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THESIS

**THE SECURITY DILEMMA
IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
REGIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION**

by

Holger Mölder

December 1998

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**THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION AND ITS IMPACT
ON THE REGIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION**

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The Republic of Estonia
B.A., Estonian Institute of Humanities, Tallinn, Estonia, 1994

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that the Baltic Sea region still faces significant security challenges in the post-Cold War era. In particular, nations in the region confront a "cooperative security dilemma." Baltic Sea countries are adopting a range of cooperative agreements to strengthen their security. By doing so, however, they may risk alienating other nations that are left out of those agreements, and thereby create an unstable security environment. This thesis examines the nature of the cooperative security dilemma in the Baltic Sea region, and analyzes how Baltic Sea nations can cooperate in the future without posing a threat to other nations, including Russia. This thesis argues that the Baltic Security Assistance (BALTSEA) program offers a model of future security arrangements could avoid the problems of the security dilemma.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BA/BC	Baltic Assembly/Baltic Council
BALNET	Baltic Air-surveillance Network
BALTBAT	Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion
BALTDEFCOL	Baltic Defense College
BALTRON	Baltic Naval Squadron
BALTSEA	Baltic Security Assistance
BEL	Belarus, Belorussians
CBSS	Council of Baltic Sea States
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DAN	Denmark, Danish
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	Council of Europe
EEA	European Economic Area
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
EST	Estonia, Estonians
EU	European Union
FIN	Finland, Finnish
FRA	France
GER	Germany, Germans
ICE	Iceland, Icelanders
ID	Intensified Dialogue
ITA	Italy
LAT	Latvia, Latvians
LIT	Lithuania, Lithuanians
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NC	Nordic Council
NED	Netherlands
NOR	Norway, Norwegians
NRJPC	NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PIP	Partnership for Peace
POL	Poland, Polish
RUS	Russia, Russians
START II	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II
SWE	Sweden, Swedish
TUR	Turkey, Turkish
UK	United Kingdom
UKR	Ukraine
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
WEU	Western European Union
WPO	Warsaw Pact Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The need for the current thesis stems from the new security environment which emerged in Europe in the early 1990s. The northern part of Europe, and particularly the Baltic Sea region, need new guarantees for a stable security environment, and it would be desirable if these new guarantees could be based on cooperation rather than conflict as in the past. At the same time, several threats to security exist as continuing challenges from historical periods or as new potential threats. This thesis examines new mechanisms of cooperation in the region. At present conflicts are latent and not manifested in any combat in the region. Even very peaceful regions may face considerable threats, however, and they sometimes expand into serious conflicts.

Robert Jervis, describing the phenomenon of the "security dilemma," warns that an increase in one state's security can decrease the security of others (Jervis, 1978, 169). Referring to the post-Cold War security environment, it is appropriate to modernize Jervis's definition and to develop new concepts. We are facing a post-Cold War cooperative security dilemma. In this situation, when states cooperate to decrease their security fears, they may risk alienating nations that remain outside of those cooperative security arrangements, and thereby create an unstable security environment. This thesis examines how this argument applies to the security environment in the Baltic Sea region, and analyzes measures to resolve the security dilemma. In particular, this thesis argues that there are still considerable security dilemmas in the Baltic Sea region. The security interests of the majority of the Baltic Sea countries differ from the interests of Russia,

which is the strongest regional military power. Solutions for the Baltic security dilemma may be found through the elaboration of cooperative security arrangements in the region. In particular, the thesis tries to identify how to solve the security dilemma, and promote security and defense cooperation in the Baltic Sea region in the near future, considering political and military preferences and prospects of the Baltic Sea countries.

The 1990s have offered to European countries a range of new cooperative security options. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program allowed the inclusion of non-members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into NATO's security cooperation. Several initiatives to strengthen Europeanization in the region by the European Union (EU) or Western European Union made cooperation more flexible in the framework of these organizations. The case study of the BALTSEA program points out one additional way to establish an appropriate cooperative security arrangement to escape from the security dilemma. New dimensions of the Council of the Baltic Sea States have contributed to the development of regional security and defense cooperation. There is no need to establish new regional security organizations in the Baltic Sea region; the process of regionalization can be developed within the framework of existing organizations with more success.

The post-Cold war security challenges on the Baltic Sea are based to a great extent on the security environment shaped in the period of Cold War. There are basically four security issues in the Baltic Sea region:

- The Baltic question. The Baltic states have often remained in sphere of influence of their stronger neighbors. However, the decrease of conflictual basis in international

relations and a general orientation toward cooperation reduces the need to establish “buffer-zones.”

- Instability of Russia. Russian instability is probably the main security concern in the region. If democracy ultimately wins in Russia, and Russia becomes stable, its efforts to create a “zone of peace” in the Baltic Sea region will become a reality. If Russian democracy collapses, the security environment could become very tense.
- Arms control issues. Russia has demanded reservations concerning the CFE treaty which could increase Russia’s military presence and capability in the region.
- Kaliningrad (Königsberg) area. This is Russia's highly militarized enclave in the Baltic Sea region. It raises security concerns not only in neighboring Poland and Lithuania, but in all countries of the region. There is no practical need to preserve Russia’s military outpost outside her main territory in the era of cooperation and mutual interdependence.

In theory, cooperative security arrangements can help deal with these security issues by giving Baltic Sea countries an additional source of security. In practice, however, Russian reactions to enhancement of these security arrangements - especially NATO enlargement - are a potential source of concern. The enlargement of cooperative security arrangements cannot be stopped in the Baltic countries without harming regional security. As the BALTSEA program suggests, however, it should be possible to pursue these arrangements without creating a severe regional security dilemma involving Russia.

The effectiveness of cooperative security arrangements depends on involvement of all interested actors in regional peace. The Baltic Sea region is a security complex where the security of individual countries depends on the security of other countries belonging to this complex. This is one reason why all the countries in the region must cooperate with each other in minimizing threats to the regional peace. The involvement of Transatlantic and European security arrangements on the Baltic Sea may produce a positive outcome, balancing the power of individual actors such as Russia that might destabilize the security environment. At the same time, the enlargement of these security arrangements to Russia, as much as possible, makes Russia also responsible for stability and peace in the region.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THESIS

Robert Jervis defines a security dilemma as a situation in which “an increase in one state’s security decreases the security of others.” (Jervis, 1978, p. 169). How does this argument apply to the Baltic security environment in the post-Cold War era? Which measures could be necessary to resolve the situation of the security dilemma described by Jervis? These are the main questions that will be examined in this work. Today, we are facing the post-Cold War’s cooperative security dilemma, which differs in some ways from the meaning given by Jervis. According to the cooperative security dilemma, as some states tend to cooperate in decreasing their security fears, it could decrease the security of these states and others if any country remained outside of the cooperative security arrangements.

This thesis argues that there are still considerable security dilemmas in the Baltic Sea region. The security interests of the majority of the Baltic Sea countries differ to some extent from the interests of the strongest regional military power, Russia. Solutions for the Baltic security dilemmas may be found through the elaboration of cooperative security elements in the region. Security and defense institutions such as NATO and WEU offer many opportunities for promoting peace and stability in the Baltic Sea region. The BALTSEA program points out one additional way to establish an appropriate cooperative security arrangement to escape from the security dilemma.

The need for the current work stems from the new security environment that emerged in Europe in the early 1990s. The northern part of Europe, and particularly the Baltic Sea region, need new guarantees for a stable security environment. It would be desirable if these new guarantees could be based on cooperation rather than conflict as in the past. At the same time, several latent threats to security exist as continuing challenges from historical periods or as new potential threats.

The regional peace in the Baltic Sea region is influenced by a cooperative security dilemma. It is obvious that the elements of this security dilemma tend to be related to Russia, which is the only unstable democracy in the region today. Additionally, Russia is not involved in the majority of cooperative security arrangements and neither is it an active participant in regional PfP cooperation. The Russian security threat from Russia is also emphasized by cultural differences between Russia and other Baltic Sea nations.

The dependent variable of this thesis is the effectiveness of regional security cooperation in contributing to a stable security environment on the Baltic Sea. My two independent variables are the security environment in the Baltic Sea region, and the different kinds of cooperative and collective security arrangements as presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Independent Variables

Security environment on the Baltic Sea.	Nordic countries; Baltic countries; Germany, Russia, Poland.
Cooperative and collective security arrangements in the Baltic Sea region.	NATO/PfP, EU/WEU, neutrality and non-alignment, regional security options (including bilateral cooperation, regional projects like BALTSEA, and so forth).

The effectiveness of cooperative security arrangements depends on involvement of all interested actors in the regional peace. The Baltic Sea region is a security complex where the security of individual countries depends on the security of other countries belonging to this complex. This is one reason why all the countries in the region must cooperate with each other in minimizing threats to the regional peace. The involvement of Transatlantic and European security arrangements on the Baltic Sea may produce a positive outcome, balancing the power of individual actors such as Russia that might destabilize the security environment. At the same time, the enlargement of these security arrangements to Russia, as much as possible, makes Russia also responsible for stability and peace in the region.

B. BACKGROUND

The current European security dilemma includes two aspects. First, Europe is not ready to give up U.S. participation in European security architecture. Second, there is an obvious need to strengthen the European role in its own defense. There are parallel trends under way in the European political landscape: Europeanization and regionalization.

Nordic political scientists Pertti Joenniemi and Ole Waever stress that Europeanization takes three forms:

- Classical interstate cooperation especially in the field of security, and in relation to the two semi-European states, USA and Russia/Soviet Union, in NATO and especially in the [OSCE].
- Creation of a superstate, the [EU] which takes on a number of state-like traits without ever becoming a nation-state or just a normal sovereign state.

- The emergence of substate and around-state structures, especially with German *Länder* and other regions, with business and all kinds of networks. (Joenniemi and Waever in Wellmann, 1992, p. 28)

The second tendency influencing present-day Europe is a process of regionalization. The importance of regional cooperation and regional security has grown rapidly. The overall tendency in the contemporary European politics is cooperation-oriented, and terms like conflict prevention, crisis management or peace operations are new in modern security issues. Regionalization could be seen as a parallel process to Europeanization, developed within the framework of a larger unification, not as an alternative or opposite movement to it.

The Baltic Sea region can be defined on two dimensions. The geographical dimension includes Germany (regionally Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Hamburg, Bremen), Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia (regionally St.Petersburg, Kaliningrad, Karelia), and Poland (regionally Northern Poland including Gdansk and Szczecin). The political dimension includes all the members of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS).

The Council of the Baltic Sea States was founded in 1992 by Danish-German initiative, and its members belong to at least five, sometimes overlapping, geopolitical areas – Nordic countries (Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland); Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania); Western-European countries (Germany); Central-European countries (Poland); and the CIS members (Russia). Of course, the Nordic countries could be at the same time referred to as the Western-European countries, and the Baltic countries as the Central-European countries. Table 2 below gives a general overview of the Baltic Sea States.

Table 2. Basic Facts of the Baltic Sea States¹

	Denmark	Estonia	Finland	Germany	Iceland	Latvia	Lithuania	Norway	Poland	Russia	Sweden
Area (km²)	43094	45226	337030	356910	103000	64100	655200	324220	312683	17075200	449964
Population (in thousands, 1997)	5305	1437	5137	82071	270	2421	3617	4400	38615	147306	8865
GDP per capita (US\$, 1996)	22700	5560	19000	20400 West 23100 East 9000	19800	3800	3870	26200	6400	5200	20800
Military active duty personnel 1997	32900	3510	32500	347100	2200 (U.S.) 120 (Coast Guard)	8100	5100	29000	241750	1,240000	62600
Military expenditure (GNP%) 1994/95	1,9%	1,1%	2,1%	1,9%	0%	0,9%	0,5%	2,7%	2,3%	11,4%	2,8%
Main trade partners 1996	GER SWE UK	FIN RUS SWE	GER SWE UK	FRA NED ITA	UK GER USA	RUS GER SWE	RUS GER UKR	UK GER SWE	GER ITA RUS	GER USA ITA	GER UK USA
Ethnic composition 1994-1996	DAN 95,8%	EST 63,9% RUS 29,0%	FIN 92,9% SWE 5,7%	GER 91,2% TUR 2,5%	ICE 95,9%	LAT 55,1% RUS 32,6% BEL 4,0%	LIT 81,4% RUS 8,2 % POL 7,0%	NOR 96,3%	POL 98,7%	RUS 81,5%	SWE 89,3% FIN 2,3%
Major religion	Lutheran	Lutheran	Lutheran	Lutheran	Lutheran	Lutheran	Roman Catholic	Lutheran	Roman Catholic	Russian Orthodox	Lutheran

¹ Data of the table comes from *CIA Factbook 1997*; available <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook>, Internet and *Encyclopedica Britannica: Nations of the World*; available: <http://www.eb.com:180/wld>, Internet.

Although Norway and Iceland do not belong geographically to the region, their security interests are strongly connected with it. Also the Danish territories, the Faroe Islands and Greenland, and Åland Islands belonging to Finland should be considered as parts of the extended region. Referring to the Baltic Sea Region, it is necessary to determine its meaning in respect to other geopolitical terms, often used in the same context. Northern Europe includes the Baltic Sea region but also the European part of the Arctic. Scandinavia or Baltics are actually subregions of the Baltic Sea region. Therefore we can distinguish three levels of geopolitical regions (as it is described in Table 3).

Table 3. Northern Europe

<i>Level</i>	<i>Geopolitical region</i>	<i>Countries</i>
First level	Northern Europe	
Second level	Arctic region	Norway (+Svalbard), Sweden, Finland, Russia
	Baltic Sea region	Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, Denmark
Third level	Nordic (Scandinavian) countries	Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Finland, Denmark
	Baltic countries	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania

Germany, Poland, and Lithuania also belong to the Central-European geopolitical region, and simultaneously form the Central-European part of the Baltic Sea region.

C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS

Chapter II deals with the questions connected to international relations theory and creates the theoretical background of the thesis. This chapter examines changes which influenced the world development after the end of the Cold War. It also analyzes the concepts central to the thesis: the security dilemma, regionalization, and cooperation. Chapters III and IV give a general political, cultural, and historical overview of the region, and focus on several issues connected with conflict and cooperation around the Baltic Sea. These issues involve Nordic cooperation, Baltic cooperation, and the Lithuanian-Polish relationship. These chapters examine two great powers in the region – Germany and Russia. The Baltic dilemma, which caused many conflicts in the past, is examined in Chapter IV. Two other issues, which emerged during recent years, are the destiny of arms control agreements in the context of the region, and specific problems connected with the Kaliningrad (Königsberg) area. Chapter V examines a case study concerning the prospects for regional cooperation and international defense assistance to the Baltic states, particularly the Baltic Security Assistance (BALTSEA) program. The last chapter examines the role of different institutions in accordance with future security options for the region.

II. COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN THE MODERN ERA

A. SECURITY DILEMMA

According to a well-known definition of the security dilemma, given by Robert Jervis,² a security dilemma is present in a situation where “an increase in one state’s security decreases the security of others.” (Jervis in Williams et al., 1994, p. 197). The anarchy in international politics causes the fear that competing powers can threaten a state’s sovereignty and creates the basis for the emergence of a security dilemma. Features characterizing Jervis’s security dilemma include self-help and an anarchic international system.

The causes of war are closely connected with the security dilemma. Actually, the security dilemma represents a modern variant to Thucydides’ classical definition of the causes of war: “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta.” (Thucydides in Williams et al., 1994, p. 184). This indicates that the security dilemma already existed in Ancient Greece. Michael Howard has offered the same judgement in his essay “The Causes of War.” “The causes of war remain rooted, as much as they were in the pre-industrial age, in perceptions by statesmen of the growth of hostile power and the fears of restriction, if not the extinction, of their own.” (Howard,

² The basic concept of the security dilemma was initially discussed by John H. Hertz in his “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 2 (January 1950). Jervis’s definition is, however, the most widely used.

1984, p. 18). The similarity of definitions suggests that the security dilemma has remained the main reason for the emergence of wars.

In the past, the Warsaw Pact organization dominated the Baltic Sea, including the former Soviet Union, Poland, and East-Germany. NATO countries (Denmark and West-Germany) had limited access to the Baltic Sea, and neutral Sweden and Finland were as buffer-zones between two military blocs. We have to face now a totally changed security environment now, which has created new chances to aspire to a more stable political climate. Under the present-day security conditions, it is mistaken and possibly dangerous to create an artificial bipolar situations again. It will be more useful to seek large security arrangements in the multipolar world, which promote cooperation between democratized countries rather than stress a possible conflict as in the past when great powers tried to achieve balance of power between themselves. Differently from the past, the new security environment deals with threats, not with enemies.

As a point of departure, this paper will consider the model of the security dilemma as constructed by Jervis. This model was relevant for a long time to the Northern European security environment. Referring to the post-Cold War security environment, it is appropriate to modernize Jervis's definition and to develop the concept of a cooperative security dilemma. It is obvious that the security dilemma described by Jervis did not disappear with the Cold War but now has new dimensions. "The security dilemma identified by Jervis has become inverted with the end of the Cold War." (Sperling and Kirchner, 1997, p. 8). The cooperative security dilemma is in accordance with the modern trend of institutionalization that is as some states cooperate in decreasing their security fears, it could decrease the security of these states and others if any country remained

outside of the cooperative security arrangements. At least in some circumstances, isolationism in the modern era creates offensive security options, while cooperation is mainly defense-oriented. NATO enlargement is related to the cooperative security dilemma. Countries try to avoid being left in a “gray zone” between potential adversaries, and make attempts to protect their security interests in the framework of collective security and defense institutions.

However, cooperation itself can reduce the security dilemma, and the shared threat stimulates cooperation between countries. According to Jervis, “There is rough proportionality between the magnitude of the conflict with the enemy and the strength of the unifying force generated. Relatedly, the more deeply two countries are divided from each other, the greater external threat that will be required to bring them together.” (Jervis, 1997, pp. 222-223).

Different interests stress competition in any security complex. Any competition may be able to promote a serious interstate conflict that makes the entire region unstable. The Baltic Sea region, which was a typical example of bipolar competitiveness in the past, has recently turned into a cooperation-oriented low conflict area. Security and defense cooperation and collective security are effective tools to avoid the emergence of the security dilemma. Both of the processes, characterizing the political tendencies in Europe today, Europeanization and regionalization, are helpful to avoid the negative consequences of the security dilemma. Europeanization creates a space for a joint security environment, which is protected by collective defense organizations such as NATO and the WEU, which may be used as instruments of collective security.

The NATO enlargement is a typical example of cooperative security dilemma. It seems that the main obstacle to this process are misperceptions concerning Russia. The involvement of Russia with appropriate cooperative security arrangements offers a solution for resolving the security dilemma. At the same time, NATO-Russia partnership should not decrease the security of other countries in the region. Therefore, we have to avoid the offering of special status for Russia, and try to establish such arrangements which treat Russia as equal partner in the particular security complex.

B. COOPERATION AND SECURITY

Security does not solely depend on the will and actions of individual actors. This circumstance makes finding solutions for security dilemmas extremely complicated. "As Martin Wight pointed out, security – in contrast with power – need not be a 'relational concept,' whereby 'the security of one power is in inverse ratio to that of others... Security consists in other factors besides national power: the strength and reliability of allies, and the absence of conflicting interests, for example... Security, like prosperity, is an objective towards which all powers can, conceivably, move simultaneously'." (Wight in Yost, 1998, p. 292).

The world before the 1990s regarded conflict between different national interests as an unavoidable aspect of interstate relations. The security environment forced states to find allies and create alliances as the only way to succeed in the interstate competition.

An alliance is not a collective security agreement. A collective security arrangement is an inclusive institution: it commits the members to oppose any act of aggression, even one committed by one of its members. By

contrast, alliances are exclusive institutions: they entail a commitment to support the other members against states outside the community. Although members of an alliance may also be part of a collective security organization and may engage in other forms of security cooperation, failure to keep these concepts distinct can lead to misleading analyses and muddy policy-making. (Walt, 1997, p. 158)

The modern era has introduced terms like *cooperative security* and *collective security*, which co-exist with a traditional security cooperation model, an alliance. Cooperation is the main basis of cooperative security and collective security. According to the definition given by Williams and Davis, “*cooperation* includes events ranging from meetings of officials and verbal statements of support, to military and economic agreements, establishing joint military commands, and jointly fighting a war. Cooperation is neither the absence nor the opposite of conflict but a separate indicator that measures a different type of state behavior. Both of these components are also incorporated in the broader measure of net interactions, which represents the overall flow of relations from a state to its dyadic partner.” (Davis and Williams in Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 95). Fred Chernoff states that “regimes promote cooperation by reducing the dangers and costs of cooperating with others.” (Chernoff, 1995, p. 15). Referring to the theory of Robert Keohane, Chernoff concludes, “cooperation may continue in an established regime as long as there is a community of interests, but not necessarily a coincidence of interests among the states.” (Chernoff, 1995, p. 15).³

Clive Archer distinguishes three ways of developing multinational security cooperation:

³ The original source of Chernoff's citation is Robert O. Keohane. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Economy*. Princeton: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

- *Collective defense.* Organizations providing a collective defense have as their main aim the defense of members against an identified enemy or threat. Thus planning can be undertaken between the members on how such a threat might be met by a collective response, with at least part of the emphasis being placed on a joint military effort. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provides the best example of a collective defense organization, certainly from 1949 to 1989.
- *Collective security.* Organizations devoted to collective security bring all members of the international community together in response to aggression from any quarter. Thus the potential threat is unnamed, but, should it materialize, all members of the organization should be prepared to take collective action against the aggressor, regardless of any alliance links they may have with that aggressor. The United Nations, acting under Chapter Seven of the Charter, is a classic example of a collective security organization.
- *Cooperative security.* This type of security arrangement represents an attempt to maintain security by consensus. Here the emphasis is less on identifying an aggressor (as with the above two systems) and more on identifying problems that can lead to conflict and then attempting to resolve them collectively. So the emphasis may be on peacekeeping missions (as with the UN in Cyprus) or with conflict prevention and avoidance (as with the OSCE). (Archer in Brundtland and Snider, 1994, 120)

This three-dimensional division refers objectively to the period of the Cold War. Alliances of the “balance of power era” often represented collective defense institutions. “The distinction between *collective defense* and *collective security* is often blurred. Many persons apply the term *collective security* to any alliance, particularly one they approve of including NATO. This conceptual confusion is regrettable because *collective security* was originally conceived as an alternative to alliances for collective defense.” (Yost, 1998, p. 137). The post-Cold War era recognizes two types of security arrangements: collective defense (institutional security – NATO, the WEU); and cooperative security (outside of alliances – PfP, Mediterranean Initiatives by NATO and the WEU, Nordic-

Baltic security cooperation, and so forth). Cooperative security offers the most relevant options to decrease the magnitude of the Baltic security dilemma today, because the security policy preferences of the states in the region differ a lot significantly.

Collective and cooperative security arrangements seem promising because mutual interdependence - political, economic, and even cultural - has grown to a great extent. The emergence of collective and cooperative security arrangements has also increased interdependence in the fields of security and defense.

Military force is not used by governments toward other governments within the region, or the issues, when complex interdependence prevails. It may, however, be important in these governments' relations with governments outside that region, or other issues. Military force could, for instance, be irrelevant to resolving disagreements on economic issues among members of an alliance, yet at the same time be very important for that alliance's political and military relations with a rival bloc. For the former relationships this condition of complex interdependence would be met; for the latter, it would not. (Keohane and Nye in Williams et al., 1994, p. 77)

Political and economic interdependence usually can create security interdependence. "In this *cooperative security* perspective, the security of one state is viewed as intrinsically linked to, and dependent on, the security of others. This interdependence of security thus motivates states to utilize multilateral forums, including formal institutions, to make cooperation easier." (Kay, 1998, p. 9). Thus, the European Economic Community established a basis for the European Union, and the character of this organization created immediate needs for what we know today as the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The further logical development of the CFSP is the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Similar security needs

which will be examined in this work, have promoted security and defense cooperation in the Baltic Sea region.

C. REGIONALIZATION

Enhancing regional security cooperation is one way to escape from security dilemmas. In its traditional meaning *regionalization* refers to regional cooperation and mutual interdependence between cooperation partners. The modern trend towards regionalization has been treated in different ways. Kenichi Ohmae proposed a formula of region-state as a model for future states, predicted the disappearance of national differences and the rise of new identities based on economic relationships.⁴ The modern tendency illustrates that cooperation tends to be multinational and is institutionalized into different organizations. The European Union (EU), the North-Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the cooperation in the Caribbean area, which is institutionalized into the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and many other examples could describe this process perfectly.

The early 1990s heard much talk of regionalism and the regionalization of world politics. Regional conflicts replaced the global conflict on the world's security agenda. Major powers, such as Russia, China, and the United States, as well as secondary powers, such as Sweden and Turkey, redefined their security interests in explicitly regional terms. Trade within regions expanded faster than trade between regions, and many foresaw the emergence of regional economic blocs, European, North American, East Asian, and perhaps others. The term "regionalism," however, does not adequately describe what was happening. Regions are geographical not political or cultural entities. As with the Balkans or the Middle East, they

⁴ The idea of region-state was presented in Kenichi Ohmae, "The Rise of the Region State," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72 No.2, (Spring 1997): 78-87.

may be riven by inter- and intracivilization conflicts. Regions are a basis for cooperation among states only to the extent that geography coincides with culture. (Huntington, 1997, p. 130)

After World War II, the strengthening of the European common identity started to replace the traditional competition between the European powers. These plans have been realized by the appearance of a new political and economic cooperation formula on the European political landscape – the European Union. In addition to political and economic unification of Europe, there is yet another process under way called regionalization. Regionalization is a process whereby similar social and political interests are institutionalized in a particular region, and it consists of political, security, defense, economic, cultural, ethnic dimensions. It may also include historical, cultural factors and geopolitical factors. Regionalization may exist within the framework of larger organizations (such as NATO and EU) or be institutionalized into separate organizations.

Joenniemi and Waever treat the meaning of regions and regionalization as follows:

- Regions are defined by shared traits of a topographical or cultural nature, i.e. internal similarity distinguishing the region from neighboring and allegedly different areas.
- Regions are defined by great power rivalry in the international system, which tends to generate regional arenas as a product of great power politics and local reactions.
- Regions come into being as a result of revolutionary changes in technology, particular transport and communication. New economic and social networks come into being, providing the breeding ground for what might be called neo-regionalism, defying the centralizing tendencies inherent in older technologies, and thereby favoring new elites. These regions can be mapped and localized by studying the actual patterns of interaction and processes.

- Regions are constituted by political projects where often stories are told along the lines of region-logic-1 or -2 (about similarity, shared history, geography – or external threats and pressures) – and produce something like region-3-networks – but the emphasis in this fourth approach is on the way these “facts” are selected and arranged as part of a political and discursive rearranging of geographical space. (Joenniemi and Waever in Wellmann, 1992, p. 15)

The importance of regional security has increased in different parts of the world. New initiatives, like the NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue or WEU’s Mediterranean Initiative, have involved different subregions and they are moved away from the framework of institutions. Regionalization offers not only solutions for mitigating security dilemmas but a way to organize cooperation between countries with similar security concerns. Technological changes in the current century led to a situation where military capability has acquired new meanings and a global military power has spread all over the world. “All those developments make regionalization the central trend in military strategy and power in the post-Cold War world. Regionalization provides the rationale for the reductions in Russian and Western military forces and for increases in the military forces of other states. Russia no longer has a global capability but is focusing its strategy and forces on near abroad.” (Huntington, 1997, p. 90).

These developments have caused wishes to promote regional security by creating regional security institutions. The concept of *regional security complexes*⁵ “is about distinctive patterns of security relations within regions.” (Buzan and Waever in Øberg,

⁵ The concept of security complexes is presented Barry Buzan’s book *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. (original 1983), Harvester Wheatsheaf, London 1991. Before that it was introduced in Barry Buzan’s and Gowher Rizvi’s *South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers*, Macmillan, London 1986.

1992, p. 87). The concept developed by British scholar Barry Buzan stresses security interaction among the neighbor-states and importance of geographical proximity in the security relations. The Baltic Sea region has all the features of those security complexes. It has a multidimensional character, including the NATO members and aspirants, countries following non-alignment policy (Sweden, Finland), and Russia, which represents a separate dimension by itself.⁶

Regions can stimulate cooperation, but sources of regional conflicts still seem to be inexhaustible. Frequently, those conflicts have initiated long and bloody wars with involvement of powers outside of the region. In the modern era of globalization, it is difficult to solve the regional conflicts within a limited security complex because of enhanced mutual interdependence in the contemporary world. "Crisis management on the global level would also necessitate, in fact, termination of the regional war if and when this war reaches the point where it could escalate to involve the military forces of one or more of the great powers." (Miller, 1995, p. 61).

