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A u f z e i c h n u n g

über die Unterredung des Führers mit dem japanischen Botschafter Oshima in Anwesenheit des Reichsaußenministers und des Gesandten v. Sonnleithner auf dem Berghof am 27.5.44 von 16.35 bis 17.45 Uhr.

Einleitend erinnerte der Führer den Botschafter Oshima daran, daß er das letzte Mal vor einem Jahr und schon früher einmal vor der Einnahme von Singapur auf dem Berghof gewesen sei.

Der Führer führte dann aus, daß wir die Invasion erwarteten und darauf vorbereitet seien. Der Angriff in Italien sei nur erfolgt, um uns zu veranlassen, Reserven aus jenen Gebieten abzuziehen, die später Gegenstand der eigentlichen Invasion sein würden. Wir würden uns aber in Italien auf keinen Fall schwächen, da die Entscheidung dort fallen werde. In Italien befänden sich unsere Bootstützpunkte und dies sei der entscheidende Kriegsschauplatz. Es sei uns möglich gewesen, dort verhältnismäßig große Reserven anzusammeln, obwohl wir im Laufe des Winters 7 starke Panzerdivisionen nach dem Osten gezogen hätten. Leider seien unsere

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
NURMBERG, GERMANY

GB EXHIBIT 293

19 April 1946

Panzer für die Verhältnisse im Osten ungeeignet. Dies hinge zum Teil auch mit den Rohstoffverhältnissen zusammen, da die Russen bei ihrer Produktion mehr Nickel und Molybdän als wir verwenden könnten. Zweifellos seien wir aber den Russen in der Luft überlegen und unser Jägerprogramm würde am Ende dieses Jahres eine Monatsproduktion von 6000 Maschinen erreichen. Auch würden in 6 Monaten alle Produktionsstätten der Luftwaffe verbunkert und unter die Erde gelegt sein. Wir hätten ^{s.Zt.} 5 Panzer- und 10 Infanteriedivisionen zu einer größeren Operation im Osten zusammengezogen, infolge des Regens aber sei dieser Stoß vollkommen verpufft, da unsere Panzer einfach in Schlamm stecken geblieben seien, während der russische T 34 auch im Schlamm fahre. Im Gegensatz zu den russischen Panzern sei aber die russische Infanterie "miserabel schlecht", wenn man von einigen jugendlichen Brigaden und NKWD-Verbänden absehe. Allerdings läge es dem Russen, sich zäh zu verteidigen und beim Angriff große Massen von Panzern einzusetzen. Jetzt hätten wir endlich den "Panter" (Panzer 5) fertig, den wir zwar schon eingesetzt hätten, bevor er endgültig ausprobiert wor-

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den sei, der aber laufend verbessert worden sei, so daß er jetzt wirklich einen erstklassigen Panzer darstelle. Um Panzer richtig einsetzen zu können, brauche man auch ausgebildete Fahrer.

In Westen stünden zur Zeit etwa 1 Dutzend Panzerdivisionen mit besten Panzern hinter der Front bereit, darüber hinaus noch eine Eingreifreserve; insgesamt hatten wir im Westen ca. 60 Divisionen. Dem Feind sei es mit seiner Luftwaffe nur gelungen, Feldstellungen zu zerstören, den wirklichen Befestigungen hätte er nichts anhaben können.

Eine Frage Bshinas, ob die Engländer zur Invasion fertig seien, bejahte der Führer. Die Engländer hätten auf ihrer Insel ca. 80 Divisionen, von denen allerdings nur ein Teil Kriegserfahrung habe. Für den Invasionsfall hielten wir auch Luftwaffenreserven bereit, die wir trotz des harten Kampfes in Italien dort nicht einsetzten. Unsere Vorbereitungen zur Beschließung Londons und der südenglischer Städte liefen weiter. Trotz der schweren täglichen Luftangriffe seien unsere Menschenverluste an der ganzen Front von über 2000 km im Westen außerordentlich gering; wir hätten höchstens 10 - 15 Tote bei

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einen Angriff zu beklagen. Unlangst sei aber, und zwar nur durch den verbrecherischen Leichtsinns eines Transportführers, ein größerer Unfall passiert, wobei wir 140 Leute verloren hätten. Auch irgendwelche Geschützstellungen wären im Westen nicht empfindlich getroffen worden, da wir uns angewöhnt hätten, für jedes Geschütz 3 - 4 Stände zu bauen.

