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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.

INTERROGATION OF

(Marquis) KIDO, Koichi

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 11 March 1946, 1400 - 1600 hours
PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan
PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer
Questions by : Mr. Sackett

- Q Some time back, when you had Dr. TSURU bring in your diary and some other papers, included in the papers was this instrument. I want to ask you about it. I have a translation here. Can you tell me just what the text is, where it came from, where you got it and where Dr. TSURU got it?
- A I had this at home.
- Q Where did you get it?
- A I noted it down when I read the memoirs of Prince KONOYE. At the time the Prince wrote it, he showed me his memoirs.
- Q Is this your writing or Prince KONOYE's?
- A This is my hand-writing.
- Q In other words, these memoirs were the ones that were printed in the paper here shortly after Prince KONOYE died?
- A I believe it was printed in the paper. The day that Prince KONOYE died, I was confined here at Sugamo so I don't know.

Q When was it you wrote this - about what time?

A I believe about one or two years ago.

Q I see. You have had this for some time?

A Yes.

Q What was the occasion when you wrote this? Was Prince KONOYE present?

A I noted it down when I borrowed Prince KONOYE's memoirs.

Q In other words, he had written up some memoirs and showed them to you?

A Yes.

Q Had they been printed or published, or were they private?

A They were his own private memoirs. There was a type-written one.

Q And you made some notations just for your own information in order you might know his version of what took place?

A And at the time the request that every material be brought out, I believe they brought this out along with the rest of things.

Q Yes, I know. You didn't make notes of the entire memoirs but just picked out certain things you wanted to keep some records on? Is that right?

A Because the memoirs is so long, I could not take down all of it, so only those portions that concerned me, I noted down.

Q Do you know whether the memoirs that were printed in the press after he died were the same as he had written and displayed to you some two years ago?

A I did not read the memoirs that were written in the paper. I only read a portion of it, just one day's portion. I believe it is the same one.

- Q Do you know where the original memoirs that were written by Prince KONOYE are?
- A I believe it is at the home of Prince KONOYE.
- Q When was it, to your recollection, that Prince KONOYE wrote his memoirs about what happened around 1940 or '41?
- A I believe shortly after he left the Cabinet, he started on his memoirs. I have no accurate recollection but I believe it is 1942 or 1943.
- Q When was it he showed them to you - a couple years ago - 1943, perhaps?
- A Yes, he showed them to me at that time.
- Q They had not been published in book form, or anything like that in those days?
- A No, it was kept very secret because at that time divulgement of it would subject him to punishment under the peace provision law.
- Q What reason did he give you for having written these memoirs? Why did he write them or why did he tell you he wrote them?
- A He wrote it for the intent of clarifying the Japanese-America negotiations that were conducted.
- Q He wanted to leave a record of what he had done with reference to these negotiations so anyone could see the position he took. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q The way it starts out, does the first page pertain to what actually took place at the July 2 Imperial Conference?
- A This is just an extract and each paragraph does not join with the following paragraph.
- Q This is the way it starts out, referring to policy: "The Empire will eliminate whatever difficulty in order to attain the foregoing objective." I would like to ask with reference to that statement, was that something that was decided at the July 2 Conference?

A I believe so.

Q According to his memoirs, that is one of the things determined or decided at the Imperial Conference?

A Yes.

Q Reading further, when it says the Empire will continue diplomatic negotiations which are necessary from the standpoint of self-existence and self-defense in the southern zone and will hasten various other plans, was that also a decision of the July 2 Conference?

A I believe so.

Q In other words, KONOYE indicated that was one of the things decided on July 2, 1941?

A Yes.

Q Do you have any personal recollection or information that that was decided upon other than the fact you read it in his memoirs?

A Personally, I do not know anything about the decision reached at the July 2 Conference but I learned that only later after reading the memoirs.

Q I appreciate that you were not present at the Conference but you did talk to other people on or about July 2, 1941 that told you in effect what had taken place at the Conference? That is true, isn't it?

A I did not hear these clear-cut statements such as these at that time. Later on, after reading the memoirs, it sort of struck me as really being significant and for that reason, I noted it down.

Q Understand, I am only interested in honestly finding out what took place at the Imperial Conference, I only want to know what happened at the July 2 Conference. Your notations read further: "For that reason, she will make preparations for war against Britain and the United States." Prince KONOYE indicated that that was decided at the July 2nd Imperial Conference, did he not?

