

Exhibit 2676

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

SAKI Sadao, et al

A F F I D A V I T

TANAKA SHINICHI

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I, Tanaka Shinichi, am a former Lieutenant-General. My present residence is No. 2042, Mizusawa-Mura Yokoseko, Mie-gun, Mie Prefecture.

2. I held the office of chief of the First Department (operations) in the General Staff Office from 12 October 1940 to 7 December 1942.

3. The following is my deposition regarding operations plans against the Soviet Union and the proposed expansion of armaments in Manchuria in 1941, in planning which I took part.

4. In accordance with custom, the Army's plans for operations against the Russians for 1941 were formed in the winter of 1940. They technically prescribed as the operations necessary for the defense of Japan Proper, Manchuria (in conformity with the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol which stipulated the joint-defense duties), and Korea, and the basic principle of the plan consisted in shifting from a protracted defensive to the offensive.

I shall hereinafter furnish necessary data about this matter:

(1) At the beginning of November 1941, General Sugiyama Gen, Chief of the General Staff (who took command of the General Staff Office as a whole and was responsible for national defense and tactics), indicated to the Vice-Chief (who conducted the general affairs of the office and was in charge of coördinating policy and operations) and myself, chief of the First Department (in charge of matters relating to operations), that in drawing up and deliberating on the plans of operations against Russia we should steadfastly adhere to the lines of national policy which had been established in regard to the adjustment of Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations and to the policy which had been clearly shown to the Kwantung Army by the Supreme Command in August 1940; that is, the basic policy of reserving a part of the army to provide against Soviet attack and to maintain peace in the North. I was at the same time informed by the Chief of the General Staff that he and the War Minister had reached complete agreement on that fundamental principle.

(2) The Second Department of the General Staff Office (whose duty it was to obtain intelligence and judge the situation, and whose chief was Lieutenant-General Tsuchihashi Yūitsu until the beginning of 1941, later succeeded by Major-General Okamoto Seifuku) came to the following conclusion regarding the situation at that time.

In the winter of 1940-41 the Kwantung Army had 10 divisions and 500 planes as against 30 sharpshooter divisions

(According to information, the Russian forces stationed in the Far East, east of Baikal, reached 38 divisions, but I, for one, roughly estimate them at 30 divisions in this case) and 2,500 planes which formed the main strength of the Soviet Army in the Far East. If the two Japanese divisions in Korea, and the four Russian divisions stationed in the Siberian military district, were added respectively, Japan would have 12 divisions as against 34 sharpshooter divisions of the Soviet Army. As a rule, the Soviet Army in the Far East had in the past aimed at maintenance of three times the strength of the Kwantung Army, but in those days the growing number of her planes and tanks tended to increase further the ratio of the Soviets' fighting power against Japan; and the Russian strength judged to be used in the Far East in wartime reached about 50 divisions.

With the progress of her successive five-year plans, the Soviet preparation for mobilization, concentration and engagement upon the outbreak of a war remarkably increased the speed of its effectuation; it would, in our judgment, have been completed in three or four months at the latest. Japan had to take precautions especially because the Russian Army stationed in the Far East had adopted even in peace time a high standard of quasi-wartime organization and more than 100 long-range bombers stationed south of the Ussuri were in a position to raid Tokyo and other important areas in Japan Proper at any time, these being well within their bombing range. Out of the total mobilized strength of the Soviet Union, the sharpshooter divisions amounted to about 150, of which about 50 were on the Far Eastern front. Therefore, even in the case of a two-front war, to say nothing of a single-front war in the Far East, it must be calculated that considerably more strength would be available for the Soviets in the Far East. Russia stood in a more advantageous position than Japan in regard also to the supply of strength after the commencement of operations. In addition to 4,500 first-line planes she had 2,000 second-line planes which could be instantly used as first-line aircraft. Moreover, judging from the fact that in the Russo-Finnish war in the winter of 1939 the Russian Army carried on operations maintaining a line of communications extending over 200 kilometres in 50 degrees below zero, and in view of the efficiency of the Russian supply at the time of the Nomonhan Incident, the capacity of the Soviet Army supply to assist the operations could by no means be made light of.

(3) Next I will mention the direction of operations. The total wartime strength of the program for 1941 as approved by the War Ministry consisted of 48 divisions and if its employment in wartime is estimated at about 30 divisions against Russia, about 10 in China operations, about five against Anglo-Americans and a few as reserve under the Imperial Headquarters, it was evident that a considerable shortage of strength would be felt in every quarter, especially in regard to aircraft, tanks, rear services and liquid fuel. In particular, with only about 30 wartime divisions, it would be extremely difficult for us to take the offensive and overcome the Soviet Far Eastern Army on a wartime footing, which it was judged would reach about 50 divisions at the commencement of operations. After consultations and investigations with the War Ministry bureaus concerned in regard to the relative rapidity of concentrating mobilized forces and the relative capacity for production and supply of war-materials of Japan and Russia, it was concluded that we were in a more difficult position to take such an initiative in these respects.