Einmal würden die Engländer im Westen angreifen müssen, denn wenn die Invasion nicht käme, würden wir zu orgeln beginnen, und dann bliebe wohl den Engländern nichts anderes übrig als anzugreifen.

Im Osten sei es uns gelungen, nunmehr, nachdem in Ungarn Ordnung geschaffen worden sei, die Rumänen und Ungarn zum Einsatz zu zwingen. Beide Völker hätten je 16 - 17 Divisionen an der Front. Wir hätten diese Divisionen mit panzerbrechenden Waffen und viel Artillerie ausgestattet und deutsche Verbände dazwischengeschoben, so daß diese Einheiten einen gewissen Kampferfolg hätten. Jetzt verstünden die Ungarn und Rumänen, was ihnen der Führer immer gesagt habe: daß es besser gewesen wäre, wenn sie ihre Truppen eingesetzt hätten, solange die Frontlinie am Don verlaufen sei.

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Auf die Frage Oshimas, ob wir eines Tages in Rußland wieder offensiv würden, erwiderte der Führer, daß, wenn die Verbündeten unsere Flanken geschützt hätten, Stalingrad zu einem anderen Ergebnis geführt hätte und wir heute in Mesopotamien stünden.

Oshima warf hier ein, daß dann die Verbindung zu Japan hergestellt worden wäre.

Der Führer erklärte fortgehend, daß es das unverrückbare Ziel des Polen- und auch des Westfeldzuges gewesen sei, die feindlichen Truppen zu vernichten. Dieses Ziel hätten wir auch in Rußland verfolgt, aber infolge des unglaublich harten Winters 1942 nicht erreichen können, da damals innerhalb von 5 Tagen Tausende von Zugmaschinen und 80.000 Kraftfahrzeuge im Schlamm eingefroren und damit für uns verloren gewesen seien.

Oshima meinte, daß man etwa hinter den Pripjet-sümpfen oder sonstwo eine Panzerarmee versammeln und zu einem vernichtenden Schlag ausholen müsse.

Der Führer erwiderte, daß hierzu die Invasion die Voraussetzung sei, da ein Teil der Westverbände im Osten eingesetzt werden müßte. Wir bemühten uns

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aber jetzt schon, durch Steigerung der Sturmgeschützproduktion, die jetzt bereits 1800 Sturmgeschütze pro Monat betrage, unsere Infanteriedivisionen wieder panzerfest zu machen. Jede Division solle am Ende dieses Jahres 36 Sturmgeschütze haben. Außerdem sollten 54 Sturmgeschütz-Brigaden aufgestellt werden. Heute müßten die Panzerdivisionen zur Panzerabwehr der Infanterie beigegeben werden; dadurch würden unsere Panzer ihrer eigentlichen Aufgabe als Angriffswaffe entzogen. Wir hätten jetzt 47 Panzerdivisionen und außerdem 8 Panzerdivisionen der Waffen-~~SS~~, zu denen noch 4 in Aufstellung begriffene ^{Panzer-}Divisionen kämen. Wenn diese durch Neubewaffnung der Infanteriedivisionen wieder ihrer eigentlichen Aufgabe zugeführt werden könnten, stünden nunmehr 45 Divisionen bereit, um im Osten einen Schlag auszuführen.

Auf die Frage Oshinas nach den russischen operativen Reserven meinte der Führer, daß die Russen 6 - 7 Divisionen aus der Front herausgezogen hätten, sie hätten aber noch etwa 200 Divisionen außerhalb der Front in Reserve. Nach einer Invasion könnten wir 30 - 35 Divisionen aus dem Westen nach

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dem Osten ziehen, und dann hätten wir mit den in Rußland vorhandenen Reserven insgesamt ca. 80 Divisionen für Operationen bereit. Durch den Verrat Italiens seien in Rußland 45 Divisionen ausgefallen, und auf dem Balkan und in Italien hätten wir weitere 45 deutsche Divisionen einsetzen müssen so daß uns der Ausfall Italiens zusammen 90 Divisionen gekostet hätte.

