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DRAFT SCAPIN

15 SEPTEMBER 1947

(SCAPIN_____)

SUBJECT: Reorganization of Demobilization Machinery.

TAB B

1. The Japanese Government is directed to transfer the First Demobilization Bureau (including the local agencies under its operational control, such as Home Depot Bureau, Demobilization Liaison Offices and their branches; hereinafter the same) intact to the jurisdiction and control of the Welfare Ministry, the transfer to be completed on or before 1 October 1947. Upon completion of the transfer, the Welfare Ministry will be responsible for the operation of the First Demobilization Bureau and all activities currently being carried out by such Bureau. After such transfer, demobilization will continue to be carried out in consonance with the program and processes of demobilization provided for in the memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government, AG 388.3 (10 Oct 45) DCSO, subject "Demobilization, Japanese Armed Forces," memorandum AG 388.3 (1 June 46) DCS (SCAPIN 993), subject "Establishment of Demobilization Board", and memorandum AG 091.1 (24 Jan 47)GB (SCAPIN 1483), subject "Personnel Reduction Demobilization Board". In accomplishing this transfer, the Japanese Government is authorized to transfer to the Welfare Ministry personnel, records, accounts, and other matters now used by or assigned to the First Demobilization Bureau. Transfer of personnel will not be construed as requiring any additional screening or further application of SCAPIN 550 beyond requirements already imposed by existing directives and instructions of SCAP.

2. The Japanese Government is further directed to undertake a complete and comprehensive study and survey of the organization, personnel, functions and operating procedures of the Demobilization Board and its components, and

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to submit to SCAP by not later than 1 January 1948 a detailed specific plan for the effective integration into the Welfare Ministry of all necessary remaining functions and operations of the Demobilization Board. Such plans will be so devised as to initiate reorganization of the First Demobilization Bureau within four months after the plans have been approved by SCAP, and to provide for merger with the First Demobilization Bureau or its successor in the Welfare Ministry, on completion of minesweeping operations, of the remaining necessary functions and organization of the Second Demobilization Bureau. They will insure the continued efficient execution of existing directives and instructions of SCAP relating to functions exercised by the Demobilization Board. Such plans will provide for the control of the policies and operations of the demobilization agency by persons not subject to the provisions of SCAPIN 550, and they will insure the speedy elimination of remaining ex-military officers subject to the exclusion provisions of SCAPIN 550, applications for whose retention have been disapproved by SCAP.

3. Minesweeping and other operational responsibilities of the Second Demobilization Bureau will continue to be discharged under the direct supervision and control of COMNAVFE until, at a time to be determined by SCAP on completion of minesweeping, the necessary remaining functions and personnel of the Second Demobilization Bureau are transferred to the jurisdiction of the Welfare Ministry to be there merged with the First Demobilization Bureau or its successor. Only such functions and personnel shall be transferred as SCAP shall approve.

4. Direct liaison between the demobilization agencies on the one hand and the agencies of the Occupation Forces primarily concerned with the operations of the demobilization agencies on the other hand, will continue

to be maintained, and nothing in this directive will be construed as abrogating such existing direct relationships.

5. The Japanese Government is advised that nothing in this directive will be construed as authorizing any delay or interruption of the discharge of the responsibilities of the Japanese Government in carrying out the directives and instructions of the Supreme Commander, with especial reference to the smooth performance of the functions of demobilization, repatriation, demilitarization, minesweeping, and other and related activities. Nothing contained in this directive shall be construed to authorize the retention or employment of any personnel not now employed by the Demobilization Board without the specific prior approval of SCAP under the terms and conditions of SCAPIN 550.

6. The Japanese Government is further directed to report, prior to 1 October 1947, the steps whichit plans to take immediately in order to transfer jurisdiction and control of the First Demobilization Bureau to the Welfare Ministry by that date.

7. All queries regarding this directive, and requests for interpretation if required, will be forwarded by the Japanese Government to SCAP in writing.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

CONFIDENTIAL

CW/CLK/ARH/amm

Demobilization Machinery, Reorganization Of.

Govt Section G-2
LS
COMNAVFE

4 Sept 1947

1 Pursuant to the agreement reached on 4 September 1947 in conference between representatives of G-2, COMNAVFE, LS, 8Army, and GS, the following draft SCAPIN, Tab "A", is submitted for your approval. In view of the length of time that has elapsed since the Chief of Staff's original instructions of 25 January 1947, it is hoped that this matter may now be disposed of with dispatch.

1 Incl
Tab "A" Draft SCAPIN

C. W.

CAW/PMB/chi

From: G-2 To: Govt Section Date: 15 Sept 1947

2 1. G-2 appreciates the cooperative attitude of Government Section in the latest negotiations on Demobilization/Repatriation Machinery and in the preparation of draft SCAPIN (Tab A). There are some minor points in this proposed SCAPIN on which certain changes and clarifications are requested. Note our observations and a revised draft SCAPIN (Tab B) suggested by G-2, viz:

2. Par.1, Tab A:

a. Comment: (1) Theoretically, such Army demobilization agencies as the Home Depot Bureau, the Demobilization Liaison Offices and their branches including offices within the Landing Point Reception Centers, are under the Demobilization Board for practical purposes. However these segments of the organization operate under the First Demobilization Bureau. To avoid any misunderstanding, it is necessary to specify that the term "First Demobilization Bureau" as used in the directive, also includes all related field agencies. (In this checknote, G-2 is using the designation in this inclusive sense).

(2) To guarantee in a positive manner that the heretofore successful program and long-tested processes of demobilization should not be interfered with adversely, delayed, or disrupted as a result of a transfer, it is necessary that the First Demobilization Bureau be transferred intact, and that those processes set up under the organizations created and continued under the provisions of SCAPINs 137(10 Oct 45), 993 (1 Jun 46), and 1483 (24 Jan 47) not be disturbed; inclusion of injunctions to this effect is desired. This was an emphatic basic point by both Eighth Army and Navy.

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CAW/PHB/chi

Demobilization Machinery, Re-
organization Of.

G-2 Government Section 15 Sept 1947

2 Cont. b. Omit and/or Change: In second sentence, change "...will assume and be held fully responsible for the operation of.." to read: "... will be held responsible for the operation of .."

c. Insert: (1) After "First Demobilization Bureau" in first sentence, add: "..(including the local agencies under its operational control, such as Home Depot Bureau, Demobilization Liaison Offices and their branches; hereinafter the same) intact..."

(2) Between second and third sentences, insert: "After such transfer, demobilization will continue to be carried out in consonance with the program and processes of demobilization provided for in the memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government, AG 388.3 (10 Oct 45)DCSO, subject "Demobilization, Japanese Armed Forces," memorandum AG 388.3 (1 June 46) DCS (SCAPIN 993), subject "Establishment of Demobilization Board", and memorandum AG 091.1 (24 Jan 47)GB (SCAPIN 1483), subject "Personnel Reduction Demobilization Board"."Direct contact with SCAP authorities having operational primary interest will continue, as heretofore, viz: COMNAVFE (Naval matters) Eighth Army (inspection) G-2 (Staff surveillance).

3. Par.2, Tab A: This paragraph is rather more comprehensive than the subject matter discussed and tentatively agreed upon. It could be interpreted to include the Prisoner of War Information Bureau (a Cabinet bureau under direct supervision of AG, GHQ, SCAP) and the Local Assistance Bureaus which are already part of the prefectural governments. G-2 suggests that the directive be confined to instruction for study, resulting in submittal of reorganization plans, to the Demobilization Board. The paragraph asks for plans incorporating the remaining functions and operations connected with demobilization and demilitarization into the permanent administrative structure of the Government; tentative agreement, by which G-2 wishes to abide, was that plans should provide for the integration into the Welfare Ministry of remaining necessary functions of the Demobilization Board only. Your par. 2 does not call for SCAP approval of the plans but indicates they would go into effect within four months; they should be put into effect only within a certain time after SCAP shall have approved them. Where GS requires that the plans insure only the continued efficient execution of existing directives and instructions "relating to demobilization and demilitarization", G-2 wishes to substitute "relating to functions exercised by the Demobilzation Board", which include the furnishing of required information, although it is not advisable to refer to such function specifically in a SCAPIN. Where Government Section proposes "elimination and absorption" of organization, G-2 can agree only to a reorganization and integration of the Demobilization Board within the Welfare Ministry;

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2 Cont. there will of course be no objection to the ultimate disappearance of the present nomenclature of the Board provided the substance remains. It is also desirable to order inclusion in the plans of provision for ultimate merger of the remainder of the Second Demobilization Bureau with the First Demobilization Bureau or its successor in the Welfare Ministry, at a time dependent on completion of current tasks (minesweeping) rather than at a calendar date.

The last sentence provides for "speedy elimination of ...ex-officers.. approval for whose retention has not been specifically granted.."; under such a clause, ex-officers now with the organization would have to be removed pending consideration of applications already on file for their retention. G-2 can agree to such elimination only when such applications have been disapproved. These officers are only used because they are needed.

In keeping with these comments, G-2 proposes to rephrase most of par.2; see par.2, Tab B.

4. Par.3, Tab A: GS proposes the complete elimination of the Second Demobilization Bureau by 1 Jan 1948. G-2 objects to the phraseology "complete elimination" since though the name of the organization may be changed, remaining functions and necessary organizations must be retained and merged with FDB or its successor in the Welfare Ministry. As stipulated minesweeping and other functions should be continued under COMNAVFE supervision, not until 1 Jan. 1948, but until physical completion of minesweeping; though that date may be around 1 January, it should be left open and be determined when the task is near enough completion to permit the fixation of a definite date. As after termination of minesweeping, COMNAVFE's interest in the remaining functions of Second Demobilization Bureau will be secondary to that of other agencies, particularly Legal Section (investigations), G-2 (residual demobilization; investigation) and Eighth Army (demobilization), not necessarily COMNAVFE, but rather SCAP, should determine what functions and personnel of the Second Demobilization Bureau shall be transferred. There will be sailors coming out of Siberia long after minesweeping has ceased.

G-2 therefore proposes to reword par.3 of the GS draft, as shown in par. 3, Tab. B.

5. Par.4, Tab.A; It is agreed that direct liaison between operationally interested agencies of the Occupation Forces and the demobilization agencies should be continued as heretofore and adequate provision for such liaison made. Par.4, as now written, is considered vague as it authorizes "direct liaison between the Japanese Government and those officers and agencies on the one hand and interested agencies of GHQ SCAP and COMNAVFE on dictated matters within the purview of such agencies..", and the term "dictated matters" is not understood in this connection. It is therefore proposed to substitute the more specific text proposed in par.4, Tab.B.

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Demobilization Machinery Re-
organization Of.

G-2 Government Section 15 Sept 1947

2 Cont. 6. Par.5, Tab.A: G-2 concurs in this paragraph, on the express understanding that "other and related activities" at the end of the first sentence include the furnishing of information required of the demobilization agencies.

7. To safeguard against the commission of any precipitate measures, in connection with the assumption by the Welfare Ministry of responsibility for the First Demobilization Bureau, which might ultimately interfere with the smooth functioning of that Bureau despite the various injunctions written into this directive, it is considered desirable to call for a report from the Japanese Government on the concrete steps that Government plans to take to implement the transfer. A new paragraph should therefore be added, as proposed by G-2 in par.6, Tab.B.

Such report should be reviewed promptly by GS and G-2 in consultation with the other agencies concerned, and adjustive action taken if necessary.

8. At the conference on 4 September 1947 it was agreed that in order to leave no room for misunderstandings the Japanese Government should be required to submit any questions or requests for amplification or interpretation, regarding this directive, in writing, so that such enquiries can be discussed and answers agreed upon among GS, G-2, and the other Occupation Force agencies primarily concerned. Tab. A contains no clause to this effect. G-2 desires to see par.7, Tab.B., incorporated in the directive, instructing the Japanese Government to submit queries concerning this SCAPIN in writing.

9. It is hoped that GS can see its way clear to concur in the text of the revised proposed SCAPIN, as contained in TAB. B. I reiterate, as on many previous occasions, that while over 900,000 repatriates are still awaiting transfer from Russian areas, the time-tested demobilization/repatriation machinery must continue to operate somehow. That it is reduced progressively has been amply demonstrated in numerous reports, an extract of which is attached. (Status of Monthly Employment).

3 Incls:
Tab.A - GS Draft SCAPIN
Tab.B - G-2 Draft SCAPIN
TAB.C - Extract Status of
Monthly Employment

Copies furnished:
Legal Section
Eighth Army
COMNAVFE

---------- CONFIDENTIAL C. A. W. ----------

~~SECRET~~ ORB
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

STATUS OF MONTHLY EMPLOYMENT IN THE DEMOBILIZATION BOARD

1 January 1946

to

1 June 1947

~~SECRET~~ ORB
Confidential

MISCELLANEOUS

4. Status of Monthly Employment in Demobilization Board, 1 Jan 46-1 Jun 47: (Refer to following graphs and chart)

(a) Demobilization Groundwork: The basis for the demobilization and disarmament of the Japanese Armed Forces was laid during the surrender conference at Manila on 15 Aug 45. Matters pertaining to the Japanese Armed Forces naturally fell into the purview of G-2, GHQ. Surrender negotiations agenda, drafts of general orders, directives, and documents were heavily participated in by G-2 and its Allied Translator and Interpreter Section. G-2 was designated to develop and supervise the initial demobilization and disarmament plans of the Japanese Government, exercise GHQ supervision of subsequent developments, and render periodical reports thereon.

