A PLATFORM FOR ALL PARTIES.

BY

AUSTRO-BOREALIS.

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CICERO, *De Repub.*
What is the Commonweal but the People's Weal?
A.—B.

BALTIMORE:
J. P. DES FORGES.
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WILL YOU MANTAIN AND SET FORWARD, AS MUCH AS LIETH IN YOU, QUIETNESS, PEACE, AND LOVE, AMONG ALL CHRISTIAN PEOPLE, AND ESPECIALLY AMONG THEM THAT ARE OR SHALL BE COMMITTED TO YOUR CHARGE?

I WILL SO DO, THE LORD BEING MY HELPER.

Form and Manner of Ordering Priests.

PRELIMINARY.

It will be inferred from the quotation on the back of the title page that the writer is a clergyman; a Clerical Platform, therefore, may not be out of place to begin with.

1. A clergyman is a citizen, and, as such, has the same rights as other citizens, though it may not always be advisable to exercise them.

2. It is proper for a clergyman to petition Congress, or the State Legislature, in his clerical capacity, respecting what concerns him *purely* in that capacity. Thus, clergymen in Maryland petitioned the Legislature for a modification of a section of the Marriage law, which bore hard on them as the authorized, and, in that State, the sole authorized solemnizers of the marriage rite.

3. It is *not* proper for a clergyman to petition Congress, or the State Legislature, *in his clerical capacity*, respecting what concerns him only as a citizen. The "three thousand New England clergymen" might have petitioned Congress in their capacity of citizens, and along with their fellow-citizens, though, even then, it might have been a fair question for them whether they would not thereby be lessening their influence as clergymen.

4. A clergyman has no right to prostitute the pulpit to the purposes of the rostrum or the stump.

5. If, as a citizen, he has any thing to say to his fellow-citizens, that is worth saying, and can find time to say it without neglecting other duties, there is no reason why he should not say it.

Whether what follows is worth saying must be left to others to determine.

CATONSVILLE, MD. E. J. S.

PLATFORM.

Every age has its characteristic. The present is the age of Platforms. Each new party inaugurates itself upon a new one, and each old party, every four years, trundles out the old one; takes out, here and there, a rotten or a broken plank, and puts a new one in its place, sometimes of hard oak, sometimes of soft pine—very soft.

We are now in the latter half of the eighteenth *lustre* of the Republic, and the platform-building season is again upon us. Already the sound of the saw and the hammer may be heard, and ere long master-builder, journeyman, and prentice, will be hard at work, from Maine to California.

The truth is, this platform-building is getting to be an expensive luxury. Can there not be found some economical succedaneum,—a perennial platform, in place of the quadrennial. Thomas, Richard, and Henry build platforms. Why should I be the only modest man in the community? I will build one, too.

My platform shall consist of four planks, a Naturalization plank, a Territorial plank, a Presidential plank, and an Administrative plank. These four planks fairly and squarely put together into a platform, and the people fairly and squarely on it, and Demos will no longer be the pack-horse of peculating politicians.

1. *The Naturalization Plank.*—What the chief captain said to St. Paul, our naturalized fellow-citizens may say each of himself: "With a great sum obtained I this freedom;" not, however, as in the chief captain's case, with a great sum of money, but at the incomparably greater cost of cutting loose from old associations, of sundering the ties of kindred and country, of undergoing the hardships and perils of the middle passage, and of feeling one's self, for a time at least, a stranger in a strange land. Surely they who have gone through all this to secure to themselves what is ours by birthright, should be subjected to no unnecessary restrictions, and, above all, to no invidious distinctions. Give them their political regeneration, the new-birth of American citizenship, as the Church gives those who come to her from the world the new-birth of the kingdom of grace, the citizenship of

Heaven, as the Apostle calls it,* and the old allegiance will be cast off, old habits of thought and feeling outgrown, old associations forgotten, and the new-born heir of freedom will grow up steadily into "the measure of the fullness of the stature" of the "perfect man."

If there are evils connected with our present system of naturalization, let them be got rid of, but not at the expense of introducing greater evils in their place.