⁶ The idea of security communities, particularly using Nordics as an example, was discussed by Karl W. Deutsch in his book *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.

[The page contains several paragraphs of text that are extremely blurry and illegible. The text appears to be a continuous block of prose, possibly a chapter or section of a book, but the individual words and sentences cannot be discerned.]

III. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION – GENERAL OVERVIEW

A. HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL BACKGROUNDS

Nations around the Baltic Sea have a lot of common historical and cultural features to share. The Swedes, Danish, Russians, Polish or Germans dominated the region entirely or partially. At the same time, there is a strong interlinkage and mutual dependence between countries and provinces of the region. The Baltic Sea region includes several different political and cultural dimensions. First, Scandinavian countries, with their special historical identity, form the core of the region. Scandinavian nations have always remained active participants in the regional matters, depending on their geographical location, even if the interest of other nations towards the Baltic Sea has been varied. Second, Germany and different German states, reached to the Baltic Sea in the early Middle Ages. Germany has traditionally been a great regional power in the Baltic Sea region and influenced the history of all the Baltic Sea countries. Nevertheless, Germany's national interests in the region after World War II have remained outside of her primary political goals. Poland and Lithuania became powers on the Baltic Sea since 14th –16th century but they have also been more connected with the Central-European countries. Estonia and Latvia (to some extent also Finland) have been a long-time battlefields between East and West. In this respect, German and Scandinavian countries

competed with another power, Russia, which has definitely been an essential influence in several developments in the Baltic Sea region.

Samuel Huntington noted that the ideological conflict between nations that determined the world order from the middle of 20th century has recently been replaced by the increasing influence of the cultural/civilizational differences. "A central axis of post-Cold War world politics is thus the interaction of Western power and culture with the power and culture with the power and culture of non-Western civilizations." (Huntington 1997, p. 29). According to Huntington's theory, there is a civilizational conflict in the Baltic Sea region. Except Russia that is a core state of the Orthodox civilization, countries of the region belong to the Western civilization. It gives a considerable probability to the future conflict between Russia and the countries within the domain of Western civilization.

Considering the close links between nations around the Baltic Sea, we can discern and discuss a special cultural identity – the Baltic subcivilization, the roots of which originated from the medieval Hanseatic League. The Hanseatic League was the most powerful economic player in the Baltic Sea region between 12th -17th century and it determined to a great extent the prosperity of trade and banking in the northern part of Europe. Additionally, it was able to mobilize considerable military power to defend its interests, if necessary. The Hanseatic League consisted of about 200 towns from Holland to Estonia including also some Russian towns like Novgorod, and its center was situated in the northern German town Lübeck.

The core states of the Baltic subcivilization are Sweden, Germany, and to a lesser degree Denmark. Religiously, the subcivilization is mostly Protestant (Lutheran). The

reformation movement, initiated by Martin Luther in the 16th century, met its greatest success in Northern Europe. At the same time, the border between subcivilizations does not go along the borders of countries. Germany is actually multicultural nation, which consists of regions with different political and cultural history. While Schleswig-Holstein is a natural part of the Baltic Sea region, it is more difficult to find common interests, for example, between Baden-Württemberg or Bavaria on the one hand, and the Baltic Sea countries on the other hand. Three nations, Russia, Lithuania, and Poland, belong politically to the Baltic Sea region but they have only a few common characteristics with the Baltic subcivilization. Catholic Poland and Lithuania are rather the bridges to the Central-European subcivilization, and Russia is the core nation of another big civilization, the Orthodox world.

The history of the Baltic Sea region witnessed two forms of interlinkage between countries – cooperation and conflict. The primacy of either of those actions has been varied through centuries. The Baltic Sea region has been a historical battlefield between several regional powers. “The history of the region, after this early settlement is intimately bound up with the permanent struggles for supremacy in the whole Baltic region between a succession of rising and falling powers: the Teutonic Knights, the Danes, the Hanseatic towns, Sweden, Poland-Lithuania, Prussia, Russia and the Soviet Union. At all events, the region was, for the most part a victim, an object rather than a subject of its own history.” (Fitzmaurice, 1992, p. 4). Throughout history, we see different developments in interstate relations here. Wars varied with peaceful cooperation between the Baltic Sea nations. Marju Lauristin provides us a table, which indicates the

mutual interdependence between the nations of the Baltic Sea region. (Lauristin in Lauristin et al., 1997, p. 33).

Table 4. Factors of Integration and Separation in the Baltic Sea Region⁷

Factors of integration	Factors of separation
1. Belonging to the same state is a widespread experience in the region: Finns and Estonians with Swedes, Danes and Russians; Latvians, Lithuanians, and Poles with Russians; Lithuanians with Poles; Estonians and Latvians with Germans; Swedes, Danes and Poles with Germans; Norwegians with Danes and Swedes; Icelanders with Danes and Norwegians.	1. Wars, occupations, military confrontations (between Russia and Germany, Russia and Finland, Poland and Germany, Denmark and Germany, Sweden and Russia, Poland and Russia, Sweden and Denmark, etc.
2. Belonging to a common linguistic group facilitates integration between Estonians and Finns, Germans and Scandinavians, Latvians and Lithuanians, Poles and Russians.	2. Overlapping ethnic and class borders (e.g., Swedish aristocracy in Finland, Baltic German aristocracy in Estonia and Latvia, Polish aristocracy in Lithuania).
3. Similar religious traditions unite nations with a Protestant background (Germans, Scandinavians, Finns, Estonians, Latvians) and with a Catholic background (Lithuanians, Poles).	3. Religious differences between Western and Eastern Christian traditions.
4. The Hanseatic League was an important economic union for the integration of the Western and Eastern parts of the Baltic region.	4. Different rates of economic and technological development.
5. The existence of historical minority communities on other's territories, mutual migration (Finns and Estonians in Sweden; Poles in Lithuania and vice versa; Baltic Germans in Estonia and Latvia; Swedes in Finland and Estonia, etc.).	5. Differences in living standards and life-styles.
6. Similar cultural forms, common traditions.	6. Different political regimes and ideologies.

⁷ The table was originally presented by Marju Lauristin in the book edited by her and Peeter Vihalemm *Return to the Western World*. Tartu: Tartu University Press, 1997. Table 4 is an augmented variant of her contribution.

There was a sole regional war on the Baltic Sea in the current century – the Finnish Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland in 1939/40. The other military conflicts have been part of the global conflicts (World War I, World War II, and the Russian Civil War). As the Finnish Winter War can be treated as a prelude to World War II, the last “real regional war” was between Germany and Denmark about the Schleswig-Holstein area in 1863-64. Thus, we can conclude that the Baltic Sea region has traditionally been considered as a low intensity conflict area since the mid-19th century. At the same time, belonging to opposite alliances, membership in different institutions and differences in foreign policy preferences made regional cooperation more complicated than the state interests could actually afford.

During the Cold War, the security conditions in the Baltic Sea region were influenced by bipolar opposition between the two antagonistic competitive systems. NATO countries in the region (Denmark, West-Germany, Iceland, Norway) have been balanced by the Soviet Union, and its allies from the Warsaw Treaty Organization - Poland and East-Germany. The Swedes, despite their traditional neutrality and being dominated many years by leftist Social Democrats, trained her armed forces to be interoperable with NATO in a relative sense and developed military cooperation with the United States. Finland, politically a Western democracy, had its foreign and security policy strongly conditioned by the reality, that the Soviet Union was on its long frontier, and they were under the pressure of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty and the 1948 Treaty of Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. (Brundtland in Brundtland and Snider, 1994, p. 4).

After the Cold War, the conflictual basis in relationship has been replaced with the regional cooperation, which makes possible to turn to the era of New Hansa. The medieval Hanseatic League offers considerable sources for regional cooperation, which could be a model for the present. The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) was established in March 1992 on a German-Danish initiative. This organization, which has been founded in the spirit of the Hansa cooperation, includes 12 member-states: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, and the European Commission. It is important to mention the individual membership of the European Commission that establishes the close relationship between the CBSS and the EU. The CBSS has no permanent secretariat or its own budget in this organization, and the routine business is performed by the presiding country. Three working groups were established in the framework of the CBSS: Working Group on Economic Cooperation, Working Group on Assistance to Democratic Institutions, and Working Group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety. In its first stage, the CBSS excluded issues, which would be connected with the security policy, and was mainly concentrated into economic, cultural, and environmental cooperation. From the governmental meeting held in Visby (Sweden) in the beginning of May 1996, there was raised a need to switch some 'soft-security cooperation issues' into the framework of CBSS. These measures include some cooperation in humanitarian operations like search and rescue.

The security measures of the extended Baltic Sea region have traditionally had a low profile. Norway and Denmark are members of NATO but they practice some special restrictions in their defense policy since the Cold War. They do not allow the stationing of foreign military troops and nuclear weapons on their territory during peacetime. The

modern era opened a door for enhanced security and defense cooperation on the Baltic Sea, which includes not only institutional but also bilateral and multilateral cooperative security arrangements. Regional security and defense cooperation has several pillars, the most known is the Nordic and the Nordic-Baltic security and defense cooperation. The Nordic security community is unique which “is merely based on a pattern of cooperation that is institutionally restricted to low politics with an ideology that is so vague that it might rather be referred as a common sentiment.” (Wiberg and Waever in Øberg, 1992, p. 18). On the southern flank of the Baltic Sea, the extended trilateral cooperation between Denmark, Germany and Poland is evolving. Extensive bilateral defense relations are established between Poland and Lithuania, and between Estonia and Finland. Since 1993, there has been a remarkable number of the Estonian officer corps which has been educated in Finland, and Finland has offered a three-year program to re-establish the structure of the Estonian Defense Forces.

There are positive examples arising on the Baltic Sea, which could give their positive impulse to the regional cooperation. First of all, the traditional peaceful cooperation between Nordic countries contributes to the regional peace. The return of democratic Germany to Northern Europe and positive shifts in bilateral cooperation, as between Lithuania and Poland, have enhanced stability in the region. The post-Cold War security dilemmas are still connected with historical desires of Russia to increase her influence in the Baltic Sea countries. Struggles for sphere of influence are strongly presented on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea, in the Baltic Sea and Kaliningrad. Russia also attempts to maintain a considerable military presence in Northern Europe.

B. NORDIC COOPERATION

Nordic or Scandinavian countries have a strong cultural and historical identity, which has its specific political dimension. The Nordic cooperation was institutionalized into the Nordic Council in 1952, including Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland, and Finland joined the club four years later. There were many functioning cooperation elements between the Nordic countries before this, however, the Union of Kalmar between 1397-1521 joined all Nordic countries together into one state and created historical bases for further cooperation. Scandinavian history includes regular ministerial meetings between the period 1918-1939, Danish-Norwegian-Swedish currency union in 1873-1914, Nordic postal union since 1860, and Nordic interparliamentary union since 1907. Of course, this is just a part of integration the Scandinavian countries have established throughout this century⁸. The security and defense policies of the Nordic countries have had a defensive character since Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the 19th century, when Sweden was ultimately a partner in a greater European coalition. The last imperialistic war the Nordic countries were involved in, as participants not victims, was probably the Great Northern War between 1700-1721.

The security policy pattern that emerged in the Nordic region after the war reflected the proximity of the great power. Those states which were furthest away from the Soviet Union (Norway and Denmark) became members of NATO; Sweden proclaimed its non-aligned status but oriented itself entirely towards the West; and Finland, restricted in its foreign policy by the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union from 1948, tried to uphold an independent neutrality policy.(Jonsson in Baranovsky, pp. 305-306)

⁸ Scandinavian countries fought each other over the centuries. In 1905 Norway and Sweden almost went to war. Their cooperation is confined to the 20th century (Comment of Professor Rodney Minott, 30 November 1998).

The Nordic security and defense cooperation never turned into a reality until the Cold War ended. Neutrality was a traditional form of the Nordic security policy in the first half of the 20th century. Nordic countries were not involved in World War I, and they tried to keep neutrality during World War II. Nevertheless, Germany occupied Norway and Denmark and they lost temporarily their sovereignty. For that reason, there was no interest in Denmark and Norway to continue neutrality in security policy matters. There were discussions about the formation of the Scandinavian Defense Union after World War II. “Norway, Denmark, and Sweden had hoped to create a regional collective security institution of their own based on shared cultural identity, commonality of interests, and at Sweden’s insistence, neutrality.” (Kay, 1998, p. 28). Different opinions concerning the neutrality made these attempts unsuccessful.

After the idea of an independent Scandinavian Defense Union failed in the late 1940s, Norway and Denmark joined NATO, and Finland signed the Treaty of Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. The emerging Nordic security dilemma was based on the concept of the *Nordic Balance*, which was elaborated by Norwegian political scientists Nils Ørvik, Arne Olav Brundtland, and Johan J. Holst. This concept followed the realist tradition of International Relations theory, with the aim to find a place for Northern Europe in the Cold War’s bipolar system. The concept of the Nordic balance is based on the argument that there is a bipolar security situation and spheres of influence among the Nordic countries (see Table 5). The Nordic Balance meant that “if the Soviet Union increased its pressure on Finland, the Nordic NATO members might ease their present bans on foreign bases and nuclear weapons in

peacetime, thus making for a greater US/NATO military presence; the knowledge of this could dissuade the Soviet Union. On the other hand, such an increasing presence might lead to a Soviet call for closer cooperation with Finland.” (Wiberg and Waever in Øberg, 1992, p. 25).

