

EXHIBIT 2188X

一九四六年一月十七日ヨリ一九四六年二月十八日
ニ亘リ行ハレタ橋本欽五郎ノ陳述ヨリノ抜萃

橋本欽五郎ニ關スル公判事實與領事ニ
對スル資料

1875-1

問、

一又二月十二日ノ貴下ニ對スル審問ニ於テ
貴下ハ一九四一年一月三十日ニ發行サレタ「
世界再建ノ道」(How to Rebuild the World)
ト題スル出版物ニ包含サレタ次ノ聲明ヲ行ッ
タ事ヲ否定サレタ。「私ハソレガ唯一ノ理由
ダトハ云ハナイ、然シ兎モ角其ノ後滿洲事件、
國際聯盟脫退、軍備減少條約ノ廢棄、五・一
五事件、神兵隊、及ビ二・二六事件ガ相次デ
發生シタ。」貴下が二月十二日ノ貴下ニ對
スル審問ニ於テ斯カル陳述ヲシタコトヲ否定
サレタ時、貴下ハ斯カル點ニ於テ間違ッテ居
タノデアッタ。ソウデハナカッタカ。
答、ソレハアノ本ノ中ニ書イテアリマス。私ハ先
日ハ間違ッテ居マシタ。

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
（審問） 五四三〇、 八頁
下ノ前同ノ審問
ハテ貴
ハ審會

ノ創立者ノ一人デアルト云ハレタ。ソレハ專
實ナリヤ。

答、然リ。

問、アノ結社ガ組織サレタ當時ノ會員中他ノアル
モノハ難々デスカ。

答、櫻會ノ創立者ハ私自身デス。然シ當時私ニツ
イテ居タ人が數名アル。……此ノ結社ノ唯
一ノ創立者ハ私自身デス。ソシテ他ノ人々ハ
大体幹事等トシテ補佐役ノ資格ニ在ツタノデ
ス。

(調査番号 三四三一六、三一頁)

問、貴下ハ大東亞共榮國ニ就テ何カ知ツテ居マス
カ。

答、然リ。

問、此國ガ地理的ニ如何ナル地域ニ及ンデキルカ
ヲ述ベテ下サイ。

答、大体ノ地理的範圍ハ印度、比律賓、支那ヲ含
ムト思フ。

問、ビルマハ包含サレテキタカ。

答、然リ。

問、貴下ハ此ノ地域ヨリ英國ヲ驅逐スベク意圖セ

シヤ。

答、然リ。

。 。 。 。 。

問、貴下ハ大日本赤誠會ニ屬シテ居マヌネ。

答、私ハソレヲ組織シマシタ。

(調査番號 三四三一六、 四十一頁)

問、然シ貴下ハ早晚「クーデター」ヲ行スベク劃

策サレタノデハナカツタカ。

答、櫻會ガ單獨テ計畫シタモノトハ一様ニ云ヘヌ。

然モ一九三一年十月ニハ兼ネテ計畫サレタ「
十月事件」ガ起ツタ。之ニ依リ現任ノ政府高
官ヲ追拂ヒ、新シイグループヲ引キ入レルベ
ク企圖サレタノデアツタ。

問、ソシテ此ノ「十月事件」ニ先立ツテ「三月事件」
ガ起ツタ。之ハ失敗ニ終ツタ。左様ニ事ガア
ツタノデハナカツタカ。

答、然リ。

。 。 。 。 。

問、大佐、デハ「三月事件」及ビ「十月事件」ヲ
計畫シタ人々ノ氏名ヲ告ゲラレタイ。

答、私ハ先ツ「三月事件」カラ始メマセウ。私ハ
夫等ノ氏名ヲ思ヒ出ス當時ノ余裕ガ欲シイ。

二宮、彼ハ現在故人トナツテ居ル。杉山、彼
 モ故人トナツテ居ル。小磯、彼ハ生キテ居ル。
 建川ハ死亡。大川ハ存命。永田少将モ参加シ、
 テイタト思フガ、確カテハナイ。池田少佐ハ
 若干關係シテイタ。……重藤セソウダ。
 之テ大体全部デス。……

問、長少佐ハドウカ。

答、然リ。

(調査香號三四三一七、二―三頁)

問、「三月事件」及び「十月事件」ヲ惹キ起ス爲
 メ賞下ガ建川大將、小磯大將、二宮大將、杉
 山大將及び大川博士ト謀議シタ事ヲ賞下ガ肯
 定シタ事ニナツテイル。然シ賞下ハ二・二六
 事件ニ關シ何等カノ知識又ハ共謀關係ヲ否定
 シマスカ。

答、ハイ、ソノ通りデス。

問、賞下ハソレデハ二回ノ革命ニ積極的ニ参加シ
 タコトヲ認メル事ニナル。併シ三回デハナイ
 ノデスネ。

答、然リ。

(調査香號三四三一七、一四頁)

。。。。。

問、貴下ハ大日本青年黨ノ結黨ニ當リ何等カノ役
割ヲシマシタカ。

答、一九三六年十月ニ退役シテカラ私ハ此ノ結社
ヲ組織シマシタ。

問、ソシテ貴下ハ此結社ノ統領デハナカツタカ。

答、私ハ此結社ノ長デアリマシタ。

(調査書第三四三―六、三頁)

。。。。。

問、パネイ號事件ノ時貴下ノ部隊ハ何處ニ駐屯シ
テ居マシタカ。

答、揚子江ノ南京ノ上流ニ在ル蕪湖ト云フ所ニ居
リマシタ。

問、ソノ當時貴下ヲ指揮シタ將官ハ誰デスカ。

答、柳川中將デス。

問、何ウシテパネイ號ニ對スル攻撃ガ起ツタノデ
スカ。何が其原因デアリマシタカ。

答、私ハ英國砲艦レデイバード號ガ蕪湖ヲ通過ス
ル迄パネイ號事件ニ關スル知識ヲ持チマセン
デシタ。私ハレデイバード號ニ砲ヲシソレヲ
抑留シマシタ。ソノ時レデイバード號ノ指揮
官ハ私ニ對シテパネイ號ニ事故ノ起ツタ事ノ
知ラセヲ受ケタノデパネイ號ノ救援ニ行ク處

ダト語ツタ。之ガ事件ニ關スル私ノ最初ノ知
 識デシタ。私ハパネイ號ガ下流中デアツタ事
 ダケヲ知ツテ居タ。ソレ以上ノコトハ何モ知
 ラナカツタノデス。

問、レデイバード號ニ發砲シタ時貴下ハ誰ノ命令
 ニ從ツテヤツタノデスカ。

答、之ハ柳川中將ノ命令デアツタノデス。此ノ命
 令ハ次ノ如ク書カレテアツタ。「南京ハ包圍
 ノ状態ニ在リ、而シテ敵軍ハ上流へ遁走ヲ企
 圖シ居ルモノノ如シ。橋本大佐ハ南京へ向ケ
 航行ノ全船舶ヲ船籍ヲ顧慮スルコトナク擊沈
 スベシ。」……

(訓書番號三四三一六 四一五頁)

問、大佐、貴下ガ一九三九年三月二十五日支那ノ
 戰場カラ歸還サレタ時、「國家再興ノ爲ノ朱
 曾有ノ示威運動」トツテ記述サレタ大歓迎ヲ
 受ケマセンデシタカ。

答、會合ハ私ノ歸還後非常ニ澤山アリマシタ。貴
 下ノ御質問ノ其ノ他ノセノニ關シテハ、ソレ
 ハ大体ニ於テソノ通りデス。

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問、貴下ハ貴下ノ著書ノ中テ貴下ガ大日本青年黨ヲ解散シ直ニ大日本赤誠會ヲ結成シソシテ次ノ政策ガ一九三九年十一月十九日ノ黨ノ第三次總會ニ於テ承認サレタト述ベテ居ル。

一 國家ノ再建。

ニ アジア民族ノ防衛ト解放ノ爲ノ軍備強化。

三 アジアノ自給自足

四 英國及其ノ領土ノ攻撃

五 東亞ノ皇道化

六 アジアニ於ケル國家聯合ノ建設

答、第一項ハ、ソノ通りテス。第二項ハ私ハ無比ノ空軍ヲ主張シタ。第三項ハソノ通りテス。第四項ハ、私ハソノ時ソノ事ヲ云ツタカドウカ知ラナイ。然シ私ハ斯カル考ヘヲ抱イテ居マシタ。

問、ソレ等ハ貴下ノ著書中ニ陳ベテアリマセンカ。
答、此ノ本ハ第二回總會ガ済ンダ後ニ始メテ出来タモノデス。イイエ、ソレハ此所ニ在リマス！
第四ノ點ハ正シイデス。私ハ英國ヲ攻撃スル事ハ支那事變ニ結末ヲツケルモノデアルト云フノデス。第五項ニ就テハ……私ハ貴下ガ何ヲ意味シテ居ラレルノカ正確ニ了解出来ナイ

…私ハアジアノ全國家ノ獨立ヲ提唱シマシ
タ。第六ハ正シイ。

問、大佐、貴下ガ一九四一年之等ノ附帯セル概
ト沿革ヲ包含シテ居ル此ノ本ヲ上梓サレタ時、
貴下ハ大政翼賛會ノ指導者デアリ又職員デア
リ又常任總務デハナカツタカ。

答、ソレハソノ通りデス。

問、又近衛首相ハ大政翼賛會ノ總裁デアツタ、ソ
ウデハアリマセンデシタカ。

答、ソウデス。

問、大佐、貴下ハ二月十二日ノ私ノ數個ノ質問ニ
對スル答ノ中テ太陽大日本所載ノ「樞東ヨリ
英勢力追放」ト題スル一文中テ「現在ノ情勢
下テ英國ヲ打負カスコトハ非常ニ容易デアル。」
ト云フ事ヲ述ベナカツタト陳述シマツタネ。

（太陽大日本ガ橋本ニ示サレタ。）

答、ソウデシタカ。

問、貴下ガ何モ云ハナカツタト云フ貴下ノ答ハ眞
實デシタカ。…。

答、間違ヒハアリマセン。私ハソレヲ云ツタニ違
ヒアリマセン。

問、又貴下ハ同ジ日ニ私ニ對シ一九三九年五月十
一日ノ同紙上所載ノ一文中テ「我々ハ只斷然

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香港ト上海ニ於ケル彼ノ租界ヲ占領スルコトヲ主張スルノミダ。何ウシテ英國軍隊ガ極東ニ來ラレヤウカ？」ト云フ事ヲ述ベナカツタト云ヒマセンデシタカ。〔記事ノ寫ガ橋本ニ示サレタ。〕

答、ハイ、私ハ斯カル陳述ヲシマシタ。ソレハ私ガズツト以前ニ云ツタモノデアリマス。ソレテソノ爲ニ私ハソレヲ大變ヨクハ記憶シテハ居ナカツタノデス。然シ若シ貴下ガソレヲ此所（新聞紙ヲ指摘シ）テ御覽ニテレバ其正確ナ聲明ヲ御覽戴ケルモノト存ジマス。

問、デハ貴下ハ斯カル聲明ハシナカツタト云フ二月十二日ノ貴下ノ答辯ヲ訂正スル意ナリヤ。

答、ソレハ此所ニ管カレテアル通りデアリマス。

問、ソシテソレハ貴下ニ依ツテ管カレタ其論文ノ中ニハ、大体一我々ハ只斷然香港トソノ上海ニ於ケル租界ヲ占領スルコトヲ主張スルノミダ。何ウシテ英國軍隊ガ極東ニ來ラレヤウカ？」ト云フ意味ノ事ガ述べラレテ居ル。

答、ソレハソノ通りデス。

問、又貴下ハアノ同ジ論文ノ中デ「我國ガ其艦隊ノ外、比類ナキ航空隊員ヲ有スルガ故ニ英國艦隊ハシンガポールヘハ入り得ナイデアラウ。」

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ト云ヒマシタネ。

答、ハイ、大体ニ於テ、・然シ實際ニ此所ニ述ベ
ラレタ事ハ、我國ガ以上述べタ様ナモノヲ持
ツテ居ルトスレバ英國陸隊ハシソングポールニ
入り得ル前ニ潰滅的打撃ヲ蒙ルダラウト云フ
事ナノデス。

問、貴下ガ今讀ンダ此ノ引用文ハ一九三九年五月
十一日附ノ出版物太陽大日本カラノモノデア
リ、ソレハ第十三號文藝ノ一部デアル。ソウ
デハアリマセンカ？（出版物ノ寫ヲ挿挿ッテ）
答、勿論。

問、ソシテ貴下ハアノ新聞ノ刊行ニ對ッテ責任ノ
立場ニアルノデハナカツタカ。

答、ハイ。

問、ソシテソレハ月貳回、五日ト廿日ニ發行サレ
タノデハナカツタカ。

答、月三回デス。ソレハ赤誠會ノ外部ニハ配付サ
レテイマセン。

問、ソノ會ニハ何名ノ會員ガ居マシタカ。

答、貳萬ヲ超ヘタトハ思ヒマセン。

問、ソシテ此ノ同ジ論文デ貴下ハ大体「ヨシンバ
英國ガ富裕デアルニシテセ、若シ一億圓ヲ發

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ツタ彼レ五隼艦ガ我レノ三十萬圓テ出來ル統
空機ニ依テ沈メラレ、バ英國ハ莫大ナ損害ヲ
蒙ル事ニナラウ。」ト云フタテハナイカ。

答、ソレハソノ通りデス。

問、ソレデハ貴下ガ二月ノ十二日供述ノ際貴下ハ
斯カル聲明ヲツタコトハナイト云ツタノハ聞
違ヒデアツタト思ハヌカ。

答、ソレハソウデス。忘レテイマッタ。

問、又一九三九年六月一日發行ノ同紙上テ貴下ハ
「英國ヲ敵トツテ定義ス。」ト云ツタテハナ
イカ。

答、ハイ。

問、テハ二月十二日ノ審問テ貴下ガ斯カル聲明ヲ
ツタコトハナイト陳述サレタノハ聞違ヒデハ
ナイカ。

答、ハイ。

問、ソシテ貴下ハ第十三號文書タル六月一日ノ同
紙上テ、「我々ノ道ハ唯一ツ。・英國ノ隱匿
ニアリ。」ト云ハレマシタネ。

答、ハイ。

問、デハ貴下ノアノ陳述警ニ對スル否認ハ眞實テ
ハナカツタノダ。

答、私ハ記憶ガナカツタノデス。貴下ノ解釋ハ誤

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ツテイナカッタ。私ノ記憶ガ間違ッテイタノ
デシタ。

問、アノ論文ノ題名（紙上所載ノ論文ニ冠セラレ
タ）ハ何デスカ。

答、ソレハ其ノ時ノ話題、其ノ當時ノ種々ナ出來
事、大体ソウシタ事ニ關シスル意味合ヒノモ
ノデス。

問、「事變ノ解決ハ英國ノ追放ニ懸ル。」トナツ
テハイナカッタカ。

答、ハイ。（通譯ノ註釋。「彼ハソレヲ認メタ。」）
問、英國ノ援助ナカリセバ、將政權ハ已ニ崩壞シ
テイタラウニ。」ト貴下ガ云ツタコトガ其處
ニ出テイルノデハナイカ。

答、元來ソウ云フ事ハ私ノ理念デス。然シソレガ
此所ニ出テイルカ何ウカ私ニハ分リマセン。
（示サレタ論文ヲ見ナガラ。）ソレハ此所ニ
ハ見當ラナイ。然シ孰レニシテモソレハ私ノ
理念デアリマシタ。

問、「英國ノ追放ハ支那事變ノ解決策ナリ。」ト
題スル一九三九年六月二十日附論說ニ移ル。
貴下ハアノ論說中ニ大体「天津ニ於ケル外國
租界ハ封鎖サレタ。今ガ攻撃開始ニ好適ナ時
機デアル。何故ナラ全國民ハ政府ガ此ノ機ニ

乘ジテ即刻攻撃スベキコトヲ認メテ居ルカラ
 デアル。攻撃ハ天津ニ止ルコトナク上海ニ、
 更ラニ香港ニ及ブベキデアル。之ガ唯一ノ支
 那事變ノ可能ナル解決方法デアル。我々ハ英
 國ト國フ・ヨリ仕方ガナイ。」ト云フ様ナ
 要旨ノ事ヲ述ベラレマセンデシタカ。

答、大体ソノ通りデス。

問、五公二冊主目ノ陳述ノ際貴下ハコノ新聞紙上デ
 ソノ様ナコトハ云ハナカツタト述ベタガ之レ
 ハ間違ヒダツタノデスネ。

答、ソウデス。私ノ記憶ガ悪カツタノデス。

問、「チジデブロッタヲ建議スル事下ヲ躊躇シテマナラナイ、之
 ハ九箇國條約ノ違反トハナラナイ。若シ他國テ之ガソウシタ
 違反ヲ構成スルセノデアルト看做スナラバ、
 條約ヲ廢棄スルバカリダ。」ト云フ聲明ヲ發
 表シタコトヲ貴下ハ否定シタガ、貴下ハ間違
 ツテ居タトハ思ハメカ。

答、此ノ論說ニハ九箇國條約ニ就テハ何モ書イテ
 アリマセン。私ハソノ聲明ヲ一九三九年十二
 月五日發行ノ同紙上ニ掲ゲタ一文中ニ此事ヲ
 聲明シタノデス。

問、去八月十二日ノ貴下ノ答問ニ於テアノ聲明ヲシ

タコトヲ否定サレタガソレハ貴下ノ間違ヒテ
アツタノデスネ。

答、ハイ、私ガ間違ッテ居マッタ。

(詞書番號 三四三〇、四一七頁)

問、薩摩中ハ然ッ乍ラ、滿洲へノ遠征ニ贊成ッテ
居タ、ソウデハアリマセンカ。

答、然リ。...

