B. B. C. A. B. Y

GVL30/A16-3/ Serial: 0017

U.S.S. SAN JACINTO

10/jrs

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:

C.O. VF45 secret Ltr.

VF-45/A16-3/A9 Serial: (0010) of

4 March 1945

c/o Fleet Post Office. San Francisco, California,

7 March 1945.

From:

Commanding Officer.

To:

Commander in Chief. U.S. Fleet.

Via:

(1) Commander Task Group FIFTY-HIGHT POINT TWO.

(2) Commander Task Force FIFTY-EIGHT.

(3) Commander FIFTH Fleet.

(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject:

Aircraft Action Reports; 16 and 17 February 1945.

- 1. Forwarded. On 16 February, Fighting Squadron 45 embarked on U.S.S. SAN JACINTO, engaged enemy aircraft in such great numbers over and near TOKIO that it appeared they must be overwhelmed by numerical superiority, either as a squadron, teams, or as individuals. However, they achieved such outstanding results in their air engagements as to not only reflect great credit upon themselves, but also upon those who have formulated sound doctrines, tactics and plans of employment of Naval Aviation Forces in deep penetrations into the enemy's innermost homeland fortresses.
 - 2. There are two remarkable facts in connection with the Air Operations participated in by "ighting Squadron 45 in the TOKYO area that are so significant and striking as to be almost unbelievable: First, that for every fighter sortie over the TOKYO area, 1.2 airborne enemy planes were destroyed without the loss of a single plane or pilot. Many planes were badly shot up, but they managed to return to home base; Second, at least six (6) different types of enemy airborne aircraft were destroyed in this engagement without departing from the standard approved fighting doctrine, procedures and tactics prescribed and employed by U.S. Maval Aviation. It is also significant that the enemy, through choice or necessity, employed at least six different types of interceptors.

MICHAEL H. KERNODLE.

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In Reply Refer To:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AIR FORCE FIGHTING SQUADRON FORTY-FIVE

c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California

4 March, 1945

Commanding Officer, Fighting Squadron FORTY FIVE. Froms (Commander CVL Air Group FORTY FIVE) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet. To :

Via :

(1) Commanding Officer, U.S.S. SAN JACINTO.

Commander Task Group FIFTY-TIGHT POINT TWO.

Commander Task Force FIFTY-EIGHT.

Commander FIFTH Fleet.

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subjects

Aircraft Action Reports; 16 and 17 February, 1945.

Reference:

(a) ComInCh Serial 7152 of 29 October, 1943.
(b) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter ICL-45 of 1 January, 1945.

Enclosure:

(A) Comments by Commander CVL Air Group FORTY FIVE.

(B) VF-45 Aircraft ction Report ACA-1, No. 28, ated 16 February, 1945.

(C) VF-45 Aircraft Action Report ACA-1, No. 29, dated 16 February, 1945.

(D) VF-45 Aircraft Action Report ACA-1, No. 30, dated 16 February, 1945.

(E) VF-45 Aircraft Action Report ACA-1, No. 31, deted 16 February, 1945.

(F) VF-45 Aircraft Action Report CA-1, No. 32, dated 17 February, 1945.

In accordance with references (a) and (b), enclosures (A) through (F) are forwarded herewith.

G. E. SCHECTER.

DISTRIBUTION OF ENCLOSURES:

ComInCh CinCPac JICPOA ComAirPac ComAirPacSubComFwd USS SAN JACINTO

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S-E-C-R-E-T

SUMMARY OF ACTION REPORTS FOR PERIOD 16-17 PERRUARY, 1945

1. RESUME OF SCRITTES FLOWN AND TIME:

VF Sorties - 31 (103.9 hours) VT Sorties - 17 (58.6 hours)

Ground targets attacked by VF:

2. OWN PLANE LOSSES:

VF - One F6F-5 VT - One TBM-3

3. OWN PERSONNEL LOSSES:

VF - One, Ensign James E. HOOD, A-1, USNR (File No. 326428) did not survive water landing inside Task Group screen. VT - None.

