Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

And the separation of judicial from administrative police would not conform with practical conveniences, whereas, since we are expecting the increase in number of administrative secretaries of procurator's offices, I am sure the arrest of offenders would not be precluded on this account, even if judicial police officials are not necessarily attached to the procurator's offices. This is the reason why my proposed renovation will not touch on this.

V

The relationship of all these governmental instrumentalities to the people in the execution of the judicial process.

It is a matter of course that both the system of police officials holding trials and summary procedure without formalities of trials should be abrogated.

The system of court trials through the indictment of procurators should be adhered to, in any cases, however simple they may be, or by increasing the number of the staffs if necessary. In this regard, more summary courts should be set up and the circuit court system also be adopted. It is not quite democratic for procurators to have exclusive right as to whether to indict the case or not. As the operation of jury system for indictment is considered too early in our country, I think it desirable that citizens of municipalities, towns or villages will elect Prosecutive Committees which will make comments on such cases as were apparently to be but have not been indicted and also indicts them in lieu of procurators when deemed necessary, then committing to the trials of the courts. This system would also stir up public criticism to procurators, making data available for reference by the Procurator General at times of the promotion, selection and removal etc. of his men.

In addition, various instrumentalities mentioned above must be open to criticism of the Diet, especially of the Judicial, Self-Government and Public Order Standing Committees before they stand against active criticism of the people. It is natural that local police should be commented by local assembles. However, I do not think the time has come for public election of chiefs of police departments and of police stations.

Although I think some additional changes should be made to the Code of Criminal Procedure whose revision has already been prepared in order to safeguard the liberty and rights of the people in the investigation of crime, maintenance of public order, or in cases of indictment and trial through the medium of these agencies, I should like to have some other opportunity to refer to it.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Intelligence Section
PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

19 July 1947

TRANSLATION OF A PAPER REPORTED BY MR. SUZUKI, M/J, TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO HIM BY MR. KADES, GOVERNMENT SECTION

FROM: Government Section
Mr. Kades

1. The attached chart indicated a series of precedure to be taken in order to revise the judicial procedure so as to have it come in compliance with the principles of the New Constitution. The series will be based on the following principles:

a. Public opinion is voicing for an immediate and radical revision of the judicial procedure system which has hitherto been admitting infringement of individual freedom, individual dignity, and fundamental human rights.

b. With an aim to accord with the model of democratization advocated by the government through the recent speech made by the Prime Minister at the Diet, and to correspond to the proposal made by the government on 28 February that "the extreme trend of centralization of police system must be remedied" and that "the police administration, as a rule, must be placed under the charge of local public bodies," the people must be emancipated from the far-reaching control of the national police which has been an organ showing a characterized history by suppressing or avenging anyone who would not obey the orders of the centralized and bureaucratic organization.

c. The director of a local administrative body who bears the responsibility of enforcing local and national laws and regulations under the authorization provided in the law must be given ample authority to enforce these laws and regulations.

d. It is absolutely essential to eliminate any organ from the central government of Japan which has the probability of becoming a ready-made tool for the outrageous political party

Jet F

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

leaders of extreme leftists or rightists, agitators, or terrorists who would aim at enjoying domination over the people in general.

e. Decentralization must accord with the local self-governing spirit which is stipulated in the present government functions and the New Constitution, and be most promptly and ultimately performed. This does not mean that the mobilization of prefectural police personnel by the Prime Minister will be excluded on necessary occasions to handle emergency cases.

f. Such method as replacing a different group for a group of senior government officials must not be taken; the police must be directly responsible to public officials who have been elected by vote, and it must not be responsible for appointed public officials who bear responsibility for the voters only through the supreme national standard.

g. In order to maintain political stability, it is absolutely necessary to have economic stability. However, there is no sign of menace foreseen against the continuous existence of an orderly democratic society within the frame of the New Constitution.

h. Therefore, the plan must include emergency authority for the Prime Minister under which he can act promptly in case he comes across a case extending to emergency. However, the plan must not be based upon the presumption of a continuous state of emergency and crisis.

2. So far as the Board of Procurator is concerned, it is unnecessary to make much change at present except for the increase of administrators in charge of investigation affairs. As the first help in regard to this matter must come from the police, the number of such administrators, as above mentioned, who would be rendered the authority of arrest will be set at its minimum rate.

3. The Local Self-Governing Law and Article 7 (notes) of Law for Administrative Government Office gives the local chief administrator responsibility in enforcing national and local laws in the prefectural and city areas. To deprive these public officials of enforcing power is to annul the enforcement of the spirit and letter of the Local Self-Governing Law. Therefore, it is believed that the heads of prefectures and big cities should exercise both administrative and judicial police powers within their jurisdiction.

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4. A certain law now under consideration will stipulate the matter pertaining to impeachment on a Governor who neglects to enforce the national law within his prefecture. This will be a means of check on the Governor to prevent him from misappropriating his authority and should a Mayor neglect to officiate his duties properly, he shall be dismissed by the Governor. It is required for a police official to make an oath to respect the national and local laws, and he shall be dismissed if he neglects to perform his duties properly. His duties will naturally include close cooperation with the public procurator.

5. It is considered that the Superintendent General or the Police Board shall be responsible for Police Training Schools, National Bureau of Fingerprints, decision of standard for criminal identification, improvement of scientific crime investigation methods, and Radio Bureau of National Police. And responding to the requisition of a group of one hundred (100) men, specially trained detectives who can be available for service for a local police force as a means to carry out scientific crime investigation shall be included in the police force that shoulders these duties.

6. In case of such grave emergency as that provided in the law, the Prime Minister must be given the authority to use these police forces in prefectures or areas where it is absolutely obvious that the execution of law has completely failed.

7. However, on all other occasions, the relations that exist between the Superintendent General and local police force shall be absolutely of a technical nature. Direct liaison affairs in regard to technical matters may be permissable, but no commanding system shall be had between them.

8. It is needless to say, however, that on special occasions in executing the law, it is being planned that a few of other kinds of police authority shall be left in the hands of the Central Government. That is, such limited judicial police authority as will be seen remaining as a certain kind of administrative police authority, the national railroad officials, customs inspectors, narcotic supervisors, etc. who will remain existing together with such special organs as the ESB (Economic Stabilization Board). However, it is not believed that the Cabinet could grant these police authorities, and the matter is expected to be discussed at the Diet.

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NOTE: In regard to the affairs under his jurisdiction, the Minister in the capacity of a national organ based on law may issue orders or supervise the director of a local public body on administrative matters which are executed by the director of the local public body. The provision in the preceding item shall not be applied to administrative matters of a local self-governing body which are executed by the director of the local self-governing body in compliance with the law that accords with the principles of the local area itself.

* * *

Translated by Mutsuo Nakajima - 26 August 1947

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Japanese Police Force

Memorandum GHQ AG 5, C-2

From Chief PSD

3 July 1945

Serial No. 50.

Channel Conveyancing

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

1969

COPY

CIS/OD:TPD/mc
6 July 47

FROM: Col. Bratton TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

1. In reply to Government Section's request of 14 Nov 1946 for recommendation concerning the DAI NIHON BUTOKU KAI, G-2 gave its opinion (TAB A) that:

a. The Society was never an "ultra-nationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society such as those organizations originally intended to be listed under SCAPIN 548" for purge.

b. The effect on government and public life should be carefully considered before making the holding of office in the society a category for purge.

c. If Government Section insisted on making the holding of office in the society a basis for purge, such basis should be limited to people who held office during the war years only.

2. The check sheet (TAB A) and a memorandum describing the society (TAB B) were included as Tabs in CIS/G-2's Memorandum to the Chief of Staff of 3 December 1946 - "Interpretation and Implementation of the Purge Phase of the Occupation."

3. Since the question of the DAI NIHON BUTOKU KAI has not been raised again in the meantime, CIS believed that the matter had been dropped.

4. CIS's opinion of the DAI NIHON BUTOKU KAI has not changed.

5. The subject memorandum from Public Safety Division gives another graphic example of the damage which the inclusion of a nationwide semi-official organization such as the DAI NIHON BUTOKU KAI in the purge will do to the stability of the country.

6. CIS considers it particularly unfortunate that these far-reaching purges apparently must continue despite the revision of occupational policy as stated in JCS radio WAR 81011 (which was subject of CIS IOM to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of 30 June 1947).

2 Incls:
TAB A - Check sheet from Govt Sec to G-2
TAB B - Memorandum for Information re: DAI NIPPON BUTOKU KAI ("Great Japan Military Virtue Society")

R.S.B.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

11977

HEADQUARTERS
METROPOLITAN PROVOST MARSHALL OF TOKYO, JAPAN
APO 181

CHECK SHEET

File No: Subject: Japanese Police Losses Purge of Butokukai

Note No.	From:	To:	Date:
	Provost Marshal, Tokyo	Asst Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ	21 July 47

1 Confirming our telephone conversation of Saturday, herewith a brief study on what the proposed purge of the BUTOKU-KAI will do to the Metropolitan Police Board, Tokyo.

I am furnishing Col. PULLIAN a copy of this communication with Exhibits 3 and 4 withdrawn, of which I am sure he has copies.

/s/ CSF
C. S. Ferrin

2. FROM: Gen Willoughby TO: Col Bratton - Action; Col Duff - Follow up; Col Myers - Info
CAW/3338/mvb
DATE: 25 July 1947

1. Add att M.P. Commander's views, as exhibit to Col Pulliam.
2. The check sheet contains good points that can be copied.

Incls:
4 Exhibits

- C.A.W. - - - - - - - - - - - -

CIS/PSD/HEP/sm

FROM: CIS TO: G-2
CIS/PSD/HEP/sm
DATE: 29 July 1947

3 Exhibits attached as tab to action paper subject: "Police Purge - Dai Nihon Butoku Kai (Great Military Virtues Society)".

Incls
4 Exhibits w/drawn
- R.S.B. - - - - - - - - - - - -

PSD FILE CIS/PSD/HEP/sm

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9564

Japanese Police Losses 5 Aug 47

Col Bratton Gen Willoughby 26-5651
Col Bratton

1. Reference par. 2, C/N 3, I have discussed this with Col Pulliam. We will go to Gen. Whitney with this or any other paper, if and when you so desire. 4

2. I do not believe, however, that this is the psychological moment to do so.

3. As a result of the (probably) enforced house-cleaning he is now engaged in he will not be in a mood to consider or consult with us except to take a pot shot by way of letting off steam.

4. We recommend this conference with Gen. Whitney be delayed until the time of presentation of the general paper referred to in par. 1, C/N 3, or some other appropriate time.

Incls
n/c R.S.B.

PSD File Copy

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3123
#20

CIS/PSD/HEP/nnb
9 Aug 47

Japanese Police Losses

CIS G-2 26-5915
Col. Pulliam

It is recommended that the proposed draft check note (Incl 2) be approved. 6

2 Incls
1. Memo to AC of S, G-2 w/ Tabs A and B.
2. Check Sheet to Gen Whitney from Gen Willoughby.

R.S.B.

CIS/PSD FILE cis/psd/HEP/nnb

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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CIS/PSD/HMP/sm
4 August 1947

Japanese Police Losses

Col Pulliam

Col Bratton

26-5915
Col Pulliam

1. Viewing this problem from all angles it is not believed now is the psychological time to approach Whitney. Reason - he has been recently needled and rebuffed by (CIS, G-2) with check notes etc., and it is not believed that he would be in a mood to consider or consult (you & I) except to take a pot shot for revenge. 4

2. It is believed that within a few weeks Whitney will encounter some Jap Govt opposition to some of GS dictates in our favor. A meeting at an appropriate time then may be useful. Now is not the time for us (Bratton & Pulliam) to do it.

3. Recommend that we keep the nose in the breeze for a more appropriate time.

Incls
n/c

H.M.P.

PSD FILE

CIS/PSD/HMP/sm

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

COPYE COPY

G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

File No: **Subject:** Japanese Police Losses CAW/3144/mvb **Date:** 9 July 1947

FROM: Gen Willoughby **TO:** **PHONE:** **NAME:**

Col Bratton - Action
Col Duff - follow up
Col Myers - Info

Comment Number 1

What is action? This can be made the basis of negotiations with Govt Section.

C.A.W.

P.S. Please do not send papers in to Gen Willoughby without indicating constructive suggestion or desired action. Make recommendation.

- - - -

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Memo to: Ass't C of S, G-2, thru CIS, subject, "Japanese Police Losses", dtd 5 July 47.

