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FOUNDED BY EDWARD C. HEGELER

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

THE GAME JIRIT AS PLAYED IN ITS HEYDAY

Frontispiece to The Open Court

THE OPEN COURT

Volume XLVIII (No. 1) January, 1934 Number 928

LINCOLN'S LOST CAUSE

BY EDWARD O. SISSON

CAN any discussion of Abraham Lincoln be timely today? The very world in which he lived and died has passed away; even the vision which he had of his country has vanished, and the America of his ardent dreams—"the last, best hope of man"—can never be. The tame and human 'capitalism' of which he had a friendly inkling has expanded into an ominous monster, quite as bitterly execrated by its enemies as the "Slave Power" of Lincoln's day. The very type of man he was, frontiersman, has passed away, there being no frontier. Yet Lincoln is still interesting: there is a great Lincoln play—written, it is true by a foreign hand; books still come from the press about him, some conventionally laudatory, some critical, hostile, even calumnious. Besides Lincoln stands alone among American figures in his universal human interest, having been vastly admired all around the world, by people to whom for the most part the issues of Lincoln's own time meant little or nothing. Is it possible that even with the stage so completely re-set and the very persons of the drama so diverse, the deeper elemental forces may be the same, and the final significance still vital? This is the view which inspires the following discussion and, we believe, is supported by it.

Because the discussion takes this view and undertakes to set forth qualities exhibited in the public career of Lincoln which support the view, it is proper to say in advance that it does not intend in any way to add to the Lincoln myth, nor even to justify him against certain charges which may be brought against him. He has been accused of opportunism; the very things praised here are cited by others to prove the charge. He was condemned in his own day as lukewarm in the cause of negro freedom; this is in a sense admitted here, even insisted upon. Far more serious is the charge still made by some Southern writers, that Lincoln had it in his power to avert war and yet deliberately precipitated the War; even to this there is no rebuttal in this paper, although there are in it certain clues which might be followed up toward a possible defense. But the paper confines itself to a definite question and offers a definite answer to this question. Also it seeks to rest the case upon grounds the least open to controversy, mostly accepted historical facts, including extensive citation of Lincoln's own official utterances.

The specific issues of Lincoln's day, slavery and secession, have passed into history and concern us no more; it would seem that whatever enduring fame Lincoln enjoys must rest not upon these issues, but on something else, deeper, more basically human perhaps, more ultimate in its significance. These issues were both adjudicated by the victory of the North and the triumph of the party which Lincoln led, and in that victory Lincoln played a major role. But his supreme contribution was something quite other than these services of his as leader of the victorious party, and in the irony of fate this contribution was in the event rejected and brought to naught. What he did offer, in the briefest terms, was an ideal and a spirit, together with definite and concrete ways and means to embody the spirit and the ideal; his own utterances make it clear that he considered these things to be of supreme importance, not solely to his own country in its immediate crisis, but to all mankind and in all human affairs. All this is to say that Lincoln's enduring significance is bound up with a cause that was lost rather than with the causes that were victorious. It is this lost cause of Lincoln's and its significance that we here seek to exhibit.

In the great conflict between North and South there were two salient and obvious issues; the abolition of slavery, and the preservation of the Union. The grand visible drama revolved upon these, and these were both decided by arbitrament of war. Lincoln was, up to the moment of his assassination, the spokesman and the executive head of the political force which carried through the war and its settlement; even before his death slavery was, if not legally abolished, visibly doomed; and the Union, although still dismembered, was manifestly to be preserved—and as time showed, enormously strengthened. These then are the imposing aspects of the drama as played on the scene with battles, political movements, proclamations, and eventually constitutional transformations.

We come next to an emphatic negative—that neither of these great causes which were won was in any peculiar sense Lincoln's; in neither was he an originator or pioneer, but in both he was a follower where others had blazed the trail. Inasmuch as Lincoln is constantly hailed as Emancipator and Preserver of the Union, this will seem strange; he was the emancipator in the sense of having signed and issued, on his own official authority, the Emancipation Proclamation; and he was likewise supreme magistrate and commander-in-chief during the armed conflict and did in those capacities inexorably demand the submission of the revolting states and their return to the Union. But in both these causes, to use Napoleon's words, "his mind marched with millions of men," he was the symbol and executor of these causes but not their prophet or protagonist. Lincoln's own true causes, in which he played the role of leader and prophet, were quite other than these operations of abolition and of federal solidification; causes far less capable of dramatization, subtle, human, moral; causes which were lost and in which Lincoln was defeated, partly during his life and more tragically after his death, which canceled the last hope of success for these causes. We must then consider what Lincoln's position and function really were with respect to the two great issues which were won; for his own cause, which was lost, had to do with these huge historic causes, which were won.

First, Lincoln and slavery. Lincoln's attitude concerning slavery was quite clear and definite, but was complex, with the result that it was often misunderstood by both friends and opponents in his own day and is still seldom clearly understood. Yet it was really the attitude of the great mass of people in the North, and, strange as it may sound, of many if not most in the South. It was this attitude, shared by the mass of the North, which made it possible for him to be elected to the Presidency in 1860.

First, he "hated slavery"; it was utterly obnoxious to him and clashed with his dearest principles, both moral and political. He "thought it wrong"; and this when Christian churches, north as well as south, were busy proving that it was divinely ordained and plainly supported by the Bible. In his first office of any consequence, as member of the Illinois legislature at the age of 30, he recorded this view: when the legislature passed resolutions denouncing abolitionists and condoning slavery, Lincoln with one lone supporter read into the mintes a protest, joining in the condemnation of abolitionists, but declaring that "slavery is founded on both injustice and bad policy." In 1854, in one of his earliest speeches of significance, he speaks of the "monstrous injustice of slavery." But in all this he might almost have been quoting Jefferson or even Washington speaking a generation earlier. The land was full, north and south, of people who disliked and disapproved slavery, with a smaller number who hated it intensely.

In the second place, Lincoln's political view concerning slavery and political program for dealing with it were clear cut and changed little, until the War changed everything. First, he was inexorably opposed to the extension of slavery; this view governed his political affiliations on all vital occasions. But he was also opposed to any aggressive interference with slavery in the states which legalized it; the constitutional provision concerning fugitive slaves which Phillips denounced as "a covenant with death and an agreement with hell," Lincoln regarded as a covenant with the slave-holding states which he was bound to respect. So he wrote to his friend Speed, a slave-holder, "I acknowledge your rights and my obligations under the Constitution in regard to your slaves." This compelled him to oppose the Abolitionists and condemn their program; and the Abolitionists in turn hated and denounced him.

The third point is of great importance, and not quite easy to describe; it was his utter incapacity to extend his hatred of slavery to a hating of the slave-holder, or even to denouncing him morally. It was his realistic sense of the actual institution of slavery as something historical, with a long background in the old world, and with deep economic and social roots in its strange last stand in the great American Republic. It was his persistent view that slave-holders, slaves, and opponents of slavery were all human and all caught in the mesh of events, all striving to live their lives in the midst of difficulties and perplexities and all entitled to humane and kindly consideration from their fellows in spite of differing opinions and conflicting programs and policies.

Lincoln never fell into the prevailing Northern fallacy of throwing the whole responsibility for the institution of slavery upon the South; he saw that the guilt, if guilt there were, rested upon the Nation as a whole, North as well as South. "It is no less true for having been often said," he writes in the Second Annual Message, "that the people of the South are not more responsible for the original introduction of this property than are the people of the North;

and when it is remembered how unhesitatingly we all use cotton and sugar and share in the profits of dealing in them, it may not be quite safe to say that the South has been more responsible than the North for its continuance."

These elements in Lincoln's attitude toward slavery were definitely fixed at the time of his first important public utterance on the subject, in his speech in answer to Douglas at Peoria in 1854. After denouncing slavery as wrong, and the Missouri Compromise as therefore also wrong, he goes on:

> Before proceeding, let me say that I think I have no prejudice against the Southern people. They are just what we would be in their situation. If slavery did not now exist among them, they would not introduce it. If it did now exist among us, we should not instantly give it up....When Southern people tell us they are no more responsible for the origin of slavery than we are, I acknowledge the fact....If all earthly power were given me, I should not know what to do, as to the existing institution. My first impulse would be to free all the slaves, and send them to Liberia....But a moment's reflection would convince me, that whatever of high hope (as I think there is) there may be in this in the long run, its sudden execution is impossible....I think I would not hold one in slavery, at any rate; yet the point is not clear enough for me to denounce people upon.

These are striking words, not by their violence but by their moderation. It is true they were uttered before the heat of the conflict, nearly seven years before the actual outbreak of the war; but the fact is that the fury and madness of the later period, before and during the armed conflict, never changed Lincoln's attitude. In 1858, debating with Douglas, in 1860, as candidate for the presidency, and through all his career as war ruler, he never shifted from his position: he was against slavery, would not compromise with its extension, yet insisted that the slave states should solve their own domestic problem; and he demurred to all self-righteous condemnation and all spirit of revenge.

Thus on the issue of slavery and emancipation Lincoln was emphatically a moderate, and so was unsatisfactory to both extremes. The abolitionists abhorred his patience with slavery and his support of the constitutional provision for fugitive slave laws; the slave party feared and hated him for his outspoken condemnation of slavery and his unyielding stand against its extension. As a moderate, on the other hand, he was elected to the presidency and led the nation to both emancipation and the refounding of the Union.

So much for slavery and emancipation; next, what of Union? This question is, in and of itself, far simpler than that of slavery. The South claimed the right to secede; the predominant party in the North denied the right; Lincoln became, by one of the most amazing processes in history, the leader of a war to coerce the southern states back into the Union. It is true that Lincoln was an ardent believer in the Union and inflexibly resisted any sort of compromise or question on this point. It is also notorious that many influential voices in the North were raised from time to time demanding that the war should be averted, or when once begun, terminated, by the simple plan of letting the seceded states go their way and acknowledging the Confederacy as an independent nation. Greeley, for example, wrote in November of 1860, when secession was getting under way: "If the cotton States shall decide that they can do better out of the Union than in it, we insist on letting them go in peace....whenever a considerable section of our Union shall deliberately resolve to go out, we shall resist all coercive measures designed to keep her in. We hope never to live in a republic whereof one section is pinned to the residue by bayonets."

To all this Lincoln refused to yield; in utterance and in action he made it clear that Union was the paramount issue and that slavery was secondary. Even when he issued the Emancipation Proclamation he justified it not on the issue of slavery itself, but on the military necessity of exhausting every means to win the war and preserve the nation. In this sense Lincoln was the "Savior of the Republic"; nor should we belittle in any way his profound and unvarying devotion to the Union. In the famous "Lost Speech," delivered in 1856, he is reported to have risen to an impassioned climax, crying out, "we will say to the Southern disunionists, we won't go out of the Union, and you shan't." If this is of questionable authenticity we find his view gravely and unequivocally put in his first Annual Message: "The Union must be preserved; and hence all indispensable means must be employed."

We may well pause here to consider the vast significance of this inflexible attitude of Lincoln with respect to the federal union and secession. Even an ardent admirer must feel the force of the question whether the fearful tragedy of the War might not have been averted by a more tolerant and conciliatory policy on the part of the federal government—in other words, on Lincoln's part. Nor can it be denied that the apparent rigor of Lincoln's mind on the question of the Union is strikingly in contrast with his flexibility and conciliation in general. The story of events in Virginia—her reluctance to join the secession movement and apparent deep desire to preserve the Union—powerfully suggests the possibility of that great state becoming the bearer of conciliation from the Southern side to meet conciliation from the North. But Lincoln had, to paraphrase slightly Goldwin Smith's remark, "an obsession for the American Union," and at that point his flexibility vanished and adamantine fixity took its place. This, I must confess, seems to me the gravest question concerning Lincoln's part in the vast tragedy of the slavery conflict, a question still not adequately treated.

But still the Union was not his cause in any peculiar or individual manner; the doctrine of the "indissoluble union," of the perpetuity of the constitutional bond, and of the nation as supreme and indestructible, had long been familiar to the whole country. Hamilton and Marshall had cemented the legal fabric of the Union a generation before the war; Webster had clarified and illuminated the doctrine of indissolubility. A southern president, Andrew Jackson, had given sharp rebuke in his official capacity, to a southern impulse toward secession; Jackson's toast which so startled many of his fellow democrats, "Our Union: it must be preserved!" offers almost the very words of Lincoln's statement. Thus with respect to the Union, as with respect to emancipation, Lincoln was simply the natural and inevitable leader of the great mass of the northern people but was in no wise an originator or prophet.

If then these causes that were won in the war and its aftermath were not Lincoln's very own, what was his cause, that which was truly his and was lost? This is a far harder question to answer. The victorious causes are concrete, picturesque, dramatic; they fill the pages of American history for almost half a century and are so plain that the wayfaring man may read. Above all they were triumphant, and fame blows its trumpets for successful causes. The lost cause which should have been Lincoln's contribution to his day and generation is far less dramatic, far more subtle and was terribly vanquished; what wonder that it tends to slip through the fingers of historians? Yet it is utterly real and in no way mysterious or fanciful. Also this lost cause links up with an immense body of what we know about Lincoln: it is more intimately bound up with his character and personality than is his more imposing official functioning.

This lost cause of Lincoln's naturally manifested itself in connection with the two great issues of the day: slavery was to be abolished; the Union was to be preserved and reconstructed; it was on the method and manner of these two gigantic tasks that Lincoln bent his mind and strove to make his own peculiar contribution. He wrought into concrete form a plan for emancipation and later a plan for reconstruction; he preached them in season and out, in messages to Congress, in Proclamations, in public addresses, in conferences with governors, congressmen, senators, cabinet officers, generals, and people in general. He pushed their execution to the limit of his constitutional powers and doubtless beyond it. In spite of misunderstanding, opposition, calumny, hatred, and partial defeat, he was still holding fast to hope of their realization when the assassin's bullet cut off his life and left events at the mercy of far other forces. In the event both plans were utterly defeated, and being defeated have left almost no mark in our minds and little upon history.

This is Lincoln's lost cause, or, if you will, his lost causes: it is one cause in that throughout a common spirit and attitude ruled both the concrete plans. Thus there was one spiritual lost cause and two lost causes in the realm of practical politics. For the adjudication of the spiritual cause we must look to the two concrete causes in their actual process and fate.

