

THE MUTINY

OF

THE BENGAL ARMY.

An Historical Narrative.

BY ONE WHO HAS SERVED UNDER
SIR CHARLES NAPIER.

FIFTH THOUSAND.

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TO
THE LIVING AND THE DEAD—
THE LIVING EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH
AND
THE DEAD SIR CHARLES NAPIER,
WHO BOTH KNEW
HOW TO CHECK A MUTINY,
TO SELECT EFFICIENT PUBLIC SERVANTS,
AND TO GAIN THE AFFECTIONS OF THOSE OVER WHOM THEIR
SWAY EXTENDED,

These Pages are Dedicated.

India, July 2, 1857.

INTRODUCTION.

I PURPOSE to write an historical narrative of the rise, progress, and termination of the mutiny and revolt of the Bengal Army. It will be my object to expose, in the first instance, the causes of the disaffection, to state then the consequences to which that disaffection led, and to conclude by pointing out the remedies which ought to be adopted to ensure the country against a repetition of the fearful outrages that have disgraced it. As my object is simply to present to my countrymen in England a true account of this awful disaster, and of all the causes which, either directly or indirectly, have led to it, I shall be deterred by no feeling of favour or affection for any individual from speaking out as the occasion demands, awarding praise where praise has been earned, but not shrinking from denouncing those whose conduct has at all contributed to the rise and progress of the mutiny.

It will, I think, be advisable in the first instance, for the benefit of non-professional readers, to present a slight sketch of the organisation and interior economy of a Bengal Infantry Regiment, more especially as on the maintenance or entire abrogation of the existing system the future discipline and efficiency of the army will depend.

Organisation of a Bengal Regiment.—A Regiment of Infantry on the Bengal Establishment is composed of 1000 privates, 120 non-commissioned officers, and 20 native commissioned officers. It is divided into ten companies, each containing 100 privates, 2 native commissioned, and 12 non-commissioned, officers. The regiment is never quartered in barracks, but in lines—such lines consisting of ten rows of thatched huts—one being apportioned to each company. In front of each of these rows is a small circular building, in which the arms and accoutrements are stored, after having been cleaned, and the key of which is generally in the possession of the havildar (sergeant) on duty. Promotion invariably goes by seniority, and the commanding officer of a regiment has no power to pass over any man, without representing the fact to the Commander-in-Chief. A Sepoy, then, who may enter the service at the age of 16, cannot count on finding himself a naick (corporal) before he attains the age

54, and a subahdar (native captain) at 60.* By the time he has attained the age of 50, a native may generally be considered as utterly useless. The blood in his veins and the marrow in his bones have been dried up or wasted by constant exposure to the trying climate of India; his energies are relaxed, his memory impaired, and in governing and controlling the men who are especially under his surveillance in the lines, he can be of but little use to his European superior.

Caste.—But there is a principle at work, unknown to the European soldiers, which operates with tremendous force on the mind of the native, and either essentially adds to, or vitally detracts from, the authority of the native officer. This principle is *caste*. Now the predominating race in a Bengal regiment is the Hindoo; the followers of that religion, as a general rule, being to the Mahomedans in the proportion of five to one. A regiment, a thousand strong, will therefore be found to contain about eight hundred Hindoos. Of these it often happens that more than four hundred are Brahmins or priests, about two hundred Rajpoots (a high caste, but lower than the Brahminical order), and the rest of a lower caste.

The Brahmins are the most influential, as they are the most bigoted of the whole race of Hindoos. In their mythological tales the gods themselves are constantly made to do penance and propitiation to this superior order. As these tales form the only kind of literature circulated amongst the Hindoos, and as the acts they record, however absurd they may appear to the educated, are implicitly believed, it is not to be wondered at that the Brahmins are the objects of veneration to the other castes. “The feet of a holy man are like the waters of life,” is a proverb which gains implicit credence from all classes, and is at the same time practically acted upon. His curse is dreaded as a fate worse than death itself, whilst his protection is earnestly sought after by means of small presents, and of what to them is more valuable, constant prostrations or salaams publicly performed, so as to show the world the extent of the belief in their mighty power. When it is considered that in each regiment of the Bengal Army there are several of these men, in many regiments from three to four hundred, the mighty influence they have in their power to exert for good or evil may be imagined.

The manner in which this influence can be brought to bear on the discipline of a regiment may be easily conceived. We will suppose that one company is composed of 20 Mahomedans, 40 Brahmins, and 40 Rajpoots and lower-caste Hindoos. The influence of the Brahmins over the 80 Hindoos is paramount, and the Mahomedans being a small minority, would not contest the palm with them. The whole company may, therefore, be said to be under Brahminical influence.

If a low-caste Hindoo happened at the time to fill the responsible post of subahdar, he would be entirely under the spiritual guiding of the Brahminical clique. Were a mutiny hatching in the lines, he would not dare to divulge it, from the fear of a penalty more dreadful even than death — excommunication.

It is very evident, therefore, that by means of this pernicious system of caste, the men of a Bengal regiment, though nominally subject to the British Crown, are really under the orders and control of a Brahminical clique, formed in each regiment, constantly corresponding with one another, and acting without any sense of responsibility whatever.

European Officers.—Hitherto it has been supposed that the example of, and association with their European officers, have done more than anything else to loosen the power of caste. And it has undoubtedly been proved that on many trying occasions, especially during the Affghanistan war, when the Sepoys were exposed to more than ordinary trials, these men, generally so tenacious, have forgotten their prejudices, and have infringed many of their strictest precepts. It was in Affghanistan that the Sepoy earned the character given of him by Major D'Arcey Todd, of Herat renown, that "he would go anywhere, and do anything, if led by an officer in whom he had confidence." He earned and deserved that character in that rude country. Removed from the influences which hourly thrust themselves upon him in India, he was in Affghanistan a different and a far more useful being; but the moment he returned, he indued his prejudices at once, and became again the bigoted, relentless Brahmin. Still, even upon him then, the example of his officer had a certain influence. That is to say, he was prompt to recognise a daring, chivalrous nature, and to pay a sort of homage, not unmixed with fear, to high intellectual powers. Where an officer was at all lax in the performance of his duty, the Sepoy was certain to be lax also; and in cases where a stern strictness was unaccompanied by an occasional warmth, a good word off duty, or an inclination to patronise their sports, the officer was obeyed, but uncared for. Twenty-six officers make up the complement of a native regiment, but of these nearly half were generally absent, and there were seldom more than fifteen present at head-quarters. For the management of a regiment under Brahminical control, as all Bengal regiments are, this number is amply sufficient in times of peace. That is to say, the management is not affected by the mere number. In fact, the conduct of Irregular regiments, which possess only three officers, has always contrasted so favourably with that of Line regiments, with their fourteen or fifteen, that the natural conclusion one would arrive at is, that the latter are over-officered.

The officers live in bungalows, or thatched houses, near the lines of their regiments, but too far off to enable them to have any direct control over the movements of their men during the day; and for eight months of the year at least, the weather is too warm to allow them to ride out, except in the morning and evening. In order, however, to

sergeants are allowed to each corps, who are required to live in the lines, and to report all that goes on daily to the Adjutant.

Duties of Officers.—The duties of the officers are very similar to those performed in an English regiment. There is a Commander, generally of the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, who commands the regiment; an Adjutant, who superintends the drill, and makes daily reports to the commanding officer; an Interpreter and Quarter-Master, whose duty it is to look after the clothing of the men, and to interpret all orders: then each company is assigned to a separate officer, who is expected to settle all matters connected with his men every morning; or, should he be unable to do so, to refer them to the commanding officer.

Powers of the Commanding Officer.—The power of a commanding officer is of a very limited nature: he can make no promotions to the grade of commissioned officer; even in the ordinary rise from Sepoy to naick, should he think fit to pass over a man, his decision is liable to be upset by the Commander-in-Chief: he can make no prompt recognition of distinguished services; and, worse than all, by a recent order of Sir W. Gomm, he cannot refuse a court-martial to any Sepoy who may choose to demand it, in reference to the punishment which may have been awarded to him. The commanding officer is therefore quite powerless, and the men know it. Once it was otherwise: there was a time when the Commandant had it in his power to punish or reward, and his decision was irrevocable. But the system has been gradually changed. Commanders-in-Chief fresh from Europe, and accustomed all their lives to command Englishmen, have forgotten the inherent distinction between the European and the Asiatic, and in endeavouring to assimilate the rules for the latter to those which are suited only to the former, have broken down one of the chief barriers to Brahminical supremacy. One consequence of the present system is the gradual decline and final loss of all regard on the part of the men for their officers. As members of a Christian and converting religion they are disliked, as superiors they are no longer feared. Personal qualities may attract a short-lived admiration, but even that would shiver to atoms in the encounter with Hindoo fanaticism.

The Pension List.—But there was one resource upon which the Government relied above all others to influence their Sepoys, and this was by making it their interest to remain faithful to the British standard. The establishment of a pension list on a large and liberal scale, by the operation of which a fixed monthly stipend was secured to any soldier who might be incapacitated for further duty after a service of fifteen years, and which, moreover, provided for the heirs or nearest of kin of those who might perish in the field of battle, or from sickness whilst on foreign service, seemed well adapted to secure this end. A nobler or more liberal institution than the pension establishment for native soldiers does not exist, and it was thought by those competent to judge, that the estimation of the benefits accruing from it was fixed so firmly in the minds of the Sepoys, that that single consideration would weigh against all tempta-

tions to mutiny or revolt. The result has shown that Hindoo fanaticism, when fairly pitted against the enjoyment of present comfort, the certain prospect of rank and wealth, a sure provision for one's family, a reputation for loyalty of one hundred years' standing, will invariably carry the day in a regiment where Brahminical influence is paramount, and where the European officers do not possess absolute authority.

Yet such had been the condition of the Bengal Army for several years before the outbreak of the mutiny of which I am about to treat. The slumbering feeling first showed itself of late years during the rule of Lord Ellenborough, but the prompt and vigorous measures of that nobleman so completely repressed it, that for six years no similar symptom was anywhere apparent. A second time it rose in a still more dangerous form, and attempted to coerce the iron will of Sir Charles Napier. That gallant veteran extinguished it ere yet the spark had smouldered into a flame, and was rebuked by Lord Dalhousie for so doing. He retired, to avoid witnessing with his hands tied the catastrophe which he foresaw. A third time, in 1852, the prejudices of the Sepoys were placed in opposition to the will of Government. Lord Dalhousie requested the 38th Regiment to proceed to Burma. They refused. Lord Dalhousie succumbed. From that moment a revolt became a mere question of time and opportunity.

CHAPTER I.

THE FIRST MANIFESTATIONS OF REVOLT.

DURING the year 1854, the 38th Regiment Native Infantry, unpunished for their refusal to go to Burma, were located at the station of Cawnpore; there were two other regiments at the same station, the 63rd and 74th Native Infantry. At Lucknow, distant about fifty miles, were the 19th and 34th Regiments; at Allygurh, on the high road between Cawnpore and Meerut, was the 54th Regiment, which also supplied troops to the small civil stations of Etawah, Mynpoorie, and Bolundshuhr, the two former in the vicinity of Cawnpore and Agra, the latter close to Meerut. At Allahabad, about 125 miles from Cawnpore, the 11th and 48th Regiments were stationed. The native troops at Meerut consisted of the 3rd Cavalry, and the 36th and 46th Regiments. Considering the joint share which many of the regiments thus enumerated had in the late outbreak, it is reasonable to suppose that constant communications were going on between them all. No suspicion of it existed at the time in any quarter. Our native troops were as much trusted as Europeans; it was believed that they were not only completely satisfied, but that they regarded service in our ranks as preferable to any other mode of obtaining a livelihood. And certainly the authorities had grounds for this belief. No sound of disaffection was heard in any quarter. For every vacancy in the ranks there were more candidates than could possibly be enrolled, and the tone and bearing of the Sepoys towards their officers left nothing to be desired in that respect.

The relation of the Sepoys to the Province of Oudh.—An event, however, was about to occur, which, in the opinion of officers who had served long in India, would put to the severest test the feelings of the native soldiery towards their foreign masters. Of all the considerable native states with which we had come in contact, the province of Oudh was the only one which had maintained its independence intact. Immediately contiguous to our own possessions, inhabited by a mixed population of Hindoos and Mahomedans, from which our own army was principally recruited, the kingdom of Oudh had remained for upwards of half a century firm in its alliance to the British Government. During the height of our reverses in Affghanistan, that friendship had never wavered. So firm indeed was the attachment to, or the perception of the power of British arms, that

the Kings of Oudh had more than once, in the season of our distress, accommodated our Government with loans to a considerable amount, in repayment of which we, to our shame be it said, compelled them to receive accessions of territory alike useless to both parties. We were therefore under considerable obligations to the Court of Lucknow. Undoubtedly, the Kings of Oudh regarded us in the light of a protecting rather than an absorbing power. It had been their policy for years and years to give in to every demand of the British Government, and to avoid every act which, directly or indirectly, might give a claim for interference in their internal affairs. To this end the suggestion of the Resident, whom, backed by three native regiments, we maintained at the Court of Lucknow, was always considered as law, and the intrigues for his favour amongst the candidates for places in the king's council were carried on in a manner which those who have visited Constantinople may perhaps understand.

The King of Oudh, then, believed himself secure from further interference than that which I have just related, and it was generally believed, amongst the civil and military community of India, that the Government had no serious intention of annexing any portion of his country. There seemed indeed, in a political view, to be strong objections to such a course. The King of Oudh was the sole remaining independent Mahomedan sovereign in India; as such he commanded the veneration and regard of all the members of the Mussulman persuasion. To strike him down, then, would excite a general feeling of discontent amongst a very numerous and powerful class of our subjects—men of whom the Cavalry regiments were chiefly composed, and who supplied at least two hundred bayonets to each regiment of Native Infantry. From his territories, indeed, our army was almost entirely recruited. The Hindoo and Mahomedan Sepoy alike came from Oudh; he transmitted all his savings to his relatives in that country; and it is a remarkable fact, and one that fully refutes Lord Dalhousie's assertions about the mis-government of Oudh, that not a single instance has been known of a Sepoy settling down after the completion of his service in our provinces: he has invariably proceeded to Oudh, to invest his little fortune in land. Colonel Sleeman, for many years our agent at the Court of Lucknow, and one of the ablest men who ever held that appointment, was so well aware of this fact, that he lost no opportunity of impressing upon Government his conviction that the annexation of Oudh would produce disaffection in the native army, principally because it would transfer the family of the Sepoy from the operation of the regal regulations and justice of the King of Oudh to our own civil courts.

But Colonel Sleeman died, and Sir James Outram reigned in his stead. New councillors, aware of Lord Dalhousie's mania for annexation, succeeded the tried statesmen who had hitherto so successfully administered the affairs of our empire on a contrary principle, and in an evil hour Lord Dalhousie decided upon seizing Oudh. He resolved to do it, too, in a manner the most offensive, and the most irritating to the large Mahomedan population of India, and the most prejudicial to our own character for truth and honour. He

secretly collected troops, entered the kingdom of Oudh like a thief in the night, marched the British force directly upon Lucknow, and then, with the capital of Oudh virtually in his own hands, gave the first intimation to the King of his impending fate. Wajid Ali, of course, was unable to resist, and Oudh became from that moment a province of the British Empire.

It is impossible to describe the mixed feelings of indignation and hatred which pervaded the whole Mussulman population of India when they heard of this deed. Naturally treacherous themselves, they yet had an instinctive admiration for honest and truthful dealing, and they had hitherto placed implicit confidence in the word of an Englishman. When, however, they learned the story of the annexation, the juggle by which the King of Oudh had been done out of his dominions, their hearts filled with rage and a desire for revenge. Our Mahomedan Sepoys were by that act alienated at once and for ever, and the Hindoos began to reflect that the kingly power which could condescend to trick a king out of his dominions, might by a similar manœuvre cheat them out of their religion.

Such were the consequences of Lord Dalhousie's last act. He had first, in the instance of the 38th Native Infantry at Barrackpore, in 1852, sown the seed of revolt by provoking a mutiny and failing to check it. He followed this up in the early part of 1856 by the perpetration of a dark deed, calculated to raise a spirit of disaffection, dislike, and distrust throughout the native army of India, and the fruits of which I am now about to record. He did all this, I may add, in spite of, and in direct contrariety to, the warning voice of the great man whom his paltry littleness and petty jealousy had driven from the country.

Lord Dalhousie left India in the early part of 1856. So utterly ignorant was he of the real feeling of the native army, and of the effect of his ill-judged measures, that he left upon record his opinion that their position could not be improved. And yet he himself had done a great deal to affect that position most injuriously. Before Lord Dalhousie's time, the roads were free to man and beast; that nobleman imposed a tax upon all travellers. Previous to his arrival in India, a Sepoy's letters were allowed to travel free of postage all over India; under Lord Dalhousie's administration he was subjected to the same charge as his officer. These imposts were small in themselves, but they greatly restricted freedom, and told upon the pocket of the man who received only fourteen shillings monthly, with which to support his family hundreds of miles distant, and to provide himself with food and all the necessaries of life.

Lord Dalhousie left India in March 1856. It might have been supposed that the feelings of the native Indian community would have been relieved sensibly by his absence. And so, undoubtedly, they were for the moment. But it was soon found that, although he himself had quitted the country, he had left his counsellors and satellites behind him. It is a matter of necessity for a newly-arrived Governor-General, ignorant of the machinery and working of the Indian Government, to continue in office, for a time at least, the

officials whom he may find installed in the several departments. Lord Canning has, therefore, been compelled since his arrival to work with Lord Dalhousie's tools. He has since, it is reported, found out their utter inefficiency. As it is important for the right understanding of my narrative that the characters and habits of thought of these men should be known and appreciated, I do not think I can do better than present in this place a sketch of each individual member of Government, for the benefit of the reader.

Characters of the Members of the Government of India on Lord Canning's arrival.—The Supreme Council of India is composed of four members, in concert with whom the Governor-General administers the affairs of the country. At the time of Lord Canning's assumption of office these members consisted of Mr. Dorin and Mr. J. P. Grant, members of the Civil Service, General Low of the Madras Army, and Mr. Peacock of the English Bar.

There were four Secretaries to Government: Mr. Lushington for the Financial, Mr. Beadon for the Home, Colonel Birch for the Military, and Mr. Edmonstone for the Foreign Department. It will suffice for the purposes of my narrative to describe the Members of Council and the Military and Home Secretaries.

Mr. Dorin.—Mr. Dorin was a man who, in a service of thirty-three years, had never been fifty miles out of Calcutta in the direction of the interior: he was, therefore, practically ignorant of the manners, and customs, and peculiar requirements of the people of India. For all practical purposes, those three-and-thirty years might as well, or even with more advantage, have been spent in England. He was verging upon sixty years of age, and in all his habits was a very Sybarite. His experience of ruling had been principally confined to the Financial Department; but even there his budgets bore a stronger resemblance in their results to those of Sir Charles Wood, than to the more perfect calculations of Sir R. Peel or Mr. Gladstone. In 1854, during Lord Dalhousie's absence in the Neelghery Hills, he had temporarily assumed the Presidency of the Council. His tenure of that office was chiefly remarkable for the outbreak of the Southal rebellion, and for the weak and inefficient measures pursued to check it. He was indolent, void of energy, deficient in mental culture and ability, and certainly, in no other country but India, and in no other service but the Civil Service, would have attained any but the most subordinate position.

Mr. J. P. Grant.—Mr. Grant was a very different character. In the prime of life, active, energetic, and possessed of a certain amount of ability, he might, had he been trained in any other school, have done good service on the occurrence of a crisis. Unfortunately, he laboured under a complete ignorance of the habits and customs of the natives of Upper India. Accustomed, during his service, to deal only with Bengalees, he had imbibed the extraordinary notion that they were a type of the Hindostanees generally. His vanity was so great, that he would not stoop to demand information even from practical men of his own service. With the supercilious manner which is so often the accompaniment of a confined understanding, he pooh-

pooh'd every suggestion which was at variance with his settled ideas. Of the Sepoys he had no knowledge whatever, although, with respect to them, he was always ready to offer a suggestion. Of military men in general he had a jealous dislike, which prompted him on every occasion to oppose any plans or suggestions offered by a member of that profession. He was an adept at intrigue, and, being possessed of a practical knowledge of revenue matters, a plausible manner, an easy address, and considerable influence at the India House, he had gained a seat in council at an earlier age than was customary. As a practical man he had always been a failure. It was his advice, given because Mr. Halliday proposed an opposite plan, which delayed for seven or eight months the proclamation of martial law in the Santhal districts; and it will be seen, that on the occasion of the mutiny at Barrackpore, his pernicious influence was always opposed to those prompt and severe measures, on the execution of which the safety of the empire depended. These faults are attributable to the evil action of the school in which he was trained, on a disposition naturally haughty and supercilious. Had he never been a civilian, had he been trained to depend on his own exertions from the moment of his entrance into life, his career would have been more useful to his country and more honourable to himself.

General Low. — General Low was the only really practical member of the council. Unfortunately he was the oldest, and age and climate had already begun to tell upon his nerves. Nevertheless, he was the only man from whom the Governor-General received any real assistance. He knew, at all events, that there ought to be no trifling with mutiny, and he advised accordingly. It is to be lamented that he was wanting in the eloquence or power of language necessary to support his views. He could record a minute, but could not make a speech. And it thus happened that he was unable to defend measures, of the propriety of which he was convinced, against the legal subtleties sometimes brought to bear on them by his colleagues.

Mr. Peacock. — Mr. Peacock was the Law member of council, and as such was not expected to be able to deal with purely military questions. When such matters were debated he generally vacillated between Mr. Grant and General Low, inclining oftener to the civilian. His intentions were always pure, and when convinced of the justice of a cause, no special pleading would alter his vote. Unfortunately, his unacquaintance with soldiers prevented him from comprehending the dangers of unchecked mutiny, and he was found, on trial, ignorant of the proper moment to disregard rule and to resort to urgent measures.

Colonel Birch. — The Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department was a man in every way unsuited for his position. Placed early in his career in the department of the Judge-Advocate-General, his confined understanding was exerted in mastering the quirks and quibbles of the law. His intellect being essentially shallow, he was unable to take a broad view of any question; but he would argue for hours, and exhaust all his ingenuity in com-

bating some petty detail. When Sir Charles Napier assumed the command of the Indian Army, Col. Birch was Judge-Advocate. He was rather afraid of Sir Charles's downright character, and at their first interview exerted all his powers to please him. No amount of special pleading, however, would go down with the great Conqueror of Scinde.

Sir Charles's bad opinion was, however, of this service to Colonel Birch, that it obtained for him Lord Dalhousie's patronage. That nobleman, eager to show his spite towards Sir C. Napier, took the opportunity of the first vacancy to appoint Colonel Birch Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department; thus placing him, *de facto*, at the head of the army in India—giving him a position, indeed, exactly analogous to that of the Minister of War in France.

A worse appointment could not have been made. Colonel Birch was essentially a sycophant, always ready to give up his own opinion, if by so doing he could curry favour with his superior. He had tried this plan with Sir C. Napier, but Sir Charles found him out, and not only felt, but showed contempt towards him in consequence: he found it an easier task to ingratiate himself with Lord Dalhousie and his successor.

But he was also an ignoramus. He knew nothing of the Bengal Army. Many years had elapsed since he had even spoken to a Sepoy. He was ignorant of the composition of the army, as well as of its wants; whilst his previous training had so unfitted him for his post, that he could not even write an order without making it unintelligible by excessive quibbling.

Mr. Beadon.—Of Mr. Beadon, the Home Secretary, it will suffice to say that his great idea of policy, the one scheme which he kept constantly before him, was "India for the Civil Service." He looked, in fact, upon the country as the property of the members of the service, and he legislated accordingly. Indigo planters, merchants, in fact all Europeans who were not civilians or soldiers, were discouraged by him. He hated independent Englishmen; he hated the Press, because its motto was "India for the English:" he hated every one and every thing which interfered with his grand idea, and he never lost an opportunity of showing that hatred. Under his rule, India would have remained in our hands what it has been for the last hundred years: its resources would never have been developed, it would have continued almost like a burden on England; but as a compensation, it would have produced annually a certain sum of money as salaries for the family clique who governed the country.

Mr. Beadon had one recommendation: if he was narrow-minded and unscrupulous, he was honest: he could not "smile and smile and be a villain:" he spoke his thoughts freely and honestly, and people whilst they hated, could not help respecting him—a sentiment never entertained towards his colleague in the military department.

Lord Canning.—Such were the men by whom Lord Canning was surrounded on the outbreak of the mutiny. If they were, as a body, vain, ignorant, and incompetent, truth compels me to record that they could not have found a softer soil on which to exercise their

talents than that imbedded in the nature of the Governor-General. He was a man of excellent disposition, but weak and vacillating to a degree scarcely to be imagined. It was his great misfortune to be the son of an illustrious man. Qualities were therefore expected from him which he certainly did not inherit from his sire. His abilities were essentially mediocre, and, like many weak men, he almost invariably submitted his intellect to the influence of the last counsellor who had his ear.

He possessed, however, many agreeable qualities, calculated to adorn a private station. His personal courage was undeniable, but he lacked firmness and self-reliance to a degree which quite incapacitated him for his high position. Had he been surrounded by men possessing honesty and ability, he would doubtless have taken his tone from them, and under their advice and tuition would have shown himself equal to the occasion. But the slave of intriguing and incompetent advisers, the shuttlecock of Messrs. Grant, Beadon, and Birch, he gave, as I shall now proceed to show, an impetus to a mutiny which might have been crushed in the bud.

CHAPTER II.

FROM THE OUTBREAK OF THE DISAFFECTION TO THE DISBANDING OF THE 19TH NATIVE INFANTRY.

THE King of Oudh having been, as before stated, summarily deprived of his kingdom, determined to appeal to the Parliament and people of England for redress. Accordingly, in the month of April 1856, he came down to Calcutta, and took up his abode at Garden Reach, in the outskirts of Calcutta, attended by his prime minister, Ally Nucky Khan, and several followers. The Queen-mother, his brother, and one of his sons, proceeded to England, in the month of May following, in order effectually to prosecute the schemes on which he had resolved for the recovery of his kingdom. They set out, in fact, not with any hope on their part, or on the part of the King and his advisers, that their mission would be successful, but in order to convey to the people of England the impression that he had no hope but in their justice and mercy, in order to remove attention from the vast design he had formed—to upset at one blow the British rule in India.

In fact, this plan was decided upon before the King* left Luck-

* It should be borne in mind that the expression, "King of Oudh," refers here to those who carried on intrigues in his name. It is probable that the king himself, an imbecile, was not trusted with the full extent of the conspiracy; but his prime minister, Ally Nucky Khan, without doubt a man of transcendent ability, was the soul of the plot. Since his confinement in Fort William he has, in private conversation, attempted to justify himself, by declaring it was a counter-stroke for the treachery by which the seizure of Oudh was consummated.

now. He had become aware from the reports of his agents, that the Bengal Army was disaffected, and ripe to be worked upon. The Brahmical priesthood throughout the country were impatient at the proselyting efforts of the missionaries, whilst the Mahomedans, as I have shown before, were discontented at seeing the only kingdom connected with them by faith swallowed up by the paramount Power. The King found, in fact, that there never would be a time more propitious for an attempt to overthrow the British. Acting accordingly under able advice, he at once commenced a system of tampering with the native army. Of the Mahomedans he was sure; the Hindoos, already disaffected, might be acted upon by means of their religion. The new system of administration in Oudh would, he felt satisfied, cause considerable vexation to the families of the Sepoys, and, consequently, no little discontent amongst the Sepoys themselves. His agents were accordingly directed to lay stress on this new interference of the British with the privileges of the natives. It was pointed out to them that they were the original owners of the land, the lords of the soil, but that now, gradually and insidiously, the British were depriving them of their rights, and resolved to go on until they had subverted their religion. An alliance was at the same time entered into with the King of Delhi, who entered heart and soul into the plot, and it was finally determined that throughout the Bengal Presidency, from Calcutta to Peshawur, there should be a simultaneous rising on one day, in which the life of no Christian should be spared. The month of August, 1857, by which time it was hoped the Queen-mother would have left England, was fixed upon for the outbreak.

Had the measures of the Government of India been conducted at this time with even ordinary prudence, had the Military Secretary not blundered in a manner which would have been unpardonable in an ensign of twelve months' standing, it is probable that the attempts of the King of Oudh to tamper with the native army would have altogether failed. In the absence of tangible evidence on the subject, it had been difficult to convince the Hindoo Sepoys that their religion was actually in danger, and without satisfactory proof on that point they were unwilling to rise against the Government. In fact the plot was beginning to languish, when, at this juncture, the combined ignorance and folly of Colonel Birch gave the King of Oudh the very opportunity he had been seeking for in vain.

It is well known that the chief object of a Hindoo's veneration is the cow. She is in his eyes the sacred animal, the visible presence of the Creator on earth. Her life is not only precious, but to take it the greatest crime of which man could be guilty. The slaughter of a cow in a Hindoo village would always have been the signal for a rise. So convinced, indeed, were the Governments of former days of the necessity of respecting this prejudice, that in the large towns where Europeans were stationed a paddock or compound, surrounded by high walls, was set apart for the reception of bullocks intended for their food. The Hindoos always ignored the existence of such a spot; indeed all possible means were adopted to conceal it from them.

To kill a cow openly was openly to violate their religion, and the practice was consequently forbidden throughout India.

Yet, in the face of these prejudices, of the order to respect them, and of the danger of the consequences which must result from their violation, no sooner had the Government of India resolved to introduce the Enfield rifle partially into the Indian army, than the Secretary to Government deliberately issued an order, which, by violating the caste of the Hindoo, was alone sufficient to bring about a revolt. The Enfield rifle required a particular species of cartridge, and this cartridge in England was greased with lard made from the fat either of the hog or the ox. Without reflecting, or if reflecting, ignoring the consequences of his act, Colonel Birch ordered that the cartridges for use in India should be made up similarly to the cartridges in use in England, and should be used by the native troops—that is to say, that Hindoo Sepoys should handle cartridges besmeared with the fat of their sacred animal, the cow! The knowledge of this fact was conveyed to the Hindoos in the most casual manner. These cartridges had been made up by Lascars—men of an inferior caste. It happened that one day a Lascar requested a Brahmin Sepoy to give him a drink of water from his lotah, or brass pot. The Sepoy refused on the plea of his superior caste, and that the lotah would be defiled by the touch of the Lascar. The Lascar in reply taunted him for talking of defilement, when he every day touched cartridges besmeared with cows' fat. The Hindoo, horror-stricken, rushed to his comrades and told them the story: they inquired, and found it true to the letter. Indignant, believing themselves deceived by the Government, they wrote an account to their comrades throughout India. From that moment the work of the agents of the King of Oudh was easy.

For a man occupying the position of Military Secretary to the Government of India to make so gross a blunder was unpardonable. Equally so that, when the mistake was discovered, no disavowal was made by Government for four months, and then only in consequence of the outbreak at Meerut! Well aware that the idea had taken possession of the Sepoys' minds, Colonel Birch made no attempt to counteract it, gave no intimation that the manufacture of greased cartridges had been stopped. He calmly surveyed the mischief his acts had caused, and—did nothing. Yet this man, whose blundering incapacity caused the revolt, is still Secretary to the Government of India in the military department!

The consequences of this gross mismanagement were quickly apparent. The agents of the native conspirators were not the men to allow such an opportunity to slip through their fingers. On the 24th of January, less than a week after the discovery of the greased cartridges, the telegraph office at Barrackpore was burned down. An idea seemed to pervade the minds of the Hindoos that the Government was resolved to Christianise them all; that as the plan of open conversion, pursued now for several years, had failed entirely, it had been resolved to resort to insidious and secret measures to bring about the same end; that Lord Canning had undertaken the government of India with that sole object in view, and that he had engaged to

accomplish it in three years. Hence the greasing of the cartridges: hence the changes that were talked about in their dress and equipments. They knew our skill; they witnessed the constant scientific improvements evinced in railways, electric telegraphs, &c., and they dreaded lest some morning they should awake and find themselves, owing to some unaccountable ingenuity on our part, deprived of their religion and caste. Discontent took possession of their minds; they were in perpetual dread of something undefined, supernatural: a restless desire of showing their discontent evinced itself, and resulted, after nearly a week's hesitation, in the perpetration of the act recorded above, viz. the burning of the electric telegraph office at Barrackpore.

This station, distant about sixteen miles from Calcutta, was garrisoned entirely by native troops; at this time four regiments were quartered there, the 2nd Grenadiers, the 34th Native Infantry, the 43rd Light Infantry, and the 70th Native Infantry. Between Calcutta and Dinapore, an extent of 400 miles in length and enormous breadth, there was but one European regiment, the 53d Foot. Half of this regiment garrisoned Fort William, the other half was stationed at Dumdum, about seven miles from Calcutta. In case of any disturbance, not a single man could have been spared from the wing located in the fort, whilst the other was insufficient in strength to put down a simultaneous rising of the town and of the native army.

Such an idea, at this time, never suggested itself to a single European in the country. Although after the burning of the telegraph office on the 24th, scarcely a night passed over without the perpetration of some act of incendiarism, these acts were never traced to their source. The Government were confident and callous. Although about this time* the excited state of the minds of the Sepoys, consequent upon the discovery of the nature of the grease, was reported to them, not a single explanation was offered, not an attempt made to soothe them. It is true that an order was issued, after the interval of almost a month, to serve out no more greased cartridges, but, in the absence of any accompanying explanation, the Sepoys viewed that merely as an evidence that the Government was baffled for the time, and waited only a more convenient season for the renewal of their insidious attacks on their caste.

But, although the eyes of our Government were blinded, those of the King of Oudh and his agents were wide open to the importance of the occasion. The minds of the Sepoys at Barrackpore were hourly worked upon, and with such effect, that letters were despatched in shoals to every regiment in the service, giving full details, often amplified and exaggerated, of the cartridge business. Agents were also despatched, well supplied with money, to every station in India; these men were directed to prepare the native army for an immediate rise, and to adopt every possible means to bring about the revolt without the cognizance of the authorities.

* January and February, 1857.

The King of Oudh was well served. The whole army succumbed to his influence; a very considerable portion of the large police force came into his plans, and even where his agents were unsuccessful, in not one instance were they betrayed.

By the middle of the month of February, the discontented amongst the native regiments at Barrackpore had assumed such an appearance, and had risen to such a height, that General Hearsey commanding the Presidency division found it necessary to assemble the troops, in order to point out to them the absurdity of the fears they entertained for their religion. General Hearsey was a very gallant cavalry officer, well acquainted with the native character: he spoke the language also with rare facility. It was not in his power to do more than harangue the troops and report their state of mind to the Government: the first he did well, and at the outset with some effect; but as the second measure produced no explanation or sign from the head of the military department, the Sepoys, still secretly instigated, soon returned to their former state of murmuring against their masters.

To give one instance of the apathy of the Government at this momentous period it will suffice to state, that although disaffection had been manifested, in the most marked manner, by the Sepoys at Barrackpore and Dumdum on account of the greased cartridges, towards the end of January, it was not before the middle of the following month that Colonel Birch telegraphed to the schools of musketry at Seealkote and Umballah to prohibit the use by the Sepoys at those stations of the greased cartridge. Long before the message reached Seealkote (in the heart of the Punjab) those cartridges had been distributed to, and used by, the native troops there located.

The condition of the troops at Barrackpore, towards the latter end of February, was that of men who felt themselves aggrieved, who were resolute to revenge themselves on the supposed authors of their grievances, but who were restrained, partly by fear, partly by policy, from setting about it at once. Suddenly a spark lighted on the powder: it did not, fortunately for us, at the moment ignite, but a low rumbling noise, sufficient to enable us to make some preparation, warned us of our danger. The spark was first visible at Berhampore; it fizzed subsequently at Barrackpore; but the grand explosion took place two months later at Meerut!

On the 24th February, a small guard of the 34th Regiment N.I. arrived in the station of Berhampore, distant from Calcutta about one hundred and twenty miles. As was customary in such cases, the men of the 19th Regiment N.I., then stationed at Berhampore, feasted the men of the 34th guard, and of course inquired after the doings of their comrades at Barrackpore. The 34th men made a clean breast of it; they poured all their grievances into the sympathising ears of their entertainers: not an item in the catalogue was left out—the cartridges, the beef fat, Lord Canning's supposed mission, all were enumerated; the determination of the Barrackpore brigade to mutiny on the first convenient occasion was dwelt upon;—nothing,

in short, was omitted which could possibly work upon the feelings of their listeners.

It is a remarkable fact, illustrative of the native character, that in a regiment numbering a thousand men, composed of Mahomedans and Hindoos, of high caste and low caste, not a single man after hearing the astounding stories of the 34th guard thought it worth while to go to his commanding officer or to the adjutant of the regiment and inquire into their truth. They had been associated for years with their European officers, had marched with them from station to station, had received from them the kindest treatment, and, moreover, were conscious of the pride with which they were regarded, and of the implicit confidence placed in them by all. Yet on hearing for the first time, perhaps, tales which were brought them by men of another regiment, of a vast conspiracy brewing against the state, not one of them reported the circumstance or even inquired if it were true!

The acute sensitiveness peculiar to the natives on matters affecting their caste doubtless induced them to accept all they heard as literal truth. For a whole day they brooded over it; in making the morning report to their officers on the 25th of February, their demeanour was quite respectful, there was not an outward sign of the excitement which reigned within. But their feelings had been too much worked upon to allow this passive submission a longer sway. A slight circumstance supplied the igniting spark. On the 25th February, Colonel Mitchell, commanding the 19th, ordered a parade for exercise with blank ammunition for the following morning. In the evening, the blank cartridges were served out to the men. They were of the very same description as those which for a century past had been used by the Bengal Army. These particular cartridges had, in fact, been made up before even an Enfield rifle had reached India, and had been made over to the 19th magazine by the 7th Regiment N.I., on the latter leaving the station. In ordinary circumstances no objection whatever would have been made by any Sepoy to use similar cartridges. But the passions of the men had been roused; their feelings had been so excited that they could no longer control them; they were beyond the power of reason; they felt satisfied that their caste was to be taken away by means of cartridges, and their excitement persuaded them that these were the fatal messengers. They at first refused to receive them, and it was only when their commanding officer threatened all recusants with court-martial that they took them in gloomy silence. That night they held a consultation. The "multitude of counsellors" gave new energy to their fears, and in a moment of fanatical frenzy the regiment rose as one man, and took possession of their arms, shouting defiance.

Intelligence of these facts was promptly conveyed to the commanding officer, Colonel Mitchell. Two courses were open to him. The only troops at the station besides the 19th were a detachment of native cavalry and a battery of native artillery. The night was pitch dark, and no movement could be made with any certainty. He might either, therefore, have despatched the cavalry and artillery to

guard the public buildings, the treasury, &c., and await the early dawn for ulterior operations, or he might at once march down on the lines and endeavour to coerce the mutineers. The first course seemed the most prudent, and was urged upon him; however, he adopted the other, and moved as quickly as possible on his mutinous regiment. The night was so dark that he was compelled to use torches to enable him to find the way; in this manner, and with difficulty, he moved on.

In the meanwhile the 19th having seized their arms, remained drawn up in front of their lines, waiting apparently for their European officers to take the initiative. The ground near their lines was interspersed here and there with tanks, and on these, by the light of the torches, they beheld the artillery and cavalry advancing. Had they been thoroughly evil-disposed, it would have been easy for them, in darkness as they were, to have picked off their officers and the artillery-men, whilst the nature of the ground and the darkness of the night would have prevented all idea of danger from the cavalry. They were, however, more excited than ill-disposed, and with arms in their hands they waited the first movement of their officers.

On his part Colonel Mitchell could not have been insensible to the insecurity of his own position; he was marching at the head of natives against natives. Could he depend upon them? It was at all events doubtful. Were he to give the order to charge or to fire, was he certain that he would be obeyed? And if he were not obeyed, not only would there be three regiments in revolt instead of one, but the lives of the residents of that and surrounding stations would be jeopardised. Besides which he found, as had been pointed out to him, that the nature of the ground and the darkness of the night would prevent the possibility of his acting efficiently against the mutineers.

Something, however, must be done: he felt that. After deliberately weighing every circumstance of his position, he deemed it most prudent to try in the first instance the effect of conciliatory measures. He accordingly addressed the men of the 19th; he pointed out to them the absurdity of their fears and the enormity of their offence, and conjured them to give up their arms and return peaceably to their lines.

The 19th on their part were not over-anxious to push matters to extremities; their excitement was beginning to wear off, and many of them felt a little ashamed of themselves. Still they were sensible of the advantage of their position, and seemed resolved not to act under coercion. In reply, therefore, to their Colonel, they expressed their readiness to return to their lines, and to restore their arms to the proper place, provided only the artillery and cavalry were first moved away.

To this unmilitary concession Colonel Mitchell felt averse to accede. However, for the reasons above stated, he was powerless: he did not wish to provoke the 19th into a more open demonstration; he consented then to the proposal, and moved off the artillery and

cavalry. The 19th gave up their arms, returned to their lines, and the *émeute* was at an end.

Reflections on Col. Mitchell's conduct.—Colonel Mitchell's conduct on this trying occasion was much criticised at the time, and he was generally condemned for not at all risks enforcing his order to the mutineers to lay down their arms. Subsequent events have proved that had he done so—had he ordered the artillery to fire, or the cavalry to charge—he would not in all probability have been obeyed. Or, even had they endeavoured to obey him, the darkness of the night would have prevented any efficient working of the guns, whilst the Sepoys could have picked off the gunners with but little risk to themselves. Had he been worsted in the encounter, the rebellion would have been precipitated two months; the regiments at Barrackpore would have risen *en masse*, and the consequences to the metropolis would have been fearful.

The writer is of opinion that if Colonel Mitchell erred, he erred in not adopting the advice said to have been tendered to him of placing guards over the treasury and public buildings till the morning, and then acting with decision. But even then, as shown above, the result would have been doubtful; and every Englishman ought to be thankful that the matter ended as it did.

The news of this outbreak reached Calcutta about the 4th of March, and first opened the eyes of the Government to a sense of their insecurity. They had but one European regiment between Calcutta and Dinapore. It would be unsafe to punish the 19th Native Infantry without having European troops at hand to overawe them, and Government had literally none. Perhaps, after securing the fort and public buildings, about two hundred men might have been available—a mere handful amongst five native regiments deeply imbued with a spirit of fanaticism. In such a crisis there was but one course for Government to pursue; and it is but justice to say that they pursued it. No intimation was conveyed to the 19th of the sense entertained of their conduct. They were allowed to do their duty as usual; but on the morning of the 6th of March the Oriental Company's steamer "Bentinck" steamed for Rangoon, with orders to bring up H.M.'s 84th Foot to Calcutta with the utmost possible dispatch.

On the account of the disturbance at Berhampore reaching Barrackpore, great excitement was manifested by the Sepoys of the regiments at that station, more especially by those of the 2d and 34th Regiments. They did their duty, it is true, but with a sullen doggedness which it was impossible to conceal: it was known that nightly meetings took place in their lines, at which the conduct of the 19th in seizing their arms was applauded, and great sympathy expressed for them. A report of these meetings was made to Government; but not having the power to interfere with effect, they wisely abstained from noticing the matter.

Reports about this time reached Calcutta of ill-feeling and disaffection evinced at the important stations of Meerut and Lucknow. The occurrence of constant incendiarisms in the neighbourhood of the

Sepoy lines cast suspicion upon them, and served to show, not only that they were dissatisfied, but were seeking opportunities to evince their feelings.

At length, on the 20th of March, to the great satisfaction of every one in Calcutta, the "Bentinck" returned from Rangoon. H.M.'s 84th were immediately conveyed to Chinsurah, a station eight miles distant from Barrackpore; and orders were immediately transmitted to the officer commanding the 19th Regiment to march his corps to Barrackpore.

Greater excitement than ever prevailed at that station in consequence of the arrival of the 84th. The native troops, feeling themselves guilty of conspiring against the state, imagined that this move was directed against them. In the 34th especially the mutineers' whispers became louder and louder; they openly expressed their sympathy with the 19th, and scarcely concealed their intention to stand by the men of that regiment in the event of their offering any resistance.

Happily for us, these feelings found a vent before the 19th reached Barrackpore.

On the 29th March it was reported to Lieut. Baugh, Adjutant of the 34th, that several of the men of his regiment were in a very excited state; and that one of them especially, Mungul Pandey by name, was traversing the lines, armed with a loaded musket, calling upon his comrades to rise, and declaring himself that he would shoot the first European he came across. On receipt of this intelligence Lieut. Baugh put on his uniform, mounted his horse, and, with a pair of loaded pistols in his holsters, rode down to the parade-ground. It must here be mentioned, that immediately in front of the Quarter-guard of the 34th Regiment the station gun was posted, from which the morning and mid-day salutes were fired. Mungul Pandey, on hearing of Lieut. Baugh's approach, concealed himself behind this gun; and as that officer drew near, he took a deliberate aim and fired. The ball wounded the horse in the flank, and brought him with his rider to the ground. Lieut. Baugh, however, quickly disengaged himself; and snatching up one of his pistols, advanced on Mungul Pandey, who, finding himself unable to load his musket a second time, had taken up a sword which he had with him. Lieut. Baugh fired and missed. Before he could draw his sword the Sepoy was on him, with one blow brought him to the ground, and but for timely assistance would have then and there killed him.

All this took place, it must be recollected, in front of the Quarter-guard of the 34th, and not thirty yards distant from the guard of a jemadar and twenty Sepoys there located. These men not only made no effort to assist their officer, but showed evident sympathy with Mungul Pandey. The Sergeant-major of the regiment, who was a short distance behind Lieut. Baugh at the time, called out to them to assist him; but their jemadar forbid them to stir. At this juncture, just as Lieut. Baugh had been struck down wounded, the Sergeant-major came up breathless, and attempted to seize Mungul Pandey; but he, too, was wounded and struck down. Upon this the jemadar

advanced with the men of his guard ; but these, instead of assisting their European officers, commenced striking their heads with the butt-ends of their muskets. To this treacherous conduct there was one exception. The Mahomedan orderly who had followed Lieut. Baugh from his house, arrived on the scene of action in sufficient time to seize Mungul Pandey just as he had succeeded in reloading his musket. He was quickly followed by General Hearsey and other officers, who had been roused by the firing ; and by their joint aid the officers were rescued from their perilous situation. Mungul Pandey, on being seized, made an abortive effort to shoot himself. He was then taken off the ground and lodged in the Quarter-guard of the 70th Regiment. Affairs wore a very serious aspect when General Hearsey reached the ground.* That gallant officer, a friend and pupil of Sir Charles Napier, comprehended all in an instant. He felt that to give way now would be to incite a mutiny. Drawing a pistol from his belt, he rode up to the men of the guard, and ordered them back to their posts, declaring he would with his own hand shoot the first man who showed any symptoms of disaffection. This conduct had the desired effect ; the men were for the moment overawed ; and the dark cloud which appeared to be on the very point of bursting passed quietly away.

In order more effectually to convince the Sepoys that loyalty would always meet with a fitting reward from the British Government, General Hearsey then and there promoted Sheikh Pultoo, the Mahomedan orderly who had rescued Lieutenant Baugh and the Sergeant-major, to the rank of havildar. This had a most salutary effect : and yet it will scarcely be believed, that for this act a severe wiggling was administered to the gallant officer by the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Colonel Birch, whose quibbling mind and red-tape instincts could see no necessity for so grave a departure from rule !

But although the station had resumed its outward appearance of calm, within the lines all was disaffection. The jemadar and the Sepoys of the Quarter-guard, who, strange to say, had not then been, and were not for two or three days afterwards, placed in arrest, reproached their comrades for not taking advantage of so fine an opportunity of rising against and massacring the "Feringhees." The recriminations, however, were short, and the 34th, in conjunction with the 2nd Grenadiers, proceeded to mature a fresh plan, the nature of which will shortly be detailed.

On the 30th March the 19th Native Infantry arrived at Barraset, about eight miles distant from Barrackpore. It had by this time transpired that they were to march into the latter station for the purpose of being disbanded : still the behaviour of the men was respectful ; and in order to avert their fancied doom, they had sent in

* The men of the regiment had turned out in undress in front of their lines, and had shown, by their gestures and other signs, that their sympathies were all with Mungul Pandey. They had even jeered at Lieutenant Baugh as he passed them wounded, and reproached them for not assisting him.

a petition to the Governor-General, offering, in case they were pardoned, to proceed at once to China, or to serve anywhere on land or sea. In short, they showed a repentant spirit, and were never less inclined to join in a conspiracy against the state. On arriving on the morning of the 30th at Barraset, they found a deputation from the 34th awaiting their arrival. It has since transpired that these men made them a proposal — the result of their deliberations of the previous night — which it was well for us that they did not accept. On that very morning, Her Majesty's 84th, from Chinsura, a wing of the 53d Foot from Dumdum, a couple of European batteries from the same place, and the Governor-General's body-guard (native) from Calcutta, had arrived at Barrackpore, and had been ordered to appear on parade with the native regiments at five o'clock on the following morning. The proposal made by the 34th to the 19th was to the following effect: that they should, on that same evening, kill all their officers, march at night into Barrackpore, where the 2nd and 34th were prepared to join them, fire the bungalows, surprise and overwhelm the European force, secure the guns, and then march on to and sack Calcutta.

Had the 19th been as excitable then as they had shown themselves on the 25th of February, these views might possibly have been entertained; but they were repentant, and ashamed of their former excess. That they were not thoroughly loyal is proved by the fact that the tempters were not reported: they were suffered to return unbetrayed, but their scheme was at once and definitively rejected.

On the following morning the 19th Regiment marched into Barrackpore. An order by the Governor-General in Council, in which their crime was recapitulated, their fears for their religion pronounced absurd, and their disbandment directed, was read out to them in the presence of the assembled troops before enumerated. On being ordered to lay down their arms, they obeyed without a murmur; many of them, indeed, showed signs of deep contrition. They were then paid up before their comrades, and were marched across the river without arms. They had ceased to belong to the Company's army.

CHAPTER III.

FROM THE DISBANDING OF THE 19TH REGIMENT TO THE REVOLT AT MEERUT.

THE 19th were disbanded, and in the opinion of the Government a lesson had been thereby read to the Sepoys which they would not easily forget. They argued that Lord Ellenborough, by the disbandment of a regiment in 1844 (the 34th Native Infantry), had repressed

a mutiny; and that Sir Charles Napier, by a similar measure in 1849, had effected the same end; quite oblivious of the fact, that the entire circumstances were dissimilar, and that both those statesmen had followed up their disbanding orders by others. But the Indian statesmen who were at this time in power affected to sneer both at Lord Ellenborough and at Sir Charles: their pattern statesman was Lord Dalhousie (the real author of the mutiny), and they chuckled at the ease with which they had (to their own satisfaction) disproved the vaticinations of that nobleman's rival. Colonel Birch, in particular, was especially gleeful on this occasion. He — the man of whom Sir Charles had made a laughing-stock! — had he not by a single movement effected all that Sir Charles Napier had been able to bring about by twenty general orders? So at least he thought, or professed to think. All was confidence, superciliousness, and self-congratulation on the part of the Government officials! But although the Government was satisfied, the public was ill at ease. Symptoms were showing themselves throughout India, which the oldest Indian officers had never witnessed before. It was evident to them that some great movement was in progress, although they were not in a position either to fathom its causes or to avert its consequences. The bare hint of such an idea to Colonel Birch was sufficient to expose one to an outpouring of ridicule. That official's pluck at this epoch could not be questioned.

In the meantime, in April, the Sepoy, Mungul Pandey, had been brought to trial, and condemned to death. He made no confession, but stoically accepted his fate in the presence of all the troops at the station. The jemadar who commanded the guard of the 34th on the 29th March, and who had prevented that guard from assisting Lieutenant Baugh, had also been tried and condemned to death. The sentence, however, owing to some red-tape informalities originating with Colonel Birch, was deferred, most prejudicially to the public interests, to the 21st April. On that day the jemadar was brought to execution, and was hanged. Immediately before his death he harangued those around him, confessing the justice of his sentence, and warning others from following his example.

With this execution the Government appeared to rest satisfied. The atrocious conduct of the men composing the guard on the 29th March, evinced by their not only conniving at the attack upon their officer, but by themselves assaulting him and the Sergeant-major as they lay wounded on the ground, was quite overlooked. The Government appeared "satisfied of the loyalty of the 34th Regiment." Indeed, so convinced did they seem to be of the loyalty of every regiment in the Bengal Army, that at the end of the month of April they determined to send the 84th Foot back to Rangoon, and actually engaged transports for that purpose!

The Government came to this conclusion when in possession of reports from the commanding-officers of the different stations in India, which would have convinced any unprejudiced man that the whole army was ripe for revolt. At Agra the incendiarisms had been frequent, and the Sepoys had refused their aid to subdue the

flames; at Sealkote, letters had been discovered from the Barrack-pore Sepoys, inciting their brethren at that distant station to revolt. At Umballah, the discontent had been so marked that the Commander-in-Chief himself had been compelled to assure the Sepoys that their apprehensions regarding their caste were groundless. At Lucknow, the Sepoys of the 48th, incensed at their doctor for tasting a bottle of medicine previously to making it over to the sick man, and construing that act into an attempt against their caste (although the system had been prevalent for an hundred years), had taken their revenge by burning down his bungalow. At Benares, too, a very strong feeling of disaffection had been evinced: in fact, there was scarcely a regiment in the Bengal Army which had not shown itself ripe for revolt. Still the Government professed themselves confident, and actually issued orders to the 84th to re-embark for Rangoon.

The truth is, they were in a panic, and, like weak men in that situation, they attempted to hide it from their friends by the assumption of a bullying manner, whilst they effectually showed it to their enemies by vain attempts at conciliation. Hence the wretchedly weak measure of sparing the guard of the 34th, who had beaten their officers; they actually feared to incense them, and believed they were acting the part of statesmen by saving them from condign punishment. Little did they know the native character! That very act, miscalled an act of mercy, tended more than anything else to convince the conspirators that the Government was afraid to strike, and encouraged them still further to develope their plans.

It has since transpired, that soon after the attack upon Lieut. Baugh had been reported to the Government, it had been determined to disband the 34th, and that an order was at the time drafted in which this resolution was announced. For upwards of three weeks that order was kept back. In whose possession it remained it is impossible now to state; but this fact is certain, that for upwards of a month the men of the 34th, including those who had assaulted Lieut. Baugh, were allowed to believe themselves trusted by the Government.

The fact is, that the advisers of the Governor-General, being for the most part members of the Civil Service, refused to recognise these disloyal symptoms as overt acts of mutiny; they endeavoured to persuade Lord Canning that they were mere partial and local disturbances, which should be met rather with conciliation than with severity. In truth they were unwilling to admit, even to themselves, that their own domination, extending over an hundred years, had completely failed in attaching even one section of the population to British rule. If they had previously been called upon to declare the class upon which they would most firmly rely in case of need, they would have named Jack Sepoy; they had pampered, petted, and indulged him until they thought they had made sure of him; they had, in their love of power, wrested the control over him from their military officers, by the encouragement of appeals from their decisions, and vested an overwhelming power in the Supreme Government themselves; they had witnessed his devotion to his officer when sub-

ordinated to him alone, and they imagined that the transfer of the subordination to themselves would have ensured the transfer the devotion also. They knew that the Sepoys were the mainstay of order throughout the country, that they represented the feelings of the entire population of Oudh, of Behar, of Gwalior, the Punjab, Nagpore, and Hydrabad: that so long as they were contented, the people would remain passive, if not altogether satisfied. The Sepoy, in fact, was their barometer, and they were unwilling to believe the steady indication of a cyclone. They would not even admit to themselves that their house was founded upon sand, liable to be levelled to the ground by the first storm.

And it is certainly true that they had little other surety for the tranquillity of the country than the fidelity of the Sepoy. Attached by education, training, and hereditary policy to the principle, "India for the Civil Service," they had steadily discouraged the settlement in the land of that other element which, in a crisis like that which, in spite of themselves, they felt approaching, might have formed a countervailing barrier to Mahomedan or Hindoo rebellion. Had independent Europeans been encouraged to invest their capital in the land of India; had not the terrors of subjection to a Hindoo or Mahomedan magistracy been held over their heads to prevent such a catastrophe (to the Civil Service); had they been allowed the smallest exercise of political power, or had the way to that power been open to them, an independent body of landholders would have arisen, who would have formed the connecting link between the Government and the natives, and also have been able, from their numbers and organisation, to have checked any outbreak on the part of the people of the country. But it was very evident that such a measure could not have been accomplished without invading the exclusiveness of the Civil Service. Hence it has always been (with the brilliant exception of Lord Metcalfe, who had thoroughly at heart the interests of India,) systematically opposed by the members of that body. Their policy has ever been to shut out independent Europeans from the country. To carry out this end they have encouraged the trade in opium, whilst they have neglected purposely the cultivation of cotton; they have restricted as much as possible public enterprises which necessitated settling in the land; and although this policy has resulted in a wide-spread rebellion, it will never be lost sight of so long as the rule exists that a man, were he to possess the highest administrative abilities, would be debarred from their exercise, because he did not in the first instance come out to India as a member of the Civil Service.

True to this policy they, as stated above, affected to make light of the discontent in the native army, and persuaded Lord Canning to view matters in the same light. The determination to disband the 34th was accordingly postponed, in the hope that affairs would settle down quietly, and that no further interference on the part of Government would be needed. In pursuance of this plan the 84th were ordered to re-embark for Rangoon.

In a few days they would have started, and the long-wished-for

opportunity would have been afforded to the mutineers; when, providentially, an event occurred at Lucknow which suddenly disturbed, although even that failed to rouse the Government from their apathetic attitude.

At Lucknow, the capital of Oudh, the conduct of the native troops had been for some time past in the highest degree disorderly. Nightly meetings and consequent conflagrations had been of frequent occurrence. The city had always been the hotbed of intrigue, and no efforts had been spared on the part of the agents of the King of Oudh to corrupt the native soldiery. On intelligence of the disbanding of the 19th Native Infantry reaching that city, the king's brother intimated to the native troops, that as they now saw the extent of the punishment awarded for mutiny, he was prepared to give service at a similar, or even an increased rate of pay, to all who might be discharged by the Company! The consequence was, that the troops at that station were on the verge of open revolt. Most fortunately for India, the Commissioner of Oudh, Sir Henry Lawrence, was a man who would not suffer himself to be deterred by any consideration from acting with vigour and determination. He was, without doubt, the ablest man in India. It was he who had laid the foundation of that administration in the Punjab, which had in so short a period developed the capacities of that noble province. For Oudh he was the very best ruler that India could produce. Versed in civil matters, he had to repair in the first instance the egregious errors perpetrated by his predecessor, Mr. Coverly Jackson, a red-tapist of the school of Messrs. Grant and Beadon. As a military man, he found himself suddenly called upon to check a rising mutiny. In that respect he has done marvels. At the moment of my writing (29th June), although the whole province of Oudh has risen against him, — a province larger than England, — he, with a handful of Europeans (500 men), holds Lucknow, the most disaffected city in India! He has proved himself a real man, indeed! How does his conduct contrast with that of Colonel Birch, Mr. Grant, and the other advisers of the Governor-General? It will be seen that his measures were successful, because they were totally opposed to the ideas of those who administered the Supreme Government of India.

Sir Henry Lawrence had not been an idle spectator of the movements amongst the troops at Lucknow, and he resolved to visit the first overt act of mutiny with condign punishment. An opportunity was not long wanting. On the 3d of May a letter from the 7th Oudh Irregular Infantry (formerly in the service of the ex-king) was intercepted and brought to him. This letter was addressed to the men of the 48th Regiment, and its purport was as follows:— “We are ready to obey the directions of our brothers of the 48th in the matter of the cartridges, and to resist either actively or passively.” This letter was taken to a Brahmin Sepoy of the 48th. He communicated its contents to a havildar, and the latter to a subahdar. The three consulted over it, and resolved to bring the matter to the notice of the Commissioner. This was done. About the same time Sir Henry received intimation that the 7th Irregular

Infantry had proceeded to overt acts against their officers; and although none of them had been murdered, that result was more owing to their own courage than to the forbearance of the mutineers. The Adjutant, Lieut. Mecham, owed his life pre-eminently to his presence of mind. Four mutineers entered his house on the afternoon of the 3d, and told him to prepare for death; that personally they did not dislike him, but that he was a Feringhee, and must die. Lieut. Mecham was unarmed; they were armed to the teeth. Resistance was hopeless. He at once made up his mind to meet his fate with dignity and resolution. As the mutineers paused to listen to what he had to say, he replied, "It is true I am unarmed, and you can kill me; but that will do you no good. You will not ultimately prevail in this mutiny. Another Adjutant will be appointed in my place, and you will be subjected to the same treatment you have received from me." These words, delivered with coolness, without change of countenance or the movement of a muscle, seemed to strike the mutineers. They turned and left the house, leaving their Adjutant uninjured!

Tidings of these mutinous acts reached Sir Henry Lawrence on the evening of the 3d. Without a moment's delay, he ordered out Her Majesty's 32d Foot, the 13th, 48th, and 71st Native Infantry, the 7th Cavalry, and a battery of eight guns, manned by Europeans, and proceeded at once to the lines of the mutineers, distant about seven miles. Darkness had set in before he arrived there; but so prompt had been his movements, that the 7th were completely taken by surprise. They were instantly ordered to form up in front of their lines. In the presence of a force so imposing, they had no resource but to obey. The infantry and cavalry were then formed on either side of them, the guns within grape distance in front. The 7th, completely cowed, awaited their doom. They were ordered to lay down their arms: they obeyed. At this moment the artillery portfires were lighted. A sudden panic seized them, with the cry, "Do not fire! do not fire!" Mad with terror, they rushed frantically away, cowed into repentance. The ringleaders, and most of their followers, were secured that night by the native cavalry and infantry, and were confined pending trial.

Thus easily was suppressed the first mutiny at Lucknow. It has since transpired that the whole of the 71st, and very considerable portions of the 48th Native Infantry and 7th Cavalry, sympathised with the mutineers. Had Mr. Grant's and Col. Birch's plan, adopted by Lord Canning, of coquetting with mutineers, of giving in to them, of fearing to strike, of merely dismissing men for attacking their officers (an offence for which many European soldiers have suffered death); had, in fact, a delay occurred at Lucknow similar to that which occurred at Barrackpore in dealing with the 34th—a delay of three weeks—then, in all probability, that night or the following would have seen all Lucknow in revolt. It may be said that the troops subsequently did revolt. It is true; but they gave Sir Henry Lawrence nearly a month to prepare himself; and he proved that he was not the man at such a crisis to waste even an hour. When the

revolt which had long been foreseen did come, every preparation which it was possible for human foresight to devise had been made. The consequence was, that the mutineers were baffled; Sir Henry kept Lucknow, and still keeps it, though the whole of Oudh, almost the whole of India, is in arms against him. Had the revolt of the 30th of May occurred on the 3rd, there could have been but one result—our European troops would have been surprised, and every European resident murdered.

On the 4th of May the electric telegraph conveyed to the Supreme Government of India at once the account of the mutiny at Lucknow and of its suppression. A new book was in that act opened for Lord Canning's perusal, and he profited by it. The conduct of the men of the 34th at Barrackpore had been characterised by a sullen doggedness which could not be misconstrued: they were evidently watching their opportunity. When called upon to name the men of the guard who had attacked Lieut. Baugh and the Sergeant-major, they had steadily refused. Their officers, with one, or, perhaps, two exceptions, had declared before a Court of Inquiry that they had lost all confidence in their men. Some, unconnected with the regiment, attributed their conduct to the ill-judged zeal for proselytism evinced by their commanding officer, Colonel Wheler; but this, although it may have acted as an additional item in the balance against us, was scarcely the main cause of their ill-feeling. They were, in fact, thoroughly corrupted—more influenced even by the agents of the King of Oudh than by fears for their religion. A bad feeling at this time prevailed amongst all the regiments at Barrackpore. A jemadar of the 70th had been caught in the lines urging his men to revolt. He was tried and sentenced by a Court, composed of native officers like himself, to simple dismissal. This sentence was approved and confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief in India. To the jemadar himself it was no punishment at all. He owed four hundred rupees; and this dismissal eased him at once of his commission and his debt! But the effect upon the Sepoys is indescribable. "This," they said, "the only punishment for mutiny! They are afraid of us—we can do what we like."

There can be no doubt that the men of the 34th and of other regiments at Barrackpore only waited the departure of Her Majesty's 48th Foot from Chinsurah. They knew that that regiment had come up from Burmah, lightly equipped; that it would, in all probability, return thither soon; the rumour of their immediate departure was prevalent amongst them: they therefore waited, and would have waited with good purpose, but for the providential occurrence of the meeting of the 7th Irregular Infantry at Lucknow.

That mutiny, and the mode in which it was quelled by Sir Henry Lawrence, excited the admiration of Lord Canning. It also spurred him on to follow an example so nobly set. The account of the mutiny reached him by electric telegraph. It was not yet known in Calcutta or Barrackpore; the news would, however, be widely spread by the 8th or 9th. It was most desirable to act before that time; it was, indeed, essential. A blow must be struck. Upon the

34th, as the most guilty parties, it was resolved that it should fall. The order for the 84th to re-embark for Rangoon, was at once rescinded; they were directed to proceed to Barrackpore on the 5th of May; the wing of the 53rd and two batteries of Artillery were also ordered there, and a message was despatched the same evening to the officer commanding at that station, directing him to parade all the troops at the station on the following morning, to read to them an order by the Governor-General therewith enclosed, and to conclude by paying up and disbanding the whole of the 34th Native Infantry who had been present in the lines during the outrage of the 29th of March.

On the morning of the 6th of May, accordingly, the troops were paraded, the order was read, the men were paid up and disbanded. None who were on the ground that morning and heard that order read—none who, in Calcutta, read that order at the same moment that they learned the fate of the mutineers, can ever forget the lamentable effect it produced, the universal impression it infused amongst all ranks, that the Government was absolutely afraid to punish. In this order the infamous conduct of the 34th was detailed at full length; their outrage upon their officer, the sullen apathy of the whole regiment on that occasion, their unconcealed sympathy with the murderer, were all dwelt upon in forcible language; but the punishment, the retribution for mutiny and connivance at murder, what was that?—simple disbandment! Even on the men of the guard, who looked on the attack with sympathy, and even followed it up by striking the wounded men as they lay on the ground, no severer punishment was inflicted. Punishment!—it was no punishment at all. The Kings of Delhi and Oudh had offered them a national service and a higher rate of pay, and the road to these was opened to them by their disbandment.

But the Governor-General was not content even with such a demonstration of weakness. Judging him from his written proclamations, he appeared desirous to impress upon the minds of the native army that the 34th had been guilty of a very venial offence; for he wound up his order—an order which he desired to be read at the head of every regiment, troop, and company in the service—by informing the army, that if they still refused to trust in their officers and the Government, and still allowed suspicions to take root in their minds, and to grow into disaffection, insubordination, and mutiny, their punishment, too, would be “sharp and certain.” Sharp and certain as what?—as the punishment awarded to the 34th? The Bengal Army proved, by their after-conduct, that they wished for nothing better!

However, the order was read, and the men was disbanded. Did they express the least contrition for their offence? Did they show the smallest regret at leaving their officers and their colours? One incident, slight but significant, will suffice to show. They were allowed to keep their Kilmarnock caps, as they had paid for them. Before crossing the river, after having been paid up, many of them were seen to take off their caps, dash them on the ground, and

trample them in the mud; they would not carry away with them the smallest reminiscence of their service to the Company!

The 19th and 34th, the only two regiments of the Bengal Army who, up to this moment, had been guilty of overt acts of mutiny, had now been disbanded, and the Government fondly imagined that disaffection had been dismissed with them. Two orders of the Governor-General had distinctly intimated to the native troops, that the Governor-General had neither the desire nor the intention to interfere with their religion or their caste, and it was believed that these orders, coupled with the disbandment of the 19th and 34th, would have the best possible effect.

The men of the 34th had assaulted their officer on the 29th of March; punishment was meted out to them on the 6th of May. This interval of five weeks was not lost on the men of the Bengal Army. Throughout India every eye had been turned towards Barrackpore, to ascertain what fate would befall that regiment which had encouraged a murderous attack on one of its officers. For five weeks they looked, and looked in vain. It is true that the murderer himself and one of his sympathisers had been hanged, but less than that the Government could not do, without entirely abdicating its functions; otherwise all was quiet; the regiment had not even been rebuked for its share in the crime. The universal impression consequently prevailed amongst the Sepoys that the Government could not do without, and feared to punish them.

That these feelings would not have become modified by listening to the order published by the Governor-General, on the disbandment of the 34th, may be imagined from the fact, that when it reached Lucknow, Sir Henry Lawrence, one of the best judges of native character in India, refused to allow it to be read to the native troops, being of opinion that it would hasten rather than repress an outbreak.

At Meerut, disaffection had been more plainly manifested than in any other station in the North-western provinces. A rumour had been spread amongst the troops by means, it cannot be doubted, of the agents of the King of Oudh, that the Government had plotted to take away their caste, by mixing the ground bones of bullocks with the flour sold in the market; that thus the Hindoo, partaking inadvertently of the substance of the deified animal, would find himself compelled to embrace Christianity. It was in vain that General Hewitt and the commanding officers of regiments attempted to combat these ideas; it was fruitless that they pointed out to the Sepoys, that during a century's occupation of India no interference with caste had ever been tried. Left to themselves, the Hindoos might possibly have been pacified by these assurances; but they were urged on by the Mahomedans, who pretended similar fears for their own religion. The disbandment of the 19th, did nothing to allay the discontent, whilst the impolitic delay which intervened between the crime of the men of the 34th and their punishment served greatly to increase it. During the latter end of April this discontent showed itself in the usual manner. Houses were burned down, officers were not saluted

as usual, and whispers were heard that a resolution had been arrived at in the lines not to touch a single cartridge.

To such a height were these manifestations carried, that it appeared advisable to bring them to the test. In the presence at the station of two European regiments, the 60th Rifles and the 6th Carabineers, besides two troops of Horse Artillery and a light field battery, General Hewitt had, or thought he had, a sufficient force to repress on the instant any act of open mutiny. He was resolved, therefore, that the Sepoys should see that he was there to give orders, they to obey them. A parade of the 3d Cavalry was accordingly ordered for the morning of the 6th of May. On the evening of the 5th, cartridges, the old cartridges of the kind which they and their fathers had always used, were served out to them. Eighty-five men in the regiment at once stepped out and refused to take them. They were subsequently offered, and again indignantly refused. But one course remained to the Brigadier. The men were confined, brought to a court-martial composed of native officers, and by those native officers condemned to periods of imprisonment with hard labour, varying from six to ten years.

In the meanwhile, impressed by the consequences resulting from Sir H. Lawrence's vigour and promptitude, the Government had sent instructions by telegraph to the commandants of the principal stations in India, directing that sentences pronounced on mutineers, whatever might be their nature, should be carried out at once, that no delay might be caused by a reference to army head-quarters. General Hewitt, therefore, prepared to carry out the sentences pronounced on the mutineers of the 3d Cavalry at the earliest possible moment. The condemned mutineers were placed under an European guard, composed of two companies of the 60th Rifles and twenty-five men of the Carabineers, and a general parade was ordered for the morning of the 9th. At day-break on that morning,* all the troops in the station, leaving the guards standing, paraded on the 60th Rifle parade-ground; the Carabineers, the 60th Rifles, the 3d Light Cavalry, the 11th and 20th Regiments of Native Infantry, a light field battery, and a troop of Horse Artillery. The Carabineers and the Rifles were then ordered to load and be ready, and the Horse Artillery the same. This done, the mutineers were marched on to the ground; the European troops and Artillery guns being so placed, that the least movement of disaffection or insurrection would have been followed by instant slaughter. The mutineers were in uniform when marched on to the ground; they were then stripped of their clothes and accoutrements; and the armourers' and smiths' departments of the Horse Artillery being in readiness, every man was ironed and shackled for ten years' imprisonment on the hard roads, with the exception of five, whose period of bondage was only six years. These unfortunate wretches looked miserably crest-fallen and depressed, and many of them, putting up their hands, appealed to the General for mercy. None, of course, was

* I am indebted to the talented correspondent of the *Calcutta Englishman* for the graphic account of this morning's proceedings.

vouchsafed, and the work went steadily on until all had been heavily ironed. The 3d Cavalry looked very much humbled, mounted with their swords drawn and sloped, silent spectators of the doom of their comrades. When the ironing had been completed, the prisoners reproached their comrades for allowing the punishment to be carried out. It is now evident, that an understanding existed between the culprits and the native soldiery, both infantry and cavalry, at Meerut; that these latter had sworn not to allow the sentence to be carried into effect. The sight, however, of the loaded guns and the two European regiments was sufficient to chill their ardour; at all events, the prisoners were carried away, and they made no sign.

Had it been deemed advisable still to keep the prisoners under an European guard, the natives might have been overawed, and all yet have gone well; but apparently the necessity for such a deviation from the usual course of procedure did not suggest itself to the authorities, and the mutineers were made over manacled to the civil authorities. By these they were lodged in the jail—a building some two miles distant from the cantonment, and guarded entirely by native burkundazes.

Meanwhile the native troops returned to their lines, furious with pent-up indignation. There can be no doubt that on that afternoon they matured their plans for a rise; messengers were dispatched to Delhi, to inform the regiments there of the projected move, and to warn them to be ready to receive them on the 11th or 12th. They resolved to rise on the evening of the following day (Sunday), whilst the Europeans should be in church, to release their imprisoned comrades, fire the station, and to slaughter every man, woman, or child, pertaining to the Christian community. The originators of this plan were the men of the 3d Cavalry; but they found the men of the 20th Regiment as eager as themselves to join in any insurrection. Not so, however, with the 11th Native Infantry. This regiment had but recently arrived in the station, and whether sufficient opportunity had not been afforded for corrupting them, or for some other unexplained reason, they hung back, and expressed a decided disinclination to join in any attack on their officers. They did not, however, betray the secret.

All this time the authorities were unsuspecting: the havildars made the morning report to their officers; the men of the European Regiment attended morning service as usual, and there was no sign of the coming storm. The day passed away as Sundays generally pass in India, and not even the sergeants, who live in the native lines, had noticed anything to call for report, or even for remark. Evening church-time was approaching: the 60th Rifles were turning out with their side-arms to proceed thither; officers, too, were dressing either for church or for an evening ride. Sepoys! restrain your impatience for half-an-hour longer, and Meerut is your own. Providentially they cannot restrain it. Suddenly the alarm of fire is given; then there is loud shouting, as if the Sepoys were turning out to quench the flames. But, then, that volley of musketry, followed by another and another! those discordant yells! that clattering of cavalry! the bugle sound of the alarm! It is not fire only that

has caused this direful outcry—it is mutiny!—insurrection!—
THE BENGAL ARMY HAS REVOLTED!

It was nearing five o'clock on that memorable afternoon when, at a given signal, the 3rd Light Cavalry and the 20th Native Infantry rushed out of their lines, armed and furious. A detachment of the former regiment at once galloped in the direction of the jail. On reaching it, its gates were opened to them without resistance, and they at once liberated all its inmates, including their imprisoned comrades: a native smith was at hand to strike off their irons. These men, infuriated by their disgrace, ran with all possible speed to their lines, armed themselves, and mounted; they then rushed to the scene of action, yelling fearfully, and denouncing death to every European. Meanwhile the remaining portion of the 3rd Cavalry and the 20th Native Infantry had proceeded to the lines of the 11th with all possible speed. Thither also the officers of that regiment, alarmed by the shouting and noise, had gone before them. They found Col. Finnis haranguing his men, and endeavouring to keep them firm to their colours. The men were wavering when the 20th arrived. The men of this regiment, whose hands were already red with the blood of several of their own officers, seeing this hesitation and its cause, at once fired at Col. Finnis. The first shot took effect on his horse only, but almost immediately afterwards he was riddled with balls. All discipline, all better feelings, now vanished. It is true that the Sepoys of the 11th permitted their officers to escape with their lives; but having done this, the greater portion of them followed the example of the 20th. And now ensued a scene of disorder, rapine, and murder which pen cannot describe. Every house and building near the lines, except the hospital, had been fired; and the smoking and blazing barracks and houses, the yells of the mutineers, and the shouts and shrieks of the multitude gathered there, numbers of whom fell from the shots of the mutineers, made on that dark night a scene than which one cannot be imagined more horrible.* Officers galloping about, carrying orders to the European troops, were fired at, not only by the mutineers, but by the native guards placed over the public buildings for security. Ladies driving in their carriages, gentlemen in their buggies, who had left their houses unsuspecting of evil, were assaulted, and if not murdered, treated with a brutality to which death would have been a relief. Not only the Sepoys, but the released jail-birds, fifteen hundred in number—the population also, that “vile rabble” which is always available for plunder or murder, had joined the movement, and spread terror and desolation all around them. Nor were houses or public offices safe places of refuge from these assaults. Most of the houses in Meerut—all of those in the military lines—are thatched with straw, and easily inflammable: the plan of the insurgents was to set fire to the roof, and to murder the frightened residents as they quitted the burning dwelling. Many met their deaths in this way; more, providentially, escaped: yet not one of those in the latter category owed their safety to the mercy of their as-

* Correspondent *Bengal Hurkaru*.

sailants. In some instances outrages were perpetrated which the pen refuses to record. These men, whom we had pampered for a century, who had always professed the utmost devotion to us, seemed suddenly converted into demons. Nor was this a solitary example; other stations were destined to witness atrocities fouler, more brutal, and more treacherous than even those of Meerut.

Meanwhile unaccountable delay occurred in turning out the European troops, and night had set in before the Carabineers arrived on the parade-ground of the 11th Native Infantry. They found there the 60th Rifles and Artillery waiting for them. Their arrival was the signal for a move against the rebels. They found, however, that by this time their work of destruction within the station had been completed, and that they had betaken themselves to the Delhi road. Thither they followed them. The night, however, was too dark, and the movements of the insurgents too uncertain, to permit our troops to act with vigour. A portion of the rebels were, it is true, found in a wood, and shots were exchanged between them and the 60th Rifles. The Artillery, too, fired upon and dispersed them; but it was considered that nothing more effective could be done; that fifteen hundred jail-birds, maddened with the taste of blood, were at large, and might still inflict incalculable damage on the station; and that, at such a crisis, the presence of the troops was absolutely required there. These, at least, are all the reasons that can be imagined (for none have hitherto been assigned) for the languid pursuit of that evening. One fact is clear, that the rebels were not followed up with any vigour, and that, after seeing them clear of the station, the troops returned to the scene of the outbreak of the mutiny, and there bivouacked. The night was spent "in taking precautions against attack, and in measures preliminary to strengthening the place, so as to secure it, if the troops should be compelled to leave it."*

The horrors of that fearful night could scarcely have been surpassed. The rebels, it is true, had been driven away, but the liberated prisoners and the rabble continued their fearful work. It is true that European sentries were posted, with all possible celerity, in the different parts of Meerut; and the constant fire of their rifles showed that their presence was necessary. Still, in spite of all precautions, foul deeds were even then perpetrated. To every one it was a night of agonising suspense. Husbands had missed their wives, and wives their husbands; infants had been separated from their mothers, and mothers from their children. Many passed the night, depending entirely on the fidelity of their native servants; and it is gratifying to state that, in more than one instance, that fidelity was proof. To this source Mr. Greathed, the commissioner, and his wife, owed their safety. Their house—a flat-roofed one, fortunately—was one of the first attacked by the Sepoys. On the first alarm they fled to the roof; thither, on the least intimation from the servants, the Sepoys would have followed them: but these persisted in

* Correspondent *Bengal Hurkaru*.

the story that they had left the house; and the mutineers, after searching every room, at last believed them and went away. The courageous action of the ayah, or female servant, in the service of Captain and Mrs. Macdonald of the 20th Regiment, must here be recorded. She had heard the alarm, and had perceived the blood-stained mutineers advancing towards her master's house. Unable to save him or her mistress, she seized their two children, and concealing them as well as possible, carried them to a place of safety. They never saw their parents again. Subsequent experience has shown that the "brave and loyal Sepoy" does not disdain treating children of one and two years of age with the most cruel barbarity.

How that night passed with those poor sufferers, they alone can tell. The day at length dawned, and the sun shone on dismantled Meerut. Their worst sufferings were over; the houseless were sheltered, and order was in some degree restored. Thenceforth they were safe from further attack, and could watch the progress of the avalanche by which they had been almost overwhelmed.

As soon as it was ascertained that the mutineers had taken the road to Delhi, only forty miles distant from Meerut, messengers were despatched to intimate the fact to Brigadier Graves, commanding at that station. The situation of this officer was full of peril. Besides the officers and sergeants of the native corps, he had not a single European under his command. The garrison consisted of the 38th, 54th, and 74th Regiments, Native Infantry, and a battery of Native Artillery. The men of these regiments had hitherto shown no symptoms of disaffection; but the 38th was the corps which had so successfully defied Lord Dalhousie in 1852, and the men of it had ever since been impressed with the idea that the Government was afraid of them. The British rule in India seemed to be staked on their fidelity, and Brigadier Graves must have felt that the issue would at least be doubtful. But he was not the man to give way to despair under any circumstances; and he at once resolved to make the most of the means at his disposal.

The approach to Delhi from Meerut is defended by the little river Hindun, which is traversed by a small bridge. On receiving intimation of the movements of the rebels, the Brigadier's first idea was to cut away the bridge and defend the river. But there were two objections to this plan. The first was, that at the season of the year, the height of the hot weather, the river was easily fordable, and his position on the other bank might be turned. The second, that in case of their attempting that manœuvre, he would be compelled to fight (even if his men continued stanch) with the rebels on his front and flank, and the most disaffected city in India, the residence of the descendant of the Mogul, in his rear. This plan, therefore, was abandoned almost as soon as conceived, and he determined to content himself with defending the city and cantonments as best he could. As this might endanger the lives of the non-military residents, intimation was conveyed to them to repair to the Flagstaff Tower, a round building of solid brickwork, well capable of defence, and at some distance from the city. In many

instances that intimation never reached those for whom it was intended, by some it was received too late, but by none was it wilfully disregarded.

Meanwhile the regiments were ordered out, the guns loaded, and every possible preparation made. The Brigadier harangued the troops in a manly style; told them that now was the opportunity to show their fidelity to the Company to whom they had sworn fidelity, and by whom they had never been deceived. His brief, pithy address, was received with cheers. The 54th, especially, seemed eager to exterminate the mutineers, and loudly demanded to be led against them.* The Brigadier, responding to their seeming enthusiasm, put himself at their head, and led them out of the Cashmere Gate to meet the rebels, whose near approach had been announced. As they marched out in gallant order, to all appearance proud and confident, a tumultuous array appeared advancing from the Hindun. In front, and in full uniform, with medals on their breasts gained in fighting for British supremacy, confidence in their manner, and fury in their gestures, galloped on about two hundred and fifty troopers of the 3rd Calvary: behind them, at no great distance, and almost running in their efforts to reach the golden minarets of Delhi, appeared a vast mass of Infantry, their red coats soiled with dust, and their bayonets glittering in the sun. No hesitation was visible in all that advancing mass; they came on, as if confident of the result. Now the Cavalry approach nearer and nearer! At this headlong pace they will soon be on the bayonets of the 54th. These latter are ordered to fire; the fate of India hangs on their reply. They do fire, but alas! into the air; not one saddle is emptied by that vain discharge. And now the Cavalry are amongst them; they fraternise with them; they leave the officers to their fate; and these are remorselessly cut down wherever they can be found!

It was too true, indeed! The bold and confident bearing of the rebels was thus accounted for; the Delhi troops, too, had been corrupted. In shouting to be led against the mutineers, they had acted a part which to Asiatics is familiar from their youth, but which Englishmen accustomed to them all their lives have never been able to comprehend. All was now over with Delhi. The enraged troopers, accompanied by the greater part of the 54th, the other arrivals from Meerut, and gaining fresh recruits at every step from the 38th and 74th, dashed into the city, shooting in their progress all the Europeans they met with. Many of them pointed to the marks left by the manacles on their legs, as if to justify their atrocities. Not a Christian whom they could lay hold of was spared, and on the women death was the smallest of the barbarities inflicted. The Governor-General's agent, Mr. Simon Frazer, and Captain Douglas commanding the palace guards of the titular King of Delhi, were cut down in the very precincts of the palace. Mr. Jennings, the chaplain, and his daughter, were seized when making their way to

* Private account.

the king for his protection. They were brought before the monarch—a man the descendant of the house of Timour, born our pensioner and ever treated by the English Government with marked liberality. “What shall we do with them?” inquired the enraged troopers of the king. “What you like; I give them to you!” was the reply. This man and the King of Oudh were at the bottom of the conspiracy: it was thus that the former repaid British generosity.

Meanwhile Brigadier Graves, rallying a few men who had remained faithful, retreated to the Flagstaff Tower. Here he found a vast assemblage of ladies and gentlemen—all, in fact, who had received or who had been able to comply with his intimation. Here also were stationed a company of the 38th and two guns; and so great was the strength of the tower that it was imagined that these men, if they remained faithful, might hold it against the enemy. But when the Brigadier addressed them, it became evident that their hearts were with the rebels, and that they only waited an opportunity to join them.

A remarkable occurrence, a feat of gallant devotion, unsurpassed in any age or country, brought the matter quickly to a crisis.

The Delhi magazine, situated in the very heart of the city, contained at this time immense stores of ammunition;* it was in charge of Lieut. Willoughby, a young Artillery officer. Of him, as the writer had the pleasure of a slight acquaintance with him, he may be allowed to say a few words. He was a young man of modest unpretending worth; his mother, if I may be pardoned for mentioning her, (for she still lives), is a lady possessing very superior accomplishments, a refined taste, and a generous disposition. All these young Willoughby had inherited. Those who met him in society might pronounce him shy and reserved, for so he appeared to strangers; to appreciate him, it was necessary that he should be known intimately; and by those to whom that gratification was extended, his generous sentiments and steadfast principles were rated at their real value. There was nothing showy about him, all was sterling gold. He sought on every occasion the path of duty, and he followed it careless of the consequences. I am fully sensible of the feebleness of my pen when endeavouring to render homage to his merits; the deed I am about to chronicle speaks for itself, and will, I am certain, ensure for him at least the enthusiastic recollection of his countrymen to never-ending time.

Young Willoughby, in common with others, had heard of the approach of the rebels, of the insurrection of the troops sent out to check them, and of their rush upon the city. In the heart of the city was the magazine, and that building contained stores which would enable their possessors to arm all the extent of the wall of Delhi against an enemy. This consideration decided him; his duty was clear—that magazine should not fall into the hands of the

* The official account of the blowing of the Delhi magazine differs somewhat from that given above, which was necessarily compiled from accounts written by people who were in another part of the station when the event happened. It is given in this edition in an Appendix.

rebels. The consequences to himself he little recked; they would most likely be fatal. There was, it is true, a subterranean passage, of which he might avail himself; but even there the effects of an explosion would probably be felt. He was convinced, that after the first desire for blood was glutted, there would be a rush to secure the stores in the magazine; there he could await the insurgents, and there should they find their doom.

It turned out as he predicted: on they came, red with gore, infuriated with slaughter: in the meanwhile he had laid the train and stood ready to fire it. Not for an instant did his coolness desert him; not for a second, when he placed in the balance his own life against theirs, did he hesitate; he thought only of the consequences to the rebels and to his countrymen hereafter. Gradually the place was filling, and yet the portfire was not applied. Now, now it is full—they are struggling for admittance, it will contain no more; and now he stoops, the steady hand is applied, the slow-match burns,—a few seconds, then a puff of white smoke,—an immense cloud of red dust—an explosion—and the bodies of two thousand* rebels are hurled into the air!

And he! where was he, the gallant author of the deed? Scorched, maimed, bruised, almost insensible, he still had life. How he escaped, how he afterwards got away, I cannot tell; but I read in the paper of this morning (1st July) that he had died of his injuries at Meerut. Let us hope that his death,—the death of one so young,—so gallant, so devoted to his country, will be still more terribly avenged. Will it be so? I cannot say. The proclamation of Mr. John Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-west Provinces, offering pardon to these villains, is yet unrepealed!

To those assembled at the Flagstaff Tower this explosion could have but one meaning: it plainly told, or seemed to tell, that the rebels had penetrated into the heart of the city, and would be upon them before long: it had, at all events, the effect of deciding the movements of the company of the 38th. The men, previously hesitating, now became actually hostile, and, taking possession of two guns which had been sent up to increase the defences of that position, they prepared to point them against the tower. It was now evident that nothing more could be effected: the troops, almost to a man, had revolted; the jail-birds, as at Meerut, had been released; the Delhi population, composed principally of ignorant and bigoted Mahomedans, were up in arms: this intelligence would shortly be conveyed to the surrounding inhabitants, who were chiefly Googiers, a race of savage marauders, and by them escape would be cut off. Not an instant was to be lost. Brigadier Graves perceived this, and advised every one to escape as best he could: his own conscience was clear: he had done his duty, and now that the inevitable hour of departure had arrived, he remained, the last to leave the ancient capital of the Mogul. Some on foot, others crowded in carriages, a few riding, the remnants of the Europeans left Delhi: their fate has yet

* The numbers are variously stated from 1500 to 3000.

to be related: some who were for six weeks afterwards despaired of have since turned up living; their adventures have to be told: the great proportion of them, we know, met with all but insurmountable difficulties and dangers, and the escapes of many remind one of the supernatural. Up to the date of writing but few authentic accounts have been received, but sufficient is known to make us long for the time when the story of each individual's adventures can be published.

Meanwhile the rebels reigned supreme in Delhi. Undismayed by the loss incurred at the magazine, perhaps thereby rendered more furious, they ruthlessly pursued every Christian. The officers' bungalows were all entered and searched: they were not, in a single instance, pillaged *by the Sepoys*: they significantly remarked that they wanted only life. Their deeds, too, have yet to be recorded and revenged. Language cannot describe the bitter animosity or the savage cruelty evinced by those who, up to a recent period, had been the chief pillar of British supremacy!

It will be sufficient to add, that from the first moment the King of Delhi showed sympathy with the revolt: the Europeans, who fled to him for refuge, he handed over to their tender mercies: their several regiments he called after the names of his sons; he proclaimed himself Emperor of India; and, after the first few days of disorder he appointed Lall Khan, a subahdar of the 3d Cavalry, commander-in-chief of his army. He threw for a great stake, and has more than once been within an ace of winning it.

To show how the revolt at Meerut gave the signal for a general rise over India; how successively the troops at Ferozpoore, at Benares, at Allahabad, and at Cawnpore, in the provinces of Oudh and Rohilcund, rose against us, and for a time achieved success; how the atrocities of Meerut and Delhi were surpassed by those of Oudh and Allahabad, will be my task on a future occasion. I shall then be able to prove, if indeed proof be required, (for I hope and believe that the people of England will have already judged and decided), how, up to the very last moment, the members of the Government, true to their principle of "India for the Civil Service," refused to open their eyes to the magnitude of the danger, and endeavoured as much as possible to conceal its extent from Lord Canning; how, in pursuance of this policy, they rudely declined to take precautions against a rising of the troops at Barrackpore, until an accident disclosed a plan which was to have been executed on the following day for murdering every European; how, in spite of their miserable policy, Calcutta has three times been providentially preserved when on the very brink apparently of destruction; how, notwithstanding their assumed blindness to the public danger, the principal civil servants of Government took most extensive precautions for their own security. I shall also show how precisely the same policy was pursued in the North-west provinces; how Mr. John Colvin, when the massacres of Meerut and Delhi were fresh in the recollection of all, offered free pardon to the rebels on the sole condition of their laying down their arms; how, up to this hour, no official proclamation has been published disavowing that act; how by its operation many

mutineers, laden with plunder and red with the blood of our countrymen, have found their way to their homes.

I shall then ask if the people of England will permit this policy to be further carried out; whether they will allow India still to remain an appanage of the Civil Service? This noble country has been under the rule of that service for a century: the present insurrection is the inevitable result of that domination. They have had no root in the land; their interests have not been the interests of the people of India. We have lately seen how, in many parts of the country, the Indigo planters, men like Mr. Venables, Mr. Saunders, Mr. Chapman, have actually not only held their own factories, but have rescued the magistrates and others from the insurgents: in some instances the Commissioners have been compelled to invest them with magisterial powers. Whence was their authority derived? In what lay the secret of their immunity from outrage? The answer is plain: they are owners of the soil; their interests are the same as those of the population. These, then, are the men who ought to be made magistrates, in place of unfledged boys, ignorant of the people and imperfectly acquainted with the language of the country.

The last act of the Government has, as much as any other, exposed the "courage and capacity" of our civil administrators. So long as there was real danger they pretended to ignore it; but no sooner had the crisis passed away, than, looking back at it, appalled at its magnitude, they fell into a panic. They determined on a vigorous demonstration, one which should strike terror into the hearts of all. The question was, Whom they should attack? The rebels, unfortunately, were beyond their reach; Barrackpore was quiet. But a demonstration was necessary. They could not attack the national enemy, so they resolved to assault the declared antagonists of the principle, "India for the Civil Service;" and in pursuance of this plan, they actually persuaded Lord Canning to go down to the Legislative Council, suspend all the standing orders, and in the course of forty minutes to abolish the freedom of the Press!!!

Take the present members of the Government of India, the Members of Council, and the Secretaries; try their powers, analyse their abilities, and with the single exception of Mr. Edmonstone, there is not one of them whose capacity can be rated higher than that of an average lawyer's clerk; had their lot not been cast in "the pleasant places" of an exclusive service, few of them would have been able to earn an independent livelihood!

It is easy, therefore, to imagine why they should have been jealous of a Press which did not recognise their pretensions to an exclusive possession of intellect, but that such men should have subordinated Lord Canning to their views appertains to the marvellous. Lord Ellenborough would have used them to his own purposes; they have moulded Lord Canning to theirs!

With terrible anxiety do the independent Europeans wait the decision of the people of England regarding the future government of India. It is a most momentous question, fraught with all-important results for good or evil, not only to the independent Europeans, but

to the millions of native inhabitants! For the good of all, it is *essential* that the exclusive Civil Service should be abolished!

I cannot, however, conclude this part of my narrative without paying the homage which is due to those civil and military servants who have in every respect deserved well of their country. Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow, and his brother Sir John Lawrence in the Punjab, have, in this crisis, not only nobly sustained their great reputation, but have risen to a height in public estimation beyond which it is impossible to ascend. Sir Henry especially has, with the smallest means at his disposal, effected the greatest marvels. With five hundred Europeans he has held the most disaffected city in Asia, and kept at bay the inhabitants of a province larger than England! Sir Hugh Massey Wheeler, at Cawnpore, has successfully defended a barrack containing two hundred Europeans against thousands of natives thirsting for their blood. Messrs. Gubbins and Lind, and Colonel Neil, at Benares, have done all that men could do in their circumstances. I mention the names of these illustrious men in this place, not with the vain hope of doing them justice here, but to show that my pen is not entirely dipped in gall—that I wish to speak impartially of all, irrespective of the service to which they belong.

At a future and not very distant occasion I hope to produce a fully detailed narrative of their deeds.

One word on the subject of Army Reform. That subject is now under the consideration of the Government of India, but as their plans must be primarily submitted to the Court of Directors and the Board of Control, they will doubtless be subjected to alteration according to the expressed sentiments of the people of England. I will only say on this occasion, that the Brahmins have proved that they cannot be trusted with arms: the Mahomedans, too, have shown that they cherish in their hearts the proselyting doctrines of their religion, and that us Christians they will ever detest, and take advantage of every opportunity of destroying Europeans.

We shall therefore be compelled to adopt an entirely new system; of this, one necessary feature must be a large increase to the purely European force: this is indispensable. Then the whole of the Bengal Army—at least the regiments which have not mutinied—should be disbanded, and re-organised on a new footing: the rank of native officer should be abolished; promotion by merit directed; the pension establishment, which has failed in its purpose, should be done away with.

Those regiments which, few in number, have not mutinied or been disarmed, might be allowed to retain their arms; their numbers be reduced to 800 men, and they should always be quartered with Europeans. The practice of living in lines should be forbidden, but barracks similar to those of the European troops should be provided. To each company, in lieu of native officers, who have proved themselves either mutinous or incompetent, two steady European non-commissioned officers should be attached. They should live in the barracks with the men, though separated from them, and should keep the keys of the bells of arms.

Supposing twenty more European regiments to be added to Bengal, there might be twenty native regiments of the nature I describe. Not a Brahmin should be admitted; they should be composed chiefly of low-caste Hindoos and Sikhs. The Goorkhas should remain as they are, unmixed.

The men of the regiments thus re-formed should never be sent on escort duty; they should remain cantoned with Europeans, and should be constantly brigaded and exercised with them.

To carry on other duties, mere police duties, such as escorting treasure and commissariat stores, other regiments should be raised, under the denomination of Police Corps. To these fire-arms should not be entrusted. A short sword and an iron-bound club should be their weapons; they should be paid at a lower rate than the others, and should not be allowed to rank as soldiers.

As a preliminary measure it will be necessary, merciless as it may sound to English ears, to hunt down every mutineer. India will not be secure so long as a single man remains alive. Since I commenced this page, details have been received of the merciless slaughter of upwards of an hundred unarmed ladies—women and children flying for a place of refuge. These are our sisters and your sisters, people of England! And ought their murderers to be spared, perhaps pensioned? Yet, canvass Calcutta at this moment—inquire from civilians, merchants, and military men, and the all but universal answer will arise, that at the hands of our Government—a Government comprehending such men as Messrs. Dorin, J. P. Grant, Beadon, and Birch, there will be the same shrinking from severe punishment, the same paltering with mutineers, the same truckling to rebels, by which their measures, up to the present moment, have been fatally marked.

DII AVERTANT OMEN!

END OF PART I.

APPENDIX.

From LIEUTENANT G. FORREST, *Assistant-Commissary of Ordnance, to*
COLONEL A. ABBOTT, C.B., *Inspector-General of Ordnance and Magazines, Fort William.*

SIR,—I have the honour to report for the information of Government, and in the absence of my commanding officer, Lieutenant Willoughby, Artillery, supposed to be killed on his retreat from Delhi to this station, the following facts as regards the capture of the Delhi magazine by the mutineers and insurgents on the 11th instant. On the morning of that date, between seven and eight A.M., Sir Theophilus Metcalfe came to my house, and requested that I would accompany him to the magazine for the purpose of having two guns placed on the bridge, so as to prevent the mutineers from passing over. On our arrival at the magazine we found present Lieutenants Willoughby and Raynor, with Conductors Buckley, Shaw, Scully, and Acting Sub-conductor Crow, and Serjeants Edwards and Stewart, with the Native Establishment. On Sir Theophilus Metcalfe alighting from his buggy, Lieutenant Willoughby and I accompanied him to the small bastion on the river face, which commanded a full view of the bridge, from which we could distinctly see the mutineers marching in open column, headed by the cavalry; and the Delhi side of the bridge was already in the possession of a body of Cavalry. On Sir Theophilus Metcalfe observing this, he proceeded with Lieutenant Willoughby to see if the city gate was closed against the mutineers. However, this step was needless, as the mutineers were admitted directly to the Palace, through which they passed cheering. On Lieutenant Willoughby's return to the magazine, the gates of the magazine were closed and barricaded, and every possible arrangement that could be made was at once commenced on. Inside the gate leading to the Park were placed two six-pounders, double-charged with grape, one under Acting Sub-conductor Crow and Serjeant Stewart, with the lighted matches in their hands, and with orders that if any attempt was made to force that gate, both guns were to be fired at once, and they were to fall back on that part of the magazine in which Lieutenant Willoughby and I were posted. The principal gate of the magazine was similarly defended by two guns, with the chevaux-de-frise laid down on the inside. For the further defence of this gate and the magazine in its vicinity, there were two six-pounders so placed as either to command the gate and a small bastion in its vicinity. Within sixty yards of the gate and in front of the office, and commanding two cross-roads, were three six-pounders and one twenty-four pounder howitzer, which could be so managed as to act upon any part of the magazine in that neighbourhood. After all these guns and howitzers had been placed in the several positions above-named, they were loaded with double charges of grape. The next step taken was to place arms in the hands of the Native Establishment, which they most reluctantly received, and appeared to be in a state not only of excitement, but also of insubordination, as they refused to obey any orders issued by the Europeans, particularly the Mussulman portion of the establishment. After the above arrangements had been made, a train was laid by Conductors Buckley, Scully, and Serjeant Stewart, ready to be fired by a preconcerted signal, which was that of Conductor Buckley raising his hat from his head, on the order being given by Lieutenant Willoughby. The train was fired by Conductor Scully, but not until such time as the last

round from the howitzers had been fired. So soon as the above arrangements had been made, guards from the Palace came and demanded the possession of the magazine in the name of the King of Delhi, to which no reply was given.

Immediately after this the subadar of the guard on duty at the magazine informed Lieutenant Willoughby and me, that the King of Delhi had sent down word to the mutineers that he would without delay send scaling-ladders from the Palace for the purpose of scaling the walls, and which shortly after arrived. On the ladders being erected against the wall, the whole of our Native Establishment deserted us by climbing up the sloped sheds on the inside of the magazine, and descending the ladders on the outside, after which the enemy appeared in great number on the top of the walls, and on whom we kept up an incessant fire of grape, every round of which told well, as long as a single round remained. Previous to the natives deserting us they hid the priming pouches; and one man in particular, Kurreembuksh, a durwan, appeared to keep up a constant communication with the enemy on the outside, and to keep them informed of our situation. Lieutenant Willoughby was so annoyed at this man's conduct, that he gave me an order to shoot him, should he again approach the gate.

Lieutenant Raynor, with the other Europeans, did everything that possibly could be done for the defence of the magazine; and where all have behaved so bravely, it is almost impossible for me to point out any particular individual. However, I am in duty bound to bring to the notice of Government the gallantry of Conductors Buckley and Scully on this trying occasion. The former, assisted only by myself, loaded and fired in rapid succession the several guns above detailed, firing at least four rounds from each gun, and with the same steadiness as if standing on parade, although the enemy were then some hundreds in number, and kept up a continual fire of musketry on us, within forty or fifty yards. After firing the last round, Conductor Buckley received a musket-ball in his arm, above the elbow, which has since been extracted here. I, at the same time, was struck in the left hand by two musket-balls, which disabled me for the time. It was at this critical moment that Lieutenant Willoughby gave the order for firing the magazine, which was at once responded to by Conductor Scully firing the several trains. Indeed, from the very commencement, he evinced his gallantry by volunteering his services for blowing up the magazine, and remained true to his trust to the last moment. As soon as the explosion took place, such as escaped from beneath the ruins, and none escaped unhurt, retreated through the sallyport on the river face. Lieutenant Willoughby and I succeeded in reaching the Cashmere Gate. What became of the other parties it is impossible for me to say. Lieutenant Raynor and Conductor Buckley have escaped to this station. Severe indisposition prevented my sending in this Report sooner.

I have, &c.
(Signed)

G. FORREST, Lieut.
Asst. Commy. of Ordnance.

Meerut, May 27th, 1857.

N. B.—After crossing the river, on the night of the 11th, I observed the whole of the magazine to be on fire, so that I am in hopes that little of the property fell into the hands of the enemy. Park-Serjeant Hoyle was shot about 11 A.M., by the mutineers, in attempting to reach the magazine to aid in its defence.

(True Copy)

A. ABBOTT, Colonel,
Inspector-General of Ordnance and Magazines.

THE MUTINY

OF

THE BENGAL ARMY.

An Historical Narrative.

BY ONE WHO HAS SERVED UNDER
SIR CHARLES NAPIER.

PART II.

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TO
THE LIVING AND THE DEAD ;—

TO
THE STATESMAN

WHOSE PRESIDENT POLICY SAVED A MIGHTY EMPIRE FROM RUIN,—

TO
THE HERO,

WHOSE VOICE EVEN FROM THE TOMB FORETOLD THE ADVENT
OF THE
NEMESIS OF MISRULE ;—

TO
THE LIVING EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH,
AND
THE DEAD SIR CHARLES NAPIER,

These Pages are Dedicated.

ADVERTISEMENT.

IN presenting the second part of his narrative of the great national insurrection in India to the public, the writer is anxious to avow the reasons which primarily induced him to adopt a step so foreign to his previous habits, as that involved in publication.

Having, in India, been precluded from offering warning or advice, the writer, in common with many others, foresaw at an early stage that the system adopted by the Supreme Council of Calcutta, so far back as March 1857, of coquetting with mutiny and with mutineers, would inevitably lead to disaster. There was not an officer in Bengal, living out of the charmed circle of official red-tapeism, that did not scent from afar the stormy blast; and although the revolt in all its magnitude was anticipated, probably, by none, still there was a deep conviction on the minds of many, that something dangerous was impending.

The crisis came. At first, apparently, a mere military mutiny, it speedily changed its character, and became a national insurrection. The Rajpoot villages in Behar, those in the districts of Benares, Azimgurh, Goruckpore, in the entire Doab, comprising the divisions of Allahabad, Cawnpore, Meerut, and Agra, in the provinces of Rohilcund and Oudh, shook off our rule and declared against us. But the men who administered the affairs of India refused to admit the existence of events which were clear to all around them; they persisted in governing as though there were no disorder in the civil districts, and feigned to believe that the cultivators of the soil — the class from which the Sepoys are selected — were, to a man, in our favour. Their tactics were at once detected; but no sooner had their exposure been threatened by the local press, than the fourth estate was summarily silenced by the authoritative application of a Press Act.

In the midst of the unparalleled disaster by which the country had at this period been overwhelmed, with a Government whose measures, always tardy, were often ill-advised, whose policy was a hand-to-mouth policy, in whose eyes the suppression of the mutiny seemed to be of less importance than the maintenance of an exclusive service,

and with the ordinary vehicles of information virtually suppressed, it appeared to the writer to be the duty of every Englishman, to the best of his abilities, to enlighten his countrymen on the rise and progress of an insurrection which, if not misunderstood, had certainly been mismanaged.

The first part of the narrative, therefore, was the offspring of the Gagging Act.

In the second part, now offered to the public, the writer has endeavoured, still maintaining the narrative form, to trace the consequences of a still-existing adherence to principles inaugurated upwards of a century ago. The natural tendency of those principles has been, to place all the power and patronage of the country in the hands of a class who have no stake in its prosperity beyond the salary they draw, who have been educated in an implicit belief in Leadenhall Street, who are jealous of every other class of Europeans, and who therefore cast every obstacle in the way of their settling in the country — a policy advocated by Lord Metcalfe, Mr. Shore, and others of the Civil Service, whose combined integrity and capacity had elevated them above the prejudices of their education.

These civilians, thus forming an oligarchy and possessing power so great that by their means one Governor-General, who saw through and defeated their designs, was recalled, are now intrusted with the task of re-organising a system on the ruins of that internal administration which has broken down under their misrule. They have already commenced their work in a manner that plainly indicates the mere re-erection of the ancient edifice.

It is because the writer is convinced that the selfish nature of their policy needs only exposure to meet with the indignant reprobation of the people of England, that he has ventured in the course of this narrative to exemplify some of its results. He would humbly suggest to his countrymen, that in any future scheme for the government of India the "exclusiveness" which has been the bane of the present system be abolished, and that it be made lawful for the supreme power to appoint any man of talent and ability, beyond the pale of the Civil Service, to the highest places of trust and confidence under the Government.

It would appear also most essential that the Legislative Council be either remodelled, or abolished altogether. * Constituted as it now is, of paid nominees, it commands neither respect nor consideration.

This work is dedicated to Lord Ellenborough, and to the lamented Sir Charles Napier, partly because those two great men, each in his turn, suppressed mutinies which, in their development, only became

less dangerous than the present one because, instead of wasting their time in discussing milk-and-water theories, in writing minutes on abstruse legal technicalities, or in debating the distinction between treachery and treason, they acted not to excite, but to crush them, and succeeded accordingly;—because also they not only detected the sore spot in the Indian system, but likewise applied to it “the incision-knife and the caustic;”—because they adopted justice as the basis of their systems of government; and because, finally, their wise policy in Scinde, on one side, and in Gwalior, on the other, have assured the safety of India in this as in preceding crises.

Of personal admiration, shared in as it is by all around them, this is not the place to speak.

It had been the intention of the writer to have included a notice of the able administration of the Punjab in the narrative now submitted to the public; but its insertion would have increased the bulk, and have delayed the publication of the present part, already too long postponed: it shall assume a prominent position in the third part.