A Yes

Q On or about that time, didn't anyone else talk to you with reference to the conference and indicated that such a decision had been made.

A I did not hear any clear-cut statements like these at that time. At that time, they were saying that it was a Conference devoted mainly in order to take measures against Russia and for that reason, our entire attention was taken toward Russia and we did not hear anything. As written later on here, our immediate objective was to decide toward not being engaged in any action with the Soviet and for that reason, that matter of war with the United States and Britain did not come up. Prince KONOYE had his entire attention taken toward the prevention of any action against Russia.

Q I understand. You told me before that one of the main reasons they called the July 2 Imperial Conference was to decide whether or not to follow MATSUOKA's policy of attacking Russia and at that meeting, it was decided Japan would not engage in war with Russia. And, that is the reason, is it not, at the end of the notations, you have there with reference to the July 2 Conference, "Finally on July 2, I petitioned the Emperor for a council in his presence and for the present decided not to start any movement against Soviet Russia."? A. Yes.

Q My next question is, I would like to know what was decided at that Conference with reference to the war against the United States and Great Britain. According to your notations from Prince KONOYE's diary, it was decided at that Conference that Japan would make preparations for war against the United States and Great Britain, and also, was it not decided that Japan would not avoid war with Britain and the United States in order to achieve her objective as set forth in these memoirs?

A Yes.

Q What I would like to ask you is, can you give me any other information, other than what you find in these notations with reference to what was decided at this particular conference concerning Britain and the United States?

- A In the beginning, part of this is the appendix to the memoirs of Prince KONOYE, while the latter part is the text of his memoirs and the most striking one is noted down here and I have marked paragraph 2 and paragraph 3. There are others, but I have no recollection.
- Q I don't quite understand you. What do you say paragraphs 2 and 3 from his memoirs are?
- A Paragraphs 2 and 3 are from his appendix to his memoirs.
- Q And what did the appendix to the memoirs purport to contain?
- A Relating matters to the other - the memoirs is a narrative while the appendix is reference matter.
- Q In other words, attached to his narrative statement, as to the story of the United States and Japanese diplomatic relations, Prince KONOYE attached an appendix where he referred to certain background material and other factual material in which he was referring to in the memoirs themselves, is that right?
- A I believe that the original in the Japanese-American negotiations was attached to the appendix.
- Q And this section of part two, concerning July 2, 1941, you copied from the appendix? Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q And where did the appendix indicate this information that was therein contained came from? What was the source of this information we are talking about? Was it an official writing coming out of the liaison conference or some such thing as that?
- A Prime Minister Prince KONOYE had the bill or proposed plan and I believe that he wrote it from that plan.
- Q By that you mean that this appendix from which you made your notes refers to the decision that was actually made at the Imperial Conference on July 2, 1941, as shown by the original, or a copy of the decision of the liaison conference, and the conference, itself, which was in Prince KONOYE's possession?
- A I believe so.

Q One reason I am asking is this. The other day when I was asking you certain questions with reference to what was decided on July 2, 1941, you told me very definitely about the Russian decision. When I asked you if there was anything further decided, you indicated you thought that was the principle decision. Then, I read to you from these notations I have, which are now before you and pointed out certain decisions had been made with reference to Britain and the United States, at which time you confirmed that you recalled conversations to that effect. What I want to know is how you know those things were decided at the July 2 Conference and where you got your information other than through this source?

A Because I have no other sources of substantiation and for that reason, I had no recollection at that time.

Q When I pointed out what Prince KONOYE had said, you recalled that you had read that in his memoirs. Is that what you mean?

A At that time, that portion of Prince KONOYE's memoirs preventing action against Soviet Russia has taken my entire attention so that part was written in my memory while the other part, there weren't very many talks on it.

Q Well, I am not complaining about your failure to remember everything that was decided on July 2. What I am honestly trying to find out is whether or not the items mentioned in this document you have were actually decided at that conference. You think they were?

A I believe it was decided at that conference and because I was surprised, I noted it down.

Q Doesn't this refresh your recollection as to conversations with leaders back in July 1941, at which time they told you that such decisions were made?

A No, I did not hear anything about it.

Q In other words, you remember the July 2 Conference because of the decision with reference to Russia and when you were reading Prince KONOYE's memoirs written in 1943, perhaps you were surprised to learn of these other decisions and that is why you wrote them down. Is that correct?

A Yes.

