

PLAIN

-4- #31, January 26, from Tokyo

Socialists, a development long anticipated. The extent of Communist gains from this source is largely reflected in the reduction of 28 in the Socialist left-wing representation from its pre-election strength. Both the Democratic-Liberal and Communist parties garnered strength from the disrepute into which the center parties had fallen as a result of the scandal investigations, which each vigorously exploited.

The Democratic-Liberal Party campaigned effectively, urging voters to support a strong single party qualified to lead the nation during the period of economic rehabilitation ahead, stressing the weaknesses resulting from past ineffectual coalitions. The Party pledged itself to eliminate unnecessary economic controls, to reduce government personnel, to eliminate the sales tax, and to adopt measures which would stimulate the introduction of foreign capital.

The Communist Party was benefited by external circumstances peculiarly advantageous to the party. Developments in China, for example, were exploited by the party, which insisted that only a Communist Japan could live profitably in harmony with a Communist China. Chiang Kai-Shek's sudden retirement on the eve of the election gave dramatic support to the Communist campaign propaganda. Communists also won support by their promises to ease food collection requirements and eliminate taxes of lower income groups as well as their attacks upon the economic stabilization program of the government. The Radical elements in the ranks of labor gave strong support to Communist candidates not because of ideological preference but by way of protest against the ineffectual labor support of the Socialist Party and fear of suppressive measures affected by the influence of the hundreds of thousands of Japanese servicemen intensively trained in Soviet indoctrination centers prior to their repatriation.

In assessing the extent of the Conservative victory, it is necessary to take account of the support

accorded the

PLAIN

PLAIN

-5- #31, January 26, from Tokyo

accorded the slightly more moderate but essentially conservative Democratic Party and the smaller conservative groups and individuals with conservative tendencies, all of which add up to over 75 percent of the total number of seats in the House of Representatives. Four successful independents have already formally announced their intention to join the Democratic Liberal Party.

The Communist gain, under existing extraordinarily favorable conditions, should reflect the high water mark of its political support, unless conditions alter even more in its favor. The danger should not be discounted, however, from the unrealistic and undue over-emphasis which will undoubtedly be given the Communist political strength through ill-conceived propaganda efforts to be expected from Moscow and elements of American journalism or individuals either irresponsibly inclined or directly within the orbit of Communist sympathy. Such propaganda, especially any from seemingly reliable and responsible quarters, may be expected to be fully exploited by the local Communist Party in the uncensored Japanese press.

General MacArthur's comment on the election:

The Supreme Commander issued the following statement on 24 January:

"Peoples of the free world everywhere can take satisfaction in this enthusiastic and orderly Japanese election which at a critical moment in Asiatic history has given so clear and decisive a mandate for the conservative philosophy of government."

SEBALD

DU:VRS

PLAIN

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 197, January 26

Rec'd January 26, 1949
1:48 p.m.

OFFICE OF
EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 28 1949
Department of State

FILE

JTS
HRS

Soviet press January 26 carries 1/2 column Tokyo Tass despatch reporting successes Jap CP in parliamentary elections and noting number violations electoral law. Two-column article IZVESTIYA same date reviews anti-Liberal actions Jap reaction in preparation for elections and states simple understand how Liberal-Democratic Party received 262 places out of 466 under such conditions. Greatest blow to reactionary forces, however, was shameful failure suffered by right Socialists in elections. This contrasted with increase CP membership from 4 seats 1947 to 36 as result recent elections. Article states one reason for CP success was increased support in agricultural areas. Asserting that new CP strength indicates growing movement for independent, democratic Japan, article concludes that elections forecast inevitable defeat forces seeking involve peoples Asia in new war.

894.00/1-2649

Sent Department 197, repeated Tokyo 6.

KOHLER

RE:RS

PLAIN

FEB 4 1949

MEMO

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DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM PLAIN

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Rec'd January 26, 1949 7:54 p.m.

Office of EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 27 1949
Department of State

DIVISION OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
to NAC
JAN 27 1949
act: 1-27-49

FROM: Shanghai
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 256, January 26

China press English language Kung organ January 26 editorial opines that Japanese elections show that "the Japanese Communists have taken heart by the recent developments in China" and asserts that "the growth of Communist representation in the Japanese Diet is due more to the encouragement they have received by the Red victories in China than to general opposition to the policies of the occupation."

British controlled North China DAILY NEWS January 26 editorially declares that if there is any conclusion to be drawn from the elections "it must be that the Communists, though in no powerful position, now constitute a political force which will have to be reckoned with."

Intensified antagonism between the extreme right and extreme left in Japanese politics and impressive gains by leftist elements at the expense of the middle-of-the-road group are election results stressed in today's editorials in SHUN PAO KMT supervised CC journal, and CHUNG YANG YIH PAO, KMT organ.

Sent Nanking 194, repeated Department 256.

CABOT

DES:VRS

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MAR 16 1949

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894.00/1-2649

INCOMING AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS



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AIRGRAM SENT

From: Paris
 Date: January 28, 1949
 Rec'd: Feb 3, 1949, 5:36 PM
 Mailed: Jan 31, 1949

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

W.A.
FE

Examining the general elections which took place in Japan on January 23 for the renewal of the Lower House, semi-official LE MONDE in the lead editorial of its January 26 issue considers them "a brilliant success for the Right, a defeat for the moderates - particularly the Socialists - and distinct progress for the Communists", and concludes that the absolute majority of the liberal party will enable Japan to rise out of the political instability which in the past four years has caused five ministerial crises and three general elections.

DIVISION OF
 NORTH EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
Noted - file
 FEB 11 1949
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LE MONDE, however, finds cause for reflection in last Sunday's voting. It recalls that Japan is experimenting a parliamentary regime for the first time and that it is not possible to evaluate Japanese public opinion which is still uncertain and wavering, as is seen by the vote for the Center in April 1946, the enthusiastic support of the Socialists in April 1947, and, in this last election, the switch to the extremist parties. "In addition, the Communist gains will undoubtedly aggravate the class struggle which has intensified during the past year." The editorial recalls that the May 1947-October 1948 experience with a coalition government representing the moderate parties proved very disappointing. It had been expected that having won the April 1947 elections the Socialists would be able to quiet the labor unrest which followed the February attempt to bring about a general strike. The Socialists however had split, the Left wing moving towards the Communists and the Right wing towards the centerist Democratic Party, resulting in February 1948 in the replacement of Socialist Prime Minister by a representative of the Center. Despite American efforts to limit recourse to strikes and to control union activities, a series of strikes took place during 1948. In the autumn of that year a series of financial scandals revealed the corruption in parliamentary circles, numerous Socialist and Democratic Party members being involved and the Prime Minister, himself, arrested. The Liberal Party, the party of the extreme Right in the Japanese Parliament, was practically untouched by the general corruption and LE MONDE finds that its recent victory is directly attributable to its capturing the vote of those who formerly voted for the Center.

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-2-

Paris, France
A-184

LE MONDE points out, however, that this new turn to the Right does not represent a resurrection of pre-war Japan. According to most observers Japan does not want to return to the past: it suffered too much from its militaristic adventure and is convinced that its best chance for the future lies in collaboration with its occupiers. LE MONDE warns, however, that while collaborating, the Yoshida Cabinet will be more exacting and less pliant than any of its predecessors. It will also benefit from the international situation in the Far East where at the moment when the Communists are victorious in China, Japan decidedly resumes the role of the champion of anti-Communism, thereby gaining greater American support and greater freedom in the economic field.

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893.00

The success of the Communists, which exceeded the fondest hopes of the party, is attributed by LE MONDE to the collapse of the Center, the dissatisfaction of the working class and, in great part, to the influence of Communist victories in China. "It is perhaps in the Communist party rather than in the traditional Right, capitalist and still attached to the imperial regime, that the totalitarian tendencies of the Japan of the past survive or revive."

But the Communist success is not great enough to cause undue alarm as the Japanese remain instinctively attached to their traditions and hostile to Russian influence. They are not yet on the point of ceasing to be good pupils of their American masters, concludes LE MONDE, provided the democratic regime regains for them a part of the position they formerly held in international affairs.

CAFFERY

Copy to Tokyo
William O. Boswell/hc



THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ACTION

is assigned to

FE

Despatch No. 40

American Mission in Korea,

Seoul, January 28, 1949

RESTRICTED

Subject: Transmission of Note to Korean Foreign Office.

DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
FEB 2 1949
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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a note presented to the Korean Foreign Office by this Mission at the request of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, relative to the extradition of two Korean nationals believed residing in Korea and wanted for criminal activities by Japanese authorities.

The memorandum from the United States Political Advisor in Tokyo, who forwarded the request of the Supreme Commander, indicated its understanding that in the absence of a treaty of extradition between SCAP and the Korean Government the latter was under no obligation to return the fugitives to SCAP representatives. It went on to add that the Supreme Commander was not willing to promise the Korean Government, even in the event of its rendition of the fugitives, that it would reciprocally in the future honor similar extradition requests of the Korean Government presented to SCAP.

The note to the Korean Foreign Office therefore broaches the request as a matter of comity between nations in a mutual desire to see accomplished the fundamental principles of justice to which both countries subscribe. In the memorandum of this Mission to the Political Advisor in Japan reporting on the action taken on its request it was noted that it is possible that the Korean Government may shortly wish to present requests to SCAP for extradition of Koreans resident in Japan who are wanted in Korea for prosecution under the National Traitor's Act (reference Mission Despatch No. 23, January 15, 1949). It was asked of the Political Advisor that should any such request be received from the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Japan the details first be forwarded this Mission before answer from SCAP is given in view of the delicate political nature of the National Traitor's Act prosecutions in Korea.

894.00/1-2849

Respectfully yours,

For the Special Representative:

Everett F. Drumright
Counselor of Mission

Enclosure: att
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FEB 16 1949

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 40, January 28, 1949, American Mission in Korea, Subject: Transmission of Note to Korean Foreign Office.

No. 21

The American Mission in Korea presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea and has the honor to forward a request of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan for the apprehension and rendition to his representatives of two Korean nationals, accused of various crimes in Japan, and now believed in hiding in Korea.

The two Koreans whose return is requested are LEE Kil Moon () and KANG Yong Soo (). The former is reportedly domiciled at No. 133, Tocho Ri, Ma-am Myun, Kosung Goon, Kyung-sang Namdo. The latter may be resident in Saengnim Myun, Keumhae Goon, Kyung-sang Namdo. Both persons are believed to frequent the following addresses given with their Japanese names: No. 14, 2nd-chome, Tori-cho, Masan City, Kyung-sang Namdo; and No. 25, Bonichi-cho, Pusan City, Kyung-sang Namdo. Mr. Lee is described as about 36 years of age; five feet, seven inches tall (about 170 centimeters); dark, square face; wears horn-rimmed spectacles; hair parted at the side. Mr. Kang is reported to be either 42 or 43 years of age; five feet, two inches tall (about 158 centimeters); dark, round face; hair parted at the side. Mr. Lee is, at the present time, on probation from a Japanese prison to which he was sentenced to a six year term for theft in 1944. Mr. Kang is the husband of Mr. Lee's sister, LEE Moon Sun, now resident in Korea.

Both of the aforementioned individuals together with three other Korean nationals, resident in Japan, and presently in custody, are believed to have forged checks, and thereby defrauded, thirty-eight banks in Japan in the amount of YEN 10,235,000 during March 1948. With the hope of escaping to Korea, this sum of money was converted into gold bullion, jewelry, books, and pencils, which the five persons accused intended to smuggle into Korea aboard a fishing vessel which they purchased for this purpose. Before all arrangements for departure were completed, three of the accused were captured by Japanese police authorities. Mr. Lee and Mr. Kang, together with the valuables noted, succeeded in smuggling themselves into Korea by ship. Their success is testified to by a cable from Mr. Lee in Taegoo, Kyung-sang Pukdo on May 17, 1948, to a friend in Japan who was requested to look after one of the three captives, who is Mr. Lee's brother. This cable was intercepted by the Japanese authorities.

This Mission is cognizant of the fact that since the establishment of the Government of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948, there has not yet been sufficient time for a treaty of extradition to have been negotiated between the Republic of Korea and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan. In

/fact

Enclosure to Despatch No. 40, January 28, 1949, American Mission in Korea, Subject: Transmission of Note to Korean Foreign Office.

fact, officers of the Korean Mission in Japan, accredited to the Supreme Commander, have only within the last several days departed for their post at Tokyo. It is, furthermore, recognized, that in the absence of such a treaty, the Government of the Republic of Korea is under no legal obligation to comply with the request of the Supreme Commander for extradition.

It is thought, however, especially in view of the apparent violation by the accused individuals of the customs and exchange laws of the Republic of Korea, that your Government may wish, as a matter of comity and as evidence of its desire to see justice accomplished, as expressed in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, to apprehend the fugitives concerned, and deliver them to the appointed representatives of the Supreme Commander. Although this Mission is not authorized to commit the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan with regard to his future actions, it is felt that favorable action by the Government of the Republic of Korea in this case may establish a basis for reciprocal action by the Supreme Commander should such occasion arise, pending the negotiation of a treaty of extradition.

As of possible assistance to your Government in reaching a decision in this matter, there are attached hereto the following documents:

1. Letter, in English, dated June 5, 1948 from the Office of the Hiroshima Chief Procurator to the Commanding Officer, Hiroshima (United States Army) Military Government Team, requesting the latter's assistance in effecting the return to Japan of the two fugitive Korean nationals accused;

2. Japanese text, together with English translation, of a letter dated September 1948 from the Hiroshima District Chief Procurator to the Commanding Officer, Hiroshima (United States Army) Military Government Team, providing the texts of affidavits, facts, and charges involved in the said case;

3. Letter, in English, dated November 16, 1948, from the Attorney General of the Japanese Government to the Chief, Legal Section, Supreme Command Allied Powers, requesting the latter's assistance in effecting the return to Japan of the two fugitives.

Enclosures:

1. Letter dated June 5, 1948 (described above)
2. Japanese text with English translation of letter dated September 1948 (described above)
3. Letter dated November 16, 1948 (described above)

American Mission in Korea,

Seoul, January 21, 1949

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) NND# 760050

FEB 14 1949

INCOMING AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER

FROM: Moscow, U.S.S.R.

DATED: January 29, 1949

DESPATCHED: January 29, 1949

RECEIVED:

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of
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Feb. 8, 1949 5:12pm

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

A-92, January 29, 1949.

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The Soviet press interpretation of the results of the recent Japanese parliamentary elections is outlined in the closing paragraphs of a long article on Japan entitled "Dangerous Shoots", which appears in the January 26th issue of the Literary Gazette. The author of the article, M. Markov, describes the results as "the most eloquent evidence of the growth and consolidation of democratic forces", and as a "hard blow for Japanese and international reaction".

As was to be expected, Soviet propaganda played up the nine-fold increase in the number of Communist deputies elected to Parliament (from 4 to 36). Thus, Markov describes the new composition of Parliament as follows: "Although the numerical preponderance in the new Parliament, as a result of unbridled anti-democratic terror and every kind of fraudulent device, remains on the side of the reactionary parties, the Communist Party in these elections received 9 times more deputy seats than in the 1947 elections!" This, he continues, is an important success for the progressive forces of Japan, which, however, would have been still greater had the progressive forces been supported instead of subjected to repression.

It is also to be expected that the Communist showing in the Japanese elections will be further exploited, in combination with the numerous reports of rising Communist Party membership and transfers to the Communist Party by prominent Japanese intellectuals which have been appearing recently in the Soviet press, to prove to Soviet readers that Communism is advancing swiftly in Japan in spite of all US efforts at suppression.

KOHLER

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Copy to Tokyo

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894.00/1-2949

FEB 14 1949

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Rec'd Feb. 1, 1949
10:36 a.m.

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FROM: Moscow
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 254, February 1

One-third column Tokyo Tass despatch IZVESTIYA Feb. 1 reports Jap CP proposal United Front with Socialist and Worker Peasant Parties and outlines CP's 13 point programme of common struggle.

Repeated Tokyo 9.

KOHLER

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OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER

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FEB 4 1949

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

Control 528

Rec'd February 2, 1949
1:47 a.m.

FROM: Shanghai DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 339, February 1

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
FEB 2 - 1949
DIRECTOR
Department of State

TA KUNG PAO January 28 editorial predicts that the victorious conservative elements in Japan will oppose US control especially in economic matters and that "the inevitable conflict of interests between American and Japanese capitalists" will come to a head. While deploring the defeat of the middle of-the-road parties the paper declares that the most significant election result was the victory of the Japanese Communist Party which is described as "the mainstay against aggression and militarism as well as the vanguard against feudalism and fascism" and whose three million supporters are called "the core of the influence that is to re-mould Japan."

TUNG NAN JIH PAO, Kuomintang southeast China organ, January 28 editorial, "rebirth of fascism" expects that "under the control of rightist conservative political influence Japan will once more tread the path of fascism while at the same time the strength of Communism will also grow with the passage of time", producing a severe conflict between the two forces. The journal fears that "in the twinkling of an eye militarism will again be rampant in Japan."

Sent Nanking 258, repeated Department 339, Tokyo 29.

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EMB:EC

MAR 11 1949

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894.00/2-149

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS United States Political Adviser
for Japan

Tokyo, February 5, 1949.

No. 79

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET (For Department use only)

Subject: Assassination of Prominent Korean Rightist Leader in Japan

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of an intelligence report dated January 14, 1949, prepared by the G-2 Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, in regard to the assassination in Tokyo on January 13, 1949, of GEN Ko Sho (alias HYUN Ho Sup).

Gen was a prominent leader in the Kansai area of the rightist Korean Residents Union. Interested officials of this Headquarters state that the motive for Gen's murder was political. Gen had incurred enmity of the leftist League of Koreans Residing in Japan and its satellite Youth League by his intensive anti-communist efforts in the Kobe-Osaka region and had allegedly become a marked man after a scuffle some months ago in Kobe in which a Korean leftist was killed by the Japanese police. Gen's murderer has not been apprehended, but there appears to be reason to believe that ISHIMATSU Marino (Korean), a prominent communist leader of the Korean Democratic Youth League, procured the services of a hired assassin from Korea for the purposes of this crime. Headquarters officials also state that Japanese police have made little progress in this case and seem reluctant to pursue it vigorously.

The immediate effect of this assassination has been to unnerve leaders of the Korean Residents Union, several of whom have resigned. It is rumored that the Korean League has published a list of Korean rightists whom it intends to assassinate and that this list includes the name of the new Korean Minister accredited to SCAP, Mr. Henry DE YOUNG. Regardless of the authenticity of this list or of plans of the Korean League, this murder has further weakened the Korean Residents Union and the cause of Korean moderates in Japan.

Respectfully yours,

173728

Enclosure:

Intelligence Summary
dated January 14, 1949.

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RBFinn:hh

In triplicate to Department.

Copy to Office of Special Representative
Political Adviser, Seoul.

SECRET

W. J. Sebald

JWS

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W. J. Sebald

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SECRET

Enclosure to Despatch No. 79 dated
February 5, 1949 from United States
Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo,
subject: "Assassination of Prominent
Korean Rightist Leader in Japan."

COPYSECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
Military Intelligence Section,
General Staff

SPOT INTELLIGENCE

CAW/RSB/CFG/amh
Date: 14 Jan 49
Hour: 1120

SUBJECT: Assassination of Prominent Rightist Korean Leader

TO : Chief of Staff

1. Information:

a. CIC reports that GEN Ko Sho, alias HYUN Ho Sup (Korean) - AITIYAMA (Japanese), a prominent leader in Korean Rightist movements was shot and killed near Ueno Station, Tokyo, at 1815 hours last evening. The assassin fired a pistol at very close range after ordering GEN to step out of a car and then fled into the UENO crowds and disappeared.

b. GEN was the most valuable CIC Informant in the Kobe-Osaka area, chairman of the rightist Korean Residents Union and one of the most powerful Korean anti-leftist leaders in Japan. He was publisher of the TAI Kan Nimpo, a strongly anti-communist newspaper in the Kansai region. GEN was an active leader in Korean anti-communist activities and as such incurred the enmity of all leftist organizations notably the League of Koreans Residing in Japan, its subsidiaries and the Japan Communist Party.

c. GEN had been in the Tokyo area for several days for the following reasons:

(1) To expedite Japanese official approval of a request for cloth to be used in making Korean Republic flags. The flags were to be used as a counter-measure against the illegal leftist display of the flag of North Korea.

(2) To attempt to have the newsprint allocation increased so that he could expand the circulation of his paper.

(3) To confer with local CIC and rightist Korean leaders as to the Korean situation throughout Japan.

d. GEN's address in Tokyo was supposedly a closely guarded secret among the top rightist leaders as he was aware of his many enemies and the possibility that they would carry out previous threats against his life.

e. It is believed that the Koreans in both Kobe and Tokyo will react violently to GEN's assassination.

2. Action:

a. CIC will observe and report on all developments which may arise as a result of this incident.

b. Following agencies notified: ADC, Deputy Chiefs of Staff SCAP and FRC, DS, CPM, Tokyo PM, G-3.

SECRET

C. A. W.

SECRET

No. 15 to Department.

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AMERICAN CONSULATE
Kunming, Yunnan, China, February 7, 1949

DIVISION OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
FEB 23 1949
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1949 FEB 22 AM 10 16

Subject: Editorial on the Development of Japan.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

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4:39 p.m.
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Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a translation of an editorial entitled "Where is Japan Heading?", published in the "Cheng Yi Pao" (Truth Daily) on February 1, 1949. This paper, probably the second most respected in Kunming after the "Kuan Char Pao", is controlled by Mr. Lin Nan-yuan, a leader of the CC Clique in this province and currently Provincial Commissioner of Finance.

Respectfully yours,

LaRue R. Lutkins
LaRue R. Lutkins
American Vice Consul

Enc. att.

Original and hectograph to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Nanking.
Copy to USIS, Shanghai.

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APR 28 1949
FILED
DMR

Cheng I Pao
February 1, 1949

Where is Japan Heading?

Pre-war Japan was the No. 1 aggressive country in the Far East. The first one to suffer serious harm was of course China. The memory of this painful fact is still fresh in our minds and will never be obliterated. We therefore watch with close interest the developing trends in post-war Japan. With great sympathy and sincere friendship we would like Japan, after three years' reformation since the war, to have become truly democratic, reached a reasonable economic prosperity, and improved the livelihood of the majority of her people. On the contrary, for the sake of ourselves and the Japanese race, we do not wish to see her revert to her old militaristic rut to endanger the world and bury her own future.

Actual developments up to the present have told us that Japan has proceeded along a path contrary to our wishes. That murderous feature of the typical Japanese militarists which appears in cartoons is again moving before our eyes. According to reports, the number of Japanese armed policemen will soon be increased to 300,000, equivalent to the total number of standing military and police forces in the pre-war period. The supreme organization which commands the police is the so-called "National Peace Preservation Committee" which is directly under the Premier and which is in fact a metamorphosed "Department of the Army". The "police control areas" in different areas are metamorphosed "military control areas". The "Police College" set up last year is a metamorphosed military officers' academy or an army college. As to the navy, General MacArthur's Headquarters, under the pretext of preventing smuggling activities, last year turned over 28 submarines and destroyers for use by the Japanese police. At the same time, the "Central Naval Peace Preservation Committee" and the "Naval Peace Preservation Bureau" were set up. In fact, they are a metamorphosed revival of the "Department of the Navy". The force of the Naval Peace Preservation Bureau is temporarily set at 8,000 naval peace preservation policemen and 38 armed patrolling cruisers. In the future, the number will be increased to 10,000 naval policemen and 135 vessels. Such a grand new organization, with American equipment, will be no weaker than the pre-war naval force. As to the air force, all the Japanese air bases are still in existence and their equipment is as good as ever. Besides secretly training a group of Japanese flying personnel, the United States has spent the large sum of 13 million US dollars and mobilized several thousand Japanese laborers in building on the northern part of Honshu a strategic airfield capable of accomodating the largest and fastest airplanes. As to man power, the big and small war criminals have not been wiped out and are openly carrying out their activities everywhere. It is even said that the arch war criminal Tojo is still alive. A group of 200,000 retired military persons will again get the opportunity of "being employed". Fascist organizations of different sorts are preparing for further activities. As to material power, certain equipment of military factories and heavy industries of high productive capacity have largely been retained. General MacArthur's nine-point economic plan for Japanese recovery is indeed designed to restore Japan's armament industry to its pre-war level. According to the occupation report released by General MacArthur's Headquarters on October 24 last year, Japanese economy has greatly progressed. The general production index for the industrial and mining industry and the manufacturing industry, which was 43.1 in September 1947, increased to 52.9 in July 1948, reaching 50% of the 1930 - 1934 production level. As for coal production, the average production in the last eight months of 1947 had already gone beyond the 1930 - 1934 level. Yet Japan is still not satisfied with the above conditions. According to a telegram

from

PAPER 22 1242

- 2 -

from Tokyo of the French News Agency, the semi-official "English Chronicle" in Japan brags about Japan as being an anti-communist fortress and shows dissatisfaction with the fact that Japan has not been totally armed. Thus, the Japanese "ambition" can be readily seen.

The Potsdam Declaration clearly stipulates that all visible and invisible Japanese aggressive arms should be removed. The Far Eastern Commission also passed a resolution reiterating the dissolution of Japanese military organizations, the prohibition of the manufacture of articles of a military nature, and the abolition of all military activities. Yet the United States from beginning to end has paid no attention to all this. In the so-called "democratic" new constitution put into force in May 1947, a preliminary step had already been made toward re-armament. The Japanese general election on January 23rd of this year was obviously held with General MacArthur supporting the formation of a cabinet by the conservative and reactionary Yoshida of the Democratic Liberal Party, in order to carry out the mission of anti-Soviet and anti-communist "militarism". The American support of Japan has now gone from politics and economy to military affairs, from the sea to the land and the air, from the Emperor to the rascal, from production to trade, from man power to financial power, from semi-official to official, from partial aid to all-out support.

"Where is Japan Heading?" The conclusion to be drawn from the above facts is this: Japan, because of the fundamental conflict between the United States and Soviet Russia, has obtained American support, put on an "anti-communist" cloak, and is marching again in a new style on the old foundation along the aggressive path of Fascist militarism.

