

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST



THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition

Deponent ; -- KAGFSA, Sadaaki

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I, KAGFSA, Sadaaki, am an ex-Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Army and am now in the First Government Hospital of Tokyo owing to ill-health.
2. Immediately after Lieutenant-General ITAGAKI's appointment as the Minister of War, in June, 1938, I was transferred from the post of department chief of the General Staff Office to that of chief of the Department of Military Affairs in the Bureau of Military Affairs. Since then, I continued in this office till the end of March, 1939. During this period, as a person in authority, I had to do

- with the question of strengthening the Japan-Germany-Italy anti-communist front.
3. Not only the Government, but also the Army and the Navy had all been at all times very anxious to effect immediate settlement of the China Incident. Considering it as a sine qua non for the settlement of the incident to nullify the menace of the Soviet Union in the north by extricating Japan from her state of international isolation, the three ministries of war, Navy, and Foreign Affairs had eagerly studied the problem of strengthening the Tripartite anti-Comintern Pact before War Minister ITAGAKI's assumption of office.
 4. According to my recollection, War Minister ITAGAKI's opinion about foreign policy which he expressed to us when he took office war, on the whole, as below:
 - 1) To concentrate every possible endeavour on bringing about the peace with China without a moment's delay and to make this the foundation of our policy.
 - 2) To maintain a state of silence in regard to the Soviet Union, to keep strict guard against having any trouble with her, and at the same time, to watch closely her positive actions.
 - 3) To strengthen friendship with Germany and Italy, and make use of them for alleviating the threat of the

Soviet Union. At the same time, to let these powers take part in the co-operation for realizing the immediate settlement of the China Incident.

4. Attempts were to be made to let Britain, the United States, and other countries understand Japan's real intention, and thus let them restrain their acts of aiding the Kuomintang Government, thereby contributing to the settlement of the incident.
5. War Minister ITAGAKI's idea, about the Tripartite anti-communist Pact all originated from the above-mentioned principle and there was absolutely no other intention involved. Therefore, when the German Foreign Minister made a suggestion in August, 1938, the government replied, according to the decision of the Five Ministers' Conference, that the pact should amount to an extension of the anti-Comintern Pact. Furthermore, when Germany in November of the same year attempted to make the meaning of "the objective power" broader the government, in accordance with the decision of Five Ministers' conference replied as follows:
 - 1) We will regard the Soviet Union as the main objective power.
 - 2) If the situation demands it, Britain, France, and others may be made objective powers. However, whether any

military assistance should be given or not all depends upon the situation.

Thus, while making every effort not to hinder co-operation with Germany and Italy, we, on the other hand, had been exerting ourselves to avoid making Britain, France, and others objective powers. Especially, we had been firmly maintaining the attitude of avoiding military assistance to the utmost.

Moreover, it was quite apparent that, apart from the worst eventuality in which we would have to make Britain, France, etc. objectives, even if we had to make the Soviet our object, this pact was a pure defensive mutual-aid pact against any kind of invasion and did not contain even the slightest hint of positive aggression. After all, the only object of this pact was to make the pact itself serve in the settlement of the China Incident.

On this 22 day of Sep., 1947

At _____

DEPONENT /S/ KAGESA, Sadaaki (seal)

I, YAMADA, Hanzo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

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On the same date

At _____

Witness: /S/ YAMADA, Hanzo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ KAGUSA, Sadaaki (seal)

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣 告 供 述 者

供 述 者 影 佐 禎 昭

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣告ヲ爲シタル上次ノ如ク供述致シマス

一 私影佐禎昭ハ元陸軍中將デ目下病氣ノ爲東京國立第一病院ニ入院中デアリマス。

二 私ハ昭和十三年六月板垣中將ガ陸軍大臣ニ就任ノ直後參謀本部課長ヨリ轉ジテ陸軍省軍務局軍務課長ニ任ビラレ昭和十四年三月末日ニ及ビマシタ。此間日獨伊防共強化問題ニ就テハ事務當局トシテ之ニ關係シテ居リマシタ。三支那事變ヲ急遠ニ處理スルコトニ就テハ政府ト謂ハズ陸海軍ト謂ハズ終始非常ニ焦慮致シテ居リマシタ。日本ガ國際的孤立ノ狀態ヨリ脫シ北方「ソ」連ノ脅威ヲ緩和スルコトガ事變解決上ノ緊急事ト考ヘ陸、海、外三省ニ於テハ板垣陸相就任前カラ既ニ三國防共協定強化問題ヲ熱心ニ研究シマシタ。

四 板垣陸相就任ニ際シ私共ニ示サレタ其ノ對外政策上ノ意見ハ概ネ次ノ通りデアツタト記憶シテ居リマス。

- (1) 一刻モ速ニ對華和平ヲ招來スルコトニ一切ノ努力ヲ傾倒スルコトヲ根幹トスル
- (2) 「ソ」連ニ對シテハ沈靜狀態ヲ維持シ之ト事ヲ構フルヲ嚴戒スルト共ニ其ノ積極的行動ヲ嚴重監視スル
- (3) 日伊トハ友好關係ヲ強化シテ「ソ」連脅威ヲ緩和スルコトニ利用シ又事

變ノ急速處理實現ノ爲メ協力ヲ擔當セシメル

(4) 英、米等ニハ日本ノ眞意ヲ理解セシメ國民政府援助ノ行動ヲ抑制シテ事變解決ニ寄與セシメル。

三三國防共協定ニ關スル板垣陸相ノ考モ以上ノ原則カラ發足シテ居ルモノデアリマシテ其ノ外ニ寸毫ノ他意ヲ挾ンデ居ナカツタノデアリマス。

サレバコソ昭和十三年八月獨外相ノ提案ニ對シ五相會議ノ決定ニ基キ協定ハ防共協定ノ延長タルコトヲ趣旨トスベキコトヲ回答シ又同年十一月獨外側カラノ協定ノ對象國ヲ一般的タラシメントスル提案ニ對シテハ五相會議

ノ決定ニ基キ政府ハ

(1) 「ソ」連ヲ主タル對象トスル。

(2) 狀況ニ依リテハ英佛等ヲモ對象トスルコトガアルガ武力援助ヲ行フヤ否ヤハ「ソ」ニ、狀況ニ依ル。

コトヲ回答シ以テ一方獨伊トノ提攜ヲ逸スルコトガナイヤウニ努メツツ他方努メテ英佛等ヲ對象トスルコトヲ避ケ特ニ武力的援助ハ極力之ヲ忌避スルノ態度ヲ固持シタノデアリマス。

尙本協定ハ英佛等ヲ對象トスル萬一ノ場合ハ勿論ノコト「ソ」連ヲ對象トスル場合ニ於テモ其ノ侵略ニ對スル純然タル防衛的キモ相互援助協定ニ依リ毫毛稍局的侵略的ノ意味ヲ有シテ居ラマユドハ明瞭デアリマス。蓋シ

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本協定ハ之ヲ以テ支那事變解決ニ資セントスル事ヲ唯一ノ目的トシテ居
タカラデアリマス。

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）九月二十二日 於東京

供述者 影佐 禎 昭

有公堂立立人面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同日於同所

立會人 山田 半 蔵

フ 良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ黙秘セス又何事ヲモ附加セサルコトヲ

宣
言
書

署
名
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影
佐
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昭