



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330530

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

30 May 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000837DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Bashir Nasir Ali al-Marwalah
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Bashir Nasir Ali al-Marwala, Abu al-Fida al-Sanaani, Abu Fida al-Yemeni
- Place of Birth: Al-Haymah, Yemen (YM)
- Date of Birth: December 1979
- Citizenship: Yemen
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000837DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 11 September 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative intending to participate in terrorist operations targeting US forces in Karachi, Pakistan (PK) and possibly inside the United States. Detainee was captured during Pakistani raids on al-Qaida safe houses in Karachi, during which senior al-Qaida operative Hamza al-Zubayr was killed. A laptop computer recovered at one of the safe houses contained data that could be used to target aircraft for hijacking operations. Also recovered was detainee's will, which noted his intention to martyr himself, and additional documents indicating an impending

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attack against hotels in Karachi. Detainee received basic and specialized militant training at al-Qaida facilities and is associated with several senior al-Qaida leaders, including two key operatives involved in attacks against the US: USS COLE conspirator Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash, aka (Silver), ISN US9YM-010014DP (YM-10014), and 11 September 2001 attacks coordinator Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, ISN US9YM-010013DP (YM-10013). Detainee probably participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces as a member of Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) 55th Arab Brigade.¹ Detainee's willingness to withhold information indicates his continued support for extremist causes and his associates, some of which may still be at large. Detainee will probably rejoin these elements if released. **[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.]** JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Additional information on planned terrorist attacks against US forces in Karachi
- Added alias Abu Fida al-Yemeni²
- Revised details of detainee's capture

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: In 1997, detainee dropped out of school after completing the tenth grade. In October 1997, detainee began studying at a nursing school at the hospital where his father worked in Sanaa, YM. Detainee did not hold a job, but did periodically help at his uncle's farm.³

¹ Analyst Note: The 55th Arab Brigade served as UBL's primary battle formation supporting Taliban objectives, with UBL participating closely in the command and control of the brigade. Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi, aka (Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026), had primary operational command of the 55th Arab Brigade, serving as UBL's military commander in the field.

² Analyst Note: There is another Abu al-Fida al-Yemeni who ran a Kabul guesthouse and was a member of al-Qaida's Shura Council. Detainee is not assessed to be that Abu al-Fida.

³ 000837 302 29-OCT-2002

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b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In mid-2000, detainee met Bashir al-Shadadi,⁴ Shaddad al-Shadadi, and Abu Salah, with whom he discussed jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviets. Due to his growing interest in jihad, detainee left the nursing school for six months and traveled to Afghanistan (AF) via Pakistan in September 2000. Detainee stayed at Daftar Taliban, a Taliban guesthouse in Quetta, PK, before he proceeded to Kandahar, AF where he stayed at the Hajji Habash Guesthouse.⁵

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee then trained at the al-Qaida sponsored al-Faruq Training Camp for approximately two weeks, during which the USS COLE was attacked.⁶ A few days later, leaders at the camp evacuated the facility for fear of US retaliation for the attack. Detainee returned to Hajji Habash and then moved to the Qutaybah Guesthouse in the Karte Parwan section of Kabul, AF where he and the others waited until the Malik Training Camp was established.⁷ After two weeks, detainee went to the Malik Camp, which was located between Bagram, AF and Kabul. He received training on the AK-47 assault rifle, PK machine gun, a handgun, hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades, and map reading. Upon completion of his training, detainee had the opportunity to go to the front lines, but declined for three reasons: he felt it was wrong to join a war pitting Muslim against Muslim, he felt regretful for not obtaining his parents' permission to join the war, and he heard that his father was sick in the hospital. In December 2000, detainee returned to Yemen and finished his nursing studies in July 2001. Upon his return to Yemen, detainee told his father about traveling to Afghanistan. His father became angry and confiscated detainee's passport. Detainee purchased a replacement passport and on 13 August 2001 departed Yemen for his second trip to Afghanistan. Omar Daleiy purchased detainee's airline ticket and gave detainee \$200 US.⁸ Detainee traveled from Sanaa to Dubai, United Arab Emirates (AE), and then to Karachi. A Pakistani named Amqaad al-Pakistani met detainee at a hotel in Karachi.⁹ Detainee remained at the hotel for one day and then traveled again to the Daftar Taliban Guesthouse.¹⁰