Moreover, if our relations with the United States and Britain should grow strained, we should have to estimate at the least more than 10 divisions against these Powers, about 10 for China operations, more than 20 against Russia and a few for reserve under the Imperial Headquarters. In such case, it was feared, there

would be little hope for Japan of even succeeding with defensive strategy to carry on a protracted defensive struggle. And the strategical danger from the above-mentioned wide disparity in numerical strength and war-materials between Japan and Russia was aggravated by the fact that even a basic defensive organization against the Soviets had not been established owing to the insufficient peace-time strength of the Kwantung Army at that time. The aforesaid circumstances also suggested that even if Japan could carry out her operations most favorably, she would come to a standstill strategically and would be at a loss how to discover the means to end the war.

The above was the result of investigations made by the First Department.

Regarding the fact that Japan lagged far behind Russia in preparations for defensive operations on the Russo-Manchurian borders, General Sugiyama, who had inspected Manchuria in the autumn of 1940 immediately before his assumption of office as Chief of the General Staff, reported as follows: Even on the eastern borders (Tungning and Suifenho) to which the Kwantung Army attached the greatest importance, the strength of divisional units was so weak that only about 60 soldiers out of an infantry company were available for emergency dispatch, to say nothing of the shortage of divisions themselves. Moreover, though the fortifications on the eastern borders had been somehow completed in the front, on the first line, there was no provision of vertical depth, on the second and third lines. Should an emergency arise, those lines would be easily broken through. The division commanders in charge of defense on the spot said that in the early stages of operations it would be very difficult to resist Russian attacks for three months, and quite impossible to do so for over four months. Many defects were to be seen, especially in the air force, he concluded.

(4) The Chief of the General Staff approved the results of the aforesaid investigations and concluded that Japan's policy of totally avoiding war should be adhered to from a standpoint of strategy as well; because, should a Russo-Japanese war break out, her shortage of fighting power as mentioned above not only would endanger the execution of operations but also would force Japan to leave the China Incident without any solution; and further if unfortunately the United States and Britain should become involved in the war, there would be little or no hope of success on the part of Japan, particularly in regard to air forces. He decided, therefore, that Japan should always adhere to her principle of totally avoiding war from a standpoint of strategy. I thought that on this point he was in complete agreement with the War Minister.

(5) Now I will discuss Japanese strategy, which was based on shifting from a delaying type of defense to the offense. I approved the conclusion of the First Section that the Kwantung Army--whose ground forces in wartime would not be more, at the most, than 60 to 70 per cent of the Russian forces which would be used in wartime--would be obliged to employ defensive strategy at least in the early period of operations. The details of this were as follows: Their troop-strength relationship with ours was as above mentioned. The relationship of concentration and transportation of forces and materials in the event of opening of hostilities would compel Japan definitely to adopt a defensive strategy in the early period of operations; that is, in order to secure a troop strength of about 30 wartime divisions against Russia, she would be required to transport about 20 wartime divisions from Japan Proper and China to reinforce the 10 divisions stationed in Manchuria; the forces to be drawn from China and transferred to Manchuria were then actually engaged in the midst of China operations.

In other words, about 70 per cent of the Japanese total wartime strength against Russia and wartime matériel would require rapid increase and transportation, and assuming that circumstances took the most favorable turn for Japan, and that railway and shipping throughout Japan Proper, Korea and Manchuria went most orderly and smoothly, it would take about 110 days from the time of mobilization to complete the concentration of the whole strength of the Kwantung Army. In the meanwhile, even if we hurried it would take 120 days after mobilization at the earliest to change to the offensive and commence it in the eastern border area (Tungning and Suifenho), and so we reached the indisputable conclusion that the Russian Army would take the initiative in starting the offensive during this period in view of general strategy and progress of Soviet preparations for operations. The Kwantung Army, therefore, was obliged to make it the basis of its operational plans that it should adopt a passive strategy at the beginning, check Russian aggressive attacks for quite a long time by a delaying type of defense, making every effort to speed preparations for battle and overcome all obstacles during that time, and shift to the offense in the eastern border area first about the fifth month after the outbreak of war. We reached the above conclusion.

