



The
Doctrine of God



**SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS
1970**

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P r e f a c e

Under the auspices of the Academy of Comparative Philosophy and Religion, Belgaum a seminar was organised in the Gurudev Mandir on 11th, 12th and 13th November 1970. The topic chosen for discussion was "The Doctrine of God". Mr. A. S. Adke, Vice Chancellor of the Karnatak University Dharwar inaugurated the seminar on 11-11-1970. Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, M. A. B. D. Head of the Dept. of Sanskrit, Karnatak University, Dharwar presided over the deliberations of the seminar. The scholars invited to participate in the seminar read their papers and took part in the discussions that followed the reading of the papers. The elite of Belgaum present also took part in the discussion and got their doubts clarified. The scholars who read their papers and the aspects of the topic dealt with in the papers submitted were as follows.

1) Dr. N. V. Joshi, M. A., D. Litt. R. Ruia College, Bombay. - Divine from the standpoint of philosophy of Individuation.

2) Prin. M. A. Kulkarni, B. A., LL. B., R. L. Law College, Belgaum - Doctrine of God or Dharwar.

3) Prof. B. H. Kotbagi, M. A., Govt. College, Gulbarga — Spinoza's conception of God.

4) Prof. B. R. Kulkarni, M. A., LL. B., Director, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, New Delhi — God and Creation.

5) Prof. A. S. Deshpande, M. A., D. A. V. College Sholapur — Our Belief in God : Its Bases and Forms.

6) Sri. M. S. Deshpande, M. A. Athani — The Problem of God's Presence.

7) Dr. R. C. Badwe, M. A., Ph. D., LL. B. Principal, Baliga Arts and Science College, Kumta — The Doctrine of God (Its place and value in scientific age).

8) Prof. S. H. Dixit, M. A., Rajaram College, Kolhapur — The Operative Meaning of 'God Exists'.

9) Dr. L. V. Rajagopal, M. A., Ph. D.; Principal, M. A. S. College, Haunsbhavi — The Doctrine of God.

10) Prof. S. V. Atre, M. A., Janata College, (Nipani) — Doctrine of Personal God—Determinism of Mundane Existence

11) Dr. G. N. Kundargi, M.A., Ph.D.(U.S.A.), Parle College, Bombay — Proofs. for the Existence of God.

12) Prof. D. S. Jakatey, M. A., Vidarbha Maha Vidyalaya, Amaravati – God and Personality in the light of śāṅkara Vedānta.

13) Dr. B. R. Modak, M. A., Ph. D., Dept. of Sanskrit, K. U. Dharwar — God in the Veda.

Sri. K. D. Sangoram, trustee welcomed Dr. Adke, the Chief Guest and Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, the President and the Elite of Belgaum.

Dr. A. S. Adke, Vice Chancellor, Karnatak University, Dharwar, while inaugurating the Seminar on 11th November morning, declared the publication of the Journal 'Pathway to God' published by the Academy. In his inaugural address he appreciated the work of the Academy and hoped that the discussions held in the Mandir would serve the worthy purpose of establishing peace on earth. He opined that thinkers or philosophers alone could, by their foresight, save humanity from danger of total destruction caused by wars involving misuse of science and technology. Man, in his opinion, needed right type of education which would improve one's own self, change one's attitude and help one to utilise knowledge for the good of man. Only in such a world inhabited by men who received spiritual education could exist peace, love and happiness which are the dire needs of the present day world. He said we should learn

from saints like Gurudev Ranade and lend our ears to the advice of philosophers to know how we could better ourselves and the world in which we live by killing the wickedness in us.

The inaugural address was followed by the reading of the paper presented by Dr. N. V. Joshi of Bombay. The contents of his paper were discussed. In the course of the discussion it was pointed out that the dynamism of the Absolute did not detract from its all-inclusiveness. The potentialities of the Absolute become actualities. That there is a rational synthesis of the ontological and logical aspects in mystical experience was also made clear.

In the afternoon session on 11-11-1970. Prin. M. A. Kulkarni and Prof. B. H. Kotbagi read their papers. The special features of Spinoza's Pantheism were pointed out in the discussion which followed. The day's deliberations ended with a talk in Marathi by Prof. S. V. Atre of Arjunnagar.

On 12th Nov. 1971 the morning session commenced with Prof. B. R. Kulkarni's paper on 'God and Creation'. It was pointed out that creation was mysterious. It was stated that Anirvachaniya vāda came nearer to Vichitravāda. The difference between material creation and spiritual creation

was made only to explain the Christian standpoint. Prof. A. S. Deshpande, Sri. M. S. Deshpande and Dr. R. C. Badwe also presented their papers. Dr. Badwe tried to convince the listeners that in the scientific age the doctrine of God does play an important and necessary role. The movement 'Death of God' recently started need not make us think that science has killed God and occupied His place. Belief in God can play a significant role in social life to make social disciplines possible.

In the afternoon, Prof. S. H. Dixit, Dr. L. V. Rajagopal and Prof. S. V. Atre read their papers. In the course of the discussion which followed, Prof. S. H. Dixit made clear that the statement 'God Exists' is not an existential statement. There is no conclusive and logical proof for the existence of God. He held that the meaning of the statement 'God exists' should be operative and to understand it we should take into consideration the attitude of the person towards life and his behaviour. When Dr. Rajagopal's paper was discussed the metaphysical principles underlying the Doctrine of God were emphasized. The author held the view that the philosophers must apply their categories to God. God cannot act irrationally or arbitrarily. God functions under the categorial conditions like space and time. The existence of the world does not set at naught the

omnipotence and independence of God. It was pointed out that God's omnipotence was a qualified omnipotence. Prof. S. V. Atre's paper was discussed thereafter and it was held that to attribute personality to God was not to attribute human imperfections to Him. In the evening Dr. G. N. Kundargi gave a talk in Kannada on 'Karmayoga in Gita'.

The morning session of 13-11-1971 began with the reading of the paper, presented by Dr. G. N. Kundargi. It aimed at proving God's existence. He held that cosmological argument for the existence of God was more important than the ontological argument. Elucidating Dr. R. D. Ranade's rational mysticism he held that what was accepted by faith should be rationally proved. It was agreed in the discussion that the so called proofs for the existence of God, far from establishing God's existence, confirm belief in God's existence by removing doubts, if any. Then followed the paper by Dr. B. R. Modak on 'God in the Veda'. It was intended to show how the idea of God took shape in the Veda.

Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy in his presidential remarks observed that the 'Doctrine of God' was discussed in the seminar threadbare and from all possible angles right from traditional Indian standpoint to modern Western Views. That the partici-

pants should differ in their stands was just natural. He quoted the example of difference of opinion between Appayya Dixit and Jagannatha Pandita in the interpretation of the first verse of Raghuvansa : वागर्थाविव सम्पृक्तौ....। The former stated that the verse was a beautiful example of शृंगार रस while the latter held that it was a perfect example of Bhakti. Even absolutists like Sankara did recognize the importance of चित्तशुद्धि or moral preparation as a prerequisite for spiritual life. The various standpoints argued out in the seminar constituted, in the words of अभिनवगुप्त a विवेक सोपान where every theory had its own place.

On 10th Nov. 1971 evening Dr. N. V. Joshi gave a talk in Marathi on आध्यात्मिक जीवन.

Prof. K. D. Tangod proposed a vote of thanks on behalf of the Academy to Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, the President, the learned participants of the seminar and the public of Belgaum all of whom responded to the invitation and co-operated in making the seminar a grand success.

The papers read in the seminar are now published in the form of the book for the benefit of the readers.

Inaugural Address

by : Dr. A. S. Adke,

Vice-Chancellor, Karnatak University, Dharwar.

on the occasion of the Seminar on

‘Doctrine of God’

at the Academy of Comparative Philosophy and
Religion, Belgaum (11-11-70)

**Dr. Krishnamoorthi and esteemed Professors
and Friends,**

I am really very happy to be associated with the Seminar on ‘Doctrine of God’ and also to be amongst you who are great thinkers and philosophers. When I was requested by Shri. V. G. Jambhandi to inaugurate this Seminar, I did not know what responsibility I was accepting. I knew that the whole work in this Gurudev Mandir is going on under the divine guidance of Gurudev Rambhau Ranade and if I invoke his blessings on this occasion, I think every thing should be smooth and inspiring. Shri. Gurudev Ranade was the Professor of Philosophy in Willingdon College from 1921 to

1924 and was staying in Madhavanagar extension of Sangli. I was then a student studying in Sangli State High School. Every day evening I used to see Shri. Rambhau Ranade passing by our Hostels—a serene and affectionate person glowing with radiance and spiritual dignity. We loved to see this frail body walking in a meditative mood every day in the evening, clad in dhoti, with his unmistakable bārābandi, uttariyam and turban. One day I made myself bold to catch him by the hand and requested him to go to my room. He smilingly accepted my invitation and came to my room and sat on the mat. We boys sat around him and he gave us some advice. I must have repeated this experiment 3 or 4 times but never he felt disturbed. On the other hand, he was glad to respond to our affectionate call and used to spend some time with us. In his company we felt so happy and delighted that we were jumping with joy. Naturally when I was invited in the name of Gurudev Ranade, I could not but accept the invitation with least hesitation. However, I now feel I do not deserve this honour as I little know about the ‘Doctrine of God’.

All of us, who are gathered here, are either devotees of Gurudev or his admirers. Shri. Gurudeva spent all his 70 years of life in experimenting with or realising God. It is, therefore, not necessary for this audience to discuss whether there is

God or not. However, it is worth while to ponder over the life of Gurudev Ranade a bit before we proceed to discuss about God.

Shri. Rambhau took his birth on 3rd July 1886 at Jamakhandi, Bijapur District, in a pious Ranade family. He took his primary and secondary education in Jamakhandi. He was a brilliant scholar in his class. While he was 15 years old, he came in contact with Shri. Bhausahab Maharaj of Umadi. The Divine flame entered his head and heart and it continued to burn brighter and brighter throughout his life. After his matriculation when he got Shankarshet scholarship and stood second for the Bombay State he entered the Deccan College, Poona and got his B. A. with Mathematics, in 2nd class though everybody expected him to have first class. If he would have got first class, probably he would have gone for I. C. S. which was so attractive then and would have been a great loss to the world of Philosophy and Mysticism. This is a case where good comes out of bad. So Shri. Ranade, who was so fond of Philosophy, took philosophy for his M. A. and topped the list with remarks from his Examiner that the Examinee knows more than the Examiners. He was also awarded two gold medals at the examination. He started as Lecturer in the Fergusson College

and was helping the students to write correct essays. After some time he was transferred to Sangli and did his best towards the progress of research in subjects like Philosophy. When the ambition was not fully realised by him in the D. E. Society, he resigned and turned his labours towards the production of the celebrated work 'A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy', from his Ashram at Nimbai.

Recognition and honours came seeking him from far and near. He left the Ashram to become the Professor of Philosophy at Allahabad University at the pressing invitation by Dr. Ganganath Jha. He worked as Professor there for 18 years. Afterwards he was invited to be the Vice-Chancellor of that University, which responsibility he fulfilled for a year.

All the time he was a true *Sādhaka*. With the blessings of Bhausaheb Maharaj and Amburao Maharaj he persevered in his meditations until he realised supernormal experiences. This gave him the conviction about God's omnipresence and the surety of pathways described by mystics leading up to Him. He made a deep study of the recorded experiences of saints in Marathi, Hindi, and Kannada literatures and could corroborate their essential validity and universality on the basis of

his own realisation. Most of these studies in mysticism are published in book-form.

It is thus seen that Gurudeva Ranade was not only a great philosopher trained in Western lines but also a great mystic saint who had imbibed both the theoretical and practical Vedānta and Yoga traditions of the East. His books are always clear, precise and calculated to dispel the doubts in the modern minds who inherit both or either of the traditions.

Shri. Gurudeva said, "To realise God for oneself and for others is and should be the end of human life". Devotion beginning with God's name has always been held to be the primary means to achieve this end. But Ranade mapped out the path more systematically in his writings. He distinguished five aspects clearly in the path of *Sādhanā*. He showed how there is no real opposition but in fact, a supreme harmony between (i) reason and faith (ii) effort and grace (iii) unity and diversity (iv) dispassion and bliss (v) finite and infinite spiritual experiences. He proved that 'eroticism has no place in mysticism'. The place of devotion to God and saints and Guru is thus set out in a new light altogether. It does full justice not only to the findings of modern science and

philosophy in the West but also to the unbroken inheritance of Indian mystic tradition in books as well as in actual experience. Ranade classifies for the first time the main types of true spiritual experience. They are—supernormal sounds, flavours, odours, lights, colours etc. These serve to distinguish the true from the false.

The problem of the existence of God has indeed baffled all the philosophers and theologians in the world over so many centuries. The Vedantic concept of Brahman as well as the atomic theory of the ancients hardly admitted of unassailable logical validity. But the latest researches in modern physics are most unexpectedly pointing towards a solution which only saints could visualise in former times by their intuition as well as experience. If Newton said categorically that all matter is made of atoms and God made the atoms indivisible, only to close further discussion, a modern Physicist like Niels Bohr speaks of the *principle of complimentarity*. This principle gives an *absolute* meaning to Science, to the concept of big and small. It recognises the unavoidable disturbance which is due to the inherent nature of the experimenter and which inevitably accompanies the very act of observation or experiment. A thing is big in the absolute sense if the effect of this disturbance on the thing can be ignored. It is

small in the absolute sense if it cannot be ignored. Atoms are small in this absolute sense.

All matter consists of atoms and even our bodies are made of atoms. The atomic behaviour in a living body and in a dead body is absolutely the same according to science. Yet all of us have the feeling that we have a free will, that we have freedom of choice, that we may exercise our preference in the acts of consciousness.

The ultimate problem, then, which neither philosophy nor science can bypass, is the nature of the 'I'. It won't do to dismiss free-will itself as a make-believe like Einstein and Schopenhauer and Freud.

'I' or Atman is not only atoms but also the controller of atoms. This truth reached now by modern physics and embodied in the complementarity principle comes closest to the Upanisadic concept of Atman and proves indirectly the teachings of Gurudeva Ranade. This obviously shows how the essential nature of God is *nirguna*, *nirākāra*, *niranjana* etc. As the saying goes —

अग्निर्देवो दिवजातीनां हृदि देवो मनीषिणाम् ।
प्रतिमास्वल्पबुद्धीनां सर्वत्र विदितात्मनाम् ॥

Let us by all means discuss very frankly all about the various doctrines of God, but at the

same time we shall not lose our goal. It is the prosperity of humanity as a whole and realisation of the Self here and now.

Let me thank you heartily for giving me this opportunity for meeting all of you and to speak a few words.

ॐ शांतिः शांतिः शांतिः

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
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
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1st Row-L. to R. : 1. Prof. B. R. Kulkarni, 2. Dr. N. V. Joshi, 3. Dr. A. S. Adke,
4. Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, 5. Sri. M. S. Deshpande.

2nd Row-L. to R. : 1. Prof. D. S. Jakatey, 2. Prof. B. H. Kotbagi, 3. Prin. M. A. Kulkarni,
4. Prof. S. V. Atre, 5. Dr. R. C. Badwe, 6. Prof. A. S. Deshpande.

Sri. K. D. Sangoram welcoming the Chief Guest.



L. to R. 1. Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy (President) 2. Dr. A. S. Adke (Chief Guest)
3. Sri. K. D. Sangoram (Trustee).

Our Belief in God : Its Bases and Forms.

Prof. A. S. Deshpande, M. A.,
D. A. V. College, Sholapur.

Our awareness of Unlimitedness, Harmony and Creativity :

Denial of God when it is not purely verbal, is really rejection of one idea of God in favour of another. For though not so evident as in the case of the awareness of oneself, it is no less true that such denial means a failure to understand the significance of some aspects of even our ordinary experience. Ordinary experience of any object reveals in addition to the collection of sense-impressions something which is different in nature from them. The very transitoriness and impermanence which are characteristic of all sense-experience seems to involve something which transcends them, something which contains them and is yet more and other than them. Freshness, vigour and decay which reveal these features in

a striking way also reveal something which is not transitory and impermanent. It is not only our inner experience but also the outer which possesses the dimension of depth which gives rise to a feeling in us that there is something other than what appears on the surface. Common experience attaches greater significance to this other element, assumes that the nature of a thing is due more to this element than to the impermanent and the evanescent features in it. Further, while the impermanent features, which, one usually identifies with the sense-data seem, in the very act of comprehending them, to be of a limited nature, this other element seems to reach beyond any conceivable limit. It is this depth and profundity, which can be sensed even in the most ordinary of our experiences which made the poet say that God can be seen "in the flower on the crannied wall". Even the philosophies which looked upon the flow and the flux as the essence of all our experience have not been able to disregard altogether either the reality or the significance of this element. The Buddhistic "Nirvana" whatever else it may be, is an escape from the flow of being, and the Heraclitean flux is the "divine law" by which "all human laws are nourished" and is therefore "common to all". It is this aspect to which we cannot conceive a limit and which seems to transcend all that is comprehended

as being of a limited nature. This element which is without limit is the infinite and the eternal, and most of philosophy is the attempt to define the nature of the infinite and the eternal.

Besides depth an ordinary precept has a form by virtue of which we are conscious of harmony in the nature of things. Things do not seem to fall apart from themselves on every side, but everything seems to be held together in a definite form; and this awareness of different elements in a single form is the consciousness of harmony. Though present in the nature of everything this harmony is more easily noticeable in some things as against others. A flower, a plant or a tree may reveal it, and even in its simplest form it makes things interesting and agreeable to us. Our experience of the pleasant and the beautiful is largely an awareness of this harmony; apprehension of it in an individual form is art, and a consciousness of it as an essential feature of all being is religion, though both art and religion are more than the awareness of harmony alone. Science is a persistent effort to discover order and harmony in their subtle forms, and every scientific discovery corroborates common sense in respect of its assumption of harmony in the nature of things. Along with depth and harmony creativity is also a universal feature of all our experience. It can be

felt in a refreshing breeze, observed in a gurgling brook. One can be aware of it as one realizes that the thing which he notices at this moment is the same that he noticed at the previous moment, in other words, as the "was" is transmuted in our perception into "is" and pushes forward to bring in its fold the "will". By itself, this experience of transition and of creativity does not constitute the knowledge of causation. It gives rise to the knowledge of causation only when it is combined with some other aspect of our experience, and the form of creation or causation suggested by it depends on that other aspect of experience.

Assuring and Inspiring experiences : There is yet another aspect of our experience which goes to form our belief in the existence of God and constitutes almost the core of it. We have had, each one of us at one time or another, experiences of a releasing, saving, sustaining or elevating type proceeding from our fellowmen, sometimes from other animals and occasionally from inanimate objects and places. We seem to pay too much attention to deceitfulness and wickedness, cowardice and cruelty that we find around us to be mindful of the gentleness and generosity, strength and serenity which we experience in the presence of some of our fellowmen. It is on account of the saving, assuring and inspiring experiences that

they have in the presence of some persons that a large number of men and women remain devoted to them. And our kinsmen from the animal world are not altogether without this saving and inspiring power. Apart from the fact that in every age some species of animals have rendered loyal and beneficial services to man, there have been instances of animals, which by their work, have roused in man the attitudes of gratitude and reverence. These have, by virtue of their uncommon gifts, earned a place for their kind in the pantheon of man's gods. Similarly, if some places have seemed haunted by evil spirits, others have become sacred to man on account of the experiences associated with them.

Unity of Religious Experience : However neither any of these experiences taken singly nor all of them taken together can constitute the theistic belief. An infinite, eternal, harmonious, creative, kind and benevolent power is still less than God if an earnest soul cannot enter into some kind of communion with it. The abode of God is the soul of his devotee; ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठतिः said the Lord to Arjuna.

Outside this natural abode God seems to get entangled in the meshes of worldly relations from

which His devotee himself seeks to escape through His grace. Thus the various experiences which suggest the existence of an infinite and eternal principle can constitute the belief in God only if they fall into a unity in some mind; in other words, the idea of God has its significance only in relation to a devotee. The idea of an omnipresent omnipotent and omniscient eternal Being is by itself an abstraction; it becomes a concrete reality only when it is soaked in the emotions of a devotee. Sankaracharya's statement that the idea of God is necessary for the purpose of worship expresses the same truth from a different point of view.

The occurrence of such a unity in an individual's mental life may be due to his innate constitution, training, circumstances or a good chance which believers call divine grace; or it may be due to all of these together. Howsoever it takes place, it varies on a large scale both in respect of its form and content, but in each case it possesses a uniqueness which constitutes its reality. It is on account of this uniqueness of the experience of God that everyone who has it is aware of only one God but when these blessed souls come out of their trances and reveal what they had experienced, each of them describes God as he has seen it and all of them seem to speak of different gods. This variety in our views of God

suggests that the search for God in one case can be as real as in any other cases.

Different Views of God : The more intense the unity of experience in which one realizes God the more "God intoxicated" is he, and the more deficient it is the more godless is the man. In its most intense form, the individual is conscious only of God and loses consciousness of even himself. One step below he retains a place for himself by the side of the omnipotent and omnipresent Being to whom he wholeheartedly surrenders himself. In some other cases this unity has been of such a limited nature that God has been conceived as one among others, though the supreme among them.

In respect of His nature too, there have been variations in our views of God in accordance with the different kinds of experiences that have gained prominence in different individuals. He has been viewed as the omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient infinite and eternal Being, as the Creator of the Universe, the Father in heaven, the Mother, the Ruler, the Spouse, an embodiment of Wisdom, Beauty, Goodness, Courage, Strength, etc., the protector of his devotees and the destroyer of their foes. He has been regarded as indescribable, unimaginable and formless, but has

also been visualized by means of images of different kinds. Many of these views are quite unphilosophical by the common philosophical standards, but some of the philosophical views have themselves been discarded by philosophers as unsound. However, belief in God has not as yet become an extinct species and those who are without this belief in one form or another have often an uneasy feeling over what is absent in them.

Reality of God : The fact that we become aware of God only through a certain kind of unity in our inner experience cannot prove that what we call God is only our experience any more than the fact that we become aware of a mountain only in our perception can prove that the mountain is no more than our perception. God has a reality outside our experience as the mountain has a reality outside our perception. It is true that we cannot find God in the outside world in the same forms in which we find a mountain, a tree or an animal. But we also do not find a mathematical principle in that form, yet we do not think that it is less real than mountains. The reality of a mathematical principle is revealed in the changes which are produced by means of them; the reality of God also becomes manifest in a similar way. Belief in God

can produce such a change in one's view of the world as to suggest that one's very mode of perception has altered. The world takes a different form for him and is in that sense changed. One's outlook on life too undergoes a similar change when one believes that in a communion with God he has received His blessings. He has a feeling of freedom, a sense of release from bondage, and a kind of joy which along with its overtones of feeling, always accompanies this sense of freedom. However, it is in the behaviour of the recipients of God's grace that far-reaching and radical changes take place. Such a person may indulge in processes of self-sacrifice and self-effacement or may develop a deep and overflowing love for all human beings and even for the whole of creation. He may become utterly indifferent to the world around him, or be full of care and mercy for all around him. His reactions to his fellowmen may vary all the way from kindness and benevolence to callousness and cruelty. If he earnestly believes that he has to carry on the mission of God, he may work incessantly for the welfare of all, or he may indulge in murder or massacre of those, who are, in his view, inimical to God. The power that produces such profound and perceptible changes should be unquestionably real and he who refuses to recognise it as God only rejects one idea of God in favour of another.

Since God cannot be found in the same sphere of experience in which we find such objects as mountains, trees, and animals, He remains outside the gamut of relations that connect these objects with each other. He cannot, therefore, be related to any of them or to all of them together in the same way as they are connected with each other. Hence all those objections against the existence of God which only prove that some of the categories of thought which are applicable to other objects are inapplicable to God, are irrelevant to the consideration of God's nature; earnest believers have, therefore, been little affected by them.

The Predicament of the Believer : But though nothing that follows from the nature of the physical world disturbs the faith of the believer, serious discrepancies and deficiencies in the nature of experience that vouchsafes the existence of God often shakes that faith. If one is overwhelmed or crushed by the deceitfulness, wickedness, callousness and cruelty that he has experienced in his fellowmen, he may lose all sensitiveness for the saving and uplifting experiences, or he may feel that they are too weak and ineffective to be of any use in overcoming the effects of experiences of the former kind. In so far as the negative and destructive forces obliterate the experiences of

a saving and uplifting nature, the impressions of depth, harmony and creativity also lose their vividness and distinctness. The image of God is then blurred and the belief in His reality becomes a doubtful proposition. In the language of theology, it is the problem of evil which rudely shakes the believer's faith. God has, however, retained His place in the souls of His devotees even when these latter have been filled with clouds of anguish and suffering. Different believers have satisfied themselves by adopting different solutions of the problem, but most of these are connected with the temperament of the believer concerned and each of them seems to be capable of satisfying only persons with particular kind of temperament. However, religious faith seems to be in a ruinous state today on account of a condition which should have contributed to our faith in God. The triumphant march of science during the past few centuries has meant an increasing discovery of order and harmony in Nature. This in its turn has given man an astonishing power to control both Nature and himself and he has produced marvellous effects by using that power. But these very achievements seem to have brought us nearer to total extinction than we were at any time in the past, and have deprived us of the peace and tranquility of mind which our forefathers with humbler means could possess. Science and technology

have in a subtle way infused into the consciousness of the modern man the sense of unlimitedness, harmony and creativity in a new form, but they have banished from it the old feeling of the presence of a saving and an uplifting power. Science, which is unmistakably a beneficial power has also turned out to be a devastating and destructive influence. The strange predicament of the modern man is that for him the good has become incompatible with the godly. The crack that has appeared in the human soul can be healed by restoring the faith in the presence of a protective and merciful Power which rules over everything in the Universe.

The Role of Philosophy : When we find ourselves in the wilderness, it is usually beneficial to take a full view of the field left behind by us. We can then obtain some cue of the right direction in which we should proceed in order to reach the promised land. In the midst of the confounding and the almost disheartening varieties of views about God, there are some aspects of them which can be regarded as their universal features. In whatever form a person believes in God, he believes that God realized by him is alone real, that He is sure to come to his rescue, fill him with blessedness if he surrenders to Him, that He is equally merciful and gracious to all those who

worship Him and wholeheartedly surrender themselves to Him, and that he is capable of conquering all who are hostile to Him and therefore to His devotees. Almost every devotee believes that when pleased with him, God takes His abode in his soul, but his own awareness of His being and glory depends on his longing for communion with belief Him. Further it is part of every devotee's that God who resides in his soul also resides in every thing else. In purely logical terms the idea of God is the idea of something which unmistakably appears as one and also as many, which is present in each and in all, and of whose existence one becomes aware only when he has an irrepressible longing for it. The philosopher would be a vain being if he attempts to present God to one who has immediate awareness of Him, and he would be undertaking a futile task if he attempts to turn a godless person into an earnest believer by means of an argument. His primary task is to find out the implications of the logical relations involved in the idea of God so as to enable his fellowmen to realize God by moulding their lives in accordance with these relations. For this purpose, he must probe deep into religious consciousness, and also seek the help of the scientist in finding out the phenomena that reflect these relations better than others. Organisation of personal and social life

in accordance with the relations revealed in such an enquiry will be a step in the process of bringing the Kingdom of God on the earth and of justifying God's ways to man.



Spinoza's Conception of God

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Spinoza, a Portugese Jewish philosopher, who was ostracized from his relatives and community because of his unorthodox views, is undoubtedly one of the great modern philosophers. Spinoza is great, not only on account of his grand deductive metaphysical system which is a challenge to some contemporary philosophers who deny the very possibility of deductive metaphysics, but also because, uncorrupted by wealth or fame or any other worldly matters which he regarded as futile and valueless, he lived his life according to what he taught. His teaching is that, instead of seeking and worrying about riches, fame and other mundane things which are futile and perishable and which therefore do not bring lasting contentment, one should devote all of one's energies to the attainment of eternal and supreme happiness which results from the understanding of the nature

of the infinite eternal Being or God; that the supreme goal of human life is the intellectual love of God. And Spinoza lived up to his teaching. Discarding the worldly pleasures and leading a simple life, he attempted, with all his mind and heart, to attain eternal and Supreme happiness—the intellectual love of God. The conception of God, therefore, occupies the central position in his philosophy; from the metaphysical viewpoint, God is the infinite, eternal, ultimate reality; He is the logical ground of every thing that there is in the universe; from the religious and ethical stand point, God is the ultimate end. That is why Spinoza has been described as “the God-intoxicated man”. But Spinoza was not so regarded by his contemporaries. He was condemned as an atheist by his contemporaries! How can the God - intoxicated man be an atheist? The answer to this puzzle is to be found in Spinoza’s conception of God which differed from the commonly accepted conception of God.

In expounding his view, Spinoza employs the geometrical method; he started with the definitions of certain fundamental concepts, such as, substance, attribute, mode etc., and with certain axioms or self-evident truths and deduces from them the theorems about the nature of the universe and the man’s place in it. Since Spinoza

identifies the substance with God and Nature as a whole, the convenient starting point in stating his view is his definition of the substance.

Spinoza defines the substance as "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; in other words, that, the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed".¹ The full significance of this definition becomes clear from the following consequences which can be drawn from it.

The substance, so defined, must be the ground and cause of its own existence; it must be self-caused. For if the substance were not the cause of itself i.e. if it were caused or produced by another thing, then the conception of knowledge of it would necessarily involve the conception of its cause. As Spinoza says "The knowledge of an effect depends upon and involves the knowledge of the cause".² But according to the definition, the substance is that the conception or knowledge of which does not depend upon the conception or knowledge of another thing. So if a substance were caused by another thing it would not be a substance, "for if a substance can be pro-

1. The Philosophy of Spinoza—Joseph Ratner. P. 122

2. „ „ „ „ P. 123

duced from anything else, knowledge of it would depend upon the knowledge of its cause, and consequently, it would not be a substance''³. To be a substance, its existence and nature must be dependent upon itself; it must be self-subsistent or self-caused.

There cannot be more than one such substance. For, if the universe were supposed to consist of two or more substances, then these substances would be causally or necessarily related with one another, since, according to Spinoza, every thing in the universe is causally or necessarily related to every thing else; the knowledge of one substance would, therefore, involve the knowledge of other substances. Hence, according to the definition, they would not be substances. There must, therefore, be only one such substance.

Since there can be a single substance, the substance must be absolutely infinite. If it were not infinite (i.e. if it were finite) then it would be limited and modified by something other than itself. But if there were something other than the substance to limit it, there would not be a single substance. But it has been shown that there can be only one substance. There cannot, therefore,

3. Spinoza. Stuart Hampshire. P. 37

be any thing other than the substance to limit and modify it. So the substance must be unlimited or infinite.

The infinite single substance must be eternal. If it were not eternal it would be characterized by a beginning and by an end i.e. it would be thought of as having come into being at a particular time and as going out of existence at another time. And the implication of this would be that there must have been something other than the substance to precede and produce it and there would be something else to succeed it. But this is impossible; there cannot be anything other than the substance to precede, produce and succeed it because there can be only one substance. So the substance must be eternal. The substance must be perfect and complete or all-inclusive. If it were not perfect it would be finite because imperfection is the essential characteristic of all finite beings. But the substance must be absolutely infinite and hence it must be perfect. Further, the substance must be all-inclusive. It would not be all inclusive only if there were something outside or independent of it, only if something were excluded from it. But there is nothing outside or independent of it, nothing is excluded from the substance. Hence the substance must be all-inclusive.