One evil there undoubtedly is,—that of naturalizing large numbers on the eve of an exciting election, the politicians paying the fee, and then marching the new citizen to the polls to vote as they may direct.

A slight change in the naturalization laws, and one to which, it seems to me, no one, whether native or foreign born, can fairly object, would do away, practically, with nine-tenths of the evil. Nearly all the elections, on the eve of which these wholesale naturalizations take place, are held in the autumn. Let, then, the law be altered so as to allow the granting of naturalization papers only in the winter and spring, and perhaps a part of the summer, say from the first of December to the first of July, with a proviso that those whose term of probation expired between the first of July and the first of December might be naturalized the preceding June.

Such is the alteration I propose. Adopt it and the term of probation instead of being extended, may be safely reduced to a single year, for none will apply for naturalization but such as value the privilege enough to pay the fee themselves, and this will be a practical limiting of it to the intelligent, the industrious, the deserving.

And now, that the naturalized vote is so nearly equally divided between the two great political parties, is the time to make the alteration. May I not, then, confidently appeal to every member of Congress to plant himself, at once, on this plank of my platform.

2. *The Territorial Plank.*—We hear a great deal about "Popular Sovereignty," "Congressional Intervention," and this, that, and the other; and men's minds have been not a little mystified on the subject. And yet it is, after all, a very simple one. Congress has the power to "exercise exclusive legislation" over the Territories, whether you derive that power from the 3d section of the 4th article, or the 2d section of the 2d article. But the power of exclusive legislation does not imply sovereignty. Congress is not sovereign. The States are the sovereign, exercising their sovereignty through the Constitution, or by

*Phil. 3: 20. Gr. Πολί'τευμα.

an alteration thereof with the concurrence of the Legislatures, or conventions of three-fourths of them. Congress can legislate for a Territory *within the limits of the Constitution;* no other body can legislate for it *at all*, except as the agent, or *locum tenens*, of Congress; and then only within the same limits. For surely what Congress cannot do, *that* the Territorial Legislature, which is its creature, cannot do, either.

We are told, indeed, by Judge Douglas, and the declaration is endorsed by "A Southern Citizen," that "it is the right and duty of Congress to organize the people of the Territories into political communities," and that, when so organized, they have "the inherent right of self-government," derived to them, however, not by Congress, but by the 10th article of the Amendments to the Constitution. His words are, "Inasmuch as the right to govern the people of the Territories, in relation to their internal polity, is not delegated to Congress, it necessarily follows that it is 'reserved to the people' until they become a State, and from that period to the new State, in the same manner as to the other States respectively." And again, "Those (powers) which are municipal and domestic in their character, are 'reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,'—'to the States' in respect to all of their inhabitants, and 'to the people' of the Territories prior to their admission as States." That is to say, the phrase "to the people," had reference to the Territories, and not to the States. If this be so, the language of the article shows a sad falling off from that of the original Constitution, which is remarkable for its perspicuity and precision. To convey the meaning here ascribed to it, it should have read, "are reserved to the States respectively or to the *several Territories.*"

Let us see if we cannot find a more natural interpretation. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to" the constituted authorities of "the States respectively, or to the people," who created those constituted authorities, conferring on them certain powers, and reserving to themselves certain other powers, either to be held in abeyance, or to be exercised by themselves *in propriis personis.* This is the natural and obvious interpretation. The 10th article refers to the people of the States alone; had it been intended to refer to the Territories it would have specified them by that designation. Our fathers weighed their words and measured their language.

But even on Judge Douglas's own showing, his interpretation is not

the true one. "Every 'right of property, private relation, condition or *status*, lawfully existing' in this country," says he, "must of necessity be a rightful subject of legislation by *some* legislative body. Where does this sovereign power of legislation for the Territories reside? It must be in one of two places—either in Congress or in the Territories. It can be nowhere else, and must exist somewhere."

Again, "The people of the Territories cannot exercise the right of self-government until Congress shall have determined that they have people enough to constitute a political community, that they are capable of self-government, and may be safely intrusted with legislative power."

Put that and that together, and it follows clearly that Congress has the same "power of legislation for the Territories" *before* the passage of the "organic act" that the Territorial Legislature has *after* it; in other words, the same power of legislation as for the District of Columbia; that is to say, the power "to exercise *exclusive* legislation in all cases whatsoever," subject only to the limitations of the Constitution.