General Order No. 1, 2 Sep 45, and Directive No. 2, 3 Sep 45, issued to the Imperial Japanese Government, directed the rapid dissolution of the Japanese Armed Forces. The actual task of demobilization was charged to the Japanese Imperial Headquarters, Army and Navy Ministries, in order that the technical and administrative skill, inherent in the demobilization process, could be exploited to the maximum degree. Planning and supervision of this complicated operation required smooth co-ordination on the part of the Occupation Forces and involved several staff sections as follows:

Development of Basic Plans	G-2 Jap Demob Bd
Control of Army Demobilization	First Demob Bureau (Army)
Control of Navy Demobilization	Second Demob Bureau (Navy)
GHQ Control of First Demob Bureau	G-2
GHQ Control of Second Demob Bureau	COMNAVFE
Disposal of Armament and Equipment	G-4
Repatriation Movement from Overseas	G-3
Ship Movement from Overseas	G-3
Repatriation Ports and Centers	Welfare Ministry, Demob Bd
Demobilization Centers	Demob Bd Eighth Army
Periodic Reports on Demobilization	G-2

(b) Progress of Demobilization: All components of the Japanese Armed Forces which were at that time in the home islands were demobilized by 1 Dec 45.

G-2 developed SCAPINS 17 (10 Sep 45) and 25 (13 Sep 45); the Imperial Japanese General Headquarters was abolished and demobilization functions were transferred to the Ministries of War and Navy. In accordance with original demobilization plans, which are still in operation, these agencies were reorganized on 1 Dec 45 into civil ministries, viz. the First Demobilization Ministry (Army) and Second Demobilization Ministry (Navy). All personnel retained in their employ were either civilians recruited for the job or former military specialists discharged and employed in a civilian status. Progressive reduction paralleling the job was the keynote of all administrative measures, then and now.

G-2 developed SCAPIN 993 (1 Jun 46); the two Demobilization Ministries were replaced by a single Demobilization Board under a civilian head with two subordinate Bureaus to handle the task of continued dissolution of the Japanese Armed Forces with progressively reduced personnel, as is evident from the attached charts. At that time, further reductions in the number of former military personnel employed were recommended; interim plans were worked out by G-2 and the Demobilization Board on 4 Nov 46 for still further reduction which was approved in SCAPIN 1483 (24 Jan 47). The effect of SCAPIN 1483 was a numerical reduction in general officers and flag ranks; this SCAPIN, while interim, is therefore in line with the general principle of reduction of high-ranking employes.

The operating or responsible agencies--Eighth Army, COMNAVFE, G-2, and G-3--are in agreement that no further reductions are advisable at present. The job is not finished; more than a million military personnel and civilians still await repatriation from Soviet-held territories. The efficiency of the current operation and basic planning are amply attested by the record of the dissolution of one of the world's great armies and navies without a single untoward incident. G-2 periodical reports are official testimony. These are:

Progress of Demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, 1 Oct 45.
Progress of Demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, 1 Nov 45.
Progress of Demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, Supplement No. 1, 15 Feb 46.
Final Report: Progress of Demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, 31 Dec 46.

The total Army and Navy Forces in Japan at the time of the surrender numbered some 3,531,848. The figure for those abroad (less civilians) was 3,424,052.

As of 1 Jun 47 there remained 1,754 former military personnel in the First Demobilization Bureau and 8,707 former naval personnel in the Second Demobilization Bureau, or .047 per cent and .238 per cent, respectively, of the total Armed Forces in Japan at the time of the surrender.

The following graphs and chart show the status of monthly employment of personnel in the various offices of the demobilization machinery. It will be noted that despite the fact that the flow of repatriates to be demobilized has been intermittent there has been an uninterrupted diminution in the number of personnel employed by the Demobilization Board.

INDEX TO GRAPHS AND CHART

EXPLANATORY NOTES

Graph No. 1: Monthly Employment of Ex-Generals and Ex-Flag Officers in the Demobilization Agencies of the Japanese Government

Graph No. 2: Monthly Employment of the First Demobilization Ministry/First Demobilization Bureau

Graph No. 3: Monthly Employment of the Second Demobilization Ministry/Second Demobilization Bureau

Chart No. 1: Monthly Employment of the Demobilization Board:
First Demobilization Bureau
Second Demobilization Bureau
Officer Employment and Relative Percentages Employed in the Demobilization Board


210
190
170
150
130
110
90
70
50
30
10
Jan
1946
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul

GRAPH

EX-GE

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Nov	
Dec	
Jan 1947	
Feb	
Mar	
Apr	
May	
Jun	



GRAPH OF MONTHLY EMPLOYMENT OF EX-GENERALS AND EX-ADMIRALS IN THE DEMOBILIZATION AGENCIES OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

	Ex-General	Ex-Admiral	Total
Jan 1946	146	44	190
Feb	133	43	176
Mar	122	44	166
Apr	110	27	137
May	108	27	135
Jun	57	25	82
Jul	55	23	78
Aug	42	23	65
Sep	35	22	57
Oct	32	21	53
Nov	30	20	50
Dec	30	19	49
Jan 1947	24	18	42
Feb	21	17	38
Mar	21	17	38
Apr	18	13	31
May	10	7	17
Jun	10	7	17

GRAPH NO. 1
FOR INTELL. SUMMARY 1858



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
30,247
28,000
26,000
24,000
22,000
20,000
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16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
Jan
1946
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul

GRAPH

FIRST DEMOBILIZATION MINISTR

	Ex-
Jan 1946	
Feb	
Mar	
Apr	
May	
Jun	
Jul	
Aug	
Sep	
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Nov	
Dec	
Jan 1947	
Feb	
Mar	
Apr	
May	
Jun	

TOTAL

CIVILIAN

EX-MILITARY

May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

GRAPH OF MONTHLY EMPLOYMENT

OF THE

FIRST DEMOBILIZATION MINISTRY / FIRST BUREAU OF THE DEMOBILIZATION BOARD

(Army)

	Ex-Military	Civilian	Total
Jan 1946	---	---	30,247
Feb	6,966	20,853	27,819
Mar	6,922	19,647	26,569
Apr	5,402	13,389	19,109
May	4,825	12,847	17,672
Jun	4,789	12,526	17,315
Jul	3,776	5,733	9,509
Aug	3,583	5,504	9,087
Sep	3,091	5,296	8,387
Oct	2,951	5,309	8,260
Nov	2,842	5,184	8,026
Dec	2,703	5,118	7,821
Jan 1947	2,433	4,920	7,353
Feb	2,163	4,488	6,651
Mar	2,114	4,405	6,519
Apr	1,991	4,287	6,278
May	1,764	4,071	5,835
Jun	1,754	3,784	5,538

GRAPH NO. 2
FOR INTELL. SUMMARY 1858



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
55,000
50,000
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35,000
30,000
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20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
Jan
1946
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul

GRAPH OF M

Second demobilization Ministry / Se

	Ex-Naval
Jan 1946	33,214
Feb	32,402
Mar	33,862
Apr	33,666
May	32,949
Jun	32,115
Jul	28,909
Aug	25,479
Sep	22,202
Oct	19,481
Nov	17,968
Dec	16,133
Jan 1947	14,367
Feb	12,009
Mar	10,675
Apr	9,469
May	9,066
Jun	8,707



un Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan 1947 Fe

GRAPH OF MONTHLY EMPLOYMENT

OF THE

Second demobilization Ministry / Second Bureau of the Demobilization Board

(Navy)

	Ex-Naval	Civilian	Total
Jan 1946	33,214	17,063	50,277
Feb	32,402	17,090	49,492
Mar	33,862	17,601	51,463
Apr	33,666	14,950	48,616
May	32,949	6,784	39,733
Jun	32,115	6,702	38,817
Jul	28,909	6,929	35,838
Aug	25,479	6,581	32,060
Sep	22,202	6,803	29,005
Oct	19,481	6,352	25,833
Nov	17,968	6,083	24,056
Dec	16,133	5,706	21,839
Jan 1947	14,367	5,239	19,606
Feb	12,009	4,884	16,893
Mar	10,675	4,733	15,408
Apr	9,469	4,613	14,082
May	9,066	4,237	13,303
Jun	8,707	4,138	12,845

GRAPH NO. 3
FOR INTELL. SUMMARY 1858



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MONTHLY

DEMOBILIZ

AS OF

FIRST DEMOB

	EX-GEN	EX-LT GEN	EX-MAJ
Officer Corps (Active List Aug 45)	17	485	761
Ex-Officers Employed in Bureau		7	3
Total Ex-Military Employed in Bureau			
Total Employes in Bureau			
PERCENTAGES			
% By Rank of Officers Employed Against Officer Corps	0	1.44	.39
% By Rank of Ex-Officers Employed	0	.67	.28
% Of Ex-Officers By Rank Among Total Ex-Mil Employes	0	.39	.17
% Of Ex-Officers By Rank Among Total Employes	0	.12	.05

SECOND DEMOB

	EX-ADM	EX-VICE ADM	EX-REAR
Officer Corps (Active List Aug 45)	12	129	353
Ex-Officers Employed in Bureau		1	6
Total Ex-Military Employed in Bureau			
Total Employes in Bureau			
PERCENTAGES			
% By Rank of Officers Employed Against Officer Corps	0	.77	1.69
% By Rank of Ex-Officers Employed	0	.07	.44
% Of Ex-Officers By Rank Among Total Ex-Mil Employes	0	.01	.06
% Of Ex-Officers By Rank Among Total Employes	0	.008	.04

TOTAL ARMY & NAVY OFFICER CORPS (ACTIVE L
TOTAL EX-OFFICERS EMPLOYED (ARMY & NAVY).
TOTAL EX-MILITARY EMPLOYED (ARMY & NAVY).
TOTAL PERSONNEL EMPLOYED (EX-MILITARY & C
COL. & NAVAL CAPTAINS AND ABOVE EMPLOYED

PERCENTAGE OF OFFICERS IN BOARD equals
PERCENTAGE OF OFFICERS IN BOARD equals 22
PERCENTAGE OF OFFICERS IN BOARD equals 12
PERCENTAGE OF POSITIONS HELD BY COLS. & NAVAL CAPTAINS AN
PERCENTAGE OF POSITIONS HELD BY COLS. & NAVAL CAPTAINS AN

SECRET

THLY EMPLOYMENT
OF THE
OBILIZATION BOARD
AS OF 1 JUNE 1947

DEMOBILIZATION BUREAU

N	EX-MAJ GEN	EX-COL	EX-LT COL	EX-MAJ	EX-CAPT	EX-1st LT	EX-2nd LT	TOTAL
	761	2,970	3,341	12,370	25,208	81,924	85,999	213,079
	3	50	143	264	223	145	202	1,037
								1,754
								5,538
	.39	1.68	4.28	2.13	.88	.17	.23	.438
	.28	4.82	13.79	25.45	21.50	13.98	19.47	100.
	.17	2.85	9.15	15.05	12.71	8.26	11.51	59.12
	.05	.90	2.58	4.76	4.02	2.61	3.66	18.72

DEMOBILIZATION BUREAU

DM	EX-REAR ADM	EX-CAPT	EX-COMDR	EX-LT CDR	EX-LT	EX-LT (JG)	EX-ENSIGN	TOTAL
	353	1,335	1,192	2,514	13,776	15,680	27,445	62,436
	6	42	90	154	357	255	437	1,342
								8,663
								12,801
	1.69	3.14	7.55	6.12	2.59	1.63	1.23	2.149
	.44	3.12	6.70	11.47	26.60	19.00	32.56	100.
	.06	.48	1.03	1.77	4.12	2.94	5.04	15.49
	.04	.32	.70	1.20	2.78	1.99	3.41	10.48

S (ACTIVE LIST AUG 45)..... 275,515
MY & NAVY)..... 2,379
MY & NAVY)..... 10,417
ILITARY & CIVILIANS)..... 18,339
E EMPLOYED IN BUREAU..... 109

CHART NO. 1
FOR INTELL. SUMMARY 1858

D equals .86 OF TOTAL OFFICER CORPS
D equals 22.83 OF TOTAL EX-MILITARY EMPLOYED
D equals 12.97 OF TOTAL PERSONNEL EMPLOYED
CAPTAINS AND ABOVE equals 1.04 OF TOTAL EX-MILITARY EMPLOYED
CAPTAINS AND ABOVE equals .58 OF TOTAL PERSONNEL EMPLOYED

SECRET

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets) CW/CLK/ARH/amm

File No.:

Subject: Demobilization Machinery, Reorganization Of.

Note No.:

From: Govt Section To: G-2, LS, COMNAVFE Date: 4 Sept 1947

1. Pursuant to the agreement reached on 4 September 1947 in conference between representatives of G-2, COMNAVFE, LS, 8 Army, and GS, the following draft SCAPIN, Tab "A", is submitted for your approval. In view of the length of time that has elapsed since the Chief of Staff's original instructions of 25 January 1947, it is hoped that this matter may now be disposed of with dispatch.

1 Incl
Tab "A" Draft SCAPIN

C.W.

From: Legal Section To: Government Section Date: 19 Sept 1947

2. 1. Reference reply of G-2 to Government Section dated 15 September 1947.

2. Legal Section considers the proposed SCAPIN as drafted by G-2 as the most desirable from its point of view for the reason that it is more specific in providing for the transfer of the First Demobilization Bureau, together with its related activities, intact. Failure to definitely provide for a transfer intact, would result in the disintegration of the Bureaus ability to efficiently provide information as demanded by this section. This point was discussed at the conference on 4 September 1947.