問、「當該地域ハ指導者トシテノ日本、滿洲國、
支那、極東方面ソ聯領土、佛領印度支那、ピ
ルマ、マライ、蘭領東印度、英領東印度、ア
フガニスタン、オーストラリア、ニュージ
ランド、ハワイ、フィリッピン、及太平洋及
印度洋上ノ島嶼ヲ含ム。」旨ヲ述ベ、天皇ノ
下ニ於ケル世界統一ヲ提唱シタコトハナカツ
タカ。

答、ソウ私ハ云ヒマシタ。私ハロシアトハワイヲ
包含スルト云フ事ハ思ヒ出セナイ。然シ、私
ハ斯ノ様ナ聲明ヲシマシタ。

問、事實、ソノ計畫ハ貴下ノ胸中ニ在リ又貴下ニ
依テ多年ノ間提唱サレタ、ソウデハアリマセ
ンカ。

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答、私ハ斯カル考ヲ多年ノ間持ツテ居マシタ。

(即書香號 三四三一 五―六頁)

問、貴下ハ「革新ノ必然性」ト題スル書物ヲ刊行シタ事ハアリマセンデシタカ。或ハ其ノ著者デハアリマセンカ。

答、然リ。

問、私ハ貴下ニ「文書香號第四八八號」ト書カレタ文書ヲ見セル。而シテ貴下ガソノ本ノ著者デハナカツタカヲオ訊ニスル。

答、然リ。私ハソレヲ書キマシタ。

問、貴下ハ此ノ書ノ中デ「然シ世界ノ進退ト民族ノ繁榮ヲ妨ゲル最モ重大ナル事柄ハ英國ノ援助デアル。日本ハ只英國ニ對シテ決然タル態度ヲ示スノミデアル。即チ香港及ビ上海ヲ占領スベシト云ヘバ足リル。英國ハ若シ彼ガ支那ニ於テ敗退スレバ彼ハ又印度カラモ撤退セネバナラヌト云フコトヲ知ツテ居ル。」トイフ事ヲ述べマセンデシタカ。之ハ「革新ノ必然性」ト題スル一九四〇年十二月廿五日ニ發行サレタ本デス。

答、ハイ。

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問、大佐、貴下が其著者タルコトヲ認メタ此同一出版物ノ三五頁ヲ見テ戴キマセウ。一貴下ハ神武天皇ニ依テ宣布サレタ勅諭ニ示サレテアル様ニ天皇ノ下ニ於ケル世界ノ統一ヲ提唱シタノデハナカツタカ。

答、ハイ。ソレハソノ通りデス。

問、五二頁ヲ見テ戴クトシテ。貴下ハ「此ノ新タニ組織サレタ方法ハ天皇ノ下世界統一ノ完全ナ發展ヘノ唯一ノ道デアル。又ソレ故ニ我國ハ新秩序建設ニ對スル權利ヲ有シ且支那專横ノ如キ問題ハ此ノ世界新秩序建設ノ端緒トシテ思考シ得ル。」ト云ヒマセンデシタカ。

答、ハイ、夫レハ其處ニ警カレテアリマス。

問、前ニ戻ツテ三六頁ヲ見テ下サイ。貴下ハ來ル可キ世界ハ三ツノブロック、東亞民族ノ東亞ブロック、アメリカブロック、東亞民族ノ東亞ブロック、及ビ歐洲ノ歐洲ブロックニ分割サレルデアラウト云ヒマセンデシタカ。

答、ハイ、私ハソウ云ヒマシタ。

問、ソシテ此三ツノブロックガ制覇ヲ目指シテ角逐スルデアラウト云フ事ヲ。

答、然リ。

1875-17

問、ソシテ日本ノ國際的地位ヲ向上スル上ニ最重
要ナル點ハ日―滿―支―ブロックノ樹立デアルト
云フ事ヲ。

答、ソウデス。言ヒ換ヘレバ、世界ハ三ツノブロ
ックニ分割サレルニ至ルデアリマセウ。而シ
テ我々モ亦一ツノブロックヲ作ラネバナラナ
イノデス。

問、ソレデ貴下ハ近衛聲明ニ沿フテ東亞ブロック
ガドノ程度ニ強力ナモノトサレナケレバナラ
ヌカニ就テ述ベ、更ラニ貴下ハ次ノ様ニ聲明
シテ居ル。即チ「此ノ新秩序ハ英、米、佛、
露ニ依テ維持サレテイル舊世界秩序ノ徹底的
破滅ヲ意味スル」ト。ソレハ依然三六頁ニ出
テ居ル所デアル。

答、大体之等ハ私ノ言葉デアリマス。

問、貴下ハ更ニ民衆ニ向テ此著書ヲ通シテ「東亞
開港ノ爲メ英米機務ノ驅逐」ヲ強調シテ居ル
ガ如何。

答、ハイ、私ハ斯カル聲明ジシマシタ。

問、五八頁ニ移ル。貴下ハ之等ノ目的ヲ達成スル
上ニ強力内閣ノ出現ヲ主張シ、「英、米、露
ノ如キ國家ハ互ニ緊密ナ聯繫ヲ保チ日本ヲ壓
迫セント對策シテ居ルコトハ疑ヒヲ容レザル

所ダルト云ツテルガ、ドワカ。

答、ハイ、私ハソノ聲明ヲシマシタ。

問、テハ此同一文書第四八八號ノ六二頁ヲ見テ下
サイ。貴下ハ反日包圍攻撃ノ指導者トシテ
頑張ツテ居ルノハ英國デアアル。故ニ彼等ノ間
ニ緊密ナ連絡ガ出來ルニ先立テ、指導者タル
英國ニ決定的打撃ヲ加ヘルコトハ爾余ノモノ
ヲ驅逐スル上ニ先ヅ第一ニナスベキコトデア
ル。一度英國ガ撃破サレレバ、米國ハ不遜ナ
行動ニ出テナイダラウ。然シ若シソレニモ拘
ラズ米國ガ我レニ挑戦ノ兆候ヲ示スナラバ、
米國ハ各個撃破ニ依テ容易ニ敵ク專ガ出來ル
ダラウ。ソシテ此ハ日本ガ勝利ヲ獲得スル爲
ノ唯一ノ戰略デアルト云フ專ヲ云ヒマセンデ
シタカ。

答、ハイ、私ハソノ様ナ聲明ヲシマシタ。

問、ソレカラ貴下ハ第六四頁ニ於テ「幸ヒ歐洲ノ
精強タル二強大國ガ、日本ト同盟スベク彼等
ノ手ヲ提携ベテ居ル。今ハ發展的大日本建設
ノ問題ヲ解決スル爲ノ重大時期デアアル！秋ハ
將ニ至レリ！若シ我々が今ニシテソレヲ行ヘ
バ即チ其達成ハ可能デアアル！ト云フ專ヲ言ツ

1875-19

テ居ルガドウカ。

答、然リ。

問、サテ、大佐、此ノ同ジ文書ノ第七一頁ヲ見テ
戴ク事ニスル。ソコテ貴下ハ「獨伊ハ現状維
持ヲ打破シ新秩序ヲ建設スル爲ニ英佛ト戦ツ
テイル。」

ソシテアジアニ於ケル支那事變モ亦英米支配
ニ對所スル日支共同戦線デアルコトハ云フ迄
モナイ。我々が歴史的事實ノ嚴密ナ考察ヲ爲
ス時、日、獨、伊ハ已ニ英、佛、米ニ對スル
不可避的戦争ニ突入シテ居ルノダ。」ト主張
シテ居ラレルノガ判リマセンカ。更ラニ貴下
ハ「故意ニ此ノ事實ノ肯定ヲ拒否スル人々ハ
英米ノ庇護下ニアルノダ。」ト云ツテマスネ。
サテ私ハ貴下ニオ訊ネシマセウ。一貴下が米
内首相ニ對スル此ノ質問ヲ公表シタ當時、彼
ハ支那事變ニ結末ヲツケ又英米トノ友好的解
決ニ到達スベク努力シテ居ツタノデハナイカ。
答、私ハ彼等ガソウデアツタトハ考ヘテ居ナイ。
問、此ノ進言ノ目的ハ何デアリマシタカ。
答、私ハソレハ米内ニ更ニ努力ヲ續ケ支那事變ヲ
終結ニ導ク様善處ヲ進言スルノガ目的デアツ

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タト考ヘテイマス。

問、デハ、大佐、何故貴下ハ次ノ様ナコトヲ云ツ
タノデスカ。

「モシ貴下ガ英米ト協力ノ下ニ支那事變ノ終
結ヲ企圖スルナラバ、貴下ハ決ッテ此ノ問題
ヲ解決シ得ナイデアラウ。貴下ガ支那ヨリ英
米ヲ驅逐セント決意サレル其瞬間、支那ハ新
秩序ノ方嚮ヘ動キ始メルデアラウ。」ト。ソ
レハ第七三頁ニアリマス。

答、米内ガ支那事變ヲ終結セシメヤウト試ミテ居
タト云フコトハ事實デハアリマセン。然シ乍
ラ、當時合衆國及ビ英國トノ協力ニ就テノ話
ハアツタ。之ハソウ云フコトヲスルナト云フ
警告トシテ書カレタノデス。

問、デハ此ノ同ジ注目ニ値ヒスル文藝ノ一五頁
ヲ見テ戴ク事ニスル。ソコデ貴下ガ「今コソ
世界側面ノ爲ノ全体主義時代デアル。」ト日
本民衆ニ向ッテ呼ビカケテ居ルノガ判リマセ
ンカ。

答、ハイ、確カニ。

問、又一二二頁ニ、貴下ハ「世界ハ個人主義カラ
全体主義ニ進ミツツアル、ソシテ將來世界中
ノ國々ハ一ツニ結合サレルデアラウ。」ト云

1875-21

ツテイマヌネ。

答、ハイ。

問、又一三一頁ニ貴下ハ年末ニ際シ大響鐘ヲ亂打
スルト云フコトニ就テ書イテイル。ソシテ貴
下ハ一九四〇年十二月二十日附テ、世界ハ今
ニツノ陣營ニ分レテイル、即チ一ツノ陣營ハ
現狀維持ノ爲ノモノデアリ、他ノ一ツハ新秩
序ニ對スルモノデアアル。日本ハ中立テハナイ。
我々ノ敵ハ勿論。……現狀維持ヲ支持セント
欲スル英米デアアル。……米國ニ對シ斷乎タル
態度ヲ採ルコトヲ懸望スル理由ガドコニア
ルカ。……如何ナル型式ガ採ラレヤウトモ、日
米間ノ衝突ハ避ケラレナイ。我々ハ時期ヲ失
セザル中ニ立上リソシテ南方ニ共榮國ヲ建設
スベキデアアル。危険ヲ冒カサズシテハ何物セ
ン
獲ラレナイ。」トイフ事ヲ云ツテハイマセン
カ。

答、ソレハソノ通りデス。

問、ソシテ更ニ貴下ハ少シ後ニ、一三五頁デ、「
聖戰」タル事ヲ云フ不可思議ナレツテ
ルヲ附セラレタ支那トノ戰ヒニ言及シテイル
ガ如何。

答、ハイ如何ニモ。

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問、サテ、大佐、一九三六年ニ廻ッテ當時貴下ガ
相嘗有名ナ「橋本欽五郎宣言」ヲ發表サレタ
筈ダガ、ドウデスカ。

答、ハイ、アレハ會ノ宣言デシタ。

問、然シソレハ「橋本欽五郎ノ宣言」トシテ一般
ニ知ラレ又夫レニ關スル貴下ノ刊行物ノ中ニ
ソウ銘ヲ打タレテイタ筈ダガ。

答、ハイ。

問、ソシテ貴下ガソレヲ誓イタノデスカ。

答、ハイ。

問、其レヲ貴下ニ見テ驚クトシテ、貴下ハ……「
蓋ッ、其ノ國策トシテ天皇ノ下ニ於ケル世界
統一ノ達成ト云フ事ヲ詠セラレテイル我國民
ハ、即刻天皇ニ直結シテ全國民ガ結束シ、カ
クシテ日本固有ノ本領ヲ顯現スベキデアル。」
トイフ事ヲ云ヒマセンデシタカ。

答、私ハ譯文ノ意味ガ判リマセン。然シ要スルニ
「世界ハ八紘一字ノ原理ノ下ニ結合サルベキ
デアアル。」ト云フ風ナコトヲ私ハ申シマシタ。
問、貴下ノ吾對外政策ノ仲長ニ關スル項ヲ見テ驚
キタイ。貴下ハ其ノ項ニ於テ「吾ガ版圖内ニ
於テ各民族ヲシテ緊密ナ有機的組織ノ下ニ制
限地方政府ヲ彼等ニ附與スルコトニ依テ彼等

自身ノ特色ヲ完全ニ發揮セシメル。彼等ノ民族的文化ヲ益的ニ高揚シ又皇道ノ具體的顯現ニ努メル。此ノ公式ニ則リ我々ハ今後世界ノ他ノ部分ニ備キカケネバナラナイ。」ト言ツテイル。

答、ソレハ大体ソノ通りデス。

問、大佐、一九三六年ニ遼ツテ爲サレタ、此ノ同ジ貴下ノ宣言中ニ、「軍備ノ發達」ナル一節ガアル。ソノ中テ貴下ハ「我々ノ皇道實現途上ニ於テ我々ヲ阻止セントスル異レル主義ノ他ノ諸國家ヲ征服スル爲我國ノ軍備ヲ絶對所要最迄強化スル。軍備ノ中核ハ無敵ノ空軍タルベクソノ空軍機ハ陸軍ノミノモノニ非ズシテ、國民ノ空軍機トシテ考ヘラルベキデアル。國民ヲシテ彼等ガ昔時劍ヲ信頼シタルガ如ク空軍機ヲ信頼セシメヨ。」ト云ヒマシタネ。

答、ハイ、私ハソノ様ナ事ヲ申シマシタ。

(詞書番號三四三一七、六一一〇頁参照)

問、此ノ本ガ發刊サレタ時、貴下ハ大政翼贊會ノ職員デシタカ。

答、私ハサウデアツタト思ヒマス。

問、當時、貴下ハ大政翼賛會テ如何ナル地位ニ居
リマシタカ。其點ヲ話サレタイ。

答、甚難デス。(通譯ノ註解・ゼネラル アフエアス
セクリタリ ニ當ルト存ジマス。)

問、貴下ハ又前任理事デハナカツタデスカ。
答、ハイ。

問、又、近衛公爵ハ貴下ニ準備委員ニ爲ルベク
ンダノデハナカツタデスカ。

答、サウデス。

問、一九四一年―一九四二年ノ日本年鑑カラ引用
スルト、一七五頁ノ天皇翼賛ノ國民的運動ナ
ル標題ノ一文中ニ次ノ事ガ出テイル。即チ此
ノ運動ハ本質ニ於テ高度ニ政治的ナリ」トア
ル。サウデハナイノデスカ。

答、近衛公爵ハ元々、其レヲ政治運動ト見ナシタ
ノデスガ、議會ニ於ケル嚙々タル反對論ノ爲
ニ、スベテノ政治的活動ハソレカラ取り除カ
レマシタ。

問、同會ハ「割據的利害關係ニ依テ特徴ヅケラレ
且自由主義ニ立脚スル在野イ政黨政治ニ取ツテ
代ル」事ヲ目的トシタノデハナイデスカ。

答、ソレハ其本來ノ理念デアリマシタ。

問、ソレハ本質的ニ國家的デアリ性質上總テヲ抱擁セントスル公共的性格ヲ持ツタモノデハナカツタデスカ。

答、本質的ニハサウデツタ。

問、ソシテソレハ、國民ノアラユル力及ビ資源ノ集中統一ヲ目的トシ、其ノ活動ハ國民ノ全生活ニ及ンダノデハナカツタデスカ。

答、サウデス。

問、更ニ年鑑ヲ濫用スルト、「總裁ハ翼贊會ヲ統轄シ活動ヲ指揮ス。首相ハ職權上其總裁ナリ」トアリマスガ本當ノ事デスカ。

答、ソレハ用語上ノ問題デス。何故ナラバ首相ハ事實上總裁デアリ、彼ノ下デ翼贊會ヲ統轄シ其ノ運動ヲ指揮スルモノハ副總裁ト呼バレテキルカラ。

問、ソレデハ大佐、若シ新シイ人が首相ニナツタ時、彼ハ矢張り翼贊會總裁ニナツタノデスカ。答、ソレハソノ通りデス。

問、大佐、翼贊會會員ノ資格ニ關シ一九四一—一九四二年ノ日本年鑑ニハ「皇道翼贊會ハ全國民ニ關連スル運動ナレバ日本民族ニ屬スルモノハ總テ言葉ノ後セ良イ意味ニ於テ生レナガ

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ラニシテ翼賛會ノ會員タル資格ヲ有スルトアリマスガ、其レハ正確ナ記述デスカ。