Being perfect, the substance cannot change; it must be permanent; since its change would be a change to something which is not perfect and this is impossible. According to Spinoza, the substance must be absolutely free. By freedom Spinoza means self determination. To be free means to be determined, not by any thing other than or external to itself, but by its own nature or essence. "That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone and is determined to action by itself alone. That thing, on the other hand, is called necessary or rather compelled, which by another is determined to existence and action in a fixed and determined manner."⁴ In this sense, whatever is finite is not free because it is necessarily determined by something other than itself. But the substance being infinite and all-inclusive cannot be determined by anything outside or beyond it, because there is nothing outside or beyond it. So it must be self-determined and hence absolutely free.

The substance is, therefore, self caused, one, absolutely infinite, eternal, perfect, all-inclusive, permanent and free. Spinoza identifies such a substance with God. For, God, by definition, is

‘Being absolutely infinite, that is to say, substance consisting of infinite attributes each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.’⁵ And since the substance is infinite and all-inclusive it is further identified with Nature as a whole, with the totality of all that there is. That is, in Spinoza’s philosophy, the three terms Substance, Nature and God, have the same meaning.

Spinoza argues that the absolutely infinite Being or God necessarily exists. His main arguments are :—

Just as from the essential nature of a triangle that it is a plane figure bounded by three straight lines, it necessarily follows that the sum of the three internal angles of a triangle must be equal to two right angles, so from the essence of God it necessarily follows that He must exist. The essential nature of God is that He is absolutely infinite. Being absolutely infinite God cannot be without existence because existence is one of the qualities of infinitude. Therefore God must exist because His essence involves His existence.

Further, a thing must exist if there is no cause or reason for its non-existence. So God

5. The Philosophy of Spinoza — Joseph Ratner.

must exist unless there is cause or reason, either in the nature of God or outside God, for His non-existence. But there cannot be a cause or reason outside God which makes it impossible for Him to exist, because there is nothing external to God. So if there were any cause or reason for God's non-existence it should be present in His nature. And it would be present in His nature, if the conception of God involved logical contradiction. For just as it is impossible for the square circle to exist because the conception of square circle involves contradiction, so God's existence would be impossible if the conception of God were self contradictory. But the conception of God does not contain logical contradiction; on the contrary, the conception of God is a clear and distinct idea. So either in the nature of God or external to God there is no cause or reason for His non-existence. Hence God must exist.⁶ Spinoza holds that God must possess infinite number of infinite attributes. Spinoza defines an attribute as "that which intellect perceives as constituting the essential nature of substance".⁷ Since substance or God is absolutely infinite, there are infinite number of ways in which His essential nature can be conceived by

6. The Philosophy of Spinoza — Joseph Ratner
P. 124—125

7. Spinoza — Stuart Hampshire. P 65

the intellect. And as an attribute, by definition, is an essential nature of God as conceived by the intellect, it follows that God must possess infinite number of attributes. The substance or God cannot be conceived by the intellect to have a finite number of attributes. To think of God as possessing a finite set of attributes is to put a limit to the nature of God, i.e., it is to think of Him as a finite being. But God is infinite and must, therefore, have infinite number of attributes. Further, each attribute, being an expression of the infinite essential nature of God, must itself be infinite, i.e. it cannot be limited or modified by any other attribute. For a finite attribute cannot be an expression of infinite essence of God. So God must possess infinite number of attributes, each of which is infinite in itself. Since God and Nature are, according to Spinoza, identical it follows that Nature as a whole must be characterized by infinite number of infinite attributes.

Of the infinite number of attributes of God or Nature, our finite intellect can clearly conceive only two attributes, namely extension and thought. To the finite minds, Nature as a whole reveals itself as an infinite system of extended physical bodies or as an infinite system of minds or thoughts. According to Spinoza, mind and matter are not substances. Descartes had supposed

that mind and matter were quite different substances. He believed that mind was a substance characterized by thought and that matter was a substance which possessed extension. Spinoza does not accept this view; he holds that mind and matter (or thought and extension) are not substances; but that they are attributes of one and the same substance, God or Nature. The attribute of extension is infinite in its own kind in the sense that it cannot be limited or modified by thought; similarly, thought is infinite in its own kind because it cannot be limited or modified by extension. That is, the body (or matter) cannot produce changes in mind and mind cannot produce changes in the body, each attribute is completely independent of another attribute and therefore one attribute cannot affect or modify another attribute. But both the attributes inhere in the same substance; and in their common substratum they are the same. Though each attribute is infinite in its own kind, it is not absolutely infinite like God or Nature; Nature or God is absolutely infinite because He is the single, all-inclusive substance. Since there are infinite number of attributes of God, no one attribute can be regarded as absolutely infinite.

From these considerations it is clear that God (or Nature) is both material and mental.

under the attribute of extension God is a material system extending infinitely in space and under the attribute of thought He is also an infinite system of minds or thoughts. To think of God as an infinitely extending physical order is as legitimate or correct as to think of Him as an infinite system of ideas because the physical and the mental orders are identical order of causes in one and the same substance. The Physical order is a causally or necessarily inter-connected system of events or objects and mental order is a causally inter-connected system of ideas or thoughts; for, according to Spinoza, every thing in Nature is causally or necessarily determined. There is nothing uncaused or undetermined in Nature; every thing that happens in Nature happens according to the necessary and eternal laws of Nature and as Nature and God are identical, the laws of Nature are the eternal decree of God. "Nothing, then comes to pass in nature in contravention to her universal laws, nay, everything agrees with them and follows from them, for whatever comes to pass, comes to pass, by the will and eternal decree of God; that is, as we have just pointed out, whatever comes to pass, comes to pass according to laws and rules which involve eternal necessity and truth. Nature, therefore, always observes laws and rules which involve eternal necessity and truth, although they may not all be known to us, and

and Nature are one and that the laws of Nature are the decrees of God, Spinoza argues that the belief in the occurrence of miracles, in the sense of events which are contrary to the laws of Nature would be equivalent to the absurd belief that the occurrence of such events violates the "Divine decree, nature, and understanding"; or it would be equivalent to the absurd belief that God acts against His own nature in producing miracles. Further if by "miracle" is meant a mysterious event i.e., an event which is beyond the reach of human understanding, then such an event cannot lead us to the *knowledge* of God's existence and essence. How can an event about which we are completely ignorant give us knowledge about God; how can ignorance lead us to knowledge? On the other hand, since God and Nature are identical, we can increase our knowledge of the essence of God by understanding more and more the laws of Nature according to which phenomena occur in the "fixed and invariable manner". "When we know that all things are ordained and ratified by God, that the operations of Nature follow from the essence of God, and that the laws of Nature are eternal decrees and volitions of God we must perforce conclude that our knowledge of God and of God's will increases in proportion to our knowledge and understanding of Nature...."¹⁰

10. The Philosophy of Spinoza—Joseph Ratner. P. 110

Spinoza holds that the miracles narrated in the scriptures can be rationally interpreted i.e., they can be explained in terms of natural causes.

Another consequence of the identification of God with Nature is that God, on Spinoza's view, is not the transcendent cause of the world, that God is not outside or beyond the world; but God is the immanent cause of the world; He is the Nature. God is the immanent cause of the world in the sense that He is the logical ground or substance of the world; i.e., from the adequate knowledge of the essential, eternal and infinite attributes and modes of God, one can deduce the existence and characteristics of everything in the universe. Thus everything in the world logically depends on the essential and eternal attributes and modes of God. "God is not only the effecting cause of the existence of things but also of their essence."¹¹

Since the substance is the free and self-creating cause and since substance is identical with God or Nature, it follows that God or Nature is the free and self-creating cause. God or nature conceived as the free and self-creating cause is called *natura naturans*. God, considered as *natura*

11. Spinoza.—Stuart Hampshire. P. 50

naturans is Nature actively creating the various finite things (or modes) in the world. So God, in this aspect, is the creator of finite things. He is the creator in the sense that the existence and properties of finite things follow from the essential nature of God. But God or Nature can equally well be conceived as the system of created things - as a passive Principle. God or Nature thus conceived is called *natura naturata*. God or Nature as the creator of *natura naturans* is essentially identical with God or nature as the creation or *natura naturata* and this involves the denial of the transcendental or super natural realm of Divine Being or Beings who are supposed to control and guide the natural realm. Or to put it in other words, in Spinoza's view, science and religion are not separate. The scientific rational investigation of Nature which results in the discovery of laws of Nature is at the same time the way of gaining knowledge of the essence of God. Therefore there cannot be any conflict between science and religion.

The *natura naturata* - the system of created things consists of finite individual things - men, plants, animals, objects, etc. These individual finite things are modes or modifications of God. By a mode Spinoza means "a modification of substance; in other words, that which is in, and is

conceived by means of, something else.”¹² Spinoza holds that finite modes follow from the infinite attributes and modes of God. This being so, to understand fully the cause of existence or nature or activity of any finite thing involves the full understanding of the Nature as a whole or God. Man being a finite mode is no less a part of Nature than any other thing in Nature, and therefore, like every thing else in Nature, man’s existence and actions are necessarily determined. Human freedom in the sense of indeterminism is rejected by Spinoza. Man’s blessedness or salvation consists in the intellectual love towards God. And the intellectual love towards God involves intuitive knowledge of Nature or God and joy which results from such knowledge; the more the man intuitively understands the workings of Nature, the more he understands the essence of God and hence the more blessed he becomes. “The more of this kind of knowledge (intuitive knowledge) any one possesses the clearer is his consciousness of himself and of God, that is, the more perfect and blessed is he.”¹³

The foregoing considerations make it clear that Spinoza’s conception of God is fundamen-

12. A student’s History of Philosophy...

A. K. Rogers P. 258

13. ” ” ” ” P. 275

tally different from the commonly accepted conception of God. (1) According to the common conception, God is the creator of the world and that the universe and God are quite different from one another. God is believed to transcend the world; He is supposed to be outside or beyond the world. To this conception of God Spinoza's objections are :—

(a) This ordinary conception involves the belief in the existence of two substances - God and the universe - which are distinct from each other. But, Spinoza holds that there cannot be more than one substance.

(b) If God is supposed to be distinct from the universe then God cannot be infinite and omnipotent; for His nature and power will be limited by the universe. Further this supposition leads to the conclusion that God cannot be perfect and all-inclusive. For nature, which is supposed to be different from God, must have some qualities or attributes which are not present in God and God who lacks some attributes cannot be perfect. Neither can God be all-inclusive because, according to this supposition, the universe is outside God, it is excluded from God. So the ordinary conception of God involves the

conception of Him as finite and imperfect which is absurd and self contradictory.

(II) God, as commonly conceived, is a person or a super-person, the father in heaven who looks after his creation, who has emotions, passions, desires, purposes and intellect, who is good and beautiful and so on. Spinoza rejects such a conception as anthropomorphic; in this conception of God, the qualities of Human beings are magnified and ascribed to God. Spinoza remarks that "...a triangle, if it could speak, would in like manner say that God is eminently triangular, and a circle that the divine nature is eminently circular; and thus would every one ascribe his own attribute to God"¹⁴ That such a conception of God is unsatisfactory is shown by the following considerations also :—

(a) We finite and imperfect beings, who are limited and affected by things external to us experience emotions. Some external situation or object such as sight of house on fire, or of tiger or hearing bad news etc. produces an emotion in us. But God who is perfect and all-inclusive cannot be affected by something other than or external to Himself because there is nothing other

14. The story of Philosophy.—Will Durrant P. 162

than or external to God. So God cannot have emotions.

(b) We desire to have those things which we do not already possess. We make plans to achieve the object of our desires. We intend or will to carry out our plans. But God who is perfect and complete, who therefore does not lack or need anything cannot have desires, purposes and plans. He cannot have will in the sense in which we have it.

(c) In order to know the things which we already do not know, we think or reason, we observe or experiment. But God, who is omniscient, has no need to reason and investigate and therefore He has no intellect in the sense in which we have it. "...if intellect and will pertain to His eternal essence, these attributes cannot be understood in the sense in which men generally use them, for the intellect and will which could constitute His essence would have to differ entirely from our intellect and could resemble ours in nothing except in name."¹⁵

(d) Good, bad, ugly, beautiful are unsatisfactory human conceptions which change from individual to individual and which therefore can-

not characterize God or Nature. These conditions are relative to our tastes and ends. We call those things which are useful to us or which we like good or beautiful and the things which are harmful or unprofitable or which we dislike are called by us bad or ugly. Since the tastes and ends of individuals vary, what is good or beautiful to one individual may be bad or ugly to another individual. But the things in themselves are neither good nor bad, neither beautiful nor ugly. It is in this way that Spinoza avoids the possible objection to his view. The objection can be stated in this way. Since, on Spinoza's view, God and nature are identical and since there is much evil and deformity in nature, it follows that there is evil and deformity in God. Spinoza's reply would be, God or Nature considered in itself, can be neither good nor bad, neither beautiful nor ugly. When considered in itself Nature is a perfect system in which every thing is necessarily determined, or in which every thing is perfectly adjusted with other things; it is because we are ignorant of the nature of things and of the order of Nature that we imagine them to be good or bad, beautiful or ugly; we ascribe to them these inadequate subjective human conceptions. "Whenever, then, any thing in nature seems to us ridiculous, absurd or evil, it is because we have but a partial knowledge of things, and are in the main ignorant of the order and coherence of nature as a

whole and because we want everything to be arranged according to the dictates of our own reason; although in fact, what our reason pronounces bad is not bad as regards the order and laws of universal nature, but only as regards the laws of our own nature taken separately, —As for the terms good and bad, they indicate nothing positive considered in themselves. For one and the same thing can at the same time be good, bad and indifferent. For example, music is good to the melancholy, bad to mourners, and indifferent to the dead”¹⁶ It was because Spinoza rejected the common conception of personal transcendent God and substituted in its place the conception of impersonal immanent God, who is the system of necessary laws governing the behaviour of phenomena, that he was accused of being an atheist by his contemporaries - an accusation which is far from being true.

It is possible to criticise Spinoza’s view from different standpoints. Materialists may argue that he is not justified in giving equal importance to thought (or mind) along with extension (or matter) while idealists may argue that he is mistaken in treating matter on a par with mind. Pluralists may object to Spinoza’s emphasis on

16. The Story of Philosophy.—Will Durant. P. 161

the systematic unity of all things. Moral philosophers may revolt against his determinism and theologians against his conception of impersonal God. Yet whether or not one accepts Spinoza's view, I think, that, one has to admit that his conception of God is grand.



The Problem of God's Presence

M. S. Deshpande, M. A.

The Problem of God :

The Problem of God is an eternal problem. As Sri Gurudeva Dr. Ranade has put it : "The problem of finding the universal in the midst of particulars, the unchanging in the midst of change, has attracted the attention of every man of vision.... Knowledge has taken immense strides with the growth of time. Scientific inventions have enormously enriched the patrimony of man. The old order has changed and a new one has taken its place. Nevertheless, the goal of human life as well as the means for its attainment, have remained the same. Unquestionably the search after God remains the highest problem even today and a philosophical justification of spiritual life is as necessary today as it was hundreds of years ago." (C. S. P. 16-17).

Since God is eternal, the problem about Him is bound to be eternal. It existed in the past; it exists in the present; and it would exist in the future as well. Hence we are naturally called upon to tackle it satisfactorily, to enable us to attain our ideal in a better manner. This problem resolves itself into four sub-problems: (i) The problem of His existence; (ii) The problem of His nature; (iii) The problem of His realisation; and (iv) The problem of His presence, the last problem being an off-shoot of the third one. The first three problems would be discussed threadbare by my philosopher-friends here. Hence I would deal with them in a brief manner. I would, however, try to discuss the last problem at some length. But my treatment of the subject would be more practical than theoretical as it is offered by an aspirant for the aspirants and not by a technical philosopher for philosophers. I would, therefore, like to invite your sympathetic attention to it, as it is likely to be of some use to us in our everyday life.

God's Existence :

There are four main classes of thinkers who entertain four sets of conceptions regarding the existence of God. They are: (i) Atheists (ii) Sceptics (iii) Agnostics and (iv) Theists. May it please be noted that these words have been used

by me in their ordinary popular sense and not with their strict philosophical connotation.

(i) The Atheists do not believe in the existence of God. The Cārvākas of ancient Bhārat, the Epicureans of ancient Greece and the scientific materialists of modern times, belong to this class. They positively deny the existence of God. To them sense-perception is the only criterion of reality. Objects that can be perceived by the senses alone are real; those that cannot be so perceived are unreal. So they maintain, that matter alone is real, while the so-called Spirit or God is unreal or non-existent. Our life, according to them, is the product of chemical combination of various atoms. We are born of atoms and we would be reduced to atoms after death. Hence our only concern should be to enjoy as much pleasure as possible, during our brief sojourn on earth, before we are finally reduced to dust.

ii) The Sceptics form the second class. They neither affirm nor deny the existence of God. They entertain serious doubts about it. God, according to them, may exist or may not exist. We have really nothing to do with Him. We are the masters of our destiny. We ourselves can make or mar our fortune. Let us try to be guided by our conscience, lead a good life according

to our light and contribute to bring about peace and harmony in our own life as well as in that of our society. That is the ideal to be realised to the best of our ability, they say, during the short span of our life here.

(iii) Unlike the Sceptics, the Agnostics believe in the existence of God. But they consider Him to be unknowable. Man is, according to them, incapable of knowing God, much less of realising Him. It is absolutely impossible for human beings to have any knowledge of Reality on account of the limited power of their intellects. Hence the pursuit of Truth—the search for Reality is, they maintain, a thankless task, a sheer waste of time and energy. Hence we should not vainly try to aspire and labour for attaining the impossible. We should simply have faith in God's benevolence, lead a moral life and work for the welfare of our fellow beings. This is their philosophy of life.

iv) The Theists form, by far, the vast majority of mankind. As stated already, this word is used, not in its strict philosophical sense. It simply connotes a believer in the existence of God. Almost all human beings are theists by nature, as their souls are sparks from the Divine Fire. Faith in God is ingrained in them from

their very birth. . But it is latent in many. Just as children absorbed in play, forget their mother, these persons in their hot pursuit and enjoyment of worldly pleasure, are oblivious of their original Divine Mother. It is only when they are required to meet with failure and disappointments that they instinctively remember God and seek His assistance. In the case of those endowed with the power of reflection, it is 'little philosophy' that turns them towards Atheism. But if they develop a little more depth in their thinking, they would naturally be attracted towards theism.

As human intellect, with its limited capacity, is by nature incapable of knowing the nature of God, the science of logic, mainly based on intellect, cannot prove the existence of God. Still the arguments of design and purpose, advanced by eminent philosophers, for proving His existence, though logically inadequate, have got a force of their own. And hence they cannot be lightly brushed aside as completely invalid. The Moral Argument, advanced by Kant, though not quite conclusive, as he has himself admitted later on, supplies a better proof for God's existence. But the following two simple proofs, based on common sense observation, are sufficient to silence the doubts of any sceptic and convince him about the existence of God. i) The first is the innate

craving of our soul for God ii) the second is the actual realisation of God by the Saints.

i) Just as our sense-organs and their instinctive craving is a sufficient proof for the existence of the respective objects our soul's craving for God is a proof positive for His existence. Our eyes prove the existence of light; our ears, the existence of sound; our stomach and lungs, the existence of food, water and air; our intellect and heart, the presence of Truth and Love. In the same way does not our soul clearly prove the existence of God?

ii) Secondly, Saints of all times and countries, have experienced the vision of God. Not only could they have His vision themselves, they could also direct and guide other aspirants to enjoy it. They were all God-men. They have faithfully described what they have actually realised. So their words deserve our respectful belief.

Moreover, though science has been all along wedded to Atheism, recent discoveries in sub-microscopic physics and sub-nuclear biology, have been presenting new vistas, before the wondering eyes of top-scientists. They have been gradually leading the scientists towards the con-

ception of the presence of some mysterious energy underlying the material universe. These scientists have come to realise that matter is congealed energy and energy is rarified matter. As an eminent modern psychologist points out: "In this realm, the scientist has seen matter vanishing into waves and the waves vanishing into nothing ...A brand new conception of science . shot through and through with spirituality...has already arisen, only the scientist has to lift up his eyes and see the new horizons in science. He has to see the hand of God behind the puzzling phenomena - He has to fill his mind with the God-permeated new science." (P. B. June 1920).

Sri A. Cressy Morrison, former President of the New York Academy of Sciences, has contributed a thought-provoking article in the Readers' Digest (Nov. 1960 entitled "Seven Reasons why a Scientist Believes in God." We shall give below a few extracts from it to quell the doubts of scientific minds. He writes :

"We are still in the dawn of the scientific age and every increase of light reveals more brightly the handiwork of an Intelligent Creator." — "For myself I count seven reasons for my faith.

1) By unwavering mathematical law we can prove that our universe was designed and executed by a great engineering Intelligence.

2) The resourcefulness of life to accomplish its purpose is the manifestation of all-pervading Intelligence. What life itself is, no man has fathomed. It has neither weight nor dimensions, but it does have force; a growing root will crack a rock... Life, the sculptor, shapes all living things; an artist, it designs every leaf of every tree, and colours every flower; Life is a musician and has taught each bird to sing its love-songs... Life is sublime chemist, giving taste to fruits, perfume to roses. Nature did not create life. Who then, has put it here ?

3) Animal wisdom speaks irresistibly of a good Creator who infused instinct into otherwise helpless little creatures.

4) Man...has the power of reason..... Thanks to human reason, we can contemplate the possibility that we are what we are, only because we have received a spark of Universal Intelligence.

5) Provision for all living is revealed in the phenomena such as the wonders of the genes. How do genes lock up all the normal heredity of multitudes of ancestors and preserve the psychology of each, in such an infinitely small space? That cunning can emanate only from a Creative Intelligence.

6) By the economy of nature, we are forced to realise that only Infinite Wisdom could have foreseen and prepared with such astute husbandry.

7) The fact that man can conceive the idea of God is itself a unique proof. The conception of God rises from a divine faculty of man unshared with the rest of the world...the faculty we call imagination....As man's perfected imagination becomes a spiritual reality, he may discern in all the evidence of design and purpose, the great truth...that God is everywhere and in everything but nowhere so close as in our hearts. It is scientifically and imaginatively true; in the words of the Psalmist: "The heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament showeth His handiwork."

These are the various views expressed by different thinkers regarding the existence of God.

God's Nature :

Now about His nature. There is a good deal of controversy about this problem, among eminent philosophers. Some of them maintain that God is transcendent and impersonal; others maintain that He is immanent and personal; and there are still others who hold that God is both transcendent and immanent, both personal

and impersonal. I leave this matter to the expert consideration of my philosopher-friends. I shall merely state in brief the opinion of our Saints in this respect and pass on.

According to our Saints, there is one Spiritual Energy popularly called God-that pervades the universe, sustaining and guiding it. The whole universe springs from it, lives in it and is ultimately dissolved in it. It is both personal and impersonal, both immanent and transcendent. The personal aspect of this Energy is called Íśvara or Lord while the impersonal aspect is called Brahman or the Absolute. The Absolute is without beginning and without end. It is infinite and eternal. It pervades everything like the ether and illumines everything like the sun. This Absolute has latent mysterious power called Māyā or Prakṛti. This power became patent when the thought of becoming many dawned upon the Absolute. The Absolute associated with this patent Māyā, has received the appellation of Íśvara or Lord. It is the Lord that is regarded as the creator, preserver and destroyer of the universe. As Dr. Ranade puts it: "The personal aspect of Brahman is Íśvara and the impersonal aspect of Íśvara is Brahman."

God is called Sat-Cit-Ānanda by the saints which signifies that He is present everywhere,

knows everything, is all powerful, yet all-merciful and is full of Bliss. This is, in short the nature of God, as described by the Saints.

God-realisation :

Saints have also declared with one voice that infinite though God is, He can be realised by man as he is originally a part and parcel of God. Man has the capacity to realise God and enjoy His vision and bliss. In fact, God is the Summum Bonum of human life. This assertion of the Saints is not an outcome of mere speculation, but it is the result of their actual experience. The Saints not only enjoyed the blissful experience of the Lord themselves but also chalked out paths or Yogās as they are called, for His realisation and guided their disciples along the Yogās and enabled them to realise the Lord.

Now what are the principal Yogas and what is their nature? The Gita mentions four Yogas viz. Karma-Yoga—the Yoga of Action, Jñāna-Yoga—the Yoga of Knowledge, Bhakti-Yoga—the Yoga of Devotion and Dhyāna-Yoga—the Yoga of Meditation. All these Yogas stand on the bed-rock of moral life. They mainly utilise one of the respective faculties of human mind viz. Will, Intellect, Emotion and Imagination, though they use the other faculties also along with them.

They aspire to reach God-head mainly through their special faculty, by developing it to the fullest extent. Sri Gurudeva Dr. Ranade, however, goes further and maintains that there is only one Pathway leading to God. It consists in the soulful meditation on the Divine Name—granted by a realised Sadguru, and complete self-surrender to the Lord. This would awaken the faculty of Intuition and grant super-sensuous spiritual experiences, which would, in the fulness of time, culminate in the full-fledged Vision and Bliss of the Lord. The four Yogas mentioned above, are not, according to him, independent paths, but are merely by-paths leading to the Pathway. “They will lead you”, he said, “only to the portals, but not take you inside the Shrine.” On account of temperamental differences those endowed with powerful Will, will begin their Spiritual Pilgrimage with Karmayoga; those with a powerful Intellect, with Jñānayoga; those with powerful Emotion, with Bhaktiyoga; while those that are blessed with a powerful Imagination will begin it with Dhyānayoga. They will all proceed along their respective paths for some time, in the outer circle and reach the portal of the inner circle of the Shrine. Thereafter, they will have to take recourse to the Pathway only. Otherwise, they will not be able, according to Gurudeva, to have the grand blissful experience of the Lord.

There are other Yogas in the field as well that claim to be short-cuts to realise God. But as I am innocent of them, I leave the matter to be dealt with by those who possess a direct knowledge about their nature and efficacy.

God's Presence :

I shall now deal with 'The Problem of God's Presence.' I shall first point out the blessings of our life in His presence and then expound the four stages through which our life should pass before it could enjoy the direct presence and bliss of the Lord.

a) *Blessings* : "Learn to live in the presence of God and attain His vision and bliss. Then you will enjoy material comfort, moral purity, mental peace and spiritual bliss!" This is the essence of the message of all the Saints and Sages of all times and climes. They have proclaimed, as it were with one voice, that it is the only effective panacea for all the ills of life... individual, social, national and international. Even a little practice of this art carries with it good many blessings. But man has paid scant respect to this eternal Elixir of Life and has made his life utterly miserable. All other remedies tried by him so far have proved a failure and are doomed to prove a miserable failure in future

as well. Hence how to cultivate and develop this valuable art, and bring it into daily practice, has been the most important problem, for the solution of which we would like to make a few humble suggestions, in a rather popular and practical way.

b) *Four Stages*: Now how to cultivate this art? How to live in the presence of God? Our life in God's presence will have to pass through the following four stages: i) Intellectual ii) Emotional, iii) Moral and iv) Intuitional. We should try to think about His presence, feel His presence, act in His presence and finally experience His presence.

i) To develop the thought of God's presence, we should read sacred books, listen to sacred discourses and constantly try to think about and recapitulate the knowledge of God gained through them. We should regularly go through the sacred books like the Upanisads and the Gītā, dealing with the greatness and glory of God and Life Divine. Ours should be meditative reading. Our reading should begin with thinking, proceed along with thinking and should be followed by thinking. This would ensure clarity of understanding and profundity of impressions. Along with reading, listening to the discourses of saintly scholars

should be adopted, as they would clarify several moot-points and difficulties. In fact, listening is better than reading as its impressions are more deep and stable.

We should also try to recall and visualise the import of the epithets *Sat-cit-ānaṅd*, or *Kānti-sagar*, *Nāda-sagar*, *Amṛta-sāgar*, that are generally attributed to God. We should as well try to attune ourselves with such clarion calls as:

Íśāvāsyaiṅ idaṁ sarvaṁ, yat kiñca
jagatyāṁ jagat.

Tena tyaktena bhujjītāḥ, mā gṛdhaḥ
kasyasiddhanam.

“The universe is the abode of the Lord. Enjoy what He grants you. Don’t covet anybody’s wealth.” And again,

Íṣvaraḥ sarvabhūtānāṁ, hṛddeśe
Arjuna tiṣṭhati,
Bhrāmayaṅ sarvabhūtāni, yañtrārūdhani
māyayā.

Tameva śaraṇaṁ gaccha, sarvabhāvena
Bhārata,
Tatprasādāt parāṁ śaṅtim, sthānaṁ
prāpsyasi śāśvataṁ.

“The Lord resides in the hearts of all beings. He

whirls them all, as though they are mounted on a machine, through His mysterious power. Surrender yourself to Him alone, with all your heart. His grace will grant you Supreme Peace and Eternal Existence.” Constant consciousness of these inspiring messages will ever keep us aware of the presence of God.

ii) To develop the feeling of God’s presence we should reverentially study the lives and literature of saints and sages. Their holy lives graphically demonstrate the infinite greatness and glory of God. We learn from them that though saints had a past, they could mould a bright future for themselves, by being the recipients of the grace of God. We would, thus, be inspired to lead such a life and try to make it sublime through personal effort and Divine Grace. While going through these lives, we would, for the time being, be living and moving in a holy atmosphere that would automatically generate the feeling of devotion in us.

The valuable literature of the saints also is supremely inspiring and elevating. It is a genuine record of the actual trials and tribulations encountered by them during their Pilgrimage to Divinity, as well as of the bliss and blessedness enjoyed by them after they realised the Lord.

Throbbing with genuine spiritual emotions, this literature naturally arouses corresponding emotions in us, in case we approach it in a proper spirit of devotion and humility. Thus, it not only rouses our feelings but also moulds them properly in the requisite pattern and enables us to feel the presence of God.

iii) Now to be able to act in the presence of God i.e., in the consciousness and feeling of the presence of God, we should try to seek the holy company of God-men, sit at their feet, observe their noble lives and hear their valuable words of wisdom. God lives in the hearts of such Saints; He speaks through them and blesses their devotees through them. God's grace works through the Saints. Saints are, indeed, potent dynamos of Divine Energy. They are inspiring ideals in flesh and blood for all humanity. We should, hence establish loving direct contact with them, try to seek their guidance and follow their advice to the best of our ability. Their holy lives would purify our thoughts, refine our feelings and intensify our devotion for the Lord. This would turn the direction of our will and activity from self to God. Our small and narrow self would, then, begin to have wider and wider vision and in course of time, would even aspire to embrace the whole creation with love. We would, thereafter,

not only try to act in the presence of God but for the presence of God as well. We would lead a pure, pious and noble life full of compassion and charity for all. This would create an atmosphere of self-less love round about us, which would eliminate gradually all types of conflicts and would enable the society to enjoy the blessings of lasting peace and consequent general prosperity.

iv) For the stability and permanence of this experience, the support of the actual mystical apprehension of the presence of God is absolutely necessary. Such an experience can be had only through the guidance and grace of realised Saints. Generally such Saints are rarely to be met with. They love to live in cognito. We should therefore, assiduously search for them, approach them with proper humility, ascertain from them the actual Sādhana for the realisation of God and practise it with due devotion. It is only after a long, untiring and loving practice of the Sādhana that we would have the blessing of the glimpses of God's vision, through the grace of the Master. We would, then, be able to live "under the canopy of His illumination" i.e. in the direct presence of the Lord. That would be the culmination of our persistent effort in this direction.

The presence of God experienced through all these stages, —especially through the last stage—

would be the only remedy for the ills of life from which, not only our Bharat, but also the whole world, is acutely suffering. Even a little of such practice would free and protect us from great danger.

