




LELAND STANFORD JR.
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY.

THE GIFT OF

Dr. J. C. Branner



1971

THE WAR
IN
PARAGUAY.

LONDON : PRINTED BY
SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE
AND PARLIAMENT STREET

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100



R. Adlard sc.

Alfred Russel Wallace

London: Longmans & Co.

20 Kas

J. C. Brunner

INTERNATIONAL

LIBRARY

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY





20 800

J. C. Branner

THE
WAR IN PARAGUAY.

WITH
A HISTORICAL SKETCH
OF
THE COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLE
AND NOTES UPON
THE MILITARY ENGINEERING OF THE WAR.

BY
GEORGE THOMPSON, C.E.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL OF ENGINEERS IN THE PARAGUAYAN ARMY.
AIDE-DE-CAMP TO PRESIDENT LOPEZ,
KNIGHT OF THE ORDER OF MERIT OF PARAGUAY,
ETC.

WITH MAPS, PLANS, AND A PORTRAIT OF LOPEZ.

LONDON:
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

1869.

fc

285370

www.orchard.com

P R E F A C E .

THE contradictory views of the conduct and character of President Lopez, taken by those who have felt an interest in the struggle between the Paraguayans and the Allied Powers opposed to them, have led me to think that a short work, written by one who has resided eleven years in Paraguay, might not be unacceptable. Having been engaged in the defence of the country, I am enabled to give authentic information on the subject.

As will be seen from the following narrative, I consider Lopez to be a monster without a parallel, but I did not discover his character before the latter end of 1868. All his outrages at the commencement of the war I only heard by vague rumours. His manner, however, was such as entirely to dispel and throw discredit on any whispers which might be uttered against him. Latterly, however, I have received overwhelming corroborations of what I have stated against him in the early part of the book.

The mode in which President Lopez began the war on the Argentines was outrageous, but with Brazil war was apparently unavoidable ; and had he not commenced the war when he did, Brazil would have taken Paraguay at a disadvantage.

My personal motives for taking a part in the war were not, however, so much political as physical. I wanted

change of air, and I was glad of the opportunity of joining what then promised to be only a military promenade over several hundred miles. Interested motives I had none, for I received no augmentation of salary; and when the Secret Treaty was published, it gave me a further zest to fight for Paraguay, as I believed, from the terms of the Protocol, that she must either fight or be absorbed.

It was not my intention to have written the following account of the war until President Lopez should have been deposed by the Allies. They appear, however, to be in no way anxious to put an end to the fearful sacrifice of life which has been going on in Paraguay for four years and a half; and, considering that the following narrative might have some effect towards urging them to conclude the war, and thus save the lives of the women and children in Paraguay, who must now be dying of mere starvation, I have endeavoured to give an unadorned statement of facts.

Although I can speak of the despot, who has used them for the purposes of his own selfish ambition, only with the greatest horror and aversion, for the Paraguayans themselves I have the most friendly feelings; and I think I may say that I have done my duty towards them, having, as far as I could, alleviated the misery of the military life of those who were under my orders, and having been able to save many of their lives.

For some of the information respecting the Allies, I am indebted to files of the Buenos-Ayrean *Standard*, *Tribuna*, and *Nacion Argentina*.

LONDON:

June 18, 1869.

CONTENTS.



CHAPTER I.

	PAGE
GENERAL NOTICE OF THE BELLIGERENT POWERS, AND SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF PARAGUAY UP TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR	1

CHAPTER II.

OF THE CAUSES WHICH LED TO THE PARAGUAYAN WAR, AND THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SAME BY LOPEZ II. AGAINST BRAZIL	16
--	----

CHAPTER III.

THE PARAGUAYAN EXPEDITION TO MATTO-GROSSO	32
---	----

CHAPTER IV.

THE COMMENCEMENT, BY LOPEZ II., OF THE WAR AGAINST THE ARGENTINE CONFEDERATION—THE SECRET TREATY OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE	40
---	----

CHAPTER V.

THE ARMY OF PARAGUAY AND ITS GENERAL RESOURCES—THE FORCES OF THE ALLIES	52
--	----

CHAPTER VI.

THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN IN CORRIENTES—GENERAL URQUIZA	59
---	----

CHAPTER VII.

	PAGE
THE BATTLE OF THE RIACHUELO—LOPEZ LEAVES ASUNCION FOR THE SEAT OF WAR—IMPRISONMENT OF GENERAL ROBLES, AND CONTINUATION OF THE CAMPAIGN OF CORRIENTES	70

CHAPTER VIII.

THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RIVER URUGUAY—THE ALLIES TAKE THE FIELD—THE EVACUATION OF CORRIENTES BY THE PARAGUAYAN ARMY	85
---	----

CHAPTER IX.

LOPEZ PREPARES TO RECEIVE THE ALLIES IN PARAGUAY—RECRIMINATIONS BETWEEN LOPEZ AND MITRE—THE ALLIES ARRIVE ON THE CORRIENTES SIDE OF PASO LA PATRIA—RAIDS OF THE PARAGUAYANS ON CORRIENTES	98
---	----

CHAPTER X.

THE ALLIES INVADE PARAGUAY—PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS—THE BATTLE OF THE BANK—EVACUATION OF PASO LA PATRIA	121
--	-----

CHAPTER XI.

THE BATTLES OF MAY 2 AND MAY 24, 1866, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PARAGUAYAN ARMY	134
--	-----

CHAPTER XII.

PARALYSATION OF THE OPERATIONS—THE BRAZILIAN FLEET— DESCRIPTION OF CURUPAYTY—PORTO ALEGRE REINFORCES THE ALLIES—LOPEZ REVIVES—BATTLES OF YATAITY CORÁ AND OF SAUCE	150
---	-----

CHAPTER XIII.

THE BRAZILIAN FLEET—CAPTURE OF CURUZÚ—INTERVIEW BETWEEN LOPEZ AND MITRE—DEFEAT OF THE ALLIES AT CURU- PAYTY—PARALYSATION OF ALL OPERATIONS	165
--	-----

CHAPTER XIV.

	PAGE
THE ALLIES DO NOTHING—CHOLERA—WHITWORTH'S ARTILLERY AND THE OLD SMOOTHBORE GUNS—DEATH OF GENERAL DIAZ— MANUFACTURES IN PARAGUAY—ANNIHILATION OF THE BRA- ZILIAN EXPEDITION TO MATTO-GROSSO	184

CHAPTER XV.

THE ALLIES MARCH TO TUYUCUÉ—THE IRONCLADS PASS THE BATTERY OF CURUPAYTY	211
--	-----

CHAPTER XVI.

PROPOSALS OF PEACE—MEDIATIONS OF MR. WASHBURN AND OF MR. GOULD	216
---	-----

CHAPTER XVII.

THE ALLIES ATTEMPT TO BESIEGE HUMAITÁ.	
DESCRIPTION OF THE COUNTRY ABOUT HUMAITÁ—THE FIGHT FOR THE CONVOY—BATTLES OF ISLA TAYÏ, TATAYÏBÁ, OBELLA, AND GUARDIA TAYÏ—SACKING AND BURNING OF THE ALLIED CAMP AT TUYUTÏ	221

CHAPTER XVIII.

LOPEZ CONCENTRATES HIS FORCES AT PASO PUCU, AND ESTABLISHES A CAMP AND BATTERY AT TIMBÓ—MITRE LEAVES THE COMMAND IN THE HANDS OF CAXIAS—DEATH OF GENERAL FLORES	238
---	-----

CHAPTER XIX.

THE IRONCLADS PASS HUMAITÁ—CAPTURE OF CIERVA REDOUBT— EVACUATION AND BOMBARDMENT OF ASUNCION—ATTACK ON IRONCLADS BY CANOES—LOPEZ RETREATS TO THE CHACO— ATTACK ON THE PARAGUAYAN LINES AT ESPINILLO AND SAUCE— EVACUATION OF THE SAME BY THE PARAGUAYANS	246
--	-----

CHAPTER XX.

THE MARCH THROUGH THE CHACO—BATTERIES AT FORTIN—LOPEZ ESTABLISHES HIMSELF ON THE TEBICUARY—EVACUATION OF MATTO-GROSSO	256
---	-----

CHAPTER XXI.

THE SIEGE OF HUMAITÁ.

	PAGE
HUMAITÁ INVESTED—OPPOSITION BY THE PARAGUAYANS IN THE CHACO—ATTACK ON THE IRONCLADS AT TAYÍ—ATTACK ON HUMAITÁ—BATTLE OF ĀCĀYUASÁ—EVACUATION OF HUMAITÁ—HARD FIGHTING IN THE CHACO—SURRENDER OF THE REMAINDER OF THE EX-GARRISON OF HUMAITÁ—EVACUATION OF THE CHACO	269

CHAPTER XXII.

LOPEZ ABANDONS THE TEBICUARY, AND FORTIFIES HIMSELF AT ANGOSTURA AND PIKYSRY—THE ALLIES ESTABLISH THEMSELVES AT PALMAS	278
--	-----

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE ALLIES PREPARE FOR ACTIVE OPERATIONS—ROAD THROUGH THE CHACO—THE IRONCLADS PASS ANGOSTURA—NEUTRAL VESSELS OF WAR—LOPEZ FORMS A RESERVE FORCE	285
---	-----

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE END OF THE WAR.

THE BRAZILIANS LAND AT SAN ANTONIO—BATTLES OF YTORORÓ AND OF AVAY—CAPTURE OF THE TRENCHES AT PIKYSRY—SEVEN DAYS' FIGHTING AT ITÁ YVATÉ, RESULTING IN THE DEFEAT OF LOPEZ, THE DESTRUCTION OF HIS ARMY, AND THE CAPITULATION OF ANGOSTURA	293
--	-----

CHAPTER XXV.

CONCERNING THE ALLEGED CONSPIRACY, AND THE ATROCITIES OF LOPEZ	318
--	-----

CHAPTER XXVI.

PERSONAL CHARACTER OF LOPEZ	326
---------------------------------------	-----

CHAPTER XXVII.

ENGINEERING NOTES	331
APPENDIX	337-347

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.



Frontispiece. PORTRAIT OF LOPEZ WITH AUTOGRAPH.

- PLATE I. MAP OF THE COUNTRY IN THE VICINITY OF PASO LA PATRIA, ILLUSTRATING THE CAMPAIGN IN PARAGUAY UP TO JULY 18, 1866.
- „ II. MAP OF THE ENVIRONS OF HUMAITÁ, ILLUSTRATING THE CAMPAIGN FROM JULY 18, 1866, TO THE FALL OF HUMAITÁ.
- „ III. MAP OF THE PARAGUAYAN POSITION AT TEBICUARY.
- „ IV. MAP OF PIKYSRY AND ITS VICINITY.
- „ V. PROFILES OF PARAGUAYAN FORTIFICATIONS, AND THE BOOM AT FORTIN.
- „ VI. PROFILES OF BATTERIES AT ANGOSTURA.
- „ VII. PLAN OF LEFT BATTERY AT ANGOSTURA.
- „ VIII. MAP SHOWING THE POSITION OF THE COUNTRIES NAMED IN THIS WORK.

THE
WAR IN PARAGUAY.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL NOTICE OF THE BELLIGERENT POWERS, AND SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF PARAGUAY UP TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR.

PARAGUAY*, the Argentine Confederation, the Banda Oriental, and Brazil, are four States in South America, which, from their topographical position, are obliged to hold a certain amount of intercourse, which each of them would gladly dispense with, as their inhabitants cordially dislike each other. The first three are peopled by a mixture of Spaniards with the aboriginal races, and the fourth by a mixture of Portuguese with the same, and with negroes.

Brazil has, since she was first colonised by the Portuguese, been chiefly engaged in the slave-trade, and in the cultivation by slave-labour of produce for exportation to Europe. She has had no foreign wars, excepting a few skirmishes with her neighbours, always carried on abroad, and a few small and weak revolutions have been quickly put down by a free Government, by bribery, and not by fighting. The number of negroes imported, and the degrading influences to which they have been subjected

* Paraguay: *Pará*, the sea; *gua*, pertaining to; *y* (pronounced *ñ*), river or water. Literally, 'the river pertaining to the sea.'

as slaves, have lowered the Brazilians (as a race) very far in the scale of humanity.

The Argentines and Orientals (as the inhabitants of the Banda Oriental are called) are very similar races—fine men and women—showing very little of the Indian, excepting the Gauchos and the Correntinos, who have much more Indian than Spanish blood. These two nations have continually been fighting; when not fighting with each other they have fought at home, generally cutting the throats of the prisoners they took in battle.

Paraguay, since it was first conquered by the Spaniards, had been in a state of profound peace, if we except an expedition of a few hundred men under General Belgrano, sent by Buenos Ayres, at the beginning of this century. This expedition fought two so-called battles, in both of which Paraguay claimed the victory. The first, however, after crossing the River Paraná*, at the River Tacuari, must have been a drawn battle, or more probably a defeat for the Paraguayans; as after it the Argentines marched on a distance of 260 miles through the heart of the country, to the plain of Paraguari, where they were beaten by the Paraguayans, who had only sticks and stones to oppose to the arms of Belgrano. This is the only instance, before the present war, in which Paraguay had been invaded by a foreign force.

In the wars of Rosas, Paraguay sent a few men to Corrientes, under Lopez, then a lad of 18, and 'General-in-Chief of the Paraguayan Armies,' but there was no fighting; so that, before the present war, the Paraguayans may be said to have been quite unacquainted with the science of war.

The race of men in Paraguay was physically a finer race than those of the other States mentioned, and was

* *Pará*, the sea; *ná*, like. Literally, 'like the sea'.

divided into four classes, viz:—White, Mulatto, Indian, and Negro—the second being a mixture of either the third or fourth with the first. The ‘White,’ the aristocracy of Paraguay, was descended from the original Spanish invaders, who married Indian women. The descendants of these marriages have only intermarried themselves, or with fresh European blood, admitting no more of the Indian. Mulattoes could not be ordained priests—Indians might.

X Almost immediately after the discovery of Paraguay the Jesuits settled there, and built a church (1588). At this time the Spaniards, who governed the country, were treating the Indians very badly, and using them as slaves. The Jesuits wrote to their Home Government and complained of this, and the Government of Paraguay was reprimanded, and the Jesuits ordered to use their best endeavours to civilise the Indians and to treat them kindly.

The Jesuits thus got a standing in the country, and turned it to good account. They built villages called ‘Missions,’ far enough away from the Spanish Government to have no fear of being disturbed by it in their labours. These villages were from ten to twenty miles apart, so that the communication between them was easy. Here they collected the Indians, and taught them reading and writing. They reduced to a system of writing the unwritten Indian language, Guarani (spoken by all Paraguayans), and printed grammars, dictionaries, missals, &c., in that language. They taught the Indians all the trades, and built churches containing some fine wood-carving, gilding, matting, &c.—the work of their disciples. X They brought the Indians to a more than military state of discipline and obedience, under which they gradually abdicated reason and thought, and did what they were X ordered, without thinking whether their masters had the right or not to order them.

X In 1767 the Jesuits were ordered to leave the country by the Spanish Government, and they deserve great applause for avoiding bloodshed; as, by their influence over the people, they could have easily withstood the Government and remained masters of the country. They had done a great deal of good in Paraguay, by civilising the Indians and protecting them from the Spaniards; but though they probably had ambitious views, they were not prepared to enforce them at the cost of so much life as would have been lost had they opposed the Government.

X After the expedition of General Belgrano, and in the same year (1811), a quiet revolution, during which (not a drop of blood was shed,) was got up; the result being the appointment of two Counsellors, to assist the Spanish Governor (Velasco) in forming a new Government. One of these was the famous Dr. Josè Gaspar Francia. These three ruled mildly till 1813, when Francia and Yegros were chosen Consuls. Yegros died shortly after (he is said to have been put out of the way by Francia), and Francia then called together a congress, and had himself named Dictator—first for two years, and shortly afterwards for life.

X He now began his terrible system of tyranny. He first instituted so perfect a system of espionage, that no one saying a word to his nearest relations could feel safe that it would not be reported to Francia. Everyone supposed to be against the Government, even only in thought, was thrown into prison, and some of them shot (especially the more influential men of the country), and their property confiscated. Francia was in continual fear of being assassinated; and when he rode in the streets, everyone was obliged to hide, even women, for his escort used to beat everyone found in the streets when his Excellency passed.

! He closed the whole of Paraguay, by land and by water,

to all communication from abroad, placing guards and piquets all around the frontiers. He prohibited ingress and egress, both of persons and goods; and anyone found attempting to leave the country, or to send money out of it, was shot. A ship was now and then allowed to go to Paraguay with goods, for which Francia paid in Yerba (the tea of the country), but any other foreigners who came within his grasp, he detained in the country. X

He made a law prohibiting the intermarriage of Whites, Blacks, Indians, and Mulattoes; and declared several of the chief families, whom he disliked, to be Mulattoes, so that they should not marry,—for no White Paraguayan would degrade himself or herself by marrying with one of a lower caste. He expected thus to exterminate those families, but the Spanish law of legitimacy enabled them to marry after his death, and so legitimise their children. Marriage generally was discouraged by Francia, and hence arose the immorality to which the lower classes gave way, though rarely the higher. Their morals were not, however, in reality so bad as would be supposed; for although the marriages were not celebrated in church, the women were nearly as faithful as if they had been regularly married, with the difference that, as the tie was not irrevocable, when two people found they did not agree well they separated. X

Francia died in 1840, 85 years of age. He was buried under the altar in the Encarnacion Church, at Asuncion; but his remains were afterwards dug out, and flung into the river, by men whose families he had wronged. Three of the principal men of Paraguay were to have been shot the morning he died, but the order for their execution was never carried out.

A congress was assembled, and Carlos Antonio Lopez and Roque Alonzo were chosen Consuls. The second of these was a good man, and well spoken of by all who

knew him; but he had not strength of mind enough to keep up with Lopez, who soon turned him out, and remained alone in the Government. At first they both signed in one line, denoting equality of power. Soon afterwards Lopez signed first, and Alonzo underneath him, as second; but at last Lopez said to Alonzo, 'Andate, barbaro' (Go away, barbarian), and had himself elected President for ten years by a congress, which he called together in 1844. In this congress, and in others,* laws were passed, of which the following are extracts:—

*From the 'Statutes for the Administration of Justice,'
November 24, 1842.*

ART. 71.—'The pain of torture and confiscation of goods is abolished.'

From the 'Decree for Abolishing Slavery,' Nov. 24, 1842.

The Supreme Government of the Republic of Paraguay accords and decrees:—

ART. 1.—'From the first of January of the year 1843, the wombs of the female slaves shall be free, and any children they have after that date shall be called Libertos of the Republic of Paraguay.'

ART. 2.—'The Libertos are obliged to serve their masters till the age of 25 the males, and 24 the females.'

From the 'Approbation' of the Message to Congress.

ART. 29.—'From the first of next month the salary of the First Consul will be 4,000 hard dollars per annum, and that of the Second Consul 3,000.'

* An unlucky member of one of the congresses ventured to whisper to his neighbour during the sitting, and was ignominiously turned out by Lopez.

From the 'Act of Independence of Paraguay,' Nov. 25, 1842.

ART. 2.—'The Republic of Paraguay shall *never* be the patrimony of one person or family.'

From the 'Instructions of the Police,' June 15, 1843.

ART. 37.—'It is absolutely prohibited to speak of the parties and of the civil war which, sad to say, is breaking up the neighbouring provinces, and insults and threats to the refugees of either party will not be permitted. Those who wish to live in this Republic must understand that they have to keep profound silence concerning the occurrences and parties on the other side, in Corrientes, and the Commissary of Police will advise all foreigners and refugees that we wish here to know nothing of their disastrous hatreds and rancours, and those who do not like it may retire at once from the country.'

From the 'Law Establishing the Political Administration of the Republic of Paraguay,' March 16, 1844.

CHAPTER VII.

'Of the Attributes of the President of the Republic.'

ART. 1.—'THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC IS EXTRAORDINARY IN CASES OF INVASION, INTERIOR COMMOTION, AND AS OFTEN AS IT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THE CONSERVATION OF THE ORDER AND PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY OF THE REPUBLIC.'

ART. 9.—'He declares war and peace, and takes upon himself the responsibility of all measures which may tend either to war or peace.'

ART. 17.—'He can celebrate concordats with the Holy Apostolic See, grant or refuse his consent to the decrees of the Councils and any other ecclesiastic constitution, give or refuse the exequatur to the Pontifical Bulls or Briefs, without which requisite no one will comply with them.'

ART. 18.—'He is the private judge of the causes reserved in the statute of the administration of justice.'

CHAPTER VIII.

ART. 3.—‘The Ministers of State will have no other style than “you,” and can give no order without the approbation and consent of the President of the Republic.’

ART. 4.—‘They will receive the compensation which the President of the Republic shall assign to them.’

From the ‘Reform of some of the Privileges of the Reverend Bishops,’ November 3, 1845.

‘The President of the Republic of Paraguay considering that, at the same time that he has accredited himself by his zeal for religious worship, he must also take care that no employé of the Church appear either there or in the streets, exalting himself above the Supreme National Government, decrees :—

ART. 1.—‘Any and every ringing of bells is prohibited on the Bishop’s entering and leaving the Church.’

ART. 2.—‘It is likewise forbidden to kneel in the streets, or in any other place, when the Bishop passes.’

ART. 3.—‘He will not use a throne, nor a robe, either in or out of the church.’

Having thus got the absolute power legally into his hands, he began to make an army to sustain it. This will be described further on.

His family was poor when he first entered the Government, and he himself, in Francia’s time, was a poor lawyer glad to get a dollar fee. Carlos Antonio Lopez was married to Dona Juana Carrillo. Both of them were ‘white,’ and both extremely stout. They had five children : three sons—Francisco Solano, Benancio, and Benigno—and two daughters—Inocencia and Rafaela, all of them very stout. Lopez I. began his reign by pushing his children’s fortunes in a most unscrupulous way. He made his eldest son (afterwards Lopez II.) General-in-Chief of the

army and Minister of War. From an early age this young man was entrusted with a great deal of the executive power by his father, who used sometimes to pay him an official visit, on which occasion the folding-doors were all thrown wide open with a rush, as he used to take his son by surprise. His second son, Benancio, was made colonel, and commander of the garrison of Asuncion. The third, Benigno, was made major in the army, but not liking it was promoted to be Admiral of the Fleet. This post, however, he also resigned, preferring a roving life. He was the great favourite of the old man. Each of the sons had a separate house and establishment; and they were all noted for their libertinism, especially the eldest and the youngest.

This unlimited authority of Lopez, which the sons also exercised under his auspices, made people very much afraid of saying or doing anything to incur their displeasure. They all got rich very quickly by every means in their power. They used to offer a price for cattle far below the market price, and which people were afraid to refuse. They then sent the cattle to market and sold them at any price they liked, as no one was allowed to sell cattle in the market when any belonging to the President's family were there. They also bought property at the same low prices from private people and from the Government. The ladies of the family established an exchange, where torn paper-money, which would no longer pass, was bought at a discount of sixpence in the dollar, and by their connection with the Government they changed it at the treasury for new paper of the full value. They also lent money on jewellery at a large profit, and anything they liked they kept, without any reference to the owner's wishes.

Lopez I. kept up, though not to so great an extent, the system of spies begun by Francia, as also that of imprison-

ing people on suspicion of their not being favourably inclined towards him.

Notwithstanding all the selfishness of Lopez I., his Government was comparatively a good one for Paraguay. Probably in no country in the world has life and property been so secure as all over Paraguay during his reign. Crime was almost unknown, and when committed, immediately detected and punished. The mass of the people was perhaps the happiest in existence. They had hardly to do any work to gain a livelihood. Each family had its house or hut in its own ground. They planted, in a few days, enough tobacco, maize, and mandioca for their own consumption, and the crop hardly wanted looking at till it was ready to be gathered. Having at every hut a grove of oranges, which form a considerable article of food in Paraguay, and also a few cows, they were almost throughout the year under little necessity of working. The higher classes, of course, lived more in the European way, many families being very well off and comfortable.

Everybody was liable at any moment to have himself and his property pressed into the public service, without payment, at the call of any judge of the peace; but this power was not generally abused in the old man's time. He would allow only his own family to tyrannise over the people to any great extent. As to most Paraguayans the idea of the sum of human happiness is to lie down all day on a 'poncho' in the shade, and smoke and play the guitar, they may be considered to have been very happy, as they had little else to do.

The Paraguayans were a most hospitable people. They received anybody who called at their houses, whether known or not, with the greatest kindness, and set their very best before them, giving them the best hammock and room in the house, and would generally give a dance in

the evening when they had visitors. They never expected any compensation, and the better classes would have felt insulted had it been offered them.*

The Paraguayan costume was, for the men, a tall black hat, such as is at present worn in Europe, a shirt with the front and cuffs beautifully embroidered, a pair of white drawers, with a foot of fringe down to the ground, and three or four inches of embroidery above the fringe. Over these a 'chiripa' or sort of sheet, wrapped round the legs from the waist down to above the embroidery on the drawers, and secured by a scarlet silk sash; no shoes, and a 'poncho' hanging over the shoulder. The women wore a white chemise with short sleeves, embroidered and edged with lace, and the top of the chemise embroidered all round in black silk. They wore nothing over their chemise down to the waist, where a scarlet sash secured a white petticoat embroidered with a broad black band half-way down. They had no shoes. These costumes were only worn by the country people and by those of the lower class in town. The women's chemises, called *tüpoi*, are very beautiful and look charming. The ladies and gentlemen in town dressed like Europeans, and the ladies showed generally very good taste. They were very ladylike and graceful, and anyone going to a ball in Asuncion might have almost imagined himself in Paris.

In 1845, Lopez I. declared the country open to foreigners both for trade and residence. They were not, however, allowed to hold real property in Paraguay, nor to marry with the natives without a special license from the Government, which was not easily obtained. The form to be gone through was to make a petition to Government for the permission to marry, citing two witnesses

* The Paraguayans lived in such a simple way, and cared for so few luxuries, that the mode of living here described quite satisfied them: they knew of nothing better.

who were to swear that they knew the petitioner to be a bachelor. Lopez generally kept people waiting a few months for the answer, which was often a negative, and sometimes he took the opportunity of insulting the petitioner. Once a Spaniard (of very small stature) who made the petition, received, after waiting three months, the following answer endorsed on the petition:—‘Notwithstanding that the insolvent little Gallego* N. N. came to this country, as all foreigners do, to try his fortune, he is yet permitted, as a special favour, to marry the distinguished young lady M. M.’

In 1849, a Paraguayan expedition was sent to Corrientes under General Lopez, and returned shortly afterwards without having been in action.

The first differences with Brazil arose about the frontiers on the North, in 1850, Brazil claiming the Rio Apa as her boundary, and Paraguay claiming the Rio Blanco. Brazil occupied the Pan de Azucar, a sugar-loaf hill in the disputed territory, and was driven out of it by the Paraguayans. The matter was allowed to rest here, and a treaty was made, leaving the boundary question open. Since then Paraguay has always occupied the disputed territory.

Lopez I. got into hot water with all the Powers he had anything to do with. He was of a petulant temper, and disliked foreigners generally, though he treated them well, probably from having a notion that their governments were stronger than he. He generally got out of his troubles by paying whatever was demanded when the ministers went to arrange the questions. When he came into power the treasury was immensely rich in doubloons and dollars, and in silver and gold plate. Most of these riches had been confiscated by Francia from private people, and from the Jesuits, who had immense quantities of church-plate.

* Gallego, inhabitant of Galicia; and a disparaging term.

In 1854, Lopez sent his son, General Lopez, to Europe, as minister to the different courts. He was eighteen months in Europe—in England, France, Spain, Germany, and Italy. In this trip he picked up a great deal of superficial knowledge, and some polish. It was by seeing the European armies, probably, that he imbibed a notion of imitating them, and playing Napoleon in South America. His mission had no particular object beyond bringing Paraguay before the world.

In 1858, Lopez I. put some twenty people in prison for an alleged conspiracy to shoot him in the theatre. One of these was a British subject, Canstatt, who escaped through the exertions of Mr. Henderson, the British consul, and through the forcible measures taken by the Admiral in the River Plate, who stopped and detained in Buenos Ayres the Paraguayan war-steamer 'Tacuari,' when she was leaving that port, having on board General Lopez, who had been mediating successfully between the two parties of a revolution in the Argentine Confederation. General Lopez landed, and went overland to Santa Fé, where he embarked on a vessel for Asuncion. As soon as Lopez I. heard of the detention of the 'Tacuari,' he released Canstatt from prison, and vented his rage on two gentlemen named Decoud, belonging to one of the first Paraguayan families, who were shot by his order. This was, perhaps, the only great atrocity committed during the reign of Lopez I., besides one on the Indians of the Chaco, who were invited over the river to make a treaty with the commander of Villa Oliva, who, having got a great number of them into a room, murdered them in cold blood. This, however, probably was done by the commander on his own authority.

On the whole, Lopez I. did his country a great deal of good. He opened it to commerce, and built arsenals, steamers, and railways. No taxes were ever levied in

CHAPTER II.

OF THE CAUSES WHICH LED TO THE PARAGUAYAN WAR, AND THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SAME BY LOPEZ II. AGAINST BRAZIL.

- Λ LOPEZ I. had fortified a bend in the River Paraguay, near its mouth, with a few batteries, which were continually but slowly augmented, and a trench was dug on the land side enclosing the rear of them. These batteries commanded the whole bend of the river, and Paraguay made all vessels anchor and ask permission before they could pass up the river. As this was the only practicable road which Brazil had to her province of Matto-Grosso, she naturally disapproved of the stoppage of the river, and gradually accumulated large military stores in Matto-Grosso, with
- × the view, no doubt, of some day destroying Humaitá, which was the name of the site where the batteries were erected. Brazil had a similarly-placed fort on the river, higher up, called Coimbra, which all vessels going to Matto-Grosso had to pass. This, however, had nothing to do with Paraguay, as it did not disturb her traffic. These batteries, and the boundary question, were continually producing 'misunderstandings' between the Governments, which made it evident that a war must break out some day, as neither side would surrender what it considered to be its rights. The war, however, was begun by Lopez, both against Brazil and the Argentine Confederation, and without any regular declaration of war. He went a roundabout way, with the intention of declaring war in a civilised manner, but could not resist the temp-

tation to profit by the carelessness of his opponents, and seized their steamers in time of peace. The way in which the war was really begun, and its ostensible causes, were as follows :—

On April 17, 1863, General Flores, a Gaucho, head of one of the political parties of Monte Video, and an exile, started in a small boat from the gasworks at Buenos Ayres with four companions, and landed in Monte Video, to make a revolution. This was done only to get the Government into his own hands. When the Gauchos had been quiet for a few months, they only wanted a leader to stir them up again to their unceasing civil warfare. He soon collected a few Gauchos, and was supplied with arms and ammunition from the War Department of Buenos Ayres, a State then at peace with Monte Video. The revolution gained ground very slowly, and the Government was not strong enough to put it down.

Brazil took advantage of the state of the Banda Oriental to urge claims against the Government for damages to some Brazilian subjects inhabiting it, and who were said to have been some of them staked out on the ground, and some murdered, the Oriental Government taking no steps to discover or punish the offenders.

Paraguay began active preparations for war in the beginning of 1864, and in March of the same year Lopez established a military camp at Cerro-Leon, where 30,000 men, between the ages of sixteen and fifty, were drilled for soldiers. At the same time recruits were drilled to the number of 17,000 at Encarnacion, 10,000 at Humaitá, 4,000 at Asuncion, and 3,000 at Concepcion. In all about 64,000 were drilled in the six months, from March to August 1864, without counting about 6,000 who died in that period. Before these preparations began, the army was about 28,000 strong, and had one general, Lopez.

The Paraguayan army was organised on the Spanish system, and obeyed the Spanish ordinances. Its pay was nominally seven dollars a month to a private soldier, but he only received it every two months. It was paid a third in silver, a third in paper-money, and a third in goods, which the soldiers were allowed to choose from a Government shop kept for that purpose. After the war had begun, however, the army received no pay, but during the whole of the war Lopez ordered them three 'gratifications,' each one equal to about a month's pay.

Brazil also continued her preparations for war, and in March, 1864, she got out her first ten Whitworth guns.

The Buenos Ayrean press became very much alarmed at the recruiting at Cerro-Leon, though they knew that it was intended only for Brazil, and they considered Paraguay, from her traditions and position, to be a natural ally of the Argentine Confederation.

The preparations in Paraguay were being carried on on a great scale for that country. A telegraph line was laid down from Asuncion to Paso la Patria, 270 miles, the work taking ten months. A large manufactory of leather accoutrements was established, where saddles, belts, cartouche-boxes, &c. were made, and sent by railway to Cerro-Leon.

In the same year, the Paraguayan Government sent a note to the Argentine Government, complaining of the assistance and countenance given by that Government to the rebel Flores, and asking explanations about the arming of the island of Martin Garcia. This is an island at the mouth of the Rivers Paraná and Uruguay, and commands the navigation of them both—and, consequently, that of Paraguay. In Lopez' hands it would have been to Paraguay what Humaitá was to Matto-Grosso. By its geographical position it belonged to the Banda Oriental, but it was (and still is) held by Buenos

Ayres. The Argentine Government promised explanations, but in ten weeks they had not sent them, and Paraguay wrote again. Buenos Ayres, however, evaded the question. These occurrences did not tend to improve the feeling between the two Governments, which was never very good.

In July, Brazil, in order more strongly to urge her claims, invaded the Banda Oriental by land, but stopped near the frontiers; and none knew whether she would take any part in the revolution, or merely forward her own claims. At the end of the month, however, she sided with Flores, but without giving him any help beyond her mere countenance. Buenos Ayres, about the same time, sent Flores 2,000 men, but without acknowledging the fact.

At length, on August 4, Saraiva, the Brazilian Plenipotentiary in the River Plate, sent an ultimatum to the Monte-Videan Government, demanding the payment of the claims, and the punishment of the authorities who had committed the barbarities complained of on Brazilian subjects, and threatening to make reprisals.

Before this time, the Paraguayan Government had been corresponding with the Monte-Videan minister residing at Asuncion, leading him to believe that Paraguay would assist the Monte-Videan Government. When the news of the Brazilian ultimatum reached Paraguay, the resident Oriental minister proposed to the Paraguayan Government to intervene in the affairs of the River Plate, with ships and men. The Paraguayan note, in reply to this request, is a most extraordinary document; but, from its length, it cannot be here inserted whole. Under pretext of recalling the antecedents, for the better understanding of the case, it discloses all the diplomatic confidences of the Oriental minister. Among other revelations, it states that the Monte-Videan minister,

in his official capacity, had proposed to make an alliance, offensive and defensive, against the Argentine Government; that the same minister had stated that the island of Martin Garcia belonged, of right, to Monte Video, offering, in case his Government seized the island, to keep it neutral; that the Oriental minister had proposed to go to Monte Video, and thence dispatch an emissary to conduct an intrigue with Urquiza (chief of the State of Entre-Rios), and try to induce him to declare against the Government of the Argentine Confederation, and pronounce in favour of Monte Video. The Paraguayan minister, Berges, finishes his despatch by saying, that he does not think it convenient that his Government should intervene, as Monte Video proposes, and send ships and men to the River Plate; but that the equilibrium of the River Plate being essential to the wellbeing of Paraguay, that country reserves to itself to secure that result by its own independent action. Having thus disposed of his allies, Lopez, on the same day (August 30), by his minister, Berges, wrote to Mr. Vianna de Lima, Brazilian resident minister in Asuncion, protesting against the threatened reprisals, by Brazil, in Oriental territory.*

On September 1, Mr. Vianna de Lima answered, that no consideration would stop his Government in the execution of the sacred duty of protecting the lives and interests of its subjects. Berges replies, on the 3rd, that if the Brazilians take the measures protested against, his Government will be under the painful necessity of making its protest effective.

Demonstrations were now made in Paraguay (of course by order of the Government), in favour of the protest. A body of the chief men of Asuncion went to the Palace and declared their adhesion. They then went,

* See *Appendix*, No. I.

with a piquet of soldiers, from the Palace to the Government Square, in procession. Here they hoisted the Paraguayan flag, under a salute of 21 guns; and afterwards all the town took to dancing, drinking, and serenading—by order, of course. Everyone, high and low, was obliged to assist at these frolics, under pain of being reported by the police as unpatriotic, which was equivalent, for the ladies, to being banished to the wilds, and for the men, to being imprisoned. Deep family affliction was no excuse for being absent from the revels.

Written manifestoes were made out, and signed by *everyone*, offering their lives and goods to sustain the cause. Even ladies and children were obliged to sign these documents; and they were got up in all the towns and villages of Paraguay, so that no one remained in the country who had not signed away his life and his property, without knowing why. The written manifesto of Asuncion was taken by all the citizens to Lopez, and read to him; and he answered as follows:—

‘In the name of the country, I thank you, citizens, for the solemn manifestation you have made me, and the chief importance of which consists in the sincerity and spontaneousness of which you appear so justly proud. As a magistrate, and as a Paraguayan, I congratulate myself on receiving here your eloquent adhesion to the policy of the Government, by such an explosion of patriotism as this numerous assembly represents. On account of the attitude assumed by the Republic in these solemn moments, we shall perhaps have need of you to make heard the voice of our fatherland. It is time that it should be heard.

‘Paraguay must no longer consent to be lost sight of, when the neighbouring States are agitating questions which have more or less a direct influence against her dearest rights.

‘On assuming the attitude which has called forth your generous adhesion and offerings, I have not deceived myself as to the seriousness of the situation ; but your union and patriotism, and the virtuous army of the Republic, will uphold through all emergencies our nation, so jealous of its rights, and full of a glorious future.

‘In performance of my first duties, I have called the attention of the Emperor of Brazil to his policy in the River Plate ; and I yet hope that, appreciating the fresh proof of moderation and friendship which I offer him, my voice will be heard ; but if it should not be so, and my hopes should turn out vain, I shall call on you, feeling certain that the patriotic decision with which you are animated will not fail me for the triumphing of the national cause, however great may be the sacrifices which the country may demand of its sons.

‘Meanwhile, remain in the imposing attitude you have assumed, until I find it necessary to appeal directly to you.’

These demonstrations did not cease, and they continued throughout the whole of the war. Balls were got up, in improvised rustic saloons, in the squares ; and after the bands of music accompanying the people had been round to the President’s, Mrs. Lynch’s, the Bishop’s, and the Ministers’, they returned to the saloons, and dancing began, and was kept up till morning. These dances were given every night, by different bodies of the inhabitants, who received their orders from the police. The Buenos-Ayrean press, in ridicule, called them St. Vitus’ dances.

It had taken alarm from the time when the first recruiting began in Paraguay ; and when the reports of the proceedings there reached Buenos Ayres, the papers began to canvass which side the Argentine Confederation was likely to take. Corrientes was reported to be invaded by Paraguayans, and 10,000 were said to be about to land

at La Paz, in Entre-Rios. The Paraguayan army was, in Buenos Ayres, supposed to be 50,000 strong; and as the Confederation had no army, and Lopez was continuing his preparations, they had every reason to be alarmed in the River Plate.

In October, Admiral Tamandaré, the commander of the Brazilian fleet in the River Plate, wrote a pompous circular to the foreign ministers there; stating that he was going to make reprisals on the Banda Oriental, and should overhaul all neutral vessels passing up the River Uruguay, in search of contraband of war. Mr. Lettsom, British minister in Monte Video, replied that the waters of La Plata and Uruguay were open to all nations, and that the Brazilians had no jurisdiction there; that there was no neutrality in the question, as Flores was merely a rebel; that Brazil had not declared war, and therefore there could be no contraband of war; and, finally, that the British gunboats would protect all vessels with the British flag from any trespass or insult in those waters.

The Buenos-Ayrean press, always an enemy of Lopez, became very sarcastic about the keeper of the equilibrium of the River Plate, and about the leather manufactory, which the Paraguayan official paper, the *Semanario*, had mentioned as one of the preparations of war. These jokes, however amusing to their authors, entered deeply into Lopez' soul, and he felt them more than he did any reverse he afterwards suffered in the war. He even mentioned them in official correspondence with the Argentine Government, as the 'ribald articles' of the Buenos-Ayrean press, and there can be no doubt that these articles were the chief cause of his making war on the Confederation.

Brazil openly joined Flores, without declaring war against the Banda Oriental, and Tamandaré, in one of his

official circulars, states casually that all his operations will be conducted in combination with Flores.

It was believed throughout Brazil that Paraguay would make good her protest; and it was even reported, in a Rio Janeiro newspaper, in October, that 7,000 Paraguayans had marched on Brazil.

In the beginning of November, 1864, the Brazilians occupied the Oriental towns north of the Rio Negro, and General Flores was operating on the south, in combination with them. Tamandaré blockaded the ports of the Banda Oriental on the Uruguay. Brazil made it a *sine qua non* of peace, that the existing Government of Monte Video should fall. Two of the ministers of that Government had a bad reputation for having ordered the massacre, in cold blood, of several hundred prisoners of war taken during one of their revolutions; and the Buenos-Ayreal press was at this moment very severe upon one of them, Dr. Carreras, for some strong phrases he had used in his diplomatic correspondence. A Brazilian-Argentine alliance was talked of, and on November 1, the Government organ showed what the policy of Buenos Ayres would be.

General Urquiza, chief of Entre-Rios, though nominally only governor of a province of the Argentine Confederation, and under the President of the same, was in reality an independent monarch. He was daily expected to send an army to the help of the Monte-Videoan Government; and to give more appearance of truth to this supposed policy of his, the Entre-Rios press stated that 5,000 Paraguayans were about to land in Entre-Rios, where carts and oxen were already prepared for them, to march thence into the Banda Oriental. Urquiza was the head of a strong political party in the Confederation, and especially in Buenos Ayres. There can be no doubt that he secretly encouraged the hope of assistance to Monte Video, as he

afterwards did to Paraguay throughout the war, though he publicly professed adherence to the Argentine Confederation, and promised to send troops, &c. to the war. He, however, managed so well for himself and his province, that he sent hardly a man to these wars, and made himself and his people immensely rich, by providing the greater part of the cattle and horses consumed by the Allies during the Paraguayan war.

The ridicule of the Argentine press against Paraguay was continued, and as no action was taken immediately after the news arrived of the Brazilians occupying some of the Oriental towns, it was said that Paraguay would not come out of her chrysalis.

There was a Brazilian company which had two steamers running every month between Monte Video and Corumbá, calling, of course, at Asuncion. One of their steamers was called the 'Marquez de Olinda.' She arrived, on her northward passage, at Asuncion, on November 10, 1864, having on board Mr. Carneiro Campos, a newly-named president or governor of the Brazilian province of Matto-Grosso. Lopez was at Cerro-Leon at the time, and hesitated for a whole day whether he should break the peace or not. He had an idea that only by having a war could Paraguay become known, and his own personal ambition drove him on, as he knew he could assemble every man in the country immediately and raise a large army; he knew also that the Brazilians would be a long time recruiting to get a large force together, and he did not think they would wish to carry on a war for long. He said, 'If we don't have a war now with Brazil, we shall have one at a less convenient time for ourselves.' He therefore sent an aide-de-camp, by an express engine, to Asuncion, to order the 'Tacuari' (the fastest steamer on the River Plate), to follow the 'Marquez de Olinda,' which had continued her voyage, and to bring her back

✧ to Asuncion. This was done, and she was overtaken two hundred miles up the river, and brought down and placed under guard at Asuncion, all her passengers, the President of Matto-Grosso among them, being detained prisoners on board, and not allowed to communicate with the shore.

On the same day (November 12, 1864) Berges wrote to Mr. Vianna de Lima, saying that, in consequence of the Brazilian invasion of the Banda Oriental, all relations with Brazil had ceased, and that only neutral vessels would be allowed to pass up the river to Matto-Grosso.

Vianna wrote back, protesting against the detention of the 'Marquez de Olinda' without a previous declaration of war, and demanding his passports, to go down the river in the 'Marquez de Olinda.' The passports were sent, but the steamer was not allowed to go. As there were no steamers now running on the River Paraguay, the Brazilian minister did not know how to leave the country, and he applied to Mr. Washburn, the American minister, as the senior member of the diplomatic corps in Paraguay, to obtain some means of transport for himself and his family. After a good deal of correspondence with Berges, Mr. Washburn succeeded in obtaining an order for the steamer 'Paraná' to be placed at the disposal of Mr. Vianna de Lima, on his giving an official guarantee that she would be allowed to return unmolested. In this correspondence Mr. Washburn refers to an offer of Berges to facilitate and grant every protection to Mr. Lima for travelling by land, to which Mr. Washburn replies that he hopes that will not be necessary, as the Brazilian minister and his family, if they travelled by land, would be exposed to terrible hardships from the heat, and from the bad state of the roads. In his answer Berges says:—

'The undersigned did not profess to provide for the safety of Mr. Vianna de Lima, in case he should travel by land, as your Excellency appears to have understood,

because that safety is fully guaranteed by the laws of the Republic, and by the morality of its inhabitants, as your Excellency has had many opportunities of observing in your frequent journeys to the interior.'

By the energy which he displayed in this matter, Mr. Washburn doubtless saved Mr. de Lima and his family from the great misery and slow death which fell to the lot of the President of Matto-Grosso and the greater part of the 'Marquez de Olinda's' crew.

On the day of the capture of the 'Marquez,' Mr. Washburn showed the Paraguayan Government a letter from Mr. Seward, praising the attitude of Paraguay, and condemning that of Brazil, as likely to kindle a war throughout the whole of the River Plate States. In the following January Mr. Washburn left for the United States, on leave of absence.

A few days after the capture of the 'Marquez de Olinda,' her passengers and crew were landed, and put in a barn as prisoners of war. Here they were badly taken care of, the President Campos having to eat his food out of the same dish with the common sailors, and no one was allowed to communicate with them. Forty-two of the crew were afterwards allowed to go down to Buenos Ayres. The rest of the prisoners were, after some time, sent out into the country, no one knew where, and suffered terrible privations, most of them dying of want, although Lopez, in the *Semanario*, the Government paper, declared that they were getting half-pay and full rations. The President Carneiro Campos, and about half-a-dozen more, survived this, and in the middle of 1867 were brought, under a guard, to the Paraguayan camp at Paso Pucu, where they all died. The President died the day he saw the Brazilian camp at Tuyuti burnt, when he thought there was no more to be hoped for from his countrymen. He left a most affecting note in pencil to his wife, which

was found by the Allies among Lopez' papers, taken December 27, 1868.

The cargo and stores of the ship were sold by auction, and the returns placed to the account of the Paraguayan Government. Two thousand muskets, and 400,000 dollars in new paper-money, were taken. The latter was of no use to Paraguay, of course. Shortly afterwards the Brazilian consul in Buenos Ayres published a notice, saying that an attempt was being made to pass these notes in Buenos Ayres, and warning people that they would not be paid by the Imperial Government.

Four guns were placed on the 'Marquez de Olinda,' and she formed part of the Paraguayan flotilla.

The following circular was sent by the Paraguayan Government to the foreign agents at Asuncion:—

‘ Foreign Office, Asuncion, November 17, 1864.

‘ The undersigned, Minister of Foreign Affairs, has received orders from his Excellency the President of the Republic, to inform you, that the territory of the Banda Oriental having been invaded and occupied, on the 12th October last, by the vanguard of the Imperial army, under the orders of General Mena Barreto, and the event provided against in the solemn protest of the 30th August last having actually come to pass, the undersigned, faithful to that declaration, and to the one contained in the letter of September 3, has addressed to his Excellency Mr. Cesar Sauvan Vianna de Lima, resident minister of his Majesty the Emperor, the resolution which your Excellency will find in the accompanying copy, No. 1, and its answer, No. 2.

‘ The undersigned flatters himself that, in the principles of free navigation and commerce allowed to the province of Matto-Grosso, in favour of friendly flags, your Excellency will see a proof of the strong desire of his Government

to limit, as nearly as he can, to the customs of the most civilised nations the evils of war, by avoiding any damage to the subjects of friendly nations which have any interests in that Brazilian province.

‘The undersigned profits by this opportunity to reiterate to your Excellency the assurances of his high consideration and esteem.

‘ JOSÉ BERGES.

‘To H. E. the Minister of’

By this document it will be seen how anxious Lopez was, at that time, to be looked upon by European Powers as a civilised and enlightened ruler. From the beginning to the end of the war he has always declared, and put it forward in every possible way, that it was Brazil who made war against Paraguay, and not Paraguay against Brazil.

It is wonderful how the Buenos-Ayorean papers, all through the war, have given accounts of things taking place before they really happened. The expedition to Matto-Grosso was announced long before it was known in Paraguay; and so early as November, Lopez was stated to have asked permission from the Argentine Government to pass an army through Corrientes, which permission he did not ask for till the following February.

The following paragraph, translated from a Buenos-Ayorean paper, gives a good idea of the feeling in that place towards Paraguay:—

‘PARAGUAYANS.—These gentlemen have just left their chrysalis, contrary to the general belief, and to common sense. They have been four months coming out, and probably they will be a year before they do anything, because Paraguay always uses a very prudent slowness—too prudent.

‘Let us see, my dear Paraguayans, how you behave in a war carried on abroad. Mind you don’t get frightened

at the difficulties you may meet when you go out into the world, transformed from Paraguayans into conquerors of other people's liberties.

'As for my country, it does not care a rap for your having moved; and as for myself, I like rows, and I vow that the strangest thing I shall see in my life will be a battle between tortoises and other more agile animals. God be praised!'

Some of these papers, however, were in the Paraguayan pay. The Paraguayan consul at Rosario, at the beginning of the war, offered one of the newspapers there ten doubloons a month and its printing-paper, to write in favour of Paraguay. In this instance it was refused.

When the news of the capture of the 'Marquez de Olinda' and of the detention of the President of Matto-Grosso reached Brazil, everyone there was furious. The Government took it coolly, however, and stated in the official newspaper that it counted on the patriotism of all the Brazilians for wiping out the affront; that Paraguay was enervated by a despotic government, and that, consequently, there need be no anxiety about the result; that the Monte-Videan affair would soon be finished, and then the whole force of the Empire would be free to operate against Paraguay.

The Monte-Videan affairs had been advancing rapidly towards a conclusion since the Brazilian interference. Brazil had united with Flores, and they had carried everything before them until they arrived at the town of Paysandú, where their progress was for a time arrested. They besieged it by land and water with the whole of their forces. The garrison was commanded by Colonel Leandro Gomez, and was defended with a heroism that gained the applause even of his enemies. He had a mere handful of men against all the Brazilians and Flores, and had no provisions. He executed some twenty-four

Brazilians whom he had taken prisoners, for which their countrymen vowed revenge.

Strictly speaking, however, he did right, as Brazil had not declared war, and the army was, in fact, merely a horde of murderers. After several fruitless attacks, Paysandú was bombarded by the Brazilians during two days, after which they sent a demand to surrender under a flag of truce. While Gomez was writing an answer, the Brazilians treacherously entered the town, under cover of the flag of truce. Some of the Brazilian officers went straight to where Gomez was writing, and seizing him, sent him prisoner, with some of his principal officers, into another house. Hence they were all shortly taken out into the garden and shot. There was an indiscriminate massacre of the women and children of the place. The taking of Paysandú, with the atrocities committed there, form a revolting page in the history of Brazil.

The Monte-Videan Government now saw that there were no hopes of holding out, and determined to come to terms. The situation was a very complicated one. It was, however, patched up, and a large share in the Government given to Flores, who soon turned out the rest of them, and remained alone, with the title of 'Provisional Governor of the Republic of the Banda Oriental.'

CHAPTER. III.

THE PARAGUAYAN EXPEDITION TO MATTO-GROSSO.

ON December 14, 1864, all Asuncion was down at the riverside, as it was understood that an expedition was to start that day to invade Matto-Grosso.

Three thousand men and two field-batteries were embarked on five steamers and three schooners. Two flat-bottomed gunboats, each mounting an 8-inch gun, were also taken in tow. The men had all new uniforms, and looked very picturesque in their scarlet camisetas.

Among the troops embarked were the 6th and 7th Battalions, which for the few years previous had been occupied on the earthworks of the railway, now of course stopped. These were the two best battalions in the army, all old soldiers, and all mulattoes, or 'small ears,' as they were called. The 7th was commanded by Major (since Colonel) Luis Gonzalez, who has made some figure in the war and seen almost all the hard fighting.

Before the men started, the following proclamation was issued to them:—

'SOLDIERS!—My endeavours to keep the peace have been fruitless. The Empire of Brazil, not knowing our valour and enthusiasm, provokes us to war, which challenge we are bound by our honour and dignity to accept in protection of our dearest rights.

'In recompence for your loyalty and long services, I have fixed my attention on you, choosing you from among the numerous legions which form the armies of the

Republic, that you may be the first to give a proof of the force of our arms, by gathering the first laurels we shall add to those which our forefathers planted in the crown of our Fatherland in the memorable battles of Paraguari and Tacuari.

‘Your subordination and discipline, and your constancy under fatigues, assure me of your bravery, and of the lustre of the arms which I confide to your valour.

‘Soldiers and sailors! carry this vote of confidence to your companions, who will join you on our northern frontiers, and march serenely to the field of honour, where, gathering glories for your country and fame for yourselves, you may show the world what the Paraguayan soldier is worth.

‘FRANCISCO SOLANO LOPEZ.’

Coimbra is a fort on the River Paraguay, situated near the Paraguayan frontier of Brazil, in Matto-Grosso. It commands the river-entrance to that province, which is practically the only entrance, as the roads are so bad overland from Rio Janeiro that it takes three months for carts to do the journey, and a month for people on horseback. All the communication with it was therefore carried on through the River Plate. Coimbra stands on the spur of a mountain, sloping down to the river. Being built of stone, with scarps about fourteen feet high, it was a strong place, assailable only from one side, while it could be defended by a small garrison. It mounted thirty-seven brass guns—chiefly 8-pounders, with some 32-pounders—and had a garrison of four hundred men. It was about forty feet above the level of the river.

On the night of December 26, the steamers anchored a league below Coimbra, and the troops and artillery were landed. General (then Colonel) Barrios, a brother-in-law of Lopez II., was commander of the expedition. The

artillery was placed on a hill opposite Coimbra, on the other side of the river. The gunboats took up positions for bombarding the fort, and everything was prepared for an attack.

On the morning of the 27th, Barrios sent a note to Porto-Carreiro,* the commander of Coimbra, under a flag of truce, inviting him to surrender within one hour, threatening to take the place by force if his demand was not complied with, and saying that in that case the garrison would be subjected to martial law.

Porto-Carreiro replied that it was not customary in the Brazilian army to surrender without being ordered to do so by a superior officer; that he had sent a copy of Barrios' letter to his commander, and awaited the decision of the latter.

Fire was then opened on the fort by the Paraguayans, and the bombardment continued till next day. It was then assaulted by part of the Paraguayan forces, which were driven back.

The fort was assailable only on one side, on account of the inaccessible hills which surrounded it; and on that one side it was strongly protected by cactus hedges, which the assailants had to cut through under fire. Even then they could hardly advance on account of the stones and stumps. Although exposed to a terrible fire of grape and musketry, they reached the walls; but they could not scale them, having taken no ladders with them. They also lost many men by the hand-grenades which the garrison threw upon them. Seven men, however, did scale the wall and got in, but they were immediately overpowered, and the remainder retreated. Colonel Luis Gonzalez led the attack with the 6th Battalion, 750 strong; he was struck himself

* Porto-Carreiro had formerly been a military instructor in the Paraguayan army, having been sent at the request of Lopez I. by the Brazilian Government.

by a ball, and lost 200 men killed and wounded. This was more a reconnoissance than an attack, as few men were exposed.

During the night preparations were made for a regular attack by all the forces next day. About the middle of the day, when they were going to attack the place, it was found that the only occupants of the fort were two wounded men. The garrison, seeing that the Paraguayans really meant to have the place, evacuated it silently at night in two steamers, without their movement being suspected by the Paraguayans.

Large stores of arms and powder were taken in Coimbra by the Paraguayans. The garrison had left everything behind.

The retreat of the Brazilians was conducted in a masterly way; but with the stored-up ammunition in the fort, and considering the fact that their communications were open, and that they had steamers, they certainly ought to have held the place.

When Porto-Carreiro reported himself to his superior officer, he was arrested and sent prisoner to Cuyabá.

Coimbra being taken, Barrios at once advanced to Albuquerque and Corumbá, both of which places he found deserted; but in the latter were found twenty-three brass guns, and in both places large stores of ammunition.

Corumbá was the chief commercial town of the province of Matto-Grosso, and a great deal of valuable booty was taken in it. The inhabitants had hidden themselves in the surrounding woods, and Barrios sent and brought them back. Their houses were already completely sacked, and some of the choicest articles of spoil were sent as presents to Lopez, who did not disdain to accept them. The women were ill-treated, and Barrios himself took the lead in it. A Brazilian gentleman and his daughter were taken to him on board his steamer, and on the old man

refusing to leave his daughter with Barrios, he was sent away under a threat of being shot, and his daughter was kept on board. All whom Barrios took he put to the question, and those who did not give or did not possess the information he required were beaten by his order, and some of them lanced to death as spies.

After the Paraguayans had occupied Corumbá, General Barrios sent two steamers, to follow those in which the Brazilians had left. One of those sent by General Barrios, the 'Ypora,' a small passenger-boat built of planks in Paraguay, and mounting four small guns, went much faster than her consort, and in the San Lorenzo river sighted the 'Añambay.' This was a small English-built war-steamer, mounting six guns, the stern-chaser being a beautiful brass 32-pounder. Lieutenant Herreros, commander of the two steamers, was on board the 'Ypora,' and immediately gave chase. The 'Añambay,' commanded by Captain Baker, an Englishman, kept up a running fire from her stern-chaser on the 'Ypora,' one of her shots killing a Paraguayan officer on the bridge. The 'Ypora' did not return the fire; but having on board some infantry, as well as her crew, followed, and at last came up with and boarded the 'Añambay.'

The Brazilians were terror-stricken, and many of them jumped into the water, where they were shot at; the rest were put to the sword. Captain Baker, who had been obliged to load and fire his gun himself, finding that his men would not fight, jumped into the water and escaped into the woods. Boats were sent to follow the fugitives, and all who were caught were killed. The Paraguayans cut off the ears of the dead Brazilians, and strung them on a string, which they hung on the shrouds of the 'Ypora.' When the 'Ypora' arrived afterwards at Asuncion, the ears were quickly removed, 'by supreme order'; and when the Buenos-Ayrcean press got hold of

the story, the Paraguayan official paper, the *Semanario*, indignantly repudiated the calumny.

Coming down the river with the steamers, Herreros stopped at Dorados, the arsenal of Matto-Grosso, which he had found deserted on his journey up the river. Here he met two more steamers, and they all loaded ammunition, of which there were vast stores, especially of powder. There was also a great deal of machinery in store. The sun was intensely hot in the middle of the day, and the powder was so badly conditioned and stored that the floors of the magazines were covered with loose powder, as was likewise the road leading from the magazines to the steamers. The officer superintending the loading went to Herreros, and remonstrated with him on the danger of continuing the loading of the powder in that intense heat. Herreros, however, said that there was no danger, and himself relieved the officer. The gunpowder-store shortly afterwards blew up, killing Herreros and another officer, and twenty-three rank and file. This took place on January 10, 1865. On the news arriving at Asuncion a public funeral service and a monument were decreed to him. He was almost universally liked, and he was well connected.

At the same time with the expedition by water to Matto-Grosso, General (then Colonel) Resquin marched into that province by land from Concepcion, with 2,500 cavalry and a battalion of infantry. They found the whole country deserted, as all the people had been advised two months beforehand, by the Government, to be ready to retreat should the Paraguayans appear. In every place they came to, they saw merely one or two old women who had not wished to leave. They always found papers and arms, many of them buried in a hurry by the authorities who had left. In many places the women were found hiding in the woods with all their property. These unfortunate women were invariably ill-treated, and their property

taken from them. The houses were all sacked by the Paraguayans, who found a great deal of booty in them. They laid waste the property of the Baron de Villa Maria, who only just got away in time himself. He managed to put a bottle of diamonds in his pocket. He was the richest man in the province, and had a fine house and furniture, paintings, &c. He had also 80,000 head of cattle. All this was taken by the Paraguayans, together with his patent of nobility, under the Emperor's seal, which he had but lately bought. It was in a gilt frame, and afterwards adorned Mrs. Lynch's* anteroom.

The news of the invasion of Matto-Grosso by the Paraguayans was taken to Rio Janeiro by the Baron de Villa Maria, who did the journey in a month.

Many of the women taken in Matto-Grosso were sent to Asuncion, where they were given to different families, to serve and to be fed by them. Many, however, had to beg in the streets, and it was sad to see how unhappy they looked.

Resquin was under the orders of Barrios, and they kept open their communications. The former had hardly met with any resistance on his march. The country was very much flooded by the river at the time of the invasion, and the Paraguayans had to ride and march through water, sometimes for days together. On this account they pushed no farther north than to about the same latitude with Barrios, and they sent to the latter all the arms and papers taken, leaving small garrisons in the villages through which they passed.

A first instalment of sixty-seven brass guns, of all calibres, from a 4-pounder to a 32-pounder, was at once sent to Asuncion, where great activity was displayed in mounting them on field-carriages, and making

* This was an Irish lady, educated in France, who had followed Lopez from Europe to Paraguay.

ammunition-waggons. Fifty carpenters worked day and night at them. In Matto-Grosso these guns were very badly mounted, most of them on very poor garrison carriages.

Many cargoes of gunpowder, arms, and ammunition were sent down to Paraguay, which drew from Matto-Grosso almost all the stores it consumed during the war. Only the guns required for defending the places garrisoned by the Paraguayans were left.*

Brazil had for a long time been preparing for war in this quarter. Among the papers which were taken were despatches from the Imperial Government of July and October 1861, and of January 1862, ordering the Provincial Government to keep a watch upon and report the movements of Paraguay.

The behaviour of the Brazilians, in not fighting for Matto-Grosso, and in jumping into the water instead of taking or sinking the 'Ypora,' naturally made the Paraguayans thoroughly despise their enemies.

As the Paraguayan steamers could go no higher up the river than to the mouth of the Rio Cuyabá, on account of the shallowness of the water, and the march by land to the town of Cuyabá would have been almost impossible, a garrison of somewhat over 1,000 men was left in Corumbá, Coimbra, &c., while the remaining troops were sent back to Asuncion.

* In one village taken by the cavalry there were found—4 cannon, 500 muskets, 67 carbines, 131 pistols, 468 swords, 1,090 lances, and 9,847 cannon-balls.

CHAPTER IV.

THE COMMENCEMENT, BY LOPEZ II., OF THE WAR AGAINST THE
ARGENTINE CONFEDERATION — THE SECRET TREATY OF THE
TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

IN the middle of January 1865, the old Bishop of Asuncion (Urvieta) died, as had been foreseen, and the new one (Palacios) remained Head of the Church. He was a young man, about thirty-five years of age, with a very mild countenance, and could never look anyone in the face. From the time he was made Bishop, he generally took his meals at Lopez' table, and became a great glutton, which characteristic no doubt contributed to aggravate his naturally bad character. He prostituted himself and the whole of the priesthood to Lopez, and carried his wickedness so far as to use the confessional, which is a sacrament of the Roman Catholic Church, for no other purpose than that of relating people's thoughts to Lopez. This bad man never lost an opportunity of speaking against anyone to Lopez, and doubtless many atrocities of the latter were owing to him. Lopez despised him so much that he used to make public fun of him at his table. He urged Lopez to take revenge for the articles against him in the Buenos-Ayorean press, which continued to lash Lopez on his sore points, calling him a Cacique, and Asuncion his wigwams. It professed to see in the retreat of the Brazilians from Matto-Grosso a great strategic design, and prophesied that Brazil would have no difficulty whatever in disposing of Paraguay.

On January 26, Mr. Paranhos, the Brazilian Minister-

Plenipotentiary in the River Plate, addressed a circular to the foreign resident ministers, detailing the mode in which Paraguay had begun the war, and finishing as follows :—

‘ The Imperial Government will repel its aggressor by force, but, while keeping intact both the dignity of the Empire and its legitimate rights, it will not confound the Paraguayan *nation* with the *Government*, which thus exposes it to the hazards of an unjust war, and will therefore, as a belligerent, maintain itself within the limits which its own civilisation and its international obligations prescribe.’

On February 5, 1865, despatches from Lopez, for General Mitre, then President of the Argentine Confederation, arrived in Buenos Ayres, demanding permission for a Paraguayan army to march through a part of the province of Corrientes. This Mitre refused to allow, and demanded explanations concerning the large Paraguayan forces which were being assembled on his frontier.

The press of Buenos Ayres now ceased to ridicule Lopez, and called him the American Attila. It became loud in its clamours to overthrow Lopez, and to open out the rich country of Paraguay, considering cheap the lives lost in such an enterprise. The Argentines had always been a little jealous of the Paraguayan railways, arsenals, shipbuilding yards, telegraphs, &c., which were then more advanced than in the Confederation. In Paraguay these establishments belonged exclusively to the Government, which, by its despotic power over the persons and property of the inhabitants, could construct large works with no other expense than that of the plant ordered from England.

