Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

PSD
FILES
1974

Proposed SCAPIN Subject Tokyo Kaiwan Pilot District.

GS Chief of Staff 25 October 1949

1 1. Government Section believes that the SCAPIN proposed by G-2 is necessary in order to

a. Modify the instructions contained in an existing SCAPIN (4855-A dtd 10 Nov 47) to conform to the existing situation.

b. Clarify the situation regarding which agency of the Supreme Commander is responsible for supervising implementation of the directive by the Japanese Government.

G-2 PSD

2. The proposed SCAPIN (Tab D to the G-2 Memorandum) was found objectionable only in the wording of those portions of paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 which required the Japanese Government to enact or amend legislation. After discussion of these points with G-2, PSD (Mr. G. H. Rettew), it was agreed that the portions mentioned could be deleted without affecting the purpose or effectiveness of the memorandum.

3. Accordingly, it is recommended that paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the memorandum be re-worded to read as follows:

"1. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers deems compulsory pilotage of Non-Japanese vessels in the outer-Tokyo Bay area no longer necessary. Accordingly, Memorandum AG 548 (10 Nov 47) CTS-W (SCAPIN 4855-A) is rescinded.

"2. It is desired that the Japanese Government take the necessary action to provide the minimum number of qualified pilots for the Yokosuka-Yokohama-Tokyo harbor areas."

4. The remaining paragraphs, namely, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 should then be re-numbered respectively 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.

5. The proposed directive, re-worded in accordance with above recommendation, is enclosed to be substituted for the present Tab D.

6. G-2 Public Safety Division concurs in this recommendation. Further, since the substance, intent or the effectiveness of the proposed directive are not affected by the changed wording recommended above, further coordination with other interested staff sections is not necessary.

2 Incl:
G-2 Memo
Amended Tab D

C.W.

DRAFT

PSD FILE

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
APO 500

AG 548 (16 Aug 49)GB/PSD
SCAPIN

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH: ~~Liaison Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs~~

SUBJECT: Tokyo Kaiwan Pilot District

1. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers deems compulsory pilotage of Non-Japanese vessels in the outer-Tokyo Bay area no longer necessary. Accordingly, Memorandum AG 548 (10 Nov 47) CTS-W (SCAPIN 4855-A) is rescinded.

2. It is desired that the Japanese Government take the necessary action to provide the minimum number of qualified pilots for the Yokosuka-Yokohama-Tokyo harbor areas.

3. Charter and operating procedures of the Association authorized by the Maritime Safety Agency, Ministry of Transportation, to furnish pilot services in the Yokosuka-Yokohama-Tokyo Harbors will be submitted within thirty (30) days to the Maritime Safety Agency and shall be subject to approval of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

4. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers reserves the right to exclude from employment as pilots on Allied Vessels any pilot of the Association deemed unfit. This is not to be so construed as to affect

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

4855-A) is rescinded.

2. It is desired that the Japanese Government take the necessary action to provide the minimum number of qualified pilots for the Yokosuka-Yokohama-Tokyo harbor areas.

3. Charter and operating procedures of the Association authorized by the Maritime Safety Agency, Ministry of Transportation, to furnish pilot services in the Yokosuka-Yokohama-Tokyo Harbors will be submitted within thirty (30) days to the Maritime Safety Agency and shall be subject to approval of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

4. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers reserves the right to exclude from employment as pilots on Allied Vessels any pilot of the Association deemed unfit. This is not to be so construed as to affect the rights of the pilot as a member of the Association.

5. Pilot station boat "ARB-870" may be retained in custody of the Maritime Safety Agency, Ministry of Transportation, and utilized as coast patrol for the saving of life and property and enforcement of law in the harbors, bays, sounds and waters adjacent to Japan. It shall not be armed and is subject to recall by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers within thirty (30) days on order of the Commander, Naval Forces, Far East.

6. Communication and liaison between the Maritime Safety Agency, Ministry of Transportation, and Public Safety Division, C-2, GHQ, SCAP is authorized.

DRAFT

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

AG 548 (16 Aug 49)GB/PSD, SCAPIN
Subject: Tokyo Kaiwan Pilot District

7. Priority of pilotage requests to the Association shall be established, when necessary, by Commander, Fleet Activities for Yokosuka Harbor and the U. S. Port Commander, 2d T. Med. Port for Yokohama-Tokyo Harbors. For this purpose liaison between the Association and the respective Port authorities is authorized.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

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PSD
FILES

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION
ROUTING SLIP

FROM: JB DATE: 17 Oct 45

3	Chief of Division	
2	Executive Officer	
	Capt. Graves	
	Capt. Russell	
	Administrative Officer	
5	Chief Clerk	
	Fire Branch	
	Liaison Branch	
4	Maritime Branch	
	Police Branch	
	Prison Branch	
	Stat & Anal Branch	

FOR:
Information 1-3 Comment ___
Action (3) ___
Approval ___ File ___

Remarks:

(3) – ACTION

$3,000,000. funds.

Fletcher
Cmdr. Burnes
Col. Miller
Col. Sears
Capt. Rethuen.

26-6065

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION
ROUTING SLIP

FROM: PB DATE: 17 Oct 45

3	Chief of Division	WEP
2	Executive Officer	
4	Capt. Graves	
	Capt. Russell	
1	Administrative Officer	RJH
6	Chief Clerk	
	Fire Branch	
	Liaison Branch	
5	Maritime Branch	
	Police Branch	
	Prison Branch	
	Stat & Anal Branch	

FOR:
Information ✓ Comment ___
Action ___
Approval ___ File 5

Remarks:

Just 3 WEP

3 - To insure pilot service for allied shipping, reasonable rates, numbers etc.

4 - To insure ready FJG from financing - stabilize.

5 - Basic maritime law, for master to refuse pilot services for reasons of his own.

Place sea going tug into rescue & life saving service.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

14 October 1949

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Record of Telephone Conversation

TO: Chief, Maritime Branch, PSD

1. Subject of conversation was the draft of SCAPIN initiated by PSD/G-2 concerning the discontinuance of compulsory pilotage of Allied vessels in the outer Tokyo Bay.

2. Colonel Christiansen of the Chief of Staff office wanted to know why SCAP approval is stated and required in paras. 3, 4, & 5. It is his idea that the policy should be to give the entire control of Japanese shipping back to the JG unless specific and strong reasons exist to the contrary.

3. Following points were brought out by the undersigned:

a. The proposed SCAPIN will affect only pilotage of Allied vessels. Vessels of Japanese registry will not be affected.

b. The required approval of SCAP as stated in paras. 3 & 4 of the proposed SCAPIN will be a one-time proposition.

c. Such approval by SCAP is required as outlined in para 3 in order that US agencies responsible for shipping in the three major harbors of Tokyo Bay may be assured that a sufficient number of pilots will be available to handle Allied shipping.

d. Approval by SCAP of the charter and operating procedure of the new association is required in order to guarantee that the JG will not in the future be required to finance the pilot association, the latter being a private commercial organization. Heretofore, those pilots performing outer Tokyo Bay Pilotage have been pocketing the fees collected while the JG was paying most of their expenses. This is contrary to the accepted practice of pilot's associations in that all expenses and overhead connected with performing such pilotage should be borne by the association.

e. The authority reserved by SCAP in paragraph 5 of the draft of the proposed SCAPIN is merely a reiteration of basic maritime law since any ship's master may refuse to accept the services of any pilot for reasons of his own.

f. Reserving authority for approval by SCAP as listed in paras. 3, 4, & 5 are mutually insisted upon by COMNAVFE, 2nd Medium Port, and PSD, G-2.

4. By reason of above, Colonel Christiansen said that he had no further questions.

R. M. LANTZ
Maj Inf

16

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

SECRET

PSD FILES 1896 314.1

APO 500
13 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Expected Arrival of First Contingent of Nine Lend-Lease Vessels being Returned to US Government by the Soviets

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Reference the expected return of twenty-seven frigates by USSR Government to US Government, Capt Yashin, Soviet Naval Adviser, informed Foreign Liaison at 1015 hours, 12 October 1949, that the first contingent of nine frigates departed Vladivostok on 11 October 1949. ETA Yokosuka, 1200 hours, 14 October 1949.

