



THE

OFFICIAL AND OTHER PAPERS

OF THE LATE

MAJOR-GENERAL ALEXANDER HAMILTON:

COMPILED CHIEFLY FROM THE ORIGINALS IN THE
POSSESSION OF MRS. HAMILTON.

VOL. I.

NEW-YORK AND LONDON:
WILEY & PUTNAM.

1842.

E 203
H 22

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1842, by
MRS. ELIZABETH HAMILTON,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District of
New-York.



P R E F A C E .

THE "Papers" in this volume, were, with many others, confided to the subscriber, by Mrs. HAMILTON, for the purpose of publication. It is of little moment to the public, to know all the circumstances that induced the Editor to undertake the task. Suffice it to say, that his labour is but the fulfilment of a solemn promise, made at the request of the aged and much respected proprietor of the original documents, when she was supposed to be upon the bed of death. Under the circumstances, the subscriber did not feel at liberty to refuse his assent to her earnest entreaty; accompanied, as it was, by the assurance, that his compliance would be agreeable to all the immediate descendants of General Hamilton.³² He was the more willing, also, to embark in the work, from his knowledge of the fact, that the papers had been, at different periods, confided to several distinguished individuals for publication; and that one and another untoward event had, in every instance, defeated the purpose. When, therefore, the Editor found that, with the assent of the family, he could at least attempt the work, he felt that, in some degree, it was a debt due to his country, to perpetuate the writings of a man, of whom it may be said, without disparagement of others, that he was second to but one in services rendered to the Republic.

The task of the Editor has been little more than that of compilation: he has but arranged the papers in chronological order, with the occasional addition of a brief note. The life of General Hamilton, by his son,* rendered a biographical sketch unnecessary.

* J. C. Hamilton, Esquire.

ry. To that interesting contribution to the stores of American history, these "Papers" may, in fact, be deemed an Appendix. They will be found to illustrate the careful research, and prove the accuracy, of the Biographer.

The Editor is indebted to the kindness of J. C. Hamilton, Esq., for some few of the papers contained in this volume : the residue were in the collection of Mrs. Hamilton ; and some of them have never before been printed.

The succeeding volumes, containing matter that increases in interest as we advance, will be published with as little delay as possible.

F. L. HAWKS.

May 1, 1842.

PAPERS

OF

ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

COMMERCIAL LIFE.

“In the autumn of seventeen hundred and sixty-nine, he [Hamilton] was placed in the counting house of Mr. Nicholas Cruger, an opulent merchant, and most worthy man, then residing at Santa Cruz.

“His aptitude in conforming himself to his situation was such, and his advancement so rapid in the confidence of his respected principal, that before he reached his fourteenth year he was left by Mr. Cruger, who made a visit to the American continent, at the head of his extensive establishment.”—*Life of Hamilton, by his Son: p. 4—5, vol. 1.*

We subjoin a few of the letters written during this period, as illustrative of the facility with which Mr. Hamilton's mind mastered any subject to which he chose to direct its powers.—[EDITOR.]

TO EDWARD STEVENS.*

ST. CROIX, Nov. 11, 1769.

This serves to acknowledge the receipt of yours, per Capt. Lowndes, which was delivered me yesterday. The truth of Captains Lightbown and Lowndes' information is now verified by the presence of your father and sister, for whose safe arrival I pray, and that they may convey that satisfaction to your soul that must naturally flow from the sight of absent friends in health; and shall, for news this way, refer you to them. As to what you say respecting your soon having the happiness of seeing us all, I wish for an accomplishment of your hopes, provided they are concomitant with your welfare, otherwise not; though doubt whether I shall be present or not, for to confess my weakness, Ned, my ambition is prevalent, so that I contemn the grovelling condition of a clerk or the like, to which my fortune condemns me, and would willingly risk my life, though not my character, to exalt my station. I am confident, Ned, that my youth excludes me from any hopes of immediate preferment, nor do I desire it; but I mean to prepare the way for futurity. I'm no philosopher, you see, and may be justly said to build castles in the air; my folly makes me ashamed, and beg you'll conceal it;

* This letter was written by Hamilton before he had reached the age of thirteen.

yet, Neddy, we have seen such schemes successful when the projector is constant. I shall conclude by saying, I wish there was a war.

P. S. I this moment received yours by William Smith, and am pleased to see you give such close application to study.

TO NICHOLAS CRUGER.

ST. CROIX, Oct. 31, 1771.

Expecting that Capt. Codwise would have sailed two days ago, I had already wrote and delivered my letters to him, but the arrival of Capt. Lowndes furnishes me with something more to say.

By him I received sundry letters; one from Mr. Henry Cruger, and several from Henry Cruger, Jr., of Bristol, one from Mr. John Cruger, one from Mr. John Harris Cruger, which are all copies and have been answered, except one of the 24th of June.

I now enclose it to you with an abstract of your last letter to him, which perhaps will be requisite in returning an answer.

I also send you the owner's last letter now arrived, and a list of the bills; all the protests for non-acceptance have come to hand. In Mr. John Harris Cruger's letter, he says that he will remit Mr. Tileman Cruger for his one-third part of the

sloop's first cargo of mules, and should depend upon your honor for the other two, being £400 in advance for you, exclusive of your part of the cargo out; I, therefore, just enclose a little state of matters between you, that you might be able more clearly to convince him of his mistake, there is nothing in the other letters that require or will even admit of an answer from me especially, as you will be on the spot: in fact their contents are of but little consequence.

TO TILEMAN CRUGER, ESQ.

ST. CROIX, Nov. 16, 1771.

In behalf of Mr. Nicholas Cruger, (who, by reason of a very ill state of health, went from this to New York, the 15th ult.,) I have the pleasure to address you by the long expected sloop Thunderbolt, Capt. William Newton, owned by Messrs. Jacob Walton, John Harris, and Nicholas Cruger, the latter of whom has written you fully concerning her destination, which I need not repeat. She has on board besides a parcel of lumber for yourself, sundry articles on account of her owners as per enclosed bill lading; and, when you have disposed of them, you will please to credit each partner for one-third of the proceeds.

Mr. N. Cruger's proportion of this, and the balance of your account hitherto, will more than pay for his one-third cost of her first cargo up; and for the other two, I shall endeavor to place value in your hands betimes. I only wish for a line from you to know what will best answer.

Reports here represent matters in a very disagreeable light, with regard to the Guarda Costas, which are said to swarm upon the coast; but as you will be the best judge of what danger there might be, all is submitted to your prudent direction.

Capt. Newton must arm with you, as he could not so conveniently do it here.

Give me leave to hint to you, that you cannot be too particular in your instructions to him. I think he seems to want experience in such voyages.

Messrs. Walton and John H. Cruger are to furnish you themselves with their respective proportion of the cost of the several cargoes.

The staves on board, if by any means convenient, I beg may be returned by the sloop, they will command a good price here, and I suppose little or nothing with you; could they be got at I would not send them down, but they are stowed promiscuously among other things.

If convenient, please to deliver the hogsheads, now containing the Indian meal, to the Captain as watercasks, and others should he want them. I sup-

plied him with twenty here. I must beg your reference to Mr. Cruger's last letter of the 2d ult. for other particulars.

Our crop will be very early, so that the utmost despatch is necessary to import three cargoes of mules in due time.

TO CAPTAIN WILLIAM NEWTON.

ST. CROIX, Nov. 16, 1771.

Herewith I give you all your despatches, and desire you will proceed immediately to Curracoa. You are to deliver your cargo there to Tileman Cruger, Esq., agreeable to your bill of lading, whose directions you must follow in every respect concerning the disposal of your vessel after your arrival.

You know it is intended that you shall go from thence to the main for a load of mules, and I must beg if you do, you'll be very choice in the quality of your mules, and bring as many as your vessel can conveniently contain—by all means take in a large supply of provender. Remember, you are to make three trips this season, and unless you are very diligent you will be too late, as our crops will be early in. Take care to avoid the Guarda Costas. I place an entire reliance upon the prudence of your conduct.

TO HENRY CRUGER, ESQ.

ST. CROIX, Feb'y 24, 1772.

The 9th ult., Capt. Robert Gibbs handed me your favor dated December 19th, 1771, covering invoice and bill lading for sundries, which are landed in good order agreeable thereto. I sold all your lumber off immediately at £16, lucky enough, the price of that article being now reduced to £12, as great quantities have been lately imported from different parts of the continent. Indeed there must be a vast consumption this crop, which makes it probable the price will again rise, unless the crop at windward should fall short, as is said to be the case, whereby we shall fail to be overstocked. The oats and cheese I have also sold, the former at 61 cents per bushel, and the latter at 9 cents per lb. Your mahogany is of the very poorest kind, or I could have readily obtained 6d. per foot for it, but at present it is blown upon: 'tis fit only for end work.

I enclose you a price current, and refer you thereto for other matters.

Capt. Gibbs was ready to sail seven days after his arrival, but was detained two days longer by strong contrary winds, which made it impossible to get out of the harbor; believe me, sir, nothing was neglected on my part to give him the utmost despatch, and considering that his cargo was stowed

very confusedly, the proceeding part of it rather uppermost, I think he was despatched as soon as could be expected. Enclosed you have invoice of rum and sugar shipped in the sloop agreeable to your orders: I could not by any means get your casks filled by any of the planters, but shall dispose of the hogsheads, out of which the rum was started, for your account, from which, however, will proceed a small loss. Also, you have account of sloop's port charges, and which I hope, and doubt not, you will find right.

You'll be a little surprised when I tell you Capt. Gibbs was obliged to leave his freight money behind. The reason is this: Mr. B. would by no means raise his part; 'tis true he might have been compelled by law, but that would have been altogether imprudent, for to have enforced payment and to have converted that payment into joes, which were extremely scarce, would have been attended with detention of at least ten or twelve days, and the other freights were very trifling, so that the whole now rests with me, and God knows when I shall be able to receive Mr. B's. part, who is long winded enough. Mr. B. begs to present his respects.

“ Within a short time after the adjournment of the first congress, among several publications, two tracts appeared more distinguished than the rest, which were the joint productions of Doctor Seabury and Mr. Wilkins ; the latter of whom had recently occupied a prominent place in the deliberations of the New-York Assembly. The first bore the title of “ Free thoughts on the proceedings of the Continental Congress :” the other was entitled, “ Congress Canvassed, by a Westchester Farmer.”* These publications were chiefly directed against the “ non-importation, non-consumption, and non-exportation agreements,” which had been recommended by the congress. * * * *

“ The wide, industrious, and gratuitous circulation of these pamphlets, inducing the belief that they had the sanction of the government, they soon became the text book of the Tories, and were applauded by them as containing irrefutable arguments against the measures of the “ sons of liberty.” * * * *

“ Within a fortnight after the second tract had issued from the press,† a pamphlet appeared under the title of “ A Full Vindication of the Measures of Congress from the Calumnies of their Enemies, in answer to a Letter under the signature of A W. Farmer ; whereby his *sophistry* is exposed, his *cavils* confuted, his *artifices* detected, and his *wit* ridiculed, in a General Address to the Inhabitants of America, and a Particular Address to the Farmers of the *Province of New-York. Veritas magna est et pravelebit.*—Truth is powerful, and will prevail. New-York : Printed by James Rivington : 1774.”—*Life of Hamilton, by his Son* : p. 26—28, vol. 1.

* November 24, 1774. † December 15, 1774.

FRIENDS AND COUNTRYMEN.—It was hardly to be expected that any man could be so presumptuous, as openly to controvert the equity, wisdom, and authority of the measures adopted by the congress: an assembly truly respectable on every account! Whether we consider the characters of the men who composed it; the number and dignity of their constituents; or the important ends for which they were appointed. But, however improbable such a degree of presumption might have seemed, we find there are some, in whom it exists. Attempts are daily making to diminish the influence of their decisions, and prevent the salutary effects intended by them. The impotence of such insidious efforts is evident from the general indignation they are treated with; so that no material ill-consequences can be dreaded from them. But lest they should have a tendency to mislead, and prejudice the minds of a few, it cannot be deemed altogether useless to bestow some notice upon them.

And first, let me ask these restless spirits, Whence arises that violent antipathy they seem to entertain, not only to the natural rights of mankind, but to common sense and common modesty? That they are enemies to the natural rights of mankind is manifest, because they wish to see one part of their species enslaved by another. That they have an invincible aversion to common sense, is apparent in many respects: They endeavor to persuade us, that

the absolute sovereignty of parliament does not imply our absolute slavery ; that it is a Christian duty to submit to be plundered of all we have, merely because some of our fellow subjects are wicked enough to require it of us ; that slavery, so far from being a great evil, is a great blessing ; and even, that our contest with Britain is founded entirely upon the petty duty of three pence per pound on East India tea ; whereas the whole world knows, it is built upon this interesting question, Whether the inhabitants of Great Britain have a right to dispose of the lives and properties of the inhabitants of America, or not ? And lastly, that these men have discarded all pretension to common modesty, is clear from hence ; first, because they, in the plainest terms, call an august body of men, famed for their patriotism and abilities, fools or knaves ; and of course the people whom they represented, cannot be exempt from the same opprobrious appellations ; and secondly, because they set themselves up as standards of wisdom and probity, by contradicting and censuring the public voice in favor of those men.

A little consideration will convince us, that the congress, instead of having “ ignorantly misunderstood, carelessly neglected, or basely betrayed the interests of the colonies,” have, on the contrary, devised and recommended the only effectual means to secure the freedom, and establish the future prosperity of America upon a solid basis. If we are not free

and happy hereafter, it must proceed from the want of integrity and resolution, in executing what they have concerted; not from the temerity or impolicy of their determinations.

Before I proceed to confirm this assertion by the most obvious arguments, I will premise a few brief remarks. The only distinction between freedom and slavery consists in this: In the former state, a man is governed by the laws to which he has given his consent, either in person, or by his representative: In the latter, he is governed by the will of another. In the one case, his life and property are his own: in the other, they depend upon the pleasure of a master. It is easy to discern which of these two states is preferable. No man in his senses can hesitate in choosing to be free, rather than a slave.

That Americans are entitled to freedom is incontestable upon every rational principle. All men have one common original: they participate in one common nature, and consequently have one common right. No reason can be assigned why one man should exercise any power or pre-eminence over his fellow creatures more than another; unless they have voluntarily vested him with it. Since, then, Americans have not, by any act of their's, empowered the British Parliament to make laws for them, it follows they can have no just authority to do it,

Besides the clear voice of natural justice in this respect, the fundamental principles of the English constitution are in our favor. It has been repeatedly demonstrated, that the idea of legislation, or taxation, when the subject is not represented, is inconsistent with *that*. Nor is this all; our charters, the express conditions on which our progenitors relinquished their native countries, and came to settle in this, preclude every claim of ruling and taxing us without our assent.

Every subterfuge that sophistry has been able to invent, to evade or obscure this truth, has been refuted by the most conclusive reasonings; so that we may pronounce it a matter of undeniable certainty, that the pretensions of Parliament are contradictory to the law of nature, subversive of the British constitution, and destructive of the faith of the most solemn compacts.

What, then, is the subject of our controversy with the mother country? It is this: Whether we shall preserve that security to our lives and properties, which the law of nature, the genius of the British constitution, and our charters, afford us; or whether we shall resign them into the hands of the British House of Commons, which is no more privileged to dispose of them than the Great Mogul? What can actuate those men, who labor to delude any of us into an opinion, that the object of contention between the parent state and the colonies, is only three

pence duty upon tea? or that the commotions in America originate in a plan, formed by some turbulent men, to erect it into a republican government? The parliament claims a right to tax us in all cases whatsoever: its late acts are in virtue of that claim. How ridiculous, then, is it to affirm, that we are quarrelling for the trifling sum of three pence a pound on tea; when it is evidently the principle against which we contend.

The design of electing members to represent us in general congress, was, that the wisdom of America might be collected in devising the most proper and expedient means to repel this atrocious invasion of our rights. It has been accordingly done. Their decrees are binding upon all, and demand a religious observance.

We did not, especially in this province, circumscribe them by any fixed boundary; and therefore, as they cannot be said to have exceeded the limits of their authority, their act must be esteemed the act of their constituents. If it should be objected, that they have not answered the end of their election, but have fallen upon an improper and ruinous mode of proceeding: I reply by asking, Who shall be the judge? Shall any individual oppose his private sentiment to the united counsels of men, in whom America has reposed so high a confidence? The attempt must argue no small degree of arrogance and self-sufficiency.

Yet this attempt has been made : and it is become, in some measure, necessary to vindicate the conduct of this venerable assembly from the aspersions of men, who are their adversaries, only because they are foes to America.

When the political salvation of any community is depending, it is incumbent upon those who are set up as its guardians, to embrace such measures, as have justice, vigor, and a probability of success to recommend them : If, instead of this, they take those methods which are in themselves feeble, and little likely to succeed ; and may, through a defect in vigor, involve the community in still greater danger ; they may be justly considered as its betrayers. It is not enough, in times of imminent peril, to use only possible means of preservation : Justice and sound policy dictate the use of probable means.

The only scheme of opposition, suggested by those, who have been, and are, averse from a non-importation and non-exportation agreement, is, by **REMONSTRANCE** and **PETITION**. The authors and abettors of this scheme, have never been able to invent a single argument to prove the likelihood of its succeeding. On the other hand, there are many standing facts, and valid considerations, against it.

In the infancy of the present dispute, we had recourse to this method only. We addressed the throne in the most loyal and respectful manner, in a legislative capacity ; but what was the conse-

quence? Our address was treated with contempt and neglect. The first American congress did the same, and met with similar treatment. The total repeal of the stamp act, and the partial repeal of the revenue acts, took place, not because the complaints of America were deemed just and reasonable; but because these acts were found to militate against the commercial interests of Great Britain: This was the declared motive of the repeal.

These instances are sufficient for our purpose: but they derive greater validity and force from the following:

The legal assembly of Massachusetts Bay, presented, not long since, a most humble, dutiful, and earnest petition to his Majesty, requesting the dismissal of a governor, highly odious to the people, and whose misrepresentations they regarded as one chief source of all their calamities. Did they succeed in their request? No—it was treated with the greatest indignity, and stigmatized as “a seditious, vexatious, and scandalous libel.”

I know the men I have to deal with, will acquiesce in this stigma. Will they also dare to calumniate the noble and spirited petition that came from the Mayor and Aldermen of the city of London? Will they venture to justify that unparalleled stride of power, by which popery and arbitrary dominion were established in Canada? The citizens of London remonstrated against it; they signified its re-

pugnancy to the principles of the revolution; but, like ours, their complaints were unattended to. From thence we may learn how little dependence ought to be placed on this method of obtaining the redress of grievances.

There is less reason now than ever to expect deliverance, in this way, from the hand of oppression. The system of slavery, fabricated against America, cannot, at this time, be considered as the effect of inconsideration and rashness. It is the offspring of mature deliberation. It has been fostered by time, and strengthened by every artifice human subtilty is capable of. After the claims of parliament had lain dormant for awhile, they are again resumed and prosecuted with more than common ardor. The Premier has advanced too far to recede with safety: He is deeply interested to execute his purpose, if possible: we know he has declared, that he will never desist, till he has brought America to his feet: and we may conclude, nothing but necessity will induce him to abandon his aims. In common life, to retract an error, even in the beginning, is no easy task; perseverance confirms us in it, and rivets the difficulty: but in a public station, to have been in an error, and to have persisted in it, when it is detected, ruins both reputation and fortune. To this we may add, that disappointment and opposition inflame the minds of men, and attach them, still more, to their mistakes.

What can we represent which has not already been represented? What petitions can we offer, that have not already been offered? The rights of America, and the injustice of parliamentary pretensions, have been clearly and repeatedly stated, both in and out of parliament. No new arguments can be framed to operate in our favor. Should we even resolve the errors of the ministry and parliament into the fallibility of human understanding, if they have not yet been convinced, we have no prospect of being able to do it by anything further we can say. But if we impute their conduct to a wicked thirst of domination and disregard to justice, we have no hope of prevailing with them to alter it, by expatiating on our rights, and suing to their compassion for relief; especially since we have found, by various experiments, the inefficacy of such methods. Upon the whole, it is morally certain, this mode of opposition would be fruitless and defective. The exigency of the times requires vigorous and probable remedies; not weak and improbable. It would, therefore, be the extreme of folly to place any confidence in, much less confine ourselves wholly to it.

This being the case, we can have no resource but in a restriction of our trade, or in a resistance *vi et armis*. It is impossible to conceive any other alternative. Our congress, therefore, have imposed what restraint they thought necessary. Those who

condemn or clamor against it, do nothing more, nor less, than advise us to be slaves.

I shall now examine the principal measures of the congress, and vindicate them fully from the charge of injustice or impolicy.

Were I to argue in a philosophical manner, I might say, the obligation to a mutual intercourse, in the way of trade, with the inhabitants of Great Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies, is of the *imperfect* kind. There is no law, either of nature, or of the civil society in which we live, that obliges us to purchase, and make use of the products and manufactures of a different land, or people. It is indeed a dictate of humanity to contribute to the support and happiness of our fellow-creatures, and more especially those who are allied to us by the ties of blood, interest, and mutual protection: but humanity does not require us to sacrifice our own security and welfare to the convenience or advantage of others. Self preservation is the first principle of our nature. When our lives and properties are at stake, it would be foolish and unnatural to refrain from such measures as might preserve them, because they would be detrimental to others.

But we are justified upon another principle besides this. Though the manufacturers of Great Britain and Ireland, and the inhabitants of the West Indies, are not chargeable with any actual crime towards America; they may, in a political view, be

esteemed criminal. In a civil society, it is the duty of each particular branch to promote, not only the good of the whole community, but the good of every other particular branch: if one part endeavors to violate the rights of another, the rest ought to assist in preventing the injury. When they do not, but remain neutral, they are deficient in their duty, and may be regarded, in some measure, as accomplices.

The reason of this is obvious, from the design of civil society; which is, that the united strength of the several members might give stability and security to the whole body, and each respective member; so that one part cannot encroach upon another, without becoming a common enemy, and eventually endangering the safety and happiness of all the other parts.

Since, then, the persons who will be distressed by the methods we are using for our own protection, have, by their neutrality, first committed a breach of an obligation, similar to that which bound us to consult their emolument; it is plain, the obligation upon us is annulled, and we are blameless in what we are about to do.

With respect to the manufacturers of Great Britain, they are criminal in a more particular sense. Our oppression arises from that member of the great body politic, of which they compose a considerable part. So far as their influence has been wanting

to counteract the iniquity of their rulers, so far they acquiesced in it, and are to be deemed confederates in their guilt. It is impossible to exculpate a people, that suffers its rulers to abuse and tyrannise over others.

It may not be amiss to add, that we are ready to receive with open arms, any who may be sufferers by the operation of our measures, and recompense them with every blessing our country affords to honest industry. We will receive them as brethren, and make them sharers with us in all the advantages we are struggling for.

From these plain and indisputable principles, the mode of opposition we have chosen, is reconcilable to the strictest maxims of justice. It remains now to be examined, whether it has also the sanction of good policy.

To render it agreeable to good policy, three things are requisite. First, that the necessity of the times requires it: secondly, that it be not the probable source of greater evils than those it pretends to remedy: and lastly, that it have a probability of success.

That the necessity of the times demands it, needs but little elucidation. We are threatened with absolute slavery: it has been proved, that resistance by means of REMONSTRANCE and PETITION, would not be efficacious, and of course, that a restriction on our trade, is the only peaceable method, in our

power, to avoid the impending mischief: it follows, therefore, that such a restriction is necessary.

That it is not the probable source of greater evils than those it pretends to remedy, may easily be determined. The most abject slavery, which comprehends almost every species of human misery, is what it is designed to prevent.

The consequences of the means are a temporary stagnation of commerce, and thereby a deprivation of the luxuries, and some of the conveniencies, of life. The necessaries, and many of the conveniencies, our own fertile and propitious soil affords us.

No person that has enjoyed the sweets of liberty, can be insensible of its infinite value, or can reflect on its reverse, without horror and detestation. No person that is not lost to every generous feeling of humanity, or that is not stupidly blind to his own interest, could bear to offer himself and posterity as victims at the shrine of despotism, in preference to enduring the short-lived inconveniences that may result from an abridgment, or even entire suspension, of commerce.

Were not the disadvantages of slavery too obvious to stand in need of it, I might enumerate and describe the tedious train of calamities inseparable from it. I might show that it is fatal to religion and morality; that it tends to debase the mind, and corrupt its noblest springs of action. I might show

that it relaxes the sinews of industry, clips the wings of commerce, and introduces misery and indigence in every shape.

Under the auspices of tyranny, the life of the subject is often sported with; and the fruits of his daily toil are consumed in oppressive taxes, that serve to gratify the ambition, avarice, and lusts of his superiors. Every court minion riots in the spoils of the honest laborer, and despises the hand by which he is fed. The page of history is replete with instances that loudly warn us to beware of slavery.

Rome was the nurse of freedom. She was celebrated for her justice and lenity; but in what manner did she govern her dependent provinces? They were made the continual scene of rapine and cruelty. From thence let us learn, how little confidence is due to the wisdom and equity of the most exemplary nations.

Should Americans submit to become the vassals of their fellow subjects in Great Britain, their yoke will be peculiarly grievous and intolerable. A vast majority of mankind is entirely biassed by motives of self-interest. Most men are glad to remove any burthens off themselves, and place them upon the necks of their neighbors. We cannot, therefore, doubt, but that the British Parliament, with a view to the ease and advantage of itself, and its constituents, would oppress and grind the Americans

as much as possible. Jealousy would concur with selfishness; and for fear of the future independence of America, if it should be permitted to rise to too great a height of splendor and opulence, every method would be taken to drain it of its wealth, and restrain its prosperity. We are already suspected of aiming at independence, and that is one principal cause of the severity we experience. The same cause will always operate against us, and produce a uniform severity of treatment.

The evils which may flow from the execution of our measures, if we consider them with respect to their extent and duration, are comparatively nothing. In all human probability they will scarcely be felt. Reason and experience teach us, that the consequences would be too fatal to Great Britain to admit of delay. There is an immense trade between her and the colonies. The revenues arising from thence are prodigious. The consumption of her manufactures in these colonies, supplies the means of subsistence to a vast number of her most useful inhabitants. The experiment we have made heretofore, shows us of how much importance our commercial connexion is to her; and gives us the highest assurance of obtaining immediate redress by suspending it.

From these considerations it is evident, she must do something decisive. She must either listen to our complaints, and restore us to a peaceful enjoy-

ment of our violated rights ; or she must exert herself to enforce her despotic claims by fire and sword. To imagine she would prefer the latter, implies a charge of the grossest infatuation, of madness itself. Our numbers are very considerable : the courage of Americans has been tried and proved. Contests for liberty have ever been found the most bloody, implacable, and obstinate. The disciplined troops Great Britain could send against us, would be but few. Our superiority in number, would overbalance our inferiority in discipline. It would be a hard, if not an impracticable, task, to subjugate us by force.

Besides, while Great Britain was engaged in carrying on an unnatural war against us, her commerce would be in a state of decay. Her revenues would be decreasing. An armament, sufficient to enslave America, would put her to an insupportable expense.

She would be laid open to the attacks of foreign enemies. Ruin, like a deluge, would pour in from every quarter. After lavishing her blood and treasure, to reduce us to a state of vassalage, she would herself become a prey to some triumphant neighbor.

These are not imaginary mischiefs. The colonies contain above three millions of people. Commerce flourishes with the most rapid progress throughout them. This commerce, Great Britain has hitherto regulated to her own advantage. Can we think

the annihilation of so exuberant a source of wealth, a matter of trifling import? On the contrary, must it not be productive of the most disastrous effects? It is evident it must. It is equally evident, that the conquest of so numerous a people, armed in the animating cause of liberty, could not be accomplished without an inconceivable expense of blood and treasure.

We cannot, therefore, suspect Great Britain to be capable of such frantic extravagance as to hazard these dreadful consequences; without which, she must necessarily desist from her unjust pretensions, and leave us in the undisturbed possession of our privileges.

Those, who affect to ridicule the resistance America might make to the military force of Great Britain, and represent its humiliation as a matter the most easily to be achieved, betray, either a mind clouded by the most irrational prejudices, or a total ignorance of human nature. However, it must be the wish of every honest man never to see a trial.

But should we admit a possibility of a third course, as our pamphleteer supposes; that is, the endeavoring to bring us to a compliance by putting a stop to our whole trade: even this would not be so terrible as he pretends. We can live without trade of any kind. Food and clothing we have within ourselves. Our climate produces cotton, wool, flax, and hemp; which, with proper cultivation, would furnish us with

summer apparel in abundance. The article of cotton, indeed, would do more; it would contribute to defend us from the inclemency of winter. We have sheep, which, with due care in improving and increasing them, would soon yield a sufficiency of wool. The large quantity of skins we have among us, would never let us want a warm and comfortable suit. It would be no unbecoming employment for our daughters, to provide silks of their own country. The silk-worm answers as well here as in any part of the world. Those hands, which may be deprived of business by the cessation of commerce, may be occupied in various kinds of manufactures, and other internal improvements. If, by the necessity of the thing, manufactures should once be established, and take root among us, they will pave the way, still more, to the future grandeur and glory of America; and, by lessening its need of external commerce, will render it still securer against the encroachments of tyranny.

It is, however, chimerical to imagine, that the circumstances of Great Britain will admit of such a tardy method of subjugating us, for reasons which have been already given, and which shall be corroborated by others equally forcible.

I come now to consider the last and principal ingredient that constitutes the policy of a measure, which is, a probability of success. I have been obliged to anticipate this part of my subject in considering the second requisite; and, indeed, what I

have already said, seems to me to leave no room for doubting, that the means we have used will be successful : but I shall here examine the matter more thoroughly, and endeavor to evince it more fully.

The design of the Congress in their proceedings, it cannot, and need not, be denied, was, either, by a prospect of the evil consequences, to influence the ministry to give up their enterprise ; or, should they prove inflexible, to affect the inhabitants of Great Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies, in such a manner, as to rouse them from their state of neutrality, and engage them to unite with us in opposing the lawless hand of tyranny, which is extended to ravish our liberty from us, and might soon be extended for the same purpose against them.

The FARMER mentions, as one probable consequence of our measures, “clamors, discord, confusion, mobs, riots, insurrections, rebellions in Great Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies;” though at the same time that he thinks *it is*, he also thinks *it is not*, a probable consequence. For my part, without hazarding any such seeming contradictions, I shall, in a plain way, assert, that I verily believe, a non-importation and non-exportation, will effect all the purposes they are intended for.

It is no easy matter to make any tolerably exact estimate of the advantages that accrue to Great Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies, from their commercial intercourse with the colonies ; nor, indeed, is it necessary. Every man, the least ac-

acquainted with the state and extent of our trade, must be convinced, it is the source of immense revenues to the parent state, and gives employment and bread to a vast number of his Majesty's subjects. It is impossible but that a suspension of it, for any time, must introduce beggary and wretchedness, in an eminent degree, both in England and Ireland. And as to the West India plantations, they could not possibly subsist without us. I am the more confident of this, because I have a pretty general acquaintance with their circumstances and dependencies.

We are told, "that it is highly improbable, we shall succeed in distressing the people of Great Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies, so far as to oblige them to join with us in getting the acts of Parliament, which we complain of, repealed. The first distress," it is said, "will fall on ourselves: it will be more severely felt by us, than any part of all his Majesty's dominions, and will affect us the longest. The fleets of Great Britain, command respect throughout the globe. Her influence extends to every part of the earth. Her manufactures are equal to any, superior to most in the world. Her wealth is great. Her people, enterprising and persevering in their attempts to extend, and enlarge, and protect, her trade. The total loss of our trade will be felt only for a time. Her merchants would turn their attention another way: new sources of

trade and wealth would be opened : new schemes pursued. She would soon find a vent for all her manufactures in spite of all we could do. Our malice would hurt only ourselves. Should our schemes distress some branches of her trade, it would be only for a time : and there is ability and humanity enough in the nation, to relieve those that are distressed by us, and put them in some other way of getting their living.”

The omnipotence and all-sufficiency of Great Britain, may be pretty good topics for her passionate admirers to exercise their declamatory powers upon, for amusement and trial of skill ; but they ought not to be proposed to the world as matters of truth and reality. In the calm, unprejudiced eye of reason, they are altogether visionary. As to her wealth, it is notorious that she is oppressed with a heavy national debt, which it requires the utmost policy and economy ever to discharge. Luxury has arrived to a great pitch ; and it is a universal maxim, that luxury indicates the declension of a state. Her subjects are loaded with the most enormous taxes. All circumstances agree in declaring their distress. The continual emigrations from Great Britain and Ireland to the continent, are a glaring symptom that those kingdoms are a good deal impoverished.

The attention of Great Britain has hitherto been constantly awake to expand her commerce. She

has been vigilant to explore every region, with which it might be her interest to trade. One of the principal branches of her commerce, is with the colonies. These colonies, as they are now settled and peopled, have been the work of near two centuries. They are blessed with every advantage of soil, climate, and situation. They have advanced with an almost incredible rapidity. It is, therefore, an egregious piece of absurdity to affirm, that the loss of our trade would be felt for a time (which must signify a short time). No new schemes could be pursued that would not require, at least, as much time to repair the loss of our trade, as was spent in bringing it to its present degree of perfection, which is near two centuries. Nor can it be reasonably imagined, that the total and sudden loss of so extensive and lucrative a branch, would not produce the most violent effects to a nation that subsists entirely upon its commerce.

It is said, "There is ability and humanity enough in the nation, to relieve those that are distressed by us, and to put them into some other way of getting their living." I wish the gentleman had obliged his readers so much as to have pointed out this other way. I must confess, I have racked my brains to no purpose to discover it: and I am fully of opinion it is purely ideal. Besides the common mechanic arts, which are subservient to the ordinary uses of life, and which are the instruments of

commerce, I know no other ways, in time of peace, in which men can be employed, except in agriculture and the liberal arts. Persons employed in the mechanic arts, are those, whom the abridgement of commerce would immediately affect: and as to such branches as might be less affected, they are already sufficiently stocked with workmen, and could give bread to no more. Not only so, but I can't see by what legerdemain, a weaver, or clothier, could be at once converted into a carpenter or blacksmith. With respect to agriculture, the lands of Great Britain and Ireland have been long ago distributed and taken up; nor do they require any additional laborers to till them: so that there could be no employment in this way. The liberal arts cannot maintain those who are already devoted to them; not to say, it is more than probable, the generality of mechanics, would make but indifferent philosophers, poets, painters, and musicians.

What poor shifts is sophistry obliged to have recourse to! We are threatened with the resentment of those against whom our measures will operate. It is said, that "instead of conciliating, we shall alienate, the affections of the people of Great Britain: of friends, we shall make them our enemies." And further, that "we shall excite the resentment of the government at home against us; which will do us no good, but, on the contrary, much harm,"

Soon after, we are told, that “we shall probably raise the resentment of the Irish and West Indians. The passions of human nature,” it is said, “are much the same in all countries. If they find us disposed, wantonly to distress them, to serve our own purposes, they will look out for some method to do without us. Will they not look elsewhere, for a supply of those articles they used to take from us? They would deserve to be despised for their meanness, did they not.”

To these objections I reply, first, with respect to the inhabitants of Great Britain; that if they are our friends, as is supposed, and as we have reason to believe; they cannot, without being destitute of rationality, be incensed against us, for using the only peaceable and probable means, in our power, to preserve our invaded rights. They know, by their own experience, how fruitless remonstrances and petitions are. They know we have tried them, over and over, to no purpose. They know, also, how dangerous to their liberties, the loss of ours must be. What, then, could excite their resentment, if they have the least regard to common justice? The calamities that threaten them, proceed from the weakness, or wickedness, of their own rulers, which compels us to take the measures we do. The insinuation, that we *wantonly* distress them, to serve our own purposes, is futile, and unsupported by a single argument. I have shown, we could have no other resource; nor can they think our conduct such, with-

out a degree of infatuation that it would be impossible to provide against, and, therefore, useless to consult. It is most reasonable to believe, they will revenge the evils they may feel, on the true authors of them; on an aspiring and ill-judging ministry; not on us, who act out of a melancholy necessity, and are the innocent causes in self-defence.

With respect to the ministry, it is certain, that any thing which has a tendency to frustrate their designs, will not fail to excite their displeasure. But since we have nothing to expect from their justice and lenity, it can be no objection to a measure, that it tends to stir up their resentment. But their resentment (it is often said) may ruin us. The impossibility of doing that, without, at the same time, ruining Great Britain, is a sufficient security.

The same may be said, with regard to the Irish and the West Indians, which has been said concerning the people of Great Britain. The Irish, in particular, by their own circumstances, will be taught to sympathize with us, and commend our conduct. Justice will direct their resentment to its proper objects.

It is true, self-love will prompt, both the Irish and the West Indians, to take every method in their power, to escape the miseries they are in danger of. But what methods can they take? "The Irish," it is said, "may be supplied with flax-seed from Holland, the Baltic, and the river St. Lawrence. Canada produces no inconsiderable quantity alrea-

dy." And as to the West Indies, "they produce now, many of the necessaries of life. The quantity may be easily increased. Canada will furnish them with many articles they now take from us; flour, lumber, horses, &c. Georgia, the Floridas, and the Mississippi, abound in lumber: Nova Scotia in fish."

The Dutch are rivals to the English in their commerce. They make large quantities of fine linens, gauze, laces, etc., which require the flax to be picked before it comes to seed: for which reason, it is not in their power to raise much more seed than they want for their own use. Ireland has always had the surplus from them. They could, if they were ever so willing, enlarge their usual supplies but very little. It is, indeed, probable they may withhold them. They may choose to improve the occasion for the advancement of their own trade. They may take advantage of the scarcity of materials in Ireland, to increase and put off their own manufactures.

The Baltic has ever supplied Ireland with its flax; and she has been able to consume that, with all she could derive from other quarters.

As to Canada, I am well informed, it could at present afford but a very inconsiderable quantity. It has had little encouragement, hitherto, to raise that article; and, of course, has not much attended to it. The instances mentioned, of seed being "bought up there at a low price, brought to New-

York, and sold to the Irish factors at a great advance," does not prove there is any quantity raised there. Its cheapness proceeds from there being no demand for it; and where there was no demand, there was no inducement to cultivate it.

Upon the whole it appears, that the supplies of flax-seed, which Ireland might draw elsewhere, could be trifling, in comparison with those received from us, and not at all equivalent to her wants. But if this were not the case; if she might procure a sufficiency without our help; yet could she not do without us. She would want purchasers for her linens after they were manufactured: and where could she find any so numerous and wealthy as we are? I must refer it to the profound sagacity of Mr. A. W. Farmer, to explore them: it is too arduous a task for me.

Much less could the West Indies subsist independent of us. Notwithstanding the continual imports from hence, there is seldom, or ever, in any of the Islands, a sufficient stock of provisions to last six months; which may give us an idea, how great the consumption is. The necessaries they produce within themselves, when compared with the consumption, are scarcely worth mentioning. Very small portions of the land are appropriated to the productions of such necessaries: indeed it is too valuable to admit of it. Nor could the quantity be increased to any material degree, without ap-

plying the whole of the land to it. It is alleged, that "Canada will furnish them with flour, lumber, horses, &c.:" and that "Georgia, the Floridas, and Mississippi, abound in lumber: Nova Scotia in fish." These countries have been all along carrying on a trade to the West Indies, as well as we: and can it be imagined, that, alone, they will be able to supply them tolerably? The Canadians have been indolent, and have not improved their country as they ought to have done. The wheat they raise at present, over and above what they have occasion for themselves, would be found to go but little way among the islands. Those who think the contrary, must have mistaken notions of them. They must be unapprized of the number of souls they contain. Almost every one hundred and fifty, or two hundred, acres of land, exclusive of populous towns, comprehend a hundred people. It is not a small quantity of food that will suffice for so many. Ten or fifteen years diligence, I grant, might enable Canada to perform what is now expected from her; but, in the mean time, the West Indians might have the satisfaction of starving.

To suppose the best; which is, that by applying their cane-lands to the purpose of procuring sustenance, they may preserve themselves from starving: still, the consequences must be very serious or pernicious. The wealthy planters would but ill relish the loss of their crops: and such of them as

were considerably in debt, would be ruined. At any rate, the revenues of Great Britain would suffer a vast diminution.

The FARMER, I am inclined to hope, builds too much upon the present disunion of Canada, Georgia, the Floridas, the Mississippi, and Nova Scotia, from other colonies. A little time, I trust, will awaken them from their slumbers, and bring them to a proper sense of their indiscretion. I please myself with the flattering prospect, that they will, ere long, unite in one indissoluble chain with the rest of the colonies. I cannot believe, they will persist in such a conduct, as must exclude them from the secure enjoyment of those heaven-descended immunities we are contending for.

There is one argument I have frequently heard urged, which it may be of some use to invalidate. It is this: that if the mother country should be inclined to an accommodation of our disputes; we have, by our rash procedure, thrown an insurmountable obstacle in her way; we have made it disgraceful to her to comply with our requisitions, because they are proposed in a hostile manner.

Our present measures, I have proved, are the only peaceable ones we could place the least confidence in. They are the least exceptionable, upon the score of irritating Great Britain, of any our circumstances would permit. The Congress have petitioned his Majesty for the redress of grievances.

They have, no doubt, addressed him in the most humble, respectful, and affectionate terms : assured him of their own loyalty and fidelity ; and of the loyalty and fidelity of his American subjects in general : endeavored to convince him, that we have been misrepresented and abused : and expressed an earnest desire, to see an amicable termination of the unhappy differences now existing. Can a pretext be wanting, in this case, to preserve the dignity of this parent state, and yet remove the complaints of the colonies ? How easy would it be, to overlook our particular agreements, and grant us redress in consequence of our petitions ? It is easy to perceive there would be no difficulty in this respect.

I have omitted many considerations which might be adduced, to show the impolicy of Great Britain's delaying to accommodate matters, and attempting to enforce submission, by cutting off all external sources of trade. To say all the subject allows, would spin out this piece to an immoderate length. I shall therefore content myself with mentioning only three things more. First, it would be extremely hurtful to the commerce of Great Britain, to drive us to the necessity of laying a regular foundation for manufactories of our own ; which, if once established, could not easily, if at all, be undermined, or abolished. Secondly, it would be very expensive to the nation, to maintain a fleet, for the purpose

of blocking up our ports and destroying our trade : nor could she interrupt our intercourse with foreign climes, without, at the same time, retrenching her own revenues ; for she must then lose the duties and customs upon the articles we are wont to export to, and import from, them. Added to this, it would not be prudent to risk the displeasure of those nations, to whom our trade is useful and beneficial. And lastly, a perseverance in ill-treatment, would naturally beget such deep-rooted animosities in America, as might never be eradicated ; and which might operate to the prejudice of the empire, to the latest period.

Thus have I clearly proved, that the plan of opposition concerted by our Congress, is perfectly consonant with justice and sound policy ; and will, in all human probability, secure our freedom against the assaults of our enemies.

But, after all, it may be demanded, why they have adopted a non-exportation ; seeing many arguments tend to show, that a non-importation, alone, would accomplish the end desired ?

I answer, that the continuance of our exports, is the only thing which could lessen, or retard, the efficacy of a non-importation. It is not, indeed, probable it should do that to any great degree ; but it was advisable to provide against every possible obstruction. Besides this, the prospect of its taking place, and of the evils attendant upon it,

will be a prevailing motive with the ministry, to abandon their malignant schemes. It will also serve to convince them, that we are not afraid of putting ourselves to any inconveniences, sooner than be the victims of their lawless ambition.

The execution of this measure, has been wisely deferred to a future time; because we have the greatest reason to think, affairs will be settled without it; and because its consequences would be too fatal, to be justified by any thing but absolute necessity. This necessity there will be, should not our disputes terminate before the time allotted for its commencement.

Before I conclude this part of my address, I will answer two very singular interrogatories proposed by the FARMER. "Can we think," says he, "to threaten, and bully, and frighten, the supreme government of the nation into a compliance with our demands? Can we expect to force submission to our peevish and petulant humors, by exciting clamors and riots in England?" No, gentle sir. We neither desire, nor endeavor, to threaten, bully, nor frighten, any persons into a compliance with our demands. We have no peevish and petulant humors to be submitted to. All we aim at, is, to convince your high and mighty masters, the ministry, that we are not such asses as to let them ride us as they please. We are determined to show them, that we know the value of freedom;

nor shall their rapacity extort that inestimable jewel from us, without a manly and virtuous struggle. But for your part, sweet Sir! though we cannot much applaud your wisdom, yet we are compelled to admire your valor, which leads you to hope you may be able to *swear*, threaten, bully, and frighten, all America into a compliance with your sinister designs. When properly accoutred, and armed with your formidable hickory cudgel, what may not the ministry expect from such a champion? Alas, for the poor committee gentlemen! how I tremble when I reflect on the many wounds and scars they must receive from your tremendous arm! Alas, for their supporters and abettors! a very large part, indeed, of the continent: but what of that? They must all be soundly drubbed with that confounded hickory cudgel: for surely you would not undertake to drub one of them, without knowing yourself able to treat all their friends and adherents in the same manner; since 't is plain you would bring them all upon your back.

I am now to address myself in particular to the Farmers of New-York.

MY GOOD COUNTRYMEN:

The reason I address myself to you, in particular, is, because I am one of your number, or connected with you in interest, more than with any other branch of the community. I love to speak the truth, and would scorn to prejudice you in favor of

what I have to say, by taking upon me a fictitious character, as other people have done. I can venture to assure you, the true writer of the piece signed A W. FARMER, is not in reality a Farmer. He is some ministerial emissary, that has assumed the name to deceive you, and make you swallow the intoxicating potion he has prepared for you. But I have a better opinion of you, than to think he will be able to succeed. I am persuaded, you love yourselves and children better than to let any designing men cheat you out of your liberty and property, to serve their own purposes. You would be a disgrace to your ancestors, and the bitterest enemies to yourselves, and to your posterity, if you did not act like men, in protecting and defending those rights you have hitherto enjoyed.

I say, my friends, I do not address you in particular, because I have any greater connexion with you than with other people. I despise all false pretensions, and mean arts. Let those have recourse to dissimulation and falsehood, who can't defend their cause without it. 'T is my maxim, to let the plain naked truth speak for itself: and if men won't listen to it, 't is their own fault: they must be contented to suffer for it. I am neither merchant, nor farmer. I address you, because I wish well to my country, and of course to you, who are one chief support of it; and because an attempt

has been made to lead you astray in particular. You are the men, too, who would lose most, should you be foolish enough to counteract the prudent measures our worthy Congress has taken, for the preservation of our liberties. Those who advise you to do it, are not your friends, but your greatest foes. They would have you made slaves, that they may pamper themselves with the fruits of your honest labor. 'Tis the Farmer who is most oppressed in all countries where slavery prevails.

You have seen how clearly I have proved, that a non-importation and non-exportation, are the only peaceable means in our power, to save ourselves from the most dreadful state of slavery. I have shown there is not the least hope to be placed in any thing else. I have confuted all the principal cavils raised by the pretended Farmer; and I hope, before I finish, to satisfy you, that he has attempted to frighten you with the prospect of evils which will never happen. This, indeed, I have, in a great measure, done already, by making appear, the great probability, I may almost say, certainty, that our measures will procure us the most speedy redress.

Are you willing, then, to be slaves without a single struggle? Will you give up your freedom, or, which is the same thing, will you resign all security for your life and property, rather than

endure some small present inconveniences? Will you not take a little trouble to transmit the advantages you now possess, to those who are to come after you? I cannot doubt it. I would not suspect you of so much baseness and stupidity, as to suppose the contrary.

Pray, who can tell me why a farmer in America, is not as honest and good a man as a farmer in England? or, why has not the one as good a right to what he has earned by his labor as the other? I can't, for my life, see any distinction between them. And yet, it seems, the English farmers are to be governed and taxed by their own Assembly, or Parliament; and the American farmers are not. The former, are to choose their own Representatives from among themselves, whose interest is connected with theirs, and over whom they have proper control. The latter, are to be loaded with taxes by men three thousand miles off; by men who have no interest or connexions among them; but whose interest it will be, to burden them as much as possible; and over whom they cannot have the least restraint. How do you like this doctrine, my friends? Are you ready to own the English farmers for your masters? Are you willing to acknowledge their right to take your property from you, and when they please? I know you scorn the thought. You had rather die than submit to it.

But some people try to make you believe, we are disputing about the foolish trifle of three pence duty upon tea. They may as well tell you, that black is white. Surely you can judge for yourselves. Is a dispute, whether the Parliament of Great Britain shall make what laws, and impose what taxes, they please upon us, or not ; I say, is this a dispute about three pence duty upon tea ? The man that affirms it, deserves to be laughed at.

It is true, we are denying to pay the duty upon tea ; but it is not for the value of the thing itself. It is, because we cannot submit to that, without acknowledging the principle upon which it is founded ; and that principle is, *a right to tax us in all cases whatsoever.*

You have heretofore experienced the benefit of being taxed by your own Assemblies only. Your burdens are so light, that you scarcely feel them. You'd soon find the difference, if you were once to let the Parliament have the management of these matters.

How would you like to pay four shillings a year,* out of every pound your farms are worth, to be squandered (at least a great part of it) upon ministerial tools and court sycophants ? What would you think of giving a tenth part of the yearly products of your lands to the clergy ? Would you

* The full price of your farms every five years.

not think it very hard to pay ten shillings sterling, per annum, for every wheel of your waggons and other carriages; a shilling or two for every pane of glass in your houses; and two or three shillings for every one of your hearths? I might mention taxes upon your mares, cows, and many other things; but those I have already mentioned, are sufficient. Methinks I see you stare, and hear you ask, how you could live, if you were to pay such heavy taxes? Indeed, my friends, I can't tell you. You are to look out for that, and take care you do not run yourselves in the way of danger, by following the advice of those who want to betray you. This you may depend upon; if ever you let the Parliament carry its point, you will have these and more to pay. Perhaps, before long, your tables, and chairs, and platters, and dishes, and knives, and forks, and every thing else, would be taxed. Nay, I don't know but they would find means to tax you for every child you got, and for every kiss your daughters received from their sweet-hearts; and God knows, that would soon ruin you. The people of England would pull down the Parliament House, if their present heavy burdens were not transferred from them to you. Indeed, there is no reason to think, the Parliament would have any inclination to spare you. The contrary is evident.

But being ruined by taxes, is not the worst you have to fear. What security would you have for

your lives? How can any of you be sure you would have the free enjoyment of your religion long? Would you put your religion in the power of any set of men living? Remember, civil and religious liberty always go together: if the foundation of the one be sapped, the other will fall of course.

Call to mind one of our sister colonies, Boston. Reflect upon the situation of Canada; and then tell me, whether you are inclined to place any confidence in the justice and humanity of the Parliament. The port of Boston is blocked up, and an army planted in the town. An act has been passed to alter its charter; to prohibit its assemblies; to license the murder of its inhabitants; and to convey them from their own country to Great Britain, to be tried for their lives. What was all this for? Just because a small number of people, provoked by an open and dangerous attack upon their liberties, destroyed a parcel of Tea belonging to the East India Company. It was not public, but private, property they destroyed. It was not the act of the whole province, but the act of a part of the citizens. Instead of trying to discover the perpetrators, and commencing a legal prosecution against them; the Parliament of Great Britain interfered in an unprecedented manner, and inflicted a punishment upon a whole province, "untried, unheard, unconvicted of any crime." This may be justice,

but it looks so much like cruelty, that a man of a humane heart would be more apt to call it by the latter than the former name.

The affair of Canada, if possible, is still worse. The English laws have been superseded by the French laws. The Romish faith is made the established religion of the land, and his Majesty is placed at the head of it. The free exercise of the Protestant faith, depends upon the pleasure of the Governor and Council. The subject is divested of the right of trial by jury; and an innocent man may be imprisoned his whole life, without being able to obtain any trial at all. The Parliament was not contented with introducing arbitrary power and popery in Canada, with its former limits; but they have annexed to it, the vast tracts of land that surround all the colonies.

Does not your blood run cold, to think that an English Parliament should pass an act for the establishment of arbitrary power and popery, in such an extensive country? If they had had any regard to the freedom and happiness of mankind, they would never have done it. If they had been friends to the Protestant cause, they would never have provided such a nursery for its great enemy: they would not have given such encouragement to popery. The thought of their conduct, in this particular, shocks me. It must shock you, too, my friends. Beware of trusting yourselves to men,

who are capable of such an action! They may as well establish popery in New-York, and the other colonies, as they did in Canada. They had no more right to do it there than here.

Is it not better, I ask, to suffer a few present inconveniences, than to put yourselves in the way of losing everything that is precious? Your lives, your property, your religion, are all at stake. I do my duty. I warn you of your danger. If you should still be so mad as to bring destruction upon yourselves; if you should still neglect what you owe to God and man; you cannot plead ignorance in your excuse. Your consciences will reproach you for your folly; and your children's children will curse you.

You are told, the schemes of our Congress will ruin you. You are told, they have not considered your interest; but have neglected, or betrayed you. It is endeavored to make you look upon some of the wisest and best men in America, as rogues and rebels. What will not wicked men attempt! They will scruple nothing, that may serve their purposes. In truth, my friends, it is very unlikely any of us shall suffer much: but let the worst happen, the farmers will be better off than other people.

Many of those that made up the Congress, have large possessions in land, and may, therefore, be looked upon as farmers themselves. Can it be sup-

posed, they would be careless about the farmer's interest, when they could not injure that, without injuring themselves? You see the absurdity of such a supposition.

The merchants, and a great part of the tradesmen, get their living by commerce. These are the people that would be hurt most, by putting a stop to it. As to the farmers, "they furnish food for the merchant and mechanic: the raw materials for most manufactures, are the produce of their industry." The merchants and mechanics are already dependent upon the farmers for their food: and if the non-importation should continue any time, they would be dependent upon them for their clothes also.

It is a false assertion, that the merchants have imported more than usual this year. That report has been raised by your enemies, to poison your minds with evil suspicions. If our disputes be not settled within eighteen months, the goods we have among us, will be consumed; and then the materials for making clothes must be had from you. Manufactures must be promoted with vigor; and a high price will be given for your wool, flax, and hemp. It will be your interest to pay the greatest care and attention to your sheep. Increase and improve the breed as much as possible. *Kill them sparingly*, and such only as will not be of use toward the increase and improvement of them. In

a few months we shall know what we have to trust to. If matters be not accommodated by spring, enlarge the quantity of your flax and hemp. You will experience the benefit of it. All those articles will be very much wanted: they will bring a great deal higher price than they used to do. And while you are supplying the wants of the community, you will be enriching yourselves.

Should we hereafter find it necessary to stop our exports, you can apply more of your land to raising flax and hemp, and less of it to wheat, rye, &c. By which means, you will not have any of those latter articles to lie upon hand. There will be a consumption for as much of the former as you can raise; and the great demand they will be in, will make them very profitable to you.

Patience, good Mr. Critic! *Kill them sparingly*, I said. What objection have you to the phrase? You'll tell me, it is not *classical*; but I affirm it is, and if you will condescend to look into Mr. Johnson's dictionary, you will find I have his authority for it. Pray, then, for the future, *spare* your wit, upon such occasions, otherwise the world will not be disposed to *spare* its ridicule. And though the man that *s pares* nobody, does not deserve to be *spared* himself, yet will I *s pare* you, for the present, and proceed to things of more importance.

Pardon me, my friends, for taking up your time, with this digression; but I could not forbear step-

ping out of the way a little, to show the world, I am as able a critic, and as good a punster, as Mr. Farmer. I now return to the main point with pleasure.

It is insinuated, "That the bustle about non-importation, &c., has its rise, not from patriotism, but selfishness;" and is only made by the merchants, that they may get a high price for their goods.

By this time, I flatter myself you are convinced, that we are not disputing about trifles. It has been clearly proved to you, that we are contending for everything dear in life; and that the measures adopted by the Congress, are the only ones which can save us from ruin. This is sufficient to confute that insinuation. But to confirm it, let me observe to you, that the merchants have not been the foremost to bring about a non-importation. All the members of the Congress were unanimous in it; and *many* of them were not merchants. The warmest advocates for it, every where, are not concerned in trade: and, as I before remarked, the traders will be the principal sufferers, if it should continue any time.

But, it is said, it will not continue, because, "when the stores are like to become empty, they will have weight enough to break up the agreement." I don't think they would attempt it: but, if they should, it is impossible, a few mercenary men could have influence enough to make the

whole body of the people give up the only plan their circumstances admit of, for the preservation of their rights, and, of course, to forfeit all they have been so long striving to secure. The making of a non-importation agreement, did not depend upon the merchants; neither will the breaking of it depend upon them. The Congress have provided against the breach of the non-importation, by the non-consumption agreement. They have resolved, for themselves, and us, their constituents, “not to purchase, nor use, any East India Tea whatsoever; nor any goods, wares, or merchandise, from Great Britain, or Ireland, imported after the first of December; nor molasses, &c., from the West Indies; nor wine, from Madeira, or the Western Islands; nor foreign indigo.” If we do not purchase, nor use, these things, the merchant will have no inducement to import them.

Hence, you may perceive, the reason of a non-consumption agreement. It is, to put it out of the power of dishonest men, to break the non-importation. *Is this a slavish regulation?* Or, is it a hardship upon us, to submit to it? Surely not. Every sensible, every good man, must approve of it. Whoever tries to disaffect you to it, ought to meet with your contempt.

Take notice, my friends, how these men are obliged to contradict themselves. In one place, you are told, “that all the bustle about non-import-

tation, &c., has its rise, not from patriotism, but from selfishness ;” or, in other words, that it is made by the merchants, to get a higher price for their goods. In another place, it is said, “ that all we are doing, is instigated by some turbulent men, who want to establish a republican form of government among us.”

The Congress is censured, for appointing committees to carry their measures into execution, and directing them, “ to establish such further regulations, as they may think proper, for that purpose.” Pray, did we not appoint our Delegates, to make regulations for us ? What signified making them, if they did not provide some persons, to see them executed ? Must a few bad men be left to do what they please, contrary to the general sense of the people, without any persons to control them, or to look into their behaviour, and mark them out to the public ? The man that desires to screen his knavery from the public eye, will answer, Yes : but the honest man, that is determined to do nothing hurtful to his country, and who is conscious his actions will bear the light, will heartily answer, No.

The high prices of goods are held up, to make you dissatisfied with the non-importation. If the argument on this head were true, it would be much better to subject yourselves to that disadvantage, for a time, than to bring upon yourselves all the

mischiefs I have pointed out to you. Should you submit to the claims of the Parliament, you will not only be oppressed with the taxes upon your lands, &c., which I have already mentioned; but you will have to pay heavy taxes upon all the goods we import from Great Britain. Large duties will be laid upon them at home; and the merchants, of course, will have a greater price for them, or it would not be worth their while to carry on trade. The duty laid upon paper, glass, painter's colors, &c., was a beginning of this kind. The present duty upon tea, is preparatory to the imposition of duties upon all other articles. Do you think the Parliament would make such a serious matter of three pence a pound upon tea, if it intended to stop there? It is absurd to imagine it. You would soon find your mistake if you did. For fear of paying somewhat a higher price to the merchants, for a year or two, you would have to pay an endless list of taxes, within and without, as long as you live, and your children after you.

But, I trust, there is no danger that the prices of goods will rise much, if at all. The same Congress, that put a stop to the importation of them, has also forbid raising the prices of them. The same committee that is to regulate the one, is also to regulate the other. All care will be taken to give no cause of dissatisfaction. Confide in the men whom you, and the rest of the continent, have chosen the

guardians of our common liberties. They are men of sense and virtue. They will do nothing but what is really necessary for the security of your lives and properties.

A sad pother is made, too, about prohibiting the exportation of sheep without excepting wethers. The poor Farmer is at a mighty loss to know how wethers can improve, or increase the breed. Truly I am not such a conjurer as to be able to inform him: but, if you please, my friends, I can give you two pretty good reasons why the Congress have not excepted wethers. One is, that, for some time, we shall have occasion for all the wool we can raise; so that it would be imprudent to export sheep of any kind. And the other is, that if you confine yourself chiefly to killing wethers, as you ought to do, you will have none to export. The gentleman who made the objection, must have known these things as well as myself: but he loves to crack a jest, and could not pass by so fair an opportunity.

He takes notice of the first of these reasons himself; but, in order to weaken its force, cries, "Let me ask you, brother farmers, which of you would keep a flock of sheep, barely for the sake of their wool?" To this he answers, "Not one of you. If you cannot sell your sheep to advantage, at a certain age, you cannot keep them to any profit." He thinks, because he calls you "brother

farmers," that he can cajole you into believing what he pleases: but you are not the fools he takes you for. You know what is for your own interest better than he can tell you. And we all know, that, in a little time, if our affairs be not settled, the demand for wool will be very great. You will be able to obtain such a price, as will make it worth your while to bestow the greatest attention upon your sheep.

In another place this crafty writer tells you, that, "from the day our exports from this province are stopped, the farmers may date the commencement of their ruin." He asks, "Will the shopkeeper give you his goods? Will the weaver, shoemaker, blacksmith, carpenter, work for you without pay?" I make no doubt you are satisfied, from what I have said, that we shall never have occasion to stop our exports: but if things turn out contrary to our expectation, and it should become necessary to take that step, you will find no difficulty in getting what you want from the merchants and mechanics. They will not be able to do without you: and, consequently, they cannot refuse to supply you with what you stand in need of from them. Where will the merchants and mechanics get food and materials for clothing, if not from the farmer? And if they are dependent upon you, for those two grand supports of life, how can they withhold what they have from you?

I repeat it, my friends, we shall know how matters are like to be settled by the spring. If our disputes be not terminated to our satisfaction by that time, it will be your business to plant large parts of your lands with flax and hemp. Those articles will be wanted for manufactures; and they will yield you a greater profit than any thing else. In the interim, take good care of your sheep.

I heartily concur with the farmer in condemning all illicit trade. Perjury is, no doubt, a most heinous and detestable crime: and, for my part, I had rather suffer any thing, than have my wants relieved at the expense of truth and integrity. I know there are many pretended friends to liberty, who will take offence at this declaration: but I speak the sentiments of my heart without reserve. I do not write for a party. I should scorn to be of any. All I say, is from a disinterested regard to the public weal.