4. DAMAGE TO ENEMEY:

Airborne enemy aircraft by VF:	destroyed	7 Zekes 6 Oscars 3 Claudes 2 Tojos 1 Dinah 1 Myrt
Airborne enemy aircraft destroyed by		4 Tonys 2 Tojos 1 Oscar 1 Zeke
Airborne enemy aircraft by VF:	damaged	1 Cacar 1 Zeke 1 Tojo 1 Tony
Airborne enemy aircraft by VT:	destroyed	2 Oscars
Airborne enemy aircraft by VI:	damaged	4 Unidentified
Enemy aircraft probably on ground by VI:	destroyed	2 or 3 single engine (VF tyre)

42 rockets were launched at Makajima

plants, all rocket hit in target area.

Ota and Hoizumi aircraft assembly

Extent of Damage unascertained.

Sall-Carallar

Ground targets attacked by VT:

76 hits with 100 lb. bombs on aircraft assembly plant at Ota. Vital assembly area in southern half of plant expecially hard hit.

5. TACTICS EMPLOYED:


For both fighter sweeps and combined VF, VB and VT strikes, the standard escort doctrine as set forth in USF 74-B (Tentative) was employed. Air Group Commanders from this Task Group (58.2) were most fortunate in being able to get together prior to departure from port on this past operation and were able to formulate definite plans as to the exact part to be played by each participating unit in each of the missions assigned for the first two days. A great deal of cooperation and coordination was achieved in this manner, and by relying on certain tactical standards as outlined in USF 74-B, a high degree of uniformity was achieved in the air work of three separate air groups working together on these strike or sweep missions.

6. GENERAL COMMENTS:

Though considerable success was achieved on the initial VF sweeps over enemy fields on the morning of D-2 day, I am firmly convinced that the same number of planes employed in smaller groups of not less than 16 and not more than 24 planes per group, could have accomplished half again the amount of destruction of enemy airborne aircraft as was attained on any of the VF sweeps. In particular the larger sweeps became very unwieldy immediately after making the initial strafing pass on the first field hit and while attempting to rendezvous thereafter. Enemy airborne fighters were taken under attack by detached elements of the sweep at this time, and it became quite impossible for the sweep leader to effect a rendezvous of his 40 odd planes in order that they could continue on to the next airfield. Since enemy airbowne aircraft w re the primary target, it would appear that the following tactics would have accomplished the desired result: The initial VF sweep to be composed of three groups of 16 planes each. The groups, proceeding in company, would split when about 40 miles from the target and attack three different airfields somewhat in the immediate vicinity of each other in order to stir up the hornet's nest. After that the enemy VF could then be engaged in aerial combat by a compact, fairly maneuverable fighter group in the vicinity of each field. A single rendezvous point for all three groups would have previously been designated as a rallying point for all three flights so as to form up the entire flight for the return trip to base. In the case of the first VF sweep over Chiba Peninsula these fields could have been Katori, Mobara and Kisarazu with some of the lesser fields designated as alternate targets.

It is particularly gratifying to witness the Jap being outsmarted and outfought by such recommended tactics as the high speed diving turn to the right or left as set forth in TAIC Report No. 17 of November, 1944. Other

的时候,我们就是一个人,我们就是一个人,我们就是一个人,我们就是一个人,我们就是一个人,我们就是一个人,我们就是一个人,我们就是一个人,我们就是一个人,我们就是 第一个人,我们就是一个人,我们就是一个人,我们就是一个人,我们就是一个人,我们就是一个人,我们就是一个人,我们就是一个人,我们就是一个人,我们就是一个人,我们就



S.F.C.R.E.T

approved tactics such as the wing over, in order to keep the saddle position after a Jap fighter has tried to elude attack by a split-S, have met with the same favorable results. In keeping up the good word, it is recommended that all head-on runs sgainst Jap VF be employed with caution, and if such a run is indicated, make every effort to initiate it from below or cause it to develop into a small deflection bow shot. Over their own homeland the Japs have already become increasingly vigorous and aggressive in their tactics, and there is every reason to believe that they will welcome the head-on run as a splendid opportunity to ram the enemy. They have everthing to gain and possibly only a cheap life to lose by such maneuvers, and they are finding us just as tough to shoot down as ever.