2. Capt Yashin also informed Foreign Liaison that the Soviet vessel, Tobol, which has been cleared by General Headquarters to enter Tokyo harbor for the purpose of unloading provisions, will proceed from Tokyo to Yokosuka, as soon as provisions have been unloaded, for the purpose of returning the crew members of the nine frigates to Vladivostok.

3. Commander Bromley, COMNAVFE, has requested G-2 to provide Russian linguists to assist them in the turnover of these vessels. G-2 is prepared to provide seven Russian linguists and to assist COMNAVFE as necessary.

4. COMNAVFE (Commander Bromley) and G-3 (Col Jark) have been informed regarding the expected arrival date of these vessels.

5. G-2 is prepared to exploit all intelligence possibilities which may occur as a result of this turnover.

6. This is for information only.

C. A. W.

PSD

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

PSD
FILES

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION
ROUTING SLIP

FROM: PB DATE: 11 Oct 49

3	Chief of Division	
2	Executive Officer	PSD
4	Capt. Graves	
	Capt. Russell	
1	Administrative Officer	RJM
5	Chief Clerk	
	Fire Branch	
	Liaison Branch	
	Maritime Branch	
	Police Branch	
	Prison Branch	
	Stat & Anal Branch	

FOR:
Information 1-4 Comment ___
Action (2) ___
Approval ___ File ___

Remarks:

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2835

DO NOT DETACH

G-2, GHQ, FEC

15 September 1949

FROM:

TO 2: ADMIN

AC of S, G-2	( )	Information	( )
Deputy Exec SCAP	( )	Necessary Action	( )
Deputy Exec FEC	( )	Note & Return	( )
E/A Admin	( )	Approval	( )
E/A Radio Reports	( )	Signature	( )
E/A Theater Intell	( )	Initials	( )
E/A CI Div	( )	Comment or Concurrence	( )
E/A 441st CIC	( )	Dispatch	( )
E/A JSO	( )	Draft reply	( )
E/A Fiscal	( )	Info on which to base reply	( )
E/A Hist	( )	Preparation of brief	( )
E/A MISD	( )	Listribution Desired	( )
E/A CCB	( )	File	( )
E/A PSB	( )		
Administrative Officer	( )		
G-2 Supply	( )		
G-2 Message Center	( )		
G-2 File Section	( )		
Theater Intell Div	( )		
Operations	( )		
PDM	( )		
Plans & Estimates	( )		
Foreign Liaison	( )		
Targets Branch	( )		
MISD	( )		
ATIS	( )		
TID	( )		
Historical Div	( )		
Library	( )		
CI Div	( )		
Dep for Opns	( )		
Exec	( )		
Asst Exec Admin	( )		
Asst Exec Opns	( )		
Central Files	( )		
Jap Liaison	( )		
441st CIC	( )		
JSOB	( )		
Coll & Pub	( )		
Public Safety Br	( )		
Civil Censorship Br	( )		
G-2 Doc Research	( )		
_____	( )		
_____	( )		
_____	( )		

ROUTED BY: Sterling

REMARKS Formation of Tokyo Kaiwan Pilots' Association

Recommend approval of Proposed Memoranc
For the Chief of Staff.

HEP

Mr. Carusi —

Comments please

WR

Col Myers —

Carusi

WR

O/L 6 Oct 49

Get Concurrence ComNavFE

FE 4 S

11 Oct 49

DO NOT DETACH

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

1 1
8 8
4 5
0 4

G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

File No: Subject: Formation of Tokyo Kaiwan Pilots' Association CIDiv/JSC:ll Date: 5 October 1949

FROM: CI Div TO: G-2 Attn: Col Crist PHONE: 26-5749 NAME: J. S. Carusi

Comment Number 2.

1. SCAP, pursuant to the needs of the Occupation, and in furtherance of the overall Occupation mission, has the power and authority to issue orders, instructions, and directives to the Japanese Government for the accomplishment of said objectives. This power and authority includes the amending, rescinding, or otherwise changing and modifying orders, instructions, and directives deemed necessary to conform with changing needs and conditions.

2. SCAPIN 4855-A in its present form has outgrown its usefulness and changing needs and conditions require that it be supplanted by a new SCAPIN to satisfy present requirements.

3. The proposed SCAPIN (Tab D) and the correspondence to Eighth Army and COMNAVFE (Tabs E and F), indicating respective corrollary action, are considered legal, appropriate, and should be approved.

1 Incl:
Memo to C/S w/Incls
w/D + duplicated

P.S.B.
R. S. B.

Permanent Record—Do not Detach

11667

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

1/6
5
4

G-2, GHQ
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only) G-2/PSD/RTB/HEP/gw

File No: **Subject:** Formation of Tokyo Kaiwan Pilots Association. **Date:** 4 Oct 1949

FROM: PSD **TO:** G-2 **PHONE:** 26-5916 **NAME:** Lt Col Battey

Comment Number

1. ComNavFE forwards by 1st Ind ComFltAct letter, subject as above, dated 16 Aug 49 (Tab A) which recommends that the Director General, Maritime Safety Agency, Ministry of Transportation, cancel the existing charters of the Tokyo and Yokohama Pilots' Association and that the Director General cause the Tokyo, Yokohama and Yokosuka pilots to submit a new charter embracing the existing Tokyo Bay Pilot Facilities, including operations of a pilot boat, and that the presently qualified and licensed pilots of Tokyo, Yokohama and Yokosuka and the pilots for Tokyo Bay be included in the organization. CTS forwarded to G-2 for action as a matter pertaining to PSD. 1

2. Subsequent to above letter, the Commanding General, Eighth Army, recommended the abandonment of compulsory pilotage in the outer-Tokyo Bay area on the basis of independent studies of that Command, the Transportation Officer, FEC, and Maritime Safety Agency, JG, all of whom determined that the navigation aids are adequate and the area not hazardous to navigation.

3. Action required:

a. SCAPIN (Tab D) directing the Japanese Government to eliminate compulsory pilotage of Allied Vessels in outer-Tokyo Bay area and amend the Marine Pilot Law to conform with SCAPIN.

b. Letter to ComNavFE (Tab F) replying to basic letter (Tab A) and indicating corollary action in amending port regulations required coincident with implementation of SCAPIN.

c. Letter to Commanding General, Eighth Army (Tab E) indicating corollary action in amending port regulations required coincident with implementation of SCAPIN.

4. ComNavFE and CTS have informally indicated concurrence in the following recommendations.

5. Recommend approval of proposed Memorandum for the Chief of Staff recommending:

a. That proposed SCAPIN (Tab D) be approved.
b. That proposed letter to CG, Eighth Army (Tab E) be approved.
c. That proposed letter to COMNAVFE (Tab F) be approved.

1 Incl:
Proposed Memo for CofS w/Incls

for R2B H.E.P.

Permanent Record—Do not Detach

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

1880

G-2 ACTION BRIEF

4 October 1949

From: PSD

To: G-2

Subject: Formation of Tokyo Kaiwan Pilots' Association.

Synopsis of Previous Action:
(including concurrences)

COMNAVFE proposed elimination of existing pilots association in Tokyo Bay and formation of one association. In subsequent conference 8th Army recommended elimination of compulsory pilotage provision of SCAPIN 4855-A. Proposed action concurred in by CTS and COMNAVFE.

Comment:

Proposed SCAPIN accomplishes above thru issuance of new SCAPIN and letters to COMNAVFE and 8th Army, indicating required corollary action in amending port regulations to conform with SCAPIN.

(X) Recommended Action: Approval of draft Memo to CofS recommending above action.

