


056523

EAST CHINA SEA OPERATION



CONFIDENTIAL
1-7 AUG. 1945
U.S.S. LUNGA POINT
C.V.E. 94

Shang-hai

Chou-shan

121° 15' E
22° 15' N
(Ningpo)

Chi-chow

TUNG-YUNG

Kiirun
Taihoku

FORMOSA
(TAIWAN)

Taito

HOISHO TO

HOKA SHO

BENTO SHOUO

SENJI SHO

YONAKUNI JIMA

IRIOMOTE

ISHIGAKI

MIYAKO JIMA

MITSUBISHI
KARAKA NETTO

OHMAWA JIMA

CHINOTERABU JIMA

TOYAKO JIMA

MIYAKO JIMA

OTO NETTO

NAGASHI

CVE94/A12
Serial: 0112

U.S.S. LUNGA POINT (CVE 94)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

10/h

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

7 August 1945

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Task Unit NINETY-FIVE POINT THREE POINT ONE
(C.T.U. 95.3.1) (ComEsCarFor)
(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE also C.T.G. 95.3 (ComBatRon 1).
(3) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Action Report -- East China Sea Operation 1 August to 7 August 1945.

Reference: (a) CinCPac Confidential Letter 1CL-45.
(b) ComTHIRDFleet Standard Instructions 1-45 - Part 8.
(c) CpPlan 3/45.
(d) C.T.F. 95 Dispatch 051147 of August 1945.

Enclosure: (C) & PART III: Chronology.
(D) & PART IV: Ordnance.
(E) & PART V: Damage.
(F) & PART VI: Special Comments and Information.
(G) & PART VII: Personnel Performance and Casualties.
(H) & PART VIII: Lesson Learned - Conclusions and Recommendations.
(I) Photographs Appendix #1 to PART III.

1. Enclosures (C) through (I) constitute the action report of the East China Sea Operation representing the period 1 August through 7 August 1945.

2. East longitude dates are used throughout and Item time except where indicated otherwise. All bearings are true.

W. R. HOLLINGSWORTH

Distribution:

Cominch (1 copy)
CinCPac (3 copies) ←
ComAirPac (1 copy)
ComCarDiv26 (1 copy)

U.S.S. LUNGA POINT (CVE 94)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

PART III

NARRATIVE

Approach and Typhoon Phase

1 August

The LUNGA POINT sortied Buckner Bay, Okinawa at 0650 in company with Task Group 95.3. Swells increased during the morning attended by rain squalls. A course was set for the operating area off the coast of China at the mouth of Hangchow Bay. At 1116 all AA batteries were manned when a bogey was sighted 8 miles, bearing 205° T. Two minutes later it was identified as friendly and AA batteries were secured. The wind by afternoon had increased to 40-50 knots.

2 August

Although AA batteries were manned at 1456 and weighted sleeves were dropped from planes no firing was done due to unfavorable cloud conditions. AA batteries were secured at 1604. The storm center had moved to the east at a distance of 135 miles and increasingly heavy seas caused the ship to roll to 25°.

East China Sea Operation Phase

3 August

Heavy seas were causing the ship to pitch and roll violently. While spotting planes, one of the handlers was struck on the arm by a propeller, while another was pinned between two planes. The former, with a compound fracture of his arm, was transferred to the USS NEVADA (BB 36) where more extensive hospital facilities were available. Three fighter planes were damaged during this storm. As the day progressed the storm passed to the northward, and wind and seas decreased. LCAP and LASP were flown during the day.

4 August

Air cover was furnished for Task Group 95.2 throughout the day. All AA batteries were manned from 1407 until 1517 while gunnery practice was conducted. At 1620 planes from the CAPE GLOUCESTER (CVE 109) reported they had splashed a TABBY (DC-3 type transport) 50 miles west of our formation.