The Congress, I am persuaded, were of the same opinion. They, like honest men, have, as much as was in their power, provided against this kind of trade, by agreeing to use no East India Tea whatever, after the first day of March next.

I shall now consider what has been said with respect to the payment of debts, and stopping of the courts of justice. Let what will happen, it will be your own faults, if you are not able to pay your

debts. I have told you, in what manner you may make as much out of your lands as ever: by bestowing more of your attention upon raising flax and hemp, and less upon other things. Those articles (as I have more than once observed) will be in the highest demand. There will be no doing without them; and, of course, you will be able to get a very profitable price for them. How can it be, that the farmers should be at a loss for money to pay their debts, at a time when the whole community must buy, not only their food, but all the materials for their clothes, from them? You have no reason to be uneasy on that account.

As to the courts of justice, no violence can, nor will, be used, to shut them up: but, if it should be found necessary, we may enter into solemn agreement, to cease from all litigations at law, except in particular cases. We may regulate law-suits in such a manner as to prevent any mischief that might arise from them. Restrictions may be laid on, to hinder merciless creditors from taking advantage of the times, to oppress and ruin their debtors: but, at the same time, not to put it in the power of the debtors, *wantonly* to withhold their just dues from their creditors, when they are able to pay them. The law ruins many a good honest family. Disputes may be settled in a more friendly way. One or two virtuous neighbors may be chosen, by each

party, to decide them. If the next Congress should think any regulations, concerning the courts of justice, requisite, they will make them; and proper persons will be appointed to carry them into execution, and to see that no individuals deviate from them. It will be your duty to elect persons, whose fidelity and zeal for your interest you can depend upon, to represent you in that Congress, which is to meet in Philadelphia in May ensuing.

The Farmer cries, "Tell me not of delegates, congresses, committees, mobs, riots, insurrections, associations: a plague on them all! Give me the steady, uniform, unbiassed, influence of the courts of justice. I have been happy under their protection; and, I trust in God, I shall be so again."

I say, tell me not of the British Commons, lords, ministry, ministerial tools, placemen, pensioners, parasites. I scorn to let my life and property depend upon the pleasure of any of them. Give me the steady, uniform, unshaken, security of constitutional freedom. Give me the right to be tried by a jury of my own neighbors; and to be taxed by my own representatives only. What will become of the law and courts of justice without this? The shadow may remain, but the substance will be gone. I would die to preserve the law upon a solid foundation: but take away liberty, and the foundation is destroyed.

The last thing I shall take notice of, is the com-

plaint of the Farmer, that the Congress will not allow you "a dish of tea to please your wives with, nor a glass of Madeira to cheer your spirits, nor a spoonful of molasses to sweeten your buttermilk with." You would have a right to complain, if the use of these things had been forbidden to you alone: but it has been equally forbidden to all sorts of people. The members of the Congress, themselves, are no more permitted to please their wives with a dish of tea, nor to cheer their spirits with a glass of wine, nor to sweeten their buttermilk with a spoonful of molasses, than you are. They are upon a footing with you in this respect.

By him—but, with your leave, my friends, we'll try, if we can, to do without swearing. I say, it is enough to make a man mad, to hear such ridiculous quibbles offered, instead of sound argument: but so it is: the piece I am writing against contains nothing else.

When a man grows warm, he has a confounded itch for swearing. I have been going, above twenty times, to rap out an oath, *By him that made me*: but I have checked myself with the reflection, that it is rather *unmannerly*, to treat him that made us with so much freedom.

Thus have I examined and confuted, all the cavils and objections, of any consequence, stated by this Farmer. I have only passed over such things as are of little weight, the fallacy of which will easily

appear. I have shown, that the Congress have neither “ignorantly misunderstood, carelessly neglected, nor basely betrayed you;” but that they have devised and recommended, the *only* effectual means to preserve your invaluable privileges. I have proved that their measures cannot fail of success; but will procure the most speedy relief for us. I have also proved, that the farmers are the people who would suffer least, should we be obliged to carry all our measures into execution.

Will you, then, my friends, allow yourselves to be duped by this artful enemy? Will you follow his advices, disregard the authority of your Congress, and bring ruin on yourselves and posterity? Will you act in such a manner as to deserve the hatred and resentment of all the rest of America? I am sure you will not. I should be sorry to think any of my countrymen would be so mean, so blind to their own interest, so lost to every generous and manly feeling.

The sort of men I am opposing, give you fair words to persuade you to serve their own turns; but they think and speak of you, in common, in a very disrespectful manner. I have heard some of their party talk of you, as the most ignorant and mean-spirited set of people in the world. They say, that you have no sense of honor or generosity; that you don't care a farthing about your country, children, nor any body else but yourselves: and

that you are so ignorant, as not to be able to look beyond the present: so that if you can once be persuaded to believe the measures of your Congress will involve you in some little present perplexities, you will be glad to do anything to avoid them; without considering the much greater miseries that await you at a little distance off. This is the character they give of you. Bad men are apt to paint others like themselves. For my part, I will never entertain such an opinion of you, unless you should verify their words, by wilfully falling into the pit they have prepared for you. I flatter myself you will convince them of their error, by showing the world, you are capable of judging what is right and left, and have resolution to pursue it.

All I ask, is, that you will judge for *yourselves*. I don't desire you to take my opinion, nor any man's opinion, as the guide of your actions. I have stated a number of plain arguments. I have supported them with several well-known facts. It is your business to draw a conclusion, and act accordingly. I caution you, again and again, to beware of the men who advise you to forsake the plain path marked out for you by the Congress. They only mean to deceive and betray you. Our representatives in general assembly, cannot take any wiser or better course to settle our differences, than our representatives in the continental congress have

taken. If you join with the rest of America in the same common measure, you will be sure to preserve your liberties inviolate : but if you separate from them, and seek for redress alone, and unseconded, you will certainly fall a prey to your enemies, and repent your folly as long as you live.

May God give you wisdom to see what is your true interest, and inspire you with becoming zeal for the cause of virtue and mankind.

“A SHORT time after,* a reply followed, entitled “A View of the Controversy, by a Westchester Farmer,” marked with still greater asperity than the former, and pressing its object with new arguments. The inertness of the colony is shown, to prove the narrow circle of factious principles; the right of legislation in the colonies is denied, on inferences drawn from the tenor of the colonial charters; the effect of an embargo, to sever from them their English friends, is alleged; the dangers of a civil war strongly deprecated, and a remedy proposed of vesting in Parliament, the enactment of general laws, reserving to the legislatures the mere right of taxation.

Within a month,† this paper was followed by a more elaborate answer, of seventy-eight pages, entitled “The Farmer Refuted; or a more Comprehensive and Impartial View of the Disputes between Great Britain and the Colonies; intended as a Further Vindication of the Congress, in answer to a Letter from A. W. Farmer, entitled A View of the Controversy between Great Britain and her Colonies, including a Mode of determining the present Disputes finally and effectually, etc. By a Sincere Friend to America. Tituli Remedia pollicentur, sed Pixedes ipsæ venena continent. The title promises Remedies, but the Box itself poisons. Printed by James Rivington, 1775.”—*Life of Hamilton, by his Son*: p. 31, vol. 1.

* January 5, 1775.

† February 5, 1775.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE writer of the ensuing sheets can, with truth, say more than the generality of those, who either espouse, or oppose, the claim of the BRITISH PARLIAMENT; which is, that *his* political opinions have been the result of mature deliberation and rational inquiry. They have not been influenced by prejudice, nor by any interested or ambitious motives. They are not the *spawn* of licentious clamors, or popular declamation; but the genuine offspring of sober reason. To those who are inclined to doubt *his* sincerity, *he* begs leave to recommend a little more *charity*. To those who are possessed of greater candor, and who, yet, may be disposed to ask, How *he* can be sure, that his opinions have not been influenced by prejudice? *He* answers, Because he remembers the time, when he had strong prejudices on the side *he* now opposes. His change of sentiment (*he* firmly believes), proceeded from the superior force of the arguments in favor of the American claims.

Though *he* is convinced there are too many, whose judgments are led captive by the most venal and despicable motives; yet *he* does not presume to think every man, who differs from him, either fool or knave. *He* is sensible there are men of parts and virtue, whose notions are entirely contrary to his. To imagine there are not wise and good men on both sides, must be the effect of a weak head, or a corrupt heart. *He* earnestly entreats the candid attention of the judicious and well-meaning; and hopes, that what he has written, may be read with as much impartiality, and as sincere a regard to truth, as the importance of the controversy demands.

 THE FARMER REFUTED.

SIR.—I resume my pen, in reply to the curious epistle you have been pleased to favor me with; and can assure you, that notwithstanding I am naturally of a grave and phlegmatic disposition, it has been the source of abundant merriment to me. The spirit that breathes throughout, is so rancorous, illiberal, and imperious; the argumentative part of it, is so puerile and fallacious; the misrepresentations of facts, so palpable and flagrant; the criticisms so illiterate, trifling, and absurd; the conceits so low, steril, and splenetic; that I will venture to pronounce it one of the most ludicrous

performances, which has been exhibited to public view, during all the present controversy.

You have not even imposed on me the laborious task of pursuing you through a labyrinth of subtilty. You have not had ability sufficient, however violent your efforts, to try the *depths* of *sophistry*; but have barely skimmed along its *surface*. I should, almost, deem the animadversions I am going to make, unnecessary, were it not that, without them, you might exult in a fancied victory, and arrogate to yourself imaginary trophies.

But, while I pass this judgment, it is not my intention to detract from your real merit. Candor obliges me to acknowledge, that you possess every accomplishment of a polemical writer, which may serve to dazzle and mislead superficial and vulgar minds: a peremptory dictatorial air; a pert vivacity of expression; an inordinate passion for conceit; and a noble disdain of being fettered by the laws of truth. These, Sir, are important qualifications; and these all unite in you, in a very eminent degree. So that, though you may never expect the plaudits of the judicious and discerning, you may console yourself with this assurance; that

“Fools and wittings “will” ev’ry sentence raise,
And wonder, with a foolish face of praise.”

You will, no doubt, be pleased with this further concession; to wit: that there is a striking resemblance between yourself and the renowned hero

of the *Dunciad*. “*Pert dullness,*” seems to be the chief characteristic of your genius as well as his. I might point out a variety of circumstances in which you both agree ; but I shall content myself with having given the hint, and leave it to yourself and to your *other** admirers, to prosecute a comparison, which will reflect so high lustre on the object of admiration.

Having thus briefly delivered my sentiments of your performance in general, I shall proceed to a particular examination of it, so far as may be requisite, towards placing it in that just point of light in which it ought to stand. I flatter myself, I shall find no difficulty in obviating the objections you have produced against the “*Full Vindication ;*” and in showing that your “*View of the Controversy between Great Britain and the Colonies,*” is not only partial and unjust, but diametrically opposite to the first principles of civil society. In doing this, I may occasionally interweave some strictures on the “*Congress Canvassed.*”

First, then, I observe you endeavor to bring the imputation of inconsistency upon me, for writing “*a long and elaborate pamphlet, to justify decisions, against whose influence none but impotent attempts had been made.*” A little attention would have unfolded the whole mystery. The reason assigned

* If we may judge from the style and turn of thought, you were pleased to be your own admirer in the *card in reply*.

for what I did, was, "lest those attempts," impotent as they were, in a general sense, "might yet have a tendency to mislead and prejudice the minds of a few." To prevent this, I wrote: and if I have been instrumental in preserving a single person from the baneful effects of your insidious efforts, I shall not regret the time I have devoted to that laudable purpose. To confirm, or to add, one friend to his country, would afford a more refined and permanent satisfaction to me, than could possibly animate the breast of the proudest ministerial minion, though elevated to the pinnacle of his wished-for preferment, and basking in the sunshine of court favor, as the despicable wages of his prostitution and servility.

You tell me, "I knew, that at the bar of impartial reason and common sense, the conduct of the Congress must be condemned; but was too much interested, too deeply engaged in party-views and party-heats, to bear this with patience. I had no remedy (you say) but *artifice, sophistry, misrepresentation, and abuse.*" These you call "my weapons, and these I wield like an old experienced practitioner."

You ask, "Is this too heavy a charge? Can you lay your hand upon your heart, and upon your honor plead not guilty?" Yes, sir, I can do more. I can make a solemn appeal to the tribunal of Heaven, for the rectitude of my intentions. I can af-

firm, with the most scrupulous regard to truth, that I am of opinion, the conduct of the Congress will bear the most impartial scrutiny; that I am not interested more than as the felicity and prosperity of this vast continent are concerned; and that I am perfectly disengaged from party of every kind.

Here, I expect you will exclaim, with your usual vehemence and indecency, "You are now espousing the cause of a party! It is the most daring impudence and falsehood to assert the contrary!" I can by no means conceive, that an opposition to a small herd of malcontents, among whom you have thought proper to rank, and a zealous attachment to the general measures of America, can be denominated the effect of a party spirit. You, sir, and your adherents, may be justly deemed a faction, because you compose a small number inimical to the common voice of your country. To determine the truth of this affirmation, it is necessary to take a comprehensive view of all the colonies.

Throughout your letter, you seem to consider me as a person who has acted, and is still acting, some part in the formation and execution of public measures. You tacitly represent me as a Delegate, or member of the Committee. Whether this be done with a design to create a suspicion of my sincerity, or whether it be really your opinion, I know not. Perhaps it is from a complex motive. But I can

assure you, if you are in earnest, that you are entirely mistaken. I have taken no other part in the affair, than that of defending the proceedings of the Congress, in conversation, and by the pamphlet I lately published. I approved of them, and thought an undeviating compliance with them, essential to the preservation of American freedom. I shall, therefore, strenuously exert myself for the promotion of that valuable end.

In the field of literary contention, it is common to see the epithets *artifice*, *sophistry*, *misrepresentation*, and *abuse*, mutually bandied about. Whether they are more justly applicable to you, or to me, the public must decide. With respect to abuse, I make not the least doubt, but every reader will allow you to surpass me in that.

Your envenomed pen, has endeavored to sully the characters of our continental representatives, with the presumptuous charges of ignorance, knavery, sedition, rebellion, treason, and tyranny;—a tremendous catalogue indeed! Nor have you treated their friends and adherents with any greater degree of complaisance. You have also delineated the mercantile body, as entirely devoid of principle; and the several committees, as bands of robbers and petty tyrants. In short, except the few who are of your own complexion and stamp, “the *virtuous* friends of order and good government,” you have not hesitated to exercise your obloquy and malevolence against the whole continent.

These things being considered, it is manifest, that in my answer to your "Free Thoughts," I treated you with more lenity than you had a right to expect; and did by no means observe the strict law of retaliation. None but yourself, will think you can, with the least propriety, complain of abuse.

I congratulate myself upon the sentiments you entertain of my last performance. Such is my opinion of your abilities as a critic, that I very much prefer your disapprobation to your applause. But with respect to the *brilliancy* of thought you speak of, give me leave to inform you, that I aimed at nothing more than justness of thought. I addressed myself to the judgment, not to the imagination. In works where fancy is predominant, as is the case with yours, there is a better opportunity for displaying brilliancy of thought, than where reason presides and directs. No wonder, then, if you have excelled me in this particular; since your plan is so much more favorable to it than mine.

I shall, for the present, pass over to that part of your pamphlet, in which you endeavor to establish the supremacy of the British Parliament over America. After a proper *eclaircissement* of this point, I shall draw such inferences as will sap the foundation of every thing you have offered.

The first thing that presents itself, is a wish, that "I had, explicitly, declared to the public, my ideas of the *natural rights* of mankind. Man, in a state

of nature (you say), may be considered as perfectly free from all restraint of *law* and *government*; and then, the weak must submit to the strong."

I shall, henceforth, begin to make some allowance for that enmity you have discovered to the *natural rights* of mankind. For, though ignorance of them, in this enlightened age, cannot be admitted as a sufficient excuse for you; yet it ought, in some measure, to extenuate your guilt. If you will follow my advice, there still may be hopes of your reformation. Apply yourself, without delay, to the study of the law of nature. I would recommend to your perusal, Grotius, Puffendorf, Locke, Montesquieu, and Burlamaqui. I might mention other excellent writers on this subject; but if you attend, diligently, to these, you will not require any others.

There is so strong a similitude between your political principles and those maintained by Mr. Hobbes, that, in judging from them, a person might very easily *mistake* you for a disciple of his. His opinion was exactly coincident with yours, relative to man in a state of nature. He held, as you do, that he was, then, perfectly free from all restraint of *law* and *government*. Moral obligation, according to him, is derived from the introduction of civil society; and there is no virtue but what is purely artificial, the mere contrivance of politicians, for the maintenance of social intercourse. But the

reason he run into this absurd and impious doctrine, was, that he disbelieved the existence of an intelligent, superintending principle, who is the governor, and will be the final judge of the universe.

As you, sometimes, swear *by him that made you*, I conclude your sentiments do not correspond with his, in that which is the basis of the doctrine you both agree in: and this makes it impossible to imagine whence this congruity between you arises. To grant, that there is a supreme intelligence, who rules the world, and has established laws to regulate the actions of his creatures; and, still, to assert, that man, in a state of nature, may be considered as perfectly free from all restraints of *law* and *government*, appears, to a common understanding, altogether irreconcilable.

Good and wise men, in all ages, have embraced a very dissimilar theory. They have supposed, that the deity, from the relations we stand in to Himself, and to each other, has constituted an eternal and immutable law, which is indispensably obligatory upon all mankind, prior to any human institution whatever.

This is what is called the law of nature, “ which, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is, of course, superior in obligations to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times. No human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as

are valid, derive all their authority, mediately, or immediately, from this original.”—BLACKSTONE.

Upon this law depend the natural rights of mankind: the Supreme Being gave existence to man, together with the means of preserving and beautifying that existence. He endowed him with rational faculties, by the help of which, to discern and pursue such things as were consistent with his duty and interest; and invested him with an inviolable right to personal liberty and personal safety.

Hence, in a state of nature, no man had any *moral* power to deprive another of his life, limbs, property, or liberty; nor the least authority to command, or exact, obedience from him, except that which arose from the ties of consanguinity.

Hence, also, the origin of all civil government, justly established, must be a voluntary compact between the rulers and the ruled; and must be liable to such limitations, as are necessary for the security of the *absolute rights* of the latter: for what original title can any man, or set of men, have to govern others, except their own consent? To usurp dominion over a people, in their own despite; or to grasp at a more extensive power than they are willing to entrust; is to violate that law of nature, which gives every man a right to his personal liberty; and can, therefore, confer no obligation to obedience.

“The principal aim of society, is to protect indi-

viduals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature ; but which could not be preserved, in peace, without that mutual assistance and intercourse, which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities. Hence it follows, that the first and primary end of human laws, is to maintain and regulate these *absolute rights* of individuals.”—**BLACKSTONE.**

If we examine the pretensions of Parliament by this criterion, which is evidently a good one, we shall presently detect their injustice. First, they are subversive of our natural liberty, because an authority is assumed over us, which we by no means assent to. And, secondly, they divest us of that moral security, for our lives and properties, which we are entitled to, and which it is the primary end of society to bestow. For such security can never exist, while we have no part in making the laws that are to bind us ; and while it may be the interest of our uncontrolled legislators to oppress us as much as possible.

To deny these principles, will be not less absurd, than to deny the plainest axioms. I shall not, therefore, attempt any further illustration of them.

You say, “ When I assert, that since Americans have not, by any act of theirs, empowered the British Parliament to make laws for them, it follows they can have no just authority to do it ; I advance

a position subversive of that dependence, which all colonies must, from their very nature, have on the mother country." The premises from which I drew this conclusion, are indisputable. You have not detected any fallacy in them; but endeavor to overthrow them by deducing a false and imaginary consequence. My principles admit the only dependence which can subsist, consistent with any idea of civil liberty, or with the future welfare of the British empire, as will appear hereafter.

"The dependence of the colonies on the mother country," you assert, "has ever been acknowledged. It is an impropriety of speech, to talk of an independent colony. The words independent and colony, convey contradictory ideas; much like *killing* and *sparing*.* As soon as a colony becomes independent on the parent state, it ceases to be any longer a colony, just as when you *kill* a sheep, you cease to *spare* him."

In what sense the dependence of the colonies on the mother country, has been acknowledged, will appear from those circumstances of their political history, which I shall, by and by, recite. The

* I find, Sir, you take a particular delight in persisting in absurdity. But if you are not totally incorrigible, the following interpretation of the unfortunate *adverb*, will secure it from any future stripes. It is taken from Johnson's Dictionary: SPARINGLY, not abundantly, *Bacon*; 2, frugally, parsimoniously; not lavishly. *Hayward*; with abstinence, *Atterbury*; cautiously, tenderly. Substitute *frugally*, or, *not lavishly*, for *sparingly*, and you must blush at your own conceit. "Kill your sheep *frugally*, or, *not lavishly*." Where is the impropriety of this?

term colony, signifies nothing more than a body of people drawn from the mother country, to inhabit some distant place, or the country itself so inhabited. As to the degrees and modifications of that subordination, which is due to the parent state, these must depend upon other things besides the mere act of emigration, to inhabit or settle a distant country. These must be ascertained by the spirit of the constitution of the mother country; by the compacts for the purpose of colonizing; and, more especially, by the law of nature, and that *supreme law* of every society—*its own happiness*.

The idea of colony does not involve the idea of slavery. There is a wide difference between the dependence of a free people, and the submission of slaves. The former I allow; the latter I reject with disdain. Nor does the notion of a colony imply any subordination to our fellow subjects in the parent state, while there is one common sovereign established. The dependence of the colonies on Great Britain, is an ambiguous and equivocal phrase. It may either mean dependence on the people of Great Britain, or on the king. In the former sense, it is absurd and unaccountable. In the latter, it is just and rational. No person will affirm, that a French colony is independent on the parent state, though it acknowledge the king of France as rightful sovereign. Nor can it, with any greater propriety, be said, that an English colony is

independent, while it bears allegiance to the king of Great Britain. The difference between their dependence, is only that which distinguishes civil liberty from slavery; and results from the different genius of the French and English constitutions.

But you deny that "we can be liege subjects to the king of Great Britain, while we disavow the authority of Parliament." You endeavor to prove it thus:* "The king of Great Britain was placed on the throne, by virtue of an act of Parliament: and he is king of America, by virtue of being king of Great Britain. He is, therefore, king of America by act of Parliament: and, if we disclaim that authority of Parliament which made him our king, we, in fact, reject him from being our king; for we disclaim that authority by which he is king at all."

Admitting that the king of Great Britain was enthroned by virtue of an act of Parliament; and that he is king of America, because he is king of Great Britain; yet, the act of Parliament is not the *efficient cause* of his being the king of America. It is only the *occasion* of it. He is king of America, by virtue of a compact between us and the kings of Great Britain. These colonies were planted and settled by the grants, and under the protection, of English kings, who entered into covenants with us, for themselves, their heirs, and successors; and it is from these covenants, that the duty of protection,

* Vide "Congress Canvassed."

on their part, and the duty of allegiance, on ours, arise.

So that, to disclaim the authority of a British Parliament over us, does by no means imply the dereliction of our allegiance to British monarchs. Our compact takes no cognizance of the manner of their accession to the throne. It is sufficient for us that they are kings of England.

The most valid reasons can be assigned for our allegiance to the king of Great Britain; but not one of the least force, or plausibility, for our subjection to parliamentary decrees.

We hold our lands in America by virtue of charters from British monarchs; and are under no obligations to the Lords, or Commons, for them. Our title is similar, and equal, to that by which they possess their lands; and the king is the legal fountain of both. This is one grand source of our obligation to allegiance.

Another, and the principal source, is, that protection which we have hitherto enjoyed from the kings of Great Britain. Nothing is more common than to hear the votaries of Parliament, urge the protection we have received from the mother country, as an argument for submission to its claims. But they entertain erroneous conceptions of the matter. The king himself, being the supreme executive magistrate, is regarded by the constitution, as the supreme protector of the empire. For this

purpose, he is the generalissimo, or first in military command. In him is vested the power of making war and peace; of raising armies, equipping fleets, and directing all their motions. He it is, that has defended us from our enemies; and to him alone we are obliged to render allegiance and submission.

The law of nature, and the British constitution, both, confine allegiance to the person of the king; and found it upon the principle of protection. We may see the subject discussed at large, in the case of Calvin. The definition given of it by the learned Coke, is this: "Legiance is the mutual bond and obligation between the king and his subjects; whereby subjects are called his liege subjects, because they are bound to obey and serve him: and he is called their liege lord, because he is bound to maintain and defend them." Hence it is evident, that while we enjoy the protection of the king, it is incumbent upon us to obey and serve him, without the interposition of parliamentary supremacy.

The right of Parliament to legislate for us, cannot be accounted for upon any reasonable grounds. The constitution of Great Britain is very properly called a limited monarchy; the people having reserved to themselves a share in the legislature, as a check upon the regal authority, to prevent its degenerating into despotism and tyranny. The very aim and intention of the democratical part, or

the House of Commons, is, to secure the rights of the people. Its very being depends upon those rights. Its whole power is derived from them, and must be terminated by them.

It is the unalienable birth-right of every Englishman, who can be considered as a *free agent*, to participate in framing the laws which are to bind him, either as to his life or property. But, as many inconveniences would result from the exercise of this right, in person; it is appointed by the constitution, that he shall delegate it to another. Hence, he is to give his vote in the election of some person he chooses to confide in as his representative. This right no power on earth can divest him of. It was enjoyed by his ancestors time immemorial; recognized and established by Magna Charta; and is essential to the existence of the constitution. Abolish this privilege, and the House of Commons is annihilated.

But what was the use and design of this privilege? To secure his life and property from the attacks of exorbitant power. And in what manner is this done? By giving him the election of those who are to have the disposal and regulation of them, and whose interest is in every respect connected with his.

The representative, in this case, is bound, by every possible tie, to consult the advantage of his constituent. Gratitude for the high and honorable

trust reposed in him, demands a return of attention, and regard to the advancement of his happiness. Self-interest, that most powerful incentive of human actions, points and attracts towards the same object.

The duration of his trust is not perpetual, but must expire in a few years : and if he is desirous of the future favor of his constituents, he must not abuse the present instance of it, but must pursue the end for which he enjoys it ; otherwise he forfeits it, and defeats his own purpose. Besides, if he consent to any laws hurtful to his constituent, he is bound by the same, and must partake the disadvantage of them. His friends, relations, children, all whose ease and comfort are dear to him, will be in a like predicament. And should he concur in any flagrant acts of injustice or oppression, he will be within the reach of popular vengeance ; and this will restrain him within due bounds.

To crown the whole ; at the expiration of a few years, if their representatives have abused their trust, the people have it in their power to change them ; and to elect others, who may be more faithful and more attached to their interest.

These securities, the most powerful that human affairs will admit of, have the people of Britain, for the good department of their representatives towards them. They may have proved, at some

times, and on some occasions, defective ; but, upon the whole, they have been found sufficient.

When we ascribe to the British House of Commons, a jurisdiction over the colonies, the scene is entirely reversed. All these kinds of security immediately disappear : no ties of gratitude or interest remain. Interest, indeed, may operate to our prejudice. To oppress us, may serve as a recommendation to their constituents, as well as an alleviation of their own incumbrances. The British patriots may, in time, be heard to court the gale of popular favor, by boasting their exploits in laying some new impositions on their American vassals ; and, by that means, lessening the burthens of their friends and fellow subjects.

But what merits still more serious attention, is this : There seems to be, already, a jealousy of our dawning splendor. It is looked upon as portentous of approaching independence. This, we have reason to believe, is one of the principal incitements to the present rigorous and unconstitutional proceedings against us. And though it may have chiefly originated in the calumnies of designing men, yet it does not entirely depend upon adventitious or partial causes ; but is also founded in the circumstances of our country and situation. The boundless extent of territory we possess ; the wholesome temperament of our climate ; the luxuriance and fertility of our soil ; the variety of our products ;

the rapidity of our population; the industry of our countrymen; and the commodiousness of our ports; naturally lead to a suspicion of independence, and would always have an influence pernicious to us. Jealousy is a predominant passion of human nature, and is a source of the greatest evils. Whenever it takes place between rulers and their subjects, it proves the bane of civil society.

The experience of past ages may inform us, that when the circumstances of a people render them distressed, their rulers generally recur to severe, cruel, and oppressive measures. Instead of endeavoring to establish their authority in the *affection* of their subjects, they think they have no security but in their *fear*. They do not aim at gaining their fidelity and obedience, by making them flourishing, prosperous, and happy; but by rendering them abject and dispirited. They think it necessary to intimidate and awe them; to make every accession to their own power, and to impair the people's as much as possible.

One great engine to effect this in America, would be a large standing army, maintained out of our own pockets, to be at the devotion of our oppressors. This would be introduced under pretext of defending us; but, in fact, to make our bondage and misery complete.

We might soon expect the martial law, universally prevalent to the abolition of trials by juries,

the *Habeas Corpus* act, and every other bulwark of personal safety, in order to overawe the honest assertors of their country's cause. A numerous train of *court dependents* would be created and supported at our expense. The value of all our possessions, by a complication of extorsive measures, would be gradually depreciated, till it became a mere shadow.

This will be called too high wrought a picture, a phantom of my own deluded imagination. The highest eulogies will be lavished on the wisdom and justice of the British nation. But deplorable is the condition of that people, who have nothing else than the wisdom and justice of another to depend upon.

“Political writers,” says a celebrated author,* “have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, *every man* ought to be supposed a *knave*; and to have no other end, in all his actions, but *private interest*. By this interest we must govern him; and, by means of it, *make him co-operate to public good*, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition. Without this, we shall in vain boast of the advantages of *any constitution*; and shall find, in the end, that we have no security for our liberties and possessions, except the *good will* of our rulers; that is, we should have *no security at all*.

* Hume, vol. 1. Essay 5.

“It is, therefore, a just *political* maxim, that *every man must be supposed a knave*. Though, at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in politics, which is false in fact. But to satisfy us on this head, we may consider, that men are generally more honest in a private than in a public capacity; and will go greater lengths to serve a party, than when their own private interest is alone concerned. Honor is a great check upon mankind. But, where a considerable body of men act together, this check is, in a great measure, removed; since a man is sure to be approved by his own party, for what promotes the common interest: and he soon learns to despise the clamors of adversaries. To this we may add, that every court, or senate, is determined by the greater number of voices; so that, if self-interest influences only the majority (as it will always do), the whole senate follows the allurements of this separate interest; and acts as if it contained not one member who had any regard to public interest and liberty.” What additional force do these observations acquire, when applied to the dominion of one community over another!

From what has been said, it is plain, that we are without those checks upon the representatives of Great Britain, which alone can make them answer the end of their appointment with respect to us; which is the preservation of the rights, and

the advancement of the happiness, of the governed. The direct and inevitable consequence is, *they have no right to govern us.*

Let us examine it in another light. The House of Commons receives all its authority from its electors, in consequence of the right they have to a share in the legislature. Its electors are freeholders, citizens, and others, in Great Britain. It follows, therefore, that all its authority is confined to Great Britain. This is demonstrative. Sophistry, by an artful play of ambiguous terms, may perplex and obscure it; but reason can never confute it. The power, which one society bestows upon any man, or body of men, can never extend beyond its own limits. The people of Great Britain may confer an authority over themselves; but they can never confer any over the people of America; because, it is impossible for them to give *that* to another, which they never possessed themselves. Now, I should be glad to see an attempt to prove, that a freeholder, citizen, or any other man in Great Britain, has any inherent right to the life, property, or liberty, of a freeholder, citizen, or any other man, in America. He can have no original and intrinsic right; because nature has distributed an equality of rights to every man. He can have no secondary, or derivative right; because the only thing which could give him that, is wanting; the consent of the natural proprietor. It is incumbent upon you to de-

monstrate the existence of such a right; or anything else you may produce will be of little avail. I do not expect you will be discouraged at the apparent difficulty. It is the peculiar province of an enterprising genius to surmount the greatest obstacles; and you have discovered an admirable dexterity in this way. You have put to flight some of my best arguments, with no greater pains than a few positive assertions, and as many paltry witticisms: and you become altogether irresistible, by adding, with a proper degree of confidence, *You know the case to be as I state it.*

When I say, that the authority of Parliament is confined to Great Britain, I speak of it in its primitive and original state. Parliament may acquire an incidental influence over others; but this must be by their own free consent. For, without this, any power it might exercise, would be mere usurpation, and by no means a just authority.

The best way of determining disputes, and of investigating truth, is by descending to elementary principles. Any other method may only bewilder and misguide the understanding; but this will soon lead to a convincing and satisfactory crisis. By observing this method, we shall learn the following truths.

That the existence of the House of Commons, depends upon the people's right to a share in the legislature; which is exercised by means of elect-

ing the members of that house. That the end and intention of this right, is, to preserve the life, property, and liberty of the subject, from the encroachments of oppression and tyranny.

That this end is accomplished, by means of the *intimate connexion* of interest, between those members, and their constituents, the people of Great Britain.

That with respect to the people of America, there is no such *intimate connexion* of interest, but the contrary; and therefore that end could not be answered to them; consequently, the *end* ceasing, the *means* must cease also.

The House of Commons derives all its power from its own real constituents, who are the people of Great Britain; and that, therefore, it has no power but what they *originally* had in themselves.

That they had no original right to the life, property, or liberty, of Americans; nor any acquired from their own consent; and of course could give no authority over them.

That, therefore, the House of Commons has no such authority.

What need is there of a multiplicity of arguments, or a long chain of reasoning, to inculcate these luminous principles? They speak the plainest language to every man of common sense; and must carry conviction where the mental eye is not be-dimmed by the mist of prejudice, partiality, am-

bition, or avarice. Let us now see what has been offered in opposition to them.

But, by the way, let me remark, that I have levelled my battery chiefly against the authority of the House of Commons over America; because, if that be proved not to exist, the dispute is at an end. The efficacy of acts of Parliament, depends upon the due authority of the respective branches, to bind the different orders and ranks of the nation.

It is said, that “in every government there must be a supreme absolute authority lodged somewhere. In arbitrary governments, this power is in the monarch; in aristocratical governments, in the nobles; in democratical, in the people, or the deputies of their electing. Our own government, being a mixture of all these kinds, the supreme authority is vested in the king, nobles, and people; *i. e.*, the King, House of Lords, and House of Commons *elected by the people*. The supreme authority extends as far as the British dominions extend. To suppose a part of the British dominions, which is not subject to the power of the British legislature, is no better sense than to suppose a country, at one and the same time, to be, and not to be, a part of the British dominions. If, therefore, the colony of New-York is a part of the British dominions, the colony of New-York is subject to, and dependent on, the supreme legislative authority of Great Britain.”

This argument is the most specious of any the advocates for parliamentary supremacy are able to produce ; but when we come to anatomize, and closely examine, every part of it, we shall discover, that it is entirely composed of distorted and misapplied principles, together with ambiguous and equivocal terms.

The first branch is, That “in every government, there must be a supreme, absolute authority lodged somewhere.” This position, when properly explained, is evidently just. In every civil society, there must be a supreme power, to which all the members of that society are subject ; for, otherwise, there could be no supremacy, or subordination ; that is, no government at all. But no use can be made of this principle beyond matter of fact. To infer from thence, that unless a supreme absolute authority be vested in one part of an empire over all the other parts, there can be no government in the whole, is false and absurd. Each branch may enjoy a distinct, complete legislature, and still good government may be preserved everywhere. It is in vain to assert, that two or more distinct legislatures cannot exist in the same State. If, by the same State, be meant the same individual community, it is true. Thus, for instance, there cannot be two supreme legislatures in Great Britain, nor two in New-York. But if, by the same State, be understood a number of individual societies, or bodies politic, united under one common

head, then I maintain, that there may be one distinct, complete legislature in each. Thus there may be one in Great Britain, another in Ireland, and another in New-York; and still, these several parts may form but one State. In order to this, there must indeed be some connecting, pervading principle; but this is found in the person and prerogative of the king. He it is, that conjoins all these individual societies into one great body politic. He it is, that is to preserve their mutual connexion and dependence, and make them all cooperate to one common end, the general good. His power is equal to the purpose; and his interest binds him to the due prosecution of it.

Those who aver, that the independency of America on the British Parliament, implies two sovereign authorities in the same State, deceive themselves, or wish to deceive others, in two ways; by confounding the idea of the same State with that of the same individual society; and by losing sight of that share which the king has in the sovereignty, both of Great Britain and America. Perhaps, indeed, it may with propriety be said, that the king is the only sovereign of the empire. The part which the people have in the legislature, may more justly be considered as a limitation of the sovereign authority, to prevent its being exercised in an oppressive and despotic manner. Monarchy is universally allowed to predominate in

the constitution. In this view, there is not the least absurdity in the supposition, that Americans have a right to a limitation, similar to that of the people of Great Britain. At any rate, there can never be said to be two sovereign powers in the same State, while *one common king* is acknowledged by every member of it.

Let us, for a moment, imagine the legislature of New-York independent on that of Great Britain. Where would be the mighty inconvenience? How would government be frustrated, or obstructed, by this means? In what manner would they interfere with each other? In none, that I can perceive. The affairs of government might be conducted with the greatest harmony, and, by the mediation of the king, directed to the same end. He (as I before observed) will be the great connecting principle. The several parts of the empire, though otherwise independent on each other, will all be dependent on him. He must guide the vast and complicated machine of government, to the reciprocal advantage of all his dominions. There is not the least contradiction in this; no *imperium in imperio*, as is maintained: for the power of every distinct branch will be limited to itself; and the authority of his Majesty over the whole, will, like a central force, attract them all to the same point.

The second part of your paragraph, is this: "In arbitrary governments, this (supreme absolute)

power is in the monarch ; in aristocratical governments, in the nobles ; in democratical, in the people, or the deputies of their electing. Our own government, being a mixture of all these kinds, the supreme authority is vested in the king, nobles, and people ; that is, in the King, House of Lords, and House of Commons elected by the people.”

You are mistaken when you confine arbitrary government to a monarchy. It is not the supreme power being placed in one, instead of many, that discriminates an arbitrary from a free government. When any people are ruled by laws, in framing which they have no part, that are to bind them, to all intents and purposes, without, in the same manner, binding the legislators themselves, they are, in the strictest sense, slaves ; and the government, with respect to them, is despotic. Great Britain is itself a free country ; but it is only so, because its inhabitants have a share in the legislature. If they were once divested of that, they would cease to be free. So that, if its jurisdiction be extended over other countries that have no actual share in its legislature, it becomes arbitrary to them ; because they are destitute of those checks and controls which constitute that *moral* security, which is the very essence of civil liberty.

I will go farther, and assert, that the authority of the British Parliament over America, would, in all probability, be a more intolerable and excessive

species of despotism than an absolute monarchy.* The power of an absolute prince is not temporary, but perpetual. He is under no temptation to purchase the favor of one part of his dominions at the expense of another; but it is his interest to treat them all upon the same footing. Very different is the case with regard to the Parliament. The Lords and Commons, both, have a private and separate interest to pursue. They must be wonderfully disinterested, if they would not make us bear a very disproportional part of the public burthens, to avoid them as much as possible themselves. The people of Britain must, *in reality*, be an order of superior beings, not cast in the same mould with the common degenerate race of mortals, if the sacrifice of our interest and ease to theirs, be not extremely welcome and alluring. But should experience teach us, that they are only mere mortals, fonder of themselves than their neighbors; the philanthropy and integrity of their representatives will be of a

* Mr. Hume, in enumerating those political maxims, which will be eternally true, speaks thus: "It may easily be observed, that though free governments have been commonly the most happy, for those who partake of their freedom, yet are they the most ruinous and oppressive to *their provinces*." He goes on to give many solid reasons for this; and, among other things, observes, that "a free state necessarily makes a great distinction (between herself and the provinces), and must continue to do so, till men learn to love their neighbors as well as themselves." He confirms his reflections by many historical facts, and concludes them thus: "Compare the *pais conquis* of France with Ireland, and you will be convinced of this truth: though this latter kingdom, being in a good measure peopled from England, possesses so many rights and privileges, as should naturally make it challenge better treatment."

transcendent and matchless nature, should they not gratify the natural propensities of their constituents, in order to ingratiate themselves, and enhance their popularity.

When you say, that "our government, being a mixture of all these kinds, the supreme authority is vested in the king, nobles, and *people*; that is, the King, House of Lords, and House of Commons *elected by the people*;" you speak unintelligibly. A person who had not read any more of your pamphlet than this passage, would have concluded you were speaking of our Governor, Council, and Assembly, whom, by a rhetorical figure, you styled, "King, Nobles, and people." For how could it be imagined, you would call any government *our own*, with this description, that it is vested in the King, Nobles, and *people*, in which, *our own people* have not the *least share*? If our own government be vested in the King, Nobles, and people, how comes it to pass, that *our own* people have no part in it? The resolution of these questions will afford a proper field in which to display your ingenuity. You must endeavor to transmute the people of America into those of Great Britain, or your description will be considered as mere jargon, by every man of sense. Perhaps you may be able, in imitation of that celebrated sophist Spinosa, to prove, that they are only *modally* different, but *substantially* the same. Or, if you please, that syllogism of the schools, by which a

man is proved a *horse*, may serve as an excellent model. If I recollect right, it is in these words:

Homo est animal :
Equus est animal :
Ergo, homo est equus.

Which is rendered thus: A man is an *animal*: A horse is an *animal*: *Therefore a man is a horse.* By the same method of argumentation, you may prove, that, as Britons and Americans are *generically* the same, they are *numerically* so, likewise, as your description implies. You may form a syllogism thus:

Britons are men:
 Americans are the *same*:
 Therefore, Britons and Americans are the *same*.

This argument will be as good as the one I am next going to examine.

“The supreme authority,” you say, “extends as far as the *British* dominions extend. To suppose a part of the *British* dominions, which is not subject to the power of the British legislature, is no better sense, than to suppose a country at one and the same time, to be, and not to be, a part of the *British* dominions. If, therefore, the colony of New-York be a part of the *British* dominions, the colony of New-York is subject and dependent on the supreme legislative authority of Great Britain.”

By “this supreme authority,” I suppose you mean the Parliament of Great Britain. I deny that

it extends as far as the *British* dominions extend ; and I have given many substantial reasons for this denial : whereas you have never offered any to prove that it does. You have begged the question, and taken that for granted, which is the very point in debate. As to your general position, that there must be a supreme absolute authority lodged somewhere, I have explained in what sense it ought to be understood ; and shown, that the several parts of the empire may each enjoy a separate independent legislature, with regard to each other, under one common head, the king.

The seeming proof you have subjoined, is entirely fallacious ; and depends upon the use of the terms *British* dominions, and *British* legislature, in an *equivocal* sense. The former may either signify countries subject to the *king*, or to the *legislature* of Great Britain. When we say French dominions, we mean countries subject to the king of France. In like manner, when we say British dominions, the most proper signification is, countries subject to the king of Great Britain. At least there is no impropriety in using it in this sense.*

If, by the British legislature, you mean nothing more than the Parliament of Great Britain, it is well ; but if you affix a different idea to it, you are

* Or, if there is, all your objection amounts to this : that we have adopted an improper mode of expression ; and, for the future, we may, in the language of the honorable House of Assembly, call the colonies his Majesty's American dominions.

not *arbitrarily* to impose it upon others. If there be any *chimera* in your fond imagination, which you express by that term, you must allow others the liberty to think it such. In short, if, by the term, you mean an authority resident in one part of his Majesty's dominions, to make laws for every other part of them; you ought not to apply it in this sense, till you have proved that such an authority does really exist; especially in a controversy about that very matter.

By the British dominions, I mean the countries subject to his Britannic Majesty, in his royal capacity. By the British legislature, I will suppose you intend simply the Parliament of Great Britain. Let us now try whether, "to suppose there may be a part of his Britannic Majesty's dominions, which is not subject to the Parliament, be no better sense, than to suppose a country, at one and the same time, to be, and not to be, a part of the British dominions." It is impossible for any thing *to be, and not to be*; but it involves no contradictions to say, that a country may be in subjection to his Britannic Majesty, and, in that sense, a part of the British dominions, without being at all dependent on the Parliament of Great Britain.* The

* I doubt not, you will here be disposed to cavil, by urging, that if we deny the authority of Parliament, we also reject his Britannic Majesty, since he composes a part of it: but, let it be considered, that the Parliament, as such, is a political institution, not a *physical* being. We may deny his Majesty, in his

colony of New-York, therefore, may be a branch of the British empire, though not subordinate to the legislative authority of Britain.

Upon the whole, if, by the British dominions, you mean territories subject to the Parliament, you adhere to your usual fallacy, and suppose what you are bound to prove. I deny that we are dependent on the legislature of Great Britain; and yet I maintain that we are a part of the British empire; but in this sense only, as being the free born subjects of his Britannic Majesty.

Thus I have fully examined that argument, which is esteemed the bulwark of the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy; and, I flatter myself, clearly refuted it. The main pillar being now broken down, the whole structure may easily be demolished. I shall, therefore, proceed with alacrity in the completion of the work. But it is worthy of observation, that a cause must be extremely weak, which admits of no better supports.

Your next argument (if it deserve the name), is this: "Legislation is not an inherent right in the colonies: many colonies have been established and subsisted long without it. The Roman colonies had no legislative authority. It was not till

political capacity, as a part of the legislature of Great Britain, and yet acknowledge him in a similar political capacity, as a part of the legislature of New-York. This is an obvious distinction, and cannot be contested, without an affront to common sense.

the latter period of their republic, that the privileges of Roman citizens, among which, that of voting in Assemblies of the people, at Rome, was a principal one, were extended to the inhabitants of Italy. All the laws of the empire were enacted at Rome. Neither their colonies nor conquered countries, had any thing to do with legislation.”

The fundamental source of all your errors, sophisms, and false reasonings, is a total ignorance of the natural rights of mankind. Were you once to become acquainted with these, you could never entertain a thought, that all men are not, by nature, entitled to a parity of privileges. You would be convinced, that natural liberty is a gift of the beneficent Creator, to the whole human race; and that civil liberty is founded in that; and cannot be wrested from any people, without the most manifest violation of justice. *Civil liberty is only natural liberty, modified and secured by the sanctions of civil society.* It is not a thing, in its own nature, precarious and dependent on human will and caprice; but is conformable to the constitution of man, as well as necessary to the *well-being* of society.

Upon this principle, colonists, as well as other men, have a right to civil liberty. For, if it be conducive to the happiness of society (and reason and experience testify that it is), it is evident, that every society, of whatsoever kind, has an ab-

solute and perfect right to it, which can never be withheld without cruelty and injustice. The practice* of Rome towards her colonies, cannot afford the shadow of an argument against this. That mistress of the world was often unjust. And the treatment of her dependent provinces, is one of the greatest blemishes in her history. Through the want of that civil liberty for which we are so warmly contending, they groaned under every species of wanton oppression. If we are wise, we shall take warning from thence; and consider a like state of dependence, as more to be dreaded than pestilence and famine.

The right of colonists, therefore, to exercise a legislative power, is an inherent right. It is founded upon the rights of all men to freedom and happiness. For civil liberty cannot possibly have any existence, where the society, for whom laws are made, have no share in making them; and where the interest of their legislators is not inseparably interwoven with theirs. Before you asserted, that the right of legislation was derived "from the indulgence or grant of the parent state," you should have proved two things:—that all men have not a natural right to freedom; and that civil liberty is not advantageous to society.

* If her practice proves any thing, it equally proves, that she had a right to plunder them as much as possible. This doctrine, I presume, will not be disagreeable to some ears. There are many who would rejoice to see America plundered in a like manner, provided they could be appointed the instruments.

“The position,” you say, “that we are bound by no laws but those to which we have assented, either by ourselves, or by our representatives, is a novel position, unsupported by any authoritative record of the British constitution, ancient or modern. It is republican in its very nature; and tends to the utter subversion of the English monarchy.

“This position has arisen from an artful change of terms. To say, that an Englishman is not bound by any laws but those to which the representatives of the nation have given their consent, is to say what is true. But to say, that an Englishman is bound by no laws but those to which he hath consented, in person, or by *his* representative, is saying what never was true, and never can be true. A great part of the people have no vote in the choice of representatives; and, therefore, are governed by laws to which they never consented, either by themselves, or by *their* representatives.”

The foundation of the English constitution rests upon this principle; that no laws have any validity or binding force, without the consent and approbation of the *people*, given in the persons of *their* representatives, periodically elected by *themselves*. This constitutes the democratical part of the government.

It is also undeniably certain, that no Englishman, who can be deemed *a free agent* in a *political* view, can be bound by laws, to which he has not con-

sented, either in person, or by *his* representative. Or, in other words, every Englishman (exclusive of the mercantile and trading part of the nation) who possesses a freehold to the value of forty shillings per annum, has a right to a share in the legislature; which he exercises, by giving his vote in the election of some person he approves of as his representative.

“The true reason,” says Blackstone, “of requiring any qualification, with regard to property in voters, is to exclude such persons as are *in so mean a situation*, that they are esteemed to have *no will* of their own. If these persons had votes, they would be tempted to dispose of them, under some undue influence or other. This would give a great, an artful, or a wealthy man, a larger share in elections than is consistent with general liberty. If it were probable, that every man would give his vote freely, and without influence of any kind; then, upon the true theory and genuine principles of liberty, every member of the community, however poor, should have a vote in electing those delegates, to whose charge is committed the disposal of his property, his liberty, and life. But since that can hardly be expected, in persons of indigent fortunes, or such as are under the immediate dominion of others; all popular States have been obliged to establish certain qualifications, whereby some, who are suspected to have no will of their own, are ex-

cluded from voting; in order to set other individuals, whose wills may be supposed independent, more thoroughly upon a level with each other."

Hence, it appears, that such "of the people as have no vote in the choice of representatives, and, therefore, are governed by laws to which they have not consented, either by themselves or by their representatives," are only those "persons, who are *in so mean a situation*, that they are esteemed to have *no will* of their own." Every *free agent*, every free man, possessing a freehold of forty shillings per annum, is, by the British constitution, entitled to a vote in the election of those who are invested with the disposal of his life, his liberty, and property.

It is therefore evident, to a demonstration, that unless every *free agent* in America be permitted to enjoy the same privilege, we are entirely stripped of the benefits of the constitution, and precipitated into an abyss of slavery. For, we are deprived of that immunity which is the grand pillar and support of freedom. And this cannot be done without a direct violation of the constitution, which decrees to every *free agent*, a share in the legislature.

It deserves to be remarked here, that those very persons in Great Britain, who are *in so mean a situation* as to be excluded from a part in elections, are in more eligible circumstances than they

would be in who have every necessary qualification.

They compose a part of that society to whose government they are subject. They are nourished and maintained by it; and partake in every other emolument for which they are qualified. They have, no doubt, most of them, relations and connexions among those who are privileged to vote; and, by that means, are not entirely without influence in the appointment of their rulers. They are not governed by laws made expressly and exclusively for them; but by the general laws of their country, equally obligatory on the legal electors, and on the law makers themselves. So that they have nearly the same security against oppression, which the body of the people have.

To this we may add, that they are only under a conditional prohibition, which industry and good fortune may remove. They may, one day, accumulate a sufficient property to enable them to emerge out of their present state. Or, should they die in it, their situation is not entailed upon their posterity by a fixed and irremediable doom. They, agreeably to the ordinary vicissitudes of human affairs, may acquire what their parents were deficient in.

These considerations plainly show, that the people in America, of all ranks and conditions, opulent as well as indigent (if subjected to the British

Parliament), would be upon a less favorable footing than that part of the people of Great Britain, who are *in so mean a situation*, that they are supposed to have no will of their own. The injustice of this, must be evident to every man of common sense.

I shall now proceed to take such a survey of the political history of the colonies, as may be necessary to cast a full light upon their present contest; and, at the same time, to give the public a just conception of the profound and comprehensive knowledge you have of the dispute; the fairness and candor with which you have represented facts; and the immaculate purity of your intentions.

But, previous to this, the following observations may not be destitute of utility.

His Holiness the Pope, by virtue of being Christ's Vicegerent upon earth, piously assumed to himself a right to dispose of the territories of infidels as he thought fit. And in process of time, all Christian princes learned to imitate his example; very liberally giving and granting away the dominions and property of Pagan countries. They did not seem to be satisfied with the title which Christianity gave them to the next world only; but chose to infer from thence, an exclusive right to this world also.

I must refer it to sounder casuists than I am, to determine concerning the consistency, or justice, of this principle. It is sufficient for my purpose to observe, that it is the only foundation upon which Queen

Elizabeth, and her successors, undertook to dispose of the lands in America. Whatever right, therefore, we may suppose to have existed, it was vested entirely in the crown: the nation had no concern in it. It is an invariable maxim, that every acquisition of foreign territory is at the absolute disposal of the king; and unless he annex it to the realm, it is no part of it. And if it be once alienated, it can never be united to it without the concurrence of the proprietors.

Were there any room to doubt, that the sole right of the territories in America was vested in the crown, a convincing argument might be drawn from the principle of English *tenure*. By means of the *feudal* system, the king became, and still continues to be, in a legal sense, the original proprietor, or lord paramount, of all the lands in England* Agreeably to this rule, he must have been the original proprietor of all the lands in America; and was, therefore, authorized to dispose of them in what manner he thought proper.

The great inquiry, therefore, is, concerning the terms on which these lands were really dispensed.

“The first charter granted by the crown, for the purpose of colonization, is” not “that of King James the first, to the two Virginia companies,” as you assert. Previous to that, there was one from

* See Blackstone, volume 1.

Queen Elizabeth to Sir Walter Raleigh, for all the territory he might discover and plant, between the thirty-third and fortieth degrees of north latitude, which was not actually possessed by any christian prince, or inhabited by any christian people; to have, hold, occupy, and enjoy the same, to him, his heirs and assigns forever, with all *prerogatives, jurisdictions, royalties, privileges, franchises*, thereunto belonging, by sea or land; only reserving to herself, her heirs and successors, the fifth part of all gold and silver *ore* that might be acquired in those regions.

By this grant, Queen Elizabeth relinquished the whole legislative and executive power to Sir Walter, upon no other condition than simple homage, and the above mentioned fifth part of gold and silver ore; which shows, that the crown considered itself as invested with the absolute and entire disposal of the territories in America: and the passive conduct of the nation, declares its acquiescence in the same.

After many unsuccessful efforts to plant a colony in Virginia, this charter was forfeited and abrogated by the attainder of Sir Walter Raleigh: and then succeeded that of King James the first, to the two Virginia companies, dated the 10th of April, 1606. This was afterwards altered and improved, by a second charter, issued in 1609. There was also a third, dated March 12, 1611—12. The mention

of this last would not have answered your purpose, and, therefore, you chose to pass it over in silence.

In neither of these three, is there the least reservation made of any authority to Parliament. The colonies are considered in them, as entirely without the realm, and, consequently, without the jurisdiction of its legislature.

In the first charter from King James, there are the following clauses :

“ We do ordain, establish, and decree, &c., that each of the said colonies, shall have a council, which shall govern and order all matters and all causes, which shall arise, grow, or happen to, or within the same ; according to such *laws, ordinances, and instructions*, as shall be, in that behalf, given and signed with our hand, or sign manual, and pass under the privy seal of our realm of England.”

“ And that, also, there shall be a council established here in England, which shall consist of thirteen persons, to be for that purpose appointed ; which shall have the superior managing and direction *only* of, and for, all matters, that shall or may concern the government of the said several colonies.”

“ Also, we do for us, our heirs, &c., declare, that all and every the persons, being our subjects, which shall dwell and inhabit within every, or any, the said several colonies, and every of their children,

which shall happen to be born within any of the said several colonies, shall have and enjoy all *liberties, franchises, and immunities*, within any of our *other dominions*, to all intents and purposes, *as if they had been abiding and born within our realm of England.*”

This latter declaration (to which there is one correspondent, or similar, in every American grant), plainly indicates, that it was not the royal intention to comprise the colonies within the realm of England. The powers committed to the two councils, demonstrate the same; for they would be incompatible with the idea of any other than distinct States.

The King could neither exercise, himself, nor empower others to exercise, such an authority as was really vested in the council, without a breach of the Constitution, if the colonies had been a part of the realm, or within the jurisdiction of Parliament. Such an exertion of power would have been unconstitutional and illegal, and, of course, inadmissible: but we find it was never called in question by the legislature; and we may conclude from thence, that America was universally considered as being without the jurisdiction of Parliament.

The second charter explains and amplifies the privileges of the company, erecting them into “one body or commonalty perpetual;” and confirming to them the property of their former territories, with the addition of all the islands lying within

one hundred miles of the shores of both seas ; together with all “ *commodities, jurisdictions, royalties, privileges, franchises, and pre-eminences,*” to be held by the king, his heirs and successors, “ in free and common soccage.” They were only to pay one-fifth part of all the gold and silver ore they might find, in lieu of all *services*.

Their government was vested in a council, first appointed by the king ; which, upon every necessary occasion, was to be summoned together by the company’s treasurer. But immediately after the persons appointed are named in the charter, it is declared, that “ the said council and treasurer, or any of them, shall be henceforth “ *nominated, chosen, continued, displaced, changed, altered, or supplied,* as death, or other several occasions shall require, *out of the company of the said adventurers, by the voice of the greater part of the said company and adventurers ;*” every member, newly elected, to be sworn into office by the Lord Chancellor.

This council had “ full power and authority to make, ordain, and establish, all manner of *orders, laws, directions, instructions, forms and ceremonies,* of government and magistracy, fit, and necessary for, and concerning, the government of the said colony ; and the same to abrogate, revoke, or change, at all times, not only within the precincts of the said colony, but also on the seas, in going or coming, to or from the said colony.”

This charter is also silent with respect to Parliament; the authority of which is evidently precluded by the whole tenor of it.

You, sir, took no notice of the circumstance, that the council was to be *nominated, chosen, continued, &c., out of* the Virginia company itself, agreeably to the voice of the majority. You omitted this, and gave quite a different turn to the matter: but herein you acted not at all discordant with your usual practice. Nor did you esteem it politic to transcribe the following clause: “that the said company, and every of them, their factors and assigns, shall be free of all subsidies and customs in Virginia, for the space of one and twenty years; *and from all taxes and impositions forever*, upon any goods or merchandises, at any time or times hereafter, either upon importation thither, or exportation from thence.”

The third charter is a still farther enlargement of their territory and privileges, and is that by which their present form of government is modelled. The following extract will show the nature of it. “We do hereby ordain and grant, that the said treasurer and company of adventurers and planters aforesaid, shall and may, once every week, and oftener, at their pleasure, hold and keep a court or assembly, for the better order and government of the said plantation; and that any five persons of our council for the time being, of which company the

treasurer, or his deputy, to be always one, and the number of fifteen persons, at the least, of the generality of the said company assembled together, in such manner as hath been heretofore used and accustomed, shall be reputed to be, and shall be, a sufficient court for the handling, ordering, and despatching of all such casual and particular occurrences, as shall, from time to time, happen, touching and concerning the said plantation. And, nevertheless, for the handling, ordering, and disposing of the matters and affairs of greater weight and importance, such as shall, *in any sort*, concern the weal public, and the general good of the said plantation, as, namely, the *manner of government*, from time to time, to be used, the ordering and disposing of the lands and possessions, and the *settling and establishing of a trade there*, or such like, there shall be held and kept, every year *forever*, one great general and solemn assembly. In all and every of which said great and general courts, so assembled, our will and pleasure is, and we do, for us, our heirs and successors forever, give and grant to the said treasurer and company, or the greater number of them, so assembled, that they shall and may have full power and authority, from time to time, and at all times hereafter, to *elect and choose* discreet persons to be of our said council, for the first colony of Virginia; and to nominate and appoint such officers, as they shall think fit and requisite for the govern-

ment, managing, ordering, and despatching of the affairs of the said company; and shall likewise have full power and authority to ordain and make such laws and ordinances for the good and welfare of the said plantation, as to them, from time to time, shall be thought requisite and meet; *so always, as the same be not contrary to the laws and statutes of this our realm of England.*”

By this charter, King James divested himself wholly both of the legislative and executive authority: but, for his own security, prescribed a model for their civil constitution. Their laws were not to be *contrary* to the laws and statutes of his realm of England; which restriction was inserted into all the subsequent charters, with some little variation, such as, that their laws should be “consonant to reason, and not repugnant, or contrary, but *as near as conveniently may be*, agreeable to the laws, statutes, and rights of this our kingdom of England.”

This mode of expression, so indefinite in itself, shows that the use made of the clause, by some ministerial advocates, is by no means natural or warrantable. It could only be intended to set forth the British Constitution as a pattern for theirs: and accordingly we find, that upon the arrival of Sir George Yardly in Virginia, soon after this patent was procured, the government was regulated upon a new plan, that it might “resemble the British

Constitution, composed of two Houses of Parliament, and a sovereign. The number of the council was increased, intending this body should represent the House of Lords, while the House of Commons was composed of burgesses, assembled from every plantation and settlement in the country."

There might be a great dissimilarity between the laws of Virginia and those of Great Britain, and yet not an absolute contrariety; so that the clause in question is not explicit or determinate enough, to authorize the conclusion drawn from it. Besides, if the colonies were within the realm of England, there would be no necessity for any provision in favor of its laws: and if they were without (as is clearly implied by the clause itself), it must be a contradiction to suppose its jurisdiction could extend beyond its own limits.

But the true interpretation may be ascertained, beyond a doubt, by the conduct of those very princes who granted the charters. They were certainly the best judges of their own intention, and they have left us indubitable marks of it.

In April 1621, about nine years after the third Virginia charter was issued, a bill was introduced into the House of Commons, for indulging the subjects of England with the privilege of fishing upon the coast of America: but the House was informed by the secretary of State, by order of his Majesty King James, that "*America was not annexed to*

the realm; and that it was not fitting that Parliament should make laws for those countries."

In the reign of his successor, Charles the First (who granted the Massachusetts and Maryland charters), the same bill was again proposed in the House, and was, in the like manner, refused the royal assent; with a similar declaration, that "it was unnecessary; that the colonies *were without the realm and jurisdiction of Parliament.*"

Circumstances which evidently prove, that these clauses were not inserted to render the colonies dependent on the Parliament; but only (as I have observed), to mark out a model of government for them. If, then, the colonies were, at first, *without the realm and jurisdiction of Parliament*, no human authority could afterwards alter the case, without their own voluntary, full, and express approbation.