With respect to the facts which are adduced in this work, there is not one which is not based upon authority. To those kind friends who have sympathised with his undertaking, and who share his sentiments, the best acknowledgments of the writer are offered; something more is due to those who have aided him by their assistance and advice.

The writer cannot but be sensible that he has rendered but scant justice to many of the gallant officers and soldiers who have fought so nobly for their country. In common with his countrymen, he is at a loss to pronounce whether the daring energy of Havelock's soldiers, the patient and determined fortitude of those who for four months sat before Delhi, or the undaunted resolution of the heroes who defended Lucknow, is most worthy of admiration. Should this work reach a second edition, it will be his pleasing duty to endeavour to portray at greater length the deeds of those who have the greatest claims on the gratitude of England.

To that portion of the English press which noticed so favourably the first instalment of this narrative, the writer desires to convey his warmest acknowledgments. Composed without access to a single official document, its details have been found singularly correct; but one or two trivial errors occur. The whole part is now under revision, and will, it is hoped, be shortly again presented to the public in a slightly enlarged form.

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PART II.

CHAPTER I.

THE EFFECTS OF THE REVOLT AT DELHI IN CALCUTTA AND AGRA. —
THE MUTINIES AT FEROPPORE, ALLYPORE, ELAHAH AND MYNPOOREE.
— MR. COLVIN'S PROCLAMATION.

WHILST the terrible events recorded in the last chapter were being enacted at Meerut and Delhi, Lord Canning and the Supreme Council were congratulating themselves on the success and facility with which they had eradicated the spirit of mutiny from the Bengal Army. It is true that a written report from Sir Henry Lawrence of the *émeute* at Lucknow on the 3rd of May, a telegraphic notification of which had been received on the 4th, arrived on the 9th of May, but it caused the members of Government no uneasiness whatever. Sir H. Lawrence's vigorous measures had suppressed the mutiny, and to the majority of the Council there appeared no necessity for any precautions for the future. Mr. Grant, indeed, who was considered to carry the brains of the Council, in a minute which he recorded on that date, expressed his marked approval of the dilatory policy which had been pursued with reference to the 34th Native Infantry, and hoped that the Government would not depart from it on this or on any future occasion. He, therefore, advised that the punishment of the 7th Oudh Infantry should neither be prompt nor sudden, and that it should be prepared by all those tedious forms under shelter of which the guilty parties in the 34th Native Infantry escaped punishment. Both he and Mr. Dorin were evidently desirous to make the European officers the scapegoats: the latter recorded his opinion that no regiment which was properly commanded would mutiny, and both expressed a desire that before punishment should be meted out to those men who had mutinied with arms in their hands, a strict and searching investigation should be made into the conduct of the European officers, and a proportionate punishment awarded to them — to those very men who were at the time risking their lives and the lives of their wives and children by remaining at their solitary posts, and by endeavouring to preserve order and discipline — many of whom, not long after, paid for their zeal and confidence in their men by a lingering and cruel death.

The Governor-General himself was apparently quite satisfied with the aspect of affairs; on the 12th of May, whilst our countrywomen

at Delhi were being massacred, he recorded his belief that the measures taken with reference to the mutineers had not been "too mild," and he was evidently of opinion that the spark of mutiny, though it might glow for a time, was fast dying out.

It was in consequence of these feelings that he and his Council at this period acted a part which very nearly, for a time, lost to England the possession of India — to which many of the horrors which were afterwards perpetrated may be traced.

The long agitation about the cartridges, the mutiny of the 19th, the continued smouldering of the native regiments at Barrackpore, the murderous attack on Lieut. Baugh, the incendiarisms committed at all the principal stations in India, and lastly, this outbreak in the heart of Oudh, a newly annexed country, had made a very deep impression on the minds of all thinking men in India. The want of decision on the part of Government, the long interval of five weeks which had been suffered to intervene between the crime of the 34th Native Infantry and its punishment, if punishment it can be called, had too evidently impressed the natives with the idea that we were afraid of them; and it was apparent to a vast number of our military commandants, that unless our policy underwent a total change, unless a system of repression of mutiny were substituted for the existing plan of coquetting with and succumbing to it, it would be impossible to maintain the discipline of the army. The Sepoy now felt that his commanding officer was a cypher; the Government, his real master, was at a distance, and, moreover, had showed that it feared him. What was there to deter him from making himself master of the situation? All who had studied the Asiatic character, who from constant intercourse had become acquainted with its peculiarities, felt assured that a further system of conciliation would but impress the Sepoys with an idea of their own power; that instead of becoming more reconciled to us by our constant and slavish acknowledgment of their religion, and by our system of entirely ignoring our own, they would the rather despise us. Already in their eyes we were on a par with their lowest caste. A Christian was one who drank brandy and eat pork and beef. Was not the idea that we wished to reduce them by trick to the same degrading position sufficient to excite every deep-seated prejudice against us? Yet we knew that they entertained that idea. We knew, or we ought to have known, that such an idea once imbibed by an Asiatic, once thoroughly taking possession of his prejudiced and uneducated mind, was ineradicable, that every attempt to remove would only confirm it, and be regarded as a part of the process by which he was to be suddenly converted.

But the men who ruled India in 1857 knew little of Asiatic character. The two civilians had seen only that specimen of it of which the educated Bengalee is a type: the legal member and Lord Canning had seen no more, and General Low was a Madras officer. How could a Council so constituted comprehend the crisis through which they were passing, — a crisis the result of which depended on their treatment of a proud, bigoted, relentless race, of whose national character and peculiarities they were one and all ignorant? The

manner in which they did treat it, in which they are now treating it, proves that up to the present moment even they have not comprehended it.

The many signs and warnings which had been given them from the end of January up to the beginning of May, might have convinced even intellects of no extraordinary power that an occasion might arise for the employment of an European force, larger than that at the time of their disposal. The measure therefore adopted by Lord Canning of ordering up the 84th from Rangoon so early as March, met with universal approval. It was fondly believed that he foresaw the danger, that he was providing against it by anticipation. Alas! for the imputation of good motives! No sooner had the 34th Native Infantry been disbanded than, in the face of all that had passed, of the smothered mutinies at Barrackpore, of the *émeute* at Lucknow, he resolved to send back the 84th Foot to Rangoon. This was decided upon on the 8th May, 1857. Had that measure been carried out, there would have been but one weak European regiment to guard the arsenal of Fort William, and the entire country between Calcutta and Dinapore. What would have been the consequences if the 84th had left before the insurrection at Meerut had become known? Lord Canning, at least, would have paid dearly for his incapacity, and India would have been temporarily lost to us. Providentially the account of that insurrection arrived on the 14th, before the arrangements for the departure of the 84th had been completed, and the order was recalled.

If Lord Canning, finding that, notwithstanding his conciliatory policy towards the 19th and 34th Native Infantry, the bad feeling was gaining ground, was showing itself by incendiarisms at Agra, Meerut, Umballa, and throughout the North-west, by actual mutiny at Lucknow, had acted on the 4th May as he acted subsequently to the 16th May, and, instead of resolving to send away one regiment, had written to Madras, Ceylon, Rangoon and Moulmein for three or four others, what should we not have escaped? The fearful massacres of Cawnpore, Futtehgurh, and Allahabad would not have occurred: Oudh and Rohilcund would have been preserved from the contagion, and Delhi might have fallen in a fortnight. When he did send for them, it was "too late;" the plague had spread throughout India, and there required, not staying, but extirpation.

But up to the 14th of May, the Government believed that their "not too mild" measures had overcome the spirit of mutiny. From the enjoyment of that pleasing dream they were somewhat rudely disturbed by receiving an account of the Meerut outbreak. The telegraph had flashed it to them on the 11th, but it was not till the 14th that they became acquainted with the main fact, that our troops were in open revolt and had murdered their officers. On that date, then, a Council assembled. Its first measure was to countermand the departure of the 84th; its second showed how little our statesmen were able to appreciate the crisis, to comprehend the scene that was acting before their eyes.

The system which allowed to each native regiment a certain

number of native officers, about twenty-two to every corps, also granted to these native officers the privilege of sitting on courts-martial. By them alone could a Sepoy be tried; the verdict at which they might arrive could be disturbed by no superior power. The Commander-in-Chief might return their "finding" and "sentence" for revision, but they possessed the power, and not unfrequently exercised it, of adhering to their original decisions. Their sentences in general courts-martial, whatever they might be, were invariably sent for the approval of the Commander-in-Chief; no lesser power could confirm, and even he had no power to increase, the punishment awarded: he might indeed withhold his approval and confirmation, but in that case the prisoner would escape scot-free. It will be evident then to all, that in this important matter of courts-martial, the discipline of the army was in the hands of the native officers, and they had it in their power, so long as this system might be upheld, to abet treason by inflicting only a nominal punishment on traitors.

A notable instance of this had but lately occurred at Barrackpore, where a native officer brought to trial for trying to incite the men of his own regiment to mutiny, by going about the lines and imploring them in the name and for the sake of their religion to rise, was sentenced only to dismissal from the service, which to him was no punishment at all.

This circumstance of the discipline of the army being, in its most important particular, in the hands of native officers, could not have escaped the notice of the members of Council or of the Military Secretary, for the court-martial above alluded to had only recently been published, and the subject had been commented upon by the Press. It is not surprising, therefore, that it was the second subject to which the members of the Government turned their attention at the meeting of Council on the 14th of May. But how did they treat it? With the Bengal Army "drifting" into revolt, how did they meet together to strike a deadly blow at mutiny?—how did they settle this question? They actually feared to touch it; they still left that part of the order existing in which it was laid down that native soldiers must be tried by native officers, that is, mutineers by mutineers, and their solitary remedial measure was to transfer the appointing confirming and approving power from the Commander-in-Chief to commanding officers of divisions and stations!*

This was on the 14th; on the 15th or 16th, the news of the Delhi massacre arrived. Still assuming it to be a mere affair of greased cartridges, regarding the instrument as the cause of the revolt, the Government on the latter date issued a proclamation in which the native army and the native population were assured that the Government never had and never would interfere with their religion; at the same time the mischief having been completed, the anomaly regarding courts-martial was rectified, and it was left optional with commanding officers to appoint either European or native officers

* Vide Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary, 14th May, 1857.

upon them. On the same day Lord Canning telegraphed to Bombay for the troops of the Persian expedition, whom the treaty with the Shah would place at the disposal of that Government.* It may fairly be presumed that to Sir Henry Lawrence belongs the credit of this measure; his critical eye had discerned the coming storm, and on the 16th he telegraphed to Lord Canning to send for troops from China, Ceylon, and elsewhere, wherever they might be available. That message reached Calcutta the same day, and was acted upon at once both in letter and spirit, for expresses were sent to Moulmein and Madras, and not long after to Ceylon and Singapore for every available man.

It has been the fashion to bestow all the credit of this measure upon Lord Canning, but the Blue Book abounds with proofs that it is a credit which must be shared with many others; not only Sir Henry Lawrence, but his brother Sir John, General Anson, Sir P. Grant, and Mr. Colvin made it the subject of their earliest messages. It was, in fact, an idea which must have struck every one; to have neglected it, would have shown the grossest incompetency. It was indeed our only hope of safety—the sheet anchor which was left us wherewith to ride out the storm. In acting upon it Lord Canning was animated by the instinct of self-preservation. It was the rope at which he clutched when overset by this mutiny: none but a madman, or one utterly careless of life, would have neglected it. The fault which posterity will find with Lord Canning is, that he did not avail himself of these resources earlier. During the month of April, whilst all India was fermenting, a prudent statesman would have employed himself in strengthening his hands; he might without risk or danger to any part of our Indian possessions, have brought up one regiment from Moulmein, in addition to the 84th from Rangoon, and another from Madras. When the mutiny broke out, these two regiments might have been at Cawnpore; they would have preserved that most important station, and probably Oudh, from outbreak; they would have kept up our communications with the North-west, and the revolt would probably have been confined to the very district of Delhi.

In acting after the event as it would have been prudent to act before, Lord Canning earned but small claims to our admiration; especially if it be remembered that on the 8th May he was actually contemplating the return of the 84th to Rangoon. It is but justice to him, however, to state, that on the 16th May, when the full force of the storm became apparent, he took all ordinary precautions to meet it. He sent everywhere for troops, he telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief “to make short work of Delhi,” he gave full powers to Sir John Lawrence in the Punjab, and on the 19th he issued an order promising rewards to all who might distinguish themselves by conspicuous acts of gallantry and devotion to the state. All these arrangements were excellent as far as they went, but they did not go far enough. The Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, with a

* Blue Book.

keener instinct of the danger, offered to despatch an extra steamer to Suez on the 17th May, which would forestall by a fortnight the ordinary Calcutta mail, and have enabled the authorities in England to make prompt arrangements for sending out reinforcements. But Lord Canning, full of hope that we should gain some countervailing advantage before the next ensuing mail should leave Bombay, would not avail himself of the offer. He was, at this time, probably, the only * man in Calcutta who looked for a speedy issue to the revolt. He alone would not believe that the whole army was pledged to insurrection. He ignored the fact that even in Calcutta we were a handful of Christians living in the midst of a fierce, bigoted, intractable race, who knew no law but that inspired by fear, and on whom the intelligence of the revolt of Delhi was likely to have the worst possible effect. Yet so keen was the sense of this amongst the merchants, the shopkeepers, and others, whom long residence and constant intercourse had made well acquainted with the temper of the natives, that although the use of arms was foreign to their habits, they came forward between the 20th and 31st May, and tendered their services to Government in any manner in which they could be most usefully employed for the preservation of the peace. An enrolment on a large scale at this time, would have enabled the Governor-General to dispense with the services of one European regiment at least; but so bent was he on ignoring the danger, that he not only declined the offers of the Trades' Association, the Masonic Fraternity, the Native Converts, the Americans, the French inhabitants and others, but he declined them in terms calculated to deaden rather than to excite a spirit of loyalty, for whilst he seemed to refer the cause of their petitions to a "passing and groundless panic"† on their part, he snubbed them for supposing for an instant that the whole Army of Bengal was infected with the spirit of revolt! At the same time, as if in mockery, he invited those who wished to enrol themselves to apply to the Commissioner of Police, to whom, it transpired, orders had been issued to furnish applicants with clubs!

On the 23rd May the Madras Fusiliers, under their gallant commanding officer, Colonel Neill, arrived in Calcutta, and were at once despatched in the most expeditious manner possible to the North-west. Up to this moment, no account of any fresh mutiny had been received, and Mr. Colvin, Governor of the North-west Provinces, was beginning to believe that "the worst of the storm was passed, and that the aspect of affairs was brightening."‡ Neither Sir Henry Lawrence nor Sir Hugh Wheeler was so confident; but Mr. Colvin, being a civilian, was supposed to be far better acquainted with the character of the people, and to possess better opportunities for judging them than were open to military men. He was not only of opinion that severity in dealing with mutineers was a mistake§, but he was anxious to fetter the Commander-in-Chief by placing a civilian at his elbow. This principle, introduced by Lord Auckland, when Mr.

* The members of Council of course excepted.

† Vide letters to the French inhabitants.

‡ 16th May.

§ 19th May.

Colvin was his private secretary, had been wisely abolished by Lord Ellenborough. Like many of that great nobleman's alterations, it had been effaced immediately by his successors, and the application of the system was now, not unnaturally, advocated by one who had all along been its warmest supporter. Up to this moment, indeed, the opinions of Mr. Colvin had been entirely in accord with those of the Governor-General.

Thus did matters progress up to the 25th May — the day on which Her Majesty's birthday was celebrated. The Governor-General and the Lieutenant-Governor very confident in the future; Sir Henry Lawrence and Sir Hugh Wheeler, at Lucknow and Cawnpore, making every preparation to meet the coming storm; the European society, military men and civilians throughout India, anxious, yet not desponding. The crisis was about to take a turn.

The 25th May must be ranked as one of the memorable days connected with the mutiny. In the morning, the 70th Native Infantry, one of the regiments stationed at Barrackpore, volunteered to a man to march against their countrymen in Delhi; Mr. Colvin issued his famous proclamation, in which he announced that "soldiers engaged in the late disturbances," *i. e.*, in the massacres of Delhi and Meerut, who might give up their arms at the nearest Government post, should be "permitted to go to their homes unmolested," and in the evening intelligence arrived of the mutiny of the native troops at Ferozpoore, on the border of the Punjab, on the 13th and 14th of the month.

Before commenting upon the two first-named occurrences, it may be as well to give a detailed account of that ill-managed affair. On the 12th May, an account of the occurrences at Meerut reached Ferozpoore. The troops in that station consisted of Her Majesty's 61st Foot, the 45th and 57th Native Infantry, the 10th Light Cavalry (Native) and about 150 European Artillery; they were commanded by Brigadier Innes*, certainly an active, and up to that time considered an intelligent officer. He had arrived only the day before, and had had but little opportunity of testing the temper of the native troops. The value of Ferozpoore must be estimated not only from its having been, up to the period of the Sutlej campaign, the frontier station in the North-west, and of its consequent importance with reference to the Punjaub, but from its possessing an entrenched magazine of the largest class, and containing military stores almost equal in amount to those in the arsenal at Fort William. Ferozpoore is only seventy-three miles from Delhi, and it may be easily imagined that the rebels, already possessed of the Delhi Arsenal, and aware alike of the contiguity and importance of that at Ferozpoore, would spare no efforts to make themselves masters of it also. Had they been capable of acting in concert with their brethren at Meerut, they might have succeeded; but the sound of that explosion was sufficient to put the commanding officers all over India on the alert.

* Not James, as erroneously named in the Blue Book.

On the 12th, the report of it reached Ferozpoore. On the following day, the Brigadier ordered out the troops to judge of their disposition. Trained amongst natives himself, he might have been supposed to be a competent authority on such a point. He looked at them, and believed their bearing, especially that of the 57th, to be "haughty:" the 10th Cavalry he considered loyal. The commanding officers of all three regiments pronounced the state of their corps to be satisfactory.

At noon on the same day information of the occurrences at Delhi reached the station. At that time the entrenched magazine, the most important position in Ferozpoore, was held by a company of the 57th Native Infantry. Immediate arrangements were made for relieving them by a company of Her Majesty's 61st, and one of European Artillery. This was not done completely, for the company of the 57th was allowed to remain in the magazine. At the same time the 10th Cavalry, in whom every confidence was placed, were stationed under the walls of the new arsenal, and the 61st, under Colonel Jones, were held in readiness to move on any point. These arrangements having been completed, the 45th and 57th were ordered to parade at 5 P. M. with the view of being marched out of cantonments. The Brigadier went at that hour to the parade ground, formed them up in quarter-distance columns, and addressed them. They were then ordered to move off in opposite directions. They obeyed unhesitatingly. The road by which the 45th were ordered to march took them close to the entrenched magazine. Arriving there they halted and refused to advance a step. They then loaded their muskets, and, heedless of the entreaties of their officers, ran to the north-west bastion of the magazine, and stood there, apparently hesitating what to do next. At this moment scaling ladders were thrown out to them by the Sepoys who had been allowed to remain inside. They immediately commenced climbing over the parapet, and three hundred of their number having succeeded in finding their way inside, made an attack on the company of the 61st, who were hurriedly drawn up to receive them. They were repulsed with the loss of about half a dozen of their number, but not despairing of success, made a detour and attempted to take our men in the rear, but were again unsuccessful. At this moment two more companies of the 61st arrived, and the mutineers fled in all directions — many of them being killed. The company of the 57th, which had not apparently joined actively in the *émeute*, was disarmed and turned out of the magazine. So far the arrangements of the Brigadier had been apparently defective: he had suffered the entrenchment to be escalated to the great peril of the arsenal, and he had no troops at hand to keep the mutineers in check. Still he had been successful in repelling their attack: the movements that followed proved that success to have resulted rather from accident than from skilful organisation on his part.

It must be remembered that in Ferozpoore there were the 61st regiment and about 150 artillerymen supplied with all the munitions of war, to combat against two native infantry regiments. They could

have beaten a dozen of them, deprived as these were of their European officers. There was also a regiment of cavalry, which was supposed to be, and which proved loyal. But admitting that the Brigadier was justified in looking upon these as doubtful, or even as hostile, he still should not have feared the issue with the force at his disposal. It was his duty to have attacked and followed up the 45th immediately he heard of their outbreak. What did he do? Believing, he says in his report, that the 57th would follow the example of the 45th, he determined to maintain the barrack and the entrenchment. Fatal policy! to shrink before Asiatics! The movement of two companies of the 61st, with the horse-battery of artillery, would have completely dispersed the 45th, and in all probability have deterred the 57th from following their example. He remained, however, on the defensive; the consequence was that the 45th took the initiative against him!

The men of that regiment, on being repulsed from the entrenchment, retreated towards the ice-pits, carrying their dead with them. These they left in the Mahomedan burial-ground, and, returning in small bodies to the cantonment, set fire to and burned the church, Roman Catholic chapel, two vacant hospitals, the 61st mess-house, and several bungalows. In doing this, strange to record, they were not even molested except at the chapel, where one of them was shot. They even made several fresh attempts upon the entrenchment, but were foiled on every occasion. Hitherto, panic had reigned throughout Ferozpoore: one part of the 61st remained in the barracks, the other part in the entrenchments: not a single man was brought to act against the mutineers. To such an extent was the defensive principle carried, that hearing that the mutineers intended seizing their own regimental magazine on the following morning, instead of choosing that moment for attacking and dispersing them, the Brigadier actually preferred as it were abandoning his position by causing the magazines of the 45th and 57th to be blown up. The great body of the former regiment, having done all the mischief they could, then set off for Delhi. On this intelligence reaching the Brigadier, he, for the first time, began to act with vigour, for he despatched three troops of cavalry and two guns in pursuit of them, whilst he caused at the same time the 57th to be disarmed. Both these measures were fairly successful. The 45th the moment the initiative was taken against them were panic-stricken, and fled in confusion; they lost a number of men, and several of those who escaped threw away their arms to accelerate their flight. The greater part of the 57th were disarmed quietly, a few only preferring to follow the fortunes of the 45th. The 10th Cavalry throughout the affair behaved with the most perfect loyalty and emulated the conduct of the Europeans.

Such was the mutiny of Ferozpoore,—a mutiny which affords painful evidence of the evil action of the government of India on characters not more than ordinarily distinguished by firmness. It has been noticeable throughout the insurrection that only on rare occasions, and when a Lawrence, a Neill, or a Wilson have been invested with supreme authority, have commanding officers dared to cast regulations to the winds and act on their own responsibility.

Men of average capacity even have felt the conviction that, act as they might, they would be judged only by the result, and they have therefore felt compelled, in self-defence, to adhere as much as possible to the letter of the regulations. The burden of red tape has weighed them down. It was so with Colonel Mitchell at Berhampore, with General Hewitt at Meerut, and on this occasion with Brigadier Innes at Ferozpoore. That officer, on hearing of the sad events at Meerut and Delhi, must have felt that all middle courses were insecure; that there was but one road to be pursued consistently with safety. If he had, for instance, especially after noticing the "haughty" bearing of the Native Infantry, ordered a general parade of all the troops, taking care by previous arrangement and skilful disposition to place the guns, manned as they were by Europeans, on both flanks of the Native Infantry, the 61st in their front between them and the entrenched magazine,—if he had at the same time directed the actual, not the nominal, relief of the company of the 57th inside the magazine;—if he had then ordered the native regiments to lay down their arms, and, on their failure to do so, had been prepared to open out on them with grape and small arms,—all would have been well: there would have been no attempt on the magazine, no burning of churches and houses, no panic, no loss of property. Why did he not do it then? He feared the responsibility of disarming them in the first place, of mowing them down in case of refusal in the second. But had he no reason for his fear? Had he not seen the Government of India allow itself to be insulted for three months with all but impunity by its native troops? Had he not read in the public prints the uncontradicted statement that Lord Canning had affirmed that if Colonel Mitchell at Berhampore had opened fire on the 19th the Government would not have supported him? Was he justified, he probably asked himself, in taking this responsibility upon himself,—in doing more than the Government, with all its appliances and means at hand, had thought it necessary to do? The truth is, Brigadier Innes was neither a Neill nor a Lawrence: he could not see that to succeed in such times as were coming, he must be ready to brave every responsibility. He could not look beyond the Book of Regulations, and to it he adhered with a zeal worthy of a better cause.

Had his measures been successful, identical as they were in spirit with those of the Government of India, he would doubtless have been held up as a pattern Brigadier. Unfortunately for himself, the regulations led him to failure, and his failure cost him his command. He failed,—and was summarily removed from the list of brigadiers.

The account of the Ferozpoore mutiny reached Calcutta simultaneously with Mr. Colvin's proclamation and the report of the volunteering of the 70th Native Infantry. Lord Canning dealt promptly with both. He telegraphed to the Lieutenant-Governor his disapproval of the spirit and wording of his proclamation, and he rode down on the following morning to Barrackpoore, personally accepted the services of the 70th, and promised them that they should start for Delhi as soon as arrangements could be made for sending them up-country. This promise was never fulfilled, and it seems a pity that it was ever made. Subsequent events convinced even the

Governor-General that the whole army was tainted; and the 70th were eventually disarmed along with the other regiments of the Barrackpore Brigade, on the 14th June. Still the fact of their having volunteered, and of their example in that respect being followed by many other regiments stationed at or near Calcutta (of whom those which have not mutinied have been since disarmed), made a deep impression at the time on the minds of Lord Canning and the members of his Council, and probably induced them to reply so discourteously to the patriotic offers of the Trades' Association and others. They perhaps acted in his mind as incidents counterbalancing the disaster of Ferozpoore and the proclamation of Agra.

This latter document was yet unrepealed. Up to the hour I am writing* it has never been recalled from circulation, and it is even supposed to have influenced our authorities at Delhi in sparing the life of the blood-steeped king, of his youngest and favourite son, and of many of those chiefs who were most forward in the rebellion against us. On the 26th May Lord Canning expressed his disapproval of it, and begged that it might be recalled. Mr. Colvin replied that it was too late to recall it, that it had been circulated all over the country (in the interval between the 25th and 27th), that it was perfectly understood by all, and that it was hoped and believed that it would have the best possible effect. He concluded by pleading earnestly that it might stand.

But Lord Canning had not, at this epoch, entirely enslaved himself to the policy of "India for the Civil Service." On the same day (the 27th), he replied to Mr. Colvin, pointed out the necessary inference which the mutineers must draw from the terms of his proclamation, and requested that, as it could not be withdrawn, another which he forwarded, extraordinarily mild, but not open to the objections which were fatal to Mr. Colvin's, might be substituted for it, and sent up forthwith to the Commander-in-Chief. Still the Lieutenant-Governor hesitated: he felt disinclined to stultify himself; and instead of obeying the orders of his superior, he ventured (the 28th May) on another remonstrance. This was too much for a nobleman wielding the authority of Governor-General of India. Every moment that this miserable document was allowed to circulate was big with ruin to our interests: it betrayed weakness in every line, it was conveying to mutineers the fact that we feared them, that they might murder our women and children and go to their homes unpunished. And yet, although issued on the 25th of May, up to the 29th it had not only been cancelled, but the Lieutenant-Governor was still pleading for it, and in substance refusing to obey the instructions of the Governor-General. The latter had submitted to this treatment for four days, but when he saw this continued trifling with his instructions, he could bear it no longer. He forthwith sent a copy of his own proclamation to Major-General Sir Hugh Wheeler, commanding at Cawnpore, with instructions that it might be forwarded *viâ* Futtehgurh to the Commander-in-Chief. Sir Hugh, with a

* 21st November.

soldier's promptitude, obeyed at once, but the message never reached General Anson, and it is the prevailing belief that Mr. Colvin's proclamation is still in force. That gentleman certainly made another, and a final attempt (31st May) to retain his own ideas, and to be spared the pain of transmitting to the Commander-in-Chief the opinion of the Governor-General, that he had offered life to the murderers of his countrymen; but Lord Canning was obdurate, and on the same day transmitted very peremptory instructions that his own proclamation should be sent on, uncurtailed, to the Commander-in-Chief.

This was all very well, but, like so many of Lord Canning's acts, it was only a half-measure. Mr. Colvin's proclamation had been published in the Agra Government Gazette, marked with all the official emblems of authority. Lord Canning's counter-stroke was smuggled into the North-west, was circulated perhaps by the Commander-in-Chief, but necessarily in a very limited degree, and never appeared in the Agra Gazette at all. The Commander-in-Chief has no civil power whatever: the people therefore who read one proclamation published under authority — the authority under which they were placed, that of the Lieutenant-Governor — would naturally pay more obedience to it than to a written document, circulated by a military man of whose connexion with themselves they had never heard. So indeed it has proved: Every letter from the north-west induces the belief that Mr. Colvin's proclamation of the 25th May, securing pardon to bloody-handed mutineers, is still considered by the authorities, as well as by the people, to be the law of the land!

In reflecting upon this ill-advised proclamation, the first thing that strikes us is, the fact of its having been promulgated at Agra, without previous reference to the Governor-General. The telegraph line between Agra and Calcutta was complete. From the Meerut outbreak up to the 4th June daily messages passed between the two high functionaries. If Mr. Colvin had telegraphed the proclamation for approval on the morning of the 25th, he would have obtained a reply the same day. Up to that moment he had received the cordial support of the Governor-General: he had done well: he had shown nerve in addressing the native regiments at Agra, in maintaining a bold front, and his position outside the Fort. All his previous intentions had been communicated to Calcutta; why was not this one? It is a point which, if Mr. Colvin were living, might be worth investigating: but Mr. Colvin is no more, and it is now far more pleasurable to dwell on the fact that to the last he never left his post, than on the causes of that important error which cost him the confidence of his countrymen.

Meanwhile affairs were not progressing favourably in the North-west. On the 20th of May four companies of the 9th Regiment Native Infantry, considered the pattern regiment of the Bengal army, mutinied: two companies of the same regiment stationed at Mynpoorie followed their example on the 22nd; two more at Etawah on the 23rd; and the remainder at Bolandshuhr on the 24th. About the same time information reached Calcutta that a company of Sappers which had

been ordered from Roorkee to Meerut after the outbreak, had mutinied at that station on the 16th, and, after killing their forming officer, Captain Fraser, had set out for Delhi. Our men were, however, fortunately on the alert, and followed them up so quickly, that fifty-six of their number were killed. About two hundred and eighty managed to reach Delhi with their arms. A hundred and fifty of them, who had been on duty when the main body mutinied, were promptly disarmed.

The mutiny of the 9th Regiment at Allygurh was caused by a circumstance which places in a strong light the bigotry of the Hindoos, and demonstrates most clearly the ease with which they can be acted upon by the lever of their religion. Allygurh lies about eighty miles south of Meerut on the Grand Trunk Road. It possesses a bastioned fort, well capable of defence, and memorable in Anglo-Indian history as having been stormed by Lord Lake in 1803. In May 1857 it was garrisoned only by four companies of the 9th Native Infantry. This detachment had not apparently been shaken by the events at Meerut and Delhi. The corps had always been a good one, well behaved and well drilled. The officers felt the utmost confidence in their men, and this feeling was apparently reciprocated. Up to the morning of the 20th, their behaviour had been most exemplary, and the men had made over to their officers several spies who had entered their lines with the avowed object of seducing them from their allegiance. One of these villains, caught in the very act, had been condemned to suffer death that morning. Accordingly he was brought out, the Sepoys were drawn up, and his sentence was read to him in their presence. He had in fact been convicted by a court-martial composed of native officers. He was then led to the gallows, the rope was adjusted, the drop taken away. In a few minutes he had ceased to breathe. All this time the Sepoys were looking on in silent approbation. But just as they were about to be moved off the ground, a small detachment of their own corps, which had been absent on command, marched in. They too beheld the dangling corpse, and they too seemed to think that the miscreant had received his deserts. At this critical moment, one of their number more bigoted than the rest stepped forth from their ranks, and pointing to the gallows exclaimed, "Behold a martyr to our religion." By that simple exclamation he touched a chord which had till then lain dormant. Instantly these men, who had passed the sentence and assisted at the execution, overcome by a sudden frenzy, broke out into open mutiny. They did not, it is true, assault their officers, they simply dismissed them: but they plundered the treasury, opened the jail doors, and then went off bodily to Delhi. The detachments of the same regiment at Bolundshuhr *, Etawah †, and Mynpoorie ‡, followed the example of their comrades. The outbreak at Bolandshuhr was accompanied by no violence: that at Mynpoorie was principally remarkable for the

* Forty miles from Allygurh.

† Seventy-three miles from Agra.

‡ Seventy-one miles from Agra.

courage, coolness, and presence of mind displayed, under trying and most perilous circumstances, by Lieutenant De Kantzow of the 9th Native Infantry.

The mutiny broke out very suddenly on the morning of the 22nd, by the men of the 9th rising upon their officers.* Lieutenant De Kantzow, instead of leaving them, as he might have done, stood up before them, urged them to reflect on the lawlessness of their acts, and evinced the utmost indifference of his own life in his zeal to make them return to their duty. But the Sepoys would not listen; many muskets were levelled at him, and his life was in the greatest danger: they commenced plundering in every direction; and finally, dragging their officers with them, proceeded to the treasury, and endeavoured to force open the iron gates. A fearful scene here ensued: the jail-guard, about thirty in number, and some of the jail officials, rallied round the Lieutenant. He did not desist a moment from his efforts to quiet his men: though jostled and buffeted by them, he stood up manfully, and for three dreary hours in turns threatened and implored them to return to their duty.

His efforts were not altogether in vain: aided latterly by a trust-worthy native, who had been set down by the magistrate, he at length persuaded the Sepoys to retire from the treasury. They returned to their lines, and, after plundering the regimental treasure chest, took the road to Delhi. It must in justice be added that the conduct of Mr. Power, the collector, and his brother, in remaining at their posts, is worthy of praise.

This victory—for that surely is a victory in which one European officer, standing alone against 200 armed native soldiery, causes them finally to quit the station, leaving the treasury unplundered—had the effect of restoring confidence in the city and district of Mynpoorie. The gallantry of Lieutenant De Kantzow was acknowledged in the most handsome manner by Lord Canning, and he was at once placed in command of a special body of police. On the following day (the 23rd) the mutiny broke out at Etawah: this too was a bloodless affair, but the Sepoys succeeded in plundering the treasury and private houses. Mr. Hume, the magistrate, escaped in the dress of a native woman. On the 25th the station was re-occupied by a Gwalior regiment, and British authority was temporarily re-established. The news of these events reached the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-west Provinces at Agra before he had issued his famous proclamation. Up to this time Mr. Colvin had been very successful in maintaining tranquillity in his neighbourhood. As soon as possible after the Meerut and Delhi massacres he had paraded the two native regiments, which with one English corps (the Company's 3rd Europeans) and some artillery formed the garrison of Agra, and had succeeded apparently in pacifying them. He felt confident that "all would be put to rights in a few days," if a "simple proclamation were issued to quiet the minds of the troops." He evidently had no conception of the magnitude of the crisis, and on the 20th May, two

* Magistrates' report.

days before the outbreaks at Mynpoorie and Etawah in his own immediate neighbourhood, he telegraphed to the Governor-General that "a very few days would see the end of this daring mutiny." He had previously, with the assent of the Supreme Government, proclaimed martial law throughout the districts under his rule.

On the 21st May the intelligence of the disaster at Allygurh reached him. He immediately organised an expedition for its recapture: this expedition consisted of about 230 cavalry under Lieutenant Cockburn of the Gwalior Contingent and fifty volunteers. This small party reached Allygurh on the 26th, and effected its recapture without difficulty. Six or seven Europeans who were besieged in a neighbouring factory were released, a large amount of treasure recovered, and the whole brought back to Hattrass, a walled town about twenty-two miles from Allygurh on the Agra road. Here a portion of Lieutenant Cockburn's cavalry, about 100 in number, who had up to this moment performed excellent service, suddenly rebelled. After vainly attempting to seduce their comrades, who were mostly Mahomedans, the rebels rode off to plunder the country. But Lieutenant Cockburn was resolved to pay them out, if possible, for their treachery. Hearing that, increased in number to 500, they were plundering and murdering in the vicinity of Hattrass, he resolved to attack them. And, to do so with the more certainty as to the result, he hit upon a stratagem. He procured a covered cart of the description in which native women were in the habit of travelling, and, placing in it four of his troopers with loaded carbines, he followed himself with the main body at a distance of about fifty paces, under the shade of some trees. The rebels, attracted by the cart, rushed out to seize the supposed inmates, but the foremost of them was saluted by a bullet, and at this signal Lieutenant Cockburn's party dashed amongst them, and not only defeated and dispersed them, but killed forty-eight of their number.

The history of the mutiny abounds with similar instances of individual tact and courage.

But the recapture of Allygurh, the preservation of Mynpoorie, the re-occupation of Etawah, and the gallantry of individuals, could not check the progress of the mutiny. From this moment, indeed, it began to assume a popular character. The zemindars and the ryots joined in it. From Agra to Delhi, to Meerut, to Cawnpore, to Allahabad, from Allahabad downwards, and throughout Central India, the entire country made a tremendous effort to shake off our sway. On the 30th of May two companies, both belonging to the regiments stationed at Agra, but themselves located at Muttra, thirty-five miles to the north of that station, mutinied, plundered the treasury, committed a few murders, and went off to Delhi. In the face of this, and of the disorganisation prevailing all around him, Mr. Colvin could no longer hesitate. On the following morning (31st), the two native regiments, the 44th and 67th, were disarmed, and allowed two months' leave to visit their homes.

The atmosphere was indeed thickening, and it was impossible even to guess the quarters in which the storm would next break out.

CHAPTER II.

CALCUTTA TO 31ST MAY. — OUDH TO 2ND JUNE.

ACCOUNTS of the occurrences detailed in the last chapter were all promptly conveyed by the electric wire to Calcutta, in the order in which they became known to the Lieutenant-Governor at Agra. Darker and more unfavourable reports reached the Governor-General about the same time from Cawnpore and Lucknow, and so impressed was he with the danger that he actually telegraphed to General Anson his opinion (31st May), that "his force of artillery would enable him to dispose of Delhi with certainty;" he therefore begged that he would "detach European infantry and cavalry to the south of Delhi." The movements of General Anson, and of the force which undertook the siege of Delhi, will be recorded in a separate chapter. It may suffice here to state that the measure proposed by the Governor-General — like all his measures, a half-measure — was impracticable. It might have been a question whether the Commander-in-Chief's force should not have been concentrated on the lower provinces, leaving Delhi for a time to its fate. This plan would have had the advantage of securing Cawnpore, Oudh, Agra, Goruckpore, and the country south-east of these places; but, on the other hand, it would have permitted the conspirators to raise the semblance of an empire at the imperial seat of Government: it would have allowed an unchecked communication with Central India and with the armies of Madras and Bombay. It would have been in the highest degree unwise to have allowed treason and treachery to remain unchecked or unmenaced. Our retirement on the Lower Provinces would have been attributed to fear. It is even possible that the Punjaubees, a warlike race, seeing rebellion raising its victorious head so near their frontier, would have been tempted to endeavour to shake off our yoke also. It cannot then be doubted that General Anson and his successors in command acted wisely in going to Delhi, in preferring to risk everything rather than forego the capture of the stronghold of the murderers. They persevered in this undertaking, despite of difficulties hardly surmountable, and they well deserved that glorious success which was finally vouchsafed to their arms.

If Delhi had been the defenceless place, which some represented it to be, there would even then have been little force in the Governor-General's suggestion: for we knew it to possess a large arsenal, and at least ten thousand insurgent troops. Had we despatched our infantry and cavalry to the southward, the result would have been, that the enemy would have captured our siege train!

About this time (May 29th), when the mutinies at Meerut, Delhi, Allygurh, Mynpoorie, and Etawah, were known to the Governor-General, when it must have been perceived that the insurrection must

now be put down, not by words, but by bayonets ; the military secretary, Colonel Birch, issued the first and only proclamation to the army on the subject of the greased cartridges. Before this circular reached the upper provinces, the whole of Oudh, the important districts of Benares, Allahabad, and Cawnpore, were in open insurrection. It therefore fell to the ground, a blunted weapon. Far different, in all probability, would have been its effect had it been issued in the month of January, when suspicion regarding greased cartridges was first mooted. But Colonel Birch and the Government were dumb at that time. The Sepoys murmured, yet no explanation was offered. They were suffered then to "drift" into the belief that the Government was endeavouring to impose upon them. But now, when the time for explanations had passed away, when every word falling from Government was liable to be misconstrued, a full and complete explanation was offered regarding the substitution of the Enfield rifle for Brown Bess, and the whole question of greased cartridges ! Alas for that terrible "Too late" which attaches itself as the motto of statesmen without prescience or genius,—of little men in great positions !

Meanwhile fearful events were enacting at Lucknow. As it was that city which set the example to the surrounding districts, it may be as well to give a *résumé* of the doings of Sir Henry Lawrence, subsequent to the revolt of the 7th Infantry *, so promptly quelled on the 3rd of May.

Lucknow.—It has been already mentioned † that on the 3rd May a treasonable letter had been sent by the Sepoys of the 7th Native Infantry to the 48th Native Infantry, but that it had fortunately fallen into the hands of a faithful Sepoy, who, after consulting with the havildar and subadar of his company, in conjunction with them, reported the matter to Sir Henry Lawrence. This able officer having already struck terror into the minds of all by his prompt and vigorous treatment of the mutineers, was justly of opinion that to openly reward these men, who, in spite of the temptations of caste, had done their duty, would impress upon the minds of the natives that the British Government was equally prompt to reward as to punish, and that whilst it had no mercy for mutineers, it had honours and emoluments for those who did their duty faithfully and honestly. With this view he summoned all the civil and military residents, the officers and men of the native regiments, and other native officials, to a grand durbar on the evening of the 12th May. The lawn in front of the Residency was carpeted, and chairs were arranged forming three sides of a square. At 6 p.m. Sir Henry Lawrence entered, followed by his staff and a large body of officers, and took his seat at the head of the assembly. Beside him were deposited in trays the presents intended for the native soldiers. Before, however, he distributed them, he addressed the assembled company in the Hindustani language. He commenced by alluding to the fear of the Hindoos for their religion : he pointed out how, under the rule of the Mahomedan emperors of Delhi, that religion had never been respected : how Hindoos were

* Recorded in Part I.

† Part I.

forcibly converted by having the flesh of the cow forced down their throats. To the Mahomedans he showed how Runjeet Singh would never tolerate their religion at Lahore. Then turning to the assembled crowd, he asked them to reflect on the toleration which the Government of India had for a century always afforded to both religions. He next noticed our power, our exploits in the Russian war, our ships, our resources, how in a few months the British Government could, if necessary, concentrate a large army on that very spot. Finally, he alluded to the inseparable connexion between the Sepoys and their officers; he dwelt long and eloquently on this subject, on the dangers they had shared, on the services they had performed together; on the feeling instinctive in the breast of every officer that the regiment was his home, that the glory of the regiment was his glory, its disgrace his shame. He then impressed upon his listeners to think upon what he had told them, to place firm reliance on the assurances of Government, warning them that if, the dupes of fools and knaves, any of them were to attempt to follow in the footsteps of the 19th and 34th, the Government would inflict such a punishment as would not easily pass away from the memory of man. Sir Henry then called forward the Subadar and the Sepoys, and shaking hands with them bestowed upon them, in the name of the government of India, substantial testimonials of its appreciation of their fidelity.

The speech of Sir Henry Lawrence, truthful, solemn, and striking, had an immense effect. The entire scene was particularly calculated to impress those to whom it was addressed. The vast assemblage of all the representatives of British authority, the congregated natives, and this simple-minded Christian addressing them in their own language, and swaying them not less by the eloquence than by the truthful force of his harangue, presented indeed a picture which could only have been realised in the East. Bigoted as were those men, prejudiced against us, the dupes of vile intriguers, they left that durbar the most loyal subjects of the British Government, anxious only to have an opportunity of showing their zeal. But Sir Henry was not deceived by transient impressions: he felt that the time could not be far distant, unless Delhi should unexpectedly fall, before these loyal soldiers would become bloodthirsty mutineers, and he commenced taking every precaution in anticipation of an outbreak.

On the 16th of May, he became fully acquainted with the events of Meerut and Delhi. Precluded as he was by his situation from forcing advice upon a Governor-General with whom he had no personal acquaintance, he at once felt that the present was not a time for ceremony, and he telegraphed a strong recommendation to send for Europeans from China, Ceylon, and elsewhere, as well as for Goorkhas from the hills. Feeling also the anomaly of his own position, a military man invested with the chief civil authority, and yet subordinate in a military capacity to many of those who were about him, he applied for plenary military power in Oudh. On the 19th, he received a notification of his appointment as Brigadier-General. Assuming command at once, he without delay made an entirely new disposition

of the troops. Before entering upon this subject, it may be convenient to give an outline of the city and cantonment of Lucknow.

The city of Lucknow, built on the right of the river Goomtee, and extending for four miles along its banks, lies about fifty miles to the north-east of Cawnpore. All the principal buildings, including the Imambarrah, the King's palace, and the adjoining gardens, are between the city and the river bank. Here also is the Residency, a large walled enclosure, comprising not only the palace of the Resident, but other houses and outhouses, as well as underground buildings, or vaults on a large scale. It is situated on higher ground than the rest of the town, which it may be said to command. Near this, and higher up the river, almost on its bank, is a strong, turreted, castellated building, called the Muchee Bawun, very well adapted for defence against native troops. To the south, and covering an immense space, lies the town, intersected by a canal, which falls into the Goomtee close to the Martinière, about three miles south-east of the Residency. A little to the south of this is the Dilkoosha, a hunting-box, or palace, within an enclosed park. To the north-east of the Residency and on the left bank of the Goomtee is the cantonment, communicating with the right bank by means of two bridges, one of stone near the Muchee Bawun, the other of iron close to the Residency. Recrossing by these to the right bank, we come to the space between the Residency and the Martinière. This is filled up principally by native palaces, amongst which the Motee Mahal, Shah-munzil, Secundrabagh, and Furrabhuksh-ke-kotee, are the most conspicuous. To the south of the town, about four miles from the Residency on the Cawnpore road, is the Alum-bagh, a very strong, defensible position. The troops at Lucknow, in the month of May, 1857, consisted of H. M.'s 32nd Foot, about 570 strong, between fifty and sixty European Artillerymen, a native battery of artillery, the 13th, 48th, and 71st Regiments, and the 7th Light Cavalry. They had previously been disposed in the ordinary manner, the Europeans being preserved as much as possible from exposure, and the natives entrusted with the charge of several important buildings.

Sir Henry's first object was to remedy this error. He commenced by reducing the number of posts from eight to four; three of these he greatly strengthened, and so arranged their composition that none of the natives on duty could effect anything against the buildings, of which, conjointly with the Europeans, they were in charge. All the magazine stores hitherto under the charge of Sepoys, he caused to be removed into the Muchee Bawun, and entrusted that building to a company of Europeans: thirty guns were also placed in position there, and supplies for European troops rapidly stored in. At the Treasury, within the Residency Compound, he stationed 200 Sepoys, 130 Europeans, and six guns; the Treasury tent was actually under the charge of the Sepoys, but the guns were so disposed that at the first alarm they could be brought to bear upon them.

In the centre, and between these two positions, was a strong post of four hundred men with twenty guns, some of them eighteen-pounders, commanding the two bridges leading to cantonments.

The fourth post was at the dâk bungalow, between the cantonment and the Residency, and consisted of six guns and two squadrons of the 2nd Oudh Cavalry.

In the cantonment, on the left bank of the Goomtee, were the head quarters of the three native regiments, 340 of the 32nd Foot, fifty artillerymen (European), and six guns, and a battery of native artillery.

In consequence of a pressing requisition from Sir H. Wheeler, on the 21st May, the European force in cantonments was reduced by about fifty men. The 7th Cavalry were stationed at Moodkeepore, seven miles distant from the infantry cantonment.

That the precautions above detailed were necessary was proved by the fact, that during the night, papers were constantly posted up in prominent positions in the town, in which all good Mahomedans were called upon to rise *en masse*, and massacre the Frank infidels. The city police, from their inability to discover the perpetrators of these insurrectionary invitations, showed either that they connived at them, or that they were incapable. From their subsequent conduct, it may be assumed that they were at this time in league with the conspirators.

About the 24th, in consequence of a report that the Regiments would rise that night between 8 and 9 o'clock, all the ladies were moved into the Residency Compound; here also the sick and families of the 32nd were placed, and it was appointed the general rendezvous in the event of a rise. At the same time, the uncovenanted assistants, comprising clerks, copyists, section-writers, &c., were embodied as special constables, and took night duty. One great source of strength was the entire confidence which Sir Henry Lawrence inspired in all around him. He never for a moment underrated the danger, but, beholding its approach, he did not fear to look it in the face. Every precaution that man could take, he adopted. He improvised a fortress in the Muchee Bawun, seized and held the bridges, strengthened the Residency, conveyed into it all the ladies and invalids, and then, having his European force well in hand, prepared for any alternative. All this time, so far from betraying any of the anxieties which he felt, he went freely amongst the people, rode constantly about the city, endeavoured to calm men's minds, to reason with them, to show them their folly, their fool-hardiness. The designs of the men who were duping them he laid bare. But all was in vain. There was the same servility of manner on the part of the natives; but their hearts were shut to reason and argument. They thought they had caught us in a trap, and should find us isolated and unable to afford assistance to one another. They felt, in fact, sure of their game, and no persuasions or reasoning would, at that hour, have induced them to forego the attempt to win it.

At length, after nightly alarms, on the night of the 30th May, at 9 o'clock, the insurrection broke out. At that hour, suddenly a few shots were heard from the lines of the 71st Native Infantry; the men of this Regiment had been told off in parties, to fire the bungalows and murder their officers, and these shots were the signal. They were

joined at first by only a few of the 13th and 48th; but, nothing daunted, they commenced at once their murderous work. Brigadier Handscombe, a meritorious and much respected officer, who commanded under Sir Henry, and who lived in the cantonment close to them, had hastened to their lines on the first sound of the firing: he was received with a volley, and shot dead. Lieut. Grant, who was out on picket duty, was wounded by a random shot. Unable to stir, the subadar of his guard concealed him under a charpoy*, and told the mutineers that he had escaped. But a havildar of the same guard, merciless in his intense bigotry, pointed to the charpoy, whence Lieut. Grant was at once dragged, and brutally murdered. All this, and the firing of every bungalow they came near, lasted only a few seconds,—less time than I have taken to describe it. Sir Henry Lawrence had, on the first sound, ridden to the scene of action. It was his great object to prevent all communication between the insurgents and the mutinously disposed in the city. Accordingly, he at once moved off two guns and a company of Europeans to the corner of the only road by which the mutineers could approach the bridges, and disposed the rest to meet the attack of the enemy. This was not long waited for: the insurgents came on, infuriated with bang, and excited by their own deeds; but, as they neared the guns, they were received with such a volley of grape, that they at once retreated into their lines, whence they continued for a short time to carry on a desultory fire. As, however, the Europeans and the guns moved on, although only for a few hundred yards, they abandoned even these defences, and as they moved off, the Irregular Cavalry were sent in to cut them up. But their hearts were not in the contest, and although they followed their gallant commandant, Lieut. Hardinge, who greatly distinguished himself, it was but with little effect. Still pursuing their retreat, the insurgents reached the cavalry lines at Moodkepore, about 4 A.M. on the 31st. Finding they were not pursued, they determined to return, persuaded that they would be joined by others of their creed and colour. Firing the cavalry lines to encourage themselves, they started back for Lucknow. But Sir Henry was ready to meet them. Having secured the safety of the Residency, he marched forward with two hundred Europeans, two guns, the 7th Light Cavalry, and a handful of Daly's, Gall's, and Hardinge's Irregular regiments. As he passed the native lines, he was joined by the men of the three native regiments who had not joined the insurgents, about five hundred in number. The 7th Light Cavalry were sent in advance; but, on nearing the enemy, two troops went bodily over and joined them. Seeing our force still advancing, the enemy then turned and fled, although still about a thousand yards distant. Our artillery at once opened upon them, and quickened their flight; they were pursued by the Europeans as far as Moodkepore, and by the Native Cavalry for twenty miles further, in the direction of Seetapore. Their loss in killed, however, was only two or three; but sixty were taken prisoners. At Moodkepore was found the body

* A low native bedstead, with four legs.

of a young officer, Raleigh, quite a boy, who had but lately arrived. Left from ill-health at Moodkepore, he had been surprised and murdered by these assassins.

Unable, with a city full of men plotting our destruction, to pursue the mutineers further with his Europeans, Sir Henry returned to cantonments, and leaving there two hundred of the 32nd Foot, and four guns, he moved the remainder of his force into the Muchee Bawun and the Residency, distributing two of the battery guns to each. He at once proclaimed martial law. The city guards he strengthened with a hundred Europeans and four guns. The city, indeed, was surging with excitement; an insurrection was threatened that night, and but for the bold attitude assumed by Sir Henry (who, with Colonel Inglis, H. M.'s 33rd, slept in the town), and the hold which his character had obtained on the minds of all with whom he had been brought much in contact, it would have undoubtedly broken out. As it was, a good deal of firing took place between the more riotous of the city people and our police. The latter, however, aided by the Europeans, beat them off on each occasion. It is gratifying to add that the havildar who so basely betrayed the place of Lieut. Grant's concealment was caught and hanged; six or seven of the mutineers shared the same fate. Amid the all but universal disaffection, it is also pleasing to record that the officers of the 48th owed their lives to the fidelity of their men. They were at mess when the insurrection broke out, and were consequently in very great risk from detached parties of the mutineers. But about an hundred of their own men rallied round them, and escorted them in safety to the Muchee Bawun. Of the three thousand five hundred comprising the four native regiments, less than one fourth remained true to their colours, and these gradually dropped off as the rebellion progressed.

The spark which on the 30th May was fired at Lucknow, lit up the whole of Oudh. But before carrying the reader in the steps of the mutineers, it will be as well to trace the proceedings of a party of cavalry, which had left Lucknow for a specific purpose before the mutiny broke out.

Towards the end of May, in consequence of communications between Mr. Colvin, Sir Hugh Wheeler, and Sir H. Lawrence, it was resolved that a party of Gall's horse, upon whom it was believed every reliance could be placed, should be detached to clear the road between Cawnpore and Mynpoorie, and thence re-open communications with Allygurh. As this was a service of an important and delicate nature, Sir Henry Lawrence selected his military secretary, Captain Fletcher Hayes, an officer of great abilities, to perform it. He took with him two troops of Irregular Cavalry, and was accompanied by Lieut. Barbor, Adjutant of the regiment, Captain Carey, and Mr. Fayrer. The party reached Cawnpore safely, and on the evening of the 31st of May, had progressed by forced marches as far as Bowgong, about a hundred miles north of Cawnpore. Here they heard that Mynpoorie had been re-occupied by our troops, but that a Rajah in the neighbourhood had set our rule at defiance. As Mynpoorie was only eight miles distant, Captains Hayes and Carey cantered in

to consult the magistrate about attacking this miscreant. They remained there the entire day (1st June), the cavalry being halted at Bowgong. Orders, however, were transmitted to them to march on the following morning to Kurrowlie, sixteen miles on the road to Allygunh, at which place Captain Hayes would join them by a cross road. On the evening of the 1st, one of the native officials came in from Bowgong with the intelligence that the men were bent on mutiny. But as the small detachment which formed Captain Hayes' escort, and which arrived very soon after, merely complained regarding the length of the marches, no importance was attached to the previous information. In the morning, the two officers started by the cross-road, and after riding eleven miles, came in sight of their men proceeding in an orderly manner towards Kurrowlie. They crossed the plain to meet them, but as they approached, a native officer rode up and bade them fly for their lives. The words were scarcely out of his mouth before the two troops, yelling like demons and discharging their carbines, made at them. They had nothing for it but to wheel their horses round and make off. Captain Carey was fortunately untouched, but Captain Hayes, who was riding next the troopers, had not gone many yards before a native officer rode up to his side and cut him down. They then made after the other, but by judicious riding and being a light weight, he escaped after a two miles' chase, and eventually arrived safely at Mynpoorie.

It subsequently transpired that Lieutenant Barbor and Mr. Fayrer had been murdered about ten minutes before Captain Hayes came up. Mr. Fayrer was drinking at a well, when a dastardly sowar came up behind him and nearly cut off his head. Lieutenant Barbor seeing this, fled up the road, pursued by the whole body; he shot one horse and two of the sowars, when he was himself hit; the mutineers almost immediately afterwards came up with him and cut him down. The sowars, after plundering the property of their officers and securing all that they wore on their persons, went off to Delhi.*

Meanwhile the Lucknow rebels, baffled by the vigilance and promptitude shown by Sir Henry Lawrence, had taken the road to Delhi, viâ Seetapore. At this station were the head-quarters of the 41st regiment Native Infantry commanded by Lieut. Colonel Birch, a brother of the Military Secretary, and two regiments of Oudh Local Infantry. This officer, hearing of the approach of the mutineers, and justly feeling that in such times as the present boldness was the greatest safety, drew up his regiment to oppose their passage. As they approached, Colonel Birch gave the order to fire and was obeyed. The mutineers were so much discouraged by this reception, that they desisted from the attack, and continued their route to Delhi.

It must not be supposed that the conduct of the 41st, gratifying as it might appear on a mere superficial examination, was to be attributed in any degree to a spirit of loyalty. It was indeed supposed so at the time, and the "loyal 41st" was held up as a pattern to the

* Captain Carey's Letter, published in the "Times."

Bengal Army. But their conduct is capable of another and a more facile solution. There was a treasury at Seetapore. The 41st felt that if they delayed their revolt until the other regiments had passed away, the treasure would be theirs and theirs only. There would be none to share it with their brigade. Hence their apparent "loyalty" in repulsing the Lucknow mutineers. On the following morning, the 4th June, this regiment rose in revolt, murdered Colonel Birch, and many, if not all of the officers present, civil and military, and plundered the treasury.* It did not then, like so many of the other regiments, take the road to Delhi, but proceeded, committing fearful atrocities on the road, as will be recounted hereafter, to Futtehgurh, and aided in the capture of that place.

The whole country was now in flames. Not only the province of Oudh, but our own districts, had felt the force of the contagion and had risen on every side. On the 3rd, 4th, and 5th, the troops at the stations of Azimgurh, Benares, Allahabad, and Cawnpore rose in revolt. The entire province of Rohilcund, on the north-west frontier of Oudh, had even previously pronounced against our rule. In few of these districts did our countrymen escape massacre; in some they were put to death with every exaggeration of torture. But before detailing these events it will be necessary to follow the progress of the revolt throughout Oudh.

Sultanpore, ninety miles to the south-east, and Fyzabad, about the same distance to the eastward of Lucknow, felt the shock of the insurrection about the same time. At the former place were the 15th Irregular Cavalry and the 8th Oudh Locals. The cavalry regiment had been raised eleven years before by Colonel S. Fisher, an officer of H.M.'s service, a first-rate soldier, and the kindest-hearted man in existence. He was very proud of his men, felt entire confidence in them, always associated with them as much as possible, and being a great sportsman, was in the habit of taking his native officers with him to share his sport. He had felt the insecurity of his position, but he did not doubt his own men. In order, however, to remove one great incentive to revolt, the desire of plunder, from their minds, he resolved on the 8th June on emptying the treasury. He ascertained that this process might be effected by issuing three months' pay in advance to officers and men. This plan was accordingly carried out on the same evening. The following morning, as he was riding down to his regiment, he was shot in the back by a native policeman; his men — the men he had commanded for so many years — saw it but did not stir: the adjutant, Lieut. Tucker, however, went up to them and persuaded some of them to get a dooly †; in this he was placed; Lieut. Tucker then took out the ball and gave him some water; but he felt he was dying. Just at this moment, and as the second in command, Captain Gibbings, was coming up, a party of men, headed by a favourite orderly of Colonel Fisher's — a man who had accompanied him throughout that shooting season, rode up, first speared and then cut

* Account of a Bengalee, who escaped in the disguise of a Fakir.

† A covered conveyance for sick people.

him down. Lieutenant Tucker, finding it was all over, rode off, and, although pursued for three miles, escaped.

Fyzabad was the head-quarters of the 22nd Regiment Native Infantry, a local regiment, a detachment of Irregular Cavalry, and a battery of Native Artillery. Intelligence was received early in June that the 17th Native Infantry, who had mutinied at Azimgurh on the 3rd, would pass through Fyzabad *en route* to Delhi. The native officers and men of the 22nd were at once sounded; they swore that they were loyal and "of one heart" with their European officers. On the morning of the 8th it was ascertained that the 17th were within one march of the place. Colonel Lennox, commanding the 22nd, proposed moving out to give them battle; but the native officers of his regiment seemed much averse to it, as they said their families were with them, and they would prefer fighting on the spot for the lives of those dear to them. Whether the Colonel saw the force of this reasoning or not, he was compelled to succumb to it; but from that moment he must have felt that the game was up with them. But no distrust was shown. On the evening of the same day the troops were ordered to be drawn up against the anticipated attack, the guns being placed in the centre, supported by infantry on both flanks. Thus they remained till 11 P.M., when, on a signal from the lines of the local regiment, the artillerymen loaded their guns with grape. At this moment the two companies of the 22nd rushed amongst them, followed by the main body from the lines and the detachment of cavalry, and formally appointing Dhuleep Singh, a Subadar of the 22nd, as their colonel, and a Repaldar of the cavalry their general, took possession of the guns. In his new capacity the Subadar procured boats for the officers and let them go off uninjured: information of their departure was, however, conveyed to the 17th Native Infantry, who were encamped lower down the banks of the Gogra, and many of them were intercepted and massacred; those who escaped were wonderfully preserved through all but insurmountable dangers. The conduct of the 22nd, in sparing the lives of their officers, was much lauded at the time; but there appears to be but little real difference between men who actually commit murder and those who invite others to perpetrate the deed.

The regiments at Secora, Pertahgurh, Pershadipore, Durriabad, Baraitch, and Gouda mutinied about the same time. Everywhere the treatment was the same, death to the "Feringhee" was the war-cry; and those who escaped that fate, escaped in the face of dangers and difficulties which few of them would care to encounter again.

There was one case showing so strongly the fickleness of the native character, that it will well bear insertion in this place.

In the months of February and March, a rebel chieftain, Fuzl Ali, had made himself notorious by the murder of Mr. Boileau, a civilian, and the commission of other atrocities. In pursuit of him a detachment of the 3rd Oudh Infantry, under Lieutenant Clarke, had been especially active, and that officer had finally succeeded in executing justice upon him. His own men were the instruments of British

vengeance; they had followed him unhesitatingly, uncomplainingly, and had striven equally with their commander in pursuit of the murderer: but in the month of June they revolted. Lieutenant Clarke, their former leader, and another officer, were powerless in their hands. The 17th Regiment Native Infantry were close at hand. To them these men, the accomplices of Lieutenant Clarke in the pursuit and death of Fuzl Ali, sent this message: "We have the murderer of Fuzl Ali; what shall we do with him?" "Behead him," was the reply. The injunction was at once executed upon the unfortunate officer and his companion.

From that day to the present all Oudh has been up in arms against us. Not only the regular troops whom we poured into that province, but the sixty thousand men who formed the army of the ex-king, the zemindars with their retainers, the two hundred and fifty forts, most of them heavily armed with guns, have been working against us. Here and there a petty raja has been found ready to spare the lives of our fugitives, and even in his heart wishing us success; but these exceptions have been very rare. The great body of the landowners, the mass of the people, have declared against us: they have balanced the rule of the Company and the sovereignty of their own kings, and have pronounced almost unanimously in favour of the latter. The very pensioners who had served in the ranks of our army, and who now derive their support solely from our bounty, have declared definitively against us; not only have they to a man joined in the insurrection, but it is a well-authenticated fact that they have been foremost in the commission of atrocities.*

Such is the political aspect of the question. In a military point of view, Oudh has been the great stumbling-block in our course, the ulcer that has swallowed up and paralysed all our resources. Granting that we should have had the rebellion, if Oudh had not been annexed, there would still have been one European regiment available for Cawnpore. There would have been no occasion to keep all our reinforcements between that place and Calcutta, or to pour them into Oudh in long-fruitless attempts to succour our countrymen. In all probability, Oudh would have remained to us what it was in the Mahratta, Sikh, and Burman wars, not only a harmless but a friendly country. Our troops would have been able to reinforce the army before Delhi and to re-conquer Rohilcund. As it is, they have been reduced by exposure, by disease, and by the sword, in the endeavour to rescue from the clutches of the enemy those of our countrymen who had been sent, in defiance of the most solemn treaties, to usurp the place and dignity of the native sovereigns of the country.

Seldom indeed has retribution so quickly followed crime as in the case of Oudh. The nearest approach to it in history is the seizure of Spain by Napoleon, under circumstances infinitely less revolting than those which accompanied the spoliation of Oudh. And yet Spain was Napoleon's ruin. In the agony of his mighty heart he

* I am unwilling to publish my authority for this statement; but my publishers will receive, privately, the name of my informant.

exclaimed, "This great Spanish ulcer has ruined me!" It swallowed up his armies as Oudh swallowed up our reinforcements, and his power from that moment received a death-blow not inferior to that which the immoral and illegal annexation of Oudh has dealt to the Court of Directors. In both cases justice was violated: in the first, happening long ago, she was speedily, in the second we will hope she will be as quickly, avenged. Already the accents of despair, significant of the death-bed of the unrighteous, have been heard from Leadenhall Street. It is fit that man should be taught that there are certain fixed laws which cannot be violated without bringing upon the head of the violator, even in this life, dishonour, confusion, and disgrace.

CHAPTER III.

INSURRECTIONS AT AZIMGURH, JUANPORE, BENARES, AND ALLAHABAD.

THE little stations of Azimgurh and Juanpore, forty miles apart, constituted our advanced posts on the south frontier of Oudh. With the larger towns of Benares and Ghazeepore, they formed a square based upon the Ganges. Thus the natural action of a detachment beaten at Juanpore would be to retreat on its main station, Benares, of a force overwhelmed at Azimgurh to retire on Ghazeepore. This latter station and Benares, likewise forty miles apart, and based on the Ganges, constituted thus the heart on which the smaller arteries of Juanpore and Azimgurh depended for a constant supply of vitality.

To the north again of Azimgurh, sixty miles from it, and abutting on the Oudh and Nepal frontiers at the extreme front of our territory, was the station of Goruckpore: this was held merely by two companies of the 17th Native Infantry, and a small party of Irregular Horse. The remainder of the 17th Native Infantry, and a detail of Native Artillery, guarded Azimgurh. Juanpore was defended by a detachment of Sikhs.

As soon as the events of Meerut and Delhi became known at Azimgurh, the demeanour of the Sepoys of the 17th assumed a form not to be mistaken. They had always been a most indifferent regiment, and it was now their misfortune to be commanded by a man totally unfit to have charge even of a company. The consequence was that disorder reigned rampant; the Sepoys behaved exactly as they chose, and became the terror, instead of being the safeguard, of the European inhabitants.

Such was the state of affairs at the end of May. It was known that every station in India was "shaky," that no native troops could be depended upon. Yet at this epoch, the Accountant of the North-West Provinces, a civilian, wiser in his own conceit than his neighbours, issued an order for the removal of ten lakhs of treasure from

Goruckpore and seven from Azimgurh to Allahabad: that is to say, at a time that native troops were known to be disaffected, he placed the entire treasure of the Azimgurh and Goruckpore districts under their charge, directed them to march with it through a country surging as it were against us, and to convey it to another station where only native troops were posted. It was, in fact, to give the insurgents the very opportunity they were seeking for, of plundering the whole.

However, the orders of the Accountant must be obeyed. The ten lakhs of treasure were therefore brought from Goruckpore to Azimgurh by an escort, under the command of Lieutenant Palisser of the Irregular Cavalry: here they took charge of the seven lakhs. But the 17th Native Infantry were not going to lose this money without a struggle. On the 2nd of June they made a desperate effort to prevent the party leaving Azimgurh; but the tact and coolness of Lieutenant Palisser, and the staunchness of the troopers of the cavalry, quite paralysed them, and they were compelled for the moment to forego their intentions. But, though baffled, they were not defeated. On the night of the 3rd the treasure party started: it consisted of two companies of the 17th and Palisser's Horse. They had scarcely marched three hours when the six companies left behind rose in revolt, killed Lieutenant Hutchinson, their quarter-master, and, letting loose the prisoners from the jail, accompanied by them and by all the police, set off after the treasure.

It had been Lieutenant Palisser's intention to disarm the two companies of the 17th with him; but on his intimating his resolve, they went down upon their knees and swore that they would stand by him to the last. At that time we were not so well acquainted with the value of native oaths and with the estimation to be placed on native honour as experience has subsequently made us, and Palisser believed them. They were, therefore, not disarmed. The consequence was that when the excited crowd, pouring out from the station, came near him, all armed to the teeth and thirsting for blood, Palisser was helpless. His troopers stood by him so far as to defend him and the officers with him (Lieutenant Simpson and Mr. Turner), but no more. They would not act against their countrymen. He was compelled, therefore, to draw off, and abandon the treasure: his troopers retired with him.

But it did not suit the object of the mutineers to permit these officers to retire unmolested. Their avarice was even surpassed by their desire for blood. They therefore did all in their power to persuade the sowars to give up their officers; they appealed to religion, nationality, love of money; even offered 5000*l.* for each head: but all in vain. The sowars were negatively faithful: they would neither act for us or against us, and, resisting all temptation, safely escorted their officers into Benares. The very next day they deserted. Sensible perhaps that they had done but half their duty, and secretly sympathising with the rebels, they had gone, probably after having seen their officers safely disposed of, to swell their forces.

On the mutiny breaking out at Azimgurh, the lives of the residents

were in great danger, and had it not been that the Sepoys were primarily intent on securing the treasure, but few of them would have escaped. As it was, one only who went amongst them was killed; the others barricaded themselves till the mutineers had started after the treasure party, and then set out for Ghazepore,— Mr. Astell, the judge, leading the way in his carriage, most of the others following as best they might. However, all who started reached in safety. On arriving at Ghazepore it was discovered that some of the indigo-planters and the poorer class of Christians had been left behind. As it was known that the 17th Native Infantry would return to plunder the place, great anxiety was felt on their behalf by one, at least, of those who had escaped. This was Mr. Venables, an indigo-planter residing in the neighbourhood of Azimgurh, a gentleman of large property and of a very high character. Fearing for the unfortunates who had been left behind, Mr. Venables endeavoured to persuade Mr. Astell, Mr. Horne, and others, to return with him. They were most unwilling, and pleaded fear of the Commissioner's anger, if they should return without his sanction. A message was instantly despatched for that sanction. But the Commissioner, Mr. Tucker, comprehending in an instant the feelings of his subordinates, sent back a reply to the effect that "he had no objection to Mr. Venables' going, but the civilians were on no account to risk their lives."

Thus privately and officially left to himself, this noble-hearted man determined to go alone. He started the next day, went direct to his estate at Doorie Ghat, some two and twenty miles on the Goruckpore side of Azimgurh, assembled his ryots*, armed them, marched at their head, and recovered Azimgurh. He did more; he held it; and whilst the apathetic civilians had retired into Benares, and were allowed to continue to draw their immense salaries — Mr. Astell alone 250*l.* per mensem — Mr. Venables, the indigo-planter, remained at their proper station, did all their work, even collected the revenue which they ought to have collected, restored order where all was chaos: and whilst these men were whining over the loss of their own private property, he employed himself in restoring the power and re-asserting the prestige of Government.

And yet he was one of those "adventurers" whom the Government of India takes every opportunity of insulting. Mr. Venables held this district, reinforced only by a small detachment of native troops, for about six weeks. At the end of that time the civilians were most unwillingly compelled to return. The events which subsequently happened will be related in their proper place. It is time now to notice the effect which the events at Azimgurh produced on Benares and its out-stations.

The city of Benares, distant four hundred and twenty miles north-west of Calcutta, and nearly eighty east of Allahabad, is on the left bank of the river Ganges. It is the metropolis of Hinduism, sacred to the votaries of that religion. Thither do they proceed, that, by

* Tenantry.

presents to the Brahmins and bathing in the holy water of the Ganges, they may be purified from their sins. Thither they are taken to die, convinced that the departure of the soul in the stronghold of Brahminism ensures a certainty of eternal bliss. The population may be estimated at 300,000, of whom four-fifths are Hindoos. These, it may easily be imagined, are almost entirely under the influence of the priests: by them the poorer class are kept in rigid subjection, whilst the richer are permitted to atone for defalcations and indulgences by offerings of no mean value in the various temples. The cantonment of Benares, denominated *Jeccole*, is three miles inland. Here were stationed in May, 1857, the 37th Regiment Native Infantry, the Sikh Regiment of Loodhiana, an irregular Cavalry regiment, and half a company of European Artillery, or about thirty men. Thus, notwithstanding the warnings that had been given, the Government of India, in the early part of May, considered that thirty European gunners were sufficient to hold in check three native regiments, and a city — the hot-bed of Brahminism — containing 300,000 inhabitants.

There were other considerations which ought to have inspired a far different arrangement.

Benares, in addition to its sacred character, might be styled the city of dethroned monarchs. Hither came the despoiled princes of Sattara, the ex-royal family of Nepal, a branch of the royal family of Delhi, boorg rajahs and Sikh chieftains, to seek an asylum in their misfortunes. All these were elements of mischief. Some of them were princes whom we had dethroned, or grand seigneurs whom we had deprived of their estates. Intrigue was their delight, they could not live without it; treachery had been familiar to them from their childhood, and it might have been surmised, without any great stretch of imagination, that no opportunity would be lost by them of exercising their talents with effect against us.

The inhabitants of Benares were a proud turbulent race, fond of ancient ways, and very impatient of innovation. Previous to 1851 they had successfully resisted all attempts to trench upon any of their customs. Thus they would prefer that filth should lie in their streets rather than that the novel system of draining should be introduced; that the highways should remain unlighted at nights, their roads encroached upon by filthy huts, than that a clear thoroughfare should be made. Many magistrates had endeavoured to remedy these evils; but, after several trials, the population, or rather the bourgeoisie backed up by the priests, who looked upon improvement as the first step to undermine their religion, were too much for them: the magistrates were baffled, and receded from their orders.

But in 1851 a gentleman was appointed to the post of magistrate, who did not like to be baffled. He too ordered improvements after the manner of his predecessors: unlike them, he carried them out. This was Frederic Gubbins of the Civil Service.

His first attempt had been unpromising: the inhabitants, according to custom, resisted his innovations, and, finding that he did not succumb, the very next time he came into the city, they pelted him out

of it. He had in fact to fly for his life. But he still persisted in his plan. The bourgeoisie, not to be beaten, resolved to starve him out; they shut all their shops and sent to stop their supplies of grain from all quarters. As the troops were dependent upon their regimental bazars, and these again dependent on the city of Benares for grain, it was supposed that, on the failure of the three or four days' supply laid up in the bazars, the magistrate would be glad to give in. But Mr. Gubbins resolved to fight them with their own weapons: he sent to Mirzapore and other places for grain; and finally, hearing that the leading members of the insurrection were about to hold a meeting to concoct a further scheme of opposition, he sent down two companies of Sepoys, caught them in the act, and lodged them in jail.*

The next morning he rode through the city and opened all the shops. From that moment, not only was the insurrection at an end, but Mr. Gubbins was lord of Benares. He had inspired a conviction of his power, his earnestness, his energy, such as if a native once imbibes he exaggerates,—he never loses the feeling. From that time forth, the idea reigned supreme in the minds of the people of Benares that it was impossible to organise a successful opposition against Mr. Gubbins.

It is necessary to mention this, because in every phase of the insurrection at Benares, this influence is visible, not only preventing the townsmen from joining the insurgent troops, but overawing them subsequently, when all the surrounding districts had risen. At the time of which I am writing, Mr. Gubbins was judge, Mr. Lind, an able active zealous officer, was magistrate; the troops were temporarily commanded by Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Gordon of the Sikhs corps, a very steady capable commandant; the commissioner or civil ruler of the district was Mr. H. C. Tucker, a most amiable good man, but ill adapted to rule in the emergency which was now approaching. Very soon after the news of Delhi and Meerut reached Benares, it became visible that, of the troops, the 37th were "gone;" the Sikhs mostly faithful, but some of them even wavering; the Irregular Cavalry doubtful. How to maintain order amongst these, and in the city, with the aid and by the sole means of thirty European artillerymen with three guns, was a problem which required solution.† With this view, a meeting of the principal members of the society was held. There one gentleman proposed to abandon the station, and to retreat upon Chunar, a fortress thirteen miles distant, and on the opposite bank of the river: he was supported at first by two others; but the idea was so strongly combated by Messrs. Gubbins and Lind, to whom it appeared in the light of a shameful abandonment of the most important city between Calcutta and Lucknow, that it was given up, and a resolution adopted to make a stand where they were, taking every precaution against an emergency.

* I received all these particulars from a gentleman who was at Benares at the time.

† On the authority of an officer who was at Benares at the time.

The first of these precautions was to despatch an urgent requisition to Dinapore, 130 miles distant, for troops. This was attended to, and two companies of Her Majesty's 10th foot, about 150 strong, were at once sent up by steamer.

There was unfortunately no defensible position in Benares; but arrangements were made that in the event of an outbreak, the ladies and others should repair on the first alarm to the Mint, a very large oblong brick building, proof against fire, and capable of being defended against men unprovided with artillery.

Towards the end of May the symptoms of disaffection amongst the native troops became even more strongly marked; the agents of the king of Delhi were found to be busy amongst the Mahomedan Sepoys; the Hindoos went openly to their temples, and prayed for the time to arrive when they might murder us; placards were posted up calling on the people to rise, and every thing indicated the approach of a crisis.

On the 3rd and 4th June, reinforcements of the Madras Fusiliers, sixty men in all, arrived, and it appeared that the time had now come when stronger measures might be adopted. It was felt that an insurrection was imminent, that it could not be deferred much longer; it was therefore thought that with 240 Europeans at their disposal, with the Sikhs believed to be staunch, and with the 13th Irregulars in whom their officers had every confidence, the measure might be adopted of disarming the 37th Native Infantry. About a fortnight before, Colonel Gordon had been superseded in command of the station by Brigadier Ponsonby, a cavalry officer. Both these officers, Mr. Tucker and Mr. Gubbins, debated these questions on the afternoon of the 4th June. In the height of the discussion, suddenly the brigade-major rushed in with the startling intelligence that the 17th Native Infantry at Azimgurh, sixty miles distant, had risen in revolt, and plundered the treasure. This decided them. It was unanimously resolved to disarm the 37th Native Infantry the following morning, and a plan of operations was arranged by which that measure could be effected, it was believed, without the effusion of blood.

All was settled. Brigadier Ponsonby had gone to his own house to issue the necessary orders, when the sudden arrival of one man changed the whole aspect of affairs. This man was Lieutenant-Colonel Neill, commanding the Madras Fusiliers.

As Colonel Neill is one of the characters figuring in the suppression of this mutiny, who rose at once to the surface, and never sank below it, it may be as well to give some brief outline of his character.

It is told in a very few words, and may be illustrated by one example. Colonel Neill was the type of a resolute, determined, energetic Englishman—a man of very quick observation and an iron will. He saw the true bearings of a question in an inconceivably brief space of time, and acted always at once: he was not to be trifled with when he gave orders: he always knew that he would be

obeyed. His character was quickly appreciated by those with whom he came in contact.

The illustration is as follows:—When he arrived in Calcutta at the head of the Madras Fusiliers, he was ordered up with a detachment by railway. The train was to start at a certain hour; but, owing to some delay on the part of the authorities in procuring boats, a portion of the detachment seemed likely to be a few seconds behind time. Colonel Neill had already arrived. The station-master, addressing him, stated that he was behind time, and could not wait for his men, and that the train should go without them. As he rose to execute this threat, Colonel Neill ordered his men to seize and detain him till the rest of the detachment should arrive. When they came up, the station-master was let go, the men got into the carriages, and the train started. A military man who could thus brave the civil power, was not likely to shrink before mutineers. When, therefore, Brigadier Ponsonby detailed to Colonel Neill his plan for the following morning, and the grounds upon which it had been formed, the latter inquired the reason for delaying the measure even so long. “Why,” said he, “give the 37th, who will hear, or have heard, of the Azimgurh mutiny, the opportunity of rising to-night?” He strongly urged that the measure should be carried out at once. Convinced by his arguments, the Brigadier yielded, then and there altered all his arrangements, and sent orders to the regiments to parade that same evening.

The lines of the 37th were in the centre of the parade, about midway between those occupied by the Sikhs and by the artillery. At the hour appointed, and before the 37th had come out in front of their lines, the artillery advanced from the left, the Sikhs and Irregular Cavalry from the right. As they came near, the Sepoys of the 37th were directed to place their muskets in the bells of arms appointed to receive them: some obeyed, but as the Europeans still continued to advance, they appeared to repent, for, rushing forward, they recovered their muskets, many of which were loaded, and commenced a brisk fire from the whole line on their officers and the advancing Europeans. Some of their officers, confident of their loyalty even then, went amongst them to smooth them down; but upon these also they fired, and even went at them with their bayonets.

The Sikhs and Irregular Cavalry were now approaching. The commanding officer of the former, Captain Guise, riding in front of them near the lines of the 37th, was shot dead. Captain Dodgson, the brigade major, seeing the catastrophe, rode up to them, and intimating that he had been sent by the Brigadier to take the command, called on them to follow him. They flashed their swords in reply, giving vent to a low equivocal murmur. At the same moment, one of them drew his pistol and fired at Captain Dodgson; the shot took effect in his sword arm, paralysing it for the moment. The sowar then rode up and was about to cut him down, when another interfered, and both were lost in the *mêlée*.

The sound of that pistol-shot had not yet been borne away on the winds, when the Sikhs, hitherto standing firm, brought up their muskets to the shoulder, and opened an indiscriminate fire on their

own officers and the Europeans. Our guns, which, up to this time, had been blazing away at the 37th, then turned upon the Sikhs: these latter dashed forward to charge them, but were repulsed and broken. The Irregular Cavalry, most of whom had joined the mutineers, were also put to flight and dispersed. The 37th likewise fled in terror and confusion. Brigadier Ponsonby, in an early part of the day, had fallen, stricken apparently by the sun, on the ground, and the command had been assumed by Neill, who directed the arrangements which ensured the defeat and flight of the rebels.

Whilst this was going on on the parade ground, the civilians, with their wives and families, had, according to previous arrangement, assembled on the roof of the treasury, distant about two miles, and there abided the fortunes of the day. Just before the firing commenced, Soorut Singh, a Sikh *détenu*, had left Mr. Gubbins; but on the booming of the first gun, he returned to the place where he and the others were collected; and, taking a double-barrelled gun from the hands of that gentleman, announced his intention to share his fate. His arrival was most opportune. A quarter of an hour had not elapsed before it was announced to the Sikh guard stationed over the treasury, on the roof of which the civilians were standing, that our guns had been turned on their countrymen, who were being slaughtered in every direction. Already the Sikhs began to feel that they at least were capable of avenging their comrades, when Soorut Singh, going amongst them, pointed out to them that the attack must at all events have been unpremeditated, or the civilians would not have placed themselves and their families in their power. He stated his firm belief in the sincerity and good faith of the English, and announced his intention to stand by them. These arguments, proceeding from one of their own countrymen, himself a *détenu*, had the desired effect, and the men never afterwards attempted to swerve from their duty.

The presence of Messrs. Gubbins and Lind on the roof of the treasury that evening, undoubtedly saved the building from plunder. Had they not been there, the Sikh guard, hearing of the massacre of their comrades, would at once have made the best of their time, and have helped themselves, previous to making off. There would have been no one to prevent them. But the presence of Mr. Gubbins primarily, and of Soorut Singh secondarily, saved the station from that catastrophe — a catastrophe which might have been the prelude of a greater.

In the cantonment, meanwhile, the ladies and non-combatants, on the first sound of fire, had hurried into the mint, which had been prepared for their reception: here also congregated, after the mutiny had been crushed, the officers and civilians. Every bungalow was deserted; but it is a fact that speaks decisively as to the effective manner in which the *émeute* had been suppressed, that, though all the houses were deserted and every door left wide open, not a single robbery took place that evening.

The revolt of the Sepoys had, indeed, been effectually put down; but no sooner had it become known in the districts around that there

had been an insurrection, than the whole country rose as one man : communication was cut off with the neighbouring military stations, and it appeared as if the ryots and zumindars were about to attempt the execution of the project in which the Sepoys had failed. All depended on the deportment of the city. It was at this epoch that the character and influence of Mr. Gubbins came fully into play. The memory of the fruitless revolt of 1852, and of the punishment meted out to the ringleaders, had its full effect. The powers with which, in their eyes, Mr. Gubbins was endued, were sufficient to discover and overturn any cabal ; and what was really the effect of untiring zeal, undaunted energy, and clear-headedness unmatched, was attributed by them to the supernatural.

They saw, indeed, that Mr. Gubbins exposed himself as much or more than any one else. One shot would have brought him low ; and on his death the insurrection of the city would have followed as a matter of course : but the shopkeepers and the *canaille* had fired at him in 1852 ; he had laughed at their miserable attempts ; he had baffled, he had punished them. They feared the same result now.

So argued the commonalty. With the superior class his influence was of a higher order. There were two native noblemen in Benares at that time, both of them of great wealth and immense influence, and one of them possessing, in addition, strong sense and ability of no common order. This was the Rao Deo Narain Singh ; the other was the Rajah of Benares. Everything that the former possessed he placed at the service of Government. After the mutiny he and the Sikh Sirdar Soorut Singh, actually lived in the same house with Mr. Gubbins. The former procured for us excellent spies, first-rate information, and placed all his resources, and they were great, whatever he possessed in the world in fact, at the service of our Government. Soorut Singh almost gave his life, at least he offered it ; but, as will be subsequently shown, the rebels were content with paralysing a limb. As for the Rajah of Benares, he behaved throughout like a loyal subject. Although not so personally active as the Rao, he was equally liberal with his resources, which were even greater, and never, in our darkest hour, did he hang back from assisting us.

It has been stated that the entire district rose at the sound of the cannon at Lecrole. But in this emergency our countrymen were not wanting to themselves. A small number of the Irregular Cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant Palisser, had remained faithful ; but they were suspected by every one. At this crisis Mr. Chapman, an indigo-planter, came forward and offered to accompany them anywhere ; he even proposed to take a portion of them under his command, and surprise and attack the Azimgurh mutineers. But this proposal, after due consideration, was rejected by Colonel Neill, who had arrived at a very correct appreciation of native troops. But this gallant volunteer's services were not refused. He was endowed with the powers of a magistrate, and sent first with the Irregulars, and afterwards with detachments of Europeans, against the surrounding districts, and with marked success. Three gibbets were erected at Benares. Again the name of Mr. Gubbins became a proverb for

swift stern justice. Neither rank nor caste protected any man; and by this means, and the success of the flying parties who were sent out, order was temporarily restored in the Benares division. Meanwhile Colonel Neill, having driven away the rebels, and in the short space of three days made every department as efficient as possible, set out for Allahabad, making over his command to Brevet-Lieutenant Colonel Gordon.

Before we follow him in his travels, or relate the cause of his prompt departure, we may refer to the occurrences at the little station of Juanpore.

Juanpore lies, as I have already stated, forty miles from Benares, in the direction of Oudh, and was at the time of the outbreak garrisoned by a detachment of the Loodhiana Regiment of Sikhs under Lieutenant Mara. The station had remained tolerably quiet up to the 5th June. But on the morning of that day some indigo-planters, who lived three miles from the station, galloped in with the information that the 37th mutineers had attacked their factory. All the residents at once assembled in the treasury, over which was a Sikh guard. The men of this guard shook hands with our countrymen, and swore to protect them. Soon, however, information reached them how their comrades had been shot down on the Benares parade ground. They forthwith mutinied, commencing by shooting their own officer, Lieutenant Mara, and progressing by pillaging the treasury. At this crisis Mr. Guppge, a young civilian, going outside in the direction of the jail, was shot dead by the Sikh sentry on duty. The other residents remained in the enclosure of the magistrate's catcherry*, until the Sikhs had gone off, when, at the instigation of Mr. Fane, the magistrate, they gave up their arms, and started in the direction of Benares. Had they retained their arms, and pushed on like Englishmen, little opposition would have been offered. As it was, they were reduced to the most humiliating straits, being compelled to give up their watches and personal ornaments to natives, who but the day before had crouched before them. They were finally compelled to take refuge with one Hingun Lall, a native of some power and influence. In this pitiful state they remained, until, intelligence of their situation having reached the Benares authorities, a party was organised to go out and bring them in—a movement which was effected without loss.

But we must turn from this incident to notice the events which in the interim had occurred at Allahabad. The important station of Allahabad, its fort and arsenal, were in the month of May 1857 garrisoned entirely by natives,—the 6th regiment Native Infantry, a battery of Native Artillery, and five companies of the regiment of Ferozpoore (Sikhs). The military value of Allahabad cannot be over estimated. Situated at the juncture of the rivers Ganges and Jumna it commands both, and the troops who possess it can therefore prevent all river navigation. It also commands the road. Indeed it is only approachable on the Benares side by a bridge of boats thrown across the Jumna,

* Office.

and this is completely within range of the guns of the fort. The Ganges separates it from Oudh; there are or were no defences on either bank, and that river also is spanned by a bridge of boats. The fort itself is stored with immense quantities of arms and ammunition: it is of great natural strength, resting absolutely on the Jumna on one side, and commanding on the other the entire station of Allahabad, the city, and the road to Cawnpore.

To have left so strong a position and such immense stores under the guardianship of natives, so soon after the acquisition of Oudh, its nearest neighbour, was an inexcusable fault. If we had lost Allahabad, we should have lost all power of communicating with the north-west, — the whole aspect of the campaign would have been changed; and our enemies at Cawnpore and Lucknow, after massacring our garrisons at those places, would probably have marched 50,000 in number to overwhelm our troops at Delhi. Lord Ellenborough, when Governor-General of India, was so impressed with the importance of Allahabad, that he would never allow less than three companies of Europeans to be stationed there. He built for them magnificent barracks inside the fort, and made every possible arrangement for their comfort. Sir Charles Napier also took care that European troops should always garrison the fort. But what were Lord Ellenborough and Sir Charles Napier to Lord Dalhousie, Lord Canning, and Colonel Birch? Why, it had been the practice of the two former not only to give orders direct to the parties concerned, but invariably to see them obeyed, — an unpardonable offence in the eyes of those illustrious red-tapists! Hence all they did was undone by their successors; and, amongst other “reforms,” the Europeans were moved away from Allahabad.

In no scene of the drama was the action of Providence more conspicuous than in the events by which the Allahabad mutiny was characterised. The news from Delhi and Meerut arriving about the 14th May, had a visible effect on the 6th Regiment: they looked round and saw no one to interfere with their plans: they were, or might become, without even the semblance of a struggle, the masters of all they surveyed. They took duty over the treasury, in which there were 170,000*l.* in silver; they guarded, alternately with the Sikhs, the arsenal, the fort gates, the magazine; they had only to rise and say, “these are ours;” there were none or few to share it with them: the population of Allahabad are bigoted Mahomedans; their sympathies would ever be with those, of whatever religion, caste, or tribe, who would fight against the British. Why, then, did they not mutiny at once? A question to which but one reply can be given. They were Asiatics: they could not comprehend the advantages of time, circumstance, position, promptitude: they saw that they could seize these places and this treasure when they chose; therefore they did not seize them at once: they had, in fact, all the wickedness and all the irresolution of Macbeth. In their manner and tone they allowed, even at this time, something to appear which alarmed, not the authorities or their own officers, but the European residents at Allahabad. These latter wrote their fears to the Indian newspapers,

and the press, then unfettered, inserted their letters. The consequence was that, having no other Europeans to spare, the Government ordered up a portion of the European invalids from Chunar: sixty-five of these arrived on the 23rd May, and were at once placed in the fort. To their presence, and the presence of the few Europeans who followed them, the subsequent safety of the fort may be attributed. About the same time a detachment of the 3rd Regiment Oudh Irregular Cavalry, under Captain Alexander, was brought over from Oudh. All this time the officers of the 6th had the most perfect confidence in their men. There was not a regiment in the service in which the Sepoys were so looked after, so cared for, as in this one.* The officers' feelings seemed to be entirely one with theirs. They encouraged them in their wrestling and in all their sports, and contributed largely towards their maintenance from their own private funds. They had battled on their behalf with the civil authorities, and had exposed themselves to contumely by the pertinacity with which they held out for the character of their men. They were proud of them: the regiment was truly their home: they would have gone anywhere with it, and, had the entire Bengal army risen before their eyes in revolt, they would still have placed implicit confidence in the 6th. Men like Mr. Mangles, who passed their career in India, in the luxurious ease of a civilian's life, may, if they chose, libel the officers, whose character and interest they are bound to protect; they may endeavour to make those officers the scape-goats for a rebellion, which their own lust of territory and mis-government have caused; but who that studies these events will believe them? We have seen how the officers of the 6th had behaved for years past toward their men; it has now to be related how they were requited.

On the 22nd May, Colonel Simpson, who commanded the 6th, wrote a letter to the newspapers, in which he denounced the statement that the 6th had evinced symptoms of discontent and insubordination as "false and malicious." This assertion was apparently borne out on the 1st June by the 6th volunteering *en masse* to march against Delhi,—a demonstration which had the effect of inducing the utmost confidence in their loyalty. About this time, too, they made over to public justice two spies, who had come into their lines for the purpose of tampering with their fidelity: this circumstance combined with their volunteering seemed to stamp them as proof against every temptation.

Yet throughout this period they were bent on mutiny: the man in the regiment most trusted by them was the very soul of the plot: but he and the others maintained to the last every appearance of respect and loyalty, and not one Sepoy out of the thousand who composed the regiment warned their officers of their impending fate.

On the 27th May the first detachment of Europeans sent up by Government from Calcutta arrived at Allahabad: they were not detained there, but were sent on at once to Cawnpore. Daily batches of them arrived, and were forwarded with all despatch. The danger appeared to have passed: the very sight of the Europeans would, it

* Personal experience.

was thought, scare the evil-disposed from their designs. Grave error! It had an effect the very opposite: the Sepoys of the 6th saw those men arrive, and they felt that the prize was slipping from their grasp: a few more Europeans, and their chance of the treasure would be *nil*. It was resolved to strike at once, and strike boldly. In order, however, completely to deceive their officers, they, on the 1st, as already stated, volunteered for Delhi.

On the 5th Colonel Simpson received a telegraphic message from the Governor-General requesting him to inform the regiment that the thanks of the Governor-General in Council were due to them, and would appear in the next Gazette. The officers were delighted at this manifestation, and were in raptures with their men for having, by volunteering, caused so great a distinction to be bestowed upon the corps.

All was quiet till the 5th June: on that day accounts of the mutiny at Benares reached the station, accompanied by reports that the mutineers were in full march upon Allahabad. On the same day a message was received from Sir Hugh Wheeler, commanding at Cawnpore, to "man the fort with every available European and make a good stand." Preparations were consequently made: all the ladies and non-combatants were advised to go into the fort. Many of the latter obeyed, and formed themselves into a volunteer company about a hundred strong; but a great number, confiding in the loyalty of the 6th, preferred remaining outside. Two guns and two companies of the 6th were ordered down to the bridge of boats which crosses the Jumna underneath the fort, in order to be ready to play upon the Benares insurgents: the guns of the fort were at the same time pointed on to the Benares road. Captain Alexander, with two squadrons of cavalry, was posted in the Alopee bagh, a large encamping ground under the lee of the fort, and commanding all the roads to the station: the main body of the 6th were not taken from their lines,—distant from the fort about three miles,—but were kept in readiness to move anywhere at the shortest notice.

The fort itself was garrisoned by sixty-five invalid artillery-men, four hundred Sikhs, and one company of the 6th. In addition to these were the civilians and other non-military men, who might have numbered about one hundred.

The removal of the ladies into the fort did not appear to satisfy the men of the 6th, who, it may be inferred, were bent even then on bloodshed; for they remonstrated with one of their officers for sending his wife into the fort, and begged him to allow her to return to cantonments, as they were one and all determined and able to defend her. The officer hesitated; but his better genius prevailed: he did not bring back his wife. Still he had no distrust of his men, and showed his feeling of confidence by himself remaining in the lines.

On the afternoon of that day (the 6th) Colonel Simpson ordered a parade of the regiment, in order to communicate the Governor-General's message. Great was the real enthusiasm of the officers, as great the apparent heartiness of the men. After the message had been announced, they cheered like Europeans; and when the order to

fall out was given, the European shook hands with the native officers, and congratulated them on their all being of one mind on their regiment having thus come forward. Little did they dream at that moment that their death-warrant had been signed by the very men whom they were congratulating!

That night almost all the officers in the station dined at the 6th Mess, Colonel Simpson presiding. Every one was in the highest good humour; the officers, proud of their regiment, congratulating themselves and one another that, placed in the midst of mutineers, their regiment—a word comprehending home, honour, glory, reputation, to zealous officers—had remained loyal. The cloth was removed; it was half-past nine o'clock; already some were thinking of going home, when suddenly the alarm was sounded. Jumping to the not unnatural conclusion that the Benares insurgents were advancing, or that there was an inroad from Oudh, the officers started up, buckled on their swords, and, those that had them ready, mounting their horses, rode down to their lines to call out their men. They were still in the highest spirits, rejoicing in the prospect of an encounter and proving the loyalty of their men. As they rode on to the parade, they perceived one of their companies drawn up. They called out to them: the answer was a volley. Yes: those men they had mingled with, trusted, encouraged, shown every kindness to, thus deliberately murdered them! Most of the officers were shot dead. Colonel Simpson managed to escape to the fort. Captain Gordon was miraculously saved by some of his men. All the others upon whom they could lay hands were remorselessly butchered. Those even that had remained in the mess-house, for the most part boys lately arrived from England, were treacherously assaulted by the mess-guard, and, though defending themselves with desperation, were one and all murdered.

Rebellion was now in full swing. Houses were plundered and burnt, their inmates chopped to pieces, some roasted, almost all cruelly tortured, the children tossed on bayonets. Foremost in the commission of these atrocities were the pensioners,—a body of men retired from military service, entirely dependent on Government, and receiving from it half-yearly a handsome sum for their maintenance. These men, unable from their infirmities to fight, were not thereby precluded from inflicting tortures of the most diabolical nature: they even took the lead in those villainies, and encouraged the Sepoys and others to follow their example.* And yet these men still draw, they still receive, their pensions from the merciful Government of India!

To plunder the treasury, let loose the prisoners, raise the townspeople, to hunt after Europeans, to destroy all property useless to themselves, was the work of that night and the following day. Meanwhile, on the first sound of musketry, the two companies of the 6th and the native artillerymen who had been stationed on the bridge,

* I have these particulars from an undoubted source. My informant received them from the lips of an eye-witness.

turned against their officers. These latter, however, preferred trusting the waters of the Jumna to the tender mercies of the 6th; and finally, after a swim for it, succeeded in gaining the fort, quite naked: there they were at once taken in and cared for. Captain Alexander, of the cavalry, was not so fortunate. Warned, by the firing, of some impending catastrophe, he jumped on his horse and rode towards the lines, followed by several of his men: but the Sepoys were waiting for him in ambush, and as he passed they fired at him, at so close a distance that they blew out his heart. He was a fine, noble, dashing soldier, beloved by all.

In the fort, all this time, a scene was going on which almost baffles description. Our countrymen there too heard the "alarm" sounded: they rushed to the ramparts, in expectation of an enemy; then came the sound of a volley, then another, then steady file-firing, constant, without intermission. Never doubting the loyalty of the 6th, they believed that they were in action with some insurgents. This belief was confirmed as the firing grew fainter and fainter: they congratulated one another that the gallant 6th had been so successful in beating off the foe. But these pleasing impressions did not remain very long: the sight of the flaming cantonment first suggested a doubt, and immediately afterwards an officer who had escaped the massacre brought in the fatal tidings.

Their situation was a very precarious one: not 200 Europeans in the fort,—of these 65 invalids, a hundred non-military, the remainder officers, conductors, sergeants, &c., to meet 400 Sikhs and a company of the 6th, the latter now known to be hostile, the former, since the conduct of their brethren at Benares, scarcely to be trusted. It was necessary to act boldly, and, as the only chance of safety, to take the initiative. Fortunately there was a man on the spot, who comprehended all this at once, and acted accordingly. This was Captain Brazier, who commanded the Sikhs, an officer who had risen from the ranks, having been promoted for daring and cool courage displayed during the Sutlej campaign. He had been originally posted to the Sikh regiment as quarter-master, and had risen through the grades of adjutant and second in command to the post of commandant, which he still holds.

The first thing was to disarm the 6th, who had loaded their muskets. This was difficult on account of the temper of the Sikhs, amongst whom some little hesitation was visible. Thanks to the coolness of their commandant, who went amongst them and almost forcibly kept them firm in their loyalty, the operation was successfully accomplished. The muskets were then taken from the 6th, and the men of that corps were turned out of the fort. The Sikhs then quietly resumed their posts on the ramparts.

That night passed in painful anxiety. Nor was this feeling sensibly diminished the next day. The conduct of the Sikhs alone was sufficient to give cause for alarm. They were permitted to plunder in every direction; the stores of the European merchants and others, containing wines of every description, private packages from Calcutta, and provisions were sacked, wholesale — the commandant of the for-

gress, Colonel Simpson, looking on, and fearing by checking to exasperate them. But in another point this officer was even more culpable.

The greater portion of the 6th, after their successful mutiny, despairing of gaining the fort, and eager probably to secure their plunder, had made off, some for their houses, others for Oudh. There remained then at Allahabad only a few Sepoys, the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages, untrained to arms, and possessing only the two guns which had been abandoned on the bridge on the night of the mutiny. And yet Colonel Simpson allowed himself and the fort to be invested by this rabble; nay more, to such an extent did his amiability stretch, that on some few Sepoys being pointed out to him passing in and out of the village of Deragunj, the inhabitants of which also had rebelled, he refused to permit the guns of the fort to be turned upon them, for fear of destroying the innocent with the guilty.

Such a state of things could not last very long without producing most disastrous consequences. Fortunately it was not permitted to last. On the 11th June, Colonel Neill arrived, and from that moment affairs took a turn.

How he raised the investment, and dispersed the enemy, how he restored order out of chaos, and, infusing his own energy into all around him, equipped an army out of an exhausted country, will be recounted in another chapter. For the present we must unwillingly leave him to survey the effect which these events produced on the magnates of Calcutta.

CHAPTER IV.

CALCUTTA TO 30TH JUNE. — MASSACRES AT FUTTEHPORE, JHANSIE, NOWGONG, AND ROHNEE.

THE latter end of May and the beginning of June witnessed the arrival of strong reinforcements to our European garrison in India. In quick succession the Madras Fusiliers from Madras, the 64th Foot and 78th Highlanders from Persia, the 35th from Moulmein, a wing of the 37th, and a company of Royal Artillery from Ceylon, were poured into Calcutta. It would have been imagined that the Government, aware as they must have been at this time of the universal disaffection, would have been glad to display their troops, to notify to the mutinously disposed the arrival of such strong reinforcements, to show them that they had means at their disposal wherewith, if necessary, to strike home. But they acted on a contrary principle. The European troops were smuggled in like contraband goods; the Government even went out of the way to conceal their arrival. If, for instance, it were known that the "Auckland," or some other war steamer, was bringing troops, and the public were in consequence natu-

rally on the tiptoe of excitement expecting her, orders would be transmitted by the Home Secretary, that on the arrival of the "Auckland," the telegraph should announce the "Sarah Sands," or a similar *nom-de-guerre*. The ship thus came up unnoticed, the troops generally landed in the dark, and were smuggled into the fort.* Had they landed with all the pomp and circumstance of war, in broad daylight, in martial array, with crowds of Englishmen looking on and cheering them, the insolent demeanour of the natives would have been checked, the Sepoys at Barrackpore have been cowed, the Government have been spared some very anxious moments, and Calcutta might possibly have escaped the imminent peril to which it was subsequently exposed.

But even the safety of an empire must give way to the importance of an individual. When clerks occupy the position of statesmen, they are specially impressed with the necessity of parading their power in the face of their former associates; they will do anything to attract notice, and in the dread of being despised, will often exert themselves unnecessarily to gain popular hatred.

It must be remembered, too, that in the beginning of June, the prospects of the Government were looking up. They believed that Delhi would fall in a very few days; they had called upon General Anson to send down his infantry and cavalry to Cawnpore, and to take Delhi with his artillery †; they were sending up infantry as fast as they arrived; all was *couleur de rose*.

But their dreams of restored tranquillity were destined to be somewhat rudely broken. Thick as hail, post by post, came tidings of disaster. The mutiny at Lucknow, followed by the defection of the whole of Oudh, the revolts at Azungurh, Benares, and Allahabad, already related, the fearful massacre of Jhansie, yet to be told, burst on their astonished ears. To counterbalance these, there was only the victory of Ghazee-ood-deen-Nuggur, gained by Brigadier Wilson over a portion of the rebel force on the 31st May. About this time, also, intelligence was received of the death of the Commander-in-Chief, on the 27th May. But little communication had passed between General Anson and the Government since the revolt at Delhi. He had gone to the Upper Provinces early in the year, with the assent of the Government and the Court of Directors, and when the Meerut disaster occurred he was in the hills. The tidings reached him on the 12th of May, and he at once made every preparation which man could make to meet the coming storm. His operations will be detailed in a future chapter. It is necessary to make a cursory allusion to him here, because a great outcry was made against him on account of the delay in reducing Delhi; on his shoulders was laid all the blame, and men connected with the Government were anxious to single him out as the scape-goat. The rash schemes proposed by the Government at this time have been commented upon in a previous page; had they been adopted, ruin must have overtaken us. The plan pro-

* My authority for this statement is as follows: 1st, Personal observation: 2nd, the telegraphic reports: 3rd, the notice of the circumstance by the local press.

† Blue Book.

posed and followed by General Anson up to his death, and subsequently adopted by his successor, was the only practicable one ; and yet, because it involved a little delay, the gallant General became the *bête noir* of vice-regal circles and of the Secretary's walk.*

The fact is, General Anson was no favourite in Council: his abilities were far superior to those of his colleagues, and in clear-headedness not one of them came near him. His ways too were not their ways. If there was one thing more than another against which he had set his face, it was the Calcutta-prevailing system of jobbing. He would have none of it: he would not touch the unclean thing.

It was a common practice to sneer at General Anson as a mere Horse-Guards' General, as one who had gained his honours at Newmarket. But it is nevertheless a fact, that this Horse-Guards' General, by dint of application and perseverance, made himself so thoroughly master of his profession, that when the mutiny broke out, he drew up a plan of operations, which his successor, a Crimean warrior, carried out in all its details, rejecting as crude and ridiculous the suggestions sent up by the collective wisdom of Calcutta. It cannot be denied that this man, who "gained his honours at Newmarket," when brought in both the Councils face to face with men who had made legislation for India the study of their lives, "distanced" them all: that, whatever the subject, he always mastered it, and showed in reasoning a strong good sense, which was more than a match for the special pleadings by which he was frequently met; whilst in facility of expression, and power of laying down an argument clearly and forcibly, not one of them came near him.

It is not to be wondered at that they disliked him. A Commander-in-Chief is always a bugbear to civilians, who, in India at least, have an innate jealousy of military men, of which very few can divest themselves. And when the Commander-in-Chief, in addition to his superior position, is a man who is beyond them in every other respect, they invariably manœuvre to get rid of him. They like an easy, impressionable man, who will be ready on all occasions to see with their eyes, and hear only what they tell him. The Napier school is their abhorrence.

When, therefore, the intelligence of General Anson's demise reached the members of Government, whatever they might have felt for the man, they certainly did not sorrow for the Commander-in-Chief. Lord Canning instantly telegraphed to Madras for Sir Patrick Grant; and he appointed General Barnard to succeed to the command of the Delhi force. Sir Henry Somerset became, by virtue of seniority, Commander-in-Chief in India. Sir Patrick Grant, who was now about to proceed to Calcutta, was an officer of the Bengal army. He had always been "lucky." He had, when a comparatively young officer, raised the Hurriannah Light Infantry, a local battalion which he commanded for many years, with the character of being unsurpassed

* A public pathway in Calcutta, in which secretaries of Government and their toadies meet every evening to discuss the gossip of the day.

as a commandant. A vacancy occurring in the department of the Adjutant-General, Grant was selected to fill it. Whilst in this position, he married a daughter of Lord Gough, and from that moment his rise was assured. He became Adjutant-General, served in that capacity under his father-in-law and Sir Charles Napier, and finally obtained the command of the Madras army, — the first officer of the Company's service to whom that honour had been vouchsafed.