COPY

CIS/OD:TPD/mc
6 July 47

FROM: Col Bratton TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

2

1. In reply to Government Section's Request of 14 November 1946 for recommendation concerning the DAI NIHON BUTOKU KAI, G-2 gave its opinion (TAB A) that:

a. The Society was never an "ultra-nationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society such as those organizations originally intended to be listed under SCAPIN 548" for purge.

b. The effect on government and public life should be carefully considered before making the holding of office in the society a category for purge.

c. If Government Section insisted on making the holding of office in the society a basis for purge, such basis should be limited to people who held office during the war years only.

2. The check sheet (TAB A) and a memorandum describing the society (TAB B) were included as Tabs in CIS/G-2's Memorandum to the Chief of Staff of 3 December, 1946 - "Interpretation and Implementation of the Purge Phase of the Occupation."

3. Since the question of the DAI NIHON BUTOKU KAI has not been raised again in the mention, CIS believed that the matter had been dropped.

4. CIS's opinion of the DAI NIHON BUTOKU KAI has not changed.

5. The subject memorandum from Public Safety Division gives another graphic example of the damage which the inclusion of a nationwide semi-official organization such as the DAI NIHON BUTOKU KAI in the Purge will doto the stability of the country.

6. CIS considers it particularly unfortunate that these far-reaching purges apparently must continue despite the revision of occupational policy as stated in JCS radio WAR 81011 (which was subject of CIS IOM to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of 30 June 1947).

2 Incls:
TAB A - Check sheet from Gov't Sec to G-2
TAB B - Memorandum for Information re: DAI NIPPON BUTOKU KAI ("Great Japan Military Virtue Society")

/s/ R.S.B.
R.S.B.

COPY

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Intelligence Section, G-2
Public Safety Division

APO 500
5 July 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

THRU: Civil Intelligence Section

SUBJECT: Japanese Police Losses

FILED UNDER "JAPANESE POLICE LOSSES"

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

"A"

Check sheet to Government Section in re:
DAI NIPPON BUTOKU KAI

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SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
NND 775009
By MM Sles NARS, Date 10-30-79

CW/CLK/CPM/BAB/raj

Dai Nippon Butoku Kai

Govt Sec G-2 14 Nov 46

Request your comments and recommendations concerning the dates during which the Dai Nippon Butoku Kai was considered an ultra-nationalistic organization.

- -C.W.- - - - - - - - - - - - -

From: G-2 To: Government Section Date: 15 Nov 46
CIS/Conf:RPW/raj

1. After careful study, it is felt by this section that the DAI NIPPON BUTOKU KAI never became an "ultra-nationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society" in any sense such as those organizations originally intended to be listed under SCAPIN 548. It was from its inception to the beginning of the war a ZAIDAN HOJIN (juridical body) which fostered the physical training in the form of the jiujitsu, fencing and archery and published a magazine "BUTOKU" to further its interests. Its national membership was 3,000,000 in 1941.

On 21 March 1942 this ZAIDAN HOJIN, like others of its kind, was absorbed by the Welfare Ministry. The premier became its honorary chief with the Welfare, Education, Home, Army and Navy Ministers as honorary vice-ministers. It was at this time that the activities of the society were expanded to include bayonet and firing practice.

It is recommended therefore that if the organization is to be placed under SCAPIN 548, the beginning date for application be set not earlier than 1 January 1942.

2. Since many persons who held high positions in subject organization held such positions only because they were in high government posts, it is felt that the mandatory purge clause of SCAPIN 550 should not apply after 2 September 1945. While it is true that subject organization was not severed from government control until early 1946 as pointed out above, the society certainly did not actively engage in the promulgation of militarism after the termination of the war. Furthermore, persons in high government posts subsequent to 2 September 1945 were in such posts with the approval of the occupation authorities, and it would seem unfair, to say the least, to purge people for holding office in such a society when holding it depended upon their occupying a government post for which they had been approved by SCAP.

It is believed that ex-office posts in any government-controlled society in which holding of office was contingent on the holding of public

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Dai Nippon Butoku Kai

G-2 Government Section 18 Nov 46
CIS/RPW/raj

office approved by SCAP, should not be considered as a basis for purge after 2 September 1945, the limitation date set in Category E and in the interpretation of Category G of SCAPIN 550. .

It is recommended, therefore, that the termination date for the period in question re. the DAI NIPPON BUTOKU KAI be set not later than 2 September 1945.

3. One further consideration is the effect that adding this society to SCAPIN 548, and thus to SCAPIN 550, will have on the present government. If this new criterion, DAI NIPPON BUTOKU KAI, is included in the purge without limitation, and, if the final date is set after 2 September 1945, three members of the Cabinet and the Director of the Bureau of Public Safety of the Home Ministry will certainly be affected. If this number of its key personnel is purged the Cabinet is likely to fall.

It is our opinion that the Japanese Government should not at this time be forced, by such circumstances as the unlimited addition of BUTOKU KAI to the purge, to undergo such a strain as marked its efforts to replace the Shidehara Cabinet last May. It is our opinion that a long interim between Cabinets under the present circumstances would be detrimental to the interests of SCAP. We believe that barring unusual developments, the present government should be allowed to continue until the election of the new Diet in the Spring under the new constitution permits the choice of a successor cabinet with the backing of the people.

In the proposals for the extension of the purge, it is noted that persons now occupying posts in the central government are not to be removed so long as they remain in their present posts. It seems logical that the same provision should apply where subject organization is concerned.

It is recommended, therefore, that in applying Category C of SCAPIN 550, so far as the DAI NIPPON BUTOKU KAI is concerned, this criterion should not be applied to persons who are occupying posts in the central government so long as they remain in their present posts.

- -C.A.W.- - - - - - - - - - - - -

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

"B"

Memorandum describing:-
DAI NIPPON BUTOKU KAI

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

COPY

COPY

19 December 1946
CIS/OD:TPD/cn

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION:

SUBJECT: DAI NIPPON BUTOKU KAI ("Great Japan Military Virtue Society")

1. The DAI NIPPON BUTOKU KAI was founded in 1895 at Kyoto as a ZAIDAN HOJIN (foundation) to sponsor wrestling (judo), fencing (kendo), and archery (kyudo). Because these forms of athletics had been traditional to the samurai, the society incorporated in its name the word "BUTOKU", which is a combination of the character "BU" of "BUSHI" (samurai) with the character "TOKU" (virtue or morality). Thus the connotation of the title is "Great Japan Samurau Morality Society", rather than the usual literal translation "Great Japan Military Virtue Society".

2. Over the years the society became nation-wide in scope, with 3,000,000 members in 1941 and with a federation of local branches in every prefecture. Because of its prestige the president was traditionally an Imperial prince and the chairman a retired field marshall or admiral.

3. For 46 years the society was privately financed. Accounts of the branches were maintained independent from the accounts of the head office.

4. In March, 1942,--after the declaration of war,--the government took over the society as it did practically all other organizations of its kind. The premier became president, and the ministers of Welfare, Education, Home Affairs, Army and Navy became its vice-chiefs. This organization continued after the end of the war with the result that SCAP-sponsored Premier Shidehara and his Cabinet Ministers became by virtue of their positions honorary heads of the society.

5. In the post-surrender confusion the society lay dormant for several months. Then several attempts were made to revive it on the pre-1942 basis. This brought the matter to the attention of CIS through CIC. As a result, it was temporarily decided to ban the society under SCAPIN 548. After consultation with CI & E, however, this decision was reversed, because the society decided to dissolve.

6. When Government Section and CPC proposed a post-mortem wholesale proscription of the society in November, CIS advised moderation and pointed out the dangers of too drastic action by check sheet dated 15 November 1946, (TAB I)

T.P.D.

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2. CIS
30 Aug 47

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500
29 August 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Police Purge - Dai Nihon Butoku Kai (Great Military Virtues Society)

1. Continued blanket purges of personnel previously screened and passed are resulting in constant personnel changes with complete deterioration of the efficiency of the Japanese police and their ability to perform the mission directed by SCAP.

2. During the period 1945-1947, 39,637 members of the Japanese police have been separated from the service, a loss of 45% from normal establishment (Tab A).

3. 5,073 key officials, experienced and most capable, have been lost by purge. 1,583 more key officials have been lost from other causes. This is an average yearly increase of 375% over the previous five year average (Tab A).

4. The present Butoku Kai purge sponsored by Government Section will remove about 1,004 additional key police officials, all in grade of inspector or higher, a total loss of 25.16% of all top bracket police by purge.

5. The activities of the Butoku Kai are roughly the counterpart of the U. S. National Rifle Association. Most police officials concerned were ex-officio officers of the Butoku Kai, similar to members of our state police forces who are ex-officio game, forest and fire wardens. Their activities were no more militaristic than our own police supervision over war-time civilian air raid wardens.

6. That this particular blanket purge adversely affects police efficiency and occupation tranquility, is the considered opinion of: (1) Civil Intelligence Section, Public Safety Division (Tab B); (2) Tokyo Provost Marshal (Tab C); (3) [illegible]

CIS/PSD/HEP/ab PSD FILE HEP

3. 5,073 key officials, experienced and most capable, have been lost by purge. 1,583 more key officials have been lost from other causes. This is an average yearly increase of 375% over the previous five year average (Tab A).

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5. The activities of the Butoku Kai are roughly the counterpart of the U. S. National Rifle Association. Most police officials concerned were ex-officio officers of the Butoku Kai, similar to members of our state police forces who are ex-officio game, forest and fire wardens. Their activities were no more militaristic than our own police supervision over war-time civilian air raid wardens.

6. That this particular blanket purge adversely affects police efficiency and occupation tranquility, is the considered opinion of: (1) Civil Intelligence Section, Public Safety Division (Tab B); (2) Tokyo Provost Marshal (Tab C); (3) Commanding General, 8th Army (Tab D).

7. Factors involved in the resolving of these opinions are:

a. Crime incidence has increased over 200% since the occupation (Tab E).

b. Loss of police personnel has exceeded recruitment of authorized strength (Tab B). On 1 May police personnel reached 97% of authorized strength.

c. Six million disillusioned and jobless repatriates may become an easy prey to subversive ideas and represent an element of social unrest (Tabs G, H).

d. Ninety-four per cent of foreign nationals in Japan are Koreans, a unified group of potential dissatisfaction and lawless characteristics (Tab I).

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
NND 775009
By MM Mills NARS, Date 10-30-79

CRS/PSD/HRP/ab PSD FILE HRP

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC No. 775009

Memo for the C/S, subj: "Police Purge - Dai Niton Butoku Kai (Great Military Virtues Society)", dtd 29 Aug 47.

e. The present and future weakness of occupation strength in Japan is well known. The ratio of population density is approximately 1 U. S. soldier per 730 Japanese.

f. The average ratio of Japanese police to population is 1 to 807, which compares unfavorably with the United States ratio of 1 to 598 backed by a regular army and national guard.

g. Our total military, plus a semi-trained and largely unarmed Japanese police force, currently 92,495, represents an inadequate force for the control of seventy-three million people (Tabs F, K, L).

h. The low effectiveness of the forces of law and order, on the basis of numerical ratios, training and decreasing efficiency, could not prevail against organized blocks, millions strong, such as dissatisfied discharged military, with a highly trained nucleus to furnish command leadership.

i. Changes in the status of the police affecting its efficiency thereby affects the occupation and throws a potential burden on this shrinking manpower of the Occupation Forces.

8. When the Butoku Kai purge was discovered, unavailing contact was made with Government Section in an effort to postpone or minimize the effect on the Japanese Police (Tab B).

9. Continual purging of experienced police officials has, and will continue to be, reflected in decreasing police efficiency and domestic tranquility.

10. The practical aspects of the need for balance between blanket purges and efficiency must be recognized. Theory versus practicability can give divergent results (Tab B).

11. It is recommended that:

a. The Butoku Kai purge be immediately suspended from specific mass application to the Japanese police forces.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

dissatisfied discharged military, with a highly trained nucleus to furnish command leadership.

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9. Continual purging of experienced police officials has, and will continue to be, reflected in decreasing police efficiency and domestic tranquility.

10. The practical aspects of the need for balance between blanket purges and efficiency must be recognised. Theory versus practicability can give divergent results (Tab B).

11. It is recommended that:

a. The Butoku Kai purge be immediately suspended from specific mass application to the Japanese police forces.

b. Further blanket purging of Japanese police be delayed to permit training of replacement personnel.

c. The practical effects of any blanket purge be considered and coordinated by the initiating staff section with other staff sections.