3. Legal Section recommends the adoption of the proposed SCAPIN as drafted by G-2.

C.A.R.
C.A.R.

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CW/CLK/ARH/amm
Demobilization Machinery,
Reorganization Of.

Govt Section

G-2
LS
COMNAVFE

4 Sept 1947

1. Pursuant to the agreement reached on 4 September 1947 in conference between representatives of G-2, COMNAVFE, LS, 8 Army, and GS, the following draft SCAPIN, Tab "A", is submitted for your approval. In view of the length of time that has elapsed since the Chief of Staff's original instructions of 25 January 1947, it is hoped that this matter may now be disposed of with dispatch.

1 Incl
Tab "A" Draft SCAPIN

C.W.

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2. 1. Reference reply of G-2 to Government Section dated 15 September 1947.

2. Legal Section considers the proposed SCAPIN as drafted by G-2 as the most desirable from its point of view for the reason that it is more specific in providing for the transfer of the First Demobilization Bureau, together with its related activities, intact. Failure to definitely provide for a transfer intact, would result in the disintegration of the Bureau's ability to efficiently provide information as demanded by this section. This point was discussed at the conference on 4 September 1947.

3. Legal Section recommends the adoption of the proposed SCAPIN as drafted by G-2.

C.A.R.

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28467

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

CHECK SHEET

23688

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.: Subject: Memorandum to Chief of Staff Re: Reorganization of the Demob. Board

Note No.: From: GS To: C/S Thru G-2 Date: 20 Aug 47

2 Cont

Allied Powers, and transferring all legitimate research and investigation agencies to the Ministry of Justice or some other suitable civilian agency of government, and that the entire matter be completed by 30 September 1947, other than elimination of the Second Demobilization Bureau's minesweeping agency, which shall be permitted to remain until 1 January 1948.

1 Incl
n/c

C. W.

CAW/PHB/lg

From: G-2 To: GS Date: 26 August 1947

3

1. As regards GS note 2, above, G-2 suggests that the presently divergent views of GS and the combined position of LS, G-2, 8th Army, and COMNAVFE, might be reconciled. It is C/S policy that every means of reconciliation be exhausted before a paper is forwarded.

2. With respect to your par.3, G-2 has no objection to the "Welfare Ministry" as the ultimate ministry under which the demobilization organization functions.

3. Re. your par. 7, we insist that the Demobilization Board is a bona-fide civilian agency; ex-military personnel are retained in it only to efficiently accomplish the demobilization of overseas forces on their repatriation to Japan, and in order to furnish information not procurable from other sources. See also previous comment by LS (par. 3b of proposed Memorandum for C/S).

4. Re. your par. 8: The organization of the Demobilization Board parallels that of a military organization because demobilization is a military function. One would not try to run an oil business with a grocery store organization.

5. Re. your par. 11: The statement that the demobilization machinery is gathering military information "for its own use" has never been substantiated. Determining whether persons are missing or dead is a humanitarian obligation neglect of which would reflect against the Occupation and against the Japanese Government, even if it were not necessary from a

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

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File No.: Subject: Memorandum to Chief of Staff
Re: Reorganization of the Demob. Board

Note No.: From: G-2 To: GS Date: 26 August 1947

3 (contd)

purely practical fiscal point of view. It is not clear what portion of JCS 1380/15 these activities would violate?

6. With respect to separating "investigational agencies" from the remainder of the Board, the following disadvantages are noted:

a. Practically all ex-officer personnel of the Demobilization Board perform a dual role; the same people manage demobilization and contribute to required reports.

b. To separate interlocking functions will require an increase in total personnel; it will obviously require constant liaison between separate agencies. The records, archives, files etc. are interlocking.

c. The total personnel strength of the Demobilization Board as of 15 August 1947, including ship crews, is 15,585, of which 1,572 are ex-officers subject to the purge. The so-called investigational agencies involve possibly 200 to 300 individuals; it is not worth while to set up a separate organization.

7. Re. your par. 14: The total of 50,000 repatriated from Russia each month includes both civilians and military. Actually, the bulk of personnel repatriated from Russia so far have been civilians. Your calculations of an estimated date of completion of repatriation of ex-soldiers from Russia is therefore inconclusive. It is much more likely that the Japanese soldiers will be the last Japanese individuals to be returned from Russia: they are busy indoctrinating them. - The rate of flow of repatriation is a controlling factor in the size of the demobilization machinery required, not the number of persons still undemobilized. It takes a fixed minimum number of operators to maintain repatriation ports, demobilization camps and centers, regardless of the constantly diminishing number of men still to be demobilized. If repatriation should be stepped up (which is actually under consideration now), the Demobilization Board's current responsibility would increase, although the day of completion of its task would be brought closer.

8. Your par. 15, last sentence: A change of command will mean a change of policy and loss of efficiency.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

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(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.: Subject: Memorandum to Chief of Staff
Re: Reorganization of the Demob. Board

Note No.: 3 (contd) | From: G-2 | To: GS | Date: 26 August 1947

9. Your par. 17: These recommendations fail to consider the 8th Army's views that there should be a "period of observation" by whichever ministry is given responsibility for demobilization before any radical reorganization takes place.

10. It is still believed that a solution acceptable to all might be arrived at in a conference. It is believed that the recommendations to be submitted to the Chief of Staff should be in the form of a proposed SCAPIN in which all affected American agencies concur. If such an agreement can be achieved, a complete paper can be presented to the Chief of Staff's Office that will be much more in harmony with the provisions of Staff Memorandum 6, 6 Jan 47, than the present one.

11. In its ultimate implication, the fact of several hundreds of thousands of future repatriates awaiting shipment requires a machinery to handle them. There is no point to challenge the machinery until the job is completed.

12. It is proposed that a conference be held in Room 520, Daiichi Bldg., at 1000 hrs 4 Sept 1947 between representatives of 8th Army, COMNAVFE, Legal Section, Government Section, and G-2, for the purpose of again trying to develop a mutually satisfactory solution. Government Section is hereby invited to such a conference; G-2 is issuing invitations also to the other parties mentioned.

Incl: n/c

C. A. W.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets) JL/JWS/lg

File No.: Subject: Memorandum to Chief of Staff re. Reorganization of Demob. Board.

Note No.:	From: G-2 To: GS Date: 25 July 1947
1	1. Forwarded attached is copy of G-2 memorandum to the Chief of Staff, concurred in by Legal Section, Eighth Army, and ComNavFe, containing the record and recommendations of a conference held on 5 June 1947 for the purpose of discussing and recommending action regarding the reorganization of the Demobilization Board. 2. Your concurrence or comment is requested prior to submission of the memorandum to the Chief of Staff. 1 Incl: Cpy of Memo for C/S with tabs A to M C. A. W. CW/CLK/ARH/amm
2	FROM: Govt Section TO: C/S THRU: G-2 DATE: 20 August 1947 1. Government Section does not concur in the proposed Memorandum to the Chief of Staff. 2. The recitation of facts is substantially accurate except for the statement in Paragraph 2.e. with reference to a Memorandum for Record initialed by Brigadier General Harrison (G-2 Tab I). The modifications arrived at in conference between General Harrison, General Whitney, General Willoughby, Captain Bard and Colonel Buckart and approved by the Chief of Staff are set forth in GS's Memorandum for the Record of 28 March 1947 and attached Tab (G-2 Tab J). Copies of this Memorandum, reporting the modified instructions given to the Japanese Government, were sent to G-2, COMNAVFE and General Harrison and accepted without comment. Subsequently, in connection with G-2's check sheet to GS of 8 June (G-2 Tab B), Commander Hussey checked by telephone with General Harrison as to his recollection of the understanding reached and was informed that it was General Harrison's clear understanding that in no case was implementation of the original instructions to be postponed for any such time as a year, or until the end of repatriation. 3. The proposed Memorandum recommends that the Demobilization Board remain intact, regardless of the nature or time of transfer,

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

CHECK SHEET

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File No.:

Subject: Memorandum to Chief of Staff
Re: Reorganization of Demob. Board

Note No.: 2 Cont

From: GS To: C/S Thru G-2 Date: 20 Aug 47

(actually, no change would be effected before July 1949, or November 1950) that the Demobilization Board pass to the control of the Home Ministry (notwithstanding that Ministry is in process of dissolution) upon completion of repatriation, that no transfer or further reorganization take place in the First Demobilization Bureau until completion of repatriation and no transfer or reorganization take place in the Second Demobilization Bureau until completion of minesweeping and delivery to the Allies of former naval vessels and that GS consult with interested Staff Sections in applying SCAPIN 550.

4. Taking up the recommendations in reverse order, that concerning SCAPIN 550 is pointless. Implementation of SCAPIN 550 as it applies to ex-military and naval officers employed by the Japanese Government is being carried out in consultation with G-2 and COMNAVFE who are, pursuant to the orders of the Chief of Staff, given the right to pass on the technical justifications submitted for the retention of every officer in an activity over which either has staff responsibility.

5. It was agreed in March that the Second Demobilization Bureau would be retained intact until the operational responsibilities of COMNAVFE for minesweeping and delivery of certain minor Japanese naval vessels to the Allies has been discharged. It was contemplated that this would not extend beyond September 1947. More recently COMNAVFE has suggested the likelihood of the need for the retention of a small minesweeping staff at least until 1 January 1948 (Ltr CNF 10 July 47, Subject "Japanese Minesweeping" Tab A). With the discharge of these operational responsibilities no further justification for the retention of the Second Demobilization Bureau exists. This Bureau should be progressively reduced in size, all other functions removed, and the Bureau itself eliminated upon completion of minesweeping.

6. This then leaves us with the major question: Is the Demobilization Board to be retained intact and is no change to be directed until the end of repatriation which, according to the Japanese Government, will probably come in November 1949, but which might come in July 1948? It needs no argument to demonstrate that this proposition does not comply with the original orders of the Chief of Staff (G-2 Tab E) even as modified. GS feels, however,

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

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File No.: Subject: Memorandum to Chief of Staff Re: Reorganization of Demob. Board

Note No.: From: GS To: C/S Thru: G-2 Date: 20 Aug 47

2 Cont that the matter is of sufficient importance to warrant an examination of the raison d'etre of these orders and a critical appraisal of the proposal itself.

7. Basic Post-Surrender Policy with respect to Disarmament and Demobilization is contained in JCS 1380/15 and FEC 014 pertinent quotations from which are attached hereto (Tab B). Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan as stated in FEC 014/10, derived from JCS 1380/15, repeats the strictures of the policy statement on Demobilization, stating Part III, paragraph 1: "Disarmament and demilitarization are the initial tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out promptly and with determination." And from paragraph 2: "Japan is not to have any army, navy, airforce, secret police organization, or any civil aviation, or gendarmerie, but may have adequate civilian police forces, etc." These are the governing requirements for the conduct of the Occupation. As Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General MacArthur is responsible for executing these policies. The method and time of execution are entirely within his discretion. But language used is both clear and specific. Beyond peradventure of doubt, the eleven Allied Powers desire the complete disarmament of Japan at the earliest possible time and the conclusive demilitarization of the Japanese Government as soon as practicable.

8. No one will for a moment question the fact that a splendid job has to date been done in carrying out these policies. It is a testimonial to the efficiency of our operating procedures and the skill and industry of the officers and men of the United States Army and Navy that by far the greater part of a tremendous task has been accomplished within the short space of two years. The Japanese Government deserves credit for the manner in which it has responded to the orders of the Supreme Commander. But, notwithstanding what has been done and done so well, the fact remains that, as of today, there exists in the Japanese Government and as an official agency thereof an organization which in makeup, operating procedures and personnel duplicates the administrative organization of the Japanese Military Agencies and manned, within the Demobilization Board alone, by 17 flag officers, 84 colonels and captains and 6,474 other ex-commissioned Army and Navy officers, exclusive of those serving on shipboard. The organization of both First and Second Demobilization Bureaus is patterned upon and follows closely the strictly military command organization of the Japanese Army and Navy.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
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File No.:

Subject: Memorandum to Chief of Staff
Re: Reorganization of Demob. Board

Note No.:	From: GS	To: C/S Thru: G-2	Date: 20 Aug 47

2 Cont

9. This agency of the Japanese Government represents the present form of what were the First and Second Demobilization Ministries from November 1945 until June 1946, and the Ministries of War and Navy prior to 1 November 1945. They are charged with specific responsibility for repatriating and demobilizing Japanese military and naval personnel remaining overseas, for the completion of such minesweeping as Commander Naval Activities Far East shall require, for the maintenance of naval vessels in laid-up reserve and their delivery to the Allied Powers and for providing information necessary in the indictment and trial of war criminals. Certain agencies are being used for specific intelligence operations.

10. Intelligence operations making use of repatriation facilities at reception centers must be carried on in all events. No one has suggested that this work be interrupted or hampered. Whatever reorganization takes place, the actual operating agencies of repatriation and demobilization must remain intact.

11. There are a number of agencies within the Japanese Government charged with securing information required by SCAP. By far the greater part of the information asked for relates to activities associated with the conduct of the war. Much of it is military in nature. The most important single requirement is in connection with the prosecution of war criminals. This work must go on. But at the same time that the Demobilization Board agencies are providing the information required by SCAP, they are collecting and collating information concerning the conduct of the war, for their own purposes. This is being done under the guise of settling the affairs of the known dead, the dead whose condition is unknown and the missing. Between 90% and 95% of the volume of work of the Demobilization Board for the fiscal year 1947-48 will be taken up with this work, according to official Japanese estimates. This is, of course, a direct violation of JCS 1380/15. No justification exists for permitting this situation to continue. All investigatory and research agencies should be combined and placed under the Ministry of Justice or the Cabinet Secretariat, with a civilian organization administering and ex-military and ex-naval commissioned officer personnel used at the working level where necessary. Direct transfer of working groups and records would not interfere with continuation of the work. This bears no relation whatsoever to demobilization or repatriation except that those agencies are used as sources of information from time to time. They can still be so used.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

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Re: Reorganization of Demob. Board.