Sir P. Grant was not altogether undeserving of his fortune. Without being a general, he was a fine soldier under fire, possessing great coolness and imperturbable presence of mind; his general capacity was good, though not great: he had a clear knowledge of the details of his profession, and an intimate acquaintance with the natives of India. On the other hand, he was ill-informed, had received an inferior education, was destitute of imagination, and had not been endowed with the slightest spark of genius. He was better fitted to carry out the details of a campaign than to plan one; he adopted favouritism rather than merit as his principle of dealing out the rewards in his gift; was at the same time a subtle courtier, and ever ready to give up his own opinion at the proper time, and with the best possible grace.

He was just suited for the officials of Government House, but, with a true instinct, the people of England divined that he was not the man to command the army which they were sending out to crush the mutiny.

Sir Patrick Grant was telegraphed for on the 3rd of June: he arrived on the 19th. In the interim events of great importance had occurred.

The disastrous tidings from Azimgurh, Benares, Allahabad, and Oudh—the rumours afloat respecting Jhansie, Cawnpore, Rohilkund, and Central India—made a deep impression on the Government. They appeared at last to have an idea of the magnitude of the crisis. But what could they do? They had, as it were, anticipated all their resources. Not three weeks had elapsed since they had refused the volunteering offers of the British and French merchants, with the rude and baseless insinuation that they were the result of “a passing and groundless panic.” Had they accepted those offers in May, they would, in June, have had at their disposal a militia ready to take the place of the regiment of the Line, which might have been despatched to the scene of action. But again they were “too late.” All their anticipations had failed them; and, to add to their troubles, they at this time received intelligence of the mutinous disposition of the troops at Barrackpore, and the certain proof of the connection of the King of Oudh with the revolt. Strong measures were, indeed, necessary. What could they do?

In the beginning of June, it had been brought to the notice of the Governor-General that the native newspapers were primed with incendiary articles, abetting and encouraging the insurrection. It was then strongly urged upon his lordship that the native press, being the organ of the enemy, it would be politic, convenient, and justifiable

to suppress it. The reply of Lord Canning was, "The remedy is worse than the disease."

He was wrong. The native newspapers were the organs of the enemy; they disseminated treason throughout the country; they were read by all natives who could read; they advocated the cause of the King of Delhi. It was the bounden duty of Lord Canning to suppress them.

But Lord Canning was in the hands of his secretaries. The Indian Press, that is, the English portion of it, had been, as every press must be, the organ of the European society in India. Formerly, a portion of that press had advocated more especially the interests of the Civil Service. But as India became more closely connected with England, as the interests of both countries became more closely involved, the conductors of that portion of the newspaper press favourable to the Civil Service perceived, that in advocating the peculiar interests of that service, they were running counter to the interest both of England and India — that an exclusive service was, in fact, the bar, the most effectual bar, to all improvement in the latter country. Hence all the old established and respectable journals had dropped their cause, and none other of any character had risen to advocate it.

It may be imagined, then, that the hostility of the leading members of the Civil Service to the Indian Press was not light. That Press had already in fact commenced the exposure of their shortcomings in this insurrection: it had discriminated between Lord Canning and his advisers, knowing that the avowed opinions of the former at the outset of the mutiny were very different from those which he afterwards adopted — knowing also that he was dependent on the advisers whom he had inherited from Lord Dalhousie. The leaders of the Civil Service had, too, at this time, prepared an outline of the policy to be carried out at all risks, as the only policy which could save their service — the policy of ignoring, as much as possible, the magnitude of the insurrection; of treating it as a mere revolt of the Sepoys, caused by the incapacity of commanding officers; a policy of conciliating the natives, of pardoning the mutineers — even those red with the blood of our countrymen; and they dreaded nothing more than the exposure by the Press, not only of this line of action, but of their previous neglect of warnings, of their false security, of their design of implanting a native magistracy with power over all Europeans, of their discouragement of European settlers, of their betrayal of the great trust confided to them by treating India, not as a country to be improved, but solely as an appanage of their own exclusive service. When, therefore, the incendiary articles appeared in the native newspapers, openly advocating the cause of the King of Delhi, they jumped at the opportunity of making a crusade against the entire Press, of shutting the mouths of those who alone could expose their shortcomings, of triumphing over the great domestic enemy of their interests. It was necessary, in the first instance, to gain over Lord Canning to their views.

That nobleman, prompted by his English instincts, and true to the

principles he had inherited from his great father, had only a fortnight before declared, with reference to any restriction even on the Native Press, that the "remedy was worse than the disease." But the leaders of the Civil Service knew Lord Canning.* The great man of their party, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, had just arrived from his retreat at Darjeeling, to give his counsel in the crisis. He was the head of the family clique, whose policy is comprehended in the words "India for the Civil Service." He entered cordially into the views of his colleagues, and the thing was done. Mr. Halliday had an interview with Lord Canning; Mr. Beadon had an interview; Mr. Grant had an interview. The result was, that without consulting those whose English instincts would have made them invaluable counsellors in such a crisis, Lord Canning went down to the Legislative Council, suspended all standing orders, and in the course of forty minutes abolished the Freedom of the Press.

The Legislative Council is a council of nominees: it comprehends, besides the members of the Supreme Council, and the judges of the Supreme Court, four civilians—a member for Bengal, one for the North-west Provinces, one for Madras, and a fourth for Bombay. They are generally selected on account of their great interest, and because, from physical or mental incapacity, they are unfit for the heavier duties of a Judge's Court.

There were present when the Gagging Act was read three times in forty minutes, and passed, Lord Canning, Mr. Dorin, General Low, Mr. J. P. Grant, Mr. Peacock, to all of whom the reader has been introduced; the two Judges, Sir James Colville (a pains-taking, industrious Judge, but, as regards the Vice-Regal Court, the most obsequious Chief-Justice that ever occupied a seat on the bench), Sir Arthur Buller (brother of the lamented Charles Buller, and himself possessing more abilities than were contained in all the Council besides, but indolent to a degree that made him one of the drones of life), Messrs. Currie and Le Geyt—the former a most amiable gentleman, but of no capacity whatever, the latter well known at Bombay under Lord Falkland's administration. Lord Canning, in introducing the measure, took the whole responsibility upon himself: he said it had been caused by the seditious tone of the Native Press; that it was not "specially levelled at the European Press, but that he had found it impossible to draw a line of demarcation between the two, and that therefore he must place the gag upon both." His Lordship's argument amounted to this: that because in a conquered country, the natives of which had risen in revolt against our rule, the Native Press had sided with them, therefore a law should be passed placing restrictions upon the European Press as well as on the native, notwithstanding the loyalty of the former, and the support it had given to Government. It was not a logical argument, but in a case in which his Lordship was arguing against the convictions of a life-time, the tool, though he knew it not, of a corrupt party, logic was scarcely to be expected.

The motion was seconded by Mr. Dorin, and carried without a

* I received these details from one of the rank and file of the party.

division. Sir James Colville went so far as to profess his readiness to take his share of the responsibility, and Mr. Grant moved an augmentation of some of the penalties that had been proposed.

The only man, in fact, in that Council from whom a generous opposition to this truly Austrian measure (as the *Examiner* well terms it), might have been expected, was the brother of Charles Buller. He possessed all the ability, all the readiness necessary for the purpose. A few sentences such as he was capable of pouring forth would have utterly discomfited his assailants: there was not a man amongst them (Lord Canning having already spoken) who possessed sufficient ability to reply to him. Had he done so, had he obeyed the whisperings of his heart, his name would have been enshrined for ever in the grateful recollection of his countrymen. He would have gone down to posterity as the one Englishman who in that Council of nominees had had the courage and the honesty to withstand tyranny to its face. He might have so acted without any personal risk, for, as a Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court, he was entirely independent of the Company.

But he was dumb, and spake not. He afterwards stated that he believed the assertion of the Governor-General, that the measure was not to be directed against the English Press. ■

Unopposed, therefore, it became law.

It has been said that strong measures were earnestly required. This was one of them. With the whole country up in arms, with station after station rising in revolt, the opportunity was chosen to insult the entire European community, to place them before the law on a level with the natives who had revolted, to show contempt for the rights and privileges which they had inherited from their ancestors, and to intimate to them, in a manner that could not be misunderstood, that they were living under a despotic Government. This treatment was the better appreciated by the inhabitants of Calcutta, as they had but just given the best proofs in their power of their earnest desire to assist the Government to strengthen its hands in the crisis.

It will be recollected that in May, the offers of the inhabitants of Calcutta to serve as volunteers had been contemptuously refused. In June the Government found that had those offers been then accepted, they would have been in a position to detach a reinforcement of at least one European Regiment to assist our countrymen at Cawnpore. Rendered wise by experience, they now desired the aid which they had before declined. But there was one difficulty; the Calcutta residents were not likely to proffer their services again, and the Government did not wish to place itself in the "humiliating position" of having to ask for them. In this emergency negotiations were opened between some of the officials of Government House and the leading merchants. The latter were assured that if they would offer their services again, the Government would accept them. This compromise was arranged, and on the 12th of June Lord Canning announced, that having received many offers from the inhabitants to enrol themselves, he had much pleasure in accepting them, and directed the formation of a corps of Cavalry and Infantry. Such

was the origin of the Volunteer Guards of Calcutta,—a body of men comprehending the leading lawyers, merchants, and tradesmen of the place, who, foregoing their customary pleasures, gave themselves up ungrudgingly to all the fatigues of drill and discipline; who, through the long nights of the hot weather, and the inclement rainy season, took all the duties of a corps of the line; who, by their very formation, gave the first check to the insolent demeanour of the natives of Calcutta; who were instrumental in saving that city from the horrors of an insurrection; who, raised in June, were thoroughly organised in July, and who, when brigaded with crack Highland Regiments in November, were halted by Sir Robert Garrett, in order that he might compliment them upon the unsurpassed manner in which they went through their duties. It cannot be denied that but for the Calcutta Guards, Horse and Foot, this city, in the suburbs of which were 60,000 fanatical Mahomedans, ready and waiting the opportunity for a rise, would, in all probability, have been exposed to the most imminent peril.

On the 12th June, Lord Canning accepted their services; on the 13th he rewarded them by gagging the Press, of which they were the principal supporters.

It cannot be denied that the Gagging Act of the 13th June, 1857, was a very bold measure, but the Calcutta public had not many hours to wait before they had ocular demonstration, that it was the work of very timid men.

On the evening of the same day an express arrived from Major-General (now Sir John) Hearsey, commanding at Barrackpore, to the effect that the native troops there contemplated rising that night, that he was about to send for the 78th Highlanders from Chinsura, and he proposed disarming them all, to prevent the outbreak which must otherwise ensue. The Government, terribly alarmed, at once authorised General Hearsey to carry out his views.

It has been said by a great writer, that "there is scarcely a less dignified entity than a patrician in a panic." The veriest sceptic as to the truth of this aphorism could have doubted no longer, had he witnessed the living panorama of Calcutta on the 14th June. All was panic, disorder, and dismay. The wildest reports were in circulation. It was all but universally credited that the Barrackpore brigade was in full march on Calcutta, that the people in the suburbs had already risen, that the King of Oudh, with his followers, were plundering Garden Reach. Those highest in office were the first to give the alarm. There were Secretaries to Government running over to Members of Council, loading their pistols, barricading the doors, sleeping on sofas; Members of Council abandoning their houses with their families, and taking refuge on board ship: crowds of lesser celebrities, impelled by these examples, having hastily collected their valuables, were rushing to the Fort, only too happy to be permitted to sleep under the Fort guns. Horses, carriages, palanquins, vehicles of every sort and kind, were put into requisition to convey panic-stricken fugitives out of the reach of imaginary cut-throats. In the suburbs, almost every house belonging to the Christian

population was abandoned. Half-a-dozen determined fanatics could have burned down three parts of the town. A score of London thieves would have made their fortunes by plundering the houses in the neighbourhood of Chowringhee* which had been abandoned by their inmates.

It must in fairness be admitted, that whilst his advisers—the patricians of Leadenhall Street—were hiding under sofas, and secreting themselves in the holds of the vessels in port, Lord Canning himself maintained a dignified attitude: his palace remained guarded by armed Sepoys: he might have provoked the danger, but he did not flinch when it was at hand. Meanwhile General Hearsey, at Barrackpore, had quietly disarmed the Sepoys: they had been deterred, probably by the extra precautions which were taken, from rising in the night, and when morning came, and they saw the 78th Highlanders march into the station, they felt that the game was up. But there can be little doubt but that some of the bolder spirits amongst them had been anxious to hasten an *émeute* before the arrival of the 78th. But whatever their intentions, their hearts failed them when the hour for action arrived. It passed, and they saw themselves overmatched. The entire brigade, comprising the 2nd Grenadiers, 43rd Light Infantry, 70th Native Infantry, and a portion of the 34th, was disarmed successfully in the afternoon of the 14th. This result having been telegraphed up to Calcutta, the native troops on duty there were marched into the Fort, and were disarmed without resistance.

On the following morning, the King of Oudh and his Prime Minister, Ally Nucky Khan, were arrested. Every precaution had been taken to prevent resistance: a detachment of the 37th Foot and a company of Royal Artillery were posted in the vicinity of the house occupied by the ex-king, every outlet was secured, and every salient point commanded by our guns. Mr. Edmonstone, the Foreign Secretary, then went forward to the residence of the Prime Minister, and asked for him. “He is at his prayers,” was the reply. Mr. Edmonstone signified his intention of waiting, and at the end of half an hour, Ally Nucky Khan appeared. He seemed a little startled at the sight of the soldiers, but quickly regained his composure, and when it was signified to him that his presence was required in the Fort, he simply acquiesced. His house was then searched, and himself and his papers were secured. The party then proceeded to the king’s apartments: after some little delay they were admitted. Mr. Edmonstone almost immediately broached the subject of his visit. He plainly told the ex-king that the Governor-General had reason to believe that he had connected himself with the disaffected in the Bengal army, and that he wished to see him. Wajid Ally, taking off his jewelled turban and placing it before the Foreign Secretary, replied, “If I have by word, by deed, or in any way whatever encouraged the mutineers, I am worthy of any punishment that can be devised: I am ready to go wherever the Governor-General thinks fit.” The public apartments, but not the zenana, were searched for

* The patrician quarter of Calcutta.

papers, but, as might have been anticipated, none of any importance were found. As the king was being carried off, a ludicrous incident happened. The inmates of the zenana had been spectators, behind a lattice, of the scene: as the king was departing, one of them, tall, dark, and ill-favoured, stepped into the room, and forbade his removal. "What will the king do without us?" was the burden of her song, accompanied by protestations of his innocence. They were of no avail; the king and his minister were both taken off and lodged in the Fort; the former in the Government House there, the latter in the Royal Barracks, both guarded by Europeans.

The demeanour of both prisoners since their incarceration has been strikingly characteristic of their respective characters. Whilst the King has relapsed into the state of idiocy which is natural to him, Ally Nucky Khan has omitted no plan, has left no stone unturned, with the view of communicating with his friends outside. He has admitted, in the course of conversation, that he considered the insurrection as a just measure of retaliation for the seizure of Oudh; that we, leaving the high road of justice, had condescended to fight them with the weapons of trickery and expediency, and that we ought not to be surprised at their meeting our attacks with the weapons we had selected.

That he was the soul of the plot, that that plot was organised and arranged at Garden Reach, is beyond a doubt. The Government of India have, or had, in their possession, proofs sufficient to convict the King of Oudh and his minister of complicity in the plan of insurrection. Whether they will use them is another question. The lives of their enemies seem to have a far greater value in their eyes than the lives of those English troops who have been sent out to subdue them.

The King of Oudh was arrested on the 15th June: on the 17th Sir Patrick Grant arrived from Madras. He brought with him the account of General Barnard's first victory at Delhi — the victory of the 8th June. Great was the delight; it was even announced by vice-regal lips that evening that Delhi had fallen. Intense was the gratification of every one; the Gagging Act was for the moment forgotten, until it was discovered that instead of the city it was only the cantonment of Delhi of which we had obtained possession. Still Sir Patrick Grant had arrived; and at first many men believed in Sir Patrick. It was thought that he would give a tone to the proceedings of Government, that he would infuse a little energy into their counsels, and induce them to feel that the Sepoy Army, and not the European population, was the enemy most to be feared. Such were the feelings with which Sir Patrick Grant's arrival was greeted. He held the command for nearly two months. What he did during that interval has not been made public. Enconced in his comfortable quarters in Government House he may have performed wonders — upon paper; but one thing is certain, that the public mind was sensibly relieved, when it was announced, in the month of August, that Sir Colin Campbell had arrived to relieve him. Simultaneously, in the same steamer in fact with Sir Patrick Grant, arrived General

Havelock, Adjutant-General of H.M. forces in India. This officer, on the breaking out of hostilities with Persia, had been sent to Bushire to assume the command of a division; he had commanded the troops at the attack of Mohumrah, and was preparing to give further proofs of his capacity for command, when the preliminaries of peace were signed. Havelock then returned to Bombay, and, unaware of the state of the country between Meerut and Calcutta, sailed for the latter place before even he had heard of General Anson's demise. Had the intelligence of that melancholy event reached him before leaving Bombay, he would not have come on to Calcutta, as his proper place as Adjutant-General of H.M. forces would have been with the temporary Commander-in-Chief, General Somerset.

Providentially he did not hear of it until he had too far progressed in his voyage to be able to return. General Havelock had seen perhaps more Indian service than any living man. He had served throughout the first Burmese war, of which he wrote a clear and graphic history. In 1838-9 he went into Affghanistan, and only left it in 1842 in company with the avenging armies of Pollock and Nott: he had in fact remained one of the illustrious garrison of Jellalabad, throughout our terrible disasters in that country. In the campaign of Gwalior, in 1843, and in the Sutlej campaigns of 1845-6, he took a distinguished part, having in one action had two horses, in another a third horse, shot under him. It was after this that he became first Quarter-Master-General, and subsequently Adjutant-General of H.M. forces in India. In his private life, and in manner, Havelock was the most quiet and retiring of men. He ate and drank little — sufficient only for the purposes of life, and devoted his whole time to his profession and to his God. Religion was not with him a mere outward sign; it was a part, and by far the most important part of his daily exercises. He had mourned over the idolatry-encouraging system of the Government of India, but he was powerless to prevent it. Nevertheless, he was one of those men who, in olden days, would have led the Crusaders to Ascalon, and whose deep enthusiasm would have inspired all around him with equal fervour in the cause.

Who indeed that saw that spare figure, below the middle height, that pale, thoughtful face, seldom showing any interest in the general conversation, but often lighted up by the latent fire within, would have thought him capable of mighty deeds? He would sit silent and meditative. He might be thinking of the yet possible destiny of India under a bold and God-fearing policy. The smile would gleam on his face, but as quickly die away, for what chance seemed there then of action for him? He was approaching the term of life, the end of his days, and all India lay before him calm and still, not a breath agitating her bosom, not even a ripple indicating the quarter from which a storm might be approaching. The faith of our rulers in Hinduism was never stronger.

Who that saw him then would have believed that that pale, thin, spare man, studiously avoiding all fare but the plainest, was the hero who would place his heel on the neck of this terrible rebellion?—was the man who, under a July, August, and September sun,—deadly to

the strongest, — would march without tents against twenty times his number, would baffle all their attempts to overwhelm him? Who would ever make a retreat the prelude of a further step in advance; and finally, after three months' encounters with a persevering foe, would succeed in forcing his way, at the head of 2,500 British troops, through 50,000 fanatics, holding the largest and most defensible city in Asia, and be the first to bring relief to our countrymen?

And yet Havelock did all this.

This day, 27th November, intelligence has reached Calcutta that he is dead. Mourn not for him, my countrymen, for a nobler and a purer spirit never winged its way to its God. Mourn rather for India, that at such a crisis as this, a God-fearing soldier, a Christian warrior, as yet unsurpassed—in the present crisis unequalled by any—should have been removed from the head of her armies!

An officer of far inferior rank to General Havelock, Captain Stuart Beatson of the 1st Bengal Cavalry, came round to Calcutta about the same time. He was an officer of great promise, of very considerable talent, and of a very manly nature. He, too, on the outbreak of the war with Persia, had been sent to that country to raise a regiment of Arab Horse. But peace was concluded too soon for his ambition, and he returned to Bombay. Arriving there, he heard of this mutiny, and that his own regiment, the 1st Cavalry, had broken out into insurrection at Mhow. It had previously been his intention to proceed to England to recruit his failing health, but on hearing this intelligence, he came round to Calcutta, determined to place his services at the disposal of the Government, in the hope that he might be useful in some way. He had scarcely arrived before he was struck with the fact, that all or the greater part of our native cavalry having mutinied, we should experience the greatest difficulties from our deficiencies in that arm. Looking about him and making inquiries, it appeared to him, that it would be feasible to raise a corps of Eurasian Cavalry on the spot, provided the Government would sanction the arrangement. He accordingly drew up a scheme, the bases of which were, forty rupees per mensem nett pay to each trooper, the Government furnishing horse, arms, and accoutrements. But the eyes of the Government were not even yet opened to the necessities of the times. The scheme was of a novel character; Captain Beatson had no personal acquaintance with any of the Secretaries or Members of Council: his scheme was rejected, and he was himself informed that the Government had no need of his services.*

One month later, when Havelock was advancing towards Cawnpore, when the fiend Nana Sahib was escaping for want of cavalry to pursue him, when the prices of horses had risen enormously, the Government which had rejected Captain Beatson's plan of forty rupees per mensem, was compelled to raise a corps on the infinitely more expensive basis of 100 rupees per mensem for each trooper, with horse, arms, accoutrements, and camp equipage supplied by Government.

* My informant received this account from Captain Beatson himself.

But although Captain Beatson's offers were not appreciated by the members of Government, he received shortly after the offer of the highest appointment in his gift from one second to none in his capability of judging men — General Havelock.

Before, however, alluding to this officer's nomination to high command, it will be as well to give a brief detail of the events which had been occurring in different parts of the country, and accounts of which reached Calcutta about this time.

Of the places or districts which had been especially distinguished by deeds of atrocity, and intelligence of which reached Calcutta at the end of June, Central India and Rohilcund demand separate chapters; Futtehpore, Jhansie, Nowgong and Rohnee may be treated of here.

Futtehpore is a small civil station, distant about two-thirds of the road from Allahabad to Cawnpore. It is the centre of a Mahomedan district, and indeed furnishes many of the recruits for the Cavalry. The native troops there consisted of a detachment of fifty men from the 6th Regiment, stationed at Allahabad. Besides these were only the usual hangers-on of a civil station, consisting of burkundazes, chuprasses, deergahas, moonsips, and others. The residents comprehended the judge, the magistrate and collector, the assistant-magistrate, the opium agent, salt agent, the doctor, and three or four gentlemen connected with the railway; in addition to these, amongst the officials, was the deputy-magistrate, a native and a Mahomedan.*

Although the district had been tolerably quiet during May, yet in anticipation of possible evil the residents had adopted the wise precaution of sending their wives and families to Allahabad. At the same time they made arrangements for all to assemble in the house occupied by the magistrate in case of need. On the 4th they received an account of the events of the 30th May at Lucknow, and an intimation from Cawnpore that the troopers of the 2nd Cavalry would certainly rise in insurrection that evening. On the following day (5th June) heavy firing was heard in the direction of Cawnpore, only forty miles distant; the residents accordingly adopted the precaution of all sleeping on the flat roof of their house, with their weapons by their sides, to guard against surprise. On the following day, expecting a party of the 2nd Cavalry and 56th Native Infantry in progress to Cawnpore, they deemed it advisable to make a permanent lodgment on the roof, conveying thither tents, water, provisions, ammunition, &c. On the 7th this detachment arrived, and shortly after, in confirmation of the worst fears of the residents, made an attempt on the treasury. The "loyalty," however, of the 6th repulsed them — this loyalty consisting in an earnest desire to appropriate the treasure to themselves, and to permit none to share it with them. The troopers shortly after went on towards Cawnpore.

Thus far they were delivered, but they were still in a hostile

* The name of this man was Hikmut-olla Khan. On the arrival of Havelock's victorious force at Futtehpore six weeks subsequently, he went out to congratulate him, was recognised, and hanged.

country, and in a dangerous position. That same day they received intelligence of the Allahabad catastrophe; they learned that the deputy-collector and all their subordinates had turned against them, and that some mutinous troopers, accompanied by some released prisoners, were in full march for the place. Still, unable to devise a feasible plan of escape, they determined on remaining; they barricaded the house, and waited the issue.

On the 9th the ruffians came on, and, burning every bungalow, threatened to attack them. But they showed a determined front, and the natives, with their instinctive dread of Europeans, feared to make the assault. During the day they heard that the 6th from Allahabad, and some mufineers from Cawnpore, were marching upon them. In the afternoon, the recreant deputy-collector, attended by a large body of armed men, made his way towards them, apparently on a friendly errand, but our countrymen, suspecting him, made the best of their way to the roof. That night, environed by dangers, they held a council of war, in which it was resolved to fly. Accordingly, at 10 P. M., they mounted their horses, and attended by four sowars who were faithful, all started for Banda, which, after many difficulties and hair-breadth escapes, they reached in safety.

All started—all save one—the judge, Robert Tucker of the Civil Service; he steadily and manfully refused to desert his post. He remained as usual in his own house. But the natives who had been deterred from attacking eleven armed Englishmen, felt themselves not unequal to the murder of one. They could not appreciate the sublime rashness which prompted Mr. Tucker to remain alone at Futtehpore; nay, so confident did they feel of “victory” over him, and so determined were they on his death, that, at the suggestion of the deputy-collector, who now openly avowed himself their leader, they resolved upon making him undergo the mockery of a trial, with all the forms of the Civil Court. Full of this idea they marched against him.

But Mr. Tucker, enthusiast as he was, was not the man to give away his life. The native Christian who witnessed the attack upon him asserts, that he killed sixteen men with his own hand before he was secured. Secured, however, he was at last. He was, in mockery, tried; of course condemned; and, as naturally, executed. His hands, head, and feet were cut off, and held up for the inspection of the rabble—the deputy-collector being present, and directing the proceedings.

It is a noticeable fact that, under the *régime* of the exclusive Civil Service, those men only have been chosen for the appointment of deputy-collector who, in the opinion of the civilians, were the *élite* of the natives of India. It is also to be observed that, in the month of February, 1857, a project of law had been read a second time in the Legislative Council, without opposition from any of the Civil members, by which it was proposed to place the persons and property of Europeans under the jurisdiction of natives of even a lower class than those who, like the Futtehpore assassin, filled the office of deputy-collector. Had the mutiny been unhappily postponed one

year, our civilian legislators, labouring for their exclusive system, would have organised a system by which men devoid of honour, without conscience or self-respect, and gifted only with a smattering of education, would have been placed as arbiters over the lives and fortunes of our countrymen in India.

Can we wonder that the isolated mutiny of one regiment drifted into a wide-spread insurrection in the hands of puling theorists such as these ?

We must turn for a moment to another horrible incident, the details of which made Calcutta mad for vengeance about this time,—the massacre of Jhansie.

The town of Jhansie, in Bundelcund, lies in the direct route from Agra to Saugor, about 140 miles south of the former. It is surrounded by a wall, and this again is overlooked by the fort, a lofty stone building, surmounted by a round tower. In the cantonments, which were outside and a little distance from the town, was a smaller fortified building, denominated the Star Fort, in which the guns and treasure were deposited.

The garrison of Jhansie was composed entirely of natives. There were a detail of Foot Artillery, the left wing of the 12th Regiment, the head quarters and right wing of the 14th Irregular Cavalry. Towards the end of May, apprehensions of an outbreak were entertained, as some of the agents of the dewan of the Ranee of the district were discovered plotting to seduce the Sepoys: but there was nothing in the demeanour of the latter to sanction the belief that they had been in any way successful. Still, as a precautionary measure, the authorities stored the Star Fort with provisions and ammunition.

To their dismay, on the afternoon of the 4th June, a company of the 12th Regiment marched into this fort, and announced their intention of holding it on their own account. The greater part of the residents then retired to the town fort; but the regimental officers went among their men, and, encouraged by their demeanour, which was quiet and respectful, ordered a parade for the following morning. The parade was held, and the native officers and men of infantry, cavalry, and artillery solemnly declared that it was their intention to stand by their officers to the last. That very afternoon they all rose in revolt. The Irregular Cavalry, scouring across the plain, came upon two officers of the 12th: these they shot dead with their carbines. They then made a rush at their own commanding officer, who, well mounted, was making for the fort; but though they managed to wound him, he reached the fort in safety, and our countrymen on the ramparts, opening fire on his pursuers, killed some five or six of them. There was only one officer now remaining outside, and he was on foot—Lieutenant Turnbull of the Artillery—a young man of great promise, and of a fine, generous disposition. Despairing of escape, and believing himself unseen, he climbed a large leafy tree, about midway between the fort and the cantonment. But a miserable townsman had seen him, and this wretch, in his fanatic zeal, or, perhaps, in a true spirit of Asiatic servility, could not rest till he had pointed him out to the sowars. He was at once shot down.

With loud shouts the mutineers then proceeded against the fort, and, on the second day, the Ranee sent her guns and elephants to assist them. But there was not only force without, there was treachery within. The Europeans numbered only fifty-five, including women and children: the natives who were with them were numerically superior. Two of these, brothers, were discovered in the act of opening one of the gates to the enemy. Lieutenant Powys, who saw them, instantly shot one dead, and was himself cut down by the brother. Captain Burgess avenged him in a second, and the assassins lay side by side in the ditch.

But provisions were failing them; two attempts to communicate with Nagode and Gwalior had been abortive; some Eurasians who had tried to escape over the parapet had been caught and killed; all appeared hopeless. At this crisis, the Ranee sent to say that, if they would surrender, their lives should be spared, and they should be sent safely to some other station. She swore, the troopers of the cavalry swore, the Sepoys swore, the native gunners swore, to adhere to these terms. Seizing this as the only chance of life, unable indeed to hold out for twenty-four hours longer, the garrison surrendered.

They came out two and two; as they advanced through the line of cavalry and infantry they saw none but hostile faces, but there was no movement against them. At last, every Christian had quitted the fort: then was commenced a deed of ruthless treachery, unsurpassed even by the Nana Sahib. The gates were shut behind them; they were seized, the men and women separated, and tied together in two rows, facing one another; the children standing by their mothers. The men were then decapitated; the children were seized, and cut in halves before their mothers' eyes; and last of all, the ladies found what, under those circumstances, they must have felt to be a happy release in death.

The natives, upon whose authority it is alone possible to give any details of this terrible massacre, assert that the lives of the quartermaster sergeant and his wife were spared: nothing has since been heard of them; but it has been ascertained that his name was John Newton, that his wife was a country-born woman, or Eurasian, and that they had four daughters, all of whom were with them in Jhansie when the troops mutinied.

Such was the massacre at Jhansie, a deed unsurpassed in fiendish cruelty by any in the world. In reflecting upon it, we are struck with the impolicy of allowing native troops to be thus congregated in close vicinity to a native power beyond the influence of a European force; with the folly, in any case or under any circumstances, of trusting to the oaths of natives; with the preferable alternative of perishing of starvation or of running all the chances of war, to trusting to the tender mercies of the natives of India.

It may be as well, for the sake of connection, to follow the movements of the other wings of the same regiments in Nowgong, the sister station to Jhansie, in Bundelkund. At Nowgong were quartered a company of Artillery, the head quarters and right wing 12th Regiment Native Infantry, and the left wing 14th Irregular Cavalry, the whole under the command of Major Kirke of the 12th. On the 5th of June,

the wing of 12th Regiment volunteered to march against the Delhi mutineers: the men of that wing and the native gunners professed the most enthusiastic loyalty, whilst the sowars* of the 14th stood aloof, and acted as if they believed it was impossible to doubt them. On the 8th, the account of the terrible events of that morning at Jhansie reached them: on the following day the Artillery volunteered to go against Delhi. But something in the deportment of the men having excited suspicion, four of their number, notoriously disaffected, were seized, and, it being dangerous in the temper of the men to try them by court-martial, were sent off to the Fort of Chutterpore. This bold demonstration had a wonderful effect for the moment, and that day and the next morning all appeared quiet. But on the evening of the 10th, as the guards were being relieved, three Sepoys of the 12th, all of them Sikhs, and one a large and very powerful man, stepped forward with loaded muskets, went up to the havildar-major, and shot him dead. They then made a dash at the guns: these the Artillery sergeant made an effort to defend; but, deserted by his own men, he was compelled to fly, and, though fired at, he succeeded in getting off. Almost immediately, a discharge of musketry was heard from the lines—a sure sign that the revolt was universal.

But the officers did not flinch from their duty. Careless of the consequences to themselves, they rushed to the parade, and endeavoured by every argument in their power to induce the men not to swerve from their allegiance. But their efforts were not very successful: about a hundred rallied round them, out of five times that number, and accompanied them to the appointed rendezvous at the mess-house.

Here also all the residents were assembled. It being evident that the efforts of the mutineers would not stop at this point, Major Kirke endeavoured to persuade the hundred "staunch" Sepoys to go out and attack the enemy before their preparations were completed. But not a man would stir. At this moment, before any definite plan of action had been settled, the mutineers brought up the guns to bear upon the mess-house: intelligence also reached them that the sowars were going from house to house thirsting for their blood. Unless they were prepared to undergo the fate of their friends at Jhansie, there was left them but the resource of flight. On flight then they determined; and mounting horses, buggies, and a carriage drawn by three camels, and accompanied by about eighty Sepoys, they started.

It does not belong to this history to follow them in their flight. It will suffice to say, that after suffering incredible hardships, after enduring in fifteen days privations more than sufficient to be allotted to an ordinary existence, a few of them arrived in safety at Banda: of the rest many were killed by the natives, others struck down by the sun. Those that were saved bore up with the most unflinching fortitude, with the most unselfish heroism,—the men guarding the women with the utmost solicitude,—caring not for the ladies only,

* Troopers.

but for the sergeant's wife, evincing in the trying circumstances under which they were placed a firm reliance on a Higher Power.* They did not abandon one another, neither did He desert them.

It is necessary that one more tragical event should be recorded — the murderous assault at Rohnee. Rohnee is a new station in the Sonthal district, distant about 300 miles from Calcutta. It was the head-quarters of the 5th Irregular Cavalry: there were present of that regiment Major Macdonald, commanding; Sir Norman Leslie, the Adjutant; and Dr. Grant. On the 8th June these three officers were seated outside the bungalow of the first-named, engaged in friendly conversation. During a pause, Dr. Grant rose, with the intention of entering the bungalow. In the very act of rising he noticed the stealthy approach of three men, apparently strangers. As he turned to point them out to his companions, the intruders, drawing their swords, rushed upon them. Our party were without weapons of any sort, and had not time to fly. Sir Norman Leslie indeed turned to enter the house in search of his sword, but his foot slipping at the threshold, he was cut down at once. The other two seized the chairs on which they had been sitting, and with them endeavoured to ward off the blows aimed at them. Both, however, were wounded, Major Macdonald receiving three severe cuts on the head; and the affair would probably have terminated unfavourably for both of them, when unaccountably their assailants lost heart and fled. It was not known who they were; there was a guard close to the house, but the troopers composing it declared that they had neither seen nor heard anything of the intruders.

The news of this dastardly attack was quickly conveyed to the lines; all the men were instantly collected, and their swords drawn for inspection: all, however, were found clean: not a speck of blood was apparent on any of them. All was mystery: no suspicion attached to the men of the regiment, who had up to that time behaved well; and from the fact of the murderers having worn dhotees †, they were believed to be disbanded Sepoys, many of whom had been seen in the neighbourhood.

Such were the first impressions, but time brings to light every evil deed. It was ascertained, by the confession of a comrade, that these men belonged to Major Macdonald's own corps. They were at once seized, brought to a drum-head court-martial, and sentenced to be hanged. Now came the trying moment, it was impossible to say whether these men had or had not any accomplices in the regiment; whether the entire corps was not infected. They might refuse to allow the sentence of death to be carried out; they might turn against their officers, only two in number, one of them deprived of his scalp. These contingencies appeared not only possible but probable: more unlikely events had happened before, and have occurred since. In this emergency Major Macdonald showed the undaunted

* Mrs. Mawe's narrative, sent by Lady Canning to the Queen. Captain Scott's letter, published in the *Times*.

† A cloth wrapped round the loins.

pluck of a Briton. Let him tell his own story; it is worth recording: "One of the prisoners was of very high caste and influence, and this man I determined to treat with the greatest ignominy by getting a low caste man to hang him. To tell the truth, I never for a moment expected to leave the hanging scene alive; but I determined to do my duty, and well knew the effect that pluck and decision had on the natives. The regiment was drawn out; wounded cruelly as I was, I had to see everything done myself, even to the adjusting of the ropes, and saw them looped to run easy. Two of the culprits were paralysed with fear and astonishment, never dreaming that I should dare to hang them without an order from Government. The third said he would not be hanged, and called on the Prophet and on his comrades to rescue him. This was an awful moment; an instant's hesitation on my part, and probably I should have had a dozen balls through me; so I seized a pistol, clapped it to the man's ear, and said, with a look there was no mistake about, 'Another word out of your mouth and your brains shall be scattered on the ground.' He trembled and held his tongue. The elephant came up, he was put on his back, the rope adjusted, the elephant moved, and he was left dangling. I then had the others up and off in the same way. And after some time, when I dismissed the men of the regiment to their lines, and still found my head on my shoulders, I really could scarcely believe it."

In another letter, in reply to a brother officer who advised him to go away on account of his wounds, he replied: "Certainly not; leave any strange officer with the men! I'd rather stay and die first."

Such is the stuff of which British officers are composed! Who can wonder that, in spite of divided counsels, or orders and counter-orders, of procrastination unheard of before, of the weakest, the most selfish, and most incapable Government that ever ruled in any crisis, the mutiny should have been put down? Had Captain Macdonald gone away for the cure of his wounds, had he flinched on the day of execution, had he feared to take upon himself the responsibility of ordering that execution, the 5th Irregulars would then and there have risen in revolt. Subsequent events have proved, that there was at that time an organised conspiracy in the regiment; that many knew of the plot to assassinate their three officers; that they waited its fulfilment to rise *en masse*.

They were cowed first by the ill-success of the plot, secondly by the determined spirit and truly English pluck displayed by Major Macdonald. At the execution, everything depended upon his spirit. Another call from the condemned trooper to his comrades to save him, and Major Macdonald's life would not have been worth five minutes' purchase. The regiment would have risen; and in the middle of June an insurrection in that part of the country would have endangered Calcutta, Patna, and the whole of Bengal.

And yet although Major Macdonald's firmness undoubtedly saved us at that time from a great calamity, we fail to trace in the papers published by authority any signification to him of the approval of the Supreme Government. There are glorifications *in extenso* of

civilians, an occasional notice of military men, but in praise of Major Macdonald, the Government of Lord Canning is silent.* Does any one inquire the reason? Major Macdonald was a nominee of the late Sir Charles Napier. For a deed of unflinching daring and ready presence of mind in shutting the gates of the fortress of Umritsur against the whole body of the mutinous 66th in 1849-50, Sir Charles Napier gave him the command of the 5th Irregulars. To the army at large the bestowal of an appointment by that great man was a proof that it had been deserved; from the clique that ruled at Calcutta, it insured coldness, neglect, often insolence. The account of these massacres arriving towards the end of June simultaneously with rumours of butcheries at Hansi and Hipar, with telegraphic messages from Sir Henry Lawrence, intimating that he was closely besieged and could afford no help to Sir Hugh Wheeler, who was worse off than himself, at length aroused Government from its lethargy. It was resolved to assemble a considerable force at Allahabad, and to make an onward movement towards Cawnpore. General Havelock was selected to command it. He appointed Captain Stuart Beatson, before referred to, as his Adjutant-General; and, accompanied by him, on the centenary of Plassey, left Calcutta to assume his command.

That day too was another panic day in Calcutta. The "patricians" had imbibed the idea that there was to be an universal rising. The scene of the 14th was therefore repeated, although on a scale not quite so large; that is to say, the wives and daughters were sent on board ship, but there was less personal apprehension. In the interval ridicule had done her work, and fears, if entertained at all, were less loudly expressed. There is little pleasure in dwelling upon such a topic; it has been introduced to show that the men who advised and passed the Gagging Act were bolder in the Council Chamber than they cared to be on other occasions, and to demonstrate the truth of the axiom, that there can be no more dangerous legislators than those who in every respect of life must be regarded as little men.

From the contemplation of their characters, let us turn to a far nobler and more inspiring theme; let us survey the actions of those who restored victory to our standards, and dwell, while we may, on the unsurpassed achievements of real men — men inspired by an earnestness of purpose, by a depth of zeal, by a determination to avenge the murder of our countrywomen, which those who guided our counsels in Calcutta could neither understand nor appreciate.

* There is an expression of approval from the Commander-in-Chief, but it is not endorsed by the Governor-General.

CHAPTER V.

ALLAHABAD TO 4TH JULY.

COLONEL NEILL left Benares on the night of the 9th of June, and proceeded by post, in company with forty-three men of his own regiment, to Allahabad, to the command of which post, in supersession of Colonel Simpson, he had been appointed. The road between the two stations was deserted; the post-horses had been carried off; the country round about was infested with plunderers; and it was with the utmost difficulty and by intense labour, that a journey ordinarily occupying from eight to ten hours was performed by our troops in twenty-four. However, on the afternoon of the 11th, the Colonel and his party found themselves at Jhoosie, a village on the high bank overlooking the junction of the Jumna and the Ganges, and the point where the road from Benares merges into the bridge of boats across the former river. This bridge, however, was partly destroyed and in the hands of the enemy: the village, or rather the suburb of Deragunj, which commands it, was also in their possession: not a boat was visible on the right bank: the men were prostrated by fatigue. But Colonel Neill was not the man to be overcome by any difficulties. Descending the Ganges below the junction, he obtained possession of a solitary boat, having bribed a native to bring it over from the right bank: in this he embarked a portion of his men, intending to wait for its return to cross over with the remainder; but at this juncture he was seen by the guards in the fort, and boats were sent over for the whole detachment: by their means they all arrived safely in the fort, though completely exhausted by the long journey and the intense heat.

His first act on arriving was to assume command. It was indeed time. He found the fort invested; the Sikhs, coaxed into the appearance only of subordination; confusion and disorder in every direction; — an unchecked enemy without, vacillation within.

He did not lose an hour. Notwithstanding his fatigue and consequent exhaustion, he did not sleep until he had arranged his plans for the early morrow. Day had scarcely dawned when the guns of the fort opened on the suburb of Deragunj, the head-quarters of the most bigoted Brahmins. After eighteen or twenty rounds had been fired, three companies of Sikhs, sixty Madras Fusiliers, and forty Irregular Cavalry, — the sole loyal remnant of the Oudh corps, — advanced from the fort, attacked the suburb, drove the enemy out, bayoneting all that came within their reach, burnt a great part of the village, and secured the bridge of boats. This he instantly caused to be repaired, and, placing at its head a company of Sikhs, re-opened the communications with the Benares road.

The movement was opportune. The very next morning, 13th, Major Stephenson, at the head of a hundred Fusiliers, arrived at

Jhoosie : instead of being compelled to hunt for boats, and to expose himself and his men to the deadly fury of a June sun, he was able, thanks to Colonel Neill's vigour and forethought, to cross by the bridge of boats.

On the same day an attack was made on the village of Kydgunj, situated midway between the fort and the city. The attacking party consisted of the Sikhs, the remnant of the Irregular Cavalry, and a small party of European Volunteer Cavalry, composed of railway engineers and others, whom Colonel Neill, even in this short space of time, had succeeded in organising. The Sikhs went in advance, the cavalry on their flanks. The enemy attempted a mere nominal resistance, and were driven out with loss. Our troops then returned to the fort.

All this time, since the hour of Colonel Neill's arrival in fact, a very sharp cannonade had been kept up day and night on the city. The enemy, headed by a fanatic Moulvie or priest, had taken up their head-quarters at the gardens of Sultan Khoosroo at the other extremity of the city, about three miles distant from the fort. They had few regular troops with them, but the whole country had risen, and arms were plentiful. They had also possession of the two guns which we had lost on the bridge on the night of the 6th : they also occupied the cantonment and the villages in its vicinity.

It was incumbent to drive them out of these positions. Colonel Neill having obtained an accurate plan of the station, and received reports from the residents of the bearings of the several villages, came to the conclusion that by marching from the fort directly on to the jail,—about three miles, and situated midway between the gardens of Sultan Khoosroo and the cantonments,—the enemy's position would be cut in two, and he could destroy them at a blow.

He was not, however, yet strong enough to attempt it : he had no carriage for his guns, and the Sikhs were daily becoming more troublesome and more unmanageable. It was necessary, in the first instance, to deal with these men.

It has been already related how, after the events of the 6th of June, Colonel Simpson permitted the most disgraceful pillage on the part of the Sikhs. The go-downs of the European merchants, of the agents of the steam companies, and of others, were plundered of all their contents : the Sikhs were actually allowed to bring the property they had thus obtained into the fort, and to guard it as their own. There was, indeed, much more than sufficient for their own consumption,—and they are a money-loving race ; consequently, upon the arrival of the Europeans, they opened a store on their own account, and sold the liquor,—comprehending everything from brandy to champagne,—at four anas (sixpence) a bottle. The result was, that facilities to drunkenness were afforded to Europeans ; and experience has shown that that is a temptation that they are seldom able to resist.

Colonel Neill's object, then, was to deprive the Sikhs of this liquor, and to locate them outside the fort, away from our magazine ; for he did not quite trust them. But it was quite evident that they would not give up their plunder ; and it was doubtful whether they would leave the fort without a struggle. Under these circumstances,

Colonel Neill's conduct was singularly judicious. He wished to avoid embroiling himself with these men: he was anxious, indeed, that their sympathies should remain with us; but he was as resolved to maintain discipline. He accomplished his purpose in this way:—he ordered the Commissariat to purchase from the Sikhs all the liquor in their possession: he then paraded the regiment, and, by dint of a little management, in which he was ably abetted by Major Brasyer, the Commandant, he succeeded in marching them out and in locating them outside the fort and under its guns, in some old storehouses on the banks of the Jumna. The Sikhs had scarcely reached their new position before they were attacked by the enemy, and were, at first, compelled to retire; but they soon regained their lost ground, and never after receded from it.

Secure in this important particular, Neill again turned to the enemy. Unable yet, from the causes before stated, to execute his plan of cutting them in two, he resolved to clear the suburbs, which had been re-occupied in the night. Accordingly, early on the 15th, he commenced pounding Kydgunj with round-shot; he sent a steamer up the Jumna with twenty picked men and a howitzer-gun; at the same time the Sikhs, supported by fifty Fusiliers and the cavalry, were directed to scour Kydgunj and penetrate beyond it.

The plan succeeded admirably. The villages on the banks of the Jumna suffered very severely from the firing of the party on board the steamer, to which they were unable to reply with any effect. The land-party were opposed, the Europeans especially, very obstinately; nevertheless, the rebels were so completely beaten, were followed up with such vigour, and lost so many men, that the chiefs of the insurrection were completely panic-stricken, and that very night the Moolvie himself, with three thousand of his followers, evacuated his quarters in the gardens of Sultan Khoosroo, and fled with precipitation across the Ganges into Oudh.

This result was not known to Neill till the next morning. He had proposed sending a steamer up the Ganges, with the view of procuring bullocks for his guns. The steamer, indeed, had already started, when the news of the evacuation of the city reached him: his wants, in the way of bullocks, were at once supplied. It was fortunate; as the small depth of water in the Ganges effectually prevented the progress of the steamer.

On the 18th, his force having been augmented by successive reinforcements to 360 Europeans, he resolved to move out, and sweep the enemy altogether away.

On that morning, therefore, while a steamer containing eighty Fusiliers and a hundred Sikhs steamed up the river to attack the villages of Durgabad, Sydabad, and Russoolpore, on its banks, Neill, with the remainder of the Sikhs, 200 Fusiliers, and the cavalry, marched on the jail. Interposed thus between the city and the insurgent villages, he turned on the latter and destroyed them,—the enemy making no opposition. Finding the work of destruction so easy, he did not proceed with the European portion of his force beyond the parade of the 6th, leaving the Sikhs and the cavalry to

complete what he had so well begun. It was his intention to have permanently occupied the cantonments; but cholera had broken out among his men. He therefore deemed it advisable to return with the Europeans to the fort, leaving the church to be occupied by the detachment of the 84th, then daily expected.

That morning another party of one hundred and fifty Fusiliers, under Captain Fraser, reached Allahabad. This officer had been detached, in company with eighty sowars, under Lieut. Palliser and Mr. Chapman, an indigo planter, but to whom the necessities of the times had given the appointment of magistrate, to clear the country between Benares and Allahabad. Right well had the task been performed. Not long before, Mr. Moore, the Magistrate of Mirzapore, had been murdered, in company with two friends, whilst bathing at Gopeegunj, midway between the two stations on the Grand Trunk Road. Terribly was their death avenged: everywhere our authority was re-asserted. One man in the neighbourhood of Sydabad, who had set himself up as Raja, having been caught and condemned to death, threatened to appeal to the *Sudder*.* In twenty minutes he was dangling from a tree! Large quantities of plunder and treasure, to the extent of twelve thousand rupees, were recovered by this party; and not only this, but communication with Benares was rendered facile and safe. From this day (the 13th) all opposition from the villages in the Allahabad district having ceased, the town having been coerced by a very heavy contribution — the native merchants having evinced the strongest feelings against us throughout — and the constant arrival of troops having been regulated, Colonel Neill turned his attention to procuring carriage and stores for an onward movement. Indefatigable himself, he infused his own energy into all around him, and he received the most willing and effectual assistance from Messrs. Chester and Court, the Commissioner and Magistrate of the district, whose local knowledge and experience were invaluable. In a very few days affairs began to assume an improved aspect. The cantonment was occupied, carts and camels were brought in, and the natives, ready to run from one extreme to another, from crowing over our downfall became as cringing and as suppliant as before. On the 24th everything was getting on famously; Captain Russell at the Ordnance, Captain Davidson in the Commissariat, and Captain Brown of the Artillery, and others, working well, and with effect. Neill superintending all, and encouraging them in their up-hill work. Throughout this period, the gallows were well at work. Daily some three or four scoundrels were brought in, who, on being convicted of being concerned in the massacre of our countrymen and women, were strung up without hesitation. Extraordinary was the effect of this promptitude. The natives, accustomed to our civil courts, to the long delays, the appeals, and all the trickery of native subordinates, could not comprehend this sharp and severe justice — this necessary retaliation on them for their misdeeds.

* The highest court of appeal in India, presided over by civilians. Its natural action is to render the prompt execution of justice impossible.

It was on this day, 24th June, that Neill, having surmounted all the difficulties in his path, having organized a force, ready to start in a few days for Cawnpore, learned that another was to reap the fruit of his labours — that he was superseded.

It is true that he was superseded by Havelock : but to replace him at all was an injustice to him. He was the first man who had turned the tide of the mutiny ; his arrival at Benares had converted what might have been a massacre into a victory ; his presence at Allahabad had produced order out of chaos ; he had proved himself a real man ; he had gained the confidence of the troops under his command ; he had organised all the arrangements for the advance. It was unfair to deprive him of the opportunity of reaping the fruit. It is true, I repeat, that he was superseded by a good man ; but it is a fact, that it was not because he was a good man that Havelock was appointed. They gave him the command because he wanted active employment. To prove that it was a mere hap-hazard selection, it is only necessary to point to the supersession of Havelock himself, after he had reached Cawnpore, by Sir James Outram.

Nevertheless, disappointed as he doubtless felt, as he must have felt, the true-hearted Neill never relaxed a single energy. He was now working for another ; but he worked with as much heart and vigour as before : the preparations for the march of the column progressed every day, and on the afternoon of the 30th June, a force, consisting of 300 Sikhs, 400 Europeans, and 120 native horse, under the command of Major Renaud, a gallant and most intelligent officer, started for Cawnpore. The same day, General Havelock arrived and assumed command of the station.

It had not been merely on the organisation of this advanced body under Renaud that the attention of Neill had been fixed. He had made arrangements also to follow them up, at the expiration of two or three days, by a much larger force. When, therefore, Havelock assumed command, it was with the determination to follow out this plan, to leave with the main body on the 4th, if possible, and to detach a steamer up the Ganges with provisions and stores for Cawnpore. This latter arrangement was very speedily carried out, and, on the morning of the 3rd, a vessel having on board 100 Fusiliers and two guns steamed from Allahabad.

But before she started, terrible rumours had reached Havelock as to the fate of the Cawnpore garrison. On the 2nd, a message came from Sir Henry Lawrence informing him that they had one and all been massacred. Neill disbelieved it. Havelock doubted. To provide against accidents, the two guns were placed on board the steamer. On the following day the intelligence was confirmed ; time, place, dates, all were given. Havelock no longer hesitated. He sent up orders to Renaud to halt till he could join him himself, and he delayed his own departure until he could make arrangements for the transport of his guns.

It was not till the morning of the 7th that all his preparations were complete. On that evening, at 4 o'clock, he gave orders to his column to march, and bent his steps resolutely towards Cawnpore.

But before we follow him in his heroic achievements, it will be necessary to record the actual occurrences at that ill-fated station.

CHAPTER VI.

CAWNPORE.

THE news of the outbreak at Meerut reached Cawnpore on the 13th May. The force at that station consisted at that time almost entirely of natives. So unsuspecting were our rulers of intrigue on the part of the late sovereign of Oudh, so confident in their policy of annexation, so sure of the loyalty even of those whom their recent measures had reduced from wealth to poverty, from a state of seigneur-ship to a condition of vassalage, that although Oudh had been occupied by our troops so recently as 1856, they did not deem it expedient in 1857 to add a single European soldier to the sixty artillerymen who were the representatives of our army at Cawnpore. They even went further: at the end of 1856, they ordered the wing of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, which had been temporarily detained at Cawnpore at the request of the Chief Commissioner of Oudh, to proceed to Umballa!

The departure of the wing of the Fusiliers left Cawnpore garrisoned as follows. There were the 1st, 53rd, and 56th Regiments of Native Infantry: the 2nd Regiment Light Cavalry, and sixty one European artillerymen with six guns—five of which were nine-pounders, and the sixth, a twenty-four pound howitzer. In case of a revolt of the native troops, there were therefore at the disposal of the General only sixty-one Europeans, besides the officers, to oppose to, in round numbers, three thousand five hundred trained soldiers, backed by a rabble of at least equal numerical strength.

It can easily be imagined that the intelligence of the events at Meerut, following, as they did, an agitation in the minds of the men of the Native army of more than four months' duration—an agitation which the weak and vacillating measures of the Government had served but to increase, must have been received with no slight anxiety by the Commander of a force so almost wholly native as was this at Cawnpore. It is true that the officer who in May, 1857, held the command of the Cawnpore Division, was one of the most distinguished generals of the Company's army. Sir Hugh Massy Wheeler had spent nearly fifty-four years in India, and throughout that period he had served only with natives. He had had peculiar facilities of studying their character; he had served with them under Lord Lake, against their countrymen; he had led them in Affghanistan against foreigners: they had achieved victory under him in both Sikh campaigns, in the second of which he held an independent command. By Lord Gough, under whom he gained his brightest

laurels, he was most highly esteemed. He had proved himself on so many occasions so fertile in resources, so ready to overcome difficulties, so prompt, active, and energetic, that it was thought he was the man of all others most competent to deal with an insurrection of this character, most fitted to unravel the web of mystery in which its origin was then clouded, and to open the minds of the Sepoys to the insensate folly of their proceedings. And if this had been a mere military outbreak, as some have imagined, if the dispossessed princes and people of the land, farmers, villagers, ryots, had not made common cause with the Sepoys, there is every reason to believe, as will be shown hereafter, that but a portion of the force would have revolted: the certainty exists that not a single officer would have been injured.

The outbreak at Meerut was not wanted to open Sir H. Wheeler's eyes to the magnitude of the crisis. He had, from the first sign of disaffection at Berhampore, been watching with an anxious eye the progress of events, and, in common with many others, he had been deeply struck with the fatal delay which occurred in dealing out punishment to the 34th Native Infantry; and with the immunity granted to those who attacked Lieutenant Baugh. Still, the Government of India, having announced that their "forcibly feeble" acts had restored discipline to the Bengal army, Sir Hugh was bound to strengthen their hands as much as possible, by endeavouring to maintain and to justify the confidence they felt. He was powerless to do more without exciting the suspicions of those whom the Government had proclaimed well-affected and loyal.

The news of the Meerut outbreak, which reached Cawnpore on the 13th May, left him freer scope to act. Although the Government even then professed to look upon that outbreak as a mere local revolt, although they ignored the possibility of its being part and parcel of a plan for a general rising, it was not so with Sir Hugh Massy Wheeler. That experienced officer felt that the army was gone; that, incapable of acting in concert, every regiment would take its own time and opportunity; but that all would go he felt morally certain. Surveying then his own position, he found himself the commander of a large native force, separated by the river only from Oudh, and in the heart of a native population, with but sixty-one Europeans at his disposal: his cantonment was an open one, no semblance of fortification existing in any portion of it; the magazine, which bore the nearest approach to anything of the sort, being seven miles distant. It was, in truth, a perilous position.

The minds of all in Cawnpore were naturally much excited by the accounts of the Meerut insurrection, full details of which reached the station on the 15th. It was felt that, composed as their own force was, a revolt might break out any day; and as there were many ladies in the station, and all the families of H.M. 32nd Regiment then quartered at Lucknow, as too there was a large mercantile community, it was deemed desirable to select and to fortify some place of refuge to which the entire European community could retire in case of need. The magazine, a very large building on the banks of the river, sur-

rounded by a high wall, was first proposed for this purpose : but the fatal objection existed that it was seven miles from the native lines, and on the Delhi road. It was argued that, in case of a rising, the native troops, as at Meerut, would, after massacring every European who might come in their way, march as quickly as possible towards Delhi, and that it would only be necessary to provide a place of refuge at the opposite end of the station, sufficiently fortified to resist a sudden attack, and provisioned for a few days, in which the whole of the residents might remain until the first fury of the mutineers had been spent, and they had left Cawnpore for Delhi. These views prevailed, and two large barracks, formerly the hospital barracks of the European Regiment *once* stationed at Cawnpore, were selected, and earth-works were commenced upon without any further delay.

These barracks were situated in the centre of a very large plain, with a tolerably clear space all round them. In front was the cricket-ground, a very clear space, bounded on its left and left-front by unfinished barracks, then in the course of construction ; on its right was the road, and beyond it another level plain of smaller extent terminating in a row of houses ; beyond these another road, another row of houses, and then the river. To the left and left-rear of the barracks was an extensive plain, upon which the European Regiments, on passing through the station, were wont to encamp : to the right and right-rear the description I have already given of the country to the right of the cricket-ground applies. It has, since the catastrophe, been regretted by some that the magazine had not been selected as the place of refuge. As one who knows the locality well, I cannot coincide with those who are of this opinion. The magazine was seven miles distant from the new native lines, and on the Delhi road ; it was next door to the jail. Unless Sir Hugh Wheeler had chosen to abandon the station before any signs of mutiny were apparent, he, the officers, and ladies would have found it impossible to get there. The Government of India had loudly proclaimed their trust in the Native army. Could Sir Hugh Wheeler have told the portion of that army stationed at Cawnpore, "I have no trust in you ; I resign command of you : your officers I take from you into the magazine, and bid you defiance," — this too before a single overt act of mutiny had been committed? Had he acted so, he would at once have been made the scape-goat for all that has since followed. Had he, on the other hand, waited for a movement on the part of the native troops, and then endeavoured to reach the magazine with the ladies and children, not one-third the number would have arrived there.

There is more plausibility in the expression of regret which I have also heard, that Sir Hugh did not entrench himself on the river, still not abandoning his position in the native lines. To this I can only reply, that an officer of General Wheeler's judgment and experience must have perceived the advantages resulting from such a course, but that under the circumstances he must have perceived also that it was not feasible. There were no barracks on the immediate banks of the river, and therefore there would have been no

cover for the women and children. He had the terrific heat of the months of May, June, and July to calculate upon, as well as the enemy; besides which, it was not then a question of standing a siege. The object was to provide a temporary refuge for the European residents till the mutineers had left the station. The barracks afforded this better than any other place he could have selected, and he was justified, both by his innate knowledge of the Sepoys and by events which had occurred elsewhere, in making that selection.

That position was therefore chosen, and it was commenced to fortify it, and to furnish it with supplies. At the same time everything was done which could be done to keep the Sepoys firm in their allegiance. At this time, and to the very day of the outbreak, the regimental officers had perfect confidence in their men. They had associated with them, had joined in their sports, and had in every way identified themselves with them; the name of their regiment was to them all in all; its glory, its honour were their pride. They refused to entertain the slightest suspicion of those with whom they had for years past mixed so freely and unreservedly; who had followed them through the swamps of Burma, and the snows of Cabool; who, in the Sutlej campaign, had withstood all the seductions of the Sikh soldiery. They believed them faithful, and they showed their belief; every night the officers slept in tents in the lines, each officer at the head of his own troop or company, liable to be murdered in their sleep, but they flinched not. Most of them rejoiced in the opportunity of showing their confidence in their men. So much, and to such an extent, can the wily Asiatic deceive the open-hearted, too credulous Englishman!

At this epoch another character appeared on the scene—one whose powers of duplicity exceed the bounds of imagination, and whose treachery and cruelty stand out in bloody relief, far surpassing the crimes that have been recorded under the same headings in the annals of the world.

Dhoondoopunt Nanajee, quasi Raja of Bithoor, was the son of the late Peishwa's Subahdar, Ramchundur Punt. Although never legally adopted by Bajee Rao, for adoption requires the performance of many ceremonies, commencing in the lying-in room, Dhoondoopunt was yet as a boy received into his family, and was treated as a member of it. He received a tolerable education, and can both read and write English. On the death of the Peishwa without issue, either actual or adopted, his widow became, according to Hindoo law, his legal heiress, Dhoondoopunt still continuing in the position of a dependant. But his grasping ambition was ill-content with so subordinate a position. He forged a will, and on its authority claimed possession of the personal property of the Peishwa. That chieftain's widow having unsuccessfully contested the claim, fled to Benares, determined to appeal to the British Government. She was, however, inveigled thence by the arts of Dhoondoopunt, and persuaded to proceed to Bithoor, where she had ever since remained, her claims having been abandoned from that date. Emboldened by the success of his measures against the personal property of his deceased benefactor, Dhoon-

doopunt laid claim to his title and possessions, on the ground of his being the adopted son, and he sent an agent to England to push his appeal. He was not, as I have already shown, the adopted son, but his claims were refused on other grounds by the British Government—the principle of inheritance by adoption having been disallowed. He was, however, allowed to keep six guns, to maintain as many followers as he chose, and to live in almost regal state at Bithoor—a castellated palace about six miles north of Cawnpore. In his social relations he much affected European society, and appeared fond of joining those pursuits in which Englishmen in all climates delight. He was hospitable, too, after his fashion, gave entertainments on a large scale, and was always ready to lend his elephants to any of the more exalted *employés* of Government.

Between this man and the Collector of Revenue at Cawnpore, Mr. Hillersdon, there had been considerable intercourse on official subjects, and the latter had been greatly impressed by his suave and courteous manner of transacting business. This intercourse had increased since the commencement of the agitation in the Sepoy mind, and the Nana Sahib (as I shall call him in future—that being the name by which he is now best known to the world) had more than once commented on the folly of the Sepoys in believing that any plan was being hatched against their religion. Very soon after the news of the Meerut outbreak had arrived, he again met Mr. Hillersdon, and advised him to send his wife and other ladies to Bithoor, assuring him that they would be quite safe there, as he would protect them against any number of Sepoys. Although Mr. Hillersdon did not act upon this offer at once, yet so confident was he in the loyalty of the Nana Sahib, that he made arrangements for carrying it into effect on the first symptoms of insurrection. He further arranged a plan with the Nana, that the latter should organise 1500 fighting men, who should be ready to surprise the Sepoys on their showing a disposition to rise, and to put them all to the sword.

This plan had been arranged in consequence of the successful insurrection at Delhi, an account of which reached Cawnpore on the 17th May. This information redoubled the anxiety of General Wheeler; the works at the barracks were hastened, and the preparations for the supply of provisions hurried on, for it was felt that no time was to be lost. On any night the signal might be given, and the women and children massacred in their beds. It was felt on all sides that the speedy recapture of Delhi could alone avert a great catastrophe. The General had learned from his spies that meetings of an insurrectionary character were held nightly in the lines of the 1st Regiment of Native Infantry and the 2nd Light Cavalry; that these latter especially were bent on revolt, that they knew their power and our weakness. Fatal knowledge for all parties! Lamentable want of foresight in the Government that sanctioned such a disposition of troops!

On the night of the 21st matters were very nearly coming to a crisis. The 2nd Cavalry had completed their arrangements, the examples of their comrades at Meerut and Delhi had fired them, and

they were determined to revolt. Sir Hugh Wheeler had received early information of the probability of such an event; he had, therefore, sent to all the European residents, advising them to repair towards evening to the barracks, and he had dispatched an express to Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow, begging him to lend him two or three companies of H.M. 32nd, or as many as could be spared. He made at the same time an attempt to move the treasure, which was seven miles distant from the station, into the barracks; but, as the Sepoy guard at the treasury showed a disinclination to part with it, loudly protesting that they were able to defend it where it was, and Sir Hugh being powerless to coerce them, he preferred accepting the offer of the Nana Sahib, made through Mr. Hillersdon, and strongly recommended by that gentleman. It was to the effect that the Nana's troops should guard the treasury. Accordingly, that night, 200 Mahrattas, armed with matchlocks and fully equipped, accompanied by two guns, moved from Bithoor and took up their quarters at the treasury, close to the jail, and within a stone's throw of the magazine in which were all our military stores.

That night all the European residents, with the exception of Sir George Parker, the cantonment magistrate, who at that time disbelieved the excess of danger, slept in the barracks: the ladies had scarcely arrived there ere the arrival of the Mahratta troops caused an alarm, and the guns were sent for; they arrived about 11 P.M. Meanwhile, four native officers of the 2nd Cavalry, either finding that the other regiments would not join them, or that the pear was quite ripe, and unable of their own authority to control some of their younger and more excitable privates, had made a virtue of the emergency, and reported to their commanding officer, Major Vibart, that the regiment was ready to rise. He instantly went down to the lines, turned out the men, and addressed them in a manly style, appealing to the number of years he had passed with them, the dangers and vicissitudes they had encountered together, and imploring them to remain true to their colours, and to maintain the glory of their regiment unsullied. How they were affected by this address it is impossible to say, but they returned to their lines apparently contented.

Of the scene in the barrack that night descriptions have appeared from the pens of some of the actors in it. One of them, a gentle lady, wrote: "There were an immense number of ladies and gentlemen assembled there, and oh! what an anxious night it was. The children added much to our distress and anxiety; it was some hours before I could get them to sleep. I did not lie down the whole night." Another, a high-spirited and promising young officer: "Nearly all the ladies in the station were, however, turned out of their houses, and hurried off to the barracks. The scene in the morning you can imagine. They were all huddled together in a small building, just as they had left their houses; on each side of this the guns were drawn up." It seems strange now to read what follows: "I still put all trust in our Sepoys, and shall do so until I see that they are unworthy of it." Such was the confidence engendered by

long association and constant intercourse with their men, that even these sad events could not shake it.

Early on the morning of the 22nd, eighty-four men of H.M. 32nd Foot, under the command of Captain Moore of that regiment, a most able and energetic officer, cheered the hearts of the residents by their arrival; they were all that Sir Henry Lawrence could spare — he himself being in a most precarious situation. Indeed, most men in his position would have declined General Wheeler's request; but Sir Henry had an enlarged and sympathising soul, and he did not hesitate to reduce his garrison to the smallest possible number, in order to render assistance to his imperilled countrymen at Cawnpore. They were accompanied by two squadrons of Oudh Cavalry, who were at that time believed to be staunch: their fidelity, however, being shortly afterwards questioned, they were sent back again.

For an entire week, from the 24th to the 31st of May, the state of suspense was awful, in some instances, more than could be borne. One lady lost her reason in consequence, and almost all suffered in a manner defying description. They were daily, hourly, expecting an insurrection,—in fact almost praying that it might come, in order that the too terrible suspense might pass away. Every precaution was taken to avoid giving the natives the slightest cause for revolt. Even the customary salute in honour of the Queen's birthday was forbidden, lest the sound of the guns should afford a pretence to the Sepoys to revolt. Still the officers slept in the lines of their men: in the most heroic manner they passively placed themselves in the power of those who had shown but too clearly their ultimate intentions against them. They did it, it is true, by order; but they went without hesitation to what some of their number at least must have considered certain death: but they looked that fate boldly in the face, and not in one single instance did they shrink from encountering it.

At length on the morning of the 31st, after a terrible night, in which rumours of the rising of the 1st Native Infantry were rife, the joyful intelligence spread through the station that the first instalment of the European reinforcements had arrived. It was quite true; on that day and the two following, fifteen men of the Madras Fusiliers and 150 of the 84th Foot joined the garrison, and cheered their hearts by the information that they were but the forerunners of several regiments; that troops had poured into Calcutta from Madras, Burma, and Ceylon, and were being sent up with all possible speed. A letter also arrived from Lord Canning to General Wheeler, in which it was stated that all the available troops should be sent up; that many were on their way, some coming by steamers, some by bullock-train, some by dâk carriages.

All might yet have been well, and all would have been well, but for the stoppage of these reinforcements by the mutiny of the 6th Regiment of Native Infantry at Allahabad. The Government had permitted this, the most important military post in India, a strong fortress and immense magazine, to remain, after this crisis had commenced, under the charge of a native regiment. The result was, that

all Bengal very narrowly escaped destruction,—Cawnpore and the adjoining stations were swept away.

So confident were the authorities at Cawnpore that the crisis had passed, that the daily arrival of European troops would render our force more than a match for the natives, that on the morning of the 8th of June Sir Hugh Wheeler ordered one company of the 84th and a portion of the 32nd Foot back to Lucknow.* There then remained at Cawnpore:—

1st comp. 6 batt. Artillery	- -	61
H.M. 32nd Foot	- - - -	84
1st Madras Fusiliers	- - - -	15
H.M. 84th Foot†	- - - -	50

Total 210 men.

In addition to these were about a hundred officers, the same number of merchants, and about forty drummers; making a total of 450 Europeans, with six guns. These, had they been alone, could have fought their way either to Agra or Allahabad; but there were besides about 330 women and children, many of them reared tenderly, and unaccustomed to hardships. Their lot, indeed, was the hardest of all, and his heart must be hardened who can think of their protracted sufferings without a pang.

It was on the morning of the 3rd of June that the Europeans left for Lucknow. On the evening of the same day, half of the 3rd Oudh Horse Battery, under Lieutenant Ashe, which had been sent towards Futtchgurh to quell a disturbance in that quarter, but had been compelled to retreat on account of the mutiny of the troops which accompanied it, arrived at Cawnpore. They had with them two 9-pounders and a 24-pounder howitzer, which were at once placed in the entrenchment. The men had behaved well on the road, had refused to join the mutineers, and it was hoped and believed that they would continue proof against the inducements to revolt which seemed to loom in the future.

On the morning of the 4th June, Sir Hugh Wheeler received positive information that the 2nd Cavalry, the 1st and 56th Regiments, were determined in the course of the next four and twenty hours to rise and murder their officers: these latter were therefore directed to discontinue sleeping in their lines. Orders had been previously issued to Mr. Reily, in charge of the magazine, to blow it up, in the event of an outbreak. He was prevented carrying out these directions by the Sepoys on guard at the magazine: consequently, when the mutiny did break out, immense stores of ammunition, guns, and small-arms, fell into the hands of the insurgents.

Meanwhile the Nana Salub, in order, as it was imagined, to testify his sincerity, had moved, with a very large number of his followers, from Bithoor to the civil station, and had taken up his residence in a house not far from that belonging to the collector. He was here for

* Lieut. Delafosse's Narrative.

† Mr. Shepherd's Narrative.

a double purpose, to excite the Sepoys to revolt, and to guard the treasure for himself. Nevertheless, he was not once suspected; every one, even after the outbreak of the mutiny, placed implicit confidence in him. It was believed that it was his interest to remain true to us, not only on account of his vast territorial possessions, but because he had invested upwards of 500,000*l.* in Government securities. It was not known until afterwards that ever since the annexation of Oudh he had been gradually disposing of these securities, until in the month of June, 1857, only 30,000*l.* worth remained.* This is one of those incontestable facts which prove that it was the spoliation of Oudh which decided the large chieftains and landowners to rise against us. It was the last feather on the camel's back; they thenceforth saw no security for themselves in passive submission; they had no hope remaining but the sword.

By the 4th of June nearly a month's provisions had been stored in the entrenchment, the guns placed in position, and every possible arrangement to secure the lives of the European residents had been completed. Dire suspense reigned in every mind: the arrival of reinforcements from Calcutta had ceased, and there appeared no hope from any quarter. They all felt, as had been the case during that last long fortnight in May, that any day they might be attacked and massacred. Nevertheless, no hearts quailed: there was but one feeling amongst the men—an indomitable resolution to defend the British flag and the lives of the ladies and children committed to their charge to the very last.

At length, on the night of the 4th, the 2nd Cavalry, on the pretence that they felt themselves suspected, and could not bear it, rose in revolt with a great shout, mounted their horses, and set fire to their sergeants' bungalows. Thence proceeding to the commissariat cattle yard, they took thirty-six elephants, the property of Government, and went direct to the treasury, some seven miles distant: here, assisted by the Mahratta troops of the Nana Sahib, they plundered the treasury (about eight lakhs and a half of rupees), and packed it on the elephants and carts. They had hitherto been unsuccessful in persuading the 1st Native Infantry to join them; but these latter being informed of the process going on at the treasury, also left their lines with a loud shout, and joined the 2nd Cavalry. Their officers attempted, but in vain, to persuade them to be loyal. Command and entreaty were alike ineffectual: the Sepoys begged and even forced them to return to the entrenchment, intimating at the same time that they were no longer under their orders. They then took the road to the treasury, burning and plundering all the bungalows, and seizing all the property on which they could lay hands.

This had been a night of horror in the entrenchment: the mutinous shouts, the discharge of pistols, the blazes of fire in every direction must have struck terror into the hearts of the ladies and children. The men were, however, not at all dismayed. No attack had been made upon them; there had been no disposition to shed blood:

* Vide Government Gazette, published by authority.

accordingly, about seven o'clock next morning, three or four officers sallied forth and proceeded on horseback toward the assembly-rooms, with the intention, it is stated*, of blowing up the magazine. But when they reached the canal, less than one-third of the distance, the Sepoys fired upon them, and killed one officer; the remainder returned to the entrenchment. On their arrival, the 3rd Oudh Horse Battery (natives), with a company of Europeans, were ordered to pursue the rebels. On reaching the canal they were recalled, as symptoms had in the meanwhile manifested themselves in the 53rd and 56th Native Infantry, which rendered it highly undesirable that the barrack should be left unprotected.†

These symptoms were soon changed for actions. The native officers had reported that the men were no longer to be depended upon; and very soon after, about 9 A.M., a bugle was sounded, and the two regiments were seen drawn up in columns on their parade ground, showing a defying front: they were, however, dispersed immediately, on hearing the booming of cannon from the entrenchment, and, making a circuit, they joined their rebellious brethren at Nawabgunj (the place where the treasury, magazine, and jail were situated). The native artillerymen (belonging to the Oudh Battery) went off about the same time, to swell the ranks of the rebels.

The station was now clear of insurgents, and yet Sir Hugh Wheeler had no choice but to remain where he was. The road to Allahabad was the only one open to him, had he been inclined to make a move; but, independently of his being unprovided with carriage, it was clear to him, from the non-arrival of further reinforcements, that something had gone wrong there also. He could do nothing, then, but remain where he was, and strengthen his fortifications as much as possible. Some muskets had been left in the native lines; these were brought in and distributed to the merchants, clerks, drummers, and others. These latter were told off in sections, placed under the command of officers, and assigned distinct duties.

Hopes were entertained at this time that they would be allowed to remain in the barracks unmolested, for information reached them early on the 6th of June, that the mutineers, having cleaned out the magazine, and loaded as much as they could carry upon carts, had marched to Kullhanpore, the first stage on the road to Delhi, leaving a small body of cavalry behind as a rear-guard. That they would have gone on, that they were then innocent of any bloody intentions against our garrison, is more than probable. They were themselves inclined to push on to Delhi: it was in their eyes the principal seat of war; there they thought the struggle for the empire of India would be fought and decided, and they were emulous to join those comrades and relations who were so fiercely combating under the green flag in the city of the Mogul. Their intentions were, in fact, pronounced by

* Deposition of Marian ayah.

† The narrative that follows is compiled from the following sources: viz. Mr. Shepherd's and Lieut. Delafosse's Accounts, Marian's Deposition, Statement of the Writer in the Pay Office, Statement of an Eye-witness, Nujoor Tewarree's Account.

their march on Kullianpore. DELHI was the cry which burst from every lip as they marched forth from Cawnpore. And it must be a strong temptation to induce them to forego that resolution; nevertheless, that temptation was held out, and by one whom our party even at that moment believed to be their friend — by the treacherous friend — the Nana Sahib.

This man in fact saw that, if the troops were to go to Delhi, all the advantages he had promised himself from the revolt would slip from his hands. The shadowy dream of a Mahratta Empire reconstructed on the ruins of the British power was already passing away: the march to Delhi would dissipate it for ever. He knew the extent of the conspiracy, and there can be no doubt but that he firmly believed that the British authority was about to receive a death-blow. His object then was to lay the foundation of his future sovereignty at Cawnpore; his influence would thence be spread into the surrounding districts; it would penetrate to Delhi itself. The mighty power once exercised by the Peishwas would be restored, and to himself, the architect of his own fortunes, would belong the glory of replacing their vanished sceptre. There can be little doubt that some such thoughts influenced him, when, as he accompanied the insurgents to Kullianpore, he used every argument to persuade their leaders to place themselves under his orders, and to return and destroy the band of Feringhees whom they had left behind. He, in all probability, pointed out to them, that, so long as their officers lived, their lives would not be safe; they would always be marked men, and, should their insurrection prove unsuccessful, they would be hunted to death all over India. These considerations, and the reports brought out by the Oudh Artillery-men of the large quantity of treasure in the entrenchment, and of the facilities existing for attack, in consequence of the quantity of powder and guns still remaining in the magazine, besides about forty boat-loads of shot and shell lying in the canal, decided the mutineers to place themselves under the orders of the Nana Sahib.

Accordingly, about 8 o'clock on the morning of the 6th, the whole force returned to Cawnpore, with the Nana at their head. He pitched his camp in the centre of the station; and, although a high-caste Brahmin himself, he hoisted two standards, one to the honour of Mahomed, the other of Hunaman (the Hindoo Deity); and to these he bade all the faithful repair. He then sent about fifty sowars into the town, to kill any Europeans who might be found there, as well as the native converts to Christianity; at the same time the houses of the Cawnpore Nawab and other influential native gentlemen were attacked and gutted, on the pretence that their owners had harboured Europeans: he himself spent the greater part of the day in mounting some heavy guns, of which he had obtained possession, and of making preparations for the attack.

On the following morning, the 7th of June, a letter was received by General Wheeler from the Nana Sahib. Up to that moment, his fidelity had not been questioned, but now the mask was thrown off. The letter merely intimated the Nana's intention to attack the gar-

rison. It very soon appeared that this was by no means an idle threat, for two guns opened upon them from the north-west, and musketry from all directions. On the 8th three more guns were brought against them, and on the 11th the enemy had in position, and playing upon the garrison night and day, three mortars, two 24-pounders, three 18-pounders, two 12-pounders, the same number of 9-pounders, and one 6-pounder. Their numbers had in the same interval greatly increased. The 6th from Allahabad, red with the blood of our countrymen there, irregular corps from Oudh, and *bud-mashes*, *i. e.* armed rabble from all parts of the country, had poured in to make common cause against us. All the bungalows in the neighbourhood of the barracks were occupied by rebel infantry, and these poured an incessant fire day and night upon our unhappy countrymen. A small church, situated to the south-east of the entrenchment, was strongly occupied, and the fire from it was most galling. The unfinished barracks, to which I have already referred as lying on the left front of the entrenchment, were also constantly threatened and attacked; but fortunately the enemy were never able to obtain a permanent lodgment in them.

Meanwhile, the sufferings of the garrison were such as no description can adequately portray.* The heat was very great; and what with the fright, want of room, want of proper food and care, several ladies and soldiers' wives, as also children, died with great distress: many officers and soldiers also were sunstruck from exposure to the hot-winds. The dead bodies were thrown into a well outside the entrenchment near the unfinished barracks; and this work was generally done at the close of each day, as nobody could venture out in the daytime, on account of the shot and shell flying in all directions like hail-stones. The distress was so great, that no one could offer a word of consolation to his friend, or attempt to administer to the wants of another. The dead bodies of young ladies tenderly brought up, were placed outside the verandah amongst the ruins to await the time for the fatigued party to carry them to the well. For there was scarcely room to shelter the living, the buildings were so riddled; and every available corner was considered a great object.

They began too to be badly off for water. There was but one water-well, in the middle of the entrenchment, and the enemy kept up their fire so incessantly both day and night, that it was as much as giving a man's life-blood to go and draw a bucket of water. So great did the demand become, even after the second day's siege, that five rupees were paid for a leathern bag full, and one rupee for a small bucket of water: it became finally a matter of necessity for every one to procure it for himself, and as, after the first three days' incessant firing, there was generally a cessation for two hours about candle-light, the well was then crowded by gentlemen and others endeavouring to fill their pitchers and buckets.

As the siege went on, as the weary night succeeded the never-ending day, each fraught with new horrors, their sufferings increased

* Mr. Shepherd, an eye-witness.

tenfold. Although after the first few days the barracks became so riddled as to afford little or no shelter, yet the greater portion of the garrison preferred remaining in them to exposure to the heat of the sun outside. A great many had made holes under the walls of the entrenchment, covered over with boxes, cots, &c. In these they were safe from the shot and shell of the enemy, but not from the effects of heat; and the mortality from apoplexy was considerable. At night every person had to sleep out and take watch in turn: the women and children then slept under the walls of the entrenchment, near their respective relatives. Here the bomb-shells kept them in perpetual dread, for nearly all night they were seen coming through the air and bursting in different places, often doing mischief. To add to their miseries, the stench from the dead bodies of horses and other animals was not only horrible in itself, but the means of their being annoyed by myriads of flies, who never left them. Nevertheless, if their sufferings were great, their fortitude was greater. Sir Hugh Wheeler himself, an old man and worn with anxiety, was physically unable to take an active part in the defence of the entrenchment, but his subordinates rivalled one another in their exertions and contempt of danger. Prominent* amongst these was Captain Moore of H.M. 32nd Foot, who, though severely wounded in the arm, never gave himself the least rest, but wherever there appeared most danger, he was sure to be foremost, his arm in a sling and a revolver in his belt, directing the men or leading them to the fight. It was his custom to place scouts on the top of one of the unfinished barracks, who were able to direct the fire of our artillery. Occasionally the Sepoys would endeavour to take possession of these buildings; but Moore was always on the alert, and whenever they came on in large numbers he would call for volunteers, who, sallying out under cover of a line of carts which connected the unfinished barracks with the entrenchment, would quickly put the enemy to the rout. On such occasions our men generally escaped unhurt, whilst the loss of the enemy was invariably great. They could never stand a British cheer and a British charge. On two occasions this gallant officer sallied forth at night, with about twenty-five Europeans, and succeeded in spiking the nearest guns of the enemy. On every occasion the immense superiority of the British soldier was apparent,—even the enemy's cavalry, though their numbers were very great, never daring to attack our small party.

Meanwhile events were progressing in the rebel camp, which plainly showed that the soul of the Nana was open to no compunctions, that his primary object was the extirpation of the European race, and that he would allow no consideration to interfere with that object.† On the 10th June, a lady with four children, travelling by post from the north-west to Calcutta, arrived, unsuspecting of evil, at Cawnpore. She was taken before the Nana, who, at once, ordered that she and her babes should be slaughtered. The innocent children, exposed to the sun, and unable to comprehend the scene, were crying

* Mr. Shepherd's Narrative.

† Journal of a Native.

to their mamma to take them into the bungalow and give them food ; but no one listened, and in a few minutes, tied hand to hand, and made to stand up in the plain, they were shot down by pistol bullets. On the following day another lady fell into the hands of these fiends, and experienced a like fate, her head being subsequently offered as a "nuzzur," or royal gift, to the Nana Sahib.

On the 12th, intelligence reached them that a large party of Europeans were coming from the north-west. Some cavalry and infantry were at once despatched to reconnoitre ; and it was found that the advancing party were fugitives from Futtehgurh, about 136 in number, most of them females. They had left Futtehgurh with the intention of proceeding to Allahabad, thence to Calcutta by water, when, on passing Cawnpore, they were pounced upon by these rebels. Being brought before the Nana and sentenced to death, one of them, disdainingly to sue for life, reproached him with his cruelty and the insensate folly of his proceedings ; showing how futile it was to imagine that by the slaughter of a few hundred women he could exterminate the English. She also warned him of the fate which, sooner or later, must inevitably overtake him. In reply to this spirited remonstrance, the ruffian ordered that her two hands should be filled with powder, and the powder exploded : the rest were ruthlessly shot down. At the same time an order was issued that all boats should be secured, in order to prevent the escape of even a solitary individual. The story of these atrocities never reached the garrison, and some of them still believed that the Nana was an unwilling instrument in the hands of others.

Flushed by this easy conquest over unarmed women, the Nana prepared on the following day a tremendous assault on the entrenchment. For some days past he had been firing shells, with the intention of firing the barrack ; but it was not till 5 P.M. on the evening of the 13th of June that he succeeded in setting fire to the hospital barrack : it contained not only the sick but the families of the European soldiers, and the flames spread so rapidly that many of the former unfortunates (about forty in number) were consumed. Nearly the whole of the medicines and surgical instruments shared the same fate. No sooner was the fire visible to the enemy, than they came down, 4000 in number, to attack our half-starved, dispirited countrymen ; but not even on such an occasion, with such odds, could they muster up courage to dare a hand-to-hand encounter with Englishmen. The fire of our artillery was sufficient to keep them at bay, and, although they prevented our men from offering effectual succour to the wounded in the blazing hospital, they finally slunk back discomfited to their lines.

From the 13th to the 21st similar attacks were made, and with a similar result. Although the enemy succeeded in disabling six out of our eight guns, they never could get beyond the fire of those that were left. But on the 21st, having been largely reinforced from Oudh and other districts, a tremendous attack was made on all sides of the entrenchment. To counteract the effect of our fire, the enemy had provided themselves with large bales of cotton, which they used

as a flying sap. On the north-west they took possession of three of the empty barracks, and endeavoured to drive our picket out of the rest: on the south-east they advanced under cover of the cotton bales. On the former, Captain Moore advanced with twenty-five men under the cover of a fire of grape, and, after a very brief conflict, succeeded in driving them entirely out of the barracks. The latter party were equally unsuccessful; for, having advanced behind the bales within 150 yards of the entrenchment, they suddenly made an attempt to charge, but a few rounds of canister and perpetual file-firing speedily caused them to change their determination; and they dispersed with a loss of about 200 men, including their leader. An attack was made at the same time by about 200 men on the north-east; but the fire of the enemy, after having been kept up for an hour and a half, was silenced by our musketry.

Among the deeds of daring performed on this day, the following, related by Mr. Shepherd, deserves a place, not in the history of this revolt only, but in the annals of national prowess. About mid-day one of the ammunition waggons in the north-east corner was blown up by the enemy's shot, and whilst it was blazing the batteries of the rebels directed all their guns towards it. Our soldiers, being much exhausted with the morning's work, and almost every artilleryman being killed or wounded, it was a difficult matter to put out the fire, which endangered the other waggons near it. However, in the midst of all this cannonading, a young officer, Lieutenant Delafosse, 53rd Native Infantry (one of the survivors), with unusual courage, went up, and, laying himself down under the burning waggon, pulled away from it what loose splinters he could get hold of, all the while throwing earth upon the flames. He was soon joined by two soldiers, who brought with them a couple of buckets of water, which were very dexterously thrown about by the Lieutenant; and whilst the buckets were taken away to be replenished, the process of pitching earth was carried on amidst a fearful cannonade of about six guns, all firing upon the burning waggon. Thus at last the fire was put out, and the officer and men escaped unhurt.

A deed like this tells its own story. It betokens that calm, cool, determined courage which is rarely bestowed except upon those who are capable of even greater things. It is, as a simple act of courage, without a parallel in history. The chief performer, Lieutenant Delafosse, still lives: it will be a consolation to him to know that he has earned the lasting admiration of his countrymen: I will hope that he has gained more—the highest reward for valour which it is in the power of the Crown to bestow. Of his comrades, let him speak: if they still live, let them share with him the gifts of the Crown; should they not have escaped the fearful ordeal, let their families reap some portion of the benefit derivable for matchless courage.

From the 21st to the 24th June our unhappy countrymen were subjected to an incessant bombardment: the barracks were now riddled with balls and shot, and afforded but little protection. The season, too, for the commencement of the rains had arrived, and it was evident that at the first heavy shower not only would the whole

edifice come down, but the holes which, as mentioned before, had been made in the ground, would be filled up. Added to this, since the first five or six days of the siege, the supplies of fresh water had failed entirely, and the garrison had subsisted on otta (ground wheat) dak, and gram (two species of grain peculiar to India). In order to make this supply last the longer, they had lived for some days on half rations. They were now in great straits, and all felt that affairs could not last as they were much longer. With insufficient food, the prospect of the barracks, their only place of refuge, tumbling about their ears, with no hope of relief, and with the agonising sight before them of gentle ladies perishing before their eyes, it was the conviction of all that something must be done. A great many of the officers and men were of opinion that it would be best to sally out in a body at night and take the guns, or perish in the attempt — and this course, if adopted, would probably have succeeded; but it was felt that, if unsuccessful, the women and children would be left a prey to their infuriated antagonists. Although often considered, and earnestly advocated by many, it was never put into execution. The fact is, the character of the Nana Sahib was not rightly appreciated in our entrenchment: he had mixed so much with Europeans, his prime minister, Azimollah, a Mahomedan, had actually been to England, and been received in society there, and he had been apparently so earnest in our behalf before the outbreak occurred, that some believed that he was secretly in our favour, that at all events he would, if he had the power, protect the lives of our countrymen. Had a contrary belief prevailed, had the massacre of the 12th of June been known in the camp, there can be little doubt that the first alternative would have been tried, and as little (from information subsequently obtained, whereby it appeared that the enemy's guns were almost abandoned at night) that it would have been successful.

However, under the impression which unfortunately prevailed, it had been almost determined to treat with the Nana, when, on the afternoon of the 24th, a note arrived from that individual, brought by Mrs. Greenway (a member of the family of Greenway Brothers, merchants of Cawnpore), to the effect that all the Europeans in the entrenchment who had nothing to do with Lord Dalhousie's Government*, and would lay down their arms, should be sent to Allahabad. The preliminaries were agreed to, and the following day Azimollah, on the part of the Nana, and Captain Moore, deputed by General Wheeler and armed with full powers, met in one of the unfinished barracks. Azimollah attempted to open the conversation in English, but was prevented by the sowars who accompanied him. It was, therefore, carried on in the Hindustani language. An agreement was concluded to the effect that the Government money, the magazine, and the guns, should be made over to the Nana, who on his part bound himself to provide tonnage and permit every individual in the entrenchment to proceed to Allahabad unmolested. This agreement

* It will be recollected that it was Lord Dalhousie who annexed Oudh and deviated from the previously recognised practice of acknowledging the principle of adoption.

was drawn up in writing, signed, sealed, and ratified by a solemn oath by the Nana. On the morning of the 26th a committee of officers went down to examine the boats; they found them serviceable and in good order: they were molested neither in going nor in returning. On their report every preparation was made to start on the morrow.

That fatal day at length arrived, and on the morning of the 27th, carriage for the women, children, and wounded having arrived, the whole party started,—our men taking with them their muskets and ammunition, and being escorted by nearly the entire rebel force. They arrived at the river about 8 A.M. without being at all molested. There were no signs of any preparation for a breach of faith; they were even allowed to seat themselves in the boats, and some of these actually pushed off. But no sooner had our unfortunate countrymen laid down their muskets than, at a signal given by the Nana, two guns were run out, and opened upon them immediately, whilst the Sepoys, running from every direction, kept up a strong musketry fire. The boats' crews (natives) immediately deserted them; some of the boats were set on fire, whilst volley after volley was poured on the unhappy fugitives, numbers of whom as they attempted to get away were followed into the water breast-deep by the Sepoys. A few boats managed to get over to the opposite bank; but there they were met by the Sepoys of the 17th Native Infantry and by a regiment of Oudh Cavalry, who effectually prevented their escape. The boats, with one exception, were finally all secured, and all the males they contained were at once massacred: the women, reserved for a worse fate, were brought to the Nana's camp and placed in a brick building, where for the first three days no attention was paid them, beyond supplying them with food of the coarsest description.

But one boat had managed to run the terrible gauntlet, and on this many of the wounded and the refugees from other boats had crowded. The bloodthirsty Sepoys, not content with the massacre of the others, were resolved that our countrymen in this boat also should fall into their hands, that not one, in fact, should escape. For the first day and night she was followed by the two guns and by crowds of Sepoys along the bank.* On the 28th there was still one gun on the Cawnpore side, and the infantry on both sides blazing away. Still they pushed on. But on the morning of the third day their strength was gone, the boat had stuck on a sandbank; and there she lay, a mark for the enemy's fire. Directly any of our men jumped into the water to try and move her, they were fired upon by thirty or forty men at a time. In this emergency, it was resolved again to try the efficacy of a British charge, and fourteen of the wearied band were deputed to drive over the persevering fiends. Amongst them were Lieutenant Mowbray, Thomson, and Delafosse, 53rd Native Infantry, private Murphy of the 84th, and gunner Sullivan of the Artillery. Amongst those in the boat severely wounded was Captain Moore of H.M. 32nd, whose exertions in defence of the entrenchment had been the theme of

* Lieut. Delafosse's Narrative.

universal admiration : many other gallant spirits were there, stiff with their wounds, or lying in the agony of death, unable to strike a blow for their own lives and those of their countrywomen. Of many tender beings the success of these fourteen was the last hope, the only chance of life. It was but a glimmering, and was destined soon to be extinguished. They saw them, however, advance boldly and rapidly, and drive the enemy before them. A bend of the river soon hid them from their sight : the sound of the firing grew fainter and fainter, and presently a boat filled with Sepoys was discerned advancing from the direction of Cawnpore.* They still, however, had sufficient strength to repulse these new assailants, and, a flood coming on in the night, they were carried off the sandbank and floated down a short distance. Meanwhile the Nana hearing of their position, had sent off a force of three companies of Sepoys to secure them : these, placing themselves on board boats propelled by men accustomed to the work, soon came up with our unfortunate countrymen, after a short struggle overpowered them, and, lifting them from their boat, took them back to Cawnpore in carts. On arriving there they were at once taken out of the carts and seated on the ground. There were sixty men, twenty-five women, and four children. The Nana in person ordered the men to be shot ; but the Sepoys of the 1st Regiment, of which General Wheeler's son had been Quarter-master, making some demur, an Oudh regiment was brought up for the purpose. The order was then given to separate the wives from the husbands ; but to this last indignity the poor captives refused to submit, and it was finally accomplished by force. In one instance husband and wife were so firmly locked together that they were unable to separate them, and finally desisted from the attempt. The Sepoys were then making every preparation to fire, when the Chaplain of Cawnpore, the Rev. E. Moncrieff, formerly Curate of Tooting, requested leave to read prayers. Permission being accorded, the whole party read and prayed together ; they then shook hands all around. The signal was then given, and the Sepoys fired. Many were killed, others only wounded ; but these latter were quickly despatched with swords. This bloody work having been completed, the women were conveyed to the place in which those previously captured were confined, whence the whole party, about 150 in number, were taken to the house in which they were finally slaughtered.

There yet remain to be accounted for the fourteen heroic Englishmen who left the boat on the sandbank to drive off their persevering assailants.† Wading to the shore, musket in hand, they charged the enemy : these did not wait their attack, but fled before them. Our party, however, having followed them up too far, were cut off from the river, and were compelled, for fear of being surrounded, to retire. Unable to make direct for the river, they took a road parallel to it, and came upon it a mile lower down. But as they approached, they found they had been cut off by a large body of men, whilst another party on the opposite bank was ready to receive them in case they

* Nujoor Tewarree's Account.

† Lieut. Delafosse's Narrative.

should attempt to cross. There appeared indeed no hope of safety. But even at this moment they did not despair. Close to the river, and very near the force in front of them, was a small temple. They fired a volley at the enemy and made for this temple, losing in the attempt one man killed and one wounded. However, they gained it, and, secure themselves, they fired on every insurgent who showed himself. The enemy finding that they could effect nothing so long as our party remained inside, determined to smoke them out. They accordingly heaped wood all around it, and then set it on fire. Our gallant countrymen, unable to stand the smoke and heat, took off their clothes, and, musket in hand, charged through the fire and the enemy. Seven out of the twelve remaining reached the river, and began to swim for their lives, followed by the insurgents along both banks, wading and firing as fast as they could. Before they had gone far, two of their number were shot, leaving five only remaining. After swimming about three miles down the stream, one of these, an artillery-man, to rest himself, began swimming on his back, and not knowing in what direction he was going, got on shore and was killed. The other four, Lieutenants Thomson and Delafosse (the same whose heroism is recorded at page 137), private Murphy 84th, and gunner Sullivan of the Artillery, succeeded in out-swimming the mutineers, and finally gave themselves up to an Oudh raja who was friendly to the English. They eventually succeeded in rejoining a party of our troops.

It remains * only to add that, on the evening of the 27th June, the day on which his deed of treachery was consummated, the Nana celebrated his "victory" by a grand parade of his troops, at least ten thousand in number, on the plain of Subada to the north of our entrenchment. Three salutes were fired: one of twenty-one guns for the Nana as sovereign, nineteen guns for his brother Balla Sahib as Governor-General, and seventeen guns for Jowalla Pershad (a Brahmin) as Commander-in-Chief. He then caused to be proclaimed by beat of drum throughout the district that he had entirely conquered the British, whose period of rule in India had come to an end; that they were defeated at Delhi, and dared not set foot in Cawnpore; that he himself was prepared to drive them all out of India. A few days after, he broke up his camp and proceeded to his seat at Bithoor, where he ordered one hundred guns to be fired in honour of the King of Delhi, eighty in honour of his self-styled adopted father, the ex-Peishwa Bajee Rao, sixty in honour of himself, and twenty-one each for his mother and his wife. He evidently thought that he had laid the first stone of the Mahratta sovereignty, and made it firm with a bloody cement.

Such was the termination of the Cawnpore insurrection. If, on the one hand, it resulted in the defeat of our arms, in the massacre of our soldiers and our countrywomen, it formed, on the other, a scene for the display of those qualities which pre-eminently belong to the national character. We see here Englishmen, originally only three hundred and fifty strong, of whom two-thirds only had been bred to

* Mr. Shepherd's Narrative.

arms, their numbers daily decreasing, successfully defending a barrack situation on a level plain, against ten thousand trained soldiers,—for although the rebels numbered only four thousand when they made the first attack, yet, by reinforcements from Allahabad, Oudh, Agra, and other districts, they gradually increased to more than double that force. We see them deprived of animal food, living for days on half rations of grain, performing feats of individual heroism unsurpassed, eager to make a dash at the enemy with their full strength to the cry of victory or death, yet restrained solely by the thought that failure would leave three hundred and thirty women and children the prey of men who knew neither mercy nor pity, who neither feared God, nor regarded man. We see them again, on their own accounts unwillingly, and animated solely by a hope of saving the women and children, giving themselves up to a faithless enemy, who, despite of oaths the most binding, condemned them all to the most ruthless massacre. We see them finally in the hour of death, forcibly separated from their wives and daughters, still comforting themselves as Christians, devoutly appealing to their Creator for pardon, and, incapable of resistance, submitting, in firm reliance on Him, to the fire of the enemy.

But we may conjecture, Did they not, in that last hour, when they prayed to their God for pardon, look to their country also for retaliation on those who had so treacherously murdered them? Could they have imagined it possible that, within a few days of the account of their fate reaching Calcutta, an order would be issued by which immunity to their assassins would be virtually secured? by which evidence would be required as to the actual presence of every individual at this massacre before he could be convicted? Evidence! when the Sepoys had ruthlessly murdered all who could witness against them! Evidence! when the four native regiments at Cawnpore had for three weeks been attacking our countrymen in that all but defenceless barrack! Evidence! when it could be proved from the muster-rolls that there was scarcely a man belonging to those regiments* who was not a partner in the revolt, a consentor to the massacres that had been perpetrated from the very commencement! The names of the few who had remained staunch were known to Government; the rest had revolted *en masse*! But the members of the Government of India could not nerve themselves to summary proceedings. Instead of expressing sympathy for the dead, in place of acknowledging their devotion and their valour, they issued an edict, promising immunity to their murderers! Why should it have been otherwise? There are some natures so cold-blooded as to be incapable of feeling sympathy with suffering humanity. Lord Canning was safe: his kith and kin were far away in England: what were the lives of three or four hundred unknown English women and children to him? Was it worth while further perilling the ancient and anti-Christian system of Government, which had lasted a century, on such an account? The answer may be found in the Home Secretary's circular of the 30th July!

* The 1st, 6th, 17th, 53rd, 56th, Native Infantry; the 2nd Cavalry.

But the shades of our brave countrymen and the surviving relatives of our countrywomen appeal from the selfish and cold-blooded Government of Lord Canning to the People of England. Our generous-hearted countrymen at home have answered by anticipation. They have sent out their thousands of warriors; they have testified by public meetings, by subscriptions, by letters in the newspapers, how they sympathise with those who to the last never despaired of the fortunes of England, who, perishing in her cause with their latest breath testified to their belief in her ability to reassert her sway, who died, I must believe, in the fullest confidence that she would avenge them. And she will yet avenge them. The soldiers she has sent forth have no sympathy with the *doctrinaires* who govern India: no special pleading will restrain them; they will view with their own eyes the charnel-house in which our sisters were murdered, and the cry of all will be:—

“Front to front
Set thou these fiendlike Sepoys and ourselves;
Within our swords' length set them; if they 'scape,
Heaven forgive them too!”

CHAPTER VII.

HAVELOCK'S ADVANCE TO CAWNPORE. — FUTTEHGURH. — ATTEMPTS TO RELIEVE LUCKNOW.

It is now time to return to Havelock's movements. That gallant officer left Allahabad at 4 P. M. on the 7th July. His force was composed as follows:—

3rd company, 8th battalion Royal Artillery	- 76 men
H. M. 64th Regiment - - -	- 435 ”
„ 78th Highlanders - - -	- 284 ”
„ 84th Regiment - - -	- 190 ”
Volunteer Cavalry - - -	- 20 ”
<i>Natives.</i>	
Sikhs - - -	- 150 ”
Irregular Cavalry - - -	- 30 ”

His staff consisted of an assistant adjutant-general, an assistant quarter-master-general, and an aid-de-camp. In the selection of officers for these posts he had been particularly happy. Captain Beatson, of whom mention has already been made, filled the first-named office; Colonel Tytler, a dashing Irregular Cavalry officer, acted as quarter-master-general, and the General's son had been taken from the adjutancy of the 10th Foot to perform the duties of aid-de-camp in this his first campaign.

The rain was falling as the column passed through the streets

of Allahabad, extending for nearly three miles between the fort and the Grand Trunk Road leading to Cawnpore. As it marched, the inhabitants, so lately in revolt, turned out to observe our first offensive movement.* The Hindoos appeared indifferent or apprehensive; but wherever a Mahomedan was seen there was a scowl on his brow and a curse in his heart. Of such demonstrations our troops were careless: they had started on a noble errand; they were animated by the hope of being able to save, by the certainty at all events of avenging, their countrymen at Cawnpore: like Cromwell's Ironsides, there was a stern determination in their aspect, even in their very tread, which showed the earnestness of purpose within. For the first three days they marched at the ordinary rate of about thirteen miles a day: the weather was hot, and there was more to be risked in hurrying them on unnecessarily than was to be gained by forced marches. Whatever might have been the prevailing impression among the men, Havelock knew that Cawnpore had fallen. Major Renaud, with his advanced party, seven hundred strong, was within nineteen miles of Futtehpore. All his efforts were being exerted to settle the country, and procure information from the front; and it was to him that the General would look for the intelligence which would quicken his movements. For the first three days, then, they took the ordinary marches. The entire country was under water, the rainy season having set in with great severity. Our troops, however, marched cheerily on; the road presented one scene of desolation, every one of the staging bungalows erected for the accommodation of travellers had been pillaged and burnt down by the insurgents; on the other hand, their blackened homesteads, and the bodies of rebels hanging by half dozens from trees on the roadside, and nick-named by our soldiers "acorns," afforded ample evidence that Renaud had not been slack in the work of retribution.

On the 11th the force arrived at Khagu, twenty-four miles from Futtehpore. They had scarcely reached the ground when information was received from Renaud, himself then only five miles in advance, that the enemy were advancing in considerable force on Futtehpore, and that it was apparently their intention to hold that place against us. Havelock could scarcely credit such good tidings: no one indeed thought that they would be foolish enough to move out of Cawnpore, and give us the opportunity of beating them in detail. However, the authority was good, and the news positive. Havelock therefore, sending orders to Renaud to be prepared to join him with his detachment on the following morning, broke up his camp at midnight.

After an hour and a half's marching, the two detachments met, and went on together. The plan of the General was to halt about six miles from Futtehpore, rest his troops for the day, reconnoitre that place, and, if the enemy should be found in position there, to move on him the following morning. In accordance with this idea, on arriving at Belunda, within five miles of Futtehpore, the column

* Letter in a London Paper.

was halted, the men fell out to light their pipes and make a brew of tea, whilst a party of Volunteer Horse, under Colonel Tytler, went in advance to reconnoitre.

Whilst they are engaged in this important movement, it may be as well to return for a brief period to Cawnpore, and ascertain as far as possible the intentions and objects of the Nana Sahib.

Scarcely had that miscreant proclaimed himself Sovereign of the Mahrattas, when he experienced the cares and perils of his elevation. He found himself not the master, but the servant, of those mutinous Sepoys whom he had abetted in their treachery; many of them were anxious to proceed to their homes, and enjoy or secure their ill-gotten plunder. Others again, and in this line of policy the native officers of the 2nd Cavalry took the lead, pressed him to pursue his advantage, and exterminate the "Kafirs"* at Allahabad. The Nana himself was very much under the influence of these men; they had been the leaders of the revolt; they had influenced the Infantry regiments to turn and attack us; they had superintended the slaughter of our countrymen; they were relentless and violent in their hatred to us. The views of the Nana also coincided with theirs; he probably felt that he would never be safe at Cawnpore so long as a base for operations remained to us in the Fort of Allahabad; to be secure he must have more blood. He, therefore, was not indisposed to march against us.

The difficulty consisted in persuading the troops to leave their ease and plunder for a fresh campaign against the dreaded "Gora log." But he was well served with spies: all our movements were reported to him, and at this crisis he received information of the march of Renaud's column from Allahabad. This was just what he wanted. He communicated with the native officers of the 2nd Cavalry; then held a durbar, in which he pointed out the ease and facility with which Renaud's detachment might be cut off, and the treasure they had with them plundered.

Both these inducements and that belief in his own invincibility, which even the cowardly massacre of Cawnpore naturally produces in the mind of a native †, had the desired effect. An expedition was at once organised to crush Renaud.

It left Cawnpore on the morning of the 8th July, commanded by Sikka Singh, subadar of the 2nd Cavalry. At 8 o'clock on the morning of the 12th, as our troops were marching on to the encampment of Bolinda, the enemy's force, composed of 100 native artillerymen and twelve guns, 500 cavalry, 1400 mutinous Sepoys, and 1500 Mahrattas and armed insurgents, was passing through Futtehpore. They had advanced some little distance on our side of that place, their infantry, in column of route, marching along the high road, with three guns, a 6, a 9, and a 24-pound howitzer, a little in advance, and about half a mile in rear, the Mahrattas with two guns, an iron 18, and

* Europeans.