G. E. SCHECTER.

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

I. GENERAL

STATIST

	A CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF TH				USS SAM				
d) Take off				_Time (LZT)_			The second secon		(1° 59 12
				on Chilbo			f) Time of	Return	(Zone)
II. OW	N AIRCRA	FT OFFICIA	NUMBER	ERED BY THI					
TYPE (a)	SQUADRON (b)	TAKING OFF (c)	ENGAGING ENEMY A/C	ATTACKING TARGET (e)		AND TORPEDOES ED (PER PLANE) (f)	S	FUZE, SET	TING
762-5	WF-45	8	8	target					
				airborne					
				aironatt					
III. O	THER U. S.	OR ALLIED	AIRCRAF	T EMPLOYED	IN THIS OPE	RATION.			
TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER		BASE	TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE	
168-5	VP-9	16	USS 1.2	TIMEON					
61-5	72.00	12	TES BAN	COCK					
IV EN	JEMY AIRC	RAFT ORSE	RVFD OR	ENGAGED (By	Own Aircraf	t Listed in II	Only).		
(a) TYPE	(b) NO. OBSERVED	NO ENGAGING	(d)	(e	ON OF	BOMBS, TORPE GUNS C	F) EDOES CARRIED; OBSERVED	CAMOU	(g) IFLAGE AND ARKING
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-	3	9	(Z	ONE)				balls.	CONTRACTOR SEC
W. C. A. W. W. C. C.		200			THE PROPERTY AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY AND ADDR			TREATMENT AND THE WASHINGTON TO SERVICE THE PARTY OF THE	
Tony Omegan	3	2	47	2000					
Oscar	1	3	(Z	ONE)	ceatern				
-	2		33	ONE)	Chiba -	Noy Area			
Dinah	ent Enemy A	Aission(s)	(2	ONE)	Castera Chiba La, Tokyo				
(h) Appare	ent Enemy A y Part of oter(s) Occu	4	(7	ONE)				20/10ths.	2500 alto
(h) Appare Did And (i) Encoun	y Part of oter(s) Occi	ur in Clouds	(7	ONE)				AND TENTHS OF COV	/ER)
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AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED (Reclassify when filled out)

SECRET

77-45 REPORT No. 28

VII. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES (in aircraft listed in II only; identify with planes listed in VI by Nos. at left).

(a) NO.	(b) SQUADRON	(c) NAME, RANK OR RATING	(d) CAUSE	(e) CONDITION OR STATUS
	None			
		7		
	3			

VIII. RANGE, FUEL, AND AMMUNITION DATA FOR PLANES RETURNING

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g) T(DTAL AMMI	UNITION EXPEN	NDED	NO. OF PLANES
TYPE A/C	MILES	MILES RETURN	AV. HOURS	AV. FUEL LOADED	AV. FUEL CONSUMED	.30	.50	20MM	MM	RETURNING
F6F-5	120	120	2.7	400	175	1600	rds.	av.		8
						1000	· plane			

IX. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED (Check one block on each line).

CALIBER	NONE	MEAGER	MODERATE	INTENSE
HEAVY — Time-fused shells, 75mm and over	29-	X Kateri		
MEDIUM — Impact-fused shells, 20mm-50mm			2	Katori
LIGHT — Machine gun bullets, 6.5mm-13.2mm				

X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

SPEED, CLIMB, at various altitudes

The Japs appeared to be completely disorganized, having apparently no preconceived plan of attack or defense. They milled around the sky in scattered elements.

TURNS
DIVES
CEILINGS
RANGE
PROTECTION
ARMAMENT

The split-S was the favorite evasive maneuver of the Jap, but this was not attempted or followed by our planes.

