

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 the Joint Board meeting rather than the possibility that I  
3 was seeing him after the Joint Board meeting.

4 Mr. Gesell: Mr. Congressman, may I interpose?

5 Mr. Keefe: Surely.

6 Mr. Gesell: We made an inquiry over the lunch hour to  
7 see if we could find any telephone record of conversations  
8 held on the 26th between Secretary Stimson and General Marshall,  
9 anticipating the line of questioning which you were on before  
10 the recess.

11 The White House telephone records show that at 7:07 a.m.  
12 on the 26th Secretary Stimson called General Marshall. That  
13 is the only call through the White House telephone that is  
14 recorded on the 26th between Secretary Stimson and General  
15 Marshall. The other two calls involving General Marshall on  
16 that day are one at 10:30 when Admiral Stark called him but  
17 he was not there and Admiral Stark talked, I believe, to a  
18 Miss Thomas, who must have been General Marshall's secretary,  
19 and a call at 1:25 p.m. by Admiral Stark where the record  
20 shows "M.M." which means "never mind", apparently again  
21 Admiral Stark being unable to reach General Marshall.

22 We have asked for a photostat of those records but  
23 couldn't get it over the noon hour.

24 Mr. Keefe: Thank you very much for that information,  
25 Mr. Gesell.

(3)



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Just so that I may be correctly informed, reference has been made repeatedly to the White House telephone.

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General Marshall, will you tell me just what is meant by that?

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General Marshall: The White House maintains a switchboard and I believe --

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Mr. Keefe: That is a switchboard in the White House?

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General Marshall: Yes, sir. And I believe the lines leading up to that switchboard went through no other channel. They passed through no other switchboards.

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Mr. Keefe: So if you wanted to get a quick contact with Mr. Stimson or vice versa you would call through this White House switchboard?

General Marshall: That and other reasons, too. It was supposed to be more secure because there was only one switchboard and very carefully selected operators were on the switchboard. And also they were highly efficient and gave you very prompt service. I had one on my desk. I had one at my home. Mr. Stimson had the same.

Mr. Keefe: Now, General Marshall, if you are confused about the events of this particular period I wonder what about somebody like myself. I am utterly confused up to date. I want to try as diligently as I can to get these facts pinned down as accurately as possible.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 Now, General Marshall, Secretary Stimson has a better  
3 recollection than you have about these events on the 25th  
4 and 26th because he kept a diary?

5 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Keefe: You didn't keep a diary?

7 General Marshall: I did not.

8 Mr. Keefe: But if he made an entry in his diary you  
9 would believe the things he wrote about took place?

10 General Marshall: I certainly would, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: Now, what is bothering me is this, you left  
12 for the maneuvers at 1:00 o'clock on the 26th. Evidently you  
13 had some conversation over the telephone with Admiral Stark  
14 or with somebody -- who was it?

15 Mr. Gesell: Secretary Stimson; 7:07 a.m.

16 Mr. Keefe: Yes. That morning must have been pretty  
17 important. 7:07 he is calling you. Do you recall that tele-  
18 phone conversation?

19 General Marshall: No. He called me several times at  
20 7:00 or thereabouts.

21 Mr. Keefe: Do you recall him calling you that morning  
22 of the 26th?

23 General Marshall: No, sir.

24 Mr. Keefe: You were getting ready to go on these  
25 maneuvers?



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 General Marshall: Yes, sir. I probably was having  
3 breakfast at 7.

4 Mr. Keefe: You had some business things, I suppose, you  
5 wanted to clean up?

6 General Marshall: I was going to occupy myself at the  
7 War Department until 1:00 o'clock. Mr. Stimson called me  
8 rather frequently late in the evening or, not too frequently,  
9 early in the morning. My guess on this would be that he told  
10 me of these things that had been worrying him and that he  
11 talked to me about it later in the morning.

12 Mr. Keefe: General Marshall, I don't want you to testify  
13 to anything except what you recall.

14 General Marshall: I don't recall.

15 Mr. Keefe: If you don't recall, that is the best answer,  
16 because otherwise it is hearsay.

17 Then the situation is you must have had some talk with  
18 General Gerow the morning of the 26th before you went away  
19 on the maneuvers, in order to get ready for him to prepare  
20 this message that was going out on the 28th, the alert message.

21 Mr. Gesell: May we have the Joint Board --

22 General Marshall: I think there was a meeting of the  
23 Joint Board on the morning at which General Gerow, Admiral  
24 Stark and myself, and others, were present.

25 Mr. Keefe: What time was that meeting held?



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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 General Marshall: At 11:35 a.m. Members present:

3 Admiral Stark; myself; Rear Admiral Ingersoll, Assistant  
4 Chief of Naval Operations; General Bryden, Deputy Chief of  
5 Staff; General Arnold, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air; Rear  
6 Admiral Turner, Director, War Plans Division, Office of Naval  
7 Operations; General Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff,  
8 War Plans Division; Captain Ramsey; and Colonel Soobey.

9 Mr. Keefe: What did you talk about at this meeting?  
10 You have it before you?

11 General Marshall: Yes, sir, I have it before me.

12 Mr. Keefe: Let me ask you first, did you discuss the  
13 question of sending an alert message to the overseas commanders?

14 General Marshall: It does not show in this record,

15 Mr. Keefe: Do you have any independent recollection that  
16 at this meeting of this Board held after 11:00 o'clock on  
17 the morning of the 26th of November, do you have any independent  
18 recollection that the subject of sending an alert was discussed?

19 General Marshall: My recollection is that the subject  
20 of sending an alert was discussed and I think General Gerow's  
21 memorandum to me later confirms that.

22 Mr. Keefe: Then your recollection is based on the fact  
23 that General Gerow later wrote a memorandum?

24 General Marshall: On the following day Gerow wrote a  
25 memorandum to me in which he stated, "I then showed him" --



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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that is the Secretary of War -- "copy of the draft message  
you discussed at the Joint Board meeting." "You" being  
General Marshall.

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Mr. Keefe: Is that message then the alert message which  
was discussed?

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General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: With that refreshing of your recollection  
can't you remember what the discussion was or any part of it?

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General Marshall: My recollection of it is that we  
decided to send an alert message which Gerow was to draft,  
and that was where I or Admiral Stark gave, I thought I gave,  
the directions to the President that that message should  
include the statement in regard to the overt act not being  
on our part.

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Mr. Keefe: Well, you were pretty well satisfied at  
this meeting, and the rest of them were, that war was perhaps  
inevitable at that time, weren't you?

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General Marshall: We felt at that meeting that there  
was a great danger of a sudden outbreak of war in the Pacific.

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Mr. Keefe: Did you think that the message Mr. Hull had  
sent to the Japanese would bring that about?

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General Marshall: I could not say that I did, sir.

Shefner  
follows  
at 3:25

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Shefner fls  
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2:35 PM

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: Well, evidently Secretary Stimson did not  
3 know on the 26th that Hull had sent his message or delivered  
4 it to the Japs.

5 General Marshall: That is what I gathered from his  
6 record, from his testimony.

7 Mr. Keefe: Because, as appears on page 51 of this Army  
8 report, the Board finds:

9 "Apparently the Secretary of War was not advised  
10 by the Secretary of State that he had handed this so-  
11 called ultimatum to the Japanese. The diary of the Sec-  
12 retary of War and his actions indicate that to be a  
13 fact.

14 "Witness what it says as of the morning of the 27th  
15 of November 1941:

16 "The first thing in the morning, I called up Hull  
17 to find out what his final decision had been with the  
18 Japanese -- whether he had handed them the new proposal  
19 which we passed on two or three days ago or whether,  
20 as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole mat-  
21 ter off. He told me now he had broken the whole matter  
22 off. As he put it, 'I have washed my hands of it, and  
23 it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and  
24 Navy.'"

25 "His diary continues:



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 "I then called up the President and talked with him  
3 about it."

4 Now, at least on the 27th, from that statement in Mr.  
5 Stimson's diary, prior to the 27th he did not know that Hull  
6 had sent this final message to the Japs or handed it to them  
7 on the 26th and he got the information when he called Hull  
8 up on the morning of the 27th and that is when Hull told  
9 him that he had "washed his hands of the whole thing and it  
10 is now up to Knox and Stimson, to the Army and Navy."

11 Now, when you came back on the 27th, in the evening,  
12 and got to your office on the morning of the 28th, did Stim-  
13 son contact you?

14 General Marshall: I presume that he did. I am certain  
15 that he must have. I do not recall.

16 Mr. Keefe: Did he tell you at that time that he had  
17 talked with Hull and Hull had told him that he had washed his  
18 hands of the whole matter, it was now up to the Army and Navy?

19 General Marshall: I assume that he did. I have no di-  
20 rect recollection.

21 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, I will ask you, General Marshall,  
22 at that time were you of the then opinion, at that time,  
23 that that was the end of the negotiations and that war was  
24 inevitable, if not imminent?

25 General Marshall: As to the negotiations, I am not so



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 clear on that because I was thinking in terms of military  
3 disposals, preparations and hazards. I must have known from  
4 my previous knowledge of the course of the negotiations and  
5 the difficulties of the situation on the side of Mr. Hull in  
6 finding a basis of dealing with the Japanese, while represent-  
7 ing our interests, that would have some chance of stalling  
8 them off, I was aware of all the complications of that. I  
9 presume then that at this particular time in view of these  
10 statements which Mr. Stimson registers as of that day that  
11 I must have been aware of the extremely serious situation and  
12 the probability of war breaking out in the very near future in  
13 the Pacific.

14 Mr. Keefe: Well, nothing but the imminence of an attack  
15 would have caused you to send out the alert that was sent on  
16 the 28th of November, would it, General Marshall?

17 General Marshall: Nothing but the imminence of an attack?  
18 I do not believe that would quite express it because we did  
19 not see the imminence of an attack in the alert of June 17th  
20 of the previous summer.

21 Mr. Keefe: You did not?

22 General Marshall: We regarded a hazard of an attack  
23 rather than the imminence of an attack. I, for example, went  
24 through an alert in the Philippines against the Japanese in  
25 1913. We had, as I recall, no imminence of an attack but



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 there was the hazard of an attack. So, I believe, was the  
3 previous alert in the Philippines in 1937. I believe that  
4 that same statement possibly would hold true. There was the  
5 hazard of an attack rather than the imminence of attack.

6 Now, you would issue an alert order, I would feel, if  
7 you thought there was the hazard of an attack at that par-  
8 ticular time. You would also issue an alert order, certainly,  
9 as we did then, if we regarded the imminence of an attack  
10 somewhere in the Pacific.

11 Mr. Keefe: Well, when you issued the alert on the 17th  
12 of June 1940 you used the language, "To deal with possible  
13 trans-Pacific raid."

14 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

15 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Well, now, then, let me out it this  
16 way without splitting words: General Marshall, on the morn-  
17 ing of the 28th of November you had tremendously more infor-  
18 mation as to the possibility of an attack by the Japanese than  
19 you had in June 1940?

20 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

21 Mr. Keefe: If you had information in June 1940 as to  
22 the possibilities of a trans-Pacific raid, you had a mountain  
23 of evidence on the 27th of November, did you not, to the same  
24 effect?

25 General Marshall: That is correct.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: Now, when I said possibility or imminence  
3 of attack I did not limit it to Hawaii, because you have testi-  
4 fied that you did not consider at that time that the attack  
5 would come on Hawaii.

6 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: You thought it might come on the Philippines  
8 or it might possibly go on to Panama?

9 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

10 Mr. Keefe: Or some other place.

11 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Keefe: But taking what was in your mind as to the  
13 imminence of an attack some place, had you concluded definite-  
14 ly in your mind on the morning of the 28th that we were bound  
15 and determined at that time -- not bound and determined, but  
16 we were of the opinion that negotiations were at an end and  
17 that Japan would attack some place?

18 General Marshall: You said the morning of the 28th and  
19 you said negotiations were at an end. I have to qualify that  
20 with the statements in the message which differed on the Army  
21 side from those in the Navy and which followed the Secretary  
22 of War's telephone communication with Mr. Hull on the morning  
23 of the 27th, where the Army message stated that -- I haven't  
24 got the message here -- that the question in terms of it  
25 was probably terminated -- you probably have the message in



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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front of you, I haven't -- "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes."

Mr. Keefe: Yes, but the Navy message, General Marshall--

General Marshall: Yes, I referred to that. They said it terminated.

Mr. Keefe: They interpreted it that it had terminated, do you remember?

General Marshall: Yes. This, naturally, followed a telephone conversation between Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hull while Mr. Stimson was checking the draft of a message for a general alert which General Gerow had brought into his office.

Mr. Keefe: Well, now, General Marshall, if the facts are as Mr. Stimson recorded in his diary, that Hull told him on the morning of the 27th of November 1941 he had terminated the whole matter, he had broken the whole matter off, "I have washed my hands of it, it is now in the hands of the Army and Navy," how in the name of conscience in the face of that statement and that those are the facts could anybody come to any other conclusion than the conclusion that was inserted in the Navy telegram, namely, that the negotiations had actually broken off and were finished?