C. A. W.

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

SECRET

Memo for the C/S, subj: "Police Purge - Dai Niton Butoku Kai (Great Military Virtues Society)", dtd 29 Aug 47.

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EFFECTS OF PURGE ON POLICE MANPOWER

(Purges of Oct. '45 and Jan. '46.

Actual Strength as of 15 October '46)

Rank or Grade	Actual Strength	Number Purged
Prefectural Chiefs	51*	49
Superintendents	947	114
Inspectors	1,773	196
Ass't Inspectors	6,994	1,000**
Police Sergeants	13,264	1,587**
Policemen	66,393	2,127**
Total	89,022	5,073

* A number of police officials presently hold the rank of prefectural chief but are assigned to duty as heads of sections in the Police Bureau or to other general duties. The chiefs of all prefectural police departments were removed by the purge.

** These represent the principal numerical component of the Special Higher Police (Tokko Ka).

Policemen	66,399	2,127**
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TAB A

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Intelligence Section, G-2
PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

APO 500
July 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

THRU: CIS

SUBJECT: Police Purge

1. During the years 1945-1946, 39,637 members of the Japanese police force have been separated from the service by reason of purge, voluntary retirement, cause and death; an average yearly increase of 374% over the 1940-1945 average. To date the force has lost 5,073 of its most capable experienced and key police officers by purge. In addition, 1,589 more of its most capable and experienced police officers have been lost from other causes.

2. The present Butokukai purge, now being sponsored and urged upon the purge board of the Japanese Government by the Government Section, SCAP, will remove about 1,004 additional police officers, all in the grade of inspector or higher. This purge will remove 10.3% of the remaining experienced administrators, resulting in the removal from the police force of all men of the rank of prefectural chief, two-thirds of superintendents, and one-third of the inspectors, or a total loss of 25.16% of all top bracket police officers by purge. All together this means that 60% of the present police force are men with less than two years of experience.

3. The civilian police are the only stabilizing force available to the Japanese Government to maintain civil law and order. Crime incidence has been upward since termination of hostilities. Recruitment and partial training of Japanese policemen has not kept abreast of losses. There are, as of 1 January 1947, 90,550 police as against an occupation authorization of 93,935. The average ratio of police to population for Japan is 1 to 807, which does not compare favorably with that of the United States of 1 to 598, supported by a regular army and national guard. There are approximately five

upon the purge board of the Japanese Government by the Government Section, SCAP, will remove about 1,004 additional police officers, all in the grade of inspector or higher. This purge will remove 10.3% of the remaining experienced administrators, resulting in the removal from the police force of all men of the rank of prefectural chief, two-thirds of superintendents, and one-third of the inspectors, or a total loss of 25.16% of all top bracket police officers by purge. All together this means that 60% of the present police force are men with less than two years of experience.

3. The civilian police are the only stabilizing force available to the Japanese Government to maintain civil law and order. Crime incidence has been upward since termination of hostilities. Recruitment and partial training of Japanese policemen has not kept abreast of losses. There are, as of 1 January 1947, 90,550 police as against an occupation authorization of 93,935. The average ratio of police to population for Japan is 1 to 807, which does not compare favorably with that of the United States of 1 to 598, supported by a regular army and national guard. There are approximately five million repatriated Japanese ex-soldiers, disillusioned and jobless, who may become easy prey to subversive ideas. Ninety-four per cent of the foreign nationals in Japan are Koreans. The current (and future) weakness of occupation strength in Japan is well known. Our total military, plus the semi-trained Japanese police force of 93,935, represent the physical force for seventy-three million people. The demobilized block or nationalistic elements can permeate and influence these vast millions and instantly create serious problems. Any change in the status of the Japanese police which affects its efficiency, thereby affects the occupation force and throws an increasing potential burden upon this shrinking manpower.

4. Further purging or a continual erosion of capable and experienced police officials, will remove the remaining remnants of key personnel and destroy the efficiency of this arm of government.

5. The activities of the Butokukai society as an organization were not entirely police functions in nature. Evaluating the pros and cons with respect to the society, it appears to have been about the counterpart of the National Rifle Association in the United States.

TAB B

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That this society was used by the military as a civilian defense organization is true, as was every other organization which could contribute to or be utilized toward the national effort. Most police officials concerned were ex-officio officers of the Butokukai, similar to members of our state police forces who are ex-officio game, forest, and fire wardens. Their activities were no more militaristic nor ideological than our own police instruction or supervision of civilian air raid wardens who were utilized in the promulgation of our own war effort.

6. The Tokyo Provost Marshal is opposed to further blanket purges that will seriously affect the efficiency of the Metropolitan Police Board. This Board has had five different superintendent generals since initiation of the purges. These changes have not all been desirable, yet the efficiency of the force, as a result thereof, has been maintained only by the closest supervision and retention of other key officers. It is presently operating more efficiently than at any time since the beginning of the occupation. However, it is feared that the present purge will destroy the efficiency thus far obtained and the incentive responsible for the development. The metropolitan police force will be particularly hard hit and will lose about 75% of its top executives. Prior purges have eliminated the most capable and experienced police officers to the point where there are now no qualified replacements on the force. Police efficiency as it now exists is entirely dependent upon a few experienced executives. This purge will eliminate this group.

7. The Commanding General, Eighth Army, charged with the operation of the Japanese police, is opposed to further blanket purges that will seriously affect the efficiency of the police. From an operational point of view, police departments throughout Japan will be similarly affected as the Metropolitan Police Board. Today's effort should be towards strengthening police efficiency, not weakening it. Constant personnel changes brought about by purge, after personnel have presumably been screened and passed, are causing complete deterioration of police efficiency and the ability to perform the mission directed by SCAP.

8. When the Butokukai purge was known to be in the making, contact was established with Government Section to determine whether

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at any time since the beginning of the occupation. However, it is feared that the present purge will destroy the efficiency thus far obtained and the incentive responsible for the development. The metropolitan police force will be particularly hard hit and will lose about 75% of its top executives. Prior purges have eliminated the most capable and experienced police officers to the point where there are now no qualified replacements on the force. Police efficiency as it now exists is entirely dependent upon a few experienced executives. This purge will eliminate this group.

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8. When the Butokukai purge was known to be in the making, contact was established with Government Section to determine whether or not the effect upon the Japanese police could be postponed and minimized. In general, the answer was that this organization fell in the category of undesirables, that Government Section had decided to eliminate personnel of this society, and that this purge will affect all personnel belonging to this organization, be they government officers, school teachers, newspaper men, etc. However, Government Section indicated they might consider individual cases, depending upon the individual and the time spent in the organization.

9. There are other purges under study by the Government Section which will affect members of the police force but the number involved and for what reason or affiliation is as yet unknown. Continual purging of experienced police officers has and will continue to be reflected in the general efficiency of the force. How long the Japanese police force will be able to sustain similar losses and maintain any degree of efficiency is a serious question. If policy requires continual purging of police officers the force cannot hope to rebuild as rapidly as it is destroyed. There must be a reasonable balance maintained between efficiency and purge with the practical aspects for the latter duly recognized.

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Memo to Ass't C/S, G-2, thru CIS, subj: "Police Purge"

10. It is recommended that:

a. The practical effects of any purge affecting the police be considered and coordinated by the initiating staff section with PSD, CIS, G-2 and 8th Army.

b. The provisions of the Butokukai purge be suspended from application to the Japanese police.

c. Further blanket purging of Japanese police be terminated to permit adequate training of replacement personnel lost from all causes.

H. E. PULLIAM
Colonel, (GSC)
Chief, Public Safety Division

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H. L. JULIAN
Colonel, (GSC)
Chief, Public Safety Division

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

COPY

HEADQUARTERS
METROPOLITAN PROVOST MARSHAL OF TOKYO, JAPAN

COPY

CHECK SHEET

Note No.	From:	To:	21 July 47
	Provost Marshal, Tokyo	Chief, Public Safety Division GHQ	

1 Herewith brief study on the effect of the proposed purge on the local MPB. I have sent a copy of this to G-2, including Exhibits 3 and 4, of which, I am sure, you have already received copies. They consist in reports from the MPB, #3 headed "OUTLINE OF THE BUTOKU-KAI", and #4 Letter dated 21 July 1947 to Chief of Public Peace Section, GHQ.

C. S. Ferrin

COPY

COPY

TAB C

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

HEADQUARTERS
METROPOLITAN PROVOST MARSHAL OF TOKYO, JAPAN
APO 181

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No: Subject:

Note No.	From: Liaison Section, PMO, Tokyo To: Provost Marshal, Tokyo Date: 21 July 1947
1.	1. The undersigned is in receipt of information which indicates that a large percentage of the police officials occupying executive positions throughout Japan will be "Purged" in the near future. 2. Metropolitan Police Board will be particularly hard hit. It appears that the Superintendent General and Chiefs of all Major Sections will be affected. This will leave MPB with no experienced executives. (See exhibit 1) 3. Police Affairs Bureau of the Home Ministry and Prefectural Police Organizations will be similarly affected. (see exhibit 2) 4. Due to the number of Police Officials affected, (approx. 60% of top executives) the executive nature of their duties, and the number ofpolice executives already removed in prior purges, there will be no experienced police executives available for replacement. Therefore the police efficiency, not only in Tokyo, but throughout Japan will be reduced. 5. Since the Occupation began, Metropolitan Police Board has had five (5) different Chief Executives. While these changes of Chief Executives have not always been desireable, the damage resulting therefrom has been held to a minimum by the retention of all other key personnel, and Metropolitan Police Board has continued to improve until, it is at present operating more efficiently than at any time since the occupation began. It is feared that the present purge, if carried out, will destroy the efficiency which has been built up since the end of the war, and will, in some measure, destroy the incentive which has been responsible for the progress made to date. 6. Those presently scheduled for purge were at one time connected with BUTOKU-KAI. An outline of the activities of this society is appended as exhibit 3. There is no doubt that it has been somewhat glossed over but whether or not it falls within the scope of SCAP Directives is questionable. 7. The summation of the possible effects of the pending purge which was prepared by MPB is appended as exhibit 4. 8. Recommend that action be initiated to forstall any such drastic purge as is contemplated. s/ James W Miller t/ JAMES W. MILLER Capt., F.A. Liaison Officer

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JAPANESE EXECUTIVES OF MPB WHO ARE SCHEDULED FOR PURGE.

Present Position		
Supt. Gen. MPB.	TOGA, Muneo	Represants MPB on Policy matters at a cabinet level.
Dir. Police Affairs Dept.	NAKANISHI, Hisao	Top executive and wheelhorse of MPB.
Dir. Pub. Peace Dept.	SHIOYA, Takao	Responsible for Police Adm. and enforcement in economic field.
Dir. Criminal Affairs.	FUJITA, Jiro	Coordinates Criminal investigations on national level.
Chief of Police Affairs Section.	MASUI, Shojiro	Direct Administrator of Police in Tokyo.
Chief of Police Guard Section.	SAEGUSA, Saburo	The executive in charge of all police matters other than Traffic, Economic and criminal.
Chief of 2d CI Section.	TAMAMURA, Shiichi	In charge of Criminal Investigations in Tokyo.
Chief of Liaison Section.	WATANABE, Minoru	Coordinates work of MPB with all outside agencies, particularly O.F.

1. This inclues all top executives of MPB.

2. In addition, approximately 28% of the personnel of the section chief class will be affected.

EXHIBIT 1.

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POLICE EXECTUTIVES OTHER THAN MPB THROUGHOUT JAPAN SCHEDULED FOR PURGE.

1. Of the 45 directors of prefectural police departments 14 will be affected. (31%)

2. Of the 306 section chiefs of prefectural police departments, 198 will be affected. (65%)

3. Of the 1127 chiefs of police stations 680 will probably be affected.

4. As an overall picture, approximately 60% of the top police executives throughout Japan will be affected.

EXHIBIT 2.

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OUTLINES OF THE BUTOKUKAI (MARTIAL VIRTUES SOCIETY) AND ITS RELATION TO THE PURGE

I. AIM OF THE BUTOKUKAI

The Butokukai was formed by followers of the ancient Japanese art of fencing, judo (jujitsu) and archery and aimed, through improvement in training and technical skill, at fostering a department of frugality, chivalry and pride and at elevating character and training of physique. Thus it is neither a political, ideological body nor a militaristic body. As may be seen from its activities neither can it be considered to have taken part in any political or ideological activity nor in carrying out any militaristic or quasi-militaristic training. nor can it be considered that the reform in 1942 produced any basic change in organization or activities. The following attempts to demonstrate this point through a historical survey as well through the reform of 1942 and through their real activities.

