began with the difficult war situation that Japan was facing, then as main body of the instruction wrote about the true aim of the Operation No. 1. I concluded that every unit must be in high morale and in enduring spirit in carrying out and continuing this "wedge-in" operation which involved the distance of one thousand and several hundred kilometers. The concluding phrase was "in reaching our objective, you must overtake the enemy like an autumn wind sweeping away dead leaves". I presented the manuscript to the Commander for approval. Then, after reading it for a while, the commander added the following sentences at the end and approved it: "In facing the enemy forces you must overtake them like an autumn wind sweeping away dead leaves, and in coming in contact with the people you must be kind like the spring sun shining upon tender grass. With this sense of both strictness and kindness

you must endeavour to reach our objective in this operation"

The idea "to frustrate the enemy but to love the people" was the basic principle in settling the China Incident and it was also the fundamental principle which our Empire followed in the holy war. It was what our Commander-in-chief wanted most. Even in undertaking this difficult operation, the Commander hoped not only for what was necessary purely from the operational point of view, but also more than anything else for his troops' love for the people during the battle. I had nothing but respect for his such attitude.

When this operation commenced, the three principles "don't burn, don't violate, don't loot" which the Commander always advocated, were printed and distributed among the entire Army. The Commander of the 6th Area Army carried out the campaign to capture Wuchang and Hankow sometime back as the Commander of the 11th Army and this time again he was appointed Commander of an Area Army in capturing Kwellin and Liuchow. His past policy in leading his troops has always been "defeat Chiang but love his people". When he arrived at his new post this time, he made an instructional announcement that his principle will be to "defeat America but to love her people", and spread this idea throughly among his officers and men.

The wishes of the Supreme Commander and the Commanders of the Area Armies were also reflected in the mind of every lower commanders and I believe that this operation was executed

under strict military discipline without any violations.

2. In carrying out the Operation No.1 what was most difficult and what hampered the progress was the already mentioned differences in air power between our forces and the enemy. This resulted in the absolute control of air by the enemy and in the stoppage of long range supply line such as water routes and railways.

Relative Strength of Our Airpower and that of the Enemy.

Period		At the time of Changsha campaign	At the time of Hengyang campaign	At the time of Kweilin campaign
The Sino- American Air Force	Number of planes at the front	590	750	800
	Number of bombers	170	240	300
The Japanese Air Force in China	Number of planes prepared	220	160	150
	Number of light bombers	30	25	25

The estimated airstrengths of our forces and that of the enemy were roughly as shown on the foregoing table. The ratio of our air force to that of the enemy at the beginning of the operation grew larger and larger as the operation progressed, and in addition as the campaign moved towards south-west the flight range increased which made the difference in number of planes seem greater. In other words, our air force was unable to go into action in formation during the day. Only a few planes went into action at dawn and dusk. With the marked inferiority of bombers both in quality and in number, the best our planes could do was to infiltrate into

Def. Doc. #1353

the enemy territory at night and bomb his airfields or to carry out ^{sniper-} like single plane attack at night upon strategic military objectives. Such a tactic of pattern bombing which destroys a greater part of a city as carried out by the Sino-American Air Force upon the City of Changsha around June 25 after our capture of the city and upon the city of Hengyang around August 13, also after the city fell into our hand, was something that we could not even dream of undertaking.

Accordingly, the movements of our troops and the transportation of supplies being done only at night due to the free action of hostile planes, we were not only restricted in respect of time and quantity of supplies but also suffered increasing damages while in the process of such movements and transportation.

Of course, being different from an operation which is carried out on a vast ocean where one side is kept in check almost completely because of his inferior air power, we were able to execute somehow our operation in China since it was on land. However, it was far from being an easy task because both at the front and rear we were at the mercy of enemy planes.

3. That the inhabitants in a theater of operation flee the locality voluntarily in advance and then return gradually to their residences after the campaign is over is what usually happens. But in Changsha, Hengyang, and Kweilin the enemy commanders had issued proclamations to compel the inhabitants to move out in advance.

Ref: # 1353

In this connection, at the beginning of the operation even the use of "red" and "green" candles (TN: vomiting and tear gases) was prohibited by the orders of our Expeditionary Force in China.

Since these candles are not in fact so-called "prohibited gases", there were times in the past when they were put to use in small quantities in self-defense and in increasing the power of smoke chemicals. However, these were prohibited so as not to cause misunderstanding and bring about reprisals.

Def. Doc. # 1353

(according to the statement made by the Chinese army). Therefore, not a single case of inhuman act and atrocity, which are commonly feared to occur immediately after an area is captured, did not take place because there were no people in these areas.

Also, what was different in this operation was that in Chungsha and Hengyang the citizens who had returned to the cities suffered casualties and lost their homes through the indiscriminate bombings of the enemy planes, as already mentioned before, and some citizens were much delayed in returning and rehabilitation.

4. Since with the Operation No. 1, our armies came to fight directly with those of the U.S.A. also on the China Continent, caution was taken to observe and to prevent violation of international laws.

In this connection, at the beginning of the operation even the use of "red" and "green" candles (TN: vomiting and tear gases) was prohibited by the orders of our Expeditionary Force in China.

Since these candles are not in fact so-called "prohibited gases", there were times in the past when they were put to use in small quantities in self-defense and in increasing the power of smoke chemicals. However, these were prohibited so as not to cause misunderstanding and bring about reprisals.

On this 9th day of April, 1947.

at Tokyo

Deponent /S/ AMANO, Shoichi (seal)

Def. Doc. # 1353

I, IMANARI, Yasutaro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness : /S/ IMANARI, Yasutaro (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth with holding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ AMANO, Shoichi (seal)