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Book # 1
Line 1 — 35

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Authority 813562
By E. NARA Date 1/10/12



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
6-2
SOUTH EAST ASIAN COMMAND

G-2 FILE COPY

File. 013.361


Date From 1951 To 1951 JAN-DEC

Line No 1 To 35

Book # 1

013,6

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LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 013 361

Sheet #6

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
pmb 34	Mil Intel Sec	12 DEC		Interrogation Rpts, Munitions facilities in China & Manchuria
rmk 5	DAFDEPTR	20 Dec		EVASION AND ESCAPE BULLETIN -25#
rmk 32	CINCFE	7 Dec	DEPTAR	C-58912: Brick personnel returned to MI in medical channels without debriefing FECCOM
pmb 34		17 Aug	Gen Ennis	MEMO: Returnees (Military Pers) from North Korea and China
rmk 32	CINCFE	29 Dec	DEPTAR	C-604059 Negative rppt submitted
pmb 35	Allied Translator & Interpreter Sec	Aug 51		MEMO: Instr for Interrogation Off
pmb	Allied Translator and Interpreter sec	1 Nov		MEMO: Instr for Interrogation Officers

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 013.361

Sheet #5

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
rmk 5	HQ FEAF	30 Oct		Evasion and escape division Deputy for intelligence
pmb 5	Mil Intel Sec	28 Nov	Asst C/S, G2 Wash DC	LTR: Trans of Evasion & Escape rpts
pmb 5	FEAF	17 Jul		LTR: Evasion and Escape Rpt 56
cd 31	G/Mil Hist, DA	Sep 51		X REF: Russian Methods of In- terrogating Captured personnel
cd 5	DofAF Wash	15 Nov		Special E&E Bulletin No. 24 (Filed separately)
rmk 1	J/L	10 Dec	CO MISG FEC	IMO: reimbursement for interroga
rmk 5	Int-REQ	10 Dec	CINCFE	LTR: US&F Evasion & Escape Bull ettin No.24
rmk 32	DEPTAR	23 Nov	CINCFE	DA87722: BRICK pers returned ZI in medical channels without debriefing in FECOM
pmb 32	CINCFE	27 Nov	DEPTAR WASH DC	C58085, BRICK pers rtn ZI in Med channels without debriefing in FEC
PMB 33		13 Dec		C/R: E&E Training Conference -XVI Corps-
pmb 5	FEC/LG	14 Dec	Asst CofS, G2 Wash DC	LTR: Trans of E&E Reports
pmb 32	CINCFE	30 Nov	DEPTAR	C58399, BRICK pers rtn ZI in Med Channels w/o debriefing in FEC
RMK 5	FEAF	8 Nov	G2	C/S: Evasion & escape report #66 interrogation of F-86 pilot
rmk 5	FEAF	28 Nov	G2	C/S: Evasion & escape report # 65 interrogation of F-84 pilot
pmb 5	FEAF	18 Dec		LTR: E&E Rpt #70 Interrogation of F-84 Pilot, Capt CRUMP, James T.

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 013.361

Sheet #5

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
hs 22	GHQ FEC		CG, 8th Army & others	LTR: Evasion and Escape Tactics and Techniques
hs 1	J/L Section	10 Sept	CG, TIS	IOM: Reimbursement for Interrogees
cd 23	CI Div	4 Sep	G2	IOM: Interrogations
ed 24	G2		FEAF	X REF: Korean Interrogation Program
hs 25	G2	9 Oct	G2, 8th Army	LTR: Special Interrogation of PsW (CCF Civilians)
ed 1	J/L	11 Oct	CG TIS	IOM: Reimbursement for Interrogees
hs 25	CINCFE	22 Sept	CG 8th Army	Des C 51374: Desire additional Interrogation of PW MAO, Chung (CCF Civilian)
hs 25	G2	16 Sept	G2, 8th Army	LTR: Special Interrogation of PWs (CCF Civilians)
hs 26	G2	3 Nov	FEAF	LTR: CEC Interrogation Program & Orientation
rak 16	G2	8 Nov	Liaison Section	C/R: Interrogation of Exchanged POW
rak 1	J/IS	10 Nov	CG TIS	IOM: Reimbursement for interrogees
rak 26	G2	11 Nov	G1	C/S: Interrogation of Correspondent
cd 28	T/Intel	14 Nov	TIS	IOM: Research Supplement, Interrogation Report, Issue #106
cd 29	TIS	15 Nov	Dist	LTR: ATIS Interrogation Report No 3037
rak 30	G2	17 Nov	Def Intel FEAF	LTR: Interrogation of repatriated released geographical Section
rak 16	HQ 8th Army	18 Oct	Comd-in Chief	LTR: Interrogation of ROKA & UN Recovered PW's

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 013.361

Sheet # 4

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
RB 1	Jap Lia	11 July	CO TIS	IOM: Reimbursement for Interrogates
hs 16	GHQ FEC MIS	23 July	CofS	MEMO: Interrogation of Returned ROKA & UN POW's
ed 5	FEAF	10		EVASION AND ESCAPE REPORT #36 Lt Col DETTRE, Rexford H.
hs 16	GHQ FEC	26 July	CG, JLCOMD & others	LTR: Interrogation and Counter Intelligence of Investigation of Recovered UN POWs
hs 5	FEAF			EVASION & ESCAPE REPORT #37 1st Lt MacARTHUR, D.W.
hs 16	G2	31 July	CG, XVI CORPS	LTR: Interrogation and Counter Intelligence of Investigation of Recovered UN POWs
hs 17	T/ntell	23 July	MIS DIV	IOM: Non-interruption of G2 Interrogation Program
hs 18	MIS DIV	11 July	G2	IOM: ATIS Geo Br Jap Repat Interrogations
5 hs	FEAF	2 August		EVASION AND ESCAPE INTERROGATION REPORTS NO. 35 (HUTTON, H.C.)
hs 16	G2	4 August	G2 8th Army	LTR: Interrogation of ROKA & UN Recovered POW's
hs 19	G2	3 August	G2 8th Army	LTR: PW Interrogation Reports
ed 20	G2	9 Aug	PMS	C/S: Transmittal of E & E Report No. 38
ed 1	J/L	13 Aug	CO TIS	IOM: Reimbursement for Interrogatee
hs 17	G2 Fiscal	9 August	MIS DIV	IOM: Non-interruption of Gw 2 Interrogation Program
hs 21	G2	23 Aug	SGS	X-ref: Distribution of Routine Interrogation Reports
ed 1	G2	1 Sep	PMS	C/S: Transmittal of E & E Report

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 013.361Sheet # 3

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
10	G2	4 Jun	C of S	MEMO: Special Briefing for the CinC - Preliminary report of Interrogation on NK POW Lt KANG, SOK KUN
11	JLCOM	9 Jun		LTR: Interrogation Report # 5 - FINNEGAN, Owen
5	FEAF ⁽⁶⁾ 360.33	15 Jun	CinC FE	LTR: Evasion and Escape Reading File Covers (Filed Separately)
12	CG 8th Army	8 Jun	CINCFE	X REF: Interrogation of 7 Russian civilians captured in Pyongyang
13	CG ATIS	14 Jun	G2	IOM: Research Supplement Interrogation Report No. 101
5	FEAF	23 June	CinC FE & others	LTR: Evasion and Escape Interrogation Reports
5	HQ FEAF	24 June	CinC FE & others	LTR: Evasion and Escape Interrogation Reports
14	G2	22 June	CofS	C/S: Policy re Interrogation of POW's by Representatives of Foreign Governments
14	G2	22 June	CofE	C/S: Same as above
HBS 5	FEAF	27 June	CinC FE & others	LTR: Evasion and Escape Interrogation Reports
HBS 5	FEAF	29 June	CinC FE & others	LTR: Same as above
HBS 5	FEAF	27 June	CinC FE & others	LTR: Same as above
hbs 15	G2	28 May	MED SEC, GHQ	C/S: Interrogation Rpt No. 35750
ed 5	G2	7 Jul	PM	C/S: Transmittal of Special Interrogation Reports
ed 5	G2	9 Jul	PM	C/S: Transmittal of Interrogation Reports

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RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

FAR EAST COMMAND

Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

ALLIED TRANSLATOR & INTERPRETER SECTION

1 November 1951

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Instructions for Interrogation Officers

1. PHASE I QUESTIONNAIRE RECOVERED UN PsW

a. This questionnaire is to be filled out by the individual under the supervision of the interrogation officer present. Answers should be printed in a legible hand. Interrogation officer's indorsement and remarks at the bottom of the questionnaire should be well considered, in order to give a clear indication of the follow-up action to be taken.

2. SAFEGUARDING MILITARY INFORMATION SECURITY CERTIFICATE

a. The certificate at the end of the circular is to be accomplished in three copies for following disposition:

- (1) One (1) copy - Individual's 201 file.
- (2) One (1) copy to file G-2, FEC/LG.
- (3) One (1) copy to individual concerned.

b. The circular covering the certificate will be thoroughly explained to the individual before he signs, with special emphasis on the importance of not giving out information which might be of value to the enemy, or which might endanger the lives or safety of friendly persons who are still in the hands of the enemy.

3. PHASE II INTERROGATION GUIDE FOR RECOVERED UN PERSONNEL

a. See instructions on the form.

b. Interrogator should also be alert to any leads not included in the guide, and should follow-up same with appropriate questions.

c. Note particularly provisions concerning legal rights of the interrogee under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and instructions on Part 2 of form.

4. G2 CLEARANCE

a. A reading panel consisting of three officers representing ATIS (chairman), 441 CIC and FEC/LG will review all Phase I and II interrogations including any accompanying comments and recommendations, and will indicate their findings on the Clearance Form provided for this purpose. Members of the panel may meet or may act separately as the situation demands (in the latter case the material will be circulated). The initials of each officer on the panel will be required on the Clearance Form for final G2 clearance.