Als China sich nach unseren Absichten in Italien erkundigte, meinte der Führer, daß wir Rom unter allen Umständen halten würden. An Hand einer Karte zeigte der Führer, daß wir uns auf eine Linie südlich Rom, die am Fuße des Gran Sasso verlaufende sogenannte "C-Stellung", zurückziehen würden. Diese Stellung sei zum Teil schon gut ausgebaut. Im großen gesehen sei es völlig gleichgültig, ob wir etwas weiter südlich in Italien ständen oder nicht.

Die Invasionserwarte der Führer in der Bretagne und Normandie, während die anderen Stöße am Kanal, vielleicht auch Dänemark und Südnorwegen nur als Ablenkungsmanöver zu werten seien. An den Hauptbrennpunkten ständen auch 4 Fallschirmregimenter bereit, um Fallschirmaktionen der Engländer sofort

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entgagentreten zu können. Ferner sei es möglich, daß mit Panzerwagen ein Unternehmen in der Gegend von Bordeaux versucht werde, und schließlich seien mögliche Landestellen der Feinde noch Marseille von Algier aus oder weiter südlich im Raume von Genua. Sollten die Feinde versuchen, ins Skagerak einzuläufen, würden wir dieses hinter ihnen mit Druckminen sperren. Diese Minen hätten allerdings den Nachteil, daß wir sie selbst nicht mehr räumen könnten.

Es zeige sich, daß die Engländer nur ungern große Blutopfer brächten, da sie nicht wüßten, was nach einem Kampf mit Deutschland kommen werde.

Auf Rußland übergehend, bemerkte der Führer, daß er dort das Luftkorps "Meister" aufgebaut habe. Aufgabe dieser Einheit sei es, alle Bahnhöfe hinter der russischen Front anzugreifen und völlig auszulöschen. Den Hauptstoß erwarte der Führer in der Richtung gegen Warschau und gegen die Bonaumündung. Den Russen stünden insgesamt 700 Divisionen zur Verfügung, doch hätten manche dieser Divisionen nur 2500 Mann oder seien reine Panzerdivisionen mit je 50 Panzern; einige schließlich beständen

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nur aus Artillerie.

Entscheidend sei es, daß wir unsere Panzerwaffe wieder in Ordnung brächten, die für den Osten bisher nicht genügt habe. Unser "Panzer" sei jetzt verbessert worden: er hätte einen besseren Motor erhalten, würde aber jetzt laufend mit einem noch stärkeren Dieselmotor ausgestattet.

Der Führer bemerkte, daß unser Volkswagen hervorragend laufe, und riet Shima, sich auch den neuen Motor einbauen zu lassen. Der Reichsaußenminister warf hier ein, daß er für den Neueinbau des Motors sorgen wolle.

Botschafter Shima führte hierauf aus, er habe zwar keine offiziellen Nachrichten, aber er glaube, daß für die Japaner der südliche Kriegsschauplatz im Pazifik der wichtigste sei. Dort gebe es Schwierigkeiten, da die Amerikaner ziemlich stark angriffen und leider durch Besetzung der Insel Nadke die Verbindung nach Neu-Guinea unterbrochen hätten. Er halte es deshalb für möglich, daß man sich auf eine mehr im Innern gelegene Linie zurückziehen werde, bis im Sommer durch Auffüllung der japanischen Schiffstonnage und durch weitere Luftauf-

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rüstung der entscheidende Kampf gegen die Amerikaner aufgenommen werden könne. Es sei ihm offiziell und nicht etwa zu Propagandazwecken von zu Hause mitgeteilt worden, daß man den Entscheidungskampf mit den Amerikanern suchen werde. Er müsse zugeben, daß man die amerikanische Industriekraft unterschätzt habe und daß man nach Pearl Harbour vergessen habe, den Helm fester zu binden. Nun aber habe man diesen Fehler erkannt und werfe sich mit ganzer Kraft auf den Schiffsbau und den Ausbau der Luftwaffe. Es sei möglich, daß die Amerikaner von Australien aus angreifen würden; es werde aber auf diesem Wege lange dauern, bis sie zu einem Erfolg kommen. Andersseits würden sie dort die japanische Rohstoffbasis gefährden. Vielleicht würden sie versuchen, direkt die Hauptinseln anzugreifen. Auch von den Aleuten aus seien die Amerikaner aktiv, aber dem messe man keine große Bedeutung bei. Die Japaner seien sich darüber im klaren, daß die amerikanische Marine einen großen Schlag bekommen müsse.