II. HISTORY OF THE BUTOKUKAI AND OUTLINE OF THE ACTIVITIES THEREOF.

1. History

a) The old Butokukai.

The Butokukai was established in Kyoto in April 1895 by civilian enthusiasts with the object of building up the physique and mind and the inculcation of curtesy through training in the ancient Japanese Art of fencing.

EXHIBIT 3

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

judo (Jujitsu) and archery. At that time the Governor of Kyoto Prefecture, Mr. Chiaki WATANABE was made Chairman and leading members were appointed from among the respective spheres and have been instrumental in the advancement and dissemination of these arts. Subsequently, members of the society increased in many localities and the members in the various prefectures formed themselves into branches of the society and thus commenced activities by contributions from members and enthusiasts.

In the prefectures it became customary as in the case of Kyoto, to delegate the head post of the branch to the prefectural governor. With the establishment of the local branches it no longer became appropriate at Kyoto to have its governor as the chairman, and it was decided to ask a senior person to assume it. Accordingly, civilians such as Mr. Shuzo AOKI, the then Foreign Minister and Mr. Kanetake OURA, Minister of Communications were entrusted with the post in the beginning. In 1915, however, the then chairman Viscount OURA in the midst of political turmoil retired from office under a cloud of suspected corruption and thereafter in order to make it a sports organ of true lovers of the martial arts, the choice of a chairman from among politicians was avoided and it was considered appropriate to recommend a retired soldier of high moral character and a non-participant in politics and in 1916 Lieut.-General Nariyuki MIYOSHI was appointed Chairman while subsequently it became customary to appoint retired soldiers of impartial and high integrity and unrelated to politics. Its activities however never at any time exceeded the aims given before and no

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political or ideological activities were carried out up to and subsequent to the reform of 1942 it remained a purely athletic organization.

b) Reform of 1942.

After the commencement of the pacific war, it was inevitable that the various set ups internally moved to a wartime forting and the Butokukai could claim no exception to this rule, that is on the demand of the military (person responsible at that time was former Lieut.-General Ryukichi TANAKA, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau) and with the object of co-ordinating military arts and of the advancement of bayonet drill and shooting, the Ministry of Welfare, former Surgeon Lieut.-General KOIZUMI) planned to establish a new Martial Arts Organization. Despite strong opposition from the Butokukai which took its stand from its tradition and original mission, it was arbitrarily taken over and the old name of Butokukai was continued, while in addition to fencing, judo and archery (including the arts of scythe, staff and stick wielding) the two arts of bayonet drill and shooting were added, thus culminating in March 1942 in the formation of a new organization as an outer organization of the government. The Prime Minister was appointed Chairman, while the five Ministers of Welfare, Education, War, Navy and Home Affairs, together with one other from academic circles were made Vice-Chairmen. Although the competent minister was the Minister of Welfare, the reasons for the appointment of the arts of students, soldiers and police personnel and the respective ministers concerned were thus made vice-chairmen. As it may be seen later, the activities of the Butokukai differed very little from what they were prior to the

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surrender.

a) Reform after the surrender.

With the surrender, the Butokukai immediately embarked upon wholesale reform in order to efface its abnormal wartime character. Thus it abolished bayonetting and shooting and having reverted to a purely civilian body, it was democratically organized to contribute to the advancement of judo, fencing and archery as a healthy sport. Subsequently stern attention was drawn by the General Headquarters to the existence of certain undesirable persons among the members of the Butokukai. Since however, by the character of this organization it was unable to assume responsibility in the suppression of individual activities of such persons, it took its inevitable step of a voluntary dissolution.

2. The Reform of the Butokukai and its Activities.

a) Central Headquarters.

After this reform the military attempted arbitrarily to disseminate bayonetting and shooting to the youthful group, but the leading members of the old Butokukai who had adhered to fencing, judo and archery of their own free choice, maintained their ground on these old arts and internal harmony could not have been said to have been attained. Thus the military were unsuccessful in their attempt to exercise control over them, with the result that the pivot of Butokukai rested as before on the arts of fencing, judo and archery and its activities differed very little from what they were previous to the reform. In judo and fencing auditoriums were placed at the disposal of a few enthusiasts for entirely voluntary and individual

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practice and training and forced mass training such as is in the armed forces and schools was never practised while no organized direction and dissemination to the general public was made. As far as Bayonet drill and shooting were concerned they were not practised by the Butokukai, but were given training courses mainly in the Japan War Veterans' Association (Dainippon Zaigo-gunjin kai), Bayonetting Advancement Association, (outer organization of the Zaigo-gunjin-kai), and the Japan Shooting Association (Olympic Member organization) and in schools. The Butokukai merely conducted tests for those who desired them in bayonet drill. Especially in regard to shooting, both training and tests were conducted by the Shooting Association. Bayonet drill and shooting were given no direction or training, while general dissemination to the public was entirely non existent; nor was there any relation between the Butokukai and the training conducted by the schools and War Veterans' Association.

b) Branches.

With the reform of the Butokukai there was a change in the members at headquarters and military personnel on active service were included in part; but the control and management over the branches remained no different from what they were prior to the reform.

As stated before, owing to the gradual increase in the members since the establishment of the Butokukai in 1895, the branches were operated by the members by prefectures through contributions of members and enthusiasts. In the local branches the martial arts were cultivated and maintained, apart from a few enthusiasts, by police officers from the nature of their duties. With regard to the relation between the branches and headquarters

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the latter merely exercised control in the granting of high gradings. The branches were independent financially of the central headquarters and possessed independent capital and the leading members thereof were appointed by the branch chiefs. Thus the activities of the branches were not bound in any way by headquarters but were operated on a self-regulatory basis. Furthermore, the formations of branches were not confined to this country alone, but branches were established overseas, for example not only in Shanghai and Hankow but also in Southern California and in Seattle.,

c) Members.

The members of the Butokukai since its establishment entered the society on a voluntary basis as enthusiasts of the arts and no effects were felt by the reform. The grades of the Butokukai however were granted only to the members thereof. Thus persons holding grades of the Butokukai have first of all to be members, with the result that since a considerable length of time has elapsed since the establishment of the society, the total members thereof reach considerable proportions. These persons however who took a real part in the real activities were but a small minority.

d) Capital.

The capital of headquarters and the branches were respectively independent of each other. The headquarters exercised no control over the assets of the branch. Both headquarters and the branches however, apart from halls built from contributions by members and enthusiasts, generally did not possess capital worth mentioning and the financial status in each of these cases was in considerable difficulties.

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III. WHETHER OR NOT THE BUTOKUKAI SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS FALLING UNDER PARAGRAPH "C" OF THE PURGE DIRECTIVE.

1. Whether or not to consider the Butokukai as a militaristic or ultra nationalistic body. No qualification is required in that the object of the Purge is in the removal and exclusion from public office of militaristic and ultra nationalistic persons. The organizations under Paragraph "C" must be such that their aims or the results of their activities fall under any one of the items under paragraph 1 of the SCAP Memorandum of January 4, 1946.

The organizations thus far designated as paragraph "C" cases have all possessed aims or activities which fall under the above disqualifying categories. It is a fact however that the Butokukai for circumstances stated before were formed by enthusiasts of the ancient Japanese art of judo, fencing and archery for the purpose of training character in the virtues of curtesy, pride and courage and in the building of moral integrity and physical fitness. Never at any time did the activities of this society exceed the limits of those aims. By the organizational reform of 1942 its organizational formation and activities were seen temporarily to have distorted the original mission and character, but the circumstances leading up to it together with the actual facts of the case were as has been stated before an emanation of wartime abnormality and not the real outcome of the intentions of the Butokukai. Nor were its activities in any close proximity to the pretentions of the military and its basic features were hardly different from these prior to the reform and politico-ideological activities with such interprotation during

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that period were entirely inconceivable. It is possible that there were persons amongst those who excelled at fencing and judo and who received grades from the Butokukai, who possessed militaristic or agressive thoughts and who were responsible for such activities and it is moreover a fact that persons concerned in the martial arts have been actually warned by the General Headquarters for having exchanged correspondence suspected of such nature since the surrender. It is considered however that these have been the results in many cases of discontent through the loss of livelihood or the part of instructors following on the abolition of the martial arts from school curricula and that a minority of these discontented groups became recklessly directly related to the Butokukai and even if they are members thereof, their unruly conduct is entirely of a personal nature, of which the Butokukai is wholly ignorant. It is not for the Butokukai to assume responsibility for the behavior and actions of a part of its members. Thus it was evident that the Butokukai aimed solely at training in the martial arts for the advancement of the moral character of the individual and in the shaping of the mind and physique. Never did it lend itself to the assertion of aggression or militarism or to acts of violence and thus it cannot be regarded as a militaristic or ultra nationalistic body.

2. Did the Butokukai carry out militaristic or quasi-militaristic training or perpetuate or acts with the object of perpetuating a bellicose spirit.

a) On the occasion of the reform of 1942, as a result of strong pressure from the military, the Butokukai came to handle nominally bayonetting and shooting in addition to judo,

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fencing and archery. As stated before however, the enthusiasts who adhered to the tradition of the old Butokukai never agreed with the military and in actual fact diverged considerably from the initial intentions of the military. In other words neither bayonetting drill, nor shooting were carried out by the Butokukai, and courses given in these by the Japan War Veteran's Association and in the schools have no relative to the society.

Thus even assuming bayonet exercise and shooting to be militaristic or quasi-militaristic, it would be wrong to assume that the Butokukai engaged in organized and co-ordinated training thereof. It is clearly stretching the point too far to consider shooting as militaristic or quasi-militaristic just as shooting for game-shooting is considered a pleasant sport and is widely acclaimed by peaceloving persons and just as the Japan Shooting Association a member organization of the Olympic Federation can hardly be considered a paragraph "G" case.

b) Ever since its foundation, the Butokukai has it is true been engaged in the advancement of the technique in the ancient Japanese arts of judo, fencing and archery but through the attainment of this technical skill it has never given militaristic or quasi-militaristic training or diffused a bellicose spirit or to have had such aims. As far as the Butokukai was concerned it was essentially athletic organization formed by persons of common leanings resulting in the erection of training halls in the respective branches, where such persons got together for the improvement in technical skill. It was fundamentarily a voluntary organization of enthusiasts with the specific aim of perfection of technique and personal self-improvement.

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Never did it carry out any generally organized directed training, let alone resort to propaganda of technique or training with militaristic motives. Where organized training in judo or fencing was given most were perhaps in the armed forces, schools and police. The courses given in the armed forces and in the schools have no relation with the Butokukai. Among instructors in schools there are some graduates of Martial Arts Technical Schools operated by the Butokukai; but of the 5,000 martial arts instructors at the time of the abolition of martial arts education in schools last autumn they only numbered 800. The relations of these persons to the Butokukai moreover were personal and there is no relation whatsoever between the education given in the martial arts in the schools and the Butokukai itself.

The training given in judo and fencing in the police forces were carried out in consideration of the nature of their duties and the fact that this constituted the chief work in the branches are as stated previously. To regard judo or fencing themselves as something militaristic or quasi-militaristic or bellicose is clearly mistaken just as in the case of shooting. Judo or fencing are no different from boxing or wrestling and on this point there are no reasons for differentiating the society from the Yodokai or other civil training fall.

c) For these reasons even after the organizational reform of 1942, to regard the Butokukai as having carried out militaristic or quasi-militaristic training or aimed at or engaged in the perpetuation of a bellicose spirit, is a conclusion which cannot be said to be based on accurate facts.

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21st July 1947

TO : Chief of Public Peace Section, G.H.Q.

FROM : NAKANISHI Hisao,
Director of Police Affairs Dept.,
Metropolitan Police Board.

SUBJECT: Report on the Purge of police officers once connected with the "Butokukai (Martial Arts) Association and on its possible effects.

We beg to submit for your information a report on the above subject as follows:

1. LIST OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF M.P.B. ONCE CONNECTED WITH "BUTOKUKAI (Martial Arts) ASSOCIATION.