⁴ Analyst Note: A variant of Bashir al-Shadadi is Basheer Shaddadi. Basheer al-Shadadi is an al-Qaida recruiter in Yemen who previously fought in Bosnia. Basheer was reported in Yemeni custody since late 2000. Al-Shadadi also facilitated the travel to Afghanistan for Muhammad Rajab Sadiq Abu Ghanim, US9YM-000044DP (YM-044); Mashur Abdullah Muqbil Ahmed al-Sabri, US9YM-000324DP (YM-324); and Hail Aziz Ahmed al-Maythali, US9YM-000840DP (YM-840), and is married to YM-044's sister. See TRRS-04-01-0650, IIR 6 034 0059 05.

⁵ 000837 302 29-OCT-2002, IIR 6 034 0234 03

⁶ Analyst Note: The USS COLE was attacked on 12 October 2000.

⁷ Analyst Note: The Malik Training Camp is also referred to as the Malik Military Center.

⁸ Analyst Note: Variants of Omar include Ahmar, Ammar and Umar. Omar Daleiy is assessed to be Ammar Abdallah Ali al-Dhalai, variants (Abu Ammar al-Dale, variant Abu Omar Aldhalia), aka (Zubayr), a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden who was killed in the shootout that ensued when Pakistani forces raided the Karachi, PK, safe house where he was staying. See 001453 SIR 22-NOV-2004, and TD-314/37833-02.

⁹ Analyst Note: Variants of Amqaad include Amgaad and Amjad. See IIR 6 034 0234 03.

¹⁰ 000837 302 29-OCT-2002, IIR 6 034 0234 03

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(S//NF) After three days at the Daftar Taliban, he traveled to the al-Nibras Guesthouse in Kandahar and subsequently trained at another camp named al-Faruq. The al-Faruq Training Camp was across a valley from the old camp, but was still in the same general area. He received specialized training on the AK-47 assault rifle and a handgun. Prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks, UBL visited the camp. When the attacks occurred, detainee finished his training and traveled to the Dar al-Aman Guesthouse in Kabul. One week later, detainee went to the rear of the front lines, but claimed he did not see any fighting. For the next few weeks, detainee traveled back and forth from the front lines at Bagram and the Omar Sayf Center to the Dar al-Aman Guesthouse in Kabul.¹¹ When a retreat was ordered, detainee headed to Kabul, and then to Lowgar, AF. When he reached Khowst, AF his commander, Abu Harira al-Sanani, split the retreating mass into groups of 12.¹² Detainee's group stayed in a valley near Khowst for the month of Ramadan in 2001.¹³ They then traveled to Zormat, AF, where they remained for one week. In Zormat, after turning in his weapon, a weapons instructor named Abu Eimman al-Masri returned detainee's passport to him and detainee left Afghanistan via Birmal, AF.¹⁴ Detainee and his group then continued through Miram Shah, PK to Bannu, PK where his group stayed a few days at an unidentified school. They then traveled through Lahore, PK to Moltair, PK where detainee stayed in an unidentified safe house for approximately three months, from January to March 2002. Detainee then moved to Karachi where he was moved around to different safe houses for approximately six months.¹⁵

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) On 11 September 2002, Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) officers, rangers, and police conducted raids against three suspected al-Qaida residences in two separate sections of Karachi. In the first safe house raid, where detainee was captured, the occupants held knives to their throats and threatened to kill themselves rather than be taken into custody. After an approximately four hour standoff, Pakistani authorities were able to overpower and captured the three occupants. The occupants of the second house, led by Hamza al-Zubayr, resisted and fought a nearly three hour firefight with Pakistani security

¹¹ Analyst Note: Variants of Saif include Seif and Sayf.

¹² 000837 302 29-OCT-2002, IIR 6 034 0234 03, Analyst Note: Variants of al-Sanani are Samany and Sanaani. Al-Sanani denotes a person from Sanaa, YM. Abu Harira al-Sanani is assessed to be Qassim Yahya Mahdi Abdu al-Raimi, aka (Abu Hurayra al-Sanani), an explosives expert and a trainer at al-Faruq who was suspected of providing explosives training to extremists in Yemen. See TD-314/36314-03, TD-314/14472-04.