In China habe Japan einen großen militärischen Erfolg erzielt. Zwar wisse Tschiua nicht, was eigentlich beabsichtigt sei. Gewiß sei Tschungking dadurch

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in eine schwierige Lage gekommen; vielleicht habe man auch den Amerikanern dadurch Flugplätze weggenommen, aber ein politischer Kompromiß mit Chiang-kei-shek sei sehr schwer zu erzielen, da er auf den amerikanischen Sieg baue.

Eine große Schwäche sei der Holzbau der japanischen Städte, die also Bombenangriffen gegenüber außerordentlich empfindlich seien.

Der Führer riet Oshima, die Japaner sollten jeden amerikanischen Terrorflieger aufhängen, nicht erschießen, dann würden sich die Amerikaner solche Angriffe überlegen.

Oshima erklärte weiter, daß ein Drittel der japanischen Truppe in China, ein Drittel in Mandschukuo und das letzte Drittel in Indien eingesetzt sei. In Burma hätte man beinahe Laphal genommen, leider sei aber der letzte Erfolg den Japanern versagt geblieben. Das Entscheidende sei aber der Kriegsschauplatz gegen die Amerikaner, und Oshima sei fest davon überzeugt, daß einmal ein großer Zusammenstoß der beiden Flotten kommen würde. Amerika müsse aus eigener Kraft besiegt werden.

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Über das Ubootgeschenk hätte sich die Japanische Regierung sehr gefreut. Auch japanischerseits arbeite man an Verbesserungen der Uboote durch Erhöhung der Unterwassergeschwindigkeit und Erweiterung des Aktionsradius. Ein japanisches Uboot habe die diesbezüglichen japanischen Pläne mitgebracht. Japanische Uboote könnten 20 Knoten unter Wasser erreichen. Die Japaner hätten vor uns kein Geheimnis.

Der Führer bestätigte, daß wir vor den Japanern im Gegensatz zu dem Verhältnis zu anderen Bundesgenossen ebenfalls kein Geheimnis hätten, da das deutsch-japanische Bündnis eines auf längste Zeit sei und wir gemeinsame Feinde hätten.

Oshisa bemerkte, man sei, vom Zwei-Mann-Uboot ausgehend, nunmehr zu einem 1200 to Uboot gekommen, das nur 31 Mann Besatzung habe.

Oshima erinnerte fortfahrend, daß der Führer sich nach einer in Rabaul verwendeten Leuchtgranate erkundigt habe. Der Plan dieser Granate sei mit einem Uboot an uns abgegangen. Dieses sei aber durch Verrat eines Italieners, der die Route des Ubootes gekannt habe, von den Engländern bei Penang versenkt worden.

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den. Jetzt seien die neuen Pläne eingetroffen und bereits der Luftwaffe übergeben worden. Es handele sich um eine 12,7 Flakgranate, die auch bei einem Kaliber von 36 cm versendet werden könne und große moralische Wirkung habe, was die Japaner bei Guadalcanar ausprobiert hätten. Ferner hätten die Japaner gute Erfahrungen mit einer Stabilisierungseinrichtung von Lufttorpedos gemacht. Auch diese Erfindung sei von dem Uboot mitgebracht und bereits unserer Flotte übergeben worden. Ashima halte diese Erfindung für sehr wichtig im Falle der Invasion.

Zusammenfassend meinte Ashima, es handele sich um eine Auseinandersetzung auf Leben und Tod, und die Japaner wüßten, daß sie die Amerikaner aus eigener Kraft schlagen müßten.

Der Führer schloß die Unterhaltung mit dem Hinweis darauf, daß wir den Frieden gewinnen müßten, wovon er überzeugt sei, da unsere Völker sonst vernichtet würden.

Berghof, den 27. Mai 1944

gez. v. Sonnleithner.