Regarding the decision on the time for assuming the offensive, we did not take into consideration much of the practical claims by the Kwantung Army that at least one month or generally two months for preparation for battle after the concentration of forces would be necessary for the eastern border operations. Concerning the above, according to the judgment of the Second Section, it would obviously take a longer time for the Kwantung Army to complete preparations for commencement of attack, if we took into account the extremely well-developed intelligence net of the Soviet Union, the real conditions of peace in Manchuria and the existence of the well-equipped and superior Russian air forces, which could freely destroy our transportation. In addition, the Russian forces stationed in the Far East not only retained a high standard of quasi-wartime organization in ordinary times, but were far superior to the Japanese in their speed of concentrating mobilized forces. In other words, from the aforesaid various circumstances, it was clearly indicated that Japan would surely face a prepared Russian-initiated attack with her operations unprepared, irrespective of whether it was to the east (Tungning and Suifenho), the north (Heiho) or the west (Hailar and the Great Hsingan Mountains). We had especially to pay serious attention to the inevitability and intenseness of early air-raids on Japan Proper and Manchuria by Russian planes. In short, we reached the conclusion that it would evidently take a much longer time than the planned estimate to concentrate and transport Japanese forces to the Kwantung Army in wartime, and that the period of this concentration and transportation would constitute one of grave crisis in operations against Russia.

(6) According to the investigations by the First Section, the Kwantung Army should shift to the offensive following the delaying type of defense in the early period of the hostilities and should, especially in the eastern border area, at least sweep and destroy the bases of long-range bombers in the southern Maritime Province of Siberia, in order to complete the defense of Japan. This was a minimum requirement from the viewpoint of defense, which is why the Japanese Army must take the offensive, without falling into a mere defense which would compel it to stay on the borders for a long time. With the development of the war situation thereafter, she should open an offensive movement on other borders between Manchuria and Russia to complete her defense and positively carry out operations necessary for the termination of the war.

(7) Now I shall discuss operations in the north--Blagoveshchensk--as viewed by the First Section.

In the eastern border area, the offensive operations would require about two months after changing over to the attack, it was considered. During that time the Japanese forces would check the Russian attack and invasion in the north (Peiho), while in the west (Hailar) they would withdraw, if necessary, successively to the line of the Great Hsingan Mountains to obtain sufficient time. Along with the completion of organization of a passive offensive in the east, attack would be opened anew and changed over to the northern area of Blagoveshchensk. For this purpose a strength of about 10 divisions of ground forces and the main strength of the air forces must be transferred from the eastern front to the northern one after the seventh or eighth month after the opening of hostilities. According to the investigations in cooperation with the Third Section (which dealt with transportation and communications and whose chief was Lieutenant-General Suzuki Sosaku), the transfer of Japanese forces to the north would require about three months even under the most favorable conditions. It became clear, therefore, that the concentration of forces for an attack in the north would figure out to continue at least until the end of the tenth or eleventh month after mobilization; needless to say, however, success and completion of the concentration would be greatly influenced by the general war situation and extent of Russian air-raids. By far the most important problem was that of preparing munitions necessary for the attack in the north. According to consultations over the matter with the War Ministry about August 1941, the program was to prepare and store the ammunition necessary for two battles (eight months each) in Manchuria, but it was considered that it would be exhausted by the seventh month after mobilization when the battle in the eastern border area occurred. Therefore, the ammunition necessary for transition to the attack in the north must depend upon new production after the outbreak of hostilities. The preparation of ammunition necessary for a total of 60 divisions, namely that for two battles for about 20 divisions in both the north and the west, and those for one battle for other forces of the Kwantung Army, would require seventeen months after mobilization, even if extreme economy in the amount of preparation were practiced. That is, the opening of attack on the northern front would be decisively curbed by this fact, and consideration of production and supply of ordnance other than ammunition would all the more be a circumstance requiring Japan's postponing the attack.

In short, in the northern area of Peiho, Japan would face a Russian-initiated attack from the beginning of hostilities, and would not take the offensive until at the least more than a year had passed. During this time, there would be many changes occurring in the situation. The conclusion was that realization of shifting to the attack in the north was very doubtful.

(8) The chief and vice-chief of the General Staff approved the aforesaid conditions and ordered that they form the basis of annual operations plans. We were asked to investigate in the future a policy of speeding up the time of shifting to the attack in the eastern area and at the same time to pay close attention to not weakening the aggressive spirit of the Kwantung Army's officers and soldiers in the early part of the delaying type of defense operations. The Chief of Staff further asked that formulation of all plans should be based on the fact that Russo-Japanese operations in the Far East might be considered overseas ones to Russia, and could be compared to colonial operations; but to us they were interior operations, a battle around the area of our very heart. According to his own inspections in Manchuria, however, defensive preparations at the actual spot were a matter of serious anxiety and required the strengthening of the defense and guard

organization of the Kwantung Army in ordinary times.) For this purpose, he indicated firstly that the system of 16 divisions being stationed in Manchuria and Korea must be realized. This system, of course, had to have the consent of the War Ministry; and the Ministry itself had, furthermore, to get the Government's consent to the outline of materials and expenditure, among other things. It having, further, connections with diplomacy, we were asked to continue investigations on its realization thereafter.