The Brazilian fleet in the River Plate, under the orders of Admiral Tamandaré, gave no signs of moving to

release the President of Matto-Grosso, or even to blockade the River Paraguay.

On February 15, Lopez decreed the assembly of an Extraordinary Congress for March 5. All the Paraguayans in Buenos Ayres who were out of his clutches signed and published a protest against his attempting to legalise his acts by forcing a congress to endorse them. Lopez revenged himself on six of the principal ones, by making their relations in Paraguay write and publish letters, disowning them as relations on account of their *treason*. The following is an extract from one of them, a long letter, which Lopez forced a mother to write about her son, and published in the *Semanario* :—

‘ I further say that if my son, Benigno, persists in his misguided way, or does not publicly vindicate himself, he will receive the malediction of all his fellow-citizens, and of his afflicted mother, who will, against her wish, be obliged to curse him! ’

Later on in the war, as things went worse with Lopez, he made the letters much more scandalous to humanity. The friends of all who were taken prisoners, or who surrendered or deserted to the enemy, were forced to write these letters in the *Semanario*.

On March 5, the Congress assembled in Asuncion. It was composed of the most affluent men in Paraguay, who, when they arrived in town, had to go to some of the *employés* of Government, to get their cue as to what they were to say in congress. These cues were given upon every subject.

In the President's message to Congress, he strongly alluded to the unfriendliness of Buenos Ayres, and had copies of some of the sarcasms of the press of that city distributed among the members.

The Congress sat for four days, and the following propositions were made and passed :—That the Government

be authorised to negotiate a loan of 5,000,000*l.* ; and that Lopez be allowed to create six brigadier-generals, and three of division. The insults in the Buenos-Ayrean press were denounced by the members, and it was proposed to have the papers containing them burnt by the public executioner. A decree was made, allowing Lopez to issue whatever amount of paper-money he thought fit. The rank of Field-Marshal was conferred on him, with 60,000 dollars a year (his father had only 4,000 dollars). Lopez accepted the post of Field-Marshal, 'on account of the honour of it,' but could not bring himself to receive the money. The members however insisted, but he again refused. This was repeated each day the Congress sat (all by 'supreme order'), till he at last accepted it. During the discussion a member proposed to give him a sword and a jewel of honour, instead of the 60,000 dollars. He accepted these as well. The statement of the Bishop, that the private fortune of Lopez and that of the State were both one, was received with great applause. A law was proposed, prohibiting him from exposing his precious life in the war. Lopez objected that if anything went wrong, he should feel himself responsible if he were not there in person ; but, as it was so much insisted upon, he promised to expose himself as little as possible. The Bishop said that it was the decision and personal bravery of Lopez which chiefly made them anxious on his account.

It was asserted that Buenos Ayres had virtually declared war by refusing the passage of Paraguayan troops through Corrientes, while she had formerly allowed the Brazilians to go up the river and menace Paraguay. Lopez was authorised to pass the troops through whenever he thought fit.

Banquets, balls, &c. were still the order of the day in Asuncion. Lopez had dances going on every night in 'improvised saloons' in the public squares. These were

divided into three compartments, for three classes of people—the swells, the ‘golden combs,’ and the common people. The ‘golden combs’ was a name given to a class invented at the beginning of the dancing mania, and consisted of all the third-class girls who had any pretension to good looks, and were tolerably loose in their morals. They all wore immense golden combs in their back-hair. They were brought forward by the Government to spite the ladies, most of whom refused to dance at these places, though under danger of their lives. They were, however, obliged to go and look on for a short time.

The people whom Lopez had imprisoned on his election were dying now and then in prison, and great terror was caused among the people by the maltreatment to which they were subjected. One of them—the Judge Lescano, a good old man—was kept in the open air, and in the mud, till he died. His body was then sent to the hospital to have a *post-mortem* examination held on it. (This was done with all distinguished prisoners who died, to prove that they were not poisoned.) The Chief of Police then sent for his wife, and (smiling) told her that her husband was free, and that she might go to the hospital and take charge of him. She went, delighted, but what was her horror to find him in the *post-mortem* room! In the afternoon a little bullock-cart, with policemen for drivers, was sent to carry away his remains, his family not even being allowed the poor consolation of burying him.

Another, Jovellanos, just as he was about to die, was sent home to his family. When he was dead, Lopez sent a bullock-cart, as in the former case, with policemen, who entered the house rudely, and, taking the body by the feet, threw it into the cart, and took it away. People became afraid to breathe.

On March 25, Lopez decreed the augmentation of

2,900,000 dollars in paper-money, making the total issue 5,000,000 dollars; and on April 10, he abolished the law which ordered the half of all payments to be made in specie.

About this time a disgraceful outrage was committed on the Brazilian Consul in Asuncion, who, being married to a native lady, had stayed in the country. As he was quietly going along the street one evening, his head was broken by the blow of a bottle, leaving him senseless, and very dangerously wounded. The general impression was that the perpetrators of these deeds acted by authority.

On April 16, large transactions on 'Change in Buenos Ayres, done by Paraguayan agents, made a sensation, and caused curious people to seek for news. They found that a letter had been written by the Paraguayan General, Robles, from Humaitá, to the Paraguayan agents in the River Plate, by order of Lopez, telling them, secretly, that war had been declared against the Argentine Confederation; that he had orders to march to Corrientes, and was on the eve of moving thither; and that the intelligence was sent them beforehand, that they might take any measures they thought fit.

This declaration of war was a despatch from Berges to Elizalde, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was dated March 29, and the first that the Buenos-Ayorean Government saw of it was from its being published in a newspaper of Corrientes, after that city was occupied by the Paraguayans. It was officially received by the Argentine Government on May 3, and was to the following effect:—That the professions of neutrality of the Argentine Government did not deceive Lopez; that an Argentine General had assisted in the Oriental war, with the countenance of the Argentine Government; that the Government of Buenos Ayres, being at peace with Paraguay, had countenanced the 'Paraguayan War

Committee' in that city ; but all this was not sufficient :— that Government must lend its official press to stupid and insulting productions against Paraguay, such as had never been issued by any press in the world ; that to be really neutral, the Argentine Government should either grant to both Paraguay and Brazil, or refuse to both of them, the freedom of transit for their troops ; that the protestations of friendship were very contrary to the insults and calumnies which the official press was continually throwing out to the world against Paraguay and its Government ; that all these hostile acts, for which Paraguay had given no provocation, had convinced Lopez that the policy of the Argentine Government threatened the most vital interests of that of Paraguay. That, convinced that the actual Government of the Confederation was an enemy to the rights, interests, honour, and integrity of the Paraguayan nation, and its Government, he had laid the case before Congress, and now sent a copy of the resolution of that body, declaring war against the actual Argentine Government ; that he throws all the responsibility on the Argentine Government.

The following is from the enclosure mentioned, namely, the declaration of war by the Paraguayan Congress :—

‘ THE SOVEREIGN NATIONAL CONGRESS.

‘ Considering

‘ *Declares.*

‘ The conduct of the Executive Power of the nation, towards Brazil, is approved of. . . . and it is authorised to continue the war.

‘ ART. 2.—War is hereby declared against the actual Argentine Government, till it gives such assurances and

satisfactions as are due to the rights, honour, and dignity of the Paraguayan nation and its Government.

‘ART. 3.—His Excellency the President of the Republic will make peace with both belligerents when he thinks proper, reporting thereon to the National Congress, according to law.’

‘Asuncion, March 18, 1865.’

On April 17 the news reached Buenos Ayres of the following outrage:—

On the 13th, at 7 A.M., five Paraguayan steamers × came down the river, past Corrientes, in which port two steamers of the Argentine navy were anchored—namely, the ‘25 de Mayo,’ and the ‘Gualeguay.’ The Paraguayans turned their ships round, and, going up-stream, went alongside the Argentine steamers; and having fired into them, with grape, boarded them, and took them. The Argentines made hardly any resistance, as they were not in the least prepared for a fight. Some of those, who did not throw themselves into the water, were put to the sword. Many, who lay hid till the carnage was over, were taken prisoners—in all 49, including a captain, a commander, and four lieutenants. Those who jumped into the water were shot at by the Paraguayans, who remained three or four hours in the port, and then went away, towing their two prizes up to Paraguay. Eight hundred boarding-cutlasses were taken on these steamers, which were given to the 6th Battalion, in addition to their other arms. The two steamers were almost useless old merchant-vessels, but after some repairs they were made serviceable, and added to the Paraguayan flotilla.

In Paraguay the news was received as a great triumph, and dancing was redoubled. Buenos Ayres almost exploded at the news. The citizens collected, and went in a body to President Mitre’s house. Having expressed

their sentiments as well as they could, Mitre replied:—
 ‘Gentlemen, after the provocation and insult to our flag, by the tyrant of Paraguay, your Governor can only tell you that proclamations and manifestations will be translated into deeds; and that in twenty-four hours we shall be in the barracks, in a fortnight at Corrientes, and in three months at Asuncion.’

This speech brought down immense cheers. The excitement in Buenos Ayres was intense. The performance in the theatre was stopped, while people made warlike speeches; and the curtain fell, showing a transparency with the words, ‘In three months to Asuncion!’

Mitre declared the Argentine Confederation in a state of siege. He decreed that nineteen battalions of infantry, of 500 men each, should be added to the army for the campaign, and that Corrientes and Entre-Rios should each contribute 5,000 cavalry. He named Urquiza ‘Superior Officer’ of the cavalry of Entre-Rios. This was impolitic, as Urquiza was ‘Captain-General’ of the Argentine army, and a complete Czar in his province of Entre-Rios. He was so powerful that the Government could not force him to do anything against his will. Had Mitre offered him the post of Commander-in-Chief of the army, Urquiza might have accepted it; and then the Confederation would have had, perhaps, 15,000 Entrerianos—good troops—to add to its army, besides the advantage of Urquiza’s generalship, and the war would probably have been over in a few months. It was perhaps owing to this slight that Urquiza took no part in the war, and sent no men to the army.

Mitre also issued the following proclamation:—

‘The President of the Republic to his Fellow-citizens.

‘Compatriots! In complete peace, and contrary to the faith of nations, the Government of Paraguay declares

war against us, by the act of treacherously seizing in our territory, by force of arms, two steamers of the Argentine squadron, and firing on our defenceless towns.

‘Being provoked to the combat, without having sought it, after having done all that decorously could and ought to be done to avoid it—keeping the neutrality, which was the rule of our policy—we shall answer war with war, and we shall carry it on with all the energy and power which correspond to the glorious antecedents of the Argentine nation, now so disloyally wounded in her honour.

‘Fellow-citizens! Counting on the strength of the Argentine people, and on your firmness, the country has till now maintained itself on an entire footing of peace, thus complying strictly with the conditions of neutrality; in the assurance that when the moment of danger arrived, everyone, without distinction, would rush to his post, at the foot of the national flag, resolved to comply with his sacred duties.

‘Argentines! The moment has arrived. In the name of our country, and with the authority of the law, I call upon you to occupy your posts, as citizens and soldiers of a free country, whose standard was ever followed by victory and justice.

‘Compatriots! I can calmly offer you triumph; for every Argentine feels that it is insured beforehand by the powerful elements which the nation has at command, and by the help of Providence, and of your valour and patriotism.

‘After this noble effort peace will be more solid, more glorious, and more fruitful; and you can continue, with greater energy, the task of progress, in which you have been interrupted by a vandalic and treacherous aggression.

‘For my own part, I need not tell you that I shall

fulfil the high duties which the country and the Constitution impose on me under the circumstances; and that, confiding in Heaven, which protects the justice of our cause, and in your generous patriotism, I shall not rest until I have restored to you the peace which has been treacherously taken from you, and until I have vindicated the honour of the Argentine nation.

‘Your compatriot and friend,

‘BARTOLOMÉ MITRE.

‘Buenos Ayres, April 16, 1865.’

President Mitre called the Congress together, wrote a circular to the foreign ministers, informing them of the state of war which the Republic was in, and declared the ports of Paraguay blockaded.

He cancelled the exequaturs of the Paraguayan consuls in the Confederation, and put Eguzquiza, the consul in Buenos Ayres, in prison. He was released on bail, but again arrested next day.

General Paunero was named commander of the 1st division of the Argentine army. All the battalions of infantry were ordered to be increased to a strength of 500.

The Governor (Lagraña) of Corrientes was in time to stop and send back the ‘Esmeralda,’ a steamer going to Paraguay with small and side-arms, which were seized by the Government of Buenos Ayres.

Urquiza also got up an army of 10,000 men, without, however, moving them in any direction.

On May 1, 1865, General Flores, General Urquiza, the Brazilian Minister-Plenipotentiary in the River Plate, Mr. Octaviano, Admiral Tamandaré, and the Brazilian General Osorio, arrived in Buenos Ayres, and were met at the pier-head by President Mitre. The same day a treaty of alliance was signed between Brazil, the Argentine Confederation, and the Banda Oriental,

the terms being kept secret. It was known, however, that the Allies had resolved to spend their last man and their last dollar in humiliating Lopez. In a few days the press managed to pump the principal stipulations out of the ministers who had signed the treaty, and they were published, though without authority.

Banquets were given all round, at which most of the neutral ministers showed their sympathy with the Allies.

The secret treaty was first published in Buenos Ayres in April 1866, by a newspaper which took it from an English Parliamentary blue-book. It had been communicated privately by the Oriental minister, Castro, and all the contracting parties were very wroth when that iniquitous document came to light; and, in consequence of its publication, the Oriental minister in London demanded his passports.

The treaty is given in full in the Appendix; the following are the principal points in it:—The Allies bind themselves not to lay down their arms till they have abolished the Government of Lopez, nor to treat with him, unless by common consent. The independence of Paraguay is to be guaranteed. Paraguay is to pay the expenses of the war. The fortifications of Humaitá are to be destroyed, and no others allowed to be built. No arms or elements of war are to be left to Paraguay.

Buenos Ayres might be excused to a certain degree for signing such documents, as the outrage of Lopez was still fresh in her mind; but Brazil had received no such affront, and the proceeding was quite unpardonable on her part.

CHAPTER V.

THE ARMY OF PARAGUAY AND ITS GENERAL RESOURCES—THE
FORCES OF THE ALLIES.

THE forces of Paraguay, at this time, consisted of an army of about 80,000 men, a third of which were cavalry, and the rest infantry and artillery. The best men were picked out for cavalry and artillerymen. The cavalry was divided into regiments, and the infantry into battalions; the artillery nominally into regiments of horse, and battalions of heavy artillery.

The regiments of cavalry consisted of four squadrons, each of one hundred rank and file, and properly was commanded by a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, two majors, &c.; but a regiment was often commanded by a lieutenant, and seldom by an officer of higher rank than captain. This was on account of the scarcity of officers of high rank, as Lopez was always very sparing of his promotions. As the war went on, the force of a regiment decreased as the men died, and there were not sufficient to replace all. The last two remarks apply to the infantry also. The cavalry was armed with sabres, besides which, generally, one of the squadrons of a regiment was armed with flint-lock carbines, and the other three with lances. The Paraguayan lances were three yards long, and the Allies' lances ten to twelve feet. The Government Escort of 250 men was armed with Turner's breech-loading rifled carbine, and the regiment of 'Dragoons of the Escort' with

common rifled carbines. As the former were not in action till the last few days of the war, there was no opportunity of testing their weapons. The cavalry rode upon the 'recado,' which is the saddle of the country, and which makes also a capital bed. It consists, first, of a thick woollen rug, which is laid double on the horse's back; on this a large piece of leather, made of a whole skin, also doubled, on which is placed the seat, to which are secured the stirrups. These consist of a sort of button at the end of the stirrup-leather, which is passed between the great and first toe, as they wear no boots, and they rest on the button. The seat is fastened down by a broad leather lashing with immense iron rings, over which is placed a sheepskin to sit upon. They use no bits, but with a leather thong tie the reins to the horse's under-jaw inside his mouth. There were at this time, in the whole of Paraguay, perhaps 100,000 horses, only half of which could gallop two or three miles. The Paraguayan horses were never good, and a terrible disease in the spine had latterly carried off the greater part of them, attacking generally the best animals.

Each battalion of infantry was divided into six companies, of one hundred rank and file, called 'company of grenadiers,' first, second, third, and fourth companies, and 'company of chasseurs.' The first-named consisted of the strongest men in the battalion, and the last of the smallest and weakest. At the beginning of the war, however, most of the battalions were 800 to 1,000 strong, with companies of 120, and with more than six companies to a battalion. Three battalions were armed with Witton's rifles. One of them had been created in the time of Lopez I., and had always been at Humaitá, where they got no rations, but were sent out with their rifles for two or three days at a time, and with a few rounds of ammunition, to shoot game for their food. The bullets were

chopped up into small slugs to shoot wild ducks with, and the rifles, being thus misused for several years, had at last no grooves left in them. Three or four battalions were armed with percussion-locks, and all the rest with the old flint-lock 'Brown Besses,' with the Tower of London mark upon them. None of the infantry had side-arms, excepting their bayonets, for which they had no sheaths, and which they always carried fixed. The 6th Battalion only had the boarding-cutlasses taken on the steamers in Corrientes, as it was destined to take the place of marines in the navy, after it returned from Matto-Grosso.

There were three regiments of horse artillery, each consisting of four batteries of six guns. There was one battery of steel rifled 12-pounder guns; all the rest were of every imaginable size, shape, weight, and metal, from 2-pounders to 32-pounders. Most of them had been lately mounted at Asuncion.

The heavy artillery (all smoothbore) counted twenty-four 8-inch 65-cwt. guns; two 56-pounders, heavy guns; and altogether about 100 more, between 32- and 24-pounders. Of these eighteen 8-inch, two 56-pounders, and 70 smaller guns, among which there were many 8-pounders and 12-pounders, were all that the redoubted batteries of Humaitá mounted. Six 8-inch guns were in the flat-bottomed gunboats.

The greater part of the Paraguayan artillery consisted of old honeycombed iron guns, probably taken by ships for ballast and bought by Paraguay. They were like the guns which do duty as posts on Woolwich Common.

Besides the artillery drill, the horse-artillerymen were exercised in cavalry manœuvres, and the heavy artillery in infantry battalion drill. Altogether Paraguay had between 300 and 400 guns of all sizes.

The navy consisted of seventeen small steamers, all of them passenger-vessels, excepting the 'Añambay' and the

'Tacuari,' both of them built for gunboats. They were all armed with smoothbore guns, from 4- to 32-pounders. The 'Jejuí' mounted a 12-pounder rifled breechloader. The sailors were armed with Witton's rifles with sword-bayonets.

Neither the riflemen nor artillerymen of Paraguay were ever taught the use of the graduated sights of their arms, but they elevated their guns by pointing them so many yards above the mark, according to its distance. They, nevertheless, made much better practice than their enemies, who understood the use of the sights.

The land transport was effected by the slow means of bullock-carts. There was no separate corps of transport, but every commanding-officer had what carts and bullocks he required given to him, and he supplied the drivers from among his men.

The medical staff was composed of a surgeon-major, three surgeons with the rank of captain, and a chemist with the rank of lieutenant—all Englishmen. Besides these, there were under them many Paraguayan surgeons and students, all of them taught by the doctors and chemist of the medical staff. The hospital transport service was carried on in the same way as the land transport. Drugs were already getting scarce.

There were altogether about five hundred tons of powder in the Paraguayan magazines, and plenty of shot and shell, &c.

The Paraguayan soldiers were dressed in a white shirt and drawers, white trousers, scarlet baize camiseta (a sort of blouse) with black or blue facings, over which they wore their white belts, and no shoes. The hat or cap was the distinguishing feature of their uniform. The infantry wore a cap something like the undress-cap of the French Imperial Guards, but with a peak, and it was either black with red facings, or red with black facings.

Afterwards, when there was no cloth left in the country, this was exchanged for a black leather kepi, a very good contrivance. The cavalry and artillery wore a tall square black leather morion with a peak, the cavalry having a fleur-de-lis, and the artillery a tricoloured target painted on it.

The regiment of the escort which was armed with the Turner's rifles was called 'áčă-carayá,' or monkey-heads, as they wore a leathern helmet faced with brass, on the top edge of which was sewn a black monkey's tail. A long black horse-tail hung down behind, from the helmet to the waist. These men wore a scarlet tunic, white trousers, and, when on duty, dragoon boots. The 'Dragoons of the Escort' wore tall square morions, like the other cavalry; but they had a broad band of shining brass round the top, whence they were called 'áčă-verá,' or shining heads. A Paraguayan soldier carries in his hat his comb, paper-money, cigars, matches, needle and thread, buttons, chewing tobacco, and handkerchief.

The officers' and the sailors' uniforms were very similar to the French; but for undress they wore a black camiseta with scarlet facings, which, when cloth became scarce, was replaced by the camiseta of the soldiers, who had to go without one. At the last they had not even this, and the only distinction of an officer was his kepi and sword, which he *always* wore.

The Paraguayans were the most respectful and obedient men imaginable. From the soldier to the General, everyone squared up, with his cap in his hand, to his superior officer, who never returned the salute.

Anyone in military costume, in Paraguay, was the superior officer of any civilian, and all judges, &c. had to take off their hats to any ensign. Lopez was very jealous of any affront to his officers, and during his father's reign, a young lady was invited to no public balls

for two years, by his order, for having refused to dance with an officer.

A Paraguayan *never* complained of an injustice, and was perfectly contented with whatever his superior determined. If he was flogged, he consoled himself by saying, 'If my father did not flog me, who would?' Everyone called his superior officer 'his father,' and his subordinate 'his son.' Lopez was called 'taitá guasú,' or big father; also 'mita morotí,' white child; and 'caraĩ,' or 'caraĩ guasú,' the gentleman, or the big gentleman.

A corporal was always obliged to have his cane in his hand when on duty. He was the executioner of 'sticks,' and could give any soldier three, on his own responsibility. A sergeant was allowed to order a soldier to receive twelve sticks (*i. e.*, twelve blows with a stick), and an officer almost as many as he liked.

For very grave offences, and also for *any* offence committed in the *vanguard*, a commanding-officer could not punish the culprit, but had to put him in the stocks and report his offence to Lopez, who passed sentence. If it was an officer, he had his sword taken from him, and was kept under arrest till Lopez disposed of him. The 'stocks,' on a campaign, consisted of a lasso, fastened at one end to a stake in the ground; then tied round the ankles of the offender, who was out of reach of the stakes; and again fastened to another stake on the other side of him, and drawn tight.

As in the French army, all officers were promoted from the ranks. Young men of good family, who were enlisted, had to take off their shoes and go barefooted, as none of the Paraguayan soldiers were allowed to wear shoes.

At first the punishments were continued according to the Spanish ordinances, but latterly they were quite arbitrary. One of the articles of the ordinances condemns

to death anyone who shall approve anything appertaining to the enemy.

The Paraguayan rations were a bullock to eighty men per diem, or, if meat was scarce, as many as two hundred had to share it. This, however, was rare. They had a pound of 'yerba' (Paraguayan tea) per month, and a little tobacco, salt, and maize (when there was any) to parch, or to make soup with. During the war, salt was very scarce, and the want of it was felt more than the lack of anything else, costing Paraguay thousands of lives; thousands died also from want of vegetable food, upon which most of them had lived exclusively, till they were sent to the army, when they had *nothing* but bad, tired, black beef. The rank and file received one ration, officers two, field-officers or 'chiefs' four, and generals eight.

The Brazilians had, at this time, a fleet of twenty gun-boats, which could navigate the river, mounting, on an average, eight guns each. Their army was about 25,000 strong, and they were concentrating it in the Banda Oriental. Flores had declared his intention of making a crusade against Lopez, and the population of the Banda Oriental was to 'rise as one man.' However, he only scraped three battalions together. He had no artillery or steamers. Buenos Ayres had hardly any army at all, and her navy consisted of two quite rotten old passenger-steamers, which were hardly fit to move from their anchorage. One of them was the old ex-Royal Mail steamer 'Camilla.'

The Allies had, therefore, all their preparations to make, before they could take the field.

CHAPTER VI.

THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN IN CORRIENTES—GENERAL URQUIZA.

ON Good Friday, April 14, 1865, the day after the capture of the two Argentine steamers by the Paraguayans, General Robles, with 3,000 men, disembarked at the city of Corrientes, from five Paraguayan steamers. He formed his men on the beach, and waited there for some one to come from the city, to whom he might tell what he had to say, in order to quiet the fears of the inhabitants. At last some ventured near him, and he told them that the Paraguayans were come as brothers, to free the Correntinos from the despotism of Buenos Ayres, and that they and their city would be respected. On the same day, about eight hundred Paraguayan cavalry marched into the city. These had come overland, having crossed the Paraná at Paso la Patria, which was the route by which the greater part of the correspondence was kept up between Paraguay and its army in Corrientes.

Robles left a garrison in Corrientes, and having received reinforcements, which arrived daily by steamers, he marched slowly towards the south, along the side of the river. From a short distance below the city of Corrientes, the cliffs on that side are fifty feet high, and continue so some way down; so that, if the Brazilian fleet had shown itself suddenly, it could have done little damage to the Paraguayan army.

Three Paraguayan steamers were anchored at and near Corrientes, with steam constantly up, on the look-out for the Brazilian fleet.

The city of Corrientes was respected, but in the country and on the roads everything found was taken, whether cattle, horses, or other goods. But, generally, persons were not molested at the beginning of this campaign.

For a year previous to these events, Lopez had had in Corrientes a Paraguayan, named Miguel Rojas, as Government agent, ostensibly as a purchaser of cattle for Paraguay, quantities being yearly imported from Corrientes for the consumption of the army. Rojas had, however, other commissions as well, and had sounded most people in the city of Corrientes as to their political opinions; and by the time Robles arrived there, he knew pretty well who might be counted upon as not adverse to the Paraguayan invasion. There were many discontented people in Corrientes, and as the Correntinos and Paraguayans among themselves speak the same language (Guaraní), they considered each other as in some sort brothers. The Paraguayans and Correntinos admire each other's horsemanship; the former call the latter by the nickname of 'Curepĩ,' or pig-skins.

Lopez sent a number of chosen men from Asuncion to govern Corrientes, though he also placed there an ostensible Government, consisting of three Correntinos—Gauna, Silvero, and Caceres. This triumvirate, however, went for nothing. The party sent from Paraguay was headed by Don José Berges (Minister of Foreign Affairs), and he was assisted by Padre Bogado, Miguel Haedo, J. V. Urdapilleta, and various others. Lopez sent his orders to Berges, who passed them on to the triumvirate to execute. The garrison of Corrientes and the steamers there were under the orders of Berges. He did not abuse his power more than Lopez obliged him to do.

At first passports were given freely to people who wished to leave the city, and everything was done to try and make Lopez' Government appear a civilised and honourable one.

The Government archives of Corrientes were seized, and all valuable papers were sent to Asuncion—among them a map of the province, showing the different estates in it.

Large quantities of Paraguayan paper-money were introduced, the Correntinos being forced to take it in payment for their goods.

President Mitre, meanwhile, was making preparations for taking the field, and was raising an army as quickly as possible. Everyone was sending contributions towards the war. The press made little of Lopez and his men, counting upon an easy victory the moment they took the field. In reference to this a Monte-Videan paper remarked, that 'only a nation of sheep would become enthusiastic by having the impotency and degradation of its enemies pictured to it.'

A Paraguayan Legion was enrolled, and Colonels Iturburu and Decoud placed in command of it.

People were so maddened by the outrage on the steamers, that the news of the invasion of Corrientes had no effect upon them. On April 24, the first battalion of troops left Buenos Ayres for Corrientes.

Lagraña, the Governor of Corrientes, on the invasion of Robles had retreated a short way south, and made proclamations, calling the Correntinos to arms, and had decreed that every Argentine in the province, between 16 and 60 years of age, should immediately report himself for the army; he also declared that all persons obeying the orders of the self-installed Government of Corrientes would be considered as traitors, and condemned to death.

In Rosario great demonstrations had taken place.

Caminos, the Paraguayan consul, had been put into prison. A procession was formed to proceed to the Paraguayan consulate, where a ladder was put up, and the shield, with the Paraguayan arms on it, torn down and thrown on the ground. They then took it, together with a portrait of Lopez, to the pier-head, where they stuck them up and shot at them, after which they threw them into the river. They then wrote, signed, and published a 'solemn act,' giving an account of their proceedings.

Urquiza made great proclamations and professions, and he led Buenos Ayres really to believe that on the 26th he should march with 10,000 men to the relief of Corrientes. He decreed that all his men should join the army with their own horses, and he got the Government of the Confederation to pay for them—the decree which ordered this payment leaving the men, nevertheless, still owners of their horses.

The Argentine Congress assembled on May 1, and sanctioned a loan of 12,000,000 dollars, which was immediately negotiated. In his message to Congress, Mitre commends Urquiza for having got together more men than were required of him.

In a few days Urquiza left for Entre-Rios, taking leave of his friends in Buenos Ayres by a paragraph in a newspaper, as 'the necessity he was in of putting himself immediately at the head of his troops did not allow him the pleasure of doing so personally.' President Mitre accompanied him to the pier, and, shaking hands with him, said: 'Hurry yourself, General.' At that moment a messenger from Lopez, with despatches for Urquiza, arrived. These he at once handed over (unopened) to Mitre, who said to Urquiza's secretary, who had given them to him, that the good faith shown by General Urquiza did not permit him to open them. The secretary then opened

them, and gave them to Mitre, who ordered them to be published, and the messenger who had brought them to be put in prison. The despatches contained a letter from Berges, giving an account of the events in Corrientes, and hoping that Urquiza would not be indifferent. For some time Lopez had carried on communications with Urquiza by means of a direct messenger (the ex-Argentine consul).

When Urquiza arrived in Entre-Rios from Buenos Ayres, he began to assemble his army, and in less than a month he had 10,000 men. For these he received arms and clothing from Mitre, which he distributed among his troops, and marched towards Concordia, the rendezvous of the Allies, where Mitre already was. When he reached Bassualdo—a place on the frontiers of Entre-Rios, and on the road to Concordia—he halted his men, and went forward alone to see Mitre. While on the way, he was overtaken by a messenger, who brought tidings that almost the whole of his army had broken up. He returned immediately, and, finding it was true, gave the rest of it leave of absence for a month. He then wrote an account of the affair to President Mitre, promising to have 12,000 men under arms in a month. Mitre wrote back, approving what had been done, and Urquiza went to see Mitre at Concordia, on July 24. He perfectly satisfied Mitre, and made a formal promise, in a letter, of which the following is an extract:—

‘ I beg the Government of my country, and also your Excellency, and I beg the people of the Republic, for a few days’ patience, that I may then, with the Entre-Riano division, which I am ordered to raise, be enabled to occupy any post of danger which may be indicated to me; being certain that we shall not be the last in the field, and that we shall contribute equally with the best towards preserving untarnished our honour and the brilliancy of our arms.’

Urquiza then went back to Entre-Rios. At the end of October he collected a few thousand men again, and with some 2,000 of them marched to Concordia, which the allied armies had already left, where he was joined by more. He then marched towards Mitre's headquarters; but at Toledo, on the road, the greater part of his army again broke up, and he returned with the rest, and gave them all leave of absence again. When the Allies invaded Paraguay next year, he sent a few hundred men, who mutinied on board the steamers, and were ultimately disbanded. He also sent a few old guns, which he had formerly taken from Buenos Ayres.

He was not heard of again during this war, except as selling large quantities of cattle and horses to the Allies, and thus amassing immense wealth. His name was often used during the war by Lopez to enliven his troops, who were told that Urquiza was on the march to help them.

In his declaration of war, President Mitre said that the Argentine Government would not lay down its arms until it had overthrown the present Government of Paraguay.

The Brazilian fleet had been much censured for not having yet moved; but at last, on April 3, it left Buenos Ayres 'for Paraguay,' but it took just a year to reach the nearest point of Paraguay. There was a great deal of talk of what the fleet would do. The Paraguayans were to run the moment they saw this fleet, which would immediately blow up Humaitá. When they left Buenos Ayres, however, and felt that they were really going to the war, the officers were observed to be very quiet; and, by way of encouragement to them, bets were made, in their hearing, that none of them nor of their vessels would ever return. They managed to move so slowly, that it took them 42 days to go from Buenos Ayres to Corrientes, a distance of 600

miles. The fleet could never operate to its content; the river was always either too high or too low.

The Paraguayan steamers, meanwhile, had the run of the river, and they made use of it to take down troops, and to carry up the booty from the sacked towns and villages.

Humaitá had only ninety guns, mounted in seven batteries, and the Brazilian river-fleet had more. With very little danger of any of their boats being sunk, they might have anchored opposite the batteries and destroyed them; as it would have been easy for them, with grape and canister, to have swept the Paraguayans away from their guns, as the latter had no parapet higher than their knees, except in one battery of sixteen guns.

The Argentines now complained loudly of the inactivity of the fleet. On April 28, eight Brazilian war-steamers were at Goya, and the commander of that squadron (Gomensoro) on that date declared the Paraguayan ports blockaded, and had an interview with a delegate of the ex-Governor (Lagraña) of Corrientes, with the view of combining operations against the Paraguayans. Gomensoro said he believed his guns would carry right through the Paraguayan steamers, as they were only armed for war, while his own were built for it.

General Caceres was the commander of the Correntino forces, and now had 6,000 men. On May 2, General Paunero landed at Bella Vista with his forces, and the skirmishing with the Paraguayan vanguard began, the victory always being claimed by both sides. There were, however, no important engagements.

On May 3, the triumvirate sent a deputation to General Caceres, to beg him to avoid bloodshed by ordering all his troops to lay down their arms, and by accepting the offer of a free pardon. No answer was returned to this insolent message.

There were now 8,000 men under Caceres and Paunero, and towards the end of May they had 16,000.

General Robles, who was now encamped with about 25,000 men at Riachuelo, on a high cliff of the river about three leagues below Corrientes, marched southward on May 11, and, passing through the intermediate villages, reached Bella Vista on the 20th. Lieutenant-Colonel Aguiar commanded the vanguard, and had continual skirmishes with the enemy. When one of their companions was wounded, the Correntinos, on horseback, would stoop down, and, picking him up between two of them, gallop off with him. He marched as far as Goya, which place his vanguard entered on June 3.

Robles had left a garrison of 1,500 men and two small guns in the city of Corrientes, under the command of Major Martinez. On May 25, a squadron of eight Brazilian and two Argentine steamers of war came in sight of Corrientes, and the Brazilians took up positions to rake the streets of the city (which is built in squares), while the Argentines went inshore and landed their troops.

General Paunero, who commanded this expedition in person, had embarked 4,000 men on board the squadron, with the object of taking Corrientes, but only landed about 2,000 with two 6-pounder guns, under Colonels Rivas, Charlone, and Rosetti. A few of these troops were Brazilians. The two last-named commanders were Italians, and they, with their troops, were considered some of the best soldiers in the Argentine army. The fleet, meanwhile, bombarded the Paraguayans. They now came to hand-to-hand fighting, and the greatest gallantry was shown on both sides. Major Martinez could not have prevented the landing of the allies, as they were protected by the guns of the squadron; but when the fighting began, the Paraguayans displayed great courage, for which their enemies afterwards gave them due credit.

The landing took place just outside the town, to the north of it, and the Paraguayans retreated about 1,000 yards, to a stone bridge which led to the city. This they defended for a long time, being all the while exposed to the fire of the fleet, as well as to that of the infantry. The Brazilians here first showed a peculiarity in their tactics, which consists in firing whenever they have any guns to fire with, no matter whether they kill friend or foe, or both together—which last was usually the case—or whether they see or do not see what they are firing at.

The bridge was riddled with grape from the fleet, and both sides having left many men on the spot, the Paraguayans retreated about a mile outside the city. Berges and the triumvirate were already gone, and the victors, having embarked their wounded, took on board the ships all persons who wished to leave the city. Next morning they embarked, and went down the river again to join the main army. The triumvirate and Berges immediately reinstated themselves in the Government.

The loss of the Paraguayans in killed and wounded was about 400, and that of the Allies about 350. Char-lone was badly wounded in the head, by a sword-cut from a Paraguayan officer. The dead were buried under the bridge where the fight had taken place.

The river being open to the enemy, General Robles did wrong to leave so small a garrison in Corrientes (which had no fortifications of any kind), with orders to fight instead of to retreat before a superior force, as he himself was miles away with the army, and no reinforcements could arrive in time. It was, however, done by the orders of Lopez.

The Allies said that they heard among the Paraguayans a cry of, 'Whoever dies here will come to life again in Asuncion,' and they say that this doctrine was preached

by the priests in Paraguay. Such was not the case, as the Paraguayans would never have believed it, though the priests would certainly not have hesitated to teach it.

In the Paraguayan account of the affair, the Argentines were stated to have committed robberies and rapes in the city. This does not, however, appear to be true.

The Argentine Government granted a medal to all who had been engaged in the attack.

The Brazilian squadron of nine war-steamers now anchored opposite Corrientes, in line of battle, to carry into effect the blockade which they had declared.

Preparations were still actively carried on in Paraguay. Lopez himself was getting ready to take the field, and rumours were circulated that he was going to march to Monte Video and Buenos Ayres. General Diaz (then a lieutenant of police) was promoted to a captaincy, and commissioned to drill and command the 40th Battalion, which was composed entirely of people from Asuncion. This battalion was 1,050 strong, and performed its evolutions very creditably. This 40th Battalion saw more fighting during the war than any other; it was five times almost completely annihilated, and as many times reorganised, as far as possible, with Asuncion people. General (then Lieutenant-Colonel) Bruguez had got the horse-artillery into very good trim, and Lopez reviewed all the troops in Asuncion, one day in May—some 15,000 men. They looked very well in their scarlet camisetas, and went creditably through their evolutions. On the same day a torpedo was tried, in his presence, by a Yankee, Mr. Krüger, who blew up a raft of palm-trees high into the air, himself being about six yards only from the point of explosion.

It was currently stated in Paraguay that Bolivia was going to ally itself with Paraguay, and send an army to the assistance of the latter.

On April 8, 1865, Lopez, by a long decree, instituted the 'National Order of Merit,' consisting of five different degrees—namely, grand cross, grand officer, commander, officer, and knight. The decoration was a five-pointed star, with arrows converging between the points, and a medallion in the centre, with, on the obverse, the words 'Honoris Causa,' and on the reverse 'Præmium Meriti.' It was to be suspended at the left breast by a purple ribbon, each edge of which displayed a very narrow tricolour.

H.B.M.'s gunboat 'Doterel' was at Corrientes at the time of the fight on May 25, and next day was continuing her voyage to Asuncion, when she met the 'Pirabebé,' a steam yacht, one of the Paraguayan flotilla, which carried one gun. The 'Pirabebé,' thinking she was a Brazilian, fired at the 'Doterel,' but did not hit her. The commander of the yacht afterwards apologised, saying he did not distinguish the flag. The 'Doterel' arrived at Asuncion about June 1, having on board an English secretary of legation. What mission she had at Asuncion was not generally known to the English there. It appears, however, that she was sent to take away any British subjects who wished to go.

CHAPTER VII.

THE BATTLE OF THE RIACHUELO—LOPEZ LEAVES ASUNCION FOR THE SEAT OF WAR—IMPRISONMENT OF GENERAL ROBLES, AND CONTINUATION OF THE CAMPAIGN OF CORRIENTES.

ON June 2, 1865, Lopez published the following proclamation, previous to leaving Asuncion to join the army:—

‘The Marshal, President of the Republic of Paraguay, and General-in-Chief of her Armies:

‘TO THE NATION.

‘Citizens! The course of the war in which our Fatherland is engaged against the triple alliance of Brazil, the Argentine Confederation, and the Banda Oriental, no longer allows me to continue the self-sacrifice of absenting myself from the seat of war and from my companions in arms, who are in campaign, as the public order and the unanimous enthusiasm of the nation permit me to go where the soldier’s duty calls me.

‘I feel the necessity of personally participating in the fatigues of the brave and loyal defenders of our Fatherland, and I leave the public administration duly provided for, in order that it may be properly attended to.

‘On separating myself momentarily from the bosom of the Fatherland, I carry with me the sweet satisfaction that the general administration of the State will still be carried on with all the loyalty, devotion, and patriotism

which the public officers always show in carrying out their duty.

‘I am also assisted by the conviction that all the citizens will contribute indefatigably, in their respective spheres, towards the conclusion of the struggle in which we are engaged; and to this end it is not necessary that we should all of us take up arms, nor all of us join the ranks, but only that all of us should co-operate for the good of the common cause.

‘I am led to entertain this confidence by the uniform pronunciamiento, with which the nation arises to demand the vindication of its outraged honour, the guarantee of its threatened existence, and the stability of its wounded rights.

‘Every citizen in his heart believes in the holiness of the cause, which has forced us to leave our peaceful and laborious life, and the God of armies will watch over our fate!

‘FRANCISCO S. LOPEZ.’

‘Asuncion, June 2, 1865.

Lopez embarked on board the ‘Tacuari’ on June 8, at sunset, four other steamers loaded with troops being ready at the same time. All the people of Asuncion were, of course, at the riverside, waiting the whole afternoon to see him embark. As he went off in the boat, H.B.M.S. ‘Doterel’ manned her yards, and the Paraguayan steamers formed their men along the bulwarks of their vessels. There was, however, no cheering. At midnight he started, and arrived at Humaitá next evening.

Immediately on his arrival at Humaitá, Lopez began to prepare his steamers for a combat. The following steamers were selected for action, the remainder being either in Matto-Grosso, or useless for the purpose:—

		TONS.	CAPT.
Tacuari (flagship)	. . . 6 Guns. Paddle	421	Cabral.
Paraguari	. . . 4 " "	627	
Ygurei	. . . 5 " "	548	Alonzo.
Ypora	. . . 4 " "	205	Ortiz.
Marquez de Olinda	. . . 4 " "	about 300	Robles.
Jejuí	. . . 2 " "	120	
Salto Oriental	. . . 4 Screw,	about 250	Alcaraz.
Pirabebé	. . . 1 " "	<u>120</u>	Pereira.
		30	
Yberá	. . . 4 " "	300	Gill.

The last-named is put separately, as the key of her screw came out while she was on the road, and she was obliged to stop at Tres-Bocas. There were also six flat-bottomed boats, each carrying one 8-inch gun. These gunboats had no deck, and were just large enough to float the gun and its garrison. They stood about a foot out of the water, and were double-prowed, and built of two layers of diagonal two-inch planking. They were only moved by towing. They were called 'Chatas.'

The whole of the 10th of June was occupied in loading ammunition on the steamers, and in consultations on the operations to be carried out.

Five hundred picked men of the 6th Battalion were told off, and marched down to the steamers: and before they embarked, Lopez went, on horseback, and addressed them. They were all in a great state of enthusiasm, and promised to bring back the Brazilian fleet. Lopez told them to bring prisoners, and they answered, 'What do we want prisoners for? We will kill them all!' 'No,' said Lopez, 'bring some prisoners.' Lopez was very festive, and the men were delighted.

Captain Mesa was commander of the expedition, and Captain Cabral was his second. The engineers of the steamers were all Englishmen, except one or two of the second engineers, who were Paraguayans. Every steamer

had enough men to cover both sides of the ship, throughout its length. Each vessel had also a Paraguayan surgeon on board.

These steamers were all (excepting the 'Tacuari') merchant-vessels, and had their boilers far above the water-line, and consequently exposed to the enemy's shot.

By an oversight, none of them were provided with grappling-irons, and thus probably they failed to take the Brazilian squadron.

The orders which the commanders received were—to be down on the Brazilians by break of day, steaming just past them; and then, turning short round, every Paraguayan steamer was to go alongside a Brazilian, and having discharged her broadside, as well as that of the gunboat, which some of them were to tow, they were to board and take the Brazilian steamers.

The river-steamers started that night, leaving the 'Yberá' on the road. Gill, her commander (afterwards one of the commanders of Humaitá) was so vexed at not being able to go, that he absolutely cried. Instead of being alongside the Brazilians by daybreak, it was half-past eight o'clock before the Paraguayan steamers came in sight of them.

The River Paraná, at Corrientes, is about two-and-a-half miles wide, and at Riachuelo nine miles; below Corrientes it is divided into two branches by an island—the one near the Correntino shore being the channel, and about a mile and a half wide. At this place the channel is narrow, but above it there is plenty of room for steamers to manœuvre.

At the Riachuelo, on the beach, Bruguez had placed about twenty-two field-guns (without any parapets), from 4-pounders to 18-pounders, which he had brought across the Paraná, arriving just in time.

The Brazilian squadron was anchored, in line of battle,

opposite and a little below the city of Corrientes, on the Chaco side of the river, and about a mile and a half from the Correntino coast. It consisted of the following steamers:—

Flagship Amazonas	Paddle	6 guns
Jequitinhonha, 9	Screw	8 "
Belmonte	"	8 "
Paranahyba, 12	"	6 "
Ipiranga	"	7 "
Mearim	"	8 "
Iguatemi	"	5 "
Araguary	"	3 "
Biberibé	"	8 "
		59

All of these were fine war-steamers, and had infantry on board, besides their crews.

The Paraguayan vessels steamed down past the Brazilian squadron, at a distance of about a mile from it, (giving the superior artillery of the Brazilians a great advantage), and went down to Riachuelo, where they turned round. This foolish manœuvre gave the Brazilians time to clear for action, to get up their anchors, and be all on the move, the Paraguayans thus losing the advantage of getting alongside them before they could get under way, in which case it would have been a hand-to-hand fight, much to the advantage of the latter.

In passing the Brazilian squadron, both sides fired as fast as they could, and one of the Paraguayan steamers had her boiler shot through, and was consequently *hors de combat*. This was the 'Jejui,' and she anchored at Riachuelo, while the other seven went up to meet the Brazilians, who were already going down towards them, and attacked them in the middle of their line.

The 'Jequitinhonha' went rather far down, and, being peppered by Bruguez' little guns, ran on to a bank opposite, where she stuck fast, firing all day long till the

afternoon, when she was abandoned, after an effort had been made with two steamers to tow her off.

The 'Tacuari,' 'Marquez,' and 'Salto' attacked the 'Paranahyba' at once, but only the 'Tacuari' got fairly alongside, and only the men on her paddlebox could get on board the 'Paranahyba,' as the rest of the vessel was, of course, distant from her. Two men jumped on board, but had to jump back again, as the vessels were not grappled, and did not keep together. The 'Salto,' a screw vessel, next got alongside, and, as the steamers passed each other, thirty Paraguayans jumped on to the 'Paranahyba.' These cut right and left, and of the Brazilians, many, panic-struck, jumped into the water, and most of them ran down below. The Paraguayans were masters of the 'Paranahyba' from the stern to the mainmast. They hauled down the Brazilian flag, and steered the ship. At the same moment, the 'Amazonas' and another came up, and, firing grape on the 'Paranahyba,' killed three-fourths of the Paraguayans on board. The Brazilian crew, seeing how few were left, charged them, killing three or four, and the rest jumped into the water and swam ashore. Two companies of the 9th Brazilian Battalion were on board, and their captain (Ferreira) was killed.

The Brazilian official report states that there were twenty-eight wounded and twenty missing of the crew of the 'Paranahyba,' the latter being supposed to have fallen overboard. In this battle, whenever a Paraguayan steamer got alongside a Brazilian one, numbers of the crew of the latter jumped into the water—some of them being drowned, and some swimming ashore. The latter were all killed as they landed.

The 'Amazonas' next managed to run down the 'Paraguari,' striking her in the middle, and running her on to a bank, from whence she still kept up her fire. The

captain of the 'Paranahyba,' in his official report, also claims to have run her down.

The cannonade continued heavily all the time, as likewise the musketry. The 'Belmonte' had several holes knocked in her under her water-line, and was filling, so that she had to be run ashore to prevent her from going to the bottom. By the time she was aground she was full of water, nearly to the deck, and all her ammunition and provisions were lost. The 'Jejuí' was fired at where she lay at anchor, and was sunk. The 'Marquez de Olinda' got her boilers shot through, and drifted down the stream, having many of her crew scalded to death, and nearly all of them killed or wounded. She struck on a bank and remained there. Captain Mesa was mortally wounded by a rifle-bullet from the tops of one of the Brazilian steamers, and the command devolved upon Captain Cabral.

The 'Tacuari' had a narrow escape, a 68-pounder shot ripping up the clothing of her boiler, without, however, damaging it. The 'Ygurei' got a 68-pounder shot into one of her boilers, but worked on with the other, being scarcely able to move. The 'Salto' also had her boiler knocked to pieces, and almost all the crew killed and wounded. She drifted on to a bank near the 'Marquez.'

The four remaining Paraguayan steamers now retreated, and the Brazilians did not try to stop them. The 'Ygurei' could only go very slowly, and the 'Tacuari' kept behind her to protect her. She was followed for a few miles by the 'Amazonas,' at a long distance, the 'Tacuari' stopping now and then to let the 'Ygurei' get on ahead, the 'Amazonas' stopping also. Two of the small gunboats were sunk, and the other four took refuge in the Riachuelo.

By this time there were only a dozen men left on the

‘Paraguari’—among them Mr. Gibson, the engineer; and a Brazilian steamer came alongside, ordering him, as the only officer remaining on board, to haul down the flag, or they would fire on them. He did so, and they said they would soon send a boat for them. Before they sent, however, the remainder of the crew swam ashore to the Chaco, to save themselves from being made prisoners. Part of the crews of the other destroyed steamers also went to the Chaco. The Brazilians sent an armed boat to take off some of these, but the Paraguayans killed her crew, and seized the boat.

The Brazilian steamers were very much damaged. The ‘Paranahyba’ had thirteen holes through her, at or near her water-line.

On the 13th the Brazilian squadron went down the river, running the field-batteries at Riachuelo, for which it had great respect. The ‘Jequitinhonha’ was still in front of them, and had not been revisited; everything was left on board, excepting one Whitworth gun, which they had thrown into the water on abandoning her. The Brazilian squadron anchored a little above Bella Vista.

On the following day, H.B.M.S. ‘Doterel’ passed down the river, and took on board sixteen men belonging to the ‘Marquez de Olinda,’ who were found alone. Her commander (Robles) had been taken on board the ‘Amazonas,’ and had his arm amputated; but he tore off the bandage and died, saying that he preferred death to being taken prisoner. The commander of the ‘Salto Oriental’ (Alcaraz) was also taken, but, being badly wounded, he soon died. The ‘Salto’ and the ‘Marquez de Olinda’ disappeared in a few days under the water.

The Brazilians set fire to the ‘Paraguari,’ but as she was an iron vessel, only the interior work was burned, and after a few days she was towed up to Asuncion. Her plates and machinery proved very valuable to Para-

guay, being cut up and used for iron, of which, at the latter end of the war, there was a great scarcity in Paraguay.

When the Brazilians left the river free, the Paraguayans, who were in the Chaco, crossed over, having been, most of them, three-and-a-half days without food.

In this battle the Brazilians lost about 300 (killed, wounded, and missing), and the Paraguayans about 200. Two of the principal disadvantages with which the Paraguayans had to contend were, that the Brazilian vessels were so much higher than their own that they could hardly reach to board them. They also all had boarding-nets up. The Brazilian vessels, being almost all screws, slipped away very easily from the Paraguayans, who had no grappling-irons.

On the day of the battle, Berges sent several messengers from Corrientes to give news of it, but he knew really nothing of what was going on. One of the messengers brought the news that two of the Brazilian ships were taken.

The cannonading was distinctly heard at Humaitá. The following morning, before daylight, news was brought by the river-guards that some steamers were coming, but that they did not know whether they were Paraguayan or Brazilian. Lopez himself did not know, and all the batteries were manned. At sunrise a steamer came in sight, towing another, which at first was thought to be a Brazilian, but turned out to be the 'Yberá,' and shortly afterwards all the remaining steamers arrived.

The 'Ypora' looked as if she had suffered most, having had her foremast shot away near the deck, and all her fore-bulwarks being gone, besides having her deck-house riddled with shot. She had, however, in reality suffered the least of any. All the steamers had their chimneys riddled with shot, and some holes in their hulls; but the

only serious damage done to any of them was the hole in the boiler of the 'Ygurei,' which, however, was repaired in three or four days. The 68-pounder shot had stopped in the boiler, and was lying on the tubes.

Every gun of the Paraguayan squadron was dismantled, most of them by the incessant firing, the remainder from having been hit. The steamers which came back had not suffered much personal loss, the greatest on any one being twenty-eight killed and wounded. The Brazilians had some 150-pounder and 120-pounder Whitworth guns, but none of the steamers which returned had been hit by those guns, and we only knew they had them from the fact that some of the balls, which had gone five or six miles inland, were sent to Humaitá by Berges.

The Paraguayans displayed great bravery in this battle, fighting against immeasurably superior ships and guns. The Brazilians themselves confess it was 'touch and go.' They would probably have taken the squadron had they immediately gone alongside instead of running down past it.

The Brazilians celebrated this battle as a great victory, and the Emperor conferred a cross on Barroso, the commander, and made him Baron das Amazonas. In any other country he would have been tried by court-martial, not only for not attempting to stop the retreating Paraguayan steamers, but also for his rumoured cowardice on board his own vessel, where he is said to have completely lost his head, and the Correntino pilot to have been for the time the real commander of the fleet.

Tamandaré, who for months had been 'going,' did not manage to get to the fleet, but was nevertheless complimented for the 'victory.' He was flirting in Buenos Ayres.

On one occasion, when a Paraguayan steamer had run alongside and past a Brazilian one, a Paraguayan

jumped on board the latter, and split an officer's head through to the neck with his cutlass, when, finding himself alone, he jumped through the opposite porthole and escaped.

Captain Mesa was landed at Humaitá, and well cared for; but Lopez would not see him, and if he had not died of his wounds, would probably have had him shot.

A sailor was shot for cowardice, the evening the steamers returned to Humaitá, having gone into the hold during action. Lopez gave some foreigners to understand that he was very vexed it had been reported to him, but that, such being the case, he had no other course to pursue.

Two or three days after the battle, the people who had taken refuge in the Chaco arrived at Humaitá, having had to walk all the way (forty miles), excepting just the passage of the Paraná. Among them came Messrs. Gibson, Bagster, Spivey, and another—English engineers, the last two very badly scalded. These died in a few days, and Lopez had an English cemetery made at Humaitá, with a decent wall round it, and an ornamental gate.

Mr. Gibson was put into prison for many days. Mr. Watts, chief engineer of the 'Tacuari,' was made Knight of the Order of Merit. He was three years afterwards one of the victims of Lopez' latter unaccountable fit of blood-thirstiness.

The news of this battle was not received in Buenos Ayres for ten days, although it was only a four days' voyage, and salvos, crackers, and rockets testified to the great victory.

Lopez decreed a medal to the 2nd Regiment of Horse Artillery, which was the one at Riachuelo, with the inscriptions, 'The Marshal President to the 2nd Regiment of Horse Artillery,' and 'Riachuelo, June 11 and 13, 1865.' These medals were designed and struck in the country.

Steamers were sent to try and recover the stranded

vessels, but only the 'Paraguari' could be taken back. From the 'Jequitinhonha' were taken two 68-pounders, and four beautiful 32-pounder iron guns, also two brass 5-inch howitzers. A large spare brass screw was also taken and sent to the foundry. Numbers of books, swords, and papers, clothing, watches, and instruments, were brought from the 'Jequitinhonha,' and her mainyard was taken to Humaitá, and made the centre column of a dancing rotunda.

In less than two months Bruguez, having received reinforcements (and with them two 32-pounders), made a sudden forced march, and passed below the Brazilian fleet, to Bella Vista, where he established his batteries on the cliff of the river, there fifty feet high. When the Brazilians, who had been reinforced by two more steamers, knew he was there, they ran the gauntlet, and kept their infantry all on deck and in the tops, to fire on the Paraguayans; but, being completely commanded by the latter from the high cliff, they did them no damage, but lost a terrible number of men themselves, as the Paraguayans had three battalions of infantry under Major (afterwards General) Aquino, and swept the decks with their artillery. They anchored about six miles further down the river, and the same night Bruguez, making another rapid march, by next morning again placed his batteries below them at Cuevas. The Brazilians reconnoitred, and again found flying batteries below them; they again ran the gauntlet, but this time not a soul was seen on deck. They all went into the hold, excepting the crew of the Buenos-Ayrean steamer 'Guardia Nacional' (ex R.M.S. 'Camilia'), which behaved gallantly, returning the fire all the time. This last running of the batteries took place on August 12.

The Brazilian fleet was not again seen or heard of for eight months, when it went up the Paraná in order to pass

the allied army into Paraguay, and it was supposed to be incessantly trying to keep ahead of horrible flying batteries ever close on its heels.

General Robles was at Goya with the army, where he had arrived on June 3; and he began to retreat by forced marches on the day of the Battle of Riachuelo, probably not knowing what the cannonading was about, as Lopez, at the beginning of the war, never let his right hand know what his left was doing, though in the latter part of the contest he used to advise the whole of the army when he was going to make an attack anywhere, in order to prevent confusion.

Robles encamped near Empedrado, twelve leagues below Corrientes. On his advance he had been barely molested by the skirmishers of the enemy, under General Caceres; the main body of the enemy, under General Paunero, being always sixteen or twenty leagues to the south of him.

Robles remained at Empedrado, doing nothing, till July 23, on which day General Barrios, Minister of War, arrived at his camp, which was a mile from the riverside. Robles came out of his tent to meet and shake hands with Barrios, who, however, pushed him back, and, delivering a letter from Lopez, told him to read it. After reading it, Robles took off his sword and presented it to Barrios, who sent him under guard on board the 'Ygurei,' where he was confined to a state-room with a sentry at the door, and taken to Humaitá, together with his papers, which Barrios had sealed up and sent to Lopez. In Humaitá he was imprisoned in a room, no one being allowed to communicate with him.

A short time before this, Resquin had been recalled from Matto-Grosso, and promoted to be brigadier-general, and was immediately despatched to Corrientes as second to Robles. He had no doubt also a commission to see what

Robles was doing, and Colonel Alén, Robles' Chief of the Staff, was given him by Lopez to be a spy upon his actions.

It was circulated in the Paraguayan army that Robles had agreed to sell the army to the enemy, and that it was to be done in the following manner:—July 24 being Lopez' birthday, of course dances were given everywhere, and Robles was on that evening to send all his men to the dances without their arms. The enemy was then quietly to walk in, and take the whole of them prisoners.

Robles was left for some months in his room at Humaitá, and was almost forgotten. Barrios stopped a short time with the army, and then left Resquin in command. He began again to advance, and marched as far as Bella Vista, in the neighbourhood of which place the army continued for about a month, executing various marches and countermarches with no apparent motive. It was not molested by the enemy, General Paunero having marched to the east at the end of July, and General Caceres contenting himself with a few skirmishes, which were always well fought on both sides.

In the former march to the south the towns had been respected to a certain degree, but this time all were completely sacked. The triumvirate decreed all woollen and cotton goods to be contraband of war, and thus furnished the Paraguayan steamers with an excuse for taking to Humaitá everything of the kind they found. Immense stores of wines, liquors, and beer were also taken to the Humaitá government stores. Part of these are probably not yet consumed. Many presents of articles robbed were sent to Lopez, and a new piano, found in Mr. Delfino's house, was sent as a present to Mrs. Lynch. People were also much illused, and many were murdered without any cause.

The people of Goya, hearing what was taking place,

and expecting every day that the Paraguayans would arrive, deserted the town, and went to live on islands in the river, below the Brazilian fleet, which was at Goya, and which allowed the Paraguayans to hold the river above that place, and carry away the spoil in their steamers. They would certainly again have absconded had the Paraguayans gone further south.

Lopez had thrown the city of Corrientes into a panic by sending to Humaitá, in the middle of July, some six or eight ladies from that place, being the families of some distinguished Argentine officers, under the pretext that they were in correspondence with the enemy. These poor ladies were sent somewhere into the interior of Paraguay, and have not since been heard of. Some of them were forced to leave their children in Corrientes.

On July 24 a ball was given in the city of Corrientes, at which all the ladies were obliged to assist, and they made a very good show of pretty faces and dresses.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RIVER URUGUAY—THE ALLIES TAKE THE FIELD—THE EVACUATION OF CORRIENTES BY THE PARAGUAYAN ARMY.

AT the same time that General Robles invaded Corrientes, a column of 12,000 men and six guns marched across the 'Missions of Corrientes' to the Uruguay, with the object of invading Rio Grande. This column—which crossed the Paraná at Encarnacion, called also Itapúa—was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Lacu Estigarribia. He took canoes with him in carts, for crossing the River Uruguay.

The two armies of Robles and Estigarribia were separated by the immense and impassable morass called 'Yberá'—literally, 'shining lake.' This spreads over half the province of Corrientes, and stretches from the banks of the Paraná to near the south of the province. The two armies could not communicate. They were two hundred miles apart, as the crow flies. Estigarribia was a like distance from Encarnacion, the nearest point to him of Paraguay, and he was therefore totally isolated, and without any base of operations whatever. He kept up communications with Paraguay, at first, by means of messengers on horseback, who, through the negligence of the enemy, were enabled to carry the correspondence.

This isolation of Estigarribia was a fatal and unpardonable error, and Lopez paid for it by the loss of every man

of that army. It was a very daring thing to put the River Paraná between the army and Paraguay, without having any fortifications or ships of war to protect its return. The Allies, however, did not profit by the opportunity thus afforded to them.

By the time Estigarribia reached the frontiers of the province of Rio Grande, the Brazilians had, in different parts of it, 30,000 men, under the command of General Canavarro and the Baron de Yagui. These, however, took no notice of Estigarribia, and allowed him to sack their towns, illtreat their women, and destroy everything before him, without doing more than sending a few skirmishers to watch him. If they left the honour, lives, and property of their countrymen and countrywomen entirely out of the question, and looked at it in a purely military point of view, they did right, as they would have had much more trouble in fighting him than they had afterwards in besieging and starving him out, though they had very superior forces. Strange to say, the Allies knew nothing of this invasion by Estigarribia, till they got copies of the *Semanario* (Paraguayan newspaper), in which it was reported.

The Allies were now beginning to get their forces together. Concordia, on the Uruguay, was made the rendezvous, and at the beginning of June some thousands of Brazilians arrived and encamped there. General Mitre, Commander-in-Chief of the allied forces, left the Government of the Argentine Confederation in the hands of Don Marcos Paz, Vice-President, and started for Concordia on June 17. A few days afterwards, General Flores arrived there with 6,000 men, half of them Brazilians. The Argentine troops were also assembling there gradually. General Osorio, commander of the Brazilians, was already there, and the Brazilian troops were arriving continually.

On July 18, General Flores, who was named 'General-

in-Chief of the Vanguard,' marched up the right bank of the Uruguay to meet the Paraguayans, who were advancing southward.

Colonel Estigarribia and his army advanced, with little opposition, as far as opposite San Borja, having a vanguard of 2,500 men under Major Duarte. Here he crossed the Uruguay, leaving Duarte on the right bank, and took San Borja (June 10), where some show of resistance was made by Colonel Payba with 2,000 men. General Canavarro, with 4,000 men, kept himself at a prudent distance, and, on the taking of San Borja, retreated to Uruguayana, which place he then began to fortify.

General Canavarro was afterwards tried by court-martial, for allowing Estigarribia to cross the river almost unmolested; as, with the small means at the disposal of the latter, it was stated that 500 men would have been quite sufficient to have prevented the passage of the river.

Estigarribia and Duarte kept up their communications by means of canoes, of which they took a considerable number on the Uruguay, besides those that they had brought from Paraguay. They marched down the river, opposite and in sight of each other, delaying a great deal on the road, and receiving one reinforcement of 400 men from Paraguay. On August 6, Estigarribia entered Uruguayana, which General Canavarro (who had now 8,000 men, including Colonel Payba's) had fortified, but which he had thought prudent to evacuate, leaving two field-guns, and stores of victuals, for Estigarribia, who settled down there with 8,000 men. Duarte encamped opposite, with 2,500, at a place called Yatai.* These 10,500 men were all that remained of the total force of 12,400, the remainder having gone back sick or died on the road, some few having been killed in the skirmishes.

* *Yatai*, the name of a palm with edible fruit.

Duarte's scouts now brought him news of the approach of Flores with a large force, and he sent to Estigarribia, to ask for reinforcements. The reply was, that if he was afraid, some one else should be sent to command in his stead. Duarte also wrote to General Robles, telling him of his condition. He also mentions in this letter that he had orders from Lopez to kill all the prisoners he took. The letter was captured on the road by General Paunero, who was marching to incorporate his force with that of General Flores.

On August 17, 1865, General Flores came up to Yatai, having a force of 13,000 men, and the whole of the Oriental artillery, which consisted of four smoothbore 6-pounders and four rifled 9-pounders. He at once sent a summons to Duarte to surrender, which Duarte refused to do, saying that he had no orders to that effect from the Supreme Government. Duarte posted his line behind some houses, his rear being secured by the River Uruguay, and awaited the assault. This was very shortly begun by attacking columns, which received a terrible fire from Duarte's infantry, and were then charged by his cavalry, which cut down many men. The superiority of numbers, however, soon told, and Duarte's line was broken, and thrown into complete disorder. The Paraguayans, however, kept up a very harassing fire from groups and from individuals, until they were absolutely cut down, for they would accept no quarter. Not a man escaped. Between two and three hundred prisoners were taken, including Major Duarte.