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

DECEDICATED

(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)



KEZIKICIE	
(Reclassify	wher
filled out)	

				TIVES (D. O.	m Aircraft Listad	in II Only)	
1-100 Carlot	XI. ATTACK ON EN	EMY-SHIPS OF	GROUND OBJEC	THE SERVICE	n Augrant Listed	Taract(s)	Z (Zor
	Target(s) and Location	(S) (FOR SHIP	S INCLUDE ALL IN AREA	A UNDER ATTACK)	(b) Time Ove	er rarger(s/_	\ 2_0
CHRISTIA	Clouds Over Target		(BASE IN FE	ET, TYPE AND TENT	THS OF COVER)	•	MEDICAN-
	Visibility of Target	CLEAR HAT	ZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURE	D BY CLOUDS, ETC	(e) \	Visibility	(MILES)
	Bombing Tactics: Type		3		Bomb Sight U	sed	(TYPE)
		***	(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIV	E.)	Altitude	of Bomb Rele	ease
	Bombs Dropped per Rur		R)	(FEET)		46	Damaged
	Number of Enemy Airc	craft Hit on Gro	ound: Destroyed	Pro	obably Destroyed		
-	(h) AIMING POINT	DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO. A/C ATTACKIN (k) SQUADRON	BOMBS AL	ND AMMUNITION ACH AIMING POINT	NO. HITS On Aiming Point	DAMAGE (None, sligh serious, destroyed or sur
-	All Militor Collection	TONIVIOL					
-							
-							
_							
_							

⁽o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED (Reclassify when filled out) *





REPORT No.

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition Altitudes Speeds Approach Tactics Use of Cover, Deception Angles of Attack and Their Effectiveness Distance of Opening Fire Defense Tactics and Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance Disposition Altitudes Speeds Approach Tactics Use of Cover, Deception Angles of Attack Distance of Opening Fire Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses Enemy Weaknesses Offensive Tactics, Own , Enemy Defensive Tactics, Own , Enemy Flexible Gunnery, Own Escort Tactics Fighter Direction Use of Radar Night Fighting

Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target Approach to Target Altitudes, Speeds Approach Dive Pull-Out Dive Angle Strafing Retirement Defensive Tactics Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships Concealment Searchlights Night Fighter Tactics Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics Torpedo Tactics Effectiveness of Bombs, Torpedoes Selection of Targets Fuzing Strafing Tactics Defensive Tactics Use of Radar Reconnaissance Photography Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation Homing Rendezvous Recognition, Ships Communications Flight Operations Search and Tracking Base Operations Maintenance

XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

NARRATIVE

Fight F6F-5's of Fighting Squadron FORTY FIVE were launched at 0700 (K), 16
February, 1945 to participate in the first Navy raid on the Japanese homeland.
They accompanied twenty eight (28) F6F-5's from the USS LEXINGTON and USS HANCOCK, flying high cover for the other fighter elements at 7,500 feet. The divisions of SAN JACINTO planes were composed as follows: Comdr. Scheeter, Ensign Taylor, Ensign Mosely, Ensign Kidwell; Lieutenant Perry, Ensign Doig, Ensign Cuffe and Ensign Bywater.

The sweep leader had planned to hit the major sirfield of Kisarazu first on the western coast of Chiba Peninsula but was denied doing this by the weather which had closed in that area. The eastern coast of Chiba Peninsula was reasonably clear, however, and at 0750 (K) the flight was over Choshi Point (Imubo Saki Light). At 0800 (K) the fighter elements below the SAN JACINTO planes which were still at 7,500 feet made a rum on Katori airfield from west to east. Commander Schecter, through binoculars observed at that time enemy planes in the process of taking off both from the runways and the dirt portions of the field, kicking up clouds of dust. The sweep in one pass started at least six large fires on the field, attributed to burning single planes or groups of planes. Through the glasses the SAN JACINTO leader also observed very intense medium anti-aircraft fire coming up from all sections surrounding the field to a depth of one half to three quarters of a mile from the periphery of the runway area.