( ) Action Taken:

for P2B
H.E.P. PSD/G-2
(Initials) (Section)

Remarks: See Col Carnes's comment in white D concurs. Recommend approval

P.S.B C1Div.
(Initials) (Section)

8 Oct 49
Concur
WP

11687

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

0759

G-2, GHQ
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only) G-2/PSD/RTB/HEP/gw

File No: Subject: ~~ICM No. 852~~ Date: 29 Sep 49

FROM: PSD TO: G-2 PHONE: 26-5916 NAME: Lt Col Battey

Comment Number

1. Reference ICM, PSD to G-2, same subject, this date. 1

2. Normal operational run on a 24-hour day basis from Aomori to Shiogama is 3 days. With a crew of but two (2) aboard this vessel put in at port at night.

3. This vessel remained four (4) days at Obata due to typhoon warning, normal procedure for small craft.

4. Shiogama was a regular scheduled port of call for this vessel.

5. Apparently inadequate sailing orders resulted in destination of vessel not being advised of intermediate stops or delays.

6. Investigation closed. Forwarded for your information.

- -H.E.P.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

G-2/PSD/RTB/HEP/gw INFO COPY: Capt Russell

Permanent Record--Do not Detach

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

SECRET

Petition for Release of Vessel "Ho Ichi Maru"

PSD File Copy

CIS/PSD/HEP/sm

MEMO FOR RECORD:

CPC fwd petition for return of Korean vessel as matter pertaining to G-2. Previously fwded to G-2 by CPC on c/n 1, same subj, dtd 16 May 49 to note and return. Rtd per c/n 2 19 May 49. Disposition of vessels not deemed appropriate action for PSD/G-2. CPC contacted and requested return of paper for appropriate action.

HEP 26-5915

From: G-2 To: CPC

CIS/PSD/HEP/RTB/sm
Date: 7 October 1949

4 Returned per telephone request CPC (Maj Oswald) to PSD/G-2 (Lt Col Battey)

2 Incls
n/c

- -C.A.W.- - - - - - - - - - - -

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

SECRET

COPY CHECK SHEET COPY

A. E. Jann 26-5622

Subject: Petition for Release of Vessel "Ho Ichi Maru"

From: CPC/FP To: LS Date: 25 Aug 1949

1 1. Pursuant to telephone conversation with Mr. J. Bassin, 11 August 1949, the inclosed petition and investigation report are forwarded to Legal Section for an opinion on which to base a reply to the petitioner.

2. Attention is invited to Part III of SCAP radio CX 63259, 24 August 1948, which converns vessels retained in Japan for illegal entry. Washington reply, radio WX 91303, 23 October 1948, concurs that such vessels need not be returned to Korea.

2 Incls
1. Investigative Rpt, 18 Jan 49 (cy)
2. Petition, 22 Mar 49 (cy)

- - - -

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

COPY

CHECK SHEET

COPY

Subject: Peitition for Release of Vessel "Ho Ichi Maru"

From: Legal Section To: CPC/FP Date: 1 Sep 49

2 (Cont'd) "4-d. All confiscated vessels or small craft will be placed into service as soon as possible after court action".

5. SCAPIN 1758, subj: "Exercise of Jurisdiction over Vessels", dated 5 Aug 47, authorizes the Japanese Government and its tribunals and agencies to exercise jurisdiction over Korean vessels not having clearance from the duly authorized port authorities in Korea, subject to review by Occupation authorities. Assuming the contention of the owner, as indicated in Inclosure 2, is correct, travel from one port in Korea to another would not require clearance papers.

6. It is, therefore, the opinion of the Legal Section that from the facts submitted, the confiscation of the vessel HO ICHI MARU was not legally justified and should be returned to the owner, subject to outstanding legitimate claims.

2 Incls
n/c

- A. C. C. -Chief, Legal Section- - - - - - -

A. E. Jann - 26-5622

From: CPC/FP To: G-2 Date: 4 Oct 1949

3 Inclosed information is forwarded as a matter pertaining to your section.

2 Incls
n/c

- E. C. M., Jr - - - - - - - - - -

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

COPY

HEADQUARTERS
NAGASAKI MILITARY GOVERNMENT TEAM
Nagasaki, Kyushu, Japan

COPY
RHA/tk

File: 000.5

APO 929
18 January 1949

SUBJECT: Illegal Entry

TO : Commanding Officer, Kyushu Mil Govt Region, APO 929
(Attn: Legal & Government Section)

In compliance with GD 45, dtd 24 May 47, the following report on twenty-two (22) Koreans arrested for illegal entry in this area by the Japanese police is hereby submitted.

a. Individuals

(1) KIN SEKIJUN, 42, male, Korean, captain; Gorin-ri, Dozan-men, Toei-gun, Keishoan-do.

(2) RI GAKUHAN, 34, male, Korean, crew member; Raiko, Enjyo-men, Toei-gun, Keishoan-do

(3) BOKU ICHIDO, 22, male, Korean, crew member; Yoka-ri, Ichiun-men, Kyosai Island, Toei-gun, Keishoan-do.

(4) RI SOKON, 30, male, Korean, crew member; Tozan, Dozan-men, Torai-gun, Keishonan-do.

(5) RIN SOTO, 34, male, Korean, crew member; Dozan-ri, Dozan-men, Toei-gun, Keishoan-do.

(6) KO TAISHUN, 29, male, Korean, crew member; Seiki, Sai-shu-do, Korea.

(7) RI KORO, 18, male, Korean, crew member; Sanzan-men, Kokan-gun, Keishonan-do.

(8) TEI KONSAI, 26, male, Korean, stevedore; Sanzan-men, Heisui-gun, Zenranan-do.

(9) KIN SHOKUN, 53, male, Korean, stevedore; Teiryo-ri, Toei-yu-. Toei-gun, Keishonan-do.

(10) TAI KIGO, 25, male, Korean, stevedore; Konai-to, Toei-gun, Keishonan-do.

Encl 1

COPY

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

BASIC: Ltr Hq Nagasaki Mil Govt Team, APO 929, 18 Jan 49, subject: "Illegal Entry"

(11) KIN SEIGO, 50, male, Korean, stevedore; Konai-to, Toei-gun, Keishonan-do.

(12) RI SOHAI, 53, male, Korean, stevedore; Konai-to, Toei-gun, Keishonan-do.

(13) RIN DOAN, 55, male, Korean, stevedore; Kozen-ri, Dozan-men, Toei-gun, Keishonan-do.

(14) RIN JYOSEI, 42, male, Korean, stevedore; Dozen-ri, Dozan-men, Toei-gun, Keishonan-do.

(15) TEI KARETSU, 30, male, Korean, stevedore; #37 Hokushin-ri, Toei-yu, Keishonan-do.

(16) KIN EIKO, 22, male, Korean, stevedore; Gorin-ri, Dozan-men, Toei-gun, Keishonan-do.

(17) TEI KOSHU, 33, male, Korean, stevedore; Dozen-ri, Toei-gun, Keishonan-do.

(18) BOKU HOCHIN, 35, male, Korean, stevedore; Dozen-ri, Dozen-men, Toei-gun, Keishonan-do.

(19) TEI KISEI, 26, male, Korean, stevedore; Gorin-ri, Toei-gun, Keishonan-do.

(20) KIN KOGYOKU, 36, male, Korean, stevedore; Nanpo-to, Toei-gun, Keishonan-do.

(21) KIN HODO, 40, male, Korean, stevedore; Sanzan-men, Koyo-gun, Keishonan-do.

(22) TEI SOSHUN, 20, male, Korean, stevedore; Toei-yu, Toei-gun, Keishoan-do.

NOTE: (1) Information recevied from the above mentioned Koreans indicates that they were sailing from Toei, Korea to Senchiku Island but due to engine trouble they were forced to drift towards the coast of Tsutsu, Shimoagata-gun, Tsushima.