- Q In your own mind, you are confident that those things were actually decided on July 2, are you not?
- A I noted it down because I believe it was decided.
- Q Did you ever talk to Prince KONOYE about it and tell him you were surprised to learn about the southern expansion and Britain and the United States, and did not know it?
- A I remember telling him that serious things has been decided when all that time I thought they dealt mainly with Russia.
- Q What did he say in answer to that?
- A I have no recollection as to what he said. Because Prince KONOYE doesn't say much, I have no accurate recollection.
- Q What was there in particular about what you read with reference to the July 2 Conference that surprised you? As I understand it, you were not surprised about what was decided concerning Russia because you knew that. What was there in there that surprised you in particular?
- A I always felt that decision of war against Britain and America will be made in the Imperial Conference of September and here it is written down that it has been decided at the July 2 Conference that Japan will not avoid war with America and Great Britain. I was greatly surprised, although it is written here that war will not be avoided. It consequently means that war will be decided upon.
- Q And it was for that reason you called it to the attention of Prince KONOYE but you don't remember what he said about it?
- A I have no accurate recollection. I believe that Prince KONOYE has been thinking of things like this in order to avoid war with Russia.
- Q I don't quite understand that last answer.
- A I believe that KONOYE compromised.
- Q Explain a little more what you mean by compromised.
- A I believe in order to prevent incursion into the North, he started to give his attention toward the South.

- Q Do you think it was discussed at that July 2 Conference and decided upon by those present as a sort of compromise and diversionary program in order to take emphasis off of Russia?
- A I believe so, although I am not too clear about it. Hardly anyone knows much or remembers much about this July 2 Imperial Conference because everyone's attention has been taken by the German-Soviet War.
- Q Do you think it is possible that Prince KONOYE was mistaken as to these decisions with reference to the United States and Great Britain being made on July 2 or do you think it actually happened that way, as written in his memoirs and in your notes?
- A I believe that it is an actual fact; that it is not a mistake. Although I did not see the original, I believe this is true.
- Q This that is written in your notations, is it an exact copy of what was contained in the appendix to Prince KONOYE's diary, or is it just a summary that you have written out in your own words? In other words, does this contain your language or is it an actual copy of what was in the appendix?
- A This is an actual copy.
- Q I still am not very clear in my mind as to where Prince KONOYE got this information that he put in his appendix as reference material with reference to what happened on July 2, 1941?
- A As Prime Minister, Prince KONOYE has a copy of the Imperial Conference and I believe that he wrote it down from his copy.
- Q In other words, it is your belief that these notations you made from the appendix to Prince KONOYE's diary came in the first instance from the copy of what happened at the Imperial Conference of July 2, 1941, which was in the possession of Prince KONOYE and that when he was writing his memoirs some time later, he referred to that copy in order to write out his narrative and attached a copy of it as an appendix as authority for what he was talking about?
- A Yes.

- Q To be perfectly fair with you, the reason I am asking these questions is that certain other people who were actually present at the July 2, 1941 conference didn't seem to have any recollection of any such decisions having been made, other than the Russian question, just like you did when I first asked you about it and I would like to know the truth of the matter as to whether these things were decided with reference to the United States and Great Britain in July or whether it was in September.
- A I honestly felt that it was a matter decided at the September Conference but because it was decided at the July Conference, I was surprised, because at that time, it was completely a matter concerning Soviet Russia. I wish to make one place correct in order to avert any misunderstanding. It is the beginning of the second paragraph here where it says, "The foreign minister reported to the Emperor". That matter that was reported to the Emperor was the operation against Soviet Russia and it does not refer to the preceding paragraph.
- Q I don't quite understand you. I wish you would explain that again.
- A The narrative has no relation with the appendix.
- Q I see. In other words, down to that point in your notations, you had copied word for word what Prince KONOYE had set forth in the appendix, then that paragraph starting, "Besides reporting to the Emperor, the Foreign Minister made similar explanations to the Lord, Keeper, etc.", that is your language?
- A No.
- Q That is which language?
- A This is the actual extract from KONOYE's memoirs. There is a phrase that I omitted here and should be included in the beginning of the sentence in the narrative that I have extracted. It says, "The Foreign Minister reported to the Emperor about the operations against Soviet Russia which the Foreign Minister advocated." Therefore, the narrative has no relation with the appendix.