A. Directors of Departments and others who are above them in rank.

PRESENT POSITION	N A M E	POSITION IN THE BUTOKUKAI ASSN.	PERIOD OF CONNECTION
Police Superintendent General	TOGA Muneo	Vice-chief of Prefectural Branch	For a year and seven months. (From 7th July 1942 to 1st July 1943). As Chief of Yamanashi Prefectural Police. (From 2nd Aug. 1944 to 24th March 1945). as Chief of Ibaraki Prefectural Police.
Director of Police Affairs Dept., M.P.B.	NAKANISHI Hisao	ditto	For two years and a month (from 7th July 1942 to 2nd Aug. 1944) as Chief of Mie Prefectural Police.
Director of Public Peace Dept., M.P.B.	SHIOYA Takao	ditto	For nine months (from 2nd Aug. 1944 to 21st April 1945) as Chief of Akita Prefectural Police.
Director of Criminal Affairs Dept., M.P.B.	FUJITA Jiro	Director of Prefectural Branch	For a year and six months (from 22nd March 1942 to 9th Sept. 1943) as Chief of School Affairs Section, Fukushima Prefecture.

EXHIBIT 4

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B. Officers concerned of section chief class.

PRESENT POSITION	N A M E	POSITION IN THE BUTOKUKAI ASSN.	PERIOD OF CONNECTION
Chief of Police Affairs Sect., Police Affairs Dept., M.P.B.	MASUI Shojiro	Director of Prefectural Branch	For a year and five months (from 13th Jan. 1943 to 20th June 1944) as Chief of Police Affairs Sect., Gifu Pref.
Chief of Police Guard Sect., Police Affairs Dept., M.P.B.	SAEGUSA Saburo	ditto	For a year and nine months (from 13th Jan. 1943 to 6th Oct. 1944) as Chief of Police Affairs Sect., Mie Pref.
Chief of 2nd Criminal Investigation Sect., Criminal Affairs Dept., M.P.B.	TAMAMURA Shiichi	ditto	For four months (from 24th July 1942 to 20th Nov. 1942) as Chief of Education Sect., Akita Prefecture).
Chief of Liaison Sect., Secretariate of Police Superintendent General, M.P.B.	WATANABE Minoru	ditto	For seven months (from 1st July 1942 to 20th Jan. 1943) as Chief of Education Sect., Tokushima Prefecture.
Police Supervisor, M.P.B.	MATSUMOTO Kyo	ditto	For a year and five months (from 2nd March 1942 to 31st July 1943) as Chief of Police Affairs Sect., Tokushima Pref.
ditto	FUJISAWA Saburo	ditto	For two years and six months (from 2nd March 1942 to 26th Feb. 1944) as Chief of Police Affairs Sect., Ehime Pref.; (from 26th Feb. 1944 to 19th June 1944) as Chief of Police Affairs Sect., Niigata Pref.

REMARKS:

In the above list the period of connection shows the service term of each person as director or section-chief. The date of the reorganization of the "Butoku-kai" was not the same in all the prefectures, and as a result the actual period of connection in each case is expected to be found much shorter than shown above.

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2. NUMBER OF POLICE OFFICERS CONCERNED, SERVING IN THE POLICE BUREAU OF THE HOME MINISTRY AND THE POLICE DEPARTMENTS OF ALL PREFECTURES, AND THE EXPECTED EFFECT TO BE PRODUCED BY THE DISMISSAL OF THEM.

1) Police Bureau of Home Ministry:

Of 16 persons, including the Director of the Bureau, Chiefs of all sections and school head masters, 8 persons are concerned (50%)

2) Metropolitan Police Board:

Of 7 persons, including the Police Superintendent General and Directors of all departments, 4 persons are concerned (57%).

Of 21 persons of section chief class, 6 persons are concerned (28%).

3) Hokkaido and Prefectural Police Departments:

i) of 45 directors, 14 are concerned (31%).

ii) of 306 section chiefs, 198 are presumed to be concerned (65%).

iii) 60% (680 persons) of all police station chiefs numbering 1,127 are presumed to be concerned.

Summing up the above, we can see that as many as 910 (64% of all police executives totaling 1,422 including police station chiefs) are presumed to be concerned.

Dismissal of all these executives would no doubt produce a very bad effect on the whole police. It can be easily presumed, moreover, that it would make the very preservation of public peace difficult.

Further, it is clear that we should be confronted by a difficulty of filling up the vacant positions.

Police experts are already decreased by the simultaneous dismissal executed in accordance with the Memorandum regarding the abolition of all limitation to political, civil, and religious freedom.

If the dismissal of police officers who were once connected with "Butokukai" Association were really brought to effect, it would be extremely difficult to fill up the position not only of the highest executives but also of the police station chiefs. As a result, we should be forced to fill them with those who are not competent.-- for example, with such officers as are wanting in experience or in ability, especially in administrative abilities -- which would wreck the efficiency of police. There may be some prefectural police departments which would lose all the executive officers and more than half of the police station chiefs.

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3. REAL SITUATION OF M.P.B.

M.P.B. being not only the police board controlling the Metropolitan police affairs but also the rallying center of all the criminal investigations throughout the country, the positions of officers of this Board, especially of executive officers, have usually been filled with those selected from among the most competent executives of the prefectural police departments. So, if all the police officers who were connected with "Butokukai" Association were dismissed simultaneously, Police Superintendent and the brains of this Board -- Director of Police Affairs Department who is the mainstay of police administration, Director of Criminal Affairs who is in charge of crime investigation which is indespensable for maintainance of public peace and Director of Public Peace Department engaging in the hardest business of controlling the economic field which has been utterly confused since the cessation of hostility -- would all leave their position. As to the persons of section chief class, Chief of the Police Affairs Section who is the direct administrator of police, Chief of Police Guard Section and Chief of 2nd Criminal Investigation Section -- both are in charge of regulating people directly and maintaining social peace, and the Chief Police Supervisor and an attache who are expected to play the most important role for police reform -- these important positions in this Board would all become vacant. The difficulty of filling these positions would prevent us from reforming and strengthening the police. Sweeping purge of officers of important positions would depress the spirits of all police officers and make the whole system incompetent again which is about to recover from the bad conditions in which it has remained plunged since the termination of war. We are afraid, too, that the sweeping dismissal of executives would hinder us from securing the very public peace on which Japan should be reBuilt as a civilized nation, the accomplishment of which is the earnest desire of us Japanese people.

4. Furthermore, when the matter is studied from the viewpoint of the preservation of public peace in general, as well as from that of the police system itself,

a) The first -- and perhaps the most serious -- question to be considered is: How is public peace to be preserved in immediate future when all the persons involved be dismissed? The condition of public peace, which looks superficially to have attained a temporary calm, is in reality far from such as may be called satisfactory in any sense. With the progress of inflation and consequent stress upon life there are to be perceived some grave signs of various social problems smouldering to burst out into blaze at any moment. It needs no vivid imagination to foresee that the near future of our country will surely witness a series of social upheavals affecting public peace most seriously.

With the February 1 general strike abortion as a turning point Japanese labor disputes changed their character, much less in number and far more peaceful on the surface. Mass move-

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ments of various kinds, too, appear to have retained hitherto a peaceful and orderly character. But with the progress of inflation and the worsening of food shortage, a possibility of violent outburst of hungry masses is not to be put out of thought. It shall be a matter of grave concern how the masses, despairing of successful party politics through parliamental measures, may go drifting and into what channels of thought and action they may be led, as well as how the former militarists and ultra-nationalists, deeply dissatisfied with the present state of their half-destroyed fatherland, may find means to give vent to their stifled sense of humiliation and anger.

Unfortunately, at this very juncture the Home Ministry is going to be liquidated as a process of political democratization, and the wholesale dismissal of such police high-ranking officials as were connected with the "Butoku-kai" Association is going to be carried out. It means not only a lowering of morale and a deepening sense of instability among police officials who form the kernel power of maintaining peaceful social order, but also a loss of police experts to such an extent that it is almost hopeless to expect a safe execution of responsible police duties in the field of general peace preservation in immediate future.

In 1919 rice riots occurred throughout Japan, and their origin was to be found in the gossip of household wives in Toyama prefecture. The work of police, who make it their duty to prevent and suppress all the criminal tendencies in fluid society, is indeed an onerous one, it being necessary to keep a watchful eye over the whole aspect of ever-changing society and to apply their expert technique with a definite conviction based on a clear grasp of the actual movements of the people's mind. Order and security in society is precariously maintained only through such vigilant efforts of expert police straining themselves for the attainment of general happiness.

If over 60% of such expert police officials as form the executive nuclei of the Metropolitan Police Board, and of the Police Bureau of Home Ministry, as well as of the prefectural police departments, be purged at a blow, the whole system of Japanese police will again be plunged into such a chaos and disorder as may lead to some grave consequences in the all-important preservation of public peace in immediate future which cannot fail to materially affect the successful realization of ~~ultimately~~ the Allied Occupation policies by making a vacancy of those positions which are ultimately responsible for the preservation of public peace and the maintenance of social order.

b) In the second place, perhaps the most difficult question resulting from the wholesale dismissal throughout the country of those who are truly fit to take the highest responsibility of police affairs in Metropolitan as well as in Prefectural Governments, is that of filling vacant positions. The coming purge will cripple the efficiency of Metropolitan as well as Prefectural police so much that it will become all but impossible to fill the vacancy with any competent personnel for some time. The result will be contrary to one that

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has been sought after, I fear. Repeated purges have already robbed us of those most competent and fitted for the highest positions. It is by no means desirable now to lost such expert officials as were nothing but puppets and figure-heads though nominally forming the highest staff of the "Butoku-kai" Associations. As a result of the coming purge there may well be found such extreme cases in the provinces as will mean a virtual stoppage of all police activities. Not only that, but there is a great danger of leaving a permanent source of evil preventing the reconstruction of Japan as a peaceful democracy in future.

As it is, my firm belief is that the purge will not bring with it any beneficial effect upon the successful carrying-out of the Allied occupation policies.

Of course, it is necessary to push on democratization in political as well as administrative circles for the future benefit of Japan no less than for the fulfillment of occupation policies, but such a formal democratization, as the coming purge of the "Butoku-kai" officials means, will, I have much fear, entail an effect quite contrary to that intended for, strengthening, rather than weakening, in general the totalitarian tendencies of society.

The democratization of police, above all, will be effectively carried out only when the whole system of police is so established as to enable it to perform its duties to perfection as an organ independent of politics and solely devoted to the support and vindication of fundamental human rights, and is given a proper supervision and guidance.

FOR REFERENCE:

1. When the "Butoku-kai" purge is compared with those of the Sangyo Kokoku-kai (Industrial Patriotic Association), the Rodo Hokoku-kai (Labor Patriotic Association), the Nogyo Hokoku-kai (Agricultural Patriotic Association), or the Genron Hokoku-kai (Patriotic Association of Journalists & Authors), one cannot but be struck with the extreme impartiality. While in the latter cases the purge did not extend beyond prefectural chiefs, who were governors, in the former even the chiefs of the smallest area-branches are to be purged.

2. The relation between the Japanese police and the Butokukai was of far older standing than the so-called Greater East War. Ken-jitsu (swordmanship) and Jujitsu (way of single combat without weapons) were necessary arts for policemen, and and so police chiefs were appointed nominal officials of the Martial Arts Association without any real functions but encouraging policemen to exercise their necessary arts and to keep themselves ever fit for the execution of their duties.

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There was no instance of their enforcing the general cultivation of martial arts or of their preaching an aggressive nationalism on a system of national authority and legal compulsion. Even after the reorganization by Tojo, the actual case remained the same, and it was by a special order of the Army that Juken Jitsu (art of thrusting with a bayonet) and gun-shooting were included among the so-called Martial Arts. Moreover, those new types of martial arts were chiefly practised and superintended by the members of the Zaigo Gunjin-kai (Veterans' Association).

Preceding to the Tojo reform, there were frequent instances of friction between the Butoku-kai and its antagonistic association called the Juken-do Shinko-kai (Association for Encouraging Bayonet-Thrusting) which was composed of the Vet Association members. By the Tojo reform it was intended that the source of this friction might be eradicated by including bayonet-thrusting and gun-shooting among martial arts.

But these new types of martial arts, the practice of which was necessitated by the war, were in no way imposed forcibly upon people by those staff officials under prefectural governors composed of directors of police departments and home administration departments.

In reality these new martial arts were popularized by the Vet Association members grouped under regimental district commanders.

There was not a single instance where a police chief, who was the chief of area-branch, took the initiative in the propagation of these new types of martial arts. Police chiefs did nothing but despatch their nominal functions as area-branch chief in supervising the practice of old swordmanship and Jujitsu (sometimes such quaint art of archery) as policemen's necessary arts and as means of keeping their mind and body ever fit for the proper performance of their duties.