**JAPAN CHRISTIAN
UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION**

214 EAST 21st STREET
New York 10, N. Y.

OFFICERS

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Administrative Assistant

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

Replied 2/21/49
FEB 14 1949

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

February 9, 1949

PERSONAL

The Honorable Dean G. Acheson
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

You doubtless will recall me as the executive vice chairman of the American National Red Cross for twenty-three and a half years up to the time of my retirement soon after V-J Day. In view of the international aspects of the enterprise with which I am now associated, I enclose a copy of the NEWSLETTER relative to my recent trip to Japan, where at the suggestion of Mr. Grew I had opportunity to see Mr. Covell representing the State Department and also a number of people in SCAP from General MacArthur down. Our university project is one which will interest you. I am, therefore, also sending you under separate cover marked "Personal" some of our other material.

Background with the Red Cross and the fact that I was acting chairman at the time of the Japanese earthquake in 1923, when the Red Cross raised over \$11,000,000 for the earthquake victims, led to my reception as an old friend of Japan and opened doors from those of the Emperor, Prince Takamatsu, Prime Minister Yoshida, and the governor of the Bank of Japan down. It was a touch-and-go situation with numerous press conferences, including a final large one arranged by the C. I. & E. Section at its offices. I was pleased to have both our own leaders and those of the Japanese say that I had "a way with the Japanese." Our own high command said that I had been "on the beam" throughout my visit. I realized throughout that one could easily complicate rather than simplify relationships.

It is a pleasure to express my deep appreciation for the part played by the State Department in expediting my trip and my travel and accommodations in Japan. This relationship with your people, as well those with the military and the Red Cross at home and overseas, enabled me to play my unofficial part in helping to further international friendship on a broad public relations basis.

I am still maintaining my residence at 5009 Edgemoor Lane, Bethesda, Maryland, in order to simplify the school attendance of my two sons (Jim, 12; John, 8) at Landon Boys School. I am home with my family each weekend, but am here in New York during the week. I am at your service should there ever be occasion.

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
The Honorable Dean G. Acheson

-2-

February 9, 1949

With every good wish for your continued success in the outstandingly important post that you occupy and with best wishes, I am

Respectfully yours,



James L. Fieser
Executive Director

JLF:mp
Enclosure

P. S. Also enclosed is a copy of a 25th anniversary United Press story on the earthquake.

MAR 1 1949

Dear Mr. Fieser:

I thank you for the thoughtfulness of your letter of February 9, 1949 and the spirit which prompted you to write.

With appreciation for your expression of congratulations and of good wishes which I heartily reciprocate, I am

Sincerely yours,

Dean Acheson

Mr. James L. Fieser,

Executive Director,

Japan Christian University Foundation,

214 East 21st Street,

New York 10, N. Y.

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OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

United States Political Adviser
for Japan

Tokyo, February 11, 1949

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No. 89
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Subject: Proposed Visit to the United States of Hyoe OUCHI

The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to supply the Department with the following summary of information concerning a proposed visit to the United States of Hyoe OUCHI, Professor of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University, former Cabinet member, and a recognized authority in international monetary problems.

On January 19, 1949 this Headquarters received through the Department of the Army a telegram from Huntington GILCHRIST, Chairman of the Pacific Council, requesting favorable action upon Professor Ouchi's application for permission to visit the United States to attend the annual meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations from January 22 to 24, 1949 as a representative of the Japan Institute of Pacific Studies, and thereafter to spend approximately four months in the United States on an investigation of international monetary and financial problems for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Upon making inquiry into the matter this Mission found that favorable action in the case was being delayed by reason of a secret report from Headquarters sources which read in part as follows:

"Subject has been referred to as 'liberal and progressive' or as a 'leftist.' Some sources describe Subject as a 'veteran Marxist' and a Communist Party sympathizer, but there is no evidence that he is a member of the JCP or that he has any direct connection with the Party...Subject is a recognized and eminent authority on financial matters and his interest in Marxism probably represents an intellectual interest rather than any active cooperation with the Japan Communist Party...His close association with Communists, however, and his membership in Communist front groups seem to place him in the vague category of 'fellow traveller.'"

On January

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DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Tokyo's Despatch No. 89,
February 11, 1949

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On January 22, 1949 this Mission addressed a communication to the appropriate sections of this Headquarters which expressed the view that the foregoing report ought not to be considered sufficient grounds for refusing to accede to the invitation of the Institute of Pacific Relations for the attendance of so distinguished a scholar as Professor Ouchi. It was further pointed out that the United States has a sound and substantial interest in the reestablishment of relations with competent Japanese scholarship and that the interposing of obstacles by this Headquarters should be limited to less tenuous cases.

On the same date a final and unfavorable decision was made in the case by the Chief of Staff and a telegram was sent to the Department of the Army which stated that Professor Ouchi can be classified as a "fellow traveler" and that, "since statements of opinions expressed by him in connection with his IPR activities in the United States could be interpreted as having official or semi-official backing, his travel to the United States is not favorably considered."

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In triplicate to the
Department

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United States Political Adviser
for Japan

Tokyo, February 11, 1949

No. 89

SECRET

Subject: Proposed Visit to the United States of Hyoue OUCHI

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Tokyo's Despatch No. 89,
February 11, 1949

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MWeatherby:hh

In triplicate to the
Department

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Leikin (VD)

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS,

TOKYO,

INFO: ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF,

FOR ACTING POLITICAL ADVISER.

Dept has been requested by William Holland, SECGEN, Institute of Pacific Relations to use its good offices in obtaining permission Hyoye Ouchi to enter US to visit IPR officials here and to attend forthcoming meeting of IPR officers and Natl Council to be held Toronto Sept 20 and 21.

On basis (1) ur recommendation to Headquarters, Tokyo despatch 89, Feb 11, 1949 re Ouchi's proposed visit to US in Jan, (2) Dept's understanding that Yoshida has appointed him member of Social Security Commission and Chairman of Cabinet's Statistics Commission, (3) fact that he has been granted permission to attend Intl Statistical Congress in Switzerland and is now there; and (4) US desire to encourage Jap scholarship and (5) favorable effect that visit and US might have on Ouchi, Dept requests, at ur discretion you take this matter up with SCAP informing him that Dept has no objection Consul Geneva issuing him visitor's ~~visa~~ to enter US provided travel US approved by SCAP.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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United States Political Adviser
for Japan

Tokyo, February 14, 1949.

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
file
1949
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 94

CONFIDENTIAL
(For Department Use Only)

Subject: Japanese General Election of January 23, 1949.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's airgrams nos. 16, 17, and 18 of January 25, 1949 giving preliminary analyses of the Japanese general election of January 23, and to transmit to the Department a more detailed memorandum on the subject of the general election prepared by an officer of this Mission dated February 8, 1949. Statistics covering the January 23 election are based upon a report published shortly after the election by the National Election Management Committee. For convenience of comparison with previous postwar elections, reference is made to the Department's OIR study no. 3492 of May 15, 1946, "Analysis of the 1946 Japanese General Election", and OIR study no. 4310 of September 1, 1947, "An Analysis of the 1947 Japanese House of Representatives Election".

Summary of Election Statistics

The election of January 23, 1949 was remarkable for the exceedingly large participation of the electorate, over 31 million, or 74.1 percent, of the nation's 42 million eligible voters casting ballots. The distribution of votes by political parties and the number of seats each party won in the House of Representatives are summarized in the following table:

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Tokyo's Despatch No. 94,
February 14, 1949.

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| <u>Political Parties</u> | <u>Votes</u> | <u>Seats</u> |
|--------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Democratic Liberal | 13,381,610 | 264 |
| Democratic | 4,835,504 | 68 |
| Social Democratic | 4,129,724 | 49 |
| Peoples' Cooperative | 1,042,123 | 14 |
| Communist | 2,984,583 | 35 |
| Social Reformer | 387,214 | 5 |
| Labor-Farmer | 606,744 | 7 |
| New Liberal | 187,208 | 2 |
| Japan Farmers | 232,833 | 1 |
| Various Minor Parties | 795,308 | 9 |
| Independents | 2,007,328 | 12 |
| Total | 30,590,179 | 466 |

The election resulted in an unexpectedly large show of strength of the conservative Democratic Liberal Party, which received 13,381,610 votes (43.8 percent of the total) and won 264 seats (56.6 percent of 466) in the House of Representatives. Prior to the election the Democratic Liberal Party published statements of confidence that it would secure some 200 seats, and its present absolute majority constitutes a far greater success than was anticipated.

While the Democratic Liberal Party now enjoys a commanding position, the middle grouping, as represented by the Democratic and Social Democratic Parties, has suffered a serious defeat. Democratic candidates received less than 16 percent of the popular vote and won only 68 seats in the House, while the Social Democratic Party's popular vote amounted to only 13.5 percent, its candidates winning 49 seats. In 1947 the Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party secured 121 and 143 seats respectively.

The disintegration of the middle grouping, particularly the Social Democratic Party, was accompanied by a phenomenal increase in communist strength which far exceeded all pre-election predictions. During the campaign the most optimistic communist spokesmen predicted that their party would win 15 to 20 seats in the Diet. Most political observers, however, believed that the communists would secure only eight to ten seats. Instead, communist candidates polled close to three million votes and won 35 seats in the Diet. The communists were particularly strong in the industrialized urban areas, and in Tokyo succeeded in electing one candidate from each of the city's seven electoral districts.

Regrouping

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Tokyo's Despatch No. 94,
February 14, 1949.

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Regrouping of Political Parties

The 1949 election has thus resulted in marked gains at the two extremes of the political stage, while the formerly strong middle grouping suffered serious reverses. With 35 seats in the House of Representatives, the Japan Communist Party, on the other hand, is now in a position to bid for leadership of the opposition forces. How successful the communists will be in their effort to assume such leadership cannot at present be determined. They have, however, already openly accelerated their efforts at organizing a popular front, a strategy which they employed during the campaign at the expense of the socialists (this Mission's despatch no. 813 of December 29, 1948). Shortly after the election a number of communist leaders called at the headquarters of the Social Democratic Party and invited the socialists to join a popular front. The socialist leaders, however, rejected this proposal categorically and expressed their determination to try to rebuild the Social Democratic Party as an independent party free of communist influence.

The Japanese communists have not been deterred by this strong Social Democratic rebuff. During the campaign many left-wing socialists were won over to the communist party, and more socialist supporters, especially at the prefectural and local level, are now expected to leave their party and join the communists. Moreover, the close connection of the Japan Communist Party and the newly-organized Labor-Farmer Party (this Mission's despatch no. 813 of December 29, 1948) has become even closer since the election. It is generally believed that on most issues the seven Labor-Farmer members of the House will work on close terms with the communists, although, like the Social Democratic Party, the Labor-Farmer Party does not desire a merger with the communists.

The demoralization of the Democratic and Social Democratic parties presents a serious problem in the face of the Democratic Liberal's overwhelming majority and the possibility of a communist-led opposition. Since the election, Democratic Party leaders have discussed the advantages of working with the Democratic Liberals in the formation of a coalition government. Popular sentiment, however, is strongly opposed to the establishment of another coalition cabinet.

The position of the socialists is even more precarious than that of the Democrats. Not only did they suffer a heavy loss of strength in the House of Representatives, but their party's principal leaders were defeated at the polls and are therefore not members of the new House. Mr. KATAYAMA Tetsu, one of those defeated in the election, is faced with pressure for his resignation from the office of chairman of the party's Central Executive Committee.

Reasons

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Tokyo's Despatch No. 94,
February 14, 1949.

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Reasons for Political Realignment and Success of
Democratic Liberals

It is difficult to explain with accuracy the reasons which have brought about such a far-reaching realignment of political forces. This election has shown, as did so many prewar elections, that a large number of Japanese are innately conservative by temperament and favor a conservative administration. Prime Minister Yoshida and the Democratic Liberal Party stand for such conservatism. They do not, however, represent an ultra-reactionary ideology as is frequently attributed to them by some sections of the press in Japan and abroad. Mr. Yoshida and the Democratic Liberal Party are now at the extreme right of the political stage primarily because the ultra-nationalists, reactionaries, and militarists of the pre-war and wartime periods have been removed from political life. Nevertheless, the Democratic Liberal Party represents a form of conservatism which is still fundamental to Japanese political thinking, and the results of the election are a strong endorsement of such principles. To some degree it must also be recognized that the party's popularity, and particularly Mr. Yoshida's appeal as the party's leader, comes from the Prime Minister's independent attitude and his determination to resist pressure from General Headquarters (this Mission's despatches no. 774 of December 9, 1948 and no. 4 of January 4, 1949). Combined with his outspoken patriotism, referred to as nationalism by many of his opponents, Mr. Yoshida's independent attitude has appealed to many Japanese.

In its February issue, Seikei Joho notes that the popular desire for independence is one important reason for the Democratic and Social Democratic defeats. Such middle-of-the-road political leaders have contended, according to this magazine, that "politics in occupied Japan is necessarily restricted by occupation policies". The general election in this magazine's view has plainly indicated that the people are "opposed to such an ideology and anxious for the realization of politics as independent as possible of outside influence in spite of their position as a defeated nation".

It is also apparent that the Democratic Liberal Party profited by being out of office during the past year and a half when widespread political scandals were exposed. Although many Democratic Liberal politicians have been involved in dishonest and corrupt activities, the Democratic and Social Democratic parties have been more adversely affected not only because some of their principal leaders have been involved but also because these parties were in power. The most important cause of the defeat of the Democratic and Social Democratic parties, however, is believed to have been their failure to stand in the eyes of the electorate for definite policies. Both the Katayama and Ashida Cabinets were far too content with temporizing compromises and to a considerable degree earned reputations of being too subservient to pressure from the Occupation. It is unfortunately true that the

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Tokyo's Despatch No. 94,
February 14, 1949.

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period when they were in office was a period in which changing Headquarters policies, particularly in the field of labor relations, tended to undermine platform positions earlier taken by the parties and made the voters conscious of a lack of consistency in party policies. Both parties have also lacked effective leadership, Mr. Ashida and Mr. Katayama not being outstanding personalities calculated to arouse popular confidence. While Mr. Yoshida is personally disliked by many with whom he comes into contact, is stubborn, inclined to be arrogant, and lacks the personal charm of the professional vote-getter, he nevertheless has a strong, forceful personality which inspires confidence.

Japan Communist Party Success

The phenomenal success of the Japan Communist Party is explained mainly by its compact, disciplined organization and the tireless energy of its workers. Communist candidates made vigorous campaigns. The party's rank and file got out and worked in direct contact with the people, canvassing laborers, housewives, small businessmen, shopkeepers, and farmers. Communist henchmen went to the rallies of other party candidates, heckling the speakers and often disrupting the meetings. The party championed the working men's cause on issues which were certain to find a response among large sections of the population, such as taxes, the food situation, compulsory rice deliveries at fixed prices, the ration system, and higher wages. Communist spokesmen concentrated on issues which are of direct concern to the average Japanese and which he can easily understand. The Japan Communist Party also pursue a sound election strategy, entering only one party candidate in each election district, thereby not splitting the communist vote among two or more candidates, a mistake the communists made in the first postwar election of April 10, 1946. Finally, an important factor in the success of the communists was the great victories scored by the communists in China. This has had far-reaching effects on the Japanese. The Japanese communists have stressed that the Far East is coming under communist control and that Japan's best interests lie in being aligned with a communist Asia. There is unquestionably a fear among many Japanese that Japan may eventually become a communist country. They are wondering what, in such an event, is to become of those who have opposed communism. As Seikei Joho remarked in its January issue:

"Today in Japan the communist party supporters are in the minority. However, nobody can foresee what influence it will establish in the future. If it obtains a support of the majority, a small class party will become a major national party. In view of the fact that the Chinese Communist Party is calling CHIANG Kai-shek and other Nationalist leaders traitors and war criminals, we should like to warn anti-communists in Japan to be careful of what they say today."

Such

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Tokyo's Despatch No. 94,
February 14, 1949.

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Such a warning, if not threat, was implied in much of the Japan Communist Party's campaign propoganda before the election.

Conduct of the Election

Exceptionally good weather throughout most of Japan on election day was favorable to a large vote. Although there has been some criticism of the new system of public management of elections through Election Management Committees, the general results have been a credit to the Japanese sense of civic responsibility. On election day a group of officers from this Mission inspected a number of polling places in widely scattered parts of Tokyo, including a downtown business district, a factory workers' district, and several suburban areas. What was particularly impressive was the systematic, orderly manner in which the polls were conducted. The officials in charge and each local Election Management Committee seemed to be thoroughly familiar with the election law and the procedures to be followed. Most of the polling places visited were established in school houses, and, although some of the buildings had suffered war damage, the polling places were neat and orderly. The voters entered the polls, checked their registration, secured their ballots, and voted quietly and without confusion. At the polls visited, each voter received from one of the election officials a printed certificate showing that he had participated in the election. Many voters later pasted these certificates on their front doors. It was apparent from these personal observations of the election that the Japanese people possess good capabilities for operating the mechanical processes of democratic government.

Program Facing Democratic Liberals

While the Democratic Liberal Party may now have to face a clamorous, communist-led opposition in the House of Representatives, it has sufficient strength with its 264 seats to dictate its own course of action. The preponderant position of the party has unfortunately brought about some complacency, and considerable popular sentiment now believes that Japan can look forward to a long period of uninterrupted, stable, conservative government. This Mission believes, however, that the Democratic Liberal Party is faced with a number of dangers. As the party in power, it will have to assume responsibility for execution of the nine-point economic recovery program, the full enforcement of which will unquestionably inflict an even more austere life upon the Japanese. It cannot be expected that the government which must assume responsibility for such austerity can possibly retain its present degree of popularity. In addition, the Democratic Liberal Party is

now

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
Tokyo's Despatch No. 94,
February 14, 1949.

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now so large that it runs the danger of becoming unwieldy. Already there are indications of factionalism within the party which, if accentuated under the strain of the economic recovery program, may seriously handicap the operation of a Democratic Liberal government. It is far from impossible that party discipline may prove inadequate to keep the House majority in line on some important and widely opposed issue, and defections to a new party grouping would be in the tradition of Japanese politics. But meanwhile the existence of a single-party majority, and the consequent demand for the development of a large integrated political alignment in opposition, should continue to create a beneficial influence on the future course of Japanese politics in the direction of the two-party system.

Respectfully yours,


W. J. Sebald

Enclosure: *att.*

✓ Memorandum on Japanese General
Election of January 23, 1949,
dated February 8, 1949.

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 94 dated February 14, 1949 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject, "Japanese General Election of January 23, 1949".

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

February 8, 1949.

Subject: Japanese General Election of January 23, 1949.

The third postwar Japanese general election for members of the House of Representatives was held on Sunday, January 23, 1949. This election has brought about a far-reaching realignment of political forces. Conservative elements, as represented by the Democratic Liberal Party, have captured a commanding position in the House of Representatives with an absolute majority of 264 seats. The other two major parties, the Democratic and Social Democratic, which represent a middle grouping between extreme right and extreme left, suffered an unprecedented loss of strength. Finally, the Japan Communist Party, which heretofore enjoyed only four seats in the House, increased its strength to 35 seats, and is now in a position to bid for leadership of the leftist opposition.

The 1949 election was a remarkable manifestation of popular interest in Japanese politics, despite the pre-election attitude of apathy toward the campaigns of the various candidates. Of the nation's 42,090,916 eligible voters, 31,168,625 or 74.1 percent cast ballots. The following table shows the overall character of participation in this election.

| | Men | Women | Total |
|---|------------|------------|------------|
| Number of eligible voters | 20,054,142 | 22,036,774 | 42,090,916 |
| Number who voted | 16,192,775 | 14,975,850 | 31,168,625 |
| Number who did not vote | 3,861,367 | 7,060,924 | 10,922,291 |
| Percentage who voted | 80.7% | 68.0% | 74.1% |
| Percentage who did not vote | 19.3% | 32.0% | 25.9% |
| Number of valid votes | | | 30,590,179 |
| Number of invalid votes | | | 578,446 |
| Percentage of votes cast which were invalid | | | 1.9% |

The present Japanese population contains 1,982,632 more eligible women voters than eligible men voters. The rate of abstention among women voters, however, was higher, over seven million women failing to vote as compared with only 3,861,367 men. These men voters exceeded women voters by 1,216,925 notwithstanding the fact that there were almost two million more eligible women voters than men. The higher ratio of male participation in the election is not surprising, however, in view of the fact that women's suffrage is a postwar Japanese political institution.

The tables on page 2 show the numbers and percentages of seats secured in the House of Representatives by each

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Comparison of 1947 and 1949 Japanese General Elections
Number and percentage of the elected candidates by party classification.

| Political Parties | General election of 1949 | | General election of 1947 | |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|---------|--------------------------|---------|
| | Number elected | Percent | Number elected | Percent |
| Democratic-Liberals | 264 | 56.6 | 131 | 28.1 |
| Democrats | 68 | 15.0 | 121 | 26.0 |
| Socialists | 49 | 10.5 | 143 | 30.7 |
| People's Cooperatives | 14 | 3.0 | 29 | 6.2 |
| Communists | 35 | 7.5 | 4 | 0.8 |
| Social Reformers | 5 | 1.0 | | |
| Labor-Farmers | 7 | 1.5 | | |
| New Liberals | 2 | 0.4 | | |
| Japan Farmers | 1 | 0.0 | 3 | 0.7 |
| Various Minor Parties | 9 | 1.9 | 22 | 4.7 |
| Independents | 12 | 2.6 | 13 | 2.8 |
| Total | 466 | 100.0 | 466 | 100.0 |

(note) As for the Democratic-Liberal Party's election results of 1947, the number and percent are that of the Liberal Party. In the various parties of 1949, the Labor-Farmer New Party is included. The following pages will be in accordance with the above note.

| Political Parties | General election of 1949 | | General election of 1947 | |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|---------|--------------------------|---------|
| | Number of votes | Percent | Number of votes | Percent |
| Democratic-Liberals | 13,381,610 | 43.8 | 7,356,321 | 26.2 |
| Democrats | 4,835,504 | 15.8 | 6,839,646 | 25.0 |
| Socialists | 4,129,724 | 13.5 | 7,175,939 | 26.9 |
| People's Cooperatives | 1,042,123 | 3.4 | 1,915,947 | 7.0 |
| Communists | 2,984,583 | 9.6 | 1,002,903 | 3.7 |
| Social Reformers | 387,214 | 1.3 | | |
| Labor-Farmers | 606,744 | 2.0 | | |
| New Liberals | 187,208 | 0.6 | | |
| Japan Farmers | 232,833 | 0.8 | 258,854 | 0.94 |
| Various Minor Parties | 795,308 | 2.6 | 1,231,203 | 4.49 |
| Independents | 2,007,328 | 6.6 | 1,580,844 | 5.77 |
| Total | 30,590,179 | 100.0 | 27,361,657 | 100.0 |

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political party in 1947 and 1949, and the division of the popular vote among the parties in the two elections. Particularly noteworthy is the marked contrast between the positions of the Democratic Liberal Party and the Japan Communist Party in 1949 as compared with 1947. As a result of the general election of April 1947, the Democratic Liberal Party secured 131 seats (28.1 percent) of the 466 seats of the House of Representatives. This position was increased to 264 seats (56.6 percent), an absolute majority, in 1949. In 1947 the Democratic Liberal popular vote amounted to 7,356,321 (26.2 percent) of the total of 27,361,657 valid votes cast, but in 1949 Democratic Liberal candidates polled 13,381,610 (43.8 percent) votes out of a 30,590,179 total of valid ballots.

In 1947 only four communist candidates were elected to the House of Representatives, the party receiving a total of 1,002,903 votes (3.7 percent). In the 1949 election, however, communist candidates received almost three million votes (9.6 percent of the total), and won 35 seats or 7.5 percent of the House's total membership.

While the 1949 election resulted in such spectacular gains at the two extremities of the political stage, the formerly strong middle grouping suffered disastrous reverses. The Democratic Party's representation in the House of Representatives declined from 121 seats (26.0 percent) in 1947 to 68 seats (15.0 percent) in 1949. In 1947 the Social Democratic Party had won 143 seats (30.7 percent), the largest representation of any party, as a result of which the socialists were able to establish the coalition Katayama Cabinet. The socialist defeat in 1949, however, was the most severe suffered by any party, Social Democratic candidates winning only 49 seats (10.5 percent). The decline in the size of the popular vote of the Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party was proportionately less severe than the loss of seats. Nevertheless, in 1947 the Democrats polled 6,839,646 (25.0 percent) votes as compared with 4,835,505 (15.8 percent) in 1949; while the Social Democrats polled 7,175,939 votes (26.9 percent) in 1947 as compared with only 4,129,724 (13.5 percent) in 1949.

The Peoples' Cooperative Party (also of the middle grouping) suffered a similar loss of power. In 1947 this party won 29 seats in the House and polled almost two million votes; in 1949, however, its number of seats dropped to 14, and its popular vote, to a little over one million.

In summary, it is significant to note that only two political parties gained in strength, both as regards the size of their popular votes and in the number of seats won in the House. These two parties, the Democratic Liberal

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and the Communist, represent the two political extremes. All other parties suffered a decline, leaving the important middle grouping in a weakened and demoralized condition.

It is also significant that there was a small decline of overall major party strength in 1949. In the previous election the three major parties (Democratic Liberal, Democratic, and Social Democratic) secured about 85 percent of the seats of the House as compared with approximately 82 percent in 1949. In 1947 the major parties captured around 78 percent of the popular vote as compared with 73 percent in 1949. Thus while the Democratic Liberal Party scored its spectacular increase in popular vote and seats in 1949, this remarkable gain was made within a smaller overall major party position. In terms of its two major political rivals, therefore, the Democratic Liberal Party's position is far more dominant than its 56.6 percent position in the House would indicate. The following table shows the unusual change in the Democratic Liberal Party's position with respect to the major parties:

| Major Parties | 1947 | | 1949 | |
|-------------------|--------------|---------|--------------|---------|
| | No. of Seats | Percent | No. of Seats | Percent |
| Dem. Liberal | 131 | 32.9 | 264 | 69.3 |
| Democratic | 124 | 31.2 | 68 | 17.9 |
| Social Democratic | 143 | 35.9 | 49 | 12.8 |
| Total | 398 | 100.0 | 381 | 100.0 |

In 1947 the Democratic Liberal Party's representatives held only 32.9 percent of the major parties' position in the House; in 1949, however, the ratio increased to 69.3 percent.