Q Just in all fairness to both of us, will you please read and translate what your notations say as to what actually was contained in the appendix to Prince KONOYE's diary so we may have it correctly? In other words, to make it more accurate, I would like for you to tell me just what was contained in the appendix to Prince KONOYE's diary, according to your notations concerning the July 2, 1941 Conference.

A "Policy. 3) The Empire will eliminate all obstacles in order to attain its above mentioned objective.

"Essentials. 2) The Empire will continue necessary diplomatic negotiations concerning the vital regions of the South from the standpoint of its self-existence and self-preservation, and will promote various measures in addition. For this purpose, she will prepare for war against Britain and America and firstly, it will complete various measures against French Indo-China and Thailand on the policy of "measures against French Indo-China and Thailand and matters dealing with promoting measures toward the South; thereby, she will strengthen the situation for southern advancement. The Empire will not avoid war against England and America in order to attain or carry out its objective as listed here."

Q In other words, that part you have just stated represents what you copied from the appendix of Prince KONOYE, memoirs?

A Yes.

Q The writing that follows that immediately came from the memoirs, themselves?

A Yes.

Q I would like to ask you, was this statement which you took from the appendix and which you have just recited all that the appendix contained with reference to the July 2 Conference or was it just that part you were surprised about and wanted to keep a record of?

A This is just a part.

Q In other words, the appendix, itself, contained additional statement with reference to the decision concerning Russia but you did not write that down because you already knew about that?

A Yes.

- Q If you were in my shoes and were trying to honestly and accurately ascertain just what was decided at the July 2 conference, where would you go to try to find a record or a statement as to the decisions of that conference, other than what Prince KONOYE wrote a year or so later?
- A These decisions should be kept by the Cabinet and the Supreme Command.
- Q Are they something that you think would be destroyed or still in existence?
- A I believe they were destroyed.
- Q Who is there that is living and available that might through direct personal knowledge verify that these things were decided, if I should talk with him?
- A I believe that he would have to be a person of the Supreme Command, otherwise, they would not know.
- Q Well, of course, there were other people present at that Conference. Who would you suggest I might talk to who would tell me the truth as to what was decided?
- A I believe MATSUOKA knows it because he was Foreign Minister.
- Q In other words, it is your belief that if I would ask Mr. MATSUOKA if this was decided at the Imperial Conference, he would verify that this did take place?
- A Yes.
- Q Is there anyone else you think of besides Mr. MATSUOKA who I might refer this to and ask to verify it?
- A Perhaps the Chief Secretary of the KONOYE Cabinet.
- Q TOMITA?
- A Yes.
- Q How about General SUZUKI? Would he be one who would likely be able to verify this?
- A I do not know if SUZUKI attended the Conference.

- Q I am inclined to think that some of these people who were present who have told us that they did not think that was decided on that occasion but that the decisions against the United States and Great Britain took place in September, like you felt, the emphasis was on the Russian matter and did not pay a great deal of attention to these other decisions be made. Perhaps they are honest in not being able to remember these things were decided, but I would like to find someone who can establish the truth of the matter.
- A Yes.
- Q You would suggest MATSUOKA and TOMITA as the most likely people who would be able to verify this statement from the appendix of KONOYE's memoirs.
- A Yes.
- Q Let us look at your diary on October 2. You refer to a conversation with War Minister TOJO regarding Premier KONOYE's resolution, according to my translation. What was that conversation as near as you can remember?
- A The War Minister said that the deadline has been made for the tenth of October and the War Minister said that the time is now imminent, but he complained that the Prime Minister did not yet show a clear-cut attitude in regard to that.
- Q What did War Minister TOJO indicate to you that he thought the decision on the part of Japan should be with reference to the war?
- A I believe that TOJO had the determination and the decision of entering into war if the negotiation was not concluded by the 10th of October.
- Q And what was he complaining about Prince KONOYE's attitude?
- A TOJO was complaining that KONOYE's attitude was not clear.
- Q Well, he seemed to feel that Prince KONOYE might want to negotiate further if successful negotiations had not been completed by the 10th of October. Is that right?
- A KONOYE's attitude was not clear but I believe he was greatly in favor of continuing negotiations.