¹³ Analyst Note: The approximate dates of Ramadan 2001 were 16 November to 15 December 2001.

¹⁴ IIR 6 034 0234 03, Analyst Note: Variants of Eimman include Aiman and Ayman. Abu Eimman al-Masri is assessed to be a weapons instructor and UBL associate whose alias was Abu Ayman al-Masri, and who died in Waziristan. See TD-314/38611-02, TD-314/38915-04.

¹⁵ 000837 302 29-OCT-2002

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forces that left two of the Arabs dead and five captured, along with several of the Pakistani officials injured.¹⁶ The Arabs in the apartments were reported to be members of a special terrorist team deployed to attack targets in Karachi, including hotels frequented by US soldiers. In all, Pakistani forces detained ten individuals during raids on the three residences, including YM-10013 and Hassan Muhammad Ali Bin Attash, ISN PK9SA-001456DP (SA-1456).¹⁷ Detainee was taken to a prison facility and held for approximately a month before US forces took custody of detainee at Bagram.¹⁸

b. (S) Property Held:

- Miscellaneous personal items, including clothing

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 28 October 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Al-Faruq Training Camp
- Malik Military Center in Kabul
- Taliban/al-Qaida network of safe houses in Afghanistan and Pakistan
- Facilitators and trainers including YM-10013

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee's account is only partially truthful. Detainee had been forthcoming with information, but several inconsistencies suggest that he has been less than truthful and he is currently uncooperative. For instance, detainee first stated senior al-Qaida operative YM-10014 brought him to a safe house run by Abdul Rahim Gulam Rabbani, ISN US9PK-001460DP (YM-1460), in Karachi. Detainee later claimed a Pakistani driver delivered him to YM-1460's house and detainee had not seen YM-10014 since March 2002. PK-1460 confirmed detainee's original story, indicating detainee was trying to distance himself from YM-10014. Detainee has also provided conflicting information about his background, such as identifying his place of birth as both al-Haimah and al-Marwalah, YM. Detainee was captured in a safe house containing explosives, his martyr's will, and evidence of a future terrorist operation. However, detainee has never divulged any knowledge of a terrorist operation or associated plans.

¹⁶ TD-314/37098-02, TD-314/37833-02, Analyst Note: As a result of the three raids, ten individuals were detained. Detainee's group was dubbed the "Karachi 6." See TD-314/36523-02 as well as the eight open source articles in JDIMS titled, "Karachi 6 ...".

¹⁷ TD-314/37098-02, TD-314/37833-02, TD-314/36523-02

¹⁸ 000837 302 06-MAR-2003, 000837 302 15-MAR-2003

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7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a member of an al-Qaida cell prepared to conduct terrorist attacks on US forces in Karachi. He was captured during a series of raids by Pakistani authorities on suspected al-Qaida safe houses in Karachi. A laptop computer hard drive recovered from one of the safe houses contained data that could be used in targeting aircraft and to support hijacking operations. Also recovered were remote controlled detonators and detainee's "martyr" will, indicating he was prepared to conduct suicide operations. Detainee was associated with numerous senior al-Qaida members. Detainee probably participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces as a member of the 55th Arab Brigade. He received basic and advanced militant training and stayed in several al-Qaida and Taliban guest and safe houses.

- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida who was captured during a series of raids by Pakistani authorities on suspected al-Qaida safe houses in Karachi. Detainee is assessed to be a participant in planned terrorist attacks against US interests in Pakistan, and possibly in the United States.
 - (S//NF) Detainee stated he did not want "to go back to al-Qaida" and that he "wanted nothing to do with them."¹⁹ (Analyst Note: This is the only such self acknowledgement of detainee's membership in al-Qaida.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee was captured at the same safe house as senior al-Qaida member YM-10013 and al-Qaida member SA-1456.²⁰
 - (S//NF) Shawki Awad Balzuhair, ISN US9YM-000838DP (YM-838) stated each of the individuals living in Hamza al-Zubayr's safe house was an al-Qaida member. YM-838 said Hamza al-Zubayr was the group's al-Qaida operational leader and that Anas al-Pakistani was the group's caretaker. YM-838 also identified al-Zubayr as a senior military trainer at the al-Faruq Training Camp.²¹
 - (S//NF) Said Salih Said Nashir, ISN US9YM-000841DP (YM-841), lived in the same apartment as YM-838 and was captured in the same raid. YM-841 listed his roommates as Ayub Murshid Ali Salih, ISN US9YM-000836DP (YM-836), YM-838, Musab Omar Ali al-Mudwani, ISN US9YM-000839DP (YM-839), Hail Aziz Ahmed al-Maythali, ISN US9YM-000840DP (YM-840), and Amar, who