† A native classes every species of "Killing" with "courage." Even in his sports he is cruel; after having wounded a deer or a hare, he will prefer torturing it to putting it out of misery.

an iron 24-pounder, the cavalry on their flanks, when Colonel Tytler with his reconnoitring party rode up. He had scarcely halted his escort, and taken a position in advance to survey the enemy's position, when he was seen, and their entire cavalry dashed at him. There was nothing for it but to gallop back with the information to the General. That instant the assembly sounded, the troops fell in as cheery and hearty as possible, notwithstanding that a bright July sun was burning overhead, and they had just marched eighteen miles. The guns, eight in number, under Captain Maude of the Royal Artillery, moved to the front, and a cloud of skirmishers, armed with the Enfield rifle, aligned themselves with them, ready to concentrate their fire on the head of the enemy's column, which by this time was seen in the distance advancing. Behind the guns were the several detachments of infantry, forming a line of quarter-distance columns at deploying distance: the Volunteer Horse guarded the left flank. The bulk of the Irregular Cavalry was on the right.

These dispositions had not been completed, when the enemy's artillery, coming within distance, opened fire on our men, their infantry still remaining in quarter-distance columns; their cavalry, at the same time, wearing their cold-weather suit of French grey and mounted on stud horses, but armed in the native fashion, threatened our flanks. Their guns were permitted to fire two or three rounds before ours replied; but the moment our dispositions were completed, Captain Maude answered them, and in a few minutes it became a species of duello at 400 yards between our artillery and theirs, ours assisted by the skirmishing fire of the Enfield rifles. This appeared to paralyse them; its range took them quite by surprise, and, being quite unable to reply to it, they deserted their guns in a shorter space of time than it has taken to record it. Colonel Tytler, Captains Maude and Beatson, then raced up to have the honour of capturing the guns. They were all close together, and the honour may be equally divided, although Captain Beatson was first up. The infantry then deploying, advanced in pursuit, and although the enemy endeavoured to make a second stand by falling back on their 18 and 20-pounders, it was but momentary: they dreaded the Enfield rifle, but still more the bayonet, and they fled in confusion—Major Renaud, commanding the advance, pushing on their centre, composed of the main body of their infantry, and giving them no rest.

Meanwhile the enemy's cavalry were manœuvring very steadily and with great precision on our flanks; they were anxious evidently to get round and take our infantry in rear; on our left they were checked by the steady attitude of our Volunteer Horse; but on the right we were nearly meeting with a disaster.

In that quarter was the remnant of the Irregular Cavalry that had remained faithful at Benares and Allahabad. They had hitherto acted with spirit against the insurgent villagers, but to fight their kinsmen was a different affair. They were advancing on the right of our line, when about eighteen or twenty horsemen (formerly of our own 2nd cavalry) advanced towards them at a trot, and called out to them in the most appealing terms to join them. Lieut. Palliser who com-

manded the Irregulars at once sounded the charge : he was followed most gallantly by Lieut. Simpson, the adjutant, but by only three or four of the men. Seeing this, the enemy's cavalry came down upon this handful, charged them, and somehow in the scrimmage, Palliser was unhorsed. It would then have gone hard with him, but that some of the men who had previously refused to follow him, rallied round him, and brought him off. At this place seven of the Irregulars were killed, and three or four wounded, while but one of the enemy's horsemen lay dead upon the field ; three or four however were wounded.

While this was going on on the right our main body of infantry was passing through Futtehpore ; the right column, consisting of two companies of the Madras Fusiliers and one of the 78th Highlanders, was making its way through the walled enclosures, gardens, and plantations that skirt the left of that town. At this moment they beheld the Irregular Cavalry coming towards them in full flight, pursued by the troopers of the 2nd (enemy's) cavalry. Captain Beatson, who was with the infantry, at once halted the column, and having succeeded by his coolness and commanding manner in halting the fugitives, directed a volley to be poured in upon the enemy : he never attempted to form our men into square, although they were expecting the order, but remaining in line, some even in skirmishing order, they succeeded not only in checking but driving off the enemy.

All this time the centre and left were pressing into and beyond Futtehpore. The town or village consists of but one narrow street, with lofty houses, high walls, and garden enclosures, on either side. This street was found to be choked up with the enemy's baggage, which had followed close upon his main column : so closely, indeed, were they packed that they presented the appearance of a defence run up by the enemy ; but a few rounds of shrapnel and the action of the skirmishers on the flanks speedily dislodged the most hardy of their opponents, and caused them to abandon the whole of their stores. In the midst of the ruck were two new six pounders, with limbers and ammunition complete, besides large quantities of gun and musket ammunition ; a little beyond, two tumbrils of treasure were found, one of which fell into the hands of the Sikhs and was no more seen.* Amongst the plunder which was taken on this occasion were ladies' dresses, worsted work, and other tokens of our lost countrywomen, the discovery of which served to make the men still wilder for vengeance.†

By the time the baggage had been cleared away from the town, the artillery had passed through, and a last parting shot had been sent at the enemy's infantry, it was past mid-day. The heat was intense ; many of the men dropped down, struck by the sun, some never to rise again. These, indeed, formed the only casualties amongst the Europeans ; their number amounted to twelve. The fury of the sun had effected more injury than the fire of the enemy.

* Correspondent, "Saturday Review."

† Ibid.

In addition to their baggage, treasure, and camp-equipage, twelve pieces of ordnance fell into our hands; the enemy were too intent on flight to care to struggle for their guns.

It was nearly 1 o'clock before our wearied troops, who had marched four-and-twenty miles and fought a pitched battle on an empty stomach, reached their encamping ground; their tents were pitched, and it was on the hard ground and in the shade of the mango-trees that our exhausted countrymen sought for repose.

The action of Futtehpore, in the manner in which it was conducted, as well as in its result, was a type of many that were to follow. It showed that meeting the enemy face to face in the field, we must inevitably beat him; that he could not stand for an instant against our men: but it also evidenced that our deficiency in one arm, in cavalry, almost neutralised this vast superiority. We could beat the enemy, but we had no means of following him up; he was consequently able to take up a new position, often a stronger one, after each defeat.

If the Government had acceded to Captain Beatson's proposition already alluded to—if it had even adopted General Havelock's suggestion, of sending up the officers of disbanded corps to act as troopers—if it had called for volunteers from the infantry, and taking the horses from the native body guard, had sent them up by steamer, or by forced marches, in the middle of June, Havelock might have had at his disposal a body of 400 horse, splendidly mounted, and all drilled men. With these at Futtehpore, he could have destroyed many of the enemy; had they joined him even at Cawnpore, he could have annihilated him.

But of what avail was the iron firmness of our general, the unmatched bravery of our troops, placed under the control of red-tape officials? For want of cavalry, all their labours, all their exertions, all their privations were of comparatively little avail. The enemy, though invariably beaten, yet never followed up, aided too by that powerful sun under which they could move about with comfort, whilst its rays were fatal to our men, as constantly re-appeared, their leader rejoicing if, by the sacrifice of ten of his own followers, he could spill the blood of even one European.

On the 13th, the day after the action, Havelock halted his men, as well to give them rest as to bring in the captured guns and ammunition; much of the latter, which could not be brought on, was destroyed. It may here be mentioned that no sooner had the victory been gained, and our troops had entered Futtehpore, than the deputy-collector of that place, the man who had murdered Robert Tucker, Hikrimtoolah Khan, came out to meet us, little thinking that his crimes had been discovered. It is needless to add that he was at once seized, tried, and hanged.

On the 14th, the march was resumed. The road was strewn with evidences of the precipitancy of the enemy's flight, tents standing in their camp, chests of cartridges, and various articles of property. The morning was unmarked by any particular event, but one slight incident afforded an opportunity for disarming the Irregular Cavalry.

These men, after their disgraceful behaviour on the 12th, had been turned into baggage-guards. Whether they were unable to resist the temptation thus offered, or were actuated by a spirit of disaffection, is immaterial. On the morning of the 14th, as they were in rear with the baggage, the alarm was given that the enemy were in force in a village in front, whereupon the artillery was brought up, and a few rounds of shot and shell were fired into it. Hearing the firing in front, the sowars believed that a good opportunity offered to make free with the baggage. Fortunately, the alarm was a false one, and the plunderers were discovered in the very act. The Highlanders at once went after them; they were brought into camp, and at once disarmed and dismounted. Their horses were found useful for the public service.

It is an almost incredible, but well authenticated fact, that many of these men, disarmed on the 14th July, 1857, for base and treacherous behaviour, and for misconduct in the field on the 12th, were, on the 28th of August following, promoted to higher rank in their corps, one of them to the title of "Buhadoor" for "exemplary loyalty," and "conspicuous acts of devotion to the state,"—their loyalty consisting in their refusal to face the mutineers on the 12th, their devotion in attempting to plunder the baggage of our army!*

On the evening of the 14th, intelligence was received that the enemy had entrenched themselves at Aoung, a small village some six miles distant. Our force then started on the 15th, in anticipation of a fight. Directly Havelock came within range, their guns opened upon him; our artillery, however, had been greatly strengthened by the guns captured at Futtehpore; they at once moved to the front, the skirmishers aligned with them, as on the previous occasion. The enemy also threw out skirmishers, and sent his cavalry to turn our right flank: the guns and the Enfield rifles succeeded, after a smart encounter, in driving them back, but only that they might make a wider detour, and fall on our rear. But a sergeant of the Highlanders, who had been left in charge of the baggage and sick, collected all the stragglers, and received the enemy with such a volley that they were glad to make off. Meanwhile, their guns in front had been silenced by ours, and our men, pressing onwards under Colonel Tytler, carried the village after some hard fighting. The enemy were not here, as at Futtehpore, taken by surprise; they expected us, and fought much better.

* Vide Government Gazette, 29th August, 1857.

The names of the men who were dismounted on the 14th July, and promoted on 28th August, were as follows:—

Repaldar Heera Singh, 13th Irregular Cavalry, received title of Buhadoor for exemplary loyalty to the state, — dismounted.

Naib Repaldar Maharaj Singh, promoted to Repaldar for conspicuous acts of devotion to the state, — dismounted.

Duffadar Ulta Hossen Beg, promoted to Jemadar for ditto, — deserted.

Kote Duffadar Delaur Hossein, promoted to Ressaidar for ditto, — dismounted.

Duffadar Khurrug Singh, promoted to Jemadar for ditto, — dismounted.

Duffadar Share Singh, ditto, ditto, for ditto, — dismounted.

As our men halted on the other side to rest after the engagement, which had lasted fully two hours, information was received that the insurgents had retired to a very strong entrenchment on the other side of the Pandoo Nuddy, and that they were then preparing to blow up the bridge. Forward again was the cry: the troops got up with alacrity, and recommenced their march. They had scarcely gone three miles, when the little nullah, swollen by the rains to the dimensions of a large river, the stone bridge intact, and the enemy's entrenchment on the other side, burst upon the view. The bridge was guarded by two long 24-pounders, and we had just become visible, when a puff of smoke was seen, and the shot came pounding amongst our advance. Our guns of smaller calibre never attempted to reply, but moved on steadily in face of a continuous fire till well within range, when unlimbering, they opened fire. The effect was instantaneous. The fire of the enemy ceased as if by magic. It subsequently transpired that the first discharge from our guns had smashed their sponge-staffs, and, having none in reserve, they could no longer load their pieces. Finding the firing suddenly cease, the general sent forward the Fusiliers under Major Renaud, whilst the guns turned on the cavalry. The Fusiliers, advancing in skirmishing order, and covering the rest of the force, quickly gained the bridge, dashed on to it with rare gallantry at a run, and drove the enemy before them. The victory was now gained, and the guns, limbering up and crossing the bridge, poured a last volley on the flying enemy. It was ascertained, after the engagement, that, had we not advanced that afternoon, the bridge would have been blown up, and we should have been left to cross as best we could. There were no boats available for the purpose, and the river was not fordable. Our loss must necessarily have been very severe. Of such importance is promptitude in war.

In these two actions, we lost about five-and-twenty men in killed and wounded. But the loss most sensibly felt was that of Major Renaud, of the Madras Fusiliers, a most able officer, who had hitherto always commanded the advance. He was wounded in the thigh by a musket ball, whilst cheering on his men to the bridge; he did not survive more than two days. His short career in Bengal had been most brilliant, and he died nobly doing his duty.

In these actions, too, the want of cavalry paralysed our successes. With four hundred men, the slaughter at the Pandoo Nuddy might not only have been avoided, but our men going on might have held the bridge, and the insurgents would have been in our power.

Let it be remembered that, as will be recorded in full detail presently, it was on that very evening that the Nana Sahib, enraged at the defeat and flight of his legions, murdered in the most savage, horrible, heart-rending manner, our countrywomen at Cawnpore. It is not only possible, but probable that, if we had had cavalry, this awful catastrophe might have been prevented. Not only might the rebels have been hemmed in, in the manner described in the preceding paragraph, but a detachment, pushing on that night before the news of the defeat of his troops could have reached the Nana,

would, by their sudden arrival, have so terrified the Asiatic spirit, ready at all times to sink from excess of triumph to the lowest depth of depression, that he would have had neither time nor opportunity to execute his merciless intentions.

But we had no cavalry; and whilst the horses of the native body-guard were growing sleek in their stables near Calcutta, whilst hundreds of young officers were panting to flesh their maiden swords, and many infantry privates were available and anxious for the service, not a step was taken in the matter, no cavalry were embodied until it was "too late"* and for want of them our countrywomen were massacred.

Our tired soldiers bivouacked that night on the spot whence the last gun was fired at the retreating enemy. But to them there was little rest. That evening, Havelock received information that his most severe encounter would take place on the morrow, and that the Nana in person, at the head of 7000 men, would oppose his advance into Cawnpore, every defensible point of which had been strongly fortified.

This intelligence roused every one to fresh exertion. News had reached our camp the day before, that our unfortunate countrywomen were then alive, and our gallant troops were not without the hope that their exertions might not be altogether in vain — that they might yet arrive in time to save them. The very idea shook off all sense of fatigue. That night they moved on, proud in hope, and strong and stern in the thought of vengeance. Cawnpore was twenty-two miles distant: they marched that night and morning fourteen. Bivouacking then under the trees, and there cooking and eating their food, at 2 P.M. the signal for advance was given. They moved in the array of battle, the small body of volunteer cavalry in advance, the artillery behind, supported by the infantry. The heat was fearful: at every step some one fell out of the ranks, many never to return to them, and the calls for water were loud and continuous. After proceeding for about two miles, the force of the enemy became visible — every point guarded — the guns bearing on the road by which it was thought we must advance. But Havelock had determined to trust rather to generalship than to dash, or, to speak more correctly, to the combination of both. As soon then as he ascertained the position of the enemy's batteries, he still advanced his handful of cavalry to mask his movement, but made with the bulk of his force a detour to the right with the view of taking the enemy in flank. This masterly movement had all the effect he anticipated; the enemy's guns poured their showers of shot and shell in the direction of the cavalry, whilst the main body moved off unmolested. But our men had not proceeded half a mile before they were perceived, and the enemy at once changed the direction of their fire. Not a gun of ours replied. Havelock had resolved to reserve his fire, until it could take place with effect. Forward then, with sloped arms, our men advanced, trudging alternately through marshy and ploughed land, the fierce

* 23rd July.

sun beating down upon them, and the fire of the enemy taking effect around and amongst them. But one thought was in their hearts that day, a resolution to drive out the murderers of their comrades. Thus they progressed for about a quarter of an hour, till the turning-point of the flank march was gained. Then, wheeling up into one line with the artillery at intervals, they marched down upon the foe.

The enemy numbered about 5000 men: they had eight heavy guns in two separate batteries. Direct against these our troops advanced, the artillery coming forward and engaging the enemy's guns. So hot at this moment did their fire become, that our line was halted, and directed to lie down until our artillery should have silenced it.

But after a short interchange and pounding on both sides, it was found that the enemy's guns were so well protected that it would be impossible for our Artillery to silence them. There was nothing for it then but to try the bayonet. The Highlanders were lying down. Havelock came up to them, pointed to the enemy's battery, and told them to take it. The Highlanders rose, fired one rolling volley as they advanced, and then moved forward with sloped arms and measured tread like a wall—the rear rank locked up as if on parade—until within a hundred yards or so of the village, when the word was given to charge. Then they all burst forward, like an eager pack of hounds, racing to the kill, and in an instant they were over the mound and into the village. There was not a shot fired, or a shout uttered, for the men were very fierce, and the slaughter was proportionate.* Their general was with them. "Well done, 78th," said he. "You shall be my own regiment in future. Another charge like that will win the day." On they went then, through pools and mud, shouting and cheering, and the west battery was theirs.

Nor were the other regiments behindhand. Position after position fell to their unwavering line, the Sikhs vying with the Europeans. Devoid of cavalry, threatened on their flanks and rear, they were not diverted from the one great object of taking the batteries in front of them. The guns once in their possession, they felt sure that all other obstacles would vanish. Nevertheless their difficulties were all but insuperable. At one time they were entirely surrounded, and it appeared as though our soldiers would have to fight not for victory but for their lives. Still on they went. One officer, Lieut. Seton of the Fusiliers, having, with about forty men, got separated from his regiment, was dashed at by five hundred cavalry. Nothing daunted, Seton called his men round him, formed a rallying square, and with a rolling file firing from the Enfield rifles, &c., compelled them to retire.

The field was now almost gained; but there was one position which still kept up an unabated fire. A huge 24-pounder vomited forth continuous discharges; it was by one discharge from this gun that the 64th had lost six men in their first advance; they and the 84th were nearest it. Havelock went up to them and addressed a

* Correspondent, "Saturday Review."

few inspiring words. "That gun must be taken by the bayonet; I must have it. No firing; and recollect that I am with you." There needed no more; the two regiments advanced, the grape from the battery crashing through them. They fired four times before they charged, but when they did charge their onset was irresistible. All opposition was now over, but the troops still advanced; as they came upon the ridge which immediately overlooks the grand parade, the artillery came to the front and chased the rebels into the town: here again the want of cavalry was keenly felt; with the aid of that arm the enemy might have been cut up almost to a man, his retreat on Bithoor intercepted, and the Nana himself captured. As it was, he effected his escape across the canal, and thence marched leisurely on his stronghold. Our army bivouacked for the night on the plain of Jubada.

Such was the battle of Cawnpore, in which 1000 British troops and 300 Sikhs, labouring under every disadvantage, a powerful sun over their heads, a merciless enemy in their front strongly entrenched, without cavalry, and with an artillery of inferior weight, defeated 5000 native troops, armed and trained by our own officers. Perhaps in no action that ever was fought was the superior power of arrangement, moral force, personal daring, and physical strength of the European over the Asiatic more apparent. The rebels fought well; many of them did not flinch from a hand to hand encounter with our troops; they stood well to their guns, served them with accuracy: but yet, in spite of this, of their strong position, of their disproportionate excess in number, they were beaten.

Napoleon has, in his memoirs, alluded to the immense effect which *morale* has on the physical efforts of soldiers. Never was the truth of this axiom exemplified to a greater extent than at Cawnpore. The enemy were traitors and rebels, who had gained possession of the station which they were now fighting for by the treacherous and cruel murder of their masters; they were men not only without honour, but devoid even of a conscience; they pretended to have revolted from us on account of their religion, and yet the Hindoo portion of them, at least, had committed or connived at enormities which, according to their own impure theology, would have caused the transmigration of their souls into the meanest species of animal; they had, in fact, been corrupted from their allegiance by appeals to their avarice, and they were now fighting in the sole hope of being able to retain the plunder which had accrued to them by treachery and murder. Assailed by the countrymen of those whom they had murdered and despoiled, with what heart could these men combat? Their negation of conscience was their only saving clause, for, with that guilty witness in their bosoms, their evil deeds must have choked them!

On the other hand our men, strong in the conviction not of the justice only, but of the holiness of their cause, seeing before them, not an enemy they could respect, but the vilest assassins, murderers of women and children, were animated by a zeal and fervour which nothing could repress or resist. Had you directed one of those men,

on an ordinary day in cantonments, to walk ten miles under a July sun, fully armed and equipped, with sixty rounds of ammunition in his pouch, he would have considered it the most cruel order that could have been issued. But, animated by the holy feeling of revenging his murdered countrywomen, this was but a light undertaking. Neither the length of the road, the heat of the sun, the weight of his accoutrements, or the fire of the foe diminished his ardour : he was sensible when in action of none of these difficulties ; he pressed on, conquering and to conquer, because he felt that his cause was a righteous cause, and that in no other quarrel could the strength, the intelligence, and the capacity with which he had been endowed by his Maker be more nobly or more worthily employed.

Thus inspired, no numbers were too disproportioned. Our troops bivouacked on the Cawnpore parade ground ; no tents were pitched, but, after such a day's work, even the wet ground was a luxury ; and though disturbed for a few minutes by a false alarm of an enemy, they slept, and slept soundly.

Our loss, in killed and wounded, was about a hundred. But chiefly was to be mourned the death of Stuart Beatson, the Assistant-Adjutant-General. Arriving from Persia in a weakly state of health, and actuated solely by devotion to his country, he had endured with fortitude and even pleasure, all the privations of the campaign. He had ever been foremost in the fight, and had never lost an opportunity of showing his capacity. Though suffering from the effects of fatigue, he shrank not from the anticipated dangers of the 16th of July. But the sun, more dreaded than the enemy, struck him down. Recovering from this shock, it was yet only to meet the more fatal onslaught of cholera, which carried him off on the following day. In him, Havelock lost one of his ablest followers, the most earnest, disinterested of soldiers. In addition to his military acquirements, Stuart Beatson possessed very considerable literary capabilities, which he was fond of exercising. His store of varied knowledge, his genial wit, and his kindness of heart, made him a most delightful companion, one who will never be forgotten by the many friends who have been left to mourn his lot in India.

Our troops, I have said, slept on the night of the 16th. Let them sleep on, for the morrow will convey to them fearful tidings ; while they rest, be it our task to notice the occurrences which had taken place in Cawnpore and its vicinity since we last parted from it. And first must be recorded the tragedy of Futtehgurh.

Futtehgurh is a small station on the right bank of the river Ganges, eighty-three miles above Cawnpore. It is the head of the agency for the manufacture of gun carriages, being, by its vicinity to the vast forests of the Serai, peculiarly adapted for the storing of wood. The agency yard itself is merely an enclosure surrounded by mud walls on three sides, abutting on the river on the fourth. Within these walls is a bungalow for the residence of the agent, and large go-downs for the reception of muster guns, carriages, ammunition, &c.

The rising in the Bareilly district (which will be treated of in

another chapter), the revolt in Oudh, and the events at Cawnpore, had had their influence on the residents at Futtehgurh. They were thus cut off from all land communication with any of our military posts; the river alone was available. The troops at Futtehgurh consisted of a detail of Native Artillery, and the 10th Native Infantry. This latter was one of the regiments which had volunteered for and had proceeded to Burma, on the occasion of the late war with the King of Ava. It had there done good service. In addition to the officers of the 10th, there were at Futtehgurh the gun-carriage agent, Major Robertson, the judge, magistrate, and an assistant, Colonel Goldie, his wife, and his daughters, on leave, the chaplain, the Reverend Mr. Fisker, several indigo-planters, tent-makers, merchants, and others. Here, also, were the native Orphan Asylum, and a large native Christian community under the special care of the members of the American Presbyterian mission, a most devoted body of men. So great was the alarm amongst the non-military portion that, on the 3d of June, they held a meeting, and resolved to leave Futtehgurh by boat on the following day, it having been currently reported that the 10th had resolved to mutiny on the 5th. The party, consisting of about 166, including women and children, started accordingly at one o'clock on the morning of the 4th, and got on very well as far as they went. The next morning they were joined by three officers of the 10th, with the information that that regiment had mutinied.

This intelligence was untrue. The fact was, that there was an attempt to break out of the jail; some of the convicts actually did get out, and, firing a portion of the station, advanced towards the cantonment. It was this that the three officers mistook for the mutiny of the regiment, and to avoid its effects they went off to join the boats; had they remained, they would have seen their own men turning out willingly and beating back and securing the jail-birds.

The boats meanwhile went on, but were fired upon by the villagers; information also reached the fugitives that the Oudh troops had assembled a little below to obstruct their further passage. Whilst they were debating on their plans, Hurdeobukhsh, an Oudh landholder, and owner of the petty fort or "gurhee" of Dhurrumpore, offered them protection, if they would remain with him. The counsels were divided. Forty, however, including two of the officers, the collector, Mr. Probyn and his wife, and Mr. Edwards, accepted the offer. The boats, then carrying only 126 passengers, went on downwards towards Cawnpore; they could have met with little obstruction, as it is known they reached that station on the 12th. But tidings of their arrival had preceded them; they were intercepted and taken on shore, and massacred by Nana Sahib in the manner recorded in the seventh chapter. Meanwhile the majority of the party, which had taken refuge at Dhurrumpore, hearing that the troops at Futtehgurh had not mutinied, resolved to return thither. This they did. Mr. Probyn, his wife and family, and Mr. Edwards, alone remaining.

At Futtehgurh all had been quiet: the military had been engaged in as far as possible providing against an outbreak. Still the behaviour of the 10th had been on the whole satisfactory. A few of the young Sepoys had indeed on one occasion shown a refractory spirit, but the firmness and promptitude of the colonel—Colonel Smith, a capital officer—had put it down most effectually. Had they been left to themselves, all would still have gone well; but they were about to be exposed to new dangers and temptations.

On the 15th June, the revolted 41st Native Infantry, fresh from the slaughters of Seetapore and Mohammerah*, arrived on the left bank of the Ganges opposite Futtehgurh. They at once sent over to the 10th an invitation to join them in murdering their officers and seizing the treasure. But the men of the 10th, even if they would have accepted the former proposal, saw no advantage in sharing treasure which was already *de facto* theirs. They accordingly replied to the 41st that they would have nothing to do with rebels and traitors, and were resolved to remain true to their salt. At the same time, by order of their commanding officer, they zealously set to work in breaking up the bridge of boats which connected the right bank of the river with the left, and in sinking all the other boats they could lay hands on.

On the evening of the 17th June, however, the 41st, having ascended the river, found the means of crossing,—the same having been furnished, it is supposed, by the Nawab †,—and that night marched down towards Futtehgurh. On hearing of their approach, there was a great commotion in the lines of the 10th; many wished to remain faithful; others were as resolved to take possession of the treasure. A bold movement decided them; the Grenadier Company seized the bullocks, yoked them to the treasure cart, and marching to the Nawab, saluted him as ruler of the district; the treasure, however, they kept to themselves. They then, joining the 41st, marched to attack the Sepoys who remained faithful to us; many of these, seeing the course of events, joined them, but a few, conspicuous amongst whom was the havildar major, still held out, even to blows; but they were beaten and dispersed, and the havildar major hanged as an example to the rest.

Meanwhile our countrymen and women, one hundred and ten in number, of whom thirty-three only were able-bodied men, had retired into the Agency Compound, which served them as a fort. They had about three hundred muskets, seven guns, viz. three, six, and nine-pounders, and twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four pound howitzers, and a small brass mortar. But there was a very limited supply of ammunition,—even of gunpowder,—and they lay therefore under the necessity of husbanding their resources as much as possible.

On the 27th June the attack on their position began. It is needless to follow them through the daily round of their defence, varied

* To be recorded subsequently.

† The Nawab of Futtehgurh, a Mahomedan and a man of great influence, has since assumed the government of the district.

as it was by few uncommon incidents. Suffice it to say that after defending themselves with great spirit up to the 4th July, with two practicable breaches in the walls, with a mine underneath them almost ready to be sprung, wearied with fatigue, two of their number killed, others disabled, they resolved on evacuating their position, and trusting to the Ganges. On the 4th July, accordingly, they embarked in three boats, and started. As they passed the fort, the Sepoys saw them, and calling out, "The Feringhees are running away," pursued them with a hot fire for about a mile along the banks, but happily without effect.

They had not proceeded far before one of the boats became unmanageable, and they shifted into two. In these they proceeded in safety as far as a place called Singheerampore. Here, unfortunately, one of the boats grounded. Guns were immediately opened upon her from the bank, and although our countrymen, wading in the water, made many efforts to shove her off, they were all fruitless. They had been in this position half an hour, when two boats, apparently empty, were seen coming down the stream; on approaching them, they were found to be filled with Sepoys, who immediately opened a strong fire of musketry on our party. Not content with this, they came close and commenced boarding the boat. On seeing this, and finding resistance ineffectual, our countrymen resolved rather to fall into the hand of God than of man, and to trust rather to the Ganges than to the mercy of the Sepoys. In carrying out this resolve, many of course were drowned, — all the ladies and children. But Major Robertson, and Mr. Churcher, junior, succeeded in reaching the shore, and were cared for by friendly natives. Mr. Fisher too, and Mr. Jones*, swam on and were taken up by the sole remaining boat.

But on board of this everything was in confusion; attracted, however, by voices from the shore, they put in for the night, and were kindly received by the villagers. Here Mr. Jones, suffering intensely from a wound, remained, careless of the fate that might be in store for him, and to this circumstance he owed his life. The remainder of the fugitives started on the following morning, and proceeded safely as far as a village just above Bithoor, of which † a man named Jussa Singh was the Zumindar. As they were passing this, the people on the bank called out that their Rajah was friendly to the British. Allured by this statement they took the boat into the bank, but they had no sooner landed than they were made prisoners by the Zumindar. Information of their seizure was forthwith sent to Nana Sahib, who immediately despatched carriages and other conveyances for the ladies and children, twenty-three in number, whilst the men, of whom there were twelve, walked. They were, with the exceptions already noted, the sole survivors of the Futteh-gurh party. On arriving at Cawnpore, on the evening of the 11th July, they were thrust into the little house in which our country-

* From whose narrative these particulars are chiefly taken.

† Statement of Lall Khan.

women, the survivors of the tragedies of the 27th and 28th of June, were congregated.

Here they were, in a small, confined building, lying in filth, without comfort of any sort, their food, bread, water, and salt, their bedding, the hard floor. Surrounded by savages who insulted them, who took a delight in their miseries, their children pining, even dying before their eyes, themselves powerless to help them—what must have been their feelings? They must at least have felt satisfied that, in the event of their murder, they would be terribly avenged. Hoping, perhaps, that they might be relieved, they must at times have anticipated their fate. Themselves Englishwomen, accustomed all their lives to exact courtesy from others, they must, even at the last hour, have been animated by a proud consciousness that England's hand would yet reach the fiends that were tormenting them. The inscriptions on the wall prove this; these show that our murdered ladies were animated by a full conviction that we should advance, and that speedily, to the rescue, though not in time to save, yet certainly to avenge them.

And it must be acknowledged that of those who have been engaged in the terrible work of retribution, all parties but one have done their duty nobly. Our generals, our officers, our soldiers, have lost no opportunity of dealing out a vengeance as prompt as it has been severe. The Government of India alone has held back; the Government of India alone, by its representatives in Government House, has openly proclaimed its sympathy with our "poor Sepoys." Not a word for our suffering soldiers, not a syllable of commiseration for our murdered countrywomen: but even after the event I am now about to record had been published, for whomsoever sympathy might have been felt, it was expressed at the parties in Government House only for the Sepoys who had been disarmed because they had conspired!

It will presently be shown that these were not mere words: that all the acts of the Government of India have tended to show, that they considered these mutinous, murdering Sepoys in the light of pet children, who should be coaxed back to their duty, and in no case punished for their bloody deeds.

People have talked, and may still talk, of strengthening the hands of this Government? Of what use is it to strengthen the hands when the head is weak, the heart tainted, the blood cold—the whole system rotten. To strengthen the hands of such a one, is to infuse fresh poisonous virus into the body, to give greater capabilities for mischief.

To return to the sad story of our countrywomen. There were upwards of one hundred and eighty of them in that little two roomed house that has been so often described. On the morning of the 15th, the Nana's best troops had gone out to stay our progress at Pondoo Nuddy; in the evening they came back baffled, beaten, savage. Defeated by our men they resolved to work vengeance on our unarmed women. The Nana was nothing loth. He forthwith gave the order for an unreserved massacre. It was a congenial task for the fiends by whom he was surrounded. With every kind of weapon,

from the bayonet to the butcher's knife, from the battle-axe to the club, they assaulted these English ladies; they cut off their breasts, they lopped off limbs, they beat them down with clubs, they trampled on them with their feet: their children they tossed upon bayonets: blood flowed like water, but they were not glutted, nor did they quit that building, till they were satisfied that not a living soul remained behind them. The bodies yet warm, in some life not yet extinct, were dragged into a well hard by, limb separated from limb, — all were thrown in in one commingled mass: the blood was left to soak into the floor, to remain a lasting memento of insatiable vengeance.

It was this sight which met our victorious soldiers on the 17th July, as they entered the re-conquered station. The 84th in advance marched across the canal, and scoured the town, but scarcely one rebel soldier was to be seen; they had all left on the previous evening for Bithoor, after blowing up the magazine in their retreat. As our troops moved on, a dark looking man, apparently almost mad with terror, rushed towards them, and announced himself to be the sole survivor of the Cawnpore massacre. This was Mr. Shepherd, a commissariat clerk; he had left the entrenchment in June, two days before the surrender, in the disguise of a cook. Being almost at once apprehended, he had been taken before the Nana, and sentenced to hard labour on the roads. During the panic of our advance on the 16th, he had been apparently forgotten, for he found no obstruction in the way of his escape. He has since written a lucid narrative of the events of the siege, which must form the basis of any authentic history of that fearful period. The troops then encamped, and the officers proceeded in their search for survivors. Too soon the dismal truth broke upon them; there were not wanting men to point out to them the charnel-house. It was a flat-roofed building, containing two rooms, with a court-yard between, in the manner of native houses. The floor of the inner room was found two inches deep in blood, — it came over the men's shoes as they stepped. Ladies' hair, back combs, parts of religious books, children's shoes, hats, bonnets, lay scattered about the room; there were marks of sword-cuts on the walls low down, as if the women had been struck at as they crouched. From the well at the back of the house the naked bodies, limb separated from limb, protruded out. It was a sight sickening, heart-rending, maddening. It had a terrible effect on our soldiers. Those who had glanced upon death in every form, could not look down that well a second time. Christian men who had hitherto spared a flying foe, came out bearing a portion of a dress or some such relic in their hands, and declaring that, whenever they might feel disposed for mercy, they would look upon that, and steel their hearts.

Meanwhile, Havelock had sent on the 15th a pressing message to Neill at Allahabad for reinforcements. This officer, who, possibly to compensate for his supersession, possibly to ensure him against the recurrence of such a calamity, had been created a Brigadier-General, sent off two hundred and twenty-seven men that same afternoon, and started himself on the 16th. He arrived on the 20th. On the previous day Havelock had marched with a strong detachment of his

force towards Bithoor, over a very difficult country, in which the enemy was reported to be strongly entrenched. But Havelock met with no opposition, the Nana despairing of success had crossed with the main body of his troops into Oudh, leaving behind him fifteen guns, several horses, and cattle of every description. His palace was fired, and his magazine blown up; our troops then returned to Cawnpore with their spoil, to prepare for fresh toils, and renewed exertions.

Before following them in this undertaking, it will be necessary to review the position of our troops in Lucknow.

We left them there on the 2nd of June, holding the Residency, Muchee Bawun, and the cantonments. But in the interval between the 2nd and the 30th, the whole of Oudh had risen, and although our troops were not very closely invested, still they were surrounded, and in no little danger. The native troops, those belonging to the 13th Native Infantry especially, six or seven hundred in number, had for some time remained staunch, and by their means they were enabled to maintain an imposing front, and to overawe the rebels from attacking them. Their communication by means of cossids or native messengers was still open, and it was through Sir Henry Lawrence, that the disastrous events at Cawnpore were first made known to the Government. On the 14th of June Sir Henry received a message from General Wheeler, asking for aid: it pained his noble heart to be compelled to refuse, but he could not spare one company without endangering the lives of those for whom he was responsible; but he sent off a message at once to Calcutta, pointing out in the strongest terms the perilous hazard to which Wheeler was exposed.

His own position was full of danger. Although able himself to despatch messages, none were received by him. On the 24th June, he wrote to Colonel Neill, then commanding at Allahabad, that he had received no intelligence from any quarter for twenty days, and that from every side the mutineers were threatening him. Nearer and nearer did they advance; the provisions of our garrison were gradually failing them. Still Sir Henry Lawrence and most of the officers were of opinion that it would be the wiser plan to endeavour to hold their own position, and to procure provisions by sorties, than to risk the safety of the entire force by an attack upon the enemy's positions. But one or two so very strongly held an opposite view, believing that our inaction would only increase the number of our enemies, and that we had only to appear to be victorious, that Sir Henry gave in, and towards the end of June, resolved to take the first favourable opportunity of making a dash at the enemy.

On the 29th June, information was received, that a large body of the enemy, some 6000 in number, preceded by an advanced guard of about 1,000 men was advancing steadily from Fyzabad, in the direction of the canal, and that the smaller party would arrive the following morning. It was at once determined to take hold of this opportunity and to destroy that advanced body. Accordingly at daybreak on the 30th, a party consisting of three companies of H.M. 32nd, thirty volunteer cavalry, eleven guns, including an 8-inch howitzer, manned by native artillerymen, and 120 sowars, went forth from the

cantonment ; they marched about six miles to a place called Chinbut, when, instead of only 1000 men, they found the entire insurgent army in position behind a village, in which they had fixed a battery of heavy guns. From these, on the approach of our men, they opened a very heavy fire. Our artillery, however, reserving its fire till well within range, replied with such effect, that that of the enemy was silenced, and their centre was forced back. The victory was ours, when at this critical moment our artillerymen of the Oudh battery overturned the guns into the ditches and abandoned them, thus totally exposing our flanks. On these the enemy's horse at once made a dash, and it required all the coolness and intrepidity of our men to effect their retreat to the Residency. Our loss was very great: of the three companies of the 32nd, and the European artillery, 130 were left on the field ; we lost besides three light guns and one 8-inch howitzer ; we forfeited our prestige, and, what was of even greater importance, Sir Henry Lawrence received a severe wound.

The rebels followed up their success with extraordinary pertinacity. Before 12 o'clock that day, round shot and shell were flying into the Residency, and Sir Henry Lawrence felt that his position was ten times as bad as before the attack. He wrote to General Neill that day, that unless relieved within fifteen or twenty days, he would scarcely be able to hold his ground.

It became also necessary, in consequence of the defection of the natives, and of our loss in Europeans, to contract the position. The cantonments were abandoned on the 1st, and on the 2nd, as much ammunition and supplies as could be taken away having been moved out of it, the Muchee Bawun was blown up, and the besieged were all concentrated in the Residency. On the 2nd and 3rd, by these movements, by the accumulation of one month's supplies, and by the proved ability to repulse all the attacks of the enemy, the spirit of our men revived, and they were reported as being hearty and confident.

On the following day (the 4th), Sir Henry Lawrence was killed by the bursting of a shell in the room in which he lay wounded.*

In him India lost one of the worthiest of her adopted sons. An honest and able administrator, an artillery officer of marked ability in his profession, a good Christian in whatever situation he had been placed, he had been able to advance at the same time the interests of his country and of his God. Unlike the Government of which he was the agent, in his eyes those duties were not antagonistic. The consequence was, that he, sooner than any man, gained the respect and admiration of those amongst whom he was placed, and he was thereby rendered able to perform actions, which in men inferior in capacity, and less reliant on their conviction of right, would have been deemed hazardous and imprudent. But not to great things alone had his attention been turned : his was a mind active to ferret out suffering, in order that he might relieve it. Impressed, after the Sutlej campaign, with the unhappy condition of the children and orphans of the soldiers who had been struggling for their country, he established, in 1846, the Lawrence

* He was struck on the 2nd, and died on the 4th.

Asylum, a noble institution, in which a Christian education, and, if possible, employment, is provided for the wards. But in every department of life his active benevolence was conspicuous. He was in fact a man, great in the world's estimate of greatness and good, if sincerity of belief, abnegation of self, and untiring devotion to duty, constitute goodness.

Almost immediately before the Chief Commissionership of Oudh had been offered to him, his medical adviser had recommended his return to England, assuring him that his life would not be worth two years' purchase if he remained in India. But the terms in which the virtual government of Lucknow were offered forbade him to think of life. He was a man selected in a crisis: what was life to him, except as his existence might benefit others? He at once accepted the position, and by so doing saved the lives of our countrymen at Lucknow, by at least deferring the catastrophe.

He died on the 4th July: not till the 21st September did the Government of India notice his demise, and then only because the merchants and public of Calcutta threatened to hold a public meeting to do honour to his memory. The press, gagged as it was, had spoken out on his behalf, but, — he was a military man — his measures, so far as he could regulate them, had been eminently successful — his administration had formed a marked contrast to the administration of India and the north-west provinces. The Government could afford to praise Mr. Colvin: no amount of encomium from Lord Canning could elevate Sir Henry Lawrence in the public estimation!

Hence, probably, the more than ten weeks' silence!

On Sir Henry's decease, the direction of affairs was assumed by Major Banks, an officer of very great ability. From the 4th to the 20th July, the siege assumed as it were a chronic form: the enemy daily firing, but doing little damage, our garrison remaining closely packed within the walls, officers and men alike working at the defences with untiring industry. These were of the meanest description; but such was the innate dread of the European face to face, that the enemy seldom ventured on a real attack.

But on the 20th July they were more bold. They had probably heard of the state of affairs at Cawnpore, and were resolved at one effort to exterminate the Lucknow garrison also. They came on in swarms, pounding with their heavy guns; their fire of musketry was incessant; their numbers were actually countless. They had every advantage; yet, in spite of their numbers, their perseverance, their showers of shot and shell, our countrymen never yielded an inch, but compelled their assailants, before the shades of evening had fallen, to desist from the attack.

This happened on the 20th July. On that date Havelock was crossing the Ganges to relieve them: it is time we should return to him.

Having demolished Bithoor, and having been joined by all the reinforcements he could expect, Havelock made preparations for crossing his little army into Oudh. Fortunately the means were at hand. The little steamer "Burhampootee," which left Allahabad on the 30th

July, having on board Lieutenant Spurgin, and a hundred Fusiliers, armed with Enfield rifles, and two guns, had arrived, after effecting capital service on the way. At one spot a little above Allahabad, guns had opened out on her from the bank. Lieutenant Spurgin at once went on shore with a detachment, charged the gun, put the enemy to flight, and captured it. The range of the Enfield rifles had effectually cleared both banks of the many small parties who were lying in wait there in hopes of a repetition of the tragedy of Cawnpore or Futtehgurh. The steamer managed to reach Cawnpore about the same time as Havelock's column, her instructions having been to co-operate with it as far as possible, and on no account to steam on in advance.

On the 21st July Havelock commenced crossing his artillery, the infantry following on the succeeding days. On the 25th, the whole force, amounting to about 1500 men, were united on the left bank, holding the only road to Lucknow, thence fifty miles distant. All the sick and wounded were left at Cawnpore, under General Neill, who, with three hundred men at his disposal, had received directions to maintain that station, and to restore order in the district. How well he executed both these commissions will be recorded a little further on.

Havelock crossed over on the 25th, and advanced that day to Nungurwar, a little village five miles on the Lucknow road: Here he halted, in order to complete his arrangements for the carriage of his ammunition and supplies. The men were without tents; the entire country was under water, and along the hard road alone could any advance be made with rapidity. This was a very great disadvantage to an attacking force, as the villages were all built upon the road, which, being straight without any windings, could be entirely commanded by the guns placed in them. The state of the country, therefore, compelled every attack to be made in the face of a heavy fire, without any possibility of avoiding it by a flank movement.

On the 29th July, every arrangement having been completed, Havelock set out at five o'clock in the morning. He had not proceeded five miles before the advanced pickets of the enemy warned him that he was approaching their strong position. He at once deployed his infantry, halted them in a clump of trees, and ordered them to lie down. The Fusiliers and Highlanders in skirmishing order, with two guns aligned with them, he moved to the front. He found the enemy occupying a very strong position in the village or town of Oona, stretching for about a mile along his front, and terminating on either side in an impassable swamp. In advance of it was a succession of small gardens and walled enclosures, filled with the enemy's skirmishers; the town itself was intersected by a road, at a distance of about a quarter of a mile from its extreme right. This road was commanded by the loopholed houses on either side of it, whilst batteries were so placed as to be able to pour a concentrated fire on any troops advancing against the town. In addition to this, our preparations had scarcely been completed, when another body, the remnants of the cavalry of Nana Sahib, were observed advancing on our left rear, thus threatening our communications. They were

commanded by Jussa Singh, the villain who had entrapped the fugitives from Futtehghurb.

Nothing daunted by the strength of the enemy's position, Havelock, after a brief reconnoissance, gave the order to advance. It was obeyed with alacrity, the artillery, as usual, reserving its fire till well within range: they then opened, and made such good practice that that of the enemy was speedily silenced. Still, however, they kept up a very galling musketry fire from the walled enclosures and loopholed houses guarding the approaches to the road. Havelock therefore ordered the 64th to drive them out of these outworks. They rushed forward at once; but one of their number, whose name deserves to be recorded, Private Cavenagh, a man of great personal strength, dashed in front of the line, cleared the wall with a bound, and found himself face to face with at least a dozen sword armed Mahomedans. He killed one or two of them; but before his comrades could join him, he had been overpowered, and literally hacked to pieces. His death was speedily avenged; the 64th on one side, the Madras Fusiliers and Highlanders on the other, were quickly amongst them. Lieutenant Bogle of the latter corps attacked a house filled with armed fanatics; and though wounded severely in the attempt to penetrate it, his object was attained. The rebels were either bayoneted, or driven helter-skelter through the town, and their strong position was gained.

But though the town was gained, the enemy had not yet given up all hope of victory. As our troops debouched from the narrow road on to the plain beyond, the rebel cavalry, which were in swarms, made as if they would attack them; but they wanted the pluck to charge the thin red line that at once formed up to receive them. Their infantry, however, had taken up a new position in the open, and were still threatening us. Thereupon Havelock, collecting his men, advanced upon them at once in echelon of batteries and detachments from the right. They scarcely waited the attack, but at the first charge made off, leaving all their guns in our possession. Our loss in this engagement was eighty-eight in killed and wounded: theirs was necessarily more severe.

It was now half-past eleven o'clock, and there was a burning sun overhead. The general, therefore, halted to allow the men to take their breakfast and a little rest. At two, P.M., the advance was again sounded, and our men, refreshed, but suffering fearfully from the intense heat and the burning sun, moved on: they passed at about two miles the little river Lôn without opposition. Four miles beyond they came to a large gheet, or pond, the water of which, owing to the general inundation, was running like a river: on the opposite side of this, in the town of Bessaruthgung, the enemy, strongly entrenched, were awaiting our arrival. Bessaruthgung is a walled town, situated in an open country; not a tree was there anywhere to afford shelter for our skirmishers: it is surrounded by a wet ditch, and in front of it the gheel referred to; in rear of it is a still larger piece of water, having all the appearance of a lake at this season, crossed by a narrow causeway and bridge. It is flanked on either side by a swamp. The road approaching to it was commanded by four pieces of cannon, mounted

on a round tower, by which the gateway was supported. Havelock having reconnoitred, thought that it would be possible to cut off the enemy from the causeway in rear, whilst he attacked them in front. The 64th he detached on this duty: whilst they waded up to their hips in the swamp on the right of the town, he advanced with the main body, the guns in front, interlined with skirmishers, direct against the town. The enemy's fire was heavy, but their guns had too high an elevation, and did little damage: ours, on the contrary, played with great effect on the gateway. Under their cover the Fusiliers and Highlanders steadily gained ground. When within charging distance they rushed forward with the bayonet. There was a sharp but short struggle at the earth-works, the enemy fighting with great determination; but no sooner were these gained — Lieutenant Dangerfield, of the Fusiliers, showing his men the way over — than the town was in our possession, the enemy retreating by the causeway to the village on the other side of the lake, from which they kept up an unintermitting fire all night.

It was six o'clock before even the town was gained, and our troops were completely knocked up. All had behaved nobly: Colonel Tytler, scarcely able to sit his horse from sickness, had given to the General "glorious support." Officers and privates had vied together in the terrible struggle. But if they had done well they had also suffered severely. Numbers of them had been struck down by the terrible sun; others, from the damp, the exposure, the want of dry clothes, had fallen victims to cholera and dysentery: in two days, from these causes and the fire of the enemy, the effective strength of the force had been reduced to 1200 men. The General found, indeed, that from these combined influences he was losing at the rate of fifty men per diem. He could leave no men behind to keep open communication with Cawnpore; all the wounded must accompany him. There were still thirty-six miles between him and Lucknow. As the enemy fell back they approached their resources, as we advanced ours became fewer and less available.

These considerations probably induced General Havelock to retire for the present to Cawnpore, with the intention, not of abandoning our garrison at Lucknow, but of making a new advance after having deposited his sick and wounded in a place of safety.

On the following morning the troops were allowed to rest. At noon all of them were moved into the town of Bessaruthung, and orders were issued to prepare for a move at two o'clock, P.M. Great was the surprise of the men when they ascertained that this move was to be in retreat; that they were to abandon the ground they had gained after so much hard fighting: it, dispirited them. But as they came to reason on the subject, they admitted the prudence of their General. The force retired that night to Oonao, and on the following morning (31st July) to Mungurwa. From this point Havelock detached his sick and wounded into Cawnpore (five miles distant), detailed to General Neill the cause of his retirement, and begged that officer to send on all the reinforcements that he could spare.

Meanwhile Neill had been engaged in the work of restoring order

at Cawnpore. His first object was to render his own position secure. To this end he selected a high piece of ground, on the river bank, commanding every approach to it, and made an entrenched camp. He then authorised a levy of sweeper police *, and issued a proclamation, that if within seven days from that time goods, proved to have been the property of our murdered countrymen, were found in the possession of any native, he would be liable to be hanged; at the same time a rigid search was instituted throughout the city, the bazaar, and the neighbouring villages, and an immense quantity of plunder was recovered. Every day, too, rebel Sepoys and others were brought in; were it proved that they had taken a part against our countrymen, they were taken to the charnel house, and compelled with their own hands to wipe up a portion of the blood of our murdered ladies. This operation was in itself sufficient to deprive them of their caste, and they went to the performance of it with more abhorrence than to the gallows. It may appear incredible, but it is a fact, that the high civilians, amongst them a secretary to Government, in Calcutta, disapproved of this proceeding, pronouncing it unchristian, inasmuch as it deprived the victims, in their last hour, of all hope of heaven; as if those blood-stained scoundrels, who had lived all their lives without honour and without a conscience, whose theory of an after-death state consisted in a belief in transmigration of souls, possessed any real sense of religion! If they had had any, the contemplation of their own deeds would have been more harrowing than the performance of an act, the degradation of which, in their eyes, consisted in their being seen to perform it; but as they had none, it were surely far better that their punishment should be aggravated, and that they should leave this world with the conviction that their vile souls were about to migrate into the bodies of cats and monkeys!

So at least thought Neill. He was not to be disturbed by the scruples of men† who were ever the most violent antagonists of their own religion, and, in spite of their remonstrances, the wiping up the blood and the hanging went on without interruption. Amongst those who underwent this disgrace and this penalty was an old subadar of the 1st Native Infantry, who had been most fierce in his animosity against our countrywomen. Had he known that in his last moments he possessed the sympathy of our Members of Council and Secretaries, his end might have been more dignified than it was!

By these and similar energetic measures order was soon restored in Cawnpore; the defences also progressed rapidly, and confidence in the stability of our rule began once more to prevail amongst the well-inclined natives.

Neill received Havelock's message on the 1st August; he at once took charge of the sick and wounded, and sent on to him every available man he had, trusting to his own *prestige* and the convales-

* Men of the lowest caste.

† The members of the Government of India who oppose Christian education and support Juggernath!

cents in hospital to keep his entrenchment. In this he acted a noble part,—a nobler never was performed. Havelock had superseded him, but he risked his own safety to ensure the success of Havelock's onward movement.

This latter General, having got rid of his non-effective men, and having received a small reinforcement, which brought up his force to about fourteen hundred men, again prepared for offensive operations.

On the 4th of August, having completed his arrangements, he sent his cavalry to reconnoitre. Oonao was found evacuated, but as they neared Bessaruthung it became evident that it was there that the enemy had resolved to make a stand. They had apparently taken up a very strong position in rear of the town, in a row of smaller hamlets abutting on the lake beyond it. Being fired upon on their approach, our men retired to Oonao, and bivouacked for the night; they were there joined by the main column. Next morning (the 5th), at dawn of day, our troops marched. There were but six miles between them and the enemy, and the ground had been trodden over before. As they came near, Havelock went forward with the cavalry to reconnoitre their position. It was very strong, and Havelock, notwithstanding the difficulties of the ground, resolved to attempt to turn it. With this view, sending up the cavalry to the front, to within about seven hundred yards of their position, to occupy their attention, he ordered the light guns and a portion of the infantry to make a flank movement to the right. This manœuvre succeeded; the enemy were completely taken by surprise, and after a brisk cannonading, in which our shells did fearful execution amongst them, they evacuated their first position, and fell back upon a second on the other side of the lake.

Here it was impossible to turn them: the only practicable road was a kind of causeway and bridge across the lake. Our men, pushing over this, found the enemy in great force, occupying a second line of villages. From these a heavy fire at once opened upon our advance, but their guns being badly laid, the shot went principally over the heads of our men: these dashed on unhesitatingly, and drove the enemy from village to village, until they fled into the plain beyond. Here they could no longer be followed up: their horse artillery, and their swarms of cavalry, effectively protected their retreat; our men too were knocked up, and it was necessary to spare them as much as possible.

That evening cholera again made its appearance amongst our men: this circumstance, our losses, and the strong position taken up by the enemy, again induced Havelock to retreat. The next morning, accordingly, he once more retired upon Mungurwa.

Here he lay recruiting his men for four or five days; but resolving not yet to give up Lucknow, he again, on the morning of the 11th, moved them in that direction. His intentions he had kept to himself, and no one in the force knew whither they were going, or how long they were to be absent. The force was by this time reduced to about a thousand men, but the same daring spirit still animated all, and they were relieved rather than dispirited, when the order to advance

was given. They moved out that morning in the old order, the volunteer cavalry in advance, the artillery in the centre, the main body of the infantry supporting it. On approaching Oonao, they came across the enemy's advanced picket. About three miles beyond, their new position came in view, stretching about five miles, with strong batteries of guns at intervals; and their centre so well masked by walls, gardens, and entrenchments, as to be almost invisible. In front was their cavalry in skirmishing order. It was not the object of the General to provoke an engagement that day; he accordingly gave orders to retire slowly on Oonao. This operation was performed in perfect order, without any molestation from the enemy. It was dusk when our force reached that place; no supplies were ready for them, and they went dinnerless to bed on the wet ground. In the middle of the night a heavy shower came on, which did not tend to their comfort. Nevertheless at dawn of day they rose uncomplaining, rendered perhaps even more eager, from their hunger, to have a dash at the enemy. In anticipation of meeting him at the same spot where they had seen him on the previous evening, they marched at sunrise. Soon they came upon him; his line drawn up in the manner previously described, his guns well sheltered, his cavalry on the flanks: in front of him a broad open plain, across which our infantry must advance unsheltered, and with but a handful of cavalry to protect their flanks. Their line, as I have said, stretched out for about five miles; ours, on deploying, did not extend half a mile: there could not have been less than 20,000 of them in the field. Havelock must then have felt, if he had not been sensible before, that, although he might beat these men, he could never, with his present force, hope to reach Lucknow. In their relative positions, and with their relative forces, there was but one mode of proceeding: manœuvring was out of the question; he must beat them by the exhibition of sheer British pluck, or not at all. No one knew this better than the General: his position, indeed, was something similar to that of Sir Charles Napier at Meeanee, and he adopted similar tactics.

Covered by artillery and skirmishers, our troops advanced in echelon of battalions from the right. As they came within range the enemy unmasked his batteries and poured in a deadly fire; round shot, shell, canister, grape, and shrapnel flew around, about, and amongst our men; fortunately their guns were levelled too high, and the round shot principally went over the heads of our advancing array: still the fire was fearful; it did not, however, for an instant check our men; on they went covered by the guns, till at length these latter had obtained a sufficiently advanced position to get a flanking fire on the enemy's line: this appeared to paralyse them, and at the same moment the Highlanders, who were on the extreme right, making a dashing charge, carried the enemy's left battery of two guns. This completed their panic, they at once turned and fled, and our guns and their own captured batteries turning on them completed their confusion. On the left we had been equally successful. There the enemy's cavalry had attempted to turn our flank; but the

Madras Fusiliers nobly repulsed them: they fled with the remainder of the line.

The victory was gained; but it was one of those victories which must have called to the General's mind the despairing exclamation of Pyrrhus. He had lost one hundred and forty men out of a thousand, and had not advanced ten miles on his road to Lucknow. There was but one course to pursue,—to abandon all thought of reaching that place for the present, and to fall back upon Cawnpore. If there had been wanting any further argument to persuade him to this measure, he had it in the intelligence which reached him about this time, that the Nana Sahib had crossed in great force, and was threatening that station.

His mind was made up. But he held possession of the field of battle; rested on it for two hours, then taking with him the two guns, trophies of the victory, slowly retired on Mungurwa. The following morning, the 13th August, he recrossed the Ganges, and rejoined General Neill at Cawnpore.

He found this officer threatened on all sides: on his right, the Nana Sahib had re-occupied Bithoor in great strength, pushing out his advanced pickets towards the station; on his left, and occupying the plain of Subada, was another detachment of rebels threatening the station. Until the arrival of Havelock, Neill had been unable to leave his entrenched position to attack one party, without leaving that position exposed to the other. However, he was now able to act otherwise.

Havelock arrived on the evening of the 13th of August. The 14th was devoted to rest; on the 15th Neill moved out and attacked the enemy posted near the ground on which the battle of Cawnpore was fought, about six miles from his camp. They could not stand before him; they did not even attempt more than a nominal resistance, and fled almost at the first discharge. The mere fact of Neill going to attack him had the most beneficial effect, and it enabled Havelock to concentrate all his forces for a final attack upon Bithoor the day following. This was the more necessary, as the cavalry pickets of the enemy had shown of late more than usual boldness, and had advanced even into the suburbs of Cawnpore itself.

On the succeeding day (the 16th) Havelock accordingly resolved to beat up the enemy's quarters at Bithoor. Leaving a small detachment in the entrenched camp, he marched at daybreak with the remainder, about sixteen hundred in number. About mid-day they came upon the enemy, drawn up in three lines. The first line consisted of an entrenched and all but completely masked battery in the heart of a dense field of sugar-cane,—the cane rising high above the heads of the men,—defended with very thick mud ramparts, and flanked on both sides by entrenched quadrangles filled with Sepoys, and sheltered likewise by plantations of sugar-cane. The two villages formed as it were the supports of this formidable position, being situated at some distance to the rear, one on either flank. The rebel army was arrayed in front of the entrenchments, ready to give us battle; they consisted principally of Sepoys from the 34th (whose disbandment at Barrackpore in May 1857 was thought by the Govern-

ment to have suppressed the spirit of mutiny), the 42nd, and 28th Regiments, who up to this time had not met us on the field; they were perhaps on that account the more confident.

On observing the enemy's position, and their infantry drawn up in front of it, Havelock brought his guns to the front, and opened upon them; but it soon appeared that this was only a part of their plan to draw us on, for no sooner had our guns opened, than the enemy retreated into their defences, and their guns at the same moment poured in a tremendous shower of shot and shell on our advancing line. During the twenty minutes that this was kept up our men lay down, replying with their rifles, our artillery also blazing at them. But at the end of that time, finding that our guns made little impression, and did not even silence their fire, although within six hundred yards of their position, Havelock resolved to have resort to the bayonet. A simultaneous advance was made in skirmishing order on the entrenched quadrangles before alluded to. These were quickly cleared, the Sepoys retreating to the two villages in rear: whilst the Madras Fusiliers went in pursuit of these, the 78th Highlanders advanced on the battery, alternately lying down and moving on, as it vomited forth its fierce discharges of grape and canister. The rebels, confident in their position, awaited the approach of our men; but no sooner had the foremost of them cleared the parapet, than the Sepoys' hearts failed them, and they fled in confusion. Their position was so strong, and our men were so exhausted by the heat of the sun and by their own exertions, that a determined stand here might have changed the fortunes of the day. No fact, however, has been more clearly established in the course of this insurrection, than that Asiatics, whatever may be their strength, cannot resist the charge of the smallest number of Englishmen: there is something in the sight of Europeans advancing at a run, with stern visage, bayonets fixed, determination marked in every movement of the body, which appals them; they cannot stand it, they never have stood it yet.

Meanwhile the Fusiliers, pursuing the enemy out of the entrenched quadrangles, came down upon the loopholed villages in the rear. Not an instant did they pause, but, rushing into them, gained them with scarce a struggle,—the enemy being quite unable to make head against their impetuosity. In rear of these villages was a little bridge leading to the town: across this the Fusiliers, now joined by the whole force, drove them, a few only endeavouring to make a fruitless stand; these were bayoneted; the remainder fled, followed by our men right through the town. Further it was impossible to pursue them: our troops, exposed to a hot sun and undergoing fearful exertions, were completely knocked up: they bivouacked on the ground they had won, and the next morning returned to Cawnpore, to take up a commanding position on the plain of Subada, close to the spot on which our heroic garrison had so long defended themselves.

With this action terminated Havelock's first grand campaign for the relief of Lucknow. Strictly speaking, perhaps, it was concluded on the day on which he recrossed the Ganges. In this great effort he had fought five pitched battles against an enemy vastly superior in numbers; he had been compelled to leave open his communications—

to carry with him sick and wounded—to dare the rays of a scorching, often a deadly sun—to march without tents—to carry with him every article of supply. With these difficulties to encounter, he had advanced three times, and three times had struck so great a terror into the enemy that his retreat had been invariably unmolested. He found, indeed, that he could gain victories, but that for want of cavalry he could not follow them up; that the enormous numbers of the enemy enabled them to recruit, and more than recruit, their losses as he advanced; that another large body, under the Nana Sahib and Jussa Singh, was always ready to interpose between him and the Ganges. He fought, in fact, more conscious that victory would secure his retreat, than facilitate an advance, which, with his numbers, was impossible.

His countrymen in England have paid homage to his deeds—feeling a national pride in one who fought so nobly, so earnestly, with such an end in view; but the Government of India—his masters—what did they do? Testing everything, as was their wont, by the result, they only saw that Havelock had failed to relieve Lucknow. Careless of the sun, more deadly than the foe,—of the small numbers,—of the want of cavalry,—they superseded him. And the noble-hearted Havelock had scarcely recrossed the Ganges, conscious that he had deserved the gratitude of his countrymen, when he learned that reinforcements were on their way up, but that they were under the command of Major-General Sir James Outram, his superior officer.

It is nothing to the purpose to state that Sir James did not subsequently assume the command: it was the intention of the Government that he should take it; they did not count on his abnegation of his own rights.

CHAPTER VIII.

CALCUTTA TO 5TH AUGUST.—DINAPORE, PATNA, ARRAH, GYA.—THE CLEMENCY ACT.—MR. J. P. GRANT.

REPORTS of the terrible fate of our soldiers and countrywomen at Cawnpore had reached Calcutta early in July, but it was not until the 17th of that month, when Havelock telegraphed down the account alike of his victory and of their murder, that all hope of their surviving disappeared. Then, indeed, the agony of suspense was succeeded by the deadening height of despair. But as that feeling gradually wore off, there sprang up in its place a desire for retaliation, an unrepressed eagerness for vengeance on those who, to the crimes of revolt and treachery, had added those of murder and torture. Such was the effect, alike on those whose relatives had been massacred, and on the great body of the European public. Every heart panted for

news from Havelock, sympathising most deeply with his noble efforts. General Neill became even a greater favourite. His stern measures for the restoration of order at Cawnpore, his contempt for the instructions he received to be merciful to these villains, stamped him at once as the man for the occasion. His praise was in every one's mouth, whilst in all ranks of society the measures of the Government earned only contempt.

And truly did the Government of India deserve it: all their measures had been too late! They had been over-confident and vain-glorious when the horizon appeared likely to clear, depressed and suppliant when the clouds seemed to gather around them. So it was, as we have seen, in the matter of the Calcutta Volunteers, and with reference to the raising of a corps of Yeomanry Cavalry; so it was, to an extent far greater and infinitely more culpable, as we shall now see exemplified, in their dealings with the Court of Katinandoo. That city is the capital of the vast district of Nepâl, a mountainous country lying due north of Bengal Proper. Its people are bold, hardy, and resolute; possessing, like all mountaineers, a supreme hatred and contempt for the inhabitants of the plains, over whom they had often asserted their superiority. The entire power of the government of Nepâl was in the hands of Jung Buhadoor, a man the very type of the better class of his countrymen, and endowed in a supreme degree with vigour, energy, and power of will. His visit to Europe, some eight years ago, had impressed upon his mind a deep conviction of the power and resources of England, and had made him sensible that it were better policy for him to retain the friendship and alliance of her people. In the intrigues which brought about the revolt of the native army he had no share. Under no circumstances could that revolt advance his interest or the interests of Nepâl, and he never, from the moment of the outbreak, gave the smallest encouragement to its abettors.

In the month of May, as we have seen, the Government of India felt very confident of the speedy repression of the insurrection. Even in the beginning of June that confidence was unabated; they were expecting by every post to hear of the fall of Delhi; and the fall of Delhi, they felt sure, would tranquillise the country. But there was one man, an Asiatic, who knew differently, who was aware that our troubles were only commencing, and that unless the insurgents should commit the grossest errors (which happily for us they did commit), there would be an end temporarily to our rule in India. Certain of the accuracy of his information, and well aware that nothing but promptitude could save us, he communicated his opinion, and made offers of assistance in men to Major Ramsay, our political agent at the Court of Katinandoo. This officer, like all the Ramsays, a very able man, entered at once into the views of Jung Buhadoor and the Nepâl Durbar, and without any delay transmitted an abstract of the Prime Minister's opinions, together with his offers of assistance, to the Supreme Government in Calcutta.

Unfortunately, the letter containing this offer arrived at a time when the political barometer pointed to "fair." Not only, therefore,

was the proposal refused, but refused in terms which, so far as our political agent was concerned, were most uncourteous.

But the ink with which this "wiggling" had been penned was scarcely dry, when tidings from Oudh, Azimgurh, Benares, Allahabad, Cawnpore, Jhansie, Rohilcund, came pouring in, each brimful of disaster. The Government at once perceived that Jung Buhadoor had not been so ill-judging, nor Major Ramsay so hasty, as they had supposed; they, therefore, after an interval of ten days, signified their willingness to accept the six Nepál regiments, which Jung Buhadoor had placed at their disposal.*

Jung Buhadoor, still anxious to show his devotion to the British cause, at once sent a favourable reply, and ordered his six regiments to move to Goruckpore, thence to proceed to Lucknow. Had this move been made even at that time, such a diversion would have been created that the relief of Lucknow would have been an easy, or, at all events, a feasible matter; but we were fated to have one more instance of the hap-hazard and hand-to-mouth system on which the Government of India is conducted. By the time that the Goorkhas were well on their way to Goruckpore, another change in the barometer had taken place. Benares, Allahabad, Azimgurh had been quieted, Cawnpore had been re-occupied, and Havelock was preparing to advance upon Lucknow. His success was looked upon as certain. Where then was the necessity for employing the Goorkhas? The order was transmitted to them on no account to advance beyond Goruckpore. Again, however, our necessities compelled us to apply for them: they were sent on, and have since performed excellent service, showing how they might have assisted us in the earlier stages of the revolt. They now, supported by a handful of Europeans, form our only column of defence for the Benares district, against a force of 15,000 rebels who are threatening it.

The foregoing is a sample of the foreign policy of Lord Canning; his domestic measures were scarcely more happy.

Patna, the chief city in the province of Behar, contains upwards of 300,000 inhabitants, a large proportion of whom are Mahomedans. It is situate on the right bank of the river Ganges, 380 miles north-west of Calcutta, and ten miles east of the military station of Dinapore.

The small civil stations of Gya, fifty miles to the south, Dinprah, forty miles to the north, and Arrah, thirty-five miles to the west of Patna, are entirely under the control of the Commissioner of that place.

At the time of which I am treating, the Commissioner was Mr. William Tayler, a civilian, very proud of his "order," and a great upholder of their rights and dignities. He was at the same time a gentleman and a scholar, possessing good abilities, an elegant mind,

* It would be by no means an unprofitable occupation to trace the connection of the acceptance of this offer with the Gagging Act. The "Friend of India" was warned for treating of the probability of India becoming Christianised on the 25th June: on the 25th a favourable answer to the application of Government had been received from Jung Buhadoor.

and a large fund of common sense. Thus it happened, that although starting as Commissioner wedded to the time-honoured principle of "India for the Civil Service," he had sense enough to perceive that an adherence to it would swamp the vessel he was piloting—and he threw it over. By so doing, he saved Patna and lost his appointment.

It may be easily imagined that with a rebellion incited, fostered, and kept up by Mahomedans, a city, in which men of that religion formed a preponderating class, must be an object of no ordinary anxiety. From the days of Meer Kassim Ally, Patna had always been a rebellious city. Even so lately as 1846, its Mahomedan nobility had endeavoured to take advantage of our balanced fortunes on the banks of the Sutlej. They had then succeeded in corrupting some of the native officers and Sepoys stationed at Dinapore. What might not be expected now, when our own native troops had spontaneously, apparently, revolted, and when our European troops lay scattered and beleaguered all over the country? And in fact the question which, not private individuals only, but secretaries to Government also, asked themselves, when news of the revolt of the half of India reached them, was this, "Why has not Patna risen?" For weeks and weeks the intelligence was expected. Every letter described the city as being "shaky." The wonder at its long state of quiescence was increased by the contemplation of the military means at the disposal of the Government to coerce it. To ascertain what those means were, we must transport the reader for a moment to Dinapore.

Dinapore lies, as has been stated, ten miles westward of Patna. This station was garrisoned by H. M. 10th Foot, three regiments of Native Infantry, the 7th, 8th, and 40th, one company of European and one of Native Artillery. These regiments had hitherto been "staunch;" that is to say, they had not mutinied; but two of them at least had given intimations which ought to have been sufficient, that the opportunity alone was wanting.

The regiment supposed by their own officers and by the Government to be actually loyal, was the 40th, one of the corps lately returned from Burma: its officers were good officers, and if they believed in their men, it merely proves the falsity of the charge which Mr. Mangles and others have levelled against the officers of the Bengal Army.

The station and the military division of Dinapore were commanded by Major-General Lloyd, an officer who in his day had done excellent service. Only in 1854 he had been selected by the Government of Lord Dalhousie to suppress the Southâal insurrection, and right well had he done it. He was an old man, but he had grown old in the service of his country, and that service had been passed chiefly amongst Sepoys. Take the world at large, and see how few men verging upon seventy would have been fit to control a crisis of this sort—a crisis the more trying to General Lloyd, as he was called upon to forego the experience of forty years, and to doubt those very men who under himself had, in numerous instances, given proofs of their devotion to the Company.

He had indeed no ordinary task. He was in constant communication with the Commissioner of Patna to preserve the order of the district; he had only European troops sufficient to look after the native regiments.

The district which the troops at Dinapore are supposed to command is indeed an enormous one. It extends on the north side to the very foot of the Nepâl Hills, on the east to Berhampore, on the west to Benares, on the south to Hazariebagh and Rampore; on the north alone, at the station of Segowlie, distant about a hundred miles, was a corps of irregular cavalry, a detachment from which had been located at Patna: to that place also, as a measure of security, Captain Rattray's new Sikh levies had been ordered.

It will thus be seen that to maintain the security of the Patna district, the Commissioner had very little effective military aid upon which he could rely: he had to depend entirely upon his own energy and foresight, and the influence which he could bring to bear upon others.

He had been trained, as has been stated, in the school of "India for the Civil Service;" as an adept in the practice of that school, he had earned the applause of Mr. Halliday, on the occasion of the vice-regal visit of the latter to Patna, two years before, and he had been looked upon as a most promising pupil.

He was so indeed, as are many civilians, most excellent men naturally, so long as their eyes are blinded by prejudice, routine, prescription. But this terrible insurrection had scarcely raised her Hydra-like head, before the scales fell from Mr. Tayler's eyes; he felt that the gods he had worshipped were no gods:—he acted at once the part of a true Englishman; he threw away his theories to the winds, and exerted all his endeavours—not to gain applause from Mr. Halliday, but to save Patna!

In this attempt he was ably seconded by Major Holmes, the officer who commanded the Irregular Cavalry Regiment (the 12th), already noted, at Segowlie. Constant intercourse passed between the two, and they had both come to the conclusion that Repression, not Conciliation, was the policy to be pursued in the crisis.

This, unfortunately for Mr. Tayler, was antagonistic to the principle which had been adopted by the leaders of the Civil Service, of whom Mr. Halliday, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Mr. Grant, a Member of Council, and Mr. Beadon, Home Secretary, were the chiefs. They had laid it down as a maxim, that no corps ever mutinied which was properly commanded, and that a civil district had no business to revolt, inasmuch as this was a mere military mutiny. But Mr. Tayler, although he was aware of the existence of this principle, refused to be a *doctrinaire* of this stamp. All Patna wanted but the opportunity to rise: he was face to face with incipient mutiny: like a bold, fearless man, he determined to take the initiative, to arrest the ringleaders, and, by paralysing their plans, to check the revolt in the bud.

The opportunity was not long wanting.

The fact of a conspiracy being on foot had been made clear by the

perusal of intercepted letters. At the head of it was the Moulvie Ally Kurem, a man of great wealth, large estates, and corresponding influence. He was indeed the soul of the plot. Mr. Tayler resolved to lose no time,—to arrest him and the other ringleaders at once, and bring them to prompt trial. A party accordingly was sent to seize him, but the Moulvie was well served. Unknown to us he had stationed horses along the road in anticipation of some such catastrophe as that which was impending. He had scouts upon the look-out. No sooner did they inform him that a party, with Mr. Lewis, one of the civil subordinates, at its head, was on its way to his house, than he mounted his elephant, and started in the direction he had previously resolved upon. He was seen and pursued, but no sooner did our men buoy themselves with the hope that they were gaining upon him, than they observed him descend from his elephant, mount a very powerful horse, and gallop off.

He has not since been re-captured.

But although the principal conspirator escaped, the subalterns were not so fortunate. But before referring to their capture, it is necessary to allude to the ebullition on their part which preceded it.

On the evening of the 3rd July, sixty or seventy fanatics, raising the cry of religion, beating drums, unfurling the green flag, and calling out "Ya Allah," rushed to attack the Roman Catholic cathedral, situate in the very heart of the city. No sooner had intelligence of this reached our authorities, than Rattray's Sikhs were ordered down to the spot. Dr. Lyell, the opium assistant, thinking that his presence would overawe the rioters, and being well mounted, rode on in advance. As he approached them, several shots were fired at him, one of which took effect. He fell never to rise again.

The moment was critical. Had it been attempted now to carry out the policy of conciliation, it had been all over with Patna. The sight of blood had roused the evil spirits of the populace; their number was increasing, when at this moment arrived the armed and disciplined Sikhs. The feeling with which the Sikhs regard the Mahomedans is one of intense and bitter hatred; when, therefore, they came upon this crowd of fanatics, howling out pæans in honour of a religion which they detested, their fury was ungovernable; they rushed with a will upon the undisciplined mass, and dispersed them in a moment.

The next morning the city underwent a complete search. Thirty-one ringleaders were apprehended. Amongst these were Pera Ally, an emissary from Lucknow, Shekh Ghuseeta, the Jemadar of Looft Ally Khan, the richest banker in the town, and Looft Ally Khan himself.

The three men named above were unfortunately* reprieved, with the view of eliciting more information from them. Of the thirty-one who were seized, fourteen were hanged that same afternoon, in company with a man named Waris Ally—the Jemadar of the

* I say unfortunately, because Mr. Samuells, the successor of Mr. Tayler, released them.

Moulvie Ally Kureem. When taken to the gallows this worthy exclaimed in a loud voice, "If there is any one here who professes to be a friend of the King of Delhi, aid me."

These vigorous measures saved Patna for the moment, but not an hour passed by without a risk of an insurrection, and Mr. Tayler's unceasing vigilance alone enabled him to discover the plotters. By means of a native Christian at Moughyr, a correspondence was brought to light which proved that the flight of the Moulvie Ally Kureem had by no means quelled the spirit of revolt, that the train was laid, and that the conspirators were only waiting for the opportunity to fire it.

By dint, however, of constant arrests, and an unceasing use of hemp, the city was kept quiet: the inhabitants were over-awed. Major Holmes, on the Segowlie frontier, pursued the same policy: the greatest cordiality existed between the Commissioner and himself: they were one on the subject of the only course to be pursued: they followed it, and maintained order in the district as well as in the city.

But these constant arrests, these continual hangings, the credit which they brought to Mr. Tayler from the planters and mercantile community,—even from the fettered press of India,—were all galling to Mr. Halliday. They falsified his maxim that this was a mere revolt of the soldiery. They rendered patent to the world that the largest civil district under his control was surging with revolt. They endangered the stability of the exclusive Civil Service. Mr. Tayler, too, had committed another act of "imprudence," which was not likely to further his interests with his superiors. He had suspended one of his subordinates, Mr. Lewis. Now Mr. Lewis was a son-in-law of Mr. Mangles. Mr. Mangles was Chairman of the Court of Directors, and prime patron of the Government of Bengal. The inference is easy.

Before, however, that Government could recall a man whose energy was at the same time saving Patna and spoiling their crude theories, it was necessary to provide a pretext for so strong a measure. This was not long wanting; it will appear in its proper place in this history.

The disaffection prevailing in Patna, and the threatening attitude of the three native regiments stationed at Dinapore, had not been viewed without alarm by the mercantile community of Calcutta. Their interests were in a great measure bound up in the district of Tirhoot, of which Patna and Dinapore were the two most important stations. As the great indigo-producing portion of Bengal, they were more than any class interested in the maintenance in it of peace and order. Any revolt at this period, before the plant had been cut, and even subsequently during the process of manufacture, would have been fraught with ruin to many of them. The measures of Mr. Tayler therefore met their warmest approval; they saw in him just the man for the occasion. At the same time they were sensible that all his arrangements, his vigilance, and his energy were liable to be rendered nugatory by any *émeute* or disturbance

amongst the troops at Dinapore. They had indulged the hope that those regiments, like their brethren at Barrackpore, would have been disarmed—such a step would have put to flight all their fears, and have inspired them with a confidence in the Government which had hitherto been wanting. It was easy of accomplishment. Her Majesty's 10th Regiment was on the spot; one wing of the 37th Foot was on its way up, and the 5th Fusiliers, 800 strong, arrived from the Mauritius on the 5th July.

The subject was early in that month debated in Council: the minutes of that discussion have not yet been published; its result is before the world. That result added another proof to the many that had preceded it, that the Government of Lord Canning was not above half-measures; that it was ready, in order to have a scape-goat, to shift responsibility from its own shoulders. The Supreme Council decided in this important matter, that it would not take upon itself the responsibility of ordering the native regiments at Dinapore to be disarmed; neither would it assume the responsibility of directing that those corps should retain their arms; but, casting the entire responsibility on Major-General Lloyd, it left it optional to him to disarm them or not, as he might think fit.

To cast the sole responsibility of an important measure upon an agent, is to say to him, we have confidence in you; we are ready to abide by what you do; we are ready to support you; we are perplexed and divided; act as you think best. A Government has no right to turn round to the public, after committing their power to their own agent, and that agent has acted, and acted unfortunately, and to say, "This is not our act, it is the act of our agent; we atone for it by turning him out." A Government by throwing all responsibility on an agent, becomes itself responsible for his acts, and must share with him the blame or praise. It is the more necessary that this rule should be applied in the present instance, because the Government was aware of General Lloyd's partiality for the Sepoys, that he could not bring himself to believe that they would mutiny, and that he had already on a previous occasion avoided disarming them when the opportunity presented itself.

This decision of the Government was not published, but it was privately communicated to the members of the mercantile community. It failed to satisfy them: they too, knew the disposition of General Lloyd; they felt satisfied that he had no heart for disarming the Sepoys; they saw their interests, and, with theirs, the interests of the European settlers in India,—a class of men whom the leaders of the Civil Service discouraged in every possible manner,—abandoned, by the cowardice of the Government, to the prejudices of a feeble old man.

There was one course still open to them—to appeal in a body to the Government, and to endeavour, in a personal interview with Lord Canning, to point out to him the course which they humbly deemed both feasible and advisable. They came to this resolution on the 17th of July.

But Lord Canning was a great man in petty things. This

uncalled for opinion of men, who were in no way connected with the Government, appeared to him very like trenching upon his prerogative. He resolved to show them that the will of the Governor-General of India was perfectly independent of the feelings of those who possessed the only real stake in the country.

When therefore, on the 20th July, the deputation reached him, pointed out how their interests were involved in the maintenance of peace and order; how both were threatened by the attitude of the regiments at Dinapore; how disarming them would quiet the public mind and possibly restore confidence; how that the most favourable opportunity now presented itself for carrying out that measure, as the 5th Fusiliers had left by steamer on the 12th and would be off Dinapore on or about the 22nd; how that disembarking from the steamer, disarming in conjunction with the 10th Foot the mutinous regiments, and then re-embarking, would be the work of less than three hours,—Lord Canning replied, “They shall not stop for one hour.” He said more, but that was the main point of his speech. He was very curt, and very ceremonious.

This was on the 20th July: if a message had been sent to Dinapore on that day or the following, to comply with the request of the merchants, the calamities which subsequently followed would have been avoided. As it was, and because Lord Canning would not allow the 5th Fusiliers to stop one hour, they were detained three weeks at one of the most critical periods of the revolt. Before tracing out the result of his obstinacy, it may be convenient to notice another characteristic act of the Government of India.

The bearing of the natives of Calcutta, the Mahomedan portion especially, had given no little cause for anxiety: they outnumbered the European population by about twenty to one, and it appeared quite possible that fanaticism, combined with the hope of plunder, might induce them to rise at any moment. It was known, too, that the suburbs were crowded with disbanded and disarmed Sepoys, and some of them had been heard to express their conviction that the rule of the Company was about to close. The means of providing them with weapons were at hand: the bazaars and streets in the outskirts were crowded with armourers and venders of swords and muskets, and it was remarked that they were driving a rattling trade. This circumstance, combined with the insolent demeanour of the Mahomedans, the experiences of Cawnpore and other stations, and the near approach of a Mussulman festival, the celebration of which invariably caused great excitement amongst the votaries of that religion, conjoined to impress upon the European inhabitants the policy of adopting some precautionary measure. The grand jury had, on the occasion of their being sworn in, forwarded an address to Lord Canning, urging the disarming of all natives in Calcutta, and the mercantile community had adopted with alacrity this suggestion, and had petitioned the Governor-General on the subject. But Lord Canning, impressed with the dogma of “imperial legislation,” that is, with the necessity of treating the loyal and the rebellious on the same terms, after many delays, caused a project of law to be introduced

into the Legislative Council, by which Europeans and natives were to be alike disarmed; thereby rendering it penal for the former to possess without a license (which a native magistrate might refuse) a weapon wherewith to defend himself against the murderous assaults of the latter. This was imperial legislation with a vengeance.

On the 31st July, a few days after the Dinapore mutiny had been known, just one fortnight after the details of the horrible massacre of our countrywomen at Cawnpore had been published, when every post brought accounts of some fresh deed of atrocity, some new instance of the blackest treachery on the part of our Sepoys, occasion was taken to publish a manifesto*, in which the members of the Civil Service, with Lord Canning as their accomplice, laid down their patent scheme for the suppression of mutiny and insurrection.

In this document a free pardon was offered to all mutineers against whom it could not be proved that they had been guilty of any heinous crime against person or property, or that they had aided and abetted in the commission of such crime.

Sepoys who had mutinied without murdering their officers were to be treated with all reasonable leniency.

No deserters from disarmed regiments were to be apprehended, unless with arms in their possession.

Other mutineers against whom it could not be proved that they had murdered their officers, were to be sent for trial to Allahabad.

These were the principal provisions of this celebrated order, which the *Times* has well designated "The clemency of Canning"—an order which will remain a lasting stamp of the manner in which civilians meet mutiny and revolt. To secure its being efficiently worked, a member of the council that framed it, Mr. John Peter Grant, was sent up to Benares, copies of it were transmitted to the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, and to all the Commissioners in the Province of Bengal. At the same time Mr. Tayler, the commissioner of Patna was removed from his appointment, and replaced by a gentleman pledged to maintain the cause of his own exclusive service.

The effect of the document above alluded to, published as it was at a time when Havelock was being driven back by the men to whom it specially bore reference, was to impress them with an idea of our weakness which nothing could eradicate. They saw us, at a time when they were beleaguering our countrymen at Lucknow, suddenly offer them, under very easy conditions, a free pardon. It had all the effect upon them of an offer to sue for peace, it emboldened them to renew their efforts, to push us hard whilst we were in distress, to exert themselves more than ever against us.

It is almost needless to add that when this resolution of the Supreme Government was sent up to the gallant Neill, with an order that it should be enforced at once, he declined paying any attention to it. The district of Cawnpore, he replied, was under martial law, and according to the provisions of that law, and of no other, would

* Resolution of Government of India, No. 1359, 31st July, 1857.

he act. It is currently reported that for this act of disobedience he would, had he survived, have been brought to a court-martial. The government would have found it difficult to assemble fifteen officers who would have convicted him.

Meanwhile, the governmental policy had been yielding its natural fruit at Dinapore. General Lloyd had received the instructions by which the sole responsibility of disarming the Sepoys devolved upon him; but he too bethought him of a half measure: he was permitted to take away the muskets to prevent the Sepoys from rising; the same end, he imagined, might be attained by depriving them of their percussion caps. Accordingly, on the morning of the 25th July, he gave orders for carrying this measure into effect. It may be necessary, before describing the manner in which this was performed, to give a slight sketch of the station.

Dinapore lies, as before stated, ten miles west of Patna, on the right bank of the Ganges. The European troops are cantoned in a large square immediately to the west of the native town; beyond this, and still immediately on the bank of the river, is a smaller square; outside this are a few houses, and further on the native lines; on the other side of the lines was the magazine in which the caps were kept. It will be seen, then, that to bring away the caps from the magazine into the European part of the cantonment, it was necessary to convey them along the front of the lines of the Sepoys. This measure, therefore, like all half measures, was more dangerous than disarming.

However it was tried. On the morning of the 25th the 10th Foot and the Artillery were drawn up in the large square already alluded to, whilst two bullock-carts were sent down to bring away the caps under the charge of an officer; the caps were taken from the magazine, and stowed in the carts, which then set out on their return. As they passed the lines of the 7th Regiment, a great commotion was visible; the Sepoys were parading for guard, but they broke their ranks, and rushed forward, shouting, one of them calling out in a loud voice, "Kill the sahibs! don't let the caps be taken away." But their officers went amongst them, and even forced them to abstain from any further demonstration; the men returned sullenly to their posts, and the carts went on. All was now supposed to be over, the Europeans were dismissed to their lines, and the General, congratulating himself on the success of his manœuvre, went on board one of the steamers, which had that morning arrived, to lunch. It had been previously arranged, that in the event of any disturbance two musket shots in quick succession should be fired by the European guard at the hospital — a large building between the smaller square and the native lines, and commanding a good view of the latter. At half past one, the sound of these shots was heard; instantly the 10th Foot, two companies of the 37th Foot which had arrived the day before, and the Artillery, turned out. It appeared that, previous to going on board the steamer, the General had issued an order that the caps actually in the possession of the Sepoys should be given up. But these latter, when called upon to obey, had fired upon their officers. When the Europeans came within sight of their lines, all

was uproar and confusion, but a few shots from the Enfield Rifles of the 30th who were in advance, and a sharp fire opened upon the Sepoys from the roof of the hospital, soon cleared the scene. The Sepoys made off with precipitation, leaving behind them the greater part of their property. The Europeans followed them up to the limits of the cantonments, burning their lines as they advanced. They were then halted; there was no one to give orders, no general, and no one would take the responsibility. It was a bad business as it was; and, serving under a Government which judged only by the result, no one would run the risk of making it worse.

A few of the Sepoys endeavoured to cross the Ganges in boats, but the steamer at the Ghat opened fire upon them with considerable effect; the main body therefore took their way towards the Soane river in the direction of Arrah. Information was instantly transmitted to the residents of that little station in order that they might be prepared to avoid, or to give a warm reception to their unwelcome visitors.

Arrah is only five and twenty miles west of Dinapore, but it is separated from it by the Soane; and it was hoped that this river, swollen by the rains, would oppose an effectual bar to the passage of the mutineers. But for three days they were left unpursued; leisure was allowed them to procure boats, and even to cross by the ferry, and they experienced no difficulty in passing over a river which might have been made an insurmountable obstacle. They received assistance too from a quarter on which we had even reckoned for opposition to their movements.

No sooner was it known in the district that the troops had risen at Dinapore than Koor Singh, a large landowner, possessing estates in the neighbourhood of Arrah and all along the banks of the Soane, declared in their favour. He was a known bad character, and was supposed to be in communication with Nana Sahib: at the same time he was permitted unmolested to carry out his schemes. He it was who procured boats for the passage of the mutineers across the Soane, and it was he who advised them to march without delay on Arrah, plunder the treasury, murder the residents, and then, crossing the Ganges at Busat, to make at once for Ghazee-pore and Oudh. It was a bold plan, and was very nearly succeeding. The Sepoys mutinied on the 25th, on the 26th they crossed the Soane and were joined by Koor Singh; on the 27th they arrived at Arrah, let loose the jail-birds, plundered the treasury, and attacked the residents.

But these latter had not been idle in anticipation of the visit which they were now awaiting: they had, under the direction of Mr. Boyle, a civil engineer, fortified a small detached two-storied house, fifty feet square, with a flat roof. In this they had stored supplies of meal, wine, beer, water, biscuit, and sheep. Their only garrison consisted of fifty Sikhs: these, however, were true to the very core. The Europeans numbered only sixteen, but they were well armed, and besides possessed the prestige attaching to their country. They might, had they chose, have abandoned the station to the mutineers; but they were Englishmen, and resolved rather to defend one corner of it than to submit to so humiliating an alternative.

On the morning of the 27th, the Sepoys, having gutted the station, came down to attack them. They advanced boldly at first in unbroken order; but being met by a steady, well-directed fire, they changed their tactics, and occupying Mr. Boyle's own house—only sixty yards distant—commenced, from it and from the trees which stood around it, an unintermitting fire. At the same time they offered every possible inducement by bribes and threats to the Sikhs to join them. Their own countrymen, serving in the ranks of the mutineers, were employed as mediators, but without effect. The Sikhs remained staunch: their courage and their fidelity were alike proof, and they showed throughout the siege an unwavering attachment to our interests. On the 28th the rebels brought two small guns to bear upon the besieged: these they fired as fast as they could manufacture some species of projectile: the house in which our countrymen were shut up, was riddled, but they themselves were unhurt. Every evening a Sepoy standing behind a pillar of the house occupied by the enemy, was in the habit of offering terms—in the name, not of Koour Singh, but of the commander of the allied forces, a subadar of the 8th Native Infantry. It is needless to say his "terms" were rejected, and it is satisfactory to know that the worthy at whose instigation they were made—the subadar of the 8th—was subsequently killed. He did not happily fall into the hands of Mr. Grant.

Meanwhile intelligence of the beleaguered state of the Arrah residents had reached Dinapore, and it was resolved to equip forthwith an expedition to relieve them. Accordingly, on the evening of the 26th, 193 men of the 37th Foot started to steam up the Soane, with the intention of landing at the spot where the road to Arrah joins that river. Unfortunately the steamer, running on after the moon had gone down, stuck on a sand-bank. Here she remained for six and thirty hours. Information of the catastrophe having in the meanwhile reached Dinapore, it was resolved to despatch another steamer with a detachment of the 10th Foot, to take on the troop-boat attached to the first steamer, and to carry out the original resolution. This they did. Starting with 150 of the 10th Foot, and seventy Sikhs, she came up to where the first steamer was lying, detached her troop-boat with the 37th on board, and then steamed up to the appointed spot. Here she arrived at 4 P. M. on the afternoon of the 29th, and disembarked her force. This amounted to 410 men, under the command of Captain Dunbar of Her Majesty's 10th Foot.

The point at which they disembarked was but twelve miles from Arrah, and about four miles from it was an unfordable nullah, traversable only by boats. The detachment commenced its march immediately after landing, led by a native guide, who informed them that Arrah had been evacuated by the rebels. On arriving at the nullah, Captain Dunbar was strongly advised to bivouack for the night; but finding boats on the right bank ready for crossing, and being strongly urged by the guide, he persisted in pushing on. He accordingly crossed, and marched in military order, an advanced guard in front feeling the way. At last the guide announced that Arrah was gained:

there was no sign of life anywhere: all was still. Captain Dunbar thereupon called in the advanced guard, and moved on in column of march. He had scarcely proceeded ten paces before a volley was fired into the party from a clump of trees close in their front, whilst from both flanks almost simultaneously there commenced a leaden shower. Captain Dunbar and several of the officers were shot dead at the first discharge; the enemy was invisible: our men appeared to be surrounded; their commanding officer had been shot. Great confusion ensued; the men got separated from one another, and feared to fire on their comrades. After an interval of about a quarter of an hour, order to a certain extent was restored, and the men retired to a small enclosure which afforded them some cover, and enabled them to keep together. The enemy, however, fired upon them all night. As morning dawned, they found themselves much reduced in numbers, the men dispirited, and altogether unable to resume the offensive. They therefore turned their faces towards the Soane. They had, however, scarcely moved out of their cover before they were followed by the enemy, who, advancing in skirmishing order to the number of three thousand, and keeping at a very respectful distance, poured in an unceasing fire. In vain did our men endeavour to keep them off with musketry: in vain did they attempt to drive them back by a successful charge: as they advanced the enemy fled: as they retired, again the foe returned to the pursuit. To be wounded was a worse fate than death; for it was impossible to carry away those in that condition, and a man with a broken limb was reserved for that most dreaded of all fates—the tender mercies of the Sepoys. At last the nullah was reached, and to the delight of the survivors the boats were all on the left bank. Two of them were filled and shoved off; but the nullah had gone down a little in the night, and all the other boats had become fixed in the mud. Meanwhile the enemy were advancing: from the front and on both flanks they poured in their fire. The number of our men was few: any fate was better than falling into the hands of the Sepoys: there was no longer any hesitation: as if by mutual consent, they stripped off their clothes, and plunged into the stream, and swam for dear life.

Many were drowned, many were shot, but more reached the right bank: their difficulties were then over: the steamer was gained in safety, and with heavy hearts they paddled back to Dinapore. Such was the issue of the first attempt to relieve Arrah. Out of the party fifty only were untouched: out of fifteen officers, three only un-wounded. The truth is, the fault lay with the commanding officer: our men fell into an ambuscade. Captain Dunbar's first fault was in not halting on the right bank of the nullah till daylight; his second, in trusting to the assurances of a native guide, in a case in which natives were concerned, his third, in not marching in military order. Any one of these mistakes would have been sufficient to cause a check; the three combined occasioned a disaster.

The attempt to relieve our countrymen at Arrah from Dinapore only increased their perils, for its ill-success flushed the Sepoys, and encouraged them to push their efforts against them with more deter-

mination than ever. The situation of the garrison would have been hopeless but for the occurrence of a series of seemingly fortuitous events, which can be regarded in no other light but providential intervention.

Major Vincent Eyre, an artillery officer of great ability, had left Dinapore in a steamer *en route* for Allahabad with half a company of European Artillery, and two 9-pounder guns and a 24-pounder howitzer. He arrived at Ghazepore, half way between Dinapore and Allahabad, on the 28th. Here for the first time he received intelligence that our countrymen were beleaguered in Arrah. His chivalrous spirit could not endure the idea of their being allowed to remain in that position without an attempt being made to relieve them: he accordingly went to the authorities, and pointed out to them the ease with which an attack might be made from Busar by a party under his orders, which could also co-operate with any demonstration from Dinapore. The news of the Arrah disaster had not reached any of them, and willing to afford some assistance, the Ghazepore authorities offered Major Eyre five-and-twenty Highlanders. This would increase his entire force to but sixty men, but Eyre at once accepted the offer, and embarking the Highlanders, turned the head of the vessel, and steamed back for Busar. Fortunately, on arriving there on the 30th July, he found a steamer and flat with 150 of the 5th Fusiliers on board. He gladly availed himself of their services, and sending back the Highlanders to Ghazepore, with a force now increased by the Fusiliers, and volunteers from the Stud and Railway Departments, to about 200 men, he on the evening of the 1st August pushed on. That night, or rather the next morning, they reached the Shahpore, a village twenty-eight miles distant, and here they received the first intelligence of the Arrah disaster. This only made them the more desirous to hasten on to the rescue. At 2 P.M. on the 2nd Eyre renewed his march, having to halt occasionally to repair the bridges which had been broken down or cut through. It was about sunset when they arrived at Goojeerajung, about nine miles from Arrah. Here it was known that there was a very strong bridge over a nullah, and Eyre fully expected to find it broken down: to his surprise it was in capital order. Some were of opinion that he should take advantage of the neglect of the rebels and push on at once. But Eyre was too prudent: he did not fancy a night march into an enemy's country, and he resolved to halt where he was, the only approach to his camp being covered by the bridge. It was fortunate that he did come to this resolution: the bridge had not been broken down, solely that he might be tempted to cross it; preparations had been made to receive him a little distance on the other side, and, had he moved on, there can be no doubt but that he would have shared the fate of the Dinapore party. But he was happily proof against the temptation: it was no light one, for it seemed to them all possible that the delay might make all the difference in the fate of the garrison of Arrah.

At break of day next morning Eyre resumed his march, but had not proceeded above a mile before he discovered that the corpses in

his front and on his flanks were filled with Sepoys. The road beyond them was bounded by inundated rice-fields on both sides. Observing that the enemy were more intent upon taking him in flank than in guarding their own front, he resolved to push on, under the cover of his skirmishers, armed as they were, with the Enfield rifle. The enemy fell back before him, abandoned the copses, and hastened to take up a new position.

Beyond the copses was a large marshy plain, unprotected by cover of any kind; beyond this again were some thick clumps of trees, the approach to them defended by a small river, spanned by a bridge; behind the trees were the houses which formed the village of Beebee-gunj. The Sepoys had made this their main position, and had strengthened it in every possible way; the bridge had been broken down, earthen breastworks thrown up on the opposite side of the river, and every house in the village occupied in force. Their numbers were estimated at from 2000 to 2500. Eyre having reconnoitred, concluded that with his force their position was unassailable in front: he resolved therefore to turn it. Masking this movement by the fire of his guns, he diverged to the right, taking a course parallel to the river, in the direction of the railway embankment by which it is crossed. His intention had no sooner become evident to the rebels than they left their entrenchment, and proceeded in the same direction on their side of the river, keeping upon our men a hot fire. It seemed as though the victory ought to lie with the party which first reached the railway embankment, for close to it was a large clump of trees which commanded the angle of the only approach. In this the Sepoys had a great advantage over us; our men were moving across partly swampy, partly rugged and broken ground—they had a hard soil to traverse; we were encumbered with guns—they had none. However, our men pushed on with a will, and with every hope of being beforehand with them, until within 300 yards of the railway line.

Here the ground was broken and rugged; the guns were moved with difficulty, and it was found impossible to get them on to the line. The Sepoys saw their advantage: they had reached the woods already alluded to, which quite commanded the road by which our men must pass. Under cover of these they poured a very brisk fire on Eyre's party, but these latter were not entirely unsheltered by trees, and Eyre at this moment getting the guns into position, opened upon them a heavy fire of shot and shell. But the Sepoys were bent on mischief. Led by their subadars, they made several very gallant and very desperate efforts to gain possession of our guns, and their numbers were so great that these were in very great peril. All this time the Fusiliers, moving in advance in extended order, were interchanging volleys of musketry with the enemy, whose numbers, however, were so great that they were able at the same time to occupy our infantry, and attempt to carry our guns. It became evident by this time that a much longer continuance of these tactics must end in our discomfiture, more especially as our gun-ammunition was almost exhausted, and of the sixty rounds carried by the men more than half had been fired away. The rebels, too, were becoming bolder, from observing our stationary tactics. Seeing this, Eyre re-

solved to have recourse to the bayonet — that glorious weapon which has never yet failed in the hands of England's sons. Accordingly the word was given, and with hands well down and hearts in their right place, this band of less than 150 men, extending over 300 yards and led by their gallant commandant Captain L'Estrange, bore down to the charge. Conspicuous on either flank, as the best mounted officers present, were Captain Hastings of the Stud Department, and Mr. Kelley of the Railway — both big men on big horses, charging with, and cheering on the infantry. On they came to that wood from which so many volleys had been poured forth on our devoted band. But the Sepoys would not wait for them. Sheltered behind trees they would have fought for hours; but here, as in Oudh, the sight of the cold steel was sufficient to scare them; they broke and fled. The victory was now gained; the enemy gave up the contest and fled in confusion. Our troops followed them up to within four miles of Arrah, when their further progress was stopped by an impassable river. They therefore halted whilst the engineers prepared a temporary bridge.

The reader, judging from the account I have given of this action, may imagine that the infantry charge ought to have been made sooner in the day. Such a judgment would, at least, be hasty. If there were any quality exhibited throughout the action, which called forth more than any other the admiration of all, it was the coolness and complete self-command displayed by Major Eyre. This officer showed that he possessed all the abilities which, fifteen years before, had brought him prominently to the notice of Lord Ellenborough. On this occasion, he had guns and few infantry: the enemy had no guns and swarms of foot-men. It would have shown the most culpable rashness on Eyre's part, if he had dashed at them with his handful of men, without endeavouring to make them sensible of the power of his guns. The moment he saw that they were too strongly posted for his artillery to dislodge them, he let go the infantry, and drove them out. If they had had the heart to resist, then our position would have been very critical. It was, in fact, a last resort. Like a good general, he husbanded it till the proper moment arrived, and then, by using it effectually, assured himself of victory. The gallantry of officers and men, as well as of the volunteers, was most conspicuous. Lieut. Wild, an officer of the 40th—the men of which corps were fighting against him—was observed to be everywhere, distinguished from all his comrades by wearing his red-jacket. But all were animated by the same noble spirit, and it is gratifying that all were spared to reap the fruits of their success. Our losses were little more than nominal.

Meanwhile, the party in the little house at Arrah were still holding out bravely against the foe; their hope never wavered, their hearts never sank. Every assault of the enemy was repulsed with loss; all his offers of terms repelled with indignation. On the third day, water began to run short; a well was dug within the house in less than twelve hours. Did the enemy raise a barricade, ours grew in proportion; did a shot strike a weak place in the defence, it was

made twice as strong as before. But, perhaps, their greatest danger consisted in the possibility of their being undermined. This also was attempted. The mine was dug, the powder was stored, the train was laid; why it was not fired yet remains a mystery. But the probability is, that the party on watch over the house were awaiting the return of their victorious comrades from Beebeegunj. Return they did, but how? Broken in spirit, tumbling down, after the manner of Asiatics, from the fever heat of exultation to the zero of depression, seeing an enemy in every shadow; they came but to warn their associates to fly with them. And fly they did, leaving in their haste the train which was ready for the spark unfired. The next morning Eyre arrived. Great were the congratulations on all sides. The little house in which our countrymen had held out so long was quite a picture; not a single brick unmarked by shot or bullet. Yet in it, for seven days, a few Englishmen had resisted the attacks of three thousand men. Honour to them! They all deserve the admiration of their countrymen. But, by common consent, foremost amongst them stands the civil engineer, Mr. Boyle. He it was who planned the defence; he it was who laid in stores and supplies; he it was whose engineering skill enabled the garrison to render nugatory all the efforts of the foe. The mine to which I have cursorily alluded had, under his instructions, been countermined, and another blow of the pick would have broken into it. The heroic exertions of Messrs. Wake and Colvin are also deserving of the highest praise; it was to the acuteness of the former that the garrison discovered that a mine was being attempted; whilst the untiring exertions of the latter were remarked by all.

But not the least amount of praise must be awarded to the Sikhs. Fighting for aliens against their own countrymen, for there were many of these latter in the ranks of the rebels, they displayed throughout a fidelity and a staunchness which was the more to be admired as it had become so rare; they knew that in case of our defeat they would receive no mercy from the Sepoys,—that an act of treachery, on the other hand, would ensure them the warmest welcome. But such an idea was never entertained for an instant; they had at the outset announced their intention of casting in their lot with us, and from that resolve they never swerved.

Eyre's first act after arriving at Arrah was to send in to Dinapore a report of his proceedings, together with a request that ammunition might be sent out for his detachment. His requisition was acceded to; and it having been ascertained that the Sepoys had rallied at Jugdeespore, between twenty and thirty miles south-west of Arrah, and that Eyre had proposed following them up, a detachment of two hundred men of the 10th, under Captain Patterson, burning to revenge their comrades, were sent to join him. On coming within sight of the enemy, it was found impossible to restrain the impetuosity of these men; Eyre accordingly let them go. They charged with a shout of fury, and taking three guns as they rushed on, at length came to a hand-to-hand *mêlée* with the enemy. Then did they execute terrible vengeance—a vengeance which was sufficient to wring tears of blood from the heart of Mr. Grant and his co-sympathisers with the muti-

neers. Happily Eyre was not a *doctrinaire*; he had witnessed the mangled remains of our countrymen at Arrah, and he did not check the furious onslaught of our avenging soldiers. The charge of the 10th was decisive; it struck a terror into the hearts of the rebels; they were now utterly broken and fled in dismay. The district of Shahabad was at once cleared of their presence, and those that were not killed hastened under the guidance of Koor Singh to find refuge in a more congenial part of the country. By their departure Eyre's further detention in Behar became unnecessary, and he returned to gain fresh reputation on his road to Cawnpore and Lucknow.

We must now return to Patna.

Scarcely had Mr. Taylor, the Commissioner, received intelligence of the mutiny at Dinapore, followed by the disaster at Arrah to the west, than news reached him that two companies of the 8th had revolted at Hagareebagh to the south, and that the 12th, the most trusted regiment of Irregular Cavalry, had risen in insurrection at Legowlie to the north, and had murdered their commanding officer, his own most valued coadjutor, Major Holmes. It was too true. The regiment had been doing splendid service up to the 25th of July. Major Holmes had reported most favourably of them, and this officer had been quoted as an example of the truth of Lord Canning's axiom, that no regiment which was properly commanded would mutiny. But on the evening of the 26th, as he was driving out in his buggy with his wife, a daughter of the heroic Sale, four sowars rode up to him with their swords drawn, and almost before he knew what they wanted they had beheaded both himself and Mrs. Holmes. The regiment then rose, murdered the doctor, his wife and children, plundered the treasury, and let themselves loose on the country. The fears of the mercantile community, expressed on the occasion of their interview with Lord Canning, were thus so far realised. The native troops had not been disarmed; they had mutinied; the entire district was at their mercy. It appeared to the Commissioner of Patna that the natural course of the mutineers would lead them to those small civil stations—the arteries of Patna—in which the local treasuries were deposited; he accordingly issued a circular to the magistrates of those stations which lay most prominently in the route of the mutineers, directing them to retire, with their treasure, if possible, on Patna, leaving, for the present, the district unprotected. It was this order which was made the pretext for his recall.

At the little civil station of Gyah, to which, amongst others, this order was transmitted, Mr. Alonzo Money was the magistrate. The troops there consisted of forty Europeans of the 34th, and 116 Sikhs. Eighty men of the 64th Foot had left two days before for Patna. Mr. Money, on receiving the circular, called a meeting of the residents, read out the Commissioner's orders, and announced his intention of abiding by them. The roads being considered impracticable for wheeled carriages, it was resolved to abandon the treasure, 70,000*l.* It must be premised that the station of Gya lay on the direct route from Hagareebagh to the north-west, and the residents were daily expecting a visit from the mutineers.

On the morning of the 31st of July, the party started, every European in Gya abandoning that station, their houses, property, the Government stores and money. They had not ridden far before the idea came into the head of Mr. Hollings, an uncovenanted servant of Government—that is an “adventurer” in Governmental employ—that this was a very shameful abandonment. The more he brooded over the idea, the more satisfied did he become of its being well founded. He accordingly rode up to Mr. Money, and mentioned his convictions on the subject. Mr. Money, who had felt uneasy himself on the very point, cordially sympathised with him, and adopted on the spur of the moment the resolution of returning. He halted the party, announced his individual intention, asked none of them to join him, and in company with Mr. Hollings alone rode back. He found the station in the same order as when he had left it; nothing was disturbed, the native police were doing duty over the jail and over the treasury as when he had set out. His first measure was to send a despatch for the return of the company of the 64th Foot which had left two days before; his second to endeavour to re-assure the minds of the native population, an attempt in which he was but little successful.