✓ Officers of the allied army wrote from the field of battle that the carnage had been something frightful, as no human power could make the Paraguayans surrender, and that even single individuals would rather fight on, with certain death before them. The loss of the Allies was heavy, amounting to about 2,500 killed and wounded.

The few Paraguayans who were taken prisoners were draughted into the armies of the Allies, and had clothing given them, the flimsy stuffs they had started with from Paraguay being completely worn-out, and the men nearly naked. Major Duarte was sent to Buenos Ayres, and had every comfort provided for him by the Government. The gracefulness of this conduct was greatly marred by some of the journals there harping upon the subject every day, and also upon the clothing which had been given to the prisoners. They were probably astonished at the moderation of the Allies in having left any prisoners alive, such an event being almost unknown in the annals of South-American warfare—the custom being to cut prisoners' throats after a battle. ✓

The right bank of the Uruguay was now completely freed from the invaders, and the Allies turned their thoughts towards Estigarribia at Uruguayana. He had witnessed the total defeat of Duarte, and it was supposed that he would soon surrender. However, he lost no time in strengthening the fortifications which General Canavarro had commenced, and he made an abatis round the place.

On August 25, General Mitre marched from Concordia with the rest of the allied army, and crossed over to Uruguayana. Admiral Tamandaré had four steam-gun-boats there, which he had been able to pass over the rapids by means of a great rise in the river.

Estigarribia actually began to retreat, which would have saved him; but, probably thinking of what Lopez would do to him if he acted without orders, he returned to Uruguayana, and remained there.

The allied generals now sent a note to Estigarribia, inviting him to surrender, proposing that the whole of the garrison should have their freedom, even to return at once to Paraguay, and that they should retire with all

the honours of war. This Estigarribia refused, in a long letter. The letter of the Allies was sent by a Paraguayan lieutenant, who had been taken at the Battle of Yatai; the same officer was sent back with the answer.

The Allies wrote again, in the beginning of September, telling him that they had forces sufficient to overwhelm him, and reinforcements continually arriving; that it was the duty of a military man to resist only while there was some chance of success, and that, Lopez having left him in the lurch, it was not necessary to fight any more for him.

The answer of Estigarribia is rather long, but is worth reading. It is as follows:—

‘Vive the Republic of Paraguay!’

‘Camp at Uruguayana, September 5, 1865.

‘The Commander-in-Chief of the Division in Operation on the River Uruguay, to the Representatives of the Vanguard of the Allied Army.

‘The undersigned, Commander-in-Chief of the Paraguayan division in operation on the River Uruguay, has the honour to reply to the note which your Excellencies addressed to him, on the 2nd instant, proposing the basis of an arrangement.

‘Before entering on the principal part of your Excellencies’ note, I may be allowed to refute, with the decency and dignity of a soldier of honour, all those statements in the said note which are injurious to the Supreme Government of the undersigned. With the permission of your Excellencies, such statements place that note on the same level as the newspapers of Buenos Ayres, which for some years have done nothing else, and have had no other object,

than grossly and severely to blacken the Government of Paraguay, throwing out at the same time rude calumnies against the people, who have replied to them by honestly labouring for their domestic happiness—their greatest delight being in maintaining internal peace, which is the fundamental base of the preponderance of a nation.

‘As your Excellencies show so much zeal in giving the Paraguayan nation its liberty, according to your own expressions, why have you not begun by freeing the unhappy negroes of Brazil, who form the greater part of its population, and who groan under the hardest and most terrible slavery, to enrich and keep in idleness a few hundreds of the grandees of the Empire? Since when has a nation, which by its own spontaneous and free will elects the Government which presides over its destinies, been called a nation of slaves? Doubtless, since Brazil has undertaken the affairs of the River Plate, with the decided desire of subjugating and enslaving the sister Republics of Paraguay, and perhaps even Paraguay itself, had it not counted upon a patriotic and foreseeing Government.

‘Your Excellencies will allow me these digressions, since you have provoked them by insulting the Government of my Fatherland in your note.

‘I am not of the same opinion with your Excellencies, that a military man of honour, and a true patriot, should limit himself to fight only when he has a probability of conquering.

‘If your Excellencies open any history, you will learn, from the records of that great book of humanity, that the great captains, whom the world still remembers with pride, counted neither the number of their enemies, nor the elements they disposed of, but conquered or died in the name of their country. Recollect that Leonidas, when he was keeping the Pass of Thermopylæ with 300 Spar-

tans, would not listen to the propositions of the King of Persia; and when a soldier told him that his enemies were so numerous that their arrows darkened the sun, he answered, "So much the better—we will fight in the shade." Like the Spartan captain, I cannot listen to propositions made by the enemy; for I have been sent, with my companions, to fight in defence of the rights of Paraguay, and as its soldier, I must answer your Excellencies, when you enumerate to me the number of your forces, and the amount of artillery at your disposal—"So much the better; the smoke of the cannon shall be our shade."

'If fortune should decree us a tomb in this city of Uruguayana, our fellow-citizens will preserve the remembrance of those Paraguayans who died fighting for the cause of their country, and who, while they lived, did not surrender to the enemy the sacred ensign of the liberty of their nation.

'God preserve your Excellencies many years!

'ANTONIO ESTIGARRIBIA.'

Estigarribia's letters were the productions of a priest, who accompanied him as chaplain and secretary. Later on in the war the priests did duty as secretaries in all the divisions of the army.

The Emperor of Brazil and his son-in-law, the Count d'Eu, arrived in front of Uruguayana on September 5, to review the troops. Mr. Thornton,* recently appointed H.B.M.'s Minister to Brazil, arrived shortly afterwards, to present his credentials to the Emperor.

Arrangements were now made by the Allies for attacking the place. They had 30,000 men, and forty-two rifled guns, besides those on the gunboats. It was confidently believed, by all the allied generals, that with the artillery they had, they could knock the place down on to Esti-

* Mr. Thornton is now British ambassador at Washington, U.S.

garribia, and kill every Paraguayan in the town, by bombarding it for two days, placing their guns out of range of those of Estigarribia; and it was determined, that when their guns were all in position, they would fire two or three hundred shots, which were to have the effect of frightening him, then stop the fire and send word to him to surrender, which he would be sure to do.

Estigarribia's provisions meanwhile had got very low; his army had consumed all the bullocks, and was now eating the horses. He sent all the women out of the place, so as to have fewer mouths to fill, and was getting worse off every day. On September 13, he wrote to Mitre, telling him that the conditions proposed hitherto by the allied generals were not such as he could accept, and asking him to open negotiations anew. Mitre, however, took no notice of the letter, but determined to get everything ready for an assault, and then to summon him to surrender.

On the 17th, Estigarribia began to make rafts, with the idea of crossing the river on them and in his canoes, and thus escaping, but there was no longer any time to do so. The operation would also probably have failed if undertaken, as the enemy had men on the other side of the river, besides their boats on it.

On September 18, the whole of the allied army took up its position ready for attack, and at twelve o'clock sent an intimation to Estigarribia to surrender within four hours. Estigarribia answered by making the following proposals:—1st. That all the rank and file should surrender as prisoners; 2nd. That all the officers should be allowed to keep their swords, and to go wherever they liked—even to Paraguay; and 3rd. That the Orientals should be prisoners to Brazil. This last clause was intended to save the lives of a few Orientals who had joined Estigarribia, and who expected that Flores would

cut their throats, according to the amiable practice of the country.

The allied commanders assembled in the Emperor's tent, and having consulted together, replied that the first and third terms would be granted, but that the officers must give up their swords; they might, however, reside anywhere they pleased, with the exception of Paraguay. The whole affair was finished by four o'clock, and Estigarribia delivered his sword to the Brazilian Minister of War, who was there with the Emperor.

The Paraguayans were draughted into the allied armies, excepting a few hundreds, who were sent to the different countries of the Allies, to be stared at. All their muskets, as also those taken at Yatai, were flint-locks. The men were terribly thin, having for some time had nothing but a ration of lump-sugar, of which there had been a stock in the place. Only 6,000 of them came out alive.

Estigarribia had received no communication from Lopez since June 11.

The Emperor of Brazil gave all the troops who had been present at Uruguayana a medal for their bravery.

General Castro, with 2,000 men, and Colonel Reguera, with 700, had been despatched, before the Battle of Yatai, to the rear of the Paraguayans, with orders to march opposite Encarnacion, along the same road by which the Paraguayans had come, in order to cut off their communications, and to reconnoitre, in case any reinforcements should be sent that way to relieve Estigarribia. Nothing was however attempted, and the eastern part of Corrientes, as well as Rio Grande, was quite free from the invaders. On September 27, Colonel Reguera met with 100 Paraguayans, who skirmished with him, and fought, hiding among the woods. At last he dismounted his cavalry, and made them go on foot into

the woods, after the Paraguayans, cutting up about thirty of them. In his report, he states that nothing would induce them to surrender; they all preferred death.

In the Paraguayan army the Battle of Yatai was considered of little or no importance, except to show the Allies what sort of people they were going to war with, and that they would fight to the death rather than give in. But the news of the surrender of Estigarribia fell like a thunderbolt upon Lopez, though he must have known that his division was doomed, cut off and besieged as it was by the whole of the allied armies, either to die to the last man, or to surrender. On receiving the news, Lopez was very savage with Estigarribia. He sent for all the officers in garrison at Humaitá, and told them of it, saying that Estigarribia had sold the garrison for 3,000 doubloons (10,000*l.*), and holding him up to their execration as a traitor. This was the only reverse in the whole war which affected Lopez at all, though he did not show it in public. For three days he was so savage, that even his son, on whom he doted, was afraid to go near him.

There was a demonstration got up by the Club at Asuncion, to denounce Estigarribia; and the *Semanario* was loud in praising the grand strategy of Lopez, and in calling him the Cincinnatus of America.

Lopez immediately ordered the evacuation of Corrientes by the whole of the Paraguayan forces. Berges, by Lopez' order, wrote to the triumvirate, saying that the Paraguayan Government had not met with the support in Corrientes which it had expected, the forces of the triumvirate not even keeping open the communications of his armies; and that therefore he had resolved to withdraw all his forces into Paraguay, where the communications would be free from the accidents to which they were exposed in Corrientes, and offering the hospitality

of Paraguay to all who chose to accept it, including the triumvirate.

He also wrote a circular to the foreign diplomatic agents, stating that Paraguay had carried on the war in Corrientes in a most 'civilised' manner, avoiding, as far as possible, the evils of war, and saying that if any of their subjects had suffered damages, the Paraguayan Government would settle them at the end of the war.

The Paraguayans embarked their artillery, which was at Cuevas, in steamers (the Brazilian fleet being close by, at Goya), and General Resquin deployed his army into as long a line as possible, from the river towards the east, and marched northwards, sweeping before him all the cattle and horses, to Paso la Patria, where two little steamers, with some lighters, were waiting to pass them over the river into Paraguay. The passage began on October 31. Other steamers were employed in transporting troops from Corrientes to Humaitá.

After the Paraguayans had evacuated Cuevas, and the allied troops had taken possession, the Brazilian fleet ventured to go there, and the same happened at Bella Vista and at Corrientes. This last city had not been sacked, nor its inhabitants, in general, illtreated; but, of course, the people were delighted to be free from Lopez' pranks. Many Correntinos, who had compromised themselves with the Paraguayans, accompanied them to Paraguay, taking their families with them.

On the day that the Paraguayans began to cross the Paraná to Itapirú, five Brazilian war-steamers came nearly within cannon-shot of the little Paraguayan steamers. People who saw this, of course, gave up the army as lost, thinking that the Brazilians would never allow it to cross the river, and that it would soon be overtaken and destroyed by the allied armies. The Brazilians, however, contented themselves with seeing what was going on, and

went away, absolutely, without firing a shot! They made the excuse that there was not a sufficient depth of water for their ships, which was however false, for afterwards, when the river was much lower, the same ships were continually coming and going. They also said they did not know what masked batteries the Paraguayans might have placed, and they would not risk their vessels.

By November 3, the Paraguayans had passed their last man and gun over the river, and about 100,000 head of cattle. They also killed many thousands which they were not able to pass over. The cattle brought from Corrientes were, however, of very little use to the Paraguayans, as they almost all died, either of fatigue, want of food (there being very little pasturage near Paso la Patria), or from eating a poisonous herb called 'mio-mio,' which abounds in the South of Paraguay, and which only animals reared in the district have the instinct to avoid. The number of dead animals on the ground about Itapirú and a few leagues beyond it was terrible during some months.

CHAPTER IX.

LOPEZ PREPARES TO RECEIVE THE ALLIES IN PARAGUAY—RECRIMINATIONS BETWEEN LOPEZ AND MITRE—THE ALLIES ARRIVE ON THE CORRIENTES SIDE OF PASO LA PATRIA—RAIDS OF THE PARAGUAYANS ON CORRIENTES.

WHEN Lopez left Asuncion, in June, for Humaitá, he gave out that he was going to take the command of the army of Corrientes in person, and he was expected every day to start from Humaitá for that purpose. Preparations and rumours to that effect were continual. He had two omnibuses fitted up for taking with him on the campaign—one as a writing-room, and the other as a bedroom. He was said to be going to march to Monte Video and to Buenos Ayres, and doubtless such was his intention; had he gone with his army in the beginning of the year, he would have carried everything before him, and could have dictated his own terms to those countries. They had then no army to speak of, and the Paraguayans, believing, as they did, in his prowess, would have done anything had he commanded in person.

He probably had the idea, as was said, of being crowned Emperor of the River Plate. Had he marched as far as Entre-Rios, Urquiza would perhaps have joined him. As things had turned out, however, he looked very small to the Allies, who, since they had taken the field, had met with every success. Lopez had lost all prestige as a general, from having sent Estigarribia's column, without any support, into the heart of the enemy's country. He very likely expected Urquiza to help Estigarribia, but there was no treaty to that effect, although Urquiza

doubtless led Lopez to expect his aid, and agents were continually coming and going between them. The Paraguayan army was continually encouraged by being told that Urquiza was on the move to join it. Bolivia was also stated to be about making an alliance with Paraguay, and 12,000 Bolivians were said to be on the march to Matto-Grosso. The Chilian press was the only foreign support which Lopez had at this time.

He now sent an exploring party, and made a path from near Corumbá to Santo Corazon, in Bolivia, through a totally desert tract of country. This was the only road to Bolivia, and during the whole of the war, the Allies supposed Lopez to be receiving stores and ammunition by that route. Such was not, however, the case, as everything had to be taken on mules, including provisions for the journey, which took a long time; and there being no bridges or boats for crossing the rivers on the road, nothing could be taken which might not be passed over a river in a 'pelota.' This is a kind of dish, formed by tying up the corners and turning up the sides of a raw hide, stiff from having been dried in the sun, and capable of floating on the water. Persons who do not wish to get wet cross rivers in these vessels, sitting very carefully in the middle when the 'pelota' is launched and towed over to the other side. The road was only used three or four times, and all that was ever brought by it was a little sugar and coffee, which might all be placed on an armchair.

Paraguay never received, during the whole war, supplies of any kind from abroad, excepting those taken in Matto-Grosso and in Corrientes.

Several Italian vessels were detained three months at Humaitá by Lopez, under the pretext that they would take news out of the country. A small English steamer, the 'Flying Fish,' was also detained. Dr. Barton, an Englishman who had rendered distinguished services for

many years to the Paraguayan Government, as chief medical officer, was going to England in this steamer, and was detained for a fortnight on board, at Humaitá, with hardly anything to eat. The steamer was then sent back to Asuncion, and bought by the Government. Dr. Barton, however, luckily got away in a sailing-vessel.

There were now in Paraguay many refugees, from Monte Video and the Confederation; among them Dr. Carreras (ex-Minister of War of Monte Video), Colonel Laguna, Colonel Telmo Lopez*—the Correntino triumvirate. Most of these refugees were men who had gone to offer Lopez their military services, which he accepted, although he gave no employment to any of them. They were afterwards shot or tortured to death.

Lopez brought his brothers, Benancio and Benigno, down to Humaitá, to have them specially under his eye. They were both of them in very bad health.

At the end of October I commenced a trigonometrical survey of the ground between the Paraná and Humaitá, the probable future seat of operations. This was the first survey ever made of the ground.

The army which had returned from Corrientes looked terribly fatigued, but all the men were delighted to get back to Paraguay. Only about 14,000 men returned sound, and about 5,000 sick. These last had come at different times during the whole of the campaign. About 8,500 men had perished in Corrientes, making a loss of 21,000 men, including the column of Estigarribia. In Paraguay some 30,000 men had already died since the beginning of the recruiting, making in all some 40,000 men dead, and 10,000 surrendered, while the war was only just beginning. The latter were chiefly recruits, the old soldiers having resisted better. Ever since the

* The name of Lopez is a more common name in South America than Brown is in England.

commencement of the recruiting, diarrhoea and dysentery had made great havoc in the ranks. These diseases were owing chiefly to the total change of diet the soldiers underwent, and were more or less prevalent and fatal all through the war. There were also epidemics of measles and smallpox, both in Paraguay and in Corrientes, which carried off thousands, leaving others in an extremely attenuated condition. For two or three months after Lopez got to Humaitá, the hospitals went on very well, as, though there were hardly any drugs, there was plenty of wine and sugar which had been brought from the towns of Corrientes.

Lopez now talked of going to Santa Teresa, to form his principal camp there, as it was not known which route the Allies would choose for invading Paraguay. At Santa Teresa he would be halfway between Paso la Patria and Encarnacion, the only two places on the Paraná which could be conveniently passed by an army. The Allies, however, immediately after taking Uruguayana, began to recross the River Uruguay, and to march in several divisions towards Paso la Patria, with the view of intercepting General Resquin, who nevertheless was too fast for them.

The Paraguayans hid six fieldpieces in the woods on the bank of the Paraguay, about a mile above its fall into the Paraná. Six pieces were left at Itapirú, while the others which had been brought from Corrientes (about 60 pieces), were taken to Paso la Patria, and there placed in reserve.

A small battery, of one 8-inch gun, two 32-pounders, and fourteen fieldpieces, was established at Curupayty,* with furnaces for heating shot. These however were never used, as the wooden ships did not come within range of

* Curupayty: *curupay*, a tree, the bark of which is used for tanning; *ty*, plantation: a plantation of 'curupays.'

the batteries. . . A stockade of piles was also driven across the river here; but the piles were so far apart as to be quite useless for stopping the navigation.

On November 23, Lopez addressed the following letter to President Mitre:—

‘Headquarters at Humaitá, November 20, 1865.

‘To His Excellency the President of the Argentine Republic, Brigadier-General Don Bartolomé Mitre, General-in-Chief of the Allied Army.

‘I have the honour to address to you the present communication, as General-in-Chief of the allied armies at war with this Republic.

‘In the imperious necessity under which nations and their governments sometimes find themselves, to settle by arms those questions which affect their vital interests, war has broken out between this Republic and the States whose armies your Excellency commands-in-chief.

‘In these cases it is the general use and custom among civilised nations to lessen the evils of war by laws to that effect, omitting those acts of cruelty and barbarity which, while they dishonour humanity, leave an indelible blot on the commanders who order, authorise, protect, or tolerate them, and I had expected such behaviour from your Excellency and your allies.

‘In this belief, and in the knowledge of these duties, one of my first cares was to order that all prisoners, of whatever class they be, should be treated and maintained according to their ranks, and in effect they have enjoyed as much comfort and liberty as their position and conduct permitted.

‘The Government of the Republic has given the fullest protection, not only to the Argentine, Brazilian, and Oriental citizens who were in its territory, or whom the events of the war had placed in the power of its arms,

but it has even extended this protection to the prisoners of war.

‘The strict discipline of the Paraguayan armies in Argentine territory and in Brazilian towns is a proof of this, and even the families and interests of individuals who were in arms against the Republic, have been respected and protected.

‘Your Excellency, however, began the war with excesses and atrocities, such as the imprisonment of the agent of the Republic in Buenos Ayres, Felis Equizquiza; the order for the imprisonment, and the consequent persecution, of José Rufo Caminos, consul-general of the Republic in the Argentine Confederation, and of his son, José Felis, who had to take refuge under the friendly flag of Her Britannic Majesty; the sequestration and confiscation of the public and private funds of those citizens, whether in their own power, or deposited in banks; the imprisonment of Cipriano Ayala, a simple bearer of despatches; the violent removal of the national coat-of-arms from the consulate of the Republic, to be dragged about the streets; the public execution of the portrait of the President of the Republic, and the subsequent throwing of that portrait, together with the national coat-of-arms, into the River Paraná, before the public, at the port of Rosario; the atrocious assassination committed by General Caceres in the town of Saladas, on the citizen, Marcelino Ayala, who, having fallen wounded into his hands, would not take up arms against his companions; and the barbarous treatment by which the same general put an end to the days of the likewise wounded ensign, Faustino Ferreira, at Bella Vista; the barbarous cruelty with which the wounded at the battle of Yatai were killed; and the sending of the Paraguayan deserter, Juan Gonzalez, on the special and positive commission of assassinating me. All these have not been sufficient to

make me change my firm resolution not to accompany your Excellency in such barbarous and atrocious acts ; nor did I ever believe that new crimes could be invented, to enrich the atrocities and infamies which have for so long been a public scourge, and a dishonour to the perpetual intestine wars of the River Plate.

‘ I had hoped that, in this first international war, your Excellency would have taught your subordinates that a prisoner of war is still a citizen of his country, and a Christian ; that when he has surrendered he is no longer an enemy ; and that the prisoners would be at least respected in their wretched condition, as the prisoners of the allied army fully are in this Republic. But, with extreme pain, I have had to renounce these hopes, having received information of still more illegal, atrocious, and infamous actions, which are committed on the Paraguayans, who have had the fatal misfortune to fall as prisoners into the power of the allied army.

‘ Your Excellency has compelled the prisoners taken in different engagements, especially those taken at Yatai, and those who surrendered at Uruguayana, to take up arms against their country, augmenting with their persons the effective force of your army by thousands, rendering them traitors in order to deprive them of their rights as citizens, and to take away the most remote hope of their ever returning to their country and families, whether by an exchange of prisoners or by any other transaction ; and those who have refused to assist in destroying their country have been cruelly immolated.

‘ Those who have not shared this horrible fate, have been used for no less inhuman and repugnant ends—the greater part of them having been taken and reduced to slavery in Brazil ; and those who, from the colour of their skin, were even less suitable for sale, have been sent to the Banda Oriental, and to the Argentine provinces, as

presents, as beings curious to look upon, and subject to servitude.

‘ This contempt, not only of the laws of war, but of humanity; this barbarous and infamous coercion, which places the Paraguayan prisoners between the alternative of suffering death or of becoming traitors or slaves, is the first example I know in the history of war; and it is upon your Excellency, upon the Emperor of Brazil, and upon the actual Governor of the Oriental Republic, your allies, that the stain of inventing and executing such wickedness will fall.

‘ The Paraguayan Government has not provoked these atrocities by any of its acts, either before or since the commencement of the war. The Argentine, Brazilian, and Oriental citizens have had full liberty to retire with their property from the Republic, and from the Argentine territory which was occupied by its forces, or to remain there as it suited them best.

‘ In this, my Government respected the international agreements made for a case of war, without taking into consideration that those treaties had expired, only viewing their principles as being of permanent interest, humane, and according to the national honour. It also never forgot its own dignity, nor the consideration which it owes to every Government and to its chief, although, in actual war, so far as to tolerate insults to the emblem of the country of any of the Allies, or the execution of your Excellency or of your allies, in effigy; and much less could I imitate your Excellency, by employing, as a means of war, any Argentine, Oriental, or Brazilian deserter, to assassinate you in your camp. Public opinion and history will judge these acts severely.

‘ The Allies, therefore, are not carrying on war according to the laws and customs of civilized nations, but are making it a war of extermination and horrors, autho-

rising and using the atrocious means I have denounced, which public opinion will always stamp as infamous.

‘Your Excellency and your allies having carried on the war as shown, I shall, in defence of my rights, and in virtue of the obligation I am under, as Supreme Commander of the armies of the Republic, do all in my power to make your Excellency cease these acts, which my own dignity prevents me from allowing to continue; and to that end I invite your Excellency, in the name of humanity, and of the honour of the Allies, to lay those barbarities aside, and to place the Paraguayan prisoners of war in the proper enjoyment of their rights as prisoners, whether they be in arms, in slavery in Brazil, or reduced to servitude in the Argentine and Oriental Republics; and not to continue any act of atrocity—warning your Excellency, that if no answer is returned to this, and if the prisoners are still kept in arms against their country, either scattered in the allied army, or in separate corps; or should the Paraguayan flag appear in your Excellency’s ranks, or any new atrocity be committed on the prisoners, I shall no longer consider myself bound by any consideration, and, although with repugnance, shall make the Argentine, Brazilian, and Oriental citizens, whether prisoners of war or not, existing in the territory of the Republic, or in any territory which its army may occupy, answerable with their persons, property, and lives, to the most vigorous reprisals.

‘I await your Excellency’s reply within the pre-emptory term of thirty days, during which time it will be delivered at Paso la Patria.

‘God preserve your Excellency many years!

‘FRANCISCO SOLANO LOPEZ.’

The following answer was returned by President Mitre after a few days:—

‘Headquarters near Bella Vista, Nov. 25, 1865.

‘*To His Excellency the President of the Republic of Paraguay, Marshal Francisco Solano Lopez.*

‘I have received the note which your Excellency addressed to me, as General-in-Chief of the allied army, from your headquarters at Humaitá, dated the 20th inst., in which, after referring to acts supposed to be contrary to the laws of war, perpetrated by the allied armies on the Paraguayans taken prisoners at Yatai and at the surrender of Uruguayana, as also to other events which your Excellency names, you invite me to observe those laws, intimating your intention to make reprisals should this not be done.

‘Having perused the said note of your Excellency, I am bound to reply, that the charges your Excellency makes in it, of want of humanity and self-respect on the part of the allied armies against the Paraguayans who have surrendered to the force of their arms, are, some of them totally false, and others misrepresented. This is perhaps due to impassioned and false information given to your Excellency, and it is a pity that a moment of reflection has not shown you the falseness of those reports.

‘The Government of my country, as well as those of the Empire of Brazil and of the Oriental Republic, being placed under the imperative duty of arising to defend their honour, their dignity, and the integrity of their territory, wilfully attacked by your Excellency, in a manner unusual among civilised nations; their fortifications and steamers of war being assaulted in time of peace, without any previous declaration of war, which gives these aggressions a piratical character; and being obliged to go to the rescue of, and to save from death, and from the most barbarous depredations, the lives and

property of their respective nations, both in the imperial provinces of Matto-Grosso and Rio Grande, and in this Argentine province of Corrientes, they have endeavoured to subject themselves strictly to the laws of international war. And this they have done, not only from duty and from a sense of honour, but also because, having witnessed, with indignation and repugnance, the violence and crimes of every kind which your Excellency's forces have committed in the towns and in other parts of the Brazilian and Argentine territory, which unfortunately they occupied, though only for a short time,* they would not commit the crimes which they reproached, nor could, nor would, show before the civilised and Christian world any other example than that which they are accustomed to give with their armies, which have the noble mission of vindicating the national honour, and not that of sacking defenceless towns and private property, as your Excellency's forces did the whole time they continued in Argentine and Brazilian territory, on both sides of the Uruguay, as far as Uruguayana and Paso de los Libres, leaving those towns and the neighbouring country completely devastated; a great part of the robbed booty having been sent to Paraguay and placed at your Excellency's disposal, by your own order, as appears from the book containing copies of the communications addressed to your Excellency by Colonel Estigarribia, commander of those Paraguayan forces, which book is now in the hands of the Brazilian Government; while the army which your Excellency sent forth upon this province of Corrientes, and which reached the Pass of the Santa Lucia, has committed even more atrocious acts, taking by force all the cattle from thousands of farms, setting fire to the houses, and leaving thousands

* It was believed, in the River Plate, that the Brazilians had reconquered Matto-Grosso, which, however, they never did.

of families without roof or shelter in the midst of the wasted country; and carrying its inhumanity, or rather that of your Excellency, whose order was invoked to that effect, to the length of turning from their houses and carrying captive to Paraguay, the innocent wives and helpless children of patriotic and valiant officers belonging to the Argentine army, who had remained in places occupied by your Excellency's forces, expecting that you would observe those rules which you now invoke in favour of the Paraguayan prisoners—thus giving a right to doubt the sincerity of him who has ignored them, as your Excellency has done, even towards women and children. All these acts, which are of public notoriety, will be eternally ignominious to him who has ordered, authorised, or consented to them; and your Excellency will consequently have to answer, not only to the Allies who are now waging war against you, but also to the whole world, which has been unanimous in a cry of execration against them.

‘ The combats having terminated favourably for the Allies, the wounded and the prisoners were the first received and treated in the hospitals of the army, being placed on the same footing with those belonging to the allied army; and they were even more particularly taken care of, from the compassion and sympathy which they naturally inspired, as much from their nakedness and want, as because they could be only looked upon as unhappy victims of an ill-advised Governor, who sent them to die in an unjust and groundless war, begun by a capricious and arbitrary will. Far, therefore, from forcing the prisoners to join the ranks of the allied armies, or from treating them with rigour, they have all been treated, not only with humanity, but with benevolence—many having been placed completely at liberty, many others having been sent to the towns, and part destined to passive service in the allied armies, espe-

cially in the hospitals in which their own companions were being treated. It is true that many of them have entered the ranks of the allied armies, but it has been by their own free will and because they desired it, which favour could not be denied them, when their countrymen who were refugees in the territory of the allied nations had spontaneously requested to be armed, and it had been conceded to them.

‘These are the principal charges which your Excellency’s note contains. What has been said is sufficient, not only to refute them, but to throw upon the real author the immense responsibility of the barbarous deeds which have been committed in this war. I might do the same with the isolated facts which your Excellency mentions, but some are so notoriously false, and others inexact, that it would be useless to refute them, especially as we are in open war, and the question has to be decided by arms. Your Excellency understands perfectly that this is not the moment for recriminations, into which I should have to enter did I reply to the other charges of your Excellency. I will wind up by saying that I cannot comprehend how your Excellency has been able to believe the story of the deserter Juan Gonzalez, if such a deserter ever existed; and it is a pity, for the very honour of the post in which your Excellency has placed yourself in that Republic, that, in a serious note, and under your signature, you should have confessed to a fear of a dagger, directed by the hand of an Argentine General. I declare to your Excellency that I do not believe you capable of aiming at my life, or at the life of any of the other Generals of the allied armies, because, having been always accustomed to do this honour to the commanders of the enemies whom I have had to combat, I am forced to do the same honour to your Excellency.

‘In consequence of what has been said, and to prevent

any outrages your Excellency may be inclined to commit, of which the spirit of the note I am answering gives me a presentiment, I formally declare to your Excellency, as General of the allied armies, that your Excellency will be held personally responsible, and will be subjected to those very laws which you invoke and establish, for any act which your Excellency, or any authorities under you, may commit, in violation of those recognised principles which to civilised nations are laws, against the lives and property of any Argentines, Brazilians, or Orientals whom your Excellency may have got into your power by chance or by treason, and not in open and fair fight, in which your Excellency has not yet had the good fortune to take a single soldier prisoner.

‘ If, notwithstanding this, your Excellency should employ means contrary to those recognised in warfare, your Excellency will have deliberately placed yourself beyond the pale of the Law of Nations, and will authorise the Allies to proceed as your Excellency insinuates, as then your deliberate desire to increase the cruelty of the evils of war will be manifest, which evils the allied nations have endeavoured to diminish as far as possible. They have determined to continue this course of action, being firmly and calmly resolved not to lay down their arms until they have obtained full and complete reparation for their grievances, trusting their vindication, under Providence, to the force of arms, and not to ignoble and cowardly vengeance, exercised upon defenceless men and innocent women and children.

‘ Such is the only answer I can offer to your Excellency, saving any resolutions which may be taken in view of your Excellency’s note, by the Governments of the Triple Alliance, to whom, this day, I send copies of it and of this answer. God preserve your Excellency !

‘ BARTOLOMÉ MITRE.’

The letter written by Lopez was sent by the 'Pirabebé,' a steam yacht, carrying one small gun, under a flag of truce. As soon as she came in sight of the Brazilian fleet, which was at Corrientes, the latter made great preparations for a battle, and three steamers were despatched to reconnoitre, the 'Ivahy' being the senior and taking the lead. All the guns were loaded, and the men at their quarters. The 'Pirabebé' meanwhile had run on a sand-bank and stuck fast. The Admiral (Barroso) was now coming up, 'to seek for danger,' as he said, on board the 'Ygurci.*' Notwithstanding the flag of truce carried by the Paraguayan steamer, the 'Ivahy' sent a boat's crew and an officer on board her to bring off her captain prisoner. The officer, however, only 'invited' the captain of the 'Pirabebé' to go with him, which he did; and when he got on board the 'Ivahy,' the commander embraced him, thinking he had come to deliver up his ship. He told the commander of the 'Ivahy' that he had despatches which he wished to deliver in person to Barroso, and he was taken down in a boat, and met Barroso coming up.

The Brazilians sent and took all the crew of the 'Pirabebé' on to their own vessels as prisoners; a Brazilian officer hauled down, trod and spat upon the Paraguayan flag of the 'Pirabebé'; and everything was taken from her, even to the engineers' clothes. The 'Pirabebé' was then towed off by the Brazilian steamers and taken to Corrientes, where her crew were again put in possession of her, but she was still kept prisoner. Next day, however, she was allowed to go.

Mitre's answer was taken in a rowing-boat to Paso la Patria. He is stated to have been very angry at the accusations against him.

Lopez published both letters in the *Semanario*.

* Not the Paraguayan 'Ygurei.' The Brazilians had a steamer of the same name.

Three days before Lopez sent his letter to Mitre, threatening to make reprisals, he anticipated them, bringing down in irons to Humaitá all the resident subjects of the allied nations, and throwing them into prison. The irons of most of them were soon taken off, but they were kept under arrest, and allowed no communication with any one during the whole war. They were subsequently exposed to the continued bombardment by the ironclads of Humaitá, and finally all, excepting one, who by a mere chance escaped, were shot or tortured to death.

Lopez went from Humaitá to Paso la Patria, and took the command of the army in person, on November 25, 1865.

All the troops in the Republic were now brought to swell the ranks of the army at Paso. Humaitá was left with little more than the artillerymen in the batteries. A few squadrons of cavalry were left at different frontier points for observation. Recruiting was again carried on with great vigour. Altogether Lopez scraped up an army of 30,000 men. Of the old troops the cavalry were by far the most numerous, and he converted several thousands into infantry. Horses were collected from the whole country. Private people's and women's horses* were all taken, and so he got horses to mount his cavalry. He also brought more fieldpieces from Humaitá, &c., making up about a hundred pieces at Paso la Patria.

General Robles, who had been kept a close prisoner, was brought, with his aide-de-camp, to Paso. Half the commanding-officers in the camp were also thrown into irons, it was not known why. A long secret trial ended in the condemnation of all of them to death, and having had priests sent to absolve them, and to administer the extreme unction, they were taken out—Robles on his horse,

* On account of the great distances to be travelled in Paraguay, everyone had horses: these only grazed, and cost nothing to keep.

and the rest in carts—to a place where the whole army was drawn up to form three sides of a square; and the sentence having been read, General Robles, with some of his aides-de-camp, Colonel Martinez (who had commanded the garrison of Corrientes on May 25, when General Paunero made a descent on that city), and a few others were shot, the rest being pardoned by Lopez.

Many of the Paraguayans who had been taken prisoners at Uruguayana began to come back, in parties of from two to a dozen, swimming across the River Paraná. Flores shot some whom he caught as deserters. These men were at first looked upon with suspicion by Lopez, and encamped apart; they were afterwards draughted into the different corps.

Lopez was continually in great fear of being assassinated, and at night had a double cordon of sentinels round his house. This was afterwards increased to a treble one. During the daytime these were removed, and the guard was kept under an open roof next door to Lopez. People who wished to see him had to wait under this same roof. One evening I was waiting there to see Lopez, as were also several other officers, and a sergeant of the guard entered into conversation with me. After a short time there was a great stir, officers going in and out of Lopez' room, the guard relieved, and the other officers who were waiting all arrested. One of Lopez' aides-de-camp came and said to me, 'His Excellency sends word to you to write down all the conversation you have had with the sergeant of the guard, and to bring it to-morrow morning.' I went away, not expecting to be able to remember a twentieth part of the silly talk of the sergeant; but as things looked serious, I tried, and probably remembered it all. It filled a whole sheet of paper, and was all of it somewhat in this style:— 'The sergeant asked me if Queen Victoria always wore her crown when she went out to walk.' 'The sergeant

asked me if I should wear the Paraguayan uniform when I went to England.' It was sealed up and taken next morning to Lopez, about 7 A.M. He was not yet up, but the sergeant was already shot, and all the soldiers of the guard had received a hundred lashes each. A few months afterwards I heard that the sergeant had been convicted of conspiring, with two men who had just returned from Uruguayana, to murder the President, and that the two men had been found that night in the yard of Lopez' house. The sergeant's manner that evening was certainly not that of a conspirator. Lopez never said a word about it to me, nor acknowledged receipt of the written conversation, probably feeling ashamed to do so.

A Correntino girl, who had come over with the army from Corrientes, tried to go away one day into the country, but was caught, and received sixty lashes in public on her bare flesh, which was considered a very good joke.

Two deserters from the allied army, who had crossed the Paraná a few leagues above Paso la Patria, were taken there. One of them complained of feeling ill, and Dr. Stewart, the surgeon-major, was sent to see him. The symptoms were not yet declared, but Dr. Stewart suspected what was the matter, and advised General Barrios to have him kept apart from the army. This was not attended to, and at last smallpox broke out on him. Dr. Stewart was called to task by Lopez for not having sent the man away. He stated that he had advised General Barrios to do so; this Barrios, who was present, denied. Lopez, however, must have believed Dr. Stewart, for he said no more about it. He generally believed what Englishmen told him, as they did not deceive him. These two deserters were now flogged till they would say that they had been sent by President Mitre to introduce smallpox into the country, and they were then flogged to death.

While Lopez was at Paso la Patria, he went to church every Sunday, being followed by all the officers in the army who were not on duty. He chose a particular march which some of the bands played, to be kept for himself, and this was only and always played when he left his house, and when he left the church. Some of the Paraguayan bands of music played beautifully. After mass he used to address the soldiers, who crowded round him for that purpose, telling them they were certain to beat the 'blacks,' as the Allies were indiscriminately called, and always mixing in a little chaff, which pleased the soldiers more than anything. He also addressed the officers, but to them his speech usually took the form of a reprimand for not looking after and teaching their men.

Large fields of Indian-corn were cultivated at Paso la Patria by the troops. In a very few days the whole army built itself huts. These the Paraguayans knocked up in no time wherever they stopped. They were made by cutting four young trees (just above the fork, which is left on the trunk) to the height of the eaves, and two also with the forks left on, to the height of the ridge. These are stuck in the ground, and three poles placed on the forks; the rafters, also cut roughly from the woods, are placed on these poles, and lashed to them with moistened hide-thongs. The roof and sides are then thatched with dry grass, or covered with raw hides, and the hut is complete.

An Italian war-steamer made two trips to Humaitá to try to get away some Italian subjects. The French minister, M. Vernouillet, also went up in the 'Decidée,' and afterwards went round in his steamer to Paso la Patria and paid Lopez a visit. He and the captain of the 'Decidée' were decorated with the National Order of Merit. The 'Decidée' took away some treasure from Paso la Patria.

On one of the first days in December, Lopez took a

ride to Itapirú, and seeing a few Correntinos on the other side of the river, he had a 12-pounder rifled gun fired at them, but though the shot went near, it did not hit them. He then sent four canoes with twelve men each to the other side. These, after exchanging a few shots, landed, and having driven the Correntinos away, returned. One Paraguayan was killed. Lopez was very much amused with this, and next day sent another expedition; and as the enemy did not destroy it, he sent one every day or two, numbering from one to two hundred men. These used to cross the Paraná in full sight of the enemy, standing up to paddle their canoes, as they always did; they then used to land and drive the enemy half a mile inland, fighting all the while, and go back after a few hours, taking their killed and wounded with them. This went on for more than three months, the Brazilian fleet being all the time within hearing of the musketry, and not attempting to interfere, saying that their fleet was not yet complete, and that they would run no risks, not knowing what guns and batteries the Paraguayans might have. Tamandaré, the admiral, had never joined the fleet, but was still flirting in Buenos Ayres, and talking of what he was going to do, promising to spend March 25 (a Brazilian civic feast) in Asuncion. People at last got so much out of patience with him, that had he not gone they would probably have stoned him. Accordingly, he joined the fleet at Corrientes on February 26, and publicly pledged his word to enter Asuncion on March 25, come what would.

The most serious of these raids was on January 31, when 400 men went over under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Viveros, then a lieutenant. This number of men was made up, as always, not from one battalion, but of a few men from almost every battalion in the army. Whenever they started, they did so in the highest spirits,

dancing along, and accompanied by the women and by a band of music to the riverside. Mrs. Lynch generally went to see them off, and gave them cigars, &c.

On this occasion they arrived at Corrales, the landing-place on the Correntino side of Paso la Patria, at two o'clock, and were immediately engaged with the vanguard of the Allies. These 400 Paraguayans were absolutely fighting with 7,200 of the allied troops, who yet did not dare to press them hard. After four hours' fighting (by some strange mismanagement the Buenos Ayres National Guards had only three rounds of ammunition per man), the Paraguayans retired to the river where their canoes were, and passed the night there, receiving a reinforcement of 400 men in the night, and after a little more fighting in the morning, returned to Paso la Patria. It appears incredible that the Allies should have permitted these men always to return instead of cutting them off. This fight cost the Allies fifty officers (four of them full colonels) and 900 men killed and wounded. The Paraguayans lost 170 killed and wounded. Lopez gave a cross to all the officers and soldiers who had been in the battle—silver for the officers, and copper for the soldiers.

These expeditions into the allied camp, where there were more than 50,000 men, were a great disgrace to the Allies and to their fleet, which ought to have prevented the river-traffic of the Paraguayans. These had a picket of two canoes at Paranami, one of which went every evening to reconnoitre the fleet, which was at Corrientes, and which did not make one reconnaissance all this time.

On the night of February 9, there was a panic in the fleet, occasioned by two canoes getting loose, and a few logs of wood floating down the river at the same time. The Brazilians thought that an attack was meditated, and beat to quarters, firing right and left.

After the affair at Corrales, people in Corrientes did

not feel very safe from another Paraguayan invasion; and on the night of February 19, there was a false alarm all over the allied camp, and a panic, the Paraguayans being reported to have crossed the river, to have surrounded the Allies, and to be about to attack them in the morning. The fleet was ordered to reconnoitre next day, but did not get as far as the mouth of the River Paraguay, and returned, reporting all quiet. On that very day, three Paraguayan steamers, the 'Ygurei,' 'Guauguay,' and '25 de Mayo,' sailed round from Humaitá to Paso la Patria, where they took 1,000 men on board, and went up the Paraná to Itatì, a village of Corrientes, eight leagues above Paso la Patria, where the Oriental army, 5,000 strong, under the command of General Suarez, was encamped. This officer thought prudence the better part of valour, and left with his army, retreating to a distance of eight miles, and leaving his camp and the village to be sacked, the Paraguayans crying after him, 'Where are the heroes of Yatai?' He left in such a hurry, that all his papers were taken, and his own gold watch and chain were the booty of an Italian who followed the Paraguayan army. A few head of cattle and some horses were taken; also some sugar, flour, wines, and spirits, which, after the expeditionary forces had regaled themselves, were taken to Paso la Patria. The Oriental camp was burned to the ground, and so was the village of Itatì.

A few days afterwards, the 'Ygurei' and the '25 de Mayo' went back to Humaitá, the 'Guauguay' staying in the Paraná.

The excursions to Corrales still continued, the Paraguayans always bringing back some trophy. Once a negro serjeant brought nine allied soldiers' heads in a bag, and took them to Lopez' house, piling them up at his door. Lopez sent them to the house of the Chief of the Staff, where they were piled up for public view,

almost everyone going to see them. The sergeant was promoted to be an ensign (the only black officer in the Paraguayan army), but Lopez sent him into every fight afterwards till he was killed, and thus got rid of the black officer.

Another time, a wounded prisoner was brought, but dying on the road, his body was flung on the ground near the cemetery and left there, never being buried at all.

The 'Guauguay' made frequent trips down the Paraná, to reconnoitre the Brazilian fleet; and on one occasion, when General Hornos (Argentine) was at Corrales bathing with his staff, she passed about 300 yards from him, treating him to three rounds of grape.

The Argentine Government had some trouble to get recruits for their army, even from the beginning, from their north-western provinces. They made conscriptions; but some of the contingents mutinied on the road and disbanded, and being again collected did the same thing over again. At last they sent the recruits in chained gangs to Rosario, where they were embarked and sent to the army. There is an official letter from one of the provincial governors, accompanying a remittance of recruits, in which he states the number sent, and requests that the irons should be returned, in order to send more.

The criminals were taken from all the prisons in the Confederation, and sent to the army.

CHAPTER X.

THE ALLIES INVADE PARAGUAY—PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS—THE
BATTLE OF THE BANK—EVACUATION OF PASO LA PATRIA.

NEARLY the whole of the allied army, consisting of 50,000 men and 100 guns, was encamped near Corrales, ready to cross the River Paraná; but a Brazilian division of 12,000 men and eighteen rifled guns, under the Baron Porto Alegre, had marched from Rio Grande to Candelaria, with the intention of crossing there, and of making their way into the heart of Paraguay.

To meet this latter force, Lopez sent Colonel (then Major) Nuñez, with 3,000 men and twelve guns, to Encarnacion. Porto Alegre afterwards altered his plans, and marched down the coast of the Paraná, in order to cross a few leagues above Paso la Patria, and take Lopez on the flank, while Mitre attacked him in front. This was likewise given up, and Porto Alegre, with his army, eventually landed at Paso la Patria.

On March 21, 1866, the allied fleet steamed up from Corrientes, and anchored in line of battle, from Corrales to the mouth of the Paraguay. It consisted of eighteen steam-gunboats, carrying from six to eight guns each; and four ironclads, three of which had high square casemates, and one (the 'Bahia') was a monitor, with a revolving turret, carrying two 150-pounder Whitworth guns. In all, these ships carried 125 guns.

At the same time two of the steamers, and the ironclad 'Tamararé,' proceeded further up the river, to explore

it as far as Itatì. The 'Tamandaré' got aground, but was towed off by the others, and they then returned and joined the fleet.

Itapirú,* which the Allies dignified with the name of fortress, and which they considered it necessary to raze to the ground before attempting to cross the river, was an old battery, built in the beginning of the reign of Lopez I., on a small mound of sand, which projected into the River Paraná, and which had for its base a heap of volcanic rocks. It was revetted with brickwork, and one of its sides had fallen down. It was armed with one 12-pounder rifled field-gun. Its greatest interior diameter was thirty yards, and it stood about twenty feet above the level of the river. Had it been armed with heavy rifled artillery, it might have been of some use; but, as it was, it only served as a bugbear to the Allies.

The River Paraná was deep everywhere, excepting in one place, opposite the Carayá† island, in the northern channel, where there were only twelve feet of water; Lopez had two large canoes filled with stones, and sunk there, in order to stop up that inner channel. In this channel there were two flat-bottomed gunboats, each carrying one 8-inch gun, and also the steamer 'Gualeguay,' commanded by Lieutenant Lopez, carrying two 12-pounder guns. On the 22nd, this steamer towed out one of the gunboats, and took it half a mile below Itapirú, leaving it close to the shore. The gunboat then opened fire on the fleet, putting four balls into the Admiral's vessel. Three ironclads then went and surrounded the gunboat, keeping up an incessant fire on it. The gunboat, however, made excellent practice, always hitting her mark, and killing and wounding a few men. At last the ironclads came within 100 yards of her, and her crew

* Itapirú. *Itá*, stone; *pirú*, dry; dry stone.

† *Carayá*, monkey.

then jumped out and went into the woods, leaving their boat, which was aground. The Brazilians now sent three boats to fetch the gunboat; but, just as they reached her, 100 infantry, who were hidden and parapeted in the woods, fired on them and knocked over half of the boats' crews, when the remainder made off as fast as they could. The ironclads continued their fire, and at last blew up the gunboat's powder-magazine, after which they retired. The Paraguayan gun was not injured, and was recovered out of the water; the boat itself was rendered useless.

On the 27th the other gunboat was towed down to the same place, and opened fire on the fleet. Three ironclads again came and surrounded it, keeping up a heavy fire, which was returned by the gunboat. This time the Paraguayans kept their cartridges on land, to prevent their being blown up, and a man was continually employed carrying them. Most of the balls (68-pounders) which struck the ironclads, flew into pieces against their plates, though some penetrated them. One ball struck the 'Tamandaré' at the edge of her porthole, and, flying into pieces, entered, killing and wounding almost everyone in the casemate of the ship. Her first and second commanders, three other officers, and eighteen sailors were killed, and fifteen wounded. This happened just as it was getting dark, and the 'Tamandaré' went away. The other two kept up their fire till 9 P.M., both on the gunboat and on Itapirú, which, with its 12-pounder, was also firing on them, though without any effect. The infantry in the woods kept up a good fire, which was continually returned both by musketry and grape. At 9 the ironclads retired, having done no damage beyond wounding one or two men in the woods. Next day, at noon, the gunboat again opened fire, and the four ironclads, and four wooden steamers, came up and engaged

with her. One ironclad, the 'Barroso,' got four holes through her plates, and all of them were more or less damaged. The 'Barroso' also got one of her Whitworth 120-pounder guns shot in two. This time, however, the Paraguayan gun was struck, and cut in two, just as the gunner was going to pull the lanyard; strange to say, however, no one on board was hurt.

On the night of the 29th, the Paraguayans were bringing from Humaitá an empty gunboat for the gun which had been recovered from the water. They towed it with a canoe, down the Paraguay and up the Paraná, but were seen by the Brazilians (it was a moonlight night), who immediately opened fire and steamed up. The crew escaped into the woods, and the Brazilians towed away the empty gunboat and canoe.

These gunboats frequently engaged singly the whole of the fleet. They were difficult to hit from a long distance, as they had barely more than the muzzle of their gun above the water.

For the personal amusement of Lopez—who, with some first-rate telescopes on his table, used to sit in his corridor at Paso la Patria, whence he could see everything—the steamer 'Guauguay' went out every afternoon to the point of the island opposite Itapirú, and defied the allied fleet, firing her 12-pounders, which were answered by the whole fleet, with every kind of projectile, from a 68-pounder to a 150-pounder. These used to fall around her like hail, throwing up immense water-spouts into the air. She used to retire a little before sunset. She did this every day for three weeks, without being hit, except by one ball, which passed through her funnel.

When the Allies were not occupied with the 'Guauguay,' or the gunboats, they bombarded Itapirú, but did no harm, as there was nothing to damage. The ground

all around it was quite ploughed up by their shot. They placed twelve rifled 12-pounders and a battery of 13-inch mortars at Corrales, with which also they bombarded Itapirú, and several times cut down the flagstaff, which was immediately replaced. They amused themselves likewise by firing with Whitworth's 150-pounders at people going along the Itapirú road, which was exposed to view; and they sometimes fired towards Paso la Patria, which, however, they did not reach.

Opposite to Itapirú there was a newly-formed round sandbank, which, in the previous November, had been perfectly bare, but which now had long grass upon it. It was within easy rifle-range from Itapirú. On the night of April 5, the Brazilians occupied this bank, making trenches and batteries. They mounted eight guns on it, and garrisoned it with 2,000 men, who during the day-time were hidden from view in the trenches. From this bank they kept up a fire of rifles and guns on Itapirú, without any result.

On April 10, the Paraguayans attacked it. General (then Lieutenant-Colonel) Diaz directed the attack from Itapirú, where he remained with a reserve of 400 men, having sent two divisions, each of 400 men, in canoes, which arrived at the bank at 4 A.M. It was a pitch-dark night, and they were not perceived until they landed. After delivering one volley, the Paraguayans charged, taking part of the trenches, and being driven out of them again, repeatedly. The Brazilian artillery kept up a terrible fire of canister, which killed many Paraguayans. Among these there were 200 dismounted cavalrymen, armed with naked swords, a favourite weapon of theirs, and these did great execution. The artillery was taken and retaken several times. As soon as the noise of the firing was heard, five gunboats and three ironclads surrounded the island, and numerous reinforcements were

sent to the garrison. At last the Paraguayans were nearly all *hors de combat*, and those who could move went to their canoes and pushed off, hardly a sound man being left; those who were wounded in the legs sat down and paddled, and those who had still one arm paddled with it. Day had already broken, and the Paraguayans had to stem a strong current, under a heavy fire of grape and canister, at close quarters with the Brazilian vessels; some fifteen canoes, however, got back, loaded with men.

The Paraguayans lost fourteen officers killed and seven wounded. Three hundred wounded soldiers returned; but 500, killed, wounded, and prisoners, remained on the bank. Among the prisoners was Lieutenant Romero, commander of one of the divisions, and, in consequence, his wife was forced to write a letter to the editor of the *Semanario*, disowning him as a traitor.

The Brazilians lost about 1,000 killed and wounded. The fire of their own steamers, as usual, had killed a great many of them. Six Brazilian soldiers were afterwards shot for cowardice.

The day after the bank was first occupied by the Brazilians, Lopez had an 8-inch gun mounted at Itapirú, and again another in a few days.

While the commander of the bank was writing the report of the action, another colonel and another officer being close by, a 68-pounder shot from Itapirú killed them all three. The same day, a steam-launch, the 'Fidelis,' was sunk by a shot, and the 'Enrique Martinez,' a Brazilian steamer, received two shots through her, below the water-line, and was obliged to run aground to save herself from sinking. A brass rifled 32-pounder, on the bank, was also shot in two by the Paraguayans.

It was quite unnecessary for the Allies to occupy the bank, but it was madness in Lopez to send his men there, with no object, to certain death. The bank could have

been of no use to him, had he taken it, nor could it, in the hands of the Allies, annoy him.

On April 6, General Hornos, with three steamers, went up the Paraná, to examine a landing-place opposite Itati,* whence he drove away a guard of twelve men. While he was there, Lopez sent Major Godoy, with six field-pieces and 200 men, in canoes, to the island of Carayá, to wait for him as he came back, when, to the great surprise of the three steamers, they were fired into from the woods by artillery and infantry. When they had passed, Godoy returned with his forces to Paso la Patria.

The effect of the previous daily raids on Corrientes, and of the engagements of the 'Guaaleguay' and the gunboats, had been to raise the confidence of the Paraguayans, and to give them full expectations of conquering the Allies.

The Allies were now ready to effect the passage of the river. They had 150 canoes and thirty floating piers, besides thirty transport steamers, and in a single trip they could land 15,000 men. The form and also the lowness of the angle of ground between the Paraguay and the Paraná, at their junction, were very favourable to the Allies for crossing, as they could sweep it all with the guns of their fleet, from either or both of the rivers at the same time, leaving free the very angle itself, for disembarking and forming their troops; and, in case the landing should be contested, a more favourable spot could hardly be imagined. When they crossed the river, however, they placed no gunboats in the River Paraguay, as they should have done, to protect the landing of their troops, but only ranged their steamers in line of battle along the Paraná, from Itapirú to the mouth of the Paraguay.

From the point of junction of the Rivers Paraguay

* Itati. *Itá*, stone; *tí* (nasal), white: white stone.

and Paraná, to Curupayty one way, and for very many leagues the other way, the banks of the river, for a width of from one to three miles, are all what is called (*Carrizal—i. e.*, land intersected by deep lagoons and deep mud, and between the lagoons either an impassable jungle or long intertwined grass three yards high, equally impenetrable. When the river is high, the whole 'carrizal', with very few small exceptions, is under water, and when the river is low, and the mud has had time to dry, paths may be made between the lagoons.) The only permanent road was from Paso la Patria along the edge of the river to Itapirú and Paranami, and, when the river is high, this is also under water. Two lagoons cross this road and fall into the river, having generally to be crossed in canoes, the horses swimming close to them. These are called the Yuqueri and the Pasopé. Lopez had bridges made over them for withdrawing his artillery from Itapirú. No other road could be made, on account of the numerous and deep lagoons. Going from Itapirú to Paso la Patria, a mile before reaching the latter place, there is a large open piece of flat low ground, which stretches from the river to the village of Paso la Patria. This is crossed by the stream Carayá, which is over six feet deep, and has to be passed by a bridge.

Paso la Patria is a little village standing on the edge of the *terra firma*, from thirty to forty feet above the level of the 'carrizal', and rising from it everywhere by a steep bank, the top of which is the general level of the country outside. Along the edge of this bank, at Paso la Patria, I planned a trench, which, however, dipped into the low ground opposite Lopez' own house, as he would not have it interfered with. The trench was made eleven feet wide and six feet deep, and it followed the general form of the crest of the bank, having various small redans for flanking the curtains, and for obtaining a

fire over the whole accessible front. Its right rested on the Laguna Sirena, and its left on the Laguna Panambí.* It was defended by thirty field-guns, as well as by the infantry, and was altogether a strong position, as it could not be flanked on account of the 'carrizal,' and the ground in front was open for a mile, and crossed by the Carayá stream, which had been made still deeper by means of a dam placed near its fall into the Paraná.

Along the road from Paso la Patria to Itapirú, Lopez had encamped 4,000 men, to harass the Allies on their landing. They were hidden in the woods, and dug holes in the ground to put their-cooking fires in, covering them with a few leaves upon some boughs, which they placed about a yard above the ground. The smoke was thus disseminated, and not visible to the enemy.

On April 16, 1866, General Osorio, the bravest of the Brazilian officers, went about half-a-mile up the River Paraguay with 10,000 men, and landed, entrenching himself immediately. Afterwards 10,000 Argentines landed on the same spot. The first to set foot on shore were 700 of the Paraguayans who had been taken prisoners at Uruguayana.

The Paraguayans immediately attacked them, but were, of course, driven back; they kept up a skirmish, however, all day. Osorio was made Baron do Herbal, for having been the first to cross the river.

On the morning of the 17th Lopez went with his staff some 2,000 yards towards Itapirú; two prisoners were brought with their arms tied behind them, and he ordered them to be released. They were questioned, but knew nothing of the number of the Allies' forces. On the same day the artillery was withdrawn from Itapirú, excepting the two 8-inch guns, which were too heavy, and had to be buried; these were afterwards found by the Allies. On the 18th

* *Panambí*, butterfly.

the Allies took possession of Itapirú, and General Mitre crossed the river and established himself there. He went on a reconnaissance with Generals Flores and Osorio, and was fired at by a Paraguayan guard on the road, but his escort soon came to the rescue.

The passage of the Allies continued for more than a fortnight, before they had finished transporting their cavalry, artillery, stores, &c. All this time their men suffered much from short rations, and had it not been for the activity displayed by General Gelly y Obes, Chief of the Staff, they would often have been entirely without food.

The Allies had now at Itapirú 54 large steamers, 11 small ones, and 48 sailing-vessels. Such a flotilla had never before been seen in the Paraná.

On the evening of April 19 the Brazilian fleet took up their position in front of Paso la Patria, some ships in the inner, and some in the outer channel, ready to bombard the place. Had they opened fire that night, they would have caused serious losses to the Paraguayans. Everyone in the Paraguayan camp knew what to expect next morning, but Lopez gave no orders and made no preparations, in order to keep people in the dark till the last moment. At daybreak he himself alone, allowing no one to accompany him at the moment, lest the enemy should recognise and fire at him, went off on horseback, followed at a distance by his aides-de-camp, who joined him when he was well out of sight of the fleet. He went away without giving a single order as to who was to leave or who was to stay, and left even Mrs. Lynch and his children behind, to look out for themselves. He told no one whither he was going, so that his aides-de-camp spent about half the day looking for him, as also did Mrs. Lynch.

At Paso la Patria there were about 1,000 women, army

followers, and these left in a long stream. General Resquin, who had been left behind, sent off the whole of the army, leaving a garrison sufficient to cover the trenches, and the artillery which defended them. General Bruguez commanded the whole—Lieutenant-Colonel Marcó the infantry, under him.

After sunrise, and when almost everyone had left, the fleet opened fire, and bombarded the place all day long. The garrison was behind the parapets, and could not be injured, and the whole effect of the bombardment was to kill and wound some half-a-dozen men. Wonderfully enough, the Whitworth balls were falling all around the stream of people which was leaving Paso, but not one of them was injured. A 68-pounder shell fell into the telegraph station, where a young man was receiving a despatch, and burst close to him, covering him with ink, and the instrument with dust, but doing no damage to either. The telegraph station was now removed to the north side of the Estero Bellaco, under a tree.

As no orders for leaving Paso la Patria had been given, all the government stores were left, and, by the connivance of the officers, were sacked by the garrison. Large stores of spirits, wines, and eatables were consumed, and the government money-chest, containing only paper-money, was sacked. Some of Lopez' adjutants were sent back to see after his things. His wine-casks had been broken into; and one old man, who had been in charge of the house ever since it was built, absolutely refused to leave, saying that he was too old to accustom himself to any other place, and that he preferred to die in charge of the house. He had to be carried away.

Lopez had gone to a little hill, three miles from Paso, to look at the bombardment. By the middle of the day, his aides-de-camp, the Bishop, Mrs. Lynch, and his body-guard had found him, and he hid them all out of view

behind the hill, allowing only the Bishop and the lady to come upon it, lest he should be seen. Two balls, however, came within about a mile of where he was, and, believing that they had been aimed at him, he left, and went and took up his quarters at the Abasto for the night. Here, being out of the immediate range of the balls, he was quite plucky again. He possessed a peculiar kind of courage: when out of range of fire, even though completely surrounded by the enemy, he was always in high spirits, but he could not endure the whistle of a ball.

After dark we had supper, or rather breakfast, for we had tasted nothing since the previous day, though Lopez himself had had dinner. That evening he busied himself with the plans of the ground, choosing a position in which to await the enemy's attack. The troops which had left Paso la Patria were bivouacking on the north side of the Paso Sidra. Next morning Lopez rode over a good deal of the country, especially along the Estero Bellaco, and the bombardment of Paso la Patria was continued. That night headquarters were established at Nduré's. The 22nd was occupied by Lopez in resting, and the whole of the northern Bellaco was reconnoitred and sketched, and was found to be a better position than the southern one, as the communications were more direct, and the marsh itself more formidable. It was determined to occupy this position, and the army was accordingly marched to the north side of the Paso Gomez, which is on the highroad to Humaitá, and a few corps were detached to defend the minor passes to the left. Headquarters were established at Rojas, as it was determined to evacuate Paso la Patria. The 'Gualeguay' was sunk at Tobati,* by having her pump-valves taken out. Tamandaré, however, found her in a few days, raised her, and returned her to her original owner, the Argentine Govern-

* Tobati. *Tobá*, face; *tí* (nasal), white: white face.

ment. Paso la Patria was evacuated and burned on April 23, early in the morning; and the Allies, who had constructed batteries, and placed 40 guns ready to bombard it from the land as well as from the ships, and who then meant to assault it, took possession in great glee, and rang the church-bells all day long. Lopez had orders of the day printed with his signature, in which he commanded his soldiers to respect the lives of prisoners, and of those who should surrender. These orders were left scattered about Paso la Patria, for the allied soldiers to pick up, in hopes that they might many of them be induced to desert to Lopez.

If, instead of sending his men to fight on the banks of the river, exposed to the fire of the fleet, and where he lost almost the whole of the 20th Regiment of cavalry and the 7th Battalion of infantry, without a possibility of doing the Allies any material harm, Lopez had defended the trenches of Paso la Patria, he would have cut up perhaps eight or ten thousand of the Allies, with hardly any loss on his own side, and probably they would never have been able to take the trenches. It has been his mistake, all through the war, to send small parties of his troops, who were not even properly drilled, to fight in the open field against infinitely superior numbers of well-drilled soldiers, officered by men with a proper military education. His men always came out with glory, but were of course generally completely cut up.

CHAPTER XI.

THE BATTLES OF MAY 2 AND MAY 24, 1866, AND THE DESTRUCTION
OF THE PARAGUAYAN ARMY.

At the end of April, 1866, the positions of the belligerent armies were as follows:—The Paraguayans were encamped on the north side of the northern Bellaco, with about 100 guns; their vanguard, with 6 fieldpieces, on the north side of the southern Bellaco.

The Allies were encamped on the heights running east and west, a mile north of Paso la Patria (where they were entrenching themselves), resting their left flank on the 'carrizal.' Their vanguard, under the command of General Flores, consisted of the Orientals, of a few Brazilians and Argentines, and 12 guns, and was encamped near the south side of the southern Bellaco, their sentries being on the same, and only separated from the Paraguayan sentries by the width of the marsh.