First, Lincoln's program for *emancipation*. To most people, north and south, emancipation was a word, and a word over which to fight. But few seem to have given attention to the question of how emancipation was to be accomplished, or what was to be done with the tremendous problems which must follow upon its heels, if accomplished. Lincoln had long thought about it in a practical way; in 1854 he frankly said: "If all earthly power were given me, I should not know what to do as to the existing institution." I know of no wiser utterance in the years preceding the war; it would have been well indeed if all political leaders had been so modest, or rather, so intelligent. In truth nobody north or south did know what to do with slavery; it would almost seem that the more extreme abolitionists, otherwise intelligent, really supposed that abolishing slavery would somehow abolish the millions of black men, women and children who were the slaves. Lincoln, on the contrary, was deeply concerned as to the manner and method of emancipation; the problem occupied his mind greatly and appears over and over again in his public utterances. It appears in many of his state papers, letters and addresses; it is set forth in full in his second Annual Message to Congress of December 1, 1862, to my mind the greatest of all his state papers. Whoever would grasp Lincoln's mind on this great problem must read and re-read this message.

Lincoln's plan is commonly known as "compensated emancipation," but compensation is only one of the essential features of the proposal, and perhaps not the most important. Not less vital certainly is the provision for both initiative and control by the states holding the slaves, and the limitation of federal action to giving the invitation and contributing financial aid; considering the issue on which secession was most commonly justified this was politically most intelligent. Further, the actual freeing of the slaves was to be gradual, taking, if necessary, thirty-seven years, from 1863 to 1900. Nor does Lincoln forget the vast problem of the Negroes once freed; indeed it is pretty clear that it was this aspect of the situation which had for years perplexed him; he does advert to various possibilities—segregation in territory assigned for the purpose and transportation back to Africa, in particular. The main point is that his mind is grappling resolutely with the whole picture of the thing to be dealt with; this is the essence of intelligence.

In all his many utterances not a word is said even suggesting the general enfranchisement of the freed Negroes. How conservative his view was on this phase of the problem may be inferred from a letter in 1864 to the new Union governor of Louisiana: "I barely suggest for your private consideration, whether some of the colored people may be let in (to the franchise) as, for instance, the very intelligent, and especially those who have fought gallantly in our ranks....This is only a suggestion, not for the public, but to you alone." This, too, seems far more intelligent than what was actually done, with such disastrous consequences to both races in the South.

We may well revert now to Lincoln's own words, particularly the great Second Annual Message. He introduces the subject thus:

> Among the friends of the Union there is great diversity of sentiment and of policy in regard to slavery and the African race amongst us. Some would perpetuate slavery; some would abolish it suddenly, and without compensation; some would

> abolish it gradually, and with compensation; some would remove the freed people from us, and some would retain them with us; and there are yet other minor diversities. Because of these diversities we waste much strength in struggles among ourselves.... These articles are intended to embody a plan of such mutual concessions. If the plan shall be adopted, it is assumed that emancipation will follow at least in several of the states.
>
> As to the first article, the main points are: first, the emancipation; secondly, the length of time for consummating it —thirty-seven years; and thirdly, the compensation.
>
> The emancipation will be unsatisfactory to the advocates of perpetual slavery; but the length of time should greatly mitigate their dissatisfaction. The time spares both races from the evils of sudden derangement—in fact, from the necessity of any derangement.....Another class will hail the prospect of emancipation, but will deprecate the length of time. They will feel that it gives too little to the now living slaves. But it really gives them much. It saves them from the vagrant destitution which must largely attend immediate emancipation in localities where their numbers are very great; and it gives the inspiring assurance that their posterity shall be free forever.

Next Lincoln points out the striking fact that such a plan would tend to shorten the duration of the war, perhaps even availing to lead the revolted states to make peace in order to seize the chance of compounding the loss which the ultimate freeing of the slaves would entail. He then discusses various aspects of the proposal, with relevant statistical data, and with consideration of many possible objections. He concludes with an appeal to the hearts of his audience, so unusual in a document of this nature that he apologizes for its tone:

> Is it doubted, then, that the plan I propose, if adopted would shorten the war, and thus lessen its expenditure of money and blood? Is is doubted that it would restore the national authority and national prosperity, and perpetuate both indefinitely? Is it doubted that we here—Congress and executive—can secure its adoption? Will not the good people respond to a united and earnest appeal from us? Can we, can they, by any other means so certainly or so speedily assure these vital objects? We can succeed only by concert. It is not "Can any of us imagine better?" but "Can we all do better?" Object whatsoever is possible, still the question occurs, "Can we do better?"

Lincoln was thus facing the facts with regard to the freeing of the slaves and the abolition of the institution of slavery: although desiring that all men should be free, he saw intensely the huge problem of the millions of freed slaves; although the leader of the North, he could not forget the just claims of the South. So he labors in this great message to get his Northern audience, Congress, and the people, to see the facts as he does, and he beseeches them to lay aside hatred and prejudice and act before it is too late. He rises in his peroration to what may well be considered the highest pitch of his eloquence:

> The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is now, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country....We shall nobly save or meanly lose the last, best hope of earth. Other means may succeed; this could not fail. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just—a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud, and God must forever bless.

These wise and just proposals of Lincoln met at first with no little approval, and the prospect of their realization seemed bright. Lincoln's special message in March of 1862 proposing a resolution on the subject was received favorably by Congress, and the resolution passed by large majorities in both houses. Better yet, Congress in April of the same year passed an act to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and this act included at least two of Lincoln's favorite principles— compensation and colonization. Yet in the final event all came to naught: emancipation, when it came, was necessarily a mere blanket decree, without any effective recognition of the practical and concrete aspects of the situation. Hate, fear, mutual animosity, and suspicion, not only between the two combatant peoples, but in the midst of both, brought to naught the carefully nurtured plan and exposed the outcome to passion and chance.

It is true that Lincoln never completely gave up his hopes: even as late as February of 1865, he laid before his Cabinet a plan to offer the Confederate government four hundred million dollars as purchase price for the slaves: but all except Seward were against it, and Lincoln sadly folded and laid away the draft of the proposal. Thus ended the first of Lincoln's "Lost Causes"; the black men were to be freed, but not in his "plain, peaceful, generous, just" way.

The other concrete lost cause was *Reconstruction.* Lincoln's policy and actions in this field are the most characteristic and striking of all his official career: yet they threw him into collision with the most powerful factions in the North and brought down upon his head the bitterest hatred and denunciation. These policies were precisely consonant with his unvarying view that slavery was a national and not a southern sin, and that the people of the seceded states were not traitors nor criminals but erring brethren. So when the armed conflict began to favor the Union side, and portions of the revolted area began to be occupied by Union troops, Lincoln promptly took steps to authorize and encourage local Union elements to set up loyal state governments and reëstablish relations with the federal authority. Again we find him proposing a clear-cut plan for action, simple indeed, yet sufficient to open the way for the states concerned to get back into the Union. This plan, too, might well be called "plain, peaceful, generous, just." It was, as events proved, quite too generous.

Three short documents afford a clear and effective picture of the plan and of Lincoln's grounds for proposing it: the Proclamation in which it is officially announced, December 8, 1863; the last three or four pages of the Annual Message of the same date; and—a solemn and touching fact—his last public address, on April 11, 1865, two days after the surrender of Lee at Appomatox and three days before his assassination. This address explains and defends his reconstruction policy against the bitter attacks which were being made upon it. Of this address Stephenson well says, "It is the final statement of a policy toward helpless opponents—he refused to call them enemies—which among the conquerors of history is hardly, if ever, to be paralleled."

The "Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction" was indeed astoundingly liberal: it offered full amnesty to the people in the revolted states upon their taking an oath of allegiance to the United States—with certain limited exceptions, chiefly Confederate officers above the rank of colonel and former officials of the United States who had joined the rebellion. Most extreme of all is the provision for establishing new state governments: this may be done by loyal persons "not less than one-tenth in number of the votes cast....at the presidential election of....1860."

This Proclamation was Lincoln's supreme act politically, far surpassing the Emancipation Proclamation as a manifestation of his own convictions and purposes. The Emancipation Proclamation was issued reluctantly, with great hesitation, and only after great public pressure in its favor. The Proclamation of Amnesty was made on his own sole initiative, without the shadow of doubt or hesitation. But emancipation succeeded, and amnesty failed, so emancipation is remembered, and the greater deed of amnesty is forgotten.

Two points mark the greatness of this action: first, as Stephenson well says, in it he "carried to its ultimate his assumption of war powers. No request was made for Congressional coöperation. The message which the Proclamation accompanied was informative only."[1] Second, the terms of the Proclamation were a flat defiance of the powerful radical faction in his own party. Moreover no pressure from the outside, no immediate aspect of events, impelled to this action, as had been the case with the Emancipation Proclamation: this stroke came from Lincoln's own mind and character. No wonder that Stephenson lists this episode under the title "Audacities."

When the Proclamation was issued Lincoln had already been for more than four months in correspondence with General Banks, military governor of Louisiana, concerning movements of loyal citizens of that state for a reconstructed state government; Banks was instructed and urged to foster such movements, under proper conditions. It was characteristic of Lincoln's mind that the logic of the Proclamation is definitely based upon the actual experience in Louisiana. Louisiana moved forward in the reorganization of its government, with the full recognition and support of the executive branch of the national government. The new state constitution abolished slavery and empowered the legislature to confer the franchise upon the freed men at its discretion, a remarkable manifestation of liberality, explained in part perhaps by the generosity of Lincoln toward the new state.

Here too, by good fortune, we have Lincoln's own words in his very last public utterance, an address made to a large crowd at the White House on the evening of April 11th, after the surrender of Lee on April 9th. He deals, with the utmost patience and good humor, with the conflict concerning his policy of welcome to the returning states, and particularly with the actual case of Louisiana: "Reconstruction," he says

> is fraught with great difficulty.... There is no authorized or-

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[1] N. P. Stevenson: *Lincoln* p. 331.

> gan for us to deal with....We must simply begin with and mold from disorganized and discordant elements....I am much censured for some supposed agency in setting up and seeking to sustain the new state government of Louisiana. In this I have done just so much as, and no more than, the public knows....
>
> Still the question is not whether the Louisiana government, as it stands, is quite all that is desirable. The question is, Will it be wiser to take it as it is and help to improve it, or to reject and disperse it? Can Louisiana be brought into proper practical relation with the Union sooner by sustaining or by discarding her new state government? Some 12,000 voters in the heretofore slave state of Louisiana have sworn allegiance to the Union, assumed to be the rightful political power of the state, held election, organized a state government, adopted a free-state constitution, giving the benefit of public schools equally to black and white, and empowering the legislature to confer the elective franchise upon the colored man. Their legislature has already voted to ratify the constitutional amendment recently passed by Congress, abolishing slavery throughout the Union. These 12,000 persons are thus fully committed to the Union and to perpetual freedom in the state—committed to the very things, and nearly all the things, the nation wants—and they ask the nation's recognition and its assistance to make good their committal."

He admits the tentative and imperfect nature of the new government, yet, he says with characteristic humor and sense, "Concede that the new government of Louisiana is only to what it should be as the egg is to the fowl, we shall sooner have the fowl by hatching the egg than by smashing it."

But to the radical faction in Congress Lincoln's action was the signal for the bitterest opposition. They did what they could to smash the Louisiana egg by rejecting the representatives of the new Union state, they charged the President with usurping the prerogatives of Congress and violating his constitutional obligations. The bitterness of the vindictives, as Stephenson well calls them, against this wise and magnanimous policy of Lincoln is one of the ugliest episodes of our whole history. Its venomous quality is seen in the spectacle of at least two of these vindictives actually exulting over the murder of Lincoln.

Lincoln himself characteristically stood firm to the end: in that last address already referred to, he was still looking forward regarding the problem of reconstruction; he closed with these words:

> In the present situation, it may be my duty to make some new

> announcement to the people of the South. I am considering, and shall not fail to act when satisfied that action will be proper.

Three days later his voice was silenced and his task fell to other hands. What followed was in the key of tragic irony: Lincoln was beloved in the North; his assassination inevitably aroused a storm of passion and vengeance which played into the hands of Lincoln's worst foes and wrecked the last hopes for the success of his plans. His just and generous proposals were swept into the discard, and in their stead came that dark and shameful episode known as the Reconstruction of the South. Thus were Lincoln's causes lost in his own day.

The same spirit gave form to both of these concrete plans: we may call it the spirit of intelligence and good-will: intelligence in that it seeks to reckon with facts, and with all the pertinent facts, in spite of bias and selfish interest; good-will, because it seeks to take all parties into account and recognize all just claims. This was the cause that was lost in both emancipation and reconstruction: we have called it Lincoln's cause, but of course it was the cause of the American people, Northern and Southern, and of the free and the slave; all suffered bitterly through its loss—Lincoln in a sense least of all, for fate snatched him from the scene before the denouement.

It is this greater, spiritual cause that makes Lincoln still live in the minds and hearts of men, far and wide—the universal human cause of intelligence and good-will. It is a mere truism to say that these are what we need today in every realm of life and affairs and throughout the world. It is doubtful if any man in great place ever strove more earnestly to exercise intelligence and good-will than did Lincoln. The intuition of mankind has so far sensed his eminence as to treasure his memory and magnify his fame; may it be that he living thus in the minds of men may yet share in the winning of the great cause which was lost in his own day?

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MÊNG TZŬ

BY ARDELIA RIPLEY HALL

IN Mêng Tzŭ's[1] time, 371-288 B.C., China was divided into warring feudal states. The strife and tyranny of the petty kings brought confusion and misery to the people. Mêng Tzŭ was one of the *Ju* or *Literati*, who were scholars and royal counselors. This group had long supported a humanistic tradition, as defenders of the people, which was consummated in the philosophy of K'ung Tsŭ[2] and Mêng Tzŭ, his follower. The *Ju*, who have come to be regarded as the sages of China, had developed an intellectual and philosophic approach to their national problems. It is illuminating to compare this attitude with that of the Hebrew prophets, that being religious and emotional. Both faced national dangers when a state was courting disaster, but for the Hebrews there was grave extremity of annihilation, while for the Chinese the issue was long standing and less crucial.

Such a comparison with contemporary thought in other parts of the world makes the philosophy of Mêng Tzŭ seem all the more remarkable. Based upon the analysis of man's intellectual and moral nature—upon an approach that was psychological—his work is essentially realistic. It is also a rationalization on the basis of human factors of many principles which had been advanced earlier on religious grounds. In this sense Mêng Tzŭ rises above even his contemporaries in China. To understand his achievement and to appraise it fairly, one must recognize his heritage, the pattern of society in which he lived, and the exigencies of his time.