General Marshall: The same conclusion was evidently come to by the decision of General Gerow in the preparation of the draft for the Army alert. However, when Mr. Stimson

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 read it he, to use a slang expression, he doubled checked.  
3 He called up Mr. Hull again. Mr. Hull then qualified his  
4 statement of the previous day as I understand it, so that Mr.  
5 Stimson changed the wording in the Army message to the form  
6 I just read, "Negotiations with Japan have been terminated --  
7 appear to be terminated to all practical purposes." Gerow  
8 had written it, "Negotiations with Japan have been termin-  
9 ated." That is the way the Navy wrote it.

10 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, without splitting hairs as to  
11 this language and all that sort of thing I want to ask you  
12 a plain, blunt question: You were Chief of Staff of the  
13 United States Army at that time. Whether you have a present  
14 recollection of it or not appears problematical.

15 Mr. Murphy: You mean that he was Chief of Staff?

16 Mr. Keefe: Will you please not interrupt? He was  
17 Chief of Staff.

18 Mr. Murphy: I am just trying to help you. Go ahead.

19 Mr. Keefe: Well, I don't think I need your help. It  
20 has not been evident up to date.

21 Will you strike that question and let me start over  
22 again?

23 I am asking you, General Marshall, as to your present  
24 recollection, as to your opinion, your opinion, not Stimson's,  
25 not anybody's else, but your opinion as Chief of Staff of the



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 United States Army, on the 28th day of November 1941 were you  
3 personally of the opinion that the thing was at an end and  
4 that war was imminent?

5 General Marshall: I was personally of the opinion that  
6 Japanese hostile action was apt to break out at any moment in  
7 the Pacific.

8 Mr. Keefe: And that would mean war, wouldn't it?

9 General Marshall: And that would mean war.

10 Mr. Keefe: Well, that would show the same thing that I  
11 said, only putting it in diplomatic language, wouldn't it?

12 General Marshall: Well, you were involving me, Mr.  
13 Keefe, in the question of diplomatic negotiations. I was  
14 talking from the military angle.

15 Mr. Keefe: No, no. I am asking you as Chief of Staff  
16 only.

17 General Marshall: Yes. I understood it this time but  
18 not before.

19 Mr. Keefe: I understand you have to guard your position  
20 between the Army position and the diplomatic position and all  
21 that.

22 General Marshall: It is a little more than that. I  
23 am not in the diplomatic part of it.

24 Mr. Keefe: I am asking you as Chief of Staff if you  
25 thought at that time --



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 General Marshall: I gave my answer as such.

3 Mr. Keefe: And your answer is that you thought the Japs  
4 were liable to attack any place, at any moment, and that meant  
5 war?

6 General Marshall: That is what I thought, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: And it was the intention of yourself and  
8 others associated with you when this message of the 28th was  
9 sent out to further implement whatever warning had been given  
10 to General Short to make certain that he went out on an all-  
11 out alert?

12 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: That was the purpose of it?

14 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

15 Mr. Keefe: And that was your responsibility as Chief  
16 of Staff, was it not?

17 General Marshall: That was, sir.

18 Mr. Keefe: In the line of command it was your responsi-  
19 bility as Chief of Staff to see that these overseas Army out-  
20 fits were alerted, is that true?

21 General Marshall: That is correct.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Congressman, in order to keep the  
23 record straight, you have referred to these warning messages  
24 as dated November 28th. They are dated November 27th.

25 Mr. Keefe: I want the record corrected if I did.



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Mitchell: That is the day the General was away.

3 Mr. Keefe: That is right, the 27th. The answers came  
4 back on the 28th from MacArthur and Short, that is how I  
5 made my error, but the message was sent the 27th.

6 So the chronology of the thing is Hull delivers his  
7 note on the 26th; you caused your alert message to be sent to  
8 the overseas departments on the 27th, dated the 27th at  
9 least; I don't know when they were sent. Do you know when they  
10 were sent?

11 General Marshall: I think the morning of the 27th.

12 Mr. Keefe: You did not get back until the evening of the  
13 27th.

14 General Marshall: They did not hold those messages for  
15 me, sir. They used my name but they sent them immediately.

16 Mr. Keefe: All right.

17 General Marshall: They used my name so that it would  
18 not go as a routine Adjutant General message.

19 Mr. Keefe: Are those original messages here available?  
20 You have got these mimeographed sheets.

21 Mr. Mitchell: I am not sure that we have them in the  
22 room.

23 Mr. Gesell: I think we have them here.

24 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

25 Mr. Gesell: He has them and he will bring them to you.



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: All right.

3 Well, now, so that I may understand, General Marshall,  
4 in a matter as urgent and important as this you did not per-  
5 sonally sign the message, did you?

6 General Marshall: I did not.

7 Mr. Keefe: The actual photostat of the message that I  
8 have before me appears to be signed by -- that is, your name  
9 is typed on it but it appears to bear the signature of Van  
10 Sickler, somebody by that name. D. R. Van Sickler, S-i-c-k-l-e-r,  
11 is that what it is? Signed, "Adjutant General." Do you know  
12 anybody by that name?

13 General Marshall: No, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: Well, let me show it to you.

15 General Marshall: There are a great many Adjutants  
16 General.

17 Mr. Keefe: Maybe I have got it wrong. Does that refresh  
18 your recollection as to who that is?

19 General Marshall: I do not know the man. He is  
20 evidently a member of the Adjutant General's Department in  
21 charge of the record of the dispatch of messages.

22 Mr. Keefe: Now, that is dated November 27, 1941. So  
23 this was completed during your absence?

24 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Keefe: And it was sent during your absence?



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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General Marshall: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Keefe: I do not find anything on the message which shows what time of day on the 27th it was sent out. Would there normally be --

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General Marshall: That is all there would be, sir.

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Mr. Keefe: Well, I cannot interpret these symbols, General Marshall. Will you interpret them and see if you can tell what time of day that was sent?

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General Marshall: I see nothing on there indicating the time of day. There must be some other record, maybe in the message center. That is the direction from the Adjutant General's office to the sending service, which is the message center. Now, there may be another record you can obtain.

Mr. Gesell: We can find that out if you want us to.

Mr. Keefe: Well, now, this was a command order?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: With directions to reply?

General Marshall: Correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And when you stated, or when it was stated in this message, "Report measures taken", that meant that you were to get a report from the Commanding General?

General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: A similar message went to the other commanders?



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

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Mr. Keefe: With similar directions?

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General Marshall: With similar directions.

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Mr. Keefe: Now, with the country on the brink of war, General Marshall, you having the then impression as you have stated it a few moments ago that Japan was liable to precipitate war by attacking any time, any place, it would be highly important to the Chief of Staff to see to it that the orders which he had given were carried out, would it not?

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General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

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Mr. Keefe: Now, when General Short's message came back the evidence indicates, somewhat inconclusively perhaps, that it was part of three or four papers, the top one being the reply of MacArthur, then Short, then a route sheet, the MacArthur message being on top and that bears your indorsement with your initials.

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General Marshall: Correct, sir.

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Mr. Keefe: Your initials do not appear on the Short message but they do show the initials of the Secretary of War and the War Plans Department, General Gerow.

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Now, am I correct in the assumption from an understanding of your evidence on that point that you think you must have seen the Short message although you did not initial it, having initialed the top one?



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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General Marshall: That was my assumption, sir.

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Mr. Keefe: Well, is that a mere assumption or is it a fact?

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General Marshall: I stated I did not recall, sir, that I must assume that I had seen it.

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Mr. Keefe: Well, if you saw that Short message, General Marshall, as Chief of Staff it imposed some responsibility upon you, did it not?

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General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: It was addressed to you as Chief of Staff, was it not?

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General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And the very telegram itself indicates that it is in response to the command order which you had issued to him?

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General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And it was a message which attempted on the part of Short to convey to you as Chief of Staff the nature of the alert under which he was operating?

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General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: That was his response to your order?

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Mr. Keefe: Now, I have read the various statements, General Marshall, that you have made at various times in con-



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 nection siwht this matter. You recall that when you were  
3 before the Army Board first you were somewhat confused about  
4 those things because you thought that at some time in November  
5 there had been a change in the alert numbers. Do you re-  
6 member that?

7 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Keefe: Now, it is perfectly clear now that a read-  
9 ing of this message indicates that there isn't any alert num-  
10 ber specified in Short's wire.

11 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

12 Mr. Keefe: So that puts that out of the picture, doesn't  
13 it?

14 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Keefe: So we get down to the simple fact that here  
16 is a message from your Commanding General in the bastion of  
17 defense in the Pacific to which all of our defenses, as you  
18 have testified, were tied, in which he tells you that he is  
19 alerted to prevent sabotage; liaison with Navy.

20 Now, in all fairness, General Marshall, in the exercise  
21 of ordinary care as Chief of Staff ought you not to have pro-  
22 ceeded to investigate further and give further orders to  
23 General Short when it appeared that he was only alerted  
24 against sabotage?

25 General Marshall: As I stated earlier, that was my



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

opportunity to intervene and I did not do it.

Mr. Keefe: Well, now, you say that was your opportunity. That was your responsibility, was it not?

General Marshall: You can put it that way, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, I don't want to put it that way. I am asking you. You used the words, "that was your opportunity." I do not want an opportunity to arise in the future discussion of this matter to have a conflict of words and not to be able to understand just what you meant. Do I understand that your use of the word "opportunity" is synonymous with responsibility?

General Marshall: Mr. Keefe, I had an immense number of papers going over my desk every day informing me what was happening anywhere in the world. This was a matter of great importance. It had gone into the machine, it had been sent out, the acknowledgments had come back. They passed the important messages over my desk. I noted them and initialed them; those that I thought the Secretary of War ought specifically to see I put them out for him to see, to be sure that he would see it in case he by any chance did not see the same message.

I was not passing the responsibility on to the Secretary of War. I merely wanted him to know.

Now, the same thing related to these orders of the War



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 Department. I was responsible. I was responsible for the  
3 actions of the General Staff throughout on large matters  
4 and on the small matters. I was responsible for those, but  
5 I am not a bookkeeping machine and it is extremely difficult,  
6 it is an extremely difficult thing for me to take each thing  
7 in its turn and give it exactly the attention that it had  
8 merited.

9  
10 Now, in this particular case a very tragic thing oc-  
11 curred, there is no question about that, there is no question  
12 in regard to my responsibility as Chief of Staff, I am not  
13 attempting to evade that at all, but I do not think it is  
14 quite characterized in the manner that you have expressed  
15 yourself.

16  
17 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, let me put it in another way.  
18 You have now stated it was your responsibility as Chief of  
19 Staff to see to it that General Short out there in Hawaii,  
20 which you have described as being our bastion of defense, to  
21 see that he was alerted, and if he misinterpreted your order  
22 to see that that order was carried out.

23 General Marshall: That is my responsibility, sir.

24 Mr. Keefe: Now, I have stated it correctly, haven't I?

25 General Marshall: Yes, sir, you have.

Mr. Keefe: Now, you cannot classify this --

General Marshall: And I had an opportunity to intervene



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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as I stated and I did not take it.

Mr. Keefe: You cannot classify this response of Short's as being a trivial matter, can you, General Marshall?

General Marshall: I do not, sir.

Mr. Keefe: The message which was sent on the 27th of November was about as important a message as had been sent to anybody, wasn't it?

General Marshall: It was, sir, and with reference to that reply you have there, a large number of people saw that and in every case they got the identical reaction.

Mr. Keefe: Well, a large number of people saw it? General Gerow saw it and General Gerow testified here that when he saw it he thought first that it was in response to a telegram sent out by G-2 relating to sabotage and when his attention was called to the fact, when I asked counsel to ask him some further questions and his attention was called to the fact that this was a direct response to your telegram No. 472 of the 27th and was addressed to the Chief of Staff, he then changed his position and said, "I as Chief of Operations or Chief of War Plans assume full responsibility."

Now, I think it is only fair, General Marshall, in the conduct of this examination in ascertaining the facts to find out whether or not, just as General Gerow testified here, whether you assume the same responsibility that he did?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2           General Marshall: I said earlier in this hearing, Mr.  
3 Keefe, in relation to the very thing you are talking about,  
4 when I was questioned in regard to General Gerow's statement,  
5 that I thought there was a difference; that he had a direct  
6 responsibility and I had the full responsibility. Is that an  
7 answer to your question?

8           Mr. Keefe: He had a direct responsibility?

9           General Marshall: And I had the full responsibility.

10          Mr. Keefe: And you had the full responsibility. Well,  
11 just what do you mean by that?

12          General Marshall: His was in concern to the handling of  
13 the details of the matter and he had a responsibility there.  
14 I am responsible for what the General Staff did or did not do.