The Estero Bellaco consists of two parallel streams of water, generally about three miles apart, separated by a dense forest of the Yatai* palm, which is on a height of from 30 to 100 feet above the level of the

* The Yatai is a palm without thorns, and grows only to a height of 15 or 20 feet. It bears a fruit very similar to the date (which its leaves also resemble), but although much sought after by those accustomed to it, it has a slight flavour of garlic. The heart of the tree, at the root of the leaves, is most delicious and wholesome; either raw, when it tastes like delicate chestnuts, or boiled, when its flavour resembles that of artichokes. When this heart has been taken from a tree, it dies.

'esteros.' The Bellaco falls into the Paraguay by Laguna Piris, and into the Paraná, about 100 miles to the east. The water of these 'esteros,' as that kind of marsh is called, is beautifully clear and good to drink, and is full of a rush which grows from 5 to 9 feet above the level of the water. The water in all standing ponds, if full of this rush, is excellent to drink. These rushes* grow about two inches apart only, and are consequently almost impassable in themselves. The bottom they grow on is always a very deep mud, and the water over this mud is from 3 to 6 feet deep. The 'esteros' are consequently impassable excepting at the passes, which are places where the rushes have been torn out by the roots, and sand gradually substituted for the mud at the bottom. In these passes, as in the rest of the 'esteros,' the depth of water to be waded through is from 3 to 6 feet. In some places, one or even two or three persons, on very strong horses, can pass through the rushes; but, after one horse has passed, the mud is very much worse on account of the holes made by the first horse's feet. These 'esteros' formed the principal defence of the Paraguayans.

Lopez sent fifty chosen men of his Rifle Guard to the Estero Bellaco, with orders to pick off any officers of the enemy who might come within range. He gave them double rations, and they were to do no guard or fatigue duty. These men killed several of the Allies' field-officers.

On May 2, the armies being in the positions indicated, Lopez sent a force of 5,000 men under General (then

* These rushes are called Pirí in Guaraní. They are of triangular section, have a green skin and white pith. They grow perfectly straight, without a shoot or knot, and at the top have a few small leaves and flowers. They are cut and dried in the sun, and then serve to thatch the sides of huts, or to make rolling-up doors, by tying them side by side to hide thongs. They are also plaited into matting.

Lieutenant-Colonel) Diaz, consisting of 4,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Benitez, a favourite aide-de-camp, to surprise the Allies' vanguard. The infantry went through the Paso Sidra, and the cavalry through Paso Carreta, and they were upon the enemy before he was aware of them. Their artillery had only time to fire one shot from each gun, before it was taken by the Paraguayans, who also took the camp of the Allies' vanguard, and even General Flores' tent fell into their hands. The three Oriental battalions, called 'Florida,' '24 Abril,' and 'Libertad,' were completely cut up, but they fought bravely under their commanders, Flores, Palleja, and Castro, who all behaved like lions, but were overpowered. The 'Florida' battalion had only forty men left, and eight officers out of twenty-seven. The '24 Abril' lost 9 officers and 200 men. The 38th Battalion of Voluntarios da Patria (Brazilian) had only 41 men left; according to the official account it lost 94 dead and 188 wounded. The 1st regiment of the Argentine cavalry lost 100 men. General Flores' division, the vanguard, which included the Brazilian and Argentine troops mentioned, lost 1,600 men and 31 officers. Four 9-pounder rifled brass Lahitte guns, with their ammunition-waggons complete, and three colours, were sent off and received by Lopez while the fight was still going on. These guns were always called Flores' guns, and did the Paraguayans good service during the whole of the war. General Flores himself was all but taken prisoner; but General Osorio went and rescued him, at the cost of a whole battalion of Brazilians.

Had Diaz retired after vanquishing the vanguard, and taken with him the remainder of the captured guns, it would have been a most splendid victory, with very little loss; he chose, however, to go on and meet the whole of the allied army, which was now on the move, and was

coming down upon him. Knowing nothing about the science of war, he was immediately outflanked by General Mitre, who was commanding the Allies, and had to retreat, losing the remainder of the guns he had taken, and many men killed and wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Benitez was killed by a bullet, and left on the field. The 40th Battalion was very much cut up, and had to be almost completely renewed. Altogether the Paraguayans lost 2,300 (killed and wounded), and the Allies about the same number. The latter followed the Paraguayans a short distance over the Bellaco, and took a rifled steel 12-pounder gun, which had burst, and had been left by the Paraguayans, who charged again, and drove the Allies to the other side of the Bellaco. The two armies then resumed their previous positions.

In his official report, Mitre states that the Allies took four guns and three flags, while in reality it was the other side who had done so.

Several Paraguayans of good family, who were not in favour with Lopez, took the opportunity of this battle to desert.

The commander of the 38th Battalion, the commander of the four missing guns, and Brigadier Pesegueiro—all Brazilians—demanded to be tried by court-martial, to prove that they were free from blame, which was granted to them.

After the battle General Flores wrote the following letter to his wife; it was published in the Buenos-Ayorean newspapers:—

‘Camp at San Francisco,* May 3, 1866.

‘*Doña Maria G. de Flores.*

‘MY DEAR WIFE,—Good news as well as bad should always be calmly received. Yesterday the vanguard,

* The Allies christened the village of Paso la Patria ‘San Francisco.’

under my orders, sustained a considerable defeat, the Oriental Division being almost completely lost.

‘Between twelve and one o’clock my camp was surprised by a powerful column of Paraguayans of the three arms. It was impossible to resist forces triple the number of ours, but the Oriental Division succumbed, doing honour to its country’s flag.

‘I comprehended the bad position of our encampment. Some days before the event, Marshal Osorio and myself went in person to the General-in-Chief, to show him the advantage of removing the camp, but Mitre answered us thus: “Don’t alarm yourself, General Flores; the aggression of the barbarians is nil, for the hour of their extermination has sounded.”

‘If, therefore, anyone is responsible for the occurrence of May 2, General Mitre is the man.

‘I can assure you, with all my heart, that during the whole of my campaign against the tyrant Berro, I did not suffer so many annoyances as I have done in the short period we have been on Paraguayan soil. What is passing here does not suit my temper at all. Everything is done by mathematical calculations, and the most precious time is lost in making plans, measuring distances, drawing lines, and looking at the sky: only fancy, the principal operations of the war have been executed on a chessboard.

‘Meanwhile some of the corps have had nothing to eat for three days. I don’t know what will become of us; and if to the critical situation we are in, you add the constant apathy of General Mitre, it may very well happen that going to seek for wool we ourselves may be shorn.

‘Everything is left for to-morrow, and the most important movements are postponed.

‘I have seen activity displayed only on levée-days.

Then there is plenty of it—regiments, bands of music, compliments, and felicitations everywhere; uniforms and rich swords are shown off. And this happens frequently: for one day is the Emperor's birthday, another the Princess Leopoldina's; to-morrow is the anniversary of the Independence of Brazil; and so on continually.

'In future my vanguard will be composed of Argentinians.

'There are no horses or mules for the trains, and no oxen to eat.

'If we remain here a month longer, we shall have to re-pass the Paraná and go into winter-quarters at Corrientes. In this case I shall have the pleasure of seeing you and my friends. I hardly think it worth while to tell you that the Brazilians turned tail in a swinish manner, and there was a battalion which would not charge. My tent was sacked by the Paraguayans. Send me a portmanteau with a few clothes, a large cloth poncho, a straw hat, and two pairs of boots.

'I enclose letters from our son Fortunato. A kiss to my daughter Agapita, and you, my beloved Maria, receive the whole heart of your impassioned old

'VENANCIO FLORES.

'P.S.—I recommend you, Maria, to send me nothing but camp clothes—no finery or dress-coats. Curious to say, they have lately been even wanting to order me how to dress. Did not General Mitre, very politely, tell me that it would be convenient for me to take more care of my person? At first I thought he alluded to the individual, but he afterwards asked me why I did not dispose of a uniform from the Commissariat in order to keep up the dignity of my position. I assure you I do not know how I found patience to hear him. I turned round and left him with the words in his mouth.'

Both sides used to send their prisoners and deserters from the enemy to their advanced guards, to call out to their countrymen to desert, saying they were much better treated where they were than in their own army. These decoy-ducks, however, seldom got anyone to bite.

In the Paraguayan camp, no correspondence was allowed between the army and their relatives; women, however, were constantly coming and going, and these carried news to Asuncion of what was taking place in the camp. People were ordered to consider every day a new triumph for Lopez, and of course they dared not show that they did not think so, though many people in Asuncion every day expected to see the Allies march in. People there were kept well occupied, every family having orders to buy, make, and deliver within a certain period so many dozen shirts and drawers for the army. Almost every day, too, masses were said at the Cathedral 'for the safety and welfare of Don Francisco Solano Lopez.' These masses were paid for by private people.

After the battle of the 2nd May the Allies kept a better look-out. The Paraguayans were always very watchful.

The Paraguayan army, as has been already stated, was encamped in the position which it had been determined should be defended, the vanguard being still on the southern Bellaco, four miles from the main body. The vanguard had accordingly received orders not to dispute the passes of the Bellaco, but to retire when the Allies should make a serious move in that direction. This they did on May 20, crossing the Bellaco in three columns, the Paraguayans retreating to their position in order, and leaving advanced guards in the middle of the northern Bellaco. The Allies marched forward and encamped at the edge of the palm forest, their vanguard, under Flores, occupying the low ground just south of the

northern Bellaco. General Flores' Division now consisted of the few Orientals who were left, two Brazilian divisions, and a regiment of Argentine cavalry. He also had 34 Brazilian guns. The Brazilian army, under Osorio, occupied the left, and were encamped from near Piris Potrero to opposite Flores' left; the Argentines, under Generals Gelly y Obes, Paunero, and E. Mitre (brother of the Generalissimo), occupied the right, extending as far as Rori. The whole allied force now consisted of about 45,000 men and 150 guns, and occupied a front of about three miles. They at once constructed two redoubts, one in their centre and one on their left.

The Paraguayans were encamped from Gomez to Rojas, having small detachments of troops and guns at the passes further to the east, as far as Paso Canoa. Their right rested on the impenetrable jungle-woods and 'carrizal' in the Potrero Sauce. This Potrero is a natural clearing in the jungle, and was only accessible to the Allies by a narrow mouth looking towards the east, and opening on to their camp. This mouth was closed by a small trench, from which attacking columns could be enfiladed all the way down the opening.

The Paraguayans communicated with Potrero Sauce by means of a road cut through the wood. These jungle-woods have many high trees in them as well as small ones, and between them there is an impenetrable undergrowth of shrubs, thorns, and creepers, so that one can hardly see twenty yards anywhere in them. The Bellaco in front of the Paraguayan army was more than six feet deep to the west of the Paso Gomez, till it entered the wood, when it formed itself into a clear running rivulet. The Paso Gomez, and all the passes above it, were more or less four-and-a-half feet deep; and if the Allies attacked the Paraguayans in front, they would have first to cross two equally deep passes, being all the

while under a heavy fire. If they tried to turn the Paraguayan left, they were liable to have their communications cut off.

The Paraguayan army had again been recruited, and numbered 25,000 men. On the day that the Allies drove in the Paraguayan vanguard, I began a trench at Paso Gomez, from the wood on the right, closing into the 'estero' on the left of Paso Fernandez. Trenches were constructed at the other passes, and the Paraguayan position was a very strong one. It was intended to await the attack, and when the Allies began it, to throw 10,000 men on their rear, from the Potrero Sauce, through a road cut in the narrow band of wood surrounding it, of which road the greater part was cut beforehand, leaving only a few yards to break through at the last moment, as shown on the plan. The Allies would probably keep a good look-out on the natural mouth of the Potrero, but this one would be completely hidden, and the Paraguayans not perceived till they were cutting up the rear of the Allies.

Had this plan been adhered to, the whole of the allied army might have been cut up. Lopez, however, changed his mind on May 23, and attacked the Allies on the 24th.

Talking of this battle a year afterwards, Lopez said that he had received news of the plan of Mitre for attacking him on the 25th, and that 'frankly he did not like the plan, and resolved to prevent the execution of it, by attacking him beforehand, in which he succeeded.' At the same time Lopez ridiculed Colonel Marcó for having left the battle when all the bones of his hand were broken by a ball.

On May 20 Lopez removed his headquarters to Paso Pucu, where they remained for two years, and he had several battalions of infantry in reserve there, as

there was some talk of Curupaty being attacked by the fleet. On the 23rd, in the afternoon, Lopez went round and addressed these reserve battalions, reminding them that on the 2nd a handful of them had gone and fetched the enemy's guns and flags, and that if he sent a large number of men, they must finish up the Allies. The men were in great spirits, and said they only wanted the order to go, and that they would finish up the Allies whenever he sent them. He told them to be prepared for the order. He passed almost the whole of the night in talking to and giving instructions to the commanders who were to go. General Barrios, with 8,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, was to attack the enemy's left; General (then Colonel) Diaz the centre, with 5,000 infantry and four howitzers; and General Resquin their right, with 7,000 cavalry and 2,000 infantry. The attack was to be simultaneous, and the signal a gun fired from Paso Gomez, when Barrios was ready, as he had to defile a long way through the woods. He was to march along the edge of the 'carrizal' till he got to Piris Potrero, where he was to form his men. The jungle reaches down to the impassable morasses of the 'carrizal,' all the way along, so that Barrios' men had to go one by one through a sort of undercut path through it, the cavalry having to dismount and lead their horses. Diaz was to have his troops ready as near as possible to the enemy, without being seen by him, and to rush on his centre at the signal; and Resquin was to have his forces formed before daybreak behind the palms of Yataity Corá, where they would be hidden from the view of the enemy. Barrios' and Resquin's cavalry were to sweep round and unite behind the rear of the Allies.

General Barrios was expected to have passed the defile by 9 o'clock, but it was half-past 11 before he had finished, and the signal-gun was fired. The Paraguayans immediately fell on the Allies, attacking their whole line.

Fortunately for the Allies, they happened to be all under arms, General Mitre being about to make a reconnaissance in force on the Paraguayan positions. About three minutes after the signal-gun was fired the engagement became general, and the musketry was so well kept up, that only one continued sound was heard, which was relieved by the cannonading of the Allies.

On the right the Paraguayans drove the Brazilians down to the Bellaco, where they rallied, and forced the Paraguayans back to the woods; here these again rallied, and drove back the Brazilians, this happening three times. The Paraguayan cavalry, which charged the retreating Brazilians, made great havoc amongst them, as did likewise the musketry and artillery of the Brazilians amongst the Paraguayans.

In the centre, General Diaz had to do with General Flores, whose artillery and rifles played upon him with great effect, from the moment he left the wood.

The Allies had a tremendous advantage, not only in being attacked in their own position, and by undrilled men, but in all their artillery being brought into play, while that of the Paraguayans was idle. They had also the advantage of fighting two to one, and of their arms, which were the best. The Paraguayans had hardly any rifles, and most of their muskets were flint-locks; the Allies, on the other hand, had not a single smallarm which was not rifled, and of all their artillery, only a few guns, belonging to the Argentines, were smoothbored.

Diaz had another great disadvantage, having to cross a deep morass in order to get at the Allies; this morass became literally filled with dead. One of his battalions, the 25th, composed chiefly of recruits, got into disorder, and heaped themselves up like a flock of sheep, when they were easily shot down by the Allies' artillery.

On the left, General Resquin's cavalry carried all before

it at the first charge, cutting up and putting to flight the Correntino cavalry, under Generals Cáceres and Hornos, and completely scattering it. Part then charged right up to the artillery, though half of them were left on the field on their way, and took twenty guns, which were turned round to be taken away, when, not being supported in time, the Argentine reserves came into action, and cut them up to the last man; not one would surrender. Resquin's infantry now came into action, but were destroyed—part by the artillery, and the remainder by the Argentine infantry. The reserve of Resquin's cavalry went round the enemy's right, and entered the palm forest, in order to go round and join Barrios in the rear of the Allies; the Argentines, however, formed a front in that direction, and repulsed them. The remnant of one of these regiments, under Major Olabarrieta, however, pierced through the line, after performing prodigies of valour, and he himself, with some twenty men, reached the place where they were to join Barrios; but, as he was already defeated, they had no support, and were obliged to fight their way through the Brazilians again, into the Potrero Sauce. Olabarrieta arrived almost alone, and badly wounded.

At 4 P.M. the firing was over, the Paraguayans being completely defeated, and their army destroyed. The Allies had suffered severely also, but they still had an army left. The Paraguayans left 6,000 dead on the field; the Allies only took some 350 prisoners, all wounded. This was because the Paraguayans would never surrender, but, when wounded, fought on till they were killed. 7,000 wounded were taken into the Paraguayan hospitals from this battle, those with slight wounds not going into hospital at all. Strange to say, the Paraguayans lost only one field-officer, an old major, so fat that he could hardly walk; but almost all who had been in the action were wounded. Major Yegros (who had been imprisoned

and in irons ever since Lopez II. was elected President), Major Rojas, and Captain Corvalan—all of them ex-aides-de-camp of Lopez, and in whom he formerly had great confidence—were taken out of their irons (no one knew why they had been put in them), and sent to fight, degraded to the rank of sergeant; they were all killed in the battle, or mortally wounded. José Martinez—made a cornet at Paso la Patria, lieutenant after the Battle of the Bank, captain after the ‘2nd May,’ when he was wounded—went, at his own earnest request, to this battle also, and, being mortally wounded, was made a major before he died. He was a great favourite of Lopez. Many of the merchants of Asuncion, who had just been recruited for the army, were also among the killed.

The smoke was so great during the engagement, that the Allies did not see what damage they had done to the Paraguayans; and from the difficulty of communication beyond the ‘esteros,’ and of getting any information when everything was in such disorder, Lopez did not know till next day the extent of his losses.

The Allies lost above 8,000 killed and wounded. Among the latter were General Sampayo (mortally), and Generals Osorio and Paunero (slightly)—the first two being Brazilian, and the third Argentine.

Mitre himself commanded the Argentines, paying Generals Flores and Osorio the compliment of not interfering with them during the battle.

Lopez had breakfasted early, and went, with the telescopes, to the cemetery of Paso Pucu, to witness the battle from it, five miles off. He waited there till fire was opened, and then he went down to the trench, although the Bishop (who always rode by his side when he went out) protested that he ought not to expose himself in that way. When he got within three miles of the

fire, he sent his staff one way, and with the Bishop and one aide-de-camp, so that he might not be known and fired at, he went another way, and hid himself in the little wood between Paso Fernandez and Rojas, whence he could see the smoke, but nothing more. He then retired about a mile, and had luncheon; and afterwards, returning to the wood, we met many of the first wounded, who were coming in, but who could give no idea of how the fight was going on. One of these was a boy of 16; he had been shot through the thigh by a rifle-ball, and, besides his musket, was bringing a sword, a lance, a rifle, a cannon-ball, and a fine cloth 'poncho,' as trophies from the battlefield. These he presented to Lopez, who returned him the 'poncho,' and gave the arms to his aides to carry. He made the soldier a corporal, and sent him to the trenches to fight, in case the enemy should attack. After dark, Lopez went to Paso Gomez, to General Bruguez' house, where he was joined by Barrios and Diaz, who gave him the bad news, as far as they themselves knew it. He made the bands of music play all night long, to delude his own people, as well as the enemy, into a belief that he considered he had gained the day. In the *Semanario* it was spoken of as a great and glorious victory. At 10 at night he went to his headquarters at Paso Pucu.

The Paraguayan wounded were still almost all in the woods, and they continued coming in for three days, crawling along gradually. The Allies found one in the woods so late as June 3, eleven days after the battle. He was very nearly dead. A Major Coronel came in, four days after the fight. He had been wounded in the lungs, and sat down exhausted with a soldier, who was also wounded, in the woods near the enemy. Finding that he could not get away, but was going to starve where he was,

he ordered the soldier to kill him, and take his sword and cap to Lopez, and tell him that he had done his duty to the last. The soldier, however, refused, and, at last, the Paraguayans found them and took them away. He recovered afterwards of his wound, but was killed at the Battle of Sauce, in July.

The Allies declared that Lopez made his men drunk with spirits and gunpowder, in order to make them fight as they did. There was, however, no truth in this report; on the contrary, the Paraguayans, through bad management, always had to fight on an empty stomach; as, on days when an engagement was expected, the men were not allowed to leave their corps to go and kill the beef.

In this battle the Brazilians went into action without their colours; and they have always done so since May 2, probably to prevent them from being taken.

The Allies took the four howitzers, 5,000 muskets, and five flags. One of these Osorio sent as a present to Tamandaré; it was taken by killing the wounded sergeant who carried it, and who, after he was wounded, and called upon to surrender, occupied his last moments in tearing the flag into shreds with his teeth, to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy.

The 40th Battalion, which had been so terribly cut up on the 2nd, again suffered almost complete extermination, coming out of the battle with only eighty men. The 6th and 7th Battalions, the two best and oldest in the army, had each only 100 men left.

The wounded, who were likely to be a long time before they could serve again, were sent to Asuncion and Cerro-Leon. Those who would not take long to cure remained in the camp hospitals.

The Allies buried some of their own dead, but they heaped up the Paraguayan corpses in alternate layers, with

wood, in piles of from 50 to 100, and burnt them. They complained that the Paraguayans were so lean that they would not burn.

The 10,000 men who had not been killed or wounded were completely scattered and disorganised, and it was some days before they were again collected.

day by Lopez all over the army, to see if anything was amiss. He was the great favourite of Lopez, who kept him to send wherever any fighting might be going on. General Resquin, though still keeping the title of Commander of the Division of the South, had been, in effect, only Chief of the Staff since Lopez had arrived at Paso la Patria, and he continued to the last with the same title and the same employment.

One of the greatest drawbacks with which the Paraguayans had to contend during the war was the wretched state of their horses. Aides-de-camp and commanders of corps were mounted on jades with nothing but skin and bone, and which could not possibly go beyond a poor walk; and they frequently stopped on the road, not being able to move another step. Business would have been done more quickly on foot, but the numerous lagoons which had to be passed rendered it necessary to have something on which to cross them. Those horses which had the least strength left had been kept for the event of a battle, had been used on May 24.

The reason assigned by the Allies for not moving on and profiting by their victory, was that they had no horses, and could not advance without cavalry; but the fact was that they did not know the real state of the Paraguayan forces.

The Allies lost many men by disease. The Argentines were reduced from 15,000 to 9,000 men, and the Brazilians suffered not less severely. The whole allied army was reduced to 30,000 men.

Porto Alegre left 12,000 men in the province of Rio Grande, to protect it against any new Paraguayan invasion, and marched with 14,000 men and 50 guns. He also brought 14,000 fat horses with him for the Brazilian cavalry.

The Argentines were also totally without horses, as

the Allies had brought all that they possessed into Paraguay, without making any provision of corn or hay. As, in the corner in which they were shut up, there was no pasture, their horses had got into the same condition as those of the Paraguayans. The Argentine Government consequently took effective measures for providing their army with good animals. They decreed that all horses in the Argentine Confederation were contraband of war, and prohibited them from being sent from the towns into the country. They then took the greater part of the carriage, cart, and hack-horses, paying the owners something for them, and sent them to the army.

Two thousand of Porto Alegre's cavalry arrived at Paso la Patria on July 12, and the rest of his forces not long afterwards. A great proportion of his army consisted of mounted infantry. Some of the regiments were armed with rifled carbines and sword-bayonets.

The Allies also worked hard, entrenching themselves, and constructing batteries along their lines. Their ardour for the war was spent. The soldiers had seen their comrades killed around them by thousands, the attack always having been made by the Paraguayans, and they had only advanced where the field had been purposely left to them; now that the Paraguayans had made a real stand, their leaders vacillated, and, instead of advancing, entrenched themselves.

The spirits of the Allied soldiers flagged, therefore, and peace was talked of and wished for in their army. The Brazilian alliance had been distasteful to the Argentines and Orientals, even at the moment when Lopez outraged the former at the beginning of the war; and now the Brazilians were openly run down, especially the fleet, which had boasted so much and done so little, and which now quailed before the little advanced battery of Curupyty.

By the end of June, Lopez had again got his army to number 20,000 (half of these were boys and old men, and soldiers recovered of their wounds), and he felt certain that if the Allies would attack him, he should be able signally to defeat, and perhaps to exterminate them. This, however, they were not at all inclined to do, and so Lopez tried to make them. First he had the idea of getting them to follow back a small attacking party of his own men; this did not succeed, and more serious measures were adopted, which had the desired result.

On July 10, he sent two battalions of infantry to make a feigned attack on a battalion of Argentine infantry, which was doing vanguard duty on the northern side of the Paso Leguisamon. This battalion was speedily reinforced by three others, and followed the retreating Paraguayans a short distance only, after some skirmishing.

Next day (the 11th), in the afternoon, Lopez sent five battalions and two rocket-stands, with two regiments of cavalry, to be kept in reserve, to the same place. The Argentines were this time prepared, and had artillery ready to play upon the Paraguayans, who however suffered little from it. These were at once opposed by five battalions under General (then Colonel) Rivas; General Paunero came up with the reserve; after a great deal of firing on both sides, leaving many killed and wounded, both parties retreated, the long grass being set fire to by the congreve rockets, and the action was suspended just at dark. As soon as the fire was extinguished, General Mitre himself advanced with two battalions, and occupied the field, when the Argentines were again attacked, after Colonel Rivas had come up with five more battalions, and taken the command. After a great deal more firing, the Paraguayans retired about 9 P.M., having lost some 400 killed and wounded, and the

Argentines some 500, including three field-officers. The Paraguayan rockets did much execution.

This was called the Battle of Yataity Corá; it was another instance in which Lopez weakened himself in small combats, where there was no advantage to be gained. Had the Allies been worth their salt, they would have allowed none of the Paraguayans to return, as the latter were in small force, and two miles from their position, while they were close to their own. Perhaps Lopez thought it necessary not to let his men rest too long without fighting, lest they should think he was afraid of the Allies. A great victory, as usual, was claimed by both sides. Major Godoy, the Paraguayan commander, was slightly wounded in the arm. All the time the battle was going on, a heavy cannonade was kept up by both the Paraguayan and the allied batteries.

Some other way was necessary to force the Allies to attack the Paraguayans, and the best proposition was one to mount an 8-inch gun just inside the jungle, at the Punta Ñaró, which was very near the Allies' camp, and almost enfiladed Flores' division. The gun could have been mounted and parapeted without the enemy's knowing it, and would have harassed them so much as to force them to attack it, when it would be defended by the fire from Paso Gomez and from the Potrero Sauce, as well as by its own. This plan, however, was rejected, and a reconnaissance made of the ground between Sauce and Potrero Piris, with the view of digging a trench during the night, from Punta Ñaró to the jungle of Potrero Piris, which trench would compromise the left flank of the Brazilians and the rear of the Orientals.

The woods from Sauce to Piris were not occupied by either army, but the Paraguayans always had a few men exploring them. The woods and the spaces between them were still full of the corpses from the Battle of May 24.

These bodies were not decomposed, but completely mummified, the skin having dried on to the bones, and the bodies looking tawny and thin. The ground was everywhere covered with bullets, cannon-balls, arms, cartouche-boxes, &c., and in some places the trees in the woods were riddled with rifle-bullets. We went through the woods into the Potrero Piris, in the centre of which there was a Brazilian mounted scout, who however did not see anything, and down the Yurui into the wood again, at the point, whence we could see everything, being only 500 yards from the Brazilian trenches.

The Brazilians noticed something particular in the woods close by them, and immediately collected their cattle, thinking it was a cattle-lifting party, from which they had suffered a great deal. They did not, however, fire at us, and the party, among whom were Generals Diaz and Aquino, returned through the open—the enemy's scouts watching all the time, but not firing, as we had an escort of fifty riflemen. I reported that the trench was practicable, and Lopez determined to have it dug at once. The same night, accordingly, all the spades, shovels, and picks in the army, amounting to about 700, were sent down to Sauce, and the 6th and 7th Battalions (which had made the earthworks of the railway, and the trench of Humaitá) were told off to do the work. The greatest silence was enjoined on the men, lest they should let their spades and arms clank, as the enemy would inevitably hear them. A hundred men were posted in skirmishing order, twenty yards from the line to be dug, to cover the work; and in order better to see anyone approaching, they lay down on their stomachs. In some places they were so mixed up with the corpses, that it was impossible to tell which was which in the dark. I had the line marked by the help of a lantern, which was placed at the far end, shaded from the view of the

enemy by a hide, and the workmen were dressed in a line to it. They then laid their muskets on the ground, each man in front of where he was working; and began by digging a trench one yard wide and one deep, throwing the earth to the front, so as to get a cover for their bodies as quickly as possible.

The enemy's lines were so near that we could distinctly hear their sentries' challenges, and even the laughing and coughing in their camp. Though every precaution was taken to prevent a noise, the spades and picks would sometimes clash on that dark night; but, wonderfully enough, the enemy perceived nothing till the sun rose, when the whole length of the trench, 900 yards, was so far advanced as to give a cover to the troops who were working, and who now began to throw the earth to the rear for making the parapet. Four small guns were placed at the new trench near Punta Naró, so as to be easily withdrawn when required.

In the middle of the night the whole camp was lighted up suddenly, and after nearly half a minute a tremendous report, which even shook the earth, announced the explosion of a torpedo of 1,500 lbs. of powder. These torpedoes were sent down to the fleet almost every night, but this was the only occasion on which so much powder was used. The Allies, by this light, ought to have seen the trench which was being made.

As soon as the enemy perceived what was going on they opened fire with their artillery, but made no movement either on that day or the next (15th), on which General Osorio, on account of illness, was relieved by Marshal Polydoro, just arrived for that purpose from Rio Janeiro.

The new trench was in two segments, as is seen on the plan, and Polydoro ordered General Souza to approach the short trench with his division during the night, and

to attack it early on the morning of July 16. General Mena Barreto was to post himself with his division in Potrero Piris, in reserve. This was done, and the Paraguayans retired into the woods, at the rear and left of the small trench, which the Brazilians occupied, and from the woods kept up a galling fire of musketry, which was returned by the Brazilians, though not with much effect, as the Paraguayans were hidden in the woods. An Argentine division, under Colonel Conesa, came up in the middle of the day, to act as a reserve, but hardly entered into action. The musketry, at pretty close quarters, continued all day, and ceased after sixteen hours' fighting, the Brazilians having lost 2,000 killed and wounded, among whom were seven field-officers. The cannonading continued all that night and all the next day.

On the morning of the 18th, the Allies opened a heavy bombardment, during which two Paraguayan powder-waggon were blown up. They then marched to the attack, and the Paraguayans retired into the Potrero Sauce, taking their guns with them. General Bruguez opened fire on their advancing columns, causing them immense losses. At the same time a diversion was made by the Allies on the Paraguayan left, by a few cavalry, but without any result.

General Flores, under whose command the action now came, as it was on his ground, at once ordered an attack to be made on the small trench which defended the entrance to the Potrero Sauce. This attack was made by Brazilians and Orientals, and they went to within a short distance of the trench, when they were obliged to retreat on account of the terrible enfilade-fire of the artillery. Colonel Aquino, who commanded the Paraguayans, followed up the enemy in their retreat, with his infantry, the enemy firing and falling back all the

time. Aquino, when his troops were close upon the retreating enemy, spurred forward his horse, saying that he must kill some of the 'niggers' with his own hands, and attacked their rear alone, cutting down one man, when another turned round and shot him in the waist, knocking him off his horse. The Paraguayans now again retired to the Potrero Sauce, and Aquino, mortally wounded, was sent up to headquarters, where he was promoted to be a General, but died two days after.

General Flores immediately ordered another attack on the trench, and this time an Argentine division joined the Oriental one, all under the command of Colonel Palleja. Half the Paraguayan artillery was dismounted by the rapid firing, and, though great havoc was caused among the enemy by what remained, as well as by the musketry, while they came down the long narrow opening in close column, they gallantly pushed on, and, filling the trench with their dead bodies, they took it and the artillery—killing almost all the Paraguayans who defended it, and planting an Argentine standard on the parapet. Just at that moment reinforcements were coming through the woods for the Paraguayans, and two hundred dismounted cavalry, with nothing but their naked swords, charged the enemy on foot, and drove him out of the position, retaking the guns; and the infantry coming up, the enemy retreated, having previously spiked the Paraguayan guns. The action ended here, as the Allies were satisfied with the number of men they had lost, which (from the 16th to the 18th, inclusive) was above 5,000. Colonels Palleja, Aguero, and Martinez were killed, being one from each of the Allied armies. Besides these, many officers were killed and wounded; among the latter was the Brazilian General Victorino.

The Paraguayans lost 2,500 killed and wounded, Aquino being the only officer of consideration killed.

Tamandaré, the Brazilian Admiral, made a treaty with the Guaycurú Indians in the Chaco, and armed 200 of them. These are a warlike tribe, and have always been at war with Paraguay; they did not, however, help the Allies much, for they walked off with their arms and clothing, and whenever they fell in with a *small* number of Brazilians, killed them, and took their clothes to the Paraguayans to propitiate them.

At a council of war, held on June 30, it was decided that Tamandaré should at once bombard and take the battery of Curupayty. This battery now mounted 25 guns—three of them 8-inch, and six of them 32- and 24-pounders. On July 16, accordingly, the fleet steamed up in sight of Curupayty, without however a shot being fired on either side, and steamed down again, the manœuvre being considered a great victory. General Caceres left the army, and General Netto died.

It was evident that the Paraguayan right-flank at Curupayty was a weak point. Lopez knew this, and proceeded to reinforce it. General Mitre also knew it, and determined to attack it. Had he done so quickly, he would have found no obstacles to his progress; but he gave Lopez time.

Lopez brought down from Corumbá the 10th Battalion, which was in garrison there. It was 700 strong, and was made up of splendid men. At the same time he brought *all* the inhabitants of Corumbá, except the garrison, down to Asuncion. These consisted chiefly of well-to-do merchants and shopkeepers. They had one hour's notice to go on board, and were allowed each to take one box; they were all ordered to leave their doors in Corumbá open. In Asuncion most of them were in a most destitute condition, and they are probably all dead now.

When the Allies arrived opposite Paso la Patria, at the beginning of the year, Lopez had sent *all* the natives

residing near the Paraná to Misiones, and anywhere north of the Arroyo Hondo. These poor people had to leave all they were not able to carry, and many died of want, as they had no means of living, but the small crops of oranges, beans, Indian-corn, and tobacco, which they grew at their own houses, and which they had been obliged to leave behind.

After the Battle of Sauce, the Allies constructed four new batteries—viz., at Piris, Punta Cañapà, and two advanced redoubts. They also cleared away all the woods and palms from the site of their camp, leaving the view unobstructed from their right to Potrero Piris. The Paraguayans also dug a new trench, continuing that of Paso Gomez on through the woods towards the right, and round inside the Potrero Sauce, from thence going round to Chichí. The part in the Potrero Sauce was afterwards deepened, and made into a channel for diverting the course of the Bellaco.

To prevent spies entering or soldiers deserting, the Paraguayan lines had a cordon of sentries ten paces apart. Each of these sentries challenged, in a whisper, everyone who passed, even in their rear, and the sentry at every gun did the same, making a slight clash with the sheath of his sabre, on which everyone had to stop till the corporal of the guard had examined him. Several Paraguayans, of good family, had deserted to the enemy, and Lopez was determined to put a stop to this.

Bolivia and Peru protested against the secret treaty of the Triple Alliance, and Chili seemed inclined to do the same. It was expected in Paraguay that the Pacific Republics would give material as well as moral support to her cause. At the same time the secret treaty was published in the *Semanario*, a Paraguayan weekly paper, and had the effect of convincing many people that Lopez was right in making this war upon

the Allies, and that Paraguay was compelled to fight for her very existence.

By a reference to the map, it will be seen that if the Allies could take Curupayty, they would be in the rear of the remainder of the Paraguayan army. The 'carrizal' extends from the Paraná to Curupayty, and at the latter place is 2,500 yards wide. Curupayty being defended on the riverside by a battery, the Allies would have to land below, if they did not wish to expose their men on the steamers, in compact and defenceless masses, to the fire while running past the battery. Foreseeing this, in order to protect the battery, Lopez made a trench at Curuzú,* 3,000 yards below Curupayty, from a lake on the left, to the River Paraguay on the right, where he placed an 8-inch gun and two 32-pounders on the riverside, as an advanced battery. The battery and trench of Curuzú were garrisoned with 2,500 men, and were armed with thirteen guns altogether. General Diaz commanded it, and the naval captains, Gill and Ortiz, and Major Sayas commanded the artillery.

In front, towards the south of the trench of Curuzú, the only possible road is through a jungle of canes, in which the Paraguayans had formerly cut a path. This widens into a more or less square piece of firm ground close to the trench, one side of which would be about 400 yards. The pathway was enfiladed from the trench, which by land could not be attacked in flank, but was exposed to the enfilade-fire of the fleet, which however could not see it, as it was completely hidden from view in the wood.

The ground between Curuzú and Curupayty is intersected by many lagoons, which spring from the continuation of the lake on which the Curuzú trench rested, and nearly reach to the River Paraguay. The only road, con-

* *Curuzú*, a cross.

sequently, from Curuzú to Curupayty is along the riverside. Between the lagoons mentioned are slight heights, which are covered with long cutting grass, called 'cortaderas,' and with thorny trees called 'aromitas,' whose flowers give out a delicious perfume. The lagoons themselves are about four feet deep, and have deep mud at the bottom, so that, altogether, the ground between Curuzú and Curupayty may be called impassable, except by the road along the riverside, which in its narrowest part would allow four abreast, and near Curupayty would admit of long formations. Curupayty itself stood on a perfectly level plain, being the same on which Humaitá and Tuyucué stand, and was about twenty feet above the general level of the 'carrizal,' and about thirty above the river.

On September 1, 1866, the allied fleet began to bombard Curuzú, but without effect. The battery responded, and several Brazilians were killed in the fleet. On the 2nd the bombardment was continued, and the 2nd Brazilian corps d'armée, under Baron Porto Alegre, numbering 14,000 men, having been embarked at Itapirú, landed near Palmas without opposition, under the protection of seven gunboats, and, marching up the bank of the river, encamped opposite Curuzú. The bombardment was furious that day: some of the vessels came opposite the battery of Curuzú; one of them, the ironclad 'Rio Janeiro,' 6 guns, after having her 4-inch plates twice perforated by 68-pound shot, had a hole blown in her bottom by a torpedo, and sank almost immediately—the greater part of her crew, together with her captain, being drowned. This was the only ironclad which was sunk during the war. The 'Ivahy' had one of her boilers shot through, and all the vessels which came into action were well peppered by the one 8-inch gun and two 32-pounders which formed the battery. A trunnion of the 8-inch gun

was shot off, and it was dismounted. A Paraguayan scout, up a tree, was shot to pieces by a ball, but this was almost the only casualty that day.

On the 3rd the bombardment was renewed, and Porto Alegre attacked the trench at Curuzú, marching gallantly through the enfilade-fire from the trench, and got round it at its left flank, where it terminated in the lake, by walking through four feet of water—taking the garrison in the flank and rear, and making them retreat quickly. In their march up to the trench the Brazilians lost nearly 2,000 men, killed and wounded. When they once turned the position they lost a few more men, and then began the losses of the Paraguayans, who left 700 dead on the field, and had some 1,800 wounded, all of whom they got away. The 10th Battalion, which had never been in action till then, held the left flank of the trench; and when the Brazilians began to get round them, they all took to flight, excepting the commander, who was killed. The rest fought bravely for a short time, hand-to-hand, but were soon overpowered and had to retreat, leaving the artillery in the hands of the enemy. At the moment when the Brazilians entered the position, a powder-magazine blew up, killing twelve of them. A Paraguayan and a Brazilian soldier rushed at each other so fiercely that they were each transfixed by the other's bayonet. Captain Montiel, commander of a dismounted regiment of Paraguayan cavalry, was left for dead on the field, with several wounds, and having recovered his senses, found himself in the rear of the enemy, who were marching towards Curupayty. He crawled along, however, and got through them back to his colours.

Porto Alegre pursued the Paraguayans only a few hundred yards, and then returned, and encamped his army on the square piece of ground which has been mentioned

—to the south of the trench of Curuzú. He was made Viscount for this victory.

Had he followed up the Paraguayans, he might have gone through Curupayty almost without losing another man: he would have taken the battery, and would have still had 12,000 men with which to attack Lopez in the rear, while Mitre and Flores assailed him in front. The Allies would most inevitably have taken the whole of the Paraguayan positions that day, and destroyed their army.

It is said that Porto Alegre asked Mitre for reinforcements, with which to attack the Paraguayans, but that no notice was taken of his request.

Some few of the badly-fired shots from the fleet that day passed Lopez' house at Paso Pucu, and killed a man, a woman, and a child. Lopez immediately left, and went 2,000 yards farther away; no one knew where to find him. Next day he had an earthwork begun, and worked hard at it, to cover his house at Paso Pucu, from the side of Curupayty. It was made 15 ft. high, 36 ft. at the base, 12 ft. at the top, and was 90 ft. long. It was finished in a few days.

The Paraguayans had retreated to about halfway between Curuzú and Curupayty, and had ensconced themselves behind a parapet which had been made, but which was a very bad position, being exposed to the fire of the fleet, and easily turned. It was, however, a short line to defend.

When Lopez received the news of the capture of Curuzú, he upbraided General Diaz, who said that he could not stop the men from running. Lopez then ordered him to decimate the 10th Battalion, to draft the rest into other corps, and to put Major Sayas in irons. The 10th Battalion was accordingly formed in line, and calling out the numbers, beginning at No. 1 and counting up to

No. 10, then beginning at No. 1 again, and so on, General Diaz, who had firing-parties with him ready, had every No. 10 shot in sight of the whole division, which had been strongly reinforced. The officers of the battalion drew lots, and those who drew the long pieces of grass were immediately marched off and shot. The rest were degraded to the ranks, and the whole battalion divided among the other corps of the division.*

The Paraguayans, in their new position, were still invisible to the fleet, on account of the woods between them. The fleet, however, knew more or less where they were, and continually poured in grape upon them, which did little damage, as they were behind a parapet. Curupaty was also constantly bombarded.

Some ditches were dug along the edge of those lagoons which were not deep enough to prevent troops from fording them. After a few days, Lopez got news that two Argentine divisions were preparing to embark at Itapirú, to join Porto Alegre, and it was only then that he became alarmed for Curupaty. He adopted a suggestion which I had made to him some days before, but which he had paid little attention to at the time—viz., to make a trench along the steep bank which goes from the battery at Curupaty, round the ‘carrizal,’ and which is the commencement of the plain of Curupaty. He saw the necessity of getting it done quickly. He said, ‘Things could not look more diabolical than they do.’ He reinforced General Diaz, making up his division to 5,000, and sent more field artillery. It was about September 8, in the evening, that he resolved to occupy the position of Curupaty, digging the trench, which was 2,000 yards long, but which, if done by the time the Allies attacked it, would be of great use to him.

* This I never heard of till two years after it happened—such was the secrecy kept about everything.

It was a pitch-dark night, and the troops and artillery had to be moved to the new position, which was covered with thick jungle-wood, and through which it was necessary to cut a road, before either the men could take up their position, or the trench be marked out. The confusion of that move was terrible—officers looking for their men, and men looking for their officers. A vanguard was left at the trench halfway between Curuzú and Curupayty. If the Brazilians had then come up, they would have had no trouble whatever. The trench had to be begun in the wood, as fast as the latter could be cut down, and without paying attention to more than its general outline. The clay there was extremely hard, and the picks made scarcely any impression on it. At the same time, new platforms were made for guns, both at the trench and on the river—the timber being always cut fresh from the woods, as there was never any in stock. Everything was strained to get the works advanced.

Lopez was now quite persuaded that the Allies were about to give him the *coup de grâce*, and he thought of trying to come to terms with them, or, at any rate, to gain a little time to fortify Curupayty. On September 10, therefore, he sent a letter to President Mitre, simply saying he had the honour to invite him to a personal interview, at any time and place Mitre should appoint. The letter was despatched in the afternoon by Colonel Martinez, with a flag of truce and a trumpeter. Notwithstanding the white flag, and the calls of the trumpeter to attention, the advanced guards kept up a fire on him, and Colonel Martinez had to withdraw. He appeared again next day, when he was well received, being also told that the officer who had fired on him the day before had been severely punished. His letter was taken to Mitre, who went with it to Polydoro's tent, where he also met Flores; and after half-an-hour's

consultation, he wrote an answer, saying he had the honour to accept Lopez' invitation, and naming the next day, at 9 A.M., between the advanced guards at Yataity Corá, for the interview. He then sent for Martinez to the Brazilian headquarters, where he delivered him the letter for Lopez, who the same afternoon returned a reply, that he should be at the place indicated punctually.

Next morning (September 12, 1866), Lopez put on a new kepí, and a new uniform frock-coat, without epaulettes; he also wore grenadier boots and spurs, which he always did, in imitation of Napoleon, and put on gloves. Over all he put his favourite 'poncho,' which was made of scarlet cloth lined with 'vicuña,' and had a fringe of gold all round the border, with a collar magnificently embroidered in gold. His staff were all in the undress camiseta; General Barrios, and his brothers, Benancio and Benigno Lopez, went with him also. He drove in a little four-wheeled American carriage as far as the trench, where he mounted his white horse. On leaving his headquarters with his *cortége*, he took a roundabout road, starting as if to go to Paso Gomez, in order to make the enemy believe that was the only road there was.

On arriving at the pass which leads from the Paraguayan lines into Yataity Corá, it was evident that Lopez feared Mitre would try to entrap him; for he had the Battalion of Rifles hidden at the pass, which is close to where the meeting took place, besides the usual guards there. He took with him, as an ostensible escort, twenty-four men of his cavalry guard, and about fifty officers composed his staff. The latter kept no kind of order, but rode along like a flock of sheep. When Lopez had crossed the path he felt faint, and had a glass of brandy-and-water; he then went on, and in a few minutes Mitre was seen coming, with a small staff and an escort of twenty lancers. Mitre was dressed in a frock-coat and white

sword-belt, wearing an old breakdown wideawake hat, which gave him quite a Quixotic appearance. The escorts now halted, and the two Presidents alone went forward, and, after saluting each other, got off their horses, which were taken by their orderlies, and began the conference, their aides-de-camp being within calling distance. After a few minutes, Mitre sent to invite Flores and Polydoro to salute Lopez, and to assist at the interview. The latter sent word that, since the General-in-Chief was there, his presence was not necessary. Flores went, and was introduced to Lopez, who charged him with being the cause of the war by procuring the Brazilian intervention in Monte Video, to which Flores replied that he was as anxious as anyone to preserve the independence of the Banda Oriental.

Lopez introduced General Barrios and his two brothers, and Mitre introduced General Hornos and some others. After a short time Flores left, and the two Presidents remained alone. They talked together for five whole hours. Lopez had chairs and a table brought, and they alternately sat and walked. Writing materials were produced, and a memorandum written of the interview, stating that his Excellency Marshal Lopez had invited President Mitre to consider whether the blood already spilled in the war was not sufficient to wipe out their mutual grievances; that his Excellency President Mitre had limited his reply to saying that he would place the subject before the Allied Governments, which alone could determine the matter.

During the interview, when Lopez was urging his peaceful sentiments, Mitre stated to him that he could undertake nothing which did not carry out fully the secret treaty, and asked Lopez whether, even in that case, he thought it possible to leave the appeal to arms. Lopez replied that he could never accept the conditions of that treaty, that they could never form a basis for

a treaty of peace, and that if they were the only conditions, he would resist them to the very last. They had some brandy-and-water together, which Lopez sent for, and they exchanged their riding-whips in remembrance of the day. Mitre told Lopez that the operations of the war would be carried on with the greatest vigour. They then parted.

Lopez looked very black after the interview. He stopped and had dinner at a house on the way back to his headquarters, where he was met and consoled by the Bishop and Mrs. Lynch.

Mitre behaved in a most gentlemanly manner throughout the whole affair. Though he had distinctly told Lopez that the operations of the war would not be suspended, the useless daily bombardments were stopped for a day or two, as if in courtesy to the interview which had taken place. Two of Mitre's aides-de-camp obtained permission, during this sort of understood armistice, to go and talk to the Paraguayan officers at the advanced guards. They were seized by Lopez and retained prisoners, dying ultimately of want and illtreatment. The allied soldiers were also allowed to go and talk to the Paraguayans at the advanced guards. These were only sent away.

Lopez profited by the courtesy of General Mitre to commit a horrible outrage on all common ideas of good faith. Some of the emigrant Paraguayans were in the allied army, serving against Lopez, in the Paraguayan Legion. One of these, Don Luciano Recalde, had left Paraguay in the time of Lopez I., the Recaldes being a marked family. Another, Ruiz, on the day of the interview, with one or two others, went to the Paraguayan advanced guards to talk to them, and agreed to return the next day, bringing Luciano Recalde and some others with him, to take 'mate.' This was reported to Lopez, who sent Colonel (then Lieutenant) Montiel to lay an ambush for them,

and to seize them. Next day, accordingly, Montiel and two or three more hid themselves in the grass, and, while the 'máte' was being taken, sprung upon the visitors, securing Ruiz, and another called Soriano, after wounding them badly; Recalde got away. Lopez was much pleased with the capture, and had Ruiz and his companion flogged to death. These Paraguayans were with General Flores, who, when he heard what had taken place, immediately opened a fierce bombardment upon Paso Gomez.

From about this time, any Paraguayans who had been taken prisoners at Uruguayana, and who returned to Lopez' army, were flogged to death, it being said that they ought to have come before.

On the evening of September 12, the day of the meeting between Lopez and Mitre, the 1st and 2nd Argentine corps d'armée were embarked at Itapirú, and sent to Curuzú, everything being prepared for a grand attack on Curupaty.

The Paraguayans worked very hard at the fortifications of the latter place. Eight 8-inch guns were mounted, two exclusively playing on the land front, and four exclusively on the river; the other two, on the right flank, playing both on the land and on the river. Several 32-pounders were mounted both at the trench and in the river-battery, and five 12-pounders and four 9-pounders (Flores' guns, being all the rifled artillery the Paraguayans possessed) were placed in position at the trench. There were, altogether, forty-nine guns and two rocket-stands, thirteen of the guns belonging to the river-battery, and the remainder to the trench. The river-battery was commanded by Captain Ortiz and Major Sayas, who was let out of prison to take part in the action. In the trench, the artillery on the right was commanded by Captain Gill, in the centre by Captain Saguier, and on the left

by Colonel (then Major) Hermosa. General Diaz commanded in chief. The infantry was under Colonel Gonzalez, and numbered 5,000.

On the evening of September 21, Lopez sent me to examine and report upon the state of Curupayty. Everything was just ready. The trench was finished to a depth of six feet and a width of eleven, and the guns were all mounted. A thin abatis was finished all along the front of the trench, and I reported to Lopez that the position was very strong, and could be held with great advantage.

The right of the trench rested on the river, and the left on the Laguna Lopez, care being taken to make it impossible for the enemy to march round through the water and flank the position, as they had done at Curuzú.

Lopez was in bed, unwell, at the time; but the news revived him, and General Diaz soon after arrived in high spirits, so that Lopez gave up desponding, and became eager for the attack.

The great battle took place on September 22, 1866. It was begun by the fleet (which now had eight ironclads) bombarding heavily, two ironclads, the 'Brazil' and the 'Barroso,' steaming up and anchoring in the rear of the battery—doing however very little damage, on account of the height of the cliff. The battery kept up a continual fire on them, leaving them full of indentations. A 150-pounder ball struck one of the Paraguayan 8-inch guns in the river-battery, cutting off the muzzle halfway up the chase, and dismounting the gun. The same shot killed Major Sayas. This gun was afterwards used all through the war, being generally placed at the trenches, where it would be more used for grape.

At 12 o'clock the allied army advanced, in four columns, to the attack—one going towards the Paraguayan left, two towards the centre, and one towards the right—along the bank of the river. The last-mentioned had a

good road all the way, and some of the men reached the trench, two or three being knocked into it. Some of the men of the centre columns also reached the trench, but none of those who were to attack the left got near it.

As soon as the Allies left their camp at Curuzú, the Paraguayans opened fire on them with their artillery. When they came to close quarters, notwithstanding the gallant manner in which they advanced, the Allies were thrown into disorder by the terrible artillery-fire from the Paraguayan trenches, which was crossed upon them from all sides—the enormous canisters of the 8-inch guns doing terrible execution at a distance of two or three hundred yards. Some of the Argentine commanding-officers, on horseback, got quite to the edge of the trench, where they were animating their soldiers, but almost all of them were killed. The column which attacked the right had the best road, but it was subject the whole way to enfilade-fire, and when near the trench had the concentrated fire of canister from many guns upon it. The columns of the centre and left were detained a long time on the road, by the many almost impassable marshes they had to cross.

The Allies placed a field-battery on a small height opposite the Paraguayan left, which however did no damage, and was soon dismantled. They also sent two battalions into the Chaco, opposite the battery, to enfilade the trenches. The Allies kept up a good fire of musketry with their rifles, as soon as they got into range; but only killed or wounded a very few artillerymen, as the Paraguayan infantry sat down behind the parapet till the Allies came within range of their poor old flint muskets, when they got up and opened fire.

The allied soldiers carried fascines, made of rushes and canes, to fill up the trench, and scaling-ladders 15 feet

long. They also carried their saucepans, &c., intending to sup at Humaitá.

When Mitre, who was standing on the ex-Paraguayan trench of Curuzú, saw that the attack was hopeless, he ordered a retreat, immense numbers being left on the field. The loss of the Allies was about 9,000 killed and wounded. The official reports gave them as only 2,000 Argentines and 2,000 Brazilians. There were more than 5,000 left in the hands of the Paraguayans, on the field, and in the hospital at Corrientes alone there were 104 officers and 1,000 men, all Argentines sent from Curupayty. The Argentine official reports give 153 officers, (including 16 field-officers), and 1,843 rank and file, killed and wounded, and the Brazilian give 200 officers and 1,700 rank and file.

Tamandaré's report on the losses of the fleet that day, gives 2 officers and 19 men killed and wounded, but one ironclad alone had 27 *hors de combat*. Tamandaré reported that several of the armour-plates were broken, and that many of their bolts were shot out—also that the timber backing of the plates suffered very much. Two 68-pounders of the 'Barroso' were dismounted, and many balls entered the portholes of the vessels engaged.

The brave Argentine Colonel Rivas was wounded, and was made a General on the field of battle. Colonel Charlone was wounded close to the Paraguayan trench, and four of his soldiers were carrying him away, when a canister-shot killed them all five.

The losses of the Paraguayans were incredibly small—altogether, only fifty-four killed and wounded, the greater number of these having been struck by the bullets from the riflemen in the Chaco. Lieutenant Lescano, a favourite aide-de-camp of Lopez, was killed by one of them, being shot through the neck. Lieutenant Urdapilleta was wounded by them in the arm.

After the enemy had retreated, Lopez ordered the 12th Battalion to go outside the trenches, to gather the arms and spoils, in addition to which they also massacred the wounded. These were asked if they could walk, and those who answered in the negative were immediately killed. Hardly any could walk, as those who were able to do so had already made their way back to their own lines. A Lieutenant Quinteros, who had his knee broken, was asked; when he said that he could not, and the soldier began to load his musket, Quinteros managed to crawl along, and was saved.

About half-a-dozen only were taken prisoners, all the rest being killed. Two Paraguayans, from Uruguayana, were captured, and General Diaz hanged these, on his own responsibility, on trees. One of them was a long time dying, and begged Diaz to have him killed—that he was suffering terribly. Diaz said that was just what he wished him to do.

The 12th Battalion returned, all clothed in Argentine uniform, which had been taken from the dead; and they took many watches, sovereigns, &c., the allied troops having been lately paid. Several battalions were clothed with the uniforms of the dead, and three thousand and some hundreds of Liege rifles were taken in good condition, the greater number having been shot and damaged. A great many sovereigns were brought, which Mrs. Lynch bought up for paper-money. Many drums and bugles were taken, but no colours.

During the bombardment the Brazilian fleet threw about 5,000 bombs. They fired some very beautiful 1-pounder Whitworth rifled balls and percussion-shells. These are so pretty that it would be almost a consolation to be killed by one. The Paraguayans fired about 7,000 rounds of artillery altogether.

General Diaz was on horseback during the whole of the

engagement, and in great spirits, ordering music and *réveillés* to be played.

During this battle, Lopez was at his house at Paso Pucu, and, once forgetting himself, came out beyond his earthwork, when the whistling of a ball was heard, and he immediately made a rush behind it. These displays had no other influence on his people than to make them beg him not to expose himself so much.

At night General Diaz went up, and had a champagne supper with Lopez, who became quite elevated by what he drank, and made a great noise, the only time this happened.

The dead were thrown into the ditches, which have been mentioned as having been dug along the edge of the lagoons in front of Curupayty, being covered only by the water. The lagoons themselves were also full of dead. When the ditches were full, the remainder was thrown into the river. All were stripped, as clothing was very scarce in the Paraguayan army.

At the same time that Curupayty was attacked, Polodoro had orders to assault the centre at Paso Gomez. This he did not do, but contented himself with forming his men outside his trench, in order to make the Paraguayans believe that he was going to advance. Had he assaulted Paso Gomez, he would have been even more fearfully cut up than Mitre was at Curupayty, for he would have been exposed both to a front and a flank fire, and had a worse road than that at Curupayty, and no fleet to assist him. He was very much blamed by the Allies, but, as things turned out, he did quite right.

General Flores, with the allied cavalry, marched round the Paraguayan left, crossing the Bellaco at Paso Canoa, killing and taking some twenty men who were on guard there, and nearly reached Tuyucué,* staying for some

* *Tuyucué*, mud that was: the name of a village.

time on the height just above Paso Canoa. Lopez had several battalions and regiments in reserve at Paso Pucu. These he did not move until the victory was decided at Curupayty, when he sent the 12th Battalion down there to collect arms, and despatched two regiments of cavalry to cut off General Flores—who, however, knew that the attack on Curupayty had failed, and withdrew in time. On the 24th of the same month, Flores went for a short time to Monte Video.

The Argentines were all embarked at Curuzú, and returned to Tuyuti,* leaving only the Brazilians, under Porto Alegre, at Curuzú. These, still numbering about 8,000 sound men, worked vigorously at entrenching themselves.

If Curupayty had been attacked by night, there would have been a chance of success; but there was none whatever in attacking it by day, after giving the Paraguayans all the time they required to fortify it.

After this battle, no more actions of any consequence took place for fourteen months, when the Paraguayans burned and sacked the allied camp at Tuyuti, the Allies remaining perfectly passive till February 1868.

* *Tuyuti*, mud white, or white mud. The name of a pass in the allied camp on the Bellaco, which gave its name to the whole of the site of that camp.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE ALLIES DO NOTHING—CHOLERA—WHITWORTH'S ARTILLERY AND THE OLD SMOOTHBORE GUNS—DEATH OF GENERAL DIAZ—MANUFACTURES IN PARAGUAY—ANNIHILATION OF THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITION TO MATTO-GROSSO.

AFTER the Battle of Curupaty, nothing was attempted on either side for a long time. Lopez had no men to throw away on an attack, and the Allies ruminated upon their defeat.

The fleet daily bombarded Curupaty for eighteen months, thinking nothing of throwing 2,000 shells before breakfast, and their official reports often showed 4,000 a day. Curuzú was also armed with a battery of Whitworth's 32-pounders and 12-pounders, and a battery of Lahitte's 32-pounders, which vomited their fire continually on the devoted Curupaty. All the fire was so badly directed that hardly any damage was done. Certainly not a hundred men altogether were killed and wounded by the fire of the fleet during this time. The Brazilians had all their fuzes cut to a certain length, which, as the fuzes were very bad at first, did not cause the shells to burst at equal ranges. About a quarter of their shells broke in the gun at the moment it was fired, being bad castings, and also being, by Whitworth's system, subjected to a very severe strain: about a quarter did not burst at all, and the remainder exploded at all sorts of distances. The Paraguayans had huts made under cover of the parapets, so that very few men were ever exposed but the soldiers suffered in health from

being kept always behind the parapets. One powder-magazine was blown up by a shell, but luckily little damage was done.

The fleet would sometimes be silent a day—sometimes break out into a furious bombardment at night, when it was very beautiful to watch the trajectory of the shells by their fuzes. The Brazilians would put all sorts of things into their guns besides the shot—such as firebars, pieces of chain, &c.; and once they sent a piece of 2-inch square iron, two feet long.

When the bombardments began, the Paraguayans, who had supplied themselves with horns for the purpose, opened a horrible note, which began at one end of the line, and was successively taken up, right to the other end, making a fearful din. These horns had a small hole at the point, where they were blown, something like a trumpet. They were called ‘túrútútús,’ and irritated Caxias very much.

The fleet had a vanguard of ironclads, which were anchored in range of the battery of Curupayty, though they could not be seen from it, as they were behind a projecting point of wood. They were, however, visible from the extreme right of the battery. This vanguard was relieved every fortnight, when the whole fleet was put in motion, and some of the ironclads came in view of the battery, when they were of course saluted, and always received some small damage. In February 1867, the commanders of the ironclads ‘Herbal’ and ‘Silvado’ were both killed, and a ball went right through the side of the ‘Cabral.’ The ‘Belmonte’ gunboat was once set on fire by a Paraguayan shell, and was saved with difficulty. The hospital ship at Curuzú was destroyed by fire. The steamer ‘Marquez de Caxias’ was burned by accident at Corrientes, in the beginning of 1867.

The ironclad ‘Brazil,’ after the attack on Curupayty,

was sent to Rio Janeiro to be repaired, and did not return till May 1867, at which period there were already twelve ironclads in the fleet.

In January 1867, three ironclads steamed up in front of the batteries and bombarded them, but again retired without having done any damage.

There were some mortar-boats, carrying 13-inch mortars, in the Brazilian fleet, and these, too, continually sent their shells into Curupayty. In December 1866, two small ironclads and a mortar-boat were sent into the Lake Piris, which they were enabled to enter by widening the mouth, to bombard the Potrero Sauce. This was done several times, but without any effect. Nothing was visible from the Lake Piris, except the woods which surrounded the Paraguayan position.

In January 1867, a gunboat went up the Paraná to Itati, to reconnoitre. On its arrival the small Paraguayan guard there retreated to the woods, when the crew of the gunboat landed, and went to the guardhouse, beginning to pick some Indian-corn which was growing close to it. While thus engaged, the Paraguayan guard fell upon them, killing a lieutenant and several of the crew; the rest escaped.

In May 1867, the fleet bombarded heavily, day and night, wasting immense quantities of ammunition.

On December 21, 1866, Admiral Tamandaré was relieved by Admiral Ignacio, to the great delight of both the army and navy, as everyone was tired of the inaction of the fleet, and it had been proved that the ironclads could stay under the fire of the batteries without any very grave consequences. Ignacio, however, only marked the beginning of his reign by doubling the intensity of the bombardment.

The allied army, after the defeat at Curupayty, occupied itself exclusively in fortifying both Curuzú and

Tuyuti. At the former place strong trenches were dug, and a citadel erected, all well armed with artillery. Porto Alegre, the commander, lived, for convenience, on a steamer which lay alongside the shore. The men were very much cramped, and suffered a good deal from the Paraguayan bombardments.

On November 20, 1866, the Marquez de Caxias, 'Marshal of the Army,' arrived to take command of the whole of the Brazilian forces. The fleet was consequently under his command, it having hitherto been a separate power, acting only by the will of the Admiral. Polydoro went back to Brazil. Porto Alegre also amused himself for three months in Brazil, from December to March, leaving General Argollo in command at Curuzú. When he returned, Argollo went to Tuyuti, and took the command there.

After the Battle of Curupayty, General Paunero, with 4,000 Argentines, was sent to quell an insurrection in the Andes, which threatened to give some trouble. With the new contingents, which daily arrived, the Argentine army, in January 1867, numbered 14,000 men. News of these petty revolutions was always conveyed to Lopez, who used to encourage his men by telling them that the Argentines would very soon have to leave the war on that account.

The first act of Caxias, on assuming the command of the Brazilians, was to publish an Order of the Day, prohibiting Brazilian officers from wearing any device whatever, which should distinguish them from the common soldiers, excepting their swords. Their kepis were all to be covered with white, like those of the soldiers. This measure was taken because the Paraguayans used to see when a group of men were officers, and fire at them accordingly. Caxias' other great measure was a promise, which he made in January 1867, to be in Rio Janeiro in the

following May, after having completed the conquest of Lopez. Beyond this, Caxias did nothing for fifteen months.

In September 1866, the first draughts of a new contingent of 20,000 Brazilians began to arrive, and continued coming in slowly. At the end of the same year, 2,000 Brazilians were armed with needle-guns.

General Osorio was marching from Rio Grande, with an army of 12,000 men, with the view of invading Paraguay by the way of Encarnacion, and marching into the heart of it from that place. This was what Porto Alegre was to have done formerly, but neither he nor Osorio carried it out. Had it been done, the war must have been ended by it.

To keep up the spirits of the allied soldiers, a story was told them that there was a revolution in Paraguay; that three of the Uruguayana prisoners had made a journey throughout the country, and, wherever they felt it safe to do so, had spoken to the people, and gained over many to revolt; that 300 of these had taken arms, and were entrenched at Bobi, a place beyond Encarnacion; that Lopez had sent 600 men to follow them up, and that Mitre had ordered General Osorio to go to their assistance. General Castro, the Oriental, believed this story himself, and wrote of it as a fact to a friend.