On the 2nd of August, the company of the 64th returned, and Mr. Money busied himself in procuring wheeled carriages for the treasure. Still everything was apparently secure; but on the 13th, as Mr. Money was going out of his house, he heard a fearful yell, and perceived the convicts from the jail accompanied by the jail guard rushing toward his house. Fortunately, a horse ready saddled was awaiting him at the stable close at hand. He instantly mounted, galloped to the treasury, turned out the Europeans, yoked the bullocks, and set out in the direction of Shergotty, in the hope of soon getting on to the Grand Trunk Road. He had not proceeded five miles before the crowd of savages, filling the air with discordant cries, was seen approaching. They had not perhaps counted on the warm reception which they met with, and which had the effect of completely dispersing them. Mr. Money then, unmolested, pursued his journey to Calcutta, whither we must precede him.

The account of Mr. Tayler's circular, of Mr. Alonzo Money's successful disobedience of its provision, had no sooner reached Calcutta than Mr. Tayler was suspended. This was not the real cause—that has been previously pointed out; but the Bengal Government was glad to pounce upon Mr. Tayler's first indiscretion, to replace him by a man after their own heart.

Whether Mr. Tayler's order to abandon the small stations of the Patna division were an indiscretion or a crime, or whether it were a wise forethought, is a point upon which public opinion in India is still divided. That gentleman has set forth in a pamphlet lately published, that he intended the order to be discretionary, and that in no case did he contemplate the abandonment of the treasure. If this be the case, and in the absence of the circular itself it may be accepted as a correct account, Mr. Tayler's order possesses the character of a wise and prudent measure. The entire country was swarming with revolvers; the small stations were weakly garrisoned and isolated,

It were surely then wise to accord to the chief person in authority at those stations liberty to retire, if needs be, with the treasure to the chief town of the district, there to mass the available forces. If this was all that Mr. Tayler did, he is scarcely deserving of blame.

And in that view the conduct of Mr. Money loses much of its chivalrous aspect. In any case he was wrong to leave the station, unless he conceived he were threatened by an overwhelming force; and when once he resolved on returning, it was very courageous, but not very wise, not to order back the escort and residents also. Fortune favoured him, as it so often favours those who are brave and self-reliant; but it is unfortunate that the firmness which he displayed after his conversation with Mr. Hollings had not been exerted prior to his desertion of Gya. By that means the whole scandal would have been avoided.

These gentlemen received their reward. Mr. Money, the civilian, was promised almost immediate promotion from a grade in which he received 100*l.* per mensem to another wherein that salary would be doubled. The allowances of Mr. Hollings, the "uncovenanted," received an addition of 20*l.* per mensem.

A new era was now about to be inaugurated. On the 30th July, the circular known as "Canning's Clemency" was issued; on the 4th August, Mr. J. P. Grant was sent up country to carry out its provisions; on the 5th, Mr. Samuells was appointed Commissioner of Patna, on the principle of conciliation, and Ameer Ally, a Mohammedan pleader, directed to proceed with him as his assistant; and finally, General Outram, who had arrived in Calcutta on the 1st, was on the 5th appointed to the joint commands of Dinapore and Cawnpore, thus superseding the incapable Lloyd and the noble-hearted, indefatigable Havelock!

All India stood aghast at these changes, all in the wrong direction. But the public voice was dumb, for the Press was gagged, and letters to England formed the only outlet for public opinion. On that account perhaps the thralldom was the more keenly felt; for, from the drawing room to the barrack, the tone of society was very bitter against Lord Canning and his advisers.

CHAPTER IX.

GWALIOR.—CENTRAL INDIA.—AGRA.—ROHILCUND.

THE state of Agra and the surrounding districts, up to the beginning of June, has been already related. From that date its fate, and the fate of India, it may be said, was entirely dependent upon the movements of that large body of men who form the Gwalior Contingent. It will be convenient, then, primarily to notice the influences under which those men, most of them natives of Oudh, first rose against their officers, and were subsequently persuaded to abstain from adding

their weight, at that critical period, to the burden which was then almost bowing us to the earth.

When, in 1843, Gwalior lay at the feet of Lord Ellenborough, its army discomfited, their leaders disheartened, and its king a minor, that far-seeing nobleman conceived the idea of so binding it to our interests, that without any violation of faith, without any infringement of the rights of the native ruler, it might be hereafter a source of strength to our empire; and the means by which he proposed to accomplish this result were these. To the lawful ruler, of whose infancy his counsellors had taken such unwise advantage, Lord Ellenborough returned the whole of his patrimony. But his army he disbanded. In lieu of it, he raised another army, officered and paid by British officers — the money for the purpose being furnished by the Maharaja. He placed near the person of that prince a resident, armed with plenary powers, whose duty it should be to guide, instruct, and educate the youthful monarch; to make his policy, though he remained Maharaja, and in name the despotic master of Gwalior, entirely dependent on the views and instructions of the British Government.

By these means, no shock was offered to the feelings of the native princes: these were not suddenly and rudely, even treacherously, as in the case of Oudh and Nagpore, made to feel that their existence depended on the pleasure of one man. On the contrary, the generous policy of Lord Ellenborough drew from them all the expression of satisfaction, with a devotion to our rule. Nor was it in any other respect a less wise policy. Instead of weakening our empire, as was done in the two instances referred to, by transferring to our rule, and to a more dreaded ordeal — to our civil courts, a wild, rude, untamed people, untaught in the technicalities and trickeries of law, he strengthened it by retaining them under their native laws, and by imparting thereby a sense of security to all who had inherited or purchased property under the ancient *régime*. It was hoped too that the Maharaja, as he grew up to manhood, perceiving the stability of the tenure by which he held his possessions, secure alike from all fear of his protectors, the British, and from the danger of combination among his own officers, would recognise and appreciate the tie which bound him to our rule, and would use all his efforts to strengthen rather than to break it.

Of all the schemes which the penetration of statesmen has shadowed out, there is not one which has been more justified by the result than that embodied in the policy adopted by Lord Ellenborough towards Gwalior in 1843.

Whilst other provinces under the systems of those who had preceded and who came after him — whilst Afghanistan under Lord Auckland, the Punjab*, under Lord Hardinge, Oudh under Lord

* It is readily admitted that the Punjab, since its annexation in 1848, has shown splendid results; but it is equally a fact, that the system under which she has been so ably administered was borrowed by Lord Dalhousie from Sir Charles Napier's administration of Sindé.

The plan, too, first adopted to any great extent by Sir Charles Napier, of em-

Dalhousie, have proved thorns in our sides, Gwalior has been a tower of strength. She has been an outwork, as it were, of Agra, and at the same time has overawed and kept in subjection to us, the chiefs of Rajpootana, Dodypore, and the petty rajas of Central India. Before the battle of Maharajpore she had been the source of unceasing anxiety to our Government.

The Maharaja, now a grown man, has perceived that Gwalior had had her crisis: that the administration of her affairs had been committed to him on the sole condition of dealing out impartial justice to his subjects: he has seen that he possessed great social power, a princely revenue, a high status amongst native princes, an army officered by Europeans. He had therefore no want; there was nothing to tempt him to offer any opposition to British rule: he had no sympathy in common with the Mahomedan sovereigns of Delhi and Oudh: his interests and ours had become identical.

Such was the result of Lord Ellenborough's statesmanlike policy in 1845. It was destined, as I shall now proceed to show, to save our empire in 1857.

On the revolt of Delhi becoming known at Gwalior, the Maharaja at once resolved to cast in his lot with the British: he sent his body-guard, men of his own Mahratta clan, to Agra, where they were most successfully employed, and placed at the disposal of Mr. Colvin the entire Contingent. But it soon became evident that the causes which had induced our own native army to mutiny had infected the Sepoys of the Gwalior Contingent with the virus of revolt. The first symptom of it appeared at Hatrass on the 28th May*, when a portion of one of the cavalry regiments under the command of Lieutenant Cockburn revolted and went to Delhi; again, in the beginning of June, one of the regiments of the Contingent stationed at Neemuch mutinied; those at Augur and Sullutpore followed these examples; and finally, on the 14th June, those remaining at Gwalior rose in the night and massacred their officers.

The Maharaja was in no way to blame for these calamities: the troops which had mutinied were not Gwalior men; they came from Oudh, and had been enlisted by us. Like the rest of our native troops, they had been seduced by the emissaries of the former sovereign of their country—the king of Oudh—to rise against us; they received their orders from another power than that at Gwalior, and obeyed them.

Nevertheless, no sooner had they murdered their officers, than they placed their services at the disposal of the Maharaja, and begged him to lead them against Agra. At this time not only did the insurgents occupy Delhi, but the entire country north-west of Agra had risen in

ploying hardworking subalterns on moderate salaries to do the work of highly paid civilians, has been tried in the Punjab with the best effect.

It is not necessary to enter into the reason now why a different policy was put in force with respect to Gwalior and Sinde. It was absolutely necessary that it should be so; any measure short of the annexation of Sinde would have been destruction to us. One remedy will not cure every constitution.

* Vide Chapter I.

revolt; our garrisons were beleaguered at Cawnpore and Lucknow; and the aspect of our affairs was in the highest degree unpropitious. If, therefore, the policy adopted in 1843 had been a vicious policy like that pursued towards Affghanistan in 1838-39, if it had been a selfish and grasping policy like that carried out towards Oudh in 1856, now would have been the Maharaja's opportunity — most favourable the moment for recovering his lost authority: it was merely necessary to accede to the proposal of the mutinous Contingent to revenge himself on the British. Had he so acceded, had he put himself at their head, and, accompanied likewise by his trusty Mahrattas, proceeded to the scene of action, the consequences would have been most disastrous to ourselves. He would have brought at least twenty thousand troops, one half of them drilled and disciplined by European officers, on our weak points. Agra and Lucknow would have at once fallen. Havelock would have been shut up in Allahabad; and either that fortress would have been besieged, or the rebels, giving it a wide berth, would have marched through Benares on to Calcutta. There were no troops, there was no fortification to stop them. But, happily for us, the policy inaugurated by Lord Ellenborough, unlike many other excellent measures introduced by that nobleman, had not been repealed; and the Maharaja felt that a Mahomedan power raised upon the ruins of the British would be of all things most unfavourable to his interests, that, in fact, his prosperity depended upon our supremacy. He was, however, to a great extent in the power of the Contingent troops: he could not coerce them: he was compelled therefore to temporise.

It was a difficult matter. It was not the Maharaja's object, acting for our advantage, simply to decline going with the troops himself: he saw that, to whatever part of our territories they might proceed, they would inflict terrible damage on our interests, and that his refusal to go with them would be useless unless he managed to detain them altogether, or until such time as our resources should be better able to ward off their attack.

But, in spite of the difficulty of the case, he managed it. By liberal donations of pay, by pretended difficulties in the way of procuring carriage, by all the arts to which an Asiatic mind can have recourse, he did manage to detain them. Nay, more, when the Mhow mutineers and the rebel troops of Holkar, 3000 strong, passed through his territory, he actually so temporised with the Gwalior troops as to prevent their accompanying the former in their expedition against Agra. He could not keep them back much longer, but he detained them up to the proper time; they finally rose against him, left Gwalior on the 16th October, and, after many marches and counter-marches, arrived at Cawnpore in time to fall into the hands of Sir Colin Campbell, on the 7th December.

Meanwhile the 3000 men above alluded to moved on to Agra; but, before referring to their doings at that station, it will be necessary to give a sketch of the risings in the principal districts in Central India.

The revolt at Neemuch, long previously threatened, took place on

the 3rd June. The regiments at that station consisted of the 72nd Native Infantry, the 7th Regiment of the Gwalior Contingent, and a wing of the 1st Bengal Cavalry. Their mutiny was characterised by the usual occurrences. Loud protestations of fidelity on the part of the men until their arrangements had been completed; then a sudden rise, and an attempt, more or less successful, to massacre their officers. At Neemuch, fortunately, there was a fortified square, in which our countrymen and women were able to find shelter at the commencement of the outbreak: and before this was threatened, they had time to make some preparation for escape. The rebels, thus masters of the station, plundered the treasury, and made for Delhi. Their operations there on the rear of our force, and their sudden assault on Agra, will be detailed in due course.

At Nusseerabad, about one hundred and fifty miles nearer to Delhi, the revolt had commenced even earlier: the troops here were the 15th and 30th Native Infantry, a battery of Native Artillery, and the 1st Bombay Lancers.

The mutiny commenced at 3 P. M. by the men of the 15th and the Artillery taking possession of the guns, and bidding defiance to the officers; the 30th appeared to hesitate at first, but it was not long before they also joined. The officers were fired at on all sides, and many of them escaped very narrowly. In this situation, the Bombay Lancers were brought up. As they approached, the guns opened fire upon them. In vain they tried to charge: every attack was repulsed; and their officers, leading them on with great gallantry, suffered out of all proportion. Finding it fruitless to persevere, the Lancers desisted, and contented themselves with covering the retirement of the women and children to a place of safety. The mutineers then made their way to Delhi, and managed to reach it in time to take an efficient part in the defence.

The regiments at Mhow consisted of the 23rd Native Infantry, a wing of the 1st Cavalry, and a company of European Artillery. The mutiny first commenced at Indore, some thirty miles distant, the residence of the Maharaja Holkar, and of the Governor-General's agent. The Maharaja himself was quite innocent of any share in the catastrophe: his troops had caught the infection, and turned against us in spite of him. But a sufficient number of the Bhopal Contingent, who were fortunately on duty there, remained faithful long enough to enable Major Durand and the residents to retreat uninjured.

That same day an account of the occurrence reached Mhow. That very morning two guns had been sent out on the Bombay road to join General Woodburn's advancing column; but on the news of the revolt at Indore orders were transmitted to recall them. The men who were ordered to bring them back showed little alacrity in turning out, and on arriving up to the guns seemed unwilling to coerce the gunners. However, the remonstrances and example of their officers prevailed, and the guns were brought back. The bearing of the men, however, was sulky and unsoldierlike.

These circumstances being reported to the commanding officer, the European Artillery was ordered into the fort. Thither also the

ladies repaired. That very night, as their officers were sitting at dinner close to their lines, the men rose, fired upon them, killed two or three, plundered the station, and then made the best of their way to Gwalior. The great body of the officers found refuge in the fort. Here we must leave them for the present, whilst we follow the fortunes of our countrymen at Agra.

Towards the end of June the country all around Agra had assumed so threatening an aspect, that the residents had all been ordered into the fort, and the Kotah Contingent, then supposed by Mr. Colvin to be trustworthy, was moved up to the assistance of the garrison. It had certainly performed good service up to the time of its reaching Agra, collecting revenue, hanging mutineers, and burning villages; but it had scarcely arrived at the seat of the Lieutenant-Governorship before the men mutinied, firing upon their officers. Next day the Neemuch mutineers arrived within four miles. The authorities had been expecting them, but had forborne to mention their fears: the consequence was that much property belonging to those who could least afford to lose it was destroyed. However, hearing of the approach of the rebels, it was resolved to meet them. They numbered about four thousand men, of whom one-half perhaps had been disciplined by us. Our force consisted of seven companies of the 8th Europeans, one company of European Artillery, and a few volunteer cavalry. The enemy had eight guns, which they had strongly posted in the little village of Sussia, on the road to Futtehpore Sikri, being themselves encamped on the plain beyond. Our force advanced against them in line, the artillery being on the flanks, the cavalry on the rear. When about six hundred yards from the village, their artillery opened upon our line: it was immediately replied to by D'Oyley's battery with so great effect that they were temporarily silenced. A charge of infantry at this time, such as Havelock ordered at Cawnpore, and Eyre directed at Beebeegunj, would have gained us the day; but no one of those possessing authority could appreciate the crisis, and, instead of a charge, a cautious advance was directed. But the enemy had gained courage from our inactivity. The gunners returned to their guns, and opened a fire on our line with great effect; at the same time their cavalry threatened our flanks and rear, and their infantry, advancing in skirmishing order, gave us great annoyance. It was at this time, as we were advancing too slowly for heroic souls, that Captain D'Oyley, seated on one of the gun-carriages, was mortally wounded. His horse had been previously shot under him. When struck, he called out in a loud voice, "Follow them up, follow them up," and still continued, for a short time, to direct the advance of the battery. He knew that his wound was mortal, but still he gave his orders. When at last he was overcome with pain, he turned to the man nearest him, and said, "They have done for me now; put a stone over my grave, and say that I died fighting for my guns." He did not survive long.

Meanwhile our slow advance had had some effect, for the enemy had abandoned the village to a charge of two companies of the Europeans, and the day seemed our own, when it was discovered that

all our ammunition was exhausted. There was nothing for it then but a retreat, as our creeping movements had permitted the enemy to carry away his guns. Retreat then we did, threatened by the cavalry, even surrounded. Had they had any pluck, they might have cut up every man of our party. But they still feared the red-coated European; and our force, scarcely beaten, but certainly baffled and humiliated, at last found shelter under the walls of the fort. Our loss on this day was one hundred and forty, out of five hundred engaged; that of the enemy was not known. Strange to say, he did not think of following up his advantage, but took the road to Muttra and Delhi the next day, contenting himself with letting out from the jail four thousand of the most determined villains in India. Our countrymen were thenceforth confined to the fort, whence they were subsequently released by the arrival of Colonel Greathed's column, of which an account will be given hereafter.

Before proceeding to the north-west, and detailing the circumstances connected with the siege and recapture of Delhi, it will be necessary very briefly to refer to the events which had been passing in the districts surrounding that city, as well as in the rich province of Rohilcund.

In the end of May, the men of the Hurrianah Light Infantry, a local battalion stationed at Hausi Kissar and Sirsa, and part of the 4th Irregular Cavalry, rose upon their officers and the European residents, massacred many of them, and, after plundering the entire district, made for Delhi. Every village in that part of the country is a castle on a small scale: the inhabitants, sympathising with the mutineers, rose almost simultaneously with them, and declared for the cause of the King of Delhi. They did more: every unfortunate straggler who fell into their hands was ruthlessly butchered. And yet, many of the villages in which these deeds were perpetrated have been spared. It is a fact, to which there are hundreds of witnesses, that when, after the capture of Delhi, Colonel Greathed's column reached one of the largest of these rebellious towns, notorious for the cruelties which had been perpetrated within its walls—in which too the decapitated skeleton of an European woman was still exposed, bearing besides marks of the infliction of torture—that village was, at the earnest prayer of the civilian who accompanied the force as "political adviser," it is supposed, actually spared. Does the reader ask why? Because it supplied a large revenue to the Government of the North-West Provinces. These are some of the sordid considerations which the agents of the East India Company allow to interpose between our soldiers and retributive justice. But this is but an ordinary instance; others remain to be told which proclaim even more clearly the cold-blooded nature of our rulers, their want of sympathy with humanity, if that humanity be allied to their own.

The important province of Rohilcund, lying east of Oudh and north-west of Delhi, is inhabited by a race of Mahomedan warriors, the descendants of the victorious Affghans who settled in that country nearly a century and a half ago. Notwithstanding that lapse of time, they had retained, in all its perfection, their national

character: they were brave, treacherous, revengeful, very idle, careless of any occupation save that of a soldier. Hence this race supplied many recruits to our Irregular Cavalry. Its daring, dashing service was peculiarly suited to men of their disposition, and there were always numerous applicants for the vacancies which occurred.

We had three military stations in Rohilcund,—the principal and most important at Bareilly, the chief town of the province. Here, when the Delhi outbreak occurred, were the 8th Irregular Cavalry, the 18th and 68th Native Infantry, and a battery of Native Artillery, — not a single European besides the officers and residents.

From the very day that the news arrived the infantry regiments had shown their sympathy with the mutineers. But the 8th Irregular Cavalry, one of the best corps in the army, and commanded by a very gallant officer, Captain Mackenzie, evinced every disposition to continue loyal. So well had the men behaved, and to such an extent were they trusted by all, that Captain Mackenzie was empowered to raise several additional troops for permanent service, and the lines of the Irregular Cavalry were appointed as the place of rendezvous in the event of an outbreak. That these men were at the time faithful, cannot be doubted: many of them evinced their fidelity shortly afterwards by leaving house and home, wife and children, to the mercy of the insurgents, whilst they followed the fortunes of their officers to the bleak hills of Nynee Tal. But the great bulk of the men were unable to resist the combined influences of religion and example, and the golden prospects held out to them by the tempters. Foremost amongst these was Khan Bahadoor Khan, a pensioner of Government, and the nearest descendant of the famous Rohilla chief, Hafiz Rahmut. This man, in fact, received a double pension,—one as the heir of Hafiz Rahmut, the other in his capacity of retired Principal Sudder Ameen.* He enjoyed the entire confidence of the authorities at Bareilly: he was closeted daily with the commissioner and the magistrate, who concerted plans with him for the preservation of order. He was an old, venerable-looking man, with a soft, insinuating answer: his interests were supposed to be bound up with ours. Little did the magistrate imagine, when he announced his conviction that Delhi must fall in a week, that the hearts of the people were with us, and that the cavalry would remain staunch, that the old man listening apparently so respectfully was laughing in his sleeve, that he himself was the soul of the conspiracy, that the entire district, and the infantry regiments, were ready to rise at a signal from him, and that he was busily engaged in seducing the Irregulars by means of Mahomed Sheffie, a resaldar whom he had gained over to his interests.

But so it was: the hoary traitor had, under the mask of servility, wound himself into our confidence, and he employed the hold which he had thus gained on our authorities to bring about their destruction.

* Native judge.

All was ready by the end of May. In the morning of the 31st a servant, who had been sent with letters to the post, reported that he had found the office surrounded by armed Sepoys, who had tore up the letters: information came from another quarter to the effect that the Sepoys had resolved on rising at eleven o'clock, and that they had told off parties to each bungalow to murder all their officers. The cavalry were at once ordered to turn out, but before they could be got ready the revolt had commenced. As the clock sounded eleven, the Sepoys of the 68th rushed furiously out of their lines, seized the guns, and turned them upon the mess-house, firing grape into it. The officers immediately mounted their horses, and, finding it worse than useless to attempt to restore order, rode across the parade ground to the Irregular Cavalry lines, exposed all the time to a galling fire. At the same time both the 18th and 68th Sepoys went off in parties to execute their murderous commissions. One of these came across Brigadier Sibbald, a fine old soldier, riding towards the Irregulars: they saluted him with a volley which produced instant death. Most of the other officers reached the cavalry lines in safety.

There, indeed, had assembled by this time almost all the residents of the station, civilians, military men, merchants, and others. They found Captain Mackenzie and his adjutant, Lieutenant Beecher, haranguing their men and endeavouring to keep them together; but some were already sneaking off, and the disposition of others seemed doubtful. Colonel Troup, who commanded on the death of the Brigadier, saw at once that they too were gone, and gave the order to retire on Nynee Tal, a hill-station a hundred miles distant. Captain Mackenzie, however, was anxious to give his men the opportunity of proving themselves faithful. But he had scarcely returned from taking Colonel Troup's orders than the left wing went bodily off and joined the mutineers. They halted at the magazine, raised the green flag of Mahomed, and called on the others to join them. In spite of every solicitation of their officers, they obeyed: out of the entire regiment assembled that day at Bareilly, nineteen only remained faithful, and these escorted their officers and the refugees to Nynee Tal, leaving, as I said before, their property and families behind them. The residents whom choice or accident caused to remain were brutally murdered. Khan Bahadoor Khan himself taking a leading part in the atrocities.

At Moradabad and Shahjihanpore, the two other military stations in Rohilcund, the troops rose almost immediately after. At the former place, indeed, the 29th Native Infantry only joined their comrades when coerced by the arrival of the mutineers from Bareilly; but at Shahjihanpore the 28th revolted with a will, surrounded the Christian residents as they were at church, and murdered almost all of them. A few who escaped managed, after incredible difficulties, to reach the little fort of Mohammerah in Oudh; but, compelled to leave this place of refuge, they endeavoured, under an escort of men believed to be faithful, to make their way towards Lucknow. On the road they were met by the 41st Native Infantry, red with the blood of the Europeans sta-

tioned at Seetapore : by these they were one and all brutally murdered ; some of the servants alone escaped to tell the tale.

Meanwhile the mutineers from these three stations having plundered all the treasuries and accumulated enormous quantities of spoil, prepared to take it with them into Delhi. They were about 5000 strong, and had with them 400,000*l.* in silver, laden on country carts. They crossed the Ganges within thirty miles of Meerut. We had in that station a thousand Europeans doing nothing beyond guarding an entrenchment ; and yet the general commanding did not attempt in the slightest degree to interfere with their passage. They even lay at Gurmuckteser for some days, whilst they sent over their baggage, and, to keep our men off, sent the General taunting messages that they were about to attack him, a threat which sufficed to make him keep his Europeans within the entrenchment. How the spirits of the gallant young officers, panting to revenge their countrymen, chafed at this inaction, may be imagined. More than one implored the General to permit them to go with even 500 men to attack the rebels as they were crossing : but he would not hear of it. Meerut, he said, was too important a station to be left undefended. Most true ! But there are some cases in which a bold attack is the best defence, and this was one of them. The defeat of the Rohilcund rebels at Gurmuckteser Ghât would have struck terror into the surrounding district, and would have had even a material effect on the siege of Delhi.

But it was not to be : this force, laden with the plunder of Rohilcund, marched within thirty miles of a thousand Europeans, crossed the broadest river in India in boats, traversed the country, exposing their left flank to our inactive forces, and finally reached Delhi on the 1st of July,— a very critical period for the garrison of that city,— without a shot having been fired at them in anger.* Let us turn from the contemplation of one of the most disgraceful passages in the whole course of the rebellion to recount the progress and result of the siege of Delhi.

CHAPTER X.

DELHI.

THE easy conquest of a place, the most important in India, because traditionally the seat of Indian sovereignty, had the most pernicious effect on the minds of every class of native. It convinced the wavering, unnerved the staunch, and furnished the last inducement for the yet dissimulating to throw off the veil and openly proclaim themselves rebels and traitors. Once, therefore, in the hands of the

* I have not given the name of the general officer who commanded at Meerut at the end of June, because it is possible that General Hewitt may have previously left. Whoever he may have been, he deserves to stand in a literary pillory.

insurgents, Delhi became the rallying point for all the mutinous and disaffected in the Doab. Muttra, Kurnaul, Bareilly, and all the surrounding stations contributed their quota of rebels to garrison the captured city. With vast supplies of warlike stores in their possession, and ample time afforded them to concentrate without interruption, no wonder that, before a single besieger appeared before its walls, Delhi was a stronger place than any that had ever offered resistance to a European force in the East. The news of its capture reached General Anson, the Commander-in-Chief, while on a shooting excursion in the hills, on the 12th May. He at once issued the necessary orders for the formation of a force at Umballah, whither he himself proceeded in all haste, arriving there on the 22nd. There were at Umballah at this time the following troops, commanded by Major-General Sir H. W. Barnard:— Her Majesty's 9th Lancers, two troops European Horse Artillery, 4th Light Cavalry (native), and the 5th and 60th Regiments Native Infantry, with a detachment 9th Irregular Cavalry. At the hill stations of Kussowlie, Dugshai, and Subatho, all within sixty miles of Umballah, were Her Majesty's 75th, and the 1st and 2nd Fusiliers respectively; these regiments were immediately ordered down, marched on the 14th, and reached Umballah on the 17th May. That night a force, consisting of four companies of 1st Europeans, one squadron 9th Lancers, and two guns Horse Artillery, were despatched to Kurnaul, to quell disturbances taking place there. General Anson followed on the 23rd, with the following troops:— four guns, two troops 1st brigade Horse Artillery, 2nd troop 3rd brigade and 3rd troop 3rd battery Horse Artillery, and 4th company 6th battery Artillery; Her Majesty's 9th Lancers, one squadron 4th Lancers, 75th Foot, six companies 1st E. B. Fusiliers, Head Quarters and six companies 2nd E. B. Fusiliers, 60th and 5th Regiments Native Infantry. He reached Kurnaul on the 25th, and died on the 27th May.

Major-General Barnard then assumed the command, and, pushing on, arrived at Alleepoor, ten miles from Delhi, on the 8th June, having been joined by the siege train from Phillour on the 6th, and by the force under General Wilson on the 7th. On the 23d May, the Commander-in-Chief had despatched to General Hewitt at Meerut the following lucid and definite instructions:—

(INCLOSURE 18.)

“ The Commander-in-Chief to Major-General Hewitt.

“ My dear General,

“ *Umballah, May 23, 1857.*

“ I wish to place you in possession of what has been done and is doing here, and of my ideas with respect to the future movements of the force from Meerut, which will be required to join this column in its advance towards Delhi.

“ The force from Umballah consists of the 9th Lancers, one squadron 4th Lancers, Her Majesty's 75th foot, 1st European Regiment, 2nd European Regiment, 60th Native Infantry, two troops of Horse Artillery.

“ They are formed into two small brigades. Brigadier Halifax commands

the 1st, composed of two squadrons Lancers, Her Majesty's 75th Foot, 1st Europeans, 3rd troop 3rd brigade Horse Artillery of six guns.

"Brigadier Jones will command the 2nd Brigade — 2nd Europeans, 60th Native Infantry, two squadrons 9th Lancers, one squadron 4th Lancers, 2nd troop 3rd brigade Horse Artillery, six guns.

"Four companies 1st Fusiliers, one squadron of 9th Lancers, two guns Horse Artillery, were moved to Kurnaul on the 17th, and arrived on the 20th.

"Six companies of 1st Fusiliers followed on the 21st.

"Her Majesty's 75th Foot and 60th Regiment Native Infantry march on the 22nd

"One squadron 9th Lancers and four guns will march on the 24th or 25th.

"The above will all be at Kurnaul on the 28th.

"The 2nd Europeans, 3rd troop 3rd brigade Horse Artillery, will probably follow on the 26th. The whole will be at Kurnaul on the 30th.

"I propose then to advance with the column towards Delhi on the 1st, and be opposite to Bhagput on the 5th. At this last place I should wish to be joined by the force from Meerut. To reach it four days may be calculated on.

"This would require your movement on the 1st or 2nd, according to circumstances. By that time it is hoped you will have made every preparation.

"Irregular detachments have been sent on the road to beyond Paneeput to stop plundering, and to protect the well disposed.

"The road has also been opened to Meerut. Captain Sanford arrived here with your despatches early on the morning of the 23rd, and found no obstruction.

"A detachment of 150 sowars of the 4th Irregular Cavalry will leave Kurnaul to-morrow; 25 will be posted at Shamlee, 50 will proceed to Mozuffurnugger, to restore confidence in that district, and to punish any villagers and marauders that may have been concerned in the plundering of that place.

"I have directed 75 to proceed direct to Meerut and to place themselves at your disposal; they will be under the command of an European officer. You will then be enabled to secure carriage for your troops, if you still require it. You must ascertain whether there are any difficulties on the road from Meerut to Bhagput, and the best mode of overcoming them.

"It would be very desirable to push forward some reconnoissance to as near Delhi as possible. It is reported here that a detachment of the mutineers, with two guns, are posted on the Meerut side of the river. They should be captured, and no mercy must be shown to the mutineers.

"On the 20th, I sent a detachment of 2nd company of the 5th Native Infantry and a squadron of the 4th Lancers towards Saharunpoor. I have the satisfaction of having heard that they arrived just in time to save that place from pillage, and that confidence is restored there. I hope that the occupation of Mozuffurnugger will tend to tranquillise that district.

"Many of the 5th Native Infantry have deserted, but it is gratifying to find they have done their duty when detached.

"Two companies have been sent to Roopur on duty. The remainder, with light companies of the 2nd European Regiment, will be left to guard these cantonments.

"If any families at Meerut would consider themselves more secure in the hills, they might go there with safety.

"A small siege-train has left Loodiana and is expected here on the 26th. It will require eleven days to get it to Delhi. It may join us at Bhagput on or about the 6th, the day after that I have named for the junction of your force.

"I depend upon your supplying at least 120 artillerymen to work it.

"You will bring besides, according to statement received, 2 squadrons of Carbineers, a wing of the 60th Rifles, 1 light Field Battery, 1 troop of Horse Artillery, and any Sappers you can depend upon, and of course the non-commissioned European officers belonging to them. I wish to know whether you have any information respecting troops or guns coming from Agra, or the co-operation of any native States.

"I beg you will communicate this to the Lieutenant-Governor at Agra, and to the Secretary to Government at Calcutta — telegraph and letter.

"Any change in the above shall be communicated to you instantly.

"I remain, &c,

"GEORGE ANSON."

Acting upon these, Brigadier-General Wilson left Meerut on the 27th May with the force in the margin, and arrived at Guzeeoodeen Nugger on the 30th. At this place the little river Hindun is crossed by an iron bridge, which, as it formed part of the high-road to Delhi from Meerut, it was of the utmost importance to guard. The rebels had sent out a large force with siege-guns to take possession of this bridge; and accordingly, at four o'clock, P.M. of the day of his arrival, General Wilson found himself attacked by the enemy, who had taken up a very advantageous position on some rising ground about a mile from the British camp on the other side of the river, whilst a company of 60th Rifles was detached to hold the bridge. The two 18-pounders replied to the heavy guns, and four guns of Major Tomb's troop Horse Artillery, supported by a squadron of Carbineers, moved along the bank of the river to outflank the enemy's position. They were supported by two companies of the 60th Rifles, four guns of Major Scott's battery, the Sappers, and a troop of Carbineers. The movement completely succeeded: the raking fire from the 6-pounders disconcerted the enemy, whose fire slackened, and shortly ceased. The Rifles were then ordered to advance, which they did in the most dashing style, capturing all the guns, ammunition, and stores of the enemy, who took to flight, pursued by the Carbineers under Lieutenant-Colonel Custance. In this battle, the first in which they had met us in the open field, the mutineers fought most determinedly. "They actually," writes one engaged in the action, "crossed bayonets with us, and met their death like Trojans," and did not relinquish their guns before they had attached slow matches to the ammunition waggons, one of which exploding caused the death of Captain Andrews and four men of the Rifles. The next day about one o'clock the insurgents appeared in force almost on the same ground from which they had previously been driven. After movements on our part similar to those of the day before, a general advance was ordered and the rebels were driven from their position, and the ridge was crowned. The British force, however, was so knocked up by the sun, that the enemy was not pursued, and succeeded in carrying off all their guns.

400 rank and file 6th Rifles.
200 6th Carbineers.
1 Horse Field Battery,
Half troop Horse Artillery.
Head-quarters of Sappers
and Miners, about 100
men of all arms.
2 18-pounder guns.

On the 3rd June, General Wilson was reinforced by the Sirmoor battalion (Goorkhas) 600 strong. On the same day he marched towards Alleepoor, where on the 7th he joined the Commander-in-Chief, whose force had been somewhat augmented in the meantime by troops from the contingents of the Putteala and Jhund Rajahs. Sir H. Barnard broke up his camp on the 8th at one A. M., and after marching ten miles found the enemy fully prepared to dispute his advance, in a strong intrenched position with a canal in his rear, at a place called "Badul ka Serai." The British force, divided into three brigades, was disposed as follows:—The 1st brigade, under Brigadier-General Showers, was to act on the right of the main trunk road, along which the column was to advance; the 2nd brigade, under Brigadier-General Graves, was to take the left; and the 3rd brigade, under Brigadier-General Grant was to gain the opposite side of the canal, and recross it below and in rear of the enemy's position as soon as the action commenced, so as to take the enemy in flank: the heavy guns were to remain in position on the road, the rest of the artillery to act on either side. As soon as the advanced picket met the enemy, these brigades deployed, leaving the main road clear. The enemy's guns, served with the greatest precision, now opened upon the advancing troops, causing considerable loss, the second shot killing Colonel Chester, the Adjutant-General. The light field-pieces which replied to them failing to silence guns of such heavy calibre, the 75th were ordered to advance and take the battery. This was done, as General Barnard says, "with heroic gallantry,"—the 1st Europeans supporting the attack. The 2nd brigade now coming up and threatening their right, and the 3rd brigade their left, the enemy abandoned the position entirely leaving their guns on the ground. Knowing from the natives of the country, that if he halted a similar opposition might be offered him the following morning, General Barnard determined to push on, and his victorious though exhausted army was nothing loth. Arriving at a point where the road branched off to the left through the Delhi cantonments, it became advisable to divide the army into two columns, one of which should take the branch, and the other the main road. To General Wilson was given the command of the former column, which had to fight its way through lanes and gardens enclosed by high walls and other obstacles, affording cover to an enemy as far as Hindoo Rao's house on the ridge to the extreme right of the cantonments. General Barnard, commanding in person the column proceeding to the left, soon came in sight of the enemy strongly posted on the elevated ridge which separates Delhi from its cantonments. Making a rapid flank movement under cover of the cantonment itself, General Barnard succeeded in gaining the ridge ere the enemy could get their guns into a new position to oppose him. Taken in flank and rear, the out-manceuvred rebels hastily fled, abandoning their guns, twenty-six in number, ammunition, camp equipage, and even wounded men. The whole ridge was at once in our possession, and the army was placed in position upon it. General Barnard meeting General Wilson at Hindoo

Rao's house, which became Army Head-quarters. The goal was now reached. Delhi, the city of horrors, the loathsome refuge of thousands of murderers and traitors, lay beneath our army, and distant but a mile. Welcome as the sight was to our brave little band of soldiers, few could gaze at the immense extent of the city and its formidable defences, without feeling that to attempt a "coup-de-main" with such a force, would be to risk our all upon a rash and perhaps profitless enterprise. It was determined, therefore, to retain the position on the ridge until adequate reinforcements should arrive, and in the meantime to throw up batteries at a distance of 1500 yards from which to shell the city. The extreme right of our position, or the house of Hindoo Rao before mentioned, was the nearest to the walls of Delhi, and faced in a south-easterly direction the Moree Bastion and Gate, the most salient point opposed to us. Here then were placed our batteries. A little on the left, on the ridge which from this point took a north-easterly direction till it joined the river Jumna, was a strong picket in an old mosque, and to the left of that a building called the Flag-staff Tower. Immediately behind this tower lay the cantonments, where the bulk of our force was encamped, protected from the fire of the enemy by the ridge itself, on whose slope descending towards the camp were still the ruined huts of the mutinous regiments and the houses of the unfortunate officers. Behind the camp flowed a small river, taking a northerly course through the plain, and joining the Jumna a few miles above Delhi. This river was crossed by several bridges which however were commanded by some of our heavy guns. The right of the camp was defended by a field-battery, placed upon a convenient elevation, and called the "Mound Battery." To the right of this battery, and almost in rear of Hindoo Rao's house, was a suburb of Delhi called the "Subzee Mundee." It consisted of old houses, gardens with high walls, narrow streets and lanes, affording the very cover behind which only the Sepoy is brave, and in which, as the sequel will show, some most desperate hand-to-hand fights occurred. Similar suburbs intervene between the actual defences of Delhi and the whole front of our position. The defences of Delhi enclose an area of about three square miles; they consist of a series of bastions connected by long curtains, with occasional martello towers to aid the flanking fire: these bastions rise about sixteen feet above the general level of the ground, and are built of masonry twelve feet thick; the curtains are also of masonry and about the same thickness and height. Each bastion mounts eleven guns, one at the salient, three on each face, and two on each flank. Running round the base of these bastions and curtains, is a berm or terrace varying in width from fifteen to thirty feet, and having on its exterior edge a wall eight feet high loopholed for musketry. This wall is a continuation of the escarp wall of the ditch, which descends to a depth of twenty feet, and is twenty-five feet wide. The counterscarp is not of masonry, but is a mere earthen slope of easy incline, the glacis is about sixty yards wide, and covers scarcely half of the walls. On the eastern side of the city runs the river Jumna, on whose banks stand

the palace of the king, and the old fort of Selimgurb, fronting which is the bridge of boats leading to Meerut. At the north side of the king's palace is the Calcutta Gate, and, following the defences in a north-westerly direction, is the Magazine, St. James's Church and the main guard. This was the extreme point of the face which our position fronted, and is the northernmost point of the city walls. Going still round to the left in a northerly direction, we come to the Cashmere Gate, and then to the Moree Gate and Bastion, on which our first fire was directed. This forms the left point of the face opposed to us. To the left of this again, the walls circling towards the river in an arc of which the Calcutta Gate would be about the centre, were the Cabul, Lahore, Furaskkhana, Ajmeer, Toorkaman, and Delhi Gates. Outside the Ajmeer Gate was a crown work for the defence of the tomb of Ghazee Khan. During the rainy season the river Jumna almost washes the walls of the eastern face of the city, rendering it unassailable. With the exception therefore of the three-quarters of a mile faced by our army, the enemy had free ingress and egress through the walls of the city, into which reinforcements from almost all quarters daily poured. The numerical strength of the Sepoys within the walls, on the 8th June, was estimated at 7000. On the 9th General Barnard was joined by the Guides (horse and foot), from the Punjaub, who had marched 600 miles in the extraordinary short period of twenty-two days. They were engaged on the afternoon of the day of their arrival in repelling the first of a series of assaults on our position, that occurred almost daily up to the actual storming of the place, and it was in this action that they lost their gallant young second-in-command, Quintyn Batty, a soldier of extraordinary promise. The enemy invariably endeavoured to turn our position, and was on every occasion repulsed with great loss. It would be mere repetition to describe each separate assault, and I shall therefore select only one or two of the most desperate:—The 23rd June, the 100th anniversary of the battle of Plassey, was the day predicted by the Hindoo seers for our downfall. It was the one specially selected for the General Massacre of Europeans throughout Bengal (if not India), and was by a coincidence favourably ominous both to the Festival of the Ruth Juttra of the Hindoos and the first day of the new moon sacred to the Mussulmans. The attack begun on our right from the suburb of the Subzee Munde. The object of their attack was to get possession of our battery on the hill, but finding that they could not succeed, they confined themselves to the gardens and houses of the suburb, where a most desperate hand-to-hand fight continued for many hours. Fortunately the bridges in our rear had been blown up the day previously; yet notwithstanding that this relieved the army of all anxiety for its rear, and left a larger disposable moveable force, such was the determination with which the rebels fought that it was necessary to order out Rothney's Sikhs, who had only arrived that morning after a night march of twenty-four miles. It was not until after sunset that all resistance was overcome, and the enemy retired into the city through the Lahore Gate exposed to a fire of three eighteen pounders, which com-

mitted immense havoc amongst them. The enemy's loss was estimated at 1000 men. In one inclosure 150 were bayoneted, so desperately did they cling to cover. The casualties on our side were 180 killed and wounded, of whom 45 were Europeans of the 1st and 2nd Fusiliers and 60 Rifles, who bore the brunt of the battle. On the next day Colonel Chamberlain arrived to fill the post of Adjutant-General of the army. On the 26th appeared the first symptoms of disunion amongst the rebels in the desertion from the town of the 9th Native Infantry: they fled in great confusion, and were fired upon from the walls; after wandering about for a week or so, they surrendered themselves and claimed pardon under Mr. Colvin's proclamation. On the 28th our army was reinforced by 1000 men from the Punjaub; and on the 1st July the head-quarters, and a wing of Her Majesty's 61st from Ferozpoor, arrived in camp. On that day was seen from our batteries on the ridge a large encampment on the other side of the Jumna; it was the whole body of the Rohilcund mutineers from the three stations of Bareilly, Moradabad, and Shahjehanpoor, four regiments of infantry, one of irregular cavalry, and a battery of artillery. For a time it had been hoped that they would find the Ganges impassable, but the anticipated rise of the river did not take place; it was crossed at Gurmuktesur, the usual place of passage, the Doab was traversed, and Delhi was attained. For two whole days our troops had the mortification of watching the long train of men, guns, horses, and beasts of burden of all kinds, streaming across the bridge of boats into the city, without the possibility of preventing or in any way annoying them. An immediate attack on the part of the reinforcements was anticipated from the known practice of the insurgents with regard to new comers. Accordingly on the afternoon of the 3rd, they came out in force, and threatened the right rear of the English position. But, finding our men well prepared, they drew off and marched away several miles to our rear along the Kurnaul road as far as Aliepoor, the place where our army bivouacked the night before the advance upon Delhi and the first brush with the enemy.* Finding no enemy to oppose them, they returned, and though twelve guns and 1000 infantry, and two squadrons of cavalry had been sent out by General Barnard to intercept them, the rebels, after a short artillery fight, continued to effect their retreat with the loss only of a little baggage. On the 3rd, the force was joined by "Coke's Corps" of Punjaub Irregulars. On the 5th General Barnard died, the last of the officers that formed the council of war at Umballah. General Reed, an old officer in bad health, in virtue of his seniority, succeeded to the command in chief. On the 9th the enemy added a first attempt at stratagem to his usual mode of attack. He detailed to our rear a body of cavalry, who, advancing slowly, were mistaken for our 9th Irregulars. It was not until they came upon our advancing picket, consisting of two light guns and about 80 of the 6th Carbineers, that they were dis-

* Letter from an officer present.

covered. The artillery officer in command of the guns (Lieut. Hills) was about a hundred yards in front of his guns with the party of Carbineers, who, from some unexplained reason, immediately on catching sight of the enemy's cavalry, turned and fled. The guns being limbered up, Hills could do nothing; but rather than fly he charged by himself.* He fired four barrels of his revolver and killed two men, throwing the empty pistol in the face of another, and knocking him off his horse. Two horsemen then charged him, and rolled him and his horse over. He got up with no weapons, and seeing a man on foot coming at him to cut him down, rushed at him, got inside his sword, and hit him full in the face with his fist. At that moment he was cut down from behind, and a second blow would have done for him, had not Tombs, his captain, the finest fellow in the service (who had been in his tent when the row began) arrived at the critical moment, and shot his assailant. Hills was able to walk home, though his wound was severe, and on the road Tombs saved his life once more by sticking another man who attacked him. The enemy's horsemen charged right through the camp, firing into the tents. They halted, however, in our rear, on the banks of the canal, and there made a stand. They were taken in flank by some guns under Major Tombs, and ridden down, almost to a man, by some of the 6th Carbineers, and mounted guards from the Subzee Mundee road. Meantime a general attack upon all our pickets was made by about 6000 of the enemy in front; it was repulsed, after some severe fighting, with immense slaughter, and the enemy was driven as usual into the gardens and inclosures of the suburbs, from which they were dislodged at the point of the bayonet, our guns making lanes in their ranks as they retreated into the city. Similar actions were of almost daily occurrence, so that up to the 31st July no less than 23 battles had been fought, in which 22 officers and 296 men had been killed; and 72 officers and 990 men wounded. Our force at this date consisted of 6200 effective men, and 1060 sick and wounded. General Reed had been compelled, by ill health, to go to the hills; and General Wilson of the Artillery had taken the command, Colonel Baird Smith being Chief Engineer: two abler officers it would have been difficult to find in India or elsewhere. The General had now determined to act entirely on the defensive until the arrival of Nicholson's column with another siege train, should sufficiently strengthen his hands to attempt the final assault. On the 7th, our engineers made an ineffectual attempt to blow up the bridge of boats by floating down infernal machines, so arranged that they should explode when they came in contact with anything. An officer writing from the camp, about this time, gives the following description of it:— "What a sight our camp would be even to those who visited Sebastopol! The long lines of tents, the thatched hovels of the native servants, the rows of horses, the parks of artillery, the English soldier, in his gray linen coat and trowsers (he has fought as

* Letter to the "Times."

bravely as ever without pipeclay) the Sikhs with their red and blue turbans, the Affghans with their red and blue turbans, their wild air, and their gay head-dresses and coloured saddle cloths, and the little Goorkhas, dressed up to the ugliness of demons in black worsted Kilmarnock hats and woollen coats, the truest, bravest soldiers in our pay. There are scarcely any Porbeas (Hindoos) left in our ranks, but of native servants many a score. In the rear are the booths of the native bazaars, and further out on the plain the thousands of camels, bullocks, and horses that carry our baggage. The soldiers are loitering through the lines or in the bazaars. Suddenly the alarm is sounded, every one rushes to his tent. The infantry soldier seizes his musket and slings on his pouch, the artilleryman gets his gun harnessed, the Affghan rides out to explore, in a few minutes every one is in his place. If we go to the summit of the ridge of hill which separates us from the city, we see the river winding along to the left, the bridge of boats, the towers of the palace, and the high roofs and minarets of the great mosque, the roofs and gardens of the doomed city, and the elegant looking walls with batteries here and there, the white smoke of which rises slowly up among the green foliage that clusters round the ramparts." Yet it must not be supposed from this *couleur-de-rose* sketch that our troops were enjoying much rest; they were harassed by almost daily attacks, to repel which required almost every available soldier in camp. The season was most inclement, the rains being at their height, and the men were frequently under arms for hours without any shelter whatever. There was hot work in store for them. Nicholson, the Bayard of the Punjaub, had pushed on in advance of his column, and arrived in camp on the 8th of August. This gallant and comparatively young officer was a brevet Lieutenant-Colonel and regimental Captain in the 27th Native Infantry, and at the time of the breaking out of the mutiny was a 1st class Deputy-Commissioner in the Punjaub. On General Chamberlain being sent to Delhi, Colonel Nicholson, with the rank of Brigadier, was ordered to succeed him in command of the moveable column which had been organised at Wuzeerabad. This column consisted, on the 22nd of June, when Nicholson joined it, of the following troops:—

Dawe's troop, Horse Artillery.
 Two guns, Smyth's troop (Natives).
 Bouchier's Light Infantry Battery.
 Her Majesty's 52nd Light Infantry.
 2nd Punjaub Light Infantry Sikhs.
 35th Bengal Native Infantry.
 Wing 9th Bengal Cavalry.
 Mooltanee Horse.

This force was, however, speedily reduced, for on the mutinying of the troops at Sealkote, on the 9th July, it was considered necessary to disarm the 35th Native Infantry, the cavalry and the native, gunners of Smyth's troop. This was done at Umritsir, and immediately afterwards Brigadier Nicholson started with Her Majesty's 52nd

and artillery to cut off the Sealkote mutineers, who would, it was thought, endeavour to join the Irregular Cavalry stationed at Goordaspoor; starting at 8 P. M., they reached that station, distant forty-four miles, the artillery in sixteen hours, the infantry (in carts) in nineteen. On the next day, spies brought word that the enemy were crossing the Ravee, and then might Brigadier Nicholson have closed his glass and said, "The day is ours." Marching out at 10 o'clock in the morning, in a couple of hours they came in sight of the enemy drawn up in battle array. Our guns opened immediately they got within range, and Pandy made a feeble attempt at a charge. His small body of cavalry actually rode into the Horse Artillery, but were cut down to a man. Then came the *sauve qui peut*, and they were unmolested in their flight, for there was no cavalry to pursue them. They took up a position upon an island in the river, where they threw up a parapet for their single gun, a 12-pounder. On the 14th General Nicholson crossed the 52nd, a point below the enemy's position, unobserved, and sweeping the entire island, killed or drove into the river every soul opposed to him. On the 25th of July Nicholson crossed the Beas, and commenced his march towards Delhi, which was reached by himself on the 8th, and by his troops on the 14th of August. How welcome was such a reinforcement need not be told. While it revived the ardour of the worn-out besiegers, it depressed in a far greater degree the spirits of the besieged. From the 14th of August to the 14th of September, the latter hazarded but one attack. On the 28th of August General Nicholson's brigade, of the strength in

1 squad. 9th Lancers,
16 guns Horse Artillery,
120 Guide Cavalry,
200 Mooltanee Horse,
Wing of H.M. 61st,
1st European Battl. Foot,
1st and 2nd Punjaub Irr.
30 Sappers and Miners.

the margin, was ordered out to intercept a force of the enemy reported to have left Delhi with the intention of cutting off our expected siege-train. He marched at day-break, and after crossing two difficult swamps arrived at a village called Naugloo, about nine miles to the north of our position, where he obtained intelligence of the enemy being expected at Nujffgurh, a place about five miles further on. He arrived there about 4 P. M., and found that the enemy, 7000 strong, had taken up a strong position in front of the town of Nujffgurh, with their left centre resting on an old serai, in which they had four guns. Between this point and a bridge crossing the Nujffgurh Canal, they had nine more guns. After a hasty reconnoissance, General Nicholson determined upon attacking their left centre, which seemed the key of the position, and then changing his front to take their line of guns in flank, and drive the enemy towards the bridge. Reserving 100 men of each of the corps, he sent Her Majesty's 61st and 1st Fusiliers, and 2nd Punjaub Infantry, with four guns on the left flank, and ten on the right, to carry the position. This was done in the most brilliant manner, with scarcely any loss, and following out his previously arranged movement with perfect success, the enemy were soon in full flight over the bridge, leaving the whole of their guns in our hands. The column bivouacked that

night at the bridge without food or shelter of any kind, and after blowing up the bridge the next day, marched back to camp, which it reached in the evening. On the 4th of September, the siege-train from Ferozpoore, consisting of 32 pieces, 24-pounders and 10-inch mortars and howitzers, came in. Up to this time we may be looked upon as having been rather the besieged than the besiegers, for the guns at our disposal were quite inadequate to compete with the heavier metal with which the enemy returned our fire; now, however, with fifty-four heavy guns, the siege might begin in earnest, and our general and his engineers lost no time in setting to work. Ground may be said to have been first broken before Delhi on the 7th September. This usually laborious process was materially assisted by the nature of the ground, which was scored by a series of nullahs, running almost parallel to our position in the direction of the Jumna. These nullahs, which served only to drain the eastern slope of the ridge, were dry at this season of the year, and afforded capital cover for our troops. On the night of the 7th, No. 1 siege battery was commenced; it consisted of four 24-pounders, destined to demolish the Cashmere Bastion, distant 850 yards; and five 18-pounders and one 8-inch howitzer, to silence the fire of the Shah Bastion, distant 700 yards.

During the day and night of the 8th, the whole of these guns were got into position, and commenced a most destructive fire upon the enemy's works. On the night of the 10th, No. 2 battery was constructed, and opened fire at half-past 5 o'clock, A.M. of the 11th; it was armed with nine 24-pounders, intended to breach the curtain adjoining the right flank of the Cashmere Bastion, distant 500 yards, and seven 8-inch howitzers, and two 18-pounders, to batter the bastion itself, destroy its masonry parapet, a small tower in the curtain, and the musketry parapet on its left face. No. 3 was armed on the night of the 11th with six 18-pounders, at a distance of 160 yards, to demolish the Water Bastion, and twelve 5½-inch mortars to shell the interior of the bastion. This battery opened at 1 P.M. on the 12th. No. 4 mortar battery was ready on the evening of the 9th. It was, however, ordered not to open fire until the morning of the 11th, on which date it saluted with a storm of shell, from four 10-inch and six 8-inch mortars, the Cashmere and Water Gates and bastions, the church, and Skinner's House. "At different times," says Colonel Baird Smith, in his despatch, "between the 7th and 11th, these batteries opened fire with an efficiency and vigour which excited the unqualified admiration of all who had the good fortune to witness it. Every object contemplated in the attack was accomplished with a success even beyond my expectations, and I trust I may be permitted to say, that while there are many noble passages in the history of the Bengal Artillery, none will be nobler than that which will tell of its work on this occasion." On the night of the 13th the breaches were pronounced practicable, and instant orders were issued for the assault to take place next morning. The assaulting force was divided into four columns as follows:—

		Men.
1st, Brigadier Nicholson commanding	{ Her Majesty's 75th	300
	{ 1st European Battalion, foot	200
	{ 2nd Punjaub Irregulars	450
2nd, Brigadier Jones, Her Majesty's 61st, commanding	{ Her Majesty's 8th	250
	{ 2nd European Battalion, foot	250
	{ 4th Regiment Sikhs	250
3rd, Colonel Campbell, Her Majesty's 52nd, commanding	{ Her Majesty's 52nd	200
	{ Kemaon Battalion	250
	{ 1st Punjaub Irregulars	500
4th, or Reserve, Brigadier Longfield, Her Majesty's 8th, commanding	{ Her Majesty's 61st	250
	{ 4th Sikh Rifles	450
	{ Belooch Battalion	300
	{ Jheend Rajah's troops	300
	{ Her Majesty's 60th Rifles	200

The first column was destined to assault the main breach, the second the breach in the Water Bastion; the advance of both was covered by a battalion of Her Majesty's 60th Rifles. The third column was directed against the Cashmere Gateway; it was preceded by an explosion party covered by the 60th Rifles. The fourth column was kept in reserve. The 1st Bengal Fusiliers, headed by Brigadier Nicholson in person, escalated the left face of the Cashmere Bastion, while the 75th and 2nd Punjaub Infantry carried the breach on the left of the Cashmere Gate. The bastion carried, the column reformed and, moving rapidly to the right, carried the various bastions up to the Caubul Gate; on reaching the head of the street at the Caubul Gate, the enemy made a resolute stand but were soon driven forward. Pushing on along the rampart road, the column was checked by a heavy fire from two guns commanding the road, which at this point was so narrow as scarcely to admit of four men abreast. After endeavouring for two hours to effect a passage, the column was withdrawn to the Caubul Gate, where it was met by Brigadier Jones's column. It was whilst rallying the men to a last charge down that fatal passage that the brave Nicholson received his mortal wound. The 2nd column carried the breach in the Water Bastion, and, turning to the right, followed almost in the footsteps of the 1st column, joining them as before stated at the Caubul Gate.

It was the duty of the explosion party to blow in the Cashmere Gate, and the way in which this desperate service was performed cannot be better told than in the words of Colonel Baird Smith. "The party was composed, in addition to the two officers named, of the following :

Serjeant John Smith,	}	of the Sappers and Miners.
,, A. B. Carmichael, and		
Corporal F. Burgees, alias		
Joshua Burgees Grierson,		
Bugler Hawthorne, Her Majesty's 52nd.		
14 Native Sappers and Miners.		
10 ,, Punjaub Sappers and Miners.		

Covered by the fire of Her Majesty's 60th Rifles, this party advanced at the double towards the Cashmere Gate,—Lieutenant Home, with Serjeants J. Smith and Carmichael, and Havildar Madhoo, all of the Sappers, leading and carrying the powder bags, followed by Lieutenant Salkeld, Corporal Burgees, and a section of the remainder of the party. The advanced party reached the gateway unhurt, and found that part of the drawbridge had been destroyed; but passing across the precarious footing supplied by the remaining beams, they proceeded to lodge their powder against the gate. The wicket was open, and through it the enemy kept up a heavy fire upon them. Serjeant Carmichael was killed while laying the powder, Havildar Madhoo being at the same time wounded. The powder being laid, the advanced party slipped down into the ditch, to allow the firing party under Lieutenant Salkeld to perform its duty. While endeavouring to fire the charge, Lieutenant Salkeld was shot through the leg and arm, and handed over the slow match to Corporal Burgees, who fell mortally wounded, just as he had successfully performed his duty. Havildar Tiluk Singh, of the Sappers and Miners, was wounded, and Ram Hetch, Sepoy of the same corps, was killed, during this part of the operation. The demolition having been most successful, Lieutenant Home, happily unwounded, caused the bugle to sound the regimental call of the 52nd Regiment as the signal for the advance of the column. Fearing that amid the noise of the assault the sound might not be heard, he had the call repeated three times, when the troops advanced and carried the gateway with entire success." The gateway was stormed with a cheer, and the entire column entered the main guard. Re-forming, it then advanced with the intention of occupying the Kotwallee (Police Court), and, if possible, the Jumma Musjid. Clearing the Water Bastion, the church, and the "Gazette Press" Compound, the column proceeded through the Cashmere Gate Bazaar, arrived within about 100 yards of the Jumma Musjid, when it was found that the arches and gates of that building had been bricked up, and could not be forced without powder-bags or artillery. After remaining for half an hour under a galling fire of musketry from the houses, in the expectation of hearing of the successful advance of the other columns, Colonel Campbell deemed it prudent to retire upon the Begum's Bagh, or garden, a large enclosure, which he held for one hour and a half under a fire of grape and musketry. The Kumaon battalion, which, having diverged to the right, had for some time held the Kotwallee, here rejoined the column, which now fell back upon the church. Meantime, the Sirmoor battalion and the Guides made an attack upon the enemy's position in the suburbs of Kissengunge and Pahareepore, with a view of driving in the rebels and supporting the main attack by effecting an entrance at the Cabul Gate after it should be taken. This attack was supported by the cavalry under Brigadier Hope Grant, 9th Lancers, and Horse Artillery under Major Tombs. Though conducted with the utmost gallantry, this attack failed in its object: the enemy, however, abandoned their position the next day, leaving their guns in our hands.

At the close of the day, the whole of the defences, from St. James's Church to the Caubul Gate inclusive, then remained in our hands. Our loss in killed and wounded was severe, viz. 1160,—283 under the former head, including 7 officers; 877 under the latter, including 57 officers. On the walls were captured 37 pieces of ordnance. On the 15th, the magazine was breached, and carried by assault on the 16th. It was found to contain no less than 171 guns and howitzers, most of them of the largest calibre. The resistance of the enemy now became less determined, large bodies deserted, and the townspeople crowded out of the city. Every available mortar was now turned upon the palace, the old fort of Selimgurb, and the southern part of the city. On the 17th and 18th, advance posts were taken up in the face of considerable opposition, and on the 19th, the Buree Bastion was surprised and captured. On the 20th the troops pushed on, occupied the Lahore Gate and the other bastions and gateways, until the whole of the defences were in our hands. On the same day the gates of the palace were blown up, and the head quarters established there.

In the history of sieges, that of Delhi will ever take a prominent place. Its strength, resources, and the prestige attached to it in the native mind, combined to render formidable this citadel of Hindostan. Reasonably might the "Northern Bee," or the "Invalide Russe," question our ability to suppress this rebellion, if they drew their conclusions from the numerical strength of the little band that first sat down before Delhi. But the spirit that animated that handful of soldiers was not simply the emulative bravery of the military proletarian. The cries of helpless women and children, ruthlessly butchered, had gone home to the heart of every individual soldier and made this cause his own. There was not an Englishman in those ranks, from first to last, that would have consented to turn his back on Delhi without having assisted in meting out to those bloody rebels the retributive justice awarded them by his own conscience, his country, and his God. It was this spirit that buoyed them up through all the hardships of the siege, that enabled them for four long months of dreary rain and deadly heat, to face disease, privation, and death, without a murmur.

It was for the "crowning mercy" of that day of assault that every heart throbbed with intense longing; it was in the fixed determination to do or die, that, silent with pent-up hate, every soldier dealt his death-thrust on his brutal foe. Quarter was neither asked nor given, and when at the Cashmere Gate, the charred remains of a British soldier were found about a stake, to which he had been tied, it is not to be wondered at that even the wounded, abandoned by the enemy, met the fate they had failed to find in the field. For two days the city was given up to the soldiery, and who shall tell in how many obscure corners the injured husband, son, or brother, took his blood for blood. How the King was taken prisoner, and two of his sons shot, and how the reign of red tape supervened on General Wilson's departure to the hills for his health, I shall tell in a future chapter; but I shall not

delay till then to tell the people of England, that, at the time I am writing, the King is still royally treated; that a surviving prince rides in state, with two British officers attending upon him; and that the cherished mosques and temples of Mussulman fanatics and Hindoo idolaters are still preserved intact in this modern Sodom.

THE END.

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THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE
OF
THE INDIAN MUTINY,

AS SET FORTH IN THE OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

BY GEO. CRAWSHAY, ESQ.
MAYOR OF GATESHEAD.

A LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE MECHANICS' INSTITUTION, GATESHEAD, ON
WEDNESDAY EVENING, NOVEMBER 4TH, 1857.

“Lord Canning has shown throughout the greatest courage, the greatest ability, and the greatest resources.”—*Lord Palmerston at the Mansion House, November 8th.*

LONDON: EFFINGHAM WILSON, ROYAL EXCHANGE.

“In general the English have paid very great attention to the jurisprudence and civil legislation of India, as the fundamental principle of their Indian government is to rule that country according to its own laws, customs, and privileges ; while, on the contrary, the other European powers that once had obtained a firm footing in India, formed alliances with, and attached themselves by preference to, the Mahometan sovereigns of the country. By this simple but enlightened principle in their Indian policy and administration, the English have obtained the ascendancy over all their rivals or opponents, and have become complete masters of the whole of this splendid region.”—FREDERICK VON SCHLEGEL. *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, 1828.

LECTURE.

Mr. J. B. Prockter having been called to the chair, in the course of a brief address, said that they could not but respect the Mayor for the trouble he took in obtaining and giving information on matters of public importance, and the interest he took in the affairs of this rising country.

The Mayor of Gateshead.—Ladies and gentlemen, my friend, Mr. Prockter, has been kind enough to say that he gave me credit for taking an interest in the affairs of this rising country. I am afraid that the interest which I take arises from the painful feeling that possibly this is a falling country. The mutiny of the Bengal army is a great danger in itself; but, in my opinion, it is a less danger than that arising from the ignorance of the people of England as to its causes. I have made it my duty to inquire into those causes, and my object to-night is to explain what they are. I have found no difficulty whatever in ascertaining them. I have only had to make reference to certain official documents which were laid before the House of Commons in July of this year; the information contained in which is so clear, that I hold it to be impossible for two men to look one another in the face, after reading them, and so much as express a doubt as to what has been the cause of these disasters. You have heard probably something about greased cartridges. What I shall state to you to-night will show that, whatever other causes of disaffection there may be in India, there are no sound reasons for the belief that this mutiny would have occurred, unless there had existed in the mind of the Hindoo a panic or belief that his religion was to be interfered with, and that this was to be done by means of the greased cartridge. That you may understand the case, it is necessary, before I commence an examination of the official documents, that I should say a few words as to the nature of *caste*, and what is meant by losing caste in

India. This is indeed very necessary, as it is often spoken of at present in the most flippant and careless manner. It is gravely alleged, as a chief fault of the East India Company, that they have made it a rule of government to respect the religion of the Hindoos; and people talk of abolishing caste, as if it were the simplest matter in the world! We in England talk of losing it; but that is a misuse of words by which we are misled as to what losing caste means in India. When we use the expression, we only mean that a man falls from a higher to a lower station; consequently we apply the phrase to the country whence we got it in the same trivial sense. Caste is not even a Hindoo word, but a Portuguese word, signifying race. Losing caste *in India* is equivalent to excommunication in a Roman Catholic country, or rather to what excommunication was in the old days of the Roman Catholic Church, when it carried with it the penalties of contempt and persecution in this world, and damnation in the next. The division into castes is not confined to India, but existed among other ancient nations; and a Hindoo, when he commits an act by which he loses caste, does not fall from a higher caste to a lower,—he does not, from a Brahmin, become a Sudra, but is shut out from all fellowship with any Hindoo. A man who loses his caste loses his home; his family and friends cannot speak or sit with him. He becomes a most miserable being during his life on this earth, and in his own belief is condemned to perdition in the next. This dreadful penalty falls upon the Hindoo in consequence of offences equivalent to the mortal sins of the Roman Catholic Church. Many offences may be committed not entailing this penalty; but there are some for which no forgiveness can be hoped. Of these some are moral, and some ceremonial observances. In this respect the Hindoos are like the Jews of old. There are some few observances of a ceremonial character, the violation of which stands upon the same level in the minds of the people as moral sins. Amongst these the most prominent are the prohibitions as to food. The eating of anything forbidden is defilement. The cow is the sacred animal of the Hindoos,—the pig is alike unclean to Hindoos and Mussulmen. Grease of cows and pigs, strikes at both, and for the Hindoo to put such substance to his lips is to commit one of the mortal sins; any Hindoo will rather suffer death than submit to it; and an order to do so is one which could no more be obeyed

by a Hindoo than could be an order to a Roman Catholic regiment to feed their horses with the holy water. I will not allow this to rest upon my word, I will put in evidence: the whole hinges upon this. Col. Sykes, the first witness whom I shall call, was the Chairman of the East India Company last year. He has spent the greatest part of his life in India; there is no authority higher than his. In a letter to the *Times*, dated October 8th, Colonel Sykes, after showing that the Sepoys are willing to make many concessions, proceeds to explain that there are points which they cannot concede, and to attempt to exact which must bring about such results as we have seen. He states —

“After the perusal of the above memorandum it will very naturally be asked what more could be desired or expected from native soldiers, and what possible cause or causes can there be to *drive such men into mutiny*—into the vengeful massacre of their European officers—into an utter recklessness with respect to their immediate and future personal interests, involving the loss of employment and the loss of provision in old age, of their liberal pensions from Government—and into exposing themselves to the risk of a direful retributive vengeance. There must, then, be some fatal, imperative, and irresistible obligation to produce such results. Sir, any one but a sciolist in the knowledge of Asiatic beliefs, customs, and usages, replies that external bodily defilement is removed by ablutions and oblations, but that a breach of certain alimentary laws, *ipso facto*, consigns the offender to excommunication and degradation, than which death is preferable, for his parents, his brothers, and his friends, can neither eat nor smoke with him, nor let him drink out of their water vessels. He is become an out-caste. He is condemned to contempt in this world, and his soul is damned in the next. Now, it is very lamentable that in this age of reason such stern obligations should be accepted by human beings, and be operative; but they exist,—there they are as great facts. So it is lamentable that hostile religions should exist; but there they are, and always have been—great facts which produced the conflicts of the Homocousians and the Homoiouians in our early church, Bartholomew’s Eve, De Montford’s bloody doings at Carcasone, Anabaptist atrocities at Munster, our Smithfield fires, Irish massacres, and, even in those days, threatened bloodshed at Belfast. Nor are alimentary laws of modern origin. We find that the Egyptians could not eat with the sons of Jacob because “that was an abomination to the Egyptians;” the Jews equally were debarred by their usages from eating with the Gentiles, as is attested by St. Peter’s vision of the sheet full of animals, and the command, “Rise, kill, and eat,” and St. Peter’s reply of “Not so, Lord, for I have never eaten anything that is common or unclean.” Acts x, 11—15, and at verse 28, St. Peter adds, “Ye know how that it is an unlawful thing for a man that is a Jew to keep company or come unto one of another nation.” With such precedents in our own Sacred Volume, we can the more readily understand the food obligations of the Hindoos, which, however, have, no doubt, increased in stringency with the growth of Brahminical influence since the Christian era.”

If you read the Bible you will find that, in the case of the animals taken in the ark by Noah, there was a distinction made between clean and unclean; that in Deuteronomy, some are mentioned as to be eaten, and others as not to be eaten; and that, in the case of the new converts to Christianity, as recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, they were commanded to refrain from partaking of things strangled and from blood.

Col. Sykes continues :—

“ But, whether more or less stringent, if we take the Hindoos as our servants, subject to their religious obligations, as just and humane masters we are bound to respect these obligations. The Mahomedans, also, are equally subject to a food interdict, in the case of swine’s flesh ; and Brigadier John Jacob knows full well, that if he were to order his Mahomedan soldiery (though they may venerate him) to bite a cartridge greased with pig’s fat, or his high-caste troopers to bite a cartridge greased with cow’s fat, that both the one and the other would promptly refuse obedience, and, *in case he endeavoured to enforce it, they would shoot him down.*”

Again Col. Sykes says :—

“ Let us suppose such an order to have been given at Meerut, or anywhere else, to native troops, and the consequences were inevitable. Missionary labours would have had nothing to do with producing the bloody results ; though Christianity itself had not existed they would have followed, and a Buddhist, a Pagan, or any other authority would equally have been resisted to the death. Irrational and absurd as these caste obligations are, even felons in the gaols die to maintain them, and their active resistance to the recently introduced messing system in the gaols of Bengal and the North West Provinces has occasioned bloodshed. We have read in a recent Madras newspaper that some convicts who where embarked for transportation to the eastward refused the ship’s food given to them, and, as they were dying of starvation, it became necessary to disembark them. How are we to deal with such tenacious obduracy ? We cannot kill the fanatics, and we can only, therefore, lament the fanaticism and tolerate it. It is little known or thought of in the western world to what privations and sufferings the high-caste Sepoy is subjected in embarking for foreign service. From the moment he sets foot on board a ship he cannot cook ; he cannot receive the ship’s provisions, and his support is confined to parched grain and condiments which he takes with him. In the great expeditions to Java, China, and the Persian Gulf these privations and sufferings were borne cheerfully by thousands of Sepoys in our service, and would be borne again and again if their religious prejudices were respected. In the present feeling of resentment which has been so justly roused by the bloody acts of the Bengal Sepoys, and the generally expressed want of confidence in the future loyalty of the Brahmin and Rajpoot, it is of vital importance, as we cannot do without a native army, that there should be a clear understanding not only with respect to the constitution of that army, but that in its management we should have constantly in mind what services we can and what we cannot exact from them.”

These religious scruples were in existence in the time of Alexander the Great. They are much older than the days of Menu; are so old that nobody knows their origin. If you put four or five thousand years down for their antiquity, it may not be far from the mark; and, when we consider that these observances are regarded as of the most stringent character, and are of such antiquity, it is easy to see that they must have become so fixed in the minds of the people as not to be easily removed. Nor is there any reason why they should be, since it does not hurt anybody else, if a man wishes to abstain from certain kinds of food.

There has been published a letter from a Highlander of the 78th Regiment, in India, which had been out one night burning villages. The story he tells is painful to read, and I wish to enter to-night into no details of atrocities either on one side or the other. I merely tell you that he went amongst the flames, and succeeded in rescuing a few poor people, who would otherwise have perished in them. He rescued a female, an old man, and a child or two. He then says:—

“I went in at the other end of the village and came across a woman about twenty-two years old. She was sitting over a man that, to all appearance, would not see the day out. She was wetting his lips with some sise. The fire was coming fast, and the others all round were in flames. Not far from this I saw four women. I ran up to them, and asked them to come and help the sick man and woman out, but they thought they had enough to do, and so they had, poor things; but, to save the woman and the dying man, I drew my bayonet, and told them if they did not I would kill them. They came, carried them out, and laid them under a tree. I left them. To look on, any one would have said that the flames were in the clouds. When I went to the other side of the village there were about one hundred and forty women and about sixty children, all crying and lamenting what had been done. The old woman of that small family I took out came, and I thought she would have kissed the ground I stood on. I offered them some biscuit I had for my day’s rations; but they would not take it; *it would break their caste*, they said. The ‘assemble’ sounded, and back I went, with as many blessings as they could pour out on anything nearest their heart.”

These poor perishing creatures, naked and faint, would not take the food offered to them, when “it would break their caste!” This will be new to you, but these things are not unknown to any man connected with India. The East India Company always understood this, and this has been the one thing by which they have been enabled to maintain their power. India never could have been acquired at all if it had not been a settled point that the feelings of the

people were to be scrupulously respected. This you will find has been acknowledged by the English Parliament, which has always laid it down that the Hindoo laws and customs were to be maintained. An act of George III. laid this down. The Indian articles of war provide that there shall be no interference with the religious scruples of the Sepoys. I have not been able to obtain a copy of them ; but I find this in the Blue Book :—

“ The Articles of War clearly state that any person acting against the religious feelings of any man in a regiment of the army is liable to the severest punishment.”—*Blue Book, page 294.*

Consequently, it forms part of the contract with the Sepoy that his feelings in these matters shall be respected.

You will hear me mention Dum Dum and Barrackpore, which are close to Calcutta. I shall mention Berham-pore, which is 100 miles up the Ganges from Calcutta. Six hundred miles up the Ganges is Lucknow, and 300 miles further up, or 900 miles from Calcutta, is Delhi, with Meerut only a few miles off. These are the places I shall mention, and I beg you to bear in mind that they lie all in one line up the Ganges from Calcutta. As early as January 22nd of this year, there was a wide suspicion at Dum Dum and Barrackpore, that the new cartridge made at the Calcutta arsenal for the Enfield rifle was greased with the fat of pigs and cows, and that this was done *for the purpose* of defiling the Hindoo, depriving him of his caste, and compelling him to be a Christian :—

“ *Lieut. Wright to Ensign Smith, Adjutant, Rifle Depot, Dum Dum, Dum Dum, January 22, 1857.*

“ SIR,—I have the honor to report for the information of Major Bontein, commanding the depot, that there appears to be a very unpleasant feeling existing among the native soldiers who are here for instruction, regarding the grease used in preparing the cartridges, some evil-disposed person having spread a report that it consists of a mixture of the fat of pigs and cows.

“ 2. The belief in this report has been strengthened by the behaviour of a classie attached to the magazine, who, I am told, asked a Sepoy of the 2nd Grenadiers to supply him with water from his lota. The Sepoy refused, observing, he was not aware of what caste the man was ; the classie immediately rejoined, ‘ *You will soon lose your caste, as ere long you will have to bite cartridges covered with the fat of pigs and cows,*’ or words to that effect.

“ 3. Some of the depot-men in conversing with me on the subject last night, said that the report had spread throughout India, and when they go to their homes their friends will refuse to eat with them. I assured them (*believing it to be the case,*) that the grease used is composed of mutton fat and wax, to which they replied, ‘ It may be so, but our friends will not believe it : let us obtain the in-

redients from the bazaar, and make it up ourselves ; we shall then know what is used, and be able to assure our fellow-soldiers and others that there is nothing in it prohibited by our caste.

“ In conclusion, I most respectfully beg to represent that by adopting the measure suggested by the men, the possibility of any misunderstanding regarding the religious prejudices of the natives in general will be prevented.—I have, &c.,

“ J. A. WRIGHT, Lieutenant and Brevet Captain,
70th Regiment, Native Infantry.”

[*Blue Book, page 2.*]

The question arises, was there any foundation for this suspicion ? The Blue Book tells us there was, that the suspicions were right, and that the cartridges had been greased in this manner in the arsenal at Calcutta. I must beg you to be patient with me to-night, because this is necessarily a long story. (*Applause*) In the course of a court martial connected with the mutiny in the earlier stages, Lieut. Curry, of the Ordnance, on the trial of Salikram Sing, March 23rd, is recalled and examined :—

“ By the Prosecutor.—You stated in your evidence on Saturday, that before the 27th January, cartridges were issued to the Delhi magazine from the Arsenal already greased ; what are the orders you have received on the composition of grease for the use of cartridges ?—*A.* The grease was to be made of six parts of tallow and one of bees-wax.

“ *Q.* Of what ought that tallow to consist of ?—*A.* No inquiry is made as to the fat of what animal is used.

“ *Q.* You do not yourself know what fat is used ?—*A.* No, I don't know.

“ *Q.* Is it not the intention of Government that the tallow to be used in the preparation of grease, should be mutton or goat's fat ?—*A.* It is now the intention of Government that all grease used in any preparations in the magazine is to be made of goats' and sheep fat only.”—*Blue Book, page 223.*

The officers in the Ordnance Department at Calcutta cannot deny the statement that the fat of kine and swine had been used. Evidence to the same fact is given as to the ammunition sent from London, and there are further passages to the same effect in the Blue Books. It will not be disputed.

The alarm existed on the 22nd of January, and caused such discontent amongst the Sepoys that already there had been some isolated cases of incendiarism. The Government made no admission as to the cartridges ; on the contrary, it is asserted that the report was false ; even to the last no admission of error was ever made :—

“ Colonel Wheeler, commanding the 34th Native Infantry, assured them the rumour so industriously circulated was false, and the na-

tive officers and men said they were satisfied it was so. But one native officer respectfully asked if any orders had been received regarding the Enfield rifle cartridges."—*Despatch of General² Hearsey, Blue Book, page 9.*

What they did was to issue an order, which I will read to you :—

"The Secretary to the Government of India to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

(Telegraphic.)

Calcutta, January 27, 1857.

"In order to remove the objection the Sepoys may raise to the grease used for the cartridges of the rifle-muskets, all cartridges are to be issued free from grease, and the Sepoys are to be allowed to apply, with their own hands, whatever mixture suited for the purpose they may prefer.

"You are requested to communicate to the parties concerned, and to inform the officer in charge of the Depot of Instruction at Meerut, where the cartridges are prepared.

[*Blue Book, page 5.*]

"R. J. H. BIRCH, Colonel."

This was on January 27th; but, on January 28th another order was issued which confined the operation of it to rifle practice. It is stated :—

"This arrangement, however, is to be considered applicable only to the depots of rifle practice, the question of the state in which cartridges are to be issued under other circumstances, and especially for service in the field, being under the consideration of Government."—*Blue Book, page 5.*

On the following day, the 29th, a telegraphic communication was received by the Adjutant-General of the army at Meerut from the Secretary to the Government at Calcutta, by which the order was *altogether abolished so far as Meerut was concerned.* The Secretary to the Government had received a message from the Adjutant-General in which he said his men had had no suspicions hitherto, but that the issuing of a new regulation might make them so; and he asked for fresh orders, in reply to which he was told that the "existing practice in greasing cartridges for rifles may be continued."* So that the point of the Sepoys satisfying themselves as to the mixture was put on one side. You must recollect that it was impossible to tell by the taste at any time what the substance was with which the cartridge was greased.

* "*The Adjutant-General of the Army, Meerut, to the Secretary to the Government of India.*

"(Telegraphic.)

"Received your message of yesterday. Greased rifle ammunition has been used some years by native troops, to whom Minie rifles were issued on the Peshawur frontier; also by Rifle Companies (see paragraph 21,

It was a matter of belief, a suspicion in their minds, that constituted the danger. They had been told by the Hindoos working in the arsenal at Calcutta, that the cartridges had been so greased, and the thing for the Government to do was to deal with their minds so as to remove the suspicion. In a letter to the *Times*, Major-General Tucker actually says :—

“If the recommendation addressed by me, under the authority of the then Commander-in-Chief to the Government of India in 1853, had not been most culpably disregarded, the existing disaffection among the native troops would never have arisen—not, at least, as connected with the greasing of cartridges ; for in that year, when some rifle ammunition was sent out to India from this country, and certain experiments in connexion with it were ordered, occasion was taken in my office urgently to recommend to the Government, that, “*in the greasing composition nothing should be used which could possibly offend the caste or religious prejudices of the natives !*” That recommendation was addressed under my signature as Adjutant-General to the Military Secretary of the Government ; it must obviously have been entirely disregarded.”

He adds :—

“I do not presume to say with whom specifically the blame of this most culpable neglect may rest,—only investigation can settle that point ; but I conceive that either the Military Secretary or the officer presiding in chief over the Ordnance Department in Calcutta is, one or both, the party implicated. As far as I can learn with accuracy at this distance, *the ferment existing arose, first, from the glaring error of greasing cartridges in the Calcutta arsenal, after the English receipt, with tallow ; and, secondly, in issuing to the native troops, similarly greased cartridges, sent out direct from England, but which ought, of course, only to have been issued to the European troops.* It appears truly wonderful that it should not have occurred to any of the authorities in Calcutta, charged with the issuing of these cartridges, that tallow made of the fat of all kinds of animals, a filthy composition at the best, would seriously outrage the feelings and prejudices of all the native troops, whether Moslems or Hindoos. My humble opinion is, that the

section 2, Military Regulations). Grease composed of mutton fat and wax. Will not your present instructions make the Sepoys suspicious about what hitherto they have not hesitated to handle ? Fresh orders are solicited in reply.”

“*The Secretary to the Government of India to the Adjutant-General of the Army, Meerut.*

“Telegraphic.)

“Calcutta, January 29, 1857.

“In reply to your message of the 28th, the existing practice in greasing cartridges for rifles may be continued, if the materials are mutton fat and wax. Further orders will be given, and explanations will follow by post.”—*Blue Book, page 13.*

NOTE.—These clearly indicate that on January 30th the suspicion as to the cartridges had not reached Meerut.

Government of India should have insisted on learning with whom rested the blame or the grave errors committed. And the facts of the case having been ascertained, a frank explanation should have been issued for the information of the native troops. By such a course the European officers would have been armed with a truthful and candid explanation; whereas now, in fact, the officers themselves do not in general know exactly how or in what manner the greasing process originated."

This course of the Government bore its legitimate fruit: suspicion was not removed but strengthened

On February 3rd the new cartridges were shown to the men, and they objected to the paper:—

Captain Boswell to the Major of Brigade.

"Barrackpore, February 4, 1857.

"SIR,—I have the honor to report that in obedience to instructions contained in a note of yesterday's date, from the Brigadier commanding the station to the address of officers commanding regiments at the station, I yesterday afternoon at a parade of the wing under my command, had fully explained to the men of the wing that the cartridges for the new rifles were to be made up exactly like the five produced on parade, and of the same paper as that sent with the cartridges, and that the Sepoys would dip the cartridges themselves in wax and oil before using them.

"I took the cartridges to the ranks, and showed them to the men (having one broken open); and upon my asking several of the men, here and there in the ranks, if they could see anything objectionable in them, and their reply, made in the most civil but soldier-like manner, was that the paper was not the same as that used for the old cartridges, and that they thought there was something in it.

"I deem it my duty to report this circumstance for the information of the Brigadier Commanding, as I imagine there will be no difficulty in substituting the old cartridge paper for that made use of in the construction of the new cartridges.

I have, &c.

"N. C. BOSWELL, Captain Commanding Left
Wing 2nd Grenadiers."

[*Blue Book*, page 14.]

An inquiry was made on the 6th, the result of which was communicated on the 8th to the government at Calcutta by Major-General Hearsey:—

"Major-General Hearsey to the Deputy Adjutant General of the Army.

"Barrackpore, February 7, 1857.

"SIR,—With reference to my official letter to your address, dated the 24th ultimo, I have now the honor to forward, for submission to the Government, the proceedings of a special Court of Inquiry which has been assembled at Barrackpore, for the purpose of ascertaining from the evidence of a selected portion of the 2nd Native Grenadier Regiment the cause of their continued objection to the paper of which the new rifle cartridges are composed.

"2. A perusal of the several statements and opinions recorded in these proceedings clearly establishes, in my judgment, that a most unreasonable and unfounded suspicion has unfortunately taken possession of the minds of all the native officers and Sepoys at this station, that grease or fat is used in the composition of this cartridge paper; and this foolish idea is now so rooted in them, that it would, I am of opinion, be both idle and unwise even to attempt its removal.

"3. I would accordingly beg leave to recommend for the consideration of Government, the expediency (if practicable) of ordering this rifle ammunition to be made up of the same description of paper which has been hitherto employed in the magazines for the preparation of the common musket cartridge, by which means this groundless suspicion and objection could be at once disposed of.

"I have, &c.

"J. B. HEARSEY, Major-General, Commanding Presidency Division.

[*Blue Book, page 13.*]

The paper was of a yellow colour, glazed, and had the appearance of being greased, and Major-General Hearsey, as a sensible officer, who did not wish to offend the soldier on a matter of no consequence, recommended a change of paper, with a view to remove suspicion. I cannot read all the evidence that was taken on this inquiry, but give some passages:—

"Byjonath Pandie, Sepoy, 5th Company, 2nd Grenadier Regiment, appears in Court, and voluntary states as follows:—

"Q. Were you on parade on the evening of the 4th instant, when the new cartridges were shown to the men of the regiment?—A. I was.

"Q. Did you make any objection to the materials of which those cartridges were composed?—A. I felt some suspicion in regard to the paper, if it might not affect my caste.

"Q. What reason have you to suppose that there is anything in the paper which would injure your caste?—A. Because it is a new description of paper of which the cartridges are made up, and which I have not seen before.

"Q. Have you ever seen, or heard from any one, that the paper is composed of anything which is objectionable to your caste?—A. I heard a report that there was some fat in the paper; it was a *bazaar report*.

"Q. Are these the cartridges and paper which you examined on parade (the paper and cartridges shown to the witness)?—A. Yes."

"Chaud Khan, Sepoy, 7th Company, 2nd Grenadier Regiment, voluntarily states as follows:—

"Q. Do you object to the paper of which the new cartridges were made, now lying before the Court; and if so, on what grounds?—A. I have no objection to the bullet powder; it is only the paper which I have doubts about, which appears to be tough, and on burning it it smells as if there was grease in it.

"Q. Were you present when a piece of the paper was burnt, and when?—A. On the evening of the 4th instant a piece of the cartridge paper was dipped in water and afterwards burnt. When burning it made a phizzing noise, and smelt as if there was grease in it.

"Q. Who were present when this burning of the paper took place?—A. Two or three were present. I do not recollect what their names are. [A piece of the cartridge paper is burnt in Court by the witness.]

"Q. Are you still of opinion that there is any smell of grease in it?—A. No; there is not.

"Q. Have you now any objection to use these cartridges with paper of that description?—A. I object to this paper being used, as every one is dissatisfied with it on account of it being glazed, shining like wax-cloth."

"Jemadar Buddor Sing, 6th Company, 2nd Grenadier Regiment, is called into Court:—

"Q. Have you any objection to the new cartridge which lies before the Court?—A. Nothing except the paper, which I have some suspicion about, as I have never seen anything of the kind before; and the general report is that there is grease in it."

"Jemadar Guinness Sing, No. 10 Company, 2nd Grenadier Regiment being called into Court:—

"Q. Have you any objection to the cartridge which lies on the table?—A. I have no objection to the cartridge myself, but there is a report amongst the men that there is grease in it.

"Q. How did this report get abroad?—A. I do not know.

"Q. What, in your opinion, would be the best plan to undeceive the minds of the men on this point?—A. I know no other way than to substitute other paper in its place."

"Jemadar Golaul Khan, 2nd Company, 2nd Grenadier Regiment, is called into Court:—

"Q. Have you any objection to the use of the cartridges now lying before you?—A. I have objection to the paper, as there is a report got about that there is grease in it.

"Q. Can you prove yourself that there is grease in it, or have you taken any measures to do so?—A. There is grease in it, I feel assured, as it differs from the paper which has heretofore been always used for cartridges."

"Jemadar Ram Sing, 9th Company, 2nd Grenadier Regiment:—

"Q. Have you any objection to the use of the cartridges now lying before you?—A. A report got about, which, I think, came from the Magazine Classes in Calcutta, that there was some grease in the paper; on this account I have some suspicions about it.

"Q. How can this suspicion be removed from your mind?—A. I cannot remove it."

"Jemadar Wuzeer Khan, 7th Company, 2nd Grenadier Regiment, called into Court:—

"Q. Have you any objection to the use of the cartridges lying upon the table?—A. I have no objection to it—it appears to be new.

"Q. Would you have any objection to use it in the way the old cartridges are used?—A. I should have some objection, in consequence of the suspicion which exists generally in the cantonment."

"Havildar Major Ajoodiah Sing, 8th Company, 2nd Grenadier Regiment, called into Court:—

"Q. Have you any objection to the use of the cartridges lying on the table?—A. I have suspicions about the paper, on account of the bazaar report that there is grease in it.

“Q. Have you taken any measures to prove whether this report is true?—A. I have tried it in oil, and also in water, and where it was wet with the oil it would not dissolve. After this trial I thought there was no grease in it.

“Q. By the experiment, in your opinion, there was no grease in the paper; would you object to *bite off* the end of the cartridge?—A. *I could not do it, as the other men would object to it.*”

“Bheekun Khan, Havildar, 10th Company, 2nd Grenadier Regiment, called into Court:—

“Q. Have you any objection to the use of the cartridges lying on the table?—A. I suspect that there is cow’s and pig’s grease in them, from a bazaar report.

“Q. If you had any doubt, why did you not ascertain the point from your officer?—A. I could not report it to the officer, it being merely a bazaar report.

“Q. When the paper and cartridge was shown you upon parade, had you any reason to suppose that there was any grease mixed with the paper?—A. I have heard that it smells of grease when it is burnt.”—*Blue Book, pages 15 to 18.*

Well, the project of changing the paper was declared at Calcutta to be inconvenient, because the paper objected to was thinner, and answered better; but, in the middle of the discussion as to what should be done, Major-General Hearsey writes to them in a despatch of February 11th, that at Barrackpore “we are dwelling upon a mine ready for explosion,” and complaining that he had received no answer to his recommendation of the 8th that the paper should be changed. Lieutenant-Colonel Hogge, Director of the Military School of Instruction, writes from Meerut on the 21st February, making the very opportune suggestion that the biting of the cartridge should be altogether abolished. In the course of his despatch he says:—

“As Colonel Abbott states as an objection to the use of mutton fat, that it might be difficult to persuade the native soldiers that no other animal fat was used, I can only suggest that either the cartridges should be issued from magazines ungreased, and that the Quartermaster or officers commanding companies in native regiments should purchase the material themselves, through a joint agency of a Brahmin or a Mussulman, which would convince the other men that the fat used was not from either cow or pig, and further, that *instead of the end of the cartridge being bitten off as laid down in drill instructions, the men should be told to twist it off with the right hand, the cartridge being shifted to the left hand for this purpose, whilst the rifle is supported against the body by the left wrist: this latter plan would remove all objections from that class of Hindoos who never touch animal food.*”

On March 5th, the biting of the cartridge is abolished. After this, you will wonder that suspicion could still exist, but after I have told you more you will cease

to wonder at anything. The biting of the cartridge was necessary when the old flint and steel firelock was in use, but, since the substitution of the percussion musket for the old firelock, cartridge biting had been unnecessary. Major Bontein, at Dum Dum, on March 2nd, writes to the Government:—

“Permit me to quote the regulation as it now stands:—

“‘The firelock being at the word ‘prepare to load’ placed on the ground six inches in front of the body, and held at the full extent of the left arm, the recruit receives the order ‘load;’ upon which the regulation says, first bring the cartridge to the mouth, holding it ‘between the forefinger and thumb, with the ball in the hand, and bite off the top, elbow close to the body.’”

“The above regulation is at present in force, but I would submit that the practice of biting the cartridge is a mere remnant of the platoon exercise introduced in the days of the flint and steel firelock, when the musket being brought to the right side with the left hand, for the purpose of priming, it was almost impossible to use the cartridge without the aid of the teeth.”

He further says:—

“I would suggest that, at the third motion of the order, ‘prepare to load,’ the left hand, instead of holding the musket at the full extent of the arm, should, after placing it on the ground in front of the body, slip up and seize the rifle at the brass band, or tip to the stock; it will then be in a position to meet the right hand, which conveys the cartridge from the pouch, to tear off the cartridge-paper in place of using the teeth, and (at the fourth motion of the word ‘load,’ when the right hand seizes the head of the ramrod) to return to the centre part of the stock, ready to throw up the firelock into the ‘capping position’ at the sixth command of the platoon exercise. The above suggestion I offer with every deference to the judgment of superior experience. *I do not, in the least, intend to consult the caprice of the native soldier; my motive is an increase of efficiency.*”

Mark the concluding passage, that the substitution of tearing for biting the cartridge would be an increase of efficiency. *Major Bontein dared not offer his suggestion to Lord Canning on the ground of sparing the religious feelings of the Sepoys.* The Government at Calcutta could not resist Lieut.-Colonel Hogge and Major Bontein, and issued this order:—

“This mode the Governor-General in Council is disposed to think will be an improvement, and should his Excellency concur, his Lordship in Council requests that early instructions may be given to the several depots of instructions, *not making any allusion whatever to the biting of the cartridge, but drawn up in such a way that they may appear to be independent of anything laid down in previous regulations.*

“The Governor-General in Council considers that it would be best to make the alteration before any objection is raised, and, therefore, requests his Excellency’s early attention to the subject.

“Instructions have been issued *confidentially* to the depot of instruction at Dum Dum, to defer the use of ammunition pending the reference to his Excellency.—I am, &c.

“R. J. H. BIRCH, Colonel.”

[*Blue Book*, page 35.]

Major-General Hearsey, writing on the same day, the 5th March, to the Government, says :—

“The new mode of loading may be considered as a part of the intended drill for a new weapon about to be introduced into the service, and *not as a concession extorted by discontented men.*”

He adds :—

“*We shall thus be keeping our word with the Sepoys*, and, at the same time introducing a better plan of loading with reference to their religious scruples.”

This order of the 5th of March *was concealed from the Sepoys*. The order *was not acted upon*.

I have gone in point of date, beyond other events of very great consequence. On the 26th February, occurred the mutiny of the 19th Regiment at Berhampore, and upon the conduct of Government at this juncture everything depended. The men at Berhampore were only 100 miles further up the Ganges, and the alarm which commenced at Barrackpore had spread there. The inquiry held on the 6th, at Barrackpore, clearly showed that the Sepoys objected to cartridges of a certain paper and colour. The mutiny occurred at Berhampore, on the 26th, upon this very point. Here I must read you a document of some length, viz. the petition of the 19th Regiment for mercy, first giving you the Governor-General's admission that they had stated the facts correctly. He says :—

“Upon the whole, the petition contains a fair account of what took place on the occasion of the outbreak, the main points being borne out by the evidence at the Court of Inquiry.”—*Minute of the Governor-General in Council of March 27th*, page 50, *Blue Book*.

“*Petition to the Major-General Commanding the Division, inclosed by Colonel Mitchell.*”

“(Translation.)”

“March 2nd.

“Hitherto this regiment has been always obedient in every way, and marched and halted wherever ordered, without question of any sort. For the last two months or more it has been rumoured that new cartridges have been made in the magazine at Calcutta, on the paper of which bullock's or pig's fat was spread, and that it was the intention of Government to coerce the men to bite them. On this account we were very much afraid on the score of our religion. The Colonel on hearing this assembled the native officers, and told them that on the arrival of the new muskets he would make such arrange-

ments as would satisfy them ; that is to say, that such grease as was necessary should be prepared before the Sepoys by the Pay Havildars of companies ; with this we were perfectly satisfied. After some time some fresh stores arrived from Calcutta, and on the 26th of this month we received orders on the following day to fire fifteen rounds of blank cartridge per man ; at 4 o'clock in the afternoon the cartridges were received at the bells of arms and inspected by us ; we perceived them to be of two kinds, and one sort appeared to be different from that formerly served out. Hence we doubted whether these might not be the cartridges which had arrived from Calcutta, as we had made none ourselves, and were convinced that they were greased. On this account, and through religious scruples, we refused to take the caps."

Bear in mind, that if the men *had a design* and wanted to fight *they would not have refused to take the caps*. It goes on :—

"At half-past 7 o'clock, the Colonel, accompanied by the Adjutant, came upon parade, and very angrily gave orders to us, saying, 'If you will not take the cartridges I will take you to Burmah where through hardship you will all die. These cartridges are those left behind by the 7th Native Infantry, and I will serve them out to-morrow morning by the hands of the officers commanding companies'. He gave this order so angrily that we were convinced that the cartridges were greased, otherwise he would not have spoken so. The same night, about a quarter to 11, shouts of various kinds were heard, some said there's a fire, others that they were surrounded by Europeans, some said that the guns had arrived, others that the cavalry had appeared. In the midst of this row the alarm sounded on a drum, then from fear of our lives the greater number seized their arms from the khotes."

Colonel Mitchell had previously sent an order for horses and artillery to be there in the morning with a view of coercing the men, who were to be made to bite the cartridge. The men heard of this, and flew to arms. The narrative proceeds :—

"Between 12 and 1 o'clock the 11th Irregular Cavalry, and the guns with torches, arrived on the parade with the commanding officer, which still more confirmed our suspicions of the cartridges being greased, inasmuch as the commanding officer appeared to be about to carry his threat into execution by force. *We had been hearing of this sort of thing for the last two months or more, and here appeared to be the realization of it.* On this the Colonel called all the Native officers, and said to them very angrily, 'This is a very bad business ; we don't fear to die and will die here.' Then the Native officers, in the most respectful manner, represented to him, the Sepoys are fools, whereas you have sense and judgment ; do not at this time speak so angrily, for this is a matter affecting their religion, and that is no slight thing. Please to send the artillery and cavalry away. The Colonel agreed to this and sent each officer with his Native officer to his company to soothe and explain to the men. *The Sepoys represented that all men value their religion, and we believe we shall lose caste by biting the cartridges ;* and on seeing the artillery and cavalry

THE
TRUE CAUSES
OF
THE REVOLT
OF THE
BENGAL ARMY.

BY
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PREFACE.



The writer of the following pages claims public attention on the ground of his having been connected with the British and Indian Armies as a Military journalist for the past twenty-five years, ten years of which were passed in Bengal. In his professional capacity he constantly enjoyed the confidential correspondence of numerous Officers of all ranks, and has had occasion attentively to observe the public evidences of the gradual decadence of the Bengal Native Army. He submits that he has proved, in this pamphlet, that the revolt has entirely arisen from the mal-administration of the East India Company. Their Directors and Governors General have steadily and habitually rejected all the warnings and the counsels of a quarter of a century.

THE TRUE CAUSES

OF THE

REVOLT OF THE BENGAL ARMY.

The day is rapidly approaching when it will become imperative upon the Government to determine what measures it may be advisable to adopt in order to provide a substitute force for the Native Army of Bengal, if not to alter very materially the whole Sepoy establishment of India.

It is evident that an opinion is still prevalent in some quarters that a Native Army is essential to the preservation of our empire in India, and this opinion Colonel SYKES, Sir CHARLES TREVELYAN, Mr. HEAD, and others, have been at some pains to fortify. It is impossible, says the accomplished East India Director, to hold in check 180 millions of people with a few thousand Europeans only.

As for very many years there has not been a single Soldier Native or European, in some thirty districts of Lower Bengal, containing, in round numbers, a population of twenty millions; as the greater portion of the remaining millions has never been trained to arms, or even engaged in irregular warfare; as we have not now a frontier foe, of whom we need entertain the slightest dread; and as, during the late troublous times, the peace, even in parts,

of Upper India, has been preserved, while all the Bengal Army has been in a state of open revolt, it may fairly be questioned whether Colonel SYKES is justified in his assumption. But admitting, for the sake of argument, that some description of Native Force is necessary, we propose to demonstrate, from the experience of the past thirty years, that it would be as dangerous and impolitic again to entertain the same classes of men as it would be absurd to rely on their fidelity, or to organise them after the fashion which has so suddenly exploded.

It is insisted upon by Colonel SYKES and Sir C. TREVELYAN that the main cause of the mutiny has been the introduction of the greased cartridges—an interference, in fact, with the caste prejudices of the higher class of Hindoos who constituted the chief portion of the Bengal Soldiery.

We will endeavour to show that this is altogether a mistake; that the mutinous spirit has long been rife in the Service; that the dislocation of the Sepoy Regiments has been very gradual; that the causes of their decadence are to be found in a steady disregard by the Indian Government at home and abroad of all the warnings and examples that have been placed before them, and a contempt for all the advice that has been offered by disinterested persons for years past; and that our only safety for the future lies in the employment of an European Army, with a handful of Native auxiliaries of the lower classes.

The East India Directors have announced that they have sent out instructions to India that a Commission be appointed to inquire into the causes of the mutiny. It is utterly unnecessary. The causes have long been palpable to the most superficial observer.

Down to the year 1824 there had been little reason to doubt the loyalty of the Sepoy. With the exception of the affair at Vellore, when Sir JOHN CRADOCK'S glaring contempt for the prejudices of caste, added to the intrigues of TIPPOO'S sons, caused a Madras Regiment to mutiny and murder, no symptoms had manifested themselves of a disaffected spirit. In all our wars with the Mysoreans, the Mahrattas, the Nepaulese, and the Pindarrees, the Arabs in the Persian Gulf, the Dutch at Java, and the French at Mauritius, the Sepoys had manifested an ardent attachment to the

Service, and to their immediate leaders. COOTE, LAKE, OCHTERLONY, and ADAMS were followed from confidence and affection. Privations were endured without a murmur, and blood was poured out ungrudgingly. The same feeling of regard was entertained for many Regimental Officers, and especially for those who, mastering the languages, interesting themselves in the private affairs of the men, associating with native females connected with men in the Regiments, and falling somewhat into oriental habits, became as much Sepoys as the Sepoys themselves. In addition to these circumstances there were other grounds of attachment to the Service. The men were paid punctually, their families were cared for in their absence, the Commanding Officers had power to interfere with the civil officers on behalf of the Sepoys, and Collectors and Magistrates were enjoined to pay attention to the applications of those who were on furlough in their several villages or districts.

The augmentation of the Army in 1824 loosened the connection subsisting between the Officers and the men. It was due to the former that they should be transferred to the new Battalions, with a step of rank—the changes were, consequently, very numerous, and almost every old Regiment parted with its Officers, receiving a completely new set. The result of this severance of the Sepoys from those whom they had learnt to love was soon apparent in the indifference of several Corps to their regular duty, and their reluctance to go on service when war was declared with the Burmese. One Bengal Regiment, the 47th Native Infantry, broke out into open mutiny—it refused to march if the terms it dictated were not complied with. It promptly paid the penalty of its recusancy. It was mercilessly shot down and exterminated. The very number of the Regiment was expunged from the *Army List*. Sir EDWARD PAGET was the General Commanding-in-Chief at the time, and there is no doubt that the stern vengeance which he meted out to the mutineers prevented the wider dissemination of the spirit of rebellion. But the breach established by the augmentation was enlarged by this act of summary justice. The Sepoy began to cherish unkindly feelings towards his masters. Happily, the Burmese war and the operations against Bhurtpore, kept the minds of some thousands employed for two years; the men, therefore, had

not time to think of mutiny. Returned to cantonments, their conduct at first was exceedingly satisfactory, but it gradually altered for the worse. The irregularities became numerous, Courts-Martial frequent, and severe corporal punishment indispensable.

In 1827 Lord COMBERMERE, then Commander-in-Chief, struck with the frequency of punishment, curbed the power of Commanding Officers in that respect. He directed that Commanding Officers should discharge with disgrace any Sepoy who was sentenced to receive corporal punishment. The effect of the order was partial. A better class of men more readily entered the Service, but the bad became worse. Sir EDWARD BARNES, who succeeded Lord DALHOUSIE in the command in 1830 or 1831, found the Sepoys running riot. He at once restored to Commanding Officers the discretionary power they had possessed. This, however, did not mend the case. The Sepoys, quick to observe any indications of weakness of purpose, construed this oscillation of their Commanders into timidity. Their insolence increased—desertions became more numerous.

The year 1829 was distinguished by the abolition of the full Batta allowance thitherto drawn by the Officers in peace time. The discontent arising out of this interference with “vested rights” reached an alarming height. The Sepoys, who were ripe for any acts of insubordination, sympathised with their Officers. But the Officers were too loyal to take advantage of this circumstance. In process of time the murmurs, loud and deep, died away, leaving, however, upon the mind of the Sepoy an impression that his Officer was not held in very high estimation by the Government, and that he, “Jack Sepoy,” need not therefore be very scrupulous about acts of disobedience.

In 1832, after two years passed by the Bengal Army in frequent ebullitions of discontent, the House of Commons caused evidence to be taken of the manner in which the East India Company had ruled the country for the previous 20 years, and opinions to be collected as to the expediency of effecting alterations in the system of government. The state of discipline and feeling in the Native Army was then brought under review; a considerable number of experienced and intelligent Officers were examined, and there was a wonderful unanimity of opinion on certain points of vital importance to the safety of the empire in connection with the condition of that Army.

Major Generals SIR JASPER NICOLLS, SIR THOMAS REYNELL, SIR THEOPHILUS PRITZLER were decidedly of opinion that the European Officers should be trained up with the men, *the principal bond of attachment being the Officer*. Major General SIR ROBERT SCOTT said that the Service had declined in popularity because of the change of Officers. Colonel GREENHILL also dwelt on the great importance of the presence of Officers. He described the Sepoys as a "selfish and subservient" set, who would always pay attention to those on whom they had to depend. "They will not pay attention," said he, emphatically, "unless they gain by it." Colonel DICKSON, of the Madras Cavalry, thought they only took pride in the Service when they had confidence in, and an attachment to, their Officers. Lieutenant Colonel WATSON, ex-Adjutant General of the Bengal Army, agreed with him. And Captain TURNER MACAN, who had had large experience as the Persian interpreter to five successive Commanders-in-Chief in India, considered that the bond of attachment between the European and Native Officer was broken. He did not think that the Sepoys had any regard for the English in the abstract—"they were attached to *particular leaders*, who had shared the glory and dangers of war with them, and who had flattered their vanity." The corollary to be drawn from these opinions, and those of other Officers, was that the European effective Regimental Officers ought to be more numerous. The witnesses differed a little as to the actual number, some deeming *twenty-six* Officers not too many to be *always present* with their Corps, and others limiting their suggestion to twelve, chiefly Captains—the average number suggested being about seventeen.

But Captain MACAN had a very bad opinion of the general composition of the Native Army, and spoke most strongly of its mischievous character. "*The rule of the English in India*," said he, "*is much endangered by the Native Army—the DANGER IS IMMINENT!*" and he added, emphatically—"the disaffection of the Native Army will be the cause, no doubt, of our losing our Eastern empire, as its fidelity is the means by which we retain it!" In these sentiments he was earnestly supported by the testimony of SIR HENRY RUSSELL, long resident at Hyderabad. SIR HENRY thought the greatest danger to the empire was to be apprehended *from the Native Army*,

and especially THE MADRAS ARMY. Mr. HOLT MACKENZIE, a very able fiscal Officer and Secretary to the Supreme Government, held the same language; he thought that the Bengal Native Soldier was attached to his *pay*, and had *personal* attachment to certain Officers, but his bigotry was intolerable—he was faithful, but *not loyal*. Finally, he considered there was *much prospective danger from the Native Army*, and he would be sorry to see the defence and fealty of the country trusted to it without a large European Force.

