

Present add. Hyogo Ken, Nishinomiya Shi, Genda Minoru  
Kariya, Aza, Hiatayashi, Go. Yae Sano

Genda Capt  
Home add - Hiroshima Ken, Yamagata Gun, Kake-machi,  
Gendaism -  
Fighter aircraft

To return to this place in  
December

1904 Naval Academy Sea duty - General  
1928 joined Air Force Kasumigaura  
Training group - graduated 1929 Nov.

1925 Visited USA on training Izumo

San Francisco Captain Shigeoka  
Midshipman

Calle de Atlix, Acapulco, Balboa  
Manzanera, San Francisco, Victoria,  
Vancouver, Honolulu - 55 Islands -

1928 Traveled on IZUMO Lt(jg)

Shanghai, Formosa, Hongkong, Singapore  
Batavia, Freemantle, Australia Adelaide  
Melbourne, Hobart, Sydney, Wellington  
Auckland, Suva, Honolulu - 55 Islands -

1929-1930 Yokosuka Air Force

<sup>Feb</sup> 1930 - <sup>Nov</sup> 1930 Carrier Akagi

<sup>Nov</sup> 1930 - <sup>Mar</sup> 1931 ~~Retd to~~ Yokosuka A.F. Learned

air fighting tactics under PAF  
Squadron under <sup>Nov 1930</sup> Chappel -

+ Lt Col. Wimpate - 4 mos. Then  
ret'd to Akagi.

<sup>Mar</sup> 1931 - Ret'd to Akagi.

To Nov '31 - AKAGI

Nov '31 - Nov '32 - Instr at Kasemigawa Pilot School.

Dec '32 - June 1933 - Instr at Yokosuka AF fighter training -

June 1933 - Sept 1933 - Carrier RYUJO

Sept. 1933 - Oct. 1933 Instr. Yokosuka

Nov 1933 - Nov. 1934 Returned to RYUJO.

Nov. 1934 - Nov. 1935 Instr at Yokosuka.

Dec. 1935 - July 1937 Attended Naval War College Tokyo.

July 1937 - Dec 1937 - Staff Officer of China Area Air Force.

Jan. 1938 - Nov. 1938 - Ret'd to Yokosuka as Instructor

Dec. 1938 - Oct. 1940 - Asst Naval Attache for Air in London.

Nov. 1940 - Mar. 1941 - Staff Officer <sup>for air</sup> 1st Carrier Div.

Apr. 1941 - June 1942 - 1st Air Fleet Staff Officer for Air.

July 1942 - <sup>2nd</sup> Sept 1942 - Senior Pilot Carrier

ZUIKAKU

Oct. 1942 - <sup>mid</sup> Nov 1942 - 11th Base <sup>air</sup> Fleet Staff Officer for Air. RABAL



In charge air operations.  
On Nagumo's staff.

Q - Left Nov. 26 2 yrs

How to receive instrns from Naval Ministry in case.

NM wanted to turn back - if weather inquiry  
- how turn back

A. - Message was to be rec'd by wireless -

as seen as  
~~Message~~ rec'd code message from CinC combined  
fleet - Adm Yamamoto - climb mount Nitaka  
Nitaka Yama Nobore = (all forces attack)

This message was rec'd on <sup>26<sup>th</sup></sup> Dec. Date not certain.

Exact message was: In code

Nitaka Yama Nobore code trustd X day is  
December 5th.

Where were you when rec'd message -

N Pat 40

Speed 12 to 14 knots. (315 mi/day)

Position 1500 to 1800 mi from Etorofu Bay.

What time on 26 Nov left? <sup>about</sup> At 0600 on 26 Nov.

Had down any stalls around or regular speed.

Ans. For refuelling had dropped speed to 6 knots

to each day. Greatest problem -

Q when decided to attack - What speed - course?

Ans. Proceeded at 12 knots toward P.H. until  
reached pt. <sup>True North</sup> 700 mi. away.

Q - Procedure from then on.

A - After refueling at that pt - ordered Tanker  
back + rest 26 knots to P.H. - in front  
of group 3 submarines

7 survivors

Total flying personnel - 500 to 600

Lost Period - About 50 to 60

Planes - 29

Of survivors - about 10% surviving

Q - Other despatches after, MIITAKA desk  
receiving other desps from ADM Yamamoto.

A - Think no other desps rec'd.

Q - How know what was in P.H.?

A - Rec'd all that info from Imperial Hqs.