35
013.361

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

Memo, subj: "Instructions for Interr Offs", 1 November 1951

5. GENERAL INFORMATION

a. G2 interrogation officers will report in suitable number at locations where administrative and medical processing is being accomplished and will insure that Phase I Questionnaire and Security Certificate are executed in every case where the exchangee is competent to act. This will furnish G2 with a basic roster of all returnees except severe hospital cases and an idea of their individual potential as intelligence and counter intelligence interrogees. Roster will be maintained at ATIS and will be supplemented by names of those not interrogated obtained from JLC.

b. Phase II interrogations, when indicated, will proceed with the least possible delay concurrently with the administrative and medical processing. This interrogation consists of tactical questions (Part 1) and another set of questions (Part 2) covering information pertaining to special interests (specifically JA, PM, AG Casualty, E & E and CIC). The questions in Part 2, in addition to evoking answers of direct informative value, are in the nature of "indicator questions" to help determine whether the informant should be given a still more detailed examination (Phase III) later. If a Phase III seems to be indicated this interrogation will be conducted by CIC or FEC/LG specialists, as the case may be, or by any other specialist officer (as JA, PM, etc.) whom they may invite to participate in the interrogation. ATIS will not normally be involved in the Phase III interrogations. Meanwhile both CIC and FEC/LG will have had representatives present during the Phase I and II interrogations to help select phase III potentials.

c. DA policy does not permit holding of exchangees for intelligence purposes after administrative and medical processing has been completed except in cases involving subversion, war crimes or similar contingencies. This however, will not preclude access to them by interrogation officers while still awaiting évacuation. Members of the reading panel (par 4 above) will indicate on clearance forms their recommendations as to the advisability of further interrogation where the opportunity for such interrogation exists, either locally or in the ZI after evacuation thereto.

d. UNC evacuees other than US or British who are medical cases will be reported by name to UN Liaison Group concerned, with the request that they concur in and furnish assistance for their interrogation. The British Commonwealth Forces will handle their own intelligence processing.

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
ALLIED TRANSLATOR & INTERPRETER SECTION

PHASE I QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RECOVERED U.N. PsW*

Place: _____ Date: _____

Name _____
(last) (first) (mi)

Rank and SN _____

Organization (when captured) _____
(Div) (Regt) (Company)

Place and date of capture: _____

Place and date of release: _____

Principal place (places) of internment:

_____ (place) (dates) (duties)

_____ (place) (dates) (duties)

_____ (place) (dates) (duties)

Please check YES or NO to the following questions:

Can you give information about, or instances of

- (1) Other UN PsW killed or missing in action? Yes ___ No ___
- (2) War crimes or atrocities? Yes ___ No ___
- (3) Escape from, or evasion of the enemy? Yes ___ No ___
- (4) Mistreatment of PsW by other UN PsW? Yes ___ No ___
- (5) Radio Broadcasts made by other PsW? Yes ___ No ___
- (6) Other PsW writing letters against the UN? Yes ___ No ___

Were you given any political indoctrination? Yes ___ No ___

Do you believe you can give other information of interest Yes ___ No ___

What was your treatment generally (check one)? Good ___ Bad ___ Neutral ___

YOUR SIGNATURE _____

(See over for indorsement of interrogation officer)

*(This Questionnaire and accompanying security certificate will be accomplished only in presence of and with the assistance of an authorized interrogation officer)

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

INDORSEMENT OF INTERROGATION OFFICER

(Check appropriate blanks)

- 1. Two copies signed security certificate attached Yes ___ No ___
- 2. Phase II Interrogation Report attached (___ pages) Yes ___ No ___
- 3. Further interrogation recommended Yes ___ No ___
- 4. Special comments and recommendation (see below) Yes ___ No ___

(Signature, rank and organization)

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF INTERROGATION OFFICER.

Principal place (place) of internment: _____

Place and date of capture: _____

Place and date of capture: _____

Please check YES or NO to the following questions:


- (1) Other UN POW killed or missing in action? Yes ___ No ___
 - (2) War crimes or atrocities? Yes ___ No ___
 - (3) Escape from, or evasion of, the enemy? Yes ___ No ___
 - (4) Mistreatment of POW by other UN POW? Yes ___ No ___
 - (5) Radio broadcasts made by other POW? Yes ___ No ___
 - (6) Other POW writing letters against the UN? Yes ___ No ___
- Were you given any political indoctrination? Yes ___ No ___
- Do you believe you can give other information of interest? Yes ___ No ___

What was your treatment generally? (check one) Good ___ Bad ___ Neutral ___

YOUR SIGNATURE

(See over for Indorsement of Interrogation Officer)

*This Questionnaire and accompanying security certificate will be accomplished only in presence of and with the assistance of an authorized interrogation officer.



RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMANDCIRCULAR)
NO. 43)APO 500
31 October 1951PUBLICITY IN CONNECTION WITH ESCAPED, LIBERATED,
OR REPATRIATED PRISONERS OF WAR, TO INCLUDE
EVADERS OF CAPTURE IN ENEMY OR ENEMY-OCCUPIED TERRITORY

1. Publication or communication to any unauthorized persons of experiences of escape, release, or evasion from enemy or enemy-occupied territory, activities or equipment in connection therewith, internment in a neutral country, or release from internment, furnishes useful information to the enemy. This jeopardizes future escapes, evasions, and releases, and must not be disclosed to anyone except to military officials specifically designated below.

2. It is recognized that individual returnees cannot be denied the right to relate generalized stories of their experiences. Such stories, however, must be cleared with the appropriate agency as designated by either the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Staff, United States Army; Director of Intelligence, United States Air Force, or Chief of Naval Operations. The disclosure to unauthorized persons of specific information of the following types is strictly prohibited:

- a. Information which may be of military value either to the enemy or to us.
- b. Information which may endanger the lives or security of friendly persons remaining in enemy territory.
- c. Information which would tend to make it more difficult to arrange future releases, escapes or evasions.

3. The following topics are listed specifically (but not exclusively) as items which will not be discussed except with those persons as authorized by paragraph 4 below:

- a. Methods and equipment employed by friendly personnel in assisting escape and evasion.
- b. Identities of persons assisting in escape and evasion.
- c. Traitorous acts by United Nations personnel.
- d. Criminal acts against United Nations personnel.
- e. Acts of espionage against the enemy.
- f. Methods used by enemy interrogators for political indoctrination and to gain intelligence with types of questions asked by them.

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RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

g. Methods employed by prisoners of war in resistance to such interrogations and indoctrination.

4. Subject personnel shall not be interrogated on the circumstances of their experiences in escape, evasion, release, or internment, except by authorized agencies. Personnel authorized to receive types of information covered by this circular will be designated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Far East Command, or equivalent United States Naval Forces, Far East or Far East Air Forces authorities. Only such authorized personnel will conduct formal interrogations. Interrogees have the right to demand identification and authorizations for conducting these interrogations, and will not allow themselves to be questioned by any person who cannot produce such documents.

5. It will be the responsibility of the officer in charge of the Phase I interrogations of the returnees to insure the execution of the following certificate by all personnel covered by the provisions of this circular.

C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-E

"I certify that I have read and fully understand all the provisions of (General Headquarters, Far East Command, Circular Number 43, 1951), and will at ALL TIMES hereafter comply fully therewith.

"I understand that disclosure of military information to unauthorized persons will make me liable to disciplinary action.

"I realize that it is my duty during my military service, and later as a civilian, to take all possible precautions to prevent disclosure, by word of mouth or otherwise, of military information of this nature."

Name (Print) _____ Signed _____
Grade _____ SN _____ Dated _____ Place _____
Unit _____ Witness _____

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

DOYLE O. HICKEY
Lieutenant General, General Staff with Troops
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

C. C. B. Warden
C. C. B. WARDEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General



RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED NATIONS COMMANDCIRCULAR)
)
NO. 1)APO 500
31 October 1951PUBLICITY IN CONNECTION WITH ESCAPED, LIBERATED,
OR REPATRIATED PRISONERS OF WAR, TO INCLUDE
EVADERS OF CAPTURE IN ENEMY OR ENEMY-OCCUPIED TERRITORY

1. Publication or communication to any unauthorized persons of experiences of escape, release, or evasion from enemy or enemy-occupied territory, activities or equipment in connection therewith, internment in a neutral country, or release from internment, furnishes useful information to the enemy. This jeopardizes future escapes, evasions, and releases, and must not be disclosed to anyone except to military officials specifically designated below.

2. It is recognized that individual returnees cannot be denied the right to relate generalized stories of their experiences. Such stories, however, must be cleared with the appropriate agency as designated by either the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, United Nations Command, or officers designated by him. The disclosure to unauthorized persons of specific information of the following types is strictly prohibited:

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c. Traitorous acts by United Nations personnel.

d. Criminal acts against United Nations personnel.

e. Acts of espionage against the enemy.

f. Methods used by enemy interrogators for political indoctrination and to gain intelligence with types of questions asked by them.

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

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C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-E

"I certify that I have read and fully understand all the provisions of (General Headquarters, United Nations Command, Circular Number 1, 1951), and will at ALL TIMES hereafter comply fully therewith.

"I understand that disclosure of military information to unauthorized persons will make me liable to disciplinary action.

"I realize that it is my duty during my military service, and later as a civilian, to take all possible precautions to prevent disclosure, by word of mouth or otherwise, of military information of this nature."

Name (Print) _____ Signed _____
Grade _____ SN _____ Dated _____ Place _____
Unit _____ Witness _____

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

DOYLE O. HICKEY
Lieutenant General, General Staff with Troops
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

C. C. B. Warden
C. C. B. WARDEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General



RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 FAR EAST COMMAND
 Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
 ALLIED TRANSLATOR & INTERPRETER SECTION

PHASE II INTERROGATION GUIDE FOR RECOVERED U.N. PsW

Name of Informant _____ (Rank and SN)

Name of Interrogator _____ (Rank and SN)

INSTRUCTIONS:

Topics are suggestive and should be developed in accordance with informant's ability to discuss them. Restrict questions generally to matters of current intelligence interest. Write answers on plain paper with informant's name on each page, and attach completed report to Phase I Questionnaire. Number all pages at bottom.