Upon the subject of Native Artillery, Colonel SALMOND, the Military Secretary at the India House, who had previously served under the Marquis of WELLESLEY; and Sir THEOPHILUS PRITZLER, who had commanded a Division in India, were of opinion that it was very hazardous to extend a knowledge of the science of war to the Native Soldiery, but Sir JOHN MALCOLM argued that there could be no danger, because the *Native Powers* had Artillery in their wars with us which was equal to ours—as if that fact could diminish, in the slightest degree, the risk of giving *our own people* the means of becoming more formidable to us in any rebellion that might take place!

The remedies and safeguards which these Officers and others unanimously proposed were, an augmentation of the EUROPEAN FORCE, so that there should be one European Regiment to every five or six Native Corps—the withdrawal of Regimental Officers from civil employment—an attention to the caste prejudices of the Sepoy—and a more general enlistment of the lower castes. Excepting the third condition, not one of these received the slightest attention from the Indian Government!

In the year 1833 a publication appeared in Calcutta bearing the title of the *East India United Service Journal*. It was intended to become the receptacle of the sentiments of the Officers of the Indian Army respecting the discipline and economy of the Service, and the register of the current history of Military events. That journal existed for eight or nine years, enjoyed the highest support, and was the faithful exponent of the views and experiences of all classes of Officers. The most able men in the Indian Army contributed to its pages—SUTHERLAND, LAWRENCE, ABBOTT, McNAGHTEN, GRANT, SWINEY, COTTON, BACKHOUSE, HENDERSON, N. CAMPBELL, and many others.

So early as the third number of that journal one of these Officers pointed out the impolicy of promoting the Sepoys to commissioned rank. The gross ignorance of the Subadars and Jemadars, and their peculiar unfitness to sit on Courts-Martial was dwelt upon, and the effect of certain orders of the Commander-in-Chief in depriving Commanding Officers of the power of confirming Regimental Courts-Martial came in for a large share of animadversion. It was shown that every instance of a reversal of the decree of a Court lessened the respect which the Sepoys had been accustomed to entertain for their European superiors. "A gradual estrangement between Officers and men, and an undermining of all discipline on the part of the men, and of all zeal on that of the Officers" was the general consequence of the limitation of the authority of Regimental Commandants.

The erroneous treatment of the Native Soldier in alternating severe restrictions with excessive indulgence, and in considering him more than his European Officer, became, in 1834, a very frequent subject of grave complaint. The Government now had its attention directed to the character of the Sepoy by some able writers who held high Regimental rank, and from long experience were capable of arriving at correct conclusions and furnishing accurate information. One of these Officers—a gallant fellow, afterwards slain on the banks of the Sutlej in the fierce battle of Moodkee, wrote—

"We are, as it appears to me, wilfully blind to the vices of our Native soldiery, and because they are of a different, a meaner, less troublesome, and more concealed nature, than those of our somewhat turbulent countrymen, choose to fancy that the salutary example of punishment is not necessary for them! A more erroneous idea cannot in my estimation be entertained. What are our Sepoys, and whence do they come? Are they not the same tribe of men and do they not come from the same places with those incarcerated in our jails for murder and robbery? By whom and how are they brought up? what moral ideas are ever instilled into them, or what innate virtues do they possess? Does an adherence to truth, or an honourable regard to the distinction between *meum et tuum*, such as is to be met with in the meanest clown in England, form any part of their qualifications? Have they any great horror of the crime of murder, or is one known amongst themselves to be guilty of this crime shunned? To the maiming, even of a dog, a cat, or above all, of a cow, they have, it is well known, a very great horror; and these, especially the last, are considered crimes of such a dye as to render expiation indispensable to prevent the loss of caste!

"That highness of caste or respectability of family forms no bar to their vicious propensities, is too well known. In our jails are to be found those of both, in full as high a degree as any of our Sepoys can pretend to. Nay, do not the greatest and wealthiest Zemindars and Rajahs even encourage and participate in the benefits attending the commission of those crimes? Such undoubtedly is the present state of morality in Hindostan. Yet, forsooth! it is imagined that putting a red coat on one of these men at once, like Harlequin's wand, changes his very nature, and renders him a good, an honest, and an honourable man!

“Our Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers are not to be depended upon, yet those generally in the situation of Havildars-Major, and Pay Havildars have a vast deal too much influence; they are mostly smart, intelligent men, and save Officers a great deal of trouble.

“Our Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers might, doubtless, be rendered very considerably better than they are, if more latitude were allowed in the selection of men for promotion, not only in the first instance of Sepoys, but in every step of the ladder up to the very top. Nothing is more common than for men who were good Sepoys to turn out bad Non Commissioned Officers, or for those arrived at the rank of Jemadar, who have previously conducted themselves well, to prove that they only did so from fear of punishment, but that now as Commissioned Officers, having little apprehension of that (as a reprimand, however severe, is no punishment at all to them), or of being passed over in promotion, which they are well aware their Commanding Officer cannot do unless they afford him some *over t acc*, and of going this length they are of course careful, to become worthless, good-for-nothing fellows.

“Many Officers, even old ones, who have been much absent from their Regiments on Staff employ, do not properly understand our Sepoys; they have much too high an opinion of them, and are too apt to suppose, from their apparent quietness, and the little trouble they give, that strictness of internal arrangement, or any severity in discipline or punishment, is quite unnecessary. With such Officers duty goes on easily, because, in fact, orders are not attended to, everything that possibly can be is concealed, and what is not so represented as to make it appear the good, the innocent Jacks (whose word they implicitly credit!) are not to blame. Thus, whilst in reality the core is rotten the surface continuing (as in Native Corps, under such management, it always will) to wear a healthy appearance, they remain contented; they hear every day that all is *sub achrâ* (all right), and they pride themselves on the excellence of their own management and the goodness of their Corps in which a Court-Martial had not been held for a year past, whereas, on the other hand, in another Corps at the same station perhaps there have been several during that time.

“The latter Corps is, however, in all probability commanded by an old, experienced, *practical* Officer, who well understands the character of his men, and whose consequent greater strictness renders it dangerous and difficult to conceal, what in the Corps commanded as I have just described is never known. The *real state* of the latter Regiment is undoubtedly, however, superior in all respects. Unfortunately, such Officers as *really* take pains and closely superintend the discipline of their Corps, but too frequently meet with no encouragement, and have the mortification of finding that their zealous exertions are not only not appreciated, but actually condemned; whilst those of the former stamp, good, easy, indolent men, who give no trouble, are lauded and held up as examples.

“The truth is, the apparent quiet orderly conduct of our Sepoy (for it is *only apparent*, they being in reality the greatest and most cruel tyrants and extortioners on earth to all those whom they dare to bully, such as bazaara people, villagers, &c., who rarely complain, for fear of not being able to prove their complaint, and having, as not seldom happens, the tables turned on them, and from apprehension also of the other Sepoys, the comrades of the one complained against, who, they but too well know, will never leave them alone till they have ruined them, burning their houses at night, &c, &c.), and the little trouble they consequently give, from complaints being, from the above causes, but seldom made against them, together with their extreme cringing servility to Officers in power, induces many old Officers commanding Regiments, and still more in the situations of Staff or General Officers and Brigadiers, to forget their *real characters*, and to treat them in a manner they but all deserve.”

This full and truthful exposition of the character of the Native Soldier was echoed and applauded by many other Military writers

at the time—indeed, not one came forward to contradict it on a single point. Others, of even greater experience than the writer of the foregoing sketch, adopted a prophetic tone, and without having read the warning evidence of the General Officers and civilians quoted above (for it had hardly reached India), gave expression to their sentiments in powerful articles, of which the following is at once an abstract and an extract. The writer was at the time a Major in command of his Corps:—

“The danger we have to dread is not so much from the effects of a disciplined Force, nor from the open attacks of a powerful antagonist, as from the *secret and unseen designs of an insidious enemy to undermine our authority over our Troops.*

“No people were ever more peculiarly situated than the British in India. Our rise and establishment is an anomaly in the order of all Governments; entering the country as mercantile adventurers, obtaining from the Native Princes, as a favour, a few mercantile privileges, and purchasing at an enormous cost land sufficient to establish a factory for the storehouses of our traffic; enduring with submission the supercilious insults of the natives, flourishing in spite of fraudulence and oppression; at one time reduced to the most abject misery, and rising again to greater importance from our very misfortunes; we, notwithstanding our endeavours to repress our conquest, became the rulers of a territory scarcely inferior in magnitude to any kingdom in Europe, and at length were obliged to assume the situation of Lord Paramount of India, and the conservators of the peace of the empire. The attention of the surrounding nations is now fixed upon our actions; they watch them with a hawliko-keenness, and duly wait an opportunity to attempt to hurl us headlong from the pinnacle on which we are balanced. We may search through the annals of all ages, and shall not be able to find a people who have been situated like ourselves. Other nations have before them the history of the whole world, from which they draw lessons of experience, and learn to avoid the errors their predecessors had fallen into; but the British have nothing but their foresight to be their guide. We have been aided in our rise by the empire of opinion; it will probably enable us, for some time longer to maintain our ascendancy, *but it must at last fail as the minds of the native population become enlightened, and then the only hold we shall have on the country must be an affection for our Government.* The faith of our Native Troops will then appear of importance, though now it is deemed of little consequence. The history of India is filled with instances of the defection of Troops at most critical moments, when a single engagement has involved the fate of a principality or a kingdom, and though we have hitherto possessed stronger influence over our Soldiers than any native authority has ever acquired over theirs, we shall in future have to maintain it by a system which must be superior to bribes, and every species of treachery that may be employed to seduce our Sepoys from their allegiance.”

Various reasons were assigned in 1833 and 1834 for the state of the Army by the Regimental Officers. Some spoke of the objectionable practice of sending away large Detachments as treasure escorts which interfered with the drill and economy of a Corps—others denounced the Recruiting system, urging the exclusion of low caste Soldiers, because they operated as a bar to the enlistment of Brahmins—and not a few contended for the exclusion of

Brahmins because of their mischievous propensities, and their refusal to go across seas in the fulfilment of their duty. The majority held the latter view, but it was allowed to be exceedingly difficult to keep out the Brahmins. They had a habit of changing their names and entering as Rajpoots, taking care that their real caste should not be known until they had acquired a firm footing in the Regiment.

The condition in which Lord WILLIAM BENTINCK found the Native Army when he became Commander-in-Chief, as well as Governor-General, induced him to give his attention to remedial measures. It entered into his head that the practice of flogging, which certain chicken-hearted and mistaken people in England had begun to condemn as brutal and unworthy of the nation, operated as a bar to the enlistment of the respectable classes of natives. It was an erroneous idea, but having once taken possession of the mind of a somewhat obstinate statesman, it was not easily effaceable. Before, however, he could venture upon so radical a change in the system of punishments, he considered it proper, delicate and politic, to invite the opinions of the most experienced Officers in the Service as to the expediency of the measure he contemplated. Accordingly the expression of opinion was formally invited, and the result was an unequivocal declaration of the sentiments of the Officers that it would be most unwise to abrogate the punishment.

In the face of these deliberately recorded sentiments, the more honest that the writers knew them to be opposed to the Governor General's views, Lord W. BENTINCK, aided and abetted by obscure and, in this particular, ignorant members of his Council, abolished flogging with a stroke of his pen. And what was the substitute furnished? Discharge from the Service! Lord WILLIAM argued that men would hesitate to commit crimes which involved the forfeiture of pay and pensions, with all the respect attendant upon good and prolonged service, and that therefore dismissal was a severer penalty than corporal punishment. It was the great error of his Military administration. The sole effect of the humanitarianism of the Governor General was to make the Sepoy more daring, indifferent and insubordinate! From the declarations

of experienced Officers, published in 1835, it was evident that the Service was going to pieces. One of them wrote—

“The growing spirit (for it has yet by no means come to maturity) evinced by our Native Soldiery of late is really alarming, and will, unquestionably, unless timeously checked, cause Government and Army Head Quarters to repent the unwise system pursued of late—that inconceivably infatuated system of rendering European Regimental Officers, on whom, in fact, everything depends, contemptible in the eyes of their own men!

“Not only is corporal punishment abolished without any other being substituted—and none other equally efficacious can be substituted for Native Troops—but Officers are deprived of the very power of confirming their own Courts-Martial; and, as if this were not enough to ruin any Army, every petition is listened to, and from their being generally successfully listened to, our Native Soldiers are encouraged in this practice to an extent which none but those commanding Corps can have any idea of; whilst men brought to trial before Military tribunals, whether general or of an inferior description, so frequently escape punishment by the tedious petty forms which have now taken such strong root in them, or by the stupidity, unfitness, or undue partiality of the Native Officers composing those Courts (in which, too, they, the Native Officers, are encouraged, by never being found fault with), that all fear is fast disappearing from the minds of our Native Troops.

“What is already the consequence? Do we not now continually hear of *murders by our Sepoys*? This in the 9th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry is the third or fourth within the last two or three months committed upon Native Commissioned or Non-Commissioned Officers, to say nothing of any that have been perpetrated on camp followers, and of Regiments behaving ill—were there not two or three instances only this last cold weather? Is it wonderful? What punishment has been inflicted on any Regiment? And as for individual cases, do not the evildoers, or a portion of them at least, invariably escape punishment? For what punishment is dismissal? Many, however, even escape from this!

“In former times Regiments were severely visited for any evildoers or manifestations of bad spirit; an entire Company was discharged the Service, and of the rest, every tenth man was sent about his business. Now nothing is done. Legal proof of the criminality of *each* individual is required, which, in such cases, never can be found, concealment in Native Regiments of any crime being easy to a degree beyond belief of those not *intimately* acquainted with our Native Soldiery.

“Formerly, moreover, Commanding Officers could guard against such things, and did so, by the discharge from the Service of all bad or suspected characters; now no such power exists. In an Army like this, considering the character and nature of the men of which it is composed, and the facility with which crimes are concealed, as well as the plenty of good recruits to be got, such a power *ought* to exist, and to be vested in every Officer Commanding a Native Regiment.

“If the rumour (for at present it is nothing more, though firmly believed) that this unfortunate Pay Havildar, of the 4th Company 9th Native Infantry, was murdered, in revenge, by these men, on account of their having been passed over in promotion, and that they had proposed to serve the European Officer commanding their Company in the same way on the very night of the day on which they were, fortunately—by being found out—prevented, be true, nothing more need be said of *the growing spirit of insubordination, or of the unhappy system by which it has been engendered*, for it certainly is a *new one* with the Sepoys of this Presidency, and one of which, when their Officers had more power, and were upheld in their authority, they *never even* dreamed! We have arrived at a fine pass certainly, when our men themselves, and not their Officers, are to be judges of their own qualifications for promotion! In no Army in the world is promotion to the Non-Commissioned

ranks suffered to go by seniority; and in no Army in the world is there such a necessity for good men in the ranks as in ours. More depends on them in the Native than in any other Army; and yet, even *as it is*, more—much more—attention is already paid to the claims of seniority in this than in any other; too much so, by a vast deal, as the qualifications and conduct of our Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned ranks, especially when absent from under the immediate eye of the European Officers, already but too sufficiently prove.

“Were this point of promotion by seniority ever to be conceded to our Native Soldiers, there would then, indeed, be an end to everything, and the little good that now survives the injudicious system so long pursued by Government and Army Head Quarters, would then vanish at once. Our Non-Commissioned and Native Commissioned ranks would then, in good truth, be utterly valueless. The only hold we now have on them, and which induces, generally speaking, our *old* Sepoys to behave themselves properly, is the fear of not being promoted, and the fear of being superseded is the *only hold* we have on our Non-Commissioned and Native Commissioned ranks, and that even, as is well known, keeps them but very indifferently good. Take this away, and this Army would soon become a curse, instead of a blessing, on the country.

“Unless, however, more authority is vested in Officers commanding Regiments than now is, and more support afforded them in the exercise of their power, as well as more certain and severe punishment inflicted on those who commit crimes, our Native Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers will, ere long, it is to be apprehended, be deterred, through fear, from bringing even the little which they now do of the conduct of men to their European Officers’ knowledge; and *thus, probably* numbers of *very undeserving* men will get promoted!

“Even those Commanding Officers who are not themselves in the habit of passing over in promoting their men, will, no doubt, admit that, like corporal punishment, it would be a serious evil to let them know that they did not possess the power of doing so; for so long as they are aware that such a power *is* vested in their Commanding Officers, they will, to a certain extent, avoid behaving very ill—in the same manner that they avoided committing such acts as would lead to a Court-Martial, when they knew their Commanding Officers could carry the sentence and that one of corporal infliction moreover, into effect. There are few Commanding Officers who really take any interest in their Regiments who do not occasionally pass men of all ranks over, and if it were not for fear of not being supported, would do so to a greater extent; and pity it is that any should be deterred!

“Our men have the practice of calling promotion their “*huk*,” that is—their right! which it is not, and never was. This ill-omened practice should be discontinued in the *highest quarters*, and the men should be given to understand that they misapply the term, and that those only who are deemed fit and deserving from character and qualifications, by their Commanding Officers, will ever be promoted. At present it is a common idea amongst them that promotion by seniority is ordered by Government, but that their own Regimental Officers won’t attend to it.

“No Army can get on properly on the system now pursued with this; immunity from punishment, and *license*, will render our “gentle Hindoos” worse than even Europeans.

“*Let Government, therefore, consider and beware!*”

A few weeks subsequently another communication appeared from the pen of an Officer now no more, who was considered one of the best Commanding Officers, as he had been one of the best of Adjutants. He wrote:—

“Hardly a week now elapses without our hearing of some outrage, committed

by *our once orderly and well-behaved* Sepoys, of a nature that used formerly seldom or never to be perpetrated,—pretty plainly indicating that the present mode of administering the affairs of this Army is not suited to the habits and character of the Native Soldiery of this Presidency. It behoves us, before it be too late, to reflect seriously on the subject, and endeavour to correct the system, or such parts of it as have this injurious tendency on the discipline and consequent happiness of our Native Army.

“To do this effectually, it will be necessary to compare the present with the past times—those times when our Sepoys *were* orderly and well behaved, looked up with affection and respect to their European Officers, and evinced no such symptoms of discontent, disobedience and litigation, if not even worse feelings, as they so unhappily now but too frequently do.

“Thirty years ago, when I first commenced my Military career amongst them, they were in no one respect, so far as government is concerned, so well off as now. They had no subadar major, nor colour havildars; they were not well provided with clothing; their duties were severer, both in cantonments—for they *then* took *all* the civil duties, jail guards, civilian’s personal guards, &c.—and out of them, for there were many more, treasure and other escorts, besides eternal detachments out on actual service of one kind or other; there was less leave of absence granted; they were not so well and comfortably provided with guard rooms; jemadars were not so well paid, and small parties that now, when marching, are allowed tents, used not then so generally to get them. When in large camps they were not, as now by the Commissariat they are, so well supplied with grain. For proof of this look back to Lord Lake’s day—to the first siege of Bhurtapore, for example. In those times they had to pay for many little articles of equipment, such as breast plates, havildars’ sashes, &c., that they are now no longer charged with. The half-mounting system was much worse, and a vast deal more expensive to them than now, each man having had to pay five rupees per annum, of which, *even with liberal* Commanding Officers, they never got more than the value of *one half!* And they were sometimes cut another rupee or two in addition for some articles, such as knapsack, &c, which the Commanding Officer considered they wanted. They had hospital stoppages to pay, and which, on account of the malingers, they ought to pay again; were liable at any moment to be discharged from the Service by the Officer commanding the Regiment, with whom this power rested; and had to perform in many Regiments at least; for this then, like now, depended in a great measure on the Commanding Officer; much more parade duties—many Corps I could name that used to be out daily, and some twice a day, all the year round.

“They were subject to *rattaning* at the will and pleasure of the Officer commanding the parade, and of the Drill Instructor when at drill. They were promoted solely at the pleasure of the Commandant, many of whom neither paid attention to roll, or the recommendation of the Officer commanding the Company; and some there were who even sold it! And last, not least, they were subject to corporal punishment with the cat-o’ninetails. Courts-Martial then were, as they always ought to be, confirmed by the authority which convened them, and were not *even afterwards* sent for the inspection of the General Officer commanding the Divisions, and had besides an almost unlimited power of sentence. Officers commanding Regiments or Detachments had, in fact, almost supreme authority in their Regiments or Detachments. Yet were the feeling and conduct of our men very different from, and far superior to, what they now are; though now their situation has, in every particular, been entirely changed, and in some points, such as the half mounting, for the better; but in others evidently, as their conduct shows (the alterations having been unsuited to the native character) have been worse.

“There is nothing more true than that legislators, in framing laws, should have a due regard to the peculiar habits, customs, and national character of the people for whom those laws are intended. Yet this is a consideration for which the English, above all other civilised countries, seem to have no regard.

They invariably endeavour to assimilate the laws of all countries, in opposition to all obstacles of national character, degree of civilisation, &c., to their own; and to this unfortunate, this most impolitic, propensity may, I think, firmly be attributed the *present unhappy state of this Army*; the laws and regulations for which have been assimilated too closely to those for the British European one, and, indeed, in some most essential points—such as corporal punishment and checks upon authority—even carried to a degree suited to a state of civilisation beyond that of the English Soldier, and consequently most particularly ill adapted to our men.”

Such communications could be multiplied to a great extent, but we must pass on to the year 1836.

During the whole of the years 1836 and 1837, the state of the Bengal Army was pitiable. Everything was wrong or went wrong. The Recruiting was badly managed. The duty was generally entrusted to a native Non-Commissioned Officer, who, if he did not make a job of it, in managing the subsistence money, was not a class of person under whom the more respectable villagers were very desirous of placing themselves. Too many men were drawn from Oude; the country was enriched by the sums carried from the British provinces by Sepoys and spent there by them when on furlough, and the kingdom furnished to deserters a certain refuge from punishment. The system of seniority, irrespective of merit, was obstinately continued as the rule of promotion to native Commissioned rank. Persevering in the determination to centralize all power in the Governor General or the Commander-in-Chief, the Commanding Officers were deprived of their Guards,—and further to put the Sepoy, and attach him to the Service, hospital stoppages were abolished. All this was of little avail. It was diametrically opposed to the old principle of command, which made the Sepoy dependant on his immediate leader. Besides, it was attended by several countervailing circumstances of great weight in alienating the loyalty or exciting the disaffection of the Sepoy. Although individually well treated, he could not be unaware of the dislike to the British rule which had been gaining strength among the people. “He heard,” wrote Mr. SHORE, “of the over taxation of his village land; of the sale of some family property to enable his relatives to pay the rent; and of the confiscation of the rent free land of some poor old Brahmin whom he had, since his childhood, revered as a spiritual guide. These and other causes acted upon him as upon the rest of the population, and his dislike to the Service was increased by a breach of faith of which the Government was guilty, in reducing the pensions which some old invalid Sepoys had been enjoying for some years.”

In elucidation of the state to which the Army had been reduced by the combined action of all the circumstances to which reference has been made, it may be mentioned that sleeping upon their posts became an everyday crime among the Sepoys, and quitting their arms while on sentry was by no means unusual. On one occasion (in 1836) when the Havildar (Serjeant) visited his guard and found a man in this lax condition he received, in answer to his reproof, a threat that he should be stabbed by the fixed bayonet, which the offender placed against his breast. And the Sepoy was—simply discharged! But this was by no means the worst case. The impunity of crime made murder or the attempt at murder frequent. Ensign BLENKINSOP, of the 34th Regiment Native Infantry, was assassinated by a Trooper for ordering him some extra drill in punishment of his insolent and insubordinate conduct. Subsequently a Subadar Major was murdered on parade, and as his assassin was led to prison between one and two hundred of the Privates turned out to crown him with flowers! In 1837 there was another homicide, and in 1838 violent attempts at murder were made by men in the 11th and 25th Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry. The Sepoy of the 11th who first fired at his Officer, and then made an effort to run him through, was tried and sentenced to be shot, but his comrades of the firing party (and it was difficult to get one together!) would not aim at him—they fired over his head, so that the duty of blowing out his brains devolved on the Provost Serjeant.

The expedition to Affghanistan again brought out the mercenary spirit of the Sepoy. He mutinied for extra allowances—and obtained them! (*vide* Memoirs of Sir W. NORT.) The Government was completely at the mercy of its Native Army. But foreign warfare gave the authorities a respite. The Sepoy, like the French Soldier, must be actively employed—he must not have time to think of grievances or indulge in freaks of independence. Accordingly for some years he behaved comparatively well—fought gallantly with Affghans, Khyberries, and Beloochees, and earned medals for his breast and honourable inscriptions upon his Regimental colors.

Scinde was conquered in 1843—peace ensued—and in 1844 there were more mutinies on the old score, extra pay.

“For some weeks,” writes the *Calcutta Review* (Aug., 1844), “four or five Regiments were in a state of actual revolt; and the flames of mutiny were only smothered by liberal promises of all that the mutineers had demanded.” The Commander-in-Chief of the day, without waiting for the decision of the Government, took upon himself to grant the desired pay and pension. * * * Another mutiny was the result. “Young Egypt” (Scinde) witnessed the sad spectacle of British Troops pelting their Officers on parade—“and,” adds the Reviewer prophetically, “there is too much reason to believe that we have not yet seen the full extent of the calamity—a calamity which may yet throw into the shade the mas sacre in the Cabul passes.”

In 1845 it was found necessary to restore corporal punishment. The advisability of the measure had been rendered but too apparent for some time previously, and nothing but the fear of producing a commotion by returning to the usage had held the hands of the Government. The revival of the lash was, however, received with apathy by the Native Army, and it now continues a standing punishment. It is inconceivable that it ever should have been otherwise. The subordination of Soldiers is maintained by two things—the hope of reward, and the fear of punishment. There was little enough of the latter in the Indian Army—the support of discipline fell entirely upon the latter. It may be a harsh policy to govern by fear, but, without fear, how could the numerous joints and movements composing an Army ever be kept in anything like order and regularity? Amongst so many, some must be bad, and, alas! for poor human nature, those few must be controlled either by the apprehension of bodily pain following their misdeeds, or of witnessing the actual infliction of it upon others. We would wish, if it were possible, to abolish all severe punishments—all *peines fortes et dures*, if we could think such a procedure would tend in the slightest degree to the advancement of social order and the decrease of crime. We should amazingly like a rule of kindness; but looking at the variety of characters with which a Commander-in-Chief has to deal,—that some are but a few degrees removed from the dispositions of the brute creation, and that they, without corrective power, would run riot in licentious-

ness, and that all the efforts of kindness in the world would never bring them to a proper line of conduct, we must consider that the ability to inflict corporal punishment must be possessed, or discipline would soon fall to pieces as a rope of sand.

In 1845 came the war with the Punjaub, which lasted, with a slight interval, for two or three years. It was a popular war, for the Hindoos and Mahomedans equally disliked the Sikhs, who were the wanton aggressors in the contest. No sooner, however, was the Punjaub conquered and measures taken to occupy it with regular Troops, than the old craving after the rupees revived.

he Sepoy would not see the distinction between crossing a foreign frontier to make war, which entitled him to extra batta, and entering upon acquired territory which retained a peace establishment.

In the year 1846, when H.M.'s 39th Foot, the 1st, 66th, and 23rd Regiments Native Infantry, were stationed at Dinapore, a conspiracy was discovered to murder the 39th, in which the 1st, or *Gillis ku pultun* were the chief agents. A wealthy banker in Patna, a Mahomedan, was concerned, and was to have provided the money for the Sepoys. A Beesty, or water-carrier,* belonging to the lines of the Regiment, brought money from the banker, and on his arrival took it to two native Officers Brahmins, who immediately went and informed the Commanding Officer of what was going on. The Commanding Officer instantly communicated with the civil authorities in Patna. The Regimental Moulvee, Pundit, and a Jemadar of the Grenadier Company were placed in arrest. The Moulvee was retained as Queen's evidence; the other two were tried by a General Court-Martial, and were sentenced to be dismissed the Service or to imprisonment; but the Court was ordered to revise its proceedings. The offenders were then sentenced to be hanged, but were pardoned by the Commander-in-Chief, and turned out of cantonments after the parade, promulgating their trial and sentence. The plan of massacre was similar to that which has been carried out lately. It was to have commenced whilst the 39th Foot were at church, in the square at Dinapore, with their side-arms, on a Sunday.

Shortly after this, one of the Native Officers, who informed the Commanding Officer of the conspiracy, and who was a very intelligent man and had enlisted in Lord LARÉ's time, stated that the

* He afterwards mysteriously disappeared.

impression was general that in ten years this very scheme would be carried out. He said there would be such a "tumashu" in Hindostan as we had no idea of, and that "*the Company's Raj*" (or Rule) would be at an end in 1857, when we should have governed the country 100 years!

In 1849 and 1850 the mutinous spirit was rife—twenty-four Regiments were prepared simultaneously to explode. The strong hand of Sir CHARLES NAPIER, and the aid he received from Sir COLIN CAMPBELL, prevented the catastrophe, but not until the 66th Bengal Native Infantry was disbanded and its colors given to a Corps of Goorkhas.

The periodical literature of 1850, like that of 1833-38 resumed the note of warning. Sir HENRY RUSSELL, as *Civis* of the *Times*, Colonel HODGSON, the writers in the *Calcutta Review*, and the Indian papers generally, strenuously urged attention to the alarming condition of the Army.

Sir HENRY RUSSELL predicted that an explosion would take place "without the slightest warning." He knew the Army was composed of the most combustible materials, and that a very slight ground of political discontent would act upon it instantaneously. Colonel HODGSON, in alluding to the idleness incidental to a state of peace, pointed out that Soldiers unemployed were contracting habits of a dangerous character and imagining serious grievances, "the usual forerunners of disaffection and conspiracy," and he hinted at the probable consequences of "legionary violence"—"That which had been raised by the surpassing toil of a century might be thrown down in one day." All this passed unheeded by the Marquis of DALHOUSIE, who had become Governor General of India. See the result! In 1852 a fresh war broke out with Burmah. The 38th Native Infantry refused to march. They demanded more pay. Lord DALHOUSIE succumbed.

Hostility to the ruling powers and utter indifference continued after this to mark the feelings of the Sepoys. The *facilis descensus* was illustrated in the rapid progress of indiscipline. Officers who went away on furlough in 1853 scarcely knew their Regiments again when they returned in 1856, so quick and fatal had been the consequences of a prolonged leisure. At a Court of Enquiry held in April

last into the temper and feelings of the Sepoys of the 34th Bengal Native Infantry, Captain AUBERT answered, when asked his opinion of them :—

For the last six weeks I have not been in the performance of Regimental duty, and therefore cannot speak as to the present state of feeling and temper; *but between May last year* (when I returned from furlough), and the date of my entering upon my appointment at this station, I had observed a great want of respect on the part of the men towards their European Officers. For instance, I frequently noticed, when I went to the lines on duty, and in uniform, that the men did not stand up and salute me; a mark of disrespect for which I punished the men of my own Company, and reported those of other Companies. Again, when the Regiment was coming down by water, in October and November last year, we encountered a severe gale in which three boats were wrecked, but not a single Sepoy came forward voluntarily to assist the European Officers in getting their boats out of danger. And, likewise, when the mens' boats came into collision with those of the Officers', the Sepoys, who were seated above and looking on, never lent a hand to save their Officers' boats from being damaged. In short, from all I have observed, I do not consider that the feeling and temper of the Native Officers and men are what they ought to be, and I am confirmed in this opinion by what I witnessed upon the evening of the 29th of March, after Lieutenant Baugh was cut down. On that occasion I saw numbers of the men of all Companies collected and passively looking on, and when I taxed them with cowardice in having allowed an Officer of their own Regiment to be cut down in broad daylight, within fifty yards of where they were standing, not one of them attempted any explanation; but they all seemed to regard the charge as a frivolous one, and some of them even laughed at it.

Suppose you were now ordered to accompany your Regiment on field-service, would you do so in full reliance on their loyalty and good conduct?—A. I would not.

And Ensign Chamier, the interpreter of the Corps, said, in reply to the query, "What is your opinion of the present state of feeling and temper amongst the Native Officers and men of the 34th Regiment Native Infantry?"—"It is bad. I have observed that the Native Officers and men are generally disrespectful towards their European Officers. An instance of the sort happened to myself only a fortnight ago. The Subadar Major attended at my Quarters, for the purpose of being examined as to his knowledge of reading and writing, preparatory to being sent in command of the Government-house Guard, Calcutta. I gave him a chair, and treated him with all courtesy. As he sat down, he removed his turban from his head; when I desired him to replace his puggree, and pointed out to him the impropriety of his conduct, he neither attempted to excuse himself nor to apologise. This circumstance occurred on the day on which Lieutenant Baugh was wounded. Again, on the same day, when passing the Quarter Guard, the Jemadar commanding it saluted me, but neglected to put on his cap (he being in uniform): and shortly afterwards when I re-passed the Guard, he repeated the salute in the same manner, although, on both occasions, he was standing close by his cot upon which his cap was lying.

It is not necessary to adduce another instance to render it manifest that the Bengal Army was, in 1856, ripe for mutiny upon the grandest scale. It is inconceivable how, with so many examples before them of the frail tenure by which the loyalty and fidelity of the Sepoy were held, the East India Company's Government should have persevered in the mistaken system of organisation against which so many experienced Officers had continually pro-

tested any time during the previous thirty years. There was not reason why twenty to thirty Officers should not have been kept *continually* with their Regiments, interesting themselves about the men, and gaining an ascendancy over their affections. If the demands for European agency in the superintendence of public works, the breeding of horses for the Cavalry, the performance of police duties, the survey of the country, &c., had been so considerably beyond the immediate means of supply, it was the duty of the Government to have sent to England for suitable persons, supposing that there were no candidates for uncovenanted employment upon the spot. There are thousands of young men in this country whose education peculiarly fits them for the offices to which I have referred. Robust young farmers, practical veterinarians, civil engineers, surveyors, and youth of no particular calling, but with an aptitude for any, demanding intelligence and physical power, abound in England, and could be tempted to India by moderate salaries. The Government had no right to oppose its insane and antiquated antipathy to interlopers to the interests of such an institution as the Army, on which hung the safety of the Empire. But it was not so much prejudice, we suspect, as *patronage*, which stood in the way of any effort to seek for civil *employés* without denuding the Regiments of their moral strength. Men have not hitherto sought Cadetships that their sons, nephews, or *protégés* of any kind, might pursue a respectable *Regimental* career. The Staff and the civil branch have been made the chief objects of every young Soldier's ambition from the hour of his entry into the Service. Hence a neglect of those studies and pursuits which are requisite to the formation of the good Regimental Officer. The system has had a doubly injurious effect. It has made the Officer, who would have been effective Regimentally, indifferent to his profession, and it has altogether drawn away, for other purposes, the men who had some pretensions to efficiency.

The second "instancé" of the neglect of sagacious counsel of which the Company's Government has been guilty, consists in the reduction of the European Force. There were not more British Regiments in India in the beginning of 1857 than there were in 1835, although the acquired territory, during the intermediate

period, had been immensely enlarged. We had annexed Oude, Nagpore, Scinde, Sattarah, Coorg, &c., within the limits of the Sutlej, and had trusted for their protection and internal tranquillity almost entirely to an augmentation of the native Irregular Troops. Kurnaul, Cawnpore, Berhampore, Hazareebaugh—which had once been stations for European Troops, were altogether stripped of them that the Punjaub and the frontier might be strengthened. There were in all India twenty to thirty Queen's Regiments, averaging 20,000 bayonets, and 250,000 Sepoys, Regular and Irregular; that is, about one European Regiment (including the Company's Infantry) to thirteen Native Corps. There should have been one European Regiment to every four Native Regiments. In computing the number of Europeans required to *co-operate* with the Natives the importance of having them to check and control that branch of the Service was altogether forgotten. Injurious as was the difference of strength, in that point of view, it became worse when war broke out beyond the frontier, and Troops had to be dispatched to Persia, Burmah, China, &c., inasmuch as the disproportion was exceeded. When the mutiny burst forth the 64th and 78th Highlanders, and the 29th Foot, were away from India; and a year or so previously the 10th Hussars and 12th Lancers had been sent to the Crimea. The chief ground on which the East India Company have resisted the increase of the European strength in India has been that of expense. But that this was a short-sighted economy must be obvious to every one who considers that a corresponding reduction in the native strength might at any time have been made with an augmentation of increased efficiency, and a reduction of the danger attendant upon the employment of a large body of disaffected Sepoys.

The third "count of the indictment" embraces the enlistment of Sepoys of the Brahmin caste. An opinion had frequently been expressed by the Officers most competent to arrive at a correct judgment that it was impolitic to engage Brahmins. They are undoubtedly the most Soldier-like of the Sepoys in appearance, cut a better figure upon parade than the others, and were never wanting in bravery in perilous moments. But their influence over the rest of the men was "much too great." So late as February, 1853, that experienced Soldier, General Sir WILLOUGHBY COTTON, who had

served with the Madras Army, led Bengal Divisions in the field, and finally commanded the Bombay Army, said to the House of Commons' Committee—"I had a very strong feeling that I never would enlist what they call a high-caste Brahmin; his influence over the other men is so very great. I do not think they are desirable men in the ranks." And in answer to the question, "Did not the Officers of the Bengal Army wish to have, if possible, the highest class Brahmins?" Sir WILLOUGHBY replied—"On the contrary, I can give you an instance. A very distinguished Officer of the Bengal Army has often told me that if he had the power of determining it, he would not have a Brahmin in his Regiment." Yet in opposition to such sentiments—which were but the echo of opinions frequently expressed for many years previously by Regimental Officers—the recruiting of Brahmins was persevered in and countenanced to such an extent that from a return which we lately obtained through the courtesy of an East India Director, we find that in ten Regiments of the Bengal Army, at the close of last year, there were not fewer than 700, and in some instances upwards of 800 Brahmins and Rajpoots in every Regiment, the remaining 350 being in the proportion of one-half Mussulmans and the remainder Hindoos of inferior castes. A similar proportion was to be found in any ten Bombay Regiments. But in the Madras Army, which has been the most faithful to its salt in the recent struggle, there have not been as many as sixty Brahmins and Rajpoots in any one Corps!

Twenty years ago the Brahmin Sepoy was thus spoken of in the Indian Military periodical to which we have referred :—

"The next point in Recruiting I would wish to call attention to is, the caste of men fitting and unfitting for the Army. The fittest men are the Mussulmans, Rajpoots, Chuttries, Gwallahs, Bundoolahs, Jauts, and Kooarimes; these sects have no nonsense about them, and consider themselves as only fitting for soldiering, and born to such calling. But in our Regiments at present, how truly deplorable is the reverse of all this! more than one-third, generally, are Brahmins, and the same, or greater portion, of the very worst description of men that could be laid hold of, viz :—writers, silver and goldsmiths, blacksmiths, barbers, sweetmeat-sellers, grain sellers, and palkee bearers, lallahs, souars, lohars, khows, hulwhys, buncabs, bearers, &c, in fact, the very lowest class (excepting the sweeper and chumar) in India. Such being the case, good and high caste men have the greatest aversion to mixing in the same society, or being classed in the same body, with such a refuse of mankind, as they consider the

above. A Brahmin is the best of them certainly; but it is not one Brahmin in thirty that makes a good Soldier. I mean the pandys, zewarys, opadials, ajahs, zookuls, doobeys, misser, patucks, dechits, and chowleys; these are the priests of the country, and will continue so. They have a greater hatred of Europeans than any other sect in India, and they are guilty of greater crimes, and yet they set themselves up as the purest and most innocent race on the face of the earth, and startle on treading on an ant, yet take human life for the value of one rupee.

“Let any one refer to Hough’s Case-book on Courts-Martial, and see the proportion of corresponding names to the above compared to others; or to Captain Borthwick’s narrative of the confessions of a party of Thugs, and the number of Brahmins that have been taken up in that most horrid vocation. Every one remembers the leader of the Barrackpore mutiny: he was a zewary. In fact, on every memorable occasion of ills, the Brahmins are the leaders, and in private I will not go further than to refer to Ward’s History of the Hindoos. All nations have vices of every description, but in Hindostan the Brahmin is the chief actor, and there is nothing he will stickle at where money or power is to be had. I never yet met a Brahmin Soobadar who could be compared to any other caste of the same rank; in fact, they are a race, as Abbé Dubois says, forsaken by the Almighty.

“The other castes that I have proscribed as unfit will not dare themselves to say they are Soldiers before a Rajpoot or Mussulman: they would be ridiculed and laughed at ever after if one ever was bold enough to make the assertion.

“They candidly confess they enter the Service for their bread, and no other motive. An Officer Commanding a Corps is quite helpless in recruiting for his Regiment; he must have his numbers complete, and, of course, takes such as come for service, and in many instances probably takes men who have only deserted a few months previously from some other Regiment, perhaps, within fifty or sixty miles, or quitted some Thug or Dacoity party. The melancholy desertions we had during the Goorkah war are sufficient to portray what would again take place on any serious call or occasion, for the desertions did not happen entirely among the Sepoys, but among Non-Commissioned Officers. Can anything prove greater insufficiency in an Army than such a fact?

“The war was a trying one certainly in every respect; but the war and the climate were not the causes—it was the number of Brahmins in our ranks, who first refused to carry, on an emergency, a couple of days’ provisions, and then, taking French leave, they set the example, and were followed generally by the low caste men who took the alarm. It is true they go on board ship, but what is the proportion that do go compared with the other men—one in thirty! And these men go not from the pride of Soldiering, but the hopes of gain, of promotion, and many other things. Honour and glory have not in the wide world a smaller value than with a Brahmin.”

Finally, as to the Native Artillery. Instead of reducing it to a harmless minimum, or abolishing it altogether, the Government have kept up the Golundauze in great force, and as they have shown remarkable aptitude for the scientific duties of Artillerymen, they have proved in the great rebellion, as it was foretold they would be, the most formidable of our foes.

I have endeavoured to make it clear that the Bengal Army had been reduced, at the close of last year, to a hopeless state of decrepitude entirely through the systematic neglect by the Government of the course of procedure suggested by the best informed men. The Sepoy Force had reached that combustible condition which made it susceptible of ignition from the slightest application of a political spark. The greased cartridges supplied the fire—they became the vulgar and false pretext for lighting up the empire throughout its centre. The Sepoy was in a frame of mind to accept of any ground for open revolt, and the subtle followers of the deposed King of Oude were prompt to suggest the minatory danger to their several religions in the use of animal substances. Associated with the suggestion that conversion to Christianity was meditated came the promise of the restoration of native supremacy; better pay in the service of the King of Delhi, and the prospect of immediate plunder.

We have seen with what fearful rapidity, under these impressions, the flame of rebellion spread, and to what terrible danger all India has been exposed. Happily, through the wonderful energy of the handful of Europeans scattered over the country, the great ability of some of their Commanders, and the adherence of a few Native Chiefs to the British cause, the empire has been saved—and the Bengal Native Army has been utterly extinguished. But a contrary result might have been anticipated.

A grave question now arises, and to its solution many able men have addressed their minds. Some old Indian Officers, in the very teeth of the dreadful experience we have now had of the utter uselessness, to say nothing of the danger, of entertaining Bengal Sepoys, advocate, most unaccountably, a return to the past order of things, insisting upon it that the men would have continued faithful if their religious prejudices had been respected. But others

who have carefully traced upon the spot the various causes of decay from 1824 to 1856 are firmly of opinion that we must for the future depend upon European Troops. Colonel MACDONALD, General HEARSEY, and Mr. Campbell, M.P. for Weymouth, the author of the first pamphlet published after the mutiny broke out, may be accepted as better authorities than either Colonel SYKES or Lord ELLENBOROUGH. Police Battalions officered by Englishmen, the addition of two or three Companies of low-caste Natives* to every

* "Many of the mountain fastnesses and secluded spots of Hindoostan are inhabited by Aborigines, whose number throughout the whole Continent has been estimated by General Briggs, at 16,000,000. 'How it so happens,' the same author writes, 'that in the wars of Lawrence, Clive, and Coote, in the Carnatic, the Aborigines constituted by far the great majority of the Sepoys. It was they who opposed Hyder Ally, the ruler of Mysore, and who gained the battle of Plassey in Bengal, before a Bengal Army existed. It was they, the Parwaries of the Bombay Army, who, in the siege of Mangalore, together with the second Battalion of the 42nd Highlanders, under Colonel Campbell, defended that fortress for six months, against a besieging Army of forty thousand men, and consented to honourable terms of surrender only, when on the point of starvation (as did the Garrison of Kars), having buried within its walls, more than half its numbers. The Bengies of this race, the Aborigines of Bengal, constituted a portion of the Infantry of the Mogul Armies; and it is a fact not generally known, though nevertheless true, that they claimed the honour, as the indigines of the soil, to form the forlorn hope and the storming parties in all its dangerous services. A chosen band of Bedas, the Aborigines of Mysore, (whose Rajahs, under the denomination of Polijars, hold many strongholds, or baronial estates as we should call them), in our times, formed the personal body guard of Hyder Ally, the Sovereign of Mysore. They are mentioned by the historian, Colonel Wilks, in his sketches of the south of India, as the bravest and best Soldiers of that country. The Minas, and other original races in Central India, constitute the guards of the palace of the Rajput Princes of the present day." With such antecedents, one is naturally amazed at discovering that a strong prejudice against their enlistment has existed for many years, and that the native Army of Bengal at the period of its decease, was, if we except a few Bheels and Mhoirs, formed into local Corps—uncontaminated by the presence of a single individual of this race. Many facts tend to bear out the belief that men in office, collectively and singly, have over and over again been victims of the same species of mania or delusion, which afflicted the tyrannical parent of the great Frederick—the sacrificing every other consideration to the outward appearance and stature of the Recruit. The Aborigines had proved themselves to be men of pluck; they had no scruples of caste; they would eat and drink anything that pleased the palate, and handle what they were ordered, without troubling themselves, and

European Regiment, after the manner in which the Gun Lascars are attached to the Artillery of India, and a permanent increase to the establishment of European Regiments, would amply suffice for the preservation of the security of the empire. The stations congenial to the constitution of European Troops are so situated that if good roads, rail or tram, or even ordinary metalled roads, adapted to such carriages as those used by the Military Train were constructed, a concentration of force could be rapidly effected at any menaced point. Twenty or thirty such stations regularly connected, such as Madras, Bangalore, Secunderabad and Nagpore, in the Madras territories; Poonah, Darwar, Surat, Kurrachee, in the Bombay presidency; and Barrackpore, Berhampore, and so on, up to Peshawur, including the occupation of Neemuch, Nusseerabad, and a few other places in the north-west, under the Bengal Government, would operate in their reciprocal defence like so many redoubts. Lord HARDINGE and Sir PATRICK GRANT have put on record their sentiments in respect to the value of railways in a Military point of view, but indeed recent events, by exhibiting our helplessness in their absence, have demonstrated their vast utility in

their Officers with questions, as to how, or what it was made; but their appearance was not so imposing as that of the Brahmin, who looked down upon them in two senses—which was enough.

“The same reasons were instrumental in causing the exclusion of the low caste Hindoos, and operated in such a way that the Regular Infantry of the Line consisted at one period, as shown by a return published in 1853, we believe, of about 2,500 Brahmins, 20,000 Rahoopoots, 15,000 Hindoos of inferior caste, 12,000 Mussulmans, and about 1,500 native Christians. As a proof of that, this unfortunate infatuation for the high castes was daily gaining ground, it is worthy of remark, that on the eve of the revolt an order was issued, occasioned, no doubt, by the strong and urgent representations of Officers of the Company’s Army, of standing and experience, by the Commander-in-Chief in Bombay, enjoining the seeking of Recruits among Brahminical and upper classes, as being possessed of physical and moral qualifications of a superior order. But, happily, before any mischief was done, the terrible outbreak in the sister Presidency brought it to a timely end.

“Some of the finest men we saw during our tour of service in Hindoostan, were Mikturs and Dours, the lowest of the low castes; and Sir Charles Napier, in one of his terse and pungent epistles to an Officer of Bengal Artillery, writes :—‘ I have no confidence in the allegiance of your high caste mercenaries. I have seen a sweeper show more bravery in battle than a Brahmin and a high-named Mussulman.’”

rapidly bringing a Force together exactly where it might be wanted.

There is, however, another element of protection which would be available if the more general employment of Europeans in the Government Service were to become a feature of our rule, and the settlement of Englishmen were encouraged by the introduction of a more liberal system of laws, and the opening up the means of transport of produce to the coasts and the interior. Many stations might then become the Head Quarters of a Militia or Yeomanry Corps, and their services would prove of inestimable ability in the hour of danger. Lord ELLENBOROUGH was quite right in comparing the position of the English in India to that of the Normans in Saxon England. "We must be armed," said he very recently, "or it will be impossible for us to maintain our own. The law should be that every Englishman in India should be obliged to possess arms under a penalty, and to be enrolled and drilled in local Corps. It will be impossible for us to persevere in securing the lives and properties of the Europeans in India unless we assume the appearance of an armed Militia."

But to constitute a Militia you must "first catch your hare." Let colonization be encouraged, and there will be no lack of such heads and hands as held Arrah, quieted Azimghur, and at this moment protect Calcutta. These, with an effective European Force, distributed as we have suggested, will for the future render us independent of a Native Army. In a word, the writer of this sketch subscribes implicitly to the doctrines of Lieutenant Colonel MACDONALD, who some time since wrote :—

"If the Native Army were essential to keep our Indian empire in subjection I submit, with all deference to Colonel Sykes, that for the future we must have a much larger Army of Europeans to keep that Sepoy Army in subjection than would be necessary to keep all India in perfect peace without that Army. Can any thinking man still delude himself into the belief that the men who, without a shadow of excuse have revolted against the State and committed atrocities the very thought of which makes the heart's blood run cold, are those whom we can trust "to keep in subjection the 180,000,000 of people" of the same kith and kin, the same faith, the same prejudices, and, in short, the same people as themselves ?

"I repeat what I said before—India requires no such Army for internal Government, and if we again organize a Sepoy regular Army we shall only prepare the soil from which, depend upon it, we shall in due time reap a similar harvest of sorrow and suffering to that over which we now mourn.

"I fearlessly assert that 100 European Soldiers will more thoroughly overawe the native population, more effectually secure our rule in the East, and give permanent tranquility to the country than 10,000 or 100,000 Native Soldiers ;

seeing—as all who will open their eyes to what has just occurred must do—that these men are the very first to be tampered with by those who desire to overthrow our rule, and with whom such tampering must prove most effectual, because, while they possess every element of revolt which can belong to any other native, they possess another powerful stimulus to rise against us in the confidence they have in their own strength and the hope of success which this inspires.

“But where does Colonel Sykes find in the past history of British India the grounds to suppose that the people are disposed to insurrection and require an enormous regular Army to keep them in subjection? All our troubles in this way have arisen in that very Army alone, if we except the Coles some 25 years ago and the Santals the other day, both being tribes of ignorant savages, or nearly so. The natives of India, as a people, are the most incapable of any in the world to rise in formidable insurrection because of their various castes and conflicting races, and they are the most unlikely to do so from their constitutional timidity and the love of ease and quiet. But if they were the very opposite of this,—if they were the most likely people to rise against the Government, I think I have shown that a large Army recruited from among themselves is the very worst element we can employ to protect ourselves against it.

“What I loudly protest against is another Sepoy Army similar to that which has burst from us, with results which should satisfy every one that they never can be trusted. We supposed we had won the Sepoy's love, or rather the native's love, because he was a Sepoy. We boasted of him as the ‘faithful Sepoy!’ Can we really be so simple as to continue to trust such fiends in disguise, such treacherous villains? I hope not, for it will render us not only the laughing-stock of these very men, but expose us to the same horrible tragedy, or of one ten times more terrible. We need them not. Let the Troops necessary to the protection of property, the putting down of banditti, upholding the authorities in their magisterial and revenue duties, consist of irregulars only, to be raised from tribes that have little in common with each other and less with the mass of our population. We can easily obtain these. *But let your anchor-sheet in India be henceforth British Soldiers.*”

THE END.

THE
THOUGHTS
OF A
NATIVE OF NORTHERN INDIA
ON
THE REBELLION,
ITS
CAUSES AND REMEDIES.
WITH A PREFACE.

LONDON :
W. H. DALTON, 29, COCKSPUR STREET.
1858.

[*Price One Shilling.*]

P R E F A C E.

THE following paper was prepared at the request of a well known officer in the North-Western Provinces, and is published, with the consent of the writer, at the request of several others who are well qualified to judge of its value. It was not written by any member of that race of Bengali Baboos, whose convictions constantly condemn their conduct, and to whom the friends of India look in vain for an example and for efforts calculated to elevate their countrymen; but by a man of a very different stamp in the North-Western Provinces, a native gentleman of the highest character, who has long been distinguished by well directed zeal for the public welfare. It is published precisely as he wrote it, without any correction of grammar or style, or the erasure of any objectionable expression. The writer is a man of loyalty, benevolence, and ability, and represents a class who are fairly entitled to be heard at a time when their country is attracting so much attention, and when so many other classes, both in India and in England, are submitting their views to the consideration of Parliament.

Unfortunately it has hitherto been customary to legislate for India without due enquiry. Once in twenty years, prior to the renewal of a Charter, each House of Parliament has been wont to appoint a Committee on Indian affairs, and much important information has thus been obtained. But, for the most part, no cognizance has been taken of the sentiments of the population of India; or, some general, and probably totally erroneous conclusions have been formed from the petitions of bodies like the British Indian Association, which represent the mind of the people as much the Chamber of Commerce in Liverpool represents the feelings of the Agricultural interest, or the Smithfield Cattle Club represents the opinions of the Factory men of Manchester. To the only practicable mode of ascertaining, fairly and fully, the real condition and the sentiments of the people at large, (the appointment of a Royal Commission,) there has always been a firm and unconquerable opposition. Even so lately as the end of 1856, when the Calcutta Missionaries represented the anomalous and lamentable condition of the peasantry of Bengal, and prayed for a Commission of Enquiry, the Government of India rejected the prayer, and in June, 1857 the House of Commons, on the debate on Mr. Kinnaird's motion in support of the Missionaries' petition, plainly indicated its aversion to this necessary measure. But now, when it may be fairly assumed that the British Parliament will no longer believe that all is known that need be known, and that all has been

done that need be done, there is good reason to hope that the necessity for full enquiry will be acknowledged, and that the necessity for a Royal Commission will be acknowledged too.

There are many points in the following Dialogue which deserve much consideration. Among these is the notice of the peculiarities of the Oriental mind. If these be overlooked, measures will be adopted that are altogether unsuited to India; and other measures will be condemned, simply because they are unsuited to England, while they may be precisely the sort of measures requisite for this population. Much ridicule, for instance, was cast on the pomp with which Lord Ellenborough reviewed the Cabul Army—the triumphal arch, the sweetmeats, and the like—and yet, there can be no doubt that this kind of child's play is exactly the sort of thing which the native understands, and which secures his attachment. In like manner with the Proclamation respecting the Gates of Somnath. Perhaps there are few persons who will now deny, that party-spirit rather than religious zeal detected patronage of idolatry in that "song of triumph" on the restoration of the symbols of former grandeur, which for so many centuries had remained the trophies of the invader's victory in a foreign land. Judging by our plain English taste, which admires, most of all, the Dispatch which narrated the destruction of so many ships "as per margin," the inflated address to Brothers and Friends, seemed diffuse and extravagant; but in dealing with a people among whom there are hereditary feuds based on some trifling personal indignity, a century or more ago; in which a large part of life is spent in the ceremonies and refinements of caste; and whose languages teem with lofty terms of flattery and courtesy, our severe taste must be out of place, as truly as our winter clothing in India's month of May.

We have also to remember that we are dealing with a people who are not yet released from patriarchal habits; who look for summary justice to him that sitteth in the gate; and who are wholly unprepared for representative institutions. They require a paternal government.

On the other hand, we have to consider the claims and the interests of the European community in India, as the supporters of our power, and the necessary agents of civilization.

The writer of this Dialogue thinks that the European must mix more freely with the people, as Tod did, and others of the past generation. Others will doubt the possibility, at present, of this junction. The Englishman in India in 1857, has advanced in many things beyond the Englishman of seventy years ago; and there are few natives of India who have advanced at all. There is little community of ideas; none of family habits, or of domestic arrangements; there can be no ties of kindred; and the friendship between men who are thus severed cannot be really intimate and confidential. There is also another and wider difference. The Englishman is a Christian, and in many cases is an earnest Christian, or hopes to become so. The Native worships Kali and Krishna, or receives with reverence the

bloody and cruel traditions of the Mussulman Elders. If there be community of feeling between such an Englishman and such a Native, it cannot extend far, unless the Englishman is dragged down to the lower level, or the native is raised to the higher. The more closely they are associated, the keener must be the consciousness of imperfect sympathy.

Nor is the case much better with the educated Native, whose confidence in his religion is destroyed. He no longer believes, he cannot believe, either its false science or its mythology, but he will not advance onwards to a positive and influential belief in the One true God and Jesus Christ whom He has sent. If he learns any truth, he holds that truth in unrighteousness. He will not submit to its power. He will persist in maintaining Caste, supporting Brahmans, and maintaining licentious or foolish festivals of idolatrous worship. In morals he exhibits no higher standard than many of the more steadfast Hindus.

There must then be a change on the one side or the other, before there can be really a satisfactory affinity between the Englishman and the Native; and the expectation of securing the affections of the people by this intimacy and alliance, while each remains as he is, must be abandoned.

This writer is equally mistaken as to Caste. It is true that it ramifies and permeates Native Society, and that it constitutes a large part of the religion of the Hindu population. It is said that we must maintain it; that the people are more sensitive on this point than on any other; that they will resent encroachments and indignities at all hazards, and so on. Still, the path of duty is here sufficiently obvious. Caste is based on a palpably false theory of the Creation of Man. It is a system manifestly repugnant to British jurisprudence. It is hostile to the interests of the great body of the people. What then? Is its maintenance, by our recognition of it, an essential condition of our security? Must we indeed perpetuate it or lose the Empire? It is believed that no apprehension of danger need attend a calm and tolerant policy, which simply leaves Caste to be dealt with by the people among themselves, voluntarily, like Freemasonry, but denies it all support, encouragement, or countenance. The plain duty of England, before all things, is Faithfulness to Truth. We cannot, as Christian men, admit that God did create four distinct races of human beings, and that the highest are divine and the lowest are impure. Nor can we, with common self-respect or fidelity to God's revelation, admit that we ourselves are not made "of one blood" with the Brahmans.

What then remains? Is India to be placed in peril? Certainly not. No real Christian will believe that it is impossible to frame a policy which shall combine with a complete non-recognition of Caste, such wisdom, justice, firmness, strength, and material benefits, as will secure the attachment of the people, increase and develop the energy of the European community, and bring down alike on the rulers and the country, the Divine blessing.

Let the Christian obligation to treat Caste as a thing which we can no more recognize than we can recognize the worship of Krishna, be plainly acknowledged. Let us educate in earnest: not, as hitherto, in a partial inadequate manner. Let our power be known and seen, for the assurance of the well affected, and the discouragement of the lawless and disobedient. Let us have cheap justice with a natural system of procedure, and a public administration of simple form and speedy action, including the development of the resources of the country; let the Christian Church give herself to the great task of evangelizing India with the energy of faith and hope; and the result will be, the establishment of British authority on firm foundations, and the gradual amelioration of the condition of the people, the overthrow of error, and spread of light and truth. Any other policy will end in speedy disappointment. God will not bless it; "the root will be rottenness and the blossom will fly up as dust." We may purpose to keep people in ignorance; we may discourage railways and trade; we may establish a military despotism; we may fetter the Press, patronize Caste, and discountenance Christian Missions. This policy has been avowed by Lord Ellenborough and others, and in a great measure it has been the traditionary Indian policy. But it cannot prosper. We may not discover precisely the spot where trouble will arise, but come it will, and at last we shall either lose the country, or be driven to govern it on Christian principles for the glory of God in its final conversion to Christianity.

M. W.

Calcutta, January 12th 1858.

To H. C. T. Esq.

DEAR SIR,

I beg to enclose herewith the Memo. which I had promised yesterday. I hope you will be kind enough to keep it quite secret, because if it falls into any other hand, it may do me a deal of harm, and throw me into scrape. You will find there, I dare say, many nonsensical thoughts, foolish ideas, harsh words, audacious sentences, and opinions quite contrary to yours; but you know, Sir, that I wrote it for Mr. ———, and from him I expect forgiveness for every fault except falsehood, which is unpardonable.—He was anxious to know my impression, and I wrote only to let him know it.

As to your question of yesterday's that "what is now to be done," it is difficult to answer without knowing the man through whom it is to be done. In this country much depends on the disposition and qualification of the person who is to do, than on the nature of the work to be done. In England you have only to pass good acts and draw good rules, and people will take upon themselves to see that they are worked in right way and for their benefit by the local authorities; but here the case is otherwise, the best regulations can be turned into a source of worst oppression by an unscrupulous and careless magistrate; and if you give us a good magistrate, he can keep us happy without any regulation at all: Panjab owes its happiness more to Sir J. Lawrence and Messrs. Montgomery and McLeod than to any system or regulation. Oudh was placed under the same system, but not under the same officers, and it did not succeed. Remove them from the Panjab and fill up their places by the gentlemen whom I name, none of them receive at present less

than 2,000 Rupees per mensem, and hang me, Sir, if Panjab does not go to pieces before the earth has completed its annual circuit, and another Guru Gobind Sing does not appear among the Sikhs before long. Colonel Sutherland asked the Government if they wanted the assistance of a Lakh of Rajputs, which he could easily furnish, at the time of the Cabul disaster, and now they cannot suppress the little Jodhpur rebellion without more European soldiers. I do not know how it is that General Outram—the acknowledged Hero of the “ True Heroism,” who reconciled the Bheels, could not keep Mán Sing to his faith; either he is changed or some inexplicable blunder has been committed. But does the Government know why the Azimgurh Regiment got suspicious, why it allowed the treasure to depart and then changed its mind and retook it; why the Palwárs became exasperated, and why they are now so desperately fighting; and a hundred other things—though appearing trifles but pregnant with mighty consequences—natives have naturally no moral courage to speak the truth, their religion allows them to speak lies, but at the same time, I am afraid, there are very few men in the world who are always prepared to hear and love the truth. A man may get Khilluts for speaking lies, but may lose his life if he speaks the truth.

The natives have lost confidence, and England is wrathful, the country will shortly be deluged with European soldiers, and the Government has already assumed the sternest tone possible, the disaffection will increase and the country will doubtless suffer.—Though for a time India may become again tranquil, like some Volcano to heave its sighs only in its bosom and burst again with redoubled fury.

Can a Government be considered safe or strong when its subjects are discontented and not happy?

I had many a time thought of the possibility of a mutiny in the army—a foreign European invasion and internal disaffection and combination, though I had never for a moment expected such a catastrophe in my lifetime. The first of these, however,

we have already borne, and it is the duty of the Government to provide against the latter.

If the Government are determined to irritate the people and turn every hand and heart desperately against them, I do not think that even three hundred thousand European soldiers will ever be able to keep India *quiet*; though fifty thousand of them are quite sufficient to turn it into a perfect desert.

But man proposes and God disposes; nothing yet is impossible; England may yet be able to send out some statesman, who would make the whole native population again a set of most loyal subjects by one stroke of his pen. Sir C. Napier a mere soldier when appointed Governor of Sindh was petitioned by the Balúchis against the officers shooting peacocks, his order was this: If officers will shoot peacocks, Balúchis will shoot officers; and Balúchis remained as loyal to him as English. He fought like a hero and he governed also like a hero. We do not want acts and legislators but a *just* and energetic man of an independent mind like the hero of Mianee.—Let a magistrate be dismissed for his notorious unpopularity with the people and the whole thing will mend of itself. Sir J. Lawrence would never promote a magistrate whom he knows to be unpopular with his people.

As for education I beg to inform you that it is my determined decision that if any thing is to benefit this country—people as well as the Government—it is education, I mean education carried on upon religious principles. Whether I live on the bounty of the Government or my private resources, whether I have large districts under me or only a few boys of my relations, I have made it the work of my life and hope assistance from above.

They may abolish education, the prospects of India may become gloomy for a time, but I am quite sure that it is all for its good and for the God's glory. When the Mahrattás devastated the country, no one could foresee that it would end in the establishment of such a beneficent Government as the British. Nor when the barbarians sacked Rome any one could foretell

that the death of that empire will give birth to so many noble powers who hold now Europe.

Though it is difficult to answer that question "what is now to be done?" but I may venture to say so much, that if any thing is to be done the first of all ought to be to let the people FEEL that Government will protect the innocent as certainly as they will punish the guilty, and no single innocent person will be allowed to suffer even if the safety of the empire be at stake; had this point been kept in view from the first, the revolt which was purely military would not have assumed such an aspect.

I have the honour to be,

Dear Sir,

Your most humble and obedt. Servant,

MEMO.

ON THE CAUSES

AND

REMEDIES OF THE REBELLION.

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*In the form of a Dialogue between an European and a Native.*

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European.—What do you think of the rebellion and its causes? do you think that Russians or Persians had any thing to do with it?

Native.—What a strange idea! How on earth the Russians and Persians could communicate and concert plans with such a vast number of natives, as they are, without the fact being brought to the notice of the Government. Had Russians or Persians any hand in the matter they would have marched their army by this time in Affghanistan. The Europeans never like to part with their own peculiar ideas—ideas formed in Europe—by which they want to govern this country, and decide every question howsoever grave or of whatsoever nature it may be—they see and know so little of the natives that it is no wonder if they have no notion of the ideas of the natives. They think that the natives will do the same here, what they would do in England.

E.—Did not those “Chapátees” mean something?

N.—They were mere “Chalawás” to stop the progress of some disease, as Captain Erskine wrote, and never a political move as many of your countrymen think.

E.—But surely the king of Delhi is implicated in the matter.

N.—He may be—He is a king and he might have extended

his hand or his mind to grasp the kingdom. The wish to become an independent king is a natural one. But was it ever really in the power of the pauper king of Delhi to alienate the Bengal army from the British Government? If it was, could he get a better opportunity to realize his wishes than at the time of Cabul disaster or the Mudhki and Pheru Battles?

E.—But then was he not a passive observer of all this mischief which happened to us in Delhi?

N.—And what else he could be; but for that you cannot lay the cause of rebellion to his doors. He had no moral courage to risk his life in trying his best to stop the horrid cruelties perpetrated by the mutineers in the precincts of his palace and under his very eyes, and perhaps most likely the goddess Hope gave him a gleam at that time of the restoration of his lost empire, but I can never for a moment acknowledge him to be the cause or the original instigator and plotter of this rebellion.

E.—And are you then an advocate of the continuance of the pension to that miscreant?

N.—By no means—It was a folly from the first to allow him a place in the same Dewánkhás from which his forefathers had ruled an Empire—and to allow the Mahárájas to strike coins in his name up to this period. I do not object to pension, but he ought to have received it in Australia or New Zealand. To allow him to remain in Delhi was just as to allow a man to play with fire-arms in the powder Magazine. The sooner the name of Timur is now forgotten the better.

E.—But the Ex-King of Lucknow?

N.—And do you think Sir, seriously that a man would plot against the Government when his mother, brother and son are in England; a man who left voluntarily his own kingdom, and preferred to live as a common subject in the heart of Calcutta? It is possible that he began to stir himself when he heard of the disaffection of the army so as not to let this golden opportunity slip from his hand to retake his kingdom, or perhaps his courtiers

to show their zeal and anxiety, might have been trying since the first, one foolish act or the other to secure his restoration; but to alienate the whole Bengal army from the British Government, I think, was as much out of his power as to alienate that of Great Britain is out of mine?

E.—They say papers have been seized which throw great suspicions on the Ex-King of Oudh.

N.—That I do not know, but I have very little faith in the papers. They have not however yet been made public.

E.—Well then, what is the cause of this national rebellion and of the revolt of the people? The Government cannot find it, nor the people in England can find it.

N.—Nor they will ever find it, no one can see the defects of his own face with his own eyes. The Government have searched for the cause of the rebellion in the heavens and the earth, but never in themselves, or most likely having found it in themselves now, do not like to confess it. The gagging Act has perhaps been passed to prevent the discovery and leave the Home authorities in quite darkness about it. But please, Sir, do not call it a “national rebellion,” it is a pure military revolt.

E.—But have not the villagers of many districts taken themselves to plunder and murder, and have not the Nawábs of Bareli and Fatabgarh and this vile Nanhá and treacherous Mansing raised the standard of rebellion against us?

N.—Yes; but only when they found the Government weak and without an army, in fact ceasing to exist. If there be no army, no police, in fact no Government in England, what will be the consequence? will there be no riot? will the people not act on the proverb “might is right,” and will they not take law in their own hands? and here when the Government cannot control its own army, when they are let loose like so many wild wolves and the people are left at their mercy, what else can you expect from a people strongly suspicious of the intentions of the Government to take their caste. The Government, which though the best we can have, has made itself notoriously unpopular

through the ignorance and arrogance of many individuals who are entrusted to carry out its well meant designs.

E.—But that is the question, what did induce the blackguards, the sepoys to revolt ?

N.—The Cartridge !! The Cartridge !!!

E.—Never ! Never !!

N.—It is indeed, Sir : First pray answer me a few questions, and then I will tell you the history of revolt and its progress. Pray, sir, answer me, were not some greased cartridges imported from England ? were not some new ones made and greased in the Fort William ? Were they not issued to some of the sepoys ? if you say not, then how it is that some of the newspapers to prove that the sepoys had no real prejudice against those Cartridges brought prominently forward the fact that they fired their guns loaded with the same greased Cartridges which are said to be so obnoxious to their feelings, against their officers ? Was not the Government resolved at one time to force these cartridges upon the sepoys, and were not some of the officers very anxious to exhibit their zeal in removing the objections of the sepoys against these infernal cartridges. If not, then why a change was made in the Drill about cutting the cartridges with teeth, and why the "*Friend of India*" wrote such thundering articles at the time. He wrote, if my memory does not fail, that in some of the stations the officers had succeeded (applauding the officers of course) in introducing the greased cartridges in their Regiments, and they ought to be, and should be, introduced under the loaded guns.

E.—I never recollect such sentences in the *Friend*.

N.—I will not bind myself for the exact words, because I have got no file of the paper with me. I refer you to the papers themselves.

E.—But the *Friend of India* was very foolish. The Government stopped the greased cartridges as soon as the objections of the sepoys was brought to their notice. Did you not see the proclamation issued by the Military Secretary ?

N.—Ah Yes! but the proclamation was not issued till Delhi was in the hands of the rebels; and recollect, Sir, that the intention of the Government to force the greased cartridges or in the native words, to take the caste, was impressed on the minds of the people through the length and breadth of the country, to be as a fact, beyond doubt, with the report of the disbandment of the 17th (?) I mean the Berhampur Regiment—Had the proclamation been issued before the disbandment of that Regiment, most probably it would have checked the progress of mutiny.

E.—And what you mean by the history of rebellion and its progress?

N.—Suppose, Sir, that the greased cartridges were imported from England and stored in the Fort and the new ones prepared there. Would not the sepoys on guard in the Fort observe the fat brought for the purpose and rubbed on the cartridges?—Nay, I hear they were taunted by the contractors of the fat or the cognizant parties. They of course related the whole matter to their comrades in the line. Native soldiers cannot be expected to comprehend at once the principles on which the Enfield rifles have been made, and the necessity of applying grease; they took it doubtless as a dodge to take their caste, and resolved not to accept these cartridges at any risk. The natives prefer losing life to the loss of caste, an out-caste in this country is worse than dead. It is true that the cartridges issued to the Berhampur Regiment were not greased, but their suspicion was so strong, and aggravated by the unusual colour of the paper with which unfortunately those cartridges were made, that in my humble opinion, it was the duty of the commanding officer, by whatever means possible to remove that suspicion, instead of contenting himself by ordering the native officers to tell the sepoys that the cartridges were not greased, and if they would reject them in the morning, when they were to be distributed by the English officers, they should be subjected to Court Martial. The sepoys did not know what to do, it was late in night, and they could not come to any conclusion; they rushed to arms in despair, but

again laid them down when they were ordered to do so by the commanding officer. The Bengal Army could not believe that a Regiment of Native Infantry will take up arms against the East India Company on any other ground less than the fear of losing caste, nor they could believe that the Government should acquiesce in losing such a fine Regiment unless they are determined to take the caste of the sepoys at whatever cost it may be. The Sowars in Meerut could not bear to see their comrades laid in irons for a fault which was rather a virtue or binding duty in their eyes. They released the other prisoners with their comrades only to create a confusion and facilitate their escape, and thus it became a signal for all the Regiments and Risalas to mutiny.

E.—But why some of them waited so long and did not throw off the mask till so late as even September or October?

N.—I told you, Sir, that it was not a concerted plan. Many of them had till late hopes that the Government would feel fully satisfied by disbanding the Regiments already gone, but now they are daily convinced that the Government only waits the arrival of the European soldiers to annihilate and get rid of the Bengal army by disarming them or blowing them up by the cannons; it is out of my power to give you all the local causes or the blunders of the authorities which actuated each Regiment to rebel at its own way and its own time.

E.—But what on earth could induce the sepoys to murder their officers and the innocent women and children?

N.—Ay! that was the binding cord between the ringleaders and the whole Regiment, as soon as a few men consulted and agreed to rebel, they shot their officers to make the whole Regiment proclaimed by the Government as that of mutineers, and thereby secure the services of all their comrades without the least fear of any of them betraying their ringleaders and going over to the Government or dispersing and taking the road to their homes. Besides that to kill their officers, to plunder treasuries, and to burn Cutcherries, was in their opinion a sure

passport and the best certificate to procure them employment with much higher salaries in the services of the king of Delhi or Lucknow. The fools also thought it possible to exterminate the English race, and hoped that when there would be no English, the rājás will rise simultaneously and take possession of the country and engage their services on the highest salaries imaginable.

E.—You said “suspicious.” I do not think the people have any reason to suspect the motives of the Government. The Government never wishes to interfere in the least way with their caste or prejudices, proclamations after proclamations have been issued to that effect and why the people do not read them?

N.—They read them, but do not believe them, simply because they find the acts of the Government contrary to their words. I know it is not the intention of the Government, yet the mischief is done, through the ignorance of their officers. Do you not, Sir, remember the row, which I hear, was made in Benares, the seat of Hindú religion, the resort of the pilgrims from the four quarters of India, at the time of introducing the messing system in the jail of Benares, and yet it was introduced. The people of the town met publicly and secretly to discuss the question, they insulted the magistrate openly and contemned the police, yet the system was introduced. The sowars were brought down from Sultanpoor and hundreds of the citizens of Benares were sent to jail. What would have been the consequence, had the same system been introduced at the time by the commanding officers in their regiments? nothing more or less than brought by these infernal cartridges. It is a fact worthy of being sifted by a historian. Was it not a straw to show the course of the wind? Yet the Government did not heed it. Hundreds of other acts, too numerous to relate, have been committed in this way by the officers of the Government which convinced the people beyond doubt that it was the intention of the Government to take their caste. Many of these acts were totally un-

called for, and without the least gain to the Government or anybody.

E.—And are you an advocate of re-establishment of the rites of “suttee” and infanticide?

N.—This is the way, Sir, that the Editors of the Newspapers blend the matters together. The abolishment of “Suttee” and Infanticide, was a deed in which even a boy clearly saw the advantage to be gained, without any loss to anybody, and every one applauded the Government, but in messing system and the works like that, no one can see what gain could be derived, except the loss of caste (if it can be called any gain), which is so dear and valuable to the natives.

E.—I thought from the first that it was very foolish in the Government to give even a pretence to the people to suspect its motive, as far as it was concerned with the interference in their religion: unbounded toleration to the Missionaries, unchecked distribution of religious tracts, indiscriminate zeal of many of the Government officers in promoting the cause of Missions and openly assisting the Missionaries, and the Government connection with the Missionary Schools, are no doubt much to be deplored.

N.—Here you and many of your countrymen, Sir, commit a serious mistake. No European can form, though they ought to form, a correct idea of the difference between the prejudices of caste and those of religion. Give a couple of Goldmohurs to a Pandit, and he will cheerfully compose a book in refutation of his own religion; but give him a glass of water, openly touched by you, even through the medium of a stick, hundred feet long, and he will not drink it, though you offer him a thousand Goldmohurs! I say “openly” because secretly perhaps he may not have objection to do any thing either to please you or satiate his own passions. Few nations on earth are so indifferent to religion as the Hindús are. Their religion has undergone mightier and more numerous changes than that of Europe. It is absurd to think that the English are hated by the Hindús on account

of their religion : for the Mahomedans believe the shortest way to go to Heaven, to be, to cut the throat of a Hindu, to demolish a sacred temple, or kill a cow in the day of " Id," yet they are worshipped by the Hindús. Look to Gházi Myán and a hundred other Pírs and Fakírs. The Mahomedans too do not hate the English solely for their religion, because the Bible is more honoured in the Korán than the Korán itself, and Moses and Jesus not less than Mahomed, yet their hatred towards Christians (the people of the book) is more inveterate than towards the idolatrous and Mushrik Hindús. If the English believe in the mission of Mahomed or the sacredness of the Vedas without any change in their manners, do you think that they would acquire any popularity among the natives? It is not religion but the want of religion which has brought so much evil to this country. The people know that the Government is a Christian one, let it act openly as a true Christian : the people will never feel themselves disappointed, they will only admire it. Who can detest " religion?" It is the order of their own ' Shástars' that every man is to revere his own religion. You may have a thousand Missionaries to preach, and another thousand as masters of the schools at the expense of the Government, or distribute a thousand Bibles at the hands of the Governor General. The people will not murmur out a single syllable, though they may laugh and jeer ; but take care that you do not interfere with their caste, you do not force them to eat the food cooked by another in the jails ; or thrust grease down their throats with the cartridges made by Europeans. I do not think such acts have any thing to do with the Christian religion.

E.—But would you like to perpetuate the system of caste which is such a great curse to India?

N.—By no means—But the teeth fall off themselves in old age though it is painful to extract them in youth. Difference of caste must vanish with many other offsprings of folly and ignorance when its proper time comes. To try to exterminate it now, must end in bloodshed.

E.—What bloodshed! the sooner such a nation is exterminated the better, the cruelties of Nánhá have made the Indians an everlasting stain on the human character, let them be gone and make room for a better race as you know the English are; to talk of civilization to natives is to throw pearls before swine.

N.—Are you, Sir, serious? Would you, Sir, exterminate a hundred and fifty millions of human beings, one-sixth of the population of the world; perhaps equal in number to them who were destroyed in the flood by the Almighty wrath, you cannot make them slaves even, and keep them under the yoke of servitude. The Moguls tried to do that for seven hundred years, but the moment they grew weak to hold their sceptre, the Marathás, the Játs and the Sikhs, whom they had never dreamt of before, sprung to wrest it from their hands, you may not even allow the natives to surpass the English, as long as they are English, in the science of war and especially in the practice of Artillery, but you cannot exclude from the pale of possibility a foreign invasion. I mean an invasion of some European power. In what a jeopardy will not the Government of India fall with a strong enemy out and a disaffected people in. Even if you exterminate the natives and colonize the country with your countrymen, it may become another America, another rival, and another source of trouble, nay a perfect thorn to Great Britain; but it can no longer remain the brightest gem in the British crown, or a garden—a granary—a purse to England. Sir, do not make of India what Turks have made of the Roman Empire; but be to them what Romans have been to you; they carried civilization wherever they went, but never interfered directly with the manners and customs of the people. The Jews enjoyed perfectly their own rights under their Roman masters.

E.—But your countrymen have refused civilization; I again say, we have thrown pearls before swine.

N.—But, Sir, pardon me, and tell me if you have ever tried to civilize them, have you ever done any thing for them purely in that respect? Take a Division, and let us see what you have

done for the civilization of its population. Take that of Benares for instance, one of the finest divisions in India, having a population of about ten millions of human beings, and yielding about a million of sterling pounds per annum to Government, it has been in the hands of the English since 1775, and now let us see what has been done to civilize the people who form a fifteenth part of those of India.

E.—Is there not a Government College in Benares, a magnificent College?

N.—Yes, there is one, but do you not know that the Rájá of Benares had paid a lækh of rupees for its establishment, and do you think that it can civilize ten millions of souls scattered over six districts, with such a scanty means of communication as this country possesses; but look to the adjoining division of Allahabad, almost equal to that of Benares, there you will not be able to point out even a school of any kind established by the Government.

E.—Surely, they have done something for the village schools, and the education of the mass of the people since the memorable Despatch of the Court of Directors.

N.—Yes, *since* that despatch; but what did they do during the last almost a whole century. Did they ever think of educating the sepoy? Could they not learn the Hindi alphabet in a month or two, and then spend their weary hours in reading useful and interesting books prepared for the purpose, and collecting a store of general information. Would they have thought for a moment of mutinying in this way, had they even a gleam of the resources of England? Would they have thought for a moment the cartridges as a means to get them converted to Christianity, had they possessed the least knowledge of the commonest principles of that religion? From the sepoy, and the people too, so grossly ignorant as to think Company Máí now too old a lady to hold the reins of Government, can you expect any thing else than the present confusion and havoc? I hope if ever a native corps is again to be raised, whether for police

or for the field, let it be raised on this condition that 4 annas per mensem will be deducted from the salary of each sepoy and one rupee from that of sowar, to defray towards the expenses of a Regimental School and library until he passes an examination in reading and writing Hindi alphabet fluently and correctly. Intelligent enemies are far less dangerous than the foolish and ignorant friends. Let them have a correct idea of the resources of England, a gleaming of the past history of India, a notion of the benefits which this country derives from its connection with England, and the knowledge of the kind of relation which the latter maintains with the former, even if their officers do that, I shall make myself responsible, if such a thing ever occurs again as it has now. The rise and fall of a nation depend on the kind of education it receives. The fate of a nation, at least for some generations, can be easily foretold by knowing the nature and the amount of education that it receives. Even now with all the despatches and orders of the Court only some thirty thousand rupees could be got from the Government for the Benares division, and with the full operation of the new Government educational system including the whole missionary and private institutions, only one boy in 48 of school-going age,* or one boy in four hundred souls of its inhabitants could be counted under tuition! Education cannot be expected to produce that effect, which is so desirable, until the Government does not attach to it that importance which is so undoubtedly due to its rank. Bonaparte perused and answered a college report from the field of battle; but our Governor-General cannot do that sometimes for years. All the zeal and labour of individuals are lost by the apathy shewn in the Head Quarters.

E.—But the people ought to look themselves after the education of their own children, ought they not? In England they have their own schools and pay for the education of their children.

N.—Here is the same error which you, Sir, so seriously commit

* In Prussia nine-tenths of *this portion* of the population is stated to be under instruction.

every where, you blend the ideas of England so confoundedly with this country, that it is very difficult for me to explain to you the wants of India. However, let me try it, first let us consider a few points in which the two countries so materially differ, and on the consideration of which points the Government ought to form its policy. The state of society in England, at the time of William the Conqueror, may be compared in many respects to some of the hilly and jungly parts of India. He having found himself sole master of the land by the right of conquest, divided it among his vassals like Maafee Jághirs in this country ; the law of premogeniture secured perpetuity to a set of nobility who have in all ages been thought as pillars of state ; and the income tax has brought high and low so equally under the burden that no one can complain or even pretend to have a complaint. The people tax themselves from year to year, or in other words pay only so much to the ministers that they think requisite to secure internal peace, and protect themselves from foreign invasion. The other works of general interest and public utility they take upon themselves, they meet, they consult, they subscribe and they act like true patriots for the benefit of their country. In fact, the king and ministers in England are nothing more than the servants of the people and responsible to them in every sense of the word, servant. Here in India the case is quite different. The Rájás and Bádshahs assumed the position of a father, that is master of person and property both, they left to their subjects, from the fruits of their labour, only as much as they thought proper to meet their individual wants and expenses. If any one of their subjects built a Serai or a bridge, or dug a well or a tank, it was only to perpetuate his own name and not to aggrandise the nation, for *that* the Rájás and Bádshahs only were to be looked at. They took from the Zemidárs as much as the latter could afford, they levied duties on merchandise as much as the commodities may not be driven out of market and whenever a servant of state amassed wealth beyond the limit assigned to him according to the caprice of these

self-elected "fathers," a portion of it was easily brought to the Royal Treasury under the name of Dand, or forced contribution; thus agriculture, trade and service, the three grand portals of income in the world, were all subjected to taxation; and the Rájás and Bádshahs did every thing which was required for the benefit of the country and the prosperity of the nation, they dug canals, they made roads, they built bridges, they established alm-houses, hospitals, and colleges. Hundreds and thousands of charitable institutions were established and hundreds and thousands of them received support in cash or rent free lands from the Emperors. The people thought this as their right and as a binding duty of their rulers. Whenever they failed to perform it satisfactorily and sunk in self-indulgence and luxury, the people groaned, complained and shook off the yoke of obedience; and so a kind of balance was always kept. You take more from the Zemindars (and I can prove it if you want) than the Rájás or Bádshahs took. The demand on account of land revenue in Bengal has, if my memory does not fail, more than doubled since the time of Alivardi Khan—you monopolize opium and salt—you sell stamps and levy fees—you give contracts for drugs and liquors—you collect chowkidaree, yet do not fulfil those fatherly duties for which the names of Rájás like Bhoja and Vikram, and the Bádshahs like Feroze and Akbar will long remain engraved on the memory of generations to come. The people of this country accustomed in this way to look to their rulers for the work of charity and public utility are quite astonished, and not a little annoyed to find the Government officers constantly begging for subscriptions on one pretence or the other. England sent an army to assist Turkey against Russia, the natives of India were made to subscribe for the Patriotic Fund. A Magistrate fancies to establish a hospital, the natives are called upon to subscribe; another comes and fancies to have a Ghat, the natives are called upon to subscribe—a third comes and fancies an Asylum or Dharamsálá, or library, or school, or tank, or well, or picture, or statue or any thing, and the people are called upon to subscribe.

Though the amount does not come very hard upon the subscribers, yet it being against the customs of this country is very obnoxious and unpalatable to the people, and lowers the Government in their estimation. Let the Government officers cease to have any thing to do with Chándás and subscriptions, and let the Government lay a crore of rupees or so per annum apart for charitable purposes.

E.—Bápre! where the money is to come from, the Government is already bankrupt.

N.—Thirty crores, which never came to the coffers of any Mogul, is quite sufficient to govern India, and if it does not suffice it is your fault, Sir, and not ours. Make sweeping reductions, reduce superfluous work, reduce superfluous establishments, and reduce extravagant expenditure and make people happy—the resources of the country are inexhaustible, with a little help the natives will be able to pay you even as much more as you want.

E.—Was it not our Government which abolished the transit duty—the people must be thankful at least for that.

N.—No one thinks about it—and in my opinion it was impolitic—the class which has directly gained by that is very small compared to that of agriculturist, and is composed entirely of bankers-merchants and shopkeepers. They are the wealthiest part of the population and best off under the British rule. They do not pay a single cowrie in the shape of taxation, and derive all the benefits of the best Government in the world; when the agriculturists groan overtaxed, these Mahájans fatten upon their ruin. I do not know how far it is possible to regulate and levy an income tax, but a moderate duty levied on all kinds of merchandise will not be felt by the people in this country, though if it is levied on just principles, it may be felt in England. But of whatever kind and of whatever amount the new tax may be deemed advisable for this country, let it be fixed in rate for ever, and let it have as its preliminary, a promise from Government that this is a final demand and no more will ever be asked

for. I know you will never approve this promise of "for ever," but remember that your ideas are formed in England where people have a voice in administration, a sure guarantee to protect their own interest and regulate the amount of taxation from year to year, as they find the calls of the state to meet with. But the natives of this country are still living under a despotic Government, cannot dare to open their mouth in the state affairs and find their refuge only in the word "Sudámád Kádím (law of precedence) ; once that barrier is broken and there is no limit to stop at, for the extortions of the Government. The people feel it. They argue it thus—" if the Government has passed an act to levy 5 per cent. on our income, what on earth can prevent it from passing another act the next year to augment it to 10—it must ultimately ruin us, so it is better as far as we can to oppose it now."

E.—No doubt the Government of India requires great reforms. Its fiscal, judicial and political—all administrations are based on false principles, it requires great statesmanship and genius to reform them—I hope the Parliament will take up the matter and do something for this country to which we owe so much.

N.—This is, Sir, another mistake of your countrymen, they take up every matter so elaborately and make it so grand that it becomes almost impracticable and useless. If they fancy it requires to give a code to the natives—they labor for years and years, and spend lakhs of rupees, and after all when the code is ready, they find it too difficult to be translated in Vernacular, and beyond the comprehension of the natives of this country. They never think for a moment, that first of all they ought to make themselves acquainted with the ideas of the natives for whom they have to legislate: when I told this to a gentleman—he said, "Keep your native ideas, we expect natives to imbibe *ours*." Just as if Jesus Christ instead of coming down in the form of a man and mixing with the humblest class and delivering the word of God in the language of the country, had waited in the heavens for men to go up and hear his lectures in the lan-

guage of Angels! Asia is a land of trifles, a word, a move, a courtesy, an insult, an hour's conversation, a letter, nay a look, decides here the fate of empires. Mahomed Sháh was brushing his teeth when Jay Sing went first to pay his respect after the death of his father, the king to have a fun tried to frighten the boy by taking hold of his both hands, and asking, "Well boy, how shall I treat you now?" Jay Sing answered unhesitatingly that, "O the refuge of the world, if a man takes hold of another's hand, he supports him through his life, when you have taken hold of both of mine what more have I to ask for," the king made him "Savái" that is one fourth more than the greatest Rájás of the time, and so he was called all along Jay Sing Savái. You know, Sir, how much the British Government is obliged to the Máhárájá of Patialá for his valuable assistance in the Sutlej Campaign. He asked Lord Hardinge as a favor to give his Highness' hand in that of Colonel Mackeson then Agent at Umbállá, the Lord did so immediately, but I hardly think that the Colonel ever understood its meaning. The Ladies and Gentlemen present at the Darbár were observed to smile at what they thought a mere piece of nonsense. Such is the land of Asia and such her people, whom you wish to govern by the laws and ideas of England. To expect reforms in revenue and judicial matters from Parliament is just to expect (don't laugh at me, Sir,) your dinner from the moon. To us it is of no consequence whether the Court remains or is abolished, whether the destinies of India remain in the hands of the Chairman of the Court, or the Colonial Secretary of the Queen, whether it is ruled by Mr. Mangles or V. Smith. We never take any interest in the discussions of Parliament, they show only how sadly the members are ignorant of the affairs of this country, they fight only for patronage and what is that to us, if in place of Grants and Colvins the country is deluged with Earls and Marquises. The natives may be delighted to hear the talk of having the sons and relations of Lords and Dukes as their magistrates, because they think Amírs of England must live somewhat in the

style of the Amírs of this country, namely, the Nawábs and the Rájás: will buy plenty of jewels for their ladies, employ many servants and give large Bakhshish. But they will feel themselves sadly disappointed when they find them, exceed in no other respect the present Hákimlogs, but in the ignorance of the country and its people. If the people of this country ever vote for the Queen, it will be only with an impression what they have of the difference between a king and a contractor in India. The king lavishes his wealth in gifts and khilluts and gives large Jágirs, when a contractor tries only to fill his own coffers. It was this false impression, or rather ignorance of English and England which took the Queen Mother of Lucknow to England, she thought that the Queen of England perhaps, taking compassion on a creature of her own class, and being pleased with a high valued present, may pass a word from her mouth to give back Oudh to Vagídálí Shah. Poor woman! she did not know that our gracious Queen has as little power to give an inch of land in this world as Janáb Aliya (the Queen of Oudh) has to give in the other. She perhaps had also calculated on procuring a recommendation of Pasha of Egypt in her way to England, and never thought that the recommendation of the Pasha of Egypt in such matters cannot be treated in England in any other respect than her recommendation in France to restore the house of Bourbons. If you intend seriously to reform the fiscal and judicial systems of India, why don't you have a run by dák through the length and breadth of the country. See at each stage a Tahsildár, and many respectable and intelligent Zamíndárs and Mahájans, but none of those who have the least imbibement of English ideas and talk over the matter with them; note down their hints and remarks, and in six months a man having a common sense can prepare codes which will fully supply the wants of these people. How strange it is that you do discuss such matters at the house of Lords for years and years, and never ask a question from the people of this country.

E.—When Government pass an act in this country do they not publish a draft in the Calcutta Gazette three months before?

N.—Yes, they do, but who reads it? except a few Bábus of Calcutta fit only to be employed as attorneys or teachers of Milton and Shakespear in England, they have become so imbued with English ideas and strangers to their own country, without getting rid of that want of true patriotism the wish of self-aggrandisement, and other defects so peculiar to an Asiatic, that they even think in English language, being unable to talk in their mother-tongue, are now teaching their wives English, they do not know the correct spellings of their Hindú names, and consequently have now adopted the mode of English short signatures as A. Ghose or B. Chackerbatty. They cannot walk without wearing high heeled boots and puzzle the Hidustánees by offering them their hands to shake, who do not know what to do with that extended hand. The Gazettes are very expensive, and the mass of the people do not yet understand the object of publishing drafts; neither they are able to write petitions to Counsel about them. Why the judges are not ordered immediately on the receipt of a draft in the Gazette to convoke a meeting of the respectable natives in their districts, note down their remarks and opinions and send the paper up to Government?

E.—Have your Bengálís not formed a British India Association?

N.—Yes, but can India expect for a moment a reform from this Bengálí (par excellence called British India) Association. An Association which could not get any other person to represent its petition before the Parliament than an Englishman, an Association, the members of which shudder from putting their steps on board a steamer, though perhaps many of them would not hesitate to indulge themselves in beef and sherry.

E.—But tell me what has made the Government so unpopular with the people, what is the real cause of that?

N.—I can sum up the whole cause, or the real cause, in two words, namely, the reluctance of the English to *mix* with the

natives on equal and social terms. The Government did not become unpopular when officers like Tod and Malcolm, Augustus Brooke or Sir T. Munro were appointed to govern the country; reluctance in Englishmen to mix with the people increased with the increase of their power. Colonel Tod sat down for hours by the pallet of the Udaipur Ráná in his sickness to beguile his time by showing him pictures and mirrors; but in 1851, when the last native independent state, I mean the Punjab, had fallen in the hands of the British, and their power attained its zenith, a very renowned functionary invites one of the great Mahárájás to meet him from 12 miles and yet cannot spare of a few minutes to see him from his Cutcherry works. If the members of the Parliament were sincere well-wishers of their Indian possessions they would have made Tod's travels, and Rajasthan, as a text Book for the Indian Civil Service examination instead of History of Greece and Rome, where they could have found in almost the first page written "that no European can be an acceptable or useful functionary amongst the Hindus who is not familiar with their language, manners and institutions, and disposed to *mix* them upon equal and social terms." So the real cause of the unpopularity of the Government, and consequently of all the miseries under which the country labors is the reluctance of your countrymen to mix with the natives, because without mixing with the people they cannot acquire a thorough knowledge of their ideas, sentiments, notions, capabilities, social and moral conditions, internal economy, wants and prejudices, which is so necessary to govern successfully an empire, and through this ignorance and ignorance only, what a vast amount of money, labor, genius and energy is thrown away quite uselessly. The Government has become bankrupt, the people are oppressed and plundered by the very police which has been appointed to protect them. The debt cannot be recovered on account of the same laws which were passed to facilitate its recovery, the gentry and nobility are becoming daily scarce. The Zemindars had in my life time horses and elephants, have now become cultivators and plough

another's land, the Mahájans who could lend lakhs of rupees are now obliged to borrow in hundreds. The discontent and disaffection is spreading and increasing fast through the length and breadth of the country. The Government will feel no doubt stronger after the suppression of the mutiny than they ever were; if the hatred of their countrymen towards the natives increases in ratio to the increase of power as hitherto, the disaffection of the people and unpopularity of the Government, will increase also proportionally. The consequences are obvious and be assured the country will be ruined and desolated.

E.—But surely there are officers still in India who should eclipse the names of Tods and Malcolms.

N.—There are, Sir, but how few they are. It is owing to these few officers who come now and then to the lot of some districts that people have not yet despaired and risen in body against the Government.

E.—Look to the Punjab how admirably and energetically peace has been preserved there, and how contented the people are.

N.—Yes! but at the same time our North Western Provinces owe all this rebellion and anarchy to the very Punjab for which Sir J. Lawrence has so repeatedly been thanked.

E.—What you mean by this?

N.—Why, Sir, Lord Dalhousie annexed Punjab, but did not increase the European army—he poured the whole European army of the Bengal Presidency into the Punjab and took from Mr. Thomason, the best Civil officers that the North Western Provinces did possess. It is no wonder if peace has been preserved in the Punjab with such an amount of European soldiers and such a kind of Civilians untied with the acts of the Government or the Circulars and constructions of the Sudder Adawlut, but at the same time it is no wonder if the North Western Provinces are suffering proportionally for the absence of the very materials which helped Sir J. Lawrence in preserving peace in his satrapy. The great mistakes that I find in Lord Dalhousie's administration are first, his not increasing the European army,

and the 2nd, his converting the 5 per cents. to 4 per cent. loans. The plan of the Punjab did not succeed in Oude because an adequate number of European troops could not be spared for it—nor there was time or man to select officers for it, every thing was done in hurry and in a slovenly manner. Now the consequences are to be borne. The very peasants for whose protection as an ostensible pretension, the Government took the odium of annexing Oude, have raised their hands against the Government. The "*Friend of India*" wrote that 2 Companies would suffice to depose the king, and now three Regiments of European soldiers cannot restore order, such are the delusions of mankind at the time of success.

E.—But how is this rebellion now to be suppressed ?

N.—Had proper care been taken at *first*, it had not given us so much trouble, but now *as it is*, and perhaps may be a little more troublesome, the rebellion must be suppressed with a strong hand, no mercy is to be shewn to the rebels, they must be hunted down like wild beasts wherever they go, even for years to come. The troops are coming from England and they ought to be poured in and pushed on as fast as practicable, let the man who has dared to oppose the British authority whether he is a King or a Mahárájá meet the extreme penalty of law. Let the people be convinced, by whatsoever means it may be possible, of the resources of England and the power of the English, but be careful that you, at the same time, convince the people of the cool and calm judgment and impartial justice of the British Government and the influence of the Christian religion. Do not condemn the whole nation if a handful of Badmáshes or certain delinquents disaffected for the loss of political power or the power of plunder, or suffering from the hands of the police and the Court officials, have raised the standard of rebellion, or your own army has mutinied against you through your mistakes. Do not hang an innocent man because the real culprit cannot be found, or the man possesses an immense wealth or a prodigious state or a large pension, or is obnoxious to the police or magis-

trate strike terror by all means, by hanging the guilty, but never alienate from you and irritate the people by punishing the innocent. If a man commits a crime, do not burn or plunder his whole village. Till a man is not proved guilty, do not let him feel that you are suspicious or have no trust in him. It is a time that the wants of the army must be supplied in carriage, &c., by force and impressment, but see that every thing is paid fairly, and liberally. Delhi is taken and Lucknow relieved. Mánasing will soon be killed or arrested, and I am quite sure that before cold season is over the rebellion will be suppressed and order restored. However I deplore the fate of my country. It was a day when Lord Lake entered Delhi to save it from the depredations of the Marathás and to raise it to a first class city from a perfect desolation, and now it is a day after more than half a century that General Wilson enters it to massacre and plunder the innocent inhabitants indiscriminately, with the mutineers, and convert it from a first rate city of the British India to a "perfect desolation!"

E.—And what reforms would you propose immediately after the suppression of the rebellion?

N.—For that, Sir, do not ask me because you, Sir, want some elaborate logically deduced theoretical reform which is utterly beyond the conception of a native, we live in the lands of trifles, and the reforms which we want are also very trifling; but first of all, let us have a Royal commission. Unless India is so fortunate that Sir J. Lawrence is appointed Governor-General with the powers of the President of the Board of Control, or her own Council or the Court of Directors take it into their heads to select at once Commissioners from men who may be found even better than Sir John. The Commissioners must be experienced men, well acquainted with the languages of the country, not very old, active, sharp, stout and bold, who can bear the fatigues of long journey and are unreservedly disposed to mix with the people. They must not travel like the Governors-General to cut the Burs and Peepuls which give such a cool shade to the weary

traveller, to consume the wood, grass and earthen pots which take the poor peasants months to prepare and to fill the coffers of the Burkundázes who invariably pocket the price of all such things for themselves, nor remain shut up in the big tents surrounded by Secretaries like the Governor-General, nor content themselves merely with, or waste their much time in, inspecting the records, be prepared to travel by Dák with one or two Secretaries through the length and breadth of the country and collect their information from the people, and the people only, corroborated of course by the records of the offices. They must not put up with the local authorities, for by so doing the people will be overawed to give any correct information; though the Commissioners must see and hear also the local authorities and have many references to adjust with them. The party which is against the Royal Commission, and wants to keep the public of England in perpetual darkness about this country, may object and say that such a commission will put the Indian Government in a great jeopardy, and the people will set at naught its authority, but ask them if the annual tours of the Commissioners of Revenue or the Governors put the magistrates in jeopardy and do the people set at naught their authority. All the other reforms must depend on the result of the enquiries of these Commissioners, but I can name a few subjects towards which the attention of the Commissioners may be drawn most prominently, viz. : 1st, reduction in expenditure by reducing superfluous works like hundreds of references and statements, innumerable appeals and huge appendages of law and Court formalities, by abolishing superfluous establishments and stopping the extravagancies of the Government. If I be allowed to see all the bills for one year which are submitted to the Auditor's office for the whole of India, I dare say I can suggest a reduction of at least of five crores of rupees per annum; 2nd, attaching greatest possible importance to the education of the mass of the people and appointing an educational Secretary to the Government of India, the education must be carried on a sounder principle, and religion must be

fostered. Don't turn India from idolatry to atheism ; 3rd, centralizing authority in the district officers as they have done in the Punjab, I mean do away with judges. Make the magistrates, Deputy Commissioners, convert the Deputy Collectors into extra assistants. Those cases only where the punishment is to be hanging or transportation are to be tried by the Commissioners, the rest by the Deputy Commissioners ; appeal of course lying to the Commissioner and his decision to be final, reduce the number of Commissioners, give them each a good personal assistant or Secretary, abolish the useless Board of Revenue and the burthensome Sudder Adawlut, give three or four more Secretaries to the Lieutenant Governors and the Chief Commissioners. Give them both more powers and give plenty of European assistants and native extra assistants to the Deputy Commissioners. Each Tahsil ought to have a European assistant. 4th. Stopping all the native newspapers. Let one and only one be issued in each presidency under the immediate superintendence and control of the Director of Public Instruction, if you go through the file of only Chashmaifaiz for the last year, you shall be surprized to find that the rebellion is yet so circumscribed. 5th. Preparation of very short and most simple codes for Civil, Criminal and Revenue cases. They ought to be published in all the languages and alphabets current in the country. 6th. Disallowing the Vakeels and Mukhtárs who are not lawyers but professional liars ; had I been king I had made a lie as punishable as murder. Arbitration ought to be made compulsory in civil cases, but the arbitrators to be appointed by the parties themselves. 7th. Making the Cutcherries in the hearts of the cities and a little more respectable, so that the natives may not think it as a long journey or a Pluto's realm, but as a Government office, to enter which is, by no means, disgraceful. This cannot be done as long as the peons of the Court are allowed to treat insolently and disgracefully the persons who are compelled to attend the Court. Let the authorities treat the persons who go to them in the Cutcherries, and give them seats according to their ranks, as

they do in their houses. The custom of receiving visitors at home only has made the Cutcherries very contemptible, no one likes to go there as far as possible either as a plaintiff or a witness. Let the public officers furnish their Cutcherries with carpets and chairs and receive the visitors there as the natives receive in their Durbars; the objection which the respectable natives now have to go to the Cutcherries will soon vanish, and the cases with the parties themselves present with respectable witnesses without any Vakeel to advise them to speak nothing but falsehood, will soon be decided without much time and trouble, nearer to truth and generally speaking satisfactorily to the people, a little courtesy and the commonest attention on the part of the authorities will achieve wonders. 8th. Making a provision in your revenue code against the great Zamindars being reduced in a short time to mere cultivators and their lands passing in the hands of some Mahajan: at such a settled state of the country which it enjoys under the British Government, and when there is no fresh grant of land from the state, the law of division to infinity is very injurious to the existence of great Zamindars and nobility. 9th. Electing the Thanadars by the people like the Lord Mayor of London, though the power of dismissal is to remain with the magistrate. The appointments of the Tahsildars and Saristadars ought to be gazetted like those of Munsiffs. The Tahsildars should have powers of Munsiffs and Deputy Magistrates. 10th. Increasing number of European troops by 10 or 20 thousand; local corps must be raised in different localities, never confine them to one caste or to the inhabitants of one part of the country, never import foreigners like Africans, &c., more than necessary, otherwise men of India will starve for the want of employment, 4 or 5 officers are quite sufficient for a corps, but they must think it the work for life and set their whole heart and soul in their corps without the faintest hope of ever getting a civil employment, it is not the quantity but the quality of the officers which has been the cause of our losing the Bengal army, for as soon as an officer made himself a little acquainted with

the languages of the country and showed himself conspicuously and knew a little of the people he was drafted out for the Civil Service and the Regiment left in their hands of mere boys who if failed in other things did not fail in imitating the arrogance of the Civilians and treating their sepoy with the same contempt and hatred as the Jemadars and Thanadars and sometimes Mahárájás and Nawabs also are treated by their brother Hazúrs of the Civil Service. 11th. Having the keeper of Jail always a European to protect the prisoners from the tortures of the native Daroghas, I would never allow the prisoners to increase so much, and have recourse to fine and flogging—flogging is the best punishment, felt, as the wise Chinese say,—equally by every man of whatsoever position he may be. 12th. Giving free passage at least to 10 natives of this country selected by the different Governments through their Commissioners every year to go to England, arrange for the Hindús about water and cooking places in Egypt and the board steamers. This is a very important thing equal to 10 European Regiments. 13th. Making grain cheap, put a check on its exportation. 14th. Expediting railways and increasing facility of communication in the interior. But remember that to mix with the people and to make yourself perfectly acquainted with the country is of the *first importance*, without that, no reform can be of any use, and if you do that, you will never be wanting any hint or advise from the others. Let the Governors at the time of their tours examine the district officers like Mr. Thomason by putting a few pertinent questions in their knowledge of the country and the people and let their promotion depend on the amount of that knowledge and popularity with the people, and not with the amount of favoritism in certain quarters.

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1858.

INDIA AND ITS ARMY.

AN ESSAY

REPRINTED FROM "THE EDINBURGH REVIEW,"

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BY

THE REV. G. R. GLEIG, M.A.

CHAPLAIN-GENERAL TO HER MAJESTY'S FORCES.

LONDON:

LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, LONGMANS, AND ROBERTS.

1857.

P R E F A C E.

It has not been without reluctance, and after much consideration, that I have yielded to a request, strongly and repeatedly made to me, by consenting to the republication, in a separate form, of the following paper, which originally appeared in the January number of the "Edinburgh Review" for 1853. Certainly, when it was written, neither I nor anybody else could have counted on such a speedy and terrible fulfilment of our forebodings. We might have seen,—I confess that I for one did imagine that I saw,—tokens of internal weakness in British India, hidden under the show of vast external strength. The policy of annexation so recklessly pursued, was to us a subject of constant dread; and sooner or later we counted on a resistance which should not be overcome without a heavy expenditure both of blood and treasure. But that a conspiracy could have been entered into and matured within the oldest of the English provinces, embracing, not three or four regiments, but the entire army of Bengal, without attracting the notice of the Supreme Government till the work of slaughter began; that was an issue on which we had not reckoned, and for which it appears impossible on any grounds of ordinary reasoning to account. Did the Supreme Government receive no warning whatever of the danger which impended? or did it, in the exuberance of a hollow self-confidence, disregard such warning, and thereby do the work of the conspirators?