The increase of the communist position with respect to the overall position of the minor parties in the House of Representatives is even more remarkable, as the following table indicates:

| Minor Parties | 1947 | | 1949 | |
|---------------|--------------|---------|--------------|---------|
| | No. of Seats | Percent | No. of Seats | Percent |
| Communist | 4 | 5.6 | 35 | 41.2 |
| Peoples Coop. | 29 | 40.8 | 14 | 16.3 |
| Others | 25 | 35.2 | 24 | 28.3 |
| Independents | 13 | 18.4 | 12 | 14.2 |
| Total | 71 | 100.0 | 85 | 100.0 |

With only four seats in 1947, or 5.6 percent of the total minor party and independent membership, the Japan Communist Party's position jumped to 35 seats in 1949, or 41.2 percent of the minor party and independent seats. There seems little

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doubt that the communists will be able to count upon support from the seven members of the Labor-Farmer Party, and in addition may, on many issues, be supported by some members of other minor parties as well as some left-wingers who are still within the Social Democratic Party. On the other hand, a few independents have already merged with the Democratic Liberal Party. As the above tables showing major and minor party positions indicate, there appears a strong likelihood of a sharp left-right alignment in the House of Representatives, with the conservative Democratic Liberal Party completely dominating the right and middle groups, but with the Japan Communist Party in an excellent position to assume the leadership of all leftist elements within the minor parties.

The tables on page six give a comprehensive picture of party candidates and the general character of the membership of the new House of Representatives. In the election of 1949 there was a total of 1,364 candidates, as compared with 1,590 in 1947. By provisions of the election law, Japan is divided into 117 election districts. Large areas like Hokkaido are divided into five election districts. Tokyo with its dense population has seven districts, and Osaka, five. Most prefectures are divided into two and three districts, but in a few, with comparatively small populations, the prefecture is a single district. Each district elects from three to five members to the Diet, but each voter enjoys only one vote. It is to a party's interest, therefore, to distribute its candidates in terms of its anticipated political strength in order not to have too many candidates in one district dividing the party's vote, a serious mistake the Japan Communist Party made in the first postwar election of April, 1946.

In the election of 1949 the Democratic Liberal Party entered 416 candidates, of whom 264, or 63.5 percent, were successful. This was the highest ratio scored by any party, and was far better than the Democratic Liberal Party's ratio in 1947. The Japan Communist Party originally intended to enter one candidate in each of the 117 districts, but one party member was unable to run for financial reasons and another decided to run as a Labor-Farmer candidate. The communists, therefore, had 115 candidates of whom 35 or 30.4 percent were successful. In 1947 the communists entered 120 candidates but elected only 4, or 3.3 percent.

It is significant to note that party affiliation apparently plays an important part in success in elections. Except for the minor Japan Farmers' Party, which elected only 6.25 percent of its candidates, all other parties elected at least fifteen percent. Independent candidates, however, made a much poorer showing both in 1947 and 1949. In the previous election only 13 out of 242 independent candidates were successful (5.4 percent); in 1949, 12 were elected out of 211 (5.7 percent).

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Number of candidates and number of seats secured in Diet by parties.

| Political Parties | Gen. Election of 1949 | | | Gen. Election of 1947 | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|--------|---------|-----------------------|--------|---------|
| | Cand. | Elect. | Percent | Cand. | Elect. | Percent |
| Democratic-Liberals | 416 | 264 | 63.5 | 326 | 131 | 40.2 |
| Democrats | 212 | 68 | 31.1 | 350 | 121 | 34.6 |
| Socialists | 186 | 49 | 26.3 | 289 | 143 | 49.5 |
| Peoples Cooperatives | 63 | 14 | 22.2 | 108 | 29 | 26.9 |
| Communists | 115 | 35 | 30.4 | 120 | 4 | 3.3 |
| Social Reformers | 30 | 5 | 16.7 | | | |
| Labor-Farmers | 45 | 7 | 15.6 | | | |
| New Liberals | 12 | 2 | 16.7 | | | |
| Japan Farmers | 16 | 1 | 6.25 | 11 | 3 | 27.3 |
| Various Minor Parties | 58 | 9 | 15.5 | 144 | 22 | 15.3 |
| Independents | 211 | 12 | 5.7 | 242 | 13 | 5.4 |
| Total | 1,364 | 466 | 34.2 | 1,590 | 466 | 29.3 |

Occupation and age of the newly elected members of the Diet.

Occupation-

| | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----|---------|
| Former government officials | 16 | persons |
| Educationalists | 16 | " |
| Religious workers | 5 | " |
| Businessmen | 14 | " |
| Industry and Mining | 19 | " |
| Agriculture and forestry (live-stock) | 50 | " |
| Fishing | 11 | " |
| Lawyers and notaries | 51 | " |
| Medical doctors | 5 | " |
| Writers | 29 | " |
| Employees of business companies | 152 | " |
| No occupation | 44 | " |
| Newspapermen | 5 | " |
| Others | 49 | " |
| Total | 466 | " |

Age-

| | | |
|------------------------------------|-----|--------|
| 25 - 30 years (30 years and under) | 1 | person |
| 30 - 40 years | 59 | " |
| 40 - 50 years | 177 | " |
| 50 - 60 years | 160 | " |
| 60 - 70 years | 59 | " |
| Over 70 years | 10 | " |
| Total | 466 | " |

Classification of newly elected members of Diet, new, returned, former

| Political Parties | New | Returned | Former | Total |
|-----------------------|-----|----------|--------|-------|
| Democratic-Liberals | 120 | 127 | 17 | 264 |
| Democrats | 23 | 38 | 7 | 68 |
| Socialists | 9 | 36 | 4 | 49 |
| People's Cooperatives | 1 | 13 | | 14 |
| Communists | 28 | 4 | 3 | 35 |
| Social Reformers | 1 | 4 | | 5 |
| Labor-Farmers | | 7 | | 7 |
| New Liberals | | 2 | | 2 |
| Japan Farmers | | 1 | | 1 |
| Various Parties | 2 | 6 | 1 | 9 |
| Independents | 11 | 1 | | 12 |
| Total | 195 | 239 | 32 | 466 |

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The occupational breakdown of the newly elected members of the House of Representatives shows an exceedingly large percentage of members who are employees of business concerns (152 out of the House's 466 members). Many others, however, have business connections. From the standpoint of age, there is marked emphasis on the 40-60 year category, with persons in the 30-40 year bracket and the 60-70 year bracket being equally divided. Only one member of the House is under 30, while ten are over 70 years old.

The Democratic Liberal Party elected a large number of members (120) who have never served in the Diet before. The new Social Democratic membership is comparatively small, while the communist is the largest percentage of any party. Of the twelve successful independent candidates, however, eleven have never served in the Diet before. In the overall total, the election has resulted in considerable new blood. Of the 466 members of the House, 195 are new members, 239 are reelected members, and 32 were formerly members of the House.

The table on page eight shows elected candidates by party affiliation and prefecture. Democratic Liberal candidates were elected from every prefecture in the country. The Democratic Party, however, failed to elect members from nine prefectures, while the Social Democratic Party failed in nineteen prefectures. The Japan Communist Party was successful in twenty-one prefectures. What is even more significant, however, is the fact that the communists elected seven candidates from Tokyo (one from each election district), three from Kanagawa Prefecture (one from each district), four from Osaka's five districts, one from each of Kyoto's two districts, and two from Hyogo's five districts. This plainly indicates the extent to which communist strength is still concentrated in the urban areas. Much to the surprise of all observers, the communists elected only one candidate from Hokkaido, Miss KARASAWA Toshiko, who won a seat in the Diet in 1946 but was defeated in 1947. Pre-election communist activity in Hokkaido was particularly intense, but the prefecture was overrun by the Democratic Liberal candidates and those of the minor parties. Detailed analysis of election returns from Hokkaido's five districts indicates that considerable communist strength was deflected from the party in support of candidates of the Labor-Farmer Party and some of the other minor parties. The Social Democratic Party, however, failed to elect a single candidate in Hokkaido. On the other hand, the communists failed to elect any candidates from Shikoku, and elected only one from Kyushu. The table on page eight shows that communist strength is concentrated primarily in two areas, the Kanto District, from which thirteen candidates were elected, and the Kansai District where ten candidates were elected. Both districts are, of course, highly industrialized areas.

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Number of elected candidates by party classification and prefecture.

| | Dem-Lib | Dem. | Soc. | P.Coop. | Com. | Soc. Reform. | Lab.Farm. | New Lib. | Jap.Farm. | V.M.P. | Ind. | Total |
|-----------|---------|------|------|---------|------|--------------|-----------|----------|-----------|--------|------|-------|
| Hokkaido | 11 | 2 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | 7 | | 22 |
| Aomori | 3 | 3 | | 1 | | | | | | | | 7 |
| Iwate | 6 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | 8 |
| Miyagi | 6 | 2 | 1 | | | | | | | | | 9 |
| Akita | 5 | 3 | | | | | | | | | | 8 |
| Yamagata | 5 | 2 | 1 | | | | | | | | | 8 |
| Fukushima | 9 | | 3 | | | | | | | | | 12 |
| Ibaraki | 7 | 2 | | | 1 | | 2 | | | | | 12 |
| Tochigi | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | 10 |
| Gunma | 4 | 3 | 2 | | | | | | | | | 10 |
| Saitama | 9 | | 1 | | 2 | | | | | | 1 | 13 |
| Chiba | 11 | 2 | | | | | | | | | 1 | 13 |
| Tokyo | 13 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 7 | | 1 | | | | | 27 |
| Kanagawa | 5 | 1 | 3 | | 3 | | | | | | | 13 |
| Niigata | 8 | 1 | 3 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | 15 |
| Toyama | 3 | 2 | | 1 | | | | | | | | 6 |
| Ishikawa | 3 | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | | 6 |
| Fukui | 2 | 2 | | | | | | | | | | 4 |
| Yamanashi | 2 | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | | | 5 |
| Nagano | 8 | 2 | | 2 | 1 | | | | | | 1 | 13 |
| Gifu | 7 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | 9 |
| Shizuoka | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | 14 |
| Aiichi | 10 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | | | 19 |
| Mie | 4 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | 9 |
| Shiga | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | 3 | 5 |
| Kyoto | 3 | 3 | 1 | | 2 | 1 | | | | | | 10 |
| Osaka | 10 | | 5 | | 4 | | | | | | | 19 |
| Hyogo | 10 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | | | | | | | 18 |
| Nara | 2 | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | | | 5 |
| Wakayama | 3 | | 1 | | | 1 | | 1 | | | 1 | 6 |
| Tottori | 2 | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | | 4 |
| Shimane | 1 | 2 | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | | 5 |
| Okayama | 5 | 2 | | | 1 | | 2 | | | | | 10 |
| Hiroshima | 7 | | 3 | 2 | | | | | | | | 12 |
| Yamaguchi | 6 | | 2 | | 1 | | | | | | | 9 |
| Tokushima | 3 | | | 2 | | | | | | | | 5 |
| Kagawa | 1 | 3 | 2 | | | | | | | | | 6 |
| Ehime | 8 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | 9 |
| Kochi | 2 | 2 | | | | 1 | | | | | | 5 |
| Fukuoka | 9 | 1 | 4 | | 1 | 1 | | | | 2 | 1 | 19 |
| Saga | 3 | 2 | | | | | | | | | | 5 |
| Nagasaki | 7 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | 9 |
| Kumamoto | 4 | 4 | 1 | | | | | 1 | | | | 10 |
| Oiita | 5 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | 7 |
| Miyazaki | 5 | 1 | | | | | | | | | 1 | 6 |
| Kagoshima | 9 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | 10 |
| Total | 264 | 68 | 49 | 14 | 35 | 5 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 9 | 12 | 466 |

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The table on pages ten and eleven showing the popular vote by parties and prefectures, further illustrates the overwhelming superiority of the Democratic Liberal Party, the weakness of the Democratic and Social Democratic positions as major parties, and the very substantial positions of the communists as a minor party. In Tokyo the communists polled almost as many votes as the socialists; the communist vote exceeded the socialist vote in Ibaragi, Chiba, Nagano, Osaka, Okayama, Saga, and Oita Prefectures; in a number of other prefectures the communists ran closely behind the socialists.

A percentage breakdown of the popular vote by parties and prefectures is given on page twelve. Although the communist national average was only 9.6 percent, in some prefectures the communist percentage was surprisingly high; 13 percent in Saitama, 18 percent in Tokyo, 15 percent in Kanagawa, 15 percent in Nagano, 13 percent in Kyoto, 20 percent in Osaka, 12 percent in Hyogo, and 17 percent in Tottori.

On page 13 are percentage comparisons of the Democratic Liberal, Democratic, Social Democratic and Communist vote by prefectures in 1947 and 1949. The Democratic Liberal Party's increased vote was fairly uniform throughout the country, the vote being greater in every prefecture in 1949 as compared with 1947. While the party's national average jumped from 26.5 in 1947 to 43.8 in 1949, in ten prefectures in 1949 Democratic Liberal candidates received more than fifty percent of the vote. The Democratic and Social Democratic vote in 1949 was uniformly less than in 1947 with the exception of a few prefectures. Like the Democratic Liberal Party, the vote of the Japan Communist Party was higher in every prefecture in 1949 with the one exception of Kagoshima.

The general election of January 23 plainly indicates that the great majority of the Japanese people are of conservative temperament and strongly favor a conservative administration. To a considerable degree the middle grouping, as represented principally by the Social Democratic Party, has failed to enlist popular support. The socialist failure may not be attributed entirely to Japanese conservatism or animosity toward a socialist program. What is of much more importance in explaining the great socialist defeat in 1949 is the marked failure of the Social Democratic Party to prove itself capable of providing efficient political leadership. The most unfortunate thing that happened to the Social Democratic Party arose from its opportunity in 1947 to organize and head a coalition government with the Democratic and Peoples' Cooperative parties. The one opportunity the socialists had to head a government proved unsuccessful

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Number of votes received by parties in each prefecture.

| | Democratic Liberals | Democrats | Socia- lists | People's Coopera- tives | Com- munists | Social Reformers |
|-----------|------------------------|-----------|-----------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| Hokkaido | 470,150 | 144,135 | 159,834 | | 66,584 | |
| Aomori | 150,400 | 120,432 | 38,917 | 28,484 | 36,248 | 15,718 |
| Iwate | 258,692 | 29,138 | 67,376 | 3,006 | 27,689 | |
| Miyagi | 249,464 | 70,856 | 86,396 | 26,102 | 23,456 | |
| Akita | 187,977 | 127,526 | 72,113 | 17,212 | 33,112 | 9,411 |
| Yamagata | 237,119 | 115,857 | 80,013 | | 31,449 | |
| Fukushima | 382,023 | 34,086 | 105,270 | | 60,462 | 2,975 |
| Ibaragi | 357,816 | 84,842 | 51,557 | 17,374 | 54,331 | |
| Tochigi | 275,202 | 50,763 | 81,517 | 34,546 | 45,221 | 16,510 |
| Gumma | 210,233 | 190,810 | 103,817 | 12,749 | 50,320 | |
| Saitama | 483,385 | 76,559 | 113,282 | 13,306 | 109,158 | |
| Chiba | 436,688 | 170,102 | 40,907 | 14,288 | 56,345 | 2,549 |
| Tokyo | 809,334 | 162,813 | 337,002 | 53,935 | 333,586 | 4,419 |
| Kanagawa | 300,052 | 93,993 | 183,915 | 20,283 | 127,684 | 2,608 |
| Niigata | 422,368 | 139,162 | 135,792 | | 82,777 | 30,611 |
| Toyama | 185,526 | 84,008 | 47,787 | 59,524 | 24,421 | |
| Ishikawa | 159,731 | 102,805 | 53,983 | | 43,678 | |
| Fukui | 104,131 | 99,831 | 45,857 | | 9,716 | |
| Yamanashi | 102,881 | 57,351 | 41,078 | 1,138 | 31,695 | 21,848 |
| Nagano | 416,185 | 147,757 | 85,335 | 104,658 | 122,749 | 2,603 |
| Gifu | 339,485 | 78,859 | 69,443 | | 30,254 | 23,122 |
| Shizuoka | 575,515 | 61,970 | 140,648 | 71,998 | 86,237 | |
| Aichi | 512,956 | 250,750 | 197,251 | 93,264 | 138,885 | 22,007 |
| Mie | 210,334 | 125,911 | 50,023 | 1,123 | 44,475 | |
| Shiga | 152,019 | 47,188 | 57,899 | 33,063 | 33,802 | |
| Kyoto | 185,788 | 183,547 | 89,945 | | 84,104 | 43,232 |
| Osaka | 647,631 | 113,749 | 198,688 | 3,114 | 270,352 | 15,509 |
| Hyogo | 496,130 | 277,620 | 153,423 | 44,817 | 142,315 | |
| Nara | 103,404 | 74,740 | 31,046 | | 29,837 | |
| Wakayama | 150,314 | 47,469 | 51,500 | | 30,569 | 28,639 |
| Tottori | 105,550 | 1,977 | 71,173 | | 43,654 | 1,745 |
| Shimane | 98,571 | 124,935 | 93,327 | 16,490 | 47,724 | |
| Okayama | 240,342 | 130,950 | 32,477 | 51,870 | 69,401 | |
| Hiroshima | 402,145 | 87,950 | 125,547 | 90,456 | 87,179 | |
| Yamaguchi | 394,928 | 12,877 | 90,882 | 8,130 | 77,817 | 15,718 |
| Tokushima | 102,440 | 24,459 | 22,359 | 83,236 | 18,041 | |
| Kagawa | 125,026 | 110,116 | 68,989 | 26,144 | 39,639 | |
| Ehime | 323,997 | 95,683 | 80,653 | 3,110 | 33,093 | 17,100 |
| Koochi | 130,713 | 66,843 | 20,660 | | 21,568 | 22,854 |
| Fukuoka | 409,542 | 198,505 | 249,302 | 5,030 | 118,849 | 68,755 |
| Saga | 188,331 | 107,771 | 23,389 | 12,736 | 27,766 | |
| Nagasaki | 230,755 | 68,596 | 61,980 | 5,389 | 27,965 | |
| Kumamoto | 263,150 | 208,065 | 66,807 | | 36,098 | 12,194 |
| Ooita | 214,856 | 74,877 | 32,494 | 37,395 | 39,764 | 5,624 |
| Miyazaki | 184,999 | 58,757 | 35,768 | 19,966 | 17,662 | |
| Kagoshima | 393,332 | 98,314 | 82,303 | 28,187 | 16,880 | 1,463 |
| Total | 13,381,610 | 4,835,504 | 4,129,724 | 1,042,123 | 2,984,583 | 387,214 |

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Number of votes received by parties in each prefecture.

| | Labor Farmers | New Liberals | Japan Farmers | Various Minor Parties | Indepen- dents | Total |
|-----------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|------------|
| Hokkaido | 91,326 | | | 292,362 | 69,227 | 1,293,618 |
| Aomori | 6,830 | 215 | | | 33,569 | 430,813 |
| Iwate | 4,024 | | 12,038 | 22,296 | 34,084 | 458,343 |
| Miyagi | | | 4,640 | 38,556 | 44,666 | 544,136 |
| Akita | 22,934 | | | | 7,766 | 478,051 |
| Yamagata | | 25,116 | 22,116 | | 31,518 | 543,188 |
| Fukushima | | 23,132 | | 41,324 | 74,974 | 724,246 |
| Ibaragi | 71,539 | | | | 39,694 | 677,153 |
| Tochigi | 5,534 | | | 14,794 | 36,479 | 560,566 |
| Gumma | 15,270 | | 1,109 | | 65,096 | 649,404 |
| Saitama | | | | 2,270 | 50,287 | 848,247 |
| Chiba | 38,730 | | | | 16,426 | 776,035 |
| Tokyo | 36,839 | 2,255 | | 10,965 | 100,790 | 1,851,938 |
| Kanagawa | 15,831 | | | 22,113 | 84,796 | 851,275 |
| Niigata | 51,263 | | | | 40,271 | 902,244 |
| Toyama | | | | | 35,313 | 436,579 |
| Ishikawa | | | | | 29,563 | 389,760 |
| Fukui | | | | 61,470 | 2,711 | 323,716 |
| Yamanashi | | | | 1,353 | 70,926 | 328,270 |
| Nagano | 7,464 | | | 6,125 | 7,343 | 900,219 |
| Gifu | | 25,904 | 11,063 | 7,755 | 35,385 | 621,270 |
| Shizuoka | | | | 3,763 | 98,994 | 1,039,127 |
| Aichi | 6,590 | 3,006 | 93,572 | | 39,879 | 1,358,330 |
| Mie | | | | 32,169 | 116,625 | 580,660 |
| Shiga | 5,165 | | | | 26,563 | 355,699 |
| Kyoto | 22,517 | 4,048 | 4,224 | 3,730 | 27,576 | 648,711 |
| Oosaka | 10,817 | 4,443 | | 3,228 | 79,711 | 1,347,242 |
| Hyogo | 6,337 | | | 9,143 | 62,076 | 1,191,861 |
| Nara | | | | | 92,311 | 331,338 |
| Wakayama | | 30,612 | | | 9,177 | 348,280 |
| Tottori | 28,792 | | | 3,563 | | 256,454 |
| Shimane | | | | | 45,071 | 426,118 |
| Okayama | 66,973 | 21,023 | 2,876 | | 51,871 | 667,783 |
| Hiroshima | | | 22,175 | 13,914 | 2,794 | 832,160 |
| Yamaguchi | 20,098 | | | | 11,186 | 631,636 |
| Tokushima | 7,790 | | | | 22,875 | 281,200 |
| Kagawa | | | | 18,874 | 8,282 | 397,070 |
| Ehime | 2,568 | | | 10,790 | 18,528 | 585,522 |
| Koochi | 12,766 | | 13,463 | 10,252 | 56,465 | 355,584 |
| Fukuoka | 20,664 | | | 160,802 | 64,215 | 1,295,664 |
| Saga | 15,536 | | | | 13,942 | 389,471 |
| Nagasaki | | 17,617 | 18,086 | 1,969 | 62,591 | 494,948 |
| Kumamoto | | 29,837 | 27,471 | 1,728 | 27,150 | 672,500 |
| Coita | | | | | 78,825 | 483,835 |
| Miyazaki | 9,284 | | | | 61,628 | 388,064 |
| Kagoshima | 3,263 | | | | 18,109 | 641,851 |
| Total | 1,606,744 | 187,208 | 232,833 | 795,308 | 2,007,328 | 30,590,179 |

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| Prefecture | DLP | DEM | SOC | Peo Coop | COM | Tot M.P. | IND |
|------------|------|------|------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|------|
| Hokkaido | 36 | 11 | 12 | | 05 | 31 | 05 |
| Aomori | 35 | 28 | 09 | 07 | 08 | 05 | 08 |
| Iwate | 57 | 07 | 15 | 0.6 | 06 | 08 | 07 |
| Miyagi | 46 | 13 | 16 | 05 | 04 | 08 | 08 |
| Akita | 39 | 27 | 15 | 05 | 07 | 06 | 01 |
| Yamagata | 44 | 21 | 15 | | 05 | 09 | 06 |
| Fukushima | 53 | 05 | 15 | | 08 | 09 | 10 |
| Ibaragi | 54 | 13 | 07 | 03 | 08 | 10 | 05 |
| Tochigi | 49 | 09 | 14 | 06 | 08 | 07 | 07 |
| Gumma | 33 | 29 | 16 | 03 | 07 | 02 | 10 |
| Saitama | 57 | 08 | 14 | 02 | 13 | 0.2 | 06 |
| Chiba | 56 | 22 | 05 | 02 | 07 | 06 | 02 |
| Tokyo | 44 | 09 | 18 | 03 | 18 | 03 | 05 |
| Kanagawa | 35 | 11 | 22 | 03 | 15 | 05 | 09 |
| Niigata | 47 | 15 | 15 | | 09 | 09 | 05 |
| Toyama | 42 | 19 | 11 | 15 | 05 | | 08 |
| Ishikawa | 41 | 26 | 15 | | 11 | | 07 |
| Fukui | 33 | 31 | 14 | | 03 | 19 | 0.8 |
| Yamanashi | 31 | 17 | 13 | 0.3 | 10 ³ | 07 | 22 |
| Nagano | 46 | 16 | 09 | 12 | 14 | 02 | 01 |
| Gifu | 55 | 12 | 11 | | 05 | 01 | 06 |
| Shizuoka | 55 | 06 | 15 | 07 | 08 | 0.3 | 09 |
| Aichi | 38 | 18 | 14 | 07 | 10 | 09 | 04 |
| Mie | 36 | 23 | 08 | 0.2 | 08 | 05 | 20 |
| Shiga | 44 | 13 | 16 | 09 | 09 | 02 | 07 |
| Kyoto | 29 | 28 | 14 | | 13 | 12 | 04 |
| Osaka | 48 | 09 | 15 | 0.2 | 20 | 02 | 06 |
| Hyogo | 42 | 23 | 13 | 04 | 12 | 01 | 05 |
| Nara | 31 | 23 | 09 | | 09 | | 28 |
| Wakayama | 43 | 13 | 15 | | 09 | 17 | 03 |
| Tottori | 42 | 0.7 | 28 | | 17 | 13 | |
| Shimane | 23 | 29 | 22 | 04 | 11 | | 11 |
| Okayama | 36 | 20 | 05 | 08 | 10 | 13 | 08 |
| Hiroshima | 48 | 11 | 15 | 11 | 11 | 04 | 0.3 |
| Yamaguchi | 63 | 02 | 14 | 01 | 12 | 06 | 02 |
| Tokushima | 36 | 09 | 08 | 30 | 06 | 03 | 08 |
| Kagawa | 31 | 28 | 17 | 07 | 10 | 05 | 02 |
| Ehime | 55 | 17 | 14 | 0.5 | 06 | 05 | 03 |
| Kochi | 37 | 19 | 06 | 06 | 06 | 16 | 16 |
| Fukuoka | 32 | 15 | 19 | 0.3 | 09 | 20 | 05 |
| Saga | 48 | 28 | 06 | 03 | 07 | 04 | 04 |
| Nagasaki | 47 | 14 | 13 | 01 | 05 | 07 | 13 |
| Kumamoto | 39 | 31 | 10 | | 05 | 11 | 04 |
| Oita | 44 | 16 | 07 | 08 | 08 | 01 | 16 |
| Miyazaki | 48 | 15 | 09 | 05 | 05 | 02 | 16 |
| Kagoshima | 61 | 15 | 13 | 04 | 03 | 01 | 03 |
| Totals | 43.8 | 15.8 | 13.5 | 03.4 | 09.6 | 07.3 | 06.6 |

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Percentage of Democratic Liberal, Democratic, Social Democratic,
and Communist Vote in 1947 and 1949 by Prefectures.