Q - How received it?

A - Always rec'd no report as to location

US Fleet and then rec'd about

last time rec'd about 3<sup>or 4</sup> days before  
attack - How many ships in each

4 areas - knew exactly what BB what place

Yamato at  
Mitsushima Bay

on

Q. Intercepting messages from.

Q. wh new messages com through negot  
at war tr - broken know?

A. Chur - did not listen to radio but they  
got info TH or know that no hope  
negot being lost to scgl conclusion.  
sitn becom in tension.

Heard nothing of dealt war.

Not in their mind, not in their line.

Did not hear anything -

See any ships

Q. Intercept message - Patrol planes - Broke  
the code?

A. Does not know - Intercepted - Radio bearings  
when planes were searching.

Ind at all in SW sector - patrols.

Q. Any planes or ships?

A. No

Q. If had seen what <sup>action</sup> had they have done -

If had met - 3 subs in front wd see first -

wd wd back - main group wd have turned off -  
on weak powered whales.

A - How far ahead were submarines

approx 100  
~~About 200~~ miles - not sure  
Course was <sup>planned & then approved</sup> dictated by

Reason why decided N route - weather

Route - boats - weather would be bad

foggy high seas ships not at all

Refueled almost every day

A good job

Got hair from that planning

How long work on it

Sept-Oct-Nov

Yamamoto -

American -

Planned course  
long route

All goes back to Feb 41 - Yamato on edge  
talked to Admiral Onishi <sup>then called by Navy</sup> of Navy saying  
to be a war between US & Japan, Japan has no  
hope given wing of US fleet in American

area is not destroyed. So he told Admiral

Onishi to study & draw up a plan. Cagth

Admiral Onishi called me and asked him

if he could formulate plan. He worked

on it that month (Feb) & presented to Onishi

who presented to Admiral Yamamoto for approval

Genda

That plan at that time was to find out  
what possible or a possible attach  
PA & if " how carry out.  
Changed - then put out.

Then that plan discussed at war college  
Sept. 2 - 3 teams? yes.

Those who partcptd - in maneuvers -  
Yamato - Nagumo - <sup>Adm Utsuki. C. C. Combined Fleet</sup> Yanagichi - Kuroki  
Capt Oishi - Genda - Kuroshima  
Comd Sasaki Lt Com Oro.

No army.

Does not know what army informed.

At war college - One room - none to enter  
even this group.

Gen Staff - Capt Managi - Comdr. Miyo  
Mementoff Capt Sonooka  
Adm Fukudome.

Nitaki order  
was

3 orders -  
written?



27 Nov  
28 Wed  
29 Th  
30 Fri

Dec 1 Sat  
Dec 2 (after)  
conclude

Genda

yellow to red  
short  
wing

high eyebrows  
close set black  
high cheek bones  
flat nose  
black hair teeth

Pearl Harbor - talk - (long talk to Dupt)

He knew there was an fleet in Hown waters -  
wondered whether it fleet at Lathin Roads or PH  
Submerged submarine day before attack to Lathin  
got word fleet not at Lathin - so figured fleet must  
be at P.H. - figured at least 5 battleships in PH  
Believed received message on count of ships  
but after attack got numbers.  
Submarine sunk just before attack

Was element of surprise considered to be vital  
to success of attack?

In warfare of course surprise element is necessary  
but when you're so near to another nation  
that you're in attack is when you're not ready.

Did you count on attack starting before  
American Navy was warned of attack  
and placed on alert?

Did you wonder whether

What do you consider the warning  
at P.H.? Believe, no  
Thought deal had been made -  
Since declarat not made does he  
consider attack unfair.

highly laudable -  
One says didn't expect the  
take him  
To punish a person from  
behind when not looking  
would be rash (unfair).  
Explains PH was how surprise  
element //

Quada  
Wed a.m.  
28 Nov

Q. In why plans had to work 2  
elmt of surprise for attack?

A. In form of my plan I took in  
elmt of surprise  
but prep'd to force attack  
if enemy prep'd. [On bridge Akagi]  
So primarily stressed fight

Q. combat they other had of  
of taking own 3x own strength.

Q. Dec. 2 or 3 - 8 Dec. Any other  
message indicate whether prep'd.

Wed have  
sunk  
after -  
Dec 2 or 3.

A - Can't recall - believed  
rec'd no message <sup>regarding plan</sup> Radio bdcst  
from Hawaii - what was nature of bdcst  
of " " " ?