Such is the power of Congress in the premises. How it shall exercise that power,—whether solely by enactments of its own, or also by creating a Territorial Legislature, and if the latter, to what extent it shall confer the legislative power on such Legislature, are questions to be determined on altogether different grounds.

The whole genius and spirit of our institutions is on the side of local self-government to the greatest extent compatible with "the general welfare." What that extent is, must be determined in each particular instance by the exigencies of the case.

Practically, there would be no difficulty, but for one disturbing element. Of course, I refer to slavery—the great bone of contention between North and South; and none the less so, now that all the meat has been so nearly gnawed off from it; no dog likes to have even the bare bone taken out of his mouth.

We are often told that the Fathers of the Republic had no liking for slavery, and that though they tolerated it as a temporary evil, they looked confidently to its early extinction by the action of the several State Legislatures. Whether that be so or not,—and their express permission of the foreign slave trade to the States then existing does not look much like it,—they certainly did *not* look to a warring upon the institution by the Northern States. On the contrary, they looked to the cultivation of a spirit of brotherly love among the several mem-

bers of the confederacy. How little the event has answered their expectation I need not say. The North is arrayed against the South, and the South against the North, and crimination and recrimination are the order of the day.

It was not always so. For the first thirty years, Territories were organized, and States admitted into the Union, without any restriction as to slavery except such as existed prior to the adoption of the Constitution. In this way, during that period, no less than five slave States were added to the Union. But when, in 1819, Missouri, which seven years before had been organized as a slave Territory by the *deliberate* act of Congress, (See Benton's Debates, vol vi, p. 431,) and had grown up as such under the sanction of that body, came, with a Constitution the natural and appropriate, and, indeed, necessary result of such a State of society, knocking for admission into the Union, the door was shut—say rather, *slammed*—in her face; and not till the following session, and then at the expense to the South of the so-called Missouri Compromise, did she obtain admittance.

Here was a deliberate violation of plighted faith. He who knowingly raises expectations—and this is as true of States as of individuals—is bound in honor to fulfil them. In this case, Congress practically said to Missouri: While you were a Territory we had, in our opinion, entire control over you, and *therefore* we let you do as you pleased; but now you are about to become a State, and we shall have no control over you, and *therefore* we *wont* let you do as you please. Was ever such reasoning before? What business was it to Congress what institutions the sovereign State of Missouri had, so they were "Republican," within the meaning of the Constitution?

The North having thus sown the wind, has, for the last five years, been reaping the whirlwind. Had she kept to her plighted faith, there would have been no Missouri Compromise to repeal, and the country would have been spared all this agitation, and the ill blood consequent upon it. Kansas would have filled up slowly but surely, with Northern men, and Northern institutions, and would, ere this, have taken her place among the free States of the Union, instead of being still kept waiting, by a sort of poetic justice, as Missouri was kept waiting, forty years ago. A higher law than man's determines the question of slavery or no slavery, and it is vain to fight against it. Under its operation the Indian Territory belongs to slavery; so do New Mexico and Arizona,—together 359,000 square miles. All the rest, 1,203,000 in

all, is freedom's; so declared to be by Senator Chesnut in his speech at Camden, S. C., a few weeks since. (See *N. Y. Times, Oct.* 3.) Add to these the number of square miles of the free States and the slave States, respectively, and you have half a million more for freedom than for slavery; and even if you put Utah with the South, (where it does not belong, and cannot be made to belong,) you but strike an even balance between the two. Why should not the North be satisfied with this? Why should she insist on the lion's share? She must know she cannot get it while the South retains a particle of self-respect. Too long, already, has she been enacting the part of the North Wind against the traveller's cloak, and with a similar result; let her now try the effect of a little of the genial sunshine of brotherly love. My word for it, she will gain more by it than by continuing her present course till doomsday. What is the use of all this agitation? Has it extended the area of freedom? Has it narrowed that of slavery? Can it do it? Is it not, then, worse than idle? And can a Christian man have any thing to do with it? Suppose the system of slavery as bad as represented, why should we by our meddling make it worse? I speak as a Northern man, Northern born. And we *shall* make it worse? We have made it worse already. God sees all the evils of slavery more clearly than we see them; and yet he bears with it. *Patiens quia Æternus*, says St. Augustine. Why should not man, the heir of immortality, be patient too? Leave to the brawling infidel, who "struts his little hour on life's brief stage," a life, "solitary, nasty, and short,"—to fret and fume over temporary, individual, evils, that are slowly, but surely, working out the regeneration and salvation of a race.