President Mitre himself left the seat of war in the beginning of February 1867, leaving Caxias as Commander-in-Chief of the allied armies. He was induced to leave, temporarily, by the Argentine revolution, which was assuming alarming proportions. It, however, came to nothing.

People in the River Plate now lost all interest in the war, and it was almost forgotten, as nothing whatever was being done.

Paso la Patria, now called by the Allies Itapirú, became quite a commercial place; and in the camp at

Tuyutì, many shops were erected, and almost anything could be bought for money. Change being scarce, a new system was introduced; silver dollars were cut with a chisel and hammer into halves and quarters, which passed current as half-dollars and quarter-dollars. Theatres were started in the allied camp, and even Maua's Bank had a branch at Paso la Patria.

Double lines of trenches were made at Tuyutì, with many redoubts. A fort was also made at Paso la Patria. Whitworth 32-pounders were placed in the batteries all along the front, and at Potrero Piris, together with mortars, which daily bombarded the Paraguayan camp, doing however no damage.

Brazilian slaves were impressed by the Government and sent to the war, as it was found impossible to recruit any more freemen in Brazil.

Cholera played a terrible part in the war, in 1867. It appeared at Rio Janeiro in February, and at Paso la Patria on March 26. In three days its ravages were fearful all over the army. At Curuzú 4,000 men were attacked, and 2,400 of them, including 87 officers, died. Fifty men there were kept day and night digging graves, working by reliefs. All this was visible from the Paraguayan watch-towers. Porto Alegre behaved very well, visiting his sick day and night.

In Tuyutì it was not quite so bad, yet many fell victims to it. At the beginning of May there were 13,000 Brazilians in hospital. To hide as much as possible this terrible state of things, newspaper correspondents were not permitted in the allied camp.

The plan for Osorio to cross the Paraná at Encarnacion was given up, and he was ordered to march towards Paso la Patria, as Porto Alegre had done; and 2,000 Brazilians were embarked at Itapirù, and sent up the Paraná to meet him, with the view of crossing some-

where between Paso la Patria and Encarnacion. This last idea was also given up, and Osorio, advancing to the head of his army, was met at Itatì by Caxias, in the beginning of May, after which he returned and brought his army to Paso la Patria, where it crossed the Paraná into Paraguay.

On May 29, on account of the great rise of the river, which almost covered the camp, the army of Curuzú had to be embarked, with all its artillery, and was taken round to Tuyutì. It had been encamped for nine months in one of the most unhealthy spots which could have been chosen for it. The stores at Itapirú were also endangered by the rise of the river, and had to be re-embarked.

A battalion of men called the Garibaldinos, which had been encamped in the Chaco since the attack upon Curupayty, was left there. It was on the bank of the river, in the Riacho Quíá.*

Caxias got out a balloon, which cost 15,000 dollars, and a Frenchman was to ascend in it, to view the Paraguayan lines. Just as he was about to go up in it, the balloon caught fire and was burned. The Frenchman was said to have been about to set fire to the Brazilian powder-magazines, and then to escape in the balloon. He was tried by court-martial, and sentenced to death. The sentence, however, was not carried out. Two new balloons were now brought from Rio Janeiro, and an American to manipulate them. One of them was forty feet in diameter, and the other thirty. The first ascent was made in June 1867. The balloon was retained by three ropes, held by soldiers on the ground, to prevent its being carried away. The greatest height it ascended to was 180 yards from the ground. It was moved along by the men, with the ropes, over the whole length of the allied camp,

* *Quíá*, dirty.

being directed by flag-signals from the aëronauts. The balloon was always kept out of range of the Paraguayan guns, which however often fired at it, as it was frequently used, and on one occasion four of the soldiers holding the ropes were wounded. From the balloon the Allies counted 106 guns and three mortars in the Paraguayan lines, besides those in Curupayty and Sauce, which were not visible. Whenever the balloon appeared, the Paraguayans made a great smoke in front of their trenches, to hide them—the fires, with grass to make them smoke, being prepared beforehand.

A telegraph on posts was established between Caxias' headquarters and the battery of Potrero Piris, and another line to Paso la Patria.

Caxias was said, in the allied camp, to receive continually letters from some one in Lopez' camp, informing him of everything which went on there. It is enough to say that it would have been impossible, from the system of espionage, for anyone in the Paraguayan camp to have passed those letters without Lopez knowing it.

All this time the Paraguayans were occupied in fortifying themselves. The trench at Curupayty was continually worked at by the garrison, making it deeper and wider. The parapet and banquette were heightened, and hide huts built against the parapet, in such a manner as not to disturb the fire of the infantry in case of an attack. The batteries on the river were augmented by artillery brought from Humaitá, till they counted thirty-five guns, Humaitá being left with only three 8-inch guns and a few 32- and 24-pounders. Two 24-pounders were sent to the arsenal, where they were bored and rifled to throw 56-pounder shots, and were then sent down to Curupayty. These did not answer well, the range being only 1,500 yards. A large gun, weighing twelve tons, and throwing a spherical 10-inch shot, was cast at Ybycui,

and taken to the arsenal at Asuncion, where it was bored and mounted. This gun was cast from bells contributed by all the churches in the country, and in consequence was called the 'Christian.' It was placed in position at Curupayty.

Many guns were made in the arsenal at Asuncion—some of iron and others of brass, 24-pounders and 18-pounders of iron, and two batteries of brass 9-pounder rifled guns, to fit the 9-pounder Lahitte shells which the enemy sent over in profusion, and the greater part of which did not burst. Two batteries of smoothbore 4-pounders, taken at Coimbra, were rifled to fit the same shot, and five sound old 9-pounder guns were bored and rifled to fit the enemy's Lahitte 32-pounders, and did great execution. One of these five, an iron gun, had a range of 5,300 yards, with 5lbs. of powder, and 15° elevation. There were also four or five batteries of 3-pounder rifled guns made. These guns weighed 3 cwt. each, and threw a long bolt 1½ inch in diameter and 5 inches long. These did not answer very well, probably from the turn of the rifling not being rapid enough. A heavy 56-pounder iron gun was sent up to the arsenal, and bored and rifled to throw a 150-pounder shot. The breech was turned down, and wrought-iron rings shrunk on. The shot were square-headed bolts, chilled (an article about Palliser's shot had been seen somewhere), and were fitted with a soft brass expanding ring. They were exactly like the morions of the dragoons of Lopez' escort, who, from the brass rims on the top of their hats, were called 'Àcà-verá' (or shining heads), and the gun was christened the 'Àcà-verá.' It was placed in position at Humaitá, and, after some service, the breech was blown out. Some old iron guns were cut down into mortars, and had wrought-iron hoops, with trunnions on them, shrunk on. Three were 10-inch, and two 8-inch. A

5-inch brass mortar was also made. Another gun was made of brass, weighing seven tons, and was bored to fit Whitworth's 32-pounder shot, of which the Paraguayans had collected a large stock. This gun was called the 'General Diaz.' It was a very bad casting, and after about sixty shots had been fired from it, the hexagonal bore became so imperfect that it broke all the shells which were fired from it. It was sent back to Asuncion in March 1868, and broken up. Three batteries of rifled howitzers, with a peculiar kind of shrapnel shell, were also made from my designs. These weighed each 12 cwt. and their chambers contained 1 lb. of powder. They threw either a spherical 12-pounder shot, a Lahitte 32-pounder, or the special rifled shrapnel shell made for them, and were capable of being elevated to 35°. They had a range of 5,000 yards. Another levy was made of the remaining church-bells and of all the copper boilers and saucepans in the country, and a 10-ton gun was cast, being bored and rifled to fit Whitworth's 150-pounder shot, of which some thousands were collected, which had been thrown by the enemy. This gun was a beautiful casting, and did good service. It was called the 'Criollo,' or Creole, and was at first mounted at Asuncion.

A road was cut through the wood from Curupayty, going round the edge of the 'carrizal' as far as Sauce, facilitating communications. Curupayty was also nearly united to Sauce by a long trench, which went round by Chichí, at which place a division was encamped with some artillery, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Delgado, in case the Brazilians should attempt to cross from Curuzú, though the marshes in front were utterly impassable for troops.

In March I made a new trench in the Potrero Sauce (where Colonel Roa commanded), with a more regular outline than the old one, and more retired from the woods, which had become thin and passable. The old trench

was deepened, and made the outlet for the Bellaco, which was dammed up where it enters the woods, and caused to flow through its new channel. It was raised six feet by this dam, making the water at Paso Gomez more than six feet deep, and thus rendering that place almost unassailable. The new channel also formed a great obstacle in front of the new trench at Sauce, as it was very deep, and almost too wide to admit of portable bridges being thrown over it. Where the Bellaco entered the old trench, it was dammed up to a height of six feet, by a sluice-gate, which was so arranged that it could be easily opened from the new trench, should the enemy get into the old one and prepare for a rush. In this case the gate would be opened, and the terrible flood of water would carry them all before it into the 'carrizal.' The men in the Potrero Sauce were somewhat harassed by the rifle-bullets, which came in day and night from the advanced guard of the Allies, wounding many men. If the Allies had always bombarded with rifles instead of with cannon, they would soon have finished the Paraguayans. When there was nothing further to be done towards fortifying the front, a trench was commenced from Paso Vai, connecting it with Humaitá, thus completely enclosing the Paraguayan army, and especially protecting it from an attack on that side.

With the view of harassing the enemy, and of enfilading his new advanced redoubts, I commenced a battery at the Yataity Corá pass. The ground was very low, and the terre-plein of the battery was raised six feet. It was made for twelve guns, and to facilitate communication with it, and the withdrawal of the guns in case of an attack, a road was begun across the Bellaco, at Paso Satì. This was made by an embankment on each side, with a bridge in the middle. It was, however, not finished. Various half-sunken parapets were made in the

rear of the battery, to protect by infantry the retreat of the guns. While this battery was being constructed, it was continually bombarded by the enemy from two points, with Whitworth's 32-pounders and with a Krupp's 12-pounder rifled steel gun, which belonged to the Argentines. This latter gun, though a far inferior weapon to Whitworth's, was in much better hands, and made most beautiful practice. It fired almost nothing but percussion-shells, these being so beautifully directed that every shell just went over the battery and into it, where the men were working. There was always a look-out, who gave the word the moment the puff was seen from the gun, which was 2,500 yards from the battery, and as the men had time to get under cover of the parapet, little damage was done. Once a man was rolling a wheelbarrow along in the battery, when one of those percussion-shells struck his high morion and burst in it, singeing his hair and driving some grains of powder into his forehead, without hurting him. His hat was blown almost to pieces (it was of leather), and thrown several yards from him. The moment it happened, he dropped his wheelbarrow, rushed after his morion and put it on again, and seizing the barrow, began wheeling it again with redoubled vigour, to the great delight of his companions, who set up a yell of pleasure.

Not far from Yataity Corá there was a cavalry advanced post, called Piquete Bomba, from the following circumstance. The soldiers having broken off one of the three legs of their cooking-pot, looked for something to prop it up with on the fire. They found a 9-pounder shell which had been fired by the enemy, but which had not burst, and they put that under their pot. As soon as the shell got sufficiently hot, it exploded and sent the dinner flying, to their intense delight. They were cavalrymen, and had not foreseen the *dénoûment*.

If a Paraguayan, in the midst of his comrades, was blown to pieces by a shell, they would yell with delight, thinking it a capital joke, in which they would have been joined by the victim himself had he been capable.

For precision and range, Whitworth's guns are splendid weapons, but they require good gunners. When a Whitworth shell bursts in its flight, all the splinters drive ahead, making a very small angle with the original trajectory. For firing at men behind parapets, therefore, they are not so advantageous as the old smoothbore spherical shells, which spread very much when they explode. If the rifled shells with time fuzes struck the ground before exploding, they would hardly ever burst, as the fuze became choked with earth, and the fire extinguished. One great disadvantage of using rifled shot is, that at all long ranges, when they strike the ground, they ricochet up so high in the air, as to lose all chance of doing any damage after the first graze. The Whitworth bolts appeared to have far greater penetrating power in any hard substance, but less than a smoothbore in a yielding substance like sand.

The Brazilians hardly used percussion-fuzes at all, and had they done so they would have caused some execution with their continual bombardments. As it was, however, the Paraguayan earthworks received only slight injuries, which could be repaired in a very short time.

Whitworth's balls had such a high velocity, that the report of the gun, and the shot flying by, with a peculiar whiff, were both heard at the same moment. The Paraguayans, from the sound these balls made going through the air, called Whitworth's balls 'phews.'

All the telegraph stations had parapets in front of them, to prevent their being put *hors de combat*.

In May 1867, three 8-inch guns were mounted at

Chichí, and a 32-pounder Lahitte, besides some smaller ones, and on the 30th Curuzú was bombarded heavily, both from Chichí and Curupayty. As the garrison was crowded into a very small piece of ground, some damage was done.

In October 1866, Viscount Beaumont, secretary of the French legation in the River Plate, came with a flag of truce into Lopez' lines, bringing despatches, which he was to deliver personally to M. Cochelet, the French consul in Paraguay. After waiting a few days, for M. Cochelet to arrive from Asuncion, he got his answers, and went back again under a flag of truce.

These flags of truce always inspired some hope of peace, and people were very glad to see them. When one appeared at the enemy's outposts, the bearers were made to wait halfway between the lines, till some one was sent by Lopez to receive it. He always sent several officers, not trusting one alone, and they were ordered to go round-about in all sorts of roads, to make the enemy believe those were the only roads into the Paraguayan lines. They would then talk sometimes for two or three hours with some of the allied officers, exchanging cigars, and would then go back and report to Lopez, being expected to repeat every word which had passed between them. On one of these occasions a challenge passed between Colonel Montiel and one of the allied officers, and it was agreed they should fight a duel after the war was over.

At Paso Gomez there was a large powder-magazine, in which was also the laboratory for preparing fuzes, and driving them into the shells. On December 9, 1866, this blew up (the cause being unknown) with a fearful crash, sending the heavy timber roof flying in all directions. Major Alvarenga, chief of the laboratory, a first-rate maker of fireworks, was blown up, and forty-five men besides were killed and wounded. The enemy imme-

diately opened fire upon Paso Gomez, to which General Bruguez replied with vigour, and immediately arranged his men in fighting order, thinking the enemy might profit by a confusion, to attack him suddenly. A great quantity of ammunition was lost by this explosion.

General Diaz used to ride about at Curupayty in the heavy bombardments, to show the men how little he cared for the 'negroes.' Once, during a bombardment, about the end of January 1867, he went in a canoe, with some aides-de-camp, to fish, in sight of, and near to, the fleet. A 13-inch shell burst just over them, cutting General Diaz' leg almost off, and capsizing the canoe into the water. His aides swam to shore with him, and he was taken to his house, and Lopez telegraphed to. Dr. Skinner was immediately sent down, and amputated his leg. Mrs. Lynch went down in her carriage and brought him up to headquarters, where he was accommodated in General Barrios' house, and daily visited by Lopez. His leg, which had been amputated, was put up and soldered in a little coffin of its own, and was kept in his room. After some days, however, General Diaz died, and his body was sent up to Asuncion to be buried, being accompanied by all the inhabitants of the town; many of the ladies, we are told by the *Semanario*, laid their jewels on his tomb, but it does not say what was done eventually with the jewels. Colonel Alén succeeded to the command of Curupayty.

Lopez' birthday was on July 24, and the date of his election to the presidency was October 16. Both days were kept, but the latter was specially marked. On these, as well as on Christmas Day, and on one or two civil feast-days, Lopez held a levée, all the officers who had the uniform being in full-dress. Lopez used to go to church, after which, at his house, all being assembled around him, the Bishop would address him a most complimentary speech, to which Lopez, who was a very good

speaker, would reply at length. After the reception, champagne, beer, &c., were served under the orange-trees, and hundreds of toasts given, only to Lopez, as it was not allowable to toast any other person. He sometimes, however, had something more tangible than an address, to remember the day by. In 1866, a magnificent Paraguayan flag, embroidered in gold, diamonds, rubies, &c., with gold and silver staff and mountings, was embroidered by the ladies of Asuncion ; and an album, bound in solid gold and stones, in a solid gold box with an equestrian statue of gold on it, was made in Asuncion, and sent down by the ladies, as a testimony of their patriotic feelings. The hints and ideas for these things all emanated from headquarters, a lady-friend of Lopez being the medium. No one, of course, dared refuse to contribute towards them.

Next year (1868) the citizens had to make an offering, and this time there was no reserve as to the source of the idea, designs being made by request of the lady at headquarters, and from thence sent to Asuncion, where they were executed. The presents this time consisted of a sword of honour; and a crown of laurel leaves in gold. Lopez sent one of his own swords to be remounted. The hilt was made with a Saint George and the Dragon on the guard, all of gold, with twenty-three brilliants and numbers of other stones in it. The sheath was of solid gold, with relieved arabesques, and the whole was encased in another telescopic sheath, also of pure gold, with a golden statue on the top, and made so that when the telescopic part was shut up, the part which contained the hilt alone was visible, thus making a beautiful ornament on a table. The whole was laid on an immense silver salver. It was brought down for presentation by a commission of about eight, the chief being Don Saturnino Bedoya, brother-in-law of Lopez, and treasurer-general. The workmanship was beautiful. After each of the commissioners had read

an address, and the present had been delivered, Lopez detained his brother-in-law. He never again spoke to him, and gradually treated him worse and worse, ultimately putting him in irons, and torturing him to death; but he was very angry on hearing of his decease, as, had he known that he was dying, he would have had him shot, for the sake of appearances. Two others of the commissioners died in the camp of cholera, and the remainder were drafted into the army. The crown of laurel could not be got ready in time for this presentation, as several designs were made for it, the objection made to them being that the crown 'would be worth nothing,' though between all the leaves were flowers made of diamonds. The crown was to be placed on a cushion, in a gold box which measured eighteen inches long, and fourteen broad. It was suggested that, to make a more valuable present, nothing could be done but to cast a sphere of solid gold, encrusted with brilliants. Lopez, however, afterwards found a more certain way of possessing himself of *all* that was valuable in the country. He seized all the jewels of the women in the following manner:—

It may be premised that all the Paraguayan females, from the highest to the lowest, were possessed of a large quantity of jewellery. Among the better classes were to be found quantities of beautiful pearls and brilliants, jewellery, during the time of the Spaniards, having been the particular article of luxury imported, and constituting almost solely the presents made by Paraguayans to their lady-loves.

A patriotic movement was commenced at the proper instigation among the ladies, some of whom formed themselves into a committee in Asuncion, and invited the other ladies to join them in offering their jewellery to Lopez, to contribute towards the expenses of the war. As in duty bound committees were started in all the towns and villages

throughout the country, declaring their adhesion to the idea. When the offer was made in due form to Lopez, he published an answer, in the form of a decree, thanking them for their patriotism, and saying that the country did not require that sacrifice, but that he would accept one-twentieth part, from which to have a coin struck, commemorative of their offer. Shortly afterwards *all* the jewellery was collected, and the judges of peace called upon everyone, even those who had not volunteered to give it, to deliver up at once the whole of their jewellery. This was done, and it was never again seen, heard of, or enquired after. A design was made for the coin, and four were struck from a doubloon which was melted down.

Another patriotic demonstration was ordered to be made by the women—viz., to beg permission to take up arms and fight by the side of their brethren. The offer was made to the Vice-President at Asuncion, and was declined for the present. Some twenty girls, however, belonging to the village of Areguá, got lances and white dresses with tricolour bands, and a sort of Scotch cap, designed by Mrs. Lynch, and they used to go about Asuncion singing patriotic hymns.

A large hospital was established on the road, halfway between Paso Pucu and Humaitá, and sometimes two thousand sick were in it. Every division had its own hospital as well, in which were only placed men who could stand to their arms in case of need. There were absolutely no drugs, and the doctors had to do their best with the herbs of the country. A separate hospital for distinguished field-officers was erected at Paso Pucu, close to Dr. Stewart's house, consistng of a dozen small huts. In May 1867, the cholera broke out, appearing first at Paso Gomez. It soon spread through the whole army, and made many victims. Two large cholera hospitals were established. Colonel Pereira, chief of the

cavalry, and Colonel Francisco Gonzalez, of Battalion No. 6, died of it, with many other officers and men. Generals Resquin and Bruguez, and Dr. Skinner, were ill with it at the same time, but recovered, as did also many men. Benigno, Lopez' brother, was taken ill of fright, and Lopez himself was laid up for some days in fear of it, thinking he was very ill. From the moment it appeared, the whole camp had orders to fumigate with laurel leaves and grass, and headquarters were in such a continual state of smoke, that it was almost impossible to live there. Lopez felt his utter impotence to contend personally with such a terrible scourge, and he became almost mad, charging his doctors with an intention to poison him, in which charge he was seconded by the Bishop. He let out of prison Padre Maiz (whom he had imprisoned at the time of his election), and published in the *Semanario* a long article signed by Maiz, comparing Lopez to the Saviour, and full of Scripture texts, quoted in support of that view. The *Semanario*, for some time, compared him to the Almighty, and July, the month of his birth, was called 'the month of Christian Lopez.' When he recovered again he contented himself with being called 'the unconquered Marshal.'

The doctors were prohibited from telling the name of the disease which was making such havoc (the average of daily deaths for a long time was fifty), and the soldiers christened it 'Chain.'

The cholera spread through the whole country, and laid low many thousands of people.

As soon as Lopez knew that Osorio had given up the idea of crossing the Paraná at Encarnacion, and was marching towards Paso la Patria, he recalled Major Nuñez from that place, with two battalions of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and six guns—still leaving a garrison of observation. Nuñez was promoted to be

lieutenant-colonel, and was sent as second in command to General Barrios.

A large reserve was formed and encamped round the edge of the Paso Pucu 'estero,' consisting of seven battalions of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and thirty fieldpieces, chiefly rifled. The Paraguayan lines were much exposed to attack from their great length, and the small number of men to defend them, and this reserve was placed in a central position, ready to be thrown on any point in danger.

I was commissioned to present a project for a railway from Curupayty, round by Paso Pucu, to Sauce, with a branch to the left. I took the levels, and made a section which gave no very large quantity of earthworks, but when it was going to be put into execution, it was found that there was not a sufficient quantity of rails.

A Brazilian expedition had been for two years marching into Matto-Grosso to retake it from the Paraguayans, but had contented itself with entering the towns of the interior which had been evacuated by order of Lopez, the Paraguayans holding only the river. The Indians of the province were also armed with rifles, but, instead of fighting with them, used them to shoot their game. In May 1867, however, this column, numbering 5,000 men, under Colonel Camisao, began to march towards Paraguay, hearing that there were no forces left in the north. On getting news of this, Lopez despatched the 21st Regiment of cavalry and two companies of the 12th Battalion of infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Montiel and Major Medina, by steamer to Concepcion, where they united with some 200 cavalry who were there, and marched north, meeting with Camisao already on the south side of the Rio Apa. There was no engagement, but the Paraguayans surrounded them on their march, cutting off all supplies, and taking what little cattle

they had. The cholera broke out at the same time fearfully among Camisao's men, who were living on green oranges and heads of palm-trees; Camisao and the greater part of his men became victims to disease and want, and the Paraguayans fell upon the remainder, taking their baggage, and killing most of them. A very few escaped back to Matto-Grosso to tell the tale. Camisao's men were armed with Jacob's shells to their rifles. The Paraguayans immediately returned to Paso Pucu, a distance of over three hundred miles. The whole affair took only a month. It was kept a secret by Lopez, except to a few around him, but with what object does not appear.

Another force, on July 13, 1867, landed at Corumbá from two steamers, proceeding from Cuyabá, captured it, and re-embarking the same day, returned to Cuyabá, taking some Brazilians with them. The Paraguayans lost 100 men, and Lieutenant-Colonel Cabral, the commander, was killed. The two steamers were followed up the river, and overtaken by Captain Nuñez, in the 'Salto,' who sank one of the Brazilian steamers, the 'Jaurú,' being himself dangerously wounded, and almost the whole of his crew *hors de combat*, from the fire of the Brazilian rifles.

Lopez' version of this affair was, that Cabral had sold the place to the Brazilians, and had, on the day they assaulted it, sent all the sound men into the woods, and removed the guns from the trenches; that when the sick men in hospital saw the Brazilians coming, they all stood to their arms, but were overpowered at first, ultimately driving the enemy away. Lopez further stated that the Brazilians had chopped up Cabral and his priest into small pieces, and had eaten them, in payment for their treachery.

In March, 1867, an attempt at mediation was made by

the Hon. Mr. C. A. Washburn, the American minister, but this will be the subject of a future chapter.

The bombardments all round were a source of pleasure to everybody. The Allies liked the noise, and thought they were doing immense execution. The Paraguayan soldiers liked them, as they got a mugful of Indian corn for every shell or heap of splinters they collected.* Lopez liked them, as he got large supplies of different kinds of shot and shell, and quantities of iron, which was sent to Asuncion and cast into shot, &c. The small splinters were made into canister-shot.

The Paraguayan cavalry was very badly mounted; their miserable animals were continually dying off, and being replaced by wild horses, which the men had to tame. Notwithstanding this, the enemy's infantry could not stand a charge of the Paraguayan cavalry, nor could the Paraguayan infantry compete with the Allies' cavalry, which was well mounted. The Paraguayans had all their horses saddled every morning, and when it was evident that the enemy intended no movement that day, they led their animals outside the lines to feed, and the men collected them some fodder for the night.

In the Paraguayan army not even officers were allowed alone in the vanguard, lest they should desert. Men were also selected from different corps to act as spies. They were chosen for their knowledge of the ground, and their good behaviour. They were never allowed to go alone, but always two or three together. They were treated with special indulgence, receiving extra rations of yerba, corn, &c., to keep them in good temper. They were quickly promoted, and had to do no work but their spying. Lopez often himself despatched spies into the enemy's camp. He did not, however, get much good from them, as when they reported anything not

* They sometimes took shot from their own guns and got the reward for it.

agreeable to him to hear, he used to be angry, and they soon learned always to tell a tale which would please him.

The camp-women had a row of huts built for them at every division, and at Paso Pucu there were two large villages of them. They had sergeants named from among themselves, who were responsible for them. The women were allowed to go all over the camp, except during the time of cholera, when they were obliged to keep to their own divisions. At first they were not allowed to be in the soldiers' quarters after tattoo, but towards the end of the war that order was abolished. They assisted at the hospitals, and washed their friends' clothes. They could not leave the camp without a passport signed by General Resquin. They were allowed no rations, and lived upon what beef the soldiers gave them.

The Paraguayan camp was kept particularly clean. All animals which died were buried, and the barracks were kept well swept out.

The blockade had made many necessary articles very scarce, and these were, as far as possible, replaced by native manufactures. The supply of cotton goods for soldiers' clothing had long since been consumed, and the women had to revive weaving, which just before the war had been almost given up, on account of the cheapness of English cotton goods. The Paraguayan cotton is considered some of the best in the world, as regards strength and colour, and large quantities had been sown before the war, by order of Lopez, who intended to make it one of the exports of Paraguay. It was spun and woven by hand by the women, producing a very good strong broadcloth for soldiers' shirts and drawers. Wool was woven in the same manner into 'ponchos,' stained with different colours; and the fibre of the 'caraguatá,' or wild pineapple, as well as that of the coco-palm, was

woven into shirts and drawers. The women did all the sowing and planting, &c.

Paper had become very scarce. A great quantity was used in Paraguay, as there was always a document executed to show for *everything* which was done. Three new weekly papers were started, besides the *Semanario*—viz., the *Centinela*, in Spanish, with an article or two in Guaraní; and the *Lambaré* and the *Cabichui*, both entirely in Guaraní. The last-named was meant for a representative of *Punch*, but the jokes in it were very wretched, and sometimes scandalous. The *Cabichui* and the *Centinela* were illustrated with woodcuts made by two or three soldiers, from their own drawings, and were cut with a penknife.

Mr. Treuenfeldt, of the telegraph, established a paper manufactory, making some of cotton and some of 'caraguatá,' turning out very respectable paper. All the Government archives were overhauled, and the flyleaves torn off and used for writing. Everything was written on as small a piece of paper as possible. There was a printing-press with the army, where the *Cabichui* was printed. The articles for the *Semanario* were read to Lopez, and when approved were sent to town by telegraph; those which were written in town being sent by telegraph for his approval, the amount of correspondence that went through the wires being thus something marvellous. Pieces of cowhide were scraped and brought to a white surface, and bound up in books for writing journals, &c. Parchment was made from sheepskins, and after some trials was made equal to European parchment. This was used for the commissions of the officers.

Ink was made from a kind of black bean, by extracting the colouring-matter with ashes. Soap was made by every division for its own consumption, by

retired and encamped out of range, placing their vanguard at the Puesto Guayaiví, 2,400 yards from Espinillo. They then set to work to entrench themselves and to erect batteries, bringing some Whitworth guns, which they mounted in their new position.

In expectation of the move of the Allies, Lopez had had a new line of telegraph made from Humaitá, through the 'carrizal,' to Villa Pilar, so that when the Allies cut the line on the highroad, his communications were not interrupted; but he always had the line repaired, to make the Allies believe it was his only one.

The Allies soon established a guard at San Solano, a Government 'estancia,' and only a league from the highroad leading from Humaitá to Asuncion; and they sent out reconnoitring parties of cavalry all over the country, capturing cattle, &c. The river, however, was still open to Lopez' steamers.

The Allies at Tuyucué received their supplies by means of sumpter mules and carts, of which a convoy was despatched every other day from Tuyuti, going along the road at the edge of the Bellaco, in sight of the Paraguayan guards. On August 11, Lopez sent a few cavalymen to pounce upon the convoy, which they did, killing most of the cartmen, and taking some carts into the Paraguayan lines. The escort of the convoy hardly entered into the spirit of the affair, so that there was little fighting on the occasion.

Lopez, as soon as the Allies marched to Tuyucué and threatened his communications, sent and had the Chaco explored, and a road made from Timbó, three leagues above Humaitá, to Monte Lindo, two leagues above the mouth of the Tebicuary. Timbó was the nearest place to Humaitá where a landing could be effected, all the remainder of the bank of the river being 'carrizal.' This road through the Chaco was tolerably straight, and was

fifty-four miles long. It did not follow the course of the River Paraguay, but went inland. The greater part of the road went through deep mud, and five deep streams had to be crossed, besides the River Bermejo. Almost the whole way the road lay between woods, which, long, narrow, and tortuous, are scattered over the whole of the Chaco. The land is perfectly flat, and is intersected by numerous 'esteros.' Posts were immediately established along the whole length of the road.

On August 15, being the day of Our Lady of Asuncion, Admiral Ignacio hoisted the flags of the Triple Alliance, and with ten ironclads, steamed past the battery of Curupayty at 7.30 A.M. He previously issued the following order of the day: 'Brazilians! the protecting saints of this day are Our Lady of Victory, Our Lady of Glory, and Our Lady of Asuncion. With victory and glory, therefore, we will go to Asuncion.'

The vessels received considerable damage in the passage. The commander of the 'Tamandaré,' while passing the battery, opened one of the portholes to fire, but a shot immediately entered, wounding himself, and killing and wounding fourteen of the crew. Her engine was also damaged and stopped, so that she had to be towed by the 'Silvado' and 'Herbal.' A small wooden despatch-boat was taken up behind one of the ironclads.

The passage of Curupayty by the fleet had the effect of making the Paraguayans see that they could do nothing against ironclads with their small artillery. Lopez gave out to the army that he had allowed the fleet to pass Curupayty, in order to starve it out, as it could get no supplies where it lay—between Curupayty and Humaitá—and that it would soon have to repass Curupayty, when he would sink it.

The Allies made a road round through the Chaco, from Riacho Quiá to the fleet between Curupayty and

Humaitá, and laid down a timber tramway for communicating with and supplying their ships.

Five of the ironclads anchored in sight of the Church of Humaitá, and bombarded it for months, as being almost the only object in Humaitá which they could see, and three of the vessels anchored in view of Curupayty, bombarding it from the rear. Between Curupayty and Humaitá, the whole of the ground near the river is impassable 'carrizal,' there being a narrow path along the edge of the river, from which, however, it is impossible to get inland, excepting either at Humaitá or at Curupayty. At this latter place, the cliff of the river is 3,000 yards long, and at the northern end of it, at the commencement of the 'carrizal,' a landing of troops might have taken place. These might have been sent through the Chaco, and landed there by the ironclads, with great advantage. To prevent this, I constructed, in the woods at that point, a small fort, armed with three 24-pounder guns, so mounted that they could fire both in front and to the rear, at the same time that they flanked the ditches of the fort. This fort was constructed, and the guns mounted, close to the ironclads, without their suspecting anything.

Humaitá was almost without a gun, and nearly all the heavy guns were taken from Curupayty, and mounted there, so that the fleet, by its wretched slowness, had to pass the same guns again at Humaitá. The same thing happened to them three times afterwards, so that the artillery, which they should only have had to pass once, was continually carried ahead of them, and they had to run past it four times. Colonel Alén was now sent to command Humaitá, Captain Gill being left in charge at Curupayty.

The 'carrizal' was in the hands of Lopez, from Curupayty to Lake Piris, and it was thought that if a few guns could be mounted secretly somewhere below the wooden

fleet, it might alter the course of the war, as the whole of the supplies of the fleet would be cut off, and it would have to pass down below all the batteries, and the iron-clads would also have to repass Curupayty. I was therefore sent with General Bruguez to see if a road could possibly be found by which heavy, or even light guns could be taken there. It was, however, utterly impossible without making extensive works, for which we had neither the means nor the time.

As soon as the Allies began to entrench themselves at Tuyucué, Lopez had an enormous earthwork begun to protect his house from that quarter. The nearest gun on that side was 7,000 yards off, and afterwards the Brazilians amused themselves with firing at the earthwork with Whitworth's 32-pounders, which went sometimes far over it. This earthwork was 90 feet long, 36 feet wide at the base, and 18 feet high. A roof was constructed on the top of it, under which were placed the telescopes.

Still, considering that he was not safe (a piece of shell once fell on the roof of his house), he had a casemate made, in which he would dine and live when any firing was going on—one shot in any quarter being sufficient to make him get out of bed and go there. This casemate was formed of immense logs of iron-wood, 9 feet long, stuck in the ground side by side, in two rows 9 feet apart, and covered over with larger logs of the same timber. The whole was covered over with 9 feet of earth, and had on each side of it 18 feet of earth. It had a brick floor and hammock rings, from which Lopez used to have his hammock slung. When Paso Pucu was evacuated, this casemate was completely obliterated, the timber being taken to Humaitá, and the earth carried away. This was all done in one night, not a trace of the casemate remaining.

CHAPTER XVI.

PROPOSALS OF PEACE—MEDIATIONS OF MR. WASHBURN AND
MR. GOULD.

THE Hon. Mr. Washburn, minister of the United States in Paraguay, as has been formerly stated, left Asuncion in the beginning of 1865, on leave of absence. On November 1 of the same year he arrived in Buenos Ayres on his return, and after several useless voyages to President Mitre's headquarters, to obtain permission to pass the blockade and return to his post, which permission was not granted him, he went up the river in a steamer of war, being stopped by Admiral Tamandaré; but he declared his intention of continuing his journey, which he did under protest from Tamandaré; and on November 4, 1866, he landed at Curuzú, and with a flag of truce, accompanied by some Brazilian officers, presented himself at the Paraguayan outpost of Curupayty. Having obtained leave from Lopez, and flags of truce having been hoisted by both belligerent parties, he landed with his family and luggage, and went to Asuncion.

On January 1, 1867, General Asboth, U.S. Minister in Buenos Ayres, by order of his Government, offered the mediation of the United States in the Paraguayan war. Receiving no answer, on the 26th he again wrote, enclosing a copy of his first letter, and then received an answer to the effect that the Government of Buenos Ayres was much obliged to him, and that, when it was thought fit, his mediation would be accepted.

Jan. 1867
In March of the same year, Mr. Washburn offered his mediation to Lopez, which the latter accepted, and Mr. Washburn came down to Lopez' camp. On the 11th, having ascertained Lopez' ideas on the subject, he went over to see Caxias, then Commander-in-Chief of the allied army. He went in an American carriage of Lopez', accompanied by several officers, and drawn by the horse-tail escort, as far as the Allies' advanced guards, where he was met by Colonel Fonseca, Chief of the Staff, and proceeded with him on horseback.

Mr. Washburn remained three days in the allied camp, and then returned, not having been able to do anything in the interests of peace, as Caxias told him that no negotiations would be entered into which had not for their base the separation of Lopez from the Government of Paraguay. This Lopez would not hear of, though it was hinted there would be a golden gate for him to go through.

Mr. Washburn was a staunch supporter of Lopez up to the time when the latter began his wholesale atrocities, which was not till the middle of 1868; but from the time Mr. Washburn's mediation failed, Lopez disliked him and annoyed him. Afterwards many calumnies were got up against Mr. Washburn, both by the Allies and by Lopez, charging him with receiving bribes from both sides. There was, however, nothing to bribe him for, even had he wished to be bribed.

In the middle of August, 1867, Mr. Gould, secretary of the British Legation in the River Plate, was sent by Her Britannic Majesty's Government to Paraguay, to try and get the British subjects away. He was not armed with proper credentials, and had no authority to make any threats, but merely to request Lopez to allow them to leave.

He visited the allied camps at Tuyucué and at Tuyutí, to get permission to pass through their lines into Lopez'

camp. On his arrival there (August 18), Lopez had him placed in a little room in the middle of a long hut, the partitions being only made of rushes, through which any one from the two adjoining rooms could easily hear and see what went on in his room. The Englishmen in the camp were, however, allowed freely to visit him, and they made him thoroughly acquainted with the position of all the English residents in Paraguay. Lopez did not give Mr. Gould a direct denial, but the end of the affair was that he only allowed some three or four widows and their children to leave with him. Mr. Gould was, however, allowed no means of communicating with any of the British subjects employed elsewhere than in the camp. Finding his mission was likely to have no results, he (probably at the request of Lopez) framed some conditions of peace, which he believed would be acceptable to the Allies. These conditions were formally accepted by Lopez, through Caminos, his Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and on that understanding Mr. Gould proceeded with them to the allied camp.

The following were the bases proposed :—

1st. A secret and previous understanding will assure to the Allied Powers the acceptance by the Government of Paraguay of the proposals they are inclined to make.

2nd. The independence and integrity of the Republic of Paraguay will be formally recognised by the Allied Powers.

3rd. All questions relating to territories and limits in dispute before the present war, will be reserved for future consideration, or submitted to the arbitration of neutral Powers.

4th. The allied forces will retire from the territory of the Republic of Paraguay, and the Paraguayan troops will evacuate the positions held by them in the territory of Brazil, so soon as the conclusion of peace is assured.

5th. No indemnity for the expenses of the war will be demanded.

6th. Prisoners of war will, on one side and the other, be immediately placed at liberty.

7th. The forces of Paraguay will be disbanded, with the exception of the number necessary for the maintenance of order in the interior of the Republic.

8th. His Excellency the Marshal President, at the conclusion of peace, or the preliminaries thereof, will retire to Europe, leaving the Government in the hands of his Excellency the Vice-President, who, according to the Constitution of the Republic, remains in charge in similar cases.

Great credit is due to Mr. Gould, both for his patient attempts to obtain the liberty of the English, and for the arrangement of these conditions of peace, which were so highly favourable to Paraguay, and were accepted by both sides. Lopez was to leave with flying colours, making peace himself, and thus that great obstacle, his pride, was overcome, as it was scarcely interfered with.

On September 11, Mr. Gould took the proposals to the allied camp, where they were favourably received, and referred to the respective Governments, and Colonel Fonseca (chief of the Brazilian staff) was immediately despatched in a special steamer to Rio, to receive the approbation of the Emperor,

Mr. Gould returned after two days, and after informing Lopez of the state of the negotiations, received a letter from Secretary Caminos, saying that he had *previously* declared that the eighth article could not be even discussed by him, and containing the following paragraph, which, dictated by Lopez himself, shows him in a very ridiculous light:—

‘For the rest I can assure you that the Republic of Paraguay will not stain its honour and glory by ever

consenting that its President and defender, who has contributed so much military glory to it, and who has fought for its existence, should descend from his post, and still less that he should suffer expatriation from the scene of his heroism and sacrifices, as these are the best guarantee for my country that Marshal Lopez will follow the lot which God has in store for the Paraguayan nation.'

The real reason why Lopez, at this juncture, refused the terms which he had previously accepted was, that while Mr. Gould was in the allied camp offering them, he received news of a new revolution in the Argentine Confederation, which he expected would force the Allies to make peace with him on any terms.

Mr. Gould, of course, did not condescend to answer the letter which contained such barefaced lies, and went away in the English gunboat the same day. The captain of the gunboat was made Knight of the Order of Merit by Lopez. Mr. Gould was not treated by Lopez with the respect due to an agent of Her Majesty's Government, and was only received by him at night.

The horrible selfishness displayed by Lopez on this occasion is perhaps without a parallel. The Allies were disposed to grant such terms *for Paraguay* as might have been dictated to them by a conqueror, on the one condition that he should leave the country, and that with every honour. But he preferred to sacrifice the last man, woman, and child of a brave, devoted, and suffering people, simply to keep himself for a little while longer in power. The sacrifices and heroism he speaks of in his letter are all false, as he never once exposed his person, and he had every commodity and luxury which he could wish for.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE ALLIES ATTEMPT TO BESIEGE HUMAITÁ.

DESCRIPTION OF THE COUNTRY ABOUT HUMAITÁ—THE FIGHT FOR THE CONVOY—BATTLES OF ISLA TAYÍ, TATAYÍBÁ, OBELLA, AND GUARDIA TAYÍ—SACKING AND BURNING OF THE ALLIED CAMP AT TUYUTÌ.

HUMAITÁ,* like Curupayty, is situated on a level cliff, about thirty feet above the river, on a sharp horseshoe bend of the stream, to which it presents a concave surface, thus giving the power of concentrating the fire of all the batteries on any point in the bend. The cliff is 2,500 yards long, being bounded by a 'carrizal' at each end, and the village is surrounded by a trench resting at both ends on the river, at the commencement of the two 'carrizals.' This trench is 14,800 yards long, including the redans, which are placed about every 250 yards, and encloses a space of flat pasture-land about 4,000 yards long, and 2,000 yards wide. Going up the river from Humaitá, there is no possible communication with the land before reaching Pilar, on account of the 'carrizal,' with the exception of a cliff called Tayí, fifteen miles above Humaitá, where there is a road leading to the inland highroads. This Tayí † became an important strategic point. The 'carrizal' between Humaitá and Tayí is more or less in the shape of a diamond, with

* Humaitá. *Hu* (nasal), black; *ma*, now; *itá*, stone: the stone is now black.

† Tayí. Greenheart tree.

perpendiculars respectively seven and four miles long, and is called the Potrero Obella. It is totally impassable in most parts, but there are one or two tracks by which it can be traversed. On the land side it is completely shut off by an impenetrable jungle-wood, having only one opening, by which cattle were introduced in large quantities by Lopez, and were taken out, as required, at the Humaitá end. When the river is low, there is a path along the edge of it from Tayĩ to Humaitá, but the Arroyo Hondo has to be crossed in canoes.

Outside the trench of Humaitá, the ground for some leagues is full of morasses, with thin pieces of dry land between them, more especially near San Solano and Tuyucué, but most of the ground near the trench is passable.

In front of Humaitá, on the other side of the river, the land is quite impracticable (though it was passed by Paraguayans) as far as Timbó, which, when the river is high, is completely under water; and thence as far as some three leagues below the mouth of the Tebicuary, no landing can be effected, it being all 'carrizal.' Almost the whole length of the River Paraguay, the very bank is higher than the 'carrizal,' making it practicable to cut a road along the edge of the river, but which could not communicate with the interior."

But to proceed with the account of the war. The supplies for the allied army at Tuyucué were despatched every two days, under an escort of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, from Tuyuti; these went along the road in front of the Paraguayan camp, but on the other side of the Bellaco. At the same time the sutlers' carts went without convoy by another road, behind the palm forest, and out of view of the Paraguayans. Lopez used, however, always to have small parties roving about, and

these would fall upon any isolated company and seize their property. They once made a very useful seizure of a cartload of paper, which, however, they could not bring in the daytime into the Paraguayan camp. They therefore hid all the paper in a wood, taking the cart away to some distance, and every night for a week they went and brought a few reams of the paper, through the enemy's patrols.

Lopez determined to make a pretended attack upon the convoy as it passed, and to lay an ambush for the enemy, who, he supposed, would follow his retreating men. On September 24, therefore—having the night before sent two battalions of infantry to hide themselves behind some rising ground, about halfway between Tuyucué and Tuyuti, and about a mile in front of the Paraguayan trenches—he sent a regiment of cavalry to pounce on the convoy as it passed. An inflated balloon was that day taken with the convoy, and had Colonel Rivarola, who commanded the Paraguayans, been a little quicker, he would have obtained possession of it. A cart or two and a few mules were taken, and after the regiment had retreated across the 'estero,' the enemy came up in force, with five battalions of infantry and three regiments of cavalry, and they made their artillery work upon Rivarola. They crossed the 'estero,' when Rivarola showed his two battalions of infantry, and they then stopped, the infantry of both sides firing at each other for some time. At last the Brazilian cavalry, which was splendidly mounted, charged *in column* the Paraguayan regiment, whose miserable haggard horses could hardly move, and which in line awaited the attack. The Brazilians came on bravely till within 150 yards of the Paraguayans, when the latter made their horses canter to meet them, thus causing the Brazilians immediately to turn tail in a most disgraceful manner, and gallop away.

This was the only movement made on either side, and at length the enemy retired, leaving some 200 dead on the field. The Paraguayans lost only about eighty killed and wounded.

A party of Lopez' men one night went and brought away, bodily, one of the enemy's watchtowers, made of four young trees. The guard at the tower were cut up.

The Paraguayan cavalry, under the command of General (then Major) Caballero, used every morning to go out in the direction of San Solano, about halfway from which they used to feed their horses, at a place called Hermosacué. On October 3, Major Caballero, with his whole force (about 1,000 men), went to reconnoitre as far as Isla Tayĩ, when the enemy sent out some skirmishers to meet him. These were followed by a regiment, which was routed by Caballero, as were three more which came to support the first. Some of the enemy's infantry now came up, and harassed Caballero from behind the clumps of trees, making him retreat. When the enemy's cavalry again began to advance, Caballero charged them, remaining master of the field. The Brazilians lost about 500 men, and the Paraguayans about 300, killed and wounded.

On the 21st of the same month, Caxias prepared an ambush of 5,000 cavalry, all of which were, during the night, hidden behind the different woods scattered over the plain. In the morning, as usual, Caballero came out of Humaitá with his cavalry, and followed up one regiment, which was shown him for a bait, till he was more than three miles from Humaitá, at a place called Tatayibá, when he was in an instant surrounded by the Brazilian cavalry, of whom there were so many, that on the small patches of ground between the 'esteros' they could hardly operate at all. Caballero cut his way along till under the guns of Humaitá, when the enemy left him.

For the whole three miles he was completely surrounded, and was fighting hand-to-hand the whole way. The Paraguayan cavalry suffered most severely, losing 400 dead, 138 prisoners (wounded), and some wounded who were able to ride in to Humaitá. The Brazilians lost some 150 killed and wounded, and some eight officers. The wonder is that a single Paraguayan was allowed to return. Caballero, who had been promoted to lieutenant-colonel for the action at Isla Tayĩ, was now promoted to be colonel, and Lopez decreed a medal to all engaged at Tatayĩbá.* This medal was struck, and presented at the end of the year.

On the same day a diversion was attempted by the Argentines against the Paraguayan vanguard opposite the Angle. The Paraguayans retired, drawing the enemy within the range of their guns, from which the latter suffered some losses.

Lopez had been assembling a large stock of cattle in the Potrero Obella, in anticipation of a siege. The opening to the Potrero through the woods, which has been described, was closed with a trench, and defended by some 200 Paraguayans. There was another road into the Potrero, going from Tayĩ along the edge of the river, and entering the Potrero at Laurel, where Lopez had a trench made, and placed fourteen guns, with a garrison of 600 men, under Major Franco. This trench faced Tayĩ.

On one of their reconnoitring expeditions, the enemy became aware of the trench defending the entrance to the Potrero Obella, from the land side, and determined to obtain possession of it. On October 28, General Mena Barreto, with 5,000 men, was ordered to go and take it. The trench was at the end of a narrow opening in the wood, which the Brazilians had to go down before reaching

* *Tatayĩbá*, a tree, the sawdust of which gives a brilliant yellow dye,

Tebicuary, where he had a battalion of recruits (the 45th), and two squadrons of cavalry, also recruits. He made a trench to defend the pass, and had six guns there. He also had guards at the other passes higher up the Tebicuary. Nuñez had charge of remitting the cattle, supplies, and correspondence through the new road in the Chaco, passing them over the River Paraguay, about four miles above the Tebicuary, at a point called Monte Lindo.

The cattle was taken over the river in various ways. At Monte Lindo the river was 560 yards wide, and the current very rapid. One method was to construct a 'manga'—*i. e.*, two strong fences springing from the edge of the water, about four feet apart, and parallel for a distance of about twenty yards, when they spread out like a funnel. The cattle was driven into the wide end of the funnel, and came out one by one into the water, where some cows were attached to a canoe, which immediately made for the other side of the river, the animals from the 'manga' following those attached to the canoe. Many were drowned, however, by this method. Another was to fasten four animals on each side of a canoe by their horns, and then paddle across; they also tied the animals' legs and horns together, and carried four across *in* a canoe. But the best plan, and the one most used, was a large pontoon towed by a steamer.

When the allied army had first approached Paso la Patria, Lopez ordered all the inhabitants of the coast of the Paraná,* to go to the north of the Arroyo Hondo. When he knew the Allies were going to march to Tuyucué, he ordered all the inhabitants (*i. e.* men, women, and children) to go beyond the Tebicuary, laying waste the whole of the districts of Ñeembucu and Misiones. Most

* In Paraguay, by far the greater part of the population lived in isolated houses, scattered all over the country, and not in villages, being thus enabled to maintain themselves by the produce of their ground.

of the people thus driven out of their homes died of want and hardship.

The country, therefore, between the Allies and the Tebicuary was perfectly deserted. All the poor furniture and belongings of the people were left in the houses, as they could only take with them what they could carry on their heads. The cattle of that tract of country had also been driven away, and only a few small herds were left for the immediate consumption of the army.

The Allies sent various reconnoitring expeditions into this part of the country, and there was some slight skirmishing with the Paraguayans, who were to be found everywhere in small numbers; they took possession twice of the Pilar, and once the Brazilians arrived at the pass of the Tebicuary, exchanging a few shots with Nuñez. One of these expeditions, under Major Ascona, went to San Juan, capturing some cattle and taking a few prisoners; but, returning by the same road, was waylaid by the Paraguayans, under Captain Rojas, who sprang from an ambush, and retook the prisoners and cattle, besides capturing two of the enemy's officers. One of these was a Paraguayan, who had some time since deserted to the enemy. Lopez was in great glee at having caught him; he was brought (badly wounded) to Paso Pucu, where he was nearly beaten to death, and then shot.

Ever since the Allies had marched part of their forces to Tuyucué, Lopez had the idea of attacking Tuyutì, and I was commissioned to make a map of the fortifications of that place. Having formerly made an accurate plan of the whole of the ground there, I was enabled to get through my task with tolerable success. The greater part of the fortifications of Tuyutì was visible from our watch-towers, where I took up my theodolite to make observations. I also saw some of the deserters who came from Tuyutì, and examined them upon the state of the defences.

At length Lopez determined to attack it on November 3. All the arrangements were made on the 2nd. General Barrios was to command the whole expedition, which consisted of 8,000 men, divided into four brigades of infantry, each consisting of four battalions, and two brigades of cavalry, each of three regiments. Barrios was to go with the infantry by the way of Yataity Corá; the brave Colonel Ximenez leading the vanguard, and Colonel Luis Gonzalez being Barrios' second. Colonel Caballero was to take the cavalry farther to the enemy's right, by the Paso Satì. Lieutenant-Colonel Rivarola was his second. It was not intended to hold the place, as Lopez had not men enough to garrison it. The intention was to bring away some of the guns—especially one or more of Whitworth's 32-pounders, which Lopez and everyone else envied extremely—and to cause the enemy to reconcentrate himself towards that point, which was the base of his operations.

Lopez had all the commanding-officers together over the map, and gave them his directions. These were, that they were to be all ready the night before, as near as possible to the enemy's lines, and at the first breaking of day, the infantry were to rush on the Argentine camp, and the cavalry on the Brazilian redoubts at the right; that, clearing everything before them, they were to make their way to Piris, sending the guns back to their own camp as fast as they were taken, and were then to return themselves. After giving these instructions, however, he gave them the order, that when they had entered the enemy's camp, they were to let the soldiers go about and see what they could pick up. When a General can give such an order, he deserves every reverse that may happen to him. The result of this order was that, instead of being a brilliant victory, as it was at first, it turned out a heavy loss for the Paraguayans, as well as for the Allies.

The enemy, keeping his advanced guards so near to his lines, enabled the Paraguayans to get very near them at night, and, even had they been awake and given the alarm, the distance was so short, that the Paraguayans would have been at their trenches before the garrison could stand to them.

On November 3, 1867, Lopez was up before daylight, and watching for the attack. At break of day, the Paraguayans marched on in double-quick step, silently, finding the enemy asleep; one of the advanced guards peppered the Paraguayans after they had passed, but no notice was taken of them, in order to make as little noise as possible. Just as the Paraguayans reached the first line of trenches, two guns were fired, and a few musketry shots also, but the firing immediately ceased. The infantry swept all before it, setting fire, as it went along, to everything, burning the whole camp, and blowing up many powder-magazines. The second line of trenches was taken with equal facility; four battalions of Brazilians, who were doing garrison duty there, were seized with such a panic, that they disbanded and fled to Itapirú, where they hoped to save themselves in the water. In their flight they were accompanied by all the sutlers and merchants of the camp. Ferry-boat fares rose to such an extent that 100*l.* was paid for a passage across the river, and 10*l.* to be taken a little way from the shore.

After taking the second line of trenches, the Paraguayans, who had now reached the 'Comercio,' where all the shops and stores were, disbanded, as Lopez had ordered, and betook themselves to sacking, pillaging, and burning. Porto Alegre *himself* behaved bravely, but his army did not. He assembled some troops to defend the citadel, which was now easy, as the Paraguayans had all disbanded, and from thence poured in fire upon them, killing and wounding many. The wounded immediately

loaded themselves with booty, and returned to the Paraguayan camp. Some Brazilian cavalry, which was encamped near the southern Bellaco, did not move till the Paraguayans had disbanded, when it charged them. The Paraguayans sacked the whole of the camp, as far as the southern Bellaco, in the rear of the citadel, drinking and eating handfuls of sugar, of which they were very fond. At last the Brazilians and Argentines came out of the citadel, and butchered many of the Paraguayans, who were here, there, and everywhere—those who could do so making off with their booty.

The Paraguayan cavalry behaved much better. They arrived at the trenches of the redoubts almost without being heard, turning the garrison out in their shirts. They jumped off their horses, and sword-in-hand scaled the trenches. The commander of one of these redoubts, seeing the Paraguayans were determined on having it, held up a white flag in token of surrender, when Caballero stopped his men, and ordered the enemy to lay down their arms. This they hesitated to do, and he ordered his men to cut them down. The rest now threw down their arms, and Caballero stopped the carnage. The prisoners, all Brazilians, to the number of 249 men and 10 officers, besides Major Cunha Mattos, and the Argentine Major Aranda, together with some six women, were marched off to the Paraguayan camp, under an escort of six Paraguayan cavalry soldiers. The guns were immediately sent forward, towards Paso Pucu. Two other redoubts were stormed and taken by Rivarola and Montiel, the garrisons being put to the sword. The barracks were then set on fire.

As soon as news came of what was going on at Tuyuti, reinforcements were despatched from Tuyucué. General Hornos, with the Correntino cavalry and two Argentine regiments, the Paraguayan Legion, and

General Victorino with his own and another division of Brazilian cavalry, galloped to Tuyutì and engaged the Paraguayan cavalry, at the moment they had finished with the redoubts. The Paraguayan cavalry fought bravely, charging repeatedly through the enemy. The fighting at this point, hand-to-hand, lasted more than an hour, after which they retired, all the fighting being over by nine o'clock. The whole of the enemy's camp, from the centre to the right, was a mass of fire and smoke, occasionally relieved by the explosion of a powder-magazine. The Paraguayans, retreating from Tuyutì, were collected at Yataity Corá, and reorganised, the wounded going right on to Paso Pucu with their booty.

Three flags were taken—two very seedy Brazilian flags, and a beautifully-embroidered Argentine one. Fourteen guns of different calibres, from a 7-inch howitzer to a 9-pounder rifled gun, were taken into the Paraguayan camp. Among these there was a Krupp 12-pounder rifled steel breechloader, which was taken loaded, the enemy not having had time to fire it. A Whitworth 32-pounder had been sent from Tuyutì, but, being a heavy gun, had sunk above the naves of the wheels into the mud of the 'estero,' and not being able to get it out, the men left it there, within rifle-shot from the enemy's trenches.

Lopez was much vexed when he heard that the gun had been left there, and General Bruguez, who was with him, begged to be allowed to go and fetch it. Lopez told him to take two battalions from Barrios, and go for it. He also told him to shoot, on his way, two Paraguayans who had been taken prisoners. Bruguez accordingly went, and had the two Paraguayans shot through their backs, as traitors; and having with difficulty got together two battalions of men, he started for the gun, taking twelve yoke of oxen, and lots of cordage with him. When he arrived there, the Brazilians, who dreaded that

gun being in the hands of the Paraguayans, were already trying to take it back to their trench, with men and oxen. On Bruguez approaching them, they retired, keeping up a terrible cannonade and musketry. Bruguez, however, tackled the gun, and brought it away from under their trenches. He lost some men, including Major Mendoza, of the Artillery. This gun was found to be loaded with two cartridges and no shot, and the copper ventpiece was burned inside, and turned up, so that the cartridge could not be pricked. The gun was brought away just at dark.

The Allies lost about 1,700 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners. Porto Alegre was slightly wounded, and had two horses killed under him. Some carts with clothing, some mules and horses, were taken. The whole camp of the right was destroyed and burned.

The Paraguayans lost about 1,200, left on the field, most of them killed; and about as many wounded returned, so that of the 8,000 men who went, nearly a third were put *hors de combat*. The 40th Battalion was again cut up, its band completely destroyed, and only 100 men of it came back sound; the 20th Battalion, which went into action 460 strong, came out numbering only 76; and of the 3rd Battalion, which was 400 strong, about 100 returned. Besides the field-officer mentioned, three others were left dead—viz., Lieutenant-Colonel Lescano, and Majors Fernandez and Bullo. Colonels Gonzalez, Ximenez, and Rivarola, and Majors Duarte and Montiel, were wounded, but returned.

Brigadier-General Barrios was promoted to be a general of division; but as Lopez, although a marshal, still wore the uniform of a general of division, Barrios was obliged to wear that of brigadier.

A diversion had been made by the Paraguayans, at their extreme right, threatening to attack the Brazilian left.

When the enemy at Tuyucué perceived what was going on at Tuyutì, he sent out five battalions to threaten Espinillo, but they did not come within range.

The spoil brought from Tuyutì by the Paraguayans was immense, and consisted of articles of every conceivable kind. The only artichokes I ever saw in Paraguay were brought from the allied camp that day. A mail had just arrived from Buenos Ayres, and was taken to Lopez, who, on reading one of the letters, said, 'Poor Mitre! I am reading his wife's letter,' and then stated what the letter was about. A box was brought to Lopez, which had just arrived for General Emilio Mitre, containing tea, cheese, coffee, and a pair of boots. New officers' uniforms were brought from a tailor's. Parasols, dresses, crinolines, shirts (Crimean shirts especially), cloth, were brought in large quantities, every man carrying as much as he could. A tripod telescope was brought from one of the watch-towers, and gold watches, sovereigns, and dollars were abundant. One man, who found a bag full of the cut half and quarter dollars, threw it away as not sufficiently valuable for him.

The Allies again set to work to add to the fortifications of Tuyutì. The Paraguayans rejoiced at the victory, and Lopez decreed them a medal, which was struck at Asuncion.

The prisoners who were brought from Tuyutì were put into a prison made expressly for them, by a stockade surrounding a piece of ground, which was partly roofed in. The officers, who had given their parole, were yet sent into this prison with the common men, and suffered so much from hunger, dirt, and exposure, that one of them (a captain) tried to escape, and got into the woods, but was unable to cross the Paraguayan lines. After three days, he was found sitting under a bush, and was taken and shot. To inspire the remainder with a

proper dread of attempting to escape, it was said that fifty of them were marched out and shot. The greater part of those who were now left died of want and illtreatment; a few however survived, and were taken to the Tebicuary.

The two majors who were taken were sent to the Chief of the Staff, in whose house they occupied a room. Lopez sent word to them that he did not wish to treat officers of their distinction like common soldiers, in making them answer interrogatories, and would be satisfied with their each writing out everything they knew about the situation of the Allies.

The whole line of trench from the Angle to Humaitá had been well armed with artillery ever since the Allies had marched to Tuyucué, but they never came within range of it. The 'General Diaz' was brought to Espinillo, and bombarded the camp of Tuyucué once or twice, but was soon *hors de combat*.

The Whitworth 32-pounder which, with its ammunition-waggon, had been brought from Tuyuti, very soon had a new ventpiece put in, and was taken to Curupayty one afternoon, and placed at the right of the battery, whence the wooden fleet was visible, and out of range of any artillery the Paraguayans ever had before. This delightful gun, the long-coveted 'Phew,' however, could go a long way over the fleet, and made capital practice that afternoon, sending the fleet about its business. The 'Belmonte,' among others, received a shot which dismounted her 150-pounder Whitworth, and killed the whole garrison of the gun. In all, the wooden fleet was struck thirty-four times that afternoon, and dropped down out of sight. The gun was then sent to Espinillo, where it was daily fired at the allied camp with some success. Hundreds of balls and shells fired by the enemy had been collected for this gun.

The Krupp 12-pounder had no ammunition with it, and this had to be made at Asuncion. The gun was then taken to different parts of the trench, for amusement, and fired at the enemy.

At the Battle of Tuyutì, the Oriental army, which the day before numbered forty men and a general, was reduced to a general and twenty men.

CHAPTER XVIII.

LOPEZ CONCENTRATES HIS FORCES AT PASO PUCU, AND ESTABLISHES A CAMP AND BATTERY AT TIMBÓ—MITRE LEAVES THE COMMAND IN THE HANDS OF CAXIAS—DEATH OF GENERAL FLORES.

AFTER the Battle of Tuyutì, Lopez, seeing that the Allies continued in possession of Tayĩ, and showed no intention of re-concentrating themselves, determined to withdraw his troops into a smaller compass, and to fortify Humaitá.

He therefore urged forward the work of a trench which I had begun, and which, resting its right in the Laguna Lopez, followed the crest of the height of Paso Pucu, joining on to the old trench at Espinillo. Triangular redoubts were made at the Angle, and at intervals along the trench to Humaitá, the trench itself serving for one side. They were made so as to flank, as far as possible, the intervals of trench between them. The old trench from Sauce to the Angle was left only with guards, and the artillery (150 pieces) removed, the heavy guns being all taken into Humaitá, and a few light ones placed at the Paso Pucu trench. Espinillo, and the rest of the line as far as Humaitá, was left crowded with artillery. Captain Barrios was left with 100 men and one gun at Sauce. Major J. Fernandez, with a regiment of cavalry, guarded the old centre and left. General Bruguez, whose house was now at Espinillo, commanded the whole of the new line.

In the beginning of December a trench was begun at Timbó, in the Chaco, hidden in a wood at the edge of the river. It was first garrisoned with six battalions of infantry and three regiments of cavalry, and was armed with thirty guns, all fieldpieces. It was commanded by Colonel Caballero, who had charge of the communications through the Chaco.

All the camp-women were informed that those who wished to go to Asuncion might do so through the Chaco. For more than a year none had been allowed either to come or go, and many now availed themselves of the opportunity, having to walk the whole way, a distance of about 250 miles.

The General Hospital was removed to Humaitá, where the sick, being continually bombarded, suffered some losses. Dr. Fox, one of the army surgeons, was wounded in the leg by a shell, which burst in one of the wards.

From the point where the ironclads lay at anchor the chain of Humaitá was visible. This consisted of three chains side by side, of which the heaviest had $7\frac{1}{2}$ -inch links, supported on a number of canoes, and on three pontoons. The ironclads fired for three months at these pontoons and canoes, sinking them all, when, of course, the chain went to the bottom, as the river there is about 700 yards wide, and the chain could not be drawn taut without intermediate supports. The chain was thus buried some two feet under the mud of the river, offering no obstacle whatever to the navigation. Some attempts were made to place floats and raise the chain to them, but they proved unsuccessful. From August to February the ironclads bombarded the church, displacing some bricks, and cutting one or two beams in half.