He defended the traditional organization of Chinese society and government, which was monarchial and paternalistic. He was a revolutionist only in so far as he recognized the ancient privilege of the Chinese people to drive an evil sovereign from power. Within the outlines of the existing social pattern, he attempted to instil and sustain a sense of social justice, a social consciousness in the ruling class. He attempted to bring home to them the reality of man's highest nature, its potentialities, and its universality. He sought reform through the individual, reform that was moral and in turn social.

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[1] The Latinization of Mêng Tzŭ is Mencius.

[2] The Latinization of K'ung Tzŭ is Confucius.

He constructed his philosophy upon an analysis of human endowments and human relations. This psychological groundwork was in the nature of generalized conclusions in a large-scale view of human behavior (contrasting with the detailed, almost microscopic, analysis of the individual in modern psychology). He had the discernment of a great poet. As the counselor of kings, he was a personage of high position, a man of wide experience and sophistication. His conversations display an assurance and fearlessness, as well as brilliant and rapier-like wit. With much humor he uses homely and simple parallels to drive home his arguments or to sharpen his criticism. Throughout the seven books, his dialogues are jumbled together in a haphazard way and his arguments are scattered; by reassembling them the continuity of his ideas is clear. While he did not create a philosophical system, his teachings are integrated and coherent, forming a harmonious whole.

Mêng Tzŭ clearly states his empirical source of knowledge in the following terms, "All who speak about nature (*hsing*) (human nature is included) have in fact only their phenomena to reason from, and the value of a phenomenon is in its being natural" (IV B XXVI[3]). He goes on to explain the need for willingness to follow the evidence wherever it may lead without force or manipulation of facts, with the figure of how without effort Yu led off the waters: "If your wise men would also do that which gave them no trouble their knowledge would also be great. There is heaven so high; there are stars so distant. If we investigate their phenomena, we may, while sitting in our places, go back to the solstice of a thousand years ago" (IV B XXVI). The Emperor Shun had achieved his wisdom because he "clearly understood the multitude of things, and closely observed the relations of humanity" (IV B XIX 2). In giving advice to a pupil Mêng Tzŭ says, "The way of truth is like a great road. It is not difficult to know. The evil is only that men will not seek it. Do you go home and seek it and you will have an abundance of teachers" (VI B II 7). Without mysticism or supernaturalism, Mêng Tzŭ approaches the scientific attitude.

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[3] Cf. Mêng Tzŭ, Book IV, part B, chapter XXVI, verse 1. The philosophy of Mêng Tzŭ is contained in a work of seven short books; each book is divided into two parts (A and B, or I and II), and subdivided into chapters and verses. An English translation was made by James Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Vol. II: *The Work of Mencius* in 1861, and reprinted under the title, *The Life and Works of Mencius*, in 1875. Throughout the references are written without the words, book, part, chapter, and verse as IV B XXVI 1.

His dialogues not only give evidence of his close observation but also display his insight into human nature and in the analysis of human motives. As when King Hsüan of Ch'i asks Mêng Tzŭ if such a king as he has the capacity to love and protect his people, Mêng Tzŭ in reply relates the incident of the time when a bull was being led across the lower court to a sacrifice for the consecration of a bell, King Hsüan in the hall above was so troubled by the frightened appearance of the animal "like an innocent man being lead to the place of death" that he ordered the bull released. As the consecration could not be neglected, he had a sheep substituted. For this he was criticized as niggardly. Mêng Tzŭ, however, tells him simply that it was because he had seen the bull but not the sheep. He brings home to the king that he thus has sympathy enough to reach even an animal how much more readily he should feel compassion for his subjects. King Hsüan acknowledges the truth of what Mêng Tzŭ has said. He recognizes the insight of Mêng Tzŭ by quoting a couplet from an ode, "What other men have in their minds, Can be measured by reflection" (I A VII). This understanding of human nature, Mêng Tzŭ himself describes even more explicitly when he says, he understands words, "When speeches are one-sided, I know how (the mind of the speaker) is clouded over; when they are extravagant, I know wherein (the mind) is ensnared; when they are all depraved, I know how (the mind) is departed (from principle); when they are evasive, I know how (the mind) is at (its wit's) end" (II A II 17).

The nature (*hsing*) of man reposes in the mind. In Chinese the seat of the mind was believed to be the heart (*hsin*). Like taste to the mouth, sound to the ears, sight to the eyes, is apprehension to the mind. "Hearing and seeing are obscured by external things, they do not think. To the mind belongs the function of thinking. By thinking it gets (the right attitude), by not thinking it fails to do this" (VI A XV). (It seems probable that the nature of thought was limited to moral perception.) Through our senses we all recognize agreeable flavors, enjoyable sounds, and beauty, and in the same way through intellectual perception we recognize that which we may approve, that which we may "hold to be right." Those things of which our mind approves are the principles of right (*li* and *i*)

(VI A VII 8). "*Li* and *i* are as agreeable to the mind as vegetables and meat are to the mouth." In the *Shu Ch'ing* (James Legge, *Chinese Classics*, Vol. III, pp. 326, 327) the same association between sense perception and mental perception, is found. This book of the *Shu Ch'ing*, the *Hung Fan*, is however, not generally recognized as among the genuine portions of the Book of History. Its classified ideology was probably a later systemization. Five elements of nature, eight objects of government, and various other numerical groups are listed, among which are the "five businesses." "The first is called demeanor; the second, speech; the third, seeing; the fourth, hearing; and the fifth, thinking." And the virtue of thinking is called "perspicaciousness" (*jui*). From *jui* are derived those qualities which make a sage, that is, sageness (*sheng*).

Another reference to these ideas occurs in the *Tso Chuan*. It is probable that they were current even before Mêng Tzŭ's time. "He whose ear does not hear the harmony of the five sounds is deaf; he whose eye does not distinguish the beauty of the five colors is blind; he whose mind does not accord with the rules of virtue and righteousness is wayward; he whose mouth does not speak the words of loyalty and faith is a stupid chatterer" (James Legge, *Chinese Classics*, Vol. V, p. 192).

The activity of the mind ("the movements of one's nature"—thinking) was regarded as the universal endowment of mankind, just as seeing. The senses and the mind were bestowed by Heaven on all men, and because of this, men are the same in kind. The uniformity of men was within a defined range. "If a man were to make hempen sandals without knowing the size of a man's foot, he will not make them like baskets" (VI A VII). "Thus all things which are the same in kind are like to one another; why should we doubt in regard to man, as if we were the solitary exception to this? The sage and we are the same in kind" (VI A VII 3).

All men have the feelings of pity and sympathy, deference, shame, and hate, and approving and disapproving. From these feelings, from the "pity sympathy of mind," "deference of mind", and so forth, arise the qualities of loving kindness (*jen*) from the first, good form (*li*) from the second, the sense of right (*i*) from the third, and knowledge or wisdom (*chih*) from the fourth. These qualities are not acquired from without, "not from without melted into us," but we contain them within ourselves (VI A VI 7). "We may thus see that to every faculty and relationship there must belong its law, and that since the people possess this normal nature, they therefore must love its normal virtue" (VI A VI 8). This passage Mêng Tzŭ quotes from K'ung Tzŭ. While Mêng Tzŭ accepted the psychological theories of his day, and followed the teachings of K'ung Tzŭ, his work is distinguished for a closer analysis and differentiation of moral perceptions.

Of the four virtues, *jen*, *li*, *i*, and *chih*; *jen* and *i* with sincerity (*hsin*) and true-heartedness (*chung*), Mêng Tzŭ lists as constituting the nobleness of heaven (VI A VII). He regarded kindness (*jen*) and right (*i*) as most important. Sincerity will be seen later to be of particular importance in Mêng Tzŭ's theory of the development of character, yet it is seldom mentioned by name. It is later to be found as one of the five cardinal virtues of Confucianism in the Doctrine of the Mean.

Jen may only with difficulty be translated. It is an attitude of mind—goodwill embodying love, the "charity" of Corinthians, human kindliness and sympathy—this Legge calls benevolence, in its derived meaning of *bene*—well and *volo*—wish. However, the breadth of meaning is found in Couvreur's translation of the Chinese Classics into Latin where *jen* is rendered *humanitas*. A disciple asked K'ung Tzŭ about *jen*. "He answered, 'It is to love (all) men.'" *Jen* is a dynamic force which engenders *i*. It so permeates the philosophy of Mêng Tzŭ that his Sayings might be called the doctrine of *jen*, of human kindliness. The ideal man is a man of *jen*, the ideal ruler is a benevolent king, the ideal government is a humanitarian government. "*Jen* is man's mind (*hsin*), *i* his path (*tao*)" (VI A XI). "*Jen* is the tranquil habitation of man and *i* his path" (IV A X 2). "*Jen* (benevolence) is the distinguishing characteristic of man; as embodied in man's conduct it is called the path (*tao*)" (VII B XVI). "Do you doubt my words? The path (*tao*) is one and only one." (III A L 3).

Because *jen* and *i* are innate in the mind of man this constitutes its "proper goodness" (VI A VIII 2). This goodness is as natural to the human mind as the forest was to the Niu Mountain (VI A VIII). He regarded the heroic emperors Yao and Shun as the traditional examples of royal virtue. "Mêng Tzŭ discoursed how the nature of man is good, and when speaking always made laudatory references to Yao and Shun" (III A I 2). He qualifies his conviction in the following way. "From the feelings proper to it, it (nature) is constituted for the practise of what is good. This is what I mean by saying that nature (*hsing*) is good" (VI A VI 5). And again, "The (tendency of) man's nature to goodness is like the (tendency of) water to flow downwards. There are none but have (this tendency to) goodness, (just as) water flows downwards" (VI A II 2).

A capacity for goodness is like the capacity for growth. Mêng Tzŭ compares the development of our talents with the growth of barley (VI A VII 2), the difference in growth being dependent on whether the soil is rich or infertile, upon the amount of rain and upon cultivation. He uses this same comparison when he describes an unwise king, "Suppose the case the most easily growing thing in the world, but give it one day's warmth and ten day's cold and it will not grow. It is but seldom that I have an audience of the king, and when I retire, there come all those who act on him like the cold. Though I succeed in bringing out some buds of goodness, of what avail is it?" (VI A IX).

This difference in the development of character makes for the differences in men. "So the sages among mankind are also the same in kind. But they stand out from their fellows and rise above the level" (II A II 28). "He who nourishes the small is small; he who nourishes the great is great" (VI A XIV 2). "Those who follow the part of themselves which is great are great men. Those who follow the part of themselves which is small are little men" (VI A XV). "Take stand in one's greatness then smallness cannot take it away. This makes a great man and just that" (VI A XV 2).

Mêng Tzŭ with all the force of his belief that "If men do what is not good, the guilt is not to be imputed to their natural powers" (VI A VI 6), however, is not blind to the evil in men or the evils of his day. Nor was he optimistic. He says, "That whereby man differs from animals is but small. The mass of men cast it away, while superior men preserve it" (IV B XIX). Again and again he links the degradation of the people with poverty and deprivation. "In the good years the children of the people are most of them good and in the bad years they are most of them evil. It is not owing to their natural endowments conferred by Heaven, that they are thus different. It is owing to circumstances...."

One can safeguard the native endowment through the preservation of those inborn tendencies toward good: "Hold fast and it remains with you. Let go and you lose it. Its outgoing and incoming are not dependent on time or place" (VI A VIII 4). In cherishing the natural goodness, this is to "preserve one's mind," to "maintain a fixed heart" or mind strong to hold to what is good. The small man (*hsiao jen*) is one who has lost his original nature, "How lamentable is it to neglect this path (of righteousness—*i*) and not pursue it, to lose this mind (of benevolence—*jen*) and not know how to seek it (again)" (VI A XI 2). It is the man of intelligence and education who has these qualities fixed within him. "They are not men of talents and virtue only who have this mental nature. All men have it—what belongs to such men is simply that they are not able to lose it" (VI A X 5). And again he says "They are only men of education, who, without a certain livelihood, are able to maintain a fixed heart" (I B VII 20).

Education is the strengthening of the natural mind, the regaining of their native heritage by those who have lost it. The emphasis is on the development of character as the goal of education. It is the superior man who is the leader, the guide for those who are of lesser talent, and upon this principle depends the aristocracy of teachers in China (I B III 7). "Those with ability train up those who have it not" (IV B VII). "The object of learning is nothing else but to seek for the lost mind" (VI A XI 4). It is the nourishment of one's nature (*hsing*) (VI A VIII 3).

With the preservation of the mind, and the nourishment of one's nature, a firm will should be maintained for the protection and control of *ch'i*. *Ch'i* which is given such importance by Mêng Tzŭ can only with great difficulty be interpreted. It is translated "*passion-nature*" by Legge. Its obscurity is perhaps due to the fact that even Mêng Tzŭ himself found difficulty in describing it, and the Chinese commentators have much that is vague to say. However, several clues to the meaning of *ch'i* may be traced: it pervades and animates the body, it is controlled by the will, it is nourished by righteousness and reason, it is necessary to a perfect and balanced individual, without it man's nature is starved. Mêng Tzŭ says "I understand words (as they reveal to him the mind and nature of the speaker, (see above p. 18), I am skillful in nourishing my vast, flowing passion-nature—*ch'i*. ....Being nourished by rectitude.... it fills all between heaven and earth" (II A II 12, 13). The present meaning of *ch'i* is literally breath or air, which takes the abstract meaning of a vital substance—like the air we breathe out rather than in, on which life was believed to depend—an emanation, a force given off, an influence, this abstract meaning in turn was specialized in the sense of feelings or emotions. It would appear that here the meaning of *ch'i* is limited to that emotional force which may be nourished by rectitude or righteousness: that wide human sympathy which grows from a full understanding of men and is dependent upon justice and right. In the Chinese figure, as something breathed out, given off, it is thus an out-flowing compassion filling all space, an all-encompassing sympathy.

That such feeling must be translated into action, and how it should be done is well put by Mèng Tzŭ in his conversation with King Hsüan. The king had asked how he should attain royal sway, and Mêng Tzŭ again turns the discussion to the responsibility of a ruler to protect his subjects by describing the man who had the strength to lift three thousand catties and yet he could not lift a feather, and another whose eyes could see a hair (on a leaf) but not a wagon-load of faggots, saying "The truth is the feathers were not lifted because strength was not used; the wagon-load was not seen because the eyesight was not used; and the people's not being loved and protected is because kindness is not used.....It is because you do not do it, and not because you are not able to do it" (I A VII 10).