(9) In the formation of operational plans for 1941, the existence of the Tripartite Pact among Japan, Germany and Italy had no influence whatsoever. The Chief of Staff and the Vice-Chief clarified, in this connection, the view that the Tripartite Pact neither contributed to nor influenced the operations plans of 1941 against Russia; and therefore, if a Russo-Japanese war broke out, Japan would never expect operational assistance from Germany and Italy; and similarly Japan did not feel obligated to help Germany and Italy in case of war between Russia and those two countries.

At that time, further, no one even dreamed of the likelihood of a Russo-German war's breaking out.

(10) At this time the Second Section of the General Staff had the following opinion on the general situation concerning Russia beside the aforesaid ones on operational situations; namely, immediately after the outbreak of the China Incident, that is, in August 1937, the Russo-Chinese non-aggression pact was concluded; it is not clear whether a military treaty was attached to it, but in 1939 there was a Russo-Chinese secret agreement. Further, a Russo-Chinese trade pact was concluded, the chief aim of which was to supply China with arms. Again, in March 1939, following Stalin's address at the Moscow Communists mass meeting in which he showed his support of China, Molotov's policy of assisting China was confirmed. Taking into consideration this series of facts, the principle of two-front operations in both east and west which was established in 1935, the five-year plans which included industrialization and militarization of the Far East, the Russian attitude toward the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact, it was concluded that Russia would resort in future to interference with Japan.

5. Regarding the outbreak of the Russo-German war, I state the following.

(1) The Chief and the Vice-Chief of the General Staff gave to the Department Chiefs under their jurisdiction immediately after the decision on the national policy, the following explanations of Japan's relations with the U S S R.

Such will be the most favorable situation for Japan as it will rectify the U S S R's character menacing the Far East, prevent Germany from mustering power to threaten the Far East and, further, realize cooperation among Japan, Germany and the U S S R. Resort to arms is aimed at the settling of the northern problem; if the Northern problem could be settled by such diplomatic means with armed force in the background, it would be more desirable. In any case, the long-term and protracted use of arms must be strictly avoided; that is to say, the idea of the use of arms pre-supposes the evasion of a large-scale operations in a concrete form. Therefore, in this case, military preparation against the U S S R is not synonymous with preparations for war. And resort to arms is not yet decided upon at this time.

The problems of Japan's northern defense, Sakhalin and the rights in northern waters, will be rationally solved. It is hoped that ultimately by the establishment of a demilitarized zone in the

border regions of Manchuria and Russia, border disputes will end, the Sakhalin and fisheries problems will be solved and Japan freed from menace. Even though a German-Soviet war may break out, the existence of the Tripartite Pact, needless to say, does not obligate Japan to render aid to German operations and our actions are not restricted by it. This national policy was not the deciding factor for the use of arms against the U S S R; it only stipulated that the required research or preparation must be made in view of the possible necessity for the use of arms in accordance with future developments. As to whether we shall resort to arms we have made no commitments to Germany.

In the hastening of preparations for a possible war with America and Great Britain and the policy to be adopted vis-à-vis Soviet Russia, the elimination of possible obstacles to the maintenance of the basic policy towards America and Great Britain was a great restraining influence in the drawing up of measures vis-à-vis Soviet Russia. Among the above matters, the question concerning the use of arms was regarded as the most important and an order was issued to the vice-chief, the department chiefs and the head of the 20th office requiring the careful examination thereof.

(2) To sum up the judgments of the second part, which covers the period from the German-Soviet war to about the end of July 1941, they are as follows:

The development of the German-Soviet war cannot be so easily predicted. But there is no little fear of the protraction of the war. The report of Ambassador Tatekawa to the Foreign Ministry authorities, and that of the military attachés in the U S S R contain the same opinion. The German declaration as to the end of the war needs careful consideration. Though the transportation to European Russia of the Soviet forces stationed in the Far East will naturally take place, Soviet abandonment of the Far East is certainly inconceivable. This will restrict the extent of the transportation of the Far Eastern forces to the west and will not allow of the cutting of the actual strength by half. If it should be halved, 15 sharpshooter divisions would be left in the area East of Lake Baikal and the hasty use of arms against them would inevitably result in an unexpected emergency. Therefore in order to settle the northern problem it is necessary to concentrate sufficient forces in Manchuria. That which requires particular consideration is a possible conflict between Japan and the Anglo-American camp in view of the growing difficulties of the negotiations between Japan and America since the outbreak of the Russo-German war. Also, the Soviet attitude toward Japan must be strictly watched, since the U S S R, which has long been menacing Japan, has entered into a state of hostilities with Germany, one of our allies. The would-be closer rapprochement between the United States, Britain and the U S S R in the Far East may give impetus to US-Soviet military cooperation and especially to the advance of American air forces into the Far East.