“Svalpamapi asya dharmasya,
trāyate mahato bhayāt.”



The Doctrine of God

(*Its place and value in the scientific age.*)

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I knew Dr. Ranade personally. He was the Guru of my Guru late Principal S. V. Dandekar. I was to attend one of the philosopher's camps at Nimbhal but missed it for one reason or other.

The doctrine of God can be studied from various angles. I however intend to consider it here more from religious and social point of view than the philosophical one. Though a rational approach tells us that the idea of God must have originated in the mind of the primitive man out of fear and wonder he felt while struggling for existence against the mighty forces of nature, religion seems to take the existence of God as self-evident and proceeds to lay down the ways and means of propitiating Him. As regards the

nature, attributes and powers of God almost all religions speak with one voice differing mainly on the emphasis on this or that attribute. They are almost unanimous in declaring that God is all in all and everything that takes place anywhere in the universe, is just as ordained by Him. Man's destiny depends entirely on the will of God, and as such his primary duty is to seek His grace by devotional and other methods. God is thus a dominant thought in the minds of a very huge majority of human beings, who look to him for the improvement of the conditions of their life in this as well as the other world. This tendency in one form or other is seen throughout the known history of human thought to date and it has been one of the important guiding factors determining the behaviour of individuals and societies even in this age of science. Closer observation will however show that the strength of this tendency is not uniform. It appears to have varied with the variation in the environments. But we can in general say that it is almost inversely proportionate to the development of science particularly in respect of the idea of dependence of man on God for his material welfare. The reason is simple. The basic principles of science, particularly modern science, are Uniformity of Nature and the Law of causation. Science interprets accidents, whims and caprices of nature as nothing but

ignorance of man about the respective laws of nature. Every such event is therefore put to vigorous scientific scrutiny with a view to explore its natural cause. All such efforts have contributed to make man dependent more and more on himself than on the grace of God for his needs, conveniences and prosperity. He is progressively becoming the maker of his own destiny. Diversities in innate potentialities are no doubt very real even today, but the advance of science is very likely to disclose that secret also to man and we can now certainly visualise a day when he would be able to remove even these innate disparities, and there would be no reason for him to entertain a belief in the so-called destiny. Many inequalities and evils in social life are not innate but man-made, and as such can be liquidated by the society itself in the course of time. Perhaps a new species superior to man may also emerge out of these efforts of man. Whether all these developments will be worth having or not is however, a different question which need not be dealt with here.

The net result of the achievements of Science is that the factors which were responsible for the emergence and sustenance of the idea of God in man for all these years are fast disappearing and a day when they will completely disappear is not far;

at least it has now come within the perview of imagination. Man is now not a slave but master of the forces of nature and God is gradually ceasing to have a meaningful or useful place in determining the ups and downs in his life. This is how I understand the significance of the new movement 'death of God' in the Christian world. I have no doubt that this movement will before very long catch the imagination of other parts of the world also, parallel to the spread of scientific knowledge in those parts.

Some may object to the above discussion on the plea that the theory of indetermination or uncertainty in physics invalidates the principle of Uniformity of Nature. But I beg to submit that this contention cannot stand since it is based on an erroneous understanding of that principle. The Theory of indetermination expresses merely the limitations of the accuracy of measurements of motions of atomic particles by the methods of measurements available today. It in no way contravenes or even concerns the principle of Uniformity of Nature. Hence the objection, if at all raised will defeat itself.

The traditional thinkers may perhaps feel horrified at the movement 'death of God', but I wonder how any one can ignore or escape the

impact of science on human thought and its development. That the traditional method of the study of various problems in philosophy appears sterile as compared with the productivity of science goes without saying. Besides, careful study will surely bring home to us that there is little, if any, conclusive evidence to show that prayer, devotion or religious rites bring about any change in the lot of human beings, at least in respect of the vast majority of common people, even if we believe in the stories of supernatural events in respect of saints or spiritual stalwarts who are few and far between. The wiser course therefore is to acknowledge without reservation the impact of science and to make suitable adjustments in our approach to philosophical problems. Failure to do so will only isolate religion and philosophy from the powerful current of thought and die a natural death or will be drowned and lost in that current. Scientific truths are after all experimentally proved truths and no amount of speculation having no basis in concrete experience to however heights of intellectual fits it may reach, will ever dislodge them from the place they have occupied in human life. Thinkers in philosophy will be doing a great disservice to man and to their subject of study by ignoring science, and harping on the traditional point of view in respect of God. Mystics may tell us that they do have a

vision of God; but how many mystics whose words can be depended upon have there been so far? Hardly any. So far as common man is concerned he goes only by faith in miracles or visions without any experience of his own or critical inquiry and this faith is seriously undermined by the progress of science.

The above discussion gives rise to some grave problems. Does it mean that the doctrine of God is purely illusory and hence be outright rejected? Does it mean that it is not God who created man, but it is man who created God? Does it also mean that the doctrine not only serves no useful purpose but is positively harmful to man?

To my mind such conclusions, without fixing up their exact meanings would prove overhasty. Let us see how.

(1) If we make the connotation of the word God clear we will find that there is no need to treat the doctrine as illusory. That man is not a self-created being but a product of nature is self-evident. This nature has its laws and it is these laws which sustain the whole universe. This thought leads us to the legitimate conclusion that

there must be some power which created this nature and its laws. Man and his knowledge being the product of nature he can't go beyond these laws. He can only imagine the existence of that power. To avoid being caught in the net of the infinite series of causal relations some may say that nature and its laws are eternal and as such have no creator. In that case we may legitimately assert that nature itself is that power and it determines all events according to its laws. In short, the existence of some power behind nature and its laws or nature itself as that power has to be granted. If we term this power as God then this God does exist and as such the doctrine of God can't be branded as illusory even from the scientific point of view. But the God as is understood in common parlance by the followers of various religions is nothing but man-made. He seems to be nothing else but man himself with his powers infinitely magnified. This is essentially anthropomorphic concept. It is just like a spider imagining God to be very big spider. It is this view of God that leads to blind faith in supernaturalism and superstitions of all kinds and hence must be discarded; not the doctrine of God as a power on the lines explained above. A time may come in human history when man may have a glimpse into that power as the mystics or visionaries say they have. Till then it has to be

accepted as a hypothesis only, but quite a legitimate and scientifically tenable one. We may also say that the experience of mystics the world over is a corroborating evidence for this hypothesis. Though this experience has no objectivity at present, there is no reason to suppose that objectivity at least of some kind is impossible for all the time to come.

Now the next question is whether the doctrine of God as understood by the common man is positively harmful to man's material or, and spiritual well being, or whether it does or can serve some useful purpose in his life. I feel that it is harmful and yet it can be made to serve some useful purpose in an important way and perhaps is actually serving such purpose at present. It is harmful in several ways. It is an impediment in the free expression of man's potentialities, leads to all sorts of superstitions and thereby creates serious perversions in his behaviour on individual and social plain, discourages, if not positively kills at times, his tendency of self-reliance, gives rise to all types of ill-conceived and ill-founded idea of morality or duty, ends in commercialisation and corruption of religion as well as forms of worship and so on. In other words it leads to the moral, social and spiritual degeneration of individual and society under the pretext of

propitiating God. Religion becomes more or less an economic and political proposition to the detriment of the development of spiritualism in man which is the real function of religion in human life. His fear and sense of helplessness are exploited by the so-called religious leaders for their own selfish and sinister ends. There can be no two views on the point that this must be stopped and that this can be achieved only by purifying common man's concept of God. Spread of scientific knowledge and particularly scientific way of thinking is the only effective and dependable means for this purification, for that alone will help common man to realise that most of the events which he considers as ordained by God are nothing but expressions of the laws of nature, and as such can be explained on the basis of causal relations without bringing in God in any way. There is therefore no need of invoking "God's will" for understanding them. Once man understands that there is no hand of what is called God (i.e. supernatural agency overriding the laws of nature) in any event on this earth and that everything can be explained on the basis of natural laws he will be freed from all superstitious ideas about God and his powers and whims, and will look to his own abilities to carve out the future of himself as well as of mankind on this earth.

We shall now see how this purified doctrine of God can serve an important purpose in man's life. I do not endorse the theory which tries to explain life as just a peculiar combination of some elements. I do feel that man is something more than this though one may not be able to describe it or to prove it in the present state of knowledge. That something may be termed as soul i.e. spiritual element in man. Experience shows that this soul had some innate cravings about something beyond itself. Besides, man is born helpless, and this helplessness creates in him a sort of fear which leads him to search for some shelter. This shelter is provided to him by the idea of God. He gets peace of mind and soul and values of life by virtue of that idea, in the absence of which he would be deprived of that peace, and those values and his life would be psychologically and spiritually miserable. I consider this peace and these values so vital for man that I would allow him to entertain even a distorted idea of God than to deprive him of it till his ideas are purified. This is how the concept of God serves an important purpose in an individual's life.

The concept serves a significant purpose from the social point of view also i. e. from the point of view of the safety, stability and continuation of society. It serves an important role in the maintenance of social discipline,

and through it social stability. Religion is the expression of the idea of God and the method of propitiating Him. The existing religions may differ from each other in various ways but fundamentally they are such expressions. The methods of worship do vary from religion to religion or from sect to sect in the same religion or in the same sect at different times but that is immaterial. What is important is that persons are brought up under these religions from their very birth and as such they pick up just by faith the idea of God as well as the methods of worship from their society. This faith acts as a great social control on the behaviour of the individuals and groups. They learn what is good and what is bad according to their faith and try to act accordingly. Their moral ideas coupled with the fear of God deters them from behaving in a way that won't be liked by God as they understand it. Their basic animal nature is curbed to a great extent thereby and it is primarily this that contributes to the safety and security of society as a whole. It is worth noting that the animal nature of lower animals is controlled by nature itself while that in man is being controlled by social control. If these controls lose their grip on man the beastly law of might is right alone will prevail in human societies and that will ultimately pave the way of extermina-

tion of man from the face of the earth. This is how the concept of God plays a significant role in social life of man. Had man's behaviour been controlled only by sound social reason, the idea of God would not be necessary for the purpose. But I don't think this possible in any near future since man's behaviour as we see it is guided mostly by irrational element of his nature.

Modern social and political philosophers may perhaps question the need of the idea of God for controlling the behaviour of individuals and groups, in view of the now almost universally accepted principles viz. the rule of law and equality before law, which, they may say, are more real and effective weapons to perform that job. I agree with this view as far as it goes, but feel that it will always fall short of requirement. Control by law is essentially an external control, while to be really and uniformly effective, control must be internal as well. The idea of a higher power like God plays a very important role in enabling man to acquire this internal control over himself and his behaviour, and herein lies its practical utility.

A reference to the policy of secularism will not be out of place here. I have no doubt that it is a sound policy if understood properly, since

it refuses to discriminate between man and man on the grounds of their faith. But the experience in our country shows that despite repeated harping on secularism in place and out of place by top ranking persons, discrimination based on faith is becoming more and more acute. Besides, the common man seems to interpret secularism almost as irreligion with the result that individual and social morality is being undermined. Social control of religion is fast disappearing before people have learnt to control their own behaviour in a socially healthy way. The fear of God which so far used to keep them on right path to a more or less extent is vanishing without being replaced by any other more sound method to realise the same goal. This I am afraid would soon lead to a serious social crisis. Some thinkers feel this is only a transitional situation and people will gradually learn the art of self-control. If this prophesy comes true none would be more happy than myself; but I have doubts since I feel that a vast majority will refuse to be self-controlled. Social thinkers should therefore study the impact of the propaganda of secularism as it is being done today and advise society of the ways and means to counteract the unsocial and anti-social aspect of the same. The main reason why philosophy and religion are coming into increasing disrepute in the eyes of the general public is that

their sponsors are busy advocating the outdated dogmas in respect of them. They refuse to see the impact of science. I entertain grave doubts about the wisdom of this approach and I have tried to focus attention on that impact.



Proofs for the Existence of God

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The existence of God is a philosophical question of most extreme importance both theoretically and practically. By "God" one might understand a supreme mind regarded as omnipotent and supremely good and wise. God is said to be the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world. His knowledge is not only external but also universal and perfect. He is the home of infinite number of auspicious qualities (*ananta kalyana guna paripurna*). On the one hand we have the claims of revelation on which belief in God and his attributes has so often been based, and on the other there are a great number of arguments formulated by the philosophers for the existence of God. The purpose of the present paper is to discuss the arguments of the philosophers for the existence of God.

The Ontological Argument

This argument is associated with the name of Anselm of Canterbury, an Italian, who lived from 1033 A. D. to 1109 A. D. It claims to prove the existence of God by a mere consideration of our idea of him. It may be summed up as follows :

God is defined as most perfect being possessing all positive attributes. The word "positive" enables us (i) to exclude evil attributes on the ground that they are negative and (ii) it implies the infinity of God, for there would be an element of negativity in him if he possessed any attribute in any limited degree, i.e. superior degrees would be denied of him.

Now we have an idea of a perfect being. Existence is a "perfection" or a positive attribute. If we are to avoid contradicting ourselves, we must grant the existence of God.

The most important objection against the argument is to the effect that existence is not a "perfection" or an attribute. To say something exists is to assert a proposition of a different kind from what we assert when we ascribe an attribute to a thing. It is not to add any new characteristic. It is merely to affirm that the concept is realized in fact. This is one of the cases where

we are apt to be misled by language. Sentences "Dogs are existent" and "Dogs are carnivorous" possess the same grammatical form. But they do not express the same form of proposition. To say that "dogs are carnivorous" is to ascribe an additional quality to beings already presupposed as existing; to say that "dogs are existent" is to say that propositions ascribing to something the properties which constitute the definition of a dog are sometimes true.

The distinction seems to be more obvious in the negative case. If "Centaur's are not existent" were a proposition of the same form as "tigers are not herbivorous", to say that centaurs are not existent would already be to presuppose their existence. A tiger has to exist in order to have the property of not being herbivorous, but in order to be non-existent a centaur need not first exist. "Centaur's are not existent" means nothing has the properties commonly implied by the word "Centaur".

The ontological argument seems to be dubious and least valuable. In the history of philosophy after Anselm, Descartes accepts it and Kant rejects it.

The Cosmological Argument

The cosmological or first cause argument is of greater importance. The greatest thinker of the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas who lived from 1225 to 1274 A. D. made use of this argument, while rejecting the ontological one. The argument is regarded as proving the existence of God with mathematical certainty. It has been accepted by great thinkers like Aristotle, Descartes Locke and Leibniz. The Nyaya-Vaiśeṣikas also make use of this argument.

The argument may be summarised as follows: We require a reason to account for the world. This ultimate reason must be of such a kind as itself not to require a further reason to account for it. God is the only being who could be conceived as self-sufficient and so as not requiring a cause beyond himself but being his own reason.

The argument has an appeal; because we are inclined to demand a reason for things and the notion of a first cause is the only alternative to the notion of infinite regress, which is very difficult and seems even self-contradictory. If any being is to be conceived as necessarily existing and so not needing a cause outside itself, it is most plausible to conceive God as occupying this position.

But the argument makes assumptions which may be questioned. It assumes the principle of causation in a form in which a cause is said to give reason for the effect. But this is rejected by many modern philosophers. It may be doubted whether we could apply to the world as a whole the causal principle which is valid within the world; if we hold that the causal principle thus applied is only analogous to the latter the argument is weakened. Finally and the most serious point is, it is exceedingly difficult to see how any thing could be its own reason. To be this it would seem that it must exist necessarily *apriori*. Now it is possible to see how it can be necessary *apriori* that something, P, should be true if something else, q, is. (For example, if "This is red" is true, it follows necessarily that "This is coloured"). Or again it is possible to see how it can be necessary *apriori* that something self-contradictory should not exist. (For example, if "A is A" is true, it follows necessarily that "A is not not—A" is false). But it is quite another matter to see how it could be *apriori* necessary in the logical sense that something should positively exist. What contradiction would be there in its not existing? In the mere blank of non-existence there can be nothing to contradict. This is not to say that it is absolutely impossible that a being could be its own logical reason, but this seems hard how this

could be. The advocates of the cosmological proof might contend that God was necessary in some non-logical sense, which is somewhat less unplausible though still quite incomprehensible.

Can the cosmological argument be stated in a form which gives it some probability value? It may still be argued that the world will at least be more rational if it is as the theist pictures it than if it is not, and it is more reasonable to suppose that the world is rational than to suppose that it is irrational. The latter view is rejected by many modern thinkers. We cannot prove the view they reject to be true. But we should note that it is the view presupposed by science, often unconsciously, in its own sphere. For, practically no scientific propositions can be established by strict demonstration and/or observation alone. Science could not advance at all if it did not assume some criterion beyond the laws of mathematics and logic. What is this criterion? It seems to be coherence in a rational system.

Coherence theory was put forth by Hegel and the associated school of idealists. A fact coheres into the system means that it is fitted into the system.

Now of two hypotheses (i) the world is rational and (ii) the world is irrational, more things

will be fitted into the former rather than into the latter. Therefore scientists will prefer the former hypothesis.

Theism cannot completely rationalize the universe till it can show how God can be his own cause or how it is that he does not need a cause and till it can overcome the problem of evil completely. But it does come nearer to rationalizing it than does any other view.

Modern philosophical views opposed to theism do not try to give any rational explanation of the world. They just take it as a brute fact not to be explained. But we come nearer to a rational explanation if we regard the course of the world as determined by purpose and value than if we do not. If we accept the scientific principle that we should accept the hypothesis which brings the universe nearest to a coherent rational system, then theism should be accepted by us.

The strong point of the cosmological argument is that it is incredible that the physical universe should just have happened even if it be reduced to trillions of electrons. It calls out for some further explanation of some kind. This leads to the next argument.

The Argument from Design

This is the argument from adaptation of living bodies of organisms to their ends and to the ends of their species. This is something very amazing; thousands of millions of cells in our brain are knit together in a system which works; twenty or thirty muscles are involved in a simple act of sneezing! when a wound is inflicted or germs enter into an organism, all sorts of protective measures are set up by the organism;—if you cut off a tail of a smaller animal, a new one is grown and the very same cells will again develop according to what is needed into a tail or into a leg. Such intricate arrangements seem to suggest that there is an intelligent purposing mind to explain them.

It is objected that such an argument shows wisdom in God and not goodness in him and is therefore of little value.

It is replied that a God who is so much intelligent as to have designed the universe must be at least as good as the best men. He should take care of the universe just as a father takes care of his children. He being supremely intelligent and wise must be supremely good.

Still it is said that the argument does not establish all that the theist wants to establish. The

argument might show that God is very powerful, but it does not make him omnipotent. It does not even show that God has created the world as opposed to manufacturing it out of given material. It might probably make him good, but could not prove him perfect. And the more unpleasant features of the struggle for existence are far from supporting the hypothesis of a good God.

But does the argument justify any conclusion? It has been objected that it does not on the following ground.

It is an argument from analogy,

Animal bodies are like machines.

A machine has a designer.

Therefore animal bodies have a designer and the designer is God.

But the strength of the analogy depends upon the likeness between what is compared. The more the number of positive properties, and the less the number of unknown properties the greater is the strength of the analogy etc.

Now animal bodies are not very like machines. And God is certainly not very like a man.

Therefore the argument from analogy based on our experience of men designing machines does not give much strength to the conclusion that God exists.

Therefore the argument from design is not a good argument.

It is replied that the criticism would be valid if the argument from design is mainly the argument based on analogy.

But it is not based on argument from analogy. It is said that the force of the argument lies not in the analogy; but in the extra-ordinary intricacy with which the details of a living body are adapted to serve its own interests, an intricacy far too great to be regarded as merely a coincidence.

Suppose we saw pebbles on the shore arranged in such a way as to form a machine. It is theoretically possible that they might have come to occupy such a position by chance. But we may jump to the conclusion that they have been deposited not by the tide, but by some intelligent agent. Yet the body of the simplest living creature is a more complex machine than the most complex ever devised by a human engineer. Therefore in order to create it, God should exist.

Before the theory of evolution was accepted, the only reply to this argument was: In an infinite time, there are infinite possible combinations; hence it is not improbable, even apart from a designing mind, that there should be worlds or stages in the development of worlds which exhibit great apparent purposiveness.

Suppose a monkey is playing with a typewriter. It is most unlikely that it would produce an intelligible book. But given a sufficient number of billions of years to live and play with the typewriter, by accident, it may produce a great number. The number of letters is only twenty-six, though the number of combinations is large. But given sufficient length of time, it is actually probable that even a monkey could produce a book.

This may easily be applied to the occurrence of adaptations in nature. Out of all possible combinations only very few things would display marked adaptation; but if the number of ingredients of the universe is finite, the number of their combinations is also finite. So given an infinite time, some worlds or some stages in the development of worlds would show high purposiveness than others, though this is the result of accidental combination of atoms.

The plausibility of this view is diminished, if in playing bridge one who would have thirteen spades in hands several times running, would use such an argument to meet the charge of cheating. Our attitude would not change even if people had been playing bridge for an infinite time.

But now the theory of evolution claims to give an alternative explanation of adaptation of organisms, which removes the improbability of which we complained. Once granted the existence of some organisms, their offspring would not all be exactly similar. Some would necessarily be better equipped than others for surviving and producing offspring in their turn, and their characteristics would therefore tend to be more widely transmitted. When we take vast numbers into account, this will mean that a larger and larger proportion of species will have had favourable variations transmitted to them and unfavourable ones will tend to die out. Thus from small beginnings accumulated all the extra-ordinarily elaborate mechanism which now serves the purpose of living creatures.

There can be no question for a properly informed person of denying the evolution theory, but of only considering whether it is adequate by itself to explain the striking appearance of design. If it is not, it may well be combined with the

metaphysical hypothesis that a mind has designed and controls the universe. Evolution will then be just the way in which God's design works out.

Now in reply to the purely evolutionary theory it has been said that for evolution to get started at all some organisms must have already appeared. Otherwise the production of offspring and their survival or death in the struggle for existence would not have come into question at all. But even the simplest living organism is a machine very much more complex than a motor car. If it would be absurd to suppose inorganic matter coming together fortuitously of itself to form a motor car, it would be even more absurd to suppose it coming together to form an organism. So without design the evolutionary process would never get started at all.

Some thinkers would regard it as adequate to postulate an unconscious purpose to explain design; but it is extra-ordinarily difficult to see what such a thing as an unconscious purpose could be.

The argument from design seems to have considerable, though not conclusive force. There is much beauty in the world, there are moral ideals framed. It would be strange to suppose that all this resulted from an unconscious unintelligent world.

The counter argument from evil is of course formidable. But it will be discussed at a later stage.

Moral Arguments : Immanuel Kant

Kant's ethical argument for the existence of God is as follows :

i) There is a distinction between *the intrinsic good* and *the complete good*.

Virtue is the intrinsic good. It consists in doing our actions rightly without any ulterior motive. We could be virtuous whether there is God or not.

But the complete good consists of virtue and along with it appropriate amount of happiness.

The complete good *ought* to exist. It must be possible for us to attain it. The necessary conditions for its possibility must be made actual.

ii) But there is no necessary connection either logical or causal between virtue and happiness.

a) There is no logical connection between the two because virtue cannot be defined in terms of happiness. There are many other kinds of

happiness besides feeling satisfaction with one's virtue.

b) There is no causal connection between the two. Virtue wholly depends on oneself. A man, according to Kant, could be virtuous, however unfavourable the conditions may be.

But happiness depends upon individual's innate tastes and dispositions, bodily health and external circumstances. The individual has no control over these. The virtuous man has no more control on these than the vicious one.

iii) The position then is this :

The complete good must be capable of existing, since it ought to exist.

One of its conditions, namely, virtue is possible under all circumstances. But the other factor i. e. deserved amount of happiness requires the over-ruling of nature in such a way that virtue is rewarded with appropriate amount of happiness. So a benevolent, powerful and moral being i. e. God must exist.

The argument is criticised on the following ground.

There are two different senses of 'ought'. In one sense it means a factual possibility, in the other only a logical possibility. For instance, if one says: "You *ought* to do so and so" it implies you *could* do so and so and that it not merely involves no logical contradiction.

But if I say "So and so ought to exist" it merely implies a logical possibility i.e. it involves no logical contradiction for such a being to exist; and any one who tries to bring it about may try to do so. But it does not imply that such a being actually exists.

Kant is entitled to have a hypothetical proposition: "If such a being as God exists, there will be reward for virtue in appropriate happiness." But Kant is not permitted to make a categorical assertion.

The "Argument from Religious Experience"

This is, strictly speaking, not an argument but a claim to intuitive awareness. What is meant by the appeal to religious experience is usually the claim in states where the religious emotion is present to have a direct apprehension, not based on inference, of the existence and to some extent the nature of God.

It has, however, been objected that the assertion of an intuitive conviction can be of no help in a discussion on the ground that, if I have the conviction already, I do not need to be convinced of it, while, if I do not have it, the mere statement of the fact that somebody else has it will be no ground for my accepting it apart from any argument he may give.

But suppose this situation: A man has a confused and rather feeble intuitive conviction of God. He is aware that what seems to him a reliable intuition may not really be so, and he would certainly not be justified in placing any considerable faith in the intuition if he thought himself to be the only person who had it. But if he finds that it is very wide-spread and possessed in a stronger and clearer degree by very many men who in other respects quite especially deserve the titles of good, wise and great, this may well justify him in trusting it.

The fact that very many people have an intuition is indeed hardly likely to convince anyone who has no glimmering of it himself, but even such a person will be unreasonable if he takes it for granted that those who have it are necessarily wrong because he has not got it

himself. He may well be relatively to them in the same position as a tone-deaf man is relatively to a musician.

Intuitive religious conviction has been so widespread and such a dominating factor in the thought of many, we might indeed say "most", who were in other respects obviously among the greatest and best of mankind, and so much the basis throughout history of a whole extra-ordinarily persistent, fertile and fundamental side of life and thought as to constitute a strong *prima facie* case for the view that there is at least a great deal in it.

In very many cases the intuitive conviction is attained or maintained after a very prolonged meditation on the question and exercises a tremendous transforming influence on the believer's whole life and conduct. It further seems to him "to make sense" not only of his own life but of the whole universe.

The main positive objections to the claims of religious intuition are made by empiricists who assert that knowledge is limited to sense-experience. But the view of empiricists cannot be proved. There must be some intuition if there is to be inference at all, and there is no way of determining

by '*a priori*' argument in what fields intuition is or is not possible.

It is said that apparent religious intuition can be explained by psychology. The causal explanations given by e.g. anti-religious Freudians are of such a kind that we can say that any belief caused in such a way would be unjustified, and in general we may say that a belief due simply to a desire to hold the belief must be unjustified for the person who thus holds it. But the psychologist can have no means of proving that the beliefs are due to the causes he suggests. He can only point out certain factors which might lead people to hold a religious belief even if it were false. The most he can say is that the religious man may have been prejudiced by his desires, not prove that he has been, and the risk of being thus prejudiced by one's desires is present in the case of any argument which leads to a pleasant belief. we are not obliged to abandon all arguments which lead to such conclusions because we may have been prejudiced, though we ought to do our level best not to be prejudiced. The same applies to apparent intuitions. And the theist can retort that, if there are some factors which would make a man likely to hold a belief in God, even if it were false, there are others which would make him likely to reject the belief even if it were true,

We may add that it is by no means such a simple task as might be thought to explain religion by a reference to wish fulfilment. Religious beliefs are by no means always pleasant to the person who holds them or is on the verge of doing so. The acceptance of religious beliefs has often exposed those who adopted them to terrible persecution, it has often intensified their sense of sin till this became agonizing, it has inspired the dread of hell.

Religious intuition seeks to establish at least these two fundamental beliefs. The first is the belief in the fundamental goodness of reality. This belief is essential to religion in the sense that without it a religious attitude to reality could not be justifiable. For religion is an attitude either to reality as a whole or to the fundamental principle or being on which reality is based, and it could not be desirable to enter into a relation of communion or worship with what was not good.

The second belief is the belief in a personal God. The religious attitude essentially involves emotions and states of mind which have only a point and sense as directed towards a being conceived as having attributes which we can only think of as personal. Here reference is to love,

adoration, gratitude and devotion. These are all parts of the normal religious attitude to God, and they are all states of mind which imply essentially as their object a being having at least consciousness and the capacity for deliberate benevolence.

Of the two beliefs just mentioned the first is necessary if the sense of peace and security characteristic of the religious life is to be maintained, and is the most important element in the intuition of the mystic. The second belief will entail the first if we think of God as morally good and dominating the world to such an extent as at least to secure the ultimate triumph of good over evil, and this is of course the usual view of the theist. Indeed most theists would go further and say that God must be conceived as completely omnipotent if the religious consciousness is to attain satisfaction. God seems to be intuited not only as good but as absolutely supreme.

The Problem of Evil

It is said that the existence of a good and omnipotent God is incompatible with the fact of evil. Such an objection could not indeed at the worst disprove the existence of God, because God might be conceived as limited by external

obstacles of some kind so that he could not prevent the evil. But such a conception of God is very unsatisfying to the religious mind because it takes away God's omnipotence.

A course adopted sometimes has been to declare evil unreal. But if this solution means what it says it is clearly intolerable. For it contradicts either our most certain judgements of introspection or our most certain judgements of ethics. If we say that we did not really feel the pain we thought we felt or commit the sins we thought we committed, then we are contradicting some of our most certain judgments of introspection and memory. If we say that we really felt the pain and really committed the sins but these are not really evil, we are contradicting the most certain judgments of ethics.

A more common and less unpromising solution is to say that much evil is necessary for the attainment of a greater good. This might be thought to imply a limitation of the omnipotence of God, but when philosophers have attributed omnipotence to Him they have usually not meant that He could do things which were logically impossible such as make $2 + 2$ equal 5. But what has usually been meant by calling God omnipotent is that He could do anything which

was not logically impossible and that he was not limited by anything outside Himself. God might well be omnipotent in this sense and yet be incapable of producing some kinds of goods without some evil. Similarly He might be omnipotent in this sense and yet be incapable of producing certain goods without incurring the *possibility* of evil.

The actual occurrence of certain evils and not merely their possibility is justified because it is necessary for the production of good. How could there be moral good without temptation and obstacles and therefore without some evil, at least in the form of pain and thwarting? How could there be love of the highest kind if there were never the slightest occasion for sympathy and self-sacrifice? We must have evil to conquer if we are to have the very great good of conquering it.

This solution would not deny the reality of evil. Evil is there to be conquered. Nor should the solution discourage us from fighting against evil, for evil can only be a means to the good if fought against and conquered.

The belief in an omnipotent and perfect God cannot therefore be dismissed as necessarily impossible because of the problem of evil.

CONCLUSION

The theist must always remember that God is far above any ideas of Him we can form. St. Thomas Aquinas held that, because God was a being of quite a different nature from ours, no concept could be applied to him in the same sense as it could to us but only in an "analogical" sense. Kant insisted that we could never have constitutive" but only "regulative" ideas of God, meaning that we could not form clear definite concept of God as we could of scientific objects but only highly inadequate and formal ones, and could not prove the applicability even of those in any strict sense of "prove". Samkara in his commentary on the *Vedanta Sstras* writes that when Bahva asked by Baksita to expound the nature of Brahman he kept silent. He prayed again, 'teach me, Sir.' The teacher kept silent, and when pressed a second and a third time he said. "I am teaching you, you do not follow. The self is silent." The Upanisad declares that words and mind returned back not attaining Brahman (Yato vaco nivartante aprapya manasa saha).