Individual responsibility and effort are emphasized again and again throughout Mêng Tzŭ's discussions. The development of a man depends upon himself alone and there is no limit set to his attainment. "All men may be Yao and Shun" (VI B II). The importance of this idea of the unlimited potentiality of the individual like the American ideal that "All men are created equal" is far reaching in any social philosophy. A young prince sought the advice of Mêng Tzŭ on the death of his parents. Like the King Hsüan he hesitated before the responsibilities facing him. Mêng Tzŭ replied, "....he may not seek a remedy in others but only in himself" (III A II). It is in sincerity to oneself (IV A XII) and responsibility to oneself (IV A XIX) that one achieves one's highest destiny (VI A I 3). If a superior man does not influence men for good he should look to himself for the reason (IV B XXVIII, IV A X 1). "The principle which the superior man holds is that of personal cultivation and the empire is thereby tranquillized" (VII B XXXII). Thus by extension through the development of the individual (and particularly a ruler), a whole kingdom may be controlled.

This brings us to one of the most fundamental and far-reaching principles of Mêng Tzŭ's philosophy: the power of influence. K'ung Tzŭ had already described it in a beautiful figure of the wind blowing and bending the grass. The noble man or ruler exerts an influence which will likewise sway the lowly to goodness (*Lun Yü,* XII, XIX, James Legge, *The Chinese Classics,* Vol. I). "What the superior loves, his inferiors will be found to love exceedingly" (III A II 4). In the sages, in the great rulers, in the princely men (*chün jen*) models of human conduct are to be found. "By the sages, human relations are perfectly exhibited" (IV A II 1). There has never been one possessed of complete sincerity who did not move others" (IV A XII 3). The power for good lies particularly in the hands of the king. As the father of his people he exerts an influence over all his kingdom. "If a prince, is benevolent, all is benevolent" (IV A XX, IV A V). "A benevolent ruler will establish a benevolent government" (I A VII, I B XII 3). "Let a prince by his excellence seek to nourish men and he will be able to subdue the whole empire" (IV B XVI).

A belief in the all sufficiency of good—*shan*—underlies the whole of Mêng Tzŭ's philosophy. When a disciple, Yo Ching, was appointed to the administration of the government of Lu, another follower asked if he were a man of vigor? Mêng Tzŭ answered, "no." If he were wise in council and possessed much information? And again he answered no. "He is a man who loves what is good. If that love of what is good is more than sufficient qualification for the government of the empire, how much more is it so for the State of Lu" (VI B XIII).

Mêng Tzŭ has set forth on the basis of psychological observation the following argument. The nature of man is in the mind. The mind has the sense of pity, respect, shame, and judgement, as well as sincerity and loyalty; from these feelings it is equipped to practise what is good. The mind (and body) is animated by *ch'i,* and controlled by the will. These faculties may be undeveloped, thwarted, or lost, depending upon the individual. For the mass of people, the loss may be brought about through the disintegration of society, the result of crushing burdens of taxation, of wars, and of famines. These faculties may be increased by education, individual effort, economic security, and the influence of the ruler. All these principles Mêng Tzŭ held with unassailable sincerity. He has said, "If a scholar have not faith, how shall he take a firm hold?" (VI B XII).

Upon these theories and arguments rests his social philosophy. They lead directly to his recommendations toward a government conducted in the interests of the people (I A V). These include the same fundamental issues of political science and economics that are met with today. The ruler should be noble and benevolent. There should be able officials of the highest training (III A IV 6; II A V; I B IX). Upon peace and stability the welfare of a country rests (III A III 3). There should be no aggressive wars (I B XIII). Taxes should be no higher than the ability of the people to pay (III A III 4). Trade also should be regulated (II A V 2). No customs should be charged at the frontiers (II A V 3). Agriculture should be developed (I A III; I A V). Punishments and fines should be less severe (I B V; I B VII 20). The young and old, and the destitute should be cared for. Piety, respect, sincerity, and honesty among the people should be cultivated.

THE PSYCHOSES AND MORALITY

BY GEORGE YEISLEY RUSK

I

BY the word 'morality' in the title of this paper the writer means all of the beliefs of a person which he holds with tenacity and emotional vigor and which influence his action. Therefore, this paper will include a consideration of religion as well as of secular morality, in so far as the former is conceived of as having these characteristics in any case.

The importance of the moral conceptions and resulting acts of patients, as thus defined, in the etiology and in the therapy of psychoses has repeatedly been recognized. Thus Theodor Reik (*Int. J. Psychoanalysis* 10:296-7) writes:

> The parents of the two patients have let the education of their children be influenced not only by their personality, but by all that they have taken over as a heritage and legacy from many generations.....
>
> I maintain, therefore, that the study of the genesis, development and mode of operation of religious [and moral] ideas is of extraordinary significance for the therapy....of the neurosis.[1]

But, so far as the writer has discovered, there has never been worked out a careful analysis and valuation of the moral status of the soul preceding and during psychoses. What we have had, both in books and in practice, is empirical self-contradiction and confusion—on the one hand, assurances that whatever mental phenomena appear are necessary, and even scientific defenses of the activities and characteristics of patients as arising from infantile, somatic, or subconscious influences; and on the other hand, the use of words of condemnation for such activities, and plans to reconstruct the characters of patients because at present not socially, that is, morally, satisfactory.

In addition to the confusion of direct moral estimation much has been written upon religion and the psychoses. Such writing at various points has passed moral judgments by implication, but has not constructed a moral measuring rod which can be universally employed, nor has it attempted to do so. The topics which have been dealt with under the head of the relation of religion to the psychoses are as follows:—

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[1] Reik, like all psychoanalysts, incorrectly uses "neurosis" for "psychosis."

I. The part played by religious beliefs in allaying psychoses. Thus, John R. Oliver in various of his books, but especially in his *Pastoral Psychiatry and Mental Health*, has described the performance of the Catholic mass as helpful in this regard. In the article by A. J. Boisen from which we shall presently quote extensively, the socializing influence of a belief in God is recommended for its therapeutic influence. C. Müller-Braunschweig (*Psychoanalytic Review* 19:121) holds that religion has its origin in the super-ego, a characteristic of the adult [that is, non-psychotic] personality, and therefore, that religion eliminates psychoses. Cavendish Moxon (*Brit. J. Medical Psychology* 10-11:150) tells us that Otto Rank "thinks that the world is mostly saved from madness by the very illusions that Freud's analytic aggressiveness tends to undermine." And Rank himself (*Psychoanalytic Review* 16:1) argues for the reality of these illusions by pointing out that the fact that they can be reduced to projections of biological needs does not prove that they are not real. He writes: "From a definite moment of development all these human phenomena [including religious beliefs] which are built up over the purely biological attain a life of their own and a significance of their own." The method by which religion works in overcoming psychoses is suggested by J. A. Hadfield and L. F. Browne (*Psychology and the Church*, p. 198): "Spiritual ideals have a greater power of arousing our emotional states and so liberating the repressed emotions [than have other ideals]." And A. E. Paulsen (*J. Amer. Med. Assoc.* 86:1692) concludes a series of articles on religious healing with this statement as to the effect of religion in overcoming psychoses:—

> Where spiritual therapy has been attempted under medical control, the results seem to indicate that:
> (a) Neurotic [i.e. psychotic] patients, alcoholic habitués, drug addicts, and the like are sometimes improved by treatment:
> (b) The morale and comfort of a patient with organic disease may be improved, while the disease continues to run its course.

II. The part played by religious beliefs in causing psychoses. Thus E. R. Eisler (*J. Abnorm. and Social Psychology* 19:95) writes:

> Religious doctrines and faiths constitute a powerful repressive force, active in the mental development of the child....

> Fear-inciting mysticism, which is vague to the child-mind, may be very influential in stimulating mental conflict because of its rigid inhibitive force.
>
> The mental reactions of childhood, which are characterized by phantastic thinking, are susceptible to stimuli, arising from abstract theories, which may excite fear of the unknown, initiate feelings of inferiority, or in other ways cause mental conflicts to develop.

And the present writer has pointed out the evil effects of a religion not carefully refined in view of our modern knowledge of human nature—especially in his "Christianity in its Conflict with Freudianism" (*The Open Court* 43:385).

III. Religious beliefs as being themselves psychoses. Thus A. H. Kamiat (*Psychoanalytic Rev.* 15:210-212; *J. Abnorm. and Social Psychology* 23:223) insists that religious beliefs are psychotic projections and compulsions.

> In his conflicts with his bodily appetites, the believer must draw a great deal of strength from the labeling of these appetites as carnal, vile, and evil, and of their gratification as sinful....The believer visualizes the cosmos as a battleground between the forces of good and evil; himself and his group as the guardians of the good and true and beautiful things in the world; his opponents as either wicked men, or well-intentioned, but misled persons; and the structure and evolution of the world or the universe as guaranteeing the ultimate victory of himself and his crowd.
>
> The subjective preoccupation with the problem of evil, to be found in Augustine, Paul, and Buddha, and so characteristic of the ascetic, is probably nothing less than a compulsion.

To Theodore Schroeder (*J. Abnorm. Psychology* 14:34) religious experience is essentially sexual ecstasy, and religious doctrines, therefore psychotic projections. J. H. Leuba (*J. Abnorm. and Social Psychology* 21:103) agrees with Schroeder sufficiently to write: "The thesis which we shall maintain is that the delights said by our great mystics to transcend everything which the senses can procure, involve some activity of the sex organs." Theodor Reik (*Int. J. Psychoanalysis* 11:278) has worked out the analogies between specific religious beliefs and obsessions. Owen Berkeley-Hill has revealed the analerotic factors in the extreme spirituality of the Hindu religion. Sigmund Freud in his famous *The Future of an Illusion* has reduced religious doctrines to the status of illusions. Of the external manifestation of psychotic religious belief E. R. Eisler

(*J. Abnorm. and Social Psychology* 19:95) writes: "The specific 'religious' behavior of abnormal individuals, involving conversion symptoms, convulsions, criminal assaults, hysterical states, etc., as well as the so-called normal reactions of individuals alleging 'religious' experiences, manifested by piety, ferver and ecstacy, is dependent, in part at least, upon such mental mechanisms as rationalization, compensation, conversion and compromise." And Ernest Jones (*Brit. J. Med. Psychology* 6-7:267-8) thus summarizes the vast literature in this field:

> The outstanding conclusion that emerges from all this investigation is that the religious life represents a dramatization on a cosmic plane of the emotions, fears, and longings which arose in the child's relation to his parents. The child's sense of the absolute as felt in its original attitude towards his own importance is, when it becomes impaired by contact with reality, partly continued as the anthropocentric view of the universe implicit in all religions and partly displaced, first on the parents and then, when this also fails, on to divine beings....The conflicts with the parents....lead to repressed death wishes against the parents, with a consequent fear of retaliation, and from this comes the familiar religious impulse to propitiate the spirits of dead ancestors or other spiritual beings. The accompanying love leads to the desire for forgiveness, reconciliation, help, and succour.

IV. The effect of therapeutic psychology, psychiatry, and mental hygiene (which are correlated to man's knowledge of the psychoses) upon religious doctrines. Thus, Harrison Elliott (*Survey* 65:15) writes: "Mental hygiene is influencing the conceptions of the good life; it is a factor in reconstructing the very goals of religion." What the revised doctrines are he does not state, nor shall we search for them ourselves as this is not a paper in theology.

II

In the vast literature which deals with religion and the psychoses, at every step either suggesting moral judgments or at least bearing within the ideas dealt with fossil judgments, we find, I say, no judgment upon the moral condition of the soul before and during psychoses. In discussions of morals in books and in treatment we have judgments, but confusion of judgments, and in the more authoritative sources, the judgments are generally fragmentary or incidental to other interests, and certainly constitute no systematic treatment of and decision in view of previous conflicting judgments. We have in the present paper, therefore, an open field, without stakes driven and lines laid, for estimating the moral status of the soul preceding and during psychoses.

How shall we go about our task? We might deal systematically with the problems involved. But that would not give the psychologist training in analyzing the concrete confusion of religious doctrine and moral judgment, pitiless condemnation, scientific exculpation, and implied disapproval of past living though insistence upon the need for reëducation, which the psychologist and psychiatrist are likely to run into in articles, text-books, hospital conferences, lectures and wards. Therefore, probably the best practical results will be attained if we make a rather detailed study of selected passages from "The Sense of Isolation in Mental Disorders: Its Religious Significance" (*Amer. J. Sociology* 33:555-67) by Rev. A. J. Boisen, Chaplain of the Worcester State Hospital. These passages suggest all the problems which we need to discuss, and do so, not as carefully separated and labelled, but in the concrete texture of ongoing thought —quite as these problems may be met in life.

The article by Mr. Boisen is essentially an account and an analysis of the experience of two brothers who were initiated into sex-knowledge and stealing by a third; how one of the brothers became nervous, vomited when his brother tormented him by the use of the sexual words which they had learned, felt himself shut off from those whom he loved and took to stealing as the lesser of two evils; how the other brother used the words freely, laughed at his brother's discomfort and developed no sense of inferiority. The case of the two brothers was originally reported by Dr. William Healy in *The New Republic.*

P556d and 557a. Referring to the younger brother Mr. Boisen writes: "Absorbed in horror-stricken fascination for that of which he cannot bring himself to speak, he feels himself besmirched and unfit for the company of those whom he loves and honors, and he seems to himself different from his fellows." Referring to the older brother: "He may thus lower somewhat his own standards and become coarse and lacking in sensitiveness, but he assimilates the new experience and he remains frank and undivided within and continues to be 'quiet, merry, helpful, honest'." Of course it is possible to explain the differing reactions of the two brothers in terms of their differing infantile experiences, as Mr. Boisen presently suggests, and it is important to do so, as we shall notice, in solving the ultimate moral problem involved. But what we must notice here is, what is likely to be ignored in the rush to explain the differing reactions in terms of infantile experience, that is, in terms of psychology, that it is possible, even necessary, to view the reactions also from the standpoint of morality. In doing so one may first ask himself: of the character of which brother should he approve more highly. To it he will probaby not be able to find a satisfactory answer and may at once conclude that the situation cannot be considered morally. But if he so concludes, he will be in error.