答、サウデス。

問、實際ノ處、翼賛會ノ趣意ハ議會ニ於テ他ノ總ベテノ政黨ニ代ル單一黨ヲ作ル事デハナカツタノデスカ。

答、ソレガ其目的デッタ。ツカシ結果ハ議員ガ其計畫ニ反對シ結局大改翼賛會ヲ政治カラ閉メ出ス事ニ成功シタノデス。

問、大体日本ノ總テノ人が此ノ會ニ歸シテ居タノデスカ。

答、一億デス。

問、此ノ會ハフアシスト黨ニ非常ニ似テ居タト考ヘルカ。

(審問者ヨリ通譯ヘノ言葉)

日本憲法ノ下デハ單一政黨制ナルモノハ有リ得ナイト吾々ハ考ヘテイルガ、コノ會ハ實際ニ於テ日本ニ於ケルフアシスト黨ニ類スル制度ノ變遷ヲナスモノデハナカツタカ。此點ヲ彼レニ訊セ。

答、政治ノ領域外ニ有リテ、同會ハ國民ヲ統一シ天皇ノ道ニ纏カシムル様活動シタノデアル。

問、大佐、貴下ハ此ノ會ガドイツニ於ルナチス黨、

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イタリヤニ於ルフアシスト黨ガシタ様ニ、人力ト資源ノ國民的總動員ノ方嚮ニ向ツテ日本ニ於テ同様ノ事ヲ達成シタト言ハレルノデアリマセンカ。

答、唯一ツ異ル點ハ吾々ハ政治ニ何等關係シナカツタト云フ事デアリマス。

問、然シ乍ラ今朝ノ貴下ノ答辯ノ始マリノ方ノ一節若日本年鑑ニアル「其ノ運動ハ性質上高度ニ政治的デアツタ」ノ記述ヲ貴下ハ確認シタ。此點貴下ノ注意ヲ促シタイ。

答、ソレハ元來政治的デアツタ。ガ結局政治活動ニ參加スル事ヲ禁ゼラレタ。

問、國防ト其ノ主義ノ爲ニ軍部ノ背後ニ國民ヲ統一スル事ガ必要目的デアツタト貴下ハ言ヒマセンデシタカ。

答、否、近衛ハ其ノ様々方面ノ事ハ考ヘテ居マセンデシタ。

政黨ハ解散シタ。ソレ故近衛ハ此ノ運動ハ新シキ強固ナ單一政黨ヲ作ル事ヲ可能ナラシメルト考ヘタト私ハ信ジマス。

問、ソシテ貴下ハ彼ニ同意シタノデスカ。

答、サウデス。私ハ彼ニ同意シ其レニ向ツテ働イタノデス。

ソレガ私が準備委員會ノ一員ニ爲ツタ理由デ
ス。

問、デハ貴下ニ「證據卷四九〇」ヲ渡シマス。
其レヲ見テ下サイ。其本ノ表紙ニ貴下ノ寫眞
ガアリマス。卷名ハ「世界ヲ如何ニ再建スベ
キカ」デスガ貴下ガコレヲ書カレタノデスカ。

答、サウデス。

問、何時。

答、一九四一年頃ト思ヒマス。

(調査第三四三―八號、一頁―三頁)

問、貴下ハ當時ノ大政翼賛會ノ行キ方ニ不満デシ
タカ。

答、否。

問、ドウシテ脱退シタノデスカ。

答、實際特別ナ理由ハ有リマセンデシタ。

問、翼賛政治會ニ入ルマデニドノ位アリマシタカ。

答、私ハ一九四一年ノ二月ニ翼賛會ヲ辭シタト思
ヒマス。翼賛政治會ハ一九四二年四月マデハ
出來テ居マセンデシタ。

問、大佐、貴下ノ著書「世界ヲ如何ニ再建スベキ
カ」ハ一九四一年一月三十日ニ發刊サレタノ
デスネ。

答、サウデス。

デシタカ。

答、私ハ會長デシタ。

問、「證據書類四八七號」ト警カレテアル書物ヲ
賞下ニ渡シマス。ソレヲ見テ下サイ。

答、コレハ私ノ著書デス。

問、其書名ハ「若人ヘノ言葉」デスネ。

答、サウデス。

問、本ノ表紙ノ賞下ノ寫眞ヲ見テ歎ク。日本流ノ
表側デス。——コレハ賞下ガ警イタノデス
カ。

答、サウデス。若シ賞下ガ此ノ本ノ詳細ニ亘リ吟
味サレルトナルト、其ノ中ノ理論的ナ問題ノ
或ルモノハ私ガ他人カラ聞イタモノナノデス
カラ私ニハ十分ニ説明スル事ハ一寸難カシイ
デセウ。然シ乍ラ私ハ此本ヲ警キマシタ。

問、ソレハ良イデス。大佐、十二頁ヲ見テ下サイ。
第二章ニハ「世界自由主義ノ破壞」トイフ題
名ガ附ケラレテイルガ。

答、ソレハソノ通りデス。

問、此ノ章テ賞下ハ自由主義、多数派支配、帝國
主義、及ビ白人支配ヲ攻撃シテイルノデハナ
イデスカ。又同章テ自由經濟ヲ統制經濟ヲ以
テ代替スル事ヲ主張シテイルノデハナイカ。

1875-31

答、サウデス。

問、又、二三頁デ貴下ハ「現在ノ世界秩序ハ之レヲ清算スルカ或ハ第二次世界戦争ヲヤラネバナラヌカノ段階ニ來タ」ト言ツテマスネ。

答、サウデス。

問、更ニ貴下ノ「若人ヘノ言葉」二四頁「物質文明ト精神文化」ト題スル第三章ノ中デ、「白人ハ地球ノ五分ノ四ヲ征服シタ。日本ノミ彼ニ對抗シテ居ル。日本ノ勢力ニヨリ強化サレルニ非ザレバアジア人ハ白人ノ餌食ニナラン」ト言フテイマセンカ。

ソシテ貴下ハアジアノ武器ハ屢々而シテアジアノ文化ハ常ニヨーロッパノ其レニ優レテ居タト歴史的ナ議論ヲ展開シテイル。更ニ貴下ハ歴史ヲヨーロッパ人トアジア人ノ争鬪ト見ナシ、「三千年ノ間アジア人ハ優ツテキタ。然シ過去三百年、白人ハ彼ノ物質的発展ノ爲ニ局面ヲ一尊シタ。」ト言ツテキル。更ニ又「コレハアジア人ノ精神主義ガ常ニ物質主義ニ叩頭セネバナラヌ事ヲ意味スルノカ。然ラズ。眞ノアジア精神ニ非ズシテ其ノ墮落セル形ガ破ラレタノデアル。日本ハ其古イアジア文化ノ復興ヲ導カネバナラナイ」ト述べ

テキル。

コレラハ此ノ章カラノ正確ナル引用及び記事
デハナイデスカ。

答、サウデス。大体ニ於テ夫等ハ私ノ説デス。

私ノ言ツタ事ノ要領ハ、ヨーロッパノ物質文
明ハアジアノ精神文明ヲ破ツタ。然シコノ状
態ハ常ニ續クベキモノデハ無イ。吾々ハ立上
ラネバナラヌ。ト云フ事デス。

問、私ハ貴下ノ注意ヲ一九三七年刊行サレタ同書
ノ「世界ノ日本、日本ノ世界」ト題スル第七
章ニ促シタイ。其處デ次ノ事ヲ言ハナカツタ
カドウカヲ尋ネタイ。

「日本ノ爲ノ日本、世界ノ爲ノ日本、日本ノ
爲ノ世界」ヨリ良キ日本ヲ建設スル事が吾々
ノ主要目的デアツタ。日本ハ明治維新當時、
其第一段階ニアツタ。

カクシテヨリ良キ日本ハ作ラレタ。然シ乍ラ
日本ニトリ眞ニ劇的ニ戦争ナリシ日支戦争
後、日本ハ必然的ニ世界ノ強國トナツタ。

日本ハ其國力ヲ認メラレ、世界三大強國ノ一
トナツタ。然シコレハ決シテスベテノ目的デ
ハナイノデアル。吾々ハ日本ノ爲ノ世界ヲ作
ラネバナラヌ。天ハ日本ニ偉大ナル使命ヲ成

シ遂ゲル様命ジタ。滿洲事變ハカクツテ發生
シタルト。

コレハ正確ナ引用デアリマセンカ。

答、ソレハ大体ニ於テ正確ナ譯文デス。

問、同章ニ於テ「日本ハ文字通り白人ニ依リ領土
ノ擴張ヲ強ヒラレタ。移民及ビ國家産業主義
ガ白人ニ依リ封鎖サレ、ボイコットサレタ。
此故ニ日本ニ強サレタ唯一ノ道ハ自國ノ領土
ヲ擴張スルコトナノデアル。」ト論ジテハ居
リマセンカ。

答、ソレハソノ通りデス。

問、貴下ハ同章ニ於テ「吾々が今日注目シナケレ
バナラヌ國ガ四ツアル。即チ支那、ソ聯、米
國及ビ英帝國。」ト言ツテ居ラヌカ。

答、サウデス。

問、若人ヘノ言葉ト題スル同巻第二〇一頁ノ
第八章テ「吾ガ陸海軍ハ天皇ニ依リ親シク統
率サレルモノニツテ神ノ國ノ威信ヲ示ス手段
ナリ。」ト言フテイマセンカ。

答、ソレハソノ通りデス。

(圖書第三四三―八號、六一―七頁)

Q. "And in your examination of February 12 you denied having made the following statement which was included in the publication entitled 'Sekai Saiken No Michi' (How to Rebuild the World) which was published 30 January 1941: 'I would not say that is the only reason, but anyway thereafter the Manchurian incident, withdrawal from the League of Nations, denunciation of the Disarmament Agreement, the May 15 incident, Shimpei Tai, and the February 26 incident took place in succession.' When you denied making that statement in your examination of February 12 you were mistaken on that point, were you not?"

A. It is in that book. I was mistaken the other day." (Case 343-10, Page 8-15 Feb. 46)

* * * * *

Q. "Colonel, you said at the last hearing that you were one of the founders of the Sakura Kai. Is that true?"

A. Yes.

Q. Who were some of the other members of that society when it was formed?"

A. The founder of this Sakura Kai is myself, but there are a few others that were with me at the time.....The sole founder of this society is myself, and the others were more or less in the capacity of assistants as secretaries, etc. " (Case 343 - 6, Page 31- 22 January 1946)

* * * * *

Q. "Do you know anything about the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?"

A. Yes.

Q. Describe to what geographical regions this Sphere extended.

A. The approximate geographical sphere would include India, the Philippines, China.

Q. Was Burma included?"

A. Yes.

Q. You wanted to get the British out of this Sphere?"

A. Yes. "

* * * * *

Q. "You belong to the Dai Nippon Seki Sei Kai?"

A. I formulated that." (Case 343 - 6, Page 41 - 22 January 1946)

Q. "But sooner or later you did get around to planning a 'coup de etat' didn't you?"

A. This was not something that the Cherry Blossom Society alone planned, but in October, 1931 there was the attempted 'October Incident' in which it was planned to do away with the high government officials in office and put in a new group.

Q. And prior to this October incident there had been the 'March Incident' which had failed, hadn't there?

A. Yes. "

* * * *

Q. "Colonel, suppose you just tell us now the names of those that planned the March incident and the names of those that planned the October incident.

A. I will start with the March incident. I shall have to think a bit to bring to mind the names. NINOMIYA, who is now dead. SUGIYAMA, who is also dead. KOISO - he is alive. TATEKAWA, deceased. OKAWA, alive. I think Maj.Gen. NAGATA was involved, but am not sure. Maj. IKEDA was somewhat involved..... SHIGETO, yes. That is about all.....

Q. How about Maj. CHO?

A. Yes." (Case 343 - 17, Page 2 - 3 - 18 February 1946)

* * * *

Q. "The way it stands you admit plotting with General TATEKAWA, General KOISO, General NINOMIYA, General SUGIYAMA, and Dr. OKAWA to bring about the March incident and to bring about the October incident; but you deny any knowledge or complicity in the 2/26 affair?"

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. You admit to active participation then in two revolutions, but not three.

A. Yes." (Case 343 - 17, Page 14 - 18 February 1946)

* * * *

Q. "Did you have any part in the formation of the Dai Nippon Seinen To?"

A. After being retired in October 1936 I organized this society.

Q. And you were president of the society, were you not?

A. I was head of the society." (Case 343 - 6, Page 3 - 17 January 1946)

* * * *

Q. "Where was your regiment stationed at the time of the Panay incident?"

A. At a place called Wuhu, on the Yangtze River above Nanking.

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Q. Who was the General in command over you at that time?

A. Lieutenant General ~~Y~~ANAGAWA.

Q. How did the attack on the Panay happen? What caused it?

A. I had no knowledge of the Panay incident until the British gunboat Ladybird passed by Wuhu; I shelled the Ladybird and took it into custody and at that time the Commanding Officer of the Ladybird told me he was going to the assistance of the Panay because he had gotten word that the Panay was in trouble. This was my first knowledge of the incident. I simply knew the Panay was downstream and did not know anything further than that."

* * * *

Q. "Under whose orders did you act when you shelled the Ladybird?

This was under orders from Lt. Gen. YANAGAWA. These orders read as follows: 'Nanking being in a state of siege, and it appearing that enemy troops will attempt to flee upstream, Colonel HASHIMOTO is to sink all vessels proceeding towards Nanking without regard to nationality.'....." (Case 343-6, Page 4-5. - 17 January 1946)

* * * *

Q. "Colonel, when you came back from the battlefield in China 25 March 1939, weren't you tendered a great reception described as 'an unprecedented demonstration for the national restoration'?

A. The assembly was a good deal after my return. As for the rest of your question, that is essentially correct.

Q. You state there in your book that you dissolved the Dai Nippon Seinento and instantly established the Dai Nippon Sekisei Kai and the following policies were approved at the Third General Assembly of the Association in 19 November 1939:

1. Restoration of the nation.
2. Stronger armament for the defense and liberation of the Asiatic races.
3. Asiatic autarchy.
4. Attach Britain and her dominions.
5. Imperialization of east Asia.
6. Establishment of state union in Asia.

A. Point one, that is correct. Point two I advocated a peerless air force. Point three is correct. Point four, whether I said it then or not I do not know, but I hold those feelings.

Q. Aren't they set out in your book there?

A. This book has only through the Second General Assembly. No, it is here! Point four is correct. I say that to attack England is to bring to a conclusion the China incident. Point five -- I do not know what you mean exactly -- I advocated independence of all Asiatic nations. Six is correct.

Q. Colonel, when you published this book in 1941 including these attached outlines and histories of your societies, you were a leader and an official and a permanent director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, weren't you?

A. That is correct.

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Q. And the Premier KONOYE was the President of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, wasn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. Colonel, you stated in answer to some questions of mine on the 12th of February that in Taiyo Dai Nippon you did not say in an article entitled 'Expel the British Influences from the Far East,' that 'under the present condition it is very easy to beat England.' (Copy of the Taiyo Dai Nippon is shown to HASHIMOTO.)

A. Is that so?

Q. Was your answer true that you did not say any --

A. There is no mistake. I must have said it.

Q. And did you not say on the same day to me that you did not say in an article in this paper under date of May 11, 1939, 'We have only to say decisively that we will occupy Hongkong and her concession in Shanghai. How can the British troops come to the Far East?' (Copy of the article is shown to HASHIMOTO.)

A. Yes I made such a statement. It is something I said a long time ago and therefore I did not remember it very well. But if you look at it here (pointing to the newspaper) you should find the correct statements.

Q. Then you want to correct the answer you made on the 12th of February in which you said that you did not make such a statement?

A. It is as written here.

Q. And it does say there in that article written by you, in substance, 'that we have only to say decisively that we will occupy Hongkong and her concession in Shanghai. How can the British troops come to the Far East?'

A. That is correct.

Q. And you did say in that same article that the 'British fleet will not be able to enter Singapore for we have our peerless aviators in addition to the fleet?'

A. Yes, in substance -- but what is actually stated here is that if we have these aforementioned things the British fleet will receive a crushing blow before being able to enter Singapore.

Q. This quotation which you just read is from the publication Taiyo Dai Nippon dated May 11, 1939, which is part of Document No. 13, is it not? (Indicating copy of publication).

A. Naturally.

Q. And you were responsible for the publication of that newspaper?

A. Yes.

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- Q. And that was published bi-monthly, the 5th and 20th?
- A. Three times a month. It is not circulated outside of the Sekisei Kai.
- Q. How many members did that society have?
- A. I do not believe there were over 20,000.
- Q. And in this same article you said in substance: 'Even though England is wealthy, she will suffer greatly if her warship which costs one hundred million yen will be sunk by our three hundred thousand yen airplane.'?
- A. That is correct.
- Q. Then you were mistaken when you stated on the 12th of February that you had made no such statement?
- A. That is so. I did not remember.
- Q. And in the issue of this same paper of June 1, 1939, did you say 'Define England as the enemy?'
- A. Yes.
- Q. Then you were mistaken when you stated in the examination of 12 February that you did not make such a statement?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And did you state in the issue of June 1 of this paper, Document No. 13, 'Our way is one -- expulsion of England?'
- A. Yes.
- Q. Then your denial of that statement was untrue.
- A. I had no remembrance. Your interpretation was not incorrect. My memory was in error.
- Q. What is the title of that article there? (Indicating article in paper)
- A. It means on topics of the time, upon matters of the moment, or something like that.
- Q. It doesn't say 'Solution of incident depends upon expulsion of England?'
- A. Yes. (Comment by Interpreter: He admitted that.)
- Q. Does it appear there that you said 'if it hadn't been for support of England, the Chiang Government would have been already destroyed?'
- A. Those are essentially my ideas,, but whether it is here or not I do not know. (Looking at article to see.) I do not see it here, but those were my ideas in any case.