| Prefecture | DLP | | DEM | | SOC | | COM | |
|------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1947 | 1949 | 1947 | 1949 | 1947 | 1949 | 1947 | 1949 |
| Hokkaido | 25.3 | 36 | 8.3 | 11 | 29.3 | 12 | 3.4 | 05 |
| Aomori | 30.2 | 35 | 29.3 | 28 | 9.6 | 09 | 2.9 | 08 |
| Iwate | 37.9 | 57 | 25.0 | 07 | 25.0 | 15 | 2.1 | 06 |
| Miyagi | 36.0 | 46 | 25.0 | 13 | 26.3 | 16 | 1.9 | 04 |
| Akita | 17.3 | 39 | 7.6 | 27 | 22.3 | 15 | 4.7 | 07 |
| Yamagata | 39.5 | 44 | 27.9 | 21 | 20.4 | 15 | 1.9 | 05 |
| Fukushima | 32.0 | 53 | 27.0 | 05 | 28.2 | 15 | 2.1 | 08 |
| Ibaragi | 35.8 | 54 | 23.8 | 13 | 19.6 | 07 | 1.9 | 08 |
| Tochigi | 21.4 | 49 | 35.9 | 09 | 26.4 | 14 | 2.0 | 08 |
| Gunma | 18.6 | 33 | 40.6 | 29 | 29.2 | 16 | 3.0 | 07 |
| Saitama | 42.6 | 57 | 24.0 | 08 | 25.8 | 14 | 4.9 | 13 |
| Chiba | 47.3 | 56 | 32.6 | 22 | 12.2 | 05 | 2.1 | 07 |
| Tokyo | 30.6 | 44 | 15.7 | 09 | 36.2 | 18 | 8.6 | 18 |
| Kanagawa | 24.7 | 35 | 14.1 | 11 | 38.5 | 22 | 5.3 | 15 |
| Niigata | 29.7 | 47 | 30.3 | 15 | 29.5 | 15 | 3.1 | 09 |
| Toyama | 20.3 | 42 | 32.4 | 19 | 23.8 | 11 | 1.4 | 05 |
| Ishikawa | 14.2 | 41 | 41.4 | 26 | 21.8 | 15 | 6.8 | 11 |
| Fukui | 10.5 | 33 | 49.9 | 31 | 25.6 | 14 | 1.4 | 03 |
| Yamanashi | 25.0 | 31 | 28.2 | 17 | 33.0 | 13 | 3.5 | 10 |
| Nagano | 27.5 | 46 | 20.3 | 16 | 19.8 | 09 | 8.0 | 14 |
| Gifu | 34.5 | 55 | 26.9 | 12 | 25.8 | 11 | 1.6 | 05 |
| Shizuoka | 39.8 | 55 | 19.1 | 06 | 21.8 | 15 | 3.2 | 08 |
| Aichi | 24.6 | 38 | 32.2 | 18 | 22.6 | 14 | 3.8 | 10 |
| Mie | 16.3 | 36 | 32.9 | 23 | 18.2 | 08 | 4.1 | 08 |
| Shiga | 37.7 | 44 | 11.0 | 13 | 29.9 | 16 | 1.9 | 09 |
| Kyoto | 14.9 | 29 | 36.1 | 28 | 40.5 | 14 | 2.5 | 13 |
| Osaka | 21.4 | 48 | 22.2 | 09 | 31.8 | 15 | 6.0 | 20 |
| Hyogo | 13.5 | 42 | 42.6 | 23 | 28.9 | 13 | 3.4 | 12 |
| Nara | 24.8 | 31 | 11.4 | 23 | 15.9 | 09 | 3.9 | 09 |
| Wakayama | 41.3 | 43 | 1.8 | 13 | 28.8 | 15 | 2.3 | 09 |
| Tottori | 29.7 | 42 | - | 0.77 | 32.3 | 28 | 5.2 | 17 |
| Shimane | 8.5 | 23 | 41.7 | 29 | 33.9 | 22 | 5.5 | 11 |
| Okayama | 36.1 | 36 | 21.5 | 20 | 24.8 | 05 | 5.0 | 10 |
| Hiroshima | 24.3 | 48 | 17.6 | 11 | 30.6 | 15 | 2.5 | 11 |
| Yamaguchi | 30.9 | 63 | 11.5 | 02 | 26.2 | 14 | 4.4 | 12 |
| Tokushima | 22.2 | 36 | 4.5 | 09 | 19.7 | 08 | 1.1 | 06 |
| Kagawa | 12.2 | 31 | 29.5 | 28 | 31.7 | 17 | 2.3 | 10 |
| Ehime | 29.6 | 55 | 37.6 | 17 | 24.9 | 14 | 2.9 | 06 |
| Kochi | 44.3 | 37 | 13.7 | 19 | 19.2 | 06 | 2.6 | 06 |
| Fukuoka | 16.5 | 32 | 24.8 | 15 | 36.1 | 19 | 3.6 | 09 |
| Saga | 33.5 | 48 | 23.4 | 28 | 7.6 | 06 | 2.9 | 07 |
| Nagasaki | 32.6 | 47 | 23.5 | 14 | 24.8 | 13 | 2.3 | 05 |
| Kumamoto | 26.7 | 39 | 34.0 | 31 | 24.5 | 10 | 1.1 | 05 |
| Oita | 7.7 | 44 | 32.8 | 16 | 19.3 | 07 | 3.6 | 08 |
| Miyazaki | 12.4 | 48 | 8.3 | 15 | 22.8 | 09 | 2.0 | 05 |
| Kagoshima | 10.4 | 61 | 41.4 | 15 | 12.5 | 13 | 0.5 | 03 |
| Totals | 26.5 | 43.8 | 25.1 | 15.8 | 26.3 | 13.5 | 3.7 | 9.6 |

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and demonstrated the party's lack of efficient, forthright leadership. Widespread dissatisfaction with the socialists resulted from the party's brief tenure of office. Moreover, the Social Democratic Party's record as an opposition in the last two sessions of the Diet also did much to undermine its prestige.

While the great majority of the Japanese people have demonstrated a strong preference for the kind of conservatism represented by the Democratic Liberal Party, almost three million voters, or close to ten percent, have expressed preference for the other political extreme as represented by the Japan Communist Party. The size of the communist vote, coupled with the fact that the party now has thirty-five seats in the Diet, is less impressive than the great proportional increase in communist strength. The communist vote increased by two million between 1947 and 1949, while representation in the House of Representatives jumped from a mere four members to thirty-five.

The success of the Democratic Liberal Party is attributed mainly to Japan's basic conservatism and the fact that middle-of-the-road governments, as represented by the Katayama and Ashida Cabinets, have proved vacillating and lacking in constructive, positive policies. In addition, political corruption has eaten into both the Democratic and Social Democratic parties, and while the Democratic Liberals are not free from dishonest and corrupt politicians, the great exposé of scandals over the past year and a half have naturally hit hardest the parties which were in power.

Finally, it must also be recognized that under Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru's leadership, the Democratic Liberal Party has shown an independent attitude. It has resisted, sometimes to its immediate disadvantage, direction and pressure from General Headquarters, and this independence of attitude has unquestionably been received with approval by many Japanese. The party has also combined with its conservatism a certain degree of nationalism which has had a widespread appeal.

The communist success has also utilized appeals to Japanese nationalism, but it is generally believed that the most powerful factor in its recent success was the impact of communist victories in China. Nevertheless, the Japanese communists have enjoyed other advantages. Party members at the lower levels have been relentless and tireless in working for the communist cause. The party's small, compact, well-disciplined organization has enabled it to pursue its campaign with remarkable efficiency and to exploit such popular causes as anti-tax agitation and higher wages. Finally, the communists profited tremendously by the disintegration of the Social Democratic Party and popular disillusionment with the socialists.

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In addition to voting for members of the House of Representatives, in the January 23 election the Japanese people for the first time had the opportunity to indicate on a special ballot their approval or disapproval of the fourteen justices of the Supreme Court. Only a little over one million votes were cast in disapproval of the justices. It is particularly significant that the Japan Communist Party instructed its members to vote against all Supreme Court justices in this electoral review of their office. On the other hand, almost three million Japanese voted for communist candidates for the House of Representatives. This would indicate that the communist party enjoys a fairly stable voting strength of about one million. Communist candidates in the January 23 election, however, were able to win over an additional two million votes from persons who were apparently willing to vote for communist candidates but were not willing to support the communist party program with respect to the Supreme Court justices. It is believed that at least two million of the three million votes the communists received are represented by non-communists who voted for communist candidates for the first time. There seems little doubt that many of these new supporters of the Japan Communist Party were formerly supporters of the Social Democratic Party.

Charles Nelson Spinks
Charles Nelson Spinks
Foreign Service Officer

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: February 15, 1949

TO : NA - Mr. Bishop

FROM : NA - Mr. Green *mg*

SUBJECT: Views of Mr. Kades, Deputy Chief of Government Section, SCAP GHQ

I am attaching a memorandum giving the highlights of points made by Mr. Kades during the course of several hours' discussion with him. Mr. Sneider of DRF who was present most of the time has gone over my draft in order to check the accuracy of remarks attributed to Mr. Kades.

894.00/2-1549

Evidently the 1949 Japanese elections have deeply shocked Mr. Kades who interprets the results as a repudiation of all that the Government Section has worked for, notably the development of a strong middle-class political group which could effectively oppose the Democratic Liberals. He concedes that Government Section interference in Japanese affairs may have served to undermine the very cause for which that Section was striving. He also concedes that the desideratum is an extensive disengagement by GHQ from operational interference in Japanese affairs - a point of view which, he claims, the Government Section has espoused for some time now but which has been effectively opposed by ESS. In this conflict between GS and ESS, the latter's hand is said to have been very much strengthened by the stabilization directive.

My overall conclusion is that, largely as a result of the scandals and recent elections, Headquarters' enthusiasm has finally given way to disillusionment. The time is evidently propitious for insistence upon a real enforcement of all NSC 13/2 policies, which, I am convinced, provide in their entirety a positive solution to many of the difficulties we are currently encountering in Japan.

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Here are some mental notes made during a series of informal talks with Mr. Charles Kades, Deputy Chief of the Government Section, SCAP, GHQ. Mr. Kades is in Washington on a 120 day general liaison assignment. Unless otherwise indicated, the following comments are attributable to him:

1. Election Results

a) As Mr. Justin Williams had pointed out in a private memorandum, the total vote of the left-wing parties (Socialists and left-ward) had remained about the same over the last three elections, proving that the JCP had made its gains at the expense of the Socialists. Likewise the Democratic Liberal gains had been at the expense of the Democratic Party.

Comment: Actually, the DL-D combined popular vote has increased 8% since 1947, while the S-CP combined popular vote has declined by 7% over the same period.

b) The JCP has almost reached the peak of its fortunes. The peak would come shortly, following the anticipated shift to the JCP of Jiichiro Matsumoto, influential left-wing leader of the Social Democratic Party who was recently purged as Vice-President of the House of Councilors. Matsumoto is the leader of the ETA (outcaste) class. His transfer of allegiance to the JCP would probably be accompanied by a similar shift to the JCP of the affiliations of most of his followers who number around three million.

Comment: Matsumoto was purged on January 24, 1949, at the direct behest of Yoshida possibly for political reasons. The timing and circumstances of his purging appears to be related to his reported decision to join the Communists.

c) The DL victory may be mainly attributed to: (1) the scandals and ineptitude of the Socialists and Democrats, (2) the fact that the above parties were tainted with collaboration with the occupation, (3) Yoshida's effective tactics. In the latter connection Yoshida based his campaign on a subtle appeal to Japanese nationalism. He characterized the DL's as the only party representing true Japanese national interests and aspirations. He took advantage of the known critical attitude of the State Department toward the purge to seek public favor by promising to establish, if elected, a purge review board. He spoke of an immediate "provisional" peace treaty. He even campaigned in a kimono.

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2. Future Political Developments

a) The DL's are in such a controlling position that they need make concessions to no one. Their strength is expected to increase over the next few months since many independents and Inukai faction Democrats are now on the threshold of joining the DL's.

b) The DL's are the reincarnation of the Seiyukai and the Minseito. They are directly affiliated with a number of right-wing militant, extremist groups. The party "front" man is Yoshida but the real leader is Hatoyama who is closely allied with the old Zaibatsu. Key posts in the new Cabinet will probably be filled by Hatoyama men. This will be an important point to watch.

c) While post-war cabinets have invariably lost support and prestige in measure as they continued in power, this is not expected to be the fate of the DL's. The real weakness of the other cabinets was the fact that they were based on unworkable coalition compromises. Yoshida's Cabinet is characterized by good discipline, no need to compromise, appeal to racial sovereignty.

Comment: Racial sovereignty is the current slogan of the JCP. Mr. Kades differentiated between the DL and JCP view of racial sovereignty as follows: The DL party views racial sovereignty as complete restoration of Japan's sovereignty and prestige. It is the DL view that foreign investments in Japan are not a derogation of sovereignty but a means of furthering the national economic interests. The Communists talk complete Japanese sovereignty and emphasize that US investments in Japan are a derogation of that sovereignty.

d) The future of the Socialist Party is black. For a long time to come it will be an opposition party but as such it will be caught in a squeeze between the full opposition role which the JCP will be able to follow and a modified opposition role which will have less forceful appeal and which may continue to bear the taint of being more pro-US than pro-Japanese.

e) The prospects for a two party system in Japan are poor simply because there is no group which can effectively oppose the formidable old guard conservatives. For two years now, the Government Section has done everything possible to support first the Socialist and then the Democratic Party as the "other" party.

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Socialist Party and the

Comment: Possibly it was for this precise reason that the Democratic Party failed so miserably at the polls. If any "other" party is to be nurtured, the process should be most subtle and inconspicuous. As for the party to be so developed, the choice of the Socialists or a labor party would seem to be more logical, since the DL and Democratic Parties, always ideologically affiliated, are now in the process of actual merger. If the Socialist Party is excessively weak and ineffective, those strong politically-conscious labor groups, which are now anti-Communist, may have no party to turn to but the Communists.

3. Future Relations between SCAP and the Japanese Government

a) Yoshida has never been susceptible to GHQ pressure. With his present overwhelming mandate, his attitude will certainly be even more uncooperative. It is expected that the Yoshida regime will respond to no advice, pressures, and threats from anyone except General MacArthur. Even the latter's advice will have to be presented in writing if it is to be effective. Yoshida's purpose in pursuing this probable tactic will be (1) to discourage GHQ interference, (2) to make manifest SCAP interference in the Japanese Government thereby increasing the unpopularity of the occupation, (3) to place on SCAP the responsibility for unpopular measures, especially those connected with stabilization (crop collection, tax enforcement measures). On such moves as strengthening the police or modifying the purge, however, Yoshida may be willing to accept public credit.

b) The moral of political developments to date is that interference in Japanese affairs pays off badly for the occupation. Yet what alternative is there if the occupation is charged with the responsibility of taking Japan off the American taxpayers' backs through such measures as an all-out stabilization drive that cannot succeed without almost direct occupation enforcement? Here is the dilemma. As long as the Japanese know that come "hell or high water" the U.S. will feed and clothe Japan in the interests of U.S. politico-strategic objectives, no amount of threats can evoke from the Japanese the responsibility, direction and drive necessary for carrying out a successful stabilization program.

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Comment: There seems to be no pat answer to this dilemma. De-emphasis on U.S. absolute need for Japan as a "strategic frontier", as a "bulwark of democracy", etc. is a partial answer. A sharp curtailment of ESS personnel and functions, with transfer of its rehabilitation operations to ECA, might afford another partial answer.

4. National Public Service Law

a) The National Public Service Law had little or nothing to do with the Socialist election debacle.

b) Both Blaine Hoover and James Killen took extreme views on the NPSL. Too much attention was paid in GHQ as to whether Hoover or Killen was right; insufficient thought was given to a reasonable compromise. The view was shared by many in the Government Section that the correct solution was a separation of the Communications Ministry into a Postal Ministry and a Government Telecommunications Corporation, with the latter's workers receiving the same arbitration-mediation advantages as the railroad and other Government corporation workers.

Comment: The foregoing suggested solution was precisely that offered by Mr. Draper in a personal radio to SCAP on October 16, 1948. This radio was evidently not circulated below the Chief of Staff.

5. Police

a) The Government Section did not welcome State-War radio to CINCFE of November 22, 1948, interpreting paragraph 7 of NSC 13/2 to require establishment of (1) adequate mobile national police reserves, (2) separate national agency for internal security, and (3) broadened coordinative powers for the National rural police. The Government Section took particular exception to the creation of a mobile national reserve, for which it saw no need. The JCP has no arms or other equipment for taking direct revolutionary action. So far, National rural police units have been adequate for quelling riots such as the Korean riots at Osaka.

Comment: From all press and G-2 accounts, the Japanese police were incapable of coping with the rioters.

b) A more centralized police system runs the danger of becoming an instrument for totalitarian control through infiltration by the JCP or by ultra-nationalists into Tokyo HQ.

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Comment: A decentralized police structure encounters dangers of exposing local police to the corruptive influence of local bosses or to infiltration of extremist elements. Communist influence, for example, though relatively weak nationally is strong in the cities and in Hokkaido; and a decentralized system would seem to lend itself more to Communist designs than a centralized one. This is evident from the reactions of Derevyanko at the January 5, 1949 meeting of the ACJ. On the other hand, it is probably true that a strong, centralized police system would be more conducive to the aspirations of extreme rightist elements.

c) The NRP HQ in Tokyo has set up a central investigation bureau which helped in handling the investigation of recent government scandals. It is a small bureau of detectives aiding local and national police. Any formalization of this to FBI proportions is feared since it might revive the secret police.

Comment: Mr. Kades admitted that the Japanese would probably introduce an FBI on their own after the occupation and that it might be preferable to introduce an FBI now under the tutelage of the Occupation.

d) The State-Army radio of November 22, 1948, was accepted as a directive but SCAP is not proceeding with the implementation of certain sections since he is not aware that there is any "proposed legislation amending the Police Law" to which the radio referred.

Comment: There is plenty of evidence (see DRF Information Note No. 247 of February 8, 1949) in the Japanese press that the revision of the police law has been under active and serious consideration over the last few months. It is clear that almost all Japanese Government officials favor the moves proposed in the State-Army radio.

FE:NA:MGreen:clh
2/15/49

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Letter to Sebald

AWB



DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

FEB 25 1949

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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February 25, 1949

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Secretary of State,
Washington

2-42, February 18, 1949.



Reference this Mission's despatch no. 94 of February 18, 1949 concerning the Japanese general election on January 25,

As a result of the Democratic Liberal Party's overwhelming victory, the third cabinet headed by Mr. YOSHIKAZU SHIGERU was installed in office on February 16. Despite his party's overwhelming majority in the House of Representatives, the new Cabinet includes (in addition to twelve Democratic Liberalists) two Democrats, one member of the Ryokufukai group in the House of Councillors, and one Minister who is not a member of the Diet and without party affiliation.

The new cabinet's ministers are as follows (app. - member of the House of Representatives; Councilor - member of the House of Councillors):

- Prime Minister - YOSHIKAZU SHIGERU (Dem. Lib. Rep., incumbent)
- Foreign Minister - YOSHIKAZU SHIGERU (incumbent)
- Welfare Minister and Deputy Prime Minister - KAYAMA TOSIYUKI (Dem. Lib. Rep., incumbent)
- Finance Minister - IKEDA Hayato (Dem. Lib. Rep.)
- Commerce-Industry Minister - IWANO Heitaro (Dem. Councilor)
- Agriculture-Forestry Minister - ITO Kotaro (Dem. Lib. Rep.)
- Transportation Minister - OGI Shinzo (Dem. Lib. Councilor)
- Communications Minister - OZAWA Sasaki (Dem. Lib. Rep.)
- Education Minister - TAKEDA Sotaro (Ryokufukai Councilor)
- Labor Minister - SUMIYAMA Masabumi (Dem. Lib. Rep.)
- Construction Minister - ASUYAMA Shuji (Dem. Lib. Rep., incumbent)

Attorney General - UEDA Shunichi (incumbent)
State Ministers without portfolio -

Chief Cabinet Secretary - KANESHIRO Kaneshichi (Dem. Lib. Rep.)
Director, Grand Council on Education - MATSUDA Masayoshi

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Tokyo's A-42,
February 18, 1949.

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The new Yoshida Cabinet has pledged its support of the nine-point Economic Stabilization Program and has expressed its determination to combat communism.

Prior to the organization of the cabinet there were prolonged negotiations between Mr. Yoshida and Mr. INUKAI Ken, President of the Democratic Party, in which it is understood that Mr. Inukai sought a coalition. A bitter controversy broke out in the Democratic Party in the face of which Mr. Inukai may well have considered that it would be unwise himself to enter the Yoshida Cabinet.

Democratic participation in the Yoshida Cabinet under Mr. Inukai's direction has virtually split the party, and the Ashida and Tomabechi factions, which strongly opposed a coalition, may now repudiate Mr. Inukai's leadership and attempt to reach an understanding with the Social Democratic Party looking to the formation of a kind of coalition opposition. It seems not improbable that those Democrats who support participation in the Yoshida Cabinet may be absorbed in time into the Democratic Liberal Party.

The new cabinet is a further clarification of political lines, as a result of which Prime Minister Yoshida will receive the support of about thirty Democratic members in the House (the Inukai faction), giving his government the backing of three hundred of the House's 466 members. While the conservative camp is thus further strengthened the middle grouping (Democratic and Social Democratic parties) which suffered so heavily in the election, is still further reduced in strength. The communist-led leftist opposition therefore becomes proportionately stronger.

From a reliable source this mission has been informed that Mr. Yoshida's admission of Democratic members into his cabinet, despite his party's absolute majority in the house, is the result of a pre-election agreement he made with the Inukai faction in the Democratic Party. Before the election, Mr. Yoshida, feeling no assurance that he would secure an absolute majority, believed it both desirable and necessary to make such an agreement. The absorption of all groups of conservative inclination into a single integrated party would in any event appear to be a healthy development.

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HB
 DIVISION OF
 NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

FEB 24 1949
MB
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

February 20, 1949

Mr. W. Walton Butterworth, Director
 Office of Far Eastern Affairs
 Department of State
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Butterworth:

On behalf of the American Council on Japan, I want to say how happy we were that you were able to dine with us the other night. The views of the State Department on Japan, as you expressed them, were most reassuring, and the Council welcomes the opportunity to cooperate in every way.

I hope to be in Washington again about the 1st of March. I will get in touch with you before that, and I do hope we can arrange to get together again at that time.

Sincerely yours,

Harry F. Kern

Harry F. Kern
 Chairman, Organizing Committee

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OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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United States Political Adviser
for Japan

No. 114

Tokyo, February 21, 1949.

CONFIDENTIAL
(For Department Use Only)

Subject: General Headquarters Report on Japanese Election
of January 23, 1949.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

G-DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
MAR 11 1949
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Sir:

With reference to this Mission's despatch no. 94 of February 14, 1949, I have the honor to transmit to the Department two copies of a report on the Japanese general election of January 23 prepared by the Government Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, under date of February 3, 1949.

The General Headquarters report is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the election of members of the House of Representatives and the second dealing with the referendum of judges of the Supreme Court.

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While emphasizing that the Democratic Liberal Party and the Japan Communist Party are the only two parties to increase their strength as a result of the election, the General Headquarters report rejects the view that this tends to divide the political field into two extremes. The report contends that there has been a tendency since the beginning of the Occupation for the party in power to lose popularity with the passage of time while the opposition forces gain in strength, and that there has been growing popular dissatisfaction with the ineffectiveness of the last two coalition cabinets.

There has been, as the report notes, growing dissatisfaction with coalition governments, while the

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Tokyo's Despatch No. 114,
February 21, 1949.

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exposure of political scandals has also adversely affected the Democratic and Social Democratic Parties. Thus these parties which were formerly in power have in fact lost popularity; but the explanation offered by the report would appear inadequate as regards the Democratic Liberal Party, which was in power from October 1948. Its tenure of office, although comparatively short, certainly did not diminish its popularity, notwithstanding the difficulties it faced in the third and fourth sessions of the Diet when considerable Occupation pressure was exerted for the passage of the National Public Service Law and the budget in a manner which greatly embarrassed and handicapped the Yoshida Cabinet. The Democratic Liberal Party, therefore, has scored a phenomenal victory in spite of being in power under circumstances which were at times highly disadvantageous.

There is a marked tendency in the General Headquarters report to minimize the significance of the Democratic Liberal and Communist gains. It is no secret that the Government Section of General Headquarters has long entertained a dislike of Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru and the Democratic Liberal Party for their allegedly reactionary ideology. It cannot help but be somewhat displeasing, therefore, that this party has received such an overwhelming endorsement by the Japanese public. While noting in the report that the Democratic Liberal Party has a "positive program calculated to appeal to the habitually conservative average Japanese," what particularly made the Democratic Liberal program, as formulated and directed by Mr. Yoshida, a really positive one was the Prime Minister's determined efforts to assume an independent position and resist multiple pressures from innumerable General Headquarters officials. At no time, so far as we are aware, has Mr. Yoshida shown any inclination not to follow instructions or suggestions which General MacArthur sees fit to give him; but it is a marked characteristic of Mr. Yoshida that he considers that his Cabinet's policy should be of its own devising rather than be a composite of the views which happen currently to be held by the several score division heads in Headquarters paralleling the departments of his government. The conservative ideology of the Democratic Liberal Party can be taken for granted. The party is no more conservative today than it was in 1947 when it polled only 7,356,321 votes and won only 131 seats in the House. It was quite clearly Mr. Yoshida's display of independence which gave him and his party greater appeal in 1949 rather than his well known and accepted conservatism.

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Tokyo's Despatch No. 114,
February 21, 1949.

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The increase in communist strength is also a displeasing development which the General Headquarters report only explains in part. Before the election there was a pronounced tendency in some sections of General Headquarters to believe that the communists were incapable of making an effective showing or of becoming an influential political force. The results of the election demonstrate only too clearly, however, that the communists are now in a good position to bid for opposition leadership and that their pre-election popular front strategy may yet effect a significant re-grouping of the left wing in Japanese politics.

In the light of these significant developments, the statement in the General Headquarters report on page 2 that "obviously all that happened in January 1949 was an internal redistribution of strength among the parties advocating one or another form of socialization" hardly conforms with facts.