A - Whitehouse or complacent. Heard  
(Hind) Did not listen Staff Comm for comms  
on B. One, — Comdr. killed on Saipan.  
Based on another thing - Intercept of message  
by Sectn on board ship.

phd stool  
fine line  
field  
blk his streak with  
modest -  
JA -  
Hakf. H. M. etc. - <sup>1944</sup> had dots.

A. wireless. (Happertab)

Q. any system on flagship for intercepting trans  
pacific tel calls.

~~known~~

Hiroshima  
- <sup>Exp. et.</sup> <sub>Edm</sub>

A - what mean - Imp Hdqrs. NGS

How did Imp Hdqrs

Not familiar Infantry angle -

Intended to send

Courtesy - died on Saipan -

A - Drew plans for attack 2 - If US prepd send so all this -  
If not .. send up in two  
waves

2d plan - in send out 2 waves. First atk with

0330 to dep<sup>st</sup> <sup>st</sup> torp - High Bomb - then Dive Bomb

Idokan - Jond - Iohaleh

The 3 with Torp simultaneously atkd.

Left 2 because smoke wd

Where did planes come from that hit Kanakoo

A. On Nagai Hiroshima Bay

Adm Hiroshima <sup>re: 1 - Mon 2 Dec 8</sup> <sup>2 - Tues 9</sup> <sup>3 - Sun 8</sup>

gm Staff. on Dec <sup>X-5</sup>  
mess out - 2 Dec <sup>X-6</sup>

Jan 2013  
Dec.

po. early December? Yes -

Q Recd before left Etoroju?

A. Preptu for

Akagi & Kaga ~~at~~ Basebo }  
To Shokaku & rest at Kure

from  
~~14 Nov~~  
to 8 Nov.  
to 12 "

Q Included orders statg X day wd  
be 8 Dec?

A - As far as can recall no specific  
day <sup>set by order</sup> except early December  
but heard rumors <sup>of orders</sup> that X day  
8 Dec. stating

Q - Before NIITAKA message. had  
word Dec 8 but was included in message.

Ans -

Q - Many other code messages <sup>Yes - Q -</sup> included  
on warships in Pearl Harbor? No recollect.

Why Hiroshima <sup>Aoyama</sup>  
Hiroshima

I think reason Hiroshima Bay - surrounded by mountains  
~~great protection~~ is attack of Bros in Manchuria. <sup>sp. by Russian</sup>

Suda

Suda

Total personnel  
500 to 600 in  
where he was during  
attack

Q - Yamamoto -

A - After attack met Adm Yam.  
Adm Nagumo did all talking

Q - What " said

A - Sent to Tokyo to take back  
picture PH - Then ret'd Kure -

Army - but did not talk.

Q - Army - called all air ops  
in to find you will done.  
Present to Adm.  
Navy ministry.

Got picture

Surprise...

One he must.

Q - all 6 carriers load  
planes. & left only 3A  
for defense

350 planes in air

81 ftrs -

145 <sup>alive</sup> Bombers

104 high bombers.

40 torpedos

Wed. Am. 28 Nov. <sup>2 like cor</sup> Wada  
Notes

Interview of Capt. Minoru Genda 1000-1130

Present address: Hyogo Ken, Nishinomiya,  
Danjo, Aza Hirabayashi, 90 Yae Sans.

Home address: Hiroshima Ken, Yamagata  
Gun, Kake-machi / To be located here after  
December.

### Personal History

Born in August, 1904

1924 Graduated Naval Academy.

1924-'28 General sea duty

1925 Visited USA <sup>as midshipman</sup> on training ship, Iyumo,  
commanded by Capt. Shigeroka. Called  
at Hilo, Acapulco, Balboa, Man-  
zanilla, San Francisco, Victoria,  
Vancouver, Honolulu, South Sea  
Islands.

1928 Traveled on Iyumo as Lt. (j.g.). Called  
at Shanghai, Keelung, Hongkong,  
Singapore, Batavia, Fremantle,  
Adelaide, Melbourne, Hobart,  
Sydney, Wellington, Auckland,  
Suva, Honolulu, South Sea Islands.

1929-30 Yokosuka air Force.

Feb., 1930 - Nov., 1930 Carrier Akagi

Nov. 1930 - Mar., 1931 Returned to Yokosuka Air Force and learned air fighting tactics under RAF Squadron Leader Chappel and Flight Lt. Wingate. 4 months.