It will be seen that in treating of India and its army, I speak of a state of things which can scarcely be said any longer to exist. In Bengal, at least in the north-western provinces, we are

masters of little more than the ground which is occupied by British troops. In Bombay, symptoms of disaffection appear also to be manifesting themselves ; and, though Madras and its army are still spoken of as sound, he were a bold man who would venture to express his unqualified belief in their continued loyalty. All the evils, therefore, of maladministration seem to have overtaken us, and our system of government for the future, if we succeed in putting down this revolt, as by God's blessing we hope and expect that we shall do, must be built up upon a principle in many respects different from that on which we have heretofore acted. For it is no mere reform of the military institutions of India that will render that country in time to come what it has been to us in years gone by. Our prestige, whatever may have been its value, has departed ; and to the hatred long entertained towards us, by all except a few traders and the cultivators of the soil, is now added a mistrust of our honour, and a disbelief in our invincibility.

We had two great examples before us, when our career of conquest in India began ; that of the Romans in Europe, long ago ; and that of the Mahomedans, of later date, in India itself. We might have copied either, with a reasonable hope of founding an empire which should last for ages. We neglected both, and at the end of a single century are fighting as much for existence as for dominion. The Romans introduced, among every people whom they overran, their own laws, their own language, their own customs. They were tolerant to an extreme of the religious opinions of subjugated nations, while they abolished every institution, whether it were connected with church or state, which had a tendency to foster among them a spirit of independence, or to keep them barbarous. We do not find that they put a stop to the worship of any of the gods to whom either Gauls or Britons paid their vows. But they extinguished both in Gaul and in Britain the whole race of Druids, and suppressed with a strong hand human sacrifices. Again, the Romans, while they garrisoned both Gaul and Britain with Italian troops, held Germany and Italy in subjection with legions, levied some of them in Britain and in Gaul. And they did more. They extended to Germans, Britons, and Gauls, indifferently, the privileges of Roman citizenship, and

promoted freely Gauls, Britons, and Germans to places of high trust in their own as well as in other countries. And when the religion of Christ had achieved its superiority over heathenism at the Capitol, they gave to it free course and ample protection throughout the most remote of their provinces. By a steady process which suffered no interruption, this policy guided them to the sovereignty of the world, and enabled them to retain it, till excess of luxury had rendered them no longer capable of sustaining the weight of empire.

The conquests of the Mahomedans originated in a different motive, and were pursued upon a different principle. Yet their empire proved scarcely less enduring than that of the Romans. The Mahomedans carried with them into India, as they did every where else, a bigoted devotion to their own faith, and established its superiority. But they neither sought nor obtained more. Content with the acquisition of supreme authority, they innovated in no degree upon the framework or constitution of Indian society. Rajahs whom they found in power they suffered to retain their power, subject only to tribute and military service. They established, it is true, courts for the administration of the Mahomedan law; but such courts existed for the benefit of Mahomedans only. In towns and great cities, cadis and muftis dispensed justice according to the precepts of the Koran. Throughout the length and breadth of the land the old village municipalities regulated the affairs of the great body of the people, the old Hindoo *punchayets* settled the disputes of individuals. Nor were the Hindoos, or the professors of any other faith, excluded because of their religion from offices of trust. The most distinguished of the finance ministers under Akbar and Humaoun were worshippers of Brahmah. They were Rajpoot chiefs, who fought many of the fiercest battles of Aurungzebe against the Mahrattas. To the institution of caste, on the other hand, the Mahomedans paid no regard. Brahmin, Kehatrya, Sudra, and Pariar were all equal in their eyes; each being advanced in the public service according to the measure of the abilities which he possessed. And the consequence was, that a *raj* begun so early as the 12th century of our era, lasted till the middle of the 18th, when it fell to pieces, in the common

course of things, through the degeneracy of the Moguls and their advisers.

Compare these systems of action with our own, and observe the results to which they have severally led. We entered upon the conquest of India against the national will, and pursued it trembling at our own shadow. We added day by day to the extent of our territory, courting and flattering all the while the races whom we subdued. While we professed for their institutions an unbounded respect, we offered to the people themselves continual violence, in matters which come more home to the bosoms and business of individuals than the support or rejection of any abstract opinions whatever. Think of the effect in Bengal of the perpetual settlement of 1793, which deprived the great body of agriculturists of their rights, and converted the zemendars, a set of hereditary tax-collectors, into landed proprietors. Think of what has been felt in every principality since, which, either by conquest or cajolery, has passed under our dominion, when the people saw their native rulers set aside, their gentry degraded, and the very tenures by which the peasantry held their lands subjected to investigation and revision; and, finally, consider how entirely, by the constitution of our regular army, we have shut the door to honours and advancement against all the noblest spirits in Hindostan.

Meanwhile, professing to be Christians, we have sedulously kept our own religion in the background; and ostentatiously flattered and paid deference to the superstitions of our subjects. The Mahomedans, though they ceased after a time to convert by violence, never failed to patronise and protect such proselytes as came over to them of their own accord. We long refused to give any employment either in civil or military life to native Christians, and repealed a law only the other day which doomed such as had received baptism to the loss of their property. The Mahomedans took no other notice of the impure rites of Hindooism than to tax the pilgrims who came from a distance to take part in them; and to see that breaches of the public peace were either prevented or put down. We have been in the habit of furnishing guards of honour to attend upon Hindoo processions and of saluting with our artillery wooden

idols as they passed. The Mahomedans commanding, as well in military as in civil life, the services of men of all castes, subjected all who followed their standards to one common discipline. We put arms into the hands of persons whose caste prejudices we fostered and encouraged, till in war they became useless for some of the most important operations of a campaign, and in peace proved themselves untrustworthy. The Mahomedans so far agreed in policy with the Romans, that they introduced their own language into their own courts; but differed in this respect, that they suffered the Hindoo population to seek redress for wrongs before tribunals to which they and their fathers had been accustomed, and to plead in the dialect of the province, whatever it might be, in which they happened to be resident. We, finding that in the Mahomedan courts pleadings were carried on in Persian, adopted the Persian as our own legal language, though it be quite as much as English a foreign tongue to nine tenths of the inhabitants of India, and becomes intelligible in many instances to our own judges themselves only through the medium of an interpreter. In a word, our system of administration has been from first to last a series of blunders, in extenuation of which we can urge this and no more, that they were errors of judgment only; for the most rigid of our critics will scarcely deny, that, as far as might be compatible with the realisation of a competent revenue, we have endeavoured to secure to the great body of our subjects protection from foreign violence, and safety to their lives and property at home. But is this enough? Can we wonder, on the contrary, that an effort is at length made to get rid of us? Is it not much more surprising that the revolt should stop short of a universal rising, and that it did not take place long ago.

And here I must be permitted to observe that for some of the gravest of the blunders enumerated above, the Court of Directors of the East India Company is not responsible. In common with the ablest of its servants, as well civil as military, the Court has uniformly protested against the undue extension of its territory; and if it became at last a consenting party to the organisation of the Indian army upon a European model, it did

not yield, even on that point, till after the application from without of an influence which could not be resisted. The Court of Directors has its own sins to answer for, and they are many; but to attribute all the blame to that body of the horrors which have recently been enacted in the East, would be to provide a scapegoat for the transgressions of the local authorities, of Her Majesty's constitutional advisers, and of the Houses of Parliament, by the deliberations of which the policy of cabinets is supposed to be controlled.

It is proverbially an easier task to point out defects than to suggest remedies, but if the view which has now been taken of some of the most prominent errors in our past Indian administration be correct, the line of policy which it becomes England to pursue in the future cannot be quite obscure. It is impossible for us now to take example from our immediate predecessors in supreme power. We have so completely revolutionised the condition of society in British India that materials wherewith to work, as the Mahomedans wrought before us, are wanting. But the Roman model remains, and it seems to me, that the finger of Providence itself points to the adoption of it. Heretofore Christianity has been placed, as it were, in abeyance. The time has come when, with perfect security to ourselves and very much to the temporal as well as eternal benefit of the natives of India, a prominent place may be given to it in our counsels. I am no advocate for force, or the undue influence of Government, or the direct interference of the officers of Government, whether civil or military, in the work of conversion: neither, looking as well to the object to be gained as to the condition of the people before whom it is desired to place Christianity in an attractive point of view, can I express any desire that India should be thrown more open than it is to the operations of missionaries sent out by all sects and bodies of believers indiscriminately. When the Gospel was first offered to the half-civilised heathen under the Roman Empire, the message of peace came to them from men all speaking the same thing; and all agreeing, not in doctrine only, but in discipline, in form of worship, and in the one object to be achieved. The heathen inhabitants of British India are in a state of civilisation not very

unlike to that at which the nations to whom the Apostles and their immediate successors addressed themselves had arrived; and it would be wise, as well as in conformity with primitive usage, if the first great approach to them could be made by some one section of the universal Church of Christ. Ample scope will be afforded to what is called "religious liberty" after the good seed has been sown and there is grain in the ear. Meanwhile I speak the language of all thoughtful men, when I say that England can scarcely expect a blessing to attend her efforts at the reestablishment of her supremacy, if she fail to extend the influence of her own Church in the East; by multiplying four-fold her bishops and clergy there, and taking care that only such individuals are appointed to the work as feel its unspeakable importance, and are ready to spend and be spent in the promotion of it. For, without all doubt, the great bulk of Anglo-Indian society has lived too long without God in the world; causing, thereby, both Mahomedans and Hindoos,—each, in their own wild way, devout even to superstition,—to despise, not the English nation alone, but the faith which England professes, of the hearty acceptance of which they have seen so few tokens among the individual Englishmen with whom they came in contact.

Again, it is very clear that our ostentatious deference for caste prejudices has not won for us the love or respect of the people whom it was intended to conciliate. To affect any longer what we do not feel, would convict us, even in their eyes, of folly as well as of hypocrisy,—nor can it in any point of view be necessary to do so. Caste is a social far more than a religious institution, and as such it is our policy to regard it. We shall take the proper line in reference to it, if we ignore its existence altogether. There is no occasion to intrude ourselves into the domestic circles of the Hindoos, or to outrage their prejudices in the villages through which we pass, or the towns in which we reside. But every native of India seeking employment under our Government, whether he aspire to become an advocate, and eventually a judge, or enlist as a private soldier in the ranks, should be distinctly given to understand that the Supreme Government recognises no distinctions between man and man,

and expects from those whom it takes into its pay implicit obedience to all orders which are not in themselves unlawful. There would be some surprise experienced at first, and perhaps a little outcry raised. But the Government which is physically strong enough to put down an armed revolt like the present, will be morally weak indeed, if it yield to the murmurs of an interested minority. For the great bulk of the people will soon come to perceive that such an arrangement must operate powerfully to their advantage.

Again, the substitution of the English for the Persian, in all those courts of law where proceedings are now conducted in the latter language, is a measure dictated by every consideration of policy and common sense. As has elsewhere been explained, the Persian had ceased to be the vernacular tongue in any part of India long ere we became masters of the country. It came in with the early Mahomedan dynasties, and had died out, except as the language of the law, before the house of Aurungzebe ceased to reign. It would have been forgotten long ago, except among scholars, had not we by our perverse adherence to it kept it up. Let it be abolished at once, and not a murmur of complaint will be heard; except, perhaps, from that portion of the Mahomedan population which regards the continued use of it as at once a memorial of greatness past and a prognostic of greatness to come; and from the native vakeels or advocates, who contrive by means of it to mystify their own clients, and not unfrequently to mislead our judges. To the people of India English is at this moment much more accessible than Persian; and surely it becomes us, by every means in our power, to promote among them the study of our own literature and of the truths which it communicates, rather than of the literature of their former masters, with all its obscenity and folly.

Again, two points seem to be established by recent as well as by more remote experience; first, that we cannot maintain our supremacy in India without a native army of some sort or another; and, next, that the native army, when it comes to be put together again, must be constituted upon a plan very different from that which has so signally failed. I have said so

much upon this part of my subject in the body of the paper now offered to the public, that I feel reluctant to anticipate here what the reader will find more clearly expressed elsewhere. This much, however, it is necessary to observe,—that a chain of reasoning which appeared to be conclusive only four short years ago, has received from events of the current year considerable damage. It may be doubted, for example, whether a return to the earlier and better customs of the military service in India be now possible. Certainly the conduct of many of the irregular corps holds out no great encouragement to hazard the attempt. And if this be so, then there appears no alternative except to raise our levies from among a different class of men; and, while we increase the number of European officers in our regiments, to take care that they abide more steadily than heretofore with their colours, and give all their attention to the proper duties of their stations. A writer in the “Times,” evidently no novice in the subject which he discusses, has recommended that African battalions be enrolled, and that they be employed in large numbers to garrison India. The expedient seems practicable enough; while Indian regiments, no longer composed of high-caste men, might do duty in Ceylon, at the Cape of Good Hope, and even in the West Indies. But before accomplishing so important a purpose, the present constitution of the Indian Government, civil as well as military, must be changed; and on that subject, though I may have formed my own opinions, I do not feel that the present is a fitting occasion on which to express them.

Many other suggestions occur to me, which for obvious reasons I refrain from stating, because the promotion of education, the extension of railroads, the opening out of the commerce and internal resources of the country, are all measures of such obvious policy, that merely to enumerate is to command a universal acceptance of them. But further than this, the Government will doubtless look well before it proceeds. Free institutions and a free press, invaluable as they are in homogeneous states, can work only for mischief in a country of which the ruler and the subject have nothing in common between them. Finally, the day of reckoning must come; not with

and expects from those whom it takes into its pay implicit obedience to all orders which are not in themselves unlawful. There would be some surprise experienced at first, and perhaps a little outcry raised. But the Government which is physically strong enough to put down an armed revolt like the present, will be morally weak indeed, if it yield to the murmurs of an interested minority. For the great bulk of the people will soon come to perceive that such an arrangement must operate powerfully to their advantage.

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Again, two points seem to be established by recent as well as by more remote experience; first, that we cannot maintain our supremacy in India without a native army of some sort or another; and, next, that the native army, when it comes to be put together again, must be constituted upon a plan very different from that which has so signally failed. I have said so

much upon this part of my subject in the body of the paper now offered to the public, that I feel reluctant to anticipate here what the reader will find more clearly expressed elsewhere. This much, however, it is necessary to observe,—that a chain of reasoning which appeared to be conclusive only four short years ago, has received from events of the current year considerable damage. It may be doubted, for example, whether a return to the earlier and better customs of the military service in India be now possible. Certainly the conduct of many of the irregular corps holds out no great encouragement to hazard the attempt. And if this be so, then there appears no alternative except to raise our levies from among a different class of men; and, while we increase the number of European officers in our regiments, to take care that they abide more steadily than heretofore with their colours, and give all their attention to the proper duties of their stations. A writer in the “Times,” evidently no novice in the subject which he discusses, has recommended that African battalions be enrolled, and that they be employed in large numbers to garrison India. The expedient seems practicable enough; while Indian regiments, no longer composed of high-caste men, might do duty in Ceylon, at the Cape of Good Hope, and even in the West Indies. But before accomplishing so important a purpose, the present constitution of the Indian Government, civil as well as military, must be changed; and on that subject, though I may have formed my own opinions, I do not feel that the present is a fitting occasion on which to express them.

Many other suggestions occur to me, which for obvious reasons I refrain from stating, because the promotion of education, the extension of railroads, the opening out of the commerce and internal resources of the country, are all measures of such obvious policy, that merely to enumerate is to command a universal acceptance of them. But further than this, the Government will doubtless look well before it proceeds. Free institutions and a free press, invaluable as they are in homogeneous states, can work only for mischief in a country of which the ruler and the subject have nothing in common between them. Finally, the day of reckoning must come; not with

the barbarians only, whose hands are red with the blood of our women and children, but with those to whom England had committed, in full reliance on their wisdom, the lives of her children and the care of her most important dependency. And happy will every right-minded person be, if the result of such inquiry demonstrate that, both in London and at Calcutta, there was neither supineness nor misconduct: that there was no surprise, which would convict our rulers of gross incapacity; nor any lack of preparation to resist a threatening evil, which might imperil their good name on higher grounds: and that every step taken since, to succour the weak and relieve the oppressed, has been marked by the vigour and forethought for which we are justified in looking among those to whom our sovereign has entrusted the destinies of her great empire.

P. S.— Since the preceding pages went to press, events have accumulated themselves with a rapidity which is not calculated to allay our apprehensions as to the final issue of the Indian struggle. The growing spirit of disaffection in Bombay, and the refusal of even a single regiment of Madras cavalry to march, present signs of the future still more dark than the check which General Havelock has sustained. Had the reinforcements first ordered to India gone out in steam ships instead of sailing vessels; or the overland route been made use of at the second instead of the eleventh hour; probably none of those misfortunes would have occurred. Still our game is not a desperate one, provided there be wisdom enough to play it aright; though it will certainly not be played successfully if we act under the guidance of blind passion.

Nobody in his senses would desire to extenuate the enormity of the crimes of which the rebels have been guilty. It is with-

out parallel in the history of modern times. But the cry for vengeance which we hear on all sides is as unchristian as it is impolitic. Soldiers engaged in the horrible business of war, and especially of what may be called civil war, need no stimulants to shed blood; nor is it by hanging up villagers, like acorns, to the branches of trees, or putting wounded men to death on the field of battle, that we may hope to bring the contest to a speedy issue. Indeed, every life taken, except in fair fight, or after judicial investigation held upon the case and sentence given, is just as much a murder on our part as was the slaughter of our women and children at Cawnpore; and, like all other crimes, it will be seen in the end to have been dictated by the worst possible policy.

The object which we now seek is, the suppression of a rebellion, and the reestablishment of British sovereignty in India. Our best, and indeed only chance of attaining that object, is to enlist the sympathies of the masses in our favour. We profess to believe that the great body of the people are with us. If we hope to keep them so, the discipline maintained in our ranks cannot be too strict. But you cannot train soldiers to kill their prisoners, and to plunder the towns and villages through which they pass, without putting an end to discipline altogether.

Of Sir Colin Campbell, provided he be invested with adequate powers, the highest expectations may be formed. He was trained in the school of that great man who knew that war cannot be carried on successfully, either in a friendly or a hostile country, unless the lives and property of the inhabitants be respected, and every thing required for the support of the army paid for on the spot. Probably, too, he understands that it is no sign of weakness to have mercy, and that a war which is conducted on the avowed principle of extermination cannot be other than a protracted one. He will try, and, if they be found guilty, execute the leaders of revolt, whenever they fall into his hands; but of their followers he will, without doubt, satisfy himself that some better use can be made than by shooting them. Indeed, he will follow this course as much for the sake of his own men as through regard for the lives of the enemy. For an army

which has accustomed itself to wholesale butcheries, even of savages, though it may be brave in fight and patient under privations, can never be trusted in a civilised country. The individuals composing it become brutalised in exact proportion to the indifference which they entertain for human life. Discipline, good faith, mercy, and justice may carry us through the crisis; if they do not, nothing will. Finally, I would venture to ask with all deference, whether adequate provision has been made, by the Government at home, to keep fully supplied that large European army, which it is pouring into a country where cultivation has ceased, and over which the horrors of famine, as well as of war, seem to be impending.

London, Oct. 1857.

INDIA

AND ITS ARMY.*

WE have no intention of criticising the merits, literary or otherwise, of the works which, in their titles, stand at the head of this Article. They are full of interest, every one of them; not more on account of the importance of the subjects to which they refer, than because they are suggestive to such as read them attentively of very grave reflections. Who can doubt that for the last twelve or thirteen years the existence of the British empire in the East has been hanging continually in the balance? Who can flatter himself that the scales have even now subsided into their proper places, and that all danger is past? Had the native powers better understood one another, and the disaffected within our own provinces been more energetic in their councils, the disasters in Affghanistan might have lighted up a blaze from one end of India to another, which we should have found it difficult if not impossible to extinguish. Had Burmah been ready and the Punjab further advanced, the march of Lord Gough upon Gwalior would have been the signal for an inburst through Arracan, and across the Sutlej, and so onwards to Delhi and Calcutta. Had the Sikhs been aware that our cavalry were fleeing from the field, how many of

* The following are the titles of the works on which this Essay was based on its publication in the "Edinburgh Review" in 1853:—

1. *A Letter to the Marquess of Tweeddale.* By Major-General BRIGGS, Madras Army. 1842.
2. *The War in Affghanistan.* By JOHN WILLIAM KAYE. 2 vols. 1851.
3. *History of General Sir Charles Napier's Administration of Scinde.* By Lieutenant-General Sir WILLIAM NAPIER, K.C.B. 1851.
4. *Remarks on the Affairs of India.* By JOHN SULLIVAN, Esq. 1852.
5. *Report from the Select Committee on our Indian Territories.* 1852.

the gallant men who stood to their arms amid héaps of dead outside the lines of Ferozeshur would have survived to speak of their escapes and their daring? And then, with Hardinge and Gough and their stout army annihilated, what was there to prevent a general rising of the whole Asiatic population, and the consequent expulsion of the English from their land? Nor are other and scarcely less alarming truths kept back from our notice. It is impossible to deny that we are indebted for the continuance of our supremacy in the East, quite as much to the favours of fortune as to the skill of our leaders and the bravery of our troops. Was not the advance of the enemy upon Moodkee made known to us only by the falling of their round shot about our ears? Does it not appear that, in the judgment of Sir Charles Napier at least, the famous flank-movement from Loodianah, which is supposed to have averted defeat, was an operation contrary to all the laws of strategy, and perfectly impracticable except in the face of a very rude enemy? How came 30,000 Sikhs to lie idly in their encampment within a few hours' march of Ferozeshur all the time that the battle was raging? And earlier still, when the Sikhs were beginning to threaten, and the whole army of Scinde had been prostrated with sickness,—when Napier himself lay exhausted at Suckur, and his disputes with the Bombay Government were at the bitterest,—what was it that stopped the hill hordes from pouring down into the plain and taking vengeance for the defeats of Meeanee and Hyderabad? Far be it from us to undervalue that of which Sir William Napier is justly proud—the terror of his brother's name. We believe that it was as potent as a naturally partial historian represents it to have been; and we know as well as he does how potent is such a spell among the tribes of central Asia. But even the terror of a name cannot altogether account for a state of rest so opportune among a people proverbially prone to indulge the passion of revenge, and singularly expert in obtaining information. No; we must unquestionably refer our deliverances, for such they were, to some influence beyond the compass of human ability. For, speak of the affair as we will, we were on fifty different occasions at the mercy of our enemies. Where were the proofs of attachment to our cause when 40,000 men were enabled to arrive within cannon shot of our outposts without one native out of all whom we professed to take under our protection coming in to tell us of their advance? Nor is this all. When the day of trial arrives, we do not find, as in former years, that every part of our army is to be trusted. The official despatches which describe recent great battles, with

the lists of killed and wounded that accompany them, tell a tale as alarming as it is novel. We miss the forwardness in strife which used to characterise the Sepoys of other days, and cannot discover that they any where paid the penalty of their daring. The English regiments go to their work with a will; and the face of the plain is covered with their dead; but their dark-complexioned comrades appear to fall off from them; for though their slain be comparatively few, whole battalions seem to dissolve themselves. And worse still; our Sepoys have taken to stipulate for terms when operations against an enemy are projected, and refuse to march forward unless their propositions be agreed to. Now all these are features absolutely new in Anglo-Indian history; and therefore, perhaps, as well as because of their immense importance, we cannot but give to them the chief share of our attention. How are they to be accounted for?

It appears to us that among the many subjects connected with Indian administration which must occupy ere long the attention of the Legislature, there is not one which calls for more prompt and searching inquiry than the state, as regards its discipline, organisation, and general efficiency of Her Majesty's native army. We express ourselves thus, because, without meaning to deny that British rule has proved, upon the whole, advantageous to the agricultural population of the empire, it would be ridiculous to pretend that even they are so keenly alive to the fact as honestly and in a fervent spirit to desire the continuance of our presence among them. They may be thankful,—we dare say they are,—for the protection from external violence and plunder which is afforded to them. They cannot but contrast favourably, if they consider and contrast at all, their own condition in this respect with that of the Ryots in the best governed of the native States with which they happen to be acquainted. And in regard to the administration of law and justice, the machine, though still far from what it ought to be, is more smooth and regular in its movements than it was forty or fifty years ago. Still the utmost that can be predicated even of the Ryots, considered as subjects of the English Crown, is that they seldom, if ever, trouble themselves with discussing the merits of the system under which they live; being content to do as their fathers did before them, and satisfied so long as life and property are safe. But it is not so with any of the classes above the mere cultivators: quite otherwise. They see in the English Government a power which, however evenly it may profess to hold the scales between man and man, entertains no sympathy for them or for the traditions of their ancestry. They may acquire fortunes by trade; they may build ships and obtain the

honour of knighthood; and whatever they earn by honest industry they feel that they will be permitted to keep: but all beyond this is a blank; and they are fully alive to its dreariness. There are no such avenues to advancement opened to them as stirred the ambition and stimulated the exertions of their forefathers. They cannot attain in the civil service of the State to a station more elevated than that of an ill-paid rural magistrate, or a clerk in one of the public offices. Even the status of a practising attorney in the Courts of Law seems to be denied to them, though the decision of the judge who settled the question was manifestly delivered under a painful sense of its iniquity. And as to the army, we shall have occasion presently to explain, that it offers no prizes for which it would be worth the while of a native gentleman to strive. Now people so circumstanced cannot be loyal in any sense of the term. They may submit to their fate with more or less of resignation; either because they see no chance of escape from it, or through the influence of that fatalism which enters largely into the faith of all the religionists of the East. But it is impossible that they can nourish the slightest feeling of love for the government which thus grinds them down, far less be prepared to make sacrifices of any kind in defence of it. Nor do they. By the native gentry of India,—and it is a great mistake to suppose that India has not its gentry of ancient lineage and proud reminiscences,—the rule of the English is regarded not only without favour, but with settled detestation. There is not one among them all but would rejoice to see it overthrown to-morrow.

Again, the complete antagonism which exists in manners, customs, and religion; the differences in their domestic habits, in their speech, in their very costume, interpose between the British rulers and their Asiatic subjects a gulf of severance, which neither time nor the degree of intimacy which here and there arises out of it, will ever be able to bridge over. We may be as ostentatiously tender as we will of Hindoo and Mahomedan prejudices; we may be ready to hear the complaints of outraged individuals, and prompt to give redress where we believe them to be well-grounded, but we can never hope to reconcile either the one class of persons or the other to the daily contemplation of scenes which utterly revolt them.

What Brahmin can look, except with horror, on persons who habitually slaughter and devour the flesh of the sacred cow? What Mahomedan but must regard with scorn the free intermixture of the sexes in the social life of their Christian masters? The Hindoo, religious even to the grossest superstition; the Musulman, devout and decorous in his very crimes, alike turn away

with horror from men who live, according to their notions, without God in the world, and glory in their shame. In a word, it is idle to talk of the contentment of the *people* of British India with the particular form of government which we have established among them. They submit to it, because they cannot help themselves,—the masses with the same degree of apathy which caused their co-religionists to submit to the government of the Ameer in Scinde, and to that of the Sikh Sirdars in the Punjab. But no living soul entertains the slightest predilection for us or for our government, while all who may be crossed by it in their schemes of personal or family ambition execrate, while they endure, what they feel to be the wrong.

That we are taking no prejudiced view of this important matter, nor broaching opinions that lack authority on which to rest, a very little research on the part of our readers will enable them to ascertain. The statements adduced here have been held and promulgated by almost every man of note who has made India and its institutions the subject of his inquiries. Open Mountstuart Elphinstone's able History, and you will find the same tone pervading every page. He speaks of the people whom we thus slight and keep down as having attained to a high degree of civilisation and prosperity before the march of Alexander across the Oxus. He describes them as retaining these advantages in the midst of endless wars, revolutions, and schemes of conquest, till we arrived upon the stage. And he attributes the circumstance to their admirable municipal institutions, which survived every change of dynasty except the last. "Dynasty upon dynasty," he says, quoting from Sir Charles Metcalfe, "tumbles down; revolution succeeds revolution,—Hindoo, Pagan, Moghul, Mahratta, Sikh, English, are all masters in turn; but the village community remains the same. This union of the village communities, each one forming a separate little state in itself, has contributed more than any other cause to the preservation of the people of India through all the changes and revolutions they have suffered; and is in a high degree conducive to their happiness and to their enjoyment of a great portion of freedom and independence." Again: "The main evil of our system is, the degraded state in which we hold the natives. We suppose them to be superstitious, ignorant, prone to falsehood, and corrupt. In our well-meaning zeal for their welfare, we shudder at the idea of committing to men so depraved any share in the administration of their own country. We exclude them from every situation of trust and emolument; we confine them to the lowest offices, with scarcely a bare subsistence; and even these are left in their hands from

necessity, because Europeans are utterly incapable of filling them. We treat them as an inferior race of beings. Men, who under a native government might have held the first dignities of the State, who, but for us, might have been governors of provinces, are regarded as little better than menial servants, are often no better paid, and scarcely permitted to sit in our presence. We reduce them to this abject state, and then look upon them with disdain as men unworthy of high station. Under most of the Mahomedan princes of India, the Hindoos were eligible to all the civil offices of Government, and they frequently possessed a more important share in them than their conquerors."

The above passage Mr. Elphinstone quotes from a paper by the late Sir Thomas Munro. The following sentiment is his own, and it occurs in his well-known letter to Mr. Villiers:—
 "Under a native government, independent of the mutual adaptation of the institutions and the people, there is a connecting chain throughout society, and a free communication between its different parts. Notwithstanding the distinctions of caste, there is no country where men rise with more ease from the lowest rank to the highest. The first nabob of Oude was a petty merchant; the first Peishwa, a village accountant; the ancestors of Holkar were goatherds; and those of Scindiah, slaves. All these and many other instances took place within the last century. Promotion from among the common people to all the ranks of civil and military employment, short of sovereignty, are of daily occurrence under native states; and this keeps up the spirit of the people, and, in that respect, partially supplies the place of popular institutions. The free intercourse of different ranks, also, keeps up a sort of circulation and diffusion of such knowledge and such sentiments as exist in society. Under us, on the contrary, the community is divided into two perfectly distinct and definite bodies, of which the one is torpid and inactive, while all the power seems concentrated in the other."

That these sentiments were put on record many years ago, and that some slight improvement has been effected since in the arrangements of our civil service, we are quite ready to admit. The continued remonstrances of such statesmen as Munro, Elphinstone, and Malcolm, could not be disregarded for ever; and in Lord William Bentinck India at last found a Governor-General able and willing to act upon the principles which they recommended. But even he soon discovered that there was a countervailing weight elsewhere, which neither his vigour nor his perseverance could overcome; and hence the reforms which he introduced scarcely went farther than to make more glaring

than ever the iniquity of the system against which they were directed. It appears that throughout the provinces of Bengal, comprising a population of forty millions and upwards, there are, at this moment, but 105 natives employed under Government at salaries which do not fall short of 30% a month; whereas of Europeans, salaried through all the various stages, from 600% up to 10,000 a year, there are in public employment, within the same limits, not fewer than 626. Was ever people so governed satisfied with their rulers? Nor is this all. While the working of our system has had the obvious tendency to produce the very vices which are assumed to be the causes of it, an influence more overwhelming than either prejudice or greed has forced us to transact almost all our real business through the people whom we affect to distrust. The natives do the work on miserable wages, the Europeans draw large salaries and monopolise the credit. Hear Lord Metcalfe—too early lost to his country—on this subject:—“The difficulties of procuring effectual European superintendence, whether originating in climate, difference of habits, language, and other circumstances, are so numerous and overwhelming, that it is worth while to consider whether there is not a fair prospect of the duty being done by other means, not only cheaper, but more effectually. It is well known that in some districts almost the whole business has been done by natives, though their European employers have enjoyed the credit; and it is absurd to suppose that the former should be less able to do well when working on their own responsibility. The deplorable system under which the advantages are reaped by one, while the labour is performed by another, has been too long the bane of the country. It is the cause of the inefficiency of the European, and the corruption of the native; and, so long as it is upheld, there can be but little amendment in either party.”

The time has not yet come for dealing as fully as the case deserves with the important questions involved in these statements. The whole machinery of Anglo-Indian government is once more upon its trial* ; and the evidence as yet collected, though in some respects of considerable value, is not sufficient to warrant a verdict, either of condemnation or acquittal. More, we presume, will soon follow; but, in the meanwhile, enough has been elicited to prove that matters cannot be permitted to go on exactly as they do now. Whence does it come to pass that, in direct opposition to an Act of Parliament, the Company is still able to draw so broad a line of distinction

* This was written previously to the India Bill of 1853.

between its own covenanted servants and the rest of the Indian community? The statute which renewed the charter in 1833 contains a clause to provide that no man shall be debarred from office on account of his colour or his religion. And the ablest judges of the intentions of the Legislature have declared that every post, under the highest, — collectorships, magistracies, even seats in the Supreme Council itself, — were thereby thrown open for competition to *all* the Queen's subjects in Asia, from whatever stock descended. "India," said Lord William Bentinck, fifteen years ago, "in order to become an attached dependency of the British Crown, must be governed for her own sake, and not for the sake of the 800 or 1000 individuals who go there to make their fortunes." But how stand the facts of the case? The execution of the law was left to the Court of Directors, and they ruled, in the very teeth of this enactment, that none except covenanted servants of the Company, nominated by themselves, should be competent to hold certain offices; and the consequence is, to use the words of Lord William Bentinck, in his evidence before the committee of 1837, that, "not only is the civil administration of India entirely in the hands of foreigners, but that the holders of this monopoly, the patrons of these foreign agents, are those who exercise the directing power at home; that this directing power is exclusively paid by patronage; that the value of this patronage depends exactly upon the degree in which both the honours and emoluments of the State are engrossed by their clients, to the exclusion of the natives. There exists," he continues, "in consequence, on the part of the home authorities, an interest in the administration precisely similar to what formerly prevailed as to commerce; that is, directly opposed to the welfare of India."

Whatever may be the conclusion to which we shall be driven by the force of evidence as yet to be adduced, in regard to the wisdom of retaining, either modified or otherwise, both a Court of Directors in Leadenhall Street, and a Board of Control in Cannon Row, no impartial man can doubt that such an exercise of power by the former of these bodies as is here described and condemned, is not more at variance with the letter of the statute law, than it is in contradiction to the principles of moral right and public justice. It may keep open, for a few more years, the avenues to wealth for a limited number of Englishmen in a distant land; but it does so in defiance of an Act of the Imperial Legislature, and at the expense of crying wrong to the native population of India. "There is one great question to which we should look," says Sir Thomas Munro, "in all our arrangements. What is to be the final result on the character

of the people? Is it to be raised, or is it to be lowered? Are we to be satisfied with merely securing our power, and protecting the inhabitants, leaving them to sink gradually in character lower than at present? Or are we to endeavour to raise their character? It ought undoubtedly to be our aim to raise the minds of the natives, and to take care that whenever our connexion with India ceases, it do not appear that the only fruit of our dominion had been to leave the people more abject and less able to govern themselves than when we found them. It would certainly be more desirable that we should be expelled from the country altogether, than that the result of our system of government should be such an abasement of a whole people. In proportion as we exclude them from the higher offices, and a share in the management of public affairs, we lessen their interest in the concerns of the community, and degrade their character. If we make a summary comparison of the advantages and disadvantages which have accrued to the natives from our government, the result, I fear, will hardly be so much in our favour as it ought to have been. They are more secure from the calamities both of foreign war and internal commotions; their persons and property are more secure from violence; they cannot be wantonly punished, or their property seized, by persons in power; and their taxation is, on the whole, lighter. But, on the other hand, they have no share in making laws for themselves, little in administering them, except in very subordinate offices; they can rise to no high station, civil or military; they are everywhere regarded as an inferior race, and often rather as vassals or servants than as the ancient owners and masters of the country. It is not enough that we confer upon the natives the benefits of just laws and moderate taxation, unless we endeavour to raise their character; but, under a foreign government, there are so many causes which tend to depress it, that it is not easy to prevent it from sinking. It is an old observation, that he who loses his liberty, loses half his virtue. This is true of nations as well as of individuals. To have no property scarcely degrades more in one case, than in the other to have property at the disposal of a foreign government in which we have no share. The enslaved nation loses the privileges of a nation, as the slave does that of a free man. It loses the privilege of taxing itself, of making its own laws, of having any share in their administration, or in the general government of the country. British India has none of these privileges: it has not that of being ruled by a despot of its own; for, to a nation which has lost its liberty, it is still a privilege to have its countrymen, and not foreigners, as its

rulers. Nations always take a part with their government, whether free or despotic, against foreigners. Against an invasion of foreigners, the national character is always engaged, and in such a cause the people often contend as strenuously in the defence of a despotic as of a free government. It is not the arbitrary power of a national sovereign, but subjugation to a foreign one, that destroys national character, and extinguishes national spirit. When a people cease to have a national character to maintain, they lose the mainspring of whatever is laudable, both in public and in private life, and the private sinks with the public character. This is true of every nation, as well as of India. It is true of our own. Let Britain be subjugated by a foreign power to-morrow; let the people be excluded from all share in the government, from public honours, from every office of high trust and emolument, let them, in every situation, be considered as unworthy of trust, and all their knowledge, and all their literature, sacred and profane, will not save them from becoming, in another century or two, a low-minded, deceitful, and dishonest race."

These are words of wisdom, put upon record by one who, better, perhaps, than any servant of the Company, understood the subject which he was discussing. Nor was he, while thus reasoning, blind to the well-nigh universal degradation of the people whose cause he pleaded. No one knew better than he that "the inhabitants of the Company's dominions are the most abject race in India;" no one was more keenly and bitterly aware of the causes which had produced such a result. For even the wretched satisfaction of seeing the strangers who seek their shores for the purpose of growing rich at the public expense, settle down, and become, by degrees, one with themselves, is denied them. Other conquerors had overrun their territories before, assumed supreme power, and dispensed patronage; but they did so upon the spot, and excluded no man, of whatever race descended, from a share in it. We send out our youth by shoals from England to amass wealth and exercise power for a season; each batch returning to England, when it has satisfied its own wishes, only that it may be succeeded by another. What bond of good feeling can exist between the hundred and twenty millions whom we thus govern and the few thousands of white-faced men whom we appoint to plunder while they profess to govern and protect.

It was the knowledge of facts like these,—it was the natural dread of stretching too far a system of management so thoroughly rotten,—which led all our ablest Indian statesmen, from the days of Clive downwards, to deprecate the extension,

under any circumstances whatever, of British empire in the East. It was the constant pressure from without,—the continual arrival of young men from England, for whom employment in the civil or military service must be found,—which forced them, one after another, into the adoption of a policy which all equally condemned. No doubt occasions arose, when, being driven to defend ourselves against foreign aggression, we could not otherwise cover the expenses of the war than by appropriating the whole or a portion of the enemy's territories. But it is too much to assume, as popular writers are in the habit of doing, that *all* our wars in India have been defensive in the first instance, or that each addition made to our territorial empire there has been made upon compulsion. There is no end to the instances in which our allies have been compelled or cajoled, in times of prosperity and peace, into ceding to us tracts of country which we should have done better, perhaps, to leave in their hands. Such was the transaction in 1800, between Lord Wellesley and the Nizam, when the latter made over to the Company provinces producing an annual income of 650,000*l.* in lieu of a subsidy for troops, the cost of maintaining which was calculated at 400,000*l.* Such was the nature of his lordship's dealing, in 1801, with the Nabob of Oude, who was glad to yield up the half of his dominions, after being threatened with a seizure of the whole. So also, in 1802, the Nabob of Arcot, being *an infant*, was forced to surrender the whole of his territory, in consideration of an annual pension. And in the same year, and by a similar process, the petty principalities of Tanjore, Surat, and Furrukabad, passed under our rule; yet Lord Wellesley, though a more enterprising Governor than any that had preceded him since Hastings, was no friend, any more than his illustrious brother, to the policy of excessive aggrandisement. Nor have either our proceedings, or the theory which they controvert, undergone any material change in the progress of time. In 1831, we possessed ourselves, without scruple, of the dominions of our ally the Rajah of Mysore, and have kept them ever since. Between 1840 and 1847, we confiscated to our own use the principalities of Sattara, Coleba, and Mandavie, upon the plea that the thrones were vacant, the last incumbents having died without lawful heirs. And finally, in 1848, we took possession of the territories and treasures of our *infant* ally and ward, Dhuleeb Singh of Lahore,—in consequence of an insurrection which occurred in his country, while we were exercising uncontrolled authority there, and to which the child neither was, nor could be, an assenting party. These acts may have been, in themselves, politic. That

they were forced upon us by circumstances over which we had no control, is a convenient, but it is by no means a self-evident, theory. Indeed, the very author of the latest wrong, if wrong it shall prove to be, does not so much as pretend to shelter himself under any plea of the sort. He speaks out like a man. What to him are the declarations of Parliament, uttered long ago, and never recalled. It may still be, in the opinion of the House of Commons, as it was sixty years ago, “repugnant to the interests and honour of England” to pursue schemes of territorial aggrandisement in the East. Lord Dalhousie thinks otherwise; and not only seizes upon the Punjab, but avows his determination to extend the dominions of England, whenever and wherever a convenient opportunity of doing so shall offer. “I take this fitting opportunity,” he says, “of recording my strong and deliberate opinion, that in the exercise of a wise and sound policy, the British Government is bound not to put aside or neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory or revenue, as may from time to time present themselves.”

If this reasoning be sound,—and we ourselves cannot detect a flaw in it,—the reader, we think, will agree with us in the opinion, that year by year, as we become masters of a wider extent of territory in the East, we are year by year reducing the nature of our hold upon the empire to that of mere force. Wherever our authority reaches, all the established institutions of the country, all the influence of the native princes and governments, their legitimate occupations and places in society, crumble to pieces under it. We repress feuds, it is true—we take away the power of doing arbitrary acts from individuals—we equalise taxation, and proclaim the supremacy of law, but we do not increase thereby the loyalty, far less the gratitude or the affection, of a single class,—we had almost said, of a solitary individual. “I am decidedly of opinion,” says Sir John Malcolm, “that the tranquillity, not to say the security, of our vast oriental possessions is involved in the preservation of the native principalities which are dependent upon us for protection. I am further convinced, that though our revenue may increase, the permanence of our power will be hazarded in proportion as the territories of native princes and chiefs fall under our direct rule. . . . Every means should be used to avert what I should consider as one of the greatest calamities, in a political point of view, that could arise to our empire; viz. the whole of India becoming subject to our direct rule.” “It appears to me,” says Mr. Elphinstone, “to be our interest, as well as our duty, to use every means to preserve the allied

governments. The period of our downfall in India will probably be hastened by every increase of our territory and subjects." "I consider the extinction of a native state," says Sir Henry Russell, "as a nail driven into our own coffin." Does any body distrust the wisdom of these vaticinations? Let him consider for a moment what follows immediately on the deposition of a native prince, in the single matter of employment for large and important sections of the community. We do not tolerate feudal rights, nor any thing akin to them, within the limits of our empire. We have no desire to increase our army more than may be absolutely necessary for the occasions of the moment. No sooner, therefore, is a cession effected, than down goes the state of scores of subordinate chieftains, down comes the royal establishment, with all its paraphernalia of wuzzeers, dewans, guards, and soldiery. What is to become of these people? We open no doors of exertion to their energies. "They cannot dig, to beg they are ashamed." They either pass into other principalities still nominally independent, carrying with them feelings of implacable rancour towards us, or they wander about the provinces, sometimes in bands, when they become robbers, or singly, when they not unfrequently perish. It was calculated, that after the overthrow of Tippoo Saib and the Mahrattas, not fewer than 500,000 persons, belonging to the military classes alone, became vagabonds and plunderers. And we need not tell such of our readers as concern themselves with the aspect of public affairs in the Punjab, that the whole face of that province is covered, at this moment, with men who, having no settled occupation, are ripe for anything that may occur; more especially, for any project of hostility towards ourselves.*

It is clear, then, whatever we may have accustomed ourselves to fancy, that we retain no hold upon India except by the sword. Our government is the government of the stranger, and nothing more. It is so designated by the people

* The exertions of Sir John Lawrence, and his wise and just policy, succeeded in bringing order out of chaos; and we are now congratulating ourselves on the loyalty of the Sikhs, and looking to them and the Goorkahs as our mainstay in the East. Let us take care that we do not misunderstand the motives of both races. They hate the Hindoos, and may therefore help us to destroy the rebel army. But, having done so, are we quite sure that they will be content to resume their old place in society? We may be mistaken, we hope that we are, but the advance of the Nepaulese contingent into our territories, with Jung Behauder at their head, is no subject of rejoicing to us.

who submit to it; and unless thoroughly recast, it must continue to deserve the appellation to the end of time. Indeed, we may go further. The whole bent of our legislation, even where it most professes to seek the good of the people of the country, pursues with the greatest earnestness objects which have no value whatever in their eyes. "We might read," says Mr. Sullivan, "all the Acts of Parliament which relate to India, without knowing from them that such a people exist. Take as examples the three last Charter Acts. The Act passed in 1793 provides that a proportion of the estimated surplus of the revenue shall be appropriated towards the payment of the national debt of England; and another proportion of the assumed surplus be applied to increase the dividends of the proprietors of East India Stock. The Act of 1813 provides for the support of Anglican bishops and archdeacons out of the Indian revenues, and for giving additional allowances to governors and other English functionaries. The Act of 1833 adds to the number of bishops and archdeacons, and to the number of European members of Council. It provides for the appointment of a law commission, composed of Europeans, involving an additional charge in the aggregate of at least 50,000*l.* a year for European agents, and it throws all the debts and liabilities of the East India Company, including an annuity of 660,000*l.* a year to the proprietors of that Company, on the revenue of India. The only allusion to the people of India to be found in these Acts, and that inferentially, is confined to two clauses; one of which enacts, that whenever India shall have a surplus revenue, 10,000*l.* a year shall be set apart for native collegiate establishments; the other, that no man shall be debarred from office by reason of his caste and religion." Now we do not object to the appointment of bishops and archdeacons, or the adoption of any other course which shall hold out some sure prospect of extending to the people of India, by legitimate means, the pure faith of the Gospel. Neither is the policy of necessity wrong which provides for the appointment of a law commission, even though it be composed exclusively of Europeans. But it is surely not to "govern India for its own sake," or "to render her an attached dependency of Great Britain," that any portion of the debt of England should be saddled upon her, or her people taxed, beyond what they are able to bear, in order that the dividends of the proprietors of East India stock may be increased. The people of India are proverbially patient under taxation, up to a certain point. But undoubtedly they would bear the burden with greater cheerfulness if they saw the

funds thence arising applied, even in part, to the development of the resources of their own country; and still more if members of their own body, bone of their own bone, and flesh of their own flesh, were allowed in the spirit of the law, as it stands, to have some voice, as well in the imposition of the taxes, as in the control and general management of the revenues when collected.

The growth of our Indian empire, looking first to the period when it may be said to have taken root, and next to the enormous extent of territory and population which it now comprises, may indeed be said to constitute one of the wonders of the world. In 1757, not quite a hundred years ago, England, besides being mistress of a few factories on the coasts of Malabar and Coromandel, exercised sovereignty over 4882 square miles of territory which she had acquired from the Nabob of Bengal. In 1793, the date of Lord Cornwallis's permanent settlement, upwards of 200,000 square miles of territory, with a population little short of 40,000,000, acknowledged her supremacy. The former had grown in 1813, when the Charter was renewed, to about 320,000 square miles, the latter to 60,000,000, which again were increased, in 1833, to 462,000 square miles, peopled by at least 100,000,000 of natives. At this day, the surface extent of land, actually contributing to the Indian treasury, and managed by covenanted servants of the Company, falls little short of 600,000 square miles; while the population will be placed under rather than above the mark, if we assume that it reaches 120,000,000. But this is not all. Between Cape Comorin and the Himalaya Mountains, and from Bombay to Arracan, there is not a principality, state, or province, but is more or less connected with the British empire by treaties admmissive of the superiority of the stranger. Thus, northward of the peninsula, and extending to the centre, we find Cashmere, Cis-Sutledge, Nepal,—the north-east frontier states, Rajpootana, Oude, Bundelcund,—the south-west frontier states, Berar, Sangoor, Malwa and Hyderabad, with other less important principalities; to the south lie Mysore, the Orissa Jaghires, Travancore, &c., and to the west, Cutch, Guzzerat, and various petty chieftainships besides. All these, presenting a surface extent of upwards of 690,000 square miles, and comprising a population which has been taken at 52,000,000 of souls, are, for every practical purpose, at the absolute disposal of the British Government. Some of them are connected with it by subsidiary treaties; that is to say, they supply funds for the maintenance of a given number of troops, which the British Government disciplines and officers; others pay tribute, and

undertake, in case of war, to swell our armies with contingents, of which the strength is fixed ; while the residue accepting our protection hold themselves bound, when called upon, to cooperate with us in any contest into which we may enter. In a word, we have become, far more extensively than could be predicated of the most powerful Mahomedan emperors, lords paramount of India, having vassals under us, whose aggregate military establishments show a muster-roll, in round numbers, of about 400,000 armed men.*

It would be idle to lament over a contingency which, however fraught with danger, is complete, and cannot be reversed. It would be equally so to persuade ourselves that this growth in the extent of our territorial dominions indicates a corresponding growth of power, accepting the latter term in the only sense which a wise statesman would apply to it. Were the kingdoms which we have overrun and annexed inhabited by races cognate with ourselves, we might hope, in the course of time, to become one with them. It is true that this is not the work of a day. The French population of Lower Canada, though for well nigh a hundred years bound by ties of allegiance to the British Crown, are still a distinct people in their habits, tastes, and creed, from their English conquerors. And in spite of the legislative union of the two provinces, we cannot say that as yet tokens of a different order of things are rife. But the national characteristics which stand between them and us are the merest bagatelles, when compared with the insurmountable barriers that present themselves to anything like an amalgamation of Englishmen with the Hindoo and Mahomedan natives of British India. Moreover, as has elsewhere been shown, it is, and always has been, the bent and object of our policy to prevent the natives of India from acquiring an interest in the well-being of the government under which they live. What then is each enlargement of the area and population of our eastern empire, except an extension of sources of anxiety, and a serious addition made to the difficulties, already numerous enough, that stand in the way of the maintenance of our superiority? Are we richer than we were sixty years ago? Speaking comparatively, the case is otherwise. In 1792 the public debt of India amounted to no more than one year's purchase of the public

* Since this paragraph was written, the work of annexation has made wonderful progress. State after state has been absorbed ; the tenures of the holders of land closely looked into, and set aside ; and a flame lighted, of the extinction of which he were a bold prophet who should at this moment speak confidently.

revenue; whereas now it exceeds two years' purchase. Are we more at our ease as regards either foreign war or domestic trouble? Surely not. Our frontiers now touch, wherever they touch any neighbours at all, upon tribes fiercer, more warlike, and more jealous of our encroachments than any with whom we have as yet had to deal; while within ourselves, though there may seem to be tranquillity, it is but the tranquillity of the ocean during a calm. Look back upon the events of the last eighteen years, and say whether in these you can discover any tokens either of indemnity for the past or of security against the future.

In the year 1835 the advanced frontier of British India towards the north rested upon the Sutlej, one of the branches or tributaries to the mighty Indus. Over the navigation of that great river we asserted no claim. Anxious, indeed, many of our Governors-General had been to obtain, through that channel, access to the trade of Central Asia; but none of them had aimed at more than the establishment of commercial treaties with the native chiefs, who owned the soil on each of its banks. The Sikhs, under Runjeet Singh, were undisturbed lords of the Punjab, and the Ameers governed Scinde according to their own sense of propriety; and it was considered good policy to keep them there, because they stood between us and the advance, if such an enterprise should ever be seriously contemplated, of either Russian or French troops, through Persia, upon our dominions. Moreover, India was supposed to be, and doubtless was, in an unusually flourishing condition. "The country," says Mr. Kaye, "was in a state of profound tranquillity—the treasury was overflowing—the quietest ruler was likely to be the best—there was abundant work to be done, but it was all of a pacific character." It was under such circumstances that the late Lord Auckland acceded to the chief management of affairs. What was the disposition of that nobleman?—what were his qualifications for so important a post? We shall quote again from Mr. Kaye, partly because his statements appear to be perfectly just—much more because they are of value, as coming from one who has not shown himself particularly sparing of censure on the general policy of the man whom he thus delineates:—"In entrusting that work to Lord Auckland, the Ministry thought that they entrusted it to safe hands. The new Governor-General had everything to learn; but he was a man of methodical habits of business, apt in the acquisition of knowledge, with no overweening confidence in himself, and no arrogant contempt of others. His ambition was all of the most laudable kind—it was an ambition to do

good. When he declared at the farewell banquet given to him by the Directors of the East India Company, that ' he looked with exultation to the new prospects opening out before him, affording him an opportunity of doing good to his fellow-creatures — of promoting education and knowledge — of improving the administration of justice in India — of extending the blessings of good government and happiness to millions in India ' — it was felt by all who knew him that the words were uttered in grave sincerity, and expressed the genuine aspirations of the man."

It has long been the practice — and probably it will long continue — to commit the government of the Indian empire to men who, whatever may be their qualifications in other respects, cannot but carry out to their important post the most profound ignorance on every subject of which a knowledge seems to be necessary for the right discharge of its duties. Lord Auckland was not in this respect one whit less qualified than others to bear the burden which his friends in office laid upon him. And according to the measure of the ability which God had given him, he is described as bearing it well. " The early days of his government," says Mr. Kaye, " did not disappoint the expectations of those who had looked for a pains-taking, laborious administrator — zealous in the prosecution of measures calculated to develop the resources of the country and to advance the happiness of the people. It appeared, indeed, that with something less of the uncompromising energy of Lord William Bentinck, but with an equal purity of benevolence, he was treading in the footsteps of his predecessor. The promotion of native education and the expansion of the industrial resources of the country, were pursuits far more congenial to his nature than the assembling of armies and the invasion of empires. He had no taste for the din and confusion of the camp — no appetite for foreign conquest. Quiet and unobtrusive in his manners, of a somewhat cold and impassive temperament, and altogether of a reserved and retiring nature, he was not one to court excitement or to desire notoriety. He would fain have passed his allotted years of office in the prosecution of those small measures of domestic reform which individually attract little attention, but in the aggregate affect mightily the happiness of the people. He belonged, indeed, to that respectable class of Governors whose merits are not sufficiently prominent to demand ample recognition by their contemporaries, but whose noiseless, unapplauded achievements entitle them to the praise of the historian and the gratitude of after ages."

Such a man assuming at such a crisis the chief management

of affairs in a country of which "the treasury was overflowing," and where "tranquillity was profound," was very little likely, in the common course of things, to plunge into wars. But what actually took place? Reports came in of ambitious movements through Persia by the Russians, in districts far beyond the utmost limits of our most distant political intercourse. A Persian army was laying siege to Herat, and Persians and Russians were expected, on the fall of that place, to march across the Hindoo Coosh, and to break through Affghanistan and the Punjab, into the fertile plains of Agra. Was this probable? and if it were, what ground of alarm could there be to us, secure, as popular authorities pronounced that we were, in the devoted attachment of our immediate subjects, and in the alliance of the states that were mixed up with them? A government which is supported by a strong and well-disciplined army, and which knows that every civilian capable of bearing arms is ready to support the regular troops if need arise, can afford to laugh at threats of danger, especially if they be uttered at a distance of many hundred miles from the frontier, with chains of inhospitable mountains between. Was this the feeling of Lord Auckland and his advisers, or could it be? Quite otherwise. British India shook at once from one extremity to the other. "The remoteness of the countries," says Mr. Kaye, "in which these incidents were passing, might have reconciled an Anglo-Indian statesman to dangers of a character so vague and an origin so distant; but the result of all these distracting rumours was an after-growth of new perils springing up almost at our very doors. The native states on our own borders were beginning to evince signs of feverish unrest. From the hills of Nepaul and the jungles of Burmah came murmurings of threatened invasion, which compelled the British Government to look well to their lines of frontier. Even in our own provinces these rumours of mighty movements in the countries of the north-west disquieted the native mind; there was an uneasy, restless feeling among all classes, scarcely amounting to actual disaffection, and perhaps best to be described as a state of ignorant expectancy—a looking outwards in the belief of some coming change, the nature of which no one clearly understood. Among our Mussulman subjects, the feeling was somewhat akin to that which had unsettled their minds at the time when the rumoured advent of Zemaun Shah made them look for the speedy restoration of Mahomedan supremacy in Hindostan. In their eyes, indeed, the movement beyond the Affghan frontier took the shape of a Mahomedan invasion, and it was believed that countless thousands of true believers were about to pour themselves over

the plains of the Punjab and Hindostan, and to wrest all the country between the Indus and the sea from the hands of the infidel usurpers. The Mahomedan journals teemed, at this time, with utterances of undisguised sedition. There was a decline in the value of public securities; and it went openly from mouth to mouth, in the streets and the bazaars, that the Company's Raj was nearly at an end."

Contrast this state of feeling with the spirit which prevailed at that critical period in the history of the world, when the Turks, masters of Eastern Europe and of Central Asia, poured their swarms into the Punjab, and prepared to strike for the Mogul Empire in like manner. Then every nabob, raja, and poligar, from one extremity of India to another, mustered his troops at the emperor's bidding, and prepared to take the field. There was no backwardness on the part of the chiefs; there was every readiness among the people, to be marched against the common enemy: for, however prone each subordinate ruler might be to withhold tribute and service in time of peace, he was quite as much interested as the head of the empire in repelling a foreign invader. But where are the chiefs—where their followers—to whom, under like circumstances, we could apply? They are swept from the face of the earth; and in their room has sprung up a population either perfectly indifferent or, where the Mahomedan element prevails, eagerly desirous of change, let it come from what quarter it may. In a word, we have made ourselves masters of the largest and most populous empire in the world,—China, perhaps, excepted,—and we maintain ourselves by the weight of a large regular army, and by that alone. How is this army composed?

According to the latest returns, there are now serving in India,—of Queen's troops, officers included, 29,480; of European troops in the service of the Company, 19,928; of native troops, 240,121. This gives us a grand total of 289,529 regular soldiers; of whom 2569 are engineers, 16,440 artillery, 34,984 cavalry, 229,406 infantry, and the residue medical men, warrant officers, and veterans. To this must be added the contingents of certain native states, which, being commanded by British officers, are available, under treaties, for British purposes. Of these the united strength appears to be 32,311 men. Thus we keep our hold upon the provinces through the respect that is paid to the swords, musketry, and cannon of upwards of three hundred thousand disciplined troops, supported by corps of irregulars, which increase or diminish according to the exigencies of the moment.

It will be seen from this abstract that, large as the Indian

army is, the proportion of soldiers to the peaceful population of our Eastern empire is far below that of the most favoured of the great military Powers in Europe. In France the regular army, exclusive of troops in Algeria, amounts to about 300,000 men; the population does not exceed 37,000,000. In Prussia we have 200,000 soldiers to 15,000,000 inhabitants. Austria exhibits, inclusive of her frontier regiments, 400,000 troops, with a population of 35,000,000. Russia, with her 50,000,000 of people, supports about 600,000 soldiers. The population of British India cannot be taken at less than 120,000,000, and the army little, if at all, exceeds 300,000 men.

Again: the composition of the Anglo-Indian army presents to the eye of the philosophical inquirer one of the most extraordinary spectacles on which it can anywhere rest. Out of the entire disciplined force which we keep on foot and trust, not quite a sixth part consists of Europeans;—all the rest are natives of India of every caste and from every province, Hindoos and Mahomedans taken indiscriminately, and governed by our articles of war. In other words, we make India enslave herself, and rivet the yoke when she has put it on; for we arm a small percentage of the population in each district when we have subdued it, and keep thereby the large majority in subjection. Now it is very obvious that such an experiment must, under the most favourable circumstances, be attended with some risk; and so keenly alive are many thoughtful men to the extent of the danger, that they can think of no other means of meeting it than by making a large addition to the European portion of the army. But this is clearly out of the question. A European soldier is too costly a machine to be multiplied in India unnecessarily; and the remoteness of the sources whence the Indian Government must fetch him, renders a supply of the material in the time of need both tedious and uncertain. The experiment may be perilous therefore, but it is unavoidable, unless we be prepared to withdraw from the country altogether; and it becomes much more than perilous if we fail to connect the native soldier with ourselves by the strong tie of personal interest. Is it quite certain that we have succeeded in so attaching him? That he loved our service and was proud of our uniform sixty years ago, no reader of history can doubt. For him there was no loyalty except to the Government which paid him his wages, and treated him in other respects well. We did both, and he was ready to fight for us against his own father; but can we assert the same thing of him now, and to the same extent? Why then do we hear of whole regiments turning their backs in the day of battle? How is it that mutinies—

events never known till the present century came in— are now so frequent? And in what sense shall we read the general orders of a late commander-in-chief, which seem to describe the army of Bengal, at least, as in a state of almost total disorganisation? These are very alarming signs of the times, to say the least of them; for if the native army be indeed disaffected, nay more, if the *esprit de corps* in any of its portions be destroyed or seriously weakened, it is not too much to say, that unless a remedy be applied, the days of our Indian Empire are numbered. Does any body imagine that it is by the 50,000 English soldiers now in India that we retain military occupation of the country? By no means. Were the native regiments merely to disband themselves and return to their homes, our hold upon the country would not continue three months. And this once lost, not all the available resources of England, were they turned exclusively to that one object, would suffice to recover it. Let us see then what the changes may be which are supposed to have operated not without ill effect upon the *morale* of the Indian army, and then we shall be better able to suggest a remedy, if, indeed, a remedy be needed.

We learn from Orme, the faithful though diffuse chronicler of our early wars in India, that in 1746, at the siege of Cuddalore, the French brought into the field, for the first time, a body of native troops armed and drilled after the manner of Europeans. The English felt the weight of this battalion, and resolved to raise one in like manner, which they did towards the close of the same year. And so important were the services rendered by the Sepoy corps in the military operations which terminated in the capture of Madras, that others speedily followed. These, led on by Clive and his contemporaries, proved themselves equal to every emergency. The defence of Arcot, the action at Volconda, with other affairs too numerous to mention, established for them a character such as left their commanders nothing to desire, and placed an inexhaustible depôt for recruiting at the disposal of the Company. Nor was the example thus set at Madras slow in being followed elsewhere. After the recovery of Calcutta, Sepoy battalions were embodied both in Bengal and Bombay, and side by side with their Madras and European comrades they won the battle of Plassey, and laid the foundations of that power which is now paramount in India.

The constitution of the native army at the period of which we now write was very different from that which it has since assumed. It consisted then exclusively of infantry, who, though drilled after the European fashion, worked both in peace and

war under chiefs connected with the men by ties of consanguinity and clientship. Occasionally, indeed, though not always, there was attached to a battalion a European officer, well versed in the native language, and capable of appreciating the native character. But his duties were rather those of a commissioner or field-deputy than of a commandant; he explained to the native chief the orders of the general, but took no part at all in the arrangements necessary for carrying them into effect. The services performed by Sepoy battalions so managed have been described in the official records of the day as most effective; and the names of Mahommed Yusuf, Jemal Sahib, and others, fill a page in history scarcely less memorable than that which sets forth the exploits of our own Ford, Calliaud, and Coote.

The first marked change in the organisation of the native army occurred in the year 1766, when all the battalions were raised to a uniform strength of a thousand men apiece, and had permanently attached to each of them one European captain, with two European lieutenants.

The duties of these gentlemen, however, scarcely, if at all, interfered with those of the native officers. The captain became to his battalion what the brigadier used to be to his brigade; he gave orders, through his European adjutants in the field and in quarters, which the native commandant carried into effect. But with respect to the internal economy of the battalion, that was still conducted under the native commandant, by one subadar, or native captain, with three jemadars, or native lieutenants, in each company. Hence, though European superintendence might be more widely diffused, it was no where exercised so as to lower the position or wound the feelings of the native officers. They still felt that their rank in society was an elevated one, and were still regarded by the non-commissioned officers and men as their natural superiors. It was about this time, or rather two years subsequently, that a corps of cavalry, divided into troops, was first raised at Madras. It consisted of horsemen, who had originally served in the army of the Nabob of Arcot, and amounted in 1780, when the war with Hyder Ali broke out, to 2000 sabres. "Sir John Malcolm" (we quote from "A Letter to the Marquess of Tweeddale, by Lieutenant-General Briggs") "has passed a very high and merited eulogium on this excellent body of troops, and has given examples of the distinguished character of many of the native officers, all of whom had entered the service of the Nabob, and were in it when the corps was transferred to the Company. The native officers were gentlemen of family and education, and realised the expectation which might be formed of persons of that class. It is at this

period the late Sir John Malcolm seems to think that the native army of Madras had attained its highest state of efficiency. The chivalrous conduct of its native officers, the attachment of the men to their leaders, their patience under fatigue and hunger, their devotion to their European officers, and their fidelity to the state when imprisoned and cruelly treated by the ruler of Mysore,—all tend to throw a lustre over the character of these faithful soldiers.” Nor was the case different in the other presidencies. Bombay in 1780 brought fifteen battalions into the field, raised, organised, and officered like those at Madras, while Bengal advanced from nineteen to twenty-one, adding them to the six troops of native cavalry, six battalions of European infantry, and six companies of European artillery, which she had previously embodied.

It is worthy of remark, that so long as the native armies retained this constitution the battalions got their officers from the native gentry of the provinces, all of whom entered the service as privates, though they rarely continued in that grade more than two or three years at the most. These brought with them their retainers,—every man born and reared on their own lands,—and not unfrequently filled their ranks with Pariars and persons of the lowest caste. Nor did the slightest inconvenience arise from this. Off duty, the Brahmin or Rajpoot could not come into contact with the Sudra, far less touch the Pariar, or eat of food which he had dressed; on duty, they rubbed shoulders freely, and were honestly attached to one another. In fact, to use the words of General Briggs, the native army “consisted then of two classes, of which all armies to be effective must be and have been composed,—one class derived from the better order of society, accustomed to command the services of domestics and underlings; and the other class drawn from the lowest grades, who are from infancy habituated to obedience, and taught to respect the upper class on whom they are dependent.” Meanwhile all young gentlemen sent out as cadets from England joined the European regiments. With these they served till, by the acquisition of the native languages, and by other marks of general intelligence, they attracted the notice of the Government, when one by one they were drafted off into native corps, none being permitted to join a Sepoy battalion until there was good reason to believe that he had qualified himself for the new class of duties thence arising.

It was about 1784 that this wise practice began to be broken in upon. Heretofore promotion went on through the whole line; now it was thought necessary, by way of putting the King’s and the Company’s services more upon a footing of

equality, that promotion up to a certain point should be regimental. In 1781 the rank of major had been introduced, and battalions were divided so as to form two respectively. Hence while each continued to have a captain at its head, the whole, under the designation of a regiment, fell to the charge of a major. But this half measure was not found to answer, and in 1783 it was abandoned. There came in, moreover, an innovation whereby to each company a European subaltern was allotted in command; a serious matter even when guarded by all the checks of which it was susceptible. For though the subalterns thus disposed of were carefully selected, and the feelings of the subadars spared as much as possible, the native gentleman could no longer disguise from himself or from his men that his shadow was growing less. He supported himself, however, tolerably well till the tide which had begun to set in against him acquired greater force. In 1790, and again in 1796, the European element became still stronger, and then, and not till then, the spirit of the native sank within him. Sir John Malcolm in his "Political History of India," speaking of the native army during the war with Tippoo from 1790 to 1793, says, "Though improved in discipline, it had become in some degree a secondary one, and the pride of those who composed it was lowered." Worse effects followed upon the changes which ensued in 1796. Then "the whole form of the army was changed. Instead of a single battalion commanded by a captain who was selected from the Company's European regiments, and a subaltern to each company, regiments were formed of two battalions, to which officers were appointed of the same rank and nearly of the same number, as to one battalion in the service of His Majesty."

Many and great evils followed this change, not the least telling of which lay here: that it was no longer possible to *select* European officers for Sepoy commands; but that as vacancies occurred, raw lads fresh from England, with all their inexperience and inborn prejudices in full flower, were brought forward to supply them. Such boys could hardly avoid coming into constant and painful collision with the native officers, whom they affected to look down upon because their complexions were dark, and did not understand, because they were ignorant of every language spoken among men except their own. But, defective as it was, the duplex arrangement had so far the advantage over that which now prevails, that it was competent to the authorities to select from *both* battalions, for the battalion about to be employed in war, the European officers who were known to be best acquainted with the native character and

habits. And such selections—imperfect of course when compared with those which they superseded—were continually made. But in 1824 battalions were again reunited, without any increase to the numbers of European officers, nor any distinction drawn between the wants of the several arms of the service. Hence a regiment of infantry, with its ten companies, retained its colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, five captains, eight lieutenants, and five ensigns. A regiment of cavalry, with its six troops, was equally well supplied; and a battalion of artillery, which consists of only four companies, did not fall short in its complement. It too showed a muster-roll of one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one major, five captains, eight lieutenants, and five ensigns, all being Englishmen by birth.

The effect produced by these changes upon the native officers, and ultimately upon the service at large, has been deplorable. The former losing all influence and authority in their corps, soon began to degenerate; indeed, the race may be said to have changed its nature altogether. Formerly you had the *élite* of the native gentry in your ranks; now no native gentleman ever thinks of putting on the uniform of the regular army. It would be marvellous if he did; for length of service furnishes, and has long furnished, the only claim for advancement to a commission; and it takes a soldier from twenty to thirty years to earn his subadar's epaulets. Formerly every native officer was an educated gentleman. He could keep his company's accounts, write out orders and despatches, and not unfrequently acted as interpreter, where his European comrades would have been otherwise at fault. All this is changed now. The soldiers of India are the most unlettered men in the country, and the officers, taken from the same class, do not, in this respect, go ahead of the privates.

“In the year 1831,” says General Briggs, “the Commander-in-Chief of Madras was induced to call for a return of the education in the native army; and the following result of that inquiry shows how much it is neglected, and from how low an origin the native army is derived—a conclusion, however, which should not excite our astonishment, when we reflect on the small pay which the Sepoy receives. Education is very general among the people of India; all those forming the middle classes are early instructed to read and write; and few even of the personal domestics of Europeans are so un-instructed as not to be able to keep an account.

“An abstract of the return exhibits the following state of the educated:—

Cavalry and Horse Artillery	726	can read at all out of	4,966
Foot Artillery and Infantry	7,226	”	39,988
Sepoy Recruit Establishment	280	”	4,321.”

“The original return exhibits two very remarkable circumstances which merit notice. These are, first, that in one regiment of cavalry, and in the horse brigade of the artillery, there is not a single native officer or havildar-major (serjeant-major) who can read; and the same occurs in the case of all the subadars of two other regiments of cavalry; so that out of eight regiments of cavalry and two of horse artillery, there are four corps in which no subadar, or native captain, can read. The second, is the very small portion of the Sepoy recruits that can read, and for whose education regimental schools exist. These admirable institutions consist of thirty sons of deceased Sepoys above seven, and forty above twelve years of age, in each regiment, who receive half-pay, and are trained till of an age to enter the army.”

General Briggs speaks here of the Madras army as it was in 1831, with which a service of forty years made him thoroughly acquainted. We beg to assure him that his estimate, *mutatis mutandis*, will serve quite as well for the armies of Bengal and Bombay, and for the Madras army in 1852. We doubt, indeed, whether, in the former force at least, the standard be not even lower than he has put it, though the following facts convey but a melancholy impression of the *morale*, not less than of the intellectual state of the service to which he belongs:—

“From a review of the native courts-martial I find that between the years 1800 and 1830, there were 331 native officers of the Madras army brought to trial on the following charges:—

Drunkenness on duty	-	-	-	-	-	137
Insubordination	-	-	-	-	-	29
Mutiny and sedition, with the intention of murdering the officers	-	-	-	-	-	46
Robbery, usury, peculation	-	-	-	-	-	26
Perjury and subornation of evidence	-	-	-	-	-	5
Absent without leave	-	-	-	-	-	3
Robbery, burglary, theft	-	-	-	-	-	16
Assaults and frays	-	-	-	-	-	12”

Considering that this estimate covers a space of thirty years, we should not be startled by the conclusion to which it leads, were we dealing with the non-commissioned officers and privates of any army in the world. One per cent of criminals is not a large average, but the reverse, in a general armed force. Nor are the crimes here specified different from those which we might expect to find brought home to the individuals composing it. But when one per cent in a body of officers is proved to have committed atrocities like these, we naturally ask ourselves, can they be taken from the class in society whom previous habits have qualified for situations of trust? “In considering this part of the subject,” continues the General, “we

can arrive but at one conclusion ; namely, that the race of native officers who so distinguished themselves under Clive and Lawrence, under Coote and Cornwallis, under Harris and Wellington, no longer remain in our regular army."

We perfectly agree with the General. The native veterans on whom the blow first fell struggled, as they best could, against outraged self-respect. It was very bitter for them to find, that even the practice of selection ceased to be observed ; and that, covered it might be with honourable wounds, they were subjected to the caprices of striplings from England, many of whom had not been born when they entered the service. They endured the wrong, as became them ; but they took care, instead of inviting their sons, or younger brothers, or nephews, to enlist, to warn them against it. Hence the native officers, at all the Presidencies, as compared with their predecessors, have dwindled into a low and degenerate race, in no degree superior, as respects intellect, conduct, or education, to the havildars or serjeants, from among whom they are taken. And to add to the catalogue of their faults, they are in nine cases out of ten inefficient through age ; and incapable, were they ever so much disposed, to support the position of gentlemen, through poverty. The pay of a Sepoy is, we believe, fivepence half-penny a day, out of which he is obliged to find his linen and the materials for keeping his arms and accoutrements in order. It takes him, on an average, from five to seven years to become a naeg or corporal, about ten more to reach the grade of havildar or serjeant, and twenty, or it may be thirty, in all, to earn his first commission, when his pay is raised to one shilling and four pence a day. In his turn he becomes a subadar or captain, with pay at the rate of half a crown per diem ; and, finally, if he live, and his constitution does not fail altogether, he may become subadar major, with five shillings a day. The average age of the native subalterns in the Company's service has been taken, we believe, at forty-five, of the captains at fifty-five, and of the majors at sixty-five, or from that to seventy.

A consideration of these facts leads to one of two conclusions ; first, that if the Indian Government did well in throwing so large a portion of the European element into their Sepoy regiments, they erred in not making that element larger ; next, that if it was right to deprive the native officer of all real authority and patronage, it was wrong to continue the class of native commissioned officers at all. As the case now stands, the whole of these persons, from the subadar major down to the junior jemadar, are positively in the way. The most exalted of them all — the black-faced major — cannot take command of the

battalion as long as there is a white-faced ensign or serjeant-major, or, we suspect, a white-faced serjeant on the ground. And as to his influence in quarters, nobody, we presume, would pretend to say that it is greater than that of a havildar or a naeg. Hence the inability of these people to repress the mutinous spirit which has too often shown itself of late in our Sepoy regiments; and of which, previously to the reorganisation of the army in 1796, there is not one instance upon record. Hence, too, the comparative good or bad behaviour of Sepoy corps, in the enemy's presence, according as they are led into the field by an adequate or inadequate number of European officers. Observe that we do not charge the native officers, as a body, with promoting a spirit of insubordination or with setting an example of misconduct in battle. The Hindoo portion of them, at least, have never, we believe, been known to join in a mutiny; of the Mahomedans we cannot say as much.* And in regard to courage, or its opposite, both classes stand pretty much upon a level with the non-commissioned officers—certainly not a hair's breadth above them. But in the present case it does not appear, either that their authority is of weight enough to extinguish a flame, or that in any recent instance they have been able to give the European commandant notice of the mischief that was brewing. The only fair inference to be drawn, therefore, is, that the commissioned rank just raises them to a sufficient height above their former comrades to deprive them of the hail-fellow-well-met confidence which private soldiers repose in one another, without creating for them in the class from which they have been taken the deference which leads a tenant to make a confidant of his landlord, or a poor man to seek advice, when in difficulties, from a gentleman whom he knows and respects.

It was a great mistake, when we took to officering our Sepoy battalions and companies with Europeans, to retain any native as a commissioned officer at all. His nominal position is an insult to him. It brings with it neither power nor pecuniary gain; it has ceased to be an object of ambition to the class of persons whose services could be of any value; and forasmuch as the rules of the profession render the prize, such as it is, unattainable, except in the decline of life, it is no sooner won than the fortunate individual takes steps to retire upon a pension. Nor is this all. Except for the mockery of the native commis-

* Recent events show, that, among the Hindoo as well as the Mahomedan portion of the army, the feeling of loyalty had died out.

sion, Government would admit the necessity of giving to the Indian army an adequate strength of officers; which, under existing circumstances, it certainly has not. Will any body pretend to say that an English battalion, eight hundred strong, has, upon our present peace establishment, too many officers attached to it? And if eight hundred Englishmen, speaking the same language with their officers, and standing towards them in the relation which General Briggs has so well described, cannot be made effective, as a regiment, with fewer than thirty-three battalion officers, exclusive of the staff, how can it be supposed that eight hundred Sepoys, a mixed mass of Hindoos and Mahomedans, speaking different languages, trained up to different habits, and altogether aliens, in customs and in thought, on every important subject, are to be rightly managed by twenty-two officers? But are there really twenty-two battalion officers present with any native regiment in India? By no means. Such is the demand for European service on the general staff of the army, and so trying the effect of an Indian climate on European constitutions, that not only is this not the case, even in a solitary instance, but that, in a vast variety of instances, less than one half of the regimental officers in the Company's service ever do duty with their corps. Nor is it to be forgotten that even as regards regimental duty, no provision is made in the Company's service for staff employment. The adjutant, the quartermaster, and the paymaster, are all selected from among the battalion officers, thus leaving available for Company duty, supposing all to be present, barely fifteen. Even fifteen, however, is far above the mark. We have not at hand the latest official returns explanatory of the strength and distribution of European officers belonging to the armies of India; but an article in an early number of the "Calcutta Review" sets forth the details of the service as they stood in 1844: and as nothing has occurred since to alter the principle on which the army works, we do not see why we should refuse to make use of our contemporary's tables here. It appears, then, that nine years ago, the Company's regular native army, — cavalry, infantry, and artillery, — consisted of 212,500 men; that to these were nominally attached 4481 officers; that the general staff and the command of irregular corps, absorbed not fewer than 2229; leaving exactly 2253 officers to take charge, in field and in quarters, of 212,000 men. This will give an average of something less than 1 officer to every 93 men; a proportion which all who are conversant with the subject will pronounce to be wholly inadequate, and which, as we learn, drew from Marshal Soult, when he was here, on the occasion of

Her Majesty's coronation, expressions of astonishment that discipline could be preserved in the Indian army at all.*

Again : inadequate as this complement is, the experience of the last eight years has shown that the progress of war, even for a few months, renders it far more so. We have heard of regiments, both in Affghanistan and the Punjab, going into action without being able to show so much as one European officer at the head of each company. We believe that there were occasions when three or four Europeans at the most took their places in the line. Can we expect, looking to the class of natives now dignified with the title of commissioned officers, that regiments composed like those of our Indian army, and so commanded, should behave otherwise than ill? We should not like to see the best regiment under the Crown led into action without having at least one officer per company to show the way. And yet there is affectation of surprise and regret when a Sepoy battalion, under the command of a lieutenant, becomes unmanageable and insubordinate.

Again : there has sprung up, within the last twenty or thirty years, particularly in Bengal, a notion that men of high caste make better soldiers than men of low caste ; and that it will not do to parade together persons who in common life cannot hold familiar intercourse with one another. More or less the same prejudice prevails elsewhere ; but we believe it to be as mistaken as it is mischievous. The high-caste man is the slave of a thousand scruples, which do not affect the mind of the low-caste man. He cannot eat this, and he will not drink that ; to pass the sea in ships is contrary to his religion, and as to working in the trenches, it was shown, at the siege of Mooltan, that to so deep a degradation he never will submit. The Pariar is oppressed with no such weaknesses. He will go wherever he is ordered, and do whatever he is desired ; and, under fire, exhibits as much coolness and courage as the proudest Rajpoot of them all. And in the older and, we must be permitted to say, the better times of the native army, a very large proportion of its regiments belonged to this order.

"The Sepoys," says General Briggs, "who fought the battles of Clive and Coote, who contributed to the humiliation of Tippoo in

* Since this paper was printed, a nominal addition has been made to the number of European officers in each Indian regiment. We believe, however, that this increased strength exists, as yet, only on paper. A certain number of subalterns have obtained captaincies ; but there is still a blank in the lower grades, which new appointments fail to fill up.

1792 and to his downfall in 1799, and who gained laurels under the Duke of Wellington in the campaign of 1803-4, were, like the Bombay army, of a mixed class. The infantry was composed of Pariars, Pullers, and other low cultivators of the Carnatic, and of the Northern Circars, with some few Mahomedans. The cavalry were wholly Mahomedan. In the year 1806, the epoch of the Vellore Mutiny, Government, on what ground does not appear, forbade any recruit to be enlisted for the Madras army of the low-caste tribes, and advantage was taken of that order to discharge all those for which such excuse could be found. An old Raj-put Subadar, whose company I commanded for some years, and for whom I entertained great esteem, considered the measure highly impolitic. 'These men,' he said, 'have ever been faithful, obedient, and brave; and the day will come when you will confess how much higher qualities they possess, as good soldiers, than the Mahomedans, whom it is now the fashion to bring forward.' "

The day predicted by General Briggs's friend has come. Of all the troops in the Company's service, there are none so little to be depended upon as the regular cavalry, and it is composed exclusively of Mahomedans. The best regiments in the service are the Madras Pioneers, recently converted into Sappers and Miners, the Bombay Native Infantry, and the Goorkas. They are all recruited mainly from among low-caste tribes, and, when properly led, will go any where and do any thing.*

Again: we have too much got into the practice of raising an army suddenly when war occurs, or appears to threaten, and as suddenly reducing it when the danger blows over. It is a most unwise proceeding; for he takes but a short-sighted view of the moral uses of the native army who supposes that it operates solely upon the fears of the people of British India to keep them in subjection. Of the 250,000 men composing our Sepoy force, there are probably not 10,000 unmarried. Most of them have families; and all these, as well as the followers of our camps, and hangers-on about cantonments, are interested in the welfare of the government on which they depend for subsistence. Indeed, it is from these persons, scattered over the whole surface of the empire, that our Government receives all its information of plots and conspiracies as soon as they are formed; they act as a sort of detective police, and may at all times be depended upon. But if, in the prosecution of a short-sighted economy, we take to enlisting men, and by and by discharging them

* We have seen with inexpressible regret, and some surprise, that even the army of Bombay is not free from taint. Can this be owing to any ill-judged endeavour to exclude low-caste men from the ranks?

without pensions or other provision against want, we shall not only lose the support of them and of their relatives, but we shall convert every one of them into a conspirator. Let the reader call to mind how fatally the absence of such motives of attachment on the part of the people of Affghanistan told against us. A whole nation conspired for the destruction of the force which had conquered it. Yet the leaders of the force knew nothing of the matter, till the blow fell. The Government of India will act judiciously if it avoid giving an opportunity, by a too frequent discharge of its native soldiers unpensioned, for the formation of similar plots against its continuance in districts nearer home.*

We have not half exhausted this part of our subject, to deal fairly by which would, indeed, require more than double the space now at our disposal; and there are various points besides, more or less connected with it, on which we cannot pretend to touch at all. There is the commissariat of India, for example, which, especially as it affects the means of transport for our armies, appears to us to be as defective as any thing can well be. There is also the armament of our native troops, their clothing, and their equipment, especially of the horse. See how unsuited it is, as well to the physical strength of the men as to the nature of the climate. What is it which renders the regular cavalry of British India in so marked a degree inefficient? Because you mount the trooper on an English saddle, impede his movements with your tight-fitting English uniform, and put into his hands a sabre so heavy that he is unable properly to wield it. And look at your Sepoy or infantry-man,—buttoned up to the throat in a woollen jacket of brick-dust hue, and expected to make play with a musket, fabricated in Birmingham, after the model of such weapons as a stalwart grenadier of the 87th Irish Fusileers is just able to manage. All these things require looking into; and we strongly advise when the Committee on Indian Affairs come to this part of their subject, that they fail not to examine Sir Charles Napier, having first of all carefully read and digested his pamphlet on the “Baggage of an Indian Army.”† But we are constrained, for the present, to pass them by; for it will never do to bring forward a bill of indictment against either an individual or an institution without

* This warning, disregarded at the moment, comes now too late.

† The Committee has long closed its labours, and the gallant Napier passed from the stage. It took no thought of him while his wisdom was present to advise, and the country is reaping the fruit of its negligence.

making, at least, some suggestions for the amelioration of the evils complained of ; and even these — not being forgetful that of all subjects that of Indian administration is, to the majority of Englishmen, the most distasteful — we must endeavour to make as brief as shall be consistent with perspicuity.

The points which we have established against the military administration of British India seem to be three :—

First. That the comparative inefficiency of the native army of India is attributable mainly to the want of an adequate corps of officers, who shall command and obtain the confidence of their men.

Second. That the general condition of the native commissioned officers, their false position in the corps, and the low state of their education, render them all but useless, if not positively inconvenient to the service.

Third. That if we desire to retain India, upon which our only real hold is through the native army, steps must be taken without delay to correct those evils.

As to the other subjects, glanced at rather than discussed,— such as the wisdom of recruiting from classes different from those in which we now seek our soldiers, the providing a better-organised baggage-train and general commissariat,— these involve questions which, though not without their importance, may safely be left to answer themselves. It will be enough for our present purpose if we deal with points more salient.

It appears to us then, that there are two courses open to the Indian Government, by following either of which the armed force of the country may be placed on such a footing as shall render it at all times trustworthy in quarters, and perfectly efficient in the day of battle. Either they may go back to the state of things which prevailed prior to the regulation of 1796, or they must raise the strength of their European regimental officers to the same level with that of the Queen's service. In point of economy the former course holds out many and very obvious advantages, for it is the pay of the European officers, regimental as well as staff, which renders the maintenance of the native army so costly : and though Government must be prepared, if it expect native gentlemen to serve in the ranks, to remunerate them on a scale considerably above that which has been fixed for the present race of subadars and jemadars, still the total outlay on their account would be more than met by the diminution of expense which would attend the reduction of European officers. But before this course be either recommended or adopted, one or two grave questions must be

answered. In the first place, are there left, within the Company's provinces, native gentlemen of sufficient standing and education to undertake so important a charge; and in the next place, assuming that such persons exist, should we be justified, looking to the altered state of the empire, in trusting them? Our own honest belief is, that such persons are still to be found; and we see no reason to assume that they might not be trusted. Look at the irregular corps. They are by far the most efficient, whether as horse or foot, in the native army. Yet they have seldom more than two, and sometimes only one, European officer attached to each.* And as to courage, there never was a greater libel upon human nature, than that which assumes that the people of India are naturally cowards. They were no cowards who met us at Assaye, at Dieg, at Mehedpoor, Sitalbaldy, Maharajpoor, the battles of the Sutlej, and at Chillianwallah. We defeated them on each occasion, no doubt, because of our superior discipline; but it was at a sacrifice of life quite as great, in proportion to the numbers engaged, as occurred at any of the fiercest European battles during the late war. Compare the slaughter which occurred at every one of them, with the loss sustained by the victors at Waterloo, and it will be found to stand thus:—At Waterloo, the Duke lost in the proportion of 1 to 6. The Indian returns show the following ratios:—

	British Loss.
1803. Assaye - - - -	1 to 3
1804. Dieg - - - -	1 to $4\frac{1}{2}$
1817. Mehedpoor - - - -	1 to 6
1817. Sitalbaldy - - - -	1 to $4\frac{1}{3}$
1818. Korygaum - - - -	1 to $3\frac{1}{2}$
1845. Maharajpoor - - - -	1 to 6
1846. Battles of the Sutlej - - - -	1 to 5
1848. Chillianwallah - - - -	1 to 7

Here is no proof of cowardice on the part of the defeated, whose loss, in every affair, except perhaps the last, greatly exceeded our own. Why should we assume that because they serve the Queen of England, Indian gentlemen will not lead, and Indian soldiers follow, as gallantly as when both are in arms against her. Are not the exploits of Skinner's Horse fresh in the memory of every reader of history? Have the terms in which

* Events compel us to modify this praise. The spirit of disaffection has been as strong in the irregular as in the regular cavalry of Bengal; a sure proof that we must look quite as much to our arrangements in civil as in military life, for the cause of it.

Sir Harry Smith spoke of the Sermore and Goorkah battalions been forgotten? And did not Sir Charles Napier convert the robber population of Upper Scinde into as effective a corps of irregulars as ever took the field? We cannot say that either the style or the matter of Sir William Napier's "Administration of Scinde" greatly delights us. The accomplished author has contrived to disfigure a not uninteresting narrative by a more than ordinary indulgence in the luxury of vituperation and hard names. Yet he has done no more than justice to his brother in the following passage, which we quote as strongly confirming the opinions expressed throughout this paper:—

"While the regeneration of the poorer classes was thus urged forward, the just claims of the high-born people of the land were not overlooked. Though a conquered race, Sir Charles Napier regarded them only as English subjects; and resolved to open for them all places of trust and dignity, without objection to colour or religion, demanding only qualification. Mohamed Tora, one of the greatest serdars who fought at Meanee, was made a magistrate, at his own request, the appointment being justified thus:—'The nobles of Scinde must have had the road of ambition opened to them, or they will not have their rights, in the honourable sense of my proclamation; that is, if they qualify themselves for the offices demanded. But in questions of general interest like this, even qualifications should not be required before enjoyment,—we must give first, we must turn out afterwards for incapacity. The class-right will be thus acknowledged, while the man is removed; and if one Beloochee gentleman becomes a magistrate, many will qualify themselves. I want to go beyond this, if the Indian system will allow me; but that system—a rotten fabric of expedients for the supporting of robbery,—is equally destitute of humanity and knowledge of human nature, and will, I suppose, certainly debar the Scindian gentleman of the rights possessed by Englishmen. I will, however, give them all I can. The Beloochee gentlemen may likely enough abuse this power for ten years to come; but we who have conquered the country can surely keep half a dozen such persons in order; and the great men of the land must have a door open for their ambition, their virtues, and their industry, or they will become rebellious or vile; I know not which is worst; but the government which produces either is a detestable tyranny.'"

There is sound philosophy in this, albeit the sentiment be strongly worded; and it is in the spirit of the same philosophy that we certainly should not object to the attempt, judiciously made, to introduce to public employment, both military and civil, Indian gentlemen, wherever they might show themselves qualified. Why should we hesitate to place more Mahomed Yusufs or Bhavany Sings at the head of our battalions, if we can find them,—subject, of course, to the general

control of European officers, carefully selected? Are they more likely to betray their trust than the chiefs whom we employ with our irregular corps; or gentlemen like Mohun Lal, who in the civil department of the army proved himself so useful and so trustworthy in Afghanistan? General Briggs, at least, and the late General Caulfield seem to apprehend no danger; indeed the former goes somewhat further than in the present stage of the business we feel quite disposed to go with him; for he sketches his plan in detail, and recommends it for adoption. But in the summing up of his argument we acquiesce heartily. "In such case young men of family might be received into the army as volunteers, with an understanding that according to their merits and standing they should succeed to commissions. No volunteer should be eligible to his commission before he had served at least two years as a private, one as a corporal or naeg, and one as a serjeant-major or havildar-major of his company."

It is not our business to go into the details of a plan, of the principle of which alone we are ready to express our approval. Should the Indian Government judge it expedient to revert in whole or in part to the military organisation of 1780, ways and means of doing so, without inflicting wrong upon any one, can easily be found. Should the prejudice against placing natives in offices of trust prevail to bar the door to their advancement in the army, there is no alternative left except largely to increase the number of European officers. For apart from the evils that every where follow the attempt to preserve discipline in armed bodies with inadequate means, there is this special drawback to the Indian system, that none except the least intelligent officers in the service remain with their regiments. Indeed, employment on the staff, or in the civil administration of the country, becomes an object of ambition to every well-disposed cadet from the hour of his landing in the country; and he seldom fails, with ordinary diligence and talent, to qualify himself after a few years and to win the prize. Meanwhile the idle, the stupid, the dissolute, and the ignorant remain with their colours; and even of these the numbers become, through casualties of various kinds, often so small, that the regiment cannot show, upon a peaceful parade, one European officer per company. This is a state of things which must at any cost be put a stop to; and every day, while it diffuses the native army over a wider space of territory, renders the application of some remedy to so fatal an error more urgent.

The expense of rightly supplying the army of India with European officers will be in the end very great. There is no

disputing that fact. And another measure, not wholly free from risk, must keep pace with it, namely, the abolition of the class of commissioned native officers; but this latter step need not, any more than the former, be taken precipitately; and a slight degree of caution will suffice, in our opinion, to rob it of all its terrors. For the position of a jemadar or subadar is not coveted by any natives of India above the humblest in point of birth and station; and even these seek it much more on account of the pension which it secures, than because it opens a door of advancement for them in the world. The discharged subadar, when he goes back to his village, relapses into the social place from which by enlistment he had escaped. He sits down in his unfurnished hut, a ryot,—better to do in the world than some of his neighbours, but still only a ryot. The havildar, who on the retirement of the subadar, expected to succeed to the epaulettes, will be quite satisfied if you give him in the meanwhile the pay, and assure him of a jemadar's pension by and by. Thus in time, and after no very great lapse of time, the race will die out. Nor need you push on your increase of Europeans one whit more rapidly than space shall by these means be found for them. We will engage to say that such a measure as this would give offence to no class of our Indian subjects. It might and probably would establish the custom of recruiting from low-caste tribes exclusively; for the low-caste man, as he does not in civil life indulge in ambitious longings, so he enlists for the sake of the pay, and with little or no view to promotion. And he is, for this as well as for other reasons, better suited than the high-caste man to serve in such an army as ours. But it would attract no attention whatever in circles which would be likely to make a bad use of their knowledge, for against them the military service of their rulers is already barred. The measure therefore would be at least safe, though we confess that it could not be made economical or generous.

Again: care must be taken under such a change of circumstances to attach officers permanently to the corps which they first enter. The native soldier is susceptible of strong attachment to his officer, provided the latter understand him, and deal liberally with his prejudices. But the native soldier, under the present order of things, has no time to become acquainted with any except the refuse of his European officers. All the rest are taken away from him for service on the staff, or to fill civil offices which would be far more effectively filled by the native gentry of the district. This state of things must be altered. The Indian officer must learn to look again, as he looked fifty

years ago, to his regiment as his home; and he will then think it worth his while to become personally acquainted with the characters of his men, and to conciliate their good will by fair dealing. Meanwhile such a corps as that of the *État-Major* in the French service may be formed; for admission into which all shall be allowed to compete; but from which, and from no other source, candidates for staff employment shall be chosen. This will still, to a certain extent, deprive the line of the *élite* of its officers; but at least it will render staff situations even more than they are now the rewards of transcendent merit, while it leaves with regiments enough both of *personnel* and of talent to manage them adequately in the field or in quarters. And finally, care must be taken to render superannuation, both in the Company's and in the Queen's service, compulsory. All the improvements in minor matters, which the wit of man can devise, will not render an army effective which has only worn-out old men at its head. And the days are not, we fear, distant, when the importance of this truth will be forced upon us.

We have completed the task which we had set for ourselves. It is for the Indian Government, and the general public, to judge of the manner of its performance. For in respect to the groundwork on which our argument rests, we defy the whole body of Proprietors, with the Court of Directors and the Board of Control at their back, to controvert it. We have won an enormous empire with the sword, which is growing continually larger. We have established a system of civil administration there which protects the peasant, and disgusts all the classes above him. If we could exterminate these classes, or stop education, and reduce 120,000,000 of people to the social condition of cultivators of the soil, then with our army even weaker in point of numbers than it is, we might be safe; for it is not among the peasant classes in any country that seditions and rebellions originate. But this we cannot do; and with a large body of discontented gentry everywhere, and whole clusters of native princes and chiefs interspersed through our dominions, it is idle to say that the continuance of our sovereignty depends, from one day to another, on anything except the army. Now the army is admitted by all competent judges to be very far in many respects from what it ought to be. We too are of this opinion. We have pointed out where some of the gravest defects lie, and suggested a remedy. Others must act as to them shall appear expedient in the matter.

THE END.

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A LETTER
ON THE
INDIAN ARMY,

ADDRESSED TO THE MOST NOBLE THE

MARQUESS OF TWEEDDALE,

MAY 1842,

WITH NOTES APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT TIME,

BY

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOHN BRIGGS, F.R.S.,

OF THE MADRAS ARMY,

AUTHOR OF "INDIA AND EUROPE COMPARED."

LONDON:
HARRISON, 59, PALL-MALL,
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1857.

P R E F A C E.

At a moment like the present, when India is the chief object of interest, and the reorganization of the Native Army of India becomes a subject of vital importance, it has occurred to me that I could not serve the public more efficiently than by publishing the following letter on the character of the Native Armies of India in the year 1842, addressed to the Right Honourable the Marquess of Tweeddale, on the occasion of his proceeding to Madras as Governor and Commander-in-Chief.

ORIENTAL CLUB,
30th Nov. 1857.

TO THE MOST NOBLE
THE MARQUESS OF TWEEDDALE,
K.T. AND G.C.B.,
GOVERNOR AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF MADRAS.

MY LORD,

THE substance of the following communication was put into shape six years ago, on my return from India. It consists of notes made from authentic documents, which I procured before I left Madras in 1835, and the observations and opinions it contains are the result of an experience of more than forty years in the Indian Army, of which nearly thirty-three were spent in the East.

The late Sir John Malcolm, Major Badenach, and Captain Williams, have at various times described the composition of that army; and the instructive and entertaining pages of Orme give a lively picture of its history.—To understand the subject of which I am about to treat, it is necessary to take a cursory view from those materials of the early time, when the native army of India was formed, in order to comprehend the nature of the changes which have since taken place, and have brought it to its present state.—I propose, therefore, compressing, into as narrow a compass as possible, such observations on this subject, as do not appear on the records of the evidence taken in 1832, before the House of Commons, to render more complete that body of important and useful information.

Orme tells us, that, in the year 1746, the French brought a small body of disciplined natives of India into the field, in the siege of Fort St. David, at Cuddalore; and thus describes

them:—"The Sepoys are formed into companies and battalions, commanded by officers of their own nation and religion." In the next page he remarks that, "At this time the English had not adopted the idea of training the Indian Natives in the European discipline, notwithstanding the French had set the example, by raising four or five companies of Sepoys at Pondicherry." Some, however, were entertained in the latter end of that year for the siege of Madras, which were placed under the command of European officers. This measure shortly after led to the formation of regular corps. In the month of June, 1747, five independent companies, of 100 men each, from the western side of India, arrived at Cuddalore, one of which was raised at Bombay, and the four others at Tellicherry. The latter, commanded by a Mahomedan officer, (or, as Orme calls him, a *Moor*), entertained a design to desert to the French in 1748, but the plot being discovered, he was sentenced, together with ten other native officers, to be banished to the Island of St. Helena, where, in the end, they destroyed themselves out of despair.

The capture of Madras by the French, in 1748, and the removal of the Nabob to Trichinopoly, the only position, (excepting Fort St. David), then in the hands of the English, led to the necessity for supplying troops out of the natives of the country.* The first Sepoys embodied on the Madras establishment are stated "to have been either Mahomedans or Hindûs of very high caste, the latter being chiefly Rajpûts." This description must allude to the officers, as Rajpûts in sufficient number could scarcely have been procured in the Madras provinces to form any number of corps. These new levies when brought into action were, for the most part, kept in the rear at first as a reserve, both by the French and the English; but "they soon brought themselves into esteem." At the siege of Madura, in February, 1751, "they stormed with the Europeans, and went to the attack with as much spirit as them." The breach was bravely defended, and they sustained

* Each company consisted of three native Officers, a Captain termed Subadar, three Subalterns termed Jemadars, a Serjeant termed Havildar, and a Corporal termed Naig to every ten men or squad, and ten such squads formed a Company.

a "loss of ninety men and four of their captains, (Subadars,) " who were desperately wounded ;" when Captain Cope, who commanded the storm, felt it right to desist, and to raise the siege.

In the month of August in the same year (1751), Captain (afterwards Lord) Clive, with 303 Sepoys, and 200 Europeans, occupied Arcot, and defended it by incredible exertions ; and in the month of May, 1752, we find Clive at Trichinopoly ; from whence he marched with 300 Europeans, and 1,000 Sepoys, to attack the French General D'Auteuil at Golconda. On this occasion, says Orme, " the Sepoys outmarched the Europeans, " and after driving the French out of their post *at the point of the bayonet*, decided the action before the arrival of the " Europeans."

In the year 1753 one Hussein Ally is mentioned as Commander-in-chief of all the French disciplined Sepoys ; and is found at the head of an Army. This officer had already received a gold medal from the King of France for his gallantry.

In the year 1754 Mahomed Issoof (or Yusuf) is styled by Orme, Commander of the English Sepoys ; and in 1755 he was detached to the south from Trichinopoly in command of an army consisting of some *Europeans* and 500 Sepoys, where he was reinforced by 100 *more Europeans*. Colonel Heron subsequently marched to the south, and co-operated with him, but Mahomed Yusuf retained his separate command. In the end of the same year, we find a Subadar, entitled Jemal Saheb, left at Madura, in command of 1,000 Sepoys.

At this period (1755) the Madras establishment comprised 2,000 European Infantry, and 14 battalions of Sepoys, amounting to 10,000 men, each battalion had one native Commandant and an Adjutant, both mounted officers, besides one Subadar, to each company. In the field a European Commandant (usually a Captain), and several Serjeants, were attached ; one to each company, not to command it, but for the purpose of explaining the orders of the European Commandant, and of directing the movements of the corps, the internal discipline and economy of companies being confided to the native officers.

In the year 1756, the Madras Army comprised nearly all the British troops in India. There were a few independent companies of natives belonging to the Bombay Establishment; but in Bengal there were no regular troops, excepting one corps of 500 men, denominated Europeans, but which included several native Portuguese and Caffres. This body was maintained solely to protect the factory on the Hûgly. At this crisis Calcutta was attacked by Siraj-ud-Dowla, and 2,000 Buxaries (irregular matchlock men) were raised, but they were insufficient to defend the place, which fell, together with all the British territory in that quarter, into the hands of the Nabob Siraj-ud-Dowla.

At this important juncture Colonel Clive, with 500 European soldiers, two battalions of Madras Sepoys, and one Bombay independent Company, amounting in all to 1,500 natives, embarked from Madras and re-took Calcutta in January, 1757; shortly after which he began to raise native troops in Bengal. These were supplied with European officers from the Madras detachment, on the spot, and subsequently by others from the same establishment. By the month of June one of these corps (late the 2d battalion, 12th regiment) was ready to take the field, and joined the army which fought and gained the Battle of Plassey. This army consisted of Europeans from

Madras	:	:	:	500	
Mixed corps from Calcutta	:	:	:	400	
				900	
Two Madras battalions and one Com-pany of Bombay Sepoys			}	1,400	
One Bengal battalion				700	
				2,100	
Total				3,000	

These Madras Sepoys continued in Bengal till 1759, when they were sent back to aid in the capture of Masulipatam.

In the latter end of 1758, the fort of Madras, which had been long before restored to the English, and had since been properly fortified, was besieged by the Conte De Lally, who brought with him all the French troops he could muster. On this occasion, Mahomed Yusuf, Commandant, was detached

from Trichinopoly, by Captain Richard Smith, with a force of 2,000 Sepoys, expecting to be aided by 1,000 Maratta Cavalry from Tanjore. In the event of this body not joining him he was authorised to raise a corps of 500 horse for the British service, which he was eventually compelled to do. On the 1st of December, 1758, he besieged and took the fort of Elvasanore from a French garrison commanded by Lieutenant Dumesnil; and on the 6th of the same month, he attacked and carried by storm the fortified pagoda of Tricolore; on which occasion he lost 75 men killed and wounded. From Tricolore he proceeded towards Madras, laying waste all the French territory on his route till he reached Chingleput, where he arrived on Christmas day, 1751, at the head of three battalions of Sepoys, and 1,000 Cavalry, chiefly enlisted by himself on the march. He was reinforced at Chingleput by two more battalions, which had been sent to join him; making his command altogether 3,500 Sepoy Infantry, besides Cavalry. Capton Preston, the Commandant of that station, jealous that so fine a force should be under a native officer, joined it with 80 Europeans, 600 Sepoys, and two brass three-pounders from the garrison. The Madras government, however, permitted Mahomed Yusuf to retain his command separate, in co-operation with Captain Preston; and shortly after Major Calliaud, having arrived from Trichinopoly, assumed charge of the whole at the Mount, where he was joined by the Prince Mahomed Abdul Wahab, the brother of the Nabob Mahomed Ali Khan.

During the siege of Madras, Mahomed Yusuf made two or three vigorous attacks on the French army in the suburbs, while Jemal Sahib who had been recalled from the South and was now within the fort, headed two successful sallies from the garrison. The one on the 16th, and the other on the 21st of December. On the latter occasion he drove the French before him out of their trenches, and spiked two guns. The siege of Madras was at length raised on the 15th of February, 1759, after a duration of forty-two days open trenches.—An example of the character of Mahomed Yusuf is afforded by his conduct in the capture of Conjeveram. This town was defended for the French by one Muzafar Beg, a native Commandant, who had deserted from the English, and whose name was held in execration by

the English Sepoys on account of his perfidy. The army destined to attack Conjeveram consisted of 1,150 Europeans, and several battalions of Sepoys, the whole under the command of Major Brereton. One of the two attacks made on the place was conducted by Mahomed Yusuf, which succeeded; while that under Major Brereton failed. The Commandant Muzafar Beg was taken prisoner, and was about to be carried to Major Brereton, when Mahomed Yusuf meeting the party escorting him, and apprehensive that a pardon might be extended towards him, severed his head from his body on the spot with a single stroke of his scimitar, saying, "These are the only terms to which a traitor is entitled."

In the storming of the fort of Masulipatam, in the same year, Colonel Ford, who brought back with him the two battalions of Madras Sepoys from Bengal, speaks in the highest terms of their bravery. In 1760, Colonel Coote assumed charge of the Madras army; and in his report of the conduct of the troops at the taking of Permacoil, states, "the Sepoys behaved equally well with the Europeans." On that occasion three native officers were killed while leading the Sepoys to the storm; and their loss on that day amounted to 110 killed and wounded out of 300. Bahvani Sing Subadar, who was particularly distinguished, received a gold medal for his conduct.

Up to this time the native troops had been commanded by European officers attached to them only on particular occasions; but their whole internal discipline was left to the native officers. In 1766, the Madras Sepoys were embodied into battalions of 1,000 strong, subdivided into 10 companies; and one European commander, with two subordinate officers, were selected and appointed to each corps. In 1770, this number was increased to 28,000 men, and formed the native infantry which fought against Hyder, under Sir Eyre Coote.

The first corps of Cavalry raised at Madras was a regiment formed into troops under Sir Henry Cosby, in 1768; and to which were attached other European officers. These troops were in the service of the Nabob of Arcot, and their numbers were gradually increased, till in the war with Hyder, which broke out in 1780, they amounted to 2,000 men. They served with great credit during that war, which terminated in 1784,

when the Nabob's Cavalry were permanently transferred to the Company's service.

Sir John Malcolm has passed a very high and well-merited eulogium on this excellent body of troops, and has given examples of the distinguished character of many of their native officers, all of whom had entered the service of the Nabob, and were in it when the corps was transferred to the Company. The native officers were gentlemen of family and education, and realized the expectation which might have been formed of persons of that class. It is at this period the late Sir John Malcolm seems to think the native army of Madras had attained its highest state of efficiency. The chivalrous conduct of its native officers, the attachment of the men to their leaders, their patience under fatigue and hunger, their devotion to their European officers, and their fidelity to the state when imprisoned and cruelly treated by the ruler of Mysore—all tend to throw a lustre over the character of these faithful soldiers.

The armies of Bengal and Bombay kept pace with those of Madras. The former army, in 1765, consisted of 19 battalions of 1,000 men each, formed into ten companies, of which those on the flanks were denominated grenadiers. The native officers consisted of a Commandant and an Adjutant, mounted; and a Subadar and three Jemadars to each company. To every battalion were attached three select European officers, one to command, and two subordinates as staff. The Army was separated into legions or divisions, styled Brigades, each consisting of

1 troop of Native Cavalry,
1 company of European Artillery,
1 battalion of European Infantry
7 battalions of Native Infantry.*

In 1773, four European regimental officers were attached to every battalion. In 1781, the battalions were subdivided, and two formed a regiment; each regiment was commanded by a Major, each battalion by a Captain, and each company by a

* Some such disposition of the Indian Army, with at least double the number of Europeans, might, with a well regulated militia or police like that of Ireland, be advantageously adopted at the present period.