¹⁹ 000837 302 29-OCT-2002

²⁰ > TD-314/58056-05

²¹ TD-314/37833-02, IIR 6 034 0361 03, Analyst Note: Anas is an alias used by Pakistani national and safe house keeper Saif ul Rahman, who was detainee in the raid and retained in Pakistani custody. See TD-314/37098-02.

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was killed during the firefight.²² YM-838 heard from unidentified others that Amar was one of UBL's bodyguards.²³ (Analyst Note: Amar is likely a reference to Ammar Abdallah Ali al-Dhalai, variant (Omar Daleiy), who facilitated detainee's second trip to Afghanistan.²⁴)

- ◆ (S//NF) KU-10024 stated al-Zubayr had identified two Yemeni operatives, Ammar al-Dalih (assessed to be al-Dhalai) and Hassan aka (Mansur) to serve as "martyrs" in the Karachi operation.²⁵
- ◆ (S//NF) Al-Qaida operative Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, ISN US9TZ-010012DP (TZ-10012), who was involved in the East Africa Embassy bombings, reported staying in an unidentified Karachi safe house with detainee and Ammar Dali (assessed to be al-Dhalai) in late 2002.²⁶
- (S//NF) YM-838 stated YM-10014, who visited the apartment roughly every two weeks, was the group's primary facilitator in Karachi and their link to senior people in al-Qaida. YM-838 claimed Ammar al-Baluchi, ISN US9PK-010018DP (PK-10018), also visited to bring money, clothing, and assistance. Ahmed Ghulam Rabbani, ISN US9PK-001461DP (PK-1461), who was well known to the group as a Karachi-based facilitator who previously transported many of them from other safe houses, also often visited.²⁷
- (S//NF) On 11 September 2002, Pakistani forces raided three safe houses in Karachi. Detainee was captured in the first house and five other Yemenis were captured in the second. Others captured in these raids included YM-10013, SA-1456, and PK-1460.²⁸ According to a Pakistani government service, individuals located in two of the Karachi residences raided on 11 September 2002 were suspected of being part of a special terrorist team deployed to attack targets in Karachi. The Yemenis engaged the Pakistani forces in an extended firefight before being detained. Senior al-Qaida operative Hamza al-Zubayr al-Masri²⁹ was killed at the first house during the firefight.³⁰
 - (S//NF) Pakistani authorities found detainee's "last will before a suicide operation" in the safe house where detainee was captured.³¹ (Analyst Note: The presence of the document indicates that detainee, and probably the group as a whole, were in the final stages of planning suicide terrorist operations.)

²² TD-314/37833-02

²³ TD-314/37833-02

²⁴ 000837 302 29-OCT-2002, IIR 6 034 0234 03

²⁵ ➤ TD-314/37098-02

²⁶ ➤ TD-314/37860-05

²⁷ TD-314/37833-02

²⁸ TD-314/57127-05

²⁹ Analyst Note: Variants of Zubayr include Zubair and Zubayer. A variant of Masri is Mesri.