- Q In other words, the gist of your conversation with TOJO on October 2 was that TOJO indicated that at the Imperial Conference, it had been decided that if negotiations were not decided by October 10, he was in favor of carrying out the decision to go to war with the United States?
- A Yes.
- Q And he was also concerned that Prince KONOYE would not agree with him on that point and indicated he might want to do something else to try to settle the differences with the United States.
- A I believe so.
- Q He also, did he not, indicate to you on that occasion he did not think there was any hope of negotiations with the United States being successful?
- A TOJO was of the opinion that the negotiations would not be settled by October 10.
- Q And he took the position that if the United States would not agree to the position that Japan had taken in its negotiations, Japan should make no further concessions but should declare war.
- A Yes, that was the attitude of TOJO.
- Q Do you remember your conversation with the Emperor on the morning of October 4? In order to help your recollection, I might say that it was on October 2 that the United States sent a note to Japan making inquiry as to what she was going to do about withdrawing troops from China and French Indo-China.
- A At this time, I believe Prince KONOYE reported to the Emperor of that note of inquiry from the United States so the audience had previous to that dealt with general political matters.
- Q In other words, there was nothing significant about your talk with the Emperor that morning?
- A Yes.

- Q What was it Prince KONOYE told you after he had reported to the Emperor with reference to that note later on that day? What was your conversation with KONOYE after he had seen the Emperor on that day with reference to the note?
- A I remember KONOYE saying that he would like to withdraw troops from French Indo-China and China and take on some means of doing it. That was the feeling that he expressed to me at that time. He also said that the attitude of the Army was stiffening so that matter became more difficult. I said that the September Imperial Conference ought to be reopened and reinvestigated; otherwise, the situation would not be settled.
- Q Did he indicate what, if anything, the Emperor said about the withdrawal of troops from China?
- A The Emperor said that if the Army's face can be saved, he would like to take on some kind of measures which can be undertaken and save face.
- Q Can we say it was the Emperor's attitude in these days that if Japan, and particularly the Army, could save face, he was in favor of withdrawing troops from China but that if they could not save face, he was willing that Japan declare war on Great Britain and the United States as the only other alternative?
- A The Emperor was not of the opinion that if the Army could not save face she should go to war against the United States, but that every means be taken whereby the Army can withdraw troops and yet retain its face. The Emperor always avoided war to the utmost.
- Q Did Mr. KOBOYASHI, when you talked with him on October 5 have anything significant to say about the Dutch East Indies?
- A I heard him say that as a returnee from the Celebes that the sentiment of the Japanese nationals there are that war is imminent and that their feeling was very tense.
- Q On October 7 you had a rather lengthy conversation with Mr. TOMITA, the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. What faction or group did he belong to so far as favoring war or being opposed to war in those days?

- A TOMITA belonged to a group wanting to avoid war.
- Q You would say he was not particularly sympathetic with TOJO's views?
- A No.
- Q He summarized the situation in his conversation with you by saying that the Army felt the negotiations would not be successful and Japan could not accede to the demands of the United States. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q And when he expressed that opinion to you, he was speaking of the attitude of TOJO and SUGIYAMA and MUTO, was he not?
- A I did not hear the details whereby those men were implicated but I did hear that the directing body of the military were very outspoken and making a strong stand in that respect.
- Q When he referred to the Army, by that he meant the Army group led by TOJO, SUGIYAMA and MUTO. Is that a fair statement?
- A Yes.
- Q He also told you that the Navy had opposed that view and desired to make some concessions and negotiations further. Is that right?
- A But the young Navy officers in the central body of the Navy were of the same mind as the young officers of the Army in that they were radical for a strong stand.
- Q But TOMITA was of the opinion that the higher-ups in the Navy, such as NAGANO and OIKAWA desired to negotiate further and were more liberal in their willingness in trying to negotiate than the Army group but he also held the opinion that the younger Army and Navy officers both sided in with TOJO in his way of thinking?
- A Yes.
- Q That was more or less in accord with the way as you understood the situation and as you explained it to me, wasn't it?

A Yes.

Q What was it that the Navy desired that the Premier should do, according to Mr. TOMITA?

A The Navy desired that the Prime Minister take a definite stand and guide the political situation.

Q What sort of a stand was it that TOMITA really wanted the Premier to take, one in favor of war or one in opposition to war, or what kind of a stand?

A The desire of the Navy was that Prince KONOYE take a clear-cut stand and continue negotiations.

Q In other words, he expressed the fear that the Navy desired Prince KONOYE to lead the country in further negotiations with the United States?

A Yes.

Q TOMITA expressed to you in that conversation that it was his opinion that war Minister TOJO was very anti-America. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q And that was your impression from your personal conversations with TOJO, yourself?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall anything significant from your talk with the Emperor on that day?

