


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CPYRGHT

KGB

*The Secret Work of Soviet
Secret Agents.*

By John Barron.

Illustrated. 462 pp. New York:
Readers Digest Press. \$10.95.

CPYRGHT **TREVOR-ROPER**

What is the basic strength of Soviet Communism, the power which animates and sustains that huge fabric? It is not what we once thought it to be. The original appeal of Communism was material, moral and ideological. It claimed to improve the welfare of the workers, to restore their self-respect, and to do so in tune with historical necessity. In fact, 50 years after the Revolution, real wages had hardly regained the level of 1913; rural serfdom, abolished by the Czars, has been reimposed; and the ideology convinces no one. What the Bolsheviks have created is a new system of power: power that has no basis in society, no reference to consent, no moral justification. We used to think that Lenin gave to Marxism a temporary political form; now we recognize that he used Marxism as the temporary ideological justification of a new structure of naked political power.

The essential motor of that structure is now the Secret Police. Lenin's Cheka, Brezhnev's K.G.B., is the effective sovereign in the Russian state. It is stronger than the party, it controls the organs of state. It is above the law. Accountable to no one, it can destroy anyone. Even Stalin only ruled by dividing it and murdering its successive heads, Yagoda and Yezhov. His successors similarly murdered Beria. Khrushchev tried, but failed, to escape from dependence on it. He abolished its Special Bureau for Assassination, but had to revive it three months later, and ended by setting up a public statue of its founder, the terrible Dzerzhinsky. Now the K.G.B. is stronger than ever, and three of its members sit openly in the Politburo. If it no longer

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Many of Mr. Barron's chapters describe individual espionage operations carried out by the K.G.B. abroad, as related by its defectors. We can read of the subversive activities of Vladimir Sakharov in the Middle East, the penetration of the secrets of N.A.T.O. by means of the American traitor Robert Lee Johnson, the quest of American secrets through the Finnish-American Kaarlo Tuomi, the successful extension of direct Soviet power over Castro's Cuba, the unsuccessful efforts to subvert governments in Mexico and Africa, the arrest in Russia of Professor Barghoorn, the attempts to compromise, and so afterward to use, a British member of Parliament and a French ambassador. These are readable spy stories, and others could be added to them. However, it is not these that make the K.G.B. unique. All great powers go in for espionage. It is part of

power politics, and as such has a certain conventional legitimacy. No doubt similar stories could be told of the C.I.A.

What makes the K.G.B. so sinister is not the huge resources which it invests in these foreign adventures. Rather, it is its even greater investment in repression at home. Foreigners observe, and resent, the K.G.B.'s palpable interference in their affairs, the grotesque

over-staffing of Russian embassies and delegations abroad. But, as Mr. Conquest points out in his Introduction, "the major part of the K.G.B.'s effort, the greater number of its employes, are used in the massive and continuous work against its own populations." Moreover, it is there, naturally enough, that it is most successful. Abroad, its failures have been more conspicuous than its successes. It has failed in Mexico, in Egypt, throughout Black Africa. Its agents desert in a continuous stream, and are expelled in periodic shoals. But at home it is irresistible. With 70,000 full-time censors it stamps on literature. Even bus tickets must be passed by the censor. With an army of informers, it inhibits conversation. By means of internal passports it controls movement. It has turned the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy into its agents to pervert religion. With concentration camps and "psychiatric institutes" it stifles thought. No government in history has used so monstrous an engine of repression against its own people: and no people in the world has tolerated such a tyranny.

How is it done? By what mechanism does "a tiny oligarchy," whose leadership is at the mercy of internal gang warfare, so cow a whole people? This is the most important political question raised by the existence of the K.G.B. Mr. Barron is well aware of it, and touches on it, if too lightly. It deserves to be brought out and emphasized: for it is the central mystery of totalitarian power.

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is not a productive social class—bourgeoisie, workers, peasants—but a "New Class" of bureaucrats and party workers which, having once installed itself in power, exercises absolute control over rewards and punishments. In no country does such a class rise naturally: in Russia it was created by revolution, in Eastern Europe it was imposed by conquest. But once in power, by bureaucratic centralism, the abolition of legal guarantees, and unqualified "reason of state," it can perpetuate itself against all comers. With time, and in a rigorously controlled society, the rewards and punishments themselves can be reduced: bribery becomes trivial, blackmail is expressed in mere hints. But whether the system is operated crudely, as under Stalin, or more subtly, as now, the background of terror is essential. Without terror, the system could not be installed; without the long shadow of terror, it could not be continued. For this reason, our hope must be that progressive sophistication will wear out the practice of terror and destroy the cohesion of the New Class. The heroes of this book are the defectors who have begun that process: the men who, in the end, could not endure "the daily squalor" of a system by which they have profited but which has ultimately repelled them because it has no moral base. ■

The KGB Realities Behind Solzhenitsyn's Parables

KGB: The Secret Work of Secret Soviet Agents. By John Barron. Reader's Digest Press, 1974. \$10.95.