Philosophy can be employed, if not to prove conclusively the fundamental truths of religion, at any rate to work them out, to defend them against attack, and to use them to make a fairly

coherent picture of the universe thus providing a partial justification. As Gurudev Ranade puts it:

“It would be a problem for the philosophy of the Immediate Future to place Mysticism on a truly philosophical basis. Rational Mysticism which has been hitherto regarded as a contradiction in terms, must now be a truism.”¹

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The Doctrine of God

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In this paper an attempt is made to lay down certain vital metaphysical principles which are presuppositions of the doctrine of God. The aim of this paper is limited. It will not be possible here, due to limitations of space, to refer to all problems concerning the doctrine of God.¹ Also, I shall not be dealing with the existence of God and its justification in human experience. I shall be dealing primarily with certain metaphysical doctrines concerning God. Both theoretically and practically the doctrine of God is of the highest importance to rational men.

1. The problem of Divine personality and the nature of divine attributes will not be discussed in this paper.

The doctrine of God, to carry any genuine conviction at all, must presuppose metaphysics. Whatever the antimetaphysical revolt of some contemporary philosophers, metaphysics, properly conceived, is indispensable to rational thinking and so could never be got rid of. Nor are there any logical reasons for ruling out metaphysics on principle. On the contrary metaphysics is supremely important for without it we would be committing intellectual suicide. It is a universal human function and vital concern of all ages. Metaphysics, though an imperfect human enterprise, aims at understanding the "infinity of the Universe" and of man's place within it despite the limitations of human language. In its intellectual task and adventure it alone can give us *adequate* notions of large generality which are essential for clarification of thought. Neither science nor any other discipline can be a substitute for this function of surveying the universe with generality of understanding.

There is nothing vague about the general notions of metaphysics. Generality is not vagueness. Ultimately general notions have applicability to all aspects of experience - to science, religion, morality, literature and all the practices of civilization - and so they are of vital

concern for understanding the meaning of civilization.

Philosophy uses language as a means of expression and any form of expression must necessarily be elliptical since it belongs to a particular universe of discourse presupposed by the linguistic expression. This is the great difficulty of philosophy. As has been well said "Every proposition refers to a universe exhibiting some general systematic metaphysical character" (PR. PP 14-15) . otherwise it would lack a determinate status. If this is accepted, it follows that all statements and linguistic expressions concerning the doctrine of God have to be understood only in the light of the metaphysical principles to be stated here.

Within the brief space at my disposal I can only indicate, more or less dogmatically, the metaphysical principles without claiming any analysis of them. Of course it will be the task of a metaphysical system to analyse, elaborate, and justify these principles.

The sole justification for metaphysics, as for any thought, is the analysis and elucidation of our immediate experience of the world. As Whitehead

has insisted, we have to take full human experience as an example from which the generalized description required for metaphysics is made available. We have to start with human experience as an instance of actuality - since there can be no other data - and discern in it categorial features common to all actualities. In other words, we attempt to describe *Metaphysical* characteristics of reality and not any specific characteristic of human experience such as consciousness and its functions.

In the opinion of this writer a metaphysics is a description which must include 'practice as part of its data'. The accuracy of the description is of course subject to the tests of logical coherence, adequacy, and exemplification.

We are concerned with a metaphysics of experience, not one that transcends it. So this paper is an essay in descriptive metaphysics. Now, what are the basic metaphysical doctrines or categorial notions that can be derived from a description of our immediate experience taken in the most concrete sense?

1. The world consists of a plurality of real things which are "as real as we are". The temporal world with its multiplicity of real things

is an ultimate fact of experience. This world is not deduced from some ultimate reality more real than the world. These real things exhibit a genuine connection among them. These facts of experience are self-evident by the nature of the case and so they cannot be proved. This is the basis for a pluralistic theory of the world.

2. The plurality of real things, "which are as real as we are", must exist as 'complete facts' that is they exist *concretely* and to exist concretely is to have experience in some form or other in contrast with abstract entities which have no experience at all. This means that each complete fact must possess irreducible self-identity and genuine individuality. Each such fact must be a finite and real individual which is other than any other finite and real individual. In other words, each real individual *transcends* other individuals. "It is to be noted that every actual entity, including God, is something individual for its own sake, and thereby transcends the rest of actuality" (PR, 135). This real individuality of actuality is the basis for the metaphysical doctrine of transcendence.

3. The plurality of real things have genuine and *intrinsic* connection between them by reason of which there is relatedness of things. This

involves a view of efficient causation and perception in which one real individual can influence or function in another real individual. Here we have a general metaphysical problem of relatedness. Unless one real individual functions and determines the existence of another finite individual there can be no genuine connection between them. This is obvious in the case of our perception where external objects are immanent and function in our experience. This functioning of one real thing in another is the basis of the doctrine of immanence. We can now see how the notions of causation, memory, direct perception, and personal identity 'are all different aspects of the doctrine of the immanence of occasions of experience' (A. I. 237).

4. If we are to generalize on the basis of human experience, a fundamental and irreducible distinction between two modes of being or existence, that is, between actuality and possibility has to be admitted. If we generalize from our experience, we cannot say that things being what they are, they cannot exist otherwise. We must admit real contingency, creativity or genuine novelty *within* the world of real individuals.

5. The plurality of real things which constitute the world should not be conceived as mutually

exclusive of each other. There is an organic relation between them. Each real individual is immanent in other real individuals by way of causation and also transcends them. Concrete individuals are not members of different species, as is understood in traditional modes of philosophic thought, but they display the same forms in different modes of *ingression*. This is the basis of the organic unity and solidarity of all real things in the universe.

6. Religious intuitions form part of the evidence on which we have to base a metaphysical system. Since metaphysics is a description of the temporal world and its formative elements, a complete description must include, among a plurality of real individuals, an actual but non-temporal reality which is unique and which differs in important respects from other temporal, finite and real individuals.

An adequate description of the world gives us certain categorial conditions or factors necessary for the very existence of a plurality of real individuals. We discover such conditions as real possibilities, the freedom and creativity of finite individuals as subjects, the stubborn facts which cannot be logically deduced from any abstract principles, the reality of space and the reality of

time as “perpetually perishing”, the reality of transition, the self-transcendence and immanence of all real individuals.

The foregoing survey of the world which gives us certain categoreal conditions which are the basis of metaphysical principles are not to be understood in separation from each other. Our experience is fundamentally relational in character, that is, “there are no brute, self-contained matters of fact, capable of being understood apart from interpretation as an element in a system” (PR, 21). There can be no doubt that there are stubborn and particular facts which cannot be deduced from any abstract principles as was attempted by some philosophers but these facts are always found in intrinsic relations with other such facts. This sets the goal for philosophy, that is, it becomes the distinctive function of philosophy to give an account of facts in their interrelation. In philosophy, which is a search for ultimate meaning, we cannot admit particular and self-contained matters of fact unconnected with each other. That the world exists with such and such categoreal conditions is a fact. Now, the problem of a metaphysical philosophy is not to drive this fact by logical deduction but to formulate a set of categories which describe the conditions under which the world *occurs*. The question is, how is

it that a finite world of such and such characteristics exists? That is, there is a rational need for a *categoreal* explanation of the world, not the type of explanation of the existence of the temporal world which attempts to deduce it by principles of abstract reason. The important point to grasp is that the very existence of this temporal world of finite individuals is only possible under certain *categoreal* conditions and without such a world governed by *categoreal* conditions there is no field for God's function.

The doctrine of God must distinguish between the metaphysical functions of God and his religious functions. The metaphysical function consists in his role as a principle of cosmic existence and order whereas God in his religious function serves as the object of conscious religious interest. Owing to the limitations of this paper we shall be discussing here the metaphysical functions of God although the religious function is equally important for rational beings.

Though the existence of any thing cannot be established by mere rational arguments, still we can ask the question, Is there any rational need for the existence of God? Here by 'rational need' is meant a reason and not that existence can be derived or established by logical necessity.

that existence can be derived or established by logical necessity. By asking for a reason we are asking for a categoreal condition necessary for all existence. In other words, we ask, Is God a categoreal condition for all existence? If we really accept the reality of the temporal world, with its multiplicity of finite facts- and there can be no doubt of its reality - we must give a rational explanation of the world. we must explain *how* there is a world of finite existents with such and such definite characteristics. In our experience of *this* world with the categoreal conditions mentioned earlier in this paper, we are confronted with a *metaphysical situation* and faced with a *metaphysical problem* similar to that which presented itself to the great philosopher Aristotle and the Vedantic philosophers of India.

The metaphysical problem is concerned with a 'regulative principle' as reason (ground) for synthesis on the part of finite and temporal actualities. This 'regulative principle' is the subjective aim which is the ground of the process of development of actualities. No actual entity by itself can provide the 'regulative principle' which is absolutely necessary for its synthesis. The subjective aim being a novel possibility for each actuality cannot be derived either from

antecedent actualities or from contemporary actualities. The metaphysical situation, and the metaphysical problem, demand the admission of a unique actual entity - which philosophers identify with the God ¹ of higher religions - with its unique metaphysical function of providing subjective aims for temporal actualities.

The metaphysical problem concerns the rational need of a category for the explanation of 'definiteness' exhibited by finite actualities, not merely in the sense of why there should be *this* particular definiteness and not *that* particular definiteness of being, but the explanation of why there should be 'definiteness' at all on the part of 'being' or existence. It is a genuinely real and vital problem of 'being' or existence. Many contemporary philosophers who suffer from anti-metaphysical bias deny the reality of this problem but rationalist philosophers who conceive philosophy as a search for reasons and meaning for facts

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1. In our experience of ourselves and of the world we enjoy real feelings which are derived from the timeless source of all order by reason of which our experience "acquires that 'subjective form' of refreshment and companionship at which religions aim " (PR, 43).

cannot deny¹ such a problem of 'being'. As Leibniz saw, there must be a Sufficient Reason as to why a thing exists in a particular way and not otherwise. It must be obvious that there can be no existence of actuality without definiteness. "Some particular *how* is necessary and some particularisation of the *what* of the matter of fact is necessary" (SMW, P. 249).

If we want to avoid the dogmatic assertion that the world of temporal and finite actualities is "an apparent irrational limitation" on the part of being for which no reason can be given and if we reject the equally unconvincing assertion of the idealistic philosophers who conceive of this "apparent irrational limitation" "as a proof of illusion" (or "appearance") and who look for reality behind the scene", the only acceptable alternative is to admit the necessity of a 'principle of limitation' or 'a principle of concretion' as the primordial source of all 'definiteness' or 'form' without such a principle of limitation and

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1. In philosophy we have to start with the postulate of rationality. If the world is understandable in terms of reasons as explanatory principles in science, it is equally understandable in terms of reasons for metaphysical inquiry concerning the nature of existence. If reasons are denied in Metaphysics, they must be equally denied in science also. One must be consistent.

concretion, no finite individual can ever come to 'be' or 'exist'. This argument resembles* the role of God as the ground of the world in the systems of Vedanta in Indian philosophic thought'. It is important to note that the existence of a principle of limitation becomes logically necessary given the reality of the temporal world.

God so conceived is the source of all rationality and for the source of all rationality no reason can be given. That is, what prevents reason being given to the source of all reason is a unique and stubborn fact. "The general principle of empiricism depends upon the doctrine that there is a principle of concretion which is not discoverable by abstract reason" (SMW, 250). In this connection we have to understand the nature and function of reason. Reason can only operate in a world of determinate facts governed by categorical conditions. It cannot function in an indeterminate and disordered world. Nor can it function in a vacuum. In other words, reason is possible only if determinate fact exists. It is determinate facts

* However, this resemblance is partial only since God is not merely the ground but also the *creator* of the world in Vedanta. In the argument presented in this paper, God is only a principle of limitation and cannot properly be described as creator.

which make the existence of an ordered world possible. If this argument is accepted, we can see that the very possibility of reasoning ultimately depends upon a "principle of limitation" which makes the existence of a world of order possible. It is in this sense that God is the source of all rationality. "No reason can be given for the nature of God, because that nature is the ground of rationality" (SMW, 250). Of course a reason can be given for the belief in the existence of God but no reason can be given for the *nature* of God which is a stubborn empirical fact. Again when it is said that no reason can be given for the nature of God we are not saying that the concept of God is irrational and that it is an arbitrary mystery at the base of things and that contradictory predicates are applicable to it and so on. On the contrary, a rational doctrine of God requires a coherent and consistent concept of God who is not an exception to metaphysical principles. We are only saying that the existence and nature of God as a principle of limitation is an empirical discovery which can never be deduced by mere a priori logical principles.

The metaphysical function of God is of the highest importance to the doctrine of God. Otherwise the doctrine would be subject to the

charge that God is the subjective need of some dissatisfied philosophers who have invented this concept to satisfy their moral and religious interests. But even the functional or pragmatic value of God as the object of religious belief would rapidly lose for lack of objective basis in the nature of the world. A doctrine of God must be true in *theory* before it can be the basis of truth in practice. A doctrine of God contains knowledge, however inadequate, of a unique and eternal actuality which is the object of religious consciousness. For these reasons we have to pay special attention to the metaphysical function of God. As has already been said, we have to conceive the world as a plurality of real and concrete individuals, as concrete, individual and real as we are. This is only possible on the basis of teleological metaphysics and cosmology where order in the world is the result of a principle of concretion and not due to sheer accident. If this is granted, we can understand the rational need for such a principle. Since we have to conceive of a concrete individual only in terms of subjective aim and subjective unity, as in the case of our real individuality, the concept of subjective aim is crucial and vital for any account of genuine and real individuality. A finite individual actuality possesses internal unity. Here an important

question arises, what constitutes the *ground* of the internal unity of a real individual? The answer is that the subjective aim is the ground of unity. What is the origin of this aim? It cannot come from nothing. It must clearly be derived from a reality. Since it is a novel possibility it cannot be derived from the antecedent actualities. Nor can it be derived from contemporary actualities since contemporary actualities are causally independent of each other. At this point we can see that the *ground* of the subjective aim requires a regulative principle indispensable for the existence, unity, and development of concrete individuals. This principle is the principle of limitation, the non-temporal actuality called God. "In this sense God is the principle of concretion; namely, He is that actual entity from which each temporal concretion receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts" (PR, 345). Such a function of God, be it noted, is an impartial function requiring no necessary reference to ethical and religious interests. That is to say, the metaphysical function of God, being as eternal as God, ¹ * would continue in a universe without rational beings since such a function is indispensable not

* 1. It must never be forgotten that though God is an eternal actuality, He is also temporal. God is both 'non-temporal' and 'temporal.'

only for any concrete existence but also for God's being.

A rational doctrine of God must investigate impartially and in a dispassionate manner, apart from reference to existing religions as they are, what metaphysical principles are required concerning the nature of God.

The metaphysical principles require to be understood in a proper way. Philosophers should not introduce God in arbitrary and artificial ways as was done by philosophers like Descartes and Leibniz. Descartes failed to give convincing reasons as to why God sustains mental and material substances and why God is necessary for knowledge. Likewise Leibniz, like Aristotle before him, made God an exception to his metaphysical doctrine of windowless monads but he gave no reason why God was exempted from the common fate of isolation of his monads.

We are not saying that God is unnecessary for the world or for knowledge. We are only saying that these philosophers failed to show *how* the nature of God is interwoven with the nature of other real things. It does not really convince one if a philosopher merely asserts that God sustains the world. In order to justify his assertion

he must show how a *specific* feature of God is necessary for a *specific* feature of the world. Real distinctions in the nature of God must be shown as necessary for real distinctions in the nature of the world.

Philosopher Whitehead has uttered a supreme dictum necessary for any doctrine of God and philosophy of religion. 'God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification' (PR 521). The implications of this statement are of far reaching importance to the doctrine of God and religion.

Philosophers must apply their categories to God, otherwise they are not genuine metaphysical principles. On the contrary a successful application of metaphysical principles is a sign that the system is really coherent. God's existence should never be conceived as categorically different from the existence of other finite actualities. "The far off puff of existence is as real as God". This does not mean that there are no important and fundamental differences between God and other temporal actualities but only that the difference must not be a categorical difference.

We may safely assert that in a satisfactory system of philosophy a theory of finite, concrete, and actual existences logically requires the doct-

rine of God. However, God should not be conceived as an *interpretation* of a metaphysical system merely to satisfy religious and moral purposes as is the case with Heidegger and other philosophers of the absolute, though moral and religious interests might legitimately influence the construction of a metaphysical system. The conception of God must be an integral part of the *structure* of the system itself.

GOD AND THE WORLD

Complete coherence of metaphysical categories requires mutual interdependence of God and the world. Neither world nor God is independent 'requiring nothing but itself in order to exist'. On the contrary, God and the world require each other as a metaphysical necessity of their 'being'. In this way neither the world by itself nor God by himself can be *adequately* understood unless we take into account the mutual dependence of their very natures. Further, the mutual interdependence of all actual existents can be understood only if we conceive the world as an essential process of creative activity originating novelty *within* the world. "There is no meaning to 'creativity' apart from its 'creatures', and no meaning to 'God' apart from 'creativity' and the 'tem-

poral creatures', and no meaning to the temporal creatures apart from 'creativity' and 'God' " (PR, 318).

We have already argued that the temporal world with its order cannot be adequately understood without a primordially grounded actuality called God. Indeed the reality of this temporal world, conditioned by categoreal factors, presupposes God. A pluralism which requires a multiplicity of finite individuals, which are concrete and complete facts and which are transcendent, logically depends on the subjective aim as part of the very being of actualities. The subjective aim of a temporal actuality on which its unity, individuality and its transcendence all depend requires an explanation. And the only adequate explanation is one requiring the doctrine of God in which God is the provider of subjective aims for all temporal actualities. In this way a theory of temporal actualities logically requires the doctrine of God.

Although temporal actualities vitally depend on God for their being in as much as their subjective aims are derived from God-subjective aims being of great importance since they constitute the immanent ground of all final causation in the universe - still the actualities possess the freedom

of self-causation and self-determination, which are categoreal conditions to which God is no exception. After God has provided the subjective aims, there remains some important function which cannot be done even by God. God, being subject to categoreal conditions, cannot completely predetermine, though radically qualifying them by the initial subjective aims, the self-formation of temporal actualities by way of their specification, valuation and the mode of actualization of their initial aims is derived from God. Though "the initial stage of the aim is rooted in God, ... its completion depends on the self-causation of the subject - superject" (PR, 373). This means that "Spontaneity, originality of decision belongs to the essence of each occasion" (A. 1. 332).

This metaphysical function of God requires to be understood in relation to another equally important metaphysical function of God as the ground of the givenness of the past. We have already seen that nothing can exist or be given except under categoreal conditions. If this is accepted, it can be shown that the very continuity of the world in space and time which is a condition of order logically requires the doctrine of God. We all know from our experience that the nature of time is one of perpetual "perishing" and so the past events which have perished can be

given for the present and impose conformity of its conditions, only because God functions as the ontological ground of the givenness of the past. It is by reason of the givenness of the past for the present, and the conformity of the present with the past, both according to categorial conditions, there is the basis in our experience for the continuity of time. How important is such a function of God is well brought out in the following striking passage: "Finally, there is Deity, which is the factor whereby there is importance, value and ideal beyond the actual. It is by reference of the spatial immediacies to the ideals of Deity that the sense of worth beyond ourselves arises. The unity of a transcendent universe, and the multiplicity of realized actualities, both enter into our experience by this sense of Deity. Apart from this sense of transcendent worth, *the otherness of reality* would not enter into our consciousness. There must be value beyond ourselves. Otherwise everything experienced would be merely a barren detail in our own solipsist mode of existence. We owe to the sense of Deity the obviousness of many actualities of the world, and the obviousness of the unity of the world for the preservation of values realized and for the transition to ideals beyond realized fact" (MT, 140 Italics mine).

It is by reason of Deity that “the otherness of reality” always enters our experience. Otherwise our experience would be reduced to the solipsism of the present moment. In our experience only past occasions, though they have perished, directly enter into our experience because they are made available to us in the present, *now* by reason of their prehension by God.

Using well known terminology we can say that God is immanent in the world. In the first place, He is everywhere present in the world in the most effective manner and at all times present as the object of experience on the part of temporal actualities. Secondly, He is immanent in the world as the source of initial subjective aim. His immanence in the world is a necessary structural condition of novelty and order. “Apart from the intervention of God, there could be nothing new in the world, and no order in the world” (PR, 377), there would be a ‘dead level of ineffectiveness’. Thirdly, God is effectively immanent in the world as the ontological ground of the givenness of the past for the present and by reason of this function continuity and solidarity and order of the world is made possible. In other words, by this function God saves the world and preserves it in his being.

An important truth concerning God's metaphysical function is that the nature of God gives a reason for the existence of a plurality of finite and real individuals. Since God's purpose is the attaining of intensity of experience, he evokes and elicits novelty and for this reason an unceasing plurality of finite individuals is required for satisfying God's subjective aim.

In the foregoing we have seen how God's nature is an essential part of the being of the world. Equally it is true to say that God's being requires the world. The doctrine of God must show how God requires the world. In a universe where relations are organic and affect the nature of the terms, every actuality must affect, in some degree or other, every other actuality. * 1 This is a categoreal condition. If this is so, God, being an eternal actuality, must be continuously influenced and affected by the world.

Now, in God's experience, as in the experience of every finite and temporal actuality, conceptual experience and physical experience are integrated by reason of subjective aim into satisfaction. Physical experience of temporal actualities is essential to God, for without them he would have no satisfaction and so would be defi-

* 1. This influence is subject to the categoreal condition of causation which takes place in time.

cient in actuality. It is not enough to say that God requires the world for his physical experience. God's physical experience of a *plurality* of real individuals, other than God, since this is necessary for his satisfaction. With regard to each and every particular actuality, God's purpose is the evocation of the highest intensity of experience possible to it. In other words, God's aim is to achieve a maximum actualization of value experience, under given conditions, on the part of every actuality but this value is not only for itself, it is for others also, for the whole world and for God. This is the meaning of actuality, that is, every actuality has value not only for its own sake but also for other actualities. Temporal actualities exist not only for the fulfilment of God's being but also for their own sake.

God's purpose for each temporal actuality is for "its depth of satisfaction as an intermediate step towards the fulfilment of his own being" (PR, 146-7).

As a result of this influence of the world on God, the intensities of God's physical feelings are affected though they do not completely determine them. God's physical feelings which are affected also affect indirectly the qualitative patterns of God's satisfaction. Otherwise prayer would be

pointless and religion would lose its meaning. However, finite and temporal individuals do not alter the intensity of God's satisfaction, the perfection and steadfastness of God's aim.

Now, we shall discuss and explain the notions of Transcendence and Immanence so essential to the doctrine of God.

Since the elucidation of our immediate experience is the only justification for any thought, it follows that in philosophy we should not introduce any metaphysical notion that does not in some way or other characterize our experience. Absolutely trans—empirical notions can find no place in philosophy.

Experience has a fundamental relatedness in character. Although we can know only an extremely small part of the universe by sense-perception, we nevertheless have knowledge and experience of the whole universe by relatedness. What is felt is not necessarily analysed completely. Here mention must be made of the fundamental category of being: "It belongs to the nature of 'being' that it is a potential for every becoming". This is the 'principle of relativity' (PR, 33). The full implications of this principle, which is the basis of rational thought, is of the most extreme

importance in philosophy. It is by reason of this principle our immediate experience of any actuality brings into connection, in some form or other, all other entities in the universe and thereby these entities characterize our experience. This means that there can be no absolute transcendence of our experience on the part of any entity in the universe. This is a postulate of rationality empirically not demonstrable. If this is accepted, the doctrine of God, based on a rational system of metaphysics, can find no room for any metaphysical notion transcending experience. If we accept 'the principle of relativity' mentioned above, it follows that no entity or being can be beyond logical discourse or beyond the world, or beyond our experience. Whatever does not communicate with our immediate experience of matter of fact "is unknowable", and the unknowable is unknown" (PR,5-6). We cannot even say that there is an unknowable. Even if we assume the existence of an absolutely transcendent being or entity reason is incapable of dealing with such an entity, which does not communicate with our experience. In philosophic thought 'absolute transcendence' of experience is meaningless and such a thing cannot even be rationally conceived. For all these reasons "absolute transcendence" is ruled out in the doctrine of God.

Of course denial of 'absolute transcendence'

leaves enough scope for other senses of transcendence owing to the limits of reason and human finitude. It is only in this sense that we have to understand the mystic experience of God. There may be a very strong sense of "transcendence of God" and indeed this is necessary for the satisfaction of religious consciousness which feels the depth and mystery of God which human reason cannot fully penetrate. "Of course we are unable to conceive the experience of the Supreme Unity of Existence" (IMM). This is a warning against dogmatic rationalism and the need for a reverent humility in the presence of the deep mystery of things. However, such an attitude should be combined with speculative boldness and not with intellectual timidity.

Equally important it is to reject 'absolute immanence'. This rejection follows from 'The Principle of Relativity' mentioned above. If the nature of 'being' is a potential for every 'becoming', it is obvious that there can be no room for 'absolute immanence'. By the statement that "X is absolutely immanent in Y" where X and Y are concrete, actual, and real individuals, one might mean that X is completely included by Y and in no sense excluded by Y. For example, when it is said that 'God is absolutely immanent in the world' one might mean that God is completely

included in the world and in no sense excluded by it. This would mean that God has no existence of his own except as a part or aspect of the world; or conversely when it is said that the 'world is immanent in God', one might mean that the world is completely included in God and in no sense excluded by it, which would mean that the world consisting of a plurality or real individuals has no existence except as a part or aspect of God. But rational thought cannot accept such a position. One actuality cannot be absolutely immanent in another since no actuality is merely something for some other actuality or actualities. A real individual is also something *for its own sake*. It is of course true that every real individual contributes something for the being of other real individuals but the converse is equally true. "Every actual entity, including God, is something individual for its own sake" (PR, 135). We certainly require the notions of transcendence and immanence for the doctrine of God but not the notions of *absolute* transcendence and *absolute* immanence.

The doctrine of God must reject uncritical forms of supernaturalism; we must not explain nature by reference to divine 'fiat' that is, unconditioned acts of will on the part of God.

We must not ascribe arbitrary power to God and any such explanation of nature by such power is uninformative and unconvincing. This does not rule out theistic explanation or reference to 'acts of God'. Uncritical explanation fails to connect specific features or aspects of the nature of God with specific facts and features of the world. It fails to tell us how or in what manner the existence and activity of God really explain the facts. Cheap and easy appeals to the supernatural don't convince at all.

Again, difficulties of metaphysics should not be solved by an appeal to a *Deus ex Machina* as was done by philosophers like Descartes, Leibniz and Berkeley. Their defect was not that they introduced God into their systems for which they felt a genuine logical need but that they failed to apply the fundamental categories of the system to God. If God is exempted from the application of fundamental categories, then any appeal to God becomes a sort of *ad hoc* explanation and philosophers should not resort to such *ad hoc* explanation "Since metaphysics requires that the relationships of God to the world should be beyond the accidents of will, and that they be founded upon the necessities of the nature of God and of the nature of the world" (AI, 215).

In traditional theology, at a certain stage, we have the doctrine that God is absolutely complete and self-sufficient. God was conceived as “absolutely self-sustaining” requiring “no relations to anything beyond himself”. Such a view is highly defective. A rational doctrine of God must reject the notion of absolute completeness and self-sufficiency of God. God so conceived implies that “the supreme reality is devoid of change” from which it follows that “the historic universe is degraded to a status of partial reality, issuing into the notion of mere appearance” (M. T. 109). The fundamental defect of this view is that it reduces our temporal experiences to mere appearance. It dismisses “The most evident characteristic of our experience”, that is, “we live in a world of turmoil” (MT 109).

Again the view of God as ‘absolutely self-sustaining’ and requiring “no relations to anything beyond himself” is highly defective. If this view were to be accepted, it follows that though the world may be real, it is absolutely separated from God. If this were true, then there would be an inseparable gulf between God and the world and consequently we could never know God at all except by an appeal to esoteric mysticism which would carry no conviction. For this reason God can never be abstracted from the historic universe.

We can see why the ontological argument fails since Descartes abstracted God from the historic universe.

The doctrine of God must also reject the notion of God as absolutely omnipotent. Absolute omnipotence means "Unqualified omnipotence" and by which is meant that God is the only ultimate agent or determiner of everything in the universe and that everything in the universe is determined to act and function by divine necessity. This implies that all effective agency belongs only to God. If we accept this fatalistic view, certain grave and most unsatisfactory consequences follow :

- (1) The power of God is only coercive and arbitrary power like that of a tyrant. In other words, God becomes a divine tyrant,
- (2) God would be morally responsible for all evil in the world and with all its details,
- (3) Since everything is determined by divine necessity, freedom would only mean recognition of necessity. All human effort or endeavour would become ineffective and trivial since freedom would be an illusion.

In criticism of the above, a rational doctrine must accept the view : “ The Divine element in the world is to be conceived as a persuasive agency and not as coercive agency ” (A. I. 213). By reason of God functioning as a lure of the ideal in human experience and in the world, there is a tendency in the universe to do and achieve worthwhile things but God is “ by no means omnipotent since other forces work against it ”. God is not to be conceived as absolutely omnipotent in the sense that God can do anything and everything at any time and under any condition. This would be giving arbitrary power to God. On the contrary we have to conceive of God’s action in conformity with categoreal conditions and conditioned by the actual state of affairs obtaining at a particular time in the world, for which God is not the sole cause.

Now, I want to say a word about divine attributes. All the attributes of God such as omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, power, wisdom, love, and compassion should be conceived in conformity with metaphysical principles and the categoreal conditions mentioned earlier.

Finally some discussion of the problem of evil is necessary. For a believer in God the undoubtedly great amount of evil in the world might

seem to present an insuperable difficulty, but this difficulty, if we could properly understand the role of God in relation to his power and wisdom, is only apparent and not real. God cannot take away the invaluable freedom of temporal actualities and so cannot really prevent the occurrence of evil. This is not due to any helplessness or lack of power on the part of God. On the contrary God's interference in the free choice of temporal actualities is moral evil. Once we accept the categorical condition of freedom on the part of actualities. it follows that occurrence of evil experiences and decisions becomes inevitable. Temporal actualities have the freedom to do things, good or bad, and impose conditions on God's power but these conditions, such as evil decisions and desires, are not to be construed as limitations of God's power which is effective everywhere and always but as occasions and opportunities for God's power of activity which consists in evoking some constructive response to these situations and thus overcome them. Whatever may be the magnitude of evil in the world, God in his wisdom and power can respond perfectly and evoke a constructive solution to the problems set by temporal actualities. In this way out of every situation, something worthwhile and some constructive outcome is made possible by God. To say this is not to take a complacent attitude towards the

problem of evil. Since evil is always related to the good and opposed to it, it can be made to function as an element in a constructive outcome. Evil is inevitable so long as we admit the reality of freedom and the reality of time. It is only in this sense we have to understand that the actual occurrence of certain evils is *metaphysically* ¹ justified. We have to remember that evil experiences and decisions may be the only constructive outcomes really possible in certain situations but God always ensures that some positive value comes out of all situations. * ¹ This does not of course mean that evil is unreal. Evil is a stubborn fact of reality requiring conformation and thus acting as an efficient cause, but God's power and goodness consists in his patient overcoming and conquering of evil. In this way God can boldly face and limit-but not annul-evil in the world using it as a means of contrast to achieve a harmony of opposites of an unimaginable type, hardly conceivable by us.

1. not morally.

★ 1. The problem of evil is to be considered in a particular context of conditions obtaining at a particular time but not abstractly. If we abstract any problem such as evil and freedom from particular contextual conditions, it becomes insoluble.