It is possible and valuable to view the reactions of the two brothers from the standpoint of morality for several reasons. In the first place, the essential factor in causing the younger brother to strive to repress his sex thought absolutely was his belief that such an attitude is morally correct, the only one by which he could retain the respect and love of his parents. In the second place, he indulged in stealing for a moral reason—because the fear which he experienced during stealing was alone strong enough to drive the sex-struggle temporarily from his soul, which he considered the more degrading of the two. In the third place, his loss of frankness and resulting uncontrolled sexual desires came from the very repression which he regarded as morally necessary. In the fourth place, moral living became self-contradictory and so impossible for him (with resulting loss of frankness, unwise sexual desires and stealing) because by his extreme sense of guilt he lost an inner sense of fellowship with his parents, which morality guaranteed him he would not lose if he did what he deemed right. And finally, he got into his difficulty because he did not know that all sane people mean by social ideals, ideals that are not to be taken absolutely, and when regarding them so, achieve characters which command the respect and love of companions and permit the establishment of happy family life.

We must, I believe, conclude that although we cannot come to any relative moral judgment as between the two brothers, the situation which we are studying is a profoundly moral one. It permits us to come to one specific moral conclusion: that we cannot concur in the self-condemnation of the younger brother of himself since all his actions resulted from his extreme desire to do right, coupled with a lack of knowledge as to what the right is. And the situation is also instructive with regard to fundamental ethical theory, for it teaches that whatever obedience to the categorical imperative may mean, it does not mean the *absolute* repudiation of what is regarded as evil. E. C. Tolman in his *Purposive Behavior* has shown that mice learn best who are free to make numerous exploratory mistakes. Such religious injunctions as: "Be ye perfect even as your Heavenly Father is perfect" and, to avoid hypocrisy, to make every secret thought in accord with the finally determined deed, are exceedingly dangerous to those who take them seriously.

We may add that psychology in tracing thoughts and acts to infantile experience or to the subconscious, and psychiatry, to neurological and somatic conditions, would confirm our strictly moral findings of absolution for the younger brother.

P557d. "It is probably safe to say that no man will have mental disorder so long as he can feel himself an integral part of some group whose standards he is able to accept as final." But what if, as we have shown to be the case, morality is fundamentally contradictory, since it cannot be carried out to its logical conclusion, with the result that the morality of no group can be consistent and worthy of acceptance as final? Then a person can avoid mental strain only if he can feel at home despite the moral inconsistency of his group because the group affords him essential economic and social security. If it does so, society must act on the basis of no immediate advantage to itself. It must act irrationally—since in seeing the inconsistency of its social standards an individual is disloyal to the community and so is worthy of no good at its hands. Therefore, mental disorder cannot decrease until society is so organized that it can give security to its rebels for services that can be objectively valued and also can give them time to develop their ideal thought. If so, then a person ought not to be morally condemned for undergoing mental disorder in present society. The fundamental situation may simply be that he is more intelligent (and so sees the moral contradictions) and more morally sensitive to them than is the average person.

P559c. "Under somewhat different circumstances or if he had been of a different make-up, he might....have sought to make peace with himself by substituting a minor for a major virtue," instead of a "minor for a major offense." Mr. Boisen is here interpreting the course of events *explicitly* in terms of the psychological constitution of the patient, but also, as is common in supposedly psychological analyses, *implicitly* in terms of a moral criticism. It is important to notice, however, that at this point and at all points it is possible to interpret events *explicitly* in terms of moral judgment. Thus, in the present instance, the boy substituted a minor for a major offense instead of a minor for a major virtue, among other moral reasons, because he judged himself too sinful to do otherwise—a specifically moral judgment for which morality cannot condemn him. Psychology cannot rule out ethics, but each can powerfully aid the other to achieve its own objective.

P559d-560a. "Again he might have made himself believe that he couldn't help it....Or he might have found some physical weakness which relieved him of all responsibility....But the result is isolation." Is not the final objective of all therapeutic psychology to show that the patient could not help what he has done? Does not psychoanalysis place the ultimate springs of action in the subconscious, over which one has no control? Does it not effect its cures by relieving the patient of a sense of guilt and restoring the emotional life which the guilt had dammed up? Is it any worse to attempt to escape guilt by referring one's action to some physical weakness than to the subconscious, which Ernest Jones has admitted may be physical? Doubtlessly it cannot be. The person who does what Mr. Boisen believes leads to isolation and insanity is doing what the psychiatrist will insist that he do. Such a person cannot be intellectually or morally condemned. When he personally justifies himself he does not know that society approves his judgment, and so, tossed by fear and hope, his emotional life is upset. When he receives the justification of science, he knows that informed society grants him an absolution far profounder and more systematized than he had devised for himself, and he is at rest.

P560a. "Again, this boy might have met the situation by simply yielding to the sex temptation. Many unfortunates do just that. They surrender to the lower cravings and seek satisfaction in easy ways such as drink or day-dreaming. And the end thereof is the progressive hopelessness and disintegration which the psychiatrist calls simple or hebephrenic dementia praecox."

(1) We should note, in the first place, that Mr. Boisen, though he subjects the actions of the brothers to no careful moral analysis, again incidently, although here explicitly, condemns their actions. In the present passage he calls autoerotic tendencies responses to "lower cravings," "the end thereof is....progressive hopelessness and dis-

integration"; in another passage, "solitary sex indulgence." He calls the boy who initiated the brothers of our story into sexual knowledge a "miserable fellow" in the moral sense, and declares that the process of recovery may have "the value of the valid religious conversion experience," and that a person has a healthier nature who is "relatively immune to the sex appeal." If moral judgments are to be passed, they should be established on explicit thought.

(2) We should note, in the second place, that several well-known studies of autoerotic reactions have shown that they need not be followed by hopelessness and disintegration. Therefore, when these conditions do occur they cannot be the result of the autoerotic reactions per se, but at most to certain attitudes toward those reactions.

(3) We should note, in the third place, that the cause of hopelessness and disinegration may be one or another or a combination of the following:—

(a) a generally high-strung nervous system, local structural or functional pathology of the nervous system or somatic pathology affecting it, which makes some autoeroticism inevitable;

(b) a lack of a knowledge of the biological sexual variation of individuals, popularized by J. R. Oliver in his *Pastoral Psychiatry*, which frees each person from terror as to his own sexual nature, absolute suppression of it and resulting disruption of personality, while leaving in tact the standards of conduct necessary for the good of the individual and of society;

(c) a lack of a knowledge of the normal stages, discovered by Freud, through which sex goes—which, if followed, bring sufficient heteroerotic reactions and sublimation within the realm of moral possibility and obligation; and

(d) an initial taking of sexual standards too absolutely, which keeps the body in a condition of intense restraint, which is equivalent to great internal excitement, and which, by making the body abnormally important to consciousness, shuts out interest in the outside world and increases autoerotic desire to a maximum. Then there follows self-condemnation for inability to live up to social standards as absolutely conceived; then more intense restraint and so on in a vicious circle, with ever increasing isolation and disintegration.

In conclusion we must affirm the hebephrenic originally accepted social standards as absolute: that is, the boy was unusually moral and became isolated from mankind when he found it impossible to live up to them as thus conceived. Therefore moral condemnation of him seems inappropriate.

P560d. "The foreign element, the unassimilated experience, is brought from the realm of evasion and concealment and of vague consciousness out into the open, after the manner of a festering abscess." From such a sentence one would gain the impression that the persons to whom reference is made are morally reprehensible before they overcome their evasion and concealment. But such persons may think that they are most effectively living up to social standards by utterly concealing those of their thoughts which violate the standards: that thus they are making the standards more universal. To this end they may employ all the approved means of grace in the hope of annihilating the unsocialized thoughts, and therefore, cannot be called immoral before an explosion brings the secret things to light.

P561a. "The chances of such a favorable outcome [recovery] seem to depend not upon the profoundness of the disturbance but upon the nature of the personality trends which are present." But these, in turn, science affirms are due to somatic conditions, lack of knowledge or subconscious complexes, for which there is no moral responsibility. Before coming to moral estimates one should always probe to their fundamental conditions.

P561c. "The patient may be overwhelmed with the consciousness of guilt and sit in sack-cloth and ashes mourning over his sins." As the sense of sin has no proportional relationship to any misdeeds done—judging by the moral sense of the sane, and as the deeds which call up the sense of sin were due to overconscientiousness, which the organism could not stand, the court ought not to concur in the condemnation of himself of the prisoner before the bar.

P563a and 564d. "It [recovery] is the attempt to order and organize the inner life, to become reconciled with the 'Man Above' in order thereby to become reconciled with one's fellows"...."No man can be dependent upon another human being, whether physician or mother or wife, and yet be free and well. Independence of other human beings and right relationship with the 'Man Above,' under whatever conception our philosophy of life permits to us, is indispensable to the full development of the personality." But suppose one is a religious agnostic because he does not see how there can be a central moral power, God, amid the appalling evil of the world. Then, according to Mr. Boisen, he can never gain recovery. Yet he may be extremely sensitive to moral values. And, much more important, suppose one's psychology condemns dependence upon an overwhelming being which would be enervating if made upon a fellow mortal. Suppose one considers that an emotional dependence upon Jesus increases one's homoerotic component. Suppose one regards any special religious obligations as anti-socializing. Suppose one regards the acceptance of the absolute, abstract precepts of religion as establishing false methods of thought and living—as divisive of the personality, and as an impediment to that constant, irrational admixture of passion and its sublimation which is the essence of the normal life of the soul. I believe that we could scarcely regard even such a person as immoral, although his convictions, however dimly realized, should keep him for life a patient in a hospital for the insane. We could commit him as insane, as unable to realize the infinitely self-restraining complexity of truth, but, though agnostic, we could not deny him at death an entrance into any fullness of joy prepared for all the saints.

III

In conclusion we would point out, in the first place, that although the present writer defends the moral status of the psychotic, he does not advocate the elevation of their characteristic thoughts to a place of preëminence or practical control in the souls of men generally. One should realize that social standards, when thought of as *standdards,* not as absolutes, cause a person never to be completely satisfied with pleasure that has no reference to society, not even in marriage, nor yet deny all pleasure which is not completely socialy justified, and so, on the whole, produce finally the greatest personal-social integration, interaction, and so development. Or, to observe the same matter from the opposite point of view: civilization would have nothing to standardize if the original impulses were completely denied and destroyed. And one should realize that acceptance of the fact of biological variation of individuals and the stages of sexual development, to which we have already referred, justifies a moderate attitude to sex, makes possible the acceptance of standards as such, not as absolutes, the consequent retention of peace of mind and the greatest possible degree of unified sexual control, expression, and sublimation, in view of somatic conditions, subconscious complexes, knowledge of correct sexual ethics, and social environment. One learns to ride a bicycle by (1) having an eager interest in the road ahead, (2) by putting a lot of unregenerate impulse into the pedals and (3) by turning the forewheel sufficiently in the direction in which one is afraid of falling to satisfy and so overcome the imbalance and therefore carry out the essential purpose of going straight ahead, which is registered by the rest of the bicycle and by the bicycle as a whole. In like manner should one govern sexual desire.

We would point out in conclusion in the second place, that the ethics which we have developed accepts and reconciles within itself various psychologies, yet does so without ruling out ethical norms. Thus we have conceived of the behavior of the individual as determined by his environment (behaviorism), by somatic conditions (psychiatry), by subconscious conflicts (psychoanalysis), as subject to correction if not taken too seriously (experimentalism) and as implying conflicting forces, which cannot exist in absolute lines but only in fields (gestaltism). But also we have noted the progress of the soul and acknowledged its self-appointed goal (ethics). The foundations of our ethical resolution of the psychoses are well laid, and so should be of therapeutic value.

We would point out in conclusion, in the third place, that it is indeed true that those suffering from a nervous breakdown, and in the years when preparing for it, have not deployed their forces to the best advantage to get along in the kind of world that this one is, and that this fact must be central in all treatment of patients—from the very fact that they come to a doctor or are in a hospital. It may even be true that scientific men when they use words which popularly imply condemnation, have small notion of implying condemnation, but intend essentially to refer to the fact (whatever the explanation) of the lack of a proper deployment of forces. But students and patients must receive words in their common denotations and connotations. It is difficult to believe that any mode of expressing the necessity of a change of character or personality, however cold and scientific it be, will fail to suggest condemnation of present character to a person who for years has been striving after perfection and so who is highly sensitive to every suggestion of self or social condemnation.

In the case which we have been studying, however, the writer passes from the use of words which are essentially scientific, with overtones of moral condemnation, to those which are essentially condemnatory. It is impossible for the present writer to conceive of a psychiatrist who should divest himself of his humanity at any time so completely as to avoid weighting his words with some of the usual emotional cargo, even if he has no use for the theological advisements and explicit condemnations of Reverend Boisen. But in many cases, the scientific psychiatrist would do more harm than the theological. Against the torrents from Sinai the patient might open a mental umbrella. But the moral implications of "scientific" psychiatry are so bound up with his essential treatment that a patient cannot separate the two—to his own continued undoing.

If the psychiatrist must, by the very fact of treatment and by the words which he must employ, imply some adverse moral judgment upon his patients, how can he avoid doing so? He cannot, nor is it necessary that he do so. (1) He can avoid all needless implications of moral condemnation, e.g., by carefully choosing his words and controlling his emotional expressions and by separating patients who are sensitive to moral conventions from those whose condition requires violation of those conventions—as otherwise the patient concludes that his endeavors to lead a moral life are regarded as of no value and so condemns his empirical self and either becomes hebephrenic or reënforces his impossible ideal self. (2) But much more important, the psychiatrist can work out the moral issues involved in every case as we have done in the case of the two brothers, and competently present them to the patient as fully as the patient desires—both personally and in writing, so that night and day the patient may review his moral analysis and let it sink to the center of consciousness. Then vindication and aspiration, forced by the fact of his being under treatment, would fuse with each other as in the souls of the most distinguished human beings. As long as the patient knows only (a) condemnation or evasion of moral issues and (b) perfection, set over against each other, he cannot incorporate enough of perfection to respect the self or dare to feel reconciled to society. Psychiatric evasion but reënforces the parental evasion which created the terror about duty and the possibility of achieving it which is the core of his psychosis.

The human soul is something more than a psychological Frankenstein. It is an organized moral aspiration and should be treated as such.

DOVER DAYS—MEMORIES FROM THE LIFE OF EDWIN MILLER WHEELOCK*

BY CHARLES KASSEL

THE CHILDHOOD and young manhood of a talented and forceful individual is always a matter of absorbing interest. It is a pleasant and often a profitable task to run the threads of character back to their first outcropping and in the youth search out the traits which, with time and experience, shall ripen into the qualities of the prime. With those destined to heroic work, in whatever path, whether illustrious or obscure, the child is commonly father to the man and in the early arenas of endeavor reflects the image of his after-life. Few phases of biography, indeed, yield a richer return to the assiduous student.