CPYRGHT

Ernest W. Lefever

Detente is a many-splintered thing. With one hand Moscow reaches out for American wheat and trade concessions. With the other it exiles Alexander Solzhenitsyn for telling the truth about Soviet repression. In one gesture it sends its artists and performers to the United States. In another it threatens to strip Valery Panov, former star of Lenin-grad's Kirov Ballet, of his citizenship because he wanted to migrate to Israel.

IT MAY STILL be fashionable in some circles to overlook or downplay unpleasant realities that do not fit the illusion of detente. But after a great Soviet writer has been declared a non-person and with almost daily reports of repression against other Soviet nonconformists, it is increasingly difficult to turn a blind eye to the moral and political schizophrenia of the Soviet regime.

Or perhaps it is not the Soviets who are afflicted with a split-level ethics, but we who are confused by split-level perception. Many of us want to believe that the era depicted in Solzhenitsyn's "The Gulag Archipelago" is in the distant past and that the post-Stalin leaders have moved toward a new and less repressive political order. We want to think of the Soviet Union as an ordinary state operating by ordinary rules. When the rules are dramatically broken we are shocked and disappointed.

What kind of a political system does Moscow have today? Is it significantly different from that of the Stalin era? Important light is thrown on this question by John Barron's impressive book on the KGB — the massive clandestine agency created by Lenin to be the "sword and shield" of the Communist party, the instrument of the Politburo to enforce its will and confound its opponents. The KGB is the current manifestation of the state security apparatus originally established in 1917 as Cheka. Today, says Barron, "the KGB has the same relationship to the Politburo under Brezhnev that the Cheka had with the Council of People's Commissars under Lenin."

SOLZHENITSYN, Panov, and millions of other Soviet citizens have felt the brutal, often lethal, force of the KGB and its predecessors. The vast concentration camp system portrayed in "The Gulag Archipelago" and the present system of exile are their handiwork. At least 20 million Soviet citizens have died in the ruthless pogroms of the secret police. But silencing or neutralizing troublemakers is only a small part of the KGB's far-flung assignments.

As an instrument of totalitarian control, the KGB has no peer, past or present. If the Soviet Communist Party is a state within a state, the KGB is in fact the "sword and shield" of the party. It penetrates every nook and cranny of Soviet life to control the words, actions, tastes, loyalties, and even thoughts of Soviet citizens.

As the obedient agent of the party, the KGB operates a Border Guard, an elite military force of 300,000 equipped with tanks, artillery, and armed ships. In 1965 KGB patrols captured more than 2,000 Soviet citizens attempting to escape. The KGB oversees the entire military establishment and has agents and informers assigned to the Ministry of Defense and in every military headquarters and unit down to the company level. "The slightest evidence of ideological deviation among the military can provoke swift KGB retribution." It was only in the late 1960s when "the military finally persuaded the leadership that it would be impractical to use atomic weapons in a future internal struggle" that the KGB relinquished custody of nuclear warheads.

Through its complex of directorates, the KGB penetrates the entire state bureaucracy, starting with the Politburo. "The KGB today probably has more officers and alumni in positions of power than at any other time in Soviet history."

Of the 17 Politburo members in 1973, three have spent "significant portions of their careers in the apparatus." While the full-time staff of the KGB may be as small as 100,000, its influence is vastly expanded by a network of informers — from the concierge in Kiev to the U.S. ambassador's aide in Washington — at home and abroad that may run into the millions.

THE KGB CONTROLS job and housing permits, internal and external travel, and all forms of police activity. Former KGB chairman Shelepin runs the Soviet trade union organization. The KGB monitors industry and the economy to detect and bring to justice perpetrators of crimes such as "incorrect planning," unauthorized private enterprise, and blackmarketeering.

It keeps watch on education from kindergarten through the universities and on all academic and research institutes. In 1970 the KGB launched a large new division, the Fifth Chief Directorate, "to annihilate intellectual dissent, stop the upsurge in religious faith, suppress nationalism among ethnic minorities, and silence the *Chronicle of Currency Events*, an underground journal.