Slavery has not brought the American negro *down* to his present level, as so many at the North seem to think. If it had, no words of condemnation would be too strong for it; it would deserve, as it would receive, the execration not only of every Christian, but of every honorable and high-minded man. On the contrary, it has brought him *up* to his present level from the deepest degradation, and is still elevating him with each successive generation. It has made him all he is, and all he hopes for, in this life, and in the life to come. This is its one sufficient justification before God and man. Certainly Freedom cannot show such justification yet, in Hayti or in Jamaica; and till it does, we may be well content to leave things as they are. In this way only shall we be doing as we would be done by. The Constitution puts two restrictions upon slavery, and only two, and on the well-known prin-

ciple of legal interpretation, *Expressio unius est exclusio alterius*—a principle recognized by implication (since *exceptio probat regulam*) in the ninth article of Amendments—Congress has no right to add a third. The restrictions are found in article 1, section 2, paragraph 3, which, in determining the basis of representation, counts five slaves equal to but three freemen, and section 9, paragraph 1, which confers on Congress the power to prohibit the foreign slave-trade, after a certain time —a power which that body exercised at the earliest moment. The prohibition is still on the statute-book, and there it will remain. We hear, indeed, a great deal of talk about repealing it, but it is nothing but talk; the interests of the five slave States farthest north, and of the majority of slave owners in the other ten, are a guarantee of its perpetuity. As to the allegation that the prohibition is a reflection upon slavery, it is a palpable *non sequitur;* for, in the first place, it may be enacted from considerations of expediency; and, in the second place, the right to keep men in slavery does not imply the right to reduce them to that condition. I have no right to shut a sane man up in a madhouse till, by brooding over his wrongs, he becomes really mad; (this is not an imaginary case;) but when he has become mad, even though it be by my doing, I have a perfect right to keep him shut up. I use this comparison not as indicating the effect of slavery on the negro, for it does not do that, but to illustrate the single point that the right to keep a man in a certain state or condition does not argue the right to reduce him to that state or condition.

Equally idle is it to make the repeal of the prohibition a point of honor. If the *honor* of the South was not safe in the hands of the Rutledges, the Pinckneys, and the Butlers, who subscribed their names to the Constitution in witness that it was "done in convention, by the unanimous consent of the States present," among which was every Southern State, it will hardly be safer in the hands of its self-constituted guardians of the present day.

But there is another point of view from which this subject may be regarded. At present, the high price of the negro is his protection; worth more to him as such than all the provisions of the statute-book. It secures to him kind treatment and consequent elevation, physical and moral, in the scale of being. But bring in a horde of barbarians and you rapidly deteriorate him, not only by that evil communication which corrupts good manners, but by lowering his market value, and thereby making it the interest of his master to use him solely as a means to an

end, as the Cuban master is using his negroes at the present moment. Now, no man has a right thus to use his fellow man; and no legislative body has a right to tempt him thus to use him. This is the teaching not merely of Christianity, but of the commonest morality.*

Let us hear no more, then, of this talk about reopening the slave-trade. If it is meant in earnest, it is very foolish, for there is not the slightest chance of success; if it is meant in joke, to goad the anti-slavery feeling of the North, it is very foolish, none the less, and very wicked into the bargain.

The other restriction, which counts but three-fifths of the slaves in determining the ratio of representation, is very commonly looked upon at the North as not a restriction of the power slavery, but an enlargement. And yet it is a restriction, as is clear from the fact that if the South were to abolish slavery, she would thereby add to her basis of representation more than a million and a half, and that, too, without the slightest extension of the right of suffrage. She has now five representatives in Congress on the basis of her free negro population; if she were to enslave that population, as she is talking of doing in some of the States, she would have but three.