Note No.: From: GS To: C/S Thru: G-2 Date: 20 Aug 47

2 Cont

12. Of minesweeping and maintenance of ships, comment has already been made. This work will soon be completed. The Japanese Navy has already been demobilized, except for men engaged in these operations. With the termination of those operations, all justification for the retention of a separate Second Demobilization Bureau ceases.

13. This leaves the major responsibility of repatriation and demobilization of ex-soldiers remaining overseas. Repatriation is now being carried on under the responsibility of the Welfare Ministry, the agency being the Board of Repatriation. Ex-military personnel coming through the repatriation centers are handled in the same manner as civilians except that they are subject to an additional processing by the First Demobilization Bureau. When they reach home, they are handled by the Local Assistance Bureau, military-staffed agencies of the prefectural governments.

14. The Japanese official figures disclose that, as of 31 March 1947, a total of 772,400 remained overseas, of which 76,000 are known to be alive and in areas outside the USSR and the balance, including both living and dead, inside the USSR (Tab C). Repatriation of ex-soldiers from the USSR is proceeding at the rate of 50,000 a month, so that it must be patently clear that in fifteen months from 1 April 1947, this phase of demobilization will be completed. But we do not need to be concerned with facts and figures of this nature. The basic problem is primarily a political one. The issue is made perfectly clear. Shall the present organization of the Demobilization Board be continued intact for two to four more years, notwithstanding a constantly diminishing responsibility and contrary to the express provisions of over-all policy directives? G-2 argues for this continuation purely on the basis of expediency.

15. GS is responsible to the Supreme Commander for recommending those changes in the structure of the Japanese State and the organization of the Japanese Government which will bring about its demilitarization and democratization. GS's studies have clearly indicated that the basic structure of the Japanese War and Navy Departments and the administrative structure of the Japanese Army and Navy remain substantially unchanged and an integral part of the Japanese Government. With the major portion of the work of demobilization and disarmament completed, to permit this situation

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

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File No.:

Subject: Memorandum to Chief of Staff
Re: Reorganization of Demob. Board

Note No.: 2 Cont

From: GS

To: C/S
Thru: G-2

Date: 20 Aug 47

to continue is to render the Supreme Commander and the United States Government open to the direct charge of bad faith. The time has come for the complete elimination of that basic structure. This can be done by the separation of the agencies responsible for the performance of remaining operations into their component parts and the placing of each component part under a civilian agency of government (except in the case of the Second Demobilization Bureau which can be eliminated entirely by the end of this year). No loss of efficiency can result because the actual operating agencies remain. It is only the command that is changed. The men, the offices, the records are still available.

16. Nowhere, in all of the arguments presented in favor of maintenance of the status quo, has there ever been presented a single fact in contravention of the practicability of this step. No one denies that basic policy requires it, that the Chief of Staff has ordered it and that it can be done. All that is offered in opposition is the feeble argument that we have done so well with the present set-up, why change it. The clear lesson of recent history is completely ignored. Knowing full well the contribution of the Japanese military clique to the tragedy of the last decade in the Orient, knowing full well through what channels and by means of what agencies that military clique operated, knowing full well that one of the major purposes of the occupation of Japan is to destroy for our time at least the capability of Japan to wage war, knowing full well that the entire nucleus of machinery for recreating a Japanese war machine still remains in existence, it is argued that efficiency and expediency demand that we do nothing.

17. Not questioning for a moment the sincerity of the patriotism of those who argue in support of the position taken in the proposed Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Government Section recommends that the plans submitted by the Japanese Government be rejected in toto and that they be instructed to eliminate the Demobilization Board without further delay, transferring responsibility for demobilization to the Board of Repatriation, including all personnel and agencies now engaged therein, doing away with the Second Demobilization Bureau entirely immediately upon the satisfactory termination of minesweeping operations and the transfer of remaining naval vessels to the

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Memorandum to Chief of Staff
re. Reorganization of Demob. Board.

From: G-2 To: GS Date: 25 July 1947

1 1. Forwarded attached is copy of G-2 memorandum to the Chief of Staff, concurred in by Legal Section, Eighth Army, and ComNavFe, containing the record and recommendations of a conference held on 5 June 1947 for the purpose of discussing and recommending action regarding the reorganization of the Demobilization Board.

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1 Incl:
Cpy of Memo for C/S
with Tabs A to M

C. A. W.

CW/CLK/ARH/amm

2 FROM: Govt Section TO: C/S DATE: 20 August 1947
THRU: G-2

1. Government Section does not concur in the proposed Memorandum to the Chief of Staff.

2. The recitation of facts is substantially accurate except for the statement in Paragraph 2.e. with reference to a Memorandum for Record initialed by Brigadier General Harrison (G-2 Tab I). The modifications arrived at in conference between General Harrison, General Whitney, General Willoughby, Captain Bard and Colonel Buckart and approved by the Chief of Staff are set forth in GS's Memorandum for the Record of 28 March 1947 and attached Tab (G-2 Tab J). Copies of this Memorandum, reporting the modified instructions given to the Japanese Government, were sent to G-2, COMNAVFE and General Harrison and accepted without comment . Subsequently, in connection with G-2's check sheet to GS of 8 June (G-2 Tab B), Commander Hussey checked by telephone with General Harrison as to his recollection of the understanding reached and was informed that it was General Harrison's clear understanding that in no case was implementation of the original instructions to be postponed for any such time as a year, or until the end of repatriation.

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2 Cont (actually, no change would be effected before July 1949, or November 1950) that the Demobilization Board pass to the control of the Home Ministry (notwithstanding that Ministry is in process of dissolution) upon completion of repatriation, that no transfer or further reorganization take place in the First Demobilization Bureau until completion of repatriation and no transfer or reorganization take place in the Second Demobilization Bureau until completion of minesweeping and delivery to the Allies of former naval vessels and that GS consult with interested Staff Sections in applying SCAPIN 550.

4. Taking up the recommendations in reverse order, that concerning SCAPIN 550 is pointless. Implementation of SCAPIN 550 as it applies to ex-military and naval officers employed by the Japanese Government is being carried out in consultation with G-2 and COMNAVFE who are, pursuant to the orders of the Chief of Staff, given the right to pass on the technical justifications submitted for the retention of every officer in an activity over which either has staff responsibility.

5. It was agreed in March that the Second Demobilization Bureau would be retained intact until the operational responsibilities of COMNAVFE for minesweeping and delivery of certain minor Japanese naval vessels to the Allies has been discharged. It was contemplated that this would not extend beyond September 1947. More recently COMNAVFE has suggested the likelihood of the need for the retention of a small minesweeping staff at least until 1 January 1948 (Ltr CNF 10 July 47, Subject "Japanese Minesweeping" Tab A). With the discharge of these operational responsibilities no further justification for the retention of the Second Demobilization Bureau exists. This Bureau should be progressively reduced in size, all other functions removed, and the Bureau itself eliminated upon completion of minesweeping.

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Memorandum to Chief of Staff
Re: Reorganization of Demob. Board

CS To: C/S 20 Aug 47
Thru : G-2

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10. Intelligence operations making use of repatriation facilities at reception centers must be carried on in all events. No one has suggested that this work be interrupted or hampered. Whatever reorganization takes place, the actual operating agencies of repatriation and demobilization must remain intact.

11. There are a number of agencies within the Japanese Government charged with securing information required by SCAP. By far the greater part of the information asked for relates to activities associated with the conduct of the war. Much of it is military in nature. The most important single requirement is in connection with the prosecution of war criminals. This work must go on. But at the same time that the Demobilization Board agencies are providing the information required by SCAP, they are collecting and collating information concerning the conduct of the war, for their own purposes. This is being done under the guise of settling the affairs of the known dead, the dead whose condition is unknown and the missing. Between 90% and 95% of the volume of work of the Demobilization Board for the fiscal year 1947-48 will be taken up with this work, according to official Japanese estimates. This is, of course, a direct violation of JCS 1380/15. No justification exists for permitting this situation to continue. All investigatory and research agencies should be combined and placed under the Ministry of Justice or the Cabinet Secretariat, with a civilian organization administering and ex-military and ex-naval commissioned officer personnel used at the working level where necessary. Direct transfer of working groups and records would not interfere with continuation of the work. This bears no relation whatsoever to demobilization or repatriation except that those agencies are used as sources of information from time to time. They can still be so used.

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12. Of minesweeping and maintenance of ships, comment has already been made. This work will soon be completed. The Japanese Navy has already been demobilized, except for men engaged in these operations. With the termination of those operations, all justification for the retention of a separate Second Demobilization Bureau ceases.

13. This leaves the major responsibility of repatriation and demobilization of ex-soldiers remaining overseas. Repatriation is now being carried on under the responsibility of the Welfare Ministry, the agency being the Board of Repatriation. Ex-military personnel coming through the repatriation centers are handled in the same manner as civilians except that they are subject to an additional processing by the First Demobilization Bureau. When they reach home, they are handled by the Local Assistance Bureau, military-staffed agencies of the prefectural governments.

14. The Japanese official figures disclose that, as of 31 March 1947, a total of 772,400 remained overseas, of which 76,000 are known to be alive and in areas outside the USSR and the balance, including both living and dead, inside the USSR (Tab C). Repatriation of ex-soldiers from the USSR is proceeding at the rate of 50,000 a month, so that it must be patently clear that in fifteen months from 1 April 1947, this phase of demobilization will be completed. But we do not need to be concerned with facts and figures of this nature. The basic problem is primarily a political one. The issue is made perfectly clear. Shall the present organization of the Demobilization Board be continued intact for two to four more years, notwithstanding a constantly diminishing responsibility and contrary to the express provisions of over-all policy directives? G-2 argues for this continuation purely on the basis of expediency.

15. GS is responsible to the Supreme Commander for recommending those changes in the structure of the Japanese State and the organization of the Japanese Government which will bring about its demilitarization and democratization. GS's studies have clearly indicated that the basic structure of the Japanese War and Navy Departments and the administrative structure of the Japanese Army and Navy remain substantially unchanged and an integral part of the Japanese Government. With the major portion of the work of demobilization and disarmament completed, to permit this situation

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GS To: C/S 20 Aug 47
Thru: G-2

2 Cont to continue is to render the Supreme Commander and the United States Government open to the direct chafge of bad faith. The time has come for the complete elimination of that basic structure. This can be done by the separation of the agencies responsible for the performance of remaining operations into their component parts and the placing of each component part under a civilian agency of government (except in the case of the Second Demobilization Bureau which can be eliminated entirely by the end of this year). No loss of efficiency can result because the actual operating agencies remain. It is only the command that is changed. The men, the offices, the records are still available.

16. Nowhere, in all of the arguments presented in favor of maintenance of the status quo, has there ever been presented a single fact in contravention of the practicability of this step. No one denies that basic policy requires it, that the Chief of Staff has ordered it and that it can be done. All that is offered in opposition is the feeble argument that we have done so well with the present set-up, why change it. The clear lesson of recent history is completely ignored. Knowing full well the contribution of the Japanese military clique to the tragedy of the last decade in the Orient, knowing full well through what channels and by what agencies that military clique operated, knowing full well that one of the major purposes of the occupation of Japan is to destroy for our time at least the capability of Japan to wage war, knowing full well that the entire nucleus of machinery for recreating a Japanese war machine still remains in existence, it is argued that efficiency and expediency demand that we do nothing.

17. Not questioning for a moment the sincerity of the patriotism of those who argue in support of the position taken in the proposed Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Government Section recommends that the plans submitted by the Japanese Government be rejected in toto and that they be instructed to eliminate the Demobilization Board without further delay, transferring responsibility for demobilization to the Board of Repatriation, including all personnel and agencies now engaged therein, doing away with the Second Demobilization Bureau entirely immediately upon the satisfactory termination of minesweeping operations and the transfer of remaining naval vessels to the

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55
1 cc

Memorandum to Chief of Staff
Re: Reorganization of the Demob.Board

GS To: C/S Date: 20 Aug 47
Thru: G-2

2 Cont Allied Powers, and transferring all legitimate research and investigation agencies to the Ministry of Justice or some other suitable civilian agency of government, and that the entire matter be completed by 30 September 1947, other than elimination of the Second Demobilization Bureau's minesweeping agency, which shall be permitted to remain until 1 January 1948.

1 Incl
n/c

C. W.

CAW/PEB/lg
From: G-2 To: GS Date: 26 August 1947

3 1. As regards GS note 2, above, G-2 suggests that the presently divergent views of GS and the combined position of LS, G-2, 8th Army, and COMNAVFE, might be reconciled. It is C/S policy that every means of reconciliation be exhausted before a paper is forwarded.

2. With respect to your par.3, G-2 has no objection to the "Welfare Ministry" as the ultimate ministry under which the demobilization organization functions.

3. Re. your par. 7, we insist that the Demobilization Board is a bona-fide civilian agency; ex-military personnel are retained in it only to efficiently accomplish the demobilization of overseas forces on their repatriation to Japan, and in order to furnish information not procurable from other sources. See also previous comment by LS (par. 3b of proposed Memorandum for C/S).