The following year it established a special Jewish Department to intensify infiltration into Jewish circles to curtail emigration of educated Jews and to silence protest. The KGB oversees 70,000 full-time censors who control the printed word. It works through the criminal justice system and operates special KGB "mental hospitals" where prominent citizens who do not conform to "official doctrine" are taken for forcible treatment, including the use of brain-washing drugs.

All foreigners in the U.S.S.R., including tourists, are placed under the surveillance of the KGB. In 1963, an American visitor, Prof. Frederick C. Barghoorn, who was on open academic business in Moscow, was drugged, falsely accused of espionage, arrested, and held hostage by the KGB for the release of a real Soviet spy, KGB agent Igor Ivanov, who was caught red handed by the FBI in New York. Prof. Barghoorn was released only after the public intervention of President Kennedy.

The long tentacles of the KGB reach out in support of Soviet objectives around the world. The clandestine service penetrates and uses the Foreign Ministry and all other official Soviet agencies overseas. KGB agents accompany all Soviet scientific and cultural groups abroad. As a rule, the KGB's harshest and most brutal coercion is directed against Soviet citizens at home. "These tough professionals," says

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An Absorbing Report on Russia's KGB

The reviewer is a member of The Washington Post's editorial page staff and The Moscow correspondent.

Now, any American who's spent time in and on Russia fancies he knows quite a bit personally about the KGB, which is, in its foreign aspect, the Soviet CIA; at home it's the political police. I recall: the wires in our Moscow apartment wall that the flustered workmen failed to plaster over before we came in; the colleague slipped a drug and then undressed and photographed, in company; the "disinformation" letter written about me to my editor by the "diplomat" who's now the Soviet consul in San Francisco; the luncheon invitation from a "journalist" here asking how Premier Kosygin might be received on American TV, on which Kosygin later did appear.

But this sort of thing, nasty or normal as it might be, is trivia along side John Barron's calm-voiced, detailed, absorbing and—I'm prepared to believe—authentic report on selected foreign operations mounted by the KGB in the '50s and '60s and on up to the present day.

From former Soviet agents who defected and from American and foreign intelligence sources, Barron, a Reader's Digest senior editor, has produced an account which goes well beyond being a catalog of KGB dirty tricks and becomes a sobering challenge to what the Soviet Union professes to mean by "detente." This is what, at this time of second-thoughts about Soviet-American relations, gives "KGB" unusual topicality.

One can understand, for instance, why the KGB, thinking (in the mid-'50s) that Ambassador Maurice Dejean might use his friendship with De Gaulle to influence him, should have gone to strenuous lengths—elaborated splendidly by Barron—to get Dejean to fall for a succession of "swarms" to

entrap him even without his knowing that he had been caught by the KGB, and to But at this point, a KGB man defected in Paris and told all. Recalled at once, Dejean was dismissed by De Gaulle in one sentence: *Eh bien, Dejean, on couche.*

Similarly, one can understand why the KGB would have gone to equally strenuous lengths to recruit a flabby disgruntled Army NCO and, when he became a guard at the super-secret Orly Airport courier center in 1962 to arrange for him to spirit out documents for months. His wife later flipped out and raved to the FBI. On July 30, 1965, Robert Lee Johnson and a confederate were each sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment in Federal Court, Alexandria. His son, visiting him at Lewisburg in 1972, murdered him with a knife.

And—one more—there was a certain logic to the KGB's planting Michigan-born Kaarlo Tuomi, whose family had returned to Russia when he was 16, back in the United States in 1958 as a secret agent. (A mentor, riding up the elevator one day in the building housing the apartment in which Tuomi was learning to act like an American, found himself standing next to Eleanor Roosevelt, who was being shown a "typical" Soviet flat!) Arriving in New York, Tuomi had barely sent his first coded postcard to the Soviet United Nations mission when, somehow, the FBI picked him up. After a while he went to work for the FBI, giving up his family back in Russia.

Subversion, however, is something else:

The KGB, according to a favored son of the New Class who got fed up and came over to the CIA, had honeycombed Egypt with agents, one being a classic case of "a little man" (recruited early) who became "a big man," presidential adviser Sami Sharaf. Egyptian President Sadat wiped out Sharaf and other agents in May 1971, crushing the KGB's Egyptian support, creating "absolute pandemo-

num at the Kremlin," Barron says.