(2) The above mentioned Koreans were apprehended at 1800 hrs 10 Jan 49 off the coast of Tsutsu, Shimoagata-gun, Tsushima.

b. Vessel

(1) Port of embarkation Toei, Korea

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

COPY COPY

BASIC: Ltr Hq Nagasaki Mil Govt Team, APO 929, 18 Jan 49, subject: "Illegal Entry"

(2)	Name of vessel	Hoichi-maru
(3)	Port of registry	Saishu, Korea
(4)	Registered number	#115
(5)	Gross tonnage	19.69 tons
(6)	H-p and type of motor	45 h.p., semi-diesel
(7)	Name and address of owner	KIN JINCHU, #2593 Kaki-ri, Gaigetsu-men, Kitasaishu-gun, Saishu-do, Korea
(8)	Name and address of captain	KIN SEKIJUN, Gorin-ri, Dozan-men, Toei-gun, Keishoan-do
(9)	Date of embarkation	2355 hrs 8 Jan 1949
(10)	Layover en route	None
(11)	Date and place of arrival in Japan	1700 hrs 9 Jan 1949 Aza Asamo Coast, Tsutsu-mura, Shimoagata-gun, Tsushima
(12)	Cargo	None

c. Disposition of case

(1) The above mentioned Koreans were sent to Hario for repatriation to Korea.

(2) The vessel was placed in custody of the Izuhara Marine Bureau.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

VERNON C HILL
Captain CAC
Adjutant

Info copy to CO 34th Inf

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

/s/ Richard G. King
/t/ RICHARD G KING
1st Lt FA
Legal & Govt

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

COPY

COPY

P E T I T I O N

22 March 1949

SUBJECT: Petition for Release of the boat, "Ho ichi maru" confiscated.

TO : General Douglas M. Mac Arthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers General Headquarters, Far East Command, Tokyo, Japan.

FROM : Kim, Hong Up ( ), a marine transportation business-man, residing at #121, Hangnam dong, Toyung upp, Toyung Gun, province Kyong Sang NamDo, Korea.

1. Name of boat : "Ho ichi maru" (Bo ill hand in Korean)
2. Kind of boat : Wooden and sailing boat.
3. Register of boat : registered at the Cheju harbor, provice Cheju do, Korea.
4. Displacement tonnage: 19,69 tons.
5. Horse power : 45 horse powers.
6. Owner of boat : Kim, In Chung (金仁中)
7. Present owner : Kim, Hong Up (金洪葉)
8. Reason of petition:

Keeping a marine transportation business at the above mentioned place of my residence, this petitioner, I had bought some lumbers at the island, Sunchukdo, Samsen Myun, Yosu Gun, province Chulla Nam Do, Korea. On the 7th day of Jan 1949, I and sailors left from Toyung harbor to the island with the boat in order to bring up the lumbers. At 4 a.m. 8 Jan, during the boat was going on the sea, the boat has stopped due to the accident of its engine at the place which is about 5 miles distant from the island, therefore the boat had tried to find up any other boat which might has been round there, for the purpose of getting helpness, but the boat could not find any boat then. Unopportunately, a strong storm had come over the place, and the boat had been begun to be drifted Tsushima island, Japan. The storm was of 50 meters of speed a second. At about 5 p.m. 10 Jan, the boat approached to the island, Tsushima and stopped at the place by the storm goen over then, which is about 300 meters distant from Tsushima island. And the boat had entered into the Izuhara harbor in order to be supplied with drinking-water and fuel, because the boat had few water and fuel to return to Korea then. (The boat entered to the harbor on 11 Jan).

As soon as the boat entered into the harbor, the Izuhara Japanese police station captured all the food and 3 To of rice from the boat, confiscated the boat with the anti-pathy to the Repluc of Korea, and also I and all the crews were confined into the Korean Smuggler Quarter in Saseho, Japan. In this, I didn't know the reason why the Japanese police had recognized us to smuggler, whom had brought nothing else except 15 laborers. The boat was confiscated by the order of the commander of American Military gov't in Saseho.

Cont'd ----------1.

COPY

Encl 2

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

COPY

COPY

On 3 Feb 1949, I, 7 sailors, and 15 laborers, who all were confined had returned to Korea from Saseho by the boat named "Hokoda maru" started from Saseho, Japan, at soon after we were liberated.

The Saseho Japanese police station had confiscated not only the boat, but many drifted Korean fishing boats which belong to the Republic of Korea.

I hereby offer the above mentioned statement to you with a copy of register of the boat, so as you would release the boat as soon as possible, understanding the circumstances that the boat was drifted to Tsushima, Japan.

Stated by Kim Hong Up ( ),
on 22 March 1949.

The copy of certification of boat registered.

1.	Number of boat	: M.T. 115.
2.	Place of register	: registered by Awol Myun, North Cheju Gun, province Cheju do, Korea.
3.	Name of boat	: "Ho ichi maru" (Bo ill han).
4.	Displacement tonnage	: 19.69 tons.
5.	Date of launching	: unknown.
6.	Large of boat	: 14.16 meters long, 4.6 meters wide, and 1.63 meters deep.
7.	Horse power	: 45 horse power.
8.	Owner of boat	: Kim, In Chung ( ), residing at Awol Myun, North Cheju Gun, province Cheju do, Korea.

It is certified that the above is quite right of the boat registered.

Certified by the chief of Cheju harbor Office, the Marine Transportation Bureau of Transportation Dept of USA military gov't in Korea, on 27 March 1947.

COPY

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

29917 1/8

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

PSD FILES

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff

SUBJECT : Missing Small Craft - LCM No. 852

1. Reference Memorandum from Chief of Staff to G-2, dated 28 September 1949 requiring: a. Report of action taken by G-2; b. Recommendations as to further actions on the part of G-2 and Japanese agencies.

2. G-2, at 1400 28 September, alerted subordinate agencies, 441st CIC and PSD.

3. MSA (Japanese Coast Guard) notified and learned boat reached Shiogama, Miyagi Prefecture 271630. Local port authorities permitted entrance of harbor as it was an occupation vessel. On receipt of "wanted" instructions, MSA contacted CIC (occupation vessel involved) and boarded vessel.

4. MIYAGI CIC area learned from Saito, Akira, a member of the Japanese Geographical Bureau, that the LCM No. 852 which left Aomori for Sendai and Chiba on 17 Sep 49 and was reported missing has been located in Shiogama, Miyagi Prefecture just NE of Sendai.

5. The itinerary of the vessel to date follows:

	Departed		Arrived	
a.	Aomori	0800 17 Sep	Kawauchi	1800 17 Sep
b.	Kawauchi	0630 18 Sep	Ohato	1600 18 Sep
c.	Ohato	0455 25 Sep	Hachinohe	1410 25 Sep
d.	Hachinohe	0515 26 Sep	Komaishi	1530 26 Sep
e.	Komaishi	0515 27 Sep	Shiogama	1630 27 Sep

6. Vessel is waiting in Shiogama Harbor for another vessel and crew, and does not expect to depart Shiogama until 3 Oct 49.

7. G-2 Action: Col Daniels, G-3, and Engineer Section notified by telephone as vessel was Engineer property. Lt Col Chiles, SGS, was notified verbally at 1030, 29 Sep. G-2 contemplates no further action. This for your information.

C.A.W.

DISPATCHED 29 SEP 1949

1 Incl:
Memo fr SGS, 28 Sep 49
same subj.

PSD

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

0759

G-2, GHQ
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only) G-2/PSD/RTB/HEP/gw

File No: Subject: ~~LCM No. 862~~ Date: 29 Sep 49

FROM: PSD TO: G-2 PHONE: 26-5916 NAME: Lt Col Battey

Comment Number

1. Reference ICM, PSD to G-2, same subject, this date. 1

2. Normal operational run on a 24-hour day basis from Aomori to Shiogama is 3 days. With a crew of but two (2) aboard this vessel put in at port at night.

3. This vessel remained four (4) days at Obata due to typhoon warning, normal procedure for small craft.

4. Shiogama was a regular scheduled port of call for this vessel.

5. Apparently inadequate sailing orders resulted in destination of vessel not being advised of intermediate stops or delays.