The air was suddenly filled with Jap fighters, some (particularly Zekes) flying north from Mobara Airfield and some coming up from Katori. Commander Schecter and his wingman (Ensign Taylor) saw a Claude climbing near them dead shead and they moved over in section formation to him, with Taylor about 300 feet behind his leader. The Claude started a turn to port, exposing the top of his wings and fuselage in perfect plan view to the encoming Hellcats. Commander Schecter opened fire at about 400 feet range, full deflection shot hitting the cockpit and fuselage section. Taylor opened almost immediately afterwards from the same range 30 degree deflection, and his burst splattered in to the cockpit and engine accessory section. The Claude exploded into flames as Taylor passed under him. The Jap was observed to have the cockpit open, apparently having planned to bail out before he was burned to a cinder by his flaming plane.

Shortly after the above encounter Ensign Mosely, second section leader of the first division, saw three Oscars approache head on, five hundred feet higher than the division. Mosely pulled up sharply as they came in range and fired a long burst at the center Oscar from a quartering converging course and saw large pieces from the cowl section fly off. As Mosely looked back the plane was headed down out of control with flames streaming from the engine. The pilot did not bail out.

Ensign Kidwell, flying wing on Mosely, observed three Claude's at the base of the clouds, about 700 feet above him and Mosely. The latter pulled up sharply to port from below to engage the center plane, as Kidwell made a climbing right turn to tackle the one on the right. Kidwell fired very short burst in a 30 degree deflection shot, and the Claude rolled on his back going down in flames. The Jap plane crashed with a large explosion when he hit the deck.

The high cover fighters effected a rendezvous over the lower altitude VF about five miles southeast of Katori airfield, and the entire flight headed in a general course of 270°, with the SAN JACINTO fighters still at 7000 - 8000 feet. The sweep leader still intended to proceed to Kisarazu Airfield, but the flight soon encountered many other Jap planes, both in the single and twin-engine categories, and a general melee occurred in the area around the coastal airfield of Kiyakawa and southward toward Mobara Airfield.

-1-

Commander Schecter and Ensign Taylor made a section rum on a Zeke, with Taylor missing but the section leaders bullets smoking the Jap in a full deflection shot. Taylor saw the Zeke splash.

While Lt. Perry's division was almost directly over Miyakawa Airfield at 7,000 feet, a Claude came over in their direction, in Perry's language "like an inquisitive kid". As soon as the Jap saw that the Hellcats were not friendly planes he started down in a steep dive to port. Perry banked sharply and dove after him giving the Claude a squirt which missed owing to too much lead. The rest of Ferry's division was not in a position to fire. The four planes recovered to the north, did a quick 180 degree turn and made another run on the Claude which had leveled out somewhat on an easterly course. Perry got the right lead in this pass and his bullets smoked the Claude. No one else in the division scored hits. The Claude wheeled around again and started heading down fast apparently for a landing on a westerly course at Miyakawa field, as Perry's division turned again to the north for another run. Perry got in another burst, scoring hits on the Claude which momentarily smoked again. By this time the Jap was about three-quarters of a mile east of the field, still too high for a landing. Ensign Dywater, "tail-end Charlie" of his division, fired a good burst hitting the Claude and sending it crashing to the field in Clause from about a hundred feet altitude.

This encounter occurred at the beginning of the climex of the melee, regarding which Ensign Bywater said "for a while you could look in any direction and see from 1 to 3 Jap planes going down in smoke and flames." As Lt.(jg) Cuffe, Lieu enant Perry's second section leader described the battle, "It was a mill of planes in which the turn was to the left, with Japs feeding in from the top and burning out at the bottom."

At this time Ensign Mosely and Kidwell were a little south of Miyakawa field on course about 270° when they saw 6 or 7 Zekes and Tonys on their same course about a thousand feet above them. A Zeke and a Tony rolled over and started an overhead run on Mosely. The latter turned sharply to port, but the Tony pressed home the attack. As the Zeke broke off Kidwell made a turn to the right in a steep bank to observe the Tony's dive and to be able to get in position for attack. Then the Tony started firing on Mosely, Kidwell banked back to the left and climbed steeply firing a short burst with about a 30 mil deflection. The Tony smoked and later flamed, going straight down until be crashed.