In March 1971, Mexican officials uncovered an astonishing plot, coordinated through the Soviet Embassy,

to create on a large scale "another Vietnam." Through an offer of a scholarship to KGB-run Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow, an angry Mexican had been recruited who became the chief agent. At KGB bidding, he led a group of unwitting Mexicans through Russia to North Korea for guerrilla training—to disguise the Russian hand. A Mexico City bank was robbed, elaborate subversion and propaganda plans prepared. But the police found out. Five Soviet diplomats were expelled.

In September, 1971 (a bad year for the KGB, evidently), a sorely provoked British government expelled at one stroke no less than 105 intelligence officers from the incredibly overmanned Soviet mission. The simultaneous defection to the British of a KGB officer in the sabotage and assassination branch induced the Soviet Politburo to recall other "Department V" men around the world.

The KGB seems to have, along with its core of brutality, a compulsion to distrust as thick as the walls of its Moscow headquarters on Dzerzhinsky Square; its new building for foreign operations, by the way, sits hidden off the Moscow beltway, like the CIA, and is of a design uncannily like CIA's. To the KGB, good relations with a particular country, or detente, is not a signal to relax but an opportunity to exploit foreigners' relaxation and to use the expanded channels of trade, culture and the like to burrow deeper.

Whether this tendency flows from a political decision by the whole Kremlin, or whether the KGB has the power to demand a longer leash for foreign operations as its price for letting other Kremlin factions pursue detente, or whether the KGB is partially responsible for questions which Barron does

not really address. Nor does he ask what real difference KGB operations make in a given context, apart from preoccupying those who conduct and combat them. Ask

yourself, for instance, why in 1964 the KGB sent here (through the Czech pouch) thousands of copies of a pamphlet depicting Barry Goldwater as a racist.

Suppose Henry Kissinger said, quietly, to the Soviet ambassador, "Anatoly, enough." It would be a legitimate test of Soviet intentions and a fascinating exercise in Soviet-American dynamics. Naturally, the reciprocity principle would have to be applied.

Barron, have a kind of respect for Americans and Northern Europeans, a respect not accorded Asians, Arabs, Latins, or Southern Europeans, though this did not prevent the abuse of Prof. Barghoorn or shooting with nitrogen mustard gas a German technician in Moscow who had just cleared his embassy of KGB microphones.

WHILE THERE ARE superficial resemblances between the operations of the KGB abroad and those of the clandestine services of Western governments, there is one profound difference. The KGB is in the service of a totalitarian regime ideologically committed to the neutralization or destruction of non-communist governments. Soviet objectives are different from Western objectives, and the KGB often operates by different means. In dramatic detail, Barron relates several KGB operations, some successes and some failures.

"Officers of the KGB and its military subsidiary, the GRU (Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff), ordinarily occupy a majority of embassy posts," as much as 80 percent in some Third World countries. In Washington, the FBI estimates that over 50 percent of

Soviet representatives, including trade officials and Tass correspondents, work for the KGB. In addition, many agents use the U.N. headquarters and Mexico City for operations against the United States. For several years Secretary General U Thant had a personal assistant, Viktor Lesiovsky, a KGB agent. Probably half of the 207 Soviet citizens employed by the U. N. Secretariat, are KGB agents, and at least one was assigned to the division responsible for assassination and sabotage, described in Chapter 13 of the book.

In 1971 there were 108 official Americans in Moscow and 189 Soviet citizens with diplomatic immunity in Washington. "In Moscow the total number of accredited diplomats from 87 non-communist countries was 809, while the Soviet Union had 1,769 accredited diplomats in the same countries." A revealing, top-secret KGB textbook obtained by Western intelligence, *The Practice of Recruiting Americans in the U.S.A. and Third Countries*, is reproduced almost in its entirety in the book's appendix.

KGB operatives abroad have made their share of mistakes

many of them have been caught and expelled. In September, 1971 the British government publicly expelled 105 KGB and GRU officers, but only after Moscow had "contemptuously ignored" London's quiet request to desist from a campaign to "suborn politicians, scientists, businessmen, and civil servants." "Between 1970 and July 1973, 20 nations found it necessary to expel a total of 164 Soviet officials because of their illegal, clandestine actions." A list of some 1,400 "Soviet Citizens Engaged in Clandestine Operations" is carried in the book's appendix. It includes only names "positively identified by two or more responsible sources."