4. Re. your par. 8: The organization of the Demobilization Board parallels that of a military organization because demobilization is a military function. One would not try to run an oil business with a grocery store organization.

5. Re. your par. 11: The statement that the demobilization machinery is gathering military information "for its own use" has never been substantiated. Determining whether persons are missing or dead is a humanitarian obligation neglect of which would reflect against the Occupation and against the Japanese Government, even if it were not necessary from a

CONFIDENTIAL

3 (contd) purely practical fiscal point of view. It is not clear what portion of JCS 1380/15 these activities would violate?

6. With respect to separating "investigational agencies" from the remainder of the Board, the following disadvantages are noted:

a. Practically all ex-officer personnel of the Demobilization Board perform a dual role: the same people manage demobilization and contribute to required reports.

b. To separate interlocking functions will require an increase in total personnel: it will obviously require constant liaison between separate agencies. The records, archives, files etc. are interlocking.

c. The total personnel strength of the Demobilization Board as of 15 August 1947, including ship crews, is 15,585, of which 1,572 are ex-officers subject to the purge. The so-called investigational agencies involve possibly 200 to 300 individuals; it is not worth while to set up a separate organization.

7. Re. your par. 14: The total of 50,000 repatriated from Russia each month includes both civilians and military. Actually, the bulk of personnel repatriated from Russia so far have been civilians. Your calculations of an estimated date of completion of repatriation of ex-soldiers from Russia is therefore inconclusive. It is much more likely that the Japanese soldiers will be the last Japanese individuals to be returned from Russia: they are busy indoctrinating them. - The rate of flow of repatriation is a controlling factor in the size of the demobilization machinery required, not the number of persons still undemobilized. It takes a fixed minimum number of operators to maintain repatriation ports, demobilization camps and centers, regardless of the constantly diminishing number of men still to be demobilized. If repatriation should be stepped up (which is actually under consideration now), the Demobilization Board's current responsibility would increase, although the day of completion of its task would be brought closer.

8. Your par. 15, last sentence: A change of command will mean a change of policy and loss of efficiency.

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(cont'd)

9. Your par. 17: These recommendations fail to consider the 8th Army's views that there should be a "period of observation" by whichever ministry is given responsibility for demobilization before any radical reorganization takes place.

10. It is still believed that a solution acceptable to all might be arrived at in a conference. It is believed that the recommendations to be submitted to the Chief of Staff should be in the form of a proposed SCAPIN in which all affected American agencies concur. If such an agreement can be achieved, a complete paper can be presented to the Chief of Staff's Office that will be much more in harmony with the provisions of Staff Memorandum 6, 6 Jan 47, than the present one.

11. In its ultimate implication, the fact of several hundreds of thousands of future repatriates awaiting shipment requires a machinery to handle them. There is no point to challenge the machinery until the job is completed.

12. It is proposed that a conference be held in Room 520, Daiichi Bldg., at 1000 hrs 4 Sept 1947 between representatives of 8th Army, COMNAVFE, Legal Section, Government Section, and G-2, for the purpose of again trying to develop a mutually satisfactory solution. Government Section is hereby invited to such a conference; G-2 is issuing invitations also to the other parties mentioned.

Incl: n/c

C. A. W.

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BRIEF: DEMOBILIZATION BOARD PLANS FOR REORGANIZATION

I. PLAN A - FIRST DEMOBILIZATION BUREAU:

1. The present organization now employs only 10 ex-generals and 50 ex-colonels (as directed by Chief of Staff). This organization is to be retained until repatriation is completed.

2. Upon completion of repatriation, the following reorganization will be effected:

a. Placing the Bureau under the Home Ministry as an Outer Bureau
b. Abolition of all landing point reception centers
c. Reduction in the number of demobilization liaison offices
d. Employment of high-ranking ex-officers to be reduced to 4 ex-generals, 21 ex-colonels
e. Combining the Home Depot Bureau with other investigative agencies into a single Investigation Division
f. Sections primarily concerned with investigation work for the Allied Forces (Legal Investigation, Reports & Statistical, Translation) to be combined in a single Records Division.

3. The result of this reorganization will be that the current organization which consists of the central offices (6 divisions), Home Depot Bureau (3 branches, 4 divisions, 2 sections), 8 Demobilization Liaison Offices, 4 Landing Point Reception Centers, Shipping Remaining Business Division, will be reduced to a single central bureau (in the Home Ministry) with 3 divisions and 7 branch offices to handle field liaison.

4. Approximately one year later, residual affairs of the demobilization machinery will have dwindled sufficiently to warrant a further reduction. The plan calls for curtailment of the central bureau in the Home Ministry to 5 sections, employing 10 ex-colonels and no ex-generals, which final organization will complete the liquidation of the affairs and records of the military forces of Japan.

II. PLAN B - FIRST DEMOBILIZATION BUREAU:

1. The present organization is to remain until completion of repatriation.

2. When repatriation is completed, the residual administrative affairs relating to demobilization are to be separated from investigative activities for the Allied Powers. The offices handling residual demobilization matters would be combined in a Bureau placed under the Home Ministry; the

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BRIEF: DEMOBILIZATION BOARD PLANS FOR REORGANIZATION (cont'd)

offices concerned with investigative functions for GHQ, SCAP, are to become an agency of the Central Liaison Office. This reorganization involves the following changes:

a. Abolition of all landing point reception centers
b. Reduction of the central offices of the present Demobilization Bureau to a single General Affairs Division, which, combined with a reduced Home Depot Bureau and Demobilization Liaison Offices, is to become an Outer Bureau of the Home Ministry.
c. Investigative agencies to be combined in an Investigation Division of the Central Liaison Office.

III - PLAN OF SECOND DEMOBILIZATION BUREAU:

1. This plan of necessity takes into consideration not only repatriation but also minesweeping and ship maintenance duties. It calls for retention of the present organization utilizing 7 ex-admirals and 42 ex-captains until those activities are liquidated.

2. Upon completion of minesweeping and ship maintenance services, all offices connected with these activities will be abolished, leaving only those elements concerned with residual demobilization matters and investigation work for GHQ SCAP. Personnel would be reduced to about 3150 from the current 12845 (1 June 1947).

3. Upon completion of repatriation, all sections concerned with personnel investigation and demobilization will be abolished leaving only the administrative elements necessary to carry out residual investigation work for the Allied Forces.

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR NAPIER

13 August 1947

SUBJECT: Demobilization Bureau Statistics

1. High level decision has established the following limitations on the number of top-ranking career officers whose retention is authorized within the First and Second Demobilization Bureaus of the Demobilization Board:

First Demobilization Bureau

Generals	10
Colonels	50

Second Demobilization Bureau

Admirals	7
Captains	42

There is no restriction on the number of officers of lower ranks except that those to be retained will be kept within the bounds of necessity.

2. As of this date the Japanese Government has requested the temporary retention of the following numbers of career officers:

First Demobilization Bureau

Generals	10
Colonels	50
Officers of lower ranks	571
	631

Second Demobilization Bureau

Admirals	7
Captains	42
Officers of lower ranks	456
	505

0854

3. The Second Demobilization Bureau is authorized to retain career commissioned officers on or in command of vessels engaged in mine sweeping and/or vessels in laid-up reserve. Individual justification for their retention is not required. There are 721 career commissioned officers serving in these capacities.

721

TOTAL 1857

25

JOHN H. BRADY

MEMORANDUM FOR : Major Napier

8 August 1947

SUBJECT : Former Career Military Personnel in Ministries and Agencies of the Japanese Government.

1. Information received indicates as of 4 August 1947 the number of former career military personnel employed in Ministries and agencies of the Japanese Government in regular and non-regular status before or since 2 September 1945 is as follows:

Copy

Cabinet Secretariat:	
Board of Reconstruction	6
POWIB	24
Foreign Office (Demobilization Secretaries under Jurisdiction of Demobilization Board)	18
Ministry of Home Affairs	1
Ministry of Finance (Report Still Due from Sapporo Financial Bureau- Reported to be 8)	211
Ministry of Justice	~~1~~ -10
Ministry of Education (Including 2 approved by Govt. Section: MURAMATSU and YUHARA. Report not complete.)	~~5~~ - 21
Ministry of Welfare (Report not complete.)	~~591~~ 587
Ministry of Commerce and Industry	38
Ministry of Transportation	58
Ministry of Communications	10
Demobilization Board (Officers engaged in Minesweeping and stationed aboard ship)	~~1327~~ 1109 ~~1727~~
TOTAL.....	~~2817~~ 2799 2824

(JOHN BRADY)

encl. 1

16.

25 July 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE CHIEF OF STAFF

SUBJECT : Record of Latest Conference on Plans for Reorganization Submitted by First and Second Demobilization Bureaus.

1. Colonel McEldowney, Eighth Army; Captain Dunning, COMNAVFE; Colonel Bethune, G-2; Major Reinhard, Legal Section; and Mr. Schneider, G-2; met at 10.30 a.m., 5 June, to examine plans for reorganization of the Demobilization Board, recently submitted by the First and Second Demobilization Bureaus. The Government Section was invited to send a representative by Check Note (Tab A). However, the Government Section, (Tab B), declined to send a representative; see G-2's answer thereto (Tab B). Proposed reorganization plans are attached as Tab C. An analysis of the plans is shown (Tab D).

2. The history of the planned reorganization of the Demobilization Board was reviewed and the following documents referred to:

a. Memo for Chief of Staff, 20 Jan 47, subject: "Removal of Japanese ex-Army and Navy officers from the Demobilization Board", approved by the Chief of Staff (Tab E). This plan required that the Japanese Government expedite elimination of former officers and transfer functions of Board to Ministry or Ministries.

b. Statement by Mr. Hussey to CLO, First and Second Demobilization Bureau representatives, on 28 Feb 47 (Tab F), based on the Chief of Staff's instructions. This statement ordered the Japanese to submit plans by 15 March for elimination of Board, transfer of its functions to several Ministries; dismissal of senior ex-officers except 10 former generals, 50 ex-colonels, 8 ex-admirals, 40 ex-captains.

c. Letter from General Eichelberger to the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, AG 370.01, subject: "Plans to Eliminate 1st Demobilization Bureau", (Tab G). This letter protests the orders referred to in 2b, on grounds that "the smooth functioning of demobilization is jeopardized" and that "with a new ministry, staffed with inexperienced people, a state of chaos is forseeable".

d. Letter from Commander, Naval Forces, to SCAP, subject: "Comments on Plans to Eliminate 2nd Demobilization Bureau" (Tab H), which recommends with-drawal of CS approval on the grounds that "operational responsibilities re mine sweeping, custody and delivery of ex-naval ships . . . need to retain Bureau" - confusion of authorities.

e. Memorandum for Record, subject: "Demobilization Board", 25 Mar 47, initialed by "WKH" (Brigadier General Harrison), (TAB I). Chief of Staff agrees that "the time to transfer functions is not now propitious".

f. Memorandum for Record, subject: "Demobilization", signed Alfred H. Hussey, Jr., Government Section 28 Mar 47 (Tab J), gives new instructions to Japanese for plans to be submitted by 31 May, implementation to be determined by "those same agencies of SCAP under whom the Bureaus were operating".

3. Record of action of conferees.

a. The Eighth Army's position (Col McIldowney) is as follows:

First: Gen. Michelberger's letter to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (Tab C) confirmed.

Second: The date upon which the First Demobilization Bureau should come under a civil ministry is a matter for decision of General Headquarters. The date preferred is upon termination of repatriation.

Third: If the Bureau is to be placed under a ministry, the whole Board should go under one ministry and the details of reorganization should be worked out by the ministry, after a period of observation so that the ministry then may intelligently work out a reorganization plan.

b. The Legal Section's position (Major Reinhard) is:

The Legal Section is making every effort to complete its program by the end of 1947. A new reorganization would tend to slow down work and would be objectionable to the Section. The bulk of past information has been secured from the Demobilization Board, particularly the Legal Investigations Sections of the two Bureaus. The problem goes a little deeper than merely investigating because it is through the coordinated efforts of various sections of the Demobilization Board that information is obtained. Therefore, the Legal Section feels that nothing should be done in the way of reorganization which would tend to interfere in any manner whatever with the securing of information. At this time, requests for information are not diminishing. About one-half of the information requested by the Legal Section is for the use of the Section itself for trials in Japan; the other one-half of the information requests is for use of Allies, particularly the British and Australians. Both of these nations are continually requesting a more steady flow of information, and we anticipate objections by these two nations if a reorganization resulted in a flow of less accurate or slower reports. For those reasons, the Legal Section is interested in keeping the Board as it is at present, and until its program is completed.

c. COMNAVFE's position (Capt Dunning) is:

COMNAVFE's position is that the timing of when a reorganization should be made would depend on the progress of discharge of assigned responsibilities rather than upon a calendar date, which cannot be picked out at this time. Our particular concern is that the mine sweeping program and conditioning and delivery of the ships that are being divided between the four powers must be completed under the present organization. We feel that when we complete these operational functions, our interests will be the same as those of the Eighth Army, but on a reduced scale.

d. G-2's position (Col Bethune) is that G-2 has no objection to placing the Demobilization Board under a ministry at the time recommended by COMNAVFE and Eighth Army, provided smooth functioning of demobilization and compliance with certain requests for international and WD information are not interfered with, and provided the board as a unit is moved to one ministry. G-2 reiterates that it desires smooth functioning as in the past, without interference of inexperienced personnel or control.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That the Board remain intact as a unit, regardless of the ministry to which it is transferred, or the date when the transfer is made.

b. That Demobilization Board pass to the control of the Home Ministry upon completion of repatriation.