TOPICS FOR QUESTIONING

(Give location and dates of observation whenever possible)

PART I

1. Military Installations Observed
 Camps, barracks, storage and supply dumps, fortifications, air fields, naval bases, repair plants, prison camps, radio stations
2. Military Units and Concentrations
 Type, organization, number of troops, nationality, equipment, general activity
3. Military Movement
 Travel of troops, supplies, armament, etc., by vehicle, railroad, water or other means, indicating size, routes, direction, security measures, etc.
4. Weapons and Armor
 Tanks, artillery, aircraft, special weapons (type and number observed)
5. Military Construction
 Buildings, roads, railroads, airfields, ships, fortifications, communication facilities, etc.
6. Special Defensive Measures
 Air raid shelters, camouflage, trenches, obstacles, stock-piling of food and other supplies, blackouts, civilian evacuation
7. Military Training
 Type of training, maneuvers, exercises. Who were being trained?
8. Personalities
 Presence of important officials, advisors, etc. Native or foreign. What did they appear to be doing?
9. Propaganda and Psychological
 Nature of, effect of, mental attitude of people and troops
10. Indications of Enemy Intentions
 Any other indications observed which do not come under above headings, such as issues of combat supplies, conscription or discharge of personnel, enemy press and radio trends, current rumors.

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RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

PART II

The following questions are designed to obtain information on treatment of PsW, casualties, war crimes, escape and evasion, subversion and other subjects of special interest. They are also "Indicator Questions" to help determine whether the informant should be interrogated in more detail later. All answers should be reported and comments or recommendations added on the basis of these answers. IMPORTANT: Where suspects of subversion or similar crimes are developed in the course of interrogation, warning will be given of the suspect's legal rights under Art 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice, together with the statement that previous testimony given by him cannot be used against him.

11. Prison Camps and Staging Areas

Information on locations, size, lay-outs, population and organization of camps or staging areas, number and types of guards, methods of segregating PsW, methods and routes of evacuation.

12. Treatment of PsW

Information on seizure and search, punishments, medical attention, discrimination or favoritism, passes, safe conduct guarantees. Were you photographed or finger-printed by the enemy?

13. Enemy Attitudes

Experiences of a friendly nature. Difference of attitudes of front line troops and rear area personnel. Did you make any friends? Who? Did you exchange addresses for later correspondence? Is bribery effective? What kind of bribes are best? Effect of UN propaganda.

14. Enemy Indoctrination

Were you given any Communist indoctrination during internment? Were you required to attend public gatherings or lectures? Did you sign any papers, swear to any statements or take any oath during your internment? Did they tell you what to write home? Did they mention any contacts in the US? Did the enemy assign you any type of mission to be accomplished after your release?

15. Enemy Interrogation

How many times were you interrogated? Places and dates. Methods used. Identities, descriptions, race and attitude of individual interrogators. Inducements offered to you to talk (privileges, special benefits etc.). Threats. Did they ask questions on our intelligence or espionage activities?

16. Escape and Evasion

Plans made by you or other PsW to escape. Tries made, methods used, routes taken. Did anybody help you? If so, who? What suggestions can you give to help others plan their escape? Give all the information and advice you can on evasion tactics and equipment.

17. Other PsW

Give all the information you can on other PsW of whom you know, and other groups of PsW. Do you know of anyone who may have collaborated with the enemy? Who had special privileges or treatment? Who was used as an interpreter or office worker? Who may have accepted an espionage mission? Who broadcasted or wrote letters against the UN? Identify them, and tell exactly what they did, if known.

18. Sabotage, Guerrilla Warfare and Underground Activities

Tell all you know about these types of activities noted by you or by others in the enemy rear areas.

19. KIA, MIA and Other Captured Persons

Names, organization, descriptions, dates, circumstances. If hearsay, state source.

20. War Crimes and Atrocities

Cite instances observed or of which you learned and circumstances. Identify both perpetrators and victims.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 813562

By CEC NARA Date 1/10/12

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section

NO. _____


THE BEARER

IS AUTHORIZED ACCESS TO UNITED STATES RECOVERED PRISONERS OF WAR FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING INTERROGATIONS

FOR THE AC OF S, G-2:

E. H. F. SVENSSON
COL, ARMOR
COMMANDING ATIS G-2.

1a.



CONFIDENTIAL

17 Aug 51

MEMORANDUM

TO: General Ennis

SUBJECT: Returnees (Military Personnel) from North Korea and China

1. This morning I conferred with Col Williamson and Maj Murray (JA Section) and discussed in general the many problems arising from Returnees (military personnel) who have been held Prisoners of War in North Korea and China, with special emphasis on interrogation procedures to be followed

- a. For the purpose of getting general information
 - b. For the purpose of obtaining specific information with respect to those Returnees suspected of treasonable acts.
2. Interrogation of Returnees is desirable in order to gain information
- a. On atrocities perpetrated on prisoners by the enemy (JA interest)
 - b. Of intelligence value (G-2 interest)
 - c. Of subversive activities by Prisoners of War (G-2 interest)
 - d. Of misconduct by Prisoners of War against fellow prisoners (JA interest)
 - e. On casualties, missing persons, etc. (AG interest).
3. As stated above, items b and c are of primary interest to G-2.

4. It is believed advisable that initially all Returnees be treated alike. There should be no segregation and no line of demarcation in treatment between those Returnees suspected of activities falling under items c and d and others. Segregation of suspects at the initial stage of interrogation may cause the individuals concerned to become suspicious and refuse to talk. This may, inter alia, negate our (G-2) efforts to obtain possible valuable intelligence information.

5. It is believed that initially each Returnee should be required to answer a questionnaire which would not include any questions relative to his own activities as a Prisoner of War but

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would contain a statement calling attention to Article 104 - Aiding the Enemy, MCM 1951, and include questions relative to the activities of fellow prisoners. This initial questionnaire, excluding self-incriminatory questions, would then make incorporation of a cautionary statement advising the individual of his personal rights unnecessary.

6. All such initial questionnaires would then be screened, and from the information derived therefrom relative to "activities of fellow prisoners" decision could then be reached as to the person or persons whom it was considered necessary to investigate and question. From this point all persons whom it was decided to interrogate would have to be advised at the outset of the interrogation as to their rights.

7. If the evidence obtained through the interrogation and investigation of an individual discloses a prima facie case of treasonable activities the next question is: what court shall have jurisdiction over him and under what section or sections of what applicable law.

8. In the "Unified Code", MCM, 1951 there is no offense categorized as treason. I feel, however, that by giving Article 104 - Aid to the Enemy a liberal interpretation we could construe "giving aid to the enemy" to include radio broadcasting and thus might be enabled to try a person so broadcasting under said article by either a general court or a military commission. The JA however feels that treasonable acts involving radio broadcasting activities do not come within the interpretation of Article 104 of the "Unified Code". In any event we are all in agreement, however, that a federal court has jurisdiction over the offense. As authority for this statement, Winthrop on "Military Law and Procedure", page 629, states: "Treason as such is not properly cognizable by a courts martial".

9. The particular section of the US Code under which the individual concerned may be prosecuted is Section 2381, Title 18, which states in part: "Whoever owes allegiance to the United States ...adheres to their enemies...giving aid and comfort to the enemy is guilty of treason...". The US Code also makes provision for prosecuting an individual who "having knowledge of the commission of treason" does not disclose or make known such knowledge. (Title 18, Section 2382 - Misprision of Treason).

10. The policy in the Army during the last war has been to refer treason cases to the federal courts for trial. No treason cases are known to have been tried by either a general court or a military commission during the last war.


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11. The national policy with reference to cases involving treason has been to try all such cases if the evidence so warranted.

12. There is no statute of limitation with respect to treason and hence a treason case may and is often tried several years after the offense has been committed.

J. S. C.

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G-2, GHQ

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INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CIDiv/ExGp/JSB/vvm

(For use within G-2 only)

File No: _____ **Subject:** Interrogations **Date:** 4 Sep 51

FROM: CI Div **TO:** G2 **PHONE:** 26-5652
Thru: MIS Div **NAME:** Lt Col Bochnowski

Comment Number

5

1. Reference par 2c, supra. The Phase I cards in CI Div are filed according to the soundex system for each year of arrival, and under this set up it should not be a difficult matter to pull out the cards on the 6000 names for initial screening by the personnel from Geographic Branch, T/Intel.

2. CI Div reiterates that a circularized questionnaire might prove to be a psychological boomerang. The next three or four months will be very critical in the Japanese-U.S. relations and everything should be done to avoid any actions that might be of propaganda value to Japan Communist Party and/or the Soviets for use to array public opinion against the U.S.

3. CI Div concurs in MIS Div's recommendation that the plan to circulate questionnaire not be favorably considered.

1 Incl
n/c


----- E. C. E. -----

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CIDIV/EXGP/JSB/vvm

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G-2, GHQ

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CIDIA/EXGP/12B/vm

(For use within G-2 only)

File No:

Subject: Investigations

Date: 1 Sep 51

FROM: CI Div

THRU: MIS Div

NAME: Lt Col Bochnowski
PHONE: 26-2822

Comment
Number

2

1. Reference par 30, supra. The Phase I cards in CI Div are filed according to the sounder system for each year of arrival, and under this set up it should not be a difficult matter to pull out the cards on the 6000 names for initial screening by the personnel from Geographic Branch, T/Intel.

2. CI Div reiterates that a circulate questionnaire might prove to be a psychological boomery. The next three or four months will be very critical in the Japanese-U.S. relations and everything should be done to avoid any actions that might be of propaganda value to Japan Communist Party and/or the Soviets for use to array public opinion against the U.S.


3. CI Div concurs in MIS Div's recommendation that the plan to circulate questionnaire not be favorably considered.

I Incl
w/c

----- E. C. H. -----

GS Cobb

CIDIA/EXGP/12B/vm




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G-2, GHQ

25217

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

LSW/jes

File No:

Subject: Interrogations

Date: 27 August 1951

FROM: Geog. Branch

TO: G-2
Thru: T/Intel
GI Div
MIS Div

PHONE: 26-8582

NAME: L. S. Wilson

Comment
Number

4

1. The purpose of the paper is to request approval and allocation of \$400 for the purpose of obtaining additional information about Soviet towns. It is our considered belief that these 6,000 "Underguard" people afford a good source of information required by Town Plans Unit to discharge their responsibility.