In earlier years, the Soviet Union followed a policy of supporting only those terrorist groups abroad which its agents controlled or thought they controlled. Today the KGB trains and materially supports many more terrorist organizations, including some operating against black and white regimes in Africa, several in Latin America, the Quebec Liberation Front in Canada, Palestine groups, and terrorists in Northern Ireland.

Many terrorist leaders are trained in the Soviet Union, but assistance to these groups is frequently assigned to the clandestine services of Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. At the KGB's behest, the Cubans have trained both Palestinian and Irish terrorists. KGB operatives are also active in encouraging, supporting, and organizing "peace demonstrations," riots, and other disturbances to discredit regimes whose character or policies Moscow opposes.

ONE OF THE LESSER known KGB activities is the "disinformation" program designed to discredit individuals, institutions, and governments by disseminating forgeries, literary hoaxes, and false information and by committing acts such as murder for psychological-political effects. The operations of a master disinformation specialist, known as Victor Louis, make interesting reading. "Twice Louis has been received at the White House; by Vice President Humphrey on Oct. 17, 1966, and by Presidential Adviser Henry A. Kissinger on Nov. 13, 1971."

The book is filled with demonstrably true stories that will fascinate the spy enthusiast. But precisely because it is interesting and well written, some people may be tempted to dismiss KGB as a romanticized thriller. That would be a mistake. John Barron has produced a harmonious blend of journalism and scholarship to the credit of both professions.

THIS IS A SERIOUS book on a serious subject and it is abundantly documented. For four years it has been painstakingly researched. Most of the facts came from former KGB agents, but in virtually all instances information was corroborated by independent sources cited in the chapter notes. "We believe we have interviewed or had access to reports from all postwar KGB defectors except two," says the author. Western intelligence services were consulted to verify data.

Barron had substantial research support from the *Reader's Digest*, of which he is a senior editor, including the monitoring of publications in 13 languages by various *Digest* offices abroad. The 331 pages of text and 131 pages of appended material make a significant contribution to literature on the Soviet Union. From beginning to end, the book rings true.

Coming at this time of intensified KGB efforts to suppress dissent, the book makes a singular contribution to understanding the limits of cooperation between the two superpowers. It lends valuable perspective to what appears to be current contradictions in the Soviet system.

The root problem is not the KGB, but the totalitarian character of the Soviet regime. And the evil in totalitarianism is its arrogance, its insistence that the party has the whole truth in all spheres of man's existence, the answer to all problems. Unlike Western political leaders, the men in the Kremlin are not constrained by a transcendent ethic, a code beyond the party and independent of it. The party is not only the state, but God. Soviet leaders invoke terms like "the rule of law" and "human rights," but they tend to be code words used to manipulate the masses and confuse adherents to Western values.

It is this spiritual arrogance that crushes the human spirit and aspirations of the people who live in a totalitarian state. This is why the KGB seeks to create spiritual isolation among Soviet citizens by making every person afraid of his neighbor or member of his family. This is why Pavlik

Morozov, a 14-year-old boy who denounced his father in 1932 for giving refuge to fleeing peasants, was made a Hero of the Soviet Union. The father was summarily shot and enraged peasants lynched the boy. In 1965 a statue of Palvik was erected in his honor. The house where he betrayed his father is a Communist shrine, and today he is held up as an ideal for every worthy citizen to emulate.

BARRON INSISTS there can be no full "detente until there is an end to this massive KGB aggression" against the Soviet people and against persons, institutions, and governments around the world. The "deferential silence about KGB oppressions and depredations," he says, must be shattered. Governments, he adds, should refuse to accept known KGB agents in the guise of diplomats and should "summarily expel the legions of KGB officers entrenched in foreign capitals."

Barron acknowledges that some of the brutality of the Stalin era has passed. In those days Solzhenitsyn would not simply have been stripped of his citizenship and expelled. He would have been shot. But the basic moral (or immoral) foundation of the Soviet system has not changed. The spiritual pretention and political arrogance are still there. If this recognition means that anti-communism is becoming respectable again, all to the good.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union is a superpower and the United States should continue to induce it to adopt those disciplines that will make nuclear war less likely without making nuclear blackmail more attractive.

It is precisely because the Soviet Union is a tyranny that we Americans should seek intellectual and cultural dialogue with Soviet citizens. "Our society," says Barron, "can survive the clandestine activities of the KGB, but their society cannot ultimately withstand the free flow of ideas."

Dr. Lefever, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, has written "Ethics and U.S. Foreign Policy," "Spear and Scepter," and other books. This review also draws upon an interview with the author.