Mar., 1931 - Nov., 1931 Duty aboard <sup>carrier</sup> Akagi.

Nov. 1931 - Nov., '32 Instructor at Kasumigaura Pilot school.

Dec., 1932 - June, 1933 Instructor at Yokosuka air force in fighter training.

June, 1933 - Sept., 1933. Duty aboard <sup>carrier</sup> Ryujo.

Sept., 1933 - Oct., 1933. Instructor at Yokosuka.

Nov., 1933 - Nov., 1934 Returned to Ryujo

Nov., 1934 - Nov., 1935 Instructor at Yokosuka

Dec., 1935 - July, 1937 Attended naval war college.

July 1937 - Dec 1937 Staff officer of China area air force.

Jan. 1938 - Nov. 1938 Ret'd to Yokosuka as Instructor

Dec 1938 - Oct 1940 asst Naval attache for air in London.

Nov. 1940 - Mar. 1941 Staff officer for air, 1st Carrier Division

Apr. 1941 - June 1942 1st air Supt, Staff officer for

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air.

July 1942 - End of Sept. 1942 - Senior pilot, carrier Zuikaku

Oct. 1942 - Mid Nov. 1942 - Staff officer for air, 11th Base  
air Fleet, Rabaul

Nov. 1942 - Mid Jan. 1945 - Staff officer for air operations  
at Imperial Headquarters.

Jan 1945 - Oct 1945 - Commander 343rd Naval air  
Group.

Oct 1945 - assigned to Sasebo

Q- We have heard a lot of talk of "Gendaiism".  
~~and we believe you are its founder.~~ Will  
you tell us ~~about it?~~ what it is?"

A- While at Yokosuka, there were two trains of  
thought in regard to fighter combat and the  
use of aircraft carriers. My theory was that  
maneuverability should be considered first  
and speed second. The other school contended  
that speed should be first and manue-  
verability second. The majority of those  
at Yokosuka followed me. It was finally  
proven that I was right in the China  
battles. However, I changed my mind  
in regard to it during the middle of the



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recent was to speed first and maneuverability second.

Q - Why did you reverse your theory?

A - With the advance of science, better planes and weapons were being developed. Another aspect of my theory pertained to the use of aircraft carriers. Prior to November 1940, the theory of the navy was to use them separately and in dispersed formation. I reached the conclusion that they should be used in groups rather than separately. I derived this idea from a saying of an old Chinese military critic, called "Sun", who lived about 2000 years ago. He said, "Do not place your expectations or hopes on the enemy not daring to invade. Instead be always prepared." My theory was that aircraft carriers, when used separately and individually, were vulnerable to enemy attacks, but if used in groups, they would be able to ward off an attack by their group strength.

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Q - Was this the theory you used in the Pearl Harbor attack?

A - Yes.

Q - What were your duties on Nagumo's staff?

A - I was staff officer in charge of air operations.

Q - Did you leave for Pearl on 26 November?

A - Yes.

Q - How were you to receive instructions from the navy ministry if the Washington negotiation had been concluded, thus nullifying the necessity to attack?

A - The message was to be received by wireless.

Q - How were you to be informed to go ahead as planned?

A - The message was to be received from Cinc Yamamoto of the Combined Fleet. This message was "Kiritaku-yama nobore", a code message ordering all forces to attack.

⑥

This message was received on the 2nd or 3rd December. I am not certain about the date, but the exact message was in code. It was "nitaka yama noboru", followed by another code indicating that X day was 8 December.

Q- Where were you when this message was received?

A- At North Latitude  $40^{\circ}$  / Indicated approximate position on map.

Q- What was your speed after leaving Etorofu?

A- About 12 knots.

Q- How far were you from Etorofu when this message was received?

A- Our position was from 1500 to 1800 miles from Etorofu.

Q- What time did you leave on 26 November?

A- At about 0600.

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Q - Did you proceed on a regular speed?

A - No. We had to drop our speed down to six knots every day for refueling. This was our greatest problem.

Q - When it was decided to attack, at what speed did you come in?

A - We proceeded at 12 knots toward Pearl Harbor until we reached a point true north 700 miles away. After refueling at this point we ordered the tankers to leave and the rest of the ships sped toward Pearl Harbor at 26 knots. In front of our group, we had three submarines to scout our way.

Q - Could you name the captains of the various ships?