Q. Turning to the June 20, 1939 article, title, 'Expulsion of England is the Solution to the China Incident,' did you state in that article substantially as follows: 'The foreign concessions in Tientsin are blockaded. This is an opportune moment to start the attack, because the whole nation has recognized it is necessary the Government should avail itself of this opportunity and attack instantly. The attack should not be stopped at Tientsin but extended to Shanghai and to Hongkong. This is the only possible solution of the China incident. We have no choice -- fight England.'

A. In substance that is correct.

Q. Then you were mistaken when you made a statement on the 12th of February that you did not say that in this paper?

A. That is so. My memory was bad.

Q. When you denied that you published the statement 'Don't hesitate to establish the Asiatic Bloc, this is not an infringement of the Nine Power Treaty; if others think it constitutes such an infringement, renounce the treaty,' you were mistaken, were you not?

A. There is nothing about the Nine Power Pact in this article. I made that statement in an article in the issue of this same paper dated December 5, 1939.

Q. Then you were mistaken when you denied making that statement in your examination of February 12?

A. Yes, I was mistaken." (Case No. 343-10, Pages 4 to 7, inc. - 15 Feb. 1946)

* * * *

Q. "You were in favor, however of the expedition into Manchuria, were you not?

A. Yes.....

Q. "Did you make a statement advocating the unification of the world under the Emperor, in which you said 'The territories will include Japan, the leader, Manchukuo, China, the far eastern part of Soviet Russia, French Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, Dutch East Indies, British East India, Afganistan, Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, Philippines, and islands on the Pacific and Indian Oceans?'

A. That I did say. I do not recall including Russia or Hawaii. However, I did make such a statement.

Q. In fact, that plan has been in your mind and been advocated by you for many years, has it not?

A. I have had such an idea for a long time." (Case No. 343-⁷ Page 5-6) - 12 Feb. 1946)

* * * *

Q. "You published a book, did you not, or were author of it, entitled 'Inevitability of the Renovation?'

A. Yes.

Q. I show you a document which is marked 'Document No. 488,' and ask you if you were the author of that book?

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A. Yes, I wrote it.

Q. Did you state in this book 'But what prevents most seriously the progress of the world and the prosperity of the races is the assistance of England. Japan has only to show her decisive attitude. We have only to say that we will occupy Hongkong and Shanghai. England knows that if she loses in China she must withdraw also from India.'? This is the book published 25 Dec. 1940, called the 'Inevitability of the Renovation.'

A. Yes.

Q. Colonel, directing your attention to page 35 of this same publication that you admitted authorship of -- Did you not advocate the unification of the world under the Emperor as expressed in the Imperial Edict promulgated by Emperor JIMMU?

A. Yes that is correct.

Q. Directing your attention to page 52. Did you not say, 'This newly organized measure is the only way for the complete promotion of the unification of the world under the Emperor. And consequently our nation has the right to establish a new order and a problem like the China Incident can be considered as the beginning of the establishment of this New World Order.'?

A. Yes, it is written there.

Q. Directing your attention back to page 36, did you not say in substance that the world to come will be divided into three blocks -- the American block with the Monroe Doctrine, the Oriental block of the Oriental Races, and the European block in Europe?

A. Yes I did.

Q. And these three blocks will have to strive for mastery?

A. Yes.

Q. And in promoting Japan to international position, the most important point is the establishment of the Japan-Manchukuo-China block?

A. That is so. In other words, the world will be divided into three blocks, and we must make a block also.

Q. Then you talk about how strong the Oriental block must be made following the KONOYE declaration, and then you make this statement: 'This new order means a thorough destruction of the old world order sustained by England, America, France, and the Soviet Union.' That is still on page 36.

A. Essentially those were my words.

Q. Now you further urged on the people through this publication the 'expulsion of the Anglo-American organization to exploit East Asia.'?

A. Yes I made such a statement.

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- Q. Directing your attention to page 58, you are urging a powerful Cabinet to accomplish these aims, and you say 'It is beyond doubt that those nations like Britain, America, and the Soviet are scheming to oppress Japan by having close touch with one another.'?
- A. Yes I made that statement.
- Q. Now directing your attention to page 62 of this same document No. 488, did you not say that -- the nation which stands as the leader of the anti-Japanese enveloping attack is Britain. Therefore the infliction of the decisive blow on Britain, the leader, prior to their thorough amalgamation is one of the first for dispelling the others. Once Britain is defeated, America will not act haughty, but if in spite of that America shows signs of challenging us, she can easily be knocked off by means of an individual attack; and this is the only strategy through which Japan can win her victory?
- A. Yes I made that statement.
- Q. Then you went on to say on page 64 'Fortunately the cream of Europe, two mighty nations, are extending their hands for an alliance with Japan. Now is the critical moment for deciding the question of creating the expanded greater Japan! The time has come! If we do it now it can be done!'
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, Colonel, we direct your attention to page 71 of this same document and do we not find you urging 'Germany and Italy are fighting against England and France in order to overthrow the status quo and to establish a new order. And it is needless to say that the China Incident in Asia also is the Japanese-Chinese united front against the Anglo-American domination. When we take a strict view of the historical facts. Japan, Germany, and Italy have already gone into an inevitable war against England, France, and America.'? Then you say 'Those who purposely refuse to admit this fact are dependent upon England and America.'
- Now I will ask you -- at this time that you published this query to the Premier YONAI, wasn't he trying to put an end to the China Incident and effect a friendly settlement with England and America?
- A. I do not believe they were.
- Q. What was the purpose of this exhortation?
- A. I believe it was aimed at telling YONAI to carry on and to bring about an end to the China Incident.
- Q. Then, Colonel, why did you say this -- 'If you try to put an end to the China Incident in collaboration with England and America, you will never be able to solve the problem. The instant you make up your mind to expel England and America from China, China will start moving toward a new order'? That is on page 73.
- A. It was not a fact that YONAI was trying to bring to a close the China Incident. However, at the time there was talk about working in conjunction with the United States and England, and this was written as a warning not to do so.

- Q. Directing your attention to this same remarkable document, page 115, do you not find yourself urging on the people of Japan that 'Now is the time for totalitarianism to rule the world.'?
- A. Yes that is correct.
- Q. And on page 122, you say 'The world is advancing from individualism to totalitarianism, and in the future the nations in the world will be united into one.'?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And on page 131 you are writing about ringing the loud alarm bell at the year end, and did you not say under the date of 20 December 1940, 'The world is now divided into two camps, the one camp is for the status quo, and the other is for the new order. Japan is not neutral. Our enemies of course... are England and America who want to maintain the status quo... Why should we hesitate to take a decisive attitude toward America?.. Whatever form it may take, the collision between Japan and America is inevitable. We had best rise when it is not too late and establish a Co-Prosperity Sphere in the south. Nothing ventured, nothing gained.'?
- A. That is correct.
- Q. And then don't you refer a little later, on page 135, to the war with China, which has been curiously labelled 'an incident' as a 'holy war'?
- A. Yes that is correct.
- Q. Now I believe, Colonel, that back in 1936 you published your rather famous 'Declaration of HASHIMOTO Kingoro'?
- A. Yes that was the declaration of the society.
- Q. But it is known and was labelled in your publication of it as the 'Declaration of HASHIMOTO Kingoro'?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And you wrote it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Directing your attention to it, did you say --- 'Methinks that our nation, which has the realization of the unification of the world under the Emperor as her national policy, should instantly manifest her inherent nature in uniting all her people directly under the Emperor.'?
- A. I do not know how the translation reads, but essentially I said something of the sort -- that the world would have to be united under the principle of the Eight Corners Under the One Roof.

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Q. I will direct your attention to your section dealing with the advancement of our policy abroad. You say in that section 'Within our dominion let each race give a full play to their own characteristics by giving them restricted local government under a close organic system. Try to enhance their racial culture as a whole and to materialize concretely the way of the Empire. With this formula we must later work upon the other parts of the world.'?

A. That is essentially correct.

Q. In this same declaration of yours, Colonel, made away back in 1936, you have got a section on "Advancement of Armaments," in which you said 'Increase our armaments to the amount absolutely necessary for conquering other countries of different principles that try to hinder us on our way toward the realization of the Imperial Way. The essence of the armaments should be the invincible air force whose airplanes should be considered airplanes of the nation, not only of the Army. Make the people trust the airplane as they trusted the sword in the old times.'?

A. Yes I did make such a statement." (Case No. 343-7, Pages 6 to 10, inc. -12 Feb. 1946)

* * * *

Q. "Now at the time this book was published, were you an official in the IRAA?"

A. I believe so.

Q. Now will you state just what position you held in the IRAA at this time?

A. Sōmu. (Interpreter's Note: Which I believe translates General Affairs Secretary.)

Q. You were also a permanent director, were you not?

A. Yes.

Q. And Prince KONOYE had asked you to be on the preparatory committee, had he not?

A. Yes.

Q. Quoting from the Japan Year Book for 1941-42, in the article on Page 175, entitled 'National Movement for Assisting the Throne,' the following appears: 'The move is highly political in nature.' Isn't that so?

A. Prince KONOYE originally thought of it as being a political movement, but because of the clamor in the Diet, all political action was stripped from it.

Q. The party aimed at 'superseding the old party politics characterized by sectional interests and predicated upon liberalism?'

A. That was the original idea.

Q. It was "essentially national, all embracing and public spirited in character, was it not"?

- 11
- A. That is substantially so.
- Q. And it aimed at 'the concentration and unification of all the forces and resources of the nation?' Its activity extended to the whole life of the nation, did it not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now quoting further from the Year Book, 'the President controls the Association and directs the movement; the Prime Minister is President ex officio.' Is that true?
- A. That is a question of terminology as the Prime Minister is actually the President and under him the man who controls the Association and directs the movement thereof is known as the Vice President.
- Q. Now, Colonel, if a new man became Prime Minister he also became President of this Association, didn't he?
- A. That is correct.
- Q. Colonel, as to the membership of the Association, the Japan Year Book 1941-1942 states 'The Association for Assisting the Throne being a movement that concerns the entire nation, every individual of the Japanese Race is by birthright qualified for membership in it in the widest sense of the term.' Is that a true statement?
- A. Yes.
- Q. As a matter of fact, the effect of this Association was to create a single party in the Diet replacing all the other political parties, was it not?
- A. That was the aim; but the result was that the Diet members fought the scheme and ultimately succeeded in keeping the IRAA out of politics.
- Q. Did nearly everybody in Japan belong to this society?
- A. One hundred million.
- Q. Would you say that this association largely resembled a Fascist Party? (Comment by Interrogator to Interpreter: Explain to him that we understand that under the Japanese constitution there couldn't be a one-party system, but ask him if actually this was not the beginning of the institution of somewhat of a Fascist Party in Japan.)
- A. Outside the realm of politics it worked to unite the people as one and to follow the road behind the Emperor.
- Q. Colonel, wouldn't you say that this association had accomplished the same thing in Japan in the way of a national mobilization of efforts and resources that the Nazi party did in Germany, or the Fascist party did in Italy?
- A. The only difference is that we had nothing to do with politics.

Q. However, I will direct your attention back to one of your first answers this morning, in which you verified the statement in the Japan Year Book that the 'movement was highly political in nature.'

A. It was originally political, but was eventually prohibited from having any part in political action.

Q. Didn't you say the main purpose was to unify the nation back of the military for defense of the nation and its principles?

A. No. KONOYE was not thinking along those lines. The political parties had disbanded and therefore KONOYE thought, I believe, that this movement would make it possible to have a new and strong single party.

Q. And you agreed with him?

A. Yes I agreed with him and worked towards it. That was the reason I became a member of the Preparatory Committee.

Q. Now I hand you a document marked 'Evidentiary Document 490', and ask you to look at it. I show you your picture in the front of the book. The name of this book is 'How to Rebuild the World.' and I ask you, did you write this book?

A. Yes.

Q. When?

A. Around 1941 I believe. " (Case No. 343-8, Pages 1 and 3- 14 February 1946)

* * * *

Q. "Were you dissatisfied with the way the IRAA was being run at this time?

A. No.

Q. Why did you get out?

A. There was actually no particular reason.

Q. How long before you joined the IRAPS?

A. I believe I resigned from the IRAA in February of 1941 and the IRAPS was not set up until April of 1942.

Q. I will ask you, Colonel, if your book 'How to Rebuild the World' was not published 30 January 1941?

A. Yes.

Q. Then it was published while you were still a member of the IRAA, wasn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. Then your other answer was a mistake, was it not?

A. I believe I said I was still a member.

13.

Q. To clear it up anyway, Colonel, you were still officially connected with IRAA when this book was given to the nation?

A. Yes. " (Case No. 343-8, Page 4 - 14 February 1946)

* * * *

Q. "Directing your attention to page 83 of this same book, do you not urge a 'reformation of Japan is an urgent necessity. Liberalism should be taken away from every sphere.'?"

A. Yes, more or less. Liberalism must be done away with because this is a form under which different individuals strive to make money for themselves or gain power for themselves, and do not heed the overall wishes of the nation." (Case No. 343-8, Page 5) - 14 February 1946)

* * * *

Q. "You were the leader of a Young Men's Organization at this time?"

A. Yes.

Q. What was your position in this organization -- President?

A. I was the President.

Q. I hand you a book marked for identification 'Evidentiary Document 487,' and ask you to look at this book.

A. This is my book.

Q. Is not the title of this book 'Speeches to Young Men'?

A. Yes.

Q. I point to your picture in the front of the book, that is the Japanese front, and ask -- did you write this book?

A. Yes. If you go into detail on this book, some of the academic subjects in it are things that I heard from others so that it might be a little difficult for me to explain fully. However, I wrote it.

Q. That's all right, Colonel. Directing your attention to page 12, is Chapter II not headed 'Destruction of World Liberalism'?

A. That is correct.

Q. In this chapter, do you not attack liberalism, majority rule, imperialism, and white rule?
And in this chapter you advocate substituting a controlled economy and free economy, do you not?

A. Yes.

- 14
- Q. And on page 23, don't you say 'The existing world order has come to such a pass that it must either settle accounts or undergo a second world war?'
- A. Yes.
- Q. Still, from your book, 'Speeches to Young Men,' on page 24, Chapter III, headed 'Material Civilization and Spiritual Culture,' don't you say that 'The white man has conquered four-fifths of the globe and Japan alone is standing against him. Unless strengthened by Japanese influences, Asiatic peoples fall prey to the white man.' You then present historical arguments to the effect that Asiatic arms were often and Asiatic culture was always superior to European. You then view history as a struggle between the Europeans and Asiatics and say 'for three thousand years the Asiatics were superior, but in the past three hundred years the white man turned the tables because of his material progress.' Then you further say 'Does this mean that Asiatic spiritualism will always bow to materialism? No! Not the true Asiatic Spirit, but a degenerated form of it was defeated. Japan will lead a revival of the old Asiatic culture.' Are these not accurate quotations and statements from this chapter?
- A. Yes, in substance those are my remarks. What I have said in essence is that European material civilization has defeated our Asiatic spiritual civilization, but that this state of affairs does not necessarily have to continue, and that we must rise.
- Q. I will direct your attention to Chapter 7 of this same book published in 1937, headed 'Japan of the World, the World of Japan,' and will ask if you don't say there -- 'Japan for Japan's sake; Japan for the world's sake; the world for Japan's sake. Building a better Japan was our chief aim. At the time of the Meiji restoration Japan was on the first stage. A better Japan thus built, however, must be a power of the world since after the Sino-Japanese war, which was quite an epoch making war for Japan, Japan's power has been recognized and become one of the three most powerful nations in the world. But this is never the end of all. We must build the world for Japan's sake. Heaven ordered Japan to achieve its great mission. The Manchurian incident has thus occurred.' Is that not a correct quotation?
- A. That is substantially a correct translation.
- Q. Do you not argue in this same chapter that Japan is literally forced to expand by the white man, that because of emigration and national industrialism being blocked and boycotted by the whites, the only course left is for Japan to enlarge her territory.
- A. That is correct.
- Q. Then don't you say in that chapter that 'there are four countries we must watch today -- China, Soviet Russia, America, and the English Empire.'
- A. Yes.
- Q. In Chapter VIII of this same book entitled 'Speeches to Young Men', don't you say on page 201, 'Our Army and Navy are personally controlled by the Emperor and are the means to show the dignity of this country of the Gods.'
- A. Yes that is correct." (Case No. 343-8, Page 6-7 - 14 February 1946)

- c o p y -

INTERROGATION OF
Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Date and Time: 17 January 1946, 1000-1130 hours
Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan
Present: : Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO
Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth, Interrogator
Captain J. J. Robinson, Interrogator
Mr. Hugh B. Helm
Lt. Commander Frank B. Huggins, Interpreter
Miss Edna Hickam, Stenographer
Questions by : Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth
Captain J. J. Robinson

Oath of Interpreter: Administered by Captain Robinson

Captain Robinson: Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

Commander Huggins: I do.