6. Investigation closed. Forwarded for your information.

- -H.E.P.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

G-2/PSD/RTB/HEP/gw PSD FILE COPY

Permanent Record--Do not Detach

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

0759

G-2, GHQ
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Files

(For use within G-2 only)

G-2/PSD/RTB/HEP/gw

File No: **Subject:** LCM No. 852 **Date:** 29 Sep 49

FROM: PSD **TO:** G-2 **PHONE:** 26-5916 **NAME:** Lt Col Battey

Comment Number

1. MSA (Japanese Coast Guard) notified by PSD Duty Officer of missing LCM 271445 September. Instructed to notify local patrols in area to search and report. 1

2. This boat reached Shiogama, Miyagi Prefecture 271630. Local port authorities permitted entrance as it was an Occupation boat. On receipt of "wanted" instructions MSA contacted CIC (Occupation vessel involved) and boarded vessel.

3. Information as to reason for vessel entering Shiogama not available (280845 Sep) as communication circuits are not open.

- H.E.P.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

G-2/PSD/RTB/HEP/gw PSD FILE COPY

Permanent Record—Do not Detach

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

SECRET

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION
ROUTING SLIP

FROM: FB DATE: 29 Sept

	Chief of Division	
2	Executive Officer	RBC
3	Capt. Graves	BHG
	Capt. Russell	
1	Administrative Officer	JOH
3	Chief Clerk	
	Fire Branch	
	Liaison Branch	
4	Maritime Branch	[illegible]
	Police Branch	
	Prison Branch	
	Stat & Anal Branch	

FOR:
Information 1-4 Comment ____
Action ____
Approval ____ File 5

Remarks:

This was brought over by CPC as an info copy. original has not come in from G-2 yet

FB

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

SECRET COPY

CHECK SHEET A. E. Jann 26-5622

File No.: Subject: Petition for Release of Vessel "Ho Ichi Maru"

Note No.: From: GPC/FP To: LS Date: 25 AUG 1949

1 1. Pursuant to telephone conversation with Mr. J. Bassin, 11 August 1949, the inclosed petition and investigation report are forwarded to Legal Section for an opinion on which to base a reply to the petitioner.

2. Attention is invited to part III of SCAP radio CX 63259, 24 August 1948, which concerns vessels retained in Japan for illegal entry. Washington reply, radio WX 91303, 23 October 1948, concurs that such vessels need not be returned to Korea.

2 Incls
1. Investigative Rpt, 18 Jan 49 (cy)
2. Petition, 22 Mar 49 (cy)

- E. C. M., Jr - - - - - - - - - - -

2 From: Legal Section To: GPC/FP Date: 1 Sep 49

1. Radios referred to in paragraph 2 above pertain to vessels retained in Japan by SCAP order for illegal entry and violations of local laws and regulations and which have been confiscated and sold pursuant to judgments rendered by authorized courts.

2. In the instant case, while the crew members were arrested for illegal entry, there is no evidence of their conviction by an appropriate court for any criminal act. It is, therefore, evident that they were deported administratively to Korea by the Japanese Government without any judicial determination against either the crew or the vessel as to suspected illegal entry or illegal import and export trade.

3. Investigation Report submitted by the Nagasaki Civil Affairs Team indicates that the Koreans were sailing from Tosi, Korea, to Senchiku Island, Korea, and because of engine trouble, were forced to drift toward the coast of Isutsu, Shimoagata Gun, Tsushima, Japan, where they were apprehended on 10 Jan 49. While this evidence is not conclusive, there has been nothing submitted in contradiction.

4. SCAPIN 926, subj: "Illegal Import and Export Trade", dated 4 Jun 46, paragraph 4 and 4d states:

> "4. If it is judicially determined that property is the subject of illicit import and export trade, the property shall be confiscated and the following actions will be taken.

SECRET COPY

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

CHECK SHEET

Subject: Petition for Release of Vessel "Ho Ichi Maru"

Note No.: From: Legal Section To: CPC/EP Date: 1 Sep 49

2 (Cont'd) 4-d. All confiscated vessels or small craft will be placed into service as soon as possible after court action".

5. SCAPIN 1758, subj: "Exercise of Jurisdiction over Vessels", dated 5 Aug 47, authorizes the Japanese Government and its tribunals and agencies to exercise jurisdiction over Korean vessels not having clearance from the duly authorized port authorities in Korea, subject to review by Occupation authorities. Assuming the contention of the owner, as indicated in Inclosure 2, is correct, travel from one port in Korea to another would not require clearance papers.

6. It is, therefore, the opinion of the Legal Section that from the facts submitted, the confiscation of the vessel HO ICHI MARU was not legally justified and should be returned to the owner, subject to outstanding legitimate claims.

2 Incls
n/c

A. C. C.
- Chief, Legal Section - - - - - - -

M. E. Jamm - 26-5622

From: CPC/EP To: G-2 Date:

3 Inclosed information is forwarded as a matter pertaining to your section.

2 Incls
n/c

- E. C. M., Jr - - - - - - - - - -

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

Mr. Rellus:

Mr. Jonn, CPC, brought the SD
for information and said an MR Files
follow in a few days.

If we have no objection, it is to be returned to CPC for action. According to Jonne, MSA seized the vessel, had the crew deported without proper legal proceedings and is letting a friend of theirs use the vessel.

The above is of interest & we and I am having Mike submit a full report on the incident, without his knowledge of what we know about it.

R. B. J.

Check with PSD + return to CPC

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDC NO. 77009

ST. ANDREW ISLANDS

POM ISLANDS

30′

Pearse

Shoal

MOK ISLANDS

BALUAN ISLAND

SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN

PAPIALOU ISLANDS

45′

SAUWAI ISLAND

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

DO NOT DETACH

28362

G-2, GHQ, FEC

15 Sept 48

FROM:

G-2 ADMIN

PSD FILES

AC of S, G-2	( )	Information	( )
Deputy Exec SCAP	( )	Necessary Action	( )
Deputy Exec FEC	( )	Note & Return	( )
E/A Admin	( )	Approval	( )
E/A Radio Reports	( )	Signature	( )
E/A Theater Intell	( )	Initials	( )
E/A CI Div	( )	Comment or Concurrence	( )
E/A 441st CIC	( )	Dispatch	( )
E/A JSO	( )	Draft reply	( )
E/A Fiscal	( )	Info on which to base reply	( )
E/A Hist	( )	Preparation of brief	( )
E/A MISD	( )	Distribution Desired	( )
E/A CCB	( )	File	( )
E/A PSB	(1)		
Administrative Officer	( )		
G-2 Supply	( )	ROUTED BY:	
G-2 Message Center	( )		
G-2 File Section	( )		
Theater Intell Div	( )		
Operations	( )	REMARKS	
PDM	( )		
Plans & Estimates	( )		
Foreign Liaison	( )		
Targets Branch	( )		
MISD	( )		
ATIS	( )		
TID	( )		
Historical Div	( )		
Library	( )		
CI Div	( )		
Dep for Opns	( )		
Exec	( )		
Asst Exec Admin	( )		
Asst Exec Opns	( )		
Central Files	( )		
Jap Liaison	( )		
441st CIC	( )		
JSOB	( )		
Coll & Pub	( )		
Public Safety Br	(2)		
Civil Censorship Br	( )		
G-2 Doc Research	( )		
_____	( )		
_____	( )		
_____	( )		

DO NOT DETACH

50

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

28362

CNFE/S82/QS15
Serial: (4763)

COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES, FAR EAST
Tokyo, Japan

80-ht

14 September 1949

From: Commander Naval Forces, Far East.
To : Ministry of Transportation, Ex-Naval Ship Section.
Ministry of Construction.
Ministry of Finance.
Via : Liaison and Coordination Office, Tokyo.

Subject: Disposition of Ex-Japanese Naval Small Craft.

Reference: (a) MSB ltr. No. 1095(PE) dtd 1 September 1949.
(b) CNFE ltr. Serial 1681 dtd 30 July 1947.

1. By reference (a), the Ministry of Transportation, Ex-Naval Ship Section reported three (3) Ex-Japanese small craft recently released by the British Common-wealth Occupation Forces in the Kure Area, and requested disposition instructions.

