DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NNDG# 760050

894.74 RADAR/1-145--12-3146-47-48-49

WAR 26 1944

In reply refer to

My dear Mr. Norcross:

In confirmation of a telephone conversation with your secretary, attached is a copy of a report on the Sumitomo Research Laboratory in Japan which may be of interest to you. This report deals with Radar research activities at this laboratory during the war.

Sincerely yours,

Harvey B. Otterman
Assistant Chief
Telecommunications Division

Enclosure:

Report of Investigation,

OCR NF OMOVEMBER 3, 1945.

The Cleveland Norcross,

Acting Executive Secretary,

Office of Scientific

Research and Development,

1530 P Street, N.W.,

Washington, D.C.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

Office of the Chief Signal Officer

Technical Liaison and Investigation Division

1341 1343 Advance Echelon 1584 APO 500 3 November 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Investigation.

TO: Director, Technical Liaison and Investigation Division.

1. A further investigation of the Sumitomo Research Laboratory at Noborita was made on 29 October 1945 by Lt. Col. Minks, Mr. Waite and the undersigned.

2. There was no one present at the time who had a complete knowledge of the entire laboratory, but Mr. Morita attempted to give the overall setup to the best of his knowledge. He explained that before the war this laboratory was engaged in communication and vacuum tube research. After the war the organization remained substantially the same, except that only radar research was carried on. It was made up of 4 main divisions.

tions equipment, television, acoustics, etc. before the war, now did only radar research.

b. The vacuum tube division developed all types of vacuum tubes.

on the equipment.

d. The Administrative Division carried on the usual administration duties.

3. They were given research projects by Tama Laboratory. In most cases the project was not a complete radar set but only specific parts. For example, they might only be given a small part such as a special tube to develop for specific sets. The only two radars that were completely developed here were the Taki 2 and the Taki 34. Nearly all of the work on the Tachi 22 was done here with the exception of the transmitter tubes and some minor parts. Mr. Morita has been interrogated previously on the details of the Tachi 22.

4. Mr. Shimizu was questioned further on the details of the Taki 34. This project was started in October 1944. They made a magnetron operating on 5cm. and started building a radar around this. Later they had access to a B-29 radar and copied many of the parts including the R-F section, the

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PPI and the discharge tube. In July 1945 an experimental model was completed and taken to Ajiro (near Atama) where some field tests were conducted. The tests showed that the range was too limited and it did not show enough detail. At this time the war ended and Mr. Shimizu claimed that the set was destroyed.

6. Mr. Shimasu was asked who helped him with the tests. He said that Major Saisho, Major Katsuki and Major Tomono assisted him. When he was asked about jamming tests that were performed against this radar, he said that he understood that Major Tomono was doing such experiments but that they did not prove successful. He was not present at the time of the jamming tests and knew nothing further about it.

HAROLD C. WICH, lst Lt., Signal Corps.

E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NNDG# 760050 DECLASSIFIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC Office of the Chief Signal Officer Technical Liaison and Investigation Division Advance Echelon APO 500 3 November 1945 SUBJECT: Report of Investigation. TO: Director, Technical Liaison and Investigation Division. 1. A further investigation of the Sumitomo Research Laboratory at Noborita was made on 29 October 1945 by Lt. Col. Minks, Mr. Waite and the undersigned. There was no one present at the time who had a complete knowledge of the entire laboratory, but Mr. Morita attempted to give the overall setup to the best of his knowledge. He explained that before the war this laboratory was engaged in communication and vacuum tube research. After the war the organization remained substantially the same, except that only radar research was carried on. It was made up of 4 main divisions. a. The Communications Division, which did research on communications equipment, television, acoustics, etc. before the war, now did only radar research. b. The vacuum tube division developed all types of vacuum tubes. c. The Experimental or Testing Division did the performance tests on the equipment. d. The Administrative Division carried on the usual administration duties. They were given research projects by Tama Laboratory. In most cases the project was not a complete radar set but only specific parts. For example, they might only be given a small part such as a special tube to develop for specific sets. The only two radars that were completely developed here were the Taki 2 and the Taki 34. Nearly all of the work on the Tachi 22 was done

- 4. Mr. Shimizu was questioned further on the details of the Taki 34. This project was started in October 1944. They made a magnetron operating on 5cm. and started building a radar around this. Later they had access to a B-29 radar and copied many of the parts including the R-F section, the PPI and the discharge tube. In July 1945 an experimental model was completed and taken to Ajiro (near Atama) where some field tests were conducted. The tests showed that the range was too limited and it did not show enough detail. At this time the war ended and Mr. Shimizu claimed that the set was destroyed.
- 6. Mr. Shimizu was asked who helped him with the tests. He said that Major Saisho, Major Katsuki and Major Tomono assisted him. When he was asked about jamming tests that were performed against this radar, he said that he understood that Major Tomono was doing such experiments but that they did not prove successful. He was not present at the time of the jamming tests and knew nothing further about it.

HAROLD C. WICH, 1st Lt., Signal Corps.