Interrogation by Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth

- Q. Please state name and rank.
A. Kingoro HASHIMOTO, Reserve Colonel.
- Q. What was the date of your birth?
A. 19 February 1890.
- Q. What year did you graduate from Military Academy?
A. In 1907 from the Kumamoto Military Academy. Then two years later, in 1909, I graduated from Tokyo Military Academy.
- Q. When did you graduate from the Staff College?
A. In 1911 I graduated from the Advanced Military Academy in Tokyo. I became a 2nd Lieutenant towards the end of the year 1911.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. In what branch of service did you serve?
A. As an Artillery Officer.
- Q. Where did you serve and in what countries did you serve from 1911 on to 1927?
A. In 1913 I went to the Artillery Engineering School; in 1914 to Ghinta Tao. In 1915 I returned to the Artillery Engineering School and graduated from same. In 1917 I entered Military War College, and in 1919 graduated from War College. In 1922 I was attached to General Staff. In 1923 I was attached to the Special Service Organization officer in Harbin. In 1923 I was again attached to General Staff. From 1923 to 1925 I was a Special Service Organization Officer at Manchuli in Manchuria. From 1925 to 1927 I was again attached to General Staff.
- Q. In 1927 you became Military Attache to Russia?
A. From 1928 to 1930 I was Military Attache to Turkey.
- Q. Were you ever Military Attache to the Embassy in Russia?
A. No.
- Q. When did you return from Turkey to Japan?
A. I believe it was in May of 1930 that I returned from Turkey. It might have been April, but I believe it was May.
- Q. When did you serve on the staff of the Kwantung Army?
A. I was never on the staff of the Kwantung Army.
- Q. Did you ever serve with the Kwantung Army at any time?
A. When I was at Harbin I was under the Kwantung Army, that being part of the area controlled by the Kwantung Army.
- Q. That was prior to 1930, was it?
A. Yes.
- Q. Did you serve as Chief of the Hailir Special Services at any time? If so, when?
A. Towards the end of 1932.
- Q. When did you take command of the 2nd Field Artillery Regiment?
A. In 1933 I was an officer attached to the 2nd Heavy Artillery Regiment. Then in 1934 I became Commanding Officer of this same regiment.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. Then during that year you were promoted to the rank of Colonel?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was the 2nd Field Artillery located at that time?

A. At Mishima. And in 1936 I was retired.

Q. Did you have any part in the formation of the Dai Nippon Seinen To?

A. After being retired in October 1936 I organized this society.

Q. And you were President of the society, were you not?

A. I was head of the society.

Q. What was the purpose of this society?

A. Politics at the time, in my opinion, being corrupt, this society was organized in order to attempt to better the condition. Also:

1. To better Japanese politics by having the Emperor as its central factor.
 2. To advance the national structure by the use of the Japanese spirit.
 3. To build towards an internal national economy, making it unnecessary to rely on foreign countries.
 4. To foster national defense by placing emphasis on the air.
 5. To distribute to foreign countries the culture of Japan.
- These were the five aims of the aforementioned society.

Q. How was the society supported financially?

A. The society received one yen a year from each member, and it cost about one thousand yen a month to keep it running.

Q. How many members did the society have?

A. I don't know the exact count, but believe that towards the end there were 20,000 members.

Q. Is that society still in existence?

A. It was broken up in 1940. After this was broken up, the principal aim of the society being political change, I started a new organization to advance spirit matters, called the Seki Sei Society; and this society was dissolved in 1944.

Q. What service were you on in 1931?

A. I was attached to General Staff in Tokyo.

- Q. Did you go to Manchuria at any time during 1931?
A. I never did go to Manchuria in 1931.
- Q. When were you recalled to active duty after retirement?
A. In August 1937.
- Q. Where did you serve?
A. I went to China at that time and returned in 1939.
- Q. Did you command an Artillery Regiment in China?
A. I participated in the China incident as Commanding Officer of an Artillery Regiment.
- Q. Was that in the neighborhood of Shanghai?
A. Originally I went to North China to a place called Sekkaso, and then very soon afterwards went to Shanghai. I then participated in the attack on Nanking and subsequently went to Rozan. Then I returned to Japan in 1939.
- Q. Were you again placed on the retired list in 1939?
A. Yes.
- Q. You were decorated, were you not for your services in China?
A. Yes.
- Q. What decoration did you receive?
A. The Grand Order of the Imperial Kite.
- Q. Where was your regiment stationed at the time of the Panay incident?
A. At a place called Wuhu, on the Yangtze River above Nanking.
- Q. Who was the General in command over you at that time?
A. Lieutenant General Yanagawa.
- Q. How did the attack on the Panay happen? What caused it?
A. I had no knowledge of the Panay incident until the British gunboat Ladybird passed by Wuhu; I shelled the Ladybird and took it into custody and at that time the Commanding Officer of the Ladybird told me he was going to the assistance of the Panay because he had gotten word that the Panay was in trouble. This was my first knowledge of the incident. I simply knew the Panay was downstream and did not know anything further than that.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. Did you permit the Ladybird to proceed to help the Panay?
A. Yes I did. Later somebody came requesting use of my trucks to haul some of the Panay wounded, and the trucks did go downstream but returned without accomplishing their mission.
- Q. Under whose orders did you act when you shelled the Ladybird?
A. This was under orders from Lt. Gen. YANAGAWA. These orders read as follows: "Nanking being in a state of siege, and it appearing that enemy troops will attempt to flee upstream, Colonel HASHIMOTO is to sink all vessels proceeding towards Nanking without regard to nationality." I believe these orders were issued two days before the fall of Nanking. I believe that was about the 10th of December 1937. These orders were received about 0200 when I was about 5 or 6 kilos downstream from Wuhu. Having received the orders I returned to Wuhu and prepared my guns. The next morning the river was heavily fog bound and when the fog lifted at about 1000 I noticed four ships were in the stream, three of which were gray and one ship was painted white. I immediately started shelling them and the three gray ships fled downstream. The white ship came towards our position and it turned out to be the British gun-boat, "Ladybird." The other three were Chinese ships which had been landing troops on the shore. While the Ladybird was in my custody, evidently they received a wireless communication to the effect that the Panay had been hit, and the Commanding Officer of the Ladybird asked my permission to go to the rescue of the Panay.
- Q. Where was the Panay at that time?
A. I can not say where it was, being at a considerable distance. (I point it out on the rough sketch I have made as being somewhere upstream from Nanking.)
- Q. And downstream from Wuhu?
A. Downstream from Wuhu.
- Q. About how far would you say it was from Wuhu?
A. I have no idea at all as I could not see any ships, but it was a distance of about 50 kilometers between Wuhu and Nanking.
- Q. Did you see any of the survivors from the Panay?
A. No.
- Q. Do you know what batteries hit the Panay or how it was hit?
A. At that time I did not know anything. I saw in the papers that it had been bombed.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. Upon your return to Japan, did you become a member of the IRAA?
A. The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society (Yokusan Seiji Kai) was started in 1942 for the first time, hence prior to that time there was no society and I was not a member.
- Q. You did become a member of that society later?
A. I was in general affairs of the organization for about six months. Then I was later Vice President of MP's within the organization for another six months, after which I did nothing in the organization.
- Q. Later were you elected to the House of Representatives along about April 1942?
A. Yes in April 1942 I was elected to the House of Representatives.
- Q. How long did you serve in the House of Representatives?
A. I was representative until I was taken to Omori Prison.
- Q. Did you serve as Director of IRAPS?
A. Sometime around the beginning of 1945 I left the IRAPS and with 29 members of the House of Representatives built an organization known as the Gokoku Doshi Kai. I opposed the aims of the IRAPS because it was headed by a group of old politicians.
- Q. Did you at one time belong to the Black Dragon Society?
A. No. I didn't even know where they were.
- Q. Do you know TOYAMA, Mitsuru, NAKANO, Seigo, and OKAWA Shumei?
A. Yes, I knew all these men.
- Q. Were you a member at that time of the East Asia Society?
A. No.
- Q. Were you at any time a member of Sakura Kai?
A. Yes, I was.
- Q. How was that society financed?
A. This organization had no funds as it was a study organization.
- Q. Were you at this time a member of Kinki Kai?
A. No.
- Q. Were you one of the organizers of Sakura Kai?
A. Yes, I was.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. Do you know what caused the resignation of Premier Hamaguchi in 1931?
- A. He was stabbed by a man named SAGOYA.
- Q. Who was stabbed?
- A. He was stabbed by this man and while he did not die, he was no longer able to appear in Parliament and hence he resigned.
- Q. About October or November 1931 were you put in prison for some time?
- A. About 17 October 1931 I was apprehended by the Kempei and was in prison for 15 days.
- Q. For what reason?
- A. I was planning a revolution to overthrow the existing government at that time. I went to General ARAKI to request him to become the head of this new Government, but ARAKI opposed the plan and turned my name into the War Department, so that I was apprehended on the same day.
- Q. General Minami was in favor of this revolution, was he not?
- A. I did not at that time have any meeting with General Minami so that I do not know how he felt about it.
- Q. Were TOJO, DOIHARA and ITAGAKI in favor of this revolution?
- A. I had no meeting with them so do not know.
- Q. Were you at any time a member of Kokoku Seinen Shoko Domei?
- A.
- Q. Were you at any time a member of Seiei Kai?
- A. I do not know what this means.
- Q. Were you acquainted with Major ISHIWARA?
- A. Yes, I know him. However, he was a Lieutenant Colonel instead of a Major.
- Q. In 1931 he was a Major?
- A. I believe he was a Lieutenant Colonel. This man was a Lieutenant Colonel, as I had just become a Lieutenant Colonel.
- Q. Were you a member of JIMMU KAI?
- A. No I was not.
- Q. Who founded that organization? Do you happen to know?
- A. I believe it was OKAWA.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Interrogation by Captain Robinson

Q. Referring to the China incident, were you reprimanded by Japanese military authorities for your action in that case?

A. Nothing was said.

Q. I understood you to say that your Commanding Officer was Lt. General YANAGAWA.

A. Yes.

Q. What was the command at that time of General Iwane MATSUI?

A. General MATSUI was above General YANAGAWA.

Q. General MATSUI then was your Commanding Officer?

A. General MATSUI then General YANAGAWA and then a Division Commander.

Q. I repeat the question. MATSUI was your Commanding Officer?

A. I was under YANAGAWA, but MATSUI was in charge of all troops in China.

Q. Including HASHIMOTO and his command?

A. That is true. However, my orders concerning the Ladybird incident came from YANAGAWA.

Q. After the incident what did General MATSUI do or say with regard to your action in the Ladybird-Panay incident?

A. No action was taken.

Q. Did he talk to you about what you had done in that incident?

A. I did not see MATSUI.

Q. Do you know whether or not MATSUI felt that your action in regard to the Ladybird and Panay was the right action?

A. I did not meet MATSUI so do not know for sure, but believe MATSUI opposed the action. I just heard it from people and therefore was not sure.

Q. Were you not recalled to Japan immediately following that incident?

A. No, I later took part in the attack on Roxan.

Q. You were recalled in 1938?

A. Yes.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. What was the reason for the recall?
- A. No -- it was April 1939. Only regular officers who had not been recalled from retirement were used as Regimental Commanders, and hence they said they had no use for me and I was again retired.
- Q. Was your retirement due in any part to your conduct in the Ladybird-Panay incident?
- A. No.
- Q. You were asked to speak in Japan and did make speeches in Japan after the Ladybird-Panay incident, did you not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And you in those speeches approved and praised the action that had been taken by the Japanese authorities in those instances?
- A. I did not say anything in my lectures about the Panay incident as I did not know about it.
- Q. Did you think at that time that the action taken in the Panay incident was right?
- A. No, I believe it was a mistake.
- Q. Why?
- A. Because it was in the papers.
- Q. From a military standpoint or international standpoint -- why do you condemn the action of Japan in the Panay incident?
- A. I believe they bombed the Panay by mistake, but do not think things of this kind should occur.
- Q. Why by mistake? What was the mistake?
- A. They bombed it without knowing whether it was friendly or enemy.
- Q. Didn't the orders call for bombing whether the ship was friendly or enemy?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Therefore, why was it a mistake?
- A. The Panay incident was a Navy affair and Navy Commander HASEGAWA subsequent to the bombing apologized for it as being a mistake, while in my case my orders were clear cut to shoot at any vessel friendly or enemy.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. What was the relation between the Navy Command and your command there at Wuhu and Nanking?
- A. Around my part of the world there was no Navy at all.
- Q. Navy planes took part in the bombing?
- A. There was no liaison where I was.
- Q. Where did those Navy planes come from?
- A. I do not know.
- Q. There was not any coordination then by you in regard to Navy action? Had you not had part in any Navy coordination?
- A. The Navy was not there and I had no liaison with them at all.
- Q. Did you have any communications with the Navy?
- A. None.
- Q. Do you not know who was in command of the Navy planes?
- A. I only heard about it, so have no idea.
- Q. What did you hear?
- A. I only heard from the British Naval Captain aboard the Ladybird that the Panay had been hit and later read in the papers that Navy planes had bombed it.
- Q. You made no investigation then?
- A. Because of the distance from where the Panay was bombed, it was not in my jurisdiction and I carried out no investigation.
- Q. You did send trucks there didn't you?
- A. The trucks were requested by the British Naval Officer who had probably, in my opinion, received wireless communication from somewhere.
- Q. What was the name of the British Naval Officer?
- A. I do not know. --Where the Panay incident took place was so far from Wuhu I neither saw or heard anything of it. ---I thought the bombing of the Panay was a mistake.
- Q. Do you consider it to be a mistake from viewpoint of international relations with the United States?
- A. It could not be helped, after all, because it was a mistake; but I did not think that a good thing for relations with the United States.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. Did you later learn that machine guns strafed the Panay and survivors?
- A. No, I didn't know.
- Q. You never heard that?
- A. I never heard it.
- Q. Didn't the Commander of the Ladybird tell you about it?
- A. No.
- Q. Where were the survivors he told you to go down and get in trucks?
- A. I was simply asked to go downstream.
- Q. You received the decoration on 24 January 1942.
- A. I do not remember for sure, but think it was not in 1942 but in 1939 that I received the medal.
- Q. What was it received for?
- A. I believe I received it for my action at Rozan, but there being no letter stating reasons I was not sure.
- Q. Was it not in the papers at that time that you received it for the attack on the Panay and the Ladybird?
- A. No.
- Q. Were you commended or censured for your firing on the Ladybird?
- A. I heard that General MATSUI censured me for my action in the Ladybird matter and that General YANAGAWA stated to General MATSUI that I had been only following orders and hence I had done a good job. I was in a fog at about 4,000 meters and I shot at the ships not knowing one was the British gunboat; I stopped when I knew its identity.
- Q. What did you think the identity of the ships was when you fired?
- A. I believed them to be Yangtze River ferries the Chinese were using for ferrying troops, and when I saw one was a gunboat and believed it might be friendly I ceased fire.
- Q. What happened then? Did the gunboat fire back?
- A. No.

- Q. What did the gunboat do?
A. The Ladybird came close to shore and I ordered them to anchor there and stand by, at which time a communication from the Panay evidently was received by them. The Ladybird was hit twice by my guns. I did not board the Ladybird and I met the Captain in the Customs Office ashore, which I was using as headquarters.
- Q. Why did the Captain come ashore?
A. To speak to me.
- Q. Did you order him ashore?
A. No, I did not order him ashore.
- Q. Did the Captain then return to the Ladybird?
A. Yes.
- Q. And the Ladybird then proceed.
A. Yes.
- Q. To Hanking?
A. I don't know whether it was to Hanking or not, but they went downstream.
- Q. Were you a member of the Greater East Asia League formed in 1941?
A. No.

INTERROGATION OF

Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Date and Time: 18 January 1946, 1030-1145 hours
Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan
Present : Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO
Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth, Interrogator
Captain J. J. Robinson, Interrogator
Mr. Hugh B. Helm
Lt. Commander Frank B. Huggins, Interpreter
Miss Edna Hickam, Stenographer
Questions by : Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth
Captain J. J. Robinson

Interrogation by Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth:

- Q. Colonel, yesterday you drew a rough sketch of your position at Wuhu there on the river and the location in regard to Nanking. Will you take a piece of paper and show where your command was located at Wuhu at the time of the Panay incident.
- A. (A sketch was drawn and is attached to original of this interrogation as Exhibit No.) Advance on Nanking was being made by the forces coming from the south, southeast, and I was to make a flanking movement and take Wuhu and go on from there downstream to Nanking. Hence, there was no area of command because they were in a position of advance, the object being Nanking.
- Q. Was there an airfield near Nanking?
- A. No, there was no airfield, either our own or Chinese, it being the first advance in that area.
- Q. Were there any Japanese Naval ships near Wuhu?
- A. No. There were no Naval troops at all.
- Q. Where did the Naval planes come from which attacked the Panay.
- A. I do not know, but believe they came from the direction of Shanghai.
- Q. Did they have a carrier ship at Shanghai?
- A. I do not know.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. How far did the trucks which you sent from Wuhu go toward Nanking --the trucks which you sent at the request of the British Naval Captain?

A. I deny having much knowledge of when the trucks left, but believe it was in the afternoon sometime and they arrived back in the evening. I do not know the distance they went.