Furthermore, when we take into consideration the confusion in the Soviet territory, and the lack of peace and order in Manchuria caused by the German-Soviet war, it is necessary that we should strengthen the defense, vigilance and war-preparations in Manchuria as a measure of self-defence regardless of whether we have the intention of settling the northern problem.

In addition, the change in Japan's relation with the United States, especially in view of the difficulties in the negotiations between the two countries since the outbreak of the German-Soviet war and the attendant change in future relations is, along with the state of affairs in the U S S R, the most important item to be considered in deciding Japan's defence policy against the U S S R.

According to the judgment of the Japanese Ambassador at Moscow, Lieutenant-General Tatehawa, in connection with the prospect of the German-Soviet war, the U S S R will not yield to Germany. Such a thing as a compromise is inconceivable. The war will be protracted. Communism is vehement nationalism and patriotism. The U S S R will not totter. There is apprehension that the U S S R may take positive steps in the Far Eastern area in case she should be strongly supported by the United States and Britain.

Then, the relations between Japan and the United States took a sudden turn for the worse with the American-British freezing of Japanese assets upon Japanese-French agreement for joint defence of French Indo-China. Therefore it was judged, most serious consideration would be required as to what should be the measures for settling the northern problem in view of the situation as of about the end of July 1941.

(3) At the beginning of July 1941 the Chief of the General Staff intended to dispatch more troops to Manchuria in view of the circumstances, after he had compared the actual strength of the Soviet Army with that of the Kwantung Army and made a judgment of the future moves of the Soviet Army, taking into consideration our relations with the United States and Britain. And then, after consultation with the War Ministry, reinforcement by two divisions, as the nucleus, was decided upon in early July.

But the agreement reached between the War Ministry and the General Staff was as follows. In view of the general situation, including Japanese-American relations, and especially the smallness of the reinforcements for Manchuria, it seemed more urgent to reserve the hope of military preparation for settling the northern problem and to streamline the 16-division system in Manchuria and Korea with the long-pending object of defence and vigilance. And in case the opportunity became ripe in future for settling the northern problem, this would have significance also as the preliminary steps thereto. What resulted from this was the reinforcement of the army in Manchuria, or the so-called Kwantung Army Special Maneuver. But it was the desire of the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff to drive home to the officers and men, on the occasion of this reinforcement, the idea that it did not mean the commencement of military operations. Frontier incidents were also to be avoided by them.

(4) Since the end of July 1941 we started a study of a plan of operations against the U S S R which was different from that of 1941. The study of the new plan of operations against the U S S R which would fit the situation was necessitated by the declaration on 2 July 1941 of a national policy of preparedness for war with the United States and Britain, if unavoidable. But in consideration of the foregoing paragraph (2), and the changes of the trends of the times, which required serious consideration of our relations with the United States, the Chief of the General Staff again ordered the vice-chief and the 1st Division Chief to study the new operation plan against the U S S R, as well as the operations plans against Britain and America which were correlated with the former. It was because the Chief of the General Staff came to consider that if operations against the United States and Britain should be taken into consideration at all, a considerable decrease, contradictory to the annual operations plan, in the strength available for the defence against the U S S R was unavoidable, that is to say, we could not help reducing the general scope of the defence operations against the U S S R to some 20 divisions. Nevertheless, the policy remained unchanged as to the principle that the operations would be based upon self-defence for insuring the defence of the Japanese mainland by a strategy of protracted

defensive and passive offensive. | The results of the studies were approximately as follows: Strict vigilance would be maintained relying on the existing strength, defence would be further reinforced and utmost efforts would be made to prevent war from breaking out. In case the U S S R should challenge us, we would lose no time in dispatching necessary reinforcements, destroying in an instant the enemy air forces in the Soviet/Far East in order to destroy the enemy air force in the southern part of the Maritime Province and thus insure our defence. Time elapsed while the General Staff members were still studying those plans.

I now discuss the reinforcement of the army in Manchuria in 1941; the so-called Kwantung Army Special Maneuver.

(1) The reinforcement of the Kwantung Army in the summer of 1941, or the so-called Kwantung Army Special Maneuver was intended to complete the 16-division system in Manchuria and Korea in line with the former study. Both the War Ministry and the General Staff were of the opinion that this step purported to rectify and strengthen the Kwantung Army's defence and guard system which had formerly many defects and drawbacks and implied preliminary measures, to be adopted in case the national policy of 2 July be developed in future. This was one of the steps decided upon through the agreement between the War Ministry and the General Staff, with subsequent approval of the government, with a view to contributing to the execution of the peace-time duties of the Kwantung Army.