Thus the purge of the Butoku-kai officials is a demand of sacrifice to be solely borne by those who did nothing in practice for the advancement of sheer militarism and jingoism. I cannot help expressing my deep regret when I see an extreme impartiality with which the Butoku-kai officials are treated in comparison with those connected with other organizations under purge-directives.

Let me add one more word in conclusion. It is often said that the Butoku-kai was a national organization dedicated to militarism and its proselytization, but the former area-chiefs and other officials have at present no memory whatever of what they did during their office-terms, and have been reduced to a nonplus by the recent purge directive.

We have done nothing that leaves a guilty conscience, nor anything in the way of enforcing the practice of martial arts compulsory with peaceful citizens in general. It is particularly worthy of notice that the majority of such nominal officials of the Butoku-kai as are going to be

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purged know nothing of what martial arts mean or do not know how to handle bamboo swords or how to throw a person according to the rules of Jujitsu.

In order to play an active role in the technical practice and positive encouragement of martial arts, some knowledge at least of these arts will be required. It is strange and quite incomprehensible that those who were mere nominal officials without any actual knowledge of the arts are to be purged as responsible persons who played active parts in the positive work of their advancement.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Intelligence Section, G-2
PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

APO 500
25 July 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Police Purge Dai Nihon Butoku Kai (Great Military Virtues Society)

1. Commanding General, 8th Army, is seriously concerned with respect to the far-reaching effect the Butoku Kai purge will have on the Japanese police. The force at present is dangerously low in experienced police officials of the higher grades and that further loss in this bracket would mean the difference between the preservation of law and order among the civilian population and the use of occupation troops to restore law and order.

2. The five million repatriated, demobilized ex-soldiers, disillusioned and jobless, are easy prey to subversive ideas and may well become a social problem. The occupation force, plus the semi-trained Japanese police of 93,935, represents the physical force for seventy-three million people. Further losses of capable and experienced police personnel serves only to aggravate the seriousness of this situation.

3. The Commanding General, 8th Army, is charged with operational control of Japanese police and for the preservation of law and order throughout Japan. He has repeatedly voiced concern over the inexperience and length of service of the higher police officials to cope with the growing lawlessness of gangster elements. He has consistently maintained that the police should be the stabilizing force for the civilian population and that further losses of experienced police by purge be reduced to a minimum.

4. The Commanding General, 8th Army, is opposed to any blanket action of purge affecting the Japanese police. Judicial use of individual case action should be the guiding principle.

5. The Commanding General, 8th Army, recommends:

That the Butoku Kai purge, directed by the Government

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disillusioned and jobless, are easy prey to subversive ideas and may well become a social problem. The occupation force, plus the semi-trained Japanese police of 93,935, represents the physical force for seventy-three million people. Further losses of capable and experienced police personnel serves only to aggravate the seriousness of this situation.

3. The Commanding General, 8th Army, is charged with operational control of Japanese police and for the preservation of law and order throughout Japan. He has repeatedly voiced concern over the inexperience and length of service of the higher police officials to cope with the growing lawlessness of gangster elements. He has consistently maintained that the police should be the stabilizing force for the civilian population and that further losses of experienced police by purge be reduced to a minimum.

4. The Commanding General, 8th Army, is opposed to any blanket action of purge affecting the Japanese police. Judicial use of individual case action should be the guiding principle.

5. The Commanding General, 8th Army, recommends:

a. That the Butoku Kai purge, directed by the Government Section, SCAP, be suspended from specific application of the Japanese police force.

b. That individual case action only be applied in aggravated instances.

H. E. PULLIAM
Colonel, (GSC)
Chief, Public Safety Division

TAB D

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RESTRICTED

JAPANESE CRIME STATISTICS

A. JAPANESE CRIME STATISTICS
OFFENSES AGAINST THE CRIMINAL CODE

1. 1924 — 1946



2. JANUARY 1945 — MAY 1947

B. JAPANESE CRIME RATE
(OFFENSES AGAINST THE CRIMINAL CODE)
BY PREFECTURE
MAY 1947



MAY NATIONAL RATE: 152



C. OFFENSES REPORTED
BY OFFENSE, BY MONTH
1947



NUMBER OF OFFENSES REPORTED DURING
MAY 1947
BY TYPE, BY PREFECTURE

Prefecture	Against Criminal Code: Person	Property	Others	Total	Other Than Criminal Code	Grand Total
Hokkaido	77	4,751	374	5,202	2,146	7,348
Aomori	35	831	80	919	400	1,319
Iwate	20	681	72	743	995	1,738
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1,330	1,277	2,607

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

C. OFFENSES REPORTED
BY OFFENSE, BY MONTH
1947





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Prefecture	Against Criminal Code: Person	Property	Others	Total	Other Than Criminal Code	Grand Total
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Aomori	35	531	53	619	400	1,019
Iwate	20	651	72	743	995	1,738
Miyagi	40	1,211	59	1,310	1,377	2,687
Akita	26	538	40	598	853	1,451
Yamagata	16	504	16	536	288	824
Fukushima	48	1,650	99	1,797	778	2,575
Ibaraki	74	1,087	243	1,404	484	1,888
Tochigi	31	1,036	100	1,167	495	1,662
Gunma	65	1,928	41	2,034	761	2,795
Saitama	86	3,156	70	3,292	634	3,926
Chiba	89	1,633	155	1,877	317	2,194
Tokyo	203	10,510	806	11,518	896	12,414
Kanagawa	62	2,900	102	3,064	842	3,906
Niigata	43	1,971	69	2,083	1,504	3,621
Toyama	16	563	26	607	1,682	2,289
Ishikawa	6	973	10	989	167	1,156
Fukui	16	680	15	711	190	901
Yamanashi	22	612	63	697	197	894
Nagano	39	1,566	102	1,707	721	2,428
Gifu	18	1,566	70	1,653	274	1,927
Shizuoka	25	2,474	106	2,606	663	3,269
Aichi	64	7,409	257	7,730	2,729	10,459
Mie	25	1,306	57	1,388	298	2,186
Shiga	3	486	100	589	285	874
Kyoto	73	4,980	75	5,098	993	6,091
Osaka	136	10,267	295	10,698	958	11,656
Hyogo	121	5,763	162	6,046	2,635	8,681
Nara	17	819	29	865	196	1,060
Wakayama	36	1,838	68	1,932	289	2,221
Tottori	18	581	19	584	334	918
Shimane	21	439	38	498	520	1,018
Okayama	73	2,724	102	2,899	979	3,878
Hiroshima	58	2,750	101	2,909	767	3,676
Yamaguchi	67	3,373	99	3,539	642	4,181
Tokushima	7	316	66	391	618	1,009
Kagawa	16	953	11	980	297	1,277
Ehime	40	1,908	40	1,988	481	1,908
Kochi	30	626	31	687	666	1,631
Fukuoka	108	6,893	127	6,928	1,745	8,007
Saga	22	706	45	823	460	1,283
Nagasaki	30	1,666	344	2,039	266	2,305
Kumamoto	69	2,222	67	2,388	690	3,268
Oita	37	1,306	59	1,402	421	1,870
Miyazaki	12	908	36	820	338	1,158
Kagoshima	40	1,807	88	1,935	378	2,613
TOTAL	2,145	104,089	4,734	110,969	30,087	146,048

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

GRAPH NO. 1

RESTRICTED

PREPARED BY: PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

TAB E

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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JAPANESE POLICE

PREFECTURE	POPULATION	NUMBER OF POLICEMEN	NUMBER PEOPLE TO ONE POLICEMAN
HOKKAIDO (1)	3,488,013	3,595	970
AOMORI	1,089,232	953	1,143
IWATE	1,217,070	890	1,367
MIYAGI	1,462,100	1,384	1,056
AKITA	1,195,813	869	1,392
YAMAGATA	1,294,934	1,141	1,135
FUKUSHIMA	1,918,746	1,260	1,523
IBARAKI	1,940,833	1,547	1,255
TOCHIGI	1,503,619	1,148	1,310
GUMMA	1,524,635	1,131	1,348
SAITAMA	2,028,553	1,357	1,495
CHIBA	2,008,114	1,686	1,191
TOKYO	4,183,072	18,315	228
KANAGAWA	2,019,943	3,668	551
NIIGATA	2,326,811	1,707	1,363
TOYAMA	932,669	880	1,060
ISHIKAWA	877,197	958	916
FUKUI	695,703	764	911
YAMANASHI	796,973	713	1,118
NAGANO	2,028,235	1,390	1,459
GIFU	1,444,000	946	1,526
SHIZUOKA	2,260,059	1,622	1,393
AICHI	2,919,085	4,329	674
MIE	1,371,858	1,135	1,209
SHIGA	831,306	706	1,177
KYOTO	1,621,998	2,489	652
OSAKA	2,976,140	6,814	437
HYOGO	2,826,192	4,330	653
NARA	744,381	700	1,063
WAKAYAMA	933,231	1,086	859
TOTTORI	557,429	579	963
SHIMANE	848,995	739	1,149
OKAYAMA	1,538,621	1,377	1,117
HIROSHIMA	1,901,430	1,841	1,033
YAMAGUCHI	1,375,472	1,839	748
TOKUSHIMA	828,784	756	1,096
KAGAWA	872,312	708	1,232
EHIME	1,380,700	1,100	1,255
KOCHI	797,876	812	983

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JAPANESE POLICE

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YAMAGATA	1,294,934	1,141	1,135
FUKUSHIMA	1,918,746	1,260	1,523
IBARAKI	1,940,833	1,547	1,255
TOCHIGI	1,503,619	1,148	1,310
GUMMA	1,524,635	1,131	1,348
SAITAMA	2,028,553	1,357	1,495
CHIBA	2,008,114	1,686	1,191
TOKYO	4,183,072	18,315	228
KANAGAWA	2,019,943	3,668	551
NIIGATA	2,326,811	1,707	1,363
TOYAMA	932,669	880	1,060
ISHIKAWA	877,197	958	916
FUKUI	695,703	764	911
YAMANASHI	796,973	713	1,118
NAGANO	2,028,235	1,390	1,459
GIFU	1,444,000	946	1,526
SHIZUOKA	2,260,059	1,622	1,393
AICHI	2,919,085	4,329	674
MIE	1,371,858	1,135	1,209
SHIGA	831,306	706	1,177
KYOTO	1,621,998	2,489	652
OSAKA	2,976,140	6,814	437
HYOGO	2,826,192	4,330	653
NARA	744,381	700	1,063
WAKAYAMA	933,231	1,086	859
TOTTORI	557,429	579	963
SHIMANE	848,995	739	1,149
OKAYAMA	1,538,621	1,377	1,117
HIROSHIMA	1,901,430	1,841	1,033
YAMAGUCHI	1,375,472	1,839	748
TOKUSHIMA	828,784	756	1,096
KAGAWA	872,312	708	1,232
EHIME	1,380,700	1,100	1,255
KOCHI	797,876	812	983

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

SECRET

MILITARY FORCE GROUND ARMS

ICE TO ONE AN	M.P.	CIC	MIL. GOVT.	GROUND ARM TROOPS (2)	TOTAL	NO. TO ARM
	86	56	69	4,784	4,995	
	—	9	39	2,482	2,530	
	—	10	33	76	119	1
	218	16	75	3,437	3,746	
	—	13	33	—	46	2
	—	10	39	2,174	2,223	
	—	11	33	—	44	4
	—	13	33	—	46	4
	—	12	33	—	45	3
	—	12	39	1,676	1,727	
	106	13	69	5,069	5,257	
	—	14	33	—	47	4
	923	97	76	3,587	4,683	
	1,060	48	94	6,591	7,793	
	—	14	33	—	47	4
	—	3	33	—	36	2
	—	13	33	—	46	1
	—	4	26	—	30	2
	—	10	33	—	43	1
	—	14	33	—	47	4
	—	3	33	3,475	3,511	
	—	12	33	—	45	5
	351	19	69	10	449	
	—	15	33	—	48	2
	—	4	26	2,350	2,380	
	65	23	80	860	1,028	
	106	24	44	5,094	5,268	
	471	21	39	524	1,055	
	—	5	26	1,676	1,707	
	—	4	26	—	30	3
	—	4	26	934	964	
	—	5	26	1,111	1,142	
	—	11	33	2,684	2,728	
	—	16	69	5,673	5,758	
	—	15	33	3,351	3,399	
	—	5	26	341	372	
	—	12	56	75	143	
	—	7	33	—	40	
	—	5	26	43	74	
	106	21	69	4,349	4,545	