Q. They were dispatched on your orders, were they not?

A. Yes, on the request of the British Captain.

Q. Who was in command of the trucks?

A. Soldiers and a non-commissioned officer.

Q. Did the non-commissioned officer make a report to you on his return?

A. I did not see them at all -- There are about 50 kilometers between Wuhu and Nanking and on the road there was a bridge over a small tributary, which was broken to my knowledge.

Q. Please locate on the map the position of your artillery, your batteries, when they fired on the Ladybird.

A. Right on the bank of Wuhu.

Q. How many guns did you have in action?

A. Twelve 15 centimeter guns. I had 12 guns there but because we were having to move guns to fire downstream I do not believe that more than two or three were used in firing on the Ladybird.

Q. That incident happened on the 12th of what month?

A. I do not believe it was the 12th -- think it was the 10th of December, but it might be one day off, I am not sure.

Q. Before the fall of Nanking?

A. Yes.

Q. At what time of day was it you opened fire?

A. About 1000 o'clock.

Q. You were decorated with the Order of the Golden Kite Fourth Class. According to the Japan Times and Advertiser of January 24, 1942, that decoration was awarded you on account of your action against the British ship Ladybird?

A. That is not true.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. Did you make a statement to a Domei reporter the day you were decorated?
A. No I did not.
- Q. You did not have an interview with a newspaper reporter?
A. No I did not.
- Q. Did you state at that time that the United States and Britain should be chastised thoroughly in the war of Greater East Asia, and "by so doing this country will console the souls of the war dead?"
A. I deny making the statement.
- Q. Were you in Tokyo when you received the decoration?
A. Yes, I was in Tokyo. I was in Tokyo and the award was given to me by mail. My regiment was a Kyushu Regiment, and thus the award was sent from Kyushu.
- Q. Where were you in 1931, Colonel, at the time of the first Manchurian incident?
A. I was in Tokyo.
- Q. What work were you engaged in at that time?
A. I was attached to the General Staff.
- Q. What section?
A. The Russian Section.
- Q. Did you at that time know an officer named TOJO Hideki?
A. Yes, I knew him and he was in General Staff Headquarters.
- Q. What was his position? What Section of General Staff was he in?
A. I believe that he was working in the Organizational Department of the General Staff.

Interrogation by Captain Robinson?

- Q. Where were you on December 8, 1941?
A. I was in Tokyo.
- Q. How long had you been in Tokyo?
A. I was in Tokyo from April of 1939.
- Q. You knew then that events were moving toward war between Japan and the United States?
A. Yes.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. How long had you thought that war between Japan and the United States could not be avoided?
- A. Ever since the ABCD Agreement.
- Q. In what year?
- A. I believe it was in the summer of 1941.
- Q. Did you consider that Japan was justified in making the attack at Pearl Harbor?
- A. The attack was made after the start of the war. I believe it was justified insofar as it was after the beginning of hostilities.
- Q. What do you consider the beginning of hostilities?
- A. The beginning of hostilities was Pearl Harbor, and insofar as war was started, I believe Japan was Justified in attacking Pearl Harbor.
- Q. What was the act which you think constituted the beginning of hostilities?
- A. Being a civilian at the time I am not certain of the events which led up to Pearl Harbor, but believe that while no actual declaration of war had been made, a state of war existed prior to Pearl Harbor, and hence the attack on Pearl Harbor was simply another link in the chain of events.
- Q. What event then was the opening of hostilities?
- A. Being a civilian I was not aware of what the actual event precipitating the war was, but believe there must have been something before Pearl Harbor.
- Q. You said there was a state of war existing before Pearl Harbor. Therefore, you assumed the responsibility of saying there had been an event which constituted the beginning of the war. Now I want to know what it was.
- A. There must have been a declaration of war prior to the attack by Japan, but being a civilian I do not know for certain and I believe an attack without a declaration of war is not a good thing.
- Q. You understood that Japan was bound by the Hague Treaty to give notice before she attacked the United States?
- A. Yes, I am aware of that.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. And therefore you consider that Japan did violate international law by starting the war without having given a declaration of war.

A. Yes, I believe that.

Q. And therefore you disapprove the Pearl Harbor attack?

A. I believe that the Cabinet had made a declaration of war; I received the news about noon. I believe an attack without a declaration of war is not good.

Q. What leads you to think that the Cabinet had declared war?

A. I believe that if they had not made a declaration of war there would be no reason for them to attack Pearl Harbor.

Q. You knew TOJO at this time, the Premier?

A. I am fairly certain that I have not met TOJO except when we were in General Staff together.

Q. Then you have not met TOJO since 1931?

A. No.

Q. And you have had no correspondence with him by mail or by any personal messenger?

A. No.

Q. Why didn't you have any associations with him? Did you object to him? Did you think his leadership was bad?

A. Since I was put on the Reserve List I had very little to do with any Regular Army officers.

Q. You were a leader of these various societies?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they oppose TOJO's policies?

A. Very few of these people had actual contact with TOJO.

Q. That was not the question. I asked -- did these societies you were leader in oppose TOJO's policy?

A. No they did not oppose it.

Q. Did they support it?

A. They did not support it either. Being a civilian I had no connection with these matters.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. These were patriotic societies?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore, they were supposed to be supporting the Premier and the Government of Japan?

A. You are somewhat misled in believing that the Japanese civilian organizations had anything to do with the Cabinet. The Japanese civilian organizations have no connection whatsoever with the Cabinet.

Q. Did these political societies support or oppose the policy of the national government?

A. We did not oppose them; we supported them. I believed that when the ABCD agreement was made we would have to fight the United States.

Q. Why?

A. Japan would be in a precarious position as far as food, oil, and other materials went, and I believed that in this chaotic state it would be necessary to fight the United States.

Q. What about Great Britain?

A. I believed at the time of the Tri-Partite Pact that England was behind China in the China incident and I stated that we would have to (literally) get rid of England before we could clear up this matter.

Q. The policy of Great Britain and the United States in regard to China really dated from the 1922 treaty did it not -- the Nine Power Treaty?

A. No, I do not believe it was in accordance with this pact. However, I was very young at the time of the Nine Power Pact and do not know a great deal about it.

Q. It was the pact in which Japan, China, Great Britain, and six other nations agreed to what was known as the open door policy in China.

A. Yes, I know that.

Q. Did you approve or oppose the open door policy for China?

A. Being very young when it came into effect, and not feeling, later on, that it was any longer in effect, I did not feel one way or the other about it.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. When did you think it ceased to be in effect?
A. I knew very little about it and, therefore, did not think of it.
- Q. You were 32 years of age when it came into effect, were you not? You had graduated from military academy 15 years before it came into effect, and still you say you were too young to know anything about it.
A. I knew of the treaty, but I say that I was not of an age yet to be thinking much about things of this type.
- Q. You had been connected with the Special Service Branches of the Japanese Army?
A. Yes, I had.
- Q. And your Army connections had been such that it was your duty to keep in touch with relations with other nations, was it not?
A. Yes. Particularly in regard to Russia.
- Q. And Russia was a party to the Nine Power Treaty of 1922?
A. I don't believe it was a member.
- Q. You had opposed Naval Limitation Treaty of 1924?
A. I did not like it.
- Q. You made speeches in which you said that the Japanese had been misled and had been mistaken in entering into that treaty.
A. No I did not. Lectures were not permitted.
- Q. How about the publication of pamphlets?
A. No, none at all.
- Q. How did you express your opposition to those treaties -- that is, both the "Open Door" Treaty and the Naval Limitation Treaty?
A. I made no speeches or anything. I simply thought they were wrong. I did not feel very good about this 5-5-3 ratio.
- Q. How did you express your feeling against it?
A. I did not make it public at all.
- Q. What did you do in private?
A. I naturally spoke to friends of that period about the matter.
- Q. Including friends in the Army and in the Government?
A. Yes, to fellow officers and people of that period.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. To what fellow officers and what members of the government did you speak regarding your opposition to these treaties?

A. This is so long ago I do not remember who it might be.

Q. Did you speak to ISHIHARA, Kenji?

A. I had not met ISHIHARA, Kenji at that time.

Q. You met him in 1936?

A. No I had never met him. I have never met him.

Q. Have you met MITSUI?

A. Yes, this man was a member of the House of Representatives, so I had a great deal of contact with him.

Q. You had met SASAKI, Jiro?

A. I do not know this man.

Q. You remember the incident of February 26, 1936?

A. Yes.

Q. You counselled with the young officers preparatory to that incident, did you not?

A. No not prior to the incident.

Q. At the time of the incident then?

A. At the time of the incident, because the incident had occurred, I went to stop it.

Q. Whom did you see in regard to stopping it?

A. I met a Captain by the name of MURANAKA.

Q. What did you say to him?

A. I told him to stop it.

Q. Where did you see him?

A. At the War Minister's home.

Q. At what time?

A. Two o'clock in the morning.

Q. What did he say to you?

A. He stated that he would not quit.

Q. Why?

A. He did not give any reasons.

Q. You knew what his reasons were, did you not?

A. I believe that what he meant was that once it was started he would go through with it.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. You knew that one reason for that revolt or uprising was opposition to the Open Door Treaty and to the Washington Naval Limitations Treaty?
- A. I do not know that.
- Q. What did you think had caused the uprising? What were the reasons behind it?
- A. I believe it was in order to do away with the political parties.
- Q. No other reason? Nothing to do with international affairs? Had the Army approved the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty?
- A. Naturally they approved it as it was ratified.
- Q. What do you mean by approved?
- A. Because it would not be ratified unless the Army approved it.
- Q. I mean after it had been ratified and while it was in effect, did the Army not object to it?
- A. It did not.
- Q. The February 26 incident then was not in any way a protest against the 1922 Treaty, Open Door China Treaty, or the Naval Limitation Treaty by the Army?
- A. I do not know these officers at all and I do not know anything about how they felt about international matters. I simply believe it was an incident fomented in order to dissolve the political parties. I was in Nishina commanding my regiment when the incident took place, and I came to Tokyo that night in order to try to stop them.
- Q. Why was the Army opposed to the political parties?
- A. The two major political parties were hand in glove with the financiers, that is the Zaibatsu and consequently there was a rise of moneyed interests, with the result that the Army was held down and hence they naturally opposed these parties.
- Q. On the international policy of these parties, did the Army not oppose them on that ground?
- A. I have not heard much about that.
- Q. Of course we can't believe that. You were political leader here, and we want to know what your attitude was as a political leader and as a member of the Army toward these treaties which the Army considered as cutting down Japanese national prestige and power.
- A. Because these political parties were in with the moneyed interests they thought nothing of the common people, and politics were extremely corrupt, hence I opposed them strongly.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. I repeat my question. Did you oppose them also on the ground of their international policies as represented by these treaties?
- A. I therefore stated that a war with the United States was inevitable following the ABCD Agreement. Prior to this I said nothing. However, I did oppose the 5-5-3 ratio as stated before.
- Q. How did you oppose it?
- A. We officers were not able to make any statements to the press or make any speeches, etc., therefore I did not actively voice my opinions.
- Q. What do you mean then when you said you did oppose it?
- A. Simply telling people in gatherings and among friends, things of that sort.
- Q. In what gatherings?
- A. Not in any large gatherings, but when some members of the House of Representatives and people like that were gathered, I opposed this treaty.
- Q. Did you make speeches in the House of Representatives opposing the treaty?
- A. No I did not.
- Q. Did anyone make speeches in the House opposing the treaties?
- A. I do not think so.
- Q. You did favor the expansion of the influence of Japan in the Greater East Asia League, did you not?

RECESSED FOR LUNCH 1145 hours

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Date and Time: 18 January 1946, 01515-1630 hours
Place : Same
Present : Same

INTERROGATION BY CAPTAIN ROBINSON:

- Q. Was there any answer that you made this morning that you would like to correct, or any explanation you would like to add?
A. No.
- Q. You have travelled in America and Europe?
A. In Europe, yes, but not in the United States.
- Q. You have never been to the United States?
A. No.
- Q. When were you in Europe?
A. I was in Europe in 1928-1929 and 1930.
- Q. What part of Europe did you visit?
A. Mainly in Istanbul.
- Q. Where else?
A. Russia, the Balkans, Germany, France and England. Apart from Istanbul my travels in these other countries were for a period of about one week only.
- Q. Did you see anything in these other countries which influenced you in your later policies with regard to Japan?
A. No I did not. However, I did study a good deal about Russia's policies and politics, etc.
- Q. Did your study of Russian policies lead you to any plan or policy with regard to Japan?
A. Not particularly. However, I did believe that there was danger of the Comintern fostering its communistic ends in Japan, and I did not like this.
- Q. Have you seen any indications of the Comintern interfering in Japan's affairs?
A. Around 1922 men by the names of SAHO and YAMAKAWA started the Japanese Communistic Party and were active from then on in spreading Communistic propoganda in Japan. I made quite a study of Communism in Japan.
- Q. Did your study influence your policy with regard to enlarging the Japanese Army?
A. No, not because of any study of the Communist policy. I have never advocated increasing the size of the Japanese Army.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. Haven't you stated that with the British closing in and the Russians closing in, and the Dutch and America, Japan would have to increase her Army to protect herself against these powers that were closing in on her?
- A. I have never made such a statement?
- Q. Have you heard others make it in Japan?
- A. I do not believe there were many people who advocated an increase in the size of the Army, but I do believe there were many who advocated mechanizing the Army.
- Q. What was your policy when you were in the Diet in regard to voting appropriations for the Army? Were you for smaller appropriations or larger appropriations?
- A. There has never been any argument in the Diet on such matters.
- Q. Who has determined how big appropriations for the Army should be?
- A. The Cabinet. The Army and Navy let the Cabinet know what they need and the Cabinet in turn passes it on to the Diet. There has never been an argument on this matter. It has always been passed without discussion.
- Q. Including the large secret funds that could be disposed of without any accounting?
- A. There is never any detailed accounting of the budget for the Army and Navy. It is simply the overall requests for appropriations.
- Q. Have you ever received any Army funds for the purpose of financing the patriotic societies you have been officially connected with?
- A. I have never received a penny from such sources.
- Q. How have these societies been financed?
- A. Membership dues and no other funds.
- Q. And no other funds?
- A. No other funds. My societies never used much more than one thousand yen a month.
- Q. Going back to your policy with regard to the size of the Army, you say you have never favored an enlarged Army because of the possible closing in of Russia or England or the Netherlands or the United States? That is true, is it not?
- A. Yes. I never have. I did say that they should build more airplanes.
- Q. Have you ever favored a larger Army in order that Japan might exercise greater influence in East Asia?
- A. No I have not.
- Q. In March of 1941 the Greater East Asia League was formed, was it not, with you as a permanent director?
- A. I have never heard of such a society.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. Did you say this morning that you had had no conversation with Premier TOJO or members of his official cabinet or government after he became Premier on 19 October 1941?
- A. I have only seen him in the Diet, and have never had any conversation with him. If you will ask TOJO I am sure he will corroborate my statement. Since the end of the war I did meet him once in a train, but we did not speak to each other.
- Q. It is not true then that you were a member of a small unofficial ring of leaders in his government who helped to shape imperial policy?
- A. I do not see how I could be because I have not had any dealings with TOJO.
- Q. Do you know that that statement has been made in regard to your activities here?
- A. I do not know. I have not seen him.
- Q. Calling your attention to Russia and Communism again, did you ever state that unless a Fascist Party could be created as a bulwark, Japan would be engulfed by Communism?
- A. No I did not.
- Q. How many times have you been the subject of disciplinary action by the Japanese military authorities?
- A. I was censured at the time of the 2-26 incident and after the October incident and also when I was at the War College.
- Q. In addition to being censured, you were in prison, were you not, after the 1936 incident?
- A. I was not taken to jail but I was under house arrest.
- Q. For how long a period?
- A. For 20 days.
- Q. What was the reason for the censure in each case?
- A. In the February incident I was disciplined for having come to Tokyo without orders. In the October incident I was taken into custody on the charge that I had not listened to General Orders over a period of time. And when at the War College for being AWOL.
- Q. Only three instances then?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How many times have you been placed on inactive duty or at least relieved of active duty in the nature of a disciplinary treatment?
- A. Those are the only cases.
- Q. The statement then that you have been disciplined by the Army eighty times is erroneous to the extent of 77 times?
- A. Yes, absolutely. If I had been as bad as you paint me I could not have been an officer.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. That is not my statement. That statement is in the record here.
Do you have any enemies who would make such a statement about you?
- A. The Communists might make such a statement. I do not believe that there would be any others.
- Q. Going back to the 1936 incident and the disciplinary action taken then, how many miles was it from your station to Tokyo?
- A. About three hours by train.
- Q. The incident occurred on the 26th of February and you came to Tokyo early in the morning of the 27th of February.
- A. No, I believe I arrived here about eight o'clock in the evening of the 26th.
- Q. You knew then that the incident was going to take place before it occurred?
- A. The incident took place in the morning.
- Q. How did you learn of it so quickly?
- A. By phone.
- Q. From whom did you learn of it?
- A. From a man named MATSUNOBU, Shigeji.
- Q. Why did he call you?
- A. This man MATSUNOBU is just a friend of mine, a civilian in Tokyo, and he called me to say that an important event had taken place.
- Q. And you immediately took the train for Tokyo?
- A. I then spoke to my Brigade Commander who told me not to go, but I argued the point until he gave me permission of a sort to go but to return the next morning. I did go therefore and returned by the six o'clock train, arriving back at my regiment about nine.
- Q. Why were you disciplined then?
- A. Because he told me to go and come back immediately and I did not return until the next morning.
- Q. Why did you not come back until the next morning?
- A. I wanted to go to the War Minister's home and speak to these people immediately, but was not able to enter the premises at that time.
- Q. That does not answer the question. How did that delay you?
- A. I could not get in - I finally got in at 0200 am and was there for about one hour and came back by the six am train.
- Q. What did you do while there, after getting in?
- A. I told them to stop doing what they were doing and to surrender.
- Q. Did you see your friend who had called you by telephone?
- A. No I did not.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. You had known that an incident of this kind was about to occur, had you not?
- A. No, I knew nothing about it.
- Q. You never suspected the likelihood of such an incident occurring?
- A. I never even suspected such a thing.
- Q. Why did you think they would listen to you when you told them to stop?
- A. I knew Captain MURANAKA slightly from before, so that I figured if I spoke to him he would listen to me.
- Q. Was he a leader in the incident?
- A. Not the leader, one of the members of it.
- Q. You had talked to him before about the possibility of such an incident occurring?
- A. I had not seen him for a considerable period of time prior to the incident.
- Q. You had never discussed with MURANAKA matters of political nature or of Army policy or the possibility of an Army incident?
- A. No I did not. -- I went first to the Kempei Tai Headquarters where the members of the War Ministry had fled, and asked them did they not think it was a rather shameful thing for them to be fleeing from their own quarters, and I gave them hell along those lines and then proceeded to go there, being the first to enter the premises, where I found MURANAKA and spoke to him. I did not know until I entered the premises that I would meet MURANAKA.
- Q. Why did you come down from your Regiment unless you knew you --
- A. I came down from the Regiment after the phone call, and it was only after I entered the War Minister's residence that I discovered the man there I knew.
- Q. Who were the members of the War Ministry whom you say you reprimanded?
- A. They were all sitting around eating dinner when I arrived. The ones there were only Lieutenant Colonels and under, no high ranking officers. The place was full of members from GHQ and the War Ministry.
- Q. Was the War Minister there?
- A. No he was not.
- Q. Was the Inspector General of Military Education there?
- A. No none of the higher-ups were there?