15          Mr. Keefe: All right. Well, now, then, the fact re-  
16 mains that on this most important matter, and I consider it  
17 to be one of the most, if not the most, important matter in  
18 connection with this investigation, all of this preliminary  
19 talk and all these discussions and all the conversations and  
20 all the plans finally funneled themselves down to the morning  
21 when this alert message was sent out to General Short and  
22 when you and everybody else in the exercise of ordinary care  
23 must have known that war with Japan was imminent and that  
24 they might strike any time or any place, as you have said,  
25 and yet this important message comes back from Short and



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 through some misadventure or dereliction some place no further  
3 message went to General Short or no further investigation was  
4 made.

5 General Marshall: I think I stated, Mr. Keefe, that a  
6 number of people saw that and in no case did it make the im-  
7 pression that it is now making in the statements that you are  
8 bringing forward.

9 Mr. Keefe: Who were the other people that saw it?

10 General Marshall: Well, it was seen by Colonel Bundy  
11 who handled it immediately in General Gerow's section; pre-  
12 sumably it was seen by General Gerow; presumably it was seen  
13 by me. It carries the initials of the Secretary of War.

14 There is this in regard to that particular message:  
15 We had gone through a long period beginning specifically with  
16 a letter from me about February 6th or 7th, I believe, to  
17 General Short, in which every indication that we had in all  
18 communications, our statements to General Short, his replies  
19 to us, referred specifically, almost invariably, to the  
20 hazard of an air attack and of a submarine attack, and very  
21 little at any time was said regarding sabotage because they  
22 had been figuring on that all the time there through the  
23 years.

24 Now, that went on continuously. I, I know, was com-  
25 pletely imbued with the idea that the great hazard that they



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 were worried about out there was air attack.

3 I had been pressed very, very heavily to provide addi-  
4 tional planes, additional antiaircraft when we could only  
5 manage it by a very costly procedure in this country and at  
6 the expense of not being able to help anybody else. That had  
7 gone on all through the spring and into the summer.

8 The same thing in regard to radar. I was involved in  
9 that not only as Chief of Staff in the ordinary way but to  
10 the point of myself conducting over the telephone the nego-  
11 tiations with regard to procedure because of General Short's  
12 insistence that that be provided. Everything that had oc-  
13 curred directly in the reactions that we had received had  
14 been related to air attack and to submarine attack.

15 So when this message came in in this way I think every-  
16 one that had seen it was misled on what it meant or did not  
17 mean and that, I think, accounts for the main portion of the  
18 misunderstanding in the case. The fact that it was merely  
19 sabotage did not register on anybody's mind.

20 I testified earlier that Colonel Bundy, the officer im-  
21 mediately in charge of all the papers and also immediately  
22 in charge of the forwarding of them spoke to me very briefly  
23 in regard to this about an hour and a half after the attack  
24 was known by me, in which he stated in relation to this  
25 sabotage statement --



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: The fellow that is dead, Colonel Buny?

3 General Marshall: He lost his life shortly after that.

4 A few days after that I sent him out to Hawaii and he was  
5 killed. He made the statement to me, - he mentioned that  
6 at the time that it actually was in his own immediate re-  
7 cords and he checked it for General Gerow and incidentally,  
8 of course, for me, that his impression was that he had read  
9 it in his handling of it, of where he spoke of liaison with  
10 the Navy and he was going ahead with the general procedure  
11 as we understood it.

12 In other words, what was going on throughout this period  
13 had been a long series of backs and forths in relation to  
14 protection against a specific thing, which was an air attack  
15 and also a submarine attack. Sabotage had practically not  
16 been mentioned. Suddenly for some reason that I still do  
17 not know because I have never discussed it with the in-  
18 dividuals concerned, the idea of air attack appeared to be  
19 entirely brief and the idea of sabotage appeared the great  
20 and urgent matter.

21 Our alert did not refer to sabotage. General Gerow  
22 testified, I believe, or I was told he did, - I haven't read  
23 his testimony, - of his part in not including in the message  
24 any reference to sabotage, which I believe also had been the  
25 desire of the G-2 of the Army. So nobody was thinking of



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 sabotage. All the correspondence, all the understanding that  
3 we all had in regard to General Short related to one specific  
4 thing in particular and that was an air attack. Now, under  
5 those circumstances this message came in. It did not register  
6 on Colonel Bundy, it did not register on General Gerow, it  
7 did not register on me and it carries Mr. Stimson's initials  
8 also.

9 Mr. Keefe: Well, then, I understand that the long  
10 statement that you have just made, General Marshall, is not  
11 to be considered except as an extenuation of the failure on  
12 the part of the General Staff to perform what you have said  
13 was your --

14 General Marshall: I stated that I accepted the respon-  
15 sibility; that I thought General Gerow had overstated it  
16 when he said he had the full responsibility. That he had a  
17 direct responsibility but that I had the full responsibility.

18 I understood you tossy in some of your remarks, or at  
19 least the implication seemed to me clear, that it was com-  
20 pletely not understandable to you how such an important mes-  
21 sage at such a critical time should have been so handled. I  
22 endeavored to explain that.

23 Mr. Keefe: Well, you understood me all right, General  
24 Marshall, I will say that. That is what I am trying to find  
25 out exactly.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 Now, I call your attention to the fact that in this mes-  
3 sage of November 27th it says: "But these measures should be  
4 carried out so as not, comma repeat not, comma, to alarm  
5 civil population or disclose intent."

6  
7 Now, I call your attention to the situation that trans-  
8 pired at the time of the 1940 alert and ask you whether or  
9 not it would have been possible for General Short or anybody  
10 else to go onto an all-out alert in response to this message  
11 without disclosing intent?

12 General Marshall: He might have used the maneuvers as  
13 a device, he might have made other arrangements in the taking  
14 up of the deployments for the alert. There were other things  
15 that could be done to adjust the thing but he was cautioned,  
16 I believe, in the message that he was not to jeopardize his  
17 defense by reason of such arrangements.

18 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, General Marshall, just so that we  
19 may have the picture before us, will you state for the purpose  
20 and benefit of the record what you conceive should have been  
21 done by General Short had he gone out on an all-out alert,  
22 differentiating between the normal activities in peacetime  
23 and his activities under an alert in the face of prospective  
24 war.

25 General Marshall: His planes should have been, - he  
should have been in full contact with the Navy; the arrange-



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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ments should have been made so far as he could manage them through the Navy for the conduct of over water reconnaissance, of which the Navy would have the direction; his own planes, his fighter and interceptor planes in particular, should have been ready for action. They were flying anyway. They should have been armed. Pilots sufficient for the first flight should have been ready; planes, presumably, might have been in the air in the early morning; the radar station should have run twenty-four hours a day as they did in Panama. The dispositions of the troops for alert would in the usual manner, if not entirely, have been carried out but I see no particular reason why there was any difficulty in relation to the restrictions that you indicate in the message towards the water reconnaissance, over water reconnaissance, towards radar activity, towards the handling of the fighter planes, towards the manning with the ammunition ready of the antiaircraft guns.

Mr. Keefe: Would it have been possible to send somebody out there to see that this great bastion of ours was ready for this war?

General Marshall: Yes, sir, somebody could have been sent out there. The same thing would have applied to Panama, Alaska, the West Coast and the Philippines. General Short was a Lieutenant General, he was an officer of distinction



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 and reputation and he was in command out there. Our presump-  
3 tion was that --

4 Mr. Keefe: You understand that in asking these questions  
5 I am not doing so with the idea of holding any brief for  
6 General Short or anybody else.

7 General Marshall: Yes, I understand.

8 Mr. Keefe: I am simply asking for the facts.

9 General Marshall: I understand.

10 Mr. Keefe: We will get to General Short, I assume,  
11 after a while.

12 General Marshall: In the light of the present facilities,  
13 where planes are available and speed of transit, we send  
14 people very frequently to all of these various places because  
15 it is almost as easy to do that as it is to communicate by  
16 radio. In those days it was not so simple.

17 Mr. Keefe: Well, could you have called him up on the  
18 telephone?

19 General Marshall: We avoided telephone conversations as  
20 much as we could.

21 Mr. Keefe: For security reasons?

22 General Marshall: For security reasons.

23 Mr. Keefe: Could you have sent a confirming letter by  
24 registered mail?

25 General Marshall: We could have sent it by courier;  
that is probably what would have happened.

Mr. Keefe: That was not done either, was it?

General Marshall: That was not done.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 Mr. Keefe: In fact, as between the 27th of November  
3 and 7th of December, am I correct in the assumption that  
4 nothing was done further than this alert message of the  
5 27th?

6 General Marshall: He received a command direction on  
7 the 27th. It was not modified. It was not changed or  
8 altered. Between the 27th of November and 7th of December,  
9 other information went out in Naval channels to the Navy,  
10 with whom he was supposed to be in close contact, which  
11 related to various things, including the destruction of  
12 codes.

13 Mr. Keefe: I was just going to get to that, General  
14 Marshall. You continued to intercept messages which dis-  
15 closed the fact that the Japs had issued orders to destroy  
16 certain codes, and certain orders went out to destroy some  
17 of our codes too, did not there?

18 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Keefe: You sent the orders?

20 General Marshall: Orders were sent out. G-2 wrote  
21 them; I authorized them.

22 Mr. Keefe: When was the first order to destroy the  
23 military code sent out?

24 General Marshall: I do not recall, sir. The record will  
25 undoubtedly show it.

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: Well, I think it was around the 3rd or  
3 4th of December. That is my recollection. You sent them  
4 out to the Naval Attache, for instance, or the Military  
5 Attache at Tokyo, did you not?

6 General Marshall: We did.

7 Mr. Keefe: And the Navy would have the responsibility  
8 of sending such an order to the Naval Attache at Tokyo and  
9 other naval establishments?

10 General Marshall: I do not recall whether we used  
11 the instructions for one to give the other the instructions  
12 in that case or not, but that was their responsibility, to  
13 see that their men got it.

14 Mr. Keefe: Do you know whether any message was sent  
15 to Short by the Army, either by you or G-2, advising him  
16 that the Japs were destroying their codes on the third or  
17 fourth of December?

18 General Marshall: I do not recall offhand. I do re-  
19 call, I think, it was the Navy message to the Commander  
20 on the third or fourth, maybe the fifth.

21 Mr. Keefe: When that word came in to you through  
22 magic, you were satisfied that war was inevitable, were  
23 you not?

24 General Marshall: It would appear so.

25 Mr. Keefe: Well, maybe I do not understand. I want to



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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1  
2 understand, General Marshall, but you say "it would appear  
3 so."

4 Is that to be a direct answer to my question? Do I  
5 so interpret it?

6 General Marshall: Yes, sir. That is a direct answer  
7 to your question. There were still things the Japanese  
8 could do without completely breaking over.

9 Mr. Keefe: But ordinarily that is true?

10 General Marshall: Ordinarily, yes, you are correct.

11 Mr. Keefe: The destruction of codes is considered  
12 to be the immediate preliminary to war, is it not?

13 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: And you so considered it?

15 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Keefe: Well, in view of this situation, what was  
17 done to alert the War Department here in Washington? Were  
18 any orders issued that changed the existing situation?

19 General Marshall: I know of no particular orders that  
20 were issued, sir.

21 Mr. Keefe: Now, I listened with a good deal of atten-  
22 tion, General Marshall, to the testimony of General Miles  
23 with respect to the complete necessity for secrecy with  
24 respect to magic, and I want to go through that just a  
25 moment, in order to ask you a question, and my recollection



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 of what that testimony was.

3 As I recall it at the present time there were orders  
4 in effect in both the Army and Navy that these magic inter-  
5 cepts were of such tremendous and vital importance, that  
6 knowledge of them was limited to a very few people.

7 General Marshall: The source was regarded of such  
8 tremendous importance that the knowledge of it was restricted  
9 to very few people.

10 Mr. Keefe: Now, I recall, General Marshall, and I  
11 think I am correct, that General Miles testified that when  
12 these intercepts came in, when they were decoded, there  
13 was a man in the room, Colonel Bratton, and his opposite  
14 in the Navy, Commander Kramer, who were designated as  
15 couriers, to transmit and deliver these intercepts to cer-  
16 tain specified people in locked pouches, and the people  
17 who were entitled to receive them alone had the key to  
18 those pouches.

19 Do you recall that being the fact?

20 General Marshall: That is correct on the Army side.  
21 So far as the pouch and so far as the key is concerned --  
22 I do not know whether Colonel Bratton was the only one that  
23 made deliveries. He was the usual one, certainly.

24 Mr. Keefe: In any event, it was considered to be so  
25 secret that it was necessary to put it into what I believe

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C. .NOTDINHEAW .JUA 4 6 DRAW



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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1  
2 the witnesses described as a portmanteau with a lock on  
3 it. That is a brief case, as I understand it, locked up.

4 General Marshall: That is right, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: Then I will call it a brief case.