5 August

At 0925 fighter plane #15, bounced on landing and tried to take a wave-off. He cleared the barrier and the forward end of the flight deck, in doing so his hook smashed the ball turret of a TBM and he in turn lost one of his stabilizers on the prop of the TBM which caused his plane to crash in the water about one mile off our port bow. The pilot was picked up uninjured by the USS PUTNAM (DD 757) and returned safely to this ship. TBM #85 crashed the barrier on landing damaging its propeller and engine. During the afternoon planes from the CAPE GLOUCESTER and MAKIN ISLAND each splashed one FRANCIS. All AA batteries were manned for gunnery practice at 1634. At 1704 bogies were reported closing at 48 miles bearing 076° T. AA practice ceased but batteries remained manned and on the alert. At 1738 the TCAP from this ship reported it had splashed a twin

U.S.S. LUNGA POINT (CVE 94)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NARRATIVE (Cont.)

PART III

5 August (Cont'd.)

engine plane later identified as a FRANCIS. All AA batteries were secured. An anti-shipping sweep was flown along the China coast north of the mouth of the YANGTZE river with negative results.

6 August

Went to General Quarters at 0144 as a bogey closed to within 9 miles and then opened with no attack developing. At 0500 eight FM-2's from this ship accompanied by eight from the MAKIN ISLAND and CAPE GLUCESTER took off on a mission to destroy shipping in TINGHAI Harbor. Their secondary target was planes parked along the TINGHAI fighter strip. A low ceiling contributed to poor visibility but they were able to hit the shipping which consisted of small craft of the coastal variety both on and along the shore. Intense and accurate AA was encountered from positions north and east of the strip, the seaplane ramp and along the shore both east and west of the town. One of our planes was holed while one from the MAKIN ISLAND was shot down in flames. The pilot parachuted but landed either on or near the seaplane ramp making rescue attempts impossible. Definite results of the strike were difficult to observe because of the weather but one large sea-going barge was destroyed and barracks and gun positions along the shore were well strafed and rocketed. Several bogeys were reported throughout the day but they all managed to escape, including a DINAH, which was sighted visually directly over the formation at 1152. General Quarters were secured for the day when two bogies proved to be P-38's and the screen was cleared. The ship had started working south at 0900 and at sunset was well on the way to Buckner Bay.

7 August

Entered Buckner Bay, Okinawa and dropped anchor at 1238.

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~PART IIIB. WEATHERWEATHER SUMMARY 0800 August 1 to 0800 August 7, 1945

Prior to 0800 I August 1, tropical storm warnings had been received concerning the position and expected movement of a tropical storm moving northward toward Okinawa. Typhoon plan Xray was ordered executed in the Okinawa area at daylight August 1. The position of the typhoon was then 24° N - 130° E moving north 5 knots, with a predicted movement of NNE 10 knots. A strong wide spread high pressure cell was centered east of Kyushu and a weak low pressure trough extended southward along the China coast. The upper winds at Iwo Jima were SE'ly. At 0700I August 1, this ship in company with the other ships in this task force, departed Buckner Bay. The course followed was a normal course necessary to return to the northern East China sea. At 0700I August 1 the wind was N'ly averaging 18-25 knots, barometer falling steadily reaching a minimum of 992.5 mbs. at 1300I. The sky remained overcast with frequent squalls until 2000I then became partly cloudy with squalls less frequent. The course of 270 degrees and 330 degrees made it possible for the task force to leave behind the approaching edge of the tropical storm. The barometer rose steadily, the swells decreased from 6-8 ft. to 2 ft. and became confused. The land mass of Okinawa protected the task force from the east swells. During this period flying conditions were poor becoming average. By 0600I August 2, the task force had passed the zone of protection offered by Okinawa and the swells, which had been temporarily blocked, increased in height and frequency. The air schedule was carried out with considerable difficulty from 0515 until 1115 when all planes were grounded. During the morning the weather had become steadily worse with increasing northerly sea and easterly swell. Numerous squalls made flight conditions poor. We reached the operating area (30° N 125° E) by 1200I August 2. The typhoon was at that time centered at 29° N- 128° E and moving NNW. Weather conditions deteriorated further. By 1700I pressure had fallen to 991.5 mbs. swells increased to 15 feet from the NE with a cross wind of north 30 knots. Squalls appeared in increasing number and intensity. At 1700I the task force began retiring southward when it became apparent that the center of the typhoon was approaching. The weather improved slightly as we proceeded south but course was again changed to north at 2000I and again the storm center and the task force converged with the weather rapidly deteriorating. By 2100I we experienced 20 ft. swells from the NE with a north wind of 35 knots. As the storm passed north of our position the swells became confused at 12 ft. but frequent moderate squalls continued. Although an air schedule was prescribed, no planes were launched until 1300 August 3. At 0300I the task force was at 30.2° N - 124.5° E and the storm center was located 31° N- 127° E. The generally rough weather was further deteriorated by the passage of a cold front at 0600I August 3. At 0700I the task force again turned south in order to avoid a heading which was leading us into the path of the storm center and meeting swells. This course was maintained until 1200I when the task force again turned north. Planes were launched at 1300I. The wind had dropped 15-18 knots and squalls were infrequent. Swells were 6-8 ft. from the NE. As the storm center had been moving NW, there was a delay in the time of encountering the maximum swell. By 1500I north swells of 15-18 ft. were encountered. The fact that the direction of these swells coincided with the direction of a light wind made landing operations extremely hazardous. By 2000I swells began to subside, surface wind decreased to 8-12 knots and the barometer had risen from 992.8 mbs. at 0400I to 1006.5 mbs. at 2000I. While the airplane engines were turning up preparatory to launching at 1300I, due to swell three planes were torn from their moorings. During the night of August 3 the storm center recurved to the north and the weather