A distinguished American poet has referred to Edwin Miller Wheelock as one of the remarkable men of his time, and such indeed he was in spite of the restricted though eminently useful sphere in which he wrought. A precise parallel for his character and career might be hard to find in the lives on our shelves. Beyond many of those better known to fame he possessed the elements of greatness. In form and figure, in feeling and faculty, in superb courage where his convictions were concerned, and in the eloquence that made words dynamic on his lips, he was fashioned for a shining place, but to a degree rarely found in the history of such men he held in contempt the motives which lead to achievement for ambition's sake. A dreamer and a mystic, disdainful of renown and wealth, he turned his back deliberately upon the avenues to distinction, preferring to disregard the urge of private interest for the exalted call of great humane movements.

It is precisely of such a man, however, that the antecedents carry the loftiest challenge. The self-seeking man, the organizer of personal success, the manipulator of social and business forces in his

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*The installments of the biography of Edwin Miller Wheelock as published through the issues of the present magazine for July, 1908, September, 1920, February and July, 1922, March, August, and September, 1923, March and July, 1924, April and September, 1925, March and November, 1926, April, 1927, and January, 1928, carried the story of the author of *Proteus* through the anti-slavery agitation and the Civil War, ending with the close of that great struggle, and in the February issue, 1929, we turned back the pages of the narrative to review the early life of our subject.

own interest, is a familiar type, and we need no recourse to the lessons of biography for an analysis of his character. It is about such types chiefly that latter-day history has turned. The altruistic man, engrossed, through some inner pressure, with the human problem, hunting the secret of a nobler race and society with all the self-forgetfulness of a scientist in his laboratory, is by the conventional standards an eccentric, undeserving the attention of sober historians. That such individuals are really anticipations of a type of humanity to which the future belongs is a truth too refined as yet for popular acceptance. Changing standards, however, call from age to age for a revaluation of life and history, and a generation to come will resurrect from the limbo of forgotten things the stories of such men and give them a commanding place in the chronicles of mankind.

We saw in the preceding instalment of this biography that, when our young minister entered upon his pastorate at Dover, the church whose creed he had espoused was torn with dissension, the younger and more radical clergy storming at the citadels of tradition with their transcendentalism and their agitation against slavery, while the older and more conservative and influential fought to preserve the strongholds of ancient belief and sweep back the rising tide of heresy. The fact of young Wheelock leaving the faith of his fathers for the somewhat more liberal creed of the Unitarians is abundant proof of his independence of feeling and action, and the influence of Emerson and Parker must have tended powerfully to draw him into the more radical movement; but he had come out of one of the old churches, the pressure of the traditional belief was strong upon him, and the hold upon his mental being of a long heredity of orthodox teaching was something not to be easily released.

We get an insight into his spiritual struggle in an expression we find in the manuscript of an old sermon which speaks of the distrust and misery and horror of the unknown which for many years weighted down his own spirit. Moreover, the early writings of Thomas Lake Harris had told strongly in favor of the old ideas, investing them with a mystical meaning which might win acceptance from a youthful and visionary intellect when in their literal nakedness they would find instant rejection. So it is, therefore, that the earliest sermons breathe a spirit of orthodox piety which comports ill with the virile, questioning tone of the later discourses. In one of the earliest of his deliverances we see something of Puritanical asceticism in the intimation that nothing should be spent on art or works of mere beauty so long as suffering existed in the world. A sermon upon baptism, too, attached a value to the rite which jars harshly with his later and kindlier view. A discourse, again, upon the subject of "Home" spoke with a feeling one might expect in the most orthodox of pulpits of the old-fashioned religious observances in the domestic circle. Here was plainly a soul in struggle with itself, held in the grip of religious instincts inherited from a hundred generations, while the growing intellect was straining at its bars, reaching out for the freedom of thought which could not long be denied it.

The steady growth of his mind in the direction of rational belief was inevitable. On June 22, 1857—a scant half year after his ordination—he delivered at Dover a discourse in which he declared:

> When a man lowers the flag of his personal independence before an unhealthy and unchristian sentiment and trembles before the vulgar tribunal that he should despise, that man is at once a traitor to his manhood and an infidel to his heart. We find few indeed, who have the courage and heart to be *true* at any cost. We follow the leadings of the Divine with "ifs" and "buts" and reservations and so it comes that we follow it not at all.

A spirit such as this could not fear the leadings of reason, whithersoever they might tend, or, once found, shrink from declaring the truth.

We are not without abundant evidence, moreover, of a growing liberality. In a sermon which could not have been delivered later than 1858, he says:

> No form of faith professed by the older nations of the world, by Turk, Arabian, Hindu, Chinese, Persian, and the like, is wholly superstitious; and no form of so-called Christian faith, whether Greek, Catholic, Protestant or any of their subdivisions, is *wholly* spiritual. Indeed, the lower and more selfish forms of nominal Christianity contrast very unfavorably with the purer forms of paganism as we in our bigotry term those modes of belief which have for centuries furnished bread of spiritual satisfaction to the vast majority of our race. And we ourselves, who almost alone of all the sects profess a benign and hopeful faith, resting on the pure reason of man, while we have shaken off many of the grosser and more sensual terrors of the old superstition still bear the token of

> its unwholesome contact and morbid influence. The marks of the old fetters are still visible on our limbs and the prison smell yet lingers on our garments. Far, very far, are we yet from a purely spiritual faith. It has often been my duty to point out these defects and such as these, and to speak of the noxious elements of superstition, worldliness and unbelief mingling with the purer current of our faith. It will be no less my duty in the future to hold them up to view until we cast them off as belonging to the time of our ignorance and our spiritual childhood and press forward to higher truths.

It is in a lecture, however, delivered on June 20th, 1859, from his pulpit at Dover that convincing evidence is found of his growing independence and incisiveness of statement and his deepening inclination to do fiery battle for the saner and more rational views of religious truth. The address is entitled "Literal Interpretation"—and described as "A Lecture in the Unitarian Church, Dover, New Hampshire, June 20, 1858, being a reply to the recent attack upon liberal Christianity by Rev. T. J. Greenwood, with a review of the dogma of verbal infallibility and a statement of rational Scriptural belief." The lecture is found printed in a pamphlet of twenty-four pages by Crosby, Nichols, & Company, Boston, 1858, and is to be seen in the Congressional Library at Washington among the Waterman pamphlets bound together with other tracts ranging in date back to 1758.

The purport of the lecture makes clear that Rev. Mr. Greewood had taken deep umbrage at the presence of the young religious rebel in the community and had referred to him in a public address as an "infidel" and a "blasphemer" and "corrupter of youth" because of a series of discourses the young Unitarian had delivered during the winter upon "Liberal Christianity." It is evident that our minister had not scrupled to declare his beliefs wholly as they had matured in his mind and that even upon the supreme question of slavery, then agitating the entire country which, more than any other, timid souls sought to avoid, his words had rung out clear and unmistakable.

> For myself personally I can only say that any charge of infidelity emanating from one who during a ministry in this town of seven or eight years has consented to be muzzled on the most momentous and sacred question that ever came before the pulpits of a nation—the question of the chief sin of America, an organized national crowning sin; the buying and selling and holding as merchandise of four millions of human

> beings, many of them Christian church members; any charge of infidelity, I say, emanating from such a source, I accept as a compliment.

The lecture attacks the dogma of the literal infallibility of the Scriptures with every weapon wielded before or since by those who espouse a rational interpretation, and it is plain enough that this dogma, at least, had no remnant of hold upon the mind of the fearless young polemic. The language of the discourse, compared with that of the earlier sermons, betrays a steady growth in the direction of a firm, clear, balanced diction. A vein of biting sarcasm appears which in the earlier sermons had not been noticeable and an occasional pungency of phrase—foreshadowings of that splendid command of the resources of language which his maturer writings were to manifest.

The sermons of this period were not without many beautiful touches, indicative of the fine sentiment which was a part of the man and the poetic atmosphere with which his thought surrounded the subject of his deliverances. Thus, upon the subject of "Childhood"—a favorite theme, often treated in his sermons and one which his domestic felicity and growing family circle invested, doubtless, with a personal interest, he says:

> The young soul, all sensation, stands upon the confine ot a new and boundless world, filled with an exhaustless variety of interesting objects to excite and gratify the senses and to solicit by every varying delight the manifold activities of the soul. Experience has not yet taught caution and disappointment has thrown no dark shadows over the heart. Life is a May morning with no recollections of the past and no fears of the coming winter. All life is in the present. The only rest is action; the only peace is the all-absorbing interest of delightful sensation. All sorrow is a passing cloud; all darkness a quickly vanishing vapor. There are no mournful memories, no sharp regrets, no paralyzing fears. A perfect singleness of purpose is the secret of the loveliness of childhood. The child does one thing at a time and that one thing fills his whole mind. No cautious reserve, no circumspection, no fear of criticism tones down the color of his eagerness to the cold propriety of the adult. Is it strange that we should call this the happiest season of life?

So, in another discourse:

> I know not if anywhere in the whole world God's voice and presence seems more plainly heard and felt than in our

> children. They are perfumed with the very air of Heaven. How absorbed is a child in the present!—a living embodiment of the command "take no thought for the morrow." How spotless its innocence! Truly children are among God's highest gifts.

Again, upon the subject of "Marriage and Spiritual Laws," we find a beautiful passage in an old sermon of this period, and its tone reflects the happiness of his own home and the joy he took in the noble companionship of a loving and loyal helpmate. He had been married September 22, 1855, at Charleston, Massachusetts, to Ellen, the daughter of Thomas C. Brackett, then in her twenty-fifth year—a young woman of distinguished colonial descent, and of fine qualities of mind and spirit, who, in the following year, became the mother of their eldest child, Charles. For nearly forty years that companionship was to be vouchsafed by the fates and was to make his life redolent of a sacred and enduring influence, but it is pleasant to read the words which that first flush of his happiness inspired and bridge in thought the chasm of time between that early, youthful, ardent day and the day, well nigh two score years later, when beside her form, stilled in death, he penned, and two weeks later delivered, the most beautiful and touching of all his discourses.

> Innumerable phenomena, both of matter and mind, are solved by reference to sex and marriage as universal laws. They offer the grandest proof that man is nature concentrated and nature man diffused. They constitute a bond of divinity which certifies every part of the creation to be of common origin and of a common plan—the manifest expression of one primary idea. Each of the spiritual elements of our nature is lonely and celibate until conjoined to the other and instinctively impels its possessor towards its vital complement. Along with this marrying of the spiritual effigies come all the sweet blessings of the family circle—birthdays, the musical prattle of children and their silvery laughter—the noble friendship of brothers and sisters—the tender and changeless affection of fathers and mothers—thanksgiving gatherings around the bright hearths that reflect the warmer and more glowing welcome of those around. And these phenomena are to a great extent repeated in the vegetable world, furnishing one of the most striking parallels in nature. Nothing is more beautiful than the sight of a hazel tree on a fine day in early Spring, covered with its thousand pendent stamen-blossoms—blossoms from which with the slightest motion descends a shower of golden-colored particles kissing the

> crimson lips of the unpretending little pistil-blossoms; it stands living and awake while everything else is still steeped in its heavy winter slumber. Thus, sex, like life, is uniform in its history, whatever kind of body it may actuate.

Once more, upon the subject of the duty of man. In a sermon of June 1861, he says:

> The Almighty reigns in every atom, in all states, in all things visible, in all things invisible. Demons are subject to Him; angels are obedient to Him; the elements run swiftly to obey him; what we call nature is His servant and His slave. Friends, this is the word of the spirit to us, be strong! Take up your crosses whatever they are. Do not pray for deliverance but pray to God continually for more strength to bear more burdens. The heaviest burden can never sink you lower than your knees and at last your fetters will become wings and you will rise with Christ above worldliness and all selfishness.

Upon the fundamental subjects of religion, those departments of thought where speculation is most difficult, the utterances of the early sermons are striking, since they give token of keen and balanced thinking and show a tendency to reason closely in the direction of basic principles. Upon these subjects indeed his views underwent no change in the passing of the years, and the quotations which follow might have served as well for the last years of his ministry.

Of the nature of Deity, he says in a sermon delivered at Dover, Salem, Marblehead, Jersey City, and Easton:

> If the Almighty is to fill our dead hearts with new life he must appear to us not merely as the all-diffusive energy mixed up with everything in the creation—the Infinite All; but as one having personal attributes, sympathy, heart, reciprocal feeling. God in nature seems too distant, too diffusive, too vast, too impersonal to meet the needs of our hearts.

So, on the nature of matter, he says:

> The universe with all the things in it is an actual emanation of God and rests as closely to him now as in the beginning. God in the infinite past threw out from himself portions of his own substance which, becoming more and more dense in their recession from Him, gradually formed the world and their apparel. Now everything that is created must first have existed in the spiritual world before it can exist as matter. It is impossible for anything to be and not yet

> first exist as a thought before it can have material shape. Man, trees, flowers, animals, the birds, the sea, the mountains, the stars, everything that enters into the composition of the visible universe, every line of duty, every touch of harmony, must have distinctly pre-existed in the realm of spirit before taking form in the realm of matter. God *thought* them all and sent them forth first as spiritual things and lastly expressed in a material clothing. We know this to be true for like Paul we reason from the known to the unknown. When we look upon a beautiful landscape, we see trees, hills, rivers, real and substantial, indeed, yet only the temporary images of forms existing in a world we do not see. That world is spiritual—the same old beautiful world of God in fact with which we are familiar only on a higher plane of creation. As the soul is to the human body so is that grand spiritual realm to the human world.

So, again, upon the subject of immortality:

> As the scientist learns the intrinsic quality of a fixed substance in his laboratory by testing it with appropriate acids and alkalis till he finds that with which its different parts combine and thus learns the nature of its elements, so the spirit of man after death is tried and judged by its interior attractions and affinities. The real center of a man's life, both in this world and the next, is his ruling motive, that which he most desires and loves. After death all qualities extraneous to that drop away—nothing goes out but that which is within till the whole man, within and without, is the type of his ruling love. Whatever of errors and vain imaginings we may embrace let us never fancy that we can live all our lives in the exercise of worldly and selfish affection, that we can stimulate into gigantic growth the passions, desires, appetites, ambitions and other forms of self-love and of the love of the world, and that when we die all this mighty organism, all this solid framework of character which has become knit into the moral tissue by constant exercise during a whole life, will vanish away like a morning vapor before the sun, and those spiritual and Christ-like affections which we have never called into action and life during the period assigned to their germination and growth leap at once full-grown into vigorous life.