If it be said that the slaves ought not to be counted at all, because they are not citizens, I answer that the North has now, and has had for the last ten years, and will have for a long time to come, a floating population of some three millions of unnaturalized foreigners, every one of whom counts, and not merely three-fifths; and yet not one of them is a citizen or has a vote, except in some of the Western States, and, then, against the spirit, if not the letter of the Constitution.

These are the only restrictions on slavery in the Constitution, and on the principle already cited, *Expressio unius*, &c., which is the principle of common sense, as well as law, Congress has no right to add another.

This, then, is my Territorial plank, the *status quo* of the early days of the Republic, when Territories were organized, and States were admitted, with or without slavery, and no questions asked; when things were allowed to take their natural course, and Territories *grew* into

* The argument presented above against the reopening of the slave trade, is equally strong in favor of enlarging the area of slavery. It matters not whether you glut the market by fresh importations from abroad, or by hemming in within narrow limits those already here. In either case you lower greatly the value of the negro, and he is the first to suffer from it, physically and morally.

States without the hot-bed cultivation of Emigrant Aid Societies and Slavery Propagation *Clubs*—the one the natural consequence of the other.

And now, that all the Territory that was ever in doubt has been secured to freedom—now that the higher law of climate and production, a law too hard for even Yankee ingenuity to get around or over, has enacted a Missouri Compromise Line that neither North nor South can repeal—now is the favorable opening for this plank of my Platform. May I not, then, appeal with confidence to the whole people, infinitesimals excepted, to plant themselves upon it. Under the operation of the law above referred to, four-fifths of the remaining Territory is freedom's; only one-fifth goes to slavery. And yet the North is clamoring for more. Surely she might be content with what she has. Better is four-fifths, with good neighborhood, than five-fifths without it.

3. *The Presidential Plank.*—This involves an amendment of the Constitution, but as it is to get rid of a practical inconvenience in the operation of its working machinery, and as it has already been amended once in the same article, and for the same purpose, that need not be an objection. The object is to do away with the nominating conventions, without disturbing the balance of power. Ordinarily, public opinion in each of the great parties settles down some weeks, if not months, before the meeting of the nominating convention, on three or four candidates, either of whom would be satisfactory to the rank and file of the party, but neither of whom, owing to their own rivalry or that of their partisans, or to the fear of their non-availability, can command the requisite majority, and all of whom, in consequence, have to be thrown overboard, to make way for a compromise candidate.

My plan proposes to change this state of things by a simple and practicable alteration in the working machinery of the Constitution. Let the Electoral College, which has long since ceased to answer its original design, if, indeed, it ever did answer it, and has come to be, practically, a useless and cumbrous piece of machinery, be thrown aside. Let each State make choice, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, of three persons for President, designating them as first, second and third choice, respectively; and let the persons so chosen in any State be returned to the President of the Senate of the United States, as the first, second, and third choice, respectively, of said State, with the number of *electoral* votes to which the said State would be entitled under the present system appended to the name of each of them.

On the opening of the returns by the President of the Senate in convention of the two Houses of Congress, let the one having the greatest *aggregate* number of electoral votes be declared President. If no *one* person has such aggregate greatest number, (as will probably be the case,) then, of the two or more having such greatest aggregate number, let the one having the greatest number *as first choice*, be declared President. If no *one* has such greatest number as first choice, then, of the two or more having such greatest number, let the one having the greatest number *as second choice* be declared President. In the improbable event of the choice being determined by neither of these methods, then, of the two or more between whom the choice lies by the last of the above methods, let the one having the vote of the greatest number of *States*, as first choice, be declared President. If no *one* has the vote of such greatest number of States, as first choice, then, of the two or more having the vote of such greatest number, let the one having the vote of the greatest number of States, as second choice, be declared President. In the *extremely* improbable event of the choice being determined by none of all the above methods, let the election be made, as now, by the House of Representatives.