The settlement of New England was the next in succession, and was instigated by a detestation of civil and ecclesiastical tyranny. The principal design of the enterprize, was to be emancipated from their sufferings, under the authority of Parliament and the laws of England. For this purpose, the Puritans had before retired to foreign countries, particularly to Holland. But Sir Robert Naughton, Secretary of State, having remonstrated to his Majesty, concerning the impolicy and absurdity of dispeopling his own dominions, by means of religious oppression, obtained permission for the Puri-

tans to take up their abode in America, where they found an asylum from their former misfortunes.

Previous to their embarkation at Holland, they had stipulated with the Virginia Company,* for a tract of land in *contiguity* with Hudson's River: but when they arrived in America (by some misconduct of the Pilot), they found themselves at Cape Cod, which was without the boundaries of the Virginia Patent. There the season compelled them to remain; and there they have prosecuted their settlements.

They looked upon themselves as having reverted to a state of nature; but, being willing still to enjoy the protection of their former sovereign, they executed the following instrument.

“In the name of God, Amen! We, whose names are underwritten, the loyal subjects of our dread Sovereign Lord, *King* James, of Great Britain, &c., *King*,* defender of the faith, &c., having undertaken, for the glory of God, and the advancement of the Christian faith, and the honor of our *King* and country, a voyage to plant the first colony in the northern part of Virginia, do, by these presents, mutually, in the presence of God and one another, covenant and combine ourselves together, into a civil body politic, for our better ordering and preservation, and furtherance of the ends aforesaid; and

* This was after they had received their third charter.

by virtue hereof, to enact, constitute, and frame, such just and equal laws, ordinances, acts, constitutions, and officers, from time to time, as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the general good of the colony; unto which we promise all due submission and obedience.

“In witness whereof, we have hereunto subscribed our names, at Cape Cod, November 11, 1620.”*

This was the original constitution of New Plymouth. It deserves to be remarked here, that these first settlers possessed their lands by the most equitable and independent title, that of a fair and honest purchase from their natural owners, the Indian tribes. King James, soon after, erected a council at Plymouth, in the county of Devon, “for the planting, ruling, ordering, and governing, of New England in America;” and granted to “them, their successors and assigns, all that part of America, lying and being, in breadth, from forty degrees of north latitude from the equinoctial line, to the forty-eighth degree of the said northerly latitude, inclusively; and in length of, and within all the breadth aforesaid, throughout all the main land,

* This ought to silence the infamous calumnies of those, who represent the first settlers in New England, as enemies to kingly government; and who are, in their own opinions, wondrous witty, by retailing the idle and malicious stories that have been propagated concerning them; such as their having erased the words *King*, *Kingdom*, and the like, out of their bibles, and inserted in their stead, Civil Magistrate, Parliament, and Republic.

from sea to sea ; together with all the firm lands, soils, grounds, havens, ports, rivers, waters, fishings, mines, minerals, precious stones, quarries, and all and singular other commodities, *jurisdictions, royalties, privileges, franchises, and pre-eminences*, both within the said tract of land upon the main, and also within the islands and seas adjacent.—To be held of his Majesty, his heirs and successors, in free and common soccage : and the only consideration to be, the fifth part of all gold and silver ore, for and in respect of *all and all manner of duties, demands, and services.*”

This council was vested with the sole power of legislation ; the election and appointment of all officers, civil and military ; authority to coin money, make war and peace, and a variety of other signal privileges. The colony of New Plymouth was comprehended within the grant. In consequence of which, its inhabitants, a few years after, purchased the claim of the patentees, with all their rights and immunities, and became an independent state by charter.

The same motives that induced the settlement of New Plymouth, did also produce that of Massachusetts. It was first colonised by virtue of a patent from the council at Plymouth ; and in a year after, by a charter from King Charles the First, dated the 4th of March, in the fourth year of his reign ; by which the adventurers and inhabitants

were formed into "one body politic and corporate, by the name of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay, in New England," and clothed with powers and privileges resembling those of the colony of New Plymouth.

It happened some time before this, that there was a dissolution of the Virginia Company, by a royal proclamation, dated 15th of July, 1624; by which the colony became more immediately dependent on the king. The Virginians were greatly alarmed at this, and forthwith presented a remonstrance to the Throne; in which they signified an apprehension of "designs formed against their rights and privileges." In order to banish their fears, the Lords of the Council (in a letter dated the 22d of July 1634), gave them an assurance, by his Majesty's direction, "that all their *estates, trade, freedom, and privileges*, should be enjoyed by them, in as extensive a manner as they enjoyed them before the recal of the company's patent." Agreeably to this, their former constitution was confirmed and continued.

The Maryland charter is the next in order, of which you, sir, have made no mention. It was granted by King Charles the First to Lord Baltimore; and contains such ample and exalted privileges, that no man in his senses can read it, without being convinced it is repugnant to every idea of dependence on Parliament.

It bestows on him, "all the country of Maryland, and the islands adjacent; together with all their commodities, *jurisdictions, privileges, prerogatives, royal rights, &c. &c.*, of what kinds soever, as well by sea as land; and constitutes him, his heirs and assigns, true and absolute lords and proprietaries of the said country, and of all the premises aforesaid; saving always the faith and allegiance, and the sovereign dominion, due to *himself*, his heirs and successors: to be holden of the Kings of England, in free and common soccage, by *fealty only*, and not *in capite*; paying two Indian arrows every year, and also the fifth part of all gold and silver ore which shall from time to time happen to be found: Granting also full and absolute power to the said Lord Baltimore, his heirs, &c., to ordain, make, enact, and publish, *any laws whatsoever, by and with the advice, assent, and approbation*, of the *freemen* of the said province, or the greater part of them; or of *their delegates or deputies*; *whom*, for the enacting of the said laws, when, and as often as need shall require, we will, that the said now Lord Baltimore, and his heirs, shall assemble in such sort and form, as to him and *them*, shall seem best. Provided, nevertheless, that the said laws be consonant to reason, and be not repugnant, or contrary, but *as near as conveniently may be*, agreeable to the laws, statutes, and rights of this our kingdom of England."

In another place it is ordained, that he the “said Lord Baltimore, *may from time to time for ever*, have and enjoy, the customs and subsidies, within the said ports, harbors, &c., within the province aforesaid, payable or due for *merchandises* and *wares*, there to be laden and unladen; the said *subsidies* and *customs*, to be reasonably assessed (upon any occasion), by *themselves* and the *people there*, as aforesaid; to whom we give power by these presents, for us, our heirs and successors, upon just cause and in due proportion, to assess and impose the same.”

I confine myself to these extracts, to avoid prolixity, and pass over the enumeration of those many extensive prerogatives this charter confers; such as the appointment of all officers, civil and military; the power of making war and peace; the establishment of *boroughs* and *cities*; with all necessary immunities, and the like.

In the fourteenth year of Charles the Second, the two colonies, Connecticut and New Haven, petitioned the King to unite them into one colony, which was complied with. Privileges, as valuable and extensive as any that had been before granted, were comprised in their charter. There was only a reservation of allegiance to the king, without the smallest share of the legislative or executive power. The next year, Providence and Rhode Island procured a charter, with privileges exactly correspondent to those of Connecticut.

You are pleased to assert, “that the charters of Rhode Island and Connecticut are simply matters of incorporation;” and produce an extract in confirmation of this assertion.

I should be astonished at so extraordinary a deviation from truth, if there were not many instances similar to it. Not only the whole tenor of their charters, but their constant practice and form of government, hitherto, declare the reverse of your assertion. But, that I may not unnecessarily prolong this letter by a quotation of the different parts of the respective charters, give me leave to present you with an account of the constitution of these colonies, which was laid before the House of Lords in January 1734.

“Connecticut and Rhode Island,” say the commissioners of Trade and Plantations, “are charter governments, where almost the whole power of the crown is delegated to the people, who make annual election of their Assembly, their Councils, and their Governors; likewise to the majority of which Assemblies, Councils, and Governors, respectively, being collective bodies, the power of making laws is granted; and, as their charters are worded, they can, and do, make laws, even without the Governor’s assent, no negative voice being reserved to them, as Governors, in said charters. These colonies have the power of making laws for their better government and support; and are not

under any obligation, by their respective constitutions, to return authentic copies of their laws to the crown, for approbation or disallowance; nor to give any account of their proceedings; nor are their laws repealable by the crown; but the validity of them depends upon their not being contrary, but *as near as may be*, agreeable to the laws of England.”

As to the expression, as *other* our liege people of this our realm of England, or any *other* corporation or body politic, within the same; if any stress be laid on the particle *other*, it will imply, not only that the colonies were simple matters of corporation, but that the inhabitants of them were considered as being within the realm of England. But this cannot be admitted as true, without contradicting other clauses of the same charters. Thus, in the preamble to that of Rhode Island, it is said, that the first planters “did, by the consent of our royal progenitors, transport themselves *out* of this Kingdom of England *into* America.” And in each of the charters, the King stipulates, that all the children born in America, shall enjoy “all the liberties and immunities of free and natural subjects, within any of his dominions, as *if* they and every of them *were* born within the realm of England.”

The vague and improper manner, in which this particle is used, in many other places of the several charters, will not allow it the least weight in

the present instance. In the eleventh article of the third Virginia charter, there is this expression: "All such, and so many of our loving subjects, or any *other* strangers that will, &c." The same rule of inference that makes Rhode Island and Connecticut simple corporations, will also transform the king's loving subjects into mere strangers; which I apprehend cannot be done, without some degree of absurdity.

In the fifteenth year of Charles the Second, Carolina was erected into a principality. A patent dated March 24, 1663, was granted to eight lord proprietors, vesting them with all its rights, privileges, prerogatives, royalties, &c., and the whole legislative and executive authority, together with the power of creating a nobility. The form of government was determined by a compact between the people and the proprietors, which contained one hundred and twenty articles; and "these were to be and remain, the sacred and unalterable rule and form of government in Carolina for ever." A Palatine was to be erected from among the proprietaries, who was to govern the principality during his life; and at his demise, the surviving lords were to succeed him according to the order of seniority. The legislative power was to reside in the parliament of that country, consisting of the Palatine as sovereign; an upper House, in which the proprietors or their deputies, the Governor and the Nobility, were to

sit; and a lower House *composed of the delegates of the people*. There was likewise a court established, the members of which were three proprietaries, and the Palatine as president; and in this court, the whole executive authority was lodged.

There were also several other courts; the Chief Justice's, the High Constable's, the Chancellor's, and High Steward's Court. The principal officers of the State, in number, titles, and power, resembled those of the realm of England. The proprietors of Carolina considered themselves as possessed of every requisite towards forming a separate independent State, and were always extremely jealous of any encroachments. They even disputed the King's authority to establish Courts of Vice Admiralty within their precincts, though for the examination and punishment of offences committed without them; and always appointed an Admiral of their own. One of their governors was deposed, for "accepting a commission under King William, as Judge of the Admiralty, when he had, at the same time, a commission from the Lords proprietaries, for the same office."

The Philadelphia charter was next granted, and contained almost an equality of privileges with that of Maryland. There was, indeed, a reserve in favor of Parliament, perfectly singular and unprecedented in any foregoing charter; and which must either be rejected, or the general tenor of the grant becomes unintelligible.

It happened that the charter of Massachusetts was vacated by a decision in Chancery, and a new one was conferred by *William and Mary*. The agents for that colony did not accept it, till they had first consulted the most judicious civilians and politicians upon the contents of it; and then drew up an instrument in which they assigned the reasons of their acceptance. The following extract will serve to show their sense of it: "The colony," say they, "is now made a province; and the General Court has, with the King's approbation, as much power in New England, as the King and Parliament have in England. They have all English privileges and liberties, and can be touched by *no law*, and by *no tax*, but of their own making. All the liberties of their religion are for ever secured."

You say, that "the power to levy taxes is restrained to provincial and local purposes only; and to be exercised over such, only, as are inhabitants and proprietors of the said province."

They are empowered "to levy proportionable and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes, for our service in the necessary defence and support of the government of the said province or territory; and the protection and preservation of the inhabitants there." The defence and support of government, and their own protection and preservation, are the purposes for which they are to raise supplies; and, in my humble opinion, there are no others to which any

society is under an obligation to contribute its wealth or property.

I shall only make one more observation upon this charter; which is, that there was a reservation in it of liberty for the people of England to fish upon their coasts, which would have been useless and absurd, had that province been a part of the realm, and within the jurisdiction of Parliament.

Were it necessary to elucidate, still more, a point which is so conspicuous from the several charters of the colonies, as well as the express declarations of those princes by whom they were granted, to wit, "*that the colonies are without the realm and jurisdiction of Parliament;*" I might enumerate many striking circumstances besides those I have already mentioned. But as the case is by this time sufficiently clear, I shall confine myself to the recital of only one or two more transactions.

An act of the twenty-fifth of Charles the Second, was the first that ever imposed duties on the colonies for any purpose; and these, as the preamble itself recites, were simply as a regulation of trade, and were of a prohibitory nature. Notwithstanding this, it was the source of great dissatisfaction; and was one of the principal causes of the insurrection in Virginia, under Colonel Bacon, which, after his death, subsided; and then the province sent agents to England, to remonstrate "against taxes and impositions being laid on the colony, by

any authority but that of the General Assembly.” In consequence of this, a declaration was obtained, under the privy seal of King Charles, dated nineteenth of April, 1676, to this effect: that “taxes ought not to be laid upon the proprietors and inhabitants of the colony, but by the common consent of the General Assembly.”

About three years after, when King Charles had occasion to raise a permanent revenue for the support of Virginia, he did not attempt to do it by means of a parliamentary donation; but framed a Bill, and sent it there by Lord Colepepper, who was at that time governor, to receive the concurrence of their legislature. It was *there* passed into a law, and “*enacted by the King’s most excellent Majesty, by and with the consent of the General Assembly of the colony of Virginia.*” If the Virginians had been subjects of the realm, this could not have been done, without a direct violation of *Magna Charta*; which provides, that no English subject shall be taxed without the consent of Parliament.

Thus, sir, I have taken a pretty general survey of the American charters; and proved, to the satisfaction of every unbiassed person, that they are entirely discordant with that sovereignty of Parliament for which you are an advocate. The disingenuity of your extracts (to give it no harsher name), merits the severest censure; and will, no doubt, serve to discredit all your former, as well as future, labors in your favorite cause of despotism.

It is true, that New-York has no charter. But if it could support its claim to liberty in no other way, it might, with justice, plead the common principles of colonization : for it would be unreasonable to seclude one colony from the enjoyment of the most important privileges of the rest. There is no need, however, of this plea. **THE SACRED RIGHTS OF MANKIND ARE NOT TO BE RUMMAGED FOR AMONG OLD PARCHMENTS OR MUSTY RECORDS. THEY ARE WRITTEN, AS WITH A SUNBEAM, IN THE WHOLE VOLUME OF HUMAN NATURE, BY THE HAND OF THE DIVINITY ITSELF ; AND CAN NEVER BE ERASED OR OBTUSCURED BY MORTAL POWER.**

The nations of Turkey, Russia, France, Spain, and all other despotic kingdoms in the world, have an inherent right, whenever they please, to shake off the yoke of servitude (though sanctified by the immemorial usage of their ancestors), and to model their government upon the principles of civil liberty.

I will now venture to assert, that I have demonstrated, from the voice of nature, the *spirit* of the British constitution, and the charters of the colonies in general, the absolute non-existence of that parliamentary supremacy for which you contend. I am not apt to be dogmatical, or too confident of my own opinions ; but, if I thought it possible for me to be mistaken, when I maintain, that the Parliament of Great Britain has no sovereign authority

over America, I should distrust every principle of my understanding, reject every distinction between truth and falsehood, and fall into a universal scepticism.

Hitherto, I have reasoned against the whole authority of Parliament, without even excepting the right we have conceded, of regulating trade. I considered it, in its original state, as founded in the British constitution, the natural rights of society, and the several charters of the colonies. The power of regulating our trade, was first exercised in the reign of Charles the Second. I shall not examine upon what principle. It is enough, we have consented to it. But I shall proceed to consider the argument you make use of, to establish the propriety of allowing special duties to be imposed by way of tribute, for the protection of our commerce.

You argue thus: "Notwithstanding the large landed estates, possessed by the British subjects in the different parts of the world, they must be considered as a commercial, manufacturing people. The welfare, perhaps the existence, of Great Britain, as an independent or sovereign State, depends upon her manufactures and trade; and many people in America think, that her manufactures and commerce depend, in a great measure, on her intercourse with her colonies; insomuch, that if this should be neglected, her commerce would decline

and die away; her wealth would cease; and her maritime power be at an end. If these observations be just, they establish the right of the British Parliament to regulate the commerce of the whole empire, beyond possibility of contradiction: a denial of it, would be a denial of a right in the British empire to preserve itself. They prove, also, that all parts of the empire must be subject to the British Parliament; for, otherwise, the trade of the whole cannot be regulated. They point out, also, the best mode of raising such a revenue as is necessary for the support and defence of the government, viz., by duties on imports and exports: because these are attended with the least inconvenience to the subject, and may be so managed, as to raise a revenue and regulate the trade at the same time.

“When it is considered that Great Britain is a maritime power; that the present flourishing state of her trade, and of the trade of her colonies, depends, in a great measure, upon the protection which they receive from the navy; that her own security depends upon her navy; and that it is, principally, a naval protection we receive from her; there will appear a peculiar propriety in laying the chief burthen of supporting her navy, upon her commerce; and in requesting us to bear a part of the expense, proportional to our ability, and to that protection and security which we receive from it.”

The supposition, that a cessation of commerce

between Great Britain and the colonies, would be ruinous and destructive to the former, is ushered in, as the principal argument for her right to regulate the commerce of the whole empire. I am willing to allow it its full weight; but I cannot conceive how you can pretend, after making such a use of it, to deny it the force it ought to have, when it is urged as affording a moral certainty that our present measures will be successful. If you tacitly adopt the principle, and reason from it, in one case, with what propriety can you reject it in the other? If the preservation of the British empire depends, in any material degree, upon the right of Parliament to regulate the trade of the colonies, what will be the consequence if the trade ceases altogether? You must either acknowledge, that you have adduced a very weak and foolish argument, or that the commercial connexion between Great Britain and the colonies, is essential to her security and prosperity. You have either failed in proving your point, or you have furnished me with an ample confutation of all your reasoning against the probability of success, from the restrictions laid on our commerce. If our trade be necessary to the welfare of Great Britain, she must, of course, be ruined by a discontinuance of it.

But it is granted, that Great Britain has a right to regulate the trade of the empire. The Congress have acknowledged it, so far as concerned their con-

stituents. You infer from thence, that all parts of the empire must be subject to her. They need only be so far subject, as is necessary for the end proposed, that is, the regulation of their trade. If you require any further subjection, you require *means* that are disproportionate to the *end*, which is unreasonable, and not at all allowable.

With respect to the justice of submitting to impositions on our trade, for the purpose of raising a revenue to support the navy by which it is protected; I answer, that the exclusive regulation of our commerce for her own advantage, is a sufficient tribute to Great Britain for protecting it. By this means, a vast accession of wealth is annually thrown into her coffers. It is a matter of notoriety, that the balance of trade is very much against us. After ransacking Spain, Portugal, Holland, the English, French, Spanish, Dutch, and Danish plantations, for Money and Bills of Exchange, as remittances for the commodities we take from Great Britain; we are still always greatly in arrears to her. At a moderate computation, I am well informed, that the profits she derives from us every year, exceed two millions and a half sterling; and when we reflect, that this sum will be continually increasing, as we grow more and more populous, it must be evident, that there is not the least justice in raising a revenue upon us, by the imposition of special duties.

The right of Great Britain to regulate our trade

upon this plan, it is now acknowledged, is not an inconsiderable matter. It is as much as any free people can concede, and as much as any just people would require. We are not permitted to procure manufactures any where else than from Great Britain, or Ireland. Our trade is limited and prescribed, in every respect, as is most for her interest. This is a plentiful source of wealth to her, as I have heretofore shown, and shall hereafter confirm by the testimony of some British writers.

But I have found out an argument, which, I imagine, will go very near convincing yourself of the absurdity of what you have offered on this head. It is short, but conclusive. “*The principal profits of our trade centre in Great Britain.*”* How can you, my dear sir, after making this confession, entertain a single thought, that it is incumbent upon us to suffer her to raise a revenue upon our trade? Are not the *principal profits* a sufficient recompense for protecting it? Surely you would not allow her the whole. This would be rather too generous. However ardent your affection to her, and however much it may be your glory to advance her imperial dignity, you ought to moderate it so far, as to permit us to enjoy some little benefit from our trade. Only a small portion of the profits will satisfy us. We are willing to let her have the *principal* share, and this you acknowledge she already has. But

* See Page 19 of your own letter.

why will you advise us to let her exhaust the small pittance we have reserved, as the reward of our own industry, in burthensome revenues? This might be liberality and generosity, but it would not be prudence: and let me tell you, in this selfish, rapacious world, a little discretion is, at worst, only a *venial* sin. It will be expedient to be more cautious for the future. It is difficult to combat truth; and unless you redouble your vigilance, you will (as in the present instance) be extremely apt to ensnare yourself.

I shall now briefly examine the excellent mode you have proposed, for settling our disputes finally and effectually. All internal taxation is to be vested in our own legislatures; and the right of regulating trade, by duties, bounties, &c., to be left to the Parliament, together with the right of enacting all general laws for all the colonies. You imagine that we should then “have all the security for our rights, liberties, and properties, which human policy can give us.”

Here we widely differ in sentiment. My opinion is, that we should have no “security besides the good will of our rulers; that is, no security at all.” Is there no difference between one system of laws and another? Are not some more favorable and beneficial to the subject; better calculated to preserve his life and personal liberty than others? It is evident they are. Suppose, instead of the pre-

sent system established among us, the French laws were to be introduced, for the good of all the colonies: Should we have the same security for our lives which we now have? I presume we should not. I presume, also, that a revolution in our laws might and would gradually take place.

A fondness for power is implanted in most men; and it is natural to abuse it, when acquired. This maxim, drawn from the experience of all ages, makes it the height of folly to entrust any set of men with power, which is not under every possible control: perpetual strides are made after more, as long as there is any part withheld. We ought not, therefore, to concede any greater authority to the British Parliament, than is absolutely necessary. There seems to be a necessity for vesting the regulation of our trade *there*, because, in time, our commercial interests might otherwise interfere with her's. But with respect to making laws for us, there is not the least necessity, or even propriety in it. Our legislatures are confined to ourselves, and cannot interfere with Great Britain. We are best acquainted with our own circumstances, and therefore best qualified to make suitable regulations. It is of no force to object, that no particular colony has power to enact general laws for all the colonies. There is no need of such general laws. Let every colony attend to its own internal police, and all will be well. How have

we managed heretofore? The Parliament has made no general laws for our good; and yet our affairs have been conducted much to our ease and satisfaction. If any discord has sprung up among us, it is wholly imputable to the incursions of Great Britain. We should be peaceable and happy, if unmolested by her. We are not so destitute of wisdom as to be in want of her assistance, to devise proper and salutary laws for us.

The legislative power of Parliament would at any rate be useless to us; and as utility is the prime end of all laws, that power has no reason for which it should exist. It is not even requisite for preserving the connexion between Great Britain and the colonies; for that is sufficiently secured in two ways: by being united under the same king; and by the important privilege of regulating our commerce, to which we have submitted.

That it might be prejudicial to us, no reasonable man can deny. We may trace the evils of it through the whole administration of justice. Judicial proceedings may be so ordered, as to render our lives and properties dependent on the will and caprice of court favorites and tools. A wide field for bribery and corruption of every kind would be opened; and the most enormous exactions would take shelter under the garb of law. It is unnecessary to enter into a particular detail of the different methods in which all this might be effected; every

man's own imagination will suggest to him a multiplicity of instances.

Rigorous, oppressive, and tyrannical laws, may be thought expedient, as instruments to humble our rebellious tempers, and oblige us to submit to further exertions of authority, till the claim to bind us, in all cases whatsoever, be fully complied with. This, no doubt, would be a work of time. The steps would be gradual, and perhaps imperceptible ; but they would be sure and effectual. That thirst of power, which influenced the Parliament to assert an unlimited authority over us, without the least plausible foundation for it (as I have clearly proved), will authorize us to apprehend the worst.

The power of legislating for us, and of raising a revenue upon the articles of commerce, would be a sufficient degree of slavery. It is absurd to say, that Great Britain could not impose heavy burthens on our commerce, without immediately feeling the effect herself. She may enrich herself, by reducing us to the most lamentable state of penury and wretchedness. We are already forbid to purchase the manufactures of any foreign countries. Great Britain and Ireland must furnish us with the necessaries we want. Those things we manufacture among ourselves may be disallowed. We should then be compelled to take the manufactures of Great Britain upon her own conditions. We could not, in that case, do without them. However excessive

the duties laid upon them, we should be under an inevitable necessity to purchase them. How would Great Britain feel the effects of those impositions, but to her own advantage? If we might withdraw our custom, and apply to other nations; if we might manufacture our own materials; those expedients would serve as a refuge to us; and would indeed be a security against any immoderate exactions. But these resources would be cut off. There would be no alternative left us. We must submit to be drained of all our wealth, for those necessaries which we are not permitted to get elsewhere.

As to our trade with foreign countries, the burthens imposed on that, however grievous, would in like manner affect Great Britain, only by increasing her public treasure. Her own inhabitants would pay no part of them: they would fall solely upon ourselves. There is no immediate connexion between her trade and ours, of this kind: they are separate and independent; and, of course, the incumbrances on the one would not injure the other. The superfluity of our products must be exported, to enable us to pay our debts to her; and we must submit to be loaded at her discretion. If we look forward to a period not far distant, we shall perceive, that the productions of our country will infinitely exceed the demands which Great Britain and her connexions can possibly have for them;

and, as we shall then be greatly advanced in population, our wants will be proportionably increased. These circumstances will open an ample field for extortion and oppression.

The legislative authority of Parliament, would always be ready to silence our murmurs by tyrannical edicts. These would be enforced by a formidable army, kept up among us for the purpose. The slightest struggles to recover our lost liberty, would become dangerous, and even capital. Those hated things, Continental Conventions, by which there might be a communion of councils and measures, would be interdicted. Non-importation and non-exportation agreements, would, in effect, be made *seditions, illegal, and treasonable*.* No remedy would be left, but in the clemency of our oppressors; a wretched one indeed, and such as no prudent man would confide in! In whatever light we consider the matter, we shall find that we must effectually seal our bondage by adopting the mode you recommend.

Agreeably to your own concessions, Great Britain is abundantly recompensed for the naval protection she affords, by the *principal profits* of our trade. It can, therefore, with no color of justice, be urged upon us, to permit her to raise a revenue through that channel.

* I believe these were the epithets bestowed upon them by General Gage.

But, after all, let us suppose that the emolument which arises from the simple and abstracted regulation of our trade, is inadequate to the protection we derive from the parent State : does it follow, that her just demands cannot be satisfied, unless we put it in her power to ruin us ? When did the colonies refuse to contribute their proportion towards defraying the expenses of government ? During the war, our contributions were so liberal and generous, that we were thought to have done more than our part ; and restitution was accordingly made. Massachusetts, that injured, insulted, and calumniated country, was foremost in displaying its loyalty ; and was parsimonious neither of its men nor money. But, notwithstanding this, no confidence, it seems, is due to our virtue or fidelity ; but everything is to be trusted to the wisdom and disinterestedness of a British Parliament.

We do not expect, nor require, that all should depend upon our integrity or generosity, but only a part ; and this, every rule of equity entitles us to. We have assented to the exercise of a power which gives a certainty to Great Britain of a vast annual income : any further aids that may be necessary, ought to be entrusted to our fidelity. When the circumstances of two parties will not admit of precise boundaries to the duty of each, it is not a dictate of justice to put one entirely into the power of the other. If the mother country would desist

from grasping at too much, and permit us to enjoy the privileges of freemen, interest would concur with duty, and lead us to the performance of it. We should be sensible of the advantages of a mutual intercourse and connexion, and should esteem the welfare of Britain as the best security for our own. She may, by kind treatment, secure our attachment in the powerful bands of self-interest. This is the conduct that prudence and sound policy point out : but, alas ! to her own misfortune as well as ours, she is blind and infatuated.

If we take futurity into the account, as we no doubt ought to do, we shall find, that in fifty or sixty years, America will be in no need of protection from Great Britain. She will then be able to protect herself, both at home and abroad. She will have a plenty of men, and a plenty of materials, to provide and equip a formidable navy. She will, indeed, owe a debt of gratitude to the parent State for past services ; but the scale will then begin to turn in her favor : and the obligation for future services will be on the side of Great Britain. It will be the interest of the latter to keep us without a fleet, and, by this means, to continue to regulate our trade as before. But, in thus withholding the means of protection which we have within our own reach, she will chiefly consult her own advantage, and oblige herself much more than us. At that era, to enjoy the privilege of enriching herself

by the direction of our commerce, and, at the same time, to derive supports, from our youthful vigour and strength, against all her enemies, and thereby to extend her conquests over them, will give her reason to bless the times that gave birth to these colonies.

By enlarging our views, and turning our thoughts to future days, we must perceive, that the special benefits we receive from the British nation, are of a temporary and transient nature : while, on the other hand, those it may reap from us, by an affectionate and parental conduct, will be permanent and durable ; and will serve to give it such a degree of stability and lasting prosperity, as could not be expected in the common fluctuating course of human affairs. Such reflections will teach us, that there is no propriety in making any concessions to Great Britain, which may be at all inconsistent with our safety.

You employ several contemptible artifices to varnish and recommend your scheme. Your conduct, in every respect, affords a striking instance of the depravity of human nature. You insinuate, that the Pennsylvania Farmer admits the right of Parliament to regulate our trade in the same sense you do. The very letter your extracts are taken from, is expressly levelled against the revenue act, with regard to paper, glass, &c. The design of that, and all his subsequent papers, is to prove, that

all duties, imposed upon the articles of commerce, for the purpose of raising a revenue, are to be considered in the same light as what you call *internal* taxes, and ought equally to be opposed.

By the "legal authority to regulate trade," he means nothing more, than what the Congress have allowed: an authority to confine us to the use of our own manufactures; to prescribe our trade with foreign nations, and the like. This is the power he speaks of as being "lodged in the British Parliament." And as to *general duties*, he means such as the people of Great Britain are to pay as well as ourselves. Duties, for the purpose of a revenue raised upon us only, he calls *special* duties; and says, "they are as much a tax upon us as those imposed by the stamp act."

The following passage will show the sentiments of this ingenious and worthy gentleman; and, at the same time, will serve to illustrate what I have heretofore said.

"If you once admit," says he, "that Great Britain may lay duties upon her exportations to us, *for the purpose of levying money on us only*, she will then have nothing to do, but to lay duties on the articles which she prohibits us to manufacture; and the tragedy of *American* liberty is finished. We have been prohibited from procuring manufactures in all cases, anywhere but from Great Britain (excepting linens, which we are permitted to import directly

from Ireland). We have been prohibited in some cases from manufacturing for ourselves, and may be prohibited in others. We are, therefore, exactly in the situation of a city besieged, which is surrounded by the besiegers in every part but *one*. If that is closed up, no step can be taken, *but to surrender at discretion*. If Great Britain can order us to come to her for the necessaries we want ; and can order us to pay what taxes she pleases before we take them away, or when we land them here ; we are as abject slaves as *France* and *Poland* can show, in wooden shoes, and with uncombed hair.*

“ Perhaps the nature of the necessities of dependent States, caused by the policy of a governing one for her own benefit, may be elucidated by a fact mentioned in history. When the Carthaginians were possessed of the island of *Sardinia*, they made a decree, that the Sardinians should not raise *corn*, nor get it any other way than from the *Carthaginians*. Then, by imposing any duties they would upon it, they drained from the miserable *Sardinians* any sums they pleased : and, whenever that miserable and oppressed people made the least movement to assert their liberty, their tyrants starved them to death or submission. This may be called the most perfect kind of political necessity.”

* The peasants of *France* wear wooden shoes ; and the vassals of *Poland* are remarkable for matted hair which never can be combed.

You would persuade us, also, that Mr. *Pitt's* sentiments accord with yours, about the regulation of trade; but this is as false as the other. When he tells them "to exercise every power but that of taking money out of our pockets," he does not mean that they shall barely refrain from a *manual operation* upon our pockets; but that they shall exact money from us in no way whatsoever. To tax the commodities Great Britain obliges us to take from her only, is as much taking money out of our pockets as to tax our estates; and must be equally excluded by Mr. *Pitt's* prohibition.

You all along argue upon a suppositious denial of the right of Parliament to regulate our trade. You tell us, "It will never give up the right of regulating the trade of the colonies:" and, in another place, "If we succeed in depriving Great Britain of the power of regulating our trade, the colonies will probably be soon at variance with each other. Their commercial interests will interfere;* there will be no supreme power to interpose; and discord and animosity must ensue."

I leave others to determine, whether you are most defective in memory or honesty: but in order to show that you are starting difficulties where there are really none, I will transcribe, for your perusal, part of the fourth resolve of the Congress. After

* I do not see any reason to believe this would be the case; but as it is of no importance to controvert it, I shall pass it over.

asserting the right of the several provincial legislatures to an exclusive power of legislation “in all cases of taxation and internal policy,” they conclude thus: “But from the necessity of the case, and a regard to the mutual interests of both countries, we cheerfully consent to the operation of such acts of the British Parliament, as are *bona fide* restrained to *the regulation of our external commerce*, for the purpose of securing the commercial advantages of the whole empire to the mother country, and the commercial benefits of its respective members; excluding every idea of taxation, internal or external, for raising a revenue on the subjects in America without their consent.”

It seems to me not impossible, that our trade may be so regulated, as to prevent the discord and animosity, at the prospect of which you are so terrified, without the least assistance from a *revenue*.

Thus have I not only disproved the existence of that parliamentary authority of which you are so zealous an abettor; but also shown, that the mode you have proposed for the accommodation of our disputes, would be destructive to American freedom. My next business is, to vindicate the Congress by a few natural inferences; and such reflections on the state of our commercial connexion with the mother country, as are necessary to show the insignificancy of your objections to my former arguments on this head.

Since it has been proved, that the British Parliament has no right, either to the legislation or taxation of America; and since neither could be ceded without betraying our liberties; the Congress would have acted inconsistent with their duty to their country had they done it. Their conduct, therefore, so far from being reprehensible, was perfectly justifiable and laudable.

The regulation of our trade, in the sense it is now admitted, is the only power we can, with justice to ourselves, permit the British Parliament to exercise: and it is a privilege of so important a nature, so beneficial and lucrative to Great Britain, that she ought, in equity, to be contented with it, and not attempt to grasp at anything more. The Congress, therefore, have made the only concession which the welfare and prosperity of America would warrant, or which Great Britain, in reason, could expect.

All your clamours, therefore, against them for not having drawn some proper line, are groundless and ridiculous. They have drawn the only line which American freedom will authorize, or which the relation between the parent State and the colonies requires.

It is a necessary consequence, and not an assumed point, that the claim of Parliament to *bind us by statutes in all cases whatsoever*, is unconstitutional, unjust, and tyrannical; and the repeated at-

tempts to carry it into execution, evince a fixed, inveterate design to exterminate the liberties of America.

Mr. Grenville, during his administration, was the projector of this scheme. His conduct, as a minister, has been severely arraigned by his successors in office, and by the nation in general: but, notwithstanding this, a measure which disgraces his character more than anything else has been steadily pursued ever since.

The Stamp Act was the commencement of our misfortunes; which, in consequence of the *spirited* opposition made by us, was repealed. The Revenue Act, imposing duties on paper, glass, &c., came next, and was also partly repealed on the same account. A part, however, was left to be the instrument of some future attack. The present minister, in conjunction with a mercenary tribe of merchants, attempted to effect, by stratagem, what could not be done by an open, undisguised manner of proceeding. His emissaries, every-where, were set to work. They endeavoured, by every possible device, to allure us into the snare. The Act, passed for the purpose, was misrepresented; and we were assured, with all the parade of pretended patriotism, that our liberties were in no danger. The advantage we should receive from the probable cheapness of English tea, was played off with every exaggeration of falsehood; and specious declamations

on the criminality of illicit trade, served as a gilding for the whole. Thus, truth and its opposite were blended. The men, who could make just reflections on the sanctity of an oath, were yet base enough to strike at the vitals of those rights which ought to be held sacred by every rational being.

It so happened, that the first tea ship arrived at Boston. The Assembly of that province, justly alarmed at the consequences, made repeated applications to the consignees for the East India Company, requesting them to send back the tea. They as often refused to comply. The ship was detained till the time was elapsed; after which the tea must have been landed, and the duties paid, or it would have been seized by the Custom House. To prevent this, a part of the citizens of Boston assembled, proceeded to the ship, and threw the tea into the river.*

The scheme of the ministry was disappointed on all hands. The tea was returned from all the colonies except South Carolina. It was landed there; but such precautions were taken, as equally served to baffle their attempt.

This abortion of their favorite plan, inflamed the ministerial ire. They breathed nothing but vengeance against America. Menaces of punishment resounded through both Houses of Parliament.

* I shall examine the justice and policy of this procedure in some future publication.

The Commons of Great Britain spoke more in the supercilious tone of masters, than in the becoming language of fellow-subjects. To all the judicious reasonings of a Burke, or Barre, no other answer was returned, than an idle tale of *lenity* and *severity*. Much was said of their past forbearance, and of their future resentment. This was the burthen of the song. The Quixotte minister, too, promised to bring America to his feet. Humiliating idea, and such as ought to be spurned by every free-born American!

Boston was the first victim to the meditated vengeance. An Act was passed to block up her ports and destroy her commerce, with every aggravating circumstance that can be imagined. It was not left at her option to elude the stroke by paying for the tea; but she was also to make such satisfaction to the officers of his Majesty's revenue, and others who might have suffered, as should be judged *reasonable by the governor*.

Nor is this all. Before her commerce could be restored, she must have submitted to the authority claimed and exercised by the Parliament.*

* This must be evident to every person who has read the Act. The prefatory part of it, is in these words: "Whereas, dangerous commotions and insurrections have been fomented and raised in the town of Boston, &c.; in which commotions and insurrections, certain valuable cargoes of tea, &c., were seized and destroyed: And whereas, in the present condition of the said town and harbour, the commerce of his Majesty's subjects cannot be safely carried on there, nor the *customs* payable to his Majesty, duly collected, &c."

The commotions specified, are those in which the tea was destroyed: The commerce obstructed, was that of the East India Company: And the

Had the rest of America passively looked on, while a sister colony was subjugated, the same fate would gradually have overtaken all. The safety of the whole depends upon the mutual protection of every part. If the sword of oppression be permitted to lop off one limb without opposition; reiterated strokes will soon dismember the whole body. Hence, it was the duty and interest of all the colonies to succour and support the one which was suffering. It is sometimes sagaciously urged, that we ought to commiserate the distresses of the people of Massachusetts, but not intermeddle in their affairs, so far as perhaps to bring ourselves into like circumstances with them. This might be good reasoning, if our neutrality would not be more dangerous than our participation: but I am unable to conceive, how the colonies in general would have any security against oppression, if they were

customs which could not be collected, were those on the tea. These are the evils the Act is intended to punish and remove: and accordingly it provides, that "whenever it shall appear to his Majesty, in his privy council, that peace and obedience to the laws (i. e. the laws of Parliament) shall be so far restored in the said town of Boston, that the trade of Great Britain may safely be carried on there, and his Majesty's *customs* duly collected;" then, his Majesty may, at his discretion, so far open the port, as to him seems necessary. So that until the Bostonians shall submit to let the trade of Great Britain be carried on upon her own terms, and suffer his Majesty's customs (the duty upon tea, or any other the Parliament may impose) to be duly collected, they must remain in their present distressed situation: that is, unless they resign their freedom, and put on the ignominious yoke tendered them by Parliament, they are never to recover their lost trade. Hence it appears, how weak, ungenerous, and contemptible, that objection is, which supposes the Bostonians might have avoided their present calamities by paying for the tea. The truth is, they had no alternative but submission to all the *unjust claims of Parliament*.

once to content themselves with barely *pitying* each other, while Parliament was prosecuting and enforcing its demands. Unless they continually protect and assist each other, they must all inevitably fall a prey to their enemies.

Extraordinary emergencies require extraordinary expedients. The best mode of opposition was that in which there might be a union of councils. This was necessary to ascertain the boundaries of our rights, and to give weight and dignity to our measures, both in Great Britain and America. A Congress was accordingly proposed, and universally agreed to.

You, sir, triumph in the supposed *illegality* of this body: but granting your supposition were true, it would be a matter of no real importance. When the first principles of civil society are violated, and the rights of a whole people are invaded, the common forms of municipal law are not to be regarded. Men may then betake themselves to the law of nature; and, if they but conform their actions to that standard, all cavils against them betray either ignorance or dishonesty. There are some events in society, to which human laws cannot extend; but, when applied to them, lose all their force and efficacy. In short, when human laws contradict, or discountenance, the means which are necessary to preserve the essential rights of any society,

they defeat the proper end of all laws, and so become null and void.

But you have barely asserted, not proved, this *illegality*. If by the term, you mean a contrariety to law, I desire you to produce the law against it. I maintain there is none in being. If you mean that there is no law, the intention of which may authorize such a convention, I deny this also. It has been always a principle of the law, that subjects have a right to state their grievances, and petition the king for redress. This is explicitly acknowledged by an Act of the first of William and Mary: and "all prosecutions and commitments for such petitioning," are declared to be illegal. So far, then, the Congress was a body founded in law; for if subjects have such a right, they may undoubtedly elect and depute persons from among themselves to act for them.*

As to the particular agreements entered into, with respect to our commerce, the law makes no provision for or against them: they are perfectly indifferent, in a *legal* sense. We may, or may not, trade, as is most suitable to our own circumstances.

The deputies chosen in the several provinces, met at Philadelphia according to appointment, and

* All lawyers agree, that the *spirit* and *reason* of a law, is one of the principal rules of interpretation: if so, it cannot be doubted, that when a people are aggrieved, and their circumstances will not allow them unitedly to petition in their own persons, they may appoint representatives to do it for them.

framed a set of resolves, declarative of the rights of America: all which I have by general arguments proved, are consonant to reason and nature; to the spirit of the British Constitution; and to the intention of our charters. They made the only concession (as I have also shown) that their duty to themselves and their country would justify, or that the connexion between Great Britain and the colonies demanded.

They solicited the King for a redress of grievances: but, justly concluding, from past experience; from the behaviour and declarations of the majority in both Houses of Parliament; and from the known character and avowed designs of the minister; that little or no dependence was to be placed upon bare entreaties; they thought it necessary to second them by restrictions on trade.

In my former defence of the measures of the Congress, I proved, in a manner you never will be able to invalidate, that petitions and remonstrances would certainly be unavailing. I will now examine your frivolous and prevaricating reply.

You answer thus: "In the commotions occasioned by the Stamp Act, we recurred to petitions and remonstrances: our grievances were pointed out, and redress solicited with temper and decency. They were heard; they were attended to; and the disagreeable Act repealed. The same mode of application succeeded, with regard to the duties

laid upon glass, painter's colours, &c. You say, indeed, that our addresses on this occasion were treated with contempt and neglect. But, I beseech you, were not our addresses received, read, and debated upon? And was not the repeal of those Acts the consequence? *The fact you know is as I state it.* If these Acts were not only disagreeable to the Americans, but were also found to militate against the commercial interests of Great Britain, it proves what I asserted above; that duties which injure our trade, will soon be felt in England; and then there will be no difficulty in getting them repealed."

I entirely deny the fact to be as you state it; and you are conscious it is not. Our addresses were not heard, attended to, and the disagreeable Act repealed in consequence of them. If this had been the case, why was no notice taken of them in the repealing Act? Why were not our complaints assigned as the inducement to it? On the contrary, these are the express words of the first repeal, to which the second is also similar: "Whereas the continuance of the said Act would be attended *with many inconveniences, and may be productive of consequences greatly detrimental to the commercial interests of Great Britain:* May it therefore please your most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent, &c., that from and after the first day of May, 1766, the above mentioned Act, and

the several matters and things therein contained, shall be, and is, and are, hereby repealed and made void, to all intents and purposes whatsoever."

The inconveniences, and the ill consequences, to Great Britain, are the only reasons given for the revocation of the Act. How, then, can you pretend to say it was in compliance with our petitions? You must think the complaisance of your readers very great, to imagine they will credit your assertions at the expense of their own understandings.

Neither is the use you make of the assigned reasons at all just. The consequences, so detrimental to the commercial interests of Great Britain, are not such as would have resulted from the natural operation of the Act, had it been submitted to; but from the opposition made by us, and the cessation of imports which had taken place.

A non-importation (to which you have so violent an aversion) was the only thing that procured us redress on preceding occasions. We did not formerly, any more than now, confine ourselves to petitions only; but took care to adopt a more prevailing method; to wit,—a suspension of trade.

But what proves to a demonstration, that our former petitions were unsuccessful, is, that the grand object they aimed at was never obtained. This was, an exemption from Parliamentary taxation. Our addresses turned entirely upon this point. And so far were they from succeeding, that imme-

diately upon the repeal of the Stamp Act, a subsequent Act was passed, declaring the right of Parliament to bind us by statutes in all cases whatsoever. This declaration of the unlimited, universal authority of Parliament, was a direct denial of the leading claim held up in our petition, and of course a rejection of the petition itself.

The same observations are applicable to the Revenue Act, which, had our addresses been successful, would have been wholly, not partially, revoked; and we should not, at this time, have had any occasion to renew our complaints; but should have been in a state of security and tranquillity.

In my former reflections on this head, I urged many considerations to show, that there is less reason now than ever, to expect deliverance by means of remonstrance and entreaty. And, indeed, if we consider the vindictive spirit diffused through the words and actions of our oppressors, we must be convinced of this. It impeaches the understandings of the ministry and the Parliament in the grossest manner, to suppose they have renewed their attempts, and taken such violent methods to carry them into execution, merely to have the pleasure of undoing the whole, in condescension to our prayers and complaints. The taxation of America is an object too near at heart to be resigned unless from necessity: and, if they would not have abandoned the principle, there could be

no reason to expect they would have desisted from the exercise of it in the present instance. For the duty upon tea is, in itself, very trifling; and, since that is opposed, they could not hope to vary the mode in any way that would be less offensive and less obnoxious to opposition.

In answer to the instance I produced from the unsuccessful application of the Boston Assembly, you tell me, that "the Governor against whom the complaint was made, was called to a public trial before the only court where the cause was cognizable, the King in Council: but the Boston Assembly could not support their charge; and the Governor was acquitted." The truth is, their charge was extremely well supported in the eye of strict justice; but it was destitute of the mere formalities of law, and, on this score, it was rejected. They accused him of treachery and falsehood, and produced his own letters against him. It was not admitted as a *legal* charge, or *crimen*; nor the party's letters as an evidence, or *testis*; and, by these evasions, the criminal escaped the punishment he deserved; and, instead of it, has been advanced to higher honours; while the complainants were unrelieved and insulted. I remember when the particulars of this transaction were first published, there was this circumstance mentioned; that the petition in question, was pronounced at *St. James'*, to be "*a seditious, vexatious, and scandalous libel.*"

You tell me, "There is also this reason why we should, at least, have tried the mode of petition and remonstrance, to obtain a removal of the grievances we complain of: The friends of America, in England, have strongly recommended it as the most decent and probable means of succeeding." I wish you had been so kind as to have particularized those friends you speak of. I am inclined to believe, you would have found some difficulty in this. There have been some publications in the newspapers, said to be extracts of letters from England: but who were the authors of them? How do you know they were not written in America? or, if they came from England, that the writers of them were really sincere friends? I have heard one or two persons named as the authors of some of these letters: but they were those whose sincerity we have the greatest reason to distrust. The general tenour of advice, from those with whose integrity we are best acquainted, has been, to place no dependence on the justice or clemency of Great Britain; but to work out our deliverance by a spirited and self-denying opposition. Restrictions on our trade, have been expressly pointed out and recommended, as the only probable source of redress.

You say, "If the information from England be true, we have, by our haughty demands, detached most of our friends there from our interest, and forced them to take part against us." Pray, sir,

where did you get this information? Is there any inhabitant of the invisible world that brings intelligence to you in a supernatural way? There have been no arrivals from England, preceding the time you wrote your letter, that have brought any account of the proceedings of the Congress being received there, or of the consequences resulting from them. Your information must have either come to you in a miraculous manner, or it must be a fiction of your own imagination.

But there are other powerful reasons against trusting to petitions only, in our present circumstances. The town of Boston is in a very critical situation. Men, under sufferings, are extremely apt, either to plunge into desperation, or to grow disheartened and dejected. If the colonies, in general, appeared remiss, or unwilling to adopt vigorous measures, in order to procure the most speedy relief, the people of Massachusetts might perhaps have been hurried on to a rash and fatal conduct, or they might have become languid and lifeless. Delays are extremely dangerous in affairs of such vast consequence.

The dispute might have been spun out by ministerial artifice, till the generality of the people became careless and negligent, and, of course, fitter to be imposed upon, and less forward to assert their rights with firmness and spirit. **THE HAND OF BRIBERY MIGHT HAVE BEEN STRETCHED ACROSS THE**

ATLANTIC, and the number of domestic vipers increased among us. The ministry and their agents here, are active and subtile: nothing would have been neglected, that might have a tendency to deceive the ignorant and unwary, or to attract the dishonest and avaricious. How great an influence, places, pensions, and honours, have upon the minds of men, we may easily discover, by contrasting the former with the present conduct of some among ourselves. Many who, at the time of the Stamp Act, were loudest in the cause of liberty, and the most ardent promoters of the spirited proceedings on that occasion, have now, from patriots of the first magnitude, dwindled into *moderate men*, friends to order and good government, dutiful and zealous servants to the ministry.

Had our petitions failed, we should have found our difficulties multiplied much more than we can imagine: and since there was the highest probability of a failure, it would have been madness to have hazarded so much upon so unpromising a footing.

It betrays an ignorance of human nature, to suppose, that a design formed and ripening for several years, against the liberties of any people, might be frustrated by the mere force of entreaty. Men must cease to be as fond of power as they are, before this can be the case.

I therefore infer, that if the Congress had not

concerted other, more efficacious measures, they would have trifled away the liberties of their country, and merited censure instead of approbation. Commercial regulations were the only peaceable means, from which we could have the least hope of success. These they have entered into; and these, I maintain, must succeed, if they are not treacherously or pusillanimously infringed.

You tell me, "I over-rate the importance of these colonies to the British empire;" and proceed to make such assertions, as must convince every intelligent person, that you are either a mortal foe to truth, or totally ignorant of the matter you undertake. The following extracts will show whether my representations have been just or not.

"Our plantations spend mostly our *English* manufactures; and those of *all sorts* almost imaginable, in *prodigious* quantities; and employ near *two-thirds* of all our English shipping; so that we have more people in *England*, by reason of our plantations in *America*.*

"We may safely advance, that our trade and navigation are *greatly* increased by our colonies; and that they really are a source of treasure and naval power to this kingdom, since they *work for us*, and their treasure *centres here*. Before their settlement, *our manufactures were few*, and those but *indifferent*; the number of English merchants

* Postlethwait

very small; and the *whole shipping* of the nation, much inferior to what now belongs to the northern colonies only. *These are certain facts.* But since their establishment, our condition has altered for the better, *almost to a degree beyond credibility.* Our manufactures are *prodigiously* increased; chiefly by the demand for them in the plantations, where they *at least take off one-half*, and supply us with many valuable commodities for exportation; which is as great emolument to the mother kingdom as to the plantations themselves.”*

The same author says, in another place, “Before the settlement of these colonies, our *manufactures were few*, and those but indifferent. In those days, we had, not only our *naval stores*, but our *ships*, from our neighbours.”

“I shall sum up my whole remarks,” says another writer, “on our *American colonies*, with this observation: that, as they are a *certain annual revenue of several millions sterling* to their mother country, they ought carefully to be protected, duly encouraged, and every opportunity that presents, improved for their increment and advantage; *as every one they can possibly reap, must at last return to us with interest.*”†

These quotations clearly prove, that the colonies are of the last importance to Great Britain.

* Postlethwait. † Lex mercatoria.

They not only take off vast quantities of her manufactures, but furnish her with materials to extend her trade with foreign nations. They also supply her with naval stores, and, in a great measure, with a navy itself. The present flourishing state of her commerce, is chiefly to be attributed to the colonies who *work for her*, and whose treasure *centres in her*. How unjust, therefore, is it in her, not to be satisfied with the advantages she has hitherto received from us, but to aim at depriving us of our freedom and happiness! And what ruinous consequences must flow from a cessation of our trade, on which her manufactures so much depend! What prodigious numbers must be thrown out of employ and reduced to beggary and misery!

“But she is a great nation: has vast resources: may easily supply the want of our trade, by making very small concessions to Portugal, Russia, Turkey, &c. Should our non-importation distress her manufactures, every man may employ himself to labour on a farm: and the price of grain would be much advanced in France, Spain, and the Mediterranean. Notwithstanding the present high cultivation of the lands in England, that kingdom is capable of being improved, by agriculture and commerce, so as to maintain double the number of people that it does at present. The improvements in Scotland within the last thirty years are amazing. The enterprising spirit of the people, has opened an easy inter-

course between all parts of the country; and they have been enriched by commerce to a surprising degree.”

I can hardly prevail upon myself to give a serious answer to such ridiculous rant; but it may be requisite for the sake of the uninformed; and of course it would be improper to decline it.

The national debt is now about one hundred and forty millions sterling; a debt unparalleled in the annals of any country besides. The surplus of the annual revenues, after paying the interest of this debt, and the usual expenses of the nation, is, upon an average, about one million and a quarter sterling;* so that, with all their present resources, they would not be able to discharge the public debt in less than *one hundred and twelve years*, should the peace continue all that time. It is well known that most of the necessaries of life are, at present, heavily taxed in Great Britain and Ireland. The common people are extremely impoverished, and find it very difficult to procure a subsistence. They are totally unable to bear any new impositions; and of course there can be no new internal sources opened. These are stubborn facts, and notorious to every person that has the least acquaintance with the situation of the two kingdoms.

* See a calculation made by Blackstone. He says, the year '65, two millions were paid, and three millions in the succeeding years; i. e., five millions in four years.

Had there been the vast resources you speak of, why have they not been improved to exonerate the people, and discharge the enormous debt of the nation? The guardians of the State have been a supine, negligent, and stupid pack indeed, to have overlooked, in the manner they have done, those numerous expedients they might have fallen upon for the relief of the public. It cannot be expected, but that a war will take place in the course of a few years, if not immediately; and then, through the negligence of her rulers, Great Britain, already tottering under her burthens, will be obliged to increase them, till they become altogether insupportable, and she must sink under the weight of them. These considerations render it very evident, that the mighty resources you set forth, in such pompous terms, have nothing but an *imaginary* existence; or they would not have been left so uncultivated in such necessitous and pressing circumstances.

You think you have nothing to do, but to mention the names of a few countries, Portugal, Russia, Turkey, &c., and you have found out an easy remedy for the inconveniences flowing from the loss of our trade. Yet, in truth, Great Britain carries on as extensive a commerce with those countries, and all others, as their circumstances will permit. Her trade is upon the decline with many of them. France has, in a great measure,

supplanted her in Spain, Portugal, and Turkey ; and is continually gaining ground. Russia is increasing her own manufactures fast ; and the demand for those of Great Britain must decrease in proportion.

“ Most of the nations of Europe have interfered with *her*, more or less, in divers of her *staple manufactures*, within half a century ; not only in her woollen, but in her lead and tin manufactures, as well as her fisheries.”*

A certain writer in England, who has written on the present situation of affairs with great temper, deliberation, and apparent integrity, has these observations : “ The condition of the great *staple manufactures* of our country is well known : those of the linen and the silk are in the greatest distress : and the woollen and the linen are now publicly banded, and contending against one another. One part of our people is starving at home on the alms of their parishes ; and another running abroad to this very country that we are contending with. The produce of North America, that used to be sent yearly to Great Britain, is reckoned at about four millions sterling : the manufactures of Great Britain, and other commodities returned from hence, at nearly the same sum : the debts due from America to the British merchants here, at about six millions, or a year and a half of that commerce. Supposing,

* Postlethwait.

therefore, the Americans to act in this case as they did in the time of the Stamp Act; we shall then have yearly, until the final settlement of this affair, manufactures, to the value of four millions sterling, left and heaped on the hands of our merchants and master manufacturers: or we shall have workmen and poor people put out of employ and turned adrift in that proportion. There will likewise be drawn from our home consumption, and out of our general trade and traffic, North American commodities to the same value: and debts, to the immense sum above-mentioned, will be withheld from private people here. What effects these things will produce, considering the present state of our trade, manufactures, and manufacturers, the condition of our poor at home, and the numbers of people running abroad, it don't want many words to explain and set forth. *They were before severely felt* for the time that they lasted; and it is apprehended, that the present situation of the public is yet more liable to the impression. These are some of the difficulties and distresses which we are, for a trial of skill, going to bring on ourselves; and which will be perpetually magnifying and increasing as long as the unnatural contest shall continue."

From these facts and authorities it appears unquestionable, that the trade of Great Britain, instead of being capable of improvement among foreign countries, is rather declining: and instead

of her being able to bear the loss of our commerce, she stands in great need of more colonies to consume her manufactures.

It is idle to talk of employing those who might be thrown out of business upon farms. All the lands in England, of any value, have been long ago disposed of, and are already cultivated as high as possible. The laborious farmers find it an exceeding difficult task to pay their yearly taxes, and supply their families with the bare necessaries of life : and it would be impracticable to give employment in agriculture to any more than are already engaged. We can have no doubt of this, if we consider the small extent of territory of Great Britain, the antiquity of its settlement, and the vast number of people it contains. It is rather overstocked with inhabitants : and were it not for its extensive commerce, it could not maintain near the number it does at present. This is acknowledged on all hands. None but yourself would hazard the absurdity of a denial. The emigrations from Great Britain, particularly from the north part of it, as well as the most authentic accounts, prove the contrary of your representations. Men are generally too much attached to their native countries to leave it, and dissolve all their connexions, unless they are driven to it by necessity. The swarms that every year come over to America, will never suffer any reasonable man to

believe, upon the strength of your word, that the people in Scotland, or Ireland, are even in tolerable circumstances.

I cannot forbear wondering, when you talk of the price of grain being advanced in France, Spain, and the Mediterranean, and insinuate that Great Britain may be able to supply them. It will be well if she can raise grain enough for herself, so as not to feel the want of those considerable quantities she frequently gets from us. I am apt to think she will experience some inconveniences on this account.

With respect to Ireland, you think yourself under no obligation to point out where she may find purchasers for her linens so numerous and wealthy as we are : but unless you could do this, you must leave that country in very deplorable circumstances. It is not true, that she may do just as well with her linens upon her hands, as we can with our flax seed upon ours. Linen is a staple-manufacture of hers, and the sole means of subsistence to a large part of her inhabitants. Flax seed, as an article of commerce, is comparatively of little importance to us : but we shall stand in need of all the flax we can raise, to manufacture linens for ourselves ; and therefore shall not lose our seed by ceasing to export it. I shall say more of this hereafter.

Nor is it by any means a just inference, that be-

cause Ireland formerly subsisted without a linen manufactory, she would not, therefore, severely feel any present obstruction to the sale of the article in question. Her burthens are now much more grievous than they formerly were ; and of course her resources ought to be proportionably greater, or she must sink under the pressure of them. The linen manufactory is, at this time, one of her most valuable resources, and could not be materially injured, or impeded, without producing the most melancholy effects. The distressed condition of Ireland will not admit of any diminution of her *means*, but pressingly demands an enlargement of them.

It is of little moment to contest the possibility that that country might procure a sufficiency of flax elsewhere than from us, till it can be shown where she may find a mart for her linens equal to the American : and this you are not willing even to attempt. Yet I have credible information that she could not obtain from Holland much more than usual (for the reasons I before assigned) ; and that she has always had as much from the Baltic as she could conveniently get. With regard to Canada, any considerable supply from thence would be a work of time, and no relief to her immediate exigencies.

I observed, in my former pamphlet, that “the Dutch may withhold their usual supplies: They

may choose to improve the occasion for the advancement of their own trade: They may take advantage of the scarcity of materials in Ireland, to increase and put off their own manufactures." You answer it by saying, "You never yet knew a Hollander who would withhold anything that would fetch him a good price." The force of my observation turns upon its being his interest to do it. You should have shown, that it would be more profitable to him to sell it to the Irish than to retain it for the purposes mentioned; otherwise, that very avarice you ascribe to him, will operate as I supposed.

You are unmercifully witty upon what I said concerning the West Indies: but the misfortune of it is, you have done nothing else than "blunder round about my meaning." I will endeavour to explain myself in a manner more level to your capacity.

The lands in the West Indies are extremely valuable, because they produce the sugar cane, which is a very lucrative plant; but they are small in quantity, and therefore their proprietors appropriate only small portions to the purpose of raising food. They are very populous, and therefore the food raised among themselves goes but little way. They could not afford sufficient sustenance to their inhabitants, unless they were chiefly or entirely applied to the production of necessaries; because

they are so small in quantity, and so thickly inhabited.

These are truths which every person acquainted with the West Indies must acquiesce in: and should they be deprived of external succours, they must either starve, or suspend the cultivation of the sugar cane. The last is the best side of the dilemma; but that would cut off an annual income of several millions sterling to Great Britain; for it cannot admit of a doubt, that the chief part of the profits of the English West Indies, ultimately centres there.

But, in order to disappoint my malice, you tell me that Canada raises four hundred thousand bushels of wheat a year; and this, you imagine, will pretty well supply the wants of the West Indians: but give me leave to inform you, that it would not satisfy a tenth part of them. The single Island of Jamaica would require much more. At a moderate computation, I believe there are four hundred thousand people in the British West Indies only. Let us allow a pound of wheat a day upon an average, to each,* and make a calculation accordingly.

At a pound a day, every person must be supposed

* This allowance cannot be thought too much, if we consider that the negroes live chiefly upon grain; and must continue to do so; because the quantity of flesh and fish would be proportionably diminished when our supplies failed.

to consume three hundred and sixty-five pounds a year ; that is, about twelve bushels. Now, as there are as many people as there are bushels of wheat raised in Canada ; and as each person would consume twelve bushels, it follows, that the quantity you mention, would not be above a twelfth part sufficient.