About the beginning of October, M. Cochelet, the French consul, was relieved by M. Cuverville. M. Cochelet was in Lopez' black books, because he would

not visit Mrs. Lynch. When he came from Asuncion, he was placed with his family in a room at Humaitá, exposed to the continual bombardment of the Brazilians, remaining there for some days till the French steamer came for him.

At the beginning of December the Italian Government sent a consul, who, after living for some days under fire at Humaitá, was sent to Asuncion through the Chaco.

Whenever a ball made a hole in Lopez' house at Humaitá, it was immediately repaired and whitewashed, so as to leave no trace, as it was not to be supposed that his house could be hit by the enemy. Two or three small guns, placed in the woods opposite the ironclads at Humaitá, molested the Brazilians whenever they showed themselves on board.

On December 26 the ironclads steamed up within range of Humaitá, to reconnoitre, and then returned to their anchorage.

The steamers 'Tacuari' and 'Ygurei,' which had remained between Humaitá and Tayi, did all the transport work between Timbó and Humaitá, landing and taking in their cargoes opposite the church, and out of sight of the ironclads.

The 'Acá-verá' gun was by this time finished, and brought down to Humaitá, where it was placed in position. The 'Cristiano' was also brought from Curupayty, and mounted at Humaitá.

Small raids were made continually by Lopez' men where they were least expected. One day in December they brought 800 bullocks from behind the enemy's line of communication between Tuyucué and Tuyutí. On another occasion they brought 1,800 head of cattle from near Pedro Gonzalez, and another time carried off from the same place Captain Silva, a Paraguayan who had deserted to the enemy some time before, and who was

serving them as guide. He was thrown into prison, and after answering many questions, was flogged to death.

One of the principal amusements, both in the Paraguayan camp and in that of the Allies, was bombarding each other with Whitworth's 32-pounders. After it was begun by the Paraguayans from Espinillo, the Brazilians brought three of those guns to their lines at Tuyucué, and they used to fire both at our 32-pounder, to try and dismount it, and at Lopez' headquarters. When Lopez had had his dinner, and retired in peace to his casemate, he would order Espinillo to bombard. He always had some officers with telescopes on the top of his earthwork, who sent word to him of everything that went on—every shot which was fired by the enemy, where it came from, where it fell, and whether it burst or not; also every shot from Espinillo, where it was going to, and where it fell and burst. In order to do this properly, the officer at the gun at Espinillo had a number of black letters painted on hide, these letters representing the different parts of the enemy's camp. Thus T stood for Tuyucué, C for Caxias' headquarters, &c. While the gun was being pointed, the telescopes at Paso Pucu were informed, by the raising of a letter at Espinillo, where to look for the shot, and they would be laid towards that spot, Lopez being immediately informed. When the gun was fired, the exact place where the shot fell was seen and reported to him. One of the most favourite marks was Osorio's house. This had a small low earthwork in front; and when his roof had been repeatedly pierced, he had some bales of hay piled upon the earthwork. These were, however, repeatedly disarranged by the Paraguayan fire.

During one of these bombardments the Brazilians set fire to a row of houses at Espinillo, burning the ammunition of a whole battalion of infantry (240 rounds per man), and setting fire to the watchtower which was close by. This

happened just before dark, and the Allies saw the houses burning. Next morning they were amazed at seeing (as they thought) the whole of the houses replaced exactly as they had been before the fire, which they considered as another proof of the omnipotence of Lopez. The fact, however, was that the houses which were burnt down were exactly behind those seen by the Allies, which latter were not burnt at all. Most of the allied generals had their carriages with them, and Lopez was always informed, when they went out, whether they went on horseback or in a carriage.

On January 11, 1868, the flags in the allied camp were hoisted half-mast high, and every half-hour through the day a blank cartridge was fired from a gun in the Argentine camp, and was immediately answered by one in the Brazilian camp. Lopez was in great excitement about this, which was evidently a sign of mourning in the Argentine camp. That morning, too, all the Argentine troops, in parade dress, were marched out, apparently to mass, and Lopez decided that it was Mitre who was dead. To make sure, however, he sent and kidnapped two Argentine sentries that night, who were questioned, but had heard nothing of Mitre's death. They were flogged till they said they knew he was dead. For some time all prisoners and deserters were questioned and flogged till they said Mitre was dead. Lopez was determined he should be dead, and he published his death for some months in his different newspapers. Woe to anyone who should have hinted anything to the contrary! It was, however, the Vice-President of the Argentine Republic, Don Marcos Paz, who died on January 2, and Lopez knew it after a few days. This was one of his inexplicable tantrums.

General Flores, who was in Monte Video, was shot in his carriage, going along the streets, on February 20, 1868, some revolution being on hand.

In consequence of the death of the Vice-President, President Mitre was obliged to retire from the seat of war, and go to Buenos Ayres. He left on January 14, and delegated the command-in-chief to the Marquez de Caxias, much to the sorrow of all the Argentines. Mitre himself was probably glad to get away, as he could make nothing of the Brazilians. When he proposed any movement, Caxias said it was impossible, as, out of 43,000 Brazilians, 13,000 were in hospital. As soon as Mitre left, however, it was found that only 2,500 were in hospital, and the Marquis prepared to gain immortal fame by doing something. What it was to be he could not imagine, but with 50,000 sound men, which the allied army now counted, it stood to reason that he must conquer Lopez, who had only some 15,000. He therefore made a military promenade from Tuyucué to San Solano and back, with the greater part of the allied army, with the view of impressing the Paraguayans with the number of his forces.

The more their enemies, however, the more the Paraguayans would laugh. They used to play all sorts of pranks at night with the Brazilian guards, shooting at them with bows and arrows, and with 'bodoques.' This is a ball of clay, baked in the sun, about an inch in diameter. It is shot from a bow with two strings, which are kept two inches apart by a small stick inserted between them near each end of the strings. The ball is placed on a piece of canvas fixed to the two strings, and is shot by holding the ball with the right thumb and forefinger, like an arrow, only the strings have to be pulled askew, else the ball would strike the bow. This weapon is used by the boys in Paraguay to shoot parrots with.

The Brazilians had a battalion always on guard at an entrenchment at Paso Poi.* Colonel (then Major)

* *Poi*, narrow: the narrow pass.

Rivarola went one night with fifty naked cavalrymen, sword-in-hand, crossed the 'estero,' and fell on the rear of the battalion, cutting up many. The battalion could not use their firearms, as, in doing so, they would have fired on another Brazilian battalion which was coming to their relief.

On another occasion, the Paraguayans kidnapped the corporal of the guard of an Argentine battalion, while he was going his rounds. They took him from between two sentries who were eighty paces apart, the commander of the battalion being at the moment going his rounds. It was done so quickly and quietly, that he was gone before they knew it.

The Argentines used every morning to reconnoitre beyond their lines at Tuyucué, in the direction of the Angle. On February 17, Lopez had an ambush laid for them, commanded by Captain Urbietta. The Argentines passed the ambush, when the Paraguayans fell upon them, and killed and wounded eighty men and four officers. Colonel Giribone, commander of the Argentines, was killed, and his second wounded. Captain Urbietta had his thigh broken by a rifle-bullet, and about thirty of his men were killed and wounded.

Lopez had some idea both of attacking Tuyucué and Tayí, but it was manifest that he could only lose, as both places were strongly fortified, and had plenty of men.

With the view of mystifying the enemy, he had a redoubt made at Cierva, 3,500 yards to the north of Humaitá, and armed with nine fieldpieces; it was garrisoned with about 500 men, under the command of Major Olabarrieta. The enemy naturally supposed this was an important point, and an opening into the Potrero Obella, part of which they had formerly taken, and at the south end of which Lopez still kept his cattle. Such was not, however, the case, as the position was of no use to Lopez.

In the beginning of February, Lopez sent me to start a battery in the Chaco at Timbó. He sent first six 8-inch guns and eight 32-pounders. These were all mounted quickly on the bank of the river, there being no time to make any parapets or powder-magazines before they were called into play. The bank of the river here is low, and liable to be flooded by the river; the platforms were consequently raised three feet above the ground. Captain Ortiz was sent from Curupayty to command the battery.

General Porto Alegre left the army about this time, and General Argollo was placed in command of Tuyuti.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE IRONCLADS PASS HUMAITÁ — CAPTURE OF CIERVA REDOUBT—
EVACUATION AND BOMBARDMENT OF ASUNCION—ATTACK ON IRON-
CLADS BY CANOES — LOPEZ RETREATS TO THE CHACO—ATTACK ON
THE PARAGUAYAN LINES AT ESPINILLO AND SAUCE—EVACUATION
OF THE SAME BY THE PARAGUAYANS.

WHEN the ironclads had passed Curupayty, they did not attempt to face Humaitá, saying it would be impossible to pass its batteries without the monitors which were expected from Brazil. At that time there only were three 8-inch guns, and about twice as many 32-pounders, at Humaitá. Now there were eighteen 8-inch guns between that place and Timbó, nine of which the ironclads had passed at Curupayty, and there was a 130-pounder and a 150-pounder besides.

On February 13, three monitors, which had been built at Rio Janeiro, and had recently arrived at Curuzú, ran past Curupayty at night, suffering very little from the few guns which were left there, and incorporated themselves with the ironclad squadron between Humaitá and Curupayty.

These Rio Janeiro-built monitors were vessels with twin screws, and plated with 4-inch armour-plates on the hull, which only stood about a foot out of the water. Their one revolving turret was covered with 6-inch plates, and armed with one Whitworth gun. The port-hole for this gun was made circular, and barely larger than the muzzle of the gun, which, when it was run out,

was flush with the face of the turret, almost filling the porthole, so that there was absolutely no part of these monitors exposed. The elevation and depression of the gun was obtained by a double carriage, which raised or lowered the trunnions of the gun at will—the muzzle always being at the height of the porthole. So little of the hull was visible that they were very difficult to hit.

On February 18, 1868, at half-past three in the morning, the ironclad squadron began to bombard furiously ; so did the wooden squadron at Curuzú, and one or two gunboats went into the Laguna Piris, and bombarded thence. Tuyucué bombarded Espinillo as hard as it could, and then sent several battalions to fire their rifles as fast as they could towards Espinillo. These were all diversions to the passage of Humaitá, though it is difficult to guess their object, as the 8-inch guns could not very well, at a moment's notice, have marched off to Espinillo.

The large ironclads 'Bahia,' 'Barroso,' and 'Tamandaré,' each with a monitor lashed to her port-side, steamed up past the batteries of Humaitá. The three monitors were the 'Alagoas,' the 'Pará,' and the 'Rio Grande.' The 'Alagoas,' after passing the batteries, was cast loose by her consort, and, having got into a very rapid part of the current, was carried down again some way, and had to steam back. She was out of range of the guns of Humaitá by daylight. The fire of Humaitá was well sustained and true, but the balls flew in pieces on the plates of the ironclads. After passing Humaitá, they went straight on, and ran past the battery of Timbó, on to Tayí.

The battery at Timbó being lower than that at Humaitá, the ironclads suffered almost more from it than from Humaitá. The 'Alagoas,' 'Tamandaré,' and 'Pará' were the most damaged, the first receiving 180 shots, and the second 120. These damages consisted chiefly in the plates being dented and bent, and the bolts started.

The 'Tacuari' and the 'Ygurei' had gone into the Arroyo Hondo, to get out of the way of the ironclads. The garrison of Laurel, which was exposed on the river-side, hid itself while the steamers passed, and then was ordered to retire with its artillery, across the river, to Timbó, which was effected.

Had one or two ironclads remained between Timbó and Humaitá, this could not have happened. Lopez himself, too, would have been unable to get away, and Humaitá would have been really besieged, which was the object in making the ironclads pass its batteries.

Ever since Tayí had been in the hands of the Allies, Lopez' communications with Asuncion had been carried on by telegraph, as far as the Tebicuary, whence they were taken on horseback to Timbó, where there was a telegraph again to Humaitá. A telegraph was begun through the Chaco, but was not finished till March.

As soon as the ironclads had passed Humaitá, Lopez sent orders to the Vice-President at Asuncion, to order the evacuation of the city by ALL the inhabitants, within twenty-four hours, and to declare Asuncion 'a military position.' The Vice-President, of course, issued the decree. People were allowed to take what they could with them, which was in almost all cases only what they could carry themselves, and they were not to return for anything without a passport from the 'Judge of Peace' of the district to which they removed. The seat of government was removed to Luqui, a village on the railway, nine miles from Asuncion, inland. Thither the greater part of the people flocked, many of them having to live in the open air, and many families being crowded into the corridors outside the few houses of the village. They suffered very much from this, as well as from want of food.

All the population on the banks of the river was

ordered to remove inland, to be out of the way of the ironclads.

As soon as Lopez knew that the ironclads were going to attempt to pass Humaitá, he sent Mrs. Lynch to Asuncion, to take out into the country all valuables in his house and in her own. This was done at midnight, in order that it should not be known.

The 'Bahia,' 'Barroso,' and 'Rio Grande' steamed up towards Asuncion the same day they passed Humaitá, with orders to destroy everything they found, and to bombard Asuncion. At Monte Lindo, close to the river, there were some sheds, in which was deposited everything which had to be sent on through the Chaco to the army. There were only a few men at Monte Lindo; and when it was known that the ironclads were coming, their officers gave them leave to sack these sheds, that nothing might be left for the Brazilians. They accordingly took everything away into the woods, where they crammed themselves with the treacle, salt, and Indian-corn meant for the hospitals, leaving the rest there for a future feast. They even took cases of shells, thinking they were something edible. When the ironclads arrived here, they landed some men, and set fire to the sheds, which now only contained some dried beef, full of worms. They then went on, and presently came within sight of the 'Pirabebé,' which was towing a schooner up to Asuncion. She did not expect these visitors, and was out of firewood, which was the only fuel burned by the Paraguayan steamers since the commencement of the blockade. She had to burn all her bulwarks, and all her crew's chests, to get up steam with to escape, and she had to sink her schooner, which the Brazilians claim to have taken and sunk. She got up beyond Asuncion in time. When the three ironclads hove in sight of Asuncion, on February 22, they commenced firing at it; but they did not go sufficiently close to

do any damage to the arsenal, which was in full work, because, on their seeming inclined to go too near, the 'Criollo' threw three shots at them, which all missed; but the ironclads had seen enough, and returned down the river. They had thrown about sixty shells into Asuncion. On their way down, they stopped again at Monte Lindo, where not a soul was to be seen; but they fired a few rounds of grape into the woods, and then returned to Tayĩ. On their way down, Nuñez laid an ambush of two guns and a few infantry in the woods, doing them some little damage.

The Allies had to transport overland to Tayĩ all supplies and ammunition for their ironclads. They had to pay 2*l.* 10*s.* for the transport of a 150-pounder shot, and 3*l.* for the carriage of a ton of coal.

On the same morning that the ironclads forced Humaitá, Caxias with 8,000 men attacked the redoubt at Cierva. His declared object in doing this was to cut off the garrison of Laurel, which shows that he had not learnt much of the topography of the place, although the Brazilians had held the ground in the vicinity for some time. There was no possibility of getting from Laurel to Cierva, without going round either by Humaitá or by Tayĩ.

At daylight Caxias sent his first attack, headed by the famous needle-guns. These did not do much execution, as the Paraguayans were behind parapets, and poured into the Brazilian columns such a fire of grape and canister, at close quarters, that the needle-gun men, the hope of the Brazilian army, were thrown back, and completely disbanded. Another column was immediately sent forward, and that, as well as a third, and a fourth, had no better luck than the first. While the fourth column was retreating, a Paraguayan in the redoubt was heard to call out to his officer, that the artillery ammunition was all finished,

which encouraged the Brazilians to reorganise and return to the attack. While they were doing this, Major Olabarrieta retreated with his men on board the ' Tacuari ' and ' Ygurei,' which were close at hand, and had assisted with their fire. After exchanging shots for some time with the Brazilians, the two steamers went down to Humaitá, and discharged the troops there.

The Brazilians lost about 1,200 killed and wounded, and the Paraguayans about 150 men, and their nine guns. The defence was heroic, for the Brazilians came right up to the counterscarp, and many fell into the ditch.

After the third attack had been repulsed, Lopez received a telegram from Olabarrieta, telling him of the fact. On receiving news of the fall of the redoubt, he determined to retake it, and Olabarrieta had reinforcements given him at Humaitá for that effect. The idea, however, was given up before being put into execution.

On hearing that the ' Alagoas ' was left alone between Timbó and Humaitá, Lopez determined to send his two steamers to take her. While they were preparing for it, however, news arrived that she had passed Timbó.

Lopez now determined immediately to take measures for retiring through the Chaco with the main part of his army, and with what artillery he could. The artillery from all the trenches was therefore taken into Humaitá, leaving six fieldpieces at Curupayty, one at Sauce, and twelve from the Angle to Humaitá. One battalion was left at Espinillo, with guards at the other points of the trenches. The two steamers now did excellent service, running between Timbó and Humaitá, transporting men, artillery, &c. The first cargoes sent consisted of Lopez' private commissariat stores. Then came the Whitworth 32-pounder, and the Krupp 12-pounder; after these eight 8-inch guns; then everything, from a sick man to

trees. We got some roast beef, and my own horse, with three of Lopez,' caught us up here, having, by his permission, been brought over in a steamer the day after we left Humaitá, so that I was now well mounted. In the afternoon we went on and had dinner at the Posta Timbó, the cooks, with their paraphernalia, having gone on ahead and prepared it. We then went on and reached the Paso Palenque,* where we overtook a division of the army which was marching in the same direction. The bridge over this stream was not finished, and Lopez had a hut made for himself of boughs, while we slept on the grass. The troops had to work all night to finish the bridge, as Lopez could not cross the stream, and they were in and out of the water all night, in the greatest good-humour. As soon as the bridge could stand the carriage, Lopez got into it, and was dragged across by men on foot, the horses swimming.

After two leagues' ride, we came to Paso Puente, where the first four 8-inch guns had arrived, and were waiting to be passed over. Lopez stayed and chaffed the men a little, telling them he wished to see how they pulled, and he would wait while they took two of them across. The men were greatly delighted, and pulled with a will, taking the guns over in a very short time; they were very heavy, and very difficult to draw over those elastic bridges.

We then went through some leagues of bamboo forest, after which we crossed the Paso Ramirez in canoes, and had dinner there, feeding our horses with the leaves of the 'pindó,' a tall palm-tree without thorns. Horses are very fond of its leaves, which contain as much nourishment as corn. After dinner we went on, those who

* Lopez always had a name given to every place which had none. This gave great facilities for conversing and giving instructions about any place.

could keeping up with Lopez, who began to gallop, till we arrived at Seibo, about four miles from Monte Lindo, where Lopez stayed some time, looking for a place to encamp, and then went on to Monte Lindo, which we reached by dark. Here most of us found a roof to sleep under.

Next day three ironclads came up to reconnoitre, and Lopez went back to Seibo; the battery at Monte Lindo was commenced, but the men covered the work over with boughs, and the Brazilians, suspecting nothing, went away in a few hours.

Lopez now established his headquarters in a circular islet of wood, at Seibo, the troops which had come from Paso Pucu being all encamped round him, but in positions where they could not be seen from any side from a distance.

There is some reason to believe that at this time Lopez had an idea of marching through the Chaco to Bolivia, and thence making his way to Europe. He sent none of the troops over the Paraguay to defend the Tebicuary; he had horses brought across the river to Seibo, and five cartloads of silver dollars were also brought to Seibo from Asuncion. The heavy guns were mounted at Monte Lindo, and he would not for some days hear of their being moved to the Tebicuary.

While at Seibo, Lopez had his brother Benigno brought down in irons from Asuncion, secretly, and put under a guard. José Berges, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Saturnino Bedoya, the treasurer, were at Seibo, in the black books, but not in prison.

After some days he resolved upon having the battery removed to the mouth of the Tebicuary, and I was sent to execute this order.

At the spot where the Tebicuary falls into the Paraguay it is about 500 yards wide, and the River Para-

guay there is exactly 330. They make together an angle of about sixty degrees, on the northern side of the Tebicuary, which is firm ground for a distance of about 2,000 yards up the Paraguay, and about 200 up the Tebicuary, forming an island called Fortin. On account of the 'carrizals,' this island is accessible only from one point on the land side, where canoes were stationed to cross the water.

Fortin, like Curupayty and Humaitá, presents a concave surface on a bend of the Paraguay, which, a thousand yards below Fortin, makes a reverse curve, turning towards the left. The ground all round, both on the other side of the Tebicuary and of the Paraguay, is 'carrizal,' so that no land-batteries could have been placed by an enemy to annoy Fortin. When the river is high, its bank at Fortin is about a yard above it, though in extraordinary floods it would all be under water.

When I first went there, the whole island was covered with a thick high grass in flower, called 'aguaráruvai,' or fox-tail, from the bushiness of its flowers; it was over six feet high, and I had a wide margin of it left next the river, to hide our work, should the ironclads come up before the guns were mounted. After marking out the work, I returned to Lopez, and gave him a sketch of what I had determined on, and he sent me back to carry out the works as quickly as possible, ordering that that very night two 8-inch guns should be dismounted at Monte Lindo, and taken to the Tebicuary. I was to ask Colonel Nuñez at the Tebicuary for as many men as I wanted. I could only get 200, about eighty of whom were men, and the rest boys. All the timber for the platforms had to be cut in the woods, some distance up the Tebicuary, as there was none near; and the platform had to be raised three feet, in case the river should rise high

and flood them. By dint of judiciously relieving the men, in three days I had four 8-inch guns mounted and in fighting condition. I had not shut my eyes the whole time, and they felt like deal boards. It turned out that there was no need for such hurry, as the ironclads did not make their appearance till the batteries were finished; the one at the mouth of the Tebicuary mounting seven 8-inch guns and two 32-pounders, and the other one, 2,000 yards higher up the Paraguay, on the same island, two 8-inch guns and three 32-pounders. I also got two of my 32-pounder rifled howitzers, and placed them in a separate battery facing the Tebicuary, in case a landing should be attempted there.

After the batteries were established, the workmen were sent away again, and the 18th Battalion, 300 strong, sent to garrison the island, which was placed under my command, Lieutenant Abalos, who was my second, being always there, while I had frequently to go about the other positions, to trace out works or to report upon them.

When the guns were all mounted, four ironclads came up and anchored within sight of the battery, arriving in the evening. They bombarded all night, doing no damage however, and the next morning steamed up to reconnoitre.

The battery at the mouth of the Tebicuary had to be constructed so that its guns should fire on that river, as well as on the Paraguay, for there were not sufficient guns to have separate batteries. Owing to this, and to the form of the ground, the battery was enfiladed from down the River Paraguay, but there were traverses between the guns, to protect them. In the direction straight down the Paraguay, therefore, only one gun (the one at the point) could fire.

A monitor steamed up within a hundred yards of the point, and engaged this one gun, firing nothing but canister

at the garrison, which was quite exposed, as there was no parapet; we replied with solid shot, which had very little effect on her. The pivot of this gun came out twice, the whole slide moving away, and the gun had to be moved back with purchases. The other three steamed about below, and after an hour they went away again to Tayi.

In a few days they came again, and anchored in sight of the batteries, bombarding continually. I then began to throw one or two shells at them every hour or so, for our ammunition was scarce, and they soon retreated behind the bend of the river. Here, however, they fared no better, for our shells, by good luck, often fell on their decks, and they went away altogether.

A telegraph was established to San Fernando, where Lopez was, four miles from Fortin.

As stuff of any kind for cartridges was very scarce, we had to tan the lining-membrane of the insides of the oxen we killed. This formed a sort of leather, about the thickness of brown paper, and made excellent cartridges.

Here, as at Curupayty, a mug of maize was given for a ball or a poncho-ful of splinters of shells, which were sent to Asuncion to the foundry.

Once a 68-pounder shell from the ironclads fell at the mouth of a powder-magazine, and, instead of going past it, stopped there and burst. The door was open, and the cartridges were covered with the earth moved by the explosion, but no harm was done.

Cattle were rather scarce at the Tebicuary, and all those which lay down to die of leanness were killed and eaten.

From whisperings I gathered that something extraordinary was taking place at San Fernando, and that many people were in irons there. I had a room at Lopez' headquarters, and occasionally stayed there; but saw

only two priests and two officers, who were all day coming and going to him, apparently with reports. For about a fortnight before July 24 (his birthday), Lopez continually told me that the ironclads would force the batteries on that day, which they really did. They arrived on the 23rd in the evening, and on the 24th the 'Bahia,' with a monitor lashed to her port-side, and the 'Silvado,' steamed up at full speed. The river was deep across its whole width, but the channel was close to the battery. I gave them a few shots at long range, and then reserved my fire so as to make sure of one shot from each gun striking perpendicularly to the plates, having all the guns trained to their front, for each one to fire as the steamer passed it. The ironclads first appeared to be coming along the channel, but when very near the guns, veered as if to go on the Chaco side, when I immediately increased the elevation, upon which they came back into the channel, there being just time to put all the guns at point-blank for the spot to which they were coming. They passed about eighteen yards from the guns, getting every shot to the greatest advantage. Most of the balls split into a thousand pieces, but they did a great deal of damage, and we picked up a piece of one of the plates of the 'Bahia,' ten inches long, which had sprung on shore from the force of the blow.

While passing the batteries, three people put their heads out of the turret of the 'Bahia,' and one of them waved a handkerchief, and shouted out something. The moment they had passed, I telegraphed to Lopez the number which had passed, and proceeded to write another despatch containing details, when I received a telegram from him, saying, 'What signal did the first ironclad make on passing the battery?' The telegraph clerk had already informed him. I then wrote and told him all about it, and that the men said it was the Paraguayan

Recalde, who had formerly deserted from Lopez. Hereupon he wrote me a terrible anathema against traitors, wondering that they had been allowed to pass in silence, and to open their polluted mouths to honest patriots fighting for their country. I wrote back that they had been well abused by all, which was a fact; he then wrote back that he was now 'satisfied with my explanation.' He absolutely held me responsible for Recalde putting his head out of the turret of the ironclad. He, however, expressed himself contented with the damage done to the vessels, one of which was laid up hammering all the day near Monte Lindo. The other two bombarded the Paraguayan steamers which were in the Riacho Recodo, where they always loaded and discharged. They were not visible from the River Paraguay, and were not damaged by the bombardment; neither did the Brazilians think of going in after them.

At Fortin, it being a great feast-day, we had a band of music, and the men were dancing in the afternoon, the other ironclads below bombarding slowly, when the lookout gave the word that the ironclads were returning. They came down at full speed, with the current in their favour, at such a rate that we had barely time to get ready for them, when we gave them one shot each from every gun, but at close quarters and perpendicular to the plates. They went right on, and about five miles down had to put up for three days to repair, before they could get back to Tayi.

The ironclads repeatedly returned to bombard, but did not attempt to pass again.

Lopez' birthday this year was celebrated, as usual, with great feasts, but they were more methodically arranged than heretofore. All the women lived together in a village built for them, and were under the superintendence of the Chief of Police. They had their own sergeants

as well, and were formed into divisions. When any commander of a division of the army wished to give a ball, he had to get permission from Resquin, who would order the Chief of Police to send so many women. He would then order such-and-such sergeants to go with their divisions, and present themselves for the ball. Resquin would generally send a couple of 'demijohns' of spirits, and allow an extra bullock to be killed for the feast.

As soon as the batteries at Fortin were established, Lopez crossed the River Paraguay, and took up his quarters at San Fernando, a house belonging to a Government 'estancia,' about four miles from Fortin, and a mile from the Tebicuary Pass.

The whole of the country included between the River Paraguay, the Tebicuary, Laguna Ypoá, and Angostura, is perfectly flat and wet, and is traversed by many 'esteros.' Along the Rivers Paraguay and Tebicuary, besides the 'carrizal,' stretches a band of wood from one to three miles wide (also wet), along which the highroad runs; but inside this the country is perfectly open, without a tree or a hill, for many leagues. It looks like the ocean. In one or two places a solitary palm serves for a landmark. The whole of this large tract of land is of course uninhabitable, as it is wet, but it is considered very good for breeding cattle. There are a few houses along the highroad, on bits of ground a shade higher than the country in general, but in a heavy rain even these are under water.

San Fernando is on a little spot of dry ground about thirty yards square, and the army, numbering about 8,000, had to encamp in the mud all round. It was, however, speedily drained, and huts were built quickly, so that it soon became a village. Lopez had a large house made for himself, with corridors all round. He brought down Mr. Charles Thompson from the arsenal,

and established workshops, with lathes, &c., for repairing guns, or anything required.

He established telegraphs to Recodo (the port of the steamers), to Paso Portillo (up the Tebicuary), to Fortin, and to the Tebicuary Pass. The telegraph from Monte Lindo to Timbó was in full work, and the despatches had to be passed over the Paraguay in canoes, between Recodo and Monte Lindo.

A pretty little octagonal church was built near Lopez' house, as he had taken a fit of church-going, and went every day without fail, staying some four hours. All this time he appears to have been committing the most horrible and wholesale murders, under pretext of a conspiracy being on foot. It was afterwards said that the conspirators were to have been joined by the enemy, both with his army and ironclads, on July 24, which accounts for Lopez' despatches to me on that date.

This matter I shall again refer to, but will notice two things more concerning it now. My room at Lopez' headquarters was next to that of General Bruguez, and he and I were very good friends. One evening, arriving from Fortin, I went into his room to see him, and found that all his things were gone, and other things in their place. There was a boy in the room, and I asked him for General Bruguez; he did not know. I then asked him if he had moved.—'Yes.' 'Where?'—'I don't know.' I then imagined that something must be wrong with him, and asked no further questions; I had asked too many already. Next day I dined with Lopez; Barrios, Bruguez, and the Bishop used always to dine with him, but Bruguez was not there. Lopez' little boy asked where he was, and they all told him, with smiles, 'He is gone.' He was, I have since learned, bayoneted to death.

A few days after this Barrios was placed under arrest in his house, upon which he attempted to commit suicide

by cutting his throat, but did not succeed. All this was kept very secret.

While these things were going on, the Vice-President was sent for, and was under a cloud, though Lopez saw him several times. He was allowed to return. Lopez' mother came down to see him, probably to beg for the lives of her two sons, who were both in irons, and of her two daughters, who were in prison. She had been formerly to Paso Pucu, after the Battle of May 24, 1866, it was whispered, to beg her son to give up the war against such overwhelming Powers, and to retire to Europe. She had, however, no influence over him.

Mr. Washburn, the American minister, also visited him at San Fernando, but he was not well received. M. Cuverville, the French consul, however, was much fêted during his visit to San Fernando.

The vanguard at the Tebicuary was under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Rolon, and was stationed at the 'estancia' Yacaré,* about four miles to the south of the Tebicuary Pass, and there were parties of Paraguayan cavalry continually scouring the country, as far as Pilar.

On June 8, the enemy for the first time sent a reconnoitring force, consisting of 3,000 men, towards the Tebicuary. They were to ascertain the position of Lopez and his army. They reached the Yacaré, a narrow but deep stream, which falls into the Tebicuary, and commenced crossing it. When one regiment had crossed, Major Rojas, with 200 cavalry, fell upon it, and cut it up, killing many, and taking many arms. The rest immediately returned to Tuyucué.

A force of 400 men was at Paso Portillo, to defend the same, and a guard at Paso Recalde, still further up the Tebicuary.

* *Yacaré*, Guaraní for alligator.

Lopez organised his steamers for an attack upon the ironclads, should any one or two give a favourable opportunity. The steamers were always kept, when not running, in the Riacho Recodo, and their masts and yards were covered with green boughs, in order that they might not be easily distinguished from the surrounding woods. They were all supplied with grappling-irons, and with rockets to send into the enemy's portholes.

Matto-Grosso was completely evacuated, and the steamers and troops there were brought down to the Tebicuary, a squadron of cavalry being left near the Rio Apa. Four hundred cavalry, 100 infantry, and four guns, which had been left at Encarnacion, were brought, with the exception of one squadron of cavalry, which was left as a guard, and which afterwards seized and sunk a sailing-vessel in the Paraná, belonging to the Brazilians.

At the Tebicuary, Lopez formed the *Cuerpo de Bogabantes*, or 'Corps of Paddlers,' which consisted of picked men, trained to paddle canoes, with the idea of boarding the ironclads.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE SIEGE OF HUMAITÁ.

HUMAITÁ INVESTED—OPPOSITION BY THE PARAGUAYANS IN THE CHACO—ATTACK ON THE IRONCLADS AT TAYÍ—ATTACK ON HUMAITÁ—BATTLE OF ĀCĀYUASÁ—EVACUATION OF HUMAITÁ—HARD FIGHTING IN THE CHACO—SURRENDER OF THE REMAINDER OF THE EX-GARRISON OF HUMAITÁ—EVACUATION OF THE CHACO.

AS soon as Paso Pucu was evacuated, the Allies took possession, and their transport fleet now came up to Curupayty, where their supplies were landed, instead of having to be brought round from Itapirú. They closed in their lines all round, the Brazilians occupying from Cierva to Espinillo, and the Argentines thence to Paso Pucu. Every available gun, even 68-pounders, were brought and mounted against Humaitá, and the place was bombarded. Some damage was done, though nothing which could have any effect on the holding out of the place.

Humaitá was garrisoned with 3,000 men, and mounted nearly 200 guns (of which six were 8-inch), including the batteries on the river.

It had large stores of maize and starch, besides quantities of spirits, wines, preserves, &c., which there had not been time to remove. There were some live sheep and cattle, and a large stock of jerked beef. Some cattle were passed over the river from the Chaco also, at night, since the ironclads had placed themselves between Timbó and Humaitá.

There was therefore still a road, though a difficult one, open to the garrison of Humaitá, by which they could get their supplies, and it was determined to cut off this road.

General Rivas was therefore commissioned to cross from Riacho de Oro with 1,200 Argentines. He was to be met by 2,500 Brazilians, who were to land below Timbó, and force their way through the woods till they incorporated themselves with him—thus making a line across the peninsula in front of Humaitá, and completely cutting off its communication.

Rivas started on April 30, and had to cut his way all through the woods; he was attacked, on May 2, by a small body of Paraguayans, who crossed from Humaitá for that purpose, and whom he repulsed. On the same day Caballero, from Timbó, attacked the Brazilians, who were marching to join Rivas, causing them a loss of 300 men, killed and wounded. On the 3rd the two corps amalgamated under Rivas, and commenced a redoubt on the banks of the River Paraguay, at a place called Andai. This redoubt was in front protected by an impassable 'estero,' and assailable only on the two flanks, which rested on the River Paraguay. While this was being commenced, the Argentine Legion (*Voluntarios*), being sent forward to reconnoitre, came upon a Paraguayan guard, which took to flight, and led the *Voluntarios* into an ambush of 200 Paraguayans, who fell upon them on their flank and rear, and completely cut them up. The commander alone returned to General Rivas to tell the tale, and the stragglers who came in afterwards were draughted into other battalions, the officers being sent under arrest to Buenos Ayres, for cowardice.

Next day the redoubt of Andai was attacked by Caballero, with four battalions of infantry and two dismounted regiments of cavalry, on the flank next Timbó,

which was guarded by Brazilians. The Paraguayans were repulsed, with a loss of 300 killed and wounded. The Brazilians lost eighty men. After this Rivas was left in comparative peace for some time. A few messengers managed to go between Humaitá and Timbó, but some of them were taken with their despatches.

The lagoon which protected the front of the Andai redoubt was found to communicate with the Riacho de Oro, and provisions were carried there in boats. This lake was call Yberá, or 'the shining water.'

On April 11, the Allies had made a reconnaissance on Humaitá, discovering nothing, however, of the weakness of the place, which consisted in 15,000 yards of trench, garrisoned by less than 3,000 men. It might easily have been taken in a night-attack.

They made great preparations for an assault, constructing gabions and sandbags, fascines and scaling-ladders. The idea of assaulting was, however, given up, as it was supposed they must soon surrender. They frequently sent letters to the commanders of Humaitá, advising them to surrender; but they were not received, and there were no signs of the place giving in.

Towards the end of June, Lopez became anxious about Humaitá, and entertained several plans for relieving it. Rivas, however, was so strongly posted, that it seemed hopeless, and he determined to make another dash for an ironclad, which would have settled the question, could he have obtained possession of one.

There were only two ironclads above Timbó—the 'Barroso' and the 'Rio Grande'—and they both lay under the guns of Tayí. Twenty-four canoes were sent down into the River Bermejo, where they took their crews of ten men each, carrying naval officers and engineers to work the steamers, should they capture them. They were to go in two divisions: each one of twelve canoes was to

attack one of the ironclads, as nearly as possible at the same time.

On July 9, they started from the Bermejo in the evening, and went down the stream of the Paraguay, reaching the ironclads, without being noticed, in the middle of the night. The division which was to board the 'Rio Grande' did so, but the one destined for the 'Barroso' passed her, and left her free. The captain of the 'Rio Grande' was on deck with part of the crew, and he and they were all killed by the Paraguayans, the remainder of the crew having shut themselves up inside. The guns of Tayí now began to play upon the Paraguayans, and the 'Barroso' came up and fired canister, so that they were nearly all killed, and the rest taken prisoners. Of the other division of canoes, some arrived at Timbó, and some, passing further down, were taken by the other ironclads.

Provisions had been getting scarce at Humaitá, and it was evident to the commanders that they would have to evacuate it before long. Colonel Alén, probably afraid of what Lopez would do if he left the place without orders, attempted to commit suicide with a revolver. He was, however, only badly wounded, and the chief command devolved upon Colonel Martinez. They had a redoubt opposite Humaitá, with a few pieces of artillery; and from seeing some canoes pass between the two places, the ironclads reported to Caxias that the Paraguayans were evacuating Humaitá. On receiving this news, on July 15, Caxias prepared everything for attacking the place next morning, in order to have the glory of taking it by force of arms.

General Osorio, with 12,000 men, led the attack on the San Solano front, the Argentines being formed ready to attack on another point. After daylight, Osorio gallantly led on his troops, and with his *cavalry* reached the abatis, which was of no account, and began to pull it open. The

Paraguayan artillery, however, at close quarters, did such execution with grape and canister that the Brazilians took to their heels, completely routed. Osorio had sent to Caxias to ask for reinforcements, but had been refused. He had his horse killed under him, and three of his aides-de-camp by his side. No further attempt was made to assault the trenches. The Brazilians lost 2,000 men, *hors de combat*, and the Paraguayans only 47.

With the view of harassing General Rivas—who was daily bombarded at Andai from Humaitá, with great effect—and of rendering his position untenable, the Paraguayans advanced with redoubts from Timbó. The one made nearest to Rivas was on the only road from Timbó to Andai, about halfway between the two, and was called the Corá redoubt. It was garrisoned with one battalion of infantry, and 200 swordsmen on foot. On July 18, General Rivas ordered this to be attacked, and sent Colonels Martinez de Hoz and Campos, with their battalions and some Brazilians. The latter turned tail quickly, but the Argentines reached the abatis, when they were forced to retire, and the 200 swordsmen were then sent upon them, and cut them up. The two colonels were taken prisoners, and 400 Argentines put *hors de combat*. The Paraguayans followed up the fugitives to near Andai, when General Rivas charged them and drove them back.

The colour-sergeant of one of the Argentine battalions was killed, but saved his colours by throwing them into the river, where they were picked up by an ironclad. This was called the Battle of *Ácãyuasá*,* from the place where the colonels were taken prisoners, and Lopez granted a decoration to all who had been engaged in it, consisting of a silver Maltese cross.

Provisions in Humaitá were now almost consumed,

* *Ácã*, heads or boughs; *yuasá*, crossing each other: crossed boughs.

and it was necessary to evacuate it. They had thirty canoes, and in these they passed all the wounded and the women across into the Chaco, on the night of July 23. On the 24th (Lopez' birthday) dancing and music was carried on to deceive the enemy; and that night the garrison crossed over, the bands of music remaining to the last, and playing. The enemy suspected nothing, and not till the middle of the next day did they reconnoitre and take possession of Humaitá.

On the 21st, three ironclads had forced the batteries of Humaitá, going up and joining the fleet above Humaitá. These were the 'Cabral,' 'Silvado,' and 'Pianhy.' The fleet had not perceived the Paraguayans crossing the river at Humaitá, and the passage was effected without the least disturbance.

Once in the Chaco, the Paraguayans carried their canoes overland into the Laguna Verá, which they had to cross in order to get to Timbó, as Rivas, with his army and fortifications, occupied the road along the river. General Caballero, with the Timbó forces, awaited the garrison of Humaitá on the other side of the lake, and their rear was protected by the redoubt opposite Humaitá, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Vallovera. From this redoubt, several marshes had to be crossed to get to the Laguna Verá, the last narrow strip of land before the lake being called Isla Poi. The whole of the ground was wooded, so that the combatants could rarely see each other.

The commanders of Humaitá immediately commenced sending the women and the wounded in canoes across the lake to General Caballero, and they had to pass through a terrible fire. As soon as the Allies saw what was going on, they reinforced General Rivas, increasing his division to 10,000 men. They also sent sixty boats, some of them with guns in them, into the Laguna Verá, to cut

off the Paraguayans when they crossed. Their ironclads were so stationed as to sweep the Isla Poi, and a force, with artillery, was sent to the west side of the lake. All these forces kept up a terrible fire, both of artillery and rifles: day and night, by regular reliefs, eleven guns and 2,000 rifles played incessantly, from all quarters, on the Paraguayans. In one week, 10,000 shells were thrown at them.

Notwithstanding the enemy's boats on the lake, the Paraguayan canoes continued the passage at night, a hand-to-hand fight between the canoes and boats taking place every time they passed. Many, of course, were killed and wounded, and many canoes sunk by the artillery, which played upon them till they reached the double line of guardboats. As soon as the canoes had passed the ordeal, and arrived at the other side of the lake, the paddlers would give a yell of delight, and, having landed their passengers, return through the same terrible fire to fetch more.

On the 28th, the Brazilians attacked Martinez, but were repulsed with loss; he had a few 3-pounder rifled guns, but the ammunition was finished, and he had to break up the muskets of those who were killed, and make grape of the locks and fittings. There was one night a confusion among the Brazilians, caused by a battalion returning from some duty meeting another battalion. They thought each other enemies, and fired for some time, killing and wounding over a hundred men.

At length all the Paraguayan canoes were sunk and taken, and the only road to Timbó was through General Rivas' forts and army. 2,500 men had left Humaitá, and of these, 1,200 had attempted to cross the Laguna Verá, and nearly 1,000 succeeded in doing so, many of them wounded. Colonel Alén had been sent across among the first on a stretcher, the other three commanders

remaining to the last. Every man, on leaving Humaitá, had taken a small bag of parched corn with him; but this was soon finished, and they suffered very much from hunger, and had to eat two or three horses which had been brought from Humaitá.

On August 2, General Rivas sent Colonel Martinez an invitation to surrender. The flag of truce, however, was received with bullets, but two days afterwards it returned upon the same mission. This time Martinez agreed to an interview with Rivas, which took place on the 5th, and ended in the surrender of the remnant of the garrison of Humaitá, the officers keeping their swords. Colonel Martinez was so faint from want of food that he could hardly speak, and 200 of his men had lain down to die from hunger. Most of them had been four days without food.

For surrendering, after this unexampled faithfulness to Lopez, all were declared traitors by him; and Colonel Martinez' wife, who had lived at headquarters with Mrs. Lynch during the whole war, was thrown into prison, frequently beaten, and finally shot.

The starving men were supplied with food and taken to Humaitá. Their number was 4 field-officers, 95 officers, and 1,200 rank and file, of which 300 were wounded. The Allies took 5 guns and 800 muskets at the same time. At Humaitá the trophies consisted of 144 iron guns, of which eight were 8-inch, and one a burst 150-pounder; 36 brass guns, one of them being a 130-pounder; 600 muskets, and 400 bayonets.

The firing at Humaitá was distinctly heard at the Tebicuary, and at night the reflection of flashes from the heavy guns was seen, and everyone knew that something was taking place there.

When Lopez heard of the evacuation of Humaitá, he sent word to all the commanders of divisions in the army,

to tell the men that he had left Humaitá provisions to last till October, but that the commanders had not been very careful of them, adding that, although he had been obliged to order the evacuation, it would have no material influence on his plans. He immediately ordered the evacuation of Timbó, the heavy artillery to be sent on first. When no hope remained of any more men crossing the Laguna Verá, Caballero, with his own men and with those from Humaitá, marched to Monte Lindo, and joined Lopez at the Tebicuary, bringing all the artillery and ammunition with him; and the Allies were left alone in the vicinity of Humaitá, where they rested for three weeks, having required thirteen months' siege to reduce Humaitá, the weakest position of any the Paraguayans had held.

CHAPTER XXII.

LOPEZ ABANDONS THE TEBICUARY, AND FORTIFIES HIMSELF AT AN-
GOSTURA AND PIKYSRY—THE ALLIES ESTABLISH THEMSELVES AT
PALMAS.

AS soon as Humaitá fell, Lopez thought of preparing for another retreat from the Tebicuary, and he ordered a map to be made of the country in the vicinity of the Estero Poi,* about three leagues to the south of Villeta. This Estero Poi is a marsh something like the Bellaco, and is a branch of the vast 'estero' called Laguna Ypoá,† joining it to the river. It can be crossed only on the highroad from Humaitá to Asuncion, and is there nearly a league wide, and about four feet deep. It was Lopez' idea to fortify the north side of this 'estero,' but he subsequently obtained better information of the ground, and sent me, in the middle of August, to examine, sketch, and report upon the Pikysry‡ as a defensible position. This is one league north of the Estero Poi.

The Pikysry is the northernmost drain of the Lake Ypoá, from which it takes its rise in the shape of a wide 'estero,' which gradually lessens as it approaches the River Paraguay, and becomes a narrow running stream where it enters the woods, which there are about 2,000 yards wide; it falls into the Paraguay at Angostura, where it is about twenty yards wide, and very deep. It is also the boundary of the lowlands which commence at the Tebicuary, and

* Poi, narrow. † Y (ü), water or lake; pod, lucky: lucky lake.

‡ Pikysry: piky, a shrimp; syry, a stream: the shrimp stream.

which are all wet, with the exception of a very few small spots. For about two leagues to the south of the Pikysry, the ground is covered with woods and palm forests, being next to impassable anywhere but on the highroad, which is also very bad.

Immediately to the north of the Pikysry may be said to commence the habitable portion of Paraguay, for the first hills are seen here, and rise from that stream. Six miles would be the length required to be covered by forces, as for that distance the Pikysry was passable, though barely, and the highroad was the only place where an enemy might be expected. The position could not be flanked, without either going round through the Misiones, or through the Chaco, in which case it would be taken in the rear. The only place, too, for leagues, where river-batteries could be placed, was Angostura, which again gave the concave side of a horseshoe bend for the batteries; these could be so made as to flank the front of the land-lines. The river was rather wide, 600 yards, but there was no remedy for that.

The army would also be much nearer to its resources, and the soldiers' relations would be able to go to the army and take them mandioca, oranges, &c., which would tell very favourably on the health, and consequently on the strength, of the force.

I therefore reported all this to President Lopez, and gave it as my opinion that Pikysry would be a much more advantageous position than Tebicuary. He then sent me to Fortin, to arrange matters there for a removal, to leave the batteries in charge of Major Moreno, and to take Lieutenant Abalos with me. The guns in the smaller battery were to be immediately embarked and taken to Angostura. I was then again despatched to Pikysry to trace out the batteries, and to give directions concerning them to Lieutenant Pereira, who was

the men thus had no hold on them on account of their slipperiness. Their bare feet were sore from being continually in the mud.

Lopez arrived in the beginning of September, and took up his quarters at Cumbarity,* a high hill, about four miles from the river, and also from the trenches; he shortly had an immense house built at Itá Yvaté,† a hill about two miles to the rear of the trenches, and four from the river. Hence he could see the whole country around for many leagues.

In order to protect the port of Angostura, for our steamers to load and discharge, until the ironclads should force the battery, the latter was divided into two sections, 700 yards apart, called the right and left batteries. The ironclads could not see what was going on at the right battery, where the port was, unless they came opposite the left battery. They did not show themselves till September 8, on which day three came up to reconnoitre. I covered the guns in the left battery with boughs, so as completely to hide them, having previously laid them for a broadside opposite the battery. The 'Silvado' alone came up and passed the batteries, receiving considerable damage from the 'Criollo,' which struck her with a steel shell at the water-line. She went down again in half an hour, and had another 150-pounder on the other side in the same place. From that day a few ironclads almost daily came up to bombard Angostura, returning after a few hours to their anchorage, which was out of sight, near Palmas.

The allied army meanwhile marched northwards, and on September 23 its vanguard reached Surubiy,‡ a stream about two leagues from Pikysry. Here Lopez

* *Cumbari*, a kind of pepper; *ty*, a plantation: a pepper plantation.

† *Itá*, stone; *yvaté*, high: high stone.

‡ *Surubi*, a kind of fish; *y*, stream: the Surubi stream.

had prepared an ambush, of 200 cavalry and 150 infantry, which were hidden to the north of the Surubiy; a few skirmishers were sent to the other side to entice the enemy, which they succeeded in doing; and when a considerable force had passed the stream, the Paraguayans fell upon them and cut them up, many being drowned in the water, which was deep, and one Brazilian battalion was completely annihilated. Next day the main army arrived, and encamped at Palmas, a guardhouse on the river, with a very small piece of dry land, the army being almost all of it in mud.

The Allies made several reconnaissances on the lines of Pikysry, but considered them too strong to attack, and gave up the idea. The water of the Pikysry had been dammed up in two places, so that it was over six feet deep on the highroad.

There were altogether just over a hundred guns in the Paraguayan lines, including those of Angostura, which mounted twelve 8-inch guns, one 150-pounder, two smoothbore 32-pounders, and the Whitworth 32-pounder, which had been taken at Tuyutì.

The Paraguayan army was formed into five divisions, viz.—the Angostura batteries, with 1,000 yards of trench, commanded by myself, the right commanded by Colonel Hermosa, the centre by Colonel Gonzalez, Timbó (so called from its being garrisoned by the forces from Timbó) commanded by Colonel Montiel, and the left by Colonel Rivarola. The army now numbered altogether about 10,000, by far the greater portion being boys.

Large quantities of ammunition of all kinds had been lost in the retreat from the Tebicuary, none of the guns having a hundred rounds, and many only twenty or thirty. The infantry, too, had most of them only sixty to a hundred rounds. All the powder and shot in the magazines was brought down, and barely made up, for

the artillery a hundred rounds per gun, and for the infantry twenty-four packets of ten rounds each, which was the number every soldier was ordered to have, and which he carried in two hide-cases made to sling round the neck, so that, in case of a sudden march, they should have plenty of ammunition with them.

As all the regimental music-bands had been completely destroyed, the remaining musicians were collected from the army, with such instruments as could be found, and they were divided into five bands for the five divisions. Their instruments were horribly battered about and out of tune, and I had to abolish my music, and set the men to dig instead, as it was quite unbearable.

To provide against the exposure of the artillerymen at the heavy guns, in case the ironclads should remain opposite the batteries and fight, I had some high traversing carriages made, which raised the guns above the men's heads, so that a high parapet could be made, and all the garrison of the guns, excepting the man serving the vent, was under cover. These carriages also overcame the difficulty caused by the pivot jumping out, for the guns were light, but were used with heavy charges, and kicked very much in the recoil. I thus mounted six 8-inch guns, with the 150-pounder, and they answered very well, being less troublesome to work than the old ones. The ironclads afterwards passed the batteries, and I could get no more from Asuncion, as our communication by water was cut off.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE ALLIES PREPARE FOR ACTIVE OPERATIONS—ROAD THROUGH THE CHACO—THE IRONCLADS PASS ANGOSTURA—NEUTRAL VESSELS OF WAR—LOPEZ FORMS A RESERVE FORCE.

WHEN Caxias gave up the notion of attacking the front of the Paraguayan defences at Pikysry, he conceived the idea of making a road through the Chaco, from opposite Palmas to opposite Villeta, intending to pass his troops across the Paraguay, and march on Lopez' rear. He accordingly commissioned General Argollo to explore the Chaco with a force, and to make the road. This was begun on October 11.

On October 1, before daylight, four ironclads forced the batteries of Angostura, receiving almost as much damage as they would have done by daylight. I used to lay all the guns every evening opposite the batteries for a broadside, which always took effect, every shot which struck an ironclad giving out a flash of light. It was very difficult to see the steamers by night, as the Chaco opposite was thickly wooded, and this threw a deep shade over half of the river, hiding the ironclads, which always sought this protection. They could sometimes be seen only by the moving reflection of their chimneys in the water. After sunrise on the same day, eight more ironclads came up to reconnoitre, and after them the 'Belmonte,' wooden gunboat, with the Admiral on board. No sooner, however, did she show herself beyond the point of Itapirú*, than we put a Whitworth 150-pounder shell into

* A bend of the river below Angostura.

her at her water-line, upon which she immediately retreated.

The ironclads which had passed up reconnoitred the banks of the river, and one of them, a small monitor, entered the Buey Muerto above Angostura, and came out opposite Villeta. The Buey Muerto is a branch of the Paraguay, formed by a large island, and the Brazilians did not before know that it was navigable. These ironclads came and anchored above Angostura, behind the point there formed by the Chaco. I now sent twenty men, under Lieutenant Fleitas, to annoy with their rifles the crews of these vessels; and he laid an ambush for a party which landed to cut firewood, and fell upon them, killing about twenty-five. He lost only two men. A small trench was dug at night, to protect the riflemen, and after two days' firing at everyone who showed himself on deck, the ironclads went higher up the river.

On October 8 one ironclad ran down past the batteries at night, and on the 10th two ran up past them, lashed together. It was capital sport looking out for these steamers at night. They used to extinguish every light on board, and when going down the stream would go with the current, only putting on full speed when they found they were detected. On the 15th eight ironclads came up by daylight, and five of them passed up by the batteries. They always lost some men on these occasions, as the balls, though they did not perforate them, yet sent a number of splinters of wood flying inside. On November 22, at two in the morning, the 'Brazil' passed down, and returned on the 26th, with two more ironclads, taking on their port-side a small steam-launch and a pontoon, loaded with provisions. This time the 'Brazil' fared badly, being struck by thirty-one balls, five of them 150-pounders, and having her commander wounded, and three officers and the pilot killed, besides some of the

crew. The steamers went up to Villeta, to repair alongside the Chaco, and when they arrived there they began to clean out the splinters and throw them into the river. We saw them drifting down for four or five hours, and among other small splinters came pieces of doors and other inside work, which showed they had been perforated.

All this time neutral vessels of war kept coming, to negotiate the liberty of their different countrymen. The first which arrived was the United States' steamer 'Wasp,' about the middle of September, to take away the Hon. Mr. Washburn, the U.S. minister, who had long since sent in his resignation. She was allowed to pass Angostura, on requesting leave to do so, and to go up as far as Villeta, where she was to await Mr. Washburn. After several days' delay, he was sent down on board the 'Pirabebé,' and went on board the 'Wasp' and down the river, the 'Pirabebé' accompanying the 'Wasp' with a flag of truce as far as the ironclads, and then returning. Mr. Washburn sent from on board the 'Wasp' a letter to Lopez, which would probably have had the effect of my receiving orders to fire at her as she went down, had he received it before that took place; but of this more anon.

On September 30 three vessels—English, French, and Italian—steamed up, and anchored below Angostura. They each sent a letter for Lopez, and retired to anchor for the night opposite the point of Itapirú, where their lights were visible from the battery. A trust in our belief that nothing would be attempted during the proximity of the neutral vessels, and that we should be all asleep, induced the Brazilian ironclads to pass up that very night, and the Admiral to show off next morning. We were not, however, caught napping on this or on any other occasion.

The English vessel was H.B.M.S. 'Linnet,' bringing Mr. Gould, to attempt again what he could do towards

getting the British subjects away. He sent a letter to Lopez, stating his object, and received an answer that he might communicate with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and that Lopez would be happy to see him, if he liked to go to headquarters. This proved that Lopez was disposed only to entangle him in a long correspondence, which would have no result; and Mr. Gould, seeing this, went away again, as it would not have been dignified, after so much humbug, to enter again into a long and fruitless correspondence.

H.B.M.'s ship 'Beacon,' Captain Parsons, was sent up, and arrived on November 4, with the object of taking away the English. On Lopez hearing of the arrival of an English captain, he was much vexed, and almost sent him away without hearing what he had to say. He allowed him, however, to go up to his headquarters, and, instead of treating him with marked politeness, as he did the French and Italian captains, he threw open his house, and gave orders that Captain Parsons was to be allowed to go about anywhere he liked at headquarters. He also invited him to some English plum-pudding which Mrs. Lynch had made, told him that he might talk to all the British subjects, and that none of them wanted to go away. He had, however, bottled up the few British subjects who were near headquarters, and only one was allowed to see him, and then only within earshot of Lopez. Everything was so arranged as to impress Captain Parsons that he had been allowed to go wherever he wished, and to see everybody he liked. He was allowed to take away Dr. Fox, and a dozen English women and children. The husband of one of these women was allowed to go on board the 'Beacon' with her, and stay till midnight. He was a mechanic, who, by the successive deaths of the chief men in the arsenal, had become the head of it himself, and was getting a large salary. He

did not wish to go away, and he told Captain Parsons that none of the English wished to leave.

When the 'Beacon' came up, instead of anchoring some distance below, as the other neutral vessels had done, she slowly steamed up towards the battery. Seeing this, I immediately woke my second, Lieutenant-Colonel Carrillo, who was taking his siesta, and was very fast asleep. I told him that the English steamer was coming up, that he knew the orders respecting any vessels passing the battery, and that I left the command with him for the moment; but that the instant a shot was fired at Her Majesty's ship, I should consider myself no longer in the Paraguayan service. (This was a very dangerous thing to say in Paraguay.) Carrillo jumped up, half asleep, and, rushing to the battery, began to sponge a gun, at the very moment that the 'Beacon' anchored a little below the battery. At the same moment I received a despatch from Lopez, who could see the river from his headquarters, saying that he was surprised I had allowed the steamer to go so far, and telling me to fire at her if she attempted to pass the battery. I gave the despatch to Carrillo, and answered Lopez, telling him I had done so.

When Captain Parsons was going on board the 'Beacon,' he was so good as to send me word that he should like to see me. I immediately telegraphed for permission to Lopez, who replied, 'Send any excuse you like;' so I had to send word that I was busy, and could not go. Later in the evening one of the officers of the 'Beacon,' who was waiting with a boat at the battery, sent me his card, and I telegraphed again twice to Lopez, as the first time he sent no answer. He told me to send word that it was too late. It would have been as much as my life was worth to have spoken to any of these gentlemen without Lopez' leave, although everything that came and went had to pass through my hands.

During the months of October and November the French and Italian steamers almost daily came and went between Palmas and Angostura, the commanders frequently going to visit Lopez at his headquarters. The Italian vessel at last took away 52 women and children, and the Frenchman a smaller number, as well as M. Libertat, the chancellor of the French Consulate, who was imprisoned in irons for supposed conspiracy against Lopez, and who, under torture, was made to declare that he had received 40,000 dollars (8,000*L.*) from the heads of the conspiracy for his complicity therein. He was sent down to me, together with his papers, with orders to deliver him to the French captain, as a prisoner, which I did. Some of these steamers took away a number of heavy cases, each of which required from six to eight men to lift; they probably contained some of the ladies' jewellery, which had been collected in 1867, as well as a large number of doubloons.

On December 3 the United States' ship 'Wasp' again made her appearance, carrying an Admiral's and a Minister's flag. The new Minister was General MacMahon, sent to replace Mr. Washburn, whom he had met at Rio Janeiro. As Mr. Washburn had been subjected to some indignities on leaving Paraguay—especially in having two members of his legation forcibly taken from him while on his way to embark, thrown into irons, and sent to the army to be judged—it was determined that Admiral Davis should go with a squadron of war-vessels, and demand the surrender of these prisoners, and that, until they were given up, General MacMahon should not land. The morning the 'Wasp' arrived, Captain Kirkland went up to see Lopez at his headquarters, and arranged that Lopez should meet the Admiral the same evening at Angostura. The meeting took place at my house, Lopez being so amiable and plausible, that he

delighted Admiral Davis, and made him really believe that Masterman and Bliss, the two prisoners demanded, were guilty of a horrible conspiracy. He told the Admiral that he himself wished to give them up, but that the tribunals would not do so. However, Admiral Davis had some arguments with him in the shape of 11-inch guns, which would have been applied in a more persuasive manner than the Brazilians did theirs; and so on December 10, at night, Masterman and Bliss were sent to me, with orders to deliver them to Captain Kirkland as prisoners. I was only too glad to obey this order, as I knew it was only a farce. I could not, of course, see either Admiral Davis or Captain Kirkland, to tell them my idea of their guilt. On the 12th General MacMahon landed and went up to headquarters, where he remained some time with Lopez.

While these neutral vessels were carrying on their negotiations, the Brazilian ironclads several times came up and insulted them, going even to the length of firing at the battery over the bows of the Italian steamer. The English gunboat was the only one they respected.

The road in the Chaco, meanwhile, was being constructed. It was a large work, being almost wholly made of palm-trees, laid transversely, side by side, on the ground, which was muddy, and liable to be flooded when the river rose high; several bridges also had to be made over it. The whole ground there, as in the rest of the Chaco, is perfectly flat. About a mile below Villeta, a stream called the Aracuay, in the Chaco, falls into the Paraguay. The mouth of the former is narrow, and barely admits a small paddle-steamer; but shortly it becomes larger, and divides into several long branches, one of which goes towards Palmas, but is not navigable so far. Into the Aracuay was sent the steam-launch, which the ironclads took past Angostura with them;

and it did good service in transporting provisions &c.—first for the ironclads only, and afterwards for the whole army.

The Brazilian road ran along the eastern side of this stream, and a telegraph was also laid down along it. Four encampments, or guards, of two battalions each, were stationed along the road, and a redoubt was made at the northern end of it, in a wood. We had forces, varying from 100 to 800 men, in the Chaco; but the ground was so intersected with 'esteros,' that it was almost impossible for more than two or three men at a time to go anywhere. Twice, however, these forces had engagements with the enemy, which resulted in very small losses on either side.

At first Lopez did not believe that the Brazilians really meant to march through the Chaco, but thought it was only a diversion, more especially as our spies reported that troops marched from Palmas towards Villeta by day, returning by night. At length, however, there could be no doubt of their intention, and he had a trench made round the village of Villeta, where they were expected to land, and this the ironclads continually bombarded. He also formed a movable reserve force, consisting of the greater part of the army, leaving in the trenches only the 'indisposed,' and the greater part of the artillery. I had to send five battalions to this reservé, remaining with only one, and a few contingents belonging to other battalions. The reserve was encamped close to Lopez' headquarters, so that he could despatch them himself, at a moment's notice.

The men were much improved in health by the food they had been eating since they arrived at Pikysyry, for their relations came continually, bringing them eatables, and many people sent presents of cartloads of oranges, mandioca, &c.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE END OF THE WAR.

THE BRAZILIANS LAND AT SAN ANTONIO—BATTLES OF YTORORÓ AND OF AVAY—CAPTURE OF THE TRENCHES AT PIKYSRY—SEVEN DAYS' FIGHTING AT ITÁ YVATÉ, RESULTING IN THE DEFEAT OF LOPEZ, THE DESTRUCTION OF HIS ARMY, AND THE CAPITULATION OF AN-GOSTURA.

TOWARDS the end of November, the whole Brazilian army, amounting to 32,000 men, had crossed over into the Chaco, and on the 27th Caxias went himself. The Brazilians embarked in their ironclads, landing, not at Villeta, but at San Antonio, a village about four miles farther up the river, where they were not expected, on December 5. A small force had been awaiting them at Villeta, and on the evening of the 5th, Lopez sent his reserve, consisting of about 5,000 men and 12 guns, under General Caballero, his second being Colonel Ser-rano, to defend the pass of the Ytororó.* This is a narrow deep stream, having a bridge over it, which it was necessary to cross in order to go from San Antonio to Villeta; and the ground all about is covered with islets of wood, in one of which, close to the bridge, the Paraguayans, after marching all night, concealed themselves.

In the morning the bridge was attacked by the Brazilians. Osorio, with the 3rd Division of the Army, was sent round, by an impracticable road, to the left, in order

* Y, water; *tororó*, cascade.

to attack the Paraguayans in their rear, while General Argollo attacked them in front; he could not, however, arrive in time, on account of the badness of the road. General Argollo led the attack with the 2nd Division, the 1st Division being kept in reserve; and after encountering a terrible fire from the Paraguayan artillery, which was commanded by Major Moreno, he crossed the bridge, but was immediately charged and driven back by Caballero. A determined hand-to-hand fight now took place, and the bridge was taken and retaken three times, remaining at last in possession of the Paraguayans. Caxias now came up with the 1st Division, with which, joined to the 2nd, he attacked and took the bridge, and also six guns, the Paraguayans retreating with the other six. The Brazilians lost over 3,000 killed and wounded; among the former one of their best colonels, Fernando Machado, and among the wounded, Generals Argollo and Gurjao. The Paraguayans had 1,200 *hors de combat*, and lost six guns. Lopez, after he had received news of the battle, telegraphed to me that, after five hours' hard fighting, Caballero had remained in possession of the field of battle, and ordered me to decorate the battery with flags in honour of the victory.