The choice of President having thus been determined, from the remaining candidates, in like manner, let a first, and a second *heir presumptive*, if I may accommodate the expression, be selected, who shall succeed, in the order of choice, to the office of President, in case of vacancy by death, resignation, or disqualification.* Let the office of Vice-President be abolished, and let the Senate choose its own President, as the House now chooses its Speaker.

Such, in brief, is the plan I propose. Some tabular illustrations of its practical working will be found in the Appendix.

Among the advantages that will result from it, if adopted, are the following:

1. It will do away with the expense and the excitement of nominating conventions, public opinion, in each of the great parties, settling down as heretofore, spontaneously, on the three candidates.

2. If the election is by the popular vote, as no doubt it will be in

* I am not sure that it would not be well to have the election but once in *six* years, and let the successful candidates hold the office two years each, in the order of choice. It would at least lessen the rivalry between contending candidates of the same party. Nor would the change of Administration be more frequent than has been the change of ministry in England, on the average, during the last twenty years.

all the States but one, perhaps even in that one, it will enable every voter to express on his ballot his preference among the three candidates without thereby risking the success of his party.

3. It will enable each of the three candidates to have his pretensions passed upon by the people, and will leave him untrammelled by obligations to the wire-pullers, and free, in case of his election, to bestow office on the deserving.

4. In case of no choice by the popular vote, it will decide the election, as now, by States, but not (except in a contingency not likely to happen once in a millennium) through representatives chosen two years before, and, it may be, on altogether different issues, but through a vote fresh from the people—a vote, too, already cast, and therefore leaving no room for bargain and corruption.

Last, not least, it will divide the abuse of partisan editors and stump-speakers among *three* candidates, instead of concentrating it upon one, and thereby lessen it, in even a yet greater ratio, in quantity and quality.

May I not, then, appeal to all, but third-rate politicians, to plant themselves on this plank of my platform.

4. *The Administrative Plank.*—My other planks are so wide that this will have to be narrow or my platform will be too large. Brief suggestions, therefore, on two or three points must suffice.

1. *The Post Office.*—The number of postmasters appointed by the President and Senate is 400, and their compensation averages, probably, $1,200. In regard to these, no change is needed. The rest—some 28,000—are appointed by the Postmaster General, and their compensation averages some $65 or $70. Let these be chosen by the people, the Postmaster General retaining the power of removal—a power which he would not be likely to exercise improperly when he could only create vacancies, not fill them. Relieve these Postmasters of the trouble of keeping accounts, and you take away more than half their labor, and they will be glad to do the rest for half price. Give them the postage on newspapers, pamphlets and books, which will average $15, and the postage on registered letters and the inland postage on foreign letters, $5; add $15 in stamps, and you have the $35. Here then, is a saving of more than $1,000,000 annually, and a drying up, at the same time, of one great source of political corruption.

2. *The Patent Office.*—The fee to be paid in on application for a patent is $30, of which $20 is returned if the application is unsuccess-

ful; $10 therefore, pays the expense of examination. Let this sum, then, be the fee required to be paid in at the filing of the application, and if the invention be found patentable, let the patent be issued on payment of the other twenty. Many a poor inventor might scrape together ten dollars, who would find it impossible to raise thirty without betraying the secret of his invention.

3. *Church and State.*—This will seem to many a strange heading, and yet it finds a place, legitimately, in a platform for all parties. We have, to be sure, no "established" religion, and we want none. But the Church has, nevertheless, its relations to the State, here as elsewhere. The Lord's Day is a *dies non* under the Constitution, being expressly excluded from the ten days allowed the President for signing a bill or returning it to Congress. If a *conscientious* Jew, or Seventh-Day Baptist were President, and a "bill" should be presented to him on Tuesday, he would have to sign it or return it by the Friday of the following week, whereas one of any other denomination could retain it till Saturday. There is, therefore, no such *absolute* equality of sects before the law as some seem to imagine. The Constitution is a practical instrument, and seeks to accomplish its objects in a practical, common sense way.