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

MILITARY FORCES GROUND ARMS

T.	GROUND ARM TROOPS (2)	TOTAL	NO. PEOPLE TO ONE GRD, ARM SOLDIER	NO. PEOPLE TO ONE COMBINED GRD. ARM SOLDIER & POLICEMAN
	4,784	4,995	698	406
	2,482	2,530	430	313
	76	119	10,227	1,206
	3,437	3,746	390	285
	—	46	25,995	1,306
	2,174	2,223	583	385
	—	44	43,607	1,471
	—	46	42,192	1,218
	—	45	33,413	1,260
	1,676	1,727	882	533
	5,069	5,257	385	307
	—	47	42,725	1,159
	3,587	4,683	893	182
	6,591	7,793	259	176
	—	47	49,506	1,327
	—	36	25,907	1,018
	—	46	19,070	874
	—	30	23,190	876
	—	43	18,534	1,054
	—	47	43,153	1,411
	3,475	3,511	411	324
	—	45	50,224	1,356
	10	449	6,501	611
	—	48	28,580	1,160
	2,350	2,380	349	269
	860	1,028	1,578	461
	5,094	5,268	564	246
	524	1,055	2,678	525
	1,676	1,707	436	309
	—	30	31,108	836
	934	964	578	361
	1,111	1,142	743	451
	2,684	2,728	564	375
	5,673	5,758	330	250
	3,351	3,399	408	263
	341	372	2,226	735
	75	143	6,100	1,025
	—	40	34,517	1,211
	43	74	10,782	900
	4,349	4,545	639	341

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

ISHIKAWA	877,197	958	916
FUKUI	695,703	764	911
YAMANASHI	796,973	713	1,118
NAGANO	2,028,235	1,390	1,459
GIFU	1,444,000	946	1,526
SHIZUOKA	2,260,059	1,622	1,393
AICHI	2,919,085	4,329	674
MIE	1,371,858	1,135	1,209
SHIGA	831,306	706	1,177
KYOTO	1,621,998	2,489	652
OSAKA	2,976,140	6,814	437
HYOGO	2,826,192	4,330	653
NARA	744,381	700	1,063
WAKAYAMA	933,231	1,086	859
TOTTORI	557,429	579	963
SHIMANE	848,995	739	1,149
OKAYAMA	1,538,621	1,377	1,117
HIROSHIMA	1,901,430	1,841	1,033
YAMAGUCHI	1,375,472	1,839	748
TOKUSHIMA	828,784	756	1,096
KAGAWA	872,312	708	1,232
EHIME	1,380,700	1,100	1,255
KOCHI	797,876	812	983
FUKUOKA	2,906,644	3,969	732
SAGA	856,692	860	996
NAGASAKI	1,417,924	1,945	729
KUMAMOTO	1,631,976	1,403	1,163
OITA	1,148,009	1,007	1,140
MIYAZAKI	957,856	869	1,102
KAGOSHIMA	1,629,760	1,233	1,322
TOTAL	73,110,995	90,550	807

(1) ALL PREFECTURES IN HOKKAIDO CONSOLIDATED UNDER THIS ONE ENTRY.

(2) MILITARY STRENGTH FIGURES SECURED FROM G-2 SOURCE AND ARE T/O STRENGTHS OF VARIOUS UNITS CONSIDERED AVAILABLE FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS STUDY. THE FOLLOWING TYPE UNITS WERE CONSIDERED:

(A) ORGANIC DIVISIONAL TROOPS OF ALL BRANCHES
(B) MILITARY GOVERNMENT UNITS INCLUDING MILITARY PERSONNEL
(C) AAA, AGF CHEMICAL AND ARMORED
(D) CORPS M.P. PLATOONS
(E) NON-DIVISIONAL M.P. PERSONNEL
(F) BULK OVERHEAD M.P. PERSONNEL
(G) B.C.O.F. FIGHTING FORCES

TAB F

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

16	—	13	33	—	46
11	—	4	26	—	30
18	—	10	33	—	43
59	—	14	33	—	47
26	—	3	33	3,475	3,511
93	—	12	33	—	45
74	351	19	69	10	449
09	—	15	33	—	48
77	—	4	26	2,350	2,380
52	65	23	80	860	1,028
37	106	24	44	5,094	5,268
53	471	21	39	524	1,055
63	—	5	26	1,676	1,707
59	—	4	26	—	30
63	—	4	26	934	964
49	—	5	26	1,111	1,142
17	—	11	33	2,684	2,728
33	—	16	69	5,673	5,758
48	—	15	33	3,351	3,399
96	—	5	26	341	372
32	—	12	56	75	143
55	—	7	33	—	40
83	—	5	26	43	74
32	106	21	69	4,349	4,545
96	—	7	26	—	33
29	—	6	39	3,210	3,255
63	—	31	33	3,210	3,274
40	—	9	33	3,210	3,252
02	—	7	26	—	33
22	—	9	33	—	42
07	3,492	692	1,885	72,056	78,125

NE ENTRY.

ARE T/O
HE PURPOSES
RED:

S
TARY PERSONNEL ONLY

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

3	—	46	19,070	874
26	—	30	23,190	876
3	—	43	18,534	1,054
3	—	47	43,153	1,411
3	3,475	3,511	411	324
3	—	45	50,224	1,356
9	10	449	6,501	611
3	—	48	28,580	1,160
26	2,350	2,380	349	269
0	860	1,028	1,578	461
4	5,094	5,268	564	246
9	524	1,055	2,678	525
6	1,676	1,707	436	309
26	—	30	31,108	836
6	934	964	578	361
6	1,111	1,142	743	451
3	2,684	2,728	564	375
9	5,673	5,758	330	250
3	3,351	3,399	408	263
6	341	372	2,226	735
6	75	143	6,100	1,025
3	—	40	34,517	1,211
6	43	74	10,782	900
9	4,349	4,545	639	341
6	—	33	25,960	959
9	3,210	3,255	439	273
3	3,210	3,274	498	349
3	3,210	3,252	350	270
6	—	33	2,902	1,062
3	—	42	38,804	1,278
5	72,056	78,125	AVG. 936	AVG. 433

ANALYSIS OF POPULATION

MILITARY & POLICE

STRENGTH BY PREFECTURE

SECRET

DENSITY OF DEMOBILIZED
JAPANESE SOLDIERS
BY PREFECTURE

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG No. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

GHQ · SCAP NUMBER

TAB G

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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

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

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

JAPAN

HOKKAIDO

HONSHU

SHIKOKU

A 695,703 B 87,948	A 2,028,235 B 178,811	A 1,089,232 B 77,805
A 831,306 B 122,836	A 932,669 B 96,952	A 1,195,813 B 99,905
A 1,621,998 B 244,819	A 757,676 B 99,612	A 1,217,070 B 91,679
		A 2,326,811 B 181,439
		A 1,294,934 B 110,478
		A 1,462,100 B 121,282
		A 1,918,746 B 133,767
		A 1,503,619 B 105,470
		A 1,524,635 B 115,698
		A 1,940,833 B 129,723
		A 2,028,553 B 137,547
		A 2,008,114 B 153,177
		A 4,183,072 B 284,196
A 1,371,858 B 108,988	A 2,019,943 B 123,009	
A 744,381 B 95,026	A 796,973 B 70,609	
A 2,976,140 B 274,107	A 2,360,059 B 165,316	
A 933,231 B 112,106	A 1,444,000 B 180,650	
A 828,784 B 65,010	A 2,919,085 B 182,156	
A 872,312 B 80,177		
A 797,676 B 86,593		
A 1,380,700 B 115,860		

Military Intelligence Section
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

GEOGRAPHIC TABLE OF POPULATION AND DEMOBILIZED PERSONNEL BY PREFECTURE

0 40 80 100 MILES
SCALE

SECRET

REPRODUCED BY 2773RD ENGRS.

SECRET

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF KOREANS IN JAPAN BY PREFECTURE

FOREIGN NATIONALS IN JAPAN



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009



TAB I

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

SECRET

NUMBER OF JAPANESE TO ONE

JAPANESE POLICEMAN

BY PREFECTURE

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009



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NUMBER OF JAPANESE TO ONE
GROUND ARM SOLDIER
BY PREFECTURE

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009



GHQ · SCAP NUMBER

TAB K

SECRET

SECRET

NUMBER OF JAPANESE TO ONE GROUND ARM SOLDIER AND JAPANESE POLICEMAN COMBINED.

BY PREFECTURE

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 77509



GHQ · SCAP NUMBER

TAB L

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

3358

SECRET

CIS/PSD/HEP/nnb
27 Aug 47

Japanese Police Losses

CIS G-2 26-5915
Col. Pulliam

Draft of proposed check note (Incl 4) is submitted 9 in accordance with instruction of 23 August.

4 Incls.
1. Memo to ACofS G-2 with Tabs A and B
2. Proposed check sheet G-2 to GS
3. Proposed check sheet G-2 to GS
4. Proposed check sheet G-2 to GS

R.S.B.

CIS/PSD/HEP/nnb
PSD FILE HEP

SECRET

Security Room

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

SECRET

DRAFT

CHECK SHEET

Subject: Japanese Police Losses

Note. No.	From: G-2	To: Government Section	CIS/PSD/HEP/sm Date:

1 1. In the initial occupation period 1945-1946, 49,637 members of the Japanese police force, 53% of the authorized personnel, have been separated from the service by reason of purge, voluntary retirement, cause and death. This represents an increase of 232% over a normal five (5) year attrition average. To date, the force has lost 5,073 of its most capable and experienced officers by purge. 1,583 more of its most capable and experienced officers have been lost from other causes. There have been six (6) chiefs of the Metropolitan Police Bureau since August 1945. The present "Butoku Kai" purge, if carried into full effect, will remove approximately 904 additional police officers, all in the grade of inspector or higher. This purge will remove 9.65% of the remaining experienced administrators, resulting in a total loss of 24.16% of all top bracket police officers by purge. Altogether this means that 60% of the present police force are men with less than two (2) years experience.

2. In view of the above and of the controversial character of the "Butoku Kai", recommend that reconsideration be given the purge directive, insofar as it pertains to police, since most individuals held ex-officio membership therein only by virtue of their occupational position.

3. Your attention is invited to the continuous reduction in strength of the Occupation Forces, and the corresponding increase in security risks and maintenance of law and order, placing greater emphasis on the quality of the top police personnel. In this connection, see Civil Intelligence Summary, No. 19, August 15, 1947, Part IV, "Demobilized Japanese vs Occupation Security".

1 Incl
Brief of Butoku Kai

Info copy to:

C of S
D/C/S SCAP
D/C/S FEC

C.A.W.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

3744

COPY

COPY

19 December 1946
CIS/OD:TPF/cn

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION:

SUBJECT: DAI NIPPON BUTOKU KAI ("Great Japan Military Virtue Society")

1. The DAI NIPPON BUTOKU KAI was founded in 1895 at Kyoto as a ZAIDAN HOJIN (foundation) to sponsor wrestling (judo), fencing (kendo), and archery (kyudo). Because these forms of athletics had been traditional to the samurai, the society incorporated in its name the word "BUTOKU", which is a combination of the character "BU" of "BUSHI" (samurai) with the character "TOKU" (virtue or morality). Thus the connotation of the title is "Great Japan Samurai Morality Society" rather than the usual literal translation "Great Japan Military Virtue Society".

2. Over the years the society became nation-wide in scope, with 3,000,000 members in 1941 and with a federation of local branches in every prefecture. Because of its prestige the president was traditionally an Imperial prince and the chairman a retired field marshall or admiral.

3. For 46 years the society was privately financed. Accounts of the branches were maintained independent from the accounts of the head office.

4. In March, 1942--after the declaration of war,--the government took over the society as it did practically all other organizations of its kind. The premier became president, and the ministers of Welfare, Education, Home Affairs, Army and Navy became its vice-chiefs. This organization continued after the end of the war with the result that SCAP-sponsored Premier Shidehara and his Cabinet Ministers became by virtue of their positions honorary heads of the society.

5. In the post-surrender confusion the society lay dormant for several months. Then several attempts were made to revive it on the pre-1942 basis. This brought the matter to the attention of CIS through CIC. As a result, it was temporarily decided to ban the society under SCAPIN 548. After consultation with CI & E, however, this decision was reversed, because the society decided to dissolve.