2. Reference C/N 2, Town Plans, formerly a part of ATIS is familiar with 1,301,000 Phase I Cards on file. The data they contain is inadequate because:

- a. Only one place of interment is listed.
- b. Many may have passed thru or been held in towns of great importance for a period almost equalling their largest assignment and yet not be noted on Phase I Card.
- c. Phase I Cards are filed by ship and arrival date, not by camp or area. To get the 6,000 names 216 unwanted cards would have to be examined for each of the required cards.
- d. There is no indication of present employment, or retentiveness of memory on Phase I Cards.
- e. Expenditure of \$400 thru Japanese Demobilization Center would not tie up G-2 personnel in a card file search, and could not be a "psychological boomerang". It will materially reduce the number of call-ins and in the long run cost less.

3. Reference C/N 3. Attention is invited to the fact that no "Underguard" personnel were given Phase II or III reinterrogation so none could "give on first interrogation". This is not reinterrogation. Wringer IBM program is not complete, will be generalized rather than specific, and will require additional research upon completion.

4. Recommend allocation of ¥ 150,000 for purpose of surveying Underguard Group. Survey to be done by Japanese Demobilization Center, thus reducing cost, time, labor and obviating psychological boomerangs, newspaper advertisements, and unnecessary interrogation expenses.

1 Incl
n/c

-----L.S.W.-----

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G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

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(For use within G-2 only)

File No: _____ **Subject:** Interrogations **MISD/TNS/ao**
Date: 22 Aug 51

FROM: MIS Div **TO:** G2 **PHONE:** 26-7489
NAME: Col Stark

Comment
Number

3

1. MIS Div concurs in Col Ewert's remarks, IOM #2, 20 Aug. However, it is believed that a good percentage of the "Underguard" group, particularly those who failed to "give" on first interrogation and who have been back in Japan for at least a year or more, have lost some of their Communist fervor. It is therefore suggested that a sample reinterrogation of a certain percentage of this group who are known to have been in the most sensitive areas, and selected from Phase I Cards or other effective method, be conducted. In this regard, it is suggested that FEAF "Wringer" assistance in the selection of the reinterrogation "test group" be solicited as the Wringer Project interest in sensitive areas is believed to closely parallel that of Geo Br. The Wringer reinterrogation of Japanese repatriates has been quite extensive (in connection with the USAF Global Bombing folder) since their unilateral reinterrogation program was approved by the CofS. FEAF Wringer experience in reinterrogations should prove of great assistance to Geo Br in this field.

2. Additionally, FEAF Wringer is in the process of compiling tabulations by IBM of all repats returned to Japan (from Soviet areas). G2 is on distribution for a copy of these tabulations and the first should be received in the next few days. These tabulations give the names of all repats who were interned at any place during any period prior to repatriation. Tabulations are coded to give all pertinent information regarding rank, period of internment, place of internment, occupation during internment, etc. The use of these systematic tabulations should prove invaluable to Geographic Branch, and it is felt that these will contain not only the information Geo Br desires, but all information available or obtainable.

3. In view of the above, it is recommended that the plan of Geo Br to circulate questionnaires, as stated in IOM #1, 16 Aug, not be favorably considered.

4. Recommend this action be classified SECRET.

1 Incl
Sample Phase I Card
and Questionnaire

T.N.S.

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CI Div/JSB/sk

20 Aug 51

Interrogations

Col Ewert

G-2

26-5652

Thru: MIS Div

Lt Col Bochnowski

2

1. The Central Files, Civil Intelligence Division contain approximately 1,301,000 Phase I Cards on Japanese POWs returned from various areas in the Far East. The information on these cards is essentially the same as sought by the Geographic Branch, T/Intel, as shown by the sample inclosures (Incl 1). Admittedly these Phase I Cards do not have registered on them every locality in which Japanese POW was interned but they do list the place of the longest interment. It is believed that the perusal of the CI Div Phase I Cards will accomplish generally the same purpose of preliminary selection of informants as would the mailed questionnaire. This process could be done without revealing our intentions prematurely.

2. It is believed that the only individuals granted any semblance of a freedom movement in Siberia were Soviet-selected POWs who were members of either the Democratic Group (Minshu Grupp), the radical anti-Fascist Committee (Han Fashisute Minshu IINKAI), or the propaganda section of the Japanese Newspaper (Nippon Shimbun), who were used for Communist indoctrination of other POWs. Some of these individuals have already been interrogated; it has been proven, because of their pro-Soviet sympathies and strong Communist indoctrination, little or no intelligence could be gained from them.

3. CI Div agrees with Geographic Branch that there is much information to be gained from certain selected Soviet repatriates but does not concur in the proposed method of screening of individuals for interrogation. CI Div recommends that Geographic Branch be granted access to its Central Repatriate File for perusal of the Phase I Cards. Initial screening of the Phase I Cards in CI Div will prove to be faster and less costly than the circalized questionnaire, which might prove to be a psychological boomerang.

1 Incl:
a/1

----- E. C. E. -----

G-2 File Copy

CI Div/ExGp/JSB/sk

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G-2, GHQ INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

File No: _____ **Subject:** Interrogations **Date:** LSW/jes
16 August 1951

FROM: Geog Br. **TO:** G-2
Thru: T/Intel **PHONE:** 26-8582
NAME: L.S. Wilson

**Comment
Number**

1

1. During the past six years a total of 6,000 repatriated JNs having special opportunities to observe towns in USSR Siberia have been listed as "Underguard" by this headquarters.

2. Because of conduct, indication of communist sympathy, linguistic ability or other cogent reason, these individuals were given considerable freedom of movement while in custody as PWs of USSR. They are an excellent untapped source of information about Soviet towns.

3. In order to minimize cost of interrogations, thru preliminary screening of these individuals, the Town Plans Unit has prepared a questionnaire which it proposes to circulate by mail thru the Japanese Demobilization Center at a cost of ¥ 25 per Unit. This seems to be a reasonable and cheap way of accomplishing the preliminary selection of informants.

4. Recommend:

a. Approval of questionnaire.

b. Allocation of ¥ 150,000 to circularize by mail, thru the Japanese Demobilization Center, a total of 6,000 Underguard repatriates.

1 Incl
Sample Questionnaire Form

-----L.S.W.-----



Name: UCHIDA Hikaru (内田 光)
Age: 26 as of 1949
Permanent Address: 292, 5-chome, Kemikawa-machi, Chiba-shi,
Chiba-ken
Destination: Same as the above
Rank: S/Pvt. Signal
Education: Graduated Industry School
Occupation: Technician, Communication Ministry
1942-1944
POW Camp: Cheremkhove, Irkutsk (#32-6)
1945-1947
Duty in Camp: Lumbering
Date of Repatriation: 10 August 1949 by Eitoku-maru at Maizuru-port

Incl 1

Name: OSAWA Kisaburo (大澤 喜三郎)
Age: 38 as of 1949
Permanent Address: 97, Wakamiya-cho, Ichikawa-shi, Chiba-ken
Destination: Same as the above
Rank: Cpl. Infantry (Veterinary)
Education: Completed Primary School
Occupation: Jockey, Japan Horse-Racing Association
1933-1942
POW Camp: Begovat (#288-1) 1945-1948
Duty in Camp: Liveryman
Date of Repatriation: 3 October 1949 by Daitaku-maru at Maizuru-port

Name: YAGI Tokutaro (八木 徳太郎)

Age: 24 as of 1949

Permanent Address: 10,868, 1-chome, Tokawa-machi, Choshi-shi,
Chiba-ken

Destination: Same as the above

Rank: Pfc. Railway

Education: Graduated Higher Primary School

Occupation: Fishery 1940-1944

POW Camp: Almaata (#40-2) 1945-1948

Duty in Camp: Road construction

Date of Repatriation: 18 September 1949 by Enshu-maru at Maizuru-port

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G-2, GHQ INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

File No: _____ **Subject:** Non-Interruption of G2 Interrogation Program **Date:** 9 Aug 1951

FROM: G2 Fiscal **TO:** MIS Div **PHONE:** 26-8836
THRU: G2 Admin **NAME:** Lt Col Ohman

Comment Number


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1. Study and evaluation of the JFY-51 Interrogee fund situation in advance of the termination of the current TOW budget is timely and commendable. However the need of action now by G2 is not indicated. About 1 June 1951 after several weeks of estimating requirements, of justifying, hearings and reviews by COM, FEC, the JFY-51 TOW budget and the U. S. FY-52 funding program were re-established. Since 1 June there has been no specific change in the situation. Several months from now, say about 1 January 1952 a more realistic estimate of fund requirements can be made, and the Interrogee program will not be imperiled by with-holding action until that time. If the TOW budget is terminated prior to the end of JFY-51, the required support can probably be had either from appropriated funds or from the Locally Funded Yen Account. Until the situation is reviewed again early in CY-1952, G-2 Funding will be adequate. In the meantime the Interrogee projects may change and the now-anticipated unused balances in both the Locally Funded Yen Account and in Appropriated Funds may also change.

2. Inasmuch as G-2 cannot now submit proof to COM, FEC, that the three presently established sources of funds will finally (on 30 June 1952) prove to be inadequate, the present time is not a propitious time to request additional funds from the COM. The COM concurs in this opinion and also states that (reference par 3 of CN 1) when the overall source of TOW funds is terminated, the cut-off will be absolute and will apply to all PD's including those of G-2.

1-Incl n/c

R. L. O.



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G-2, GHO

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

File No: _____
Subject: Non-Interruption of G2 Investigation Program
Date: 9 Aug 1951

FROM: G2 Fiscal
THRU: G2 Admin
TO: MIS Div
NAME: Lt Col Ohman
PHONE: 26-8836

1. Study and evaluation of the JY-51 Interrogator fund situation in advance of the termination of the current TOW budget is timely and commendable. However the need of action now by G2 is not indicated. About 1 June 1951 after several weeks of estimating requirements, of justifying, hearings and reviews by COM, the JY-51 TOW budget and the U. S. FY-52 funding program were re-established. Since 1 June there has been no specific change in the situation. Several months from now, say about 1 January 1952 a more realistic estimate of fund requirements can be made and the Interrogator program will not be hampered by withholding action until that time. If the TOW budget is terminated prior to the end of JY-51, the required support can probably be had either from appropriated funds or from the locally funded Yen Account. Until the situation is reviewed again early in CY-1952, G-2 funding will be adequate. In the meantime the Interrogator projects may change and the now-anticipated unused balances in both the locally funded Yen Account and in appropriated funds may also change.