³⁰ TD-314/37098-02, TD-314/36523-02

³¹ 000837 AFGP-2002-906445 02-DEC-2002

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- ◆ (S//NF) YM-10014 acknowledged detainee's intent to become a martyr and described him as a "good soldier."³²
- (S//NF) Among the papers found at the residence where detainee was captured was an undated letter addressed to Hamza al-Zubayr from an individual named Mukh.³³ According to the letter, the group had the approval to attack hotels in Karachi where large numbers of US military members were staying. Following the raid on the Karachi safe houses and al-Zubayr's death, the attack was postponed.³⁴ (Analyst Note: Mukh is a variant of the alias used by Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (KSM), aka (Mukhtar), ISN US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024).)
 - ◆ (S//NF) PK-1461, who is familiar with the coded terminology used by KU-10024, said the letter, addressed from KU-10024 to Hamza al-Zubayr, contained instructions for al-Zubayr to speed up the execution of a planned, coordinated terrorist attack on multiple targets, likely using poisons and remote detonators. PK-1461 added the tone of the letter to al-Zubayr indicated that he was an operational leader in Karachi and was given responsibility of a large operation.³⁵
 - ◆ (S//NF) KU-10024 admitted being the author of the letter, dubbed the "Perfume Letter," and stated the attack was to take place using military grade explosives against two hotels that housed US troops. KU-10024 commented the operation was postponed because it was compromised when the Pakistani ISID raided al-Qaida residences tied to al-Zubayr's cell in September 2002 and arrested a number of cell members.³⁶ (Analyst Note: It is assessed KU-10024 is referring to the raids which resulted in al-Zubayr's death and the capture of the Karachi 6, YM-1456, PK-1461, PK-1460 and YM-10013.)
- (S//NF) KU-10024 stated in March 2002 al-Zubayr discussed conducting a car bomb attack against the Midway Hotel and Airport Hotel, located in the immediate vicinity of the old airport in Karachi. The hotels were chosen as targets because they regularly housed large numbers of US troops. KU-10024 approved the idea and agreed to fund it with \$30,000 US to purchase the two cars needed for the operation.³⁷
- (S//NF) KU-10024 indicated detainee had direct access to operational communications. In another letter recovered during the Karachi raids, KU-10024 instructed YM-10013 to tell an individual named Jafar al-Tayyar to be ready for

³² TD-314/36856-03

³³ TD-314/37823-02

³⁴ TD-314/12088-03, TD-314/17985-03

³⁵ TD-314/41583-02, TD-314/39649-02

³⁶ TD-314/17985-03

³⁷ > TD-314/37098-02

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travel. When KU-10024 was confronted with the letter during a custodial interview, he was surprised that the letter existed, as detainee was supposed to destroy important documents and correspondence.³⁸ (Analyst Note: KU-10024's comment indicates that detainee had access to operation planning and coordination through his handling of the correspondence. It is probable that Jafar al-Tayyar (Tayyar is Arabic for pilot) was involved in an operational planning utilizing the data from the hard drives recovered during the safe house raid.)

- (S//NF) After the safe house raid, YM-10013 informed officials that the safe house was a training center.³⁹
 - ◆ (S//NF) Over 20 radio-type detonating devices were discovered in the Tariq Road Safe House where detainee was captured. The devices were built inside of black "Sega" videogame cartridges and were designed for remote activation through use of a cell phone.⁴⁰ Also, schematics and programming information for remote detonation devices from a laptop computer hard drive were recovered in the joint safe house raid.⁴¹
 - ◆ (S//REL ISAF/CAN) Sega video game cartridges modified to be used with remote detonators were recovered in Khowst, AF on 27 July 2002.⁴² Al-Qaida bomb maker Abd al-Bari estimated that 400 to 500 Sega remote controlled firing devices (RCFD), 600 to 700 Casio [watch] timers, and 600 to 700 integrated circuit timers were made at two workshops in Karachi in 2002. Al-Bari noted after Hamza Zubayr was killed on 11 September 2002, Ammar came to the workshop to move the group and close the shop. Ammar told 'Abd al-Bari that brothers had been arrested who knew the location of the shop.⁴³ (Analyst Note: The Karachi 6 were arrested 11 September 2002.)
- (S//NF) Two laptop hard drives were recovered during the raids in which detainee was captured.⁴⁴
 - (S//NF) The hard drives contained images of instrument approach charts for major US and European airfields, along with flight simulator software. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) analysts assessed that a hijacker could use the data on the hard drives to study the proper approach to a commercial airfield, helping disguise his intent to crash an aircraft into a building or facility at or near the airport. In addition, terrorists could use the charts and software on the hard

³⁸ TD-314/45194-02

³⁹ 001460 FM40 10-JUN-2004

⁴⁰ TD-314/37098-02, TD-314/40307-02

⁴¹ TD-314/38215-02

⁴² >IIR 6 044 7041 02

⁴³ >TD-314/67976-04

⁴⁴ TD-314/37121-02

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drive to study incoming aircraft patterns, assisting in targeting with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).⁴⁵