6 Colonel Bratton had a key necessarily to lock it, and  
7 you had a key to unlock it, as far as you were concerned?

8 General Marshall: That is right, sir.

9 Mr. Keefe: Now, I understood the testimony to be that  
10 under the orders that were issued, this material was con-  
11 sidered to be of such extreme importance and secrecy, that  
12 it was the duty of Colonel Bratton, for instance, to take  
13 this message to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War,  
14 originally to the White House, and then that was changed  
15 later on, and I believe the Chief of War Plans, and it may  
16 have been somebody else.

17 General Marshall: The Secretary of State.

18 Mr. Keefe: Well, originally to the Secretary of State.  
19 It was his job to take that pouch to the person entitled  
20 to receive it, and there have that pouch unlocked, have the  
21 individual who was entitled to read it, read it, take the  
22 message back, bring it back to some place in the War Depart-  
23 ment where it was burned up, and only one copy was left,  
24 and retained for the files.

25 Did you so understand that to be the practice?



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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General Marshall: I did, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And I understood that a similar practice obtained in the Navy. In other words, they would not even leave the message in the hands of the Chief of Staff. He could read it while the courier was there, give it back to the courier, take it back to the War Department and burn it up, and file one copy.

Now, am I correct in that assumption?

General Marshall: I think you are, sir.

Mr. Keefe: All right.

Now, following the delivery of the note of Mr. Hull, to the Japanese envoys on the 26th of November, you testified you did not believe they would accept it; it was too drastic; that Stimson said so in his diary. That seems to have been quite generally understood. Were you expectantly waiting to see whether the Japs would make any reply?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: And the people in G-2 in the Army, and in Intelligence in the Navy, were waiting for the Jap reply to come in. It would be quite important to see what their reply would be, if they replied at all, wouldn't it?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You had alerted the outlying posts, you were ready for war, you thought, ready for any eventuality, getting ready as fast as you could. So you were waiting for this reply to come in. It now appears, rather inconclusively, from the evidence thus far given here but quite conclusively from the evidence given before other hearings, that sometime on the afternoon of the 6th of December the pilot message came in -- it might have been at 11:00 o'clock in the morning or it might have been in the afternoon -- telling the Japanese emissaries that a long message was going to follow, to watch for it and to do certain things with it, and then the message started coming in, and sometime that evening the first 13 parts, together with that pilot message, arrived, were decoded and translated in clean form ready for delivery by the couriers, Colonel Bratton and Commander Kramer.

Now, as a preliminary to the questions I am going to ask you, had you received these courier pouches in the evening at any time prior to December 6th?

General Marshall: I do not recall any such receipts.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: You do not recall Bratton ever delivering one to you out at your residence at Fort Myer?

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General Marshall: No, sir, I do not.

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Mr. Keefe: You do not recall ever having received one in the evening?

7

8

General Marshall: I think I might have, but I do not recall. I do not recall Colonel Bratton being out there.

9

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12

Mr. Keefe: What were the orders when an important message came in? Were they to be delivered to you immediately, or were they to be delivered at the whim and caprice of the courier?

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General Marshall: The orders then, - and that continued throughout the war, - were if anything came up at night on which I could act that night, on which it was necessary I should act that night, it should be brought to my attention immediately.

18

19

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Mr. Keefe: I am referring to the specific orders, General Marshall, with respect to the delivery of the magic. Was there a written order given with respect to that?

21

22

23

24

General Marshall: Not referring specifically to magic. Mr. Keefe: You did not issue an order to G-2 directing them as to the manner in which this magic was to be delivered around to the respective people?

25

General Marshall: I did in relation to the pouch that



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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you spoke of, the dispatch case and locked pouch.

2

Mr. Keefe: Is that a written order?

3

General Marshall: I do not think that is a written order, but that referred to providing a locked pouch.

4

5

Mr. Keefe: To whom did you give that order?

6

General Marshall: G-2, at that time, I presume.

7

Mr. Keefe: General Miles?

8

General Marshall: General Miles.

9

Mr. Keefe: Well, that was a command, wasn't it?

10

General Marshall: That would be a command, yes, sir.

11

Mr. Keefe: Was he commanded and directed to deliver important messages in these locked pouch to you when they came in?

12

13

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General Marshall: I said, Mr. Keefe, that I directed the G-2 to prepare these dispatch cases with a lock for the delivery of magic messages.

15

16

17

Mr. Keefe: Did you instruct them when and how they were to be delivered?

18

19

General Marshall: I recall giving no specific instructions of that kind.

20

21

Mr. Keefe: Did you expect that if an important message did come in, it would be delivered promptly?

22

23

General Marshall: I expected as to magic, and as to any other matter that if an important matter came in that

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 required my attention that night, that I could act on,  
3 that it was necessary that I should act on that night,  
4 that it should come to my attention. That was the rule.  
5 It was in force then, and was in force up to the time I  
6 ceased to be Chief of Staff.

7 Mr. Keefe: Now, at this point in the hearing, General  
8 Marshall, we get into the realm of some conflict.

9 Testimony has been read into the record here of Colonel  
10 Bratton given before the Army Board as to the delivery of  
11 this 13-part message, and the pilot message in the locked  
12 pouch which was very specific, very direct that he delivered  
13 it on the evening of the 6th to Colonel Sedell Smith,  
14 Secretary to the Chief of Staff, and later on in the Clausen  
15 investigation, a different situation developed.

16 I understood General Miles to testify that in view of  
17 the fact that there was to be a 14th part to this message,  
18 that perhaps that was the reason that Colonel Bratton did  
19 not deliver the 13 parts, and the pilot message, that night  
20 to you.

21 Now, I do not know what the fact is. I am simply  
22 trying to get the facts. At least, so far as you know,  
23 General Marshall, there was no change in the orders to the  
24 Chief of G-2 by you?

25 General Marshall: No change by me.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: And if an important message came in, it was the duty of G-2, and its courier to see to it that that important message was brought to your attention immediately?

General Marshall: I would say so, sir.

Mr. Keefe: All right.

Now, the fact is, as I think is undisputed, that you personally did not get this 13-part message on Saturday night.

General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Nobody called you about it?

General Marshall: Not to my recollection.

Mr. Keefe: And you think you were home?

General Marshall: Yes, sir, I think I was home.

Mr. Keefe: You are not certain about that?

General Marshall: I am not certain about that. I had no formal engagement, and we practically did not go out at all, except to the movies.

Mr. Keefe: And if you had been away, you had a watch officer at your house?

General Marshall: I had an orderly to answer the telephone, to be there until I got back.

Mr. Keefe: Who was the orderly on duty at your house on the evening of the 6th of December?



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe.

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2 General Marshall: I do not know, sir. There were  
3 three orderlies, and I do not know which one it was.

4 Mr. Keefe: Can you give the names of the three of  
5 them?

6 General Marshall: There was Sergeant John Simenko,  
7 there was Sergeant William Spearman, and I do not know who  
8 the third one was. I will have to go back to try to find  
9 out, because they change quite frequently.

10 Mr. Keefe: Well, so far as you are concerned, General  
11 Marshall, you went to bed that night without any knowledge  
12 that the Japs were sending in any reply at all?

13 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: And you got up in the morning without any  
15 such knowledge?

16 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

17 Mr. Keefe: And performed your Sunday morning functions  
18 as usual?

19 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

20 Mr. Keefe: In entire ignorance that this message had  
21 come in to the final 14th part, and instructions to deliver  
22 at one o'clock?

23 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

24 Mr. Keefe: So you went out for your morning horseback  
25 ride?



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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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General Marshall: Correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And you have indicated that you got back to your house, and during or right after your shower there was a telephone call.

General Marshall: Yes, sir, I think during the shower.

Mr. Keefe: That was from Colonel Bratton?

General Marshall: That was from Colonel Bratton as I recall, wishing to come out to see me there, and I sent in word I would be right out to the War Department.

Mr. Keefe: Have you fixed the correct time? I have listened to the testimony and I have no recollection of you fixing the correct time.

General Marshall: I have not fixed the correct time. The only thing I remember is the delivery of the message to the Message Center, and you have to reason it out from there. There were the two telephones from Admiral Stark on which we have time. Then, preceding that, the longhand preparation of the message, and preceding that the length of time it would require for me to read the first time the Japanese 14-part message, some portions of it, some paragraphs being reread the second time. That would be the only way we could estimate the time.

Mr. Keefe: Well, the evidence seems to indicate that you got in your office about 11:25.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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General Marshall: I think that evidence indicates the time we were preparing this message. Prior to that I had read this 14-part message.

Mr. Keefe: I only go by the testimony of Colonel Bratton, whose testimony I have studied rather carefully, and I think he said 11:25.

General Marshall: I do not think that is correct. I think it is more nearly 11.

Mr. Keefe: Well, at least when you read the message, as has been indicated, it was getting pretty close to noon, wasn't it?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: You called up Stark, didn't you?

General Marshall: Yes.

Mr. Keefe: And talked with him.

General Marshall: Yes, sir, I called him up on the telephone.

Mr. Keefe: He wanted to know if you wanted to use the Navy radio to send the message out?

General Marshall: He asked me if I wanted to use the Navy radio. I first spoke to him about sending the message. I do not think he spoke in that first telephone conversation about the Navy radio. I think it is probable that that came in the second message, the second conversation ten



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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minutes later.

Mr. Keefe: At any event, in one of the conversations before the message was sent to your Message Center, you talked to Stark and he wanted to know if you wanted to use the Navy radio?

General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And you did not accept it?

General Marshall: I did not accept it.

Mr. Keefe: Well, when you were before the Army Board, General Marshall, there were some questions asked you at that time as to why you did not use the telephone, and you gave quite a long answer, if you recall, and in your answer you referred to the fact that, oh, it would have required getting those fellows out of bed out there in Hawaii at that hour. Do you remember that?

General Marshall: Well, I was talking about the time involved, and I was multiplying it by the number of places involved.

Mr. Keefe: And was that one of the reasons why you decided not to use the telephone, that perhaps it would take time getting the fellows out of bed in Hawaii?

General Marshall: I think you are giving a considerable emphasis to the "bed." I was talking about the time required to get the people on the phone and giving them the



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 communication at the hour that the message would come in.

3 Mr. Keefe: If I could put my hands on the testimony --

4 General Marshall: I am not stating I did not say that.  
5 I was talking about the emphasis regarding it.

6 Mr. Murphy: In all the courts of the country, the  
7 usual practice is to read the questions and the answers  
8 of the witness.

9 The Chairman: Let us go ahead.

10 Mr. Keefe: Thank you for that very valuable informa-  
11 tion. We have now gotten to the point where we are running  
12 a court here. I did not think we were proceeding according  
13 to the rules of evidence because if we were, there would be  
14 lots of this evidence thrown out the window as hearsay evi-  
15 dence.

16 The Chairman: Let us proceed with General Marshall and  
17 reserve our committee controversies until a later date.

18 Mr. Keefe: I rather thought, Mr. Chairman, that the  
19 member would be permitted to proceed without interruption.

20 The Chairman: The Chair has ruled two or three times  
21 to that effect.

22 Mr. Keefe: All right.

23 You recall that testimony, do you not?

24 General Marshall: Yes, sir, I have a recollection of  
25 seeing something like that.

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1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

3 Now, as a matter of fact, what sort of telephone service  
4 did you have to Hawaii at that time?

5 General Marshall: We had no special lines, but I  
6 think we had a scrambler. I know I had a scrambler on  
7 mine, and I think we had a scrambler on the phone.

8 Mr. Keefe: Did you have to use the ordinary commercial  
9 telephone service?

10 General Marshall: I think so, yes.

11 Mr. Keefe: Put in a call and ask to get somebody out  
12 there?

13 General Marshall: Well, as far as I recall, that was  
14 the situation at that particular time.

15 Mr. Keefe: You got a call that morning from somebody  
16 out there, and they got you out there right when the bombs  
17 were dropping?

18 General Marshall: I think I put in that call.

19 Mr. Keefe: You may have put in the call later on that  
20 morning?

21 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Keefe: Whom did you call?

23 General Marshall: I called General Shert, and I got  
24 his Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips.

25 Mr. Keefe: How long did it take you to get it?



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 General Marshall: I do not recall.

3 Mr. Keefe: You got it right when the raid was in pro-  
4 gress?

5 General Marshall: Yes, when the bombs fell.

6 Mr. Keefe: There will be testimony from Mr. Shiver,  
7 the Chief of the FBI out there, calling Mr. Hoover right  
8 when this was in progress without any difficulty at all,  
9 and he talked with him a short time on the telephone.

10 General Marshall: Yes.

11 Mr. Keefe: Were you aware of the fact that the FBI had  
12 direct radio communication with Hawaii?

13 General Marshall: I was not, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: Did not the FBI let you know or tell you  
15 they had a radio communication tower over here at Bainbridge  
16 connected with San Diego and direct to Honolulu?