A - Yes. Akagi was captained by Capt. Kishi Hasegawa. This was the flagship of Admiral Nagumo and I was aboard it. Kaga by Capt. Jisaku Okada. Soryu by Capt. Ryusaku Yanagimoto. Shokaku by Capt. Jozime. Hiryu by Capt. Tomoo Kaku. I can't recall

①

the captain of Zuikaku.

Q- What was the total flying personnel?

A- From 500 to 600.

Q- How many planes did you lose?

A- 29 planes.

Q- What was your personnel loss?

A- About 50 to 60.

Q- How many of the fliers that participated in the attack are still living?

A- Only about 10 percent. The leaders still living are Lt. Sakamoto, Makino, Niikida and perhaps Ichihara.

Q- After the "Nimitz" despatch, did you receive any others from Adm. Yamamoto?

A- I think no other despatch was received.

Q- Then, how did you know what was in Pearl Harbor?

A- We received all that type of information

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from the Imperial Headquarters.

Q - How did you receive it?

A - We had been receiving a monthly report in regard to the location of the United States Fleet. The last one was received about 3 or 4 days before the attack. It told us how many ships were in each area and from the customary practice of the United States navy, we knew exactly where the battleships were berthed.

Q - Did you intercept any message from the United States?

A - We listened to the Radio broadcast of Honolulu stations.

Q - Did you hear any news pertaining to the Washington negotiations? Whether it had ended in a failure or not?

A - I did not listen to the radio, but they got information to the effect that there was

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no hope for the negotiation being brought to a satisfactory conclusion and that the situation was becoming tenser.

Q- What was your purpose in checking the broadcast of these radio stations in Honolulu?

A- We wanted to know how the situation in Honolulu was, whether it was normal or abnormal. We were able to do this by the tenor of the broadcast.

Q- Did you hear anything about war being declared?

A- We did not hear anything. In fact, it was not in our mind, as it was something out of our field.

Q- Did you intercept any of our messages?

A- Yes. From patrol planes.

Q- Were you able to break our code?

A- No, but we were able to take a radio

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bearing, which indicated that the patrol planes were all in the south-western area, leaving the northern area wide open for us.

Q- Did you see any plane or ship?

A- no.

Q- What action would you have taken if you had seen one?

A- If we had met one, the three submarines in front would have seen it first and warned the main group by a weak powered wireless, and the main group would have turned away.

Q- How far ahead were the submarines?

A- I am not sure, but about 100 miles in front.

Q- Who planned this course?

A- I did, and it was approved by the higher ~~command~~



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command.

Q- How did you come to decide on this course?

A- I took into consideration the weather and the ship lanes. I found out that the weather over that area during that particular time of the year was bad and the sea was foggy and high. Besides, no ship lane crossed it. So the possibility of meeting a ship was slight. But it made refueling very difficult as we refueled every day.

Q- You did a very good job of planning. could you show us your return route?

A- I traced his course on the map. It went north, then northwest, then west on about north latitude 42, then south. At this point, two carriers broke off to attack Midway. I continued tracing his course. Headed toward the Marshalls, then north to Shikoku and into the Bungo channel to Kure.

Q- How many months did it take you to plan this?

A- It took me three months, from September to November.

Q- When was this plan first thought of?

A- It all goes back to February, 1944. One day, Adm. Yamamoto had a talk with Admiral Onishi, then commander of the 11th Carrier Division, telling him that if there is going to be a war between Japan and America, Japan has no hope of winning as long as the U.S. Fleet in the Hawaiian waters is not destroyed. So he told Admiral Onishi to study and draw up a plan. Hence, Adm. Onishi called me and asked if I could formulate a plan. I worked on it that whole month (Feb.) and presented it to Adm. Onishi, who presented it to Adm. Yamamoto for approval.

Q- What was that plan?

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A- That plan was to find out whether it was possible or impossible to attack Pearl Harbor. And if possible, how it should be carried out. It was changed several times.

Q- Then, this was the plan that was discussed at the war games held at the War College in September?

A- Yes.

Q- How many teams were there? Three?

A- Yes.

Q- Could you give us the names of the persons that took part in it?

A- They were Admirals Yamamoto, Nagumo, Ugaki, Yamagishi, <sup>and</sup> Kusaka, Captains Onishi and Kuroshima, Cmdr Sasaki, Lt. Cmdr. Ono and myself and representatives from the General Staff.

Q- Who were the representatives?

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A. Admiral. Fukudome, Capt. Yanagi,  
Capt Tomiska and Cmdr. Miya.