2. Inasmuch as G-2 cannot now submit proof to COM, FHC, that the three presently established sources of funds will finally (on 30 June 1952) prove to be inadequate, the present time is not a propitious time to request additional funds from the COM. The COM concurs in this opinion and also states that (reference par 3 of CW I) when the overall source of TOW funds is terminated, the out-off will be absolute and will apply to all PD's including those of G-2.

Comment Number

2

G-5 Admin

I-Incl n/c

R. L. O.



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G-2, GHQ

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INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

Non-interruption of G2

File No: Subject: Interrogation Program Date: 2 Aug 51

FROM: MIS Div

TO: G2 Fiscal
Thru: G2 Admin

PHONE: 26-7489
NAME: Col Stark

Comment
Number

1

1. It is believed that the following developments, based on current assumptions, could possibly cause an interruption in the overall G2 interrogation program administered by TIS unless sufficient funds were available when required:

a. Signing or ratification of a Japanese peace treaty, either of which, presumably, could terminate expenditures of unobligated TOW funds.

b. End of JFY 1951 (31 Mar 52) if not preceded by signing or ratification of a peace treaty, the assumption being, that with the latter developments imminent at that time, no further allocations will be forthcoming from TOW funds.

c. Possible difficulty in re-adjusting FY 1952 funding program to meet developments indicated in subpara a and b, above, due to eventualities currently not foreseeable.

2. In order to obviate any interruption in the interrogation program administered by TIS resulting from developments indicated in par 1 above, Incl 1, an estimate of funds required to carry this program through from 1 Jan 52 thru 30 Jun 52 inclusive, is submitted for your info and necessary action.

3. In the event that funds in the amount required (Incl 1) may possibly be not readily available when needed, it is suggested, if you so consider necessary and have not already done so, that Compt GHQ be queried as to the possibility of setting up a procedure whereby unexpended, or unobligated, TOW funds can continue to be expended, or obligated, on a reimbursable basis, and if this is not feasible, whether Compt GHQ could make available the required funds to insure no interruption in this important program.

1 Incl

Estim Funds for Call-Ins
1 Jan 52 - 1 Jul 52

T.N.S.

G2 Admin



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G-2, GHQ
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

Non-Interruption of US
Subject: Interruption Program

Date: 2 Aug 51

File No:

FROM: MR Div
TO: G2 Fiscal
NAME: Col Staff
PHONE: 28-7483

Comment
Number

1

1. It is believed that the following developments, based on current assumptions, could possibly cause an interruption in the overall US interrogation program administered by TIS unless sufficient funds were available when required:

a. Signing or ratification of a Japanese peace treaty, either of which, presumably, could terminate expenditures of mobilized TOW funds.

b. End of FY 1951 (31 Mar 51) if not preceded by signing or ratification of a peace treaty, the assumption being that with the latter developments imminent at that time, no further allocations will be forthcoming from TOW funds.

c. Possible difficulty in re-adjusting FY 1952 funding program to meet developments indicated in subpara a and b, above, due to uncertainties currently not foreseeable.

2. In order to obviate any interruption in the interrogation program administered by TIS resulting from developments indicated in par 1 above, incl 1, an estimate of funds required to carry this program through from 1 Jan 52 thru 30 Jun 52 inclusive, is submitted for your info and necessary action.


3. In the event that funds in the amount required (incl 1) may possibly be not readily available when needed, it is suggested, if you so consider necessary and have not already done so, that Comp G2 be queried as to the possibility of setting up a procedure whereby unexpended, or mobilized, TOW funds can continue to be expended, or obligated, on a reimbursable basis, and if this is not feasible, whether Comp G2 could make available the required funds to insure no interruption in this important program.

I incl
Estim Funds for Calif-las
1 Jan 52 - 1 Jul 52

T.S.S.

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
G-2 Admin

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ESTIMATED FUNDS FOR CALL-INS 1 JAN 52 - 1 JUL 52
@ ¥ 10,000 ea

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>NR OF CALL-INS</u>	<u>TOTAL COST</u>
T/Intel	1020	¥10,200,000
CI Div	none	
FEC, LG		1,400,000
ASAPAG	10	100,000
441st CIC	none*	
TIS	30	<u>300,000</u>
TOTAL (YEN)		¥12,000,000
TOTAL (Dollars)		\$33,400.00

*None administered by TIS



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
ESTIMATED FUNDS FOR CALL-INS I JAN 52 - 1 JUL 52
@ \$ 10,000 ea

SECTION	NR OF CALL-INS	TOTAL COST
T\Intel	1030	\$10,300,000
CI Div	none	
SEC, LG		1,400,000
ASAPAC	10	100,000
441st CIO	none*	
TIS	30	300,000
TOTAL (YEW)		\$13,000,000
TOTAL (Dollars)		\$33,400.00

*None administered by TIS



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G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

MISD/TNS/ac

Non-interruption of G2
Interrogation Program

Date: 18 Jul 51

File No:

Subject:

FROM: MIS Div

TO: T/Intel
CI Div
JSOB
441st CIC
TIS
ASA
(in turn)

PHONE: 26-7489
NAME: Col Stark

Comment
Number
1

1. It is anticipated that unobligated TOW funds for interrogations administered by ATIS will be terminated effective with the signing (or ratification) of a peace treaty, or at the end of JFY 1951 (31 Mar 52), whichever occurs first.

2. In order that interrogations required by the addressees, above, will not be interrupted by the termination of funds contemplated in par 1, above, request that G2 MIS Div be furnished as soon as possible for planning purposes:

a. An estimate of all call-ins required by your section for any type call-ins administered by ATIS for the remainder of US FY 1952 beginning with 1 Oct 51.

T.N.S.

From: T/Int

To: MIS Div

TI/HVW/rep
23 July 1951

1. It is estimated that monthly requirements of Geographic Branch, T/Int, will be approximately 20 call-ins for its regular program and 150 for Town Plans compilation. This totals 1020 call-ins for the six month period.

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2. There is no way of foreseeing call-in requirements for other branches of T/Int, but based on past experience it is believed that the number of call-ins will be negligible and probably not more than 5 or 6.


-H.V.W.-

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G2 File



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**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND**
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

43982

APO 500
4 August 1951

AG 350.09 (26 Jul 51)GB

SUBJECT: Interrogation of ROKA and UN Recovered Prisoners of War

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK)
APO 301

1. Inclosure 1 is copy of command letter, AG 350.09, above subject, dated 26 July 1951, sent to Commanding General, Eighth Army.
2. Forwarded herewith (Incl 2) are three (3) copies of information guide referred to in Paragraph 1 of attached letter. This form, entitled "Phase II Interrogation Guide for Recovered UN PW's", was designed specifically for the follow-up interrogation of UN returnees who are processed in Japan. We believe, however, that you may be able to use it profitably also on ROKA returnees and are prepared to send you whatever number you need, as required.
3. The personal data card for ROKA returnees referred to in subparagraph 2c of foregoing letter (Incl 1) coincides with the Phase I interrogation card to be used under "Project Stitch" which is the subject of separate correspondence (Subject: "Establishment of Counter Espionage Program"). Our thought here is that this card will serve in the preliminary screening for both positive and counter intelligence purposes.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

- 2 Incls
1. Ltr, Subj as above,
dtd 26 Jul 51
 2. Phase II Interrogation
Guide (Triplicate)

WASHINGTON M. IVES, JR.
Colonel GSC
Deputy for Administration

file
cy to: AT/S
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43982

22462

2 August 1951

SUBJECT: Interrogation of ROKA and UN Recovered Prisoners of War

43982

FROM : CO, ATIS

TO : G2

- | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| A C of S, G-2 _____ () | Theater Intell _____ () |
| Deputy _____ () | Operations _____ () |
| Secretariat _____ () | PDM _____ () |
| Deputy for Admin _____ () | Fn Mil Ln _____ () |
| Deputy for Navy _____ () | Plans & Estimates _____ () |
| Deputy for Air _____ () | Special Intell _____ () |
| Asst Admin _____ () | Geog Branch _____ () |
| Asst MIS Div _____ (3) | CIS (CI Div) _____ () |
| Asst CI Div _____ () | Operations _____ () |
| Sp Asst 441st CIC _____ () | Coll and Pub _____ () |
| Sp Asst Fiscal _____ () | 441st CIC _____ () |
| Sp Asst Radio _____ () | Public Safety Branch _____ () |
| Sp Asst Historical _____ () | JSOB _____ () |
| Sp Asst JSOB _____ () | SIA _____ () |
| Sp Asst PSB _____ () | MIS Division _____ () |
| Admin Officer _____ (2) | ATIS _____ () |
| Personnel (Mil)(Civ) _____ () | TID _____ () |
| Jap Liaison _____ () | Special Projects _____ () |
| | Historical Division _____ () |

Info _____ ()	Approval _____ ()	Signature _____ ()	Draft Reply _____ ()
Action _____ ()	Concur _____ ()	Initials _____ ()	Info for rply _____ ()
File _____ ()	Comment _____ ()	Dispatch _____ ()	Brief _____ ()

2 August 1951

1. Forwarded herewith is draft letter to G2, EUSAK which transmits preliminary copies of Phase II Interrogation Guide designed for use with returned UN and ROKA PsW, offers to supply as many copies as desired, and explains that the Phase I card to be used in this program coincides with the Phase I card to be used in the counter intelligence program (Project Stitch).

2. Recommend approval and dispatch.

N.W.W.
N.W.W.