Evil is a stubborn fact and so functions as a real cause and like all stubborn facts requires to be conformed, not only by temporal and finite actualities but also by God. Though God is influenced by evil deeds, decisions and experiences, and in this sense he is the divine sufferer, he is not, the author of sin and evil. God's physical experience of the world contains evil as an ultimate element in the nature of things. The task of creative advance is the reconciliation of opposites: " God and the world are the contrasted opposites in terms of which creativity achieves its supreme task of transforming disjointed multiplicity, with its diversities of opposition, into a concrescent unity with its diversities of contrast " (PR. 528). This means that all the opposed elements of the world like good and evil, joy or sorrow, pleasure or pain existentially require each other and are incorrigibly there in God's actual being. A true doctrine of God must never resort to the Hegelian solution of nullifying the opposites by a dialectic. In Hegel the opposites are finally made to disappear by dialectical logic which becomes magic. A rational doctrine of God must accept stubborn facts and must not resort to such logical stunts. The reality of the world is the reality of its opposites and of their interplay. Beauty requires order but order cannot exist with-

out disorder. Good cannot be actualized without the actualization of evil. Not only the opposed elements existentially require each other but each of them requires an endless plurality of its exemplification.

A doctrine of God must teach us ultimate wisdom which consists in our perception that the order of nature is no irrational arrangement due to chance or brute compulsion but is the patient effort of God to achieve a 'harmonious adjustment of detail' by utilizing diversities of opposition into a unity and thus giving rise to the 'solemnity and grandeur of the world'.

I NOTE :

In the above paper there are numerous references to the Philosopher Whitehead. This does not necessarily indicate any appeal to authority. The arguments are general and stand by their own intrinsic appeal to reason.

II Notes on Terminology :

- 1) The words 'actuality' 'actual entity', 'reality', 'finite individual', 'concrete individual', 'temporal actuality', 'complete fact' mean one and the same thing. They all refer to a concrete and fully existent entity as distingui-

shed from other types of entities which are abstract.

- 2) '**Creativity**' means the principle of novelty.
- 3) '**Ingression**' It is the name of a timeless *relation* namely, "being an ingredient" e. g. The colour blue has ingression in a natural event. To be an ingredient in an event is to be a characteristic of it and not a part of it.
- 4) '**Being**' In this paper the word 'being' is mostly used in the sense in which it is the primary concern of metaphysics i. e. existence or being of 'actual entities' which are concrete and complete facts. Sometimes "Being" refers to "forms" or "possibilities" which are abstract entities. We have to guard against the fundamental ambiguity of the word 'being' which has several senses in language.
- 4) '**Prehension**' This word means apprehension or perception which may be conscious or non-conscious. As used in this essay it means conscious apprehension or perception.
- 6) '**Concretion**' This word means production of novel togetherness.

7) 'Primordial' This word means ultimate ground.

Abbreviations :

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|-----------------|---|
| a) PR indicates | 'Process and Reality' by
A. N. Whitehead (ANW) |
| b) SMW „ | 'Science and the Modern
World' by A. N. W. |
| c) MT „ | 'Modes of Thought'
by A. N. W. |
| d) IMM „ | 'Immortality' by A. N. W. |
| e) A. I. „ | 'Adventures of Ideas'
by A. N. W. |

The author wishes to acknowledge with thanks that he is highly indebted both to the above mentioned works of Whitehead and the following works on Whitehead :—

1. Whitehead's Metaphysics by Ivor Leclerk.
2. An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics by William A. Christian.
3. Philosophy and the Modern World by Albert William Levi.

Doctrine of Personal God.

Determinism of Mundane Existence.

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As one normally experiences our worldly life is determined by many seen and unseen factors. One only knows that he or she behaves in a particular way, but one is not able to exactly make out all the prompting or determining factors of one's own or other's behaviour. Geeta points out :

कर्तुं नेच्छसि यन्मोहात्

करिष्यस्यवशोहि तत् । (Gita XXIII—60)

(Even if, Oh Arjun, you, out of delusion, do not wish to act upon, you will act, as if bound to, accordingly.)

The events in human life are as if mercilessly linked together by many a known and unknown

factor. As we ordinarily find, some actions in life are prompted by elementary material needs such as food, clothing and shelter. Life of modern man of twentieth century is as if exhausted in fulfilling these needs. Life of man today is highly dominated by these needs, that do not allow him to rear his head above these clutches of life.

Secondly, we find that there are certain mental factors that dominate the behaviour from within. Man cherishes security. A feeling of insecurity makes him or her quite uneasy. He becomes out of mood. Modern psychology tells us that, the inner tensions of the unconscious of a person essentially determine his overt behaviour. The covert so to say dominates the overt. A human being, in the life full of strife is bound to repress some of his desires; and the repression in turn results in severe tension. The six antagonists of spiritual life are as if planted in human nature. They as a rule make him extremely uneasy, and get actions done from him. The thinking process of man is itself not free from these influences. Human mind constantly works under the influence of these propensities. We thus find that human actions are determined by mental and material determinants. We are here to mind that the material factors influence human behaviour through the medium of mind. Mind, ultimately

becomes responsible for all actions in life. (मन एव मनुष्याणां कारणं बन्धमोक्षयोः ।). The life of man in this sense is generally compared with that of a prisoner, who is tied up by strong chains. As man is but the child of nature, fate of all animate and inanimate existence fares no better chance. Animal and plant life, inanimates such as mountains, rivers and even things like atoms and other aggregates, big and small, are all governed by definite laws, known and unknown. In spite of the pressing outward diversity, one unknowingly comes across the convincing uniformity of nature. The thinking nature of man started to develop his knowledge based on the uniformity of existence. Sciences moral, mental, social, and material progressed accordingly.

Insufficiency of Remedies.

Remedy implies some difficulty, mental or physical. Dispair, insult and like are mental difficulties, and fever, constipation and colds are physical ones. Struggle for existence implies a constant combat against these. Saints and prophets describe these as threefold miseries, and life is full of such misery. The material progress of modern man has extended to him many a means of comfort and luxury so as to minimise his pains and difficulties. But with all comforts and efforts, we find that the difficulties have multiplied and there

is as if a game of hide and seek between the problems and solutions to them. The situation is like a whirlpool, wherein all beings move rapidly till they become calm because they are no more. Gita points to this nicely. :

केचिद्विलग्ना दशनान्तरेषु

संदृश्यते चूर्णितैरुत्तमाङ्गैः ।

Gita XI—27

“some of them are seen under the teeth, with their heads broken into small pieces ”.

The three types of difficulties (तापत्रयम्) are physical, mental and superhuman. Even if one rejects the last owing to one's disbelief in the supernatural beings; one has not been able to overcome the former two completely. This means that worldly remedies, out of their insufficiency, cannot possibly overcome the pressing problems of life. The first rank nations of the world namely the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. with all their enormous progress and material prosperity, have not yet been able to solve the fundamental problem namely “ status of man as a man ”. A subtle but powerful note of despair has made these lands of science, quite uneasy.

Divine principle that can mould human destiny.

The rationality of man does not allow him

to keep quiet and suffer the hardships mutely. It has hunted out definite discipline to control the mind and its modifications, that are the root cause of all troubles. Worldly imperfection points out to the idea of perfection. The worldly instances of truth, beauty and goodness point out the ultimate values of life. The supreme good is the God Himself. Truth, beauty and goodness are as if fused together in what is called God. Worldly kingdom gave the Christians the idea of Divine Kingdom. "Let your kingdom, Oh God, dawn upon us", is the usual prayer of a devout Christian. Muslims and Christians pray the Almighty through their respective prophets. The idea of God for a Hindu suggests whatever is noble, glorious, lustrous and powerful. All good things wherever they may be, are but the manifestations of the Almighty. points Gita out :

यद्यद्विभूतिमत्सत्त्वं श्रीमदूर्जितमेववा ।

तत्तदेवावगच्छत्वं मम तेजोऽशसंभवम् ॥ Gita X—41

The noble idea of God is an indication of the shortcomings of the world, just as the lighthouse is an indication of a solitary rock in lonesome ocean. God thus becomes the source of real bliss, satisfaction and solace. He is just the spring of what man in fact cherishes. One may safely rely upon Him for the fulfilment of his hopes. God

has the supreme power to mould the destinies of man, if at all man so desires. He is available to everybody of us, provided we seek for Him. He is always with us and every where else.

ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति ।

('Oh Arjun, God occupies the very heart of all beings. ' Gita XVIII/61)

If an ordinary friend pleases us when we approach him, we are to understand God as friendship par excellence. He thus becomes the supreme reliable resort for man. Men are selfish as regards ordinary gains and they get ordinary satisfaction when they have these gains, but if the man is sufficiently selfish it is possible for him to have perfect solace. Schopenhaur declared, ' The Upanishads are the solace of my life and they will be the solace of my death '.

A Way to Live Divine.

As there are many social groups and many minds, the idea of God is expressed by many in different ways. Modes of prayer and worship also vary accordingly. Different names are given, and expressions are used to make the divine experiences clear to others. One may not agree with the tastes of others, he may have his own taste and

mode of realising the Supreme. The Vedas declare :

एकं सत् विप्रा : बहुधा वदन्ति । Rigveda.

‘The Supreme is one but the learned call it in many ways’. The meaning that underlies various names used and modes practised is the same. Even the so called atheist also cherishes nobler ideas and ends. He may not call these as God. Gita professes the path of Duty, enlightened with knowledge and wet with love. An idolater would worship a symbol of his deity which in turn is the manifestation of God. The ardent devotion and a mode of worship extends to him satisfaction. A mass prayer may ennoble and satisfy the heart of a devout Christian or of a Muslim. On the other hand the Yogis try to find Him by means of Dhyana (Perfect concentration of their minds). A mystic tries to realise Him by means of a deep solitary trance. Tukārām and Rāmdās had divine experiences on Bhandara hills near Dehu and at Shivathar respectively. Mt. Sinai, Gallili and Hira are holy places because Moses, Jesus and Mohammed had Divine experiences at these places respectively. We also know, that the prophets who denied God, also had divine knowledge in their trance at different places. Gautama the Buddha had such an experience beneath an

Ashvattha tree (Pippal) at Gaya. The so called atheist Vardhamana had supreme knowledge of the existence, at Jrimbhikgrāma. The last two are adored by millions as gods themselves. Million others invoke the Almighty and pray for their good through their respective prophets Jesus and Mohammed. The prophet is supposed to be the supreme reliable mediator between God and the devotee. Bhakti or the ardent love of God is generally accepted to be the popular way towards the realization of the Almighty. Bhakti or love itself results in nine different modes so as to suit the tastes of the aspirants. These are Sravaṇa (listening to stories), Kirtana (uttering names of Gods), Smaraṇa (contemplation), Pādasevana (service), Arcana (worship), Vandana (salutation), Dāsyā (idea of being a servant of God), Sakhya (friendliness) and Ātmanivedana (intimate consultant). One may sincerely choose the mode he pleases to undertake. It is not an ordinary job to become a real aspirant.

Rational Mysticism and Personal God.

As seen before God is all glory, power, and whatever is good. It is also called in Vedanta Philosophy as the real, consciousness and bliss. These concepts are abstractions of worldly qualities arrived at by logical method. The abstraction

itself points out that God is beyond all qualities and forms. (Nirgun and Nirākar.) But it is very difficult for the lay aspirants to conceive and pray or worship such a God. Gita points out :—

क्लेशोऽधिक तरस्तेषामव्यक्तासक्तचेतसाम् ।

(Gita—XII—5)

Again human beings by their very nature love what is concrete. They love qualities and forms. Naturally enough they conceive the Almighty as having a form and qualities. The anthropomorphic concept has its roots in the very nature of man. In the eleventh chapter of Gita, Arjun the man (Nara) requests God (Nārāyana) to assume the usual form i. e. of Krishna :

किरीटिनं गदिनं—विश्वमूर्ते । (Gita XI—46)

Even the Muslims and the Christians invoke Allah and the father of the Heaven, through their respective prophets, who were human beings with superior qualities. Saints and prophets are honoured and worshipped because of their superior qualities and status. The expressions such as भूदेव (Brahmans), पितृदेव, मातृदेव, गुरु or आचार्यदेव point out the same idea. Guru or the spiritual guide is to be understood as the great God (Maheshwarh—महेश्वर :). We are thus led to

conclude that God as a person is the genuine need of human heart.

Perfect devotion is said to be the easiest Pathway to God, but if we turn to nature of devotion, we find that it is not so easy as it is understood to be. An aspirant also requires certain qualities. It requires cool and deep thinking, restraint, concentration, sacrifice, conviction and painstaking attitude. An unqualified devotion is the perfect conjunction of all the powers of mind and intellect. Again hatred, egoism, fickle mindedness, greed are all highly detrimental to a real aspirant. The discipline prescribed for a devotee cannot be easily secured by an ordinary man having several expectations and prejudices. An aspirant is required to undertake systematic efforts and regular process to secure and get the discipline imbibed in his person. Then alone he can have the status of a Sādhaka. Later he would become a devotee (Bhakta). Rāmdās, Tukārām, Nāmdev, Mohammed and other saints and prophets, adored by millions, were devotees in the above sense. A devotee is the God incarnate as there is the only difference of concreteness and abstraction.

An aspirant out of his deep thinking and feeling perfectly concentrates his mind upon his deity. He loves solitude, and enjoys a state of

trance, a state quite different from an event of ordinary life. The experience of an aspirant in such a state is essentially limited to his person; and it is difficult to explain or elaborate such an experience. Such an aspirant is a mystic and his experience is mystical and the approach of such an aspirant is called mysticism. The approach is sometimes criticised by the materialists and positivists from the point of view of demonstrability. A mystical experience cannot admit of any demonstration of experimentation. It is essentially a personal experience. The experience is not to be termed as blind or void. It is a positive state arrived at through well directed reason and affection. It is the state reached by practically all eminent thinkers, prophets and poets. The state is not negative. It is on the other hand constructive and blissful. Such a state may be called as the culmination of reason and affection, with a view to achieve what is noble and beautiful in life. It is the strenuous effort to catch hold of the Divine within one's own self. Such an effort is called rational mysticism.

God and Personality

in the light of Sānkar Vedānta

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The Advaita Vedānta of Sankar is an absolutism, and it is generally held that in accordance with it an Advaitin must treat the God of religion as somehow lower (in status) than the Absolute. The reason obviously is that the God of religion is 'Personal', and personality logically implies certain limits which the Absolute can not tolerate. It follows that Advaitism as a philosophy can not serve as an appropriate basis for religion and that, therefore, one has to choose between being a religious believer and being an Advaitin. But we have it as an historical fact that Sankar was both. He was essentially a philosopher of Religion. I would like to attempt in this paper to show how this could be so.

I

From the philosophical standpoint the problem would seem to be to see if the Absolute could

also be a Person, or if the Personal God of religion could also be absolute. And it is quite possible to show that the two concepts of the Absolute and Personality are not so antagonistic as they seem to be. But the problem of Religion (or rather of the philosopher of religion is not merely conceptual, i. e. it can not be resolved merely by demonstrating the compatibility of the two concepts concerned. The problem is whether the Absolute is *really* a Person as the religious man *believes* it to be. If philosophy is to be merely " conceptual", it is hard to believe if it could help solve this problem. But the religious man who experiences God as Personal, is after all, a rational being, and would not rest content unless he feels assured that in the Divine-Personality he is really in contact with the highest reality.

The situation is indeed complex and therefore admits, at least apparently, of mutually diverging interpretations and solutions. For much will depend upon (i) what the religious man actually requires and (ii) whether philosophy must remain merely conceptual. Religion is indeed rightly taken to be a *form of life* — — a matter of "living by Faith ". And *faith* as Wittgenstein has pointed out is not a creation of knowledge. It is in a sense *sui generis*, being instinctively found in some, and equally naturally absent in others; and there does

not seem to be any moral degradation attachable to such a lack of religious faith. It is indeed not a man's "duty" to be religious, but if he happens to be religious i. e. a *man of faith*, certain duties (= obligations) impinge upon him; (i) subjectively he must be sincere and unswerving in his *faith*, and (ii) objectively he can not be satisfied with any thing less than the Highest Reality. Are these subjective and objective conditions of religious life *necessarily* related, have they any mutual implication in the context of reality? Or is their relation merely contingent? Let me explain what I mean. 'Contingency' in this context would mean that, "One may be sincere to the utmost in his religious faith, and still not be in contact with Reality. His Faith in Personal God and even his *experience* of Him, has no intellectual obligation to show that the God he claims to experience is either a Person, or the ultimately Real. For Reality is not a creation of Faith. Faith presupposes reality, but not vice-versa. The independence and absoluteness (i. e. unconditionality) attributed to Reality in such a view is indeed commendable. But one may still ask, Does it really follow that because Reality is not a creation of faith that it must have nothing whatever to do with faith? But it would not do either merely to concede that Reality has *something* to do with Faith. What matters is whether Reality has *that much* to do with Faith as the man

of religion demands, requires and claims. Hence much depends upon *what the religious man requires*.

With all his sincere desire to *meet with* Reality through his faith, (for, this is the essence of being religious), "How is the religious man going to know that he has *now* come into contact with the Real?". But if such *knowing* is going to validate his faith then that faith has no longer the character of Faith but only of an hypothesis; and religious life would be on a par with the struggle of the Scientist to discover Reality through the method of trial and error. Is the *path of Faith* merely a trial which may or may not meet with success?. To concede this is to give up the whole *religious—claim*. Faith is indeed a venture, but not a trial. And the reason why such a venture does not entail a trial is that it is *spiritual*, divine, transcendental, or any thing else which you may choose to call it, to contra-distinguish it from the way of science. Aside from the question (which is possible) whether science can really deal with the Real by its *trial and error method*, Religion claims to be an *unfailing venture to meet the Real*. Religious Faith is not a hypothesis, which needs to be *validated* by experiments; it is indeed a venture which never fails. Faith ends in knowledge; but only at a stage where they can hardly

be distinguished, that is, their distinction fails to obtain (cf “ श्रद्धावान् लभते ज्ञानम् ” –गीता)

It is indeed open to observe that such a knowledge which is merely a transformation of faith, amounts to a psychological conditioning of oneself, effecting a kind of subjective orientation towards Reality, which, therefore, cannot entail any guarantee of its truth-claim. But this is precisely the point at issue. Has *Religion* a truth-claim, at least in the same sense as Science has? The answer is an emphatic “ No ”! Faith claims to deal with Truth (Reality) without involving a truth-claim. The assertions of religion as Wittgenstine says, have no ‘constative’ force; they have only a *commissive* force. The life of Faith is a life of commitment; and the source of such commitment is not indeed (prior) knowledge, for mere knowledge has no commissive force. Nor does the religious man aspire to know Reality so much as to ‘live’ it. And it would certainly be extravagant to expect that the man of Faith must first know the Reality which it aspires to live or participate in. It indeed requires the knowledge of “ How to live ”—the life of Faith; and this can be obtained from those (and only from those) who have ‘lived’ it. If you have Faith, and if you know how to live the life of commitment, the rest is not your question. Knowledge becomes nece-

ssary to quell doubt, not so much to inspire faith, though it (knowlegde) may certainly have a corroborating effect. And can Reality be known without Faith, i. e. by mere conceptual thought? Is it a matter of mere intellectual necessity? This is the counter challenge of Religion to pure Philosophy. Philosophy, at least in so far as it is useful to religious life is not 'merely conceptual'; it does indeed deal in concepts, but only in such concepts as symbolise reality. And such symbolism becomes systematic because it arises out of a sincere desire to understand i. e. interpret the utterances of those who have lived the Divine life. They have earned the right to be the apostles of God; and through them i. e. by following the same path, we can be sure of reaching the destination. Only we must 'know' correctly what the path is; and philosophy as the right interpretation of the *Shrutis*, as Sankar would put it, helps us just here. The *Shrutis* as verbal embodiments of the visions of Truth possessed by the realised-souls, are both the subject-matter and the guide for the philosopher. For he has to use his reason only to understand 'some' divine utterances vis-a-vis 'others'. Reason demands that they form a system, and it is only some (such) intellectually coherent presentation of the ultimate situation that guides the aspirant (who is conscious of his rationality),

in adjusting his psycho-physical make-up in the required direction. And the progressively increasing adjustment, is the sure *test* and justification of the appropriateness of the *subjective conditions* of religious life to its *objective* expectation. Philosophy alone can justify *Faith*, if justification be needed. And Sankar, in his Advaitism could be said to have given such justification. How ?

II

To repeat, much depends on what the religious man requires; and what he requires is this that the Divine Person he experiences is the (*i. e. can be shown to be* the) ultimate Reality, and that the ultimately Real can be experienced as a Person. I shall, therefore, deal especially with only such items in Sankara's Advaitism as in my opinion *do meet* this situation.

The basic tenet of Sankara's Advait is that the ultimate Reality is Brahman, which is all-pervading, immutable and undifferenced, and therefore one absolute substance, which though in and by itself indescribable is nevertheless described as सच्चिदानंद in contradistinction from प्रकृति which is often believed to be a rival substance, coordinate with Brahman. That is, Brahman is what the Prakriti is not, and *is not* what the Prakriti is.

Sāṅkhya system which is the chief exponent of Dualism, defines Prakriti as constituted of सत्व, रज, तम-गुणः. The attributes of प्रकृति are indeed to be viewed as forces which together constitute a substantive or unitary force called प्रकृति which is thus essentially a Power, or energy. It is indeed a Power which either manifests (सत्त्वगुण) or conceals (तमोगुण) or transforms (रजो गुण). But what does it manifest, conceal or transform?—itself or some thing other than itself? Most certainly it cannot conceal itself for why should it?) nor manifest itself for to whom should it? nor transform itself (for in what else can it be transformed?) Hence though a Power it is in itself powerless. Its being real pre-supposes another reality, and Sāṅkhya calls this the पुरुष (or पुरुषः). Prakriti can conceal his nature from himself i. e. he forgets what he really is; प्रकृति can transform his nature i. e. make him feel that he is something - say, the body or the mind, the intellect, which he really is not and प्रकृति can also reveal ' himself ' to him—i. e. make him know what he really is (by himself) Thus it is प्रकृति which creates Bondage (बन्ध) for पुरुष and also can help him to be freed from it through knowledge (मोक्ष) and also constitutes all the intermediary transformation which it itself necessitates for him apparently to undergo.

Now looking to the पुरुषः they are held by

the Sāṅkhya to be spirits, or centres of consciousness, each distinct from the others, infinite in number. But how is one centre of consciousness distinguished from others? Only in terms of its embodiments, physical, mental or intellectual; and these are admitted to be the effects of प्रकृति. But if the source of their distinction is not in themselves, why should they (पुरुष) be many? That each of the पुरुष holds itself to be distinct from the others may be a *fact*, but not 'reality'; and if 'individuality' is of the very essence of the पुरुष their very existence, as unique ontic centres, get jeopardized by the interference of प्रकृति with them. Indeed they seem to owe their very nature and being to प्रकृति no less than प्रकृति owes its significance to them. Nor can प्रकृति as cosmic force or power belong either to any one of them, or to their collection; for when even their '*individuality*' is not independently determinable, how can their collection be so determined? It is apparent, therefore, that the Purushas and Prakriti, though admittedly inter-related, are both ultimately dependent on something different from both. This *something* is called God in Vedānta, to whom both of them (the पुरु. & प्र.) become adjectival; they become inseparable from God, and God alone can hold them together. This is the position of Ramanuja which is known as विशिष्टाद्वैत for the simple reason that here God alone is Real, but

his reality is manifest in (at least) these two forms viz : the प्रकृति on the one hand and the पुरुष on the other. Ramanuja's position can thus be seen as a logical consequence, (not historical) of the Sāṅkhya Dualism.

Why does Sankar not entertain it then ?. If the metaphysical situation is indeed what it has been described to be, it runs counter to the spirit of the *Shrutis* in two ways : (i) Logically, God who is unequivocally accepted as चेतन or even चिद्घन is here vitiated by accommodating the अचित् (जड) Prakriti in Himself, and (ii) The *Status* of the पुरुष (=आत्मा) becomes unnecessarily degraded (cf द्वाइमौ पुरुषौ लोके etc.). In no manner can a Vedāntin compromise the metaphysical substantiality of the पुरुष.

Sankar saves the situation by two means, (i) He assimilates the all-enveloping Power of प्रकृति to God as His very *nature*, which though logically distinguishable is metaphysically inseparable from the Divine Substance. It no longer stands now as an adjunct, much less a limitation, to God; for it now becomes Divine Power. Nevertheless, God remains free to manifest His Power, or not to manifest. And the manner of his manifestation is sportingly assuming the infinite multiplicity of *names* and *forms* (नामरूप) ! This is how He

becomes सत् i. e. describable or better 'imagable' (not qualified as it is usually said). There नामरूपस render the Reality concrete in the sense that it can now be seized upon as सत् (=being) and चित् (=enjoyable, thinkable, knowable). But why should it become concrete? It is its (Reality's) very nature to do so : God = Brahman is आनन्दमय (=Blissful). 'Love' is the immediate manifestation of blissfulness; and love is enjoyed through 'loving'; and 'loving' necessitates an *apparent* bifurcation of Reality into the lover and the loved. The पुरुषस are the different centres from which or at which, God loves Himself. The operation of 'loving' is the explicit assertion of *identity* between the differentiated centre, and that (God) from whom it has differentiated. And the assertion is not an abstract thought but a concrete living—which is usually described as *Devotion* (भक्ति). Devotion as the manifestation of Divine Love (cf. Spinoza's, God-loving-Himself) is thus a metaphysically natural phenomenon. It becomes artificial in the form of Religion, because of a *mistake*, the non-recognition of which is the source of all controversy.

(ii) To Sankar goes the credit of brining into relief this basic mistake, and of showing the way of its rectification. This he does by introducing a new (explanatory) category of the ' जीव ' as

distinct from that of the आत्मन् (self) which is well known to all. In reality there is no such thing as जीव but only जीवत्व or जीवदशा. आत्मन् is indeed a reality and obtains as अहम्. It is identical with ब्रह्मन् for it is ब्रह्मन् which is enjoying His Blissfulness through these infinite number of consciousness-centres. Hence Brahman can not be unaware of His identity pervading all these centres. For in and through all these centres, He is enjoying nothing else than Himself. In His view, therefore, there is neither the world nor the ' जीवः '. What is, is all Himself. This is described as नित्यदृष्टि (the Eternal vision of God) which admits of no superior state into which it can lapse, nor does it evolve into any thing better. That is the unconditional and immutable nature of Brahman.

This free and sportive self-differentiation of Himself into these centres, is in no sense mischievous, but can admit of a ' lack of attention '. If some how, at any centre of consciousness, there arises a forgetfulness of its primordial identity with the universal चित्, then an *imagined* isolation of itself (i. e. that centre) takes place; and the divine operation of assuming different नामरूपः which indeed is the eternal sport of God, in his enjoyment of Himself, lends colour to this isolating tendency, and the *basic mistake* occurs in that, *that* आत्मन् (=अहम्) now identifies itself with some specific

नामरूप and forgets its original identity with the Divine Substance. It is this super imposition (अध्यास) of an *individuality* on the आत्मन् which is जीवदशा. It is not so much that an आत्मन् *becomes* जीव; जीवत्व is mistakenly assumed, when a sense of individuality gets lodged at a centre of consciousness.

III

The impact of the aforesaid details in Sankara's Advait, on the problem of God's Personality may be shown as follows :—

Sankar says “ जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापरः ”; for जीव as a centre of consciousness is आत्मन् and the identity of ब्रह्मन् (as universal consciousness) pervades all आत्मन्s. Hence according to Advait Vedanta the जीव can realise his identity with the ब्रह्मन् only as (i. e. through) the आत्मन्, for आत्मन् alone is the real substratum of the जीव.

Now, forgetfulness is a 'fact' but not a reality. For what is forgotten can be remembered and recognised. Forgetting is a phenomenon giving rise to the fact of जीवदशा for so long as it is believed. Though we can not say *when*, but forgetting may also lapse and memory (recollection) may set in, and the awareness (in the जीव) of the आत्मन् may supervene and along with that the sense

of identity with ब्रह्मन् or God may begin to assert itself with more or less intensity. The temporary conflict between this inner rising awareness of one's identity with the Divine, and the self imposed limitations of empirical individuality (जीवत्व), manifests itself in the form of what is called *divine discontent*; which in positive terms becomes the 'religious urge'. The religious urge is nothing else than an inordinate desire to be united with God. The individual trying to get linked up with the Universal, the आत्मन् realising itself as ब्रह्मन्. And since ब्रह्मन् is आनन्द and आनन्द is Love, this religious urge for God becomes, more or less distinctly, transformed i. e. is experienced as *Devotion* which is only the first step to *Love*.

Now religious devotion, through an 'empirical' phenomenon, has a transcendental reference. It is an intense move on the part of the जीव to get united with God (= ब्रह्मन्). But the successful working out of this movement is subject to certain psychological conditions; the जीव as a person can most fruitfully identify itself only with *another person* whom he considers to be deserving of the highest regard and devotion. Devotion involves self-sacrifice, and when this also becomes natural, the devotion becomes 'love' where the Beloved alone supervenes.

Thus arises the religious need for Divine Personality. The belief in God as a Person is a complex phenomenon having empirico-transcendental dimensions. That is precisely why religious faith can not be empirically validated. But we have seen that religious Faith has no empirical origin, though the conditions of its appearance, and to a certain extent those of its realization, are certainly empirical. We know 'persons' only empirically; but if the Divine Person were to be met only on the empirical level it won't satisfy the religious urge. Somehow the transcendental Divinity must make itself patent i. e. visible and tangible in the medium of the Person with whom the aspirant can claim to be in actual contact. The 'Person' as an object of actual experience cannot be doubted, even in the 'language of tables and chairs'. But the claim of meeting the Transcendental Divine Reality in and through it, does certainly require a language (and basically an attitude) different from the one of the tables and chairs. It is the language of symbols whose function and justification are indistinguishable. It is justified in the very fact of its functioning in the religious attitude. Take e. g. the situation—when a patient who is a believer in Christ, understands his illness much more illuminatingly in the transcendental context as a "punishment" rather than as *a disease* describable as Phenomia. May be, that

he is already conditioned to such an understanding. Yes, but what does it matter ?. How do we know that even the usual empirico-scientific understanding is not psychologically conditioned, though perhaps there may be some kind of a uniformity and universality about it. For these latter are our tests of reality. That has no tendency to prove that they i. e. the characters of universality and uniformity are really constitutive of the Ultimately Real. If Reality can make itself available through the general and the abstract, why should it not do so in the concrete and *individual*. It may at best be admitted as a different approach but not for that reason a wrong, much less a silly approach to the Real. But all this shows only a theoretic possibility of the Universal Reality i. e. Brahman making itself *available* in the concrete form of a Person whom the religious believer can claim to *experience*. But Sankar goes further in showing the ' *divine* ' need for this.

The infinitely varied self-manifestation of ब्रह्मन् by means of the नामरूपा is spontaneous—i. e. it goes on without any apparent cause; and therefore it becomes *willful* when there arises a sufficient cause i. e. an appropriate occasion. Such an occasion arises when the ' religious – soul ' earnestly yearns for meeting God as a *Person* of his choice; and Brahman having no difficulty in

assuming any ' name — form — concreteness ', would hesitate to assume this *Personal Form*. Not only so, but since this divine urge on the part of the religious aspirant is after-all a special part of the general movement for Divine-Selfmanifestation, such a Personal manifestation (of God) could easily be described as a *need* for God or in the Spinozistic language, *Divine necessity*. For thereby God would be doing his natural or normal work in a special and therefore an esteemed fashion. It appears thus that on Sankara's theory (i. e. presentation of the metaphysical situation), appearance (objectivity) of a Personal God is too '*natural*' to need any special explanation. Let there be an intense religious need or demand for divine personification and the Divine Person is bound to obtain. The fault, if any, can be only on the side of the urge, and never on the side of the response. Sankar, therefore, can be said to have shown a kind of necessary relation between the subjective and objective conditions of Religious life.