But can we imagine, that all the wheat of Canada would be devoted to the use of the British West Indies ? If our ports were to be blocked up, would not the French and Spanish islands be in great distress for provisions ? And have not the Canadians any near connexions among them ? Would they not naturally sympathize with them, and do all in their power to afford relief ? And could they find no means to accomplish their inclinations ? The answer to these questions is easy. The islands belonging to the French and Spaniards will be greatly distressed : The Canadians will be very ready and desirous to assist them : And they will contrive some expedients to communicate a large share of what their country yields.

What you say concerning the lumber exported from Canada is totally false. That country labours under many inconveniencies which have hitherto prevented the exportation of that article, but in very small quantities, and of a particular kind. The places where the lumber grows, are so far distant from the seaports, that the expense of transporta-

tion is too great to make it worth while to ship any other than butt staves, and these must be brought quite from Lake Champlain. This disadvantage, together with the number of hands it would require, and the time necessary to enter extensively into any branch of trade, and to remove all the impediments naturally in the way, would render the situation of the West Indians truly pitiable, were they once necessitated to depend upon Canada only, for supplies of lumber.

The attention of Mississippi is entirely engrossed in raising corn and indigo. The advantage arising from these articles, is much greater than would result from lumber; and of course the people of that country will never attend to the latter in preference to the former.

Thus have I proved, in a full, clear, and conclusive manner, that a cessation of our trade with Great Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies, would be productive of the most fatal consequences to them all; and that, therefore, the peace, happiness, and safety, of the British empire, are connected with the redress of our grievances; and, if they are at all consulted, our measures cannot fail of success.

As to the justice of proceeding in the manner we have done, it must depend upon the *necessity* of such a mode of conduct. If the British Parliament are claiming and exercising an unjust authority, we are right in opposing it, by every necessary

means. If remonstrances and petitions have been heretofore found ineffectual (and we have no reasonable ground to expect the contrary at present), it is prudent and justifiable to try other methods, and these can only be, restrictions on trade. Our duty to ourselves and posterity, supersedes the duties of benevolence to our fellow-subjects in Great Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies.

You can never confute the arguments I before made use of on this head, unless you can prove the right of Parliament to act as it has done; or the likelihood of succeeding by petitions. Your feeble endeavours to effect this, I have sufficiently baffled. You must now collect new forces, and make a more vigorous effort, or you must quit the field in disgrace.

Such vociferation as this is not to be admitted instead of argument: "Are the Irish and West Indians accountable for our mad freaks? Do you expect to extend the tyranny of the Congress over the whole British empire, by the legerdemain of calling it American freedom? Do you think that the Irish and West Indians are in duty bound to enter into our non-importation, non-consumption, and non-exportation agreements, till our grievances, real or pretended, are removed? And that they deserve to be starved if they do not? Enjoy your folly and malevolence if you can."

The resistance* we are making to Parliamentary tyranny, cannot wear the aspect of *mad freaks* to any, but such mad imaginations as yours. It will be deemed virtuous and laudable by every ingenuous mind. When I said that the people of Great Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies, were to be considered as *politically* criminal, for remaining neutral while our privileges were attacked; I did not mean that they ought to enter into any of the above mentioned agreements; but that it was their duty to signify, in a public manner, their disapprobation of the measures carrying on, and to use all their influence to have them laid aside. Had they interested themselves in the affair, with any degree of zeal and earnestness, we should not, probably, have had occasion to act as we do; and they would not have been in danger of their present calamities. Their obligation to assist us in the preservation of our rights, is of the very same nature with ours, to carry on a trade with them.

But you insist upon it, we should not be able to live without the manufactures of Great Britain; and that we should be ruined by a prohibition of our exports. "The first winter after our English goods are consumed, we shall be starving with cold:" after all our endeavours, "the requisite

* I mean the general resistance. That there have been some irregularities committed in America, I freely confess. It would be miraculous and inconsistent with human nature, for a people in such critical and trying circumstances, to act perfectly right.

quantity of wool to clothe the inhabitants of this continent, could not be obtained in twenty years." As to cotton, it "must come from the southern colonies; and the expense of bringing it by land, would be too great for the poor. Besides, we have nobody to manufacture our materials after we have got them." All these, you think, are insuperable obstacles; and would, if duly considered, induce us to bend our necks tamely and quietly to the proffered yoke, as much less dreadful than the evils attendant upon our measures will inevitably be.

Nature has disseminated her blessings variously throughout this continent. Some parts of it are favorable to some things, others to others; some colonies are best calculated for grain; others for flax and hemp; others for cotton; and others for live stock of every kind. By this means, a mutually advantageous intercourse may be established between them all. If we were to turn our attention from external to internal commerce, we should give greater stability, and more lasting prosperity, to our country, than she can possibly have otherwise. We should not then import the luxuries and vices of foreign climes; nor should we make such hasty strides to public corruption and depravity.

Let all those lands, which are rich enough to produce flax and hemp, be applied to that purpose: and let such parts as have been a long time settled, still continue to be appropriated to grain, or other

things they are fit for. We shall want as much of the former articles as can be raised ; and perhaps as much of the latter, as may be requisite towards the due improvement of the poorer part of our soil. Let it be considered, that the colonies which are adapted to the production of materials for manufactures, will not be employed in raising grain, but must take what they use, chiefly from the other colonies ; and, in return, supply their materials. By this means, and by dedicating no more of our land to the raising of wheat, rye, corn, &c., than is incapable of producing other things, we shall find no superfluity of those articles ; and shall make a very beneficial use of all our lands. This is practicable : difficulties may be started, but none which perseverance and industry may not overcome.

The clothes we already have in use, and the goods at present in the country, will, with care, be sufficient to last *three years*.* During that time, we shall be increasing our sheep as much as possible. It is unfair to judge of the future from the past. Hitherto we have paid no great attention to them : we have killed and exported as fast as we could obtain a sale. When we come to attend properly to the matter, to kill but few, and to ex-

* I may be thought here to contradict my former assertion, to wit, that in eighteen months, all the goods we have among us will be consumed ; but I only meant, that all the goods in the hands of the merchants would be purchased and taken off.

port none, we shall, in the course of two or three years, have large numbers of sheep; and wool enough to go a considerable way towards clothing ourselves.

Flax and hemp we should undoubtedly have in abundance. The immense tracts of new rich land, which may be planted with these articles, would yield immense quantities of them. What large supplies of seed do we annually export to Ireland! When we come to withhold these, and make the cultivation of flax and hemp a matter of serious attention, we shall soon procure a plenty of them. In speaking of this matter, you confine your views to the single small province of New-York. You say, "We sow already as much flax as we can conveniently manage. Besides, it requires a rich free soil; nor will the same ground in *this* country produce flax a second time, till after an interval of five or six years. If the measures of the Congress should be carried into full effect, I confess we may, in a year or two, want a large quantity of hemp for the executioner. But I fear we must import it. It exhausts the soil too much to be cultivated in the old settled parts of the province."

There is land enough in the other provinces, that is rich, free, and new; nor is it at all liable to the objections you make. As to this particular province, and any others in the same circumstances,

let only such parts as are fit, be planted with the articles in question; and let the rest be managed as before. Much more may be produced in this, than has been hitherto; but if it could not afford a sufficiency for itself, let it exchange its grain with other colonies that superabound with such materials.

If we sow already as much flax as we can conveniently manage, it is because the chief of our attention is engrossed by other things: but the supposition is, that there will be less demand for them, and more for flax; and, by attending less to present objects, we shall have it in our power for the future to sow and manage much more flax than in the time past.

With respect to cotton, you do not pretend to deny that a sufficient quantity of that might be produced. Several of the southern colonies are so favorable to it, that with due cultivation, in a couple of years, they would afford enough to clothe the whole continent.*

As to the expense of bringing it by land, the best

* When it is recollected, that when this was written, cotton (the great staple of the South), was almost unknown as an article of commerce; the far-reaching anticipations of the author, in this respect, which, in our own day, are so completely fulfilled, evince powers of mind, certainly remarkable in a stripling of eighteen.—[EDITOR.]

way will be, to manufacture it where it grows, and afterwards transport it to the other colonies. Upon this plan, I apprehend, the expense would not be greater than to build and equip large ships to import the manufactures of Great Britain from thence.

The difficulty of transportation would be attended with one great advantage. It would give employment and bread to a number of people ; and would, among other things, serve to prevent there being those terrific bands of thieves, robbers, and highwaymen, which you endeavour to draw up in such formidable array against the Congress.

It would, however, be hardly possible to block up our ports in such a manner as to cut off all communication between the colonies by water.

There would remain some avenues, in spite of all that could be done ; and we should not be idle in making proper use of them.

I mentioned before the vast quantities of skins in America, which would never let us want a warm and comfortable suit. This is one of our principal resources ; and this you have passed over in silence. A suit made of skins would not be quite so elegant as one of broadcloth ; but it would shelter us from the inclemency of the winter full as well.

Upon the whole, considering all the resources we have, and the time we shall have to prepare them before we are in actual want, there can be no

room to doubt, that we may live without the manufactures of Great Britain, if we are careful, frugal, and industrious.

But it is said, we have no persons to manufacture our materials after we have provided them. Among the swarms of emigrants that have, within these few years past, come to the continent, there are numbers of manufacturers in the necessary branches. These, for want of encouragement in their own occupations, have been obliged to apply themselves to other methods of getting a living, but would be glad of an opportunity to return to them. Besides these, we should soon have a plenty of workmen from Great Britain and Ireland. Numbers who would be thrown out of employ *there*, would be glad to flock to us for subsistence. They would not stay at home and be miserable, while there was any prospect of encouragement here. Neither is there any great difficulty in acquiring a competent knowledge of the manufacturing arts. In a couple of years, many of our own people might become proficient enough to make the coarser kinds of stuffs and linens.

But, if it should be necessary, we have other resources besides all these. It will be impossible for the ships of Great Britain to line the vast extended coast of this continent, in such a manner as to preclude the admission of foreign aids and supplies. After every possible precaution against it,

we shall still be able to get large quantities of goods from France and Holland.*

I shall conclude this head with one more observation, which is this: That all such as may be deprived of business by the operation of our measures in America, may be employed in cultivating lands. We have enough and to spare. It is of no force to object, that "when our exports are stopped, our grain would become of little worth." They can be occupied in raising other things that will be more wanted, to wit, materials for manufactures; and only a sufficiency of provisions for their own use. In such a country as this, there can be no great difficulty in finding business for all its inhabitants. Those obstacles which, to the eye of timidity, or disaffection, seem like the *Alps*, would, to the hand of resolution and perseverance, become mere *hillocks*.

Once more I insist upon it, that Great Britain can never force us to submission by blocking up our ports; and that the consequences of such a procedure to herself, Ireland, and the West Indies, would be too fatal to admit of it. If she is determined to enslave us, it must be by force of arms; and to attempt this, I again assert, would be

* You may perhaps tell me here, that I contradict the sentiments I formerly delivered, respecting unlawful trade. But it is by no means the case. I despise the practice of avaricious smugglers very heartily; but when a whole people are invaded, there can be no law of any force against their procuring every needful succour.

nothing less than *the grossest infatuation, madness itself.*

Whatever may be said of the disciplined troops of Great Britain, the event of the contest must be extremely doubtful. There is a certain enthusiasm in liberty, that makes human nature rise above itself in acts of bravery and heroism. It cannot be expected that America would yield, without a magnanimous, persevering, and bloody struggle. The testimony of past ages, and the least knowledge of mankind, must suffice to convince us of the contrary. We have a recent instance in *Corsica*, to what lengths a people will go in defence of its liberties: and if we take a view of the colonies in general, we must perceive that the pulse of Americans beats high in their country's cause. Let us, then, suppose the arms of Great Britain triumphant, and America mutilated, exhausted, and vanquished. What situation will Great Britain then be in? What laurels will she reap from her conquests? Alas, none! Every true friend to that deluded country, must shudder at the prospect of her self-destroying success. The condition we should be left in, would disable us from paying the six millions sterling, which is due for the manufactures of Great Britain. Instead of the present millions derived annually from our trade, we should be so distressed and reduced, as to be, for many years to come, a burthen, and not an advantage. Millions

are soon dispensed in supporting fleets and armies. Much British treasure and blood would be expended in effecting our ruin.

This, then, would be the situation of Great Britain. Her public debt would be augmented several millions. Her merchants, who are one of the principal sources of her opulence, would, many of them, become bankrupt, by the loss of the vast sums due them in America. Her manufactures would stagnate and decay, and her revenues would be considerably diminished. This continent, which is now a rich source of wealth and strength, would be debilitated and depressed.

Would the ancient rivals and enemies of Great Britain be idle at such a conjuncture as this? Would they not eagerly seize the opportunity to recover their former losses, and revenge the evils they have sustained on former occasions? It will be said, This is possible, but it may not happen. I answer, Causes must fail of their usual effects if it does not. Princes and nations must cease to be ambitious and avaricious. The French, from being a jealous, politic, and enterprising people, must be grown negligent, stupid, and inattentive to their own interest. They never could have a fairer opportunity, or a greater temptation to aggrandize themselves, and triumph over Great Britain than would be here presented. Let us imagine England immersed in a war with France, Spain, or any

other potent neighbour; with her public debt increased; some of her best springs dried up; and America ruined: not only unable to afford her any assistance, but, perhaps, fired with resentment, and a sense of accumulated injuries, ready to throw itself into the arms of her enemies. In these circumstances, what would be the fate of this unhappy kingdom? Every man of discernment must be convinced that ruin would be unavoidable.

But what reason have we to believe the arms of Great Britain would prevail? It will be replied, Because she can send against us some of the best troops in the world, either with respect to valour or discipline; and because we have only a raw, unexperienced militia to oppose them with. Discipline and military skill are certainly matters of great importance, and give those to whom they belong, a vast superiority; but they do not render them invincible. Superior numbers, joined to natural intrepidity, and that animation which is inspired by a desire of freedom, and a love of one's country, may very well overbalance those advantages.

I imagine, it will be readily allowed, that Great Britain could not spare an army of above fifteen thousand men to send against the colonies. These would have to subdue near six hundred thousand. The established rule of computing the number of men capable of bearing arms in any nation, is by taking

a fifth part of the whole people. By the best calculations, we are supposed, in America, to exceed three millions. The fifth part of three millions is six hundred thousand. But in order to be certain of our computation, let us suppose there are only five hundred thousand fighting men in the colonies. Then there will be upwards of thirty Americans to one British soldier. A great disparity indeed! And such as never can be compensated by any discipline or skill whatever! It will be objected, that these five hundred thousand cannot act together. I grant it: nor is there any occasion that they should. Forty thousand will be a sufficient number to make head at a time; and these must be kept up by fresh supplies as fast as there is any diminution.

Let it be remembered, that there are no large plains for the two armies to meet in, and decide the contest by some decisive stroke; where any advantage gained by either side, might be prosecuted till a complete victory was obtained. The circumstances of our country put it in our power to evade a pitched battle. It will be better policy to harass and exhaust the soldiery, by frequent skirmishes and incursions, than to take the open field with them, by which means they would have the full benefit of their superior regularity and skill. Americans are better qualified for that kind of fighting, which is most adapted to this

country, than regular troops. Should the soldiery advance into the country, as they would be obliged to do if they had any inclination to subdue us, their discipline would be of little use to them. We should, in that case, be at least upon an equality with them, in any respect; and as we should have the advantage, on many accounts, they would be likely to gain nothing by their attempts.

Several of the colonies are now making preparation for the worst (and indeed the best way to avoid a civil war, is to be prepared for it). They are disciplining men as fast as possible; and, in a few months, will be able to produce many thousands, not so much inferior in the essentials of discipline as may, perhaps, be imagined. A little actual service will put them very nearly upon a footing with their enemies. The history of the Swedes and Russians, under Charles XII., and Peter the Great, will teach us how soon a people, possessed of natural bravery, may be brought to equal the most regular troops. The Swedes, at first, obtained very signal advantages; but, after a while, the Russians learned to defeat them with equal numbers. It is true, there was one of the greatest men the world has seen, at the head of the latter; but there was one who emulated the Macedonian conqueror, at the head of the former. Charles was, perhaps, never surpassed by any man in cou-

rage, or skill : and his soldiers were well worthy of such a general. There is also this important circumstance in our favour, when compared with the Russians. They were barbarous and untractable. We are civilized and docile. They were ignorant even of the theory of war. We are well acquainted with it ; and, therefore, should more easily be brought to the practice of it, and be sooner taught that order and method which we are deficient in.

It is sometimes urged, that we have no experienced officers to command us. We labour under some disadvantage in this respect, but not so great as is believed. There are many who have served in the last war with reputation, dispersed throughout the colonies. These might have the superior direction of matters : and there are men enough of known sense and courage, who would soon make excellent officers. During the disputes between the unfortunate *Charles* and the Parliament, many country gentlemen served in the armies of the latter, and signalized themselves for their military virtues. It is worthy of observation, that the present state of the army is not the most favorable. As is always the consequence of a long peace, there are many effeminate striplings among the officers, who are better calculated to marshal the forces of *Venus*, than to conduct the sturdy sons of *Mars*. There are, comparatively, but few veterans, either among the leaders, or the common soldiers.

You ask me, What resources have the colonies to pay, clothe, arm, and feed their troops? I refer you to the accounts from Virginia and Marblehead, for an answer to this question. Our troops, on the spot with us, will be much more easily maintained, than those of Great Britain at such a distance. We are not so poor and encumbered, as to be unable to support those who are immediately employed in defending our liberties. Our country abounds in provisions. We have already materials enough among us, to keep us in clothes, longer than Great Britain would have any appetite to continue her hostilities. Several of the colonies are pretty well stored with ammunition. France, Spain, and Holland, would find means to supply us with whatever we wanted.

Let it not be said, that this last is a bare *possibility*: that France and Spain have promised not to interfere in the dispute; and that Holland has long been a faithful ally to the British nation. There is the highest degree of probability in the case. A more desirable object to France and Spain, than the disunion of these colonies from Great Britain, cannot be imagined. Every dictate of policy and interest, would prompt them to forward it by every possible means. They could not take any so effectual method to destroy the growing power of their great rival. The promises of princes and statesmen are of little weight. They never bind longer, than till a strong temptation

offers to break them: and they are frequently made with a sinister design. If we consult the known character of the French, we shall be disposed to conclude, that their present seemingly pacific and friendly disposition, is merely a piece of *finesse*, intended to dupe administration into some violent measures with the colonies, that they may improve them to their own advantage. The most that can be expected, is, that they would refrain from an open rupture with Great Britain. They would undoubtedly take every clandestine method to introduce among us, supplies of those things which we stood in need of to carry on the dispute. They would not neglect any thing in their power, to make the opposition on our part as vigorous and obstinate as our affairs would admit of.

With respect to Holland, notwithstanding express engagements to the contrary, her merchants, during the last war, were constantly supplying the French and Spaniards with military stores, and other things they had occasion for. The same, or, perhaps, more powerful motives, would influence them to assist us in a like manner.

But it seems to me a mark of great credulity to believe, upon the strength of their assurance, that France and Spain would not take a still more interesting part in the affair. The disjunction of these colonies from Great Britain, and the acquisition of a free trade with them, are objects of too

inviting a complexion, to suffer those kingdoms to remain idle spectators of the contention. If they found us inclined to throw ourselves upon their protection, they would eagerly embrace the opportunity to weaken their antagonist, and strengthen themselves. Superadded to these general and prevailing inducements, there are others of a more particular nature. They would feel no small inconvenience in the loss of those supplies they annually get from us; and their islands in the West Indies would be in the greatest distress for want of our trade.

From these reflections it is more than probable, that America is able to support its freedom, even by the force of arms, if she be not betrayed by her own sons. And, in whatever light we view the matter, the consequences to Great Britain would be too destructive to permit her to proceed to extremities, unless she has lost all just sense of her own interest.

You say, "The grand Congress, the *piddling* committees, through the continent, have *all* disclaimed their subjection to the sovereign authority of the empire. They deny the authority of Parliament to make any laws to bind them at all. They claim an absolute independency. Great Britain has no choice, but to declare the colonies independent States, or to try the force of arms, in order to bring them to a sense of their duty."

It is the common trick of ministerial writers, to represent the Congress as having made some new demands, which were unknown to former times ; whereas, in truth, they have, in substance, acknowledged the only dependence on Parliament which was ever intended by their predecessors. Nor is it true, that they have claimed an *absolute independency*. It is insulting common sense to say so, when it is notorious that they have acknowledged the right of Parliament to regulate the trade of the colonies. Any further dependence on it, is unnecessary and dangerous. They have professed allegiance to the British King, and have bound themselves, on any emergency, to contribute their proportion of men and money, to the defence and protection of the whole empire. Can this be called *absolute independency*? Is it better for Great Britain to hazard the total loss of these colonies, than to hold them upon these conditions? Is it preferable to make enemies of the people of America, instead of being connected with them, by the equal tie of fellow-subjects? Is it not madness, to run the risk of losing the trade of these colonies, from which the mother country drew* “ more clear profit than Spain has drawn from all her mines,” because they insist only

* See Shipley's Speech.

upon all the essential rights of freemen? You may call it effrontery, consummate assurance, or what you please, to say so: but every man, capable of taking a full prospect of all the probable mischiefs which may result from an open rupture between Great Britain and the colonies, will coincide with me, when I affirm, that nothing but the most *frantic extravagance*, can influence administration to attempt the reduction of America by force of arms.

It is sufficiently evident, from the respective charters, that the rights we now claim, are coeval with the original settlement of these colonies. These rights have been, at different times, strenuously asserted, though they have been suffered to be violated in several instances, through inattention, or, perhaps, an unwillingness to quarrel with the mother country. I shall decline producing any other proofs of the sense of the other provinces than those already mentioned, and shall confine myself to a few extracts from the resolves of some assemblies of this province.

In 1691, there was an Act passed by the General Assembly, which contained the following clauses.†

“Be it enacted, by the Governor, Council, and

† This Act is very remarkable. It was drawn up by Messrs. *Tazewell* and *Emmett*, two gentlemen appointed by the governor for the purpose, and remained *six years* in England before there was a negative put upon it.

Representatives, met in General Assembly, and it is hereby enacted and declared by the authority of the same, that the *supreme legislative power and authority*, under their Majesties, William and Mary, King and Queen of England, &c., shall, for ever be, and reside, in a Governor-in-Chief and Council, appointed by their Majesties, their heirs and successors, and the people, by their representatives met and convened in General Assembly.

“That no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be deprived of his freehold, or life, or liberty, or free customs, or outlawed, or exiled, or any otherways destroyed; nor shall be passed upon, adjudged, or condemned, but *by the lawful judgment of his peers, and by the law of the province.*

“That no *aid, tax, tallage, custom, loan, benevolence, gift, excise, duty, or imposition whatsoever*, shall be laid, assessed, imposed, levied, or required of, or on, any of their Majesties subjects within this province, &c., or their estates, *upon any manner of colour or pretence whatsoever*, but by the act and consent of the Governor and Council, and Representatives of the people, in General Assembly met and convened.”

This Act shows clearly, the sense of his Majesty's representative, his Council, and the Assembly of this Province, above *eighty years* ago, which was, that the supreme legislative authority, and the exclusive power of taxation, should for ever be, and

reside, in a Governor-in-Chief and Council, appointed by their Majesties, their heirs and successors; and the people, by their representatives, met and convened in General Assembly.

We may also infer from hence, that the other colonies actually enjoyed similar privileges at that time: for it would have been the height of presumption, in this province, to claim such important immunities, had not the others been in possession of the like.

This Act, of itself, confutes all that has been said concerning the novelty of our present claims; and proves, that the injurious reflections on the Congress, for having risen in their demands, are malicious and repugnant to truth.

You have produced some expressions of the Congress and Assembly of this province, in 1765, which you lay great stress upon. The true meaning of them may be gathered from the following passage, which is taken from the same piece that contains the expressions in question. The Congress speak thus: "It is humbly submitted, whether there be not a material distinction, in reason and sound policy at least, between the necessary exercise of parliamentary jurisdiction, in general Acts for the amendment of the common law, and the regulation of trade and commerce through the whole empire; and the exercise of that jurisdiction by imposing taxes on the colonies."

They allow only a power of making *general Acts* for the amendment of the *common law*, and for the general regulation of trade. As to any special laws to bind the colonies, in particular, they never intended submission to these: nor could they intend a right to impose special duties, of any kind, for the purpose of raising a revenue; which is, to all intents and purposes, a species of taxation.

The Resolves of our Assembly, the last day of December, 1771, about three years afterwards, will serve as a full explanation. “As it is, not only the common birthright of all his Majesty’s subjects, but is also essential to the preservation of the peace, strength, and prosperity of the British empire, that an *exact equality of constitutional rights*, among all his Majesty’s subjects, in the several parts of the empire, be uniformly and invariably maintained and supported; and as it would be inconsistent with the constitutional rights of his Majesty’s subjects in Great Britain, to tax them, either in person, or estate, without the consent of their representatives, in Parliament assembled; It is therefore

RESOLVED, *nemine contradicente* :

“That it is the opinion of this Committee, that *no tax under any name, or denomination, or on any pretence, or for any purpose whatsoever*, can or ought to be imposed, or levied, upon the persons, estates, or property, of his Majesty’s good subjects within

this colony, *but of their free gift, by their representatives lawfully convened in General Assembly.*

“That it is the opinion of this Committee, that this colony lawfully and constitutionally has, and enjoys, an internal legislature, in which the Crown and the people of this colony, are constitutionally represented: and that *the power and authority of the said legislature cannot lawfully or constitutionally be suspended, abridged, abrogated, or annulled, by any power or prerogative whatsoever; the prerogative of the Crown, ordinarily exercised for prorogations and dissolutions, only excepted.*”

A supreme authority, in the Parliament, to make any special laws for this province, consistent with the internal legislature here claimed, is impossible, and cannot be supposed, without falling into that solecism in politics, of *imperium in imperio*.

I imagine, sir, I have, by this time, pretty fully and satisfactorily answered every thing contained in your letter of any consequence. The parts I have left unattended to, are such as cannot operate, materially, to the prejudice of the cause I espouse; but I should not have neglected them, had it not been, that I have already taken a very ample range; and it would, perhaps, be imprudent to delay a conclusion.

Whatever opinion may be entertained of my sentiments and intentions, I attest that Being, whose all-seeing eye penetrates the inmost recesses

of the heart, that I am not influenced (in the part I take) by any unworthy motive.—That, if I am in an error, it is my judgment, not my heart, that errs.—That I earnestly lament the unnatural quarrel between the parent State and the colonies; and most ardently wish for a speedy reconciliation—a perpetual and *mutually* beneficial union.—That I am a warm advocate for limited monarchy, and an unfeigned well-wisher to the present Royal Family.

But, on the other hand, I am inviolably attached to the essential rights of mankind, and the true interests of society. I consider civil liberty, in a genuine, unadulterated sense, as the greatest of terrestrial blessings. I am convinced, that the whole human race is entitled to it; and that it can be wrested from no part of them, without the blackest and most aggravated guilt.

I verily believe, also, that the best way to secure a permanent and happy union between Great Britain and the colonies, is to permit the latter to be as free as they desire. To abridge their liberties, or to exercise any power over them, which they are unwilling to submit to, would be a perpetual source of discontent and animosity. A continual jealousy would exist on both sides. This would lead to tyranny on the one hand, and to sedition and rebellion on the other. Impositions, not really grievous in themselves, would be thought so: and the murmurs arising from thence, would

be considered as the effect of a turbulent, ungovernable spirit. These jarring principles, would at length throw all things into disorder, and be productive of an irreparable breach, and a total disunion.

That harmony and mutual confidence may speedily be restored between all the parts of the British empire, is the favourite wish of one who feels the warmest sentiments of good will to mankind ; who bears no enmity to you ; and who is

A SINCERE FRIEND TO AMERICA.

“ IN June, seventeen hundred and seventy-five, with a view to confirm the opinion, that the English ministry had abandoned every regard to the principles of her constitution, he published a series of “Remarks on the Quebec Bill,” a measure which had been resisted in the British Parliament by the whole force of the opposition. * * * *

“ The “Remarks” were published in two numbers. The first on the fifteenth of June, 1775, in a brief, but close examination of the terms of the Act. * * * *

“ The purport of the second number, was to prove that the Church of Rome had the sanction of a legal establishment in that province. It is an able refutation of an essay, which professed to show, that by this Act, the catholic religion was merely *tolerated*; and, giving a very precise and accurate definition of an established religion, it deduces clearly, from the terms of the Act, that the Catholic religion is placed on the footing of a regular establishment; while the Protestant is “left entirely destitute and unbenefriended.”

“ These essays are an interesting specimen of the early* reach of thought, and precision of language, which were afterwards disclosed by him in so remarkable a degree.”—*Life of Hamilton, by his Son.*—p. 45-6, vol. 1.

* Hamilton was barely more than eighteen years and six months old when these “Remarks” were written by him: the “Full Vindication,” and the “Farmer Refuted,” he produced, the former six, and the latter four, months previously.—[EDITOR.]

NO. I.

In compliance with my promise to the public, and in order to rescue truth from the specious disguise with which it has been clothed, I shall now offer a few remarks on the Act, entitled “An Act for making more effectual provision for the government of the province of Quebec in North America:” whereby I trust it will clearly appear, that arbitrary power, and its great engine, the Popish religion, are, to all intents and purposes, established in that province.

While Canada was under the dominion of France, the French laws and customs were in force there; which are regulated in conformity to the genius and complexion of a despotic constitution; and expose the lives and properties of subjects to continual depredations, from the malice and avarice of those in authority. But when it fell under the dominion of Great Britain, these laws, so unfriendly to the happiness of society, gave place, of course, to the milder influence of the English laws: and his Majesty, by proclamation, promised to all those who should settle there, a full enjoyment of the rights of British subjects. In violation of this promise, the Act before us declares, “That the said proclamation, and the commission under the authority whereof the government of the said province is at present adminis-

tered, be, and the same are, hereby revoked, annulled, and made void, from and after the first day of May, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five." This abolition of the privileges stipulated by the proclamation, was not inflicted as a penalty for any crime by which a forfeiture had been incurred; but merely on pretence of the present form of government having been found by experience to be inapplicable to the state and circumstances of the Province.

I have never heard any satisfactory account concerning the foundation of this pretence: for it does not appear, that the people of Canada, at large, ever expressed a discontent with their new establishment, or solicited a restoration of their old. They were, doubtless, the most proper judges of the matter, and ought to have been fully consulted before the alteration was made. If we may credit the general current of intelligence which we have had respecting the disposition of the Canadians, we must conclude they are averse to the present regulation of the Parliament, and had rather continue under the form of government instituted by the Royal proclamation.

However this be, the French laws are again revived. It is enacted, "That in all matters of controversy relative to property and civil rights, resort shall be had to the laws of Canada, as the rule for the decision of the same: and all causes that here-

after shall be instituted in any of the Courts of justice, shall, with respect to such property and rights, be determined agreeably to the said laws and customs of Canada, until they shall be varied and altered by any ordinances that shall, from time to time, be passed in the said province, by the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, or Commander-in-Chief for the time being, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council of the same." Thus the ancient laws of Canada are restored, liable to such variations and additions as shall be deemed necessary by the Governor and Council: and as both the one and the other are to be appointed by the King during pleasure, they will be all his creatures, and entirely subject to his will, which is thereby rendered the original fountain of law: and the property and civil rights of the Canadians are made altogether dependent upon it: because the power communicated, of varying and altering, by new ordinances, is indefinite and unlimited. If this does not make the king absolute in Canada, I am at a loss for any tolerable idea of absolute authority; which I have ever thought to consist, with respect to a monarch, in the power of governing his people according to the dictates of his own will. In the present case, he has only to inform the Governor and Council, what new laws he would choose to have passed, and their situation will ensure their compliance.

It is further provided, "That nothing contained in the Act, shall extend, or be construed to extend, to prevent or hinder his Majesty, his heirs and successors, from erecting, constituting, and appointing, from time to time, such courts of criminal, civil, and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, within and for the said province of Quebec, and appointing, from time to time, the judges and officers thereof, as his Majesty, his heirs and successors, shall think necessary for the circumstances of the said province."

Here a power of a most extraordinary and dangerous nature is conferred. There must be an end of all liberty where the prince is possessed of such an exorbitant prerogative as enables him, at pleasure, to establish the most iniquitous, cruel, and oppressive courts of criminal, civil, and ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and to appoint temporary judges and officers, whom he can displace and change as often as he pleases. For what can more nearly concern the safety and happiness of subjects, than the wise economy, and equitable constitution of those courts in which trials for life, liberty, property, and religion, are to be conducted? Should it ever comport with the designs of an ambitious and wicked minister, we may see an Inquisition erected in Canada; and priestly tyranny hereafter find as propitious a soil in America, as it ever has in Spain or Portugal.

But in order to varnish over the arbitrary complexion of the Act, and to conciliate the minds of the Canadians, it is provided, "That whereas, the certainty and lenity of the criminal law of England, and the benefits and advantages resulting from the use of it, have been sensibly felt by the inhabitants, from an experience of more than nine years: Therefore, the same shall be administered, and shall be observed as law, in the province of Quebec, to the exclusion of every rule of criminal law which did, or might, prevail in said province before the year one thousand seven hundred and sixty-four."

As "it is in the goodness of criminal laws, that the liberty of the subject principally depends,"* this would have been an important privilege, had it not been rendered uncertain and alienable by the latter part of the same clause, which makes them "subject to such alterations and amendments, as the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, and Commander-in-Chief for the time being, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council of the same, shall, from time to time, cause to be made therein."

Under the notion of necessary alterations and amendments, the King, through the medium of his creatures, the Governor and Council, may entirely new mould the criminal laws of Canada, and make

* Montesquieu.

them subservient to the most tyrannical views. So that, in this respect, also, the principle of arbitrary power, which is the soul of the Act, is uniformly maintained and preserved, in full vigour, without the least real or effectual diminution.

It has been denied, with the most palpable absurdity, that the right of trial by juries is taken from the Canadians. It is said, that the provincial legislature of Canada may introduce them as soon as they please : and it is expected that they will, “as soon as the inhabitants desire them,” or “the state of the country will admit of them.”

A civil right is that, which the laws and the constitution have actually conferred ; not that which may be derived from the future bounty and beneficence of those in authority. The possibility that the Legislature of Canada may hereafter introduce trials by juries, does not imply a right in the people to enjoy them. For in the same sense it may be said, that the inhabitants of France, or Spain, have a right to trial by juries, because it is equally in the power of their legislatures to establish them.

Since, therefore, it is apparent, that a system of French laws has been established in the province of Quebec ; and an indefinite power vested in the King, to vary and alter these laws ; as also to constitute such courts of criminal, civil, and ecclesiastical jurisdiction ; and to introduce such a form of

criminal law as he shall judge necessary : I say, since all this is deducible from the express letter of the Act ; or, in other words, since the whole Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary powers, are ultimately and effectually, though not immediately, lodged in the King ; there can be no room to doubt, that an arbitrary government has been really instituted throughout the extensive region now comprised in the province of Quebec.

NO. II.

Having considered the nature of this Bill with regard to civil government, I am next to examine it with relation to religion ; and to endeavour to show, that the Church of Rome has now the sanction of a legal establishment in the province of Quebec.

In order to do this the more satisfactorily, I beg leave to adopt the definition given of an established religion, by a certain writer who has taken great pains to evince the contrary. “ An established religion,” says he, “ is a religion which the civil authority engages, not only to protect, but to support.” This Act makes effectual provision, not only for the protection, but for the permanent support of popery ; as is evident from the following clause : “ And for the more perfect security and ease of the minds of the inhabitants of the said

province, it is hereby declared, that his Majesty's subjects, professing the religion of the Church of Rome, in the said province, may have, hold, and enjoy, the free exercise of the religion of the Church of Rome, subject to the King's supremacy, &c.; and that the clergy of the said Church, may hold, receive, and enjoy, their accustomed dues and rights, &c."

This is represented as a bare permission to the clergy, to enjoy the usual emoluments of their functions, and not as a legal provision for their support. Much stress seems to be laid on the word "*may*," which is commonly italicised. But though the phraseology be artful, yet it is easy to perceive, that it operates to the same effect as if it had been more positive and emphatical.

The clergy "may hold, receive, and enjoy, their accustomed dues and rights." They may if they please. It is at their option, and must depend upon their will; and, consequently, there must be a correspondent obligation upon their parishioners to comply with that will, and to pay those dues when required. What the law gives us an unconditional permission to enjoy, no person can legally withhold from us. It becomes our property, and we can enforce our right to it. If the Legislature of this colony were to decree, that the clergy of the different denominations, may hold, receive, and enjoy, tithes of their respective

congregations ; we should soon find that it would have the same efficacy as if it were decreed, that the several congregations should pay tithes to their respective clergy. For, otherwise, the Legislature might confer a right which had no correlative obligation ; and which must, therefore, be void and inefficacious. But this is contradictory and impossible.

“Tithes in Canada,” it is said, “are the property of the Roman Church : and permitting a tolerated Church to enjoy its own property, is far short of the idea of an establishment.” But I should be glad to know, in the first place, how tithes can be the property of any but of an established church ? And in the next, how they came to be the property of the Romish Church in Canada, during the intermediate space between the surrender of that province to the English, and the passing of this Act ? Nothing can be deemed my property, to which I have not a perfect and uncontrollable right by the laws. If a church have not a similar right to tithes, it can have no property in them : and if it have, it is plain the laws must have made provision for its support, or, in other words, must have established it.

Previous to the surrender of Canada, the Catholic religion was established there by the laws of France ; and tithes were, on that account, the legal property of the Church of Rome ; and could

not be withheld by the laity, though ever so much disposed to it. But after the surrender, this circumstance took a different turn. The French laws being no longer in force, the establishment of the Romish Church ceased of course; and with it, the property which it before had in tithes.

It is true, the clergy may have continued to receive and enjoy their customary dues, tithes, and other perquisites: but they were not, for all that, the property of the Church; because it had lost its legal right to them, and it was at the discretion of the laity to withhold them, if they had thought proper; or to abridge them, and place them upon a more moderate footing. Their voluntary concurrence was necessary to give their priests a right to demand them as before. But by the late Act, this matter is again put into its former situation. Tithes are now become the *property* of the Church, as formerly; because it again has a legal claim to them; and the conditional consent of the people is set aside. Thus we see, that this Act does not, in fact, permit a tolerated church to enjoy "its own property," but gives it a real and legal property in that which it before held from the bounty and liberality of its professors; and which they might withhold, or diminish, at pleasure: and this, in the most proper sense, converts it into an establishment.

The characteristic difference between a tolera-

ted and established religion, consists in this : With respect to the support of the former, the law is passive and improvident, leaving it to those who profess it, to make as much, or as little, provision as they shall judge expedient ; and to vary and alter that provision, as their circumstances may require. In this manner, the Presbyterians, and other sects, are tolerated in England. They are allowed to exercise their religion without molestation, and to maintain their clergy as they think proper. These are wholly dependent upon their congregations, and can exact no more than they stipulate and are satisfied to contribute. But with respect to the support of the latter, the law is active and provident. Certain precise dues, (tithes, &c.), are legally annexed to the clerical office, independent on the liberal contributions of the people ; which is exactly the case with the Canadian priests ; and therefore, no reasonable, impartial man, will doubt that the religion of the Church of Rome is established in Canada. While tithes were the free, though customary, gift of the people, as was the case before the passing of the Act in question, the Roman Church was only in a state of toleration : but when the law came to take cognizance of them, and, by determining their permanent existence, destroyed the free agency of the people, it then resumed the nature of an establishment,

which it had been divested of at the time of the capitulation.

As to the Protestant religion ; it is often asserted that ample provision has been made by the Act, for its future establishment : to prove which, the writer before mentioned, has quoted a clause in the following mutilated manner : “ It is provided,” says he, “ that his Majesty, his heirs or successors, may make such provision out of the accustomed dues, or rights, for the encouragement of the Protestant religion, and for the maintenance of a Protestant clergy within the said province, as he or they shall, from time to time, think necessary and expedient.”

It must excite a mixture of anger and disdain to observe the wretched arts to which a designing administration, and its abettors, are driven, in order to conceal the enormity of their measures. This whole clause, in its true and original construction, is destitute of meaning ; and was evidently inserted for no other end than to *deceive* by the *appearance* of a provident regard for the Protestant religion. The Act first declares, “ That his Majesty’s subjects, professing the religion of the Church of Rome, may have and enjoy the free exercise of their religion ; and that the clergy of the said church, may hold, receive, and enjoy their accustomed dues and rights.” Then follows this clause : “ Provided, nevertheless, that it shall be lawful for his Majesty, his heirs and

successors, to make such provision out of the rest of the said accustomed dues and rights, for the encouragement of the Protestant religion, for the maintenance and support of a Protestant clergy within the said province, as he or they shall, from time to time, think necessary and expedient.”

Thus we see, the Romish clergy are to have, hold, and enjoy, their accustomed dues and rights; and the *rest* and remainder of them, is to be applied towards the encouragement of the Protestant religion: but when they have had their wonted dues, I fancy it will puzzle administration, by any effort of political chemistry, to produce the *rest*, or remainder. Suppose, for instance, A. had made an actual settlement of a hundred pounds on B.; and, by a subsequent act, should declare, that B. should continue to hold and enjoy his accustomed and annual bounty; and that the *rest* of the said bounty should be given to C.: it is evident that C. would have nothing, because there would be no *rest* whatever. Exactly parallel and analogous is the case in hand. The Romish priests are to have their accustomed dues and rights; and the *rest* of the said dues and rights, is to be dedicated to the encouragement of the Protestant religion. In the above recited quotation, there is a chasm: the words “the *rest* of,” being artfully omitted, to give the passage some meaning which it has not in itself. With this amendment, the sense must be,

that his Majesty might appropriate what portion of the customary revenues of the Romish clergy he should think proper, to the support and maintenance of Protestant churches. But, according to the real words of the Act, he can only devote "the rest," or remainder, of such revenues to that purpose; which, as I have already shown, is nothing. So that the seeming provision in favour of the Protestant religion, is entirely verbal and delusory. Excellent must be the encouragement it will derive from this source. But this is not all. Had there been really provision made, to be applied at the discretion of his Majesty, I should still consider this Act as an atrocious infraction on the rights of Englishmen, in a point of the most delicate and momentous concern. No Protestant Englishman would consent to let the free exercise of his religion depend upon the mere pleasure of any man, however great or exalted. The privilege of worshipping the Deity, in the manner his conscience dictates, which is one of the dearest he enjoys, must, in that case, be rendered insecure and precarious. Yet this is the unhappy situation to which the Protestant inhabitants of Canada are now reduced.

The will of the king must give law to their consciences. It is in his power to keep them for ever dispossessed of all religious immunities; and there is too much reason to apprehend, that the same

motives which instigated the Act, would induce him to give them as little future encouragement as possible.

I imagine it will clearly appear, from what has been offered, that the Roman Catholic religion, instead of being tolerated, as stipulated by the Treaty of Peace, is established by the late Act; and that the Protestant religion has been left entirely destitute and unbefriended in Canada. But if there should be any who think that the indulgence granted, does not extend to a perfect establishment; and that it may be justified by the terms of the treaty, and the subsequent conduct of the Canadians; and if they should also be at a loss to perceive the dangerous nature of the Act, with respect to the other colonies; I would beg their further attention to the following considerations.

However justifiable this Act may be, in relation to the province of Quebec, with its ancient limits, it cannot be defended by the least plausible pretext, when it is considered as annexing such a boundless extent of new territory to the old.

If a free form of government had “been found by experience to be inapplicable to the state and circumstances of the province;” and if “a toleration less generous, although it might have fulfilled the letter of the articles of the treaty, would not have answered the expectations of the Canadians, nor have left upon their minds favourable impres-

sions of British justice and honour :” if these reasons be admitted as true, and allowed their greatest weight, they only proved that it might be just and politic to place the province of Quebec, alone, with its former boundaries, in the circumstances of civil and religious government which are established by this Act. But when it is demanded, Why it has also added the immense tract of country that surrounds all these colonies, to that province, and has placed the whole under the same exceptionable institutions, both civil and religious? —the advocates for administration must be confounded and silent.

This Act develops the dark designs of the ministry more fully than any thing they have done ; and shows that they have formed a systematic project of absolute power.

The present policy of it is evidently this. By giving a legal sanction to the accustomed dues of the priests, it was intended to interest them in behalf of the administration ; and by means of the dominion they possessed over the minds of the laity, together with the appearance of good will towards their religion, to prevent any dissatisfaction which might arise from the loss of their civil rights ; and to propitiate them to the great purposes in contemplation ; first, the subjugation of the colonies ; and afterwards, that of Great Britain itself. It was necessary to throw out some such

lure to reconcile them to the exactions of that power which has been communicated to the King, and which the emergency of the times may require in a very extensive degree.

The future policy of it demands particular attention. The nature of civil government will hereafter put a stop to emigrations from other parts of the British dominions thither, and from all other free countries. The pre-eminent advantages secured to the Roman Catholic religion, will discourage all Protestant settlers, of whatever nation; and on these accounts, the province will be settled and inhabited by none but Papists. If lenity and moderation are observed in administering the laws; the natural advantages of this fertile infant country, united to the indulgence given to their religion, will attract droves of emigrants from all the Roman Catholic States in Europe: and these colonies, in time, will find themselves encompassed with innumerable hosts of neighbours, disaffected to them, both because of difference in religion and government. How dangerous their situation would be, let every man of common sense judge.

What can speak, in plainer language, the corruption of the British Parliament than this Act, which invests the King with absolute power over a little world (if I may be allowed the expression), and makes such ample provision for the

Popish religion, and leaves the Protestant in such a dependant, disadvantageous situation ; that he is like to have no other subjects in this part of his domain, than Roman Catholics, who, by reason of their implicit devotion to their priests, and the superlative reverence they bear those who countenance and favour their religion, will be the voluntary instruments of ambition, and will be ready, at all times, to second the oppressive designs of administration against the other parts of the empire.

Hence, while our ears are stunned with the dismal sounds of New England's Republicanism, bigotry, and intolerance ; it behooves us to be upon our guard, against the deceitful wiles of those who would persuade us, that we have nothing to fear from the operation of the Quebec Act. We should consider it as being replete with danger to ourselves, and as threatening ruin to our posterity. Let us not, therefore, suffer ourselves to be terrified at the prospect of an imaginary and fictitious Scylla ; and, by that means, be led blindfold into a real and destructive Charybdis.

MILITARY LIFE.

[1776.]

“ Hamilton, during the previous winter, foreseeing that the course of events must soon lead to an open rupture, determined to apply himself to the study of arms : and before any steps were taken to organize a regular force, had, by great assiduity, made such progress as books, and the instruction of a British bombardier, could give him, in pyrotechnics and gunnery.”—*Life of Hamilton, by his Son* : p. 51, vol. 1.

In introducing the papers connected with the Military life of General Hamilton, we make no apology for commencing with a *rough draught*, by him, on “ Tactical Experiments relative to the Step :” because (trifling as the subject may seem) we think this single paper furnishes evidence of a remarkable mind, in the compactness of his style, the comprehensiveness of his ideas, and the characteristic readiness of his faculty, in seizing the cardinal points of any subject, whenever he had once deemed it worthy of his consideration.—[EDITOR.]

GUIDE IN MAKING TACTICAL EXPERIMENTS RELATIVE TO THE STEP.

Tacticians agree, that a proper regulation of the length and speed of the step, is of primary importance in a system of tactics. Upon this depends essentially the exactness of all evolutions ; the attainment of the best results with the least inconvenience to the soldier. Yet, in the theories of military writers, and in the establishments of military nations, there is great diversity in this important

article. For example: While our step is two feet English, that of France (and it is believed of Prussia) is two feet French, or about twenty-six inches English: that of Great Britain, two feet six inches English. There is also some, though less, difference as to the velocity of the step: that of France being 76—100, and 120 in a minute: that of Great Britain, 75—108, and 120 in a minute.

This diversity is a reason against adopting implicitly any foreign standard, and a motive to investigation of the principles on which the step ought to be predicated. It is desirable, if possible, to find a standard in nature.

As to length, the step ought to be accommodated to men of the smaller sizes. A tall man can abridge, easier than a short man extend, his natural pace. And yet, perhaps, neither extreme ought to govern. A short man may, by habit, somewhat lengthen his usual step without fatigue; while a tall man may be too much constrained, if obliged to contract his step to the measure of a very short man. The man of middle stature, may be the properest criterion: or, perhaps, the average step of a number of men, of different sizes, marching together, may furnish a still better rule. In such case a kind of compromise naturally takes place, by the mutual effort of all to move in unison.

But to arrive at a just result, it is necessary that the experiments should be multiplied; should be by individuals of different sizes, and by bodies of

different numbers, from few to many; and especially, that they should be in different sorts of ground, rough as well as smooth, unequal as well as plain. By this diversification of the experiments, it may be possible to discover some medium, which, being adopted as a standard, and made habitual to troops, will best accommodate itself to the variety of circumstances which occur.

It is a fact, which in this investigation demands particular attention, that the length of the step naturally increases with its speed or velocity. In a slow movement, the body is nearly perpendicular, and the leg kept back: in a rapid one, the body is impelled forward, and with it the leg; which, without effort, takes a greater distance in this than in the former case.

Hence a question, whether the length of the step ought not to be proportioned to the speed? And whether, instead of that uniformity which seems to have been preferred, it ought not to be less in the slower, and greater in the quicker steps? 'Tis evident, that by lengthening the step with the speed, a greater quantity of ground will be passed over in a given time, and perhaps with less fatigue from the men being less constrained.

The varieties in the speed of the step, demand careful examination. A slow, cadenced, majestic step has been adopted, especially in reference to manœuvres of parade, and the march in line. From seventy-five to eighty in a minute, have been

latterly deemed an eligible standard. For occasions which require greater celerity, about one hundred in a minute has been adopted; to be increased, in particular cases, to one hundred and twenty.

These questions arise: Are all these varieties desirable as fundamental rules? If not, what ought to be substituted? Is the slowest of these steps ever useful in the actual service of the field? If not, ought it to obtain for any, and for what, collateral reasons? To what kind of movements is each variety applicable? In fine, what ought to be established as to the speed of the step?

Respect for the institutions of nations who have arrived at considerable perfection in the art of war, is a dictate of good sense: but when we consider the influence of the spirit of imitation, and how liable men, habituated to routine, are to be trammelled by that to which they have been accustomed, we shall find good reason not to follow those institutions implicitly.

In the particular affair of the length and speed of the step, there is room to suspect, that principles have not been sufficiently consulted; and that real improvements may be made. This, however, is to be carefully examined, with a temper no less remote from the love of innovation, than from a spirit of blind deference to authority and precedent.

“The convention of New-York having determined to augment its military establishment, among other arrangements, ordered a company of artillery to be raised. Hamilton seized this opportunity to enter the service, and was recommended to the convention by his friend McDougal, who had been appointed colonel of the first regiment raised in the province. A doubt having been intimated of his knowledge of that branch of arms, McDougal proposed that he should undergo an examination; and on a certificate being given of his competency, he was appointed, on the fourteenth day of March, seventeen hundred and seventy-six, “Captain of the Provincial Company of Artillery;” and within a short time after, was directed to guard the records of the colony.”—*Life of Hamilton, by his Son: p. 52, Vol. I.*

HAMILTON TO THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS.

New-York, May 26, 1776.

GENTLEMEN :

I take the liberty to request your attention to a few particulars, which will be of considerable importance to the future progress of the company under my command: and I shall be much obliged to you for as speedy a determination concerning them as you can conveniently give. The most material is respecting the pay. Our company, by their articles, are to be subject to the same regulations, and to receive the same pay, as the Continental Artillery. Hitherto I have conformed to the standard laid down in the Journal of the Congress, published the 10th May, 1775; but I am well informed that, by some later regulation, the

pay of the Artillery has been augmented, and now stands according to the following rates: Captain, £10. 13. 4. Captain-Lieutenant, £8. Lieutenants, each, £7. 6. 8. Sergeants, £3. 6. 8. Corporals, £3. 1. 4. Bombardiers, £3. 1. 4. Gunners, £3. Matrosses, £2. 17. 4. Drummers and Fifers, £3. By comparing these with my pay-rolls, you will discover a considerable difference; and I doubt not you will be easily sensible that such a difference should not exist.

I am not personally interested in having an augmentation agreeably to the above rates, because my own pay will remain the same as that it now is: but I make this application on behalf of the company; as I am fully convinced such a disadvantageous distinction will have a very pernicious effect on the minds and behaviour of the men. They do the same duty with the other companies, and think themselves entitled to the same pay. They have been already comparing accounts; and many marks of discontent have lately appeared on this score. As to the circumstance of our being confined to the defence of the colony, it will have little or no weight; for there are but few in the company, who would not as willingly leave the colony on any necessary expedition, as stay in it: and they will not, therefore, think it reasonable to have their pay curtailed on such a consideration. Captain Beauman, I understand,

enlists all his men on the above terms; and this makes it difficult for me to get a single recruit: for men will naturally go to those who pay them best. On this account, I should wish to be immediately authorized to offer the same pay to all who may incline to enlist. The next thing I should wish to know, is, whether I must be allowed any *actual expenses* that might attend the enlistment of men, should I send into the country for that purpose. The expense would not be great; and it would enable me to complete my company at once, and bring it the sooner into proper order and discipline.

Also, I should be glad to be informed, if my company is to be allowed the frock which is given to the other troops as a bounty? This frock would be extremely serviceable in summer, while the men are on fatigue; and would put it in their power to save their uniform much longer. I am, gentlemen, with the greatest respect,

Your most obedient servant,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Captain.

HAMILTON TO THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS.

July 26, 1776.

GENTLEMEN:

I am obliged to trouble you, to remove a diffi-

culty which arises respecting the quantity of subsistence which is to be allowed my men. Enclosed you have the rate of rations, which is the standard allowance of the whole continental, and even the provincial, army; but it seems Mr. Curtenius cannot afford to supply us with more than his contract stipulates; which, by comparison, you will perceive is considerably less than the forementioned rate.

My men, you are sensible, are, by their articles, entitled to the same subsistence with the continental troops: and it would be to them an insupportable discrimination, as well as a breach of the terms of their enlistment, to give them almost a third less provisions than the whole army besides receives. I doubt not you will readily put this matter upon a proper footing.

Hitherto, we have drawn our full allowance from Mr. Curtenius; but he did it upon the supposition that he would have a farther consideration for the extraordinary supply.

At present, however, he scruples to proceed in the same way, till it can be put upon a more certain foundation. I am, gentlemen,

With the utmost esteem and respect,

Your most ob't. and most humble serv't,

A. HAMILTON,

Captain of New-York Artillery.

[1777.]

“ He continued with his company, which, from the severity of the weather, and its exposure in the brilliant enterprises of Trenton and Princeton, was reduced to a fragment of five-and-twenty men, until the establishment of head quarters at Morristown; when, at the invitation of General Washington, on the first of March, seventeen hundred and seventy-seven, he was appointed his aid-de-camp, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel.”—*Life of Hamilton, by his Son: vol. 1, p. 57.*

HAMILTON TO THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS.

Morristown, March 6, 1777.

GENTLEMEN :

It is necessary I should inform you of the changes which have happened in your Company of Artillery, which should have been done long ago, had I not been prevented by sickness, from which I am but lately recovered.

General Washington has been pleased to appoint me one of his Aids-de-Camp. Captain-Lieutenant James Moore, a promising officer, and who did credit to the State he belonged to, died about nine weeks ago. Lieutenant James Gilleland, some time before that, resigned his commission, prompted by domestic inconveniences and *other* motives best known to himself. There remain now only two officers, Lieutenants Bean and

Thompson, and about thirty men. The reason that the number of men is so reduced, besides death and desertions, was owing to a breach of orders in Lieutenant Johnson, who first began the enlistment of the company; and who, instead of engaging them during the war, according to the intention of the State, engaged them for the limited term of a twelvemonth. The time of those enlisted by him has expired; and for want of powers to re-engage them, they have mostly entered into other corps.

I have to request you will favour me with instructions as to your future intentions. If you design to retain the company on the particular establishment of the State, it will be requisite to complete the number of officers, and make provision to have the company filled by a new enlistment. In this case, I should beg leave to recommend to your notice, as far as a Captain-Lieutenancy, Mr. Thompson. Mr. Bean is so incurably addicted to a *certain failing*, that I cannot, in justice, give my opinion in favour of his preferment. But if you should determine to resign the company, as I expect you will, considering it as an extraordinary burthen, without affording any special advantages, the Continent will readily take it off your hands, so soon as you shall intimate your design to relinquish it. I doubt not you will see the

propriety of speedily deciding on the matter, which the good of the service requires.

I am, with the sincerest respect, gentlemen,
Your most ob't and most humble servant,
ALEX. HAMILTON.

THE COMMITTEE OF CONVENTION TO HAMILTON.

Kingston, March 17, 1777.

DEAR SIR :

We are to inform you, that Robt. R. Livingston is, with us, a committee appointed by Convention to correspond with you at Head Quarters. You will give us pleasure in the information that His Excellency is recovered from the illness which had seized him the day before Messrs. Cuyler and Taylor left Head Quarters. Any occurrences in the army which may have happened, you will please to communicate.

In answer to your letter to the Convention, of the sixth of March instant, we are to inform you, that it is determined to permit that company to join the Continental Army, for which you will take the necessary steps. At the same time, you will take some notice of the disposition of our guns, which, as you well know, are all in the Continental service ; and [unless some little attention

is paid to them, we may, perhaps, never see them again. We are, sir,

Your most obe't. and humble servants,

Gouv. MORRIS,

Wm. ALLISON.

Colonel Alexander Hamilton, Aid-de-Camp
to His Excellency Gen'l. Washington.

GOUVERNEUR MORRIS TO HAMILTON.

Kingston, 26 March, 1777.

SIR :

By unavoidable incidents, this letter is delayed beyond the usual time ; for which I assure you I am extremely sorry. Your favour gave great pleasure, as well to the committee, as to several members of the House, who are much pleased with your judicious caution, to distinguish between what you sport as your private opinions, and the weighty sentiments of the General.

No circumstance could have more contributed to our happiness, than to hear of the General's recovery ; which, believe me, gave universal joy. Be pleased to make my most respectful compliments to his lady.

That the enemy are willing to desert, can hardly be doubted ; and a variety of sufficient reasons may easily be assigned.

Want of success is not among the least consi-

derable: add also the want of pay, the want of plunder. I think the situation of the enemy clearly demonstrates the want of political wisdom, and knowledge of war, at the fountain head. To pass over the succession of other blunders they committed, from their attempt on Long Island to their present disposition, their treatment of the soldiery is a monument of folly. First, to prevent their foreign mercenaries from deserting, they kept back arrearages of pay. And secondly, to prevent mutiny, and silence murmurings, they allowed the plundering of a country they intend to conquer. Here common sense alone would have informed them, had they listened to her dictates, that by irritating they would never subdue; and that an indulgence in excesses would relax all discipline. Taught by experience, they begin now to wind up the cords; but as it was said of James the First, they are always either too high or too low. Instead of liberal discipline, they ask servile obedience. Would it not be wise to meet this with taunting insult? To encourage our men in abuse of them, as poor slaves, hired without pay, yet not daring to vent a complaint; and contrast the different situations: at the same time inviting them to come and taste the air of freedom. The English are the proudest people on earth.

You will hear more of a little expedition against Peekskill at Head Quarters than I can tell you. I

suppose it is intended as a diversion ; if so, it is a ridiculous one.

I am, &c.

Gouv. MORRIS.

Col. Alex. Hamilton.

THE COMMITTEE OF CONVENTION TO HAMILTON.

Kingston, April 2d, 1777.

SIR :

We received yours of the 29th ultimo, and are extra sorry to hear of your indisposition.

In our last we expressed an apprehension that the enemy might possibly make Hudson's river their first object; not only because they could open their campaign there earlier than they could go to Pennsylvania (as in one case their army would move by land, and in the other by water); but because, having the command of the river, by taking the advantage of a southerly wind, they would have it in their power to run up in a few hours; and, by destroying the boats that are along its banks, render it impossible for General Washington's army to cross till they have marched to Albany; a thing almost impracticable at this season of the year, considering the distance, and badness of the roads. This would enable them, not only to ravage all this State, but to enter Connecticut on its western side, where the disaffection of the people will ensure them many friends. We have strained every nerve to prepare for their re-

ception, having vested a power in General George Clinton to make whatever draughts he may think necessary from the militia: in consequence of which, every third man is ordered to be drawn from the southern, and every fifth man from the northern counties. We are not without apprehensions that these heavy draughts will be dreadfully felt, in the want of the necessary supplies for the army and inhabitants, which can hardly be raised under such circumstances in this State: but more remote evils must yield to the pressures of necessity. We enclose you, by direction of Convention, some resolutions lately passed, in order to render the laws against spies, and secret enemies, more effectual. You will be pleased to deliver them, with our respectful compliments, to His Excellency the General.

We are happy to hear of the arrival of the vessel with arms from France, as no supplies can be more necessary.

We flatter ourselves that it will shortly be in our power to communicate more important intelligence from that quarter.

We are, with great respect, Sir,
Your most obedient and humble servants,
WM. ALLISON,
ROBT. R. LIVINGSTON.
GOUVR. MORRIS.

Col. Alex. Hamilton.

HAMILTON TO A COMMITTEE OF THE PROVINCIAL
CONGRESS.

Head-Quarters, Morristown, April 5, 1777.

GENTLEMEN :

Since my last, I have had the pleasure of receiving your reply to my two favours of the 29th ultimo and 2d current. I am happy enough to be able to inform you, that my indisposition, which was the occasion of my brevity when I last wrote, is now removed.

The opinion I advanced respecting the enemy's not moving before the beginning of May, seems to be shaken, though not entirely overthrown, by some present appearances. We have received information that they are embarking about three thousand men on board of transports, which are lying at the Hook, by way of Staten Island. This, it is conjectured, is with a view to the Delaware; and the supposition is confirmed, by the circumstance of a confederacy lately detected at Philadelphia, who, among other things, were endeavouring, by the temptation of fifty pounds, to engage persons as pilots up that river. The extreme difficulties they must labour under for want of forage, and the infinite hazard they must run by moving with a small body of about five thousand men, with an enemy in the rear, incapable of sparing any considerable body of troops to form

a post behind, and be an asylum to them in case of accident,—these circumstances will hardly allow me to think they will be daring enough to make the attempt at this time. But on the other hand, as they know we are in a progressive state as to numbers, and other matters of importance, and as they have no prospect of early reinforcement, and are in a state of uncertainty as to any, from the bustling aspect of European affairs, it is probable they may conceive a necessity of making a push at all risks. Perhaps, however, this embarkation is intended for some other purpose; to make a diversion, or execute some partisan exploit elsewhere. On the whole, I find it difficult to believe they are yet ready for any capital operation.