U.S.S. LUNGA POINT (CVE 94)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
WEATHER (Dont'd.)


improved very rapidly. 4 to 5 ft. swells from the north were experienced during the entire day August 4. The sky was partly cloudy with a north wind. Photographic missions were successfully carried out during the forenoon. Weather conditions caused no delay nor prevented air operations on August 4. By mid-day August 5, a warm front associated with a wave passed into this area from the south. The warm front passed through the area during the afternoon and caused low ceilings and visibilities for planes making shipping sweeps north westward along the coast north of Shanghai. As the wave proceeded northeastward the center passed into the Yellow Sea, north of Shanghai. At 0800I August 6, the cold front associated with the wave passed eastward over the operating area, then as a course of 140 degrees was set the task force passed to the southeast of the cold front at 1100I. Planes making a strike on Saddle Island were forced to fly through the front twice and were handicapped over the target by low ceilings and visibilities. During the remainder of the day, August 6, the task force proceeded on course retiring to Buckner Bay. The weather remained partly cloudy with light ESE wind and negligible sea conditions until the arrival at Buckner Bay at 1100I August 7.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LPART IIITABLE OF DAILY POSITIONS, TIMES OF SUNRISE, SUNSET

(NOTE: All positions are North and East, Times Zone -9, except where indicated)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>LATITUDE</u>	<u>LONGITUDE</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>
8/1	0800	26-12	128-00	0558	1930
	1200	25-41	127-40		
	2000	26-02	126-33		
8/2	0800	28-22	123-03.5	0600	1932
	1200	29-00	125-12.5		
	2000	29-45	124-40		
8/3	0800	30-33	124-37	0600	1932
	1200	30-23.5	124-56		
	2000	30-26	124-45		
8/4	0800	30-49	124-30	0600	1932
	1200	31-05	124-21		
	2000	31-29	123-51		
8/5	0800	30-51	124-11.6	0601	1932
	1200	30-55.5	124-14		
	2000	30-32	124-25		
8/6	0800	29-43	124-05	0602	1930
	1200	29-16.5	124-15		
	2000	27-55	125-29		
8/7	0800	26-15	128-00	0600	1930
	1238	Anchored in Buckner Bay.			