The ironclads still paid us their daily visits, but seemed very fearful of coming within sure range; they used to come up past Itapirú, and hide behind the point of the Chaco, opposite Angostura, and would bombard thence; occasionally showing themselves beyond that point, which was about 1,000 yards off, when they were almost always hit, as we had got the range pretty accurately. There was, however, one of the ironclads which, by some good luck of theirs, we could never hit; it was the only one whose commander showed himself, and he used, with another officer, both in white waistcoats, to stand on the top of his casemate, while we

were exchanging shots. They came to their end in the following manner. On the night of December 8, thinking to bring the ironclads nearer to the battery, I masked the left one completely with boughs of trees, so that nothing could be seen of it. As luck would have it, there was a report in the fleet that Angostura had been evacuated, and on the same night the Commodore sent a most trustworthy officer, who returned, and reported to the Commodore that he had been right up to the battery, and that there were no guns or men there. (This I learnt from the private diary of an officer temporarily commanding one of the ironclads, taken by an expedition I sent afterwards into the Chaco.) Next morning the white waistcoats and a monitor came up to reconnoitre, but I had no flag flying, and showed none. They came rather nearer than usual, and after examining with their glasses for some time, and firing a few rounds of grape, they went away. I then rode up to Lopez' headquarters to see him, and just as I arrived there, saw all the guns in the battery go off. The ironclads had been to report the evacuation of the left battery, and received orders to pass it, and go and reconnoitre the right one, in doing which the 'Mariz-e-Barros,' of the white waistcoats, had gone ahead, and in passing the battery, the officers on the casemate were blown to pieces. The vessel was also much damaged. The monitor made off back again as fast as she could; but the 'Mariz-e-Barros' passed the right battery also, not being able (so says the diary) to turn in time and go back.

All this time the Argentine army, which had remained at Palmas, used every night to make some noise in the woods, to keep us awake in expectation of an attack; and they used to play the 'túrútútús,' in which our men had taken the initiative before. Now and then a rowing-boat would attempt to come silently at night to reconnoitre,

but it was invariably heard from a long distance, and a shot or two sent it away.

After the Battle of Ytororó, the Brazilians marched on and encamped at Ypané,* an old guardhouse on the River Paraguay, where their fleet was passing over the cavalry and artillery from the Chaco; and on December 11 they again marched southwards, having to fight another battle at Avay,† a stream crossed by the road, and which the Paraguayans held. These had been reinforced by Lopez with six guns and a few men, making up about 4,000 men and 12 guns in all. General Caballero again commanded the Paraguayans, and they all fought like lions. They held their ground, in a pouring rain, for four hours against the continual assaults of the Brazilians, until the cavalry surrounded them, and they were attacked on all sides. They were now completely cut up, and hardly a man escaped. General Caballero was pulled off his horse, and his 'poncho' and silver spurs taken; but he was not recognised by the enemy, and next day presented himself to Lopez. Colonels Serrano and Gonzalez were taken prisoners, and, in fact, all who were not killed were captured. Wonderfully enough, the Brazilians took so little care of their prisoners that several field-officers made their escape in a day or two, and went back to Lopez. Among these were Major Moreno (wounded), commander of the artillery, Major Mongelos, &c. About 200 men escaped altogether. The Brazilians took the 12 guns and 700 sound prisoners, besides 500 wounded. They also took 300 women belonging to the Paraguayan army, and did not treat them well.

The Brazilians, however, lost more than the Paraguayans did on this occasion, having about 4,000 men *hors de combat*, and General Osorio severely wounded. They

* Y, water; pané, crooked: a crooked stream.

† Avá, an Indian; y, stream: the Indians' stream.

now encamped on the heights of Villeta, in view of Angostura, though about four miles off.

The day after this battle, Lopez wrote to me, that it had not gone so well for us as the preceding one, but that the enemy had suffered so severely that the generals had only been able to keep their army together by assuring them that General Caballero had been killed.

Lopez now saw that he was going to be attacked in the rear, and, at my suggestion, a trench was begun from Angostura towards his headquarters, with its front towards Villeta, and flanked in the same manner by the right battery, as the old trench was by the left. It was, however, soon apparent that we had not sufficient men to execute a large work like this, and it was given up, and a star fort begun on a hill 2,000 yards on the way, intended to be one of a chain of forts; but the enemy did not give time for this either. Lopez accordingly scraped together all the men he could, and collected about 3,000 at his headquarters, where he also had a number of guns sent, including the Whitworth 32-pounder. He had a ditch dug, two feet wide by two feet deep, and the earth thrown to the front, so that, by sitting down on the inner edge of the ditch, the men would be somewhat protected from rifle-bullets. This trench was garrisoned with all his troops—his escort, which was now well mounted, being kept in reserve—and guns were placed all round it. With the view of keeping it out of rifle-range of his house, the trench was made of an immense radius, so that it was very thinly defended on the front. There was not time to dig this ditch all round, and the rear, towards Cerro-Leon, was completely open, and had no men to defend it. This, however, did not signify with a general like Caxias, who was certain to find out which was the strong side, and attack it. Had Lopez saved all his men to defend Itá Yvaté, instead of sending them to fight in the open

field, he might have destroyed the Brazilian army this month.

The whole trench of Pikysyry was left garrisoned with about 1,500 men, most of them invalids and boys, and about forty guns of different calibres. I turned each of the batteries into a small redoubt, by digging a trench round it of a peculiar construction, that the men defending it might not be injured by the canister, which, in case of an attack, the guns were to fire over their heads.* There was no time to make anything more formidable. I also had chain-cables placed round on posts to stop the cavalry, should it attempt to charge, as a horse could jump our trench.

On the night of the 16th two ironclads ran down past the batteries, and on the 19th five passed up, taking loaded pontoons with them, making in all twelve ironclads above and six below the batteries, besides seventeen wooden vessels of war, which were not brought into play at all. The ironclads, both above and below the batteries, favoured us with their eternal and useless bombardments, which at Angostura had only cost us, up to this time, one officer and ten men killed, and one officer and twelve men wounded. During the last few days, however, the losses were greater, as we were more crowded.

On December 17, the Brazilian cavalry made a reconnaissance on our positions, not however going far enough to see anything. They surprised a Paraguayan regiment of cavalry (the 45th), which they completely destroyed, only the commander and two or three men escaping.

It was said that Caxias had been urged on to action by positive orders from the Emperor to risk his last man in bringing the war at once to a conclusion. Having raised their camp at Villeta, embarking all the tents, &c., during

* See Plate IV.

the previous day, the whole Brazilian army, 25,000 strong, marched in two columns, on the morning of December 21 ; and having reconnoitred the front of Lopez' position at Itá Yvaté, sat down before the strongest portion of it, to have their dinner, while General Mena Barreto, with the cavalry, a few guns, and some infantry, took the Pikysyry trenches in the rear, and cleared them of the Paraguayans, killing some 700, and taking 200 prisoners, most of them wounded, and all the artillery to within a mile of Angostura, where he stopped. Many of the fugitives and women sought refuge in Angostura, which was now completely cut off from Lopez, the road from Palmas by land being open for the enemy's supplies. Some of the defeated Paraguayans, from the left of the Pikysyry trench, found their way to Lopez, and reinforced him. At three in the afternoon the Brazilians attacked Lopez' headquarters, and after three hours' fighting became masters of fourteen of his guns, including the Whitworth 32-pounder. They had also made an entrance in another point, and reached Lopez' house, when his escort charged them and drove them out again. The Brazilian losses were immense, for they had chosen the only two defiles which led to Lopez' lines for their attack, instead of going round, where they might have attacked in any formation they liked, and their infantry was made of such stuff that a very few Paraguayans were able to defeat a great many of them. On this day, besides the losses at the trenches of Pikysyry, Lopez lost the greater part of the forces he had with him at Itá Yvaté. The Brazilians that day lost about 3,500 killed and wounded, the Baron del Triunfo being among the latter. Lopez that night sent to Cerro-Leon and to Caapucu, where he still had a few men, to recall them ; and on the next day he wrote a letter, addressed both to me and my second, being the first time he had addressed an order to Angostura, excepting to me solely,

the General-in-Chief of the allied armies and President of the Argentine Republic, General Bartolomé Mitre, the reconciliation of four sovereign States of South America, which had already begun to destroy each other in a remarkable manner; but my initiative met with no answer but the contempt and silence of the allied Governments, and new and bloody battles on the part of their armed representatives, as your Excellencies call yourselves. I then more clearly saw that the tendency of the war of the Allies was against the existence of the Republic of Paraguay, and, though deploring the blood spilled in so many years' war, I could say nothing, and, placing the fate of my Fatherland and its generous sons in the hands of the God of Nations, I fought its enemies with loyalty and conscience, and I am disposed to continue fighting until that God and our arms decide the definite fate of the cause.

‘Your Excellencies have thought fit to inform me of the knowledge you possess of my actual resources, thinking that I have the same knowledge of the numerical forces of the Allies, and of their every-day increasing resources. I have not that knowledge, but I have more than four years' experience, that numerical force and those resources have never influenced the abnegation and bravery of the Paraguayan soldier, who fights with the resolution of the honourable citizen and of the Christian man, and who opens a wide grave in his country rather than see it even humiliated. Your Excellencies have thought fit to remind me that the blood spilled at Ytororó and at Avay should have determined me to avoid that which was spilled on the 21st instant; but your Excellencies doubtless forgot that those very actions might have shown you beforehand, how true all is that I say about the abnegation of my compatriots, and that every drop of blood which falls to the ground is a new obligation for those who survive.

After such an example, my poor head will bear the burden of the ungentlemanly threat (if I may be allowed the expression) which your Excellencies have considered it your duty to notify to me. Your Excellencies have not the right to impeach me before the Republic of Paraguay, my Fatherland, for I have defended it, I defend it, and I will yet defend it.

‘ My country imposed that duty on me, and I take glory in fulfilling it to the last ; as for the rest, I shall leave my deeds to history, and I owe an account of them only to my God.

‘ If blood is still to flow, He will lay it to the account of those who are responsible. For my part, I am still disposed to treat for the termination of the war upon bases equally honourable for all the belligerents, but I am not disposed to listen to an intimation to lay down my arms.

‘ Inviting your Excellencies, therefore, to treat of peace, I consider I am, in my turn, fulfilling an imperious duty towards religion, humanity, and civilisation, as well as what I owe to the unanimous cry I have just heard from my generals, chiefs, officers, and troops, to whom I have communicated your Excellencies’ intimation, and also what I owe to my own name.

‘ I ask your Excellencies’ pardon for not citing the date and hour of the notification, as they were not on the document, but it was received in my lines at a quarter-past seven this morning.

‘ God preserve your Excellencies many years !

‘ FRANCISCO S. LOPEZ.

‘ *To their Excellencies Marshal the Marquez de Caxias, Colonel-Major Don Enrique Castro, and Brigadier-General Don Juan A. Gelly y Obes.*’

not visit Mrs. Lynch. When he came from Asuncion, he was placed with his family in a room at Humaitá, exposed to the continual bombardment of the Brazilians, remaining there for some days till the French steamer came for him.

At the beginning of December the Italian Government sent a consul, who, after living for some days under fire at Humaitá, was sent to Asuncion through the Chaco.

Whenever a ball made a hole in Lopez' house at Humaitá, it was immediately repaired and whitewashed, so as to leave no trace, as it was not to be supposed that his house could be hit by the enemy. Two or three small guns, placed in the woods opposite the ironclads at Humaitá, molested the Brazilians whenever they showed themselves on board.

On December 26 the ironclads steamed up within range of Humaitá, to reconnoitre, and then returned to their anchorage.

The steamers 'Tacuari' and 'Ygurei,' which had remained between Humaitá and Tayĩ, did all the transport work between Timbó and Humaitá, landing and taking in their cargoes opposite the church, and out of sight of the ironclads.

The 'Àcà-verá' gun was by this time finished, and brought down to Humaitá, where it was placed in position. The 'Cristiano' was also brought from Curupayty, and mounted at Humaitá.

Small raids were made continually by Lopez' men where they were least expected. One day in December they brought 800 bullocks from behind the enemy's line of communication between Tuyucué and Tuyuti. On another occasion they brought 1,800 head of cattle from near Pedro Gonzalez, and another time carried off from the same place Captain Silva, a Paraguayan who had deserted to the enemy some time before, and who was

serving them as guide. He was thrown into prison, and after answering many questions, was flogged to death.

One of the principal amusements, both in the Paraguayan camp and in that of the Allies, was bombarding each other with Whitworth's 32-pounders. After it was begun by the Paraguayans from Espinillo, the Brazilians brought three of those guns to their lines at Tuyucué, and they used to fire both at our 32-pounder, to try and dismount it, and at Lopez' headquarters. When Lopez had had his dinner, and retired in peace to his casemate, he would order Espinillo to bombard. He always had some officers with telescopes on the top of his earthwork, who sent word to him of everything that went on—every shot which was fired by the enemy, where it came from, where it fell, and whether it burst or not; also every shot from Espinillo, where it was going to, and where it fell and burst. In order to do this properly, the officer at the gun at Espinillo had a number of black letters painted on hide, these letters representing the different parts of the enemy's camp. Thus T stood for Tuyucué, C for Caxias' headquarters, &c. While the gun was being pointed, the telescopes at Paso Pucu were informed, by the raising of a letter at Espinillo, where to look for the shot, and they would be laid towards that spot, Lopez being immediately informed. When the gun was fired, the exact place where the shot fell was seen and reported to him. One of the most favourite marks was Osorio's house. This had a small low earthwork in front; and when his roof had been repeatedly pierced, he had some bales of hay piled upon the earthwork. These were, however, repeatedly disarranged by the Paraguayan fire.

During one of these bombardments the Brazilians set fire to a row of houses at Espinillo, burning the ammunition of a whole battalion of infantry (240 rounds per man), and setting fire to the watchtower which was close by. This

happened just before dark, and the Allies saw the houses burning. Next morning they were amazed at seeing (as they thought) the whole of the houses replaced exactly as they had been before the fire, which they considered as another proof of the omnipotence of Lopez. The fact, however, was that the houses which were burnt down were exactly behind those seen by the Allies, which latter were not burnt at all. Most of the allied generals had their carriages with them, and Lopez was always informed, when they went out, whether they went on horseback or in a carriage.

On January 11, 1868, the flags in the allied camp were hoisted half-mast high, and every half-hour through the day a blank cartridge was fired from a gun in the Argentine camp, and was immediately answered by one in the Brazilian camp. Lopez was in great excitement about this, which was evidently a sign of mourning in the Argentine camp. That morning, too, all the Argentine troops, in parade dress, were marched out, apparently to mass, and Lopez decided that it was Mitre who was dead. To make sure, however, he sent and kidnapped two Argentine sentries that night, who were questioned, but had heard nothing of Mitre's death. They were flogged till they said they knew he was dead. For some time all prisoners and deserters were questioned and flogged till they said Mitre was dead. Lopez was determined he should be dead, and he published his death for some months in his different newspapers. Woe to anyone who should have hinted anything to the contrary! It was, however, the Vice-President of the Argentine Republic, Don Marcos Paz, who died on January 2, and Lopez knew it after a few days. This was one of his inexplicable tantrums.

General Flores, who was in Monte Video, was shot in his carriage, going along the streets, on February 20, 1868, some revolution being on hand.

In consequence of the death of the Vice-President, President Mitre was obliged to retire from the seat of war, and go to Buenos Ayres. He left on January 14, and delegated the command-in-chief to the Marquez de Caxias, much to the sorrow of all the Argentines. Mitre himself was probably glad to get away, as he could make nothing of the Brazilians. When he proposed any movement, Caxias said it was impossible, as, out of 43,000 Brazilians, 13,000 were in hospital. As soon as Mitre left, however, it was found that only 2,500 were in hospital, and the Marquis prepared to gain immortal fame by doing something. What it was to be he could not imagine, but with 50,000 sound men, which the allied army now counted, it stood to reason that he must conquer Lopez, who had only some 15,000. He therefore made a military promenade from Tuyucué to San Solano and back, with the greater part of the allied army, with the view of impressing the Paraguayans with the number of his forces.

The more their enemies, however, the more the Paraguayans would laugh. They used to play all sorts of pranks at night with the Brazilian guards, shooting at them with bows and arrows, and with 'bodoques.' This is a ball of clay, baked in the sun, about an inch in diameter. It is shot from a bow with two strings, which are kept two inches apart by a small stick inserted between them near each end of the strings. The ball is placed on a piece of canvas fixed to the two strings, and is shot by holding the ball with the right thumb and forefinger, like an arrow, only the strings have to be pulled askew, else the ball would strike the bow. This weapon is used by the boys in Paraguay to shoot parrots with.

The Brazilians had a battalion always on guard at an entrenchment at Paso Poi.* Colonel (then Major)

* *Poi*, narrow: the narrow pass.

Rivarola went one night with fifty naked cavalymen, sword-in-hand, crossed the 'estero,' and fell on the rear of the battalion, cutting up many. The battalion could not use their firearms, as, in doing so, they would have fired on another Brazilian battalion which was coming to their relief.

On another occasion, the Paraguayans kidnapped the corporal of the guard of an Argentine battalion, while he was going his rounds. They took him from between two sentries who were eighty paces apart, the commander of the battalion being at the moment going his rounds. It was done so quickly and quietly, that he was gone before they knew it.

The Argentines used every morning to reconnoitre beyond their lines at Tuyucué, in the direction of the Angle. On February 17, Lopez had an ambush laid for them, commanded by Captain Urbieta. The Argentines passed the ambush, when the Paraguayans fell upon them, and killed and wounded eighty men and four officers. Colonel Giribone, commander of the Argentines, was killed, and his second wounded. Captain Urbieta had his thigh broken by a rifle-bullet, and about thirty of his men were killed and wounded.

Lopez had some idea both of attacking Tuyucué and Tayĩ, but it was manifest that he could only lose, as both places were strongly fortified, and had plenty of men.

With the view of mystifying the enemy, he had a redoubt made at Cierva, 3,500 yards to the north of Humaitá, and armed with nine fieldpieces; it was garrisoned with about 500 men, under the command of Major Olabarrieta. The enemy naturally supposed this was an important point, and an opening into the Potrero Obella, part of which they had formerly taken, and at the south end of which Lopez still kept his cattle. Such was not, however, the case, as the position was of no use to Lopez.

In the beginning of February, Lopez sent me to start a battery in the Chaco at Timbó. He sent first six 8-inch guns and eight 32-pounders. These were all mounted quickly on the bank of the river, there being no time to make any parapets or powder-magazines before they were called into play. The bank of the river here is low, and liable to be flooded by the river; the platforms were consequently raised three feet above the ground. Captain Ortiz was sent from Curupayty to command the battery.

General Porto Alegre left the army about this time, and General Argollo was placed in command of Tuyutí.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE IRONCLADS PASS HUMAITÁ—CAPTURE OF CIERVA REDOUBT—EVACUATION AND BOMBARDMENT OF ASUNCION—ATTACK ON IRONCLADS BY CANOES—LOPEZ RETREATS TO THE CHACO—ATTACK ON THE PARAGUAYAN LINES AT ESPINILLO AND SAUCE—EVACUATION OF THE SAME BY THE PARAGUAYANS.

WHEN the ironclads had passed Curupayty, they did not attempt to face Humaitá, saying it would be impossible to pass its batteries without the monitors which were expected from Brazil. At that time there only were three 8-inch guns, and about twice as many 32-pounders, at Humaitá. Now there were eighteen 8-inch guns between that place and Timbó, nine of which the ironclads had passed at Curupayty, and there was a 130-pounder and a 150-pounder besides.

On February 13, three monitors, which had been built at Rio Janeiro, and had recently arrived at Curuzú, ran past Curupayty at night, suffering very little from the few guns which were left there, and incorporated themselves with the ironclad squadron between Humaitá and Curupayty.

These Rio Janeiro-built monitors were vessels with twin screws, and plated with 4-inch armour-plates on the hull, which only stood about a foot out of the water. Their one revolving turret was covered with 6-inch plates, and armed with one Whitworth gun. The port-hole for this gun was made circular, and barely larger than the muzzle of the gun, which, when it was run out,

was flush with the face of the turret, almost filling the porthole, so that there was absolutely no part of these monitors exposed. The elevation and depression of the gun was obtained by a double carriage, which raised or lowered the trunnions of the gun at will—the muzzle always being at the height of the porthole. So little of the hull was visible that they were very difficult to hit.

On February 18, 1868, at half-past three in the morning, the ironclad squadron began to bombard furiously ; so did the wooden squadron at Curuzú, and one or two gunboats went into the Laguna Piris, and bombarded thence. Tuyucué bombarded Espinillo as hard as it could, and then sent several battalions to fire their rifles as fast as they could towards Espinillo. These were all diversions to the passage of Humaitá, though it is difficult to guess their object, as the 8-inch guns could not very well, at a moment's notice, have marched off to Espinillo.

The large ironclads 'Bahia,' 'Barroso,' and 'Tamandaré,' each with a monitor lashed to her port-side, steamed up past the batteries of Humaitá. The three monitors were the 'Alagoas,' the 'Pará,' and the 'Rio Grande.' The 'Alagoas,' after passing the batteries, was cast loose by her consort, and, having got into a very rapid part of the current, was carried down again some way, and had to steam back. She was out of range of the guns of Humaitá by daylight. The fire of Humaitá was well sustained and true, but the balls flew in pieces on the plates of the ironclads. After passing Humaitá, they went straight on, and ran past the battery of Timbó, on to Tayĩ.

The battery at Timbó being lower than that at Humaitá, the ironclads suffered almost more from it than from Humaitá. The 'Alagoas,' 'Tamandaré,' and 'Pará' were the most damaged, the first receiving 180 shots, and the second 120. These damages consisted chiefly in the plates being dented and bent, and the bolts started.

The 'Tacuari' and the 'Ygurei' had gone into the Arroyo Hondo, to get out of the way of the ironclads. The garrison of Laurel, which was exposed on the river-side, hid itself while the steamers passed, and then was ordered to retire with its artillery, across the river, to Timbó, which was effected.

Had one or two ironclads remained between Timbó and Humaitá, this could not have happened. Lopez himself, too, would have been unable to get away, and Humaitá would have been really besieged, which was the object in making the ironclads pass its batteries.

Ever since Tayĩ had been in the hands of the Allies, Lopez' communications with Asuncion had been carried on by telegraph, as far as the Tebicuary, whence they were taken on horseback to Timbó, where there was a telegraph again to Humaitá. A telegraph was begun through the Chaco, but was not finished till March.

As soon as the ironclads had passed Humaitá, Lopez sent orders to the Vice-President at Asuncion, to order the evacuation of the city by ALL the inhabitants, within twenty-four hours, and to declare Asuncion 'a military position.' The Vice-President, of course, issued the decree. People were allowed to take what they could with them, which was in almost all cases only what they could carry themselves, and they were not to return for anything without a passport from the 'Judge of Peace' of the district to which they removed. The seat of government was removed to Luqui, a village on the railway, nine miles from Asuncion, inland. Thither the greater part of the people flocked, many of them having to live in the open air, and many families being crowded into the corridors outside the few houses of the village. They suffered very much from this, as well as from want of food.

All the population on the banks of the river was

ordered to remove inland, to be out of the way of the ironclads.

As soon as Lopez knew that the ironclads were going to attempt to pass Humaitá, he sent Mrs. Lynch to Asuncion, to take out into the country all valuables in his house and in her own. This was done at midnight, in order that it should not be known.

The 'Bahia,' 'Barroso,' and 'Rio Grande' steamed up towards Asuncion the same day they passed Humaitá, with orders to destroy everything they found, and to bombard Asuncion. At Monte Lindo, close to the river, there were some sheds, in which was deposited everything which had to be sent on through the Chaco to the army. There were only a few men at Monte Lindo; and when it was known that the ironclads were coming, their officers gave them leave to sack these sheds, that nothing might be left for the Brazilians. They accordingly took everything away into the woods, where they crammed themselves with the treacle, salt, and Indian-corn meant for the hospitals, leaving the rest there for a future feast. They even took cases of shells, thinking they were something edible. When the ironclads arrived here, they landed some men, and set fire to the sheds, which now only contained some dried beef, full of worms. They then went on, and presently came within sight of the 'Pirabebé,' which was towing a schooner up to Asuncion. She did not expect these visitors, and was out of firewood, which was the only fuel burned by the Paraguayan steamers since the commencement of the blockade. She had to burn all her bulwarks, and all her crew's chests, to get up steam with to escape, and she had to sink her schooner, which the Brazilians claim to have taken and sunk. She got up beyond Asuncion in time. When the three ironclads hove in sight of Asuncion, on February 22, they commenced firing at it; but they did not go sufficiently close to

do any damage to the arsenal, which was in full work, because, on their seeming inclined to go too near, the 'Criollo' threw three shots at them, which all missed; but the ironclads had seen enough, and returned down the river. They had thrown about sixty shells into Asuncion. On their way down, they stopped again at Monte Lindo, where not a soul was to be seen; but they fired a few rounds of grape into the woods, and then returned to Tayí. On their way down, Nuñez laid an ambush of two guns and a few infantry in the woods, doing them some little damage.

The Allies had to transport overland to Tayí all supplies and ammunition for their ironclads. They had to pay 2*l.* 10*s.* for the transport of a 150-pounder shot, and 33*l.* for the carriage of a ton of coal.

On the same morning that the ironclads forced Humaitá, Caxias with 8,000 men attacked the redoubt at Cierva. His declared object in doing this was to cut off the garrison of Laurel, which shows that he had not learnt much of the topography of the place, although the Brazilians had held the ground in the vicinity for some time. There was no possibility of getting from Laurel to Cierva, without going round either by Humaitá or by Tayí.

At daylight Caxias sent his first attack, headed by the famous needle-guns. These did not do much execution, as the Paraguayans were behind parapets, and poured into the Brazilian columns such a fire of grape and canister, at close quarters, that the needle-gun men, the hope of the Brazilian army, were thrown back, and completely disbanded. Another column was immediately sent forward, and that, as well as a third, and a fourth, had no better luck than the first. While the fourth column was retreating, a Paraguayan in the redoubt was heard to call out to his officer, that the artillery ammunition was all finished,

which encouraged the Brazilians to reorganise and return to the attack. While they were doing this, Major Olabarrieta retreated with his men on board the ' Tacuari ' and ' Ygurei,' which were close at hand, and had assisted with their fire. After exchanging shots for some time with the Brazilians, the two steamers went down to Humaitá, and discharged the troops there.

The Brazilians lost about 1,200 killed and wounded, and the Paraguayans about 150 men, and their nine guns. The defence was heroic, for the Brazilians came right up to the counterscarp, and many fell into the ditch.

After the third attack had been repulsed, Lopez received a telegram from Olabarrieta, telling him of the fact. On receiving news of the fall of the redoubt, he determined to retake it, and Olabarrieta had reinforcements given him at Humaitá for that effect. The idea, however, was given up before being put into execution.

On hearing that the ' Alagoas ' was left alone between Timbó and Humaitá, Lopez determined to send his two steamers to take her. While they were preparing for it, however, news arrived that she had passed Timbó.

Lopez now determined immediately to take measures for retiring through the Chaco with the main part of his army, and with what artillery he could. The artillery from all the trenches was therefore taken into Humaitá, leaving six fieldpieces at Curupayty, one at Sauce, and twelve from the Angle to Humaitá. One battalion was left at Espinillo, with guards at the other points of the trenches. The two steamers now did excellent service, running between Timbó and Humaitá, transporting men, artillery, &c. The first cargoes sent consisted of Lopez' private commissariat stores. Then came the Whitworth 32-pounder, and the Krupp 12-pounder; after these eight 8-inch guns; then everything, from a sick man to

a fieldpiece, was transported to the Chaco as rapidly as possible. Great quantities of ammunition were sent to the port at Humaitá, for transport to the Chaco, and an immense pile exploded on March 25, being a heavy loss to Lopez, as powder was getting scarce.

Being sent by Lopez to the Tebicuary, to examine the position and report upon it, I found that a battery might be quickly mounted at Monte Lindo, in order to keep the guns dismounted as short a time as possible, but that at the very mouth of the Tebicuary, a battery would be much more serviceable, as it would close the navigation of that river, at least to wooden vessels; it would, however, take longer to make.

I found that the ground north of the Tebicuary, for a distance of ten leagues from the River Paraguay, was shut off from the east by 'esteros' more than a league wide, joining the Tebicuary to the great Laguna Ipoa, which runs parallel with the Paraguay as far as the latitude of Villeta. In these ten leagues of the Tebicuary there were four passes, but the water was deep, and boats would be needed to cross it. With little work, however, a landing might be effected between the passes in many places. As the roads there were very bad, and there were no horses, reinforcements would not soon reach any given point. There was no fear of being outflanked by an enemy, but the line to be defended was very long, and therefore much exposed.

On receiving this report, Lopez determined to have a battery mounted at once at Monte Lindo, and I was sent again to mark it out, and have the platforms commenced.

The journey through the Chaco was very fatiguing. There were several streams which had to be passed in 'pelotas,' the bridges not being yet finished. The poor wretched horses could barely go at a walk, and the

seventeen leagues took twenty-five hours to accomplish, going the whole time! About half an hour was lost at each post while they looked for the new horses.

Lopez knew very well, that if he could get only one ironclad, and man it with his own men, it would be sufficient to chase the whole of the Brazilian fleet out of the river; it was therefore his greatest ambition to take one or more, and for some time he had had a body of picked men trained to swimming and paddling in canoes, with the view of boarding them.

There were seven ironclads left between Curupayty and Humaitá, two of these, the 'Herbal' and the 'Cabral,' doing duty as vanguard, some distance above the others. On the night of March 1, these two were suddenly attacked by the Paraguayans in canoes. There were twenty-four canoes, each containing twelve men, armed principally with sabres, and carrying hand-grenades and rockets to throw inside the ironclads. The canoes were connected, two-and-two, by a rope about twenty yards long, so that one canoe paddling towards each side of a vessel, the rope would catch across her bows, and bring the canoes alongside of her. The expedition was commanded by Captain Xenes, an aide-de-camp of Lopez. The night was very dark, and they were only seen just as they were going alongside, when they jumped on board. Several canoes missed the ironclads, as the current was very strong, and these were carried down, and taken by the ships below. On perceiving what was coming, the crews of the ironclads immediately shut themselves up inside, and began to fire canister from their turrets at the Paraguayans on their decks. Two more ironclads came up to the rescue, and poured in volleys of grape and canister on to the men on the decks of the others, causing terrible havoc. The Paraguayans had caught the commander of the division of ironclads and some of his crew,

trees. We got some roast beef, and my own horse, with three of Lopez,' caught us up here, having, by his permission, been brought over in a steamer the day after we left Humaitá, so that I was now well mounted. In the afternoon we went on and had dinner at the Posta Timbó, the cooks, with their paraphernalia, having gone on ahead and prepared it. We then went on and reached the Paso Palenque,* where we overtook a division of the army which was marching in the same direction. The bridge over this stream was not finished, and Lopez had a hut made for himself of boughs, while we slept on the grass. The troops had to work all night to finish the bridge, as Lopez could not cross the stream, and they were in and out of the water all night, in the greatest good-humour. As soon as the bridge could stand the carriage, Lopez got into it, and was dragged across by men on foot, the horses swimming.

After two leagues' ride, we came to Paso Puente, where the first four 8-inch guns had arrived, and were waiting to be passed over. Lopez stayed and chaffed the men a little, telling them he wished to see how they pulled, and he would wait while they took two of them across. The men were greatly delighted, and pulled with a will, taking the guns over in a very short time; they were very heavy, and very difficult to draw over those elastic bridges.

We then went through some leagues of bamboo forest, after which we crossed the Paso Ramirez in canoes, and had dinner there, feeding our horses with the leaves of the 'pindó,' a tall palm-tree without thorns. Horses are very fond of its leaves, which contain as much nourishment as corn. After dinner we went on, those who

* Lopez always had a name given to every place which had none. This gave great facilities for conversing and giving instructions about any place.

could keeping up with Lopez, who began to gallop, till we arrived at Seibo, about four miles from Monte Lindo, where Lopez stayed some time, looking for a place to encamp, and then went on to Monte Lindo, which we reached by dark. Here most of us found a roof to sleep under.

Next day three ironclads came up to reconnoitre, and Lopez went back to Seibo; the battery at Monte Lindo was commenced, but the men covered the work over with boughs, and the Brazilians, suspecting nothing, went away in a few hours.

Lopez now established his headquarters in a circular islet of wood, at Seibo, the troops which had come from Paso Pucu being all encamped round him, but in positions where they could not be seen from any side from a distance.

There is some reason to believe that at this time Lopez had an idea of marching through the Chaco to Bolivia, and thence making his way to Europe. He sent none of the troops over the Paraguay to defend the Tebicuary; he had horses brought across the river to Seibo, and five cartloads of silver dollars were also brought to Seibo from Asuncion. The heavy guns were mounted at Monte Lindo, and he would not for some days hear of their being moved to the Tebicuary.

While at Seibo, Lopez had his brother Benigno brought down in irons from Asuncion, secretly, and put under a guard. José Berges, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Saturnino Bedoya, the treasurer, were at Seibo, in the black books, but not in prison.

After some days he resolved upon having the battery removed to the mouth of the Tebicuary, and I was sent to execute this order.

At the spot where the Tebicuary falls into the Paraguay it is about 500 yards wide, and the River Para-

guay there is exactly 330. They make together an angle of about sixty degrees, on the northern side of the Tebicuary, which is firm ground for a distance of about 2,000 yards up the Paraguay, and about 200 up the Tebicuary, forming an island called Fortin. On account of the 'carrizals,' this island is accessible only from one point on the land side, where canoes were stationed to cross the water.

Fortin, like Curupayty and Humaitá, presents a concave surface on a bend of the Paraguay, which, a thousand yards below Fortin, makes a reverse curve, turning towards the left. The ground all round, both on the other side of the Tebicuary and of the Paraguay, is 'carrizal,' so that no land-batteries could have been placed by an enemy to annoy Fortin. When the river is high, its bank at Fortin is about a yard above it, though in extraordinary floods it would all be under water.

When I first went there, the whole island was covered with a thick high grass in flower, called 'aguaráruvai,' or fox-tail, from the bushiness of its flowers; it was over six feet high, and I had a wide margin of it left next the river, to hide our work, should the ironclads come up before the guns were mounted. After marking out the work, I returned to Lopez, and gave him a sketch of what I had determined on, and he sent me back to carry out the works as quickly as possible, ordering that that very night two 8-inch guns should be dismounted at Monte Lindo, and taken to the Tebicuary. I was to ask Colonel Nuñez at the Tebicuary for as many men as I wanted. I could only get 200, about eighty of whom were men, and the rest boys. All the timber for the platforms had to be cut in the woods, some distance up the Tebicuary, as there was none near; and the platform had to be raised three feet, in case the river should rise high

and flood them. By dint of judiciously relieving the men, in three days I had four 8-inch guns mounted and in fighting condition. I had not shut my eyes the whole time, and they felt like deal boards. It turned out that there was no need for such hurry, as the ironclads did not make their appearance till the batteries were finished; the one at the mouth of the Tebicuary mounting seven 8-inch guns and two 32-pounders, and the other one, 2,000 yards higher up the Paraguay, on the same island, two 8-inch guns and three 32-pounders. I also got two of my 32-pounder rifled howitzers, and placed them in a separate battery facing the Tebicuary, in case a landing should be attempted there.

After the batteries were established, the workmen were sent away again, and the 18th Battalion, 300 strong, sent to garrison the island, which was placed under my command, Lieutenant Abalos, who was my second, being always there, while I had frequently to go about the other positions, to trace out works or to report upon them.

When the guns were all mounted, four ironclads came up and anchored within sight of the battery, arriving in the evening. They bombarded all night, doing no damage however, and the next morning steamed up to reconnoitre.

The battery at the mouth of the Tebicuary had to be constructed so that its guns should fire on that river, as well as on the Paraguay, for there were not sufficient guns to have separate batteries. Owing to this, and to the form of the ground, the battery was enfiladed from down the River Paraguay, but there were traverses between the guns, to protect them. In the direction straight down the Paraguay, therefore, only one gun (the one at the point) could fire.

A monitor steamed up within a hundred yards of the point, and engaged this one gun, firing nothing but canister

at the garrison, which was quite exposed, as there was no parapet; we replied with solid shot, which had very little effect on her. The pivot of this gun came out twice, the whole slide moving away, and the gun had to be moved back with purchases. The other three steamed about below, and after an hour they went away again to Tayi.

In a few days they came again, and anchored in sight of the batteries, bombarding continually. I then began to throw one or two shells at them every hour or so, for our ammunition was scarce, and they soon retreated behind the bend of the river. Here, however, they fared no better, for our shells, by good luck, often fell on their decks, and they went away altogether.

A telegraph was established to San Fernando, where Lopez was, four miles from Fortin.

As stuff of any kind for cartridges was very scarce, we had to tan the lining-membrane of the insides of the oxen we killed. This formed a sort of leather, about the thickness of brown paper, and made excellent cartridges.

Here, as at Curupaty, a mug of maize was given for a ball or a poncho-ful of splinters of shells, which were sent to Asuncion to the foundry.

Once a 68-pounder shell from the ironclads fell at the mouth of a powder-magazine, and, instead of going past it, stopped there and burst. The door was open, and the cartridges were covered with the earth moved by the explosion, but no harm was done.

Cattle were rather scarce at the Tebicuary, and all those which lay down to die of leanness were killed and eaten.

From whisperings I gathered that something extraordinary was taking place at San Fernando, and that many people were in irons there. I had a room at Lopez' headquarters, and occasionally stayed there; but saw

only two priests and two officers, who were all day coming and going to him, apparently with reports. For about a fortnight before July 24 (his birthday), Lopez continually told me that the ironclads would force the batteries on that day, which they really did. They arrived on the 23rd in the evening, and on the 24th the 'Bahia,' with a monitor lashed to her port-side, and the 'Silvado,' steamed up at full speed. The river was deep across its whole width, but the channel was close to the battery. I gave them a few shots at long range, and then reserved my fire so as to make sure of one shot from each gun striking perpendicularly to the plates, having all the guns trained to their front, for each one to fire as the steamer passed it. The ironclads first appeared to be coming along the channel, but when very near the guns, veered as if to go on the Chaco side, when I immediately increased the elevation, upon which they came back into the channel, there being just time to put all the guns at point-blank for the spot to which they were coming. They passed about eighteen yards from the guns, getting every shot to the greatest advantage. Most of the balls split into a thousand pieces, but they did a great deal of damage, and we picked up a piece of one of the plates of the 'Bahia,' ten inches long, which had sprung on shore from the force of the blow.

While passing the batteries, three people put their heads out of the turret of the 'Bahia,' and one of them waved a handkerchief, and shouted out something. The moment they had passed, I telegraphed to Lopez the number which had passed, and proceeded to write another despatch containing details, when I received a telegram from him, saying, 'What signal did the first ironclad make on passing the battery?' The telegraph clerk had already informed him. I then wrote and told him all about it, and that the men said it was the Paraguayan

and established workshops, with lathes, &c., for repairing guns, or anything required.

He established telegraphs to Recodo (the port of the steamers), to Paso Portillo (up the Tebicuary), to Fortin, and to the Tebicuary Pass. The telegraph from Monte Lindo to Timbó was in full work, and the despatches had to be passed over the Paraguay in canoes, between Recodo and Monte Lindo.

A pretty little octagonal church was built near Lopez' house, as he had taken a fit of church-going, and went every day without fail, staying some four hours. All this time he appears to have been committing the most horrible and wholesale murders, under pretext of a conspiracy being on foot. It was afterwards said that the conspirators were to have been joined by the enemy, both with his army and ironclads, on July 24, which accounts for Lopez' despatches to me on that date.

This matter I shall again refer to, but will notice two things more concerning it now. My room at Lopez' headquarters was next to that of General Bruguez, and he and I were very good friends. One evening, arriving from Fortin, I went into his room to see him, and found that all his things were gone, and other things in their place. There was a boy in the room, and I asked him for General Bruguez; he did not know. I then asked him if he had moved.—'Yes.' 'Where?'—'I don't know.' I then imagined that something must be wrong with him, and asked no further questions; I had asked too many already. Next day I dined with Lopez; Barrios, Bruguez, and the Bishop used always to dine with him, but Bruguez was not there. Lopez' little boy asked where he was, and they all told him, with smiles, 'He is gone.' He was, I have since learned, bayoneted to death.

A few days after this Barrios was placed under arrest in his house, upon which he attempted to commit suicide

by cutting his throat, but did not succeed. All this was kept very secret.

While these things were going on, the Vice-President was sent for, and was under a cloud, though Lopez saw him several times. He was allowed to return. Lopez' mother came down to see him, probably to beg for the lives of her two sons, who were both in irons, and of her two daughters, who were in prison. She had been formerly to Paso Pucu, after the Battle of May 24, 1866, it was whispered, to beg her son to give up the war against such overwhelming Powers, and to retire to Europe. She had, however, no influence over him.

Mr. Washburn, the American minister, also visited him at San Fernando, but he was not well received. M. Cuverville, the French consul, however, was much fêted during his visit to San Fernando.

The vanguard at the Tebicuary was under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Rolon, and was stationed at the 'estancia' Yacaré,* about four miles to the south of the Tebicuary Pass, and there were parties of Paraguayan cavalry continually scouring the country, as far as Pilar.

On June 8, the enemy for the first time sent a reconnoitring force, consisting of 3,000 men, towards the Tebicuary. They were to ascertain the position of Lopez and his army. They reached the Yacaré, a narrow but deep stream, which falls into the Tebicuary, and commenced crossing it. When one regiment had crossed, Major Rojas, with 200 cavalry, fell upon it, and cut it up, killing many, and taking many arms. The rest immediately returned to Tuyucué.

A force of 400 men was at Paso Portillo, to defend the same, and a guard at Paso Recalde, still further up the Tebicuary.

* *Yacaré*, Guarani for alligator.

attack one of the ironclads, as nearly as possible at the same time.

On July 9, they started from the Bermejo in the evening, and went down the stream of the Paraguay, reaching the ironclads, without being noticed, in the middle of the night. The division which was to board the 'Rio Grande' did so, but the one destined for the 'Barroso' passed her, and left her free. The captain of the 'Rio Grande' was on deck with part of the crew, and he and they were all killed by the Paraguayans, the remainder of the crew having shut themselves up inside. The guns of Tayí now began to play upon the Paraguayans, and the 'Barroso' came up and fired canister, so that they were nearly all killed, and the rest taken prisoners. Of the other division of canoes, some arrived at Timbó, and some, passing further down, were taken by the other ironclads.

Provisions had been getting scarce at Humaitá, and it was evident to the commanders that they would have to evacuate it before long. Colonel Alén, probably afraid of what Lopez would do if he left the place without orders, attempted to commit suicide with a revolver. He was, however, only badly wounded, and the chief command devolved upon Colonel Martinez. They had a redoubt opposite Humaitá, with a few pieces of artillery; and from seeing some canoes pass between the two places, the ironclads reported to Caxias that the Paraguayans were evacuating Humaitá. On receiving this news, on July 15, Caxias prepared everything for attacking the place next morning, in order to have the glory of taking it by force of arms.

General Osorio, with 12,000 men, led the attack on the San Solano front, the Argentines being formed ready to attack on another point. After daylight, Osorio gallantly led on his troops, and with his *cavalry* reached the abatis, which was of no account, and began to pull it open. The

Paraguayan artillery, however, at close quarters, did such execution with grape and canister that the Brazilians took to their heels, completely routed. Osorio had sent to Caxias to ask for reinforcements, but had been refused. He had his horse killed under him, and three of his aides-de-camp by his side. No further attempt was made to assault the trenches. The Brazilians lost 2,000 men, *hors de combat*, and the Paraguayans only 47.

With the view of harassing General Rivas—who was daily bombarded at Andai from Humaitá, with great effect—and of rendering his position untenable, the Paraguayans advanced with redoubts from Timbó. The one made nearest to Rivas was on the only road from Timbó to Andai, about halfway between the two, and was called the Corá redoubt. It was garrisoned with one battalion of infantry, and 200 swordsmen on foot. On July 18, General Rivas ordered this to be attacked, and sent Colonels Martinez de Hoz and Campos, with their battalions and some Brazilians. The latter turned tail quickly, but the Argentines reached the abatis, when they were forced to retire, and the 200 swordsmen were then sent upon them, and cut them up. The two colonels were taken prisoners, and 400 Argentines put *hors de combat*. The Paraguayans followed up the fugitives to near Andai, when General Rivas charged them and drove them back.

The colour-sergeant of one of the Argentine battalions was killed, but saved his colours by throwing them into the river, where they were picked up by an ironclad. This was called the Battle of *Ăcăyuasá*,* from the place where the colonels were taken prisoners, and Lopez granted a decoration to all who had been engaged in it, consisting of a silver Maltese cross.

Provisions in Humaitá were now almost consumed,

* *Ăcă*, heads or boughs; *yuasá*, crossing each other: crossed boughs.

and it was necessary to evacuate it. They had thirty canoes, and in these they passed all the wounded and the women across into the Chaco, on the night of July 23. On the 24th (Lopez' birthday) dancing and music was carried on to deceive the enemy; and that night the garrison crossed over, the bands of music remaining to the last, and playing. The enemy suspected nothing, and not till the middle of the next day did they reconnoitre and take possession of Humaitá.

On the 21st, three ironclads had forced the batteries of Humaitá, going up and joining the fleet above Humaitá. These were the 'Cabral,' 'Silvado,' and 'Pianhy.' The fleet had not perceived the Paraguayans crossing the river at Humaitá, and the passage was effected without the least disturbance.

Once in the Chaco, the Paraguayans carried their canoes overland into the Laguna Verá, which they had to cross in order to get to Timbó, as Rivas, with his army and fortifications, occupied the road along the river. General Caballero, with the Timbó forces, awaited the garrison of Humaitá on the other side of the lake, and their rear was protected by the redoubt opposite Humaitá, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Vallovera. From this redoubt, several marshes had to be crossed to get to the Laguna Verá, the last narrow strip of land before the lake being called Isla Poi. The whole of the ground was wooded, so that the combatants could rarely see each other.

The commanders of Humaitá immediately commenced sending the women and the wounded in canoes across the lake to General Caballero, and they had to pass through a terrible fire. As soon as the Allies saw what was going on, they reinforced General Rivas, increasing his division to 10,000 men. They also sent sixty boats, some of them with guns in them, into the Laguna Verá, to cut

off the Paraguayans when they crossed. Their ironclads were so stationed as to sweep the Isla Poi, and a force, with artillery, was sent to the west side of the lake. All these forces kept up a terrible fire, both of artillery and rifles: day and night, by regular reliefs, eleven guns and 2,000 rifles played incessantly, from all quarters, on the Paraguayans. In one week, 10,000 shells were thrown at them.

Notwithstanding the enemy's boats on the lake, the Paraguayan canoes continued the passage at night, a hand-to-hand fight between the canoes and boats taking place every time they passed. Many, of course, were killed and wounded, and many canoes sunk by the artillery, which played upon them till they reached the double line of guardboats. As soon as the canoes had passed the ordeal, and arrived at the other side of the lake, the paddlers would give a yell of delight, and, having landed their passengers, return through the same terrible fire to fetch more.

On the 28th, the Brazilians attacked Martinez, but were repulsed with loss; he had a few 3-pounder rifled guns, but the ammunition was finished, and he had to break up the muskets of those who were killed, and make grape of the locks and fittings. There was one night a confusion among the Brazilians, caused by a battalion returning from some duty meeting another battalion. They thought each other enemies, and fired for some time, killing and wounding over a hundred men.

At length all the Paraguayan canoes were sunk and taken, and the only road to Timbó was through General Rivas' forts and army. 2,500 men had left Humaitá, and of these, 1,200 had attempted to cross the Laguna Verá, and nearly 1,000 succeeded in doing so, many of them wounded. Colonel Alén had been sent across among the first on a stretcher, the other three commanders

remaining to the last. Every man, on leaving Humaitá, had taken a small bag of parched corn with him; but this was soon finished, and they suffered very much from hunger, and had to eat two or three horses which had been brought from Humaitá.

On August 2, General Rivas sent Colonel Martinez an invitation to surrender. The flag of truce, however, was received with bullets, but two days afterwards it returned upon the same mission. This time Martinez agreed to an interview with Rivas, which took place on the 5th, and ended in the surrender of the remnant of the garrison of Humaitá, the officers keeping their swords. Colonel Martinez was so faint from want of food that he could hardly speak, and 200 of his men had lain down to die from hunger. Most of them had been four days without food.

For surrendering, after this unexampled faithfulness to Lopez, all were declared traitors by him; and Colonel Martinez' wife, who had lived at headquarters with Mrs. Lynch during the whole war, was thrown into prison, frequently beaten, and finally shot.

The starving men were supplied with food and taken to Humaitá. Their number was 4 field-officers, 95 officers, and 1,200 rank and file, of which 300 were wounded. The Allies took 5 guns and 800 muskets at the same time. At Humaitá the trophies consisted of 144 iron guns, of which eight were 8-inch, and one a burst 150-pounder; 36 brass guns, one of them being a 130-pounder; 600 muskets, and 400 bayonets.

The firing at Humaitá was distinctly heard at the Teboricuary, and at night the reflection of flashes from the heavy guns was seen, and everyone knew that something was taking place there.

When Lopez heard of the evacuation of Humaitá, he sent word to all the commanders of divisions in the army,

to tell the men that he had left Humaitá provisions to last till October, but that the commanders had not been very careful of them, adding that, although he had been obliged to order the evacuation, it would have no material influence on his plans. He immediately ordered the evacuation of Timbó, the heavy artillery to be sent on first. When no hope remained of any more men crossing the Laguna Verá, Caballero, with his own men and with those from Humaitá, marched to Monte Lindo, and joined Lopez at the Tebicuary, bringing all the artillery and ammunition with him; and the Allies were left alone in the vicinity of Humaitá, where they rested for three weeks, having required thirteen months' siege to reduce Humaitá, the weakest position of any the Paraguayans had held.

for the time to command there. On my return, to report the commencement of the work, I was promoted from the rank of major to that of lieutenant-colonel, and Lopez made me a present of a sword. He sent me back the same evening, to command the troops which were to be sent there, and to arrange their encampment; to place the artillery, mark out and urge on the completion of the trenches and batteries, to get all needful stores from the Minister of War at Asuncion, and have everything ready for defence by the time he arrived, as probably he should bring the enemy on behind him. Major Caballero was sent as my second.

All means of conveyance were now put into requisition, both by land and water, and troops and guns were constantly arriving by steamers and by land. Quantities of ammunition were also brought, nor was there any place to store it but under hides in the open air. The riverside became crowded with stores of all kinds.

The wood had to be cut down both for the river-batteries, and for opening a connection between them and the trenches, and for leaving an open space in front of them. It was very hard work to cut down this jungle, and make all so low that a rifleman could not hide himself behind any of the trees. However, it made a most excellent abatis.

The great 'Criollo' gun was brought from Asuncion in a steamer, and mounted in the left-hand battery; all the other guns were also brought from town, as well as the garrison.

On the 26th, Lopez left San Fernando, and travelled overland slowly with the main army, leaving Colonel Rivarola in command of the rearguard, and in charge of the final evacuation.

On the same day that Lopez left, the vanguard of the Allies, under the Baron del Triunfo, crossed the Yacaré,

after some skirmishing with the Paraguayan guard; and on the 28th they attacked and took a small redoubt, with three guns, which defended the retreat across the river, just as the last of the garrison were evacuating it, on their way to pass the Tebicuary in boats, which they effected with a very slight loss.

Three ironclads had come up meanwhile, and, after a great deal of reconnoitring, found that only three old 32-pounders were left—the rest of the guns having been taken to Angostura, but their vacant places had been supplied with hide-coverings similar to those over the real guns. The 18th Battalion was still at Fortin, with sufficient artillerymen to work the three guns, and the ironclads came close inshore, all round the battery, both by the Tebicuary and the Paraguay, and poured in canister. There was, however, plenty of covering for the men while not working the guns, and they suffered little, firing at the ironclads when these had just discharged their guns, when they also had time to load. This went on from the 26th to the 28th, when Moreno received orders to retire, and, throwing his three guns into the river, he marched away during the night—the ironclads being very much surprised next morning to find their hosts gone. Caxias must have now seen that Lopez intended fortifying himself higher up the river; but he was so elated with the fall of Humaitá, and the evacuation of the Tebicuary, that the idea seems never to have struck him of the advantage of sending the fleet up the river, to see what was being done, and to prevent any batteries being erected on it.

We were consequently allowed to work on in peace, and hard work it was. The weather was very bad, and the mud at the battery was so deep as nearly to hide an 8-inch gun, for there had not been time to drain it. This mud was so slimy, that all ropes and tackle which went near it became just as if they had been soaped, and

the men thus had no hold on them on account of their slipperiness. Their bare feet were sore from being continually in the mud.

Lopez arrived in the beginning of September, and took up his quarters at Cumbarity,* a high hill, about four miles from the river, and also from the trenches; he shortly had an immense house built at Itá Yvaté,† a hill about two miles to the rear of the trenches, and four from the river. Hence he could see the whole country around for many leagues.

In order to protect the port of Angostura, for our steamers to load and discharge, until the ironclads should force the battery, the latter was divided into two sections, 700 yards apart, called the right and left batteries. The ironclads could not see what was going on at the right battery, where the port was, unless they came opposite the left battery. They did not show themselves till September 8, on which day three came up to reconnoitre. I covered the guns in the left battery with boughs, so as completely to hide them, having previously laid them for a broadside opposite the battery. The 'Silvado' alone came up and passed the batteries, receiving considerable damage from the 'Criollo,' which struck her with a steel shell at the water-line. She went down again in half an hour, and had another 150-pounder on the other side in the same place. From that day a few ironclads almost daily came up to bombard Angostura, returning after a few hours to their anchorage, which was out of sight, near Palmas.

The allied army meanwhile marched northwards, and on September 23 its vanguard reached Surubiy,‡ a stream about two leagues from Pikysry. Here Lopez

* *Cumbari*, a kind of pepper; *y*, a plantation: a pepper plantation.

† *Itá*, stone; *yvaté*, high: high stone.

‡ *Surubi*, a kind of fish; *y*, stream: the Surubi stream.

had prepared an ambush, of 200 cavalry and 150 infantry, which were hidden to the north of the Surubiy; a few skirmishers were sent to the other side to entice the enemy, which they succeeded in doing; and when a considerable force had passed the stream, the Paraguayans fell upon them and cut them up, many being drowned in the water, which was deep, and one Brazilian battalion was completely annihilated. Next day the main army arrived, and encamped at Palmas, a guardhouse on the river, with a very small piece of dry land, the army being almost all of it in mud.

The Allies made several reconnaissances on the lines of Pikysry, but considered them too strong to attack, and gave up the idea. The water of the Pikysry had been dammed up in two places, so that it was over six feet deep on the highroad.

There were altogether just over a hundred guns in the Paraguayan lines, including those of Angostura, which mounted twelve 8-inch guns, one 150-pounder, two smoothbore 32-pounders, and the Whitworth 32-pounder, which had been taken at Tuyutí.

The Paraguayan army was formed into five divisions, viz.—the Angostura batteries, with 1,000 yards of trench, commanded by myself, the right commanded by Colonel Hermosa, the centre by Colonel Gonzalez, Timbó (so called from its being garrisoned by the forces from Timbó) commanded by Colonel Montiel, and the left by Colonel Rivarola. The army now numbered altogether about 10,000, by far the greater portion being boys.

Large quantities of ammunition of all kinds had been lost in the retreat from the Tebicuary, none of the guns having a hundred rounds, and many only twenty or thirty. The infantry, too, had most of them only sixty to a hundred rounds. All the powder and shot in the magazines was brought down, and barely made up, for

the artillery a hundred rounds per gun, and for the infantry twenty-four packets of ten rounds each, which was the number every soldier was ordered to have, and which he carried in two hide-cases made to sling round the neck, so that, in case of a sudden march, they should have plenty of ammunition with them.

As all the regimental music-bands had been completely destroyed, the remaining musicians were collected from the army, with such instruments as could be found, and they were divided into five bands for the five divisions. Their instruments were horribly battered about and out of tune, and I had to abolish my music, and set the men to dig instead, as it was quite unbearable.

To provide against the exposure of the artillerymen at the heavy guns, in case the ironclads should remain opposite the batteries and fight, I had some high traversing carriages made, which raised the guns above the men's heads, so that a high parapet could be made, and all the garrison of the guns, excepting the man serving the vent, was under cover. These carriages also overcame the difficulty caused by the pivot jumping out, for the guns were light, but were used with heavy charges, and kicked very much in the recoil. I thus mounted six 8-inch guns, with the 150-pounder, and they answered very well, being less troublesome to work than the old ones. The ironclads afterwards passed the batteries, and I could get no more from Asuncion, as our communication by water was cut off.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE ALLIES PREPARE FOR ACTIVE OPERATIONS—ROAD THROUGH THE CHACO—THE IRONCLADS PASS ANGOSTURA—NEUTRAL VESSELS OF WAR—LOPEZ FORMS A RESERVE FORCE.

WHEN Caxias gave up the notion of attacking the front of the Paraguayan defences at Pikysry, he conceived the idea of making a road through the Chaco, from opposite Palmas to opposite Villeta, intending to pass his troops across the Paraguay, and march on Lopez' rear. He accordingly commissioned General Argollo to explore the Chaco with a force, and to make the road. This was begun on October 11.

On October 1, before daylight, four ironclads forced the batteries of Angostura, receiving almost as much damage as they would have done by daylight. I used to lay all the guns every evening opposite the batteries for a broadside, which always took effect, every shot which struck an ironclad giving out a flash of light. It was very difficult to see the steamers by night, as the Chaco opposite was thickly wooded, and this threw a deep shade over half of the river, hiding the ironclads, which always sought this protection. They could sometimes be seen only by the moving reflection of their chimneys in the water. After sunrise on the same day, eight more ironclads came up to reconnoitre, and after them the 'Belmonte,' wooden gunboat, with the Admiral on board. No sooner, however, did she show herself beyond the point of Itapirú*, than we put a Whitworth 150-pounder shell into

* A bend of the river below Angostura.

During the months of October and November the French and Italian steamers almost daily came and went between Palmas and Angostura, the commanders frequently going to visit Lopez at his headquarters. The Italian vessel at last took away 52 women and children, and the Frenchman a smaller number, as well as M. Libertat, the chancellor of the French Consulate, who was imprisoned in irons for supposed conspiracy against Lopez, and who, under torture, was made to declare that he had received 40,000 dollars (8,000*L.*) from the heads of the conspiracy for his complicity therein. He was sent down to me, together with his papers, with orders to deliver him to the French captain, as a prisoner, which I did. Some of these steamers took away a number of heavy cases, each of which required from six to eight men to lift; they probably contained some of the ladies' jewellery, which had been collected in 1867, as well as a large number of doubloons.

On December 3 the United States' ship 'Wasp' again made her appearance, carrying an Admiral's and a Minister's flag. The new Minister was General MacMahon, sent to replace Mr. Washburn, whom he had met at Rio Janeiro. As Mr. Washburn had been subjected to some indignities on leaving Paraguay—especially in having two members of his legation forcibly taken from him while on his way to embark, thrown into irons, and sent to the army to be judged—it was determined that Admiral Davis should go with a squadron of war-vessels, and demand the surrender of these prisoners, and that, until they were given up, General MacMahon should not land. The morning the 'Wasp' arrived, Captain Kirkland went up to see Lopez at his headquarters, and arranged that Lopez should meet the Admiral the same evening at Angostura. The meeting took place at my house, Lopez being so amiable and plausible, that he

delighted Admiral Davis, and made him really believe that Masterman and Bliss, the two prisoners demanded, were guilty of a horrible conspiracy. He told the Admiral that he himself wished to give them up, but that the tribunals would not do so. However, Admiral Davis had some arguments with him in the shape of 11-inch guns, which would have been applied in a more persuasive manner than the Brazilians did theirs; and so on December 10, at night, Masterman and Bliss were sent to me, with orders to deliver them to Captain Kirkland as prisoners. I was only too glad to obey this order, as I knew it was only a farce. I could not, of course, see either Admiral Davis or Captain Kirkland, to tell them my idea of their guilt. On the 12th General MacMahon landed and went up to headquarters, where he remained some time with Lopez.

While these neutral vessels were carrying on their negotiations, the Brazilian ironclads several times came up and insulted them, going even to the length of firing at the battery over the bows of the Italian steamer. The English gunboat was the only one they respected.

The road in the Chaco, meanwhile, was being constructed. It was a large work, being almost wholly made of palm-trees, laid transversely, side by side, on the ground, which was muddy, and liable to be flooded when the river rose high; several bridges also had to be made over it. The whole ground there, as in the rest of the Chaco, is perfectly flat. About a mile below Villeta, a stream called the Aracuay, in the Chaco, falls into the Paraguay. The mouth of the former is narrow, and barely admits a small paddle-steamer; but shortly it becomes larger, and divides into several long branches, one of which goes towards Palmas, but is not navigable so far. Into the Aracuay was sent the steam-launch, which the ironclads took past Angostura with them;

and it did good service in transporting provisions &c.—first for the ironclads only, and afterwards for the whole army.

The Brazilian road ran along the eastern side of this stream, and a telegraph was also laid down along it. Four encampments, or guards, of two battalions each, were stationed along the road, and a redoubt was made at the northern end of it, in a wood. We had forces, varying from 100 to 800 men, in the Chaco; but the ground was so intersected with 'esteros,' that it was almost impossible for more than two or three men at a time to go anywhere. Twice, however, these forces had engagements with the enemy, which resulted in very small losses on either side.

At first Lopez did not believe that the Brazilians really meant to march through the Chaco, but thought it was only a diversion, more especially as our spies reported that troops marched from Palmas towards Villeta by day, returning by night. At length, however, there could be no doubt of their intention, and he had a trench made round the village of Villeta, where they were expected to land, and this the ironclads continually bombarded. He also formed a movable reserve force, consisting of the greater part of the army, leaving in the trenches only the 'indisposed,' and the greater part of the artillery. I had to send five battalions to this reserve, remaining with only one, and a few contingents belonging to other battalions. The reserve was encamped close to Lopez' headquarters, so that he could despatch them himself, at a moment's notice.

The men were much improved in health by the food they had been eating since they arrived at Pikysry, for their relations came continually, bringing them eatables, and many people sent presents of cartloads of oranges, mandioca, &c.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE END OF THE WAR.

THE BRAZILIANS LAND AT SAN ANTONIO—BATTLES OF YTORORÓ AND OF AVAY—CAPTURE OF THE TRENCHES AT PIKYSRY—SEVEN DAYS' FIGHTING AT ITÁ YVATÉ, RESULTING IN THE DEFEAT OF LOPEZ, THE DESTRUCTION OF HIS ARMY, AND THE CAPITULATION OF AN-GOSTURA.

TOWARDS the end of November, the whole Brazilian army, amounting to 32,000 men, had crossed over into the Chaco, and on the 27th Caxias went himself. The Brazilians embarked in their ironclads, landing, not at Villeta, but at San Antonio, a village about four miles farther up the river, where they were not expected, on December 5. A small force had been awaiting them at Villeta, and on the evening of the 5th, Lopez sent his reserve, consisting of about 5,000 men and 12 guns, under General Caballero, his second being Colonel Serano, to defend the pass of the Ytororó.* This is a narrow deep stream, having a bridge over it, which it was necessary to cross in order to go from San Antonio to Villeta; and the ground all about is covered with islets of wood, in one of which, close to the bridge, the Paraguayans, after marching all night, concealed themselves.

In the morning the bridge was attacked by the Brazilians. Osorio, with the 3rd Division of the Army, was sent round, by an impracticable road, to the left, in order

* Y, water; *tororó*, cascade.

to attack the Paraguayans in their rear, while General Argollo attacked them in front; he could not, however, arrive in time, on account of the badness of the road. General Argollo led the attack with the 2nd Division, the 1st Division being kept in reserve; and after encountering a terrible fire from the Paraguayan artillery, which was commanded by Major Moreno, he crossed the bridge, but was immediately charged and driven back by Caballero. A determined hand-to-hand fight now took place, and the bridge was taken and retaken three times, remaining at last in possession of the Paraguayans. Caxias now came up with the 1st Division, with which, joined to the 2nd, he attacked and took the bridge, and also six guns, the Paraguayans retreating with the other six. The Brazilians lost over 3,000 killed and wounded; among the former one of their best colonels, Fernando Machado, and among the wounded, Generals Argollo and Gurjao. The Paraguayans had 1,200 *hors de combat*, and lost six guns. Lopez, after he had received news of the battle, telegraphed to me that, after five hours' hard fighting, Caballero had remained in possession of the field of battle, and ordered me to decorate the battery with flags in honour of the victory.