2. The Aircraft Rescue Boat "OTAKA MARU" is listed among the vessels subject to division among the Four Powers, and will be retained pending division. The Ministry of Transportation, Ex-Naval Ship Section is directed to assume custody of the Otaka Maru, deliver her to Nagaura Port, and place her in laid up reserve status pending further instructions. A written report will be submitted to Commander Naval Forces, Far East when the above has been accomplished.

3. The two (2) tugs listed in reference (a), the No. 9 TSUKUSHI MARU, and No. 13 TSUKUSHI MARU are hereby returned to the Japanese Government for use in the Japanese Economy. The receipt form required by reference (b) will be executed in the case of each of the above craft.

4. The No. 9 Tsukushi Maru and No. 13 Tsukushi Maru are considered as returned captured enemy equipment and an accounting will be kept for future reference.

G. P. HUNTER,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to:
SCAP
G-2
G-3
G-4
ESS
CTS
ComFltAct, Yokosuka
CG 8th Army (MG) 10

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

1693

CNFE/S82/QS15
Serial: (4763)

COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES, FAR EAST
Tokyo, Japan

80-ht

14 September 1949

From:
To : Commander Naval Forces, Far East.
Ministry of Transportation, Ex-Naval Ship Section.
Ministry of Construction.
Ministry of Finance.
Via : Liaison and Coordination Office, Tokyo.

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Chief of Staff.

Copy to:
SCAP
G-2
G-3
G-4
ESS
CTS
ComFltAct, Yokosuka
CG 8th Army (MG) 10

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

1693

CNFE/S82/QS15
Serial: (4763)

COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES, FAR EAST
Tokyo, Japan

80-ht

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Chief of Staff.

Copy to:
SCAP
G-2
G-3
G-4
ESS
CTS
ComFltAct, Yokosuka
CG 8th Army (MC) 10

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION
ADMIN ROUTING SLIP

FROM: JB DATE: 16 Sept

CAPT. HOLTON
MISS WEBSTER
PSD CENTRAL FILE
TYPISTS
TRANSLATORS
SUPPLY
MESSAGE CENTER
CHIEF CLERK

For:
Information ____ Comment
Action 1 ____
Approval ____ File

Remarks:

Hall

Hall — file with ltf. paper if you can.

JB

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION
ROUTING SLIP

FROM: DS DATE: 15 Sept

2	Chief of Division
1	Executive Officer
3	Capt. Graves
	Capt. Russell
5	Administrative Officer
6	Chief Clerk
	Fire Branch
	Liaison Branch
4	Maritime Branch
	Police Branch
	Prison Branch
	Stat & Anal Branch

FOR:
Information 15 Comment ___
Action ___
Approval ___ File ___

Remarks:

Ref: to letter on par 1 attached. Also telephone conversation yst 2 mr. Issue to C of Div.

DS

OK
WEP

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

PSD FILES 285

DO NOT DETACH

G-2, GHQ, FEC

15 SEP 1949 1949

FROM:

G-2: ADMIN

AC of S, G-2	( )	Information	( )
Deputy Exec SCAP	( )	Necessary Action	( )
Deputy Exec FEC	( )	Note & Return	( )
E/A Admin	( )	Approval	( )
E/A Radio Reports	( )	Signature	( )
E/A Theater Intell	( )	Initials	( )
E/A CI Div	( )	Comment or Concurrence	( )
E/A 441st CIC	( )	Dispatch	( )
E/A JSO	( )	Draft reply	( )
E/A Fiscal	( )	Info on which to base reply	( )
E/A Hist	( )	Preparation of brief	( )
E/A MISD	( )	Distribution Desired	( )
E/A CCB	(1)	File	( )
E/A PSB	( )		
Administrative Officer	( )	ROUTED BY:	
G-2 Supply	( )		
G-2 Message Center	( )	REMARKS	
G-2 File Section	( )		
Theater Intell Div	( )		
Operations	( )		
PDM	( )		
Plans & Estimates	( )		
Foreign Liaison	( )		
Targets Branch	( )		
MISD	( )		
ATIS	( )		
TID	( )		
Historical Div	( )		
Library	( )		
CI Div	( )		
Dep for Opns	( )		
Exec	( )		
Asst Exec Admin	( )		
Asst Exec Opns	( )		
Central Files	( )		
Jap Liaison	( )		
441st CIC	( )		
JSOB	( )		
Coll & Pub	( )		
Public Safety Br	(2)		
Civil Censorship Br	( )		
G-2 Doc Research	( )		
_____	( )		
_____	( )		
_____	( )		

DO NOT DETACH

A

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

28304

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets) Miss Hirst - 26-8706

File No.: 560 Subject: Release of SS "Margaret Moller" (Japanese Name "Magane Maru") from Present Service

Note No.:	From: CPC/PLD To: G-2 (Public Safety) Date: 14 SEP 1949
1	1. Reference is made to the following: a. Letter to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 29 Aug 49, subject, "Release of two looted vessels from their present service," from the Commander Naval Forces, Far East, copy of which was forwarded to G-2 (Public Safety) b. Telephone conversations between Mr. Janus, G-2 (Public Safety), and Mr. Krieger, CPC. 2. As was explained during the referenced conversations, the ships restitution program must be concluded as quickly as possible, consistent with the allocation of funds from the Japanese budget to cover the cost of repairing and refitting the vessels. At present no funds are available to repair and refit the SS "Margaret Moller," but it is expected that additional funds may be made available 1 Dec 49 or, in any event, not later than 1 Apr 50. 3. Therefore, at such time as necessary funds to repair and refit the SS "Margaret Moller" are made available, its release will be required. Until that time it may continue in its present service. E.C.M. Jr.

41215

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

Miss Hirst - 26-8706

560

Release of SS "Margaret Moller" (Japanese Name "Magane Maru") from Present Service

CPC/PLD G-2 (Public Safety)

14 SEP 1949

1

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a. Letter to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 29 Aug 49, subject, "Release of two looted vessels from their present service," from the Commander Naval Forces, Far East, copy of which was forwarded to G-2 (Public Safety)

b. Telephone conversations between Mr. Janus, G-2 (Public Safety), and Mr. Krieger, CPC.

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E.C.M. Jr.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

PSD FILES

CONFIDENTIAL CAW/RSB/VCA/ckw

SPOT INTELLIGENCE

Hour: 1515
Date: 11 Sep 1949

SUBJECT: Report of Submarine near Omasaki

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Information:

a. Local CIC reports receipt of message reporting unidentified submarine observed at anchor approximately 1 mile northwest of OMASAKI, northern tip of AOMORI Prefecture, at 1015 hours, 11 September. Who saw the ship is not yet clear. Report included statement that two Japanese nationals alleged that the submarine had also been observed at 1530 hours, 10 September, engaged in manoevers including submerging, until about 1830 hours.

b. Report stated further that 7th Division and 9th Corps Headquarters had been notified and that a plane had been dispatched from MISAWA Air Base to reconnoiter the area.

2. Action:

a. Duty officer COMNAVFE, Tokyo, was informed immediately and requested to identify submarine if possible. He reported no U. S. submarine in area.

b. CIC will report additional details as they become available.

c. Following agencies notified: ADC, Deputy Chiefs of Staff SCAP and FEC, G-2 Eighth Army, G-3, A-2 FEAF, COMNAVFE.

C. A. W.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DEC 22 1948
U.S. GOVT

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

0705

G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

CIS/PSD/HEP/RCG/sm

File No: **Subject:** Proposed PSD Article for MSB Monthly Bulletin **Date:** 7 Sep 49

FROM: PSD **TO:** G-2 ATTN: Lt Col Tait **PHONE:** 26-5916 **NAME:** Capt Graves

Comment Number
1

1. The editors of the MSB Monthly Bulletin (professional publication of the Maritime Safety Board, circulation 2000) have requested Mr. G. H. Rettew, Chief of Maritime Branch, PSD, to write an article for the November issue of this bulletin.