IV

I wish now to add a few clarifications and explanations.

i) The concept of अवतार is quite appropriate

in the present context and its significance becomes clear in the light of Sankar Vedanta, not in spite of its absolutism, but because of it. For "Personal" appearance of God becomes free and real (genuinely transcendental) only if the power underlying it is Absolute. This also explains the distinction between *Divine* Person and the empirical individual, the latter being mostly a matter of historical necessity, whereas the former is essentially non-historic, in spite of the historical details added on to it. It is on this count that these अवतारs can be regarded as eternal, for they can be re-realised on the emergence of an appropriate occasion. Again Divine assumption of Personality is not an effect of *past actions*, like the human-person; there is, therefore, no (real) destruction of it, but only spontaneous disappearance (vanishing = अंतर्धान पावणे).

(ii) The distinction of सगुण and निर्गुण needs to be properly understood in the context of Sankara's Advaitism. When God is spoken of as the creator of the world, he is सगुण because we can call Him the Creator, Omniscient etc. But his सगुणता here is determined by reference to the world which we already assume to be a sufficiently significant reality. Thinking from the Transcendental attitude (stand-point) Sankara points out that there is really speaking no world. Brahman's self-manifestation through

the assumption of नामरूप is what we call the 'world', and the mistake is not in the mere 'naming' but in the underlying belief in the objective substantiality of such a thing as the 'world'. Hence all attempts to define God as the Creator, and attributing what we consider to be the necessary attributes for such creation to Him is only sustaining in the initial mistake. Such सगुणता 'of God' thus becomes relative and dependent. The Absolute is सगुण however, on account of his own inherent nature as सत् चित् and can even become palpably concrete by the assumption of नामरूप. For throughout these innumerable differences there shines in them the same immutable reality of Brahman. Thus the Absolute is both निर्गुण and सगुण at once. With नामरूप it is nevertheless ब्रह्मन् just as without them, it is.

The DIVINE
From
**The Standpoint of Philosophy
of Individuation**

By

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“While the soul shrinks in bottomless humility from the mysteriously awful might and majesty of the numen in its *tremendum* aspect, it is at the same time entranced and filled with blissful rapture by the mysterious enchantment and allure of the numen in its *fascinans* aspect. This ‘dual character of the numinous consciousness’, Otto writes, ‘is at once the strangest and most noteworthy phenomenon in the whole history of religion’. Fear of the Lord has as its essential complement Praise of the Lord. For the object of religious worship is felt to possess transcendent *worth or value* no less than transcendent power and majesty, to be the ideal goal of all our desiring, communion with which brings to the soul ‘the

peace that passeth understanding. ”

(Campbell, *on Selfhood and Godhood*,
pp. 332—333)

A cursory glance at the history of philosophy reveals that two opposed lines of thinking have been followed in the past with a view to furnishing an explanation of the religious experience. The first line originates from Plato, pursues its course through Stoicism, Cartesianism and ultimately finds its culmination in the Critical philosophy of Kant. The second line begins with Pythagoras, finds its powerful support in the Christian Theology and is revived in modern times by Bergson, Existentialism and Neo-Thomism.

The first line of thinking believes only in the logical approach to religion and seeks to find an explanation of it strictly within the bounds of Reason. The three main arguments advanced for proving the existence of God, viz. the cosmological, teleological and ontological proofs, could be ultimately assimilated to the ontological proof. If Reason is the source of system and order or, as Kant has put it, the supreme regulative principle in the totality of experience, then obviously the partial orderliness, as expressed either by causality or teleology, cannot but find its proper justification through those rational criteria, which stand

a thorough guarantee for the perfect organization of our experience.

As against this, Kant was quite right when he maintained that the application of logical criteria does not in the least yield an existence that can fully satisfy them. But when Kant himself offered the moral argument, he posed a new problem without breaking any new ground. The categorical imperative, which aimed at eliminating all contradictions from human experience, is to be *willed*. The will is perfectly free in the sense that it has its source in the absolute choice of an individual to *be* one's real self through the process of unfolding one's own latent potentialities to their maximum. Such a process of self-realization is *not purely logical*, but *ontological*.

Precisely this was the main line of approach to the religious experience as embodied in the Christian theology. It is not through any logical understanding that one can attain the Godhead, but it is through *faith*, which makes us will intensely and identify ourselves with, the highest possibility of our self, that we can attain Him. By setting aside the rational approach, theology, in spite of much soundness in what it has believed, has given a liberal scope to blind faith and dogmatism. But when in consequence of Cartesian

Rationalism and Kantian Idealism, the insolvency of bare logicism was thoroughly exposed, a reversion to the ontological approach, as it was represented by the Christian Theology, was but natural. Bergson, Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Marcel, several other existentialists and neo-Thomists have revived it by employing all the best devices of philosophical understanding, which has undergone much refinement in our times.

What deserves our careful consideration in the contemporary approach is its categorical subordination of logic to ontology. "Existence is prior to essence" constitutes the basic maxim of existential philosophy. It epitomizes the contemporary approach to religion in the best possible manner. Experience has to be *realized* first. It is only then that the question of its proper organization can be properly attended to. This necessarily leads us to raise the question: What is that which constitutes the *Being* of our experience?

Of all the modern thinkers, Heidegger has made a serious attempt to grapple with this issue. He makes a distinction between a being (*Seiende*) and the Being (*Sein*). The former is only such an entity which is found existing in our concrete experience. But when we seek to understand the nature of the *Being* of such beings, then such enti-

ties cannot be taken in their detached or isolated form. The best way to get an insight into the existence of such an entity is to make the human being (*Dasein*) the special object of our existential analysis. A human being is just like any other object, if he is looked at from outside. But it is possible for us to enter deeply into his inwardness. The *Dasein* then reveals his real character as a dynamic process. Such a process may be called evolutionary in as much as it incessantly goes on unfolding its inward potentialities. There is always a certain existential situation in which a human being is involved. This requires him to assimilate and appropriate the objects to his own self. Such objects, which have been brought in the existential relation to one's self, constitute the means, in and through which the highest possibility, of which a human being is capable, could be attained. This develops an inward ontological tension or, as it is called by Heidegger, the *Angst* (anxiety). The *Angst* is the fountainhead of the *Being* of the *Dasein*. The entire personality, its entire equipment, nay, its entire impulsion is derived from it. It is this *Angst*, which can put us at the very heart of one's own existence.

Is it ever possible to have any knowledge of such an *Angst* by way of a logical understanding of its nature? To this, Heidegger emphatically

says : No. According to him, the *Angst* is not concrete, but quite *abstract*. It is, as he boldly puts it, a *Nothing*. Such a characterization of the ontological principle, although it may sound strange and confusing to our minds, is nevertheless the most appropriate. That which is creative must necessarily pass from the abstract to the concrete. If it is already concrete, then it becomes static and bereft of all the creative dynamism.

Jaspers, perhaps, has brought out more clearly the positive character of the ontological principle through his conception of the *Umgreifende* (the Encompassing). While the *Umgreifende* constitutes the very condition of the possibility of everything which can be concretely experienced, he nevertheless believes that the process of the unfoldment of the *Umgreifende* passes through at least three modes, viz. empirical perception, consciousness-in-general (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*) and finally spirit (*Geist*). The Encompassing is all of them, but like the *Puruṣa* in the *Vedas*, something of him is always left over which human reason might struggle to comprehend by perpetually extending its horizons farther and farther, but it cannot completely bring it within its grasp. The human spirit of Reason can never transcend the limits of the finite and the concrete. Hence, the *Umgreifende*, which is the creative source of the

universe and as such must necessarily be infinite and abstract, defies it, when there arises the question of unravelling the mystery of its inward dynamic impulsion. Human reason with all its failings is unable to avoid the temptation to grasp it. But when it seeks to do so, its language assumes the form of mythological symbolism, which is called by Jaspers the Cipher language. Although ordinarily it makes no sense, it is nevertheless pregnant with profound suggestive meaning.

Marcel, with the zeal of a true Christian, catches up Jaspers precisely here and points out that it is through the intensive force of the self-identity with our inmost being (*l'être*) that there emerge within us the truly religious qualities of love, grace, mercy, etc

It can be seen from this brief sketch of the existentialist approach that religious experience is regarded as the supreme expression of the process of self-realization, which is essentially ontological in its character. There is, however, one important point of difference between Jaspers and the other existentialists. Kierkegaard and Marcel, for instance, are more inclined to yield the palm to the existential feeling as the *raison d'être* of religious experience. Their philosophy of religion, therefore, leads us towards an excess of mysticism and sub-

jectivity. Jaspers, however, does not go to such an extreme. He has conceded to human reason the rightful place, though it is ultimately subordinate to ontologoy. But in doing so, religion has fared very badly at his hands. It has almost lost its identity in the process of human reason seeking to bring itself in tune with the abstract and infinite *Umgreifende*. God appears at such limit-situations (*Grenzsituationen*), when the *Dasein* suffers an absolute shipwreck (*Scheitern*) speaking a Cipher language, which sets human intelligibility at naught. Like the *Umgreifende*, Jaspers' God seems to be at His best, when He has lost His concrete character. Indeed, Jaspers has given us an aristocratic God, who excels in making Himself progressively inaccessible to human intelligibility. Verily, this reduces religion only to a chase after brilliant, but sheer, phantoms.


It is precisely here that the philosophy of Individuation can come to our rescue. It starts with the belief that our experience in its totality has an individual character, which is not simple but composite. It includes both the logical and ontological elements within itself. But unless the former is subordinated to the latter, experience can never have a real individual character.

To begin with, logic by itself is purely a

formal discipline. Its principles can be employed with certain modifications to introduce system and order in the actual experience. Such an experience is essentially bipolar. That aspect of it which is exposed to our senses acquaints us with the particular details of it, having a relative and changeful character according to the spatio-temporal conditions under which they are presented. By subjecting such data to the intellectual and rational criteria, it is possible for us to find in them certain features, which are universal and necessary. The former is called the aspect of objectivity, while the latter is the one of subjectivity.

Both epistemology and axiology deal with the relation of the objectivity to the subjectivity. The difference between them consists in that while epistemology leads us from the objectivity to the highest subjectivity, axiology reverses the direction and leads us from the highest subjectivity to such objective particulars that seek to represent it in a more or less powerful degree. Sometimes this difference in the sense of direction could be said to be that which subsists between the theoretical and practical attitudes of our self. Taken together epistemology and axiology are complementaries of each other. Together they seek to establish more and more organic relation between the subject and object by introducing a hierarchical gradation in the

three main domains of our experience, viz matter, life and mind. The following table will illustrate this point somewhat clearly, although it may need further explanations in detail ;—



A careful study of the above table will reveal to us that both epistemology and axiology are concerned with giving to objectivity an intensionality whether in theory or in practice with

reference to the appropriate subjectivity. In a word, the task of both of them is nothing but to give a proper *form* to the objectivity. It is precisely this that we expect from logic, when it is harnessed to fulfil the demands of truth. It is quite evident that both epistemology and axiology are basically the disciplines of logic and reflect its general standpoint.

Having thus had a complete view of the whole range of individuated experience, it is necessary to ask : What is it that gives rise to the logical distinction between the subject and object? It is generally understood that the relation between the two is that of an intelligible whole to its parts. In other words, the two are not mechanically related to each other, but if at all there is any relation between them it is organic. The parts have meaning and significance in proportion to their capacity to represent the spirit of the whole. Such a spirit is an inward impulsion, dynamic and creative, which is mainly responsible for effecting a *real* synthesis between the subject and object. It is not logical, because it is neither subjective nor objective, but a generative matrix of both of them. It creates its own subject and object. The implications of their relation, however, admit of hierarchical gradation according as the basic ontological principle passes through the various degrees of intensive dynamism. If the intensity of such a

principle is very low, the subjective element in the experience emerging from out of it will be very weak, while the objective aspect will be more predominant. But as we pass from matter to life, and from life to mind, the dynamism and creativity of the ontological principle grow in their degree of intensity. That is why, at these levels we come across experiences, in which the subjectivity comes to the fore and exercises full control over the objectivity. At the level of highest spirituality, the experience is not only most comprehensive and internally organic, but it is also found to be intensely active and creative in so far as it gives evidence of exercising perfect control and mastery over everything that is objective.

In so far as we are interested in religion, it is such an experience alone, which might satisfy us. Such an experience is bound to show a *dual* character. In so far as it is subject to the logical analysis, it may be characterized by the highest validity, which is the same as *sublimity*. There can be no other experience, which can have a value higher than that, simply because it can be attained by reaching the highest subjectivity which is known to be within one's reach at any particular time. For example, at the dawn of human culture and civilization, when man had just emerged from the status of a brute, the sense of sublime was

closely associated with Nature. This is quite evident from the conception of Ṛta as embodied in the *Ṛg Veda*. Through it the Vedic seers sought to convey the idea that the world of physical existence is not merely a blind concourse of events, but there is in it a perfect regularity and order. The movements of planets, the cycle of seasons, the elemental forces of Nature are all perfectly regular. Later on, Pythagoras pointed out that the order of Nature can be made intelligible through mathematical reasoning. He believed that there is a music in the spheres which is conducive to the health of our soul. Thus, Nature was progressively spiritualized and was found to be fully in harmony with our self.

As we come to the times of Socrates and Plato, the rational principle of Justice as expressed by a well-organized community of human beings was hailed with more fervour and zeal as the manifestation of the better and more profound aspirations of humanity. It gradually pushed Nature into the background according as its implications were sought to be realized more adequately and thoroughly by the Romans in their system of law and administration; by the English in their Parliamentary system of democratic State; and lately by the Russians in building up of their socialist State.

There is, however, a community higher than mere body politic. It may be called the Spiritual Organism, of which human beings in their rational frame of mind irrespective of time, place, nation, caste or creed, are the members. Such a Spiritual Organism has not yet made its full impact on our mind, because humanity has yet to reach the stage when it can pay proper heed to the requirements of spiritual life. But men like Socrates, Jesus Christ, Gautama Buddha along with a legion of truth-seekers and moral reformers, who have laid down their lives for the assertion of the highest spiritual values, have proved that the rational spirit that animated them, although it appears to be overpowered by the irrational forces, is bound to be triumphant in the long run. For as a rational animal man cannot rest satisfied with anything less than the perfect life of Reason, which is the same as the Life Divine.

Besides the logical aspect, the religious experience has also the ontological character in as much as it requires the *realization* of that which is the Sublime. Such a realization is a process through which an individual is able to represent the spirit of the whole. The relation of an individual to the universe is one of microcosm to macrocosm. Both of them contain the same elements of being. But the microcosm contains them in a potential form,

while the macrocosm does so in the actual form. The development of an individual depends on the sharpening and intensifying its inward ontological sensibility to the utmost possible extent. If the Life Divine consists in the capacity of the individual to represent the highest subjectivity, then its realization demands the help of the twin modes of religious experience, viz prayer and worship. Both of them seek the realization of the Sublime in *theory alone*. For the need of a religious person is to undergo a course of training and discipline with a view to transcending the limitations of his private or particular self in order to attain the most sublime Divine Self. To achieve such an end, he has to develop within himself an unusual power of mental concentration. He must learn to fix up his total attention only on the Divine Idea day and night and for several years together. It is only then that he can hope to introduce some modification in the lower set of values by contrasting it constantly with the values of the supreme experience on which he has set his heart. This implies complete suppression of certain interests which are found to be completely inconsistent with the Divine Experience. Frequently, he has to cultivate and develop a passion for those new interests which are in direct harmony and, indeed, constitute the quintessence of the Life Divine. Such a shifting, inhibiting or totally suppressing of one's

interests as well as grafting new interests entails a long and arduous training of one's personality. It sometimes imposes on one's self several austerities, abstentions and even tortures in order to check the erratic passions and impulses. Moreover, he has to find out also various methods of autosuggestion through which he might infuse a spirit of Divinity in his lower self.

If the Divine Experience is the felt communion of one's self with the supreme rational self, then this means that our self must transcend the limitations which keep it restricted to the partial interests. We know that wealth, power, fame, etc. have such a fascination on our mind that they lure us away from the righteous path and make us expend our entire energy on certain ends which are very narrow, relative and transitory. It is, therefore, the first and foremost requirement of the truly religious person to keep his own self undefiled by such narrow parochial interests. This demands an intense concentration of the mind on that which has the supreme value in our experience, a consistent effort to purge one's self from egotism and selfishness and to keep perpetual vigil on one's own mind lest it might swerve from the path of righteousness. It is such a subjective effort to elevate and sublimate one's spirit that finds its proper expression in the prayer.

Let us now pass on to worship. There are two types of worship. The one, in which the devotee seeks to make a certain effect on the Deity, is called the *objective worship*. In the other kind, called the *subjective worship*, the worshipper seeks to induce some desired mood or attitude in himself. Such a distinction in the two types of worship is important. It corresponds to the two different kinds of devotion mentioned by the Hindu theologians, namely, the *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa Upāsanā*. Such a distinction has its basis in the fundamental conviction of the Hindu theologians that the positive religious attitude has to pass through certain stages before it can reach the final goal. In the earlier stages, the aspirant has to hold some objective image of Deity before his mind. He has to train his mind to identify himself with all those divine qualities, with which the objective image or the idol is invested. This can be achieved through the ninefold path of *Saguṇa Upāsanā*.

When the aspirant has succeeded in bringing about a required transformation in himself by virtue of the objective worship, he can dispense with all idols or objective images. His mind now gets so radically transformed that without any objective aid it may bring itself into an intimate communion with God. This is possible only when he reaches the stage of *Nirguṇa Upāsanā*. We thus find that the transition from the *Saguṇa* to the

Nirguṇa Upāsanā depends entirely on the mental equipment and capacity of the aspirant to surrender himself to the Divine Will. If the aspirant's mind is most easily susceptible to the rational implications of Divine Existence due to lack of education and self-culture, then he may do well by starting from the *saguṇa* form of devotion. But if the aspirant is well prepared in these respects, he may directly take recourse to the *nirguṇa Upāsanā*.

Our view that *religion is the realization of the Sublime in theory* will enable us to explain the presence of heterogeneous elements in the mysticism which is closely associated with the religious experience. There are two distinguishing traits of mystic experience. Firstly, it is accompanied by the exuberance of feeling resulting in the inward satisfaction of the mystic's mind. Secondly, every mystic experience shows a rational plan in as much as it derives its supreme validity and authority on account of the better internal systematization and comprehensiveness of its various elements.

It is necessary to note that these characteristics are not the elements entering into any psychical experience. For example, the first characteristic, namely, the exuberance of feeling is not identical with any emotional state. The emotional

state, along with the various sentiments and moods to which it might give rise, is essentially a psychological phenomenon. It can be observed empirically, because almost all the emotions are accompanied by some sort of physiological reverberation. Feeling, on the contrary, may or may not be accompanied by such emotional states at all. The distinguishing character of feeling is that it brings about a radical transformation of the personality. In other words, it gives an existential status to the total experience. It is, thus, the constitutive or the ontological principle. It is spontaneous and creative. Such a feeling is inaccessible to the empirical observation. It is, as James points out, *ineffable*. The ineffability does not mean that the experience is either indefinite or non-existent. On the contrary, it is the most positive in so far as the existential aspect is concerned. Only that such an experience is incapable of being communicated to others. It is presented immediately or intuitively. According to the Indian thinkers, it is self-susceptible (*svasamvedya*).

Coming to the second characteristic of mysticism, namely, the rational organization of experience, there is a similar confusion. Psychologists of religion tend to confuse it with the cognitive or the ideational aspect of our mind. Psychological cognitions are unable to stand the test of logical

validity in all cases. For example, illusions, hallucinations or several cases of phantastic imagination are usually included by the psychologists in the cognitive states. But everyone knows that these psychical phenomena have no logical value at all. The mystic experience, on the contrary, is capable of standing fully the logical test. In other words, it aims at being valid and authoritative. This is so because it makes an appeal to human reason and is, indeed, its best expression under the circumstances in which it manifests itself.

But the religious experience has also an intensely personal character in as much as it demands that what is the highest must be *felt* and *lived* by someone. This is sometimes totally forgotten, even by the distinguished writers on religion. Hoffding, for example, believes that religion consists in the "conservation of values." Now, Hoffding's axiom is nothing but Reason in a depersonalized form. It has purely regulative significance and as such it simply represents a formal possibility. It can be conceived by many who need have nothing religious about them at all. In their life, the Reason, although supreme, lacks that living and dynamic force, through which the entire personality of man is moulded and metamorphosed. But when the same Reason is integrated with feeling,

it tends towards mystic experience. It then becomes the primary source of his life's inspiration as well as the supreme value with reference to which his desires and passions are ordered and properly organized. Such a synthesis of the ontological and logical principles in the mystic experience is sometimes called the "spiritual marriage."

Our view of religion will help us in refuting totally the dualistic interpretation of religious life. The life of a religious person, prior to the attainment of mystic vision, shows a radical contrast between the two stages, namely, the stage of imperfection in which the mind is overpowered by the sense of guilt or sin and is torn by conflicting desires and passions and the stage of perfection in which the mystic develops a self-confidence of having attained the highest level of perfection by overcoming all the weaknesses and inconsistencies of his previous self. Thus, in the religious life, the imperfect self stands face to face with the Perfect or the Divine Self. Very often, the opposition between the two selves is exaggerated to such an extent that they are regarded as the embodiments of two disparate ontological principles, so that if the one is accepted the other is completely nullified. For example, God and Satan, Spirit and Matter, Mind and Body, Soul and Flesh, all these are the various ways in which the same ontological

disparity is sought to be expressed. It is maintained that they represent an actual dualism between two ontological entities which do not admit of any reconciliation. Sometimes, such a view had led the theologians to advocate a sort of partisanship. One who takes sides with God is supposed to have nothing but hostile intentions against His enemy, namely, Satan. That is why, it is believed that the realization of spiritual well-being is possible only when the demands of flesh are totally mortified. Such a view leads to the extreme form of asceticism. The history of several institutional religions bears ample testimony to the fact that such a dualistic view had been cherished by many of them.

It is interesting to note that when dualism is put forward as an ontological doctrine, it has no other basis for itself except the opposition felt by the religious man between the lower and the higher selves. The question, however, is : Can such an opposition of the lower to the higher self be ever looked upon as ontological at all ? Now, in so far as the actual fact is concerned, the higher and lower selves cannot be denied their legitimate claim to exist. Both of them are capable of being *really* experienced. Hence, it is absurd to suggest that if the higher self exists, the lower self becomes thereby non-existent. Indeed, the distinction bet-

ween the higher and lower selves falls within the *logical sphere*. It is only when we think of grading our experiences that the question of higher and lower arises at all. If so, then the very basis of dualism is undermined. The higher level is not attained by negating the lower selves. That which is higher must logically preserve all that is good in the lower experiences. What it destroys is the inner conflict and the tendency on the part of the lower experience to assert itself absolutely with all its imperfections. What is actually needed is to reduce the lower experience to a proper subordination to the higher experience. This can be done by assigning due importance and value to it in relation to the other parts constituting the higher experience. Complete destruction of the lower will defeat the very purpose of the attainment of the higher experience.

This should not be taken to mean that the evil, according to us, is nothing but a "vanishing appearance." Such a view, indeed, takes away the real "sting" of evil. That such is not the case can be seen from our thesis that both the higher and lower experiences, in so far as they are *felt*, are individuations and thus have a claim to existence: The problem of evil becomes insoluble for them who identify reality with the highest stage of our experience, viz. God. For, then, the lower stages

are bereft of all significance. Ontologically, they are relegated to the region of unreality. The evil, therefore, which makes itself felt at the lower stages, is also regarded as unreal. But, as Joachim in his *Nature of Truth* has pointed out, this view which condemns evil as an unreal appearance, cannot afford to ignore that "sting" of evil which creates all the terrible havoc and mischief in our real life. Evil, thus, constitutes the irreconcilable residuum in the philosophy of the Idealists. But if we concede being to both the higher and lower selves by making them the individuations of the same ontological principle at the different levels of its intensity, the whole difficulty vanishes. The evil is now real, but *as long as* the delusion persists. The moment the lower experience is absorbed in and assimilated to, the higher, the evil is completely neutralized. We thus find that our view does not find anything inconsistent in maintaining the reality of the evil and the possibility of its ultimate subjugation to the highest Divine Experience.



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GOD AND CREATION

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One of the fundamental problems of philosophy is to explain the existence of the world. God is regarded as the creator of the world. When we discuss the Doctrine of God, it is natural that we analyse the concept of creation. We shall first deal with the theory that there is no creation at all. Pantheists share this stand-point. Next comes the view that creation is evolution. Here we shall consider whether evolution is mere unfoldment or it is creative synthesis. After this, the problems that would confront us would be the deistic and theistic theories of creation. If God is the creator, the question would arise : does he create out of foreign matter or does he himself undergo transformation. We shall end with the view that creation is mysterious.

The Doctrine of no-creation, among others, is held by Gauḍapāda. He advocates the doctrine

of Ajātavāda and says that nothing whatsoever is born either of itself or of another. Nothing is ever produced whether it be being, or non-being or both being and non-being (Mandūkya Kārikā IV. 22). Or again 'The existent cannot (again) pass into (birth) existence. Nor can the non-existent be born or come into being as existent. Thus disputing among themselves, they, as a matter of fact tend to establish the Advaita view and support the Ajāti or the absolute non-evolution (of what exists) (IV. 4). On the whole Gauḍapāda's contention is that the concept of causality cannot explain the world. He therefore believes in Ajāti or non-creation.

Pantheism also does not subscribe to the doctrine of creation. For pantheism world and God are one. God-world being eternal, there is no question of creation. God is not only the ground of all being, but is the whole of being; every special existence is only a modification of the universal itself, which by force of inner necessity, as Schwegler says, expands its own infinite reality into an immeasurable quantity of being, and comprises within itself every possible form of existence. "To Spinoza the World without God and God without World are alike impossible. It is represented as : $G - W = O$ and $W - G = O$.

There is again another contention that the

creation of the World is not a wilful act on the part of the Providence. But it is his very nature to create the world. The world is derived from the ultimate principle without its intelligent concurrence. The theory of emanation is found in the *Mundaka Upaniṣad*—I. 1.7, as well as in neo-platonists especially Plotinus. The emanationists have given a number of physical analogies to explain emanation. According to them the world is an effluence or irradiation of God. From the all perfect and eternal in the exuberance of its perfection emanates the universe which is equally everlasting. One of the criticisms levelled against the theory is that the one may weaken itself in the process of emanation. The neo-platonic theory of emanation as if anticipates the objection and in the very statement of the theory says that in this emission or production the one loses nothing. Still, to say that it is the nature of God to send forth the world is no explanation. It presumes what is to be proved by labelling it 'natural'.

Coming to the view that creation is evolution we find that the word evolution is understood in two senses implying two different stand points: 1) Preformation where evolution is only unfolding what is already pre-formed, and 2) Epigenesis or creative synthesis where evolution is creative.

1) **Preformation** : If one takes the literal meaning, the term evolution means unfolding. It implies making explicit what was implicit, making actual what was potential. The further implication is that when this process of unfolding is taking place, nothing new from outside is added. Whatever has come out was there from the beginning, though in a miniature form. It was already formed—pre-formed. Omar Khayyam voices the same idea when he sings :

knead

With earth's first clay they did the last men
 And then of the last harvest sowed the seed;
 On the first morning of creation wrote
 What the last dawn of reckoning shall read.

The theoretical description of such a view is the doctrine of preformation. The Sāmkhya philosophy in the East and Leibnitz in the West can be cited as the best known advocates of the theory. The Sāmkhya conception of Satkārya Vāda states the principle that if the effect is not contained in the cause, it cannot proceed exnilito. In the cause the effect is in the not-yet-state (Anāgatāvasthā). In no case can it be said that the effect is not non-existent in the cause.

According to Leibnitz every monad is eternal and so must have been there always. With Cud-

worth he shares the view that mere mechanistic processes where nothing is organised can not form an animal. For, the formation of animated organic bodies does not seem to be explicable by physical or natural processes. So generation of an animal is only transformation or augmentation of what already exists. So there always must be a pre-formed being which serves as the basis of transformation. Now as regards the rational monad of a human being, the question is : where and in what condition was it before it became a rational soul of a man ? According to Leibnitz it comes from either of the parents where it existed either (i) as a sensitive monad or (ii) as a monad having simple reason. Both these alternatives are found in Leibnitz, eg. i) He says that 'souls latent in seminal animalcules are not rational until by conception they are destined for human life'. Or again, 'But it seems proper for several reasons that they should have existed then only as sensitive or animal selves'. But how does this sensitive soul become a rational one ? As a sensitive soul does not naturally become rational, generation must involve a miracle in rendering that sensitive soul into a rational soul. This is the difficulty in the first alternative. ii) Now the second alternative : Leibnitz offers the second alternative when he says that he should prefer to do without a miracle in the generation of man and so he says :

Among the great number of souls — — those souls alone which are destined to attain some day to human nature contain the reason which will some day appear in them '.

Leibnitz can not decide between the alternatives. But Russell comments that the alternative involving a miracle would be preferable from the point of view of Leibnitz himself. Leibnitz maintains elsewhere that after death human beings do not naturally sink to the level of mere sensitive monads. But if we stick to the second alternative viz. from elementary reason there is development to a fully rational soul, there is nothing wrong if by the same logic, the rational soul, after death, sank to the pre-rational level.

But whether the soul was sensitive or rational, it is assumed by both alternatives that according to Leibnitz generation must be explained as pre-formation:

This theory makes Darwinian evolution impossible. For, if whatever comes out, is contained there already not betterment of the monad or its adjustment with the environment is ever possible. There is no trial and error and no achievement.

Deductive logic is the best example of the

theory of preformation. Whatever conclusion is to be drawn must be implied by the premises. This kind of evolution is just opening of the Pandora's box and seeing what is contained inside. This again is the process applied to the universe by Hegel. Dialectical evolution applied to the universe means the self-determining process of explication of the Absolute.

This view goes well with the singularistic philosophy where only one principle contains all the potentialities and where the evolution is self-determined.

2. Secondly the term evolution is used for a process entirely opposite to this, i. e., where evolution is not preformation but new formation or epigenesis. This view is consistent with the pluralistic hypothesis. There is not only education but production. Things do not merely come out. There is interaction, development, give and take with the environment; and whatever can be said to be the end product is not mere blooming of the bud or only fructification of a seed where every thing was contained. The whole is more than the sum of its parts. A genuine synthesis must have some characteristics which were absent when the parts existed independently. This evolution is not mechanical where there is only coming together of qualities. It rather resembles the chemical process where

there is generation of entirely different qualities. Mechanical change is reversible; but the biological or the life processes are not so reversible. Synthesis then is creative synthesis.

According to this theory reality is actuality, the potential is only an abstraction. It may be true that the oak is in the acorn but an acorn will not grow into an oak unless it gets proper environment. The maximum comes out of the minimum. It is put in another way by saying that not new entities but new values are created. Energy and mass may not be added, they being constant, but a direction is given to them. In progress or development, the higher values acting as form depend on the lower ones which act as matter; but the lower also depends on the higher; for matter requires form for direction. It is a two-way process. The pluralist conceives of harmony through progress. How exactly this progress is brought about or new things are created remains unknown.