17 General Marshall: I have no doubt the War Department  
18 knew that, but I individually did not.

19 Mr. Keefe: Did not anybody in this conference that  
20 morning on the 7th suggest that they could get word out  
21 there quickly by using either the Navy or the FBI radio?

22 General Marshall: I think everyone in that conference  
23 thought the Army radio would get word out there as quickly  
24 as any other, and it did, I believe, everywhere but Hawaii.

25 Mr. Keefe: This message went by Western Union, did it



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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1  
2 not?

3 General Marshall: Yes, sir, I am told it went by Western  
4 Union, then RCA and then a boy.

5 Mr. Keefe: Did you have direct radio communication with  
6 Hawaii at that time, that is, the Army?

7 General Marshall: The reason it was sent that way at  
8 that time is they could not raise Hawaii on their radio,  
9 and they did not turn to anything else but sent it the  
10 way I described.

11 Mr. Keefe: Do you understand that the Army Signal Corps  
12 tried to get into contract with somebody and raise them  
13 up there at Hawaii?

14 General Marshall: As I understand it -- and that can be  
15 testified to directly -- they proceeded on the basis of a  
16 radio message to each place. They were unable to raise  
17 Hawaii. They raised the Philippines and they raised the  
18 Caribbean, but they did not raise Hawaii, and then they  
19 turned to this other method of sending the message through.

20 Mr. Keefe: Did anybody ever try to find out what was  
21 the matter out there that they could not raise them?

22 General Marshall: I do not know whether it was static  
23 or what it was, but I have been told since that the Navy  
24 radio was a more powerful set than the Army radio.

25 Mr. Keefe: And the message got there after the raid had



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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started?

General Marshall: That is right, sir.

Mr. Keefe: When was General Short removed?

General Marshall: I think about ten days later.

Mr. Keefe: Is the order for removing General Short here before the committee?

General Marshall: It is obtainable, of course.

Mr. Keefe: That was by direction of the Secretary of War?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: In the form of a formal written order?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, will you get that please, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: As I indicated at the outset of this exami-  
3 nation, General Marshall, one of the purposes of this investi-  
4 gation as stated by the distinguished Chairman is to determine  
5 responsibility for this tragedy at Pearl Harbor. We have had  
6 all these different investigations. The Army Board, subse-  
7 quently followed by the Clausen investigation, the Navy Court  
8 of Inquiry, followed by the Hewitt and the Hart investigations,  
9 and now this one.

10 Do I understand, General Marshall, and is it fair to  
11 conclude from your testimony, that you fix responsibility for  
12 this disaster upon General Short so far as the Army is con-  
13 cerned?

14 General Marshall: I have never made that statement, sir.

15 I feel that General Short was given a command instruction  
16 to put his command on the alert against a possible hostile  
17 attack by the Japanese. The command was not so alerted.

18 Mr. Keefe: Well, I will ask the same question, from a  
19 full and complete knowledge of the situation and the responsi-  
20 bility involved, do you assume any responsibility for this  
21 disaster at Pearl Harbor?

22 General Marshall: I assume the responsibility, as I  
23 already stated, in connection with Short's acknowledgment of  
24 the alert message, in not detecting that that did not indicate  
25 a full alert but rather merely a sabotage alert.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: I ask that question, General Marshall, because, if I understand your testimony previously given, and you will correct me if I misstate it, had Hawaii been alerted and the Jap attack had been repulsed in whole or in part, it would have been a disaster for the Japs and might have changed the entire course of the war in the Pacific; is that in substance what you have said?

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General Marshall: On one occasion I said in relation to surprise, surprise actions if successful usually mean success and if they fail they mean a catastrophe.

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I testified, I think, in regard to a Japanese attack of the nature they carried out on Hawaii, assuming the garrison was fully alerted and was utilized to the best effect, the men and materiel available, that they could have so interfered, so disrupted the Japanese effort that it would have been limited in its effect. Rather, limited in the damage done, in the general effect.

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Mr. Keefe: And might have very definitely changed the course of the war, I understood you to say, if they had been unsuccessful at Hawaii, they perhaps wouldn't have continued this move on down through the China Sea?

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General Marshall: They would be limited in their actions in going out in the China Sea and probably would have proceeded on a much more conservative basis than they did, where they



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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went all out without any regard to the length and exposure of their communications.

Mr. Keefe: They wouldn't have dared to do that, exposed on the flank by Hawaii, if it had not been wiped out, in your opinion?

General Marshall: They would not have dared to proceed as they did if the major portion of the U.S. Fleet was still in effective condition.

Mr. Keefe: When was General Miles relieved as Chief of G-2?

General Marshall: I think sometime in February.

Mr. Keefe: 1942?

General Marshall: 1942, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Was that the time he actually got his orders for the new command, or is that the time he was relieved?

General Marshall: I think he was relieved and assigned to the new command at the same time. I think the record will show that.

Mr. Keefe: Now, I have a few other questions, General Marshall, relating to the deployment or disposition of troops pursuant to any plan that had been made.

I want to ask you when the first troops were sent to Iceland.

General Marshall: I will have to go back in the record



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 to get that, sir. I don't know.

3 It was a Naval and a Marine command, incidentally.

4 Mr. Keefe: I thought you were --

5 General Marshall: They are looking for it here.

6 Mr. Keefe: I see.

7 Mr. Mitchell: We are trying to find it in the State  
8 Department book, but I am not sure we can.

9 (Short pause)

10 General Marshall: In the State Department document on  
11 Peace and War, 1931-1941, presumably volume 1, page 686,  
12 document 216, under Department of State bulletin, vol. V, p.15,  
13 it reproduces a message of President Roosevelt to the Congress,  
14 dated July 7, 1941, in which he states:

15 "I am transmitting herewith for the information of the  
16 Congress a message I received from the Prime Minister of  
17 Iceland on July 1st and the reply I addressed on the same day  
18 to the Prime Minister of Iceland in response to this message.

19 "In accordance with the understanding so reached, forces  
20 of the United States Navy have today arrived in Iceland in  
21 order to supplement, and eventually to replace, the British  
22 Forces which have until now been stationed in Iceland in order  
23 to insure the adequate defense of that country."

24 The date of that is July 7, 1941.

25 Mr. Keefe: That refers to sending some ships there to



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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replace British ships. My question is when troops were sent.  
I mean Army troops, not Navy men.

General Marshall: They first sent Marines and sometime later the Army relieved the Marines.

Mr. Keefe: When did the Army relieve the Marines?

General Marshall: I will have to obtain that information from the War Department.

Mr. Keefe: Was it in 1941?

General Marshall: I imagine it was, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And was the deployment of troops to Iceland pursuant to the President's agreement with the Premier of Iceland, or was it pursuant to the ABC agreement?

General Marshall: I think the movement into Iceland was prior to the ABC agreement.

Mr. Keefe: You think it was prior to the ABC agreement?

General Marshall: I think it was, sir. I am not certain.

Mr. Keefe: The ABC agreement was in the spring of 1940, wasn't it? This refers to the summer of 1941.

General Marshall: You are correct, sir. That was the first -- this first movement was July 7, 1941 and that would mean that all took place after the ABC.

Mr. Keefe: When you sent troops into Iceland was it pursuant to the ABC agreement, or wasn't it?



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2           General Marshall: I will have to look at the agreement  
3 and check up whether that was specifically covered in it.

4           Mr. Keefe: General Marshall, in your testimony reference  
5 was made to Exhibit 57, as I recall it, a memorandum of a  
6 conference held on May 19, 1941, and it refers to conversations  
7 about a proposed Martinique invasion. I confess to a very  
8 hazy recollection as to what those conversations were and  
9 what was proposed. Can you explain that?

10           General Marshall: As I recall the matter, the situation  
11 at that time was there was in Martinique a French airplane  
12 carrier and also I think either a cruiser or a battleship.  
13 "\*\*\* a first class cruiser ship." So it was a cruiser. And  
14 also a carrier.

15           The question was whether the carrier and the cruiser  
16 would become available to the Germans for use in the Atlantic  
17 hostile to our interests. The question was what was to be  
18 done in regard to the matter. This particular place was a  
19 French Colony, with a commander, a French Naval Officer,  
20 Admiral Gaubert, I think. And if it was used in a hostile  
21 way -- it was in the Caribbean region.

22           There was also in Martinique certain planes that were  
23 then enroute, as I recall, to be delivered to the French at  
24 the time of the fall of France and they were still in  
25 Martinique, as a possibility for use should the Germans



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 get control of the situation.

3 This discussion here -- I am endeavoring to read it while  
4 I am talking -- related to what might have to be done in order  
5 to meet that situation.

6 Mr. Keefe: General Marshall, before you go on, was that  
7 in line with this plan that I referred to this morning, the  
8 Hemispheric Defense Plan, Plan 57, I think?

9 General Marshall: I would say that that was roughly in  
10 line with that.

11 Mr. Keefe: May I ask counsel if we have got a copy of  
12 that plan in the record, the Hemispheric Defense Plan?

13 Mr. Mitchell: The Canadian Plan, yes, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: No, not the Canadian Plan.

15 General Marshall: They never reached a complete plan  
16 for hemispheric defense.

17 Mr. Keefe: Was there such a plan?

18 General Marshall: We were gradually building it up,  
19 first in relation to Canada, next in relation to Mexico, next  
20 in relation to the bulge of Brazil and Brazil generally, and  
21 later on the points of the West Coast of South America.

22 Mr. Keefe: Was this proposed invasion of Martinique  
23 as a result of that plan that you were building up for hemis-  
24 pheric defense?

25 General Marshall: I don't believe it would be correct



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 to say the result of that plan. It followed the fact that  
3 we had in Martinique two vessels, one of which in particular  
4 could have been very harmful to us if it suddenly passed to  
5 the control of Germany, and could be exceedingly harmful to  
6 the British, of course. But they were right here in the  
7 Caribbean region with an uncertainty as to what their future  
8 use might be.

9 Mr. Keefe: I recall at the time a great deal of discussion  
10 in the public press and in the Congress in which there was a  
11 rather insistent demand that we do something about seizing  
12 this carrier and the planes that were there which had been  
13 tendered under Lease-Lend for France.

14 General Marshall: I stated in the conference in the  
15 office of the Secretary of War on May 19, 1941, at which were  
16 present: The Secretary of War; the Under Secretary of War;  
17 the Assistant Secretary of War; the Assistant Secretary of  
18 War for Air; the Chief of Staff -- myself; the Deputy Chiefs  
19 of Staff, General Bryden, General Moore, General Arnold;  
20 the Secretary, General Staff, Colonel Ward, on the subject  
21 of Martinique:

22 "In the light of statements made in the Sunday papers  
23 with reference to Dakar and Martinique, I had the plans  
24 checked immediately. The plan provides for 2800 Marines,  
25 with the necessary landing equipment, to make the initial



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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landing, followed by the First Division. The Marines have the necessary landing equipment for their troops. They will be opposed by 4,000 to 5,000 50-percent effective troops.\*\*\*"

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Mr. Keefe: You don't have to read that for me, General Marshall. I think it has already been read into the record. That plan was not put into effect, of course?

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General Marshall: It was not.

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Mr. Keefe: Was there a discussion of a possible taking over of the Azores at the same time?

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General Marshall: I don't know about at that particular time, but we had several discussions in regard to the Azores.

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Mr. Keefe: Now, I note in examination of the Army report and in the testimony that a Colonel Clausen is mentioned. Is that the same Colonel Clausen -- may I ask counsel -- do you know, that went out afterwards and took this subsequent examination?

18

Mr. Mitchell: Yes, sir.

19

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Mr. Keefe: He is the same man that participated in the Army Board hearings?

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Mr. Gesell: I think, Mr. Congressman, he was Assistant Recorder of the Army Board and was appointed to make this examination.

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Mr. Keefe: All right.

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You know General McNarney, of course?



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General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Is he a Lieutenant General now?

General Marshall: He is a full General.

Mr. Keefe: A full General?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, he was a member of the Roberts Commission, wasn't he?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: General McNarney, prior to his appointment as a member of the Roberts Commission, was in the office of G-2, wasn't he, of the General Staff?

General Marshall: He belonged to the War Plans Division.

Mr. Keefe: War Plans Division.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: So they picked him out of the War Plans Division and put him on the Roberts Commission?

General Marshall: Not that, sir. In the previous spring, sometime about April, I think, I sent General McNarney to England as an observer. He continued to be carried on the War Plans Division. He remained in England until December, sometime about the middle of December in 1941. I recalled him to the United States to head the Board for the reorganization of the War Department on which we had been working for about a year.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 We had reached the time where active measures should  
3 be put into effect and a small board, of three or four  
4 men, with McNarney at the head, was picked for this pur-  
5 pose.

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7 I had selected him because he not only was a very  
8 capable administrator, but also an officer of the Air Corp  
9 and a great deal of the intricacy of the reorganization was  
10 confused by the part of the Air. I don't know what the  
11 date was that he was recalled back, but I imagine he pro-  
12 bably got his notice sometime the latter part of November.  
13 Anyway, he arrived here in the middle of December.