The explanation of the failure of the middle grouping, particularly the Social Democratic Party's defeat, is on the whole accurate. But the report's suggestion that the transfer of loyalty from the socialist camp to the communist camp was more apparent than real is certainly inaccurate. Prior to the election there was a significant movement of left-wing Social Democrats into the communist party, especially at the prefectural level. That these left-wingers had long favored a line of action closer to the communist line than to the socialist does not minimize the significance of this actual shift in party loyalty. The total number of Social Democratic leaders who went over to the communists was not great in absolute numbers. But what is of much more importance was the influence of this shift on Japanese voters who had been inclined to support the Social Democratic Party because they agreed with the policies of the party's left-wing leaders. When the leftists left the Social Democratic Party, they carried with them into the communist fold the votes of their supporters. Had the leftist leaders not deserted the Social Democratic Party, such voters would very likely have voted the socialist rather than the communist ticket.

Finally, in discussing the Social Democratic debacle, it is somewhat ironic that the General Headquarters report states that the Social Democratic Party "suffered from a long-standing division in its ranks and a loss of popularity among labor groups traceable to its participation in the efforts to amend government employee labor

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
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practices, exploited by communist inspired labor factions".
In other words, by supporting an Occupation-sponsored labor program the Social Democrats lost a great deal of the labor vote upon which they had hitherto depended so heavily.

actually the Socialists voted against the NPSL but supported it during most of the Diet discussion so that labor gained impression that Socialist party supported NPSL.

While some criticism may be made of the interpretation of the political trends reflected in the election, the General Headquarters report is a most comprehensive survey which it is believed will be of value to the Department. The section dealing with the administration of the election affords a full picture of the electoral process and procedures now in force. Attention is also invited to the detailed statistical data compiled for the report and the chart giving the platforms of the political parties on a comparative basis.

Respectfully yours,


W. J. Sebald

Enclosure:

Two copies GHQ report on
Japanese general election
of January 23, 1949.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

3 February 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SUPREME COMMANDER.

SUBJECT : ELECTION REPORT.

The accompanying report on the Japanese national elections of January 23, 1949 covers the general election of members of the House of Representatives and the popular review of the appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court, both of which were conducted on that date.

The general election of members of the House of Representatives, although the third such election since the beginning of the Allied Occupation of Japan, was the first to be conducted under the Constitution of Japan which became effective on May 3, 1947. It furnished the first instance of the use of Article 69 of the Constitution, which provides:

"If the House of Representatives passes a non-confidence resolution, or rejects a confidence resolution, the Cabinet shall resign en masse, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within ten (10) days."

The result of the election registered the confidence of the people in the Government party.

Since the recent election was the first general election of members of the House of Representatives following the appointment of the judges of the present Supreme Court, Article 79 of the Constitution called for a popular review of the appointment of the judges to be held at the same time. The result of this referendum was an overwhelming confirmation of the appointments.

The Japanese people have given another demonstration of their ability to operate the machinery of representative government.

/s/ Courtney Whitney

COURTNEY WHITNEY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Chief, Government Section.

G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N S

O F

J A N U A R Y 23, 1949

"Peoples of the free world everywhere can take satisfaction in this enthusiastic and orderly Japanese election which at a critical moment in Asiatic history has given so clear and decisive a mandate for the conservative philosophy of government."

MACARTHUR

Government Section
General Headquarters
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

I N D E X

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GENERAL ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 23, 1949

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PART I

GENERAL ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 23, 1949A. Introductory Statement

On January 23, 1949, in a nation-wide election which held a number of surprises, the Japanese people for the third time since the beginning of the Occupation elected a new House of Representatives. As on each of the two preceding occasions the recent election resulted in a redistribution of strength and a shifting of relative positions among the principal contending parties in the House of Representatives. Unlike the preceding occasions, however, the latest election gave the winning party not a mere plurality but an absolute majority of 264 or 56.7% of the 466 seats in the House. The final results of the election in terms of number of seats won, as compared with the respective party strengths just prior to the election were:

| Party | Elected Jan. 49 | Seats Held Dec. 48 | Gain | Loss |
|----------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|------|------|
| Democratic Liberal | 264 | 152 | 112 | |
| Democratic | 68 | 90 | | 22 |
| Social Democratic | 49 | 111 | | 62 |
| Communist | 35 | 4 | 31 | |
| Peoples' Cooperative | 14 | 29 | | 15 |
| Labor Farmer | 7 | 12 | | 5 |
| Social Renovation | 5 | 20 | | 15 |
| New Liberal | 2 | 11 | | 9 |
| Japan Farmer | 1 | 7 | | 6 |
| Other (Minor & Ind.) | 21 | 11 | 10 | |
| Vacancies | | 19 | | 19 |
| Total | 466 | 466 | | |

That the conservative Democratic Liberal Party headed by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida would emerge in first place had been generally anticipated but the decisiveness of its victory had not. It was also generally anticipated that the Communists would register gains which, although minor in absolute numbers, might loom large percentage-wise because of the small initial base, but here again the final gains scored by this party were somewhat larger than had been expected. Since all parties but the Democratic Liberals and the Communists lost ground, there is a natural tendency to see in the results a "polarization" of political forces away from the middle of the road in the direction of the extreme right and the extreme left. This is an over-simplified

view, the validity of which fades in the light of an examination of the factors which demonstrably affected the outcome with respect to each of the contesting parties.

In the first place, there has been observable since the beginning of the Occupation a tendency, natural under the circumstances, for the party in power to lose popularity with the passage of time and for the opposition forces to gain in strength. Secondly, there had been a growing dissatisfaction among the electorate over the apparent ineffectualness of the last two coalition governments in meeting the critical problems of the day. Thirdly, the scandalous revelations of corruption in high places unquestionably dimmed the popularity of the former coalition government parties.

Both the Democratic and Social Democratic parties had in the past received campaign funds from contractors subsidized by the Reconstruction Finance Board. These sources of funds were cut off with the arrest of former Economic Stabilization Board Director General Kuruu and former Chief Cabinet Secretary Nishio. In addition, the Social Democratic Party suffered from a long standing division in its ranks and a loss of popularity among labor groups traceable to its participation in the efforts to amend government employee labor practices, exploited by Communist-inspired labor factions. The near-disintegration of the Social Democratic Party was dramatized by the failure of such prominent and personally popular Socialist leaders as Katayama, Nishio, Nomizu and the Kato couple to be reelected.

The gains made by the Communists are readily understood in view of the apparent availability of adequate finances, skillful campaign strategy in not scattering their forces, and vigorous and effective electioneering. The collapse of Nationalist resistance and the flight of Chiang Kai Shek before the Communist advance in China, opportunistically exploited to the full in Japanese Communist propaganda, may account for some of the Communist gain. The greatest single ally of the Communists, however, was the weakness of the Social Democrats and the defection of former Socialists to the Communist camp. This transfer of loyalty may have been more apparent than real, for the extreme left wing members of the Social Democratic Party had for a long time favored a line of action closer to the Communist line than to the moderated socialism of the Social Democratic Party. In terms of Diet seats, the left wing Social Democrats lost 23, and the Labor-Farmers, an extreme left wing splinter of the Social Democrats formed in July 1948, lost 5, making a total of 28 seats lost to the representatives of extreme left wing views. That the Communists drew their gains from the votes lost by the Social Democrats is evident from the fact that the combined votes garnered by all the parties advocating socialization in some form (Social Democrat, Communist, Labor-Farmer, and Social Renovation) in the January 1949 election totalled 63,506 less than the total received in 1947, the year of Social Democratic victory. Obviously all that happened in January 1949 was an internal redistribution of strength among the parties advocating one or another form of socialization.

The Democratic Liberal Party as the chief opposition during the past eighteen months gained from the mistakes and mishaps of the government coalition parties, but its decisive victory cannot be explained on that score alone. Contributing to its success in the January 1949 election were strong leadership, adequate finances, a wide-spread and efficient political machine, and a positive program calculated to appeal to the habitually conservative average Japanese. The advance of Communism across Asia, as noted above, may have helped the Japanese Communists some, but the chances are that it had a greater influence on the size of the Democratic Liberal victory. The multiplying signs of Communist infiltration in Japanese labor and other organizations were another influence in the same direction. For to the average Japanese the threat of Communist power close by is an inducement to turn to the conservative fold as to a safe haven. Over 3,370,000 more persons voted in the January 1949 election than in the April 1947 election for the House of Representatives and all of this additional vote went to the Democratic Liberals.

In several respects the January 1949 election reflected the increasing political maturity of Japanese parties and the Japanese electorate. Before the election numerous comments were circulated to the effect that (1) the Japanese always vote for individuals rather than for parties or principles; (2) the legal restrictions on campaign activities weighted the odds overwhelmingly in favor of incumbents and other well-known persons and against new-comers; (3) the Japanese people were apathetic toward the election. These comments were utterly refuted by the results of the election. The emphatic swing toward the Democratic Liberal Party, the poor showing made by independent candidates and members of minor parties, and the defeat of a number of prominent figures shows a definite inclination to vote for parties rather than for individuals. In spite of the initial advantage enjoyed by incumbent candidates, 43.5% of the incumbent candidates in the January 1949 election were defeated. Of the successful candidates, 192, or 41.2% were "new faces" elected for the first time; 31, or 6.6% were members of former Diets, and 243, or 52.2% were reelected members. As for the reputed disinterest of the electorate, the following figures speak for themselves:

| | January 1949 | April 1947 | April 1946 |
|-------------------------|--------------|------------|------------|
| Total Vote Cast | 31,168,625 | 27,797,884 | 26,558,611 |
| Ratio to Total Eligible | 74.1% | 67.9% | 72.1% |

Candidates participating in the 1949 election totalled 1,364 as compared with 1,590 in 1947 and 2,770 in 1946, indicating a continuing shrinkage in the proportion of votes dissipated on hopeless candidates and an increasingly meaningful channelling of the power of the electorate. There was a sharp drop in the number of women candidates, 44 running in the 1949 election as against 84 in 1947 and 71 in 1946. Of the 44 who ran, 12 were elected, compared with 15 in 1947 and 39 in 1946. The reduction in women candidates and members-elect reportedly reflected the unimpressive record made by a number of the women members in the last Diet.

As on the preceding two similar occasions the election was administered under the Japanese law for the election of members of the House of Representatives but surveilled by Military Government and tactical troop units of the Occupation forces. The election was peaceful, orderly and above all free of interference. Violations of the election law reported to the authorities were neither numerous nor serious.

Before the election there was public discussion of a probably conservative coalition led by the Democratic Liberals and including the Democrats and possibly the Peoples' Cooperatives, but as a result of its present dominant position the Democratic Liberal Party can, if it chooses, form a Cabinet to carry out its governmental program without coalition or other assistance from any of the other parties. If support from other sources is accepted, it will be on the basis of small, weak groups joining the winning team and will, therefore, be unattended by such compromises or commitments as those which weakened and handicapped the coalition cabinets of 1947 and 1948 and doomed them to early collapse. From the point of view of political stability and the ability to carry out measures required by the Occupation and necessary for national rehabilitation, the emergence of a government led by one party which controls a majority in the Diet is a turning point in the political development of post-war Japan.

B. Background

Following the resignation in October 1948 of Prime Minister Hitoshi Ashida together with his coalition Cabinet of Democrats, Social Democrats and Peoples' Cooperative and the formation of a new government by Shigeru Yoshida, leader of the Democratic Liberal Party, which for eighteen months had been in the opposition, a general election to select a new House of Representatives became inevitable. The Democratic Liberals did not command a majority in the House of Representatives. A coalition with other conservative groups, even if it had been feasible, would have produced a precarious majority at best, but it did not prove possible in the existing circumstances. The House of Representatives was sharply divided between the government bloc and the opposition parties and both camps proved rigidly uncooperative and intransigent. Further, the revelations of bribery and official corruption which had come to light during the fall of 1948 had implicated not only prominent members of the coalition cabinet but a number of Diet members as well. The public was disillusioned and confused. The problems facing the Japanese government, including measures necessary to carry out Occupation objectives and to promote rehabilitation, required a government which enjoyed the confidence of the public. The need for a new House of Representatives was indisputable.

Prime Minister Yoshida's intention to dissolve the existing House of Representatives was made known soon after his assumption of the Premiership, but the action was delayed pending enactment by the Diet of the bill revising the National Public Service Law in which General Headquarters, SCAP had an avowed interest. This bill was passed on November 30. The Government's budget plan which was related to the public service salary question, remained as unfinished business when the third (special) Diet session closed on November 30 but was presented again as a supplementary budget to the fourth (regular) Diet session which began on December 1, 1948. On December 4, 1948 Prime Minister Yoshida in his administrative policy address to the House of Representatives in Plenary Session served notice on the opposition parties that the Government intended to dissolve the House of Representatives two weeks after the submission of the supplementary budget. He stressed that his Cabinet was a "minority government" and that the dissolution of the current Diet would hasten the establishment of a democratic political system in Japan and emphasized the necessity of stabilizing the political situation of post-war Japan through the speedy institution of a two party political system.

On December 7, 1948 a conference of representatives of the opposition parties agreed upon a request which was submitted to the Government by Gizo Tomabechi, acting president of the Democratic Party, proposing (1) in the interest of a fair election that the Government avoid holding the general election during the year end and new year season; (2) the opposition parties favor dissolution of the House of Representatives; (3) a vote of non-confidence in the present Cabinet be introduced; (4) the policy agreement previously entered into by the Democratic, Social Democratic and Peoples' Cooperative parties was not binding on the minor parties.

On December 21, 1948 the Diet passed the Government's new wage bill for Government employees, clearing the way for approval of the supplementary budget. On December 22 the supplementary budget bill was passed. On December 23 the House of Representatives by a vote of 227 to 130 passed the opposition motion of non-confidence in the Yoshida Cabinet. On the same day the Imperial Rescript counter-signed by the Prime Minister was received by Speaker Komakichi Matsuoka and the House was dissolved. The Rescript stated that the House was being dissolved in accordance with the provisions of Articles 69 and 7 of the Constitution of Japan. This was the first time the House of Representatives had been dissolved under the new Constitution and the first time Article 69 thereof had been invoked.

On the following day, the Cabinet met to discuss post-dissolution issues. In a press conference following the meeting, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida declared that his Government would seek the confidence of the people in order to put its policies into practice. "Our Cabinet has sustained considerable wounds during the past Diet session," Yoshida declared, "but such wounds are only slight and we hope to become healthier and stronger hereafter." The Prime Minister characterized as deplorable the events which took place in the Third and Fourth Diet sessions and said he hoped in the next general election that the people would select a new Diet of which they could really be proud. He further stated that he hoped to realize a two-party political system in Japan, and that he would strive to bring all conservative elements within a single powerful party.

On December 27, 1948 the Imperial Edict setting the date of the general election was published in the Official Gazette. The Edict stated as follows:

"I hereby proclaim that general election of members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the 23rd day of January 1949, in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 and Article 54 of the Constitution of Japan, as well as Article 18 of the Law for the Election of Members of the House of Representatives."

C. Occupation Interest In The Election

1. Statement of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

The interest of the Allied Powers in the impending election was expressed by General MacArthur in the following paragraph from his New Year's Message to the Japanese people on January 1, 1949:

"The general election just ahead will test your wisdom in the selection of a leadership to whom you will in this crucial period entrust the sovereign power. The times require a great dignity and capacity for wise statesmanship and such should be the measure of your choice -- men capable of elevating your national legislative forum to the standard set by the finest of your traditions. Thereafter the issue will rest squarely upon the type of leadership they bring to the country and the resolute will by which each among your citizenry acquits his individual responsibility in the great task of ensuring that Japan may live."

2. Surveillance by the Occupation Authorities

The election surveillance procedure employed in the general elections of 1946 and 1947 having proved highly satisfactory was adopted again in the 1949 election. This consisted of general observation and surveillance of the pre-election campaign, the administration of the election procedures, the voting, and the ballot counting, performed by Military Government Teams and tactical units of the Occupation forces to insure that the election laws were fairly and honestly administered and that the election was conducted without official or other interference from any source.

Command instructions charging the Commanding General, Eighth Army with responsibility for the surveillance of the election were dispatched on December 24, 1948. These instructions were accompanied by two handbooks which included annotated text of all laws and ordinances pertinent to the election.

Continuous contact was maintained between the Government Section of General Headquarters, SCAP and the Military Government Section, Headquarters, Eighth Army. Until the termination of the election the Government Section remained the

the principal point of contact with the Japanese National Election Management Commission. As in previous elections under the Occupation the Military Government Teams were authorized to report directly to General Headquarters, SCAP any matters which in their judgment required expeditious action such as a serious infringement of the election laws, or criticism of activities on the part of Occupation personnel in connection with the campaign or the election.

The Military Government Teams began actual surveillance of the election at the time of the announcement on December 27, 1948. Several days thereafter a surveillance team from other units of the Occupation forces was assigned and began operation in each of the 117 electoral districts of Japan. Just prior to election day the program was augmented by many additional teams so that on election day and until the counting of the ballots there were 1168 surveillance teams actually in the field, of which 139 came from Eighth Army units, 686 from I Corps units, 304 from IX Corps units, 3 from the U. S. Navy, 7 from the U. S. Marine Corps, and 29 from ECOM. A surveillance team consisted of an officer or a non-commissioned officer of the first three grades, an interpreter and a driver, and was equipped with a motor vehicle.

Surveillance teams were physically present in the electoral districts throughout the entire campaign and were in constant contact with the various local election administration committees, with candidates, political party leaders, newspaper men, and personnel of the law enforcement agencies. They attended political meetings, observed campaign procedures and interviewed members of the general public. If violations of the law were reported to have occurred, reports were immediately sent to Headquarters, Eighth Army, where the Military Government Section indicated the action to be followed. No major violations were found and no criticism of the activities of Occupation personnel were received.

On the voting and counting days the surveillance teams visited over 90% of all the polling stations and counting places throughout Japan at least once on each day, subsequently making reports to the Military Government Teams based on their observations.

D. Administration Of The Election

1. Legislation

The general election of 1949 was held under the law for the election of the members of the House of Representatives, the same law which had governed the election of April 1947 with certain changes which had been made by the Japanese Diet early in 1948. These amendments were aimed at equalizing the competitive campaign opportunities of all candidates by placing certain limitations on electoral publicity, speech making and other campaigning by candidates, parties and supporters, and providing more stringent penalties for election law violations, including bribery, forgery, intimidation, violence, abduction or official neglect of duty or abuse of power.

The Law Concerning the Regulation of Political Contributions and Expenditures, enacted by the Diet on 30 June 1948, increased the penalties for violations of the provisions of the Law for the Election of Members of the House of Representatives approximately threefold, and in some cases more. For example, violations calling for fines of ¥1,000 were increased to as high as ¥25,000; ¥20,000 fines were increased to ¥35,000; ¥30,000 increased to ¥75,000; etc.

The Law Concerning the Regulation of Political Contributions and Expenditures,--also popularly called the "Corrupt Practices Law,"--was enacted with the aim of insuring fair and impartial elections, both national and local.

This law, as its title indicates, requires all political parties, political organizations, and candidates to report contributions and expenditures, requires that certain appropriate records and vouchers pertaining to contributions and expenditures be maintained within the political parties and organizations. It prohibits certain types of contributions.

The highlights of this law follow:

- (1) Prohibits purges from making contributions in any election.
- (2) Prohibits holders of government contracts, both national and prefectural, from making political contributions.
- (3) Prohibits candidates from making contributions within the area in which the candidate is running for office.
- (4) Prohibits persons from making or receiving election contributions anonymously, or under any name other than his full legal name, together with his legal address.
- (5) Prohibits foreign nationals or agencies from making election or campaign contributions.
- (6) Prohibits contributions through a third person.
- (7) Requires that political parties, political organizations, and individual candidates register the names and addresses of responsible officials with the National Election Management Commission or the Prefectural Electoral Administration Committee.
- (8) Requires that a candidate report in writing all contributions made by him for the period of one year preceding the date of announcement of the election for which he is a candidate.
- (9) Requires that political parties, political organizations, and individual candidates report to the National Election Management Commission or the Prefectural Electoral Administration Committee the names, addresses, dates of birth, and dates of appointment of responsible party officials, location of the political party or organization, within 7 days of its establishment.
- (10) Requires that political parties, political organizations, and individual candidates keep account books, records, and other documents pertaining to all contributions, to include the names, addresses, and occupations of all persons making the contributions. (For organizations making contributions, their names, address of main office, and name and address of representative).
- (11) Requires that political parties, political organizations, and individual candidates keep account books, records, and other documents indicating all payments made on behalf of the political party or association. Records must also indicate the name, address, and occupation of all persons to whom such payments have been made, together with the object, amount, and date of such payments.
- (12) Requires that any person other than the treasurer of a political party or organization who accepts contributions or makes payments for or on behalf of said party, shall report the details of such payments or contributions to the treasurer within 7 days, or immediately upon request of the treasurer.

- (13) Requires that vouchers for any payments exceeding ¥1,000 made by the political party, political organization, or other organization, be collected and maintained by the treasurer of the political party or organization.
- (14) Requires that the treasurer of a political party, or political organization submit a report to the National Election Management Commission prior to the tenth day following each April 30, August 31, and December 31, which must include the following items:
- a. All contributions and all other income received by a political party, or political organization, and all contributions and incomes received on their behalf.
 - b. Contributions received by a political party or political organization which exceed ¥1,000 (or aggregate amounts for identical contributions) must indicate name, address, and occupation of contributor, and amount and date of contribution.
 - c. Contributions received by other than a political party, political organization, or other organization which exceed ¥500 must indicate the name, address, and occupation of contributor, and amount and date of contribution.
 - d. All payments made by a political party, or political organization.
 - e. Payments made by a political party, or political organization which exceed ¥1,000 (¥500 for other than political parties) must indicate name, address, and occupation of the person to whom such payments were made and the object and date.

2. Supervision by the Electoral Authorities

Before the elections of April 1947, supervision over Japanese elections was exercised by local executives: governors, mayors, and headsmen. For the first time in the history of Japanese political affairs, the elections of April 1947 were supervised by special committees elected by local legislatures and responsible for all elections, national or local, which were held in their areas of responsibility.

On the basis of the experience thus derived, the functions of these committees were developed and strengthened by legislation. An election administration committee was set up in each local entity. These committees were responsible to the public at large and charged with supervision of all elections conducted in their area of jurisdiction. Each city, town, village, and Tokyo ward thus had a committee exercising on its own account immediate control over the election in its own locality, under the general supervision of prefectural committees. The prefectural committees had six members, including a chairman; others had four. The method of electing committees permits of bipartisan membership. A committee meeting was held at the request of any member. All complaints regarding the conduct of the election were normally made, in the first instance, to the committee.

An innovation since the elections of April 1947 was the establishment in December of that year, of the National Election Management Commission, under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Office. This Commission is composed of nine regular members and nine alternate members, nominated by the various parties. The Commission assumed certain of the functions pertaining to elections once performed by the former Home Ministry having to do with the coordination of the work of the various levels of local committees, statistics gathering and reporting, and so forth.

Under the law creating the National Election Management Commission, enacted December 9, 1947, the Commission is responsible for the administration of all popular elections. This includes elections for both national and local offices, as well as those held for ratification of amendments to the Constitution and, as in the present election, for the popular review of Supreme Court Judges. Among the specific duties of the Commission are the securing of necessary appropriations assisting in the procurement of necessary paper, and other preparations concerning the elections.

Although the National Election Management Commission is placed under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister, it operates as an autonomous body governed by the decisions of its members.

All political parties and political associations must register with the Commission and file with it financial statements or any other data required.

The Commission coordinated the work of all independent local committees: There was an election administration committee in each of the 46 prefectures, and 10,050 cities, towns, and villages each had an election administration committee under the direction of the prefectural committee. In addition, each of the six major cities (Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya, Kyoto) had an election administration committee in each of their wards. Thus, Tokyo had 23 ward election administration committees. In short, in the recent election there were over 10,000 subsidiary election administration committees under the 46 prefectural election committees, whose work was supervised by the National Election Management Commission.

Before the end of December 1948, the National Election Management Commission had already completed all the necessary preparations to discharge its duties thoroughly, beginning with the acceptance of candidacy applications and ending with the opening of the polling stations on election day, so that an orderly election would result. The Commission set up 42,900 polling stations throughout the country to accommodate the 42,090,916 eligible voters. In the election of 1949, the Commission operated on a budget of ¥770,000,000.

3. Screening of Candidates

All candidates who had not previously received certificates of eligibility pursuant to screening under the provisions of SCAPIN 550 were screened by the Japanese Government before being admitted as candidates in the 1949 election. Of the 291 aspirants so examined only one, Tosoyo Oda, Tokyo independent, was barred under Category G of SCAPIN 550 because of his ultranationalistic writings. 19 candidates were former purgees who had been released from the disabilities of the Purge as the result of appeals, and of this number 8 were elected. Prominent among such successful candidates were Ken Inukai, Ryuta Komine, and Shigeru Hori; notable among such reinstated purgees who were defeated in the election were Wataru Narahashi, and Tada Tanabe.

4. Regulation of Campaign

All candidates were required to file candidacy applications before January 13, 1949, the deadline date as provided by law.

As already noted, the Japanese election laws provided stringent regulation of the election campaign. The basic election law for members of the House of Representatives was amended by the "Law Concerning the Provisional Exceptions to the Election Campaign and Others" of 29 July 1948, and the "Cabinet Order Relating to the Enforcement of the Law Concerning Temporary Exceptions Relating to the Election Campaign, etc., No. 192" of 29 July 1948.

These revisions affecting the election campaign in 1949 in many respects differed from the regulations in force for the previous election. The highlights of these revisions were as follows:

a. Regulation of campaign speech-making:

Election campaign speeches were limited to the following:

- (1) Competitive speech meetings among candidates sponsored by the city, town, or village election administration committee. (Each candidate was permitted to participate in one such meeting in each city, town, or village, and a total of 30 in his election district).
- (2) Thirty individual speech meetings by each candidate at a public school or a hall provided by the city, town, or village election administration committee.
- (3) Street speech meetings: no limit in number, provided the candidate was present.
- (4) Radio broadcasts: 3 times.

b. Use of publicity literature was limited to the following:

- (1) Newspaper advertisement: 2 times.
- (2) Signboards, posters, stickers, and placards used at street speech meetings and candidate's campaign office and on motor vehicle.
- (3) One thousand free postcards and envelopes (with postage) supplied by the Government (the National Election Management Commission) to each candidate.

c. Other:

- (1) Preparations for holding competitive speech meetings and individual speech meetings, as well as the announcement of speech meetings, were required to be made by the city, town, or village election administration committee at the expense of the national treasury.
- (2) Fifteen free passes enabling the holder to ride in public or privately managed railways, streetcars, etc., were issued per candidate. (This expense to be borne by the national treasury).
- (3) Use of good offices to obtain gasoline and charcoal for motor vehicles to be used by candidates in the election campaign.