- ◆ (S//NF) In addition to the aviation chart data mentioned above, the laptop computer hard drive contained procedures for kidnapping; smuggling money, weapons, ammunition and personnel; lectures and essays on terrorist training, executions, assassinations, and guerrilla warfare; remote control and electronics training programs; Stinger anti-aircraft missile assembly instructions; and other al-Qaida affiliated documents and videos.⁴⁶
- (S//NF) Passports belonging to UBL's family were also recovered in the raid of detainee's Karachi safe house.⁴⁷
- (S//NF) Detainee probably participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces as a member of UBL's 55th Arab Brigade and as a fighter in Zormat.
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted traveling back and forth between the front lines at Bagram and the Omar Saif Center after September 2001 until the order to retreat was given.⁴⁸ (Analyst Note: Members of the 55th Arab Brigade were assigned to small units and were positioned at camps or "centers" ("markez" in Arabic). These centers would rotate their positions between front line and rear echelon rest areas. While several centers occupied forward fighting positions, another would be located away from the front line for rest and acting as a reserve unit. The retreat is a probable reference to the withdrawal from the front lines by al-Qaida and Taliban forces in November 2001.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee reported he last saw Abd al-Salam al-Hadrami at the Daftar Taliban Guesthouse in Quetta.⁴⁹ (Analyst Note: Al-Hadrami, originally subordinate to Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi, aka (Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026), assumed command of the Omar Sayf Center, a 55th Arab Brigade position. Al-Hadrami was in charge of the Arab fighters who served on the defensive line and was also the second-in-command under IZ-10026, responsible for all Arab fighters in north of Kabul. Al-Hadrami was killed during Operation Enduring Freedom.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted spending a week in Zormat, where he surrendered his weapon and his passport was returned. Detainee then admitted traveling to Birmal in an effort to leave Afghanistan.⁵⁰
 - (S//NF) Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), reported groups of fighters from all over Afghanistan fled to Zormat, where senior al-Qaida commander Abu Muhammad

⁴⁵ NIMA HL0302363 03-OCT-2003

⁴⁶ TD-314/37121-02, TD-314/37833-02

⁴⁷ TD-314/37103-02, TD-314/40307-02, TD-314/37823-02, TD-314/37098-02

⁴⁸ 000837 302 29-OCT-2002

⁴⁹ IIR 6 034 0234 03

⁵⁰ 000837 302 29-OCT-2002

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- al-Masri wanted to stand and fight. In March 2002, IZ-10026 arrived and joined fighters to defend Zormat. GZ-10016 reported when he left Afghanistan he traveled to Birmal to arrange exit routes to assist the fighters escape to Pakistan.⁵¹
- (S//NF) Detainee received basic and advanced militant training at militant training camps in Afghanistan.
 - (S//NF) Detainee admittedly receiving training at the al-Faruq Training Camp outside Kandahar in 2000 and again in 2001. He received both basic and advanced militant training.⁵²
 - (S//NF) Detainee's alias, Abu al-Fida al-Sanaani, is noted on a list of incoming recruits, arriving on 18 September 2000 for training at al-Qaida camps. The document notes detainee intended to spend one year in Afghanistan.⁵³ (Analyst Note: This corresponds with detainee's first trip to Afghanistan.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee also received one and one half months of training at the Malik Training Camp in Kabul.⁵⁴ Detainee stated Abu Ayman al-Masri returned detainee's passport to him when detainee was preparing to leave Afghanistan.⁵⁵ (Analyst Note: Advance courses at the Malik Training Camp included air defense, MANPADS, artillery, and anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. Detainee may have surrendered his passport to Abu Ayman al-Masri when he was in training at the Malik Camp where Abu Ayman al-Masri was an instructor.)
 - (C) Detainee's name and alias are included on a list of applicants for Afghanistan-based militant training camps, which was recovered during an 8 December 2001 raid on an Arab office in Kandahar.⁵⁶ (Analyst Note: This list contains the application information for al-Qaida training camps acknowledged by detainee. However, while detainee states he was born in 1979, the list identifies his date of birth as 1981.)
 - (S//NF) Just prior to 11 September 2001, while detainee was training at al-Faruq, UBL and his second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, visited the camp. Detainee was directed to evacuate from the camp on 12 September 2001.⁵⁷
 - (S//NF) Detainee stayed in numerous al-Qaida and Taliban guesthouses and safe houses in Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁵⁸

⁵¹ TD-314/46047-02

⁵² 000837 302 29-OCT-2002

⁵³ Various ISNs AFGP-2002-800321 31-JAN-2002, detainee is listed on page 40, number 95; Analyst Note: The original date was listed as 18-6-1421 hijra.