(1) That Plan "A" of the First Demobilization Bureau and the Plan submitted by the Second Demobilization Bureau are approved, for the present, and to a date three months subsequent to the completion of repatriation. (Plans shown in Tab C, and briefed in Tab D)

(2) That upon assuming control the Home Ministry will study the organization of the Board and in three months submit for approval by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers plans for any necessary reorganization. Such plans are to be effective six months after the Home Ministry assumes control of the Board.

c. That no transfer or further reorganization should take place in the case of the First Demobilization Bureau until completion of repatriation, and in the case of the Second Demobilization Bureau until mine sweeping operations have been completed and former Japanese vessels have been turned over to Allied Nations.

d. That the Government Section consult with interested Staff Sections in applying SCAPIN 550 to all individuals in the Demobilization Board as intended by Staff Memorandum 13, 16 Jan 1947.

CONCURRENCES:

COMNAVFE : Letter 16 July 1947 signed by Captain A. L. Dunning (Tab K)

LS : Checknote Note 2, 21 June 1947 initialed A.C.C. (Mr. A. C. Carpenter) (Tab L)

Eighth Army : 1st Ind. to G-2 letter 20 June 1947, signed by Col. G.A.A. Jones, G-2, received 24 July 1947 (Tab M)

Govt. Sect. :

C. A. W.

DRAFT

18 July 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Public Service Qualifications Division

SUBJECT : Career Military Personnel in Various Ministries and Agencies other than 1st and 2nd Demobilization Bureaus.

1. Ministry of Finance

a. It has come to the attention of Public Service Qualifications Division that within the employ of the Finance Ministry there are a number of ex-army and navy officers. This matter was referred to Mr. Sunobe about 1 July, and he was asked to report details and on what authority such persons were employed.

b. On 7 July Mr. Imaizumi, Kanehiro, (Chief, General Affairs Section, National Property Bureau, Ministry of Finance) and Mr. Sunobe called to discuss this matter. Mr. Sunobe said that personnel in question were hired as 2nd class officials (SONIN) prior to SCAPIN 550, and were not required to be screened except as provided for by the provisions of Cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947. Mr. Sunobe admitted there was no authority for their employment, but that there was no directive which prohibited it. He also said that matters under the jurisdiction of the War and Navy Ministries were understood to have been transferred to the other ministries, but that no mention was made of personnel involved. Mr. Imaizumi submitted reasons attached hereto for which the Ministry of Finance believes the persons concerned are essential. He stated number of ex-army and navy personnel employed at present is as follows:

Regular employees (SONIN)	57
Shokutaku (SONIN treatment)	100

2. Ministry of Welfare

On 7 July Mr. Sunobe reported that employed in this ministry there are about 390 doctors as 2nd and 3rd class officials. It was understood that PHW had approved this informally.

3. Ministry of Commerce

On 7 July Mr. Sunobe reported that there are about actually 34 ex-army and navy officers as 2nd class officials, employed prior to SCAPIN 550.

4. Ministry of Education

Mr. Sunobe reported there are 10 ex-army and navy officers working in the Physics Research Institute for Radio Waves. He stated that they were employed prior to SCAPIN 550 and were not in the same status as Yuhara and Muramatsu for whom reinstatement was requested so they could be employed as 2nd class officials. This was disapproved.

5. Cabinet Secretariat

a. In conference 9 July 1947 Mr. Iida, Yukio, (Chief, General Affairs Section, Prisoner of War Information Bureau) reported that the POWIB was formerly under the Demobilization Board and was transferred June 1946 to the Cabinet Secretariat. All personnel were transferred, including 24 former army and navy officers as follows:

1st class (CHOKUNIN) - NAKANISHI, Sadayoshi,
ex.Lt. Gen. Chief, POWIB since transfer June '46
2nd class (SONIN) - 12 (incl. 1 ex-navy)
3rd class (HANNIN) - 3
Shokutaku - 8 (incl. 1 ex-navy)

b. When asked to explain why these persons had not been screened and reported to GHQ together with requests for their retention, Mr. Iida stated that it was due to some misunderstanding between the Demobilization Bureaus and the Cabinet Secretariat. The persons concerned are classed as

Demobilization Secretaries, and the Cabinet Secretariat on 15 March 1947 requested the Demobilization Bureaus to submit their cases to GHQ. Demobilization Bureaus said these persons were under the Cabinet Secretariat and it was their responsibility to submit the names of the 24 persons within their jurisdiction. The result was that neither agency took any action in the matter. Mr. Iida was told that the screening of these persons must be initiated immediately, and that requests for retention in the form similar to that used by the Demobilization Bureaus would be satisfactory.

6. Imperial Household Department

On 9 July Mr. Mitsui, Yasuya (Chief, Personnel Section, Imperial Household Department) stated that the following number of ex-military officer personnel were being employed since prior to SCAPIN 550:

3rd class official (HANNIN) - 1

Shokutaku - 7

7. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

9 July 1947 Mr. Ishida, Teijiro (a secretary of the Ministry) reported number of ex-military officer personnel employed since before SCAPIN 550 as follows:

Shokutaku - 8 (incl. 2 not yet repatriated)

8. Ministry of Transportation

9 July Mr. FUKUZAWA, Suiharu (Secretary, Personnel Section) reported that 7 - 2nd class officials, (career military personnel whose retention had been reportedly approved by GHQ) resigned on 6 July as successors had been found. An investigation is being made of this reported approval. He reported number of ex-army officers employed

at present is:

3rd class officials - 33 or 34

9. a. In summary, number of former career military personnel is as follows:

Ministry of Finance (non-regular)	11 157
" " Welfare	390
" " Commerce & Industry	~~20~~ 34
" " Home Affairs	
" " Education	10
Cabinet Secretariat (POWIB)	24
Imperial Household Department	8
Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry	8
" " Transportation	33 or 34
Total	~~650 or 651~~ 676 - 677

b. Mr. Fukuzawa, of the Ministry of Transportation, said that about 2 July the Cabinet had notified the various agencies to ascertain number of ex-officers within their employ. It was pointed out to Mr. Sunobe that inspite of the absence of authority for the retention of these persons, it was regarded as an act of bad faith inasmuch as it was understood that only the Demobilization Bureaus were believed to be retaining former regular army and navy officers, and were so authorized. Mr. Sunobe said on 9 July '47 that the screening of all concerned was being initiated, and that requests for their retention were being prepared to be submitted with questionnaires. No estimate has been given as to when questionnaires will be submitted.

c. Mr. Sunobe was asked on 10 July to report full details on the case of ex-Gen. NAKANISHI. This was ready 17 July in rough, but is to be submitted in typewritten form.

He also stated that the Cabinet Secretariat questionnaires would be in early next week.

JOHN BRADY

~~Min. of Com. & Ind. 34 ex-officio~~

add Home Min. 1

File: CNFE/S81/(00)
Serial: (0096)

COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES FAR EAST

SECRET

SECRET

10 July 1947.

From: Commander Naval Forces Far East.
To : The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Subject: Japanese Minesweeping.

1. In order to give the Japanese a definite date for the completion of minesweeping, they were told to complete magnetic sweeping during August, and Guinea pigging of the same areas during November of 1947. They submitted a plan on that basis which will be substantially completed by 1 August 1947.

2. However, it is advisable to continue the sweeping for the following reasons:

(a) To add branch channels to ports essential to the Japanese economy.

(b) To sweep areas where submarine cables require repair.

(c) To widen channels in areas where shipping is liable to be congested, particularly at the approaches to Shimonoseki which is the only area now presenting any serious danger.

3. The operation of a small Japanese sweeping detachment will also provide a means of keeping channels to key ports free of mines (magnetic only) in an emergency. U.S. Sweepers will not be available for this purpose before 1 January 1948, and, if available then, will be few in number.

4. The Japanese Maritime Bureau, the Maritime Safety Security Committee, the Communications Bureau and various sections of SCAP have requested additional Japanese minesweeping.

5. In view of the foregoing, Japanese minesweeping in the Shimonoseki and Inland Sea areas will be continued, utilizing a force approximately half of the present size. This will require about thirty small sweepers and four guinea pig vessels, and will permit the release of about half the personnel now engaged in minesweeping, and require for retention of about 200 ex-naval officers and 1200 to 1500 former naval enlisted ratings.

R.M. Griffin

Copy for GS

SECRET

23 June 1947

MEMO FOR ~~RECORD~~ PSGD:

SUBJECT : Demobilization Bureaus

1. At 1400, 23 June 1947, Mr. Yoshie, of the First Demobilization Bureau, and Mr. Fukuchi, of the Second Demobilization Bureau, with Mr. Sumino, Political Affairs Section, CLO, met with the undersigned to report on the status of their work in preparing their requests for retention.

2. The First Demobilization Bureau reported that 620 requests will be submitted, of which 384 have been submitted to the Central Screening Committee. About 30 requests may be made with old questionnaire forms. Mr. Yoshie was advised to exert every effort to obtain new forms. It was stated that about 11 ex-Army officers are employed on repatriation vessels, and that considerable difficulty had been experienced in getting questionnaires to them due to their undetermined movements. He expressed doubt that their requests could be submitted by 1 July. He was advised that such requests would be considered after 1 July if individuals concerned had left Japan before it was possible to get questionnaires to them. Mr. Yoshie said they would not be able to submit by 1 July biographies of those officers not affected by the purge. He was advised that by that date only a list would be required.

3. Mr. Fukuchi, of the Second Demobilization Bureau, reported that 550 cases would be submitted, of which 50 Admirals and Captains had been submitted to the Central Screening Committee.

John H. Brady
JOHN H. BRADY

OK

14

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

Demobilization

5 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Demobilization Bureau Conference

1. At 1530, 29 May 1947, Comdr. Hussey, Major Napier, and Mr. Brady met with the following:

Mr. Yoshie, Seiichi, Secretary of the Personnel Section, First Demobilization Bureau.

Mr. Ihara, Mitsugu, Secretary of the General Affairs Section, Second Demobilization Bureau.

Mr. Fukuchi, Nobuo, Secretary of the Personnel Section, Second Demobilization Bureau.

Mr. Yamada, Chief of the Political Affairs Division of CLO.

Mr. Sunobe, Assistant to Mr. Yamada.

2. Major Napier stated that requests for retention by the First and Second Demobilization Bureaus of persons affected by the purge had not been submitted in conformance with instructions issued by Comdr. Hussey 28 February, and by Col. Marcum 23 April. Major Napier then explained that instructions being issued at the present conference provided a deadline and procedure by which all requests are to be submitted. He iterated that these instructions were being issued, not to CLO, but to the Demobilization Bureaus. After being assured that those present were responsible for the application of the instructions now being issued, Major Napier read in their hearing the instructions, repeated in Japanese by Mr. Sunobe, and attached hereto as enclosure No. 1.

3. Comdr. Hussey stated that the retention of every person falling under the Memorandum, regardless of rank, must be justified in the form of these instructions. He requested that the names and biographies of all persons not falling under the Memorandum and retained by the Bureaus be submitted by 1 July 1947. He stated that requests will be submitted in order of rank.

4. Comdr. Hussey read the following from his initial instructions of 28 February:

a. On and after 31 March 1947, the employment of every ex-military officer in any capacity shall be justified on an individual basis within the requirement of SCAPIN 550; all retentions shall be on a temporary basis and until replacements can be obtained.

66

12

b. On and after 31 March 1947 the employment of every ex-naval officer in any capacity shall be justified on an individual basis within the requirement of SCAPIN 550 except that ex-naval officers employed on or in command of vessels engaged in mine sweeping and vessels in laidup reserve shall be reported and need not be further justified. All other retentions shall be on a temporary basis and until replacements can be obtained.

5. Mr. Brady delivered to Mr. Sunobe a copy of the instructions read by Major Napier.

JOHN BRADY

Encl. 1

1. For each individual affected by the purge whose retention by the First and/or Second Demobilization Bureaus is requested a questionnaire screened by the Central Screening Committee will be submitted to this Headquarters.

2. In no case will any one request for retention cover more than one individual.

3. Each request must state the specific job and title of the job together with a detailed description of the duties and responsibilities of the post to which it is desired to assign the individual concerned.

4. Each request must state the specific job and title of the job together with a detailed description of the duties and responsibilities of the post which the individual occupies at present, and the length of time he has occupied said post.

5. Each request must state the peculiar and particular qualifications which render the person concerned absolutely indispensible to the specific position for which his services are requested.

6. In case incontrovertible evidence in support of each request is not submitted prior to 1 July 1947, the individual concerned will be removed from the post which he occupies.

7. Each request must specify the date until which the services of the individual concerned are considered to be absolutely essential.

8. A certificate must be submitted by both Demobilization Bureaus prior to 1 July 1947 stating that within the employ of the respective bureau there are no persons affected by the purge other than those for whom retention has been requested.

9. These instructions apply to all future requests for retention.

29 May 1947

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5. Each request must state the ~~peculiar and particular~~ particular and peculiar qualifications which render the person concerned absolutely indispensible to the specific position for which his services are requested.

6. In case incontrovertible evidence in support of each request is not submitted prior to 1 July 1947, the individual concerned will be removed from the post which he occupies. Request for retention will not be considered at any time subsequent to 1 July 1947.

7. Each request must specify the date until which the services of the individual concerned are considered to be absolutely essential.

8. A certificate must be submitted by both Demobilization Bureaus prior to 1 July 1947 stating that within the employ of the respective bureau there are no persons affected by the purge other than those for whom retention has been requested.