Already, it is apparent the young minister had become a finished preacher. His thought had grown deeper and broader in the few scant years of responsibility, and practice with the pen had greatly enriched his native gift of expression. The clinging of old beliefs had been early sloughed off and he was ready now to take his place with the advanced thinkers of the day.

It is not difficult to conjure up before the mind's eye a faithful picture of the days and works at Dover. There was the small but cultivated congregation. There was the Sunday school and its activities. There was the simple and unpretentious service before the discourse each Sunday morning. Above all, however, there was the young minister with his rich voice and fine figure—a voice and figure which even in the last years defied the infirmities of age—and the large, full, prophetic eyes, turned upon his hearers or lifted, as was his wont, in whispered prayer.

That finely disinterested, splendidly heroic nature must have impressed greatly the little assemblage which greeted him on the Sabbath morning. So rare a personality could not but have won deeply upon their affection and devotion. It was a remarkable type of man, indeed, who had come among them—a type alien to the crass commercial world and even to the smug and self-sufficient religiousness of the time. A hero of the old day who set out for savage lands resolved to barter life and ease for the spiritual welfare of the rude inhabitants—such a one might have found something congenial in his spirit. Souls of lesser mold were drawn powerfully to him by the nobility of his motives, the tenderness of his feeling and the beauty of his thought and speech, but they knew him afar only, and his true spiritual proportions they could not discern.

BOY SCOUTS IN TURKEY

PLAY IN TURKISH VILLAGES

BY HELEN VROOMAN

International College, Izmir, Turkey

ON going into a Turkish village for the first time, one might feel that the spirit of play was lacking. Turkish crowds seem quiet and serious; little children seem solemn for their years. But with better acquaintance, one is soon impressed with the genuine and hearty hospitality which is perhaps their chief recreative enjoyment. I shall never forget the delight we experienced on entering a small village after a strenuous hike when the inhabitants came to meet us, gave us mats to sit on under the trees, and then brought baskets of fresh grapes and small cups of coffee. As we partook of this delectable fare, we exchanged experiences and stories. The unhurried poise of most Turks, high or low, makes one love to linger over coffee and conversation.

The feast of Ramazan is still celebrated in Anatolia. Thirty days of fasting from sunrise to sunset followed by three days of feasting and visiting is the custom. After each long day of fast comes a night of merry-making and eating. During these evenings there is dancing to the beating of the drum, singing in a minor key, and story-telling.

The Turks possess a charming traditional character called Nasreddin Hoja, an old man about whom there are innumerable stories which depict either his extreme cleverness or his stupidity. Often of an evening village folk will sit around and rock with laughter over the tales of his escapades. Sometimes a traveling story-teller, called a "mete," will go from village to village telling about old Nasreddin Hoja. A favorite story is the following:

One day Nasreddin was sitting on the limb of a tree sawing away between himself and the trunk. A traveler went by, looked startled and said, "Old man, pretty soon if you aren't careful, you are going to get a bad fall." Nasreddin paid no attention, and the traveler went on. In a few minutes the limb broke and down went the old fellow. After he had recovered from the shock, he rushed after the traveler and cried, "I beg you to tell me when I am going to die." The traveler answered that he could not do such a thing. "But," said Nasreddin, "you told me I was going to fall and I did, and of course you can prophesy when I shall die."

Another story, illustrating his cleverness is often told: Once Nasreddin borrowed a big soup kettle from his neighbor. After a few days he returned it and a small kettle in addition. The neighbor said he had loaned only the large kettle, but Nasreddin declared the large kettle had had a baby while at his house. At that the neighbor delightedly accepted the little one.

Some time later, the old fellow again borrowed the big kettle. This time weeks went by and it was not returned. Finally, the neighbor came after it. Nasreddin sadly shook his head, "Your kettle died," he said.

"Whoever heard of a kettle dying?" indignantly protested the neighbor.

"Well," said the old Hoja, "if a kettle can have a baby, it can also die."

From early times comes a kind of "Punch and Judy" show, called "Kara Göz" (Black Eye). Huge, hook-nosed old "Black Eye" is always having narrow escapes in marital or financial troubles, but by his ingenuity he usually wins out. During the Ramazan evenings "Black Eye" is performed in a corner of a coffee house behind a small lighted screen. The little marionettes are cleverly made from camel's hide and are nicely colored.

Often, during these nights and at many other times a national folk dance of distinctive charm is performed, which has descended from the romantic, Robin-Hood type of mountain robber. The Zeybeck, as it is called, is often performed by villagers in the center of a group of friends who sing, clap or strum their accompaniment. The athletic instructors teach it to the children in the city schools, where it is often done in the old national costume.



ZEYBECK DANCE

With the Westernization and educational programs, of course, sports such as volley ball and basket ball are coming into the village schools. For the older men, however, the coffee house still seems to be the chief center of recreation. For a cent one can buy a tiny cup of coffee and can sit at a table under a huge sycamore by a running stream. All the men in the village seem to gather here during their leisure hours to talk, to sit, or to play a bit of backgammon. There are always a few to smoke the "hubble-hubble" pipe or nargile. It would be fascinating to sit in on some of the coffee house discussions if one knew the language well enough. It is the country club and golf course of the Turkish villager.

And what of the women? The young girls are more and more getting education with all the broadening interests which it brings with it. Marriage comes at eighteen or twenty where before it came at fourteen or fifteen. The older women still keep apart from the men, however; they have their gossip fests in each other's homes or they take an all-day picnic in some green spot. It was my privilege a few years ago to spend a few nights in a rather isolated village. In the evening I was invited to join the women at their recreation. They put on a program of native dances and dances improvised to some western jazz records. I could not but think that the stage had lost some excellent talent in one of these women.

The little girls seem always to be playing hopscotch or little singing games. Rarely are dolls seen. Sometimes one sees little girls playing with two sticks between which is suspended a slack string. On the string is a big spool which flies into the air as the arms are extended and the string becomes taut. The skilful ones catch the spool on the string as it descends. This game is sometimes seen depicted on a frieze of an old ruin. More often one sees a group of little girls throwing balls into the air, endeavoring to see who can clap their hands behind their backs the most before the ball is caught on its return.

Little boys announce spring in Turkey by flying beautiful kites. Wind and hills and a little urchin with a colored kite! One can hardly look up in the sky without seeing a kite somewhere. The most distinctly Turkish game which the boys play, seems to be one called *chelik chomak*. Even the donkey boys who drive in from the hills often steal a few minutes to indulge in chelik chomak. Sometimes just two play though any number can take part. The words mean a special kind of stick which is always used. The boys divide into teams about thirty feet apart. One side bats the stick, which is laid in a hole, into the air. If it is caught, it gives several points toward the final score which may be five hundred. If not caught, it is left lying and the number of steps taken to retrieve it count for the batter. When the players are skilful, it is a clever and attractive game to watch.

Clubs for sports are growing. Soccer and basketball are popular and well played. A Turk recently won the Balkan tennis championship. Baseball is practically unknown, as is American football. The old sport of *jirit* which is essentially Turkish is still played in some villages, and is being revived by the army to improve the cavalry. This is a game which seems to hold the tradition of its people.

Originally it was played in Central Asia. It has a warlike air and smacks of Jengis Khan and Tamerlane. In different villages, it has different versions. I have been told it originated in the custom of a man fighting for and carrying off his bride.

The most common form it takes seems to be the mock battle. Armed with long sticks called *jirits*, horsemen strive to touch each other. When the stick falls to the ground it must be recaptured without dismounting. When a rider is hit he is out of the game.

Another version of the game comes from a village near Ancient Pergamos, where there are many good horsemen. This is played at weddings. The host pins various articles of clothing on a high rope strung between poles. The riders come at breakneck speed from a distance, hurl their sticks at the ground point down, and, if the sticks bounce over the rope, they are entitled to an article of clothing.

Most often now it seems to be played as a test of the skill with which riders can hurl the jirit stick on to the ground and catch it again on the bounce.

With the Westernization program that is being effected by the President, traditions will change in Turkey. One cannot but hope, however, that the gracious hospitality, the delightful Zeybeck, jirit, the stories of Nasreddin, and old Kara Göz will always be part of Turkish life.

EDUCATION UNDER ETHICAL CHAOS

BY VICTOR S. YARROS

EDUCATIONAL and pedagogical questions are always with us, but in late years these questions have been discussed with rather exceptional earnestness and concern. Literally every part and aspect of our educational system have been challenged. Some of our ablest and most faithful educators have all but despaired of that system. Schools and colleges, it has been said in sorrow and in anger, do more harm than good. They are standardized, conventional, wedded to certain outworn ideals, controlled by ignorant, stupid or selfish and reactionary members of the Plutocracy, and they stifle inquiry, destroy independence, cripple originality and darken counsel by sophistry, suppression, misrepresentation, what not.

It is unnecessary to continue the summary of the indictment. Intelligent persons are familiar with it. Here we shall consider certain issues that have emerged from the agitated and poignant discussion of educational faults, vices, omissions, and high misdemeanors.

The first and most vital is this: In an age universally described as transitional, an age of intellectual and moral confusion, lack of positive standards, profound skepticism and "revaluation of all values," what are the professors and teachers to teach? Dr. Alexander Miklejohn, head of the late Experimental College of the University of Wisconsin, has often dramatized and emphasized this question. *How* to teach, he has said truly, *when* to teach this or that subject, how to coordinate and organize education are relatively minor questions, to be answered in the light of the basic question—*What?*

The more intelligent and sincere an educator is, the less competent he is—and feels himself to be—to guide and direct youth or, for that matter, adult persons in search of culture and knowledge. In religion, Agnosticism has taken the place of Belief. In ethics, thanks to anthropology, history, modern geography, ethnology, and other sciences, dogmatism is no longer possible or respectable.

We do not know what the future will do for the family, the institution of marriage, the political organism, the economic system, the form and modes of social organization. We do know that everything is changing and evolving, and that no principle can be said to be absolute.

It would be foolish to deny, therefore, that the position of the educator is much more difficult today than it was in the simpler days of absolutism in theology, religion and ethics. But it is less difficult than it is generally represented to be. The lay world appreciates—in a vague way, to be sure—the nature of the educators' predicament and does not expect more of them than they can honestly and legitimately give.

Let me illustrate. Some years ago the University of Wisconsin was under attack from several powerful quarters, including the legislature and governor of the state, because of its alleged social and political radicalism. It was charged that too many of its professors were socialists and were actually teaching socialism, indirectly perhaps, and undermining the American economic and political system by their heresies. It was charged, further, that many of the professors were "godless" and adherents of the mechanistic philosophy of the universe.

The present writer was asked by a leading daily newspaper to interview the Governor of Wisconsin, a few legislators and some of the professors and deans of the University at Madison. He gladly accepted the mission and discharged it with scrupulous impartiality. And what did he find? That the assaults upon the University were attributable to a grave misunderstanding—to failure to distinguish between "teaching" and honest *exposition.* When he called the attention of the Governor to that significant distinction the latter—who had not thought of it—instantly admitted that it would be wrong and inexpedient for any first-class educational institution to ignore socialist theory and socialist movements. He would not, he declared earnestly, object to full and frank exposition of socialism at the University; he objected only to the teaching of socialism in the sense of professorial approval and indorsement of socialism, Marxian or other, and the sweeping condemnation of the present system based, as he thought, upon private property, free contract, competition, and reward of capital as well as of labor and management.

The University authorities then were seen and interrogated. They solemnly assured me that socialism and radical theories generally were *not* being taught at the institution, but only expounded and elucidated. And this, moreover, without overemphasis and with full recognition of the case for the present system or alternative systems embodying individualistic principles.

Clearly, there was no real issue between the University and its vehement critics. The bitter controversy did not long survive the confusion of thought which gave it birth. Indeed, the recent demagogical attempt to revive that controversy met with complete failure.

Now, have we not in this one example the key to the solution of practically all our educational problems? No educator should be required or permitted to teach what he does not believe, but he should be permitted and encouraged to give his students the benefits of his knowledge and lay before them, objectively, the various theories and conceptions that are worthy of attention and discussion in his particular field.

Today, for instance, no professor of economics can overlook the Russian Soviet-Communist experiment. We must and ought to discuss it, analyze it, explain the ideas that underlie it, present the arguments pro and con the experiment, and let the students reach their own conclusions. No sane defender of Capitalism or Individualism can object to such treatment of a momentous revolution.

What is true of economics, politics, government is equally true of religion, morals, art, philosophy. No educational institution should dogmatize where the scientific spirit and attitude forbid dogmatizing. Open questions should be discussed as such, and whether or not a question is open, is a point not at all hard to determine.

Are not all sound educators insisting that their business is not to impose opinions upon students, but to teach them to think for themselves—to compare, test, weigh, and verify before forming any opinion? If this be true, as it is, what is the corollary? Why, manifestly this—that the personal views or leanings of a teacher or professor are not of great consequence, provided he is well informed and willing to be fair and impartial in his exposition of divergent and conflicting theories.

One professor's conservatism should no more constitute a qualification, or disqualification, than another's liberalism or radicalism. What should be demanded of all would-be teachers is ability to teach, to open minds, to stimulate independent thinking and the desire to understand and to know.

It will be objected, perhaps, that the position here taken is applicable only to colleges, post-graduate schools, professional schools, but not to primary and secondary schools. There is some force in the objection, but not much. The primary and secondary schools do not deal, and should not deal, with highly controversial subjects. They cannot wholly ignore such subjects, but even in elementary text-books on economics, politics, government, history, and the like, it is possible to indicate differences of opinion while dwelling on the need of further and deeper study. Besides, the primary and secondary schools will have their hands full if they attend to the elements of the more exact sciences—geography, physics, mathematics, physiology, hygiene, grammar, languages, music, drawing.

Educators, indeed, have complained that the colleges unduly dominate and tyrannize over the primary and secondary schools. The majority of children, it is pointed out, discontinue their academic education when they graduate from the primary school. They should, therefore, be prepared not for college, but for life—for work and for citizenship.

Quite true, but how is one prepared for work and citizenship, or for life in modern society? Certainly not by suppression or distortion of facts, or by ignoring serious problems, or by indulging in misty generalities and deliberately refraining from applying first principles to typical situations and patent maladjustments. Education must be scientific, not contrary to science, but there is no conflict between science and the truly practical viewpoint. Nothing is sillier than the talk of some successful men of business about the danger of theorizing in blissful ignorance of practical, daily experience. Theories not based on experience are worthless. The true man of science builds his theories upon facts and corrects them in the light of additional facts. The objection is not to theory, but to false, loose, jumped-at theories.