Table 5. The Nordic Balance 1949-1991

NATO's sphere of influence	Neutral	The WPO's sphere of influence
Norway, Denmark	Sweden	Finland

The Nordic balance was one of the classical results of the security dilemma. Today, after the collapse of the Cold War’s bipolarity, and the initial unification process in the European continent, we might say that the Nordic balance is history. Nordic countries have been rather successful in establishing political and economic cooperation with each other, but the security and defense cooperation made progress only during the last years. The end of the Cold War abolished institutional barriers that excluded Nordic military cooperation during the forty-five years, and the new initiatives like PfP made this cooperation even more flexible. “In fact Nordic cooperation in the defense field has increased since 1989. The regular meetings of defense ministers that earlier had only UN peacekeeping operations on the agenda now touch upon every aspect of security. Cooperation in creation of the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion is one example. The development of the Nordic battalions in the former Yugoslavia into the Nordic Brigade in IFOR is the most spectacular example and it may become a permanent institution in Nordic security. A treaty on cooperation in procurement was signed in December 1994.” (Dörfer, 1997, p. 71). In 1997, the joint Nordic military exercise “in the spirit of PfP”

“Nordic Peace 97” took place in Norway, followed by “Nordic Peace 98” in Sweden with the participation of the Baltic countries. Now, the Nordic defense cooperation has involved to a great extent the Baltic states, and we can talk about the joint Nordic-Baltic security complex, which, mainly by the initiatives of Denmark, may enlarge to include Germany and Poland in the near future.

The security situation of Denmark improved a lot in the last decade. Denmark has an extensive experience as the NATO outpost in the frontier of the Warsaw Pact countries. This would be one reason why Denmark especially is vitally interested in the enlargement of NATO to the Baltic Sea, and has been an initiator of different bilateral and institutional cooperative security and defense cooperation activities in the Baltic Rim. Additionally to the traditional cooperation with Germany and Nordic partners Denmark has set apart remarkable resources for establishing a defense cooperation with Poland and Baltic states and Denmark has often been the main supporter in their integration to the European structures.

Norway and Iceland have traditionally been more oriented to the transatlantic relationship rather than identifying themselves as purely European nations. Norway has twice rejected the EU membership and Iceland never applied to the EU. Today, Norway has remained the only member of NATO, which has a land border with Russia. The Russian threat did not disappear from Norway with the end of the Cold War. “Unlike in Denmark, in Norway the Russian threat remained unchanged after 1990, even as Russia’s Northern Fleet rusted at the piers and gradually lost its offensive capability.” (Dörfer, 1997, p. 36). Therefore, Norway is vitally interested in maintaining “the NATO flag” in the Norwegian territory.

Sweden and Finland have survived general changes in their security policy in 1990s. They have practically given up their Cold War traditional neutrality, and introduced new solutions in security policy. The non-alignment policy practiced by Sweden and Finland means that they develop cooperation with the European and Transatlantic security and defense organizations but do not seek membership. Both, Sweden and Finland, have enhanced their participation in PfP cooperation, and have actively participated in different Baltic assistance programs.

The Nordic model of cooperative security can be extended to other parts of the region and developed into the security community of the Baltic Sea states. "The notion that states in a region do not go to war with each other and that there is no expectation that such conflict will happen is a core element of Karl Deutsch's notion of a *security community*. One in which the states are not politically integrated." (Archer, 1996, p. 452). There was little hope to realize the idea of a security community under the circumstances of the Cold War. However, a changing security environment and the progress of democratization of the Baltic Sea creates preconditions for that circumstance.

C. GERMANY – A REGIONAL GREAT POWER?

The Baltic Sea region has been outside of Germany's primary foreign and security policy goals for a long time. "With the reunification of Germany in 1990, a littoral state disappeared from the Baltic map and a former Great Baltic power re-emerged." (Krohn, 1994, p. 594). It is predictable that the German interests in the region will increase after her governmental institutions will finally move to Berlin. "The move of the capital from

Bonn to Berlin will strengthen northern Germany as it will Northern Europe; the Eastern Baltic coast of Germany will again flourish, since the neighborhood of the most important city in Europe cannot remain a backwater.” (Dörfer, 1997, p. 46).

There are some fears, mainly historical, about the strengthening of Germany. These fears are related especially with its military power, and there are attempts to see the strengthening of Germany in connection with Germany’s possible aggressive influence against her smaller neighbors. Nevertheless, these perceptions seem to be rather unlikely. The strengthening of democratic Germany could have also positive consequences, for example, balancing Russian power in the region. “Today there is no threat to Germany. For this reason and because of economic commitments in the East, Bonn is unlikely to invest very much in military forces.” (Lodgaard in Øberg, 1992, p. 289).

Germany’s particular interests in the region, including trade, fishing, transportation, and environmental protection, do not differ much from other Baltic Sea countries. It is remarkable that with the exception of Estonia, Germany is among the first three trade partners of all the Baltic Sea countries (see Table 2), and her economic interests are growing. “The Kiel Canal has the highest amount of ship traffic in the world.” (Krohn, 1994, p. 595). It is in Germany’s interest to promote trade and cooperation in the Baltic Rim. The towns of Northern Germany initiated the Hanseatic League, and the economic and cultural influence of Germany in the Baltic Sea countries has been traditionally noteworthy.

The relationship between Germany and the new democracies in the region, Poland and the Baltic countries, is developing rapidly. Germany is perhaps the strongest supporter of Poland in its integration with the European institutions. The possible conflict

area concerning the border between Germany and Poland was regulated with the border treaty of 1990. The reasons why Germany's special interests in the EU and NATO enlargement are related with Poland proceed not only from historical guilt about the Polish sufferings during World War II, but also from Germany's security concerns in avoiding its status as a 'border-state' between Europe and the Russian sphere of influence and to establish a politically and economically stable neighborhood. "It would not be the old *Mitteleuropa* of German imperialism but a more benign community of economic renewal stimulated by German investments and trade, with Germany also acting as the sponsor of the eventually formal inclusion of the new *Mitteleuropa* in both the European Union and NATO." (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 69).

Germany's policy towards the Baltic States has been more complicated. Generally, it includes three pillars: Germany is interested that these countries will remain outside of the sphere of influence of Russia; Germany offers assistance in developing a market economy and establishing an administrative and legal system, which is based on democratic principles; Germany supports their aspirations in accession to the European political institutions, primarily the European Union. We are also witnesses to the increasing security and defense cooperation between Germany and the Baltic states, though Germany has been a rare initiator on those matters.

At the end of 1980s, the former Premier of Schleswig-Holstein, Björn Engholm (later leader of the German Social Democratic Party), initiated the idea of a *new Hanseatic cooperation*, which was initially oriented to increase linkage between Schleswig-Holstein and Scandinavian countries, at this time also dominated by Social Democrats, "in order to bring Schleswig-Holstein out of a certain apparent isolation as a

peripheral region in Germany on the way to nowhere.” (Fitzmaurice, 1992, p. 151). The key elements of new cooperation initiative were connected with several environmental issues, but also transport, trade, energy policy, cultural links, and scientific research cooperation. The changes in the political environment, emergence of new political actors like the Baltic states or Poland, gave this initiative a broader prospect. This initiative was finally institutionalized into the Council of the Baltic Sea States, which was founded in 1992.

All in all, the reunification of Germany, and restoring the rights of Berlin as a historical capital of Germany brought Germany back to the Baltic Sea. “After unification, Germany inherited a long stretch of Baltic coast line. Before, Germany was basically involved as a doorkeeper to the Danish Straits. As a result of German unification, NATO also acquired a larger presence in the Baltic Sea region, without mentioning NATO’s potential incorporation of countries like Poland, the Baltic Republics, or even Sweden and Finland.” (Krohn, 1995, p. 598). We have historical evidence that a strong and influential Germany has been an aggressive and destabilizing power in the region. Today, however, the positive involvement of democratic Germany with regional cooperation may give an impulse play to the establishment of a stable security environment around the Baltic Sea.

D. LITHUANIA AND POLAND – REBIRTH OF COMMON HISTORY

There is a significant difference between the Catholic southeastern part of the Baltic Sea region, and the Lutheran majority of Baltic Sea countries. Historically,

Lithuania and Poland are more linked to Central-Europe, and their presence on the Baltic Sea has been varied from time-to-time.

Differently from the main part of Lithuania, the coastal Klaipeda (Memel) area of Lithuania was related with Germany and the German cultural space. For centuries, it was heavily Protestant (Lutheran) and with a significant number of German population. Similarly, the Polish coastal areas around Szczecin (Stettin), Gdansk (Danzig), and Gdynia (Gotenhafen) with contiguous territories were populated with Germans or German-Polish mixed population. Stettin was a German town until the end of the World War II.

The close relationship between Lithuania and Poland began from Middle Ages. The Personal Union from 1386 lasted until the last division of Rzeczpospolita in 1795. Between World War I and World War II, the relationship between Lithuania and Poland was full of tensions. The main reason of the interstate conflict was that Poland annexed in 1920 the historical capital of Lithuania – Vilnius (Vilno), which belonged to Poland until 1939 when Poland was divided again between Germany and Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union returned the Vilno area temporarily back to Lithuania, just before Lithuania itself was occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940.

There are several painful issues influencing the relationship between Lithuania and Poland. The Vilnius (Vilno) question is one of them. This city is a part of history for both countries. There is a strong Polish minority in Lithuania, mainly in the Vilnius area. There is also a Lithuanian minority in the North-East of Poland. When Lithuania regained her independence in the 1990s, the Polish minority in Lithuania did not support the secession from the Soviet Union, fearing Lithuanian pressure on their identity.

The bilateral relationship between the two countries, however, developed with a remarkable success in the post-Cold War era. “The most important aspect of changes in Lithuanian foreign policy at the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997 concerned the hierarchy of partners. The efficiency of cooperation with the Baltic states was questioned, and the development of relationship with Poland was indicated as being of primary importance.” (Zajaczkowski in Wohlfeld, 1997, p. 15).

Poland has been very active in seeking membership in the European and Transatlantic security and defense organizations. “As Poland’s former Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski stated, the first reason is Poland’s attempt to hedge against a potentially expansionistic Russian policy, which in substance implies a US nuclear security guaranty. The second reason is the hope that quick NATO membership is probably an important stepping stone toward a safe entrance into the EU. The third reason might be the attempt to ‘counterbalance’ the strong German position in NATO, that is avoiding a strong sphere of German influence in the Central- and Eastern-European countries.” (Krohn, 1994, p. 596). Many Lithuanian politicians have seen the cooperation with Poland as a direct access to the European and Transatlantic structures. The Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas has mentioned that “Lithuania’s strategic partnership with Latvia and Estonia was agreed long ago, however such cooperation may sometimes not seem beneficial.” (Zajaczkowski in Wohlfeld, 1997, p. 15).⁹

Similar to Estonian-Finnish cooperation, the defense cooperation between Lithuania and Poland has made quick progress. “From 1993 to 1996, several decisions were made resulting in the establishment of a Polish-Lithuanian peacekeeping battalion, a

common airspace system, and the organization of joint military exercises.” (Zajackowski in Wohlfeld, 1997, p. 15). There is an obvious tendency to strengthen the relationship between the two neighbors, which have similar security concerns. “An alternative to the Baltic option for Lithuania has been the close cooperation with the Central and Eastern European region, especially with Poland, who is a strategic partner of Lithuania.” (Rull, 1998, p. 5). The enhanced Polish-Lithuanian cooperation does not necessarily mean the end of Baltic cooperation. However, these two nations have shared a common history, and their further interlinkage is generally positive and that should be understood and encouraged by other countries.

⁹ Minister Saudargas presented his views to the press after his visit to Warsaw in January 1997.

IV. POST-COLD WAR SECURITY DILEMMAS ON THE BALTIC SEA

A. THE BALTIC QUESTION – THE ETERNAL SECURITY DILEMMA?

Three small countries on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea have been battlefield for their powerful neighbors for a long time. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have experienced similar fates during the last century. This has often led to the mistaken belief that their historical and cultural backgrounds are close to each other. In fact, the Baltic states may be described as a geopolitical unity. This does not exclude historical and cultural differences between these countries. The Estonian language is close to the Finnish language and differs a great deal from the Latvian and Lithuanian languages, which are close to each other. Since the 13th century, Estonians and Latvians have been under German and Scandinavian cultural influence. A majority of Estonians and people in the Northern and Western Latvia are Lutheran Protestants like people in Scandinavia and Northern Germany.

The Lithuanians established an independent statehood relatively at the same time. Later they joined into a personal union with Poland. Religiously, they are Roman Catholics as their Polish neighbors (similarly to the Latvians in the Eastern Latvia). Russia established her power over Estonia and Northern Latvia during the Great Northern War between 1700-1710. The rest of Latvia and Lithuania came under the Russian Empire with the division of Poland at the end of 18th century. There was a fundamental

difference in the destiny of Baltic nations within the Russian Empire. While “German” or Lutheran provinces (Estland, Lifland and Kurland) maintained their cultural origin and close relationship with German states and the Russian central power did not interfere in their domestic matters until the end of the 19th century, Lithuania and Poland had to suffer under strong Russian pressure.

The Baltic cooperation has been a “hot topic” since the world recognized the Baltic states as an independent geopolitical region, after World War I. Initially, the Baltics included all the former non-Russian parts of the former Russian empire in the region, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Finland. There were attempts to create a regional Baltic organization between World War I and World War II, but these attempts failed because of several conflicts and different attitudes of the possible members. Finland tried to establish close links with Scandinavian countries, which, in their turn, were not interested in small and weak Baltic countries as possible areas. Poland aspired to the leader role of the smaller Baltic Union, but its aspirations were destined to failure due to the border conflict with Lithuania over the Vilno (Vilnius) area. In 1934, when Poland concluded a friendship agreement with Germany and withdrew from the Baltic cooperation, the agreement between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was finally signed. “The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed by the three Baltic states for an initial ten-year period, called for periodic conferences of their foreign ministers and consultation on foreign policy matters of mutual interest. However, the most significant point about the *Baltic entente* is that it did not include a military alliance, and even the earlier Estonian-Latvian pact in July 1921, which theoretically established military cooperation, did not lead to common defense plans.” (Raun, 1987, p. 125).

Low measures in cooperation and underestimation of military threat to their independence led to a similar scenario for all the Baltic states, including Finland and Poland. At the beginning of World War II all these countries were targets of aggression from Germany and the Soviet Union. As a result of “the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact” and its enclosures, they initiated attacks against sovereignty of all Baltic countries and only Finland was able to maintain her sovereignty after the war with the Soviet Union in 1939/1940 and again in the period 1941-1944. The destiny of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania remained similar and they re-established their statehood in 1991. The political cooperation after the re-independence includes interparliamentary cooperation (the Baltic Assembly), and regular governmental consultations (the Baltic Council). As result of historical experiences, the military cooperation in the post-Cold War period has been very successful. There have been discussions about the Baltic Defense Union again, but the security needs of the Baltic countries demand a larger determination of the security complex with the involvement of other countries. Thus, the Baltic military cooperation is channalized into the international Baltic defense projects (BALTBAT, BALTNET, BALTRON, BALTDEFCOL), the framework of European-Transatlantic cooperative security arrangements (PFP, Nordic-Baltic), and regular contacts between leadership.