(2) The Kwantung Army's peace-time duty is to defend Manchoukuo and Kwantung Province. But apart from that, in 1939 the central Supreme Command decided to assign a part of the Imperial Army for maintaining peace in the north as against the U S S R, thus establishing the principle concerning the duties and actions of the Kwantung Army. Then, in July of 1941, on the occasion of the so-called Kwantung Army Special Maneuver, the Imperial Headquarters gave an instruction to the commander of the Kwantung Army to the effect that the purpose of reinforcement, the so-called Kwantung Army Special Maneuver, was to strengthen preparedness against the U S S R.

(3) The main strength of the Kwantung Army at that time consisted of 10 divisions (in addition, two divisions not completely organized and of meager strength) and 500 airplanes. It was, according to the judgment of the 2nd department (of the General Staff), not much more than 30 per cent of the Soviet forces actually existing in the Far East. In these circumstances, unless the 16-division system in Manchuria and Korea, the minimum requirement for defensive preparedness, materialised, peace in the north could never be maintained, according to the opinion of the Chief of the General Staff, General Sugiyama.

(4) The main features of the so-called Kwantung Army Special Maneuver included reinforcement of the divisions stationed in Manchuria, dispatch of two divisions (one of which was diverted to South China in September), additional dispatch of forces under the direct control of the Kwantung Army such as air forces and artillery, additional dispatch of supply forces such as automobile and transport units, organization of the Kwantung Defence Headquarters to command all independent garrisons existing in Manchuria, establishment of the 20th Army Corps Headquarters, and increased supply of munitions. Also such matters required from the above items as mobilization of men, collection of materials, organization and equipment of the forces, transportation of men and materials, training, disposition and billeting of the forces were dealt with. For the mobilization of the required men the form of emergency en-

listment was adopted and each unit was placed on the basis of full equipment, but not on the wartime basis. The above-mentioned constituted the substance of the so-called Kwantung Army Special Maneuver and did not imply a war program, operational plans or strategic plans.

(5) Its execution covered the period from July to October 1941. As the result, the Kwantung Army's strength at the end of 1941 consisted of 13 divisions (in addition to the 10 divisions which had existed in Manchuria prior to the Maneuver, two were dispatched from Japan Proper and two others were organized in Manchuria, in line with the formerly established program; but one of them was diverted to South China) and other units, so the total strength of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria was a little over 600,000 men. Among them the air forces had some 700 serviceable planes after the Kwantung Army Special Maneuver, but since many of them were transferred, 280 serviceable planes remained at the end of 1941. The above-mentioned Kwantung Army strength contains not only the increase by the so-called Kwantung Army Special Maneuver plan, but also that realized in 1941 by the previously established program unrelated to the former. For example, the aforesaid organization of two divisions in Manchuria belongs to the previously established program.

(6) The Kwantung Army Special Maneuver was placed under the routine control of the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, in line with the Chief's direction, after having been decided at a conference between the General Staff and the War Ministry. But the steps for each question were decided and disposed of each time without waiting for the over-all plan of execution.

(7) Even after the Kwantung Army Special Maneuver had been carried out, the Kwantung Army's defensive and guard preparedness along the Soviet-Manchurian frontiers was weak, and it was greatly feared at that time whether Japan's defensive operations could possibly be conducted, as was provided in the operational plan on the basis of 15 divisions in Manchuria and Korea, in case of a Soviet attack. Around November 1941, when a part of the Soviet Far Eastern Army was transferred to the European zone, its strength consisted of 33 sharpshooter divisions, about four other divisions, some 1500 airplanes and 1300 tanks, while the Kwantung Army was estimated as inferior by about 50 per cent to the former, even after the reinforcement by the Kwantung Army Special Maneuver.

At about the beginning or the middle of August 1941 the 2nd department of the General Staff estimated the situation as follows: The Soviet-Manchurian frontier districts would likely be considerably stabilized, and there would be no sign of materialization of military cooperation in the Far East between the United States and the U S S R. Judging from the general situation, the Soviet Army would not challenge Japan for the time being; that is to say, positive offensive action by them would hardly be possible so long as we maintained this degree of strength (based on the reinforced strength by the Kwantung Army Special Maneuver).

At about the beginning or in the middle of August, the Chief of the General Staff approved the aforesaid estimate of the situation and acknowledged that there would be very little chance of the Soviet Army's taking a defiant attitude for the time being, if the Kwantung Army Special Maneuver were perfectly carried out. The War Minister also gave consent to it. And after a consultation it was decided not to slacken the Kwantung Army's alertness and preparedness and to spur the execution of the established plan of the Kwantung Army Special Maneuver, as much as possible, making preparation for the approaching winter. Then the surveillance of the execution of the established plan for maintaining peace in the north was further tightened in order to avoid untoward incidents on the Soviet-Manchurian frontiers, and efforts were exerted for defense and self-protection, taking utmost precaution not to arouse friction, and adhering to a policy of peace at any cost.