A I reported to the Emperor about the conversations I had with TOMITA.

Q What, if anything, did the Emperor have to say?

A The Emperor was dissatisfied about the stand Prince KONOYE was taking in not making himself clear and the Emperor said it would be a very good thing if KONOYE made a clear-cut stand.

Q I guess there isn't any question but what Prince KONOYE was very weak in his decisions in those critical times? Isn't that just criticism of KONOYE?

- A Yes, that is the great defective of Prince KONOYE.
- Q He made it possible for War Minister TOJO and his followers to push their program through without much serious objection?
- A Yes.
- Q On October 8, when you talked to Mr. HARA, you discussed the conference of ex-premiers. Why was that and why were the ex-premiers being called into conference in those days. My information was that they were called ordinarily when the Cabinet falls. Was this a different type of meeting?
- A This wasn't actually carried out.
- Q Was it a plan?
- A A plan only.
- Q What was the plan?
- A Because the situation was so grave and because of that I thought the senior statesmen should get together and help out in that matter and this was the suggestion or talks I had with HARA but this plan did not materialize at all.
- Q Had that ever taken place before or was it a new plan?
- A This is the first time I ever spoke of the plan.
- Q In other words, the Premiers previously had only been called to decide a new cabinet?
- A Until now, it wasn't concerned with other policies.
- Q What did the Emperor have to say when you talked with him on that day with reference to answering the United States?
- A I just told him about what Prince TAKAMATSU said in regard to the reply to the United States.
- Q What was it that was said?
- A Prince TAKAMATSU is a Navy man and he expressed the Navy's sentiment. He said that something must be done in order to avoid war.

- Q On October 9, you had a rather lengthy talk with Prince KONOYE. As I understand it from your diary, you expressed the opinion to him that the decision of September 6 conference should be changed so as to give more opportunity for negotiations and that you personally felt there was very little likelihood of victory in case Japan and the United States got into war. You were fearful Japan would lose? Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q You favored that Japan concentrate all her efforts on the China campaign.
- A Yes.
- Q How did you propose to avoid difficulty with the United States if more troops and more concentrated effort was made to conquer China?
- A Naturally, the non-withdrawal of troops would end in war but I said that Japan should devise all means whereby she can avoid war and I said that if Japan can bring her strength out to the extent of fighting America, she ought to use that strength in solving the China incident.
- Q Do you mean that you felt that if Japan would follow your reasoning and concentrate on China, she would involve herself in war with the United States?
- A I felt that if Japan did not go down into the South she will not become engaged in war with America and therefore I felt that the China incident ought to be settled and troops should be withdrawn from French Indo-China.
- Q In other words, it was your opinion, as expressed to Prince KONOYE that Japan should abandon its southern expansion program and stationing of troops in French Indo-China and should concentrate her efforts of fighting in China?
- A My greatest concern was not to fight with America.

- Q You thought that would avoid war with the United States - that sort of a program?
- A And I felt that if negotiations with America can be kept right on continuously, I felt that an understanding between the two can be reached.
- Q We can say that it was your thought and suggestion in those days that Japan abandon this plan on the part of the military to go into the South Pacific and she should fight in China but you were opposed to having Japan coming out and withdrawing troops in China to meet the then demands of the United States?
- A Yes.
- Q What did Prince KONOYE have to say to that suggestion of yourself?
- A Prince KONOYE listened to me but he did not disagree with me, but he did not show such great interest as to follow my suggestion.
- Q Your suggestion was more or less a compromise to abandon the Southern Pacific Expansion Program but to go ahead and complete the policy of bringing about a new order in East Asia by fighting the China War to a successful conclusion?
- A And I said that Japan has enough strength to go to war against the United States and she ought to use her strength against China and settle the incident there.
- Q One of the things that was embarrassing to Japan in those days was that she could not bring the China War to a conclusion and you wanted to concentrate Japan's efforts on that and argued that if she were strong enough to fight the United States, she ought to be able to settle the China War?
- A The consequence of concentrating in China would mean that the Southern Expansion Program would be suspended and thereby war with the United States would be avoided.
- Q Can we say that it was your feeling in those days as to Japan's foreign policy, she should not try to bring about a new order in East Asia and the Southern regions but she should bring about a new order only in China and Manchuria, according to her original plan or efforts?