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. How many people or how many officers of the Japanese War Ministry were assassinated in that February 26 incident?
- A. SUZUKI was wounded badly, was he not? And OKADA the Prime Minister was saved (musing to himself). I am sorry but I can not recall exactly how many there were at the moment.
- Q. Well, it was at least five, was it not?
- A. I believe so. I can not recall at the moment very well.
- Q. Had you known AIZAWA?
- A. Yes I knew him very well when I was a youth at the Military Academy, but later had no dealings with him.
- Q. What was his connection with the February 26 incident?
- A. I do not believe there was any connection.
- Q. You think not?
- A. Yes.

INTERROGATION BY MR. HELM:

- Q. Colonel, after the war was started, you helped organize several political societies, did you not?
- A. The IRAPS is the only one that I took part in organizing. I also had connections with the IRAA.
- Q. What was the purpose of these organizations.
- A. The IRAA was formed in 1940 during the time of the KONOYE Cabinet. At this time the reputation of the two major political parties became bad and they dissolved themselves, so that in order to have one unified political party the IRAA was set up, and I was one of the directors of this organization.
- Q. Did that organization continue after the attack on Pearl Harbor? That is, during the war?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Would you say that after the war one of its main purposes became to assist in the successful prosecution of the war?
- A. Yes.
- Q. To what extent?
- A. This society had no political affiliations and hence our way of prosecuting the war was to tell the people to grow more rice or to work in factories, or to keep the national spirit up -- things of this type.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. How in 1944 were you connected with an organization known as DAI NIPPON SANGYORODO DAN?
- A. I had no connection with such an organization.
- Q. Were you connected with DAI TOA DOSHI KAI?
- A. There were no such organizations.
- Q. Radio Tokyo reported that you were at an inaugural ceremony of this society on 9 January 1945 at the Tokyo Imperial Hotel.
- A. DAI TOA DOSHI KAI -- There was no such organization.
- Q. On 17 February 1945 did you resign from IRAPS?
- A. Yes. Although I do not recall the date.
- Q. Why?
- A. I was sick and tired of how they were following the cabinet and everything that was said there, so 29 of us resigned in protest.
- Q. Colonel, did these 29 members of the DIET then form the GOKOKU DOSHI KAI?
- A. The 29 of us formed an organization known as the GOKOKU DOSHI KAI.
- Q. What were the aims of this society?
- A. In order to oppose the IRAPS. A vote of 25 members is needed in the Diet in order to speak on the floor, hence 29 of us gathered together so that we might have a chance to speak our piece.
- Q. Was one of the reasons for the formation of this party extreme dissatisfaction with the way the Cabinet was prosecuting the war?
- A. Mainly my reasons were not opposition to the way in which the war was being prosecuted, but more the fact that because of the IRAPS the right to speak on the floor of the Diet was being muzzled.
- Q. Colonel, in 1945 did you advocate a last ditch stand?
- A. Yes I did.
- Q. At any time after 1941 did you oppose efforts toward peace?
- A. I know of no such movement for peace.
- Q. In other words, you were for active prosecution of the war to the bitter end?
- A. Yes.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. Colonel, why did you have that attitude?

A. I believed that the United States would land on the mainland of Japan and at that time I believed that we should make an all out attack and defeat them.

INTERROGATION BY INTERPRETER:

Q. Did you believe that last attack would defeat the United States?

A. Yes I thought so. But we were defeated.

REMARKS:

Mr. Helm: Tell him when we come back the next time that if he would like to we would appreciate a prepared statement on the Japanese side of the war and his views on that.

Cmdr Huggins: Will that be Monday or Tuesday? Do you want him to write it?

Mr. Helm: If he wants to.

Cmdr. Huggins: What do you mean exactly by that?

Mr. Helm: What he thinks the causes of war were and just the whole Japanese side of the war. I would also like to question him about his political beliefs and principles.

Cmdr. Huggins: Causes for war?

Mr. Helm: How Japanese victory would have improved things or what the results of Japanese victory would have been.

Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO

I, Frank B. Huggins, Serial Number 167619, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of pages 1 to 30, inclusive, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of February 1946.

/s/ G. S. Woolworth
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

I, Edna M. Hickam, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Edna M. Hickam

We, Gilbert S. Woolworth, Colonel
J. J. Robinson, Captain USNR, Serial No. _____
Hugh B. Helm

certify that on the 17th and 18th of January 1946 personally appeared before us Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO and according to Lt. Commander Frank B. Huggins, interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

s/s G. S. Woolworth

/s/ James J. Robinson

/s/ Hugh B. Helm

Tokyo, Japan
4 February 1946

INTERROGATION OF

Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Date and Time: 22 January 1946, 9:45-12:00 hours
Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan
Present : Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO
Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth, Interrogator
Captain J. J. Robinson, Interrogator
Mr. Hugh B. Helm
1st Lt. Shizuma Yamamoto, Interpreter
Miss Edna Hickam, Stenographer
Questions by : Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth
Captain J. J. Robinson
Mr. Hugh B. Helm

Oath of Interpreter: Administered by Col. Woolworth

COL. WOOLWORTH: Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

Lt. Yamamoto: I do.

Interrogation by Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth

- Q. Colonel, you said at the last hearing you were one of the founders of the Sakura Kai. Is that true?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Who were some of the other members of that society when it was formed?
- A. The founder of this Sakura Kai is myself, but there are a few others that were with me at the time. One of them is CHO, Isame, and one TANAKA, Wataru. The sole founder of this society is myself, and the others were more or less in the capacity of assistants as secretaries, etc.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. Any other names that you recall as being members?
A. No, the only ones are myself and the other two just previously mentioned.
- Q. Did more members come in later?
A. This club is more or less in the nature of assistance in research of the other Young Officers' Club, etc., and there are no other members besides myself and the two just mentioned in this club at all.
- Q. Didn't you tell me the Sakura Kai had upwards of 20,000 members?
A. The membership of 20,000 or upwards is another Club entirely apart from this one just mentioned. The Club that had 20,000 members is called the Dai Nihon Seki-Sei-Kai.
- Q. When was that club formed?
A. October of the eleventh year of Showa - 1936. Previous to that this club was the Dai Nihon Seinen-To.
- Q. Isn't that the same as "Nippon"?
A. (By Interpreter) It is a matter of pronunciation. The Japanese call it "Nihon".
- Q. There were records kept of the meetings of the Sakura Kai, were there not?
A. These meetings of the club were just impromptu meetings and there were no records of any such kept at all.
- Q. What society are you referring to now, the Sakura Kai, or the other society?
A. I am referring to the Sakura Kai.
- Q. In regard to the latter society, the Dai Nihon Seinen-To, you stated, I believe, that one of the reasons for its founding was that politics were at that time corrupt?
A. Yes, that is so.
- Q. Who particularly amongst the politicians were corrupt?
A. There were no individual politicians, so to speak, but the Minsei and the Seiyu parties were more or less forming a clique. The Minsei party and the Seiyu party were making activities with the capitalistic party and trying to run the government, and this Nihon Club was formed.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. Were those parties failing to make proper appropriations for the Army?

A. By parties do you mean to say Saiyu parties?

Q. I asked if they failed to support the Army?

A. There was no connection with the Army.

Q. Were their members connected with the Diet?

A. Most of the Diet members were of the Minsei and Saiyu parties.

Q. Who were the leaders of the Minsei party at that time when you formed this society?

A. I can't recall at the present moment.

Q. Do you recall who was the leader of the other society, the other political party? Who were leaders of the other one?

A. I may be mistaken, but I believe the leader of the Minsei party was MACHITA, and if I am mistaken and recall the correct name at a later date I will tell it.

The Saiyu party at that time was divided into two factions, one headed by NAKASHIMA and the other by KUKARA. I may be mistaken on these names, but if I do happen to recall the correct names at a later date I will gladly volunteer them.

Q. What corruption were they guilty of?

A. No individual was directly responsible for the corruption of the government at all. However, the government as a whole was more or less coordinating with the Zaibatsu, the capitalists, and in that way the government had gone into a stage of corruption. Consequently there was a great difference in the livelihood of the wealthier people and the lower class of people.

Q. How did this society aim to correct that condition?

A. I have been answering most of the questions believing they were in connection with the Club, Nihon Seinen-To.
(Interpreter: I said that I had an understanding of that also.
Remark by Col. Woolwerth: That was right).

I pleaded to the War Minister to formulate a committee in the revision of the government. This plea was neglected, and consequently this club was formulated to study the revision of the government. I had planned on formulating a plan and submitting it to the government. This was the purpose in forming the so-called Sakura Kai.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. He is talking about the Sakura Kai?

A. (By Interpreter) Yes. You asked him why the Sakura Kai was formed).

Q. Was that plan later presented to the War Minister?

A. No it was never presented to the War Minister.

Q. Was it presented to anyone else?

A. No it was never presented to any ministry or any agency of the government.

Q. Have you a copy of that plan?

A. This plan was never put in writing. It was mostly discussion as to how to carry this out. It was never put in writing at all.

Q. As to the society of Dai Nihon Seinen-To, you stated that one of its purposes was to foster national defense by placing emphasis on the air. Why did you think it was necessary to place emphasis on the air?

A. There is a bound document on which the Nihon Seinen-To was organized. However, I do not think the primary purpose for the organization of this Seinen-To was emphasized for air defense.

Q. Have you a copy of that document?

A. I personally do not have a copy of this document, but there should be a copy elsewhere.

Q. Where?

A. There were many bound books printed on this reason for formulating the Seinen-To, and there should be some copies some place. My copy that was given to me was burned at the time of bombing my home.

Q. Did the Home Ministry have a copy of it?

A. I do not think there is a copy in the Home Ministry. --On second thought, I think there may be a copy in the Home Ministry. Shall I write down the title of the book? (Given a sheet of paper to write the title.) It is a bound book about that thick. (The name written was "Hashimoto Kingoro Sengen".)

Q. Who prepared this pamphlet? Did you?

A. The contents of this book were all written by myself.

Q. You stated that among other purposes of this society was to distribute to foreign countries the culture of Japan, did you not?

A. I am referring to this book again, and this book contains the object of the Dai Nihon Seinen-To Club. I wanted to let others know why this club was formulated.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. That was one of the purposes that I have just stated?
A. Yes.
- Q. How did your organization propose to accomplish that -- to distribute to foreign countries the culture of Japan?
A. The object of this book was not to let the other countries know of the culture of Japan at all, and there was no intention of distributing this book to other countries.
- Q. You don't answer my question. How did you plan to get to foreign countries the culture of Japan?
A. I had no connection with the culture of Japan and letting other countries know of the culture of Japan.
- Q. You stated that one of the five purposes of this society was to distribute to foreign countries the culture of Japan. Was that statement true?
A. I did not make any statement to that effect yesterday.
- Q. (Colonel Woolworth showed the transcript of the previous interrogation and asked the interpreter to read the testimony and ask if the five purposes of the organization given therein were true.)
A. No. 4 -- "To foster national defense by placing emphasis on the air" should be "To foster national defense by placing emphasis on the air by increased production of airplanes and aircraft."
No. 5 -- "To distribute to foreign countries the culture of Japan." The object of that was to raise the culture of Japan so they could distribute it to foreign countries, for instance, to China and the Southwest. The transcript of previous interrogation also says "that these were the five aims of the aforementioned society." These were not the aims of the society, but this was the plan that the society was intending to submit to the higher authorities so it could be carried out in the future.
- Q. Do you say that you made that statement and it is correct?
A. (By Interpreter: Yes, that is correct. There is enough here to show that he said that.)
- Q. How did you plan to distribute culture to China, for example?
A. As in the case of "water seeks its level," if the culture of Japan was raised above that of the other countries, it would naturally have a tendency then to filter down to the other countries. The object of the society was not to carry this out directly, but to formulate a plan whereby it could be carried out.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. Done by the government, was that it?

A. The book that was made at the time the Club was formulated contains all the primary aims or objects the Club had, and if this book could be obtained it would reveal all the intentions.

(Remark by Mr. Helm: We will get the book.)

Q. Did you feel that by having more airplanes built that would tend to help to distribute to foreign countries the culture of Japan?

A. There is no connection whatsoever in the broadening of the culture of Japan with the increased production of airplanes. The subject of more airplanes was brought about for the national defense only and not in the broadening of the culture of Japan and distributing it to other countries.

Q. From whom were you fearful that attack on Japan would come, that it was necessary to strengthen national defense?

A. I had the most fear of the Russians. The Army's apparent objective was, in my opinion, Russia, as the reason for the strengthening.

Q. After you were retired after the Panay-Ladybird incident you said that you made a number of speeches in Japan. What was the subject of your speeches on those occasions?

A. I resigned my post as Regimental Commander and returned to Japan approximately one and one-half years after the Panay incident and made numerous speeches after the return to Japan, which were more or less in the relation of the Panay incident to the people.

Q. What did you say at that time in regard to the Panay incident?

A. I take that back -- my speeches did not relate to the incident of the Panay, but the "Kebima" incident, which was the British Ladybird incident.

Q. Why did you talk about that incident?

A. The speeches made were mostly on the activities and movements of my period in China during the course of one year and seven months; and since the Ladybird incident occurred during this period I also mentioned the incident in my speeches.

Q. What did you say about the incident at that time?

A. The only thing mentioned was the fact that such an incident had occurred.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. Did you describe how it happened that your batteries fired upon the Ladybird?
- A. The reason for firing on the Ladybird was because I was ordered to by the high officials.
- Q. Is that what you said in your speeches?
- A. Yes I did.
- Q. Did you say at that time that the British and Americans should be driven out of China?
- A. No I did not.
- Q. When did you become convinced that the British and Americans should be driven out of China?
- A. I had never given any thought in that respect about the Americans and the British having to be driven out.
- Q. At the time you opened fire on the Ladybird you knew there had been no declaration of war by Japan against Great Britain, did you not?
- A. There was no declaration of war by Japan against the British at the time the Ladybird was fired upon. However, when the Ladybird was hit the object was not the Ladybird, but the numerous merchant vessels close by.

Interrogation by Mr. Hugh B. Helm:

- Q. Colonel, what exactly were your aspirations for Japan, beginning with 1931 on down to 1941?
(Interpreter: By aspirations, what do you mean?)
A. by Mr. Helm: What did he wish for Japan during that time?)
- A. One of the aspirations, so to speak, was the alliance of Japan with Germany.
- Q. Why?
- A. One of the primary reasons for that is that the China-Japanese incident had taken place, and in this China-Japanese incident the English were offering assistance to China, and to cease this assistance of the British to China the alliance with Germany was sought.
- Q. Who sought it?
- A. I believe the Konoye Cabinet.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. And you supported this alliance with Germany and did all in your power to bring it about?
- A. I have made numerous speeches to the effect that the Japanese alliance with Germany must be taken.
- Q. Now this culminated in the Anti-Comintern Pact?
- A. When the Tri-Partite Treaty was reached, the relationship with Russia became neutral.
- Q. Yes, but that is not what I wanted. Your active efforts in furthering your belief that Japan should enter into an alliance with Germany finally culminated in a pact with Germany, did they not?
- A. I do not think that my efforts culminated in this Tri-Partite Treaty, but the Tri-Partite Treaty was reached.
- Q. During the time that you were urging an alliance with Germany, did you talk to any representative of the German Government about this?
- A. There is no occasion where I had talked to any German representatives directly.
- Q. Did you talk to any of them indirectly?
- A. No.
- Q. In 1931 you were on duty with the Kwantung Army?
- A. No I was not. I was with the General Staff in Tokyo.
- Q. You stated the other day that you were a Special Service Officer under the jurisdiction of the Kwantung Army?
- A. Yes.
- Q. When was that?
- A. That was during the 12th and 13th year of the Taisho, that is approximately 1923 and 1924. During the period I was in Manchuria was from April the 7th year of Showa until the year end of the same -- that would be 1932.
- Q. Who was in command of the Kwantung Army at that time?
- A. General HISHIGARI.
- Q. Did you know him?
- A. Yes.