Q- Were there any army representatives?

A- I don't know whether the army was informed  
or not, but at the war college, one room  
was set aside for this purpose and no  
one outside of this group was allowed to  
enter it.

Q- Now, in executing the plan, what pre-  
caution did you take?

A- I knew that the American fleet was  
in the Hawaiian waters, but I was wor-  
ried as to whether a part of the fleet  
was at Lahaina Roads. So the day before  
the attack, we dispatched a submarine  
to Lahaina and got word that the fleet  
was not there. So I figured that the fleet  
must be in Pearl Harbor with at least  
five battleships. I believe we received  
a message on the count of ships, but I got  
the number after the attack.

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Q- Was the element of surprise considered to be vital to the success of the attack?

A- In warfare, <sup>the element of</sup> surprise, of course, is necessary. Hence, the ideal time to attack is when foe is not ready. Therefore, to plan it that way is a matter of common sense. But Adm. Yamamoto warned us never to do anything rash (unfair).

Q- Did you plan on starting the attack before the American navy was warned of the attack and placed on alert?

A- I wanted this questioned explained. So we explained that to him that before we fight a person we tell him we are going to fight him, but to punch a person from behind, when he is not looking would be unfair, and asked the following question!

Q- Do you consider the Pearl Harbor attack to be wrong?

A- I believed it was not wrong. I thought that the declaration of war had been made.

Q- Since declaration of war was not made, do

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you considered the attack to be unfair?

A- The Pearl Harbor attack was planned with the element of surprise taken into consideration, but we thought war would be declared first, about an hour or an hour & a half before the attack.

Q- Then, in working the plan, you took into consideration the element of surprise, didn't you?

A- In forming my plan, I took into consideration the element of surprise, but we were prepared to force the attack if the American navy had been prepared. So in our training, I primarily stressed fighter combat training and we were confident of being able to take on three times our strength.

Q- Did you receive any other message indicating whether the American navy was prepared between 2 or 3 December to 8 December?

A- I can't recall of receiving any, but I believe we received no message. We listened to the radio broadcast from Hawaii to find

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out the situation in Hawaii.

Q - What was the nature of the broadcast?

A - I did not listen to it. It was done by a section set up for the purpose of intercepting messages and was headed by Cmdr. Ono, who was killed on Saipan.

Q - Did you have any equipment aboard the flagship to intercept Trans Pacific telephone calls?

A - No. I did not have a telephone aboard, but it was not strong enough to intercept trans-

Q - From whom did you get the message regarding the number of ships in Pearl Harbor?

A - From the Imperial Headquarters.

Q - What do you mean by the Imperial Headquarters?

A - Navy General Staff.

Q - How did they get their information?

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A - I am not familiar with that aspect.

Q - Since you drew the plans for the attack, how were you going to carry it out without any information?

A - I had two plans. One was to send all 80 and some odd fighters we had, if United States was prepared. This was to wipe away all opposition before the other types of planes took off. The other was to send them up in two waves. In the second plan, the first attack was to be made by torpedo planes, horizontal bombers and dive bombers. The strafing of the airfield was to be done after this, because if they were strafed first, the smoke resulting from it would cover up the location of the ships in Pearl Harbor and hinder the task of the torpedo planes, horizontal bombers and dive bombers. After that, Hickam, Wheeler and Ford Island were to be attacked simultaneously.

Q - Where did the planes that hit Kaneohe



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come from?

A - From the Wheeler Field group.

Q - When you received orders to make war preparations, did it state for early September?

A - Yes.

Q - Did you receive it before you left Etosofu?

A - No. When the order to make war preparation was received, the Akagi and Kaga went to Sasebo for minor repairs and the Shokaku and the rest put in at Kure.

This preparation took from 8 November to 12 November.

Q - Did it state that X day would be 8 December?

A - As far as I can recall, no specific date was set in the order other than the fact that it was to be in early December. However, I seem to remember hearing a rumor or it may have been in the order that X day would be about 8 December.

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Q - Did the Nimitze message include the date Dec. 8?

A - Yes. It came in code after the phrase "Nimitze yama noboru".

Q - Did you receive other code messages?

A - Yes.

Q - Did any of them pertain to the information on the warships in Pearl Harbor?

A - I can't recall it.

Q - Did you see Admiral Yamamoto after the attack?

A - Yes.

Q - What did you say to him?