I refer to this because there seems to be no little confusion on the subject in some men's minds, as is shown by a memorial to Congress, drawn up by Dr. Wayland, and signed by him and several others, as a committee of the Warren (R. I.) Baptist Association, complaining of the appointment of so many army and navy chaplains from "one denomination," and that one, "one of the smallest in the land." (I quote from memory, but that is the substance.) The Doctor will be glad to learn that this last objection is rapidly removing, as the "denomination" has already more than two thousand congregations, and is doubling every fifteen years. His other objection goes upon the strange supposition—strange for one who calls himself a Christian minister—that the office is created for the benefit of the office-holder, and should therefore be apportioned, *pro rata*, among the different denominations. So, I am sure, does not Congress regard the matter. Its only warrant for creating the office is the welfare of the service. The spirit of the first article of amendments requires the appointing power, in making its appointments, to consult, as far as practicable, the wants and wishes of those for whose benefit the appointment is made. Now, as a general thing, both officers and men prefer litur-

gical worship. Jack likes the Prayer Book, because it enables him to "jaw back." It puts him on a level with his fellow-worshippers, and makes him feel himself a sharer in the common humanity and the common redemption, and seek to gain an interest in the common salvation. If it depends on him, he "wont give up the Prayer Book;" it has been too often the only plank between his soul and shipwreck. It is his Bible in compendium; the Bible brought practically home to his wants and necessities; and he is no true friend of his who would take it from him.

One word upon another subject—Polygamy in the Territories—and I have done. That Congress has full power to prohibit it in the District of Columbia is admitted on all hands, and not only admitted, but acted on. That it has equal power in a Territory, before the organization of the Territorial Legislature, I have already shown from Judge Douglas, (see above, p. 8,) and after it has conferred that power upon the Legislature, it may, if it see occasion, resume it in whole or in part: it cannot shake off its responsibility by delegating its functions to a subordinate authority. Congress has also power to legislate upon slavery in the District, and has exercised that power on more occasions than one. And the power over slavery which it has in the District, it has also in the Territories. The difference between the two institutions is this: the one is recognized by the Constitution, and sanctioned by nearly half the States, and was once sanctioned by them all; the other is not recognized by the Constitution, and moreover, is, and has been, from the beginning, a penitentiary offence in every State in the Union. Unfriendly legislation, therefore, upon the one, except by general consent, is against the spirit of the Constitution; unfriendly legislation upon the other, even to prohibition, is in keeping with its spirit, and demanded by it. And the spirit of the Constitution *is* the Constitution. The letter killeth; the spirit giveth life.

My platform is complete. Let North and South, Cis-Alleghanian and Trans-Alleghanian plant themselves upon it; it will hold them all and have room to spare.

APPENDIX.

The following tables will illustrate the practical working of the proposed plan for choosing President, in several contingencies, of which the third is the only very probable one, though either of the others *might* happen.

The letters A, B, C, &c., designate the candidates; the columns headed 1st, 2d, 3d, contain the votes given for them as 1st, 2d, and 3d choice, respectively; the numbers in those columns, appended to the several States, or groups of States, designate the number of electoral votes to which those States, or groups of States, are severally entitled.

TABLE I.

WHIG TICKET.*

States.	A				B				C			
	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total
Conn., Ohio	29					29					29	
Mass., N. Jersey	20						20			20		
Indiana		13			13						13	
N. H., Vt., Md			18		18					18		
La., Texas		10					10		10			
Maine, R. I.			12			12			12			
	49	23	30	102	31	41	30	102	22	38	42	102

* I purposely designate the tickets by *old* party names.

INDEPENDENT TICKET.

States.	L				M				N			
	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total
New York, Cal	39					39					39	
Michigan, Wis	11						11			11		
Illinois		11			11						11	
Oregon, Minn			7		7					7		
Iowa		4					4		4			
Penn., Kansas			30			30			30			
	50	15	37	102	18	69	15	102	34	18	50	102

DEMOCRATIC TICKET.

States.	X				Y				Z			
	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total
Va., Ala., Miss.	31					31					31	
Ky., Tenn., Mo.	33						33			33		
S. C., Arkansas.		12			12						12	
Georgia			10		10					10		
Delaware, N. C.		13					13		13			
Florida			3			3			3			
	64	25	13	102	22	34	46	102	16	43	43	102

Here, the aggregate vote is equally divided between three tickets. X has the highest vote as first choice, and is President. L is first in the line of succession, and A second. Thus the three highest candidates are divided among the three tickets. Two *might* be on the same ticket, but all three could not.