The area of the air battle was now moving southward toward Mobara Airfield, with the two high cover divisions maintaining exceptionally good tactical formation throughout. At this time Commander Schecter, seeing two or three Zekes a parently elimbing in clouds, getting ready to attack, made a flat side run on the stern Seke flaming him with the first burst in a full deflection shot. The Zeke dived down out of control as the pilot bailed out.

About this time, just east of Mobera, a Zeke made a rum on the Air Group Commander's division and Ensign Mosely slid underneath the formation from the starboard quarter and with one burst flamed the Jap as he broke off his attack. The Jap pilot bailed out almost immediately.

Just then several other Jap planes made an attack from above and from different bearings. One of them, a Zeke, rolled over on his back directly above Ensign Kidwell and started diving on him. When the Zeke opened fire Kidwell banked shaply to the right causing the Jap to miss. The Zeke dove past Kidwell to port, and then the Jap pulled up sharply when about 500 feet below the former. When the Zeke got back to Kidwell's level (about 6,500 feet) Kidwell got on his tail. The Zeke continued to

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elimb, as Kidwell got in a long burst. The Teke started burning around the engine and wing roots and fell off in a steep dive. Kidwell did not see him crash as there was another Zeke coming in from above which Kidwell had to turn away from.

As Commander Scheeter's division got joined up again, north of Mobara, the group spotted a Dinah circling and gaining altitude. The division in Indian file made a flat side run on the twin engine bomber. Commander Scheeter got hits in the fuselage section in a full deflection shot. The Dinah was smoking and streaming gasoline as it passed below the lead clane to the left. Ensign Mosely, blazed the Binah with one burst.

Then the first division, getting down over Mobera field, observed units of the escorted sweep VF making runs on the field and saw at least three or four large fires from burning planes on the deck. At this time numerous Zekes came in from westward and Commander Schecter got in a quartering run on one Zeke which was dimbing and turning to the right. Numerous hits were scored in the engine and vicinity of the cockpit and a heavy stream of gas poured from the under side of the fuselage. This plane dived away to the right and Ensign Taylor saw it crash.

The planes then proceeded to their rendezvous point east of Yawata Saki, where many planes of the sweep were apparently trying to effect a rendezvous. While in a turn over this group and headed west 6 - 7 Zekes were spotted about 1000 feet above the fighters, apparently waiting to follow the sweep back to the Sask Group. The whole lat division attacked these Japs causing their formation to climb rapidly and scatter toward the coast. Commander Schecter followed the last Zeke until at maximum range (about 400 yards) he opened fire. Rits were seen in the tail and fuselage. The Jap dived away steeply to port and the Helloat followed momentarily, getting more hits in a full deflection shot. The Zeke was headed down to the water smoking heavily when last seen.

with this enemy flight broken up, the first division planes returned to the rendezvous point where the Air Group Commander gathered all the SAN JACTHTO VF and as many others as would follow and returned to Base, making frequent observations astern to insure that no Japs were tailing the returning fighters back to the Task Force.

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REPORT No.

XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.

ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights
Turrets
Ammunition
Bombs, Torpedoes

Bomb Sights Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar Homing Devices Visual Signals Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF Signals Battle Lights Procedures

PROTECTION

Armor; Points and Angles of Fire Needing Further Protection
Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes Life Belts, Life Rafts Safety Belts Emergency Kits Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses
Driftsights
Octants
Automatic Pilots
Charts
Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

STRUCTURE

Airframe
Control Surfaces
Control System
Dive Flaps
Landing Gear
Heating System
Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines
Engine Accessories
Propellers
Lubricating System
Starters
Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment Personnel Facilities


REPORT PREPARED BY:

Use additional sheets if necessary).

APPROVED BY:

SIGNATURE RANK AND DUTY





RANK AND DUTY