The ironclads still paid us their daily visits, but seemed very fearful of coming within sure range; they used to come up past Itapirú, and hide behind the point of the Chaco, opposite Angostura, and would bombard thence; occasionally showing themselves beyond that point, which was about 1,000 yards off, when they were almost always hit, as we had got the range pretty accurately. There was, however, one of the ironclads which, by some good luck of theirs, we could never hit; it was the only one whose commander showed himself, and he used, with another officer, both in white waistcoats, to stand on the top of his casemate, while we

were exchanging shots. They came to their end in the following manner. On the night of December 8, thinking to bring the ironclads nearer to the battery, I masked the left one completely with boughs of trees, so that nothing could be seen of it. As luck would have it, there was a report in the fleet that Angostura had been evacuated, and on the same night the Commodore sent a most trustworthy officer, who returned, and reported to the Commodore that he had been right up to the battery, and that there were no guns or men there. (This I learnt from the private diary of an officer temporarily commanding one of the ironclads, taken by an expedition I sent afterwards into the Chaco.) Next morning the white waistcoats and a monitor came up to reconnoitre, but I had no flag flying, and showed none. They came rather nearer than usual, and after examining with their glasses for some time, and firing a few rounds of grape, they went away. I then rode up to Lopez' headquarters to see him, and just as I arrived there, saw all the guns in the battery go off. The ironclads had been to report the evacuation of the left battery, and received orders to pass it, and go and reconnoitre the right one, in doing which the 'Mariz-e-Barros,' of the white waistcoats, had gone ahead, and in passing the battery, the officers on the casemate were blown to pieces. The vessel was also much damaged. The monitor made off back again as fast as she could; but the 'Mariz-e-Barros' passed the right battery also, not being able (so says the diary) to turn in time and go back.

All this time the Argentine army, which had remained at Palmas, used every night to make some noise in the woods, to keep us awake in expectation of an attack; and they used to play the 'túrútútús,' in which our men had taken the initiative before. Now and then a rowing-boat would attempt to come silently at night to reconnoitre,

but it was invariably heard from a long distance, and a shot or two sent it away.

After the Battle of Ytororó, the Brazilians marched on and encamped at Ypané,* an old guardhouse on the River Paraguay, where their fleet was passing over the cavalry and artillery from the Chaco; and on December 11 they again marched southwards, having to fight another battle at Avay,† a stream crossed by the road, and which the Paraguayans held. These had been reinforced by Lopez with six guns and a few men, making up about 4,000 men and 12 guns in all. General Caballero again commanded the Paraguayans, and they all fought like lions. They held their ground, in a pouring rain, for four hours against the continual assaults of the Brazilians, until the cavalry surrounded them, and they were attacked on all sides. They were now completely cut up, and hardly a man escaped. General Caballero was pulled off his horse, and his 'poncho' and silver spurs taken; but he was not recognised by the enemy, and next day presented himself to Lopez. Colonels Serrano and Gonzalez were taken prisoners, and, in fact, all who were not killed were captured. Wonderfully enough, the Brazilians took so little care of their prisoners that several field-officers made their escape in a day or two, and went back to Lopez. Among these were Major Moreno (wounded), commander of the artillery, Major Mongelos, &c. About 200 men escaped altogether. The Brazilians took the 12 guns and 700 sound prisoners, besides 500 wounded. They also took 300 women belonging to the Paraguayan army, and did not treat them well.

The Brazilians, however, lost more than the Paraguayans did on this occasion, having about 4,000 men *hors de combat*, and General Osorio severely wounded. They

* Y, water; *pané*, crooked: a crooked stream.

† *Avá*, an Indian; *y*, stream: the Indians' stream.

now encamped on the heights of Villeta, in view of Angostura, though about four miles off.

The day after this battle, Lopez wrote to me, that it had not gone so well for us as the preceding one, but that the enemy had suffered so severely that the generals had only been able to keep their army together by assuring them that General Caballero had been killed.

Lopez now saw that he was going to be attacked in the rear, and, at my suggestion, a trench was begun from Angostura towards his headquarters, with its front towards Villeta, and flanked in the same manner by the right battery, as the old trench was by the left. It was, however, soon apparent that we had not sufficient men to execute a large work like this, and it was given up, and a star fort begun on a hill 2,000 yards on the way, intended to be one of a chain of forts; but the enemy did not give time for this either. Lopez accordingly scraped together all the men he could, and collected about 3,000 at his headquarters, where he also had a number of guns sent, including the Whitworth 32-pounder. He had a ditch dug, two feet wide by two feet deep, and the earth thrown to the front, so that, by sitting down on the inner edge of the ditch, the men would be somewhat protected from rifle-bullets. This trench was garrisoned with all his troops—his escort, which was now well mounted, being kept in reserve—and guns were placed all round it. With the view of keeping it out of rifle-range of his house, the trench was made of an immense radius, so that it was very thinly defended on the front. There was not time to dig this ditch all round, and the rear, towards Cerro-Leon, was completely open, and had no men to defend it. This, however, did not signify with a general like Caxias, who was certain to find out which was the strong side, and attack it. Had Lopez saved all his men to defend Itá Yvaté, instead of sending them to fight in the open

the General-in-Chief of the allied armies and President of the Argentine Republic, General Bartolomé Mitre, the reconciliation of four sovereign States of South America, which had already begun to destroy each other in a remarkable manner; but my initiative met with no answer but the contempt and silence of the allied Governments, and new and bloody battles on the part of their armed representatives, as your Excellencies call yourselves. I then more clearly saw that the tendency of the war of the Allies was against the existence of the Republic of Paraguay, and, though deploring the blood spilled in so many years' war, I could say nothing, and, placing the fate of my Fatherland and its generous sons in the hands of the God of Nations, I fought its enemies with loyalty and conscience, and I am disposed to continue fighting until that God and our arms decide the definite fate of the cause.

‘Your Excellencies have thought fit to inform me of the knowledge you possess of my actual resources, thinking that I have the same knowledge of the numerical forces of the Allies, and of their every-day increasing resources. I have not that knowledge, but I have more than four years' experience, that numerical force and those resources have never influenced the abnegation and bravery of the Paraguayan soldier, who fights with the resolution of the honourable citizen and of the Christian man, and who opens a wide grave in his country rather than see it even humiliated. Your Excellencies have thought fit to remind me that the blood spilled at Ytororó and at Avay should have determined me to avoid that which was spilled on the 21st instant; but your Excellencies doubtless forgot that those very actions might have shown you beforehand, how true all is that I say about the abnegation of my compatriots, and that every drop of blood which falls to the ground is a new obligation for those who survive.

After such an example, my poor head will bear the burden of the ungentlemanly threat (if I may be allowed the expression) which your Excellencies have considered it your duty to notify to me. Your Excellencies have not the right to impeach me before the Republic of Paraguay, my Fatherland, for I have defended it, I defend it, and I will yet defend it.

‘ My country imposed that duty on me, and I take glory in fulfilling it to the last ; as for the rest, I shall leave my deeds to history, and I owe an account of them only to my God.

‘ If blood is still to flow, He will lay it to the account of those who are responsible. For my part, I am still disposed to treat for the termination of the war upon bases equally honourable for all the belligerents, but I am not disposed to listen to an intimation to lay down my arms.

‘ Inviting your Excellencies, therefore, to treat of peace, I consider I am, in my turn, fulfilling an imperious duty towards religion, humanity, and civilisation, as well as what I owe to the unanimous cry I have just heard from my generals, chiefs, officers, and troops, to whom I have communicated your Excellencies’ intimation, and also what I owe to my own name.

‘ I ask your Excellencies’ pardon for not citing the date and hour of the notification, as they were not on the document, but it was received in my lines at a quarter-past seven this morning.

‘ God preserve your Excellencies many years !

‘ FRANCISCO S. LOPEZ.

‘ *To their Excellencies Marshal the Marquez de Cazias, Colonel-Major Don Enrique Castro, and Brigadier-General Don Juan A. Gelly y Obes.*’

When the fighting began at Itá Yvaté, Lopez abandoned his house, and erected a tent, about a mile more to the rear, among the woods. While the enemy were actually attacking, however, he was on horseback, sheltered by the thick mud walls of his house, and all his staff on horseback with him. They were not sheltered, and kept falling one by one, struck by the bullets. Every now and then Lopez would send one of them off to fight, only saying, 'Go and fight.' Those who were prudent took care to return soon, but most of them succumbed. Colonel Toledo, an old man of about 70, commander from time immemorial of the Government Escort, was sent off to fight with a lance, and a few minutes afterwards his corpse was brought back. Almost the whole of the staff and of the principal officers were killed or severely wounded. The wounded men whom Lopez saw coming away from the fight he hailed, and enquired after their wounds. They were very proud of this, and always said, 'Oh, it's a mere nothing.' 'Then go again and fight: here, give this man a nip of spirits.' The man would go again quite cheerfully, even though he had only one hand or leg that he could use.

The women had to do all the burying during those days, and to attend to the sick, as there were no men to be spared. The rifle-bullets, by thousands, did not cease from December 21 to 27, both by day and night, and all the wounded were exposed to this fire, as well as the combatants.

General MacMahon, the United States' minister, was all this time at Lopez' headquarters, and, together with Messrs. Burrell and Valpy, civil engineers, was under this terrible fire till the 23rd, when Lopez sent them away to Pirébeui,* whither the seat of government had been removed. General MacMahon took with him Lopez' children,

* *Piré*, skin; *voui*, light: light skin.

Mrs. Lynch remaining with him. Lopez made a deed of gift of his property, making General MacMahon his executor, and charging him with the care of his children, in the following curious documents, captured by the Allies on December 27 :—

' Major-General MacMahon, Minister of the United States of America.

' Pikysry, December 23, 1868.

' DISTINGUISHED SIR,—As the representative of a friendly nation, and in precaution against anything which may occur, I permit myself to confide to your care the enclosed deed of gift, by which I transfer to Mrs. Eliza Lynch all my private property, of whatsoever nature.

' I beg you will have the goodness to keep that document in your possession until you can deliver it safely to the said lady, or return it to me on any unforeseen contingency which may prevent me from again seeing you on this subject.

' I shall also permit myself to beg you at once to do all in your power to carry into effect the dispositions made in the said document, thanking you in anticipation for all you may do with that view, towards obliging your very attentive servant,

' FRANCISCO S. LOPEZ.'

(Enclosure).

' I, the undersigned, Marshal President of the Republic of Paraguay, by this present document, declare formally and solemnly, that, thankful for the services of Mrs. Eliza A. Lynch, I make in her favour a pure and perfect gift of all my goods, rights, and personal actions, and it is my will that this disposition be faithfully and legally

complied with. For all which I sign, together with witnesses, at my headquarters at Pikysyry, on this twenty-third day of December, Eighteen hundred and sixty-eight.

‘FRANCISCO S. LOPEZ.’

The other is a letter to General MacMahon, recommending him his children, especially the youngest, Leopoldo, about three years old.

On December 25, early in the morning, the Brazilians opened a furious bombardment from forty-six guns. This was the sharpest cannonade during the whole war, and resulted in cutting in two the flagstaff at Lopez' headquarters, and also a beam of his house. As usual, the fuzes were not properly timed, and the air was full of bursting shells; many rockets were also fired. After this bombardment the Brazilians again attacked, and were once more driven back, although Lopez had not six guns left which were not dismounted. His ammunition was also almost finished. On the same evening Lopez, seeing some of the enemy's cavalry towards his rear, sent his regiment of dragoons, which had as yet suffered little, to fight them; they at first beat the Brazilians, but were quickly surrounded by large bodies of their cavalry, and were completely cut up—only some fifty returning to Lopez, who was watching them, but had no forces to send to their relief. The musketry meanwhile did not cease. Lopez' force was reduced to less than 1,000 men, while the Brazilians had not 20,000 sound men left, out of 32,000 they had at the beginning of December. The Argentines had not yet entered into action, and they were destined to turn the tide against Lopez.

On the morning of the 27th, after another bombardment, the Allies marched into Lopez' lines, the Argen-

tines at the head; the few Paraguayans who were left made a desperate resistance, and fought individually against whole battalions, till they were cut down. The artillery was all dismounted, and two or three guns had been still firing, where they lay on the ground, propped up by heaps of earth. Such of the wounded Paraguayans as were able, and some two or three hundred sound ones, betook themselves to the woods in the rear of Lopez' house, and were soon surrounded by the enemy, and in more or less time all were made prisoners. Lopez himself had started off alone for Cerro-Leon, with one or two companions, the moment he saw that the Allies were marching in, by a road he had lately had made through the woods.

He went away in a great hurry, leaving to her fate Mrs. Lynch, who went about among the bullets, looking for him. She followed him, and got away; so did Generals Resquin and Caballero, and the few dozen of his cavalry who were still sound and mounted.

All Lopez' baggage was taken; his carriages, clothes, papers, hat, gold-embroidered 'poncho,' &c., and even some of his female slaves with the baggage. A few lucky prisoners were saved by the advance of the Allies, as they captured an aide-de-camp of Lopez, whom he sent back from the road with an order to have them shot. He had shot his brother Benigno, the Bishop, Berges, Colonel Alén, the wife of Colonel Martinez, and General Barrios, on the 25th. His sisters, Inocencia and Rafaela, he had taken away to Cerro-Leon, after they had been repeatedly flogged by common soldiers, and lived on a cowhide for months.

Lopez had never been under fire before these last days of the war, and then he can hardly be said to have been so, as he was always either out of range, or protected by the thick mud wall of his house. During the last days

of December he repeatedly swore to the troops that he would stay and conquer, or die with them there. On his going away, therefore, almost without smelling powder, the men, though so well trained to think everything he did as perfectly right, yet felt disgusted with him, and I have heard many of those who were taken prisoners descant upon his cowardice.

In his Order of the Day, Caxias states that Lopez, on his retreat, was 'scarcely accompanied by ninety men, and of these only twenty-five arrived with him at Cerro-Leon.' This, if not quite exact, was certainly very nearly so; and knowing this, why did not Caxias, the Commander-in-Chief of the allied army, being at war, *not with the Paraguayan nation, but with its Government*, and having 8,000 magnificently-mounted cavalry, with nothing to do, pursue Lopez, whom he might have taken without the loss of another man? Was it from imbecility, or from a wish to make more money out of the army contracts? Was it to have an excuse for still maintaining a Brazilian army in Paraguay, or was there an understanding between Caxias and Lopez? Or was it done with the view of allowing Lopez to reassemble the remainder of the Paraguayans, in order to exterminate them in 'civilised warfare'? However this may be, the Marquez de Caxias is responsible for every life lost in Paraguay since December 1868, and for all the sufferings of the poor men, women, and children in the power of Lopez.

Angostura was now the only point held by the Paraguayans. Before the Brazilians had marched on Itá Yvaté, I, having an idea that they might cut me off from my supplies (though I did not, of course, dare to say so, as a hint of the possibility of the enemy being able to do anything was punishable by death), asked Lopez to let me have a stock of provisions. He told me to get what I

required from General Resquin. I could, however, get out of him only three days' beef, and about twelve small sacks of Indian-corn. The garrison of the two batteries consisted of 3 chiefs (field-officers), 50 officers, and 684 men, of whom 320 were artillerymen; and we had just ninety rounds of ammunition per gun. After the Pikysyry trenches were taken, on the 21st, we had an addition of 3 chiefs, 61 officers, and 685 soldiers, most of them having lost their arms, and the greater part being small boys. Besides these, we received 13 officers and 408 men, all badly wounded, whom we had to accommodate in the soldiers' quarters, and about 500 women; so that, instead of 700 mouths to feed, I had to provide for 2,400, which for some days I managed by doling out very small rations. All these people were very much crowded, and suffered a good deal from the continual bombardment of the fleet.

On the 22nd and 23rd I sent out parties of skirmishers, to bring in any wounded they might find along the trenches of Pikysyry, and several were brought in, also a few guns and muskets; and everything was ready to repel an assault, which would have cost the Allies several thousand men, and Lopez would have sent a force down on their rear at the same time, so that nothing was attempted.

Seeing that there was no hope of supplies for the present, I determined to try and take some. For this purpose I got together all the sound men, except the artillerymen, fifty of whom I also sent, making up a force of just 500 men; all the rest were useless. These 500 I sent, during the night of the 24th, into the Chaco, under Captains Frete and Lopez, and Lieutenant Fleitas, in three divisions—one of which was to march towards Itapirú, another towards Villeta, and the third straight across into the centre of the enemy's road through the Chaco. The first and second were to sweep round rapidly

towards the centre one, which could act as a reserve to either of the others. This was accomplished, and the three divisions met near the Aracuay, where one of them had taken five boats, with 120 boxes of claret; also a trunk belonging to the *pro temp.* commander of the ironclad 'Brazil,' containing his diary up to the 21st, and a number of odds and ends—such as swords, sextants, &c. Lieutenant Fleitas had taken 27 mules and 3 horses, which he immediately sent over. Four prisoners were taken (boatmen), who stated that the Brazilians had the night before evacuated the Chaco. We therefore got no provisions from that quarter, but the mules helped us to get some elsewhere. The men smashed the boxes of claret with the butt-ends of their muskets, and many of them got drunk. I sent a portion of the diary up to Lopez by a spy, who went round through the woods and arrived safely.

It was therefore necessary to try some other method of obtaining provisions; and, getting together every available man, including 50 artillerymen with sabres, I mustered a force of 550 men, of which I sent, on the night of the 26th, 100 fusiliers and three small fieldpieces, under Major Orihuela, about two miles along the old trench of Pikysry, to effect a diversion, and to make as much noise as they could; while Captain Ortiz, with the remaining 450 men, sixty of whom were mounted on mules and horses, went silently and rapidly to a large inclosure about halfway to Villeta, where, by means of spies, I knew that the enemy kept some cattle at night. It succeeded admirably, a small force of the enemy, with three guns, opposing Major Orihuela at long range, while Ortiz went along, passing a guard which fired on him, but whose fire he did not return, and, entering the enclosure, drove out all the cattle. Just as he was returning, a regiment of the enemy's cavalry charged him, but was imme-

diately driven back, and had to look on while Ortiz drove away the cattle. He only lost one man wounded, and Major Orihuela one missing. Our food was quite out, and this put us in great spirits again. The cattle were driven between the chains round the battery, and next morning was counted, numbering 248 head, besides 14 horses.

I had arranged a system of telegraphic signals, by means of flags, for communicating with Lopez when the telegraph wire was cut. On the night of the 26th, the night before he was routed, Lopez wrote to us, saying: 'Here we are getting on very well, and there is no fear. The enemy is in his last agony and desperate, and nothing troubles him so much as the impossibility of moving with the great number of wounded he has.' We did not know at Angostura of the defeat of Lopez. On account of the woods all round, only his house was visible, and we saw, with a telescope, in front of it a tent, which was not likely to be there unless Lopez was gone. No one however, of course, would ever have hinted at the possibility of Lopez being defeated, and we really knew nothing.

The allied army marched down from Itá Yvaté with its artillery on the 28th, and took up positions for attacking us, while the ironclads were continually bombarding from above and below the batteries; in the afternoon they sent a flag of truce with a despatch. I sent word to them that I could not receive it, but they might send it to Lopez, whose headquarters were close by. Just at the same moment, a monitor belonging to the squadron above the batteries hoisted a flag of truce, and came floating down with the current. We shouted to her to stop, and I sent Captain Ortiz, in a little rowing-boat, to see what they wanted. The ironclad, however, still came on, and I then fired a blank cartridge, upon which she began to steam right under the battery. I then called back Captain Ortiz,

and fired into the monitor with the 8-inch guns, upon which she quickly made off with her flag of truce. It being too late that evening, next morning I wrote the following protest, and sent it with a flag of truce to the allied generals:—

'To their Excellencies the Generals of the Allied Army at war against the Republic of Paraguay.

'Yesterday, about 5½ P.M., one of the monitors above the batteries of Angostura raised her anchor and floated down with the stream, bearing a flag of truce at her masthead. On approaching the battery she was several times ordered to anchor, and signals to that effect were also made to her with a white handkerchief from the battery. Two officers also went out in a small boat to receive the flag of truce.

'Notwithstanding all this, the monitor continued her journey, and put on steam, when by a blank cartridge she was signalled to stop. As she took no notice of this either, but kept on approaching the battery under steam, when she was opposite to it we had to fire into her with ball, upon which she turned round and went back again.

'We energetically protest against this abuse of the flag of truce, throwing all the responsibility upon the commander of the monitor, who attempted to profit by the use of that flag, without respecting those laws which ought to make it inviolable.

'We beg your Excellencies that, if you have any answer to return to this communication, you will send it to headquarters.

‡ GEORGE THOMPSON.

‘ LUCAS CARRILLO.

‘Angostura, December 29, 1868.’

The officers who took this letter were introduced to all the allied generals, who told them the abuse should be enquired into, and the commander of the monitor punished. They also took the opportunity to send a verbal message; to the effect that Lopez had been routed and lost all his men, &c. ; that we could get no assistance from him, and that it would be useless bloodshed to resist ; and that if we did not capitulate that day, the attack would commence on the next—adding that, if we wished, we could send and examine Lopez' headquarters. The officers also brought me a private letter from an Englishman who had been a witness of everything at Itá Yvaté, and who was taken prisoner by the Allies on the 27th, in which he told me the true state of the case. I therefore determined to send a commission to Itá Yvaté, and despatched five officers with a letter to the allied generals, saying that by so doing we did not throw any doubt upon their respectable word.

The commission returned late in the afternoon, and reported that they had seen our wounded and talked to them, and that Lopez' troops had been completely defeated. I therefore saw that no succour could be expected from him. We had only ninety rounds of ammunition to a gun, which would, in case of an attack, have lasted only two hours ; our provisions could last only ten days ; we had only 800 fighting-men, and were surrounded by the fleet on the river, and by 20,000 men on the land side. The position was, therefore, quite untenable ; and I called together the chiefs, the officers, and lastly the troops, and explained the case to them, putting it to them whether it would not be better to capitulate and save their lives, which could then be of use to their country, rather than that all should die there, killing certainly a large number of the enemy, but with the certainty of everyone perishing. With the exception of one officer, Lieutenant Fleitas, all were

for capitulating, and we wrote and sent the following letter* :—

'To their Excellencies the Generals of the Allied Army at War with the Republic of Paraguay.

' Having well considered the proposal of your Excellencies, and having consulted the chiefs and officers of this garrison, we have resolved upon evacuating Angostura, provided we do so with all the honours of war, everyone keeping the rank he now holds, and his adjutants, assistants, &c., guaranteeing that the troops will lay down their arms at a convenient place, without this condition extending to the chiefs and officers, who will keep theirs.

' Your Excellencies will guarantee the liberty of every one to go wherever he pleases.

' God preserve your Excellencies.

' GEORGE THOMPSON.

' LUCAS CARRILLO.

' Angostura, December 30, 1868.'

The following answer was immediately returned :—

' Headquarters, opposite Angostura, December 30, 1868.

' To Messrs. George Thompson and Lucas Carrillo, Commanders of the Fortifications of Angostura.

' The undersigned reply, in the following manner, to the communication of to-day, of Messrs. Thompson and Carrillo.

' That, having in view the avoidance of useless bloodshed, they had not hesitated to prolong, until this morning, the term of six hours, which they marked yesterday for its surrender.

* See Appendix, No. III.

‘The undersigned guarantee to those who form the garrison of Angostura, that they shall keep the military rank which they actually hold, as well as their adjutants and assistants.

‘That they equally consent that the chiefs and officers of the garrison of Angostura shall keep their swords, under their word of honour not to use them against the Allies during this war.

‘That, finally, they concede the honours of war to the soldiers of the garrison of Angostura: that marching out with their arms, they shall deposit them in the place indicated by the undersigned, or by their order.

‘MARQUEZ DE CAXIAS.

‘JUAN A. GELLY Y OBES.

‘ENRIQUE CASTRO.’

At 12 o'clock we marched out, and the troops, having deposited their arms, were divided into three portions, to be rationed by the three allied armies, until they could dispose of themselves. Caxias offered to send me either to Buenos Ayres or to England. I declined his offer, having enough money with me to pay for my passage to Buenos Ayres. I then went up to Itá Yvaté, where I found 700 of our wounded in Lopez' house alone, their wounds not having been even dressed. The ground was still covered with dead in different stages of decomposition. I obtained leave from Caxias to send up some medical students I had had with me at Angostura to attend to the wounded, and at my request, General Gelly y Obes sent twenty-five men to assist them. I then bivouacked, with some of my men, under some orange-trees, near Angostura, for two days, and afterwards went to Villeta, where I was most kindly received by Captain Haukes, on H.M.S. ‘Cracker,’ and went with him to Asuncion, where I remained two days on board, paying a visit to the

deserted town, which was being sacked by the Brazilians. The houses looked as if they were inhabited: all the furniture and everything was left exactly as if the people were still there. I then went down to Buenos Ayres, where I was met by a kind brother, and again under his roof experienced the comforts of a civilised life, after eleven years' residence in Paraguay, during the last four of which I had undergone many hardships.

The Allies were, however, determined that the war should not yet be brought to an end, and, instead of sending their cavalry to follow up Lopez, they marched to Asuncion, which the Brazilians occupied, and sacked, the Argentines taking the more dignified course of encamping outside the town.

Lopez' resources, at the beginning of the year 1869, consisted of 6,000 wounded men in hospital in the Cordillera, which is a low range of hills, forty to fifty miles from Asuncion, and six from the line of railway. He had about twelve small fieldpieces, no muskets, and no ammunition, and five small steamers which he had taken into the Riacho Manduvirá.* The Brazilians have purposely allowed many of their prisoners to go and join him, as they are determined not to leave a Paraguayan of any age or sex alive; and when Lopez has got together as many men as it is possible for him to collect, they will fight him again, and then again give him time to get up another poor force.

Lopez has, all through, acted from the impulses of personal pride, ambition, and avarice, and has not been able to hide these motives. The Allies, on the contrary, while professing extreme humanity, have, under the cloak of 'civilised warfare,' exterminated the Paraguayan nation, and never once tried to get at Lopez, the pretended aim of their warfare.

* *Manduvi*, a ground-nut; *rá*, like: like a ground-nut.

After having a 'Te Deum' sung in Asuncion, Caxias declared the war finished, and, without leave of absence, left for Brazil, where he was made a Duke by the Emperor.

The termination of the Paraguayan war now entirely depends on the state of Lopez' pantry, and will end when his stock of wine and other good things has been consumed, as he will then think he has done enough for glory.

CHAPTER XXV.

CONCERNING THE ALLEGED CONSPIRACY, AND THE ATROCITIES OF LOPEZ.

I APPROACH a difficult subject, but one which cannot be passed over in silence. I know very little about it myself, and probably hardly anyone knows much, as the victims and their executioners, with everyone else who could give any information on the subject, are alike gone, with the exception of a very few lucky ones who have escaped, and some of whom it is to be hoped will publish all they know about it.

I shall begin with the affair of Mr. Washburn, the United States' minister in Paraguay, which throws more light upon the subject than anything else in my knowledge. On arriving at Buenos Ayres from Paraguay, in September 1868, Mr. Washburn addressed a long letter to Mr. Stuart, British minister to the Argentine Confederation. The following extracts from this letter will be found interesting:—

‘When I left Paraguay on the 12th instant, I regret to inform your Excellency that nearly all the foreigners in that country, including several of your countrymen, were in prison; and as I am the only person, beyond the reach of President Lopez' power, who has any personal knowledge of their situation, it seems to be my duty to give any information I may possess. Unless speedy action is taken, there may be none left to tell the tale of their annihilation!’

Mr. Washburn then goes on to say that when the ironclads had passed Humaitá, Berges, the Minister

for Foreign Affairs, told him that the town was ordered to be evacuated, to which Mr. Washburn replied that he should not leave it. Many people brought him their valuables to take charge of, as they had to leave immediately, and had no means of conveyance for them. Several persons obtained an asylum in Mr. Washburn's house; among others Dr. Carreras and Mr. Rodriguez—the former ex-Prime Minister of Monte Video, and the latter ex-Secretary of the Legation. The people of the legation hardly ever saw anyone, and when some foreigner paid them a hasty visit with the permission of the police, they got news of many people being sent to prison, no one knew why.

In the middle of June the acting Portuguese consul, Leite Pereira, took refuge in the legation, his exequatur having been cancelled. On July 11 he was demanded by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Benitez (José Berges was in the camp in irons), Mr. Washburn being requested, at the same time, to expel from the legation all those who were not members of it. Pereira, hearing of this, determined to deliver himself up and answer any charges, as he was unconscious of having committed any crime. As soon as he left the house he was arrested and sent down to the army in irons. Next morning, Mr. Washburn received an urgent letter demanding that Carreras and Rodriguez should leave his house by one o'clock that day. Mr. Washburn told them they might go or stay as they liked, and they preferred going at once rather than waiting and enraging Lopez. They were also sent down to the army in irons.

On the same afternoon another demand was made, that Mr. Masterman and Mr. Bliss should be sent away; these were, however, members of the legation, the former being medical attendant and the latter translator. Mr. Washburn refused to give these up, and kept them with him till he left, although many threatening letters were sent to

him. On their leaving the house with Mr. Washburn, to go out of the country, they were both seized and sent down in irons to the army. From the time that Leite Pereira had entered Mr. Washburn's house, it was always surrounded by a dozen policemen. At first Mr. Washburn thought that only foreigners were being sent to prison, but he knew afterwards that once a train had arrived at midnight in Asuncion, full of Paraguayan prisoners; that nearly every man in the capital (Luque)—the judges, the clerks, accountants, and all save the Chief of Police, Benitez, and the Vice-President—had been sent down prisoners in irons to San Fernando. Mr. Washburn then goes on to say:

‘But what it was all for, no one in my house, as I yet firmly believe, had the least idea. The published correspondence, however, will show that about the 18th or 20th July, the Government suspected, or affected to suspect, a conspiracy, alleging that ex-minister Berges was a traitor, and was in collusion with the enemy, and that under my official seal I had transmitted the correspondence to and fro between the conspirators. At first, it would seem that they were so confident of implicating me, that they began to publish the correspondence; but after receiving my letter of August 11, in which I showed so many contradictions in the declarations that had been made by the accused, probably under torture, they suspended further publications. But it was not in the nature of Lopez to show any magnanimity, or even justice, by acknowledging he had been led into error by false depositions. Men who know him would as soon accuse him of ordinary courage as of magnanimity, and he was never accused of that, except in his own *Semanario*, of which he is virtually the editor. During all this war Lopez has never exposed himself to any personal danger; he has never, on a single occasion, risked himself in any battle; and while he was at Paso Pucu he had

an immense cave, or rather house, with walls of earth over it, 20 feet thick, from which he never ventured for weeks together. At the same time that his organ was filled, *ad nauseam*, with accounts of the great Lopez leading, with dauntless valour, his legions to victory, he was sitting quaking and quivering in his cave, afraid to venture out lest a ball might reach him. On one occasion, some two years ago, when he was out with the Bishop and his staff, a shell struck at a distance of half a mile or more from his Excellency. Instantly the brave Lopez turned and ran, like a scared sheep, with his staff, including the Bishop, after him, the latter losing his hat as he fled affrighted after his chief.*

‘It was not, however, till August that I heard, besides the conspiracy against the Government, that there had been a great robbery of the public treasury. This discovery was probably not made till some months after the removal to Luque, as, about the month of June, we found that all those foreigners who had made any money during the past years, and were most likely to have any money in their houses, were arrested and sent below. Among them were English, French, Italians, Spaniards, Germans, and Portuguese. The plan of Lopez appears to be to get this money into his hand, and then, by torture or threats, to extort confessions of the owners being either conspirators or plunderers of the treasury. On these confessions they will be probably executed, on the precautionary principle of footpads and other murderers, that “dead men tell no tales.” How Lopez expects to escape with the money thus obtained, I do not know. Perhaps he thinks that some neutral gunboat will take him and his plunder away at the last moment. But I here give notice that the money thus taken does not belong to Lopez. It is the property of citizens of those Powers that are able to

* This is an actual fact; it happened about May 19, 1866, near Paso Gomez.

pursue it and return it to its rightful owners. . . .
 To the last moment, Lopez hesitated whether to keep me a prisoner or not; he wants no one to survive him capable of telling the world of his enormities, and of all those whose declarations have been given in the correspondence lately published, not one will be allowed to escape, nor will any of those persons before whom they were made. For once beyond the reach of Lopez, they would declare that they had never made them, or had made them under torture.'

The following are extracts from a letter sent to Lopez by Mr. Washburn, from on board the 'Wasp,' as he was leaving Paraguay:—

'Before finally leaving Paraguay, it is my duty to make my solemn protest against the arrest of those two members of my legation, P. C. Bliss and G. F. Masterman. Their arrest in the street, as they were going with me from the legation to pass on board the steamer, was as gross a violation of the Law of Nations as would have been their seizure by force in my house. It was an act, not only against my Government, but against all civilised Powers, and places Paraguay outside the pale of the family of nations, and for this act you will be regarded as a common enemy, one denying allegiance to the Law of Nations.

'You will also be regarded as a common enemy, for having seized and made prisoners, and loaded with fetters, nearly all the foreigners in Paraguay, and afterwards entered their houses and taken away their money, on the miserable pretext that, finding less in your treasury than you expected, those who had any money in the country must therefore have robbed it from the Government.'

There was a very lengthy correspondence in Paraguay between Mr. Washburn and the Foreign Office; before it was concluded, Benitez, the minister, was also taken down to the army and shot.

Among Lopez' papers, taken at Itá Yvaté in Decem-

ber 1868, there is a book containing a diary of the executions, &c. in connection with this alleged conspiracy; this list has been published, and is in my hands; there can be no doubt as to its authenticity and correctness. It begins with June 19, and ends on December 14, after which there were still executions, but they are not entered here. The name of every individual is given, and were the list not so long it would be inserted whole. I have, however, made the following abstract:—

Foreigners executed	107	
Id: "died in prison"	113	
		220
Paraguayans executed	176	
Id: "died in prison"	88	
		264
Executed on August 22, the nationality not being expressed	85	
"Died" on the road between San Fernando and Pikysyry	27	
		596
Total number of victims up to December 14		596

This list is only of those stated to have been concerned in the conspiracy. Two are marked in the list as shot, but as having died immediately before the execution. Five are marked down as bayoneted, and one as lanced. Among those said to have died in prison is a lady, Doña Maria de Jesus Eguzquiza. Three Englishmen are among the victims—one of them being Mr. Stark, a merchant, and another Mr. Watts, who behaved so well at the Battle of Riachuelo. In this document, M. Libertat, the French chancellor, who was taken away in the French gunboat, is entered as having been 'sent to the capital.'

People who would not 'confess' were put to the torture by having their heads bound down into their knees, and being trussed with muskets.* They were also beaten, many of them to death, with lassos and sticks, and some had their hands smashed with mallets. It was all kept

* I believe Mr. Masterman, who was subjected to this form of torture, has a work on Paraguay ready for the press.

CHAPTER XXVI.

PERSONAL CHARACTER OF LOPEZ.

FRANCISCO SOLANO LOPEZ is a very stout man, about forty-five years of age. He is short, but has a commanding presence. In England he would be called darkish, being about the colour of Spaniards generally, with black hair; his hands and feet are very small. When in a good temper he is well looking, and his manners and conversation very agreeable; on the contrary, when in an ill-humour, he can look remarkably black. He is careful of his appearance, fond of military finery, especially in his staff, and has a somewhat peculiar strut when walking. His legs are short, with a decided bend backwards. He has a good seat on horseback, and when young used to be a hard rider. Now, however, it is a labour to him to get on and off his horse. He is of very indolent habits; will sit down for many hours, talking, or stand an equally long time, his walks limiting themselves to one or two hundred yards.

He is extremely fond of Mrs. Lynch's children, but not of his other ones, of whom he has a number by different women. He entertains friendly feelings for no one, as he has shot almost all those who have been most favoured by himself, and who have been for years his only companions. He is a great smoker, and lover of the table; he eats enormously; after dinner, when in a good humour, he occasionally sings a short song. He has a large stock of good claret, of which he is very fond, and

which no one at his table used to drink but himself—not even Mrs. Lynch or the Bishop; people dining with him were served with an inferior class of wine. During some months, at Paso Pucu, he used to play draughts with the Bishop the whole day long. The Bishop used to be up long before him, and used to go and wait in Lopez' corridor with his hat in his hands. When Lopez came out, the Bishop shuffled up towards him with a deprecating look, and made a deep bow, to which Lopez would return a nod, without touching his cap. Lopez speaks French fluently, always conversing in that language with Mrs. Lynch, who was educated in France. He knows a very little English, and of course Spanish well, that being the official language of the country; however, he never spoke anything but Guaraní to the men and officers, including myself. This Guaraní is a most charming and expressive language, though many words have to be borrowed from the Spanish, to express things with which the original Indians were not acquainted.

Lopez is a good speaker, especially in the kind of oratory likely to inspire his troops with confidence in himself and themselves, and with contempt for the enemy. He rarely himself did or said anything to disgust people, giving his orders for these things to General Resquin. He would allow no one to initiate a joke in his presence, though fond of making one himself; he is a great stickler for his dignity, and used to make even his brothers call him 'Your Excellency.' He has an iron will, and an intense pride, and a great reluctance ever to give a counter-order after he has once settled anything. He is, when he likes, very smooth and gentlemanly, and capable of imposing even on diplomats, and making them believe anything he wishes.

He never feels the loss of his best officers and men, except as having so many men less to fight with, but

he was particularly careful that the enemy should not know where he was, for which purpose he abolished the brass helmets of his guard and also its banner, and hid the guard behind some outhouses. He did not allow the guards to turn out, or even the sentries to present arms, on the three or four occasions on which he visited part of the army, lest the enemy should see and recognise him. He also gave up using his favourite scarlet 'poncho,' embroidered with gold, and wore a straw hat, instead of his *kepí*, and wore his gold-laced saddle-cloth inside out. He had his horse saddled every morning and his carriages harnessed, before daylight, to be ready for a bolt, should the enemy make an entrance into his lines anywhere.

At the beginning of the war he rarely took any drink except at his meals, but latterly got into the habit of calling for a glass of port-wine very often throughout the day. This habit commenced a little before he began his last atrocities, and doubtless had a great influence in making him cruel. During this period, however, he was generally in a good humour outwardly. At San Fernando he used to go out with his children and fish in a lagoon near the headquarters.

The following story, which was told me by an eyewitness, will give an idea of his summary 'justice.' During the last days of December, a corporal of his escort went on horseback to Lopez' steward, and asked him for a drop of spirits. The steward, who was an officer, asked him what he wanted spirits for, and told him to go and fight. Upon this the corporal became impertinent, and said, 'Oh, yes, it's all very fine to talk. The enemy is all round us, and we shall soon be finished up.' After a little resistance, the officer got him off his horse and took him by his collar to Lopez, who was at breakfast in his tent. After hearing what the officer had to say, Lopez said to him, 'Take him outside and kill him.' The officer took the

man, who made no resistance, outside Lopez' tent, and there split his head in two with his sword.

His distrust of everyone is illustrated in the following occurrences. In August, 1866, a Yankee, Mr. Manlove, presented himself at our outposts, and was taken up to headquarters. He stated that he had come to make certain business proposals to Lopez, who however would not see him. At length, by means of a third party, he told Lopez that, having at his disposal three vessels in the West Indies, in every way adapted for privateering, he had come to ask him for letters of marque for them to prey upon Brazilian commerce. Lopez pretended to believe he was only a spy, and would have nothing to do with him, keeping him under arrest for some time. At length he was let out, and Mrs. Lynch used to send him presents of beer, &c. He was, however, at length brought down and shot as a conspirator.

In July 1867, Major Von Versen, a distinguished officer on the Prussian Staff, presented himself at our outposts. He was sent by the Prussian Government to observe the war from the Paraguayan side. On his arrival at Rio Janeiro, the Brazilians threw him into prison, believing, or professing to believe, that he was going to join Lopez as a commander in his army. After some time, the Prussian minister procured his release, and he went on to Buenos Ayres. Here again the Government threw him into prison, and after a great deal of interference in his behalf, he was liberated on condition that he should not go to Paraguay before he had made a trip overland to Chili, which was also in his programme. He accordingly started across the Pampas for Chili, arrived there and returned, and went to Paraguay, having ridden about 3,000 miles on horseback, to keep to his promise. He left his papers in his portmanteau at Corrientes, with an agent of Lopez', who used to commu-

nicate by means of the Indians in the Chaco, and who was to send the portmanteau immediately to Lopez. Arriving at the allied camp, he bought the best horse he could get, and one morning made a bolt for it, and got into the Paraguayan lines. Here his arms were tied behind him, his horse and clothes taken from him, and he was treated as a spy; but although his papers never turned up, Lopez at last became convinced that he was really what he represented himself to be, and he was allowed to walk about near his hut only. On the retreat through the Chaco, however, he was placed in the chain-gang, and had to do that journey on foot, and the same again from the Tebicuary to Pikysry, being all the time among the prisoners. He luckily escaped with his life at the last.

CHAPTER XXVII.

ENGINEERING NOTES.

I MUST commence this chapter by stating that, at the beginning of the war, I had no pretensions to a knowledge of military engineering or artillery beyond what I could pick up from some books which I was able to obtain in Paraguay, and which I studied for the occasion. The principal of these were Macaulay's 'Field Fortification,' 'The Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers,' and various works on artillery. Colonel Wisner, a Hungarian, was the chief engineering officer in the Paraguayan army, but he was very ill during the whole of the war, and was unable to attend to anything, so that all the work fell to my share.

After some experiments in different modes of sketch surveying, I adopted the following, which I found to answer well, both as regards expedition and accuracy. I stitched together a few sheets of foolscap paper, and the book thus formed I carried loose in a stiff portfolio of its own size. In the centre of the book I pricked right through it, by means of a circular protractor, every five degrees throughout the circle. These I numbered on every page, as I began to sketch on that page, after taking the bearing of the general direction my sketch was likely to run in, and then ruled the N. and S., and the E. and W. lines. I doubled up a quarter of a sheet of foolscap till it was about an inch wide, and on its edges I marked my scales. This served both for scale and rule. Having

fixed my starting-point on the paper, so that the sketch would not run off it, I took bearings, with a small hand prismatic compass, to all objects I could see, and these bearings I laid down by applying my paper-scale to the proper bearing on the pricked protractor, and carefully shifting it along thence, in a parallel direction, to my station on the paper, and then ruling a line. I then estimated the distance, which I laid down by scale. Going by one road and coming back round by another, I have often found the discrepancies smaller than I should have expected. I surveyed in this manner a great part of the Bellaco, the whole of the ground between Tebicuary and Pilar, the River Tebicuary, and the country immediately north of it, also the ground about Tebicuary. Of the ground within a radius of more or less than ten to twelve miles of Paso Pucu, I made a very detailed trigonometrical survey, and a chained compass survey of the road along the north of the Tebicuary. I also made a trigonometrical survey of the River Paraguay, from Curupaty to its fall into the Paraná.

With the exception of some of the old batteries of Humaitá, which were revetted with brickwork, all our defences consisted of earthworks, with sod or hurdle revetments. The trace usually employed was that of continued lines, as will be seen by a reference to the accompanying drawings. The ground was in general so irregular, that no definite form could be given to the works; but redans were placed to flank the approaches, which were accessible only through the passes, opposite to which re-entering angles were always placed. Small salient angles were made for guns, in order that they might project beyond the line of trench where the infantry was placed, and which they could consequently flank. The guns were all mounted *en barbette*, to give them the widest possible field for action, by means of

raised platforms. The Paraguayans had not many infantry, and they relied most on their artillery in case of an attack.

The profile was almost the same in all the works, the ditch being made generally twelve feet wide and six deep, with a slope of $\frac{3}{4}$. No berm was ever made, but the exterior slope of the parapet and the scarp formed one, the earth being generally strong enough to admit of this. The exterior slope was revetted with sod-work; being in one slope with the scarp, it was much more difficult to be scaled than if it had had a berm. A banquette was made generally about twelve to eighteen inches high and three feet wide, being formed entirely of sods. In places exposed to be bombarded, the parapets were gradually made higher, and a further protection given to the men, by digging a small ditch to the rear of the banquette, in which they could sit. At Curupayty the bombardment was so continual that hide-sheds had to be made over this ditch and the banquette, as shown in the sketch.*

The turf in Paraguay is much more solid than in England, and the thicker the sods were cut the better revetments they appeared to make; the best revetment we had was made of hurdle-work. At the batteries of Fortin, at the Tebicuary, I revetted some traverses twelve feet high, with hurdle-work, of which the pickets were the whole height of the traverse, with a very light slope, and were interwoven with a creeper called 'Üsüpó,' which grows to a length of many yards, and is about $\frac{3}{8}$ -inch thick. Three or four of these were twisted together into a sort of rope, which formed the basket-work, and was also carried across in many places between the stakes, to act as ties. This creeper has the property of not rotting under the earth, and was very useful. It made a very neat and good revetment, which,

* See Plate V.

being frequently struck by 150-pounder Whitworth shells, received no damage beyond that of the basket-work being cut just where the shell entered, which left hardly any trace of its passage. The sod-work, on the contrary, when struck by a shot, would be considerably disarranged. At Angostura, as none of this creeper was to be obtained, the works had to be revetted with hurdles made of flexible rods. This was not nearly so good, but was still much superior to the sod-work.

In Plates VI. and VII. are shown the two methods of mounting our 8-inch guns. The first figure is the old mounting, by which the garrison are necessarily exposed, when no embrasures are used. The defect becomes worse from the pivot being at the end instead of in the centre of the slide, as our guns had to be so mounted that they might fire in any direction, either to the front or to the rear. In the trench shown at the right battery, the few infantry of the garrison were to stand to defend it against a land attack, and the guns were to fire grape and canister over their heads, which were protected by the parapet. The mode of mounting the guns in the left battery almost completely protected the garrison which worked the guns, while they were also much more easily traversed, being mounted on rollers. By the inclination given to the slide, the gun was run out with greater facility, besides the advantage of not straining the breechings. The mound of earth over the powder-magazines served also as a parapet against the land side, and the garrison of each gun was thus protected on every side. In case of an attack by land, the guns would fire over the powder-magazines, the doors of which were on the opposite side to the guns, and the battery was itself protected by a deep ditch, enfiladed by a 32-pounder, placed at the re-entering angle. This 32-pounder, and also the left gun in the battery, were protected by

epaulments from the fire of the fleet, as it was of the utmost importance that these two guns should not be dismantled in action. Every gun in the battery had a small deep embrasure to enable it to fire down on to the ironclads just below it, should they seek for protection by passing under the high bank of the river. Between the magazines and the ditch there was a smaller ditch, in which were kept spare carriages, tackle, &c.

With the view of closing the navigation of the river, to the ironclads, I had a boom made and stretched across the river at Fortin.* It was formed of logs of Timbó wood (which floats), about eighteen feet long and eighteen inches in diameter, joined together by shackles so as to form a kind of chain. We had no iron sufficiently strong to make these shackles, and we manufactured them out of double-headed rails taken from the railway, and cut in two lengthways. The chain was made a quarter longer than the breadth of the river, and was fastened at each end to four strong piles driven into the ground. When in position, it assumed a curve, as shown in Plate III. It was almost all under water by its own weight, and the Brazilians might have fired at it for a long time, with little chance of damaging it. Had they steamed up against it they could not have broken it, as they would have gradually been brought to by the form the chain assumed; and no small boat could approach it, as from the force of the current it was in a continual vertical motion, which, from its great weight, rendered it dangerous to small craft. At first, the heads of the logs were not secured with iron rings, and some of them split at the bolt-holes. I then sent the chain back to Asuncion, and had iron rings shrunk on all the heads of the logs; but on its return, by the stupidity of the persons bringing it, on a dark

* See Plate V.

night, it passed the battery before we were aware it was on the road, and going down with the current, it was lost. Although the ironclads were in range of the battery, they did not perceive it go by, and it has probably been carried into some creek to astonish the Indians.

APPENDIX.

No. I.—(*See page 20.*)

*Protest of the Paraguayan Government against the
intervention of Brazil in the Banda Oriental.*

Foreign Office, Asuncion, August 30, 1864.

The undersigned, Minister of Foreign Affairs, has received orders from his Excellency the President of the Republic to address this note to your Excellency, actuated by the motives which he proceeds to explain.

The undersigned has received from his Excellency Mr. Vasquez Sagastume, Resident Minister of the Oriental Republic, a note dated 25th instant, addressed to him by order of his Government, and enclosing copies of the last correspondence exchanged between that Government and his Excellency Mr. Councillor Saraiva, Minister-Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, in that Republic, consisting of three notes dated 4th, 9th, and 10th instant.

The attention of the Government of the undersigned has been seriously drawn to the important and unexpected contents of these notes, on account of the interest it takes in the settlement of the difficulties in the Banda Oriental, to the fate of which State it cannot be indifferent; and also with the object of appreciating the motives which may have led to such a violent solution.

The moderation and foresight which characterise the policy of the Imperial Government, authorised that of Paraguay to expect a different solution to its claims against the Government of Monte

Video, and this hope was founded greatly on the fact that Mr. Saraiva, and even the Imperial Cabinet, when declining the mediation offered by this Government at the request of the Oriental, stated that it was unnecessary on account of the friendly course the question was taking.

The Government of the undersigned respects the right which is inherent in all Governments, of arranging any differences or reclamations when satisfaction and justice have been refused, without losing sight of its right to appreciate for itself the manner in which those arrangements are carried out, or of the influence it may have over the fate of those who are legitimately interested in the result.

The demand made by his Excellency Mr. Councillor Saraiva to the Oriental Government, in his notes of the 4th and 10th of this month, is that his claims should be satisfied within the peremptory term of six days, failing which he threatens to make reprisals with the Imperial land and sea forces, which means an occupation of part of that territory in case its Government refuses to attend to and satisfy the claims, as appears from the note of his Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 9th instant.

This is one of the cases in which the Government of the undersigned cannot lose sight of its right to appreciate the mode of effecting the satisfaction of the claims of your Excellency's Government, because its results may influence the legitimate interests of Paraguay.

A painful impression has been made on the mind of the Government of the undersigned by the alternative of the ultimatum contained in his Excellency Mr. Councillor Saraiva's notes of the 4th and 10th instant to the Oriental Government, in which he demands an impossibility, from the internal state of the country, and for the removal of which neither the prestige of Messrs. Thornton, Elizalde, and Saraiva, nor the consent and abnegation of the Oriental Government, were sufficient.

The refusal of his Excellency Mr. Councillor Saraiva to the proposal made to him by the Oriental Government, to submit the reclamations to arbitration, has been no less painful to the Government of the undersigned, the more so as that principle had served as a base to the Imperial Government in its reclamations with his Brazilian Majesty.

The Government of the Republic of Paraguay deeply deploras that your Excellency's Government has thought fit to separate itself on this occasion from its moderate policy, in which it should confide now more than ever, after adhering to the stipulations of the Congress of Paris ; but it cannot see with indifference, and much less consent to, the occupation of any part of the Republic of Uruguay by Brazilian forces, either naval or military, in execution of the alternative of the Imperial ultimatum, either temporarily or permanently ; and his Excellency the President of the Republic has ordered the undersigned to declare to your Excellency, as representative of his Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, that the Government of the Republic of Paraguay will consider as infringing on the equilibrium of the States of the Plata any occupation, by the Imperial forces, of Monte-Videan territory, from the motives named in the ultimatum of the 4th instant, sent to the Oriental Government by the Special Minister-Plenipotentiary of the Emperor, as that equilibrium interests Paraguay as a guarantee of her safety, peace, and prosperity ; and that he protests in a most solemn manner against such an act, relieving himself of all responsibility as to the results of this declaration.

Having thus carried out the orders of his Excellency the President of the Republic, the undersigned profits by the opportunity to salute your Excellency with his most distinguished consideration.

JOSÉ BERGES.

To his Excellency Mr. Cesar Sauvan Vianna de Lima,
Resident Minister of his Majesty the Emperor of Brazil,
&c., &c.

No. II.

965 *Treaty of Alliance against Paraguay, signed on May 1, 1866, between the Plenipotentiaries of Uruguay, Brazil, and the Argentine Republic, taken from the Papers laid before the House of Commons by order of Her Britannic Majesty, in compliance with her Message of March 2, 1866.*

The Government of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, the Government of his Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, the Government of the Argentine Republic :

The two last being actually at war with the Government of Paraguay, it having been declared against them by acts of hostility by that Government, and the first being in a state of hostility, and its internal safety threatened by the said Government, which calumniates the Republic, and abuses solemn treaties and the international customs of civilised nations, and which has committed unjustifiable acts after interrupting the relations with its neighbours by the most abusive and aggressive proceedings :

Being persuaded that the peace, safety, and wellbeing of their respective nations is impossible while the present Government of Paraguay lasts, and that it is imperatively necessary for the greatest interests that that Government should disappear, at the same time respecting the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Paraguay :

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Alliance, offensive and defensive, with that object ; and have named their Plenipotentiaries, as follows :—

His Excellency the Provisional Governor of the Oriental Republic has named his Excellency Dr. Carlos Castro, Minister of Foreign Affairs ; His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, his Excellency Dr. J. Octaviano de Almeida Rosa, councillor and deputy to the General National Legislative Assembly and officer of the Imperial Order of the Rose ; his Excellency the President of the Argentine Republic has named his Excellency Dr. Rufino

de Elizalde, Minister of Foreign Affairs—who, having exchanged their respective credentials, which they found in good and due form, agreed to the following :—

ART. 1.—The Oriental Republic of Uruguay, his Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, and the Argentine Republic, unite themselves in an offensive and defensive Alliance for prosecuting the war provoked by the Republic of Paraguay.

ART. 2.—The Allies will contribute with all the means at their disposal, by land and by water, as they many find convenient.

ART. 3.—The operations of the war commencing in Argentine territory, or in Paraguayan bordering on Argentine, the chief command and direction of the allied arms will be confided to the President of the Argentine Republic and General-in-Chief of its army, Brigadier-General Bartolomé Mitre.

The maritime forces of the Allies will be under the immediate command of Vice-Admiral Viscount Tamandaré, Commander-in-Chief of the squadron of his Majesty the Emperor of Brazil.

The land forces of the Republic of Uruguay, a division of the Argentine forces, and one of the Brazilian forces, which will be indicated by their respective commanders, will form an army under the immediate orders of the Provisional Governor of the Oriental Republic, Brigadier-General Venancio Flores.

The land forces of his Majesty the Emperor of Brazil will form an army under the immediate orders of its General-in-Chief, Brigadier Manuel Luis Osorio.

Although the high contracting Powers have agreed not to change the field of operations, yet, with the object of protecting the sovereign rights of the three nations, they have determined that the chief command shall be reciprocal should any operations have to be carried on in Oriental or Brazilian territory.

ART. 4.—The internal military order and economy of the allied troops will depend solely on their respective chiefs.

The victuals, ammunition, arms, clothing, equipments, and means of transport of the allied troops will be supplied by their respective States.

ART. 5.—The high contracting Powers will give each other

any assistance or elements which they may require, under the forms to be stipulated on that particular.

ART. 6.—The Allies bind themselves solemnly not to lay down their arms, unless by mutual consent, until they have abolished the present Government of Paraguay, nor to treat separately with the enemy, nor sign any treaty of peace, truce or armistice, or any convention whatever to put an end to or to suspend the war, unless by the common consent of all.

ART. 7.—The war not being against the people of Paraguay, but against the Government, the Allies will admit a Paraguayan Legion, formed of the citizens of that nation, who wish to assist in deposing the said Government, and they will furnish it with all necessaries in the form and under the conditions which shall be established.

ART. 8.—The Allies moreover bind themselves to respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Paraguay. Consequently, the Paraguayan people may elect their own Government, and give it any institutions they think fit; none of the Allies incorporating it, nor pretending to establish any protectorate, as a consequence of this war.

ART. 9.—The independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Paraguay will be guaranteed by the high contracting Powers collectively, in conformity with the foregoing article, for the term of five years.

ART. 10.—It is agreed by the high contracting Powers that the exemptions, privileges, or concessions which may be obtained from the Government of Paraguay, shall be gratuitous and common, and if conditional shall have the same compensation.

ART. 11.—When the Government of Paraguay has disappeared, the Allies will proceed to make the necessary arrangements with the authorities which may be constituted, to insure the free navigation of the Rivers Paraná and Paraguay, so that the rules or laws of that Republic do not obstruct or prevent the transit and direct navigation of the war or merchant vessels of the allied States, on their voyages to their respective territories and dominions which do not belong to Paraguay; and to establish the necessary guarantees for the effectiveness of the arrangements, under the condition that these laws of River Police,

although made for the two rivers, and also for the River Uruguay, shall be established by common accord between the Allies and other States on the boundaries, for the term which shall be stipulated by the said Allies, should those States accept the invitation.

ART. 12.—The Allies also reserve to themselves to concert the measures most conducive towards guaranteeing peace with the Republic of Paraguay after the fall of the present Government.

ART. 13.—The Allies will name Plenipotentiaries, to make arrangements, conventions, or treaties with the Government which may be established.

ART. 14.—The Allies will demand from this Government the payment of the expenses of the war which they have been forced to carry on, and also the payment of damages caused to public and private property, and to the persons of their citizens, without an express declaration of war—also of the damages subsequently done in violation of the laws of war. In like manner the Oriental Republic of Uruguay will demand indemnification for the damages caused by the Government of Paraguay, in the war she has been forced to take a part in, in defence of her safety, threatened by that Government.

ART. 15.—The manner and form of liquidation and payment, proceeding from the above-mentioned causes, will be determined in a special convention.

ART. 16.—With the view of avoiding discussions and wars regarding the question of boundaries, it is agreed that the Allies will demand from the Government of Paraguay, that in its treaties of limits with their respective Governments, the following basis shall be adhered to:—

1. The Argentine Republic will be divided from that of Paraguay, by the Rivers Paraná and Paraguay, as far as the boundary of Brazil, which, on the right side of the River Paraguay, is the Bahia Negra.

2. The Empire of Brazil will be divided from the Republic of Paraguay on the side of the Paraná, by the first river below the Seven Falls, which, according to the late map by Manchez, is the Igureí, following its course from its mouth to its rise.

3. On the left side of the Paraguay, by the Rio Apa, from its mouth to its rise.

4. In the interior of the tops of the mountains of Maracayú the streams running eastward will belong to Brazil, and those running westward to Paraguay—a straight line, as far as possible, being drawn from the tops of those mountains to the rises of the Apa and Yguréi.

ART. 17.—The Allies guarantee to each other, reciprocally, the faithful execution of any arrangements and treaties which may be concluded in Paraguay, in virtue of which, it is agreed that the present Treaty of Alliance shall always remain in full force and vigour, in order that these stipulations be respected and carried out by Paraguay.

1. With the object of obtaining this result, they agree, that in case one of the high contracting parties cannot obtain from the Government of Paraguay the fulfilment of an agreement, or in case that Government should pretend to annul the stipulations agreed upon with the Allies, the other powers will employ means to make them respected.

2. Should these means prove useless, the Allies will concur, with all their power, to obtain the execution of the stipulations.

ART. 18.—This treaty will remain secret until the principal object of the Alliance has been obtained.

ART. 19.—Those stipulations of this treaty which do not require legislative authorisation for their ratification, will come in force as soon as they are approved by the respective Governments, and the others when the ratifications are exchanged, which will be within the term of forty days from the date of said treaty, or sooner, if possible, and will take place in the city of Buenos Ayres.

In faith of which, we, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries of his Excellency the Provisional Governor of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, of his Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, and of his Excellency the President of the Argentine Republic, in virtue of our full powers, have signed this treaty, placing thereto our seals, in the city of Buenos Ayres on the 1st May, in the year of Our Lord 1865.

(Signed)

CARLOS CASTRO.

J. OCTAVIANO DE ALMEIDA ROSA.

RUFINO DE ELIZALDE.

PROTOCOL.

Their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of the Argentine Republic, of the Oriental Republic, and of his Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, assembled in the Foreign Office, agree:—

1. That in compliance with the Treaty of Alliance of this date, the fortifications of Humaitá shall be demolished, and that no other or others of that kind shall be permitted to be constructed, thereby interfering with the faithful execution of the treaty.

2. That as it is a necessary measure towards guaranteeing peace with the Government which may be established in Paraguay, not to leave it any arms or elements of war, all those found will be equally divided among the Allies.

3. That any trophies or booty which may be taken from the enemy shall be divided between the Allies by the one who makes the capture.

4. That the Generals commanding the allied armies shall concert the means of carrying these stipulations into effect.

And they sign the present in Buenos Ayres, on the 1st May, 1865.

(Signed)

CARLOS CASTRO.

RUFINO DE ELIZALDE.

J. OCTAVIANO DE ALMEIDA ROSA.

No. III.

In consequence of some misrepresentations published by Caxias in an Order of the Day, I addressed him the following letter:—

Buenos Ayres, January 28, 1869.

I have just read in a newspaper, published in this city, your Excellency's Order of the Day, No. 272, dated 14th instant, giving a statement of the last events in the Paraguayan war; and not finding correct the description of the occurrences which preceded the evacuation of Angostura, of which I was the commander, I take the liberty of calling your Excellency's attention to the inexactitudes to which I refer: viz., that it is inexact that the note of the 29th December last, which, conjointly with Señor

Carrillo, second commander of the said point, I addressed to the Generals of the allied army, contained 'frivolous matters,' since it was limited to informing their Excellencies of an abuse of the flag of truce, committed by a vessel of the Brazilian squadron, and to protesting against this deed: also that it is inexact that the officers, bearing a flag of truce, who presented themselves at your Excellency's headquarters on the morning of the 30th December, were bearers of a declaration signed by the chiefs of Angostura, to the effect that 'they were ready to surrender, hoping from the generosity of the allied Generals that the officers might retain their swords, devices, &c.'

I am, your Excellency's humble and obedient servant,

GEORGE THOMPSON.

Just before leaving Buenos Ayres to come to England, I heard, upon good authority, that, instead of keeping to the terms of the capitulation of Angostura, the Brazilians were forcing the men to take arms in their own service; and on arriving at Rio Janeiro, I sent the following letter to the Minister of War there:—

To his Excellency the Baron of Muritiba, Minister of War.

Rio Janeiro, March 12, 1869.

I have the honour to address your Excellency for the purpose of communicating to you that, from various Paraguayans who have lately come from Asuncion, I have heard that many of the men who capitulated at Angostura, of which I was the commander, have been obliged to take arms in the allied army, and that others are embarked for this city, without being asked whether they like it or not.

As this is contrary to the written stipulations of the capitulation, and to the verbal assurances of the Marquez de Caxias and of the Chief of the Staff, I address myself to your Excellency to beg you will enquire into and rectify this, which has doubtless happened through the absence of the Marquez de Caxias from the seat of war.

God preserve your Excellency many years.

GEORGE THOMPSON.

No. IV.

The following shows the whole process of the condemnation and execution of deserters in the Paraguayan army :—

Statement concerning his Desertion, of the soldier Norberto Ruidias, of the 45th Battalion :—

He says that, about sixteen days ago, he left the hospital, where he was ill with diarrhœa and fever, and went to his house at Quiindî, under pretext of having received his dismissal on account of disease, and that the next day they took him to the guardhouse of his district, and the day before yesterday sent him to this camp under arrest.

He also says that there was no motive for his desertion.

For this reason the deserter is in irons in this camp.

HILARIO MARCO.

Pikysyry, October 1, 1868.

Pikysyry, October 2, 1868.

By supreme order, the soldier Norberto Ruidias, a deserter from the 45th Battalion, who was captured in the district of Quiindî, sixteen days after his desertion, is to be shot.

F. RESQUIN.

In compliance with the supreme sentence which antecedes, the soldier Norberto Ruidias, a deserter of the 45th Battalion, has been shot, in testimony of which I affix my signature, returning this document under a sealed cover.

GONZALEZ.

Camp at Pikysyry, October 2, 1868.





II.

Ri

Pro

ndo






TEBICUARY.


(Scale 1" = 2000 Yds.)


One Mile



Drawn by E. Thompson

Edw. Welser, Litho. Repr.






Drawn by G. Thompson.

Edw. Waller, Litho.





Curupayty (Scale 1"=16')

Paso Gomez (Scale 1"=16')

Boom at Fortin (Scale 3/8"=1')



7



Rio

Rio



ndo

ndo




1



ndo








Drawn by G. Thompson.

Edw. Waller, Litho. New York.






Curupayty (Scale 1"=16')

Paso Gomez (Scale 1"=16')

Boom at Fortin (Scale $\frac{3}{8}$ "=1')





Right Battery at Angostura.


(Scale 1"=16')

Left Battery at Angostura.




Left Battery
at
ANGOSTURA.

Scale 1" = 100 Ft.




Drawn by G. Thompson.

Edw. Waller, Arch. and Iron Square







Stanford University Libraries



3 6105 010 287 345

STANFORD UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES
STANFORD AUXILIARY LIBRARY
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 94305-6004
(415) 723-9201

All books may be recalled after 7 days

DATE DUE

28D NOV 14 1996
28D NOV 12 1996

JAN 1

28D DEC 12 1996

28D MAR 01 1997
28D JAN 31 1997

APR 1

28D MAR 23 1997

28D MAY 1 1997
28D MAY 21 1997

28D JUN 4 1997
28D JUN 1 1997

JUN 30 2006
MAR 31 2006