- A If settlement can be had with China, it felt that all those matters of territory and cooperation and co-prosperity sphere can be brought forth through cooperation.
- Q Irrespective of how the China War may have started, it is true that after it had been going on for some time, at least Japan adopted a foreign policy of deciding to establish a new order in East Asia to the extent of becoming the dominant power in China and Manchuria. Isn't that true?
- A The spirit of domination was not strong on the part of Japan.
- Q By domination, I mean she desired to exercise influence in China through a Government such as Nanking, like she was doing in Manchuria through the puppet government.
- A But Japan did not intend to make Manchuria a puppet nation and Nanking a puppet nation, but through them a firm nation would be established and she thought to make them develop through them.
- Q Certainly, you will agree with me insofar as Manchuria was concerned, it was the policy of Japan to control the resources and the Government of Manchuria through a puppet government. There is no question of that?
- A Yes.
- Q Can't we honestly say that some time after the China War started, Japan's foreign policy, insofar as China was concerned, was to control in some degree the Government and activities in China through a puppet Government?
- A Naturally at the beginning it would have to be a puppet government. But Japan's intention was to teach them and to lead them and then give them self-determination and independence.
- Q Japan had an opportunity to do that in Manchuria but she never saw fit to do so, did she?
- She continued to exert great influence over Manchuria through a puppet government and did not withdraw and permit the Government to operate independently?
- A Naturally, it just won't come out. It would not materialize so quickly.

- Q Irrespective of what your personal views might have been on the subject, don't you agree with me that it was the foreign policy of Japan in these days we are talking about to control and direct the affairs of China and Manchuria through a puppet government?
- A Yes.
- Q That was the foreign policy advocated by MATSUOKA, was it not, and by TOJO and the military group that he led?
- A That is the course or the way of doing of the military.
- Q I think you said that the Navy leaders were not so strongly in favor of that foreign policy. Is that TRUE?
- A So the Navy was not in favor of it.
- Q But they did come to favor the southern expansion program because of the supplies that Japan needed?
- A Yes.
- Q On October 10, when you talked to the Emperor, what did he have to say with reference to Prince FUSHIMI?
- A Prince FUSHIMI reported of the sentiment held by the young officers and he said that war seemed to be unavoidable. Upon hearing that, the Emperor became very disappointed.
- Q What was Prince FUSHIMI's capacity in the government or military circles in those days?
- A He was retired so he had no post.
- Q In other words, Prince FUSHIMI reported to the Emperor that the young Navy officers were very much in favor of fighting a war with the United States and the Emperor was concerned, wasn't he?
- A Yes.
- Q I wish you would tell me what you know about what took place at that important meeting on October 12 between War Minister TOJO and Navy Minister OIKAWA, and Foreign Minister TOYODA out at Prince KONOYE's home. Before you proceed, I would like to ask you this question: Wasn't General SUZUKI also present.

- A I believe he attended, too.
- Q I might say that Prince KONOYE so states in his memoirs. You think he was present, do you?
- A Yes, I think so.
- Q Tell me what you know about that meeting. What took place there and how you know it.
- A Prince KONOYE, at his private home in Ogikubo, on October 12 called in the concerned ministers and talked to them about the Japanese-American negotiations.
- Q May I interrupt you to ask you this question: Where did you get your information as to what took place at this meeting inasmuch as you were not personally present?
- A Chief Secretary TOMITA at nine o'clock that night reported this fact to me.
- Q You mean he reported the fact there was going to be a meeting but did he tell you what happened at the meeting?
- A Because he came to me at nine o'clock, he told me all that happened at the meeting. As written in the diary, it says, "At nine o'clock, Chief Secretary TOMITA came to my home and gave the following outline to me."
- Q May I ask, was Mr. TOMITA present at that meeting at Prince KONOYE's home?
- A I believe he was attending that meeting.
- Q In other words, he told you what had taken place according to his observations because he was personally present at the meeting? Go ahead and tell me about it.
- A The War Minister said that there is no hope of an understanding between Japan and America.
- Q That was General TOJO, wasn't it?
- A TOJO, and he requested the great decision of war.