There is a natural desire of the Baltic countries to rejoin the European or Western civilizations to which they have belonged since the 13th century or even before. One option for that is the joining with the European and Transatlantic political, economic, and security institutions like the European Union or NATO. These organizations cannot substitute each other, but they both represent the Western civilization with its values and beliefs. The attempts to create a “buffer zone” in the Baltic states between Russia and the

West failed already between World War I and World War II. “There has been over the years a Baltic dilemma for Russian policy in Northern Europe. The more force Russia exerted to secure its interests in the Baltic area, the more vulnerable it became as a result of reactions from the rest of the world. In today’s world a withdrawn position from the Baltic Sea and respect for Baltic independence seems to be a better guarantee of Russian security in the Baltic area.” (Jonsson in Baranovsky, 1997, p. 324). Russia, however, tends to tolerate the accession of the Baltic states to EU and WEU, but is strongly against joining these countries with NATO.

There were a lot of discussions about the proposal of the RAND corporation analysts Ronald Asmus and Robert Nurick to join the Baltic security guarantees with Sweden and Finland. “Such steps should lead to a situation in which the Baltic states approach the defense status currently enjoyed by countries like Sweden or Finland: countries possessing modern militaries with a heavy emphasis on a national self-sufficiency doctrine; but also countries that have very close relations with NATO and are capable of being integrated into NATO at short notice, if and when that political decision is taken.” (Asmus and Nurick, 1995, p. 132). The Asmus-Nurick proposal is briefly presented in five pillars, indicated by Sean Kay.

First, the three Baltic countries should institutionalize defense cooperation among themselves. Second, involvement of the Nordic countries aiding and assisting efforts by the Baltic countries to increase their security via a wide range of cooperative programs should accelerate. The third pillar of the strategy would be coordination of NATO and EU enlargement policies so that “the EU flag would go up in Estonia at the same time that the NATO flag goes up in Warsaw.” Fourth, the process of NATO enlargement should be clearly open-ended. Finally, further institutional efforts should be made to modify Moscow’s concerns over NATO enlargement by including Russia in the emerging web of international security cooperation wherever possible, and the West should look for ways

to encourage constructive Russian-Baltic security interaction.” (Kay, 1998, p. 110)

We have to say that these five pillars are to a great extent realized through practical cooperation, but they do not solve the Baltic security dilemma. The Baltic security dilemma is a result of the following factors:

- The Baltic countries have always been a battlefield between two civilizations, that of Western civilization and that of the Orthodox civilization. Germany, Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Poland have had in different periods their special interests here. The historical desire of Russia from the 16th century has been to open a window to the Baltic Sea. Germany, Sweden and Denmark have competed for this region since the 12th –13th century, and few centuries later, Poland was added to the competition.
- During the period of 1945-1991, a remarkable numbers of Russians moved to the Baltic countries. The amount of Russians from the total population is extended to 29% in Estonia, and 34% in Latvia. The proportion of Estonians and Latvians has decreased correspondingly 65% and 52% of total population. Even if there are no violent ethnic conflicts, Russian foreign policy has often tried to use the factor of Russian minorities in achieving its political goals.
- The establishment of defense forces in the Baltic countries differs from similar developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS countries. Baltic countries had to start from nothing, lacking necessary equipment, and educated officer corps, and without a functioning defense structures and legal system.

Estonia has probably been the most successful Baltic country in promoting economic welfare and democracy under the new circumstances. Mainly for that reason, in

1997, the European Union invited Estonia together with five other nations to start negotiations about the future joining with the EU. Latvia came under strong pressure from Russia because of a relatively strict citizenship law that they had to change. The geographical and political position of Latvia remained more isolated than that of their northern and southern neighbors, which have close connections with Finland and Poland. In considering additional factors such as unstable government, and the biggest proportion of Russian minority among the Baltic states, Latvia is perhaps an easily vulnerable part in the region.

The development of Lithuania has frequently differed from that of its northern neighbors. Aside from a glorious past and the historical Polish influence, there are several other factors, which led Lithuania to seek somewhat different paths to Europe. While Estonia and Latvia practiced democracy until 1934, followed by mild authoritarian regimes, Lithuania turned away from democracy in 1926, after the coup d'état of the future President Antanas Smetona. The further political development of Lithuania was similar to other countries in Central-Europe at that time. After re-independence in 1991, the development of Lithuania has differed from Latvia and Estonia. The smaller number of Russian minority enabled Lithuania to accomplish a very liberal citizenship policy, and, thus, to keep away from direct political attacks from the Russian side.

Historical and cultural differences could lead to different political approaches in the future and we might assume that very close Baltic cooperation could be only transitional. Estonia and Latvia should move closer and integrate with Nordic countries. Lithuania, however, has begun to renew her historical links with Poland and is moving closer to Central-Europe.

B. UNPREDICTABLE RUSSIA

There are some historical paradoxes that make Russia's political behavior unpredictable. Russia differs culturally from other neighbors on the Baltic Sea. It has practically no democratic traditions and has survived many strong autocratic rulers.

Russia was definitely an European country between 1700-1917, when Russia was largely involved with the European political games, and mostly identified itself as an European power. After the communist coup in 1917, Russia (later the Soviet Union) moved into isolation. Later, after the victorious World War II, the Soviet Union became one of the dominant superpowers applying for the first time in its history to the global leader role. Despite the fact that we witnessed the collapse of the last big colonial empire, the Soviet Union, its successor-state Russia - despite its economic disaster - lost a remarkable part of its military capability. Nevertheless, Russia still maintained a status of a great military power. "Russia presents a security dilemma. It has sizeable armed forces, including nuclear weapons. However, these forces are fragmented, poorly organized, and may not be able to respond to political command." (Archer in Brundtland and Snider, 1994, p. 123). Russia tries to maintain her image as the global power, and contrast its interests with the US interests as much it would be possible in the new security environment.

The struggle between two Russian traditional political schools of thought, the Westerners and the Slavophiles, has been a natural part of the Russian history. As Westerners are interested in enhancement of relations between Russia and Europe and

they try to bring Russia closer to Europe, Slavophiles emphasize the singularity of Russia, the Russian Orthodox church, and the role of Russia as “a third Rome” which has a global role in the world to carry out. In the first years of the Russian re-independence, 1991-1992, the Westerners, led by Premier Yegor Gaidar, dominated the Russian political life. They believed “that the West (Western Europe and the United States) should be the main orientation for Russian foreign policy. They insisted that Russia historically belongs to the Western civilization. The main task for Russian international strategy should be one of building a partnership with the West and joining Western economic, political, and military organizations – the EU, NATO, IMF, World Bank, OECD, GATT, G-7.” (Sergounin, 1997, pp. 57-58). But economic chaos and transition difficulties led to the weakening of their positions. Unfortunately, the West was not able to use the largely positive interest in the European matters of Gaidar, and, at that time; was not able to provide Russia with a particular “Marshall plan.” The latter was obviously more corresponding to the Russian needs than just elementary economic help.

Is Russia a threat to the other nations in the region? Referring to the past, the Baltic Sea region has been a historic battlefield between Western Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism) and Eastern Christianity represented by Russian Orthodoxy. The access to the Baltic Sea has been a remarkable part of the Russian foreign policy since 16th century when the Russian Emperor Ivan IV (“Grozny”) strengthened pressure to the German states on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea, and started the war of conquest in 1558. “Over the centuries, Russia has sought to secure its access to the sea in the West – to the Baltic Sea and the Barents Sea. These interests were secured with the help of traditional power politics. With a strong military and with recourse to military

expedients, Russia achieved dominance and control.” (Jonsson in Baranovsky, 1997, p. 305).

Russia (as the Soviet Union) had a strong political position in the Baltic Sea countries in the years of the Cold War. The Soviet Union established political control not only over the Baltic States, Poland, and Eastern Germany, but influenced Finland’s policy and was a major military power on the Baltic Sea. In the post-Cold War era, Russia lost all her former allies and remained alone in the political arena. This failure caused attempts to create some kind of instability in the region. “The Russian neighborhood constitutes the main source of economic hopes as well as common security problems for the future of the region. Nordic politicians have expressed continual concern about Russia’s politics in the region, especially stressing their support for the independence and security of the Baltic countries. The former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt pointed out, that the Baltic region provides the critical test of the relationship between Russia and the West.” (Lauristin in Lauristin et al., 1997, p. 35).¹⁰

Russia’s military presence in Northern Europe has been changed as a consequence of several factors: (a) Russian military withdrawal from the independent Baltic States; (b) international agreements on arms reduction; and (c) Russia’s strained economy and limited financial resources. (Jonsson in Baranovsky, 1997, p. 310). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia started to participate in several European and Baltic cooperation activities. Russia became a member of the OSCE, the European Council, and the Council of Baltic Sea States. At the same time, essential parts of the Baltic security

¹⁰ The original paper: Carl Bildt. “The Baltic Litmus Test,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.73 No.5 (1994): 72-85.

dilemma are directly connected with Russia's internal instability and her imperialist foreign policy, which sometimes acquires aggressive tendencies. The Kaliningrad question, relationship with the Baltic countries, arms control issues including reversions concerning the CFE treaty and START II, and a general political and economic instability, are among the primary threats against establishing a stable security environment in the Baltic Sea region.

C. CFE TREATY AND THE BALTIC SEA REGION

The countries of the region are concerned with the developments of two major arms control agreements in Europe, the START II¹¹, which limits strategic nuclear weapons, and the CFE Treaty¹² which deals with conventional weapons systems in NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries. Scandinavia has always aspired to be a nuclear-free zone, and the Nordic countries do not allow deployment of nuclear forces in their territory. Paradoxically, there is a high Russian nuclear concentration in the Nordic area. The Kola complex in the neighborhood of Norway's and Finland's border may house all the Russian nuclear submarines and 50 percent of the entire Russian nuclear strategic force. (Dörfer, 1997, p. 7). The high Russian military concentration on the

¹¹ Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II.

¹² Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed in 1990 by the members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization to set ceilings for five categories of conventional military equipment (tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft) for groups of states as well as specific states in several zones in the "Atlantic-to-the-Urals" area." (Yost, 1998, p.395).

borders of the Nordic and Baltic countries makes understandable the latter's concerns about the future development of these treaties.

Russia has consistently demanded a revision of the limits set up in the original CFE treaty, emphasizing the need to strengthen its forces in the troublesome southern borders. "In arms control, the West has been faced with [Russia's] rigid demands for revision of the CFE Treaty, even the readiness to violate its provisions unless 'flank limits' are lifted or suspended." (Baev, 1996, p. 100). Finland, Sweden, and the Baltic states did not become a part of the CFE treaty. However, the original treaty guaranteed their security concerns to a great extent. The changes from June 1996 excluded the Pskov area from the list of flank areas, which allows a considerable increase of Russia's military capability near the frontiers of the Baltic states. Even if we take *a priori* that this revision does not create an immediate military threat to the Baltic and Nordic countries, it is difficult to find a reason for strengthening the Russian military presence in the Pskov region either. Seeking historical parallels, we may refer to the remilitarization of the Rhineland by Germany in 1936, which also established a stronghold for attacking neighbors.

D. KALININGRAD (KÖNIGSBERG) AREA – A POTENTIAL SOURCE FOR CONFLICT?

Serious security concerns on the Baltic Sea are connected with the Kaliningrad (Königsberg) area. The highly militarized Kaliningrad area has been a great security problem from the end of World War II, when the former German East-Prussia was divided between the Soviet Union and Poland. Since the 13th century, the former East

Prussia was historically a German territory and populated with the Germans until 1944/45. After World War II, it became one of the main Soviet military bases on the Baltic Sea and a great majority of its population was related with the Soviet military system. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, all the attempts to establish a “free economic zone” or “Baltic German Republic” under the Russian jurisdiction failed. “The concentration of the Russian military in Kaliningrad is another matter of concern for neighboring Poland and Lithuania. Baltiysk (50 km from Kaliningrad) is the main Russian naval base for the Baltic Sea. From 60 000 to 400 000 military are stationed in the Kaliningrad region. The Russian leadership still considers Kaliningrad as an important military-strategic outpost of Russia in the Baltic Sea region and will keep the Russian military presence at a significant level.” (Sergounin in Baranovsky, 1997, p. 346). The data presented in Table 6 demonstrates Russia's military capability in the area, taking into account also allowed CFE ceilings.

The Kaliningrad problem affects Russia's relationship with Lithuania, because the shortest route from Russia to the enclave goes through Lithuania. “An informal agreement between Russia and Lithuania with respect to the base was hammered out in 1991 in an exchange of diplomatic notes. Under the terms of the agreement, Russian troops can travel across Lithuania by rail only, with a maximum of 180 soldiers on any one train, their weapons in a separate car.” (Coleman, 1997, p. 73). Despite the agreement, there are two problems that influence the future of Russia-Lithuania relationship concerning the Kaliningrad area. Kaliningrad has still remained Russia's military outpost in the West. At the same time, Lithuania has clearly stated its intention to join NATO in the near future. The Russia-Lithuania relationship will be very complicated

in the future, if Russia continually identifies itself as the opposite power to NATO, and treats the military pillar of CIS, the Tashkent Treaty, as a successor to the Warsaw Pact Organization.

Table 6. The Russia's (Soviet Union's) Military Presence in the Kaliningrad Area 1990-1995¹³

	1990	1995	CFE Ceilings
Manpower	60,000	40,000	1,450,000
Tanks	802	870	1,100
Armoured combat vehicles	1081	980	6,060
Artillery	677	410	735
Attack helicopters	48	52	3,450
Combat aircraft	155	42	890

The CFE treaty zone limitations created a very peculiar situation in the Kaliningrad area, after the Russian troops left from the former Warsaw Pact countries and the Baltic states. The CFE treaty allows Russia to concentrate all her armed resources, which were allowed to station into the Eastern European countries with the original treaty (including the Kaliningrad region and Baltic states), into the small Kaliningrad region. Even if Russia does not plan on reaching the CFE ceilings, it is allowed to concentrate a considerable military power outside its main territory.