Verteiler:

- RAM.
- St.S.
- Büro RAM.
- Botsch. Ritter

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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 4014

24 May 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Copy, Note of conversation HITLER and OSHIMA; exchange of military information

Date: 27 May 44 Original () Copy (x) Language: German

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

IMT (Nurnberg)

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: IMT, OCC, Nurnberg

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OSHIMA

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Aggression; conspiracy.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

1. HITLER and OSHIMA discuss war situation; HITLER expects continental invasion soon, claims Germany can build 6,000 fighter planes by end of year (p. 21).
2. HITLER boasts that "after restoring order in Hungary he managed to force Hungarian and Roumanian participation in the war in the East. (p 4)
3. HITLER's aim, both in the East and the West, has always been the destruction of enemy armies (p. 5).
4. HITLER created the air corps "Meister," whose task is to erase all railroad stations behind the Russian front (p. 8).
5. OSHIMA speculates on possible American moves in the Pacific, admits that American industrial power has been underestimated (p. 10).
6. HITLER advises OSHIMA that the Japanese should hang every American "terror-pilot" they catch (p. 11).
7. HITLER and OSHIMA exchange military secrets, regard: new weapons, latest type U-boats etc. They boast to one another that there are no secrets between Germany and Japan. OSHIMA also thanks HITLER for a U-boat present to Japan (pp. 11-13).

/A.N.: Nurnberg Doc. #3780-PS;IMT (GB Exhibit #293)/

Analyst: C.W.J.Phelps

Doc. No. 4014

M e m o r a n d u m

concerning the conference of the Fuehrer with Japanese Ambassador O s h i m a in the presence of the Reichs Foreign Minister and Ambassador v.Sonnleithner at the Berghof on 27 May 1944 from 16;35 to 17;45 o'clock.

In the beginning the Fuehrer reminded Ambassador Oshima that it was a year ago when he was on the Berghof the last time and also earlier before the capture of Singapore.

The Fuehrer then stated that we were expecting the invasion and that we were prepared for it. The attack in Italy was made only for the purpose of inducing us to withdraw reserves from those territories which later on would be the object of the actual invasion. We would, however, under no circumstances weaken ourselves in the west, because the final outcome will be decided there. In the West were our U-Boat bases and this will be the decisive theater of operation. We have been able to assemble comparatively large reserves there in spite of having redeployed 7 strong armored divisions to the East, during the winter. Unfortunately our tanks were not suitable for the conditions in the East. This — resulted partly from the raw materials, as the Russians in their production could use more nickel and molybdenum than we could use. But we were indubitably superior to the Russians in the air and our pursuit plane program will attain a monthly output of 6000 planes at the end of this year. In 6 months all airplane production plants will also be made air raid proof and installed under ground. We had assembled 5 armored and 10 infantry divisions for a large operation in the East, however, because of the rain, this operation has failed entirely as our tanks simply got stuck in the mud, whereas the Russian T 34 runs in the mud too. In contrast to the Russian tanks the

Russian infantry is "miserably bad" if one disregards a few youthful brigades and NKWD units. It is true that the Russians defend themselves tenaciously and employ large masses of tanks in the attack. We finally had the "Panter" (Tank 5) ready which was already being deployed before being completely tested, but which was continuously being improved so that it now represents a real first class tank. In order to employ tanks one has to have trained drivers.

In the West, at the present time about one dozen Panzerdivisions with best panzers are deployed behind the front, in addition to them, a combat-reserve (Eingreifreserve); altogether we had about 60 divisions in the West. The enemy with his air-force succeeded only in destroying field-positions; he could not do any harm to the real fortifications.

To a question of Oshima, whether the British are ready for the invasion, the Fuehrer answered in the affirmative. The British have on their their Island about 80 divisions; but only a part of them has combat experience. In the event of an invasion we are holding air-force reserves available, which we did not use in Italy, in spite of the hard fighting there. Our preparations for the bombardment of London and of the Southern English cities are being continued. In spite of the heavy daily air attacks, our losses of men on the entire front of more than 2000^{km.} in the West were exceedingly small; the most we ever suffered in one attack were 10 - 15 men killed.

Recently though, only through the criminal negligence of a transport leader a rather large accident had happened, whereby we lost 140 men. None of the gun-emplacements had been materially hit, since we were in the habit, to build 3 to 4 positions for each gun.

One day the English would have to attack in the West, for if the invasion did not come, we would start to let them have it (orgeln), and that would leave the English no alternative but to attack.