Col Doss:
Recommend approval of the attached ltr for your signature or Col Bratton's signature
OK - Finalize

SECRET

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APO 500
31 July 1951

SUBJECT: Interrogation and Counter Intelligence Investigations
of Recovered UN Prisoners of War

TO: Commanding General
XVI Corps
APO 14
ATTENTION: ACoFS, G2

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1. Reference letter AG 350.09, above subject, dated 26 July 51, forwarded herewith are three (3) copies each of following forms designed for use in connection with recovered PsW project outlined in reference letter:

- a. Phase I Questionnaire for Recovered UN PsW (Incl 1)
- b. Phase II Interrogation Guide for Recovered UN PsW (Incl 2)

2. Please advise how many sets of these forms you will require for orientation purposes so that we may provide them.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

- 2 Incls:
- 1. Phase I Questionnaire (3 cys)
 - 2. Phase II Interr Guide (3 cys)

15/
WASHINGTON M. IVES, JR.
Colonel GSC
Deputy for Administration

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Self-explanatory.

N. W. W.

26-7838

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

AD 350.09(26 July 51)CB

26 July 1951

SUBJECT: Interrogation and Counter Intelligence Investigation of
Recovered UN Prisoners of War


TO: Commanding General
Japan Logistical Command
APO 315

1. During the processing of recovered UN PWs in Japan under any POW exchange agreement which may materialize, it is desired that all practicable efforts be made by intelligence personnel under your command to facilitate exploitation for intelligence of immediate military interest.

2. The following allocations of responsibilities are directed in this connection:

a. Japan Logistical Command:

- (1) Japan Logistical Command will be responsible for the distribution and completion in every practicable case of a preliminary questionnaire which will be supplied in the necessary quantities by Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, GFR. These questionnaires should be completed at the concentration point or hospital where the individual is initially processed, and will then be delivered to the G2, GFR representative on the spot. It is essential that Japan Logistical Command keep G2 GFR informed on a day-to-day basis as to the exact identity of the initial processing points and the numbers of returns admitted.
- (2) It is desired that Japan Logistical Command personnel involved in this processing, will observe closely the reactions, intelligence, and general demeanor of the returns in order that mature recommendations may be made by them (with additional comments if deemed advisable) at the end of the questionnaire.
- (3) Japan Logistical Command personnel will render assistance to GFR interrogators when practicable as indicated in paragraph b (1) below.



G-2 File Copy

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

20 July 1951

20 July 1951

RECEIVED: Intelligence and Counter Intelligence Division of
Department of Defense at WFO

General Headquarters
Far East Command
APO 500

1. During the processing of messages of the Far East Command, it is desired that all messages
be processed in accordance with the following instructions:


2. The following allocation of responsibilities are directed in
this message:

a. General Headquarters

(1) General Headquarters will be responsible for the
classification and declassification of all messages
of a preliminary nature which will be processed
in the Far East Command. It is desired that all
messages of this nature be processed in accordance
with the instructions of the Far East Command.
It is desired that all messages of this nature be
processed in accordance with the instructions of the
Far East Command. It is desired that all messages
of this nature be processed in accordance with the
instructions of the Far East Command.


(2) It is desired that all messages of this nature
be processed in accordance with the instructions
of the Far East Command. It is desired that all
messages of this nature be processed in accordance
with the instructions of the Far East Command.

(3) General Headquarters will be responsible for the
classification and declassification of all messages
of a preliminary nature which will be processed
in the Far East Command. It is desired that all
messages of this nature be processed in accordance
with the instructions of the Far East Command.



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AG 350.09(26 July 51)GB

SUBJECT: Interrogation and Counter Intelligence Investigation of
Recovered UN Prisoners of War 26 July 1951

b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, GHQ:

- (1) G2, GHQ will dispatch intelligence officers to all processing points as designated by Japan Logistical Command, in numbers as deemed practicable, who will assist in the processing of the questionnaires, but who will be there specifically to observe and ask questions with an eye to obtaining leads for detailed interrogations. In the event that such interrogations are indicated, these officers and such other interrogation personnel as may be called in for the purpose will interrogate along the lines indicated in their instructions (see paragraph 3 below). Copies of these instructions will also be provided Japan Logistical Command, whose intelligence personnel will render assistance in the interrogations when practicable.
- (2) G2, GHQ will edit, publish and disseminate interrogation reports to authorized recipients.
- (3) G2, GHQ will initiate requests to CG, XVI Corps for the temporary loan of intelligence officers to assist in conducting interrogations if such assistance is needed.

3. In compliance with established policy for evacuating recovered U. S. PW personnel to the ZI as rapidly as possible, interrogations will be generally restricted to matters of current military interest. Information of long-range strategic interest of the type which can be effectively obtained in the ZI later, will not be solicited.

4. Copy of this directive will be forwarded by G2, GHQ to Commanding General, Eighth Army and Commanding General, XVI Corps for their information and familiarization with the program.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

MAK AG 26 July 51, 1730

K. B. BUSH
BRIG. GEN. U.S.A.
ADJ. GEN.

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Command channel letter to CG, JLC delineating JLC's responsibilities in the interrogation of exchanged ROKA and UN PWs. Approved by Chief of Staff, 25 July 1951.

Cepu

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1115 WIEHKE/WENTER

N.W.W. 26-7838

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

40818

AG 350.09(26 July 51) GB

26 July 1951

SUBJECT: Interrogation and Counter Intelligence Investigations of
Recovered UN Prisoners of War

TO: Commanding General
XVI Corps
APO 14

1. Inclosed is copy of letter to Commanding General, Japan Logistical
Command this date, subject as above, for your information and guidance.

2. It is desired that all intelligence officers under your command
be thoroughly familiarized with the program described and that you stand
ready to honor requests initiated by CG, JLG, for officer personnel to
assist in conducting interrogations. Whether or not such assistance will
be required cannot be determined at this time. The policy will be to
refrain from requesting personnel other than essential to accomplish the
program.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL HEDGECOCK:

MAIL AG 26 July 51, 1730 K. B. BUSH
BRIG. GEN, U.S.A.
ADS. GEN.

1 Incl
Ltr to CG, JLG, subj
as above, dtd

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Command channel ltr to CG, XVI Corps delineating XVI Corps' respon-
sibilities in the interrogation of exchanged ROKA and UN PWs. Approved
by Chief of Staff, 25 Jul 51.

H.W.W. 26-7838

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AG 350.09(26 July 51)GB

26 July 51

SUBJECT: Interrogation of ROKA and UN Recovered Prisoners of War

TO: Commanding General
Eighth Army
APO 301

1. During the processing of recovered ROKA PWs under any POW exchange agreement which may materialize, it is desired that all practicable efforts be made by intelligence personnel under your command to obtain information of immediate military interest. A guide to the type of information desired is being prepared for your utilization.

2. It is recognized that the reception and processing of ROKA recovered personnel is essentially a ROK Government problem. However, it is to their interest as well as that of the UN that this opportunity be seized for obtaining intelligence. To this end it is desired that negotiations be entered into with the ROK authorities concerned, in anticipation of eventualities. The objectives of these negotiations are conceived to be as follows:

a. To assure the minimum of confusion by guiding the South Koreans in the organization of their procedures.

b. To fix upon a minimum number of processing points through which to funnel all ROKA returnees (preferably limited to one).

c. To obtain agreement that all ROKA returnees will be required to complete the personal data card provided for in separate communication (concerning counter intelligence) and that these cards will be turned over to Eighth Army supervisory personnel on the spot.

d. To obtain agreement that Eighth Army interrogators or counter intelligence personnel may undertake interrogations or investigations among the ROKA returnees at will, and that such personnel designated by them by name will be held for further interrogation or investigation when requested.

3. Because of the probable magnitude of this project, and the low calibre of most of the interrogees, it is not contemplated that a great proportion of the ROKA returnees will be interrogated. The thought behind the program as outlined above is that by a system of selection and observation on the spot, the better potentials will be ferreted out and

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AG 350.09 (26 July 51) GB

SUBJECT: Interrogation of ROKA and UN Recovered Prisoners of War

26 July 51

interrogated for what they may know.

4. Those potentials deemed of highest value as sources of strategic information should be held and referred to G2, GHRQ (ADVATIS) for subsequent action.

5. Formal processing for intelligence of UN recovered personnel other than ROKA personnel will not be required of Eighth Army. Volunteered or chance information will, of course, be processed normally but formal action will be taken subsequent to the evacuation of these personnel from Korea to Japan.

6. Non-U.S. personnel recovered under the agreement who are not medically evacuated from Korea will not be interrogated except with the concurrence of their own unit commanders.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

~~MAIL~~ MAIL AG 26 July 51, 1730

K. B. BUSH
BRIG. GEN. U.S.A.
ADJ. GEN.

1 Incl
Ltr to CG, JLC, subj
as above, dtd

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Command channel letter to CG, EUSAK delineating Eighth Army's responsibilities in the interrogation of exchanged ROKA and UN PWs. Approved by Chief of Staff, 25 Jul 51.

N.W.W. 26-7838

SECRET

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APD 500
23 July 1951

SUBJECT: Interrogation of Returned ROKA and UN Prisoners of War

MEMO TO: Chief of Staff

1. Missing and captured South Korean troops are believed to total 60/70,000. MIA and captured UN troops number an estimated 14,000. Whatever numbers of these PWs are returned following successful armistice negotiations, they should be exploited for intelligence purposes.

2. Plans for intelligence and counter intelligence processing of recovered ROKA and UN PWs after the conclusion of an exchange agreement have been discussed between G2 (ATIS) and the following agencies:

- a. G1, GHQ
- b. JSPOG
- c. Hq, JLC
- d. G2, BUSAK
- e. 441st CIC
- f. JEOB

g. Various individual officers to clarify specific points.

3. Basic assumptions developed out of above discussions are as follows:

a. Due to many unknown factors no estimate can be reached as to the number of ROKA PWs who may be exchanged.

b. Japan Logistical Command estimates that out of the total of UN missing to date (approximately 14,000) from one-fourth to one-half will be recovered, the majority within 60 days from the beginning, and at least 50% of these will be hospital cases.

4. Action indicated is as follows:

a. Commanding General, Eighth Army will be responsible for arranging with ROKA authorities for the processing of ROKA returned PWs for intelligence, and those US returned PWs who may be evacuated directly from Korea to EI.

b. Commanding General, Japan Logistical Command will assume responsibility for intelligence or counter intelligence processing of US recovered PWs who are evacuated to Japan.

c. G2, GHQ (following the dispatch of command channel letters recommended below) will coordinate activities referred to above with other interested agencies, viz., JA, FM and AG Casualty.

d. Commanding General, XVI Corps will be provided with copies of letters and forms sent to Japan Logistical Command regarding US PWs, for familiarization, and will be alerted to provide intelligence personnel to conduct interrogations when required.