- Q By that you mean he requested that Japan should declare war on the United States. Is that right?
- A Yes, but TOJO continued that if this understanding between America and Japan can be established and such a confidence and explanation is heard, he naturally would not prefer war.
- Q Well, in effect, according to TOMITA, TOJO said that he thought the negotiations would not be successful and Japan should decide to go ahead and fight a war, but he added if there was any hope for success, he would oppose it, but he didn't think there was any hope?
- A Yes, and the Navy Minister said that war should be avoided as much as possible and he said that Japan is facing two roads; the road of diplomacy and the road of war. And, if Japan is going to take the road of diplomacy he will want her utmost to be done in that respect and if the half-hearted negotiations is not developed, then the decision of war is not a good thing to do. The Navy Minister requested that the Prime Minister take a strong stand in either case and then lead the nation in that respect. The Prime Minister said that he has hope in the negotiations so he wished to proceed with this opinion. The Foreign Minister said that even though he may have confidence, the other side is not determinable and therefore an accurate estimate cannot be given but the Foreign Minister said there is hope and the proposal of War Minister TOJO has been reached that are pertaining to Japanese-American negotiations; A) that the various measures centering on the occupation forces and other problems will not be altered; and b) the results of the China incident will not be tampered with. So, in dealing with the possibility of succeeding in diplomacy, he desired that the Supreme Command would give its determination before the desired time.
- Q The first part of the agreement was that the stationing of troops and their policy with reference to that would not be altered; and the second part was that Japan should go through with its program in China, and what else after that?

- A And under the second agreement that was mentioned, it is desired that the Supreme Command make clear that confidence be obtained for making the diplomacy successful by the time desired by the Supreme Command.
- Q By way of summary, it was finally decided at this meeting that the Japanese policy of stationing troops in French Indo-China would not be altered and second, that Japan would go through with its program of fighting the war in China to a successful conclusion. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q And third, efforts would be made to conduct successful negotiations with the United States before when?
- A The time desired by the Supreme Command.
- Q Did Mr. TOMITA state what that time was?
- A No, there is a continuation. In addition to the above, mentioned confidence, the diplomatic policy will be continued by proceeding with the above-mentioned decision, the preparation in the way of operations will be discontinued, and pertaining to the above, the Foreign Minister determined whether those things that are mentioned are possible.
- Q Summarizing again, it was decided at that meeting at Prince KONOYE's home that Japan would stand firm on her policy of stationing troops in China and French Indo-China and second, she would continue to carry out her policy of fighting the war to a successful conclusion in China, and that Japan would continue negotiations further with the United States in an effort to peacefully settle her differences and that for the time being, any operations that had been put in effect looking towards commencement of war with the United States would be stopped. Is that right?
- A Yes, and it was decided that the Foreign Minister will study whether that can be done or not.
- Q Who else did you talk to about this meeting besides Mr. TOMITA after it had taken place?

A Only TOMITA.

Q I don't mean on this day. Certainly you discussed what happened with Prince KONOYE, did you not?

A I spoke to him the following day.

Q Did he tell you the same thing with reference to what happened at that meeting or did he add anything new?

A I heard the story concerning that.

Q I don't understand that.

A No, I didn't hear anything new.

Q You talked with War Minister TOJO about what had taken place at the meeting after it was over, did you not?

A On the 14th, for the first time, I heard the story from TOJO.

Q What did he have to say about that meeting on the 12th and what was taking place in those days?

A TOJO said that he had no hope of the success of the Japanese-American negotiations but because of the attitude and opinion of the Prime Minister, he will wait until the Foreign Minister made a study of the possibility of carrying the suggested program out but as military men, preparation for war will be privately continued.

Q Where was it that he talked to you on that day, at your office?

A At my office.

Q How long was it he talked to you? Was it a long conversation or a short one?

A I don't believe it was very long.

Q In effect, he told you, although he had no hope of the success of the negotiations that he was agreeable to changing the October 10th deadline and permitting further negotiations to see if they could be successful but in the meantime, as a military leader, he was going to see to it that preparations for war continued?

A But he said because the Foreign Minister is making a study, he is withdrawing any direct preparation for war.

Q He was withholding commencing operations?

A Yes.

Q It is also true that War Minister TOJO insisted that in these negotiations, Japan would not concede to the withdrawing of any troops and also would insist upon the right to continue to fight the China War to a successful conclusion. Those were the rights he insisted upon?

A Yes.

Q Is that what he talked you about on that day?

A I believe the details were given to me only from TOMITA.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt. 02030605
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 26 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt, AUS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of _____, 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S. M. Betar

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~xxx~~) Henry B. Sackett, _____,
~~xxx~~ _____,

certify that on the 11th day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~xxx~~) KIDO, Koichi and according to Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.
Place

11 March 1946.
Date