- (4) Use of motor vehicles, loudspeakers, and boats was restricted to one each per candidate.
- (5) The offering or receiving of food or drinks in connection with the campaign were absolutely prohibited.

5. Interpretation

On the whole the administration of the election procedures by the National Election Management Commission was praiseworthy. At one point during the campaign, however, there arose some apparent confusion on the manner of application of certain provisions of the election laws which, although intended to prevent unfair campaign practices, could, if literally and strictly construed, result in unduly confining the efforts of candidates and their supporters and in restricting the normal freedom of the Press, including its right to support or oppose particular parties or candidates. The question was actually raised as to whether, under the pertinent provisions of the existing legislation, the Japanese Press could legally support or oppose individual candidates or parties. Representatives of the National Election Management Commission and the Office of the Attorney General at first were inclined to construe such activities as violations of the Law Concerning the Temporary Exceptions to Election Campaigns promulgated on July 29, 1948. According to the Attorney General's initial interpretation, activities of candidates and parties could be fully reported in the Press but, if a newspaper should go beyond the point of merely reporting events and should urge support of or opposition to any candidate or party, it could be charged with violating the election laws.

Such a situation obviously required clarification and this was accomplished by means of a conference held in the office of the Government Section, General Headquarters, SCAP, on January 15, 1949, in which representatives of the Government Section and the Civil Information and Education Section, General Headquarters, SCAP, met with representatives of the National Election Management Commission, the Attorney General's Office, and the National Rural Police Headquarters. At this conference Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, Chief of Government Section, stated in part as follows:

"I feel that the question immediately before you is a fundamental one. It is our purpose to give all assistance in resolving the question in the interest of the people of Japan.

"There is involved a question concerning freedom of the Press, freedom of the individual, and respect for the agencies of the Japanese Government. It is not our purpose to inject ourselves into the operational procedures of agencies of the Japanese Government, but rather to join with you in asserting our desire that no principles of the Constitution be violated by any improper interpretation of existing laws.

"Fundamental to that Constitution is the provision that freedom of expression is guaranteed and that the Government of Japan shall be responsive to the free will of the Japanese people. We do intend to join with you in insuring that these fundamentals of the Constitution are not violated by law or by an interpretation of the law. Had we felt that the Constitution was violated by any changes in the Election Law under consideration by the Diet, we would have been forced to intervene and to hold up those proposed changes. It is fundamental to the responsibility of this Headquarters to insure that basic freedoms and rights guaranteed by the Constitution are preserved inviolate to the people so long as we are here. We did not intervene in that legislative process because we assumed that the legislation would be broadly construed in the light of the paramountcy of the public interest. For

there can be no free and enlightened expression of the people's will unless the people can be fully informed concerning facts about which they are called to register their will.

"Since I have been in Japan I have observed a tendency on the part of judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative bodies to place a too literal interpretation on laws and administrative regulations, and I have on numerous occasions urged that official thinking and official interpretations be broadened so as to encompass the public interest. Because, after all, the public interest should be master of all official thinking and official action.

"Now that is precisely the issue presently involved: a narrow, literal, arbitrary interpretation of the body of law which governs the elections or a broad, statesmanlike interpretation which serves the public interest. My advice to you and to every section of the government here represented, in the interest of insuring free election and an untrammelled expression of public will, is that you construe all laws which you are called on to administer in the light of constitutional mandates.

"And in so doing, whenever there is doubt in your minds concerning the proper interpretation of laws or regulations you can make no mistake if you resolve that doubt in the interest of free expression. This is a fundamental requirement of all law in Japan. You must understand that it is not necessary that the provisions of the Constitution be repeated in every Act of the Diet. Those provisions are superimposed over all laws enacted in Japan. You can never fail in meeting your trust and responsibilities if you read into every law every provision of the Constitution. Apply every law and administer every law as if every provision of the Constitution were written therein. That, of course, gentlemen, is your safest course since your first loyalty and devotion is to the Constitution.

.....

"I believe that those provisions of the election law which interfere with or may be interpreted to restrict the freedom of the individual, whether they be applied to members of the electorate, political parties, candidates, or the press, should be interpreted in such fashion as to insure preservation of individual liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. I recognize that there are some seeming conflicts between the laws and the Constitution. I want to see a broad, statesmanlike interpretation of those provisions, with unflinching devotion to the precepts of the Constitution. This is a challenge to your wisdom, the breadth of your minds and your devotion to the public interest."

At the conclusion of the conference, Shunkichi Unno, head of the National Election Management Commission, on behalf of the Japanese officials present, expressed appreciation and agreement, but in view of certain difficult questions which might arise, indicated that General Headquarters' advice and guidance might occasionally be requested. It was agreed that the National Election Management Commission and other agencies of the Japanese Government would make every effort to resolve future questions and doubts in the light of General Whitney's statement, and that any residual questions would be referred to General Headquarters for assistance in developing guiding principles.

On January 18, after obtaining Cabinet approval, the National Election Management Commission issued the following statement:

"Needless to say, it is the true function of the press to report to the public all news freely and impartially. The Constitution guarantees the press freedom to express opinion. This

also in the spirit of the Press Code. It is therefore desired that the press at the time of an election especially demonstrate its true function and speedily and actively supply the voting public fair and just opinions on political parties and candidates. We believe that in the administration of election laws these principles should naturally be fully respected.

"The foregoing imposes on the press the obligation to perform its functions as a responsible media of public information, at all times giving paramount importance to the promotion of the interests of the people."

Following this release, the National Election Management Commission, the Attorney General's Office, the National Rural Police Headquarters, and other agencies of the Japanese Government instructed all prefectural and local subsidiaries to give full consideration to the Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution in administering the election laws.

E. Campaign Publicity and Press Coverage

1. Election Publicity

Candidates and political parties were extensively publicized during the campaign period - by newspapers, the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan, the National Election Management Commission and its branches throughout Japan, by the League of Political Education and other organizations and agencies. The intensive campaign efforts of individual candidates and parties served also to inform the electorate concerning election issues and party programs.

The Press devoted extensive space to the campaign throughout the election period. In general newspapers gave full coverage without giving support to individual candidates or parties, preferring instead to urge that support be accorded parties and individuals of conviction and integrity. The Press also advocated that electors inform themselves concerning campaign issues and that voters exercise their franchise on election day. Even those newspapers which did support or oppose individual candidates gave extensive publicity to major parties and candidates. Many newspapers expressed severe criticism of the laws under which the election was being conducted, holding that some provisions were excessively restrictive, tending thereby to reduce interest in the campaign and to give unfair advantage to incumbent or well-known candidates over "new faces". This criticism served to publicize the elections and undoubtedly cause many voters further to examine the records of candidates and parties.

All candidates were given opportunity to address their constituencies by means of radio. The Broadcasting Corporation of Japan also devoted extensive time to the transmission of specific information concerning individual candidates and major election issues. In addition, short biographical sketches of each candidate were broadcast ten times during the campaign. Emphasis was also given to the importance of enlightened participation in the elections.

The National Election Management Commission did an extremely effective job (1) in instructing all election officials and candidates concerning requirements of the election laws; (2) in informing the electorate concerning candidates and election procedures; and (3) in stimulating widespread participation in the election.

The Commission issued a series of informational publications which were distributed to all persons with any responsibility for the administration or enforcement of election laws. At the start of the campaign period prefectural

election administration officials conferred with Commission heads in Tokyo. Subsequently, daily information bulletins were dispatched to all local units by means of direct police telephone or radio.

Each candidate was furnished a handbook explaining the laws under which the elections were being conducted.

The Commission published 900,000 posters emphasizing the importance of the election and the review of Supreme Court justices. Local prefectural offices issued hundreds of thousands of leaflets similarly stressing the importance of the election. The single most important piece of election literature published by the Commission was issued in 53 editions, one for each election district, and was distributed to each of the 17,000,000 voting families in Japan. This bulletin contained biographical information concerning candidates in each district. Voting families also received full information relative to review of Supreme Court justices.

The Commission also utilized street panels, radio interviews, sound trucks and loud speaker announcements at all railway stations in an effort to encourage widespread participation in the elections.

Notable assistance in publicizing the election was given by the League for Political Education for Democracy, an independent non-partisan agency of the Diet, which distributed hundreds of thousands of posters, hand-bills and pamphlets designed to stimulate widespread interest and participation in the election. The League also made extensive use of the radio, motion pictures, kamishibai and all other information media in an effort to get out the vote on election day.

2. Press Coverage and Editorial Opinion

During the five weeks preceding the election, political discussion dominated the Press and the progress of the campaign was reported in great detail. Most papers made some predictions by parties in several series; some published party platforms for the convenience of their readers. Yomiuri and Jiji Shimpō, for instance, carried articles by ex-Communists in opposition to the Communist Party.

While most newspapers refrained from supporting outright individual parties or candidates, an undercurrent of sympathy in favor of the Democratic Liberal Party could be seen in the attitude of major metropolitan papers. As the election drew closer, the entire press, in efforts to stimulate public interest, urged the people to vote, and sought to rouse popular political consciousness with pertinent slogans and well-pointed editorials to vote intelligently. Political commentators almost unanimously expressed serious concern over the possibility of wide abstention from voting. Two reasons accentuated this concern: the fact that the cold weather might keep the public away from the polls on election day, and an appearance of general indifference and apathy which characterized the pre-election scene.

A Mainichi editorial, at the outset of the campaign, after expressing relief that the Diet had been finally dissolved and excoriating the Opposition bloc for delaying the inevitable break-up, urged the voters to scrutinize the candidates and the parties closely so that the most competent Diet possible would be returned. Careful study of both candidates and party platforms was also advocated by Nihon Keizai. The voters must remember, Asahi wrote, that representatives must be chosen competent enough to put the nation back on its feet.

A segment of the Press regarded the Social Democratic Party as the "black sheep" of the Opposition camp for its political fickleness. Yomiuri expressed the opinion that minor parties impeded parliamentary politics and advised the voters to cast their ballots for the major parties only, thus eliminating the "useless" small groups. Sekai Keizai, confirming this opinion, maintained that

unless minor parties whose existence could be justified banded together, the threat of communism would develop into a real menace in Japan. Dai Ichi warned all parties not to make rash campaign promises which could never be harmonized with SCIP's 9-point economic stabilization program.

Emergence of a healthy two-party system of politics, shorn of all antagonism between "reactionary conservatives" and "class-conscious workers" was desired by Nihon Keizai's editorial on December 25, which especially advocated a genuine improvement in "old-fashioned conservatism". At the same time, Tokyo Shimbun, voicing disgust at the partisan bickering preceding the Diet's dissolution, called for an ideal election free from bribery characteristics of previous voting.

Jiji Shimpo also decried the tactics of the Opposition bloc for staving off dissolution of the Diet and thus setting a bad precedent in Diet-Cabinet relations. The editorial cautioned the people not only to vote wisely but to study the records of the Supreme Court judges in order to evaluate their qualifications properly and to dismiss those believed to be incompetent.

The Communist Party organ Akahata on December 27 plugged for a joint Communist-Social Democratic election offensive as the forerunner of "a gigantic struggle for the expansion, strengthening, and bolshevization of the Communist Party." Akahata's editorial on the following day contained an "order" to Communists to fight "resolutely and dauntlessly" for their party, unifying the masses and attacking the "corrupt parties."

3. Prime Minister's Statement on the Election

On the eve of election day, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida urged all voters throughout the nation to vote with a clear understanding and with freedom of judgment. The Prime Minister's statement made on the afternoon of January 22, declared:

"Following the passage of the non-confidence resolution, the Government dissolved the Diet, in conformity with the customary practice under a constitutional form of government, to test the confidence of the people in the Government. Realizing fully the significance of the present election, the people should clarify their political faith with a clear understanding of the future of the political situation and with complete freedom of judgment.

"Needless to say, in view of the importance of the franchise, no one should abstain from voting. Abstention not only means abandonment of an important right and duty, but it will also have a far-reaching effect upon the outcome of the election. It is, therefore, strongly urged that you fulfill your sovereign duties by casting your vote. It is further urged that you do your share in cleaning up political circles by categorically rejecting the buying of votes and other corrupt practices which are bound to cast dark shadows on government.

"The Constitution of Japan is the Constitution of the people. Therefore, only the people should shape the destiny of tomorrow's government by deciding on today's government. I, therefore, earnestly hope that the people, realizing fully this important duty, will conduct a free, fair, and just election, so that a completely stabilized political situation may be created through a House of Representatives which fully reflects the sovereign will of the people and which has their confidence. I firmly believe that by so doing the people will rebuild Japan by accomplishing the nine-point economic stabilization program and thereby justify world confidence in us."

4. Political Platforms

The tendency toward vague generalizations and sweeping promises which has characterized post-war political party platforms, though still in evidence, was somewhat modified. The Democratic Liberals, in a bid to bring all conservative elements under their banner, advocated a responsible single-party government, independent within the scope permitted by the Allied Powers, relaxation of economic controls and a stiffer policy toward labor. The democrats, less definite, were for an early peace conference, economic recovery, balanced state finances and government economy. The Social Democrats also were for an early peace treaty and "racial independence", socialization of basic industries, pro-labor measures and pro-farmer measures. The Communists were for "rigid observance of the Potsdam Declaration and realization of complete national independence", for "democracy" and against fascism, against the enormous budget inviting to the danger of war", and "state management and people's control" of banking and industry, for shorter hours and higher wages to labor, and for better prices to farmers for their crops, but lower prices to consumers. They opposed the introduction of foreign capital and "hunger exports at the sacrifice of independence."

COMPARATIVE PLATFORMS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

JAPANESE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF JANUARY 1949

| | DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL | DEMOCRATIC | SOCIALIST | COMMUNIST | PEOPLES COOPERATIVE | LABOR - F |
|----------------------------|--|---|---|--|---|---|
| <u>Fundamental Policy</u> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Advocacy of liberalism in its true sense; 2. Establishment of a democratic government and of definite rules concerning change of government; 3. Abolition of coalition cabinets, and the establishment of a responsible single-party cabinet; 4. Promotion of independent government within the scope permitted by the Allied Powers | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Readjustment of the national structure and enforcement of official discipline; 2. Acceleration of holding of the peace conference; 3. Concrete application of the 9-point economic principles and realization of economic recovery; 4. Enforcement of administrative readjustments and rationalization to effect high administrative efficiency | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Thorough infusement and application of democracy and adoption of socialism; 2. The abolition of conservative reactionary governments; 3. Establishment of a single-party Socialist cabinet to succeed the current administration; 4. Early realization of a peace treaty and racial independence | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rigid observance of the Potsdam Declaration and realization of complete national independence; 2. Safeguard of democracy and elimination of fascism; 3. Opposition to the enormous budget inviting the danger of war; 4. State management and peoples' control of financial institutions and key industries | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reconstruction of national economy through cooperatives; 2. Purification of political, business and official circles and establishment of an honest government; 3. Preferential encouragement to cultural policies and thorough propagation and realization of democratic government 4. Early realization of the peace conference and participation in UN | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Formation of a democratic people's establishment through democratic government through 2. State ownership of key financial organs 3. Early realization of peace treaty reconstruction 4. Elimination of fascism and international |
| <u>Economic Policy</u> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Broad abolition of economic controls within the extent permitted by the 9-point economic principles; 2. Establishment of the principle of free economy to enable Japanese industries to compete with international level production costs; 3. Readjustment and rationalization of enterprises according to the 3-point economic principles; 4. No new-yen measures in anticipation of the early establishment of a single foreign exchange rate | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Maintenance of sound, balanced State finances and the adoption of financial policies with emphasis on industrial recovery; 2. Seek importation of foreign capital and promotion of export trade; 3. Establishment of strong public confidence in national currency and abstaining from currency revision attempts; 4. Fixation of a single exchange rate without enforcing currency devaluation | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Practice of democratic State control and socialization of basic industries; 2. Establishment of a democratic committee vested with legal authority to draft economic planning; 3. Revision or abolition of present price-fixing policy which ensures unfair profits to monopolistic capital and adjustment of prices in conformity with international commodity price levels; 4. Concrete readjustment of presently inflated currency | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Replacement of bureaucratic control with the control by the people; 2. Lowering of prices of the products of monopolistic capital, and the guarantee of prices of farm and marine products covering production costs; 3. Opposition to imports and hunger exports at the sacrifice of independence; 4. Opposition to the introduction of foreign capital menacing the peace and independence of the nation | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sever vicious circle of rising prices and wages; 2. Prohibition of unrestricted loan extensions by financial institutions, especially by the RFB; 3. Rational readjustment of both central and local taxation system; 4. Rationalization of tax on earned income to realize fair taxation and create elasticity of the source of revenue | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establishment of a national recovery and independence 2. When possible, of national limited foreign 3. Promotion of policies with socialize in finance; 4. Abolition of over goods in production, abolition of transactions of a tax |
| <u>Labor Policy</u> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Encouragement of democratic unions and the elimination of destructive, extreme-leftist unions; 2. Revision of labor laws where necessary, and a 30 percent cut in government employees coming under the General Accounts budget; 3. Readjustment and reconstruction of enterprises on a sound basis, and the adoption of the system of higher wages for higher work efficiency; 4. Establishment of a system of arbitration for labor disputes affecting public utilities and basic industries | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. For simplification, greater efficiency and economy in administration effect a 20 percent reduction in the budget-authorized government employees; 2. Expansion of the unemployment insurance program and establishment of a composite social security system; 3. Establishment of a wage structure based on proficiency; 4. Expansion of dispute conciliation and arbitration organs. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Opposition to business readjustments which protect only the interests of capital and also to administrative adjustments which intend to reduce the national budget; 2. Establishment of a rational, sliding-scale wage system to meet rising commodity prices; 3. Revision of NPSL and elevation of the wage standard; 4. Acquisition of political freedom for state and public employees and school teachers | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Payment of wages sufficient to enable a decent livelihood, and the practice of the 8-hour work day; 2. Opposition to the dismissal of workers through administrative and enterprise readjustments; 3. Opposition to anti-labor revisions of the NPSL and other labor regulations; 4. Full freedom of expression, assembly, association and the right to strike | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Democratization of the union movement and elimination of the fraction activity of extreme leftists; 2. Realization of labor-capital cooperation through participation of labor in management; 3. Adoption of proficiency bonuses to supplement standard wages; 4. Full distribution of daily necessities to workers and securing of real wage through stabilization of commodity prices | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Opposition to rationalization of enterprises 2. Creation of a standard and anti-labor laws; 3. Practice of the day and the night laborers; 4. Technical training at government establishments for the women workers |
| <u>Agricultural Policy</u> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Replace class struggle with class cooperation and effect village peace; 2. Practice of intensive agriculture based on the principle of proper crops most suited to the particular land; 3. Increase of land productivity through greater land improvement and employment of draft animals; 4. Modification of the present government crop delivery system, and adoption of measures to permit free sale of produce upon completion of assigned quota | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Maintain balance between the prices of farm products and those of other commodities; 2. Simplification and unification of production and distribution of fertilizer; 3. Thorough enforcement of the 2nd Farm Land Reform program; 4. Exchange and redivision of farm land and rationalization of farm operations | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Thorough enforcement of a third farmland reform program; 2. Enforcement of river and land improvement at government expense and practice of state control of fertilizer and farm implements industries; 3. Establishment of an agricultural finance program; 4. Establishment of a fair price for rice and revision of the official prices of farm products to conform with the rise in the general price level | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Opposition to unilateral and arbitrary government-set quotas for crop deliveries, and the completion of crop delivery at cost-covering prices; 2. Prohibition of one-sided dissolution of tenancy agreements by landowners, and the practice of control of farm land by farmers; 3. Immediate emancipation of all tenant farms, fields and forests; 4. Opposition to destructive heavy taxation upon agriculture | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Thorough enforcement of the 2nd Farmland Reform Program and creation of model farms; 2. Enactment of laws for the establishment of land improvement associations and industries in farming villages; 3. Elevation of farmland productivity at State expense and the establishment of an emergency plan for reforestation; 4. Establishment of an agricultural rehabilitation bank and expansion of the agricultural cooperative program to check agricultural depressions | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Greater democracy in crop delivery, producers more matter, and full of producers and fishermen 2. Elimination of old time land rationalization; distribution; 3. Increase of land and abolition of tax upon farmers; 4. Reorganization of lines and enlargement of cultural cooperation |
| <u>Cultural Policy</u> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Elimination of narrow-minded nationalism and the establishment of a democratic concept making the Emperor and the people one; 2. Promotion of a true cultural life; 3. Amplification of national education, and the abolition of academic cliques; 4. Encouragement of healthy recreation | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cultivation of the spirit of independence; 2. Cultural promotion in backwoods areas and purification of popular arts; 3. Internationalization of Japanese culture and beautification of national domain; 4. Encouragement of athletic games and elevation of the cultural level of the working people | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Grant budget priorities to educational and cultural appropriations and guarantee minimum appropriations; 2. Open universities to the public and expand the program of scholarships and assistance to deserving students; 3. Supervision over the education committee; 4. Popularization of the UNESCO movement | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Freedom of students' political activities; 2. Opposition to sheer imitation of foreign culture; 3. Guarantee of the livelihood of orphans and widows; 4. Elimination of decadent culture | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establishment of a peaceful nation and promotion of world friendship; 2. Establishment of a school finance program; 3. Thorough enforcement of the new 6-3 compulsory education system; 4. Improve school teachers' salaries and send them to foreign countries for further study | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Equalization of for education entirely at government expense; 2. Emancipation of the family system, scientific development; 3. Creation of progressive 4. Promotion of democratic elements in countries |

COMPARATIVE PLATFORMS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

JAPANESE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF JANUARY 1949

| DEMOCRATIC | SOCIALIST | COMMUNIST | PEOPLES COOPERATIVE | LABOR - FARMER | SOCIAL REFORM |
|---|---|--|---|--|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Readjustment of the national structure and enforcement of official disciplines; 2. Acceleration of holding of the peace conference; 3. Concrete application of the 9-point economic principles and realization of economic recovery; 4. Enforcement of administrative readjustments and rationalization to effect high administrative efficiency | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Thorough infusement and application of democracy and adoption of socialism; 2. The abolition of conservative reactionary governments; 3. Establishment of a single-party Socialist cabinet to succeed the current administration; 4. Early realization of a peace treaty and racial independence | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rigid observance of the Potsdam Declaration and realization of complete national independence; 2. Safeguard of democracy and elimination of fascism; 3. Opposition to the enormous budget inviting the danger of war; 4. State management and peoples' control of financial institutions and key industries | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reconstruction of national economy through cooperatives; 2. Purification of political, business and official circles and establishment of an honest government; 3. Preferential encouragement to cultural policies and thorough propagation and realization of democratic government 4. Early realization of the peace conference and participation in UN | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Formation of a wide democratic peoples' front and establishment of a revolutionary democratic government through peaceful means; 2. State ownership and control of key financial and industrial organs; 3. Early realization of the peace treaty and autonomous reconstruction of the nation; 4. Elimination of militarism and fascism and safeguarding of international peace | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Execution of anti-capitalism, anti-fascism and anti-communism; 2. Enforcement of official discipline and readjustment of governmental organs in local provinces; 3. Sound development of agricultural cooperative unions; 4. Realization of honest political parties and enforcement of the 9-point economic principles |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Maintenance of sound, balanced State finances and the adoption of financial policies with emphasis on industrial recovery; 2. Seek importation of foreign capital and promotion of export trade; 3. Establishment of strong public confidence in national currency and abstaining from currency revision attempts; 4. Fixation of a single exchange rate without enforcing currency devaluation | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Practice of democratic State control and socialization of basic industries; 2. Establishment of a democratic committee vested with legal authority to draft economic planning; 3. Revision or abolition of present price-fixing policy which ensures unfair profits to monopolistic capital and adjustment of prices in conformity with international commodity price levels; 4. Concrete readjustment of presently inflated currency | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Replacement of bureaucratic control with the control by the people; 2. Lowering of prices of the products of monopolistic capital, and the guarantee of prices of farm and marine products covering production costs; 3. Opposition to imports and hunger exports at the sacrifice of independence; 4. Opposition to the introduction of foreign capital menacing the peace and independence of the nation | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sever vicious circle of rising prices and wages; 2. Prohibition of unrestricted loan extensions by financial institutions, especially by the RFB; 3. Rational readjustment of both central and local taxation system; 4. Rationalization of tax on earned income to realize fair taxation and create elasticity of the source of revenue | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establishment of a rehabilitation program of self-help recovery and not entire dependence upon foreign aid; 2. When possible, effect balance of national economy with limited foreign aid; 3. Promotion of socialistic policies with which to socialize industries and finance; 4. Abolition of official controls over goods in abundant production, abolition of the Transactions Tax and creation of a tax on bank checks | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Curtailment of unproductive expenditures and greater emphasis on productive expenditures; 2. Reconstruction and stabilization of independent economy; 3. Creation of a currency stabilization fund and establishment of long term credit; 4. Creation of a democratic control committee to supervise financial organs |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. For simplification, greater efficiency and economy in administration effect a 20 percent reduction in the budget-authorized government employees; 2. Expansion of the unemployment insurance program and establishment of a composite social security system; 3. Establishment of a wage structure based on proficiency; 4. Expansion of dispute conciliation and arbitration organs. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Opposition to business readjustments which protect only the interests of capital and also to administrative adjustments which intend to reduce the national budget; 2. Establishment of a rational, sliding-scale wage system to meet rising commodity prices; 3. Revision of NPSL and elevation of the wage standard; 4. Acquisition of political freedom for state and public employees and school teachers | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Payment of wages sufficient to enable a decent livelihood, and the practice of the 8-hour work day; 2. Opposition to the dismissal of workers through administrative and enterprise readjustments; 3. Opposition to anti-labor revisions of the NPSL and other labor regulations; 4. Full freedom of expression, assembly, association and the right to strike | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Democratization of the union movement and elimination of the fraction activity of extreme leftists; 2. Realization of labor-capital cooperation through participation of labor in management; 3. Adoption of proficiency bonuses to supplement standard wages; 4. Full distribution of daily necessities to workers and securing of real wage through stabilization of commodity prices | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Opposition to pro-capital rationalization and readjustment of enterprises; 2. Creation of a minimum wage standard and opposition to anti-labor revisions of the labor laws; 3. Practice of the 8-hour working day and the protection of laborers; 4. Technical training for youths at government expense, and the establishment of facilities for the protection of women workers | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establishment of a minimum wage standard; 2. Adoption of a quarterly-sliding wage scale; 3. Absorption of employment into export industries; 4. Establishment of a social insurance program and an unemployment relief program |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Maintain balance between the prices of farm products and those of other commodities; 2. Simplification and unification of production and distribution of fertilizer; 3. Thorough enforcement of the 2nd Farm Land Reform program; 4. Exchange and redivision of farm land and rationalization of farm operations | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Thorough enforcement of a third farmland reform program; 2. Enforcement of river and land improvement at government expense and practice of state control of fertilizer and farm implements industries; 3. Establishment of an agricultural finance program; 4. Establishment of a fair price for rice and revision of the official prices of farm products to conform with the rise in the general price level | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Opposition to unilateral and arbitrary government-set quotas for crop deliveries, and the completion of crop delivery at cost-covering prices; 2. Prohibition of one-sided dissolution of tenancy agreements by landowners, and the practice of control of farm land by farmers; 3. Immediate emancipation of all tenant farms, fields and forests; 4. Opposition to destructive heavy taxation upon agriculture | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Thorough enforcement of the 2nd Farmland Reform Program and creation of model farms; 2. Enactment of laws for the establishment of land improvement associations and industries in farming villages; 3. Elevation of farmland productivity at State expense and the establishment of an emergency plan for reforestation; 4. Establishment of an agricultural rehabilitation bank and expansion of the agricultural cooperative program to check agricultural depressions | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Greater democratization of crop delivery system to give producers more voice in this matter, and full distribution of producers goods to farmers and fishermen; 2. Elimination of the influence of old time landowners and rationalization of land distribution; 3. Increase of loans to farmers and abolition of undue taxation upon farmers and fishermen; 4. Reorganization along democratic lines and enlargement of agricultural cooperative unions | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A national re-study of the rice price; 2. Establishment of a producer-operated system of crop delivery; 3. Expansion of the program of distribution of agricultural implements in proportion to crop delivered; 4. Expand agricultural public works projects program |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cultivation of the spirit of independence; 2. Cultural promotion in backwoods areas and purification of popular arts; 3. Internationalization of Japanese culture and beautification of national domain; 4. Encouragement of athletic games and elevation of the cultural level of the working people | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Grant budget priorities to educational and cultural appropriations and guarantee minimum appropriations; 2. Open universities to the public and expand the program of scholarships and assistance to deserving students; 3. Supervision over the education committee; 4. Popularization of the UNESCO movement | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Freedom of students' political activities; 2. Opposition to sheer imitation of foreign culture; 3. Guarantee of the livelihood of orphans and widows; 4. Elimination of decadent culture | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establishment of a peaceful nation and promotion of world friendship; 2. Establishment of a school finance program; 3. Thorough enforcement of the new 6-3 compulsory education system; 4. Improve school teachers' salaries and send them to foreign countries for further study | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Equalization of opportunity for education and education entirely at government expense; 2. Emancipation of women through abolition of the feudalistic family system, and more scientific daily life; 3. Creation of progressive culture; 4. Promotion of cooperation with democratic elements in foreign countries | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Thorough enforcement of the new 6-3 school system at government expense; 2. Increase and expansion of educational facilities; 3. Participation in international peace-promotion organization; 4. Full enforcement of democratic education program for women |