After creating order in Hungary we have now been able to force the Hungarians and Rumanians into action. Each have 16 to 17 divisions at the front. We had equipped these divisions with anti-tank weapons and interspersed German formations so that these units now possess some battle value. Now the Hungarians and Rumanians understand, what the Fuehrer had always told them: that it would have been better, had they deployed their troops while the frontline still ran along the Don.

To Oshimas question, whether one day we would resume the offensive in Russia the Fuehrer replied that, had our allies protected our flanks, the result at Stalingrad would have been different, and we would today stand in Mesopotamia.

Oshima interjected, that the connection with Japan would then have been established.

Continuing the Fuehrer declared that it had been the unalterable objective of the Polish and also of the West campaigns to annihilate the armies of the enemy. We had this same objective in Russia, but due to the incredibly hard winter 1942, we could not reach it, because at that time, within 5 days thousands of tractors and 80 000 motor vehicles were frozen fast in the mud and were thus lost for us.

Oshima's opinion was, that an armored army should be assembled perhaps behind the Pripjet marshes or elsewhere, and deliver an annihilating blow.

The Fuehrer replied, that the invasion would be the predisposing factor for this, since a part of the Western units would have to be used in the East. We endeavored now, to protect our infantry divisions against tanks, by increasing the production of assault guns, which at the present time amounted to 1800 assault guns per month. At the end of this year each division should have 36 assault guns. Besides, 54 assault gun brigades should be activated. Today, the armored divisions have to be given to the infantry for anti-tank defense; thereby our tanks were distracted from their proper tasks as an assault weapon. We have now 47 armored divisions and besides 8 armored divisions of Waffen-SS, to which could be added 4 armored divisions which ⁱⁿ are/the process of being activated. If these could be returned to their proper mission by the reequipping of the infantry divisions, there would now be 45 divisions to carry out a coup in the East.

Upon Oshima's inquiry as to the Russian tactical reserve, the Fuehrer said that the Russians had withdrawn from the front 6-7 divisions, but that they still have in reserve behind the front about 200 divisions. After an invasion, we could transfer 30-35 divisions from the West to the East, and we would then have with our reserves in Russia a total of 80 divisions ready for action.

Because of Italy's treason, there are 45 divisions less in Russia, and 45 more German divisions had to be sent to Italy and the Balkans so that the withdrawal of Italy cost us altogether 90 divisions.

When Oshima inquired about our intentions in Italy, the Fuehrer meant, we would hold Rome under all circumstances. On a map the Fuehrer pointed out, how we would withdraw to a line South of Rome, which ran along the base of the Gran Sasso, the so-called "C-position". This position was in part already well fortified. On the whole it was absolutely immaterial, whether we stood a bit farther South in Italy or not.

The Fuehrer expected the invasion to take place in the Bretagne and Normandy, while other advances along the channel and perhaps also in Denmark and Southern Norway were expected to be distractive maneuvers only. On the most critical points, 4 parachute regiments were held in readiness to oppose any parachute landings from the English side. An other possibility was that something might be attempted with tanks near Bordeaux, and lastly, as possible landing places for the enemy, coming from Algeria, one had to consider Marseilles or farther South, around Genoa. Should the enemy attempt to enter the Skagerak, we would close it behind them with pressure-mines.

These mines however have one disadvantage, that we could not remove them again.

It was apparent, that the English were loathe to make large bloody sacrifices, since they did not know what to expect after a battle with Germany.

With regard to Russia, the Fuehrer remarked, that there he had built up the air-corps "Meister". It was the duty of this unit, to attack and completely destroy every railway-station behind the Russian front. The main attack, the Fuehrer

expected in the direction of Warsaw and towards the mouth of the Danube. The Russians had a total of 700 divisions at their disposal, but some of these divisions had only 2500 men or were strictly armored divisions with 50 tanks; some consisted of artillery only.

It is important, that we improve our tanks again, which up to now have not been satisfactory in the East. Our "Panter" has been improved now: it has a better motor, but from now on an even stronger Diesel-motor is continuously being installed.

The Fuehrer remarked, that our people's car (Volkswagen) is running excellently, and advised Oshima, to have the new motor installed. The Foreign Minister added here, that he would take care of the installation of the new motor.