¹³ Data is provided in Hansen, B. & Heurlin, B. *The Baltic States in World Politics*, 1998, 148. Sources are originated from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1995-1996* and L.Vardomsky, L.Vorobyova, A.Yershov *Kaliningradskaja oblast' Rossiiskoi Federatsii: problemy i perspektivy*. Moscow: Raduga, 1995.

Given that Russia is not a global power anymore and identifies itself as a democratic state in the international community, there is no need to maintain Kaliningrad as a military outpost. More appropriate solutions would be demilitarization of the Kaliningrad area and the establishment of a "free economic zone." Pertti Joenniemi presented an interesting approach that "recognized as inalienable part of Russia, the [Kaliningrad] region could be invited, to become part of the European Economic Area, therewith to outface the Federation as a whole." (Joenniemi, 1997, p. 32). This proposal could be in accordance with Russia's interest in resolving its economic problems.

V. BALTIC SECURITY ASSISTANCE (BALTSEA) – A FORMULA OF REGIONAL COOPERATION

A. BACKGROUND

The appearance of new political actors in the Baltic Sea region, like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, created a requirement to establish a special program to coordinate Western assistance in rebuilding their own defense forces. For historical reasons, three countries of the region, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, who recently re-established their independence and sovereignty, had to create their national defense from nothing. The program called Baltic Security Assistance (BALTSEA) includes all countries in the region except Russia, but also countries outside the region - the United States, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Canada, joining together due to their security concerns in the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea. The idea relies on positive consequences of earlier international support projects to the Baltic countries like BALTBAT - Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion; BALTRON - Joint Baltic Naval Squadron; BALTNET - Joint Baltic Air Surveillance System; BALTDEFCOL - Baltic Defense College. Baltic Security Assistance is a remarkable instrument in avoiding negative consequences of the security dilemma in the Baltic Sea region, and demonstrates the willingness of partners to maintain a stable security environment in the region.

B. BALTIC PROJECTS

The BALTBAT is the first, and probably the best known Baltic military cooperation project. The idea was proposed in 1993 by the former Commander of the Estonian Defense Forces, the U.S.-born General Aleksander Einseln. In 1994, three Baltic countries and five Western partners (the United Kingdom, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway) concluded an agreement to establish a trilateral peacekeeping battalion. The battalion consists of a combined trinational battalion staff, combined headquarters and a logistics company and three national rifle companies. The battalion is formed from volunteers of three Baltic countries.

Since 1995, the Baltic national military units participated in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. They were in former Yugoslavia as a part of the Danish or Swedish units, including UNPROFOR-missions in Croatia and IFOR/SFOR-missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1996-1997, the Estonian Peacekeeping Company participated in Norway's UNIFIL mission in Southern Lebanon. However, there are still problems in finding a permanent mission for the BALTBAT.

The idea of BALTNET project was presented for the first time in 1994 when three Baltic states started to coordinate their efforts to create a joint air surveillance radar system. The Regional Airspace Initiative study, sponsored and conducted by the United States, and extended to the Baltic states in 1996, has found a necessary output here. In 1997, the BALTNET project officially started under the chairmanship of Norway. The main tasks of the project are the building a Regional Air Surveillance Coordination Center and providing equipment and training.

The idea of a common Baltic naval unit (BALTRON) was raised during the Baltic-Danish staff talks in August 1996. The permanent Headquarters was established in Tallinn in April 1998. Estonia and Latvia provided the BALTRON project with two minesweepers and one ship came from Lithuania.

The Baltic Defense College will be situated in Tartu, Estonia, and a study program starts in the middle of 1999. The school will prepare Baltic and international mid-career officers with a perspective to serve in policy-making positions in the national defense structures, joint international (Baltic) military projects, at NATO Headquarters, and other international staff working according to NATO procedures. Sweden has taken a lead in the coordination of the project and professors will come overwhelmingly from sponsor countries (See also the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion, 1998).

C. FROM LONDON INITIATIVE TO BALTIC SECURITY ASSISTANCE

As the Western assistance to the re-establishment of the Baltic defense forces was miscellaneous, it often faced troubles in ensuring that the resources drafted for this purpose are spent rationally and effectively. These experiences led to the recognition that these efforts need to be coordinated between sponsor-countries. The first attempt towards coordination has been made by the initiative of the United Kingdom, who in 1995 initiated the process called London Initiative. This process attempted to coordinate the assistance of sponsor-countries in so-called "defense management issues." Unfortunately, the definition of defense management remained itself unclear. Initially, the London Initiative was mainly focused on defense issues dealt with by Ministries of

Defense, including issues of the budget, defense planning and policy, defense resources management.

Several meetings were organized, but without remarkable progress. At the end of 1996, Norway made a proposal to arrange a special working group, which would be extended to all possible defense assistance and cooperation areas. Norway's proposal was followed by Denmark's similar plans, which tried to give additionally a security dimension to the new cooperation form. This process, later called the Baltic Security Assistance (BALTSEA), started on April 10, 1997 in Oslo, where general guidelines of the new program were decided. The first official meeting in the framework of BALTSEA was conducted in September 1997 in Copenhagen. The main issue concerned the creation of a special database about the military assistance to the Baltic states, which will be established with the coordination of Norway.

BALTSEA does not have a formal structure and a basic document. It consists of regular meetings twice a year, led by the high officials of the Ministries of Defense of the participant countries. The representatives of the respective Foreign Ministries will participate in the fall sessions of the program. In the meeting of fall 1998, the Military Working Group (MWG) was founded. The structure of the BALTSEA is similar to other Baltic projects now. As the main sessions will be more concentrated on political issues, then the MWG will work on a practical level, to implement the guidelines of general meetings (See also Practical Regional Cooperation in PfP, 1997).

D. TWO DIMENSIONS OF BALTSEA

There are two dimensions in the BALTSEA process: sponsor-countries and supported countries. This process can be described as a two-dimensional project. A first dimension is the assistance to the Baltic countries in their rebuilding-process of defense forces. A second dimension is the enhancement of military cooperation between the parties. The contribution of the sponsor-countries to the overall defense assistance support, and the role of the Baltic countries in this process, are described below, on the basis of the minutes of the BALTSEA meeting held on 8 December 1997, in Tallinn, Estonia.

Denmark is a leading nation in the BALTBAT project. It is remarkable that the Danish contribution to the rebuilding of the armed forces in the Baltic states has been extensive, involving almost all areas. Denmark is focused on different fields of training, especially short-term training. Bilateral cooperation plans include the largest number of activities.

Norway has been an initiator of the BALTSEA, and a leading nation for the BALTNET project. Within the framework of BALTSEA, Norway is responsible for the development of Baltic databases. These databases should indicate the information about the defense assistance to the Baltic states.

Sweden increased its participation in the defense cooperation with the Baltic states since the end of 1997 when the Swedish Parliament approved new defense policy guidelines, which paid special attention to enhancement of military cooperation with the Baltic states. The Swedish contribution includes training of army and navy cadets,

training of the BALTBAT antitank platoon and participation in the Nordic-Baltic exercises "Nordic Peace 1998." Latvia is the main recipient of the Swedish military assistance.

Finland has paid relatively more attention to the cooperation with Estonia and has been criticized by the other sponsor countries for that policy. Finnish-Estonian cooperation plans emphasize the training of Estonians in Finland and the work of Finnish defense specialists in Estonia.

Poland's security and defense cooperation with the Baltic states is formed into two separate pillars. First, extensive bilateral cooperation with Lithuania has been developed very effectively during the last years. The Polish-Lithuanian Peacekeeping Battalion is the result of enhanced cooperation. Second, Poland is also interested to enlarge cooperation with Latvia and Estonia. Annual cooperation plans with Latvia and Estonia include five joint activities.

Germany is a leading nation of the BALTRON project. The German training assistance for the Baltic states has also been remarkable. Annual cooperation plans with three Baltic states involve 32 different activities. Medical service and personnel management are mentioned as key areas for assistance.

The United Kingdom has been a traditional ally for the Baltic states since their independent statehood in 1918. It is important that the United Kingdom was the first country that raised the issue of coordination regarding the assistance to the Baltic countries and was the initiator of the 'London Initiative' process. The British assistance includes attachment of British Civil Servants to Baltic MoDs, language and NCO-training.

The United States has paid a lot of attention to the issue of Baltic security, which has been formed into the Baltic Action Plan, and the signing of the Baltic Charter on January 1998. The present cooperation gives priority to the BALTNET initiative. The United States will also support the IDAB project, which is a Western defense consultation working group for Baltic states, including retired high-level officers from sponsor countries.

France has participated in the Baltic cooperation since 1994 when the first annual bilateral cooperation plan was signed. Cooperation has remained at the same level, at 10-15 bilateral activities within a year. There are no signs that this cooperation will be enhanced because the French security concerns are linked to Mediterranean and southern part of Europe. Nevertheless, cooperation plans embrace language training and officer training courses in France.

Netherlands pays more attention to the BALTRON project.

Belgium joined the BALTSEA only in the late 1997. Belgium's contribution is similar to Netherlands and is based on forwarding experiences from Netherlands-Belgium joint navy.

Switzerland participated in the BALTSEA since 1997. The main contribution of this country is connected with defense policy courses and officer and NCO training. The participation of Switzerland has been especially remarkable because of their traditional neutrality and non-involvement into the Europeanization process.

Iceland has been an observer at the BALTSEA meetings. Although Iceland has no independent defense capability, she has been one of the main supporters of the Baltic states in their integration in European and Transatlantic structures.

Canada participated in the first meetings of the London Initiative. Because of internal problems related with the illegal arms trade operations, Canada withdrew from the political coordination of the Baltic assistance programs. However, the practical assistance through the MTAP (Military Training Assistance Program) continued, and recently Canada rejoined the BALTSEA group.

Baltic countries have determined their responsibilities in coordinating international Baltic projects. *Estonia* coordinates the BALTRON and BALTDEFCOL projects, *Latvia* is a host-country for the BALTBAT project, and *Lithuania* is the Baltic coordinator for the BALTNET project. According to development plans for the near future, Estonia plans to raise the defense budget to 2% of GNP, establish a Combat Readiness Force, and the Rapid Readiness Force. Latvia's plans are focused to the changes in defense structures in which Land Forces are planned to serve within the National Guard Structure. Lithuania plans to reorganize force structure and including streamlining the command and control system, developing procedures for officer selection, centralizing basic training, establishing a combat service support school, and developing the military academy (See also Minutes of the BALTSEA Meeting, 1997).

E. GOING AHEAD

Further development of BALTSEA seems to take the key role for adjusting both parties of this process, the Baltic countries and sponsor states. This process will continue in order to guarantee rational use of defense and security assistance, and involve the initiative of a broader security dimension including the other aspects of assistance beyond

purely military ones. The main goal of BALTSEA is primarily to establish reliable armed forces in the Baltic States which can be tools in guaranteeing the sovereignty of these countries, and, of course, to promote democracy, stability, and cooperation in the whole Baltic Sea region, and Europe, and last but not least, have a certain influence on global issues.

There are two ways to further develop BALTSEA. First, BALTSEA is an enhanced model of its predecessor, the London Initiative, and deals mainly with technical adjustment of cooperation plans, coordination between bilateral cooperation plans, and exchange of information. Second, BALTSEA is also a forum for political consultation with the aim to elaborate common understanding in different defense and security related issues. As the project is still young, it is rather difficult to predict which way will dominate in the future.

The BALTSEA is not only an international assistance project, but it also promotes defense cooperation between different countries. For the future, it would be useful for Baltic countries to join such regional cooperation elements with other larger cooperation security arrangements, first of all PfP cooperation, but also WEU, OSCE, UN initiatives, regional cooperation and other possible cooperative security arrangements. The BALTSEA program represents a positive example of cooperative security that brings countries with different institutional background together in building up a stable security environment in the region. The program is under way and it has not open all its resources yet. Nevertheless, the program fits exactly with the general political needs of the modern era described in the first chapters, if there is the interest and concern about security on the Baltic Sea, and partners cooperate in solving the respective security dilemmas.

VI. DIFFERENT PATHS FOR COOPERATION IN ENHANCING SECURITY ON THE BALTIC SEA

A. COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION

As mentioned before, the Baltic Sea region's security dynamics have changed. During the Cold War it was a clearly distinguished potential conflict area for the superpowers. It has subsequently become a multipolar cooperation environment. The countries of the region are linked with each other through different institutions, agreements, and bilateral cooperation arrangements. These processes, started for the most part in the European political landscape in the 1990s, have created new possibilities for deepening the positive outcomes of regionalization in the Baltic Sea region.

Still, changing European realities could support regionalization and create new ties between people living on the shores of the Baltic Sea. Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are on the waiting list of the European Union. In the long perspective, a Nordic-Baltic imagined community could develop as a broader regional identity encompassing all the Baltic Sea countries. In ten or twenty years' time, expanding and deepening economic, environmental, political and cultural cooperation may well contribute to a sense of belonging together: a new region in a new Europe. (Vihalemm in Lauristin et al., 1997, p. 162)

A lengthy confrontation with the involvement of local and global great powers has been replaced by a strong emergence of cooperative security.

The Baltic Sea region includes a remarkable number of small states¹⁴ with their specific security concerns. Small states tend to be more interested in collective security arrangements than are larger states because their military capability makes it difficult for them to maintain their sovereignty in potential conflicts with stronger neighbors. "Only rarely can European small states point to a period in which their security dilemmas were alleviated and their security desires were largely satisfied." (Gärtner and Sens in Peters, 1996, p. 201). Therefore, small states frequently support the idea of multinational institutionalization. In the current European security environment, only two institutions seem to have the potential as alliances for collective defense. The traditional Western military alliance, NATO, has demonstrated its capability already. However, especially in the post-Cold War era, the tendencies to seek security and defense pillars in the framework of the European Union, and using for that purpose the organization of the Western European Union, are increasing.

The role of another Trans Eurasian security institution, the OSCE, in this particular region has remained secondary, at least from the Baltic regional aspect. The OSCE has been particularly involved only with the Russian minority questions in Estonia and Latvia. This is the reason why the OSCE option was excluded from possible regional security options. Similarly, the United Nations has not been involved with the Northern European issues due to the lack of serious conflicts. At the same time, the contribution of Baltic Sea countries to UN conflict resolution and their participation in peacekeeping

¹⁴ It is difficult to determine which states should be placed in this category. "The set of European states we refer to here excludes the European great powers and the so-called 'middle states' of Italy and Turkey, as well as ceremonial or microstates such as Monaco or Liechtenstein." (Peters, 1996, p.179).

missions has been remarkable. Nordic countries especially have had a long tradition in peace operations.