9. These instructions apply to all future requests for retention.

Demobilization

5 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: DEMOBILIZATION BUREAUS

Mr. Yoshie, Seiichi, Secretary of Personnel Section, First Demobilization Bureau presented the following questions 1330, 2 June 1947 which were answered as indicated:

1. Date until which persons are to be retained is difficult to determine because of uncertainty as to when repatriation and other functions will be completed.

(a) Told him to use best judgment as to time.

2. If a person is requested for retention, say until 1 December 1947, can he be released prior to that date?

(a) Yes

3. Asked for approval of sample request.

(a) Suggested full details as to why other person can't be secured as replacement.

4. If details re position under consideration are same as for present position, can such be indicated by "same as above" or similar phrase?

(a) Yes, as long as all details are exactly the same.

5. Is it okay to submit some questionnaires in their old form?

(a) Yes

To John Brady
Per our conversation
please make
necessary comment
JJ

John Brady
JOHN BRADY

6 June 1947 - Mr. Yoshie was advised by telephone that questionnaires were to be submitted in their new form.

John Brady
JOHN BRADY

68

JJ

11

Reorganization of Demobilization Board

GS

G-2

(1) 3 June 1947

1. By check sheet dated 31 May 1947, G-2 submitted to GS "tentative plans for reorganization of the demobilization apparatus". These plans were submitted by the 1st and 2nd Demobilization Bureaus in compliance with the instructions issued by GS, on 28 February 47 as modified on 27 March 1947, GS then acting under the instructions approved by the C/S on 25 Jan 1947.

2. GS has considered the submitted plans and sees no occasion for any discussion of these plans. As submitted, they do not comply in any manner with either the instructions issued by GS or the basic orders approved by the C/S. In fact, they constitute a deliberate perversion of the same.

3. If this were solely the failure of the Japanese Government, the situation would be serious enough. It is understood, however, that a representative of your Section instructed Japanese officials that they were at liberty to present a plan which contemplated no transfer of any of the functions of the Demobilization Board until completion of demobilization or repatriation if they felt that it would be unwise to make such transfer and that if they did submit such a plan, they should state the reasons for it. The plans as submitted contemplate no transfer until the completion of repatriation which is stated to take place not before November 1949 in the case of the 1st Demobilization Board. A large portion of the material submitted is devoted to figures and arguments to show why nothing should be done to carry out the instructions of this Headquarters.

4. Under these circumstances, there is no other course open than to reject the plans in toto and to determine the reason why after consultation with agencies of this Headquarters who were fully acquainted with the instructions approved by the C/S such matters were submitted in pretense of compliance.

- -C.W.- - - - - - - - - -

GS File

CONFIDENTIAL

19708

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.: Subject: Reorganization of Demobilization Board

Note No.: From: GS To: G-2 Date: 3 June 1947

(1)

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C.W.

- - - -

Reorganization of Demobilization Board

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- -C.W.- - - - - - - - - -

From: G-2 To: GS

8 Jun 47
GB/CAW/ap/2742

2 1. I am anxious to maintain this matter, and relations between sections, on a comparatively amicable level; however, this phraseology practically suggests that we are abrogating the C/S orders; the Government Section is ih

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No: Subject: Reorganization of Demobilization Board (cont'd)

Note No.	From:	To:	Date:

2 cont'd

error; note sequence and status of measures taken or proposed:

a. Gen Harrison studied demobilization machinery: (Dec 46/Jan 47).
b. Gen Harrison submitted a plan to the Chief of Staff (21 Jan 47).
c. The Chief of Staff approved Gen Harrison's plan (15 Feb 47)
d. Govt Sect issued instructions based on (c) (28 Feb 47).
e. Comdg Gen, 8th Army and COMNAVFE, protest (Tabs A and B).
f. Gen Harrison called conference to reconsider plan (17 Mar).
g. C/S decision: "...time was not propitious for placing of the demobilization machinery under a ministry" (23 Mar 47), (Tab C).
h. Gen Harrison called conference (25 Mar); it was decided that Govt Sect issue revised instructions. (Tab D).
i. Mr. Hussey called a conference (27 Mar 47), issued new instructions and orally informed the Japanese that "the time when the new plans should come into operation....was a matter to be determined by those same agencies. SCAP, under whom the bureaus were operating." (Quotations are from memo for record 28 Mar 47, signed: Alfred R. Hussey, Jr), (Tab E).
j. Second Demobilization Board (Navy) receive instructions from COMNAVFE. First Demobilization Board (Army) from G-2, GHQ.
k. First Demobilization Board (Army) submitted plans to G-2. Second Demobilization Board (Navy) to COMNAVFE. First Demobilization Board is aware of obligation to transfer to ministry. (See footnote on plan "A": 1st Demobilization Bureau).
l. Central Liaison Office recommended no change until demobilization is practically completed (29 May), (Tab F).

2. "Submission" of a plan does not necessarily mean "acceptance" of it. Such plans would be studied and analyzed by the participating authorities, i.e., Eighth Army, COMNAVFEC, G-2, Legal Section and, of course, Govt Section; we called such a conference and expected Comdr Hussey to attend, to obtain the benefit of his experience.

3. G-2's entire interest is to maintain a machinery that will repatriate over 1,000,000 remaining military and civilian Japanese, from Russ territory, and to conduct certain investigations required under MID, WD, and FEC orders; the present machinery is the same that repatriated over 5,000,000 from the Asiatic areas. The method, plan, personnel, internal functions, etc., have been tested; no one challenges the efficient demobilization/repatriation performance, from September 1945 to December 1946. Consequently, I do not quite understand the Government Section position in being apparently uneasy of continuation of a tested system? Proportionally, this machinery "for unfinished business" requires approximately 20/30% of the former personnel: we are already far below that level, in every category. The operating agencies,

RETURN THIS RECEIPT IMMEDIATELY TO:

AC/S G-2 GHQ FEC APO # 500

POSTAL
Registry No.

19708

Date 10 June 47

Serial No.
File No.
or Subject | ~~C~~ C/n d/d 3 June re: RODB

with: ~~6~~ inclosure(s)

1 indorsement(s)

Addressee:

Govt Section
APO # 500 dbm

NOTE.—Sheet 2 (addressee's copy) to be retained by addressee.

(DUPLICATE)

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 996, 16 July 1943 (See AR 380-5). CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT RECEIPT 16—36304-1

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2 cont'd

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No: Subject: Reorganization of Demobilization Board (cont'd)

Note No. 2 cont'd

From: To: Date:

Eighth Army (Gen Eichelberger) and Navy (Admiral Griffin) have stated their own positions rather plainly, (Tabs A and B).

4. The complex interlocking machinery and the staff sections concerned:

*1 - Demobilization/Plans & Policy.....G-2/Eighth Army
2 - Disarmament/Equipment/Supplies.....G-4 Eighth Army
3 - Repatriation/Plans & Policy.....G-3 Eighth Army
4 - Repatriation Shipping/Plans & Policy.....COMNAVJAP
5 - Execution of: 1 to 4, plan for.....Jap Demobilization Board
6 - Field Operations in execution/1 to 4.....1st & 2d Demobilization Board
*7 - Demobilization/Disarmament/GHQ Surveillance..G-2
8 - Armament & Equipment Storage & Distribution..G-4/Eighth Army
9 - Repatriation from Overseas. Plans.....G-3/US Navy
10 - Control of overseas repatriation shipping....COMNAVJAP
**11 - Operation of repatriation shipping.....2d Demobilization Bureau
12 - Repatriation Port & Camps.....1st Demob Bureau Home Ministry
13 - Demobilization and Reception.....1st Demob Bureau Public Health
14 - Rail/Motor Movements to Home areas.....1st Demobilization Bureau
15 - Discharge/Dependent Aid/Relocation....Local Asst Bureau Home Ministry

(*) Basic Plans at Surrender Negotiations Manila, 15 Aug 45, GHQ control exercised since that time, in periodical consultation with and joint action by Eighth Army, COMNAVJAP, G-3 and G-4.

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Demobilization/Disarmament of Japanese Armed Forces.....15 Oct 45
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Final Report Demob/Disarmament of Jap Armed Forces.....31 Dec 46
Operation of Demobilization Centers ATIS No 146..... 6 Jan 47

5. We will continue to solicit the cooperation of the Govt Sect in planning, surveillance and development of this problem, since all operating agencies are in fair agreement, and suggest that this check sheet be reconsidered. I trust that we can arrive at an amicable understanding with the Govt Sect on this matter.

6 Incls
1. Tab A - Ltr fr Lt Gen Eichelberger, file AG 370.01, subj: Comments on Plan to Eliminate 1st Demob Bureau
2. Tab B - Ltr fr Adm Griffin, COMNAVFE, subj: Comments on Plan to Eliminate 2d Demob Bureau, 8 Mar 47

AFPAC AGO Form No. 37

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No:

Subject: Reorganization of Demobilization Board (cont'd)

Note No.	From:	To:	Date:
2 cont'd	6 Incls (cont'd) 3. Tab C - Memorandum for Record, 25 Mar 47, subj: Demob Bd 4. Tab D - Conference 25 Mar 47 (revised instr) 5. Tab E - Comdr Hussey's Memo for Record 28 Mar 47 6. Tab F - Ltr fr Central Liaison Office, subj: Reorgn of Demob Bd dtd 29 May 47		

-C.A.W.-

AFPAC AGO Form No. 37

CONFIDENTIAL

6 Incls (cont'd)

2 cont'd

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4. Tab D - Conference 25 Mar 47 (revised instr)
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- -C.A.W.- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Reorganization of Demobilization Board

GS G-2 3 June 1947

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- -C.W.- - - - - - - - - - -

Comdr Hussey

TAB
A

COPY

AG 370.01

SUBJECT: Comments on Plan to Eliminate the First Demobilization Bureau.

TO : Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, APO 500

1. References:

a. Copy of statement handed by Mr. Hussey, Government Section, SCAP, to CLO, First Demobilization Bureau and Second Demobilization Bureau representatives on 28 February 1947.

b. Letter this headquarters, AG 370.01 (MG-L) to SCAP, subject: Investigation of Demobilization Agencies.

2. Reference a. above apparently disregards the principal recommendations from Eighth Army (reference b. above) and it is felt that the statement tends to make it impossible for the Japanese Government to recommend a satisfactory plan for the completion of the repatriation and demobilization program.

3. This headquarters, in reference b. above, made certain recommendations in connection with the First Demobilization Bureau, including one to the effect that the ministry under which the bureau may be placed be given a certain length of time to determine which of the former officer personnel are essential to the completion of the demobilization and repatriation, and that the ministry work out details of reorganization for the Supreme Commander's approval. Without this period of essential test by the new agency before a change is made the smooth functioning of demobilization, which has characterized these efforts from the beginning, is jeopardized. The numbers yet to be repatriated are approximately 1,371,406.

4. It is true that the Eighth Army has been charged only with surveillance of demobilization and repatriation. The use of experienced Japanese personnel for this purpose has resulted in a rapid and smooth operation, with the utilization of a minimum of occupation forces. However, if the process is now turned over to a new ministry, staffed with inexperienced personnel, a state of chaos is forseeable. Since the responsibility of the Eighth Army will remain unchanged, it will be mandatory for a larger proportion of occupation troops to be utilized, to the detriment of other occupation missions. For this cogent reason I therefore request permission to have representatives present our position in conference before final approval is given to the plan.

R. L. EICHELBERGER
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

COPY

Incl 1

TAB
B

COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES, FAR EAST
Tokyo Japan

File CNFE/EF37 (5)/(80)
Serial (475)

8 March 1947

This is a copy

From: Commander Naval Forces, Far East.
To : Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Subject: Comments on Plan to Eliminate the Second Demobilization Bureau.

Reference: (a) Deputy Chief of Staff's Memorandum for the Chief of Staff dated 20 January 1947, subject: "Removal of Ex-Japanese Army and Navy Officers from the Demobilization Boards".

1. It is recommended that the approval of reference (a) by the Chief of Staff be withdrawn for the following reasons:

(a) Occupation instructions make Commander Naval Activities Japan responsible for minesweeping, demilitarization and custody of ships of the former Japanese Navy, and through the Administrator, Naval Shipping Control Authority for Japanese Merchant Marine (SCAJAP) for the operation of former Japanese Navy vessels in repatriation.

(b) Considerable work remains to be done principally in minesweeping, custody of ex-naval ships and their delivery to the allied powers.

(c) If the work is to progress as smoothly as similar work has in the past, it will be necessary to retain the present Second Demobilization Bureau and its responsibility to Commander Naval Activities Japan.

(d) Any discussions of reorganization of personnel or transfer of functions of the Second Demobilization Bureau carried on between the Government Section of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the Second Demobilization Bureau, without reference to Commander Naval Activities Japan, confuses the authority previously definitely established with Commander Naval Activities Japan as the executive representative of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in matters pertaining to the Second Demobilization Bureau.

R. M. GRIFFIN.

COPY

TAB
C

25 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Demobilization Board

1. On 23 March 1947, Chief of Staff concurred orally in the recommendation that so much of the 25 January 1947 directive relating to the further demilitarization of the Demobilization Board as required transfer or elimination of functions be postponed and that the part of the directive which requires the early elimination of former senior officers (generals, admirals, colonels, naval captains) be executed. The reasons for the recommendation which led to his decision were as follows:

Disagree

a. The directive in itself and execution are not difficult nor is it believed that they would in any serious degree reduce the efficiency of the Demobilization and related operations. However, those parts relating to transfers of functions are by no means essential at this time although they ultimately will become so.