A - I had returned <sup>to Kure</sup> from Tokyo, where I had flown to deliver pictures of Pearl Harbor attack. Admiral Yamamoto called in all the air officers to commend them "well done". I was presented to him, but Admiral Nagumo did all the talking.

Q- Did all the six carriers launched their planes?  
A- Yes. We left only 30 for defense. In all there were 350 planes in the air. — 81 fighters, 145 dive bombers, 104 horizontal bombers and 40 torpedo planes.

Q - How far ahead were the submarines?

A - I am not sure, but about 100 miles.

Q - Who determined the course?

A - The course was planned by me and then presented for approval to the higher command. The reason why I chose the northern route was because the weather there was foggy and bad & fewer ships sailed there. In fact, practically no ship lane crossed that course. The sea was rough and we had a hard time refueling.

Q - How long did you work on this plan?

A - I worked for three months - September, October and November.

Q - How was it that you were chosen to draw up the plan?

A - It all goes back to February, 1941. One day, Admiral Yamamoto talked to Vice Admiral Onishi, then in command of the 11th Carrier Division, stating that

if Japan and America go to war against each other, Japan has no hope of ever coming out on the winning end as long as the U.S. Fleet in the Hawaiian area is not destroyed. So he told Vice-Admiral Onishi to study and draw up a Pearl Harbor attack plan. Vice-Admiral Onishi called me in and asked me if I could formulate a plan. I worked on it throughout that month (February) and presented my plan to Vice Admiral Onishi, who, in turn, presented it to Admiral Yamamoto for approval.

Q- What were your plans for attacking Pearl Harbor?

A- We had two plans. First, if United States was prepared we were to send in all 70 fighters. If not, we were to send them up in two waves. The second plan was to send the planes out in two waves, starting from 0330. The first was to consist of torpedo planes, horizontal bombers and dive bombers and this was

to be followed by the strafing of the airfields.  
The reason for strafing the airfields later  
was because if they had been strafed and  
bombed first, the smoke resulting from it  
would hide the location of the ships.

Q - From which group did the planes that hit  
Kaneohe come?

A - Indicated it on the chart. Wheeler Field  
group.

Q - How many planes did you lose in the  
attack?

A - 29 planes.

Q - Could you give us an estimate of the  
total flying personnel that took part in  
the Pearl Harbor attack?

A - About 500 to 600.

Q - How many of these men did you lose?

A - About 50 to 60.

Q - How many planes did you send off on the attack?

A - I have figures according to the type of planes.

Q - Could you show us who on this list failed to return?

A - I checked their names off the list.

Q - How many do you believe are still living?

A - Only about 10%. I and proceeded to check the names of those who had since been killed in action.

Q - Did you receive other despatches from Adm Yamamoto after the "Nimitaka" message?

A - I think no other message was received.

Q - Then, how did you know what was in Pearl Harbor?

A - We received all that message from the Imperial Headquarters.

Q- What do you mean by the Imperial Headquarters?

A- The Navy General Staff.

Q- How did they obtain the information?

A- I am not familiar with that aspect.

Q- How did you receive it?

A- We had been receiving a monthly report as to the location of the U.S. Fleet. The last time that we received such a report was about 3 or 4 days before the attack. It just indicated how many ships were in each area / drew a map of Pearl Harbor and indicated the areas, but we knew the types of ships from the past practice of the U.S. Navy.

Q- Did you intercept any message from Hawaii?

A- Yes, the radio broadcast from Hawaii.

Q- What news did you hear? Anything about the Washington negotiation falling through?



A- I did not listen to the radio, but I heard from others that there was no hope of the negotiation being concluded and that the situation was becoming tenser.

Q- Did you hear anything about a declaration of war?

A- I did not hear anything. It was not in our mind, because it was not in our line.

Q- What type of broadcasts was it and why was it checked?

A- They were news and ordinary news broadcast and we listened to it to check the situation in Hawaii. That is, whether the situation there was tense or normal.

Q- Did you intercept any other type of messages?

A- Yes, from the patrol planes.

Q- Did you broke our code?

A- I don't know. We were intercepting

for radio bearing. That is, to find out where the planes were searching. and through our intercept, it was indicated that they were all in the southwest sector, leaving the northern sector wide open for us.

Q - Did you see any ships or planes?

A - No.

Q - If you had seen a ship or plane, what action would you have taken?

A - If we had met any, the three submarines in front would have seen it first and would have wired it back on a weak powered wireless. Then, the main group would have turned off.