Table 7 illustrates how European and Transatlantic institutions are presented in the Baltic Sea region.

Table 7. Institutionalization in the Baltic Sea Region

State	NATO/PfP	WEU	Other institutions
Germany	NATO; EAPC	member	EU; OSCE; EC; CBSS
Iceland	NATO; EAPC	associate member	EFTA/EEA; NC; CBSS; OSCE; EC
Norway	NATO; EAPC	associate member	EFTA/EEA; NC; CBSS; OSCE; EC
Denmark	NATO; EAPC	observer	EU ¹⁵ ; NC; OSCE; EC; CBSS
Finland	PfP + ID ¹⁶ ; EAPC	observer	EU; NC; OSCE; EC; CBSS
Sweden	PfP; EAPC	observer,	EU; NC; OSCE; EC; CBSS
Estonia	PfP + ID; EAPC	associate partner	BA/BC; OSCE; EC; CBSS
Latvia	PfP + ID; EAPC	associate partner	BA/BC; OSCE; EC; CBSS
Lithuania	PfP + ID; EAPC	associate partner	BA/BC; OSCE; EC; CBSS
Russia	PfP, NRPJC; EAPC	-	CIS; OSCE; EC; CBSS
Poland	NATO/PfP (becoming member); EAPC	associate partner	OSCE; EC; CBSS

The enlargement of security institutions has had a positive impact in diminishing security fears. When states cooperate with each other, this helps to avoid the emergence

¹⁵ Except Greenland and the Faroe Islands.

¹⁶ Participants of the Intensified Dialogue between NATO and partner countries (16+1).

of security dilemmas. Such dilemmas arise when the security concerns of one state depend on the activities of a neighbor country. According to Clive Archer, a British political scientist, cooperative security "is the type of security arrangement, which represents an attempt to maintain security by consensus. Here the emphasis is less on identifying an aggressor and more on identifying problems that can lead to conflict and then attempting to resolve them collectively." (Archer in Brundtland and Snider, 1994, p. 120). The Baltic Sea countries belong to different institutions, and there are few examples of regional collective security arrangements (NATO cooperation in the region; Baltic cooperation; Polish-Lithuanian cooperation; Danish-German cooperation). There is still no interest (and no acknowledgement of the practical needs) in building distinctive collective security institutions for the entire region. The existing frameworks are able to cover the main security concerns of the countries. However, the establishment of a regional security forum, with the purpose of mitigating possible interstate tensions, would be desirable, and the Council of the Baltic Sea States could aspire to this role.

It should not be forgotten that security is much more than the strengthening of institutions or the expansion of military cooperation. These are of course important, and it is difficult to envision a stable security environment without either. However, stability in Europe cannot be achieved solely through institutions and military actions that respond to outbreaks of inter-state or intra-state violence. Peace and security in Europe will to a large extent depend on the ability of European countries to develop structures for conflict prevention. (Gärtner and Sens in Peters, 1996, p. 181)

The security dilemma in the Baltic Sea region is mainly related to the instability of Russia, the major military power in the region. Therefore, the other countries have attempted to solve their security problems by joining with Transatlantic and European

security institutions. The Baltic countries and Poland applied for membership in NATO and the EU. Sweden and Finland joined the EU and enhanced their security cooperation with NATO.

Territorial and ethnic conflicts tend to be among the most difficult interstate quarrels to solve. Changes in territory and population were remarkable in the Baltic Sea region after World War II. However, in contrast to the Balkans and other crisis areas in the contemporary world, violent international conflicts did not emerge in the Baltic Sea region. Today, with the sole exception of Russia, all the countries in the region can be considered stable democracies. Francis Fukuyama has emphasized the importance of the internal policies of particular countries for the international political environment. In 1992, when a member of the U.S. State Department, he wrote, “while the peoples of the Soviet Transcaucasus have already been guilty of acts of unspeakable brutality, there is little evidence to date that the nationalisms of the northern half of Eastern Europe – Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic states – will develop in an aggressive direction incompatible with liberalism. This is not to say that existing states like Czechoslovakia may not fracture, or that Poland and Lithuania will not have border disputes. But this need not lead to the maelstrom of political violence characteristic of other areas, and will be counteracted by pressures for economic integration.” (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 273). Some of these factors, in the Baltic Sea region, are discussed below, and presented in Table 8 and Table 9.

The most prominent territorial changes took place during World War II. Germany lost huge territories, including old German areas like East Pomerania, Silesia, and East Prussia, to Poland and Russia. Finland lost some border regions in Karelia and Northern

Finland to Russia. Estonia and Latvia suffered from minor territorial cessions to Russia, and Poland lost its eastern part to the Soviet Union (now Belarus and Ukraine).

Table 8. International Disputes in the Baltic Sea Region

Border conflicts	Estonia/Russia (Land border: Petseri and Narva region)
	Latvia/Russia (Land border: Abrene/Potalovo region)
	Lithuania/Russia (Maritime and riparian boundary: Kaliningrad region)
	Latvia/Estonia and Latvia/Lithuania (Maritime border)
	Norway/Russia (Maritime boundary: Svalbard)
	Denmark/Iceland/UK/Ireland (Rockall continental shelf)
	Lithuania/Belarus (Border demarcation)

The minority issues have not caused violent clashes in the Baltic Sea region. Nations around the Baltic Sea have practiced living together successfully for centuries. The drastic shifts in interstate migration took part during and after World War II. The historic Baltic German minority was forced to leave the Baltic countries. The Estonian Swedes returned to their Fatherland in 1944, despite the fact that they had lived in the Estonian territory since the 12th and 13th centuries. Many Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians left their countries because of the Soviet occupation, and now, for example, there is a relatively big Estonian community in Sweden. At the same time, a remarkable number of Russians moved to the Baltic countries. For example, the proportion of Russians in Estonia grew from 8% of the total population in 1934 to 30% in 1989. Due to territorial changes, many Polish, Finnish and German people were forced to go back to their national territories.

These changes actually created the preconditions for serious ethnic conflicts. Russians in the Baltic states who enjoyed a status of dominant nation in the Soviet Union, found themselves a minority in the reborn independent countries. A huge German minority stayed in Poland but, as in many Communist countries, they were not allowed to identify themselves as Germans for many years and were described in the official statistics as Poles. The Polish minority in Lithuania felt uncomfortable in a situation in which they had minority status in a Lithuanian-dominated country.¹⁷

Table 9. Baltic Minorities in the Territories of Other Baltic Sea Countries¹⁸

Danish	50,000 Germany; 35,000 Sweden; 12,000 Norway; 7,830 Greenland.
Estonians	60,000 Sweden; 56,000 Russia; 6,000 Finland; 3,000 Latvia.
Finnish	443,000 Sweden; 31,570 Russia; 16,622 Estonia; 12,000 Norway.
Germans	1,400,000 Poland; 896,000 Russia; 23,000 Denmark.
Latvians	29,000 Russia; 8,000 Germany; 6,000 Sweden; 5,000 Lithuania; 2,000 Estonia.
Lithuanians	67,000 Russia; 35,000 Latvia; 11,500 Poland; 2,205 Estonia.
Norwegians	28,000 Sweden.
Polish	258,000 Lithuania; 241,000 Germany; 94,000 Russia; 57,000 Latvia.
Russians	861,600 Latvia; 474,834 Estonia; 360,000 Germany; 344,000 Lithuania; 60,000 Poland; 10,000 Finland; 3,000 Norway.
Swedish	296,000 Finland; 21,000 Norway.

¹⁷ Specific problems are connected with non-state nations: Inuits in Greenland, Faroes in the Faroe Islands, the Sami people in Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia, numerous small Finno-Ugric nations in Russia and so forth.

¹⁸ Data is presented in the Ethnologue website:
<http://www.sil.org/ethnologue/countries/Europe.html>, Internet.

Territorial and population changes constitute a minor security dilemma in this region. There is no evidence that it will develop into a serious interstate conflict.

B. NATO/PfP OPTION

Through the PfP program, NATO has already reached Northern Europe. We should not underestimate the importance of NATO, not only in guaranteeing security for its member states, but also in promoting democracy and cooperation in the Western cultural hemisphere. Zbigniew Brzezinski has recently noted that “without NATO, it is most unlikely – for the same reasons – that the EC and now the EU would have ever come into being.” (Brzezinski, 1998, p. 13). After the Cold War, NATO became a more important political player in the Baltic region. The strengthening of NATO’s position in the region is reflected by the reunification of Germany, by the approval of Poland as a new member of NATO, and by the active PfP cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Some studies have argued that in the further enlargement of NATO the Allies should not concentrate only on the southeastern flank of Europe, but pay more attention to Northern Europe. Brzezinski suggested that in a second round of enlargement NATO might pursue a two-dimensional course – one country from the south (possibly Slovenia), and one country from the north (possibly Lithuania) (Brzezinski, 1998, pp. 16-17).

Due to its historically minor role in this area, and the absence of violent conflicts, NATO did not develop separate collective defense structures in the Baltic Sea region. After the reorganization of the NATO structure in 1994, Norway belonged to the

AFNORTHWEST command chain in High Wycombe, in Great Britain. Denmark, together with Germany, is under the AFCENT command in Brunssum, the Netherlands.

Since the end of the Cold War, Denmark has been very active in developing security relations around the Baltic Sea. Together with Iceland, Denmark has been advocate of the Baltic states in their integration with the European structures. Denmark has also started to pay enhanced attention to security and defense cooperation with Germany and Poland. The latter has recently been accepted as a new member of NATO, and will probably belong to the same command as Denmark and Germany.

The official policies of Sweden and Finland still reject NATO membership. However, there are tendencies to consider such membership in the future. Finland especially has taken several serious steps to come closer to NATO. A study conducted in Finland in 1995 concluded that there is no immediate need to join NATO because of the lack of threats. At the same time, Finland has promoted cooperation with NATO through existing programs like PfP and PARP. Finland also decided to participate in the Intensified Dialogue process which is a special mechanism for regulating relations and cooperation between NATO and applicant countries. "We have observed that Finland applied for EU membership in the wake of the Swedish application in fear of otherwise being isolated as a gray area between the EU and Russia. In view of the difference in security outlook, one might entertain the possibility of Finland being more interested in NATO membership than Sweden." (Brundtland in Brundtland and Snider, 1994, p. 29).

Many prominent Finnish and Swedish diplomats and researchers (for example Max Jacobsson and Ingemar Dörfer) have made statements supporting NATO membership for their countries (Dörfer, 1997, p. 84). The non-alignment policy of

Finland and Sweden does not mean that these countries do not recognize the positive role of NATO in stabilizing the post-Cold War world. They are generally not against NATO enlargement to the Baltic states. "Swedish Defense Minister Björn von Sydow thinks that regional security would increase if the Baltic States joined NATO and that Kaliningrad is not a problem because Russian sovereignty there is uncontested even though it would then be sandwiched between two NATO members, Lithuania and Poland." (Blank, 1998, p. 65). NATO enlargement to the Baltic countries, with Sweden and Finland remaining outside of NATO's framework, might cause another security dilemma. If the NATO flag was hoisted in the Baltic states, in these circumstances, Sweden and Finland would enjoy NATO's security umbrella without any obligation to NATO.

NATO enlargement to the North has not been discussed much yet. While Russia continues to treat NATO enlargement as a threat to its security, the possible membership of Finland and the Baltic states will change the security environment in the region a great deal. "Although Danish – and some German – leaders speak about the desirability of NATO eventually enlarging to the North, many in the Alliance might be skeptical about, if not opposed to, the prospect of Finland in NATO, given its 1,200-km border with Russia. Others, however, would support the entry of Finland, Sweden, and the Baltic states as a Northern package – but only an appropriate future date." (Asmus and Nurick, 1995, p. 136). From the perspective of the Baltic states, the accession of Sweden and Finland is highly desirable. "According to other schools of thought, Baltic security would be enhanced by Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO; then NATO's shadow would fall over the Baltic states." (Dörfer, 1997, p. 84). The new geopolitical situation

eliminates obstacles set up by Russia, even though Moscow has constantly demanding the buffer-zone between its frontiers and NATO frontiers.

NATO's PfP program, is currently the only military cooperation forum covering the Baltic Sea region entirely. NATO members such as Denmark, Iceland, Germany, and Norway (and Poland in the near future), together with the Baltic states, which have demonstrated their readiness to join NATO at the first possible opportunity, form a considerable stronghold in the Baltic Sea region. Sweden and Finland, though officially still uninterested in NATO membership, have actually started an extensive program of cooperation with NATO. Even Russia is a participant in the PfP program, although the official statements from Russia are still frequently oriented towards bipolar opposition.

In this respect, NATO can offer an even more acceptable regional cooperation formula through its enhanced PfP program, with the EAPC as a political forum. It would be difficult to imagine Russia as a member of the EU, but theoretically, in the absence of opposing alliances, NATO membership for Russia would be achievable in the long run, if democratization in Russia ultimately succeeds. "Moreover, Russia, if it is to be a truly European national state and not a nostalgic craver of empire, must accept the fact that democratic European states do wish to coalesce in a joint security framework with America, and that sovereign right cannot be denied them." (Brzezinski, 1998, p. 17).

NATO enlargement is related to the cooperative security dilemma. Countries try to avoid remaining in a "gray zone" between potential adversaries, and make attempts to protect their security interests in the framework of collective security and defense institutions. It would be very dangerous for European security to set up Russia as a world power again with its global interests and to stop the NATO enlargement because of

Russia's security fears. One of NATO's main responsibilities is to find a prudent way to diminish these security fears and to show Moscow that the NATO enlargement process generally will guarantee peace and stability in Europe. A positive solution will include the involvement of Russia in cooperative security arrangements, which take Russia away from the outsider's role.