FRANCIS SPLASHED BY LUNGA POINT
TCAP AT 1738 8/5



0800K 8/5

0800K 8/4

0800K 8/3

0800K 8/6

0800K 8/2

0800K 8/7

NANSEI

SHOTO

KUME SHIMA

KARAMA RETTO

SEKIBI SHO

SENTO SHOSHO

HOKA SHO

MIYAKO JIMA

ISHIGAKI

IRIOMOTE

YONAKUNI JIMA

Taihoku

Kirun

OKINAWA

Naha

Yang-hai

Chou-shan

Yin-hsien (Ningpo)

Shia (10W)

Yung-yung

FORMOSA (TAIWAN)

NAVIGATIONAL TRACK
U.S.S. Lunga Point
East China Sea
Operation
1 to 7 August, 1945
CONFIDENTIAL

U.S.S. LUNGA POINT (CVE 94)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

PART IV

AMMUNITION EXPENDED

<u>By Ship</u>	<u>20MM</u>	<u>40MM</u>	<u>5 inch</u>
Training, 4 Aug. 1945	480 HEI 240 HET	272 HEI-T	
Training, 5 Aug. 1945	312 HEI 155 HET	113 HEI-T	
Training, 6 Aug. 1945			19
	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1187</u>	<u>385</u>
			<u>19</u>

By VC-98

<u>Date</u>	<u>VF & VT</u>		<u>ROCKETS</u>					
	<u>.50</u>	<u>.30</u>	<u>3.5"</u>	<u>5"</u>	<u>100#GP</u>	<u>500#GP</u>	<u>500#SAP</u>	<u>350#DC</u>
8/5	3200							
8/6	1600			53				
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>4800</u>			<u>53</u>				

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

PART V

BATTLE DAMAGE

A. BATTLE DAMAGE TO OWN UNITS.

1. None was sustained by this ship.
2. Damage to own aircraft is included in Part VI, paragraph (3), Air Operations.

B. BATTLE DAMAGE TO ENEMY UNITS

1. There was no damage inflicted by this ship on enemy units.
2. Damage to enemy units by Composite Squadron NINETY-EIGHT is included in Part IV, Air Operations, and is fully covered by ACA-1 reports forwarded separately.

U.S.S. LUNGA POINT (CVE 94)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

PART VI

Special Comments and Information

1. Table of sorties and plane availability by days.

AVAILABILITY																							
ABOARD		AVAIL		SUPP'T		TCAP		TASP		PHOTO		OTHER		LCAP		LASP		OTHER		TOTAL		GRAND	
DATE	VF	VT	VF	VT	VF	VT	VF	VT	VF	VT	VF	VT	VF	VT	VF	VT	VF	VT	VF	VT	TOTAL	TOTAL	
8/1	19	12	19	12																			
8/2	19	12	19	12									16	4							16	4	20
8/3	19	12	19	12			16							2							16	2	18
8/4	19	12	17	12			20							4		1					20	5	25
8/5	19	12	18	12			24							6		4	9				28	15	43
8/6	18	12	17	11			20							4		8					28	4	32
8/7	18	12	18	11																			
TOTALS							<u>80</u>						<u>16</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>108</u>	<u>30</u>			<u>138</u>		

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

U.S.S. LUNGA POINT (CVE 94)

PART VI (Cont'd.)

Special Comments and Information

2. Table of Bombs, Rockets and Ammunition Expended at Target.

MISSION	DATE	TARGETS ATTACKED AT TARGET		SORTIES			AMMUNITION	
		GENERAL	SPECIFIC	VF	VT	BOMBS 100# 500#	PKTS.	CAL. CAL.
Interception	8/5	Off coast of China east of HANGCHOW BAY		4				3200
Shipping strike	8/6	TINGHAI Harbor CPUSAN 8 island - shipping					53	1600
TOTAL				<u>12</u>			<u>53</u>	<u>4800</u>

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PART VI

Special Comments and Information

3. Table of Combat and Operational Losses.

DATE	T/O	A/C	CIRCUMSTANCES, PLACE, CAUSE	NO. PILOTS LOST	NO. AIRCREW LOST	NO. PILOTS SAVED	NO. AIRCREW SAVED
8/5		FM-2	Crashed in water while trying to take wave-off 100 miles off mouth of YANGTZE river.	0	0	1	0
TOTALS				0	0	1	0