As to your apprehensions of an attempt up the North river, I imagine you may discard any uneasiness on that score, although it will be at all times advisable to be on the watch against such a contingency. It is almost reduced to a certainty, that the principal views of the enemy, in the ensuing campaign, will be directed towards the southward, and to Philadelphia more immediately; of which idea, the discovery before mentioned, with respect to pilots, is no inconsiderable confirmation. Philadelphia is an object calculated to strike and attract their attention. It has all along been the main source of supplies towards the war;

and the getting it into their possession, would deprive us of a wheel we could very badly spare, in the great political and military machine. They are sensible of this, and are equally sensible, that it contains, in itself, and is surrounded by, a prodigious number of persons attached to them, and inimical to us, who would lend them all the assistance they could, in the further prosecution of their designs. It is also a common and well grounded rule in war, to strike first and principally, at the capital towns and cities, in order to the conquest of a country.

I must confess I do not see any object equally interesting to draw their efforts to the northward. Operations merely for plundering and devastation can never answer their end; and if they could, one part of the continent would do nearly as well as another. And as to the notion of forming a junction with the northern army, and cutting off the communication between the northern and southern States, I apprehend it will do better in speculation than in practice. Unless the geography of the country is far different from anything I can conceive, to effect this would require a chain of posts, and such a number of men at each, as would never be practicable or maintainable, but to an immense army. In their progress, by hanging upon their rear, and seizing every opportunity of skirmishing, their situation might be rendered insupportably uneasy.

But for fear of mistake, the General has determined to collect a considerable body of troops at or about Peekskill, which will not be drawn off till the intentions of the enemy have acquired a decisive complexion. These will be ready, according to conjunctures, either to proceed northerly or southerly, as may be requisite. Every precaution should be taken to prevent the boats from being destroyed, by collecting them, at the first movement of the enemy, under cover of one of the forts, or into some inlet, difficult of access, and easily defensible with a small number of men. The loss of them would be an irreparable disadvantage.

The enemy's attempt upon Peekskill is a demonstration of the folly of having any quantity of stores at places so near the water, and so much exposed to a sudden inroad. There should never be more there than sufficient to answer present demands. We have lost a good deal in this way at different times, and I hope experience will at last make us wiser.

His Excellency lately had a visit from the Oneida Chief and five others. He managed them with a good deal of address, and sent them away perfectly satisfied. He persuaded them to go to Philadelphia, but they declined it, alleging their impatience to return, and remove the erroneous

opinions of their countrymen, from the misrepresentations of British emissaries, which they were apprehensive might draw them into some rash proceedings. They parted, after having made the most solemn protestations of friendship and good will. His Excellency has been very busy all day in despatching the southern post, which has prevented me giving him your resolve. It will, no doubt, be very acceptable; and it is with pleasure I inform you, that the zeal and abilities of the New-York Convention hold the first rank in his estimation.

No news from France, save that the Congress have obtained a credit there, for which they can draw bills to the amount of £100,000 sterling. This will be extremely serviceable in carrying on a trade with the French. The new troops begin to come in. If we can shortly get any considerable accession of strength, we may be able to strike some brilliant stroke.

I am, Gentlemen, with the greatest respect,
Your most obedient servant,

A. HAMILTON.

P. S. We have been some time endeavouring to negotiate a regular cartel; but it has been lately broken off, principally on account of Major General Lee. General Howe will not allow him to be comprehended under the general idea of American prisoners.

THE COMMITTEE OF CONVENTION TO HAMILTON.

Kingston, 8th April, 1777.

SIR:

Yours of the third came safe to hand this day, and gave us great pleasure by certifying your health. The smallness of our numbers will not permit the loss of one useful citizen. It is, therefore, a determined point, that, sick or well, you are by no means to die.

At this distance, it is impossible to determine what the enemy can, or what they cannot, do. But, certainly, if we can bring a respectable force into the field previous to their movements, it must be extremely difficult for them to advance or retreat. The latter, indeed, may be assisted by the works they are throwing up.

Their attempt upon the Delaware is far from improbable. Howe is certainly a stupid fellow: but if he reasons so far, the taking of Philadelphia would give a splendid sight to their manœuvres in the eyes of Europe. This would be productive of advantage. The seizing that large city, would also afford him much benefit in the several ways which you suggest. But would it not be wise to permit his force to be thus divided, that one part after another might be cut to pieces?

Since the affair at Peekskill, their views this way seem to be less probable. It was, doubtless, unmmilitary to warn us of our danger. They will

also soon learn that we are in this quarter, in a decent posture of defence; and that may decide their fluctuating councils.

Perhaps, after all, they will find it more convenient to keep post at Amboy, with an advanced party at Brunswick, secure New-York, and carry on a kind of naval partisan war, till the further aid and order of their masters.

You will take care, whenever you write to us matters which ought not to be seen by all, to direct to *one* of *us* only in a separate letter; while that which is merely indifferent, comes under your usual direction. The reason is, that sometimes, when we do not happen to be immediately in the way, your letters are opened by the President; and although no evil consequences have accrued from this as yet, it is nevertheless proper to guard against it.

What you say relative to a cartel, reminds us of the case of Major Edminston, who was taken by General Schuyler at the same time with Sir John Johnson. This gentleman, as His Excellency will recollect, was sent into the enemy's quarters, with a letter to negotiate an exchange for one of three Majors, prisoners in their hands. He hath since returned, with a letter from Howe to General Schuyler, purporting that one of those Majors shall be exchanged for him, he being permitted to join his regiment in Canada. He was three weeks, or

thereabouts, travelling from New-York to Albany; of which the Convention being informed, caused him to be made prisoner, and intend sending him to Head Quarters. He is well acquainted with the face of this country, and the disposition of its several inhabitants. He has sufficient interest with the Indians to accomplish an escape. Upon the whole (as it will not be prudent to confine him within this State), it is submitted, whether it would not be proper to secure him elsewhere until the close of the present campaign?

We are, Sir,

Your most ob't. and humble servants,

ROBT. R. LIVINGSTON,

GOUV. MORRIS.

Colonel Hamilton.

THE COMMITTEE OF CONVENTION TO HAMILTON.

Kingston, 16th April, 1777.

SIR:

We are directed by Convention, to enclose a Resolution passed this day, in addition to that of the 1st of April, which we before did ourselves the honour to transmit to His Excellency, by which we hope to put an effectual stop to any further desertions to the enemy; as the disaffected have been hitherto greatly emboldened by their having, for the want of courts, escaped the punishment they deserved. It frequently happens, that igno-

rant young lads are seduced to enlist with the enemy, and are taken in their way to them. We have sometimes thought that such might safely be admitted to enlist in our regiments (which they are generally inclined to do), as a change of company will often make an alteration in their sentiments, in which case a useful number may be preserved to the community. We wish you to consult the General on this subject, and to favour us with his opinion, by which we shall regulate our future conduct relative to such persons.

We are obliged to you for communicating, by Mr. Troop, an account of the engagement on Sunday, in which we equally admire the extreme caution of the enemy, and the spirit of that handful of men by whom they were opposed. The same bravery will, we hope, prove as fortunate, when a fairer occasion offers for its exertion. We have daily information of plots that are formed in this State; and a few days ago apprehended a Colonel who was raising a regiment for the service of the enemy. We hope, by a seasonable severity, to prevent this evil from becoming very extensive.

We are, Sir, &c.

HAMILTON TO LIVINGSTON.

Head Quarters, Morristown, April 29, 1777.

SIR:

The enclosed was intended to be sent with

the prisoners mentioned in the list; but before this could be conveniently done, Mr. Sims, one of the Chief Justices of the State, came to this town, and informed me, that the Governor and Council were upon the point of adjourning; and that the sending of the prisoners to them, would only be an embarrassment, without answering, at present, any valuable purpose. He considered himself authorized to take the matter under his direction, and desired a sight of the papers relating to it. After perusing them, he determined it was best the prisoners should remain here, until he should receive your further orders on the subject; and delivered me a letter for you, containing a representation of their cases, as they appear to him, in order to know your sense, in what manner they shall be disposed of.

He admits two of them, Woolverton and Silas Howel, to bail.

In addition to the former, I send you a second list of four others that have been lately committed to jail. These are high offenders, and among the number of those who it were to be wished could have an immediate trial and punishment. Isaac Ogden, in particular, is one of the most barefaced impudent fellows that ever came under my observation. He openly acknowledged himself a subject of the King of Great Britain; and flatly refused to give any satisfaction to some questions

that were put to him respecting one Moses Nichols, an emissary from the enemy; assigning no other reason for his refusal, than that he had given his word to be silent.

A spirit of disaffection shows itself with so much boldness and violence in different parts of this State, that it is the ardent wish of His Excellency, no delay, which can be avoided, might be used in making examples of some of the most atrocious offenders. If something be not speedily done, to strike a terror into the disaffected, the consequences must be very disagreeable.

Among others, all security to the friends of the American cause will be destroyed; and the natural effect of this, will be an extinction of zeal in seconding and promoting it. Their attachment, if it remain, will be a dead, inactive, useless principle. And the disaffected, emboldened by impunity, will be encouraged to proceed to the most dangerous and pernicious lengths.

I have the honor to be, with great respect,

Your Excellency's most ob't servant,

A. HAMILTON, A. D. C.

To Gov. Livingston.

HUGH KNOX* TO HAMILTON.

St. Croix, April 31st, 1777.

MY DEAR FRIEND :

A pretty fair opportunity just offering for Philadelphia, I could not omit acknowledging the receipt of your very circumstantial and satisfactory letter of the 14th February. The thing has happened which I wished for. We have been amazed here by vague, imperfect, and very false accounts of matters from the Continent : and I always told my friends, that if you survived the campaign, and had an hour of leisure to write to me, I expected a more true, circumstantial, and satisfactory account of matters in your letter, than by all the public papers and private intelligence we had received here. I have but a moment to command at present, and have not time to remark upon your letter. I can only inform you, that it has given high satisfaction to all friends here. We rejoice in your *good character* and *advancement*, which is, indeed, only the just reward of merit. May you still live to deserve more and more from the friends of America, and to justify the choice, and merit the approbation, of the GREAT AND GOOD GENERAL WASHINGTON—a name which will shine with distinguished lustre in the annals of history—a name dear to the friends of the Liberties of

* Mr. Knox was a physician in the West Indies, and one of Hamilton's friends there.—[EDITOR.]

Mankind! *Mark this*: You must be the Annalist and Biographer, as well as the Aid-de-Camp, of General Washington—and the Historiographer of the AMERICAN WAR! I take the liberty to insist on this. I hope you take minutes and keep a Journal! If you have not hitherto, I pray do it henceforth. I seriously, and with all my little influence, urge this upon you. This may be a new and strange thought to you: but if you survive the present troubles, *I aver*—few men will be as well qualified to write the history of the present glorious struggle. God only knows how it may terminate. But however that may be, it will be a most interesting story.

I congratulate you on your recovery from a long and dangerous illness. It is my own case—I am just convalescent, after the severest attack I ever had in my life. I hope to write you more at large soon, and remain, with the tender of every kind and friendly wish,

My Dear Sir,
Your affectionate Servant,
HUGH KNOX.

HAMILTON TO WILLIAM DUER.

Head Quarters, Morristown, 6th May, 1777.

SIR:

The bearer of this, is Mr. Malmedi, a French gentleman of learning, abilities, and experience. I believe he thinks himself entitled to preferment,

and comes to Congress for that purpose. At the recommendation of General Lee, he was made Brigadier General by the State of Rhode Island ; and filled the station to the satisfaction of his employers, as appears by a letter from Governor Cook, speaking of him in the highest terms of approbation. This has led him to hope, that he should be adopted by the Continent on an equal footing. But in this he will, no doubt, be mistaken, as there are many insuperable objections to such an event. Among others, it would tend to raise the expectations of the Frenchmen in general, already too high, to a pitch which it would be impossible to gratify or endure. It might not, however, be amiss, to do whatever propriety would warrant, to keep him in good humour, as he is a man of sense and merit. I think policy would justify the advancing him a step higher than his former Continental rank.

Congress, in the beginning, went upon a very injudicious plan with respect to Frenchmen. To every adventurer that came, without even the shadow of credentials, they gave the rank of Field officers. This circumstance, seconding the aspiring disposition natural to those people, carried the expectations of those who had really any pretensions to the character of officers, to a length that exceed all the bounds of moderation. As it was impossible to pursue this impolitic plan, the Congress have be-

gun to retrench their excessive liberality ; and the consequence has been, universal disgust and discontent.

It would, perhaps, be injurious, as the French are much addicted to national punctilio, to run into the opposite extreme to that first embraced, and, by that mean, create a general clamour and dissatisfaction. Policy suggests the propriety of discriminating a few of the most deserving, and endeavouring to keep them in temper, even by gratifying them beyond what they can reasonably pretend to. This will enable us to shake off the despicable part with safety, and to turn a deaf ear to the exorbitant demands of the many. It will be easily believed in France, that their want of merit occasioned their want of success, from the extraordinary marks of favour that have been conferred on others : whereas, the united voice of complaint from the whole, might make ill impressions in their own country, which it is not our interest should exist.

We are already greatly embarrassed with the Frenchmen among us ; and, from the genius of the people, shall continue to be so. It were to be wished, that our agents in France, instead of courting them to come out, were instructed to give no encouragement but where they could not help it ; that is, where applications were made to them by persons countenanced and supported by great

men, whom it would be impolitic to disoblige. Be assured, Sir, we shall never be able to satisfy them; and they can be of no use to us, at least for some time. Their ignorance of our language; of the disposition of the people; the resources and deficiencies of the country; their own habits and tempers: all these are disqualifications that put it out of their power to be of any real service to us. You will consider what I have said entirely as my own sentiments, and

Believe me, with great regard, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

A. HAMILTON.

William Duer, Esq.

GOUVERNEUR MORRIS TO HAMILTON.

Kingston, 16th May, 1777.

SIR:

I had the pleasure of your two favours within two days of each other, and am very happy to find that our form of government meets with your approbation. That there are faults in it is not to be wondered at, for it is the work of men, and of men, perhaps, not the best qualified for such undertakings. I think it deficient, for the want of vigour in the executive; unstable, from the very nature of popular elective governments; and dilatory, from the complexity of the legislature.

For the first, I apologize by hinting the spirit

which now reigns in America, suspiciously cautious. For the second, because unavoidable. For the third, because a simple legislature soon possesses itself of too much power for the safety of its subjects. God grant it may work well, for we must live under it.

I cannot persuade myself that Howe will either go to Philadelphia or come hither. In either case, General Washington can hang upon his rear, and place him in the light rather of a fugitive than a conqueror. If he bends his efforts this way, the Council of Safety, you may depend upon it, will exert themselves to make his situation as uneasy as he would wish; probably more so. The spirit of the Tories, we have great reason to believe, is entirely broken in this State. If it is not, it will soon be so; for they shall have a few more executions, than which nothing can be more efficacious. I speak from experience: but then it is necessary to disperse the victims of public justice throughout different parts of the several States; for nothing but ocular demonstration can convince these incredulous beings that we do really hang them. I wish the several States would follow our example. Pennsylvania, in particular, would experience many good effects from a vigorous manly executive. Adieu.

Your most obedient and humble servant,

GOUV. MORRIS.

Col. Hamilton.

GOUV. MORRIS TO HAMILTON.

Kingston, 24th May, 1777.

DEAR SIR:

You certainly had no reason to complain of me, for not informing you of the destruction of the stores at St. John's. True it is, we had a vague report of such a transaction; and we had also an account, from private persons, that the report was confirmed at Albany: but General Gates has never done us the honour to make us acquainted with his intelligence upon that subject; and therefore I was not really warranted to say any thing about it. Apropos, I shall lose two beaver hats if our troops are not in possession of New-York by the first day of July next. If the enemy expect reinforcements, prudence will dictate to us to do something offensive as soon as possible. Would it not be prudent to make several attacks at the same time? For instance, about Hackensack, Bergen, or wherever else the enemy are in that quarter: upon Brunswick, by way of Round Brook, Bonumtown, and from the southward: upon Fort Independence in Westchester county, or against Harlæm: and upon Long Island, by throwing over some of the eastern troops. If only one should prove successful, it would give splendour to our arms, and dismay the enemy. But our numbers, etc., etc., must govern these things. Howe certainly cannot mean to come

this way, unless he is considerably reinforced. He will, unless he is to act on the defensive. I hope that our Generals are very busy fortifying the passes in the Highlands. I fear we shall destroy many men by it when the weather grows warm. Much fatigue prevents that attention to cleanliness which is essential to the health of soldiery. Soldiers should, in my opinion, be as much exercised in the use of arms, and the various evolutions, as is necessary to preserve their bodies in a state of strength and elasticity. The rest of their time may be usefully employed in the care of their clothes, and collecting refreshments. I seriously believe, that if two armies of thirty thousand men each, were to take the field in May, and the one be employed in building fortifications for three months, which the other should storm at the expiration of that term; the odds would be in favour of the assailants, that the campaign would not cost them as many as the enemy. But a truce to idle speculation. Be pleased to direct your next letter to Robert R. Livingston and Christopher Taffin, Esqrs., as I shall not myself be in the way to receive it. We have no news here but this, that the Tories are much humbled, and will, I believe, be more so.

Adieu. Yours,

GOUV. MORRIS,

Col. Hamilton.

HAMILTON TO A FRIEND.

Head Quarters, Smith's Clove, July 22, 1777.

DEAR SIR :

Your favour of the eighteenth, from Saratoga, reached me yesterday. Your pronouncing Fort Edward, among the other forts, indefensible, surprises me a little, as it is entirely contrary to the representations of several gentlemen of judgment, who have had an opportunity of seeing and considering its situation; by whom we have been taught to believe that it would be an excellent post, at least for checking and retarding Burgoyne's progress. I agree with you that our principal strength in the quarter you are, will be in the forests and natural strength of the country, and in the want of forage, provisions, carriages, &c., in which the enemy may easily be thrown, by taking away what there are of those articles, which, you observe, have never been in great abundance.

I am doubtful whether Burgoyne will attempt to penetrate far, and whether he will not content himself with harassing our back settlements by parties assisted by the savages, who, it is to be feared, will pretty generally be tempted, by the enemy's late successes, to confederate in hostilities against us.

This doubt arises from some appearances that indicate a southern movement of General Howe's army, which, if it should really happen, will cer-

tainly be a barrier against any further impressions of Burgoyne ; for it cannot be supposed he would be rash enough to plunge into the bosom of the country without an expectation of being met by General Howe. Things must prove very adverse to us indeed, should he make such an attempt and *not be ruined by it*. I confess, however, that the appearances I allude to, do not carry a full evidence in my mind ; because they are opposed by others of a contradictory kind ; and because I cannot conceive upon what principle of common sense, or military propriety, Howe can be running away from Burgoyne to the southward.

It is much to be wished he may, even though it should give him the possession of Philadelphia, which, by our remoteness from it, may very well happen. In this case, we may not only, if we think proper, retaliate, by aiming a stroke at New-York ; but we may come upon him with the greatest part of our collective force, to act against that part which is under him. We shall then be certain that Burgoyne cannot proceed, and that a small force of continental troops will be sufficient for that partisan war which he must carry on the rest of the campaign.

A small force will also be sufficient to garrison the posts in the Highlands, and prevent any danger there ; so that we shall be able to bring nearly the whole of the continental army against Mr.

Howe. The advantages of this are obvious. Should he be satisfied with the splendour of his acquisition, and shut himself up in Philadelphia, we can ruin him by confinement. Should he leave a garrison there, and go forward, we can either fall upon that or his main body, diminished as it will be by such a measure, with our whole force. There will, however, be many disagreeable consequences attending such an event; amongst which, the foremost is, the *depreciation of our currency*, which, from the importance in which Philadelphia is held, cannot fail to ensue.

I am, dear Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

ALEX. HAMILTON.

HAMILTON TO DR. KNOX.

“A fragment of a letter written by him about this time to his venerable friend Doctor Knox, who warmly espoused the American cause, will be read with interest, as exhibiting more at large, the prospects and views of policy which he entertained.”—*Life of Hamilton, by his Son: vol. 1, p. 97.*

This event [the evacuation of Ticonderoga*], redounds very little to our credit. For if the post was untenable, or required a larger number of troops to defend it than could be spared for the purpose, it ought long ago to have been foreseen and given up. Instead of that, we have kept a

* July 5, 1777.

large quantity of cannon in it, and have been heaping up very valuable magazines of stores and provisions, that, in the critical moment of defence, are abandoned and lost. This affair will be attended with several evil consequences; for besides the loss of our stores, which we cannot well afford, it opens a new and easy door by which to penetrate the northern States. It will fix the hitherto fluctuating disposition of the Indians in that quarter, in their favour, and expose the frontiers of the adjacent country to their depredations. But though it is a misfortune we have reason to lament, I dare say it will be regarded with you as much more important than it really is, and as materially endangering the success of our cause, which is by no means the case. Our opposition is at this time too well matured, and has too great stability, to be shaken by an accident of that kind. While we have a respectable army in the field, and resources to feed, clothe, and arm them, we are safe. We have had a force sufficient for the foregoing part of the campaign, to maintain such a superiority over the main army of the enemy as effectually to hinder them from attaining any of their purposes. And, to the northward, with the reinforcements sent up to succour the retreating garrison of Ticonderoga, and the militia flocking in from New England, I think there is little doubt we have by this time a force adequate to give

Mr. Burgoyne a seasonable check. One good effect will result from the misfortune, which is, that it will stimulate the eastern States to greater exertions than they might otherwise make.

By our last advices, the enemy were in possession of all the country between Ticonderoga and Fort George ; and our army, nearly equal in number to them, were about to take post somewhere between Fort Edward and Saratoga.

The consequences of this northern affair will depend much upon the part that Howe acts. If he were to co-operate with Burgoyne, it would demand our utmost efforts to counteract them. But if he should go towards the southward, all or most of the advantages of Burgoyne's success will be lost. He will either be obliged to content himself with the possession of Ticonderoga, and the dependent fortresses, and with carrying on a partisan war the rest of the campaign ; or he must precipitate himself into certain ruin, by attempting to advance into the country with a very incompetent force.

Appearances lead us to suppose that Howe is fool enough to meditate a southern expedition ; for he has now altered his station at Staten Island, mentioned above, and has fallen down to the Hook. Judging it morally certain that there would be a co-operation of the two armies, we thought it expedient to march northerly ; and had accordingly

reached within fourteen miles of New Windsor, the place where we could cross the North River without danger of interruption. But this new movement of the enemy's fleet, has induced us to return a few miles, and make a disposition for marching southerly. We shall, however, be cautious how we proceed on that course, lest nothing more than a feint is intended, to divert us from the real object.

If they go to the southward in earnest, they must have the capture of Philadelphia in view; for there is no other sufficient inducement. We shall endeavour to get there in time to oppose them; and shall have the principal part of the continental force, and a large body of spirited militia, many of them, from their services during the last campaign, pretty well inured to arms, to make the opposition with. Yet I would not have you to be much surprised if Philadelphia should fall; for the enemy will doubtless go there with a determination to succeed at all hazard; and we shall not be able to prevent them, without risking a general action, the expediency of which will depend upon circumstances. If the militia turn out with that zeal we have a right to expect, from their conduct when the enemy made their last experiment in the Jerseys, and were supposed to be going to Philadelphia, we may do it without much inconvenience. If they fall materially short of it, we shall be

obliged to confine ourselves to a skirmishing opposition, which we cannot expect will be effectual. It may be asked, If, to avoid a general engagement, we give up objects of the first importance, what is to hinder the enemy from carrying every important point, and ruining us? My answer is, that our hopes are not placed in any particular city or spot of ground, but in the preserving a good army, furnished with proper necessaries, to take advantage of favourable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal. Every new post they take, requires a new division of their forces, and enables us to strike with our united force against a part of theirs: and such is their present situation, that another Trenton affair will amount to a complete victory on our part; for they are at too low an ebb to bear another stroke of the kind. Perhaps, before I may have an opportunity of sending this, facts will unfold what I am now endeavouring to anticipate by conjecture.

You will expect some animadversions on the temper and views of the French nation. I presume you are nearly as well acquainted with the assistance they are giving us as I am, both by their intrigues in foreign courts, and by supplies of every kind of warlike stores and apparatus.

It does not admit of a doubt that they are interested to wish us success; and their conduct plainly shows, they are willing to give us every

aid essential to our preservation. But it is natural they should desire to do it with as much convenience to themselves as they can. I apprehend they are not overfond of plunging themselves into a war with England if they can avoid it, and still answer the end they have to pursue : and, indeed, from the evident reluctance shown on the part of the latter, to do anything that may bring about such an event, it becomes extremely difficult to draw her into it. The conclusion we may make, is, that France will not wish to force England into a war, unless she finds our affairs require it absolutely ; and England will not enter into one, till she is compelled to do it.

My best respects to all friends ; and I beg you will believe me to be, with unabated regard,

Dear Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

A. HAMILTON.

TO THE HONOURABLE JOHN HANCOCK, PRESIDENT
OF CONGRESS.

September 18., 1777. 9 o'clock at night.

SIR :

I did myself the honour to write you a hasty line this evening, giving it as my opinion, that the city was no longer a place of safety for you. I write you again, lest that letter should not get to hand. The enemy are on the road to Swedes

Ford, the main body about four miles from it. They sent a party this evening to Daviser's ferry, which fired upon me and some others in crossing it, killed one man, wounded another, and disabled my horse.

They came on so suddenly, that one boat was left adrift on the other side, which will of course fall into their hands; and, by the help of that, they will get possession of another, which was abandoned by those who had the direction of it, and left afloat, in spite of every thing that I could do to the contrary. These two boats will convey fifty men across at a time, so that in a few hours they may throw over a large party, perhaps sufficient to overmatch the militia who may be between them and the city. This renders the situation of Congress extremely precarious, if they are not on their guard: my apprehensions for them are great, though it is not improbable they may not be realized.

The most cogent reasons oblige me to join the army this night, or I should have waited upon you myself. I am in hopes our army will be up with the enemy before they pass Schuylkill: if they are, something serious will ensue.

I have the honour to be,

With much respect,

Sir, your most obedient,

A. HAMILTON.

HAMILTON TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Philadelphia, 22d September, 1777.

SIR :

I left camp last evening, and came to this city to superintend the collection of blankets and clothing for the army. Mr. Lovell sends to inform me there is an express going off to Congress; and I do myself the honour to communicate a brief state of things when I left camp. The enemy moved yesterday, from where they lay opposite to Valley Forge, &c., higher up the river, on their old scheme of gaining our right. I don't know precisely where they halted; but our army was preparing to move up also, to counteract them.

I am this morning told, they marched about twelve o'clock at night for that purpose. The general opinion was, that the enemy would attempt crossing this day: every appearance justified the supposition.

We had intelligence that the enemy had, the night before last, surprised Generals Smallwood and Wayne, and consequently dispersed them, after a small opposition. The loss, it is said, was not great; and our troops were re-assembling fast at the Red Lion. This seems to have been a bad look out, and is somewhat disconcerting.

By a letter from General McDougal, received this morning, it appears he was, on the twentieth, in the morning, at Second River, just setting out

on his march toward Woodbridge. He is pressing forward with all possible expedition. The troops were pretty well refreshed, and in good spirits.

I have, &c.,

A. HAMILTON.

WASHINGTON TO HAMILTON.

Head Quarters, Philadelphia County, 30th Oct., 1777.

DEAR SIR:

It having been judged expedient by the members of a council of war, held yesterday, that one of the gentlemen of my family should be sent to General Gates, in order to lay before him the state of this army, and the situation of the enemy; and to point out to him the many happy consequences that will accrue from an immediate reinforcement being sent from the northern army; I have thought it proper to appoint you to that duty, and desire that you will immediately set out for Albany; at which place, or in the neighbourhood, I imagine you will find General Gates.

You are so fully acquainted with the principal points on which you are sent, namely, the state of our army, and the situation of the enemy, that I shall not enlarge on those heads. What you are chiefly to attend to, is, to point out, in the clearest and fullest manner, to General Gates, the absolute necessity that there is for his detaching a very considerable part of the army at present under

his command, to the reinforcement of this ; a measure that will, in all probability, reduce General Howe to the same situation in which General Burgoyne now is, should he attempt to remain in Philadelphia without being able to remove the obstructions in the Delaware, and open a free communication with his shipping. The force which the members of the council of war judge it safe and expedient to draw down at present, are the three New Hampshire and fifteen Massachusetts regiments, with Lee's and Jackson's two of the sixteen, additional. But it is more than probable, that General Gates may have detained part of those troops to the reduction of Ticonderoga, should the enemy not have evacuated it; or to the garrisoning of it. If they should, in that case the reinforcement will be according to circumstances; but, if possible, let it be made up to the same number out of other corps. If, upon your meeting with General Gates, you should find that he intends, in consequence of his success, to employ the troops, under his command, upon some expedition, by the prosecution of which the common cause will be more benefitted than by their being sent down to reinforce this army, it is not my wish to give any interruption to the plan. But if he should have nothing more in contemplation than those particular objects which I have mentioned to you, and which it is unnecessary to commit to

paper; in that case you are to inform him, that it is my desire that the reinforcements before mentioned, or such part of them as can be safely spared, be immediately put in motion to join the army.

I have understood that General Gates has already detached Nixon's and Glover's brigades to join General Putnam; and General Dickinson informs me, Sir Henry Clinton has come down the river with his whole force: if this be a fact, you are to desire General Putnam to send the two brigades forward with the greatest expedition, as there can be no occasion for them there.

I expect you will meet Colonel Morgan's corps upon their way down: if you do, let them know how essential their services are to us; and desire the Colonel, or commanding officer, to hasten their march as much as is consistent with the health of the men after their late fatigues. G. W.

P. S. I ordered the detachment belonging to General McDougal's division to come forward. If you meet them, direct those belonging to Greene's, Angel's, Chandler's, and Duryee's regiments, not to cross Delaware, but to proceed to Red Bank,

HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.

Fishkill, Nov. 2., 1777.

DEAR SIR:

I lodged last night in the neighbourhood of New

Windsor. This morning early, I met Colonel Morgan with his corps, about a mile from it, in march for head quarters. I told him the necessity of making all the despatch he could, so as not to fatigue his men too much, which he has promised to do.

I understood from Colonel Morgan, that all the northern army were marching down on both sides the river, and would, probably, be to-morrow at New Windsor and this place; and that General Putnam had held a council for the general disposition of them, in which it was resolved to send you four thousand men, and to keep the rest on this side the river. I came here in expectation that matters were in such a train as to enable me to accomplish my errand without going any farther, unless it should be to hasten the troops that were on their march: but on my arrival, I learned from Mr. Hughes, an Aide-de-Camp of General Gates, that the following disposition of the northern army had taken place.

General Patterson's, Glover's, and Nixon's brigades, and Colonel Warner's mountain boys, to remain in and about Albany: barracks building for them. General Poor's brigade, marching down this side of the river to join General Putnam, will be here probably to-morrow. General Learned's brigade, Morgan's corps, Warner's brigade of Massachusetts militia, and some regiments of New York militia, on their march on the west side of the river.

I have directed General Putnam, in your name, to send forward, with all despatch, to join you, the two continental brigades, and Warner's militia brigade : this last is to serve till the latter end of this month. Your instructions did not comprehend any militia : but as there are certain accounts here, that most of the troops from New York are gone to reinforce General Howe ; and as so large a proportion of continental troops have been detained at Albany ; I concluded you would not disapprove of a measure calculated to strengthen you, though but for a small time, and have ventured to adopt it on that presumption.

Being informed by General Putnam, that General Wynds, with seven hundred Jersey militia, was at King's Ferry, with intention to cross to Peekskill, I prevailed upon him to relinquish that idea, and send off an immediate order for them to march towards Red Bank. It is possible, however, unless your Excellency supports this order by an application from yourself, he may march his men home, instead of marching them to the place he has been directed to repair to.

Neither Lee's, Jackson's regiments, nor the detachments belonging to General McDougal's division, have yet marched. I have urged their being sent ; and an order has been despatched for their instantly proceeding. Colonel Hughes is pressing some fresh horses for me. The moment

they are ready, I shall recross the river, in order to fall in with the troops on the other side, and make all the haste I can to Albany, to get the three brigades there sent forward.

Will your Excellency permit me to observe, that I have some doubts, under present circumstances and appearances, of the propriety of leaving the regiments proposed to be left in this quarter? But if my doubts on this subject were stronger than they are, I am forbid, by the sense of council, from interfering in the matter.

General Poor's brigade is just arrived here: they will proceed to join you with all expedition. So strongly am I impressed with the importance of endeavouring to crush Mr. Howe, that I am apt to think it would be advisable to draw off all the continental troops. Had this been determined on, General Warner's sixteen hundred militia might have been left here.

I have the honour to be,

With the warmest esteem and respect,

Your Excellency's most obedient servant,

A. HAMILTON.

HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.

Albany, November, 1777.

DEAR SIR.

I arrived here yesterday at noon, and waited upon General Gates immediately, on the business

of my mission ; but was sorry to find his ideas did not correspond with yours, for drawing off the number of troops you directed. I used every argument in my power, to convince him of the propriety of the measure ; but he was inflexible in the opinion, that two brigades, at least, of continental troops, should remain in and near this place. His reasons were, that the intelligence of Sir Henry Clinton's having gone to join Howe, was not sufficiently authenticated to put it out of doubt ; that there was, therefore, a possibility of his returning up the river, which might expose the finest arsenal in America (as he calls the one here) to destruction, should this place be left so bare of troops as I proposed ; and that the want of conveniences, and the difficulty of the roads, would make it impossible to remove artillery and stores for a considerable time ; that the New England States would be left open to the depredations and ravages of the enemy ; that it would put it out of his power to enterprise any thing against Ticonderoga, which he thinks might be done in the winter, and which he considers it of importance to undertake.

The force of these reasons did by no means strike me ; and I did every thing in my power to show they were unsubstantial : but all I could effect, was to have one brigade despatched, in addition to those already marched. I found myself

infinitely embarrassed, and was at a loss how to act. I felt the importance of strengthening you as much as possible: but, on the other hand, I found insuperable inconveniences, in acting diametrically opposite to the opinion of a gentleman, whose successes have raised him to the highest importance. General Gates has won the entire confidence of the Eastern States. If disposed to do it, by addressing himself to the prejudices of the people, he would find no difficulty to render a measure odious, which it might be said, with plausibility enough to be believed, was calculated to expose them to unnecessary dangers, notwithstanding their exertions, during the campaign, had given them the fullest title to repose and security. General Gates has influence and interest elsewhere: he might use it, if he pleased, to discredit the measure there also. On the whole, it appeared to me dangerous, to insist on sending more troops from hence, while General Gates appeared so warmly opposed to it. Should any accident, or inconvenience, happen in consequence of it, there would be too fair a pretext for censure: and many people are too well disposed to lay hold of it. At any rate, it might be considered as using him ill, to take a step so contrary to his judgment, in a case of this nature. These considerations, and others which I shall be more explicit in when I have the pleasure of seeing you, determined me not to insist upon

sending either of the other brigades remaining here. I am afraid what I have done, may not meet with your approbation, as not being perhaps fully warranted by your instructions: but I ventured to do what I thought right, hoping that, at least, the goodness of my intention will excuse the error of my judgment.

I was induced to this relaxation the more readily, as I had directed to be sent on, two thousand militia, which were not expected by you; and a thousand continental troops out of those proposed to be left with General Putnam, which I have written to him, since I found how matters were circumstanced here, to forward to you with all despatch. I did this for several reasons: because your reinforcement would be more expeditious from that place than from this: because two thousand continental troops at Peekskill will not be wanted in its present circumstances; especially as it was really necessary to have a body of continental troops at this place, for the security of the valuable stores here: and I should not, if I had my wish, think it expedient to draw off more than two of the three brigades now here. This being the case, one of the ends you proposed to be answered, by leaving the ten regiments with General Putnam, will be equally answered by the troops here; I mean that of covering and fortifying the Eastern States: and one thousand continental troops, in addition to the militia collected, and that may be collected, here,

will be sufficient, in the Highlands, for covering the country down that way, and carrying on the works necessary to be raised for the defence of the river.

The troops gone, and going, to reinforce you, are near five thousand rank and file, continental troops; and two thousand five hundred Massachusetts and New Hampshire militia. These, and the seven hundred Jersey militia, will be a larger reinforcement than you expected, though not quite an equal number of continental troops; nor exactly in the way directed. General Lincoln tells me, the militia are very excellent; and though their time will be out by the last of this month, you will be able, if you think proper, to order the troops still remaining here, to join you by the time their term of service expires.

I cannot forbear being uneasy, lest my conduct should prove displeasing to you: but I have done what, considering all circumstances, appeared to me most eligible and prudent.

Vessels are preparing to carry the brigade to New Windsor, which will embark this evening. I shall, this afternoon, set out on my return to camp; and on my way, shall endeavour to hasten the troops forward.

I have the honour to be,

With great esteem and respect,

Your Excellency's most ob't,

ALEX. HAMILTON.

HAMILTON TO GATES.

Albany, November 5., 1777.

SIR :

By inquiry, I have learned that General Patterson's brigade, which is the one you propose to send, is by far the weakest of the three now here, and does not consist of more than about six hundred rank and file fit for duty. It is true, that there is a militia regiment with it of about two hundred; but the time of service for which this regiment is engaged, is so near expiring, that it would be past by the time the men could arrive at their destination.

Under these circumstances, I cannot consider it either as compatible with the good of the service, or my instructions from His Excellency General Washington, to consent that that brigade be selected from the three to go to him; but I am under the necessity of desiring, by virtue of my orders from him, that one of the others be substituted instead of this; either General Nixon's, or General Glover's; and that you will be pleased to give immediate orders for its embarkation.

Knowing that General Washington wished me to pay the greatest deference to your judgment, I ventured so far to deviate from the instructions he gave me, as to consent, in compliance with your opinion, that two brigades should remain

here instead of one. At the same time permit me to observe, that I am not myself sensible of the expediency of keeping more than one, with the detached regiments in the neighbourhood of this place; and that my ideas coincide with those gentlemen whom I have consulted on the occasion, whose judgment I have much more reliance upon than on my own, and who must be supposed to have a thorough knowledge of all the circumstances. Their opinion is, that one brigade, and the regiments before mentioned, would amply answer the purposes of this post. When I preferred your opinion to other considerations, I did not imagine you would pitch upon a brigade little more than half as large as the others: and finding this to be the case, I indispensably owe it to my duty, to desire, in His Excellency's name, that another may go instead of the one intended, and without loss of time. As it may be conducive to despatch, to send Glover's brigade, if agreeable to you, you will give orders accordingly.

I have the honor to be,

With real respect and esteem,

Sir, your most obedient servant,

A. HAMILTON.

General Gates.

HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.

New Windsor, November 10., 1777.

DEAR SIR :

I arrived here last night from Albany. Having given General Gates a little time to recollect himself, I renewed my remonstrance on the necessity and propriety of sending you more than one brigade of the three he had detained with him; and finally prevailed upon him to give orders for Glover's, in addition to Patterson's brigade, to march this way.

As it was thought conducive to expedition, to send the troops by water, as far as it could be done, I procured all the vessels that could be had at Albany, fit for the purpose; but could not get more than sufficient to take Patterson's brigade. It was embarked the seventh instant; but the wind has been contrary: they must probably be here to-day. General Glover's brigade marched at the same time, on the east side of the river, the roads being much better than on this side. I am this moment informed, that one sloop, with a part of Patterson's, has arrived, and that the others are in sight. They will immediately proceed, by water, to King's Ferry, and thence take the shortest route.

I am pained beyond expression to inform your Excellency, that on my arrival here, I find everything has been neglected and deranged by Gene-

ral Putnam; and that the two brigades, Poor's and Learned's, still remain here and on the other side of the river at Fishkill. Colonel Warner's militia, I am told, have been drawn to Peekskill, to aid in an expedition against New York, which, it seems, is, at this time, the hobby-horse with General Putnam. Not the least attention has been paid to my order, in your name, for a detachment of one thousand men from the troops hitherto stationed at this post. Everything is sacrificed to the whim of taking New York.

The two brigades of Poor and Learned, it appears, would not march for want of money and necessaries; several of the regiments having received no pay for six or eight months past. There has been a high mutiny among the former on this account, in which a captain killed a man, and was himself shot by his comrade. These difficulties, for want of proper management, have stopped the troops from proceeding. Governor Clinton has been the only man who has done anything towards removing them; but for want of General Putnam's co-operation, has not been able to effect it. He has only been able to prevail with Learned's brigade, to agree to march to Goshen; in hopes, by getting them once on the go, to induce them to continue their march. On coming here, I immediately sent for Colonel Bailey, who now commands Learned's brigade, and persuaded him to

engage to carry the brigade on to head quarters as fast as possible. This he expects to effect by means of five or six thousand dollars, which Governor Clinton was kind enough to borrow for me, and which Colonel Bailey thinks will keep the men in good humour till they join you. They marched this morning towards Goshen.

I shall, as soon as possible, see General Poor, and do everything in my power to get him along ; and hope I shall be able to succeed.

The plan I before laid, having been totally deranged, a new one has become necessary. It is now too late to send Warner's militia: by the time they reached you, their term of service would be out. The motive for sending them, which was to give you a speedy reinforcement, has, by the past delay, been superseded.

By Governor Clinton's advice, I have sent an order, in the most emphatical terms, to General Putnam, immediately to despatch all the continental troops under him to your assistance ; and to detain the militia instead of them.

My opinion is, that the only present use for troops in this quarter, is, to protect the country from the depredations of little plundering parties ; and for carrying on the works necessary for the defence of the river. Nothing more ought to be thought of. 'Tis only wasting time, and misapplying men, to employ them in a suicidal parade

against New York : for in this it will undoubtedly terminate. New York is no object, if it could be taken : and to take it, would require more men than could be spared from more substantial purposes. Governor Clinton's ideas coincide with mine. He thinks that there is no need of more continental troops here, than a few to give a spur to the militia in working upon the fortifications. In pursuance of this, I have given the directions before mentioned. If General Putnam attends to them, the troops under him may be with you nearly as early as any of the others (though he has, unluckily, marched them down to Tarrytown); and General Glover's brigade, when it gets up, will be more than sufficient to answer the true end of this post.

If your Excellency agrees with me in opinion, it will be well to send instant directions to General Putnam, to pursue the object I have mentioned : for I doubt whether he will attend to anything I shall say, notwithstanding it comes in the shape of a positive order. I fear, unless you interpose, the works here will go on so feebly, for want of men, that they will not be completed in time : whereas, it appears to me of the greatest importance they should be pushed with the utmost vigour. Governor Clinton will do everything in his power. I wish General Putnam was recalled from the command of this post, and Governor Clinton

would accept it: the blunders and caprices of the former are endless. Believe me, Sir, nobody can be more impressed with the importance of forwarding the reinforcements coming to you, with all speed; nor could anybody have endeavoured to promote it more than I have done: but the *ignorance* of some, and the *design* of others, have been almost insuperable obstacles. I am very unwell; but I shall not spare myself to get things immediately in a proper train; and for that purpose intend, unless I receive other orders from you, to continue with the troops in the progress of their march. As soon as I get General Poor's brigade in march, I shall proceed to General Putnam's at Peekskill.

I have, &c.,

ALEX. HAMILTON.

His Excellency General Washington.

HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.

New Windsor, November 12., 1777.

DEAR SIR:

I have been detained here these two days by a fever, and violent rheumatic pains throughout my body. This has prevented my being active, in person, for promoting the purposes of my errand; but I have taken every other method in my power, in which Governor Clinton has obligingly given me all the aid he could. In answer to my pressing

application to General Poor, for the immediate marching of his brigade, I was told they were under an operation for the itch; which made it impossible for them to proceed till the effects of it were over. By a letter, however, of yesterday, General Poor informs me, he would certainly march this morning. I must do him the justice to say, he appears solicitous to join you; and that I believe the past delay is not owing to any fault of his, but is wholly chargeable on General Putnam. Indeed, Sir, I owe it to the service to say, that every part of this gentleman's conduct is marked with blunder and negligence, and gives general disgust.

Parson's brigade will join you, I hope, in five or six days from this. Learned's may do the same. Poor's will, I am persuaded, make all the haste they can for the future. And Glover's may be expected at Fishkill to-night; whence they will be pressed forward as fast as I can have any influence to make them go. But I am sorry to say, the disposition for marching, in the officers and men in general, of these troops, does not keep pace with my wishes, or the exigency of the occasion. They have, unfortunately, imbibed an idea, that they have done their part of the business of the campaign, and are now entitled to repose. This, and the want of pay, make them averse to a long march at this advanced season.

* * * In a letter from General Putnam, just now received by Governor Clinton, he appears to have been, the 10th instant, at King's Street, at the White Plains. I have had no answer to my last applications. The enemy appear to have stripped New York very bare. The people there, that is, the tories, are in a great fright: this adds to my anxiety, that the reinforcements from this quarter to you, are not in greater forwardness and more considerable.

I have written to General Gates, informing him of the accounts of the situation of New York with respect to troops, and the probability of the force gone to Howe being greater than was at first expected; to try if this will not *extort* from him a further reinforcement. I don't, however, expect much from him; as he pretends to have in view an expedition against Ticonderoga, to be undertaken in the winter: and he knows that, under the sanction of this idea, calculated to catch the eastern people, he may, without censure, retain the troops. And as I shall be under a necessity of speaking plainly to your Excellency, when I have the pleasure of seeing you, I shall not hesitate to say, I doubt whether you would have had a man from the northern army, if the whole could have been kept at Albany with any decency. Perhaps you will think me blameable in not having exercised the powers you gave me,

and given a positive order. Perhaps I have been so : but, deliberately weighing all circumstances, I did not, and do not, think it advisable to do it.

I have the honour to be,

With unfeigned esteem and regard,

Your Excellency's most ob't. serv't.,

A. HAMILTON.

His Excellency General Washington.

HAMILTON TO GATES.

Fishkill, November 12, 1777.

SIR :

Ever since my arrival in this quarter, I have been endeavouring to collect the best idea I could, of the state of things in New York, in order the better to form a judgment of the probable reinforcement gone to General Howe. On the whole, this is a fact well ascertained, that New York has been stripped as bare as possible : that in consequence of this, the few troops there, and the inhabitants, are under so strong apprehensions of an attack, as almost to amount to a *panic* ; that to supply the deficiency of men, every effort is making to excite the citizens to arms for the defence of the city. For this purpose, the public papers are full of addresses to them, that plainly speak the apprehensions prevailing on the occasion.

Hence I infer, that a formidable force is gone to General Howe. The calculations made by those who have had the best of opportunities of judging, carry the number from six to seven thousand. If so, the number gone, and going, to General Washington, is far inferior; five thousand at the utmost. The militia were all detained by General Putnam till it became too late to send them.

The state of things I gave you when I had the pleasure of seeing you, was, to the best of my knowledge, sacredly true. I give you the present information, that you may decide, whether any further succour can with propriety come from you.

The fleet, with the troops on board, sailed out of the Hook on the fifth instant. This circumstance demonstrates, beyond a possibility of doubt, that it is General Howe's fixed intention to endeavour to hold Philadelphia at all hazards; and removes all danger of any further operations up the North River this winter. Otherwise, Sir Henry Clinton's movement, at this advanced season, is altogether inexplicable.

If you can, with propriety, afford any further assistance, the most expeditious manner of conveying it, will be to acquaint General Putnam of it; that he may send on the troops with him, to be replaced by them. You, Sir, best know the uses to which the troops with you are to be applied, and will determine accordingly. I am certain it is not

His Excellency's wish, to frustrate any plan you may have in view for the benefit of the service, so far as it can possibly be avoided, consistent with a due attention to more important objects.

I am, with respect, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

ALEX. HAMILTON, A. D. C.

To General Gates.

HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.

Peekskill, Nov. 15, 1777.

DEAR SIR:

I arrived at this place last night, and unfortunately find myself unable to proceed any further. Imagining I had gotten the better of my complaint, which confined me at Governor Clinton's, and anxious to be about attending to the march of the troops, the day before yesterday I crossed the ferry, in order to fall in with General Glover's brigade, which was on its march from Poughkeepsie to Fishkill. I did not, however, see it myself, but received a letter from Colonel Shepherd, who commands the frigate, informing me he would be last night at Fishkill, and this night at King's ferry. Waggons, &c., are provided on the other side for his accommodation; so that there need be no delay but what is voluntary; and I believe Colonel Shepherd is as well disposed as could be wished, to hasten his march. General Poor's brigade

crossed the ferry the day before yesterday. Two York regiments, Courtland's and Livingston's, are with them: they were unwilling to be separated from the brigade, and the brigade from them. General Putnam was unwilling to keep them with him: and if he had consented to do it, the regiments to displace them, would not join you six days as soon as these. The troops now remaining with General Putnam, will amount to about the number you intended, though they are not exactly the same. He has detached Colonel Charles Webb's regiment to you. He *says* the troops with him are not in a condition to march, being destitute of shoes, stockings, and other necessaries: but I believe the true reasons of his being unwilling to pursue the mode pointed out by you, were his aversion to the York troops, and his desire to retain General Parsons with him.

I am, with much respect and esteem,

Your Excellency's most ob't. serv't.,

A. HAMILTON.

To General Washington.

WASHINGTON TO HAMILTON.

Head Quarters, November 15, 1777.

DEAR SIR:

I have duly received your several favours, from the time you left me to that of the twelfth instant. I approve entirely of all the steps you have taken; and have only to wish, that the exertions of those

you have had to deal with, had kept pace with your zeal and good intentions. I hope your health will, before this, have permitted you to push on the rear of the whole reinforcement beyond New Windsor. Some of the enemy's ships have arrived in the Delaware; but how many have troops on board, I cannot exactly ascertain. The enemy have lately damaged Fort Mifflin considerably: but our people keep possession, and seem determined to do so to the last extremity. Our loss in men has been but small. Captain Treat is unfortunately among the killed. I wish you a safe return,

And am, dear Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

G. WASHINGTON.

Lt. Col. Hamilton.

HUGH KNOX TO HAMILTON.

St. Croix, December 10, 1777.

DEAR HAMILTON:

The fine, impartial, laconic, and highly descriptive account you favoured me with of the last year's campaign, in your letter of March last, excited in me, and many of your other friends here, an earnest desire of further accounts from your pen, of the succeeding fortunes of the Great American War: a war which will, one day, shine more illustriously in the historic page, than any which has happened since the times of Nimrod and the

Giants; and deservedly, on account of the goodness of the cause, the grandeur of the object, the eclat of the Generals, the bravery of the troops—and (alas! that I should be obliged to add) of the cruelty and ferocity which has marked the route of your enemies; and the tons of brothers' blood which have been shed on the unhappy occasion!

I wrote two answers to your obliging letter, both of which I hope have reached you; and in both of which I have urged it upon you, to make and collect such memoirs as the urgency of your affairs will permit you; which may furnish materials for an accurate history of the war, when you shall have leisure to fill up and embellish such a skeleton, with all that elegance and dignity of which your fine pen is capable.

The honorable post you hold under the GREAT General Washington, and so near his person, will give you a peculiar advantage for delineating his character, both in his amiable private virtues, and military abilities. And depend upon it, the very minutiae of that incomparable man will be read with avidity by posterity. You know me too well, I hope, to suspect me of superstition; yet I feel myself, at times, under a strong impulse to *prophecy*, that *Washington* was born for the deliverance of America—that that Providence who has raised and trained him up for that very purpose, will watch over his *sacred* life with a paternal and solicitous care; will shield

his head in every day of battle—*will* give him to see America *free, flourishing, and happy*—and *will* adorn his fame, among latest posterity, with a Garland of Laurel, more verdant, blooming, and enviable, than ever adorned the brow of a *Marlborough!*

The bearer of this line (if he shall be indeed so fortunate as to put it into your hand), is our worthy friend, Mr. Cornelius Durant, who is possessed of an ardent desire of having the honour of a short interview with General Washington; principally, that he may have it to say, that he has seen and spoken to *the greatest man of this Age*: and, indeed, considering Mr. Durant's personal worth; his uncommon zeal for, and attachment to, the American cause; the losses he has sustained in attempting to assist her; and his extraordinary admiration of, and love to, the General's character and person; few men more richly merit this indulgence. If you still exist, and exist near the General's person (and I have not yet seen your name among the lists of the slain or the disgraced), you can easily procure him this honour—and I trust you will.

We are now blessed with, and certified of, the glorious news of Burgoyne's surrender to the immortal GATES; another bright star in the Constellation of American Heroes: and we are momentarily expecting to hear, that General Washington has

done something like the same by General Howe ! But we yet tremble in suspense—and it is indeed a *painful one*. Probably before this letter goes, we shall hear more of the matter. Our general accounts are favourable : and while the *Chevaux de frize* are defended, we have no fears about Philadelphia. May this campaign decide the matter !

By the time this reaches you, you will be (if you are at all) in winter quarters ; and perhaps may be at leisure to write me a half folio, of which Mr. Durant will take care to write me duplicates or triplicates, for fear of miscarriage.

A piece of mine, entitled “ An Address to America, by a friend in a foreign government,” has been sent to the Congress for publication (if approved). I know not yet its fate. It is, at least, an honestly designed and animating piece, but written incorrectly, and in a hurry. If you have seen it, pray give me your sentiments about it ; but let it be on a loose paper enclosed in your letter ; for the knowledge of my being the author must be a profound secret here.

My wishes are, that the God of Armies may defend and protect you, and cause you happily to survive, and to hand down to posterity the present important scenes. Numbers here esteem you, and would join me in declaring themselves, as I do,

Dear Hamilton,

Your ever affectionate friend and servant,

HUGH KNOX.

[1778.]

HAMILTON TO DUER.

Head Quarters.

DEAR SIR :

I take the liberty to trouble you with a few hints on a matter of some importance. Baron Steuben, who will be the bearer of this, waits on Congress to have his office* arranged upon some decisive and permanent footing. It will not be amiss to be on your guard. The Baron is a gentleman for whom I have a particular esteem; and whose zeal, intelligence, and success, the consequence of both, entitle him to the greatest credit. But I am apprehensive, with all his good qualities, a fondness for power and importance, natural to every man, may lead him to wish for more extensive prerogatives in his department than it will be for the good of the service to grant. I should be sorry to excite any prejudice against him on this account: perhaps I may be mistaken in my conjecture. The caution I give will do no harm if I am: if I am not, it may be useful. In either case, the Baron deserves to be considered as a valuable man, and treated with all the deference which good policy will warrant.

On the first institution of this office, the General allowed him to exercise more ample powers than

* Inspector-General of the Army.

would be proper for a continuance. They were necessary in the commencement, to put things in a train with a degree of despatch which the exigency of our affairs required: but it has been necessary to restrain them, even earlier than was intended. The novelty of the office excited questions about its boundaries: the extent of its operations alarmed the officers of every rank for their own rights. Their jealousies and discontents were rising fast to a height that threatened to overturn the whole plan. It became necessary to apply a remedy. The General has delineated the functions of the Inspectorship in general orders, a copy of which will be sent to Congress. The plan is good, and satisfactory to the army in general.

It may be improved, but it will be unsafe to deviate essentially from it. It is of course the General's intention, that whatever regulations are adopted by him, should undergo the revision, and receive the sanction, of Congress: but it is indispensable, in the present state of our army, that he should have the power, from time to time, to introduce and authorize the reformatations necessary in our system. It is a work which must be done by occasional and gradual steps; and ought to be entrusted to a person on the spot, who is thoroughly acquainted with all our defects, and has judgment sufficient to adopt the progressive remedies they require. The plan established

by Congress, on a report of the Board of War when Conway was appointed, appears to me exceptionable in many respects. It makes the Inspector independent of the Commander-in-Chief; confers powers which would produce universal opposition in the army; and, by making the previous concurrence of the Board of War requisite to the introduction of every regulation which should be found necessary, opens such a continual source of delay as would defeat the usefulness of the institution. Let the Commander-in-Chief introduce, and the legislature afterwards ratify, or reject, as they shall think proper. Perhaps you will not differ much from me, when I suppose, that so far as relates to the Board of War, the former scheme was a *brat of faction*, and therefore ought to be renounced.

There is one thing which the Baron has much at heart, which, in good policy, he can by no means be indulged in: it is the power of enforcing that part of discipline which we understand by subordination, or an obedience to orders. This power can only be properly lodged with the Commander-in-Chief, and would inflame the whole army if put into other hands. Each Captain is vested with it in his company: each Colonel in his regiment: each General in his particular command: and the Commander-in-Chief in the whole.

When I began this letter, I did not intend to meddle with any other subject than the Inspectorship; but one just comes into my head which appears to me of no small importance. The goodness, or force, of an army, depends as much, perhaps more, on the composition of the corps which form it, as on its collective number. The composition is good or bad, not only according to the quality of the men, but in proportion to the completeness or incompleteness of a corps in respect to numbers. A regiment, for instance, with a full complement of officers, and fifty or sixty men, is not half so good as a company with the same number of men. A Colonel will look upon such a command as unworthy his ambition, and will neglect and despise it: a Captain would pride himself in it, and take all the pains in his power to bring it to perfection. In one case we shall see a total relaxation of discipline, and negligence of every thing that constitutes military excellence: in the other, there will be attention, energy, and every thing that can be wished. Opinion, whether well or ill-founded, is the governing principle of human affairs. A corps much below its establishment, comparing what it is with what it ought to be, loses all confidence in itself; and the whole army loses that confidence and emulation which are essential to success. These, and a thousand other

things that will occur to you, make it evident, that the most important advantages attend the having complete corps, and proportional disadvantages the reverse. Ten thousand men, distributed into twenty imperfect regiments, will not have the efficiency of the same number in half the number of regiments. The fact is, with respect to the American army, that the want of discipline, and other defects we labour under, are as much owing to the skeleton state of our regiments as to any other cause. What then?

Have we any prospect of filling our regiments? My opinion is, that we have nearly arrived to our *ne plus ultra*. If so, we ought to reduce the number of corps, and give them that substance and consistency which they want, by incorporating them together, so as to bring them near their establishment. By this measure the army would be infinitely improved; and the State would be saved the expense of maintaining a number of superfluous officers.

In the present condition of our regiments, they are incapable even of performing their common exercises without joining two or more together: an expedient reluctantly submitted to by those officers who see themselves made second in command of a batallion, instead of first, as their commission imports; which happens to every younger

Colonel whose regiment is united with that of an elder.

What would be the inconveniencies, while the officers who remain in command, and who might be selected from the others on account of superior merit, would applaud themselves in the preference given them, and rejoice at a change which confers such additional consequence on themselves?

Those who should be excluded by the measure, would return home discontented, and make a noise, which would soon subside and be forgotten among matters of greater moment. To quiet them still more effectually, if it should be thought necessary, they might be put upon half-pay for a certain time.

If, on considering this matter, you should agree with me in sentiment, it were to be wished the scheme could be immediately adopted, while the arrangement now in hand is still unexecuted. If it is made, it will be rather inconvenient, immediately after, to unhinge and throw the whole system again afloat.

When you determined on your last arrangement, you did not know what success the different States might have had in draughting and recruiting. It would then have been improper to reduce the number of corps, as proposed. We have now seen their success: we

have no prospect of seeing the regiments filled ;
we should reduce them.

Believe me to be,

With great esteem and regard,

Dear Sir, your obedient servant,

A. HAMILTON.

HAMILTON TO THE MARQUIS DE LA FAYETTE.

25th June, 1778.

SIR :

We find, on our arrival here, that the intelligence received on the road is true. The enemy have all filed off from Allen Town, on the Monmouth road. Their rear is said to be a mile westward of Lawrence Taylor's tavern, six miles from Allen Town. General Maxwell is at Hyde's Town, about three miles from this place. General Dickinson is said to be on the enemy's right flank ; but where, cannot be told. We can hear nothing certain of General Scott ; but, from circumstances, he is probably at Allen Town. We shall, agreeably to your request, consider and appoint some proper place of rendezvous for the union of our force, which we shall communicate to Generals Maxwell and Scott, and to yourself. In the mean time, I would recommend to you to move toward this place as soon as the convenience of your men will permit. I am told that Colonel Morgan is on

the enemy's right flank. We had a slight skirmish with their rear this forenoon, at Robert Montgomery's, on the Monmouth road, leading from Allen Town. We shall see General Maxwell immediately, and you will hear from us again. Send this to the General after reading it.

I am, your ob't. serv't.,

ALEX. HAMILTON.

Doctor Stile's house, Cranbury Town, 9 o'clock.

We are just informed, that General Scott passed by Hooper's tavern, five miles from Allen Town, this afternoon at five o'clock.

M. De La Fayette.

HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.

Robin's Tavern, 8 miles from Allen Town, 12 o'clock

June 26, 1778.

SIR :

We have halted the troops at this place. The enemy, by our last reports, were four miles from this (that is, their rear), and had passed the road which turns off toward South Amboy, which determines their route toward Shrewsbury. Our reason for halting, is the extreme distress of the troops for want of provisions. General Wayne's detachment is almost starving, and seems both unwilling and unable to march further till they are supplied. If we do not receive an immediate sup-

ply, the whole purpose of our detachment must be frustrated.

This morning we missed doing anything, from a deficiency of intelligence. On my arrival at Cranbury yester-evening, I proceeded, by desire of the Marquis, immediately to Hyde's Town and Allen Town, to take measures for co-operating with the different parts of the detachment, and to find what was doing to procure intelligence. I found every precaution was neglected; no horse was near the enemy, nor could be heard of till late in the morning: so that before we could send out parties and get the necessary information, they were in full march: and as they have marched pretty expeditiously, we should not be able to come up with them during the march of the day, if we did not suffer the impediment we do, on the score of provisions. We are entirely at a loss where the army is, which is no inconsiderable check to our enterprise. If the army is wholly out of supporting distance, we risk the total loss of the detachment in making an attack.