14 Now --

15 Mr. Keefe: General, my only purpose, in reference to  
16 General --

17 General Marshall: May I carry this to conclusion?

18 Mr. Keefe: All right.

19 General Marshall: He was here, as I have said, to be  
20 the head of that Board. He was carried, and had been car-  
21 ried, I believe, since 1939, in the War Plans Division,  
22 although he had not been in the Division since the previous  
23 April.

24 On his return here, the Secretary requested me to sug-  
25 gest an officer of the Air Corps to be a member of this  
26 Roberts Board. I don't recall the names of those I pro-

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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posed, but I mentioned McNarney's name. I thought he was probably the most capable one, but it was a very inconvenient thing for me to have him on the Board, because it was imperative that we reorganize the War Department as quickly as possible. So he was loaned for that purpose, went on that Board, and the minute they released him, he was made head of this committee.

As a matter of fact, I think he became active on the committee before he was released from the Roberts Board, and he carried out the final completion of the plan and the implementing of the plan and the minute the plans were completed, he became Deputy Chief of Staff. He did not serve in the Operations Section as such, or the War Plans Division as such at any time after April of that year. He was merely carried there until he became Deputy Chief of Staff.

Mr. Keefe: April of what year?

General Marshall: 1941.

Mr. Keefe: Then, prior to April of 1941 was General McNarney in the War Plans Division in a position where he had access to magic?

General Marshall: I doubt if he saw magic.

Mr. Keefe: Do you know?

General Marshall: I do not know, no.

Mr. Keefe: Do you know whether or not he was in a posi-



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 tion to communicate to his colleagues on the Roberts  
3 Commission the information obtained by him as to magic  
4 when he was in the War Plans Division?

5 General Marshall: I do not know that, sir.

6 The Chairman The Chair would like to suggest that the  
7 hour of adjournment has come. Unless we can conclude with  
8 General Marshall in a few minutes, we will have to recess.

9 I don't know what the chances are to conclude.

10 Mr. Keefe: Well, Mr. Chairman, I confess I am not  
11 quite through.

12 The Chairman: Then we might as well recess.

13 I hope I will not be guilty of impropriety in suggesting  
14 that tomorrow when General Marshall returns, that members  
15 of the committee make every effort to, consistent with their  
16 duty, to expedite the conclusion of General Marshall's  
17 testimony for reasons which we all understand.

18 So we will recess at this time.

19 Mr. Murphy: Before we recess, Mr. Chairman, may I  
20 make one observation?

21 The Chairman: Yes.

22 Mr. Murphy: On yesterday afternoon the gentleman from  
23 Michigan wanted read into the record, the first 18 pages  
24 of the top secret report. At that time I made a statement  
25 that that was qualified subsequently by the Clausen report



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1  
2 and that it would be essential to have the subsequent part  
3 in the record in order to understand the first part.

4 Now, the committee ought to have proper public rela-  
5 tions and press relations. Some of the press of the nation  
6 took the first 18 pages without the remainder of the report  
7 and part of that went out to the nation. It resulted in  
8 a somewhat garbled presentation of the picture to the nation  
9 and a number of reporters at ten o'clock last night were  
10 still puzzled as to whether they were free to use the mater-  
11 ial after other reporters had used it.

12 This afternoon there is more material from the Clausen  
13 report and the papers, I think all of the reporters, ought  
14 to be treated alike. Either the Clausen report is public  
15 material and can be used, or it is not.

16 Let's not do it for one reporter and have a different  
17 rule for another reporter.

18 It seems to me that as long as some of the reporters  
19 have used a part of the Clausen report that all ought to  
20 be made available to them.

21 General Marshall: May I be excused, Mr. Chairman?

22 The Chairman: General Marshall, you may be excused.

23 (Witness temporarily excused.)

24 The Chairman: The Chair will state that when that  
25 document was presented yesterday, and the request made



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1  
2 that the 18 pages referred to be read, there was a discus-  
3 sion as to whether that entire document should be filed as  
4 an exhibit in relation to other exhibits and whether the  
5 entire record or the reports involved should be filed with  
6 the committee as exhibits.

7 The discussion resulted in suspending the whole matter  
8 until today.

9 Last night, after dinner out at my home various news-  
10 paper correspondents, including the Associated Press and  
11 the United Press, and the New York Times, the Chicago Daily  
12 Times, and other papers called me and stated that the Senator  
13 from Michigan had given to two newspapers the 18 pages to  
14 which he referred, and wanted to know whether it would not  
15 be advisable to release the entire release which had been  
16 given to the papers with the understanding that it would be  
17 released today when the matter was again presented, and the  
18 Chair took the liberty of authorizing the release of the  
19 entire document to those newspapers who called me, but what  
20 happened to the others, the Chair does not know.

21 He felt that if any was going in, it should all go in.

22 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman --

23 The Chairman: The Senator from Michigan.

24 Senator Ferguson: I want to say now emphatically that  
25 I gave no amount of data or any part or parcel of the 18



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1  
2 pages to any press or to anyone else.

3 I say emphatically I had this book which the counsel  
4 now has, that was the memo that I had, and it is the  
5 only memo that I had of that, and he retained it, and I  
6 gave no part or parcel of any of this record to any press  
7 or to anyone.

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The Chairman: The Chair has no information except what the press associations and newspaper correspondents called him up over the telephone and told him. Based upon that information the Chair felt that all the papers ought to get all that any other papers got, they ought to get the entire record if any was to be used.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, there is just one other thing. There are only, as I understand it, two copies of the Clausen Report available to the committee, one in the hands of counsel and one in the hands of the Senator from Michigan. I --

Senator Ferguson: Just a moment. I don't have the Clausen Report.

Mr. Murphy: You do not. Where is the other report?

Senator Ferguson: I haven't had it recently.

Mr. Murphy: I see. <sup>GREAVES</sup> Mr. Gray has it, and I suppose he has it for some Senator.

Senator Ferguson: He says he has it for Senator Brewster.

Mr. Murphy: <sup>BREWSTER</sup> Senator Murphy has it.

The Chairman: Would it be possible for any other Senator to get ahold of it? The Chair has never had a chance to get ahold of that, and very few other reports, because they are always in the hands of somebody else.

Mr. Keefe: I agree, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gearhart: That is why, Mr. Chairman, I asked that



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the testimony be briefed.

The Chairman: The Chair wishes to say, and I think the committee will agree, that, as a matter of fact, these releases concerning the contents of documents ought not to be given out until they have become a part of the record of this committee, and when they are given out they ought to be given to all newspapers and all press associations without discrimination.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire, as a matter of information, I would like to see the Clausen Report, and this top secret report offered by Senator Ferguson yesterday; I understood that the Chair had made some ruling to the effect that it was to be examined by counsel and there would be a future determination as to whether it would be admitted in evidence. Is it in evidence?

The Chairman: It is not in evidence yet. The question arose when the Senator from Michigan presented it -- apparently counsel desired to look through it in order to identify it, and that resulted in a discussion which in turn resulted in the whole matter being suspended until today and it has not yet been made a part of the record or identified as an exhibit.

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, in order that we may know and be guided accordingly, may that not now be identified as a part of the record? It appears that the newspapers have all



1 had it.

2  
3 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, I think counsel was  
4 about to make some remark.

5 Mr. Murphy: I would like to make one other observation --

6 The Chairman: The Chair recognizes counsel.

7 Mr. Mitchell: All I wanted to say was that this Army  
8 Pearl Harbor investigation top secret report and top secret  
9 memoranda that Senator Ferguson asked to have admitted yester-  
10 day, has been mimeographed, every member of the committee has  
11 a mimeographed copy, and all the press has it, but the press  
12 were instructed not to release it until it was offered; and  
13 then there was some question about whether part of the press  
14 didn't get a release on it and you, Mr. Chairman, ordered  
15 the release for all of them.

16 The document itself hasn't yet been formally entered  
17 in the record and I understand that you want the whole document  
18 in.

19 I just wanted to look at it yesterday to see what it was  
20 so that I could identify it in the record.

21 The Chairman: Without passing on the question of whether  
22 all these reports and all these top secret documents concern-  
23 ing all these reports will be ultimately made a part of our  
24 record, is there any objection to the filing of this particu-  
25 lar report now in its entirety and its identification as



1 Exhibit No. 63?

2 Mr. Mitchell: It will be identified as Exhibit 63.

3 The Chairman: So it may now become a part of the record.  
4 It will be so ordered.

5 Mr. Mitchell: If Senator Ferguson would like to have  
6 the first 18 pages transcribed into the daily transcript,  
7 perhaps that should be done.

8 Senator Ferguson: That is what I had in mind.

9 The Chairman: I think the members of the committee ought  
10 to have some information as to what those first 18 pages are  
11 in order to determine whether they alone should be printed  
12 as a part of the record or the whole report printed as a  
13 part of the record.

14 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask  
15 first of counsel as to when these 18 pages were released to  
16 the press, when you gave copies of it to the press. When  
17 were they given to the press?

18 Mr. Mitchell: Yesterday afternoon.

19 Mr. Gesell: Four o'clock; 4:15.

20 Senator Ferguson: I understood the Chairman to say that  
21 the press said that I had given them the papers. Now it  
22 turns out, as I understand it, that counsel gave it out.

23 The Chairman: No. The Chair stated it accurately. The  
24 news men who called me said that you had given it out to two  
25 newspapers, but they did not identify the two newspapers.



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Based on that information, from members of the press,  
 and whom I knew personally, I assumed that you probably had.

Senator Ferguson: I want to state on the record that I  
 did not. I had no knowledge that they had it and I didn't  
 give it out.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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2       The Chairman: Of course, these telephone calls came  
3 in all the way up to ten o'clock, and it was difficult  
4 at that hour to take a census of all the news offices in  
5 Washington and members of the committee, and I thought it  
6 safe.

7       Senator Ferguson: Is the record clear that at 4:15  
8 yesterday, this instrument was given to the press -- made  
9 public?

10       Mr. Mitchell: No. I have said repeatedly, it was given  
11 to the press in mimeographed form, copies were handed to  
12 the committee yesterday; you had them on your desk as did  
13 every other member.

14       Am I wrong about that?

15       Senator Ferguson: I didn't see my copy until this  
16 morning.

17       Mr. Mitchell: Well, as I understand it, the press  
18 were given copies, mimeographed copies of this top secret  
19 document yesterday, with the instructions that it wasn't  
20 released for publication until the document itself was  
21 admitted.

22       The Chairman: The newspaper men informed me that they  
23 had it with instructions not to use it until ten o'clock  
24 this morning with the understanding that at ten o'clock it  
25 would probably be offered as a part of the record; but in



h2

1  
2 view of the fact that some of the papers had it, they  
3 felt it was a discrimination not to let them all have it  
4 and I took the authority to release it last night for  
5 publication in this morning's papers.

6  
7 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman --

8 The Chairman: The Senator from Illinois.

9 Senator Lucas: In view of the fact that a segment of  
10 the press violated the instructions given to them by counsel

11 --

12 Mr. Mitchell: I don't say that they did. I am not  
13 saying that at all.

14 The Chairman: The Chair doesn't know what newspapers  
15 got it, and from whom. All he knows is what reputable members  
16 of the press associations and reputable news men told him  
17 over the telephone.

18 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, it does seem to me, just  
19 as a matter of good practice, that perhaps none of these  
20 statements should be issued to the press, notwithstanding  
21 the fact that they are told they cannot be used until a  
22 release date comes later.

23 The Chairman: Well, the Chair feels that as a rule  
24 the press observe these restrictions in regard to getting  
25 advance copies of something to be released at a future date  
so that they may have it as a base for their articles.



h3

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2 Senator Lucas: It goes without saying that certain  
3 papers did carry this without any authorization on the part  
4 of counsel or any authorization upon the part of this com-  
5 mittee.

6  
7 The Chairman: Well, it is difficult now to know which  
8 newspapers would have carried it if I hadn't authorized it  
9 to be released to all of them. The Chair doesn't know  
10 about that, but it is the rule that when things are to be  
11 offered in evidence, and there is to be a release for the  
12 press, that the release is not given out for publication,  
13 but will be held for publication until it becomes a part  
14 of the record.

15 Mr. Mitchell: They have stood by that very well,  
16 the press has.

17 The Chairman: Yes.

18 This was a peculiar circumstance, and the Chair had no  
19 reason to doubt, and doesn't doubt now that the representa-  
20 tions made by these newspaper reporters were correct as to  
21 the fact that some newspapers had it; and as to who gave it  
22 to them, the Chair doesn't know.

23 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel a question  
24 with respect to the document he has in his hands? There has  
25 been a question about the first 18 pages, and counsel has  
examined this document, as I understand. I should like to



h4

1  
2 have his opinion as to whether or not he thinks the 18  
3 pages should go in separately, or whether the entire docu-  
4 ment should go in the record.