The established plan for peace in the north included such steps as suitably withdrawing the outposts in those districts where troubles were likely to start, while strictly forbidding the forces to advance, to dispense with defense duties in those areas where frontiers were disputed or the actions of forces were difficult, and to do the most possible in localizing frontier troubles in case they should arise.

Thus efforts were made to maintain the peace in the north. While the materialization of the reinforcement was being delayed day by day owing to the circumstances of shortage of transportation, the approaching cold season in the Manchurian area finally necessitated abandonment of a part of the plan. Later, the unsatisfactory progress of the negotiations with the United States and Britain worsened the situation, and with the establishment of the new national policy in the beginning of September, a considerable proportion of the strength in Manchuria was withdrawn and diverted to South China, Formosa and northern French Indo-China.

The chief forces diverted were one division and a considerable proportion of tanks, heavy artillery; anti-aircraft guns, auxiliary forces, air corps headquarters, fighters and light and heavy bombers.

I have stated as above the substance and circumstances of the so-called Kwantung Army Special Maneuver, and I believe that I have made it clear that that plan was not meant to be a preparation for aggression on the part of Japan against the U S S R.

7. In connection with developments thereafter, I will now offer material to explain the Japanese attitude toward the Soviet Union.

(1) Since the main emphasis of our national policy had naturally come to be directed toward the United States and Britain, according to the decision of 6 September, it followed that we not only clung to the established policy of peace toward the Soviet Union, but also reduced our precautions and war preparations against the Soviet Union. I have already referred to the major transfers from Manchuria to Southern China, Formosa, and Northern French Indo-China, which took place between September and November of the year 1941. To explain in detail, the following units were transferred:

- 1 division
- 3 tank regiments
- 5 heavy artillery regiments
- 20-odd anti-aircraft artillery companies
- 3 air brigade headquarters
- 4 fighter regiments
- 3 light bomber regiments
- 2 heavy bomber regiments
- 5 scout-plane squadrons and some ground service units

(2) After July 1941 the Japanese Army operating in China was planning, firstly, the Changsha operations, to be executed about September and October of the same year; secondly, operations for the restoration of peace and order in the triangular area comprising Nanking, Shanghai and Hangchow; and thirdly, operations for aerial advance into the interior of China. These constitute some of the factors to help judge the attitude of Japan toward the Soviet Union.

(3) At the Liaison Conference held toward the middle of November 1941, the following decisions were reached: that in the event of the outbreak of a war against the United States and Britain, we should by all means avoid making enemies of other countries, and especially entering into a state of war against the Soviet Union; and that we would endeavor to effect a reconciliation between Germany and the Soviet Union, should they be so disposed, and winning the Soviet Union over to the Axis camp, adjust relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. This also helps to form an opinion concerning Japan's attitude toward the Soviet Union.

8. I now come to materials to explain the Japanese attitude toward the Soviet Union after the outbreak of the war against the United States and Britain.

(1) The gist of the order issued by the Imperial Headquarters to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, on 3 December 1941, was as follows:

It is the intention of Imperial Headquarters to capture the major points in the southern regions and at the same time to dispose of the China Incident, in the meantime making utmost efforts to prevent the outbreak of war against the Soviet Union. The Kwantung Army will perform its duties of defending Manchoukuo and the Kwantung Province, and in particular it will make preparations for defensive operations against the Soviet Union, in order to meet any development of the situation. In settling any boundary dispute, efforts shall be made to localize the affair. In the case of special areas, defence by armed forces may be dispensed with, if the situation so demand.

(2) I was informed by the Chief of the Army General Staff that at the Liaison Conference toward the end of November 1941, it was agreed that although at the outset of an outbreak of war between Japan on the one hand and the United States and Britain on the other, it was hardly probable that Russia should take positive action against Japan, it was quite possible that the United States would utilize Russian territory in the Far East for military bases, and that Soviet Russia would act in various ways against Japan; but that according to later developments it was also possible that Soviet Russia would wage war against Japan. Nevertheless concrete measures towards these eventualities were not decided upon, excepting the existence of the following defensive plan against Soviet Russia.

(3) The Chief of the Army General Staff decided that the operational plan in 1942 against Soviet Russia should be drafted along the line of the principle of the previous year's plan, and that it should generally be based upon the following policy: That the Kwantung Army should maintain its disposition up to that time but should assume strict precautionary measures, strengthen defenses and strive its utmost to prevent outbreak of a war. In case the United States and Soviet Russia in concert should challenge Japan from the north, or the Russian Army should independently challenge us, without delay Japan should transfer necessary divisions from Japan Proper and China in order to destroy Russian air forces in the Russian Far Eastern territories, especially in the Maritime Province of Siberia. Thus our objective was yet to fulfill the minimum defensive requirements by assuming a passive offensive in place of a protracted defensive operation.