Ambassador Oshima then stated, although he had no official news, he believed that the Southern theater of operations in the Pacific is the most important for the Japanese. They had difficulties there, because the Americans attacked rather vigorously and, unfortunately through occupying the Island of NADKE had cut communications to New Guinea. He therefore thought it possible, that withdrawal to a line more in the interior would take place, until, through increase of the Japanese tonnage and through further air armament, the decisive fight against the Americans can be taken up in the summer.

The weaker construction of Japanese cities constitutes a great weakness because they are extremely vulnerable to bombing attacks.

The Fuehrer advised Oshima to hang out a flag of truce to American terror pilot, then the Americans would talk about such attacks.

Oshima declared further that a third of the Japanese forces is deployed in China, a - 8 - in Manchukuo and the rest is in the South. India in Burma had almost been lost. This success had unfortunately been denied to the Japanese.

He had been informed officially and not for propaganda purposes by his home country that a try would be made for the decisive battle with the Americans. He had to admit that American industrial power had been underestimated and that it had been forgotten to fasten the helmet tighter after Pearl Harbor. But now this mistake had been recognized and all available power is being concentrated on the construction of ships and the extension of the air force. It is possible that the Americans will be attacking from Australia but by this way it would take them a long time to become successful. On the other hand, they would endanger the Japanese raw material basis from there. Perhaps they would try to attack the main islands directly. The Americans are also active from the Aleutians, but no great importance is attached to that. The Japanese know very well that the American Navy will have to be dealt a big blow.

Japan has achieved a great military success in China. It is not known to Oshima what is actually intended. Most certainly Chungking has been placed in a difficult situation thereby. Perhaps airfields had been taken away from the Americans, but a political compromise with Chiang-Kai-Shek was very difficult to achieve because he is counting on an American victory.

The wooden construction of Japanese cities constitutes a great weakness because they are extremely vulnerable in regard to bombing attacks.

The Fuehrer advised Oshima to hang, not to shoot every American terror pilot, then the Americans would think twice about such attacks.

Oshima declared further that a third of the Japanese Army is deployed in China, a third in Mandchukuo and the remaining third in the South. Imphal in Burma had almost been taken but final success had unfortunately been denied to the Japanese.

The Japanese Government has been very pleased to receive the

But the decisive thing is the theater of war against the
Americans, and Oshima is firmly convinced that at one time
it will come to a big clash between the two fleets. America
must be defeated out of one's own power.

speed of 20 knots under the surface. The Japanese had no intention
of trying to do this.

The speaker confirmed that he had no doubts either as
far as the Japanese were concerned in connection with relations
to other allies of war, because the German-Japanese treaty
was made meant for a very long period of time and because of
our having common enemies.

Oshima mentioned that, starting from the I-26 submarine
they now had arrived at a 1200-ton submarine, that had a crew
of but 35 men.

Oshima further brought to mind, that the Fuzeiro had ac-
quired about a star shell used in Rabaul, the plan of this
had been dispatched on a submarine sent to us. The submarine
had been sunk however by the English near Penang being
an Italian, who knew the ship's route. How the new plan
arrived and had already been given to the airforce.
The plane described a 22.7 A.A. G. grenade which can also be used
for a calibre of 36 mm and which is supposed to have a 2000
moral effect and was tried out by the Japanese at Guadalcanal.
Furthermore the Japanese had developed a means of attacking
air torpedoes, which had rather satisfactory results. This
also had been brought by the submarine and had been given
to the Warrent. Oshima thought this new idea to be of great

In summary Oshima said that they were engaged in a
struggle for life or death and that the Japanese knew that

The Japanese Government had been very pleased to accept the submarine gift. Japan too was working on improvements of submarines by increasing the undersurface speed and the radius of action. A Japanese submarine had brought the Japanese plans on these subjects with it. Japanese submarines could travel at a speed of 20 knots under the surface. The Japanese had no secrets as far as we were concerned.

The Fuehrer confirmed, that we had no secrets either as far as the Japanese were concerned in contrast to our relations to other allies of ours, because the German-Japanese treaty was once meant for a very long period of time and because of our having common enemies.