2. The article (Incl 1) is of educational value, encourages Maritime Safety personnel and pertains to their mission.

3. Article does not contain any material of intelligence nature.

4. Recommend approval.

1 Incl
Proposed Article

H.E.P.

PSD File Copy CIS/PSD/HEP/sm

HEP

Permanent Record—Do not Detach

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

Chief, PSD.

Attached is my latest and (I hope) my final effort at drafting an article requested by NSA for the first issue of the NSA Monthly Bulletin for November.

Circulation will be 2000 copies; 1500 for NSA personnel, 500 for other DoD agencies and advertisers.

What clearance is necessary?

GSR

P.S: Shall I still go back to sailing ships?

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

MARITIME SAFETY IN JAPAN

By G. H. Rettew,
Master Mariner

This release is under the auspices of the Public Safety Division, an operating agency of G-2 in the field of Maritime Safety (Coast Guard), Police, Prison, and Fire reform.

Scarcely more than a century ago a vessel in distress was regarded as a fit subject for plundering rather than for assistance. One who traveled by sea did so at his own risk, and his safe return was a cause for jubilation and celebration. The way of the mariner was hard, the sea-lanes of strange coastal waters fraught with peril. Distinctly, the seafarer was on his own.

During the past century a remarkable change of public thought has taken place and the trend has been toward acceptance of public responsibility for the protection of life and property at sea. It is generally taken for granted today that the Government has a responsibility for safeguarding life and property at sea, both by providing rescue and assistance facilities and services and by taking steps to eliminate or reduce marine casualties.

The Japanese Government has accepted this responsibility progressively as have other leading maritime nations. Indeed, fittingly so, for the Japanese merchant marine, with its thousands of ships, small and large, cargo, passenger and fishing, and the hundreds of thousands of merchant marine personnel who man them, are an integral part of the Japanese economy and one cannot readily envisage a prosperous Japan bereft of her fishing fleet and merchant vessels in coastal and international commerce.

It has been true in Japan, as it has been true in other maritime

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

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The various maritime safety agencies which sprang into being because of this public pressure did so at intervals over a long span of years and lacked the benefit of a well-developed and coordinated master plan for complete maritime safety. Their inception did, however, represent progressive steps and the promulgators must be remembered as persons with a sense of public responsibility. It remained though that, lacking the master plan, the various agencies found themselves in strange places and under supervision of various ministries, all having a share in the responsibility for maritime safety but noe with overall responsibility. The attendant overlapping and duplication was but the natural corollary and the development of basic laws was retarded. A Lighthouse Bureau, under the Communications Ministry, took care of only a part of the then far too few navigational aids with long stretches of the coast left to prefecture, to, do, fu, municipal and public enterprise. Not a good system and one which left many voids. A very high incident rate of stranded and shipwreck vessels in the coastal waters was the only possible result. The Hydrographic Division was in the Navy Ministry and became an outstanding organization. However, credit for this cannot be ascribed solely to a desire to promote maritime safety any more than

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Last, but not least, salvage of life and property at sea was left to the Navy, private salavage enterprises and the Imperial Life Saving Association. I would like here to pay glowing tribute to that latter organization, containg, as it does, the many public spirited humanitarians who serve on a voluntary basis, without recompense, under very adverse conditions, laboring long and tirelessly, at great risk to their own lives, to save vessels and crews in the near-coastal waters. Japan may well be proud of this organization. Here again, however, we have a basic lack in almost non-governmental acceptance of public responsibility for the Association is supported largely by public contributions necessitated by the yearly small subsidies of the Government. This lack of operating funds has resulted in inadequate rescue vessels and quipment. The price of this lack is the same in every country; life and ships. A dear price indeed.

The year 1948 may well be considered a milestone in Japanese

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Government acceptance of public responsibility for maritime safety, for during that year the Government took a tremendous step forward when they activated the Maritime Safety Agency with responsibility for safety of life and property and enforcement of law at sea. Bring under on responsible head the former multiplicity of agencies cannot be praise too highly. Fine work as been done by this organization to date, and the work is continuing. Many laws have been amended to cope with present day needs and conditions, duplicating features of the various agencies have and are being eliminated, continuous research into more and better ways of saving lives and property is being carried on, personnel are being trained, vessels and equipment are being added slowly.

The Maritime Safety Agency may take pride in accomplishments to date but it dare not become complacent. There are yet many things to be done, much that each individual must become before he may rest at his oars. Failure to do so will result as always; lost of lives and ships. This neither the Maritime Safety Agency nor the Government can afford.

The Government must replace within the shortest possible time the vessels of the MSA patrol and rescue fleet, vessels which a year and a half of operations have shown to be inadequate to the task. Numerical strength in ships, spirit of the crews, is necessary but those alone cannot do the job. Patrol vessels must be physically capable of 240 hours patrol and rescue per month if an efficient patrol and rescue service is to be maintained. The patrol vessels, due to their age and condition, have a record of 80 hours per month of operation. Spreading this small number of operating hours out over a nine-thousand mile

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coastline and a 100 thousand square mile water area has been so restrictive in accomplishing the mission there is much rescue work left undone. Navigation aids must be rehabilitated and augmented if the number of rescue missions to shipwreck vessels is to be brought to a minimum. Augmentation must be in number and in light of the technological advances made in navigational aids during the past decade. Inadequately lighted coasts tend to drive away the commerce of friendly nations who would like to do business with Japan and coupled with an inadequate rescue service, can only result in a poor national reputation for maritime safety responsibility; not a sound basis for enduring international relationship. Personnel must be adequately trained in lifesaving techniques, a full-scale maritime safety academy is a paramount need. Adequate knowledge, training and ability are requisite and go hand in hand with adequate vessels and equipment, the one is worthless without the other. Either a well supported plan for rehabilitation and strengthening of the stations and equipment of the Imperial Life Saving Association must be carried forward by your Government or there must be established a series of coastal surf stations in densely populated water areas for protection of small boats and crews. Strengthening the Association from the standpoint of economy alone appears the more logical. Many operating bases for an expanding fleet of patrol and rescue vessels must be established nearer the sea-patrol area in order to minimize to-and-from time. Yes, the Japanese Government must adopt an ambitious program and see it to conclusion with vigor and despatch; it is believed an enlightened Government will do so as have other progressive maritime nations.

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0705

DO NOT DETACH

G-2, GHQ, FEC

FROM: PSD

C. A. WILLOUGHBY

DATE 7 Sep 1949

TO: G-2

27561

ATTN: Lt Col Tait

AC of S, G-2	( )	Information	( )
Executive	( )	Necessary Action	( )
Asst Executive SCAP	(Wx)	Note & Return	( )
Asst Executive FEC	( )	Approval	(X)
E/A Admin	( )	Signature	( )
E/A Radio Reports	( )	Initials	( )
E/A Fiscal	( )	Comment or Concurrence	( )
E/A CI Div	( )	Dispatch	( )
E/A Sp Intell	( )	Draft Reply	( )
E/A C & P	( )	Info on which to Base Reply	( )
E/A PSD	(2)	Preparation of Brief	( )
E/A CCD	( )	Distribution Desired	( )
E/A MIS Div	( )	File	( )
E/A Hist	( )		
Administrative Officer	( )	ROUTED BY: SM	
G-2 Message Center	( )		
G-2 Supply	( )	REMARKS:	
G-2 File Section	( )		
Theater Intell Div	( )	Proposed PSD Article for MSB Monthly Bulletin	
Operations	( )		
PDM	( )	very good. DT	
Plans & Estimates	( )	General -	
Foreign Liaison	( )	Concur	
Targets branch	( )		
MIS Div	( )		
ATIS	( )		
TID	( )		
Historical Div	( )		
Library	( )		
CI Div	( )		
Executive	( )		
Plans & Policy Br	( )		
Opns Control	( )		
Japanese Liaison	( )		
Central Files	( )		
441st CIC GP	( )		
Sp Intell	( )		
Coll & Pub	( )		
Public Safety Div	( )		
Civil Censorship Det	( )		
G-2 Document Research	( )		
_____	( )		
_____	( )		

DO NOT DETACH

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Col Crist

This is an article written by the Chief of Maritime Safety Branch PSD for a monthly magazine of MSB. It has cleared thru Col Tait.