5. In view of the foregoing and the necessity of firming and expediting detailed plans, recommend approval and dispatch of:

a. Inclosure 1, which is draft letter to Commanding General, Eighth Army, outlining procedure to be followed in Korea.

b. Inclosure 2, which is draft letter to Commanding General, Japan Logistical Command, outlining procedure to be followed in Japan.

c. Inclosure 3, which is draft letter to Commanding General, XVI Corps, alerting him to his possible part in the program.

d. Inclosure 4, which is detailed plan for Interrogation of Returned ROKA and UN Prisoners of War, to be sent in telecon to General Belling.

4 Incls

1. Drft Ltr to CG, BUSAK, Subj: "Interr of ROKA & UN Recovered PWs", dtd 21 Jul 51
2. Drft Ltr to CG, JLC, Subj: "Interr & Counter Intel Investigation of Recovered UN PWs", dtd 21 Jul 51
3. Drft Ltr to CG, XVI Corps, Subj: "Interr & Counter Intel Investigation of Recovered UN PWs", dtd 21 Jul 51
4. Detailed Plan for Interr of Returned ROKA & UN PWs (To be sent in Telecon to Gen Belling)

R. F. E.

CONCURRENCE:

G1 _____

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G2 file

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APD 800
23 July 1951

SUBJECT: Interrogation of Returned KORA and UN Prisoners of War

MEMO TO: Chief of Staff

1. Missing and captured South Korean troops are believed to total 80,000. KIA and captured UN troops number an estimated 14,000. However, numbers of those PWs are returned following successful armistice negotiations, they should be exploited for intelligence purposes.
2. Plans for intelligence and counter intelligence processing of recovered KORA and UN PWs after the conclusion of an exchange agreement have been discussed between GS (ATIS) and the following agencies:


- a. G2, GNS
- b. JSPC
- c. HQ, JCS
- d. GS, BUREAU
- e. JCS, JIC
- f. JCS, JIC

3. Various individual officers to clarify specific points.
4. Basic assumptions developed out of above discussions are as follows:
a. Due to many unknown factors no estimate can be reached as to the number of KORA PWs who may be exchanged.
b. Japan Logistical Command estimates that out of the total of UN missing to date (approximately 14,000) from one-fourth to one-half will be recovered, the majority within 90 days from the beginning, and at least 80% of these will be hospital cases.

5. Action indicated is as follows:
a. Commanding General, Eighth Army will be responsible for arranging with KORA authorities for the processing of KORA returned PWs for intelligence, and those US returned PWs who may be evacuated directly from Korea to SI.
b. Commanding General, Japan Logistical Command will assume responsibility for intelligence or counter intelligence processing of US recovered PWs who are evacuated to Japan.

6. GS, GNS (following the dispatch of command channel letters recommended below) will coordinate activities referred to above with other interested agencies, viz., JCS, JCS and AG Cavalry.
7. Commanding General, XVI Corps will be provided with copies of letters and forms sent to Japan Logistical Command regarding US PWs, for facilitation, and will be alerted to provide intelligence personnel to conduct interrogations when required.
8. In view of the foregoing and the necessity of timing and expediting detailed plans, recommend approval and dispatch of:
a. Inclosure 1, which is draft letter to Commanding General, Eighth Army, outlining procedure to be followed in Korea.
b. Inclosure 2, which is draft letter to Commanding General, Japan Logistical Command, outlining procedure to be followed in Japan.
c. Inclosure 3, which is draft letter to Commanding General, XVI Corps, alerting him to his possible part in the program.
d. Inclosure 4, which is detailed plan for interrogation of Returned KORA and UN Prisoners of War, to be sent in liaison to General Helling.

R. F. S.




Detailed plan for liaison of returned KORA and UN PWs (to be sent in liaison to General Helling)

CONCURRENCE:

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Handwritten notes and stamps at the bottom right corner.



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**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND**

CHECK SHEET

Col Power
26-6166

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No:

Subject: Policy re Interrogation of POW's by
Representatives of Foreign Governments

Note
No.

From: G2

To: CofS

Date: 22 June 1951

1.

1. On 20 June 51, Colonel LOUIE, head of the Military Section, Chinese Mission called at my office. In the course of the conversation he asked if it would be possible for the Chinese Mission to interrogate some of the Chinese Communist prisoners.

2. After careful consideration of this matter I have reached the conclusion that it would be unwise to grant this request. Current U.S. policy is, of course, not to use Nationalist troops against the Chinese Communists. Permitting Nationalist personnel to interrogate prisoners of war taken by UN forces in Korea would, in my opinion, constitute an evasion of current U.S. policy and might result in embarrassment to the Commander-in-Chief. It is believed that the policy of this headquarters should be that only representatives of governments that have military forces supporting operations in Korea as part of the United Nations Command should be permitted to interrogate prisoners taken by UN forces.

3. I wish to point out that in February 1951, as a result of arrangements made by my predecessor, two (2) officers of the Chinese Mission were authorized by orders issued by this headquarters to proceed to Korea in connection with military intelligence activities and were allowed to interrogate prisoners under supervision of the Commanding Officer, ADVATIS. At that time G2 detailed an officer to accompany the officers of the Chinese Mission and handled the matter in a manner to avoid publicity. No publicity resulted, but past experience with Chinese Nationalists has shown a general lack of security consciousness on their part and unfavorable publicity might result if we continue to grant such requests. Copies of interrogations made are on file in ATIS.

4. Notwithstanding the precedent outlined in preceding paragraph, recommend approval of policy as stated in paragraph 2 above.

-----R.F.E.-----

CHIEF OF STAFF
APPROVED
6/26/51
INITIALS (H)

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

Col Power
Ss-6166

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

Subject: Policy re Interrogation of POW's by
Representatives of Foreign Governments

File No:

Date: 22 June 1951

To: G2

From: G2


Note
No.

1. On 20 June 51, Colonel LOUIS, head of the Military Section, Chinese Mission called at my office. In the course of the conversation he asked if it would be possible for the Chinese Mission to interrogate some of the Chinese Communist prisoners.

2. After careful consideration of this matter I have reached the conclusion that it would be unwise to grant this request. Current U.S. policy is, of course, not to use Nationalist troops against the Chinese Communists. Permitting Nationalist personnel to interrogate prisoners of war taken by UN forces in Korea would, in my opinion, constitute an evasion of current U.S. policy and might result in embarrassment to the Commander-in-Chief. It is believed that the policy of this headquarters should be that only representatives of governments that have military forces supporting operations in Korea as part of the United Nations Command should be permitted to interrogate prisoners taken by UN forces.

3. I wish to point out that in February 1951, as a result of arrangements made by my predecessor, two (2) officers of the Chinese Mission were authorized by orders issued by this headquarters to proceed to Korea in connection with military intelligence activities and were allowed to interrogate prisoners under supervision of the Commanding Officer, ADVANTIS. At that time G2 detailed an officer to accompany the officers of the Chinese Mission and handle the matter in a manner to avoid publicity. No publicity resulted, but past experience with Chinese-Nationalists has shown a general lack of security consciousness on their part and unfavorable publicity might result if we continue to grant such requests. Copy of interrogations made are on file in ATIS.

4. Notwithstanding the precedent outlined in paragraph 3, I recommend approval of policy as stated in paragraph 1.



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SECRET G-2, GHQ INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

Chinese Mission Request
for Interrogation of
CCF PsW

ATIS/EHFS/BWP/bj
Date: 21 June 1951

File No:

Subject:

FROM: CO, ATIS

TO: G2
Thru: MIS Div

PHONE: 26-8646
NAME: Maj Perry

Comment
Number
1

1. Incl 1 is memo from Lt Col Wilmeth of Foreign Military Liaison which states that Col Louie of Military Section, Chinese Mission, had asked Gen Ennis about possibility of Chinese Mission being allowed to interrogate CCF PsW and that Gen Ennis had directed Col Wilmeth to obtain Col Svensson's opinion.

2. Incl 2 is IOM series, subject, "Chinese Mission Interrogators", dtd 31 Jan 51, which contains G2 approval for two Chinese Mission officers to interrogate CCF PsW for a two-week period. Lt Colis Hua Kao Teng and Wei Da Hu from the Chinese Mission arrived in ADVATIS approximately 16 Feb 51 and conducted interrogations for approximately two weeks. Copies of these reports are on file in ATIS.

3. Despite the precedent outlined in para 2 above, I recommend against permitting additional interrogations by the Chinese. Current U.S. policy is of course not to use Nationalist troops against the Chinese Communists. Permitting Nationalist personnel to interrogate Communist prisoners of war secured by us in Korea would in my opinion constitute an evasion at least in the spirit of U.S. Far Eastern policy. Of course the CNA is notorious for its lack of security consciousness but more than that they might utilize our permission to interrogate Communist PsW publically as a lever in their efforts to effect a change in present U.S. policy, and thereby embarrass you and/or the CinC.

4. Accordingly, I strongly recommend that the Chinese Mission not be permitted access to CCF PsW.

2 Incls:

1. Memo to Col Svensson fr Col Wilmeth, 20 Jun 51
2. CAV 2608, subj: "Chinese Mission Interrogators", 31 Jan 51

----- E.H.F.S. -----

SECRET

DO NOT DETACH
G-2 GHQ FEC

17784

21 June 1951

SUBJECT: Chinese Mission Request for Interrogation of CCF PsW

34348

FROM: CO, ATIS

TO: G2

A C of S, G-2 (1)
 Deputy (3)
 Secretariat
 Deputy for Admin
 Deputy for Nav
 Deputy for Air
 Asst Admin
 Asst MIS Div (2)
 Asst CI Div
 Sp Asst 441st CIC
 Sp Asst Fiscal
 Sp Asst Radio
 Sp Asst Historical
 Sp Asst JSOB
 Sp Asst PSB
 Admin Officer
 Personnel (MIL) (CIV)
 Jap Liaison

Theater Intell
 Operations
 PDM
 Fn Mil Ln
 Plans & Estimates
 Special Intell
 Geog Branch
 CIS (CI Div)
 Operations
 Coll and Pub
 441st CIC
 Public Safety Branch
 JSOB
 SIA
 MIS Division (1)
 ATIS
 TID
 Special Projects
 Historical Division

Info	()	Approval	()	Signature	()	Draft Reply	()
Action	()	Concur	()	Initials	()	Info for Reply	()
File	()	Comment	()	Dispatch	()	Brief	()

DATE ALL COMMENTS

Col. Power:
 I concur w/ ATIS' stand. You will recall that I was against the first deal but never had the opportunity to express my views in writing after having received the initial, + direct, verbal order from CAW in person and learning later that CAW had offered this opportunity to you Ho himself.