F. Election Statistics1. Summary of Results

a. Population. According to the ration census announced on August 1, 1948, the population of Japan was as follows:

| | |
|--------|-------------------|
| Male | 39,365,452 |
| Female | <u>40,851,444</u> |
| Total | 80,216,896 |

b. Voting Age. The voting age figures (20 years and over) were given as follows:

| | |
|--------|-------------------|
| Male | 21,046,824 |
| Female | <u>22,941,823</u> |
| Total | 43,988,647 |

c. Registered Voters. According to figures of the National Election Management Commission, the registered voters in Japan on January 23, 1949 totalled 42,090,916, divided as follows:

| | |
|--------|-------------------|
| Male | 20,054,142 |
| Female | <u>22,036,774</u> |
| Total | 42,090,916 |

d. Number of Candidates. The number of candidates registered by the various political parties, according to the National Election Management Commission, follows:

| | |
|----------------------------|--------------|
| Democratic Liberal Party | 416 |
| Democratic Party | 212 |
| Social Democratic Party | 186 |
| People's Cooperative Party | 63 |
| Social Renovation Party | 30 |
| New Liberal Party | 12 |
| Japan Farmer's Party | 16 |
| Farmer-Labor Party | 45 |
| Communist Party | 115 |
| Independent | 211 |
| Minor Parties | 58 |
| Total | <u>1,364</u> |

e. Total Votes Cast. At the close of the polls at 1800 hours on January 23, 1949, a total of 31,168,625 votes had been cast in the general election for members of the House of Representatives. This represented a turn-out of 74.1 percent of the total of 42,090,916 registered voters.

The highest voting participation by prefecture was 89.9 percent in Shimane Prefecture; the lowest voting participation by prefecture occurred in Tokyo with 61.6 percent.

The highest voting participation of townships was 99.8 percent in Kuranimura in Shizuoka Prefecture. In the 1947 election, the highest voting participation of townships was 93.8 percent in Iwatsunachi in Aichi Prefecture.

f. Comparative Percentages of Participation and Abstention.

| | <u>Participation</u> | | |
|--------|----------------------|-------------|-------------|
| | <u>1946</u> | <u>1947</u> | <u>1949</u> |
| Male | 78.6 | 74.9 | 80.7 |
| Female | <u>67.0</u> | <u>61.6</u> | <u>68.0</u> |
| Total | 72.1 | 67.9 | 74.1 |

| | <u>Abstention</u> | | |
|--------|-------------------|-------------|-------------|
| | <u>1946</u> | <u>1947</u> | <u>1949</u> |
| Male | 21.4 | 25.1 | 19.3 |
| Female | <u>33.0</u> | <u>38.4</u> | <u>32.0</u> |
| Total | 27.9 | 32.1 | 25.9 |

g. Parties in the Diet. Tabulated according to political parties, final election results were as follows:

| <u>Party</u> | <u>Vote</u> | <u>Percent of Total</u> | <u>Number Elected</u> | <u>Percent of Total</u> |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Democratic Liberal | 13,381,610 | 43.8 | 264 | 56.7 |
| Democratic | 4,835,504 | 15.8 | 68 | 14.6 |
| Social Democratic | 4,129,724 | 13.5 | 49 | 10.5 |
| Communist | 2,984,583 | 9.6 | 35 | 7.5 |
| People's Cooperatives | 1,042,123 | 3.4 | 14 | 3.0 |
| Labor-Farmer | 606,744 | 2.0 | 7 | 1.5 |
| Social Renovation | 387,214 | 1.3 | 5 | 1.1 |
| New Liberal | 187,208 | 0.6 | 2 | 0.4 |
| Japan Farmer | 232,833 | 0.8 | 1 | 0.2 |
| Minor Parties | 795,308 | 2.6 | 9 | 1.9 |
| Independents | <u>2,007,328</u> | <u>6.6</u> | <u>12</u> | <u>2.6</u> |
| Totals | 30,590,179* | 100.0 | 466 | 100.0 |
| | 578,446** | 1.9 | | |
| | <u>31,168,625</u> | | | |

*Valid Votes

** Invalid Votes

h. Composition of the New House of Representatives.

(1) New Faces in the Diet. One hundred and ninety-two of the members of the House of Representatives are "new faces" elected for the first time; 243 were reelected, and 31 were members of former Diets. Following is tabulation by party:

| <u>Party</u> | <u>New</u> | <u>Re-elected</u> | <u>Former</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-----------------------|------------|-------------------|---------------|--------------|
| Democratic Liberal | 121 | 125 | 18 | 264 |
| Democratic | 23 | 39 | 6 | 68 |
| Social Democratic | 6 | 40 | 3 | 49 |
| Communist | 28 | 4 | 3 | 35 |
| People's Cooperatives | 0 | 14 | 0 | 14 |
| Labor-Farmer | 0 | 7 | 0 | 7 |
| Social Renovation | 1 | 4 | 0 | 5 |
| New Liberal | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Minor Parties | 2 | 7 | 1 | 10 |
| Independents | 11 | 1 | 0 | 12 |
| Totals | 192 | 243 | 31 | 466 |

(2) Women. A total of 44 women candidates ran for seats in the House of Representatives; of these 12 women were successful. (Fifteen women were elected in 1947).

(a) Women Candidates according to political parties:

| | |
|-----------------------|----|
| Democratic Liberals | 5 |
| Democrats | 8 |
| Social Democrats | 9 |
| Communists | 3 |
| People's Cooperatives | 1 |
| Social Renovation | 1 |
| New Liberal | 0 |
| Japan-Farmer | 0 |
| Labor-Farmer | 1 |
| Independents | 14 |
| Minor Parties | 2 |
| Total | 44 |

(b) Women elected according to parties:

| | |
|---------------------|----|
| Democratic Liberals | 2 |
| Social Democrats | 5 |
| Communists | 3 |
| Social Renovation | 1 |
| Labor-Farmer | 1 |
| Total | 12 |

(3) Distribution of House of Representatives according to Occupation:

| | |
|--------------------------------|-----|
| Government officials | 16 |
| Educators | 16 |
| Religious | 5 |
| Commerce | 14 |
| Industry & Mining | 19 |
| Agriculture & Forestry | 50 |
| Fisheries | 11 |
| Attorneys & Public Accountants | 51 |
| Physicians | 5 |
| Writers | 29 |
| Company Employees | 152 |
| Journalists | 5 |
| Miscellaneous | 49 |
| Without known occupation | 44 |
| Total | 466 |

(4) Distribution of members of the House of Representatives according to age.

| <u>Age Group</u> | <u>Number</u> |
|------------------|---------------|
| 25 - 29 | 1 |
| 30 - 39 | 59 |
| 40 - 49 | 177 |
| 50 - 59 | 160 |
| 60 - 69 | 59 |
| 70 - | 10 |
| Total | <u>466</u> |

i. Eminent Political Personalities Who Failed in the 1949 Election.

| | | |
|------------------------|--------------------|--|
| Sadayoshi Hitotsumatsu | Democrat | (Former Welfare Minister) |
| Tetsu Katayama | Social Democrat | (Former Prime Minister) |
| Kanju Kato | Social Democrat | (Former Labor Minister) |
| Shizue Kato | Social Democrat | (Noted Feminist Leader) |
| Tetsuo Kudo | Democratic Liberal | (Former State Minister) |
| Kazuo Nagae | Social Democrat | (Former Agriculture and Forestry Minister) |
| Wataru Narahashi | Democrat | (Former Chief Cabinet Secretary) |
| Suehiro Nishio | Social Democrat | (Former State Minister) |
| Kazuo Nomizo | Social Democrat | (Former Agriculture and Forestry Minister) |
| Giichi Takeda | Democrat | (Former Welfare Minister) |
| Eiji Tomiyoshi | Democrat | (Former Communications Minister) |
| Haruye Yamashita | Democrat | (Involved in "Izumiyama Incident") |

j. Runners-Up (According to Parties).

| <u>Party</u> | <u>Number</u> |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------|
| Democratic Liberals | 28 |
| Democrats | 26 |
| Social Democrats | 32 |
| Communists | 10 |
| Farmer-Labor | 2 |
| People's Cooperatives | 2 |
| Japan Farmer | 2 |
| New Liberals | 3 |
| Independents | 8 |
| Minor Parties | 4 |
| Total | <u>117</u> (Election Districts) |

2. Comparative Statistics

COMPARISON OF ELECTIONS FOR HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN JAPAN - APRIL 1946; APRIL 1947; JANUARY 1949

| 1949 | | | 1947 | | | 1946 | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|-------------------------|---|--|
| 1. TYPE OF VOTING - Single Ballot System. | | | 1. TYPE OF VOTING - Single Ballot System. | | | 1. TYPE OF VOTING - Res | | |
| 2. SIZE OF ELECTION DISTRICTS - Medium | | | 2. SIZE OF ELECTION DISTRICTS - MEDIUM | | | 2. SIZE OF ELECTION DI | | |
| 3. NUMBER OF ELECTION DISTRICTS - Total of 117 in Japan. | | | 3. NUMBER OF ELECTION DISTRICTS - Total of 117 in Japan. | | | 3. NUMBER OF ELECTION | | |
| 4. REGISTERED VOTERS - | MALE - 20,054,142 FEMALE - 22,036,774 TOTAL - 42,090,916 | | 4. REGISTERED VOTERS - | MALE - 19,569,839 FEMALE - 21,326,483 TOTAL - 40,896,322 | | 4. REGISTERED VOTERS - | | |
| 5. TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTES CAST - | MALE - 16,192,775 FEMALE - 14,975,850 TOTAL - 31,168,625 | | 5. TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTES CAST - | MALE - 14,658,264 FEMALE - 13,139,620 TOTAL - 27,797,884 | | 5. TOTAL NUMBER OF VOT | MALE - 12,77 FEMALE - 13,78 TOTAL - 26,55 | |
| 6. AVERAGE ABSTENTION RATE - | MALE - 19.3 FEMALE - 32.0 TOTAL - 25.9 | | 6. AVERAGE ABSTENTION RATE - | MALE - 25.1 FEMALE - 38.4 TOTAL - 32.1 | | 6. AVERAGE ABSTENTION | MALE - 21.4 FEMALE - 33.0 TOTAL - 27.9 | |
| 7. TOTAL NUMBER OF ABSTAINERS - 10,922,291 | | | 7. TOTAL NUMBER OF ABSTAINERS - 13,098,438 | | | 7. TOTAL NUMBER OF ABS | | |
| 8. TOTAL NUMBER OF INVALID VOTES CAST - 578,446 | | | 8. TOTAL NUMBER OF INVALID VOTES CAST - 435,273 | | | 8. TOTAL NUMBER OF INV | | |
| 9. TOTAL NUMBER OF CANDIDATES - | | | 9. TOTAL NUMBER OF CANDIDATES - | | | 9. TOTAL NUMBER OF CAN | | |
| | PARTY NUMBER ELECTED | | | PARTY NUMBER ELECTED | | | PARTY | |
| DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL | 416 264 | | LIBERAL | 326 131 | | LIBERAL | | |
| DEMOCRAT | 212 68 | | DEMOCRAT | 350 121 | | PROGRESSIVE | | |
| SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | 186 49 | | SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | 289 143 | | SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | | |
| PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE | 63 14 | | PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE | 108 29 | | COOPERATIVE DEMOCRA | | |
| COMMUNIST | 115 35 | | COMMUNIST | 120 4 | | COMMUNIST | | |
| SOCIAL RENOVATION | 30 5 | | MINOR PARTIES | 155 25 | | MINOR PARTIES | | |
| NEW LIBERAL | 12 2 | | INDEPENDENTS | 242 13 | | INDEPENDENTS | | |
| JAPAN FARMER | 16 1 | | TOTAL | 1,590 466 | | TOTAL | | |
| FARMER - LABOR | 45 7 | | | | | | | |
| MINOR PARTIES | 58 9 | | | | | | | |
| INDEPENDENTS | 211 12 | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL | 1,364 466 | | | | | | | |
| 10. TOTAL NUMBER OF CANDIDATES - FEMALE ELECTED | | | 10. TOTAL NUMBER OF CANDIDATES - FEMALE ELECTED | | | 10. TOTAL NUMBER OF CA | | |
| DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL | 5 2 | | LIBERAL | 9 3 | | LIBERAL | | |
| DEMOCRAT | 8 0 | | DEMOCRAT | 22 3 | | PROGRESSIVE | | |
| SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | 9 5 | | SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | 15 9 | | SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | | |
| PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE | 1 0 | | PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE | 4 0 | | COOPERATIVE DEMOCR | | |
| COMMUNIST | 3 3 | | COMMUNIST | 8 0 | | COMMUNIST | | |
| SOCIAL RENOVATION | 1 1 | | MINOR PARTIES | 4 0 | | MINOR PARTIES | | |
| NEW LIBERAL | 0 0 | | INDEPENDENTS | 22 0 | | INDEPENDENTS | | |
| JAPAN FARMER | 0 0 | | TOTAL | 84 15 | | TOTAL | | |
| FARMER - LABOR | 1 1 | | | | | | | |
| MINOR PARTIES | 2 0 | | | | | | | |
| INDEPENDENTS | 14 0 | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL | 44 12 | | | | | | | |
| 11. COMPOSITION OF DIET AS RESULT OF JANUARY 1949 ELECTION | | | 11. COMPOSITION OF DIET AS RESULT OF APRIL 1947 ELECTION | | | 11. COMPOSITION OF DIET | | |
| | ELECTED FOR PREVIOUS FORMER | | | ELECTED FOR PREVIOUS FORMER | | | | |
| | FIRST TIME DIET DIETS | | | FIRST TIME DIET DIETS | | | | |
| DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL | 121 125 18 | | LIBERAL | 56 69 1 | | LIBERAL | | |
| DEMOCRAT | 23 39 6 | | DEMOCRAT | 64 66 3 | | PROGRESSIVE | | |
| SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | 6 40 3 | | SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | 73 70 3 | | SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | | |
| PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE | 0 14 0 | | PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE | 7 24 | | COOPERATIVE DEMOC | | |
| COMMUNIST | 28 4 3 | | COMMUNIST | 2 2 | | COMMUNIST | | |
| SOCIAL RENOVATION | 1 4 0 | | MINOR PARTIES | 14 3 | | MINOR PARTIES | | |
| NEW LIBERAL | 0 2 0 | | INDEPENDENTS | 6 6 | | INDEPENDENTS | | |
| JAPAN FARMER | 0 1 0 | | TOTAL | 222 237 7 | | TOTAL | | |
| FARMER LABOR | 0 7 0 | | | | | | | |
| MINOR PARTIES | 2 6 1 | | | | | | | |
| INDEPENDENTS | 11 1 0 | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL | 192 243 31 | | | | | | | |
| * Of the 16 original Japan Farmer Party candidates, only one ran on the Japan Farmer Party ticket. All others ran as minor party candidates (New Japan Farmers' Party which was formed by 15 candidates). | | | | | | | | |
| 12. VOTES AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VALID VOTE RECEIVED BY PARTIES - | | | 12. VOTES AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VALID VOTE RECEIVED BY PARTIES - | | | 12. VOTES AND PERCENT | | |
| | VOTES REC'D PERCENT | | | VOTES REC'D PERCENT | | | | |
| DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL | 13,381,610 43.8 | | LIBERAL | 7,295,242 26.7 | | LIBERAL | | |
| DEMOCRAT | 4,835,504 15.8 | | DEMOCRAT | 6,857,480 25.1 | | PROGRESSIVE | | |
| SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | 4,129,724 13.5 | | SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | 7,168,888 26.2 | | SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | | |
| PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE | 1,042,123 3.4 | | PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE | 1,862,753 6.8 | | COOPERATIVE DEMOC | | |
| COMMUNIST | 2,984,583 9.6 | | COMMUNIST | 1,002,883 3.7 | | COMMUNIST | | |
| LABOR FARMER | 606,744 2.0 | | MINOR PARTIES | 1,561,070 5.7 | | MINOR PARTIES | | |
| SOCIAL RENOVATION | 387,214 1.3 | | INDEPENDENTS | 1,614,295 5.8 | | INDEPENDENTS | | |
| NEW LIBERAL | 187,208 .6 | | TOTAL | 27,362,611* 100.0 | | TOTAL | | |
| JAPAN FARMER | 232,833 .8 | | | | | | | |
| MINOR PARTIES | 795,308 2.6 | | | | | | | |
| INDEPENDENTS | 2,007,328 6.6 | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL | 30,590,179* 100.0 | | | | | | | |
| *This figure does not include 578,446 invalid votes. | | | *This figure does not include 435,273 invalid votes. | | | *Plural vote figur | | |
| | | | | | | received - not | | |

COMPARISON OF ELECTIONS FOR HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN JAPAN - APRIL 1946; APRIL 1947; JANUARY 1949

1947

1946

Ballot System.
- Medium
- Total of 117 in Japan.
MALE - 20,054,142
FEMALE - 22,036,774
TOTAL - 42,090,916

10,922,291
VOTES CAST - 578,446

| ELECTED |
|---------|
| 264 |
| 68 |
| 49 |
| 14 |
| 35 |
| 5 |
| 2 |
| 1 |
| 7 |
| 9 |
| 12 |
| 466 |

| FEMALE | ELECTED |
|--------|---------|
| 5 | 2 |
| 8 | 0 |
| 9 | 5 |
| 1 | 0 |
| 3 | 3 |
| 1 | 1 |
| 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 |
| 1 | 1 |
| 2 | 0 |
| 14 | 0 |
| 44 | 12 |

OF JANUARY 1949 ELECTION

| PREVIOUS DIET | FORMER DIETS |
|---------------|--------------|
| 125 | 18 |
| 39 | 6 |
| 40 | 3 |
| 14 | 0 |
| 4 | 3 |
| 4 | 0 |
| 2 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 |
| 7 | 0 |
| 6 | 1 |
| 1 | 0 |
| 243 | 31 |

Former Party candidates, only
Party ticket. All others
(New Japan Farmers' Party
candidates).

VALID VOTE

| REC'D | PERCENT |
|---------|---------|
| 21,610 | 43.8 |
| 25,504 | 15.8 |
| 29,724 | 13.5 |
| 22,123 | 3.4 |
| 24,583 | 9.6 |
| 25,744 | 2.0 |
| 27,214 | 1.3 |
| 27,208 | .6 |
| 28,833 | .8 |
| 25,308 | 2.6 |
| 27,328 | 6.6 |
| 20,179* | 100.0 |

28,446 invalid votes.

1. TYPE OF VOTING - Single Ballot System.
2. SIZE OF ELECTION DISTRICTS - MEDIUM
3. NUMBER OF ELECTION DISTRICTS - Total of 117 in Japan.
4. REGISTERED VOTERS -
MALE - 19,569,839
FEMALE - 21,326,483
TOTAL - 40,896,322
5. TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTES CAST -
MALE - 14,658,264
FEMALE - 13,139,620
TOTAL - 27,797,884
6. AVERAGE ABSTENTION RATE -
MALE - 25.1
FEMALE - 38.4
TOTAL - 32.1

7. TOTAL NUMBER OF ABSTAINERS - 13,098,438
 8. TOTAL NUMBER OF INVALID VOTES CAST - 435,273
 9. TOTAL NUMBER OF CANDIDATES -
- | PARTY | NUMBER | ELECTED |
|----------------------|--------|---------|
| LIBERAL | 326 | 131 |
| DEMOCRAT | 350 | 121 |
| SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | 289 | 143 |
| PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE | 108 | 29 |
| COMMUNIST | 120 | 4 |
| MINOR PARTIES | 155 | 25 |
| INDEPENDENTS | 242 | 13 |
| TOTAL | 1,590 | 466 |

10. TOTAL NUMBER OF CANDIDATES -
- | PARTY | FEMALE | ELECTED |
|----------------------|--------|---------|
| LIBERAL | 9 | 3 |
| DEMOCRAT | 22 | 3 |
| SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | 15 | 9 |
| PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE | 4 | 0 |
| COMMUNIST | 8 | 0 |
| MINOR PARTIES | 4 | 0 |
| INDEPENDENTS | 22 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 84 | 15 |

11. COMPOSITION OF DIET AS RESULT OF APRIL 1947 ELECTION
- | PARTY | ELECTED FOR FIRST TIME | PREVIOUS DIET | FORMER DIETS |
|----------------------|------------------------|---------------|--------------|
| LIBERAL | 56 | 69 | 1 |
| DEMOCRAT | 64 | 66 | 3 |
| SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | 73 | 70 | 3 |
| PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE | 7 | 24 | |
| COMMUNIST | 2 | 2 | |
| MINOR PARTIES | 14 | 3 | |
| INDEPENDENTS | 6 | 6 | |
| TOTAL | 222 | 237 | 7 |

12. VOTES AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VALID VOTE RECEIVED BY PARTIES -
- | PARTY | VOTES REC'D | PERCENT |
|----------------------|-------------|---------|
| LIBERAL | 7,295,242 | 26.7 |
| DEMOCRAT | 6,857,480 | 25.1 |
| SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | 7,168,888 | 26.2 |
| PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE | 1,862,753 | 6.8 |
| COMMUNIST | 1,002,883 | 3.7 |
| MINOR PARTIES | 1,561,070 | 5.7 |
| INDEPENDENTS | 1,614,295 | 5.8 |
| TOTAL | 27,362,611* | 100.0 |

*This figure does not include 435,273 invalid votes.