6. When Government Section and CPC proposed a post-mortem wholesale proscription of the society in November, CIS advised moderation and pointed out the dangers of too drastic action by check sheet dated 15 November 1946 (TAB I)

T.P.D.

COPY

Encl: Tab B

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

26 Aug 47

fcl
ED

This suggestion of the two reforms of system only suggests general principles and policy of the reform of system. If the general principles are approved fortunately, a detailed and concrete plan will be made along this line and presented anew.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Draft for the Reorganization of the Justice Ministry and the Revision of Judicial Procedure.

Committee of Reformation (26 August 47)

(1) Organization of Justice Ministry Pursuant to the

Pursuant to the independence of courts and their separation from the Ministry, some of the business heretofore handled by the Ministry are to be transferred to the Supreme Court, but the power of judicial administration should still rest in the Ministry. Although I am not explaining the details here, the Ministry should be reorganized generally as follows:

(1) Minister's Secretariat.

Secretariat Section, Personnel Section, Accounting Section, etc.

(2) Research Bureau

(3) Civil Affairs Bureau

(4) Criminal Affairs Bureau

(5) Prison Affairs Bureau

(6) Rehabilitation Bureau

Outside offices. Public Procurator's Offices.

Note: - It is open to question whether the duties concerning juvenile trials should be handled by Rehabilitation Bureau of the Ministry or by the courts. However, it is only in the worst Possible cases that juveniles might be subject to judici disposition. Administrative action is more advisable for ther if possible, to prevent further delinquencies and correct thei errors. Accordingly, I am of opinion that the most part of the duties should be controlled by the Ministry along with the super vision over the facilities of rehabilitation and protective associations. As a matter of course, this must be done in close connection with the Children's Welfare Section, Ministry of Welfare.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Another question may arise as to which of the two branches, judicial or executive, should take charge of the duties concerning family registration and other registrations because these duties are of both judicial and executive nature. We are expecting to settle this question properly in the conférences with the Supreme Court. (The opinion in favour of the Ministry's control is held by the majority and accordingly influential).

(2) Connection of Justice Ministry with other Ministries and also with various agencies of the Cabinet.

Speaking of the connection of the Justice Ministry with other Ministries, there is no special revision made except that the power of prosecution is retained by public procurators with some judicial police power necessary for the administration peculiar to other Ministries leaving to respective Ministry.

Now, the problem is where we should ascribe the duties of the Legal Bureau, among those of other agencies of the Cabinet. Since the Legal Bureau is an agency to study the drafting and correction of all the bills, drafts of Cabinet orders, etc. from all the Ministries in general, I think it proper to attach it to the Cabinet under the circumstances. In future, when the dignity of the National Diet will have been established and the major part of legislature committed to its hands, the diminution of the scale of Legal Bureau or its annexatic to Research Bureau of the Ministry will come to consideration. There is, however, no room for consideration for the moment.

Although some are arguing, as to the drafting or revision of the Civil, Criminal Code and other hundrads of judicial statutes, that such preparatory or research duties should belong to the Supreme Court, in my opinion, they are, after all, the duties of the Diet through the Justice Ministry and the Cabinet because the courts are agencies to apply the laws and accordingly it is undesirable for the

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

courts to confound two extremities. It is needless to say, however, that the rule-making duties of various procedure needed for the holding of trials are entrusted to the courts.

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3. The relation between executive organs under the Justice Ministry and other executive organs.

First, there is the question of relation between the Justice Minister and the Procurator General. There is the opinion that the Offices of the Public Procurator should be independent of the Ministry of Justice. There is, also, the opinion that though the Offices of the Public Procurator should belong to the Ministry of Justice, the Procurator General should be the highest officer as to prosecution and should not come under the direction of the Justice Minister. Those are opinions whose purpose exists in cutting off the influence of party politics from the prosecution. But in view of experience in the past, it is dangerous to make officials who have no direct liability to the Diet, exercise the power of prosecution independently, because, if that so, a few member of Public Procurators may, in combination, arrest two or three cabinet ministers under fragile suspects of offences, giving serious blow to the Cabinet and bringing a political change. In consideration of the principles of democracy, as it is thought that the administration should be under a chief personnel of

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who owes, always, direct liability to the Diet, so we consider that the public procurators should be under the direction of the Justice Minister.

Next, other executive organs of the most importance are procurators and police officers. The two organs should stand on the relation of very close cooperation, following the principle of separation of powers. Considering the fact that there has been criticism that the police has not been fully co-operative concerning the arrest of certain crimes, as police has been under the jurisdiction of the Home Minister and Procurator, under the jurisdiction of the Justice Minister, in future the above-mentioned point should be provided in law (it should be provided in the Code of the Criminal Procedure that Procurator can direct and order police officer), as well as police officers should be made sworn when they are employed, and disciplinary punishment or dismissal should be requested for those who violate the liability of co-operation, with the Justice Minister requesting the Prime Minister (who is the Governor of the Public Safety Board (Kōan ~~Kyoku~~ Chō)) of it. The Governor of the Public Safety Board should decide it by referring it to the deliberation of a speci-

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There are various reasons for that policies which have been decided by the national diet and should be enforced strictly by the government cannot produce sufficient effect, and that violators fof law are being looked over is also an important reason and the rise of the curve of the criminal statistice is remarkable lately. Although petty offences are included, a procurator is at present in charge of 200 cases to 300 cases on the average and the number of those who are looked over is high to some extent. This is over the limit of capacity. It is urgent need of the present times that the members should at least be increased by two times or more, and those of the Assistant procurator or of assistant officer of prosecution by three times or more. There is no question that although the code of Criminal Procedure should be amended under careful consideration in order to shorten the term of imprisonment before sentence and to get rid of the evils of outraging human rights in the course of investigation of offence, but it is also thought recessary to give the power of arrest to the Assistant Officers of procuration. (at least and especiably, bribery,

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violation of the election laws, violation of economic control, etc.)

It is natural that police power is vested also in the officials of each depertment of the Government accompanied with the administration of each department as provided by laws. For instance, taxation business, customs, inspection by the Economic Stabilization Board, Board, mining, forestry, labor, control of narcotics, etc. But it must be stipulated that a Procurator may direct and order the officials of each department and especially that the right to prosecute is the sole power of a Procurator.

Although it seemed to suit the convenience in practice that the execution of the decision in criminal affairs is entrusted to the Court, a Procurator and a Prison Officer may be entrusted to executed as in the existing system, because execution is an administration. But it must be designed especially to promote closer co-operation among a Procurator, a Prison Officer, and a Rehabilitation Official in the future system, because the execution of a wsentence, liberation and protection after liberation ought to be inseparably united as an organ. For instance, to nomi-

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nate the officials jointly in charge of an offender among a Procurator, a Prison Officer and a Rehabilitation Official, etc.

It goes without saying that in order to perform the duty of ex-prisoners' protection, there must be established a choser co-opefative set-up with the officials of the Ministry of Welfare.

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(4) The relation the people will have to the enforcement of administration of justice procedures of the organs mentioned above. Needless to say we must do away as much as possible with holding of trials by police or procurators or having summary trials without having the form of public trials in conformity with the spirit of the New Constitution. If necessary, we must increase our staff so that we can make the procedure of the procurator bringing cases to public trials and the judges trying the cases, and this must be realized no matter how summarily such cases are tried.

(the judges must try cases in courts.)

In order to meet the situation, we must, besides increasing the number of summary courts, have the assize courts. Some criticize as not being fully democratic to leave in all cases the matter of whethen to put the cases on trial or not solely in the hands of procurators. Some think that it is too early yet for our country to have grand juries, so we should have at each city, town or village procurator committees whose members are to be chosen by vote by the people of the above mentioned city, town or village. Such committees will they say take up for consideration cases which, it is thought, was not brought for trial but which should have been brought to trial. If the committee consider that the cases should be brought to trial, the committee will bring the action on behalf of the procurator and ask the court to deliberate on the case. We think however, that at the present stage of our people's cognition of the matter, there will be abuses of the system. Therefore our wish is, in case the procurator made the case non-indictment case, the prosecutor can ask the court to prosecute and thus the court will discharge the duties of holding trials.

Again, in order that the above mentioned various organs may bear the active criticism of the people, we must meet the criticism by the Diet, especially criticism by the standing committees of ad-

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ministration of justice self-government corporations and of the peace preservation. It is just and proper that the national and prefectural police and the Metropolitan police should be under the review of the local assemblies, provided election by public votes of the chief of the police at the prefectural offices and the police station heads will be too early.

There are, some additional revisions that are necessary to be made in the Law of Criminal Procedure (which are already completed) in order to secure the liberty and rights of the people in the search for crime, maintenance of public peace, prosecution and trial to be done with these organs, as means, but these will be considered at some other time.

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26 Aug 47 file
HED

Plan for the Reform of Police in Japan.

August 26, 1947, Committee of Reformation

The Japanese Government, with the enforcement of the New Constitution, has considered the reform of police system which is adapted to this, and, refering to the report of the Deliberative Committee of Police System of December, 1946, the decision of the Cabinet meeting of Yoshida Cabinet of February 28, 1947 and the suggestion from the Public Safety Branch, CIS, GHQ, etc., and establishing especially a commission inside the Cabinet, has decided as follows after careful deliberation and hereby suggested them.

With the democratization of all system, the method of execution of police power should be democratized and with the establishment of self-government system, police power should be decentralized as soon as possible, but if the fact that our country is now in the great transitional period, the administration of self-government system is still in the state of early stage, our country without army solely depends upon police force for the preservation of peace, and the local finance is poor is considered, we think that it is not proper for the safety of our country to decentralize police suddenly and wholesale. And if

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the fact that we have not army and the curve of the criminal statistics shows the trend of rise lately is considered, we beleive it necessary to increase police force for the whole of the country to some extent and we calculate its total number as 125,000. ~~at the minimum.~~

We beleive that the abuse that police power of the past has invaded and oppressed the right, thought, freedom, etc. of the nation can be eliminated by the establishment of democratic government, the diffusion of thought of human right, the strengthening of direction and supervision of the national assembly, the improvement of the criminal procedure and laws and regulations for police, the improvement and elevation of the quality of police officers ,etc.

Accordingly, in the present suggestion, police is composed of national police and local police (city police - police which is independent of the nation is established in cities of the population of more than 200,000 for the time being) and national police is divided into head office (including the Metropolitan Police Board) and local offices.

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Plan for Re-organization of Police

(I) There shall be established an independent city police in a city of the population of above 200,000.

A city police shall perform the police business (including so-called judicial police) within the jurisdiction of the city.

(II) The district outside the jurisdiction of a city police shall come under the jurisdiction of the national police.

As for the national police, the whole country shall be divided into nine districts (Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Hokuriku, Chubu, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku, Kyushu) under the head office, and a local office shall be established in each district and shall exercise jurisdiction over the said district.

(III) Considering the speciality of the capital of the country, there shall be established the Metropolitan Police Board which is organ of national police in Tokyo Metropolis notwithstanding (1).

(IV) City police and national police shall be in the relation of mutual help. But concerning the following business, national police itself may also perform it even in the jurisdiction of city police and direct the latter, if necessary.

(1) Guard and defence of object which is important nationally, such as the Imperial Family, high ranking officials of the central government, foreign envoys, national assembly, central government offices, foreign diplomatic establishments, etc.

(2) Business which needs action which covers wide area going over the area of urban prefectures (fu), prefectures (ken) or cities, such as moving patrol by railway, control on waters, etc.

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(3) Prevention and arrest concerning those to be prescribed respectively by laws, out of the offences against the state and foreign countries (those against the internal safety, the external safety and national intercourse, unlawful assembly, etc.), the cases on which our country is under obligation to foreign countries (those concerning war criminals, control of narcotics, political offenders who have fled, etc.) and those offences which especially require the strictness and unification in the execution of police for carrying out of national policy (for instance, election, control of economic offence, etc.)

(Note)

Local offices of national police or their branches shall respectively be established in suitable cities all over the country and make co-operations, assistances and connections among the city polices in the district concerned and between city police and national police; at the same time, they shall maintain and manage the facilities for police communications, criminal indentification, culture of the officials, etc. for the convenience of the police in that district.

(V) In case of natural disaster or other emergencies and if it is needed especially, the mayor of a city where city police is established, may request the national police for its moving for assistance.

(VI) In case of emergency, according to the declaration of the state of emergency by the Cabinet, national police shall have also the charge of the preservation of peace in the jurisdiction of city police. In this case, city police shall come under the