Creation is understood in different senses. It is a natural part of deism which conceives of God as a purely transcendent being and cause of the world. He then remains entirely distinct from the world, the Absentee Lord. In pantheism God is the immanent ground, in deism He is the transcendent ground, in theism He is both.

Theism does not only assume that Being exists, but states that this Being is related to other beings in a way different from the way in which they are related to each other, and further that they exist in and through it.

The idea of creation cannot be reached from phenomenal experience which neither confirms nor disproves it. Creation is a transcendent idea like God, not reached through experience. It is contended that the universe must have a beginning and a first cause. What we can do is only to go back endlessly. Some physicists indicate that there is evidence of the beginning of the world. Taking help from science, Flint in his Gifford Lectures observes: the progress of science has convincingly and completely established that everything of which our sciences inform us has had a commencement in time..... There is no denying, then, that the universe is to a great extent an effect, an event, something which has begun to be, a process of becoming (Theism pp. 102—103).

But we cannot assume that what modern science tells is absolute truth. The conclusions of science are being continually revised. Again Flint's argument is no less than a fallacy of composition. Looked at from the point of view of science, destruction at one place is creation in another. So

that they are only local incidents on the background of the universe. When again cause is understood as an all-pervading, all-penetrating principle, it loses the temporal implication and only the logical dependence remains.

If we look at the problem of creation from another angle, what evidence is there to show that the event of creation occurred at a finite date? Why did God wait up to that date, asks Hartmann. So creation should not be taken in this sense. Pringle Pattison, another Gifford Lecturer, wonders how a scholar of Flint's competence could believe in such a puerile view that the world began to be on a definite day. If it means world's dependence on Him—but it is not causal dependence – it may only mean that God is the ground of the world, its *ratio essendi*.

There is another theory which maintains that the world was created at a particular time. The theory of Genesis, i. e., God made heaven and earth—can be shown to be metaphysically insufficient by asking, who made God? So the purely transient causality will lead only to infinite regress. To stop at God is only arbitrary.

Again the view which treats of creation taking place at a definite time does not treat the

universe as organic to divine life; creation becomes an after-thought of God. It is just an incident in God's life. To meet the difficulty of creation of a definite date, St. Augustine says that time itself was created along with the world. But so long as the world is not grounded in God but is an event, the difficulty is not solved. For him God would be God even when there is no world. This contention is not acceptable to personal idealists.

Other thinkers like Ulrici have maintained, to avoid the difficulty of creation at a fixed date, that creation is an eternal act. Here God and world become co-eternal; and the doctrine smacks of the eternity of matter. But the world or matter would remain remaining a heteros as in Plato's. Now would not this external matter limit Him? God again becomes only an architect, a designer and not a creator in the real sense of the term. There thus remains ultimate dualism from which there is no escape.

The personal idealists have sought to justify the Christian conception of creation out of nothing by saying that it is directed against such a kind of dualism. They further contend that as the nature of the Christian conception is polemical, it should be understood by noting what it denies. When the Christian conception maintains that creation

is out of nothing, it means firstly that it denies that matter was there as a heteros on which God, the artificer, works. Secondly the Christian view rejects emanation. For unlike emanation, creation must be understood as an act of will. These are two negative facts about the Christian conception. What is the positive meaning ?

In the beginning, creation was meant to indicate an act of will—the world remaining eternal. But this externality does not remain in the spiritual creation, maintains Pringle Pattison (*Idea of God* : pp.307 ff). The finite is that through which God manifests Himself. So the theory tends to mean that creation is not out of nothing so far as souls are concerned but revelation to finite minds of the riches of the divine life. Thus creation terminates in conscious existences.

Dr. James Ward, one more very able Gifford Lecturer, compares the creation of the world by God to the Being who has intellectual intuition (*Realm of Ends* : P. 235) There is nothing “given” to that Being from outside but something posited by itself. Such a being is creative. In the case of the Being having intellectual intuition its knowledge itself constitutes the existence of things. Such knowledge is not ordinary knowledge which knows external objects.

God is compared by Ward to a genius who creates new things. He is the Absolute genius and that stage we cannot reach. His ways are not our ways. The Absolute of the theist is not the absolute of the singularist. It is that which the God and the world constitute. The creation of the world is self-limitation of God. As to why he creates the world and limits himself we cannot know.

Pringle Pattison voices the same feelings when he admits that how the creative spirit creates the creatures remains unknown. Creation according to him is individuation. God finds his fulfilment in such a creation; for, he yearns for fellowship. Unless there is a created world God is not God. Thus it is useless to think of the vacancy before the world was created.

God apart from the world is a bare abstraction; on this the personalists insist. God wrapped up in himself or a bare unity is meaningless. This is their contention against Absolutism; i. e., the philosophy which thinks of self-identical Absolute without any multiplicity. Pringle Pattison spends many a page in criticising this concept. He thus criticises Hegel by saying that Hegel frequently recurs to this absolutistic conception. For the personalists, Father without Son is a bare abstraction. The words which are used to deride the absolutistic view are : abyss, absolute nothingness, figure

of logical imagination, Solitary monad and the like. Creation as efficient causation is not acceptable to these anti-absolutists. Creation to them is only partaking of divine nature. Mutual implication is supposed to be the fact of the universe. The finite exists through the Infinite and the Infinite through the finite. Still God is not accepted as one among other selves.

But the view sounds only to be dogmatic. It treats the Infinite and the finite alike in a sense. If God is the ground, he must have an existence apart from the world. In fact He is pure Existence. To say that God is not God if He does not create is too personalistic and incomplete a conception of the divinity and majesty of God.

To talk of God's desire for fellowship is quite unconvincing. For, how can an omniscient, omnipotent Being like God benefit from such fellowship? It is alright to say that creativity is one aspect of God's being. But the conclusion that God is not God without the world makes creativity the essence of God's being. God may have that power but may not weild it. Creativity need not be taken as definitive. Another difficulty which arises is : if creativity is the essence of God's being, the evil in the world becomes a wilful activity of God. He remains responsible for evil and the theist does not like it.

Though we say that God as an all-powerful and perfect Being is the creator of the world, what idea do we have about these characteristics as applied to God? Once it becomes clear that causality with its temporal implications is not applicable to God's creation the very distinction between material and efficient cause becomes superfluous. Thus to the objection raised by the opponent that Brahman cannot create without instruments, the Vedāntin replies that there goes on the process of creation without the conglomeration of efficient and material causes (Vedānta Sūtras II. 1.28). In fact according to Vedānta generally, Brahman is both the material and efficient cause in one. It is all powerful and does not need any external accessories. Why apply our limitations to Brahman? Thus Dr. Ranade states that creation according to Badarayana is mysterious. The world is a mysterious mode of God. Dr. Ranade gives the name Vicitravada to this theory. The mysteriousness of creation can be traced back to ancient times as early as the Rig- Veda. In the Nasadiya Sūkta, the seer exclaims : how from the immutable, indeterminate single principle, the mutable, determinate multiple universe emerged remains a mystery. The very nature of Brahman and the process of creation are uncharacterisable.

Does such a conclusion land us in a hopeless

agnosticism ? To admit God as the creator and so say later on that we are ignorant of His ways or the method of His creation as mysterious is due to a defect in reason. God's causality then does not seem to be explicable before the bar of reason.

The answer to such objections is that if ignorance of God's ways amounts to agnosticism, we are and will have to remain agnostics. Reality not being only thought, its nature cannot be grasped by thought alone. The Divine More cannot be caged into the meshes of our thought construction. This is agnosticism but justifiable agnosticism as Taylor calls it; and we should not deride thought for its limitations but rejoice in its glory that it knows its limitations. Consciousness of limitations of reason does not amount to neglect of reason. Reason should get its proper place in the scheme of reality but ultimately will have to be transcended.

The Operative Meaning of 'GOD EXISTS'.

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X, a middle class gentleman living in a self-owned flat in a Bombay suburb, says that he believes that God exists. Y, his neighbour in the same building, however, claims to be an atheist. Residents of the building have heard their unending debates on this single issue umpteen number of times and have grown weary of it. X says that, like everything else, the world must have a cause which is God and Y retorts that your God also would require a cause and so on and so forth. The two warring gentlemen, however, follow, more or less, the same daily routine, exhibit a similar behaviour pattern and their attitudes in life are also similar. Yet the two gentlemen think that they differ fundamentally from each other because one believes that God exists and the other that He does not.

I am persuaded to think that this difference is not very important. It is of as little significance as between a person saying that there is at least one planet beyond Pluto in the solar system and another saying there is none such. The difference between believing that God exists and believing that He does not exist would be very important, indeed, if we do not take these as theoretical beliefs like propositions concerning the existence of a planet beyond Pluto but as practical beliefs concerning the validity or otherwise of a certain way of living. In spite of appearances, "God exists" does not so much assert the existence of some entity as vindicates a way of life. If it were merely to assert that some entity called God exists, it would be of very limited interest. It is of such profound interest to all of us because instead of asserting that some entity exists, it expresses one's commitment to a set of values to be realized in life. To say 'God exists' implies, contextually, that I accept a certain way of life which involves a profound sense of the mystery of existence, universal love, absolute sincerity and so many other things.

Let us imagine a man like the late Prof. R. D. Ranade, who may be variously described as God-fearing, God-intoxicated, pious, religious etc. In what ways such men strike us differently from

the ordinary run of people? I suppose, one important characteristic of a man of God is his humility. He is meek and humble. There could be several intellectual constructs to explain and justify this attitude. One might say, "values are impersonal and, therefore, it never behoves a man to be dogmatic and arrogant. Truth regarding what is good and proper could always be on the other side. So, the view-point of the other man deserves as much consideration and reverence as my own. The thought that the other man also may be right makes me humble." But a simpler intellectual construct would be "God is great, He knows what is good and proper, I should completely surrender myself to His will". Again, I think a God-fearing man is honest, even in the dark. Why should he be honest when it does not profit him? An atheist might say "why, he ought to be honest, because that is his duty". If we ask "why should he do his duty," the atheist might answer, "Because, that is exactly what 'duty' means". The God-fearing man might simplify the whole thing by saying "Be honest, even in the dark, because God sees you". There are a thousand and one such injunctions, acts of behaviour and attitudes which flow from and can be organized under a very comprehensive human response—"God exists". Just as the concept of matter organizes a number of physical properties and laws of Nature, the

assent to the sentence " God exists " organises a set of values, attitudes and experiences. When one says "God exists" one really means that a certain way of living is valid. The term 'valid', in this context, would mean acceptable, satisfying. There is no point in saying ' God exists ' unless one commits oneself to a certain pattern of living. Gandhiji used to say that a sincere atheist was really a believer in God.

Consider a man who pines to see God face to face. Will this man be satisfied, if wandering in the streets of Pandharpur, he sights a human figure with four arms, holding a wheel in one hand, clad in the traditional pitambara and having a halo around its face ? I do not think so. For, what is the good of seeing such a funny figure ? It might be entertaining and exciting. But it cannot be the serious thing called " seeing God ". The man who wants to see God wants to live in a certain way, feel in a certain way, experience everything in a radically different way. It is the experience of realizing God, i. e., to say, of making God real.

Now, what exactly does he want to make real and actual ? Of course, I cannot say with any authority. Not only that I have not realized God, but I have not in me even the yearning to see God which one finds, for example, in the poetry of

saint Tukaram. But I can have an imaginative understanding of what Tukaram means when he says “ I feel like a fish out of water : O Vithoba, when wouldst thou meet me ?” I think he wants to experience this very world not as a tale told by an idiot, signifying nothing but as completely meaningful, responding to all one’s cravings and desires. It would be an absolutely satisfying experience giving meaning to one’s own existence.

Or, consider the Krishna Consciousness movement, popular, at present, in the U. S. A. What do the Americans joining the movement want ? Do they want to see Lord Krishna ? What could be the gain ? I take it that they want to be Krishna-conscious, i.e., to say, they want to build certain attitudes. The chanting of ‘Hare Krishna’ opens to them new vistas of consciousness, adds to the dimensions of their being.

When one sincerely says ‘God exists’ one prepares to live in such a way as life unquestionably has a meaning and when one realizes God one has actually found that meaning. Swami Vivekananda has said “God certainly does exist—otherwise what is life for, what is it worth ?” (Page 212 in Isherwood Christopher’s ‘ Ramkrishna and his Disciples’). One can paraphrase this as “ If God did not exist, life would not be worth-living.

But life is worth living; Therefore God exists ". I suggest that this should not be taken as a rational proof of the existence of the deity. For there is no theoretical way of substantiating the minor premise. You can uphold it by living life in a certain way. When saint Jnaneshwara prayed that let there be an abundance of persons adhering to the doctrine of God (ईश्वरनिष्ठांची मांदियाळी) he did not ask for a large number of people giving an intellectual assent to the statement " God exists ". He was rather praying that a society of a certain type of men should come into being. It is the function of the philosophy of religion to spell out what this type of men is like. I here merely want to suggest that the sentence ' God exists ' has more an operative meaning than a declarative one.

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DOCTRINE of GOD

OR ईश्वर

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1) I first bow to my Sadguru Anand Jai Prabhuraj Maharaj, because गुरुः साक्षात्परब्रम्ह तस्मै श्रीगुरुवे नमः Then I bow to God who is unfathomable यस्यान्तं नविदुः सुरासुरगणाः देवाय तस्मै नमः I bow then to Shree Siddhi Vinayak who represents the beginning of Nirgun Brahma मुळारंभआरंभ तो निर्गुणाचा. I bow further to Godess of Learning, Shree Saraswati. या ब्रम्हाच्युत शंकर प्रतिभिदेवैः सदा वंदिता सा मां पातु सरस्वती भगवती निःशेष जाड्यापहा. I bow afterwards to my family Godess Shree MahaLaxmi जयमान महालक्ष्मी संतारार्णव तारिणी. I bow to Shree Bhau Saheb Maharaj, Shree Gurudeo and all other saints. Lastly I bow to all learned listeners who are the various manifestations of Paramatman. पश्यामि ते सर्वं जनांतरस्थम्। नमामि हंसं परमात्मरूपम्॥ and solicit their patience. By the grace of my Sadguru-raj I venture to speak on the Doctrine of God though God is beyond words अर्निर्वचनीय ब्रम्ह.

2) The subject of the Paper i. e. Doctrine of God or इश्वर takes us to the very Truth behind this existence. The Doctrine of God and the problem of life are rather correlated, as tides are related to the ocean. One who solves the problem of life understands the doctrine of God. Aim of philosophy and religion is to solve the problem of life and to realise the doctrine of God. Therefore let us first consider the problem of the Universe and life on it.

3) Origin of Universe

The universe was created to amuse and recreate God. एकाकी न रमते । इतिश्रुती and एकोहंबहुस्याम - स्फुरण which is the cause of the universe. Just as human drama is meant for human recreation, the divine drama is meant for God's recreation. Just as human drama is not real, so also divine drama is not real. Human drama runs for hours and divine drama runs for years. A spectator is swept away by events in ordinary human drama if he identifies with those events. So also one who identifies with his body and with events in divine drama suffers from pleasures and pains. Some regard that this universe is the result of evolution from monkey to man. Acceptance of this theory of evolution leads us to confusion and the problem is not solved. If monkeys gradually became men by process of evolution, then all men must have same level

of thought and reason. But that is not so in fact. Men differ in their power of thinking. पिंडे पिंडे मतिभिन्ना. The proper answer would be that the universe was simultaneously created in various forms.

ममयोनिर्महद्ब्रम्ह । तस्मिन् गर्भं दधाम्यहम् ।

संभवः सर्वं भूतानां ततोभवति भारत ।

सर्वं योनिषु कीन्तेय मूर्तयः संभवन्ति याः ।

तासां ब्रह्म महद्योनिरहं बीजप्रदः पिता (अ १४/३।४)

The Bhagwadgita provides this answer, that all different bodies in different Yonees or forms are created. They differ in quality because of three different gunas सत्व, रज and तम. These are qualities of प्रकृति; सत्वरजस्तम इतिगुणाः प्रकृतिसंभवाः । निभघ्नन्ति महाबाहो देहे देहिनमव्ययम् ॥ १४:५; as children of same parents differ in their nature. It is further laid down that actions due to these Gunas lead to rebirth. अन्ते मतिः सा गती. The thought at the time of death determines rebirth. वासांसि जीर्णानि यथा विहाय । नवानि गृण्हानि नरोपराणी । तथा शरीराणि विहाय जीर्णानि । अन्यानि संयाति नवानि देही । We change old clothes by replacing them by new ones; so the Atman changes the old body by having a new one. Lord Shree Krishna says आब्रम्ह भुवनांल्लोकाः पुनरावर्तितोऽर्जुन. Everything in the Universe is subject to the cycle of birth and rebirth according to actions. लोकोद्भयं कर्मबंधनः and Jeeva gets higher class if it has quality of 'Satva'. ऊर्ध्वगच्छन्ति सत्वस्थाः and it remains

in the middle position and neither goes in higher or lower position if it has 'Rajas' quality. मध्ये तिष्ठन्ति राजसाः ; and 'Jeevas' of 'Tamas' Guna get lower birth. अधोगच्छन्ति तामसाः. To avoid this cycle of birth and rebirth जरामरण मोक्षाय is to understand the doctrine of God and to realise Him, because Geeta says : मामुपेत्य तु कौन्तेय पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते : (अ8/16)

4) Human reason and its capacity to understand the doctrine of God.

Geeta says ; इंद्रियाणि पराण्याहुरिन्द्रियेभ्यः परं मनः । मनस्तु पराबुद्धिर्यो बुद्धेः परतस्तु सः (अ 3.42) Senses are said to be greater than body; mind is greater than the senses because mind leads the senses to action. Intellect is greater than mind because intellect can reason out what is good and what is bad. The Atman is greater than intellect. Intellect is a part of lower or insentient nature and Jeeva is higher than that. अ ७/४१५ deal with प्रकृति/पराप्रकृति. Human intellect has thus a limited scope and belongs to lower nature. God is thus above and beyond intellect. The aim of man should be to understand and to have experience of God who is beyond intellect. " एवंबुद्धेः परंबुद्ध्वा अ ३/४३ ". It is said in 'Kathop-nishat' नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यः । न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन. Any amount of learning still falls short of understanding the doctrine of God. Again Yama tells Nachiket in same 'Kathop-Nishat' that नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया. Real-

sation of Soul or God is beyond the reach of logic and reason. Study of various faiths and study of different schools of the same faith is within the province of philosophy. Philosopher is after all a student carrying on the work of research and his work is mainly based on logic and intellect. He is after all a 'Sadhak' only. Sadhak may still be far off from realisation of God. Philosopher may try to surmise and put the doctrine in words. But God is beyond words, mind and intellect. यतोवाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसासह. Thus there is a great difference between a saint and a philosopher. Dr. Radhakrishnan said about Gurudeo that "Philosophers study and talk 'Adhyatma' but Gurudeo lives 'Adhyatma'." "It is said अरे आत्मा श्रोतव्यः मन्तव्यः निदिध्यासितव्यः. One must hear about Atman, think of Atman and meditate upon Atman. Mere talk about Atman leads one no further. There would be no peace of mind शान्ति by mere talk of God. A hungry man cannot satisfy his hunger by mere talk of food. He must eat food actually. बोलाचाचि भात । बोलाची कडी । जेऊनिया तृप्त । कोण झाला. One must realise and have experience of Atman or God. A Sadhak cannot pose as Siddha. (A story of an educated couple : Wife cooked the food and then requested her husband to offer नैवेद्य to God. Husband replied that offer of food to God is not necessary because God is within him and he is God, quoting अहं वैश्वानरो भूत्वा etc. Therefore he can be regarded as

God. Then wife said 'allright; have your food.' After husband started taking food, she brought a burning piece of coal and touched his foot with it. Then husband began to shout. Wife then quoted 'नैनं छिन्दति शस्त्राणि नैनं दहति पावकः ।' Fire cannot burn God. You should not complain. Husband had to remain quiet.)

5) Such realisation requires good character. A man without good character is a monster. It is said 'आचारप्रभवोधर्मः । धर्मस्य प्रभुरच्युतः श्री विष्णु सहस्रनाम. जेणे विटुल मात्र घ्यावी । त्याणे पथ्ये सांभाळावी॥ येरा गवाळाचे काम नोवे श्री तुकाराम. To talk of God only and not care about one's character is called (मिथ्याचारः स उच्यते-अ ३ i. e.) hypocrisy by Geeta. Misconduct does not lead to realisation of the doctrine of God. A man who is only after bodily pleasures, having uncontrolled mind, has not the capacity to understand the Doctrine. Hence it is said that युक्ताहार विहारस्य etc. One should lead a morally disciplined life. Otherwise Geeta says the life of such a man is अयुक्तस्य, is just like the life of an animal. अत्रायुरिन्द्रियारामो मोक्षं पार्थ स जीवति ३/१६. Sinful and sensual life is in vain. Foods and drinks also play an important part in moulding the intellect and character. Food is of three kinds : सात्विक, राजस and तामस. तामसाहारभुक् दुर्धीः सात्विकहार भुक्सुधीः॥ इतिश्रीवासुदेवानन्द सरस्वति. Satwik food leads to satvik or good thoughts and tamas food leads to tamas or bad thoughts. Bad thoughts remove away the

aspirant of realisation from the pathway to God. One must be pure in his conduct, character and thoughts. This is the basic requirement to solve the Doctrine. Sadhana without pure conduct and character is a false Sadhana. Swami Vivekanand was approached by a lady intending to marry him to have a son like him. "Treat me as your son, mother", was Swami's answer. Bernard Shaw's answer was different. A lady met Mr. Shaw and requested him to marry her to have a handsome son like her with intelligence of Shaw. He refused the offer saying that the son may be born with the intelligence of that lady and his ugly bodily form. Kindly note the difference between the two answers. Swamiji's answer is that of a realised soul with purity of heart and Shaw's answer is based on cold and hard intellect only of a practical minded man. It is merely a show of Sadhana if it is not followed by good conduct and character. It misleads others and such Sadhana is a nuisance. काम एष क्रोध एष रजोगुणसमुद्भवः । महाशनो पापात्मा विद्वेनमिह वैरिणम् ॥ Purity of thought and of conduct is an essential condition or a must. One who is pure in thought and action must then decide the method of realisation of the Soul.

6) Methods of realisation of Soul.

Geeta has considered various methods, for example—Dnyan, Dhyan, Karma and Bhakti.

Dnyan is very sacred नहि ज्ञानेन सदृशं पवित्रमिह विद्यते. In all kinds of knowledge, Adhyatma Vidya is superior. अज्यात्मविद्या विद्यानाम् says Geeta. But Dnyan is obtained by having faith only; श्रद्धावान् लभते ज्ञानम्. Because श्रद्धामयो भयं पुरुषः यच्छ्रद्धः स एव सः 17/3; faith is necessary for even successful worldly life. Wife must have faith in her husband and vice versa. It is more necessary in spiritual life. Even a scientist should have faith in certain hypothesis. A materialist has faith in material things only and a spiritual person should and must have faith in Atman. A faithless person is neither here nor there. संशयात्मा विनश्यति. Shree Dnyaneshwar says—मूढाः संशयाहूनी योर । आणिक पाप नाही योर. Faith in Atman leads to Dnyan or knowledge of Atman. Shree Aruni sage showed a seed of a banyan tree to Swetketu, his son and asked him to break it. Swetketu did so. Aruni asked him whether he sees anything in the broken seed. Swetketu replied that he saw nothing. Then Aruni told him that the seed contained the tree in its latent form and asked him to have faith. सोम्येषोऽणिम्न एवं महान्यग्रोधोतिष्ठति. Faith is of three kinds : यजन्ते सात्विका देवान् यक्षरक्षांसी राजसः । प्रेतान् भूतगणाश्चान्ये यजन्ते तामसाः जनाः ॥ १७/४. Faith in Atman is thus very necessary to realise the Atman and to follow the various methods of realisation of Soul.

(a) **Dnyan.** Geeta describes Dnyan in three kinds viz :— सर्वभूतेषु येनैकं भावमव्ययमीक्षते । अविभक्तं विभक्तेषु

तज्ज्ञानं विद्धि सात्त्विकम् ॥१८/२०. That knowledge by which man sees one imperishable entity in all being, undivided among the divided, is known as satwik knowledge. प्रयत्नत्वेन तुज्ज्ञानं नानाभावान् पृथग्विधान् । वेत्ति सर्वेषु भूतेषु तज्ज्ञानं विद्धि राजसम् १८.२१. That knowledge which regards the manifold existence of various kinds in all beings as separate, know that knowledge as 'Rajas'. यत्तु कृत्स्नवदेकस्मिन् कार्ये सक्तमहंतुकम् । अतत्त्वार्थवदल्पंच तत्तामसमुदाहृतम् १८.२२. That knowledge which clings to one individual, as if it were whole, which is without reason, without any real object and of little value, is declared as 'Tamas'. Satwic knowledge is based on सारासार विवेक, that knowledge analyses everything in the Universe, decides by reasoning what is real and what is unreal, what is perishable and what is imperishable, and tries to find out a solution by use of sound and proper reason i. e. Vivek. Then it decides that God is alone real and imperishable. And He alone is imperishable entity in all beings and undivided among the divided. On the other hand, 'Rajas' knowledge regards the manifold existence of various kinds in all beings as separate. Jeeva is regarded as different from God and each being separate from other being. 'Tamas' knowledge centres around the individual based on ignorance. तमसस्तु अज्ञानजं विद्धि १४.८. Rajas and Tamas kinds of knowledge are far from God. Lord Krishna has said in chapter

VII मत्तः परतरं नान्यत्किञ्चिदस्ति धनंजय । मयि सर्वमिदं प्रोक्तं सूत्रे मणिगणा इव. Again Bhagwan says विष्टम्यामहमिदं कृत्स्नं मेकांगेन स्थितो जगत् १०/४२. There is nothing else besides Me, Arjun. Like clusters of yarnbeads formed by knots on a thread, all this is threaded on me. The whole of this creation is deluded by objects evolved from the three modes or gunas born of प्रकृति, Satva, Raja and Tama. God is above these gunas and is imperishable. त्रिभिर्गुणमयैर्भावैरेभिः सर्वमिदं जगत् । मोहितं नाभिजानाति मामेभ्यः परमव्ययम् ७/१३. But a man who is after knowledge realises God after many births. बहूनां जन्मनामन्ते ज्ञानवान्मां प्रपद्यते; and he at last realises that all this is God. वासुदेवः सर्वमिति.

b) Lord Krishna has laid down a rule regarding the various modes to realise God, as follows :— श्रेयो हि ज्ञानमभ्यासाज्ज्ञानाद् ध्यानं विशिष्यते । ध्यानात्कर्मफलत्यागस्त्यागाच्छान्तिर्निरंतरम् ॥ १२/१२. Knowledge is better than practice carried on without proper insight; Meditation is superior to knowledge and renunciation of the fruit of actions is even superior to meditation. For peace immediately follows such renunciation. All other methods except renunciation creates egoism in a follower of these methods. Renunciation takes away that egoism. अहंकारं जने ठेवणे मोषणे ते कळेना. Ego is the worst enemy of realisation, says Shree Ramdas. Shree Tukaram also says that आलं भागाने करितो । तुझे नाम उच्चारितो ॥ It showed no ego. कर्मण्येव हि संसिद्धिमास्थिताः जनकादयः Janaka and others

realised God by renunciation of fruits of actions which does not mean renunciation of the action itself. तयोस्तु कर्गसत्यासात्कर्मयोगो विशिष्यते. Renunciation of fruits of action is better and superior to renunciation of action. A man can not live by renunciation of all actions. He must do necessary daily actions at least for maintenance of his body. Renunciation of all fruits of action means surrender of oneself : निर्ममो and of ego is निरहंकार and of mind and intellect to God, मय्यर्पितः मनो बुद्धिर्यो भक्तः स मे प्रियः १२/१४. Without surrender to God and devotion to God, renunciation of the fruits of action can not be made; for example—‘Gopis of Gokul’ were doing their actions with devotion and with spirit of surrender to Lord Krishna. Geeta says that ‘Dhyan Yoga’ or ‘Hatha Yoga’ consists in shutting out thoughts of external sense enjoyments with the eyes fixed on the space between the eyebrows having equalised the ‘Prana’ and ‘Apan’ breaths, flowing within the nostrils to bring one’s senses, mind and reason under control. (Chapter V. 27/28).

But example of Changdeo, the famous Hat-Yogi, is a glaring one in this behalf. He did not realise God by resorting to such Yoga and had to seek the grace of Muktabai – his Sadguru.

(c) Devotion or ‘ Bhakti ’ Yoga.

In Chapter IX of Geeta, Lord Krishna describes this Yoga as sovereign, secret and sacred.

राजविद्या राजगुह्यं पवित्रमिदमुत्तमम् 9/2. And this Yoga, He says, is directly enjoyable, pious and very easy to practise happily. It is further laid down that those who worship God, go to God. Those who worship manes पितर go to manes, those who adore spirits (प्रेतान्) reach spirits and ghosts भूतगणान् and those who worship Parmatman attain Him. प्रत्यक्षावगमं धर्म्यं सुसुखं कर्तुमव्ययम् ९/२. Bhakti Yoga is so supreme that even the vilest sinner who worships God with exclusive devotion, becomes a saint; for example—Walya Koli became Walmik Sage. अपिचेत्सु दुराचारो भजते मामनन्यभाक् साधुरेव स मन्तव्यः सम्यग्व्यवसितो हि सः ९/३०-३१. Resolve to offer worship devotedly brings change in him. नमो भक्तः प्रणश्यति says Lord Shree Krishna. It is a sort of guaranty. Devotee never falls down. Lord Shree Krishna says “Fix your mind on me; Be devoted to me; Adore me and make obeisance to me; Unite yourself with me and depend on me; You shall come to me. मन्मनाभव मद्भक्तो मद्याजी मां नमस्कुह । मामेवैष्यसि युक्त्वैवमात्मानम् मत्परायणः ९/३४. Those who are endowed with faith and are solely devoted to God are extremely dear to him. श्रद्धवाना मत्पराया । भक्तास्तेऽतीव मे प्रिया; । १२/२०. In Chapter VI, Lord Shree Krishna has compared all methods of realisation of Parmatman and finally laid down that devotee or Bhakti Yogi is the best Yogi. योगिनामपि सर्वेषां मद्गतेनान्तरात्मना । श्रद्धावान्भजते यो मां स मे युक्ततमो मतः ६/४७. Shree Dnyaneshwar and Namdeo went on a pilgrimage. Both became thirsty and they were mov-

ing in a jungle. There they found an old well. It was very deep and had no steps. They could not get down. Shree Dnyaneshwar took the form of small insect by exercising Yoga and drank water. But Namdeo began to chant the name of Shree Vithal. The water overflowed and then Namdeo drank water. This well is known in Punjab even now as 'Namdev Kuva'. Thus Bhakti Yoga is a sure and certain method of realisation.