⁵⁴ 000837 302 29-OCT-2002

⁵⁵ IIR 6 034 0234 03, Analyst Note: Abu Ayman al-Masri was a weapons instructor at the al-Qaida affiliated Camp Nine, aka (Malik Camp). See TD-314/38611-02.

⁵⁶ TRRS-04-11-0226, paragraph CCC.

⁵⁷ 000837 KB 01-NOV-2002

⁵⁸ 000837 KB 01-NOV-2002

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- (S//NF) Detainee stated he stayed in a safe house in Karachi belonging to PK-1460.⁵⁹
- (S//NF) In September 2000 and again probably in late August 2001, detainee stayed at the al-Nibras Guesthouse in Kandahar prior to entering the al-Faruq Training Camp. Detainee turned in his passport at this guesthouse and filled out a registration form.⁶⁰ (Analyst Note: Al-Nibras was also known as the Hajji Habash Guesthouse, which was used primarily for Arabs awaiting training at the al-Qaida affiliated al-Faruq Training Camp. The guesthouse also served as a way station for recruits traveling north to Kabul.)
 - (S//NF) YM-1457 stated he first met detainee sometime in 2001 at the Hajji Habash Guesthouse in Kandahar, and assumed detainee was either on his way to or coming from the al-Faruq Training Camp.⁶¹
- (S//NF) Detainee stayed at Dar al-Aman Guesthouse in Kabul while waiting to go to the front lines.⁶² (Analyst Note: Dar al-Aman Guesthouse was a way point for trained fighters en route to and from the front lines.)
- (S//NF) Detainee stayed at the Daftar Taliban Guesthouse in Quetta on both of his trips to Afghanistan. When recounting his second trip, detainee noted it was the same facility.⁶³ (Analyst Note: Daftar Taliban was a common stopover for recruits and fighters waiting for the opportunity to enter Afghanistan.)

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been non-compliant; however, he has been non-hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 25 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 12 May 2008, when he was in possession of contraband. He has no Report of Disciplinary Infraction for assault. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions and camp rules, damage to government property, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 16 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and three so far in 2008.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **HIGH** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 30 April 2008.

⁵⁹ 000837 302 29-OCT-2002, IIR 6 034 0654 03

⁶⁰ 000837 302 29-OCT-2002, See DAB Guesthouse Administration 14-Apr-2008.

⁶¹ 001457 SIR 20-OCT-2004

⁶² 000837 302 29-OCT-2002

⁶³ 000837 302 29-OCT-2002

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b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee made two trips to Afghanistan, stayed in numerous guesthouses, and trained at several training camps. Detainee was exposed to a variety of terrorists, including several key members of al-Qaida. At the Karachi safe house, he was probably exposed to explosives training and operational plans for terrorist attacks in Karachi and possibly in the US.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee can probably provide details of terrorist attack plans. He can probably provide information on al-Qaida explosives training and methodologies. Detainee has detailed knowledge of the facilitation network for Yemeni recruits. Detainee places himself at training camps during two al-Qaida attacks against the US. He likely has additional information regarding these attacks. Detainee had prepared a martyr's will and can probably provide information about al-Qaida's preparation of suicide operatives.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Terrorism radicalization factors
- Communication methods questions
- Detainee requirements on training
- Improvised explosive devices
- Al-Qaida terrorist operations
 - Planned attacks against US forces in Pakistan and other future attacks
 - 11 September 2001 attacks
 - USS COLE attack
- Al-Qaida
 - Recruiters, communications, and facilities
 - Guesthouses and safe houses in Pakistan and Afghanistan
 - Training camps
 - Individuals including:
 - Detainees: YM-10013, YM-10014, KU-10024, PK-1460, SA-1456
 - Hamza al-Zubayr
 - Basheer al-Shadadi
 - Shaddad al-Shadadi
 - Abu Ayman al-Masri

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9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 29 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



D. M. THOMAS, JR
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.