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LPART VI

4. Table of Enemy Aircraft Destroyed, Shipping Sunk, Probably Sunk, or Damaged.

MISSION	DATE	T/O	LOCATION	ENEMY A/C DESTROYED			ENEMY SHIPPING	
				IN AIR	ON GROUND	ON WATER	SUNK	DAMAGED
	8/5		Off HANGCHOW Bay	1	Francis			
	8/6		TINGHAI Harbor CHUSAN Island				1	115' coastal barge

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LSpecial Comments and Information (Cont'd.)

5. Table of damage to land targets.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
8/5	Shipping	TINGHAI Harbor CHUSAN Island	Barracks - Gun Posits

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

PART VI (Cont'd.)

D. COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER
GENERAL

During the first three days of this period no bogey activity whatever was encountered and no enemy planes appeared on radar screens. During the remainder of the period while no air attack was made on the group enemy air activity occurred as follows:

4 August

At 1625 a single bogey was picked up at 290° 75 miles, on course 060° speed 170 knots. Interception was made at 320° 50 miles by CAPE GLOUCESTER planes controlled by the MAKIN ISLAND and one twin engined transport was splashed at Angels 7.

5 August

At 1430 a bogey was picked up at 035° 75 miles on course 190° speed 200 knots. Two FRANCIS were tally-hoed by MAKIN ISLAND and LUNGA POINT planes who were acting as TCAP for TG 95.2 and were under control of one of the ships in that group. Tally-ho was made at 070° 40 miles at Angels 8. The bandits jettisoned bombs and fled to the east. MAKIN ISLAND fighters tail-chased and splashed one - the other got away.

At 1505 another single bogey appeared from almost the same place and on a similar course. CAPE GLOUCESTER fighters controlled by their parent ship intercepted and splashed a single FRANCIS at 060° 60 miles at Angels 8.

At 1710 a single bogey was picked up at 060° 70 miles on course 220° speed 180 knots. Interception of a single FRANCIS was made at 070° by LUNGA POINT fighters then on TCAP controlled by TG 95.2. A tail chase of over 100 miles resulted with the bogey passing 20 miles to the south of this group. The starboard engine was hit early in the chase and was observed to be smoking. The splash was made at about 250° 55 miles.

6 August

At 0130 a single bogey was picked up at 040° 65 miles on course 260° speed 180 knots. At 000° 32 miles the bogey apparently picked us up on his radar. At that point he dropped a small amount of window and turned directly towards us. Then closed and circled around to the north of the formation at a distance of 10 miles. After thoroughly snooping the group he opened on a heading of 045°. When picked up this bogey was at Angels 8 climbing. He climbed to Angels 17 and snooped the force and retired at that altitude. Ships equipped with PCM receivers picked up and reported radar pulses during the time the bogey was in our vicinity.

At 1030 a single bogey was picked up at 190° 65 miles. Two divisions of fighters were sent to intercept. Very shortly thereafter a single bogey was picked up at 015° 65 miles. Two divisions were sent after this one as well as one division of TCAP. Both of these bogies were at about Angels 30 and both closed the base without interception. There were various reports of visual sightings of one or two DINAHs at very high altitude and one CAPE GLOUCESTER fighter reported a tally-ho on a DINAH which he lost in the clouds almost immediately. These planes were apparently snoopers since no attack was pressed and they returned to the north at very high speed.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

PART VI (Cont'd.)

D. COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER
GENERAL

Comments:

1. The SK radar gives very poor results on aircraft higher than Angels 25. At these altitudes the aircraft is in a fade most of the time and shows up only occasionally for short periods. It is very difficult to keep track of and conduct an interception on a bogey at that altitude and is practically impossible if the bogey makes frequent radical course changes.
2. On several occasions it is believed that too many fighters were sent to intercept bogies. When several divisions of fighters and a bogey merge into a small area it is almost impossible to keep track of the bogey or of individual divisions of fighters.