Q - Was there any system on the flagship for intercepting trans-Pacific calls?

A - None that I knew of.

Q - When you received the orders to make war preparations, did it state that X day

would be 8 Dec.?

A - As far as I can recall, no specific date was set by the order except early December. However, I think I heard a rumor, or it may have been in the orders, stating that X day would be 8 Dec.

Q - What did you do after receiving the orders?

A - The Akagi and Kaga put in at Sasebo for minor repairs, while the Shokaku and the rest put in at Kure. The preparations took from 8 November to 12 November.

Q - Did the Nimitz message include the date 8 Dec.?

A - Yes.

Q - Do you have any other information that would be of interest to us?

A - No.

air.

July 1942 - end of Sept. 1942 - Senior Pilot, carrier Zui-  
Kaku

Oct 1942 - Mid Nov 1942 - Staff officer for air, 11th  
Base Air Fleet, Rabaul.

Nov 1942 - Mid Jan 1943 - Staff officer for air opera-  
tions at Imperial Heights.

Jan 1945 - Oct 1945 - Cmdr 343rd Naval  
Air Group.

Oct 1945 - assigned to Sasebo

Q - We have heard a lot of talk on Gendairism  
and we believe you are its founder. Could  
you tell us about it?

A - My theory pertains to the use of air-  
crafts and aircraft carriers. I derived  
this theory from a saying of an old  
Chinese military critic <sup>called "Jao"</sup> who lived about  
2000 years ago. In one of his proverbs, he  
stated, "Do not place your expectations  
or hopes on enemy not daring to invade.  
Instead be always prepared". My con-  
ception is that aircraft carriers, if used

separately, are vulnerable, but if used in a group, its group strength would be such as to repel an attack. This theory was used in the Pearl Harbor attack. Another aspect of my theory pertains to aircraft. When I was on duty as instructor at Yokosuka, there were two schools of thought. My theory was that maneuverability came first and speed second; the other school emphasized speed first and maneuverability second. Most of the men sided with me and I continued to study and experiment on my theory. In the China battles, it was proven that my theory was right. However, in the middle of this war, I changed my idea to speed first and maneuverability second.

Q-What was the policy of the navy in regard to the use of aircraft prior to 1940.

A- Prior to 1940, the Japanese navy used aircraft separately and widely dispersed. But through my suggestion, concentrated or group formation came to be used.

Q. This was the theory applied in the Pearl Harbor attack, wasn't it?

Q. What were you on Nagumo's staff?  
A. I was in charge of air operations.

Q. Did you leave for Pearl Harbor on Nov. 26?  
A. Yes.

Q. How were you to receive instructions from naval ministry in case the negotiation was concluded?

A. We were to receive the message by wireless.

Q. How were you to be informed to go ahead as planned?

A. We received a coded message from admiral Yamamoto, Cinc of the Combined Fleet. It was "Nimitaka-yama nobore / climb mt. Nimitaka," which meant all force attack.

Q. When was this message received?  
(5)

A - I am not sure on the exact date, but it was on the 2nd or 3rd of Dec.

Q - What was the exact message?

A - It was in code - Niitakayama robe - with the date in code, also. The code, when translated, meant X day is 8 Dec.

Q - Where were you when message was received?

A - on N. Latitude  $40^{\circ}$ . / Indicated <sup>position</sup> on map /

Q - What was your speed after leaving Etorofu?

A - about 12 to 14 knots

Q - How far were you from Etorofu when message was received?

A - About 1500 to 1800 miles.

Q - What time on the 26th did you leave?

A - at about 0600.

Q - Did you stall or proceed on a regular speed?

A- For refueling purpose we dropped our speed to 6 knots every day. This problem of refueling was our greatest problem.

Q- Could you show us your course on the map?

A- I Traced his course on the map!

Q- When it was decided to attack, at what speed did you come in?

A- We proceeded at 12 knots toward Pearl Harbor until we reached a point True North 700 miles away from Oahu.

Q- What was your procedure from there on?

A- After refueling at that point, we ordered the tankers to turn back. The rest sped toward Pearl Harbor at 26 knots. In front of the main group we had three submarines scouting the way for us.



Quada  
28 Nov.

War Record Institute  
Jomicka

Wade  
Fri. to Sat.  
Sally

Tomorrow report to USSBS -

Return to Section of manuscript -

Assigned for time being -

In about wk  
will stay in Tokyo.