Poor wording

b. Since the beginning of the interstaff disagreement over the Demobilization Board in the summer of 1947, failure to get staff cooperation and harmony even after the Chief of Staff directive of 25 January indicates that the execution of the directive will only increase friction in the staff regarding a matter which is not of primary importance. This feeling of friction particularly as related to the participation of the Government Section in the matter has extended to COMNAVFE who considers himself the executive agency for all dealings on naval matters with the Second Demobilization Bureau.

c. It considered more important to eliminate this feeling and lack of concord than it is to force to conclusion the execution of the approved directive.

Quotable

2. The Chief of Staff agreed that the time to transfer functions is not now propitious.

W. K.H.

Incl-3

TAB
D

25 March 1947

I am directed to inform you that the Chief of Staff has authorized a delay in the submission of the plan concerning which I instructed you on 28 February 1947 until 31 May 1947.

The Chief of Staff also desires that you be informed that in the preparation of this plan you will confer with the appropriate Army and Naval officials from whom you have heretofore been receiving your instructions.

This does not, of course, mean that there is any change in the other instructions which I gave you concerning the reduction of senior ex-military and naval personnel or the application of SCAPIN 550, 4 January 1946. The date 31 March is, however, changed to 30 April 1947.

NOTE FOR RECORD:

This statement was prepared and agreed to at a conference held in General Harrison 's office, 1600, 25 March 1947. Those concurring were: General Willoughby; General Whitney; Captain Bard (USN); and, Colonel Binkhardt (G-3). Mr. Hussey was directed to give this statement to the IJG as soon as practicable.

General Byers was informed by telephone about 0930, 26 March 1947, and concurred.

So far as can be foreseen at this time, this agreement settles the disagreement among Staff Sections regarding demilitarization of the Demobilization Board.

W. K. H.

Incl 4

TAB
E

To Col Bethune

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

28 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Demobilization

1. Pursuant to the understanding arrived at on 25 March between General Whitney, General Willoughby (G-2), General Harrison (ODC/S), Captain Bard (CNF), and Colonel Burkart (G-3), the following officials of the Imperial Japanese Government were called into Government Section on 27 March 1947 at 1000: S. Mizota, Interpreter; Y. Yamamoto, Chief, General Affairs Section, 2d Demobilization Bureau; I. Yokoyama, Chief, Liaison Division, 2d Demobilization Bureau; S. Takeyama, Chief, General Affairs Section, 1st Demobilization Bureau; T. Kato, Chief, Liaison Section, 1st Deombilization Bureau, O. Arae, Chief, General Affairs Division, 1st Demobilization Bureau; S. Morita, Chief Secretary of the Demobilization Board; and, Mr. Fujisaki, Central Liaison Office.

2. The undersigned read to the assembled officials the attached statement, Tab "A".

This doesn't not abrogate Par 6-2 Responsibilities under Staff Memos

3. The undersigned then stated that the instructions signified that in the preparation of the plan the Demobilization Board was primarily responsible to COMNAVFE, G-2, the Legal section and Eighth Army.

4. In response to an inquiry relative to the meaning of the changes in dates, it was then stated that the time for the submission of the plan was changed from 15 March to 31 May and at the same time the final date for the elimination of high-ranking ex-officers personnel in excess of specified numbers was shifted from 31 March to 30 April.

complied with

5. The undersigned then referred to the instructions given by Government Section on 28 February and pointed out that those portions of these instructions which are related to the elimination or transfer of activities or responsibilities of the Demobilization Board and Bureaus had now been made subject to such instructions as the Japanese officials would receive from the appropriate SCAP agencies with whom they are now dealing, such as COMNAVFE, G2, Eighth Army, but that instructions relating to reduction or elimination of ex-officer personnel and the application of SCAPIN 550 remain in full force and effect, except that: (a) the words, "and proportionate numbers of lower ranks," appearing in sub-paragraphs b. (4) and c. (5) are stricken; (b) the date, 31 March 1947, appearing in b. (4), b.(6), c. (5) and c. (7) is changed to 30 April 1947; and, (c) the figures 8 and 40 appearing in c. (5) are changed to 7 and 42 to conform to Admiral Griffin's instructions.

Encl 5

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Memo for Record (cont'd) 28 Mar 47

6. In response to an inquiry as to whether Government Section was interested in the retention of any particular officers, the Japanese were instructed that this is primarily a matter of concern to COMNAVFE, G-2 and Eighth Army, that while responsibility for application of the purge directive (SCAPIN 550) was Government Section's, the question of whether an officer was necessary to demobilization (that is, the decision of whether his retention was justified) is one to be answered by COMNAVFE, G-2 or Eighth Army.

7. In response to an inquiry as to whether the plan should be submitted to Government Section, the Japanese were instructed that the plan should be submitted through the representative Army and Navy agencies under whom the Demobilization Bureaus were now working and to whom they were primarily responsible.

8. The question was then asked as to when the new plan should come into operation. The officials were instructed that this was a matter to be determined by those same agencies of SCAP under whom the Bureaus were operating.

/s/ ALFRED R. HUSSEY, JR.
Special Assistant to the Chief
Government Section

TAB
F

SECOND DEMOBILIZATION BUREAU
DEMOBILIZATION BOARD
OF THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

SDB. No. 332. 3 May 1947.

To: Vice Admiral R. M. Griffin, ComNavFe.

Subject: Plan of Reorganization of Second Demobilization Bureau.

Our plan of reorganization of Second Demobilization Bureau is herewith submitted as enclosed.

FOR THE CHIEF OF BUREAU:

I. YOKOYAMA,
Second Demobilization Bureau.

Plan of the Reorganization of the Second Demobilization Bureau.

1. It is a matter of course that the Second Demobilization Bureau is considering ways and means to faithfully carry out the directive concerning the reorganization of the Demobilization Board; but on the other hand, as we also have the responsibility to thoroughly carry out those duties entrusted to us, we believe we must use every means to minimize sacrifice arising from the reorganization.

2. On the basis of the above considerations, our reorganization plan is as follows:

The fact that the present organization is best suited for carrying out the duties, can not only be explained from various standpoints but is also well borne out, we believe, by our past performances. Under the circumstances it is our wish, if possible, to maintain the present organization, to successively diminish personnel with the progress of work, and when the diminishing of personnel has reached a certain stage, to simplify the organization also, to suit the occasion. Moreover, a great many of our personnel in the higher levels have been dismissed recently and with present conditions where maximum efficiency must be raised with a minimum of manpower, we can think of no other method other than the above to bring this about.

Today, when our duties have reached nearly the final and most important state, it is the belief of the Sdeond Demobilization Bureau that efficiency must be raised yet further and the progress of the work accelerated. From the standpoint of this special situation also, it is our wish to maintain the present organizat

for the time being. By "time being" here is meant "until the various duties mentioned hereunder has been completed":

Minesweeping Activities

Ship Maintenance Activities

(Refer to Attached Table No. 1).

3. After the period mentioned above, the two duties of the Second Demobilization Bureau that would remain are those of demobilization and investigation; but as these duties are no less important than that of ship maintenance or minesweeping to us, we believe it most appropriate to more or less carry on the organization of the present, aside from abolishing the organizations concerning ship maintenance, minesweeping and their related activities. If the GHQ, SCAP would direct the transfer of our demobilization and investigation activities to other ministries (Home Ministry, Central Laision Office etc.) from the standpoint of its occupation policies, it would be then inevitable, but if otherwise, we believe that continuance of the work along aforementioned lines would be most effective and serve to accelerate the completion of the work.

(Refer to Attached Table No. 2).

4. Moreover, the Second Demobilization Bureau holds great concern concerning matters such as the following:

(a) Investigation duties.

As important documents were either lost or burned, the execution of this activity is in the main limited to no other method than referring to the memories of the former high rank officers, but there is hardly

anyone volunteering to remain on this duty. As they are all eager to join private enterprises at the earliest possible date from the standpoint of their personal livelihood, we feel that it may not be possible to continue this activity long into the future.

If the GHQ, SCAP deem it necessary to continue these various investigations for considerable time into the future, some sort of measure must be taken to hold these men. Moreover as the fragmentary memories of many former high rank personnel who belong to this activity must be synthesized, it would be fatal to divide the work relating to the Second Demobilization Bureau into several parts.

(b) Demobilization duties.

Although it is believed that this organization would be gradually contracted with the progress of demobilization, we believe it undesirable as a future organization to have the organization relating to the former navy absorbed into that relating to the former army on the ground of its small number of personnel. To explain, the substance of the work here, namely the confirming of the dead through action and disease, the checking of the unrepatriated etc., not only has absolutely no relation with that of the former army but the establishing of any such organization, would amount to adding an unrelated superstructure and is feared would be detrimental to the efficient operation of the work. Even if the two be consolidated into a single board or bureau

(division) as at present, it is desirable that the former army and navy be separated into distinct organizations standing side by side.

Also, another point in which the activities of the Second Demobilization Bureau differ with those of the First Demobilization Bureau is that the Second Demobilization Bureau divides demobilization work with its district organizations; that is, it handles the demobilization of special service branch officers and those of lower ranks are left to the district demobilization bureaus. To explain in other words, the relation of the two is not one of superior and subordinate but one of peculiar relations where each has a different objective; and this point must be considered in any plan of reorganization.

(Note).

At the former army, the work of demobilizing repatriated military personnel into civilian life is being carried out by the Local Assistance Bureau in each prefecture, while the Home Depot Affairs Section carries out, in the main, the checking of the dead, through action and disease, and the missing as well as these matters concerning their disposal.

Annexed Table No. 1.



Annexed Table No. 1.



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15 May

Predicted to be abolished when Ship Maintenance and Minesweeping activities be completed

Predicted to be abolished when demobilization businesses be completed

Predicted to be abolished when investigation businesses be completed




Supply Division
Investigation Division
Liaison Division
Institute of War Records and Technical Intelligence
Minesweeping Coordination Office
District Demobilization Bureau
Administrative Office
Personnel Office
Accounting Office
Supply Office
Ship Maintenance Office
Minesweeping Office
Repatriation Center
Organization relating to First Demobilization Bureau


General Affairs Section
Personnel Office
Accounting Office
Repatriation Center
Branch Office of Second Demobilization Bureau (Investigation Affairs)

Annexed Table No. 2.

showing organization proposed after completion of minesweeping and ship maintenance.



SECOND DEMOBILIZATION BUREAU
DEMOBILIZATION BOARD
OF THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

SDB. No.342.

10 May 1947.

To: Vice-Admiral R. M. Griffin, ComNavFe.

Subject: Table of Organization, Personnel and Duties of the S.D.B. After Ship Maintenance and Minesweeping Activities Be Completed.

Reference: (a) S.D.B. No.332 dated 8 May 1947, subject "Plan of Reorganization of Second Demobilization Bureau".

With reference to the plan of reorganization of the S.D.B. submitted you through reference (a) above, the number of personnel and duties of the offices of Second Demobilization Bureau and District Demobilization Bureau after the ship maintenance and minesweeping activities be completed are set forth in the attached table.

FOR THE CHIEF OF BUREAU:

I. YOKOYAMA,
Second Demobilization Bureau.

Table of Organization, Personnel and Duties o

Note: The numbers of the fixed personnel shown in this table, be
circumstances in the future.

			Fixed Personn				
			Sec., 1/c		Sec., 2/c		
			Ex-Adm.	Civilian Official	Ex-Capt.	Ex-Com. & below	Civ. Offi-cial
Organization relating to 1st Demobilization Bureau		Administrative Section			4	7	6
Second Demobilization Bureau	Administrative Division	Legal Investigation Section		1	1	9	2
		Liaison Section	2		1	12	5
		Historical Records Section	1		1	14	2
	Personnel Division	Personnel Investigation Section		1	3	6	9
		Demobilization Section			2	14	1
	Accounting Division				5	10	6

Demobilization Board

Cabinet

utie[illegible] of the S.E.B. aft[illegible] the Ship Maintenance and [illegible]inesweeping Activities be Complet

ble, being generally estimated ones, shall be subjected to alterations more or less ac

Personnel						Assigned Duties
	Sec., 3/c		Employee			
Civ. Offi-cial	Ex-Mil. Person-nel	Civ. Offi-cial	Ex-Mil. Person-nel	Civilian	Total	
6	1	16	0	155	189	(1) Overall control and coordination of offices within the Bureau. (2) Genera (3) Maintaining of disciplines within lating to organization and fixed perso ting and custody of official papers. lished divisions and sections. (7) Af under any other divisions or sections. Forces.
2	3	1	0	17	23	(1) Investigation and compilation of inf nals and suspected war criminals reque SCAP. (2) Aids to those who are summo with item (1) above. (3) Furnishing H tions necessary for the arrests connec
5	0	2	0	4	24	(1) Translation of papers received from Forces. (2) Interpretation. (3) Liai sections within the Bureau concerning the Allied Forces. (4) Liaison with C (5) Liaison with the Allied Forces whe
2	1	5	0	19	42	(1) Investigation and compilation of the Allied Forces concerning war history, tary articles, property and technical remaining affairs of the defunct Naval ment of Naval Aeronautics and Naval Ci
9	9	51	1	255	350	(4) (1) Investigation of the war-dead and th (2) Arrangement of various statistics re
6	1	61	0	171	244	(1) Recognition and disposition of the (former commissioned officers). (2) ing the repatriated personnel. (3) Pe Bureau.
						(1) Affairs relating to budgets, settle (2) Drawing up of various accounting relating to various pays, contracts, (4) Liquidation of remaining accounti