If the army will countenance us, we may do something clever. We feel our personal honour, as well as the honour of the army, and the good of the service, interested; and are heartily desirous to attempt whatever the disposition of our men will second, and prudence authorize. It is evident the enemy wish to avoid, not to engage us.

Desertions, I imagine, have been pretty considerable to-day. I have seen eight or ten deserters, and have heard of many more. We have had some little skirmishing by detached parties: one attacked their rear guard with a degree of success, killed a few, and took seven prisoners.

An officer is just come in, who informs that he left the enemy's rear five miles off, still in march, about half an hour ago. To ascertain still more fully their route, I have ordered a fresh party on their left, toward the head of their column. They have three brigades in rear of their baggage.

I am, with great respect and regard, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A. HAMILTON.

His Excellency General Washington.

HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.

June 28, 1778.

SIR :

The result of what I have seen and heard, concerning the enemy, is, that they have encamped with their van a little beyond Monmouth Court House, and their rear at Manalapan's river, about seven miles from this place. Their march to-day has been very judiciously conducted;—their baggage in front, and their flying army in the rear, with a rear guard of one thousand men about four

hundred paces from the main body. To attack them in this situation, without being supported by the whole army, would be folly in the extreme. If it should be thought advisable to give the necessary support, the army can move to some position near the enemy's left flank, which would put them in a very awkward situation, with so respectable a body in their rear; and it would put it out of their power to turn either flank, should they be so disposed. Their left is strongly posted, and I am told their right also. By some accounts, one part of their army lies on the road leading from the Monmouth road to South Amboy. It is not improbable that South Amboy may be the object.

I had written thus far when your letter to the Marquis arrived. This puts the matter on a totally different footing. The detachment will march to-morrow morning at three o'clock to English Town. I am, with great regard and esteem,

Your ob't. serv't.,

A. HAMILTON.

His Excellency Gen. Washington.

HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.

Black Point, July 20, 1778.

SIR :

Enclosed I transmit your Excellency a letter from Count D'Estaing. He has had the river sounded,

and finds he cannot enter. He will sail for Rhode Island to-morrow evening. In the mean time, he is making demonstrations to deceive the enemy, and beget an opinion that he intends to operate in this quarter. He would sail immediately, but he waits the arrival, or to hear, of a frigate which carried Mr. Gerard to Delaware, and which he appointed to meet him at Sandy Hook; so that he fears his sudden and unexpected departure, before she arrives, might cause her to be lost. He will not, however, wait longer than till to-morrow evening. We have agreed, that five cannon, fired briskly, shall be a signal of his arrival by day, and the same number, with five sky rockets, a signal by night. In communicating this to General Sullivan, the Count wishes not a moment may be lost; and that he may be directed to have persons stationed on the coast, and intermediate expresses, to facilitate the communication between them. Pilots will be a material article. He begs every thing may be forwarded as much as possible; and as many troops collected as may be. He would be glad if a detachment could march from your army, or could be sent by water; for which purpose he would send covering ships, and some vessels he has taken, by way of transports; but he cannot think of losing so much time as seems necessary. If the water scheme could shorten it, it would be a happy circumstance. He recommends

it to your attention; and that you would take measures, if the end can be better answered in this way, and meet him with information of the part he may have to act to execute the plan. I perceive he can, with difficulty, debark four thousand troops; but he will try to do it.

I hope your Excellency will excuse my not being myself the bearer of these particulars; the end may be answered by letter. Mr. Neville is anxious to get on. I just have heard of despatches arrived from you. I don't know but they may contain something new which may make the Count to wish a good conveyance to return an answer. My stay till to-morrow morning may answer that end. I shall not delay coming forward.

I am, Sir, your most respectful

And obedient servant,

ALEX. HAMILTON.

His Excellency General Washington.

HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.

Newark, July 23, 1778, one o'clock.

SIR:

I wrote to your Excellency the evening of the 20th, by Major Neville. I remained in the neighbourhood of Black Point till the afternoon following. The Count had received his expected despatches from Congress, and was to sail, as I men-

tioned before, the first fair wind. At Brunswick, yesterday, Mr. Caldwell joined me. He was immediately from the Point, and brought intelligence that the fleet got under way yesterday morning. The wind, unfortunately, has been much against them; which is so much the more to be regretted, as they are rather in want of water.

I need not suggest to your Excellency, that an essential part of the Rhode Island plan, is to take every possible measure to watch the enemy's motions, and to establish expresses from place to place, to give the Count instant information of any movement among their fleet. This will enable him to be in time to intercept them, should they attempt to evacuate New York, while he is at Rhode Island; and will, in general, facilitate the intercourse and co-operation between him and your Excellency.

I have nothing new to communicate, beside what was sent by Major Neville, and what I now send. All the ideas interchanged between the Count and myself, were such as were familiar before I left Head Quarters. He was to go to Rhode Island, and, in conjunction with General Sullivan, endeavour to possess himself of the enemy's ships and troops there; if, on his arrival, he had good reason to think it could be effected without further assistance. If not, he will be glad of a reinforce-

ment from you in the most expeditious manner possible. What manner you think will be most expeditious, you will adopt; and if his aid may be useful, he will afford it as soon as he is informed of it.

This being the case, my immediate presence at Head Quarters is the less necessary as to this business; and I hope your Excellency will indulge me, if I do not make all the despatch back which a case of emergency would require; though I do not mean to delay, more than a moderate attention to my frail constitution may make not improper. I have, &c.,

A. HAMILTON.

His Excellency Gen. Washington.

LAURENS TO HAMILTON.

MY DEAR HAMILTON:

You have seen, and by this time considered, General Lee's infamous publication. I have collected some hints for an answer; but I do not think, either that I can rely upon my own knowledge of facts and style to answer him fully, or that it would be prudent to undertake it without counsel. An affair of this kind ought to be passed over in total silence, or answered in a masterly manner.

The ancient secretary is the *Recueil* of modern history and anecdotes, and will give them to us

with candour, elegance, and perspicuity. The pen of Junius is in your hand; and I think you will, without difficulty, expose, in his defence, letters, and last production, such a tissue of falsehood and inconsistency, as will satisfy the world, and put him for ever to silence.

I think the affair will be definitively decided in Congress this day. He has found means to league himself with the *old faction*, and to gain a great many partisans.

Adieu, my dear boy. I shall set out for camp to-morrow.

JOHN LAURENS.

HAMILTON TO BARON STEUBEN.

Head Quarters, 19th Dec., 1778.

I snatch a hasty moment, my dear Baron, to acknowledge the receipt of your obliging favour of the sixth. It came here while I was absent in an interview with some British Commissioners on the subject of an exchange of prisoners, and was not delivered to me till two days ago. I am sorry that your business does not seem to make so speedy a progress as we all wish; but I hope it will soon come to a satisfactory termination. I wish you to be in a situation to employ yourself usefully and agreeably, and to contribute to giving our military constitution that order and perfection it certainly wants. I have not time now to enter

upon some matters which I shall take another opportunity to give you my sentiments concerning. I have read your letter to Lee with pleasure. It was conceived in terms which the offence merited; and if he had had any feeling, must have been felt by him. Considering the pointedness and severity of your expressions, his answer was certainly a very modest one, and proved that he had not a violent appetite for so close a *tete a tete* as you seem disposed to insist upon. This evasion, if known to the world, would do him very little honour. I do n't know but I shall be shortly at Philadelphia: if so, I shall have the honour of personally assuring you of the perfect respect and esteem with which I am,

My Dear Baron,

Your most obedient servant,

ALEX. HAMILTON.

ARMY REGULATIONS.

[SUGGESTED BY HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.]

There are still existing in the army so many abuses absolutely contrary to the military constitution, that, without a speedy stop is put to them, it will be impossible even to establish any order or discipline among the troops.

I would, therefore, propose the following Regulations; submitting to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to distinguish such as may be published under his own authority in General Orders, and such as will require the sanction and authority of the committee of Congress now in camp.

1stly.—Every officer or soldier who acts contrary to the Regulations for the order and discipline of the army, established by Congress, shall be tried and punished for disobedience of orders.

2ndly.—Every officer who absents himself from his regiment without leave, shall be tried and punished. If he remain absent three weeks, he shall be ordered to join by a notification in General Orders, and in the public newspapers. And in case of his absence three weeks afterward, such notification shall be repeated. And should he not return in three weeks from the last notification, he shall, by the sentence of a court martial, be cashiered and rendered incapable of ever holding

a commission in the armies of the United States.

3rdly.—Every officer on furlough, who remains absent ten days longer than the time allowed him, shall be tried by a court martial. And in case of his being, by sickness or any other cause, detained from his regiment six days above the time allowed in his furlough, he shall inform the commanding officer of his regiment of the reasons that prevent his returning. In default of such information, he shall be notified, tried, and punished, agreeably to the second article.

4thly.—It being permitted, for the care and convenience of the Generals, and other officers of the army, to take servants from the regiments, many abuses have resulted therefrom. To remedy which, the following Regulations are to take place for the future :

Each Major-General is permitted to take from the division which he commands, four men. Each Brigadier-General, three men. Each Colonel, or Lieutenant-Colonel-Commandant, two men. Each Lieutenant-Colonel, or Major, one man, and a second man, who is to be exempted from ordinary duty, but to turn out in time of action. Each Captain, two men, to be exempted from ordinary duty only. Each Subaltern, one man, who is to mount guard with the officer he serves. Those Generals, and other officers, who are not attached to any particular division or brigade, to take their servants from the line.

No officer in a civil department, shall be permitted to take a soldier from any regiment to serve him: nor is any Colonel, or commanding officer, to suffer a soldier of their regiment to be detained by any such officer.

Those who may be permitted to have servants from the line, are to apply to the Quarter-Master-General, who will take them from the regiments, and distribute them to whom he thinks proper.

5thly.—Great quantities of arms and ammunition have been destroyed, by being in the possession of men who do not use them in time of action. To prevent this, for the future, no arms, accoutrements, or ammunition, is to be delivered to those under the following description, viz: General and staff officers, waiters, waggoners, camp colour men, and all those who do not bear arms in time of action. Such of those as have arms, are immediately to deliver them to their Captains, who will deliver them to the Conductor, that they may be returned to the Field Commissary.

6thly.—Abolition of standing guards, though of great consequence to the order and discipline of the army, has not yet taken place. The soldiers on these guards, being separated from their regiments, are often employed as servants. They become ignorant of the service, and lose and destroy their arms and clothing. Therefore, for the future, no standing guard shall be permitted to any General, or other officer, on any pretence whatever.

Those guards which cannot be relieved every twenty-four hours, must be relieved at least every three days ; for which the Inspectors and Majors of Brigade are to be answerable. All guards or pickets, for more than three days, shall be called detachments.

7thly.—The multiplicity of small guards, for the stores and baggage of the army, being unnecessary, and diminishing the strength of the regiments ; it will be necessary to repeat the order given at Smith's Clove, the 25th of June last, relative to this object. It should therefore be ordered, that

The order given at Smith's Clove the 25th of June last, relative to the guard usually furnished for the Quarter-Master's, and other stores, is to be carried into execution with the greatest rigour, and is to be regarded as a standing order.

8thly.—It being very improper and hurtful to the service, that guards should be sent too far from the corps to which they belong ; it is ordered,

That the general officers shall have their guard from the divisions and brigades to which they belong : and those who have no division or brigade, shall be furnished with a guard from the line, by detail from the Adjutant-General.

No General shall take his guard above ten miles from camp, without the express leave of the Commander-in Chief.

9thly.—Nothing being more disgraceful to the ser-

vice, nor dangerous for the army, than for the advanced posts to be surprised by the enemy; it is necessary that every possible precaution should be taken, to prevent an accident so dishonourable to the officer who commands at such a post. And as the instruction given in the chapter on the service of the guard, in the Regulations, is not full and explicit, it is thought necessary to add the following article :

As soon as an officer, commanding a detachment, arrives at the post he is to occupy, he must endeavour to procure some inhabitant on whom he can depend, to show him all the roads, footpaths, and other avenues leading to the post. These he must himself reconnoitre, and then determine the number of guards necessary for his security, as well in front, as on the flanks and in the rear of the post. He must then divide his detachment into three parts, one of which must be always on guard; another, act as reserve picket; and the third, be off duty.

The part destined for guard, must be divided into as many guards as the officer may think necessary: always observing, that the guards are so proportioned as that one-third of each guard may always be on sentry at the same time.

These guards should be posted at three or four hundred paces from the main post, and the sentinels form a chain round it. They must be within

sight of each other during the day, and within call during the night.

The commanding officer having himself posted these guards and sentinels, and well instructed the officers and sergeants in their duty, will fix the place where he means to defend himself in case of an attack ; as a house, a height, or behind some bridge or fence, which he will strengthen as much as possible, by an abatis ditch, or anything his genius may direct him for that purpose.

The reserve pickets are on no account to stir from the main post, or take off their accoutrements ; but must be ready to parade under arms at any moment of the day or night ; though, during the day, they may be permitted to lay down and sleep. Every man must have his haversack under his head ; and if the post is dangerous, his arms in his hand.

The Reserve will furnish a guard of a sergeant and from six to twelve men, to furnish from two to four sentinels round the house, or wherever they are posted, to give notice of all that approach, or of any alarm. One of these sentries must always be before the arms.

That part of the detachment off duty, may undress and repose themselves. They must cook for the guard and picket, and fetch the wood and water necessary for the post ; but they must not do this before the roll-call in the morning, when the commanding officer receives the reports of all the guard. If the post is near the enemy, this

part of the detachment must not undress during the night.

As the guard form a chain of sentinels round the post, no soldier must pass the chain without a non-commissioned officer; nor any stranger be permitted to enter, without being conducted to, and examined by, the commanding officer.

After roll-call in the evening, no soldier must be permitted to go more than forty paces from the place of arms. The officers, it is expected, always remain with their men.

As soon as a sentry perceives the enemy, he must fire his piece to alarm the other guards and the main body. The guards immediately parade, and follow the rules prescribed in the Regulations. The picket parades immediately, and the other part joins it as fast as it can get ready. The commanding officer will immediately detach one-third of the picket, with orders to march toward the guard attacked, and lay in ambuscade behind some house, barn, or in a wood on the road leading from them to the main post. And when the guard attacked, retreat, and are followed by the enemy, they must fall in the rear of the enemy, and keep up a scattered fire. This manœuvre, especially in the night, will not fail to disconcert the enemy, and cause a failure of their enterprise.

The guard are, in every respect, to observe the rules laid down in the Regulations.

The part on guard is to be relieved by the

part off duty ; and the guard take the reserve picket.

No part of the service is more important, nor more neglected, than this of the guard ; notwithstanding the duties are so particularly described in the Regulations.

It is very seldom a guard turn out for a General officer of the day ; and even when they turn out, they are seldom or ever drawn up in the order prescribed. Therefore, for the future, the Generals, and Field officers of the day, are ordered to pay the greatest attention, that the service of the guard is performed strictly conformable to the Regulations. For which purpose, they must visit the guards of sentinels at different hours, and arrest or confine any officer, or non-commissioned officer, whose guard is not already paraded in order at his arrival. A guard which is surprised by an officer of the day, may, with the same facility, be surprised by the enemy. If the sentinel before the guard-house, is not sufficient, others must be added, who can see around the environs of the post, and give notice of all that approach.

For the more effectual preservation of the arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, each regiment shall be charged with the arms, &c., now in their possession, agreeably to the returns made at the last inspection. And for the future, none of those articles shall be drawn from the Field Commissary, but by returns signed by the Inspector of the Di-

vision, or, in his absence, by the Major of Brigade, doing his duty. And the Inspector and Major of Brigade, are to pay the strictest attention, that the Regulations, with respect to this object, are strictly carried into execution; examining and comparing the Regimental Returns with those of the Conductors.

In the Returns of the army, a great number of men are reckoned, who have been sick, or otherwise absent, a long time, without any account of them having been sent to their regiments.

Orders must be given to the officers superintending the hospitals, to send their Returns regularly every month; and the Majors of Brigade must take an extract of those of their Brigades returned in the several hospitals, to compare with the Returns of the inspection.

For those men who are sick in the country at private houses, certificates must be produced every two months, signed by a justice of the peace: and without such certificates, the men must no longer be returned; though the regiment may keep an account of them, that they be reclaimed if ever found.

The army, even at this day, is much reduced, by a considerable number of men being permitted to retire on furlough and extra service. I would therefore recommend the following Regulations:

That from the first of May till the campaign closes, no officer have leave of absence for more

than eight days, unless by permission from the Commander-in Chief, or officer commanding at a separate post : and that no non-commissioned officer, nor soldier, be furloughed, during the aforesaid period, unless by his Major-General, or officer commanding at a separate post ; and that, for only six days, and on the most special account. That during the army's continuance in winter quarters, not more than six men of a hundred, be absent on furlough at the same time ; these to have leave of absence from the officers commanding the regiments to which they belong.

That every officer, non-commissioned officer, and soldier, now on furlough, or on the recruiting service, be ordered to join their respective corps, by the first of June ; the commanding officers of regiments to be answerable that they be notified of this order.

Notwithstanding the General Order lately issued, respecting men on extra service, many are still improperly absent. It is therefore ordered, that they join by the first of June ; the commanding officers of the regiments to which they respectively belong, to be answerable that they be notified of this order. That for the future, none be suffered to go on such employ, except by order of the Commander-in-Chief, officers commanding at a separate post, or the Quarter-Master-General.

The Marechaussie Corps, though raised at a great

expense, has been found not to answer the purpose for which it was raised : and as, by its composition, it is not fit to be employed on the lines ; in order that they may not be useless to the army, I would propose the following

Arrangement for the Marechaussie.

That the name they at present bear, be changed into that of General-Staff-Dragoons ; and that they be employed in the following manner :

To furnish a guard for the Commander-in-Chief, of such a number as he shall please to order.

To furnish Orderly dragoons to Major-Generals and Brigadiers ; when their divisions and brigades are separated from the army, or when the Commander-in-Chief shall think them necessary. To furnish, also, Orderly dragoons to the Quarter-Master-General, and Inspector-General of the Army, and commanding officers of separate departments.

The Inspector who has the department of the Cavalry, to have the direction of this corps ; to furnish the guards and Orderly dragoons, agreeably to the orders he may receive from the Commander-in-Chief, without whose orders no dragoons shall be detached from the troop.

To prevent the abuses which have arisen, with respect to Orderly dragoons, the following Order should be rigorously observed :

No Orderly dragoons to be employed on any but military duty, nor sent express more than twenty

miles; their duty being only to carry the orders of the General in writing, whenever they may be ordered: nor are they to follow the Aids, or any other officer, but the General to whom they are Orderly; who will himself consult the preservation of the horses as much as possible, by employing them only in cases of necessity.

No person whatever is to ride the dragoon horses but the dragoons themselves: and any dragoon is to inform the Inspector, of any breach of this order; and the Inspector will immediately inform the Inspector-General thereof; that the person who made use of the horse, may be punished. And in case any dragoon neglects to inform the Inspector as aforesaid, he shall receive one hundred lashes for such neglect.

[1779.]

HAMILTON TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Head Quarters, March 14, 1779.

DEAR SIR :

Colonel Laurens, who will have the honour of delivering you this letter, is on his way to South Carolina, on a project which I think, in the present situation of affairs there, is a very good one, and deserves every kind of support and encouragement. This is, to raise two, three, or four battalions of negroes, with the assistance of the government of that State, by contributions from the owners, in proportion to the number they possess. If you should think proper to enter upon the subject with him, he will give you a detail of his plan. He wishes to have it recommended by Congress to the State; and, as an inducement, that they would engage to take their battalions into Continental pay.

It appears to me, that an expedient of this kind, in the present state of Southern affairs, is the most rational that can be adopted, and promises very important advantages. Indeed, I hardly see how a sufficient force can be collected in that quarter without it: and the enemy's operations there, are growing infinitely serious and formidable. I have not the least doubt, that the negroes will make very excellent soldiers, with proper management: and I will venture to pronounce, that they cannot

be put in better hands than those of Mr. Laurens. He has all the zeal, intelligence, enterprise, and every other qualification, requisite to succeed in such an undertaking. It is a maxim with some great military judges, that, with sensible officers, soldiers can hardly be too stupid: and, on this principle, it is thought that the Russians would make the best soldiers in the world, if they were under other officers than their own. The King of Prussia is among the number who maintains this doctrine, and has a very emphatic saying on the occasion, which I do not exactly recollect. I mention this, because I have frequently heard it objected to the scheme of embodying negroes, that they are too stupid to make soldiers. This is so far from appearing to me a valid objection, that I think their want of cultivation (for their natural faculties are as good as ours), joined to that habit of subordination which they acquire from a life of servitude, will enable them sooner to become soldiers than our white inhabitants. Let officers be men of sense and sentiment; and the nearer the soldiers approach to machines, perhaps the better.

I foresee that this project will have to combat much opposition from prejudice and self-interest. The contempt we have been taught to entertain for the blacks, makes us fancy many things that are founded neither in reason nor experience; and

an unwillingness to part with property of so valuable a kind, will furnish a thousand arguments to show the impracticability, or pernicious tendency, of a scheme which requires such sacrifices. But it should be considered, that if we do not make use of them in this way, the enemy probably will; and that the best way to counteract the temptations they will hold out, will be, to offer them ourselves. An essential part of the plan is, to give them their freedom with their swords. This will secure their fidelity, animate their courage, and, I believe, will have a good influence upon those who remain, by opening a door to their emancipation. This circumstance, I confess, has no small weight in inducing me to wish the success of the project; for the dictates of humanity, and true policy, equally interest me in favour of this unfortunate class of men.

While I am on the subject of southern affairs, you will excuse the liberty I take in saying, that I do not think measures sufficiently vigorous are pursuing for our defence in that quarter. Except the few regular troops of South Carolina, we seem to be relying wholly on the militia of that and the two neighbouring States. These will soon grow impatient of service, and leave our affairs in a miserable situation. No considerable force can be uniformly kept up by militia; to say nothing of the many obvious and well-known inconveniences that attend this kind of troops. I would

beg leave to suggest, Sir, that no time ought to be lost in making a draught of militia to serve a twelve month, from the States of North and South Carolina and Virginia. But South Carolina, being very weak in her population of whites, may be excused from the draught, on condition of furnishing the black battalions. The two others may furnish about three thousand five hundred men, and be exempted, on that account, from sending any succours to this army. The States to the northward of Virginia, will be fully able to give competent supplies to the army here; and it will require all the force and exertions of the three States I have mentioned, to withstand the storm which has arisen, and is increasing in the South.

The troops draughted, must be thrown into battalions, and officered in the best possible manner. The supernumerary officers may be made use of as far as they will go. If arms are wanted for their troops, and no better way of supplying them is to be found, we should endeavour to levy a contribution of arms upon the militia at large. Extraordinary exigencies demand extraordinary means. I fear this southern business will become a very *grave* one.

With the truest respect and esteem,

I am, Sir, your most obedient servant,

ALEX. HAMILTON.

His Excell'y John Jay, President of Congress.

HAMILTON TO LAURENS.

Cold in my professions—warm in my friendships—I wish, my dear Laurens, it were in my power, by actions, rather than words, to convince you that I love you. I shall only tell you, that till you bid us adieu, I hardly knew the value you had taught my heart to set upon you. Indeed, my friend, it was not well done. You know the opinion I entertain of mankind; and how much it is my desire to preserve myself free from particular attachments, and to keep my happiness independent of the caprices of others. You should not have taken advantage of my sensibility, to steal into my affections without my consent. But as you have done it, and as we are generally indulgent to those we love, I shall not scruple to pardon the fraud you have committed, on one condition; that for my sake, if not for your own, you will continue to merit the partiality which you have so artfully instilled into me.

I have received your two letters: one from Philadelphia, the other from Chester. I am pleased with your success so far; and I hope the favourable omens that precede your application to the Assembly, may have as favourable an issue; provided the situation of affairs should require it, which I fear will be the case. But, both for your country's sake, and for my own, I wish the enemy

may be gone from Georgia before you arrive ; and that you may be obliged to return, and share the fortunes of your old friends. In respect to the commission which you received from Congress, all the world must think your conduct perfectly right. Indeed, your ideas upon this occasion, seem not to have their wonted accuracy ; and you have had scruples, in a great measure, without foundation. By your appointment as Aid-de-Camp to the Commander-in-Chief, you had as much the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel as any officer in the line. Your receiving a commission as Lieutenant-Colonel, from the date of that appointment, does not, in the least, injure or interfere with one of them ; unless, by virtue of it, you are introduced into a particular regiment, in violation of the right of succession, which is not the case at present, neither is it a necessary consequence. As you were going to command a battalion, it was proper you should have a commission ; and if this commission had been dated posterior to your appointment as Aid-de-Camp, I should have considered it derogatory to your former rank, to mine, and to that of the whole corps. The only thing I see wrong in the affair is this : Congress, by their conduct, both on the former and present occasion, appear to have intended to confer a privilege, an honour, a mark of distinction, a something upon you, which they withheld from other gentlemen

of the family. This carries with it an air of preference, which, though we can all truly say we love your character and admire your military merit, cannot fail to give some of us uneasy sensations. But in this, my dear, I wish you to understand me well. The blame, if there is any, falls wholly upon Congress. I repeat it, your conduct has been perfectly right, and even laudable. You rejected the offer when you ought to have rejected it; and you accepted it when you ought to have accepted it; and let me add, with a degree of over-scrupulous delicacy. It was necessary to your project. Your project was the public good; and I should have done the same. In hesitating, you have refined on the refinements of generosity.

There is a total stagnation of news here. Gates has refused the Indian command. Sullivan is come to take it. The former has lately given a fresh proof of his impudence, his folly, and his *****. 'Tis no great matter; but a peculiarity in the case prevents my saying what.

Fleury shall be taken care of. All the family send love. In this, join the General and Mrs. Washington; and what is best, it is not in the style of ceremony, but sincerity.

COLONEL BROOKS TO HAMILTON.

West Point, July 4, 1779.

DEAR SIR :

Those who, under the sacred pretence of serving their country, are endeavouring to subvert its happiness, I consider equally dangerous to society with those who can tax a faithful servant of the public with acting that inconsistent part.

To hear the character of a gentleman, whom we suppose deserving, traduced and villified, and his reputation cruelly stabbed, silently and without emotion, must be attended with as great, or greater, degree of criminality, than to remain the unfeeling, unmoved spectator of the most base and villainous murder. The bystander, in either case, becomes an accessory.

Upon these principles, I found the propriety, nay, necessity, of giving you a piece of intelligence, which affects many, in some degree ; but you, Sir, most intimately.

Being in company with Mr. Dana, member of Congress, some time since, it was observed by that gentleman, that many persons in the army, were acting under a cloak of defending their country, from principles totally incompatible with its safety. Upon its being demanded who those characters were ; after declining an eclclaircissement of so vague and undeterminate a charge for some time,

he fixed at length on Colonel Hamilton ; who, he asserted, had declared in a public coffee house in Philadelphia, that it was high time for the people to rise, join General Washington, and turn Congress out of doors. To render this account in the highest degree probable, he further observed, that Mr. Hamilton could be no ways interested in the defence of this country ; and, therefore, was most likely to pursue such a line of conduct as his great ambition dictated.

As this representation gave me real pain, I was determined to make such inquiry as to satisfy my own doubts about the matter. The consequence, in either case, whether true or false, was disagreeable. If true, it would be a sad proof of the fallacy of appearances, and the impropriety of making either words or actions the criterion of forming a judgment of characters ; and, consequently, the impossibility of ever knowing a man's real character at all. If false, the idea of the charge that must necessarily fall upon a person of so highly dignified a station, must be greatly mortifying—as it would afford an instance of a want of that honour and regard to truth, so eminently necessary in the patriot and statesman. As it is of the highest importance that, at this period, all characters, in public life especially, should be indubitably and decidedly fixed, I shall contribute my share towards bringing this affair to a proper

issue. And should this letter be of any service to you for this end, you have my full permission to make such use of it as you may judge proper. I could wish an avowal or disavowal of Mr. Dana's charge, when convenient for you; as it may enable me to place the matter in a more just point of light than it stands in at present, among the circle of officers who have been made acquainted with it from him.

I am, dear Sir,

Your most ob't. humble serv't.

J. BROOKS.

Colonel Hamilton.

HAMILTON TO FRANCIS DANA.

New Windsor, July 11, 1779.

SIR:

I have received a letter from Colonel Brooks, of which the enclosed is a copy. In my reply to him, I pronounced the whole affair to be absolutely false and groundless, and pledged myself to make it appear so. The intention of this letter is to inquire, whether you avow or disavow the conversation he relates; and if the former, to demand, in explicit and direct terms, your authority. You must be sensible, Sir, that the charge is too interesting to my feelings and reputation to allow me to suffer its being protracted to a tedious and indecisive issue; and I must expect that, as a man of

honour, your answer will be immediate and unreserved.

If the observations you are said to have thrown out, to enforce the probability of the declaration ascribed to me, were really made use of; they are of so personal and illiberal a complexion, as will oblige me to make them the subject of a very different kind of discussion from the present, at some convenient season.

I have requested Colonel Henley, to whom I have communicated the nature of its contents, to deliver you this letter, and to receive your answer and forward it to me.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most ob't. servant,

A. HAMILTON.

Francis Dana, Esquire.

HAMILTON TO COLONEL HENLEY.

Head Quarters, New Windsor, July 12, 1779.

DEAR SIR :

I take the liberty to trouble you with a letter for Mr. Dana, which I have left open for your perusal; and I request it as a favour, which I hope I may claim from your friendship, to deliver it to him, and press for a speedy answer. I think you sufficiently know my character and way of thinking, to be convinced I could never have expressed

sentiments of the kind imputed to me; and you will therefore be the more ready to afford me your good offices upon this occasion. There is no other gentleman in Boston, whose friendship I could so far intrude upon.

I am, with great regard, dear Sir,

Your most ob't. serv't,

A. HAMILTON.

Colonel David Henley.

DANA TO HAMILTON.

Cambridge, July 25, 1779.

SIR :

Your letter of the tenth instant, enclosing one from Col. Brooks, of the fourth, was put into my hands the day before yesterday by Colonel Henley, at Boston. I shall notice such parts only of Colonel Brooks' as immediately respect you. I have a full recollection of expressing myself in part of you, but little variant in terms, though essentially so in substance, from what Colonel Brooks has mentioned in his letter. A conversation arising concerning the discontents of the army; in the course of it I spoke as follows: "I have heard Colonel Hamilton should have said, that it was high time for the people to rise, join General Washington, and turn Congress out of doors. How true it is, I know not; but it can easily be ascer-

tained whether true or not, because it is said to have been spoken openly in the public coffee house in Philadelphia." And I subjoined, "If true, that, or any other officer who should express himself so, ought to be broke, whatever his particular services may have been ;" but that "to render this in the highest degree probable," I further observed, "that Mr. Hamilton could be no way interested in the defence of this country, and therefore was most likely to pursue such a line as his great ambition dictated." I do not recollect, or imagine, but I do believe an observation somewhat similar was made in the company immediately upon my mentioning the declaration above. I suppose Colonel Brooks has unintentionally blended conversation had at different times, and imputed to me what was said in part by others. As to the authority upon which I mentioned the above declaration, I had it from the Reverend Doctor *****, of Jamaica Plain. I could give a more minute detail of circumstances, but think it no way necessary ; and as Col. Hamilton will know the authority upon which I mentioned the declaration, so I presume he will be satisfied I did not fabricate it ; as I am, from his denial of it, that he never made it. I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

FRA. DANA.

Colonel Alexander Hamilton.

HAMILTON TO BROOKS.

West Point, August 6, 1779.

DEAR SIR:

I enclose you the copy of a letter which I received by the last post from Mr. Dana. You will perceive, he says he does not recollect, or imagine, that he threw out the observation mentioned by you, respecting the probability of my having made the declaration with which I am charged; but believes it was used by some other person in company, and that you had unintentionally blended the conversation. As I am anxious to have this affair developed in all its circumstances, in a clear and unequivocal manner, I request you will do me the favour to inform me, whether your memory, in this particular, is distinct and positive; or whether it is probable you may have committed the mistake which Mr. Dana supposes. In the last case, I shall be obliged to you to endeavour to recollect the real author of the insinuation. Any other remarks which Mr. Dana's state of the matter may appear to you to require, will add to the obligation you have already conferred on, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

ALEX. HAMILTON.

P. S. I shall thank you for your answer to-morrow, that I may have time to take the necessary measures before the next post sets out.

Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks.

BROOKS TO HAMILTON.

West Point, August 8, 1779.

DEAR SIR :

I received yours of the 6th instant, enclosing one from Mr. Dana, yesterday, but was unable, on account of duty, to answer it till to-day. In compliance with your request, I must inform you, that my recollection of the whole affair in question, is clear and full. Mr. Dana, as I observed in my other letter, was declaring that there were dangerous, designing men in the army; and after he had related what was said to have passed in the coffee house at Philadelphia, he not only subjoined what he mentions in his letter, but previously declared he believed it to be true. He then added what he excepts against in my letter.

That I expressed what he said, verbatim, I do not pretend; but the ideas are the same. I rather represented the matter favourably on Mr. Dana's side than otherwise. The words *desperate fortune*, which I omitted in my other letter, were, more than once, applied to you.

Mr. Dana might have saved himself the trouble of supposing I had "unintentionally blended conversation had at different times," if he had but recollected, that the time referred to, was the only one that I ever conversed with him upon the subject.

I am so far from agreeing with him, in supposing

that I imputed to him what was in part said by others, that I positively declare Mr. Dana to be the only person who made an unfavourable representation of your character. He cannot have forgot his holding up you, and persons of the same stamp, as dangerous, and pressing upon the officers to watch and guard against such. He cannot deny saying, the plan in which you were engaged, would be fatal to the liberties of this country—that it was a plan pleasing to the Tories, in which they would readily engage.

As there was a possibility of my memory's failing me, I have inquired of Colonels Marshall and Wesson, who were present, and are as full and positive upon every circumstance as I am. I do not wonder at your being anxious to have the matter developed. I wish it, too. And should this contribute in any degree to the end proposed, it will be an additional happiness to, Sir,

Your most ob't. serv't.,

Colonel Hamilton.

J. BROOKS.

HAMILTON TO DANA.

West Point, August 10, 1779.

SIR :

The last post brought me your letter of the 25th of July, which I transmitted to Colonel Brooks, accompanied by some inquiries that appeared to me necessary. A copy of my letter to him, and of his

answer, are enclosed. You will see that he insists positively on your having made the offensive observation before imputed to you; adds several aggravating particulars to his first relation; and appeals to two other gentlemen who were present, and agree with him in all the circumstances. The affair now stands on such a footing, that nothing less than a peremptory denial of the exceptionable facts alleged by Colonel Brooks, will permit me to act otherwise than on the presumption of their reality. I have written to Doctor * * * * * by this opportunity. I have the honour to be,

Sir, your most ob't. servant,

Francis Dana, Esq.

A. HAMILTON.

HAMILTON TO DOCTOR * * * * *

West Point, August 10, 1779.

SIR:

You will find, by the enclosed copy of a letter of the 25th of July, from Mr. Dana, that he mentions you as his author for a charge of a very singular nature, that has been brought against me, relative to a declaration which I am said to have made in the public coffee house at Philadelphia. Conscious that this charge is totally destitute of foundation, I owe it to myself to investigate its source, and evince its falsehood. And as I cannot but believe, that you have too great a regard to the interests of

truth and justice, to withhold your aid in detecting the inventor of a calumny ; I persuade myself you will cheerfully disclose the authority on which your information to Mr. Dana was founded. This I now call for ; and you will no doubt consider it a duty, as well to yourself as to me, to give an immediate, direct, and explicit answer ; sensible that the least hesitation, or reserve, may give room for conjectures, which it can be neither your wish nor mine to excite. Colonel Henley will do me the favour to receive and forward your letter.

I am, with due respect, Sir,

Your most ob't. humble serv't.,

A. HAMILTON.

Doctor * * * * *

DOCTOR * * * * * TO HAMILTON.

Jamaica Plain, August 25, 1779.

SIR :

Upon my return home from a visit on Monday evening, I received yours without a date.

However *common* the principle may be, on which you urge me to an *immediate, direct, and explicit answer* ; as though *the least hesitation, or reserve, might give room for conjectures, which it can be neither your wish nor mine to excite* ; it is certainly a *false one*.

In many cases, a gentleman may receive information from persons of indisputable character, which it may be highly proper for him to communicate, without discovering the informer; and I am convinced you will think with me, when you have been more conversant with the world, and read *mankind* more. Neither will such gentleman, when conscious of his own integrity, and of established character, regard the *conjectures* of those who are almost, or altogether, strangers to him.

I do not mean, by advancing these sentiments, to refuse you any aid in detecting the inventor of a calumny. Mr. Dana mentions his having the declaration, alluded to in his letter, from me. He communicated to me Colonel Brooks' letter to you, and yours to himself, and the substance of what he intended to write. I objected to nothing regarding myself, excepting its being said *public COFFEE house*, in which I supposed him mistaken. I understood it was a *public* house, but rather thought it was not the *coffee* house. That excepted, and the sentiment was as he hath represented, whether the words were identically the same or not.

I am glad to find, by what you have wrote, that you have lost all remembrance of it; as it serves to show, that it was the effect of a *sudden transport*, and not of a depraved judgment. You will infer from hence, that I suppose the sentiment to have been spoken. I do: upon the belief that

my informer was a person of veracity, and could not be mistaken. The reasons are these : His general character, and his declaring that it was uttered in his hearing. I saw him in his way from Philadelphia. He left the city sometime after the inhabitants had been inflamed and divided by Mr. Dean's imprudent address, in which he promised us great discoveries, though he hath made none ; and by which he raised a jealousy of Congress, and put many upon clamouring against them. In this crisis, and I conjecture through conversation leading to it, you was betrayed into a speech tantamount to the representation made me. You was not the only one that spake unguardedly at this season. Persons of equal, or even superior, rank, are known to have done it ; and many in the military department, having been soured by the hardships they had undergone, and an apprehended neglect of their grievances, and, on the part of Congress, backwardness to redress them, seemingly took a part with Mr. Dean ; and the unguarded expressions that fell from them, then and afterwards, proved alarming to weak but good minds. I was much hurt in my own feelings, because of the wrong, I am convinced, it led some to do His Excellency, in fearing that such sentiments were dropt in his presence without meeting with a proper check,

My informer told me, that he took notice to you

of the unsuitableness of such like expressions, with which you was rather displeased ; but that he insisted further upon it, and that there it ended. I should infer from the representation given me, that there were others in company. I have not mentioned his name ; but if you cannot possibly recollect having said anything like what he reported ; continue to view it as a *calumny* ; and insist upon knowing him ; I do not imagine he would object to it. But, whether he doth or not, shall mention him ; upon your assuring me, upon your honour, that you will neither give nor accept, cause to be given nor accepted, a challenge upon the occasion, nor engage in any rencounter that may produce a duel. For though duels do not, in general, produce more than the honourable settlement of a dispute ; yet they may be the unhappy cause of the public's losing good and useful members : and upon the principles of religion I am totally averse to them. You must further assure me, that you will admit of the matter's being thoroughly examined into by Congress, or individuals of the first character. The oversights of individuals too often raise prejudices against a whole body. It is common, and yet commonly condemned. I am convinced, that notwithstanding the natural tendency of martial manners, there are as good citizens *in* the military line, as *out* of it : and I hope that the event will ever show, that by far the majority of our officers

love the liberties of citizens more than any earthly command whatsoever. I as earnestly wish, that the citizens of the United States may do justice to the army, and their own engagements, by keeping up to the spirit of them, wherein it is possible, that so our brave troops may not have any just cause of complaint, when affairs are brought to a settlement.

Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

WILLIAM * * * * *

DANA TO HAMILTON.

Boston, August 25, 1779.

SIR :

I received your letter of the 10th instant, last Sunday evening, at Cambridge, by the hand of Colonel Henley, enclosing a copy of your letter of the 6th, to Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks, and his answer to the same. I should have earlier acknowledged the receipt of them, but I thought proper to accompany such acknowledgement with such evidence as I could collect from one of the company present with Colonels Marshall, Wesson, and Brooks, at the time the conversation alluded to was had. For, till the receipt of your last, I had not communicated the subject of our correspondence to any one, except to Doctor *****, being unwilling to name him as my author, before I had seen him, and ob-

tained his consent, which he readily gave. The account given you in my first letter, was from my own memory, which I have not yet seen cause to believe hath failed me.

Your several letters, together with all their enclosures, and also my letter of the 25th ultimo, in answer, I have shown to General Ward, who has a good recollection of the conversation in question, and concurs with me in the representation I have made of it; and particularly remembers that what you distinguish as "the offensive observation," was *not* made by me; but that one in nearly similar terms was made by another gentleman in company. I have little doubt, but it is in my power to produce further evidence of the same sort from one other gentleman, who is now at a considerable distance from hence; and as soon as it can conveniently be done, I shall endeavour to obtain it, if it be only to balance this dispute in point of numbers at least. At present there are three to two: perhaps I may be able to throw the balance on the other side. I must be excused taking notice of any new matter thrown out by Colonel Brooks in his last letter, for the present. I am, Sir, &c.,

FRA. DANA.

P. S. Perhaps it may occur to Colonel Brooks, upon recollection, that we had some conversation respecting the army and some characters in it, on our passage over Charles' river, from Boston to Charlestown, which was occasioned by a report,

that two regiments in Glover's brigade, at Rhode Island, had thrown down their arms and disbanded themselves ; and somebody's saying "that the army would, by and by, turn their arms upon the country, and do themselves justice." If he should recollect this, he will, at the same time, recollect that Colonels Marshall and Wesson were not present.

N. B. Mr. Dana has shown me the whole correspondence between Colonel Hamilton and himself, respecting a certain conversation mentioned in it, at which I was present : and I do concur with him in the representation he has made of it ; particularly that he did not make the observation respecting Colonel Hamilton, now in question ; but that that, or one nearly in like terms, was made by another gentleman then present.

ARTEMAS WARD.

Col. Alex. Hamilton.

HENLEY TO HAMILTON.

Boston, 1st September, 1779.

DEAR SIR :

The enclosed is Mr. Dana's letter in answer to your last. The long detention of this, is occasioned for this gentleman to procure and support any evidence in favour of himself, to confute some part of Colonel Brooks' charge.

I do think, upon examination, you will find Doc-

tor ***** the cause of this mischievous and false report. The other day he was proved a liar in the public street; and had it not been for his cloth, I am sure would have been most severely dealt with. He more than once has occasioned quarrels by his conduct. I congratulate you upon the success of Powles Hook. Major Lee has given proof of his bravery and enterprise, as likewise upon the arrival of eight fine Jamaica ships, with five to six hundred hogsheads of rum and sugar. But to counterbalance these clever acquisitions, Penobscot is a most shameful instance of want of counsel, wisdom, and exertion. We have lost near twenty sail of our best vessels of war, besides a number of others—the army and the continent will feel this blow, for the difference is great in losing them; as, on the contrary, had they been to sea on their cruizes, it is more than probable, a vast number of prizes would have made their appearance into our ports. However, we are endeavouring, fast as possible, to replace them, and near as many ships are now set up at the different ship yards.

Please to make my respectful compliments to the General and the family, and believe me, with sincere regard, dear Sir,

Your humble servant,

DAVID HENLEY.

Alex. Hamilton, Esq.

HAMILTON TO DOCTOR * * * * *

West Point, September 5, 1779.

SIR:

I have received your letter of the 25th of August, which you will probably not be surprised to hear is by no means satisfactory. Instead of giving up the author of the accusation, you charitably suppose me guilty; and amuse yourself in a strain of conjecture (which, whatever *ingenuity* it may have, was certainly unnecessary) about the manner in which the affair happened, and the motives that produced it. Your entering a volunteer to apologize for me, is no doubt a mark of your condescension and of your benevolence; and would make it ungrateful, as well as indecent, to suspect, that the conditions with which you fetter a compliance with my request, proceed from any other cause than a laudable, though, perhaps, in this instance, an officious, zeal for the interests of religion, and for the good of society. It shall never be said, that you had recourse to a pitiful evasion, and attempted to cover the dishonour of a refusal under a specious pretence of terms, which you knew, as a gentleman, I should be obliged to reject. I venture, however, with every allowance for the sanctity of your intentions, and with all possible deference for your judgment, to express my doubts of the propriety of the concessions you require on my part, as preliminaries to

a discovery, which I still think you are bound to make as an act of justice. This is a principle from which I can never depart: and I am convinced I shall have the common sense and feelings of mankind on my side. An opinion of my *inexperience* seems to have betrayed you into mistakes. Whatever you may imagine, Sir, I have read the *world* sufficiently to know, that though it may often be *convenient* to the propagator of a calumny, to conceal the inventor, he will stand in need of no small address, to escape the suspicions, and even the indignation, of the honest and of the disinterested. Nor can I but persist in believing that, notwithstanding the confidence which, from a very natural partiality, you place in your own character, the delicacy of your sentiments will be alarmed at the possibility of incurring this danger, and will prevent your exposing yourself to it, by refusing, or delaying, any longer to comply with so reasonable a demand.

It often happens, that our zeal is at variance with our understanding. Had it not been for this, you might have recollected, that we do not now live in the days of chivalry; and you would have then judged your precautions, on the subject of duelling, at least useless. The good sense of the present times has happily found out, that to prove your own innocence, or the malice of an accuser, the worst method you can take, is to run him

through the body, or shoot him through the head. And permit me to add, that while you felt an aversion to duelling, on the principles of religion, you ought, in charity, to have supposed others possessed of the same scruples; of whose impiety you had had no proofs. But whatever may be my final determination on this point, ought to be a matter of indifference. 'Tis a good old maxim, to which we may safely adhere in most cases, that we ought to do our duty, and leave the rest to the care of heaven. The crime alleged to me, is of such enormity, that, if I am guilty, it ought not to go unpunished; and, if I am innocent, I should have an opportunity of vindicating my innocence. The truth, in either case, should appear; and it is incumbent upon you, Sir, to afford the means, either by accusing me to my civil or military superiors, or by disclosing the author of the information.

Your anxiety to engage me "to *admit* of the matter's being thoroughly examined into by Congress, or individuals of the first character," was equally superfluous. I am at all times amenable to the authority of the State and of the laws: and whenever it should be the pleasure of Congress, the means of bringing me to justice for any crime I may have committed, are obvious and easy, without the assistance of a formal stipulation on my side. I shall not expose myself to the ridicule

of self importance, by applying to Congress for an inquiry ; nor shall I invite the charge of impertinence, by promising to do what I have no power to refuse. I shall only declare, for my own satisfaction, that so far as concerns myself, nothing would give me greater pleasure, than to undergo the strictest scrutiny, in any legal mode, into the rectitude of my conduct on this, and on every other, occasion, as a soldier or as a citizen. With respect to an examination by individuals of character ; whenever I have it in my power to confront my accuser, I shall take care to do it in presence of witnesses of the first respectability, who will be able, from what they see and hear, to tell the world that I am innocent and injured, and that he is a contemptible defamer.

It is, no doubt, unfortunate for me that you have prejudged the case, and are of a different opinion. You profess to give credit to the story, because, you say, your informer “ is a man of veracity, and *could not be mistaken.*” From this description, he is probably not a soldier, or you would have been more inclined to suppose him *fallible*. But whoever he may be, you have certainly shown a facility in believing that he does honour to your credulity, at the expense of your candour. I protest, Sir, this is the first time I have heard my own veracity called in question. Had you not given a sanction to the contrary by your example,

I should have indulgently flattered myself, that I had as much right to be believed as another ; and that my denial was a counterbalance to the assertion of your informant, and left the affair in suspense, to be decided by the future circumstances. You pursue a different line ; and, in the overflowing of your pious hatred to political heresy, have determined that I must be guilty at all events. You ascribe the denial to a defect of memory ; and pretend to think it more likely that I should have lost all recollection of the fact, than that you should have been misinformed. Far from accepting, I absolutely reject the apology you make for me, and continue to believe it *impossible* I could have made a declaration similar to the one reported. For I abhor the sentiment it contains, and am confident it never could have had a momentary place in my mind, consequently never could have dishonoured my lips. The supposition is absurd, that I could have used the expressions, when I cannot recognise the remotest trace of an idea, at any period, that could possibly have led to them.

In this consciousness I again appeal to you ; and demand, by all the ties of truth, justice, and honour, that you immediately give up your author. I stake my life and reputation upon the issue ; and defy all the craft of malevolence, or of cabal, to support the charge. If you decline a discovery,

I shall then not have it in my choice to make any other than *one conclusion*.

You have blended several matters, foreign to the purpose, which might as well have been omitted. I shall only answer in general, that I religiously believe the officers of the army are among the best citizens in America, and inviolably attached to the liberties of the community; infinitely more so than any of those splenetic patriots out of it, who endeavour, for sinister purposes, to instil jealousies and alarms, which they themselves know to be as groundless as they are impolitic and ridiculous. But if any individuals have been imprudent, or unprincipled, let them answer for themselves. I am responsible only for my own conduct. Your fears for the injury which the indiscretions of such persons might do to the General, were kind, but I hope unnecessary. The decided confidence of Congress, and the hearts of the people of America, are the witnesses to his integrity. The blame of the unmeaning petulance of a few impatient spirits will never rest upon him; for whoever knows his character, will be satisfied, that an officer would be ashamed to utter, in his hearing, any sentiments that would disgrace a citizen.

I am, Sir, your most obedient servant,

ALEX. HAMILTON.

The Reverend Doctor * * * * *

HAMILTON TO BROOKS.

Head Quarters, September 10, 1779.

DEAR SIR :

I send you, merely by way of information, the copy of a letter of the 25th of August, which I yesterday received from Mr. Dana. I have only to request, that you will be good enough to inform me of the names of all the gentlemen that composed the company, before which I had the honour of being exhibited on the occasion in question.

I am, dear Sir,

Your friend and serv't.,

ALEX. HAMILTON.

Col. Brooks.

HENLEY TO HAMILTON.

Boston, September 22, 1779.

DEAR SIR :

Yesterday I delivered your letter to Doctor * * * * *, and hope you will receive such satisfaction as is due to you, either in wounding him in his honour, or by treating the man with contempt that has endeavoured to injure your reputation. You have, enclosed, a little anecdote of the Doctor's conduct, in an affair that happened not long since, handed me by a gentleman. The bearer of this is Mr. Hitchborn, a gentleman of

character and notice in the town. Any civilities shown him, will much oblige, Sir,

Your humble serv't.,

DAVID HENLEY.

Col. Hamilton.

DOCTOR * * * * * TO HAMILTON.

Jamaica Plain, September 23, 1779.

SIR :

Though, from the expressions and inuendoes in yours of the 5th instant, which I received from Colonel Henley the last Tuesday, I cannot apprehend myself treated with due respect ; yet I shall not be thereby drove either to reply with asperity, or to quit my own plan of conduct. Said one of the greatest soldiers of the age in which he lived, " The business of a general is not to fight, but to overcome." When I had answered your first letter, I inquired for an opportunity of conveying the account of what had passed, to my informer—his residence being far distant, and destitute of a stated intercourse with Boston. The last week, to my great satisfaction, an unexpected opportunity offered. I sat down immediately, transcribed your letter and my answer, and forwarded them by a person whom I prevailed with to tarry till I could do it ; as he was going to the very town. Suppose I shall receive an answer by the first trusty conveyance. My informer may probably

make no objection to my giving you his name, as he pretends to be a man of spirit, and was, or is still, in the military line, I think in the pay of the Continent. Should he deny his having informed me, I will then give it you of my own accord. At present, I have as much reason to believe his information as Colonel Hamilton's assertion. Shall keep my mind in proper poise, and leave it to preponderate as evidence offers. Should you be impatient, I am ready to send all that has passed between you and me, to be laid before Congress, and so leave it with them to determine upon the point; which, if I do, I shall, at the same time, give directions for my correspondent to mention the name of my informer, should Congress think it a matter of sufficient consequence for them to take up—but not otherwise.

Sir, your most ob't. serv't.,

WILLIAM *****.

Col. Hamilton.

DOCTOR ***** TO HAMILTON.

Jamaica Plain, November 15, 1779.

SIR :

In my last, of September 23, I mentioned my having sent to my informer. I have received an answer from him, wherein he writes, "As to the subject of your letter (for which I have now an opportunity to return my thanks), what was said,

was very confidential, and influenced by nothing but an anxious regard and attachment to our public cause. To affect the character of any one from a malignant principle, is unbecoming the title of a gentleman: nor do I know when I have been induced to make any unfavourable representation from personal prejudice. Your sense and delicacy will point out the propriety of prudence in an affair of this nature."

Should you be inclined to pursue the matter further, I will be at the trouble of transcribing all that hath passed between us, and of sending it to Congress, with direction to my correspondent, to mention the name of my informer (who is known to several of the delegates), should Congress conclude upon examining into the affair.

I am, Sir,

Your most ob't. serv't.,

WILLIAM * * * * *

Col. Hamilton.

HAMILTON TO DOCTOR * * * * *

December 10, 1779.

SIR :

As your letter of the 23d of September offered nothing conclusive, I delayed acknowledging it till I should receive the result of your pretended application to your informer. This is contained in your last of the 15th of November, which ar-

rived while I was absent from head quarters. The unravelment of the plot in the ridiculous farce you have been acting, proves, as I at first suspected, that you are yourself the author of the calumny. Such I consider you, and such I shall represent you. The representation, I am sure, will find credit with all who know me; and the notorious bias of your disposition to duplicity and slander, will give it sanction with all who are acquainted with you. I shall use the less ceremony, as I am well informed you have established a character, which, in the opinion of every man of sense, has forfeited all title to the delicacy of treatment usually attached to your function. I only lament, that respect to myself obliges me to confine the expression of my contempt to words.

The feint you make, of involving Congress in a business little worthy of their attention, I regard as a mere trick to elude my demands for a discovery which you are unable to make. And as I have no hope of bringing the affair to a more satisfactory issue, I now put an end to the correspondence on my part. I shall only add a repetition of what I before said, that I have no objection to any part of my conduct being canvassed before any tribunal whatever.

I am, &c.,

ALEX. HAMILTON.

Doctor * * * * *

HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.

Morris Town, May 2, 1780.

DEAR SIR :

I am extremely sorry your Excellency has been troubled with the affair to which the papers transmitted in your letter of this morning relate. Admitting the possibility of Doctor * * * * * 's not being the author of what I must always call a calunny; and had he not been an irreconcilable enemy to plain dealing; the matter might have been brought to a very easy issue, without the necessity of an appeal to you.

My determination, however, on the contents of his letter, will be a very summary one. I shall not follow him in his laboured digressions, because the scope of some of them is to me unintelligible, and the rest do not merit an answer.

So far from being disposed to comply with the Doctor's conditions to avoid an inquiry, I consider the proposal he makes, as a finishing stroke to that display of absurdity, littleness, and effrontery, which characterizes the whole proceeding on his part: and I defy the utmost extent of his malignity and intrigue. I shall ever continue to hold him in the highest contempt; to believe him to be the contriver of the charge against me, till he gives up some

other person as the author; and to represent him as such to all those with whom I have occasion to converse on the subject. I shall always speak of him in those terms which a sense of injury, and a conviction of his worthlessness, dictate.

I hope your Excellency will excuse the asperity of my expressions, which my respect for you would induce me to suppress, did I not owe it to my sensibility, wounded by the most barbarous attack upon my reputation and principles, to speak without reserve.

I flatter myself, you, Sir, are too well acquainted with my way of thinking, to entertain the least doubt of my innocence; and I beg leave to assure you, nothing will give me greater pleasure than to have the matter properly investigated. I am only apprehensive, that the Doctor will so manage it, as that it will be found *inexpedient* to bring it to a public discussion; and that the knowledge of circumstances will be confined to a few, to be handed about, as may best suit his purposes, to the prejudice of my character. Your Excellency, too, I trust, will see the propriety of that delicacy, by which I am withheld from making any formal appeal to public authority, in my own justification. It is the business of my accuser to bring me to justice; and by anticipating him, I should not fail to incur the

imputation of self-importance. I return your Excellency the papers from Doctor * * * * *.

I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's

Most obedient and

Humble servant,

ALEX. HAMILTON.*

His Excellency Gen. Washington.

HAMILTON TO BARON STEUBEN.

Head Quarters, September 7, 1779.

MY DEAR BARON:

The General, on reflection, is a little uneasy about the route you intend to take. He thinks it not quite safe, as the enemy leave troops on Long Island, and may easily throw a party across the Sound, so that you would be in danger of having your agreeable dreams interrupted, if you should sleep anywhere from New Haven to Fairfield. It is probable, one of the Count's motives, in coming this way, may be to see the ruins of those places. And if he could do it without risk, it would be de-

* The reader will perceive, that the foregoing letters are not arranged with those that follow, in exact chronological order: the departure from it, however, is but slight. Our desire to place the whole of the above interesting correspondence before the reader's view at one glance, rendered this arrangement expedient.—[EDITOR.]

sirable ; but he would not probably be altogether at his ease, if, in consequence of it, he should be obliged to attend the levee of Sir Henry Clinton. This may happen, if he continues his intention, unless very good precautions are taken to avoid the danger. The General recommends it to you, at least to be very vigilant upon your post, and not to suffer yourself to be surprised. You will be so good as to let us have timely notice of your approach, as we shall, at least, meet you at Fishkill Landing, with boats to take you down to Head Quarters. I hope your escort will arrive in time.

I have the honour to be,

Your affectionate and

Respectful servant,

A. HAMILTON.

Baron Steuben.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM WASHINGTON TO
COUNT D'ESTAING.

“ I have therefore appointed Brigadier-General Du Portail, and Colonel Hamilton, to wait upon your Excellency as speedily as possible, and explain to you fully, my ideas of the proposed co-operation ; the means we shall be able to employ ; the obstacles we shall have to encounter on our side ; the plans which it may be proper to pursue ; and the measures which are taking, and may be taken, by the enemy to counteract them.”—
Life of Hamilton, by his Son, vol. 1, p. 226-7.

WASHINGTON TO HAMILTON AND DU PORTAIL.

Head Quarters, West Point, Oct. 18, 1779.

GENTLEMEN :

I have been favoured with Colonel Hamilton's letter, mentioning your arrival early on the 11th, at Philadelphia, and your being about to set off for Lewistown the morning on which it was written.

I have attentively considered the object to which you more particularly refer, and am now to authorize you (provided the Count will not determine on a co-operation to the full extent of my instructions), to engage the whole force described in my letters to him, comprehending the Continental troops and militia, in such an enterprise against the enemy's shipping, as the Count and you may agree to undertake. In a word, I will aid him in every plan of operations against the enemy at New York, or Rhode Island, in the most effectual manner that our strength and resources will admit. He has nothing more to do, therefore, than to propose his own plan, if time will not admit him to accede to ours; weighing thoroughly, consequences of expense and disappointment.

Enclosed is some intelligence received from Elizabethtown since your departure. You will observe the preparations of the enemy for throwing every possible obstruction in the Count's passage.

A chain of alarm ships are stationed in the Sound,

to communicate the first approach of the Count's fleet to the Garrison at Rhode Island. This they can propagate in a few minutes by signal guns. In a letter from General Gates of the 13th instant, he advises me of the arrival of the fleet, which some time ago sailed from New York. It amounts to fifty six sail, and appeared to be only in a set of ballast. This was confirmed by one of the vessels which fell into our hands for a few hours. The opinion is, that it is designed to take off the Garrison.

General Gates makes the Marine force at Newport, one fifty, and a thirty two gun frigate. The Refugee and Wood fleet, about thirty seven sail, mostly armed, at the head of which is the Restoration, late the Oliver Cromwell, of twenty two guns. One frigate is also taken notice of in the fleet from New York.

Should the operations against New York, in either case, be undertaken, it will be of the utmost consequence to block up the Garrison at Rhode Island. You will consider the propriety of suggesting to the Count, the detaching of a superior sea force for this purpose, previous to his approaching the Hook. For, should the measure be deferred till his arrival there, it may not then be possible to prevent their junction with the army at New York, as the notice can be so very suddenly transmitted by means of the signals which they have established.

Every proper attention has been given to preparing the necessary number of fascines, and such other materials as may be requisite in this quarter. Fascines, gabions, etc., are also held in readiness at Providence in case of an operation against Newport. I had thought of the fire ships, and have taken order in the matter. I do not, however, choose to go to the great expense they must run us into, till something is decided with His Excellency Count D'Estaing; but everything relative shall be provided, so as to occasion no delay when such matters become necessary.

I am, Gentlemen,

Your most obedient servant,

G. WASHINGTON.

Brigadier-General Du Portail.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton.

WASHINGTON TO HAMILTON AND DU PORTAIL.

West Point, October 21, 1779.

GENTLEMEN:

In my letters of the tenth and eighteenth, I transmitted all the intelligence I had obtained respecting the enemy, from the time of your departure to those two periods: and by the present conveyance, I enclose you an extract of a letter from Major-General Gates, of the 15th. By this you will perceive, he was fully persuaded that the enemy

are now preparing to evacuate Rhode Island ; and he expected, from his advices, they would do it on Monday or Tuesday last.

Whether the event has taken place, or not, as yet, is a matter I cannot determine, having received no information since upon the subject. But admitting it has not, there is no room to doubt that they have all things in a condition to do it, on the shortest notice, whenever they shall think the exigency of their affairs requires it. It is also equally certain, that they continue to carry on their fortifications for the defence of New York with the utmost industry and perseverance ; and appear to be providing for the most obstinate resistance. Indeed, as their reduction would be attended with the most alarming and fatal consequences to their nation, nothing else can be reasonably expected. The moment I hear the troops have left Rhode Island, I will advise you.

The Garrisons at Verplanck's and Stony Points, still remain ; but from the concurring accounts of deserters, the heavy baggage and stores, except about eighteen or twenty rounds for each cannon, are embarked, and all matters are putting in train for an evacuation, in case events make it necessary. The deserters add, as a circumstance of confirmation, that Sir Henry Clinton was up at the posts about eight days ago ; and that, from that time, they have totally declined carrying on any works.

Having given you the substance of the intelli-

gence received since my last, I am led (from the vast magnitude of the object which carried you from Head Quarters, and the very interesting consequences it may involve, all of which I am persuaded will occur to your consideration) to remark, that the Count's entering New York Bay with his fleet, must be the basis and groundwork of any co-operation that can be undertaken by us, either for the reduction of the enemy's whole force, or the destruction of their shipping only. Everything will absolutely depend upon it, in either case; as, without it, and a free and open communication up and down the rivers, and in the Sound, which cannot be effected and maintained in any other way, we could not possibly undertake any operations on Long Island, as our supplies of provisions and stores could only be obtained by water.