1. TYPE OF VOTING - Restricted Plural Voting System (two to three votes permitted each elector)
2. SIZE OF ELECTION DISTRICTS - Large
3. NUMBER OF ELECTION DISTRICTS - Total 53 in Japan.
4. REGISTERED VOTERS -
MALE - 16,278,926
FEMALE - 20,557,564
TOTAL - 36,836,490
5. TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTES CAST -
MALE - 12,778,242
FEMALE - 13,780,369
TOTAL - 26,558,611
6. AVERAGE ABSTENTION RATE -
MALE - 21.4
FEMALE - 33.0
TOTAL - 27.9

7. TOTAL NUMBER OF ABSTAINERS - 10,277,879
 8. TOTAL NUMBER OF INVALID VOTES CAST - 460,000
 9. TOTAL NUMBER OF CANDIDATES -
- | PARTY | NUMBER | ELECTED |
|----------------------|--------|---------|
| LIBERAL | 485 | 140 |
| PROGRESSIVE | 376 | 94 |
| SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | 331 | 92 |
| COOPERATIVE DEMOCRAT | 92 | 14 |
| COMMUNIST | 143 | 5 |
| MINOR PARTIES | 570 | 38 |
| INDEPENDENTS | 773 | 81 |
| TOTAL | 2,770 | 464 |
- (vacant) 2
466

10. TOTAL NUMBER OF CANDIDATES -
- | PARTY | FEMALE | ELECTED |
|----------------------|--------|---------|
| LIBERAL | 5 | 5 |
| PROGRESSIVE | 7 | 6 |
| SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | 9 | 8 |
| COOPERATIVE DEMOCRAT | 2 | 0 |
| COMMUNIST | 5 | 1 |
| MINOR PARTIES | 20 | 9 |
| INDEPENDENTS | 23 | 10 |
| TOTAL | 71 | 39 |

11. COMPOSITION OF DIET AS RESULT OF APRIL 1946 ELECTION
- | PARTY | ELECTED FOR FIRST TIME | PREVIOUS DIET | FORMER DIETS |
|----------------------|------------------------|---------------|--------------|
| LIBERAL | 102 | 14 | 23 |
| PROGRESSIVE | 70 | 13 | 10 |
| SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | 70 | 7 | 15 |
| COOPERATIVE DEMOCRAT | 13 | 0 | 1 |
| COMMUNIST | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| MINOR PARTIES | 37 | 0 | 1 |
| INDEPENDENTS | 78 | 4 | 1 |
| TOTAL | 375 | 38 | 51 |

12. VOTES AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VALID VOTE RECEIVED BY PARTIES -
- | PARTY | VOTES REC'D | PERCENT |
|----------------------|-------------|---------|
| LIBERAL | 13,505,746 | 24.4 |
| PROGRESSIVE | 10,350,530 | 18.7 |
| SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | 9,858,408 | 17.8 |
| COOPERATIVE DEMOCRAT | 1,799,764 | 3.2 |
| COMMUNIST | 2,135,757 | 3.8 |
| MINOR PARTIES | 6,473,272 | 11.7 |
| INDEPENDENTS | 11,325,402 | 20.4 |
| TOTAL | 55,448,879* | 100.0 |

*Plural vote figures above indicate actual votes received - not "voters"

3. Election Law Violations

A total of 1,895 cases of violation of election laws occurred in the election of 1949. This figure compares favorably with the figures reported for the previous two elections: 2,632 in 1946, and 2,997 in 1947 (five separate elections, national and local). In this connection, it is significant to point out that charges advanced by the Press, the candidates, the parties, and the general public concerning improper voting were insignificant; and no charges were made from any source concerning improper counting of votes.

According to figures submitted by the National Election Management Commission on January 27, the violations included the following:

| | <u>Number of Violations</u> | <u>Cases Prosecuted</u> |
|--|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Eribing | 228 | 1 |
| Campaigning before announcing candidacy | 100 | 7 |
| House to house canvassing | 414 | 1 |
| Obstruction of election | 87 | |
| Violations concerning voting | 4 | |
| Disturbing election - carrying weapons | 35 | |
| Violation of prohibition to make use of school children | 9 | |
| Speech making and speech meeting violations | 113 | |
| Violations concerning restrictions on distribution of pamphlets, posters, and pictures | 719 | |
| Unlawful contributions and expenditures | 19 | |
| Violation of Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 (January 4, 1947: political activities by purgees) | 11 | |
| Others | <u>156</u> | |
| Total | 1,895 | |

A breakdown of violations according to political parties and individuals involved is as follows:

| <u>Party</u> | <u>Individuals Violating the Law</u> |
|-----------------------|--|
| Democratic Liberals | 915 |
| Democrats | 398 |
| Social Democrats | 260 |
| People's Cooperatives | 73 |
| Communists | 311 |
| Independents | 203 |
| Minor Parties | 129 |
| Others | <u>334</u> |
| Total | 2,623 |

A total of 354 cases of violations were reported for Tokyo, as follows:

| <u>Violation</u> | <u>Number Of Cases</u> |
|--|----------------------------|
| Bribing | 111 |
| Campaigning before announcing candidacy | 10 |
| House to house canvassing | 155 |
| Obstruction of election | 27 |
| Violation of restrictions on distribution of pamphlets, posters, and pictures | 35 |
| Speech making and speech meeting violations | 6 |
| Violation of Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 (political activities by purgees) | 1 |
| Others | <u>9</u> |
| Total | 354 |

Distributed according to political parties and individuals involved:

| <u>Party</u> | <u>Individuals Violating the Laws</u> |
|-----------------------|---|
| Democratic Liberals | 273 |
| Democrats | 123 |
| Social Democrats | 39 |
| People's Cooperatives | 20 |
| Communists | 31 |
| Independents | 55 |
| Minor Parties | 1 |
| Others | <u>23</u> |
| Total | 569 |

PART II

REFERENDUM ON THE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT

A. Introductory Statement

The new Constitution of Japan was promulgated on November 3, 1946 and became effective six months later on May 3, 1947. The general election of members of the House of Representatives held on January 23, 1949, although the third such election since the beginning of the Occupation, was the first to be held under the new Constitution. It was also the first such election to be held following the appointment on August 4, 1947 of the judges of the Supreme Court under the new Constitution. Consequently, under Article 79 of the Constitution the people were given their first opportunity to review the appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court.

The pertinent provisions of Article 79 read as follows:

"The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Judge and such number of judges as may be determined by law; all such judges excepting the Chief Judge shall be appointed by the Cabinet.

"The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be reviewed by the people at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives following their appointment, and shall be reviewed again at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives after a lapse of ten (10) years, and in the same manner thereafter.

"In cases mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, when the majority of the voters favor the dismissal of a judge, he shall be dismissed.

"Matters pertaining to review shall be prescribed by law."

B. Legal Provisions

The manner in which the review of the appointment of Supreme Court judges is to be conducted is specified in the Law of the People's Examination of Supreme Court Judges, enacted by the Japanese National Diet on November 20, 1947.

Prior to the referendum, the law requires issuance and posting of an Official Examination Bulletin containing the name, date of birth, and personal history of the judge to be voted upon, the main cases in which he has participated and his expressed opinions in such cases. This information is designed to afford the voters an opportunity to evaluate the quality of each judge and to decide whether to vote for or against retention in office. If the majority of the voters indicate a desire to dismiss a judge from office he will be removed and cannot be again appointed to the Supreme Court until five years thereafter. On the other hand, a majority vote for retention will confirm an appointment.

While the Law places no restriction on a judge prohibiting him to campaign for himself or on behalf of his colleagues and to exercise his right to vote, he may not engage in certain other specified activities. Article 52 of the

Court Organization Law (Law No. 59 of 1947) specifies that judges, while in office, shall not do any of the following acts:

"(1) To become members of the Diet or of assemblies of local public entities actively in political movements;

"(2) To hold another salaried position without obtaining the permission of the Supreme Court.

"(3) To carry on any commercial business or a business which aims at pecuniary gain."

The Law of the People's Examination of the Supreme Court Judges, in Articles 44-49, provides stringent penalties for all possible violations of the law. These offenses include direct evasions or inducing others to evade the provisions of the law, illicit canvassing, bribery, intimidation, abduction, neglect of duty or abuse of authority by officials, publication of false matters, and the like. Penalties are provided for such offenses, ranging from two to four years' imprisonment and fines of ¥10,000 - ¥30,000.

C. Referendum Procedure

In the process of discussing the form of ballot to be used in the referendum, the Judicial Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives realized that because of the large number of judges to be voted upon at one time (the number may be as high as fifteen; in the 1949 referendum the number of judges reviewed was fourteen, because there was one vacancy on the Court), a requirement that each ballot have correctly written thereon the name of each judge in the voter's own handwriting would place an undue burden on the voter and probably result in an excessive number of invalid votes. Accordingly, after considering several proposals, the Committee decided to adopt a simple form of printed ballot which would have a number of divided columns, one for each judge subject to review.

On this ballot the names of the judges were printed in the lower parts of the columns, and the voter was required simply to mark an "X" in the column over the name of any judge whose dismissal he considered desirable, and leave blank the column over the names of those judges he wished to remain on the bench.

This form of voting, entirely new to the voters of Japan, places upon their shoulders the responsibility for determining the quality of the men who administer the third branch of government.

BALLOT FOR REVIEW OF SUPREME COURT JUDGES

| COLUMNS FOR MARKING | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------|----------|---------|--------|------------|-----------|---------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|---------|---------|-------------|------------------|
| (Sawada) | (Fujita) | (Shima) | (Mano) | (Kawamura) | (Mibuchi) | (Inoue) | (Hasegawa) | (Kuriyama) | (Tsukazaki) | (Iwamatsu) | (Saito) | (Otani) | (Shimoyama) | X 書 く 欄 |
| 澤田竹治郎 | 藤田八郎 | 島野保毅 | 眞野 | 河村又介 | 三浦忠彦 | 井上登 | 長谷川太一郎 | 栗山茂 | 塚崎直義 | 岩松三郎 | 齋藤悠輔 | 小谷勝重 | 霜山精一 | 裁判官の名 |

* 注意

一、やめさせた方がよいと思う裁判官については、その名の上の欄にXを書くこと。
 二、やめさせなくてよいと思う裁判官については、何も書かないこと。

***TRANSLATION:**

Place an "X" mark above the name of the Judges who you think should be relieved; leave blank if you do not desire him to be relieved.

Writing in Romaji has been inserted for the purposes of this report.

D. Results of the Referendum on the Judges of the Supreme Court

Contrary to fears expressed in some quarters before the election that many voters, ignorant of the identities and records of the judges of the Supreme Court, would fail to participate in the referendum and thus allow a minority unduly to sway the result, the number of ballots cast in the referendum totalled 31,052,733, or only 115,892 less than the total cast for members of the House of Representatives.

The result of the referendum, summarized below, was overwhelmingly in favor of retaining all the judges.

Total Number of Votes Cast for Individual Judges

| <u>Name of Judge</u> | <u>Votes for Retention</u> | <u>Votes for Dismissal</u> |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Seiichi Shimoyama | 28,678,639 | 1,444,983 |
| 2. Katsushige Otani | 28,762,482 | 1,367,242 |
| 3. Yusuke Saito | 28,762,969 | 1,356,242 |
| 4. Saburo Iwamatsu | 28,802,512 | 1,327,465 |
| 5. Naoyoshi Tsukasaki | 28,807,528 | 1,318,425 |
| 6. Shigeru Kuriyama | 28,789,911 | 1,339,515 |
| 7. Taichiro Hasegawa | 28,798,217 | 1,330,531 |
| 8. Noboru Inoue | 28,832,369 | 1,295,515 |
| 9. Tadahiko Mibuchi (President) | 28,462,160 | 1,665,270 |
| 10. Matasuke Kawamura | 28,889,782 | 1,238,262 |
| 11. Tsuyoshi Mano | 28,884,052 | 1,243,661 |
| 12. Tamotsu Shiima | 28,861,062 | 1,258,852 |
| 13. Hachiro Fujita | 28,909,018 | 1,215,965 |
| 14. Takejiro Sawada | 28,917,190 | 1,211,957 |
| Total Votes | 403,155,891 | 18,613,885 |

(95.5% for retention) (4.4% for dismissal)

Total number of invalid ballots - 859,291, (or 2.8%).

LIST OF SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES FOR HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTION 23 JANUARY 1949
(Final Candidate Report, National Election Management Commission, 25 January 1949)

NOTE: FIGURES IN PARENTHESIS INDICATE ELECTED CANDIDATES.


| PREFECTURE | DISTRICT | SEATS TO BE FILLED | DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL | DEMOCRAT | SOCIAL DEMOCRAT | PEOPLE'S COOPERATIVE | COMMUNIST | SOCIAL RE-NOVATION | JAPAN FARMER | FARMER LABOR | NEW LIBERAL | MINOR PARTIES | INDEPENDENT | TOTAL |
|------------|----------|--------------------|--------------------|----------|-----------------|----------------------|-----------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|-------|
| AICHI | I | 5 | 4 (2) | 1 (1) | 3 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 20 |
| | II | 4 | 2 (2) | 3 (2) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| | III | 3 | 1 (1) | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| | IV | 4 | 3 (2) | 2 (1) | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 |
| | V | 3 | 3 (3) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| AKITA | I | 4 | 3 (2) | 3 (2) | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 |
| | II | 4 | 3 (3) | 2 (1) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| AOMORI | I | 4 | 2 (2) | 2 (2) | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 |
| | II | 3 | 3 (1) | 2 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 12 |
| CHIBA | I | 4 | 5 (4) | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 |
| | II | 4 | 4 (3) | 2 (1) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| | III | 5 | 6 (4) | 5 (1) | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 19 |
| EHIME | I | 3 | 5 (3) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 10 |
| | II | 3 | 2 (2) | 2 (1) | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 10 |
| | III | 3 | 5 (3) | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| FUKUI | I | 4 | 3 (2) | 4 (2) | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 14 |
| FUKUOKA | I | 5 | 2 (2) | 3 (1) | 2 (1) | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 (1) | 5 | 15 |
| | II | 5 | 2 (2) | 2 | 3 (2) | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 12 |
| | III | 5 | 5 (2) | 2 (1) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 (1) | 1 (1) | 16 |
| | IV | 4 | 3 (3) | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 12 |
| FUKUSHIMA | I | 4 | 4 (3) | 2 | 2 (1) | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 13 |
| | II | 5 | 7 (4) | 2 | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 16 |
| | III | 3 | 3 (2) | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 7 |
| GIFU | I | 5 | 5 (4) | 2 (1) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 14 |
| | II | 4 | 3 (3) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 10 |
| GUMMA | I | 3 | 3 (1) | 2 | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 (1) | 10 |
| | II | 3 | 4 (1) | 2 (2) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 |
| | III | 4 | 5 (2) | 2 (1) | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 13 |
| HIROSHIMA | I | 3 | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 1 (1) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| | II | 4 | 4 (3) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9 |
| | III | 5 | 5 (3) | 2 | 3 (1) | 1 (1) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 |
| HOKKAIDO | I | 5 | 3 (3) | 2 (1) | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 (1) | 1 | 15 |
| | II | 4 | 4 (2) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 (2) | 2 | 13 |
| | III | 3 | 3 (3) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 8 |
| | IV | 5 | 4 (1) | 2 | 3 | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 2 (1) | 0 | 2 (2) | 2 | 16 |
| | V | 5 | 3 (2) | 2 (1) | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 (2) | 1 | 13 |
| HYOGO | I | 3 | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 12 |
| | II | 5 | 3 (3) | 2 | 3 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 |
| | III | 3 | 3 (3) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| | IV | 4 | 3 (1) | 3 (2) | 1 | 1 (1) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 12 |
| | V | 3 | 2 (2) | 2 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 |
| IBARAGI | I | 4 | 5 (3) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 2 | 11 |
| | II | 3 | 3 (2) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 2 | 9 |
| | III | 5 | 4 (2) | 2 (2) | 2 | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 |
| ISHIKAWA | I | 3 | 3 (1) | 2 | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 |
| | II | 3 | 2 (2) | 2 (1) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 |
| IWATE | I | 4 | 3 (3) | 1 | 2 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 10 |
| | II | 4 | 4 (3) | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 14 |
| KAGAWA | I | 3 | 3 (1) | 1 (1) | 2 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 8 |
| | II | 3 | 3 | 2 (2) | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 10 |
| KAGOSHIMA | I | 4 | 6 (3) | 3 (1) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 |
| | II | 3 | 4 (3) | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 15 |
| | III | 3 | 5 (3) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| KANAGAWA | I | 4 | 3 (1) | 2 | 2 (2) | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 14 |
| | II | 4 | 3 (1) | 1 (1) | 2 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 14 |
| | III | 5 | 4 (3) | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 (1) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 (1) | 13 |
| KOCHI | I | 5 | 2 (2) | 2 (2) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 13 |
| KUMAMOTO | I | 5 | 3 (1) | 3 (2) | 2 (1) | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 4 | 15 |
| | II | 5 | 4 (3) | 4 (2) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 13 |
| KYOTO | I | 5 | 3 (1) | 3 (2) | 4 (1) | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 16 |
| | II | 5 | 4 (2) | 4 (1) | 1 | 0 | 1 (1) | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 16 |
| MIE | I | 5 | 3 (2) | 3 (1) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 (2) | 12 |
| | II | 4 | 4 (2) | 2 | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 (1) | 9 |
| MIYAGI | I | 5 | 4 (3) | 2 (1) | 3 (1) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 17 |
| | II | 4 | 3 (3) | 2 (1) | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 11 |
| MIYAZAKI | I | 3 | 4 (3) | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 12 |
| | II | 3 | 3 (2) | 1 (1) | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 11 |
| NAGANO | I | 3 | 3 (2) | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 10 |
| | II | 3 | 2 (1) | 2 (1) | 1 | 2 (1) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| | III | 4 | 3 (2) | 1 | 1 | 1 (1) | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| | IV | 3 | 3 (3) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| NAGASAKI | I | 5 | 6 (5) | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 17 |
| | II | 4 | 5 (2) | 2 (1) | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 (1) | 13 |
| NARA | I | 5 | 5 (2) | 5 (1) | 2 | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 (1) | 22 |
| NAHARA | I | 3 | 3 (2) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 |
| | II | 4 | 1 (1) | 2 (1) | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 |
| | III | 5 | 5 (3) | 2 | 2 (1) | 0 | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 |
| | IV | 3 | 2 (2) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 |
| OITA | I | 4 | 2 (2) | 2 (1) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 (1) | 11 |
| | II | 3 | 3 (3) | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 11 |
| OKAYAMA | I | 5 | 3 (2) | 2 (1) | 1 | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 (1) | 1 | 0 | 3 | 13 |
| | II | 5 | 3 (5) | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 3 | 12 |
| OSAZA | I | 4 | 5 (2) | 2 | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 (1) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 14 |
| | II | 4 | 6 (2) | 2 | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 17 |
| | III | 4 | 4 (2) | 1 | 2 (1) | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 13 |
| | IV | 4 | 3 (2) | 1 | 2 (1) | 0 | 1 (1) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 10 |
| | V | 3 | 5 (2) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 12 |
| SAGA | I | 5 | 6 (3) | 3 (2) | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 16 |
| SAYAMA | I | 4 | 4 (2) | 1 | 3 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 12 |
| | II | 3 | 4 (3) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 |
| | III | 3 | 3 (1) | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 (1) | 10 |
| | IV | 3 | 3 (3) | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 |
| SHIGA | I | 5 | 4 (2) | 2 | 3 (1) | 1 (1) | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 14 |
| SHIMANE | I | 5 | 2 (1) | 2 (2) | 3 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 |
| SHIZUOKA | I | 5 | 6 (3) | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 (1) | 13 |
| | II | 5 | 4 (3) | 1 (1) | 2 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 10 |
| | III | 4 | 4 (3) | 1 | 2 | 2 (1) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 12 |
| TOCHIGI | I | 5 | 5 (2) | 2 (1) | 2 (1) | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 16 |
| | II | 5 | 6 (5) | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 14 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|-----|------------------------------|-------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------|------|
| KUMAMOTO | I | 5 | 2 (2) | 2 (2) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 13 | |
| KUMAMOTO | II | 5 | 3 (1) | 3 (2) | 2 (1) | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 4 | 15 | |
| KYOTO | I | 5 | 3 (1) | 3 (2) | 4 (1) | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 16 | |
| KYOTO | II | 5 | 4 (2) | 4 (1) | 1 | 0 | 1 (1) | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 16 | |
| KIE | I | 5 | 3 (2) | 3 (1) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 (2) | 12 | |
| KIE | II | 4 | 4 (2) | 2 | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 (1) | 9 | |
| MIYAGI | I | 5 | 4 (3) | 2 (1) | 3 (1) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 17 | |
| MIYAGI | II | 4 | 3 (3) | 2 (1) | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 11 | |
| MIYAZAKI | I | 3 | 4 (3) | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 12 | |
| MIYAZAKI | II | 3 | 3 (2) | 1 (1) | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 11 | |
| NAGANO | I | 3 | 3 (2) | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 10 | |
| NAGANO | II | 3 | 2 (1) | 2 (1) | 1 | 2 (1) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | |
| NAGANO | III | 4 | 3 (2) | 1 | 1 | 1 (1) | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | |
| NAGANO | IV | 3 | 3 (3) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | |
| NAGASAKI | I | 5 | 6 (5) | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 17 | |
| NAGASAKI | II | 4 | 5 (2) | 2 (1) | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 (1) | 13 | |
| NARA | I | 5 | 5 (2) | 5 (1) | 2 | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 (1) | 22 | |
| NIIGATA | I | 3 | 3 (2) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 | |
| NIIGATA | II | 4 | 1 (1) | 2 (1) | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 | |
| NIIGATA | III | 5 | 5 (3) | 2 | 2 (1) | 0 | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | |
| NIIGATA | IV | 3 | 2 (2) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | |
| OITA | I | 4 | 2 (2) | 2 (1) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 (1) | 11 | |
| OITA | II | 3 | 3 (3) | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 11 | |
| OKAYAMA | I | 5 | 3 (2) | 2 (1) | 1 | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 (1) | 1 | 0 | 3 | 13 | |
| OKAYAMA | II | 5 | 3 (3) | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 3 | 12 | |
| OSAKA | I | 4 | 5 (2) | 2 | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 (1) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 14 | |
| OSAKA | II | 4 | 6 (2) | 2 | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 17 | |
| OSAKA | III | 4 | 4 (2) | 1 | 2 (1) | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 13 | |
| OSAKA | IV | 4 | 3 (2) | 1 | 2 (1) | 0 | 1 (1) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 10 | |
| OSAKA | V | 3 | 5 (2) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 12 | |
| SAGA | I | 5 | 6 (3) | 3 (2) | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 16 | |
| SAYAMA | I | 4 | 4 (2) | 1 | 3 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 12 | |
| SAYAMA | II | 3 | 4 (3) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | |
| SAYAMA | III | 3 | 3 (1) | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 (1) | 10 | |
| SAYAMA | IV | 3 | 3 (3) | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | |
| SHIGA | I | 5 | 4 (2) | 2 | 3 (1) | 1 (1) | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 14 | |
| SHIMANE | I | 5 | 2 (1) | 2 (2) | 3 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | |
| SHIZUOKA | I | 5 | 6 (3) | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 (1) | 13 | |
| SHIZUOKA | II | 5 | 4 (3) | 1 (1) | 2 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 10 | |
| SHIZUOKA | III | 4 | 4 (3) | 1 | 2 | 2 (1) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 12 | |
| TOCHIGI | I | 5 | 5 (2) | 2 (1) | 2 (1) | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 16 | |
| TOCHIGI | II | 5 | 6 (5) | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 14 | |
| TOKUSHIMA | I | 5 | 3 (3) | 1 | 1 | 2 (2) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | |
| TOKYO | I | 4 | 7 (2) | 2 | 2 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 23 | |
| TOKYO | II | 3 | 3 (1) | 1 | 2 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 11 | |
| TOKYO | III | 3 | 1 (1) | 2 | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 9 | |
| TOKYO | IV | 3 | 4 (2) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 15 | |
| TOKYO | V | 4 | 3 (2) | 2 | 2 | 1 (1) | 1 (1) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 11 | |
| TOKYO | VI | 5 | 5 (3) | 3 | 3 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 18 | |
| TOKYO | VII | 5 | 3 (2) | 4 (1) | 4 | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 | 3 | 18 | |
| TOTTORI | I | 4 | 3 (2) | 1 | 3 (1) | 0 | 1 (1) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 11 | |
| TOYAMA | I | 3 | 2 (2) | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | |
| TOYAMA | II | 3 | 3 (1) | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 (1) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | |
| WAKAYAMA | I | 3 | 2 (2) | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | |
| WAKAYAMA | II | 3 | 3 (1) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 0 | 8 | |
| YAMAGATA | I | 4 | 4 (3) | 3 (1) | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 14 | |
| YAMAGATA | II | 4 | 3 (2) | 3 (1) | 2 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 | |
| YAMAGUCHI | I | 4 | 5 (3) | 0 | 1 (1) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | |
| YAMAGUCHI | II | 5 | 5 (3) | 1 | 2 (1) | 1 | 1 (1) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 13 | |
| YAMANASHI | I | 5 | 3 (2) | 2 (1) | 2 | 1 | 1 (1) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 (1) | 15 | |
| TOTAL | | 117 Election Districts | 466 | 416 (264) | 212 (69)* | 186 (48)* | 63 (14) | 115 (35) | 30 (5) | 16 (1) | 45 (7) | 12 (2) | 58 (9) | 211 (12) | 1364 |

*Social Democrat candidate TANAKA Shogetsu (Fukuoka - 1st District) was disqualified 25 January 1949. Therefore, total number elected became 48. Runner-up, Democrat NAKAJIMA Shigeki, replaced TANAKA as successful candidate.

ELECTION DISTRICTS

- 1 DOTTED LINES INDICATE ELECTION DISTRICT BOUNDARIES
- 2 ROMAN NUMERALS INDICATE DISTRICT NUMBERS.
- 3 NUMBERS IN PARENTHESIS INDICATE THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS TO BE ELECTED.



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COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
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Rec'd February 25, 1949
6:05 a.m.

File
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FROM: Moscow
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 467, February 25

One-half column Tokyo Tass despatch Soviet press
February 25 quotes Akahata's publication Jap CP's
statement denouncing Yoshida Cabinet's intention
form "Un-Japanese Activities Commission".

Sent Department, repeated Tokyo 12.

KOHLER

JM:RS

894.00/2-2549

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DC/R

G. DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

United States Political Adviser
for Japan

No. 126

March 1, 1949

UNCLASSIFIED DEPARTMENT OF STATE

no action required

REC'D
MAR 8

ACTION
FE ENC 2

Subject: Factions Within Democratic Liberal Party.

INFO
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POS ENC

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

①

1/

2/

With reference to this Mission's despatch no. 94 of February 14, 1949 I have the honor to transmit herewith five copies each of an article by Mr. KUROKI Hisatoki discussing the problem of factions within the Democratic Liberal Party, as well as an editorial on the same subject, both from the Nippon Times of February 20.

Although the Democratic Liberal Party now enjoys a commanding position in the House of Representatives as a result of the January 23 election, Mr. Kuroki notes that there are widening differences of opinion developing within the party. One reason for the development of sharp factional differences is the emergence of distinct personal groupings within the party, the alignments of which have been greatly accentuated since the party has come into power.

According to Mr. Kuroki there are four distinct groups within the party. An ultra-conservative faction, referred to as the Old Guard, centers around Mr. OKO Benkoku, Mr. UHARA Etusjiro, and Mr. FOSHIMIZU Jiro. To a considerable degree, this faction represents long-standing alignments with the pre-war Seiyukai Party, and is today closely linked with extremely conservative economic interests. It is largely this group which gives the Democratic Liberal Party its allegedly "reactionary" character, the target of much criticism by the leftist press in Japan and some sections of the press abroad. Another important faction centers around the men who have come to be called the party's postwar leaders, such as Mr. HIROKAWA Kozen and Mr. OKADA Saeki. According to

Mr. Kuroki

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forwarded when
received in CS/R~~

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MAY 10 1949

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