JMS



Gen. Curtis
 21 Jun 51
 Concur with
 Col. Swenson and Lt. Stair
 Sub. JS

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 813562

By CEC NARA Date: 1/10/12



Authority 813562

By CE NARA Date: 1/10/12

CONFIDENTIAL

A. C. OF S. G-2
GHQ

Date 4 June 51

MEMORANDUM For: _____

C of S XXXX	G-1	ADC
SGS	G-3	D C/S SCAP
C of S ROK	G-4	JSPOG

Information & your file ~~XXXX~~ _____

Note & Return to _____

Appropriate Circulation _____ Noted _____

Necessary Action _____ Suspend to _____

Process Action to G-2 _____ Return with reference _____

 By draft (letter) (radio) (plan) _____ paper _____

 (order) _____

Comment to G-2 _____

 By memo _____ Orally _____

Forwarded for your information is brief of a preliminary Phase I interrogation of a NK PW, one of very few who has had contact with USSR. This PW was a signal officer and claimed to be the operator transmitting messages to Russian Army HQ in Moscow. This report includes:

- a. Chronological history of NK V Corps from April to 27 May 51.
- b. Strength figures on CCF in Korea; initial, replacement, casualties.
- c. Statement that all American and UN PWs shipped to Manchuria, then to Russia. One message to Moscow reported capture of Gen Dean, and that he would be flown to Moscow.
- d. Radio frequencies, hours of contact, and call signs used to communicate with Moscow.

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SPECIAL BRIEFING FOR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

PRELIMINARY REPORT OF INTERROGATION OF NK POW LT KANG, SOK HUN

PERSONAL AND UNIT HISTORY:

POW, after training, was commissioned June 50 and assigned to NKPA GHQ as special wireless operator transmitting messages to Russian Army Hq in Moscow.

NKPA GHQ retreated to Manchuria 2 Sept 50 and re-entered Korea 27 Nov 50. POW placed on TDF with V Corps HQ April 51 as Corps Signal Officer in conjunction with CCF-NK 5th Phase Offensive beginning 2 May 51; on 11 May 51 V Corps Commander ordered NK 6th, 12th and 32nd Divisions to envelop the 6th ROK Divisions concentrated in the Hyon Ni area, in conjunction with NK II and III Corps and one unknown CCF unit; V Corps successfully enveloped ROK 3d, 5th, 7th and 9th Divisions, capturing approximately 1200 ROK POWs between 16 May 51 and 22 May 51; enveloping forces ordered 24 May 51 to retreat to Inje, because UN forces threatened right (west) flank; retreat completed 26 May 51, when US massed artillery fire made further evacuation necessary; POW surrendered to 23d Inf 27 May 51.

LOCATION AND ACTIVITIES OF UNITS:

NK II, III and V Corps ordered 26 May 51 to retreat from Inje to Yanggu; upon arrival at Yanggu the III Corps were to be reorganized and the 1200 ROK POWs just captured were to be integrated into the corps as replacements; after reorganization CCF and NKPA will launch 6th phase offensive.

On 16 April 51, POW observed a CCF cavalry unit of division strength, which allegedly had a defensive mission; POW also observed a CCF cavalry unit at approximately army strength employed in Pyongyang, Sukchon and Sunchon triangle to haul supplies from Pyongyang area to front line troops.

STRENGTH AND REPLACEMENTS:

On 23 April POW was told the following by NKPA GHQ Signal Officer: NKPA strength as of April 51 was 200,000; approximately 900,000 CCF troops entered Korea in Oct 50; 200,000 CCF replacements arrived in Korea in Feb 51, and 100,000 CCF entered Korea in April 51; POW saw verification of the above by reading the radio log at various times.

POW remembered the following radios: Sept 50 - CCF will aid NKPA; most Russian military advisors will return to Moscow; Dec 50 - NKPA requested additional CCF aid; CCF replied more troops enroute; NKPA GHQ notified CCF that 57,000 CCF casualties will be sent to Manchuria; Feb 51 - CCF stated 200,000 CCF fresh troops enroute; NKPA radioed that 200,000 troops had been received as of 20 Feb 51; March 51 - plans for 3d Phase Offensive received from Moscow; NKPA GHQ notified that Marshal Sudikov of Russia GHQ, Moscow will depart for Korea; 17 Apr 51 - NKPA GHQ notified by CCF that 100,000 replacements enroute; NKPA GHQ acknowledged replacement arrival 5 days later; Moscow was notified 4th phase offensive was failure.

UN POWs:

All American and UN POWs are being shipped to KILIN, MANCHURIA; CCF and NKPA will arrange air shipment to Russia of all POWs; on 28 August 50 a radio message concerning capture of Gen Dean was sent to Moscow Red Army GHQ, stating that Gen Dean would be flown to Moscow; on 2 Sept 50 American POW Capt Gwen (phonetic) of 24th Division assigned to NKPA GHQ Signal Dept to intercept, decode and analyze US radio messages; officer used US Signal Manual valid for period July 50 - Dec 50.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS:

6035 KC used to communicate directly with Moscow; code name of Red Army

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 013.361

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GHQ, Moscow - AARMI ARMI or KRASNO ARMI; NKPA code name - IVANOV; contact hours 0800, 1300, 1900 daily; wave length changed only when NKPA GHQ moves to new location.

4800 KC used to contact Moscow via relay station in Manchuria; code name of relay station - STUTKO. Code name of NKPA GHQ - TAVARIS KANG KAKAE; contact hours, 0800, 1300, 1900.

3800 KC used to contact CCF.

MORALE AND BATTLE EFFECTIVENESS:

According to high ranking officers of NKPA GHQ, morale and battle effectiveness of NKPA very low as compared to CCF; NKPA GHQ quite concerned about gradually decrease morale of CCF, because once CCF troops begin to surrender en masse, most CCF units will follow, as experienced in China.

G-2 COMMENT:

This is a preliminary phase I interrogation and the PW will be brought to Japan for further interrogation, particularly desired by ASAPAG.

From a hurried scanning of this report it appears that PW might be able to furnish much valuable information. All statements attributed to PW appear logical and probably the truth within such limits as are imposed upon the knowledge of an individual junior officer.

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DO NOT DETACH
G-2 GHQ FEC

4 June 1951

30400

SUBJECT: Preliminary interrogation report.

FROM: G-2 EXOC

TO: T/Intell.

- C of S, G-2 (3)
- Deputy
- Secretariat
- Deputy for Admin
- EX Admin
- EX MIS Div
- EX CI Div
- EX T/Intell (2)
- Sp Asst MIS Div
- Sp Asst 441st CIC
- Sp Asst Fiscal
- Sp Asst Radio
- Sp Asst Historical
- Sp Asst PSB
- Sp Asst JSOB
- Admin Officer
- Personnel (MIL)(CIV)
- Jap Liaison

- Theater Intell (2)
- Operations
- PDM
- Fn Mil Ln
- Plans & Estimates
- Special Intell
- Geog Branch
- CI Division
- Operations
- Coll & Pub
- 441st CIC
- JSOB
- SIA
- MIS Division
- ATIS
- TID
- Special Projects
- Historical Division
- Public Safety Branch

Info <input type="checkbox"/>	Approval <input type="checkbox"/>	Signature <input type="checkbox"/>	Draft Reply <input type="checkbox"/>
Action <input type="checkbox"/>	Concur <input type="checkbox"/>	Initials <input type="checkbox"/>	Info for Reply <input type="checkbox"/>
File <input type="checkbox"/>	Comment <input type="checkbox"/>	Dispatch <input type="checkbox"/>	Brief <input type="checkbox"/>

DATE ALL COMMENTS

Gen Conmi desires that brief highlights of the attached report be added to the question-bordered chart. If necessary, use a new chart and he will sign it again.

4 JUNE

Recommend approval of revised memo to C/S.

EW
for HVW

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DO NOT DETACH
G-2 GHQ FEC

30400

3 June 1951

SUBJECT: Preliminary Report of Interrogation of
NK POW, Lt Kang, SOK KUN

FROM : T/Intel

TO :

AC of S, G-2

Deputy

Secretariat

Deputy for Adm

Ex Adm

EX MIS Div

EX CI Div

Ex T/Intel 3

Sp Asst MIS Div

SP Asst 441st CIC

Sp Asst Fiscal

Sp Asst Radio

Sp Asst Historical

Sp Asst PSB

Sp Asst JSOB

Admin Officer

Personnel (MIL) (CIV)

Jap Liaison

3 Theater Intelligence Div

Operations

PDM

Fm Mil Ln

Plans & Estimates

Spec Intel

Geog Branch

CI Division

Operations

Coll & Pub

441st CIC

JSOB

SIA

MIS Division

ATIS

TID

Special Projects

Historical Division

Public Safety Branch

Info ()
Action ()
File ()

Approval ()
Concur ()
Comment ()

Signature ()
Initials ()
Dispatch ()

Draft Reply ()
Info for Reply ()
Brief ()

DATE ALL COMMENTS

The attached is self-explanatory.

HVWR
H.V.W.

Subject POW is one of very few captured to date who has had contact with USSR. Report contains much information relating to the role which USSR is playing in the war. Report is especially valuable in view of the information of interest to ASAPAC. For the above reasons this brief should be brought to the attention of the CinC (according to Col Rasmussen, who says Col White told him to prepare this brief for CinC).

E.B.B.

Recommend approval

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[Handwritten initials]

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 813562

By CEC NARA Date: 1/10/12



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