This point, I am certain, would have your due consideration; but it appearing to me the hinge, the one thing upon which all others must rest, I could not forbear mentioning it. The circumstance of the season now, the expenditure of wood, and the necessity of supplying it, etc., will of course be fully attended to, according to their importance: and I have only to add, from a desire of preventing a misconception by either side, if any co-operation is agreed on, that the terms and conditions may be explicitly understood. And whether it shall extend to an attempt to re-

duce the enemy's whole force, or only to the destruction of their shipping; your engagements will provide for the continuance of the Count's fleet, to secure our retreat, and the removal of our stores from Long and York Islands, if, unhappily, it should be found, on experiment, that neither is practicable, and we should be obliged to abandon the enterprise.

I am, Gentlemen,

With great regard and respect,

Your most obedient servant,

G. WASHINGTON.

P. S. 1-4 after three, P. M. Three deserters have just come in, who left Verplanck's Point last night. They all corroborate the accounts, by a detail of circumstances, of the preparations to evacuate both that and Stony Point. I have no doubt that things will at least be held in readiness.

G. WASHINGTON.

After despatching the above, I received a letter from Major-General Heath, of which the following is a copy.

“I now have the pleasure to acquaint your Excellency, that the enemy have left both Points, having burnt and destroyed their works.”

Mandevilld's, Oct. 21, 1779.

4 o'clock, P. M.

General Du Portail, and Colonel Hamilton.

WASHINGTON TO HAMILTON AND DU PORTAIL.

Head Quarters, West Point, October 25, 1779.

GENTLEMEN :

I have just now received a letter from Colonel Hamilton, mentioning your having changed your position, at Lewistown, for that of Little Egg Harbour; and that you would write me more fully on your arrival at the Furnace.

In my last I informed you that the enemy had evacuated both their posts at King's Ferry; since which, no alteration has taken place that has come to my knowledge. Things at Rhode Island remain in the same situation; at least I have received no accounts, either confirming or contradicting my former intelligence.

I am, Gentlemen, your most ob't.,

Humble servant,

G. WASHINGTON.

Gen. Du Portail.

Colonel Hamilton.

DU PORTAIL AND HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.

Great Egg Harbour Landing, October 26, 1779.

SIR :

We are honoured with two letters from your Excellency, of the 10th and 21st.; to the contents of which we beg leave to assure you of our strictest attention.

That of the 18th is not yet come to hand. It is not improbable, it has gone round by Lewistown, which has occasioned the delay.

Colonel Hamilton wrote to your Excellency from Philadelphia, acquainting you with our arrival there, and our intention to proceed to Lewistown, Cape Henlopen, and from Great Egg Harbour, communicating our progress since, and our determination to establish ourselves at Bat Stove Furnace. We have since fixed on this place, about forty four miles from the extremity of Cape May (eighteen miles short of the Furnace, which we found to be more remote than had been represented), and, as far as we have been able to learn, from 100 to 110 miles of Sandy Hook, and about 50 from Philadelphia. Your Excellency will easily perceive the reason of our choosing this station. It did not appear to us, from our inquiries in Philadelphia, to be a point well ascertained, that the fleet would stop at the Delaware; and the time which had elapsed, made it more possible, if the Count should be determined to prosecute any further operations on the continent, that he would not lose time by a procedure of this sort, but might content himself with sending some transports, under escort of a few frigates, to receive the provisions for the fleet, and proceed himself directly on to the Hook. On this supposition, our position at Lewistown was entirely ineligible. The distance

at which we were from the city, as well as from the Hook; the delays that would consequently attend our intelligence from every quarter; the difficulty and impossibility, sometimes, of traversing the Bay; made our first situation inconvenient in every respect, in the event of the fleet's proceeding immediately to the Hook. These considerations induced us to cross the Delaware, and take the position at which we now are; where, or in the vicinity, we propose to remain till the arrival of the Count; till intelligence from him decides the inutility of a longer stay; or till we receive your Excellency's orders of recall.

We have now a better relation to the different points in which we are interested, and have taken the necessary precautions to gain the earliest notice of whatever happens. We have stationed expresses at the pitch of the Cape, and have established a regular communication with Major Lee, and with the city. If the fleet should appear off the Delaware, we can be there in twelve hours after its first appearance; and if at the Hook, in less than four days; provided Major Lee is punctual in conveying the intelligence, and the expresses, from either side, in bringing it.

By recent information from Philadelphia (though not quite so distinct and accurate as we could wish), we find, that so late as the fourth of this month, the Count, as yet, was to open his batteries against the enemy at Savannah. The time that

will probably intervene between this and the final reduction; the re-embarkation of the Count's troops; the dispositions for sailing, and his arrival on this coast; may, we fear, exhaust the season too much to permit of the co-operation to which our mission relates.

We do not, however, despair; for if the Count has been fully successful to the southward, and should shortly arrive (which may be the case), the enterprise may possibly go on.

In a letter from Major Lee, of the 22d., he informs us, that a vessel from Georgia arrived on the 16th; since which, the two sixty-fours, and the *Renown*, which were at the Hook, had fallen down towards New York; and the troops at the Hook had embarked and gone to the city. At first sight, this account alarmed us, and made us apprehensive that the enemy had received some favourable advices from the southward, which put them out of danger, and superseded the necessity of continuing their preparations for defence. But, on further reflection, we think it more probable, that this is only a change of disposition; and that finding, on closer examination, they would be unable to defend the Hook, they had determined to relinquish the attempt.

This seems the more likely, as Major Lee mentions, that a part of the hulks, sunk in the channel, had gotten afloat and drifted ashore.

To this experience of the difficulty of obstruct-

ing the channel, may, perhaps, be attributed the change we suppose. And we are confirmed in this conjecture, by the evacuation of the two posts at King's Ferry, which appears, by your Excellency's letter, to have taken place on the 21st., five days after the supposed arrival of the vessel from Georgia; a proof that they had not received information of any decisive good fortune on their side, or ill fortune on ours; and that they persisted in their defensive plan. We are persuaded, too, that their exultation would have given wings to any good news they might have received, and that it would have reached us before this. Were the season less advanced, we should regret this change of disposition; because we believe the attempt to defend the entrance of the Hook, would have been fruitless; and it might have thrown a part of their ships, and of their troops, into our hands, in the first instance, which could not fail to facilitate the successive operations.

But, at this late period, it may rather be an advantage. To force the passage, might have required land operations against the Hook, which would lose time and expose the fleet to the hazard of winds, which would have rendered its situation critical. Now, the fleet may probably enter the Bay, on its first approach, and be in security: and the whole operation will be brought to a point,

and may demand less time for its accomplishment.

As a large number of fascines, ready for use, appear to us essential to any operations that may be undertaken, we presume your Excellency has been preparing, and will continue to prepare, as many as possible. We beg leave to suggest the utility of having, at the same time, a sufficient number of gabions and sand bags. Of the former, Colonel Gouvion, if your Excellency thinks proper, may be charged with the constructing: the latter may be made under the care of the Quartermaster at Philadelphia. Several thousands may be necessary. The usual dimensions are fifteen or eighteen inches long, and twelve wide. If, notwithstanding the advices from Major Lee, any thing by land is to be attempted against the Hook, these will be peculiarly useful on such a flat, sandy spot; and, indeed, it would be impracticable to construct batteries, in any reasonable time, without them.

We have the honour to be,

Sir, your most obedient, and

Humble servants,

A. HAMILTON.

Du PORTAIL.

His Excellency Gen. Washington.

WASHINGTON TO HAMILTON AND DU PORTAIL.

Head Quarters, West Point, November 1, 1779.

GENTLEMEN :

I have this day been favoured with yours of twenty-sixth ultimo, informing me of your removal to Great Egg Harbour. My letter of the eighteenth, which had not reached you, went, as you supposed, by way of Philadelphia; and, lest any accident may have happened to it, I enclose you a duplicate. Mine of the thirtieth ultimo, which went through Major Lee, informed you of the evacuation of Rhode Island. I have since received a letter of the twenty-first ult., from my confidential correspondent in New York. He informs me, that Rawdon's Corps, the 57th, and some of the Artillery, were then embarked: and it was said, and generally believed, that they were bound to Halifax. That the *Robuste*, of seventy four guns, had arrived the twentieth, from Halifax; and that a number of transports were taking in water and ballast. He gave me nothing further worth communicating.

You will find, by the letter of the 18th, that a provision of fascines and gabions was making; and I shall give directions to the Quarter-Master-General, to provide a quantity of sand bags.

I am sorry to inform you, that Colonel La

Rodiere died on Saturday last. He is to be buried this day with the honours due to his rank.

I am, with great esteem, Gentlemen,
Your most obedient servant,

G. WASHINGTON.

P. S. Upon a presumption that Colonel Laurens will be on board the fleet, the enclosed are sent to you.

Brigadier General Du Portail.

Colonel Hamilton.

WASHINGTON TO DU PORTAIL AND HAMILTON.

Head Quarters, West Point, November 2, 1779.

GENTLEMEN :

Since mine of yesterday, I have received another letter from my confidential correspondent in New York, dated the twenty-ninth ultimo. He informs me, that the fifty-seventh regiment, Rawdon's Corps, and the Artillery mentioned in his last, were to sail on that day for Halifax; and with them, all the heavy ships of war, except the Europa. The Daphne frigate, with Sir George Collier and Colonel Stewart on board, was to sail for England the same day. He says the pilots reported, that it was now difficult to bring a vessel into the Hook, on account of the hulks sunk there. (By this it would seem that some of them still remained upon the shoals.) He says the transports

mentioned in his last, as taking in water and ballast, only carried it down to the ships at the Hook. The Rainbow, of forty guns, had arrived from Halifax. He informs me of no other circumstances that materially relate to affairs in New York. He says a packet arrived from England on the twenty-third October. The accounts brought by her, seemed to alarm the tories very much. It was reported, that the Ardent, of sixty four guns, had been taken, and the English fleet chased into Portsmouth by the combined fleet, which remained off that place several days. He mentions these matters as current reports, and adds, that a fleet of victuallers were to sail from Cork the latter end of September, and another of store ships and merchantmen, from Spithead, about the same time.

I am, with great regard, Gentlemen,
Your most obedient servant,

G. WASHINGTON.

The capture of the Ardent, is confirmed by a New York paper of the twentieth ultimo.
General Du Portail and Colonel Hamilton.

LAURENS TO HAMILTON.

Philadelphia, December 12, 1779.

MY DEAR HAMILTON:

Upon my arrival here yesterday evening, I com-

municated the intelligence received from General Wayne, to the President of Congress and the French minister. The latter surprised me greatly, by informing me, that only one 74 gun ship of the Count De Grasse's division, and the Fier Rodrigue, had arrived at Chesapeake. I am at a loss how to account for the absence of the rest. They have not been within the reach of a superior enemy's force: no storm has happened, within our knowledge, to drive them to any considerable distance from the coast. It cannot rationally be supposed that the Count has received countermanding orders, and that a capital ship of the line, together with a very valuable warlike merchantman, is to be sacrificed. Be the case as it may, all hopes of passing our reinforcement for the southern department, by sea, are out of the question. The North Carolina Brigade, after profiting by the navigation of the Delaware as far as it would serve them, marched to the Head of Elk. Thence they proceed, by water, across the Chesapeake, and up to Petersburg, where they are to be overtaken by their waggons, and pursue the rest of their way by the middle road to Charlestown. This is the route marked by the Board of War, and a Committee of Congress appointed to confer with them; and I believe it was recommended by Doctor Burke, one of the North Carolina delegates lately from that country. It is intended that the Vir-

ginians should pursue the same as far as Petersburg, where they are to take an upper road. In this route we do not avail ourselves of Albermarle Sound. The going up the river to Petersburg will certainly be tedious; and four hundred miles land march is to be executed from thence. I communicated these objections to Mr. Matthewes, and proposed the route which the General pointed out; but the poverty of the country in provision, and the means of transporting the baggage of the troops, he said, would outweigh the advantages of the water carriage and direct road. I am by no means satisfied with the present arrangement, when I reflect how much more rapidly the British may convey their reinforcements: but all the inquiries I have made hitherto, have produced nothing favourable to our plan. Indeed, in the present unguarded state of the Chesapeake, the British might render the passage even of that ineligible.

Mr. Serle, a member of Congress, who arrived in town last night from the neighbourhood of Major Leigh's post, asserts, that no transports were at the Hook on Wednesday. Whether the British operations are delayed by false rumours of Count De Grasse's division; or whether they have heard, as we have here, that Count D'Estaing was still on the coast the twentieth of November, I cannot decide: but one would be inclined to think, that they are disconcerted, either by false intelligence,

or a total defect of it. I entreat you, my dear friend, to transmit me the earliest and most accurate relation that can be obtained, of the British movements; and enlighten me with your observations upon them. Present my respects and love to our excellent General and the family. May you enjoy all the pleasure, moral and physical, which you promise yourself in winter quarters, and be as happy as you deserve.

Tell the Doctor I shall commit his darling to the press this morning.

Yours ever,

JOHN LAURENS.

Colonel Hamilton.

LAURENS TO HAMILTON:

Philadelphia, December 18, 1779.

MY DEAR HAMILTON:

On my arrival in town, I was informed by the President, that Congress had suspended the business of appointing a secretary to their minister plenipotentiary at Versailles, until my return, in hopes that I might still be prevailed upon to accept the office. I replied, that I thought my letter upon the subject sufficiently explicit; and assured him of my sincere desire to be excused from serving in that capacity at the present juncture of our affairs.

He urged the unanimity of the choice with re-

spect to me ; the difficulty of uniting the suffrages of all parties, in case of a new nomination ; and the advantages of this union. Several delegates of Congress declared to me the embarrassment of Congress since I had declined. One, in particular, suggested to me his apprehension of interest being made for a late delegate of New York, who is candidate for the office, and to whom the world, in general, allows greater credit for his abilities than his integrity ; and said, “ he was determined to oppose him with all his influence.” When I quitted town the sixteenth, these matters crowded into my mind. I fell into a train of serious reflections and self-examination ; endeavoured to investigate whether I had acted consonantly to the *καλον και αγαθον*, and fulfilled the duties of a good citizen in this transaction. In fine, I agitated the grand question, Whether a citizen has a right to decline any office to which his countrymen appoint him ; upon what that right is founded ; and whether it existed in my case.

After undergoing the severest conflict that ever I experienced ; sometimes reproaching, sometimes justifying myself ; pursuing my journey, or turning retrograde ; as the arguments on the one side or the other appeared to prevail ; I determined that I had been deficient in the duties of a good citizen. I returned to Philadelphia ; communicated my sentiments to the President and two other members ;

and declared to them, that I thought it incumbent on me, in the first place, to recommend a person equally qualified in point of integrity, and much better in point of ability. That if, unhappily, they could not agree upon Colonel Hamilton, and that I was absolutely necessary to exclude a dangerous person, or to prevent pernicious delays, I should think it my duty to obey the orders of Congress. The persons now in nomination, are, Colonel Hamilton, Mr. Lovell, Mr. G. Morris, Major Stewart. I am sorry that you are not better known to Congress. Great stress is laid upon the probity and patriotism of the person to be employed in this commission. I have given my testimony of you in this, and the other equally essential points.

I am sorry to inform you, that the North Carolina brigade had not quitted Elk the sixteenth; having been detained by the ice.

I am sorry to write you, just as I am on the wing. Be so good as to thank Tilghman for his letter. Inform him, from Mr. Mitchell, that his habiliments are making.

My love as usual. Adieu.

JOHN LAURENS.

Colonel Hamilton.

[1780.]

HAMILTON TO ROBERT MORRIS.

[SUGGESTIONS ON THE CURRENCY, AND A BANK OF THE
UNITED STATES.]

SIR :

The present conjuncture is by all allowed to be peculiarly critical. Every man of reflection, employs his thoughts about the remedies proper to be applied to the national disorders; and every one, from a partiality to his own ideas, wishes to convey them to those who are charged with the management of affairs. The channel of the public papers, commonly made use of for the purpose, appears to me exceptionable on several accounts. It not only restrains a freedom of discussion, from the extreme delicacy of the subject; but the discussion itself increases the evil, by exposing our weak sides to the popular eye, and adding false terrors to those well-founded apprehensions which our situation authorizes.

Instead of pursuing this method, I prefer addressing myself to a member of that body, in whose power alone it is, by well-digested system, to extricate us from our embarrassments. I have pitched upon you, from a personal knowledge of your abilities and zeal. If I offer any thing new and useful, I am persuaded you will endeavour to turn it to advantage. If the contrary is the case, I am, at least, doing no harm. I shall only have had

the trouble of writing, and you of reading, a few useless pages.

The object of principal concern, is the state of our currency. In my opinion, all our speculations on this head have been founded in error. Most people think, that the depreciation might have been avoided, by provident arrangements in the beginning, without any aid from abroad: and a great many of our sanguine politicians, till very lately, imagined the money might still be restored by expedients within ourselves. Hence the delay in attempting to procure a foreign loan.

This idea proceeded from an ignorance of the real extent of our resources. The war, particularly in the first periods, required exertions beyond our strength, to which neither our population nor riches were equal. We have the fullest proof of this, in the constant thinness of our armies; the impossibility, at this time, of recruiting them otherwise than by compulsion; the scarcity of hands in husbandry, and other occupations; the decrease of our staple commodities; and the difficulty of every species of supply. I am aware that the badness of the money has its influence; but it was originally an effect, not a cause, though it now partakes of the nature of both. A part of those evils would appear, were our finances in a more flourishing condition. We experienced them before the money was materially depre-

ciated; and they contributed to its depreciation. The want of men soon obliged the public to pay extravagant wages for them in every department. Agriculture languished from a defect of hands. The mechanic arts did the same. The price of every kind of labour increased: and the articles of foreign commerce, from the interruption it received, more than kept pace with other things.

The relative value of money being determined by the greater or less portion of labour and commodities which it will purchase; whatever these gained in price, that, of course, lost in value.

The public expenditures, from the dearness of every thing, necessarily became immense; greater in proportion than in other countries; and much beyond any revenues which the best concerted scheme of finance could have extracted from the natural funds of the State. No taxes, which the people were capable of bearing, on that quantity of money which is deemed a proper medium for this country (had it been gold instead of paper), would have been sufficient for the current exigencies of Government.

The most opulent States of Europe, in a war of any duration, are commonly obliged to have recourse to foreign loans or subsidies.* How, then,

* France owes a debt of near two hundred millions of pounds sterling; of which about twenty eight millions is due to Governments and individuals in the United Provinces.

could we expect to do without them, and not augment the quantity of our artificial wealth beyond those bounds which were proper to preserve its credit? The idea was chimerical.

The quantity of money formerly in circulation among us, is estimated at about thirty millions of dollars. This was barely sufficient for our interior commerce. Our exterior commerce was chiefly carried on by barter. We sent our commodities abroad, and brought back others in return. The balance of the principal branch was against us; and the little *specie* derived from others, was transferred directly to the payment of that balance, without passing into home circulation. It would have been impracticable, by loans and taxes, to bring such a portion of the forementioned sum into the public coffers as would have answered the

England owes a debt not much short; of which about thirty millions is likewise due in the United Provinces.

The United Provinces, themselves, owe a debt of the generality, of fifty millions sterling, besides the particular debts of each province. Russia, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, all owe money to the United Provinces, notwithstanding the assistance of their mines. These Governments, too, are patterns of economy. Sweden receives a constant supply from France. The House of Austria is also to be included in the catalogue. Spain is almost the only considerable European power to be excepted; but this is to be attributed to that inexhaustible fund of treasure which she possesses in the mines of South America.

The King of Prussia is one of those potentates the least in debt; notwithstanding he has a long time made a figure in Europe, much above what the comparative strength and resources of his kingdom entitled him to expect. This his superior genius has effected. By a wise administration, he maintains an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men, nearly equal to that of France, with one third of its people, and less than a third of its riches. This he does by judicious arrangements; by a rigid economy; and by a species of commerce, which is carried on, on account of the State. There are several public manufactories, from which the army is supplied; and by the help of which, the money paid out with one hand is taken in by the other.

purposes of the war: nor could it have spared so considerable a part, without obstructing the operations of domestic commerce. Taxes are limited, not only by the quantity of wealth in a State, but by the temper, habits, and genius of the people; all which, in this country, conspired to render them moderate: and as to loans, men will not be prevailed upon to lend money to the public when there is a scarcity, and they can find a more profitable way of employing it otherwise, as was our case.

The ordinary revenues of the United Provinces, amount to about twenty five millions of guilders; or two millions two hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling per annum. This is, in proportion to its territory and numbers, the richest country in the world; and the country where the people sustain the heaviest load of taxes. Its population is about equal to ours, two millions of souls. The burthens on the subject are so great, that it is by some held almost impracticable, even on extraordinary emergencies, to enlarge the revenues by new impositions. It is maintained, their dependence, in these cases, must be on the extraordinary contributions of wealthy individuals; with the aid of which, in some of their wars, they have raised four millions sterling a year. In a country possessed of so vast a stock of wealth, where taxes are carried to such a height; and where the means of paying them, so infinitely ex-

ceed those in our power; if the national revenues only amount to the sum I have stated, how inadequate must have been the product of any taxes we could have levied, to the demands of the service! Loans, for the reason before hinted, would have been out of the question; at least, they would have been so trifling as to be an object of little importance. Suppose we should have been able to raise a million sterling, annually; a sum that probably would have exceeded our ability; how unequal would this have been to our wants! * No economy could have made it bear any proportion, especially if we recur to the causes already enumerated, by which the currency depreciated in its first stages.

From these reasonings it results, that it was not in the power of Congress, when their emissions had arrived at the thirty millions of dollars, to put a stop to them. † They were obliged, in order to keep up the supplies, to go on creating artificial revenues by new emissions; and as these multiplied, their value declined. The progress of the depreciation might have been retarded, but it

* This will appear, by recurring to our expenses in the commencement of the war, before the money was depreciated. In '75, which was only three fourths of a year, the emissions amounted to seven millions of dollars: in '76, to fourteen millions. The war did not begin, in earnest, till '76.

† This is meant, without employing the assistance of a foreign loan, and of other expedients beside borrowing and taxing.

could not have been prevented. It was, in a great degree, necessary.

There was but one remedy; a foreign loan. All other expedients should rather have been considered as auxiliary. Could a loan have been obtained, and judiciously applied, assisted by a vigorous system of taxation, we might have avoided that excess of emissions which has ruined the paper. The credit of such a fund would have procured loans from the monied and trading men within ourselves; because it might have been so directed, as to have been beneficial to them in their commercial transactions abroad.*

The necessity for a foreign loan is now greater than ever. Nothing else will retrieve our affairs.

The wheels of Government, without it, cannot much longer be kept in motion. Including Loan-office certificates, and State emissions, we have about four hundred millions of dollars in circulation. The real value of these, is less than seven millions, which is the true circulating medium of these States: for though the price of specie is and the rate of exchange for sterling bills the nominal value of every commodity is at least sixty to one, on an average. All the reasonings against the possibility of raising the current expenses on the foundation of thirty millions, apply

* This will appear from the plan which will be proposed.

to our present situation in the ratio of thirty to seven; that is, it is as thirty to seven less practicable now than when our emissions amounted to only thirty millions. Could every dollar in circulation be brought annually into the treasury, which never was effected in any country, and is politically impossible, the revenue would not be equal to the yearly expense.

The hope of appreciating the money, by taxes and domestic loans, is at an end. As fast as it could be received, it must be issued in the daily expenditures. The momentary interval between its being drawn out of circulation and returning into it, would prevent its receiving the least advantage.

These reasonings may appear useless, as the necessity of a foreign loan is now acknowledged, and measures are taking to procure it. But they are intended to establish good principles; the want of which has brought us to the desperate crisis we are arrived at, and may still betray us into fatal mistakes.

How this loan is to be employed, is now the question; and its difficulty equal to its importance! Two plans have been proposed: One, to purchase up at once, in specie, or sterling bills, all superfluous paper; and to endeavour, by taxes, loans, and economy, to hinder its returning into circulation. The remainder, it is supposed, would then

recover its value. This, it is said, will reduce our public debt to the sterling cost of the paper.

Suppose two hundred millions were to be purchased, and the rest called in by taxes. At

this would require bills to the amount of
of dollars. But I doubt whether four times this sum would be sufficient. The moment it was known such purchases were to be made, the avarice of speculators would begin to operate : the demand would immediately occasion an artificial appreciation ; each successive million would cost more than the preceding. But this appreciation would be more relative to the purchasing medium than to the prices of commodities. The raising the value of the paper relative to the former, would depend on the combination of a few artful individuals, and would be easily accomplished. The diminution of prices must be slow, as it implies a change in the sentiments of the body of the people with respect to the money. A sudden revolution in the general rates of all the necessaries of life is not to be expected. The prices of these, as they have reached their present summit by degrees ; must, by degrees, revert to their former station. The minds of the people will not readily admit impressions in favour of the currency. All their past experience has given a habit of diffidence ; and the epidemical spirit of extortion, will maintain a violent struggle with what-

ever has a tendency to produce a fall of prices. A permanent reduction of the quantity of circulating cash, will alone gradually effect it. But this will not happen on the present plan.

The necessity of continuing the supplies at nearly the same rates now given (which would be the case if my reasonings are true), would have nearly the same effect mentioned with respect to taxes and domestic loans. The money would return into circulation almost as fast as it was drawn out: and at the end of the year we should find our treasury empty; our foreign loan dissipated; and the state of our finances as deplorable as ever. At a moderate calculation, we should have spent ten or twelve millions of real dollars, for the sole purpose of carrying on the war another year. It would be much better, instead of purchasing up the paper currency, to purchase the supplies out of our specie or bills. In the first instance, the public would suffer a direct loss of the artificial appreciation, relative to the purchasing medium: in the last, it would buy at the value of the commodities in specie or bills.

A great source of error in disquisitions of this nature, is the judging of events by abstract calculations; which, though geometrically true, are false as they relate to the concerns of beings governed more by passion and prejudice, than by an enlightened sense of their interests. A degree

of illusion mixes itself in all the affairs of society. The opinion of objects has more influence than their real nature. The quantity of money in circulation is certainly a chief cause of its decline: but we find it is depreciated more than five times as much as it ought to be by this rule. The excess is derived from opinion; a want of confidence. In like manner we deceive ourselves, when we suppose the value will increase in proportion as the quantity is lessened. Opinion will operate here also; and a thousand circumstances may promote or counteract the principle.

The other plan proposed, is to convert the loan into merchandise, and import it on public account. This plan is incomparably better than the former. Instead of losing on the sale of its specie or bills, the public would gain a considerable profit on the commodities imported. The loan would go much further this way, in supplying the expenses of the war; and a large stock of valuable commodities, useful to the army and to the country, would be introduced. This would affect the prices of things in general, and assist the currency. But the arts of monopolizers would prevent its having so extensive and durable an influence as it ought to have.

A great impediment to the success of this, as well as the former scheme, will be the vast sums requisite for the current expenses. The arguments adduced in the former case, are applicable here

also, though not with equal force. The necessity the public will be under of parting with its stock to defray the daily demands, will give designing men an opportunity, by combinations not to purchase, to oblige it to sell at a rate below the real value of money. This they may the more easily effect, as the demand for foreign commodities is much less than formerly, on account of the general spirit of parsimony which has obtained from necessity, and the manufactures carried on in private families for their own use. The greatest part of the country people now almost entirely clothe themselves.

The public must either sell very cheap, to collect rapidly the superfluous paper in hopes of raising the value of the remainder; or it must sell very slow, to preserve the due proportion between the articles it has for sale and those it wants to buy. By pursuing the first method, it will soon exhaust its stock at a very considerable loss, and only give temporary relief to the currency. According to my principle, though it sells cheap, it must still buy dear; and, consequently, the money collected cannot remain in the treasury long enough to preserve the rise in its appreciated state. If it pursues the second method, the expenditures will be equal to the income; and though the public will make the natural profits on its goods, as it

will lay up nothing, it will do nothing toward the appreciation.*

The farmers have the game in their own hands, and will make it very difficult to lower the prices of their commodities. For want of labourers, there is no great superfluity of the most essential articles raised. These are things of absolute necessity, and must be purchased, as well by the other classes of the society as by the public. The farmers, on the contrary, if they do not like the price, are not obliged to sell; because they have almost every necessary within themselves; salt, and one or two more, excepted; which bear a small proportion to what is wanted from them; and which they can obtain, by barter, for other articles equally indispensable. Heavy taxes, it may be said, will oblige them to sell; but they can pay,

* To form an idea of the effect of this plan, let it be supposed, that the goods imported, amount to two millions of pounds sterling, and that these sell at one hundred and fifty pounds in paper, for each pound sterling. The whole proceeds will be eight hundred millions of dollars: to these add two hundred millions, raised in taxes. There will then be in the hands of the public, one thousand millions of dollars; which, at sixty to one, gives sixteen millions six hundred and sixty six thousand, six hundred and sixty six, and two-thirds of real dollars. Take the year '76 for a standard, and suppose fourteen millions of dollars to be the proper annual expense of the war, which is only two millions six hundred and sixty six thousand, six hundred and sixty six, and two thirds less than the whole amount of the goods and taxes. At this rate, the plan would do little more than defray the expenses of the war for one year. But this calculation is not exactly true; because the money would certainly appreciate, in some degree, by the reduction of its quantity: yet, as this reduction would not last, at least in the same extent, to preserve the appreciation; and, as in proportion to the appreciation, the price of goods must fall, and bring less money in; it is difficult to say, whether it would not ultimately come to the same thing.

with a small part of what they have, any taxes our legislatures will venture to impose, or would be able to enforce.

One measure, alone, can counterbalance these advantages of the farmers, and oblige them to contribute their proper quota to the support of Government ; a tax in kind.

This ought instantly to begin throughout the States. The present quantity of cash, though nominally enormous, would, in reality, be found incompetent to domestic circulation, were it not that a great part of our internal commerce is carried on by barter. For this reason, it is impossible, by pecuniary taxes, to raise a sum proportioned to the wants of the State. The money is no longer a general representative ; and when it ceases to be so, the State ought to call for a portion of the thing represented ; or, in other words, to tax in kind. This will greatly facilitate whatever plan of finance is adopted ; because it will lessen the expenditures in cash, and make it the easier to retain what is drawn in.

I said the demand for foreign goods is less than it formerly was. I mean there is not a demand for so large a quantity, which the reasons already assigned, clearly demonstrate ; nor are the exorbitant rates now given any objection to this doctrine. There is an absolute scarcity even in comparison of the present consumption ; and, of course,

a demand for what there is. But should an importation of two millions sterling take place, the market would be glutted; and there would be no way of keeping up the price, but by making very slow sales. A less quantity would stand no chance of calling in the money, and keeping it in long enough to effect anything in favour of its credit.

I say nothing about the risk of importation. I do not believe we could obtain a convoy sufficient to justify our hazarding it without the precaution of insurance. But with this expedient we are safe; and must be satisfied with smaller profits for the sake of security.

This is a plan not altogether to be rejected. With prudent management it might enable us to carry on the war two or three years (which, perhaps, is as long as it may last); but if we should expect more from it, the restoration of the currency, we should be disappointed.

The only plan that can preserve the currency, is one that will make it the *immediate* interest of the monied men to co-operate with Government in its support. This country is in the same predicament in which France was previous to the famous Mississippi scheme, projected by Mr. Law. Its paper money, like ours, had dwindled to nothing; and no efforts of the Government could revive it, because the people had lost all confidence in its ability. Mr. Law, who had much

more penetration than integrity, readily perceived, that no plan could succeed which did not unite the interest and credit of rich individuals with those of the State; and upon this, he framed the idea of his project, which, so far, agreed in principle with the Bank of England. The foundation was good, but the superstructure too vast. The proprietors aimed at unlimited wealth, and the Government itself expected too much; which was the cause of the ultimate miscarriage of the scheme, and of all the mischiefs that befel the kingdom in consequence.

It will be our wisdom to select what is good in this plan, and in any others that have gone before us; avoiding their defects and excesses. Something on a similar principle in America, will alone accomplish the restoration of paper credit, and establish a permanent fund for the future exigencies of Government.

Article I. The plan I would propose, is that of an American Bank, instituted by authority of Congress for ten years, under the denomination of The Bank of The United States.

II. A foreign loan makes a necessary part of the plan; but this I am persuaded we can obtain, if we pursue the proper measures. I shall suppose it to amount to two millions of pounds sterling. This loan to be thrown into the Bank as a part of its stock.

III. A subscription to be opened for two hundred millions of dollars; and the subscribers erected into a Company, to be called **THE COMPANY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.**

IV. The Government to guarantee this subscription money to the proprietors, at the rate of one for twenty; that is, to engage, at the dissolution of the Bank, to make good to them the sum of ten millions of dollars, in lieu of the two hundred millions subscribed, payable in Spanish milled dollars, or a currency bona fide equivalent to them.

V. The taxes raised in money annually, to be thrown into stock.*

VI. All the remaining paper to be called in (at the option of the possessor), and bank notes issued in lieu of them, for so much sterling, payable to the bearer in three months from the date, at two per cent. per annum interest. A pound sterling to be estimated at two hundred and sixty-six, and two-thirds, of the present dollars.† The interest to be punctually paid in specie at the end of the three months; when it shall be at the

* The taxes are made to increase every year, for the three years; because the money in circulation increases, and, consequently, the people can afford to pay more.

† This is sixty paper dollars to one dollar of four shillings and sixpence sterling; which is the real value of the money. But if it is apprehended that this may meet with opposition, let the valuation of the bank notes be the same as the price of European Bills of Exchange. Other operations must be regulated accordingly.

choice of the possessor to have the bank notes renewed, or to receive the sum deposited, in the old paper.

VII. All the money issued from the Bank, to be of the same denomination, and on the same terms.*

VIII. The Bank to furnish Congress with an annual loan of two millions sterling, if they have occasion for it, at four per cent. interest.

IX. The whole, or such part of the stock as is judged necessary, to be employed in commerce, in the manner, and on the terms, which shall be agreed upon, from time to time, between the Company, and a Board of Trade to be appointed by Congress.

X. The Bank to issue occasionally, by permission of Congress, such sums as may be thought safe and expedient, in private loans, on good securities, at six per cent. interest.

XI. The Government to share half the whole stock and profits of the Bank.

* The reason of this is, to preserve the idea of a Stock, and make it seem that the old paper is still in existence. But there is danger, notwithstanding the reasons to the contrary, that there may be a run upon the Bank, from particular causes, which may embarrass it. It is not probable the old paper will be entirely, though nearly, called out of circulation: what remains, will appreciate: this may tempt those who have bank notes, to demand payment on the terms of the original deposit; without considering that, by bringing too great a quantity again into circulation, it will again depreciate. The Bank may be pushed to a very disagreeable extremity by this means. I do not know whether it may not be advisable to confine the privilege of repayment to the lenders to the Bank, and make the bills bear interest, payable every three months, without making the principal demandable. Much may be said for and against. It is well worth consideration,

XII. The Bank to be managed by the trustees of the Company, under the inspection of the Board of Trade,* who may have recourse to the Company books whenever they think proper, to examine the state of its affairs. The same is done in England, and in other countries where Banks are established, and is a privilege which the Government has a right to demand for its own security. It is the

* This Board ought immediately to be established, at all events. The Royal Council of Commerce, in France, and the subordinate Chambers in each province, form an excellent institution, and may, in many respects, serve as a model. Congress have too long neglected to organize a good scheme of administration, and throw public business into proper executive departments. For commerce, I prefer a Board; but for most other things, single men. We want a Minister of War, a Minister of Foreign Affairs, a Minister of Finance, and a Minister of Marine. There is always more decision, more despatch, more secrecy, more responsibility, where single men, than where bodies are concerned. By a plan of this kind, we should blend the advantages of a Monarchy and of a Republic, in a happy and beneficial union. Men will only devote their lives and attentions to the mastering a profession, on which they can build reputation and consequence which they do not share with others.

If this plan should be approved, Congress ought immediately to appoint a Minister of Finance, under whatsoever title they think proper, and charge him with its execution. He ought to be a man of ability, to comprehend it in all its consequences; and of eloquence, to make others comprehend and relish it. He ought, beside, to have some general knowledge of the science. This man ought immediately to address himself to some of the most sensible minded men; and endeavour to convince them of the utility of the project. These must engage others, and so on, till a sufficient number is engaged.

Then Congress must establish the Bank, and set it agoing. I know of no man that has better pretensions than yourself; and I shall be very happy to hear that Congress have said, "Thou art the man."

I had like to have omitted one remark, which is, that the subscription money may be guaranteed, if necessary, at 10 to 1, as a greater inducement. This will only be twenty millions of dollars, or five millions of pounds sterling; a cheap bargain to get rid of the perplexities we labour under, and convert the torrent of ideal money into a moderate, but sufficient, stream, to supply the real wants of the State. Congress, no doubt, would be able to borrow enough abroad to pay this debt, if it should not find better means within itself. But I shall be much mistaken, if the proprietors will desire to be repaid, and not prefer continuing the loan to Government on reasonable terms.

more necessary in this case, from the commercial nature of the Bank.

To give an idea of the advantages

[Here a part of the manuscript is missing.]

which, having all the operation of money, and of a more advantageous kind than that which the lenders have parted with, will have all the efficacy of a payment. It is for this reason they are made to bear interest: and there can be no doubt, that every man will prefer a species of money which answers all the purposes of a currency, and even, when lying idle, brings in a profit to the possessor. The same consideration will prevent the lenders recalling the old paper, at the quarterly payments; because they hold a more valuable property instead of it. The interest is to be paid in specie, as a further temptation, for which a small sum will suffice. The denomination of the money is altered; because it will produce a useful illusion. Mankind are much led by sounds and appearances; and the currency having changed, its name will seem to have changed its nature.

The Bank will advance bills to the amount of two millions of pounds sterling to Congress; and, in addition to its stock, will now have a debt due it of this sum, which is to be considered as so much gained.

[Here a part of the manuscript is missing.]

Brought over,	7,075,000
To be deducted,	
Drawn out of circulation, by the sale of goods imported, 4,000,000	
By governmental taxes, supposed to be, 1,000,000—5,000,000	
	<hr/>
Remaining in circulation the fourth year,	£2,075,000

This will be less than the preceding, which is occasioned by the million supposed to be drawn in by taxes.

The national debt, on this plan, will stand thus, at the end of three years :

Foreign loan,	2,000,000
Domestic loan, at two millions per annum,	6,000,000
Interest, at four per cent.,	320,000
	<hr/>
	8,320,000
Half the value of the Bank,	7,900,000
	<hr/>

Balance against the United States, £420,000

We may, therefore, by means of this establishment, carry on the war three years, and only incur a debt of four hundred and twenty thousand pounds over and above the guarantee of the subscription money ; which, however, is not to be paid till the end of ten years.

I have said, in one place, that abstract calculations, in questions of finance, are not to be relied on : and as the complex operations of trade are involved in the present plan, I am, myself, diffident of those flattering results which it presents at every step. I am aware how apt the imagination is to be heated in projects of this nature, and to overlook the fallacies which often lurk in first principles. But when I consider, on the other hand, that the scheme stands on the firm footing of public and private faith ; that it links the interests of the State in an intimate connexion with those of the rich individuals belonging to it ; that it turns the wealth and influence of both into a commercial channel, for mutual benefit, which must afford advantages not to be estimated ; that there is a defect of circulating medium, which this plan supplies, by a sort of creative power ; converting what is so produced into a real and efficacious instrument of trade : I say, when I consider these things, and many more that might be added, I cannot forbear feeling a degree of confidence in the plan ; and, at least, hoping that it is capable of being improved into something that will give relief to our finances.

I do not believe, that the advantages will be so great in fact, as they seem to be in speculation. They will be limited by the means of commerce which the States produce ; and these may not be

so extensive in the beginning as the plan supposes. Beside this, the profits of the commerce will not be so large, in proportion, after the first or second year, as during those years: neither will it be possible to increase the paper credit in the same degree. But the Bank of England is a striking example, how far this may be carried, when supported by public authority and private influence. On the other hand, a variety of secondary expedients may be invented, to enlarge the advantages of the Bank. The whole system of annuities, as practiced in England, may be engrafted upon it, with such differences as are proper to accommodate it to our circumstances. The European loan may also be converted into a European Bank, the interests of which, being interwoven with the American Bank, may engage rich individuals there in promoting and extending the plan.

Very beneficial contracts may be made between Government and the Company, for supplying the army, by which money may be saved to the public, the army better furnished, and the profits of the Bank extended.

I have confined the Bank to the space of ten years; because this will be long enough to judge of its advantages and disadvantages: and the latter may be rectified by giving it a new form. I do not suppose it will ever be discontinued; because it seems to be founded on principles that

must always operate well, and make it the interest, both of Government and the Company, to uphold it. But I suppose the plan capable of improvement, which experience will suggest.

I give one half the whole property of the Bank to the United States ; because it is not only just, but desirable, to both parties. The United States contribute a great part of the stock ; their authority is essential to the existence of the Bank ; their credit is pledged for its support. The plan would ultimately fail, if the terms were too favourable to the Company, and too hard upon Government. It might be encumbered with a debt which it could never pay, and be obliged to take refuge in a bankruptcy. The share which the State has in the profits, will induce it to grant more ample privileges, without which the trade of the Company might often be under restrictions injurious to its success.

It is not, perhaps, absolutely necessary that the sum subscribed should be so considerable as I have stated it, though the larger the better. It is only necessary it should be considerable enough to engage a sufficient number of the principal monied men in the scheme. But Congress must take care to proportion the advantages they give and receive.

It may be objected, that this plan will be prejudicial to trade, by making the Government a par-

ty with a trading Company ; which may be a temptation to arrogate exclusive privileges, and thereby fetter that spirit of enterprise and competition, on which the prosperity of commerce depends. But Congress may satisfy the jealousies on this head, by a solemn resolution not to grant exclusive privileges, which alone can make the objection valid. Large trading Companies must be beneficial to the commerce of a nation, when they are not invested with these, because they furnish a capital with which the most extensive enterprises may be undertaken. There is no doubt the establishment proposed, would be very serviceable at this juncture, merely in a commercial view ; for private adventurers are not a match for the numerous obstacles resulting from the present posture of affairs.

The present plan is the product of some reading on the subjects of commerce and finance, and of occasional reflections on our particular situation ; but a want of leisure has prevented its being examined in so many lights, and digested so materially, as its importance requires. If the outlines are thought worthy of attention, and any difficulties occur which demand explanation : or if the plan be approved, and the further thoughts of the writer are desired ; a letter directed to James Montague, Esquire, lodged in the post office at Morristown, will be a safe channel of any com-

munications you may think proper to make; and an immediate answer will be given. Though the writer has reasons which make him unwilling to be known; if a personal conference with him should be thought material, he will endeavour to comply.

You will consider this as a hasty production, and excuse the incorrectnesses with which it abounds.

I am, Sir, very respectfully,

Your most obedient and humble servant.

HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.

Amboy, March 17, 1780.

DEAR SIR:

I duly received your letter of the fourteenth, and shall not fail, in conjunction with General St. Clair, to attend to the military object of it. I am much obliged to your Excellency for the communication of your Southern advices. The enemy are still in the dark about their fleet and army gone that way, as we gather from the commissioners. They pretend to have little European news, though a vessel arrived two or three days since from England, after ten weeks passage. We send you some late New York papers.

The commission has been several days at an end. The enemy, as was supposed, had no idea of treat-

ing on national ground. We are now in private conversation, and so far not without hopes that the liberation of our prisoners will be effected on *admissible* terms. Two or three days more will probably put an end to the interview. General St. Clair and Colonel Carrington, beg their respects may be presented to your Excellency.

I have the honour to be,

Very respectfully and affectionately,

Your Excellency's most ob't servant,

ALEX. HAMILTON.

HAMILTON TO BARON STEUBEN.

May 10, 1780.

DEAR BARON:

General Knox, in conversation, has observed to the General, that instead of sending to Philadelphia for the fifteen hundred arms mentioned in your letter of the sixth, and sending those here to that place to be fitted, it would be a great saving of expense, in the article of transportation, to have the bayonets and accoutrements brought on without the arms, and fitted to those now here; which can easily be done at the Park. The question is, if the arms here have no other defect than want of bayonets. The General will be glad to know what you think of General Knox's proposal. It seems to him eligible, unless there are reasons he is not acquainted with.

If there are any other articles you wish to have sent for (the General thinks you mentioned something of the kind to him), he will be glad to know what they are.

We have heard from the Marquis. He will be here at dinner. Will you dine with us also? The General requests it.

I have the honour to be, dear Baron,
Your very humble servant,
ALEX. HAMILTON, A. D. C.

HAMILTON TO BARON STEUBEN.

DEAR BARON:

I am commanded by the General to inform you, that the enemy are out in considerable force; and, by the last advice, were advancing this way. We are going to meet them. The General is just set out for Chatham, and will be happy to meet you there.

Yours respectfully,

A. HAMILTON, A. D. C.

HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.

June 8, 1780.

SIR:

I have seen the enemy. Those in view I calculate at about three thousand: there may be, and

probably enough are, others out of sight. They have sent all their horse to the other side, except about fifty or sixty. Their baggage, it is agreed on all hands, has also been sent across, and their wounded. It is not ascertained that any of their infantry have passed to the other side. There are four or five hundred on the opposite point; but it is uncertain whether they are those who went from this side, or those who were on Staten Island. I rather suppose the former.

Different conjectures may be made. The present movement may be calculated to draw us down and betray us into an action. They may have desisted from their intention of passing till night, for fear of our falling upon their rear. I believe this is the case: for as they have but few boats, it would certainly be a delicate manœuvre to cross in our face. We are taking measures to watch their motions to-night, as closely as possible. An incessant but *very light* skirmishing. Very few boats, not more than enough to carry three or four hundred men at a time. It is likely more will come down this evening.

I have the honor to be,

Your Excellency's most obedient servant,

ALEX. HAMILTON.

HAMILTON TO BARON STEUBEN.

Whippany, June 25, 1780.

DEAR BARON:

The enemy, the day before yesterday, made a forward movement to Springfield, which they burnt, and retired to Elizabethtown Point. The same evening they crossed over to Staten Island; and there are a great many concurring circumstances which make it probable we shall next hear of them on the North River. As you are at West Point, the General wishes you to remain there until the present appearances come to some result. He has confidence in your judgment, and wishes you to give your advice and assistance to the commanding officer. As you have no command in the post, you can only do this in a private friendly way: but I dare say General Howe will be happy to consult you. You will consider this as a private letter in which I rather convey you the General's wishes than his commands.

All the army is in march toward you, and will be at Pumpton this evening.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully and affectionately,

Your humble servant,

ALEX. HAMILTON,

HAMILTON TO BARON STEUBEN.

Head Quarters, Ramapo, June 30, 1780.

Agreeably to your request, my dear Baron, I communicated your project to the General. Happily the inactivity of the enemy has given us time to make dispositions which render the calling out the militia unnecessary; and the whole has been accordingly countermanded.

The General requests that when you have completed the object of your errand in your department, and put things in train, you will rejoin the army.

I wrote you a line from Whippany, of which you made no mention.

I have the honour to be, yours,

A. H.

HAMILTON TO BARON STEUBEN.

Head Quarters, July 23, 1780.

I have received, my dear Baron, your two letters of the sixteenth and eighteenth. On the formation of the Light Infantry, the General has already written to you. I presume it will be, ultimately, nearly as you have proposed.

Smith set out, some days since, to join you. Bradford, I am told, is undecided about entering into the office. Col. Scammel has promised to bring him to me; and if he accepts, we will forward

him. I believe Prescott will be appointed in the Light Infantry. *Entrenous*, 't is not easy to find good Majors for this corps in the Massachusetts Line; and as it will act a good deal with the French troops, we wish it (for this additional reason) to be well officered. Prescott will answer the purpose: but he is not yet to know that he is in contemplation. We shall not long continue in our present position. The distinctions of departments are an old story, which now do not exist except with respect to South Carolina. You are with a detachment of the main army.

I dare say all you are doing will be found right. I shall join my *beau-pere* to save you from the cord. The arrangement for your department was unfortunately sent to Congress soon after you went from here; with the most pressing instances to determine upon it without delay. We have heard nothing of it since. We have repeated our *prayers* and *exhortations*. If we get no answer in three or four days, we must determine for ourselves.

Major Francis is returned from Philadelphia; but I have not seen him since the arrival of your letters. I will move the inquiry you wish, when I see him. Can you do anything for him in your department?

A severe stroke upon us, is, that our arms, expected from France, are not arrived. I do not know how we shall be able to arm our recruits.

Graves sailed from the Hook the nineteenth. We had been playing off and on two days.

Adieu, my dear Baron, and believe me always, with the most respectful attachment,

Your humble servant,

A. H.

BAUMAN TO HAMILTON.

West Point, August 13, 1780.

DEAR SIR:

I cannot help laying before you a few of my thoughts, which lately have engrossed my whole attention, on the review of our changeable Government at West Point. However, I hope you will make no other use of them but such as may be of advantage; and whatever may be improper, or improperly stated, impute to my inability only: and there you will please to let it rest, and take in good part what I shall say, as it proceeds from a zeal of affection to you, and from a regard to the cause I am engaged in. On this consideration you will excuse me, if anywhere I should seem to exceed those bounds which custom has prescribed to subalterns, when they treat of anything, or adopt modes, to their superiors.

A continual change of commanding officers, or Commandants, is, in my humble opinion, injurious to this post, and hurtful to the military duty, so absolutely requisite to be performed, and pre-

served, in a garrison. As there is no nation at war which pursues the like mode excepting us; I am therefore induced, not only from this consideration, but from weighty experience during my station at this post, to offer an opinion of its impropriety, and bad consequences. The visible ill it creates; the damage to innumerable things; the irregularity it continually causes; and lastly, the total loss of the many thousands which have been, and daily are, expended on this national fabric, which inevitably must fall to pieces, unless an officer is fixed to this post (and who ought to be a competent judge of fortifications, and a military man), are matters which, I think, demand consideration.

A Town-Major, and a good Barrack-Master, are as necessary here, as the necessaries of life are. The former to regulate the duty and to keep up discipline in this jurisdiction: the latter to take care of the buildings, which must otherwise be destroyed. The next thing which falls to our attention, is the public provision, which has been, and daily is, exposed here to be lost, to be stolen, and to be damaged, for want of sufficient shelter and proper repositories. The troops have suffered, and still suffer, from these and other causes. They have been cheated in weights, in measure, and in their scanty allowance of fatigue rum; which I can attest, by being appointed, after my having repre-

sented the matter to General M'Dougall, to inspect into some of those abuses. Notwithstanding the many thousands of boards which came here, there are not sufficient for barracks, bunks, etc. For as fast as one thing is built up, another is torn down again. There is not, in all this garrison, a proper guard-house for the conveniency of soldiers, nor for the security of the criminals. No powder magazine, nor a store for the reception and reserve of the implements of war. In short, the whole appears, at present, under the care of ungovernable and undisciplined militia, like a wild tartar's camp, instead of that shining fortification all America thinks not only an insurmountable barrier against the incursion of its enemy, but likewise an easy defence in case of an unforeseen disaster of its army.

However, to return to my subject. The importance of those heads already mentioned, and their connexion with those preceding, will, I hope, obtain your pardon for the digression into which they have led me; and to your discretion I shall leave what I state.

In a letter I wrote to General Knox some time last winter, among many things I had to say concerning the ordnance and myself, I made this remark, to wit: "That relieving of an officer from a garrison, is not like a relieve in the field; for an officer who knows himself to be relieved,

will leave many things undone for the next to do; which I have seen, heard, and experienced. Beside, after once everything is to rights, the men then ought to desist from labour, and exercise the guns. But new commanding officers have chiefly new systems of defence, which add labour to labour, and nothing will be formed systematically."

I have already stated these and more things minutely to the general officers here, who all agreed in their validity and propriety. But they, being all liable to immediate removal, there cannot be anything formed into a permanent and regular system. Moreover, I have been informed, that owing to the mismangement of their predecessors, they were obliged, after they had taken the command, to hunt for materials in order to build their own systems; and to issue orders upon orders, to acquaint themselves with those persons who have, as it were, in keeping, the several branches which flow into this department.

And let me once more, in confidence, assure you, that I suffer incessant pain from the sad state this garrison is in. To rectify defects, my dear Sir, when roused to arms, can never be attainable. Therefore let me beg you to assist in adopting some plan which may be soldiery, for the good of the service: which, however, can be done in no

other manner, but such as I have hinted to you. For let General Arnold have all the sagacity imaginable, it will take him some time to get himself well acquainted with the position and defence of this post; especially as there is not one single Continental officer left here who can any way assist him. Everything seems new here; and the very engineer is transferred from hence, on whom he, in some measure, could have depended for information, with regard to the weakest and strongest parts of this fortress. And I have not yet told you the one hundredth part of what I have to say upon some of these subjects; but I shall finish with prognosticating, that should ever capriciousness hold sway here, it may prove fatal to this post.

I am, with due respect, Sir,

Your most humble servant,

S. BAUMAN,

Major of Artillery.

WILLIAMS TO HAMILTON.

Hillsborough, August 30, 1780.

DEAR HAMILTON:

About the twenty-third instant, I wrote my friend Harrison from Salisbury, giving him a very hasty particular account of the defeat of General Gates' army at Sutton's, near Campden, the sixteenth instant. We were truly unfortunate, and

completely routed. The infamous cowardice of the militia of Virginia and North Carolina, gave the enemy every advantage over our few regular troops, whose firm opposition and gallant behaviour have gained them the applause, as well of our successful foes, as of our runaway friends. If I mentioned to Col. Harrison the loss of two howitzers, I was mistaken. We had eight pieces of light artillery, with six ammunition waggons, which, with the greatest part of our baggage, were lost.

Our retreat was the most mortifying that could have happened. Those who escaped the dangers of the field, knew not where to find protection: the wounded found no relief from the inhabitants, who were immediately in arms against us; and many of our fugitive officers and men were disarmed by those faithless villains, who had flattered us with promises of joining us against the enemy. The tories are now assembling in different parts of the country; and there is actually a sort of partisan war waged between them and the whigs of this country.

The greatest part of our baggage was plundered by those who first left the field. The enemy took a part; and much of what escaped them, has been pillaged by the inhabitants on the retreat. The waggon horses have been stolen, and frequently taken from the drivers; and some of those desperate rascals have been daring enough to fire upon par-

ties of our regular troops many miles from the place of action.

General Gates used the utmost expedition in getting from the lost field to this place. As this step is unaccountable to me, you must expect to know the reason another time, and from better authority. An unfortunate General usually loses the confidence of his army; and this is much the case with us at present. However, I suppose everything necessary will be done, in justification of the steps that have been taken, and then all will be understood. Beside my ignorance, there is another reason for my silence on this subject. The General is extremely mortified at the disappointment his hopes have met with; and I think it ungenerous to oppress dejected spirits by a premature censure.

The legislature of this State is now sitting at this place, and devising means of defending the country. The General has exhibited estimates (he informs me) of the supplies wanting to carry on the campaign, both to the legislature of this State, and to Virginia; and hopes they will be furnished. The officers of North Carolina talk confidently of re-embodiment a great number of militia. General Stephens had collected about eight hundred of the Virginia militia at this place since the action. But I am sorry to add, at least half that number have deserted. The Maryland Division, including the Delaware regiment, will, I hope, muster six

hundred when all are collected. Part are now here : a party are with General Smallwood at Ellis's Ferry, Adkin river ; and a small party with Major Anderson, who General Smallwood left some time at Charlotte, to receive the fugitives as they arrived. But this is the place of general rendezvous.

From the best accounts I can get, Lord Cornwallis had with him, on the day of battle, the seventy-first, sixty-third, thirty-third, and twenty-third British regiments ; a corps of Hessians, Tarlton's Legion, and some new levies, amounting to about three thousand men. Our numbers were very little greater ; and our force will not be imagined so great, by those who are informed of our long march in a barren country, with very little other subsistence than a short allowance of fresh beef, green corn, apples, and peaches.

As soon as I recover from a relaxation of spirits, which is all my present complaint, I will write you again, and inform you that we are resolved not to despair, but bear our fortunes like veterans in the South ; while you, like heroes in the North, win and wear the laurels of the present campaign.

Present my most respectful compliments to the General, whom I love ; to all my friends at Head Quarters and in camp. Not a man among you have been generous enough to write a single sentence to

Your sincere friend and servant,

O. H. WILLIAMS.

I mentioned the surprise of General Sumpter's

party, which happened the sixteenth instant, in my last.

HAMILTON TO JAMES DUANE.

Liberty Pole, September 3, 1780.

DEAR SIR :

Agreeably to your request, and my promise, I sit down to give you my ideas of the defects of our present system, and the changes necessary to save us from ruin. They may, perhaps, be the reveries of a projector, rather than the sober views of a politician. You will judge of them, and make what use you please of them.

The fundamental defect is a want of power in Congress. It is hardly worth while to show in what this consists, as it seems to be universally acknowledged; or to point out how it has happened, as the only question is how to remedy it. It may, however, be said, that it has originated from three causes: An excess of the spirit of liberty, which has made the particular States show a jealousy of all power not in their own hands; and this jealousy has led them to exercise a right of judging in the last resort of the measures recommended by Congress, and of acting according to their own opinions of their propriety, or necessity; a diffidence, in Congress, of their own powers, by which they have been timid and indecisive in their resolutions; constantly making concessions to the States, till

they have scarcely left themselves the shadow of power; a want of sufficient means at their disposal to answer the public exigencies, and of vigour to draw forth those means; which have occasioned them to depend on the States individually, to fulfil their engagements with the army; the consequence of which, has been to ruin their influence and credit with the army, to establish its dependence on each State separately, rather than *on them*, that is, rather than on the whole collectively.

It may be pleaded, that Congress had never any definite powers granted them, and, of course, could exercise none, could do nothing more than recommend. The manner in which Congress was appointed, would warrant, and the public good required, that they should have considered themselves as vested with full power *to preserve the republic from harm*. They have done many of the highest acts of sovereignty, which were always cheerfully submitted to: The declaration of independence; the declaration of war; the levying of an army; creating a navy; emitting money; making alliances with foreign powers; appointing a dictator, etc., etc. All these implications of a complete sovereignty were never disputed, and ought to have been a standard for the whole conduct of administration. Undefined powers are discretionary powers, limited only by the object for which they were given; in the present case, the independence

and freedom of America. The Confederation made no difference; for as it has not been generally adopted, it had no operation. But from what I recollect of it, Congress have even descended from the authority which the spirit of that act gives them; while the particular States have no further attended to it, than as it suited their pretensions and convenience. It would take too much time to enter into particular instances, each of which separately might appear considerable; but united, are of serious import. I only mean to remark, not to censure.

But the Confederation itself is defective, and requires to be altered. It is neither fit for war nor peace. The idea of an uncontrollable sovereignty, in each State, over its internal police, will defeat the other powers given to Congress, and make our union feeble and precarious. There are instances without number, where Acts, necessary for the general good, and which rise out of the powers given to Congress, must interfere with the internal police of the States; and there are as many instances in which the particular States, by arrangements of internal police, can effectually, though indirectly, counteract the arrangements of Congress. You have already had examples of this, for which I refer you to your own memory.

The Confederation gives the States, individually, too much influence in the affairs of the army. They should have nothing to do with it. The entire

formation and disposal of our military forces, ought to belong to Congress. It is an essential cement of the union: and it ought to be the policy of Congress, to destroy all ideas of State attachments in the army, and make it look up wholly to them. For this purpose, all appointments, promotions, and provisions, whatsoever, ought to be made by them. It may be apprehended that this may be dangerous to liberty. But nothing appears more evident to me, than that we run much greater risk of having a weak and disunited federal government, than one which will be able to usurp upon the rights of the people.

Already some of the lines of the army would obey their States in opposition to Congress, notwithstanding the pains we have taken to preserve the unity of the army. If anything would hinder this, it would be the personal influence of the General; a melancholy and mortifying consideration.

The forms of our State constitutions, must always give them great weight in our affairs, and will make it too difficult to bend them to the pursuit of a common interest; too easy to oppose whatever they do not like; and to form partial combinations subversive of the general one. There is a wide difference between our situation, and that of an empire under one simple form of government, distributed into counties, provinces, or districts, which have no legislatures, but merely magistral

bodies, to execute the laws of a common sovereign. Here the danger is, that the sovereign will have too much power, and oppress the parts of which it is composed. In our case, that of an empire composed of confederated States; each with a government completely organized within itself, having all the means to draw its subjects to a close dependence on itself; the danger is directly the reverse. It is, that the common sovereign will not have power sufficient to unite the different members together, and direct the common forces to the interest and happiness of the whole.

The leagues among the old Grecian republics are a proof of this. They were continually at war with each other; and, for want of union, fell a prey to their neighbours. They frequently held general councils; but their resolutions were no further observed, than as they suited the interests and inclinations of all the parties; and, at length, they sunk entirely into contempt.

The Swiss Cantons are another proof of the doctrine. They have had wars with each other, which would have been fatal to them, had not the different powers, in their neighbourhood, been too jealous of one another, and too equally matched, to suffer either to take advantage of their quarrels. That they have remained so long united at all, is to be attributed to their weakness, to their poverty, and to the cause just mentioned. These

ties will not exist in America: a little time hence, some of the States will be powerful empires; and we are so remote from other nations, that we shall have all the leisure and opportunity we can wish, to cut each other's throats.

The Germanic corps might also be cited as an example in favour of the position.

The United Provinces may be thought to be one against it. But the family of the Stadtholders, whose authority is interwoven with the whole Government, has been a strong link of union between them. Their physical necessities, and the habits founded upon them, have contributed to it.

Each province is too inconsiderable, by itself, to undertake anything. An analysis of their present constitutions, would show that they have many ties which would not exist in ours; and that they are by no means a proper model for us.

Our own experience should satisfy us. We have felt the difficulty of drawing out the resources of the country, and inducing the States to combine in equal exertions for the common cause. The ill success of our last attempt is striking. Some have done a great deal; others little, or scarcely anything. The disputes about boundaries, etc., testify how flattering a prospect we have of future tranquility, if we do not frame, in time, a confederacy capable of deciding the differences,

and compelling the obedience of the respective members.