U.S.S. LUNGA POINT (CVE 94)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

PART VII

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

The performance of this ships company and squadron was good. All hands are tired and in need of some rest and recreation in that the ship has been operating continually since departing Guam on 23 May 1945 after 11 days availability.

CASUALTIES

Ship - One man injured by propeller.
(SHERRERD, William R., AMM3c, USNR, 710 71 73 - transferred at sea to USS NEVADA for more adequate treatment).

Squadron - None.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

PART VIII

LESSONS LEARNED, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that when a strike is launched against shipping that sufficient alternate targets be assigned so that the bomb load can be used in case shipping is not discovered. It is most disappointing to carry a load of bombs to a target area similar to that of SHANGHAI-HANGCHOW then return and land aboard with them. There is always the possibility, too, that a no wind condition may exist making it advisable to jettison the load on return and, of course, the danger of landing with bombs is always present.

2. These ships roll excessively in rough weather on certain courses relative to the wind and sea. This requires constant attention to proper securing of planes which necessitates a great amount of work and line. If a wire tie down line could be devised of adequate strength and simplicity of attachment, the handling and securing of planes during flight operations would be greatly simplified in rough weather.


U.S.S. LUNGA POINT (CVE 94)
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L


APPENDIX #1 TO PART III

PHOTOGRAPHS

- #1 U.S.S. LUNGA POINT LISTS TO PORT IN HEAVY SEAS 3 AUGUST 1945.
- #2 HEAVY SEAS BREAKING UNDER STARBOARD SPONSONS OF USS LUNGA POINT
3 AUGUST 1945.
- #3 JUNK ON YANGTZE RIVER - 5 AUGUST 1945.
- #4 GUTZLAFF ISLAND 200' ALTITUDE - 5 AUGUST 1945.
- #5 GUTZLAFF ISLAND 500' ALTITUDE - 5 AUGUST 1945.



#3. Junk on Yangtse River - 5 August 1945. CONFIDENTIAL



#1. CUTZLAFF ISLAND 200' Altitude - 5 August 1945. CONFIDENTIAL



#5. GUTZLAFF ISLAND 500' Altitude - 5 August 1945. CONFIDENTIAL

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051225

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
COMPOSITE SQUADRON EIGHTY-FIVE

In


V085/13-4

Serial 04

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California
12 March 1945.



From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LINGA POINT (AG-42) (ah).
 (2) Commander Escort Carrier Force, Pacific Fleet. (COM 52.2).
 (3) Commander Task Force FIFTY-ONE.
 (4) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
Subject: ACA-1 Reports - forwarding of.
Reference: (a) PacFlt Conf Ltr 101-45, dated 1 January 1945.
Enclosure: (A) ACA-1 Reports, Numbers V085-20 to 73, inclusive.
 (B) Comments of The Commanding Officer, V085.

1. Enclosures (A) and (B) covering actions of this command from 16 February to 8 March 1945 in the Iwo Jima Operations are forwarded herewith.

FRED C. BERNHARD

*Not check
for comments*

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
COMPOSITE SQUADRON EIGHTY-FIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
12 March 1945.

COMMENTS OF THE COMMANDING OFFICERS OF YC-55 REGARDING THE IWO JIMA OPERATION:

I. RADIO AND COMMUNICATIONS.

- (a) Pilots reported hearing several YC transmitters on the same frequency (or so near the same that they could not tune out the ones not wanted). This resulted in planes becoming "temporarily" lost and in landing and launching schedules being almost upset. Considerable improvement was noted regarding this problem during the later part of the Iwo Jima Operation but it is felt that this was caused by units leaving the area who were using nearly the same frequency as ours. Ways to avoid this condition might be:
- (1) Separate the frequencies assigned to ships by a wider margin than is currently used.
 - (2) OTC "borrow" frequencies which will be clear when it can be determined that the landing ship will not be in operating area during the planned operation.
- (b) TM-3's carry around one receiver, range of three to six megacycles, for which no use is assigned. It seems that it might be used in all planes as an emergency net and this net should be established and controlled by OTC.
- (c) Support missions should have frequencies that no one else is using. During this operation support aircraft on strikes had one channel to themselves and shared another with all ships as a homing frequency. Ten channel radio might make it possible for separate channels for this purpose.