- Q. What were your relations with him?
- A. There was no occasion where I spoke to him directly, but since all reports had to be submitted, I had known of him but did not contact him directly.
- Q. Was this General HISHIGARI a member of the Cherry Blossom Society?
- A. No he was not. There was no such person a member of the Cherry Blossom Society.
- Q. Where were you in 1931 at the time of the Manchurian incident?
- A. With the General Staff here in Tokyo.
- Q. Did you regard the Manchurian incident as the beginning of a new era for Japan?
- A. No I did not.
- Q. Colonel, isn't it true that Japan was in what you regarded as a precarious position from 1931 on? They were weak in air power. You were afraid of Russia. You had corrupt politicians running things. The industrialists and the capitalists were in power. The population of Japan was increasing rapidly. In case of an attack Japan lacked war materials. So isn't it a fact that with all these factors, you favored acquisition of more territory, particularly in Manchuria where Japan had a special interest?
- A. The Manchurian interest was not brought about with the prime purpose of acquisition for military use.
- Q. Why was it brought about?
- A. The Manchurian incident took place because fighting had taken place in Manchuria and the Japanese had to quell this.
- Q. This incident was not brought about from Tokyo?
- A. Definitely no.
- Q. Did you ever at any time prior to the Manchurian incident tell anyone of your acquaintance that there was such a plot to settle the Manchurian controversy?
- A. No there was never any occasion when I made any speech that this Manchurian incident should be quelled, because I had no knowledge that the Manchurian incident was coming up.
- Q. Didn't you feel that Japan had a greater right in the Orient than Great Britain?
- A. Yes I did.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. You were willing, and actively urged an alliance with Germany, primarily against Great Britain, in the orient?
- A. The British were assisting China, and consequently to have Britain withdraw her assistance in China, Japan could not handle it along -- consequently the reason for the treaty with Germany. As long as there was assistance from England to China, the China incident would never conclude.
- Q. You mean by that China would never be conquered?
- A. Because as long as there was assistance from England, China would offer resistance endlessly.
- Q. How did you feel about the United States commercial firms like the Standard Oil Company in China?
- A. I had no special feeling because of the existence of the American Standard Oil in China.
- Q. Did you think they ought to be there?
- A. There was no relation whatsoever with the Standard Oil being there in China.
- Q. You mean your feelings were directed only against the British interests in China and not against the United States interests in China?
- A. Yes, there was no ill feeling or tendencies at all. It was solely against the British.
- Q. Colonel, do you admit that you have always hated the British?
- A. The feeling for the British was not very good.
- Q. Answer my question. Don't you admit that you have always hated the British?
- A. I do not hate the English, but the assistance the English were offering to China did not meet my approval.
- Q. Why?
- A. Because England was assisting Chiang Kai-shek in war materials for China.
- Q. In other words, the British were, in your mind, the sole obstacle in the way of the Greater East Asia expansion?
- A. At that time I thought they were.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. It was during the China incident that the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity League was formed?

A. To my recollection, I do not think anything of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity League.

Q. Do you know anything about the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?

A. Yes.

Q. Describe to what geographical regions this sphere extended.

A. The approximate geographical sphere would include India, the Philippines, China.

Q. Was Burma included?

A. Yes.

Q. You wanted to get the British out of this sphere?

A. Yes.

Q. How?

A. By helping the people in the sphere become independent.

Q. Suppose Great Britain was not willing to get out of the sphere, to what lengths were you willing to go to get them out?

A. My opinion was to coordinate with China after China had ceased resistance and then by coordinating movements with China have the English out of this so-called sphere.

Q. Were you willing to go to war with Britain to get them out of the Co-Prosperity Sphere?

A. Japan had no intention of war with England to get the English out of the sphere.

Q. You just wanted to force them out?

A. I wanted to bring the China incident to a close as soon as possible and then thereby grant India independence from England. I had hoped that the China incident would come to an early conclusion and that there would be no other frictions with any other countries of the world.

Q. You belong to the Dai Nippon ^Seki Sei Kai?

A. I formulated that.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. Would you say that the fundamental goal was one world centered about the emperor?
- A. No. All the aims and objectives of Dai Nippon Seki Sei Kai are related in the book -- that is impossible, what you just said.
- Q. How did you feel about Japan's aims to bring all Asia under one rule with the emperor over all?
- A. I did not believe in bringing all Asia under one roof; I just wanted to see each nation in Asia independent.
- Q. You just wanted to extend the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?
- A. I thought at the time that the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere must be established.
- Q. Was that one of the goals of the Dai Nippon Seki Sei Kai?
- A. It was not the primary aim, but we had hoped for such.
- Q. Did you urge this publicly?
- A. I have made numerous speeches to the effect.
- Q. Colonel, let me revert to the Ladybird incident for a moment. Is it true that when your regiment was so successful in the Nanking drive you resented the presence of the British and Americans in and about Nanking?
- A. In the drive to Nanking there was no occasion whatsoever when I wished that the Americans and the British be withdrawn from China territory.
- Q. Why did the Chinese call your regiment "The Regiment of Beasts?"
- A. As far as I can recall, my regiment was never so called, because we have never done anything beastly or anything like that.
- Q. It was a fierce regiment, wasn't it?
- A. It was noted for an outfit of "esprit de corps."
- Q. Very fierce fighters?
- A. It was a brave unit. That is my opinion.
- Q. Were they fierce in action?
- A. In action it was noted for its brave fighting.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. How about this word "fierce?"
A. It was brave.
- Q. I want you to say "yes" or "no" your regiment was fierce or it was not fierce?
A. No.
- Q. Did you at any time in your career have a race hatred of all white men?
A. No. I had never met any white people prior to that.
- Q. About your political activities, Colonel, what do you know about the "God sent troops plot" of 1940? A plot to try to assassinate Premier YONAI.
A. I have no knowledge of that.
- Q. Did you ever publish a pamphlet entitled "Proclamation of Hashimoto, Kingoro?"
A. (By Interpreter: That is the publication he has just written down.)
- Q. Did you ever publish a pamphlet entitled "Way of Re-establishing the world?"
A. No.
- Q. Did you ever publicly advocate immediate seizure of the Dutch East Indies?
A. No.
- Q. Will you state clearly once more the aims of the Cherry Blossom Society?
A. As I have stated previously, the aim of the Sekura Kai was more the research or formulating of a new government society because at the time the government was in a so-called corrupt stage where it was involved with the Minsei and Seiyu parties as well as the capitalists.
- Q. You told Colonel Woolworth this organization was to do research for the Young Officers Club?
A. This club was formulated and had members who were young officers. It was a young officers association.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. Did you belong to the Young Officers Club?

A. Yes.

Q. What were the purposes of this Young Officers Club?

A. To study the new governmental problems.

Q. Did the Young Officers Club want the Army to gain control of the government?

A. No I would not say that.

Q. Well, they did want to increase the influence of the Army in the government, didn't they?

A. No I would not say that. We wanted to see as government hands someone with character.

Q. Was General MIHAMI, Jiro a member of the Sakura Kai?

A. No.

Q. Was TOJO a member?

A. No.

Q. Was DOIHARA a member?

A. No.

Q. Was the Cherry Blossom Society responsible for the October affair?

A. I was responsible for the October incident. That is the reason why I was punished. I did not do anything directly, but I was responsible for the October incident.

Q. What was the Jimmu Kai?

A. The Jimmu Kai was formulated by OKAWA, Shumei.

Q. What was the purpose of it?

A. This was none of my affairs, so I do not know definitely. However, I believe this club also was interested in the revision of the government at the time.

Q. You said the other day you were not a member of Jimmu Kai. Were you a military representative to this society?

A. No I was not. I had no relation whatsoever with the Jimmu Kai.

Q. How well did you know OKAWA, Shumei?

A. I had many meetings with him.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. What were these meetings about?
A. By meeting I mean just personal contact and no business contacts whatsoever -- just social.
- Q. Both of you were interested in a revision of the government?
A. Yes.
- Q. And you knew each other well socially?
A. Yes.
- Q. Had you never discussed politics with him?
A. Yes I have discussed politics with him.
- Q. Did you collaborate in any way?
A. There was no collaboration at all.
- Q. Did you have any part in the Tokyo revolt of 1936, however small?
(Q. by Interpreter: By Tokyo revolt you mean the 2-26 incident?
A. by Mr. Helm: Yes.)
A. Yes I do know of the 2-26 incident.
- Q. Were you in any way responsible?
A. No I was in no way connected with the uprising or the cause of it. I was one of the parties that tried to stop this 2-26.
- Q. What were your relations with General MINAMI?
A. I have had no connection with General MINAMI until just recently.
- Q. As President of the Dai Nippon Seki Sei Kai, did you say in a speech on the 4th of December 1941 in Tokyo, "The youth of Japan and the youth of Germany and Italy must make a blood alliance with each other."
A. I have made no statement to that effect.
- Q. Did you know a Chief of the Bureau of Administration in the War Ministry named TANAKA, Ryukichi?
A. Yes I do know of a TANAKA, Ryukichi. He was formerly the head of the Kempei's which is head of the Gendarmie.
- Q. What were your relations with him?
A. There was no relationship whatsoever with TANAKA.
- Q. Did you know him socially?
A. No I did not.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. You just knew who he was.

A. Yes.

Q. What were your relations with ABE, Nobuyuki?

A. He was the head of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society and I was a member of that society.

Q. That was the only way you knew him?

A. Yes.

Q. How about ENDO, Ryusaku?

A. Yes I do know him.

Q. How did you know him?

A. He was connected with ABE. He was more or less acting in the capacity of General Affairs for the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society.

Q. How about YOKOYAMA, Sukenai?

A. Yes I knew him.

Q. How do you know him?

A. He acted in the capacity of the aforementioned ABE.

Q. In the same organization?

A. Yes he was a member of the same organization.

Q. How about OASA, Tadao?

A. Yes I knew him. He was also considered one of the leaders of this society.

Q. How about MAEDO, Yonezo?

A. The aforementioned MAEDO was the assistant to the leader ABE.

Q. How about YAMAZAKI, Tatsunosuke?

A. Yes he was one of the leaders.

Q. How about MIYOSHI, Hidayuki?

A. He was also one of the leaders of the society.

Q. How about TSUKUMO, Kunitoshi?

A. He was one of the leaders of the society?

Kingoro, HASHIMOTO

Q. Now all these men I have asked you about were military men or have been connected with the Army, were they not?

A. They were all civilians, except for Mr. ABE who was a military man.

Q. The rest of them had never been in the Army or been connected in any way with the War Ministry?

A. No.

Continuation of Interrogation of Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Date and Time: 22 January 1946, 1330-1500 hours

Place : Same

Present : Same

Interrogation by Mr. Helm (Continued)

Q. Colonel let me ask you about another group of men. NAGATA, Tetsuran?

A. I did know of him, but he has died.

Q. Was he an Army man?

A. A Major General in the Army.

Q. ISHIWARA, Konji?

A. Yes I know him.

Q. What were your relations with him?

A. I knew of him since my Military Academy days.

Q. UMEZU, Yoshihiro?

A. While I was in the General Staff he was one of the superior officers in the Staff.

Q. Did you know him well?

A. Not too well.

Q. Did you belong to any organizations with him?

A. No never.

Q. About these other two men, did you belong to any organizations with them -- ISHIWARA and NAGATA?

A. No.

Q. ANAMI, Korekigo.

A. Yes I know him.

Q. What were your relations with him?

A. I just know of him as he was War Minister at one time I remember.

Q. MUTO, Akira?

A. Yes I know him well.

- Q. What were your relations with him?
A. He held the position in Military Affairs Section in the Ministry and consequently used to attend the meeting very often.
- Q. Did he agree with you about politics?
A. Probably he was more on the side that had the same ideas as myself, but I will not say exactly the same.
- Q. Did you belong to any organizations with him?
A. None whatever.
- Q. KAWABE, Torashio?
A. I attended War College with KAWABE.
- Q. Did he agree with you politically?
A. We did not participate in any political circles.
- Q. Did he belong to any organizations with you?
A. No.
- Q. KIKEDA, Sumi?
A. I know him very well.
- Q. What relations did you have with him?
A. We thought the same way.
- Q. Did you belong to any organizations with him?
A. No.
- Q. KATAKURA, Chu?
A. I knew him very well.
- Q. He was an Army man wasn't he?
A. Yes he is an Army man.
- Q. How about a man named TOTEHAWA, or it might be TATEKAWA?
A. I knew him very well.
- Q. What were your relations with him?
A. He was one of my superiors in General Staff.
- Q. Did any of this second group belong to the Cherry Blossom Society?
A. None at all.
- Q. Were any of these men involved in either the March or October affairs?
A. Not any.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. I believe you admitted that you belonged to KOKOKU SEINEN SHOKO DOMEI?
- A. No.
- Q. You said you belonged to the Young Officers Club?
- A. No.
- Q. You said this morning that you belonged to the Young Officers Club.
- A. I stated this morning that I belonged to the Sakuri Kai, but not to the Imperial League of Young Officers, and I did not mean that it was the Young Officers Association.
- Q. Now you deny belonging to it?
- A. No I never have belonged to the Imperial Young Officers Association.
- Q. Directing your attention to 1941, did you make a speech in Tokyo on the subject of "Stubborn Attitude Toward the Southern Areas and Immediate Action?"
- A. No.
- Q. Colonel, for your information, that speech is reported in Rodo Dan - on pages 305 to 314 - and we have that record.
(Q. by Interpreter: When was it made?)
- A. by Mr. Helm: In 1941 at the 5th convention of the Dai Nippon Seki Sei Kai.)
- A. I can not recall.
- Q. But you won't state definitely that you did not make it?
- A. I do not recall a title exactly as it is printed there but I have made two or three speeches concerning the Southern move question and immediate action. I can not recall the exact titles of speeches made.
- Q. What did you urge in these speeches about the southern move?
- A. I can not recall the exact date I did make those speeches; however, I do recall on two or three occasions speeches to that effect. When the ABCD agreement was made, at that time I did make speeches to the effect that they should make a southern move.
- Q. What do you mean by that - make a southern move?
- A. By that I mean there was no alternative than to begin operations in the southern area.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. Do you mean take the Dutch India?
A. That we had come upon a period when hostilities with the Americans and English were inevitable.
- Q. and should begin?
A. Yes.
- Q. So you urged on the people of Japan war with the United States before Pearl Harbor?
A. Yes.
- Q. Let me ask you this question. Did you ever make the statement, "Watch me, HASHIMOTO. I am not one to sit and talk."
A. No.
- Q. Colonel, you were known throughout Japan as a man of action, though, weren't you?
A. I don't think so.

Interrogation by Captain J. J. Robinson:

- Q. About a year ago you resigned from the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society?
A. Yes.
- Q. Why did you resign?
A. I resigned from the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society because this society was composed of members of the Seiyu and Minsei parties, and in the Diet sessions the representatives of the societies, which names were just read off by Mr. Helm, would agree to any and all issues brought before the Diet, without any reasons or controversies. On problems brought before the Diet, they would just agree without hearing the stories brought up about the issues. Consequently I did not agree with the principles.
- Q. That doesn't make a lot of sense. I don't know just what it is all about.
- Q. Whatever the government had said in any issues, without hearing the stories of the issue brought forth, they would agree to.
(A. by Interpreter: What he is trying to put across is that on any problems brought before the government the leaders of this group would just agree without hearing the story about any issue brought before them.)

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. Did you then want to make speeches in the Diet to discuss these points?
- A. Being a civilian I could not make such speeches to the Diet or anybody else.
- Q. When did your term in the Diet end?
- A. I have not retired from the Diet as yet.
- Q. When did your term begin? A year ago? You were elected 30 April 1942, were you not? (He was a member of the Diet: why does he talk about being a civilian?)
- A. Yes I did enter the Diet then.
- Q. And you have been in ever since?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Why did you answer my question then by speaking about being a civilian when you were a member of the Diet?
- A. I was in the Diet. However, this Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society was a group in the Diet, composed of all political representatives, and I withdrew from the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, but not from the Diet. I just withdrew from the Political Society and not from the Diet organization. I was in the Diet.
- Q. My question - did you object because this policy in the Diet did not permit you to discuss political affairs as much as you wanted to?
- A. Any and all bills presented to the Diet from the Government were always agreed upon by this Imperial Rule Political Assistance Society. Consequently, even if the members in the society were opposed to the bill proposed before the Diet, they could not voice any disapproval.
- Q. You could not discuss in the Diet bills presented?
- A. Yes that is so.
- Q. Now you had resigned the preceding month as Chief of General Headquarters, Imperial Rule Assistance Association Youth Corps, had you not?
- A. Yes I had.
- Q. And you had been one of the four Vice Presidents of that Corps?
- A. Yes.