European subaltern *selected* from the whole body of officers, who rose in line. In 1783, the appellation of regiment was discontinued, the rank of Major was abolished, the former organization was again reverted to, and one European subaltern officer was *selected* to command each company.

The Bombay Army consisted originally of independent companies commanded by Subadars raised for service at Madras. They reached Cuddalore, as we have seen, in 1747; and one of these companies proceeded to Calcutta, and fought at the Battle of Plassey in 1757. Between that period and 1780, the Bombay Army had been so increased that at the latter period it consisted of 15 battalions formed into companies, as at the other presidencies. In 1783, this army was reduced to six battalions, and was on all occasions distinguished for its gallantry and attachment to its European officers. Subsequent to the termination of the war with Hyder, in 1784, gradual changes took place in the constitution of the native army, on which I shall proceed to dilate; but as my information is more complete with regard to that of Madras, I shall treat more particularly of the effect of those changes on that body. Up to that time the discipline of the Sepoy army had been entrusted principally to its native officers, having only three Europeans—that is to say, a commanding officer and two staff to each corps, with only a few serjeants serving under the native officers, to facilitate communication with the European commander and his staff; but the constitution of the native army remained essentially unchanged. It was, in effect, the same as when first formed; improved only in its discipline and regularity. It consisted of the two classes of which all armies to be effective must be, and always have been composed:—one class derived from the better order of society, accustomed to command the services of domestics and underlings; and the other class drawn from the lower grades, who are from infancy habituated to obedience, and taught to respect the upper class on whom they are dependent.

The former class composed those officers which are the subject of our admiration in the narratives of Orme, and in the relation of the late Sir John Malcolm; to the accuracy of whose testimony there are still living witnesses. The organi-

zation of our native army differed little from that of the native Princes, which is preserved in all those distinguished bodies of irregular cavalry which were, and still continue, in our service. In this I include those corps in the service of native powers, commanded by European officers drawn from our regular army. The native troops thus organized have occasionally performed feats surpassed by no soldiers of their class in the world.

Subsequent to 1784, more Europeans were attached to native regiments; and the respectability and consequence of the native officers began to be encroached on;—so that in the next war against Tippoo, which lasted from 1790 to 1793, the Sepoys were scarcely ever employed but under European officers. The war, too, was carried on with a greater body of European troops, and Sir John Malcolm, in his Political History of India, adverting to the altered state of the Sepoy force, observes, “The native army, though improved in discipline, had in some degree become a secondary one; and the pride of those who composed it was lowered.” In a subsequent part of the same work he alludes to the more serious alteration which was carried into effect at Madras, only in 1798, consequent on the re-organization of the Indian army in 1796, and says, “The whole form of the army was changed. Instead of a single battalion commanded by a Captain who was selected from the Company’s European regiments, and a subaltern to each company, regiments were formed of two battalions, to which officers were appointed of the same rank, and nearly the same number, as to one (battalion) in the service of His Majesty.” In an essay on the native army, published in the Quarterly Review, in 1818, it is remarked—“The good effects of this change, as far as related to the temper and attachment of the native army at Fort St. George, have been questioned by an officer of that establishment, who was, from local experience, well qualified to judge.”

The most material change in the new arrangement consisted in the mode of filling up vacancies among the European officers. These were no longer the élite of the Army, *selected* for their qualifications; but promotion went on in regimental gradation, and the completion of casualties took place by the nomination of Cadets, direct from England, who succeeded to

the command of companies, as vacancies among the other European officers occurred. The patronage and authority of the native officers were transferred to the Europeans. Native veterans—perhaps covered with wounds, and distinguished in the field as officers in the regiment before many of the European striplings commanding them were born—naturally lost all their influence and respect; and from that time no men of the same class as the original race of native officers have entered the service. The transfer of the power of the native officer to the European might have been attended with an improved state of discipline, and perhaps of fidelity; but in superseding the old race of native officers, their place ought to have been filled by Europeans, for the continuation of a body of native officers necessarily derived from the lower grades of society, since they rise usually, by rotation, from the ranks, and rarely obtain commissions before 20 years' service and upwards, was a great oversight: first, because these men become discontented when they do obtain commissions on finding that they never attain command; and secondly, because, while they exist, the number of European officers are deemed by the government fully adequate to the duty of commanding the men, since in former times they were managed by a smaller number even than at present, forgetting altogether that in those times the native officers were really efficient. Each battalion, with its native commandant and native officers, had hitherto offered an honourable provision for young men of family who entered the army with the promise and hope of early promotion to a commission, owing to his having connexions in the service.

Of the Bengal Army, Sir John Malcolm and Major Badenach state that the infantry is composed, two-thirds of Hindûs, and one-third of Mahomedans; while in the Cavalry and Artillery the ratio is inverted. The Hindûs of the Bengal Army are Rajpûts, a military tribe which occupies almost all the soil in the countries in which they are recruited. They for the most part follow the pursuits of agriculture; but where the land affords them no employment, they prefer the military profession to any other. Their pay on entering the service, after making allowance for the expense of linen, pipe-clay, heel-ball,

and the stoppage made for the supply of small stores, yields them little more than a day labourer, and less than many menial servants, whose offices their pride would not suffer them to undertake. The habits of these Hindûs are frugal and sober; drunkenness is hardly known amongst them; and they are excellent soldiers, in spite of some prejudices which they inherit, and which are indulged by their European officers much more than on the other establishments. The pay of the cavalry and artillery is better than that of the infantry, and into those corps the Mahomedans, who have no prejudice against taking care of their own horses, enter more willingly than the Hindûs.*

Of the composition of the Bombay Army, Sir John Malcolm

* By a Return made to the India House in 1842, the following represented the different sects in the ranks of the regular Bengal Army.

Regular Infantry, Christians	1,076
Mahomedaus	12,411
Brahmins	24,840
Rajpoots	27,993
Hindus of inferior casts	13,920
				80,249
Regular Cavalry, Mahomedans	2,088
Brahmins	1,132
Rajpoots	789
Other Hindus	135
				4,144
Total, Christians	1,076
Mahomedans	14,489
Brahmins	25,972
Rajpoots	28,782
Other Hindus	14,045
				84,393

Of this body the whole of the Cavalry and two-thirds of the Infantry are in arms against the Government, and the others have been disarmed by force.

Besides the regulars there were raised for service in the Punjaub twenty-three regiments of Infantry, one corps of Guides, and five regiments of Cavalry. The Infantry and the Guides have remained loyal, and have fought gallantly against the mutineers, most of the Cavalry have proved false. The former are composed mainly of the Sikh forces late in the service of the Government, which are subverted, and who have no common sympathy with the sects of the mutineers. The latter are for the most part Mahomedans, and joined in the attempt to reinstate a Mahomedan Empire. All this class of troops are commanded by select European officers, with only three or four in each regiment.

has spoken, and Captain James Grant Duff, an old and highly intelligent regimental officer, who filled the office of regimental staff in an infantry corps for many years, says, that “They were chiefly Marrattas from above and below the ghats in the “Deccan, but principally from the southern Concan” at a time when those countries were in the hands of the Peshwa. Some were Mahomedans of Surat and Bombay, from whom were derived many of the most respectable of the old native officers. Of Purwaries and D’hers, a very low caste, but frequently very intelligent, excellent soldiers, there were considerable numbers; there were also a few Canarese and Nairs from Malabar, the latter deeming themselves a military race. Besides these there were some Jews, commonly drunken, but invariably brave men. In modern times (that is to say, since the last Marratta war) the Hindûs of the provinces of Hindûstan, from whence the Bengal Army is recruited, have been much sought after for the Bombay Army. They are a taller, stouter, and handsomer race of men than the Marrattas: but after all, they are foreigners, and ought not, I think, to be too largely introduced. The proportion in 1835 was—

Hindûstanies	12,476
Concan Marrattas	10,015
Decanies including Mahomedans	1,910

All the achievements of the Bombay Army (and they were not a few) were performed by the mixed classes, before the Hindûstanies were introduced; and although the latter may be reckoned as equally brave soldiers, I conceive that, unless recruits are not to be obtained in the territories of the Bombay Presidency, the recruiting from Hindûstan should be discouraged; for I think it good policy to maintain those national distinctions which exist among the different Native Armies, and which invariably lead to emulation when the troops of the several Presidencies are brought to act together. There will be fewer desertions also in the field when the men leave part of their pay with their families in our own provinces.*

* The numbers of the different sects in the Bombay Army have not been satisfactorily given in the return of 1842, and no later has been received. It is believed that the Hindûstanies considerably exceed what they did in 1835, when my return was made, and that they may be fairly

The Native Officers of the Madras Army, in early times, are said to have originally consisted of Mahomedans and high caste Rajputs. Many of the descendants of these Rajputs entered the army for the sake of promotion ! and when I came into the service, in 1801, some of the most respectable of our native officers were of this description. The Sepoys, who fought the battles of Clive and of Coote—who contributed to the humiliation of Tippoo in 1792, and to his downfall in 1799 ; and who gained laurels under the Duke of Wellington in the campaign of 1803-4—were, like the Bombay Army, of a mixed class. The infantry was composed of Pariahs, Pullers, and other low cultivators of the Carnatic, and of the northern Circars, with some few Mahomedans. The cavalry were wholly Mahomedan. In the year 1806, the epoch of the Vellore mutiny, Government, on what ground does not appear, forbade any recruit to be enlisted for the Madras Army, of the low caste tribes ; and advantage was taken of that order to discharge all those for which such excuse could be found. An old Rajput Subadar, whose company I commanded for some years, and for whom I entertained great esteem, considered the measure highly impolitic. These men, he said, have ever been faithful, obedient, and brave ; and the day will come when you will confess how much higher qualities they possess, as good soldiers, than the Mahomedans whom it is now the fashion to bring forward.

The corps of Madras Pioneers, lately converted into Sappers and Miners, has always been, and still continues to be, composed chiefly, if not entirely, of low caste men. That corps has been always commanded by European officers *selected* from the line. There has been no service since the earliest times in

equally divided into Brahmins and Rajputs. They are recruited from the same provinces which supplied the mutineers of the Bengal Army, and the several instances of outbreak in the Bombay Army have been confined to them and to those Mahomedans, who are derived from the same quarter. That the Bombay regiments have not been so successful in destroying their officers and joining the mutineers of Hindustan is to be ascribed solely to the number of Marattas and men of the lowest castes, tribes which still remain in the hitherto loyal Army of Bombay.

The irregular corps in Sind, though for the most part Mahomedans, have maintained their loyalty to the British Government.

which it has not participated; and it has accompanied every expedition by sea. The weapons of a sapper are his hoe, his axe, and his mattock. His duty is to construct roads, often in the face of an enemy, and under a heavy cannonade; to form trenches during sieges; to lead assaults; and to carry the ladders by which the troops are to enter fortifications, either at the breach, or by escalade; no duty is more harassing, nor trying to the temper, the courage, and the health of men than is the life of our Indian sappers; but this corps has on every occasion covered itself with honour. There has never been an instance of disaffection in it; and in the field it has excited the admiration of every class of the army.

Official returns are sent in monthly by Regiments of the Madras Army, shewing the relative number of Hindus and Mahomedans in each; from which return the accompanying abstract was formed in the year 1835.*

MAHOMEDANS.			HINDUS.		
	Native Officers.	Non Comsd. rank & file.		Native Officers.	Non Comsd. rank & file.
Cavalry . .	151	— 3,518	Cavalry . .	7	— 448
Artillery . .	40	— 949	Artillery . .	25	— 1,021
Infantry . .	516	— 14,901	Infantry . .	375	— 25,084
	<hr/>	<hr/>		<hr/>	<hr/>
Total . .	777	— 19,368	Total . .	407	— 26,553

The Cavalry and the Horse Artillery are almost all raised in the populous town of Arcot. It is, in truth, the recruiting depôt of the mounted portion of the service. The town is full of pensioned and invalid soldiers and native officers, and perhaps this circumstance imparts an "esprit de corps" which exists in no other branch of the service to the same extent. The high character this body has ever held it still retains. There are no instances of sedition, like those which have marked the corps of Infantry during the last thirty years, though those mutinies have originated in a Mahomedan spirit; and Sir John Malcolm has truly remarked, "That in punishing the mutineers of Vellore, the swords of the native Cavalry were as deeply

* This does not materially differ from the return made to the India House in 1842.

“stained with the blood of their deluded brethren and fellow-soldiers as were those of the English Dragoons.”

In the year 1831, the Commander-in-Chief of Madras was induced to call for a return of the state of education in the Native Army; and the following result of that inquiry shows how much it is neglected, and from how low an origin the Native Army is derived—a conclusion, however, which should not excite our astonishment when we reflect on the small pay the Sepoy receives. Education is very general among the people of India; all those forming the middle classes are early instructed to read and write; and few, even of the personal domestics of Europeans are so uninstructed as not to be able to keep an account.

An abstract of the return exhibits the following state of the educated :—

	Who can read at all.
Cavalry and Horse Artillery	- 726 out of 4,966
Foot Artillery and Infantry	- 7,226 out of 39,985
Sepoy Recruit Establishment	- 280 out of 4,321

The original return exhibits two very remarkable circumstances which merit notice. These are, first, that in one Regiment of Cavalry, and in the Horse Brigade of Artillery, there is not a single Native Officer, or Havildar Major (Serjeant Major) who can read;—and the same occurs in the case of all the Subadars of two other regiments of Cavalry; so that, out of eight regiments of Cavalry, and one of Horse Artillery, there are four corps in which no Subadar (or Native Captain) can write or read. The second is the very small portion of the Sepoy Recruits that can read, and for whose education Regimental Schools exist. This admirable institution consists of thirty sons of deceased Sepoys above seven, and forty above twelve years of age, in each regiment, who receive half-pay, and are trained till of an age to enter the army.

Referring to the proportion of the Hindus and Mahomedans in the Madras Army, we find the former exceed the latter in the proportion of 7 to 5 in the Non-Commissioned Rank and File; whereas, among the Commissioned Officers the proportion is nearly 2 to 1 in favour of the Mahomedans. This excess of

Mahomedans over Hindus in the Commissioned ranks is more apparent in the choice of officers to the rank of Subadar Major, where we find out of 59 there are only 16 Hindus and 43 Mahomedans.

In the case of officers who have received orders of merit for distinguished services in the field we do not perceive the same difference, for of these, though there are 50 Mahomedans, there are also 27 Hindus. Orders have at different times been issued to recommend the Hindu and Mahomedan Non-Commissioned Officers for promotion alternately, but reasons have always been found to evade the orders, nor would such a rule be just while the proportion of Hindus so greatly predominates. The promotion should rather be made in proportion to the numbers of each class. But the real cause of this partiality towards the Mahomedans arises out of a circumstance which I shall proceed to explain.

The Madras Infantry is recruited in the Provinces of Telingana north of Nellore, wherein the Telugu language alone is spoken, and in the Carnatic south of Nellore, wherein the Tamul language prevails: the Mahomedans born in these provinces speak the language of the nation as well as the Hindustani, the language of their original country, which is for the most part unknown to the Hindus. The European Officers are required to learn the latter language alone, and therefore can communicate freely only with the Mahomedans, who speak that language. In consequence of this, the European Officer and Hindû Sepoy, on entering the army, have to learn a foreign language. The European is bound to acquire it, to fit him for his duty; but the same necessity is not imposed on the Hindû; for the whole regiment (with the exception of the European Officers) speak his language as their own native tongue. The Telugu Hindûs, if they enter the service young, contrive to understand, and often speak Hindûstani; though seldom sufficiently well to recommend themselves to their European Officers. The Tamul Hindûs, however, from the peculiarity of their native dialect, seldom, if ever, pronounce the Hindûstani language so as to be understood. These causes have tended greatly to retard the promotion of the Hindûs in the Madras Army. In the Bengal Army, the Sepoys speak Hindûstani alone; but in the

Bombay Army, where the Hindûs, for the most part, are Marrattas, a knowledge of their language is required to qualify an Officer to fill the office of a perfect Interpreter, and an increased pay is given to one so qualified. The result is, that many Officers of the Bombay Army read and write Marratta with facility.

In the year 1799, the war with Tippoo was very unpopular among the Mahomedans, and some cases of desertion in the Madras Army occurred on the march from Masulipatam to the southward, brought about by the influence of some Mahomedan Officers. During the war, several Mahomedan Native Officers of Infantry actually went over to the enemy, but they eventually suffered death, by sentence of Court Martial.

In the year 1806, the mutiny of Vellore was only part of a general disaffection of all the Mahomedan Infantry, more or less, on the Madras Establishment, which had for its object the destruction of the European Officers, and the restoration of the family of Tippoo.

In the year 1812, a very serious mutiny broke out at Travancore, which also aimed at the murder of all the European Officers on the spot. The plot was discovered and checked, by the vigilance and vigour of the local authorities. On that occasion ten Native Officers were tried, and condemned to death, though not executed. Several privates, however, suffered.

In 1832, an endeavour was again made in the Madras provinces to rouse Mahomedan hostility against our power; and two distinct attempts, within six months, occurred at Bangalore, to render our Government unpopular; and in the latter case it was certainly intended to have murdered the European Officers.

It is worthy of remark that, in the whole of these instances, no Hindû Native Officer was ever implicated; the plots having been matured, and in one instance carried into effect solely by Mahomedans.

The recollections of the subversion of the power of the Nabobs of Masulipatam, of the Carnatic, of Cuddapah, of Karnool, and of the Mahomedan sovereigns of Mysore, is still fresh in the memory of the Mussulmans. Their faith requires them to convert or to slay all other sects, and their Priests or

Fakirs, to whom they are devotedly attached, inculcate these doctrines. Sir H. Russell, in his evidence before the House of Commons, has adverted to the influence of these bigoted fanatics; and from his long residence at Hyderabad no one had a more favourable opportunity of observing it. On the whole, therefore, I consider the undue encouragement afforded to Mahomedans, as non-commissioned or commissioned officers, in the Madras Infantry, is much to be deprecated.*

The numerous instances of disaffection in the Madras Infantry, in which the Native Officers have been the leaders, seems to have suggested the idea of improving their condition, or of attaching them to the State by rewards. The pay of the Subadars has been raised to three grades, according to length of service. Honorary presentations of horses and palankeens, with increased pay to maintain them, were made; and lately even native titles and insignia of rank have been bestowed on them. In some cases, grants of land to descend to their posterity have been conferred, with other rewards. The attention to the comforts, and a just reward to the claims, of the native soldiery, was never carried farther in any military body than it has been in the Madras Army; and though no troops have behaved better in the field, none have been so deeply stained with the guilt of mutiny and sedition in time of peace. The steps that have been taken at Madras to attach the Native Officers to our Government have certainly not succeeded; whilst at Bombay and Bengal, where the same class have not enjoyed similar advantages, more fidelity and less pretensions have distinguished them.

* The sanguinary character of the Mahomedans, their bigotry and their religious zeal and phrenzy are too well known in Europe to be here insisted on. Like the Jesuits, they believe that every convert made by a true believer advances him towards Paradise in the next world, and that death in the cause of religion ensures a place in Heaven. With such convictions we need not be surprised to find the Mahomedans availing themselves of every opportunity of making proselytes, and when to this is added the regret and shame attendant on the loss of their power, we must always be prepared to meet the disaffection of this body of our subjects in India. This, however, may be effected without altogether excluding the Mahomedans from the army or from civil offices, as long as we can hold out to them sufficient motives for loyalty and dread of punishment

I have already shown of what description were the Native Officers in the Madras Army, before the organization of 1796, previous to which no such mutinies ever occurred. In the present day, the native officer must rise gradually from the ranks. He enters as a private, on a pay little superior to that of the lowest domestic of an European's establishment. He serves in the ranks, as a sentry, for fourteen or fifteen years, and in as many more; if he conducts himself properly, he passes through the non-commissions till he obtains an officer's commission. Such is the career of the greater part of the native officers of our army: and the following table exhibits the class of society from whence they are derived.

It has already been seen that, among the several races of India, some are extensively educated; that in this respect our native army is very deficient, and will hardly bear a comparison with the better order of domestics; from this class the present race of native officers is derived, and a return of the crimes committed by this body will serve to illustrate, at once, the description of persons of which the native commission ranks are composed.

From a review of the native courts-martial, I find that between the years 1800 and 1830, there were 331 native officers of the Madras Army brought to trial; and that of these 267 were convicted and sentenced, on the following charges:—

Drunkenness on duty	127
Insubordination	29
Mutiny and sedition, with the intention of murdering their officers (all Mahomedans)	46
Bribery, usury, and peculation	26
Perjury, and subornation of evidence	5
Absent without leave	3
Robbery, burglary, theft on liquors and public stores	16
Assaults and affrays	12
	<hr/>
Total*	267

In considering this part of the subject, we can arrive but

* This number, out of about 1160 native officers, during thirty years is

at one conclusion; namely, that the race of native officers who so distinguished themselves under Clive and Lawrence, under Coote and Cornwallis, under Harris and Wellington, no longer remains in our regular army.

The effect of the organization of 1796 on the native commissioned part of our army, was not foreseen. The native officers, compared with their predecessors, have dwindled into a low, degenerate race, superior in no respect to Havildars or Serjeants; and it is not asserted, by the most experienced European officers, that they fulfil any duty that the latter might not equally perform. The number on the Pension and Invalid Establishment, at Madras, amounted, in 1831, to more than two-thirds of the effective strength; and, indeed, the inducement to retire is so great, that it is difficult to retain any Subadars of the higher grades in the service.

The necessity for keeping up this useless and expensive class is urged as presenting a final reward to the native soldier in order to secure his fidelity and attachment; but it appears to me that the continuance of the present system, with all its evils and defects, is an error, and that the same end may be attained in a less expensive manner. Few if any Sepoys on entering the service, have any expectation of becoming Officers. The contingency is so remote, the time of probation in the junior grades is so long, and the chances of success among so many is so small, that the abolition of the *commissioned ranks* altogether would, I believe, have little or no effect on the temper of the Sepoys, if it were attended with any plan for improving their own present condition. The only part of the army likely to complain would be the Native Officers themselves, and the non-commission ranks: and it is these classes which it would be politic and important to reconcile to the adoption of any new measures that may be desirable. The measures I propose are of a character that would, I think, have that effect, without involving the state in much expense; but I shall defer the subject for the present, till I have said something concerning the European

infinitely small. It is a singular fact, also, that while the mutinous spirit has been confined to the Mahomedans in the Madras Army, there does not appear a single instance where it has been necessary to bring a native officer of any sort to trial for misconduct in the face of an enemy.

Officers. Sir John Malcolm, in his Political History of India, observes, "It is to our European Officers we must chiefly trust for the safety of our Empire; in case of any division among them, it will soon verge to its decline. The competency, the spirit, and the loyalty of this class constitute our strength." Every day brings with it a confirmation of the justice of these sentiments.* During the time I served in the Native Army, two events have occurred which created a clamorous disaffection among the European Officers. I allude to the period of Sir George Barlowe's government at Madras, in 1809; and to the half-batta question in Bengal, in 1829. On both these occasions the grievances complained of were partial, and, in some measure, unreal. Such, however, was the general excitement produced, that I question if there had been even one hundred Officers, of rank and influence, born in the country and attached to the soil by ties of consanguinity, whether the division alluded to by Sir John Malcolm would not then have taken place. It is awful to contemplate the consequences that might ensue in such a case. Let us imagine, for instance, one or more of the subsidiary forces intriguing with, and eventually transferring their services to, the native Princes, and securing a tract of country for their support. Imagine, I say, if at the same time the whole body of Officers in the Army were discontented, and a large portion disaffected, what might be the result. It is through the leading men of communities whole masses are directed or controlled; and the officers, both European and Native, must be kept in humour, if we expect to govern India through the agency of our army. As Sir John Malcolm has justly observed, our Eastern empire has been gained by the sword, and can only be sustained by it, in spite of the most just and excellent laws. Our rule must for ever be offensive to the people. Composed as the European part of the native army now is, England has little to apprehend from the defection of her sons: the connexion with the mother country is too close and too firmly rivetted to be broken asunder. The

* To the number of European Officers who were separated from the mutinous regiments, and became available as volunteers with the loyal troops, is due the success which has crowned the efforts of our small but gallant bands at the present crisis in different parts of India.

prospect of pensions in their native land, the land with which all their early associations are connected; the land in which their relatives reside, and in a climate to which all more or less must resort for health; these are the ties which now secure the loyalty of the European officer to the British government, and which scarcely anything can unbind. In proportion as these ties are strengthened, the safety of India will be secured, and it has been justly said that "the competency, the spirit, and the loyalty of this class, constitute our strength." These sentiments are, I believe, those of every statesman who has made the Indian government his study.

I have shown that, before 1796, the efficiency of the Native Army was preserved by *selecting* European officers to command single corps, and by the nomination of other *select officers* of experience to aid them in each; and that then was the period when the Sepoy Army was most efficient. A material change, indeed I may say a totally new organization, of the constitution of the Army took place at that time: when half the number of field officers allowed to regiments in the Royal Army, and half the number of European regimental officers, were appointed to the Sepoy Army, who virtually took the place of the old native officers. The advantage of selecting European officers for Sepoy corps was greatly diminished; but there still remained the alternative of filling up vacancies in one battalion, by selecting officers from the other.

In the year 1824, an entirely new scheme for remodelling the European branch of the native Army was adopted. The plan of the regulations of 1796 was lost sight of, and battalions of infantry were formed into separate regiments. Instead of the European officers bearing a proportion to the number of companies, that is to say, one Captain and three subalterns to each squadron of Cavalry, or grand division of Infantry, an equal number of every rank was distributed to regiments, without reference to the number of men, of troops, or of companies.

To each regiment of Infantry and Cavalry, and each battalion of Artillery, were attached

1 Colonel,

1 Lieutenant-Colonel,

1 Major,
5 Captains,
10 Lieutenants,
5 Ensigns ;

as if each regiment of Infantry and Cavalry, and battalion of Artillery, consisted of an equal number of companies and troops ; whereas at the time a regiment of Infantry consisted of ten companies ; a regiment of Cavalry of six troops ; and a battalion of Artillery of four companies.

If the regulations of 1796 limited the selection of European officers for native corps, from the whole line to the two battalions of each regiment, the arrangement of 1824 narrowed the field still more, since, in the event of a corps being weak in European officers, either in taking the field or during a campaign, the vacancies can only be supplied by raw youths from England—youths without experience, or knowledge of the language or habits of the men, or of their own duty. It is true that on such occasions officers on the general staff (two out of each regiment) are, in all practicable cases, directed to join ; but their long absence from regimental duty, their ignorance of the men, and the consequent want of confidence of the latter in such officers, render them less valuable than if they had been all along performing regimental duty.

In the two wars that are now waging, in Affghanistan and in China, it will be found that in almost every regiment some companies of Infantry are wholly without European officers ; and after the review I have taken of the organisation of the Native Army, I would submit to any officer who ever served a campaign, what can be expected, even from the best troops in the world, so destitute of efficient officers. With regard to the European regimental officers, it is notorious that the best of them are selected for staff duties or for civil employ ; that the least efficient of the seniors are left with the corps, and the great mass of them consists of the youngest and least experienced. I leave out of view the native officers who, I have shown under the present system of recruiting and promotion, can never stand higher, in point of respectability, than serjeants ; and who, from the very circumstance of holding com-

missions, become discontented, and are more noxious than useful.

It will naturally be asked what remedy I propose. In reply, I beg to be understood now to confine my remarks to the Madras Army.* I would require, as a general rule, that the promotion to the grade of lance corporal (confined by regulation to the recommendation of the officer commanding the company) should be made with reference to the proportion of the Hindûs and Mahomedans in each regiment, a rule not to be departed from except in very special cases of good conduct; that the same rule should extend to Subadars Major, who should be selected from the line in each branch, and be liable to removal from one corps to another. With respect to European officers, it ought to be a standing order that no officer should have charge of a company, or *draw the company allowance*, till he had passed an examination in the *vernacular* language of the regiment. This order, I feel confident, will be the only effective mode of securing equal justice to all classes and races in the army. I would by no means suggest any sudden innovation into the existing state of things: we ought

* The late events confirm rather than shake my opinion of the necessity of abandoning the system of raising Native officers from the ranks. I am also of opinion that it is inconvenient, if not dangerous, as it has proved in Bengal, to fill our ranks with what are deemed men of caste. The lowest tribes,—the Agrestic slaves, namely, the Pariahs and Pullers of the Carnatic,—formed the great mass of the Madras Infantry till 1806, before which time mutinies were unheard of. The Parwarries, or Nags of Bombay, formed a large portion of that army, till the rage for Hindûstania prevailed, after the Marratta war of 1817-18, and no more loyal or efficient troops ever existed. In India, where the pay is, and always ought to be, higher than that of an unskilled labourer, we shall have no difficulty in obtaining recruits from the lower classes. Neither agricultural Hindûs nor Mahomedans need be excluded; but we have seen how dangerous it is to give a preponderancy to the Mahomedans, or to permit the priesthood, with all their power and prejudice, to enter our army at all. Let priests confine themselves to their clerical duties, but not wean men's minds from their secular duties to the Government they serve, and which feeds them. Every native regiment in India should be composed of those castes or sects who have the fewest prejudices against Europeans or their habits, who should be prepared to perform the duties required of soldiers under all circumstances which should be clearly explained to every recruit on his enlisting. The articles of war should be periodically read by companies on parade.

to avoid by all means evincing distrust towards any particular class; but justice and policy both require that we should restrain that overweening disposition towards the Mahomedans, who from habit, religion, and past reminiscences, are by far the most discontented and dangerous portion of the community in the south of India.

I have exhibited, I think forcibly, that which has been so repeatedly brought before the home authorities—the total want of European Officers with our native Army in India; but I maintain that it is not so much the want of European Officers as of *efficient Officers*, in whom the men might confide. Time was, as has already been shown in the early part of this letter, when in the days of Mahomed Yusuf, Jemal Saheb, and Clive, no troops could be more efficient than the Sepoys under their native Officers, directed only by European minds. Whoever has served of late years with those bodies of Cavalry denominated Irregular Horse, whether exclusively raised for our service in time of war, or acting as auxiliaries and furnished by our native allies, and directed by one or two European selected Officers, will bear testimony to the chivalrous spirit of those troops on several occasions, and to their fidelity and discipline on all. It is not necessary, therefore, that if a change of system be adopted, we should incur the heavy expense of filling the ranks of the Native Army with the same number of European Officers as exists in the other armies of the world, but that the masses should be commanded in detail, by persons of a higher order than those which now compose the Native Officers of the Army, who are neither respected by those above them, nor by those over whom they are placed. I have no hesitation in saying that unless this be effected, our Native Army will, from day to day, decline in character and lose its utility.

The question is one of immense importance, and must not be passed over cursorily. The late Sir Thomas Monro, a high authority on almost every question regarding India, was of opinion that the proportion of European to native soldiers ought to be as one is to ten; and speaking of the former, when he served with them, this number would have been sufficient; but I should think, *constituted as the army now is*, more than

double that proportion of Europeans in India will be desirable.*

Still it would be a fatal error to suppose that we ought to desire to lessen the number of our native soldiery in India. In the first place, their expense is as one to three compared with Europeans. In the second place, the natives are alone fitted for the fatigue duties of campaigns in the tropics, where the constitutions of Europeans must too soon fail. But above all, the great moral influence obtained over the people by having so considerable a portion of the population dependent on, and attached to our Government, ought not to be lost sight of. There are now not fewer than 270,000 native soldiers under arms in India. Every Sepoy is married, and most of them have

* Unfortunately the mad conduct of the Bengal army must shake the confidence of their surviving officers, and even those of the other Presidencies, in the fidelity of native troops. It becomes very important, therefore, that the cause or causes of the outbreak should be satisfactorily traced. My own conviction is, that nothing short of religious phrenzy was first communicated by their priests (the Bramins) to the Hindûs of the army; and when we know that nearly half of this body was composed of the priestly order, we may easily conceive how readily they succeeded in inspiring their comrades with an apprehension of loss of caste by applying to their lips the fat of an animal whose life they hold sacred, and with which it was stated their rifle cartridges were greased. Finding the Mahomedans in the regiments did not sympathise in this feeling, they added to the report of beef suet, an admixture of hog's lard, though in reality the Government caused the cartridges to be made up in the regimental stores with a composition of vegetable oil and bees' wax. The apprehension of a design on their religion spread through the army, and might have extended to the whole population, but for the circumstances which led to the mutiny at Meerut on the 9th of May and the flight of the insurgents to Delhi. There the rebellion assumed a new feature. It became a political movement in favor of the Emperor of Delhi, whose dynasty had been extinguished by the Mahrattas three generations ago. The great bodies of the mutineers were landholders under the Mahomedan King of Oude, recently deposed, whose cause they openly espoused, and the original religious feeling of the Hindûs fortunately became absorbed in a war for the restoration of the deposed Mahomedan Princes.

In this object the Sikhs of the Punjab, the Hindû Princes of Upper India, Hindustan, Malwa, and Rajputana felt no interest, the great body of the Hindû population of our own territories afforded our troops all the aid they dared to do, and the great danger of an extensive religious insurrection, which might have spread throughout India, was averted by the turn given to the rebellion by the mutiny at Merût.

families;* to these may be added the numerous sutlers and camp followers, with their families; and thus we shall find that not fewer than two millions of individuals in the army alone are interested in the welfare and prosperity of our Government. It is to this circumstance mainly we owe the fidelity of a large portion of our native population; and to which we may ascribe the prompt intelligence we obtain of plots and conspiracies that are and will continue to be daily concocted against us, but which are now nipt in the bud before they arrive at maturity. We have lately had a fatal example of the absence of such motives of attachment, in the want of information in Affghanistan, where a whole nation rose in arms against us, while the ruling authority had no intelligence of the wide spread disaffection till after it burst forth at once in all directions.

The foregoing reasons appear sufficient for keeping up our Native Army in India, the question of restoring it to efficiency, by supplying it with officers, is our present difficulty.†

Amongst all the persons examined before the House of Commons in 1832, the sentiments of the late Major David Wilson, of the Bombay Army, coincided with an opinion I ventured to suggest to the present Governor-General of India, when President of the Board of Control, more than twelve years

* This is only applicable to the lower tribes of aborigines and Hindûs of which our Indian Army ought in future in a great measure to be composed. The Mahomedans, the Bramins, and the Rajputs, leave their families at home. Those of the other classes which accompany their regiments are useful to their male relations in preparing their meals, procuring fuel, and even in earning a livelihood as camp followers. They will always form a restraint on the men in preventing mutiny at the risk of their own lives in its suppression. If the Bengal mutineers had had their families with them they would have afforded an effective check against the commission of the enormities perpetrated by their savage husbands and relatives, and the mutiny in the shape it assumed could not have occurred.

† The number of our army in India, as compared with that of England, appears large; but as the area and population of the former are more than six times greater than the latter, it ought, for the ordinary purposes of securing internal tranquillity and protecting its vast extent of position, to be more than thrice as large as it has ever been. In comparing the British forces of India (native and European) according to its area and population, with those of Europe or the United States of America, the army of India is infinitely small.

ago. Admitting the inefficiency of the actual practice of providing the Indian Army with native officers, it occurred to me that we should improve this branch of the service by partially reverting to the system which prevailed before 1796, when our Sepoys were most efficient. That is to say by gradually restoring to the native officers those motives for the better classes to enter our army which then existed, but which have since ceased. I have been long enough in the Army to recollect some of those respectable officers who were still in the service when I first entered it, and who had fought under Sir Eyre Coote in the wars with Hyder Ali. They have since gradually become extinct, and their places have been filled up from the ranks. In order to afford an opening for the entrance of young men of family, or in easy circumstances, to the service, we must ensure them higher pay and more rapid promotion ; but above all, that kind treatment which is certain to follow if commanded by a few well selected European officers, as is at present the case among the irregular troops. To effect this, a gradual reorganization of the Infantry might take place by transferring the Native Officers of a few regiments into an equal number of others, and doing the same by the European Officers, selecting four European officers for the corps in which then would be the native officers. Two of which European officers should officiate as field officers and two as regimental staff. The number of Native Officers to each company should consist of one subadar or captain, and two jemadars, to be denominated 1st and 2nd, as subalterns, with a native subadar major and an adjutant, both to be mounted officers. I would require that in future no Native Officer should be promoted till he had passed an examination, which should comprise an acquaintance with the regulations of the service, together with so competent a knowledge of reading and writing as to be able to read the articles of war and keep his company's books and accounts. That this qualification should be required of serjeant-majors of companies, from which body might in future be selected all Native Officers.

In such case young men of family might be received into the army as *volunteers*, with an understanding that, according to their merit and standing, they should succeed to commissions. No *volunteer* should be eligible for his commission before he had

served at least two years as a private, one as a corporal (or naig), and one as a serjeant-major or havildar-major of a company. To form a regulation of this sort would necessarily involve many considerations and arrangements, the details of which could not be discussed in a letter.*

Although I have long thought that some such measure was absolutely necessary to provide for the deficiency of officers in the Native Army of India, yet it appears to me there never was a time when this subject demanded more attention than the present. That army is at this moment distributed over a space from Aden in the Red Sea, and Carrack in the Persian Gulf, on the west,

* It has been frequently asserted, that whereas the native army was never so faithful or so efficient as in early times when there were but three or four European Officers to each regiment of a thousand men, and as no greater number is now requisite for the irregular corps, either of infantry or cavalry, the necessity for an increased number of European Officers is not apparent.

Those who argue in this way overlook two very important points. The first is, that till the organization of 1796, the Native Officers were of a superior class, enjoying considerable patronage in their corps, and privileges of enlisting relatives often too young to do duty, of having private servants from the ranks, and of providing for their families and dependents by other indirect means. These were abuses, but they sufficed to make up for the small pay the Native Officers received, ensured their importance, and made it worth their while to enter our armies.

As regards the European Officers too, the officers of every branch of the service rose in one line, and none but those who possessed due qualifications were attached to native regiments.

The organization of 1796, as has been stated p. 11, changed all this. The native country gentry left the service. An insufficient number of Europeans took their places, and it was long before the latter were fit to occupy them. There was no longer a line of succession from whence to select officers for the military and civil departments of the army and other duties; recourse was had to the regiments. These became the school for the general staff, and latterly for the supply required for the irregular corps. The latter have since been framed on the same principle as our early native battalions. The officers are the gentry of the country, and the privates partly their own followers or peasantry, and of the class accustomed from their position in civil life to look up to them with respect. But as I have said before, (p. 27,) we never can have an efficient native army without efficient officers, and we cannot have efficient European Officers without being first trained in regular native corps.

The present system would have worked well enough if the vacancies caused by permanent removal from regiments were filled up, and the regular corps kept at all times complete in European Officers.

as far as the China seas, and the Islands of the Pacific on the East, over an extent of 50 degrees of longitude, equivalent to about 3,000 miles.*

When I reflect on your Lordship's extensive military experience, on the momentous duties which you have undertaken as Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Madras territory and army; and when I connect these circumstances with your Lordship's character, I cannot believe the topics I have ventured to discuss can be viewed with indifference.

I still feel, however, that some apology is due from an individual who is wholly unknown to your Lordship, for having obtruded, unsolicited, his opinions on your Lordship's consideration.

That apology will, I trust, be found in the magnitude and importance of the subject, and in the disinterested zeal I feel in promoting, as far as my humble talents and experience permit, the welfare of Her Majesty's magnificent empire in the East, and the future efficiency of the services to which my life has been devoted.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's faithful

And devoted, humble Servant,

JOHN BRIGGS.

* This letter was written when the news of the disastrous retreat from Affghanistan had not yet reached England.

The organization of the Bengal Army has first to be considered, and when that is completed the gradual corresponding alterations might be introduced into the armies of Madras and Bombay, but above all things let us never forget how dangerous it would have been had the three armies been amalgamated, or had the tendency to enlist the whole from the North Western provinces, and from Oude, with Brahminical priests and their fanatical devotees, extended to the armies of the Madras Presidency.

INDIA AND EUROPE COMPARED,

BY

LIEUT.-GENERAL JOHN BRIGGS, F.R.S.,

OF THE MADRAS ARMY.

ALLEN & Co, LEADENHALL STREET.

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.

ATHENEUM, *London, Saturday, July 4, 1857.*

The Indian Statesmen of the past day—of whom Malcolm, Metcalfe and Munro may be regarded as types—understood better than their successors of the kid-glove school how to win and how to rule the country. The author of *India and Europe compared* is one, and not the least distinguished, of the old school. His knowledge of all that relates to India, is at once profound and practical, and his opinions deserve to be heard with deference.

We draw attention to his valuable remarks on a subject of grave and pressing interest which the recent news has endowed with *a new life*—"the policy to be adopted towards native states." Nothing we imagine can be more just than his remarks; and the student of Indian history will at once recall those of Sir John Malcolm on the same subject. General Briggs's argument will at least make the partisans of annexation pause. We commend the chapter to their attention, and the book generally to those who wish for a brief but lucid summary of Indian statistics

EXAMINER, *June 27, 1857.*

The work is, in fact, a skilful and excellent epitome of the present condition of our Indian Empire, by an accomplished and experienced oriental scholar and statesman. We strongly recommend General Briggs' book to our readers, assuring them that they will find it at once the most concise, authentic, and freshest account of our Indian Empire, with its 170 millions of inhabitants, to which they can have recourse.

MORNING ADVERTISER, *Nov. 24, 1857.*

General Briggs treats of subjects of grave and enduring interest, and whose consideration belongs more to the future than the past, as being of such a nature it recommends itself to the study, as well as the mere perusal of those to whom the question of what we have hitherto done with India is subsidiary to the more important one, of what we shall do with it hereafter. To such, General Briggs addresses himself in their studies of our gigantic Eastern Empire, extending from the shores of the Red Sea over the intermediate continents and islands to the Yellow Sea in China.

In the present work, however, he has wisely confined himself to India, a continent in itself; the character of the information he imparts may be learned from his own epitome. "I have referred to its magnitude and the extent of its population; to the character of its inhabitants and their institutions; to its resources—military, financial, and commercial, to its public works, its educational condition, the form of its government at home and abroad, the future prospects of the people, and, finally, the chance of foreign invasion." To all these subjects General Briggs brings an extensive personal and practical knowledge, and his observations on each are clearly and plainly expressed; nor does it detract from their value that they appear to have been penned before

the present mutiny became known in England—on the contrary, the event rather adds weight to warnings and suggestions made before its occurrence.

As regards the Indian question, namely the future government of India at home, the gallant General is of opinion that the present nominally double government must merge into one solely responsible Board; composed like the Board of Admiralty, of a Ministerial First Lord, and a small number of junior Lords, taken from men who have had practical experience in the civil and military services in India, appointed for life, and properly paid.

ECONOMIST, *May 23, 1857.*

This is a good and timely book. It is a very brief but well condensed epitome of the principal responsibilities of our government in India, and the state of things out of which these responsibilities grew.

It does not pretend to be more than an epitome, but it traces out in the mind just that clear outline map of Indian affairs, with some indication of the points in which the several difficulties, which is needed before any sources of minute detail could be consulted with advantage. But short as it is, it is executed with great ability, and the judgment of the writer seems to us as sound as his knowledge.

A GLANCE
AT THE PAST AND THE FUTURE
IN CONNECTION WITH
THE INDIAN REVOLT.

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL H. T. TUCKER, C.B.,
LATE ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY IN BENGAL.

LONDON:
EFFINGHAM WILSON, ROYAL EXCHANGE.
1857.

“If you see man or boy striving earnestly on the weak side, however wrong-headed or blundering he may be, you are not to go and join the cry against him. . . . At any rate, remember that he has found something in the world which he will fight and suffer for.”—TOM BROWN’S SCHOOL-DAYS.

THE INDIAN REVOLT.

CHAPTER I.

At a time when the eyes of all men are open to the glaring errors and imperfections in our Indian system of government, which has resulted in such a revolt and mutiny as cannot be paralleled in history, and when the columns of every newspaper have teemed with suggestions and plans from many who, before the realization of this fearful catastrophe, were content to repose in placid indifference and apathy, I feel impelled, in offering a few remarks for the consideration of those interested in the welfare of our fellow-countrymen in India, to reproduce a few extracts from the cautions and warnings which, in 1852, when all was peaceful and quiet, I ventured, at the cost of grave imputations of being an alarmist, to publish in an Address to the Proprietors of East India Stock. The subsequent alteration in the terms of the Company's charter induced me to forego my design of canvassing that body generally, but I printed and distributed no less than 400 copies, of which many were circulated to persons in the highest positions, and filling the most important situations both in India and in England. The elaborate Address I had prepared commenced as follows. Paragraph 1 :—

“I beg to solicit your support in view to my election as one of your Directors for the management of the affairs of the East India Company.

“It is proper that I should state to you the grounds of my appeal, and I have thought it also incumbent on me to explain generally the views and opinions I entertain in regard to the system and policy it is desirable to pursue in conducting so difficult, so peculiar, and so vast a Government as that of the British Empire in the East.”

At Paragraph 7, I observed that—

“The stability and internal tranquillity of our vast Indian pos-

sessions require, in the chiefest degree, the constant vigilant attention of the Governing Authorities, both in Europe and in Hindostan. Our extensive conquests since the commencement of the present century have perhaps enlarged our dominions to the utmost extent necessary or desirable, but we may nevertheless find it impossible, consistently with safety and good policy, to arrest the tide of conquest. On the East, on the West, and to the northward of us, still remain powerful, turbulent, and in some cases warlike and ambitious neighbours. As with Bhurtpore formerly, so probably will it be with the kingdom of Nepal. A second war will some day be entered on to decide the final mastery, and our peaceful and fertile plains will witness the descent of an army of warlike and well-appointed Goorkahs, with possibly Thibet and China at their back.’

After entering into various details, in which, among other matters, I enforced the necessity for “*confirming and consolidating our supremacy,*” and observed that “to strengthen and secure our centre, and the long line of the Himalayan frontier, should be now, and during the years of peace, the subject of grave consideration and deliberate and scientific arrangement,” I entered, at Paragraph 12, on the subject of the Native Troops. It runs as follows:—

“No considerations can be more important than those connected with the discipline and welfare of the native forces in India. Within the last twenty years much has been done in each of the armies of the three Presidencies in view to improvement, and it is to be hoped with effect. But fanciful and mere theoretical changes, however well intended, prove often fallacious when practically applied; and that some erroneous steps have been taken of late years, in regard to the increase of pay and allowances to the Sepoys, can scarcely, I fear, admit of a doubt. To retrace our steps on such occasions is sometimes impracticable, or, at the least, dangerous and unsafe, and we can do nothing at the price of disaffection. Those who hold the reins of Government, whether at home or in India, should never be forgetful of the fact that our armies are composed of mercenaries, not of national troops; and that when, in the course of events, they shall become nationalized, it must necessarily be in opposition to foreign rule and domination. Our conquests, which have brought so many kingdoms and provinces under one form of Government, together with our system of education and freedom of the press, are gradually *nationalizing India*. For the sake alike of the governed and those who control them, it is desirable that the just and philanthropic views which have actuated our Statesmen in introducing these and

other measures of amelioration, should be slowly, even tardily, progressive; and if this, as I conscientiously believe, is applicable to the great mass of the people, it assuredly, and in tenfold force, applies to the native troops of India in European employ."

And again, in the following paragraph:—

"We have carried to the very verge of prudence a system which was and is admirable while kept within due bounds. We have been so successful that there is danger of our becoming too secure; but the tens of thousands which compose our armies in the East, are simple mercenaries, opposed to us as much in faith, nation, and feeling, as in colour. We should be sedulously careful, therefore, *to maintain a just equipoise*, for our real strength does not consist in overwhelming bodies of mercenaries,—these may indeed one day constitute our chief weakness,—but in the numbers, the valour, and the discipline of our fellow-countrymen. These, and our European officers serving with the native troops, we should increase and foster as far as the means and finances of the State will admit, for on them we must depend when troubled and stormy times shall hereafter arise; while we should be ever on the watch to avoid that false and specious system that in its result would convert useful and obedient auxiliaries into greedy, pampered, and overbearing Pretorians."

In the foregoing, I endeavoured earnestly to attract attention to the necessity for maintaining "a just equipoise" between "the overwhelming bodies of mercenaries in our employ, and the European national troops;" and to enforce attention, I added: "It is not without a motive that I advert to these grave matters, for although no alarmist, I hold *that it is fatal to slumber on in a fancied security*." It may be asked by some intelligent reflective reader, But did this paper ever reach the eye of any one in authority, having power to inquire and move in such a business? My reply is, Yes, many; but I give one proof. I printed this paper at Simla, in the beginning of August, 1852. I sent a copy to Lord Dalhousie, then in Calcutta, and had some correspondence with him on the subject; he uttered no word of dissent in reference to my estimate of the dependence to be placed upon the Sepoy troops; but his own words will be a convincing proof that he thought them just, and that my becoming a Director of the Company would be productive of good. I am not aware that in making this use of them I infringe on any received etiquette; I am not using them in order to attack his Lordship, but to show that I did make known my opinions in the very highest quarter, and that if no inquiry or reform followed, I at least

may claim to be exonerated from any charge of blindness or supineness. *Speaking before the event*, I think it will be allowed that I could scarcely have said more, for I was filling at that period a very important situation, that of Adjutant-General of the Army in Bengal, and I was liable to be called upon both to explain and justify my opinions. From Lord Dalhousie's communication, to which I have alluded, I extract as follows:—

“ Government House,
“ 16th August, 1852.

“ My dear Tucker,

“ The intimation you give me of your views towards the Direction, does not take me quite by surprise; and I shall be heartily glad to see them accomplished.

“ I doubt I can aid you with little beyond good wishes. When I was appointed to this Government, I did not know one of the Court, except — and Mr. —. Besides these I can't say I know any now, but those who have been in the Chair.

“ It does not seem to me that they will let you start while you are employed. But if they do, as whenever they do, I will most readily write to those whom I do know among them. — asked me (with the same object in view as you now propose to yourself) to write to him if I thought well of him, and say I wished him success. I was not vain enough to suppose this would be of much use. He thought so, however, and if it was useful then, it will probably be equally or more so now. If you should think so, I shall be truly glad to do it whenever you express the wish. Always yours sincerely,

“ (Signed) DALHOUSIE.”

At Paragraphs 15 and 16 of my Address, I entered upon the state of the Civil Government; that was a matter requiring delicate handling, for no persons are more easily aroused than the Bengal Civil Service of the present day, when any hint is given that they do not appear to be altogether infallible. Nevertheless I wrote as follows:—

“ As regards the civil administration, there is still avowedly a wide field open for amelioration; much has been done, much remains to do. The state of trade and manufactures, the revenue, the encouragement and improvement of the agricultural system, the condition of the native press and its tendencies, as at present exhibited, the construction of railroads and other scientific works and discoveries which can be made applicable to the East, each

and all demand the most careful attention; and the fostering aid, guidance, and support of Government are essential to the well-being of these interests in India, and in many cases to the perfect development of the great resources of the country.

“The state and efficiency of the civil courts, their adequacy to the ends in view on their introduction, also, require to be looked into with a jealous and precise scrutiny; for on the purity and simplicity with which we administer law and justice to the natives of the country, the prolongation, stability, and popularity of our rule will, in a great measure, ultimately depend. I feel constrained to avow candidly that, in my opinion, great defects at present exist, and that the venality which is stated to pervade our courts of law is a theme of condemnation throughout the country, chiefly attributable, however, even among themselves, to native venality and falsehood, and in a great degree also to the insufficiency of European superintendence, a supervision which, I may observe, cannot judiciously be dispensed with until a higher moral sense and far greater integrity of thought and conduct shall characterize the natives, who are quick to observe, keenly apprehensive, and quite capable of distinguishing between those *ad captandum* acts which have merely a popular tendency, and those which emanate from a pure and true spirit of philanthropy. Those rare acts and judgments which stand the test of time, and which, often at first unpopular, confer nevertheless a just fame hereafter, are never lost upon them; and European domination will therefore sustain no shock and lose no ground in the native mind, by the pursuance of a firm, cautious, and circumspect system of government; on the contrary, our rule will be raised greatly in their estimation by observing that we are not hastily carried away by new systems and plausible theories, nor easily led into the adoption of unexpected, fanciful, and ill-digested measures.”

Now I will avow that I look upon the Indian Civil Service as composed generally of a most zealous and admirable body of men; but I think, notwithstanding, that great defects exist in its constitution, and that it has of late years much deteriorated: that it has become too exclusive, too much of a “vested interest,” and so puffed up with self-complacency, in consequence, that it is almost impossible for the sentiments and opinions of an outsider to penetrate within the circle of its clique-like reserve. Like the unhappy native army, it has been pampered, petted, and indulged, until it cannot stand the least control or opposition, and I am greatly in error if the corre-

spondence of the Court of Directors will not show that of late years, even in the Council Chamber, unseemly, disrespectful, and insubordinate letters were addressed by the civilians of that body to the Honourable Court. Hence, when the present mutiny broke out, the opinions of independent military men were disregarded, and when officers of conduct, courage, and experience were writing from the seat of Government, that "we had *only* now to fight for it," the civilians in the council of Lord Canning were hugging themselves in the belief that the crisis was past, that the mutiny was stifled, and that an undue and unnecessary outcry had been raised! Where, it will be asked, was the Military Secretary to the Supreme Government of India at this time? What were the counsels and opinions of that officer at such a crisis? More of that hereafter. His acts shall be given in the words of an eye-witness on the spot—one who has manfully dared to speak out. The very simple reply to be given to the question here, is, that the Military Secretary was "nowhere." Except for evil, he does not appear to have even found a place. Another proof of the impolicy of advancing men to high and important positions, who have no sterling merit, and whose rise is due to mere favouritism and that pliability of disposition which bespeaks a ready partisan, while it betokens the reverse of that honest independence so necessary to the just and upright discharge of important public duties.

To recur—at Paragraph 17 of the Address to the Proprietors, I observed that the number of civilians should be greatly increased, but "not by a temporary and makeshift system, such as that of borrowing by wholesale from officers of the army, by which practice the military service is so much injured in its efficiency."

And at Paragraphs 18 and 19, I thus wrote:—

"It has been, with great justice, thought a duty to foster and promote education in India; but education generally diffused will necessarily produce new desires and suggest new objects of ambition; the process will, it is to be hoped, prove gradual, but we should prepare for it, not only with reference to our own, but with advertence also to the future interests of the people of India. The apparent apathy and indifference of the Hindu will assuredly give place by degrees under this system to feelings of patriotism, and a natural craving to exercise as well as to emulate that exalted and ennobling virtue, the desire to promote the welfare of their country, which so generally characterizes the natives of the West.

"The effect of that extension of our Empire which the course of

events has forced upon us, has been to produce an internal though almost an unconscious pressure, but which must necessarily greatly increase; and the difficulties attendant on the Government of so vast a country will be increased with it, for we cannot expect the natives of India to remain stationary. Our conquests are consolidating and becoming by degrees nationalized; but it should be remembered that dominion, equally with "glory," may be likened to those circles in the water which never cease to enlarge themselves, "till by broad spreading they disperse to nought!" In brief, our difficulties and dangers augment with our greatness, and with every prostrate and conquered kingdom, we are raising up a united internal force and pressure, which it will require all the wisdom and all the prescience our statesmen can bring to bear upon it, to regulate and control; and it is therefore essential to the well-being and interests of our own country, no less than of India, that she should be ruled and governed by those whose practical knowledge, observation, and experience will guide them to correct views and sound policy."

From this document it will, I think, appear, that I was fully alive to the imperfections of both our civil and military system, and that I desired to draw attention to it, and to aid in reforming it. I have had little opportunity for either. The door is now practically closed to the East India Direction, except to such as have interest with the Minister, or are connected with influential and aristocratic families; and, although in the situation I filled in India I did my utmost to lessen the danger of our position, yet, as it was then impossible, *in the face of all received opinion*, to dilate and insist upon the danger to be apprehended from mutiny and revolt among the Sepoys, I was able to effect but little; what I did attempt I shall briefly advert to in another chapter.

Meanwhile, in reference to what is stated at Page 4, of the "erroneous steps" taken to increase the pay and allowances of the Sepoys, it appears desirable to give an idea to the home reader of what these steps sometimes were, to enable him to understand the peculiarly unwise nature of the system often adopted in dealing with these mercenaries: one instance will suffice. It may be broadly stated, in round numbers, that the pay of the Sepoy amounts to seven rupees per mensem: with that sum he is required to feed and support himself. Certain articles of military clothing are besides supplied to him from the State; but for his food and clothing generally, and the support of his family, when he has any, this is the sum which he ordinarily receives. It is very ample; as a general rule, he saves one-half

of it, and often more, for so covetous and penurious are these high-caste men, that they will often literally half starve themselves to add to their savings; and I have positively known the medical officers of corps (than whom no class of public servants in India are more intelligent and meritorious) report men for thus denying themselves a sufficiency of food, and who, in consequence, had become so weak and emaciated as to be obliged to go into hospital!

A few years since, notwithstanding, it was thought desirable, for the sake apparently of mere change, for nothing really called for such a measure, to "better the condition" of the Sepoy, and it was resolved on the part of Government to increase their pay, and to add to it one rupee monthly, after sixteen years of service, and a second additional rupee after twenty years of service in the grade of private: these additions were to be called good-conduct pay, and could only be drawn for when the man's conduct had been unexceptionable for a previous period of two years. The theory of this very impolitic and foolish increase, which took annually a very large sum from the public exchequer, without being productive of the least corresponding good, was this:—it was contended by the advocates for the change, that by giving such increases of pay after sixteen and twenty years' service, the Sepoy would be deprived of any just ground for feeling discontent if he were passed over for promotion to the non-commissioned ranks; these additions for "good conduct" would sufficiently compensate him, it was said, for the loss of promotion, and his position would still remain an enviable one, while the addition was a proper reward for previous faithful service and good conduct. To these *ad captandum* arguments the more practical reply was, Let well alone. Do not teach your mercenaries to think that pay can be so easily raised and increased at the pleasure of any Governor or Commander-in-Chief. To imbue with such an idea mercenary troops, is to court demands of a pecuniary description which no State could support, and is to introduce amongst us the instability and fluctuations so common among the troops of the native states; when, moreover, there is no real occasion for it, and when, except in mere theory, its action will be found alike embarrassing and injurious. And so in my judgment it proved to be; for to refuse a Sepoy promotion who was enjoying extra pay for being well conducted, involved, as was soon found, a practical contradiction. Sepoys so passed over were in the habit of inquiring, "Why then did they receive extra pay, if they were not fit to be made corporals?" and the specious arguments employed were of no avail to convince them that they did not suffer an injustice.

Now, that this tampering with pay was a dangerous principle to introduce, no one who reflects dispassionately on the peculiar position we occupy in the East, can, I think, doubt. The reasons for it were simply, to the best of my recollection, those I have stated; they were certainly those of a late Governor-General, Lord Hardinge, to whose firm consistent kindness and support I have been deeply indebted, and for whose memory I shall always entertain a lasting feeling of respectful gratitude. That nobleman, in conversing with me on such subjects at Simla, so expressed himself: and the intention was doubtless good; the policy and wisdom of the act most questionable. It received, however, as was understood, the approval of the home authorities at the East India House; and with advertence to these last, I may here very properly note the contrast between the unwise and profuse liberality shown to the Sepoy, and the obstinate, perverse illiberality, in the matter of half-batta, which affects only his European officer. Just thirty years ago, the Court of Directors, during Lord William Bentinck's tenure of government, issued orders for placing all stations within 200 miles of the Presidency, on what was called "half-batta," by which measure the allowances of every European officer at such stations were considerably reduced. Now the captains and subalterns in India are very ill-paid; and this order was peculiarly hard upon the latter, who were brought from remote, quiet, up-country stations, to the Presidency (Barrackpore), and on arrival there, found themselves on reduced allowances when exposed to all the numerous expenses and temptations of the capital. No idle attempts at argument, no sophistical reasoning could get over the facts of the case. The Government urged, that wine and beer, and European articles of consumption (jams and pickles!), were cheaper than up the country, because the expense of carriage was avoided; forgetful that everything else was more expensive, and the incitements and temptations to expense incredibly increased. To add to the inconsistency, the military staff in Calcutta, the well-paid officers of the military Secretariate, Audit, Adjutant, and Quartermaster-General's offices, were all exempted and excepted from the operation of the order. These influential persons were unaffected by a general measure of so-called financial reform, while needy subalterns were to be unsparingly retrenched! The whole procedure was well fitted for the sarcasm and satire of Horace or Juvenal; and the complacency of Leadenhall-street would have been sadly ruffled, if the remarks made throughout the army had ever penetrated to those musty and antiquated recesses. Lord Metcalfe, then one of the Supreme

Council, strongly and urgently denounced the injustice and harshness of the measure, but the military class of the servants of the Company have rarely any influence at the India House, and the injustice continues to be perpetrated to this day, and is to this day also the cause of just discontent; for no quibbling logic can upset the broad fact, that in support of a foolish theory, the Directors have continued a system of payment whereby the European officer receives least pay when he most requires it, while the Sepoy, who did not require any increase at all, and to whom it was most unwise to give it, continues to receive the same, although the reasoning under which it was bestowed has been found to be utterly fallacious.

CHAPTER II.

It is not only our military system that has failed in India, but our whole civil, fiscal, and judicial policy requires to be remodelled. We have been weak and philanthropical. We have shown ourselves as rulers entirely wanting in that stern vigour, foresight, and insight into the native mind and character, so essential to the maintenance of our supremacy. We have been unwilling and reluctant to believe in that deep duplicity and consistent guile with which the *Mahomedan* native of Hindostan, more especially, so well conceals his deep-rooted malignity and hatred. Now for a time the eyes of the British public are opened, and we should seize the golden opportunity, and amend our system. It is to that end I desire to contribute my humble quota to the general information, for the question is now a national one. The will and voice of the people must now be consulted, and it is not by the Court of Directors, or even by the *Sic volo, sic jubeo* of Lord Palmerston, that the future form of Indian Government will be decided. Indeed, if, as had nearly been the case, the indecision and delay of the Cabinet, and the seeming indifference displayed to the fate of our struggling countrymen, in apparently so wilfully neglecting the means of ready transit through Egypt, had led, as was only too much to be feared, to the total overthrow of our power in Bengal, it

is to be doubted if even the patient endurance of the public would have held the Ministry excused.

To proceed with the record of my own official experience. In the beginning of the year 1850 I became Adjutant-general of the army; and Sir Charles Napier, in nominating me to that responsible post, wrote as follows:—

“From General Sir C. Napier, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief in India, to Lieutenant-Colonel Tucker, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army; dated Simla, 27th April, 1850.

“My dear Tucker,

“Your situation as Deputy Adjutant-General, your abilities, and your good service in war, have made you Adjutant-General, and you owe me no gratitude. I have only done justice to merit.

“I am, etc.,

“(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.”

The note is characteristic. I insert it to show that it was not through Directorial influence, or subserviency of any sort, that I obtained the appointment. I was naturally earnest to discharge my duties efficiently, after such an opinion expressed by such a man, and I worked hard and sedulously with him so long as he remained in India, and I continued to receive letters from him even from that sick couch whereon he not long after breathed away his noble but unquiet spirit. But I had no desire to be a partisan; and when, therefore, I was invited by Lord Dalhousie to discuss military matters, I readily availed myself of the opportunity to prepare for his consideration various elaborate memoranda, in the hope that some practical result would follow. I submitted to his Lordship, among other papers, a memorandum regarding the unsatisfactory state of the Cavalry, regular and irregular, and suggested various changes and amendments in the system. I submitted a similar paper, of great length, relating to the state of the Artillery, and pointed out the great evils resulting from the paucity of officers and insufficiency of men. At a subsequent period I forwarded to his Lordship a document which I very carefully drew up, in which I insisted on the denuded state of the Infantry in regard to officers, and offered for consideration a plan for the formation of a staff corps; and in treating of the state of the native army generally, I advocated the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officer, that rank which, in the convulsion and revolt we have to deplore, has only produced a nest of traitors, whose duplicity, baseness, and ingratitude will for ever stand unrivalled in the annals of military

revolt. What use his Lordship may have made of my suggestions, I have no means of judging; but for the Cavalry, nothing was done until, after an interval of two or three years, Government sent home to the Court of Directors a proposal to disband four, I think, of the regular Cavalry regiments, and to substitute for them two regiments of European Dragoons. That proposal came to head-quarters for the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief. I was called upon to give mine, and did so in a paper which gave so much satisfaction to his Excellency, that he drew the particular attention of the Government to it, and it was sent home for the information of the Honourable Court. The breaking out, however, of the Crimean war, put a stop to this plan, a circumstance greatly to be lamented.

To the Artillery, after a long interval, a slight addition was made, and an additional officer or two was given to each regiment of the line; but the arrangements were quite inadequate to meet the evil complained of,—the wholesale drain, that is, of officers from corps to fill civil and staff appointments, and under which system the most experienced officers were withdrawn from regiments, leaving for the discharge of regimental duties an altogether insufficient number.

But it is not to be supposed, that in advocating privately with the Governor-General changes and alterations, I thought I sufficiently performed my part. On the contrary, I pressed on the Commander-in-Chief, and by his authority on the Government, *usque ad nauseam*, the necessity for an increase to the Artillery, etc. etc.; and as opportunity offered, I endeavoured to bring about important changes. I will give two instances, both of them bearing nearly on the present state of affairs. Many people in this country have been surprised to hear of the admirable manner in which the mutineers have worked their artillery; the explanation, though scarcely credible, is as follows:—Application had been made by the military authorities, and Government had sanctioned the instruction in the artillery gun exercise of 100 men in each regiment of Native Infantry, and accordingly ten per cent. of our Sepoys were so instructed! I shall not enter into any discussion on this strange fact—it speaks for itself; but I was so sensible of its fatuity, and of the danger likely to result from it, that I took occasion to represent to the Commander-in-Chief the suicidal nature of the measure, and obtained from Sir William Gomm authority for submitting to Government a proposal quietly to stop the practice. In the letter I drafted to Government, I gave my reason for the recommendation in the plainest terms, and said, that in the event of any revolt or mutiny of the Sepoys, the knowledge

thus being acquired would only be an incitement to them to attempt to capture our ordnance. To this despatch a reply, briefly assenting, was received; not one word of remark or inquiry was made. I had been prepared to give *in extenso* my reasons for thinking that the Bengal army was ready, on any sufficiently exciting cause or occasion, to turn upon us in revolt; and the proof that I did entertain this opinion will be found in the letters I wrote in the *Times* at the first opening of this sad tragedy, in which I stood, I believe, almost alone in warning the public of what was to be expected.

The second instance of a warning bearing on what has now come to pass, was in a recommendation I made to Sir William Gomm for permission to apply to Government to disarm all travellers on the great high-roads. I represented, in a letter addressed to the Military Secretary to Government, that the Sepoys all had private arms in their possession, and that it was most desirable to deprive them of these weapons; that the Commander-in-Chief was prepared to do so; but as it was urged, that to deprive them of these means of defence, while proceeding on furlough to their homes, was to expose them both going and returning, and while there, to be murdered and robbed by the armed community and by travellers, for the sake of the savings they were known to carry with them from their regiments, he was anxious that the system of going about the country armed should be first put a stop to. To this proposal an almost scornful and derisive reply was received, and it was asked by the Military Secretary whether the Commander-in-Chief really meant to recommend to Government such an impracticable plan as that of disarming the whole population of the Upper Provinces. Now, there was nothing at all impracticable in the matter. Sir John Lawrence had done the same thing in the Punjaub, and we now know of what signal benefit such a procedure would have been; but the Governor-General was sick, and, it was said, splenetic, and there was a most pernicious and adverse influence at work in the Military Secretariate. I do not pretend to quote the actual words of the despatches in those two cases, but they were precisely to the effect I have described, and will be found on record in the Military Departments in Bengal.

It may be remarked, To what end write of past errors of Government, which can now in their narration be inoperative for good? To this I would reply, that not only may good be educed in the future, by showing the errors we have fallen into, but the wilfulness too often displayed by governors, secretaries, and others, in combating judicious measures merely because they were personally opposed

to those who suggested them, ought to be held up to just condemnation; and I will conclude this part of my subject by an instance, showing exactly how such feelings may operate to the detriment of the public service. I was much struck, when I first succeeded to the post of Adjutant-General, at the way in which numbers of the older officers in command of divisions, districts, and stations, applied to me, both privately and publicly, for advice as to how they had best act in such and such emergencies. I found that to rely on themselves was the exception—that almost all seemed to wish to lean on authority before committing themselves to action—in a word, a great bugbear prevented their acting on their own judgment: *that bugbear was the dread of responsibility*, produced chiefly by the “wiggling” system of the Government. I set myself to work to combat this system. I wrote in the most friendly spirit numerous letters, showing how badly such a system must necessarily work; pointed out the purpose for which men were placed in these important and lucrative posts; and deprecated the reference of every petty detail for the opinion of the Adjutant-General, and more broadly the system of centralization which had sprung up. I had reason to suppose that my efforts, during the six years I was Adjutant-General, were productive of much good; but there was a higher influence than that of the Army Head-Quarters at work, an authority under which the native Articles of War, with all its faults and errors, had been prepared; I allude to the Military Secretary to the Government, who had previously served all his life in the department of the Judge-Advocate; a department admirably calculated for generating a quibbler where that turn of mind existed, but extremely ill calculated for the training of a Secretary to the Supreme Government, who should be one able and willing to take a broad, general view, free from the petty bias which, as Sir Charles Napier used justly to observe, far too frequently characterizes the class of military lawyers; but we have the opinion of this great soldier, in his life, by Sir W. Napier, of the amount of merit to be discovered in the *ci-devant* Chief of the Judge-Advocate’s Department. To proceed: one striking reason for the laxity in point of discipline which too often called for censure, appeared to me to rest with the Government,—the appointing, namely, to important commands, of worn-out and incapable officers, merely on account of their seniority. Soon after I became Adjutant-General, I wrote, with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, a very strong and earnest despatch, pointing out the evils, and suggesting the remedy. The then Secretary to Government, Colonel J. Stuart,

was a man of vigorous understanding and sound sense; he warmly seconded the proposal, and Lord Dalhousie at once assented in terms of praise and approbation. Vacancies existed on the Divisional and Brigade staff, and at once some half-a-dozen incapables were set aside; and the Commander-in-Chief, thus secure, as he imagined, of the support of the Indian Government, nominated junior officers, considered more equal to the performance of such responsible duties. But the affair did not thus terminate; Colonel Stuart fell sick, and was succeeded, though he was known earnestly to deprecate such an appointment, by the present Military Secretary; and at an interval of some two years, the Commander-in-Chief was called upon by this officer, in the name of the Government, to state more specifically the reasons for passing over one of these worn-out, used-up old Generals, a man who, in his best days, had been notoriously inefficient. The Commander-in-Chief observed, in commenting on this unexpected communication, that he did not know personally any of the officers who had been superseded; that he was obliged to depend in such matters on the confidential report and explanations of the Adjutant-General, who was responsible for the fidelity of his representations; but that it was altogether too much to expect of that functionary to give, in detail, each and every item constituting inaptitude and incapacity on the part of those superseded, for public report to Government, *and communication, when solicited, to the aggrieved parties concerned*; and that, finally, the letter from the Military Secretary under comment appeared to be strangely at variance with that from his predecessor on the same subject. Ultimately the supreme Government gave way, and no such explanation as had been required was furnished!

I have little to say in this place of the details of the measures of reform and change which the state of the native troops and the general disorganization prevalent everywhere in Bengal, so loudly demands. "Indophilus" and others have written nearly all that can be said of practical use in way of suggestion; and to re-echo and repeat what is now so generally seen and felt, would be merely pedantic and useless; I will therefore offer only a brief outline of the principal changes I would advocate. Those changes, to be of use, must be most carefully and dispassionately considered; and it is to be hoped that, in the alterations and revision which will take place, the brave and devoted Indian officers who are now so heroically upholding the empire, without one word of despondency, far less of despair, will not be made to bear the onus or to suffer for

the faults of a vicious system over which they had no control, or for the blindness, fatuity, and utter want of prescience which has characterized too many of the acts, both of omission and commission, of those in authority. The officers of the Bengal army, unwisely shipped for the East at the immature age of sixteen, are a wonderful body, considering the difficulties with which they have to contend. It is true they cannot perhaps dress, on their return to their native country, like the more finished loungers of Regent Street and the Clubs, they are not so graceful and refined in a drawing-room,—they were exiled ere they could attain to that style of seeming superiority; but for all real, manly feeling and acquirements they have, as a body, few superiors. Those acquirements have been diverted by the Government into improper and unprofessional channels, to the great loss and detriment of the military service; but for that *they* are not the responsible parties.

Of the army before Delhi, Henry Tombs, for daring gallantry, manly and professional readiness, could not be surpassed in all Europe. Nor in all the ranks of the British army here, at home, will a more accomplished, talented, or more thoroughly instructed staff-officer be found than is to be met with in the person of Captain Henry Norman. Of Brigadier-General Nicholson, who shall speak in terms of adequate praise? To the firmness, courage, and judgment of this officer, and to that equally brave and unhesitating man, Sir John Lawrence, we owe our very existence in the North-west. Major Edwin Johnson, Adjutant-General of the Artillery, in the field is an officer who, for calm excellent judgment and great official aptitude, cannot be surpassed. And from among those sacrificed to the inefficiency of our system, how many names of gallant and able men appear. Let me pay a brief tribute, in adverting to the fate of some few—men who were honoured and respected by all.

Colonel J. Finnis fell devotedly at the Meerut outbreak. He had written to me while his regiment was marching to that station; and, with his usual sagacity, observed, that “some very strange feeling had come over the Sepoys,” that “something was brooding.” That mystery was soon to be solved; and so fell one of my earliest Indian friends.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tudor Tucker, of the Cavalry, fell, after having for eight days worked day and night as a common gunner, with all that zeal and earnestness for which he was through life distinguished. He was as gentle and amiable as he was brave and devoted, and not a man in India fell more generally beloved. To the end he was

favoured, in that he died while yet the heroic defence of the few officers at Futtehghur was maintained—ere yet the captivity of his wife and family, ending in revolting massacre, had occurred.

Of that gallant, able, and most talented officer, Major Fletcher Hayes, Military Secretary in Oude; of Edward Fraser, Commandant of the Sappers; of Arthur Gibbings and John Smith, of the Irregular Cavalry; of Herbert Gardner, Stuart Beatson, Lieutenant-Colonel Philip Goldney; Lieutenant Robert Stuart, Adjutant of the 6th Native Infantry; Major Banks, who fell in the performance of his arduous duties at Lucknow; and many other dear friends, it need simply be said, that they fell in the execution of their duty, victims to the incautious policy of rulers too weakly secure in their ideal empire of opinion, and too fully persuaded of their personal inviolability—of that “divinity” supposed to “hedge” the persons of the present race of Indian civilians in high office—to take the commonest precautions the trust delegated to them demanded, even when it was notorious that Mahomedan and other conspirators had for years been preaching a crusade against us, and the native press teemed with articles only too well calculated to produce disaffection and revolt. The English world will not fail to notice the heroic struggle made everywhere, and in the face of all difficulties, by the general body of officers, Queen’s and Company’s—all alike confident in the final result, even when most pressed upon and outnumbered; and we may be justly proud of bearing and conduct which has so gloriously upheld the national character.

If here and there imbecility or cowardice have been productive of great evils, as at Jullundur, Meerut, Dinapore, Allahabad, even at Calcutta,—where at least a sense of duty should have assumed the appearance of firmness,—it has been owing to that system under which mere negative merit, when backed by seniority, has been considered to possess a *claim* to fill situations of responsibility and importance. Under this system, which has been common to the Horse Guards equally with the Indian Government, old and infirm officers have been appointed to commands, to discharge the duties of which they were physically incapable; in a revolt such men were helpless, hence the Dinapore affair, for which however the Government is the *real* party to blame. In Calcutta,—and one cannot record it but with a feeling of shame,—at the very time when firmness, courage, and a good example were most required, it is mentioned in letters as a positive fact, that on the night of the 9th of that month, now popularly called “fright night,” one member at least of the Supreme Council

sent his wife, for safety, on board a vessel in the river, while the Military Secretary to the Supreme Government took his, under a similar plea, into Fort William. The scene of panic that would necessarily ensue, when the principal officers of Government set such a wretched example, may well be imagined; the only wonder is, that the native population were not incited by it to rise in revolt and insurrection; and if, seeing the causeless panic, they had done so, to whom but to these men could we impute the loss of the capital? It may be said, that it is easy to condemn others for want of firmness,—that if ourselves so circumstanced we might equally fail. That is true, in a general way, but we are to recollect that these persons are paid extravagantly for the *efficient* performance of their duties. The Councillor, whose timidity—the Military Secretary, whose “moral courage” induced him, at all hazards, to secure the safety of his “better half,” receive, the former £10,000, the latter about £5,000 per annum of the public money. Surely, for such sums we ought to be able to ensure, at least, the respectable discharge of the duties entrusted to them? I may make such observations with the more confidence, because I never myself, while in office, shrank from incurring responsibility. On one occasion, even in a time of peace, I thought it my duty to point out to the Commander-in-Chief the inability, from age and other causes, of no less than three Brigadiers to perform their duties efficiently, and they were removed in consequence of such report from the command of their respective districts. On another occasion, I recommended the summary removal of an officer from the command of a station, who had demurred to obey the orders of His Excellency. And yet, with all these examples, no one, it seems, could be found to incur the responsibility of removing or suspending, at a most critical time, the officer commanding the Dinapore Division, when it should have been clear to any ordinary capacity, that the most sad results must almost necessarily ensue from his reluctance to disarm the native regiments there. At such a time energy and earnestness at the seat of Government were imperatively called for; and that the disasters in the Dinapore Division are imputable to the want of these qualities in those in supreme authority in Calcutta there can be no sort of doubt.

CHAPTER III.

It has often been asked, What are the precise causes which have led to this detestable display of the worst passions of human nature? Has love of country, or religious zeal and bigotry, or mere detestation of a foreign yoke, incited the native army to this revolt? To this I would reply, that fifty causes have combined to generate suspicion and jealousy and a general inimical feeling; but love of country or patriotism have no place in the catalogue. Our unhappy countrymen have been, in my deliberate opinion, the victims chiefly of the supine, unstatesmanlike, and weak, shallow views and proceedings of our rulers. It is painful to animadvert on the acts of men we have known and personally liked; and in speaking of Lord Dalhousie's administration I have no wish to say one word in unnecessary disparagement; but the truth is, that the rule of this nobleman has been most unduly extolled and over-estimated. He was young and of high birth, and the *protégé* and personal favourite of the Duke of Wellington, and he brought with him to India a reputation for quickness and ability scarcely exaggerated; but he had not the genius of the Marquis Wellesley, and his admirers (for he had many in India) were simply mistaken when they supposed him to possess a mind so gifted.

This is not the place to enter upon a general review of his Lordship's policy and acts, but I may observe, that much was no doubt effected by him worthy of praise and commendation, although, as a whole, his conceptions appear to have been destitute of originality. His thirst for "annexation" became a positive disease, and he was clearly not alive to the utter insecurity of our position, and was content, apparently, to believe with the herd, that the danger was distant, and the ultimate struggle for supremacy not to be looked for in our day; he seems to have shared, in fact, in that common feeling of common minds, who either do not really foresee danger, or else want the courage to look it steadily and manfully in the face. The annexation of Oude was one of the last important acts of his Government; that is a well-vexed question, and one on which excellent reasons may be adduced on both sides. It has been said that this act was urged on Lord Dalhousie from home; however that may be, my own conviction is, that it was as ungenerous, as ill-timed, and *wanting in good faith*, as it is now proved in its result

to have been impolitic; for no one, save a mere partisan, can now hesitate to believe that this act of annexation, more perhaps than any other single cause, gave scope and enlarged compass to the revolt now raging. That act cemented into one inimical whole the Mohamedan population of Upper India: after that act there was no further demur; prince and nobleman and peasant were all of one mind,—to compass, if possible, our entire overthrow and extirpation! And now let us inquire how, after this boasted bloodless annexation, the noble Lord proceeded in that business. True, his unexpected occupation of the country was bloodless, that of course necessarily followed; when there was no preparation against, or anticipation of danger, there would be no immediate struggle. A wise statesman would have seen this, and would, even if he thought himself secure for the time, have proceeded to render “assurance doubly sure.” The reverse of this happened; to the already overwhelming native troops of India, his Lordship added other yet more dangerous additions, in the shape of Oude levies, and it nowhere appears that consequent on this occupation he added a single European soldier to our military establishment! The just equipoise so absolutely essential to maintain our supremacy was forgotten, or only so weakly enforced as to be either overlooked or indefinitely postponed! Further words on this subject were useless. The revolt, the mutiny, gradually and slowly commenced; how it was met it is sad and humiliating to detail. The Commander-in-Chief did nothing; European regiments near at hand in the Himalayas were *not* called to the plains, where their presence would have overawed the disaffected; not a European soldier was sent to secure the safety of our depôts and magazines; Delhi, Cawnpore, and Allahabad were unregarded; General Anson finally betook himself to Simla! The Government was nearly as supine; in the beginning, the grave nature of the impending struggle with the Sepoys was ignored, and most valuable time was lost. If in the beginning the unmistakable magnitude of the danger had been bravely faced, much might have been done, and the Government here at home must have acted with decision and promptitude. Troops would at once have been sent, and by the nearest route; and the blood of hundreds of brave men and helpless women and children would have been saved. But in reference to the conduct of the Bengal authorities, I shall content myself with extracting from the ‘Historical Narrative’ of the mutiny the description therein given of the capacity and proceedings of the Military Secretary to the “Supreme Government of India!”

“*Colonel Birch*.—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department was a man in every way unsuited for his position. Placed early in his career in the department of the Judge-Advocate-General, his confined understanding was exerted in mastering the quirks and quibbles of the law. His intellect being essentially shallow, he was unable to take a broad view of any question; but he would argue for hours, and exhaust all his ingenuity in combating some petty detail. When Sir Charles Napier assumed the command of the Indian Army, Colonel Birch was Judge-Advocate. He was rather afraid of Sir Charles’s downright character, and at their first interview exerted all his powers to please him. No amount of special pleading, however, would go down with the great Conqueror of Scinde.

“Sir Charles’s bad opinion was, however, of this service to Colonel Birch, that it obtained for him Lord Dalhousie’s patronage. That nobleman, eager to show his spite towards Sir C. Napier, took the opportunity of the first vacancy, to appoint Colonel Birch Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department; thus placing him, *de facto*, at the head of the army in India—giving him a position, indeed, exactly analogous to that of the Minister of War in France.

“A worse appointment could not have been made. Colonel Birch was essentially a sycophant, always ready to give up his own opinion, if by so doing he could curry favour with his superior. He had tried this plan with Sir C. Napier, but Sir Charles found him out, and not only felt, but showed, contempt towards him in consequence; he found it an easier task to ingratiate himself with Lord Dalhousie and his successor.

“But he was also an ignoramus. He knew nothing of the Bengal Army. Many years had elapsed since he had even spoken to a Sepoy. He was ignorant of the composition of the army, as well as of its wants; whilst his previous training had so unfitted him for his post, that he could not even write an order without making it unintelligible by excessive quibbling.”

So much for this functionary’s characteristics, but that is not all: “Mr. — had one recommendation: if he was narrow-minded and unscrupulous, he was honest; he could not ‘smile and smile and be a villain;’ he spoke his thoughts freely and honestly, and people, whilst they hated, could not help respecting him,—a sentiment never entertained towards his colleague in the military department.”

And the colleague spoken of was Colonel Birch!

Again, the following, we are told, were his acts; and his antecedents quite prepare one for the detail:—

“ Yet, in the face of these prejudices, of the order to respect them, and of the danger of the consequences which must result from their violation, no sooner had the Government of India resolved to introduce the Enfield rifle partially into the Indian army, than the Secretary to Government deliberately issued an order which, by violating the caste of the Hindoo, was alone sufficient to bring about a revolt. The Enfield rifle required a particular species of cartridge, and this cartridge, in England, was greased with lard made from the fat either of the hog or the ox. Without reflecting, or, if reflecting, ignoring the consequences of his act, Colonel Birch ordered that the cartridges for use in India should be made up similarly to the cartridges in use in England, and should be used by the native troops; that is to say, that Hindoo Sepoys should handle cartridges besmeared with the fat of their sacred animal, the cow. The knowledge of this fact was conveyed to the Hindoos in the most casual manner. These cartridges had been made up by Lascars—men of an inferior caste. It happened that one day a Lascar requested a Brahmin Sepoy to give him a drink of water from his lotah, or brass pot. The Sepoy refused, on the plea of his superior caste, and that the lotah would be defiled by the touch of the Lascar. The Lascar in reply taunted him for talking of defilement, when he every day touched cartridges besmeared with cows' fat. The Hindoo, horror-stricken, rushed to his comrades and told them the story; they inquired, and found it was true to the letter. Indignant, believing themselves deceived by the Government, they wrote an account to their comrades throughout India. From that moment the work of the agents of the King of Oude was easy.

“ For a man occupying the position of Military Secretary to the Government of India to make so gross a blunder, was unpardonable. Equally so, that, when the mistake was discovered, no disavowal was made by Government for four months, and then only in consequence of the outbreak at Meerut! Well aware that the idea had taken possession of the Sepoys' minds, Colonel Birch made no attempt to counteract it, gave no intimation that the manufacture of greased cartridges had been stopped. He calmly surveyed the mischief his acts had caused, and did—nothing. Yet this man, whose blundering incapacity caused the revolt, is still Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department!”

Ex uno disce omnes! might almost be said of the Calcutta officials

acting in this sad and disastrous crisis, though in fairness some of the civil secretaries should be excepted, and perhaps General Low. The civilians were necessarily ignorant of just military considerations, as connected with the mutiny. And it would be unjust wholly to condemn Lord Canning; he, no doubt, has done his utmost; he had not been long enough in India to acquire reliable knowledge and information; he was dependent, therefore, on the judgment and counsels of those who surrounded him. That they were altogether unequal to the crisis, few will deny. It is true, that after the revolt was full-blown, troops were sent for to Ceylon, Pegue, China, and other places, but time had been sadly wasted, and when, as I have before remarked, officers of experience were writing to me from the very seat of Government that we had now "*only to fight for it*," the Government was busy in ignoring the magnitude of the revolt, and in endeavouring to induce the belief that the excitement and danger was subsiding!

Again, long after the whole country was everywhere in open revolt or commotion; when scarcely a regular regiment was left; when, to the shallowest intellect, all reliance on the Native Infantry was shown to be simple delusion, what was the conduct of the Government? At Dinapore, a station only two days' post from Calcutta, where an infatuated old General between seventy and seventy-five years of age commanded, three native regiments were suffered to retain their arms. The General is to be tried, we hear, by court-martial. To what end? He *had been* a brave and able officer, and had the Government done its duty, his career would probably have ended in honour as it began. To trust the safety of Bengal at such a time to the discretion of an old worn-out man, whose sympathies naturally were with the troops he had served with for half a century, was unwise to a degree. He ought to have been *ordered peremptorily* to disarm the native regiments; the Military Secretary to Government should so have counselled the Governor-General; and if General Lloyd had demurred or hesitated, instant supersession should have followed. But mere omission was not the only fault of the authorities. The Calcutta community saw the imminent danger, and petitioned Lord Canning to avert it, by disarming the Dinapore Brigade. Even this solicitation, it seems, was unattended to, for official incapacity does not readily give ear to even the wisest counsel. The result of this culpable inaction is well known to the British public, and but for the able conduct of that gallant officer, Major Vincent Eyre, of the Bengal Artillery, more fatal consequences would have ensued.

I now approach, and with reluctance, the case of the Court of Directors of the East India Company. I am a retired officer of the Company; one of my nearest relatives, the late Henry St. George Tucker, was an honoured and a most influential member of the Court for many years, and I feel every disposition to speak of them in terms of respect. Nevertheless, I am constrained to state broadly my opinion that the delegated rule of the Directors is no longer beneficial to the State; its day for usefulness has apparently passed away; it no longer commands any real authority; its influence, from whatever cause, is weak, and its component parts do not present to the public view those elements of strength and wisdom adequate to the government of a mighty empire. In India, it is no longer regarded with respect or deference; even its old traditional virtues are ignored; and when a Government has once ceased to command the confidence of the governed, the sooner it is made to give way, the better for all concerned. The Court has struggled on of late years in a sort of hand-to-mouth existence; and there can be little doubt that its speedy dissolution will follow on the re-establishment of peace. This recent revolt must show clearly to the blindest vision the hollowness of that boasted system the Company and its Governors-General have so long pursued. The temerity of that system; its anomalies and inconsistencies; its weak milk-and-water philanthropy, through which the natives have lost all salutary fear and awe of us; its incapacity or disinclination to protect its European servants when arbitrarily ill-treated and injured by the Indian authorities, will all form the subject doubtless of prolonged and grave inquiry. I will only here suggest one cause of its failure, and point to a single instance in elucidation. It appears, then, that the Court of Directors is composed generally of men too old or too long absent from India to be able to work effectively in its government, and too pedantically wedded in many cases to old opinions and ideas, forgetful that India has moved onwards, and is no longer the precise India of twenty-five or thirty years since, when, for the most part, those gentlemen left the country. We have, for instance, a distinguished member of the Court writing in the 'Times,' that, but for the trials of certain disaffected troopers at Meerut, the Bengal Army might have remained the "loyal Bengal Army" still! How little this venerable senior can know of that army I write a distasteful truth, but I do it deliberately, and I say now no more than I have often said before the late revolt, in confidential communications to friends and others interested, namely, that the Bengal Army never really has

been, any time the last thirty years, a trustworthy or loyal army; by which I mean that it never has been a reliable, obedient, well-disposed body. We in our blindness have been pleased to assume that it possessed all sorts of virtues; we have ignored and even fostered its vices, and allowed ourselves to be flattered as individuals into the belief that we had won its love and devoted adherence; but a more vain, a more idle and impotent delusion I am confident never existed. In this I know I shall be opposed by many, by many whom I greatly esteem; but I speak after thirty-two years' experience and observation, and I unhesitatingly affirm, that even mere personal attachment on the part of the Sepoys to their European superiors has been isolated and rare; that the singular cunning and duplicity of their character has not been fathomed by us as a nation; that in their guile and craft they have invariably befooled and laughed us to scorn; and that, dispassionately regarded, a more mercenary, huxtering, really inglorious body of men never before were banded together! These will no doubt be considered extreme opinions; I am persuaded, nevertheless, that they are thoroughly well founded. The Bengal Sepoys for many years have been simple mercenaries, without an attempt at disguise, greedy, covetous, and exacting; in the beginning these characteristics may have been less marked, but since the siege of Bhurtpore, in 1826, from about which period my more intimate acquaintance with them first commenced, the peculiarities I have described have undoubtedly attached to them in an unmistakable manner. I shall be told that these Sepoys have fought bravely. Certainly, led by their European officers, they have done so at times; but how often has their conduct been the very reverse! how often dastardly to the last degree—pale, trembling, sneaking out of the ranks on one pretence or another! Many of their European officers in time of war have regretted that it was their fate to be connected with such men. And recently, in a letter from a distinguished staff-officer serving before Delhi, this sentence occurs:—"I never saw the Sepoys fight *half* so well for us as they now do against us." The writer had seen them in all the actions of the Sutledge and Punjaub campaigns. Will the present speak in proof? What, with their overwhelming numbers, and perfectly armed and disciplined, have they done? Except to murder their too trusting and confiding officers, and defenceless women and children, what have they done worthy of the struggle for supremacy they sought to maintain? No! these boasted mercenaries, however at times useful in upholding our dominion in the East, never were loyal, in the proper acceptation of

that term; grasping self-interest has been all along their sole motive and consideration; they were thoroughly and entirely mercenary; and when they had become accustomed to consider themselves irresistible in numbers and discipline, they were ready at once to adopt any plea, such as that of the greased cartridges, for entering on that career of revolt and mutiny which, as they vainly hoped, would transfer to their own ranks and order the power and authority so supinely and unsuspectingly wielded by interloping foreigners. I maintain that for many years the Sepoy army was at heart disloyal to its very core, and all that was wanting to produce the blaze of mutiny we have witnessed, was just such a handle and opportunity as was so loosely and culpably offered to them. I cite the late Sir Charles Napier in corroboration of this opinion. He declared, on the occasion of his disbanding the 66th Native Infantry, in 1849-50, that no less than 40,000 Sepoys in the Punjab were prepared to mutiny! Such was, we may now well believe, in reality the fact; and if the fortress of Govindghur had been seized by that regiment as attempted, the fearful revolt of 1857 would probably have been anticipated! But what did the Court of Directors know of this state of feeling? There was not a Bengal military officer a member of that body, to enjoin caution or inquiry, and all danger was denied and disallowed by the highest Indian authority in that famous controversy since made public. Sir Charles Napier was permitted to resign his office of Commander-in-Chief in India, and the unreflecting there and at home naturally followed in the belief which most administered to their own ease and quiet and to the gratification of their immediate superiors; so the dark cloud was suffered to grow and increase in density, hovering onwards till it broke in that overwhelming outpour which had so nearly uprooted us in our foundations. Whatever some of us in India might think and fear, there was clearly nothing to be said; all intimation of danger was authoritatively derided, and it requires more self-reliance than most men possess to persist in an opinion condemned and ridiculed by *all* around.

The 'Times' newspaper has said that those who accuse the Indian authorities of inertness and want of vigour, in not suppressing the revolt when it first appeared, and who say also that it was premeditated, and the result of previous conspiracy, are convicted of inconsistency in so speaking. The 'Times' is a great and weighty authority, and it is with deference I take leave to differ, and to state my opinion that this is only a *seeming contradiction*. For may not a

conspiracy be crushed and overcome? And if at Meerut short, sharp, and decisive action had, on the massacre of their European officers, flooded the native lines with the blood of those miscreants, what more probable than that the outbreak would have been suppressed? Whereas impunity lent it strength. At Delhi there was nothing to oppose to it; no foresight had been exercised, no judicious arrangements made, no one single precaution appears indeed to have been taken by General Anson, whose practical inexperience and incapacity can never be effaced by that "charm of manner and demeanour" his friends dwell upon, and of which I am equally sensible; but until the flame had burst forth he did not move his European battalions from the hills to the plains, where their presence would have overawed the Sepoys, or put down forcibly their revolt; he neglected to secure with European troops our depôts and magazines; he did not organize a strong column for rapid movement in whatever direction the flame might break forth; he did not enjoin caution and vigilance on that incapable officer, General Hewitt; no commissariat carriage was made immediately available; in short, nothing was done in way of wise prevention, and so the flame burst forth in all its appalling intensity! That sooner or later our own fatal security, the Pretorian insolence of the Sepoys, and that Mohamedan intrigue and virulent hatred which has formed so principal an ingredient in the revolt, would assuredly have produced a similar result, few, I should imagine, will be prepared to doubt. From henceforth our rule will be stronger and sterner, and our hold upon the country much firmer, I trust, than it has ever yet been: it depends upon ourselves to render it so. And we need have no dread of missionary labours—these never have done the least harm. It has been our late greedy and grasping policy; our mismanagement of the Sepoys; our neglect to secure real power; our recent financial blunders, amounting, in appearance at least, to positive fraud; and, generally, the *too rapid* introduction, recently, of general schemes of education and changes in Hindoo laws and customs, which it would have been far wiser for a time to have postponed. These, at least, are my convictions.

I beg now to offer a few brief, general observations, such as in my judgment will be found most conducive to the future permanency and strength of our dominion in the East.

1. The abolition of the Court of Directors; and in substitution, a Secretary of State for India, with a staff of efficient under-secretaries in the various departments, civil, military, and political.

2. The entire abandonment of the narrow and exclusive system in the Indian Civil Service; men best qualified should be appointed, and open competition the test.

3. An entire reconstruction of the military system; no officer to be appointed a cadet before the age of seventeen or eighteen, and all to be required to pass through a military college, whether intended for the Line or for the Engineers and Artillery.

4. No natives to be enlisted who are Bramins, or who will not engage for general service anywhere; and the recruiting districts to be carefully laid down.

5. No officers to be taken from regiments for any merely civil situations, but only for military staff employ, in the strict sense of the term, and after undergoing an examination as to acquirements and aptitude for the particular department for which it is proposed to withdraw them.

6. A knowledge of the native languages to be a *sine quâ non* before any promotion or advancement can be allowed.

7. A strong, stern, but just system of government to be introduced, so that the same shall be viewed with awe and respect by the natives.

8. Europeans should not be subject to trial before natives; and the least outrage on any European, however humble his station, should be punished with severity.

9 The utter futility of the existing native pension establishment having been fully proved, should be carefully revised; and the forfeiture of all present pensions having been justly incurred by the revolt or apathy and tacit hostility of the pensioners, their stipends should be at once swept away, except in very special cases.

10. The natives of India within the British territories should be carefully disarmed, and watchfully kept so.

11. Respect for all Europeans, and for Her Majesty's Government, should be firmly and *persistently* enforced.

12. The native press in India should be kept under a strict censorship. It has been disseminating treason and sedition for years; and the recent classing of the European and native press together, was alike unjust and impolitic, robbing the State, at a critical period, of the zealous services of the former.

13. The discontinuance of the practice of bestowing upon Governors-General pensions of £5000 per annum. That system is of the "springes to catch woodcock" order; and but for the desire it has generated to conciliate the Court of Directors, a more just,

equitable, and generous policy would often have been pursued, while the community, native and European, might possibly not have been outraged by the recent five-per-cent. "swindle," whereby the credit of the Government has been injured, and our good faith called in question. A clear £30,000 a year, with all travelling and many other expenses paid besides, ought to be considered sufficient remuneration for any services.

14. The "blue-veined" aristocratic element should be more guardedly employed in responsible situations in the East. Mere men about town, however "charming in demeanour," should not be placed in command of the army; and known incapables should not be sent out as divisional commanders, merely to fill their empty pockets, or to get rid of their importunities here.

15. The military element in India, instead of being degraded socially, as hitherto, should be raised; a new and more just order of precedence should be introduced; and grey-headed officers should no longer be made to give place to boys in the civil service, whose chief merit often consists only in their very near affinity to the Directors in Leadenhall-street.

16. The native police employed in Bengal is now proved to be, as was generally suspected, utterly worthless; it should be carefully remodelled, and an effective and reliable intelligence department should be organized.

17. Battalions of Africans might with advantage be organized; there are many special duties in which they might with great advantage be employed, exposure to which would be injurious to the health of European troops—to aid, for instance, in garrisoning Fort William, and our various magazines, forts, and depôts.

18. The fortifications and public buildings at Delhi, Agra, and Lucknow, ought *not* to be destroyed; these may all be of great advantage to us in the future. At Delhi, the "Jumma Musjid," a commanding and excellent position, might be occupied for other than religious purposes, and all Mohamedan and Hindoo processions within the walls of that city may be strictly interdicted; a rule which, if strictly enforced, will sufficiently mark our re-assumption of power and authority.

19. A body of *efficient* light cavalry ought to be raised. An Inspector of Cavalry should be added to the establishment; the unwise parsimony which would not hitherto grant one has been, as foretold, productive of the worst results.

20. The enormous salaries of the Governors-General, Members of Council, and other high civil and military functionaries, should be

greatly reduced; and the "savings to the State" made by parsimonious clippings from the under-paid captains and subalterns of the army, and clerks and others in the uncovenanted service, should be abandoned. One uniform rate of pay should be given to officers everywhere; and finally, the long-standing absurdity of the half-batta system should be abolished.

CHAPTER IV.

IN reference to the very inimical feeling with which the Mohamedan population, in my opinion, regard us, as recorded in the beginning of this Pamphlet, I wish to state that my observation on this point is confined to Bengal chiefly. It may possibly be otherwise in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, and the feeling may be moderated in remote districts in Bengal; but I am confident, from personal observation, that at Delhi in particular, and in all our large Musulman cities and bazaars, rooted dislike of us, as Christians and Europeans, is the invariable rule. Officers of the Army see much more of this than the civilians, because these last are in authority, and that with the Oriental generates mere lip-service to an unbounded extent. With the military it is far otherwise; and no man of common observation could well ride through the streets of Delhi, or any large city or bazaar, without being struck with the malignant, fierce expression of countenance with which, on meeting their glances, one is so frequently regarded. The civilian on such occasions rides out with Sowars (armed horsemen) in attendance; and it is with bated breath and seeming respect and humility that these attributes of office cause him to be observed; but the whispered curse and smile of derision, which follow after, are as invariably a part of the performance. I was, as a young man, for three years in garrison at Delhi, and I know the place and its inhabitants well, and have often and often had occasion to marvel at their astonishing duplicity, effrontery, and low cunning,—characteristics common to the great mass of Mohamedans of the cities of Upper India, who, as a body, are as grossly ignorant, morally depraved, and fanatical as it is pos-

sible to imagine. I speak of *the mass*; for undoubtedly there are highly-respectable and upright men of this persuasion, but they are few and far between, and even these are fanatical to an uncommon degree. It may easily be imagined how injurious, with such people, has been our easy, unsuspecting, milk-and-water system. It has made them despise as well as dislike us; and the result we witness, in the fearful outrages and almost universal revolt of this class of our subjects, whenever there has appeared a chance of success against us. I think therefore that the greatest caution should be exercised in enlisting Mussulmans of the Upper Provinces. When, after the Sutledge campaign, so many Irregular cavalry regiments were raised, it was a common remark about Delhi, Meerut, and Seharumpore, that the effect had been to remove all the lowest scamps and vagabonds of the vicinity, who, in the zeal felt by officers to complete their corps, were far too easily entertained, without reference to character or connection. Fisher's Horse was thus unhappily organized, and its treacherous mutiny has cost us the lives of some of our best officers. For the future, or at least for some time to come, we should not, in my opinion, recruit in the Oude or Delhi territory, or in Rohilkund; the Punjaub and Cis-Sutledge states, together with our Hill Districts, will afford us a sufficient and much better field, and for this purpose the less we have to do with the disaffected districts the better.

Grave misapprehension has existed even in India as to the strength of Delhi and its means of defence. I have many correspondents now serving before those walls, and some details which I am confident may be relied upon, will be highly interesting at this anxious period. On reaching Delhi, General Barnard's force had to oppose a garrison consisting of the 11th, 20th, 38th, 54th, 74th Regiments of Native Infantry, the Hurrianah Light Infantry, portions of the 9th, 44th, and 67th and 5th Native Infantry, the majority of the 45th also, and 300 of the Sappers and Miners; of cavalry, a wing of the 4th Irregulars, the whole of the 3rd Light Cavalry, and detachments of the Oude and Gwalior regiments. In addition to these, it is known that the mutineers had a vast number of men who had gone on furlough to their homes. Of artillery, they had Captain De Teissier's battery complete, and four batteries of guns which were ready for issue from the magazine. From whence they obtained their artillery-men it is not difficult to guess; I have already explained that 100 per cent. of the infantry had been trained, under the auspices of Government, to the use of ordnance. The King of Delhi, moreover,

had some artillery-men of his own, and there was a company of old pensioned artillery-men at the place.

That they had great numbers, and well-trained, there has been plenty of proof in the way they have served their guns, both from the batteries on the bastions and in the field; in fact their artillery has been the chief difficulty. In the Delhi magazine they found 114 pieces of heavy ordnance, with ammunition and stores in immense quantities; take for example the following items: 24-pounder round shot, no less than 37,700; of 18-pounders, 33,300; of 8-inch shells, 18,900; of powder, upwards of 14,000 barrels: these will show their means of defence. Besides this the enemy was joined by all the Customs' patrols, Burkundauze, and police, than whom no class of men are stated to have committed greater horrors and atrocities. All these trained men, added to the immense population of fanatical Mussulmans in and around Delhi, constitute a force and a power not to be treated contemptuously or encountered carelessly. It must be borne in mind, too, that the walls of Delhi are of considerable strength; there is a deep ditch also, and the place is at least seven miles in circumference; and as to cutting them off from communication with the Jumna and so investing the place, the idea is simply ridiculous, not to say preposterous. With 4,500 bayonets, of which the force originally consisted, that was not to be done, and on the whole the delay in storming the place has doubtless told to our advantage. One side of the city, which takes in the palace and the interior defences of Selimgurh, is washed by the Jumna, the bridge of boats across which we had been unable in the beginning to destroy, although the rise of the river must, when the rains commenced in full flood, have probably done that work for us, and thus one means of escape will, it is to be hoped, have been destroyed. Prematurely to have made the assault might have been eminently disastrous, and failure would have imperilled our authority throughout India. When the last letters left the Camp, on the 25th of August, the siege-train was within ten days' march; and we may, in my opinion, expect confidently to hear that by the 15th of September at latest the city was in our possession. Major-General Wilson is an officer of great ability and judgment, and every confidence may be reposed in him. With the re-occupation of Delhi, the revolt *in our old possessions in the Upper Provinces* will cease, and we shall have simply to resume our control and authority; with Oude it will probably be found more difficult to deal.

And now, before committing these brief pages to the press, I cannot do better than record my humble testimony in favour of the English in India,—of those men who are now so heroically fighting for their country's honour and supremacy, and with whom I can only wish that it was my good fortune to be serving at such a crisis. It may be all very well for those who, in the pursuit of mammon or notoriety, indite exaggerated stories in novels, or for those who desire to shine at the expense of their comrades, to indulge in the ideal description of imputed laxity and immorality in India. The fact is otherwise; simply I may affirm that *it is not so*, and for this sufficient reason, that there are neither means nor appliances available to the European officer for indulgence in vice. We all know what sort of conduct may be "sugared over" in London or Paris, but nowhere in India is the European able thus to pass unnoticed and unknown; the result is, that living openly, and as it were in the face of the community, vice is the marked exception, and decorum and decency are the natural and usual results of our position. The English public at large will not think the worse of Indian officers for being free comparatively from the *pretence* and *affectation* of superior virtue and goodness. My own experience leads me to the broad conclusion, that nowhere are men brought up to be bolder, and more free from all the subservient vices; more honest, sincere, and trustworthy, than they are in India. Our class, by which I mean the middle class, is well represented; there, no one need blush for them; and I will venture to predict that, when the causes of these tragical mutinies come to be hereafter sifted and ascertained, it will be found, that in no one instance were men incited to join in them by indignation or disgust at European vice or immorality. No! lust of dominion and of mammon, lured on these brigands to their fate. It may sound inflated, but theirs has been a struggle for empire; they have sought to "push us from our stools" and to rule in our place; they are now fatally undeceived. Their unexpected battalions burst irresistibly upon our defenceless out-posts, but their superiority has been short-lived; and it is to be hoped that no puling miserable weakness will be suffered to interfere with the stern, just retribution which is due to the memory and fate of our slaughtered countrymen. If the Calcutta Government is too weak to deal with the mutineers and murderers, who have outraged human nature in the infamous atrocities they have perpetrated on our women and children; if, as reported, meekness, tenderness, and lenity are now being enjoined, by the Indian Government, on those who have

endeavoured manfully to uphold our supremacy; if, as stated, the civilians who, at Patna and Monghir, acted with courage, promptitude, and decision, have been removed from their appointments under the displeasure of their rulers, a Royal Commission, to examine into and condemn the guilty who have taken part in this infamous revolt, should be at once sent out to India, and should be composed of men who know how to uphold the honour of our country, protect and avenge the innocent, and to punish the guilty. If a man escapes of those who have outraged humanity, in this fearful revolt, we shall ill have performed our part or our duty to those who have fallen.

In conclusion, I am aware that I shall be blamed by some for so openly expressing my opinion of the incapacity of the Indian Government, and of some of its more prominent subordinates; I shall be blamed for speaking as I have done of the Sepoys, for the delusion connected with these men is yet strong upon many; I shall be blamed, possibly, for presuming to censure some of the acts of the Marquis of Dalhousie. To all this I have but one simple reply, namely, that under ordinary circumstances I should have held my peace, for I have no further connection with public business, or desire to re-engage in it; but I consider that this, if ever there was one, is a time to speak out, and to make known boldly the truth and facts to the best of my knowledge and ability. In the inquiries which I presume will follow on the re-establishment of peace, it is desirable that the conduct of those who govern India should be rightly understood and thoroughly sifted; if it be then found that I have "set down aught in malice," I am content to abide the condemnation of my fellows. I need make no further apology for the open expression of my opinions; and I will only add, that the details I have given in connection with our position before Delhi have been added since the arrival of the Mail from thence of the 25th of August, and since the first part of the MS. was placed in the printer's hands.

Newport House, near Exeter,

October 16th, 1857.