Recommend approval

LeBK

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10
6705
1015
27561

G-2, GHQ
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

CIS/PSD/HEP/RCG/sm

File No: **Subject:** Proposed PSD Article for MSB Monthly Bulletin **Date:** 7 Sep 49

FROM: PSD **TO:** G-2 **PHONE:** 26-5916
ATTN: Lt Col Tait **NAME:** Capt Graves

Comment Number

1. The editors of the MSB Monthly Bulletin (professional publication of the Maritime Safety Board, circulation 2000) have requested Mr. G. H. Rettew, Chief of Maritime Branch, PSD, to write an article for the November issue of this bulletin. 1

2. The article (Incl 1) is of educational value, encourages Maritime Safety personnel and pertains to their mission.

3. Article does not contain any material of intelligence nature.

4. Recommend approval.

1 Incl
Proposed Article

H.E.P.

13189

Permanent Record—Do not Detach

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

Forwarded for approval
7 Sept 44

MARITIME SAFETY IN JAPAN

By G. H. Rettew,
Master Mariner

This release is under the auspices of the Public Safety Division, an operating agency of G-2 in the field of Maritime Safety (Coast Guard), Police, Prison, and Fire reform.

Scarcely more than a century ago a vessel in distress was regarded as a fit subject for plundering rather than for assistance. One who traveled by sea did so at his own risk, and his safe return was a cause for jubilation and celebration. The way of the mariner was hard, the sea-lanes of strange coastal waters fraught with peril. Distinctly, the seafarer was on his own.

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The various maritime safety agencies which sprang into being because of this public pressure did so at intervals over a long span of years and lacked the benefit of a well-developed and coordinated master plan for complete maritime safety. Their inception did, however, represent progressive steps and the promulgators must be remembered as persons with a sense of public responsibility. It remained though that, lacking the master plan, the various agencies found themselves in strange places and under supervision of various ministries, all having a share in the responsibility for maritime safety but not with overall responsibility. The attendant overlapping and duplication was but the natural corollary and the development of basic laws was retarded. A Lighthouse Bureau, under the Communications Ministry, took care of only a part of the then far too few navigational aids with long stretches of the coast left to prefecture, to, do, fu, municipal and public enterprise. Not a good system and one which left many voids. A very high incident rate of stranded and shipwreck vessels in the coastal waters was the only possible result. The Hydrographic Division was in the Navy Ministry and became an outstanding organization. However, credit for this cannot be ascribed solely to a desire to promote maritime safety any more than

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PSD FILES

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION
ROUTING SLIP

FROM: JB DATE: 30 Sept

3	Chief of Division	VET
2	Executive Officer	RJS
4	Capt. Graves	BGH
	Capt. Russell	
1	Administrative Officer	BJW
6	Chief Clerk	
	Fire Branch	
	Liaison Branch	
5	Maritime Branch	JDR
	Police Branch	
	Prison Branch	
	Stat & Anal Branch	

FOR:
Information ✓ Comment ____
Action ____
Approval ____ File 6

Remarks:

Bethune Looks to me MSB did a good job, since Christ can't get through source & the occupation — I go erase & tape.

WEP

PSC FILES

General Headquarters
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Intelligence Section, G-2
PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

APO 500
3 September 1949

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Grounding of SS CITRUS PACKER

TO: Chief, Public Safety Division

1. The enclosure, received from MSB, is an explanation of events resulting from the grounding of the SS CITRUS PACKER.

2. The message received by MSB radio station, Yokohama, at 2140, 31 August 1949 is as follows:

From: KVGN SS CITRUS PACKER RUSH

To: EVERETT YOKOHAMA

ASHORE APPRXIMATELY LAT. 35° 13' N, LON. 139° 51' E X
STRONG GALE HIGH SEAS VESSEL POUNDING X AHR (another vessel)
STRUCK BOTTOM IN VICINITY OF KANNON SAKI X

CHANGE IN COMM. REGULATIONS TO ROUTE ALL DISTRESS MESSAGES TO DUTY OFFICER WILL BE REQUESTED. GHQ.

3. As can be seen from the above message, it was not a distress or SOS and the operator did not handle it as such. As MSB radio station, Yokohama, is also authorized to handle commercial and private traffic, the message was immediately delivered to Everett. Communication regulations do not permit the Duty Officer to receive info copies of commercial and private messages, thus preventing him from knowing the CITRUS PACKER was aground, and putting MSB in an embarrassing situation.

COTP = MSB Port Captain

4. All SOS and emergency messages received during the typhoon were reported to the US Army Harbor Master by the Duty Officer. As no salvage vessels were available to MSB during or after the typhoon, there was little MSB could do. Prior to the typhoon, the COTP Yokohama notified all shipping in and around Tokyo Bay of the impending storm, and during the height of the typhoon, dispatched small harbor craft to the aid of vessels in

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 770009

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5. The CITRUS PACKER is aground in a well-sheltered cove, on a sandy bottom, and is in no danger. The US Navy has dispatched salvage tugs to its aid. No commercial salvage tugs could be dispatched by MSB as they were and still are occupied with vessels in and around Yokohama Harbor. The KAIKO MARU (STR04) could not be used due to extremely high seas and also because it is on PD to the US Army for use as a berthing tug. This last stated fact was unknown to CNFE when they complained to PSD about MSB failing to dispatch the designated Sea Rescue Tug for salvage work.

6. It appears, from the above stated facts, MSB should be commended rather than censored for its actions during the recent disaster in utilizing every available small craft in Yokohama to prevent loss of life. Property damage is inescapable at such times. Had the Master of the CITRUS PACKER sent an SOS or requested assistance, it is felt certain MSB would have done everything possible to aid him.

GHR R. B. Janus

R. B. JANUS
Maritime Investigator

1 Incl.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDC No. 76009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/NNDG NO. 775009

MARITIME SAFETY AGENCY
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION

MSA No. 1098 (PR)

September 2, 1949

To: Chief, Maritime Branch, PSD, G-2, GHQ.

From: Chief, Patrol and Rescue Division, Maritime Safety Agency.

Subject: Re the Citrus Packer.

1. Report on the Citrus Packer is as follows:

a) AONO on duty of Yokohama Wireless Telegraph Station (J.G.C.) handled a telegram from the Citrus Packer to Everett Company at 2140 August 31, 1949.

b) Aono took it to be a private telegram and not S.O.S. and did not report to the official in charge of Yokohama MS Regional Headquarters of its contents. Accordingly, the official in charge knew nothing of the Citrus Packer case, until he was informed of it from the National Headquarters, MSA, at about 1030 September 1.

c) (Connection with the National Headquarters at about 1100 September 1)

Yokohama MSRH confirmed the fact that the Citrus Packer had met with a disaster by the communication with American Harbor Master's Office at Yokohama. Whereupon, the National Headquarters gave orders to do their best to have connection with the Citrus Packer and to rescue her. At the moment, all the vessels of Yokohama MSRH were overbusy to save lives on board other vessels in distress in the port, leaving no proper vessel to be sent to the scene. And Yokohama MSRH ordered PB No. 46 in Uraga Port to set out for the rescue of the Citrus Packer.

d) At 1150, any connection between J.G.C. and the Citrus Packer was still unable beacuse no answer came from ~~PB No. 46~~ Citrus Packer.

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e) Yokohama MSRH which deemed PB No. 46 unable to proceed to the scene of the accident because she had her bulwark and fresh water pump broken, wanted to send a pilot boat Shimachidori instead at 1530 and asked the U.S. Harbor Master for permission, but the request was refused because a vessel was scheduled to enter the port at 1800.

f) At 1645 Yokohama MSRH requested to have a vessel of Yokosuka Ex-Naval Ship Division sail out for the rescue. But it received a telephone answer from Yokosuka that the permission of the Naval Forces in Yokosuka had been unobtainable.