5 Mr. Mitchell: My notion is that the whole document  
6 ought to go in.

7 The first 18 pages is "Top Secret Report of Army Pearl  
8 Harbor Board, discussing certain evidence and documents."  
9 That is a part that was withheld by the Army Board and it  
10 contains a reference to some but not all of the evidence  
11 given on certain points.

12 Then we come to the next part, we have a memorandum of  
13 the Judge Advocate General, reviewing it.

14 The third item is another memorandum of the Judge Advo-  
15 cate General.

16 And item four is again a top secret memorandum of the  
17 Judge Advocate General, and I don't think -- discussing  
18 additional evidence -- I don't think the first 18 pages  
19 are really intelligible unless you have the full report  
20 of the Judge Advocate General.

21 The Chairman: It has already been ordered printed as  
22 a part of the transcript, the entire document, as I under-  
23 stand it, and that being so, we will now recess until  
24 ten o'clock tomorrow.

25 (Exhibit 63, the document referred to above, is as follows:)



AH 1

Army Pearl Harbor InvestigationTop Secret Report and Top Secret Memoranda

1. Top Secret Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, discussing certain evidence and documents.
2. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 25 November 1944, reviewing Secret and Top Secret Reports of Army Pearl Harbor Board, and recommending further investigation.
3. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 14 September 1945, reviewing Secret and Top Secret Reports of Army Pearl Harbor Board on the basis of additional evidence.
4. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 14 September 1945, reviewing in greater detail certain aspects of the Top Secret Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board in the light of additional evidence and modifications of previous testimony.



AH 2

1 Memo: To The Secretary of War:

2 The following is a brief discussion of the evidence  
3 and documents in the possession of the Army Pearl Harbor  
4 Board, which for reasons of security should not be incorporated  
5 in the General Report. The Secretary of War is entirely familiar  
6 with this type of evidence and the Board is sure concurs in  
7 its decision to treat it separately and as Top Secret.

8 1. General. Information from informers and other means  
9 as to the activities of our potential enemy and their inten-  
10 tions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan  
11 was in possession of the States, War and Navy Departments in  
12 November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reason-  
13 ably complete disclosure of the Japanese plans and intentions,  
14 and were in a position to know what were the Japanese po-  
15 tential moves that were scheduled by them against the United  
16 States. Therefore, Washington wa in possession of essential  
17 facts as to the enemy's intentions.

18 This information showed clearly that war was inevitable  
19 and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly de-  
20 monstrated the necessity for resorting to every trading act  
21 possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations  
22 to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventual-  
23 ties of war.

24 The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army  
25



AH 3

1 or Navy gave only a small fraction on this information. No  
2 direction was given the Hawaiian Department based upon this  
3 information except the "Do-Don't" message of November 27,  
4 1941. It would have been possible to have sent safely in-  
5 formation, ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders  
6 in Hawaii, or positive directives could have been formulated  
7 to put the Department on Alert Number 3.

8 This was not done.

9 Under the circumstances, where information has a vital  
10 bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and  
11 this information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to  
12 its field commanders, it is incumbent upon the War Department  
13 then to assume the responsibility for specific directions to  
14 the theater commanders. This is an exception to the admirable  
15 policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete  
16 responsibility upon the competent field commanders.

17 Short got neither form of assistance from the War De-  
18 partment. The disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eli-  
19 minated to the extent that its defense were available on De-  
20 cember 7 if alerted in time. The difference between alerting  
21 those defenses in time by a directive from the War Department  
22 based upon this information and the failure to alert them is  
23 a difference for which the War Department is responsible,  
24 wholly aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having  
25



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AH 4

1 selected the right alert.

2 The War Department had the information. All they had  
3 to do was either to give it to Short or give him directions  
4 based upon it.

5 The details of this information follow:

6 2. Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions  
7 and Intentions from September to December 1941. The record  
8 shows almost daily information as to the Japanese plans and  
9 intentions during this period.

10 1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned  
11 that November 29 had been fixed (Tokyo time) as the govern-  
12 ing date for Japanese offensive military operations. (R. 86)

13 2. On November 26 there was received specific  
14 evidence of the Japanese' intentions to wage offensive war  
15 against Great Britain and the United States. (R. 87) War  
16 Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on November 26 that  
17 the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the concentration  
18 of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for  
19 offensive action.

20 3. On December 1 definite information came from  
21 three independent sources that Japan was going to attack  
22 Great Britain and the United States, but would maintain  
23 peace with Russia. (R. 87)

24 As Colonel Bratton summed it up:

25 "The picture that lay before all of our



AH 5

1 policy making and planning officials, from  
2 the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War  
3 down to the Chief of the War Plans Division,  
4 they all had the same picture; and it was a  
5 picture that was being painted over a period  
6 of weeks if not months." (R 243-244)

7 The culmination of this complete revelation of the  
8 Japanese intentions as to war and the attack came on Decem-  
9 ber 3 with information that Japanese were destroying their  
10 codes and code machines. This was construed by G-2 as mean-  
11 ing immediate war. (R 280) All the information that the  
12 War Department G-2 had was presented in one form or another  
13 to the policy making and planning agencies of the government.  
14 These officials included Secretary of State, Secretary of  
15 War, Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division.  
16 In most instances, copies of our intelligence, in whatever  
17 form it was presented, were sent to the Office of Naval In-  
18 telligence, to keep them abreast of our trend of thoughts.  
19 (R 297)

20 Colonel Bratton on occasions had gone to the Chief of  
21 the War Plans Division and to the Assistant Chief of Staff,  
22 G-2, and stood by while they read the contents of these folders,  
23 in case they wished to question him about any of it. Colonel  
24 Bratton testifies:

25 "I had an arrangement with Colonel Smith,



AH 6

1 Secretary to the General Staff, how he could get  
2 me on the telephone at any time in case the  
3 Chief of Staff wished to be briefed on any of  
4 them." (R. 299)

5 4. When the information on December 3 came as  
6 to the Japanese destroying their codes and code machines,  
7 which was construed as certain war, Colonel Bratton took  
8 the information to General Miles and General Gerow and talked  
9 at length with both of them. General Gerow opposed sending  
10 out any further warning to the overseas command. General  
11 Miles felt he could not go over General Gerow's decision.  
12 (R.283) Colonel Bratton then went to see Commander McCullom  
13 of the Navy, Head of the Far Eastern Section in ONI, and he  
14 concurred in Bratton's judgment that further warning should  
15 be sent out because this action of the Japanese meant war  
16 almost immediately. Colonel Bratton then returned after  
17 making arrangements with McCullom and persuaded General Miles  
18 to send a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, instructing  
19 him to go to Commander Rochefort, Office of Naval Intelligence,  
20 with the Fleet to have him secure from Rochefort the same in-  
21 formation which General Gerow would not permit to be send di-  
22 rectly in a war warning message. (R 283-284)

23 All of this important information which was supplied to  
24 higher authority in the War Department, Navy Department, and  
25 State Department did not go out to the field, with the possible



AH 7

1 exception of the general statements in occasional messages  
2 which are shown in the Board's report. Only the higher-ups  
3 in Washington secured this information. (R. 302) G-2 was  
4 prevented as a matter of policy from giving out intelligence  
5 information of this sort to G-2 in overseas departments. The  
6 Navy also objected to any of this type of intelligence being  
7 sent by the Army without its authority.

8 The War Plans Division refused to act upon the recom-  
9 mendations of G-2. Intelligence Bulletins were distributed  
10 giving this information. When G-2 recommended, for instance,  
11 the occupation of the outer Aleutians ahead of the Japanese,  
12 the War Plans Division took no action upon the estimate and  
13 recommendation, with the result that we later had to fight  
14 two costly campaigns to regain Attu and Kiska. (R. 301-302)

15 Captain Safford of the Communications Security Division  
16 in Naval Operations, testified as to the type of information  
17 that was coming into the Navy during November and December.

18 Tokyo informed Nomura on the 22nd of November that the  
19 25th was the last date they could permit him negotiations.  
20 (R. 121) On November 26th specific information received from  
21 the Navy indicated that Japan intended to wage offensive war  
22 against the United States. (R. 123-124) Nomura on the 26th  
23 said he thought he had failed the Emperor and that his humilia-  
24 tion was complete, evidently referring to the ultimatum de-  
25 livered to him by the Secretary of State.



AH 8

Colonel Sadtler testified as to the information that was coming in as to Japanese intentions in the fall of 1941, saying:

"The information began to assume rather serious proportions regarding the tense and strained relations between the two countries, and the number of messages about warnings of conditions that obtain in case of hostilities really reached a climax around the middle of November, to such an extent that we were of the opinion that there might be a declaration of war between Japan and the United States on Sunday, November 30. This, as you all know, proved to be a 'dud', and on Monday, December 1 if I recall the date correctly, messages that morning began coming in from Tokyo telling the Consuls to destroy their codes and to reply to Tokyo with one code word when they had so complied with their directive."

The Japanese Embassy in Washington was advised to destroy their codes on December 3. (R 249-250)

3. The "Winds" Message. Colonel Sadtler said that about November 20, a message was intercepted by the Federal Communications Commission, to the effect that the Japanese were notifying nationals of possible war with the United States. The "winds" message was indicated in these instructions,



AH 9

1 which would indicate whether the war would be with the  
2 United States, Russia, or Great Britian, or any combina-  
3 tion of them. The Federal Communications Commission was  
4 asked to listen for such information.

5 On the morning of December 5, 1941, Admiral Noyes,  
6 Chief of Naval Communications, called Colonel Sadtler at  
7 9:30 saying, "Sadtler, the message is in!" He did not know  
8 whether the particular message was the one that meant war  
9 with the United States, but it meant war with either the  
10 United States, Russia, or Great Britain. He immediately ad-  
11 vised General Miles and Colonel Bratton.

12 Sadtler was instructed to go back to Admiral Noyes to  
13 get the precise wording used, but Admiral Noyes said that  
14 he was too busy with a conference and he would have to at-  
15 tend to it later. Colonel Sadtler protested that that would  
16 be too late. (R. 251-252) He reported back to General Miles.  
17 He then went to see General Gerow, Head of the War Plans Di-  
18 vision, and suggested a message be sent to Hawaii. General  
19 Gerow said, "No, that they had plenty of information in  
20 Hawaii." He then went to the Secretary of the General Staff,  
21 Colonel Smith, and made the same suggestion. When Smith  
22 learned that G-2 and the War Plans Division had been talked  
23 to, he declined to discuss it further. It was about the 5th  
24 or 6th of December that Tokyo notified the Japanese Embassy  
25 at Washington to destroy their remaining codes. It was on

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



AH 10

1 December 5 that Sadtler discussed this matter with General  
2 Gerow and Colonel Smith, because as Sadtler said, "I was  
3 sure war was coming, and coming very quickly." (R. 254)

4 Colonel Bratton arranged on behalf of G-2 for monitor-  
5 ing of Japanese weather broadcasts with the Federal Commu-  
6 nications Commission. These arrangements were made through  
7 Colonel Sadtler. (R. 57, 103) Colonel Bratton testified  
8 that no information reached him as to the break in relations  
9 shown by the "winds" message prior to the Pearl Harbor di-  
10 saster, December 7, 1941, and he does not believe anybody  
11 else in G-2 received any such information. (R. 58-59)

12 He conferred with Kramer and McCullom of the Navy.  
13 The message sent to him by the Federal Communications Com-  
14 mission was not the message he was looking for. (R. 60)  
15 Later he learned from the Navy about their monitoring ef-  
16 forts in Hawaii and the Far East, and the fact that they  
17 would probably secure the "winds" message sooner than he  
18 would in Washington. That is the reason why he sent the  
19 message of December 5, to Fielder, G-2, in Hawaii, to make  
20 contact with Commander Rochefort, to secure orally informa-  
21 tion of this sort. (R. 62-63) A copy of this message has  
22 been produced in the record showing that it was sent.  
23 Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler testified to the fact  
24 that their records showed that it was sent. (R. 69, 70, 71)  
25 But Colonel Fielder said he got no such message. (R. 68)



AH 11 1 The Navy now admits having received this "winds" activating  
2 message about December 6, but the War Department files show  
3 no copy of such a message. (R. 89, 281)

4 From the Naval point of view Captain Safford recites  
5 the story of the "winds" message saying that Japan announced  
6 about the 26th of November 1941 that she would state her  
7 intentions in regard to war with Russia, England, the Dutch,  
8 and the United States, by the "winds" message. On November 28,  
9 1941, the "winds" code was given. On December 3, 1941, the  
10 Naval Attache at Batavia gave another version of the "winds"  
11 code. All three of these messages indicated the probability  
12 of the breaking off of relations and offensive warfare by  
13 Japan against the United States or the other nations men-  
14 tioned.