TABLE II.

WHIG TICKET

States.	A				B				C			
	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total
N. Y., Ky., La.	53					53					53	
Del., Ohio	26						26			26		
Me., Mass. R. I., Ct.		31			31						31	
Vermont, N. H.			10		10					10		
Maryland		8					8		8			
N. C., Tenn., Fla.			25			25			25			
	79	39	35	153	41	78	34	153	33	36	84	153

DEMOCRATIC TICKET.

States.	X				Y				Z			
	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total
Penn.	27					27					27	
N. J., Tex., Ind., Ill., Mich., Iowa, Minn., Kansas.	52						52			52		
Virginia, S. C.		23			23						23	
Ga. Miss. Ala. Ark. Wis. Mo. Cal.			48		48					48		
Oregon.		3					3		3			
	79	26	48	153	71	27	55	153	3	100	50	153

Here the aggregate vote is equally divided between the two tickets. The vote as first choice also is equally divided between A and X, but A has the highest number as second choice, and is President. X is first in the line of succession, and Y second.

TABLE III.

WHIG TICKET.

States.	A				B				C			
	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total
N. Y., N. C., La., Tenn., Ky.	75	.....	.....	.....	.....	75	.....	.....	.....	.....	75	.....
Maryland, Ohio	31	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	31	.....	.....	31	.....	.....
Maine, Mass., R. I., Conn.	.....	31	.....	.....	31	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	31	.....
Vermont, N. H.	.....	.....	10	.....	10	.....	.....	.....	.....	10	.....	.....
	106	31	10	147	41	75	31	147	.....	41	106	147

DEMOCRATIC TICKET.

States.	X				Y				Z			
	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total
Penn	27	.....	.....	.....	.....	27	.....	.....	.....	.....	27	.....
N. J. Ind. Ill. Mich. Iowa, Minn. Kan.	48	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	48	.....	.....	48	.....	.....
Virginia, S. C.	.....	23	.....	.....	23	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	23	.....
Ga. Mi. Ala. Tex... Ark. Wis. Mo. Cal.	.....	.....	52	.....	52	.....	.....	.....	.....	52	.....	.....
Fla. Oregon	.....	6	.....	.....	.....	.....	6	.....	6	.....	.....	.....
Delaware	.....	.....	3	.....	.....	3	.....	.....	3	.....	.....	.....
	75	29	55	159	75	30	54	159	9	100	50	159

Here the entire Democratic ticket is elected. X and Y have an equal number of votes as first choice, but Y has the largest as second, and is therefore President. X is first in the line of succession and Z second.

Had Pennsylvania given her 27 votes to W, as third choice, Z would have been defeated, and A, the highest as first choice on the Whig ticket, would have been second in the line of succession.

TABLE IV.

DEMOCRATIC TICKET.

States.	X				Y				Z			
	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total	1st.	2d.	3d.	Total
Texas, Mo., Minn...	17	.....	.....	.....	.....	17	.....	.....	.....	.....	17	.....
Oregon, Penn. Fla. Kansas.	36	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	36	.....	.....	36	.....	.....
Ga. Ark. Ind. Wis. Cal.....	.....	36	.....	.....	36	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	36	.....
Ala., S. C.....	.....	.....	17	.....	17	.....	.....	.....	.....	17	.....	.....
N. J., Del., Miss....	.....	17	.....	.....	.....	.....	17	.....	17	.....	.....	.....
Va. Ill. Mich. Iowa.	.....	.....	36	.....	.....	36	.....	.....	36	.....	.....	.....
	53	53	53	159	53	53	53	159	53	53	53	159

Here the Whig ticket remaining as in the preceding table. the Democratic ticket is elected; but the vote in the aggregate, and also as first and second, and of course, therefore, as third choice, is equally divided among the three candidates. The vote *by States*, also, as first choice, is equally divided among the three, each having seven States; but, as second choice X has eight States, Y seven, and Z six. X is, therefore, President, and Y is first in the line of succession, and Z second.