II. FIGHTER DISCIPLINE

- (a) It is felt that the length of combat air patrols should be not more than three hours in duration for maximum efficiency of the pilots.
- (b) When ever it is practicable the senior division leader should be in charge if two or more divisions are used together and FIC's should issue orders to him instead of the junior. The call of the leaders usually establishes who is senior.
- (c) FIC's give estimated angles of bogey at earliest opportunity.

ENCLOSURE (2)

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III. AIR COORDINATORS.

- (a) Smoke rockets should be available for use in marking targets.
- (b) Should stay on station at least three hours and more if practicable
- (c) Should give thought to using planes of one squadron together and then if more weight is needed, to use planes of another squadron. This permits better chance for squadrons to use their own methods which they can always do with less "radio briefing" than is possible if attack groups are mixed.

IV. RADIO DISCIPLINE AND AIR DISCIPLINE.

- (a) These two items are so inter-related that they need to be corrected simultaneously. We would hear a lot less transmissions like "What is your position" if air discipline was such that pilots would not lose sight of their leader. And if planes stay joined up it is possible, by hand signals, to find out "how much ammo" or "how much fuel". Air and radio discipline is a responsibility of the squadron commander and requires his strong, continuous effort to discharge properly.

V. THE DASH LAUNCHING AND RENDEZVOUS.

- (a) We had best results when we rendezvoused over a "dishpan" light which was stationed about 2000 or 3000 yards out in our sector. Pilots were briefed to rendezvous with running lights on and at 1500 feet or below the overcast, whichever is lower. This is dependant on not more than three or at most four ships launching at this time and upon good briefing by all ships regarding location of its sector and to not go elsewhere. This would not work if large groups of planes were to be rendezvoused. But it is practicable for CTR's. The dishpan light should be as bright as practicable, and its distance from the launching ship as little as permits reasonable assurance that rendezvous circles will not overlap.

VI. SUPPORT MISSIONS.

- (a) There were several occasions when bombs were dropped from Wildcats when naval gunfire and other considerations cause them to be ordered to not go below 500 feet. Pilots feel it is wasted effort to drop under those conditions. Commander Support Aircraft had his problems too. Among them were the fact that the planes were nearly out of gas and it was

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a case of drop them now or go home and drop them in the sea on the way. Wildcats do not have a good release system and there are no fins for the tanks. Both need to be provided for best effectiveness. Electric release is suggested.

- (b) Fuses: We dropped lots of GP instantaneous fused bombs on block houses, dugouts, etc. Possibly blast effect is more desirable under these conditions but suggest arming with two different fuses (nose and tail) and use whichever Commander Support Aircraft thinks best.

VII. OBSERVATIONS.

- (a) Damage done by attacks in this area was difficult to observe. The Jap has used cover to the best advantage this squadron has observed to date. It is probable that concussion and flying fragments did more harm to personnel than it did to installations. Even if you knock a hole in the block house it is still a valuable fort to the Jap.

VIII. PARACHUTES.

- (a) There is an urgent need for CVN's to get a comfortable parachute for the pilots to use. Some sort of a rubber pad to keep buttocks from resting directly on heavy web bolting will add immeasurably to pilots efficiency if it can be provided.

IX. MAPS AND ORIENTATION.

- (a) Maps were good this time. Orientation for pilots was easy. The photographs were very useful. It is believed that troops on the ground have more difficulty with the problem of orientation. If their position is in error, the position of the target they request attacks against is likely to be in error. When pilots meet such a situation, confusion and delay are the result and may cause the strike group to make a hurried attack or none at all.