Oshima mentioned that, starting from the 2 Men-submarine they now had arrived at a 1200 t submarine, that had a crew of but 31 men.

Oshima further brought to mind, that the Fuehrer had inquired about a star shell used in Rabaul, the plan of this grenade had been dispatched on a submarine sent to us. The submarine had been sunk however by the English near Penang owing to treason of an Italian, who knew the ship's route. Now the new plans had arrived and had already been given to the airforce (Luftwaffe). The plans describe a 12,7 A.A.C. grenade which can also be used for a calibre of 36 cm and which is supposed to have a great moral effect and was tried out by the Japanese at Guadalcanar. Furthermore the Japanese had developed a means of stabilizing air torpedos, which had rather satisfactory results. That invention also had been brought by the submarine and had been given to the Wehrmacht. Oshima thought this new item to be of extreme importance in case of invasion.

In summing up Oshima said that they were engaged in a struggle for life or death and that the Japanese knew that they

would have to rely on their own strength to beat the Americans.

The Fuehrer closed the meeting in saying that we would have to win the war and that he was convinced we would, because otherwise our peoples would be destroyed.

Berghof 27th May 1944

signed v. Sonnleithner

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 3780-PS
cont'd

I, Dr. H.v.V. VEITH, AGO No. D 150649, hereby
certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English
and German languages; and that the above is a true
and correct translation of Document Nr. 3780-PS

19 April 1946



Dr. H.v.V. VEITH
AGO No. D 150649

(Stamp): Secret Reich Matter.

R e c o r d

of the Fuehrer's conference with the Japanese Ambassador OSHIMA in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister (RAI) and Minister (Gesandter) von Sonnleithner at the Berghof the 27 May 1944 from 16.35 to 17.45 hrs.

Exerpt from page 11, Line 9 to 12 inclusive.

The Fuehrer advised OSHIMA that the Japanese should hang - not shoot - every American terror pilot (Terrorflieger); then the Americans would think it over before making such attacks.

Berghof, 27 May 1944

Distribution:

Signed: von Sonnleithner.

Reich Foreign Minister (RAI)
State Secretary (S.St.)
Office of Reich Foreign Minister (Buero RAI)
Ambassador RITTER
(Translator's note: further distribution illegible).

CERTIFICATION OF TRANSLATION
DOCUMENT NO. 3780 - PS

I, SAMUELO, U.S. Civ. B-210 776 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated exerpts of Docu ent No. 3780-PS.

SAMUELO
U.S. Civ.
B-210 776.

III. (Photostatic copy in Doc. Rm.)
AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:


1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of true and accurate photostatic copies of a certain original captured enemy document. That said photostatic copies have been numbered **3780-PS** by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from **German Foreign Office Files and Archives.**


3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure was retained by the United States Army Document Center at **Marburg, Germany,** and such above mentioned photostatic copies were delivered to, filed, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany, in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, being held and retained by the United States Army Document Center Sub-Section in charge of captured German foreign office papers and now located in Berlin, Germany, for inspection by various authorized agencies, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.


Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this **16th** day of **April** 1946.


John W. Auchincloss
O-2052152
Capt., JAGD

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

- against -

HERMAN WILHELM GOERING et al

Defendants.

CERTIFICATE.

The undersigned, BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM L. MITCHELL, hereby certifies:

That he is the duly appointed qualified and acting General Secretary of the International Military Tribunal, and that as such he has possession, custody and control of all of the records of said Tribunal and all documents admitted in evidence during the trial of the above entitled cause.

That the document to which this certificate is attached is a true and correct copy of the photostatic document which was heretofore admitted in evidence in the course of the trial of the above entitled cause and identified as Exhibit **GB 293**.

That said photostatic document so admitted in evidence as aforesaid has been impounded by said International Military Tribunal through the undersigned as its General Secretary, and as a result is being held and retained by the undersigned.

That the undersigned has issued the herein certificate and caused the same to be attached to said copy of said photostatic document in order to verify the existence and contents of said Exhibit, and to further establish the fact that the original of said Exhibit is unavailable because of its having been impounded as aforesaid.

D O N E at Nurnberg, Germany this **16th** day of **April** 1946.

William L. Mitchell

WILLIAM L. MITCHELL
General Secretary
International Military Tribunal

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General *OHHS*