The above plan was decided upon the basis of a separate operations plan against Soviet Russia which had been studied since the end of July 1941, and the matters in it relating to the War Ministry were decided upon after consultation with that Ministry.

(4) According to intelligence obtained by the Second Department, the Russian strength in the Far East at the beginning of 1942 was as follows:

Total strength: 19 sharpshooter divisions
1 tank division
3 cavalry divisions
Total... 23 divisions

Ground forces south of Haborovsk:
10 sharpshooter divisions
1 tank division
1 cavalry division
Total... 12 divisions

Air Forces: 60 heavy bombers
80 long range bombers
330 light bombers
450 fighters
60 assault planes
200 seaplanes
Total.. 1200

The Kwantung Army around that time consisted of 13 divisions and about 500 airplanes, of which about 280 were operational (50 heavy bombers, 100 light bombers, 130 fighters), and in comparative ratio of the two ground forces ours were below 60% of the Russian forces.

(5) The decision of the Liaison Conference about the middle of March 1942 was as follows:

To conduct necessary operations against vital spots outside the occupied area in order to hasten the termination of the war by way of forcing the United States and Britain into a position of passive defense; to strive for the prompt settlement of the China Incident so far as circumstances permitted, taking advantage of the result of operations in southern regions; and to prevent as much as possible the occurrence of a new incident with Soviet Russia and to strengthen precautionary measures against the eventuality of war with Soviet Russia.

(6) According to the estimate of the staff of the

Kwantung Army, the Russian strength in the Far East consisted of 20 sharpshooter divisions or 23 divisions including other divisions, 1,300 tanks and 1,200 airplanes. Though the lowering in the standard of their fighting strength was perceptible, the entire fighting personnel totalled over 300,000. Against this the strength of the Kwantung Army was composed of 14 divisions, about 500,000 men, and about 600 airplanes. Thus the strength of the Kwantung Army was about 60% of the Russian forces then in the Far East.

(7) Beginning in May 1942, Imperial Headquarters were examining operations against the Aleutian Islands, Fiji, Samoa, New Caledonia, Eastern New Guinea, etc., as operations against the outer strategic points in the Pacific area. However, the operations which were actually carried out were those of the Aleutian Islands, Midway, Eastern New Guinea, etc. After the spring of 1942, Imperial Headquarters were conducting various studies with the intention of conducting a future offensive with the occupation of Chungking as its objective. This series of such operational plans by the Imperial Headquarters in 1942 is a fact indicative of Japan's attitude of peace toward Soviet Russia.

As to the offensive into the inland of China, aiming at the reduction of Chungking, a definite plan was formed through the study of the Army General Staff, and it was agreed that whether it should be put into execution was to be settled finally in the autumn of 1942. The nucleus of the strength necessary for this operation was to be 15 divisions. Of the necessary strength and equipment, 2 divisions, 200 airplanes, two-thirds of the motor vehicles and communications units, and almost all the river-crossing matériel were to be taken from those in Manchuria, and the greater part of the necessary fuel and ammunition were to be taken and transferred from the Kwantung Army. In accordance with this plan the personnel to be transferred from Manchuria totalled 200,000. This plan, however, was abandoned in December 1942, as a result of adverse developments of the operations centering around Guadalcanal.

(8) Our strength was transferred to the south-east sector of the Pacific from various quarters, including Manchuria, to cope with the counter-attack by the United States forces centering around the Solomon Islands and Guadalcanal after August 1942. This concentration of our forces made it all the more urgent to prevent the outbreak of any incident against Soviet Russia, so that absolute peace might be maintained between the two countries.

(9) According to intelligence obtained from the Second Department, at the end of 1942, the strength of the Kwantung Army consisted of 14 divisions and 500 airplanes as against the Far Eastern Russian Army's 20 divisions and 1,000 airplanes. Our strength was ^{calculated to be} 70 per cent of theirs. Thus the Russian Army in the Far East continued to maintain a strength superior to the Kwantung Army even in this period.

(10) As to the operational plans against the outer strategic points in the Pacific area and the reduction of Chungking, the Army General Staff was worried since they might endanger the execution even of the passive defensive operations of the Kwantung Army against Soviet Russia, in reference to the military strength, especially airplanes, tanks, motor vehicles, various corps in the rear, and munitions, especially liquid fuel.

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OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Tanaka Shinichi (seal)

On this 14 April 1947

At International Military Tribunal
for the Far East

DEPONENT Tanaka Shinichi (seal)

I, Kiyose Ichirō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness: Kiyose Ichirō (seal)

Translation Certificate

Charles D. Sheldon and Yukio Kawamoto, of the defense, hereby certify that they are conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of their knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Charles D. Sheldon

Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo
27 May 1947