The Confederation, too, gives the power of the purse too entirely to the State Legislatures. It should provide perpetual funds, in the disposal of Congress, by a land tax, poll tax, or the like. All imposts upon commerce, ought to be laid by Congress, and appropriated to their use. For, without certain revenues, a Government can have no power. That power which holds the purse-strings absolutely, must rule. This seems to be a medium which, without making Congress altogether independent, will tend to give reality to its authority.

Another defect in our system, is want of method and energy in the administration. This has partly resulted from the other defect; but in a great degree from prejudice, and the want of a proper executive. Congress have kept the power too much in their own hands, and have meddled too much with details of every sort. Congress is, properly, a deliberative corps; and it forgets itself when it attempts to play the executive. It is impossible such a body, numerous as it is, constantly fluctuating, can ever act with sufficient decision, or with system. Two thirds of the members, one half the time, cannot know what has gone before them, or what connexion the subject in hand, has to what has been transacted on former occasions. The

members who have been more permanent, will only give information, that promotes the side they espouse, in the present case ; and will as often mislead as enlighten. The variety of business must distract ; and the proneness of every assembly to debate, must at all times delay.

Lately, Congress, convinced of these inconveniences, have gone into the measure of appointing Boards. But this is, in my opinion, a bad plan.

A single man, in each department of the administration, would be greatly preferable. It would give us a chance of more knowledge, more activity, more responsibility, and, of course, more zeal and attention. Boards partake of a part of the inconveniences of larger assemblies. Their decisions are slower, their energy less, their responsibility more diffused. They will not have the same abilities and knowledge as an administration by single men. Men of the first pretensions, will not so readily engage in them ; because they will be less conspicuous, of less importance, have less opportunity of distinguishing themselves. The members of Boards will take less pains to inform themselves and arrive to eminence, because they have fewer motives to do it. All these reasons conspire to give a preference to the plan of vesting the great executive departments of the State in the hands of individuals. As these men will be, of course, at all times under the direction of

Congress, we shall blend the advantages of a Monarchy and Republic in our constitution.

A question has been made, whether single men could be found to undertake these offices. I think they could; because there would be then, everything to excite the ambition of candidates. But, in order to this, Congress, by their manner of appointing them, and the line of duty marked out, must show that they are in earnest in making these officers, officers of real trust and importance.

I fear a little vanity has stood in the way of these arrangements, as though they would lessen the importance of Congress, and leave them nothing to do. But they would have precisely the same rights and powers as heretofore, happily disencumbered of the detail. They would have to inspect the conduct of their ministers, deliberate upon their plans, originate others for the public good; only observing this rule: that they ought to consult their ministers, and get all the information and advice they could from them, before they entered into any new measures, or made changes in the old.

A third defect is, the fluctuating constitution of our army. This has been a pregnant source of evil: all our military misfortunes, three fourths of our civil embarrassments, are to be ascribed to it. The General has so fully enumerated the mischiefs of it, in a late letter of the _____, to Congress,

that I could only repeat what he has said, and will therefore refer you to that letter.

The imperfect and unequal provision made for the army, is a fourth defect, which you will find delineated in the same letter. Without a speedy change, the army must dissolve. It is now a mob, rather than an army; without clothing, without pay, without provision, without morals, without discipline. We begin to hate the country, for its neglect of us. The country begin to hate us, for our oppressions of them. Congress have long been jealous of us. We have now lost all confidence in them, and give the worst construction to all they do. Held together by the slenderest ties, we are ripening for a dissolution.

The present mode of supplying the army, by State purchases, is not one of the least considerable defects of our system. It is too precarious a dependence; because the States will never be sufficiently impressed with our necessities. Each will make its own ease a primary object; the supply of the army a secondary one. The variety of channels through which the business is transacted, will multiply the number of persons employed, and the opportunities of embezzling public money. From the popular spirit on which most of the Governments turn, the State agents will be men of less character and ability: nor will there be so rigid a responsibility among them, as there might easily be among those in the employ of the Conti-

ment; of course, not so much diligence, care, or economy. Very little of the money raised in the several States, will go into the Continental treasury, on pretence, that it is all exhausted in providing the quotas of supplies; and the public will be without funds for the other demands of Government. The expense will be ultimately much greater, and the advantages much smaller. We actually feel the insufficiency of this plan; and have reason to dread, under it, a ruinous extremity of want.

These are the principal defects, in the present system, that now occur to me. There are many inferior ones, in the organization of particular departments, and many errors of administration, which might be pointed out; but the task would be troublesome and tedious: and if we had once remedied those I have mentioned, the others would not be attended with much difficulty.

I shall now propose the remedies, which appear to me applicable to our circumstances, and necessary to extricate our affairs from their present deplorable situation.

The first step must be, to give Congress powers competent to the public exigencies. This may happen in two ways: One, by resuming and exercising the discretionary powers I suppose to have been originally vested in them, for the safety of the States; and resting their conduct on the candour of their countrymen, and the necessity of the

conjuncture: the other, by calling immediately a Convention of all the States, with full authority to conclude finally upon a General Confederation; stating to them, beforehand, explicitly, the evils arising from a want of power in Congress, and the impossibility of supporting the contest on its present footing; that the delegates may come, possessed of proper sentiments, as well as proper authority, to give efficacy to the meeting. Their commission should include a right of vesting Congress with the whole, or a proportion, of the unoccupied lands, to be employed for the purpose of raising a revenue: reserving the jurisdiction to the States by whom they are granted.

The first plan, I expect, will be thought too bold an expedient, by the generality of Congress; and, indeed, their practice hitherto, has so riveted the opinion of their want of power, that the success of this experiment may very well be doubted.

I see no objection to the other mode, that has any weight, in competition with the reasons for it. The Convention should assemble the first of November next. The sooner the better. Our disorders are too violent to admit of a common or lingering remedy. The reasons for which I require them to be vested with plenipotentiary authority, are, that the business may suffer no delay in the execution; and may, in reality, come to effect. A Convention may agree upon a Confederation: the States, individually, hardly ever will. We must

have one at all events, and a vigorous one, if we mean to succeed in the contest, and be happy hereafter. As I said before, to engage the States to comply with this mode, Congress ought to confess to them, plainly and unanimously, the impracticability of supporting our affairs on the present footing, and without a solid coercive union. I ask, that the Convention should have a power of vesting the whole, or a part, of the unoccupied lands in Congress; because it is necessary that body should have some property, as a fund for the arrangements of finance; and I know of no other kind that can be given them.

The Confederation, in my opinion, should give Congress complete sovereignty; except as to that part of internal police, which relates to the rights of property and life among individuals, and to raising money by internal taxes. It is necessary that everything belonging to this, should be regulated by the State legislatures. Congress should have complete sovereignty in all that relates to war, peace, trade, finance; and to the management of foreign affairs; the right of declaring war; of raising armies, officering, paying them, directing their motions in every respect; of equipping fleets, and doing the same with them; of building fortifications, arsenals, magazines, etc., etc.; of making peace on such conditions as they think proper; of regulating trade, determining with what countries it shall be carried on; granting indulgencies; laying prohi-

bitious on all the articles of export, or import; imposing duties; granting bounties and premiums for raising, exporting, or importing, and applying to their own use, the product of these duties; only giving credit to the States on whom they are raised, in the general account of revenues and expenses; instituting Admiralty Courts, etc.; of coining money; establishing Banks on such terms, and with such privileges, as they think proper; appropriating funds, and doing whatever else relates to the operations of finance; transacting everything with foreign nations; making alliances, offensive and defensive; treaties of commerce, etc., etc.

The Confederation should provide certain perpetual revenues, productive, and easy of collection; a land tax, poll tax, or the like; which, together with the duties on trade, and the unlocated lands, would give Congress a substantial existence, and a stable foundation for their schemes of finance. What more supplies were necessary, should be occasionally demanded of the States, in the present mode of quotas.

The second step I would recommend, is, that Congress should instantly appoint the following great officers of State. A Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a President of War, a President of Marine, a Financier, a President of Trade. Instead of this last, a Board of Trade may be preferable, as the regulations of trade are slow and gradual; and re-

quire prudence and experience more than other qualities; for which Boards are very well adapted.

Congress should choose for these offices, men of the first abilities, property, and character, in the Continent; and such as have had the best opportunities of being acquainted with the several branches. General Schuyler, whom you mentioned, would make an excellent President of War; General M'Dougall a very good President of Marine. Mr. Robert Morris would have many things in his favour for the department of finance. He could, by his own personal influence, give great weight to the measures he should adopt. I dare say men, equally capable, may be found for the other departments.

I know not if it would not be a good plan to let the Financier be President of the Board of Trade; but he should only have a casting voice in determining questions there. There is a connexion between trade and finance, which ought to make the director of one acquainted with the other; but the Financier should not direct the affairs of trade, because, for the sake of acquiring reputation by increasing the revenues, he might adopt measures that would depress trade. In what relates to finance, he should be alone.

These officers should have nearly the same powers and functions as those in France analagous to them; and each should be Chief in his depart-

ment; with subordinate Boards, composed of assistants, clerks, etc., to execute his orders.

In my opinion, a plan of this kind would be of inconceivable utility to our affairs: its benefits would be very speedily felt. It would give new life and energy to the operations of Government. Business would be conducted with despatch, method, and system. A million of abuses, now existing, would be corrected; and judicious plans would be formed and executed for the public good.

Another step of immediate necessity, is, to recruit the army for the war, or at least for three years. This must be done by a mode similar to that which is practiced in Sweden. There the inhabitants are thrown into classes of sixteen; and when the sovereign wants men, each of these classes must furnish one. They raise a fixed sum of money; and if one of the class is willing to become a soldier, he receives the money and offers himself a volunteer. If none is found to do this, a draught is made; and he on whom the lot falls, receives the money, and is obliged to serve.

The minds of the people are prepared for a thing of this kind. The heavy bounties they have been obliged to pay for men to serve a few months, must have disgusted them with this mode, and made them desirous of another, that will, once for all, answer the public purposes, and obviate a re-

petition of the demand. It ought, by all means, to be attempted; and Congress should frame a general plan, and press the execution upon the States.

When the Confederation comes to be framed, it ought to provide for this by a fundamental law; and hereafter there would be no doubt of the success.

But we cannot now wait for this. We want to replace the men whose times of service will expire the first of January: for then, without this, we shall have no army remaining; and the enemy may do what they please. The General, in his letter already quoted, has assigned the most substantial reasons for paying immediate attention to this point.

Congress should endeavour, both upon their credit in Europe, and by every possible exertion in this country, to provide clothing for their officers; and should abolish the whole system of State supplies. The making good the depreciation of the currency, and all other compensations to the army, should be immediately taken up by Congress, and not left to the States. If they would have the accounts of depreciation liquidated, and governmental certificates given for what is due, in specie, or an equivalent to specie, it would give satisfaction; appointing periodical settlements for future depreciation.

The placing the officers upon half-pay during life, would be a great stroke of policy ; and would give Congress a stronger tie upon them than any thing else they can do. No man, that reflects a moment, but will prefer a permanent provision of this kind to any temporary compensation. Nor is it opposed to economy : the difference between this, and between what has been already done, will be insignificant. The benefit of it to the widows, should be confined to those whose husbands die during the war. As to the survivors, not more than one half, on the usual calculation of men's lives, will exceed the seven years for which the half-pay is already established. Beside this, whatever may be the visionary speculations of some men at this time, we shall find it indispensable, after the war, to keep on foot a considerable body of troops : and all the officers, retained for this purpose, must be deducted out of the half-pay list. If any one will take the pains to calculate the expense of these principles, I am persuaded he will find the addition of expense, from the establishment proposed, by no means a national object.

The advantages of securing the attachment of the army to Congress, and binding them to the service by substantial ties, are immense. We should then have discipline ; an army in reality, as well as in name. Congress would then have a solid basis of authority and consequence : for, to

me, it is an axiom, that in our constitution, an army is essential to the American Union.

The providing of supplies, is the pivot of every thing else (though a well-constituted army would, not in a small degree, conduce to this, by giving consistency and weight to Government). There are four ways, all which must be united : A foreign loan ; heavy pecuniary taxes ; a tax in kind ; a Bank founded on public and private credit.

As to a foreign loan, I dare say Congress are doing every thing in their power to obtain it. The most effectual way will be to tell France, that, without it, we must make terms with Great Britain. This must be done with plainness and firmness ; but with respect, and without petulance ; not as a menace, but as a candid declaration of our circumstances.

We need not fear to be deserted by France. Her interest and honour are too deeply involved in our fate ; and she can make no possible compromise. She can assist us, if she is convinced it is absolutely necessary ; either by lending us, herself, or by becoming our surety, or by influencing Spain. It has been to me astonishing, how any man could have doubted, at any period of our affairs, of the necessity of a foreign loan. It was self-evident, that we had not a fund of wealth in this country capable of affording revenues equal to the expenses. We must then create artificial revenues,

or borrow. The first was done ; but it ought to have been foreseen that the expedient could not last, and we should have provided in time for its failure.

Here was an error of Congress. I have good reason to believe, that measures were not taken, in earnest, early enough to procure a loan abroad. I give you my honour, that from our first outset, I thought as I do now, and wished for a foreign loan ; not only because I foresaw it would be essential, but because I considered it as a tie upon the nation from which it was derived, and as a mean to prop our cause in Europe.

Concerning the necessity of heavy pecuniary taxes, I need say nothing ; as it is a point in which everybody is agreed. Nor is there any danger, that the product of any taxes, raised in this way, will overburthen the people, or exceed the wants of the public. Indeed, if all the paper in circulation were drawn annually into the treasury, it would neither do one nor the other.

As to a tax in kind, the necessity of it results from this principle : that the money in circulation is not a sufficient representative of the productions of the country ; and, consequently, no revenues, raised from it as a medium, can be a competent representative of that part of the products of the country which it is bound to contribute to the support of the public. The public, therefore, to

obtain its due, or satisfy its just demands, and its wants, must call for a part of those products themselves. This is done in all those countries which are not commercial; in Russia, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, etc.; and is peculiarly necessary in our case.

Congress, in calling for specific supplies, seem to have had this in view; but their intention has not been answered. The States, in general, have undertaken to furnish the supplies by purchase; a mode, as I have observed, attended with every inconvenience, and subverting the principle on which the supplies were demanded; the insufficiency of our circulating medium as a representative for the labour and commodities of the country. It is therefore necessary that Congress should be more explicit; should form the outlines of a plan for a tax in kind, and recommend it to the States as a measure of absolute necessity.

The general idea I have of a plan, is, that a respectable man should be appointed by the State, in each county, to collect the taxes and form magazines; that Congress should have, in each State, an officer to superintend the whole; and that the State collectors should be subordinate and responsible to them. This Continental Superintendent might be subject to the general direction of the Quarter-Master-General, or not, as might be deemed best; but if not subject to him,

he should be obliged to make monthly returns to the President at War, who should instruct him what proportion to deliver to the Quarter-Master-General. It may be necessary, that the Superintendents should sometimes have power to dispose of the articles in their possession, on public account; for it would happen, that the contributions, in places remote from the army, could not be transported to the theatre of operations without too great expense; in which case it would be eligible to dispose of them, and purchase, with the money so raised, in the countries near the immediate scene of war.

I know the objections which may be raised to this plan; its tendency to discourage industry, and the like. But necessity calls for it. We cannot proceed without: and less evils must give place to greater. It is, beside, practiced with success in other countries, and why not in this? It may be said, the examples cited are from nations under despotic governments; and that the same would not be practicable with us. But I contend, where the public good is evidently the object, more may be effected in governments like ours, than in any other. It has been a constant remark, that free countries have ever paid the heaviest taxes. The obedience of a free people to general laws, however hard they bear, is ever more perfect than that of slaves to the arbitrary will of a

prince. To this it may be added, that Sweden was always a free government ; and is so now, in a great degree, notwithstanding the late revolution.

How far it may be practicable to erect a Bank on the joint credit of the public and of individuals, can only be certainly determined by the experiment. But it is of so much importance, that the experiment ought to be fully tried. When I saw the subscriptions going on to the Bank established for supplying the army, I was in hopes it was only the embryo of a more permanent and extensive establishment. But I have reason to believe I shall be disappointed. It does not seem to be at all conducted on the true principles of a Bank.

The Directors of it are purchasing with their Stock, instead of Bank notes, as I expected : in consequence of which, it must turn out to be a mere subscription of a particular sum of money for a particular purpose.

Paper credit never was long supported in any country, on a national scale, where it was not founded on the joint basis of public and private credit. An attempt to establish it on public credit alone, in France, under the auspices of Mr. Law, had nearly ruined the kingdom. We have seen the effects of it in America ; and every successive experiment, proves the futility of the attempt. Our new money is depreciating almost as fast as the old ; though it has, in some States,

as real funds as paper money ever had. The reason is, that the monied men have not an immediate interest to uphold its credit. They may even, in many ways, find it their interest to undermine it. The only certain manner to obtain a permanent paper credit, is to engage the monied interest immediately in it, by making them contribute the whole, or part, of the Stock, and giving them the whole, or part, of the profits.

The invention of Banks, on the modern principle, originated in Venice. There the public, and a Company of monied men, are mutually concerned. The Bank of England unites public authority and faith with private credit: and hence we see, what a vast fabric of paper credit is raised on a visionary basis. Had it not been for this, England would never have found sufficient funds to carry on her wars: but, with the help of this, she has done, and is doing, wonders. The Bank of Amsterdam is on a similar foundation.

And why can we not have an American Bank? Are our monied men less enlightened to their own interest, or less enterprising in the pursuit? I believe the fault is in Government, which does not exert itself to engage them in such a scheme. It is true, the individuals in America are not very rich; but this would not prevent their instituting a Bank; it would only prevent its being done with such ample funds as in other countries. Have

they not sufficient confidence in the Government, and in the issue of the cause? Let the Government endeavour to inspire that confidence, by adopting the measures I have recommended, or others equivalent to them. Let it exert itself to procure a solid Confederation; to establish a good plan of executive administration; to form a permanent military force; to obtain, at all events, a foreign loan. If these things were in a train of vigorous execution, it would give a new spring to our affairs; Government would recover its respectability, and individuals would renounce their diffidence.

The object I should propose to myself, in the first instance, from a Bank, would be an auxiliary mode of supplies; for which purpose, contracts should be made, between Government and the Bank, on terms liberal and advantageous to the latter. Everything should be done, in the first instance, to encourage the Bank. After it gets well established, it will take care of itself; and Government may make the best terms it can, for itself.

The first step to establishing the Bank, will be to engage a number of monied men of influence to relish the project, and make it a business. The subscribers to that lately established, are the fittest persons that can be found; and their plan may be interwoven.

The outlines of my plan would be, to open subscriptions in all the States, for the Stock, which we will suppose to be one million of pounds. Real property, of every kind, as well as specie, should be deemed good Stock; but at least a fourth part of the subscription should be in specie, or plate. There should be one great Company, in three divisions; in Virginia, Philadelphia, and at Boston; or two at Philadelphia and Boston. The Bank should have a right to issue Bank notes, bearing two per cent. interest, for the whole of their Stock; but not to exceed it. These notes may be payable every three months, or oftener: and the faith of Government must be pledged for the support of the Bank. It must therefore have a right, from time to time, to inspect its operations, and must appoint inspectors for the purpose.

The advantages of the Bank may consist in this; in the profits of the contracts made with Government, which should bear interest to be annually paid in specie; in the loan of money at interest, say six per cent.; in purchasing lives by annuities, as practiced in England, etc. The benefit resulting to the Company, is evident from the consideration, that they may employ, in circulation, a great deal more money than they have specie in Stock, on the credit of the real property which they will have in other use. This money will be employed, either in fulfilling their contracts

with the public, by which also they will gain a profit; or in loans at an advantageous interest, or in annuities.

The Bank may be allowed to purchase plate and bullion, and coin money; allowing Government a part of the profit. I make the Bank notes bear interest, to obtain a readier currency, and to induce the holders to prefer them to specie, to prevent too great a run upon the Bank, at any time, beyond its ability to pay.

If Government can obtain a foreign loan, it should lend to the Bank, on easy terms, to extend its influence, and facilitate a compliance with its engagements. If Government could engage the States to raise a sum of money in specie, to be deposited in Bank in the same manner, it would be of the greatest consequence. If Government could prevail on the enthusiasm of the people, to make a contribution in plate for the same purpose, it would be a master-stroke. Things of this kind sometimes succeed in popular contests; and, if undertaken with address, I should not despair of its success: but I should not be sanguine.

The Bank may be instituted for a term of years by way of trial; and the particular privilege of coining money, be for a term still shorter. A temporary transfer of it to a particular Company, can have no inconvenience, as the Government are in no condition to improve this resource; nor could

it, in our circumstances, be an object to them ; though, with the industry of a knot of individuals, it might be a valuable one to them.

A Bank of this kind, even in its commencement, would answer the most valuable purposes to Government and to the proprietors : in its progress, the advantages will exceed calculation. It will promote commerce, by furnishing a more extensive medium, which we greatly want, in our circumstances. I mean a more extensive valuable medium. We have an enormous nominal one at this time, but it is only a name.

In the present unsettled state of things in this country, we can hardly draw inferences from what has happened in others ; otherwise I should be certain of the success of this scheme : but I think it has enough in its favour to be worthy of trial.

I have only skimmed the surface of the different subjects I have introduced. Should the plans recommended come into contemplation, in earnest, and you desire my further thoughts, I will endeavour to give them more form and particularity. I am persuaded a solid Confederation, a permanent army, a reasonable prospect of subsisting it, would give us treble consideration in Europe, and produce a peace this winter.

If a Convention is called, the minds of all the States, and the people, ought to be prepared to receive its determinations by sensible and popular

writings, which should conform to the views of Congress. There are epochs in human affairs when *novelty* even is useful. If a general opinion prevails that the old way is bad, whether true or false, and this obstructs, or relaxes, the operations of the public service, a change is necessary, if it be but for the sake of change. This is exactly the case now. 'Tis a universal sentiment, that our present system is a bad one, and that things do not go right on this account. The measure of a Convention would revive the hopes of the people, and give a new direction to their passions, which may be improved in carrying points of substantial utility. The eastern States have already pointed out this mode to Congress: they ought to take the hint and anticipate the others.

And, in future, my dear Sir, two things let me recommend, as fundamental rules for the conduct of Congress: to attach the army to them by every motive; to maintain an air of authority (not domineering) in all their measures with the States. The manner in which a thing is done, has more influence than is commonly imagined. Men are governed by opinion: this opinion is as much influenced by appearances as by realities. If a Government appears to be confident of its own powers, it is the surest way to inspire the same confidence in others. If it is diffident, it may be certain there will be a still greater diffidence in others; and that its authority

will not only be distrusted, controverted, but contemned.

I wish, too, Congress would always consider, that a kindness consists as much in the manner as in the thing. The best things done hesitatingly, and with an ill grace, lose their effect, and produce disgust rather than satisfaction or gratitude. In what Congress have at any time done for the army, they have commonly been too late. They have seemed to yield to importunity rather than to sentiments of justice, or to a regard to the accommodation of their troops. An attention to this idea, is of more importance than it may be thought. I, who have seen all the workings and progress of the present discontents, am convinced, that a want of this has not been among the most inconsiderable causes.

You will perceive, my dear Sir, this letter is hastily written, and with a confidential freedom: not as to a member of Congress, whose feelings may be sore at the prevailing clamours; but as to a friend, who is in a situation to remedy public disorders; who wishes for nothing so much as truth; and who is desirous of information, even from those less capable of judging than himself. I have not even time to correct and copy; and only enough to add, that I am, very truly and affectionately, dear Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

A. HAMILTON.

HAMILTON TO COLONEL LAURENS.

[MAJOR ANDRE.]

September, 1780.

Since my return from Hartford, my dear Laurens, my mind has been too little at ease to permit me to write to you sooner. It has been wholly occupied by the affecting and tragic consequences of Arnold's treason. My feelings were never put to so severe a trial. You will no doubt have heard the principal facts before this reaches you. But there are particulars, to which my situation gave me access, that cannot have come to your knowledge from public report, which I am persuaded you will find interesting.

From several circumstances, the project seems to have originated with Arnold himself, and to have been long premeditated. The first overture is traced back to some time in June last. It was conveyed in a letter to Colonel Robinson; the substance of which was, that the ingratitude he had experienced from his country, concurring with other causes, had entirely changed his principles; that he now only sought to restore himself to the favour of his king, by some signal proof of his repentance; and would be happy to open a correspondence with Sir Henry Clinton for that purpose. About this period, he made a journey to Connecticut: on his return from which to Philadelphia, he solicited the command of West Point; alleging, that the effects of his wound had disqual-

ified him for the active duties of the field. The sacrifice of this important post was the atonement he intended to make. General Washington hesitated the less to gratify an officer who had rendered such eminent services, as he was convinced the post might be safely entrusted to one who had given so many distinguished specimens of his bravery. In the beginning of August he joined the army and renewed his application. The enemy, at this juncture, had embarked the greatest part of their force on an expedition to Rhode Island ; and our army was in motion to compel them to relinquish the enterprise, or to attack New York in its weakened state. The General offered Arnold the left wing of the army, which he declined, on the pretext already mentioned, but not without visible embarrassment. He certainly might have executed the duties of such a temporary command ; and it was expected from his enterprising temper, that he would gladly have embraced so splendid an opportunity. But he did not choose to be diverted a moment from his favourite object ; probably from an apprehension, that some different disposition might have taken place, which would have excluded him. The extreme solicitude he discovered to get possession of the post, would have led to a suspicion of the treachery, had it been possible, from his past conduct, to have supposed him capable of it.

The correspondence thus begun, was carried on between Arnold and Major Andre, Adjutant-General to the British army, in behalf of Sir Henry Clinton, under feigned signatures, and in a mercantile disguise. In an intercepted letter of Arnold's, which lately fell into our hands, he proposes an interview, "to settle the risks and profits of the copartnership;" and, in the same style of metaphor, intimates an expected augmentation of the garrison; and speaks of it as the means of extending their traffic. It appears, by another letter, that Andre was to have met him on the lines, under the sanction of a flag, in the character of Mr. John Anderson. But some cause, or other, not known, prevented this interview.

The twentieth of last month, Robinson and Andre went up the river in the Vulture sloop-of-war. Robinson sent a flag to Arnold with two letters; one to General Putnam, enclosed in another to himself; proposing an interview with Putnam, or, in his absence, with Arnold, to adjust some private concerns. The one to General Putnam, was evidently meant as a cover to the other, in case, by accident, the letters should have fallen under the inspection of a third person.

General Washington crossed the river, on his way to Hartford, the day these despatches arrived. Arnold, conceiving he must have heard of the flag, thought it necessary, for the sake of appearances,

to submit the letters to him, and ask his opinion of the propriety of complying with the request. The General, with his usual caution, though without the least surmise of the design, dissuaded him from it, and advised him to reply to Robinson, that whatever related to his private affairs, must be of a civil nature, and could only properly be addressed to the civil authority. This reference fortunately deranged the plan; and was the first link in the chain of events that led to the detection. The interview could no longer take place in the form of a flag, but was obliged to be managed in a secret manner.

Arnold employed one Smith to go on board the *Vulture* the night of the twenty-second, to bring Andre on shore, with a pass for Mr. John Anderson. Andre came ashore accordingly; and was conducted within a picket of ours to the house of Smith, where Arnold and he remained together in close conference all that night and the day following. At day light in the morning, the commanding officer at King's Ferry, without the privacy of Arnold, moved a couple of pieces of cannon to a point opposite to where the *Vulture* lay, and obliged her to take a more remote station. This event, or some lurking distrust, made the boatmen refuse to convey the two passengers back, and disconcerted Arnold so much, that by one of those strokes of infatuation which often confound the

schemes of men conscious of guilt, he insisted on Andre's exchanging his uniform for a disguise, and returning in a mode different from that in which he came. Andre, who had been undesignedly brought within our posts in the first instance, remonstrated warmly against this new and dangerous expedient. But Arnold persisting in declaring it impossible for him to return as he came, he at length reluctantly yielded to his direction, and consented to change his dress, and take the route he recommended. Smith furnished the disguise, and in the evening passed King's Ferry with him, and proceeded to Crompond, where they stopped the remainder of the night, at the instance of a militia officer, to avoid being suspected by him. The next morning they resumed their journey, Smith accompanying Andre a little beyond Pine's Bridge, where he left him. He had reached Tarrytown, when he was taken up by three militia men, who rushed out of the woods and seized his horse.

At this critical moment, his presence of mind forsook him. Instead of producing his pass, which would have extricated him from our parties, and could have done him no harm with his own, he asked the militia men, if they were of the *upper* or *lower* party; distinctive appellations known among the enemy's refugee corps. The militia men replied, they were of the lower party; upon which

he told them he was a British officer, and pressed them not to detain him, as he was upon urgent business. This confession removed all doubts; and it was in vain he afterwards produced his pass. He was instantly forced off to a place of greater security, where, after a careful search, there were found, concealed in the feet of his stockings, several papers of importance, delivered to him by Arnold! Among these, were a plan of the fortifications of West Point; a memorial from the engineer on the attack and defence of the place; returns of the garrison, cannon, and stores; copy of the minutes of a council of war held by General Washington a few weeks before. The prisoner, at first, was inadvertently ordered to Arnold; but on recollection, while still on the way, he was countermanded, and sent to Old Salem. The papers were enclosed in a letter to General Washington, which, having taken a route different from that by which he returned, made a circuit that afforded leisure for another letter, through an ill-judged delicacy, written to Arnold with information of Anderson's capture, to get to him an hour before General Washington arrived at his quarters; time enough to elude the fate that awaited him. He went down the river in his barge to the Vulture with such precipitate confusion, that he did not take with him a single paper useful to the enemy. On the first notice of the affair, he was pursued, but much too late to be overtaken.

There was some colour for imagining it was a part of the plan to betray the General into the hands of the enemy. Arnold was very anxious to ascertain from him the precise day of his return; and the enemy's movements seem to have corresponded to this point. But if it was really the case, it was very injudicious. The success must have depended on surprise; and as the officers at the advanced posts were not in the secret, their measures might have given the alarm; and General Washington, taking the command of the post, might have rendered the whole scheme abortive. Arnold, it is true, had so dispersed the garrison, as to have made a defence difficult, but not impracticable; and the acquisition of West Point was of such magnitude to the enemy, that it would have been unwise to connect it with any other object, however great, which might make the obtaining of it precarious.

Arnold, a moment before his setting out, went into Mrs. Arnold's apartment, and informed her that some transactions had just come to light, which must for ever banish him from his country. She fell into a swoon at this declaration; and he left her in it, to consult his own safety, till the servants, alarmed by her cries, came to her relief. She remained frantic all day; accusing every one who approached her, with an intention to murder her child (an infant in her arms); and exhibiting every other mark of the most genuine and ago-

nizing distress. Exhausted by the fatigue and tumult of her spirits, her phrensy subsided toward evening, and she sank into all the sadness of affliction. It was impossible not to have been touched with her situation. Everything affecting in female tears, or in the misfortunes of beauty; everything pathetic in the wounded tenderness of a wife, or in the apprehensive fondness of a mother; and, till I have reason to change the opinion, I will add, everything amiable in suffering innocence; conspired to make her an object of sympathy to all who were present. She experienced the most delicate attentions, and every friendly office, till her departure for Philadelphia.

Andre was, without loss of time, conducted to the Head Quarters of the army, where he was immediately brought before a Board of General Officers, to prevent all possibility of misrepresentation, or cavil, on the part of the enemy. The Board reported, that he ought to be considered as a Spy, and, according to the laws and usages of nations, to suffer death; which was executed two days after.

Never, perhaps, did any man suffer death with more justice, or deserve it less. The first step he took, after his capture, was to write a letter to General Washington, conceived in terms of dignity without insolence, and apology without meanness. The scope of it, was to vindicate himself

from the imputation of having assumed a mean character for treacherous or interested purposes; asserting that he had been involuntarily an impostor; that contrary to his intention, which was to meet a person for intelligence on neutral ground, he had been betrayed within our posts, and forced into the vile condition of an enemy in disguise: soliciting only, that, to whatever rigour policy might devote him, a decency of treatment might be observed, due to a person, who, though unfortunate, had been guilty of nothing dishonourable. His request was granted in its full extent; for, in the whole progress of the affair, he was treated with the most scrupulous delicacy. When brought before the Board of Officers, he met with every mark of indulgence, and was required to answer no interrogatory which could even embarrass his feelings. On his part, while he carefully concealed everything that might involve others, he frankly confessed all the facts relating to himself; and, upon his confession, without the trouble of examining a witness, the Board made their Report. The members of it were not more impressed with the candour and firmness, mixed with a becoming sensibility, which he displayed, than he was penetrated with their liberality and politeness. He acknowledged the generosity of the behaviour toward him in every respect, but particularly in this, in the strongest terms of manly gratitude.

In a conversation with a gentleman who visited him after his trial, he said he flattered himself he had never been illiberal ; but if there were any remains of prejudice in his mind, his present experience must obliterate them.

In one of the visits I made to him (and I saw him several times during his confinement), he begged me to be the bearer of a request to the General, for permission to send an open letter to Sir Henry Clinton. "I foresee my fate," said he, "and though I pretend not to play the hero, or to be indifferent about life ; yet I am reconciled to whatever may happen, conscious that misfortune, not guilt, has brought it upon me. There is only one thing that disturbs my tranquillity. Sir Henry Clinton has been too good to me ; he has been lavish of his kindness. I am bound to him by too many obligations, and love him too well, to bear the thought, that he should reproach himself, or that others should reproach him, on the supposition of my having conceived myself obliged, by his instructions, to run the risk I did. I would not, for the world, leave a sting in his mind that should embitter his future days." He could scarce finish the sentence, bursting into tears in spite of his efforts to suppress them ; and with difficulty collected himself enough afterwards to add : "I wish to be permitted to assure him, I did not act under this impression, but submitted to

a necessity imposed upon me, as contrary to my own inclination as to his orders." His request was readily complied with; and he wrote the letter annexed, with which I dare say you will be as much pleased as I am, both for the diction and sentiment.

When his sentence was announced to him, he remarked, that since it was his lot to die, there was still a choice in the mode, which would make a material difference in his feelings; and he would be happy, if possible, to be indulged with a professional death. He made a second application, by letter, in concise but persuasive terms. It was thought this indulgence, being incompatible with the customs of war, could not be granted; and it was therefore determined, in both cases, to evade an answer, to spare him the sensations which a certain knowledge of the intended mode would inflict.

In going to the place of execution, he bowed familiarly, as he went along, to all those with whom he had been acquainted in his confinement. A smile of complacency expressed the serene fortitude of his mind. Arrived at the fatal spot, he asked, with some emotion, "Must I then die in this manner?" He was told it had been unavoidable. "I am reconciled to my fate," said he, "but not to the mode." Soon, however, recollecting himself, he added: "It will be but a momentary pang;" and, springing upon the cart, performed

the last offices to himself, with a composure that excited the admiration, and melted the hearts of the beholders. Upon being told the final moment was at hand, and asked if he had anything to say, he answered, "Nothing, but to request you will witness to the world, that I die like a brave man." Among the extraordinary circumstances that attended him, in the midst of his enemies, he died universally esteemed and universally regretted.

There was something singularly interesting in the character and fortunes of Andre. To an excellent understanding, well improved by education and travel, he united a peculiar elegance of mind and manners, and the advantage of a pleasing person. 'Tis said he possessed a pretty taste for the fine arts, and had himself attained some proficiency in poetry, music, and painting. His knowledge appeared without ostentation, and embellished by a diffidence that rarely accompanies so many talents and accomplishments; which left you to suppose more than appeared. His sentiments were elevated, and inspired esteem: they had a softness that conciliated affection. His elocution was handsome; his address easy, polite, and insinuating. By his merit, he had acquired the unlimited confidence of his General, and was making a rapid progress in military rank and reputation. But in the height of his career, flushed with new hopes from the execution of a project,

the most beneficial to his party that could be devised, he was at once precipitated from the summit of prosperity, and saw all the expectations of his ambition blasted, and himself ruined.

The character I have given of him, is drawn partly from what I saw of him myself, and partly from information. I am aware that a man of real merit is never seen in so favourable a light as through the medium of adversity: the clouds that surround him, are shades that set off his good qualities. Misfortune cuts down the little vanities that, in prosperous times, serve as so many spots in his virtues; and gives a tone of humility that makes his worth more amiable. His spectators, who enjoy a happier lot, are less prone to detract from it, through envy, and are more disposed, by compassion, to give him the credit he deserves, and perhaps even to magnify it.

I speak not of Andre's conduct in this affair as a philosopher, but as a man of the world. The authorized maxims and practices of war, are the satires of human nature. They countenance almost every species of seduction as well as violence; and the General who can make most traitors in the army of his adversary, is frequently most applauded. On this scale we acquit Andre; while we could not but condemn him, if we were to examine his conduct by the sober rules of philosophy and moral rectitude. It is, however, a blemish on

his fame, that he once intended to prostitute a flag: about this, a man of nice honour ought to have had a scruple; but the temptation was great: let his misfortunes cast a veil over his error.

Several letters from Sir Henry Clinton and others, were received in the course of the affair, feebly attempting to prove, that Andre came out under the protection of a flag, with a passport from a general officer in actual service; and consequently could not be justly detained. Clinton sent a deputation, composed of Lieutenant-General Robinson, Mr. Elliot, and Mr. William Smith, to represent, as he said, the true state of Major Andre's case. General Greene met Robinson, and had a conversation with him; in which he reiterated the pretence of a flag; urged Andre's release as a personal favour to Sir Henry Clinton; and offered any friend of ours, in their power, in exchange. Nothing could have been more frivolous than the plea which was used. The fact was, that beside the time, manner, object of the interview, change of dress, and other circumstances, there was not a single formality customary with flags; and the passport was not to Major Andre, but to Mr. Anderson. But had there been, on the contrary, all the formalities, it would be an abuse of language to say, that the sanction of a flag for corrupting an officer to betray his trust, ought to be respected. So unjustifiable a purpose,

would not only destroy its validity, but make it an aggravation.

Andre, himself, has answered the argument, by ridiculing and exploding the idea, in his examination before the Board of Officers. It was a weakness to urge it.

There was, in truth, no way of saving him. Arnold, or he, must have been the victim: the former was out of our power.

It was by some suspected, Arnold had taken his measures in such a manner, that if the interview had been discovered in the act, it might have been in his power to sacrifice Andre to his own security. This surmise of double treachery, made them imagine Clinton might be induced to give up Arnold for Andre; and a gentleman took occasion to suggest this expedient to the latter, as a thing that might be proposed by him. He declined it. The moment he had been capable of so much frailty, I should have ceased to esteem him.

The infamy of Arnold's conduct previous to his desertion, is only equalled by his baseness since. Beside the folly of writing to Sir Henry Clinton, assuring him that Andre had acted under a passport from him, and according to his directions while commanding officer at a post; and that, therefore, he did not doubt, he would be immediately sent in; he had the effrontery to write to

General Washington in the same spirit ; with the addition of a menace of retaliation, if the sentence should be carried into execution. He has since acted the farce of sending in his resignation. This man is, in every sense, despicable. Added to the scene of knavery and prostitution during his command in Philadelphia, which the late seizure of his papers has unfolded ; the history of his command at West Point is a history of little, as well as great, villainies. He practised every dirty art of peculation ; and even stooped to connexions with the suttlers of the Garrison, to defraud the public.

To his conduct, that of the captors of Andre forms a striking contrast. He tempted them with the offer of his watch, his horse, and any sum of money they should name. They rejected his offers with indignation : and the gold that could seduce a man high in the esteem and confidence of his country, who had the remembrance of past exploits, the motives of present reputation and future glory, to prop his integrity, had no charms for three simple peasants, leaning only on their virtue and an honest sense of their duty. While Arnold is handed down, with execration, to future times, posterity will repeat, with reverence, the names of Van Wart, Paulding, and Williams !

I congratulate you, my friend, on our happy es-

cape from the mischiefs with which this treason was big. It is a new comment on the value of an honest man, and, if it were possible, would endear you to me more than ever.

Adieu,

A. HAMILTON.

WASHINGTON TO HAMILTON.

Rhode Island, September, 1780.

DEAR HAMILTON:

I shall be obliged to you for the answer to the Address as soon as it is convenient to you. If we do not ride to the Point to see the fleet pass out, I am to have a conference with Count De Rochambeau and the Engineer directly after breakfast, at which I wish you to be present.

I am, sincerely and affectionately, yours,

G. WASHINGTON.

Col. Hamilton.

GENERAL SCHUYLER TO HAMILTON.

Poughkeepsie, Sept. 10, 1780.

MY DEAR SIR:

I am very apprehensive the unhappy event, mentioned in your favour of the fifth instant, will draw very serious consequences in its train. It will certainly much embarrass us, and probably retard the termination of the war. It will, however, be attended with one good: the adherents, in Congress, to the gallant Commander, will not have it

any longer in their power to play him off against the General. Gracious God! that any rational being should put two men in competition, one of which has *commanded* an army, the other only been at the head of one: for I aver, that when he was to the northward, he never made a disposition of his troops. Indeed he was incapable: he never saw an enemy, except at a good distance, and from places of perfect security. Indeed, indeed, he has not lost a whit, in my estimation, by this stroke of his.

The General will have shown you extracts from the Senate and Assembly's Addresses to the Governor. A Committee of both Houses is appointed to report on the proceedings of the Convention: they will certainly adopt and extend the views of that Convention. Some here are for appointing a Dictator, with a Vice-Dictator in each State, invested with all the powers conferred formerly by the Roman people on theirs. I made great interest to be left out of the delegation, and obtained it, although not without much difficulty. General M'Dougal is appointed in my stead: but I believe I shall be obliged to go to the eastern Convention. If so, I shall not repair to Rhode Island so soon as I intended.

Colonel Warner is wounded, and two of his officers killed near Fort Edward.

Pray make my respects acceptable to the Gene-

ral, to the gentlemen of the family, the Marquis, and those of his. Adieu.

I am, dear Sir,
Very affectionately and sincerely,
Your most obedient Servant,
PH : SCHUYLER.

I forgot to inform the General, that the Governor had sent him an extract of the proceedings of the Convention which I had promised to transmit.

SCHUYLER TO HAMILTON.

Poughkeepsie, September 16, 1780.

DEAR SIR :

The great scarcity of wheat before harvest, and the drought since, has prevented the agent appointed to collect the supply required from this State, to deliver it to the Issuing Commissary ; and we are at least ten thousand barrels in arrear ; the wheat for all which is already assessed, a considerable quantity of it brought to the mills to be manufactured, and the remainder daily collecting. Hence, unless a second drought should prevail, our deficiency can be made good in the course of a month : and this may be relied on. But should the army actually be in operation, I do not *make a doubt* but that the hand of Government will be laid on all in the country ; and, in that case, a con-

stant supply can be kept up so as to complete to thirty thousand barrels, and perhaps half as much more, should Congress order the quota of Pennsylvania (if she deigns to furnish any) to be sold, and the money transmitted to this State. Exclusive of the wheat already assessed to complete our quota of flour, the inhabitants of Tryon County, and the western part of Albany, are threshing. This the Legislature has ordered to be purchased for a State Magazine, should we not be able to purchase the whole. The whole may, however, be obtained, and without delay, if an operation takes place: to procure flour casks is the greatest difficulty. I wish those at West Point were ordered to be immediately put in order: those, and an aid of bags, may be necessary.

I have communed with the Governor on the subject of M'Henry's wish. He is very much disposed to use his influence on the occasion, but doubts if he should be able to obtain a Lieutenantcy, unless the Ensigns that now are, could all be provided for. If M'Henry merely wants military rank for the campaign, and will not accept of an Ensigncy, the Governor can, and will, give him a Lieutenant-Colonelcy in the State Levies, which will always give him rank in our militia, and, consequently, in the army, when the militia is in the field. But this must be determined before the Legislature rises. Please, therefore, to desire M'

Henry to write me on the subject without delay, and to assure him of the best services in my power.

If I knew when you would be at Fishkill, if you pass that way, I would meet you there. Or if I believed it would not be disagreeable to the General, I would go to Hartford, as I wish to see the other Sachem.

A spirit favourable to the common cause, has pervaded almost both Houses. They begin to talk of a Dictator and Vice-Dictators, as if it was a thing that was already determined on. To the Convention to be held at Hartford, I believe I shall be sent, with instructions to propose that a Dictator should be appointed.

I have just seen Van Schaick's whim. There is not one Lieutenancy vacant.

I have had the enclosed several days with me, for want of a conveyance. Please to despatch the bearer as expeditiously back as you can. Compliments to all.

I am, dear Sir, affectionately yours, etc.,

PH: SCHUYLER.

Colonel Hamilton.

HAMILTON TO MISS SCHUYLER.

September 25, 1780.

Arnold, hearing of the plot being detected, immediately fled to the enemy. I went in pursuit

of him, but was much too late ; and could hardly regret the disappointment, when, on my return, I saw an amiable woman, frantic with distress for the loss of a husband she tenderly loved ; a traitor to his country and to his fame ; a disgrace to his connexions : it was the most affecting scene I ever was witness to. She, for a considerable time, entirely lost herself. The General went up to see her, and she upbraided him with being in a plot to murder her child. One moment she raved, another she melted into tears. Sometimes she pressed her infant to her bosom, and lamented its fate, occasioned by the imprudence of its father, in a manner that would have pierced insensibility itself. All the sweetness of beauty, all the loveliness of innocence, all the tenderness of a wife, and all the fondness of a mother, showed themselves in her appearance and conduct. We have every reason to believe, that she was entirely unacquainted with the plan, and that the first knowledge of it, was when Arnold went to tell her he must banish himself from his country and from her for ever. She instantly fell into a convulsion, and he left her in that situation.

This morning she is more composed. I paid her a visit, and endeavoured to soothe her by every method in my power ; though you may imagine she is not easily to be consoled. Added to her other distresses, she is very apprehensive the re-

sentment of her country will fall upon her (who is only unfortunate) for the guilt of her husband.

I have tried to persuade her that her fears are ill founded; but she will not be convinced. She received us in bed, with every circumstance that would interest our sympathy: and her sufferings were so eloquent, that I wished myself her brother, to have a right to become her defender. As it is, I have entreated her to enable me to give her proofs of my friendship. Could I forgive Arnold for sacrificing his honour, reputation, and duty, I could not forgive him for acting a part that must have forfeited the esteem of so fine a woman. At present she almost forgets his crime in his misfortunes; and her horror at the guilt of the traitor, is lost in her love of the man. But a virtuous mind cannot long esteem a base one; and time will make her despise if it cannot make her hate.

A. HAMILTON.

HAMILTON TO MISS SCHUYLER.

Tappan, Oct. 2, 1780.

Poor Andre suffers to-day. Everything that is amiable in virtue, in fortitude, in delicate sentiment, and accomplished manners, pleads for him: but hard-hearted policy calls for a sacrifice. He must die——. I send you my account of Arnold's affair; and to justify myself to your senti-

ments, I must inform you, that I urged a compliance with Andre's request to be shot; and I do not think it would have had an ill effect: but some people are only sensible to motives of policy, and sometimes, from a narrow disposition, mistake it.

When Andre's tale comes to be told, and present resentment is over; the refusing him the privilege of choosing the manner of his death will be branded with too much obstinacy.

It was proposed to me to suggest to him the idea of an exchange for Arnold; but I knew I should have forfeited his esteem by doing it, and therefore declined it. As a man of honour he could not but reject it; and I would not for the world have proposed to him a thing which must have placed me in the unamiable light of supposing him capable of meanness, or of not feeling myself the impropriety of the measure. I confess to you, I had the weakness to value the esteem of a dying man, because I revered his merit.

A. HAMILTON.

SCHUYLER TO HAMILTON.

Albany, October 10, 1780.

MY DEAR SIR:

I am still confined to my room, but believe my disorder has taken a favourable turn, and that I shall soon be tolerably restored.

Colonel Van Schaick informs me that he is ordered down with his regiment. We are so sadly off here for directors, that I most sincerely wish he had been permitted to remain here: his deafness will render him little serviceable with his regiment.

I am informed that some people have recommended, or intend to recommend, to the General, to evacuate Fort Schuyler. I hope it will not take place, as the enemy would immediately occupy the ground, and make it a receptacle for Indians and tories, from whence to pour destruction on the country. A certain Lieutenant Laird, of the militia, who was carried off, or went off voluntarily, with Sir John Johnson, when last in the country, is returned, and advises that about two thousand men were collected at St. John's to make separate attacks on the Grants, Saratoga, and the Mohawk river. If this be true, it was probably intended as a co-operating plan, if Sir Harry had come up the river. An Express is this moment arrived, announcing that about five hundred men of the enemy are arrived at the Canajoharie Falls. If this should be confirmed, I shall venture to advise Van Schaick to detain his regiment, and hope it will meet the General's approbation. It is said the enemy are fortifying at Oswego. I hope the Garrison for that place will be speedily sent up.

When do you intend to be here? Who will

accompany you? Is it probable the General will pay us a visit in winter? I most earnestly wish it. Will you make my excuses to the Marquis for my not writing him: the Doctor will not permit me; but what is worse, I really have not strength as yet. Entreat the General to accept of my best wishes: the family share in them. Adieu, my dear Sir.

I am, affectionately,

Yours, etc., etc.,

PH: SCHUYLER.

Colonel Hamilton.

HAMILTON TO ISAAC SEARS.

Boston, October 12, 1780.

I was much obliged to you, my dear Sir, for the letter which you did me the favour to write me since your return to Boston. I am sorry to find that the same spirit of indifference to public affairs prevails. It is necessary we should rouse, and begin to do our business in earnest, or we shall play a losing game. It is impossible the contest can be much longer supported on the present footing. We must have a Government with more power. We must have a tax in kind. We must have a foreign loan. We must have a Bank, on the true principles of a Bank. We must have an Administration distinct from Congress, and in the hands of single men under their orders. We

must, above all things, have an army for the war, and an establishment that will interest the officers in the service.

Congress are deliberating on our military affairs: but I apprehend their Resolutions will be tinctured with the old spirit. We seem to be proof against experience. They will, however, recommend an army for the war, at least as a primary object. All those who love their country, ought to exert their influence in the States where they reside, to determine them to take up this object with energy. The States must sink under the burden of temporary enlistments; and the enemy will conquer us by degrees during the intervals of our weakness.

Clinton is now said to be making a considerable detachment to the southward. My fears are high, my hopes low. We are told here, there is to be a Congress of the neutral powers at the Hague, for mediating of peace. God send it may be true. We want it: but if the idea goes abroad, ten to one if we do not fancy the thing done, and fall into a profound sleep till the cannon of the enemy awaken us next campaign. This is our national character.

I am, with great regard, dear Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

A. HAMILTON.

HARRISON TO HAMILTON.

October 27, 1780.

MY DEAR HAMILTON :

We are only leaving Philadelphia. The most flattering attentions have been paid to Meade and myself, and such as would not permit us to progress before, unless we had shown ourselves entirely disregardless of the great world. Besides, motives of a public nature concurred to make us stay thus long. From all I have seen and heard, there is a good disposition in Congress to do all they can for the army and the public interest; and there are many very sensible men among them. In general, they are most warmly attached to the General; and his recommendations will have their weight while the same spirit prevails. It is said, there has been infinitely more harmony among them for some time past, than has appeared since the first years of their appointment. I am not, however, without some apprehension, that if they proceed in the case of Lee, etc., the MONSTER (PARTY), may show itself again, and that we may have a second edition of the measures adopted in the instance of Deane. Our friends Sullivan and Carroll have been of great service: and gentlemen who are, or pretend to be, in the secrets of the cabinet, say they have contributed immeasurably, by their independent conduct, to destroy the

EASTERN ALLIANCE. Bland is very clever, and without question wishes to push on in the true and right road. Grayson says this is the best Congress we have had since the first. Our dear Laurens respects many of the members: and General Greene's appointment, I believe, is entirely consonant to the wishes of Congress in general, though we have heard there were members much disposed, if facts had not been so obstinate, to excuse General Gates. The former is here, and I suppose will set out in a day or two. Meade and I will serve him all we can. We have done what we could already. Apropos, you delivered him my letter. Our finances are entirely deranged, and there is little or no money in the treasury. I believe they are a subject of much consideration and puzzlement. The supplies of the army are also matters of present attention, but I do n't know what will be done. I hope we shall, by Christmas, have some clothing from the West Indies, if the moth have not destroyed it: a quantity, it is said, has been lying there. It is much to be wished that General Greene were at the South. The delegates from that quarter think the situation of Cornwallis delicate, and that by management, and a proper application and use of the force there, the late check given Furguson might be improved into the Earl's total defeat. This, I fear, is too much even to hope. The sending the Baron is

considered, as far as I have heard, perfectly right, and Lee's corps give great satisfaction. I am just about to mount my horse, and therefore shall say but little more. Laurens will write unto you in a few days, I suppose, and communicate any new occurrences. My love to the lads of the family. The same to you. May you be long happy. My most respectful compliments to the General.

Most truly and affectionately,

ROB. H. HARRISON.

P. S. The Board have been absolutely too poor to procure parchment for the many promotions that have been required.

HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.

November 22, 1780.

DEAR SIR :

Some time last fall, when I spoke to your Excellency about going to the southward, I explained to you candidly my feelings with respect to military reputation; and how much it was my object to act a conspicuous part in some enterprise, that might perhaps raise my character as a soldier above mediocrity. You were so good as to say, you would be glad to furnish me with an occasion. When the expedition to Staten Island was afoot, a favourable one seemed to offer. There was a battalion without a Field officer, the command of which, I

thought, as it was accidental, might be given to me without inconvenience. I made an application for it through the Marquis, who informed me of your refusal on two principles: one, that the giving me a whole battalion might be a subject of dissatisfaction; the other, that if any accident should happen to me in the present state of your family, you would be embarrassed for the necessary assistance.

The project you now have in contemplation affords another opportunity. I have a variety of reasons, that press me to desire ardently to have it in my power to improve it. I take the liberty to observe, that the command may now be proportioned to my rank; and that the second objection ceases to operate, as, during the period of establishing our winter quarters, there will be a suspension of material business: besides which, my peculiar situation will, in any case, call me away from the army in a few days, and Mr. Harrison may be expected back early next month. My command may consist of one hundred and fifty or two hundred men, composed of fifty men of Major Gibbes' corps, fifty from Colonel Meigs' regiment, and fifty or a hundred more from the light infantry: Major Gibbes to be my Major. The hundred men from here may move on Friday morning towards ——, which will strengthen the appearances for Staten Island, to form a junction on the other side of the Passaic.

I suggest this mode, to avoid the complaints that might arise from composing my party wholly of the Light Infantry, which might give umbrage to the officers of that corps, who, on this plan, can have no just subject for it.

The primary idea may be, if circumstances permit, to attempt with my detachment Byard's Hill. Should we arrive early enough to undertake it, I should prefer it to anything else, both for the brilliancy of the attempt in itself, and the decisive consequences of which its success would be productive. If we arrive too late to make this eligible (as there is reason to apprehend), my corps may form the van of one of the other attacks, and Byard's Hill will be a pretext for my being employed in the affair, on a supposition of my knowing the ground, which is partly true. I flatter myself, also, that my military character stands so well in the army, as to reconcile the officers, in general, to the measure. All circumstances considered, I venture to say, any exceptions which might be taken, would be unreasonable.

I take this method of making the request, to avoid the embarrassment of a personal explanation. I shall only add, that however much I have the matter at heart, I wish your Excellency entirely to consult your own inclination, and not, from a disposition to oblige me, to do anything that may be disagreeable to you. It will, nevertheless,

make me singularly happy if your wishes correspond with mine.

LA FAYETTE TO HAMILTON.

Paramus, November 28, 1780.

DEAR HAMILTON:

Here I arrived last night, and am going to set out for Philadelphia. Gouvion goes straight to New Windsor, and by him I write to the General. I speak of Hand and Smith, whom I recommend, and add: "If, however, you were to cast your eye on a man, who, I think, would suit better than any other in the world, Hamilton is, I confess, the officer whom I would like best to see in my * * * * *." Then I go on with the idea, that, at equal advantages, you deserve from him the preference; that your advantages are the greatest; I speak of a co-operation; of your being in the family; and conclude, that on every public and private account I advise him to take you.

I know the General's friendship and gratitude for you, my dear Hamilton: both are greater than you perhaps imagine. I am sure he needs only to be told that something will suit you, and when he thinks he can do it he certainly will. Before this campaign I was your friend, and very intimate friend, agreeably to the ideas of the world. Since my second voyage, my sentiment has increased to

such a point the world knows nothing about. To show *both*, from want and from scorn of expressions, I shall only tell you—Adieu. Yours,

LA FAYETTE.

LA FAYETTE TO HAMILTON.

Philadelphia, December 9, 1780.

DEAR HAMILTON :

On my arrival at Paramus, I wrote a letter to the General, which Colonel Goavion was to deliver to himself at New Windsor; so that more expedition had been made than you had thought. But the General having unfortunately altered his mind, and taken the road to Morristown, another misfortune threw Hand in his way; and remembering your advice on the occasion, he hastened to make him the proposition, and in consequence of it wrote his letter to Congress. From Paramus I went myself to the Lots, and from thence to Morristown, where I met the General; and knowing that my letter could not reach him under some days, I became regardless of your wishes, and made a verbal application in my own name, and about the same time that had been settled between us. I can't express to you, my dear friend, how sorry and disappointed I felt, when I knew from him, the General, that (greatly in consequence of your advice) he had settled the whole matter with Hand, and written for him to

Congress. I confess I became warmer on the occasion than you would perhaps have wished me to be ; and I wanted the General to allow my sending an Express, who would have overtaken the letter, as it was in the hands of General St. Clair : but the General did not think it to be a convenient measure ; and, I confess, I may have been a little blinded on its propriety. I took care not to compromise you in this affair, when the General expressed a desire to serve you, and in a manner you would have been satisfied with. Now for the voyage to France.

Congress seem resolved that an *Envoy be sent in the way you wish*, and this was yesterday determined in the House. Next Monday the gentleman will be elected. I have already spoken to many members. I know of a number of voices that will be for you. This day, and that of tomorrow, will be by me employed in paying visits. As soon as the business is fixed upon, I shall send you an Express. I think you ought to hold yourself in readiness, and in case you are called for, come with all possible speed ; for you must go immediately, that you may have returned before the beginning of operations. If you go, my dear Sir, I shall give you all public or private knowledge about Europe I am possessed of. Besides many private letters, that may introduce you to my friends, I intend giving you the *key* of the

cabinet, as well as of the societies which influence them. In a word, my good friend, anything in my power shall be entirely yours.

HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.

Albany, Dec. 9, 1750.

DEAR SIR :

Mr. Rensselaer, who has the direction of the Armory here, tells me that the Board of War write him, they are unable to support it any longer on the present establishment for want of supplies, and propose to him to endeavour to have it carried on by contract. This he declares is impossible. The Armory must either continue on the present footing or cease. As far as I understand the matter, there is no objection to the terms in themselves, but a want of means to comply with them. If there is a want of means, the thing must be relinquished; but as it does not strike me that it can be more difficult to maintain an Armory here than elsewhere; and as I apprehend, in the present state of our Arsenals, we shall stand in need of all the repairing we can do; I take the liberty, at Mr. Rensselaer's request, to mention the matter to you. I have seen the Armory myself. It appears to be in excellent order, and under a very ingenious and industrious man. I am told it

has been conducted hitherto with great activity. Its situation is, in my opinion, advantageous. As there is a considerable body of troops always at West Point, and the army generally in its vicinity, the river is very convenient for transportation to and from the Armory; and, I should think, would be conducive to economy. This consideration strikes me as of importance. General Knox, however, will be the best judge of the usefulness of this Armory.

Mr. Rensselaer also mentions a considerable number of hides in the hands of persons here who had had orders from the Clothier-General not to dispose of them but by his order. He says he can no longer, but with great difficulty, procure leather for the public works on credit; and has requested me to mention this also to your Excellency.

Mrs. Hamilton presents her respectful compliments to Mrs. Washington and yourself. After the holidays we shall be at Head Quarters.

I believe I imparted to you General Schuyler's wish that you could make it convenient to pay a visit with Mrs. Washington this winter. He and Mrs. Schuyler have several times repeated their inquiries and wishes. I have told them I was afraid your business would not permit you: if it should, I shall be happy. You will enable me to let them know about what period it will suit.

When the sleighing arrives, it will be an affair of two days up and two days down. I have, etc.,

A. HAMILTON.

WASHINGTON TO HAMILTON.

New Windsor, Dec. 27, 1780.

DEAR HAMILTON :

Your letter of the 19th came safe by the Doctor, who set out this morning for Philadelphia.

I had, previous to the receipt of it, and without knowing that the Board of War had given any direction respecting the Armory at Albany, requested the Governor to exempt (if he could do so with propriety) the citizens who were employed in it, from military services in cases of alarm; and had written to General Clinton to direct the Quarter-Master to afford every assistance in his power to have the work repaired, and the business, as far as depended upon him, accelerated. I have now given order for delivery of such hides as Mr. Rensselaer shall find *absolutely* necessary for the use of the Armory.

Although a trip to Albany, on more accounts than one, would be perfectly agreeable to my wishes, I am so far from having it in my power, at this time, to fix a period for this gratification of them, that I have but small hope of accomplishing it at all this winter. There are some matters in suspense which may make a journey to Rhode

Island necessary; but as the subject is not fit for a letter, I shall withhold the communication till I see you.

A second embarkation has taken place at New York. The strength of the detachment, or its destination, are vaguely reported; and no certainty under whose command it goes. Arnold is said to be of it; from whence the connexions conclude that New Haven or New London must infallibly be the object, while more rational conjecturers send it to the southward, from whence no late accounts have been received.

Mrs. Washington most cordially joins me in compliments of congratulation to Mrs. Hamilton and yourself, on the late happy event of your marriage, and in wishes to see you both at Head Quarters. We beg of you to present our respectful compliments to General Schuyler, his lady and family, and offer them strong assurances of the pleasure we should feel at seeing them at New Windsor.

With much truth, and great personal regard,

I am, dear Hamilton,

Your affectionate friend and servant,

G. WASHINGTON.

END OF VOLUME ONE.

Ms. A. 9. 2. 1. 1

MS - O 1911

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 011 698 316 3