15 On December 4, 1941, information was received through  
16 the Navy Department which was sent to Captain Safford which  
17 contained the Japanese "winds" message, "War with England,  
18 War with America, Peace with Russia." (R. 132)<sup>(1)</sup>

19  
20 Footnote:

21 (1) Captain Safford testified that the Japanese were no  
22 longer using the code employed to transmit the wind messages;  
23 that there was no reason now why they should not be discussed  
24 openly.

25 Colonel Rufus Bratton, on the contrary, testified that



AH 12

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it would be dangerous to acquaint the Japanese with the fact that we intercepted the winds message, as this might result in further code changes by the Japanese.

The Board, as a matter of course, decided to follow the safe plan and treat these messages as Top Secret.

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This original message has now disappeared from the Navy files and cannot be found. It was in existence just after Peal Harbor and was collected with other messages for submission to the Roberts Commission. Copies were in existence in various places but they all disappeared. (R. 133-135)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C



Rob 1

1 Captain Safford testified:

2 "General Russell. Have you helped or been active at all  
3 in this search which has been made in the Naval Department to  
4 discover this original message?

5 "Captain Safford. I have. As a last resort I requested  
6 copies of the message repeatedly from 20G, and on the last oc-  
7 casion I asked the officer in charge, who was Captain Stone,  
8 to stir his people up a little harder and see if they couldn't  
9 make one more search and discover it. And when Captain Stone  
10 discovered it couldn't be found, he called for -- required  
11 written statements for anybody who might have any notice of  
12 that; and though the written statements disclosed a lot of de-  
13 struction of other messages and things -- not messages, but  
14 the intercepts; not the translations -- nothing ever came to  
15 light on that message, either the carbon copy of the original  
16 incoming message, which should have been filed with the work  
17 sheet, or of the translation. And one copy of the translation  
18 should have been filed under JD number, which I think is 7001,  
19 because that number is missing and unaccounted for, and that  
20 falls very close to the proper date. It actually comes in  
21 with the 3rd, but things sometimes got a little bit out as  
22 far as putting those numbers on was concerned. And the other  
23 should be filed under the date and with the translation. We  
24 had a double file.

25 "The last time I saw that message after the attack on



1 Pearl Harbor about the 15th of December, Admiral Noyes called  
2 for the assembling of all important messages into one file,  
3 to show as evidence to the Roberts Commission; and Kramer as-  
4 sembled them, and I checked them over for completeness and to  
5 see that we strained out the unimportant ones; and that "winds"  
6 translation, the "Winds execute," was included in those. I do  
7 not recall whether that ever came back or not. So far as I  
8 know, it may even be with the original papers of the Roberts  
9 Commission. It never came back that I know of, and we have  
10 never seen it since, and that is the last I have seen of it.

11 "We also asked the people in the Army on several occasions  
12 if they could run it down and give us a copy. We were trying  
13 to find out the exact date of it and the exact working of the  
14 message, to run this thing down and not make the thing a ques-  
15 tion depending upon my memory or the member of Kramer or the  
16 memory of Murray, who do distinctly recall it.

17 \* \* \*

18 "General Russell. Well, now, let us talk cases.

19 "Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

20 "General Russell. I want to know if over there in 20G  
21 you had a place where you had 20G files of messages, and then  
22 over here some other place you had a JD file which was separate  
23 and distinct from the one I have just discussed.

24 "Captain Safford. Yes, sir.

25 "General Russell. But you had messages over there in the



1 JD file?

2 "Captain Safford. We had. Yes, sir; that is correct.

3 "General Russell. And they were the same as the ones in  
4 the 20G file?

5 "Captain Safford. Yes, sir, but they were in a different  
6 order.

7 "General Russell. All right. Now, this message of December  
8 4th, when it went to the JD file, was given the number, ac-  
9 cording to your testimony, of 7001?

10 "Captain Safford. It probably was.

11 "General Russell. You don't know that?

12 "Captain Safford. Not to know; only circumstantial evidence.

13 "General Russell. Well, is JD 7000 in that file now?

14 "Captain Safford. JD 7000 is there, and 7002.

15 "General Russell. But 7001 just isn't there?

16 "Captain Safford. The whole file for the month of De-  
17 cember 1941 is present or accounted for except 7001.

18 "General Russell. Now let us talk about 20G, which is  
19 some other place in this office. Is this December 4th message  
20 the only one that is out of those files?

21 "Captain Safford. That is the only one that we looked for  
22 that we couldn't find. It is possible that there will be  
23 others missing which we haven't looked for, but we couldn't find  
24 that serial number. We looked all through the month to make  
25 certain. That is the only one that is missing or unaccounted



1 for."

2 The radio station logs, showing the reception of the  
3 message have been destroyed, within the last year. Captain  
4 Safford testified that this message, and everything else they  
5 got from November 12 on, was sent to the White House by the  
6 Navy. It was a circulated copy that circulated to the  
7 White House and to the Admirals of the Navy.

8 It is this message which the Army witnesses testified  
9 was never received by the Army. It was a clear indication to  
10 the United States as early as December 4. The vital nature  
11 of this message can be realized.

12 4. Account of the Delivery of the Long 14 Part Message: the  
13 Short Implementing Message. The first 13 parts of the long  
14 reply of the Japanese finally terminating the relationships  
15 with the United States began to come in in translated form  
16 from the Navy on the afternoon of December 6, and the 13 parts  
17 were completed between 7:00 and 9:00 the evening of December 6.  
18 Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the In-  
19 telligence Branch of the War Department G-2, was the designated  
20 representative for receiving and distributing to the Army and  
21 to the Secretary of State copies of messages of this character  
22 received from the Navy. The Navy undertook to deliver to the  
23 President and to its own organization copies of similar mes-  
24 sages.

25 Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts



1 between 9:00 and 10:30 p.m., December 6, as follows:

2 To Colonel Smith, (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the  
3 General Staff in a locked bag to which General Marshall had  
4 the key. (R. 238) He told General Smith that the bag so  
5 delivered to him contained very important papers and General  
6 Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the  
7 bag and see the contents. (R. 307)

8 To General Miles by handing the message to him (P.238),  
9 by discussing the message with General Miles in his office and  
10 reading it in his presence. (R. 239 241) He stated that  
11 General Miles did nothing about it as far as he know. (R. 241)  
12 This record shows no action by General Miles.

13 Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Gailey, General  
14 Gerow's executive in the War Plans Division. (R. 238)

15 He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer  
16 of the State Department for the Secretary of State and did so  
17 between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. (R. 234, 239)

18 Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution  
19 by 10:30, had urged Colonel Smith, Secretary to General Staff,  
20 to communicate with General Marshall at once, and had discussed  
21 the matter with General Miles after reading the message. This  
22 record shows no action on the part of General Smith and none  
23 by General Miles. Apparently the Chief of Staff was not ad-  
24 vised of the situation until the following morning.

25 In the meantime, as the testimony of Captain Safford



1 shows, the following action was taken with the distribution of  
2 the same 13 parts of the message by the Navy which clearly in-  
3 dicates its importance.

4 Captain Safford testifies that the first 13 parts came in  
5 on the afternoon of December 6 and were translated to English  
6 and delivered to the Army to Major Doud by 9 o'clock Saturday  
7 night, December 6. This portion of the message was distributed  
8 as follows: Commander Kramer consulted with the Director  
9 of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson, and was directed to  
10 go to the White House to deliver a copy. He then delivered a  
11 copy to Admiral Wilkinson at his house. As the President was  
12 engaged, Kramer gave a copy to the White House Aide, Admiral  
13 Beardall. When Kramer reached Admiral Wilkinson's house he  
14 also gave a copy to Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans. He  
15 delivered the final copy by midnight to Admiral Ingersoll, who  
16 read it and initialed it. Admiral Wilkinson phoned Admiral  
17 Stark, as did also Admiral Turner. Admiral Stark ordered Kramer  
18 to be at his office at 9:00 Sunday morning. Kramer came back  
19 to the Navy Department about 1 a.m. to see if part 14 had  
20 come in, but it had not.

21 When part 14 did come in it was ready for delivery to the  
22 Army in English by 7:15 a.m., December 7. (R. 158, 160, 164,  
23 166)

24 The net result was that no one took any action based upon  
25 the first 13 parts until the 14th part came in and the Army took



1 no action on that until between 11:30 and 12:00 on the morning  
2 of December 7, or about 13 hours after the first 13 parts came  
3 in which clearly indicated the rupture of relations with the  
4 Japanese.

5 Nothing more was done with this clear warning in the first  
6 13 parts of the long message until the following events oc-  
7 curred.

8 Colonel Bratton received from a naval officer courier be-  
9 tween 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. on the Sunday morning of December 7,  
10 the English translation of the 14th part of the long message  
11 and the short message of the Japanese directing the Ambassador  
12 to deliver the long message at 1 p.m. on December 7 and to de-  
13 stroy their codes. Colonel Bratton immediately called General  
14 Marshall's quarters at 9: a.m. (R. 85)

15 General Marshall was out horseback riding and he asked  
16 that he be sent for. General Marshall called him back be-  
17 tween 10:00 and 11:00 a.m. General Marshall came into his  
18 office at 11:25 a.m., of which there is a contemporaneous  
19 written record maintained by Colonel Bratton. In the meantime,  
20 Colonel Bratton called his Chief, General Miles, and reported  
21 what he had done. (R. 77) Neither General Miles nor  
22 General Gerow were in their office on Sunday morning. General  
23 Miles arrived at the same time as General Marshall at 11:25  
24 a.m. The Chief of Staff prepared a message to General Short  
25 and called Admiral Stark, who said he was not sending any



1 further warning but asked General Marshall to inform the Navy  
2 in Hawaii through Short.

3 The answer to the following question on the record has not  
4 been supplied this Board:

5 "Why were not the first 13 parts, which were con-  
6 sidered important enough by the Navy to be delivered to  
7 the President and everyone of the important Admirals  
8 of the Navy, delivered by the War Department officers to  
9 the Chief of Staff, and his attention called to it so  
10 that he could have taken some sort of action up it?

11 (R. )

12 The only possible answer lies in the testimony that  
13 Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General Staff was told about  
14 9 p.m. December 6 that there was an important document and  
15 that General Marshall should see it right away. (R. 242)  
16 There is no proof that Colonel Smith did so act except that  
17 from General Marshall, which shows that he was not advised of  
18 this situation until the following morning when he received  
19 a message from Colonel Bratton between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m.,  
20 December 7.

21 The record shows that subordinate officers who were en-  
22 trusted with this information were so impressed with it that  
23 they strongly recommended that definite action be taken.

24 When subordinate officers were prevented from sending  
25 this information to the Hawaiian Department, by arrangement



1 with their opposite numbers in the Office of Naval Intelligence,  
2 upon learning that the Navy had this information in Hawaii, an  
3 apparently innocuous telegram was dispatched by G-2 to Colonel  
4 Fielder, G-2 in Hawaii, telling him to see his opposite number  
5 in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Commander Rochefort, to  
6 secure information from him of importance.

7 The story of the message of November 27 takes on a whole  
8 new aspect when the facts are really known as to the background  
9 of knowledge in the War Department of Japanese intentions.  
10 At the time the Chief of Staff drafted the message of the 27th  
11 on the 26th, he knew everything that the Japanese had been pro-  
12 posing between themselves for a long period of time prior to  
13 that day, and knew their intentions with respect to the pros-  
14 pects of war. The message of the 27th which he drafted in  
15 rough and which was apparently submitted to the Joint Board  
16 of the Army and Navy, therefore could have been cast in the  
17 clearest sort of language and direction to the Hawaiian  
18 Department.

19 It was no surprise that the Japanese would reject the  
20 Ten Points on November 26; that course of events had been  
21 well pictured by complete information of the conversations  
22 between the Japanese Government and its representatives avail-  
23 able to the Government of the United States.

24 5. Summary. Now let us turn to the fateful period between  
25 November 27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous



1 pieces of information came to our State, War and Navy Depart-  
2 ments in all of their top ranks indicating precisely the inten-  
3 tions of the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date  
4 of the attack.

5 To clinch this extraordinary situation we have but to  
6 look at the record to see that the contents of the 13 parts of  
7 the Japanese final reply were completely known in detail to  
8 the War Department, completely translated and available in  
9 plain English, by not later than between 7 and 9 o'clock on the  
10 evening of December 6 or approximately Honolulu time.  
11 This information was taken by the Officer in Charge of the  
12 Far Eastern Section of G-2 of the War Department personally in  
13 a locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. Gen. Smith, and  
14 Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, who was then Secretary  
15 to the General Staff, and he was told that the message was of  
16 the most vital importance to General Marshall. It was de-  
17 livered also to G-2 General Miles, with whom it was discussed,  
18 and to the Executive, Colonel Gailey, of the War Plans Division,  
19 each of whom was advised of the vital importance of this in-  
20 formation that showed that the hour had struck, and that war  
21 was at hand. Before 10:30 o'clock that night, this same  
22 officer personally delivered the same information to the  
23 Secretary of State's duty officer.

24 General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This  
25 information, as vital and important as it was, was not com-