C. EU/WEU OPTION

At the moment, the EU/WEU option as a possible security arrangement for the Baltic Sea region tends to be very controversial and complicated. Despite the fact that the European Union has recently extended its borders in Northern Europe to Sweden and Finland, the security cooperation in the EU framework tends to be in the background. Nordic countries traditionally support separation of the WEU from the EU, and represent the orthodox view in the EU, which stresses economic and cultural cooperation, and separates security and defense policy pillars from the content of the EU. "Orthodox NATO nations such as the United Kingdom will not allow the WEU to be integrated fully into the EU." (Dörfer, 1997, p. 74).¹⁹

Sweden and Finland have often supported the British position. Their negative attitude towards common European Union's security and defense options was related to concerns about losing a traditional non-alignment policy. Nevertheless, in the new

¹⁹ The eligibility of the EU members to join the WEU has caused concerns in some NATO countries due to the so-called "back-door commitment" risk. A number of the Allies (including the United States) support a principle of "congruence" – that WEU members should be also NATO members. In the case of the Baltic states, it causes another security dilemma, if they are not admitted to NATO because of Russia's claims. (See also Yost, 1998, p.379).

security environment both countries have started to reassess their positions. For example, on October 8, 1996, Sweden and Finland suggested an amendment in which they proposed to enhance the EU's role in certain fields of security cooperation. "The Union's role in the areas of crisis management that require military means, that is to say, certain types of humanitarian assignments and peace-keeping efforts need to be strengthened. Sweden and Finland therefore want to give the EU enhanced possibilities of utilizing the entire spectrum of instruments needed for effective and credible action in this area." (Lindström, 1997, p. 17). Therefore, we may conclude that Sweden and Finland are moving slowly towards an acknowledgement of the European Union's possible utility in security and defense cooperation. They do not seem to be ready to join the WEU in the near future, but they are striving to make a contribution to the issue of European Security and Defense Identity (See also European Security and Finnish Defense, 1997, p. 20).

Norway and Iceland have remained outside of the EU. They have become members of the European Economic Area, and they are members of NATO. Therefore, it is doubtful whether they would promote a separate, purely European security cooperation. "Norway is also the country where the internal situation makes EU membership most problematic. This follows from the nature of *norskhed* (Norwegianness). Norway is founded on the belief that it is possible to keep the whole territory populated, that there is a fisher on each island and farmer on each *fjell*. This would hardly be possible in the EU." (Buzan and Waeber in Øberg, 1992, p. 96). Denmark is a member of the European Union, but its oversea territories (Greenland and the Faroe Islands) are not. Denmark did not become a member of the WEU, and in terms of defense and security cooperation seems to have the same positions as Norway and Iceland.

Germany, currently the only full member of the WEU on the Baltic Sea, is trying to promote both security and defense pillars, transatlantic NATO and European EU/WEU, simultaneously. The positions of Poland and the Baltic states in this respect are close to Germany's. The EU started negotiations with Poland and Estonia about their joining the EU in the "first enlargement round." Latvia and Lithuania are willing to follow them. Russia's official policy is more tolerant towards EU enlargement than NATO enlargement. It would be very difficult to imagine Russia as a member of the European Union. Russia has created a similar institution, the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), and it seems impossible to assimilate these two institutions. As the security pillar is not a primary form of cooperation in the European Union, and economic and cultural cooperation dominate, the exclusion of Russia from the EU does not increase the risk of a security dilemma emerging.

Despite all these factors that have encouraged a cautious attitude towards European integration among the Nordic nations, the "European" EU/WEU option is still a viable way to satisfy security concerns in the region. In this respect, Finland's proposal to create a "Nordic dimension" within the framework of the European Union will be a positive step in enhancing regional cooperation, which later might also embrace the security cooperation.²⁰

²⁰ The concept of the "Nordic dimension" has been proposed to the EU by Finland with the purpose of enhancing regional interstate cooperation in the framework of the EU. The meaning of the "Nordic dimension" is described in the Finnish "Government's Report to the Parliament. 14 February 1995." [ONLINE], <http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/ms-doc/state-fi/rep-fi.html>, Internet.

D. NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT

The golden era of the neutrality for small states was probably before World War II. On the basis of both World Wars' experiences, it can be concluded that this security measure was not effective. "The disadvantage of the neutrality option is that it relies heavily on prevailing conditions for its maintenance and ultimately on the willingness of other states to honor it." (Gärtner and Sens in Peters, 1996, p. 194). If the geographical location allowing, neutrality was pursued by fighting nations (the most prominent examples were Sweden and Switzerland), but very often small countries have been occupied as a function of the military strategy of their bigger neighbors.

Neutrality has been a desirable security option for the Nordic and Baltic countries. Before World War II, Denmark and Norway, as well as the Baltic countries, pursued policies of official neutrality. However, Norway and Denmark were occupied by Germany in 1940, and the Soviet Union established its authority in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The latter occupation lasted until 1991. The failure of neutrality was the reason for seeking other security options for these countries. Norway and Denmark joined NATO in 1949. The Baltic countries have been active in seeking collective security and defense options since reestablishing their sovereignty in 1991.

Sweden was not involved directly in World War II, and for that reason plus traditional antipathy to military involvement, continued its neutrality through the Cold War period. Finland, at the same time, suffered because of its alliance with Germany in World War II, and was forced to turn its policy towards neutrality. After the Cold War, both countries, Sweden and Finland, moved their security policies from neutrality to non-

alignment, seeking cooperative security options which would exclude direct involvement with collective defense alliances.

Neutrality and non-alignment were frequently recommended as an appropriate security policy arrangement for new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe. However, after the recent changes in the European political order, and the establishment of cooperation-oriented institutions, it is hard to see a place for neutrality. In the past, small states often turned to neutrality, with the purpose of avoiding conflicts. In the modern era, the best guarantee of security is involvement with collective and cooperative security arrangements. Today, considering global changes, neutrality and non-alignment may be a transitional stage on the way to collective and cooperative security institutions.

E. REGIONAL SECURITY OPTIONS

Regionalization is a valuable element in seeking a stable security environment and solving different security dilemmas, but it is not an elixir which removes all problems. In security matters, regionalization is difficult to pursue outside of overall security concerns. "The impact of these [regional] organizations should not be overestimated. While these organizations may relax tensions and improve the political climate, they do not, and cannot solve the fundamental security dilemmas of small states. Regional organizations are limited in scope and resources, and cannot address the larger political, military, or social agendas confronting Europe." (Gärtner and Sens in Peters, 1996, p. 194).

The regional security cooperation options for the Baltic Sea region have been of considerable interest to Russia. In 1997, President Yeltsin proposed to promote military

cooperation and to conclude a security pact linking the Baltic Sea countries. “Neither the Nordic nations nor the Baltic states are interested in a regionalization of Baltic security.” (Dörfer, 1997, p. 83). Yeltsin’s proposal was not very enthusiastically received by other Baltic Sea countries. Russia has remained outside the main cooperative and collective regional security arrangements, but has been very active in seeking new regional security options.

Finland and Sweden have made some “soft security” initiatives made in the Baltic Sea region. For example, in a proposal drafted in April 1998 after the meeting of Nordic Foreign Ministers, the Foreign Ministers of Sweden and Finland, Lena Hjelm-Wallen and Tarja Halonen, made a statement about strengthening regional security cooperation in such matters as “crime-prevention work, border guarding functions, rescue services and civil and military traffic, expanded training in peacekeeping activities and regional and deeper cooperation within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.”²¹ At the same time, both Ministers gave a negative evaluation of the Russian proposals and expressed their wish to promote overall defense and security cooperation within the main European structures.

The Baltic region offers a variety of security options and preferences. We can conclude that it is still difficult to establish common collective security arrangements in the region. At the same time, cooperative security formulas in the region could be acceptable for the majority of the countries. “Thus, it seems important to articulate the contours of the emerging Baltic Sea region in terms of a cooperative and ‘wider’

²¹ “Deeper Security Bid,” *Finnish News Agency*, (21 April 1998); available <http://www.virtual.finland.fi/nr/english/bulletin/default.html>, Internet

understanding of security.” (Waeber and Joenniemi in Wellmann, 1994, p. 52). The PfP cooperation, Baltic Security Assistance program, and extensive bilateral security and defense cooperation could provide a solution for the security dilemma today.

VII. CONCLUSION

This analysis indicates that security cooperation can play a significant role in avoiding security dilemmas. The purpose of regional security cooperation is, first, to establish a stable security environment, and , second, to build up effective cooperative and cooperative security arrangements. The post-Cold War security dilemmas in the Baltic Sea region are based to a great extent on the security environment shaped during the Cold War. There are basically four main security concerns in the Baltic Sea region:

- The Baltic question. The Baltic states have often remained in the spheres of influence of their stronger neighbors. However, the current general orientation to cooperation does not give any reason to establish “buffer-zones.” One possible option is to delay the second round of NATO enlargement until the EU is ready to enlarge.
- Instability in Russia. Russia is probably the main security concern in the region. If democracy ultimately wins in Russia, and Russia becomes a more stable country, this will help create a “zone of peace” in the Baltic Sea region.
- Questions connected with arms control issues and CFE and START-II. Russia has demanded modifications in the CFE treaty, which could increase Russia’s military presence and capability in the region.
- Kaliningrad (Königsberg) area. The highly militarized Russian enclave on the Baltic Sea creates security concerns not only in neighboring Poland and Lithuania, but in all the countries of the region. There is no practical need to preserve Russia’s military outpost outside its main territory in an era of cooperation and mutual interdependence.

The escape from the security dilemma depends on the success of the development of different cooperative security arrangements in the Baltic Sea region. This paper has analyzed some special frameworks which offer opportunities for promoting collective security arrangements. The NATO/PfP framework emerged as a serious cooperative security option after the Partnership for Peace program was established in 1994. The PfP made it possible to include in the security cooperation former neutral countries like Finland and Sweden, former Warsaw Pact countries like Poland, and former Soviet republics, including the Baltic states and Russia. The reunification of Germany and the imminent membership of Poland in the Alliance, have made the NATO flag more visible in the Baltic Sea region. The Baltic states have applied for NATO membership, and Sweden and Finland have deepened cooperation with NATO. Even Russia participates at a modest level in the PfP program, although its official policy has remained relatively hostile towards NATO. This statement should be qualified, however, because Russian forces are participating in the NATO-led SFOR in Bosnia, and dialogue continues in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

The EU/WEU option has some positive outcomes. The WEU has created a four-level formula of cooperation: member, associate member, observer, or associate partner. However, of all the members of the Council of Baltic Sea States, Germany is currently the only full member of the WEU. Denmark is a member of NATO and the EU but has decided to be an observer in the WEU. We can distinguish two standpoints regarding the enhancement of security and defense cooperation in the framework of the EU or the WEU. Denmark, Norway, and Iceland represent an orthodox view in security policy: that transatlantic cooperation through NATO is sufficient and there is no need to pursue a

distinct European Security and Defense Identity through the WEU and the EU. Other countries do not exclude the European option. Sweden and Finland, as members of the EU but not NATO, would be especially interested in the promotion of the European Security and Defense Identity. However, they attach a meaning to the ESDI that differs from that favored by a majority of EU members. The ESDI would be an option for the Baltic states, which face obstacles in joining NATO because of Russia's opposition. At the same time, Russia seems to be more tolerant regarding their membership in the EU or even the WEU.

In recent years, different security cooperation arrangements have developed rapidly in the Baltic Sea region. In addition to traditional forms of regional cooperation like Nordic cooperation, Baltic cooperation, or Nordic-Baltic cooperation, new bilateral or multilateral cooperative or collective security arrangements have emerged. At Denmark's initiative, extensive Danish-German-Polish defense cooperation has started. One goal of this cooperation is to prepare Poland for NATO membership. Recently, this cooperation has extended to the Baltic states. Finland has paid a lot of attention to the establishment of capable Defense Forces in Estonia, and Poland and Lithuania have pursued extensive defense cooperation with the same goals. The development of special programs in guaranteeing the security of the Baltic states has often gained remarkable success. The BALTSEA project supplements these efforts with a security policy dimension and helps to coordinate assistance from Western countries, simultaneously making progress in multinational security and defense cooperation in the Baltic Sea region.

The neutrality option, which was popular among the Nordic and Baltic countries before World War II, lost its credibility in the war. After World War II, only Sweden and Finland remained neutral. Sweden was the only country in the region that was not a belligerent during the war. Stockholm tried to establish a Scandinavian Defense Union together with Denmark and Norway, but this effort failed, and Denmark and Norway joined NATO. Finland, owing in part to its experience during World War II, was forced by terms of its peace agreement with the U.S.S.R. to turn its policy towards neutrality. After the Cold War, Sweden and Finland moved their security policies from neutrality to non-alignment, seeking cooperative security options which would exclude collective defense commitments and direct involvement with alliances such as NATO. Nevertheless, today, in the absence of bipolarity and antagonistic alliances in that region, the neutrality option seems impractical and irrelevant. If Sweden and Finland joined NATO, this would change the security environment on the Eastern coast of the Baltic Sea, and probably make the accession of the Baltic states to NATO easier to accomplish.

The NATO and the EU enlargements must include the Baltic Sea region, in so far as it is possible.²² The enlargement of security institutions like NATO must include all democracies that are able to contribute to regional peace and stability and that are willing to cooperate in this respect. The enlargement of institutions which are mainly based on economic cooperation, such as the European Union, has certainly firm constraints, which

²² The main difference in NATO and EU enlargement in the Baltic Sea region concerns Russia. In principle, Russia would be able to join NATO, because it has security interests in Europe and NATO is mainly European security institution. In the case of EU, the joining of Russia may be more problematic. Russia participates already in similar institution CIS, and Russia is too large and diverse for the EU to incorporate.

are determined by an ability to effectively participate in the common economic and cultural complex.

Cooperative security dilemmas in the region need a positive solution by building a stable security environment, and strengthening collective and cooperative security arrangements. The Baltic Sea region is a compound security complex, in which the security of each of the Baltic Sea countries depends on the security of others²³. Therefore, security is a sum of the concerns of all the Baltic Sea nations and no country may apply for privileges in this respect, including Russia. If any nation sets itself in contrast with others, and connects democratic institutionalization with its security problems, this situation may cause instability in the region and a return to the pattern of bipolar opposition. All the countries in the region, except Russia, are stable democracies today. Democratic Transatlantic and European institutions, such as NATO and the EU, are the main guarantees of democracy and regional peace. Therefore, if the enlargement of the democratic institutions to the countries of the Baltic Sea region is stopped, it might create insecurity among the excluded nations and they might turn away from democracy.

²³ As the security complex, the Baltic Sea region is undivided. For example, the security of Nordic countries depends on security of Baltic countries and vice versa or the security of Poland depends on security of Russia and vice versa.

[The text in this section is extremely faint and illegible. It appears to be a multi-paragraph document, possibly a report or a letter, with several lines of text per paragraph. The content is not discernible.]

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