7) 'Swaroop of Bramha :'

Shree maharshi Vyasmuni has described it as जन्मादिअस्ययतः in ब्रम्हसूत्र. This Universe originates in Brahma, is sustained by Brahma and it merges in Brahma, just as tides originate in ocean, they are sustained by ocean and they merge in ocean. Tides have no independent existence. Shree Bhagwan Krishna describes the swaroop in these words: ईश्वरः सर्वं भूतानां हृद्देशेऽजुन तिष्ठति । आदित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तात् । तेजोमयं विश्वमनंतरूपम् ॥ ११। ४५

Lord shree krishna says in chapter XI that - paramatman or God can not be seen with the ordinary eyes. The divine sight was given to Arjun by Shree Krishna. न तु मां शक्यसे द्रष्टुमनेनैव चक्षुषा । दिव्यं ददामि ते चक्षुः पश्य मे योगमैश्वरम् ११/८. Then Arjun describes that swaroop in the following words, after experiencing it actually by grace of his Guru, Lord Krishna. " पश्यामि विश्वेश्वर विश्वरूप ॥ In other words, he describes

स्वतेजसा विश्वमिदं तमन्तम्. Again he says, तेजोभिरापूर्यं जगत्समग्र
 etc. Sanjaya could see that Swaroop by grace of
 Maharshi Vyas Guru. श्री निवृत्तिनाथ says जनवन न दिसे आम्हा
 आम्हा नित्य पौर्णिमा. Shree Dnyandeo says उदयोऽस्तावी
 प्रकाश- Grace of sadguru is thus very essential to
 solve the doctrine of God. Study of Vedas or ritu
 als or gifts, sacrifices or hard penances do not lead
 to realisation. न वेद यज्ञाध्ययनैर्न दानैर्न च क्रियाभिर्न तपोभिरुग्रैः
 एवरूपः शक्य अहं नृलोके द्रष्टु त्वदन्येन कुरुप्रवीर । ११/४८. Arjun
 was devoted disciple and Lord Krishna was
 his Sadguru. Such combination alone leads to
 realisation of the Paramatman. But it is not pos
 sible for ordinary human beings to worship Nir-
 guna because क्लेशो अधिकतरस्तेषामव्यक्तासक्तचेतसाम् १२.५.
 But there is no difference between सगुण and निर्गुण to
 saints. दोन्ही टिपरी एकचि नाद । सगुण निर्गुण नाही भेद ॥ A war-
 rior like Arjun was frightened. After realisation of
 विश्वरूप he requested the Lord to show him his usual
 form. Shree Krishna opines that 'Sagun' wor-
 ship is easier, sure and certain method of reali-
 sation; hence he advises Arjun to fix his mind on
 Him without any doubt. मय्येव मन आधत्स्व मयि बुद्धिं निवेशय।
 निवसिष्यसि मय्येव अत ऊर्ध्वं न संशयः १३।८ Every religion has
 one form or the other of Sagun worship e. g. some
 worship samadhis, tombs, pictures and photos or
 statues, cross or any other sign or even a point,
 books, holy person's tooth, hair etc. Arjun prays.

अदृष्टपूर्वं हृषितोऽस्मि दृष्ट्वा भयेन च प्रव्यथितं मनो मे। तदेव मे दर्शय देव रूपं प्रसीद देवेश जगन्निवास ११।४५. Sagun worship leads to realisation of Paramatman or Nirguna Brahma by grace of Sadguru. Example of Namdeo who says सद्गुरु वाचोनि नाम नये हाता, then that नाम leads to realisation of Paramatman. Even though he was a worshipper of Sagun Vithal he had to approach Visoba Khechar to realise विश्वरूप.

Surrender to Guru is "a must". Lord Krishna says - सर्वं धर्मान्परित्यज्य मामेकं शरणं ब्रज, because His grace will remove difficulties. १) मच्चित्तः सर्वदुर्गाणि मत्प्रसादात्तरिष्यसि । (२) मानेव ये प्रपद्यन्ते मायामेतां तरन्ति ते। (३) मत्प्रसादात्परा शान्तिं स्थानं प्राप्यसि शाश्वतम् । Shree Tukaram also says आवे पूजा गुरुनाथा। चाऽ देवावरि सता॥ सर्वज्ञता आली हाता । नामयाचा खेवर दाता ॥ Shree Dnyandev says ज्ञानदेव म्हणे तरलो तरलो । आतां उद्वारिलो गुरुकृपे ॥ He explains it further आतां कांहीं उरळे नाहीं। देहीच विदेही होऊनी ठेले॥. Grace of Sadguru and utmost devotion of the disciple are thus essential. Arjun even after realisation of Vishvaroop, did not claim a right to initiate others. A Sadhak even after realisation can not have a right to initiate others. It is a role of Siddha or Sadguru only. The same Sadguru may initiate differently different followers. Arjun was told to renunciate fruits of Karma and fight and Udhav was told by Shree Krishna to go to Badari for meditation. Initiation is made according to disciple's capacity—पात्रानुसार it is called. Grace of Sadguru only solves the problem and leads to realisation of God.

8) All religions are one on the point that God is all powerful, Almighty, Omnipresent, and Omnipotent. Therefore there need not be and should not be any quarrel over the manner of worship. But disputes are there because of ignorance of worshippers who think that the kind of worship they follow is superior. Fanaticism is useless and harmful to realisation and also to society. Shree Ramkrishna Paramhans reconciled all main religions and declared that realisation is possible by following any or all of them. Let Hindus at least unite by accepting Shree Bhagwad-Geeta as the Book of authority on Philosophy and religion. Importance of Geeta गीता सुगीता कर्तव्या किमन्यैः शास्त्र विस्तरैः । यास्वयं पद्मनाभरय मुत्रगयात् विनिसृता । सर्वोपनिषदो गावो दोग्धा गोपालनंदनः Thus Geeta is the essence of all Upnishadas and Shastras etc. Let us accept Satchidanand Prabhu as common description of God for common worship. Hindus can have 'Satya Dev Pooja' in public. Let private individual have his own way of worship in his house according to his liking. Let there be a common prayer.

सर्वे सुखिनः संतु सर्वे संतु निरामयः ।

सर्वे भद्राणि पश्यन्तु मा कश्चिदुःखमाप्नुयात्.

GOD IN THE VEDA

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The roots of the doctrine of God can be traced to the Vedas which are the first recorded expressions of humanity. They contain the words of the Vedic seers who were our ancestors and lived thousands of years ago. The seers were credited with supernormal insight into Reality (साक्षात्कृतधर्माणो ऋषयो बभूवुः—यास्क). Even at that hoary antiquity, we find that, they had a clear idea regarding the One Divinity that rules the universe. This can be seen from a hemistich in the R̥gveda :

सुपर्णं विप्राः कवयो वचोभिर्
एकं सन्तं बहुधा कल्पयन्ति ।

The beautiful winged (Bird i. e. the Deity) who is One, the wise poets present with their words in diverse forms (RV. X 114.5).

What was the necessity for presenting the One Being in many ways or describing it diversely ? It

was obviously for the sake of common understanding and to make it more impressive. The one being has infinite powers and functions. Each power or function is looked upon as a distinct Divinity and is accordingly glorified.

Thus there is Agni, a symbol of illumination and enlightenment. His brightness in much dwelt upon. He shines even at night and dispels the darkness with his rays. He is called 'the son of strength' owing to the great force required to churn him out. He carries the oblations to the gods or brings them to the sacrifice. The Sun in the heaven and the lightning in the atmosphere are only his other forms. He is exclusively called *Jātaveda* (who knows all created beings). He is the God nearest to men as he stays in their abodes. Aurobindo calls Agni the 'mystic fire'.

Indra is another aspect of the same Divinity. He destroys Vṛtra, the demon of drought, with his weapon the thunderbolt, makes the clouds shower rain and helps the rivers to flow. He is the great God of battle who helps his devotees to conquer their enemies.

Varuṇa is the God who maintains the cosmic order, which has two aspects, namely, natural order and moral order. The natural order is seen in the regular movement of the Sun, Moon and

planets as well as in the annual cycle of seasons. The moral order refers to the human beings. He blesses the mortals who lead a pious life and punishes the wicked who transgress the moral law.

Uṣas is another expression of the same Divinity in the form of the goddess of Dawn. She is young and beautiful though ancient. Clothed in light she rises fresh like a lady from a bath, illumines the world with her beams, drives away darkness, evil dreams as well as evil spirits and awakens the beings to their activity.

Rudra is the Divine Physician who possesses a thousand remedies. He has healing powers and is called *Jalaṣa-bheṣaja* (possessing cooling remedies). He wields his bow and terrible shafts. Hence he is implored to save his worshippers by averting his arrows that slay men and cattle.

We come across a number of abstract divinities such as *śraddhā* (Faith : Rv X.151), *Manyu* (wrath : Rv X 83-84) and *Vāk* (speech : Rv X.71, 125). Things useful in life and at worship such as plants (X 97), forest (X.146) the sacrificial post (iii.8) and even the stones used for pressing out the Soma juice (X.76, 94, 175) are looked upon as deities. Weapons, armour and war drum also (VI.75) are addressed as divinities.

We know from the Science of Religion that there is a tendency towards a multiplication of gods, each god being assigned a separate function. Hence we find that a number of natural phenomena, which strike a man with awe and wonder, are looked upon as Divine powers. Even a function like creation is personified in the form of Prajāpati (the creator), while Yama is the ruler of the dead.

In spite of the apparent diversity of divinities, the Vedic seers are conscious of the fact that there is one unity underlying them all. Hence a seer declares—

इन्द्रं मित्रं वरुणमग्निमाहुर्
 अथो दिव्यः स सुपर्णो गरुत्मान् ।
 एकं सद् विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति
 अग्निं यमं मातरिश्वानमाहुः ॥

They call him Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa and Agni, and also the divine Eagle with beautiful wings. The wise call the one Being differently. They describe him as Agni, Yama and Mātariśvan (wind-god) (Rv. I.164.46).

The concept of Viśve Devāḥ a comprehensive group consisting of all gods invoked together is a pointer in this direction. The concept finds its highest and happiest expression in the Puruṣa-sūkta (Rv. X. 90). Therein the cosmic personification of the deity as Puruṣa is described as both

immanent and transcendent :—

सहस्रशीर्षा पुरुषः सहस्राक्षः सहस्रपात् ।

स भूमिं विश्वतो वृत्वा अत्यतिष्ठद्दशाङ्गुलम् ॥

Thousand-headed was Puruṣa, thousand-eyed, thousand-footed. He having covered the earth on all sides, extended beyond it the length of ten fingers. (V.1)

पुरुष एवेदं सर्वं यद्भूतं यच्च भव्यम् ।

Puruṣa alone is this all, that has been and that will be. (2)

पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि ।

A quarter of him is all beings, three quarters of Him are what is immortal in heaven. (3)

From that Puruṣa were born all the birds and the beasts wild as well as domesticated (8). All the Vedas (9), horses, cows, goats and sheep were produced from Him (10). The four castes (12), the Moon, the Sun, Indra, Agni and Vāyu—all came into existence from his different parts (13). The earth, mid-region, the heaven and the quarters were similarly produced (14).

A seer who has realised this Puruṣa declares:—

वेदाहमेतं पुरुषं महान्तम् आदित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तात् ।

तमेव विदित्वा अतिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय ॥

“I have known that supreme Puruṣa, who is bri-

ght like the Sun and beyond darkness. It is only by knowing Him that a man transcends death. There is no other path to salvation " (Vājasoneya Samhitā 31.18).

The Hiraṇya-garbha hymn (Rv.X.121) may be cited as an instance in this regard. "With deep longing the poet seeks and searches after that God, who, being the beginning of the world and the first germ and the shaper of all life, reveals himself all over in nature. He sees the divinity in its manifestation now here, now there, now elsewhere and again and again he always asks doubting, seeking and longing, who is this God to whom we present our offering?" (Schroeder, *Indiens Literatur und Cultur*, P.80).

About Him the seer remarks —

य आत्मदा बलदा यस्य विश्वे
 उपासते प्रशिषं यस्य देवाः
 यस्य छाया अमृतं यस्य मृत्युः
 कस्मै देवाय हविषा विधेम ॥

"He is the giver of breath and the giver of strength. All beings and *even the gods* obey his command. His shadow is immortality, and death is His (shadow). Who is that God, whom we should worship with our offering? (v.2)". (In the alternate explanation of Sāyana, taking Ka to mean Prajāpati, the Poet's mood would be conviction instead of doubt.)

आपो ह यद् बृहतीर्विश्वमायन्
 गर्भं दधाना जनयन्तीरग्निम् ।
 ततो देवानां समवर्ततासुरेकः
 कस्मै देवाय हविषा विधेम ॥

“When the great waters spread over the whole (world), conceiving the embryo (i. e. Prajāpati) and producing Fire, then He came, *the one soul of the gods*; who is that God whom we should worship with our oblation ? (v.7)”

यश्चिदापो महिना पर्यपश्यद्
 दक्षं दधाना जनयन्तीर्यज्ञम् ।
 यो देवेष्वधि देव एक आसीत्
 कस्मै देवाय हविषा विधेम ॥

“He looked over the waters with His greatness, as they contained vigour and produced sacrifice. He was *the only God of gods*. Who is that God whom we should worship with our offering ? (v.8)” Thus we see that the seer of the Hiraṇyagarbha hymn repeatedly enquires about the God who is at the root of all creation.

Another instance is the hymn of the goddess of Speech (Vāk Āmbhṛī, Rv. X.125). She says that she moves with the Rudras, Vasus, Ādityas as Viśva-Devas and supports Mitra and Varuṇa, Indra and Agni as well as the twin Aśvins. She further adds —

यहं राष्ट्री संगमनी वसनां
 चिकितुषी प्रथमा यज्ञियानाम् ।
 तां मा देवा व्यदधुः पुरुत्रा
 भूरिस्थात्रां भूर्यावेशयन्तीम् ॥

I am the Queen, the gatherer of riches, I was the first to know the holy ones. Hence the gods have put me in many places, making me enter and dwell everywhere (v.3).

अहमेव स्वयमिदं वदामि
 जुष्टं देवेभिरुत मानुषेभिः
 यं कामये तं तमुग्रं कृणोमि
 तं ब्रह्माणं तमृषिं तं सुमेधाम् ॥

I myself verily speak what is dear to gods and men. Whomsoever I like, I make powerful; I make him Brahman, I make him a seer, a wise man. (v.5)

When there is at the back of the mind the idea that there is only one Power which functions through the different divinities, it is but natural that one deity is identified with the other or the attributes of one divinity are applied to another. Hence we find in the R̥gveda (II.1) that Agni is identified with Indra, Viṣṇu, Varuṇa, Mitra, Rudra, Tvaṣṭṛ (the divine architect), Pūṣan (the god of pastures), Bhaga (the god of fortune), Aditi (the mother of the gods), Iṭā (the goddess of offering) etc.

The same tendency is reflected in the later Gaṇapati Atharvaśirṣa wherein Gaṇapati is identified with various divinities and also the three worlds—

त्वं ब्रह्मा, त्वं विष्णुः, त्वं रुद्रः, त्वमग्निः, त्वं वायुः, त्वं सूर्यः,
त्वं चन्द्रमाः, त्वं ब्रह्म भूर्भुवः सुवराम् ।

The gods are worshipped with offerings and prayers. The seers feel that the oblations and the songs of praise strengthen the gods. It is said :—

यस्य ब्रह्म वर्धनं यस्य सोमः ।

“ For whom (Indra) the prayer is the invigorator, and also the Soma (Rv II.12.4).

तुभ्येदमग्ने मधुमत्तमं वचः तुभ्यं मनीषा इयमस्तु शं हृदे ।
त्वां गिरः सिन्धुभिर्वावनीर्महीर् आ पृणान्ति शवसा वर्धयन्ति च ॥

“O Agni, may this most-honied speech as well as prayer be a comfort to your heart. The songs fill you, as the great rivers the Sindhu, with power, and strengthen you ” (Rv. v.11.5).

Here is an apt simile. Just as the tributaries cause the Sindhu to swell and add to its volume and momentum, so do the prayers and praises enthuse the god Indra.

त्वां वर्धन्तु नो गिरः ।

“May our praises strengthen you” (VIII.44.19).

The idea that offerings or songs of praise

strengthen the gods is hardly found in the latter devotional literature, although the Gita (3.11) states :—

देवान् भावयतानेन ते देवा भावयन्तु वः ।
परस्परं भावयन्तः श्रेयः परमवाप्स्यथ ॥

“With this (sacrifice) support the gods, may the gods support you; by mutual support shall you obtain the highest good”.

In later literature we find only subservience or complete surrender (*prapatti*) to God.

The seers of the Vedas are seen to have various attitudes towards God. They look upon him as their father :

स नः पितेव सूनवे अग्ने सूपायनो भव ।
सचस्वा नः स्वस्तये ॥

“So, O Agni, be easy of access to us, as a father to his son, abide with us for our well-fare” (I.1.9).

पितेव नः शृणुहि ह्यमानः ।

‘Being invoked, listen to us like a father, who is being called’.

इन्द्रं क्रतुं न आ भर पिता पुत्रेभ्यो यथा ।

(Rv. VII.32.26)

O Indra, give us wisdom, like a father teaching his sons.

तिष्ठा सु कं मधवन् मा परा गाः, सोमस्य नु त्वा सुसुतस्य यक्षि ।
पितुनं पुत्रः सिचमा रभे ते, इन्द्र स्वादिष्ठ्या गिरा शन्वीवः ॥

“ O liberal Indra, please be here, do not go back. I worship you indeed with this well-pressed Soma. With my most sweet prayer I hold on to you just as a son holds, the end of the upper garment of his father.” (III.53.2) Here the picture of a child, pulling his father’s garment entreating him, clearly stands before our eyes, suggesting thereby the intense feeling of the devotee.

सुकृत्सु नो मधवन्निन्द्र मृळय ।
अथा पितेव नो भव ॥

O Maghavan, be kind to us (as we are) among the meritorious and be like a father unto us (X. 33.3).

God is addressed not only as the father but also as the mother —

त्वं हि नः पिता वसो त्वं माता शतक्रतो बभूविथ ।
अथा ते सुम्नमीमहे ॥

O God, you are indeed our father, Indra, you have become our mother. Hence we seek your good will (VIII.98.11).

The seers look upon God as a friend also :—

इन्द्रः पुरस्तादुत मध्यतो नः सखा सखिभ्यो वरिवः कृणीतु ।

“ May Indra, who is our friend, grant protection from the front, from the middle (and also the

back) to us who are his friends.” (X.42.11)

अस्य प्रियासः सख्ये स्याम ।

“May we, dear to Him, be in His friendship.”
(N.17.9)

The seers look upon God as being all in one—
अग्निं भन्ये पितरमग्निमापिमाग्निं भ्रातरं सदमित्सखायम्

“I always consider Agni to be my father, a close relative, a brother and also a friend”. (X.7.3)

The conviction in the later Bhakti school that God is everything—mother, father, relative, friend, learning and wealth—is seen here.

त्वमेव माता च पिता त्वमेव तमेव बंधुश्च सखा त्वमेव ।
त्वमेव विद्या द्रविणं त्वमेव त्वमेव सर्वं मम देव देव ॥

The same idea is found in the Gita (9.17-18):—

पिताहमस्य जगतो माता धाता पितामहः ।
गतिर्भर्ता प्रभुः साक्षी निवासः शरणं सुहृत् ॥

“ I am the father of this world, its mother, creator and grandsire....the goal, the sustainer, the lord, the witness, the dwelling, the refuge and friend”. Cf. also—

हरिः पिता हरिर्माता, हरिर्भर्ता हरिः सुहृत् ।
हरिं सर्वत्र पश्यामि हरेरन्यत्र भाति मे ॥

Jagannātha's *Rasaganḡadhara*, first ānana (illustrating *Samatā-guṇa*).

God protects his devotees. Hence a seer prays:—

प्र स मित्र मर्तो अस्तु प्रयस्वान्
 यस्त आदित्य शिक्षन्ति व्रतेन ।
 न हन्यते न जीयते त्वोतो
 नैनमंहो अश्नोत्यतितो न दूरात् ॥

“ O Mitra, let the man, who offers oblations be pre-eminent, who pays obeisance to you, O Aditya, according to (your) ordinance. He who is helped by you is not killed nor vanquished. Calamity reaches him neither from near nor from afar” (III.59.2).

One seer says : —

उप छायामिव घृणेरगन्म शर्म ते वयम् ।

“ We have approached your shelter, which is like shade warding off heat ” (VI.16.38).

Another seer expresses his desire —

घृणीव छायामरपा अशीया विवासेयं रुद्रस्य सुम्नम् ।

“I would, unscathed, attain shade in the midst of heat as it were. I would desire to win the good will of Rudra” (II.33.6).

We find in the later Bhakti schools that the highest importance is attached to the Name of God. Muttering God's Name and meditating upon it continuously is considered to be 'a must' for the devotee. We may trace the origin of this idea to the following Vedic lines—

गृणीमसि त्वेषं रुद्रस्य नाम ।

“We sing the bright name of Rudra”

(Rv II.33.8).

The God has not one name, but many names—

नामानि ते शतक्रतो विश्वाभिगीभिरीमहे ।

“We invoke your names, O Indra, with all (our) songs” (III.37.3).

Sometimes the saints are seen to have a friendly quarrel with God, when He does not fulfil their desires. Similarly we find in the Veda a seer saying

यदग्ने स्यामहं त्वं त्वं वा द्या स्वा अहम् ।

स्युष्टे सत्या इहाशिषः ॥

“ If I, O Agni, were you and you were I, your prayers would here be fulfilled.” (Rv. VIII. 44.23)

This homely intimacy with the personal God is a well known characteristic in the songs of the later saints.

We find that even in the Vedic times there were people who were sceptics or atheists—

यं स्मा पृच्छन्ति कुह सेति घोरम्

उतेमाहुर्नो अस्तीत्येनम् ।

सो अर्यः पृष्टीविज इवा मिनाति

श्रदस्मै घत्त स जनास इन्द्रः ॥

“ They ask about that fierce (God) ‘Where is he ?’; about Him they also say ‘he is not’. He

diminishes the treasures of the enemy like the (gambler's) stake. Have faith in Him; He, O men, is Indra" (Rv. II 12.5). Thus the seer points out the powers and exploits of Indra and exhorts the people to believe in Him.

The saints sing the glory of God by describing how He helped His devotees in distress. The same is seen in the Veda also. Gods help their devotees in various ways. Indra aided Sudāsa by drowning his enemies in the flooding river which Sudāsa had already safely crossed. The Aśvins are especially known for their succour. They restored the old sage Cyavāna to youth, they rescued Atri from the fire-pit into which he was thrown; they saved Bhujyu who was about to drown in the ocean, they set free by carrying away at night Jāhuṣa who was encompassed on all sides by his enemies.

In general it can be said that God aids his worshippers whenever the need arises—

अभ्यूर्णोति यन्नग्नं भिषक्ति विश्वं यत्तुरम् ।

प्रेमन्वः रव्यत् निः श्रोणोऽमूत् ॥

God covers a naked (devotee), gives medicines to the sick; due to His grace a blind person becomes able to see and a lame person is able to walk (Rv. VIII.79.2).

Cf. मूकं करोति वाचालं पङ्गुं लङ् व्रयते गिरिम् ।
 यत्कृपा तमहं वन्दे परमानन्दमाधवम्

Gītā-Dhyāna-Śloka 8.

Usually the seers seek from the gods wealth, health, fame, long life, heroic sons etc.; but we do find other-worldly or transcendental thoughts, especially in the hymns addressed to Viṣṇu. His three steps, namely the three worlds, are said to be full of honey (happiness). All the happiness and comforts of men flow down from the third step of Viṣṇu, namely the heaven.

तदस्य प्रियमभि पाथो अश्यां
 नरो यत्र देवयवो मदन्ति ।
 उरुक्रमस्य स हि बन्धुरित्या
 विष्णोः पदे परमे मध्व उत्सः ॥

“ I would attain to His dear domain, where men devoted to the gods rejoice. That indeed is akin to the long-striding God. In the highest step of Viṣṇu is the well of honey ” (I.154.4).

A seer gives expression to his God-vision thus:-

तद्विष्णोः परमं पदं सदा पश्यन्ति सूरयः ।
 दिवीव चक्षुराततम् ॥
 तद्विप्रासो विपन्यवो जागृवांसः समिन्धते ।
 विष्णोर्यत् परमं पदम् ॥

“ The wise always see the highest step of Viṣṇu as if it were the wide open eye in heaven.

The seers who are wakeful and highly praise Him, enkindle (in their heart) that (stage) which is the highest step of Viṣṇu (I.22.20-21).

In the Indian pantheon not only do we come across hundreds of gods but we find also that many a deity has a large number of names each. Thus we come across Viṣṇu-sahasranāma, Siva-sahasranāma etc. Why should a deity have a thousand names? What is a name after all? A name is a word; the word has a meaning and that conveys the specific concept regarding a power of the deity. For example God is called '*bhayakṛt bhayanāśanaḥ*' — "Causing fear (in the minds of the wicked and also, if necessary, in the devotees to create awe) and destroying fear (from the minds of the good)". God possesses infinite powers and these powers are sought to be expressed through those names. We know that the thousand names belong to one Divinity. Similarly there is the under-current of the awareness that the hundreds of gods are various manifestations of the one ultimate power. The implication in the Puruṣa-sūkta (viz. thousand-headed; thousand-eyed etc.) is extended and illustrated in the Sahasra-nāma.

One may say that there is Nature-worship in the Vedas because divinities like Vāta, Parjanya

and Savitr represent different forces of Nature. One may hold that the Vedic gods are phenomenal, because they represent some natural phenomena; or functional because they represent some function like creation, sustenance etc. One may state that there is Monism, as the seers speak of the one Principle-*ekam sat* (neuter : Rv. I.164.46). One may observe that there is Mono-theism, because there are references to one Person-*ekam santam* (masculine : Rv. X. 114.5; Cf. Rv. X. 90). One may call it Poly-theism simply because there are many gods prayed to in the Veda. One may regard it Pantheism because God is said to be everything that was, is and will be (Rv. I 89.10; X. 90.2; X. 121.8, 10). One may call it Heno-theism or Katheno-theism (to use the words of Max-miiller), as there is seen the belief in individual gods alternatively regarded as the highest. One may maintain that there is poly-theistic Mono-theism as the seers appear to seek a unity in the diversity of gods. In spite of the various theories held by different scholars, the fact remains that there is one God who assumes the names and forms of many gods as well as many objects in this universe. That is why the same attributes and cosmic powers are predicated of many gods and they have very few distinguishing features. Thus the different theories mentioned above can be seen to be partial, inadequate or incom-

prehensive especially if we take into consideration the synthetic approach of Vedānta which sees the highest monism fully substantiated by Upaniṣadic statements like इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते । “ Indra moves in many forms due to his mysterious powers ” (Bṛhadā Upa. 2.5.19). The awareness of the fact that there is one all-pervading supreme principle of which the various gods are but different aspects is seen in the vedic Ṛṣis. The realisation that there is one inner reality underlying all outer appearances is only a corollary of that awareness which becomes more manifest in the Upaniṣadic seers. The same line of thought is seen to be followed by saints and sages of the later centuries down to the present age.

The essential catholicity of the Vedic religion is refreshingly free from some of the perverse forms of fanaticism we see in mediaeval times. Religion and philosophy were so close that it is impossible for any one to draw a distinguishing line between them in the Vedas. Even this feature was fostered by the various Ācāryas. Indian tradition is thus seen to have faithfully preserved the underlying spirit of the Vedas in all its later phases—through epics, Purānas, schools of Vedānta and the works of the mystic saints.

Presidential Remarks

Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy,

M. A., B. T., Ph. D.

I think our discussion these three days on " Doctrine of God " has brought home to us the truth of Bacon's saying :—

“ It is true that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism. But depth in Philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion ”.

The range of our discussions has indeed been vast. Thanks to the sincere efforts of the learned participants gathered here, practically no important aspect has been left out of this baffling problem which has dogged the efforts of thinkers and saints down the centuries in the history of Man. Not only we had an occasion to familiarise ourselves with the outstanding theories about God in relation to the world and man both in India and the West, but we had also a glimpse into the difficulties in the way of regarding any one theory as

the final solution. Indeed it was a veritable feast of reason and flow of soul. That there should be a diversity of views is expected; what is surprising, however, is the large measure of agreement reached.

I am particularly happy that Dr. B. R. Modak has drawn our attention to the religious experience of the Vedic seers grounded in an implicit Philosophy of Monism in the midst of their prayers often mistaken for naive Nature-worship. In fact the insight of the Vedic seers has been held by all the later thinkers and saints in India as representing the highest experience of God-realisation. All the multiple divinities derive from the One only embodied in the Veda :—“ ऋवो अक्षरे परमे व्योमन् यस्मिन् देवा अधि विश्वे निवेदुः ।” (Rv I.164.39 .

We see in Dr. N. V. Joshi's paper a concise and clear formulation of the divine from an essentially new angle which resolves the opposition between the logical and the ontological. It is shown how the subject-object polarity in individuality does not lead us to duality. In the region of sublimity which is the highest value of mind, a synthesis of the various categories theological and epistemological is figured out and the heterogeneous elements are shown to culminate in positive mystic experience which is more than what Psychology can explain.

It is a very thoughtful and masterly account of the limits of reason and theology, reconciling the claims of metaphysics as well as religious experience.

Prof. B. H. Kotbagi highlights in a closely reasoned paper Spinoza's conception of God, according to which Science and religion cease to appear separate and miracles become meaningless.

Dr. G. N. Kundargi reviews the classical proofs adduced for the existence of God and notes their limitations. He distinguishes the religious attitude from the worldly in a pointed manner.

The all-embracing approach of the modern Philosopher Whitehead is set out brilliantly by Dr. L. V. Rajgopal. He underlines how a metaphysical approach will end up in God. If a thing is concrete only because of form, God becomes the only source of all forms.

The various pragmatic views of sociological thinkers showing how religion is a dying force in the modern world are set forth vividly by Principal R. C. Badwe, to stress how spiritual welfare should not be divorced from material welfare when discussing human values.

Prof. S. H. Dixit's paper pricks so many of

the bubbles in the common-place views about religion. He stimulatingly brings out how most of our life patterns are all more operative than existential. Such a searching examination should indeed be regarded as a first step towards the removal of inherited attitudes.

The inherent difficulties in the way of taking God as the creator are examined by Prof B. R. Kulkarni, both from the point of Indian Vedānta and Western philosophy. He points out how the Ajātivāda of Gauḍapāda and other theories surmount the difficulty.

We have a simple and straight forward discourse on the ideas of the Gitā about man and God by Principal M. A. Kulkarni.

Prof. A. S. Deshpande underlines the common features of religious experience and makes out a case for faith that saves. It is an analysis of our belief in God in various forms.

Shri. M. S. Deshpande has recapitulated the essence of Gurudeva Ranade's teachings about the fact of God's presence as borne out not only by the inner craving of the human soul but also by the actual realisation of saints.

In Prof. S. V. Atre's analysis, the idea of personal God Presents devotion as a harmonisa-

tion of all intellectual and emotional aspects of human nature.

Finally Prof. D. S. Jakatey has attempted to show that philosophy of Religion is not merely conceptual. God is presented as both personal and the highest Reality at the same time. He reinterprets S'ankara's Philosophy in this new light.

It will thus be seen that the papers included here are free from dogmatism and prejudice. There is a genuine attempt to understand the implications of profound thinkers in the East as well as the West with an accent on felt realisation. The quality of discussions—which however have not been included here due to unavoidable circumstances—was such as to bring credit to any University and in the true manner of Gurudeva Ranade himself. Even the most intricate philosophical issues were presented in a way intelligible to the general listeners and quite a few of them could take part in the discussions. The questions discussed, the points raised and the solutions indicated are, indeed, of such a universal importance that I do hope and trust that these will evoke wide public recognition and response in this published form.

If the mind of Man can rise above its incidental limitations and see easily beyond into Reality,

it is so only because it has mounted the several steps of thought furnished by the great predecessors :—

“ ऊर्ध्वोर्ध्वमारुह्य यदर्थतत्त्वं

धीः पश्यति श्रान्तिमवेदयन्ती ।

फलं तदाद्यैः परिकल्पितानां

विवेकसोपानपरम्पराणाम् ॥” (Abinavagupta)

OUR PUBLICATIONS.

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