One of the great services rendered by the Hoover Committee on Social Trends was to emphasize our social, ethical and cultural lag—the backwardness of our social and economic institutions as compared with the marvellous progress of technology and the exact sciences. Now, this backwardness, or lag, is not due to confusion, to lack of agreement among the natural leaders, but to the selfishness, stubborness, fear, inertia, and wilful obscurantism of certain vested interests. We have not encouraged social invention, or the readjustments demanded by changes in the conditions of life and work. The leaders have not been permitted to lead. Legislation has often spurned scientific advice. Moral standards have been flouted and violated by politicians and statesmen. And have the educators and thinkers boldly asserted their intellectual and moral authority? They have not. They have emphasized, not points of agreement, but points of disagreement.

In this tragic failure of the "clerks"—as Mr. Julien Benda might say—we should find the moral insisted upon in this paper—namely, that the things we *do* know, if we honestly applied them to life, would renovate, transform and transfigure modern society to an extent and degree that world make all talk of upheaval and revolution simply ridiculous and silly. Our excuse is that we are unsettled, confused, palsied. But this is not true.

Let me revert to a very practical question—the teaching of religious truth. Must we boycott religion because few educated men now entertain any belief in the divinity of Jesus, the existence of a personal God, human salvation by grace, bodily resurrection and the like? Certainly not. The duty and right of the professors of religion are as important as ever, though different from those of the days of dogma and fundamentalism. Students are interested in religion, religious history, religious controversy. The professors can and should trace for them the evolution and decline of the great religions of the world. They can discuss, impartially, the similarities and dissimilarities, between these religions. They can discuss the sectarian divisions within them.

The student thus guided and instructed would either embrace one of the great religions still professed and superficially dominant or else reject them all and adopt the Agnostic position. To such freedom of choice he is entitled, and education in the true sense of the term recognizes that right and serves it.

What is true of religion is true of philosophy and of ethics. Education may or may not lead to a definite choice, but the student should know and understand the several philosophical systems competing for his allegiance—Idealism, Realism, Neo-Idealism, Critical Realism, Pragmatism, Monism, Dualism, and so forth. He should know, likewise, the essence of Hebrew ethics, Greek ethics, Christian ethics, utilitarian ethics, evolutionary ethics, Nietzsche-Stirner-Egoist ethics.

Need I multiply illustrations? The point seems to be clear and irrefutable. The perplexity of so many contemporary educators seems to me to be, largely, the result of confusion of thought. H. G. Wells put the case in a nutshell when he said that the child, or adolescent, or adult student, must, first and last, learn what sort of world he lives in, what his place is in that world, what its history is, and what is its relation to the Universe as a whole. We hear a good deal about optional courses, about individual initiative in education, but the truth is overlooked that some knowledge is essential to all of us, and that without it we are tragically ignorant, helpless, stupid, and unadjusted to life.

We may or may not choose to learn Latin, Greek, Hebrew, but no one can live intelligently without knowledge of his own language, or mother-tongue, and at least one other major lanugage—German, French, or Spanish. No pupil or student should be allowed to "cut" geography, history, mathematics, elementary physiology, physics and astronomy.

What education needs is not so much novelty, originality, as sound sense and method. The subjects or courses are imposed by necessity, and their proper classification presents no particular difficulty. But what *is* taught should be taught well, and with enthusiasm and love. No subject is dull if presented with knowledge, interest, and force. As a rule, the failure of an educational institution, or department, is the failure of its faculty—the teachers and instructors.

At a convention of Law School deans and professors some time ago, the startling statement was made that references or allusions to Shakespeare, or Dickens, or the classical authors of Europe, ancient or modern, are meaningless and unintelligible to at least half of the average class in a law school. Now, no law school today admits students who have not had a high-school education plus the equivalent of two-years' training in an accredited college. Where does the blame lie if young men and women of twenty or over, supposed to be ready for a law school, are ignorant of letters? What have these students done in school and college; what have they studied and learned, and why was literature left out of their curricula? How, in truth, can one teach reading and literature, literary history, composition, style, without constant reference to classical and modern novelists, playwrights, poets and essayists?

The indictment against the law-school students was in reality an indictment of the teachers and professors who had charge, for years, of impressionable and eager boys and girls. Perhaps society does not pay salaries sufficient to attract to teaching able, earnest, conscientious men and women. But the teacher who thinks only of his pay is a poor teacher indeed. The teacher is worthy of his hire, and society should not exploit him, but the better part of the teacher's compensation is moral and spiritual. A great Harvard professor said in an article in *The Atlantic Monthly* that he had been paid all his life for doing something which he would gladly have paid the University for letting him do—direct, inspire, and train Youth. Many teachers have the same feeling and attitude, no doubt, but not all. More's the pity.

It is my conviction that the trustees of our universities and colleges, and the lawmakers, state and local, who control the public school systems, would evince more actual respect for the principle of freedom of teaching—a principle no one ventures openly to oppose—if the professors and teachers, instead of substituting new dogmas for old, dubious theories for dubious traditions, evinced due appreciation of their own duty and function. The true spirit of science is tolerant, and our age, because of its transitional character, demands tolerance and open-mindedness of all. The only thing that cannot and must not be tolerated is the invasion by spoils, politics, and jobbery. For all other evils complained of by educators and others the remedy is the scientific approach. This approach does not admit of injustice to any school of thought and insures a hearing for all. Neither does it preclude reasonable discipline, proper conditions of teaching and learning, and a measure of tactful, positive guidance of the pupils and students.

The foregoing observations adequately account for my entire indifference to the liquidation of the Experimental College of the University of Wisconsin. That college may have proved something, but it has given rise to more confusion and misapprehension than to anything else. It ignored all vital contemporary problems and directed its students to investigate Greek civilization or some phases of Medievalism. These matters, the theory was, could be treated without bias, whereas contemporary questions were too "burning" too contentious to be studied objectively or courageously. But, as I have argued, this view is totally unsound. No question is dangerous, even to politicians and rural tories, if discussed frankly from every point of view. Capitalism, for example, can be analyzed and dissected without offending the staunchest defenders of that system. Give all the arguments for it and against it, cite the best authorities, advise further study, and tell the student that in the end he will have to reach his own conclusions. Who would attack this method? And is it not truly illuminating and scientific? I assert confidently that it is.

HOMER'S POLYBOS

BY EDWARD ULBACK

I AM not aware, that any Egyptologist has attempted to identify "Polybos, Alkandra's husband," who, according to the Poet, was reigning over Egypt at, and after, the time Ilium was taken. It is evident that the name Polybos is not Greek, but, before we proceed to analyze and explain it, it will be necessary to state briefly certain facts.

The Twentieth Dynasty was composed of seven Diospolitan Kings, who reigned altogether one hundred and eighty-five years from, and after, the great sothiac era of Menophres, 1324 B.C. Each of these kings bore the celebrated name of Ramesses, but they were distinguished from one another by additional titles, such as Ramesse-Ameno, Ramesse-Sethos, Ramesse-Usermares, Ramesse-Uaphru, Ramesse-iorbasse. Ramesse-iorbasse was the sixth king of this Dynasty, and reigned thirty-nine years, from 1207 B.C. to 1168 B.C. After he had reigned three years, the sothiac month of Thoth came to a close, and the sothiac month of Paophi commenced. This was the month of the Nile, that is, Pa-hapi, Paophi, (Aquarius) "The Nile." Hapi, however, was a religious, or symbolical designation of the Nile, the popular name being simply, ar or iar, "river," or, with the definite article prefixed, Pa-iar, "The River," which the Greeks converted into Phuoro. In describing Eden, Moses uses the popular name "river." In fact, as Egypt has but one river, a distinctive proper name was not needed.

The Pharaoh who happened to be on the throne when a new sothiac month came in, assumed an appropriate epoch-title. Thus, Usertasen III, according to Eratosthenes, one of the grandest scholars that ever lived, assumed the title Phuoro, or Nile, at the beginning of the sothiac month of Paophi, 2664 B.C., ruling, first, as Hermes (Thoth) and, afterwards, as Herakles (the youthful adolescent Horus, whose dormant strength was symbolized by the reclining sphinx). One full cycle, or 1460 years later, Ramesse-iorbasse headed the same epoch, and was likewise popularly known as Phuoro, or King Nile. Now, strange as it may appear, Phuoro and Nile are identical, except that they differ in number, the one being singular, the other plural. Without the definite article, we have ar or iar, "river," ar-u or iar-u, "rivers"; with the definite article, pa-iar, "the river," na-ar-u, "the rivers." The last named form was used in the Delta, where it was pronounced naal-u, which the Greeks converted into Neil-os, "Nile." King Nile, who derived his sothiac epoch in that way, was well known to the Greeks. Dikaearches mentions him by this title, and places him very accurately at 436 years before the first Olympiad, which is but five years before the true date of his accession as sole king. Pliny, in his enumeration of the obelisks, mentions him by his proper name Ramesses, and identifies him as "Rampses, who was reigning when Ilium was captured." Diodorus refers to him by his epoch-title, introducing him after "Remphis, the miser, who spent all his time in filling his coffers, and heaping up wealth," that is, Rhampsinitus, or Remesses VI, Hy-on-nuter. He tells us, that, after the death of this Rampses, for seven generations together, there reigned successively a company of kings, who gave themselves up to sloth and idleness, and did nothing but wallow in pleasures and luxury, except Nile, who cut many canals and dykes, and used his utmost endeavor to make the river more useful and serviceable.

Having identified King Nile and fixed his date, the question arises: What is Iorbasse? The answer is simple: It is the Greek form of iar-ba-sh-i, "Gushing River," another designation of the Nile. Prefixing the definite article, pa, to this title, we have P'arbash, which was pronounced P'ol-bosh in the Delta. Now what is Homer's Polybos but this same Polybosh?

A remark originally attached to this reign, but afterwards fraudulently transferred to the last reign of the Nineteenth Dynasty, shows that Manetho called attention to the identity of iorbasse and Polybos, for he says, in so many words, that Homer called this king, "Polybos, Alkandra's husband, in whose times Troy was taken."

Homer uses Ph'ar, or Phuoro, in another form, when he sings of "Pharian Thebes," "the Pharian isle," and "the Pharian race." Aeschylus derives the name of Egypt itself, to wit: "Aeria," or Ar-ia, from ar, "river." The most important fact deducible from Polybos, however, is, that Homer, as well as Manetho, Dikaearches, Eratosthenes, Diodorus and others, knew this king by a title derived from the sothiac epoch of Paophi, 1204 B.C.

Another equally interesting epoch-king, who was known to the Greek writers of the classical period by his epoch-title, was Seti I.

This king, after reigning thirty-six years in the sothiac month of Paoni, or Payni, reigned twenty-three years in the sothiac month of Epiphi. The first of these two months was sacred to Osiris, the symbol and personation of Good, under his title of Uon-nofer, "Perfect Being," or "Perfect One," which was abbreviated into Pa-uon, "The One." The name of the month, Pa-uon-i, was derived from Pa-uon in the same way that Seti was derived from Set. The first vowel of "Uon" is preserved in Payni, the second vowel, in Paoni.

The month of Epiphi was dedicated to Set-an, or Typhonic-Set, the personation of Evil, under his title of Apap, the "Great Serpent." Epiphi is a modification of Apap-i, which was derived from Apap in the way just indicated.

Seti, therefore, represented successively Osiris and Typhon, that is, the antagonistic principles of Good and of Evil.

Although both were thus seemingly blended in his person, the ancient teachings required him to separate scrupulously and distinguish the one from the other; but in this vital particular he proved himself to be more subtle than any monarch who had preceded him. In the false list of Syncellus, the first thirty-six years of his reign are given to Spanios, that is, Sa-paoni, "Son of Paoni," which is correct enough, but the last twenty-three years of his reign are given to Osiropis, a most remarkable title, in which Ostris and Apis (Husir and Hapi) are unlawfully blended. The Greeks, by interpretation, rendered this title Aegyptus.

Seti, as the name indicates, was devoted to Sutech, the "lord god" of the serpent-worshiping Hyksos, and openly emulated his cruel and sanguinary virtues. He did not, like Apophis II, attempt to force the worship of Set upon the Egyptians to the exclusion of Amen and the other so-called deities, but he set about to accomplish his purpose by subtlety. He bridged the impassable gulf between good and evil by blending the symbols Osiris and Apap, for the later is, in reality, simply a duplication of Ap. For example, in pictorial representation of the corontaion of his son, Rameses II, we behold Horus and Set pouring ointment over the young king. Aeschylus represents the "daughters" of Danaus as fleeing from the "sons" of Aegyptus, taking it for granted that his hearers and readers would understand why the marriage which they sought to escape was unlawful.

It seems that Manetho, who was conversant with Greek literature, explained that the brothers, Danaus and Aegyptus, represented

Harmais and Osiropis, the respective epoch-titles for Paoni and Epiphi. The daughters of Danaus represent the true religion of ancient Egypt, and, as Osiris was the only lawful consort of Isis, a marriage between them and the sons of Egyptus would have been equivalent to making Sutech, Set-an, or Typhonic-Set, the lawful husband of Isis. While the symbols of Osiris and Typhon were kept separate, substantial mistakes could not occur, but after Osiris and Apis had been deceptively blended, innumerable errors grew up, many of a most serious nature. Those which injuriously affected religion, and brought on the "test and trial of the gods of ancient Egypt," I will not mention; but everyone is familiar with the fallacious notion, that Osiris was the Nile (Apis) and Isis the alluvial plains annually watered by the inundation. We need but look at the six planetary zones, through which the sun was supposed to ascend and descend during his annual course, to realize how utterly untenable such notions are. The zone through which the sun descended in the month of Paoni, was governed by Venus, the star of Osiris, and was sacred to Isis, or Hathor, and Osiris, and all the symbols and titles connected with it were good and beneficent; but the zone through which the sun descended during the month of Epiphi was ruled by the star of Set (now called Mercury) and its symbols were uniformly evil and malevolent, for example, we find the scorpion, the "great serpent," the dragon, hippopotamus, crocodile, ass, hog, in fact, the entire menagerie of malignant, hurtful, ferocious, and stupid creatures. The *Suppliants* shows that Aeschylus knew Sethos by his epoch-title and that he realized how unnatural was and ever will be the union of Osiris and Apis.

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Faith: An Historical Study. By Stewart Means. New York. The MacMillan Company. 1933. Pp. xvi 334. Price $2.50.

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Modern Tendencies in World Religions. By Charles S. Braden. New York. The MacMillan Company. 1934. Pp. xiv 343. Price $2.50.

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